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# NONTRADITIONAL IMMIGRANTS IN KYIV



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## INTRODUCTION

In August 2004, Serhiy Brytchenko, the head of the Presidential Administration's Migration Directorate, called attention to increasing immigration into Ukraine in an article appearing in *Uryadovyy Kuryer*, the newspaper of the Ukrainian Cabinet Ministers.<sup>1</sup> Brytchenko reported that the number of people granted Ukrainian citizenship rose by 40 per cent during the first six months of 2004 in comparison to the similar period in 2003, and by 180 per cent in comparison to the first half of 2002. The Ministry of the Interior similarly observed an increase in applications for permanent residence, the initial step towards Ukrainian citizenship. He continued on to note that the number of people adopting Ukrainian citizenship substantially surpassed the number relinquishing Ukrainian citizenship. Ukraine was, in short, becoming a country that was increasingly attractive to foreigners and persons without citizenship.

Ukraine's relatively liberal immigration and citizenship laws account for part of this attraction to be sure. There is more to this interesting story, however. With some notable exceptions, Ukraine provides arriving migrants from abroad with opportunities for peaceful and productive lives.

This finding—surprising, perhaps, to many readers—becomes evident from an examination of how individual migrants live in the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv, as evidenced by the results of a 2001 survey of “nontraditional” migrants conducted by the Kennan Kyiv Project. This report reviews the results of that survey.

As the young Ukrainian state emerged from the ruins of the Soviet Union during the early 1990s, it struggled with several tasks: among them, to establish its place in the shifting landscape of Europe, to create infrastructures necessary for administration of an independent country, and to determine questions of borders, citizenship, and identity. At the same time, the fall of the “Iron Curtain” beckoned to migrants pushed by war, strife, and economic uncertainty in their home countries and pulled by the promise of better lives elsewhere. Ukraine, now with increasingly open borders and no institutions with experience in state regulation of migration, became an arena for the mass relocation of people. Over a period of ten years, nearly two million people arrived in the country

seeking permanent residency. Most of these were ethnic Ukrainians and their descendants who were living outside of Ukraine when the Soviet Union collapsed. Approximately the same number of people left Ukraine for post-Soviet countries, mostly Russia, and another 600,000 immigrated to other countries in Europe and North America.<sup>2</sup>

In addition, over the first decade of its existence as an independent state, the number of foreign immigrants to Ukraine from distant Asian and African countries has increased. This group of immigrants is considered “nontraditional,” since they do not represent ethnic groups that historically have lived in Ukraine or the former Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup> These immigrants arrive continuously; some intend to reside permanently in Ukraine, while others see the country as a stop-over on their way to Eastern or Western Europe. They have various legal statuses, from official refugees to illegal aliens.

Some nontraditional immigrants first came to Ukraine well before 1991. During the Soviet era, international agreements allowed foreign students and workers to reside in Ukraine. After the break-up of the USSR some of them could not or did not want to return to their home countries. Instead, they looked for ways to adjust their legal status and social situation. However, by far the majority of long-term residents are nontraditional migrants who arrived after 1991, searching for a home away from the political and economic instability in their native countries. Many of them arrived in Ukraine illegally, often after attempting to make their way to Western Europe or North America.

The majority of nontraditional immigrants in Ukraine—those who were not in residence as students or workers in Soviet Ukraine—would not have been able to reside in the country prior its independence. With independence came changes in Ukraine’s legal system, economy, and society that encouraged, or at least allowed for, increased migration. These included the liberalization of border crossing regulations, opening Ukraine to the rest of the world, implementation of market reforms, and the creation of an application review process for those seeking asylum and refugee status. For example, market reforms allowed foreign investors, some of whom were formerly foreign students and workers, to start small joint firms or companies and to invite their compatriots as cofounders or employees. Many nontraditional immigrants first came to Ukraine through such business contacts.



Because many of the nontraditional immigrants have vague legal status, reliable statistics for their total numbers and their countries of origin are difficult to obtain. Official data from various registration agencies can give only estimates of their number. Regardless of exact numbers, it is obvious that immigrants from Asian and African countries have become a significant component of the population of Kyiv. This study—supported by the George F. Kennan Fund of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’ Kennan Institute, and conducted by the Kennan Kyiv Project with the assistance of the U.S.–Ukraine Foundation and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Ukraine—seeks to answer to what extent nontraditional immigrants have affected Kyiv, how they have integrated into city life, and how they relate to the local residents.

This is not the first study addressing questions of immigration in Ukraine. Ukrainian scholars in the fields of sociology, demographics, and political science began studying the problems connected with immigration to Ukraine, and Kyiv in particular, as soon as they became apparent.

In view of the fact that the first priority after independence was to develop a legal framework for regulating migration and training specialists, legal specialists have devoted considerable attention to issues of immigration and the legal status of foreigners. The first work to appear on this subject was a textbook by O. Piskun entitled *Osnovy mihratsiino-ho prava: porivnialnyi analiz*,<sup>4</sup> which was highly acclaimed for its analysis and extensive documentation. The encyclopedia *Mihratsiini protsesy v suchasnomu sviti*, edited by Yu. Rymarenko,<sup>5</sup> later served as the basis for a textbook developed by the National Academy of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, entitled *Osnovy mihratsiieznavstva*.<sup>6</sup> Taken together with the two-volume publication *Nelehalna mihratsiia ta torhivlia zhinkamy*,<sup>7</sup> these works contain the most important international legal documents and legislative acts of Ukraine.

Questions of the regulation of migration processes are covered in *Iurydychni aspekty mihratsiinykh protsesiv v Ukraini*,<sup>8</sup> a monograph by S. Chekhovych analyzing the institution of citizenship, the legal status of foreigners, and the institution of asylum and refugee status. Chekhovych also provides specific recommendations for improving legislation. Legal questions related to the regulation of migration problems are covered in numerous articles in scholarly journals by both the above-named authors

and others, foremost among them S. Brytchenko, V. Andriienko, V. Subotenko, V. Shepel. Articles devoted to these topics have been published in the journals *Pravo Ukrainy* [Law of Ukraine], *Rozbudova natsii* [Nation Building], and *Problemy mihratsii* [Problems of Migration].<sup>9</sup>

Sociologists have focused significant attention on migration issues. The first sociological research on refugees—a group of immigrants that is new to Ukraine—was conducted in 1997 by scholars from the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the National Institute of Ukrainian-Russian Relations (S. Pyrozhekov, A. Ruchka, L. Aza, O. Malynovska).<sup>10</sup> Their work focuses on the socio-economic situation of individuals who have acquired refugee status in Ukraine. Two studies by Nikolai Shul'ga focused on human rights issues in Ukraine with regard to refugees and individuals seeking asylum, and were well received by both scholars and the public.<sup>11</sup> Interesting results were achieved in Shul'ga's more recent work *Velikoe pereselenie narodov: repatrianty, bezhentsy, trudovye migranty*.<sup>12</sup> This study represents the first attempt in Ukrainian scholarly literature to undertake a comprehensive examination of migration issues faced by Ukraine during the first decade of independence. As part of an international study in Ukraine, a sociological report entitled *Problemy nelegalnoi mihratsii ta transportuvannia mihrantiv* was published under the aegis of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Center for Technical Cooperation for Europe and Central Asia.<sup>13</sup> In addition to an analysis of applicable laws and administrative practices based on interviews with illegal immigrants, the study includes data on the means, methods, and routes used for the illegal transportation of migrants.

In addition to the scholarly research noted above, several publications have appeared in Ukraine by authors with practical experience in the area of regulating migration processes. Noteworthy among them are V. Novik's analytical research *Derzhavna polityka i rehuliuvannia immihratsiinykh protsesiv v Ukraini* and his guidebook for refugees and immigrants.<sup>14</sup> Also important are Yu. Buznytsky, P. Burlaka, and S. Rubanov's book *Sudovyi zakhyst bizhentsiv i osib, shcho prybyly v Ukrainu u poshukakh prytulku*, and an informational publication entitled *Pravove rehuliuvannia mihratsiinykh protsesiv v Ukraini*, edited by V. Andriienko and H. Subotenko.<sup>15</sup>

Studies on interethnic relations and interethnic tolerance of residents of Kyiv, and Ukraine in general, are of significant interest. Foremost among these is the sociological monitoring study *Ukrainske suspilstvo: vid vyboriv*

do vyboriv, conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in 1994, 1998, and 2002.<sup>16</sup> This work offers both a simultaneous and diachronological view of various aspects of Ukrainian society. In the joint monograph *Kyiv ta kyiany: sotsiologichni khroniky nezalezhnosti*, which was written for the most part by specialists of the above-mentioned institute, a separate chapter is devoted to an examination of interethnic relations in Kyiv.<sup>17</sup> These issues are partially covered in Yevtukh's edited volume, *Etnichniy dovidnyk*.<sup>18</sup> Other articles have examined the question more closely, including O. Prybytkova's "Korennyie kievliane i migranty: monitoring sotsialnykh izmenenii na rubezhe XXI veka"; "Vikova struktura mihrantiv ta rynek pratsi m. Kyieva: deiaki aspekty vzaiemozv'iazku" by T. Vaidin; and O. Ivanova's articles "Mihranty u Kyievi: do stolytsi po krashche zhyttia?" and "Mihranty u Kyievi. Khto vony?"<sup>19</sup> In 2000 the materials of a roundtable discussion conducted by the Kennan Institute's Kyiv Project were published under the title *Netradytsiini mihranty v Kyievi*.<sup>20</sup> Also worth noting are many articles by N. Panina, Ye. Holovakha, V. Kulyk, and S. Makeiev, who explore migration problems, interethnic relations, and changes that have taken place in our society in the last decade.<sup>21</sup>

It should be noted that the materials of this study were used in a series of publications by O. Braichevska, H. Volosiuk, O. Malynovska, and Ya. Pylynsky, which appeared in the journal *Problemy mihratsii* [Problems of Migration].<sup>22</sup> Also, various portions of this manuscript have been published by Blair Ruble and Nancy Popson in the journals *Post-Soviet Geography* and *Economics, Urban Anthropology*, and *Nationalities Papers*.<sup>23</sup>

Although the above-mentioned publications provide a sound scientific basis for the study of migration and interethnic relations, there are still issues that need further exploration. The system of social interrelationships between local residents and immigrants is one area not covered by the existing literature. In addition, the views of the immigrants themselves have not yet been studied in depth.

This study seeks to fill these gaps. Based on concrete data collected in the city of Kyiv, the study evaluates the impact of nontraditional immigrants on general municipal processes by studying their legal status, socio-economic situation, and their cultural and religious behavior. The authors look at the extent to which immigration from African and Asian countries has led to an increase in the ethnocultural diversity of the city and to

changes in the ethnic structure of its population. Finally, it explores the attitude of the average citizen and the municipal government toward non-traditional immigrants.

Taking into account the somewhat biased attitude of a significant part of the population toward immigrants from Asian and African countries, special attention is paid to such issues as the level of interaction between immigrants and the native population and immigrants' integration into Ukrainian society.

## A Demographic and Social Portrait of Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv

As a scientific, industrial, cultural, and educational center, Kyiv was traditionally a magnet for both rural and urban migrants from different regions of Ukraine and the USSR even during the Soviet period. Regardless of the fact that Kyiv was always one of several cities with quotas limiting the number of new residents, as of the last All-Union census (1989) more than half of its residents (55.7%) were migrants from other regions of Ukraine and Union republics.<sup>24</sup> The great majority of migrants arrived in Kyiv from the villages and towns of Kyiv oblast, as well as neighboring oblasts. However, the population of Kyiv expanded not only as a result of the influx of people from other areas of Ukraine: there was also a significant influx of migrants from other Soviet republics, primarily Russia. Most migrants found employment at industrial enterprises in the city.

Among the Kyiv enterprises that used the labor of quota-restricted migrants to the greatest extent were various construction companies, enterprises providing basic municipal infrastructure services, the “Arsenal” plant, the Darnytsia train repair depot, “Khimvolokno” [Chemical Fiber] Production Union, and the Darnytsia silk plant.<sup>25</sup> Beginning in the mid-1980s, these enterprises used foreign labor in accordance with then current inter-state agreements with several socialist countries concerning the reciprocal employment of workers.

With few exceptions, the majority of foreigners who were permanent residents of Kyiv in the five to seven years before 1991 consisted of students and workers from socialist countries and those countries whose governments had a pro-Soviet orientation. As a rule, they were working or studying on referrals from their countries, and after graduating from Kyiv’s higher educational establishment or after the expiration of their contracts with enterprises, they had to return to their countries of origin.

After Ukraine gained its independence, Kyiv was transformed from the capital of a Soviet republic into the capital of an independent state. Changes to the city's functions and the emergence of new political and economic realities had a fundamental effect on migration, and on the nature and composition of migration currents involving city residents.<sup>26</sup>

A distinguishing feature of the migration situation in Kyiv after 1991 was the arrival of new categories of foreigners, which were not present in Soviet times (refugees, asylum seekers, workers, bureaucrats, and specialists working for joint ventures, businessmen, illegal migrants); at the same time, these foreigners were representatives of ethnic groups that are not traditional to Ukraine and the former republics of the Soviet Union.

### **COUNTING MIGRANTS: OFFICIAL STATISTICS**

Official statistics on the number of foreigners permanently residing in Kyiv, broken down by country of origin, have not been published. Thus, the majority of studies on problems of international migration only estimate the scale of immigration to Kyiv from Asian and African countries. The methods used to arrive at these estimates are not usually made public, and so their reliability is uncertain.<sup>27</sup>

Difficulties in determining the number of people from Asian and African countries who reside in the capital of Ukraine are primarily tied to their different legal statuses. Depending on their reasons for residing in the city, they may be registered with any number of state agencies: municipal and raion passport registration and immigration divisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Directorate of Nationality Affairs and Migration of the Kyiv Municipal Administration, the State Center for Employment in the city of Kyiv, and the Ministry of Education and Science. Each agency collects its own statistical data.<sup>28</sup> Unfortunately, they cannot provide detailed information on the number and ethnic breakdown of nontraditional immigrants in Kyiv, but they are at least able to provide figures that may serve as a fairly reliable basis for estimates.

In 2001, 101,268 foreigners were registered with the municipal and raion passport registration and immigration divisions of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the city of Kyiv. These individuals, who come from Asia, Africa, Europe, North America, and Australia, as well as the former Soviet republics, were residing in the city for different reasons. Only 20,052 of them were permanent residents officially registered

with the passport registration and immigration divisions of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the city of Kyiv, or .8% of the total city population, which in early 2001 was 2,606,716.<sup>29</sup> These are officially recognized refugees; individuals who have permanent residency, work permits, and business visas; students of Kyiv colleges and universities; and illegal migrants who have been identified by law enforcement agencies.

As of 1 January 2002, data of the Department for Nationality Affairs and Migration of the Kyiv State Administration indicate that 1,089 refugees (including children under 16) were living in Kyiv, of whom 689 individuals (63.3%) were citizens of Asian and African countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Mali, Mozambique, Palestine, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra-Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Turkey. The rest were citizens of former Soviet republics: Armenia (19.7%), Azerbaijan (9.9%), Georgia (4.7%), the Russian Federation (2%), and Tajikistan (.4%). The largest number of refugees in Kyiv are citizens of Afghanistan (48.6%).

In 2001, 5,439 foreigners had documents for residency in the capital, 40% of whom were from Asian and African countries. Of these, 31% are stateless individuals. The remainder are made up of citizens of African and Asian countries, in particular Syria (7%), Lebanon (6%), Vietnam (6%), Afghanistan (5%), Iran (5%), Pakistan (5%), Bangladesh (3%), China (3%), and Nigeria (2.5%).

In 2001, 2,071 foreigners obtained work permits from the State Employment Center of the city of Kyiv, 35% of whom are from Asian and African countries. Of these, the largest number of work permits was issued to citizens of China (26%), followed by Turkey (13%) Lebanon (10%), Vietnam (8%), Egypt (6%), Japan (6%), Pakistan (5.2%), South Korea (5%), Libya (4%), India (2.7%), Iran (2.5%), Nigeria (3%), Bangladesh (2%), and Cameroon (1.2%).

Out of 4,900 foreign students who were studying in Kyiv in 2000–2001, 76% were from Asian and African countries: from China (46%), Iran (15%), Jordan (7%), Vietnam (6%), Tunisia (4%), Lebanon (3.8%), India (2.9%), Syria (2.7%), Bangladesh (1.7%), South Korea (1.2%), Mauritius (1%), Turkey (1%), Mongolia (0.8%), Morocco (0.8%), Nigeria (0.6%), Pakistan (0.6%), Sri Lanka (0.5%), and Japan (0.3%). The rest are from other African and Asian countries.

Another category of foreigners recorded in government statistics is comprised of individuals who have violated residency regulations in Ukraine, i.e., illegal migrants. According to researchers who study illegal migration, Kyiv is an important transit point where international routes for the transportation of illegal migrants from Asia and Africa intersect.<sup>30</sup> According to data of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, in 2001, 6,553 illegal migrants were identified in the city of Kyiv, 65% of whom are from Asian and African countries. If we agree with statements by experts working to curb illegal migration that the identified portion of illegal migrants constitutes half of their real number, then the number of illegal migrants from Asian and African countries residing in the city may be as high as 8,500.

### **COUNTING MIGRANTS: SURVEY DATA**

These numbers enable us to estimate that in 2001 approximately 15,000 individuals from Asian and African countries were permanently residing in the capital of Ukraine, i.e., 0.6% of the total city population. According to respondents' estimates obtained in the course of researching immigrant households, the maximum number of their compatriots, regardless of their legal status, who were permanently domiciled in the city at the time of the survey was about 11,500 individuals, which almost fully corresponds to the results of estimates made from official statistical data.

The 233 Asian and African households included in this study comprised a total of 547 people, 370 of whom were immigrants, i.e., foreigners and stateless individuals born outside Ukraine (children born in Ukraine, even with both immigrant parents were not considered immigrants). Therefore, based on the given estimate, the study covered 3% of immigrants from Asian and African countries living in Kyiv.

Immigrants about whom data were gathered during the course of the study come from twenty-three Asian and African countries (Table 1.1).

The total number of countries of origin generally corresponds with the total number of countries of departure of registered refugees, labor migrants, foreigners with residency permits, and identified illegal migrants.

For the sake of convenience, immigrants on which data were collected in this study were divided into six groups: newcomers from Afghanistan; African countries (Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo [Brazzaville], Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Morocco,



**TABLE 1.1** *Countries of Origin and Numerical Breakdown of Surveyed Immigrants*

Country of immigrants' origin	Number	%
Afghanistan	170	45.95
Angola	29	7.84
Cameroon	1	0.27
Chad	1	0.27
China	19	5.14
Congo	4	1.08
Dem. Rep. of Congo	8	2.16
Ethiopia	3	0.81
Guinea-Bissau	1	0.27
India	5	1.35
Iran	2	0.54
Iraq	9	2.43
Lebanon	3	0.81
Morocco	1	0.27
Mozambique	1	0.27
Nigeria	1	0.27
Pakistan	22	5.95
Palestine	2	0.54
Rwanda	1	0.27
Somalia	2	0.54
Syria	9	2.43
Turkey	5	1.35
Vietnam	71	19.19
Total	370	100

Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia); China, India, and Pakistan; and Middle East countries (Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Turkey).

In addition to actual immigrants (370 individuals), children born in Ukraine and individuals from Ukraine, i.e., partners in mixed marriages, were resident in their established households at the time of the survey. This occurred both in families with two immigrant parents and mixed families (Table 1.2).

All immigrants in the study arrived in Kyiv between 1983 and early 2001. A comparison between the dynamics underlying the arrival of the study group members and the objective political and socio-economic factors that have taken place in the last twenty years in Ukraine, the post-Soviet space, and their countries of origin enables us to conditionally identify three periods of immigration from Asia and Africa to Kyiv: before 1991, between 1991 and 1998, and between 1999 and 2001 (Table 1.3).

### **Soviet-era Migrants**

Immigrants who arrived before 1991 account for 20% of the total. These are former workers or students of Kyiv colleges and universities who arrived for work or study on state referrals from their governments. After graduation and the expiration of contracts with industrial enterprises, some did not return to their homelands. Loopholes in the system of internal immigration control stemming from conditions during the transitional period, and the lack of an appropriate legislative framework, system of administrative agencies, and most importantly, experience in addressing these issues created an opportunity for them to prolong their stay in the city.

### **Migrants 1991–1998**

Two-thirds of all respondents arrived in Kyiv in the period between 1991 and 1998. The democratization of civic life and market reforms in Ukraine led to the emergence of completely new ways to legalize newcomers, such as establishment of their own businesses and joint ventures or opportunities to obtain refugee status.

The economic crisis and civil conflicts that arose in the newly independent states, especially the Central Asian and Caucasus republics, and Russia, resulted in the deterioration of state border protection, particularly along the outer perimeter of the former Soviet borders, which in turn created favorable conditions for foreigners to enter the post-Soviet space.

**TABLE 1.2 Composition of Surveyed Households**

Immigrant's country of origin	Actual immigrants (those who entered the country)		Children born in Ukraine in families with two immigrant parents	Children born in mixed marriages with citizens of Ukraine	Members of immigrant families—citizens of Ukraine	Total
	Adults (over 18)	Children (under 18)				
Afghanistan	170	43	15	21	19	225
African countries	53	-	10	20	18	101
China	19	3	-	3	2	24
India and Pakistan	27	-	-	10	9	46
Middle East countries	30	-	2	7	9	48
Vietnam	71	2	21	6	5	103
Total	315	55	48	67	62	547

**TABLE 1.3** *Distribution of Immigrants Based on Country of Origin and Period of Arrival, in % (N=370)*

Country of origin	Period of arrival			Total
	Before 1991	1991-1998	1999-2001	
Afghanistan	16.5	66.5	17.0	100
African countries	17.0	77.4	5.6	100
China	5.0	95.0	-	100
India and Pakistan	3.7	96.3	-	100
Middle East countries	20.0	53.0	27.0	100
Vietnam	39.0	48.0	13.0	100
All Respondents	20.0	67.0	13.0	100

As a result of the fact that the borders that existed between the Union republics of the former Soviet Union were purely administrative, and hence were unprotected, after the proclamation of Ukraine's independence its eastern and northern borders became state borders that remained open for foreign citizens to cross. The only exception was Ukraine's border with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania, where the system of protection created during the Soviet period remained intact. Although by 1992 the Border Guard Troops of Ukraine formally took over the control and protection of the state borders along the entire perimeter, the creation of a working system of border control was complicated by delays in the juridical designation of the borders and the lack of funds to build such a system.

In the early 1990s it became possible to work productively and engage in small business ventures, not necessarily with the proper documents or permits. The visa regime in Ukraine was also in the process of being developed, and obtaining a Ukrainian visa was not very difficult. Moreover, Ukraine passed the law "On Refugees" in 1993, and the procedure for processing asylum petitions was first set in motion in Kyiv in 1996. This meant that immigrants had real opportunities to legalize their residency status in the city.

Between 1991 and 1998 the immigrant community of Kyiv also increased as a result of the internal migration of people from Asia and Africa, who until 1991 had been studying or working in other cities of Ukraine. This type of immigrant comprised 8% of those surveyed. The main reason behind their move was to seek work, given that oblast centers in particular had been hard hit by mass unemployment as a result of the economic crisis that engulfed Ukraine.

The increase of the immigrant population in Kyiv between 1991 and 1998 was also linked to external political factors. The fall of Najibullah's pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan in 1992 did not put an end to the civil war there, but instead led to a greater escalation of the military conflict, which sparked a new outflow of refugees. This flow of refugees also reached Kyiv. Internal political struggle and resulting military and ethnic conflicts, as well as civil wars in a number of African countries led to upheaval, poverty, and the mass flight of people in search of both political asylum and better living conditions. A significant number of Asian and African refugees and people searching for a better life, who were head-

ing for Western Europe, took advantage of existing opportunities to enter the country, both legally and illegally, and arrived in Ukraine and Kyiv with the subsequent goal of crossing into the European countries.

### **Migrants Since 1999**

Beginning in 1999, immigration to Kyiv significantly decreased. Only 13% of the total number of respondents arrived in Kyiv in 1999–2001. This drop can be explained by increased border controls, a new visa regime, and a specific policy against illegal migration.

In the late 1990s significant changes were introduced into the system of state control over immigration to Ukraine, which led to decreased immigration throughout the country. A number of international agreements were signed with neighboring countries concerning the creation of a system of shared borders. At the same time, border security was stepped up at the Ukraine–Russia border by increasing the number of border posts and border subdivisions. As a result, the system of external immigration control on the northeastern borders of the state was strengthened.

In late 1999 a new regime for issuing visas for entry into Ukraine was introduced, providing control over the entry of people while they were still outside the state. In addition to strengthening visa and border controls, including on the eastern border, targeted measures to fight illegal migration and maintain control over foreigners' sojourns in the country were implemented in accordance with the state program aimed at the fight against illegal migration; these measures led to a decrease in the numbers of foreigners illegally entering Ukraine.<sup>31</sup> Finally, the drop in immigration can be linked to the municipal administration's implementation of a restrictive immigration policy targeting citizens from Asia and Africa<sup>32</sup> and the strengthening of immigration control within the city itself.

### **SOURCES OF MIGRATION TO KYIV**

Most of the immigrants who arrived in Kyiv during Soviet times were from Vietnam, Afghanistan, and those African and Middle Eastern countries with which the USSR had friendly relations, and which were recipients of Soviet economic and military aid and assistance in training qualified cadres.

In order to prevent unemployment in socialist Vietnam, an intergovernmental agreement “On the Referral and Admission of Vietnamese Citizens for Professional Training and Employment at Enterprises and

Organizations of the USSR” was signed on 2 April 1981 between the governments of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the USSR. Its implementation launched the process of organized, state-sponsored Vietnamese immigration to Ukraine.<sup>33</sup> Foremost among the Kyiv-based companies employing Vietnamese citizens was the Darnytsia Silk Plant.

The influx of Afghanistan citizens began to escalate as soon as Soviet troops entered this country. Afghan students began arriving at Kyiv colleges, universities, and military schools. But the largest number of Afghans arrived in Kyiv in 1989–90, when Soviet troops left Afghanistan.

The exacerbation of tensions in the political and economic standoff between the superpowers on the African continent and in Middle East countries forced the governments of the USSR and the countries of the above-mentioned regions to take steps to ensure the creation of a future pro-communist elite. This led to the influx in the 1980s of large numbers of foreign students from these regions, who arrived to attend Soviet colleges and universities, including those based in Kyiv. At the same time, in the 1980s, there were no students in Kyiv from Pakistan and very few from socialist China, since the Soviet leadership did not consider these countries as friendly states. As in the past, between 1991 and 1998 citizens of Afghanistan, African countries, and Vietnam constituted the largest number of immigrants. The number of emigrants from Pakistan and China simultaneously increased. During this period the lowest number of emigrants arrived from Middle Eastern countries.

After 1992, when the Mujahiddin, and afterwards the Taliban, came to power in Afghanistan, the new government began to persecute the students whom the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) had sent to study in the USSR. This was the main reason why former Afghan students and those who had stayed briefly in Kyiv for different purposes refused to return to their homeland. These Afghans became refugees. As a result of further political cataclysms in Afghanistan, especially after the Taliban came to power, PDPA functionaries, state bureaucrats, members of parliament, military personnel and specialists who had studied in the USSR (including Kyiv), and intellectuals who had supported the communist regime were not the only ones fleeing the country. Also fleeing Afghanistan were businessmen—especially those whose families included socially active female teachers, journalists, and doctors—and people who were trying to save their families from hunger and poverty caused by the protracted civil war.

Like the Afghan students, a significant number of African students who had studied in Kyiv during the Soviet period did not return to their homelands in the early 1990s. Some did not return because of changes of political regimes in their homelands; others cited the absence of valid documents and lack of money for their journey home. For others, economic considerations were the primary reason, inasmuch as their diplomas did not provide any safeguards against unemployment and poverty at home. Consequently, even those Africans who were in a position to return to their homelands remained in the city, hoping at some time in the future to reach some Western European country.<sup>34</sup>

The increase in the number of newcomers from African countries between 1991 and 1998 was also linked to military conflicts that broke out or restarted in some African countries in the early 1990s, especially in Mozambique, Ethiopia, Angola, and Congo. People escaping from war, upheavals, and poverty set out to reach Western European countries. With this goal in mind, they turned to traffickers who in the early 1990s were making intensive use of Ukraine to transfer illegal migrants from Africa to the countries of Western Europe. Those who failed to reach Western European countries as a result of corrupt traffickers or for other reasons ended up in Kyiv.

With the break-up of the Soviet Union, the organized importation of Vietnamese workers, which was guaranteed by the 1981 Agreement (signed for ten years) was terminated. However, specialists estimate that in the mid-1990s there were at least 1,100 Vietnamese citizens in Ukraine whose work contracts had ended, but owing to the economic crisis, the companies employing them could not fulfill their obligations and provide for their return to Vietnam. Some Vietnamese workers had no desire whatsoever to return home, preferring to live in Ukraine. There were cases of Vietnamese returning to their previous place of residence even from Moscow airports.<sup>35</sup>

Some emigrants from Vietnam opened small or joint businesses in Kyiv and invited compatriots from their homeland to work as co-founders, or managers, and specialists in these businesses, thus providing them with an opportunity to enter Ukraine and legalize their status in Kyiv. Some Vietnamese respondents, who had worked in Ukraine earlier under the terms of the Agreement but were forced to return to their homeland during the Soviet period, returned to Kyiv, bearing service passports issued to



Vietnamese citizens working in the USSR, which they had either saved or purchased on the black market. In the early 1990s such passports allowed them to enter Ukraine legally without any additional formalities.

Between 1991 and 1998, during the provisionally demarcated second period of immigration, citizens of China, Pakistan, and India began arriving in Kyiv.<sup>36</sup> As we discovered in the course of this study, in Kyiv and Kyiv oblast during this period there were several joint Pakistani-Ukrainian and Sino-Ukrainian firms, especially in the food service and wood processing industries. With the assistance of middlemen based in China or Pakistan, for a large sum of money one could obtain an official invitation to work in these firms, and apply for a visa to enter Ukraine. A significant number of Pakistani (as well as African) émigrés ended up in Kyiv after having been duped by dishonest traffickers promising passage to Western Europe.

Compared to the first immigration period, during this period the number of newcomers from Middle Eastern countries decreased for several reasons. When Ukraine gained its independence, the agreements and treaties that the USSR had signed with a number of countries in that region to provide financial assistance in training specialists with a higher education became invalid. Foreigners now had to pay for tuition fees in order to study in Ukrainian colleges and universities. This led to a sharp drop in the number of students from those regions attending Ukrainian and Kyivan schools; this decrease was also reflected in the scale of immigration to Kyiv. At the same time, newcomers from Middle Eastern countries also used Ukraine as a transfer point en route to Western European countries.

Against the background of a general decrease in the general scale of immigration between 1999 and mid-2001, citizens from Afghanistan and Vietnam continue to account for the majority of new immigrants. The number of newcomers from the Middle East is also increasing. The arrival of newcomers from China and Pakistan is not recorded, and at the same time, the number of immigrants from African countries is noticeably decreasing.

The predominance of newcomers from Afghanistan (59.1%) during this period may be explained by the further impoverishment of the population during the years of Taliban rule, the constant threat of persecution by Muslim radicals, and the absence of any prospects for life or opportunities to obtain an education and basic medical care.<sup>37</sup>

Despite the tightening of visa and immigration controls, the increase in the number of immigrants from Vietnam among newcomers in the last

few years is the result of the legalization of those surveyed immigrants who arrived in Kyiv during previous periods, which resulted in the possibility to legalize newly arrived family members and even relatives.

A significant percentage of newcomers from Middle Eastern countries after 1999—particularly Kurds—resulted from the influx of some among them who came to study at Ukrainian educational institutions and paid for their own tuition. For such immigrants, this was the only way to leave their countries legally and take advantage of the existing, albeit now greatly circumscribed, route for illegal crossings to Western European countries which cuts through Ukraine.

Some respondents from the Pakistani community explained that fewer Pakistani citizens arrived in Kyiv between 1999 and the first half of 2001 because of tightened visa and border controls and the “improved work of traffickers.” According to the respondents, traffickers no longer “leave” their clients in Ukraine but in neighboring Slovakia, from where it is easier for them to reach the Czech Republic, Germany, or Spain.

According to individual respondents from African countries, the drop in immigration from Africa after 1999 is linked to the invalidation of a migration myth widespread among Africans until the mid-1990s: that entry into Ukraine meant an almost obstacle-free route to the West. As a result, traffickers are now forced to seek other routes to move their clients to Europe.

During the second, and especially the third periods of immigration to Kyiv an increase was noted in the number of female immigrants. This may be a reflection of a general trend denoting a rise in numbers of women in international migration,<sup>38</sup> and a more dynamic process of family reunifications.

### **KYIV’S IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY: A DEMOGRAPHIC PORTRAIT**

The immigrant group in this study is characterized by diversity in terms of countries of origin, ethnicity, and religious affiliation.

