University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst

Doctoral Dissertations | Dissertations and Theses

July 2016

Assembling Creative Cities in Seoul and Yokohama: Rebranding East Asian Urbanism

Changwook Kim
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2

Part of the Critical and Cultural Studies Commons, Human Geography Commons, Japanese Studies Commons, Korean Studies Commons, Other Film and Media Studies Commons, and the Urban Studies and Planning Commons

Recommended Citation
Kim, Changwook, "Assembling Creative Cities in Seoul and Yokohama: Rebranding East Asian Urbanism" (2016). *Doctoral Dissertations*. 647.
https://doi.org/10.7275/8352528.0 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2/647

This Campus-Only Access for Five (5) Years is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

ASSEMBLING CREATIVE CITIES IN SEOUL AND YOKOHAMA: REBRANDING EAST ASIAN URBANISM

A Dissertation Presented

by

CHANGWOOK KIM

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 2016

Department of Communication

© Copyright by Changwook Kim 2016

All Rights Reserved

ASSEMBLING CREATIVE CITIES IN SEOUL AND YOKOHAMA: REBRANDING EAST ASIAN URBANISM

A Dissertation Presented

By

CHANGWOOOK KIM

Approved as to style and content by:

____

Paula Chakravartty, Chair

____

Briankle Chang, Member

____

Martha Fuentes-Bautista, Member

____

Piper Gaubatz, Member

____

Erica Scharrer, Department Chair

Communication

DEDICATION

The sheep hear his voice, and he calls his own sheep by name and leads them out.

(John 10:3)

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am heavily indebted to the help and support of many along this journey. First and foremost, I must thank my academic advisor, Paula Chakravartty, for her continuous guidance, support and patience in the work of this dissertation. I thank to my dissertation and comprehensive exam committees, Briankle Chang, Piper Gaubatz, Martha Fuentes-Bautista and Sut Jhally for their generous encouragement and consistent support during my years in graduate school.

I benefitted from the mentorship of other faculty members in UMass. Thanks to Michael Morgan, Shawn Shimpach, Lisa Henderson, Henry Geddes and Demitria Shabazz for their kind guidance and generous help. I also owed much gratitude to my former academic advisors, Soonchul Shin and Myungkoo Kang in Korea and Hideyuki Tanaka in Japan, who first introduced me to the field of media and cultural studies in an East Asian context.

I owe many thanks to my friends in the U.S, Japan and Korea. Specially thanks to Sreela Sarkar, Sunny Lie, Stephanie Aragao, Laras Sekarasih, Nadezhda Sotirova, Liene Locmele, Yuan Gong, Siyuan Yin, Juhee Han, Bohyeong Kim, Jiyoon Kim, Minju Lee, Jun Yoo, Shinichi Murata, Ayako Uchida, Hyunjung Park, and Sungmin Kim for their intellectual, social and emotional nourishment through the years.

I also would like to extend my sincere gratitude to the following organizations, who made the research for this dissertation possible with generous funding and affiliation: the Department of Communication at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, the Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, and Interfaculty Initiatives in

Information Studies at the University of Tokyo. Additionally, I am deeply grateful to all my interviewees who generously spared time to engage with me during my fieldwork in Japan and Korea.

Last but not least, it would not have been possible if it were not for the unconditional caring and continuous praying of my parents, my two younger sisters, two brothers-in law and my wife. I thank you and love you more than words can say.

ABSTRACT

ASSEMBLING CREATIVE CITIES IN SEOUL AND YOKOHAMA: REBRANDING EAST ASIAN URBANISM

MAY 2016

CHANGWOOK KIM, B.A., HANDONG GLOBAL UNIVERSITY

M.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Paula Chakravartty

By investigating institutional and cultural practices as well as the consequences of the creative industry-led development policy in Yokohama, Japan and Seoul, South Korea, this dissertation critically reexamines the key rationales of creative economy-driven urban development and considers social costs and tensions between the state, capital and citizens that are embedded within creative city policy discourses and practices.

This dissertation intervenes in the conventional understandings, which consider the influx of neoliberalism as the key to explain the rapid global circulation of creative city policy, typically based on cities in the West. By considering the policy transfer as endless processes of "translation" from the viewpoint of Actor-Network Theory, rather than a linear replication process, it shows that specific institutional and cultural practices—such as the historical legacy of the East Asian developmental state and its relation to capital and civic society—are necessary not only for properly locating the meaning of neoliberalism but also for evaluating the complexity of neoliberal political projects in East Asia. By conceptualizing creative city policy as "new urban governmental techniques", it argues that the creative cities

of Japan and Korea are test sites not only for neoliberal creative economy but also for new forms of governing and being governed with significant implications for fostering certain types of subjectivities such as "creative citizen" and "creative labor". Under this framework, ultimately this dissertation contributes to re-orient the current debates on the global creative city policy from a question of “How can we develop effective creative city policy?” implemented by urban planners, capitals and state officials to that of “How can we invent and share creative city politics?” raised by creative workers, activists and citizen.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS....................v

ABSTRACT....................vii

LIST OF TABLES....................xiii

LIST OF FIGURES....................xiv

CHAPTER

1. GLOBALIZNG CREATIVE CITY POLICY AND EAST ASIAN CITIES....................1

    1.1. Introduction....................1

    1.2. Creative Industry and Creative City Policy....................8

        1.2.1. The Problem of Locating the "Creative Class" and "Creative Industries"....................13

        1.2.2. The Problem of Limited Empirical Evidences and Social Inequality in Creative City....................16

    1.3. Developmental State, Neoliberalism and East Asian Cities....................22

    1.4. Research Design and Methods....................33

    1.5. Sampling Frames....................41

        1.5.1. In-Depth Interviews....................41

        1.5.2. Archival and Documentary Research....................45

        1.5.3. Events and Meetings Participant Observation....................46

    1.6. Organization of the Dissertation....................49

2. CREATIVE CITY YOKOHAMA: THE CREATIVE CORE AREA CONSTRUCTION PROJECT AND COEXISTING MODEL OF CREATIVE CITY YOKOHAMA....................53

    2.1. Introduction....................53

    2.2. Yokohama's Urban History: From "Gateway Port" to "Bedroom Community for Tokyo" (1859-1970s)....................55

2.3. “Re-Internationalization or Globalization?" of Yokohama by Minato Mirai 21 Project (1980s-2000s) 59
2.4. From “International Culture City” to “Creative City Yokohama”: Creative Core Area Project 71

3. DESIGN SEOUL: THE DONGDAEMUN DESIGN PLAZA AND PARK CONSTRUCTION AND CONFLICTING MODEL OF CREATIVE CITY SEOUL 86

3.1. Introduction 86
3.2. From the “Citizen Park Plan” to the “World Design Complex Plan” 87
3.3. From “World Design Complex” to “Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park” 97
3.4. DDP as Neoliberal-Developmental Urban Reforming 106
3.5. DDP for Citizens 110
3.6. Unfinished Stories of the Neoliberal-Developmental Urban Reforming and the Emergence of the Post-Developmental Symptom in East Asia. 116

4. TRANSLATING "CREATIVE EVENTS" AS "ART TRIENNALES": YOKOHAMA TRIENNALES 122

4.1. Introduction 122
4.2. Yokohama Triennale 2001: Aiming for Japan's Largest "International Exhibition of Contemporary Art" 127
4.3. Yokohama Triennale 2005: Between a “World Cup of Art” and Civic Participation 133
4.4. Yokohama Triennale 2008: Back to the 'Normal' Triennale 141
4.5. Yokohama Triennale 2011: the Yokohama Art Museum not just "Infrastructure" but as "Actor-Network" 148
4.6. Yokohama Triennale and the Possibility of Civic Participation 155

5. TRANSLATING "CREATIVE EVENTS" AS "DESIGN OLYMPIAD": SEOUL DESIGN OLYMPIADS 161

5.1. Introduction 161
5.2. Seoul Design Olympiad 2008 161

5.2.1. “The World’s first Seoul Design Olympiad 2008”: Symbolic Power of an “Olympic” and Urban Mega Event for City Branding 165
5.2.2. Seoul Design Conference: Mobilizing Experts to Speak for the SMG 170
5.2.3. Seoul Design Competition: Civic Participation via Competition 171
5.2.4. Seoul Design Exhibition: Promoting Corporate and State Actors 172
5.2.5. Seoul Design Festival: Uncertainty and Flexibility of the concept of “Design”.. 175

5.3. Seoul Design Olympiad 2009 177

5.3.1. Spreading the new economic value of Design: "Designomics"......... 179
5.3.2. Seoul Design Conference: Evidences of Designomics? 182
5.3.3. Seoul Design Exhibition 2009: Promoting Corporate and State Actors 183
5.3.4. Seoul Design Competition 2009: Limiting "Civic Participation" via Competition 188
5.3.5. The Seoul Design Festival: experiencing the value of "design" 190

5.4. The Seoul Design Fair 2010: Seoul as "World Design Capital" and "UNESCO Creative City" 192

5.4.1. Design For All? 195

5.5. From “Urban Mega Events” to “Citizen Hearing Workshops”: Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7 201

6. CREATIVE WORKERS AS MORAL AND ETHICAL SUBJECTS IN YOKOHAM 210

6.1. Introduction 210
6.2. Creative labor as a site of moral work 211
6.3. Creative Core Area as a Failed Creative Cluster ? 214
6.4. Precarity and Anxiety as ‘Normalized’ Living and Working Conditions 221
6.5. Networking as a tool for retaining employability and a buffer for reducing anxiety 224
6.6. “Network is fine but no union!” 231

6.7. Moral but volunteer subjectivity and the order of the creative city Yokohama 236

7. WORKING AND LIVING AS "PRECARIAT" CREATIVE WORKERS IN CONFLICTING CREATIVE CITY SEOUL 241

7.1. Introduction 241
7.2. Creative Worker as the Protagonist of the Precariat Movement 242
7.3. Creative City Policy about which creative workers disagree: creative workers speak out! 245
7.4. Creative Industry as "Red Ocean Industry" and Deeply Fractured Labor Markets in Korea's Creative Economy 249
7.5. Promoting a "Conformist Self-Development Creator" through the Creative City Policy 255
7.6. Artists Social Union Movement and Political Subjectivization 263

8. CONCLUSION 275

8.1. Ongoing Fast Circulation of Creative City Policy in East Asia and the Case of Seoul and Yokohama 275
8.2. Epilogue: From the circulation of Creative City "policy" to the transmission of Creative City "politics"? 282

APPENDICES

A. DEMOGRAPHY OF THE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWEES IN KOREA 285
B. DEMOGRAPHY OF THE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWEES IN JAPAN 286

BIBLIOGRAPHY 287

LIST OF TABLES

Table | Page

1. The Differences between Traditional Public Art Facilities and Bank ART 1929 79
2. The Brief History of the Dongdaemun Stadium before the DDP construction 91
3. SMG's Negotiation Strategy for Each Group 103
4. The New Management Plan for the DDP 112
5. The Yokohama Triennale: 1st to 4th Editions 156
6. The Participants of Seoul Design Exhibition 2009 185
7. The Summary of the Seoul Design Olympiads 2008, 2009, 2010 195
8. The List of the Presenters in Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7 208

LIST OF FIGURES

Table Page

1. The evolving phase of the developmental state and the urban policy ... 28
2. The various relationships among policy actors of creative city policy in Seoul and Yokohama ... 33
3. The Map of Yokohama and its Sixfold Urban Development Plan ... 59
4. Old Mitsubishi Shipyard located in the area of MM 21 ... 63
5. The Current Feature of Minato Mirai 21 ... 70
6. The street of the Kannai Area in 1890 ... 72
7. The Bank ART NYK Studio ... 79
8. Kitanaka Brick and Kitanaka White ... 81
9. Three places where the interviewee moved to continuously. From left to right: Kitanaka Bricks, Honcho Building, and Utoku Building ... 84
10. Yokohama's Creative City Yokohama and Minatomirai 21 Policy Networks ... 86
11. The Dongdaemun area and the major buildings' location and photo ... 90
12. The Urban Regeneration Plan Implemented by the SMG in 2007 ... 93
13. The Old Dongdaemun Stadium before the Demolition and Zaha Hadid's Metonymic Landscape for the Redevelopment of the DS ... 94
14. Artist's impression of Han River Renaissance Project ... 96
15. Artist's Impression of the Jamsil Floating Island ... 97
16. Artist's Impressions of Yongsan Redevelopment Plan ... 107
17. One of the dead protestors in the fire of the Yongsan tragedy ... 109
18. The Current features of the DDP ... 114
19. Seoul's Neo-liberal Policy Network and Post-Developmental Policy Network ... 115
20. Tsubuki Noboru and Muroi Hisashi's work, the Insect World/Locust, presented at the Yokohama Triennale 2001 ... 132
21. Yokohama Triennale 2005 Yamashita Pier Venue Yokohama ... 135
22. Triennale 2008 Shinko Pier Venue ... 144
23. Yokohama Triennale 2011 Yokohama Museum of Art Venue ... 150
24. The Picture of The Main Venue of the Seoul Design Olympiad ... 162
25. Organizational Structure for the Planning and Management of the SDO 2008 ... 164
26. The Corporate PR Pavilions ... 173
27. The Picture of the Seoul Vision Exhibition ... 187
28. The Picture of the Green Cooking Festival ... 192
29. The Photo of the Samsung Galaxy Cellphone Booth ... 197
30. The Picture of The Mayor, Won-Soon Park, Presenting the New Vision of the Design Seoul Policy in the Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7 ... 206
31. The Picture of 100 People Round-Table Discussion in Doungdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7 ... 207

CHAPTER 1

GLOBALIZNG CREATIVE CITY POLICY AND EAST ASIAN CITIES

1.1 Introduction

The UN-issued Creative Economy Report (2010) emphasizes that creative industries have a tremendous potential to contribute to economic prosperity not only for developed countries but also for "developing" countries seeking to diversify their economies. The UN's recognition of the creative industries as a "feasible development option" helps to explain why studies on this subject hold a vital significance in East Asia where both academic and public attention has focused on the success of this industry, more commonly known as "Korean Wave" and "Cool Japan" in global markets (Chua and Iwabuchi, 2008). When service industries began to displace manufacturing in the 1990s, East Asian governments began to look to "creative industries" in order to drive the future growth of urban economies (Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2005). Accordingly, the creative city discourse adopted by state officials in East Asia emerged as a new method of strategic urban planning that reinvented the city as a vibrant hub of creative industries seen to have the potential to improve the "quality of life" for citizens, as defined by Landry (2000). Recently, "creative industry" and "creative city" discourses have driven public policy interventions and sectoral prioritization of the creative economy, so much so that by 2009 over 80 cities across 35 nation-states and all major continents focused on explicit policy or strategic plans to develop creative city/creative industries (Evans, 2009).

As one of the leaders in earlier experiments in “information society” expansion (Castells, 1996; Evans, 1995), it is not surprising that Korea and Japan have emerged as leaders in creative city policy in Asia. Seoul, the winner of the World Design Capital 2010 Award and a member of the UNESCO Creative City Network, and Yokohama, the host of Creative City International Conference 2009, are two exemplary cases in which the city government is the key initiator of these new development programs. These include investment on new cultural infrastructures and agencies to spearhead new initiatives, policies designed to the successful attraction of private capital investments and the promotion of city and by extension nation branding project. Seoul and Yokohama’s vision and aspiration to develop into more competitive cities in the global market begin since 2004, when the Seoul Metropolitan Government (below SMG) and the Yokohama Metropolitan Government (below YMG) started investing vast amounts of city revenues and human resources into these creative city-related projects.

Despite their similar global recognition and celebration of new policy initiatives for economic and urban growth, Seoul and Yokohama have received dramatically different social responses and tension levels by the state, capitals and citizens in terms of their creative success. In Seoul, we see strong political and social opposition to the creative city policy agenda from various citizen groups and environmental activists. Some journalists argue that the creative city policy leads to the “McDonaldization of urban design” in Seoul because it is heavily planned and practiced by governmental top-down guidelines and regulations (Im, 2009). This mode of elite-led urban planning has been considered as one of the problems caused mainly by the East Asian developmentalist state (Hill and Kim, 2000; Fujita, 2003; Saito, 2003). For example, in the Design Seoul Street Project, the SMG even regulates the

size and the font of street shops' signboards under the comprehensive guidelines for the designs of buildings and construction; consequentially, these streets lose cultural diversity with their newly implemented similar features and homogenization. Still others argue that the Creative Seoul policy fosters and exacerbates social and economic inequality, which has been perceived as a broad symptom of global neoliberal urban reform (Harvey, 2008; Peck, 2005, 2007). In particular, many of the urban redevelopment construction projects – such as the Yong-San Redevelopment Project, which caused the death of six people in a fire during a raid to evict protestors from a building that was going to be redeveloped in 2009 – have promoted the gentrification of the area and dislocated their original residents. In the case of Seoul, it seems that the creative city policy dubbed "Design Seoul" can be seen as a typical example of what might occur when East Asian developmentalism converges with global neoliberalism.

Different from Seoul's neoliberal-developmental direction, the case of Yokohama demonstrated that the policy objective of utilizing "creativity" not only aims to reform urban planning but also to "restructure" a politics related to community development and social welfare (Sasaki, 2010). Among the numerous activities that are underway, the experimental 'Kogane Cho Bazaar' and 'Creative Core Area' projects supported by the YMG are distinctive examples. The Kogane Cho Bazaar venture purposes to regenerate the red light area that had developed during the chaotic period of the immediate postwar years as a shopping district with over 250 shops (Sasaki, 2010), while the Creative Core Area undertaking endeavors to revitalize the old downtown area often called "Kannai" – which had been degraded after the urban mega redevelopment of its nearby waterfront district, Minato Mirai 21 – but is gradually coming back to life through the utilization of historic

buildings for artistic and cultural purposes that have in turn attracted creative industries to this area (Noda, 2008). Yokohama's creative city policy advocates argue that the recruitment of more creative workers and the increase in art-related activities have been responsible not only for the enhancement of the social image of the Koganecho area but also for the revitalization of the old downtown socio-economically. These policy projects influenced by Richard Florida's work on the "Creative Class" and Charles Landry's idea of the "Creative City" came to be seen as models of how creative city policy can function as a form "social inclusion" (Sasaki, 2010).

Distinct from the welfare state models of Europe and the United States, in the Japanese context it has not been the state but rather business and family kinship networks which provide social protection through life-long employment and mutual assistance (Kamino, 1992; Kimoto, 1995; Mori, 1995). These "private welfare systems"—what Castells called "the internalization of social services" (Castells, 1999:134)—has gradually declined under the neoliberal globalization (Aoki, 2003). A key question arises: within this historical context, should the emergence of creative city policy be understood as a "new alternative of social inclusion?" Does this affirmative action of creative economy-led urban regeneration projects actually counter the problem of neoliberal-developmental forces in Yokohama? More importantly, why do creative city policies of Seoul and Yokohama show different outcomes in spite of the common socio-economic context in which the current political economic movement of neoliberalism has intersected with the historical legacy of the developmental state?

These diverse gradations of government—ranging from Seoul's more disciplinary and regulatory forms to Yokohama's more affirmative—are derived from the creative city

policies of Seoul and Yokohama, thereby demonstrating that an instrumental understanding of such policies as "global neoliberal urban reform" cannot provide a sufficient explanation (Harvey, 2005; Peck 2007). Conventional wisdom about neoliberalism, as sociologist Peter Evans (2008) argues, is often assumed to be in opposition to social welfare and deconstruction of social protection and economic regulation through a general retrenchment of government (Evans, 2008), and thus cannot successfully capture a distinctive East Asian variant of neoliberal movement. As anthropologist Aihwa Ong (2006) argues, in a non-Western context where neoliberalism itself has not been "the general characteristics of technologies of governing," neoliberalism produces various gradations of governing such as disciplinary, pastoral, civilizing/disqualifying policies; these effects tend to create fragmentation and uneven hybrid zones of government and citizenships in Asia. For this reason, I suggest that it is necessary to capture the current emergence of creative city policy by attentively balancing the global macro institutional features of neoliberalism with specific institutional, cultural practices such as the developmental state (Chakravartty and Sarikakis, 2006; Alhassan and Chakravartty, 2011). In other words, neoliberalism should be conceptualized "not [as] a 'structure' but as mobile calculative techniques of governing that can be decontextualized from their original sources and recontextualized in constellations of mutually constitutive and contingent relation" (Ong, 2006:13).

Thus, this dissertation intervenes in the conventional understandings, which consider the influx of neoliberalism as the key to explain the rapid global circulation of creative city policy, typically based on the cities in the West. By considering the policy transfer as endless processes of "translation" in the viewpoint of Actor-Network Theory (Latour, 2005), rather than a linear replication or emulation process, it attempts to empirically map how creative

city policy emerged as a new form of urban politics in Korea and Japan where the pressures of global neoliberal reform are played out against the distinct histories of the developmental state in East Asia, whose principle of legitimacy is based on "its ability to promote and sustain development, understanding by development the combination of steady high rates of economic growth and structural change in the productive system"(Castells, 1992: 56). By following recent researches about East Asian urban policy transformation (Park etc, 2012), I argue that the specific institutional and cultural practices such as the historical legacy of the developmental state and its relation to capital and civil society are necessary for "not only properly *locating* the meaning of neoliberalism but also for *assessing the breadth and depth* of the neoliberal political project" in East Asia. This approach offers a clearer picture and fills an empirical gap in the understanding of the global "creative city" phenomenon. Through this approach, my dissertation reexamines the key rationales of creative economy-driven development and provides a close analysis of the political and sociological contexts of this policy shift.

Based on these theoretical and empirical reflection, in this dissertation, my central question is: In what ways does the creative city policy in Seoul and Yokohama generate new forms of urban politics in relation to various policy actors, including city government, local and global business capitals, and citizen and creative labor? To effectively answer this question, I suggest that this policy can be better understood as a "new urban governmental techniques" assembled by various discursive and material policy practices under the name of "creativity" including: 1) numerous urban material redevelopment construction projects entailing direct ecological impacts (i.e., Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park (Korea), Creative Core Area (Japan), 2) many local and international events practiced by routinized

administrative procedures (i.e., Seoul Design Olympiad (Korea) and Yokohama Triennales (Japan), and 3) continuous efforts to foster certain types of subjectivities such as creative citizen and creative labor (i.e., the Cultivating and Educating "Creative Citizen" Project(Korea) , Creative City School and Yokohama Triennale School (Japan)).

In order to capture these various discursive and material policy practices, I draw from a combined methodology of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and ethnographic studies of globalization. My research project attempts to understand the assemblage of Seoul and Yokohama's creative city policies by investigating practical activities and consequences of the creative city policy in Seoul and Yokohama. In my ethnographic research, I will trace connections of various institutional actors including Seoul and Yokohama city governmental officials, policy experts from governmental think tanks, activist organizations, citizen groups, artists and creative workers. Specifically, in the main chapters (from chapter 2 to 7), I will investigate 1) how and what kinds of material objects are produced by creative city policy including cultural artifacts, urban landscapes, and creative clusters by focusing on Yokohama's Creative Core Area and Seoul's Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park; 2) in what ways local and international events are practiced by routinized techniques or standardized procedures by focusing on Yokohama's Yokohama Triennales and Seoul's Seoul Design Olympiads; and 3) whether the new forms and templates of subjectivities are generated by the creative city policy by focusing on Yokohama's Creative City School and Seoul's Seoul Design Supporters Center.

In the next section, I will discuss how creative city policy has emerged by examining several different academic disciplines such as urban studies as well as media and communication studies. After discussing the development of creative city policy, I will locate

the development of this policy within East Asian contexts where the current political economic movement of neoliberalism has intersected with the historical legacy of the developmental state. Thirdly, I will discuss ethnographic methods upon which my dissertation project is based and provide a brief outline of each chapters of the dissertation.

1.2 Creative Industry and Creative City Policy

The concept of creative city is somewhat vague and a puzzling one. To observe the development of the concept of creative city, it is necessary to examine how the concept of creative city has been developed with the relationship among other similar concepts such as "creative industry" and "creative class". The first coherent concept of "creative city" has been appeared in Landry and Bianchini (1995)'s book "The Creative City". In this book, what they tried to show is that the role of cultural industry and its contribution to regeneration of urban development in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Europe and North America. By using typical example of interaction between artists and community such as the case of Gateshed in U.K, they view that broadly cultural industry can solve urban problems such as unemployment and changing city image. Comunian (2010) argues that 1998 onward, the word 'creative' became popular and began linking to the emergence of the term "creative industry" emerged in media and communication studies and secondly to the development of the "creative class" theory from urban studies (Comunian, 2010:2). The articulation of "creative city" to "creative industry" and "creative class" leads to a new interpretation of the "creative city" as a place where "creative industries are concentrated and supported", and in this city "the economic success of a city is determined by the presence of a creative class" (Montgomery, 2005).

The theory of "creative class" developed by Richard Florida (2002) argues that the key factor to enhance regional economic growth is a high level of creativity mainly led by "creative class" as a category of people who are not necessarily highly educated but who are working in "creative" and "innovative" occupations (Florida, 2002). He suggest that several categories and indexes to measure and rank how a certain region might attract more workers from the "creative class" in terms of "technology, tolerance and talent".

Evans (2009) shows that the dominant objective behind the concept of creative city is economic development and employment focusing on "infrastructure (transportation, ICT) regeneration, tourism/events and branding, education and training including 'talent' generation and support" (Evans, 2009:1024). Similarly, Hesmondhalgh and Pratt (2005) also show that the concept of the "creative city" has been developed by the somewhat "undermining and contradicting" relation to the concept of "cultural quarter" and "the cultural cluster" developed in urban geography (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005:6). The major difference from those two concepts was in that the "creative city" endeavors to emphasize "a more general concern with city planning in the name of "quality of life" (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005:6). In the context of the Western countries including Europe, North America and Australia, this concept becomes influential because the creative industries have been perceived as an important way of reinvigorating post-industrial national economies. Under this policy rationale, many Western countries including Australia, Canada, New Zealand and U.K start to drive cultural policy toward more "entrepreneur and instrumental" approach to culture (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005:4).

On the other hand, Looking from the vantage point of East Asia, particularly from Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and China, a different set of scholars shows that the primary role of cultural policies in East Asian contexts until 1980 was comprised of social and political agendas—such as a mechanism to decolonize and reconstruct cultural identity formation and nation building—rather than economic development aims (Lee and Lim, 2014; Huang, 2014; Lee, 2014; Kong, 2000). However, in the late 1980s and 1990s, East Asian countries including Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and China started not only to view culture as an efficient instrument for nation branding and soft power but also to pay attention to culture's potential economic value (Lee and Lim, 2014). This relatively new cultural policy emerged with converging sets of discourses, such as "the knowledge economy, post-industrial society and globalization" (Lee and Lim, 2014, p9). Along this line, the 1996 Asian financial crisis ignited national and city governments to look for alternative economic strategies; thus the creative economy strategies, "developed since the late 1990s with the extension of city marketing techniques and their progressive transformation into city branding strategies" (Garcia, 2004: 315), became influential among countries such as Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and China (Lee and Lim, 2014; Kong, 2009). These creative economy strategies developed in the West were seen as the most dramatic solutions not only for the physical transformation of the urban landscapes but also for the enhancement of economic performance (Kong, 2009). This view motivated the creative city policy's formulaic materialization in East Asian contexts, as Kong (2009) states:

> "To compete in the new creative economy, 1) cities should seek to implement particular initiatives such as encouraging creative-industry clusters, 2) incubate learning and knowledge economies, 3) maximize networks with other successful

> places and companies, value and reward innovation, and aggressively companies to attract the "creative class" as resident (Kong, 2009:2) "

This description captures current strategies of so called "creative city policy", and the global circulation of this type of policy rational has become prevalent and obvious. However, it is important to note that the development of this policy discourse of creative city is not based on a neutral policy decision processes but is rather driven by a "willed" political logic of neo-liberalism. In other words, it is necessary to consider the emergence of this policy in a given historical and political economic context. Political economists like Jamie Peck (2005) suggests that the rise of creative city policy should be understood within the broad political economic turn of "entrepreneurial urban strategies" in Western cities since 1980s, where the fall of the Fordist economy was accompanied with diminished urban fiscal capacity and a political turn against the welfare state's social redistribution policies (Peck, 2005:761).

Harvey (1989) shows that confronted by very limited feasible options to cure the economic and political problem in 1980s, cities were forced them to enter zero-sum competitions to attract public and private investments and had to represent themselves as "an innovative, exiting, creative and safe place to live or visit, to play and consume" in a various cultural events and arts (Harvey, 1989:9). This is what he views as the rise of neoliberal logic to create "new system of governance that integrate state and corporate interests, and through the application of money power, it has ensured that the disbursement of the surplus through the state apparatus favors corporate capital and upper classes in shaping the urban process" (Harvey, 2008:38). Under this neoliberal logic, the role of "government" from welfare state replaces "the governance" based on public-private partnership, and in general, this public-private partnership loosed the barriers for capitals to enter public sectors.

Along with this historical change, Harvey (2008) tries to answer why this discourse of creative city has become so prevalent both at the global and local level. Harvey argues that it is based on political and territorial logics of neo-liberalism that captures "local and regional dynamics as a source of capitalist power and augments that power by setting up havens for capital investment where consumerism, tourism, cultural and knowledge-based industries have become major aspects of the urban political economy" (Harvey, 2008:31). Similarly, Peck (2007) argues that creative city policy has been "artfully crafted for today's neoliberalized political-economic terrain" He analyzes that the discourse and practice of creative city policy actively supports the prevailing neoliberal urbanism, characterized by "1) polarizing labor and housing market, 2) property and market-led development, 3) retrenched public services and social programming, and 4) accelerating intercity competition for jobs, investment and assets (Peck, 2007:2)"

Pratt (2008) also points out that the neo-liberal line on manufacturing re-location moved into the knowledge industry because capitalist began to notice that "it's next big thing"(Pratt, 2008:114). Pratt (2008) argues that this neoliberal understanding of economic approach to culture has been largely based on Daniel Bell's concept of the "Post-industrial Society". Bell emphasized the emergence of a cadre of scientists or knowledge workers, who will be required to service and create the scientific and technological means of a post-industrial society, and this thesis remains attractive to those who accept the notion of economic modernization (Pratt, 2008:115). Furthermore, the development of Bell's line of thought can be found in Manuel Castells' idea of both "The Information Society" and "The Network Society" (Pratt, 2008:120). Castells (2001) firmly believes in the tremendous

potential of what he called “the information economy” based on horizontal networks in terms of its inclusive and innovative feature. Pratt (2008) criticizes that this line of argument utilizing technological determinism where certain technologies convey particular modes of economic development: “anywhere could be silicon valley/alley/fen’ (Pratt, 2008:120). To sum up, creative city policy can be understood as a neoliberal policy rationales based on convergences and intersections between cultural policy and urban policy in the name of “creativity”.

In spite of the global circulation of creative city policy, urban studies and media and communication studies scholars find some common problems in this explanation. In the next two sections, I will discuss how both urban studies and media and communication scholars views some common problems of creative city policy in terms of its theoretical flimsiness, limited empirical evidence and the rising social inequality in creative cites.

1.2.1The Problem of Locating the “Creative Class” and “Creative Industries”

One of the critical problems is the question of the definition of “creative class” from urban studies and “creative industries” from media and communication studies. In the urban studies field, Marlet and Woerkens (2007) argue that Florida’s concept of “creative class” and “creativity” is not very different from “human capital theory”. In their case study of the Dutch creative class, even though they conclude that both a highly productive labor force and the right atmosphere to start up new businesses emerge in places with high levels of skilled and creative people, they doubt if this has anything to do with “bohemianism or creative ethos” endorsed by creative class theory, other than social interaction as meant in human capital theory (Marlet and Woerkens, 2007). Pratt (2008) also notices that Florida’s claim is

based on unproven assumptions in which "culture" perceives as "intrinsic value to attract and engage the creative class" (Pratt, 2008:108).

Comunian (2010) argues that because of converging formulaic policy rational such as "creative class theory + creative industry policy = creative city policy", as shown in Kong's definition (2009), it is wrongly perceived that the "creative class" and "creative industry" refer to same stakeholders. However, he argues that both concepts are based on different stakeholder groups, and both groups do not want the same policy interventions. Moreover, this conceptual fuzziness entails a contradiction of how policy interventions promote either the "creative class" who desires more globalized forms of culture such as gentrified housing, luxurious stores and cafes, or "creative industries" which should be based on strong involvement of the pre-existing community, local identity, and local skills and talents such as craft industry (Comunian, 2010:4).

In the media and communication field, Hesmondalgh and Pratt's (2005) argument about the definitional problem of cultural industry also give us a useful basis to understand the uncertain and flexible character of the concept of the "creative industry". They note that the term, "culture" is a very flexible and fuzzy term. Based on this flexibility and uncertainty, all industries can be perceived as cultural industries "because all industries are involved in the production of goods and services that become part of the web of meanings and symbols we know as culture" (Hesmondalgh and Pratt, 2005:6). For example, in the case of the music industry, it is unclear if the concept includes musicians and performers as well as training, management, promotion, and the recording facilities, compact disc pressing plants, inlay printing, etc. This definitional problem of the cultural industry naturally causes statistical

problem because it is unclear which industry should be measured and surveyed in the categories of cultural industry. In this point, they argue that there is a "knowledge gap" between "the creation of definitions and new census categories" and "the implementation of actual survey" in the cultural industry (Hesmondalgh and Pratt, 2005:6).

This definitional problem of cultural industry has not been solved, and the definition of "creative industries" exactly inherited this fuzziness. Cunningham (2002) argues that the concept of creative industry claims to grab "significant 'new economy enterprise dynamics that such terms as 'the arts', 'media' and 'cultural industries' cannot catch' (Cunningham, 2002:54). He defines "creative industries" as "activities which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have the potential for wealth and job creation through generation and exploitation of intellectual property" (Cunningham, 2002:54). Under this general definition, he argues that creative industries include "advertising, architecture, arts and antique markets, crafts, design, fashion, film, software, music, television and radio, performing arts, and publishing" (Cunningham, 2002:54).

The problem with this comprehensive and inclusive concept becomes clear when considering the policy implication. Nicholas Garnham (2005) offers one of the distinctive critiques of the implications of the shift in terminology from "cultural industry" to "creative industries" in terms of its policy implication in western context. He argues that this change of label is not a mere neutral process but holds both theoretical and policy implications (Garnham, 2005:5). Tracing the historical policy shift in the U.K, he claims that there had been a clear division between "policy toward the arts" based on broadly principle of patronage and enlightenment and on assumption of an inherent opposition between art and

commerce, and “policy toward the mass media” based on the main principle of economic analysis of what were large-scale economic activities or industries (Garnham, 2005:16). He contends that un-reflexive articulation of arts and media policy creates the rhetoric of “creative industry” which reinforces “economic” and “managerial” language and patterns of thought within cultural and media policy (Garnham, 2005:6). Under this universal and market-driven definition, the old arts and cultural industries are now subsumed into or becomes a subset of the creative industries. And the reversal of the relationship occurs in which traditionally located the arts at the core, supplying cultural commodities and then non-cultural spheres, such as a tourism, advertising and design services (Marcus, 2005).

1.2.2 The Problem of Limited Empirical Evidences and Social Inequality in Creative City

Although there has been a global expansion in creative city policy adoption, there are few empirical studies about its long-term impact. Jayne (2004) argues that “substantial funding has supported creative industries development initiatives for the past fifteen years. However, the impact of this development on the regeneration of the city has been minimal” (Jayne, 2004:208). Comunian (2010) claims that the concept of creative class lacks a precise connection of causality with economic development, and the strong links between the development of creative city-regions and rising inequality still remains an open question (Comunian, 2010:3). Given the fragile employment and markets involved in these small-firm clusters, these ubiquitous economic development initiatives rely heavily on “blind faith” in the growth prospects of the creative and knowledge economy and in their role as catalysts of regeneration and innovation (Evans, 2009:1030). Nathan (2005) also shows that in creative

cities employment and population growth is taking place, but this is relatively small in absolute terms, and in many cases are both fragile and transient.

Similarly, in their study of thirteen large scales urban development projects in European Union Countries, Swyngedouw et al (2002) finds that the policy processes of urban development in targeted cities are characterized by less democratic and more elite-driven priorities. They argues that the new urban renewal projects so-called creative city policy are "the material expression of a developmental logic that view megaprojects and place marketing as means for generating future growth and for waging a competitive struggle to attract investment capital"(Swyngedouw et al, 2002:546). Chatterson (2000) also argues that "the "creative city" perspective remains a comfortable 'feel-good' concept for consultant, policy makers and politicians rather than a serious agenda for radical change" (Chatterson, 2000:397). Moreover, this creative class theory has a limitation in terms of its top-down perspective on developing assets for attraction and growth. "The creative class" forces certain ideas that "the creative city needs specific local assets such as cultural amenities, cafe culture, cultural diversity, as well as a provision for high technology to attract creative class" (Comunian, 2010:3).

Evans (2009) points out that the potential for economic development and employment growth in these new area often relies on a small number of local actors and hubs such as universities or specialties art/design college or programs, cultural venues and some retail activities based on visitor economy (Evans, 2009:1005). Assumed that the potential to create employment and economic growth lacks credibility and hard evidence, and as such it becomes problematic to put public sector interventions in creative city policy because

importing these knowledge economy requires substantial public investments and is not guaranteed to succeed (Evans, 2009:1023). Because many successful urban regeneration projects are implying “a strong involvement with the pre-existing community and local identity,” it is not easily transferable and replicated for other regions (Comunian, 2010:17). By examining the successful regeneration in Newcastle Gateshed project, Comunian (2010) argues that one of the critical factors to make it possible was the sense of local pride and interactive dynamics. In this regard, he claims that the lesson from Newcastle Gateshed project cannot be easily to apply to other cities (Comunian, 2010:17).

Similarly, Waitt and Gibson (2009) argues that the story of creative regeneration in relatively small city, Wollongong, Australia, had little to do with “official planning schemes, global trends, desires on the part of creative producers to cluster together or the rise of the sorts of entrepreneurial creative cultures documented in larger cities elsewhere”(Waitt and Gibson, 2009:1243) Instead, they highlight that the emergence of organically developed creative areas in Wollongong is mostly based on residents’ level of affluence, employment and education and participation in grass-roots artistic scenes located not in the inner city, but in the city’s northern coastal areas, which provides with more affordable and relatively inexpensive property prices (Waitt and Gibson, 2009:1243).

One of the important problems derived from creative city policy is its connection to the problem of social and economic inequality. McCann (2007) argues that creative class theory narrowly focuses on life style and livability as assets for economic competition and cursorily engages with questions of inequality (McCann, 2007:190). Even though Florida concerns about the clear correlation between creativity and inequality, he never offers any

policy prescription on how to achieve wage equality in the creative economy (McCann, 2007:193). By examining the case of Glasgow, one of the most successful and widely known cases of European City of Culture, Mooney (2004) reports that Glasgow had become "dual city" characterized by "cultural-led regeneration, physical renewal in the city center alongside the city's large peripheral housing estates, all too frequently depicted as residual backwaters of dependency poverty and crime" (Mooney 2004:334) Importantly, this social and economic inequality is led by "market-led urban regeneration and significant growth in employment in the hospitality, tourism, retail and leisure sectors, notable as source of more poorly paid, casualized and irregular forms of work" (Mooney 2004:334). He claims that "Glasgow would become a service sector sweatshop, its workers milked by inward investors who would move on at the first sign of greater economic hardship and an increasing divide between haves and have-nots"(Mooney 2004:334).

Media and communication scholars whose research focuses on the development of the information society and its relation to inequality have contested the argument that the ICT-led development as one of big factions of creative industry is a neutral tool for economic development and social inclusion (Mattelart, 2003, Chakravartty and Sarikaskis, 2006, Zhao and Chakravartty, 2007). Mattelart (2003) argues that a utopian vision of global information society is heavily based on global capital's old reiterated determination "to defend intellectual property ownership, combat pirated software programs, continue deregulating telecommunications, and promote common standards and protect consumer"(Mattelart, 2003, 154). Chakravartty and Sarikaskis (2006) show that ICT-led development strategy in the Global South often seems to offer better employment opportunities and work conditions

compared to other existing employment opportunities, but they argue that many of these jobs actually insecure and "flexible to the detriment of workers' interests and offer little long-term mobility or stability". Moreover, these jobs are often very limited to a "tiny middle class minority with questionable impact on greater urban and rural unemployment" (Chakravartty and Sarikaskis, 2006:128).

Moreover, jobs created in the arts and cultural sectors also may seem attractive but can cause long-term social polarization. Media and communication studies scholars shed light on creative industries creates contingent labor situations, and this precarious working situations become a dominant way of life form in a given neoliberal society (Miller, 2010). Miller (2010) argues that the current creative industry does so under the conditions of flexible production and ideologies of "freedom." Importantly, he finds that this flexible production regime and post-industrial labor subjectivity of "freedom" produce certain groups of people called "precariat", whose life is based on extreme insecure economic and social conditions. Also, Hesmondalgh and Pratt (2005) claim that the cultural industries are traditionally marked by the co-existence of large multinational corporations and many small and medium-sized companies. In fact, these many small and medium-sized firms seen as an independent sector is high-risk and unstable, so these are not the ideal conditions for creating sustainable urban regeneration projects (Hesmondalgh and Pratt, 2005:7). Ross (2010) insists that it is necessary to distinguish between "mere job creation" developed by current creative industry and the making of sustainable "livelihoods" against the romantic vision of creative industry.

Importantly, Garcia (2004) divides the fundamental dilemmas based on culture-led urban regeneration policy into three different concepts:

> "1) spatial dilemmas such as tensions between city center and periphery and the risk of gentrification 2) economic development dilemmas such as that of encouraging consumption over production, 3) cultural funding dilemmas in the choice to support 'ephemeral' activity such as events and festivals or 'permanent' activity such as infrastructures"(Garcia, 2004:313).

He insists that the current entrepreneurial, elite-led and top-down approach to culture-led city regeneration had "the limited capacity of cultural endeavors to address issues of social inclusion and multicultural representation" (Garcia, 2004:313). Following the existing arguments around the concept of cultural planning, he argues that it is necessary to conceptualize "a more holistic and flexible understanding of cultural policy that informs both the current notion of an arts sphere, and the economic, political, social, educational and environmental spheres of cities"(Garcia, 2004:324). In this regard, he claims that "the thing that we might concern is not encouraging a top-down 'expert' approach, as has been commonly explored by many case studies, but the emphasis must focus on providing a platform for the local communities, including both the average citizen, authorities and specialist agencies, to express their views and expectations and survey the decision making process" (Garcia, 2004:324). Ultimately, the goal of urban regeneration led by culture should "preserve local control and build a local identity and sense of place" (Garcia, 2004:324).

Given the conceptual flimsiness, limited empirical credibility and the problem of social and economic inequality, it appears questionable why this discourse of the creative city becomes prevalent both at the global and the local level. In the next section, I will focus on

how the emergence of creative city policy can be located in non-western contexts, where neoliberalism articulates the historical legacies of the developmental state.

1.3 Developmental State, Neoliberalism and East Asian Cities

Political economists like Jamie Peck (2005) stress that creative city policy is an exemplar case of what Harvey calls the rise of 'entrepreneurial' urban strategy charged by political and territorial logic of neoliberalism, such as exploiting local and regional resources as a means of capitalist power and using it to augment power by setting up havens for financial investment (Harvey, 2008:31). In this process, generally local governments tend to reduce their spending, and inequality among local governments increases, and, finally, local governments start privatizing some social consumption services, and this tendency links to increasing support for private economic development (Hill and Fujita, 2000:676). Under this neoliberal governance regime, what Harvey (2008) calls "the right to the city", which is defined as a right far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources rather "a right to change ourselves by changing the city, becomes too narrowly defined and restricted in most cases to a small political and economic elite who are in a position to shape cities *as they desire"* (Harvey, 2008:38, italic added by myself).

Scholars working on the legacies of the developmentalist state in East Asia question the trajectories of global neo-liberal movement as a major factor that account for the current urban policy in East Asian cities. Hill and Kim (2000) argue that it is not neo-liberalism but developmentalism, which can explain current urban policy in East Asian context. They boldly criticize that Western cities such as New York and London tend to be over-represented as the "center of the world" and the prototype of "world city" (Hill and Kim,

2000:2174). They try to show how East Asian cities, especially Tokyo and Seoul, have a different set of policy principles comparing to western liberalist traditions. First of all, they argue that developmentalism addressed industrialisation not only on behalf of capital but also at the level of the nation-state. In this point, because enhancing national production was the top priority of industrial policy, "state regulations and non-market governance mechanisms were designed to restrain competition in order to concentrate resources in strategic industries and maintain orderly economic growth" (Hill and Kim, 2000:2174).

Similarly, Fujita (2003) argues that Japan's state centered developmental, capital system enabled Japan to resist the neo-liberal urban development. She shows that "Tokyo as a developmental state policy-led manufacturing city makes a striking contrast with New York as a liberal urban policy-led service city" (Fujita, 2003). She focuses on how the role of the local government, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG), actively directs and guides Tokyo's neo-industrialization by regulating small business sectors. She argues that "TMG's policy framework prevents these small business firms profiting at the expense of their fellow firms, employees, suppliers, customers and communities, while at the same time encouraging these firms through incentives to lead the Tokyo's economy" (Fujita, 2003:266). Moreover, Saito (2003) show that TMG's 'state-led' or 'state centered' urban policy initiative is not "the imposition of crude form of government order or command" but "the exercise of strategic national policy through carefully crafted institutional arrangements in which the public and private sectors maintained *a delicately balanced relationships with consensus and conformity* within the framework of the capitalist development state" (Saito, 2003:304, italic added by myself). In this regard, these scholars try to conceptualize Tokyo as "state centered, political-

bureaucratic manufacturing city" based on "egalitarianism and social and economic stability", while contrasting New York as a "market centered, liberal service city" based on "bourgeois social and economic dynamics and inequality" (Fujita, 2003; Hill and Kim, 2000).

Even though these scholars show how western centered arguments about global city overlooked local contexts in emphasizing the role of the state, some argue that emphasizing local context obscures "the fundamental role of global capital" (Waley, 2007:1466). Following Harvey, Waley (2007) claims that global urban regime shifted from "a managerial" to "an entrepreneurial urban regime" and from "urban government" to "urban governance". One of the distinctive features is an increase of "public-private partnership" as a prime principle of urban restructuring and urban regeneration (Waley, 2007:1467). However, under the public-private partnership regime, the role of city government became that of a "market facilitator", so "no longer are cities as able to establish regulatory barrier to capital; on the contrary, they are expected to lower such barriers" (Hackworth, 2007:61). Interestingly, Waley (2007) point out that the main characteristics of Tokyo as a world city become similar to what western "entrepreneurial city". Firstly, he argues that the state, whether national or metropolitan local, increasingly withdraws their role and now act principally as "cheerleader" for capital "with exhortatory statements about the need for international competitiveness" (Waley, 2007:1486). Moreover, he shows that even Japan's current urban development project is no longer based on public-private partnership but undertaken by solely private capital. With this change, urban entrepreneurs could capitalize even large parts of lands in central and inner Tokyo, and it squeezes the everyday life-spaces of the inhabitants of Tokyo's central and inner areas (Waley, 2007:1486).

In the same way, Shibata (2008) argues, “actually-existing developmental states in East Asia have vigorously applied neoliberal logic to their planning policy, even though neoliberalism seems diametrically opposed to the developmental state ideology at first glance”(Shibata, 2008:92). Shibata (2008) suggests understanding current neoliberal urban planning in Japan as a “another management technology to fulfill the unfettered desire and anxiety of developmental state elites not to lose out to global economic competition” in response to foreign pressure to remove unnecessary regulation and administrative guidance to increase “efficiency” of the market mechanism in the developmental state since the 1980s (Shibata, 2007:98). She claims that historically Japanese elites well understood the importance of “technology” such as public management technology including economics and public finance to exercise their power derived from their social status and to maintain their influence on policy-making (Shibata, 2008:110).

In this dissertation, I assume that even though East Asian cities have different urban policy traditions such as developmentalism, it is difficult to consider the current urban restructuring regime solely based on developmentalism or neo-liberalism. Also, it is not useful to ask whether state or capital have more power to influence the current urban restructuring. Rather, as Stubbs (2009) argues, it is necessary to acknowledge that “the strong state now had to deal with a strong industry but to also note that the two need not necessarily be seen as antagonistic; rather, that the capacities of both were generally enhanced”(Stubbs, 2009:13). It thus becomes to examine East Asian urban restructuring policy by looking at both developmentalism and neoliberalism.

Lee (2009) shows how the Korean developmental state's neoliberal shift creates the symbiotic relationships between governmental and business entities through examining Korea's current ICT industry policy. He points out that Korea's democratic turmoil in 1987 began to undermine the absolute state power held since the military regime established in 1963. It was the 1997 financial crisis that Korean big capital, known by Chaebol, remarkably enhanced their power through their alliance with foreign capital, so it is the Chaebol that now dominate the state (Lee, 2009:569). Through these phases of what he called "the limited developmental state", the state-capital relationships gradually transformed from a direct-strong state to the "market-driven" state. Also one of the most distinctive characteristics of this current relation is in that state-capital relationship is retained by the principal of "bilateral negotiation" between the state and business entities (Lee, 2009: 572). The national IT infrastructure project is an exemplary case, in which the domestic telecom companies were fully supported by the state-capital alliance, and it is important to note that this powerful linkage between state-capital results in neglecting the participation of the citizenry (Lee, 2009: 575).

In terms of urban policy, Kim (2006) shows that the Korean urbanism came under the direct impact of globalization following the 1997 financial crisis. The demographic and economic gaps between the capital region and other provinces widened, and the population share of the capital region continued to increase (Kim, 2006: 189). For example, Kim (2006) introduced the fourth comprehensive national territorial plan for the post-financial crisis period 2000-2020 as an explicit example of this tendency. The fourth plan greatly emphasized "efficiency" rather than "equity" based on economic logic and market principle,

and the government's role is defined as a "distributor of resources" which "minimizes along with the relaxation of various regulations, especially in the area of housing, land and construction market" (Kim, 2006: 193). On this point, the "economically egalitarian" aspect of developmentalism is obviously degraded in the current urban policy, and the tendency to promote mega-project around Seoul area exacerbates the gap between the capital region and the provincial cities (Kim, 2006: 201). On the other hand, throughout the post-developmental state period from the administration of Dae-jung Kim to that of the current president, policy plans for the cultural or creative industry have been driven by economic reductionism of culture that voices advocating cultural diversity have been drowned out by a vague rhetoric of "international competition"(Lee, 2007:338). Lee (2007) analyses the Korean government's project of "the cities of culture" launched by the direct supervision of the national government and its Ministry of Culture and Tourism. These cities are designated in order to promote global tourism and construction for the logic of economic development (Lee, 2007).

<Figure 1> summarizes the evolution of the relationship between state and capital in Korea from "the developmental state" to "the post-developmental state" throughout "the limited developmental state", and it locates two current urban policies as an example policy influenced by the post-developmental state regime. In sum, the developmental state transforms and retains its influences based on newly created state-capital relations in East Asian countries, and the current urban policy should be examined by this new capital-state context. In other words, even though the role of the developmental state seems lost or

diminished its power, as the previous literature shows, it has in practice takes a more market-driven direction.

Figure 1: The evolving phase of the developmental state and the urban policy[1]



In recent research about East Asian urban policy transformation, Park and his colleagues (2012) argue that the evolving relationship between neoliberalism and state-led developmentalism in the East Asian context produces "sizeable gaps" between "what neoliberal theory postulates" and "what has actually materialized" (Park etc, 2012:2). Influenced by the concept of "actually existing neoliberalism" from Brenner and Theodore (2002), which highlights the contextual embeddedness of neoliberalism, Park and his colleagues (2012) argue that it is necessary to properly "locate" neoliberalism by exploring path-dependent, contextually specific interactions between inherited institutional framework of the developmental state and emergent neoliberal and a market-oriented restructuring

[1] Source: adopted from Lee (2009) and Kim (2006) and synthesized by myself

project. In order to explain the current East Asian situation, Hill (2007) suggests applying the distinction of the East Asian "neo-developmental state" versus the "post-developmental state". Comparing the levels of market openness and state planning along these two dimensions, he notes three types of East Asian countries: 1) the Neo-Developmental State (Thailand: High Market Openness/Low State Planning), 2) the In-Between State (Korea and Taiwan), and 3) the Post-Developmental State (Japan: High Market Openness/High State Planning) (Hill, 2007). Because Japan's focus is now on "innovation" and "quality of life" rather than on catching up with the West's rapid growth, he argues that Japan is currently in a post-developmental stage which marks "both the continuity with past developmentalist traditions and institutions" and "the emergence of new ideologies and structures in Japan that conform neither to neoliberal nor to developmentalist models" (Hill, 2007). The ambiguities and uncertainties containing the concept of "post-developmentalism" require a historically specific understanding of the regulative and distributive dimensions of the creative city policy in East Asia.

Current studies of policy transfer also provides useful insights regarding how certain policy regimes can emerge and stabilize through continuous transferring practices of various policy actors. Peck and Theodore (2010) argue that policy transfer entails the establishment of connections between policy actors and policymaking sites, and these actors cannot be perceived as lone learners, but as embodied members of epistemic, expert and practice communities. Moreover, mobile policies rarely travel as complete "packages;" instead they move in "bits and pieces" as "selective discourses, inchoate ideas and synthesized models" so that the result of policy transfer process is not simple emulation and linear replication, but a

more complex process of nonlinear reproduction. Importantly, even though the promotion of creative city policy now has become a global phenomenon as "quasi scientific policy rationales" – heavily reliant upon proxies but light on "theory" or hard "evidence" – the rapid transfer and emulation of the creative city policy is based on what Evans calls a 'movement' of global policy and advocacy (Evans, 2009). This tendency is a 'movement' because the creative city policy is widely promoted through specialist intermediaries, experts and centers as well as through government and agency-sponsored exchanges via "inter-local policy networks" of conferences, symposia and roadshows (Evans, 2009:1006). The creative city policy as a mobile policy blurs boundaries of global and local, and temporal dimensions, thus necessitating more contextualized and historically-specific analyses. The different and distinctive role of developmental state and its relation to capital and civil society in the creative city policy in Seoul and Yokohama empirically shows how differences and ambiguities are at play when policy moves among historically distinct regions. Thus, as Ong (2006) argues, the interactions between neoliberalism and state action require a conceptual openness to contingent, ambivalence and uncertain outcomes for unconventional spaces of neoliberal movement (Ong, 2006:75).