The ethnicity of people from Afghanistan reflects the multiethnic structure of the country’s population and, at the same time, the character of discrimination on ethnic grounds in their homeland during the period of Taliban rule. Pushtuns comprise 20.6% of surveyed immigrants; the rest represent ethnic groups whose national leaders opposed the Taliban and later joined the Northern Alliance: Tajiks—68.2%, Hazaras—8.2%, Uzbeks—1.2%, and other ethnic groups—1.8%.

More than one-half of surveyed immigrants from African countries belong to the Bacongo ethnic group (56.6%), while one-fifth (21%) identified themselves according to their country of origin—Angolans; members of other African ethnic groups (21%) formed the rest of this group. Most newcomers from the Middle East are Arabs (57%) and Kurds (40%), while members of other ethnic groups account for only 3%. Among émigrés from Pakistan and India were Punjabis (33.3%), Pushtuns (11.1%), and Hindus (18.5%). Some identified themselves as Pakistanis (33.3%) and Kashmiris (3.7%). All emigrants from China and Vietnam identified themselves as Chinese and Vietnamese.

The religious affiliations of the immigrants who took part in this study reflect a diverse mosaic. Christianity (Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and Protestantism) is professed by 13%, with the following distribution: Orthodox believers from Ethiopia, Syria, and Afghanistan—1%; Catholics—8%; and Protestants—4% of the total number. Some immigrants from Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo are also Catholics. Protestant Christianity is professed mainly by people from Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

More than one-half of immigrants profess Islam (57%). Twelve percent consider themselves Shiite Muslims, and 45%, Sunnis. Islam is professed by people from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Palestine, Turkey, Syria, as well as Angola, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Morocco. Buddhism and Confucianism are professed by 14% and 2%, respectively. Buddhism is the religion professed by 58% of immigrants from China, and 55% of those from Vietnam. Twenty-six percent of Chinese immigrants consider themselves followers of Confucianism. Yezidism is professed by 2% of immigrants from Syria and from Turkish and Iraqi Kurdistan—Kurds by nationality. This group includes Zoroastrians and Sikhs from Afghanistan and India (0.4% and 0.6%, respectively). Only 10% consider themselves atheists. Immigrants from Vietnam (43%) form the largest group of atheists, with none at all from Pakistan.

Men predominate in the study group (73%), with women accounting for only 27%. The largest number of women is recorded among immigrants from Vietnam, while the lowest number includes immigrants from African countries and the Middle East. There are no women from Pakistan among the surveyed immigrants.

The majority of immigrants (84%) are adults of working age. Individuals below the working age account for 12%, and only 4% are older than working age. There are no underage children who arrived with their parents or adults over the working age among immigrants from Pakistan, the Middle East, or African countries. None of the African men were older than forty at the time of the survey. This attests to the economic character of immigration from the above-mentioned countries and regions. At the same time, the largest number of underage (31%) immigrants and people over the working age (6%) are from Afghanistan; this confirms the existence of family migration, which is a hallmark of refugeeism.

The average age of immigrants from Asian and African countries is thirty. The youngest are Afghans, whose average age is twenty-eight. The oldest are the Vietnamese (thirty-four years old). Some age differences are noted with respect to gender: the average age of immigrant women is twenty-eight; of men—thirty-two.

In general, the gender-age composition of immigrants corresponds to the gender-age structure of the population involved in current international migration, whereby the most active and mobile individuals taking part in migration processes are men between eighteen and forty years of age.

One-third of the surveyed adult immigrants, regardless of the fact that they are at the optimum age for starting families, have never been married, which indicates that young people without family obligations are most likely to migrate. At the same time, nearly 65% of the study group members are married. Of these, 54% married outside of Ukraine—in their own or other countries. Two-thirds are immigrants from the first period of immigration to Kyiv (74%). Among those who arrived in subsequent periods the number of married couples decreases and accounts for 65% and 50%, respectively. Marriages registered in countries of origin are most frequently noted among immigrants from China (78%) and Afghanistan (72%), while the largest number of marriages registered in Kyiv is recorded among Africans.

The largest number of mixed marriages is recorded among immigrants from Pakistan, the Middle East, and African countries, among whom there are either no female immigrants or significantly smaller numbers than male immigrants. The lowest number of mixed marriages is recorded among immigrants from Vietnam, Afghanistan, and China, among whom there are many more female immigrants than in immigrant groups from other countries. Mixed marriages are almost always made up of a Ukrainian woman and

an immigrant man. In the study, there was only one case of a female immigrant from Syria who is married to a Ukrainian man.

The majority of mixed marriages are officially registered. Immigrants who do not have the necessary documents to register their marriages live in civil unions. Specifically, the highest number of civil unions occurs among immigrants from African countries, most of whom do not have national passports. The lowest number of unregistered, mixed marriages is recorded among immigrants from Afghanistan. This is explained by the fact that the majority of Afghans who are married to Ukrainian women are immigrants from the Soviet period, who at the time of their marriage had the required documents to register their union. A correlation between legal national documents and the number of civil unions is also noted among the Pakistani participants of this study. Officially registered marriages occur only among those who have genuine national documents and came to Ukraine legally. The high percentage of Vietnamese couples who are living in civil unions may be explained by a tradition that arose during the Soviet period: the Vietnamese government warned everyone entering the USSR to work that marriage was inadmissible. But a large concentration of young, unmarried people, who have lived and worked in close contact for many years, has led to a rise in unregistered marital unions, which have turned out to be unexpectedly durable.

The study also uncovered a few cases of officially registered but fictitious marriages that were contracted exclusively for the purpose of legalizing their status. But in the majority of cases there are no grounds to consider study group members' marriages with Ukrainian women as a strategy for obtaining legalization and surviving in Ukraine and Kyiv.

Divorces are not typical for Asian and African immigrants living in Kyiv. Only 2.5% of the respondents were separated. The only mixed marriages that resulted in separation were those in which the spouses were Ukrainian women who had initiated the divorce, according to the respondents. Two percent of the group's members are widows and widowers.

Each immigrant family has an average of two children. As the study shows, 115 out of 176 children living in 233 surveyed households were born in Ukraine. The lowest recorded number of children per family was one, and the highest—five.

In their countries of origin, the majority of immigrants in the study lived in cities. Forty-three percent of urban residents lived in capital cities.

The largest number of such residents is comprised of immigrants from Afghanistan (60%), African countries (57%), and Middle Eastern countries (37%); there are none from Pakistan and China. Urban residents predominate among Afghans, Africans, and immigrants from the Middle East, i.e., from those countries where emigration was associated with changes in political regimes and military conflicts, causing greater suffering for urban residents, particularly the elite in capital cities and young people. Residents of rural areas are predominant among immigrants from Pakistan, China, and Vietnam—countries with a surplus of labor resources in the agricultural sector, and, as a result, high unemployment levels in rural areas,<sup>39</sup> which is a motivating factor in labor migration.

The level of education and professional skills are an important factor affecting opportunities for employment, material security, and living standards of immigrants. The educational level of men in the immigrant study group is much higher than that of women. There are more men who have completed degrees at colleges and universities (77%), technical and vocational schools (76%), high schools (77%), and those who have a professional education (78%). There are significantly fewer individuals with only a grade-school education. The comparatively lower educational level of immigrant women is due to the fact that the majority come from countries where education and social activity of women are traditionally low.

One-third (32%) of the surveyed immigrants obtained their education in Ukraine. Of these, 72% studied in institutions of higher learning, 11% in technical schools, 2% in military academies, 5% in graduate schools, and the rest in elementary, middle, and high schools. More than half of those who studied in Ukraine are immigrants of the first period who graduated after 1991.

Among the immigrants of the second period only one in five studied in Ukrainian colleges and universities, and among those who arrived after 1999—only one in ten. Sixty percent of those who studied in Soviet and Ukrainian colleges, universities, and technical schools completed their studies; 75% of these were immigrants in the Soviet period, while 25% arrived between 1991 and 1998. All those who completed only pre-college placement courses (18%) also arrived between 1991 and 1998. The majority of them (72.4%) are immigrants from Pakistan and China. Three individuals in the study group (two men from Afghanistan and Palestine, and a woman from Syria) obtained doctorates from Ukrainian universities.

### **Reasons for Migration**

The study shows that 38% of immigrant respondents came to Kyiv for economic reasons: to find a well-paying job (13%), better living conditions (15.2%), obtain a good education, for medical care (4.4%), and to start a business (5.4%) (Table 1.4). These figures challenge the widespread notion that the majority of immigrants from Asian and African countries currently living in Ukraine are transit migrants.

Economic reasons for migration were given by the majority of immigrants from China and Pakistan, and about half from Middle Eastern countries. The largest number of immigrants who wanted to engage in business in Kyiv were those from China (31.6%), Pakistan (26%) and Middle Eastern countries (10%).

Twenty-six percent of the surveyed immigrants arrived in search of asylum for political, ethnic, and religious reasons, and because of military conflicts. The largest number of asylum seekers and refugees from areas of military action in the study group are from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Turkey (Kurds), as well as from African countries, particularly Angola.

Some immigrants from Pakistan and India, especially from Kashmir, consider themselves refugees; they say they are victims of a military conflict and are in Kyiv in search of asylum.

One-fifth came to Kyiv to study at colleges and universities and to work on government referrals. Among those who came to study, the majority are from Middle Eastern countries; this is linked to the Soviet-era tradition of acquiring a higher education, especially a medical degree, in Soviet and, later, Ukrainian colleges and universities.

Approximately one in ten immigrants came to Kyiv for the purpose of family reunification. Some (3%) openly admitted that they had no other choice but to remain in Kyiv; they ended up in Kyiv by accident, originally planning to move on to European countries. The majority of transit migrants are from African countries. Besides Africans, a small number of immigrants from Pakistan and Afghanistan also consider themselves transit migrants, whereas none of the respondents from Vietnam, China, or Middle East countries stated that they were transit migrants.

### **Legal and Illegal Migration**

More than one third (38%) of the surveyed immigrants arrived in Kyiv illegally, i.e., without the necessary entry documents, with forged docu-

**TABLE 1.4** *Distribution of Immigrants Based on Country of Origin and Reason for Migration to Kyiv, in % (N=369)*

Country of origin	Reason for migration						Total
	Economic	Family reunification	Seeking asylum	Military conflict	Transit	Study or work	
Afghanistan	33.0	13.0	34.0	3.0	1.0	16.0	100
African countries	15.0	2.0	17.0	30.0	15.0	19.0	100
China	89.5	-	-	-	-	10.5	100
India and Pakistan	78.0	7.0	7.0	-	4.0	4.0	100
Middle East countries	44.0	3.0	20.0	3.0	-	30.0	100
Vietnam	36.6	16.9	-	-	-	46.5	100



ments, or with documents provided by traffickers. Immigrants who came to Kyiv from other regions of Ukraine did not need any documents. The rest arrived on legal visas issued on the basis of government referrals to study or work in the former Soviet Union (immigrants of the first period), invitations from colleges and universities, companies, private individuals, or on tourist visas (immigrants of the second and third periods) (Table 1.5).

More than half of the immigrants from African countries and Afghanistan arrived in Kyiv illegally. This confirms both the transit nature of their migration and the lack of opportunities to obtain legal entry visas, as there are no Ukrainian consulates in Afghanistan or in the majority of African countries.

Among immigrants from the Middle East and Pakistan, the number of illegal entries was significantly lower; none whatsoever were recorded among immigrants from China and Vietnam. Taking advantage of existing Ukrainian diplomatic missions in their countries of origin, immigrants from these countries who participated in the study group actively seized

**TABLE 1.5** *Distribution of Immigrants Based on Country of Origin and Type of Entry Document, in % (N=369)*

Country of origin	Did not need documents	Entered illegally	Had entry visas	Total
Afghanistan	9.0	58.0	33.0	100
African countries	6.0	65.0	29.0	100
China	-	-	100	100
India and Pakistan	3.7	14.8	81.5	100
Middle East countries	-	6.7	83.3	100
Vietnam	11.0	-	89.0	100
All Respondents	7.0	38.0	55.0	100

opportunities to come to Kyiv legally through invitations from companies (26% of immigrants from China, 20% from Vietnam, 19% from Pakistan), colleges and universities (68% of immigrants from China, 19% from Pakistan, and 17% from the Middle East region), private individuals (17% from Vietnam, 13% from Middle East countries), and as tourists (23% from Middle East countries and 18.5% from Pakistan).

### **The Decision to Migrate**

An important factor influencing the decision to move to other countries for permanent residence are the availability of information sources. These include family, extended family, business ties, and communities of compatriots in the target countries of immigration. Many immigrants obtained information about opportunities to leave their country of origin from fellow countrymen studying or working abroad (49%). Eighteen percent obtained the necessary information from their government. The same percentage of immigrants obtained information from family members or relatives. Seven percent of the surveyed immigrants obtained information from Ukrainian acquaintances, the mass media, and contacts with business partners. The same number of respondents obtained information from organizers of illegal migration.

For immigrants from Pakistan, African countries, China, and Vietnam, information sent from compatriots who had settled abroad earlier played a decisive role in their decision to move. For the majority of Chinese immigrants who took part in the survey, their sources of information were usually small business owners and traders, who were the first to take advantage of favorable conditions for entering Ukraine immediately after the break-up of the USSR, legalize their status, and launch and maintain ongoing businesses, especially in the food service industry and trading at Kyiv markets. Former workers of Soviet industrial enterprises were the main source of information for immigrants from Vietnam. Potential immigrants from African countries were informed about possible immigration to Ukraine or an “easy” transit through its territory en route to Western European countries by countrymen, who had studied at Soviet and Ukrainian colleges and universities.

The least amount of information from compatriots was obtained by immigrants from Afghanistan. On the one hand, this is explained by the existence of “shock factors”<sup>740</sup> in their country of origin, which forced them to

emigrate, regardless of availability of information about the country of destination. On the other hand, a significant number of future immigrants already had the required information concerning relocation, the source of which was their own experience acquired during their period of study or temporary residence in the USSR, or through contacts with Soviet citizens who had worked or fought in Afghanistan. Immigrants whose official reason for coming to Ukraine was to study at Ukrainian colleges and universities after 1991, and especially after 1999, when new regulations for issuing visas were introduced, learned of stipulations for foreigners studying in Ukraine and tuition fees from advertisements placed by colleges and universities in local newspapers in the future immigrants' countries of origin. In addition to fellow countrymen, an important source of information about Ukraine for immigrants from a number of Asian and African countries were migration organizers—often the same compatriots who had studied and worked in Ukraine or had visited the country and its capital city many times.

Regardless of the entry period, an important factor in the decision of the surveyed immigrants to move to Kyiv was the existence in Kyiv of compatriot and family networks. Expectation of material and moral support is the most important consideration for a prospective immigrant, who is selecting a country for planned studies, a move, or transit. A proportion of current immigrants in Kyiv had relatives, family members, and Ukrainian acquaintances in the city. Most had some acquaintances among their compatriots living here. Only 23% came to Kyiv without any prior acquaintances or family ties (Table 1.6).

During our research we discovered that immigrants arriving in Kyiv from African countries and Pakistan were quite frequently the victims of fraud and deception at the hands of their fellow countrymen. Immigrants from Afghanistan, China, Middle East countries, and Vietnam did not lodge complaints about being defrauded and deceived by their compatriots in Kyiv.

Immigrants who accepted the assistance of compatriots during the migration process were most frequently from African countries, China, Pakistan, and Vietnam, and least often from Afghanistan and the Middle East. Only newcomers from Vietnam and China were assisted by business partners helping to organize their move, usually by sending them invitations to work in their companies.

The assistance of travel agencies in organizing their move was used only by immigrants from Pakistan and Middle Eastern countries, which

**TABLE 1.6 Distribution of Adult Immigrants Based on Country of Origin and the Existence of Ties with Family, Compatriots, or Friends in Kyiv, in % (N=236)**

Country of origin	Residing in Kyiv at the time of arrival					Total
	Family members	Relatives	Compatriot friends	Ukrainian friends	No one	
Afghanistan	6.0	21.0	56.0	-	17.0	100
African countries	-	4.0	51.0	2.0	43.0	100
China	-	-	100	-	-	100
India and Pakistan	3.7	3.7	70.4	-	22.2	100
Middle East countries	-		63.0	4.0	3.0	100
Vietnam	5.0	5.0	72.0	8.0	10.0	100
All Respondents	3.0	9.0	63.0	2.0	23.0	100

**TABLE 1.7 Distribution of Immigrants Based on Period of Arrival in Kyiv and Source of Assistance in Organizing the Move, in % (N=236)**

Periods of arrival	Help in organizing the move provided by									Total
	Relatives	Family members	Compatriots	Ukrainian acquaintances	Business partners	Migration organizers	Travel agencies	Government	No one	
Before 1991	3.0	6.0	13.0	5.0	5.0	0	0	55.0	13.0	100
1991-1998	13.0	14.0	31.0	0	4.0	13.0	2.0	4.0	19.0	100
1991-2001	17.0	17.0	17.0	0	0	31.0	0	9.0	9.0	100
All Respondents	11.0	12.3	24.6	1.0	3.8	11.0	1.3	18.0	17.0	100

have Ukrainian diplomatic missions. One-fifth of the study group said that they made the move by themselves. Mostly immigrants from Pakistan, the Middle East, and Afghanistan relied largely on their own efforts.

Depending on the period of arrival, sources of assistance for organizing a move and the degree to which it was used varied. More than half of immigrants in the first period named the official government as the source of assistance for their move, since most of them arrived for study or work on government referrals. There were four times fewer immigrants who reached Kyiv thanks to the assistance of compatriots during this period. The assistance of relatives, family members, business partners, and Ukrainian acquaintances was insignificant. Incidentally, none of the immigrants of this period indicated assistance from travel agencies and migration organizers.

Those who arrived between 1991 and 1998 received the most assistance in organizing their move from their compatriots. The number of new immigrants who received assistance from relatives and family members increased significantly. In this period, 13% of immigrants participating in the study stated that they received assistance from illegal migration organizers, which was a new phenomenon in comparison with the Soviet period. Almost one-fifth did not avail themselves of anyone's assistance.

Immigrants of the third period received the most indispensable assistance for their move from migration organizers, because, as indicated earlier, more than half of them arrived illegally. One-third of the survey group members who arrived in 1999–2001 indicated this type of assistance. The number of immigrants who received assistance from relatives and family members during the process of migration increased significantly in comparison with the previous period, which indicates an intense process of family reunifications. There is no recorded case of Ukrainian acquaintances, business partners, or travel agencies assisting immigrants. This is the result of new regulations governing the issuance of visas to Ukraine.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

As our study revealed, the preconditions for the arrival of nontraditional immigrants in Kyiv were established in Soviet times. The start of the sharp increase in their numbers was determined by objective political and socio-economic factors that arose in Ukraine, the post-Soviet space, and the immigrants' countries of origin.

Multiethnicity is typical of nontraditional immigrants who have settled in Kyiv. By their religious affiliation, the majority of them are Muslims. According to gender and age characteristics, the majority are comprised of young men with high working potential.

A high marriage rate, a significant number of mixed marriages, and strong families are characteristic of Kyiv immigrants from Asia and Africa. They tend not to have many children. Obviously, this may be explained by the fact that two-thirds of today's nontraditional immigrants in Kyiv lived in large cities or capitals in their home countries and had a high level of education.

As we discovered during the course of the study, the majority of immigrants arrived in Kyiv by legal means or with official legal visas. Economic reasons predominate among the general reasons for emigrating: the search for better-paid employment and better living conditions, a desire to engage in business, and desire for a good education and medical care. This means that regardless of current economic hardships in the Ukrainian state, Ukraine is economically attractive and a desirable destination for many immigrants from a number of Asian and African countries.

**CHAPTER TWO****Living Conditions of Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv**

**L**egal status, possession of documents authorizing the right to reside in the country, and documents in general have key significance for the immigrant's situation. This is the prerequisite for securing all other rights, from finding employment and obtaining medical care, to integrating into the receiving society.

**DOCUMENTS ALLOWING LEGAL RESIDENCE IN UKRAINE**

In accordance with the rules governing foreigners' entry into Ukraine, their departure from Ukraine, and transit through its territory,<sup>41</sup> foreigners must have a passport document for entering and staying in Ukraine. Among immigrants over 18 years of age who participated in the study group (315 individuals), only 53% had valid national passports (or were included in valid passport of a husband or father). Nearly 20% had invalid passports, most of which had expired. Nearly 30% did not have any national passport documents.

Although the majority of foreigners who arrived in Ukraine before 1991 had valid passports (only 10% of immigrants in this period had no national passports), the situation was different for immigrants arriving after 1991. One-third of immigrants who arrived in Ukraine in 1991–1998, and 42% of those who arrived in 1999 and later, did not have passports. Obviously, the lack of national documents is most likely linked to the foreigners' method of entry into Ukraine in this period and the exacerbation of problems linked to illegal migration. Among the surveyed immigrants who currently do not have passports, nearly 70% arrived in our country without necessary documents or with forged documents, i.e., illegally.

The situation differs markedly depending on the immigrant's citizenship. For example, all immigrants from Vietnam and China have passports. The majority of Indian and Pakistani citizens (85%) also have passports. Only 30% of Afghans hold valid passports (including family mem-



bers recorded in passports). Africans are in the worst situation. A mere 9% have valid national documents. Consequently, most immigrants from Vietnam and China enter the country legally, and most immigrants from African countries do not.

Some respondents petitioned the embassies of their countries to renew or extend their passports. According to figures provided by the Embassy of Afghanistan, to respondents the cost of renewing a passport ranged from 300 to 500 US dollars, while a document stating that the person named was a citizen of Afghanistan, whose passport was being processed, cost an additional 30-50 dollars. For the most part, African immigrants cannot petition their embassies in order to renew or extend their passports because many African countries do not have diplomatic missions in Ukraine.

In accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On Foreigners” (Article 3), foreigners are divided into those who live in Ukraine permanently, those who are residing on its territory for a designated period of time, and those who are in the country only temporarily. Foreigners receive permits for permanent or temporary residency.<sup>42</sup> Immigrants are differentiated between permanent and temporary residents, based not on time factors but legal grounds for staying here—a residence permit or visa.<sup>43</sup> At the same time, the above-mentioned Rules Governing the Entry of Foreigners into Ukraine state that the general period of sojourn in Ukraine of a foreigner who comes for a private visit cannot exceed one year. Short-term visas are issued for up to six months, and long-term ones—for a period of six months to one year.<sup>44</sup>

There are various types of visas. Among the respondents were individuals who had tourist visas; visas issued to newcomers arriving for the purpose of finding a job; student visas; business visas issued to individuals who come to Ukraine as co-founders of joint ventures, representatives of companies who monitor and implement contracts, or foreign consultants; and visas issued to office personnel representing foreign subjects of economic activity. In those cases where individuals must remain in Ukraine for more than one year (students; workers and specialists with permits from the Ministry of Labor; employees of foreign companies, etc.), internal affairs agencies decide whether to extend the passport registration, rather than the visa. If an application review lasts longer than twenty-four hours, the applicant is issued a photo ID document indicating that his/her passport is pending registration in the organs of Internal Affairs.<sup>45</sup>

Another legal basis for remaining in the country is refugee status, which is confirmed by the issuance of special identification to a foreigner. According to the regulations that were in effect at the time of the study<sup>46</sup> (a new version of the Law of Ukraine “On Refugees” was passed in 2001), this was a document for internal use, identifying the bearer of the document and confirming that s/he had been granted refugee status. Refugee status was granted for a period of three months and could be renewed.

The procedure for examining applications of individuals seeking asylum and refugee status was predicated on the existence of several other documents authorizing the right to a temporary sojourn in Ukraine: a document about the individual applying for refugee status and a document concerning adjudication by a higher administrative organ of an asylum seeker’s appeal over denial of refugee status.<sup>47</sup>

The only way that individuals who were denied refugee status by the government to obtain some kind of document was to forward an appeal to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which was opened in Kyiv in 1994. If, after an interview, the applicant was identified by the UNHCR as one who met the criteria of the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention relating to the status of refugees, s/he was issued a document with photo ID in the form of a letter declaring the person’s intent to seek asylum in Ukraine. The UNHCR document is not an official document authorizing the right to stay in Ukraine. However, the fruitful cooperation between the UNHCR in Ukraine and the government of Ukraine, and the high prestige of the former ensures them a certain respect, which is extremely important for immigrants who have no other documents but this letter.

Thus, a residency permit, visa, refugee card, and migration service document are all accepted documents authorizing the bearer to stay in Ukraine. In cases where the foreigner’s passport is pending registration, an internal affairs agency document is provided. A student card authorizes foreign students to reside in the country. Finally, a letter from the UNHCR is accepted in certain cases by government officials.

## **LEGAL STATUS OF KYIV IMMIGRANTS**

Only 15% of the immigrants in Kyiv who took part in the survey had a residence permit. These were mostly individuals who have lived in Ukraine for a long period of time. Among those who came before 1991, one of every three had this kind of permit. Eleven percent of immigrants who arrived

between 1991 and 1998 had a residence permit. Not a single immigrant who arrived after 1999 has such a document. Therefore, mostly former students or workers who came to Ukraine on the basis of relevant intergovernmental agreements, those who have resided here for a long period of time, and immigrants who are married to local residents have such documents.

The next group of immigrants—nearly 30%—is comprised of individuals who have visas, mostly business ones, or those whose passports were registered on the basis of a contractual agreement or study in Ukraine (as noted earlier, if an individual remains in Ukraine for more than one year, his/her visa is replaced by registration, and an appropriate notation is made in the passport by an internal affairs agency). The largest number of such individuals was found among those who arrived before 1991; there were somewhat fewer among those who arrived in the next period.

It should be noted, however, that a student visa or registration does not always mean that the individual is really a student. This status is often used as a means to enter Ukraine or legalize one's status in the country. There were few "students" of this kind among the immigrants taking part in the study—just a little over 3%. It is clear that none of them were studying at an institution of higher learning. The majority of those who have a visa/registration have the right to reside temporarily in Ukraine because of business or work.

Companies founded by individuals from the immigrants' countries of origin applied for work permits on behalf of their compatriots. The motive behind these actions was the lack of certain types of specialists in Ukraine. This is a typical phenomenon, e.g., among employees of Chinese or Vietnamese cafes and restaurants.

A little over 3% of the immigrants taking part in the survey have work permits. But, as in the "students" case, the existence of appropriate documents rarely meant that this or that person was really working at a certain company.

Immigrants from China and Vietnam who are residing in Ukraine as private entrepreneurs engaged in commerce issue private invitations to their relatives whom they hire as workers. Thus, for some respondents a private visa served as grounds for staying in Ukraine. In general, 80% of immigrants from Vietnam, nearly 70% from China, and over 44% from India and Pakistan, and one-third of immigrants from Middle Eastern countries have a visa or registration. But only 3% of Afghans and only one African have such documents.

The next group of immigrants includes individuals who are officially recognized as refugees (33%) or have documents from the migration service, stating that their applications to acquire refugee status are pending (2%). Afghans are predominant in this group: they account for nearly 70% of refugees, followed by Africans (nearly 22%). At the same time, not a single citizen of China, India, Pakistan, or Vietnam has refugee status or has applied for it in Ukraine.

The majority of refugees are found among immigrants who arrived in Ukraine between 1991 and 1998 (35.5%). The majority are Afghans, which is understandable, considering the fact that Afghans sought asylum after the fall of Najibullah's regime, and later, when the Taliban came to power. Nearly 25% of those who arrived before 1991 are refugees. For the most part, these are students who were studying in Ukraine but could not return home, fearing persecution. At the same time, there are fewer refugees among the immigrants of the last period—16%.

A small number of immigrants—six individuals, or 2% of the survey participants—had surrogate documents authorizing their stay in Ukraine. If an extension of the permitted period of residence in Ukraine is reviewed by the organs of Internal Affairs for longer than twenty-four hours, the applicant is issued a photo ID stating that his/her documents are being held by the police. Documents issued by the embassy of the citizen's country, stating that the foreigner has lost his/her passport and has applied for a renewal, also serve as surrogate documents. Finally, several immigrants used forged migration service documents.

The next group of immigrants (nearly 12%) only has UNHCR documents. There are practically no holders of such documents among those who arrived before 1991. The largest number of immigrants with such documents is found among those who arrived between 1991 and 1998 (15%) and after 1999 (13%). The majority of individuals with documents from the UNHCR are from African countries (nearly 70%). One in every four is Afghan. There are practically no individuals under international protection among immigrants from other regions.

Approximately 7% of the surveyed immigrants do not have any documents authorizing their stay in Ukraine, given that they entered the country illegally. These are people from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and African and Middle Eastern countries. All of them arrived after 1991. More than half arrived with official visas and invitations from colleges

and universities, i.e., they had the necessary grounds for entering the country. As of today, one-third of these individuals have national passports (including expired ones). If we add to these individuals bearers of UNHCR letters, which are not considered identification documents, and those who use information documents from the Department of Visas and Registration of Foreign Citizens (VVIR) or embassies, or forged migration service documents, over 20% of the immigrants who took part in the survey are living in Ukraine illegally, i.e., without documents authorizing their stay in the country.

According to our research data, even those immigrants who have lived in Ukraine for over ten years (an average of six years) do not have documents authorizing their stay in Ukraine. They actually became permanent residents long ago: they have become integrated into society, have established families with Ukrainian citizens (15% of the surveyed immigrants who are in mixed marriages do not have documents authorizing their stay in Ukraine), and have children who are Ukrainian citizens. Under these circumstances, sanctions against these people as illegal immigrants and their forcible deportation contravene various standards of international human rights laws (e.g., a child's right not to be separated from both parents, which is included in the Convention on the Rights of the Child signed by Ukraine). Thus, the information obtained in our survey of immigrants who have no residence permits attests not so much to an exacerbation of the problem of illegal migration so much as to flaws in the laws of Ukraine, which regulate the status of foreigners in the country.

A sojourn in Ukraine is legal if the newcomer is registered with the organs of Internal Affairs in his/her place of residence in Ukraine. There is a state tax on this registration process and its extension. Violations of registration requirements and other regulations concerning sojourns in Ukraine may result in administrative or criminal liability, a reduction in the duration of a temporary stay, and even deportation from the country. Foreigners and stateless individuals without documents may be detained by law enforcement agencies in order to establish their identity and determine the crucial circumstances of their case.

Liability for such violations is usually a rather hefty fine. As the study shows, the majority of respondents do not own homes in Kyiv but rent private apartments. Therefore, the possibility of registering their documents with internal affairs agencies depends entirely upon the consent of

the landlord who must provide written confirmation of the rental agreement and the foreigner's residence at the stated address.

Decisions passed by the Kyiv municipal government have created additional difficulties for registering foreigners' documents. The "Measures for the Prevention of Illegal Migration and the Regulation of Migration Processes in Kyiv,"<sup>48</sup> which were passed by the deputies of the Kyiv Municipal Council, empower the municipal administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Office of Nationalities Affairs and Migration of the Municipal State Administration to "apply measures to prevent the sojourn and settlement in the city of Kyiv of foreigners and refugees who have permits for residence in other regions (incl. Kyiv oblast)." The concept of migration policy in the city of Kyiv, which was

**TABLE 2.1 *Distribution of Immigrants 18 Years of Age or Older with Documents Authorizing Residence in Ukraine and Registration by Place of Residence, in % (N=310)***

Documents authorizing residence in Ukraine	With registration	No registration	With registration at a different address	Total
Residence permit	69.6	-	30.4	100
Refugee card or form issued by migration service	65.1	19.3	15.6	100
Visa/registration	81.5	4.4	14.1	100
Form issued by UNHCR	-	100.0	-	100
Other*	57.1	28.6	14.3	100
No documents	-	100.0	-	100
All Respondents	59.7	25.5	14.8	100

\* Forms from VVIR stating that the passport is pending registration, embassy forms stating that a passport is being re-issued, including similar forged forms.

approved by a Kyiv Municipal Council decision of 24 May 2001, is aimed at putting “a certain artificial limit (yearly quota) on the settling and sojourn of immigrants in the capital.”<sup>49</sup> Regardless of the fact that the Constitution of Ukraine (p. 33) guarantees foreigners who are in Ukraine legally the right to move about and choose their place of residence freely, internal affairs agencies in the city of Kyiv were absolutely unjustifiably forced to deny registration to foreigners who had secured residence permits or refugee cards in another oblast but had nevertheless moved to the capital.

These prohibitions, like other problems that arise in connection with registration, turn foreigners who have a legal right to stay in Ukraine into violators of established regulations with all the concomitant negative repercussions of such a situation. In general, one in every four adult immigrants in the survey does not have registration with the organs of Internal Affairs in Kyiv, which means that there are more of these kinds of individuals than those with no permits/visas for permanent or temporary residency in Ukraine. Nineteen percent of officially recognized refugees are not registered, nor are more than 4% of those with visa/residency permits (Table 2.1). According to the legislation, all of them are violating the regulations governing their stay in Ukraine.

As could be predicted, immigrants who arrived before 1991 are in the best position with respect to document registration: only 11% do not have registration documents; 29% of those who arrived between 1991 and 1998 are not registered, and 46% of those who arrived later have no registration documents. The largest number of immigrants without registration is comprised of immigrants from Africa—66%. Thirty percent of Pakistanis have no registration, and 27% of Afghans. Only 12.5% of Chinese and 1.5% of Vietnamese do not have registration (Table 2.2).

In addition to documents authorizing the right to stay in Ukraine, other documents that are issued in Ukraine are crucial to finding employment, acquiring an education, obtaining medical services, and securing rights that arise from marriage. Ukrainian documents that are most widely used by immigrants are university or technical school diplomas. Among immigrants 18 years and older who took part in the study, 15% had diplomas. The largest number of diplomas are held by immigrants from Middle East countries—28%, followed by Afghans—over 20%.

Nearly 42% of adult respondents have documents authorizing them to engage in business: these are certificates issued by private businessmen or

**TABLE 2.2** *Distribution of Immigrants 18 Years of Age or Older Based on Country of Origin with Registration by Place of Residence, in % (N=312)*

Country of origin	With registration	No registration	With registration at a different address	Total
Afghanistan	53.4	27.1	19.5	100
African countries	30.2	66.0	3.8	100
China	62.5	12.5	25.0	100
India and Pakistan	48.2	29.6	22.2	100
Middle East countries	69.0	20.7	10.3	100
Vietnam	92.6	1.5	5.9	100
All Respondents	59.5	27.0	13.5	100

trading licenses. The next group of documents consists of registrations of civil status documents. Only about 54% of immigrants who contracted marriages with citizens of Ukraine have marriage certificates. This means that almost one-half of mixed marriages are not legally registered, even though they have families and manage a joint household in which the immigrant is the chief breadwinner in the family.

The main obstacle to marriage registration is the lack of valid national passports. A refugee card is not sufficient documentation for registering a marriage, since legislation requires possession of a passport or a passport-type document. This situation changed only in 2001, with the passage of a new Law of Ukraine "On Refugees," which states that a refugee card qualifies as a passport.

Immigrants also experience problems with birth registration. Children of mixed marriages, both registered and unregistered, are issued birth certificates without any difficulty, if their mothers are Ukrainian. However, problems may arise when recording paternity. Registration of a child of two immigrant parents is even more complicated. This is an insurmountable obstacle for those without national passports. Until recently, refugee



papers, as with marriage registration, could not replace passports. Other obstacles to registering immigrants' children stem from loopholes in Ukrainian legislation. Until recently, the legislation defined that a birth certificate is issued to a child who is a citizen of Ukraine or has acquired Ukrainian citizenship.<sup>50</sup> The situation was rectified only in 2001, with the passage of a new version of the Law of Ukraine "On Ukrainian Citizenship,"<sup>51</sup> which stipulates that a birth certificate may attest only to the fact of a child's birth and name, but not citizenship.

In cases where both parents are immigrants, less than half of respondents' children born in Ukraine have birth certificates. Nearly 40% have only a hospital form recording the birth, and nearly 15% did not possess even these kinds of documents (they misplaced them or lost them for other reasons). As with other types of documents, Vietnamese immigrants are in the best position: over 70% have birth certificates for children born in Ukraine. Immigrants from Africa are in the worst situation: only 20% of their children have legal documents confirming their birth and name.

It should be noted, however, that some parents whose children do not have birth certificates made no effort whatsoever to apply for such documents. There were various reasons for this: they felt their requests were doomed to failure, lack of time or money. In addition, many believed that the form issued to the mother at the hospital's maternity unit was sufficient documentation for their child.

According to our research, at the time of the survey none of the respondents had acquired Ukrainian citizenship. At the same time, many of them declared that they would like to have Ukrainian citizenship. Thirty-four percent of immigrants who answered this question gave an affirmative response. Nearly 15% explained their decision to apply for Ukrainian citizenship by citing certain circumstances (existence of employment, opportunities for their children's education, etc.). The majority of those who wished to acquire citizenship (answers: "yes" or "probably") were immigrants from Africa (72%) and Afghanistan (51%). The lowest number was noted among citizens of Vietnam (32%). Still, a definite affirmative answer was given only by 13% of Vietnamese. Not a single immigrant from China wanted to acquire Ukrainian citizenship. Many factors influenced this decision (for details, see Chapter Three), primarily immigration reasons and further migration plans, as well as legal status in Ukraine.

None of the surveyed immigrants had obtained permission to immigrate to Ukraine. Pursuant to the Law of Ukraine “On Immigration”,<sup>52</sup> “foreigners and stateless individuals [among others] who arrived in Ukraine before 6 March 1998 in accordance with the 2 April 1981 Agreement between the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Government of the USSR concerning the referral and admission of Vietnamese citizens for professional study and work at enterprises and organizations of the USSR, who remained living in Ukraine and applied for permanent residence permits in Ukraine within six months of the date that this law came into effect” are entitled to this kind of authorization.

Therefore, the legal status of immigrants in Ukraine, and in particular the existence or lack of essential documents, determine all other conditions of their residence. There is an obvious need to simplify and increase the efficiency of organs in charge of processing documents for foreigners, directing their primary orientation toward the interests of the individual. In addition, there appears to be a crucial need to improve Ukrainian legislation with respect to the legal status of foreigners and stateless individuals. Our research confirms that the problems faced by immigrants who have been living in Ukraine for years without any established legal status require immediate resolution.

### **EMPLOYMENT OF KYIV IMMIGRANTS**

To a great degree the legal status of immigrants in Ukraine in general, and Kyiv in particular, is a definitive factor in employment opportunities. The Constitution of Ukraine guarantees everyone the right to employment (Article 43) and to engage in business (Article 42). At the same time, equality of rights, freedoms, and obligations on a par with Ukrainian citizens is guaranteed only to those foreigners who have legal grounds to reside in Ukraine (Article 26).<sup>53</sup> In accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On the Legal Status of Foreigners,” foreigners who are living permanently in Ukraine have the same right to employment as Ukrainian citizens. The Law of Ukraine “On Refugees” grants individuals with refugee status the same right to employment as citizens of Ukraine. Hence, foreigners residing permanently in Ukraine, as well as refugees, do not require additional work permits. Employment opportunities for other categories of foreigners are restricted by certain conditions.

Without a doubt the economic situation in the city and general municipal job market conditions affect employment among immigrants. Even during peak crisis periods, the situation in Kyiv, the largest city in Ukraine, was always better than in other regions. For that reason, the capital was always a center attracting many residents from other areas.

Trading at the markets has become the niche where immigrants have been able most easily to realize their working potential. First of all, foreigners wishing to engage in trading did not require any special work permits, and secondly, as a result of unemployment and extremely low wages, the majority of other spheres of activity were either inaccessible to immigrants or unsuitable. Hence, it is no surprise that most (47%) economically active immigrants who took part in the survey (there were 255 economically active individuals among immigrants older than 18, excluding housewives/retirees and students supported by their families), indicated trading as their major source of income. For the most part, the activity of entrepreneurs (12.5%) is also connected with trading. Thus, nearly 60% of economically active immigrants are engaged in trading.


A comparison of the nature of immigrants' work in their homelands and their activities in Kyiv reveals that 65% of former bureaucrats and specialists, 65% of military men, and nearly 50% of those who were students or pupils in their homelands have become traders.

Although for many immigrants the decision to engage in trading was made under constraint, for others, primarily immigrants from countries where migration is typically motivated by economic reasons, business and trading were the goals behind their move to Ukraine. A significant number of such immigrants were from China, Pakistan, and Vietnam. The majority of immigrants are private entrepreneurs and traders. There are comparatively few hired workers among immigrants—15.3%. At the same time, unemployment is quite high among immigrants—nearly 24%.

The largest number of hired workers is noted among Chinese immigrants. Practically all immigrants from India and Pakistan, and the majority of newcomers from Afghanistan and Vietnam, are entrepreneurs. Unemployment is typical for immigrants from African countries.

Unemployment is lowest among those who arrived before 1991, while the highest is among immigrants who have arrived in recent years. In addition, the largest number of entrepreneurs is found among immigrants who arrived before 1991; the lowest number is noted among newcomers

**FIGURE. 2.1. Structure of Employment Statuses of Economically Active Immigrants by Period of Arrival**



who arrived in the last period (Figure. 2.1).

This may be explained not only by better integration thanks to lengthy periods of residence, but to a great degree also by the immigrants' legal status, which is more stable among those who arrived before 1991. There is a direct and obvious link between the existence of documents authorizing residence in Ukraine and the possibility for employment or private enterprise (Table 2.3).

Especially noteworthy is the fact that the category of private entrepreneurs and traders also includes some immigrants who do not have any valid documents whatsoever to stay in Ukraine or have only a form from the UNHCR, which does not constitute official permission to stay in the country. Many of these are individuals who work in a business registered in the name of a Ukrainian wife. Some are engaged in trading without any kind of permit. As a rule, these are traders selling from hand to hand (without their own stands at the market), water or tea distributors, and plastic bag sellers—individuals who occupy the lowest rungs in the market hierarchy. Forty-six percent of economically active immigrants have trading licenses or documents identifying them as private entrepreneurs. More than 60% of those who are engaged in entrepreneurship are self-employed traders.

**TABLE 2.3** *Distribution of Economically Active Immigrants Based on Documents Authorizing Residence in Ukraine and Main Types of Work, in % (N=255)*

Type of document authorizing residence in Ukraine	Hired worker	Private entrepreneur or trader	Unemployed	Total
Residence permit	10.3	87.2	2.5	100
Refugee card or form from migration service	18.4	54.0	27.6	100
Visa/registration	21.8	74.4	3.8	100
Form from UNHCR	3.7	11.1	85.2	100
Other*	-	100.0	-	100
No documents	6.7	40.0	53.3	100
All Respondents	15.3	60.8	23.9	100

\* Forms from VVIR stating that a passport is pending registration, embassy forms stating that a passport is in the process of being re-issued, including fabricated forms.

The development of markets also resulted in an increase in competition, in the course of which immigrants constantly forfeit their standings. Whereas earlier their advantage was experience in market relations, today Ukrainian citizens have also acquired this type of experience. In comparison with immigrants, Ukrainian citizens have many more opportunities for developing businesses and general room to maneuver in the job market.

Markets of the type that were prevalent in the 1990s are gradually becoming a thing of the past. Many markets are now undergoing reconstruction with the goal of creating modern trading enterprises with every necessary convenience for both sellers and buyers. Therefore, the main sphere of employment and source of income for immigrants is constantly shrinking. They have a realistic view of their prospects. Most of the Chinese and Vietnamese citizens who work in the Kyiv markets are planning to return to their homelands or to switch to other forms of entrepreneurship, primarily

**TABLE 2.4** *Distribution of Economically Active Immigrants Based on Employment Status and Level of Job Satisfaction, in % (N=252)*

Employment status	Completely satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Quite dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Not sure	Total
Hired worker	25.6	46.3	12.8	12.8	2.5	100
Private entrepreneur or self-employed	10.3	34.2	20.6	33.6	1.3	100
Unemployed	-	5.2	10.3	81.0	3.5	100
All Respondents	10.3	29.3	17.1	41.3	2.0	100

the restaurant business. Afghan refugees are in a different position, for they still face possible repatriation to Afghanistan. At the same time, immigrants with specialists' background who trade at the markets realize that with every passing day and year they are losing their qualifications. This means that opportunities for finding other kinds of jobs are constantly shrinking.

All this may explain why the level of job satisfaction among immigrants is extremely low. Only a little over 10% of entrepreneurs and traders were satisfied with their work, while over 50% were either dissatisfied or quite dissatisfied. The largest number of those who are dissatisfied with their work may be found among immigrants with higher education or vocational training.

The group of hired, working immigrants includes individuals working for international and non-governmental organizations; specialists, translators/interpreters, managers, and service personnel of private companies; workers employed in private, small- and medium-sized industrial enterprises; and workers in food service enterprises. Not a single immigrant was employed at a state-owned enterprise or educational or medical institution, etc.

Information obtained during the survey challenges the stereotypical notion that immigrants appear to prefer to engage in trading than work

in manufacturing. Finding a permanent and stable job is a great, but often unrealistic, dream for immigrants. As noted earlier, the majority of unemployed do not have the required documents to stay in Ukraine, which is the main reason behind their inability to find employment. Some of the surveyed immigrants who were not working anywhere, and had not had a job in years, relied on assistance from charitable organizations, countrymen, and family members, and did not demonstrate any particular desire to find a job. Nevertheless, the majority of the unemployed would like to work, and they have the necessary education and qualifications for this.

The unemployed are mostly immigrants from African countries. Besides the lack of documents, the reason also lies in the particularities of the African community in the city of Kyiv. The community is quite small and is comprised of immigrants from various countries, who have only sporadic contact with each other. In contrast, there are far fewer unemployed individuals in more closely knit communities, such as the Afghan or Vietnamese communities, who have a developed system of mutual assistance.

Immigrant employment in the city of Kyiv may be divided into three main categories. The first includes Afghans and immigrants from India and Pakistan, whose chief form of employment is trading at the markets. The second category is mixed: trading at the markets, entrepreneurship, and hired work in the restaurant industry and other enterprises. This is typical for immigrants from China and Vietnam. The third category is characterized by the lack of stable employment and by sporadic, occasional earnings, which is typical for immigrants from African countries. Some immigrants from Middle Eastern countries belong to all three employment categories, which is linked to the extremely diverse structure of this group, both in terms of migration reasons and legal status.

The fact that the majority of immigrants from Afghanistan work in retail sales at the markets, in the respondents' own words, is because the Afghan community in Kyiv was formed during the years of the economic crisis. Their workplaces are the Troieshchynsky and Sviatoshytsky markets. According to the respondents, the Troieshchynsky market was established by Afghans whom the government forced out of other city markets.

According to the survey data, nearly 46% of economically active Afghans who were engaged in entrepreneurship and commerce hold private entrepreneurs' permits; another 14.3% hold trading licenses. Some only have taxpayer identification codes. This indicates that these people

are included on other commercial licenses. At the same time, over 34% of traders do not have documents for entrepreneurial activity (Table 2.5).

In terms of nature of work, Pakistanis are most similar to Afghans. The market is their main workplace. There are half as many unemployed Pakistanis, but the proportion of entrepreneurs and traders is higher. The preponderant majority of Pakistanis have documents authorizing them to engage in entrepreneurship and commerce. In some cases, since mixed marriages with Ukrainian women are predominant among them, documents for business are issued to their wives.

**TABLE 2.5** *Distribution of Economically Active Immigrants from Afghanistan Based on Employment Status and Documents for Entrepreneurial Activity, in % (N=87)*

Employment status	Private entrepreneur's permit	Trading license	Taxpayer's code (for those who do not have other documents)	None of the listed documents	Total
Hired employee	-	-	44.4	55.6	100
Private entrepreneur or self-employed	45.7	14.3	5.7	34.3	100
Unemployed	-	-	-	100.0	100
All Respondents	36.8	11.5	9.2	42.5	100

As noted earlier, from its very beginnings Vietnamese immigration to Ukraine was work-related. Throughout the 1990s a number of Vietnamese companies were established in Kyiv, selling imported goods from Vietnam. As sellers, they hired their compatriots who had lost their jobs at Ukrainian enterprises but had remained in the country. Thus, former industrial workers became hired workers in the commercial sector. Eventually, many of these companies ceased to exist. Some workers obtained their own trading licenses or private entrepreneurs' permits. In turn, they began to invite their compatriots to work, issuing invitations to both former migrant workers in Ukraine and relatives and acquaintances from Vietnam. The majority of



respondents from Vietnam are private entrepreneurs engaged in commerce.

One in every four economically active immigrants from Vietnam is a hired worker. Predominant among them are cooks, waiters in Vietnamese cafes and restaurants, and managers and employees of small companies created with Vietnamese capital. In this category are also specialists from various professions who were educated in Ukraine and who are working in branches of Vietnamese companies, joint Ukrainian-Vietnamese companies, or Ukrainian firms who have business ties with Vietnam. There are practically no individuals without documents authorizing their activities among economically active immigrants from Vietnam (Table 2.6).

The majority of immigrants from China who participated in the study are also traders at the Kyiv markets or hired employees in the food service or food processing industries.

Among the most “eclectic” group of immigrants—those from Middle Eastern countries—are quite a few very successful businessmen, mostly citizens of Turkey, who are actively engaged in business with the help of their partners-compatriots in Turkey and other countries. These are mostly Kurds by nationality. Some Kurdish immigrants, however, who

**TABLE 2.6** *Distribution of Economically Active Immigrants from Vietnam Based on Employment Status and Documents for Entrepreneurial Activities, in % (N=54)*

Employment status	Private entrepreneur’s permit	Trading license	Taxpayer code (for those who do not have other documents)	None of the listed documents	Total
Hired employee	8.4	33.3	33.3	25.0	100
Private entrepreneur or self-employed	34.2	56.0	2.4	2.4	100
Unemployed	-	-	-	100.0	100
All Respondents	31.4	50.0	9.3	9.3	100

have no permits to reside in Ukraine can neither obtain employment nor engage in trading at the markets. Occasionally they work in companies owned by their countrymen, for the most part illegally. This opportunity is offered to some only as a form of assistance. In other cases, they live on sporadic earnings by working in places where no one asks for documents, e.g., at the vegetable warehouses of Kyiv, where they are happy to hire additional seasonal workers to do the hardest and dirtiest jobs for very low wages.

As noted earlier, the most acute problem affecting Africans is employment. Income gained, e.g., from retail sales at the city markets is typical for Afghans, Vietnamese, and Pakistanis, but not for them. According to the respondents, even though Africans were the first traders to appear at the Sviatoshynsky market, when it was just in its inchoate, rudimentary stage, they were later squeezed out. As a result, there were only three traders among the surveyed Africans. Two of them were working as hired employees of Afghan traders, and only one had his own market stall.

In general, only 20% of economically active African immigrants have permanent employment. Besides the above-mentioned traders, these are individuals working for NGOs (e.g. the UNHCR Reception Center), branches of foreign companies, a sports club (professional athlete), and in private manufacturing companies. The majority of Africans are unemployed. It is difficult to find a job even for those of them who have high qualifications and are fluent in several languages. The main obstacle to employment is the lack of legal status. All Africans who do not have any documents are unemployed, as are 95% of those who have only forms from the UNHCR. Although the level of unemployment among officially recognized refugees is high, it is much smaller than among refugees without documents at 62%. Meanwhile, the majority (90%) of those who have jobs have documents authorizing them to reside in Ukraine.

In summarizing the survey questions concerning employment and immigrants' sources of income in Kyiv, it should be noted that immigrants are now a component of the economic system in the city: they are producers of goods, providers of services, taxpayers, and employers who create jobs, including jobs for Ukrainian citizens. They play a certain role in supplying goods and services for the consumer market, and thanks to their connections, they are contributing to the development of business relations between Ukraine and their countries of origin, as well as the distri-

bution of goods and services not available earlier in Ukraine, e.g, Chinese or Vietnamese cuisine, and economic know-how.

At the same time, the work and intellectual potential of immigrants are not being fully exploited, primarily of those who have a high level of education and qualifications, and who could be of greater benefit to Ukrainian society by applying their knowledge that was acquired, in point of fact, in Ukrainian institutions of higher learning. Notwithstanding certain positive changes of the last few years, immigrants' employment and work activity are taking place to a significant degree in the "shadow" economy. Finally, unemployment and bleak prospects for job-hunting among some immigrants are damaging to the individual and dangerous to society, since they lead to the marginalization of immigrants, and create fertile conditions for the spread of criminality.

### **INCOME LEVELS AND POVERTY**

For 60% of economically active immigrants who participated in the survey, the main source of income is commerce and entrepreneurship. Over 15% work as hired workers. For 12.2% of respondents, the main source of income is assistance provided by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Another 5% of those who indicated other main sources of income, including commerce, said that they receive assistance from the UNHCR and regard it as an additional source of income.

At the time of this survey, UNHCR assistance was being issued to refugees registered with the UNHCR Office in Kyiv and to their family members in the amount of 30 and 20 dollars per month, respectively. In one-parent families, aid for children was somewhat higher. Additional aid was also being issued to immigrants suffering from tuberculosis—for medication and better nutrition. Most Africans, but not all, receive this kind of assistance—only those who are considered refugees from politically unstable countries with ongoing military conflicts. Since the majority of African immigrants are unemployed, this assistance is actually their main source of income. This is also the case for some Afghans, mostly families with many children and single-parent families, sick people, and the disabled. Meanwhile, not a single member of the Kurdish community has received UNHCR aid, even though some Kurds are recognized refugees.

Respondents who have no stable job listed occasional earnings (5.5%) among other sources of income. Help from families, relatives, and acquaintances, or their own savings, was cited by 6.3% of respondents. This is mostly assistance from family members in Ukraine, including Ukrainian wives or their families, and to a lesser degree from relatives abroad; there are a few such cases. The surveyed immigrants never received any kind of social assistance from the state. Even those who according to Ukrainian law are entitled to a pension—i.e., people who are permanent residents of Ukraine and refugees—encounter serious difficulties when filing their applications because they are unable to provide all the necessary documentation.

A proportion of immigrants, primarily socially vulnerable categories, i.e., families with children or disabled family members, one-parent families, and those without stable income, were receiving non-monetary income in the form of humanitarian aid—food (flour, cooking oil, sugar, etc.), second-hand clothing, medicine, and children’s vitamins. Humanitarian aid is named as a source of additional income by over 10% of immigrants. This kind of aid was being provided by the UNHCR Office and some religious communities (Baptist, Catholic, and the “Victory” church).

The Ukrainian Red Cross Society provides assistance to refugees and asylum seekers. Approximately 10% of its humanitarian programs were being allocated to this type of assistance. In particular, the Red Cross in Kyiv was distributing hot food to needy migrants and refugees in districts with dense immigrant populations, and providing food packages once every two months: two kilograms of rice, a liter of cooking oil, one package of macaroni, and one kilogram of sugar. Financing of these programs was provided by sponsors’ donations with no government intervention. Nearly 400 individuals were receiving assistance. At the time of this survey there was also a program to assist refugees, asylum seekers, and individuals suffering from tuberculosis. The program entailed the distribution of food, hygiene products, and medicine. Seventy-five immigrants in the survey were receiving this type of assistance. Africans predominated among recipients of various types of non-monetary assistance.

The questionnaires used in this survey did not include direct questions about amount of monetary income, in view of the fact that people usually prefer not to reveal this kind of information. Fifty-four percent of the economically active immigrants who took part in the survey, or 138 individuals, agreed to provide their income amount. The majority of those

who were more willing to discuss this issue were immigrants from Vietnam, which may be explained by the fact that they feel secure about their status, since, as a rule, they have all the necessary documents to live and work in Ukraine. Immigrants from Africa who are recipients of UNHCR monetary assistance were also open about reporting their income, since amounts and payment schedules are clearly defined.

**TABLE 2.7** *Distribution of Economically Active Immigrants Based on Country of Origin and Amount of Monthly Income, in hryvnias (N=138)*

Country of origin	Minimum income	Maximum income	Average income
Afghanistan	300.0	2,400.0	864.3
African countries	160.0	1,300.0	439.4
China	1,000.0	3,500.0	2,875. 0
India and Pakistan	500.0	3,500.0	1,612.5
Middle East countries	250.0	5,300.0	1,931. 3
Vietnam	800.0	4,000.0	2,141.3
All Respondents	160.0	5,300.0	1,271.7

There was a huge difference between immigrants' minimum and maximum incomes. There are also significant differences in the amount of income among immigrants from different countries of origin. The highest median income with the smallest difference between minimum and maximum income was recorded among immigrants from China. The income of Vietnamese immigrants is rather sizeable. Meanwhile, the median income of Afghans is significantly lower, with Africans' income being the lowest.

The highest median income of economically active migrants living in Ukraine working on contract is 3,200 hryvnias per month. In second place are holders of business visas or registration documents, and those with permits to reside in Ukraine—1,900 hryvnias. Immigrants who have only UNHCR forms have the lowest median income—400 hryvnias. Income is somewhat higher among those with refugee documents—700 hryvnias.

In the distribution of median income based on employment status, the highest was among entrepreneurs—2,100 hryvnias. The median income among traders was 1,400 hryvnias; among the unemployed, 430 hryvnias. In the distribution of immigrants based on country of origin, the highest incomes were noted among groups that included a larger number of entrepreneurs, businessmen, and individuals with residence permits and business visas.

Market trading is the primary and most widespread type of employment among all immigrants, and especially those from Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the majority of cases, market trading generates an income of 501–1,000 hryvnias. Earnings that are neither too low nor very high are not typical for this group. The largest incomes are connected with “combined” employment, which is widespread among immigrants from China and Vietnam who are engaged in entrepreneurial activity and other highly paid hired work (mostly in companies owned by their countrymen). Here the incomes of the majority of respondents fluctuate between 1,000 and 5,000 hryvnias. In the third type of employment, where income is generated by occasional work and humanitarian aid (typical for immigrants from African countries), incomes are the smallest and for the majority of respondents total less than 250 hryvnias per month. Finally, immigrants from Middle East countries, who are the most eclectic group in terms of migration motives and legal statuses, also turned out to be the most diverse with regard to income levels.

Taking into account the small number of answers and the respondents’ low level of candidness, data on the amount of their earnings may be regarded as somewhat provisional. However, they have been verified by information from other sources, particularly from the expert survey and from Ukrainian citizens who were also working at the market and agreed to tell the interviewers about their work.

Without a doubt, the real well-being of immigrants depends not only on the level of monetary income but also household size. For that reason, data on the average per capita income in families of respondents appear to be more revealing. The average per capita incomes of nearly 10% of immigrants and their family members in the city of Kyiv are below the official poverty line of 118.3 hryvnias per month, which was introduced by law at the time of the survey. The incomes of 52% of members of immigrant households were lower than the minimum wage, i.e., 311.3 hryvnias per

**TABLE 2.8** *Distribution of Economically Active Immigrants Based on Country of Origin and Amount of Monthly Income, in % (N=138)*

Country of origin	Up to 250 hryvnias	251-500 hryvnias	501-1,000 hryvnias	1,001-2,500 hryvnias	2,501-5,000 hryvnias	5,001 hryvnias and higher	Total
Afghanistan	-	27.0	51.4	21.6	-	-	100
African countries	39.0	29.3	24.4	7.3	-	-	100
China	-	-	25.0	-	75.0	-	100
India and Pakistan	-	12.5	50.0	12.5	25.0	-	100
Middle East countries	12.5	25.0	-	25.0	25.0	12.5	100
Vietnam	-	-	5.0	72.5	22.5	-	100
All Respondents	12.3	18.1	26.1	31.2	11.6	0.7	100

month at the time of the survey. If we agree with researchers who consider that the real poverty line in Kyiv is 175 hryvnias per person per month,<sup>54</sup> then nearly 34% of members of immigrant households are living below this level. Meanwhile, the average per capita income of 48% of members of immigrant households was higher than the minimum wage, while for some it was significantly higher.

Members of Afghan households (11.6%) and practically one in every five members of African families were living below the official poverty line; there were no immigrants from other countries and regions with incomes below this level. Three-quarters of Afghan households had incomes below the minimum wage. In African households this figure reached 83%.

Differentiation of level of income results from both the legal status and employment of immigrants, and the number of dependents per working member. Thus, one-third of immigrant families with six-seven members had an average per capita income below the official poverty line. Average per capita income exceeding the minimum wage was not recorded in such families. Meanwhile, there were no families consisting of one or two members with an average per capita income below the official poverty line. Two-thirds of such families had an average per capita income above the minimum wage.

Well-being depends both on income size and amount of expenses. The fact that an overwhelming majority of immigrants, as opposed to indigenous Kyivans, do not own homes and are forced to rent apartments must be taken into account when analyzing their level of well-being. The only exceptions are those who are married to Ukrainian citizens who have their own homes, and those who are living with their families. According to the survey data, 11% of respondents paid only utility bills; others (89%) also had to pay rent on their apartments. Rent is a significant expense and leaves immigrants with less money to spend on everyday needs.

Thus, immigrants' assessments of their families' level of material well-being were rather low. Only 2.7% of the principal respondents, i.e., representatives of households (incl. those consisting of only one individual) who provided responses to the survey questions, said that their level was problem-free. At the same time, nearly 20% considered that their families were living below the poverty level.

Relative to income amount, ratings of material circumstances markedly differed according to immigrants' countries of origin. The lowest ratings are



given by Africans; Afghans also gave low ratings. The overwhelming majority of immigrants from Vietnam and China gave high ratings of their material situation in Ukraine.

Although rent comprises a significant portion of immigrants' household expenses, the main expense is food, just as in Kyivan residents' households. Immigrants from Vietnam have the best diet. According to our observations, they spend a significant portion of their income on food, which is a priority for them, compared to other family needs. Ratings of nutrition by the group of Chinese immigrants, who have approximately the same income as the Vietnamese, are comparatively lower than the latter group's. A possible explanation for this is that more Chinese families are single individuals and those without children who are intent on saving money during their stay in Ukraine to subsidize their further move to the West.

A rather high level of satisfaction with quality of nutrition is observed among immigrants from India, Middle Eastern countries, and Pakistan. More than 70% of Afghans and over 80% of Africans consider their diet to be modest or even inadequate. The majority of Afghan immigrants are forced to economize on food. Some Afghan families, mostly those without breadwinners, only consume food that is provided through the humanitarian aid of the UNHCR and other organizations.

The nutrition situation among Africans is even worse. Forty-eight percent said that they are undernourished. For the most part, their children eat meat only in pre-schools. Often there is no milk at home for children, who drink sweetened tea. Only 19% of African households have dairy products as part of their daily diet. Over 40% never consume them. As a result of malnutrition and the lack of foods crucial to children's physical development, children in African families frequently suffer from lymphomatosis, dystrophy, and bad teeth owing to the lack of calcium in their bodies, which stems from the absence of dairy products in their diet.

It would appear that African immigrants' extremely low ratings of their families' diets are not unjustified. As noted earlier, the majority of African immigrants survive on aid provided by the UNHCR, which amounts to 20–30 US dollars. Most of this money is used for rent, with hardly any left over for food.

Similar to diet, respondents gave diverse ratings of the quality of clothing of their family members. As could be predicted, the highest ratings

**TABLE 2.9 Distribution of Primary Respondents Based on Country of Origin and Ratings of Clothing Quality of Family Members, in % (N=224)**

Country of origin	Up to 120 hryv.	121-175 hryv.	176-250 hryv.	251-310 hryv.	311-400 hryv.	401-500 hryv.	501-700 hryv.	701-1,000 hryv.	1,001 and higher	Total
Afghanistan	11.6	28.4	23.2	11.6	8.4	3.2	3.2	9.4	1.0	100
African countries	19.5	47.1	16.1	-	10.3	2.3	2.3	1.2	1.2	100
China	-	-	44.4	-	-	-	55.6	-	-	100
India and Pakistan	-	6.3	6.3	-	18.8	-	-	62.5	6.2	100
Middle East countries	-	-	8.3	-	8.3	8.3	33.3	16.8	25.0	100
Vietnam	-	-	-	-	10.2	29.0	29.0	18.8	13.0	100
All Respondents	9.7	23.9	14.6	3.8	9.7	9.0	11.8	12.2	5.2	100

were given by immigrants from Pakistan and Vietnam. The worst situation is noted among Afghans and Africans (Table 2.9).

### **ACCESS TO PUBLIC SERVICES**

Immigrants hardly ever avail themselves of public or cultural services. Over 60% of the primary respondents said that neither they nor members of their families go to movie theatres, performing arts theatres, exhibitions, libraries, or social services. Only school-aged children visit cultural institutions during organized field trips, and only in those cases where their parents are able to provide money for such excursions, or if they are free of charge. The only service establishments that immigrants frequent are beauty salons and barber shops. Immigrants avail themselves of food services somewhat more frequently, but only those who have a more or less decent income.

One important factor affecting the level of well-being is access to health care. According to the survey data, the majority of immigrant family members who participated in the study requested medical assistance during their stay in Kyiv; practically everyone obtained it. Less than 2% of immigrants were denied such services. At the same time, immigrants believe that access to medical services for foreigners in Kyiv is noticeably more restricted than for Kyiv residents.

According to the survey data, nearly 60% of respondents and members of their families visited municipal health clinics in their neighborhoods. However, free medical care was provided only in two-thirds of these cases. Respondents stated that maternity units and children's clinics do not deny services even when the parents of a child have no documents. According to information reported during the study, more than 90% of medical services for infants were provided free of charge; the same applied to 60% of new mothers. In general, respondents were most satisfied with medical services for children.

The private medical sector in Kyiv is still not well-developed, and very expensive. As a result, respondents generally obtain medical services requiring payment in ordinary medical clinics or offices through friends and acquaintances, including those who work in such establishments. Foreigners who have children and avail themselves of services offered by children's medical centers often try to resolve problems affecting adult family members with the assistance of pediatricians—for an additional fee.