In order to delineate a historically specific understanding of the regulative and distributive dimension of the creative city policy in Korea and Japan, I contend that the creative city policy in Korea and Japan should not be considered as a simple neoliberal economic doctrine in terms of "a negative relation to state power, a market ideology that seeks to limit the scope and activity of governing" (Ong, 2006). Rather, I argue that this policy can be better conceptualized by applying Ong's view (2006) of "new urban

governmental techniques" that are assembled by various discursive and material policy practices under the name of "creativity." Following Foucault's concept of governmentality (Foucault, 1991), Ong (2006) argues that neoliberalism can be perceived as an "economic doctrine" as well as a "technology of government" in "a profoundly active way of rationalizing governing and self-governing in order to "optimize"" (Ong, 2006:3). Thus, the creative cities of Japan and Korea are test sites not only for neoliberal creative economy but also for new forms of governing and being governed with significant implications for fostering certain types of subjectivities such as "creative citizens" and "creative labor". Creative city policy in both Korea and Japan actually include "the array of knowledge and techniques that are concerned with the systematic and pragmatic guidance and regulation of everyday conduct" (Ong, 2006:4). Both cities' policies contain 1) numerous urban material redevelopment construction projects entailing direct ecological impacts (i.e., the Seoul Design Street Project and the Dongdaremun Design Plaza and Park construction plan (Korea), Creative Core Area project, and the National Art Park Project(Japan)), 2) various knowledge production projects supported by governmental think-tanks and academic works (i.e., the Seoul Foundation for Arts and Culture and the Seoul Design Foundation(Korea), Yokohama Creative City Center and the Arts Commission Yokohama(Japan)), 3) many local and international events practiced by routinized administrative procedures (i.e., the Seoul Design Olympiads and Hi-Seoul Festival (Korea) and Yokohama Triennales and the Creative Neighourhood Project in Yokohama(Japan)), and 4) continuous efforts to foster certain types of subjectivities (i.e., the cultivating and educating "Creative Citizen" Project(Korea) and the Yokohama Creative City School and Yokohama Triennale School (Japan)).

My research is thus an attempt to empirically map this making and remaking of relations or connections among city government, capital, various citizen groups and creative industries workers through the creative city policy as a new mode of urban governmental techniques. Even though these identifiable actors play a key role in developing creative city policy in both cities in particular ways by sharing a certain set of meanings and practices surrounding such policies in order to explain their own developmental path, I do not assume that any of these are privileged or pre-established potential actors for creative city policy in Seoul and Yokohama. Importantly, in a given post-development context in Korea and Japan, each actor's character and formation dynamically and actively transform in unconventional ways. For example, as a neo-institutional approach to developmental state researches demonstrates, the relationship between state and capital has been transformed from "repressive" to "symbiotic." Similarly, as media and communication scholars note, the relationship between capital and labor in creative economy becomes "flexible, insecure and precarious." Under this changing relationship among state, capital and labor, the non-governmental nonprofit organizations in particular—such as the Seoul Design Foundation and the Yokohama Creative City Center whose major roles are to promote "inter-local policy networks" and to facilitate "cooperative activity" between the private and the public—become tremendously important.

Based on previous literature, <Figure 2> summarizes various possible relationships among state, capital, labor and non-governmental nonprofit organizations related to creative city policy in Korea and Japan.

Figure 2. The various relationships among policy actors of creative city policy in Seoul and Yokohama



1.4 Research Design and Methods

In elaborating my previous discussion (in introduction) of my three central questions and methodological approach, I explain further why these approaches best address my questions. And I will lay out more concretely my object of study in both sites.

I draw on the growing body of literature on Actor-Network Theory (below ANT) from the Science, Technology and Society (STS) tradition to trace the dynamic linkage surrounding the creative city policy to better capture the contingent, ambivalence and uncertain movement of creative city policy. ANT suggests that certain urban realities emerge from the enactment of both material and discursive heterogeneous relations that can construct and deconstruct all kinds of actors including human and non-human (Law, 2007). These relations are contingent and dispersed rather than determined and discrete. While not

privileging any strong claim as to the concrete character of associations of human and nonhuman actors, ANT challenges social aggregates such as class, group, state, and capital not as "the objects of ostensive definition" but only of a "performative definition"(Latour, 2005). Because of its performative characteristic, social aggregates can be perceived as endless processes of making and remaking through some other non-social means, and social aggregates cannot sustain their existence *without explicit and implicit efforts to keep up* (Latour, 2005). Under this notion, actor starts being considered as a dynamic entity having contradictory voices within its own boundary and actively designating other groups as being empty and dangerous to build their own boundaries (Latour, 2005:31-32). Just like the concept of actor, for ANT actors engage in providing controversial accounts for their actions as well as for those of others, so action cannot be understood as doing something "under the full control of consciousness". Rather, it can be perceived in the sense of the "dislocated, borrowed, distributed, influenced, dominated, betrayed and *translated*" (Latour, 2005:46, italic added by myself). Following this performative and relational concept of actor and action, my research, which focuses on the actual practices and consequences of the creative city policy, illustrates how the temporality and performativity of state, capital, citizens, and urban objects shape and translate the context and usage of the creative city policy.

By applying ANT approach to urban studies, urban assemblage scholars suggest considering policy transfer as endless processes of "translation," rather than a linear replication or emulation process (e.g., Graham and Marvin, 2001; Graham, 2010; Bender, 2010; McFarlane, 2011a, 2011b; Smith 2010). Farias (2010) points out that three principles of ANT-radical relationality, generalized symmetry and free association-can revitalize

theoretical and methodological impasses of urban studies. In detail, ANT's radical relationality extend its scope beyond language, culture and communication to all entities, and this extension of relational character makes us understand objects, technologies, texts, humans and institutions not as staying to separated and incommensurable realm of their own but as "*mutually constructing each other"* (Farias, 2010:3, italic added myself). More importantly, Farias (2010) argues that ANT scholars' aim of applying this principle to the social is not based on "deconstructing the social, but on understating the associations that *make up* the social"(Farias, 2010: 3, italic added myself). In a similar vein, McCann and Ward (2011) propose to conceptualize cities as "assemblages" in terms of three interrelated aspects: 1) assemblages "shape, reorient, reconstitute wider flows, thus continually reconfiguring geographies of territoriality and relationality"(McCann and Ward, 2011:13), 2) assemblages enables to overcome "the sorts of easy analytical dichotomies such as fixity/mobility and global/local"(McCann and Ward, 2011:14), and 3) any achievement process of assemblages of urban policies shows "uneven consequences" by involving actual policy practices and politics (McCann and Ward, 2011:14). In doing so, it is possible to understand contemporary urban policymaking process as "neither the absolute territorialization of societies, economies, or cultures onto a global scale, nor complete deterritorialization into a supra-territorial, distanceless, placeless or borderless spaces of flows" (McCann and Ward, 2011:14).

By evaluating the current urban assemblage researches, Brenner and his colleagues (2011) found that there are three different types of research trends. Firstly, what they called "ad hoc basis" research trend tends to choose to apply certain propositions and concepts only

so much to "reframe concrete urban analysis" rather than draw on assemblage approach as "an ontological foundation"(Brenner et al, 2011:231). The second trend, dubbed "methodological orientation", tends to use selected methodological tools from ANT to hinge on and to re-conceptualize the handling of socio-natures within critical urban theories (Brenner et al, 2011: 231). Finally, the third trend, so-called "radically ontological approach", altered urban political economy in order to reformulate the "fundamental character" of the urban social world (Brenner et al, 2011: 232). Brenner and his colleagues (2011) claim that the third development path might lose its theoretical and critical benefits because it tends to rather concentrate on "descriptive focus associated with ontological variants of assemblages" by forgetting important structural contexts within which actants are located such as formations of capital accumulation (Brenner et al, 2011: 232). In this regard, they suggest that urban assemblage research can best contribute to critical urban research tradition when it is linked to "political economy or to another theoretical framework attuned to the structuration of urban processes" including capital, states, territorial alliances or social movements (Brenner et al, 2011:232).

This criticism toward assemblage approach is not new. As Law (2007) reported, ANT has been criticized in that ANT researches somewhat overlooked the issue of politics and power (Star, 1991; Haraway, 1997; Couldry, 2004). Star (1991) points out that the intermingling of human and nonhuman should begin with the question, “cui bono?” rather than begin with analytical interests. For example, she indicates that certain large network has an irreversible character, no matter what their ontological status. She argues that the reason why certain network has this irreversibility because certain dwellers in that network benefit

from externalities of its own structure, density of communications populations, and already-established maintenance (Star, 1991). In this point, she claims that these network externalities are important not for its heuristic reason but for its power and political reason (Star, 1991:40). That is, ANT scholars should consider that the network is not a realm of "neutral" space but a realm of where "unequal" distribution and access already exist. It is necessary for ANT scholars to start thinking with the facts that "No networks are stabilized or standardized for everyone" (Star, 1991: 44).

Couldry (2003) also points out that applying ANT approach should be thoroughly considered in terms of its "insufficient attention to questions of time, power, and interpretation"(Couldry, 2003:11). He argues that ANT studies tend to have very little interest to say about processed that come after the establishment of certain networks. Because of this trend, ANT closes its eyes to view "the long-term consequences of network for social space and its implication for the distribution of power"(Couldry, 2003:7). This lack of attention to time and power is connected to another problem of what he called "the problem of interpretation" in ANT. Couldry (2003) claims that ANT is less interested in possibility that networks and their product can be "re-interpreted" overtime after they have been established. To overcome this limitation, similar to Brenner and his colleagues (2011), Couldry suggests combining ANT to other sociological concepts such as Durkheim's notion of the social 'categories' and Bourdieu's concept of 'habitus' (Couldry, 2003:10).

To sum up, the critiques of assemblage researches suggest that ANT research should not stop their analyses at uncovering whether heterogeneous actors intermingled together but extend to explore why those formations are possible and how other formations would be

possible. As Brenner and his colleagues rightly argue (2011), to better explore these questions of "how and why", it is necessary to locate certain urban assemblages under specific historical-geopolitical economic conditions. In doing so, my study attempts to map creative city policy in Seoul and Yokohama by attentively balancing the global macro institutional features of neoliberalism with specific institutional and cultural practices such as the developmental state and its relation to capital and civil society (Chakravartty and Sarikakis, 2006; Alhassan and Chakravartty, 2011).

This dissertation also explores the issue of subjectivities, politics and power that have been overlooked in ANT literature (Star, 1991; Haraway, 1997; Couldry, 2004). In examining the reconfiguration of subjectivities in creative city polices, I draw on Foucault's notion of governmentality for its emphasis on the effect on the enactment of strategic logics based on stable arrays or networks of relations (Foucault, 1991; Law, 2002). I am also following the insights of critical ethnographers of globalization in practice influenced by Foucauldian perspective who argue that global integration has had splintering effects based on local historical and cultural contexts (Ong, 2006; Tsing, 2004; Ferguson, 2006; Murray-Li, 2007; Mitchell, 2002). These scholars argue that the development project implemented by post-colonial developmental state function as a political technology of control. Under this logic, Murray-Li (2007) shows that governmentality can only be formed "within a heterogeneous assemblage or "dispositif" that combines "forms of practical knowledge, with modes of perception, practices of calculation, vocabularies, types of authority, forms of judgment, architectural forms, human capacities, non-human objects and devices, inscriptions, techniques and so forth" (Rose 1999:52).

In order to bridge ANT to post-structuralist politics, Law argues that "actor-network theory can also be understood as an empirical version of post-structuralism" (Law, 2007:6) Law (2002) views that post-structuralism is based on the notion that "there are different and incomplete deep structures underpinning and being enacted in different social locations" (Law, 2002:91). He claims that ANT actually shares similar vision of post-structuralism in that "speech, bodies their gestures, subjectivities and materials are an effect of enactment of strategic logics based on stable arrays or networks of relations" (Law, 2002:91-92). Borrowing from Foucault's concept of "order of things" in modernity, ANT believes that there are many possible "modes of ordering," and forming and deconstructing a certain order are the effects of what they call certain associations or networks. Under this connection to Foucaultian notion of governmentality, Law suggests how ANT study can contribute to explore the society in terms of three different ways in terms of "material durability" "strategic durability" and "discursive durability" (Law, 2007). Firstly, Law claims that it is possible for ANT to discover why some materials or material relations last longer than others (Law, 2007). As Foucault shows in his example of Bentham's panopticon, ANT is particularly useful to explain how certain configuration of the network produces its durability, and how its durability can be modified because it weights material and object as much important as social elements. Secondly, Law (2007) points out that ANT can be useful to analyze how certain kinds of strategies can create a durable network and how these networks can retain their power (Law, 2007:9).

Following this conception of governmentality and order of things, I am particularly interested in how each city government promotes certain types of subjectivities by ordering

or reordering the material and symbolic work of the creative city policy (Law, 2007). One of the best examples is the current city government-led urban mega events such as Yokohama Triennales and Seoul Design Olympiads that include many training and educational programs for citizen. Moreover, anthropologist Robert Oppenheim (2008) argues that ANT is tracing the multifarious connections among actors, things, and forces at their various sites of interactions. He claims that "thick description" is not the right metaphor to explain ANT. Rather, it is closer to "string figures" "after narrow but complex linkages" (Oppenheim, 2008). To capture these string figures, as Ong (2006) argues, my goal for ethnographic research is not to discovery "an "appropriate" scale of action-national, global, or local-but to identify an analytical angle that allow us to examine the shifting lines of mutation" of creative city policy (Ong, 2006:12).

Following the urban assemblage work of ANT (i.e.,Farias, 2011; Smith, 2011) and critical ethnographers of globalization in practice (Ong, 2006; Tsing, 2004 ; Ferguson, 2006; Murray-Li, 2007; Mitchell, 2002), my research goals thus are to understand and analyze: 1) how material objects produced by creative city policy such as cultural artifacts (i.e., uniformed and standardized signposts and public facilities), urban landscapes (i.e., Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park construction(Seoul) and Creative Core Area construction(Yokohama)), and creative clusters (i.e., the Kangnam design cluster in Seoul and the Kannai area in Yokohama) are arranged; 2) how knowledge objects and conceptual forms are created by the creative city policy (i.e., policy reports produced by the Seoul Design Foundation and the Yokohama Creative City Center); 3) in what ways local and international events are practiced by routinized techniques or standardized procedures (i.e.,

administrative procedures of the Seoul Design Olympiads and the Yokohama Triennales); and 4) whether the new forms and templates of subjectivities such as "creative citizen" and "creative labor" are generated by the creative city policy (i.e., cultivating and educating programs for creative citizen and creative labor in Seoul and Yokohama Creative School and Yokohama Triennale School in Yokohama).

1.5 Sampling Frames

1.5.1. In-Depth Interviews

This research was funded by the Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation and the Social Science Research Council Korean Studies Dissertation Development Workshop. Under this financial assistance, During the 8 months fieldwork in Korea (from June to September 2012 and from September to December 2013) and 11 months fieldwork in Japan (from October 2012 to August 2013), I conducted in-depth interviews with various policy actors including state officials, corporate professionals and NGOs as well as creative workers in the wider area of the creative city policy. The purpose of in-depth interviews was to find out the relations or connections among various policy actors through the creative city policy. Seoul and Yokohama offered access to various state officials related to the creative city policy such as the Department of Culture, Tourism and Design at SMG and the Seoul Design Foundation (Korea) and the Arts Commission Yokohama and Creative City Division in Culture and Tourism Bureau and Yokohama Creative City Center (Japan) along with access to private firms mostly located in the Kangnam, Mapo and Guro districts (Korea) and in the Minatomirai and Kanai districts (Japan). Around 2000 design-related private firms and

15,000 workers constitute creative clusters in Seoul. In Yokohama, nearly 2000 artists and around 15,000 workers consists of its creative industrial cluster.

In detail, in case of Seoul, my primary target group of state officials was SMG's the Seoul Design Foundation, which is an organization in charge of implementation and management of Seoul's creative city policies. Under its slogan of "Caring for Citizens", Seoul Design Foundation' projects mainly consist of two different streams: 1) making "world class design city" including urban redevelopment construction projects (i.e. the construction project of Dongeadmun Design Plaza and Park) and 2) establishing "comprehensive and universal guideline" for public design (i.e. the establishment of comprehensive regulation for street signboard design). In case of Japan, the counterpart of state officials was YMG's Creative City Division in Culture and Tourism Bureau. Yokohama Creative City Division's policy objects include two different parts: 1) urban redevelopment construction projects such as "National Art Park Plan" and "Creative Core Areas" to promote and stimulate local economy through creative industry, and 2) citizen participant culture and arts projects such as "Kogane Cho Bazaar" in order to enable citizens to take the lead and participate in the creation of the Creative City of Arts and Culture. The in-depth interview with state officials focused on the role of city governments in the creation and shaping of creative city policy. The Seoul Design Foundation has been established in 2009 to provide with concrete and practical support to design industry. It is primarily engaged with the urban redevelopment construction projects such as Dongdaemoon Design Plaza and Park (below DDP) and manages Seoul Design Support Centers to provide facilities, information, education and knowledge about design research and development for the industry and creative workers. In

case of Japan, the Yokohama Creative City Center is the counterpart of Seoul's. The Yokohama Creative City Center is established to provide intermediary between the municipal authorities and local communities, so its major role is to make Yokohama more friendly location for artists, local residents, companies and schools. Under this aim, it is comprehensively engaged with creative city polices initiated by YMG.

The second group for in-depth interview is non-governmental and non-profit organizations related to creative city policy in Seoul and Yokohama. In case of Yokohama, Bank ART 1929, one of Yokohama's first and most well-know creative city projects, was the major target organization. In addition to Bank Art1929, various other organizations, who directly or indirectly involved in Yokohama's creative city policy were also contacted and interviewed. Such organizations included Sakura works, Kannai Future center, SP Spot, Koganecho Management office, Kotobuki Creative Action, etc. In case of Seoul, I interviewed with different types of NPOs, both who are voluntarily collaborated with SMG's creative city policy and who actually countered with and opposed to SMG's creative city policy such as Listen to The City and Listening. These different types of NPOs/NGOs represent various different social responses and opinions to Seoul's creative city policy. The in-depth interview with these organizations focused on how and in what extent these organizations promote and "inter-local policy networks" and to facilitate "cooperative activity" between the private and the public sector.

I also conducted in-depth interviews with creative workers and artists groups in Seoul and Yokohama. In Seoul, the companies and artists in Seoul Design Support Center were the primary target groups. The Seoul Design Support Center established by SMG and managed

by Seoul Design Foundation is an integrated business incubator facility dedicated to revitalizing the design industry by discovering competent design companies and providing them with office space and financial support. This studio is located in Dongdaemun district, one of the Seoul's major creative industry clusters, and currently 45 private companies operate their business in the field of industrial design, product design, environmental design, packaging design and visual multimedia content production. In addition to these groups of companies and workers, I also contacted and conducted interviews with numerous academics and creative workers via the Facebook club titled "What can design do for Seoul?" opened by the Seoul Design Foundation. This online club was filled not only with designers but also with various types of "creators" including architects, painters, and musicians who shared their ideas and opinions about SMG's creative city policy.

In Yokohama, the companies and artists in the Creative Core Areas were major interviewees. The Creative Core Areas established by YMG is formed "to use the local resources between areas, develop core facilities, expand hubs for creative activity, and encourage the clustering of creative businesses in Yokohama"(Yokohama Municipal Government, 2015). The Creative Core Areas consists of interlinked districts including "Bashamichi Avenue Area" "Nihon-Odori Avenue Area" and "Sakuragicho-Noge Area", and the YMG provides certain amounts of subsidies to partially cover the initial cost of locating an establishment for companies and artists in the field of design production, film, new media content production and artistic activities. Through interviews with these corporate professionals, artists and creative workers, I want to locate my dissertation in broader debates about the politics of public-private partnerships.

Interviews produced data that allowed me to understand actors' beliefs and opinions about the creative city policy as well as informant's daily practices in certain creative city projects. I have conducted preliminary interviews with workers and business people in the creative industry as well as government officials in Seoul during my master's thesis research in 2007. Also, the preliminary fieldtrip to Yokohama in February 2012 allowed me to visit the creative city project sites in Yokohama and meet some of key policy actors such as non-governmental organization officials and artists. I had continued to maintain contact with these respondents in both Seoul and Yokohama and could gain access to the area. I initially estimated that each city would run 35 interviews with various stakeholders in creative city policies, and I conducted 20 interviews in Seoul and 35 interviews in Yokohama. They include: officials of the state regulatory organization such as SMG (n=3) and YMG (n=7), representatives of non-governmental organizations in Seoul (n=4) and Yokohama (n=16), corporate professionals, artists and creative workers in Seoul (n=20) and Yokohama (n=12). The brief interview time of each participant was 1-session for a total time of 60 minutes or so. In some cases follow-up session was also conducted as required by the study under the agreement from the interviewee. More detailed demographic information about each city's interviewees is included in the tables in the Appendixes.

1.5.2. Archival and Documentary Research

With in-depth interviews with various policy actors, I also collected extensive amount of archival and documentary data. These "texts" include state regulations offered by government officials; cultural representations reported by journalists; and knowledge and conceptual forms created by policy experts such as academic policy reports. In Seoul, Design

Seoul Headquarters established numerous state regulations related to creative city policy such as “comprehensive public design guidelines” and regularly publishes numerous policy books, periodicals, and PR booklets such as electronic version of policy PR book “Design Seoul”. Seoul Design Foundation also publishes various policy reports, educational books and policy PR books such as monthly updated web-magazine to inform their projects on their websites. In Yokohama, Creative City Division in YMG inaugurates various state regulations to initiate creative city policy such as Creative City Division Policy guidelines for the management and annual evaluation and assessment reports of Creative City policy. Yokohama Creative City Center distributes various policy reports, educational books and policy PR books such as “Yokohama Sozokaiwai”, monthly uploaded web-magazine showcasing most updated events, news, projects of the Yokohama art scene. The main purpose of collecting archival and documentary evidence from firms, foundations, think-tanks, and the state is to understand the role of the creative city policy sector in urban development. The growing body of multimedia and films from corporations, the state and NGOs that represent the importance of creative industry is also a valuable means by which to study constructions and contests of the creative city policy.

1.5.3 Events and Meetings Participant Observation

I also attended events, festivals, conferences and meetings held by the different policy actors involved in the initiative of the creative city policy. These “events” include participation in cultural festivals and education programs held by the city government and visits to exhibitions and international and domestic conferences such as the Creative City Network Seoul Conference. Seoul and Yokohama regularly and sporadically holds various

events, festivals and conferences, such as 2011 Seoul UNESCO Creative Cities Network Conference. This research aims to follow linkages and interactions among various policy groups. It is important to attend these numerous formal and informal events, festivals, conferences and meetings not only they are crucial and important “contact points” of various actors to form inter-local policy networks but also they function as continuous efforts to foster certain types of subjectivities and citizens. I draw on the technique of participant observation to grasp how various actors arrange and rearrange new forms of relationships and subjectivities.

Within these various events related to creative city policy, in Seoul, I participated in education programs and events held by Seoul Design Foundation. In Seoul Design Support Center managed by Seoul Design Foundation, numerous education programs and events from basic design education program for citizens to professional entrepreneurship and marketing program for future creative workers. I registered some of these programs and tried to capture how Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG), Seoul Design Foundation (SDF) and capitals jointly have promoted and fostered a certain type of subjectivity who is ideal for its creative city project. One of the mentoring programs, in which I participated during July 2012 called the “Design Job Searching Clinic”, was held in Mapo-gu City Hall and was jointly sponsored by the SMG, SDF and two online job-searching companies (Designer Jobs and Media Jobs). Also I had a chance to participate in one of the relatively 'biggest' events, which was named the "Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7". This event included public discussions, volunteer citizens' public talks about their opinions on Seoul's creative city policy, and such cultural happenings as music concerts.

In case of Yokohama, I participated in two distinctive social inclusion type projects, Creative City School held by Bank Art 1929 and Yokohama Triennale School jointly held by the YMG and the Koganecho Area Management. Both projects are important in the sense that the objective of projects not only aims to reform urban planning but also targets to implement creative city policy as social inclusion and community development. The Creative City School, in which state officials, art NPOs, academics, and creative workers gathered together weekly to discuss and share their opinions and ideas about Yokohama's creative city policy. Because the Creative City School held bi-weekly gatherings over about two month periods, it was a sufficient amount of time for them to develop a somewhat "deeper" relationship among the participants. The Yokohama Triennale School was managed by the official Triennale Supporters' office, consisting of the staff from the Yokohama Museum of Art as well as from the Koganecho Area Management, an art NPO in charge of the management of the Koganecho area. The participant observation for this event was important in that it clearly gave me a sense of how the state and NPOs guided and practiced Yokohama's one of the biggest urban mega events. Through involvement in these events, state officials on the one hand actually could monitor and obtain opinions about the city's current creative city policy from creative workers and art NPOs. On the other hand, creative workers could have the opportunity to build networks, find their next jobs from one another, and acquire the most recent information about the city's creative city policy. By attending these events, I attempted to find certain "practices" of institutional actors' routinized techniques or standardized procedures to produce new forms of subjectivities as well as urban environments.

1.6 Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation consist of five different parts including: 1) Introduction, 2) Analysis of Urban Construction projects in Yokohama and Seoul, 3) Analysis of Urban Mega event projects in Yokohama and Seoul, 4) Analysis of Labor subjectivities in Yokohama and Seoul and 5) Conclusion. Parts 2, 3 and 4 will be divided into two individual chapters, which will include a variety of dimensional dynamics of each city's creative policy in terms of places, events and subjectivities.

Chapter 1 outlines the global circulation of creative city policy and related literature within the East Asian context. This section contains theoretical orientations based on a literature review of various disciplines about creative city policy, creative economy policy and urban planning as well as a methodological approach. Drawing from the developmental state analysis, this chapter includes both historical and institutional contexts of East Asian urban politics and their relation to neoliberalism. Also, drawing from Actor-Network Theory and the ethnography of globalization, I explain further why these approaches best address my question and lay out more concretely my object of study in both Seoul and Yokohama.

Chapters 2 and 3 turn to the question of how creative city policy are located in procedures and objects within the urban construction projects. These chapters focus on urban material redevelopment construction projects entailing direct ecological and social impacts. In Seoul, the case of Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park project initiated by Design Seoul Headquarters and managed by Seoul Design Foundation comprise the primary research sources of this chapter. The area of Dongdaemun has established itself as the heart of the clothing and fashion industry and a major tourist attraction in Seoul that draws some 2.1

million or one half of Seoul's foreign tourists annually. To rehabilitate the area, in 2006 SMG decided to turn it into a park and create Dongdaemun Design Park as a cultural and recreational complex. It also sets out to promote the project for the construction of Dongdaemun Design Plaza along with Dongdaemun Design Park as a comprehensive design infrastructure in order to revitalize the Dongdaemun commercial area and boost the design industry.

Similarly, in the case of Yokohama, Creative Core Area Project will be the counter-parts in Seoul. The formation of Creative Core Area is pursued in collaboration with NPOs and local capital in three key districts such as Bashamichi Avenue, Nihon-Odori Avenue, and Sakuragicho-Noge area in order to revitalize areas through the attraction of creative industry. Under this policy object, various historical buildings, warehouses, vacant offices and similar properties in the Kannai area are converted for creative use, and the community development was pursued through artistic and cultural activities. Also, these chapters examine how various knowledge and production projects supported by governmental think-tank and academic works have been produced, distributed and gained some degree of leverage within given local settings. More specifically, the primary research data was collected from the Seoul Foundation for Arts and Culture and the Arts Commission Yokohama's regular periodicals, irregular publications, and policy reports. Drawing from Latour's (2005) concept of "performative assemblage", I focus on how these urban places become carefully rearranged settings through certain procedural, institutional and technical mechanisms implemented by various discursive and material practices of policy actors. The technique for spatial sorting of zones for "urban regeneration" and development in the name of "creativity" is reexamined in

both Seoul and Yokohama. My central focus sheds light on each city's slogan of "urban regeneration" and "site of development" through creative city policy— not in the sense of natural or illusory—but rather in terms of a highly contingent and uncertain localized achievement.

Chapters 4 and 5 independently analyze how Seoul and Yokohama's various urban mega events are practiced by routinized techniques and standardized procedures. Also, I paint a picture of how various actors of Seoul and Yokohama's creative city policy world are interlinked and engaged with one another through these urban mega events. In more detail, in Chapter 4, I first examine four different Yokohama Triennales from 2001 to 2011, and then I analyze three Design Seoul Olympiads and the Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7 in Chapter 5. These chapters include interviews from state initiators of urban mega events and other policy actors, including local and global business capitals, artists, and creative workers, each of whom are involved in various practices of urban mega events in Yokohama and Seoul. Rather than conceptualizing the development of new urban mega events as the solely the reflex of the expansion of neoliberal capitalism, by applying the concept of "translation" developed by Actor-Network Theory, these chapters suggests to reconsider the urban mega events not as a mere reflection of "false consciousness" but as an active process of "translation" among various policy actors. To shed light on such revision, the focus is on how each city's different policy networks of "neoliberal-developmental" and "post-developmental" networks differently or similarly organized urban mega events.

Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are an attempt to "reassemble" the creative city policy actors and objects together in an active process to foster certain types of subjectivities in Seoul and

Yokohama. The participant observation research in Seoul Design Support Centers in Seoul and the Creative City School and the Triennale School in Yokohama will be my main case studies in both sites. Drawing from the current researches on creative labor and global precariat movements, I examine how each city's creative workers actually experience, evaluate, participate, negotiate or even resist the given creative city policy. In particular, based on in-depth interviews and participant observations, Chapter 6 focuses on how the ethical and moral dimensions of labor subjectivity are prominently important to explain workers' everyday living and working experiences as creative labor in Yokohama. Furthermore, it addresses how these ethical and moral values in creative work are actually *preferred* within the given creative city policy and have certain limitations to overcome a "moral but apolitical volunteer subjectivity".

Similar to the living and working experiences of creative workers in Yokohama, chapter 7 attempts to show how creative workers in Seoul actually experience, evaluate, participate, negotiate and even resist the given creative city policy in their everyday lives and works. Furthermore, in contrast with its portrait of Yokohama's "moral and ethical volunteer subjectivity", Chapter 7 addresses how creative workers in Seoul demonstrate the potential to resist and oppose not only their given creative city policy but also their precarious working and living conditions. In order to rightly capture these creative workers' resistance and opposition, this chapter suggests Jacque Ranciere's concept of "political subjectivation" to better examine how creative workers through solidarity resist and oppose their precarious working and living conditions.

CHAPTER 2

CREATIVE CITY YOKOHAMA: THE CREATIVE CORE AREA CONSTRUCTION PROJECT AND COEXISTING MODEL OF CREATIVE CITY YOKOHAMA

2.1. Introduction

Chapters 2 and 3 turn to the question of how the policy of *Creative City Yokohama* and *Design Seoul* are located in procedures and objects within the urban construction projects. These chapter focus on several urban redevelopment construction projects entailing direct ecological and social impacts. In the case of Yokohama, I will focus on Creative Core Area Project in a relation to Minato Mira 21 project, one of the largest urban redevelopment projects in Yokohama's urban history. The formation of Creative Core Areas are mainly pursued in the Kannai area, which consists of several old districts including Bashamichi Avenue, Nihon-Odori Avenue, and Sakuragicho-Noge area, and it purposes to revitalize the Kannai area through the attraction of creative class and creative industry. Under this policy, various historical buildings and warehouses, vacant offices, and similar properties in central Yokohama are converted for creative use, and town development pursued through artistic and cultural activities in the community.

Similarly, in Seoul, the case of Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park construction project initiated by Seoul Metropolitan Government (below SMG) and managed by Seoul Design Foundation comprise the primary research site of this chapter. The area of Dongdaemun is in the heart of the fashion industry and a major tourist attraction in Seoul drawing around 2.1 million or one half of Seoul's annual foreign tourists annually. To

rehabilitate the area, in 2006 SMG decided to turn it into a park and create Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park as a cultural and recreational complex. It also sets out to promote the project for the construction of Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park as a comprehensive design infrastructure in order to revitalize the Dongdaemun commercial area and boost the design industry.

I will focus on how these urban sites are carefully rearranged through by discursive and material practices of policy actors including the city governments, capitals, NGO/NPOs and citizens. The technique for spatial sorting of zones for "urban regeneration" and development in the name of "creativity" will be reexamined in both Seoul and Yokohama. My central focus will shed light on each city's slogan of "urban regeneration" and "site of development" through creative city policy— not in the sense of natural or illusory—but rather in terms of a highly contingent and uncertain localized achievement. Through this analysis, I intend to demonstrate how the cultural logic of development of place is shaped not only by the internal and discursive structure of development practices but also by external and material contexts.

To better understand the emergence of the creative city policy in Yokohama, firstly I will briefly summarize Yokohama's urban history in terms of how this "small fishing village" became one of the major international gateway ports in Japan and how it became a bedroom community for Tokyo" beginning in 1859 until the 1970s. Secondly, I will examine the relationship between the Minato Mira 21 (below MM21), one of the largest urban redevelopment projects in Yokohama's history, and Creative Core Area. Thirdly, I will show

how the creative city policy emerged in the Kannai areas as a new form of urban planning that arose in response to the MM 21 project.

2.2. Yokohama's Urban History: From "Gateway Port" to "Bedroom Community for Tokyo" (1859-1970s)

Yokohama is the second largest city in Japan with nearly 3.7 million residents (Yokohama Municipal Government, 2014). It is located 25 kilometers south of Tokyo; together these two most populated cities constitute the central part of Kanto region. Yokohama has a distinctive urban history compared to other large Japanese cities. Unlike most other large Japanese cities such as Osaka, Kyoto and Sendai – that 'naturally' grew around the ruler's castle before the modernization period – Yokohama had been developed 'intentionally' under pressure by the West circa the Meiji period (Noda, 2008:12). To better understand Yokohama's urban history, it is necessary to recognize its relationship to Tokyo. During the Edo period (1603-1867), Yokohama was a small fishing village consisting of only 100 households, but it became one of Japan's major gateways when Edo Bakufu, the feudal government during the Edo period, decided to build the port in Yokohama (Noda, 2008:13). Because Edo Bakufu did not allow foreigners to reside in the city of Edo (now Tokyo) to protect themselves from outside forces, Yokohama became a residential area for foreigners (Noda, 2008:13).

Since 1859 and the opening of the port Yokohama grew into one of the leading international cities in Japan becoming a gateway for Western culture. In 1877, there were around 3200 foreign people residing there, including foreign traders, educators and missionaries along with 165 foreign corporations; in contrast, only 97 foreigners resided in

Tokyo, thus demonstrating how Yokohama was already more internationalized than Tokyo at that time (Harata, 1993:85). After the construction of the first railway between Tokyo's Shinbashi and Yokohama, Yokohama was able to develop its economy by using Tokyo as its consumption market. Beginning with western furniture production factories and vegetable farms, Yokohama gradually developed modern textile and fashion industries during the war period (Harata, 1993:86). Throughout the pre and post-war periods, Yokohama not only developed light industry including electric goods, modern music instruments, food, textile and fashion, but also established heavy and chemical industries in the early 1900s (Harata, 1993:86). These manufacturing industries extended from the Yokohama-Kawasaki harbor area to reclaimed land around Tokyo Bay that formed one of the largest industrial belts in Japan called the "Keihin industrial zone". In particular, during the postwar period the Keihin industrial zone took on the major role of Japan's economic and industrial recovery; moreover, the heavy and chemical industries including the steel mills, oil refineries and shipyards were developed in the cluster and formed its central core (Kato, 1990:155).

When the Japanese national economy entered a period of rapid economic growth in the 1960s, the city of Yokohama faced dramatic changes in terms of its socio-economic structure. Firstly, the growing urban population caused significant social problems because of shortages of roads, sewers, water supplies and garbage disposal sites, along with cultural and education facilities (Kato, 1990:187). Yokohama's population increased from one million in 1951 to two million in 1968. This continuous population explosion reached 2.7 million in 1978 and finally stood at 3.19 million in 1989 (Kato, 1990:187). This rapid increase was related to its rival city of Tokyo and its own explosive growth. Because of Yokohama's

relatively inexpensive land and housing costs compared to those of Tokyo – even though these prices were similar to levels of other peripheral areas such as Saitama and Kawasaki – Yokohama gradually turned into a "bedroom community" for people who commuted daily to Tokyo for work and study (Edgington, 1999:65). At the same time, Tokyo gradually absorbed many Yokohama-based trading firms, thus causing the decline of Yokohama's business and cultural activities (Kato, 1990:202). On the other side, growing industrialization and urbanization brought about the problem of pollution in Yokohama; this combination of environment problems and urban infrastructure shortages urgently called for a public solution (Kato, 1990:188-189).

Under these circumstances, the city of Yokohama initiated new urban planning project that was headed by the former mayor, Asukata Ichio, a member of the Socialist Democratic Party; he held a reformative vision of "direct democracy by the citizens"(Noda, 2010:18). As one of the famous "progressive local government's leaders" of that period, Asukata strived to transform the local municipal government – "historically a subsidiary branch of the national government" – into "a base for providing public services to the local community" (Watanabe, 2006:131). To cope with the general decline in Yokohama's business and cultural activities as well as its conversion into a bedroom community for Tokyo, he proposed to collaborate with citizens and incorporate their opinions into the urban planning process (Noda, 2010:18).

By enhancing Yokohama's partnership with citizen groups and its business community, in 1965 the mayor Asukata announced a new urban plan called "City Planning for Yokohama - The Future of the Citizen-Designed City" that consisted of six parts: 1) the

renewal of the city's central section, 2) the reclamation of the coast along the Kanazawa District, 3) the development of the new town of Kohoku, 4) the building of a subway system, 5) the construction of a highway system, and 6) the erection of a bridge across Tokyo Bay (Kato, 1990:202). This plan was an historically meaningful policy in that it was the very first urban plan which was originated not by the "Japanese national government" but rather by the "local municipal government". Later often called the "Sixfold Major Urban Development Plan," it was the first full scale and well-developed urban project established by the Yokohama Municipal Government (below YMG); the major purpose of the plan was to turn "Yokohama as Tokyo's bedroom community" into an independent "International Culture City" (Tamura, 1989:274).

To pursue this aim, the government encouraged "municipal officials to act from citizens' point of view rather than from that of the traditional bureaucrat" (Watanabe, 2006:132). In doing so, the mayor launched a new division called the "City Management Office" under his direct control, and he elected Tamura Akira, later a nationally famous YMG official and a renowned urban planner, as the chief officer. In detail, the plan could be divided into two different categories. The first was the "internal redevelopment plan" that consisted of a "city center renewal", a "reclamation of Kanazawa district" and "Kokoku town development", and the second was the "urban infrastructure construction" including subway, expressway and bay bridge construction (Tamura, 1989:269). <Figure 3> shows each project's location: three circles indicate "internal redevelopment plan" sites, with highway, subway and the bay-bridge connecting with one another and forming integrated networks.

Figure 3. The Map of Yokohama and its Sixfold Urban Development Plan[2]

2.3. "Re-Internationalization or Globalization?" of Yokohama by Minato Mirai 21 Project (1980s-2000s)

Along with this urban redevelopment plan, after experiencing the oil shock of the 1970s and following Endanka (the rapid rise of Japanese Yen value), the industrial structure of Yokohama gradually changed from manufacturing to service industries from the 1960s to 1980s (Edgington, 1991:64). Manufacturing industries centering on chemical industries peaked in 1965 when 50 percent of the workforce was employed in the manufacturing

[2] Source : Retrieved and modified from Tamura (1989:271)

industry. In 1985, however, only 33 percent of those employed worked in a secondary industry, and 66 percent worked in service industries (Kato, 1990:188).

As seen in Yokohama's previous urban history, Yokohama has long been recognized as an "international city" since the 19th century. With the growth of its socio-economic infrastructure from the absorption of western culture, it has become one of the most responsive cities to western urban policy trends. For this reason, the discourse around the "internationalization of Yokohama" – that was prevalent from the 1980s as a key concept for urban policy and in particular materialized in the MM 21 project – needs to be examined with consideration of both the external pressure of globalization as well as the internal socio-economic restructuring in this city.

In the middle of the 1980s, when the United States and Japan agreed on the Plaza Accord, the value of the Japanese yen rapidly increased – referred to as Endanka – and it triggered a rapid globalization and financialization of the Japanese economy. In particular, during the era of the Japanese bubble economy (1986 to 1991), the remarkable expansion of the financial market induced a massive influx of multinational financial companies and of professional service corporations such as international law and accounting firms into Tokyo's central area. The rapid growth of office space demand derived by this inflow of capital and human resources finally aroused an economic bubble in real estate and the stock market, and consequentially numerous skyscrapers were constructed in the central Tokyo's Marunouchi area (Sasaki, 2009:21).

In terms of urban policy, the Japanese national government announced its Fourth Comprehensive Plan for National Development in 1987. This plan covered the period 1989 to 2000 an emphasized the active role of the National Capital Region (NCR) that was divided into two different zones: the "Tokyo metropolitan area" and "the surrounding five outer areas" including Chiba, Tsuchiura-Tsukuba, Yokohama-Kawasaki, Urawa-Omiya and Tachikawa-Hachioji. These five surrounding outer areas would be developed into a network of "Business Core Cities" in order to redistribute the concentrated functions of Tokyo (Edgington, 1991:68). The plan can be characterized as an emphasis on economic growth within globalization and information-driven economy along with a massive investment in social infrastructure within the surrounding outer areas. As the second largest city in the plan after Tokyo, Yokohama was envisioned as taking a key role in the plan. In fact, Japanese national government decided that the 18 national government institutions would be relocated to Yokohama in the 1990s (Edgington, 1991:68).

Given these external factors in the development boom in this urban area, Yokohama's industrial structure has gradually changed with the decline of its manufacturing industries. The impact of the 1973 oil crisis was more severe in Yokohama than in the nation as a whole (Kato, 1990:196). From 1975 to 1985, in terms of the city's gross production – while the share of the manufacturing industry decreased from 29 to 25 percent – that of the service industry increased by contrast from 11 to 16 percent (Kato, 1990:197).

Edgington (1991) points out that because of the higher expenses of production after Endanka, numerous electronic companies changed their product offerings and moved their large-scale standard processing assembly plants overseas (Edgington, 1991:64). Moreover,

with the increment of area cost and contamination control in urban sites, more enterprises moved their assembling manufacturing plants to areas that were distant from the city (Edgington, 1991:64). With this out-flux of manufacturing industries, a significant number of small and medium sized companies went bankrupt through the sharp rise of the yen and its negative impact on Japanese product's price competitiveness (Edgington, 1991:65). Since over 99 percent of the factories and nearly 60 percent of the workers in Yokohama were based in these small and medium-sized companies at the time, urban planners have placed much attention on modernizing these companies through the introduction of new information technology (Edgington, 1991:65). As one of the last projects in the Sixfold Urban Development Plan, how MM21 was *actually* conceptualized and materialized as an "International Information City" was influenced by these external and internal factors. Until the 1980s, Yokohama's city center was divided into two separate regions: the Kannai area and the Yokohama station area. As shown in <Figure 4>, the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' Yokohama shipyard and the Japanese National Railways classification yard occupied the areas in between these regions. MM21 was originally proposed to connect these areas by relocating them to other parts of the city (Noda, 2008:28). In 1968 when Mayor Ichio Asukata and city official Tamura Akira suggested the Sixfold Urban Development Plan as the blueprint for Yokohama's urban development, MM 21 was one of the plan's major development projects to include a revitalization plan of the downtown area[3].

[3] See <Figure 3>'s first circle named "1. The Renewal of City's Central Section". The first circle includes the Kannai, Minato Mirai and Yokohama Station area, which together form so-called Yokohama's downtown area.

Figure 4. Old Mitsubishi Shipyard located in the area of MM 21[4]

MM21 is widely known as one of the largest waterfront redevelopment plans in Japan. It is notable how YMG's negotiation with various policy actors for MM 21 suggests that the developmental state is not "the object of an ostensive black box" but rather a "performative assemblage" which can be perceived as involved in an endless process of making and remaking (Latour, 2005). In this regards, it is important as it captures how two major policy actors, the developmental state and private capitals can assemble the state-capital relationship via the principal of "bilateral negotiation" between the two parties through the specific translation of their own version of the Public-Private Partnership. Tamura Akira, one of the key YMG officials who created the Sixfold Development Plan, shows how the MM21 project was executed as a result of the formation of this public-private partnership. In his book, *Toshi*

[4] Source : http://hamarepo.com/story.php?page_no=1&story_id=1275

Yokohama Monogatari (the story of the city of Yokohama) published in 1989, he explains why he proposed to execute the Sixfold Development Plan through the symbiotic relationship between public and private sectors from the viewpoint of the municipal government:

> The Sixfold Development Plan is absolutely needed for the city. But it was impossible to run this project entirely based on the city of Yokohama itself. Certainly the Sixfold Development Plan would take huge capital and time. Based on Yokohama's general city revenue alone, it is impossible to run the plan…..Therefore, it is necessary to use other funds, other than a subsidy from the national government and tax revenues ..... At the time, there were no words like "*minkatsu* (private participation:民活). Because I was involved in the private real estate business for a long time, *I thought that using the power of the private sector for the development of the city was a natural choice*. In spite of its lack of own financial resources, *the municipality can be a principal agent or a master planner for the policy***.** So far, what the municipal government generally did was only to follow the plan of the national government. However, *it is the only municipal government who can set a policy comprehensively with a "real" consideration for the entire city and citizens* because it is closer to ordinary citizens than to any other administrative entities. (Tamura, 1989:276-277; translated and italic added by myself)

As Watanabe (2006) argues, Yokohama's development strategy, especially developed by Tamura, was seen as "progressive" at the time. In his book, Tamura recalls that the city officials in the City Management Office constructed this plan to enhance Yokohama's independence from Tokyo. Moreover, it was a plan solely developed from the viewpoint of the city of Yokohama rather than by the "order" of the national government (Tamura, 1989). The municipal government, however, found it difficult to execute the plan by itself because of a shortage of financial funding. For this reason, as a former businessman, Tamura legitimized its reason to use "private power" in terms of not for the benefit of the private sector, but for *the citizens and the city* (Tamura, 1989). In this model of Private Public Partnership (PPP), what he focuses on is the reform of the role of the municipal government from one that is so-called "hierarchical, dependent, passive, traditional, and bureaucratic" to

one that is “synthetic, independent, citizen-friendly, active, and practical”; thus the Sixfold Development Plan was important in that this new type of “municipal government” actively performed its own “policy plan” for its citizens (Tamura, 1989:278). In this case, what we see is how the public-private partnership in Yokohama was translated by using the discourse of “for the citizens and city’s future itself”, which was different from its Western counterparts. As many scholars point out, in the context of the Western countries such as the U.S and U.K, the general rationale for the PPP has been supported by market-oriented discourses such as introducing efficiency of market, increasing flexibility and enhancing market competition (e.g, Hackworth, 2007). However, in case of Yokohama, the YMG developed a strategic approach to legitimize the role of the municipal government in the development plan by utilizing the translation of the PPP for "the citizen and the city". Here, the role of the developmental state was conceptualized as a paternalistic entity, which could strategically guide and use private capitals’ power not for private capitals but for its citizens and the city.

In particular, my interview with a former city official who worked more than twenty years at the YMG and participated in most of the urban development projects reveals that the plan was guided by “three principles of the development strategy”: 1) developing a public-private partnership, 2) controlling land use by the local government, and 3) applying urban design guidelines to the development area:

> In the case of MM21, just the same as with other big development projects, it was difficult to promote the project by only the YMG itself as a solely one of the municipal government’s [projects]. Firstly we tried to share the vision of MM 21 with several other policy actors such as the central government, Kanazawa Prefectural Government and landowners (private capitals). We made lobby teams and persuaded

> them by a variety of logic. To the Kanazawa Prefectural Government, we argued that MM 21 is beneficial for us to enhance the independence of Yokohama from Tokyo's economic and political dependency. To the central government, we argued that MM 21 could be a good strategy for redistributing the central functions in Tokyo to the local areas. Finally, for private capitals such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industry's Yokohama shipyard, we persuaded them that MM 21 could increase land values and usage. (Former YMG official)

By using this "vision sharing" strategy, in 1967 the YMG started negotiations with other policy actors such as landowners, centering on the Mitsubishi Heavy Industry (private owner); in 1979 finally they agreed with the relocation of the shipyard (Kato, 1990:203). Also the YMG established a special committee for MM 21's master plan called the "Planning and Investigatory Committee for the Overall Improvement of Yokohama City Center and Waterfront Area", and the committee presented its basic plan in 1979. In 1981, an interim report of "The Master Plan for the Overall Improvement of Yokohama City Center and Waterfront Area" was officially released, and the project's official name was decided upon as "Minato Mirai 21" (literally meaning "Future Port 21").

The principal concept of the MM21 was: "1) a cultural cosmopolitan area operating around the clock, 2) an information city of the 21st century and 3) a city with a superior environment, surrounded by water, greenery and historic monuments, in an effort to create a viable *international cultural city*" (Medda and Nijkamp, 1999:186). With this concept of an "International Cultural City", the interim report indicated that the approximate number of workers would be projected as 190,000 and that about 10,000 residents would live in MM21 (Kato, 1990:235). Moreover, the detailed conceptual activities and plans included: 1) the construction of an "International Convention Center" focusing on the construction of Pacific Convention Plaza Yokohama (now Pacifico Yokohama), a 30-story building consisting of a

hotel and conference center, 2) open space and bay frontage, 3) a high tech infrastructure including advanced systems for environmental control, waste disposal and local community networks, 4) cultural amenities such as the Minato Mirai Hall and Yokohama Museum of Art, and 5) Teleport, meaning the construction of a comprehensive communication network based on a fiber optic and satellite system (Edgington, 1991:74-75). By launching this official project in 1983, the YMG created the PPP with YMG and landowners including Mitsubishi Heavy Industry and the Japanese National Railways; the Yokohama Minato Mirai 21Corporation (YMM 21) was established in the aftermath of this assemblage between public and private actors.

In terms of its organization structure, the board members consisted of both YMG officials and corporation representatives, and its main activities included: 1) consultation and coordination among landowners and the YMG, 2) the implementation of an integrated area management plan, and 3) advertising and PR activities (Kishida and Uzuki, 2009:142). Kishida and Uzuki (2009) divided the main activities of YMM 21 into three different phases: 1st phrase: 1984-1990, 2nd phrase: 1991-1997, and 3rd phrase: 1998-2008. In the first phase, the major works of the YMM21 were concentrated in the development of the land management plan and the construction of cultural amenities such as the Yokohama Museum of Art. During the second period, with the completion of the major business buildings construction including the Landmark Tower and Rinko Park, YMM 21 developed a basic agreement on urban community development. In the third period, YMM 21 focused on PR and advertising activities by using information technology such as high-speed internet (Kishida and Uzuki, 2009:142).

Through the activities of YMM 21, the YMG implemented the guidelines for "land use control" and "urban design" for the MM 21 area as a tool for legitimating their roles of not only "cheering" private capital, but also "enhancing" the quality of life for citizens. YMM 21 created the Basic Agreement on Urban Community Development with the joint participation of YMG and landowners. According to its Land Use Plan, the MM21 area was divided into zones in terms of block characteristics such as business, promenade, international, commercial, and waterfront. Also, each developer had to follow urban design guidelines in terms of "water and greenery", "skyline, streetscapes and vistas", "shared space", "activity floors", "color schemes and outdoor advertising" and "car and bicycle parks". For example, regarding the skyline, high-rises were planned along the town skeleton as landmarks, while the overall skyline had to be designed to ascend gradually from inland toward the sea. Moreover, even the hues and materials of the buildings themselves were standardized to avoid excessive originality that could muddy the setting.

The YMG, however, not only implemented the guidelines but also provided several incentives for private capital including: 1) project research, 2) relaxation of regulations and 3) support to private enterprises (Medda and Nijkamp, 1999:187). Medda and Nijkamp show that tax reduction/exemption, subsidy and long-term low interest rate loans or no-interest loans were provided by several different laws such as "The Special Measures Law for Promoting Urban Development by Private Sector" (Medda and Nijkamp, 1999:187-188). More importantly, contrary to these various supports for private enterprises, Medda and Nijkamp (1999) argue that what is missing in the development process was "public participation". In the case of the Japanese planning system, public hearings and information

meetings had to be announced, while in the case of MM21, not surprisingly, there had been no public audience (Medda and Nijkamp, 1999:189). Indeed, as Medda and Nijkamp contend, public participation has not taken any significant role in one of the largest development projects in Yokohama's urban history (Medda and Nijkamp, 1999).

Even though the YMG officials argued, the Sixfold Development Plan was necessary for the citizens and the city's future and a PPP was seen as the best to execute the project, what was clearly neglected in the development process was actual "citizen participation". Tamura Akira argues that "minkastu" was essential to pursue the project. Minkatsu (民活) literally means "civic (min:民) participation (katsu:活)". Actually, the category of "min (civic)" is very broad and can encompass private capital, NPOs, citizen groups and even ordinary citizens. In the process of the Sixfold Development Plan, however, in particular MM21, "minkatsu (civic participation)" turned into "private participation", only narrowly focusing on "private capital's participation".

In sum, one may consider MM 21 as a distinctive example of the developmental state's master plan-based project. Via its three principles, the developmental state guides and controls urban development's master plan while the bilateral assemblage between the developmental state and private capital creates the MM 21 area as what Park et al refer to as **"***neoliberal space in a developmental state***"** (Park, Hill and Saito, 2012). The voice of the citizens is however, absent in this development process, and, as shown in <Figure 5>, now the MM21 areas are filled with a multitude of skyscrapers for global corporations and of highly commercialized entertainment places, shopping malls and luxury hotels. Kato (1990) once warned:

> The face of the MM 21 area will change greatly if only upper-class housing is available and the area does not have a middle-class atmosphere. To handle this issue, policy makers must use careful judgment. (Kato, 1990:235)

In spite of this concern, today the MM21 area has become the hub for global and local capital. Since the MM21 project began in 1983, it has become a principal business center as well as a major tourist attraction. As of 2013, about 93,000 people work here and about 1720 international and domestic corporations including Nissan Motors and Fuji XEROX have their headquarters and branches in MM21. Also in 2013, it attracted approximately 72 million visitors. With the city center moving to MM 21 with its tremendous success of attracting capital, how to revitalize Kannai's untapped potential remains a stumbling block for city planners (BankART, 2009:10).