Thirty percent of immigrants paid for medical services; nearly 70% of Pakistanis paid for medical services, as did 50% of immigrants from Middle Eastern countries, and 40% of Vietnamese.

Given that most medical services require payment, access to medical help is quite restricted to a certain proportion of immigrants, primarily refugees and asylum seekers who do not have documents issued by the government, nor funds to pay for private medical care. The UNHCR Office in Ukraine provides some assistance in resolving this problem. Pursuant to the agreement signed between this organization and the departmental hospital for oil and gas industry employees in Ukraine, beginning in 1995 immigrants have been receiving medical assistance based on a referral from the UNHCR Reception Center. In 2001 alone nearly 3,000 refugees and asylum seekers visited this hospital. Emergency intervention and treatment in specialized clinics are financed, whenever necessary. Children are vaccinated against diphtheria. Within the framework of “Women’s Health” program, clinical examinations of refugee women are provided by the Kyiv Gynecological Center. Respondents and members of their families obtained medical assistance paid by charitable organizations in 13% of all cases. These were individuals who would otherwise be entirely deprived of access to medical care.

Another possible way for immigrants to obtain medical services, like most public services, turned out to be visits to “their own” doctors, who at the present time are generally engaged in trading at the market. For example, the Afghani community has its own male doctor and female doctor, the latter treating women. The doctor “receives” his or her patients at the bazaar stall, where s/he prescribes medication, gives massages, and receives payment. The patients are satisfied. There is no need to waste time and money searching for medical assistance. “Their own” doctor has a good grasp of their problems and can always provide help, if not through treatment, then at least with advice. Nevertheless, in more complicated medical cases this kind of care would not be sufficient.

## **HOUSING**

Information collected during the study revealed that although immigrants’ income on average is somewhat higher than that of Kyiv residents, their access to many consumer goods and services, including essential ones, such as education and medical services, is limited. However, this

conclusion is true only for a certain proportion of surveyed immigrants, since property diversification and, correspondingly, the difference in consumption within their milieu is a rather pronounced phenomenon.

Our data shows that immigrants in the city of Kyiv live mostly in standard, multi-family apartment buildings equipped with standard conveniences. Over 80% of households live in apartments with telephone service. Today, the overwhelming majority of immigrants rent units from residents who live in the city of Kyiv or the suburbs. This accounts for nearly 70% of all immigrants. Of this number, 55% rent apartments, 15% rent rooms or “corners” of rooms, i.e., they share a room with the landlords of the apartment (Table 2.10).

No one has government housing; 8.7% of households live in dormitories. These are either former students who by agreement with dormitory administrations continue to avail themselves of this type of housing; individuals who are married to Ukrainian citizens and were provided with dormitory accommodations through their jobs; or foreign workers, mostly Chinese, whose employers have provided housing dormitories. Thirty-three respondents (14.3%) live in housing owned by their Ukrainian wives. Only 3%, mostly Afghans, continue to live with relatives.

According to respondents, 3.9%, or nine individuals, purchased housing with their own money earned in Ukraine. These are citizens of Vietnam and countries of the Middle East, two Afghans, and one Pakistani. Six of these individuals are businessmen; the others are highly paid employees of private companies. However, the purchased apartments are quite modest: two are one-room apartments, six have two rooms, and only one has three rooms.

Finally, two of the respondents turned out to be individuals without a designated place of residence: one is a disabled war veteran whose Ukrainian citizen wife left him and disappeared, and the other is a bankrupt Indian trader.

Immigrants' housing accommodations are small. Only a few households live in two- or three-room apartments: 23.5% and 7%, respectively. Ukrainian-born wives of immigrants own one in every five two-room apartments and half of three-room apartments. Sixty-eight percent of apartments rented by immigrants from local residents are one-room apartments. Only 27% are two-room apartments, and nearly 6% are three-room apartments. Almost all renters of three-room apartments are entrepreneurs and employees of private companies.

**TABLE 2.10 Distribution of Immigrant Households Based on Country of Origin and Type of Housing at the Time of the Survey, in % (N=233)**

Country of origin	Room in dormitory	Rented apartment	Rented room	Live with relatives	Own housing	Housing owned by wife	Other*	Total
Afghanistan	8.7	58.2	10.1	5.0	2.5	13.9	1.3	100
African countries	-	56.3	25.0	2.1	-	16.7	-	100
China	58.3	33.3	-	-	-	8.3	-	100
India and Pakistan	7.4	51.9	18.5	-	3.7	14.8	3.7	100
Middle East countries	4.1	39.3	17.9	3.6	10.7	21.4	-	100
Vietnam	5.4	67.6	8.1	2.7	8.1	8.1	-	100
All Respondents	8.7	55.0	14.3	3.0	3.9	14.3	0.9	100

\* Without a designated place of residence

The largest group of immigrant households, even households with rather large families, lives in one-room apartments or rooms rented out in larger apartments. Nearly 45% of surveyed households live in one room. One out of every four immigrant households has less than one room because the family shares a room with other households. Most of these (93%) are single people (half of unmarried respondents share a room with other tenants), although this figure also includes families. In some cases, immigrants share a room with their landlords—mostly elderly pensioners who rent space for a paltry sum of money in exchange for some assistance from their tenants.

Immigrants who rent apartments from private citizens pay both utility bills—electricity and telephone—and rent. In general, rent paid by respondents at the time of this survey was higher, and occasionally significantly higher, than rent paid by local residents for similar apartments. The owners of these apartments are often pensioners, unemployed people, single mothers, and individuals suffering from alcoholism, i.e., people whose apartments serve as their main source of income.

In order to reduce their housing expenditures, immigrants were living rather compactly, renting one-room apartments for families of four to six people. Single people share housing, two or three per room, or small, one-room hotel-type apartments. There are cases of several unrelated families living together. In the words of one female respondent, the housing problem is the chief worry of immigrant families and the main reason behind the attempts of foreigners, particularly refugees, to move to Western countries. Any reduction in wages or unforeseen expenditures, such as illness in the family, can result in homelessness for the household.

As stated earlier, some interviews were conducted at the respondents' residences, and interviewers were able to see for themselves the kinds of apartments that are rented to immigrants. These apartments are usually in poor condition and require renovations. Forty percent of these apartments are located on the first or top floors of buildings. Regardless of the fact that apartments occupied by immigrants are generally in poor condition, they rarely renovate them because of financial problems and the fact that they are not sure how long they will stay. At the same time, according to respondents' answers, one in every four has made some changes or has renovated their housing.

Most often immigrants have reinforced doors or installed bars on their windows. This was done by 12% of surveyed households. It so hap-

pens that apartments rented to immigrants are often targets of burglary attempts. On the one hand, this phenomenon may be explained by a stereotype dating back to the old days, when many average citizens associated the word “foreigner” with “rich.” On the other hand, immigrants’ apartments also attract burglars because their occupants belong to the most vulnerable segment of society. In the event of a burglary, they could not even go to the police because they have problems with documents authorizing their stay in Ukraine.

Immigrants rent apartments equipped with furniture, some kitchenware and bed linens, televisions, refrigerators, etc. Thus, landlords who rent apartments to immigrants own 80% of refrigerators, 43.2% of televisions, and 39% of washing machines. Immigrants only own such consumer items as videocassette recorders (82.4%), cassette recorders (83%), and radios (43%). Sixteen percent of immigrants own cellular telephones. Immigrants from Vietnam own one in every four cellular phone, with the same number from Pakistan. Only eight individuals (3%) own a satellite antenna; these are citizens of Vietnam and Middle Eastern countries. Respondents who own computers (6%) also come from these countries.

Only 9% of respondents had cars. Two-thirds of these cars belonged to immigrants from Vietnam, Middle Eastern countries, and Afghanistan. Most car owners are businessmen who also used their car on trips to bring goods from cities like Odesa.

Another important question is the residential distribution of immigrants in Kyiv city districts. The press, and even municipal administrators, have occasionally alarmed Kyiv residents by pointing out the danger of creating ethnic housing projects, i.e., places with compact immigrant populations along the lines of the “Chinatowns” and “black” districts in large American cities. Leaving aside the question of the danger level posed by such housing estates, we will focus on whether they actually exist or are developing in the capital of Ukraine.

Data gathered during this survey, statistical facts, and experts’ opinions indicate that the issue of ethnic housing projects is a non-starter. First of all, the number of immigrants from Asian and African countries in Kyiv is small and does not have a noticeable impact on its ethnic profile. Secondly, there are no areas with compact foreign populations in the city, except in dormitories for foreign students.



Surveyed immigrant households are distributed throughout the city (Table 2.11). The only areas in the city with no immigrants are the central districts. On the contrary, the majority live in newly built, high-rise “bedroom” communities.

Thus, settlement by residential area is more or less equal. The only district that stands out is Troieshchyna, where one-third of surveyed immigrant households were living at the time of the survey. This district is the main residential area of Afghan respondents (66%), and Pakistanis (nearly 41%), i.e., those groups of immigrants whose primary activity is trading at the market. The fact that they reside in Troieshchyna is obviously linked to the location of the largest traders’ market in Kyiv, where most immigrants work. This is also the reason behind immigrant settlement in other districts, where other large traders’ markets are located, e.g., Borshchahivka, Sviatoshyn, or Darnytsia. A juxtaposition of the residential area and working district indicates that over 75% of those working in Troieshchyna also reside there. Everyone who works in Borshchahivka also lives there.

Certain city districts have a denser immigrant population, owing to the presence of college and university dormitories where some immigrants had lived during their studies. These are the districts of Demiiivka (Studmistechno, Chokolivka), Solomianka, and Vidradny. For Vietnamese immigrants, habitation in the districts of Nyvky and Shuliavka is also traditional, since this district has workers’ dormitories, where their compatriots lived when they came to work in Soviet Kyiv. The higher concentration of African immigrants in Nyvky and Vynohradar is explained by the proximity of the UNHCR Reception Center, to which they systematically apply for assistance.

Besides distance from the city center, those districts where respondents reside share one common trait: the prevalence of cheaper apartment buildings. These are districts that in the last decade, with the development of a real estate market in the city, have been transformed into areas of “compact” habitation of Kyiv residents with lower incomes, many of whom are trying to pad their budgets by renting to tenants. Cheap housing is a defining factor in the selection of residential areas by immigrants.

In examining the distribution of immigrant settlement in Kyiv within the context of a possible formation of “ethnic” housing projects, we should keep in mind that the Troieshchyna housing estate is the largest in the city, with at least 300,000 residents. Troieshchyna has a larger popula-

**TABLE 2.11** *Distribution of Immigrant Households by District of Residence at the Time of the Survey, in % (N=233)*

Country of origin	Troïeshchyna	Borshchahivka	Nyky	Syets	Vidrady	Vynohradar	Chokohivka/Solomianka	Darnytsia	Shuliavka	Voskresenka	Dennivka / Studnistechko	Lisovy	Pechersk	Sviatoshyn	Lukianivka	Other
Afghanistan	66.3	2.5	2.5	-	1.3	-	6.3	2.5	-	2.5	1.3	2.5	-	2.5	1.3	8.8
African countries	2.1	12.5	20.8	2.1	16.7	22.9	2.1	-	2.1	8.3	4.2	-	2.1	-	-	4.2
China	16.7	8.3	-	16.7	-	-	-	8.3	25.0	-	-	-	25.0	-	-	-
India and Pakistan	40.7	7.4	3.7	3.7	-	-	-	14.8	-	3.7	-	3.7	3.7	3.7	-	18.5
Middle East countries	10.3	6.9	-	13.8	6.9	-	13.8	-	6.9	3.5	10.3	3.5	-	6.9	3.5	13.8
Vietnam	27.0	10.8	8.1	21.6	-	-	2.7	5.4	8.1	-	2.7	5.4	2.7	-	2.7	2.7
All Respondents	34.3	7.3	6.9	6.9	4.7	4.7	4.7	3.9	3.9	3.4	3.0	2.6	2.6	2.2	1.3	7.7

tion than some oblast capitals of Ukraine. Therefore, even if all the immigrant households surveyed in this study lived in this district, they would still only account for an insignificant part of the population, and in no way could immigrants change its ethnic composition.

Thus, even though the areas of immigrant habitation in the city of Kyiv share certain common characteristics—specifically remote districts with new high-rises located near large traders' markets—compact immigrant housing projects have not been established.

### **ACCESS TO EDUCATION**

Seventy-seven school-aged children (between 7 and 17 years old) were living in 233 of the immigrant households surveyed in this study. Of these, 41.6% were born in Ukraine. But only 23.4% of the total number had a right to Ukrainian citizenship by birth. These are children of mixed marriages who have a Ukrainian-born mother. Ninety percent of surveyed children were under sixteen. In most cases, the father or both parents had emigrated from Afghanistan (57.1%). The rest were members of immigrant households from Vietnam (24.7%), African countries (9.1%), China (3.9%), India and Pakistan (2.6%), and Middle Eastern countries (2.6%).

In accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine (Article 53), everyone has the right to an education, and a complete secondary education is mandatory in the state. Secure access to education and a full tuition-free secondary education in state and public secondary educational institutions are the responsibility of the Ukrainian government.<sup>55</sup> Accessibility and equality of educational conditions are the basic principles of education in Ukraine.<sup>56</sup> Foreigners who reside permanently in the country and individuals with refugee status in Ukraine have the same right to an education as Ukrainian citizens,<sup>57</sup> i.e., on the legislative level children of immigrants and Ukrainian citizens have equal rights to a complete secondary education. The list of documents required to register a child in school is also identical both for citizens of Ukraine, and immigrants and foreigners who live in the country temporarily.

However, equality of conditions governing access to education on the legislative level is hardly ever implemented in practice. Our research showed that a host of problems arise connected with the material status of immigrant families, their legal status, the difference in educational systems, and the particularities of national psychology, customs, and traditions in immigrants'

home countries and in Ukraine. In addition, inadequate knowledge of the language of instruction in schools causes problems for immigrant children.

The survey revealed that only 72% of immigrant households with school-aged children send their children to school. For a variety of reasons, 19.5% of school-aged children who live in 28% of households cannot enjoy their legal right to attend school.

Since questions pertaining to the integration of immigrants into Ukrainian society, as opposed to Western European countries and the USA, are still not common currency throughout Ukraine, state policy in the sphere of education does not yet envision any special approaches for addressing questions related to the schooling of immigrant children. Immigrant children who attend schools study with children of Ukrainian citizens and follow the same program of instruction. Thus far, no special strategies or Ukrainian-language courses have been created for immigrants' children, which would help them to speak and understand the language of instruction in schools.

The dominant language of children living in immigrant households was Russian. Over 97% speak it fluently. Ninety-one percent of children speak the native language of their immigrant parents, and 68.7% know Ukrainian. Only a few children experience difficulties with learning or speaking the new language. The parents of 25% of children from Afghan families indicated such difficulties, and 5.9% of children in Vietnamese households.

Language use at home varies: 86% of children speak their parents' native language, 31% speak Russian, and 8% speak Ukrainian. For communicating with their friends, immigrant children use either Russian or their native language, but for 20% of them that language is Ukrainian. Among those who use Ukrainian in the family home were children from India and Pakistan (50%), Afghan households (9.3%), and Vietnamese households (5.9%). Children of immigrants from India and Pakistan (100%), Middle East countries (100%), Afghanistan (18.6%), and Vietnam (17.6%) used Ukrainian to communicate with friends.

The trend toward significantly more frequent Russian-language than Ukrainian-language usage has no impact on the selection of a child's school. More children attend Ukrainian than Russian schools (58% and 42%, respectively). With the exception of Afghans, the majority of immigrants send their children to Ukrainian schools. In most cases, children from Afghan households attend Russian schools (64.3%).

As a rule, children who attend Ukrainian schools are able to speak the Ukrainian and Russian languages fluently or adequately. More than one-half of children who attend Russian schools speak fluent or satisfactory Ukrainian, according to their parents.

The majority of school-aged children were attending schools located within their residential districts. In the case of nearly one-half of school-children, parental selection of school is predicated on the quality of instruction and geographic proximity to their homes. This applies particularly to children who attend Ukrainian schools. The parents of 65.5% of children chose a school based on location and quality of instruction. Only 18.8% chose a school out of necessity to know Ukrainian in the future.

The various reasons for selecting Russian-language schools are somewhat more complicated. For 39% of children the school was chosen because of the parents' better knowledge of Russian. Nearly 22% stated that the decisive factor was quality of instruction and location; 17% said that their pre-school children had a better knowledge of Russian; and the parents of 13% of children stated that there is a greater need to know Russian today.

As a rule, families who came to Ukraine before 1994 usually sent their children to Ukrainian schools. Among those who arrived in 1995–1998, 81% sent their children to Russian schools. Obviously, this is connected to the fact that the majority of Afghan children (72% of the total number of Afghan children) arrived in Ukraine in this very period. Children who were born in Ukraine attended mostly Ukrainian schools (85.6%).

Of the surveyed children, 76.4% are registered in age-appropriate grades; 21.8% are in grades with children who are younger than them. Our study revealed that most children are in lower grades not because of insufficient linguistic knowledge: 58% of them are fluent in Ukrainian or speak it adequately, and 67% are fluent in Russian or have an adequate grasp of this language. The main reason is an inadequate level of prior school preparedness.

In response to a question concerning immigrant children's level of knowledge compared to that of their classmates, a significant majority of parents said that it is the same or higher than that of their classmates. Sixty-five percent said that their children receive the same grades as their classmates, while 31% said that their children were among the best in their class. A certain number of parent-respondents stated proudly that on a

number of occasions they had received awards from the school administration in tribute to their children's studies and upbringing.

As a rule, school-aged children of mixed marriages between immigrants and female citizens of Ukraine (23.4% of the total number of schoolchildren in immigrant households) do not have any language problems at school: they are in classes with their peers and do not experience any psychological discomfort. Somewhat more complicated is the situation of schoolchildren whose two parents are immigrants (76.6%). In many cases such children have language problems, and their level of preparedness, resulting from differences between the educational systems in their countries of origin and Ukraine, is much lower than their classmates'. Some children, regardless of age, particularly a certain number of those whose parents are from Afghanistan, never attended school in their homeland before coming to Kyiv because of the civil war and the general deterioration in the country; they began attending school for the first time only in Kyiv.

The survey showed that, on the whole, immigrant parents maintain regular contact with their children's schools. Only 4% of respondents said they did not have such contact. For the most part, contact is made at parent-teacher meetings and by parents doing some kind of volunteer work at the school (cleaning, repairing equipment, construction work); this is standard practice in Kyiv, and generally throughout Ukraine.

The Kyiv municipal administration provides a whole range of services to schoolchildren from poor families, including subsidized school breakfasts, lunches, and free textbooks. Children from immigrant families are no exception. Our analysis of the material well-being of households with schoolchildren who receive assistance from the municipal administration shows that it is targeted at the most needy. Families in dire straits or families who live below the poverty level receive both food and textbooks. The majority of these recipients consider themselves as belonging to the category of people "with a difficult economic situation." Afghan immigrant households most frequently receive state support in the form of free meals and textbooks.

At the same time, 62.5% of children from homes in which the household heads believe that they are living below the poverty level, and 43.5% of children from households with a difficult economic situation, have never received any support.

As stated earlier, children from 28% of surveyed immigrant households do not attend schools for various reasons. To a significant extent this depends on the character of the family in which they were born and are being raised. Practically all children who live in households of immigrants from Asian and African countries, who are married to female citizens of Ukraine, attend school, while non-attendance is typical for children from households where both parents are immigrants (Table 2.12).

We observed a definite correlation between the legal status of immigrants and their children's school attendance or non-attendance (Table 2.13). There is 100% school attendance of children from immigrant households with residence permits (without exception, all are married to female Ukrainian citizens) and work contracts, i.e., individuals who have national passports or documents issued to stateless people. Those who attend school least often are children from households of officially recognized refugees in Ukraine, immigrants who have refugee cards, and asylum seekers, who are under international protection and only have a UNHCR form—individuals who belong to the most vulnerable categories of immigrants who, as noted earlier, most often experience problems with employment, housing, and registration by place of residence.

School attendance or non-attendance of children from immigrant households depends to a certain extent on immigrants' countries of origin, their economic well-being, and the particularities of national psychology, customs, and traditions. One hundred percent attendance is noted among children from immigrant households from China and Middle Eastern countries. The lowest attendance is observed among children from Afghanistan (52%). As the main reason for this, heads of Afghan households most frequently cited a difficult economic situation, as a result of which children are also forced to work to help feed their families. In addition, it is quite expensive to outfit a child for school. On average, the cost (according to the lowest estimates) of clothing, shoes, and school supplies for one schoolchild is 425–500 hryvnias (\$80–90).<sup>58</sup> The study revealed that it is mostly older school-aged children from Afghan households who do not attend schools, whereas all younger children attend school.

Some heads of Afghan households believe that schooling for girls is not obligatory, and for that reason their daughters were not attending school. Meanwhile, in other Afghani households, only girls were attending school. In cases where not all school-aged children in a family are able to attend

**TABLE 2.12 Distribution of Immigrant Households Based on Type of Marriage, School Attendance, and Reason for School Non-Attendance of Children Living in These Families, in % (N=51)**

Type of marriage	Reason for school non-attendance						Total
	All children attend school	Must work to feed the family	Girls not obliged to attend school	No documents for the right to live in Ukraine	Low level of preschool preparedness	Will attend school outside Ukraine	
Not mixed	62.9	14.3	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.7	100
Mixed	93.7	-	-	-	-	6.3	100
All Respondents	72.0	10.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	6.0	100



**TABLE 2.13** *Legal Status of Heads of Surveyed Immigrant Households, Children's Level of School Attendance, and Reasons for Non-Attendance, in % (N=57)*

Legal status of immigrants, household heads	Causes of non-attendance					All attending school	Total
	Must work	Girls not obliged to attend school	No documents	Low level of preschool preparedness	Will attend school outside Ukraine		
Residence permit	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	100
Refugee card	15.0	10.0	-	15.0	5.0	55.0	100
Form from immigration service	-	-	-	100	-	-	100
Work contract	-	-	-	-	-	100	100
Visa/ registration	-	-	-	-	18,2	81.8	100
UNHCR form	25.0	-	12.5	-	-	62.5	100
No documents authorizing residence	-	-	50.0	-	-	50.0	100
All Respondents	9.0	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	72.0	100

school, their parents must choose whom to send to school. Most often they choose a little girl, since according to custom, she cannot support the family by working in the market, as her brothers do.

Some heads of Afghan households explained their school-aged children's non-attendance by citing the lack of documents authorizing the right to reside in Ukraine and Kyiv. However, as the survey of officials from raion Departments of Education in the city of Kyiv and municipal school administrations indicated, the lack of documents authorizing residence and registration in passport, registration, and migration service agencies cannot be a reason for refusing to admit a child to school.

In complicated cases involving parents who have refugee status in Ukraine or are seeking asylum and are under international protection, assistance with processing documents for school admission is provided by the Social Center for Refugee Women and Children at the UNHCR Office in Ukraine. In particular, this center organizes centralized medical exams for children, who are supposed to go to school, at the hospital for oil and gas industry workers of Ukraine; these exams include laboratory tests for various infections (AIDS, hepatitis, etc.). In addition, workers at the center establish contact with administrations of schools that children of refugees and asylum seekers (who have no birth certificates but are listed in their parents' identification cards) are slated to attend. They also provide, free of charge, school uniforms for poor families with many children, and organize language courses for prospective schoolchildren who have a poor knowledge of Ukrainian or Russian.

Another reason for non-attendance of schools by children from Afghan households is insufficient schooling prior to their arrival in Ukraine. This applies primarily to teenagers, some of whom had never attended school. They did not start school in Afghanistan because they were still too young, and later their parents were forced to flee the country. After arriving in Kyiv, they did not attend school either, mainly because they did not speak the language, and because their families needed them to work in order to survive. Now that they are 14–16 years old, they no longer want to go to school, since they would have to be in the same class with young children.

Despite the fact that all children from African immigrants' households were born in Ukraine, they are not attending school because of their low level of preschool preparedness. Their parents assured us that if this situation were to change, their children would go to school the following year.

Some heads of immigrant households from Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Pakistan, whose children had reached school age at the time of the study but did not enter first grade, explained that they were planning to send their children to study in their homeland in the very near future (Pakistan, Vietnam) or to other countries (Afghanistan).

During the survey we discovered a distinct correlation between future migration intentions of heads of surveyed households and their children's school attendance or non-attendance (Table 2.14). The lowest percentage of children's school attendance is recorded among those household heads who are definitely or very likely planning to leave Ukraine and Kyiv some time in the future, while the highest is recorded among those households that are not planning any further migration—for them, Ukraine is their country of destination. Therefore, immigrant children's school non-attendance, regardless of the objective economic, psychological, and language problems that they are actually facing, clearly attests to the further migration plans of their parents.

The results of our study indicate that the majority of immigrants' children in Kyiv are being integrated into Ukraine's school system, and the markers of their academic success are no worse than those of local children. The majority of immigrant parents cooperate with the schools by participating in teacher-parent conferences and volunteering various kinds of assistance. It is important to note that more immigrant children attend Ukrainian schools than Russian ones (especially from those families who have lived in Kyiv for more than seven years, as well as those whose children were born in Ukraine). This is additional proof of the successful integration of some immigrants into Ukrainian society.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

The results of our study show that the living conditions of immigrants from Asian and African countries in Kyiv depend first and foremost on their legal status in Ukraine. The existence of indispensable documents and permits affects all aspects of life, and the ability to realize one's fundamental human rights, including employment, education, and medical assistance.

The study revealed that surveyed immigrants had various grounds for residing in Ukraine. More than one-third of immigrants 18 years or older are legal refugees. Nearly one-third lives in Kyiv with a visa or registration based on business activities, work contracts, or student status. One in

**TABLE 2.14 Correlation between Further Migration Intentions of Immigrant Household Heads and Their Children's School Attendance, in % (N=57).**

	Reasons for school non-attendance						All Children attending school	Total:
	Must work to feed the family	Girls not obliged to attend school	No documents authorizing residence in Ukraine	Low level of preschool preparedness	Will study outside Ukraine			
Desire to leave Ukraine								
Yes	22.0	4.4	4.3	4.3	-	65.0	100	
Probably	-	10.0	10.0	20.0	10.0	50.0	100	
Probably not	-	-	-	-	25.0	75.0	100	
No	-	-	-	6.3	-	93.7	100	
All Respondents	9.0	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	72.0	100	

every five respondents does not have any official documents authorizing residence in Ukraine.

The study results confirm that even immigrants who have all the necessary documents for residence in Ukraine often fall into the category of violators of residence regulations, owing to their inability for whatever reason to obtain registration in the organs of Internal Affairs. This is exacerbated by the position of the Kyiv authorities, who unjustifiably obstruct the registration of immigrants with documents for residence in Ukraine and other regions of Ukraine, including Kyiv oblast.

In many cases, problems with processing documents for immigrants with regard to their civil status, particularly marriage certificates and their children's birth certificates, have not been resolved.

Some immigrants' problems with documents not only complicate their situation, but also have a negative impact on the state of affairs in the city. These problems lead to crimes, bribes, and human rights violations. Naturally, in many respects legal status defines the nature of employment and the source of immigrants' incomes.

The results of our study indicate that the main sphere of respondents' activities is trading at the city markets. In many respects, this kind of specialization is forced, since other forms of employment, especially qualified work, are closed to immigrants regardless of their rather high levels of education. In addition to lack of legal security, this stems from the fact that the immigrant community in Kyiv was formed under the conditions of a profound economic crisis that accompanied the initial period of reforms in Ukraine. As a result of the increase in recorded and hidden unemployment and the months-long delays in salary payments, even large numbers of Kyivan residents who lost their sources of income were forced to engage in retail sale in order to survive. Among other factors, immigrants' orientation toward trading is linked to the fact that this type of activity is not only the most accessible, but also ensures a higher level of earnings than other spheres.

Immigrants who are engaged in trading are making their contribution toward ensuring a supply of consumer goods for the city population, expanding the local budget, and creating new workplaces, including those for Ukrainian citizens. The potential of foreign entrepreneurs for establishing business relations with their countries of origin is significant. Just like for Kyiv residents, the fact that highly educated immigrants are engaged in bazaar-based commerce signifies the loss of qualifications and professional skills.

The lack of prospects for this type of activity represents another problem, for with the growth of the economy and increase in the cost of living, bazaar-based commerce will become a thing of the past. The majority of traders will be forced to seek other opportunities to earn an income, which is extremely difficult for immigrants. This explains the unusually low satisfaction among immigrants with their working activity in Kyiv. Nearly one-fourth of the surveyed immigrants live with involuntary unemployment and the lack of any stable occupation whatsoever, leading to negative repercussions for the individual.

A comparison between respondents' monthly earnings and those of average statistical Kyivans indicates that immigrants' nominal earnings are approximately one-third higher than local residents'. At the same time, immigrants are not entitled to any social payments or state benefits. In most cases they have no access to many free services, including those that are most crucial to quality of life: medical services. As a result, the level of consumption of goods and services in surveyed immigrant households is for the most part lower than that of Kyiv residents.

Income levels and quality of life vary greatly within the immigrant community. Entrepreneurs and employees of private firms and international organizations earn the highest incomes. Meanwhile, respondents who do not have stable employment and sources of income survive mainly on humanitarian aid, and live below the poverty level. Those who are most affected in such families are children, who are deprived of the most essential elements for their growth and development. More than one-quarter of school-aged children of immigrants do not attend school, owing first and foremost to their families' dire economic straits.

There is a correlation between the well-being of immigrants and their legal status, time of arrival in Ukraine, and type of work activity. Since these characteristics vary, depending on the immigrants' countries of origin, some are better off than others. The direst material circumstances are noted among refugees (represented in Kyiv by newcomers from Afghanistan and African countries). Individuals who are living in Ukraine on the basis of work agreements or as businessmen, the majority of whom are from Vietnam and the Middle East, are in a better situation.

The largest budgetary expense in immigrant families is rent, which is customarily higher for immigrants than similar housing for local residents in the same district. Immigrants' living conditions are quite mod-

est. Often several unrelated individuals or different families live together in one room.

Despite the fact that various publications frequently express the opinion that “ethnic” housing projects are springing up in Kyiv, our study does not confirm this. Immigrant households that took part in the study are equally distributed throughout the city.

The results of our study reveal the specific problems that immigrants face in the city of Kyiv. They confirm that the municipal government must pay more attention to this segment of the population by drafting and implementing appropriate measures. First and foremost, these measures should be aimed at resolving the legal status of immigrants (their documentation and registration), helping them to find employment that takes into consideration newcomers’ educational and professional level and the economic needs of the city, and implementing indispensable language, informational, and educational programs.

## CHAPTER THREE

## The Socio-Cultural Integration of Immigrants

In developed Western European countries, the social integration of large numbers of migrants, most of whom chose to remain permanently in the host states, was identified as a problem requiring analysis and state regulation at least forty years ago. In recent decades, European studies analyzing the social integration of immigrants have focused on the state policy of various countries, and have sought to compare the results of various integrational strategies and to make recommendations to government agencies and administrations.<sup>59</sup> These issues are being actively discussed in committees of the Council of Europe not only by scholars,<sup>60</sup> but also by heads of government structures responsible for questions of migration.<sup>61</sup>

Integration policies in Sweden, Germany, Holland, France, Italy, and other migrant-receiving countries in Europe were formed as separate, specific models, and have undergone certain revisions moving them away from assimilation-based toward more democratic integration approaches.<sup>62</sup> To this day Ukraine has not formulated a state policy for social integration of immigrants. In Ukrainian scholarly literature there are no publications devoted to the study of medical, ethnographical, anthropological, and other aspects pertaining to the adaptation of nontraditional migrants, which are crucial to any comprehensive analysis of the integration process.

The issue of integration of immigrant communities in Ukraine, and specifically in Kyiv, began with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Foreigners living in Ukraine during the Soviet period generally associated with a circle of compatriots in their leisure time, while every other aspect of their lives was strictly regimented and under the control of both their home state and local government structures in Ukraine. Practically none of them had the right to make independent decisions concerning further stay in the Soviet Union, which had granted them entry specifically as foreign students or temporary workers. The situation changed dramatically with the collapse of the Soviet Union, as foreigners living in



Kyiv chose to stay beyond the completion of the education or work contract and new migrants arrived. However, migration was not a priority issue for the new Ukrainian state, and the government did not even broach the issue of integration of migrants until recently.

One of the features of the immigrant integration process in Ukraine is that the receiving society is undergoing a transformation that affects all aspects of life, from economic transition to fundamental changes in the socio-political structure, and even the supplanting of a whole range of basic cultural traditions and values. The development of a market economy has initiated a process transforming Ukrainian society from a collectivist culture to a culture with a more clearly defined individualism.

On one hand, Ukraine's transition process has facilitated the arrival of new immigrants, making Kyiv society open and accessible to newcomers on practically all levels (the only restriction for non-citizens is government service). On the other hand, the process of societal transformation has placed native Kyivans in a similar situation with migrants. Simultaneously, and in the context of the same urban environment, Kyivans and immigrants are struggling to adapt to an unfamiliar social and economic environment.

Psychologists call the significant stress loads that individuals experience when adapting to a new culture "culture shock," or "acculturation stress." Researchers who study this phenomenon note that significant lifestyle changes (both negative and positive) can lead to mental and physical illnesses. Part of the shock is caused by the differences in values between the country of departure and the country of settlement. The degree of difference in value systems is directly proportional to the number of difficulties that individuals experience during the adaptation process. Crucial to integration are the quantity and quality of differences in core values, tolerance of differences in values, and the ability to modify one's system of values.<sup>63</sup>

One of the most effective methods for reducing this kind of stress is the creation of immigrant communities. Social support from the community plays an important role in the process of integrating each immigrant. Such support may take various forms. By and large the community provides both emotional support and real assistance to its members in resolving vital problems (assistance with social behavior). In addition, information is an important component of community support for each immigrant.

The process of integration into the host society can be divided into structural and socio-cultural immigration. According to this approach, eco-

conomic activity, nature of employment, and education are classified as structural integration (i.e., integration into existing social structures). Contacts between immigrants and the local population, attitudes toward it, and readiness to enter a new society characterize the socio-cultural aspect.<sup>64</sup>

In the case of structural employment, successful economic activity is the major factor in ensuring that an individual will function effectively in a given society. The overwhelming majority of Kyiv's immigrants are self-employed, and their success depends to a large extent on the support and mutual assistance of the community. Those immigrants who are not self-employed often earn their living through hired work within structures developed by their compatriots. In the process of integrating into the economic realities of Kyiv, immigrants are not only involved in the work of existing economic structures, but they have also created their own structures that are entirely new to the Kyiv landscape. Some good examples of this are the handful of manufacturing enterprises founded by Vietnamese immigrants, in which both Vietnamese and native Kyivan workers are employed; the active participation of the Afghan community in the development of Troieshchyna market; and the growing network of Chinese restaurants that employ a variety of workers.

However, not all immigrants are able to integrate into Kyiv's economy. The notable exceptions include a substantial proportion of African immigrants and a small group of Afghan immigrants. Without stable and legal sources of subsistence, they become clients of certain social security structures, which in Ukraine's case are non-governmental. Due to the lack of state-funded adaptation programs and financial support available to immigrants in Ukraine, these functions have become the responsibility of international organizations such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Red Cross, CARI-TAS, and others. For this group of immigrants, UNHCR assistance is their primary legal source of income, and their food supply consists largely of food packages from the Red Cross and other charitable organizations. This phenomenon is not unique to Ukraine. As Swedish researchers have noted, after twenty-five years of implementing the new Swedish policy of integrating migrants who depend to a significant degree on state social structures, the number of clients are more numerous now than at the start of integration programs.<sup>65</sup>

The remainder of this chapter will focus on the socio-cultural aspects of integration among Kyiv immigrants. Given that there is a significant

difference between opportunities and type of socio-cultural integration of adults and children, our analysis involved selecting from the total number of respondents a group of first-generation adult immigrants, i.e., those who were not born in Ukraine and were at least 18 years old at the time of the survey. There were 315 such individuals among our respondents.

## **INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS:**

### **INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS**

The study analyzed four main types of relations among immigrants and the local population: contacts at work, fraternization during leisure time, friendly relations, and neighborly contacts.

#### **Contacts at Work**

Naturally, only working immigrants have contacts at work. Also included in the group of working immigrants are respondents who, according to the type of activity, considered themselves unemployed or pensioners, but whose main or secondary source of income are occasional earnings. There were 216 individuals in the group of working respondents.

The level of working contacts with compatriots turned out to be much higher than the level of fraternization with the local population and immigrants from other countries. In general, the number of respondents who maintain working contacts with migrants from other countries is much smaller than the number of those who associate with compatriots or Kyiv residents. In our opinion, the general distribution of the level of working contacts with compatriots (94%), Kyiv residents (62%), and immigrants from other countries (23%) is indirect confirmation of the fact that, in terms of their economic activities, the majority of Kyiv immigrants do not act as members of a single community of newcomers but as representatives of separate ethnic communities who are partially integrated into the local milieu.

The distribution of working respondents by category based on type of work enabled us to determine that hired workers have the lowest level of working contacts with compatriots (88%), and market traders have the highest (97%). All other categories, from company employees and private entrepreneurs to the unemployed, have approximately the same level of contact with their compatriots (92%). At the same time, only 62% of working respondents have working relations with the local

population. Private entrepreneurs maintain the most contact with Kyiv residents (73%), while unemployed respondents have the least (46%).

We observed a significant link between the level of workplace contacts and period of entry into Ukraine. The indicator of contacts with compatriots rises from 92% among respondents who arrived in the first period to 100% among respondents who arrived in the third period. The level of work-related contacts with Kyiv residents for respondents of the first period (69%) is twice that for respondents of the third period (33%). Thus, there are grounds to assume some linkage between the degree of work-based contacts with Kyiv residents and the nature of migration and period of residency in Ukraine.

To a certain extent, the fact that the respondent had studied in Ukraine had an impact on the line of work-related contacts. With practically an identical number of contacts with countrymen, those who studied in Ukraine had a higher level of fraternization with Kyiv residents (71%) than those who had not studied here (57%).

Affiliation with a certain ethnic group has a more significant influence on the level and line of work-related contacts than nature of activity. A more detailed analysis enabled us to determine that all hired employees, with the exception of African immigrants, have work-related contacts with their compatriots (100%) and a significantly lower level of fraternization with the local population. Among hired workers, Vietnamese (60%) have the most work contacts with Kyiv residents, and Afghans, least (20%). Pakistani immigrants do not associate with Kyiv residents at work at all. One-third of them have contacts with migrants from other countries. Meanwhile, 100% of hired African workers have contacts with the local population, half of them with their countrymen, and two-thirds with migrants from other countries.

Unemployed people serve as another example of the links between work-based contacts, type of work, and ethnic affiliation. Whereas unemployed Afghan and Vietnamese immigrants who have occasional earnings maintain workplace contacts exclusively with their compatriots, all three lines of contact are 100% typical for other immigrants.

The prevalence of affiliation with a specific community over the influence of other parameters is also noticeable with respect to distribution by gender. Whereas on the whole there was no difference in fraternization between men and women among working respondents, there is a rather

significant difference within individual communities. Our study revealed that Vietnamese women, whose working numbers are practically equal to Vietnamese men, have more contacts than men. Seventy-three percent of women have contacts with the local population, compared to 60% of men. Meanwhile, working Afghan women, who have almost the same work-related contacts with compatriots as men, have almost no contacts with the local population. This corresponds with Afghan tradition whereby married women do not work. The fact that an Afghan woman becomes a trader at the market attests to extreme hardship within the family.

Despite a number of differences in national traits and reasons for entry into Ukraine, a group of four communities—Afghan, Chinese, Pakistani, and Vietnamese—share common characteristics of workplace contacts. Working representatives of this group of communities, regardless of the type of economic activity, have close (practically 100%) working contacts with their compatriots. This may be viewed as definite confirmation of the fact that members of these communities are also united to a certain extent by a commonality of economic activity. In the workplace, however, they fraternize less with Kyiv residents. Only approximately one-half of working Afghans and Chinese said that they have work-related contacts with the local population. Pakistani (73%) and Vietnamese (63%) have greater contacts in the workplace with Kyiv residents, but even among them contacts with compatriots predominate. Relations with immigrants from other countries are much less prevalent among the members of these four communities: approximately 20% of Afghans and Chinese, and only 4% of Vietnamese. Pakistanis are noted for their high degree of contacts (28%).

A characteristic trait of immigrants from the Middle East is their level of work-related contacts with their compatriots, which is practically indistinguishable from their level of contacts with the local population. The difference between Arabs and Kurds with respect to two lines of communication is not significant, but the Kurds' level of contacts with immigrants from other countries is almost twice (50%) that of Arabs' level of contacts (26%).

African immigrants have the lowest level of work-related contacts with their compatriots: only 58% have such contacts at work, while contacts with Kyiv residents and migrants from other countries are most widespread and typical among working Africans. Practically all of them cooperate with representatives of the local population (92%). The majority (67%) of them have workplace contacts with immigrants from other

countries. This is connected with the fact that self-employment is least germane to immigrants from African countries, even among those who are employed. There is only one private entrepreneur among them (who does not work with his compatriots). There are also several individuals who earn a living at the market by acting as sellers for Afghans, and they communicate only with them. Others earn a living by working as hired workers and employees of Ukrainian companies, offices, and offices of international organizations, and are thus not dependent on compatriots for their economic activities.

Therefore, the line of work-related contacts may be viewed to some extent as confirmation of shared economic activity within the limits of individual immigrant communities.

### **Interactions During Leisure Time**

Relations during leisure time are more conditioned by the lifestyle of each individual and of the community on the whole. Marital status, gender and age characteristics, and certain cultural traditions play an important role here. Fraternization during leisure time is indicative of the level of socio-cultural integration. It is rather high among first-generation immigrants, most of whom came to Kyiv as adults and who have resided in Kyiv for an average of almost six years.

The proportion of immigrants who mostly associate with their compatriots during their leisure time has been increasing with every successive period, albeit insignificantly—from 76% of those who arrived before 1991 to 89% of respondents who arrived after 1998. At the same time, the proportion of those who associate with Kyiv residents noticeably decreases with every successive period. They comprise 62% of respondents of the first period, while the number of those who came to Kyiv in the third period is nearly two times smaller (32%).

With regard to gender distribution, a difference in fraternization during leisure time between men and women was revealed only in their contacts with Kyiv citizens, with whom 47% of men communicate and 31% of women. Communication with compatriots is equally high for both (a little over 85%).

Distribution based on age groups of the entire study group did not reveal any dependence on age. The only exception is the unexpectedly low level of contacts of the youngest group of respondents, eighteen-year-

olds: only 20% associate with the local population, and only 40% even with their compatriots. Although there are very few of these young immigrants among our respondents (8.5%), from the point of view of prospects for integration, identifying the causes behind such a lack of contact among young people is a very important task.

### **Friendship**

The number of cases of friendly relations among respondents depends on the period of entry into Ukraine, and correspondingly, on the period of residence in Kyiv. Sixty-four percent of respondents from the first period of entry are friends with Kyivans, almost twice as many as those who arrived in the third period (29%).

The existence of relationships which immigrants describe as friendly is essential to the process of socio-cultural integration. Even in cases where these relations are not sufficiently close, they attest to people's positive attitude towards one another and foster an increase in immigrants' feelings of comfort in the new society. Psychologists have noted that during the close-friendship phase, communication concerning both insignificant and very important topics takes place; at the same time cultural stereotypes are being dismantled, and affiliation with different groups no longer plays such an important role. The influence of group affiliation diminishes as soon as relations become closer. Although all researchers note that nontraditional migrants are representatives of cultures whose distance from Ukrainian culture is great,<sup>66</sup> at the same time they prove the rule that friends from "distant" cultures share more common links (mutual acquaintances, friends) than mere acquaintances from the same culture.<sup>67</sup> Differences in attitude toward acquaintances from close and distant cultures are observed, but there are no differences in attitude toward friends. Hence, the level of interpersonal relations between individuals, i.e., their closeness, eliminates inter-group and inter-ethnic barriers. As a result, affiliation with different groups, and related ethnic and cultural stereotypes, cease to influence their association.

Therefore, people who do not have warm, friendly contacts either with their compatriots or with Kyiv residents probably comprise the most vulnerable category of individuals whose integration into a new society has turned out to be truly difficult. These individuals have the lowest level of psychological comfort. Most of these individuals are found in the Afghan

community (nearly 19%), although there are a few cases in other communities. Forty-four percent of people who do not have friendly relations with anyone are women. Of course, the majority of them are Afghans. Practically all men who do not have such relations are Afghans; there is not a single Vietnamese, Arab, or Kurd.

All categories of employment are represented among those who do not have contacts either during leisure time or friendly relations, although housewives and unemployed people comprise approximately half of the group.

### **Interaction among Neighbors**

Neighborly relations are a specific type of fraternization. On the one hand, they are of a pragmatic character, and on the other, they are not as forced as contacts during working hours. In Ukraine, as a rule, these relations play a significant role in the lives of residents of rural areas, where the rudiments of a traditional village community, based on mutual assistance and regulated by customary law, are still evident. For residents of large cities, these relations are significantly less typical.

Eighty-five percent of respondents who have neighborly relations with the local population associate with their compatriots during leisure time, and 61% with local residents (on the whole, the level of contacts with Kyiv residents during leisure time reaches 43%). This category of respondents is therefore more active in associating with local residents than the total number of respondents. For some respondents neighborly contacts with Kyiv residents are their only form of fraternization.

Respondents who do not have any family in Kyiv associate least frequently with their neighbors. This is consistent with the specific behavior of unmarried Kyivans and is more likely related to the fact that single people spend significantly less time at home than those who have a spouse and children. As a rule, single people also have fewer domestic problems. It may be assumed that this is why the highest percentage (48%) of people who do not have any neighborly relations occurs among single people.

The group of respondents who are in mixed marriages not only has the highest percentage of people who associate with their Kyivan neighbors but also those who have no neighborly relations with anyone; to some extent this may be attributed to the influence of their spouses. On the one hand, Kyiv-born wives help to expand their husbands' contacts, while on the other, the task of maintaining neighborly relations in such families



may be entirely placed on the women. There is a virtually stable correlation between the levels of neighborly contacts of immigrants from various places of origin within each group identified by marital status. In our opinion, affiliation with various communities is the reason behind the significant difference in the level and direction of neighborly relations on the part of immigrants from various countries.

Our analysis showed that there is virtually no difference between men and women in terms of neighborly communication. The breakdown by type of employment indicates that the highest percentage of those who do not maintain neighborly relations with anyone occurs among unemployed immigrants (75%). Fifty-four percent of office workers, 30% of traders and entrepreneurs, 27% of hired workers, and 41% of pensioners and housewives have no neighborly contacts.

With respect to age groups, notwithstanding the insignificant difference in neighborly contacts, the youngest and oldest strata of the population participate the most in neighborly relations. This corresponds to the general Kyivan trend. Fifty percent of respondents between 19 and 50 years old have such contacts, and a little more than 60% of older ones.

There is a clear-cut link between the existence of neighborly relations and the period of arrival in Kyiv. Although the level of contacts with neighbors is not striking, it declines noticeably with each successive arrival period. This applies both to contacts with the local population, the level of which changes from 61% among those who arrived in Kyiv in the first period to 34% among those who arrived in the third period, and neighborly contacts with compatriots (31% and 21%, respectively).

For all of our respondents neighborly contacts with the local population are almost two times higher than such contacts with compatriots, which to some extent may be confirmation of the insignificant level of immigrant concentration in Kyiv. Since almost 40% of respondents, as well as the largest number of Kyiv immigrants, live in Troieshchyna, we may assume that the highest percentage of neighborly contacts with compatriots would be typical for those who live in this area. But the percentage of neighborly contacts with compatriots (21% of respondents who live in this microdistrict) turned out to be significantly lower than the same indicator in such microdistricts as Chokolivka—31%, Darnytsia—50%, Pechersk—42%, Shuliavka—83%, Syrets—45%, Vynohradar—28%, and also significantly lower than the per-

centage of immigrants' fraternization with the local population—46% in Troieshchyna.

A higher level of neighborly contacts among residents of the small, mostly right-bank river districts may be explained by the settlement pattern and relative concentration. A significant proportion of immigrants living in this area moved to Kyiv at the invitation of institutions of higher education and commercial firms that rented dormitory accommodations to their employees. These dormitories were located not too far from the city center, in unprestigious districts filled with cramped, five-story buildings, and scores of factory and university dormitories built in the 1960s. A typical example of such a microdistrict is Syrets, where following the closure of many dormitories, their former tenants stayed on in the area. Obviously, the level of neighborly relations in a certain microdistrict is influenced not only by the real concentration of immigrants, i.e., not whether compatriots are neighbors, but whether representatives of these communities generally live in this microdistrict, and by the frequency of contacts, which is typical of this particular community.

With respect to the residents of Troieshchyna, the overwhelming majority of adult respondents from this microdistrict are Afghans (71%). According to their own estimates, the average number of compatriots per household is 1.9, and in the neighborhood—5.4. Clearly, they have opportunities for neighborly relations with their compatriots, but only 7% of them establish such contacts. Even contacts with Kyiv neighbors are almost six times higher than their contacts with compatriots.

It would appear that immigrants from African countries do not fraternize with each other as neighbors (the average percentage in all districts is nearly 8%). Immigrants treasure help proffered by neighbors to an extraordinary degree, like any other demonstration of friendliness on the part of Kyiv residents. For many years an Afghan family that arrived in Kyiv without any household articles kept several cherished plates and a dishtowel, which a Kyivan neighborwoman gave them during their time of hardship. The parents of young Afghan and African children, who for various reasons do not attend kindergarten, spoke with great warmth about their neighbor, a female pensioner, who occasionally takes care of their children, emphasizing that she also teaches the children to read letters and recite poems.

### Communication Contact Indicators

The level of contact of various communities may be an indicator of both the cohesion of a given community and the level of its members' integration into the receiving society. Therefore, in order to arrive at a comprehensive evaluation of the level of fraternization among respondents, the total contact indicators, both with compatriots and the local population, were calculated. In determining a compatriot contact indicator, an individual with all four types of relations (at work, during leisure time, friendly and neighborly contacts) within the given community, scored the maximum points (4) for compatriot communication; for lack of any type of contact, they scored the lowest number (0). Indicators of contact with the local population were drawn up in similar fashion.

The average nomenclatures of total contact indicators for representatives of various communities differ significantly. (Table 3.1). For contacts

**TABLE 3.1 Indicators of Community Contact with Compatriots and Kyiv Residents, in points (N=305)**

Community	Contact with compatriots	Contact with Kyiv residents	Difference in contacts
Afghan	2.5	1.5	1.0
African countries	2.2	1.4	0.8
Employed	2.0	2.5	- 0.5
Dependents	2.3	1.0	1.3
Vietnamese	3.4	2.3	1.1
Chinese	3.1	1.6	1.5
Middle East countries	2.4	2.1	0.3
Arab	2.3	1.8	0.5
Kurdish	2.6	2.4	0.2
Pakistani	3.2	2.6	0.6
All Respondents	2.8	1.8	1.0

with compatriots, the difference between the maximum and minimum value of an indicator was 30% of the possible maximum value.

### STRATEGIES FOR INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS

In deciding to relocate from one country to another, a person simultaneously makes a decision about his or her future life in the new society. But very few people can foresee that, besides economic difficulties, they will face the need to adapt to the socio-cultural norms of the new society. Until someone actually encounters the reality of a new environment, no one can fully predict which cultural values and traditions, most of which people accept as a standard of everyday behavior, will have to be forfeited or changed, what may be retained, and what will have to be adopted from the local population.

Readiness to accept a foreign culture and its traditions is linked to a general strategy of integration on the part of both a single individual and a community. Preservation of one's culture, uniqueness, and traditions is one of the main functions of any ethnic minority. For immigrant communities, whose period of life under new socio-economic conditions is measured over several decades (only ten years in Ukraine), the problem of interacting with the culture and traditions of the receiving society is no less relevant than preserving one's ethnicity.

By correlating the retention of one's cultural values with the degree of inclusion in the culture of the receiving society, researchers have mapped out four main strategies of intercultural interaction: assimilation, separation, marginalization, and integration.<sup>68</sup>

*Assimilation* is the absorption of one culture by another, which occurs when a community, willingly or involuntarily, adopts the customs, values, and living standards of the dominant culture. During assimilation an immigrant completely identifies with the new culture and rejects the culture of the ethnic minority to which he belongs.

With *separation*, representatives of an ethnic minority do not accept the majority culture but preserve their own ethnic traits (one of the manifestations of separation is a negative attitude toward mixed marriages).

If an immigrant does not identify himself either with the culture of the ethnic majority or that of his own ethnic minority, the result is ethno-cultural *marginalization*, which is essentially the lack of cultural identification.

Cultural *integration* is characterized by the tendency to preserve one's own cultural affiliation, together with the tendency to master the culture of the titular ethnic group; in essence, this is multiculturalism.

Our analysis of the main trends of cultural integration among adult respondents revealed the presence of all four integration strategies within the Kyiv immigrant milieu. The analysis is based on responses to the following questions: "Do you maintain your national traditions?" and "Did you adopt any of the local traditions during your stay in Kyiv?" Without a doubt, the majority of responses reflected some doubt, i.e., "Probably" or "Probably not", but for the purpose of identifying at least general trends, "Yes" and "Probably" responses were combined as affirmative ones, while "No" or "Probably not" responses were considered negative. In establishing an indicator for a strategy of cultural interaction, affirmative responses to both questions were rated as a tendency toward integration; the combination of two negative responses was considered marginalization; and the correlation of positive with negative responses was the basis for identifying the tendency of separation and assimilation.

Of course, this type of indicator cannot be viewed as a qualitative characterization of the individual respondent. A person accepts many aspects of everyday behavior, which are conditioned by traditions and societal norms, as natural and appropriate, or does not notice them at all. Representatives of ethnic groups accept only certain cultural traditions and particularities as national traditions. Therefore, a negative response to the question concerning maintenance of one's national traditions does not signify the complete absence of traditional behavior. Formed on the basis of the collected responses, this signifier demonstrates instead an attitude toward one's own traditions or the traditions of the local population. It is this aspect that is particularly interesting from the standpoint of prospects for socio-cultural integration. Our study revealed that the character of cultural interaction is closely linked to the period of entry into Ukraine (see Table 3.2).

Integration strategy is prevalent both in the first and second periods, but the percentage of respondents for whom this kind of cultural interaction strategy is typical in the period of entry before 1991 is significantly higher than for those who arrived between 1991 and 1998. Cultural integration is not prevalent among respondents of the third period of entry.

**TABLE 3.2** *Distribution of Cultural Interaction Strategies among Respondents with Different Periods of Entry into Ukraine, in % (N=236)*

Period of entry	Cultural interaction strategy				Total
	Assimilation	Separation	Marginalization	Integration	
Before 1991	30.6	6.5	3.2	59.7	100
1991-1998	25.0	17.8	16.4	40.8	100
1999-2001	31.8	36.4	22.7	9.1	100
All Respondents	27.1	16.5	13.6	42.8	100

The opposite is seen in the tendency toward an increase in separation and cultural marginalization. Six percent of respondents from the first period of entry demonstrated a tendency toward separation, and 3% toward marginalization. At the same time, separation turned out to be the predominant strategy of interaction for 36% of respondents from the third period, while the absence of definite cultural identification was rather widespread (23%).

From the above-cited ratings it is difficult to draw unequivocal conclusions about a community's integration strategy of a community on the whole, or merely its cultural aspect. Nevertheless, we believe that general tendencies may indeed be traced. Representatives of the Vietnamese community assign the greatest significance to the preservation of national traditions. The percentage of those who actively adopt local cultural norms and traditions is highest among Vietnamese (64% of Vietnamese follow the integration strategy), which may be regarded as an argument in favor of recognizing this community as one that has integrated the most into the Kyiv municipal milieu.

For Pakistani (60%) and Arab communities (53%), a strategy of cultural interaction was prevalent. Representatives of the Chinese community demonstrated the most widespread predisposition toward separation: this is the only community in which separation prevails over other strategies (50%); the lowest prevalence was noted among Kurds and African immigrants.

Africans pay the least amount of attention to maintaining their national traditions. Fifty-five percent of representatives of this community favor

the assimilation strategy. The main reason for this is that when they first arrived in Kyiv, African immigrants were not carriers of their own traditional cultures. According to them, they are representatives of various European cultural traditions. For the most part, their native language is French or Portuguese, while their traditional culture is the postcolonial culture of large cities (more than 90% are city-born). Among working Africans the prevalence of the assimilation strategy is even more apparent. Sixty-four percent of respondents in this group follow this strategy.

Besides the general level and main strategies of interaction, the question of which specific traditions are shared by Kyiv residents and immigrants is also interesting. The following table shows the distribution of respondents from various communities based on the level of adoption of various local traditions.

In studies on the socio-cultural integration of immigrants, researchers note that some cultural elements disappear during the process of entering a new society, while others are strengthened. The most distinctive cultural traits, e.g., clothing, gradually disappear, while those of average distinctiveness, such as dietary traditions, are adapted, transformed, and blended with local traditions. At the same time, the least apparent, internal elements of culture, such as religious beliefs and moral values, are reinforced and strengthened.<sup>69</sup>

On the whole, our research on Kyiv immigrants confirms this view. The largest number of respondents recognized the adoption of such elements of the local culture as language (69%) and food (77%), but they were least prepared to adopt religious traditions (9%) and approaches to raising children (16%). These general tendencies turned out to be typical for all communities.

### **Language**

The integrative role of language is historically important in contemporary Ukraine for the consolidation of diverse ethnonational communities into a single Ukrainian political nation. An assessment of the knowledge level of the language of communication (Ukrainian or Russian) was made on the basis of respondents' own ratings. Among adult immigrants in Kyiv, 21.5% do not know either of the languages used by the local population, 61.5% know Russian and at least some Ukrainian, and 17% know both Russian and Ukrainian well enough to communicate. There are no adult respondents who know only Ukrainian.

**TABLE 3.3 Distribution of Adoption of the Local Population's Traditions by Respondents of Different Communities, in % (N=182)\***

Community	Language	Religion	Food	Clothing	Music	Family relations	Children's upbringing
Afghan	72.9	13.6	78.0	45.8	37.3	32.2	18.6
African countries	54.8	9.5	66.7	14.3	30.9	40.5	21.4
Vietnamese	87.1	3.2	77.4	58.1	25.8	38.7	16.1
Chinese	25.0	0.0	100.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Middle East countries	72.2	5.0	80.7	50.7	47.9	40.7	3.6
Arab	64.3	-	71.4	71.4	35.7	21.4	7.1
Kurdish	80.0	10.0	90.0	30.0	60.0	60.0	-
Pakistani	63.6	9.1	86.4	72.7	18.2	27.3	13.6
All Respondents	68.7	8.8	76.9	45.1	31.9	34.6	15.9

\*The total percentage exceeds 100 because respondents gave more than one answer.



Immigrants from African countries are most likely to not know either Ukrainian or Russian well enough to communicate (32%). If we recall that Africans, unlike other respondents, usually know several European languages, then such low linguistic competence can hardly be explained by an inadequate educational level or problems related to the significant distance between linguistic groups.

Pakistani respondents, none of whom said that their knowledge of Ukrainian or Russian is inadequate for communication, scored the highest in linguistic competence. Arabs scored the highest in knowledge of Ukrainian, while not a single Kurd or Chinese knows Ukrainian (Table 3.4).

The difference between groups of respondents who are oriented toward different strategies of cultural interaction is quite noticeable. Twenty-eight percent of those who tend toward separation and marginalization do not know either of the languages used in Kyiv, while 14% of respondents who have opted for the assimilation strategy do not speak either Ukrainian or Russian; neither language is spoken by 10% of immigrants who are oriented toward integration.

The level of linguistic competence depends on the period of arrival in Kyiv. Whereas there are virtually no respondents from the first period who do not know at least one of the languages used in Kyiv, 19% of those who arrived during the second period do not know either language. At the same time, 67% of respondents from the third period do not know either Ukrainian or Russian.

In Ukraine, there is no educational network for those who would like to master the state language. There are practically no Ukrainian-language courses; it is difficult to buy Ukrainian textbooks, study manuals, and dictionaries, let alone Ukrainian audio and video courses, which are probably not even available in Ukraine. Not a single TV or radio channel broadcasts practical conversation courses (admittedly, a series of programs on the culture of language are broadcast). Lately, free Ukrainian-language courses for refugees, sponsored by international organizations, are being offered.

## **Culture**

Besides mastering the language of the receiving society, another important prerequisite for the successful integration of immigrants into a new cultural environment is the opportunity to maintain and develop one's own culture and native language. At the present time such opportunities

**TABLE 3.4 Distribution of Respondents Based on Knowledge of Local Languages, in % (N=310)**

Community	Languages of communication			Total
	Ukrainian and Russian	Only Russian	No local language	
Afghan	14.3	65.6	20.2	100
African countries	9.4	58.5	32.1	100
Vietnamese	23.9	50.8	25.4	100
Chinese	-	92.9	7.14	100
Middle East countries	19.5	57.1	23.4	100
Arab	38.9	38.9	22.2	100
Kurdish	-	75.0	25.0	100
Pakistani	25.9	74.1	-	100
All Respondents	16.8	61.9	21.3	100

are very limited in Kyiv. No one forbids anyone to study any language, history or culture independently or to teach these subjects to their children. However, such activities are relegated to the private sphere. Thus, children of immigrants are able to learn their native language only in the family, and this depends on the parents. Ukraine is not the only country where this kind of situation has arisen. In the majority of Western European countries the development of immigrants' national cultures are also a private matter.

One of the most pressing issues facing immigrants is the problem of obtaining information in their native language, which most communities find very difficult to obtain. Kurds have the best access to information: only 17% have no access to printed materials in their native language. To a great extent the activity of the "Media" National-Cultural Society helps to ensure the availability of information targeted at this community. Books, newspapers, and other printed matter are sent to the society from Kurdish centers in Belgium, Germany, Holland, and Turkey, and are then distributed among the members of this community.

With regard to learning about the achievements of Ukrainian culture, Kyiv has a broad network of diverse cultural institutions. Of course, visits to theaters and museums are not the most urgent problem that immigrants face in their everyday lives, but it cannot be said that they are completely cut off from these local cultural institutions.

Arabs and Vietnamese go to theaters and museums most often (more than 30%), and discos and bars have become popular entertainment destinations for Chinese and Pakistanis, which may be linked to the fact that young men are predominant in these communities. Sixty-four percent of respondents do not visit any cultural institutions; the highest percentage is traditionally found among the African and Afghan communities. This may be because, like a number of Kyivans, they cannot afford to purchase a new book, go to the theater, attend a concert, subscribe to newspapers and magazines, etc.

## **Religion**

Religion is an integral part of culture and plays a vitally important role in the lives of immigrants in a new environment. Many return to the religion of their childhood and youth in order to find new strength in an old tradition.

One would think that Orthodox believers would have the easiest time satisfying their religious needs in Kyiv, but even these faithful face certain difficulties in adapting to the specific rites and norms of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which differ from their own. In addition to the traditionally Orthodox Ethiopian Copts and Syrians, one of the respondents in our study was an Orthodox Afghan, who converted to this religion after coming to Kyiv.

For Catholics, one of the main centers in Kyiv is St. Alexander's Roman Catholic Church, where liturgies are served in four languages: Ukrainian, Polish, English, and Russian. This community exists mainly through the support of Catholics abroad, given that this religious community does not collect donations and does not have any special programs to assist the needy.

The majority of Catholic respondents (all from African countries) attend church in Sviatoshyn and the Catholic monastery located in a suburb of Kyiv; the main task of these institutions is spiritual enrichment and moral support, but not material assistance. Immigrants from African countries come here to obtain this kind of moral support and to expand their circle of acquaintances. In the words of one respondent, he was lucky to find a job in the Catholic monastery. He is proud of his job, which has opened up new vistas for him.

Unlike Catholics, Protestants combine spiritual aid with material assistance. Parishioners are expected to donate a canonical "tithe," and needy individuals obtain food, clothing, and assistance to resolve their problems. One of the Protestant religious communities in Kyiv is the "Peremoha" [Victory] Church, which has an entire range of assistance programs for immigrants. The majority of Protestant respondents, all of whom are from African countries, attend this church. For a significant proportion of these immigrants, associating with the local population means fraternizing within the confines of this religious community. Those who have reached a dead end in their lives come here seeking, and finding, support. As a result, many who in the past were Catholic and Orthodox believers have become Protestants. Representatives of all religious groups occasionally change their religious affiliation, but Muslims do this least often. Nevertheless, there are cases of conversion among Muslim immigrants from African countries: one Muslim respondent became a devoted Baptist.

To a great extent joint participation in prayers and other rituals is for many immigrants a form of communication and self-realization, and a way to meet people. For Africans, Protestantism's appeal lies in the fact that its communities support their members and work with each of them individually.

Muslims have other kinds of relations with their religious community. Today there are nine Muslim religious organizations in Kyiv, including seven communities; some of them are part of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Ukraine, which is headed by a Lebanese citizen. Others do not belong to any religious groups.

Muslims require religious buildings for their rites. Today there are two mosques in Kyiv. In addition, several public buildings have been converted for their religious needs. Newcomers, however, are establishing religious centers in areas well situated for their needs. A small building near the Troieshchyna market was converted into a mosque. With financing from the community, a building was constructed on an adjoining lot for gatherings, such as funeral repasts and holiday dinners. The most active members of this religious community are Pakistanis, several of whom have the appropriate educational qualifications. Devoted Muslims are not the only ones flocking to this mosque. This religious community has become an additional cementing factor for the Afghan community, and has strengthened ties between the Afghans and Pakistanis. Many practical problems of everyday life are also being resolved with the assistance of the religious community.