Figure 5. The Current Feature of Minato Mirai 21[5]

[5]Source:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Minatomirai_from_Yamashita_Park_at_night.jpg

2.4. From "International Culture City" to "Creative City Yokohama": Creative Core Area Project

Short-listed for the 2008 World Mayor award and nominated for the 2003 Global Leader of Tomorrow, Mayor Hiroshi Nakada officially launched the *Creative City Yokohama* policy in 2004 (Steven, 2008). Elected as the youngest mayor of a major Japanese city at his age of 37, advocating an era of "New Public Management," Nakada attempted to apply a market-oriented city management plan to enhance the YMG's "efficiency" and "transparency". This city management reform contained the introduction of performance-related pay and open recruitment, enhancement of financial transparency, and the establishment of several project-based divisions within the YMG (Steven, 2008). Influenced by an entrepreneurial approach to public management, this idea of a project-based division aimed to create a more flexible, temporal and functional organization structure to deal with "urgent and important" social tasks (Noda, 2008: 64). Yokohama Art and Culture City Creative Headquarters (YACCCH), the initial organization for Yokohama's creative city policy, was a distinctive example of this new project-based division established in 2004.

The main purpose of YACCCH was to revitalize old downtown areas, often called "Kannai(関内)", through investment in the cultural infrastructure (BankART 1929, 2009:18). The Kannai area, originally part of the oceanfront until the Edo period, was reclaimed in 1667, becoming the home of international trading companies and diplomatic missions since the opening of the port of Yokohama in 1895(Kannai, 2014). The Kannai region consists of several old districts including Bashamichi, Chinatown and Yamashita Park and includes major city government offices. These old districts were originally developed as one of the

sites where foreigners first settled in Japan by the permission from the Edo Bakufu. For this reason, the Kannai has been the doorway to western cultural influences, and numerous novel items from abroad such as the gaslight, ice cream and the western style tree-lined street were introduced into Japan through the Kannai area (Naruse et al, 2010:55).

As <Figure 6> shows the street features of the Kannai area in 1890, this area is comprised of much western modern architecture constructed from the initial formation period of the town to the war period. Because it contained major government buildings such as the city hall of the YMG, the Kanagawa Prefectural Government Offices, and the Kanagawa Prefectural Police Headquarters, it functioned as the city's main downtown area in terms of administration, business and tourism.

Figure 6. The street of the Kannai Area in 1890[6]

[6] Source : Museum of Yokohama Urban History (2004:14)

With office space becoming more available in MM 21 and Tokyo in the 2000s, Kannai's vacancies have risen dramatically. From 1996 to 2003 the number of workers in Kannai decreased from 220,000 to 200,000 (BankART, 2009:10). During that same period, Kannai's historic buildings were destroyed and replaced by new apartment blocks, thereby demolishing the original streetscape and numerous historic buildings. A former state official, who participated in the creative city policy from the beginning, recalls the situation of the Kannai area when they first came up with the policy:

> When first MM21 was planned, the city officials wanted to connect Yokohama station area to the Kannai area via the development of MM 21. We thought that through this project, the two downtown areas could stimulate development of each other. However, after the collapse of the Japanese bubble economy, the downfall of the national economy harshly impacted the Kannai area. In the Yokohama station area, generally 200 million people visit per day, so it was not so much impacted by the collapse of the bubble economy. Also, when the IT boom arose in the middle of 1990, MM21 provided a much stronger infrastructure than did the Kannai area. Because the Kannai area's buildings were old, it was more difficult to implement an IT infrastructure there. For that reason, many companies based in the Kannai area moved to the MM 21 area. Given these factors, it was clear that the empty office spaces in Kannai would increase, and therefore many people started to worry about the degradation of the Kannai area….we (YMG) expected that the MM21 project could have a synergy effect for both the Kannai area and itself, but it only exacerbated the gap between them.(Personal interview with the Former YMG Official)

Under these circumstances, this former YMG official mentions that within his government there were several groups of people who were concerned about how to handle the problem of the Kannai area. At that time, Kitazawa Takeru, who was the former chief officer of the YMG's Urban Design Office and a professor at the University of Tokyo, suggested implementation of the creative city policy to revitalize the Kannai area. Kitazawa explains how he came up with the idea of the creative city policy at the Creative City Conference:

> One day, during the period that these policies (concerning the degradation of the Kannai area) were being debated, I was walking through the Kannai district when I happened to come across Nakano-san just in front of the former Fuji Bank on the Bashamichi Dori. The Urban Design Office had just then obtained a preservation order on the Fuji Bank, and they were in the throes of putting together an operation plan for the premises. On being shown around the building, I was inspired by the space and the possibilities it offered both outside and inside. When I enquired if any decision on how to use the building had been made, Nakano-san replied that none had yet been taken. After taking some photos, I went to see the mayor and said to him: "*let's do something with this space*"….The Committee for the Regeneration of Downtown was subsequently established, and became an effective advocate for city culture, creative activities, the arts, as well as the community's creative potential (Bank ART 1929, 2009:61, emphasis added by author)

As Kitazawa mentioned, following his initial suggestion, the YMG organized a special committee for the Revitalization of the Urban Center through the Promotion of Art, Culture and Tourism in 2002. After several meetings and studies, the committee developed a proposal titled "Creative City Yokohama" (BankART, 2009:12). The Creative City Yokohama's main concept included to turn the Kannai area into a "Creative Core Area" by utilizing historic buildings for artistic and cultural purposes. The committee suggested not only to preserve numerous historic buildings but also to utilize them for attracting creative workers from outside. The committee believed that recruiting more artists and increasing art-related activities were naturally connected to revitalization of the old downtown socio-economically. This idea was influenced by Richard Florida's work on the "Creative Class," which argues that attracting a more creative class enhances a city's competitive power (Noda, 2008:103).

What is important in the initiation of the creative city policy in Yokohama is that there have been certain elite groups and policy networks within the YMG and the city itself that have studied urban design, urban policy and community development particularly within

the Japanese context referred to as "*machizukuri* (町づくり, community building)". More importantly, how these policy groups translated "creative city policy" within the Japanese context is essential to an understanding of the emergence of the creative city policy in Yokohama. As we have seen in Yokohama's urban development history from the 1960s, Yokohama's urban development policy was nationally acclaimed as a result of its Sixfold Development Plan; therefore many YMG officials, who were involved in urban planning and urban policy, moved to academia with their practical experience from Yokohama. For example, Tamura Akira, who took the major role in the preparation and execution of the Sixfold Development Plan, became a professor at Hosei University, and Kitazawa Takeru, who participated in MM 21 and the creative city policy, moved to the University of Tokyo, one of the most prestigious schools in Japan. These former YMG officials were deeply involved in creating the academic field entitled "*machizukuri*" within the Japanese urban planning discipline; moreover the creative city policy in Japan was developed in relation to the concept of "machizukuri". "*Machi"* literally means "community" and "*zukuri"* refers to "making", "building" or "developing". The term of "machizukuri" has been developed and used in a variety of activities such as "government-sponsored road construction, citizen-led monitoring of municipal government, the erection of apartment buildings by private developers and even karaoke parties held by communities" (Watanabe, 2006:128). Because of the ambiguous character of "*machitsukuri"*, it might be useful to consider the term to represent a "historical phenomenon" containing certain aspects of Japanese urban affairs. Watanabe (2006) divided the development of "*machizukuri"* into three different stages: 1) the birth of "*machizukuri"* (1950s to 1960s), 2) from opposition to partnership in "*machizukuri"*

(1960s to 1970s) and 3) the emergence of participatory "*machizukuri"* (1980s to 1990s) (Watanabe, 2006).

During the first period (1950s to 1960s), Watanabe explains that "*machizukuri"* was derived from several different fields – from the activities of the Japanese government-driven “private voluntary organization” in the 1950s to more local resident-driven urban planning and design in the 1960s (Watanabe, 2006:129). From the 1960s to 1970s, the term was developed further by “progressive local governments” beginning with Yokohama’s Asukata mayor, who proposed the Sixfold Development Plan; what is distinctive during this period is that the activities of "*machizukuri"* became perceived as a “public-private partnership with intensive participation by residents” (Watanabe, 2006:131). In the 1980s, when the city of Kobe firstly passed a "*machizukuri"* ordinance, it gradually developed three different tools – “*machizukuri* councils”, a “*machizukuri* proposal” and a “*machizukuri* agreement” – to facilitate resident participation (Watanabe, 2006:133). The Kobe’s policy was especially effective when the Kobe Earthquake occurred in 1995; their tremendous contributions in reconstruction planning after the earthquake ignited the boom of the "*machizukuri"* center and other organizations around the nation (Watanabe, 2006:133). Moreover, after the enactment of the Nonprofit Organization Law in 1998, "*machizukuri"* organizations became one of the major bodies of citizen and NPO movements in Japan (Watanabe, 2006:133). In sum, "*machizukuri"* can be perceived as one of the ways or tools in which citizens and residents participate in urban planning and design to enhance community development, and the state officials in Yokohama has been deeply involved in the development process of "*machizukuri*" from the beginning, as shown in Tamura Akira and Kitazawa Takeru.

In this regard, the committee members who developed the creative city policy in Japan share the value of Japanese *machizukuri* in terms of its citizen-driven and participatory development dimensions; it is thus clear that they try to "translate" creative city policy within the context of Japanese *machizukuri*. Following the committee's suggestions, the Urban Design Office in the urban planning department incorporated this idea into a broader development plan. The mayor then established a project-based division, YACCCH, to implement the committee's suggestions. An important component for this creative city policy – that shows the impact of *machizukuri* – was that it stressed first and foremost the collaboration among the city government, the private sector as well as various civic and business groups. In particular, the committee included non-profit organizations (NPOs) and local communities as policy actors. One of the committee members, Kumakura Sumiko, Tokyo University of the Arts professor, stated at the Creative City Conference:

> There was much discussion as to how art society interlinks [to promote creative city policy]. In the midst of the post-bubble recession, we decided that the onerous burdens undertaken by the municipal authorities to provide cultural facilities should be provided by a more flexible and self-governing administrative structure. Given the necessity for change, much hope was placed on the role that the NPOs would play….At that juncture, we wanted to ensure that the NPOs could provide proof of the viability of a new strategy. The NPOs has a business-minded approach; we were thus definitely willing to give them a chance. It wasn't a case of art for arts sake, but rather a desire to see a new group of creative people galvanizing their energy to get Yokohama on its feet once again. (BankART1929, 2009:19)

From the viewpoint of the YMG, the collaboration with the NPOs – following the committee's suggestion – became recognized as one of the major strategies for enhancing civil participation in the implementation process of the creative city policy in Yokohama. One YMG official from the creative city department mentions that YMG viewed NPOs as one of the major policy actors at the starting point of the creative city policy:

> When the city of Yokohama first started the creative city policy, it was hard to find such activities like supporting art-related NPOs in Japanese society. There were some special departments to support art or cultural activities within some large enterprises, but even in those companies it was hard to find support for art-related NPOs directly. So I think that the greatest thing in the creative city policy is that the YMG thought to encourage and support art activities related to NPOs at the beginning of the policy initiation. By doing so, the number of art NPOs in Yokohama increased, and now the NPOs activities are getting vitalized. (Personal Interview with the Current YMG Official)

Through such collaboration with NPOs, the first experimental project in forming the Creative Core Area involved the renovation and reuse of the former premises of Fuji and Daiichi Banks. Simultaneously, applications to manage these buildings were released in 2003 with 'Creative City Center Project' as the initiative's title. Financially, YMG hoped that the city would subsidize the project and then gradually reduce its contribution once the project was financially independent (BankART1929, 2009:13). Under this scheme, two art NPOs – the ST Spot Yokohama and YCCC projects – were chosen in 2003 to open BankART 1929. After the successful launching of BankART 1929, the partnership between YMG and NPOs reutilized many historic buildings for art-related activities (e.g., Bankoku Soko, ZAIM, Kitanaka Brick and White and Koganecho Bazaar).

There are several different types of development cases within the Creative Core Area project in terms of its main initiative. It is necessary, however, to note that even though the major initiative is different for each type, all three are based on collaboration among the YMG, local capital, NPOs and artist groups. Firstly, there are several projects which were initiated by the municipal government. They include the Bank ART 1929, ZAIM and Koganecho Bazaar Projects. This type of project generally took place in the historic buildings, which were owned by the city itself. Thus the city established the main plan and recruited

NPOs and artists who could manage the site and participate in the project. Bank ART 1929, as shown in <Figure 7>, was the first and one of the most famous of this type of project. As <Table 1> shows, Bank Art 1929 is distinct from traditional public art facilities in terms of its usage, management authority and management style (Noda, 2008).

Figure 7. The Bank ART NYK Studio

Table 1. The Differences between Traditional Public Art Facilities and Bank ART 1929[7]

	Traditional Public Art Facility	Bank ART 1929
Facility Construction	Newly Constructed	Renovation and Reuse
Facility Usage	Specialized for certain usage by arts genres such as Music, Theater, and Exhibition	Multi-Functional Usage
Management Authority	Municipal Government or Art Foundation established by Municipal Government	NPOs
Business Plan	Rigorous and Administrative	Flexible and Impromptu

[7] Source : Data adopted and modified from Noda (2008:99)

My interview with a YMG official reveals that local capital in Yokohama were influenced by the success of Bank ART 1929; consequentially they watched for an opportunity to use their own old buildings for corporate public relations and advertising by providing them to NPOs and artist groups. The interviewee explains this arrangement:

> After the beginning of Bank ART 1929, there had been great attention not only from the domestic media but also from international media and journalism. They led some of the local capital who owned historical old buildings to see an opportunity for corporate public relations and advertising by supporting this art-related project. Under these circumstances, I think, they thought that they themselves could do this kind of project that would create a good public image, and some of them actually contacted us (YMG) to ask for collaboration among the YMG, NPOs and themselves. Kitanaka Brick & Kitanaka White was one of the famous examples of this type. Beside this example, some local building owners also started to lend their empty office space to artists and other creators at relatively cheaper prices because they saw that the image of their buildings had become more lively and fashionable by the presence of these artists. So many owners of these old buildings in especially the Kannai area began to think of renovating some parts of their property or whole buildings for artists and other creators. Also the YMG now had a certain amount of seed money to renovate buildings if the building owners decided to lend their properties for artists and other creators.(Personal Interview with the Current YMG Official)

In the case of the Kitanaka Brick & White project (See Figure 8), the Mori Building Corporation originally had a plan to demolish the old warehouses so it could construct a new apartment complex (Noda, 2008). Influenced by the success of Bank Art 1929, however, this corporation postponed its original redevelopment plan and decided to reuse the old warehouse buildings by lending them to NPOs and artist groups for two-year periods. More than 50 NPOs and artist groups participated in this project, opening such art-related pursuits as exhibitions, conferences and education projects for citizens in Yokohama. After finishing the project, the Mori Building Corporation finally agreed with the YMG to restore one of the warehouse buildings for future art-related spaces (Noda, 2008).

Figure 8. Kitanaka Brick and Kitanaka White[8]

Finally, there were several projects initiated by the NPOs and artists themselves such as the Sakura Works and Utoku building Yonkai. These projects were started by the artists and creative workers themselves who had participated in previous projects initiated by the YMG and local capital. That is, after finishing the two-year project period such as those of Kitanaka White & Brick, many artists decided to continue to work in Yokohama and found certain places by themselves. In this process, the YMG supported the matching funds of the local building owners or in some cases it donated some other government-owned sites to them. What is important in this case is that these groups usually found their own way to be financially independent from the YMG's subsidiary. My interviews with several young artists who reside in Utoku building Yonkai revealed how they decided to stay in Yokohama

[8] Source : http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kitanaka_BRICK_1.jpg

after participating in several different projects. The interviewees' office was an atelier coop used by three different artists:

> We hadn't known one another before we had participated in Kitanaka Brick & Kitanaka White together. We met there and shared our workplace together. After finishing the Kitanaka projects, we had to decide whether to leave Yokohama or find other places to work in Yokohama. At that time, naturally, there was a certain climate within the participants' circle that led us to continue to work together to locate other places to work. In our case, we thought if we shared a certain space, we could save on rent and do certain projects together. Also I could access many networks for my own projects, so it seems natural to find other places together to share with these people. Fifteen groups first moved to Honcho Building's 4th and 5th floors in 2006, and then we finally resided here on Utoku building's 4th floor. Here, 17 different artists groups reside in their own ateliers. (Personal Interview with Artist in Creative Core Area)

<Figure 9> shows three different old historic buildings where interviewee groups moved to in 2006.

Figure 9. Three places where the interviewee moved to continuously. From left to right: Kitanaka Bricks, Honcho Building, and Utoku Building[9]

[9] Source : http://utokuyonkai.com/?cid=23

According to the YMG's 2012 Yokohama Creative Cluster and Artists Creators List, there have been 14 separate 'creative' sites in the Kannai area.[10] In Yokohama's case, the creative city policy emerged as an alternative to solve the degradation of the old downtown areas caused by MM21's development. In this project, YMG's role was to find local historic building owners (in some cases local and central governments themselves or local small firms/businesses); match them with art NPOs, artists groups or citizen groups; and then support them financially. In this regard, even though Creative City Yokohama's policy was also initiated by the developmental state, the major policy actors were assembled differently from those of MM 21. Here, the major policy actors were the YMG, NPOs, and relatively smaller capital. If one were to conceptualize MM21's policy network as "neoliberal-developmental" – assembled by multinational capitals such as Japanese chaebol companies, Mitsubishi and Nissan and the state – the Creative City Yokohama's policy network that consisted of NPOs, local, and relatively smaller business such as local building owners and the YMG could be perceived as what Hill (2007) calls "post-developmental" following neither a neoliberal nor a developmentalist model.

Yokohama City's Policy Regarding Culture, Art and Creative City Measures, one of the major policy public relations pamphlets for the creative city policy, stresses that the cooperative and inclusive relationships among different policy actors are at the heart of what made 'Creative City Yokohama'. It simply states:

[10] It includes Hammer-Head Studio Shin-Minatoku, Bankokubashi Soko, the Mass x Mass Kannai Future center, Kitanaka Brick, BLROOM, Utokubiru Yonkai, SakuraWORKS, ba ling ling zhong xin, MOTOMACHI x PORT, AGORA, CHAP, the Hatsukou.Hinode area, the AD bldg., and the Creative Design Center along with more than 221 NPOs and artists groups.

We will continue to carry out sustainable development of Yokohama as a city that its citizens can take pride in and one that will stand out both domestically and internationally. In order to further vitalize the city, we will *undertake cooperative activities together with citizens, NPOs, artists and creators, organizations, and companies* while making full use of creativity inherent in culture and art to build a cultural and artistic creative city. (YMG, 2012:4, italic added by myself)

As shown in the policy pamphlet, in Yokohama's case two different policy networks – the Kannai's Post-Developemental and MM21's Neoliberal-Developmental networks – coexist in different spaces, one in the Creative Core Areas and the other in MM21, though having different time spans (MM 21 from 1980 and Creative Core Area from 2004).

Figure 10. Yokohama's Creative City Yokohama and Minatomirai 21 Policy Networks



<Figure 10> summarizes how both Yokohama's post-developmental and neoliberal-developmental policy networks occurred in the two different locales of Kannai and MM 21. It is important to note that this Yokohama's "coexistence" and "harmonious" model has both similarities and differences from its counterpart, the Seoul's Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park (DDP) construction project. In the next section, I will focus on how Seoul's DDP construction project was implemented and in what ways its policy actors were assembled by comparing this case to that of Yokohama. After describing Seoul's case, I will discuss what kinds of factors comprise the similarities and differences between Yokohama and Seoul and how each city has its own policy limitations.

CHAPTER 3

DESIGN SEOUL: THE DONGDAEMUN DESIGN PLAZA AND PARK CONSTRUCTION AND CONFLICTING MODEL OF CREATIVE CITY SEOUL

3.1 Introduction

What is distinctive in Seoul's creative city policy is its focus on the area of design that promotes a city's brand, revitalizes the economy and enhances the quality of life. Seoul's creative city policy—widely known by *Design Seoul*—was initiated by its former mayor Se-hoon Oh in 2006. In the candidate application of the UNESCO's creative city network, the Seoul Metropolitan Government (below SMG) argues:

> Seoul has had the image of a Hard City with priority given to a development paradigm focused on construction and industrialization as well as functionality and efficiency…the city should be shifted to a focus on culture and design to transform Seoul into a Soft City. (SMG, 2010).

With this strong emphasis on the importance of design, the SMG—under the mayor's direct control—created special administrative divisions such as the Seoul Design Headquarters (below SDH). The SDH includes the vice mayor-level Chief Design Officer and the Director of the Design Seoul Planning Department. In spite of its intention of shifting from a "hard" to a "soft" city, however, Design Seoul policy ironically placed its vast amount of capital and human resources into another "hardware" construction project that centered on the construction of the Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park (DDP). The DDP's construction caused complex social conflicts among various policy actors, not only at the local but also at the national level. In this section, I will examine the DDP's construction progress by dividing

it into two phases: the first phase extends from the "Citizen Park Plan" to the "World Design Complex Plan" (2000 to 2008) while the second goes from "The DDP for the Fashion and Design Industry" to "The DDP for the Citizen" (2008 to 2014).

3.2 From the "Citizen Park Plan" to the "World Design Complex Plan"

To better understand the DDP construction project, it is necessary to start with Seoul's brief urban history. Geographically, the Han River directly passes through the middle of this city, dividing it into two different parts: the Gangbuk area (northern part of Han river) and the Gangnam area (southern part of Han river). The Gangbuk area, a relatively older area where the Dongdaemun area is located, has been the capital of the Joseon dynasty from 1394; it is surrounded by four inner mountains and four outer mountains with the Cheonggye stream passing through the center (Kim and Han, 2012:142). The Gangnam area, by contrast, was more recently developed in 1970s as new housing and business areas with a well-established infrastructure including wide roads, subways, bus terminals and highways (Kim and Han, 2012:147). Unlike the development boom in the Gangnam area from the 1970s, the SMG has retained a strict restriction policy in terms of urban redevelopment in the Gangbuk area because of its many historic sites such as the five Joseon dynasty palaces (SMG, 2013:17). When Gangnam became the city's most vibrant center in terms of its solid educational infrastructure, luxury residential areas, dynamic businesses, and active entertainment facilities, however, the gap between the areas of Gangnam and Gangbuk became a chronic social problem within Seoul.

The "Dongdaemun" or the "Great East Gate"—designated as one of national treasures by the Korean national government—is one of the eight largest gates in Seoul's Fortress Wall.

It was the major eastern gate that surrounded the Gangbuk area and connected the city wall during the previous Kingdom of Joseon Dynasty. The area of Dongdaemun is famous for being one of the Korea's largest fashion marketplaces for the trade of clothing and textile products. The development of the Dongdaemun area as a major fashion marketplace can be divided into five different stages (SMG, 2013:71). During the first stage (1905-1960)—the quickening period—the old Dongdaemun market (later called the "Kwangjang market") was established in the Dongdaemun area in 1905 as one of the nation's first modern daily markets. Through the Japanese colonial period, the Dongdaemun market has grown as a focal point for the trade of Japanese clothing and textile products (SMG, 2013:72).

After the Korean war, the Dongdaemun area became a clothing wholesale market based on the influx of aid clothing from the United States (SMG, 2013:72). At the second stage from the 1960s to 1980s, the garment factory neighborhood called "the Pyounghwa Fashion town" was established in the Cheonggyecheon area near Dongdaemun, making a division of labor between the Pyounghwa fashion town as a production site and the Dongdaemun area as a sales site (SMG, 2013:72). Korea's rapid economic development period appears to have been due to its export-oriented economic policy along with the garment and textile industries which were one of the major industries to support the nation's rapid economic growth during that period.

From 1980 to 1990, the Dongdaemun market has undergone economic depression because large conglomerates entered the fashion industry with production of brand goods (SMG, 2013:72). These sizeable companies and their brand-named clothes rapidly held the market, and consequentially the Dongdaemun market was losing its competitive power

quickly. A new business boom began in 1990 with the opening of a series of shopping mall complexes such as the “Art Plaza”, “Designer’s Club” and ‘Unocore” in the Dongdaemun area along with new marketing strategies initiated in 1998 that included 24-hour service and the provision of a bus for shoppers who lived outside Seoul (SMG, 2013:72). During this fourth period, as one of the largest fashion wholesale markets in Korea, the Dongdaemun market predominated over its rivals such as the Namdaemun market. In 1998 the Migliore, a famous chain of fashion department stores, first opened in the Dongdaemun area (SMG, 2013:73). The success of the Migliore ignited the chain department store boom not only in the Dongdaemun area but also nationwide (SMG, 2013:73). Other chain department stores such as Doosan Tower owned by the Korean Chaebol, Doosan and Hello apM Mall were built in the western part of the Dongdaemun area around 2000. Even though these chain shopping malls constructed a new retail distribution systemt, the Dongdaemun went through a period of stagnation around 2007 because of excessive competition between high-end global fashion brands and lower-priced Chinese fashion products (SMG, 2013:73). <Figure 11> shows each development period’s major buildings’ locations and photographs. The number of each picture is based on the chronological order of each building’s construction. Under these circumstances, the redevelopment of the Dongdaemun Stadium (DS)—on which now DDP is constructed—has paid great attention to revitalizing the area. The DS, which was located near the Dongdaemun gate and surrounded by the Dongdaemun fashion marketplaces, originally was built as the Kyungsung Stadium under Japanese colonial rule to celebrate the Japanese empire’s birthday in 1925. As Korea’s first modern athletic stadium, it was used for numerous historical events such as the celebration of the end of the Japanese colonial rule in 1945.

Figure 11: The Dongdaemun area and the major buildings' location and photo[11]



After Korea's independence from Japan, with the renovation of the site, it changed its name to "Seoul Stadium" and functioned as the nation's major athletic stadium before the construction of the Jamsil Olympic stadium. After the Jamsil Olympic stadium opened in 1984, it turned into the Dongdaemun Stadium and has been used primarily for amateur athletic games. Until 2003, the DS consisted of two different facilities: the soccer playground and the baseball stadium. In 2003, however, the soccer field became a temporary flea market

[11] Sources: Pictures adopted from following sources and modified by myself. 1) http://www.korea111.com/dongdaemun.htm2) Seoul Museum of History (2012) The survey of Seoul living Culture : Dongdaemun market, Seoul : Seoul Metropolitan Government,3) http://kr.aving.net/news/view.php?articleId=779049&Branch_ID=kr&rssid=naver&mn_name=news,4) http://nardoldol.egloos.com/m/2208838,
5) http://www.jgnews.co.kr/news_detail.htm?idx=9011&dir=02&subdir=00, 6) http://www.edaily.co.kr/news/NewsRead.edy?newsid=02489526583026256&SCD=DA13&DCD=A00106

for street venders who were displaced in the process of the restoration of the Cheonggye stream.

Table 2. The Brief History of the Dongdaemun Stadium before the DDP construction[12]

Name	Period	Usage
The Kyungsung Stadium	1926-1945	Modern sports stadium National major political and cultural sport events
The Seoul Stadium	1945-1984	Major professional sports events
The Dongdaemun Stadium	1984-2003	Amateur sports events especially for high school and college soccer and baseball games
The Folk Free Market	2003-2007	Temporary flea market for street venders

<Table 2> shows a brief history of the DS from 1926 to 2007 before the DDP construction. The stadium's deterioration led to two competing visions of redevelopment proposed in 2000: (1) the dome stadium construction plan proposed by the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, one of the nation's largest private economic organizations and (2) the Dongdaemun Park construction plan developed mainly by the Dongdaemun Forum consisting of the Dongdaemun tourism and fashion industries, urban planners, academics, journalists and civic organizations (Hwang, 2010). The first plan was a "typical" urban mega construction project consisting of a baseball dome stadium and various commercial facilities

[12] Source : Adopted and modified from SMG (2013:71)

and accommodations while the second was based on the idea of turning the DS into an ecological citizens' park (Hwang, 2010:67).

When Se-hoon Oh was elected as Seoul's mayor in 2006, he initially supported the second plan as part of Seoul's larger Urban Recreation Project which divided Gangbuk's center into four themed sectors: "History-Culture", "Tourism-Culture", "Green-Culture" and "Complex-Culture" (SMG, 2013). As shown in <Figure 12>, the Dongdaemun area was included in the "Complex-Culture sector" that passed throughout the Daehakro, Dongdaemun and Namsan districts. This initial policy proposal by Sehoon Oh's city government argued that the SMG redevelop the DS as a cultural, recreational and greenery-filled citizen's park (SMG, 2006). Yet soon after, the SMG turned this citizens' park plan into a "World Design Complex" after the mayor toured foreign cities such as Tokyo to observe their urban policies in September 2006.

The SMG's report entitled "World Design Complex", argued that the design industry has great potential for regenerating the city's economy and providing abundant employment (SMG, 2007:8). In order to revitalize the Dongdaemun's tourism and fashion industry, the SMG went on to claim that the complex should be constructed as "a grand landmark typed-architecture" designed by a globally renowned architect (SMG, 2007:6). Without mentioning any calculation formulas and rigorous explanations about its economic efficacy, SMG (2007:8) also argued that the World Design Complex construction would bring a substantial amount of both the production inducement value (about 655.3 million US dollars) and the employment inducement value (about 639.2 million US dollars). Under the scheme, the complex would be divided into three major parts including the design information library, the

convention hall for design related-products, and commercial areas such as shops and restaurants (SMG, 2007:6).

Figure 12. The Urban Regeneration Plan Implemented by the SMG in 2007



One critical difference between the "DS Park Construction" and the "World Design Complex" plans lies in how much of the original DS would be left standing. Citizen groups such as Cultural Action and several academics argued that the stadium should not be redeveloped entirely but rather its structure renovated or restored to maintain its original features and historic value (SMG, 2013:25). Nonetheless, the World Design Complex Plan—later changed to the DDP—called for the stadium's complete demolition replaced by a grand landmark designed by the globally-renowned architect Zaha Hadid[13]. Importantly, before the announcement of this plan, the SMG ran a citizens' contest along with extensive public

[13] Zaha Hadid is an Iraqi-British architect, who is famous for her winning the Pritzker-prize in 2004 and Stirling Prize in 2010. Her buildings are renowned by their neofuturistic features such as Guangzhou Opera House in Guangzhou, China and MAXXI of National Meseum of the 21st Century Arts in Rome, Italy.

opinion polls regarding the redevelopment of the DS. The results showed that a majority of citizens in Seoul wanted to keep the original structure and turn it into a greenery-filled ecological citizens' park (SMG, 2013:50). When SMG announced the winner of the international competition for the redevelopment of the DS, however, it was Zaha Hadid's design titled Metonymic Landscape, dramatically different from what citizens had favored (See Figure 13). As one journalist argues below, Zaha Hadid's original design of "Metonymic Landscape" did not contain any historical consideration of the Dongdaemun area. Rather, it was more suitable for creating an urban spectacle composed of grand landmarks:

> Today, Zaha Hadid Architects create landmark projects for all types of functional programs. *Their buildings are never bland or mundane, but assertive statements of a particular view, that the world may indeed look different*. Their efforts have resulted in a staggering almost one thousand projects around the globe, on every scale, from urban design schemes to objects and furniture design (Søberg, 2014, italic added by myself).

Figure 13. The Old Dongdaemun Stadium before the Demolition and Zaha Hadid's Metonymic Landscape for the Redevelopment of the DS[14]

[14] Source : www.opengov.seoul.go.kr/section/400793

Hwang (2010) explains why the citizen park plan suddenly turned into the "World Design Complex" in terms of several inter-related factors: 1) the mayor himself had political interests in the design industry; 2) SMG had focused on the design industry and landmark construction as one of the strategies to enhance the city's competitiveness; 3) SMG held opinions about redeveloping the Dongdaemun area as a fashion and design industry-specialized zone because its local economy had been based on these industries; and 4) local tourism and fashion industries hoped for redevelopment of the area (Hwang, 2010:78). To sum up, the "World Design Complex" plan was constructed based on 1) the political interests of Mayor Se-hoon Oh, 2) the administrative concerns of the SMG, and lastly 3) the economic needs of local industries. Spurred by these mutual interests, the SMG used the discourse of city branding and the enhancement of global competitiveness to promote the design industry. Se-hoon Oh stated this view in his acceptance speech for Seoul's "World Design Capital 2010" designation:

> Design will be a driving force in developing Seoul's economy. Seoul has surprised the world with the `Miracle of the Han River' and its great information technology, *but now it will attract the world's attention with design*. (Kim 2007, emphasis added by myself)

Stressing the design industry as the nation's decisive force for new development, Se-hoon Oh argues in his book, *Nothing is impossible in Seoul*, that design will be one of the major tools to enhance Seoul's city branding (Oh, 2010). By introducing famous global city marketing successes such as Britain's Gateshead and branding consultant's ideas such as Simon Anholt's city branding strategy, he legitimizes why most major urban redevelopment projects (e.g., the Han River Renaissance project, Design Seoul and Namsan Renaissance)

are necessary to improve the image of the city and attract more tourists and private capital investment (Oh, 2010:107). Yet, even though he uses the discourse of design for making a "soft and creative city", most of these projects contain "hardware construction" which not only caused a direct ecological and geographical impact but also ignited socio-political controversies. For example, although Han River Renaissance project uses the discourse of environment-friendly "restoration" of the riverside to create "an ecological home to citizens", this plan includes a series of mega construction projects such as the Jamsil Floating Island.

Figure 14. Artists Impression of Han River Renaissance Project[15]

<Figure 14> and <Figure 15> show the artist's impression of the Han River Renaissance Project and Jamsil Floating Island. In spite of the consistently strong public oppositions and criticisms during the execution of these urban redevelopment projects, the

[15] Source : www.segye.com/content/html/2009/09/04/20090904000470.html

way that the SMG cautiously countered with various policy actors using negotiation strategies illustrates the developmental state's actions to justify these urban mega construction projects. I will examine how this negotiation process was performed in the next section.

Figure 15. Artist's Impression of the Jamsil Floating Island[16]

3.3. From "World Design Complex" to "Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park"

After the new construction plan's announcement, different types of actors reacted to the plan. One major policy actor who strongly supported the mayor's plan is what Hwang (2010) calls Dongdaemun area's "local growth coalition" consisting of the local tourist and fashion industries, the Dongdaemun Special Tourist Zone Association, and local politicians.

[16]Source:http://spp.seoul.go.kr/main/news/news_report.jsp?search_boardId=1866&act=VIEW&boardId=1866

This locally-oriented coalition formed through promoting a series of local economic development plans (e.g., inviting Seoul's new city hall into the area in 1996, promoting the Dongdaemun area for the Tourist Special Zone from 2000-2, and supporting former Mayor Lee's Dongdaemun Park construction pledge from 2002-3) (Hwang, 2010:49). Interestingly, this local growth coalition in the Dongdaemun area used to have one of the major roles in promoting the redevelopment plan of the DS as "the citizens' park". When the SMG announced the World Design Complex Plan, however, this local-growth coalition strongly supported the SMG, proposing that the World Design Complex construction would be more socio-economically beneficial in the Dongdaemun area. Moreover, by using the discourse of "their territories" when referring to Dongdaemun, the assemblage between this local growth coalition and the SMG strongly countered other policy actors such as street venders, who originally resided in the Dongdaemun stadium and later dislocated to other places and citizen groups who strongly disagreed with World Design Complex plan (Hwang, 2010:94).

In fact, the SMG specified possible policy actors regarding the DDP construction projects and reported how they "negotiated" with these various policy actors in the whitepaper of the DDP construction. It is important to notice how SMG's negotiation with various policy actors shows that the developmental state is not "the object of an ostensive black box" but rather a "performative assemblage" which can be perceived as involved in an endless process of making and remaking (Latour, 2005). In the later parts, I will analyze this complex negotiation process by focusing on the whitepaper of the DDP construction, other governmental reports and news coverage.

In the whitepaper, SMG (2013) firstly points out various policy actors opposing the development plan of the local growth coalition included: 1) NGOs and citizen groups who initially claimed the "citizen park plan" for the DS (e.g., Cultural Action), 2) soccer/baseball athletic groups who actually used the DS for their athletic activities, 3) street vendors with shops in the stadium, and 4) the Cultural Heritage Administration of Korea who were in charge of the excavation and restoration beneath the DS of the Seoul Fortress Wall and the Military training facility built during the Joseon Dynasty (SMG, 2013).

Firstly, in order to oppose SMG's World Design Complex plan when it was announced, the Citizen Movement on Sports, one of the first NGO for Sports in Korea, banded together with eight other NGOs including Cultural Action, People's Solidarity for Cultural Heritage, Korea's People's Solidarity against Poverty, the Democratic Labor Party, the National Association for Poverty, the National Association for Street Vendors, Korea Professional Baseball Players Association and Korea Soccer Coach Associations (SMG, 2013:385)[17]. In particular, the Citizen Movement on Sports argued for a renovation of the DS that retained its usage as a baseball stadium during the baseball season and as a citizen park

---

[17] These heterogeneous NGOs assembled together because each of them could share their opposition to the DDP construction plan. These opponents of the DDP can be divided into three different groups such as 1) cultural groups including Cultural Action, People's Solidarity for Cultural Heritage, 2) athletics groups including the Citizen Movement on Sports, Korea Professional Baseball Players Association, Korea Soccer Coach Associations and 3) labor groups including Korea's People's Solidarity against Poverty, Democratic Labor Party, National Association for Poverty, and National Association for Street Vendors. In general, while cultural groups and athletic groups opposed the DDP construction in the viewpoint of cultural and historical value for restoration, labor groups argue that the DDP construction can cause displacement of the street vendors who were temporally doing their business in the DS. These street vendors group started their businesses in the DS because they have been relocated from their original business place due to the SMG's another urban redevelopment project, Chunggey stream restoration project during the former mayor's period.

for the off-season. Next the Citizen Movement on Sports and other eight civic organizations created the Mutual Task Force and gave a statement opposing the demolition of the DS and supporting its restoration in the name of 100 people. The list of these 100 people who signed the statement includes not only famous politicians such as Jungwoon Chan (former prime minister in Korea) but also athletic celebrities such as Jongbum Lee and Chulsoon Park. Even though these advocates comprise heterogeneous groups from different backgrounds and interests, they share the same vision for DS's historic and cultural value. Nonetheless, in order to "successfully" pursue the World Design Complex plan, the SMG distinguished these heterogeneous groups based on their backgrounds such as cultural/ athletic /labor groups and handled each group through different negotiation strategies. <Table 3>, adopted from the SMG's policy report, summarizes how the SMG approached each group.

To cope with these divergent voices against the World Design Complex construction, the SMG first divided the opposing groups into "negotiable" and "un-negotiable". SMG's negotiation strategy can be explained by the concept of what Callon (1986) called "problematisation", defining "the nature and the problems of other actors and then suggests that these can be resolved if the actors negotiated the 'obligatory passage point'" between them. From the viewpoint of the SMG, the cultural groups including Cultural Action and People's Solidarity for Cultural Heritage, which consists of civic activists, were defined as "un-negotiable", because these groups have rigid attitudes toward DS's preservation in terms of its cultural and historic value (SMG, 2013:391). In other words, SMG's 'obligatory passage point' (i.e., the construction of the World Design Complex) and its cultural group's passage point (i.e., the construction of the citizen park) cannot be mutually associated;

consequentially, the SMG decided not to contact this group directly for persuasion, which means that they were not included in the negotiation process. Rather, the SMG determined to counteract the position of this group solely through official comments on them via the media (SMG, 2013:391).

In contrast with the strategy used with the cultural group, the SMG re-classified the athletic group into several different categories so that it could be negotiated with mainly by the strategy of "personal contacting and persuasion". Because the SMG itself contains many sports administrative sections such as the Sports Promotion Office and the Seoul Sports Council, it decided to create a task force from its officials who has significant personal and academic networks tied to the athletic groups (SMG, 2013:392). Thus members of the task force consisting of SMG officials, who has personal relationships with members of athletic groups, personally contacted the people in the athletic organizations and persuaded them personally. For example, while some SMG officials contacted several members of athletic groups who graduated same colleges and high schools, others persuaded their acquaintances in athletic groups who knew one another before. At the same time, through personal contacting process, the SMG noticed that the sports celebrities who signed the statement to oppose the demolition and restoration of the DS could be placed in the "half-hearted group" category because some in this group showed a relatively weak stance toward participation in the opposition protest (SMG, 2013:391). Also, some members of the Citizen Movement on Sports were able to be persuaded by the SMG's officials who had close personal and academic ties with them. Finally, the SMG—by holding a project information meeting with

the Korea Football Association—successfully swayed the soccer athletic groups to change their stance.

In addition to this strategy of using personal and academic connections, the SMG decided to set up an athletic memorial space within the World Design Complex and collect opinions from the athletic groups in regard to the restoration of the site's historic and cultural value (SMG, 2013:392). With this strategy, these athletic groups' opposition to the World Design Complex became translated into an "athletic memorial space" within the World Design Complex. In other words, SMG transformed and translated "*the non-material idea of the restoration of historic and cultural value"* claimed by the athletic groups into *"the material actors of the athletic memorial space"* consisting of hand-prints of athletic celebrities, photographs showing the modern history of the DS, and a miniature model of the DS. Moreover, for the baseball groups who wanted to renovate and reuse the stadium for historic and cultural value, the SMG offered substitute stadiums. Here, similar to the athletic memorial space, the DS's *historic and cultural value* desired by the baseball groups was translated into *the utility of a substitute stadium as a material entity*. Even though the Korea Professional Baseball Player Association retained its original opinion to support DS's restoration, the SMG negotiated with the Emergency Planning Committee for the DS that consisted of 19 baseball associations, focusing particularly on the Korea Baseball Association that is one of the largest national associations for baseball. The SMG offered the construction of one domed stadium for the professional baseball league and six small stadiums for youth and community baseball leagues. Through this negotiation process, *the*

historic and cultural value of the DS was translated into *material sites* consisting of seven brand new stadiums mobilized by the SMG.

Table 3. SMG's Negotiation Strategy for Each Group[18]

Groups	Members of Groups	Negotiation Strategy
Cultural (23 People)	Cultural Action/ People's Solidarity for Cultural Heritage	Handling these groups by contacting with other governmental branch the Cultural Heritage Administration of Korea, who is in charge of the excavation and restoration procedure of the DS.
Athletic (88 People)	The Citizen Movement on Sports/Korea Professional Baseball Players Association/ Korea Soccer Coach Associations	Creating task Forces and negotiating with these groups by dividing them into three different actors: 1) Half-Hearted Groups (athletic celebrity) - Invitation to various meetings/sending P.R. materials 2) The Citizen Movement on Sports - unofficial personal contacting and persuasion 3) Soccer Athletic Groups - official P.R. activity such as holding a project information meeting with members
Labor (44 People)	Korea's People's Solidarity against Poverty/ Democratic Labor Party/ National Association for Poverty/ National Association for Street Vendors	Handling these groups by focusing on the negotiation with street venders

For street vendors, the SMG also utilized a different strategy based on their characteristics such as dubbed "illegal nature" of street vendors. The street vendors group was originally moved out of the Cheonggey stream area because of the restoration construction of the stream. Former mayor of Seoul, Myungbak Lee, suggested that they move into the DS soccer field temporally since it had not been used because of its deterioration. In

[18] Source: SMG (2013:391)

this reason, if the street vendors had to move to another site due to the DDP construction, it would be a double displacement for them. The SMG, however, argued that it was impossible to accept their demands to stay in the stadium because the vendors' business was "illegal" (SMG, 2013:435). In doing so, the street venders group became defined as the group who had the "least" bargaining power because they were deemed "illegal nature"; therefore the SMG identified negotiation strategies that included even physical methods such as force eviction by using police enforcement to solve the "problem" of this actor.

Moreover, the SMG—to prevent continuous collaboration among the local street vendors, their national-level organization (National Association for Street Vendors) along with other NGOs (Korea's People's Solidarity against Poverty/Democratic Labor Party/National Association for Poverty)—proposed that if the street vendors agreed with the World Design Complex construction, they would construct a substitute marketplace (later called the Seoul Folk Flea Market) near the Dongdaemun area (SMG, 2013:436). This is exactly the same translation strategy as Callon (1986)'s concept of "interessement": seeking "to lock the other actors to define the actors into the roles that have been proposed for them in that program"(Callon, 1986). In other words, if street venders were to accept the substitute marketplace, it meant that they might disassociate from other national level associations that were continuously fighting against SMG's plan together. The suggestion of a substitute marketplace became a strategy of moving street venders into a site where they could lose their connections to other like-minded actors, in this case the substituted market places that had been proposed in SMG's program. In addition to this "interessement" strategy, SMG threatened the security of the street vendors by strong "law enforcement" for those who did

not accept this substitute marketplace offer. By using this ultimatum strategy of "choosing substitute place or law enforcement", SMG smoothly disunited the street vendors group from other associations; thus most of them decided to accept SMG's offers, and consequentially were excluded and dislocated later to the place once again called the Seoul Folk Flea Market.

Finally, the Cultural Heritage Administration of Korea (below CHAK) disagreed with the World Design Complex plan in terms of their excavation and restoration beneath the DS site, because the Seoul Fortress Wall and the Military training facility were built on this site during the Joseon Dynasty. A national law for restoration and protection of the cultural heritage and artifacts enforced that any excavation investigation of this area had to be done by the CHAK before the redevelopment and reconstruction of the area. By the request of the SMG, the CHAK actually confirmed that both the Seoul Fortress Wall and the Military training facility were actually located beneath the DS site. After uncovering these buildings from the Joseon period, there were several divergent opinions within the CHAK. While some argued for a full restoration of the Seoul Fortress Wall and the Military training facility, others preferred a partial restoration or only a documented preservation of the site (SMG, 2013:120). From the viewpoint of the SMG, however, the full restoration option simply meant the halting of the whole construction plan; therefore they needed to cope with the CHAK.

One of the distinctive differences in the way that the SMG tried to define the role of the CHAK is they recognized this agency as neither an antagonistic nor an argumentative entity. Rather, the SMG defined the CHAK as a "mutual consultation" player because both were governmental actors; therefore in SMG's policy record, whenever they had a meeting

with the CHAK, the report title was recorded as "consultation agenda (협의사항) of the date" rather than "negotiation" or "discussion". Within this mutual relationship, the SMG explains that the international design competition had taken place already, so therefore the blocking of the whole construction project could spiral into an "international conflict" (SMG, 2013:121). For this reason, the SMG turned the World Design Complex plan into the "Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park" as the 'obligatory passage point' for both the SMG and CHAK. In actuality, in the original design of Zaha Hadid's "Metonymic Landscape", there was no space assigned for an "historical park". Yet because SMG had to avoid the full restoration plan, the SMG suggested instead to construct the historical park and to relocate the cultural artifacts to this site within the World Design Complex. For this reason, the historical park was newly added and assigned in the World Design Complex plan so that the "World Design Complex" was finally transformed into the new name of "Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park". In other words, in order to make a successful association with the CHAK, the Seoul Fortress Wall and the Military training facility were relocated to the "historic park," along with the restoration of historic and cultural value for the DS became translated into the "athletic memorial space" in the park.

3.4. DDP as Neoliberal-Developmental Urban Reforming

Through such a variegated negotiation process with their opponents based on the principle of "different strategies for different actors", the SMG chose Samsung and other large capital to be the executors of the DDP construction. During this process, the DDP became more and more costly to construct: the original construction costs rose from 153.9 to 509.9 billion Korean won (about 43 million US dollars). By transforming the Citizens Park

Plan into DDP construction, the local growth coalition of the Dongdaemun area, large capital (e.g., Samsung) and the developmental state successfully created what we can conceptualize as “neoliberal-developmental policy networks” similar to that of Yokohama’s MM 21. Not surprisingly, these soaring construction costs caused various citizen groups, social activists, and journalists to criticize this vast amount of city expenditures. These groups, who were once defined as "cultural groups" and assigned as “un-negotiable” by the SMG, argued that the SMG should increase welfare expenditures rather than spend the city budget for the hardware construction projects like the DDP venture. In January 20th, 2009, in the Yongsan redevelopment area—one of the places included in the Han River Renaissance project—five protesting tenants (who had refused to displace the building) and one policeman from the riot police team (who forcibly had evicted the dozens of protestors) were dead in the fire that occurred during the police raid (Ha, 2009).

Figure 16. Artists’ Impressions of Yongsan Redevelopment Plan[19]

[19] Source: http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2007/10/30/2007103001165.html

This tragedy received much attention not only from the domestic but also the international media; moreover citizens in Seoul and from the whole of Korean society started to question what the so-called "creative city policy" was actually doing to the city and its citizens. The Yongsan area also was planned to be redeveloped as a global business and commerce district by the establishment of a consortium of Korea's Chaebol including Lotte and Samsung and the government-run transit authority, Korea Railway; yet what this plan desired was to promote the gentrification of the area and with it the dislocation of their original residents, even after the death of six innocent people. <Figure 16> and <Figure 17> represent the contrasting images of "artists' impressions of the plan" and "the death of the protestors". Through the Yongsan tragedy, civil society activists and journalists began to criticize SMG's creative city policy in terms of its hardware construction-centered planning, the vast amount of city revenue spending, and capital-friendly policy. Citizen groups argued that the SMG should not pour city's funds into any urban mega construction project, including into the DDP construction. Rather, they claimed that the SMG should spend more money to expand social-welfare programs for its citizens. This agenda that pitted such an "urban mega project" against "social-welfare programs" became one of the strategies by which the actors involved criticized the SMG's creative city policy[20]. In 2011, Se-hoon Oh's

---

[20] The old mayor of Seoul, Sehoon Oh, was a member of the Hannara Party (recently renamed "the Saenuri Party"), a conservative political party in Korea. However, when he started his second term as the mayor of Seoul, the outright majority of city's education council was elected by the members of the oppositional party, the Democratic Party, a social-liberal political party in Korea. For this reason, citizen groups, who were critical of Sehoon Oh's urban mega construction oriented-creative city policy, cooperated with the oppositional party to oppose both Se-hoon Oh's free lunch referendum, which proposed to offer a limited free meal service to only 30 percent of impoverished children, as well as SMG's creative city policy.

disagreement with citizen groups spurred his opposition political party to push for Seoul's welfare budget to go to funding free school lunch programs. In response, the opposition party-controlled city education council proclaimed an ordinance to provide free meals to all elementary-aged children under its jurisdiction in defiance of the city government's call to pay heed to the limited state budget. The mayor's office then accused the opposition of flaunting a 'populist' welfare campaign and proposed holding a citizen poll to settle this ongoing dispute (Kim, 2011). Consequentially, Oh resigned because his referendum on free lunches was invalidated due to low voter turnout (Kim, 2011). The opposition party and citizen groups argued that the next city government should re-orient the urban redevelopment plan in a more citizen-friendly direction.

Figure 17. One of the Dead Protestors in the Fire of the Yongsan Tragedy[21]

[21] Source: Yonhapnews (2009)

3.5. DDP for Citizens

Won-soon Park, who is a civic society activist and a former human rights lawyer promoting himself as "a citizen's candidate," was elected as Seoul's new mayor in 2011 after the resignation of Sehoon Oh. After taking mayor's office, he invited citizens to express their thoughts about the DDP construction through "listening workshops" and "deliberation meetings". He argued for a change of the initial concept of the DDP as a "World Design Complex" for mainly the fashion and local tourist industries (with convention/exhibition buildings, commercial shopping areas, and information/technology sites) to more citizen-friendly usage. Under this circumstance, the mayor delayed the DDP's opening for more than a year to transform its usage, organizing the Citizen Consulting Committee for the DDP to oversee these new plans. The committee proposed that the DDP consider its target users not only to be the local fashion and design industries, but also citizens, creative workers and artists as well (SMG, 2012).

Moreover, the chairman of the Board of Seoul Design Foundation, which is responsible for the management of the DDP, was also changed to Sang-soo Ahn, a designer famous for the creation of one of the most popular Korean fonts, the 'Ahn Sang Soo Font'. He was recognized as a person who could better share the new mayor's vision: that of changing the usage of the DDP to be more citizen-oriented. After Sang-soo Ahn took the chairman's office, the activities of the Seoul Design Foundation indeed were reformulated toward more 'citizen-friendly'. For example, a new administrative division called the "Citizen Design Service Center" was established, with many workshops that invited ordinary citizens, actual designers and creative workers to brainstorm together. Also the Seoul Design

Foundation launched the Facebook webpage called “What Can Design Do for Seoul?” where ordinary citizens, artists, creators and designers could express and share their opinions regarding the DDP management plan as well as Seoul’s creative city policy in general. My interview with a staff at the Seoul Design Foundation reveals how this group’s activities actually changed in terms of not only their organizational structure but also their actual tasks:

> After changing the Mayor and the chairman of the board, our foundation changed a lot in terms of not only our organizational structure but also our work itself. When I first joined the foundation, our major mission was to manage the DDP from its construction to actual management after its opening. So we studied many other design-related facilities’ management plans. Our job was mostly intended to manage the DDP as a successful “World Design Complex” and to develop the design industry. But with the former mayor’s sudden resignation, we were faced with dramatic change. The foundation appointed a new chairman, and he was a person who had a different vision from that of the former chairman. He stressed how we can serve not only the design industry but also ordinary citizens as well. I was originally in the DDP management department, but I was switched to the “Citizen Service Design Division”. We suddenly had to organize “citizen listening workshops” and open our Facebook webpage, “What Can Design do for Seoul?” This was quite a dramatic change, and many of our staff were confused about what we were supposed to do. (Personal Interview with the Seoul Design Foundation Staff employed since the Foundation’s creation).

In response to public opinion surveys of various kinds, the SMG announced a new management proposal for the DDP. The new proposal argued that while the former mayor, Se-hoon Oh, viewed the DDP only in terms of the fashion, tourist and design industries, the new mayor’s proposal aim was to switch its focus to the social responsibility of design and open up the DDP to ordinary citizens. According to the new proposal, the SMG announced a management and space plan that was divided into five different sites: an art hall, museum, business center for creative workers, and a historical park and amenities (SMG, 2013b).