In the families of several respondents cases have been recorded of Kyiv wives converting to Islam. Eight spouses (13% of female spouses who are indigenous to Kyiv) converted to Islam after their marriages to immigrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. On the one hand, this may be explained by the fact that these Kyiv women, practically non-believers who are living with people for whom religion is an important part of their lives, must respect their principles and worldviews. This requires both knowledge of rites, an understanding of fundamental dogmas, and maintaining appropriate standards. On the other hand, their conversions may be viewed as an example of how immigrants, who are striving to create a typical and acceptable environment for themselves, are adapting the surrounding milieu to their needs. If a Muslim's wife must be a Muslim, then a Ukrainian girl who wants to be his spouse must convert to Islam.

## CONCLUSIONS

The process of immigrant communities' cultural interaction with Kyiv residents is virtually just beginning. Very few people in Kyiv are aware of the wonderful work of talented Afghan artists; very few have seen dances performed by the children of immigrants, heard their songs, or read their poems. Perhaps the next generation of Kyiv residents, who will be living next door to the children of immigrants, will know more about their culture.

Nontraditional migrants of Kyiv are taking an active part in city life. The level of their economic activity, legal competence, broad contacts with the local population, and participation in socio-cultural realities of the city is generally rather high.

Kyiv and its realities have an impact on immigrants' lives, while the presence of immigrants and their dynamic interaction with the surrounding milieu is having an impact on city life. This influence is noticeable both in the development of the economic structure and socio-demographic spheres, and in the development of Ukrainian society in general.



**CHAPTER FOUR****Losses and Gains, Intentions and Prospects**

**A**n important factor in the successful integration of immigrants into a new society is their own positive rating of the migration experience. This rating affects the formulation of their further migration goals, i.e., whether they will build their lives in this city and this country, return to their homeland, or move on. At the same time, their further migration intentions influence their social behavior, relations with the local population, and creation of family priorities. Therefore, it is important to determine whether Kyiv's immigrants have found something positive in their new place of residence and what specific features of Kyivan life appeal to respondents from diverse regions of origin. These data are reflected in Table 4.1.

The category of individuals whose migration motive was to improve their lives includes those who came to Kyiv to find a job, establish their own business, and re-unite with their families. It also includes those who remained in Kyiv after their work contracts or studies ended and wanted to settle down here, as well as transit migrants who, in their own words, were heading for Europe to better their lives. The reasons behind the classification into refugee immigrants and economic migrants were inadequately formalized and were for the most part subjective. But it is our view that a person who considers him/herself a refugee often adopts an appropriate life strategy, and this strategy usually differs from the aspirations of those who identify themselves as economic migrants. This classification revealed that 45% of the 315 adult immigrants who took part in the study were seeking asylum.

For those who migrated with the goal of bettering their lives and that of their family members, the most important attraction of Kyiv was the opportunity to work: 64% respondents from this group rated this as a positive feature of their lives in Kyiv, while only 22% of asylum seekers identified this opportunity and rated it as a positive feature of their new life.

To 37% of asylum seekers, the prospect of obtaining medical care and



**TABLE 4.1 Positive Aspects of Life in Kyiv Identified by Respondents, in % (N=215)\***

Community	No war	Can earn a living	Accessible education	Accessible medical care	Nice climate	Urban infrastructure	Family, fraternization
Afghan	81.8	39.4	24.2	14.2	6.1	3.0	7.6
African countries	75.0	14.6	37.5	33.3	6.2	12.5	8.3
Vietnamese	66.7	88.9	75.0	50.0	52.8	8.3	2.8
Chinese	33.3	50.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	16.7	16.7
Middle East countries	40.7	56.3	33.3	29.6	33.3	25.9	11.1
Arab	25.0	62.5	50.0	37.5	43.8	31.3	6.3
Kurdish	63.6	45.5	9.1	18.2	18.2	18.2	18.2
Pakistani	57.7	76.9	23.1	42.3	7.7	11.5	15.4
All Respondents	66.9	46.3	38.1	29.3	17.2	10.7	8.8

\*The total percentage exceeds 100 because respondents gave more than one response.

acquiring an education was somewhat more appealing than the possibility of finding work. However, even in this case the percentage of those who rated these opportunities as positive features of life in Kyiv is somewhat higher among economic migrants—49%.

An even greater difference between the respondents in these two groups is noted in the rating of Kyiv as a living environment, which included positive ratings of climate, urban infrastructure, and opportunities for marriage and expanding one's circle of acquaintances. Forty-one percent of those who wanted to improve their living conditions cited these as positive aspects of life in Kyiv, while there were nearly two times fewer refugees who rated them positively—23%.

Sixty-five percent of those whose goal was to improve their living conditions rated their material situation as normal or even problem-free. At the same time, only 11% of asylum seekers rated their current material situation as normal, while 36% rated it as being below the poverty level.

For the most part, immigrants hoping to improve their living conditions succeeded, at least in such aspects as material situation, employment, and opportunities to acquire an education and obtain medical care. It is difficult to determine to what extent these benefits offset losses in housing conditions, opportunities to satisfy their cultural needs, and securing human rights. But since 70% of the respondents in this group have been living in Kyiv for more than five years, we may assume that living conditions satisfy a significant proportion of them. However, migration meant significant material losses for refugees. A significant negative score (ratings of material situation, housing conditions, and employment) indicates a sharp deterioration in the living standards of this group of immigrants.

With regard to opportunities for acquiring an education, obtaining medical care, and satisfying cultural needs in Kyiv, both groups of respondents rated them almost equally. The difference in the score between the two groups results from the fact that at the time of the survey a significant proportion of immigrants who consider themselves refugees no longer had any prospects in their homelands.

Economic migrants rated respect for human rights in Kyiv markedly higher than refugees, although in comparison with conditions in their homeland, the rating score was negative. This is readily understandable, because in any state the situation of newcomers differs somewhat from that of the local population.

Among representatives of immigrant communities, Vietnamese encounter manifestations of unfairness least often: 75% of them have either never encountered it or did so very seldom. Traditional efforts to steer clear of potential conflicts with representatives of power structures and generally to avoid drawing attention to themselves result in the least number of manifestations of unfairness toward this community. For all other communities the distribution between those who either witnessed or were involved in unpleasant incidents that were related specifically to their foreign origin hovers between 30% for immigrants from Middle East countries (Arabs, 35%; Kurds, 25%) and 47% for Afghans. The character of these conflicts involving representatives of all communities turned out to be rather typical—most were run-ins with the police.

The legal competence of immigrants in Kyiv plays an important role in reducing conflict situations between immigrants, the local population, and representatives of governmental structures. Such competence is also an indicator of integration into society and a positive factor furthering the process of integration. As a result, legal competence positively affects immigrants' general rating of their status in the receiving society.

Legal competence may be examined solely in the context of specific communities, since every immigrant obtains information and supportive advice from his/her compatriots. A good example of the legal competence of communities may be the fact that almost immediately after the passage of the law "On Refugees," when few in Ukraine knew exactly how it would be implemented and migration services were only in the process of being created, refugees who now had some hope of legalizing their stay in Kyiv were already waiting at their doors. Even the African immigrants, whose community is not very cohesive, resolve many problems thanks to the the community's competence in Ukrainian and international law.

In addition to competence with regard to purely legislative norms, also important is the level of competence with regard to bureaucratic instructions and simple, customary norms, which regulate important aspects of immigrants' lives, such as renting housing accommodations, processing documents authorizing the right to engage in commerce, as well as norms of behavior in Ukrainian society. In this regard Kyiv immigrant communities appear to be quite competent, although the level of such competence differs within each community. It is difficult to establish quantitative indicators that would assess the level of this competence. But if one

assumes that an average number of places of habitation for representatives of different communities and level of rental payments may be a criterion, then the Vietnamese community, whose high level of integration has already been identified according to other parameters, is also the most integrated from this point of view.

A wide range of both positive and negative ratings of the new milieu merely confirms that depending on the situation, different aspects of life may be most important for each person. For example, for refugees in the early stage of migration, security might take precedence over comfort level, but as time passes, priorities change owing to the absence of a deadly threat. Therefore, it would be desirable to attempt a comprehensive assessment of each immigrant's satisfaction with the results of migration at a specific time.

Material living conditions to a great extent determine satisfaction with migration results. One-hundred percent of those who stated that his/her material situation in Kyiv is problem-free believe that their decision to move was correct. But immigrants who described their situation as difficult and even below the poverty level also said they would have definitely made the move even under those conditions. Using our respondents as an example, we can state that the category of poor immigrants who have a hard life in Kyiv but who regard their decision to migrate as correct, is first and foremost represented by people who in their homelands were hired workers or office workers (nearly 30% of this group), military personnel (15%), arrived immediately after completing school or university (41%), and unemployed (only 6%). For these people relocation was accompanied by a significant shift in the sphere of employment. At the time of the survey, 54% of the respondents in this group were traders and entrepreneurs, who were less successful than those just beginning this type of activity in their homeland.

It should also be noted that 70% of those who are living a life of poverty in Kyiv but regard their decision to migrate as correct have not encountered any manifestations of unfairness toward them, which has perhaps allowed them to assess their choice positively, notwithstanding all the hardships.

A significant difference in satisfaction with the results of the move is noted among the representatives of various communities (Table 4.2). The most satisfied were the Chinese: 100% of them would definitely or probably have come even if they had known the outcomes. High scores were noted among the Vietnamese (89%). These two communities are characterized by adequacy of expectations and achievements.

**TABLE 4.2** *Distribution of Respondents from Different Communities Based on Type of Response to the Question ‘‘Would You Have Come to Kyiv If You Had Been Aware of the Consequences?’’, in % (N= 235)*

Community	Yes	Probably	Probably not	No	Not sure	Total
Community	25.9	21.0	4.9	42.0	6.2	100
Afghan	4.1	6.1	2.0	85.7	2.1	100
African countries	43.2	46.0	10.8	-	-	100
Vietnamese	8.3	91.7	0.0	-	-	100
Chinese	24.1	37.9	6.9	31.0	-	100
Middle East countries	35.3	29.4	-	35.3	-	100
Arab	8.3	50.0	16.7	25.0	-	100
Kurdish	22.2	25.9	18.5	33.3	-	100
Pakistani	22.5	28.1	6.8	40.00	2.6	100
All Respondents						

Immigrants from the Middle East also scored high in terms of satisfaction, but among Arabs the percentage (65%) was higher than among Kurds (58%). For Afghans and Pakistanis, the correspondence of expectations to achievements is lower: a little more than half said that they would not want to come to Kyiv again.

Ninety percent of immigrants from African countries would never have come to Ukraine if they had realized the consequences of taking such a step. Even among Africans who work and have a high level of integration, as noted earlier, only 40% said that they would come again. There are practically no satisfied immigrants among those who rely on international organizations.

The most important conclusion drawn by both Africans and the city in which they are living today is the fact that they are badly off here. When immigrants experience these kinds of feelings, their successful integration into the new environment is highly unlikely. The reasons behind this situation are the community's inconsequential internal ties, limited fraternization, and the specific character of their acceptance by the local population. But the most important reason is that those who have become dependents of international organizations cannot become members of society to the fullest extent.

A general rating of migration results is the primary factor that affects further migration intentions. Consequently, it should surprise no one that the percentage of people who would like to leave Kyiv varies among those individuals who rated migration as a correct step and those who viewed it as a mistake (Table 4.3). There were no respondents who intended to improve their lives by relocating within Ukraine.

Among those who are sure or inclined toward a positive rating of their move, 45% definitely do not want to leave, while 9% are uncertain. Thirty percent of respondents in this group are completely certain of their desire to leave. At the same time, 50% of those who, in their opinion, would probably not have come to Kyiv had they known how they would end up living here, were certain that they wanted to leave. Sixty-four percent of immigrants, even if they were aware of the consequences of a move to Ukraine and would by no means take such a step, were certain that they wanted to leave the country.

The influence of the cultural integration strategy, which was not at all reflected in the formulation of ratings of migration results, is noted, albeit not very distinctly, in the formulation of migration goals. Thus, 38% of

**TABLE 4.3** *Distribution of Immigrants Who Want to Leave Ukraine, Based on the Level of Satisfaction with Migration Results, in % (N= 234)*

Would you have come if you had known the consequences?	Do you want to leave Ukraine?					Total
	Yes	Probably	Probably not	No	Not sure	
Definitely yes	30.2	11.3	17.0	28.3	13.2	100
Probably	30.3	18.2	19.7	25.7	6.1	100
Probably not	50.0	18.8	12.5	18.7	0.0	100
Definitely not	63.4	14.0	3.2	18.3	1.1	100
Not sure	50.0	0.0	50.0	-	-	100
All Respondents	45.3	14.5	12.8	22.2	5.2	100

those who are oriented toward the strategy of cultural integration, 45% of those who are oriented towards separation, and 50% of those who tend toward cultural marginalization are definite about leaving Ukraine.

The link between cultural integration and formulation of migration goals is evident even in aspects of linguistic competence. Nearly 30% of those who during their stay in Kyiv mastered not only Russian but also Ukrainian, 46% of those who learned only Russian, and 56% of those who do not know either of the local languages want to leave the country.

Forty-two percent of those who want to live permanently in Ukraine simultaneously want to leave. This paradox is connected, first of all, with the unsatisfactory situation in Kyiv of 80% of the respondents in this group, which consists mostly of Afghan and African refugees who, in their own words, are living in hardship and below the poverty line. They would like to live in Kyiv but only on condition that their lives will improve; in the meantime, under the current conditions, they see no other solution than to move somewhere else. For the majority of them, however, this desire is more of a dream, and none of them are planning to leave in the very near future.

Citizenship is an important prerequisite for an immigrant's full integration into the receiving society, as well as the best guarantee of securing rights. A desire to obtain Ukrainian citizenship clearly indicates the nontraditional immigrant's intention to remain living in Kyiv.

**TABLE 4.4 Distribution of Answers from Respondents of Various Communities to the Question  
 “Would You Like to Obtain Ukrainian Citizenship? Live Here Permanently? Are  
 You Intending to Leave Ukraine?” in %**

Community	Citizenship (N= 213)	Live here permanently (N=210)	Would you leave? (N=239)	Within a year (N=205)	Within a year (N=315)
	Definitely/ Probably	Definitely/ Probably not	Definitely/Probably	Yes	No/without a doubt (% of total)
Afghan	51.4	42.1	70.0	4.5	45.0
African countries	72.1	53.8	77.6	9.5	68.0
Employed	50.0	50	64.3	18.8	64.0
Dependents	82.8	56.0	82.8	6.5	69.0
Vietnamese	32.4	40.5	29.3	5.0	47.0
Chinese	0.0	0.0	61.5	30.8	56.0
Middle East countries	54.2	44.4	45.3	11.2	45.5
Arab	37.5	31.2	47.1	20	56.0
Kurdish	87.5	57.1	41.7	0.0	33.0
Pakistani	43.5	25.0	51.9	9.1	56.0
All Respondents	48.8	39.5	58.9	8.8	51.0



Table 4.4 illustrates the aspirations of Kyiv immigrant communities to live in Kyiv, depart to another country, obtain citizenship, and make plans for the very near future. In most communities the number of immigrants who want to become citizens is higher than those who want to live here permanently.

Ninety-two percent of those who would like to obtain Ukrainian citizenship but do not want to remain living here do not have valid passports, or any passports whatsoever; for them the main appeal of citizenship is the opportunity to receive a Ukrainian passport, which they believe will help them move to Western Europe.

Although the desire to move to Western Europe or the United States is unambiguously prevalent in respondents' answers, the presence of relatives in their homelands is a definitive consideration in their desire to return home. Some respondents would like to join relatives who do not live in their homelands. Among these are Afghans who brought their parents to Pakistan, and Africans whose relatives moved to neighboring countries to be farther away from military actions. One respondent hopes to move to Russia to join his brothers, who have created a better life there than in Kyiv. But most importantly, there are three times fewer individuals among respondents with relatives in their homelands who want to move no matter where but have no place to go.

Unlike relatives in the homeland, the presence of relatives in Western countries also has some impact on the desire to leave Ukraine (Table 4.5)

Table 4.4 shows that nearly 9% of respondents are ready to act on their intention to leave the country within a year. It is interesting to note that, with regard to immediate intentions, the difference between destinations is much smaller than with regard to desires in general, because 49% of this group are planning to move to Western European countries within a year, while 41% are planning to return to their homeland; incidentally, 12% of those who are planning to return to their homeland consider themselves refugees. Among economic migrants who have decided to leave Kyiv within a year, 58% will be heading for their homelands.

Instead of drawing conclusions here, we shall examine the hypothetical assumption that all those who have an intention or doubts about leaving the country within a year will act on this intention. How will this be reflected on the general characteristics of the respondents? The percentage of women will noticeably decline from 25% to 11%. The average age

**TABLE 4.5** *Presence of Relatives in Western Countries and Desire to Leave Ukraine, in % (N=232)*

Do you have relatives?	Do you want to leave Ukraine?					Total
	Yes	Probably	Probably not	No	Not sure	
Yes	55.1	19.1	8.9	12.4	4.5	100
No	39.8	10.5	15.4	28.7	5.6	100
All Respondents	45.7	13.8	12.9	22.4	5.2	100

will slightly increase from thirty-four to thirty-five. At the same time, the age of Chinese immigrants will drop, because only families from this group are planning to leave, not single men. Africans' and Pakistanis' ages will remain unchanged because few of them are planning to leave; but Afghans, Vietnamese, and Arabs will be older by one year. In general, the number of individuals under thirty will decrease from 30% to 22%. Half of immigrants with Ph.D.s will leave the country, although the proportion of people who studied in institutions of higher learning will increase by 2%. The absolute number of children will decrease, but the percentage of families with children will increase from 44% to 53%. Among different categories of employment the number of market traders will increase by 1%, the number of unemployed will increase by 3%, while the number of entrepreneurs will decrease by 2%. The number of people who depend on the assistance of international organizations will increase by 4%. The rating of the material situation of those who remain in Kyiv hardly differs from that of the total number of immigrants.

Among those who have no intentions of leaving Ukraine at the present time, there is a high percentage of immigrants who are dissatisfied with the nature of their activities. In this group there is a noticeably higher percentage of immigrants without essential documents and those who have already used illegal immigration channels than among immigrants in general. All this goes to prove that in the near future most of them may formulate an intention to leave Kyiv and Ukraine, especially since 57% of people who are staying for the time being no longer have the desire to live here.

A further outflow of people from Kyiv may indeed take place. Channels for the transit transport of migrants through Ukraine have not disappeared, and it is doubtful that they will vanish even after the expan-

sion of the Schengen zone. In other words, new emigrants will appear, taking the place of those who, after living here for many years, adapted and were to some extent integrated, at least through marriage and children. From the point of view of the city's growth, the loss of the youngest and most economically active representatives of immigrant communities does not appear to be the best scenario.

With respect to the direction of the hypothetical departure, those who hope to act on their intention to make it to Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, or another Western country associate it not only with the desire to improve the material conditions of their lives, but also with the fact that more clearly defined and hence more readily understandable living conditions await them there.<sup>70</sup>

## CHAPTER FIVE

## Immigrants through the eyes of Kyiv Residents

The local population's attitude toward newcomers, others, or "foreigners" is an important indicator of the maturity, development, and tolerance of a society, a people, and a state. In recent years both Ukraine and its capital city Kyiv have encountered a new problem—one that was unknown in Soviet times: the settling, employment, and adaptation of both legal and illegal immigrants and individuals seeking asylum. For the most part, Kyiv residents are prepared to understand and accept the representatives of nations that comprised the former Soviet Union, since, thanks to seventy years of common history, they resemble the local population in quite a few respects. Throughout the twentieth century, Soviet citizens, in one way or another, migrated to Ukraine, and many Ukrainians also worked alongside the representatives of other Soviet nations in different parts of a once unified state or in their homeland. For them these people are both "others" and "our own people."<sup>71</sup>

Immigrants from Asian and African countries are a different matter, although perhaps Kyivans, out of all the people in Ukraine, are most ready to associate with the representatives of these groups. After all, beginning in the 1960s, foreign students were an integral part of the student body in such leading Kyiv schools as Taras Shevchenko National University, National Technical University of Ukraine (Kyiv Polytechnic Institute), and National Aviation University. However, it is one thing to have students arriving for a designated period of time, associating mostly with fellow students in university lecture halls and on campuses, and then leaving after graduation. It is an entirely different matter when average Kyiv residents encounter immigrants from Asian and African countries in various corners of the city: in the markets as colleagues or competitors; in their places of habitation as neighbors; public places; restaurants and cafes; and on public transportation. Therefore, today we may speak about the formation of an entirely different type of interpersonal relations, as well as a dif-

ferent attitude of the local population—Kyiv residents—toward newcomers from Asian and African countries, who in the past ten years have been appearing in Kyiv as students, immigrants, and refugees. As the noted Ukrainian sociologist Nikolai Shul’ga writes: “The number of individuals who declare that they are refugees increases with every year. At the same time there is an increase in the number of problems associated with these people: legal, economic, social, ethnocultural, religious, and psychological. Even so, they are not only remaining unsolved, but practically no one is even studying them.”<sup>72</sup>

Historically, Kyiv was always a multinational and multicultural city where several cultures coexisted, evolved, intermingled, and mutually enriched each other peacefully and sometimes not so peacefully. It is worth noting that Kyiv was always an important crossroad of several trade routes linking the East and West, and the North and South. It was always a multiethnic city. When Kyiv was part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish Commonwealth (*Rzecz Pospolita*), the city already had established trade relations with almost all of Europe. The same is true of the more recent period of the turbulent growth of capitalism, when not only Russians and Poles made their way to the great industrial and cultural center of Kyiv but also Germans, Czechs, Karaims, and others. Like the Ukrainians, a significant Jewish stratum always formed an organic part of the indigenous population of Kyiv.

According to statistical data of the twentieth century, Kyiv was the place of habitation of many newcomers in varying numbers from different parts of the world, and above all from the Russian Empire and its successor, the Soviet Union. Thus, according to the 1926 census, the population of Kyiv was comprised of 43% Ukrainians, 28% Jews, 25% Russians, and 0.26% Poles.<sup>73</sup> In the post-war period, as Soviet sources confirm, a varying number of representatives of almost every nationality in the Soviet Union lived in the city.

In addition to studying the problems that are connected with the arrival of immigrants in Kyiv and their settlement in the city, it is important to clarify and analyze the attitude of Kyiv residents toward the fact that new residents have appeared in the city—newcomers from Asian and African countries. Do they see it as a problem? How do they assess their impact on city life? What do they know about their relations with the organs of state power?

**VIEWS ON IMMIGRANTS: SURVEY DATA**

In order to clarify these and other questions, we conducted a representative survey of Kyiv residents. The sampling size, which consisted of 1,000 respondents, was based on the principle of multilevel quota sampling. These quotas represent the adult population of Kyiv divided according to gender, age, and level of education, as well as territorial features (Kyiv city districts). Streets in each district were selected and used as an itinerary for the survey. Interviewers were instructed to conduct surveys with no more than three respondents from each building. Refusals to participate in the survey were not recorded. The survey itinerary forms included the address and full name of the respondent (if s/he agreed to provide such information). Thus, the sampling size incorporated relevant socio-demographic characteristics. Women comprised 53.9% of the survey participants, and men, 46.1%, which generally corresponds with the gender/age composition of the city population in 2000.<sup>74</sup>

**TABLE 5.1 *Place, and Frequency of Encounters and Fraternization of Kyiv Residents with Immigrants, in %\****

Place of encounter and fraternization	Frequency of encounter and fraternization	
	Have you ever encountered immigrants? (N=998)	Have you ever fraternized with immigrants? (N=991)
At work	7.4	5.7
At place of habitation	9.7	6.4
In public places	32.2	11.1
At the markets	25.3	14.8
In children's and learning institutions	4	2.3
In medical institutions	2	1.2
Other	0.5	0.8
No	48.0	67.8

\* The total percentage exceeds 100 because respondents gave more than one response.

The survey addressed the following questions:

- How often do Kyiv residents encounter immigrants and associate with them?
- Where do those encounters take place?
- Do encounters differ based on the type of activity or level of well-being of the Kyiv residents?
- Do Kyiv residents believe that the number of migrants in the city is increasing or decreasing?
- How do Kyiv residents and immigrants rate the reasons behind the migrants' decision to choose Kyiv as their place of habitation?
- What problems do immigrants come across (in their opinion and that of Kyiv residents)?
- Do immigrants want to adapt to the new conditions of life and integrate into the Ukrainian milieu?
- Are they prepared to engage in the process of socio-psychological assimilation while preserving their national identity?

Based on the acquired information, we were able to compare the rating of the socio-economic living conditions, which Kyiv residents and immigrants provide concerning both their own life and each other's. The frequency of Kyiv residents' encounters with immigrants from Asia and Africa confirms that as of today a significant number of Kyiv residents have experience with associating with immigrants in Kyiv (See Table 5.1)

Kyiv residents mostly encounter immigrants in public places and at the markets, 32.3% and 25.4%, respectively, which also corresponds to the survey data on the main workplaces of immigrants. (Table 5.2).

Immigrants are least frequently encountered at children's and learning institutions. However, according to this marker, there are four districts where immigrants either live, study, or work: the Pechersky and

**TABLE 5.2 Frequency of Encounters of Kyiv Residents with Immigrants from Asia and Africa, in %  
(N=998)**

Place of encounter and fraternization	City districts										Frequency of fraternization (by place) in %
	Desniansky	Obolonsky	Podilsky	Sviatoshynsky	Shevchenkovsky	Dniprotsky	Solomiansky	Pechersky	Darnytsky	Holovivsky	
Yes, at work	28.4	5.4	6.8	6.8	5.4	20.3	10.8	2.7	12.2	1.4	7.5
Yes, at place of habitation	21.7	4.1	7.2	8.3	13.4	20.6	10.3	1.0	7.2	6.2	9.7
Yes, in public places	8.7	13.7	4.4	8.4	13.7	19.9	11.5	3.7	7.1	9.0	32.3
Yes, at the markets	13.8	13.8	4.0	8.7	15.4	17.8	9.0	3.2	7.1	7.1	25.4
Yes, in children's and learning institutions	25.0	2.5	7.5	2.5	15.0	17.5	12.5	15.0	2.5	-	4.0
Yes, in medical institutions	30.0	5.0	5.0	-	20.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	5.0	5.0	2.0
No	11.9	9.0	10.6	14.6	9.0	8.3	9.8	7.7	11.3	7.9	48.1



Shevchenkivsky districts (15% each), which have a concentration of numerous institutions of higher learning where foreign students study, and a number of elite schools attended by children of businessmen and members of the diplomatic corps; and the Desniansky and Dniprovsky districts (25% and 17.5%, respectively), where a significant proportion of immigrant residents live with their families, and whose children attend secondary schools and preschool establishments in the district.

It should be kept in mind that native Kyivans do not associate that often with migrants from Asia and Africa. Only one-third of surveyed respondents (32%) said that they have first-hand experience with immigrants from these continents. With regard to the frequency with which residents of various Kyivan districts associate with immigrants, as could be expected, residents of the two largest left-bank districts closest to the Troieshchynsky market—Dniprovsky and Desniansky (14% and 13% of respondents, respectively), most often associate with immigrants. After comparing the frequency of encounters with the frequency of fraternization, we noticed that the percentage of respondents who associate with immigrants in certain places directly correlates with the percentage of respondents who encounter immigrants in the very same places. This tendency is particularly typical for children's, learning, and medical institutions, where the frequency of encounters and association is almost identical.

Aspiring to secure at least some minimal living conditions, newcomers must look for work. Under contemporary conditions, the main places where they apply their efforts are petty commerce and trading. Thus, their fraternization with citizens of Kyiv takes place most often in this sphere. Individuals who have their own business and employees of private firms (8.5% and 19.4%, respectively) associate with immigrants most frequently at work. Students most often associate with immigrants in public places (22.4%) and at the markets (13.4%). Unexpectedly, little fraternization occurs in learning institutions—6%. This clearly attests to the insignificant number of representatives of Asian and African countries among the Kyiv student population. With respect to place of habitation, the picture is almost identical for the majority of identified categories. However, as expected, with the exception of employees of state enterprises and private companies, people who do not work and the unemployed predominate.

The reciprocal fraternization between immigrants and Kyiv residents may be indicative of the level of the latter's well-being. Thus, those who live well fraternize most often with immigrants at the markets (26.3%), where many of those who rated their well-being as normal (18%) also associate with immigrants. It is noteworthy that even those who rate their living conditions as falling below the poverty line fraternize with immigrants at the markets, for quite often they look for occasional jobs in these very places, with migrant traders becoming their employers. Such individuals account for 16.1% of the poorest respondents. Among those who live well, the percentage of people who in one way or another fraternize with immigrants is 10-15% higher than among citizens with a lower level of well-being.

The study revealed that neither the material status of Kyivans nor the place of fraternization with migrants has any critical effect on the distribution of their attitude toward immigrants. Thus, 66.1% of Kyiv residents who are favorably disposed toward immigrants have never associated with them, while 62.3% of those who believe that Kyiv residents are hostile toward immigrants have also never associated with migrants. As could be expected, this percentage is even higher among those who are indifferent or unsure (73% and nearly 68%, respectively). But according to the collected data, fraternization with immigrants or its absence does not significantly influence Kyiv residents' attitude toward them.

Questions to Kyiv residents on whether they have noticed an increase or decrease in the number of immigrants in the city within the last ten years showed that in general the majority of respondents (70%) were unsure. Seventy-five percent of those 30% who have at least some idea said that there are many immigrants in the city. Although such responses as "few", "not many", "many", "average" are not expressed numerically, in our opinion they seem to have quite an explicit, emotionally laden content. Therefore, after calculating the results of the survey, we found that 3.7% of respondents think that we have few immigrants, and 4% of those who answered the question believe that there are not many. Therefore, it may be stated that the preponderant majority of Kyiv residents actually do not have an objective idea of the number of immigrants in the city, while those who answered the question are governed more by their attitude toward the problem than informed opinion.

However, it can also be said that the majority of respondents (56.4%) who do not have a clear-cut idea of the number of immigrants in the city believe that the presence of immigrants has a negative effect on the situation in the city, while 26% are not sure. Thus, generally less than 20% of respondents are neutral (“no effect”—13%) or positive—4.5%.

Here it should be clarified that after having been transformed into the capital of an independent state, Kyiv in the last ten years has almost completely lost its “provincial” coziness that was so dear to many Kyiv residents; its pace of life has changed, and many new people have appeared, owing primarily to migration to the city from other regions in Ukraine. In our opinion, this is precisely why the majority of Kyiv residents have a negative attitude toward the prospects of a further increase in the city population, number of cars on the streets, level of exhaust pollution, etc. The attitude of Kyiv residents toward both newcomers in general and immigrants in particular should also be assessed against this background.

We also analyzed the opinions of Kyiv residents concerning trends in the number of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Respondents frequently expressed contradictory opinions. The majority of Kyiv residents (65%) believe that the number of immigrants is constantly growing, regardless of the fact that objective data confirm the opposite tendency. Another 15.8% believe that even if their numbers have increased, they have not done so significantly. At the same time, 14.5% hesitated in answering this question, and even fewer (4.6%) tended to believe that the numbers of immigrants is not increasing in the city.

In identifying their countries of origin, the majority of respondents named three countries from which, in their opinion, most immigrants had come to Kyiv. Thus, Kyiv residents believed, not unjustifiably, that the majority of immigrants in Kyiv are from Afghanistan (49% of respondents) and China (48%). According to respondents, these countries are followed closely by Vietnam (41%). Only 20% of respondents believe that the overwhelming majority of immigrants in Kyiv are from Pakistan; Turkey and India were the next most commonly named countries (17% and 11%, respectively). African countries, Iran, and Iraq were identified as the home countries of a significant proportion of immigrants by fewer than 10% of Kyiv residents. An insignificant proportion of Kyiv residents named Sri Lanka and Bangladesh (2–3%).

**TABLE 5.3** *Main Factors of Immigration from Asian and African Countries according to Kyiv Residents and Immigrants, in %\**

Main factors of immigration	Kyiv residents' ratings in %	Immigrants' ratings in %
Education	32.5	22
Marriage	25.4	11
Life is better in Ukraine	38.8	38
Were escaping war	46.0	26
Transit	28.9	3
Other	4.0	-
Not sure	10.0	-

\* *The total percentage exceeds 100 because respondents gave more than one response.*

In the perception of Ukrainian citizens, the main factors that led to the migration of immigrants from Asia and Africa to Ukraine are wars and a variety of interethnic conflicts. As the following table indicates, almost half of Kyiv residents believe that the main reason behind immigration is military conflicts, which lead to destruction and human victims. Almost 40% of respondents think that one of the defining causes of migration is that life is better in Ukraine in general, and in Kyiv in particular. However, there is no denying that in 2000 Ukrainians gave a rating of 1.88 to the economic situation in their state on a ten-point scale.<sup>75</sup> (See Table 5.3)

For immigrants, adapting to daily life in a foreign country is always associated with a broad spectrum of problems. This means obtaining a residence permit and searching for a job, not to mention adapting to the living conditions in each specific country. Yet, according to the surveyed Kyiv residents, the most important problem that immigrants face in Kyiv is their dealings with law enforcement agencies. Every second surveyed resident shared this opinion (54%).

In this case, it is significant that the opinion of Kyiv residents is practically identical to the opinion of immigrants themselves. Responding to the question, "Where did you most often witness unfairness toward

you?” nearly 62% of immigrants mentioned the police, while 44% indicated public places, where such encounters actually occur most often. For the purpose of comparison, only 18% of respondents have problems at work, while a little over 3% have problems with neighbors or in medical institutions. Migrants encounter the least number of problems in educational institutions—1%.

Many Kyiv residents believe that immigrants’ social and legal vulnerability is manifested in such problems as difficulties in obtaining residence documents (40%), searching for housing (42%), and ability to find work (32%). Few Kyiv residents view issues like children’s education and the ability to obtain medical care as being problematic for immigrants from countries of the above-cited regions. With regard to immigrants’ socio-economic conditions, Kyiv residents’ ratings are rather contradictory. Kyiv residents believe that immigrants are much worse off than the local population. At the same time, they have a rather high opinion of their material situation or, to put it simply, their earnings. The majority of respondents are genuinely convinced that immigrants have significantly more money than the Ukrainian population. (See Table 5.4)

Today, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian citizens are facing the urgent problem of employment, which is also a pressing issue for immigrants. Kyiv residents spoke of limited opportunities to find a job both for themselves (median rating of 2.7) and even more so for immigrants from Asian and African countries (2.4). However, Kyiv residents believe that they still have more chances for success than immigrants.

Our analysis of median scores of job opportunities for Kyiv residents and immigrants of various social strata revealed that the category of unemployed respondents perhaps feels some competition from immigrants, since their median score was 2.4, while immigrants had a median score of 2.5. For the remaining social categories of respondents, there were no appreciable differences in the rating of opportunities to find a job, if one excludes businessmen, who account for a fundamental gap in the compared ratings.

The completed survey permits us to confirm that Kyiv residents’ perception of immigrants from Asia and Africa is quite ambiguous. Nevertheless, half of respondents (56%) believe that the presence of immigrants from these countries, who are living on the territory of Kyiv, has

**TABLE 5.4 Ratings of Socio-Economic Conditions of Kyiv Residents and Immigrants from Asia and Africa Living in the City, Given by Kyiv Residents and Immigrants (on a Five-Point Scale)**

Socio-economic conditions	Kyiv residents' ratings N=998		Asian and African immigrants' ratings N=223	
	By Kyiv residents	By immigrants from Asia and Africa	By Kyiv residents	By immigrants from Asia and Africa
Material situation	2.6	3.5	3.1	2.5
Housing conditions	3.0	*	2.4	*
Opportunities to find a job in Kyiv	2.7	3.7	2.4	2.3
Opportunities to obtain medical care	2.8	3.9	2.5	3
Opportunities to provide an education for their children	2.7	4.1	2.6	3.1
Attitude of local police	3.0	3.4	1.7	2
Attitude of municipal authorities	2.9	3.8	2.1	2.6

★ Immigrants were not asked these questions during the survey. The median rating given by respondents, based on a five-point scale: 1=lowest; 5=highest.

more negative than positive consequences for the situation in the capital. Their presence leads to a decrease in the number of jobs for Kyiv residents, provokes interethnic conflicts, weakens the housing pool, etc. The remaining respondents (44%) are either indifferent to immigrants or even positively disposed toward them. Obviously, in this case we have a rather high level of openness on the part of Kyiv residents toward other ethno-cultural groups. This opinion is also shared by immigrants, who in their leisure time are equally likely to socialize with representatives of the local population as with their compatriots and other immigrants.

A proportion of respondents believe that immigrants have a negative impact on the level of crime in the capital. Almost half of the respondents (49%) believe that immigrants who are involved in criminal activities are creating a high-crime situation where they live and work. A rather significant number of Kyiv residents expressed the conviction that all immigrants are somehow linked to the criminal world. However, police statistics show that such statements are exaggerations. Not infrequently the Ukrainian press blames a variety of crimes on immigrants. Meanwhile, according to data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, approximately 600,000 different crimes in the space of one year were officially recorded in Ukraine,<sup>76</sup> out of which nearly 3,000 were attributed to foreigners, i.e., no more than 0.5%.

An unbiased analysis of Kyiv residents' rating of the presence of immigrants in the city confirms that among those who are in constant contact with immigrants, there is a markedly higher percentage of people who believe that Kyiv residents are positively disposed toward them than those who associate with immigrants infrequently. This difference is even more pronounced among those who believe that Kyiv residents are hostile toward immigrants—a difference of 7% in the responses of those who only have occasional dealings with foreigners.

In our view, the aloof attitude of some Kyiv residents may also be explained by the fact that one-third of respondents (34%) are convinced that newcomers from Africa and Asia have an unfriendly attitude toward local residents. At the same time a significant proportion (43%) of respondents were utterly unable to rate the behavior of immigrants from Asia and Africa in Kyiv or their outlook on the local population. In other words, we are speaking not so much of unfriendliness or lack of mutual understanding as ignorance demonstrated by a significant proportion of

Kyiv city residents who have no experience in dealing with immigrants. For that reason the question, “What did they bring with them when they came to our country, and what can be expected of them?” was not completely answered, because the attitude of the majority of Kyiv residents toward immigrants is formed not so much on the basis of personal experience as on external influence, particularly the mass media.

**TABLE 5.5** *Readiness of Kyiv Residents to Accept Immigrants from Asia and Africa, in % (N=998)*

Are you ready to accept immigrants as:	Yes	Not sure	No	Total
City residents	37.3	21.8	40.9	100
Microdistrict residents	34.7	22.2	43.1	100
Work colleagues	26.3	22.4	51.3	100
Neighbors	23.1	18.9	57.9	100
Close friends	17.0	16.5	66.5	100
Family members	5.0	14.3	80.7	100

A rather high level of readiness on the part of city residents to coexist with foreigners from Asian and African countries is further corroborated by the response to questions that were posed to respondents with the goal of determining how much they are prepared to let representatives of other cultures into their lives. The collected data indicate that the majority of Kyiv residents are either ready to see immigrants as residents of their city or do not have a clear-cut answer—37.3% and 21.8%, respectively. For more detailed information, see Table 5.5.

An increase in the level to which Kyiv residents are prepared to admit immigrants from Asia and Africa to their milieu is observed concomitantly with an improvement in their material situation. The higher they rate their own well-being (“We live well,” “We live okay.”), the more positive the respondents’ attitude toward the prospect of having personal relations with immigrants, including accepting them as friends, work colleagues, and neighbors, and even members of their families.

Of the various social strata, the most positive attitude toward immigrants is observed among young people (students, schoolchildren), as



well as those who have their own businesses, i.e., those citizens who have the most contact with immigrants. On the one hand, the defining factor in this case is type of activity, and on the other—the fact that the former are the most communicative and inquisitive members of society. Respondents who have never had any personal contact with immigrants or who have had such encounters only at the markets would prefer not to let foreigners into their microdistrict or do not want them as neighbors. In other words, these are the people who are buying cheap, mass-produced consumer goods from immigrants. In our opinion, this attitude has more of a social than ethnic basis. At the same time, respondents who have prior personal experience of associating with immigrants, i.e., they have already worked with immigrants or have socialized in their places of habitation, have an entirely tolerant attitude toward immigrants as work colleagues, neighbors, or friends.

During the survey we recorded a rather high level of readiness to allow immigrants into the capital, associate with them, or live next door among those respondents who gave a relatively low rating of their material situation. Respondents who gave a high rating of immigrants' material well-being demonstrated more of a hostile attitude toward them, and were completely opposed to the idea of Asian and African immigrants being in Kyiv.

Public opinion and the municipal government's treatment of immigrants has an impact on the local population's perception of immigrants as equal members of society. Our analysis showed a direct correlation between Kyiv residents' attitude toward immigrants from Asia and Africa and their likelihood to admit immigrants into their milieu. In general, those who are prepared to accept immigrants as members of their family, close friends, and city residents believe that local residents have a positive and friendly attitude toward immigrants.

The survey revealed that only 8.4% of respondents believe that the government is doing something to improve immigrants' lives, demonstrating concern for recent newcomers to the city, and trying to resolve their social problems. Nearly one-third (33.6%) believes that the authorities are indifferent to immigrants and in fact not doing anything to help them adapt in the city. A little more than one-third (36.6%) is completely unaware of any actions that the government is undertaking to overcome real or non-existent problems connected with immigrants.

In their opinion, the authorities are indifferent to the immigrants' presence on the territory of Kyiv, and are not implementing any designated policy with respect to immigrants. This is indeed the case. To this day the state has not developed a concept of migration policy; no efforts have been made to generalize experience amassed in this sphere, and no migration legislation is being implemented (for more detailed information, see Table 2.1). One-fifth (21.4%) of Kyiv residents believe that the authorities are somehow trying to eliminate immigrants from the city.

At the same time, socio-legal measures concerning legal and illegal immigrants are not being discussed in the mass media. Perhaps for that very reason a majority of respondents were unable to identify any actions that the authorities are implementing with regard to immigrants or to define the government's attitude to people who have come to Ukraine from Asian and African countries. Hence, it was logical to ask the average Kyiv resident: what should the municipal government be doing about immigrants?

One-fifth of the respondents (21%) are convinced that the municipal authorities should treat immigrants the same as their own citizens, and help them. Over 40% believe that there is no need to do anything special, but encouraging any increase in the influx of immigrants is not desirable either. Nearly 15% of respondents are indifferent to this issue or fail to see any problem. Only 17% hold extremist opinions and think that immigrants should be expelled from the city.

Native-born Kyiv residents are most in favor of halting immigration. Citizens of practically every country in the world are critical of the growing numbers of immigrants, regardless of their skin color or country of origin. As for Kyiv residents, the situation in this city is unique: during World War II the city lost over half its population, and in the post-war years Kyiv's population grew mostly as a result of the influx of migrants from different regions of Ukraine and other Soviet republics.

The survey goes a long way to proving that Kyivans are renowned for their high level of tolerance. In the past few centuries both native-born and foreign ethnographers have frequently singled out this Ukrainian trait. In general, we see that the Kyivan population, not burdened by any special psychological problems, is prepared to accept the migration processes that have been taking place in recent years. Kyivans are tolerant toward the representatives of other races and cultures. They are, at one and

the same time, sufficiently self-critical and critical of factors at work in their own country. It is therefore possible that a positive resolution may be found to migration problems that have arisen in the last decade, and which will continue to be urgent problems for Ukraine in the future.

### **VIEWS ON IMMIGRANTS: INTERVIEWS WITH SPECIALISTS**

One of our sources of information on immigrants from Asian and African countries in the city of Kyiv was interviews with government representatives, law enforcement agencies, civic organizations, as well as teachers and medical personnel, who through their everyday work have firsthand contact with this segment of the city population. The opinions of experts are particularly interesting because, unlike average Kyiv residents, these specialists possess broader and more objective information about immigrants. In his/her own area of expertise each can influence, and indeed does influence, the formulation and implementation of migration policy in the city.

Of the forty-six experts who were interviewed, thirty-eight were Kyiv residents. Among them were twelve government bureaucrats who work in the central organs of state power, municipal and raion state administrations; seven employees of the police at the municipal and raion level; ten medical workers and teachers who work with immigrants; and nine representatives of non-governmental, religious, and charitable organizations who are implementing programs serving immigrants.

The general impression created by these experts' interviews is that even specialists, who in their line of work have the most frequent contact with immigrants, have very limited knowledge of immigrants. A significant number of questions about the presence of immigrants in the city, their numbers, dynamics of migration, and governmental policies and measures toward immigrants were left unanswered. In some cases their answers reflected the stereotypes being circulated in the press. For example, some experts would shift the subject of the conversation away from Asian and African immigrants, who were the focus of our questions, to immigrants from the Caucasus region; and from immigration issues in general to illegal migration. Again, this corroborated the fact that in the public's mind, thanks to the mass media, the concept of migration is associated above all with illegal migration, and the concept of migrant with "individuals of Caucasian nationality."

The people who turned out to be the most knowledgeable were policemen. This proves that, just as in Soviet times, foreigners and immigrants are

a point of interest primarily to law enforcement agencies—the state's relations with them take place mostly in the sphere of registration and control. The least knowledgeable about immigrants within the general city context turned out to be medical personnel and a few representatives of NGOs. Their knowledge was mostly limited to a specific area of daily activity.

The dearth of published composite statistics on the number of immigrants in the city, including those from Asia and Africa, is reflected in the experts' diverse range of responses to questions concerning their numbers. Experts' ratings of the number of African and Asian immigrants who are living in the city of Kyiv were broken down in the following way: one in five believes that there are approximately 10,000 immigrants from Asian and African countries living in the city; the majority (42%) gave a rating of between 10,000 and 20,000; four experts said that there are between 20,000 and 30,000 immigrants in Kyiv from those countries; and the remaining four gave a rating of between 50,000 and 200,000 immigrants.

Out of those who gave a rating of 50,000 to 200,000 immigrants, there was only one government bureaucrat, whose work was related to general economic questions; thus he did not deal with the immigration problem to any great degree. Other individuals who gave high ratings were teachers, medical personnel, and representatives of NGOs, i.e., individuals who, inasmuch as they have fewer opportunities to come across various types of statistical data and are thus less able to evaluate them, form their views mostly on the basis of information from the mass media.

Thus, in the opinion of most experts (66.6%) approximately 20,000 Asian and African immigrants are living in Kyiv; this figure generally parallels the data collected by the authors by means of calculations based on statistical data from various sources. It should be recalled that the survey of Kyiv residents revealed that over one half (53.5%) of respondents (city residents) gave the same kind of rating.

The experts also gave guarded responses to the question whether immigration to Kyiv from Asian and African countries has increased in the last ten years. Their position on this question does not match the opinions of Kyiv residents, over 65% of whom said that immigration to Kyiv has increased significantly in the last decade. The experts' views are more similar to the results obtained during the polling of immigrants themselves: 60% of immigrant respondents believe that the number of their compatriots who are living in Kyiv has decreased within the last few years; 13%

said that the number had not changed; and only 9% thought that the influx of their countrymen to the city had increased (18% were not sure).

As for the reasons behind the arrival of immigrants in Ukraine, one-third of the experts stated that it depends on the country of origin and on other factors, including economic and political reasons. Over 20% of the experts considered that economic reasons are predominant. Immigrants had come to Ukraine expecting that they would be able to make money here, and thinking that the economic situation was better than in their homeland. Five experts noted that the reasons for immigration are political. In the opinion of six experts, immigrants had no intentions whatsoever to come to Ukraine: they were simply transiting through the country, and had stayed here by happenstance for a short period of time.

On the whole, experts' opinions corroborate information which was obtained from the immigrants themselves. As the survey of Kyiv residents revealed, the urban population grasps the reasons in a similar fashion. It is also worth noting that most Kyiv residents/respondents thought that immigrants were escaping wars; in other words, they were refugees, which suggests a certain amount of sympathy toward them.

The experts more or less concurred in their identification of immigrants' main activity—trading in the markets. However, their responses differed as to the reasons why they engage mostly in this type of activity: some thought that immigrants had come to Kyiv only for the purpose of trading; others believed that immigrants have no other employment opportunities.

Ratings of immigrants' impact on the socio-economic development of Kyiv varied. On the whole, the impact of immigrants on the municipal economy was rated as positive by teachers and medical personnel, who in this particular context were acting primarily as consumers of goods and services offered by immigrants. In the group of government functionaries and NGO representatives, ratings were divided approximately equally between positive and negative. At the same time, employees of law enforcement agencies gave uniformly negative ratings. They blamed immigrants for contributing to the development of the shadow economy and taking jobs away from Ukrainians.

The majority of experts also did not cite any obvious impact of the presence of immigrants on the municipal infrastructure, i.e., the housing situation, medical and child-related establishments, educational institutions, etc. Only one-quarter of the experts acknowledged such an impact, which is

mostly negative. In their opinion, immigrants' "faults" stem from the temporary nature of their sojourn in Kyiv, which means that they do not care about the conditions of apartments and buildings. At the same time, they live in highly dense, unsanitary conditions that lead to the spread of diseases, thereby creating an additional burden for the municipal health system.

The majority of experts agreed that immigrants from Asian and African countries do not have any impact on the linguistic and cultural environment, or on interethnic relations in the city. They did, however, note that only Russian immigrants, who bring their language and culture to Ukraine, are making a real impact. In contrast, nontraditional immigrants are trying as quickly as possible to learn the language and traditions of the local population, since this is one of the prerequisites of their survival. At the same time, the experts warned that even though there is no ethnic conflict in the city, the mass media are inflaming the situation by setting Kyiv residents in opposition to immigrants, and creating a negative reputation for the latter.

At the same time, ten out of thirty-eight experts, i.e., one quarter, cited the impact of immigrants on diversification of city life: restaurants that serve an array of national cuisines are springing up, and the urban population is becoming more diversified. At the same time, some experts said that the presence of people with different languages, traditions, and physical appearance is irritating, and creating a certain tension. Furthermore, this is harmful to the preservation and development of national values. None of the experts stated that immigrants are causing ethnic conflicts, but some believed that in the future such conflicts might arise as a result of an increase in the scale of immigration and the number of Ukrainian citizens born of mixed marriages.

As the survey of Kyiv residents revealed, negative ratings of the impact of immigrants on the situation in Kyiv are mainly connected with an idea that is gaining currency: that the worsening of the criminal situation in the city is linked to the arrival of immigrants. It should be kept in mind that nearly 49% of city residents believed that immigrants are perpetrators of illegal activities, while 11% thought that, while immigrants were usually victims of criminals, they were occasionally also contributing to the worsening of the criminal situation.

Did the experts share the Kyivans' opinion concerning the negative impact of immigrants on crime levels? Six of them were unable to answer this question. Over one-third (twelve experts) said that there is no such

impact, and brought up various arguments as proof: from the insignificant number of immigrants to the division of spheres of influence between the national crime bosses, who are not allowing foreigners into their “business.” This group of experts generally agreed that criminals in Ukraine are not of the imported variety.

The experts’ rating of the impact of immigrants on the situation in the city is amplified by their response to the question whether the presence of immigrants is creating any problems for Kyiv residents, and if so, what kinds of problems. Twenty-eight out of thirty-eight experts, i.e., the overwhelming majority, did not see any problems. Two said that immigrants are taking jobs away from Kyiv residents; four noted that they are causing an increase in crime and drug trafficking; and another four said that they are causing discomfort for Kyiv residents, have no experience of living in a big city, and occupy housing where they live in unsanitary conditions.

In many respects the attitude toward immigrants depends on local residents’ perception of them. During their interviews the experts were asked how they rate the material situation of Asian and African immigrants in Kyiv. The majority believes that the material situation of immigrants varies; but they are not very well off, like local residents. One-quarter of the experts rated the well-being of immigrants as lower than that of Kyiv residents. Only one in five thinks that in terms of material well-being, immigrants live not too badly—somewhat better than Kyiv residents.

Experts gave a high rating to the educational level of immigrants and their knowledge of languages, i.e., their objective ability to appreciate the values of the local population and to integrate into the receiving society. The majority of experts (80%) believe that the educational level of immigrants is high or average; they gave the same rating to their interest in learning languages and educating their children in Ukraine. Only one-fifth thought that immigrants are generally poorly educated.

According to the opinion of sixteen experts, immigrants generally feel comfortable in the city (with arguments ranging from “They shouldn’t be offended, since no one invited them here” to “Kyiv is a beautiful city”). At the same time, eighteen experts stated that immigrants do not feel comfortable in the city.

The next group of questions that were discussed with the experts concerned the municipal government’s attitude toward the arrival of Asian and African immigrants in the city and the directions, mechanisms, and results

of immigration policy in Kyiv. Four experts were not sure how to answer. Two thought that the municipal government has a negative attitude toward immigrants, and is trying to get rid of them. Meanwhile, eight experts thought that the government's attitude toward immigrants is normal and loyal, and that it is doing everything for them that the law requires. As could be expected, this group of experts consisted of employees of the municipal and raion state administrations and law enforcement agencies. When asked to elaborate on their answer, they mentioned discussions of pertinent questions during meetings, the collection of statistical information, and the organization of festivals for ethnic minorities.

Therefore, the majority of experts came to the conclusion that local government agencies pay almost no positive attention to immigrants. There is no appreciation of the need to implement specific, targeted actions, nor understanding that specific problems of immigrants exist. In keeping with old stereotypes, immigrants are viewed only as violators or potential violators of the law.

The experts offered quite a few suggestions concerning what they believe the municipal government should be doing about immigration to Kyiv. They may be divided into three groups. Suggestions made by NGO representatives, teachers, and medical personnel were surprisingly similar and boiled down to drafting appeals to the municipal government to respect and understand the needs of all city residents, regardless of skin color; to take into account the interests of both local residents and immigrants; to show more tolerance; and to understand that immigrants are also people, who live, and will continue to live, in the city of Kyiv.

The group of experts who work for law enforcement agencies comprised the largest number of people who are in favor of strengthening control measures and the struggle against illegal migration; fortifying border security and restricting the entry of foreigners; and creating a system for deporting foreigners who have no grounds for remaining on the territory of Ukraine. However, policemen were in favor of a more flexible approach to the problem of immigrants who are in Ukraine without documents, but cannot be sent back to their homelands. They suggested that they should at least be issued temporary documents, and that they should be registered in internal affairs agencies. On the one hand, this would ensure control over such people, and on the other, would give them an opportunity to find employment and live normally during their stay in Ukraine.



One-third of the experts, mostly government bureaucrats, said that the municipal government should act in accordance with current legislation, i.e., for the most part they did not suggest any special measures targeting immigrants and immigration. At the same time, these experts cited the need to develop a concept of a state migration policy; establish permanent monitoring of migration processes; learn from the experience of countries that accept significant numbers of immigrants; create special programs for housing, employment, education of immigrants; and create a government body that would be responsible for finding solutions to an entire range of migration problems. There were also several experts who championed the need to adopt a special immigration policy for Kyiv, which would mostly be of a restrictive nature. Nevertheless, the majority of surveyed government bureaucrats were fully aware of the impossibility of separating Kyiv from Ukraine, and completely cognizant of the need to resolve these issues on the general state level.

Our analysis of the experts' interviews confirms that specialists who possess complete and accurate information on immigration in the city of Kyiv generally do not give a negative rating to the impact of immigration on city life. At the same time, our interviews with the experts provide convincing proof that limited and one-sided attention is being paid to this phenomenon. With the exception of law enforcement agencies, the municipal authorities are in fact keeping their distance from the problems of immigrants. What is more, they are doing nothing to influence the development of tolerant and constructive relations between the city population and the immigrant minority.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

The most important conclusion of this study is that the generally peaceful and calm interethnic relations which have been typical for Ukraine and its capital city, should not be a source of comfort for the public, scholars, or government officials who are developing state migration and ethnonational policies. The situation requires close attention and continuous monitoring. This will enable the authorities to discover undesirable tendencies and their causative factors in a timely fashion, and to implement necessary preventive measures.

The results of the survey of Kyiv residents provide grounds for making a positive—under certain conditions—assessment of the prospects for the

development of relations between indigenous residents and immigrants. Thus, both stages of the survey showed that the majority of the city population does not see a big problem in the arrival of Asian and African immigrants. For the overwhelming majority of people immigrants do not represent any competition or impediment preventing them from taking advantage of municipal benefits.

Another argument in favor of an optimistic scenario for the continuing improvement in relations between Kyiv residents and immigrants is suggested by the significant number of respondents who, despite the fact that they do not have positive views on the arrival of immigrants, did not express a negative attitude toward them and refrained from answering the question. Given that there are numerous individuals who have no clear-cut opinion either way, there is ample opportunity to develop constructive relations between these two groups of the population. At the same time, this fact indicates an urgent need to adopt active measures in this area, aimed at instilling mutual respect and developing cooperation and the spirit of unity. The government, NGOs, and the mass media should consistently implement such measures.

Scholarly research, primarily monitoring, would provide civic organizations and government structures with objective data on the dynamics of immigration, the process of immigrant adaptation, and the attitudes of local residents, and can play an important role in promoting interethnic tolerance. The dissemination of information may serve as an effective counter-measure against distrust, bias, and xenophobia, for the protection of human rights, regardless of race, nationality, or origin.

## CHAPTER SIX

### Joining the World: Why Kyiv's Migrant Communities Matter

**K** yiv and Ukraine in many ways are but minor way-stations in a much larger European migration system, an interesting sidebar to the voluminous empirical and theoretical studies of international migration.<sup>77</sup> The story told in this volume is hardly unusual in a world inhabited by somewhere on the order of 100 million international migrants (around a fifth of whom are refugees).<sup>78</sup> Human beings have always moved around, no more so than the present. During the past five hundred years alone, Europeans began to inhabit the rest of the world between 1500 and 1800; nearly ten million African slaves were forced to migrate to the Americas during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries; another 48 million people left Europe for the Americas, Australia, and Canada between 1800 and 1925; while tens of millions of people have migrated across national boundaries, continental divides and oceans during the past half century.<sup>79</sup>

Observers no longer view migration as a “singular” event tied in some manner or other to a “crisis.” Rather, migration is simply part and parcel of human existence.<sup>80</sup> Great migrations of the past are being re-examined and re-interpreted in light of new perspectives which view even mass migration as more or less normal states of being.<sup>81</sup>

The Kyiv story nonetheless commands special attention, especially in relation to the city's tormented twentieth century, during which Kyiv was isolated from the rest of the world. With very few exceptions, Soviet citizens did not move abroad; with even fewer exceptions, non-Soviet citizens did not live in Kyiv. Consequently, the growth of migrant communities within Kyiv during the 1990s provides a highly unusual opportunity to explore a metropolitan community at the moment when significant numbers of new residents began to arrive from abroad.

In a comprehensive 1998 review of the analytical and descriptive liter-

ature on international migration—*Worlds in Motion. Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millenium*—Douglas S. Massey, Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouauci, Adela Pellegrino and J. Edward Taylor identified various theoretical approaches to the initiation and sustenance of international migration.<sup>82</sup> Each approach failed to deal adequately with the complexities of present migratory patterns in isolation from one another. These theories, they argued, left insufficient room for population movements that were not economic in nature. Moreover, analysts viewed migrants as similar in “taste and risk.”<sup>83</sup>

Massey and his colleagues suggest that theoretical thinking about population movements “has moved away from reified, mechanical models towards more dynamic formulations that allow micro-level decisions to affect macro-level processes and vice versa.”<sup>84</sup> This is a welcome development as researchers operating at differing levels of analysis have often been seeking to explain the behavior of the very same migrants.<sup>85</sup> In fact, various theories employed to date to explicate international migration are not necessarily mutually exclusive as they operate at very different levels of analysis (individual, household, national, and international).<sup>86</sup>

Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouauci, Pellegrino and Taylor continued on to propose their own, more synthetic approach to migration that located the origins of movement in “the social, economic, and political transformations that accompany the penetration of capitalist markets into non-market or pre-market societies.” Migrants emerged from communities that were undergoing rapid change as they were being integrated into global networks rather than from poor and isolated regions and nations. Households used migration of some of their members as a means for gaining both more wealth and greater predictability in economic life, drawing on the social capital of “family and friends” to connect with more stable and predictable economic networks.<sup>87</sup>

Kyiv’s non-traditional migrants represent an interesting case supporting some of the contentions set forth by Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouauci, Pellegrino, and Taylor. They arrived in Kyiv largely because of factors which transcend wage considerations in the narrow sense. A substantial portion of Kyiv’s migrants fled to Ukraine to escape greater social dislocations elsewhere (thus conforming to propositions derived from the new economics of migration), while many are pursuing higher wages and economic gain in Europe (thereby falling into line with neoclassical micro-

economic and macro-economic expectations). Kyiv emerged as a migration destination in conjunction with Ukraine's emergence from Soviet autarky and entrance into global networks (hence supporting some of the contentions of segmented labor market and world systems theory), aided by previously established social contacts (in accordance with social capital theory). Finally, no single explanation is sufficient for understanding the emergence of migrant communities in the Ukrainian capital (a proposition forming the base of cumulative causation models).

Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield stimulated a dialogue concerning international migration across disciplinary boundaries in an edited volume—*Migration Theory. Talking across Disciplines*—which appeared in 2000.<sup>88</sup> Brettell, Hollifield, and their colleagues evaluate different disciplinary approaches and foci of migration research. By doing so, their conceptualization of migration is one of a dynamic process in which researchers pay less attention to specific countries of origins and destinations.<sup>89</sup>

This new sensibility is particularly appropriate for studying Kyiv's non-traditional migrants. Traditional labor market analysis adds little value to the study of communities for whom Kyiv may have been intended as merely a stop-over on a longer trek into Europe. Brettell, Hollifield and their colleagues argue against regarding migration as a permanent move from one specific location to another. Historically, migrants have more typically understood their settlement in any one new community as merely a temporary convenience than is posited in the academic literature.<sup>90</sup> Migrants often intend their sojourn to be temporary, even as life conspires to make their new abodes permanent.<sup>91</sup> A study of Kyiv's new migrants contributes to this new sensibility in migration research, one which views the presence of a particular migrant in any given city or community as merely one transitory outcome in a larger migration system which constantly changes and evolves.

These new directions in migration research and theorizing are a consequence of the field's expansion from the study of the American experience to a more global perspective. Research on the process by which international migrants were assimilated into American life had come to dominate the writings of sociologists in particular.<sup>92</sup> Sociological researchers in the United States and elsewhere over the past quarter century have re-directed their attention from the adaptation of migrants to their new environment toward the dynamic interaction between migrant and society.<sup>93</sup>

## THE “CITY AS CONTEXT”

The growing trend in migration research to focus on adaptation encourages exploration of the two way relationship between international migrant and host society, which Nancy Foner elegantly demonstrates in relation to New York City in both *New Immigrants in New York* and *From Ellis Island to JFK. New York's Two Great Waves of Immigration*.<sup>94</sup> Foner's focus on New York City is hardly accidental. As Larry S. Bourne observes in relation to another great migrant metropolis, Toronto (a city in which an estimated forty-eight percent of the metropolitan population is foreign born), “Cities, especially large metropolitan areas, sit at the intersection of transitions in the economy, demography, and social order, as well as in culture, technology, and politics. They are, in effect, the local venues where most innovations occur and where the impacts of external forces are most prominently expressed. They are the arenas in which economic linkages and social networks are constructed and deconstructed, and where political conflicts that invariably occur within and between these forces of change are worked out.” More specifically, Bourne continues, “The most obvious example of globalization, in the sense of being tied to the rest of the world, is foreign immigration.”<sup>95</sup>

Cities become the locus of migration chains and economic networks in which brokers move easily between minority communities and societies at large. Those brokers—ranging from street market vendors to international bankers—who integrate migrant communities into the host society are most often concentrated in just a few cities.<sup>96</sup> Urban life transforms migrant groups into ethnic communities with shared memories and perceptions, as it is on city streets that migrants discover their own similarities in opposition to the world around them.<sup>97</sup>

The role of the city as the venue of exchange between migrants and host societies has been the subject of scholarly debate within anthropology. Caroline Brettell concisely summarizes a quarter century of high scholarly discourse by noting that, “The concept, ‘the city as context’, was formulated within anthropology when the sub-field of urban anthropology was still in its infancy and was part of the challenge to distinguish between anthropology IN cities and the anthropology OF cities, or, as Ulf Hannerz phrased it, the city as the locus rather than the focus of anthropology.”<sup>98</sup> Anthropologists contributing to the journal *Urban Anthropology* refined the notion of “city as context” by arguing that all

cities would have to be identical in order for local urban context not to have a bearing on migrant life.<sup>99</sup>

Brettell continues on to suggest how this notion of “city as context” fell out of vogue before being resurrected by Nancy Foner in her work on New York.<sup>100</sup> Foner’s studies explore the manner in which New York as a migrant city shapes the realities of its new migrants in various and profound ways. Brettell similarly points to Louise Lamphere’s 1992 edited volume, *Structuring Diversity: Ethnographic Perspectives on the New Immigration*, as playing a critical role in reintroducing the city into anthropological discussions of migrant life.<sup>101</sup> Brettell highlights the manner in which Lamphere and her co-authors “explore the changing relationships between newcomers and established residents in different urban contexts,” thereby accenting the interrelationship between micro-level factors and macro-level forces in shaping the migrant experience.<sup>102</sup> Brettell—drawing on the works of such anthropologists as Hannerz, Rollwagen, Gulick, Foner, and Lamphere—argues that cities and their metropolitan regions should become a fundamental “unit of analysis in immigration research” as the city is a primary destination for migrant newcomers.