Table 4. The New Management Plan for DDP[22].

Former Proposal	Differences	New Proposal
World Design Complex (Result-oriented)	Vision	Creativity and Knowledge Center (Role-oriented)
New Design Product Launching site, Trend setter, Design information experiencing (Expert-oriented place)	Purpose	New Idea, Various Human Resources, Wellbeing (Citizen-oriented place)
Attracting designers, exhibitions, information	Strategy	24 hours Opening for Citizens, making 60 attractions, 100 % efficient management
Design Experts as main target and citizen as passive visitor	Target Group	World Citizen, Creative Citizen, Future Citizen as active users
Annual Visitor 180 million	Target number of Tourist Gathering	Annual Visitors - 550 million
Convention Hall, Exhibition Hall, Design Library	Space Plan	Art Hall, Museum, Business Center for Creators, Historic Park and Amenities
Content-oriented	Content	Platform-oriented
Exhibit and Interior Centered Plan	Space Construction	Equipment and Property-centered Plan
Financially Depended on The City's Subsidiary	Management Plan	Financially Independent
Revenue < Expenditure: 20.6 Billion won	Financial Plan	Revenue = Expenditure: 32.1 Billion won
Attracting Human Resource, Capital and Information related to Design	Effects	Enhancing Public Service, Becoming Tourist Attraction, Next Generation Education, Providing Culture

[22] Source: SMG (2013b)

<Table 4> shows the differences between the past management plan and the new one that was published by the SMG. Two major differences can be epitomized as "enhancing public service function" and "being financially independent". These two major distinctions were based on incorporating citizens' criticisms of the former mayor's plan. First of all, the new plan stressed that the DDP would be not only for design and fashion experts but also for its citizens. (See Table 4). To enhance this public service function, it included as its amenities an art hall and museum spaces for the general public, along with a children's playground that incorporated a learning facility. Moreover, in response to citizens' criticisms about spending a vast amount of city budgets for managing the DDP, SMG argued that the DDP would be financially efficient and independent. In regard to this financial efficiency, the SMG explained that the design library space would be replaced by business centers, including design shops that would serve as incubators for new designers and creators (Kim, 2014). By following the new management plan, the DDP was opened in March, 2014. Both domestic and international media reported its inauguration while one of Korea's most famous comedy show, Muhan Dojeon (Infinite Challenge), ridiculed it as a "a forcibly landed spaceship" in the Dongdaemun area. <Figure 18> shows the DDP's current features.

During the opening ceremony, Won-Soon Park, the new mayor of Seoul, stated, "Is the DDP really crap established by the Seoul Metropolitan Government? Or is it a masterpiece, which can be the pride of Seoul? ….I am aware of the doubts and worries among civil societies, but this 'DDP spaceship' will be the beginning of Seoul's new history." His speech reveals that even though he wanted to develop the DDP in a different way, certain limitations existed. In another press conference, he frankly mentioned:

> I know that many citizens and activists radically hate the DDP construction itself. I, myself, also really didn't like the construction plan itself. They (the former mayors and its proponents) shouldn't plan this kind of mega construction projects. However, when I took the mayor's office, the construction already was underway. [When he was elected as mayor, already 70 percent of the construction process had been completed.] I had no choice. The best thing that I can do is not spend more of the taxpayers' money to run the DDP because the original management plan expects the annual management cost to be 30 billion won. So I strongly claim that the DDP should be financially independent from the city government.
>
> (Translated by myself from Jung, (2014))

As this speech clearly shows, the new translation of the DDP, "The DDP for the Citizen", left certain limitations and regrets from citizens and even from the mayor himself. These limitations and regrets would ignite other criticism from citizen groups that had been designated as "un-negotiable" actors (e.g., the Creative Actions). I will discuss this issue in more detail in the next section by comparing this process with similar situations in Yokohama.

Figure 18. The Current features of the DDP[23]

[23] Source : http://www.ddp.or.kr/MA010001/getInitPage.do

Figure 19. Seoul's Neo-liberal Policy Network and Post-Developmental Policy Network

In summary, by passing through several phases of the DDP construction from "The DDP as World Design Complex" to "The DDP for Citizens," it is possible to observe that new policy actors emerged: citizen groups who were actively engaged with the state and organized in similar ways to what we found in Yokohama whose creative city policy network took a post-developmental policy network direction that was associated with neither state nor capital. Unlike Yokohama's coexistence model, however, in Korea the two policy networks—the former mayor's neoliberal-developmental network consisting of State and Capital and the current mayor's post-developmental network consisting of state-citizens—

conflicted with each other over one site, the DDP, in a compressed time span from 2007 to 2013. <Figure 10: See Page 93> summarizes how both Yokohama's post-developmental and neoliberal-developmental policy networks occurred in different places: Kannai and MM 21. Conversely, <Figure 19> shows how Korea's post-developmental and neoliberal-developmental policy networks struggled with each other over the same project: the Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park.

3.6 Unfinished Stories of the Neoliberal-Developmental Urban Reforming and the Emergence of the Post-Developmental Symptom in East Asia.

In his book, *Post-Soviet Social*, anthropologist Stephen Collier questions whether the antinomies having long been accepted as defining neoliberalism—public versus private value, social versus post-social, the state versus the market, and solidarity versus individualism—are still useful in explaining the current global circulation of neoliberalism (Collier, 2011). In particular, he is skeptical about its exploratory effectiveness in terms of these binary oppositional terms, which have been constructed to explain "western" situations. In this regard, he suggests a consideration of "neoliberalism"—not as "ideologies", "hegemonic projects" or "governmental rationalities"—but rather as forms of "critical reflection on governmental practices" (Collier, 2011). If we consider the global circulation of creative city policy as "neoliberal urban reforming", as many political economists argue, do these antinomies match with the "creative city policy" in Seoul and Yokohama? Or, more precisely, in what ways can Seoul and Yokohama's creative city policy be linked to Neoliberalism or Developmentalism?

To explain the current East Asian urban situation, Hill (2007) suggests the application of the distinction of the East Asian "neo-developmental" state versus the "post-developmental" state. Comparing the levels of market openness and state planning along these two dimensions, he notes three types of East Asian countries: 1) the Neo-Developmental State (Thailand: High Market Openness/Low State Planning), 2) the In-Between State (Korea and Taiwan), and 3) the Post-Developmental State (Japan: High Market Openness/High State Planning) (Hill, 2007). Because Japan's focus is now on "innovation" and "quality of life" rather than on catching up with the West's rapid growth, he argues that Japan is currently in a post-developmental stage which marks "both the continuity with past developmentalist traditions and institutions" and "the emergence of new ideologies and structures in Japan that conform neither to neoliberal nor to developmentalist models" (Hill, 2007). In regard to the creative city policy, however, one can observe that both Korea and Japan contain neoliberal-developmental as well as post-developmental elements.

Importantly, in Yokohama in particular the Creative Core Area as a post-developmental network was derived from MM 21's neoliberal developmental network; thus Yokohama's creative city policy can be seen as a response to neoliberal-developmentalism. In contrast, Seoul's creative city policy encompasses two distinct dimensions: neoliberal-developmentalist and post-developmentalist. Therefore the main differences between the two cases stem from how each society manages these different policy networks (i.e., Yokohama's coexistence model and Korea's more conflictual (or antagonistic) model). In this regard, I suggest a clearer conceptualization of the East Asian variant of post-developmental/neoliberal developmental—not along the single dimension of "Post-

Developmentalism" or "Neoliberal-Developmentalism"—but rather within the framework of multiple "post-developmentalism*s*" or "neoliberal-developmentalism*s*." Furthermore, with consideration of the post-developmental directions as meaningful responses to neoliberal-developmentalism, should the emergence of the creative city policy be understood as a "new alternative of social inclusion"? Several examples in Yokohama and Seoul do indicate that certain limits actually exist in these post-developmental symptoms. In the case of Yokohama, how the YMG differentially treats the Koganecho area compared to the Kotobukicho area suggests important implications. For example, a joint venture between the YMG, the non-profit organizations (NPOs), and the Koganecho Management Office turned the Koganecho, the city's largest red light area, into a site for artists in residence and art-related shops. For this project, the YMG first used police enforcement to "clear-up" the area by eliminating gangs and prostitutes; then it recruited NPOs who were able to rebuild and change the image of the area. This case became famous as one of the successful examples of how creative city policy can function as "social inclusion" (Sasaki, 2010). Distinct from Koganecho's sudden policy implementation, the Kotobukicho area—one of Japan's three largest homeless and day laborer areas in Yokohama—has not received any attention from the creative city policy at all. Why does "the virtue of social inclusion" of the creative city policy not embrace one of the city's most backward areas?

My interview with a state official explains that the state does not have any plans for the Kotobukicho area within the creative city policy because the Koganecho area was an illegal site for prostitution and crime while the Kotobukicho area was not. In other words, the YMG does not recognize the Kotobukicho area as a potential recipient of the creative city

policy because they cannot expect rapid and clear results from such efforts as "clearing up the area" by police enforcement or reconstruction by NPOs. Nonetheless I did meet activists who are "not even NPO" but rather part of a loosely organized citizen volunteer group that initiated "Kotobuki Creative Action" with the aim of organically changing the image of the area and supporting homeless and day-workers through initiation of arts-related activities. Interestingly enough, one member of this group is a current YMG official who well knows about Yokohama's creative city policy. In my interview with him, he mentions that the reason why he started this more grass-roots approach—while not "wearing the cap of a state official" but of "just one ordinary citizen"—is that the problems associated with the Kotobukicho area cannot be solved by current state administrative "logic," which always must legitimize its policy practices with "eye-catching" results.

With similar limitations as those of Yokohama's post-developmentalism, the case of Seoul involves several activist groups that have radically criticized the new mayor's somewhat "neutral" policy practices in his management of the DDP. For example, Cultural Action, who originally disagreed with the World Design Complex plan, argues that the new mayor's DDP management plan called the "DDP for the Citizen" does not differ much from the old management plan. They contend that the original concept—which civil society hoped for—is not "a design plaza" but rather "a citizen park". In this regard, the new mayor's plan is still based on keeping the concept of the "DDP" as a "world design complex" by changing only some of the facility's usage into more citizen-friendly practices. Moreover, the new management plan contains a fee-based policy, from which the DDP would become financially independent by charging its visitors and renting certain of its spaces to

conventions and cultural events. Even though SMG argues that this fee-based policy was invented in response to citizens' criticism of the old management plan, including the vast amount of city expenditures used to run the DDP annually, Cultural Action claims that such a fee-based policy evolved because the SMG still wanted to keep the facility as a "design plaza" by charging its citizens. For this reason, they argue that the DDP's management plan should be radically re-envisioned by abandoning the "neutral" position it holds that lies between a "design plaza" and a "citizen park".

Yokohama's Kotobuki Creative Action and Seoul's Cultural Action demonstrate even more contradictory positions, as reflected in the post-developmental propensities found in both cities. In the case of Yokohama, the actions of Kotobuki Creative Action show that the coexistence model of the State-Capital/NPOs can be "selectively" inclusive in their dependence on each policy actor's respective interests. In the case of Seoul, the new mayor's post-developmental direction does not necessarily mean radical change against the neoliberal-developmental direction in spite of the city's efforts to listen to citizens' voices. The ambiguities containing the concept of what Hill (2007) called "post-developmentalism" as "neither developmental (state-driven) nor neoliberal (market-driven)" are not necessarily connected in both Korea and Japan to an alternative concept like "society-driven". Nonetheless, there may be a slight possibility that both Korea and Japan's post-developmental networks found in the creative city policy will become a form of "either state or market and NPO". Within this inclusive policy network of the "Capital-NPO-State", what is more important is that the emerging new policy actor—the NPOs as representatives of "civil society"—can take a role in what Chakravartty (2007) calls "governance without

politics" which legitimizes assumptions about the neutrality of the category of civil society and its lack of politics. In this regard, it is important to note that neoliberal developmental urban reform is unfinished in spite of the emergence of post-developmental symptoms, as these chapters observed in Yokohama's MM21 and in Seoul's former mayor's DDP project. Rather, these post-developmental symptoms are assigned to a certain site: in the case of Yokohama within the Kannai area and in case of Seoul within the DDP. These symptoms also are connected with certain roles, both in the case of Yokohama as a "partially selective social inclusion" and of Seoul as a "neutral position between a 'design plaza' and a 'citizen park'".

To carefully interpret this ambiguous feature of post-developmental dimensions in East Asia, we should not stop with the identification of how each society's post-developmental network is assembled but further ask how it effectively counters the problem of neoliberal-developmental forces. Thus, the divergent and distinctive roles of the developmental state and its relation to capital and civil society in the creative city policy in Seoul and Yokohama empirically provide strong evidence about how differences and ambiguities are at play when policy moves among historically-distinct regions.

CHAPTER 4

TRANSLATING "CREATIVE EVENTS" AS "ART TRIENNALES": YOKOHAMA TRIENNALES

4.1 Introduction

By focusing on four different Yokohama Triennales from 2001 to 2011, in this chapter, I examine the ways Yokohama's urban mega events are practiced by routinized techniques and standardized procedures. To better locate the Yokohama Triennale as one of the major urban events in Yokohama's creative city policy, the advent of the art Triennale in Japan has to be contextualized in longer history of urban mega events. In doing so, it is helpful firstly to explore how urban mega events in general have been developed and located within Japanese society in relation to their socio-political contexts, so I will introduce key researches, which show cultural history of urban mega events in postwar Japan by focusing on the development of the world fairs in Japan. Furthermore, I will move on highlighting the longer history of art Biennale beginning in the 19th century's colonial context to the recent Third Worldist attempting to change the terms, which shows how current globalization of art biennale and triennale is based on a tension between market and curators acting as brokers with local interests as well as broader political questions. With the consideration of these historical contexts, I attempt to show how "coexisting model of creative city Yokohama" consisting of the state-NPOs-citizens *translates* "civic participation" into a certain limited mode by fostering "volunteer subjectivity", which locates the role of citizens into apolitical and only supporting the state's planning. In this regard, I will show that there is no route by

which citizens can more "radically" participate from the actual planning and management process of Yokohama Triennale, in spite of their strong desire to become a “mediator” of urban mega events.

In his book, *Banbaku genso* (*The Expo Syndrome: Postwar Politics and Cultural Struggle in Postwar Japan)*, Yoshimi Shunya, a Japanese cultural studies scholar, (2005) traces how expos and world fairs – as among the largest urban mega events – were planned and practiced as part of postwar Japan’s obsolete development-oriented ideology. He claims that postwar Japan held a series of expos (i.e., the Osaka, Okinawa, Tsukuba and Aichi Expos) in order to project what he calls "expo fantasy", meaning "a system for mobilizing the desire of the Japanese population for launching expositions, which were linked to large-scale public projects orchestrated by the state" (Yoshimi, 2006:395). In other words, Yoshimi points out that there was a structural continuity between the dramatic economic growth of postwar Japan and the boom of expos, within which these events functioned as cultural tools or symbolic "fantasies" by which to make their citizens actually experience and confirm 'the dream of the rapid economic development' in their everyday lives (Yoshimi, 2005). Coinciding with the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, Japan’s first postwar expo – the Osaka Expo 1970 – was an important example of how the Japanese national government effectively utilized this ‘expo fantasy' to attract 68 million visitors.

Importantly, Yoshimi shows that 'the expo fantasy' gradually lost its ideological power as it passed through the clash of the Japanese bubble economy in the 1990s onward. Through subsequent expos, the Okinawa Expo in 1975 and the Tsukuba Expo in 1985, Japanese civil society gradually "matured" and started questioning the socio-political role of

these expos; finally local citizen groups actively responded to the state's planning and the management of the Aichi Expo 2005 (Yoshimi, 2005). Yoshimi closely analyzed how these local citizen groups reacted to the state's original Aichi expo planning, which had contained a vast amount of ecological issues such as the development of "the untouched area of Kaisho forest" to construct its venues (Yoshimi, 2005). Community groups consisting of environment activists, local politicians, and residents in Aichi areas not only actively developed knowledge about the natural environment of the area, but also dynamically collaborated with other national and international organizations such as the Japan Audubon Society and the World Wildlife Fund to request changes in the government-proposed expo venue construction plan (Yoshimi, 2005). Through this citizen engagement process, the original expo plan changed course and took a more environment-friendly direction in terms of not only its vision (i.e., "Beyond Development") but also the newly revised venue plan. From this analysis, Yoshimi argues that the current Japanese civil society in 2000 onward no longer has stayed within a stage in which it passively accepts a state-driven developmentalist planning process. Rather, there is an emergence of a new kind of citizen's political movement related to various socio-political issues such as the environment (as in the case of the Aichi expo).

In a similar vein, in her analysis on the recent setback of Tokyo’s bid for the 2016 Summer Olympics, Kim, E. (2011) distinguishes two different policy networks: 1) what she calls the "growth coalition" that consists of state and corporate actors that is based on the pork-barrel politics of the previous high-economic growth era and 2) the "event coalition" that consists of various citizen groups based on their focus on civic welfare and life politics.

She found that the two policy networks were in conflict around the recent setback of Tokyo's bid for the 2016 Summer Olympics. Importantly, through the participation process of the Olympic bidding, the growth coalition tried to internalize the relatively alternative concepts of "eco-friendly", "sustainable" and "financially compact" in the Olympic planning to persuade and lead its opposing citizen groups (Kim, E., 2011). For now, in Japanese society, it is clear that a subtler negotiation process is necessary to mobilize civic participation for the practice of urban mega events from state's viewpoint; thus the proliferation of urban mega events under the global neoliberal movement needs to be examined with particular consideration of concrete East Asian local dynamics. In this regard, it is necessary to closely analyze the planning process of the Yokohama Triennale by considering the dynamic encounters among its various different policy actors: the Japanese national government, the Yokohama Municipal Government, art-related NPOs, and finally citizen groups.

Along with this consideration of Japanese socio-political dynamics, it is also important to locate the Yokohama Triennale within the general character of "art biennales" that differs from features of other types of urban mega events such as the Olympics and Expos. Papastergiadis and Martin (2011) introduce three different models of the art biennale in terms of its origin and historical trajectory. They explain that the first model was derived from the Venice Biennale in 1895. This initial model of the biennale can be epitomized from "the display of national visual cultures in an international frame toward a survey of current trends in art, providing an intimation of global culture" (Papastergiadis and Martin, 2011:48). Unlike the Eurocentric perspective of the first model, the 1984 Havana Biennale as the second model explicitly expresses its "regional, decentralized and anti-Eurocentric"

orientation (Papastergiadis and Martin, 2011:48). These scholars argue that the second model forms a distinctive identity through a "combination of ideological oppositions" by mixing "the reversal of stereotypes and the rejection of racial hierarchies in cultural production and exhibition" with "the expansion of biennales in non-western cities"; the sites of Istanbul, Dakar, Brisbane and Johannesburg can be included in this second model (Papastergiadis and Martin, 2011:48). Finally, the third model emerged by the mid 1990s and was consistent with second-tier cities' urgent acceptance of the global emergence of creative city discourse for the enhancement of global competitiveness in the field of cultural tourism and urban regeneration (Papastergiadis and Martin, 2011:49). This third model, so-called the "Biennalenization of art", includes the recent upsurge of over 200 Asian and European Biennales that include the Guangzhou Triennial; this international event has been criticized in terms of being "just another node in neoliberal networks of leisure and conspicuous consumerism" (Papastergiadis and Martin, 2011:49).

Even though the recent global circulation of the art biennale has been critically assessed by art commentators and academics, Papastergiadis and Martin (2011) suggest this event is not fully managed by economic motivation but rather functions as a "hybrid creature" in which "alternative knowledge of global flows and local engagement is formed" or a "symposium which generate a critical dialogue about the contradictions of contemporary globalization" (Papastergiadis and Martin, 2011:50). In particular, by analyzing several critical curators of the recent biennales such as Gwangju Biennale in Korea and Istanbul Biennale in Turkey, they focus on the performance of the curators who often tend to reject the economic motivation of its marketing organizations and hence are able to mediate with

local communities over the core of artistic practices as well as interactions related to non-artistic issues such as social inequality. As a result, Papastergiadis and Martin propose the need to examine the art biennale as a "contradictory contact zone" between "art trends, aesthetic attitudes and strategies of representation" rather than viewing these events as "mere sites of self-representation and glorification of the values of the art market" (2011:57).

By considering these two important historical contexts, in a next section I will trace how the Yokohama Triennale was launched and developed from its first opening in 2001 to its fourth incarnation in 2011 through dynamic encounters and interactions among the various policy actors including the Japanese central government, the Yokohama Municipal Government(below YMG), art-related NPOs and citizen volunteer groups. Also, based on my field interviews and participant observation of the preparation of its most recent event, the Yokohama Triennale 2014, I will examine how the next Yokohama Triennale will be processed based on the dynamics of current policy networks.

4.2. Yokohama Triennale 2001: Aiming for Japan's Largest "International Exhibition of Contemporary Art"

The first edition of the Yokohama Triennale, planned as the "International Triennale of Contemporary Art", was held from September 2nd to November 11th in 2001. This predates the YMG launch of its creative city policy, as discussed in Chapter 2. It is important to note that originally the major organizer of the Yokohama Triennale was not the YMG but

rather the Japanese national government; in particular the Japan Foundation[24] oversaw this event. The main objective of the establishment of the Japan Foundation was to promote various international cultural exchange programs to enhance the nation's 'soft power' rather than to support local artists and community. My interview with the managing director of the Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennale Office reveals that at first the Triennale was intended by the Ministry of Foreign Affair to become the "International Exhibition for Contemporary Art" in Japan. Also, Nanjo Fumio, who was one of the artistic directors of the Yokohama Triennale 2001, explained how the idea of holding the Triennale in Yokohama was developed at the Yokohama Triennale 2011 Kick-Off Meeting. At the meeting, he reported:

> I'd like to explain first the very outset and how it (the triennale) all started. Shortly before the first Yokohama Triennale was staged in 2001, I had published a book titled *Bijutsu kara toshi e* (*From art to city*) in which I pointed out that there weren't any art biennials or triennials yet in Japan, and expressed the earnest wish to realize such an event. I think it was around the year 2000 that the Japan Foundation convened some sort of commission with the aim to organize a biennial or triennial international art show, which means that *an explicit intention of doing something like that had already existed on the side of the Japan Foundation*" (Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2011:38, italics added by myself).

As Nanjo Fumio noted, the city of Yokohama was selected as "a optimal place to hold the international event" in terms of its longstanding appeal as "an international cultural city" from its birth. My interviews with state officials in the YMG, who were involved in the planning and management of the subsequent Triennales 2005 and 2008, revealed that the main objective of the first Triennale focused on enhancing "international cultural exchange"

[24] The Japan Foundation is a governmental arm which was established in 1972 as a special legal entity directly supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affair and subsequently reorganized as an independent administrative institution

and advancing Japan's role as a global leader in art and culture rather than supporting the community development of Yokohama. He said that such rival Asian cities as Shanghai (from 1996), Taipei (from 1998) and Gwangju (from 1995) already had started to hold art biennales or triennales; thus the Ministry of Foreign Affairs identified the need to hold a similar international art exhibition so that Japan should keep up with this global trend and not lose its cultural power. In this regard, he said that before the Japan Foundation left its handprint on the Yokohama Triennale in 2011, the agency's main goal was to develop a good reputation globally, particularly among foreign art societies, rather than to nurture and support the local community and artists.

The first official guide book of the Yokohama Triennale 2001 simply stated the event's main aim from the viewpoint of the central government:

> The aim of Yokohama Triennale 2001 is to supply a venue through which new advances in art across the world may be introduced to Japan. At the same time, *this will be an opportunity for Japan to reaffirm its position within the art world and to develop its role as a site of global cultural production*. (Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2002:7, italics added by my self)

Following the Japan Foundation's guidance, the organizational structure for the planning and management of the exhibition consisted of four different actors: the Japan Foundation, the YMG, NHK (Japan's national broadcasting organization), and the *Asahi Shimbun* (one of the five national newspapers in Japan). In other words, as an affiliated institution of the national government, the Japan Foundation easily could attract the national broadcasting organization, NHK, along with one of the major national level newspapers, the *Asahi Shimbun,* to take the roles of advertising and public relations for the Triennale. In my interview, the managing director noted:

> The Japan Foundation was the major organizer of the plan (Triennale). Originally they hoped to hold the event in Tokyo, but just by chance, they talked to some YMG officials, and the YMG positively responded to holding the Triennale in Yokohama; so in some sense, from the viewpoint of the Japan Foundation, it was even fine that the place for the Triennale was not Yokohama. *Yokohama was just one of the candidate cities.* Also, because the Japan Foundation had lots of contacts and networks with NHK and the Asahi Shimbun, they(NHK and Asahi Shimbun) easily decided to join the organizing committee of the Triennale.

At this time, the role of the YMG was restricted primarily to finding and managing the venue for the Triennale while the planning and organizing of the Triennale's content were handled mainly by the Japan Foundation. Namely, the selection of the artistic directors and the curators was already carried out by the Japan Foundation, with the exhibition's theme entitled "Mega Wave - Toward a New Synthesis". Nanjo Fumio, one of the artistic directors for the 2001 Triennale, recalled their intention for organizing such a theme and the major goal for selecting artists:

> ....but from the standpoint of local citizens and the Japanese general public at large, things are certainly different. For example, if you go and ask how many people in Japan have visited the Venice Biennale, I'm sure you'd get a pretty small number. That's why launching an international art show is an opportunity to introduce the citizens of a respective city or country to the amazing world of art, and at once show them that people in other parts of the world have been enjoying these kinds of events for more than a hundred years already....Mr. Briggs (another speaker in the meeting) mentioned the question whether it (the Triennale) is a festival or an exhibition, *whereas I think that biennials and triennials are expected to offer a "spectacular" kind of atmosphere*. It's especially this notion that encourages people to go and see contemporary art for the first time in their lives; so in other words, *this type of event holds the potential of being a strong hook that connects people with the realm of art*. (Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2011:39-40, italics added by myself)

As Nanjo said, because it was the first time that Japan as well as the city of Yokohama hosted such a large-scale international exhibition of contemporary art, they intended to provide a unique 'strong impression' to stand among its rivals such as Shanghai, Gwangju and Taipei. Tsubaki Noboru and Muroi Hisashi's work – a 196-foot-long inflatable

green bug entitled by "The Insect World/Locust" that clung to the Grand Inter-Continental Hotel in Minatomirai – was one of the best examples that clearly represented this intention; this work in fact became a mascot of this first Triennale (See <Picture 20>). With 105 artists from 30 different countries exhibiting a diverse selection of paintings, sculpture, photography, film and installation art, this Triennale attracted about 350,000 visitors. In addition to the exhibition, the Yokohama Triennale 2001 contained a variety of other programs including symposiums guided by four artistic directors, workshops organized by participant artists, art education programs for middle and high school students, and festival events including performance shows and music concerts. In addition, about 700 citizen volunteers participated in the exhibition to support the management.

One of the important points about the Yokohama Triennales was that they did not possess their own official venues like many others did such as the Venice Biennale. For its first Triennale, the YMG, which was mainly in charge of preparation and management of the venues for the exhibition, provided the Pacifico Yokohama Exhibition Hall located in the Minatomirai area and the Red Brick Warehouse No.1 located in the Kannai area. These two venues represented a contrast between the Minatomirai and Kannai areas. The Pacifico Yokohama Exhibition Hall was newly constructed in 2001 in keeping with many other recently built luxury shopping malls and hotels in the Minatomira area; by contrast, the Red Brick Warehouse No.1, one of the initial models of the renovation, was a reuse of an historical building in the Kannai Area promoted by the YMG's creative city policy. By evenly distributing its exhibition venues throughout both the Minatomira and Kannai areas, the YMG was able to somewhat "nicely" balance these two locations. After the event,

however, both venues returned to their "normal" usage. While The Pacifico Yokohama started a convention hall business, the Red Brick Warehouse No.1 became a shopping mall. This temporality of the venues for the Triennale became one of the major problems for the YMG's Triennale planning.

Figure. 20. Tsubuki Noboru and Muroi Hisashi's work, the Insect World/Locust, presented at the Yokohama Triennale 2001[25]

To sum up, the Yokohama Triennale 2001 was launched as "a national project" from the Japanese central government represented by the Japan Foundation to enhance its national soft power, with the YMG taking a supporting role. After its first Triennale was successfully

[25] Source : http://www.yokohamatriennale.jp/korean/archive/2001/

launched, the initial configuration of its planning and management – consisting of the Japan Foundation, the YMG, NHK and the Asahi Shinbum – was retained until its 3rd Triennale in 2008. Moreover, with its launching of the creative city policy, the Triennale became smoothly incorporated into the Yokohama's creative city project in 2005.

4.3. Yokohama Triennale 2005: Between a "World Cup of Art" and Civic Participation

The second Yokohama Triennale was delayed one year from its original opening plan due to the resignation of its initial artistic director, Isozaki Arata, a prominent Japanese architect. Isozaki proposed the plan called "World Atlas of Contemporary Art" for this second Triennale. What was distinctive about his proposal was that he suggested hold the event without any curators (Ozaki, 2004). Instead, he proposed that about thirty art foundations and art related-NPOs from around the world select their own artists and exhibit them in pavilions designed by architects chosen by the Triennale's Organizing Committee (Onishi, 2004). Initially, about fifty organizations responded to his proposal, but most of them asked for insufficient time for preparation. Under these circumstances, Isozaki requested an additional one-year delay of the Triennale until 2006 to raise more funds for the exhibition and to give these organizations extra time to prepare for their exhibitions. Through this plan, he hoped to make the Yokohama Triennale a "World Cup" or "World Expo" class event (Onishi, 2004).

The Japan Foundation and the YMG, however, refused his request for a delay because the Triennale was already one year past its original opening date and this had resulted in financial considerations. Moreover, several artists and curators criticized his plan in the symposium "Yokohama Forum 2004: Why an international art show now?" (Ozaki, 2004).

For one, the former director of the Yokohama Triennale, Nanjo Fumio, argued that this plan could not fulfill the promise to "bring out young artists onto the international stage"; in addition, Aomi Okabe, a professor at Musashino Art University, claimed that it did not stress Yokohama's locality. Faced with these criticisms and insufficient support from the Triennale's Organizing Committee, Isozaki stepped down from his position in December 2004 (Ozaki, 2004).

The current managing director of the Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennale Office recalled that because the Japan Foundation had selected Isozaki who then resigned from his position as artistic director, the YMG at that time recommended as the new artistic director, Kawamata Tadashi, whose vision could be more favorable to the YMG. After the Organizing Committee gave Kawamata Tadashi this position only nine months before the exhibition, the YMG suggested that the opening of the second Triennale take place in two publicly owned, recently renovated warehouses located at the Yamashita Pier in the Kannai area (see Figure 21). From the YMG's viewpoint, since the launching of the creative city policy in 2004 the Triennale had been an invaluable opportunity to show off this policy to the outside world; therefore the newly renovated warehouses located at the verge of the Kannai area became an ideal place to highlight their achievements. The uniqueness of the site, which generally not easily accessible to the public, also was received favorably by local citizens and visitors (BankART 1929, 2009:118). Beside these main venues, various sites in the Kannai area – including the Yamashita Park, the Former Kanto Local Finance Bureau Building, the Motomachi Shopping Street and the Yokohama Chinatown – were used for the offsite programs and exhibitions. In this regard, unlike the previous exhibition, the focal

point of the second Yokohama Triennale was moved to the Kannai area in coincident with the city's creative city policy.

Figure 21. Yokohama Triennale 2005 Yamashita Pier Venue[26]

Moreover, the new artistic director, Kawamata, had a strong vision about stressing locality and collaborating with citizens through the Yokohama Triennale. He emphasized the locality of Yokohama within the exhibition at the Yokohama Triennale 2011 Kick-Off Meeting:

> The relationship between visitor and location that is unique to the respective place – in this case, *something that can emerge only in the particular environment of Yokohama in a broader sense* – has always played a central role in my philosophy, so it was clear that this would be the base of my concept (of the Triennale). (Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2011:41)

In order to effectively connect the locality with the artists, the new artistic director Kawamata firstly organized the "Triennale School", which provided weekly public lectures

[26]Source : http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yokohama_Triennale_2005_Yamashita_Pier_Venue.jpg

about art and artists for ordinary citizens and volunteers, later called "Yokohama Triennale Supporters". He explained his intention for organizing the Triennale School at the opening symposium of the Yokohama Triennale 2005:

> The method (for civic engagement) that we have chosen...is to create the Triennale School, for example, and recruit participants from the general public there and introduce to them each time the situation of what is happening at the Triennale and what the artists are doing, this being an extremely reliable grass-roots movement kind of method.....I see it as a fundamental element of support for the next Triennale and other international exhibitions in Japan. Some 60 participants attend each time, and from among these people we shall be getting volunteers and "supporters" who are actively coming to take part. And the real reason is the artists themselves earnestly desire the support. They are saying "I need workers tomorrow, Help me out". The artists themselves explain the kind of help they need and their concepts and what is necessary. *In this way...we can communicate to people who are willing to communicate and come to take part in the work.* So I'm doing this, not just for the Triennale this time, but rather with the idea that it will be good to foster this kind of engagement with people as a base for future international exhibitions in Japan. (Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2006:118, italics added by myself)

As Kawamata stated, the Triennale School functioned not only as a place to introduce the Triennale as a contemporary art exhibition to the local community but also an efficient way to recruit volunteers for the exhibition. According to YMG's official reports for Yokohama Triennale 2005 (Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2006: 108), these supporters group consists of volunteered citizens who were mostly female (78 percent of sampled volunteered citizens are female) and relatively young (63 percent of sampled volunteered citizens are in their 20s and 30s). Most of them were recruited by contacting to the advertisements of Yokohama Triennale official websites and pamphlets, and common motivations for the participating these activities are based on their personal interests on modern arts and artists. For efficiently organizing and supporting these volunteer groups, several artists participating in the Yokohama Triennale 2005 continuously gave the lectures,

which were covered by talks, presentations, and workshops, and thereby the Triennale school became a natural "contact zone" between these volunteered citizens and artists.

Because about half of the artists were able to come to Yokohama without a rigid pre-determined plan as to what to design for the exhibition, during the preparation period, artists – through engaging with the Triennale School – had the opportunity to contact to local citizens, explore the local environment, and interact with Yokohama society in general. One artist from New York city recalled his experiences with these citizen groups at the opening symposium of the Yokohama Triennale 2005:

> One thing that I do want to say, in my first exhibition in Asia, is the regard for the artists that I've gotten from the volunteers, and I think it has been an incredible experience for me to work with all these young people and old people who have sort of come just to help. I remember the first time I did the visit, Kawamata was doing a presentation for these volunteers, and I was quite curious as to what that meant and I was even cynical, *"Volunteers? What the heck is that?"* because in New York there are not many people who volunteer to work with artists. So I remember going to this and seeing all these people, and that they were curious about what we were doing, and I still didn't get it, still couldn't understand why they were here in the room, why they wanted to be around artists..... *I see these individuals also as a kind of future in terms of laying down seeds for other triennales, and their experiences and their memories being really an important aspect in developing this notion of what an art exhibition can be.* It's been a real pleasure and learning experience to participate in this particular dialogue with those volunteers. (Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2006:114)

Not only artists recalled the experiences of collaboration with citizens as important, but also citizen volunteers themselves whom I interviewed expressed their strong impressions about their participation in 2005. Most of them chose the 2005 Triennale Supporters activities as the most memorable part of their experience in that they could more actively engage with artists and the event in general. About 1200 citizens ultimately were registered as Triennale Supporters; the YMG provided a special office space for them in the ZAIM

building, which was one of the historic buildings renovated as part of the YMG's creative city policy. The Triennale Supporters were actively organizing what kinds of activities they would do in keeping with Kawamata's vision that such pursuits by the supporters be developed primarily by citizen groups' own discussions and agreements. Finally, the Supporters ended up with four main activities: "Production Assistant: helped participating artists with the actual work of producing the artworks"; "Education Program Operation Staff: conducted guided tours"; "Exhibition Venue Operation Staff: supervised displayed works and provided visitors with information"; and "Information Counter Staff: provided visitor information at the counter, made announcements in the exhibition venue, and interpreted for non-Japanese visitors" (Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2006:170). One member of the Triennale Supporters whom I interviewed remembered that he and his peer supporters organized their own radio program called "Citizen Radio for Yokohama Triennale" during the exhibition period. Through this radio program, citizens introduced information about the Triennale through various activities such as interviews with participating artists. In addition, some supporters, whose role was as Production Assistants, actually engaged with the production process of artworks by working with artists.

Kawamata explained that these collaborating experiences themselves were the main goal of the Yokohama Triennale 2005. He strongly expressed this vision to the extent that if the Triennale could provide abundant space and time for bringing citizens and artists altogether as a 'communicative' process, the actual artworks that grew out of these collaborations were even unnecessary:

> About half of the artists could come to Yokohama without a clue as to what kind of work they wanted to show. This means that the preparation period actually becomes a creative period during which artworks are being made, and I believe that this is in fact where other people should actually be present and get involved. *My desire is to create as much communicative time and space as possible, and I would almost go as far as to say that we don't even need the actual artworks as long as we have enough of these occasions for communication. When calling the exhibition a "moving body", I am referring to this idea that the establishment and sharing of a communicative platform would ultimately render artworks unnecessary*. (Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2011:41, italic added by myself)

In keeping with Kawamata's alternative translation about collaboration and participation, some members of the Triennale Supporters did experience a strong engagement with artists, artworks, visitors and the exhibition itself. They expressed that they were happy to be part of the exhibition and to interpret artworks actively, and consequentially they were eager to share their feelings, knowledge and interpretations with other visitors and their peers. Extracts from the Triennale Supporters Notes are clues that strongly convey their strong attachment to the Yokohama Triennale:

> At the sewing artwork site, an elderly couple said, "We've been married more than 50 years, but this is the first time for us to get on a swing together". That made me happy......I am glad if they can feel art is something to enjoy, from such a young age...I'm happy to be a part of this exhibition...it makes me really happy when it lights up when many visitors are around. I feel a sense of togetherness with them all.....*I don't know what Wang Te-Yu's intention was, but I think of it as "living art". A child of elementary school age became absorbed in looking at it.*...It made me sad to see the severe-looking gate around Tonico's work. I wonder if we can't somehow protect the work without having to rely on gates...*The remaining time I have, surrounded by wonderful artworks, I want to spend in involvement with the site and the people*. (Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2006:176-177)

As shown in these extracts, supporters felt happiness and a sense of attachment as if they were themselves the creators of the artworks. I think that their desire for engagement and the role they really wanted to have in the exhibition could be seen as what Latour calls the "mediator". Latour (2005) introduced the notion of “intermediary” and “mediator”: while

an intermediary is what transports meaning or social force without transformation, a mediator is what may lead meaning or social force in multiple directions (Latour, 2005: 39). Thus, no matter how complicated an intermediary's role is, it may count for just one or even for nothing at all because it can be easily forgotten (Latour, 2005: 39). On the contrary, no matter how apparently simple mediators' involvement may look, it may become so complex that the mediators cannot be counted as only one because they have a possibility to count for one, for nothing, for several or for infinity (Latour, 2005: 39). Thus, one might view the Supporters' activities in the Yokohama Triennale as "intermediary", since they involved assisting artists and doing some miscellaneous works such as guiding the visitors and working at the information desk. I think, however, that these Supporters' demonstrated attachment and engagement with the artworks, artists and the exhibition itself could be read as a "desire to be a mediator" in that they intended to translate and transform the exhibition in their own ways, which can have a certain possibility to guide the city's one of the biggest art events into more democratic and community-oriented way.

Papastergiadis and Martin (2011) argue that the role of the curator becomes important because curators have the potential to be critical "mediators" who can reject the economic motivation of their marketing organizations as well as mediate the core of artistic practices and interactions with non-artistic issues with local communities. In the second Yokohama Triennale, the role of the artistic director, Kawamata was critical to mobilizing the new actor – citizen groups – that were represented by the Yokohama Triennale Supporters. His vision for collaboration with citizens and locality in general sparked more active civic engagement, and as a consequence citizen groups hoped to become another "mediator" of the city's major

urban mega event. All of the factors – the unfortunate resignation of the former director and the relatively short preparation period for the second Triennale, along with the designation of the new director who had a strong vision about the civil collaboration –were at work to make Yokohama Triennale 2005 be perceived as a "distinctive exhibition" in comparison with the other Yokohama Triennales. Therefore the second Yokohama Triennale shows a certain possibility that Yokohama Triennale can be close to what Papastergiadis and Martin (2011) called an "art biennale as alternative cultural public sphere" not only for artists but also for citizens and localities themsleves; as a consequence, the Triennale School, which was developed in 2005, became an important contact zone for mediating these two groups.

4.4. Yokohama Triennale 2008: Back to the 'Normal' Triennale

When I interviewed the current managing director of the Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennale Office, I asked her how she thought about the Triennale Supporters' positive impressions about the Yokohama Triennale 2005. Interestingly, she said that the second Triennale was a rather "unusual" exhibition in many aspects such as the delay of the events, a particularly short preparation period, and the artistic director's "distinctive" vision about the citizen collaboration. Moreover, when she explained about the next Triennale, the Yokohama Triennale 2008, she added that "it was back to the 'normal' Triennale", which pointed out that the Triennale would be instead an "International Contemporary Art Exhibition". Therefore, Mizusawa Tsutomo, the chief curator of the Museum of Modern Art in Kamakura and Hayama, was selected to be the artistic director by the Japan Foundation in 2006 because he had a strong 'artistic' vision to make a "completely different Triennale" from the previous two Triennales (Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2011:42). He

coined the term "TIME CREVASSE" as the theme of the event, and used it as a metaphor for expressing the contemporary art experience, which was connoted to "transcend the coordinates of space-time created by modernity" (Koplos, 2008:199). He explained this theme:

> I wanted to deal with contemporary art conditions creatively and freely, looking at art as much as possible from the viewpoint of "time" rather than "space", which tends to limit things to certain regions. This was the thinking behind the title "Time Crevasse" that was given to this exhibition. (Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2009:16)

Based on this theme, what Tsutomo initially did was to organize "international curator teams", which consisted of five "all-star curators" who were in the forefront of the current global contemporary art scene; in this way, he wanted to provide "a fresh perspective on contemporary art to Japanese viewers" (Koplos, 2008:199). This international curator team included Daniel Birnbaum (Director of the Portikus, Frankfurt am Main), Hu Fang (Artistic director of Vitamin Creative Spaces), Miyako Akiko (Co-founder and Program Director of Center for Contemporary Art CCA Kitakyushu), Hans Ulrich Obrist (Co-Director of Exhibitions and Programmes and Director of International Projects, the Serpentine Gallery) and Beatrix Ruf (Director/Curator of the Kunsthalle Zurich). This curator team met with one another in several different cities (i.e., London, Frankfurt, Miami, Zurich, Tokyo and Madrid) and held numerous discussions to create a list of participant artists. Through this selection process, the curator team agreed on emphasizing performance programs and performance based-artworks in order to distinguish the event from its two predecessors (Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2009). Finally, based on this criterion, they decided to

invite 72 artists; this third Yokohama Triennale was held from September 13th to November 30th.

As in the past, the YMG took the role of providing the venues for the Triennale. Initially, the YMG had planned to use the same venues as were utilized in its second Triennale. However, because the volume of freight passing through Yokohama port was continually increasing, the YMG should have decided to reuse the Yamashita Pier's two warehouses for storage areas for containers, once used for the venue for the Yokohama Triennale 2005. Due to its making the Yokohama Triennale an "International Art Exhibition", the Japan Foundation requested that the size of the venue be at least 10,000 square meters wide; thus the YMG should have found a new site (BankART, 2007: 121). Nonetheless, under these circumstances, the YMG decided to build a warehouse-type new exhibition hall at Shinko Pier located in between the Kannai and the Minatomirai areas (See Figure 22) (BankART, 2007:121). Unfortunately, there was not enough space there to build 10,000 square meter wide buildings at Shinko Pier; therefore the new exhibition hall was built only 4000 square meters wide in size. For this reason, the YMG suggested to use instead the newly renovated BankART Studios NYK that were established according to the Yokohama's creative city policy. In addition, several other places, such as outside of Redbrick Warehouse No. 1 and the Sankeien Garden, were included as its offsite venues mainly for performance art works (BankART, 2007: 121).

Figure 22. Yokohama Triennale 2008 Shinko Pier Venue[27]

In terms of the activities of the Triennale Supporters, even though the number of volunteers substantially increased and reached 1510, civic participation was limited due to the YMG's top-down administrative practices. In detail, after the Yokohama Triennale 2005, the Triennale Supporters group, who actively participated in the exhibition, created their own "Yokohama City Art Networks". Through this "Networks", they voluntarily held what they called the "Triennale Citizen Symposium" in order to discuss future activity and the role of citizen groups in future Triennales (Takahashi, 2009:85). In this symposium, about 60 participants – consisting of YMG officials, the artistic director (Kawamat Tadashi), Yokohama based-art NPOs, the Triennale supporters group, and other volunteered citizens, who were interested in participating Yokohama Triennale, reached the conclusion that the "continuity" of citizen activities was critical and necessary for the next Triennale (Takahashi,

---

[27] Source : http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yokohama_Triennale_2008_Shinko_Pier.jpeg

2009:85). As a result, they decided to regenerate citizen activities by taking over the spaces in the ZAIM building that they had used during the Yokohama Triennale 2005 (Takahashi, 2009:85). So as to remain "the Triennale School", citizen groups newly organized the "ZAIM Supporters' School" that met once a month from 2006 to sustain their networks and develop their own ideas and opinions about future activities for the next Triennale (Takahashi, 2009:85). After the new artistic director was selected in Novermber 2006, the citizen groups held the "Yokohama Triennale 2008 Hop Meeting" in April 2007, where they met with the artistic director, Mizusawa Tsutomo and YMG officials who were in charge of the planning and management of the Yokohama Triennale so as to learn about the main concept of the exhibition and the current preparation progress (Takahashi, 2009:85). After meeting with the artistic director and YMG officials, about 100 citizens voluntarily divided into six groups to actively and autonomously develop their own ideas and plans for citizen activities in the Yokohama Triennale 2008 based on their previous experiences and knowledge (Takahashi, 2009:85). They advanced ideas through organizing several follow-up gatherings, the "Yokohama Triennale 2008 Step Meeting" and "Yokohama Triennale 2008 Jump Meeting"(Takahashi, 2009:85).

In July 2007, however, the Yokohama Art Foundation (the public art foundation established and sponsored by the YMG) suddenly held the "Yokohama Triennale Citizen Meeting"; this was an identical type of meeting to the ones that the citizen groups already were holding. Not surprisingly, the citizen groups were perplexed why the YMG had initiated this type of meeting by ignoring the citizen groups' own preparation and cumulative activities. The YMG responded to the citizen group in that they could not just allow "unauthorized

citizen groups" lead citizen participation activities based on "their own planning" for the Yokohama Triennale 2008. The YMG's administrative logic was that it might be "unfair" for other citizens who had aspirations to participate in this Triennale if they let "the citizen groups in the ZAIM building" guide the citizen activities. However, it is possible to predict that the YMG did not want these citizen groups more 'overly' or 'radically' involved the Yokohama Triennale such as the participating whole process of the events from planning and management process, so that the YMG might need to limit the Triennale Supporters' activity in somewhat 'controllable' position for themselves. In doing so, the YMG requested that if the citizen groups wanted to continue their activities, they needed to join the YMG's "system" by officially registering as "Yokohama Triennale Supporters" just like other new comers (Takahashi, 2009:85). The citizen groups, who had developed their own autonomous citizen activities for the Triennale 2008 over the last three years, exposed that they decided not to contest the YMG. Rather, they chose to cooperate with the YMG and be "guided" by this governmental group, but at the same time they were frustrated at being back to square one and having to restart the planning of citizen activities (Takahashi, 2009:85).

Superficially, the Official Triennale Supporters activities in 2008 were not qualitatively different from previous ones in 2005. The Official Triennale Supporters again created "the Organizing Committee", developed several special project teams such as the "Information Team", "Managing Team" and "Communication Team", and organized such group activities as the "Event Activity", "Advertising Activity", and "Research Activity" (Yokohama Arts Foundation, 2009). Based on this organizational structure, the Official Triennale Supporters assisted the exhibition, developed several education programs,

supervised exhibition venues, and helped to staff the information counter (Yokohama Arts Foundation, 2009:27). Nonetheless, as one supporter, who had been involved since the Yokohama Triennale 2005, revealed, what they really hoped in the first place was for the "continuity" of citizen activity based on their own autonomy; yet such continuity was highly damaged when the YMG asked them to "get into their system" and "follow their guidance". As a result, the Organizing Committee of the Official Triennale Supporters was dispersed after finishing the exhibition; subsequently, for the next Triennale the Triennale Supporters' participation became even more weakened and limited.

The third Triennale attracted far more visitors: in 2005 there were 190,000 visitors, in 2008 550,000 visitors. The Japan Foundation was satisfied in that the number of visitors reached a "sufficient" figure to call it an "International Contemporary Art Exhibition" (Yokohama Arts Foundation, 2009:113). Several art critiques and journalists, however, pointed out the limits of the exhibition. For example, Philip Tinari, a director of the Ullens Center for Contemporary Art, evaluated the Yokohama 2008 as "an unarticulated hybrid of Gwangju-style cultural localism and Singapore-style speculative boosterism" by arguing that "Yokohama appeared an almost archetypal instantiation of the international exhibition format, impeccably designed and unrelentingly cool, with no particular political or curatorial agenda anywhere in sight" (Tinari, 2009:201). He claimed that the selection of seventy-two artists was well in keeping with current contemporary art trends by its division into three distinct categories that were "well-known [to be] a perfect equilibrium of the long-canonized (Marina Abramovic, Yoko Ono, Matthew Barney, Douglas Gordon, Paul McCarthy, Joan Jonas, Rirkrit Tiravanija)", "the recently canonized (Mark Leckey, Tino Sehgal, Paul Chan,

Jonathan Meese, Miranda July, Cao Fei, Terence Koh, Jérôme Bel)", and "the hopefully soon-to-be-canonized (Mario Garcia Torres, Shilpa Gupta, Pak Sheung Chuen, Pedro Reyes"(Tinari, 2009:201).

Similarly, another journalist criticized the Triennale 2008 in its failure to incorporate more participation from local artists. He argues:

> What if the Yokohama Triennale had taken a risk and let this new generation go to work on such themes in world class spaces with a generous budget? Not only would the triennale have offered something new, something that told us about Japan – rather than what's happening everywhere – it would have helped to ignite what is already an energetic local scene. (Eubank, 2008)

As shown in the criticisms above, in spite of the increased number of visitors, the Yokohama Triennale 2008 did not fully reach its potential for making the exhibition a "cultural public sphere" not only for its artists but also for visitors, citizens and local communities. Based on these limitations, the next Triennale underwent a tremendous change in 2011.

4.5. Yokohama Triennale 2011: the Yokohama Art Museum not just "Infrastructure" but as "Actor-Network"

On August 30, 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan, a centrist political party in Japan, defeated the Liberal Democratic Party's, a major conservative political party in Japan, longstanding dominance and became the ruling party in the House of Representatives. This political shift incidentally influenced and changed the Yokohama Triennale 2011 in a radically different direction, because the Japan Foundation, the main organizer of the Yokohama Triennale, withdrew its involvement in the exhibition. The current managing

director of the Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennale Office explained how the Japan Foundation had withdrawn from the Yokohama Triennale:

> After the Democratic Party of Japan took over the government, they screened major works of the government agencies and related organizations; so when they screened the work of the Japan Foundation, they argued that the Japan Foundation's main task was not to 'bring international culture' into Japan but to 'send Japanese culture' to the outside world. In this regard, the Yokohama Triennale looks exactly like what they viewed as "bringing international culture and artists into the Japanese society", so they claimed that the Japan Foundation transferred their authority of organizing the Yokohama Triennale to the Agency for Cultural Affairs (bunkachō). On this point, the main organizer of the Yokohama Triennale became the city of Yokohama (because the main organized, the Japan Foundation, did not participate in organizing the Yokohama Triennale)"

From the viewpoint of the YMG, the Japan Foundation's decision to take the Yokohama Triennale off its hands had a tremendous impact on organizing, planning and managing future Triennales since the Japan Foundation was mainly in charge of "filling the content of the Triennale". As seen in the previous three Triennales, the Japan Foundation took the role of selecting artistic directors and curators while the main role of the YMG was mostly to focus on providing and managing the venues. In terms of financial support, the Japan Foundation also sponsored the largest portion of the Triennale. As a result, the YMG needed to find some actors who could take over the Japan Foundation's role; they finally decided to mobilize actors who were already in their own network: it was the Yokohama Museum of Art that the YMG chose in order to fill the gap created by the withdrawal of the Japan Foundation.

The Yokohama Museum of Art was established in 1987 and opened in 1989 in the center of the Minatomirai area. It had one of the largest public art infrastructures and organizational systems of the city and was managed by the Yokohama Art Foundation, one

of the YMG-sponsored public organizations. From the viewpoint of the YMG, the Yokohama Museum of Art was not only capable of being responsible for the material infrastructure of the next Triennale, but also for human resources with its availability of curators, artists and artworks; therefore it was an "optimal" or "safe" choice to use this actor to replace the Japan Foundation. As a result, the YMG appointed Osaka Eriko, the Director of the Yokohama Museum of Art, as the General Director of the Yokohama Triennale 2011. At the same time, the Museum itself was assigned as the main venue of the event (see Figure 23). Thus one major actor, the Japan Foundation, was totally replaced by another actor, the Yokohama Museum of Art. As a consequence, the Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennale now consisted of the YMG officials, NHK, the Asahi Shimbun, and the Yokohama Museum of Art.