Brettell makes the case for the city as an appropriate unit of analysis for migration studies by recounting recent research on the migrant experience in New York, Dallas, Washington, Montreal, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Los Angeles, Las Vegas, Providence, and a number of other North American communities. She concludes that, “The argument is based on the premise that these contexts differ, in their history of immigration, in their spatial dimensions, in their political economies, in the nature of social relations within and between different ethnic groups (including African Americans), and in their dominant culture or ethos. Cities may also be differentially affected by state (or provincial) and national policies and institutions. All these differences can shape profoundly the experience of migrant populations and they should therefore be a fundamental part of our analysis.”<sup>103</sup>

Brettell is primarily concerned with the migrant experience. By posing the interrelationship between migrant and urban community as an important “unit of analysis in immigration research,” she identifies migrants as a subject for urban research. The same studies demonstrating the impact of local urban culture, tradition, economic vitality, and spatial patterns on migrants reveal the influence that migrants exert over urban communities in return. New York not only shapes its migrants; migrants

shape New York. Brettell's work reveals a dynamic inter-relationship that demands further exploration.

Research on Kyiv gains a new significance in light of these recent trends in migration research. From the perspective of migration flows, as noted above, the Ukrainian capital represents a minor side-bar to a much larger story of migration into Europe. From the perspective of urban studies, the case of contemporary Kyiv reveals some of the ways in which migrants can transform a city and its life. Post-Soviet Kyiv becomes an excellent venue for exploring the interrelationship between migrant and urban community precisely because Soviet-era Kyiv was so isolated from the world at large.

Such an examination of the impact of migrants on their new home is a subject of particular interest in relation to migrants in the Ukrainian capital. One goal of this study thus becomes an exploration of the various ways in which migrants change Kyiv even as the city changes migrants in return through assimilation into Ukrainian life.<sup>104</sup> This book thereby seeks to build on the more fluid, dynamic, multi-directional nature of the interaction between migrant and host society highlighted in the work of Brettell, Hollifield, Foner, and the other scholars mentioned in this chapter.

### **THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE AS A MODEL FOR KYIV**

Another way of thinking about the significance of this volume's findings, one which is perhaps more grounded in empirical and practical realities than social science theory, is to approach the contemporary experiences of Kyiv and Ukraine in relation to west European international migration patterns over the past half-century. Unlike the great migrant societies of the Americas and the Australo-Pacific Region, the European continent was, prior to the late twentieth-century, long held to be a source for—rather than as a recipient of—migrants. Europe was somewhere millions of people left to populate other regions around the world.

Twenty-first century Europe is no longer such a place. Cities and states across the continent have become home to strikingly diverse societies as a consequence of a half-century of steady migration into northern and western Europe (with many migrants stopping along the way in such cities as Kyiv, and such states as Ukraine). This dramatic reversal of centuries-long migration patterns has reshaped both social science research and European politics, with the realities captured by researchers proving more textured and complex than those suggested by the speeches of politicians.<sup>105</sup>



A fundamental contradiction confronts European states as a consequence of these dramatic trends. Europe, like Ukraine, has always been a home to migrants. Thomas Archdeacon correctly observes, “Despite the myth of European homogeneity, the European continent has had a long history of internal migrations.”<sup>106</sup> Ukraine fits comfortably into Archdeacon’s formulation as the Soviet era was marked by the massive (often forced) movement of local populations across the face of a dozen time zones. Ukrainians are to be found throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union; the various peoples of the Soviet state are almost all to be found living within the boundaries of contemporary Ukraine. The twentieth century simultaneously witnessed a tremendous outflow (once again, often forced) of peasants from Ukrainian villages to nearby towns and cities.<sup>107</sup> What is now different, Archdeacon adds, “is that there is external migration which presents Europe with some of the same issues of how to manage diversity that confront the U.S., Canada, Australia and other immigration-dependent nations.”<sup>108</sup>

William Rogers Brubaker’s 1989 study of the theory and practice of citizenship and membership in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and Sweden—*Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*—formulates the challenge before European states. Postwar migration eroded notions of the modern state, compelling “countries to reinterpret their traditions, to reshape their institutions, to rethink the meaning of citizenship—to reinvent themselves, in short, as nation states.”<sup>109</sup> This task was made all the more complex in European societies which had no founding myth linked to assimilating migrants from abroad, as is the case in the classic migrant-receiving societies across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. European societies and states face distinctive tasks all their own even as they share some the characteristics of expanding diversity with the United States, Australia, Brazil, and Canada.

James F. Hollifield summarized the central European migration conundrum shortly following the collapse of the Soviet Union, identifying a potential contradiction between a “modern world order” in which international migration and trade are “quintessential features,” and older notions of sovereignty, citizenship, labor markets, and tolerance.<sup>110</sup> Hollifield argued that the large-scale disruptions of the European system during the 1990s—breaks brought about by the fall of the Iron Curtain and collapse of the Soviet Union, the Balkan conflicts, economic competition with the United States, heightened concerns over loss of national

identity within the context of an ever stronger European Union—would give rise to racist rhetoric and xenophobia in nearly every state and society on the continent.<sup>111</sup> Such anti-foreign backlash ignored fundamental economic realities. Given Europe's aging population and slow-yet-steady natural population decline, continued economic well-being depends on the presence of large-scale migrant communities.

Martin Heisler and Zig Layton-Henry explored the economic underpinnings of contemporary migration patterns in a 1993 essay examining the linkages between migration policies and societal security within Europe.<sup>112</sup> Migrants and the descendants of recent migrants are a major source of labor, especially for menial, low paid, and more dangerous jobs. "The huge concentration of industrial infrastructure and investment in Western Europe," Heisler and Layton-Henry write further, "makes continuing migration the most effective means of exploiting [the continent's] resources. Transferring them via investment and reallocation to areas of labor surplus would be both an expensive and high risk strategy for Western European capital. It would have no immediate effect on stopping migration, and in the short-to-medium term would increase it as more people would acquire skills and money that would enable them to migrate more easily."<sup>113</sup>

Europe's unquenched demand for the labor that only migrants can provide has stood for a half-century at the center of patterns from south-to-north within the continent, and from the outside into Europe. Migrants became a critical ingredient in Europe's postwar economic recovery, creating a structural dependence which offered employers considerable benefit so long as economies boomed and migrants remained outside the political system, unorganized and poorly paid.<sup>114</sup> Postwar migration within Europe grew throughout the 1950s and 1960s as north European states sought contract workers from southern Europe.<sup>115</sup> Germany, for example, signed its first recruitment agreements with Italy in 1955. Further accords were soon signed with other Mediterranean countries.<sup>116</sup> France and the Netherlands quickly followed suit.<sup>117</sup> Northwest Europe's migration "footprint" spread into North Africa, Yugoslavia and farther afield as the European economy raced full throttle through years of unprecedented economic growth.

Tens of thousands of residents from various European colonies came to their imperial metropolises more or less simultaneously, especially in Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands.<sup>118</sup> By the early 1970s, millions of

migrants—including hundreds of thousands of persons of color—had literally changed the complexion of European cities and societies. Native-born indigenous populations rode a tidal wave of exploding prosperity, leaving more unpleasant chores to “invited” workers who, it was thought, would return home once their contracts had been fulfilled.

The illusion of endless prosperity fueled by workers who were only “guests” came crashing down around the French, Dutch, Belgians, Swiss, Germans, and Scandinavians with the deep recession of 1973–1975.<sup>119</sup> The traditional European working class felt the first painful bite of post-industrial transition, with factories and mines closing never to reopen. Migrants from abroad who had built their lives and families in the wealthy countries of northwest Europe chose not to return home as their hosts had anticipated. By the early 1980s, nearly every European state had formulated tough new regulations and restrictions in response, limiting access to labor markets and residency permits.<sup>120</sup>

More stringent regulations and border controls failed to stem growing cultural and racial diversity so much as they nurtured a new category of migrant and minority—the illegal resident living on the edge of the official societies and economies in and around major European cities.<sup>121</sup> A growing presence of undocumented aliens, illegal workers, transient students, and various other “outsiders” for whom assimilation was impossible contributed to a broad societal sense of insecurity in many European cities and countries. The resulting social unease encouraged a political backlash that has become increasingly visible in recent years.<sup>122</sup> Seemingly “unauthorized” migrants forced to live and work at the outer edges of respectability confronted the bourgeois smugness of many European urbanites.<sup>123</sup> The unease of many indigenous Europeans with the “strangers” in their midst was heightened during the 1990s by a new wave of refugees and displaced persons arriving as a consequence of wars in the Balkans as well as the disruptions arising from the 1989 collapse of the Iron Curtain and the 1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union.<sup>124</sup>

By 2000, somewhere around 30 million people had migrated to Western Europe during the previous half-century, transforming European societies in the process.<sup>125</sup> Nearly a third of that number were legal foreign residents of European Union nations (with Germany being home to 4.6 million foreign residents in 1990, France 3.7 million, and Britain, nearly 1 million).<sup>126</sup> By century's end, the non-citizen population of Switzerland hovered

around 16%, Belgium, 9%, Germany 8%, France, 6%, Austria 5%, Sweden 6% and the United Kingdom, over 3% (figures which are somewhat deceiving given the relative ease of obtaining citizenship in Britain as opposed to the difficulties in becoming Swiss or German citizens).<sup>127</sup>

New Europeans have concentrated in a few of the continent's major urban centers, with cities as varied as Geneva, Brussels, Rotterdam and Stuttgart emerging as centers for large foreign migrant communities.<sup>128</sup> London and Paris embrace multiethnic communities just as diverse as some neighborhoods in the quintessential migrant city of New York.<sup>129</sup> Local patterns of assimilation vary considerably from country to country and city to city. Residential segregation and labor market segmentation are emerging as serious concerns in several European cities.<sup>130</sup> Many migrants have successfully organized associations to sustain contacts with home, preserve homeland culture, and secure jobs, housing, education opportunities, and public services; others have not.<sup>131</sup>

Policies affecting migrants have become increasingly standardized across Europe in recent years as a consequence of the growing authority of the European Union. Europe's primary concern in the area of migration policy has become how to best facilitate the movement of people within the European Community while controlling access from the outside.<sup>132</sup> By the early 1990s, the Community had become, to paraphrase James F. Hollifield, internally liberal and externally protectionist.<sup>133</sup>

Peter Andreas and Timothy Snyder critique the European Community's stance in their powerful book *The Wall around the West*. Andreas and Snyder argue that North American and European "border control strategists" both faced "the same awkward and inescapable dilemma: how to make their borders more secure while simultaneously making sure that they remain business friendly. Rather than barriers that halt all movement, today's borders are supposed to function more like filters that separate out the unwanted from the wanted cross-border flows."<sup>134</sup>

A treaty signed in the Luxemburg town of Schengen on June 14, 1985 provided European Union member states with a mechanism for maximizing the internal movement of people while minimizing undesirable arrivals. On March 26, 1996, all EU members save the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland implemented a new internal border regime liberalizing travel regulations among participating states in accord with the Schengen and the more general Maastricht

treaties.<sup>135</sup> Under the Schengen accords, participating member states agreed to a series of joint measures to enhance security at their external borders, combat illegal migration, and expand police cooperation. Those states participating in the Schengen process have established national offices to administer the treaty's policies and worked to establish unitary visa and asylum regulations.<sup>136</sup>

Milada Anna Vachudova proposed that the Schengen regime turned those countries and regions surrounding the European Union into a broad "migration buffer zone" in which states aspiring to eventual Union membership have little choice but to do their best to safeguard Union borders "in order to stay in the good graces of EU governments."<sup>137</sup> Migrants seeking illegal entry into Europe are thus unable to advance beyond the nearest neighboring state.

One particularly pernicious affect of the Schengen controls has been this transfer of responsibility for dealing with expanding migrant populations from the wealthy European Union member states to their much poorer neighbors. Aspiring member states such as Poland and the Czech Republic tightened their eastern borders in response to Union concerns, pushing the problem further east. As the wars in the Balkans closed off legal and illegal migration routes through Yugoslavia, those wishing to find their way into Europe took advantage of the relatively porous border regimes within the former Soviet Union to travel into Ukraine, Belarus, and northwestern regions of the Russian Federation. They could not travel further given the strengthened boundaries to the west.<sup>138</sup> As a result, the presence of large and growing communities of non-traditional migrants in Kyiv and Ukraine is, in part, a consequence of Schengen policies.

The European experience with absorbing millions of foreign residents over the past half-century provides a suggestive comparative context for considering the potential place of non-traditional migrants in Ukraine. Like Europe, Ukraine has more often been considered as a point of origin for international migrants rather than as a recipient society. As in Europe, the presence of significant numbers of non-traditional migrants—and especially of new "visible minorities"—provides daily challenges to long-held conceptions of Ukrainian identity. Brubaker's admonition that migration forces a variety of countries to reshape their institutions and to rethink the meaning of citizenship is of direct relevance to the burgeoning migrant communities in Ukraine's capital.<sup>139</sup>

The reception of international migrants in Ukraine is different from the European experience of the past half-century in three significant respects. First, Ukraine is already a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, multi-linguistic society which must rely on civic rather than ethnic identity to sustain independent statehood. Legal frameworks, social programs, and cultural rights categories predicated on the co-existence of diverse communities exist which can accommodate migrants. Moreover, as discussed earlier in this volume, post-Soviet Ukrainian society has proven itself to be remarkably tolerant of cultural difference. Modes of thought and discourse already existed in Ukraine that were able to accommodate the presence of Afghan, Kurdish, and African Ukrainians to an extent not possible in some post-war Western European societies.

Second, migrants began to emerge at the moment when a newly independent Ukraine began to re-invent its own identity. This situation is somewhat analogous, perhaps, to some post-war European states. For the most part, international migrants began to arrive in northern Europe only after the initial stages of post-war reconstruction. Indeed, migrant recruitment often was in response to increasingly robust European economic development. Such an “economic miracle” has yet to begin in Ukraine.

Third, migration into northern and western Europe has been profoundly economic in nature. Many of Europe’s first original migrants arrived under the auspices of official programs established by national governments in conjunction with large corporate employers to supply laborers to the workshops of a thundering economy. No such boom has taken place in Ukraine. The migrants who constitute the subject of this volume have arrived in Ukraine and Kyiv to work in largely unstructured economic sectors tied to commerce and small manufacture.

### **Stories of Resilience**

The story of one of the migrants interviewed for this project, an Afghan whom we shall call “Mahmoud,” reveals a vigor and resilience that will be central to Kyiv’s future vitality.<sup>140</sup> Mahmoud and his family fled Afghanistan in 1993 while he was in his early thirties. They arrived in Ukraine after having traveled for most of that year through Pakistan and Kazakhstan. Intending to find his way into Europe, Mahmoud never expected to remain in Kyiv for nearly a decade.

Mahmoud, his wife, and daughter eventually received official refugee status in Ukraine after paying \$450 in bribes in 1998. His family secured an apartment near the robust Troieshchyna market, added a second daughter, and began to build a life in Kyiv. By 2001, he had invested in an iron door and window-bars on his apartment to protect the world that he was building for himself from thieves and bandits.

Mahmoud and his family have rarely received help from Ukrainian authorities, and only marginal assistance from international refugee organizations. They have made their way in Ukraine on their own. Both daughters attend Ukrainian language schools, with Mahmoud and his wife periodically participating in various parent-teacher meetings. He is well connected to Afghan community organizations and prays daily at a local mosque. He can communicate in spoken Russian and Ukrainian, though he claims not to be able to write in either language. A diabetic with a crippled right arm, he has received appropriate medical attention in Kyiv through a variety of channels. His earnings from trading at the Troieshchyna market provide a living for his family in excess of what he could have sustained either in Afghanistan or Kazakhstan.

Mahmoud represents the sort of quiet story of success that the literature on the “informal” city, for all of its flaws and “fuzziness,” reminds observers of urban life to celebrate as well as to decry. He and his family have navigated the difficult and complex world of migrant Kyiv to create a life for themselves unthinkable elsewhere. His success is fragile and travail certainly lies ahead. He nonetheless is a symbol of all that can be right with the migrant experience. He, his family, and Kyiv have all benefitted from one another as much through the “informal” life of the “self-built” city as through Kyiv’s “official” and “formal” institutions.

Mahmoud’s presence in Kyiv is a consequence of the opening of an independent Ukraine to social and economic networks that are global in scale. He and his family fled conflicts in South Asia seeking entry to markets in Europe, having been assisted in the settlement process by representatives of international organizations. Mahmoud personifies an openness to the outside world that was unthinkable under the Soviet regime.

## CONCLUSIONS

The opening of borders to the increasingly free flow of goods and capital similarly encourages the free flow of human beings. Such processes erode

state sovereignty by relocating, in the words of Saskia Sassen, “various components of state authority to supranational organizations,” while simultaneously privatizing “transnational legal regime[s] for cross-border business transactions which now also includes certain components of cross-border labor mobility, notably service workers.”<sup>141</sup> Nation states cede portions of sovereignty to trans-border authorities (as in the case of the Schengen states) so as to facilitate the movement of people in response to demand from private employers. Simultaneously, cities and metropolitan regions emerge as central nodes in a global economy which undercuts sovereignty from below.<sup>142</sup> The result, according to Sassen, is a global urban and economic hierarchy which favors inequality.<sup>143</sup>

Jeffrey Reitz similarly sees a direct connection between globalization and migration patterns. “Two contemporary trends linked to global economic change,” Reitz has written, “seem to point almost inevitably toward a growing crisis in immigration on the horizon. Across most industrial societies, there has been a pattern of change in recent decades toward more individualistic and market driven institutions... All these trends produce lower immigrant entry level status. At the same time global economic integration ensures the continued and in fact increasing importance of immigration. The logic of these two developments—continued immigration, and institutional changes producing more inequality for immigrants—seems inescapable.”<sup>144</sup>

The story told in this volume adds depth to the observations of Sassen and Reitz precisely because Ukraine sits on the periphery of Europe. The migration systems described in previous chapters are both part of general European population flows and distinct from it. The fact that tens of thousands of migrants such as Mahmoud are finding their way to the capital city of an economically struggling newly independent state such as Ukraine reveals the considerable extent to which migration has become integral to the global economy.

The connection between globalization and increasing international migration has deep roots. Many economic historians are coming to argue that the present is the second, rather than the first era of globalization. The earlier period extended from roughly the 1840s until August 1914, concurrent with the emergence of capitalist industrial production patterns as well as the last great wave of large-scale trans-national migration.<sup>145</sup> Not coincidentally, free European migration to the Americas began to exceed



coerced African migration for the first time only in the 1840s, with some 60 million Europeans departing for the labor-scarce New World during the decades leading up to the outbreak of World War I.<sup>146</sup> The arrival of so many European workers in North and South America led, over time, both to wage convergence on both sides of the Atlantic and growing inequality in the leading New World countries (patterns evident in contemporary globalization trends).<sup>147</sup>

This strong tie between globalization and intensified international migration carries two final implications for this study. First, the presence of significant numbers of residents in Kyiv and Ukraine who have not traditionally been associated with the region is likely to remain a fact of local urban and national life for some time to come. Second, inattention by wealthier and more secure states such as those of the European Union and North America to the limitations of and constraints confronting states-information such as Ukraine as they deal with new residents in their midst potentially places the migrants themselves at risk.

Questions about Kyiv's—and Ukraine's—capacity to absorb migrants add the Ukrainian capital to a long list of the world's great cities in which urban social sustainability is being challenged. Urban social sustainability (which Richard Stren and Mario Polese define as “policies and institutions that have the overall effect of integrating diverse groups and cultural practices in a just and equitable fashion”) stands at the center of how cities will evolve in the decades ahead.<sup>148</sup> Kyiv's ability to accommodate large and diverse communities of new arrivals provides a litmus test for the nature of the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian society more generally.

The story told in this volume has many distinctively local characteristics. Kyiv's migrants largely represent cultural and religious groups that have not traditionally lived for long periods of time in the city. They are arriving at a moment when the local economy has floundered, and when the new Ukrainian state has struggled to create viable administrative structures. Ukraine's new independence simultaneously exposes deep conflicts among contradictory conceptions of identity. For example, the country's official language is non-native for a significant portion of the city's population and for the city's migrant population.<sup>149</sup> The success or failure of efforts to integrate Kyiv's non-traditional migrants into a Ukrainian language environment will reveal the strength and limits of national language policy.

How Kyiv and Ukraine come to terms with their new residents will reveal a great deal about what sort of city and country Kyiv and Ukraine will be in the decades ahead. New arrivals though they may be, the migrants at the center of this volume are essential to Ukraine's future. This study has provided glimpses of both a tolerant and liberal Ukraine, and a poor and miserly country unable to capitalize on its own resources. Understanding how Kyiv assimilates its international migrant community—or does not do so—carries important information about what sort of state and society Ukraine will become.

The research contained in this volume also relates to a central set of issues presently confronting the international community. Myron Weiner posed the central policy and moral dilemmas presented by today's large scale migration patterns in his landmark 1995 book, *The Global Migration Crisis. Challenge to States and to Human Rights*. Weiner wrote:

“the problems created by international population movements differ greatly from one country to another. Some countries are in a position to accept and integrate large numbers of immigrants and refugees, while others are not. Some have the military, administrative, and political capacity to limit, if not control, who can enter; others do not. Some can intervene in the politics and economies of countries that produce emigrants and refugees, others can not. Nor for that matter are states autonomous in the choices they make. Governments are constrained by the choices of other governments. And so, it is necessary to understand how governments influence one another's exit and entry rules. Above all, one should not assume that global problems necessarily require or are amenable to global solutions. Solutions to the problems posed by unwanted international migration cannot easily be formulated into sound bites like increasing general policy frameworks and no analytical modern can encompass the diversity of state capacities or intentions.”<sup>150</sup>

The materials presented in this volume strongly indicate that the ability of Ukraine and Kyiv to control migration across its borders is limited. Whether or not Ukraine and Kyiv can successfully integrate and assimilate migrants into local, metropolitan, and national life similarly remains a

question. Ukraine and Kyiv are precisely the sorts of countries and urban communities in which the world's global migration challenge will be met—or not. The successes and failures of Mahmoud and his fellow non-traditional migrants to Kyiv will foretell not only what sort of society Ukraine will be, but also what sort of world everyone will inhabit.

## Research Design and Methodology

This study was conducted in Kyiv in 2001–2002 with the support of the George F. Kennan Fund of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’ Kennan Institute, and with the assistance of the US-Ukraine Foundation and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Ukraine. The study consisted of three interrelated parts: a written questionnaire for immigrants, a survey of Kyiv city residents, and an experts’ survey of officials from various government levels and specialists who have regular contact with or work directly with nontraditional immigrants. Survey questions focused on the main characteristics of nontraditional immigrants in Kyiv, their living conditions, interethnic relations, and the attitude of Kyiv city residents and the municipal government toward them.

### STAGE ONE

The first phase consisted of interviews with 233 immigrant households and was carried out in June–December 2001. The survey team developed a questionnaire consisting of twenty-four tables with an average of ten questions each. The sample included families of immigrants from African and Asian countries who were living in the city of Kyiv at the time of the survey. Immigrants from countries that were once within the borders of the Soviet Union were not included.

Because many of the nontraditional immigrants had vague legal status (they did not have national documents, permission to stay in Ukraine, permits to work or conduct business, etc.), reliable statistics for their total numbers and their countries of origin were difficult to obtain. This made it impossible to develop a sampling method based on the total number of immigrants in the city. The survey team therefore used a chain method: A well-respected third party would introduce the interviewer to a respondent and describe the nature and goals of the survey. Each respondent found through this initial introduction would in turn indicate several other potential respondents. This method ultimately ensured a rep-

representative sampling of households in the study. It was particularly important to find people who were well known and respected in their fields for the initial introductions in the chain. Among those who met these requirements were leaders and activists of civic organizations for immigrants, individuals who work in the Ukraine Office of UNHCR or participate in the distribution of UNHCR aid, teachers employed at schools where immigrants' children study, and respected community doctors who work in immigrant districts.

At the same time, it was crucial to provide a representative number of respondents from different countries of origin in proportion to the number of their compatriots living in the city of Kyiv. Based on the ethnonational structure of registered foreigners in the city of Kyiv with refugee status or seeking asylum, researchers set goals for the proportional representation of specific ethnic groups within the pool of respondents. However, these goals were only guidelines—over the course of the survey the pre-planned distribution of respondents based on their countries of origin changed, depending on the ability of interviewers to establish contact with individual ethnic groups of immigrants. Despite this, the general proportions of the sample remained constant.

The survey of nontraditional immigrants was conducted by means of semi-structured personal interviews by the members of the study group—the authors of this work. If respondents agreed, interviews were conducted in their homes. However, most immigrants were not prepared to invite interviewers into their homes. In turn, the latter did not insist on conducting interviews in the place of residence, since a few visits to the homes of a certain group of immigrants sufficed to gain an understanding of their living conditions. Approximately one in three interviews was conducted in immigrants' residences. Almost all of these interviews were with immigrants from Afghanistan, Vietnam, and African countries.

The interviewer filled out the questionnaire during or after the interview, based on recorded notes. The primary respondent (the main individual questioned by the interviewer) provided information about absent or underage members of the household and also answered open-ended questions for evaluative purposes. At the same time, the interviewer recorded the responses of other members of the household as well. In addition to the questionnaire, the interviewer recorded other observations that were typical or, on the contrary, unusual expressions or comments by the

respondents. The scope and quality of this additional information depended on many factors: the personality of the respondent, the setting of the interview, and the interviewer's ability to establish a rapport with the respondent. Thus, in some cases there was very little of this kind of information, while in others the information allowed the researchers to compile a detailed biography of the respondent and his family.

The interviews, which usually lasted an hour and a half to two hours, were conducted both at the respondents' residences and their workplaces (Troieshchynsky, Sviatoshynsky, and Volodymyrsky trading markets), at the UNHCR Reception Center, and the UNHCR's Social Center for Refugee Women and Children. Whenever necessary, an interpreter from the non-traditional immigrants' community, who was fluent in Russian and Ukrainian, would be invited to participate in the interview. These were mostly individuals with whom interviews had been conducted earlier, and they were the ones who quite often set up meetings with the next batch of respondents.

The team encountered various obstacles during the course of the survey. As might be expected given their undefined legal status (or more accurately, its absence), respondents were not always communicative. The language proficiency of the respondents, and sometimes of the interpreter, determined the level of communication as well. Occasionally, the presence of the interpreter had a negative impact on establishing trust. At the same time, if the interpreter was an individual with whom the respondent had a friendly relationship, his participation would spark a detailed, lively conversation.

The gender balance of the sample also concerned the survey team. Only 10% of the questionnaires were filled out as a result of interviews with women. Most responsive and open were women from Vietnam—women accounted for almost one-third of the Vietnamese respondents. For most women, in particular those from Muslim countries, communication was possible only at the UNHCR's Social Center for Refugee Women and Children. The male head of household was the main interlocutor for most interviews in family homes, with wives perhaps adding passing comments in some instances. Information obtained through the survey therefore reflects mainly the male view of the immigrant situation. However, the few questionnaires that were filled out during conversations with women reveal views that differ somewhat from their male counterparts.

Unfortunately, the survey did not provide exhaustive information about all social groups of immigrants. The main motive for immigrants

to meet with the researchers was the desire to describe their problems and the hope that the researchers might help them in some way. Those who agreed to participate were most often individuals without a stable income or clearly defined prospects, and those whose legal status was undefined. Immigrants who are more comfortable in Kyiv—those with legal papers, decent employment, and a defined social status—did not show great interest in the survey. They either declined offers to participate in interviews or gave very limited information. Figuratively speaking, respondents comprised mostly the less economically successful members of immigrant communities, and only partially members of their community’s “middle class.”

## **STAGE TWO**

The second stage of the study consisted of a survey of Kyiv residents. Whereas the first stage of the survey examined issues related to the influx of immigrants to Kyiv and their settlement arrangements, at this stage the task was to identify and analyze the attitudes of Kyiv residents toward problems connected with the arrival in Kyiv of people from Asian and African countries. Do they focus attention on this fact? How do they gauge the impact of nontraditional immigrants on city life? What do they know about the newcomers’ relations with government agencies?

To understand these and other issues identified during the study, the Kyiv-based sociological company “Image Control” conducted a representative survey of Kyiv residents in May 2002. The sample included 1,000 respondents and was formulated according to the criteria of gender, age, and education, taking into account employment status and territorial distribution. Territorial distribution was based on the total population of Kyiv and the population of its districts. According to the Kyiv Municipal Department of Statistics, as of early 2001, 2,606,716 people lived in Kyiv.<sup>151</sup> Kyiv’s population can be broken down by district as follows: Darnytsky—250,000; Desniansky—320,000; Dniprovsky—350,000; Holosiivsky—200,000; Obolonsky—290,000; Pechersky—170,000; Podilsky—210,000; Shevchenkivsky—200,000; Solomiansky—280,000; Sviatoshynsky—360,000. Proportionally to this data, the number of surveyed individuals by district was: Darnytsky—101; Desniansky—124; Dniprovsky—140; Holosiivsky—78; Obolonsky—101; Pechersky—60; Podilsky—79; Shevchenkivsky—101, Solomiansky—100; Sviatoshynsky—116.

The survey team selected streets in each district for the survey and instructed interviewers not to interview more than three respondents from the same building. Refusals to participate in the survey were not recorded. The route lists included the address and the first and last name of each respondent (if s/he agreed to participate).

The survey questions for the second stage of the study focused on how average Kyiv residents view nontraditional immigrants; how they gauge immigrants' opportunities to adapt to life in the city; their attitude toward the newcomers and immigrants' attitudes toward them; and whether Kyiv residents are prepared to live and work alongside people from distant countries. Interviewers recorded Kyiv residents' opinions about the newcomers' education, their employment, medical services, etc., separately. In addition, Kyiv residents evaluated the municipal government's readiness and ability to address immigrants' problems related to their arrival and residence in the city.

### **STAGE THREE**

During the third phase of the study, the researchers conducted a survey of experts—individuals whose official duties or type of work involve direct contact with nontraditional immigrants residing in Kyiv, and who therefore have special knowledge and a deeper understanding of the problem than the average Kyiv resident. Among those interviewed were several Ukrainian national government officials who are directly involved in formulating state migration policy; officials of the Kyiv municipal and local administrations; officers of the municipal and local police departments; medical personnel; teachers; and representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who work with nontraditional immigrants. The researchers interviewed forty-six experts using a conversation format based on a pre-prepared questionnaire. The questionnaire included specific questions pertaining to the respondent's area of expertise as well as a set of general questions asked of all the respondents. The questions focused on analysis of various aspects of the life of nontraditional immigrants in the city of Kyiv and the attitudes of the municipal government and average citizens toward this problem



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85. An observation emphasized by John O’Loughlin in “Foreign Minorities in Continental European Cities,” in Gunthar Glebe and John O’Loughlin, editors, *Foreign Minorities in Continental European Cities* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1987), pp. 9–29: 11.

86. Douglas S. Massey, Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouauci, Adela Pellegrino and J. Edward Taylor, *Worlds in Motion. Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium.*, p. 18.

87. *Ibid.*, pp. 277–282.

88. Caroline B. Brettel and James F. Hollifield, editors, *Migration Theory. Talking across Disciplines* (New York: Routledge, 2000).

89. The intellectual and analytic shift away from approaching migration as a one-way process rather than a dynamic interactive and multidirectional phenomenon took place over the past quarter-century as researchers began to examine migration systems outside the context of the classic transatlantic migration paradigm. For a discussion of this transformation within migration studies see Dirk Hoerder’s 1993 lecture

for the German Historical Institute in Washington, D.C. (Dirk Hoerder, *People on the Move: Migration, Acculturation, and Ethnic Interaction in Europe and North America* [Providence: Gerb, 1993]).

90. Thomas Sowell, *Migrations and Cultures. A World View*, pp. 20–21.

91. A point reflected in the various attempts to compare and contrast various groups of migrants through the use of such labels as “exiles,” “sojourners,” “tourists,” “denizens,” “citizens,” and “foreigners.” See, for example, William Rogers Brubaker, “Introduction,” in William Rogers Brubaker, editor, *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America* (New York: University Press of America/German Marshall Fund of the United States, 1989), pp. 1–27; and Francesca Battisi and Alessandro Portelli, “The Apple and the Olive Tree. Exiles, Sojourners, and Tourists in the University,” in Rina Benmayor and Andor Skotness, *International Yearbook of Oral History and Life Stories: Migration and Identity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 35–31.

92. Thomas Sowell, *Migrations and Cultures. A World View*, pp. 20–21.

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94. A trend that reflects a rethinking of the migration experience as a consequence of new research outside the context of the United States, as noted by John O’Loughlin in “Chicago an der Ruhr or what? Explaining the Location of Immigrants in European Cities,” in Gunthar Glebe and John O’Loughlin, editors, *Foreign Minorities in Continental European Cities*, pp. 52–69: 68. See, for example, James F. Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets and States. The Political Economy of Postwar Europe* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); or Gary P. Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies. The French and British Experience, 1945–1975* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979).

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