Figure 23. Yokohama Triennale 2011 Yokohama Museum of Art Venue[28]

[28] Source: http://www.panoramio.com/photo/61636166

Even though the YMG successfully held the next Yokohama Triennale by mobilizing the Yokohama Museum of Art, this incoming new actor caused several problems in the process. First of all, the adequacy of the Museum as the main venue for the contemporary art exhibition was called into question by artists and critics. In the Yokohama Triennale 2011 Kick-Off Meeting held in October, 2010, the panelists – comprised of three previous artistic directors, the general director and artistic director for the Yokohama Triennale 2011 – discussed what might be the benefits and costs of using the Museum as the main venue for the next Yokohama Triennale. They determined that one of the main benefits was financial in that the YMG did not need to spend more money to build another venue; rather it could use the established infrastructure of the Museum. On the down side, the panelists pointed out that the Museum was not intended to hold a global art exhibition. Even Osaka Miki, the Director of the Yokohama Museum of Art, worried that the museum was not large enough to host such a large-scale international exhibition because an "event like the Triennale could outgrow the framework of a museum show" (Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennale 2011, 2012:63). In a similar vein, Kawamata, the former artistic director of the Yokohama Triennale 2005, argued:

> A museum playing a central role doesn't necessarily have to be a bad thing, but I think that it would be wrong to place too much emphasis on the museum itself. One may profess that the street is a museum, or even that the entire city of Yokohama is a museum, which in other words is to say that the idea behind a museum is not limited to one building or an object in general. It's not only a matter of space, but a museum always involves some kinds of authority or power-exerting aspects, and it somehow feels a bit like artworks are being returned to a museum setting". (Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennale, 2011:47)

By pointing out the weaknesses of the museum as the main venue for the Triennale, Kawamata suggested its use as a starting point for the exhibition rather than as its final

destination. He introduced the example of "Chambres d'mais", in which the curator, Jan Hoet, placed artworks in several private homes in the city of Ghent, Belgium. In this exhibition, the visitors had to stop by the city's museum – not to see the artworks – but to obtain information about the venues before they started the tour (Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennale 2011, 2011:47). In this regard, Kawamata warned that the museum should not "swallow up all the various things that have been done in the city" (Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennale 2011, 2011:47). In particular, in terms of Yokohama's urban layout, the YMG launched the creative city policy by recovering the degradation of the Kannai area, and the Triennale was one of the main events to show the result of the creative city policy to the outside world. Yet if the main venue for the Triennale were to move to the Yokohama Museum of Art located in the center of the Minatomira area, the Kannai area might lose its one major opportunity to show what it has accomplished in the area. When I talked about this issue with the current managing director of the Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, she also agreed with this concern:

> Yes, we know the problem as well. I am actually from Yokohama, and I, myself, also do not really perceive the Minatomira area as the "real Yokohama". You know, historically, this place had been owned by Mitsubishi, so it never had been possessed by Yokohama's citizens. And by the development of Minatomirai, this area just suddenly emerged. Ordinary Yokohama citizens do not have that much attachment to this area. This is a whole new town. In this regard, I know that the Triennale can be a good chance to revitalize the Kannai area, so we will try to open as much collaboration with the galleries and art places in the Kannai area. However, for now, from the viewpoint of the YMG, holding the Triennale in the Yokohama Museum is the safest choice, because it is easy to access it and it has more amenities.

As a result of these concerns, the Yokohama Triennale 2011 designated BankART NYK Studio as its second sub-venue; in addition, art NPOs organized "Special Tie-Up Programs" in several other locations in the Kannai area including the Shinko Pier Exhibition

Hall and the Koganecho area. Unlike during the previous exhibition, however, the Kannai area was turned into a sub-region.

Furthermore, in terms of the Triennale Supporters activities, one of the key activities for civic participation in the Yokohama Triennale 2011, the new actor, the Yokohama Museum of Art, made tremendous changes. After finishing the Yokohama Triennale 2008, the Organizing Committee of the Official Triennale Supporters was dispersed. In other words, civic engagement did not derive from citizens' own autonomous activities. Rather, the YMG recruited and invited "simple volunteers", whose role was solely to help and support the state. The staff of the Koganecho Area Management Office, who was one of the main organizers of the Yokohama Triennale Supporters since the Yokohama Triennale 2011, recalled that the newly established organizing committee was actually not that interested in the Triennale Supporters activities. One reason is that a venue like the Yokohama Museum of Art did not require the Supporters' help and activities because of its formal indoor nature. For this reason, even though there were 940 registered volunteers, their main tasks were limited to assisting exhibition venue operations staff, supporting information counter employees, and helping those involved in advertising the Triennale via social network websites. Thus one citizen who had participated in the Yokohama Triennale Supporters since 2001 said in an interview that he was disappointed a great deal with the Triennale Supporters activities since the previous Triennale in 2011:

> The supporters' activity wasn't like this [before]. I felt that nowadays supporters were just doing what the government already planned. As you saw at the last supporters meeting, when people participated in roundtable discussions, etc., there was always staff present from the YMG or related NPOs. I even sometimes felt that they were constantly watching or monitoring us. What I did in 2011 was only taking care of

> seating in front of the artworks and telling visitors not to touch the artworks. I felt that it was so different from what we did in 2005. At that time, the work was far harder, but I felt a strong *yarigai* (sense of worth), but now it's not so much like that. So now I come to the Triennale School only to listen to lectures about contemporary art to gain some knowledge. I do not participate in any other activities now.

As this Supporter recalled, the Triennale School since 2011 functioned as a place to just listen solely to the artist director or to academics' lectures about contemporary art. Rather, the Triennale School 2005 used to be a possibility to become a *contact zone between artists and citizens*. Hence, the citizen groups' strong desire to become a "mediator" for one of the city’s largest urban events was transformed into mere volunteerism that acted to follow simply the government's plan.

The Yokohama Triennale 2011 held between August 6th to November 6th with 79 artists invited by the selection of the artistic director, Miki Akiko. She coined the theme for the exhibition as "Our Magic Hour: How Much of the World Can We Know?" with the intention that the exhibition become like "a magical journey transcending time and space during which people from various eras and cultural backgrounds meet, share their amazement and emotional reactions, and pose a wide array of questions" (Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennale, 2012:69). In spite of the Great East Japan earthquake, the Triennale 2011 successfully gathered 330,000 visitors and the tickets sales marked their highest figure among the four Triennales (See Table 5).

From the viewpoint of the YMG, the results of the Triennale were quite impressive, because its leadership role along with that of its affiliated organizations was central to the exhibition. An official in the YMG who was involved in planning and management of the Triennale since 2005 reported that because of this financial success finally there were not any

more debates about whether to held future Triennales within the YMG itself[29]. In fact, based on these results, the YMG decided to hold its future Triennale again at the Yokohama Museum of Art, even going as far as to establish the office of YMG's Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennale within the museum itself for the purpose of preparing for the next Triennale. Thus the new actor, the Yokohama Museum of Art, proved that it was a unique assemblage that consisted of both a stable infrastructure and abundant human resources. At the same time, however, one must note that civic engagement turned into mere volunteerism through the institutionalization of civic activities; moreover, there may be a latent problem in that this unique assemblage of the Yokohama Museum of Art located in the center of the Minatomirai "swallows up all the various things that have been done in the city", as Kawamata warned before.

4.6 Yokohama Triennale and the Possibility of Civic Participation

When I was conducting my fieldwork in Yokohama in 2013, the Yokohama Triennale School already had started its operations. The Triennale School was managed by the official Triennale Supporters' office, consisting of the staff from the Yokohama Museum of Art as well as from the Koganecho area management, an art NPO in charge of the management of the Koganecho area. The Triennale School broadly was comprised of two sets of activities: 1) "main curricular activities" and 2) "extracurricular activities". The "main curricular activities" included lectures and talks from artistic staffs, curators and the artistic director from the Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennale. Its meetings were held in the Yokohama Creative City Center, and generally there were about 60 to 70 citizens who participated.

---

[29] The YMG reported that the economic impacts effect of the Triennale 2011 reached at about 40 million us dollor. (Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennlae, 2012:132).

Table 5. The Yokohama Triennale: 1st to 4th Editions[30]

	2001	2005	2008	2011
Theme	Mega Wave-Towards a New Synthesis	Art Circus [Jumping from the Ordinary]	TIME CREVASSE	OUR MAGIC HOUR
Period (Number of days opened)	September 2 ~ November 11 (67 days)	September 28 ~ December 18 (82 days)	September 13 ~ November 30 (79 days)	August 6 ~ November 6 (83 days)
Directors	Artistic Director: KOHMOTO Shinji TATEHATA Akira NAKAMURA Nobuo NANJO Fumio	Artistic Director: KAWAMATA Tadashi	Artistic Director: MIZUSAWA Tsutomu	Director General: OSAKA Eriko Artistic Director: MIKI Akiko
Curators	-	AMANO Taro SERIZAWA Takashi YAMANO Shingo	Daniel BIRNBAUM HU Fang Hans-Ulrich OBRIST Beatrix RUF	-
Number of participated artists	109 artists	86 artists	72 artists	77 group / 79 artists / 1 collection
Main venues (paid)	Pacifico Yokohama Exhibition Hall (C, D) Yokohama Red Brick Warehouse No. 1	Yamashita Pier No. 3 and No. 4 Warehouses	Shinko Pier NYK Waterfront Warehouse (BankART Studio NYK) Yokohama Red Brick Warehouse No. 1 Sankeien Garden	Yokohama Museum of Art NYK Waterfront Warehouse (BankART Studio NYK)
Total number of visitors	Approx. 350,000	Approx. 190,000	Approx. 550,000	Approx. 330,000
Number of visitors (to paid venues)	Approx. 350,000 • Ticket valid 2 days (valid on any 2 days) • Free for pre-school children	Approx. 160,000 • Ticket valid one day • Free pass available • Free for junior high school students or younger	Approx. 550,000 • Ticket valid 2 days (valid on any 2 days) • Free for junior high school students or younger	Approx. 330,000 • Ticket valid one day (valid on any 2 days) • Free for junior high school students or younger
Ticket sales	Approx. 170,000	Approx. 120,000	Approx. 90,000	Approx. 170,000
Volunteer registration	719	1,222	1,510	940
Number of media coverage	More than 237 publishers (more than 36 among them were overseas media) * Number of publications is not available	1,089 (40 of those were overseas media)	1,233 (165 of those were overseas media)	1,763 (139 of those were overseas media)

[30] Source : Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennale(2012)

The content of lectures and talks covered educational programs, such as brief lectures about contemporary art, the introduction of participating artists in Yokohama Triennale 2014, and the explanation of the main theme of this next Triennale. In most cases, after the lectures and talks would end, there were five to six people organized for a roundtable discussion; in this case, an "inserted" staff from the official Triennale Supporters' office generally would guide these discussions. People from various backgrounds such as college students, business people, academics, city officials, and retired people would introduce themselves and share their opinions about a given topic. The topics focused primarily on how the Yokohama Triennale Supporters can effectively "support" the Yokohama Triennale.

By contrast, "the extracurricular activities" were mostly held in the Koganecho area management office, a newly redeveloped area in the once red-light area in accordance with the Yokohama's creative city policy. Here, the staff from the NPO and the Koganecho management office organized several groups to carry out certain tasks such as "making a logbook for the Yokohama Triennale", "creating local maps for the visitors of the Yokohama Triennale" and "doing public relations in social networks to spread information about the Yokohama Triennale". The participants were basically same as who participated in the "main curricular event" but who has relatively more strong interests within the participants of the main curricular activities because these activities are "extracurricular", which required more time and efforts. They could choose which groups they wanted to participate in based on their own preferences. Each group planned their own activity schedules and met with one another regularly. Sometimes there was a meeting in which all the groups gathered together and presented their work progress. All of these activities were based on volunteers' own

autonomy, and most of them were actively attended. Thus the organizational structure for civic engagement was neatly organized and efficiently managed by the staff from the YMG and the NPOs through institutionalization of civic activities. Moreover, most of the tasks, which volunteers did, were already "approved" by the YMG so that they could "outsource" these tasks to the citizens.

So what is the problem with this well-organized civic engagement structure? Does not Yokohama's post-developmental policy network – consisting of the YMG, the NPOs and citizen groups – harmoniously hold the city's largest urban event in a mutual collaboration? Importantly, Ogawa (2004) points out that there has been a tendency to create what he calls "volunteer subjectivity" by the collaboration between the state and the NPOs in Japan. After legislating the 1998 Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities (NPO Law), there was a national mobilization of volunteer subjects by the state in Japanese society (Ogawa, 2004). He argues that through mobilizing volunteer subjects, the government efficiently "outsources" their social tasks to civil society. The problem with this mobilization of volunteer subjectivity is that it is "praised only for maintaining and strengthening the existing society" and for what is "done *for the state*" (Ogawa, 2004:89). In this regard, he argues that the current state-mobilized volunteerism reflects an "apolitical" situation and thereby never has evolved into "social activism", regardless of how actively citizens participate in the activities (Ogawa, 2004:89).

The current civic engagement structure of the Yokohama Triennale was organized to promote exactly what Ogawa calls "volunteer subjectivity", which is apolitical and supports only the state. Most activities of the Yokohama Triennale Supporters already are planned by

the YMG as well as by affiliated state organizations such as the Yokohama Museum of Art and affiliated NPOs. Under this structure, what citizens do is simply carry out YMG-outsourced tasks. There is no route by which citizens can more "radically" participate in the actual planning and management process of the exhibition. The selection of artistic directors, curators and the theme of the exhibition are fixed by a small number of state officials and experts. Likewise, the selection of artists and the criteria for choosing them are still in the realm of the experts. Or, more radically, the core question of "why Yokohama holds the Triennale" has never been seriously touched by its citizens. For this reason, the role of the citizen is positioned only as a mere "intermediary" whose task is to transmit simply meanings or social forces of the state without transformation. In other words, the current role of the citizen is limited to transmitting solely the decisions of the state and experts.

Many of the citizen volunteers whom I interviewed, however, had a strong desire to have more direct interaction with artists and artworks. What they really seemed to want was to be neither a simple volunteer nor a mere audience. Rather, they desired to engage actively with the actual production process of artwork, to share their interpretations about artwork with visitors and artists, and ultimately to be part of the exhibition itself. This is a desire to be a "mediator" who can form and guide meanings or social forces in multiple directions. Based on their experiences in relatively radical collaboration with artists and their peers that occurred at the Yokohama Triennale 2005, citizens could have the opportunity to develop their own visions and opinions. Unfortunately, that potentiality of more radical civic engagement – or what I am calling citizens as "mediators" – was dispersed through the Yokohama Triennale 2008. Instead, the Yokohama Museum of Art as an assemblage of

material infrastructure and human resources successfully replaced and usurped these roles. Such limitations of the Yokohama Triennale and, more importantly, of Yokohama's post-developmental policy network itself thus spring from how they promote more *radical civic engagement* and whether this network is opened to its citizens in the first place.

CHAPTER 5

TRANSLATING "CREATIVE EVENTS" AS "DESIGN OLYMPIAD": SEOUL DESIGN OLYMPIADS.

5.1. Introduction

I now turn to the struggles over events in Seoul. Here, I focus on three *Design Seoul Olympiads* and the *Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.*7, in order to examine the ways Seoul's urban mega events are practiced by routinized techniques or standardized procedures. Rather than frame the development of new urban mega events as solely the reflex of the expansion of neoliberal capitalism, an outcome of this analysis is the proposal that one views mega events as discursive and material fields of struggle by which where a variety of policy actors conflict and oppose each other by translating and counter-translating urban spaces and events in a different direction. In particular, the focus will be on how different policy networks such as "neoliberal-developmental" and "post-developmental" networks differently organized urban mega events.

5.2 Seoul Design Olympiad 2008

The Seoul Design Olympiad (SDO), one of the major cultural events in SMG's creative city policy, was first held from October 10th to 30th over 21 days in 2008. As the title "Olympiad" suggests, the venue was the Jamsil Olympic Stadium built for the 1988 Seoul Olympic (See Figure 24). The SMG (2008a) reported that the SDO 2008 gathered approximately 2 million visitors, including 1.79 million ordinary citizens, 150,000 design related professionals, and 60,000 foreign visitors (SMG, 2008a:71). The SDO, held in

connection with Seoul being selected as the World Design Capital for 2010, was sponsored by various government ministries, including the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism, Ministry of Knowledge Economy, Ministry of Land Transport and Maritime Affairs, Korean Chamber of Commerce as well as 14 different domestic and international companies, including Samsung and Hanwha, well-known Korean *Chaebol* companies. Also, the event was supported by various national and international design-related institutions such as International Council of Societies of Industrial Design, the Korean Federation of Design Associations, and the Korean Institute of Design Promotion. In terms of staff numbers for the SDO 2008, there were approximately 1000 official staff members including SMG officials along with about 14,000 volunteers consisting of middle and high school students, college students and ordinary citizens.

Figure 24. The Picture of The Main Venue of the Seoul Design Olympiad[31]

[31] Source : SMG (2008a:85)

For planning and managing the SDO 2008, under the direct connection with the mayor's office, the SMG launched a special organization that was comprised of five different SMG internal divisions.[32] While the General Planning Team performed as the chief management organization for the event, two Design Olympiad teams conducted and guided the actual exhibitions, conferences and festivals in the Olympiad. Also, the Design Cooperative team planned and conducted advertising and public relation affairs (SMG, 2008:18). <Figure 25> represents the organizational structure for the planning and the management of the SDO 2008.

Regarding the role of the external committees, the members of the Consultative Committee – whose work was intended mainly for "supervising the planning and management of the event" – consisted of 20 international and national design foundation executives and chairmen including Carlos Hinrichsen, chairman of the International Council of Societies of Industrial Design; Peter Zec, chairman of World Design Capital; and Park Youngsoon, chairman of Korea Foundation of Design Associations (SMG, 2008a:18). The Organization Committee, whose major roles were "creating social consensus for the event" and "reviewing the important agendas of the event" (SMG, 2008a:18), was mainly comprised of nationally prominent cultural figures and designers including Lee O-Young, a renowned novelist and former Korean Minister of Culture as well as Kwon Myoung-Gwang, a prominent designer and chancellor of Hongik University, one of the most prominent art and

---

[32] These divisions includes including "General Planning Team", "Culture Design Team", "Design Cooperative Team", "Design Olympiad Team 1" and "Design Olympiad Team 2", with three specially organized external committees: the "Consultative Committee", the "Organization Committee" and the "Project Committee".

design schools in Korea (SMG, 2008a:18). Because the major responsibility of the Project Committee was intended to supervise the more "practical and actual" event planning and management, it contained relatively younger designers and academics who were working in the design industry and teaching in art and design schools (SMG, 2008a:18). The SMG also appointed Eunsook Kwon, a designer and professor at the University of Houston, as Director General of the Olympiad; her role was to coordinate the theme, planning and evaluation of the event.

Figure 25. Organizational Structure for the Planning and Management of the SDO 2008[33]



In sum, the organizational structure for the SDO 2008 shows that the major actors of planning and management were composed of the SMG (state actor), the international and domestic design industry (business actor), and lastly academics and experts in the design

[33] Source : SMG (2008a:18)

field (academic actors). Consequentially – within this process of planning and management – there was no space for its citizens.

5.2.1 "The World's first Seoul Design Olympiad 2008": Symbolic Power of an "Olympic" and Urban Mega Event for City Branding

> 'Design is AIR', the theme of the Seoul Design Olympiad 2008, addresses the design discourse and exploration for the design of life, which communicates with nature's elements: earth, water, fire, wind. *Design in the 20th century was described as 'earth', while design in the 21st century will be considered 'air'.* Beyond the boundaries of material and immaterial, digital technology in the 21st century has produced new design paradigms with connectivity and convergence. (from SMG official blog[34], italics added by myself)

In March 2008, the SMG announced the event's official title of the "Seoul Design Olympiad 2008" along with its formal theme "Design is AIR". It is important to examine the reasons why the SMG used the metaphor of the "Olympiad", which is one of the largest global sports events, for its major 'creative events' within the city's creative city policy. As Cho (2009) demonstrates, the Olympiad as a global mega event is not solely a simple sensory and symbolic event but also "a spectacle *par excellence"* (Cho, 2009:31). Moreover, especially in an East Asian context, the Olympics as a spectacle par excellence has been used as a common "cultural tool" to legitimize the role of the developmental state, thereby enabling its citizens to experience "national development", "economic growth" or "national pride" by labeling the winning of sports events as a national victory in global competition (e.g., Cho, 2009; Yoshimi, 2007). In this regard, the metaphor of the Olympics in the SDO 2008 should not be perceived as a randomly chosen word but rather as a willed selection that has the potential to mobilize and legitimize the SMG's 'creative vision'.

---

[34] Source: http://blog.seoul.go.kr/23

In the opening ceremony of SDO 2008, Myung-bak Lee, the president of South Korea and the previous mayor of Seoul, announced:

> Since the 1988 Seoul Olympic improves our country's level of economy and industry, the Seoul Design Olympiad 2008 will be a chance to enhance our national brand value. (SMG, 2008a: 58)

Similarly, the mayor of Seoul, Sehoon, Oh, said in his speech in the opening ceremony:

> It is the Seoul Olympics Stadium, where we achieved the Olympic Miracle 20 years ago; we're striving to make a miracle of design with the passion with which we have made the IT miracle for the past decade. (SMG, 2008a: 60)

By using the symbol of "Olympiad" as a metaphor that conveys proof of the nation's past economic miracles, both officials argued that design would be one of the best tools by which to provide "another miracle of the Han River" for the nation and its citizens. Here, importantly, design was being conceptualized as a "panacea" or a "Trojan horse" which had the 'inherent' or 'fundamental' character to solve economic and urban problems as well as enhance the city and nation's brand value. In its official press release, the SMG (2008b) said:

> The theme of the SDO is "Design is AIR" which showcases the Seoul Metropolitan Government's vision and strategies as a promising design city. "Air" is always near us, but never discloses itself, and is deeply connected to the lives of people and nature. As such, air represents the spirit of design in the 21st century. (SMG, 2008b)

The above quote, by using the symbol of 'air' as an essential substance for human survival, argues that now studying, developing and experiencing "design" should not be considered as an optional choice but rather as an essential priority not only to improve the city's competitive edge and brand power but also to successfully survive midst global competition. With identifying design as an essential resource, the SMG introduced its five keywords of the event – "sustainable," "convergent," "interactive," "participatory," and

"connecting" –by arguing that all terms basically refer to Seoul's future scheme of city design. The SMG explained each keyword in more detail:

> 1) “Sustainable”: an eco-friendly approach to design, thinking of both the present and future of the earth, 2) “Convergent”: exchange between design and other disciplines, convergence of design and urban developmental policy, 3) “Experiential”: increasing the interaction among humans, products and the environment, 4) “Participatory”: Creating human-centered designs through citizen participation, 5) “Connecting”: a design city connecting to the world. (SMG, 2008b:5)

Based on these keywords, the SMG claimed that the SDO will be a comprehensive design event that "develops the design industry, promotes young designers, increases Seoul’s design competitiveness and pursues globalization" (SMG, 2008b:3). Under these keywords, the entire event consisted of four different sub-events including: 1) the Seoul Design Conference, 2) the Seoul Design Exhibition, 3) the Seoul Design Competition, and 4) the Seoul Design Festival.

Interestingly enough, what we see in the main keywords of the event is neither a familiar neoliberal mantra of "competition” or “efficiency”, nor is it an East Asian developmentalist chant of “growth” or “progress”. Rather, these keywords coined by the SMG suggest relatively alternative concepts like “sustainable”, “participatory”, “connecting” and “interactive”, most of which are somewhat underdeveloped and overlooked practices in East Asian society. Why did the SMG fuse the discourse of “sustainability” and “participation” with a neoliberal discourse of “global competitiveness” and “city branding power”, and more importantly one should examine how the SMG linked these heterogeneous concepts seamlessly or incoherently within the discourse of "the value of design" as a "panacea" or “Trojan horse”.

As many urban scholars argue, it is not surprising that the so-called growth coalitions consisting of elite politicians, urban developers and commercial sponsors use the self-serving rhetoric of “development” and “growth” to deceive and mislead governments and the publics in order to approve the urban mega-event (e.g., Hall, 2006; Flyvbjerg et al, 2003; Lowes, 2002, Gotham, 2011). Hall (2006) claims that such self-serving rhetoric is often based on “assertion rather than concrete evidence” (Hall, 2006:63). For example, in an East Asian context, through an analysis of the Beijing Olympic event, Broudehoux (2007) argues that Olympic events perform like "smoke screens" to conceal China's current socio-political problems such as uneven development and rising social inequalities by exploiting the symbols of progress, efficiency and economic success. Similarly, by analyzing Beijing Olympics’ official slogan of "harmonious society", Shin (2014) argues that the urban mega event as "spectacle" functions as "false consciousness" or "delusion" not only to aid capital accumulation but also to support the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. In sum, based on political economic concepts of "false consciousness", "delusion" or "deception", these scholars tend to consider urban mega events as symbolic means for supporting a handful of economic and political elites' interests.

If we accept this argument about urban mega events as "false consciousness" for favoring the ruling blocks' interests, how can we explain the suggested concepts like "(civic) participation" or "sustainability" suggested by the SMG in the SDO 2008? Also, how can we comprehend the 200 million voluntary visitors at these events? Or, more importantly, how can we make sense of the articulation of "participation" and "sustainable" within the neoliberal discourse of "global competition" or "city branding value"? In order to rightly

answer these questions, I suggest that we should not perceive the urban mega event as a mere reflection or simple false consciousness of ideology promoted by the ruling block or political and economic elites, but rather scrutinize how it actually achieves its real power and effect in relation to its concrete discursive and material policy practices. Here, my intention is not to refute political economic criticism about urban mega events but to move such critiques forward to capture subtler dimensions of how actual discourse can create the power to mobilize and recruit actual citizens and even non-human actors. This helps us more carefully inspect these various policy practices, so we need to reconsider the urban mega events not as a mere reflection of "false consciousness" but as an active process of "translation" among various policy actors.

To shed light on such re-visioning, I apply the concept of translation developed by Actor Network Theory. Choy (2005) argues that the theory of translation is particularly useful and crucial to explain the process of articulation among heterogeneous discourses and concepts. I, thus, seek to exemplify how alternative concepts like "(civic) participation" and "sustainable" were *domesticated* and *internalized* within the neoliberal discourses like "global competition" through the SDO 2008 events. In the next part, I will analyze how each sub-event of the SDO 2008 – the exhibition, conference, competition and festival – was performed in relation to the suggested keywords of the SDO 2008 as well as materialized by a certain assemblage of various policy actors, both human and non-human. Furthermore, I will show how the SDO 2008 event formed certain "routinized techniques" or "standardized procedures" for the subsequent events held in 2009 and 2010.

5.2.2. Seoul Design Conference: Mobilizing Experts to Speak for the SMG

In the official press kit for the SDO 2008, the SMG boldly introduced the Seoul Design Conference by declaring: "World-renowned designers discuss the present and future of design" (SMG, 2008:10). SMG (2008) argued that the major goal of the Seoul Design Conference was to provide educational opportunities for young designers and citizens. The conference was held from the 9th to 12th of October in 2008, and included keynote and invited speeches, roundtable discussions, and paper/poster presentations. Famous foreign scholars and designers – including Richard Buchanan, Professor at Case Western Reserve University and the editor of Design Issue; Yves Behar, founder of Fuseproject; Ross Lovegrove, a renowned industrial designer; and domestic designers such as Youngse Kim, a founder of Inno Design – were invited to be speakers, panel members and presenters. The conference themes were sub-divided into three distinct topics: "City Design", "Design Leadership" and "Sustainable and Social Design" in line with the daily schedule.

During the "City Design" session, the mayor of Seoul, Sehoon Oh, delivered the keynote speech titled "Designing Seoul", in which he explained Seoul's creative city policy. About 3,500 people registered for the conference that lasted four days; a majority of them were students and professionals in design-related fields (SMG, 2008a: 112). The Seoul Design Conference in 2008 had a somewhat typical format with the role of experts lecturing about their knowledge and experience with design juxtaposed with the position of participants as listening to the experts' talks. From the viewpoint of the SMG, these globally renowned designers, corporate executives and academics were important expert actors who compared to SMG members themselves could *'better translate'* the value of design and

design policy by providing their own expert knowledge and communicating their public recognition via their successes in the design field. At the same time, these global expert groups were the 'precious' actors who were able to support the SMG's argument that the importance of design policy is an irresistible global trend to enhance the city's competitive power and brand. In this regard, mobilizing global and domestic experts to present and spread the value of design and the importance of design policy became one of the key "standardized procedures" or "routinized techniques" utilized in the future events in 2009 and 2010.

5.2.3 Seoul Design Competition: Civic Participation via Competition

Another important part of the event was the Seoul Design Competition. The SMG introduced this international design competition to provide a new opportunity for the participation of students and young designers in the SDO 2008. In line with its theme 2008, the SMG argued, “the Competition aims to seek eco-friendly and creative designs that will make urban life sustainable in the future" (SMG, 2008a:15), resulting in four categories of the Competition announced as: 1) Earth (Environment) referring to architecture, landscaping and space design; 2) Water (Communication in Flow) including graphic and information design and animation; 3) Wind (Experience in Media Cityscape) referring to communication, information service systems, and transportation design; and 4) Fire (Objects in Urban Culture) including products, fashion and industrial art. Ultimately the SMG received 670 submissions from 40 countries around the world; the submissions were first reviewed by academics and a design professional panel organized by the SMG.

One important thing about the Seoul Design Competition was that the review for the award not only was conducted by experts such as academics and designers but also voted on by ordinary citizens via online and on-site. When visitors entered the event sites, they received a ballot on which they could pick two of their top choices for each sub category. The winner was determined on the basis of the sum of both the experts panel's review points and the citizens' votes. This here was one approach to civic participation – "participation via competitions" – newly developed by the SMG. In other words, while young designers and students could participate in the events via submission of their design work, ordinary citizens also could participate by viewing the exhibited design work and voting for which design that they found most desirable. This configuration of civic participation, what I call "*participation via competition*", became a major "routinized technique" of "civic participation" for the future Design Olympiad; moreover, the competition component grew and grew over the next two events in 2009 and 2010.

5.2.4 Seoul Design Exhibition: Promoting Corporate and State Actors

Seoul Design Exhibition was the largest activity and provided the major content of the SDO 2008 for its audiences. The SMG introduced the main goal of the exhibition as:

> An interactive, experience-oriented experimental design exhibition through which the public can observe and experience the competitiveness and complex value system of the city with its sustainable environment, products, graphic design, fashion and information design. (SMG, 2008a: 177)

The SMG argued that sustainable design of various fields such as product, fashion and environment could enhance the city's competitiveness, and audiences actually could experience how sustainable design was able to be materialized through participation in the

exhibition. Following this major goal, the exhibition was divided into three parts: the "Organizer's Exhibition", the "Special Exhibition", and the "Participatory Exhibition". Furthermore, there were four different major exhibitors at these exhibitions: "state actors", "domestic and international business actors", "domestic and international academic actors" and "invited domestic and international designers". In the Organizer's Exhibition, 59 Korean designers and 19 international designers were invited by the director general, Eunsook Kwon and the SMG. It was the signature exhibition of the SDO, and invited designers were asked to create their final design in line with the theme of the SDO 2008. The exhibited items included graphic, product, furniture, interactive and image design.

Figure 26. The Corporate PR Pavilions[35]

[35] Source: SMG (2008a: 252)

Even though the Organizer's Exhibition was the signature feature of the SDO 2008, the largest part of the exhibition was assigned to domestic and international corporate business actors. More specifically, about two-thirds of the exhibition space were assigned to 92 domestic and international business actors, along with large corporate actors such as Hanwha, one of Korea's chaebol companies which constructed their own company public relations pavilion within the stadium (see Figure 26). Typical content of these corporate exhibitions was filled with advertising and pubic relations materials along with products of these companies. Furthermore, there was a special space called the "World Design Market", in which these businesses actually had their products for sale to the audiences.

Another large part of the exhibition space was occupied by state actors such as the SMG as well as by other foreign city governments including Paris, New York, Milan, Hong Kong and Beijing. The SMG itself occupied the largest spaces and actively exhibited the city's design policy vision and ongoing creative city policy projects such as the Han River Renaissance Project and the Floating Island. At the same time, the Special Exhibition was assigned solely to promote the DDP construction; it was filled with potential images of the DDP and artistic works of its designer, the star architect Zaha Hadid. Similar to the SMG, other foreign city governments also displayed their own city's design-related policy along with their famous design companies and products. For example, under the theme of "Lifestyle Made in Italy", the city of Torino exhibited the images and actual products of its own famous motor vehicles, fashion and jewelry products. Through this exhibition, the SMG not only strived to demonstrate the vision and excellence of their 'creative' vision but also

desired to locate its creative city policy within the global trends by comparing it to other global cities' policies.

Korean domestic and international design schools were another category of actors who actively participated in the exhibition. Seventeen Korean design schools such as Kukmin University and Seoul National University and six foreign design schools such as Purdue University, School of Visual ARTS in New York and IED Design Milano were invited by the SMG. To attract prospective students, these schools also publicized their curricula as well as some of their notable faculties and students' works. These three actors – corporate, state and academic – comprised the so-called "Participatory Exhibition" while the Seoul Design Exhibition functioned well as a platform for the promotion of corporate and state actors. Under this structure, the possible role of the citizens was positioned either as mere “audiences” to view design experts' works or as future “consumers” targeted by corporations.

5.2.5 Seoul Design Festival: Uncertainty and Flexibility of the concept of “Design”

Another big part of the SDO 2008 was the Seoul Design Festival, which was planned for "focusing on citizen participation where visitors can *see, hear, smell, taste and touch* design" (SMG, 2008b: 23, italic added by myself). Based on these goals, various events were performed including the opening and closing ceremonies aired by MBC (one of Korea’s national pubic broadcasting stations), music concerts, dance and other performances, fashion shows, and food festivals. As seen in the above quote, one of the interesting features of the Seoul Design Festival was that many heterogeneous activities were performed under the central concept of "design". In other words, rather than conceptualizing "design" as abstract knowledge or human mental activity, the SMG actively translated "design" as "existential"

entities that people can actually "see, hear, smell, taste and touch" via all the five senses. The problem, however, was that this conceptualization was uncertain and extremely flexible so as to include almost every cultural activity within the umbrella of "design".

Under this conceptualization, traditional music, dance performances, and even cooking – which conventionally do not have any explicit relation to "design" – were gathered together. For example, while music festivals, which were here were ordinary music concerts filled with rock bands and dance music performances, were designated as part of the "Sound Design Festival" while food decorating events such as the East Asian foods Exhibition, the Chocolate Cake Exhibition and the Baking Class were publicized as part of the "Food Design Festival". Furthermore, the flash mob, performed by volunteer college students to advertise the SDO 2008 event, was listed under "Shocking Design"(SMG, 2008a: 300).

Hesmondalgh and Pratt (2005) noted that the conceptual fuzziness of the "cultural industry" or "creative industry", in which any activities related to the production and distribution of symbols and meanings can be included, causes measurement problems when gathering statistical data because it is unclear which industry should be included or excluded. Similarly, in the case of the SDO 2008, by using the 'fuzzy' concept of "design", the SMG could include *any* possible cultural events within their SDO 2008 designations that opened the door for clarity problems. In other words, this translation strategy, which appears to exploit the uncertainty and ambiguity of the concept of design, nevertheless allowed the SMG to assemble together multiple heterogeneous activities such as food, music, dance and performance with particular ease and convenience all under the template of design. Moreover,

because of this conceptual ambiguity, ‘design’ became perceived as comprising ubiquitous and existential entities which people could actually '*see, smell,* and *sense'*.

To sum up, the SDO 2008 was important in that it created the initial configuration of how future design Olympiads would be "routinized” and “standardized”. The format of sub-events such as conferences, competitions, exhibitions and festivals became a regular occurrence, with the major actors and their relationships not being transformed until the new mayor, Won-Soon Park, was elected and decided to put an end to these events. Again, the major ‘players’ in these events – state actors, domestic and international business capitals, and globally and domestically renowned design experts – resulted in less civic participation. Citizens, according to the emphasis of the SMG, were translated only into listeners of experts’ talks at the Seoul Design Conference, viewers of exhibitions prepared by state and business actors at the Seoul Design Exhibition, voters of products liked at the Seoul Design Competition, or lastly participating in the festival as an audience at the Seoul Design Festival. Even though citizens could 'actively participate' in all of these four distinct sub-events, civic participation in the SDO 2008 was extremely limited to pre-given configurations created by the SMG, business actors, and design experts.

5.3 Seoul Design Olympiad 2009

The second Olympiad, the SDO 2009, was held at the same venue as the first one at the Jamsil Olympic Complex, and during the same 21-day period (October 9th-29th). In terms of its number of visitors, the SMG reported that the second year attracted approximately 2 million visitors including 92,186 foreigners, which is similar to the numbers attending the SDO 2008 (SMG, 2009:30). The sponsors of the event also consisted of similar

actors: eleven government ministries including the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism, Ministry of Knowledge Economy, Ministry of Environment, and 44 domestic and international business firms including Samsung and Starbucks (SMG, 2009:28).

In terms of its organizational structure for the management and planning of the SDO 2009, the Seoul Design Foundation was newly involved with the SMG's special SDO management branch. Moreover, in order to collaborate with the design industry and design academia, the same three external committees – the Consultative Committee, the Organizational Committee, and the Project Committee – were organized with similar actors as those in 2008. For example, the Consultative Committee was filled with domestic design foundation and business executives and chairmen, while the Organization Committee consisted of nationally prominent cultural figures and designers. Finally the members of the Project Committee were selected from design practitioners and academics. In addition, the SMG appointed Eui-young Chun, a designer and professor in Kyonggi University as Director General of the Olympiad.

Likewise, the four sub-events – the Seoul Design Conference, Competition, Exhibition and Festival – were planned and performed with similar procedures and actors as its previous event. But at the same time, the aim and target audience of each sub-event became more clarified than noted in the SDO 2008. For example, while the objective of the Seoul Design Conference was explicitly stated as "spreading the value of design" to ordinary citizens and young designers, the main goal of the Seoul Design Exhibition was publicized as "supporting the design industry and business". Also, the main objective of the Seoul Design

Competition was "to promote talented young designers" while the Seoul Design Festival aimed "to educate citizens and students who are future designers" (SMG, 2009).

In sum, the organizational structure for the planning and the management of the SDO 2009 remained consistent from 2008, and citizens in Seoul still did not receive any assigned place within the planning and management of this city's mega event.

5.3.1 Spreading the new economic value of Design: "Designomics"

Even though citizens did not participate in any management and planning process of the event, ironically the SMG explicitly strove to combine the concepts of "civic participation" and "the economic value of design" to legitimize the necessity for the event in SDO 2009. In its official white paper of that year, the SMG stressed two main goals of its second Olympiad that were "civic participation" and "Designomics: design +economics":

> The main goal of the SDO 2009 is "civic participation". The SDO 2009 should not be an opportunity for only design experts who usually create a discourse on "design" and unilaterally deliver it to citizens, but be a chance to share the idea that design can be applied to all areas and that citizen themselves are actually *the subject of design*. Furthermore, (by actively participating in the SDO 2009), all citizens should find the *latent value of design*, and they should develop their ability to look at "design" for being a foundation to construct *the nation as a design power*. (SMG, 2009:12 translated and italics added by myself).

As shown in the quote, the SMG stressed the importance of civic participation in the event, stating that since "design" has "latent value" and applicable to every field, every citizen has the potential to be a 'potential' designer. Under this notion, the SMG introduced the main theme of the SDO 2009 – "i DESIGN" – connoting that "I am a designer, you are also designer, and now we are all designers" (SMG, 2009:17). With its emphasis on the

citizen as "(potential) designer", the SMG explicitly claimed that design could create new economic value. The SMG also introduced the term "designomics":

> This implies that design not only can solve current economic depression, but also can enhance a nation's long-term economic and industrial development. (SMG, 2009:13)

Arguing that design is a major tool to enhance a nation's economic development, the SMG highlighted the following positive features:1) investment in design has a relatively short investment recovery compared with investment in technology, 2) a citizen's great eye for design can contribute to economic development, and 3) design is a useful tool to enhance the quality of citizens' welfare and social services (SMG, 2009:13). Once again, design was presented as a "panacea" which has the 'fundamental' character to resolve economic and urban problems and to enhance the quality of life for citizens.

Here, what is distinct is that the SMG started framing "civic participation" within the discourse of developmentalism, in which citizens should develop or enhance their own abilities not only for themselves, *but also for the nation and city's development.* In this regard, the SMG argues that "i DESIGN", the main concept of civic participation, means that we all (every single citizen) should be "the subject of design (*designue juche*,디자인의 주체) in order to find new economic value and to overcome this economic depression" (SMG, 2009:17). This clearly goes against more liberal understandings of creative individuality found in similar creative city projects in western cities such as Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield and Barcelona (Bell and Jane, 2003).

Moreover, this clearly shows how the SMG articulated such neoliberal values as "global competition", "responsible individuals" and "new type of citizenship" through the use

of the developmentalist idea of "national development". Several Korean scholars argue that the influence of neoliberalism in Korea brought various reforms not only at the level of the government and business practices – such as enhancing "innovation" and "flexibilization" – but also at the personal level with the creation of the "self-managing subject" (Seo, 2011:88). Song (2007, 2009) argues that the subjectification of individuals through these new values of "self-autonomy", "creativity", and "self-cultivation" became a part of the pivotal "technology of neoliberalism" for young people in Korea. Similarly, Cho (2008) points out three important elements of South Korea's new governmentality after the IMF intervention in 1997 in terms of the "legitimation of global competition", "emphasis on responsible individuals" and "the birth of a new kind of citizenship" (Cho, 2008:249). By analyzing the popularized image of Korean MLB players in the U.S, he argues that the successful Korean MLB players provide the best examples of those who are successful in global competition and responsible for their own well-being. He argues that these globally successful and self-responsible individuals are "a particular type of citizen" who is also "responsible for national competence and development" (Cho, 2008:249).

Through the SDO 2009, the SMG strove to promote a new type of citizen called the "creative citizen" who had the potential to discover the new economic value in relatively noble fields such as "design" through active participation in global mega events such as the "SDO" and to develop her/his own creative ability not only to win global competitions but also to enhance national development. By articulating the neoliberal values within developmentalism, each sub-event (i.e., the Seoul Design Conference, Exhibition,

Competition and Festival) utilized "routinized techniques" or "standardized procedures" to let citizens experience and explore these values.

5.3.2 Seoul Design Conference: Evidences of Designomics?

The SMG's vision of "i Design" in the SDO 2009 – in which every citizen should find a value of design in order to create a new economic value – was directly supported by the Seoul Design Conference. The SMG introduced this conference which was given the themes of "Interflow and Consilience" and "dedicated to discovering new alternatives for future design through tearing down boundaries between different disciplines and seeking integration between design and other areas" (SMG, 2009b). Under these themes, three distinct conferences took place: the "Design Seoul International Conference", the "Citizen Design Forum" and the "48 Hour Inclusive Design Challenge in Seoul". The Design Seoul International Conference was the largest conference among the three with its three thousand visitors.

Taking on the theme, "Designomics(Design+Economy)/Design is Economy", the conference took place from October 9th to the 11th, with a keynote speech by Mayor, Sehoon Oh, a sessional Speech, and a round table discussion with international and domestic design firm executives/chairmen[36]. With these international and domestic design experts, Sehoon Oh, the mayor of SMG, also gave a keynote speech, which stressed and publicized the

[36] These international experts in the field of design include Gianfranco Zaccai, Chairman of Design Continuum; Davin Stowell, CEO and founder of the Smart Design group; Dan Formosa, Co-founder of Smart Design; prominent designers including Hara Kenya, Art director of Muji and Youngse Kim, CEO of Inno Design; and famous academics such as Olivier Peyricot, Professor in Ecole Nationale Supeieure d'Art Decoratif de Paris in France and Su Dan, President of the Environmental Arts Council at Tsinghua University in China.

importance of Seoul's creative city policy. By following the SMG's main theme of the SDO 2009, the main content of the conference consisted of three sub-categories: "Design Leadership", "Designomics" and the "New Value of Design"; the actual speech topics included "Aesthetic Sense as Economic Resources", "An Economy of Innovation", "New Value of Design", "Design Power, Design as Life Culture and its Economic Role" and "Designomics and Korea's Design Education".

As shown in the titles of the conference programs, it was obvious that these renowned figures emphasized the importance of design and its economic value based on their experiences and specialties both domestically and globally. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the SMG, these were the key actors promoting "designomics" grounded through their own success and public recognition in the field of design. At the same time, these experts could become important "translators" who actually would provide evidence of how the importance and value of "design" does not solely lie with domestic trends but rather with undeniable global trends. Moreover, given that these people and their economic and academic successes often were viewed as "innovative" and holding "new value" in the field of design, they could be perceived as "living evidence" of "the value of design", which was what the SMG really wanted to prove with its utilization of particular tangible actors and their achievements.

5.3.3 Seoul Design Exhibition 2009: Promoting Corporate and State Actors

The Seoul Design Exhibition 2009 was structured followed similar organizational structures. The SMG introduced its main theme of the 2009 exhibition as the "forecast of global design prospects, presentation of design status quo and future possibilities and projection of the vision of Design Seoul" (SMG, 2009c). Using these themes, the exhibition

was divided into four different sub-exhibitions: "Principal Exhibition- i Design", "Citizen Participatory Exhibition", "Design Exchange Exhibition" and "Special Exhibition". <Table 6> indicates the detailed information about each exhibition plan and major organizer.

Not surprisingly, the major exhibitors were the same actors as participated in its previous exhibition including state actors (the SMG and other city governments and national governments); domestic and international business actors (corporate actors); and domestic and international design-related schools (academic actors). In particular, with the SMG's emphasis on "designomics" as the overall theme of the SDO 2009, the participation of domestic and international business actors was strongly encouraged so that consequentially most of the sub-exhibitions actually included the direct involvement of corporate actors. For example, the "Principal Exhibition" included "World Design Market Seoul 2009", in which both domestic and international design products were presented and directly sold to its visitors, and similarly the "Design Exchange Exhibition" contained the "Design Corporation Exhibition", in which design-related corporations presented their design projects and products (SMG, 2009a). In addition, "i-Brand Marketplace", another noteworthy program, had one of its main sub-events as the Principal Exhibition that aimed to show how the total process of design-to-production-to-marketing was actually performed by the interplay of actual designers, manufacturers, and marketers together (SMG, 2009a: 144-158). Moreover, by collaborating with the Seoul Broadcasting System, one of the Korea's commercial network TV stations, the SMG produced a TV show titled "Design How Much?" which first illustrated how selected designers developed their designs together with manufacturers and marketers and then recruited panels actually bid on the products during the program’s studio

recording time. In addition, the products being bid upon were exhibited at the on-site exhibition site of the SDO 2009 (SMG, 2009a: 144-158). The SMG argued that this collaboration between the exhibition and the TV show would be helpful for the general public to learn about the "the new economic value of design"(SMG, 2009a: 144).

Table 6. The Participants of Seoul Design Exhibition 2009

Exhibition Type	Sub-Exhibition	Major Organizers
Principal Exhibition	i Brand Marketplace	Domestic Corporate Actors and Domestic Designers
	Architecture: A User's Manual	Domestic and International Architects
	Seoul Vision	State Actor (SMG)
	Cultural Design of Korea, China, Japan	State Actors
	World Design Market Seoul 2009	Domestic and International Corporate Actors
Design Exchange Exhibition	Seoul Designer's Dream	Domestic designers
	World Design Cultures	State Actors (11 national governments)
	Design Corporation Exhibition	Domestic and International Corporate Actors
	Design Exploration	Academic Actors
	2009 Design Job	Domestic Corporate Actors
Citizen Participatory Exhibition	2009 Beautiful Bench Competition Winners' Exhibition	State Actor (SMG)
	2009 Featured Artists Competition Winners' Exhibition	State Actor(SMG)
	Seoul Public Design Certification Exhibition	State Actor (SMG)
	Public Facilities Standard Design Exhibition	State Actor (SMG)
	2009 Public Design Competition Winners' Exhibition	State Actor (SMG)
	i Plaza	State Actor (SMG)
	2009 Seoul "Good Sign" Exhibition	State Actor (SMG)
	2009 Steel Design competition Winner's Exhibition	Corporate Actors
	2009 Seoul Architecture Culture Festival	State Actor (SMG)
	World Design Capital Seoul 2010 Young Designer's Workshop Results Exhibition	State Actor (SMG)
	World Design Capital Seoul 2010 Citizens Competition Winners' Exhibition	State Actor (SMG)
Special Exhibition	INDEX :Award 2009 Exhibition	International Corporate Actors
	Design Seoul Tube	State Actor (SMG)
	i-Green Design	State Actors (SMG)
	DDP Collection	State Actors (SMG)
	Flower Design	Domestic Designers
	Seoul Call Center : Dasan 120	State Actors (SMG)
	An Jaebok Chair Design Collection	Domestic Designer

In terms of the promotion of state actors in the exhibition, the SMG used a vast amount of spaces at which to publicize not only the city's design-related policy but also more broadly the city's urban policy itself. Within the Principal Exhibition, the SMG organized the special exhibition titled "Seoul Vision" that consisted of eight policy projects which represented the SMG's current and future designs along with such urban policy projects as the "Design Seoul Policy", the "Han River Renaissance Project" and the "Yongsan Redevelopment Project" (SMG, 2009a: 162-184). <Figure 27> shows the Seoul Vision exhibition. Many of these exhibited policy projects such as the Han River Renaissance Project and the Yongsan Redevelopment Project, however, already had sparked public controversy and strong social criticism. From the viewpoint of the SMG, this exhibition itself was an important public relations opportunity for making public naturally exposed to the messages that conveyed the necessity of SMG's policy projects within such a positive 'climate' of creativity, innovation, and the new economic value of design.

Moreover, besides this special exhibition for the SMG, all the sub-exhibitions that constituted the "Citizen Participatory Exhibition" were filled with booths showing various award-winning products and designs from several competitions promoted and held by the SMG. As illustrated in <Table 6>, there were eleven different exhibitions; most of them – with the exception of only one exhibition – were planned for presenting designs or products awarded by the SMG's design competitions. For example, the 2009 Seoul "Good Sign" Exhibition displayed the winners of the 2009 Seoul Good Sign Competition held by the SMG while the Seoul Public Design Certification Exhibition presented the winners of the first and second competitions for the Seoul Public Design Certification.

Figure 27. The Picture of the Seoul Vision Exhibition[37]

The SMG argued that these competitions were organized to encourage ordinary citizens, who participated in the events, to reflect upon their opinions and thereby spark "civic participation" in relevant public policy. However, at the same time, these competitions functioned as one way for public relations strategies to spread and legitimize the city's design policy. Because the SMG decided on the theme, format and the guidelines of the competition, the very act itself of civic participation in these competitions functioned only as a support of the city's policy. In other words, when someone chose to participate in these competitions, he or she had to follow the SMG's already established, themes, guidelines and formats in order to win the competitions; therefore such participation demonstrated that the participant's support of the policy regardless of whether he or she actually intended to support the policy.

[37] Source: SMG (2009a: 184).

5.3.4 Seoul Design Competition 2009: Limiting "Civic Participation" via Competition

The strategy, coined here as "participation via competitions", due to its selective structure is a limited way to be involved in civic participation. The Seoul Design Competition, another main event in the SDO 2009, clearly had its limitations in terms of civic participation. The SMG argued that it chose the theme of the Seoul Design Competition 2009 as "Interflow and Consilience" in order to emphasize the event's focus on the multi-disciplinary and multicultural aspects of the competition, given that the competition was open to everyone regardless of nationality, education level or design category (SMG, 2009a: 377). Also, the keywords of the competition were "Low carbon", "Eco-friendly" and "Natural energy" to demonstrate the city's interest in a green and eco-friendly policy direction. Of the 1206 submissions, 80 percent were from Korean nationals and 10 percent from foreign nationals, with only fewer than 10 percent of the submissions from ordinary citizens. The majority of these submissions were made by undergraduate/graduate students in the arts and design and professionals in design-related fields (SMG, 2009a: 383).

As distinct from the previous event of the SDO 2008, the SMG argued that one of the innovative features of the 2009 Seoul Design Competition lay with the participation of citizens in the selection of its winner. Thus, during the three stages of screening by the professional jury (consisting of academics and design experts), 126 designs were displayed in the main venue of the SDO 2009. Citizens then could vote for five of their top choices among these 126 designs; the final winner was decided by the sum of the jury's evaluations and the citizens' voting results. This competition process demonstrates that the involvement of

citizens was limited to either their "participation in the competition" or their "voting for the design they prefer," similar to what occurred in the previous year's event.

This whole process of competition – allowing for only a limited type of "civic participation" via "voting" or "participating in the competitions" – thus represents how the SMG articulated and combined the heterogeneous concepts of competition, sustainability and civic participation. For the SMG, progressive concepts like "sustainability", "eco-friendly" or "creativity" functioned as conceptual resources which could induce and encourage people to participate in the competition by using them as keywords of the Seoul Design Competition as well as of the framework of the "competition" itself based on the logic of selection and exclusion; therefore the competition evolved into an overall translation strategy by which these progressive concepts of "sustainability", "eco-friendly" and "creativity" were explored and experienced by citizens. More specifically, because civic participation was structured only in terms of becoming either a "voter" who evaluated the submissions or a "competitor" who actually 'raced' in the competition, citizens would come to recognize these concepts in terms of the hierarchy of which one was better or which one was worse. What is missing from this strategy was any inquiry into why such progressive concepts like sustainability, eco-friendly, and creativity should be explored and experienced under the framework of competition, itself in turn based on the logic of "exclusion", "selection", and "assortment". In other words, one should ask whether the framework of a competition is a proper way to discuss social issues surrounding "sustainability", "eco-friendly" and "creativity".

Thereby, under this framework of "competition", these progressive concepts were instead treated as certain tools by which to win a "global competition" rather than as

alternative values by which to solve social problems. Through the SDO 2009's molding of these concepts within the framework of various competitions, the SMG thus explicitly and inexplicitly 'domesticated' these concepts in ways that transformed them from being considered as tools to avenues by which to win "global competitions". This approach appears to be inherently connected to what the SMG continually argued for which was the enhancement of global competitiveness and city brand power. Therefore, it is important to question why civic participation had to be limited in this context to a form of "voting" or "participation in a competition" in order for everyday people to experience or explore notions of "sustainability", "eco-friendly" and "creativity". The more radical question, however, lies with why this structure of civic participation had not been raised until Won-Soon Park, the new mayor, decided to discontinue the annual Seoul Design Olympiad.

5.3.5 The Seoul Design Festival: experiencing the value of "design"

Another facet of the SDO 2009 was the Seoul Design Festival, which aimed to enable citizens to actually 'experience' design. At its previous event in 2008, the SMG added many heterogeneous activities under the concept of "design" by exploiting its conceptual flexibility and ambiguous features. Through this translation strategy, the SMG was able to conceptualize its music festival as a "Sound Design Festival" and its food-decorating exhibition as a "Food Design Festival". By following this strategy, the SMG similarly divided the festival into four different sub-categories including "i-Design Playground", "i-Design Stage", "i-Design Square" and "i-Design Seoul".

One of the distinctive features of the Seoul Design Festival in 2009 was that more educational programs were planned for young children and students than in the previous year.

Importantly, many of these educational programs – which originally aimed to guide children to experience and explore design for developing their 'creativity' – were guided by the SMG and corporate business actors; each of these programs used the mini-festivals as opportunities to promote their policies or products. For example, the Green Cooking Festival organized by Fissler Korea, a Korean branch of the multinational cookware company of Fissler, became a chance to 'naturally' introduce their cookware to its participants via a hands-on format (<Figure 28> represents the Green Cooking Festival). Similarly, the Color Design Festival was planned and guided by Alpha Colors, a Korean domestic art supply company; likewise Alpha Colors had the opportunity to let children and their parents 'naturally experience and explore' their art stationary. The SMG also organized many festivals that guided participants to experience and discover the city's design policy. For example, the Design Seoul Tour was executed to enable citizens to tour the Design Seoul specialized streets while the Haechi Festival as well as Parade were performed to boost the recognition of Haechi, which was newly created as the symbol of Seoul under the city's creative city policy. In this regard, what the SMG argued was that "experiencing and exploring" design within education programs that were 'designed' especially for the campaign 'converted' corporate products and the promotion of Design Seoul policy into learning opportunities.

To sum up, The SDO 2009 emphasized the economic value of 'design' by using the concept of "designomics" and relied on the participation and the promotion of state and corporate actors to such a degree that their presence increased quantitatively and qualitatively. Even though civic participation was greatly stressed by the SMG, the format of civic

participation, however, was not different from how it played out at its previous event: limited in its form to "participation via competitions".

Figure 28. The Picture of the Green Cooking Festival[38]

5.4. The Seoul Design Fair 2010: Seoul as "World Design Capital" and "UNESCO Creative City"

In 2010, the city of Seoul received two international awards, the World Design Capital 2010 and City of Design (as a member of UNECO’s Creative City Network). The SMG argued that these two appointments conferred by the global organizations of UNESCO and ICSID (International Council of Societies for Industrial Design) greatly contributed not only to the acquisition of Seoul’s international brand as a creative design city but also to the advancement of Korea's national brand (SMG, 2010b). This global recognition tended to be

[38] Source: SMG (2009a:421)

publicized as among the important achievements of the city's ongoing creative city policy. Within this atmosphere, the third Seoul Design Olympiad, newly named the "Seoul Design Fair", was launched as one of the main programs to publicize these two global renowned awards and as a major campaign tool itself to raise public recognition and to expand “public participation” in the creative city policy. The Seoul Design Fair (SDF) was held from September 17th to October 21st for a duration of 21 days. The main venue for the events was the same Jamsil Olympic Stadium used in previous years; the sub-events, however, were performed in the newly built four design clusters within the city of Seoul that included the Dongdaemun DDP area, the Mapo-Hongik University area, the Guro Digital complex area, and the Gangnam-Shinsa area. These specially designated areas formed Seoul’s major creative industry clusters, which contained artists, creative workers, and fashion and other companies in the field of design (i.e., industrial, product, environmental, packaging, and visual multimedia content production). It is important to note that the participation of corporations and design-related academic institutions was greatly increased at the SDF 2010.

As shown in <Table 7>, the number of corporations participated in the events increased from 69 in 2008 and 158 in 2009 to 243 in 2010. Moreover, the number of academic institutions increased from 23 in 2008 to 56 in 2010. In terms of the numbers of visitors, the SDF attracted 1.86 million visitors, a figure similar to attendance in the previous two years. The SDF 2010 was similar to its previous events with regard to its organizational structure for planning and management; therefore the SMG and the Seoul Design Foundation took a major role by collaborating with the same three external committees: the Consultative Committee, the Organization Committee, and the Project Committee. These committees

consisted of international and domestic design foundation executives and chairmen, prominent cultural figures and designers, and academics in design-related fields. Of special note is the fact that more corporate executives were selected as members of these external committees. For example, the Consultative Committee included Mooksuk Kang, vice president of LG Telecom, along with Kukhyun Jung, a design management adviser for Samsung Electronics while the Organization Committee contained Seunghan Lee, CEO of the Samsung Tesco Homeplus Group. Interestingly, the SMG appointed an academic, Kyoung-Ran Choi, professor of Kookmin University, as Director General of the Fair.

In terms of its sub-events, four different sub-events – the Seoul Design Exhibition, the Seoul Design Conference, and the Seoul Design Competition – now were reconfigured into three distinct segments: "Design for Economy", "Design for Participation", and “Design for Education". Although the titles of the sub-events were changed under these new names, the actual sub-events within each segment contained activities that were comparable to those of the previous two Seoul Design Olympiads. In particular, the major participants of the sub-events were filled with the same actors (e.g., the SMG and other state actors, international and domestic corporate business actors, international and domestic academics, and design professionals). Also mirroring the two previous Olympiads, citizens again could not participate in the planning and management processes, and their roles were limited once more to being mere audience or participating in the competitions as "voters" or "competitors".

Table 7. The Summary of the Seoul Design Olympiads 2008, 2009, 2010

		SDO 2008	SDO 2009	SDF 2010
The Number of Participants	State actor	42	50	109
	Corporations	69	158	243
	Design related Foundations	23	40	18
	Academic Actors	23	22	56
The Number of Sub Events and Programs		4 sub-events 86 Programs	4 sub-events 67 Programs	3 sub-events 50 Programs
The Number of Submissions for Seoul Design Competition		666	1,206	2,745
Total Budget for the Event				
The Number of Visitors		1,980,000 (Foreign visitors: 59,000)	2,010,000 (Foreign visitors: 92,000)	1,860,000 (Foreign visitors: 91,000)

5.4.1 Design For All?

The theme for SDF 2010 was "Design for All" that connoted "the true value of design, which aims to develop industries, to share the benefit of economic development, and to help

people communicate harmoniously" (SMG, 2010b: 17). Under this theme, the SMG introduced three keywords of the SDF 2010: "Economy: Design can develop economy; Sharing: Design can share jobs; and Future: Design can offer the future vision" (SMG, 2010b:17). In keeping with these themes and keywords, the SMG proposed three distinct goals of the SDF 2010. Firstly, the SDF 2010 would contribute to guiding citizens to understand and share the value of design with the aim of further developing the design industry. Secondly, the SDF 2010 would enhance its function as a "market" where design-related business corporations would sell their products to create actual economic value. Thirdly, the SDF 2010 would offer educational opportunities for citizens to develop their "creative minds" (SMG, 2010:13). These three goals were performed in line with the newly titled segments of the event: "Design for Economy", "Design for Participation", and "Design for Education".

One of the important changes in the SDF 2010 was that the participation of private corporations dramatically increased from 69 corporate participants in 2008 to 243 corporate participants in 2010. This dramatic increase in the participation of corporate actors was directly related to the planning and management of the Design for Economy segment that explicitly aimed to promote corporate actors; therefore the main events held by this segment were filled with corporate public relations booths. For example, the Seoul Brand Exhibition was occupied by the campaigns for Samsung's Galaxy cell phones and LG's interior products while both the Domestic Corporation and Global Corporation Exhibitions were filled with domestic and international design-related companies' products. These companies included 81 international corporations such as Nespresso Cafe and INAX and 52 domestic companies

including Samsung and Hanssem. <Figure 29> shows Seoul Brand Exhibition's Samsung Galaxy cell phone booth. At the same time, in the Design Market, design corporations ranging from large companies like Samsung to small design firms and independent designers were able to promote and sell their products and design works. From the SMG's viewpoint, the innovative and novel products displayed and sold at the events were important non-human actors that demonstrated and provided strong evidence of "the new value of design" in the same way that the internationally and domestically renowned designers and academics functioned as human actors who supported "the new value of design".

Figure 29. The Photo of the Samsung Galaxy Cellphone Booth[39]

[39] Source: SMG (2010b:147)

The “Design for Participation” segment was intended to pursue the objectives of "enhancing of citizen participation" through "eco-friendly and sharable design" (SMG, 2010b:14). Even though the SMG argued that Design for Participation was planned to show how "Designomics" could bring about societal benefits, the main sub-events nonetheless focused on displaying the results of various design-related competitions in which civic participation was practiced solely in terms of what I refer to as "participation via competitions". For example, nine different competitions, among them the Seoul International Design Competition and the Seoul International Bicycle Design Competition, were promoted primarily by the SMG and occupied 37 sub-events in the Design for Participation segment. In addition, the rest of the sub-events were planned mostly to promote the SMG's creative city policy. For instance, the Urban Design Exhibition presented Seoul's urban design policy by focusing on the Design Seoul policy while the Seoul Upcycling (Reform) Fair displayed the Upcycling Competition submissions in order to promote Seoul's environment policy. Due to such structural constraints, civic participation was performed only in a highly limited form, reminiscent of its format at the previous two events.

Finally, the Design for Education segment was constructed to encourage citizens to explore and exercise their 'creative minds' through design education. The Seoul Design Conference was reorganized as one sub-event of this segment, and 15 internationally and domestically renowned designers and academics were invited to give presentations, lectures and open discussions to the general public. The topics included such themes as "Creating Economic Value through Design", "Re-designing Design for Future Survival" and "Seoul, Where Citizens are Happy and The City the World Loves". These topics were directly related

to what the SMG was striving to promote by means of its concept of the "creative citizen" who could actively develop his/her creative ability to successfully win global competitions not only for themselves but also for national economic development such as those held in the previous years.

Moreover, the SDF 2010 focused on children and youth education programs consisting of interactive and experience-oriented activities. Similar to the previous event in 2009, the main organizers of these educational programs were the SMG and corporate sponsors except for a few NGOs, so therefore these presentations were ‘naturally’ related to the promotion of Seoul's creative city policy and corporate branding. For example, the Seoul Color Therapy Class was organized by Alpha Colors, who conducted the Color Design Festival in 2009. In this program, children and their parents together painted various pictures in order to understand their psychological condition and relationship. What is noteworthy is that the children and their parents used crayons provided by Alpha Colors and filled in pictures with "Seoul Color", comprised of 10 colors that had been designated as the Colors of Seoul by the SMG (one of the projects of the Design Seoul policy). In this regard, an education program became but another opportunity to promote state and corporate actors.

To sum up, three urban mega events of the SDOs were organized and managed by an assemblage of three key actors: the SMG (state actors), international and domestic private capital (corporate actors), and international and domestic design-related academics and professionals (expert actors). The SMG successfully mobilized its supporting actors of private capital, academics, and design professionals to effectively present its 'creative vision'. At the same time, corporate actors and design professionals had the chance to promote their

own products and design works through participating in and supporting Seoul's urban mega events. Nonetheless, civic participation was limited to what I refer to as "participation via competition," thereby completely neglecting citizens' involvement in the planning and the management processes of the events. Through the three SDO events, four sub-events – the Conference, Exhibition, Competition and Festival – also were developed as "strategies" that were guided by certain procedures. For example, the Seoul Design Conference's function was to spread "the new value of design" via global and domestic experts' lectures and talks while the Seoul Design Exhibition was designed to promote state actors and business actors by displaying their products and design works.

Through these sub-event formats, the SMG planned to promote a new type of citizen – the "creative citizen" – who actively could explore and utilize the new economic value with in a 'noble' field like "design" to enhance not only his or her own creative ability but also to contribute to the development of the city and the nation by winning global competitions. In order to foster this 'creative citizen', the SMG actively articulated various heterogeneous concepts such as "global competition", "city branding", "designomics", "civic participation", "sustainability", "eco-friendly" and "creativity". Neoliberal values such as "global competition" and "autonomous" individuals became knowledge that was taken for granted, and progressive concepts like "sustainability" and "eco-friendly" were exploited as tools by which to win "global competitions". At the same time, the SMG put this new concept of 'creative citizen' into the framework of developmentalist discourse, through which individuals not only enhance their creative abilities but also develop city brands and national

power. In this regards, it is possible to conceptualize the SDO as a "neoliberal-developmental urban mega event", in which neoliberal values were articulated with developmentalist ideas.

In its final closing ceremony in the SDF, the mayor of Seoul, Sehoon Oh, mentioned that the third Olympiad – newly named the "Seoul Design Fair" – was extremely successful in terms of the increase in corporate and citizen participation. Based on this success, he boldly argued that Seoul Design Fair would be held bi-annually in the newly built venue, the DDP, constructed as the major policy project within Seoul's creative city policy. As I explained in the previous chapter, however, the mayor's dream never came to fruition due to his sudden resignation in 2011 because his referendum on free lunches was invalidated due to low voter turnout. The new mayor, Won-Soon Park, decided to stop the Seoul Design Fair from being an urban mega event, just as he delayed the construction of the DDP and re-discussed the usage of the DDP with its citizens.

5.5. From "Urban Mega Events" to "Citizen Hearing Workshops": Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7

After taking the mayor's office, Won-soon Park opened various "citizen hearing workshops" and deliberation meetings, which aimed to gather reflections of citizens' opinions about Seoul's creative city policy. Through these workshops and deliberation meetings, various topics such as the construction of the DDP and Seoul's Design policy in general were discussed among SMG state officials, the mayor, and various citizen groups that included civic society activists, academics, creative workers and artists.

When I started my fieldwork in June 2012 in Seoul, I found the public announcement about the discontinuation of the SDF 2012 in Seoul Design Foundation's official website. It

said that there would be no more 'SDF-like urban mega events' for directly supporting only the design industry, and it added that the SMG and Seoul Design Foundation were together gathering citizens' opinions about the new plans for the SDF and the Design Seoul policy in general. Various citizen-hearing workshops were posted at their websites, and the topics of the workshops were selected in many cases from the Seoul Design Foundation-launched Facebook club named "What Can Design Do for Seoul?" where ordinary citizens, artists, creative workers and artists could express and share their opinions regarding the city's Design Seoul Policy.

During my stay in Seoul from June 2012 to September 2012 and from September 2013 to December 2013, I had the opportunity to participate in several workshops held by the Seoul Design Foundation. In most cases, these workshops were relatively small in size, in which generally 20 to 40 volunteers gathered and discussed certain topics regarding the city's design policy and creative city policy in general. For example, the topic of the workshop in which I participated was "The Workshop for Seoul's Public Information Design: Making Kind Seoul", where various citizens discussed problems related to Seoul's public information design policy. The participation was on a voluntary basis, and open to the general public; as a consequence, participants were from various backgrounds including designers, architects, artists, musicians, undergrad/graduate students, and state officials. Most of them actively participated in the "What Can Design Do for Seoul?" Facebook club, and had a strong desire to discuss more deeply the city's Design policy in an off-line environment. Seoul Design Foundation provided the venue for such a workshop in their buildings; the results of the

workshop were discussed with the new chairman of the Board of Seoul Design Foundation, Sangsoo Ahn.

Within these various citizen-hearing workshops, I had a chance to participate in one of the relatively 'biggest' events, which was named the "Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7". This event included public discussions, volunteer citizens' public talks about their opinions on Seoul's creative city policy, and such cultural happenings as music concerts. The overall event epitomized how the new mayor – and what I call the "post-developmental policy network" consisting of state actors, citizen groups, and NGOs – re-organized the city's urban mega event in distinctively unique ways from its planning to its management.

The event actually was born from simply one casual Facebook post in June 2012. When the number of the Facebook club members reached over 10,000, the new chairman of the Board of Seoul Design Foundation, Sangsoo Ahn, posted an innocuous Facebook message on the club’s page:

> Now, the citizen members of "What Design can do for Seoul" are about to reach 10,000. Shouldn't we open some kinds of festival to celebrate it? What should we do?...about one month from now... the 1st weekend of July...7th July to 8th July? How about an overnight festival? What role would designers play? Please write unique ideas about this festival!

In response to this 'casual' message, there were 225 replies from various citizens that contained ideas about the format and the content of such celebratory events; the members of the club also discussed one another's ideas on the Facebook club page. Among the 225 replies, some people suggested a TED conference-like event, in which volunteers presented their opinions about the city's design policy; others proposed a 21st Century Town Meeting-like event, in which citizens would participate in round table discussions (e.g., 10-12 people

per table) and deliberate in depth about policy issues. Through these active discussions among the members of the Facebook club, the event's proposed formats ultimately were formulated as two different main activities entitled "I am a Talking Designer" and the "100 People Round-table Discussion". The "I am a Talking Designer" section intended that volunteer designers and ordinary citizens would present their opinions about the city's design policy and design in general. The "100 People Round-table Discussion" section proposed that ordinary citizens would discuss two topics: "What do citizens of Seoul want from Design?" and "What can Design do for Seoul?" Both sets of discussions were proposed and agreed upon by the members of the Facebook club.

After deciding the format of the event, citizen volunteers who had experience in event-planning worked with the staff at the Seoul Design Foundation, and frequently posted about the progress of the event preparation at the Facebook club page and at the official website of the Seoul Design Foundation. Finally 15 people volunteered for the "I am a Talking Designer" section that consisted of various types of citizens such as designers, a physician, academics, artists, a librarian, and NPOs (See Table 8). Moreover, the new mayor of Seoul and the new chairman of the Board of Seoul Design Foundation joined as presenters in the event as well. Regarding the "100 People Round-table Discussion", participants were recruited via e-mail, the Facebook club, the Seoul Design Foundation website, and even via on-site registration. In addition, the discussion facilitators, who helped to keep participants on point, were recruited via the online website and the Facebook club; the Seoul Design Foundation set up a special training workshop for these recruited volunteers. I myself also participated in the event as one of the discussion facilitators. The title of the event was finally

decided upon as the "Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7 Festival", and four goals of the event were chosen via citizens' discussions. These goals set up that 1) the event would be a "public sphere" for designers and citizens to discuss the Design Seoul policy; 2) the event would strive to formulate a new governance structure for civic participation; 3) the results of the discussion would be reflected directly in the future creative city policy; and 4) the event would be an off-line meeting opportunity for the members of the Facebook club to deepen their interaction and idea-sharing.

The event was held on July 7th in the Dongdaemun Historical Park within the DDP, where the SDF was originally planned to be held. About 300 participants including 230 citizens and 70 SMG and Seoul Design Foundation officials were involved in the events. In the first section of the event, "I am a Talking Designer", fifteen presenters from various backgrounds, who were mostly not renowned designer/academics, presented their opinions about the Design Seoul policy and their own design-related work. Each presentation contained different ideas, but not any single presentation argued that design could comprise a "new economic value" nor enhance the city's brand power or global competitiveness. Rather, some presenters, like Action Start, criticized the current labor situation of freelancer designers in Korea, and introduced their Freelancer Designer Cooperative's work. Furthermore, Won-soon Park, the new mayor, gave a presentation about his new vision of the city's creative city policy (See Figure 30), in which he argued that the Design Seoul policy should not focus on hardware construction like the DDP construction or Urban mega event (e.g., the SDO) but rather turn toward a more 'citizen-oriented' direction.

Meanwhile, in the "100 people round-table discussion" – based on the two main themes "What do citizens of Seoul want from Design?" and "What can Design do for Seoul?" – 100 citizens were divided into fourteen small discussion groups (See Figure 31).

Figure 30. The Picture of The Mayor, Won-Soon Park, Presenting the New Vision of the Design Seoul Policy in the Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7

In the first section, participants freely expressed what they wanted from Design; afterwards the discussion facilitators gathered each of the thirty tables' opinions. The main discussion leader shared the results of the first set of mini-discussions; then each group explained to all the participants what these opinions exactly meant and why they chose them. Based on these thirty opinions, the main discussion leader and the discussion facilitators reorganized eight larger "citizens' opinion categories" by merging similar ideas altogether;

next in the second discussion section, participants discussed these citizens' opinion categories in more depth. The eight opinion categories related to "What can Design do for Seoul?" included: 1) Offer new communication platforms between the Citizen and the State and among citizens through Design, 2) Avoid a mere display like Design Policy, 3) Place IT technology into public design, 4) Balance "old" and "new" for Urban design, 5) Add inclusive Design for disabled persons and disadvantaged groups, 6) Utilize an eco-friendly design, 7) Satisfy public needs via Design, and 8) Include all other themes. After the second set of discussions, participants voted for which issue was the most urgent for Seoul's Design policy; 44 percent of participants chose "Offer new communication platforms between citizen and state and among citizens through Design"

Figure 31. The Picture of 100 People Round-Table Discussion in Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7

Table 8. The List of the Presenters in Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7

The Name of Presenters	Type of Actor	Title of Talk
Sangsoo Ahn	State Actor (the Chairman of the Board of Seoul Design Foundation)	The Festival Celebrating Dance Performance
Youngse Kim	Designer (Inno Design)	Human Centered Design
Yoonhee Han	Journalist (Yonhap News Media Lab)	Dreaming Data
Seungbum Kim	General Practitioner (General Doctor at a Hospital)	How can Design help a small-sized medical clinic?
Hwalmin Park	Designer (Haja Design Company)	No Money Design
Bumkyu Lee	NPO (Bring your Cup)	Youth newly design tumbler culture
Namhee Lee, Jinwoo Park	NPO (Action Start, Freelancer Design Cooperative)	Socially Creative, Creative for Society
Ranki Kim	Architect (Korea History Culture Policy Research Institute)	Historical Artifacts and Seoul's Design Policy
Jiyoon Yang	Freelancer Designer	Urban agriculture project in apartment rooftop
Wonsun Park	State Actor (The mayor of Seoul)	I am a designer, too!
Hyunjoo Park	Librarian (Incheon Library)	Libraries talk with 'design'
Mijin Jung	Social Enterprise (Miracle Bookshelf Project)	Miracle Bookshelf Project
Nami Lee	Designer (Studio Bap)	Beautiful Wedding Culture Design
Inae Jung	NPO (the DOMC)	Design for Social Inclusion
Muyoung Oh	Freelancer Designer	Minus, Plus

The results of the round-table discussions implied that citizens had a strong dissatisfaction with and antipathy toward how the past mayor carried out the creative city policy. Participants argued that this mayor did "whatever he wanted" without "listening to

citizens' opinions". As shown in three SDO events, there was no place for citizens in the planning and management of the events. Moreover, the DDP construction project was pushed ahead despite citizens’ response and criticisms. Participants harshly censured the past mayor's unilateral administration style and asked for more direct and responsive communication with the SMG and state officials. In this regard, they argued that the real role of design is neither constructing "DDP"-like urban landmarks nor performing "SDO"-like urban mega events. Rather, they argued, as presented above, that the real role of design for Seoul should offer "new (or better) communication platforms between citizen and state as well as among citizens themselves".

In summary, the Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7 was organized by what I conceptualize as "the post-developmental policy networks" in which state actors interacted directly with ordinary citizens and NPOs. During the event, as distinct from the previous three SDOs, civic participation was not limited to either attendance at exhibitions as a mere spectator nor participation in competitions as a competitor or voter. Citizens also actively created the events’ format and content; consequentially – as a result of this more direct and in-depth citizen participation – the role of design for Seoul was neither conceptualized as a "new economic value" nor perceived as "a tool to win global competition". Rather, citizens explored the role of design as "a tool to offer a better communication platform between the state and citizens and among citizens". In this regard, the two different types of events – the SDOs and the Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7 – strongly demonstrate that each policy network has opposing and conflictual ideas and meanings in relation to urban spaces and events.

CHAPTER 6

CREATIVE WORKERS AS MORAL AND ETHICAL SUBJECTS IN YOKOHAMA

6.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to reconsider and re-evaluate Yokohama's creative city policy from the viewpoint of its creative workforce. One of the main policy rationales of Yokohama's creative city policy is to revitalize the Kannai area by recruiting a so-called "creative class" that includes artists, designers, and architects. To entice and promote this creative workforce, as shown in previous chapters, the Yokohama Municipal Government (YMG) reconfigured its historic downtown area into the "Creative Core Area." Here, the creative workforce would live, work and hold a series of urban mega events such as the Yokohama Triennale as a venue to present their work to the outside world. This policy rationale was originally influenced by Richard Florida's writings on the creative class, which argued that post-industrial prosperity was largely led by the creative class (Noda, 2008; Florida, 2002). Taking on Florida's propositions, the YMG viewed the creative workforce as important "human capital" who could revitalize the Kannai area and enhance the city's competitive power (Noda, 2008:102). In fact, the YMG's policy vision reflects the idea that this creative workforce comprises so-called "role model subjects" for building the creative city.[40].

Despite the prominent place of the creative workforce in discussions about urban transformation, policy makers and urban planners have paid little attention to how these workers *actually* experience, evaluate, participate, negotiate or even resist the given creative

[40] There are several scholars who argue that creative workers were perceived as role model subjects for a post-industrial/neoliberal economy. (See de Peuter, 2014a , 20014b; McRobbie 2002; Banks et al, 2000).

city policy. This chapter explores these neglected voices and experiences of the creative workforce in Yokohama's creative city making process. To shed light on their everyday experiences and labor subjectivity, this chapter draws ideas from the recent growing research trends of "creative labor" from media and cultural studies, sociology of work, and political economy of communication. Based on in-depth interviews and participant observations, this chapter focuses on how the ethical and moral dimensions of labor subjectivity are prominently important to explain workers' everyday living and working experiences as creative labor in Yokohama. Nonetheless, this chapter addresses how these ethical and moral values in creative work are actually *preferred* within the given creative city policy and have certain limitations to overcome a "moral but apolitical volunteer subjectivity". Through this observation, this chapter explores whether "the articulation of moral-political and social values in the course of cultural work"(Banks, 2006) can be possible from creative workers' moral and ethical sensitivities and actions.

6.2 Creative labor as a site of moral work

The role model analogy of creative work for contemporary capitalism has been widely discussed by prominent politicians and celebrity intellectuals such as Tony Blair, Daniel Pink and Richard Florida, but also by its critical counterparts in the study of media, cultural and creative works (de Peuter, 2014a). In particular, by opposing the celebratory discourses of creative work, many researchers focus on how these creative occupations are perceived as a "favored labor profile" for post-industrial economy in terms of the contrasting correlation between high flexibility and high insecurity, blurring boundaries between work time and leisure time, and the conflicting relationship between high individual freedom and

low solidarity (e.g., Heelas, 2002; Ursell, 2000; McRobbie, 2002). To explain these new types of labor subjectivities and work experiences, the research based on a Foucaultian framework of "subjection-subjugation" as a modern subject formation highlighting neoliberal values of "self-enterprise", "self-exploration", "passion for creativity" and "autonomy" take on an immense role in allowing for young workers to voluntarily enter these high risk labor markets and exploit themselves (e.g., Heelas, 2002; Ursell, 2000; McRobbie, 2002; Kim, 2014).

However, several scholars claim that it is necessary to view *beyond* this post-Foucaultian approach so as to more fully understand the complexity of labor subjectivity within creative occupations (e.g., Banks, 2006; Lee, 2012; de Peuter 2014a, 2004b). In particular, questioning some of these assumptions, Banks (2006) questions the argument that rampant individualization and exploitation of creative works often draw images of not only overlooking "notions of workplace rights, entitlements or responsibilities" but also denying "notions of participation and equality" (Banks, 2006). He argues that some of these studies tend to "under-develop the notion of agency" "toward a universalist position" (Banks, 2006). By analyzing the local cultural community in Manchester, U.K, Banks argues that the emergence of various types of social enterprises and ethical businesses in cultural sectors influenced by a 'slow' and 'soft' capitalist spirit newly represent the important moral motivations and ethical aspects of selfhood based on "individual self-reflexivity" (Banks, 2006). His research results reveal that moral commitments of cultural works can contrast with popular images of the self-interested and de-politicized creative labor (Banks, 2006).

By following the argument of Banks (2000, 2006), Lee (2012) also tries to locate "good work, ethics and autonomy" within the lives of creative workers by focusing on

independent television production workers in the U.K. He acknowledges that self-exploitation and a high level of risk for self-actualization and self-enterprise are prevalent, however, he also found that U.K television production workers had an "ethical desire for social impact". This included orienting audiences towards social justice and against racism and prejudice. In fact, he finds that their "desire for fulfillment through an internal sense of having done *good work* and receiving public recognition" has become an important "emancipatory purpose" for these workers (Lee, 2012:492). Through these findings, he argues,

> Exploring how the creativity doctrine impacts on worker's subjectivities and expresses itself through their passionate attachment to work is not to suggest that these workers are *ideological dupes (*of the discursive regime of truth*)*. (Lee, 2012:494, italics added by myself).

From this viewpoint, autonomy of creative workers is considered as particularly open and ambiguous enough to be a "*self-reflexive and negotiated autonomous subjectivity*" rather than "only engendering alienation, promoting compulsory individualism, or fostering status-seeking and instrumentality" (Banks, 2010: 266, italics added). Along these lines, cultural and creative works are perceived to be in the realm of "*mixed opportunity*", in which the highly individualized and de-socialized creative workers co-exist with progressive, ethical, and politically motivated actors (Banks, 2006: 466, italics added by myself).

Beyond the fact that creative workers are in fact more complex reflexive subjects in practice, however, it is still unclear how these moral and ethical dimensions of labor subjectivity are "political subjects" capable of meaningful resistance or opposition given their precarious working conditions. Are they ("individualized/de-socialized workers" and "progressive and ethical workers") separate workers? Is the point that individuals can feel

both these positions? Or is it that this is a new kind of political subjectivity altogether? In other words, as Banks (2006) himself argues, how can “the articulation of moral-political and social values in the course of cultural work” be possible from creative workers’ moral and ethical sensitivities and actions?

This chapter focuses on the moral and ethical dimensions of labor subjectivity in order to understand the lived experiences of creative workers in Yokohama. However, this chapter has uncovered that these moral and ethical motivations and actions of creative worker in Yokohama are not enough to develop a political subjectivity to resist given precarious working and living conditions and to create a collective solidarity. Rather, this chapter will show how ethical and moral subjectivity is actually *preferred* in the YMG’s creative city policy and how it is in reality connected to apolitical “volunteer subjectivity” that is “praised only for maintaining and strengthening the existing society" and for what is "done for the state" (Ogawa, 2004:89).

6.3 Creative Core Area as a Failed Creative Cluster ?

When I started my field research in 2012, I had the impression that Yokohama’s creative city policy is not so much focusing on the development of a particular industry within a broad range of creative industries; thus this approach is different from that of Seoul where the city government concentrated on one specific industry such as "design" for its policy plan. In Yokohama, by contrast, several different and somewhat heterogeneous occupations such as designers, architects and artists mixed and resided together in the Creative Core Area. In other words, there was not any single main creative industry in Yokohama; therefore I thought that might be one of the reasons why Yokohama has not been

designated as part of UNESCO's Creative City Network in spite of its renowned reputation. In this network each participant city is sorted by the name of a certain industry, such as Seoul as "The City of Design" and Kanazawa as "The City of Crafts and Folk Art."

When the YMG initially prepared to implement its creative city policy in 2002, the former mayor, Nakata Hiroshi, first organized a special committee for the Urban Center through the Promotion of Art, Culture and Tourism. The committee, chaired by Kitazawa Takeru, the former city official of Yokohama and the professor at the University of Tokyo, originally proposed several different but inter-related plans including: 1) the Creative Core Area plan, 2) the National Art Park Plan, and 3) the Yokohama Image Culture City. As I explained in previous chapters, Noda (2008) asserted that the Creative Core Area plan, influenced by Richard Florida's work of creative class, was more about "human capital" in terms of a policy plan. On the other hand, the National Art Park Plan aimed to newly regenerate the Zou No Hana District and its adjoining areas to the west of Yamashita Pier into a public waterfront park for building new tourist amenities. Finally, the plan of "Image Culture City Yokohama" had the goal to gather and entice media industries such as film and animation companies and education institutes in Yokohama. The special committee especially designated this plan as "economic policy", and one of the main detailed action plans included the attraction of large media corporations such as Nikatsu, a film production company, as well as SEGA, a game production company in Yokohama. However, the plan was not successful, and thus the YMG failed to entice these big media corporations to move to Yokohama.

When I started my interviews with city officials in 2013, art-related NPOs, and creative workers, it became clear that many of my interviewees worried about the failure of

Image Culture City Yokohama. They said that even though the creative city policy of Yokohama became famous domestically and internationally, the failure to entice large media corporations prevented the Creative Core Area from becoming a “creative industry cluster” in which various inter-related companies within certain industries complied together and created synergy effects and innovation. A graphic designer, Hideyuki (CW1[41]), with 20 years experience and had moved to Yokohama from Tokyo in 2010 told me:

> Since I moved to Yokohama, I found what is most needed in this area [Kannai’s Creative Core Area] is “industry”. As you might know, we do not have any single main industry here. If we really want to make the Kannia area self-sustainable, I think it is necessary to develop “real” industry here. If the city does not take this problem seriously, this policy might become hazy … (Personal interview with Hideyuki, a male designer with 20 years experiences)

This kind of concern is actually widely shared by city officials, art-related NPOs, and other creative workers in Yokohama. When I conducted participant observation at the Creative City School organized by BankART 1929 – in which the city officials, art-related NPOs, and creative workers weekly discussed and shared current problems and future ideas of Yokohama’s creative city policy – there was a special session for discussing the economic efficacy of Yokohama’s creative city policy. In this session, two current city officials in charge of the economic and financial part of the creative city policy in Yokohama exposed that there had been certain limitations to developing a “creative industry” in Yokohama,

> As you might know, Image Culture City Yokohama was the main industrial policy plan within the creative city policy in Yokohama. One of the main projects of Image Culture City Yokohama was to attract media content production companies in the Kannai area. The city provided a financial incentive of 50 million yen to the companies if they moved to the Kannai area, but from 2005 to 2008 we attracted only

[41] The names of actual interviewees from below are modified by myself for privacy reason. More detailed demographic information can be found in Appendix 2. "CW1" points out "Creative Worker1".

> seven companies. At the initial stage, there were several more animation production companies who showed some interest to move, but many of them said that "crossing Tama-river" (which means leaving Tokyo) for media content production companies would prove difficult for survival for this industry. In this sense, we know that Image Culture City Yokohama plan was not so successful at all. So for now, the city considers to change the plan toward more fostering human capital than enticing actual industries(Transcribed from the Creative City School held in July 8th, 2013).

As this state official reported, because Tokyo has an already well-grown media content production cluster, there are practical limitations to developing a creative industry cluster in the Kannai area in Yokohama.. Under these circumstances, the groups who fill this void would be artists, designers and architects based in small-sized and independent production companies or self-employed freelancers who currently reside in the Creative Core Area. As such, most of my interviewees in the Kannai area were either self-employed freelancers or were employed by small companies. In most cases, they worked in shared offices dubbed "co-working spaces" that were partially supported by the city of Yokohama. The shared office in the Utoku building, which I discussed in the previous chapter, was one of the main examples of a co-working space in the Kannai area. In this building, 19 different groups of creative workers including artists, photographers, designers, and architects shared an office space, and most of them met one another via participating in several creative city policy projects such as Kitanaka White and Brick.

Without one single prominent industry in the Kannai area, creative workers I spoke with told me that the unexpected result was the heterogeneity and diversity was a "positive stimulation". Nishio (CW2), an architect with 13 years experience put it this way:

> After completing my B.A, I started my personal architecture design office around the Yokohama station area. When the city started the creative city policy, I had heard that one of the main policy plans was focusing on the renovation and the reuse of old historic buildings for artists and creators in the Kannai area, so as an architect I

> naturally had some interest on the creative city policy. When I heard about the Kitanaka Brick and White project, I thought that it might be an interesting chance to meet different types of people so I decided to move into that co-working space. At that time, there were various different groups of people who were artists, designers, community development NPOs and architects and I found that this diversity and heterogeneity gave me a chance to broaden my eyes … For example, one day, when I went to the bathroom, some artists had drawn a post-modern painting on the bathroom's wall. I was very surprised and never thought about that kind of idea. Just like this example, I found that meeting with various different types of creators gave me *positive stimulation* even for my own works. (Personal interview with Nishio, a male architect with 13 years experiences)

Similarly, Kanda (CW3), a designer who used to participate in the artists in-residence program in the Koganecho area and now worked in the co-working space in the Utoku building stated:

> I know that the city itself regrets that the Kannai area is still not developed enough as a "creative industry cluster" based on one prominent creative industry. However, I personally think that the Kannai still has its own potentiality based on heterogeneity and diversity. You know, currently there are various different types of people from various different occupations and backgrounds in the Kannai area. For example, when I joined Creative City School held by BankART 1929, I even met some people who were farmers doing organic agriculture in the city. And some designers actually plan to co-work with these farmers by including their own ideas of packaging and marketing. I think that this kind of co-working and cooperation, which was never really thought of before, can be *really innovative and creative*. So I think that the future role of the YMG not only could be to attract more big companies from outside but also to put more effort into providing more opportunities to connect those various groups of creators in the Kannai area. (Personal interview with Kanda (CW3), a male designer with 4 years experiences)

On the one hand this heterogeneity and diversity gave these creative workers the opportunity to positively stimulate one another and develop noble cooperative experiences; yet on the other hand this heterogeneity and diversity suggest that there are certain economic gaps and differences in labor motivations among various groups of creative occupations. For example, architect and designer groups' wages and economic status are relatively better than

those of artists groups including fine art painter and modern artists. Most of my interviewees in designer and architect groups reveal that the first priority of their work motivation is based on satisfying their "clients" rather than pursuing their own artistic expression. Two interviews with Eri (CW4), an architect with 10 year experience, and Tomokawa (CW5), a designer with 10 year experience exemplify this difference:

> After I started my career as an architect, I was very surprised how much this work is *less creative*, which is different from what I imagined. I know there are some architects who design an artistic building, but that is an extremely rare case in this field. Except for only a few talented people, the rest of architects' work is more technical, and it is not to express your artistic vision but more like to satisfy your clients. So I found the pleasure for my work not in expressing my own creativity but in satisfying my clients. When they are happy with my design, I have a sense of feeling that I did good work. (Personal Interview with Eri (CW4), a female architect with 10 years experience)

> I became a graphic designer because I like drawing very much, and it was one kind of work that I can do well. And I like the fact that I can choose drawing as my job. That is one of the reasons why I can keep doing my job. However, the designer work is not always for expressing my own creativity. Some work is very routine and not so much creative at all. So in many cases, I divide my work into two different parts: the part that I should meet client's requirements and the part that I can pursue my own autonomy and creativity. (Personal Interview with Tomokawa (CW5), a female graphic designer with 10 years experience)

As shown in the personal interviews above, what these creative workers can achieve by giving up some parts of creativity and autonomy is a relative economic stability compared to "artist groups" including painter and modern artists. The continuous job requests from clients are based on how much they are able to satisfy their past clients rather than how much they can pursue their own creativity and artistic expression, and this is one of the ways to build their own reputation and recognition to successfully survive in these industries.

My interview with Mori (CW6), a painter who used to be a graphic designer and now is a full-time fine art painter stated:

> I have been around the field of "drawing" for 30 years. I started my career in a small graphic design company and found that I really liked drawing, so I really wanted to be a full-time fine art painter. Ten years before, I almost quit my illustration work and did only tempera painting … After participating in an artist-in-residence program here (in the Koganecho area); luckily I could paint more and almost manage my living by selling my paintings. Still sometimes when I have some urgent financial need, I do illustration work or even do some other work as well, which is not anything related to art…but I am so happy that now in most cases I can use the majority of my working time for only tempera painting … people might think that design work is similar to fine art painting, but it is a very different process. For illustration work, you always first need to think about your clients' requests rather than your own artistic expression, so I really hoped to have a chance to be a full time painter for myself. And now I think that I am almost there. I still keep my computer and graphic tools in my house, but I don't think that I will do illustration work for a full time job any more in the future. (Personal Interview with Mori(CW6), a female painter with 30 years experience)

During my conversation with Merino, she said that her current income as a full time painter had decreased compared to her earnings as a full-time illustrator, and she would sometimes have to do some manual labor to make her own living. However, she said that she wanted to remain as a full-time artist because she really likes "when she draws what she wants to draw"; the moments when focusing on her painting were precious for her. My interview with her illustrates that artists generally have a stronger passion for creativity as compared with architects and designers. Moreover, for architect and designer groups, passion or a desire for doing creative work is not a main work motivation, but "doing good work" for others (in many cases, their clients) is more important. Here, as Lee (2012) argues, it is possible to view that the so-called doctrine of "creativity", "self-exploration", or "self-enterprise" –which is reported from many previous studies – does not always explain the labor motivation of heterogeneity and diversity of "creative works". Rather, in the case of

creative workers in Yokohama, what I found to be the common ground lies with their explanation of their working and living experiences in terms of anxiety and a sense of precariousness for their future regardless of the level of passion for creative work or relative economic stability.

6.4 Precarity and Anxiety as 'Normalized' Living and Working Conditions

One of the reasons why critical scholars from media and cultural studies, sociology of work, and political economy of communication argue that creative employment is "model work" for a post-industrial economy is that this work represents a growing "precarious" life under the global circulation of neoliberalism (e.g., McRobbie 2002, de Peuter 2014a, 2014b, Banks 2006). de Peuter (2014b) argues that "broadly precarity refers to existential, financial and social insecurity exacerbated by the flexibilization of labour associated with post-Fordism"(de Peuter, 2014b, p 32). Obviously, the growing labor flexibility represented by the increase in freelancing, contract work, and self-employment has been a typical employment arrangement in creative occupations (de Peuter, 2014b). Therefore, it is meaningful to shed light on how creative workers cope better with or even resist their given precarious working conditions because they are located at the forefront of the post-industrial economy.

Two young female workers, Eri and Tomokawa, who share a co-working space in the Utoku building are typical examples of working conditions and life experiences of creative workers in Yokohama's Creative Core Area. Both of them are in their mid-30s and met each other when they participated in the Kitanaka Brick and White project in 2006. Even though their jobs are different – one is an architect while the other is a graphic designer – their working conditions and life experiences after moving into Yokohama are similar. The

graphic designer started her career in a small design office in Tokyo, and then she became a freelancer and mostly worked at home by herself. She said that it was not easy to have her own office as a young freelance designer due to economic pressures, so when she accidentally saw the announcement about the Kitanaka Brick and White project providing co-working space, it looked like a great opportunity for her to have her own office. Her office partner, an architect, also was in a similar situation. She too had started her architecture career in a small design office, and had been working as a full-time instructor at a small professional college when she decided to participate in the Kitanaka Brick and White project about seven years ago. Both of them were young, single, freelancing, and looking for a space for working in better and affordable conditions.

When I asked them about their working conditions, both of them said that these conditions were and are still "hard" and "difficult" in terms of excessive work hours, long apprenticeship periods to become a "real" independent designer and architect, and a precarious economic situation. As self-employed freelancers, there is no union for them to join and no unemployment benefits. Also, one of the most difficult aspects to handle is the reality of having to continually look for the next job by themselves. Without the benefit of a marketing department within a large design or architecture firm, Tomokawa and Eri must constantly be on the lookout for their next job through their own personal networks. During the past seven years in Yokohama, they moved to three different locations: from Kitanaka Brick and White, then to the Honcho Building, and finally to the current Utoku building because both previous projects supported by the YMG were temporary. Nonetheless, the current co-working space is still based on a four-year contract under the building owner's understanding of YMG's creative city policy; therefore both designers said that they might

have to find other places when the contract period ends. Their current goal is to become successful enough to have their own offices before their current leasing contract ends. Instead of temporary work leading to a permanent or at least more stable position, this is a way in which the city is subsidizing new forms of permanently temporary jobs.

These kinds of precarious working conditions and experiences are commonplace among creative workers in the Creative Core Area, regardless of their professional qualifications. Of course, the level of precariousness is more severe among artists who are at the bottom in terms of economic stability. One creative worker, Erika (CW7), who has been in Yokohama since 2005, reveals that living as an artist has never been easy for her. In her interview, Erika said that one of the most difficult issues for her is not having a "stable" income to make her own living. She said that this kind of unstable economic situation is not a choice but rather a typical way of living as an artist in Japan. Another artist, Mori (CW6), with 30 years of experience reveals that she sometimes does manual labor when she has some urgent financial needs. Both of them said what they really want is better working and living conditions in which they can sustainably work and live as artists.

It is natural that these precarious working and living conditions are often related to their anxiety about their futures. Most of my interviewees reveal that they feel constant stress; an interesting point is that many think that this anxiety about the future is already well-scattered midst the whole of their society, so they believe that their anxiety is not so different or special from that of other workers who are not in creative industries. Mori (CW6)'s perspective was shared by many interviewees:,

> I know that my life, in particular my economic situation as an artist, is not so ideal. I feel some anxiety about my future life, but I don't want to think that my unstable situation and anxiety are so special. In the current socio-economic situation, there are

> not many jobs providing stable employment for their workers. Even ordinary workers always worry about job stability and their future. You know, it is *the era of anxiety*, so I don’t think that my feeling of anxiety is so different from that of other people [who are not in creative occupations].
> (Personal Interview with Mori (CW6), a female artist with 30 years experience)

> When I first started my career as a graphic designer, it was right after the crush of the Japanese bubble economy. At that time, the society was dramatically changed. From that moment, I think that people already started living with some kind of anxiety. So to me, feeling anxiety is a kind of thing that you have to accept. And I think that only to keep worrying about the future is not very helpful … I think that it [anxiety] is a kind of given living condition now.
> (Personal Interview with Hideyuki (CW1), a male graphic designer with 20 years experience)

What these interviews suggest is that the precarious working conditions have become normalized in the everyday lives of artists in Yokohama. For them, anxiety is not a special feeling that only creative workers feel due to their unstable work and living situation, but an ordinary emotion that people who live in a precarious era share across all of Japanese society. If precariousness and anxiety are perceived as "normalized" living and working conditions, it is important to scrutinize how these creative workers cope with these anxieties and risks in their everyday experiences because it can tell us about how people in general cope with such psychological and societal factors in a post-industrial/neoliberalizing society. Accordingly, one of the common strategies that I found among my interviewees in Yokohama is to rigorously build and manage “networks”.

6.5 Networking as a tool for retaining employability and a buffer for reducing anxiety

Gina Neff’s research about the work and life of venture labor in Silicon Alley clearly reports that personal social networking is one of the main resources for retaining employability in risky IT venture industries (Neff, 2012). She calls this phenomenon “the

privatization of job security", in which individuals are desperately building and managing their own social connections to seek employment security under the absence of other organizational and industrial supports such as unions (Neff, 2012: 128). In her study, common networking activities such as participating in evening parties, meetings, and online communities became enormous pressures for workers, and most importantly, she argues that the creation of social capital via individual networking activities actually served only as a shield for workers who were able to access and retain them, but "they do little to help buffer workers against the "systemic risk" of an industry downturn"(Neff, 2012:125). In this regard, she claims that networks ultimately failed to protect workers during the economic crash (Neff, 2012: 131).

Despite Neff's reservations about the limitation of networking in the creative industry, my interviewees in Japan insisted that what was urgently needed for the Creative Core Area was to develop more "networks" among heterogeneous creative workers in Yokohama. My interviewees felt that there were not enough networking events and opportunities, and believe that developing personal networks among creative workers in the Creative Core Area can create new opportunities for both workers as well as the city itself. Commonly, regardless of their trade, my interviewees revealed that general ways of securing their next work and jobs are based on managing personal networks. Kanda (CW3), who worked as a graphic designer mainly organizing art education events for children, reported simply that his main strategy for maintaining job security is based on personal networking activities:

> When I first moved to Yokohama about four years ago, my personal living situation was very bad. I just started living by myself at that time, and it is still difficult but I found that it is getting better. In case of my work, after finishing one event, some people who participated in that event introduced me to other people, and I keep contacting my colleagues around me to find my next work. Fortunately, after moving

> to Yokohama, my work is increasing, and I feel that my personal network is also getting wider than before. So in my case, I handle my anxiety through this network and my colleagues. (Personal interview with Kanda (CW3), a male graphic designer with 4 years experiences)

As with the above graphic designer, my interviews revealed that in order to manage and build up personal networks in Yokohama's Creative Core Area one of the common strategies is to participate in cultural events and educational programs held by Bank ART 1929. Bank ART 1929, as the first and most well-known creative city project in Yokohama, functioned as one of the main “contact zones” for building and maintaining networks of creative workers in the Kannai area. Even though the Bank ART 1929 building was initially renovated for usage as a modern art gallery, it also regularly holds numerous arts events, art-related educational programs, and public meetings for the purpose of discussing Yokohama’s creative city policy.

When I did my fieldwork in 2013, Bank ART 1929 held an event called “Creative City School”, in which state officials, art NPOs, academics, and creative workers gathered together weekly to discuss and share their opinions and ideas about Yokohama’s creative city policy. The general format of the Creative City School was divided into two sections: first a “lecture” in which state officials and policy experts in creative city policy introduced current policy projects and second a “small group meeting” in which several participants organized one group to discuss the current creative city policy and suggest new policy projects by following such special topics as “promoting tourism in Yokohama” and “proposing new urban design in Yokohama.” Because the Creative City School generally started at 7 pm, people often had small gatherings in the down hall café in Bank ART 1929 and sometimes had a drink together after the events. Because the Creative City School held bi-weekly

gatherings over about two month periods, it was a sufficient amount of time for them to develop a somewhat "deeper" relationship among the participants. Through involvement in these events, state officials on the one hand actually could monitor and obtain opinions about the city's current creative city policy from creative workers and art NPOs. On the other hand, creative workers had the opportunity to build networks, find their next jobs from one another, and acquire the most recent information about the city's creative city policy. I was able to locate many of my interviewees by participating in this event, and many of them said that the existence of a place like Bank ART 1929 was a "strongpoint" in the Creative Core Area as a vital asset for them and the city.

Beside the example of Bank ART 1929, there are several shared offices and co-working spaces developed by other NPOs such as Sakura Works and the Kannai Future Center in the Creative Core Area. Sakura Works, developed by the community development NPO, Yokohama Community Design Lab, provided co-working spaces and held both regular and occasional cultural events. The Kannai Future Center was founded as a social enterprise incubation space, which offered not only educational and consulting opportunities but also shared offices for those with an interest in social enterprise. In these co-working spaces, more heterogeneous people tended to gather in addition to creative occupations, such as social workers, business consultant, even farmers.

Some of my interviewees claim that developing this kind of infrastructure for networking can be a solution for not only enhancing economic stability but also reducing their sense of “anxiety” based on their precarious living and working conditions. I visited one group of young workers who together opened a small art-related social enterprise company consisting of four young designers. The company was initially founded by two graphic

designers in their early thirties who had graduated from the same art school in Tokyo. Before starting their business in Yokohama, one of them had worked at several cultural event management companies, and the other had worked at a community development agency. Some in that company who used to work at larger companies revealed that they felt a strong anxiety after they entered this social enterprise business. They said that they never had experienced this kind of strong anxiety when they had worked at larger companies. Takuya (CW11), who worked in a bigger design company, told me that "I can't even sleep well, sometimes when I think about my future"; when I asked him how he coped with this, he responded that "I can handle this anxiety because I have my colleagues and personal networks here [in the Kannai area]". For him, the existence of networks is more than an instrument or tool to maintain their future employment arrangement. Rather it seems that he perceived it as a psychological buffer to protect him from a strong sense of anxiety. Along this line, some creative workers achieved a strong sense of togetherness and belonging through maintaining their networks. One interviewee, Nishio (CW2), who is an architect and participated in several creative city projects since 2006, reported,

> I think that one of the precious things that I have received through participating in creative city projects (Kitanaka White and Brick and Honcho Building) was my personal networking with various different people. I think this networking is a kind of capital for now from the city's creative city policy. We participated in the creative city project voluntarily and spent our time together. *It is different from some kinds of compulsory or interest-oriented relationships,* which you might get in your business, so this is the reason why we tried to find new co-working spaces together when Kitanaka White and Brick and the Honcho Building project ended. I want to keep moving together with these people if we have to move to another place in the future. (Personal interview with Nishio (CW2), a male architect participated in Yokohama's creative city policy since 2006)

Importantly for this creative worker, the existence of networking functions as a strong sense of togetherness or belonging. He often called his shared-office partners as “nakama (仲間)” which means literally “company, fellow or colleague,” although this term generally connotes a stronger sense of mutual trust and friendship in Japan. This attachment to networking is similar to what Banks (2000) argues: the role of networking is a common way to temper or spread risk in absence of a more formal support structure. Banks (2000) more importantly argues that cultural workers can get the opportunity to break “out of the self to the other, which now includes a process of mutual narrative and emotional disclosure” through a dependence on networking, because the relation of personal network is based on what sociologist Anthony Giddens calls an “active trust” (Banks, 2000). In doing so, Banks (2000) tries to connect “activities of developing and dependence on networks” to one way of “trusting each other” as new social relations in the post-traditional society, and the moral sentiment of “trust” is considered as an essential value to develop personal networks. Similar to what Banks (2000) found in Manchester’s local cultural sector, creative workers in Yokohama strive to get advice, training, jobs and sometimes find mentors through personal networks. Along this line of thought, some workers argue that their own vision of creating “community” in the Creative Core Area is grounded in a moral and ethical sense of "trust" and "autonomy," a possible alternative to coping with their precarious work and living conditions and with their sense of anxiety as well. For example, one male graphic designer, Kanda (CW3), and another female painter, Erika (CW7), said:

> I think that the Creative Core Area has still more potential to develop "networks" among creative workers. I think that people in this area still do not know one another much. The city government provides several events such as the "Kannai Open" to make connections among creators, but I feel that sometimes events just end as events.

> I think that spontaneous and voluntary participation is more necessary. What is ideal is developing voluntary networks with each other to develop a sense of "*community*". Until now, the city government focused only on providing a "place" like the Creative Core Area and creating "events" like the Yokohama Triennale; so in the future, it is necessary to make more opportunities to let creators develop networks one another .... I think that just keeping worrying about the future and precarious situations is not helpful at all. If people have more of these kinds of networks based on voluntary participation, I think that we might turn "*anxiety*" into the "*expectation*" that I can do something *with* these people whom I can trust. (Personal interview with Yoshiyuki (CW3), a male graphic designer, 10 years experience who moved into Yokohama in 2008)

> I think that we do not need to be *overly* connected to each other. In my opinion, ideal connection is based on "autonomy", so I think that the ideal situation would be as "if there is something that people want to join, they can naturally join" and "if they don't want to join, they can leave freely". Actually I used to try to intentionally introduce people to each other in the Koganecho area (to help them settle down the area), but you know, *people want to go is to go anyway*. So I think that the ideal relationship is to naturally gather with one another when people have certain mutual interests or concerns. (Personal interview with Erika (CW7), a female painter, 15 years of experience who moved into Yokohama in 2005)

Here, both Kanda (CW3) and Erika (CW7) perceive that they need to be connected to one another and build some kind of "solidarity" to better cope with their precarious working and living conditions and reduce their anxiety for the future. From their perspectives, ideal forms of connection should be based on voluntary participation; moreover, a sense of autonomy should be guaranteed for anyone in any situation. Furthermore, one of the most ideal forms of solidarity that they imagine is the development of more personal networks based on "active trust" and "mutual interests" among the creative workers in the Creative Core Area. By considering these worker's ideas seriously, it becomes necessary to ask questions like these: can this idea of developing networks based on trust and autonomy be read as what Banks (2000) calls "the articulation of moral-political and social values in the course of cultural work"? And, as these creative workers hope, can this network protect or

resist the "systemic risk" of an industry downturn as argued by Neff? More importantly, is this idea of solidarity and collectivity based on trust and autonomy parallel to what other studies view: "artists and other cultural workers as the protagonists of struggle against exploitation and inequality in the neoliberal era" (de Peuter, 2014a, p 274). However, what I found in Yokohama's Creative Core Area is that this idea of developing personal networks based on trust and autonomy continues to be only a "moral" and "ethical" value by not putting forth a political move to oppose and counter precarious working and living conditions. This phenomenon became clear when I asked my respondents about the idea of "labor" and "union".

6.6 "Network is fine but no union!"

In the previous chapter, I explained that the differences in translating creative city policy between Yokohama and Seoul can be conceptualized in terms of Yokohama's "co-existing" model in contrast with Seoul's "antagonistic" model in terms of the relationship among state, capital, and civil society surrounding the creative city policy. Because of Seoul's dynamic conflicts regarding this policy, it was not easy to even obtain an interview with SMG's state officials when I was conducting my fieldwork in Seoul. These government officials worried about expressing their opinions, and many of them refused to participate in an interview about the city's creative city policy because it was too "sensitive" and "political" an issue for them. However, when I started my fieldwork in Yokohama, I found that this city's atmosphere was dramatically different from that of its counterpart. Almost everyone related to the creative city policy, regardless of state officials, NPOs, and creators, and thus was eager to talk about their opinions and experiences about this policy. This sense of

"inclusiveness" and "acceptance" may be attributed to one of the unconsciousness reasons that led me to start conceptualizing Yokohama's creative city policy as a model for the images of "co-existing" and "harmony". Nonetheless, there was one significant moment that made me reconsider Yokohama's "co-existing" model not in a sense of an "alternative" but rather as a sense of "limitation"; moreover, this sense of "limitation" is directly related to people's responses and opinions to the words "labor" and "union".

It was during the time when I did the participant observation at the Creative City School in Bank ART 1929. Because I arrived there a bit early that afternoon, I was reading some of my previous interview transcripts in the café there. At that time, one of my key informants, who was working at Bank ART 1929 introduced me to many important state officials and creative workers in the area. Because he was very much interested in my research, he asked me about the study's progress; naturally we had chatted about my research. At that time, because I was doing a series of interviews with creative workers in order to listen their labor conditions and opinions about the city's creative city policy, I asked him about what he thought about the working and living conditions of creative workers in the Creative Core Area. Surprisingly, he very bluntly asked me why I am interested in "labor" kinds of questions. I told him if the city's creative city policy really wanted to "revitalize" the area, I thought that the creative workers' living and working conditions should be improving as well. I meant that these conditions should be one of the key indicators of the sustainability of the creative city policy even though they had been consistently overlooked in research on this policy. He was suddenly angry and strongly told me:

> They handle their lives by their own ways. We did not recruit artists and creators here for doing “seikatuhogo” (生活保護). We contact them to make the town “genkini” (元気に). You should think about it more seriously. (Personal conversation with informant at Bank ART 1929)

“Seikatuhogo” means “livelihood protection or social security assistance”; it is generally given as social welfare assistance for people who are below the poverty line in Japan. In addition, “genkini” means “healthy” or “vital”. I was lost for words by his angry reaction and did not want to upset him more. So I did not react to him, but started to think about questions like: How can insecure workers make the town “vital” and “healthy” without changing and improving their precarious working and living conditions? Furthermore, why does this NPO officer react so sensitively to words like “labor conditions” or "union"?

Some recent research reports that there have been uprisings by collective movements of creative workers to oppose precarity and flexploitation by means of anti-corporate sentiment and entrepreneurial forms of self-understanding (de Pueter 2014a, 2014b; Murgia, 2014; Neilson & Cote, 2014). These studies report that there are emerging new forms of organizational models such as the Fashion Industry Frictions in New York, independent worker initiatives such as the Freelancer Unions in New York, and politicized co-working spaces such as the “Brooklyn Creative League”. Along this line of examples, I talked with my interviewees about what they think about these types of more “politicized” models of collectivity and solidarity to cope with their precarious working and living conditions. They commonly reacted that the responsibility of such conditions among creative workers lies with the workers themselves. Many of them believe that their precarious working and living conditions were unavoidable: since most workers already knew the "nature" of their working

conditions before they decided to enter these industries, they are the ones who are responsible for their own choices. As Nishio (CW2), who worked as an architect explained:,

> In Japan, there are no creators or artists who are actually "starving" by living and working as creators or artists. If some artists or creators are in serious economic straits, they can find other part-time jobs in order to take care of their own living. You know, if you work in even convenient stores full-time, you can manage your own living in Japan; so none of these creative workers choose only this work for managing their own livings. Therefore, the decision to continue or quit this work is based on their own responsibility. (Personal interview with Nishio (CW2), a male architect participated in Yokohama's creative city policy since 2006)

Here, personal responsibility was key understanding the problem. From this "logic", the solution for changing this circumstance can be perceived as not based on broad structural or social action, but rather on personal action. Similarly, most who eagerly proposed to develop "networks" based on trust and autonomy demonstrated pessimistic views or questions about the efficacy of "union" type models. Kanda and Erika, who strongly proposed the necessity for building networks for creative workers, conversely expressed their negative viewpoints about the model of unions:

> Hmm … Unions for artists and creators? ... I don't think that is very useful. When I used to work in the publishing company, there was a union. There, I found, if you enter that type of organization, you also need to give up some sort of autonomy and freedom. I felt that the union seemed "closed" or was associated with "stiff" types of networks. I don't think that the state or the city can change our current working conditions (even though we make a union and ask them to provide more organization and industrial support). I believe that if we can make more "soft" type of networks (based on autonomy and trust) and if we can include various different types of occupations such as lawyers or social workers, people [creative workers] naturally share their problems with these people. In that situation, we might make our own solutions. Anyway, in my viewpoint, a union seems "rigid" and "closed". (Personal interview with Kanda (CW3), a male graphic designer with 10 years experience, moved to Yokohama in 2008)

> I don't agree with the idea of making some kind of union for artists and creators in the area. As I told you, I don't think that we need to *overly* connect with each other.

> What we need is a network based on autonomy. I felt that idea of union is very much compulsory … There were some people I met in several creative city projects really who kept blaming and asking the city for more support such as rent and utility fees for the co-working space. I thought that those people consider the city support to be like "seikatuhobo". I think that is not correct. If you start depending on the city's support, you might not be able to be independent yourself …" (Personal interview with Erika (CW7), a female painter with 15 years experience, moved to Yokohama in 2005).

Both of these respondents reveal that they do not prefer more "social" models like unions. One of the reasons is that they think that the idea of a union model represents some kind of closed, rigid and compulsory network that differs from what they believe an ideal network should be, based on trust and autonomy. The more important reason why they do not support the idea of unions, however, is that a union-type solution might more strongly and publicly argue for their workplace rights, entitlements or responsibilities than would a personal network-typed solution, which means that union-type model might entail the possibility of creating "conflict" or even "opposition" to the city government. What I found that my interviewees really want to avoid is any kind of "conflict" and "counter-arguing" over the existing creative city policy given by the YMG. One interviewee, Mori, replied to my explanation of union-type movements,

> It sounds like an interesting idea. I think that it will be great that we have some kind of place that we can share our concerns and distresses. However, if that group or organization is too much focusing only on the negative side (of our works such as anxiety and harsh labor conditions), I don't think that I want to join. I think that it should be based more on "positive thinking". (Personal interview with Mori (CW6), a female artist with 30 years experience)

Actually, she was the only respondent who showed some interest in the idea of a union-type model for artists and creators. Nevertheless, when she cautiously framed her opinions with me, I strongly felt that she does not want some kind of organization that is based on the

'spirit' of criticizing or opposing the existing system. In this sense, her views suggest that the ideal model of solidarity that is based on developing "network" is working solely in the realm of a "moral" and "ethical" sense of trust and autonomy rather than in a political sense that includes the actions and sentiments of opposition, resistance, and sometimes the creation of "conflict" with the existing system. In other words, a moral and ethical worker who connects with others based on trust and autonomy is directly related to a "volunteer subject" who supports solely the current system.

6.7 Moral but volunteer subjectivity and the order of the creative city Yokohama

Ogawa's ethnographic research that is based on NPO movements from the 1990s onward argues that Japan's social movement guided by the emergence of NPOs has certain limitations in terms of its lack of a "movement" spirit. He found that Japanese NPOs functioned primarily to pursue outsourced tasks from the state without opposing or countering the current system; thus he argues that these NPOs "invited by the state" function like arms of the state and therefore are prone to volunteer subjectivity in that they are "praised only for maintaining and strengthening the existing society" and for what is "done for the state" (Ogawa, 2004: 89).

This volunteer subjectivity is a *preferred* subjectivity in Yokohama's creative city policy, as demonstrated by the various events and projects represented by the Yokohama Triennale. When the YMG "recruited" creative workers to revitalize the Kannai area and to change the image of the Koganecho area (i.e., Yokohama's old red-light area), it became evident that a preferred subjectivity is a volunteer subject who can actively understand and devotedly participate in the creative city policy. More importantly, in the case of Yokohama,

this volunteer subjectivity tends to be connected to the moral and ethical sensitivity and actions of its creative workers. This subjectivity is shown when creative workers prefer to develop personal networks based on a moral sense of “trust” and “autonomy” rather than to build a union-like, more politicized organization; as a result, some other moral and ethical values – such as “changing the image of the town” or “helping people to fall in love with their communities” – also become some of the important motivations to participate and retain their work and lives in Yokohama. Erika, a female painter with 15 years experience and had moved into Yokohama in 2005, preferred to develop her network based on autonomy as an ideal type of solidarity; she also said that the reason why she continued to stay and work in Yokohama relates to her sense of ethical commitment and achievement in spite of harsh working and living conditions:

> One of the reasons why I want to stay in the Koganecho area is that I feel my artistic activities help the town and people here. You know, this area [the Koganecho area] used to be an insecure and dangerous red-light town, full of prostitutes and gangs. However, after the creative city policy project started, children and their parents come here to see paintings and other cultural activities. What I want is to make people like their town and have a sense of a pride about their town. I think that art and my work can play some kind of role to support that ... Art can make people like their town and give them a sense of pride about their town … In that sense, I think that I feel a sense of achievement that my work here helps them and keeps supporting them. (Personal interview with Erika (CW7), a female painter moved to Yokohama since 2005)

This creative worker thus expresses that she likes her work because it can contribute to change the image of the town and help people have a sense of pride about where they live. Here, her ethical and moral commitment and achievement became an important reason to continue her work in Yokohama. However, her moral and ethical commitment demonstrated by her desire to "change the image of the town" is exactly the same task and role as what the YMG wanted and asked from her. In other words, what the YMG desired for their creative

workers when they "invited" them to Yokohama is solely “ethical and moral actions” by those who spontaneously reside in the town, change its image, and vitalize the community rather than “political actions” that take the form of opposing and resisting their current precarious working and living conditions. In turn, creative workers like her with a strong moral commitment to support local community appear to sincerely follow this vision of the YMG.

In Yokohama's "co-existing" model of the creative city, the role of the creative worker is thus allocated solely within moral and ethical ways of doing and being that are preferred by the YMG. This co-existing model of the creative city favors a "harmonious" relationship among the state, capital, citizens and creative workers. The state takes its role as a primal "planner" which is in charge of what Hill (2007) points out is Japan's high level of "planning"; consequentially, the place of the creative workers – again based on their ethical and moral commitment – lies mainly in supporting the state's plan. In other words, in keeping with the argument of my interviewee from Bank ART 1929: “we did not recruit artists and creators here for doing “seikatuhogo (生活保護). We call them to make the town “genkini (元気に)”. The YMG’s mandate to creative workers thereby is limited to “revitalizing” and “changing” the image of the city based on their moral and ethical involvement. The creative workers in the Kannai area tend to "identify" their roles just as the YMG planned and requested in spite of their sense of precarity in their working and living conditions. Of course, moral sensitivity and ethical actions are "important" and "precious". However, they are not enough when they hinge on a volunteer subject who is conforming only to the given systems and orders. Therefore, creative workers in Yokohama’s Creative Core Area who are “invited

by the state" tend to follow this *preferred* volunteer subjectivity; more importantly, their moral and ethical sentiments and actions take on the tremendous role of retaining their volunteer subjectivity yet limiting the development of a political subject who can resist given precarious working conditions and build a collective solidarity. In doing so, the creative worker's subjectivity retreats to a moral subject solely rather than toward a political one.

Several scholars who have shed light on the ethical and moral dimensions of creative work strive to find certain "emancipatory purposes" among creative workers (e.g., Banks, 2006; Lee, 2012). They believe that creative workers are not only "governmental subjects" in the process of subjection and subjugation under the flexpolitation production regime but also moral and self-reflexive subjects who work midst "mixed opportunities" for emancipating themselves through their works. However, my findings in Yokohama suggest that when moral subjects only support the existing political economic system and order, emancipation from their precarious living and work conditions becomes dubious. For this reason, what is necessary in a "co-existing" model of creative city Yokohama is not the "right" or "high" level of the well-planned "policy" from the state which assigns, allocates, or distributes the right roles of creative workers, but rather the possibility of "politics" in which creative workers claim the fundamental assertion of workplace rights, entitlements and responsibilities.

In the next chapter, I turn to the context of creative workers' experiences in Seoul. Here, a more antagonistic model of the creative city shows somewhat different and contrasting directions in terms of its possibility of a more politicized subjectivity. In the next chapter, I will show to what extent worker subjectivities in Seoul are different from those of

their Yokohama counterparts and explore how creative workers in Seoul strive to resist the current existing system and policies in a different way.

CHAPTER 7

WORKING AND LIVING AS "PRECARIAT" CREATIVE WORKERS IN CONFLICTING CREATIVE CITY SEOUL

7.1 Introduction

This chapter turns to the experiences and voices of creative workers in Seoul in parallel to their counterparts in Yokohama. Similar to Yokohama's, the Seoul Metropolitan Government (below SMG)'s creative city policy reflects the vision that creative industries have a great potential for regenerating economy and providing abundant employment specifically by focusing on the design industry. As shown in previous chapters, the SMG not only has constructed urban mega landmarks such as the *Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park* but also has held numerous urban mega events including *Seoul Design Olympiads*. The SMG's 'creative' vision clearly represents how it has viewed creative workers as "role model subjects" who are important 'human capital' not only to regenerate the city's economy but also to enhance overall national economic development.

As in the case of Yokohama, there has been less attention placed on how these "role model workers" actually live and work in the "creative city" of Seoul. While there are similarities in the lived experiences of workers in both Yokohama and Seoul this chapter aims to show how creative workers in Seoul actually experience, evaluate, participate, negotiate and even resist the given creative city policy in their everyday lives and work. Furthermore, in contrast with its portrait of Yokohama's "moral and ethical volunteer subjectivity", this chapter addresses how creative workers in Seoul demonstrate the potential

to resist and oppose not only their given creative city policy but also their precarious working and living conditions. I locate the specific subjectivities of the creative workers' interviewed in Seoul within the growing scholarship on the "precariat" in Europe and North America (e.g, Murgia, 2014; Neilson and Cote, 2014; de Peuter, 2011, 2014a, 2014b; Lorey 2014, 2015). Based on in-depth interviews, participant observations, and archival research, I show that there are various different types of resistance arrangements in Seoul such as Artists Social Unions. Furthermore, this research – based on Jacque Ranciere's concept of "political subjectivation" – examines how creative workers through solidarity resist and oppose their precarious working and living conditions.

7.2 Creative Worker as the Protagonist of the Precariat Movement

As I shown in the previous chapter, there is growing research that strives to fully comprehend subjective responses to creative work in order to overcome the post-Foucaultian approaches that focus mainly on the doctrine of "passion for creativity", "self-enterprise", "self-exploration" and "individualization". Along these lines, Banks (2006) and Lee (2012) have explored the moral and ethical dimensions of creative workers in terms of such concepts as "self-reflection", "trust" and "ethical work". However, different from this moral and ethical direction, other scholars whose research focuses on the growing global precariat movements attempt to show that the leading mechanisms of post-Fordist exploitation – such as "flexploitation", "individualization" and "precarisation" – have not prevented "labour's capacity to act collectively" (de Peuter, 2014b). These studies not only attempt to fully "*understand*" the labor subjectivities of creative workers but further explore how creative workers actually become "*political subjects*" who can solidify themselves in order to resist

and oppose to their given precarious working and living conditions (e.g, Murgia, 2014; Neilson & Cote, 2014; de Peuter, 2011, 2014a, 2014b; Lorey 2014, 2015).

To respond to questions like "how can [we] create solidarity in conditions of precariousness?" (Berardi, 2011), a series of research conducted by de Pueter (2011, 2014a, 2014b) found that various creative workers' collective movements, mostly based in North America and Europe, start "recomposing" themselves with "autonomous communication" toward solidarity across difference, in a "collective organization" based on experimental structures, and around "policy proposals" and "institutional innovations" for coping with their precarious working conditions (de Peuter, 2011: 421-22). In particular, de Peuter (2014b) introduces numerous significant creative workers' organizations and groups such as New York's Freelancer Union, W.A.G.E (Working Artists and the Greater Economy), Arts & Labor, and Italy's creative workers in Italian Occupy Movements. de Pueter (2014b) reports three different but common strategies: 1) "aggregation" in which creative workers solidify based not on their occupations – which are conventional sources of labor solidarity – but rather on their employment status; 2) "compensation" in which creative workers bond with one another based on their shared sources of agitation, such as "unpaid work"; and finally 3) "occupation" in which creative workers actually become a part of more broad social movements such as Occupy movements (de Pueter, 2014b). Based on the evidences of these collective movements of creative workers, he argues that creative workers are not only "model workers" for a post-Fordist economy but are also among "the protagonists of struggle against exploitation and inequality in the neoliberal era" (de Pueter, 2014b).

de Peuter's studies (de Peuter, 2011, 2014a, 2014b) are meaningful in that they provide us with important clues as to how to articulate moral-political and social values in

labor subjectivities of cultural works. de Peuter (2014b) draws his examples from various different workers' organizations and movements such as the Freelancer Union and Working Artists and the Greater Economy(W.A.G.E) in New York City, Canadian Intern Association and Canadian Artists Representation in Toronto, and Creative workers' activities in Italian Occupy movement in Milan. By introducing these various examples, de Peuter's works (2014b) on the precariat are more interested in describing the emergence of these movements, so that sometimes it seems unclear how creative workers' organization solidify themselves, via what routes, under what circumstances, and by what processes. In this regard, his work somewhat under-explores questions like: by or under what "principles" can certain groups of creative workers become "political subjects" and are their any shared ways that allow creative workers to overcome the doctrine of "creativity" and "individualization"? More importantly, is it possible to find any "theoretical" resources that allow us to move past the post-Foucaultian approach so as to rightly capture creative workers' solidarity through these various creative workers' movements?

Regarding these questions, this chapter strives to explain creative workers' subjectivities by using Jacque Ranciere's concept of "political subjectivation" (1992) in order to more effectively theorize how creative workers can not only become moral and ethical subjects but also empower themselves as "political subjects" who strategically disavow their given self-identities as "individualized creators". Furthermore, this approach will examine how these creative workers recall the neglected subjectivity of "solidified labor" to resist and oppose their given precarious working and living conditions. Here, my intention is not to refute the current researches on global precariat movement but to add theoretical insights to better understand *what leads to* this political formation of creative workers. Thus, in contrast

with Yokohama's "co-existing" model of post-developmentalism that focuses on the promotion of "moral and ethical volunteer subjects", this chapter shows how Korea's "conflicting" model of post-developmentalism actually contains and fosters two different and contrasting sets of labor subjectivities: the SMG and capitals that promote "a conformist self-development creator" on the one hand and the creative workers who are empowered "artist labor" on the other.

7.3 Creative City Policy about which creative workers disagree: creative workers speak out!

When I began my field research in Korea in June 2012, the former mayor of Seoul, Se-hoon Oh – who had initially proposed the creative city policy called "Design Seoul" –had recently resigned over a failed referendum for "free lunch plan for schools". As a member of Korea's conservative party (the Saenuri party), he was criticized by both opposition parties – the Korean Democratic party and the Korean labor party – as well as by various civil society activists, journalists and academics (e.g. Im 2009). As discussed in Chapter 1, the criticism of the Design Seoul policy converged, based on two different opinions. Firstly, there was the critical view against the "top-down elite-driven urban and design policy", which is commonly considered as one of the problems caused by the developmental state. A series of news articles reported the problem of homogenization of urban design and "anti-democratic" policy-making and implementation processes (e.g., Im, 2009). For example, the Design Seoul Street Project, regulation of the size and the font of street shops' signboards, was one of the repeated points of contention. There was also opposition more broadly to the gentrification of the targeted neighborhood and the dislocation of the original residents, which was perceived

as one among many broad symptoms of neoliberal urban reform by critics like Jamie Peck and David Harvey. The DDP construction project became a symbol of neoliberal development in Seoul.

As I shown in Chapter 3, reflecting upon such critical views from various citizens, activists and academics, the new mayor, Won-soon Park, made an election pledge to stop top-down elite-driven urban and design policy and to listen to what citizens really wanted from the creative city policy. When I started my fieldwork in Seoul, I was able to locate numerous citizen workshops held by the SMG; and found there that the former mayor's creative city policy faced broad public criticism and opposition. For example, when the Seoul Design Foundation opened the Facebook page titled "What can design do for Seoul?" in 2012, there were immediately an array of posts expressing antipathy and criticism toward the past mayor's creative city policy[42]. This context of opposition to the city government policy meant while many state officials were hesitant to talk to me given that the creative city policy had become too 'sensitive' and 'political', designers, architects, and academics in design-related fields as well as with social and environmental activists were eager to discuss their opinions and ideas with me.

My conversations with two critics of the Seoul Creative City policy, both of whom were directly involved in the process initially, are indicative of the more antagonistic approach. First, Jungbong (CW13), a university professor of design who was initially called in as an expert lamented:

[42] Interestingly, even though the Facebook club was initially opened for designers by the Seoul Design Foundation, the website was filled not only with designers but also with various types of "creators" including architects, painters, and musicians who shared their ideas and opinions about SMG's creative city policy. (See : https://www.facebook.com/groups/DesignSeoul/

I think what Sehoon Oh [the past mayor] did *with design* is "*Design politics*". He simply used "design" for his own political ostentation. There was no such long-term plan based on a deeper understanding and reflection, including questions like "why design is important *for whom and for what*?" Politicians and state officials just wanted to make something easily noticeable and superficial in an extremely short time span. In this process, citizens' opinions were completely neglected … and some of designers frivolously participated in that policy … Those designers worked *not for citizens but for the mayor and capital*… Look at the examples like the DDP and the Design Street project. These examples reveal clearly how much they just want to show something "big" and "luxurious". I think that the Design Seoul policy was such a flimsy way to exploit "design". (Personal interview with Jungbong (CW13), a design professor who participated in one of the Design Seoul projects)

Similarly, Dongil (CW11), an architect, who was also involved in several creative city projects, accounts for his disappointment with the past mayor's creative city policy:

I think that design doesn't simply mean that '*making something physically beautiful'* or '*changing something superficially pretty'*. It should touch a deeper level of social and cultural dimension. However, the past mayor's policy simply tried to make something physically and superficially. So some of my colleagues who are in architecture and construction fields said that the policy [past mayor's Design Seoul] is not '*design policy*' but '*construction policy'*… In architecture works, you know, you can make ten different buildings by spending one million dollars, but, at the same time, you can make only one building by spending same one million dollars. The past mayor just wanted to put a lot of money into one big project to build something "fancy" like the DDP … (Personal interview with Doingil (CW11), a male architect who participated in one of the Design Seoul projects)

Such overt criticism was unexpected given that both respondents had been involved in some of the creative city projects in the past mayor's city government. For the academic expert in design, his strong sense of disappointment was based on his experience witnessing what he considered an "anti-democratic" process that neglected of citizens' voices. Jungbong actually had pledged that he would not participate in any activities promoted by the SMG and the Seoul Design Foundation (below SDF) any more in the future. He somewhat "carefully" restarted to work with several other projects with the SDF – such as citizen listening

workshops – was that the mayor and the chairman of the Board of the SDF were new, and he strongly supported the current mayor's more citizen-oriented policy. Dongil (CW11), the architect above, also revealed that he strongly supported the current mayor's citizen-friendly direction, and that he spent much time in sharing his ideas about the creative city policy with other Facebook club members. In my 7 months in Seoul, I did in-depth interviews with total 20 of designers, architects, activists, painters and musicians—all of whom voiced strong oppositions to the past mayor's creative city policy[43].

Given the broad criticism of the former mayor's "mega" constructions and events, the SMG did not propose any new large-scale policy plans furthering creative city policy. In 2012, the opening of the DDP was delayed to modify its usage toward a more "citizen-friendly" direction, and the Seoul Design Olympiad was not going to be held any more. However, the SMG and the new mayor himself did not actively oppose the economic potential of the creative economy and creative industries. Rather, as shown in his election campaigns, the mayor often argued that creative industries including media, design, art and crafts were an important and crucial sector to regenerate the city's economy and provide abundant employment (e.g., Park, 2014). In fact, in 2015 mayor Won-soon Park proposed a long-term vision of Seoul in the form of the "2030 Seoul Plan", which includes his version of "Seoul's Creative Economy" focusing on the development and investment of "digital and mobile convergence industry", "cultural content industry" and "silver industries" (SMG, 2014). Under this plan, he stresses that human capital is the core of creative economy, and Seoul will be home to 100,000 creative workers in his second administration that goes until 2017 (Park, 2014).

[43] The detailed demographic of interviewees is included in the Appendix A.

In practice, it seems that the current mayor disagreed only with the methods of the past mayor's "top-down" creative city policy as opposed to its underlying objectives. The new administration continued the emphasis on the "human capital"-driven policy projects promoted by the SDF and the SMG such as the various design-related educational programs, workshops for students and practitioners, mentoring programs for future employers and employees, and social enterprise incubation projects. In this sense, despite a more critical overall context of debate about the merits of the creative city policy, the question of the role of creative workers was never seriously touched upon, even under the "citizen-friendly" current mayor's regime. Keeping this in mind, I approached creative workers in Seoul with the question as to what they think about this "rosy" discourse about the relationship between creative industry and economic development and employment. And more importantly, I asked them how they evaluated their everyday working and living conditions.

7.4 Creative Industry as "Red Ocean Industry" and Deeply Fractured Labor Markets in Korea's Creative Economy

I begin my view of experiences of workers in Seoul's creative economy by drawing from a compelling interview with Bora (CW1), a professional designer with 20 years of experience, which included working in the industry who now taught at a design school. In addressing a question about the current conditions, Bora (CW1) stated:

> Interviewee (Bora): "How about the working conditions and the labor market conditions for designers in Korea?" (A designer with 20 years experience and a current university professor in a design-related department)
>
> I : "Yes, could you tell me what you know about the current working conditions of designers and the labor market situation in general? I mean, you have worked as a designer for about 20 years, and now you are teaching students in the university. So I

> think that you might have a great sense of the working conditions and the job market situation in the design industry."
>
> Interviewee (Bora): "… I can say that it is *absolutely tragic*, and it will not be changed at all in the near future …The biggest reason is that *we are graduating too many designers* every single year. Do you know how many new design students graduate annually? 25,000 students per year now. The number is bigger than that of other developed countries like the U.S., Japan, etc. In this small country, we are just churning out too many designers, so the labor market is too competitive. Why does this thing happen? Because we have too many universities with design-related majors. So it is *absolutely ill-structured*….. Even though I am a university professor in a design department, the only solution that I can think for now is to reduce the number of these design-related educational institutions (such as universities and professional colleges), which is very difficult to do..."

Bora (CW1)'s testimony is insightful because she has had a lengthy career path as both a designer and an educator in the design field. She graduated from one of the most prestigious design schools in Korea and worked in various companies from IT venture companies to big chaebol companies such as Samsung. Through her long career, she has found that the labor market situation has dramatically changed from around the 2000s onward. When she started her career at the beginning of the 1990s, the industry was still expanding; then she said that it was not so difficult to find a good job. Her major was IT-related design, which was directly connected to the global IT booms from the 1990s onward; thus she said that many of her colleagues generally could "settle down" well within the industry. However, the more the universities launched design-related departments, the more the job market became glutted and competitive. For now, she said that the design industry is a typical example of a "red ocean industry" characterized by "excessive competition"; thus it is extremely difficult to find good jobs which provide stable employment, decent salaries and welfare benefits.

According to the 2014 Korea Design Statistical Data[44], only 50 percent of college graduates in design-related majors obtained a job in the industry. Also, within the total number of 220,000 employed designers, almost 93 percent of workers are hired in small and medium-sized enterprises whose average capital is below 300,000 U.S dollars; therefore the average number of workers per company is 4. At the same time, as Bora recounted, according to the government sources, from 1999 to 2014, the number of art and design-related departments in universities and junior colleges shows a sharp increase over a span of fifteen years from 415 in 1999 to 804 in 2014 in universities and from 578 to 875 in junior colleges[45]. Parallel to this trend, the number of students in art/design-related departments, who comprise the future workers in the design industry, also has grown by nearly 60,000 in this period.[46] In fact, the trend towards the establishment of art/design-related academic institutions, which began after the 1990s, has become one of the major structural factors for the oversupply of labor in the design industry.

In the design industry, working conditions are represented by “low income”, “long working hours” and “low welfare benefits”. Most of my interviewees agreed that the “conventional” starting annual salary among this 93 percent of the small and medium-sized companies is generally from 15,000 to 18,000 U.S. dollars, which results in their barely able

[44] 2014 Korea Design Statistical Data is prepared jointly investigated by the Korean Ministry of Trade, Industry & Energy and by the Korea Institute of Design Promotion

[45] Source: Korean Educational Statistical Services' Higher Education Department Index(See: http://kess.kedi.re.kr/index)

[46] Source: Korean Educational Statistical Services' Higher Education Department Index (See: http://kess.kedi.re.kr/index)

to manage their lives in Seoul[47]. However, even for the 7 percent of lucky people who start their jobs in large companies such as Samsung, LG or Naver (one of the largest IT companies in Korea), it is difficult to retain their jobs when they reach 40 years of age because of excessive competition. As Bora (CW1), said when she used to work in one of Samsung's branch companies, there were about 35 designers in her department. However, she told me that only one person who started with her is still working there today. She explained that because not many designers can be promoted to the position of executive board member due to a "ceiling effect", when they reach their 40s, they have very limited future options: becoming a freelancer designer, starting their own design business, or quitting their job. Some of the lucky few may be able to find a job in academia as she did. The promise of freelance work or starting one's own design firm similarly risky ventures given the excessive competition in the industry.

Another female interviewee, Manok (CW12), who has worked as an industrial designer for 10 years, similarly blamed the conditions within the Korean design industry:

> Living as a designer in Seoul? Yes, it is very difficult. First of all, there are too many designers in this small country. Because there are too many designers and too many design firms, there is no way to increase the rewards of our work … I think that our educational system is completely wrong. It says only good things about design and art as a fancy creative employment opportunity … As you know, it is actually very expensive to become a designer. Tuition at design schools is generally much more expensive than at ordinary schools. And you know, for now, many young people go abroad such as to the U.S. and U.K. to study design. In this case, the money students have to pay is way well beyond the general population's imagination. In spite of these expensive costs, when design graduates come back to Korea, what is waiting for them is excessive competition and low income/hard working conditions. I think that in

[47] According to 2013 Seoul Welfare Survey (SMG, 2013c), the basic living cost per household(3 people) in Seoul is 3,140,000 Korean won (about 3100 US dollar), and the poverty line estimation in Korea is 1,218,873(about 1200 US dollar) per household(3 people).

> some sense this is an almost crazy situation … (Personal interview with Manok (CW12), a female designer with 10 years experiences)

Manok (CW12) studied at one of the renowned design schools in the United States, but when she returned to Korea she found that working conditions and the job market situation were completely different from what she originally anticipated. She also agreed that the educational system and labor market are completely ill-structured, and the oversupply of labor will be a chronic problem for the working conditions of designers. Because of this harsh competition, she revealed that she was thinking of "leaving Korea" to find better working conditions abroad. More graphically, one designer, named Sunwoo, even expressed the living and working situation of designers in Korea as nearing "slave-like" conditions:

> I think that living and working as a designer in Korea is like a "*slave in capitalist system*". When I used to work at a small design agency, I designed a lot of product packages such as for beverages. Do you know generally how many days they [the client company] give us to design their product packages? Mostly only two or three days! You have to prepare generally five or six different tentative designs for them to choose from within only two or three days. So I think that you can imagine how hard we work generally. *It is like a slave* … If you can enter big companies such as Samsung or LG, you can get at least some economic rewards for your hard work, but the work intensity is even higher in those companies. Or, if you work in general small and medium sized design firms in Seoul, they do not even provide much economic rewards for your hard work. Only your own small self-satisfaction for your work, such as feeling like "yes, I did something creative" is all that you can get from your work … I don't understand how our government keeps arguing that a designer is a promising job for the future … How does this small country create more designers than does the U.S. annually? Because there are too many designers, capitals can buy us [designers' labor] just too cheaply. (Personal interview with Sunwoo (CW16), a male designer with 10 years experience)

As shown in both statistical industry data and my in-depth interviews with designers, working and living conditions in the design industry are extremely unstable and harsh. Furthermore, one of the important findings which I uncovered through this series of interviews with designers and other creative workers such as architects, musicians, and

painters is that these working and living conditions are not only the problem of designers: there are structural commonalities in working conditions and shared experiences of labor motivation between design workers and other creative workers such as those in media production that I researched in my previous project about the independent production workers in Korea's broadcasting industry (Kim, 2013). In my previous work, I found that the increasingly flexible production system exacerbates labor precariousness within the Korean broadcasting industry. Similar to the design industry, this labor precariousness is ignited by the overflow of young labor due to the expansion of media and journalism departments in both universities and junior colleges. Also, under their harsh working and living conditions, only a small number of workers can retain their jobs as "passionate creators" and "liberal freelancers"; most of them leave the industry when they reached their 40s. Along these lines, governmental reports reveal that there is a chronic oversupply of labor in Korea's cultural industry (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 2012). One report clearly shows that the majority of creative workers earn even less than 1,000 U.S. dollars per month including in literature (91.5% of sampled workers), fine arts (79% of sampled workers), photography (79% of sampled workers), theater production (74% of sampled workers), movies (71% of sampled workers), Korean folk music (67% of sampled workers), dance (64% of sampled workers), classical music (60% of sampled workers), popular arts (43.5% of sampled workers) and architecture (34% of sampled workers)[48] (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 2012). Therefore, it can be seen that precarious working and living conditions are a prevalent

[48] See: Ministry of Culture, Sports & Tourism's 2012 Survey Report on Artists & Activities. 200 workers were sampled from each creative sector, including literature, fine arts, photography, classical music, popular arts, theater production, movies, and architecture.

phenomenon in Korea's creative economy, containing structural commonalities and shared experiences across a variety of occupations.

In spite of these structural constraints and industrial problems in Korea's creative industries, there is continuous governmental promotion of creative economy as an evolving economic sector. Yet at the same time, it is difficult to identify governmental efforts to solve the chronic labor problems in these creative industries. In general, the national creative industry policy focuses primarily on the promotion of "industry," while efforts to capture the characteristics of creative industry from the viewpoint of "labor" are neglected. Within this broad societal atmosphere when I was conducting my fieldwork in Seoul, one of the distinctive policy projects under the new mayor was to hold numerous mentoring and educational programs for future workers and to promote social enterprise and venture enterprise for young workers. I have participated in several of these programs and have met some future workers and mentors. In the next section, I look more closely at the characteristics of these educational programs.

7.5 Promoting a "Conformist Self-Development Creator" through the Creative City Policy

The Seoul Design Foundation (SDF), one of the major administrative organizations in charge of Seoul's creative city policy, has its three satellites offices called "Seoul Design Support Centers" in Guro, Mapo and Gangnam area near its main office located in the Dongdaemun area. The main task of these branch offices is to hold numerous educational and mentoring programs for the future design workforce and the current practitioners. In keeping with its mission, there are various mentoring and educational programs for college and

university students as well as professional development programs for current designers jointly held by the SMG and other design companies. One of the mentoring programs, in which I participated during July 2012 called the “Design Job Searching Clinic”, was held in Mapo-gu City Hall and was jointly sponsored by the SMG, SDF and two online job-searching companies (Designer Jobs and Media Jobs). The clinic lasted about two hours, and the venue was totally packed with hundreds of university and college students who were eager to gain any kind of information about the designers’ job market from “experts” in the field.

The “Clinic” consisted of three presentations and a Q&A session from two current designers who were working in one of the Korean chaebol companies, “LG”, and from one student who is famous for his participation in several chaebol company- sponsored PR activities and internships. As I mentioned before, it is extremely difficult to enter a Korean chaebol company as a designer due to the excessive competition; therefore these two current designers’ presentations focused on: 1) how graduates could enter these prestigious companies in terms of what kinds of routes and strategies are necessary based on their career paths; 2) what kinds of “talent” and “capacities” are required to be successful; and most importantly 3) how graduates can “develop” these abilities.

The first presenter, who had started her designer career twelve years earlier, began her presentation by talking about how she was the only one chosen among 400 candidates when she finally came to work with LG. She said that it took almost ten years to enter this “prestigious” company as a “capable” designer. She graduated from one of the most famous art schools in Korea and had worked at five different companies including several pharmaceutical companies, broadcast production house, and an advertising agency before

settling down at LG. Throughout her career path, she has worked on numerous extra projects as well, such as on book illustrations and animation character designs in order to make her portfolio more “dynamic” and “exceptional” than others.

The first and most important suggestion that she gave to these future workers was to acquire and develop “extra” abilities beside good design skills. She said that there were already too many designers “who are good at design”; so nowadays designers should have other expert knowledge and skills, such as “mastering” graphics tools and software. In this sense, she was proud of her own knowledge about medicine, which she gathered herself through working at several pharmaceutical companies as a package designer. She said that this “extra” knowledge and experience in medicine was one of the reasons why she was chosen by LG. The reason why these extra abilities is needed is obviously because they are essential for appearing “better” or “distinctive” than other “ordinary” designers so as to survive in this excessive competitive market. Another important point that she addressed was “making your own self-identity as a designer” and “visualizing it in portfolios or resumes in a original way”, which also are related to “being distinctive and better” than others. Because many of the job candidates are already well-equipped with good “qualifications” such as a strong university GPA, abundant internship experience, high English language test scores, she said that the candidates all look the same. To beat out the hundreds or sometime thousands of other competitors, she suggested that it is crucial to make yourself appealing by “framing” your own story or self-identity and showing it in a “distinctive” way. As an example, she showed some “notable” model resumes, one of which included a smart phone application programmed by the candidate himself. In her final remarks, she stressed that her career path was also somewhat “bumpy” and “hard” as numerous “others” have been; thus

she stressed that everyone could become like her if they “keep challenging themselves and not giving up”.

The second presenter had a fairly similar career path to the first presenter. She also graduated from the same design school as the first presenter and had worked in numerous different types of design companies, such as animation production, IT design solution companies and web marketing companies before entering LG. She stressed in her presentation “having a mentality of self-development” rather than following only money and welfare benefits. She revealed that she actually had three job offers from several companies when she first “hit” the job market after her completion of graduate school. Among these three firms, she said that she chose the smallest IT solution company, which actually offered the lowest salary out of the three companies because she thought that she could “develop” herself in that company more than in the other two. In this company, she said that she was never lazy but rather kept “exploring” herself by continuously reflecting upon questions like “what are my dispositions?”, “what are my interests ?”, “what am I good at?” and “how can I develop myself more?” With this self-reflective practice, she stressed that it is essential to develop various potentialities and abilities “*beyond”* what companies generally expect for designers. Based on this self-reflection and self-development mentality, she said that she was able to learn more about various different types of work than other designers did and to experience a variety of types of job roles not only as a designer but also as a manager and project planner. She stressed that these differences made her successfully arrive at a company like LG. In her final remarks, she again addressed that “Please do not search for the companies which provide you with a high salary or good welfare benefits. Choose the company in which you can develop yourself.” Her continuous stressing of “self-development”

and “self-reflection” made me think that these ideas might be based on such logic as "you have to protect yourself in order to survive in this excessively competitive situation because the companies no longer protect you".

By looking at these design workers’ career paths, it seems clear that it is extremely difficult to enter good companies like Samsung and LG as a designer. Even though both of these speakers graduated from the best design schools in Korea, they had to keep changing companies and “never” wavering from the development of their skills and abilities *beyond* what was generally expected. A self-reflection and self-development mentality became a compulsory “required” subjectivity to survive as a designer in an excessively competitive situation, and personal histories and trajectories of how people develop their skills, knowledge and more importantly “themselves” become some of the most precious resources that contribute to making creative workers appear “distinctive” and “better” than their competitors.

These two experts’ presentations were followed by one given by a current design student. The presenter, who introduced himself as an ordinary design major just like any other, had become famous by sharing his experiences and strategies as to how he was able to participate in numerous Korean big chaebol company-promoted public relations activities that were dubbed “external activities” (*daehoehwaldong*,대외활동). From the 2000s onward, large Korean companies, such as Samsung, LG, Hyundai and SK, launched various types of so-called “campus PR activities”. In most cases, these companies annually recruited around one hundred volunteer university students as “campus reporters” or “blog journalists” to give them the opportunity to provide news coverage or feature articles about the companies’

business activities. To enable them to collect news data and produce news coverage and articles about their companies' businesses, companies invited these students to tour and participate in various PR activities, such as corporate social service activities. Companies usually economically supported these volunteer students, sometimes giving them the opportunity to travel internationally, manage their own websites, and publish their own newspapers or magazines based on their news coverage or articles. For example, Samsung manages the Young Samsung Campus Reporter program, while SK operates SK Students' Blog Journalists. From the viewpoint of these companies, such activities – dubbed "chaebol company sponsored-external activities" for university students – have become one of the most effective and important of their tools to publicize their companies not only to the educational systems but also to the broader society. At the same time, to the university students, such internships become "noble" opportunities to closely experience their "dream" companies. For this reason, it is becoming very competitive to be chosen for participation in these "external activities," as with other internship opportunities.

The student presenter – chosen by all three companies of Samsung, SK and LG – was obviously some kind of "star" in the "external activities" field. He clearly argued that his participation in these "external activities" was very important because it gave him "precious" experience and information about these "dream" companies. One of the examples he pointed out was that he was able to actually meet and interview those in charge of the company's recruitment department. Because of excessive competition, any information about recruitment is extremely important for the future workforce, and he revealed that he was able to gain an "insider's viewpoint" as to what kinds of "human capitals" these companies wanted and how he could be like these "wanted human capitals". He described in detail how

ordinary students like himself – who even did not graduate from prestigious schools different from other two presenters working in LG– could get the opportunity to directly meet and interview those who were in charge of a large company's recruitment. He seemed to firmly believe that these activities functioned as a way of increasing one's possibility to enter "these dream companies". Apart from gaining such an "insider's viewpoint", he introduced that he also could meet many "able" peer students via these "external activities". Since it was really competitive to be chosen by these companies' "external activities", he argued that every chosen participant was thus an "able" one. He also revealed that he was even preparing to start his own IT design venture business with other peers whom he had met there. He added that through these activities he had developed a "strong attachment" to the companies with which he participated, even though he was not yet employed by them.

After finishing all the presentations, in the Q&A session one student's question surprised and made me strongly uncomfortable about these so-called "mentoring programs". This student said that he was now majoring in two more subjects – engineering and management *in addition to design* – in order to survive in this competitive job market. He cautiously asked the presenters whether his direction was suitable to what they framed as a "designer whose abilities go *beyond* what companies generally expected". One presenter replied to him jokingly that he thought the best future designer is a person like a Hollywood movie character, "Iron Man", who can design what he wants, engineer what he designed, and even manage his own companies. Even though many in the audience laughed at that moment, I felt a strong discomfort because I envisioned what the Korean society was imposing on these young students in order for them to become ideal future "creative workers". Such a vision encompassed expert workers who not only have reasonable knowledge and skills in

their own fields, but also have to be omnipotent "superhero" workers who can do whatever the companies wants *beyond* their expectations. More importantly, so as to keep up with the industry's "*beyond expectations*", one of the most important things creative workers have to do is to constantly monitor and push their "self-development" and "self-reflection" in order to become "distinctive" and "better" than their fellow designers.

Political scientist Isabell Lorey (2015) claims that precarization not only means "destabilization through employment" but also shows "destabilization of the conduct of life and thus on bodies and modes of subjectivation" (Lorey, 2015:13). Here she attempts to define "precarization" as a new mode of governmentality in the production of certain subjects whose main preoccupation is based on "insecurity" (Neilson and Cote, 2014). Therefore, she argues that global neoliberalism as governmentality can produce "conformist self-development subjects" who eagerly and incessantly "develop" and "manage" themselves to cope with their feelings of "insecurity". Similarly, McRobbie (2002) argues that reflexivity can function as a "de-politicizing and de-socializing mechanism" to call upon creative workers to continuously monitor and discipline themselves. She argues that in the absence of structures of social support, reflexivity can be toward a practice of "self-responsibility" and "self-blame" by keep asking oneself with questions like "where have I gone wrong?" (McRobbie, 2002: 522) In other words, these scholars importantly warn that under this precarization, self-reflexivity and self-development of the subject can be directly toward conforming to the current global neoliberalism.

As shown in this participant observation, without any structural and industrial support creative workers in Korea are now under societal promotion of becoming "conformist self-development subjects" who must keep up with the state and the industry's requirements to

successfully survive in this excessively competitive job market. In doing so, they are cultivated to be model subjects who are "distinctive and better" than their peers to satisfy their future employer in the sense of “beyond industries’ expectations”. In this regard, “self-development” and “self-reflection” function as tools to construct confirming self-development subjects who excessively try to cope with their insecure and precarious working and living conditions by continuously “developing” and “monitoring” themselves.

7.6 Artists Social Union Movement and Political Subjectivization

As shown in my participant observation, the promotion of this subjectivity of a “confirming self-development subject” is continuously fostered by the widespread educational and mentoring programs for future workers in alliance between the state and capitals; this “self-development’-type solution is preferred in even the “citizen-friendly” current mayor’s administration. However, in Seoul, I also was able to find several people working in meaningfully different directions to improve the precarious working and living conditions of creative workers. These workers were not satisfied with “self-development”-type solutions promoted by the state and capitals, but rather asked for structural changes and social supports. At the same time, in order to build up consolidation among various creative occupations, they strategically disavowed the given self-identity – such as that of “individualized creator” – yet recalled the neglected subjectivity of “solidified labor” to resist and oppose the given precarious working and living conditions. This “resistance” subjectivity could be found in a variety of different forms from individual worker or a group of workers to “union”-type movements such as the Artists Social Union. Nonetheless, there were several commonalities among them represented by “penetrating the deeply fractured structure of the

labor market in Korea's creative economy"[49] and "against the given self-identity as individualized creator".

One of my interviewees, Sunwoo (CW16), who has been working in the design industry for ten years critically evaluated his ten month-long experience in Seoul Design Foundation (below SDF)'s social enterprise incubation program. He said that he originally had a personal desire to "talk about social issues" such as global warming through his design products since his undergraduate era. When he found the SDF-supported social enterprise incubation programs, he thought that it was time to start his own business; therefore he applied to the program and luckily was chosen by SDF. Through these projects, the SDF has provided several education and mentoring programs such as entrepreneurship and marketing. Still, he finally realized that the current city's policy to support creative workers via education and mentoring typed projects was not changing their working and living conditions at all:

> My ultimate conclusion which I have found through participating in this whole project is that the state and the city's discourse and policy of booming venture and social enterprise in creative industries are completely "*wrong*". Think about it: if the state and the city still can make abundant employment by promoting the existing companies in creative industries, why do they need to support social enterprise or venture enterprise in creative industries? They already know that they can't make any more jobs through promoting current companies because it is already overly competitive. At the same time, there is a continuous oversupply of labor … So I think

[49] Here I refer to the term "penetration", developed by cultural sociologist Paul Willis. Willis (1977) defined "penetration" as "designate impulses within a cultural form towards the penetration of the conditions of existence of its members and their position within the social whole but in a way which is not centred, essentialist or individualist."(Willis, 1977:119). Based on his ethnographic research on the relationship between the counter-school culture and the reproduction of British working class, he showed that working class children actually *see through* "a common educational fallacy that opportunities can be made by education" (Wills, 1977:128) and *know better* than "the new vocational guidance what is the real state of the job market" based on their real life experiences and own knowledge (Willis, 1977:126).

> that the state and the city now tell young workers to “start your own business by yourself” and they wrap it with a fancy discourse like “Yes, we are now investing in “creative and passionate young workers’ dreams”… Do you think that many people can really survive in this competitive market in social and venture enterprise? It is almost impossible … so I think that the current city’s policy to support venture and social enterprise in creative industries is just “*deceiving*” the citizens and young people. (Personal interview with Sunwoo (CW16), a male designer participated in the SDF's social enterprise incubation programs)

Sunwoo's long-standing experience in the competitive design industry and his participation in an actual creative city policy project have allowed him to "*see through*" the mirage to come to realize that there are indeed structural constraints and limitations which individual workers cannot overcome. He has come to "*know better*" than the SMG's creative city policy as to what is the real industrial situation of creative industries. His penetration into the deeply fractured labor market in Korea's creative economy derives from his experiences and implicit knowledge through living and working in precarious conditions, and his firsthand participation has made him view the current existing policy and industrial situation critically. Therefore, it is important to note that creative workers are not simply dupes of the government-promoted fancy discourse of creative city policy just like my interviewee has actually penetrated it. However, only penetrating the given structure and existing system is not enough to resist and oppose the given working and living conditions as long as such resistance tends only to become one of individual blame or resentment. Rather, the worst situation might be that "people already know it but still are doing it". Therefore, it is necessary to create certain sites, media or organizations for workers to come together to share this blame, dissatisfaction and contempt toward the current existing system, and in this way develop solidarity and consolidation. In this regard, I was able to meet with a group of

creative workers who created a medium by which to investigate and share various creative workers' living and working conditions by publishing their own online magazine.

The title of the online magazine, “*Listening*”, implies simply that these workers are open to listening to the diversity of creative workers’ voices in terms of issues and difficulties of their working and living conditions. This group of four young creative workers from such various backgrounds as design and IT programming publish an online magazine that includes a series of articles and interviews with different types of creative workers. When I visited their office, they told me that their “deep” dissatisfaction and strong contempt with the existing system led them to spontaneously research creative workers’ working and living conditions by themselves and share this information with other workers via the format of an online magazine. One member of the group, Heyri (CW7) explained to me how she came up with the idea to start this project:

> I majored in cultural studies and feminism in my undergraduate program and have been involved in various kinds of cultural activism on social issues. After graduating college, I have been working at one of the largest IT companies (in Korea) and at several cultural foundations as well. Also, I have many friends and relatives who are working in these fields such as arts, music, design, media, etc. … By passing through my careers, I have noticed that my viewpoint toward so-called “creative industries” has been changing. I found that there is a chronic and systematic problem mostly represented by the problem of “labor”. However, I felt that there was an odd perception gap between the older generations who started their careers when creative industries were still expanding and our generation who grew up under the discourse of prominent “creative industry” but found that working conditions were extremely poor and hard. I felt that these older generations seem not to take this labor problem seriously, so I thought that this is the task that our generation should take care of by ourselves. (Personal interview with Heyri (CW7), one member of the online magazine, *Listening*)

Through the use of funding resources from the Korean Artists Welfare Foundation, this group of young workers has published twelve magazines containing various investigative

articles about and interviews with creative workers, labor lawyers, politicians, and academics. In my interviews with them, they said that even though there are certain differences in each creative industry sector such as movies, design, media, literature, and music, they ultimately have found that there are strong commonalities such as the problem of widespread precarious working and living conditions and more importantly the problem of "being socially recognized creative work as *labor*". Heyri explained this issue:

> Yes, we have researched various types of creative workers' living and working situations and found that there are some detailed differences within each industry. Broadly, the realm of "art" such as classical music, dance, and theater production, and the field of "cultural industry" such as popular music, movie, broadcasting and design have a different industrial situation. For example, in case of the artistic field, we found that state policy should be more toward the principle of patronage and enlightenment, but in more industrial fields, we found that there are certain industry-specific problems such as copyright issues and subcontracting problems ... So we might need a different policy plan to handle each of them. However, in spite of these specific differences, we found the one critical commonality is that these various creative workers all want their works to being socially recognized and respected as "labor". (Personal Interview with Heyri (CW7), one member of the online magazine, *Listening*)

Thus one of these young workers explained that there might be a certain specific tool to solve each industry's problem based on its own context. However, she argued that there is a common ground on which to solidify and consolidate these various creative workers in terms of socially recognizing and respecting creative work as "labor". As I reported in my previous research, in the Korean creative industry there is a tendency for creative workers to try not to identify themselves as "laborers" or "workers"; rather they prefer to recognize themselves as "passionate creators" or "individualized freelancers" (Kim, 2008, 2014). In order to cope with their precarious working and living conditions, creative workers in Korea appear to be inclined to differentiate their work from so-called "labor" such as white-collar

office workers and blue-collar manual laborers. "Passion for creativity" and "liberal freelancer identity" give them a sense of pleasure and freedom, but this passionate creator and individualized freelancer subjectivity has become one of the strong barriers preventing them from solidifying themselves. In this regard, recognizing and respecting creative work as a "labor" go in an exactly opposite direction from what I observed before.

In fact, this group of creative workers pointed out that there was a societal "turning point" that allowed creative workers to subvert their self-identity and turn their eyes toward the neglected subjectivity of “solidified labor”. The turning point was actually caused by a series of creative workers' deaths and suicides due to these precarious working and living conditions. In particular, in 2011, the death of the young screenwriter Chio Go-Eun, who died alone ill and in poverty at age 32, ignited societal dispute about the social welfare and support system for creative workers in Korea. Some of the news journalists reported that she was "*socially murdered*" and started investigating the poor living and working conditions of creative workers in various fields including literature, music, popular art, fine arts, designers, movies, and broadcasting (e.g, Ahn, 2011).

Along these lines, it is necessary to note that an important social movement recently has emerged in which various types of creative workers are trying to consolidate and organize themselves into a "union". This movement is a meaningful example of how creative workers can empower themselves as “political subjects” who strategically disavow their given self-identity as “individualized creators” but recall the neglected subjectivity of “solidified labor” to resist and oppose given precarious working and living conditions. In December 2011, an open forum for creative workers was held in remembrance of Chio Go-Eun's tragic death. At the forum, numerous groups of creative workers such as musicians,

novelists, playwrights, movie directors, cartoonists, art directors and politicians from the Korean labor party discussed their living and labor conditions and the problems of the current social welfare system for creative workers. One of the reasons why these various creative occupations joined this open forum was that they found the current living and working conditions of so-called creative workers were more similar to one another than different. One movie director revealed that the reason for her participation in the forum was that she perceived the death of Chio Go-Eun not as a "symbolic incident of others" but rather as a part of "her own fear of making a living" because her living and working situation was exactly the same as that of creative workers such as Choi Go-Eun[50]. In other words, most participants strongly felt a consolidated "urgency" and "necessity" to change and oppose the current existing system.

One of the critical issues during the forum focused on "how can we become socially recognized as 'labor'". When a moderator of the forum asked a question about the relationship between "art and labor", "artists and laborers" and "the concept of artists labor", workers from diverse creative occupations interestingly showed several meaningful interpretations regarding their self-identity as artist/creator and worker/laborer. For example, one playwright reported her experiences and interpretations about the relationship between "artists and laborers":

> What I want to talk about regarding this relationship between artist and laborer is that speaking about myself as an artist seems to *suppress* speaking about myself as a laborer. I think that there is a certain societal view (in Korea) that creative activities

---

[50] Even though I could not participate in the open forum because it took place before I started my fieldwork in Korea. However, I could find the full transcript of the forum in Artists Social Union's online club. Here, I refer to the transcript (See: http://cafe.naver.com/ArticlePrint.nhn?clubid=24395376&articleid=13)

> should be evaluated by other special standards (not by its labor value), and this view itself conceals artists' labor value'. (Artists Social Union, 2011, translated by myself)

Here, she points out that there has been a long-term societal viewpoint in Korea that divides "art" and "labor", "artists" and "laborer", or "creator" and "worker," treating them as oppositional concepts. As I found in my previous research on broadcast workers, when they identify themselves as "creators", they tend to assume that their work is more "artistic", "creative", or "autonomous" than is other work such as white-collar office work or blue-collar manual work in a *hierarchical* sense (Kim, 2008). In doing so, for them, self-identity as "laborer" seems to be perceived as "uncreative", "monotonous" or even "subservient". With this logic, identifying themselves as "creators" has a certain symbolic power to replace their "social rights as labor" with those of "individualized romantic artists". As Korea labor historian Hagen Koo (2001) has shown, Korean workers have suffered not only economically and politically, but also culturally and symbolically throughout Korea's industrialization period. Within this historical context, the name of "laborer" or "worker" had become stigmatized to mean "poor" and "uneducated". In this regard, the reason why the playwright sensed a suppressed feeling when she was "speaking about myself as laborer" is because the identity of laborer is perceived as "the identity of *the other*" for her.

However, these groups of creators found that they can become "political subjects" when they "dis-identify" their given identity of "creators" in a hierarchical sense and re-identify themselves as "laborer" in terms of the other in the sense of "equality". One creator said that the idea that artists/creators are also workers/laborers is a "strategic discourse" to break down the given order and the broad societal consensus of artists as "non-workers"; meanwhile other creative workers argued that artists/creators should be protected as

meaningful members of society just like others are in a equal sense. Similarly, Jun (CW8), who is an architect and a musician and strongly supports the Artist Social Union movement, told his view of the relationship between creator and worker:

> In our generation [he is in his 40s], I think that artists or so-called creators have been socially forced to enhance and intensify "selfness" in the sense of "better" and "distinctive" than have ordinary people through Korea's rapid industrialization period. People in creative occupations tend to keep think of themselves in a sense that like "I should be different, I have to be special, I have to think differently". *This is delusion*. I think this kind of self-centered identity of the creator should be subverted toward a more "other-centered identity". I always tell my creator friends and colleagues: "you are not special at all. *You are equal to anyone else*". ... In some sense, this selfness is embedded in our generation socially and culturally, so it might be a bit difficult to change it easily. However, I think that Korean society is changing now, and our next generation should find and develop how we can break this self-centered identity and develop an "other-centered" and "community-driven" identity. (Personal interview with Jun (CW8), a male musician and architect who supports Artists Social Union)

As he argues, this group of creative workers has found that the self-centered identity of creator/artist should be changed into an other-centered identity of worker/laborer. In this sense, their idea of "artist laborer" or "creative worker" points out what Jacques Ranciere (1992) argues in terms of an "in-between" subjectivity in the sense of equality, in which the artist/creator identity is not perceived as "better" or "distinctive" than that of laborer/worker in the sense of confrontation between two identities but conceptualized rather as a "being together" to the extent that they are in-between names and identities.

Jacque Ranciere (1992) distinguishes “identification” based on “the law of policy” from the concept of “subjectivization” that is based on “the law of equality”(Ranciere, 1992: 58). He argues that identification is a process of “governing with the principle of the community under the heading of universality, the reign of the law, liberal democracy, and so on” (Ranciere, 1992: 59). Under this logic of identification, minorities, smaller groups, or

workers are allocated certain “ways of doing, ways of being and ways of saying and seeing that those positions are assigned by name to a particular place and task” (Ranciere, 1999: 29); thus he calls this process of identification “police,” which is different from “politics.” Under this regime of identification, workers situate themselves according to their place. However, different from this process of identification, Ranciere conceptualizes a process of subjectivization that is “the formation of a one that is not a self but is *the relation of a self to other*” (Ranciere, 1992: 60). Under the process of subjectivization, he goes on to argue that workers or proletariats begin to claim the fundamental assertion of equality.

By applying Ranciere's concept of political subjectivization to the Artists Social Union movement, creators/artists claimed the neglected category of “worker/laborer” and opposed the given order, which divides and allocates them into a certain category or a certain order such as "individualized/passionate creator/artists". On the contrary, under the process of subjectivization, these creator/artists have the potential to become political subjects who can empower themselves by embracing and using the neglected names of "laborer" and "worker" as "poor" and "un-educated", which previously have been perceived as oppositional with a contrasting subjectivity for them. It is also important to note that the Artists Social Union is not yet legally recognized as a "union" by the state but still utilizes its name of "union". The group argues that the "Artists Social Union" is "against the limited, exclusive ways of traditional labor unions” but open to all who identify themselves as "creative workers" or who can agree with its purposes and goals. It shows that this union is based on the principle of equality, which proposes that "we all are able to be qualified regardless of qualifications or other indications” (Simons and Masschelein, 2010: 595). In this sense, this

subjectivization can be seen as what Ranciere calls the moment of “politics” which takes “the form of a part which has no part” (Read, 2007: 127).

Since its first open forum, these groups of workers launched their preparatory committee in 2012. In order to prepare the official establishment, they have held numerous open forums and collaborated not only with traditional labor unions such as the Korean rail workers who have been striking against privatization and the laid-off Ssangyong motor company workers but also with newly emerging social movement groups such as the Arbeit Workers Union (a trade union of part-time workers) and the Youth Community Union (a group of young people who fight for the right of young workers); through these collaborations, they are striving to consolidate their voices against increasingly precarious working and living conditions. Moreover, as a result of this variety of activities, they gradually have increased social recognition and officially established their organization on May Day, 2015. By looking at their activities – even though their action is still at a beginning stage – one may be able to predict that they not only will work on labor issues for artists and creators but also will engage with broad societal issues to build "social solidarity" against the current neoliberal-developmental symptoms of Korea.

In conclusion, in comparison with Yokohama's "co-existing" model of post-developmentalism that focuses on promoting ethical and moral volunteer subjects, it is possible to find that Korea’s “conflicting” model of post-developmentalism contains and fosters two different and contrasting sets of labor subjectivities: on the one hand the SMG and capitals have promoted “a conformist self-development creator” and on the other the creative workers have empowered “artists labor”. While conformist self-development subjects continue to focus on self-monitoring and self-discipline to become better and more

distinctive than the others, the in-between subjects of the artist laborers politically subjectify themselves by dis-identifying their given subjectivity as "passionate and individualized creators" in the sense of hierarchy and instead re-identifying themselves as the neglected identity of "laborers" and "workers" in the sense of equality. Through this political subjectivization, creative workers in Korea have begun to oppose not only the current creative city policy but also broader societal problems of precarious working and living conditions. In this regard, the framework of "politics" – which is lacking in Yokohama's co-existing model of post-developmentalism – can be found in Korea's conflicting model; more importantly, this notion of "politics" is one of the crucial sources that contributes to making Korea's post-developmentalism "conflicting".

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

8.1 Ongoing Fast Circulation of Creative City Policy in East Asia and the Case of Seoul and Yokohama

On July 23rd, 2015, when I was in the middle of finalizing this dissertation research, Korean President Park Guen-hye announced that the Korean national government would establish 17 state-sponsored creative economy innovation centers across the nation in collaboration with Korean chaebol companies. The government asserts that these creative economy innovation centers will function as future hubs not only to boost national economic development but also to create more jobs for young people. Moreover, the main role of the centers will focus on supporting and developing venture enterprise incubation under the name of "creative economy". Two days later on July 25th, the government held a meeting with CEOs and chairmen of 17 Korean conglomerates including Samsung's Lee Jae-yong, Hyundai Motor groups' Chung Mong-koo, and LG's Koo Bon-moo. At that meeting, President Park Guen-hye emphasized that these chaebol companies should "share" their know-how and networks to support the successful startup of these innovation centers. This national policy plan reflects the ongoing governmental initiation and promotion of "creative economy" by its spending on new infrastructures, investment in agencies to spearhead new initiatives, the successful attraction of private capital investments, and promotion of the city and by extension of the national branding project. In spite of the outpouring of broad societal criticism of the creative city/creative economy that ranges from citizens to creative workers, as I observed in my field research this circulation of "creative economy" and "creative city"

policy never has lost its symbolic power at all. In fact, after Seoul's successful designation of the UNESCO Creative City Network in 2010, more Korean cities have joined the network including Busan (the City of Film) and Gwangju (the City of Media Arts); furthermore, many other cities currently are preparing their applications for their designation as part of the UNESCO Creative City Network.

This fast circulation trend can be observed in Japan as well. One of the explicit examples of this tendency can be observed with the emergence of the "inter-local and transnational policy network" represented by the Creative City Network of Japan (below CCNJ). The CCNJ was established in 2013 as a platform to promote cooperation and exchange among creative cities within this country as well as globally and is composed of various municipalities, NPOs, professionals and academic experts. Recently, over 49 municipalities and 16 NPOs in Japan have joined the CCNJ that is supported by the Agency for Cultural Affairs in order to prepare explicit policy practices and strategic plans for Japan's creative city policy. This fast circulation trend of the creative city policy via this kind of inter-local policy network not only provides evidence that scrutinization of the growing role of inter-local policy networks may be the key to understanding the current global circulation of the creative city policy, but also shows that a case study research approach based on a particular city's policy adoption and implementation may have some methodological limitations in terms of fully capturing a representative portrait of the creative city phenomenon because there just may be too many cases to catch up with.

Given this fast-growing "creative city phenomenon", what might be the practical efficacy or importance of these case studies of Seoul and Yokohama? Is there not the

possibility that this research suffers from the pitfall of anecdotalism? Or, as Actor-Network Theory assumes *in theory* – because certain urban realities are based on highly contingent and uncertain localized achievements – is it necessary instead to scrutinize *more cases* to draw a more accurate picture and fill in empirical gaps within our understanding of ambiguous East Asian variants of the global "creative city phenomenon"? To answer these questions, I propose to use my case studies of Seoul and Yokohama – not in the sense of binary oppositional concepts of "universal" versus "particular" – but rather in the sense of the in-between concept of "*conjuncture*". In his famous concept of articulation, Stuart Hall famously proposed the consideration of certain social realities within the viewpoint of "articulation" in terms of the notion of contingent but concrete historical conjuncture; more importantly, he argues that once certain articulation is constructed, it moves not in “infinite difference” but in “unity in difference.”

Through the application of Hall’s conceptualization of articulation, it is thus possible to reframe the debate between the East Asian variant on the one hand and the global creative city phenomenon on the other. As we can see in the concept of articulation, certain policy regimes are not automatically given as transparent or abstract. Rather, they always seem to consist of concrete connections and linkages of policy practices among various policy actors, and these connections and linkages can be sustained mainly by specific processes, which are not “eternal” but rather have to be constantly renewed. By following Hall's position, I suggest that the larger characters of Neoliberalism and Developmentalism might not be useful to effectively capture the global rapid circulation of creative city policy. Rather, as I have shown in this dissertation research, it is necessary to theorize particular kinds of

developmentalisms, neoliberalisms or post-developmentalisms via conjunctural analysis of the creative city phenomenon in East Asia. In this sense, I hope that the cases of Seoul and Yokohama will contribute to the prediction that certain patterns of assemblages may re-emerge through the active translation of inter-local and transnational policy networks. Therefore, I suggest that it is crucial for future research to deliberately trace how inter-local and transnational policy networks – such as Japan's CCNJ – "translate" the creative city policy and in what ways this translation influences a local municipality' adoption and implementation of policies. In fact, the cases of Seoul and Yokohama are particularly important because they are perceived as internationally successful and among the leading cities at both the local and global levels. For this reason, it can be predicted that Seoul and Yokohama will take relatively important roles in the transmission of their knowledge and strategies to other cities, corporate actors, and NGOs midst this rapid circulation of creative city policy.

In what ways does the creative city policy in Seoul and Yokohama generate new forms of urban politics in relation to various policy actors, including city government, local and global business capitals, and citizen and creative labor? To answer this research question, this research viewed creative city policy of Seoul and Yokohama as "new urban governmental techniques", and it traced connections among various institutional actors including Seoul and Yokohama city governmental officials, policy experts from governmental think tanks, activist organizations, citizen groups, artists, and creative workers. The main body of this dissertation consists of three main substantive parts which include a variety of dimensional dynamics of each city's creative city policy in terms of: (1) urban

construction projects, (2) urban mega events, and (3) new forms of subjectivities such as "creative citizen" and "creative labor".

In the first main part (chapter 2 and 3), I focused on how creative city policies in Seoul and Yokohama are located in procedures and objects within the urban construction project by comparing Seoul's Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park construction to Yokohama's Creative Core Area construction. I examine how these urban sites become carefully rearranged settings through certain procedural, institutional, and technical mechanisms implemented by various discursive and material practices of policy actors.

In case of Yokohama, by starting from Yokohama's brief urban history, I proposed to view the relationship between the Minato Mira 21(below MM21) and the Kannai Area to better understand the emergence of the creative city policy in Yokohama. Based on the consideration of the relationship between MM21 and Creative Core Area, I found that two different policy networks-the Kannai's post-developmental and MM21's neoliberal-developmental networks-coexist in different spaces, one in the Creative Core Area and the other in MM21, though having different time spans (MM21 From 1980 and Creative Core Area from 2004). On the other hand, different from Yokohama's coexistence model, in case of Seoul, I reported that two different policy networks-the former mayor's neoliberal-developmental network consisting of the state and capital and the current mayor's post-developmental network consisting of the state and citizens- conflicted with each other over one site, the Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park, in a compressed time span from 2007 to 2013. Based on these findings, I suggest a clearer conceptualization of the East Asian variant of post-developmental/neoliberal developmental, not along the single dimension of "Post-

Developmentalism” or “Neoliberal-Developmentalism” but within the framework of multiple “post-developmentalisms” or “neoliberal-developmentalisms”.

In the second main part (chapter 4 and 5), I examined in what ways urban mega events are practiced by routinized techniques or standardized procedures by focusing on Seoul’s Design Seoul Olympiads and Yokohama’s Yokohama Triennales. Rather than understand the development of new urban mega events as merely the reflex of the expansion of neoliberal capitalism, these chapters suggested view mega events as discursive and material fields of struggle where a variety of policy conflict and oppose each other by translating and counter-translating urban spaces and events in a different direction.

In the case of Yokohama, by focusing on four different Yokohama Triennales from 2001 to 2011, I found that coexisting model of creative city Yokohama consisting of the state-NPOs-citizens only provided with a limited mode of civic participation by fostering “volunteer subjectivity”, which is apolitical and supports only the state. In this regard, in spite of citizens’ strong desire to become a “mediator” of urban mega events, there is no route by which citizens can more "radically" participate from the actual planning and management process of the exhibition. Different from Yokohama’s coexisting model and its relation to “volunteer subjectivity” as an ideal model of citizen participation, in case of Seoul, I show how different policy networks such as "neoliberal-developmental" and "post-developmental" networks differently organized urban mega events represented by “Seoul Design Olympiads” and the “Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7”. By focusing on three Seoul Design Olympiads, I found that these urban mega events were organized and managed by an assemblage of three key actors: the state, corporate actors and academic experts actors.

Through these urban mega events, civic participation was only limited to what I refer to as "participation via competition", thereby completely neglecting citizens' involvement in the planning and the management processes of the events. Different from Seoul Design Olympiads, Korea's post-developmental policy networks in which state actors interacted directly with ordinary citizens and NPOs, newly organized and managed Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7 by providing more direct and in-depth citizen participation. In this regard, the two different types of events demonstrate that Seoul's each policy network has opposing and conflictual ideas and meanings in relation to urban spaces and events.

The last main part (chapter 6 and 7) aims to "reassemble" the creative city policy actors and objects together in an active process to foster certain types of subjectivities such as "creative citizen" and "creative labor" in Seoul and Yokohama. The participant observation research in Seoul Design Support Center in Seoul as well as in Creative City School in Yokohama comprises my main case studies for these final main chapters. By focusing on the lived experiences of working and living conditions, I tried to show how creative workers in Seoul and Yokohama actually experience, evaluate, participate, negotiate or even resists the given creative city policies as well as their precarious working and living conditions.

In case of Yokohama, by following the recent researches on creative labor, I focused on how the ethical and moral dimensions of labor subjectivity are prominently important to explain workers' everyday living and working experiences as creative labor in Yokohama. Furthermore, I address how these ethical and moral values in creative work are actually preferred within the given creative city policy and have certain limitations to overcome a "moral but apolitical volunteer subjectivity". In case of Seoul, I argued how creative workers

in Seoul demonstrate the potential to resist and oppose not only the given creative city policy but also their precarious working and living conditions. In order to rightly capture these creative workers' resistance and opposition, I located creative workers' subjectivities of Seoul within the growing research trends on "precariat" studies. In contrast with Yokohama's "co-existing" model of post-developmentalism that focuses on the promotion of "moral and ethical volunteer subjects", I show how Korea's "conflicting" model of post-developmentalism actually contains and fosters two different and contrasting sets of labor subjectivities: the SMG and capitals that promote "a conformist self-development creator" on the one hand and the creative workers who are empowered "artists labor" on the other.

8.2 Epilogue: From the circulation of Creative City "policy" to the transmission of Creative City "politics"?

After completing my lengthy field research in Japan and Korea, I had the opportunity to present one of my dissertation chapters at the annual convention of International Association for Media and Communication Research in July, 2014. At that conference, one of the commentators of my research said that even though he understood the problems of creative city policy in East Asia well by reviewing my paper, he asked me that what might be my opinion as to the future policy direction or any potential "alternative" for creative city policy. I do not quite remember how I responded to that question; as far as I remember, none of us in that conference room clearly answered that question about an "alternative". After the conference, however, I had to keep struggling with this question when I worked on my dissertation manuscript. Sometimes I thought that thinking about an "alternative" was outside the scope of my dissertation research, and at some point I even thought that it was not my

role to suggest an “alternative,” given I am a "mere researcher”. Nonetheless, when I collected the data about Artists Social Union movement and re-analyzed my interviews with creative workers and activists in Korea, I finally reached the result that what these creative workers and citizens really desire is not a well-planned “policy” but rather radical “politics”.

French philosopher Jacques Ranciere defines "policy" as a governing process relying on "the distribution of shares and the hierarchy of places and functions" in which people are allocated to only within a certain way of being (Ranciere, 1992). Different from the logic of policy, Ranciere defines "politics" as an emancipating process that depends on the logic of equality in which people demolish every order, qualification and hierarchy in an anarchic sense (Ranciere, 1992). To apply Ranciere's conception of "policy" and "politics" to the creative city policy, it is clear that the creative city policy in Seoul and Yokohama exactly follows what Ranciere called the logic of "policy" as a governing process in which the order and the role of policy actors are distributed, allocated and located through certain procedural, institutional, and technical mechanisms implemented by various discursive and material practices. Under this policy regime, the role of creative workers and citizens is located solely in a "moral and ethical volunteer subject" in Yokohama or a "conformist self-development subject" in Seoul. Therefore, what is necessary is not to consent or agree with this policy regime, but to dissent and disagree with the current creative city policies; most importantly, it is possible to find an important clue about "politics" in the Korea's Artists Social Union movement.

East Asian developmental states have been well known for their high level of state planning. As many scholars point out, from Japan to Korea, what has helped them

successfully “catch up” to their western counterparts has been based heavily on the crucial role of its technocracy and well-organized state policies. In other words, well-planned state policies from “experts” have been a major tool for national economic development in East Asia. However, it is important to note that this strategy of development via a well-organized policy became one of the reasons why East Asian society prefers to be the society of consent, agreement and apolitical. The rapid circulation of the creative city policy shows that inter-local and transnational policy networks, connections and linkages are rapidly emerging now; therefore my answer about possible “alternatives” might be that it is urgently necessary to develop counter-networks, counter-connections and counter-linkages to transmit "politics". If this is accurate, what is necessary for East Asian society is not a question of "How can we develop effective and optimal creative city *policy*?" but rather that of "How can we invent and share creative city *politics*?"

APPENDIX A

DEMOGRAPHY OF THE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWEES IN KOREA

Occupation	No.	Age	Gender	Length of Career
State Official	SO 1	Mid 30s	Male	5 years
	SO 2	Mid 40s	Male	10 years
	SO 3	Mid 30s	Female	6 years
NGO/NPO	NG 1	Early 30s	Female	5 years
	NG 2	Mid 30s	Male	10 years
	NG 3	Mid 30s	Male	5 years
	NG 4	Early 40s	Male	8 years
Creative Workers	CW 1(Designer/Professor)	Mid 40s	Female	20 years
	CW 2(Designer)	Early 30s	Female	10 years
	CW 3(Writer)	Late 30s	Female	10 years
	CW 4(Architect)	Early 40s	Female	15 years
	CW 5(Designer/Professor)	Mid 40s	Female	15 years
	CW 6(Painter/Activist)	Mid 30s	Male	3 years
	CW 7(Designer)	Mid 30s	Female	8 years
	CW 8(Architect/Musician)	Late 40s	Male	15 years
	CW 9(Painter/Activist)	Mid 30s	Female	8 years
	CW10(Designer)	Early 30s	Male	3 years
	CW11(Architect)	Mid 40s	Male	14 years
	CW12(Designer)	Mid 40s	Female	5 years
	CW13(Designer/Professor)	Late 40s	Male	18 years
	CW14(Design field)	Mid 20s	Male	College Student
	CW15(Design field)	Mid 30s	Male	Graduate Student
	CW16(Writer/Activitst)	Mid 30s	Male	6 years
	CW17(Designer)	Mid 30s	Female	7 years
	CW18(Architect)	Early 40s	Female	10 years
	CW19(Designer)	Early 40s	Male	10 years
	Cw20(Design field)	Mid 20s	Male	College Student

APPENDIX B

DEMOGRAPHY OF THE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWEES IN JAPAN

Occupation	No.	Age	Gender	Length of Career
State Official	SO 1	Late 40s	Male	20 years
	SO 2	Late 40s	Male	15 years
	SO 3	Late 50s	Male	30 years
	SO 4	Mid 60s	Male	40 years
	SO 5	Mid 50s	Male	20 years
	SO 6	Mid 30s	Male	10 years
	SO 7	Mid 30s	Female	5 years
NPO/NGO	NP1	Early 50s	Male	30 years
	NP2	Mid 30s	Male	5 Years
	NP3	Mid 40s	Male	10 years
	NP4	Mid 30s	Female	10 years
	NP5	Early 50s	Female	20 years
	NP6	Early 30s	Male	2 years
	NP7	Early 50s	Male	20 years
	NP8	Mid 50s	Male	30 years
	NP9	Mid 50s	Male	30 years
	NP10	Mid 30s	Female	5 years
	NP11	Early 40s	Female	15 years
	NP12	Late 50s	Male	10 years
	NP13	Mid 30s	Female	5 years
	NP14	Mid 40s	Male	3 years
	NP15	Early 60s	Female	8 years
	NP16	Mid 30s	Female	1 years
Creative Workers	CW 1(Designer)	Mid 40s	Male	20 years
	CW2(Architect)	Mid 40s	Male	13 years
	CW3(Designer)	Late 20s	Male	4 years
	CW4(Architect)	Mid 30s	Female	10 years
	CW5(Designer)	Mid 30s	Female	10 years
	CW6(Painter)	Early 50s	Female	30 years
	CW7(Painter)	Mid 30s	Female	15 years
	CW8(Designer)	Early 30s	Male	5 years
	CW9(Designer)	Early 30s	Male	6 years
	CW10(Designer)	Late 20s	Male	2 years
	CW11(Designer)	Late 20s	Male	1 years
	CW12(Architect/Professor)	Mid 40s	Male	20 years

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ahn, E.B (2011) Who did drive Chio Go-Eun over the edge? herself or society? Pressian, [online]. Available from: http://www.pressian.com/news/article.html?no=65955 [Accessed 10 October 2014].

Alhassan, A. and Chakravartty, P. (2011) Postcolonial media policy: under the long shadow of empire, in *The Handbook of Global Media and Communication Policy*, by Robin Mansell and Marc Raboy, (eds), 366-382, Blackwell.

Aoki, H. (2003) Homeless in Osaka: globalization, Yoseba and disemployment, *Urban Studies* 40, 361-378

Artists Social Union (2011), Transcript for 2011 Open Forum for artists social union, [online]. Available from: http://blog.naver.com/artist_union/70147409445 [Accessed 10 October 2014].

BankART1929, 2009. *From the past creative city Yokohama into the future*, Yokohama: BankART 1929.

Banks, M. (2006). Moral economy and cultural work. *Sociology*, 40(3), 455-472.

Banks, M. (2010). Autonomy guaranteed? Cultural work and the “art–commerce relation”. *Journal for Cultural research*, 14(3), 251-269.

Banks, M., Lovatt, A., O’Connor, J., & Raffo, C. (2000). Risk and trust in the cultural industries. *Geoforum*, 31(4), 453-464.

Bell, D., and Jayne, M. (2003). 'Design-led'urban regeneration: A critical perspective. *Local Economy*, 18(2), 121-134.

Bender, T., Farías, I., & Bender, T. (2010). Reassembling the city: networks and urban imaginaries. *Urban Assemblages: How Actor-Network Theory Changes Urban Studies*, 303-323.

Berardi, F. "Bifo" (2003): 'What is the Meaning of Autonomy Today?' Republicart (September), [online]. Available from: http://www.republicart.net (accessed 2 December 2014).

Brenner, N., Madden, D. J., & Wachsmuth, D. (2011). Assemblage urbanism and the challenges of critical urban theory. *City*, 15(2), 225-240.

Brenner, N., and Theodore, N. (2002) Cities and the geographies of "actually existing neoliberalism" *Antipode* 34(3), 349-79

Broudehoux, A. (2007). Spectacular Beijing: the conspicuous construction of an Olympic metropolis. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 29(4), 383-399.

Callon, M. (1986) 'Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation : Domestiction of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St-Brieuc Bay', in J.Law(ed.), *Power, Action, and Belief : A New Sociology of Knowledge ?*, London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.196-233

Callon, M. (1998) *The Laws of the Markets*. London: Blackwell Publishers.

Castells, M (1992) "Four Asian Tigers with a Dragon Head: State Intervention and Economic Development in the Asian Pacific Rim." *State and Society in the Pacific Rim*. Eds. Richard Appelbaum and Jeff Henderson. London: Sage.

Castells, M (1996) *The Rise of Network Society*, Boston: Blackwell.

Castells, M (1999) *Global Economy, Information Society, Cities and Regions*, Tokyo: Aoki Shoten

Chakravartty, P. (2007). Governance without politics: civil society, development and the postcolonial state. *International journal of communication*, 1 (1), 297–317.

Chakravartty, P and Sarikakis, K (2006) *Media Policy and Globalization*, New York:Palgrave Macmillan.

Chatterson, P. (2000) Will the real creative city please stand up?, *City*, 4(3), 390-397

Cho, Y. (2009). Unfolding sporting nationalism in South Korean media representations of the 1968, 1984 and 2000 Olympics. *Media, culture & society*, 31(3), 347-364.

Choy, T. K. (2005). Articulated knowledges: environmental forms after universality's demise. *American Anthropologist*, 107(1), 5-18.

Chua, B. H. and Iwabuchi, K. (2008) *East Asian pop culture: analysing the Korean wave*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press

Collier, S. J. (2011). *Post-Soviet Social: neoliberalism, social modernity, biopolitics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Couldry, N. (2004) ‘Actor Network Theory and Media: Do They Connect and on what terms?’ in A. Hepp et al. (eds) *Cultures of Connectivity* .London

Comunian, R. (2010) Rethinking the creative city : the role of complexity, networks and interactions in the urban creative economy, *Urban Studies*, 10, 1-23

Cunningham, Stuart D. (2002) From cultural to creative industries: Theory, industry, and policy implications. Media International Australia Incorporating Culture and Policy: *Quarterly Journal of Media Research and Resources*, 54-65.

de Peuter, G. (2011). Creative Economy and Labor Precarity A Contested Convergence. *Journal of communication inquiry*, 35(4), 417-425.

de Peuter, G. (2014a). Beyond the model worker: Surveying a creative precariat. *Culture Unbound: Journal of Current Cultural Research*, 6(1), 263-284.

de Peuter, G. (2014b). Confronting Precarity in the Warhol Economy: Notes from New York City. *Journal of Cultural Economy*, 7(1), 31-47.

Edgington, D. W. (1991). Economic restructuring in Yokohama: from gateway port to international core city. *Asian Geographer*, 10(1), 62-78.

Eubank, D (2008) Digital, rough and maybe deadly: Young Japanese artists curate an exhibition in Yokohama in response to the triennale, *Japan Times*(Sep, 18)

Evans, G. (2009) Creative cities, creative spaces and urban policy, *Urban Studies*, 46(5-6), 1003-1040

Evans, P. (1995*) Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Evans, P. (2008) Is an Alternative Globalization Possible? *Politics and Society*, 36(2), 271-305

Farias, I (2011) Decentering the object of urban studies, in *Urban Assemblages: How Actor-Network Theory Changes Urban*, by Ignacio Farías and Thomas Bender (eds) Abingdon: Routledge.

Ferguson, J.(2006) *Global Shadow: Aflica in the Neoliberal World Order*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press

Fitzgerald, M. (2009) Fragments of time: Yokohama Triennale 2008, Art and Australia, 46(3), 378

Florida, R. (2002) *The Rise of the Creative Class*. New York: Basic BooksF

Flyvbjerg, B., Bruzelius, N., & Rothengatter, W. (2003). *Megaprojects and risk: An anatomy of ambition*. Cambridge University Press.

Foucault, M (1991) Governmentality. In *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds. 87-104. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fujita, K.(2003) Neo-industrial Tokyo : urban development and globalization in Japan's state-centered developmental capitalism, *Urban Studies*, 40(2), 249-281

Garcia, B. (2004) Cultural policy and urban regeneration in Western European cities: lessons from experience, prospects for the future, *Local Economy*, 19(4), 312-326

Garnham, N. (2005) From Cultural to Creative industries: an analysis of the implications of the "creative industries" approach to arts and media policy making in the United Kingdom, *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 11(1), 15-29

Graham, S., and Marvin, S. (2001). *Splintering urbanism: networked infrastructures, technological mobilities and the urban condition*. Psychology Press.

Graham, S. (2010). When infrastructures fail. *Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails*, 1-26.

Gotham, K. F. (2011). Resisting urban spectacle: the 1984 Louisiana World Exposition and the contradictions of mega events. *Urban Studies*, 48(1), 197-214.

Ha, M (2009) Panel Eyed for Redevelopment Zone Arbitration, The Korea Times, [online]. Available from: http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/02/113_39316.html [Accessed 10 October 2014].

Hackworth, J. (2007). *The Neoliberal City: governance, ideology and development in American urbanism*, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.

Koo, H. (2001). *Korean workers: The culture and politics of class formation*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Hall, M. (2006). Urban entrepreneurship, corporate interests and sports mega-events: the thin policies of competitiveness within the hard outcomes of neoliberalism. *The Sociological Review*, 54(s2), 59-70.

Haraway, D. (1997), *Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.Female_Man©_Meets_Oncomouse™: Feminism and Technoscience,*, New York and London: Routledge.

Harvey, D.(1989) From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation of governance in last capitalism, *Geografiska Annaler* 71B, 3-17

Harvey, D. (2008) The right to the city, *New Left Review*, 53, 23-40

Harata, Y. (1993). Toshinomonogatari 2- Yokohama, Kobe(The story of city-Yokohama, Kobe), Economisto, 71(41), 84-87

Heelas, P. (2002). Work ethics, soft capitalism and the “turn to life”. *Cultural economy*, 78-96.

Hesmondhalgh, D. and Pratt, A. (2005) Cultural industries and cultural policy, *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 11(1), 1-13

Hill, R., 2007. Neoliberalism and developmentalism: the East Asian experience [online]. Available from: https://www.msu.edu/user/hillrr/Taipei%20Talk%20Neolib%20and%20Dev.htm [Accessed 10 October 2014].

Hill, R and Fujita, K. (2000) State restructuring & local power in Japan, *Urban Studies*, 37(4), 673-690

Hill, R and Kim, J. (2000) Global cities and developmental state : New York, Tokyo and Seoul, *Urban Studies*, 37(12), 2167-2195

Huang, J., (2014). Nation branding of Korea. In: H.K. Lee and L. Lim, eds. *Cultural policy in East Asia*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 69–84

Hwang, J., (2010). The impacts of the local growth coalition and politics of scale on formative process of Seoul as a global city: the case of Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park. Unpublished Master's thesis. Seoul National University.

Im, A. (2009) What's wrong with design policy in Seoul? The Kyunghyang Shinmun [online].Available from: http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=200910042356205andcode=950201andarea=nnb1andcmtandcmtandcmtpage=andcmtpage=1 [Accessed 10 October 2014].

Jayne, M.(2004) Culture that works? creative industries development in a working-class city, *Capital and Class*, 84, 199-210

Jung, Y(2014) Does Mayor Park Wonsun lose his way in the DDP? The Weekly Kyunghwang, [online].Available from: http://weekly.khan.co.kr/khnm.html?mode=view&code=115&artid=201404082056461&pt=nv [Accessed 10 October 2014].

Kamino, N. (1992) Characteristics of Japan's type of welfare state's finance, in T. Hayashi and E. Kato(eds) *International Comparison of Welfare State's Finance*, pp217-38. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press

Kannai. (n.d.) In Wikipedia. [online].Available from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kannai [Accessed 10 October 2014].

Kato, Y. (Ed.). (1990). *Yokohama past and present*. Yokohama City University.

Kim, C. W.(2008) *Labor flexibility and subjectivity in the Korean Independent Broadcasting Production Sector*, Unpublished Master's thesis. Seoul National University.

Kim, C. W. (2014). Labor and the limits of seduction in Korea's creative economy. *Television & New Media*, 15(6), 562-576.

Kim, E.H (2011), The setback of Tokyo bid for the 2016 summer Olympics and the urban political economy, *Space and Society*, 21(3), 66-103

Kim, H. M., and Han, S. S. (2012). Seoul. *Cities*, 29(2), 142-154.

Kim, H.R. (2014) Embracing the alien spaceship, *The Korea Herald*, [online]. Available from: http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140323000340 [Accessed 10 October 2014].

Kim, J. (2006) 'Globalization and the Changing Urban System in South Korea,' in Ho, K and Hsiao, H, *Capital Cities in Asia-Pacific: Primacy and Diversity*, Taipei: Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies, 189-206

Kim, R (2007) Seoul Named 'World Design Capital' ,*The Korea Times*, [online].Available from: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2007/10/113_12254.html[Accessed 10 October 2014].

Kim, S.,(2011). Mayor resigns, parties brace for by-elections, The Korea Herald [online]. Available from: http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20110826000769 [Accessed 10 October 2014].

Kimoto, K. (1995) Life problem in family change, in K. Nishimura (Ed.) *Life Problem in Contemporary Japan: Questioning the meaning of 'Abundance' Now*, pp59-89. Kyoto: The Minerva Shobo

Kishida, H and Uzuki, M.(2009) *The city building strategy and project management : Yokohama's Minatomirai 21's strategy*, Kyoto: Gakugei Publishing

Kong, L (2000) Cultural policy in Singapore: negotiating economic and socio-cultural agendas, *Geoforum*, 31, 409-424

Kong, L. (2009) Making sustainable creative/cultural space in Shanghai and Singapore, *The Geographical Review*, 91(1), 1-22

Kong, L and O'Connor, J (2009) *Creative Economies, Creative Cities: Asian-European Perspectives*, New York and London: Springer

Koplos, J (2008) Yokohama triennale, *Art in America*, 96(11), 99-101

Landry, C. (2000) *The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban Innovators*. London: Earthscan

Landry, C. and Bianchini, F. (1995) *The creative city*. London: Demos.

Latour, B.(2005*) Reassembling the Social : An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory*, Claredon Lectures in Management Studies, Oxford, New York : Oxford University Press

Law, J. (2002) Objects and Spaces, *Theory Culture & Society,* 19(5-6), 91-105

Law, J. (2007) Actor network theory and material semiotics, retrieved by http://www.heterogeneities.net/publications/Law2007ANTandMaterialSemiotics.pdf.

Lee, D. (2012). The Ethics of Insecurity Risk, Individualization and Value in British Independent Television Production. *Television & New Media*, 13(6), 480-497.

Lee, H.K., (2014) Culture and the state: from a Korean perspective. In: H.K. Lee and L. Lim, eds. *Cultural policies in East Asia*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 87–103.

Lee, H.K. and Lim, L., (2014) *Cultural policies in East Asia*. London: Palgrave Macmillan

Lee, K. (2007), Questioning a neoliberal urban regeneration policy : the rhetoric of “cities of culture” and the city of Gwangju, Korea, *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 13(4), 335-347

Lee, K. (2009) A final flowering of the developmental state : The IT policy experiment of the Korean Information Infrastructure, 1995-2005, *Government Information Quarterly*, 26, 567-576

Lorey, I. (2014). The 2011 Occupy Movements: Rancière and the Crisis of Democracy. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 31(7-8), 43-65.

Lorey, I. (2015). *State of Insecurity: Government of the Precarious*. Verso Books.

Lowes, M. (2002) *Indy Dreams and Urban Nightmares,* Toronto: Toronto University Press.

Marcus, C. (2005) *Future of creative industries: implications for research policy*. DG research, European Commission, Brussels, April

Marlet, G. and Woerkens, C. (2007) The Dutch creative class and how it fosters urban employment growth, *Urban Studies*, 44(13), 2605-2626

Mattelart, A (2003*) The Information Society: An Introduction*, London : Sage Publication.

McCann, E. (2007) Inequality and politics in the creative-city-region:questions of livability and state strategy, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 31, 188-96

McCann, E., and Ward, K. (2012). Assembling urbanism: following policies and studying through the sites and situations of policy making. *Environment and Planning A*, 44, 42-51.

McFarlane, C. (2011a). Assemblage and critical urbanism. *City*, 15(2), 204-224.

McFarlane, C. (2011b). The city as assemblage: dwelling and urban space. *Environment and Planning-Part D*, 29(4), 649.

McRobbie, A. (2002). Clubs to companies: notes on the decline of political culture in speeded up creative worlds. *Cultural studies*, 16(4), 516-531.

Medda, F., and Nijkamp, P. (1999). Waterfront Revitalization Projects: A Comparative Study of London Docklands and Yokohama Minato Mirai 21, *Indian journal of Applied Economics*, 8(3), 175-193

Miller, T. (2010) Culture + labour = precariat, *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, 7(1),96-99

Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (2012) 2012 Survey Report on Artists & Activities, [online]. Available from: inaru.mcst.go.kr/cmm/fms/FileDown.do?atchFileId...fileSn=2 [Accessed 10 October 2014].

Mitchell, T.(2002) *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. Chicago, IL :

University of Chicago Press.

Montgomery, J. (2005) Beware ‘the creative class’: creativity and wealth creation revisited, *Local Economy*, 20(4), 337-343

Mooney, G(2004) Cultural policy as urban transformation? Critical reflections on Glasgow, European city of culture 1990, *Local Economy*, 19(4), 327-340

Mori, K. (1995) Life and labor in ‘corporate community’, in K. Nishimura(Ed.) *Life Problem in Contemporary Japan: Questioning the meaning of ‘Abundance’ Now*, pp177-201. Kyoto: The Minerva Shobo

Murgia, A. (2014). Representations of Precarity in Italy: Collective and Individual Stories, Social Imaginaries and Subjectivities. *Journal of Cultural Economy*, 7(1), 48-63.

Murray-Li, T.(2007) *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press

Museum of Yokohama Urban History (2004) *Minatomiraisen kaitsū kinen Yokohama chikatetsu monogatari : sore wa romen densha kara hajimatta*, Yokohama: Yokohama Toshi Hatten Kinenkan

Nathan, M. (2005) *The wrong stuff : creative class theory, diversity and city performance*, Institute for Public Policy Research, London

Neff, G. (2012). *Venture labor: Work and the burden of risk in innovative industries*. Boston: MIT Press.

Neilson, B., & Coté, M. (2014). Introduction: are we all cultural workers now?. *Journal of Cultural Economy*, 7(1), 2-11.

Noda, K., 2008. *Creative city Yokohama’s strategy*. Kyoto: Gakugei Publishing.

Ogawa, A. (2004). Invited by the state: Institutionalizing volunteer subjectivity in

contemporary Japan. *Asian Anthropology*, 3(1), 71-96.

Oh (2010) *Nothing is impossible in Seoul*, Seoul : 21books

Onishi (2004) Yokohama Triennale: A new image for international expositions?, *Domus*, 877, 46

Ong, A. (2006) *Neo-Liberalism as Exception: Mutation in Citizenship and Sovereignty*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Oppenheim, R. (2008) *Kyongju Things: Assembling Place*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press

Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, (2002) *Yokohama 2001: International Triennlae of Contemporary Art*, [online]. Available from: http://www.yokohamatriennale.jp/archive/pdf/yt2001report.pdf[Accessed 10 October 2014].

Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale(2006), *Yokohama 2005: International Triennlae of Contemporary Art*, [online]. Available from: http://www.yokohamatriennale.jp/archive/pdf/yt2005report.pdf[Accessed 10 October 2014].

Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale (2009), *Yokohama 2008: International Triennlae of Contemporary Art*, [online]. Available from: http://www.yokohamatriennale.jp/archive/pdf/yt2008report.pdf[Accessed 10 October 2014].

Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale (2011), *Yokohama Triennale 2011 Kick-Off Meeting Report*, Yokohama: Noge Publishing

Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennlae (2012), *Yokohama 2011: International*

Triennlae of Contemporary Art, [online]. Available from: http://www.yokohamatriennale.jp/archive/pdf/yt2011report.pdf[Accessed 10 October 2014].

Ozaki T. (2004) Connection between art festivals and regions amidst the bubble of international art festivals, Available from: http://www.realtokyo.co.jp/docs/files/pop/ozaki_163_pop1_en.html [Accessed 10 October 2014].

Park, B.,Hill, R., and Saito, A. (2012) *Locating Neoliberalism in East Asia*, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.

Park, C.J (2014) Park Wonsun and Jung Mongjun's creative economy without labor, [online]. Available from: http://www.mediaus.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=42259 [Accessed 10 October 2014].

Papastergiadis, N., & Martin, M. (2011). Art Biennales and Cities as Platforms for Global Dialogue. In Giorgi, L., Sassatelli, M., & Delanty, G. (Eds.). *Festivals and the cultural public sphere*, London: Routledge. 45-62.

Peck, J. (2005) Struggling with the creative class, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 29(4), 740-770.

Peck, J. (2007) The creative fix, *Eurozine,* June 28

Peck, J. and Theodore, N. (2010) Mobilizing policy: models, methods, and mutations, *Geoforum*, 41, 169-174.

Pratt, A. (2008) Creative cities: the cultural industries and the creative class, *Human Geography*, 90(2), 107-117

Rancière, J. (1992). Politics, identification, and subjectivization. *October*, 58-64.

Ranciere, J (1999) *Disagreement : Politics and Philosophy*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Read, J (2007) Politics as subjectification : rethinking the figure of the worker in the thought of Badiou and Ranciere, *Philosophy Today*, 51, 125-132

Rose, N. (1999) *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Ross, A. (2010) The making of sustainable livelihoods, *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, 7(1), 92-95

Saito, A. (2003) Global city formation in a capitalist developmental state : Tokyo and the waterfront sub-center project, *Urban Studies*, 40, 283

Shin, H. B. (2014). Urban spatial restructuring, event-led development and scalar politics. *Urban Studies*, 51(14), 2961-2978.

Sasaki, M. (2010) Urban regeneration through cultural creativity and social inclusion: Rethinking creative city theory through a Japanese case study, *Cities* 27, S3–S9

Seo, D. (2011). The Will to Self-Managing, the Will to Freedom: The Self-Managing Ethic and the Spirit of Flexible Capitalism in South Korea. In Song, J(ed), *New Millennium South Korea: Neoliberal Capitalism and Transnational Movements*, London:Routledge, 84-100.

Seoul Metropolitan Government (2008a) *Seoul Design Olympiad 2008 White Paper*, Seoul: Seoul Metropolitan Government.

Seoul Metropolitan Government (2008b) *Seoul Design Olympiad 2008 Press Release*, [online]. Available from: http://www.icsid.org/uploads/media/sdo2008_press_kit.pdf [Accessed 10 October 2014].

Seoul Metropolitan Government (2009a) *Seoul Design Olympiad 2009 White Paper*, Seoul: Seoul Metropolitan Government.

Seoul Metropolitan Government (2009b) *Seoul Design Olympiad 2009* [online]. Available from: http://www.icsid.org/events/events/calendar426/event_articles32.htm [Accessed 10 October 2014].

Seoul Metropolitan Government (2009c) Seoul Design Olympiad 2009 [online]. Available from: http://www.icsid.org/events/events/calendar426.htm [Accessed 10 October 2014].

Seoul Metropolitan Government, (2010a). UNESCO City of Design Seoul [online]. Available from: http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/images/CNN_Seoul_Application_en.pdf [Accessed 10 October 2014].

Seoul Metropolitan Government (2010b) *Seoul Design Olympiad 2010 White Paper*, Seoul: Seoul Metropolitan Government.

Seoul Metropolitan Government, (2012). *Dongdaemun Design Plaza Management Plan(2011–17*) [online]. Available from: http://opengov.seoul.go.kr/sites/default/files/wordpress/2013/02/512dce7e7d8223.58449380.pdf [Accessed 10 October 2014].

Seoul Metropolitan Government, (2013a) *Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park(51–6110000-000789-01)*. Seoul: Seoul Metropolitan Government.

Seoul Metropolitan Government (2013b) The DDP Management Plan, Seoul: Seoul Design Foundation,[online].Available from: www.slideshare.net/girujang/ddp-201212[Accessed 10 October 2014].

Seoul Metropolitan Government (2013c) 2013 Seoul Welfare Survey, Seoul: Seoul Metropolitan Government, [online].Available from: http://welfare.seoul.go.kr/files/2014/04/536190e9156059.69329596.pdf[Accessed 10 October 2014].

Seoul Metropolitan Government (2014) Seoul Metropolitan Government Announces the "Four-Year Plan for Seoul," a Blueprint for the 6th Term of the Mayor,[online].Available from: http://investseoul.com/seoul-metropolitan-government-announces-the-four-year-plan-for-seoul-a-blueprint-for-the-6th-term-of-the-mayor/[Accessed 10 August 2015].

Seoul Museum of History (2012) *The survey of Seoul living Culture : Dongdaemun market*, Seoul : Seoul Metropolitan Government

Shibata, K. (2008) Neoliberalism, risk, and spatial governance in the developmental state : Japanese planning in the global economy, *Critical Planning*, 15, p92-118

Simons, M and Masschelein, J (2010) Governmental, Political and Pedagogic Subjectivation: Foucault with Ranciere, *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 42(5-6), 588-605

Smith, R (2010) Urban studies without 'scale' : localizing the global through Singapore, in Ignacio Farías and Thomas Bender(ed) (2010) *Urban Assemblages: How Actor-Network Theory Changes Urban*, Abingdon: Routledge

Søberg (2014) Zaha Hadid Architects[online]. Available from: www.arcspace.com/features/zaha-hadid-architects/[Accessed 10 October 2014]

Song, J. (2007). 'Venture Companies,''Flexible Labor,'and the 'New Intellectual': The Neoliberal Construction of Underemployed Youth in South Korea. *Journal of youth studies*, 10(3), 331-351.

Song, J. (2009). Between Flexible Life and Flexible Labor The Inadvertent Convergence of Socialism and Neoliberalism in South Korea. *Critique of Anthropology,* 29(2), 139-159.

Star, Susan Leigh. (1991) 'Power, Technologies and the Phenomenology of Conventions: on being Allergic to Onions', pages 26-56 in John Law (ed.), *A Sociology of Monsters? Essays on Power, Technology and Domination,* Sociological Review Monograph, 38, London: Routledge.

Steven, A.(2008) Hiroshi Nakada former Mayor of Yokohama, [online]. Available from: http://www.citymayors.com/mayors/yokohama-mayor.html/[Accessed 10 October 2014]

Stubbs, R. (2009) What ever happened to the East Asian Developmental State? The unfolding debate, *The Pacific Review*, 22(1), 1–22

Swyngedouw, E., Moulaert, R. and Rodriguez, A. (2002) Neoliberal urbanization in Europe: large scale urban development projects and the new urban policy, *Antipode*, 34(3), 542-577

Takahashi, K (2009) Next 2011 keisoku suru sapoto katsudou(the continuation of supporters activity in 2011), In Ohashi, G.(ed), *Art Volunteer Yokohama Style*, Tokyo: Bijutsu publishing. 85

Tamura, A.(1989) *Toshi Yokohama Monogatari(The Story of Yokohama)*, Jiji Tsushinsha: Tokyo

Tinari, P (2009) 2008 Gwangju Biennale Singapore Biennale 2008 3rd Yokohama Triennale, *Artforum International*, 47(5), 199-201

Tsing, A. (2004) *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

UN (United Nations) (2010) *Creative Economy Report 2010-Creative Economy : A feasible development option*, [online]. Available from: http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=5763&lang=1[accessed 16th December 2010]

Ursell, G. (2000). Television production: issues of exploitation, commodification and subjectivity in UK television labour markets. *Media, culture & society*, 22(6), 805-825.

Yokohama Arts Foundation (2009) *Art Volunteer Yokohama Style*, Tokyo: Bijutsu publishing

Yokohama Municipal Government (2014), Population News of Major Cities, [online]. Available from: http://www.city.yokohama.lg.jp/ex/stat/jinko/city/1401-e.html/[Accessed 10 October 2014]

Yokohama Municipal Government (2015), Creative City Yokohama, [online]. Available from: http://www.city.yokohama.lg.jp/bunka/soutoshi/en/souzou/project/vicinity/ [Accessed 10 August 2015]

Yoshimi, S (2005) *Banbaku genso* (*The Expo Syndrome: Postwar Politics and Cultural Struggle in Postwar Japan*), Tokyo: Chikuma Sinshou

Yoshimi, S (2006) A Drifting World Fair: Cultural Politics of Environment in the Local/Global Context of Contemporary Japan In Yoda, T and Harootunian, H(ed), *Japan after Japan: Social and cultural life from the recessionary 1990s to the present*. Duke University Press. 395-414

Yusuf, S. and Nabeshima, K. (2005) Creative industries in East Asian Cities, *Cities*, 22(2), 109-122

Waitt, G. and Gibson, C. (2009) Creative small cities : rethinking the creative economy in place, *Urban Studies*, 46(5-6),1223-1246

Waley, P. (2007) Tokyo-as-World-City : reassessing the role of capital and the state in urban restructuring, *Urban Studies*, 44(8), 1465-1490

Watanabe, S.(2006). Machizukuri in Japan, A historical perspective on participatory community-building initiatives. *Cities, autonomy and decentralisation in Japan*, Oxon, Routledge, 128-138.

Willis, P. E. (1977). *Learning to labor: How working class kids get working class jobs*. Columbia University Press.

Zhao, Y., and Chakravartty, P. (Eds.). (2007). *Global communications: Toward a transcultural political economy*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers