



JAPAN

Shining A Light On
the Land of the Rising Sun

Le Japon

Éclairant le Pays du Soleil Levant

MATTHEW P. FARRELL

& KELLY LUI

Japan: Shining A Light On the Land of the Rising Sun

*Proceedings & Essays of the 20th Annual Glendon College
International Studies Symposium*

Le Japon: Éclairant le Pays du Soleil Levant

*Actes de Colloque & Dissertations du 20ième Symposium
Annuel des Études Internationales du Collège Glendon*

Edited By ~ Édité Par
MATTHEW FARRELL & KELLY LUI



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japansymposium2015@gmail.com

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The Independent Study Committee on Japan:
Andrea DaSilva
Matthew Farrell
Kelly Lui
Odmaa Sod-Erdene
Alexandra Welsh

Editor-in-Chief: Matthew Farrell
Associate Editor: Kelly Lui

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We would also like to acknowledge Palgrave Macmillan for allowing us to reprint an excerpt from *Anime Fan Communities: Transcultural Flows and Frictions* by Dr. Annett, Mr. Kelvin Lui for providing us with amazing photos of Japan for use throughout the volume, and the York Centre for Asian Research for helping us to make this text freely available.

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Nous voudrions reconnaître aussi Palgrave Macmillan, qui nous a permis d'inclure ici un extrait de *Anime Fan Communities: Transcultural Flows and Frictions* écrit par Dr. Annett, M. Kelvin Lui, pour les photos du Japon qui se trouvent dans ce livre, et le York Centre for Asian Research, qui nous a aidé avec la distribution libre et gratuite de ce texte.

Enfin, nous tenons à remercier tous ceux qui nous ont aidé pendant ce processus, de la préparation du Symposium jusqu'à la publication de ce livre. Sans ce support, la réalisation de ce projet n'aurait pas été possible.

Foreword

Matthew P. Farrell

The tradition of the International Studies Symposium at Glendon College began in 1995, when a group of highly motivated International Studies students came together with a desire to push beyond the bounds of classwork and venture into the realm of experiential learning. Since then, senior International Studies students at Glendon College have continued to show their high calibre, carrying on the tradition of independently funding, organizing, and promoting symposia which focus on various countries and regions of the World.

The inaugural year of the Symposium focused on Cuba (1995-1996), followed by China (1996-1997), South Africa (1997-1998), the European Union (1998-1999), the Middle East (1999-2000), South East Asia (2000-2001), Brazil (2001-2002), Russia (2002-2003), India (2003-2004), The Great Lakes Regions of Central Africa (2004-2005), Mexico (2005-2006), Turkey (2006-2007), Egypt (2007-2008), Venezuela (2008-2009), Iran (2009-2010), Hispaniola (2010-2011), Germany (2011-2012), the Korean Peninsula (2012-2013), The United States of America (2013-2014) and, in 2015, on the 20th Anniversary, Japan.

The Independent Study Committee on Japan, composed of some of the student organizers of the Symposium, is pleased to present this publication, *Japan: Shining a Light on the Land of the Rising Sun*, which contains a collection of transcripts and essays by some of the distinguished specialists who participated in the Symposium that was held on March 30, 2015 at Glendon College, as well as essays written by some of the student organizers of the event. We hope that these collected works will not only prove stimulating to those who have a pre-existing interest in Japan, but also eye-

opening for those who do not. Most of all, we hope that through this text, we are able to share the passion and knowledge of all those who contributed to the Symposium and to this project.

Japan was chosen as the focus of study for many reasons. Its extensive history, culture, and reputation for innovation are only a few of these. Other considerations include Japan's rapid rise to prominence on the World stage in the twentieth century, only decades after rescinding the policy of isolation by which it had kept itself secluded for hundreds of years. Following this change, Japan quickly transformed from a feudal society to an industrialized nation, all the while maintaining its singular traditions and unique institutions. This inimitable situation (who would think that the oldest hereditary monarchy in the World, headed by the only reigning Emperor, would be hailed for its progressive society and technological prowess?) was yet another factor which motivated the choice of Japan for the Symposium.

In this text, many aspects of Japan are discussed. The first section, "History and Memory: Japanese Communities during World War Two," exposes the situation of Japanese migrants in Canada and the United States during and after the war and looks at the impact of the post-war Constitution of Japan in molding Japan into a pacifistic nation. In "The Economy Under Abe and Looking Ahead: Economy, Business, and Technology," the question of economics is considered at three levels; the nation, specific companies, and workers themselves. The next section, "Post-growth Japan and Its Domestic Policies," is perhaps the most diverse section of this volume, tackling domestic economics, education, and the indigenous population of Japan. This is followed by "Pop Culture and Identity: Anime, Angura, and Japanese Abroad," which examines anime, one of Japan's major cultural exports, pop

culture communities, and migrant-based relationships between Japan and Brazil, and between Japan and Canada. The final section, “Japan and the World: Politics and Diplomacy,” focuses on Japan’s international relations, both contemporary and historical.

To fully explain or understand a country is a goal which no single work could hope to achieve and this text is no exception. Consequently, we do not claim to provide a comprehensive analysis of Japan. Rather, through this volume we aim to give an overview and to illuminate the complex and ever-changing country of Japan, opening the door to further inquiry and investigation.

Préface

Matthew P. Farrell

Le premier Symposium Annuel des Études Internationales au Collège Glendon a eu lieu en 1995, quand un groupe d'étudiants en études internationales s'est uni avec l'intention de surpasser l'éducation traditionnelle pour s'emmêler dans les études pratiques. Depuis ce temps, des étudiants seniors en études internationales à Glendon ont montré leur haute capacité en continuant la tradition d'organiser indépendamment chaque année un symposium portant sur un pays ou une région du monde.

Le symposium inaugural avait pour sujet le Cuba (1995-1996), suivi par la Chine (1996-1997), l'Afrique du Sud (1997-1998), l'Union Européenne (1998-1999), le Moyen-Orient (1999-2000), l'Asie du Sud-est (2000-2001), le Brésil (2001-2002), la Russie (2002-2003), l'Inde (2003-2004), la Région des Grands Lacs en Afrique (2004-2005), le Mexique (2005-2006), la Turquie (2006-2007), l'Égypte (2007-2008), le Venezuela (2008-2009), l'Iran (2009-2010), l'Hispaniola (2010-2011), l'Allemagne (2011-2012), le Péninsule Coréen (2012-2013), les États-Unis (2013-2014) et, en 2015, sur le 20^{ième} anniversaire du Symposium, le Japon.

La Independent Study Committee on Japan, composée de cinq parmi les neuf organisateurs étudiants du Symposium, est heureuse de vous présenter cette publication, *Le Japon: Éclairant le Pays du Soleil Levant*, qui est une collection de transcriptions et de dissertations par certains des spécialistes qui ont participé au Symposium le 30 mars, 2015, auxquels s'ajoutent des dissertations par certains des organisateurs du Symposium. Nous espérons que cette collection s'avérera intéressante et stimulante, non seulement pour ceux qui s'intéressent déjà au Japon, mais aussi pour

ceux qui commencent à le découvrir. Nous espérons avant tout qu'à travers ce texte nous réussirons à partager la passion et les connaissances de ceux qui ont contribué au Symposium et à ce projet.

Le Japon se prête à l'étude pour plusieurs raisons. Son histoire extensive, son mélange de culture moderne et de traditions anciennes, et sa réputation pour l'innovation en sont seulement quelques exemples. Une des autres considérations prise en compte est l'ascension rapide du pays au sein du vingtième siècle, seulement quelques décennies après sa réouverture au monde suite à deux cents années d'isolationnisme. Suite à ce changement, le Japon s'est transformé d'une société féodale à une nation industrialisée, gardant néanmoins ses traditions et institutions uniques. Cette situation inimitable (qui aurait pensé que la plus vieille monarchie au monde, avec à sa tête le seul empereur régnant, serait réclamée pour sa société progressive et sa technologie avant-garde?) est un autre facteur qui a influencé le choix du Japon comme sujet pour le Symposium.

Ce texte touche sur plusieurs aspects du Japon. La première section, « L'Histoire et le Mémoire: Les Communautés Japonaises pendant la 2^{ème} Guerre Mondiale, » fait une exposition de la situation des migrants japonais au Canada et aux États-Unis durant et après la guerre et considère l'impact de la Constitution japonaise de l'après-guerre sur l'évolution du Japon en tant que nation pacifique. La question de l'économie est considérée à trois niveaux dans « L'Économie Sous Abe et à l'Avenir: L'Économie, les Affaires, et la Technologie, » où on examine la nation, des entreprises spécifiques, et des travailleurs. La section suivante, « Le Japon Post-Growth et ses Politiques Domestiques, » est probablement celle la plus diverse, se mettant à considérer l'économie domestique, l'éducation, et la population indigène du Japon. Ceci est suivi par « La Culture Populaire et l'Identité: L'Anime, l'Angura, et les

Japonais à l'Étranger,» qui examine l'anime, une des exports culturels les plus importants du Japon, les communautés de la culture populaire, et les relations migratoires entre le Japon et le Brésil, et entre le Japon et le Canada. La section finale, « Le Japon et le Monde: La Politique et la Diplomatie,» traite les relations internationales contemporaines et historiques du Japon.

Aucun texte ne peut espérer d'expliquer ou de comprendre complètement un pays, et ceci n'est pas une exception. Conséquemment, nous ne prétendons pas donner ici une analyse compréhensive du Japon. Nous visons plutôt à donner un survol et d'illuminer ce pays complexe et évoluant, ouvrant la porte à de nouvelles enquêtes et à l'exploration.



HISTORY AND MEMORY:

Japanese Communities During World War Two

L'HISTOIRE ET LE MÉMOIRE:

Les Communautés Japonaises pendant la
Deuxième Guerre Mondiale

La Détention de la Minorité Japonaise en Amérique du Nord Durant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale

Greg Robinson

J'aimerais vous parler aujourd'hui de certains événements qui sont le plus souvent cités sous le nom de « l'internement » des Américano-Japonais et des canadiens japonais mais qui relèvent plutôt de la détention.

Au printemps de 1942, après le déclenchement de la guerre du Pacifique, quelque 112,000 hommes, femmes, et enfants d'origine japonaise aux États-Unis, à raison de leur ascendance raciale, étaient entassés dans des centres de détention militaires sur la côte pacifique avant d'être renvoyés dans des camps d'internement. Le gouvernement américain les a emmené ensuite, sous bonne garde, vers l'intérieur du pays, où on les tenait encore captifs dans un réseau de camps construits hâtivement et gérés par un nouvel organisme fédéral, la War Relocation Authority (WRA). La plupart de ces américains d'origine japonaise sont restés en captivité pendant toute la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. Cette mesure est souvent citée comme la violation la plus importante des droits civiques des citoyens aux États-Unis pendant tout le XX^e siècle.

J'aimerais aborder également la décision parallèle du gouvernement canadien d'enfermer quelques 22,000 personnes d'origine japonaise venant de la côte Pacifique de la Colombie-Britannique dans des camps. Les canadiens japonais étaient arrêtés en deux vagues lors des rafles au printemps de 1942, puis ils étaient envoyés dans des endroits différents; des camps de travaux routiers, des exploitations de betteraves sucrières, ou des installations dans des anciens villages miniers abandonnés. Leurs biens étaient confisqués et

vendus dans des ventes aux enchères officielles. En fin du compte le gouvernement canadien a exigé aux canadiens d'origine japonaise de choisir de se réinstaller à l'Est ou d'être renvoyés au Japon une fois la guerre terminée.

Parlons d'abord de mon pays natal, les États-Unis. Le 7 décembre 1941, après l'attaque japonaise sur Pearl Harbor, il y a la déclaration de guerre par le Président Franklin Delano Roosevelt qui est approuvé par le Congrès américain. Avec cette action, tous les immigrants japonais au pays, quelques 150,000 personnes à Hawaï et sur le continent, deviennent subitement des soi-disant «étrangers ennemis» parce qu'ils sont barrés de la naturalisation américaine par le droit américain.

Donc on leur impose un couvre-feu spécial: on leur interdit de se déplacer à plus d'une dizaine de kilomètres de leurs domiciles, on leur demande de remettre aux policiers les radios à ondes courtes, et leurs bateaux de pêche sont confisqués. Les consulats japonais restent fermés, ainsi que les journaux japonais, et les écoles de langue. Plus de 1,000 prêtres bouddhistes, professeurs de langue, fonctionnaires consulaires, et d'autres leaders des communautés japonaises sont arrêtées et mises en internement pour une période de semaines ou une période de mois par le Département de Justice. Ils seront plus tard offerts des auditions qui leur permettront d'offrir des preuves quant à leur manque de péril à la sécurité nationale. Un faible pourcentage de ces immigrants sont internés pendant toute la période de guerre mais la plupart sont «libérés» pour rejoindre leurs familles dans les camps.

Néanmoins, la question ne s'arrête pas là. Au début de 1942, les autorités militaires de la côte Pacifique américaine commencent à redouter une éventuelle invasion de la part du Japon, et ils se méfient des communautés japonaises sur la côte pacifique. Ils sont

renforcés dans leur peur par un mouvement de haine raciale, un mouvement de colère animé par les blancs racistes et les groupes nativistes et xénophobes comme le American Legion ou les Native Sons of the Golden West, ainsi que les groupes de commerçants blancs qui redoutent la concurrence de marchands japonais, des agriculteurs, et d'autres. Ces forces incitent leurs représentants au gouvernement de faire pression pour la déportation de toute personne d'origine japonaise de la côte pacifique.

Cette pression amène Président Roosevelt (qui avait ses propres préjugés à l'égard des personnes d'origine asiatique) à autoriser l'armée américaine à déporter tous les gens d'origine japonaise sur la côte pacifique loin d'une « zone militaire » qui est créée peu après et qui va composer finalement tout l'état de la Californie, la partie occidentale des états de Washington et Oregon, et le sud de l'Arizona. Donc, toute personne d'origine japonaise, nonobstant sa citoyenneté, sera déportée de la côte pacifique par l'ordre du président. La plupart de ces gens sont des jeunes, adolescents, ou enfants nés aux États-Unis, citoyens américains qui sont soupçonnés d'espionnage parce qu'ils sont d'origine japonaise.

En 90 jours, au printemps de 1942, 109 427 japonais américains sont déportés de la côte Ouest. Ils sont contraints de se débarrasser de leurs biens fonciers et de leurs affaires personnelles avant leur déportation, et ils perdent donc la plus grande partie de leurs propriétés. On demande aux résidents japonais américains de se rassembler dans les écoles ou d'autres centres pour être raflés par l'armée.

Ils sont mis d'abord dans des camps de rassemblement (« assembly centers ») dans des anciennes courses de cheval ou des parcs d'exposition sur la côte pacifique. Ces centres de rassemblement sont surpeuplés et inconfortables. Les soldats vident rapidement les écuries et les enclos à bestiaux pour en

faire des baraques destinées aux déportés. Des familles entières vont rester dans une seule pièce dans ces baraques, et les célibataires doivent cohabiter avec des parfaits étrangers. L'utilisation de la langue japonaise, sauf à certaines fins officielles, est interdite. Même les livres sont censurés, sauf pour le Bible, qui doit être approuvé par le gouvernement.

À partir de la seconde moitié de l'année 1942, on commence à transporter des gens de ces centres de rassemblement aux camps à l'intérieur du pays qui sont construits par la WRA. Ces voyages durent parfois quelques jours, surtout les voyages jusqu'en Arkansas, où il y en a deux camps. Les autres camps se trouvent à Utah, Wyoming, Idaho, Colorado, Arizona, et Californie.

Les 10 camps, dénommés officiellement centres de réinstallation (« relocation centers »), sont vraiment des camps de concentration américains. Ils se ressemblent sur bien de points. Tous se situent dans des zones très peu peuplées et habitables. En effet, à leur comble, les centres de Poston en Arizona et Heart Mountain au Wyoming restent au troisième rang des agglomérations dans leurs états respectifs durant la guerre. Dans les camps de l'Ouest, les températures vont de bien en dessous de 0 degrés en plein hiver jusqu'à 38 ou même 40 degrés en été. L'air est sec et l'altitude est forte et pénible à supporter pour les résidents qui sont issus de la côte pacifique. La terre sèche du désert se transforme avec la pluie en torrents de boue, puis s'assèche rapidement pour devenir poussière. Il y a donc des tempêtes de poussière qui remplissent les baraques de poussière, les rendant impossible à garder propre. Les camps de l'Arkansas par contre sont situés dans des zones chaudes et marécageuses pleines d'insectes.

Lorsqu'ils arrivent, on donne aux nouveaux détenus (qui dans le langage officiel on appelle des « résidents ») un logement, on leur fait subir un examen médical, et on

leur accorde une pièce de 4 sur 6 mètres dans une des baraques. Les baraques sont construites en bois brut recouvert de papier goudronné. Elles ne possèdent aucun revêtement intérieur et donc elles sont des abris insuffisants dans des climats rigoureux. Comme dans les centres de rassemblement, l'eau courante est installée uniquement dans les latrines. Les salles de douches et les toilettes sont séparées pour les hommes et les femmes, mais il n'y a aucune partition entre les toilettes. Donc, il est impossible d'y préserver même un minimum d'intimité ou de vie privée. Les murs dans les baraques ne montent pas jusqu'au plafond alors tout le monde peut entendre les autres.

Bien que les forces de sécurité de la WRA contrôlent l'intérieur des camps, ceux-ci sont entourés de barbelés et des sentinelles qui tirent sur les gens qui risquent d'essayer de s'échapper. Le gouvernement prétend que les sentinelles sont là pour protéger les détenus, mais on peut voir sans difficulté que les fusils sont orientés vers l'intérieur et non vers l'extérieur. Donc il n'est pas impossible de voir quelle est la vraie fonction des sentinelles.

Pour passer du temps, les détenus se lancent dans les activités sportives et culturelles. La vie religieuse est très riche, elle aussi, à l'intérieur des camps. Les gens parfois assistent aux services de différentes confessions pour avoir quelque chose à faire. Chaque camp possède son propre journal payé par le gouvernement et géré par les détenus, qui jouissent d'une mesure inégale de liberté de la presse, et le courrier reste censuré.

La vie dans les camps n'ayant rien de normal et leur captivité étant si injuste, les détenus sont souvent mécontents et amers. Certains détenus vont protester individuellement en portant des affaires juridiques devant les cours qui vont monter jusqu'à la Cour Suprême, en protestant aux journaux extérieurs, en circulant des pétitions, ou en écrivant à des

sympathisants du monde libre. Il faut dire qu'il y a, dès le début, un certain nombre de gens à l'extérieur des camps qui vont appuyer les droits des japonais américains détenus; les religieux progressistes comme les Quakers, certaines organisations progressistes comme le Parti Socialiste des États-Unis et son chef Norman Thomas, et des individus comme l'écrivaine Pearl S. Buck. Il y a aussi beaucoup de noirs qui vont protester l'internement des japonais américains, le regardant comme un acte raciste à laquelle il faut s'opposer. Il y a même des avocats noirs qui vont appuyer les cas juridiques des japonais américains. Dans quelques cas, les détenus se regrouperont pour mener des actions collectives (des manifestations, parfois des émeutes) qui expriment leur résistance et réorientent la politique des camps.

La WRA, presque dès le début, va favoriser la libération conditionnelle des détenus. Leurs raisons sont bien logiques: il est injuste de garder les masses dans des camps, c'est cher pour le gouvernement, et c'est humiliant pour un gouvernement qui prétend lutter pour la démocratie. Mais il leur faut régler avec la question: « comment libérer les gens sans admettre que le gouvernement a fait une erreur dans leur détention? » Donc ils vont d'un part défendre la politique officielle devant les tribunaux, mais d'autre part ouvrir toutes sortes de bureaux de réinstallation dans de différents états.

En même temps, les chefs du Département de Guerre, conscient d'avoir surestimé le péril posé par les japonais américains décident d'autoriser le recrutement volontaire des citoyens d'origine japonaise dans l'armée à partir de 1943 (la conscription sera rétablie au début de 1944) pour construire un bataillon ségrégué.

La WRA, voyant l'occasion de s'associer à l'armée, va imposer un questionnaire pour tester la « loyauté » des détenus de façon à justifier la libération

conditionnelle des japonais américains, mais cette action va s'avérer une erreur majeure. Il y a un grand pourcentage des détenus qui se méfient du gouvernement après leur détention, et qui va refuser de signer ou qui ne va pas donner un engagement inconditionnel à appuyer le gouvernement et de servir si nécessaire dans l'armée, qui sont les deux grandes questions du questionnaire. Donc quelques 15% des détenus vont être renvoyés de leurs camps à un centre à haute sécurité créé au camp de Tule Lake en Californie, où ils vont rester jusqu'à la fin de la guerre.

Parmi les autres japonais américains, qui vont dire « oui-oui » aux questions du gouvernement, peut-être un quart vont réussir à se libérer pendant la guerre pour se réinstaller à l'est du pays ou au Midwest, tandis que la majorité va rester dans les camps jusqu'en décembre 1944, au moment où la Cour Suprême des États-Unis statue que l'incarcération des citoyens d'une loyauté reconnue est anticonstitutionnelle, ce qui donne occasion au gouvernement américain de commencer l'ouverture des camps et la libération des détenus. Pendant 1945 et le début de 1946, les gens vont quitter les camps. La plupart vont se rendre sur la côte pacifique. Même s'ils doivent affronter l'hostilité et une mesure de violence contre leur propriété, les anciens détenus vont réussir à regagner leur ancienne région en bon nombre.

En partie grâce aux exploits de l'unité de combat ségrégué construit parmi des japonais américains, la 442nd Regimental Combat Team, qui sera l'unité de sa taille la plus décorée dans l'histoire de l'armée américaine, les japonais américains vont avoir une bonne presse. Ils vont faire une bonne impression, une image plus positive, après la guerre. Grâce à cette image, et la conscientisation du pays sur l'injustice des camps, toute discrimination juridique qu'ils avaient dû affronter va s'effriter après la guerre jusqu'au point qu'en 1952, on

va rouvrir l'immigration au japonais du Japon et on va légaliser pour la première fois la naturalisation des citoyens d'origine japonaise.

Maintenant je remonte finalement au Canada. Tout comme en Californie, en Colombie-Britannique il y avait une histoire de discrimination à l'égard des personnes d'origine asiatique et notamment d'origine japonaise. Il est peut-être encore pire en Colombie-Britannique parce qu'on y enlève le suffrage de toute personne d'origine asiatique et il y a une discrimination dans la fonction publique qui est encore plus forte.

Toujours est-il que le déclenchement de la guerre entre le Japon et l'empire britannique suite à Pearl Harbor va susciter une nouvelle vague d'hystérie anti-japonaise en Colombie-Britannique. Les élus de la côte pacifique, notamment le ministre du cabinet Ian McKenzie, font pression sur Ottawa pour une déportation totale de la population japonaise à l'intérieur, mais ils sont opposés (contrairement qu'aux États-Unis) par les chefs des services militaires qui disent qu'il n'y a aucun grand danger à craindre de la part des canadiens japonais, qui sont démobilisés et désarmés. Le plus grand péril, selon les militaires, est pour les canadiens japonais à craindre des racistes et des émeutes.

Néanmoins, la pression de la côte pacifique amène le premier ministre W.L. Mackenzie King, qui avait aussi, comme Roosevelt, ses propres préjugés contre les asiatiques, à annoncer un arrêt en Conseil le 14 janvier 1942 en se servant de la fameuse loi des mesures de guerre. King va décréter une zone militaire s'étendant 100 miles de la côte occidentale de la Colombie-Britannique, et va obliger à toute personne masculine d'origine japonaise de quitter cette zone pour aller s'enrôler dans un camp de travail routier. Cette action est faite dans le but d'apaiser l'opinion publique, mais en effet ça ne fait qu'encourager l'opposition, et les

hommes influents en Colombie-Britannique vont redoubler leur campagne pour l'expulsion de toute la population japonaise à l'intérieur du pays. Ce qui amène que finalement, le 24 février, quelques jours après l'ordre exécutif de Franklin Roosevelt (Executive Order 9066), le premier ministre Mackenzie King va signer l'arrêt en Conseil 1481. Sous l'autorité du décret, quelques 22,000 canadiens japonais, dont la vaste majorité sont des Nisei (c'est-à-dire des canadiens japonais nés au Canada) de moins de 21 ans, doivent quitter leurs maisons sur la côte pacifique.

Le gouvernement canadien va s'attaquer aux problèmes logistiques une dizaine de jours après le décret, au moment où le cabinet crée un nouvel organisme, la Commission de Sécurité de Colombie-Britannique (BCSC), pour diriger l'évacuation. La BCSC est composée d'un industriel de Vancouver, Austin C. Taylor (connu pour ses propos racistes), à sa tête, et John Shirras, chef de la Police provinciale de Colombie-Britannique, comme commissaire adjoint. La BCSC va nommer un comité de liaison avec la communauté japonaise dirigé par Etsuji Morii, un personnage riche de la pègre et un mafioso, ce qui ne va pas augmenter la confiance de la communauté japonaise ou ses membres respectables envers la Commission.

En procédant à l'expulsion, les autorités de la BCSC vont se retrouver devant un dilemme à Ottawa comme à Vancouver: la BCSC n'a pas de ressources pour gérer l'évacuation et le puissant ministre de la défense nationale refuse d'intervenir. Donc, les autorités fédérales, contrairement qu'aux États-Unis, décident de créer plus de camps de travail routier pour les hommes, utilisant cette main-d'œuvre forcée. Pour le reste des japonais, le gouvernement va ouvrir des installations à l'intérieur du pays. Le 23 février, une première convoie va transporter 1,300 hommes japonais dans des camps de travail routier. Pour le reste, le gouvernement va

commencer en mars à organiser des rafles. La Gendarmerie Royale du Canada va commencer à envahir les communautés rurales et à prendre des personnes, qui ont juste un tout petit peu de temps pour organiser leurs valises. Parfois ils doivent même laisser la vaisselle dans la cuisine.

Une fois arrêté, on les embarque sur des trains et des bateaux à vapeur et on les emmène à Vancouver. Pour mettre ces migrants forcés en captivité, la BCSC va réquisitionner les étables du bétail et les pavillons au Parc Hastings, ce qui est aujourd'hui le Canadian National Exhibition Grounds.

Des milliers de personnes vont être installées dans deux grands pavillons pour le bétail; des femmes, des hommes âgés, et des enfants. Ils sont séparés dans les deux pavillons; les hommes âgés dans un, les femmes et enfants dans l'autre. Ils sont sur des lits de camp. Il y a à peine un mètre entre chaque lit. Au début, les vieilles mangeoires servaient de toilettes et il n'y avait pas d'eau courant pour se laver jusqu'à ce qu'on va aménager quelques douches. La nourriture est fournie par une entreprise extérieure et c'est plutôt monotone et insuffisante, ce qui reflète bien le maigre budget de la BCSC, et donc les prisonniers vont faire une grève de faim en avril. On va installer par conséquent une cantine et une boulangerie pour augmenter les rations. Il n'y en a pas d'écoles non plus. Les détenus vont alors organiser des écoles de fortune.

Certains groupes de Vancouver, notamment les gens du journal *The New Canadian* (le journal des Nisei), vont s'organiser pour aider les détenus et pour les encourager à suivre les conseils du gouvernement. Mais un autre groupe, le Nisei Mass Evacuation Group, va s'organiser pour protester la séparation des familles. Les membres vont dire que c'est injuste d'obliger les hommes à repartir dans des camps de travail routier et de les séparer de leurs femmes et enfants. Ils vont faire la

grève et insister d'être détenus en tant que prisonniers de guerre et internés. Ils vont refuser de s'enrôler pour être envoyés dans des camps de travail routier et ils vont même se cacher à Vancouver pour prévenir leur déploiement.

Finalement, au bout de quelques semaines, le gouvernement doit céder. Les autorités vont accepter d'envoyer des familles entières dans des camps d'internement, tandis que les hommes célibataires vont être renvoyés dans de camps de travail routier. Mais cela a un coût: les gens qui ont déjà fait la grève pour ce résultat seront néanmoins envoyés dans un camp de prisonniers de guerre à Petawawa, Ontario et plus tard en Angler, Ontario. Là ils vont rencontrer, paraît-il, le maire de Montréal Camillien Houde, qui lui y est interné pour avoir dénoncé la conscription des canadiens. Par la suite, il va accueillir beaucoup de canadiens japonais à Montréal.

Toujours est-il qu'en même temps qu'elle réagisse à l'opposition du Nisei Mass Evacuation Group, la BCSC cherche des destinations pour les canadiens japonais. L'Alberta Sugar Beet Association, qui cherche désespérément de la main-d'œuvre, demande au ministre du Travail, Humphrey Mitchell, de lui envoyer des japonais pour travailler dans des champs de betterave à sucre. Finalement, presque 4,000 personnes sont envoyées pour travailler aux exploitations de betteraves à sucre en Alberta, au Manitoba, et dans l'ouest de l'Ontario.

D'autres canadiens japonais seront permis de se rendre dans des « self-supporting sites » (des lieux de réinstallation autofinancés) comme Christina Lake, Bridge River, Minto City, Lillooet et McGillvray Falls. Ils sont obligés de payer les frais de leur propre transport et leur propre installation, mais ils y sont accordés plus de liberté. Il y a aussi plusieurs dizaines de femmes qui vont se déplacer dans des villes comme

London, Toronto, et Montréal où elles acceptent le travail domestique (ceci est vraiment la première base de la grande communauté qui existe aujourd'hui à Toronto).

La plupart des canadiens japonais se retrouvent, bien malgré eux, dans des camps de concentration, désignés comme des lieux d'« hébergement intérieur, » dans des anciennes installations minières de la vallée de Slocan, en Colombie-Britannique. Là il s'y trouvait des logements abandonnés de l'époque des villes champignons, qui date de la ruée vers l'or, et il y aurait donc des places vides et désespères auxquelles les canadiens japonais redonneront vie.

À partir d'avril 1942, la BCSC commence à déporter les canadiens japonais de la côte Ouest vers l'intérieur des terres. La vaste majorité seront installés à New Denver, Kaslo, Greenwood, Sandon, et Slocan City (qui comprend les villes satellites de Bay Farm, Popoff, et Lemon Creek), que le gouvernement canadien qualifie officiellement d'« établissements intérieurs. » De plus, la BCSC va construire un camp de concentration du nom Tashme, qui est construit à partir de rien, sur un ranch abandonné, à proximité de la ville de Hope. Au départ, la BCSC a l'intention de séparer et ségréger les détenus selon leur confession religieuse; les catholiques iront à Greenwood, les anglicans à Slocan, les protestants de l'Église Unie à Kaslo, et les bouddhistes à Sandon. On décidera par la suite de loger les gens en fonction des places disponibles, mais chaque zone sera plutôt associée à une confession particulière.

Ni les Issei (la première génération d'immigrants japonais) ni les Nisei auront le droit de voyager sans une autorisation spéciale et ceux qui veulent déménager ou parcourir plus de 80 kilomètres doivent obtenir un laissez-passer. Les camps ne sont pas entourés par des barbelés comme aux États-Unis, mais dans des villages désertés dans les montagnes il n'y a aucun moyen de

s'échapper. Les gens sont tout simplement emprisonnés en exil intérieur.

La BCSC n'a pas soigneusement préparé les camps. Ils ont reconstruit les baraques hâtivement, mais elles restent assez rudes. La BCSC refuse de donner la nourriture ou l'éducation aux gens dans les camps. Les détenus sont alors obligés de s'organiser entre eux la création des écoles secondaires et les organisations confessionnelles vont construire des écoles dans les camps. Dans le camp de Greenwood, l'église catholique va envoyer des instituteurs canadiens français pour gérer des écoles.

En 1944-45 quand la guerre prend fin, le gouvernement canadien va obliger au canadiens japonais de faire un choix: ou de se réinstaller à l'est du pays, ou d'être déportés au Japon une fois la guerre terminée. Toronto devient la première destination pour les canadiens japonais. Montréal, Windsor, et Hamilton en sont d'autres. (Montréal a maintenant la plus grande communauté de japonais dans le monde francophone). Mais 10,000 canadiens japonais vont refuser de quitter les camps pour un avenir inconnu dans des zones éloignés de leur ancienne région. Le gouvernement canadien entame des processus pour les déporter une fois la guerre terminée, une question qui va rester en suspense pour quelques années pendant que les canadiens japonais amènent devant la cour cette action. La Cour Suprême du Canada et finalement le Conseil Privé à Londres vont finalement appuyer le gouvernement canadien dans son droit de déporter, même de façon involontaire, toute personne d'origine japonaise.

Mais l'opinion publique va se tourner contre le gouvernement après la guerre, et le gouvernement va finalement renoncer à la politique de déportement involontaire. Il va néanmoins garder les restrictions de guerre sur les canadiens japonais jusqu'en 1949,

quelques 4 ans après la fin de la guerre. Ce n'est qu'en avril 1949 que les canadiens japonais auront le suffrage et auront le droit de repartir vers la côte pacifique. Conséquemment, le Vancouver va avoir une très petite communauté japonaise pendant longtemps, jusqu'à la reprise de l'immigration.

Il faut signaler qu'après la guerre les canadiens japonais, comme les japonais américains, ont mis de l'effort pour se réhabiliter et pour se redresser. Ils ont fait des efforts pour s'organiser politiquement, à une moindre échelle, mais ça prend jusqu'aux années 1970-1980 avant qu'ils organisent des campagnes pour chercher des réparations pour leur traitement injuste pendant la guerre. Leur campagne va triompher en 1988 aux États-Unis et au Canada avec la signature de législation donnant réparations. Aux États-Unis on donne des excuses officielles et un paiement de \$20,000 à chaque détenu. Au Canada, on donne des excuses officielles et \$21,000. Mais les réparations ne pouvaient pas compenser tous les dommages faits par la perte de propriété, la perte de liberté, et la perte d'humanité par les détenus d'origine japonaise dans les deux pays.

Les dommages faits à nos démocraties respectives sont innombrables. C'est pour ça que j'ai qualifié cet incident comme une tragédie de la démocratie. Merci.

My Experiences During the Second World War

Frank Moritsugu

Dr. Greg Robinson has done the overview of what happened during the Second World War to both Japanese Canadians and Japanese Americans. During that last big war, as Dr. Robinson said, how our government treated more than 21,000 Japanese Canadians was both unique and totally unjustified. And today, as one of the survivors of those unique experiences, I am going to tell you about what I went through back then—as did other members of our family and thousands of other Japanese Canadians.

By the way, just to inform you of what I am in addition to being a survivor of wartime mistreatment experiences and before that. What you see up here is a card that only Japanese Canadians, sixteen years and over, were issued during World War Two. There was also a national registration card issued to everybody over sixteen but it had no pictures, prints, or anything like on this card. With these cards, Mounties could take a good look at us and figure out what we looked like. So to inform you what I am in addition to being a survivor, I am a retired journalist who was the first Japanese-Canadian writer-editor to be hired by Maclean's magazine (back in 1952). And also the first to be hired by the Toronto Star 10 years later in 1962, as the Assistant Entertainment Editor and columnist.

I also spent 13 years as an Ontario government civil servant. During my Queen's Park years, I lived in Japan for seven months in 1970 as deputy commissioner of the Ontario Pavilion at the Osaka Expo. I retired in 1989 (imagine, nearly 26 years ago). By the way I am in my early nineties, and my last fulltime job was being a

professor in the Print Journalism program at Centennial College.

What became the pivotal experience of my life began on December 7th, 1941. On that day in 1941—it was a Sunday—Japanese aircraft attacked Pearl Harbor in Hawaii and that surprise attack began the war against Japan by the United States and the Allied countries including Canada. It came during the third year of the Second World War which had begun in 1939 with the Allies—of which Canada was a member along with Britain and France—fighting Germany and Italy, mainly in Europe and then Africa. Then in 1942, a few months after this new war began, more than 21,000 Japanese Canadians who lived on the British Columbia (B.C.) coast were expelled from our homes and our communities and sent inland, usually to detention camps.

What did this government action 73 years ago do to us? Here are some details: Those of us who were working lost our jobs or our businesses. Those of us who were students had to leave our schools or universities. Those of us who owned property (cars and trucks, houses, farms, fishing boats, businesses, and so on) had it all confiscated by the Canadian government and later sold without our knowledge while we were still in camps. And our communities (Japanese communities) were broken up to disappear forever. At the time, 95 percent of Japanese Canadians in Canada lived on the B.C. coast. There had been about 30 such Japanese-Canadian communities on the B.C. coast—on the lower Mainland, the Fraser Valley, upcoast and on Vancouver Island. And consider this, if you will: Nearly three-quarters of us who were treated this way were citizens of Canada.

Why did the Canadian Government order this mass removal? One official reason given at the time was that with Japan entering the Second World War, and

therefore our country being at war with that country, those of us here of Japanese origin could not be trusted to remain loyal to Canada, especially if the Japanese invaded us across the Pacific. A second official reason given was sort of a reversal. Canada did not need to be protected from us, but we needed to be protected from the hysterical anger of other British Columbians—many of them severely upset by the war possibly coming so close from across the Pacific. As you recall, the war at that time was really from across the Atlantic. Well, confidential Canadian government documents finally released in the 1980s have proved that both of those reasons officially given for expelling us from the B.C. coast and sending us inland were false. At that time, the federal government had been advised by the Canadian Army and the RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) that there was no need to move us from the B.C. coast. So the real reasons for our mistreatment were political, economic, and racist.

As you know, Germany and Italy were also enemy countries of Canada in the Second World War. And it's true that some German Canadians and some Italian Canadians were interned in this country. But not all the German Canadians nor all the Italian Canadians were expelled and detained the way we were. And to the Canadian government, it didn't matter whether we Japanese Canadians were immigrants who hadn't gotten Canadian citizenship yet (like my parents), or were those few immigrants who had managed to get their Canadian citizenship, or were born here (as I was, and my brothers and sisters). It didn't matter so long as we were of Japanese origin. At that time the Canadian government also labelled all of us "enemy aliens." Yes, we became "enemy aliens" officially. And so we were all kicked out of our homes and communities and sent away.

When that happened I was 19, nearly two years out of high school because I had finished Grade 12 at the age of 17, and I was working for my father who had a landscape gardening business in Vancouver. Let me tell you what sort of person I was back then. What kind of guy the authorities decided was an “enemy alien” and had to be expelled from the Pacific Coast.

First, I was born in this country in 1922 on the B.C. coast in a small town called Port Alice on the northwestern tip of Vancouver Island, where Dad had a job at the pulp mill which was the reason for the town’s existence in that location. When I was about kindergarten age, the family moved to the city of Vancouver. So my brothers and sisters and I grew up in the biggest B.C. city. In the spring of 1942, I am this 19-year-old. I am a former Boy Scout troop leader. I have a green belt in judo. I am a baseball nut. I am also a bookworm. I love jazz and swing music. And I’ve pretty well gotten over acne, after having it bad during Grades 11 and 12.

My father came to Canada from Japan in 1912. After working hard for several years and putting money aside, in 1921 he went to Japan to bring back a wife, my mother. And, in December of 1922, I was born at Port Alice. Later came four brothers and three sisters, so there were eight of us – all born here, all of whom grew up Canadian. As in most immigrant families, when the older children were small the language at home was our parents’ first language—in our case, Japanese, of course. But soon—sometime between kindergarten and early public school grades, English became the main language for me and my brothers and sisters, even at home – a common pattern among immigrant families in Canada.

In my case, it also happened that English was one of my best subjects in school. So being elected the high-school paper editor by the Grade 12 journalism class was not that surprising. By the way, I was the only one

who wasn't white in that particular class, and the majority of them had voted for me. But the English-language part of my life went a lot farther than that. I knew Japanese children's songs and Japanese popular hits that our music-loving parents passed onto us. But most of my own favourite music was in English—whether American pop songs or Western tunes, British folk songs and traditional airs. The first tune I learned to play on the harmonica was *Red River Valley*, the cowboy song. And all of my bookworming, of course, was in English.

But in those years there was one big thing that stopped me and the other Japanese Canadians in British Columbia from being recognized as 100-percent citizens. That was that even when we reached the age of majority (which was 21 back then), we were not permitted to vote. Not in municipal, provincial, or federal elections. That's because anti-Asian Canadian attitudes had dominated British Columbia since well before I was born. Way back in the 1890s, provincial laws were passed which said that no one of Japanese, or Chinese, or East Indian origin would be given the right to vote—even if born here or otherwise qualifying for citizenship papers. (We say "South Asian" these days for people from India, Sri Lanka, etc.). And under the federal election laws of that time, if you didn't have the provincial vote, you couldn't vote federally either.

Not having the vote not only made me and others like me less than first-class Canadian citizens, but also kept me out of certain kinds of work in B.C. I couldn't become a lawyer. I couldn't become a pharmacist. I couldn't become a civil servant. I couldn't work in a mine, even if I wanted to. And, of course, I couldn't run for public office, at any level. All in all, not having the vote said that in the eyes of the law of the land, I wasn't as good a Canadian as the majority of my schoolmates.

For a few minutes, let's go back to the beginning of the Second World War. Back in September 1939 when that war began in Europe—with the Allies (which included Britain and Canada) against Germany and Italy, I was just entering my final year at Kitsilano High School—Grade 12. So it was natural that during that final school year many of my classmates and buddies regularly discussed what to do next after they graduated. What most of them wanted to do was enlist in the Canadian armed forces to go fight in Europe. Unlike the more recent wars, the Second World War was a “popular” war. Most young men and many women wanted to serve in the armed forces—“to fight for the country,” as they used to say.

But this talk at school about joining up in the Air Force or the Army didn't include us Japanese Canadians. We were left out because from the experience of Japanese Canadians older than us who had tried we already knew that the authorities would not accept our enlistment. That, too, was official policy in B.C. Then, as mentioned, on December 7th, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. The next day Canada was at war with the country my parents had come from. Mind you, Japan had nothing to do with me. I could understand simple Japanese and read the language a bit and had eaten sushi since I was very young but I'd never been there.

Then a few months after war against Japan began in early 1942, the manure truly hit the fan. Now that Canada was at war with Japan, many B.C. politicians poured on intense and often-racist pressure to kick all of us off the West Coast and, ideally, out of the province. This campaign was backed by most newspapers, labour unions, and even some church ministers. Very soon the federal government bowed to the screaming from B.C. and decided to move all of us from our homes to beyond the 100-mile-wide so-called

“protected area,” which ran all the way up the B.C. coast. Although Ottawa decided that every one of us was to be moved—men, women, and children—the moves were made separately. This meant that most families were split up. You could only stay together as a family if you agreed to go work on the sugar-beet farms of Alberta or Manitoba or on farms in Ontario. Sugar-beet farms were important because with the war in Europe, the ships that used to bring cane sugar could not do that anymore. So our sugar had to come from the beets.

In the first two phases of the mass expulsion, they moved the men out—men who were 18 to 60. Those sent away first were men who were not Canadian citizens, like my father at the time. They were sent to work camps in the woods along the Canadian National Railway (CNR) line in northeastern B.C. near Jasper, Alberta. Then the authorities moved out men like me and my next brother Ken, who had turned 18 in 1942, shortly after the so-called mass “evacuation” orders came down. There were several different work camps for Canadian-born or naturalized men. The one my brother and I ended up in was called Yard Creek and was one of five camps in British Columbia along the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) main line.

By the way, if we weren’t trusted to be loyal why was it that the men-only work camps were located alongside the two main railway lines, the CNR and the CPR? It was where we saw troop trains, trains carrying armoured tanks and other military equipment, and so on go by almost daily. If we wanted to help the enemy by damaging the railway, it would have been so easy. Our work camp was located in the foothills of the Rockies, some miles west of a town called Revelstoke. We were put to work on what was to become a part of the Trans-Canada Highway.

So, in our family's case, Dad was expelled in March 1942. A few weeks later in early April, I had to go. Then a few months later, Brother Ken came out to the Yard Creek Camp where I was. That meant that with all three adult males sent away, my mother and the other six children—whose ages ranged from 16 down to 3 years old—were left back in Vancouver. They knew they were going to be moved from the coast too, eventually, but they didn't know when or where, nor what was going to happen to them. Imagine how Mom must have felt.

Finally, that summer, it was decided that Mom and our younger brothers and sisters would be sent to a newly built family detention camp called Tashme, near Hope, B.C. It was newly built because married men like my father had been sent down from their original camps to construct hundreds of cheap tarpaper shacks to house the expelled families. There were eight such family detention camps, mainly in the West Kootenay area of the B.C. interior. So in September 1942, about half a year after Dad and my brother and I were sent away, my Mother and the six younger kids were finally moved, saying goodbye to Vancouver where we had all grown up.

The family stayed 14 months at the Tashme family camp. During that time, in February 1943, men like myself and my brother in the work camps, who were not married, were allowed to go visit our families for two weeks. The authorities decided to allow us because they were concerned that we would cause a lot of trouble and go on strike because we were unhappy with the way we were treated. So for two weeks, Ken and I went to visit Tashme. Then, the family decided to leave because Mom and Dad were concerned about the education of the children. Yes, you could leave the detention camps but there was only one way you could get out: You had to agree to leave British Columbia and go eastward. In our family's case, the only place the

family could find to go to was Southwestern Ontario to do farmwork. My brother Ken and I were allowed to join the family, because we were all leaving B.C. So, in March 1944—two years after Dad was sent away from Vancouver—the family was reunited at last on a large farm in St. Thomas. That's south of London, Ontario. The men in the family, including teenager Harve, became farmhands—city hicks learning how to strip cows, work in a haymow, and clean out an awful lot of animal manure. That was more than 70 years ago but I can smell the cow manure to this day. And being city guys we spent our time wondering how we could get out of there to resume more civilized lives somewhere else.

By the way, although we had moved out of B.C. to Ontario, we were still under certain restrictions—as were all Japanese Canadians wherever they were across the country: If we were 16 or over, we had to carry a Japanese registration card with us at all times. It was a unique form of wartime ID, having a mug shot on one side and the owner's right thumbprint on the other. We could not go anywhere 50 miles or more from where we lived—even for a social visit—without getting a permit from the local RCMP (the Mounties). We definitely could not go to the British Columbia coastal area, even to visit. And although the Canadian forces were appealing for recruits, we could not be accepted by any of the armed forces if we had lived in B.C. when the war began. And although we had left B.C., we still could not vote.

Then in early 1945, suddenly things changed hugely. A secret recruiting campaign was begun by Ottawa to get Japanese Canadians to volunteer. In this recruiting, we still weren't allowed to enlist in the Air Force or the Navy. Our volunteering was for one job only—to join the Canadian Army and be sent to Southeast Asia to work as Japanese-language interpreters for the British

forces out there. This near-miracle (to be allowed to enlist as so many of our school buddies already had) came about because the tides of the war had changed. In late 1944 and early 1945 the Allies found themselves finally doing well in Europe against Germany, and in Asia against Japan. One result in Asia was that suddenly more and more Japanese soldiers were being taken prisoner by our side.

However, the British and the Australian forces in the Pacific, unlike the Americans, could not make effective military use of these prisoners. This was because the Allies did not have enough personnel around who could interpret in Japanese when prisoners were interrogated, or translate captured Japanese military documents. Ironically, the only country in what was then called the British Empire, where a sizable number of citizens of Japanese descent lived, was Canada. And Canada, as you now know, had banned most of us particular citizens from serving in the armed forces.

So in April 1945, three years almost to the day from when I had to get on the CPR train in Vancouver to leave my original hometown under RCMP escort, I got on an electric train from St. Thomas up to London (no police escort this time) to volunteer for the Canadian Army. I was in the Army for only about a year and a half, but I spent nearly a year of it overseas, serving mainly in India. This was because I was among a group of 22 Japanese Canadians who were rushed overseas with barely any training because the British forces in Southeast Asia were desperate for interpreters.

Although I had never been to Japan, I had learned enough Japanese when growing up that I became an army interpreter-translator with the rank of sergeant in the Canadian Army Intelligence Corps. I was attached to Special Force 136, a British counter-intelligence operation in the Southeast Asia Command. During my

overseas stay in India, the Second World War finally ended in August 1945. Then followed the military takeovers of places held by the enemy such as Kuala Lumpur in Malaya, Saigon in Indo-China (which is now called Viet Nam), and Singapore. And that was followed by military occupation of enemy countries. In spring 1946, my duties completed, I was returned to Canada. In June 1946 I was discharged from the army to become a civilian again. I had two medals: the Canadian Voluntary Service Medal for volunteering, and the 1939-45 Star for being overseas when the war was still on.

A few days later, something happened which reminded me—a returned Canadian Army overseas veteran—that things had not changed at all for us Japanese Canadians—even for those of us who had served the country in war. It was two or three days after I'd become a civilian—I wasn't working yet. A Mountie constable arrived at the door of our St. Thomas farmhouse and handed me a brown envelope containing a wallet-sized piece of paper. It was my Japanese registration card—the document that only Japanese Canadians over the age of 16 had to carry. I had been forced to carry mine since April 1941, when registration was done the first time back in Vancouver. As I mentioned, the card had a photograph of me on one side, and my right thumbprint on the other. I had given my card up on enlistment.

By becoming a Canadian soldier when I finally got the chance, I had assumed I would never again see the hateful piece of ID that declared that there was something different about me and those like me, something so wrong that the police, and especially the Mounties, could easily check us out. But despite the Second World War being over for nearly a year, and despite my service in the Canadian Army, that detested ID card was being handed back to me, to carry again at all times. In effect, having to carry the card signified I

still was not Canadian enough. Then the young Mountie added to the insult. He said, “By the way, that picture of you is rather weather-beaten. Go into town and get new portraits taken.” Obviously at my expense! “Attach one to the card, and send two copies for our files.” What with being sent to a men-only work camp and also serving in the Army, my vocabulary was quite extensive.

So in response, I swore at him using every swear word I knew and threw the envelope and the registration card at him. He let them fall to the floor, turned on his heel, and as he left, he repeated, “Don’t forget to send us the new photographs.” It probably won’t surprise you that I never did. By the way, my Mother was the only person at home when the Mountie came and she witnessed the whole thing. And after he left, she said “You shouldn’t swear at a Mountie, you know?” But by Canadian law even with the war well over, this returned serviceman and others like me had to carry that Japanese-Canadians-only ID card for nearly three more years.

After the Second World War ended in 1945, we Japanese Canadians who underwent the wartime mistreatment had to start our lives all over again. What we didn’t know was that for the very first time many of us would enjoy totally unexpected opportunities. Especially if we were no longer in British Columbia—the province where we were born and where we had been when war against Japan began. As one example, let me share with you my own experiences after the war. I was lucky to be one of many wartime survivors in their new parts of Canada who got the kind of jobs that were impossible for us back in prewar British Columbia. As mentioned, I had served in the Canadian Army overseas. On my return to Canada, I was discharged in June 1946 and became a civilian again.

Being a WW2 veteran meant getting special benefits: either a small farm or a post-secondary education. At

Kitsilano High School in Vancouver, in addition to editing the student newspaper, I had been an eager cartoonist, so I applied to the Ontario College of Art to become a commercial artist. But because OCA—like most post-secondary schools—was jammed with returned veterans, I had to wait a whole college year to go there.

My first choice would have been to study journalism because after Pearl Harbor I had worked at *The New Canadian*, the only Japanese-Canadian newspaper allowed to publish during the war against Japan, first in Vancouver and later at the Kaslo family detention camp. Working with Editor Tommy Shoyama taught me a lot. And writing and editing was my Number One dream. But growing up in racist B.C., we Japanese Canadians knew that getting such work on a mainstream publication was impossible for those like us. A Japanese or Chinese name in a daily newspaper or national magazine byline? Pure fantasy back then.

Then in September 1946 after helping out with the harvest at the St. Thomas farm where our family was, I went to visit friends in Toronto. It was on that visit that I discovered that our world in postwar Ontario wasn't the same as back in B.C. This is what happened: One friend I looked up was Irene Uchida who wrote for *The New Canadian* in its early years and who I'd met during my months in the Powell Street offices of the paper. Hearing that I was waiting a year to go to the Ontario College of Art, Irene suggested that for something to do meanwhile, I should go see Dr. B. K. Sandwell, the editor of *Saturday Night* magazine. He was one of the active members of The Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians, which was campaigning to prevent Ottawa from forcibly deporting to Japan those evacuees who had agreed to be sent in 1945 because it was the only way they could stay in B.C. Not because they wanted to go to Japan.

So, with nothing to lose, I made an appointment with the *Saturday Night* editor, and went to his office on Richmond Street near the old Toronto City Hall. Dr. Sandwell turned out to look like a gentleman out of a Dickens novel. He first asked me about my wartime experiences, during which I naturally mentioned my two times at *The New Canadian*, and he suddenly asked: “Moritsugu, why won’t the Japanese still remaining in B.C. come out east?” This was in 1946, a year after the war ended. Even with most of the family detention camps closed, more than half of those expelled from the B.C. coast still remained in that province.

And being 23 years old and knowing everything, I gave Dr. Sandwell 5 or 6 reasons why they didn’t want to leave B.C. despite the racist attitudes there. Then Dr. Sandwell said, “Why don’t you write about that for us?” I said, “Thanks, I’d like to” and left his office with something special to do. I walked all the way up Yonge to near Bloor where I was staying with the Sumi family on Hayden Street.

Then, suddenly, reality hit me. Me write an article for a national magazine—when all I had ever done was write for small newspapers? And how do you write a magazine article anyway? There was a bookshop on Yonge Street near Bloor where I had noticed there was a shelf of how-to-write books. So I went in and found one titled *How to Write Non-Fiction Articles*. Yes, that’s what I had to do—write a “non-fiction article.” I bought the book, retired to the Sumi attic where I was staying, did everything the book suggested, rented a typewriter, and drafted the article in a week or so. I showed the draft of the article to Irene Uchida—she also showed it to Kunio Hidaka, who I think was the first B.C. Nisei to get an Ontario-government job. They checked it over and made some suggestions, which I followed, and then sent the article to Dr. Sandwell. That was in September 1946.

Back at St. Thomas, a few weeks later in October, I got a phone call from *The New Canadian* which had moved from Kaslo to Winnipeg. The paper needed an associate editor on the English side to work with Editor Kasey Oyama because Noji Murase, who had succeeded me in Kaslo when I moved to Ontario in 1944 to rejoin our family, was leaving to join his family, which had moved from the Lemon Creek camp to Hamilton. So if I wasn't doing anything could I work on the paper in Winnipeg?

Not being crazy about farm work, I jumped at the chance and joined *The New Canadian* in Manitoba. A few weeks later, I got a letter from *Saturday Night* editor B.K. Sandwell that my article would be published in one of the forthcoming November issues (the magazine was a weekly then). When that week arrived, I rushed to a store on Portage Avenue which carried out-of-town publications and found the latest *Saturday Night*. Flipped it open, and there it was: My article—"Why the Japanese Don't Want to Leave B.C." Back in the issue on page 54. Naturally, I bought several copies—had to send one home to St. Thomas right away. Back at the *The New Canadian* office, I was congratulated by everyone and for a day or two floated about in happiness.

Then suddenly it hit me. I didn't have to go to the College of Art after all. With only a high-school education and experience on a Japanese-Canadian newspaper, I had been published by a national magazine, which showed that in this new postwar world, it was possible for someone like me to become a mainstream journalist. Wow!

So I wrote to Miss Jean Story in Vancouver, my high school English and Journalism teacher—told her about the *Saturday Night* article and asked her advice about learning journalism. She replied, "Why not ask Dr. Sandwell? He was a Queen's University professor."

I did as she suggested—Dr. Sandwell wrote to me that there were two journalism schools in Canada, one at Carleton University and the other at the University of Western Ontario. But the best approach would be to get a good liberal arts education because the journalism part I could learn on the job. So in Winnipeg while working on *The New Canadian*, I attended the first year at the University of Manitoba. That would give me university entrance in Ontario where the final high-school grade was Grade 13 back then.

Then in 1948—when *The New Canadian* moved to Toronto for its final home—I left the paper to concentrate full time on my education at the University of Toronto. I chose an Honours Political Science & Economics degree program, and also worked on the student paper, *The Varsity*—which was a daily then: Monday through Friday. In my third year, I was elected editor-in-chief of *The Varsity*. And that year, I won the best editorial award in the annual Canadian University Press competition. That was quite wonderful but what followed was even more so. It turned out that one of the judges of the competition had been Ralph Allen, the best editor *Maclean's* magazine ever had. By the way, back then *Maclean's* was not a weekly newsmagazine but a monthly feature magazine with such staffers as Pierre Berton and June Callwood.

During the next year, 1952—my final year at U of T—one day in January, Ralph Allen phoned to invite me to come down to *Maclean's* when I had some spare time. There, Mr. Allen asked me if I had any half days free in my university timetable. I said, “Yes, Thursday afternoons I don’t have any lectures or labs.” “Well, come on Thursdays starting next week,” he said, “and we’ll teach you to be an assistant copy editor. And after you’ve finished your exams (which would be sometime in May) you can come on fulltime.” So there I was, not quite a university graduate, already being offered a job

on the staff of Canada's most important magazine. Of course, I jumped at the chance.

Everyone at *Macleans*'s welcomed me when I showed up on the first Thursday afternoon. Then a couple weeks after I started at *Macleans*'s, one staff member who had been out of town on an assignment came down to our office to welcome me too. He said, "Frank, come up to my office a minute, I've got something to tell you." So I followed him up to his office; he closed the door and then put out his hand saying, "As the first Jew in this building, let me welcome the first Japanese." I learned sometime later that the Maclean-Hunter publishing company, which put out more than 30 publications including *Macleans*'s, *Chatelaine*, *Mayfair*, *Canadian Homes and Gardens*, the *Financial Post*, and many, many trade publications, had had a no-Jews policy until sometime in 1950. Sid Katz, who became quite famous as *Macleans*'s science and medical editor, was the one welcoming me.

And that is how I got into mainstream journalism—being in the right place at the right time. A possibility I had never dreamed of in my prewar and wartime B.C. days. That first opening to me was followed by my eventually becoming Managing Editor of *Canadian Homes and Gardens*, and then Assistant Entertainment Editor and columnist at the *Toronto Star*, then Expo Editor at the *Montreal Star* during 1967—our country's Centennial Year, etc. And in later years, other Nisei who also began their careers on *The New Canadian* became well-known staffers of mainstream papers and magazines, such as Ken Adachi, Mel Tsuji, Rick Matsumoto, and my brother Henry Moritsugu.

And our being able to work at that higher level—starting in the 1950s, of course—was parallel to the opportunities offered to other Nisei and Sansei in once forbidden professions. To mention a few other examples: the world-famous architect Raymond

Moriyama, the novelist-poet Joy Kogawa, the world-famous biologist David Suzuki—those three had been classmates at the Bay Farm, B.C. family detention camp, as it happens. Other Japanese Canadians who became national leaders included the late Irene Uchida—who was one of my mentors—she became Professor Emeritus at McMaster University; and the ethnic newspaper editor Tom Shoyama, who became a senior civil servant in Ottawa. Plus Margaret Lyons, who became a CBC vice-president, in charge of its radio operations. By the way, when she was born in Mission, B.C., her name was Keiko Inouye.

Another postwar achievement by Japanese Canadians was the development of young lawyers, some of whom eventually became partners in Canada's top law firms. You will recall that in those years when we didn't have the vote, none of us could become lawyers. And in the 1980s, a campaign was begun, led by young Japanese-Canadian lawyers, to get an apology and redress from the Canadian government for the unique and wholly unjustified mistreatment we had suffered during the Second World War. Then in 1988, more than 40 years after all this was done to us, the Canadian government finally decided to officially acknowledge the injustices done to Japanese Canadians between 1942 and 1949. And to back up its gesture and apology, Ottawa agreed to give each of us survivors an award of \$21,000 as symbolic compensation. This historic action came about because of the determined campaign led by Japanese Canadians, which was also supported by other Canadians of many kinds and beliefs.

So for today's young Japanese Canadians—that is our children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren—there aren't many doors that are still closed to them. And if any door is closed, they know how to open it. I'm sure you'll agree that it's a better happy ending than most stories get these days. Thank you.

The End of Belligerence: How Demilitarization Shaped the Japanese Identity

Alexandra Welsh

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationships, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honoured place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognise that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

- Preamble to the 1947 Japanese Constitution¹

Introduction

When the war-weary Allied forces, led by American troops, entered Japan after a full surrender on September 2nd, 1945, both sides were unsure of what to expect of this new, rocky relationship between vanquished and victorious.² The Allies were expecting resistance, if not full-blown rebellion, against their attempts to completely rebuild and reshape Japanese

¹ Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Remilitarisation*, (New York: Routledge, 2009): 22.

² Melissa Willard-Foster, "Planning the Peace and Enforcing the Surrender: Deterrence in the Allied Occupation of Germany and Japan," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 40, no. 1 (2009): 41.

society.³ The Japanese, on the other hand, were expecting, at best, complete subjugation and extreme collective punishment of their culture, and, at worst, the widespread massacre of their people.⁴ Both parties were pleasantly surprised at what they encountered instead. The Japanese people found the American soldiers to be kind, while the troops encountered calmness and cooperation from the newly occupied state.⁵ It was in this way that the Occupation of Japan, an event that would shape international relations for decades to come, began.

The overall receptiveness of the Japanese people to the invading Allied forces, and their willingness to embrace the enforced mandate of demobilization, marked the beginning of a shift in the cultural identity of the country that would have lasting effects not only on the civil society of the state, but on its international political role for decades to come. This paper will argue that, while the demobilization of Japan was a measure imposed by an outside power, the resulting deep-rooted and long lasting pacifism were a result of the same social structures and cultural practices that had enabled the Japanese military fanaticism which culminated in 1945.

Japanese Society and Militarization

The structure of Japanese society which allowed it to become militarized in such a radical way leading up the Second World War is, in many ways, inimitable. Unlike the cases of Germany or Italy, whose militarism arose from political ideology, the militarism of Japan grew out

³ Makoto Iokibe, "Japan Meets the United States for the Second Time," *Daedalus* 119, no. 3 (1990): 93.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 94.

⁵ *Ibid.*

of the expanding strength of the military.⁶ While the military and civilian branches of the Japanese government were officially designed to rank equally, with the Emperor as the pinnacle of power presiding over both, throughout the 1930s the military branch grew rapidly in size and power, eventually outgrowing any accountability it once owed civilians.⁷

This rampant development of the military was coupled with the dominance of hierarchical relationships that were inherent in Japanese society. In pre-war Japan, the household, or *ie*, was the primary unit of governance, consequently obstructing a relationship between the government and the individual.⁸ The Civil Code of 1898 vested the heads of households with significant power over their families, which led to the development of the family state, or *kazoku kokka*, in which members of each *ie* were deeply loyal to the family, which was in turn limitlessly loyal to the Emperor.⁹ The government promoted this system, as they were able to successfully portray loyalty to the Emperor as an extension of loyalty to one's family.¹⁰ While the *ie* was abolished as a legal unit in the 1947 constitution, the government and the elites continued to promote it as a form of social control.¹¹

The Japanese people were also raised to believe that they owed the Emperor, who was cast in the role of caring father, god, and supreme commander, complete loyalty until death.¹² Together, these factors created the

⁶ Yukio Satoh, "The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy," *Adelphi Papers* 178 (1982): 2.

⁷ Hughes, *Japan's Remilitarisation*, 22.

⁸ Sheldon Garon, "State and Family in Modern Japan: A Historical Perspective," *Economy and Society* 39, no. 3 (2010): 317.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 318.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Meirion Harries and Susie Harries, *Sheathing the Sword: the Demilitarization of Japan*, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987): 8.

perfect conditions for widespread militarism. Additionally, the education system carefully crafted by the government was successful in churning out thousands of graduates who expounded the importance of allegiance to one's employer and government, and yet had very low expectations of quality of life as workers.¹³ These carefully moulded masses also had little or no conception of the differentiation between public and private life, and were willing to surveil their fellow workers in order to ensure that no one stepped out of line.¹⁴

The military was successful in engaging every aspect of society in its campaign against America.¹⁵ While Washington was keeping tabs on the growing military power of a State with which it once had a tenuous and largely superficial relationship, it was not until the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941 that Americans were fully aware of the force that Japan was willing to wield against them.¹⁶

The Plan for Japan

The United States did not wait until surrender was imminent to begin designing the post-war Japan. While it is true that the Americans waited over two years from the declaration of war to engage, they were confident, once they did mobilize, that victory would be guaranteed.¹⁷ It took the U.S. only a matter of months after declaring war against the Japanese to take it upon themselves to plan the way in which they would mould the island nation once they had successfully defeated it

¹³ Ibid, 5.

¹⁴ Ibid, 4.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Iokibe, "Japan Meets the United States for the Second Time," 91.

¹⁷ Harries and Harries, *Sheathing the Sword*, 11.

in battle.¹⁸ They struggled with the question of what role they wished Japan to ultimately play in the international community once they remodelled it. Washington identified three possible options. They could flatten Japan to a pre-industrialized version of itself, neutralize it forever by removing all military capabilities, or set up the state as a future ally of the U.S. in the Pacific.¹⁹

The option they ultimately chose was a combination, for although the Allied forces decided not only to eliminate all existing weapons, but also the infrastructure to create weapons in the future, they nevertheless managed to successfully create a political and economic relationship that turned Japan into a force on the international stage and an ally in a region that was in a state of constant change.²⁰

The Occupation itself was unique in that none of the major islands that compose Japan had yet been invaded, and their standing army remained roughly three million strong.²¹ It was also singular in that never before had a country that was limitedly invaded at the time of surrender been so thoroughly occupied after the fact.²² The Allied forces, led by the United States, infiltrated every corner of Japan, tearing down militaristic institutions and imposing ideals of democratization. The plan that US policy-makers had created for Japan included promoting democracy, fostering local autonomy through a decentralized system of government, supporting the rights of workers and unions, and handing power to the people, particularly women.²³

¹⁸ Ibid, 11.

¹⁹ Ibid, 12.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid, 23.

²² Iokibe, "Japan Meets the United States for the Second Time," 93.

²³ Ibid, 95.

The primary tool the Allied Occupation used to sculpt Japan was the rewriting of the Japanese constitution, the existing version of which had been drafted in the Meiji Period, and thereby the elimination of all the seeds of militarism from the building blocks of the society.²⁴ Article 9 of the new document came to be known as the peace clause.²⁵ Through this article, the Japanese people renounced the sovereign right to wage war, as well as the right to use either force or the threat of force as a means of settling disputes.²⁶ The new constitution, though enforced by a foreign power, was successful in establishing a new state that shied away from militancy and unnecessary force in both domestic and international settings.²⁷

Outside of the drafting of the new constitution, American policy-makers had the opportunity to completely reset all of Japanese society. They chose instead, along with their destruction of the Japanese war machine, to utilize selective violence in order to control the population as a whole, for more often than not, simply the threat of violence was enough to ensure compliance.²⁸

The mandate of the Occupation approved of the kidnapping of civilians for tactical purposes in areas where the troops were not satisfactorily embraced, but the most poignant violence that was used, though it was very limited, was the execution of those, both military and civilian, who had run the country during WWII.²⁹

²⁴ Kazuhiko Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy 1945-2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy*, (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2005): 38.

²⁵ Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan, Ballistic Missile Defence, and Remilitarization," *Space Policy* 29 (2013): 128.

²⁶ Satoh, "The Evolution of the Japanese Security Policy," 1.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Willard-Foster, "Planning the Peace and Enforcing the Surrender," 55.

²⁹ Ibid, 33.

This choice, which was viewed as leniency by many, occurred due to the fact that the Americans did not wish to bring down the government. General Douglas MacArthur, the man tasked with the reconstruction of Japan, intended to play a background role in the endeavour, and therefore required a certain amount of cooperation from the Japanese people in order to be successful.³⁰ One of the most important decisions made in this regard, as a measure to ensure compliance at the time and to prevent future uprisings, was the choice to maintain the imperial line in Japan.

The Emperor and the Post-War Uncertainty

The role of the Emperor in the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the ensuing violence and terror between 1941 and 1945 remains unclear to this day. While it is certain that many acts of war were carried out in his name, the amount he as a man did to incite violence, or conversely, measures he took to prevent violence on the part of his citizens is largely lost to history.³¹ The reason for this gap in knowledge is that before and after the Japanese surrendered, one of their top priorities in their relationship with the U.S. became to protect not only the life of the current Emperor, but also the right to maintain the imperial line going forward.³²

This was largely due to the fact that the role of the Emperor in the mythology of Japan, as a direct descendent of a single imperial line, was a historical rallying point for the Japanese people.³³ Even on August 10th, 1945, just one day after the second atomic bomb in the course of three days had been dropped on this

³⁰ Hyoe Murakami, *Japan: The Trial Years 1919-52*, (Tokyo; New York: Kodansha International, 1983): 194.

³¹ Harries and Harries, *Sheathing the Sword*, 1.

³² *Ibid*, 2.

³³ *Ibid*, 6.

country, decimating two cities, the Japanese government announced to the U.S. that they were willing to surrender only under the condition that the post-war measures taken against the country did nothing to jeopardize the Emperor, either the man himself or the station he held in Japan.³⁴ There was, however, no consensus amongst the Allied leaders in terms of how he should be punished, and therefore this attempt at a conditional surrender was unsuccessful. While the British and the Soviets wanted him to be tried and executed on war crimes, MacArthur and the American administration fought to target solely military leaders.³⁵

This decision was partially a strategic one, but was also based on MacArthur's initial impression of Emperor Hirohito. A few weeks after MacArthur set up his offices, Hirohito paid him an unexpected visit. While the General was expecting this man, who had been the face of his enemy for three years, to come begging for his life, the Emperor instead told MacArthur that he alone could be held wholly responsible for the actions of his subjects, a fact that MacArthur could punish as he saw fit.³⁶ The Emperor had come, in reality, to plead the case of his people, who were slowly starving to death. He told the General to dispatch of his own assets and the assets of the imperial family in a way that would feed his subjects.³⁷ This humility on the part of the Emperor aided the decision that saved his life.

Rather than put an end to the imperial line, the Occupation forces chose instead to strip the position of the majority of its powers through the first article of the constitution, which reads as follows: "The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the

³⁴ Michael D. Gorbun, *Five Days in August: How WWII Became a Nuclear War* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 36.

³⁵ Murakami, *Japan: The Trial Years*, 197.

³⁶ *Ibid*, 196.

³⁷ *Ibid*.

people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power".³⁸ Ultimately, without a formal investigation into the role of the Emperor in the violence of WWII, the blame for the violence which occurred was placed on the shoulders of several members of the military branch of the government, as well as a few civilian leaders.³⁹

This intense protective rallying around the Emperor occurred despite the fact that many Japanese people, particularly soldiers, blamed the Emperor and his advisors for what they believed to be an unnecessary surrender.⁴⁰ The imperial advisors were labelled as defeatists and there were accusations that the Emperor was too easily manipulated.⁴¹ As the Allied troops took over Japan, there were ritual suicides all over the country, as well as those who withdrew into the countryside to continue the fight against the Western oppressors.⁴²

Demilitarization in the Cold War and Beyond

After seven years of occupation and a security treaty, the U.S. had successfully created a state that was so averse to militarism that it was unlikely it would ever again engage in warfare.⁴³ The generation that had lived through WWII, particularly those who had been in Japan for the decimation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were unable to separate in their minds the value of force

³⁸ Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy*, 42.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Harries and Harries, *Sheathing the Sword*, 24.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Linus Hagström and Jon Williamsson, "Remilitarization, Really? Assessing Change in Japanese Foreign Security Policy," *Asian Security* 5, no. 3 (2009): 259.

when used sparingly from their memories of war.⁴⁴ The newly created, American-approved, history curriculum was teaching Japanese children to feel remorse for the actions of their people.⁴⁵ The result was an almost complete turn to pacifism on the part of the government, which continued to live in the shadow of the aggressive policies of those who had come before them.⁴⁶ As a state, they largely turned inwards in an effort to rebuild their country and their economy, a task at which they were successful.⁴⁷

The pillar of peace in the Pacific, however, was no longer the role that the U.S. wished for Japan to play. As tensions rose between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and the Cold War escalated, the U.S. hoped to find a military ally in Japan, a country that lay so close to their enemy.⁴⁸ Instead, they found a country that was perfectly happy to let the U.S. continue utilizing their military bases in Okinawa, but had little else to contribute to the cause.⁴⁹ Even as the Soviets advanced, placing their military bases on islands that the Japanese claimed as their own, the Japanese government took no steps to defend their territorial claims, both because they did not have the military capability to do so and because they did not wish to break with their newly established pacifism.⁵⁰

The one action the Japanese government took, which many deemed contrary to the ideals outlined in the Occupation Constitution, was the creation of the

⁴⁴ Satoh, "The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy," 5.

⁴⁵ Alexander Bukh, "Japan's History Textbooks Debate: National Identities in Narratives of Victimhood and Victimization," *Asian Survey* 47, no. 5 (2007): 684.

⁴⁶ Hagström and Williamsson, "Remilitarization, Really?," 242.

⁴⁷ Robert E. Osgood, *Japan and the United States in Asia*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1968): 2.

⁴⁸ Satoh, "The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy," 7.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF), which occurred at the outbreak of the Korean War.⁵¹ There were some within Japan who were concerned that this step marked the beginning of a return to militarism.⁵² Others pointed out that the peace clause in the constitution only limited external force, and did not deal with issues of self-defence in case of attack from an outside source.⁵³ Japan, however, needed to be cautious when developing any capability of force, as the countries surrounding it, particularly China, were likely to have a strong counter-reaction to any indication that Japan was approaching the possibility of remilitarization.⁵⁴

Since the Cold War, Japan has maintained its security relationship with the U.S. During the early years of the anti-terrorism wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Japanese Marine Self-Defense Force provided tactical support from the Indian Ocean.⁵⁵ This continued until 2005 when Japan elected a Prime Minister who called it home, due to the fact that the new leader utilized a more conservative interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution.⁵⁶

Conclusion

The imposition of pacifism by foreign forces on the state of Japan was embraced and maintained with unexpected fervour and fanaticism by the Japanese people. This fanaticism echoes the passion and loyalty with which the Japanese war machine operated. The continued promotion of the *ie* by the government,

⁵¹ Ibid, 2.

⁵² Hagström and Williamsson, “‘Remilitarization,’ Really?,” 259.

⁵³ Satoh, “The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy,” 2.

⁵⁴ Hughes, “Japan, Ballistic Missile Defence, and Remilitarisation,” 128.

⁵⁵ Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarization*, 11.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 12.

despite its removal as a legal unit, encouraged the Japanese people to maintain a deep-seated allegiance to their families, the edicts of their government, and the Emperor, all of whom were expounding the virtues of pacifism.

Going forward, the future of militarization in Japan is contingent on either the reinterpretation or the rewriting of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. The possibility of this occurring, however, has created deep debates within Japanese society. As the generations which remember the War age and pass away, and the younger generations become a larger proportion of the voters, public approval of the SDF and general openness to the possibility of remilitarization increase.⁵⁷ Japan, however, is still in a state of limbo, in which the future of remilitarization is uncertain. Although located in a geographically precarious area in which the growth of military capabilities would likely be beneficial, both to the state and to its American allies, the deeply embedded ideals of pacifism remain an important and determinative aspect of Japanese society.

With the constitution and the embedded sense of hierarchy and loyalty as the dual foundations, the Allied forces successfully reshaped Japan into such a deep state of demilitarization that, over sixty years later, not even the power of the White House is able to bring Japan to the decision to reengage the militarism that has lain silent for so many decades.

⁵⁷ Satoh, "The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy," 5.

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**THE ECONOMY
UNDER ABE AND
LOOKING AHEAD:**

Economy, Business, and Technology

**L'ÉCONOMIE SOUS
ABE ET À L'AVENIR:**

L'Économie, les Affaires, et la Technologie

Abenomics and the Re-Emergence of Japan: A Start

Bernard M. Wolf

This presentation analyzes the three essential ingredients of Abenomics (the “Three Arrows”) and their impact. For Abenomics to be successful, the third arrow, structural reform, is the most important, but also the most difficult to implement. The third arrow is described by *The Economist* magazine as follows: “Part of its strength is its breadth: it is less a single arrow than a thousand strong bundle of acupuncture needles”.¹ Basically, Japan, with its rapidly aging and declining population, requires a large number of structural reforms in a whole host of areas.

In the ‘60s, ‘70s, and ‘80s, Japan was the envy of the world (sometimes referred to as Japan Inc.). In the ‘60s, there was growth of 10%, in the ‘70s there was growth of 5%, and in the ‘80s there was growth of 4%. Japan was the home of advanced manufacturing. It introduced the world to the concept of “lean manufacturing,” for example, the Toyota Production System, which is analyzed in *The Machine that Changed the World*.²

Today Japan is the world’s third-largest economy and fourth-leading exporter. It has advanced technological know-how in some sectors, a formidable manufacturing base, a world-class infrastructure, and a large and affluent consumer market.

The current appearance of economic success comes after Japan lost two decades following the Asset Bubble collapse in the early 1990s. In those two decades there was chronic deflation and very low economic growth.

¹ *The Economist*, June 28, 2014.

² James Womack, D. Jones, and D. Roos, *The Machine that Changed the World: The Story of Lean Production*, (New York: HarperCollins, 1991).

Overall productivity growth has stalled well below 2 percent for much of the past 20 years. The labour productivity gap with the United States and other major advanced economies has been widening across most industries. Even Japan's advanced manufacturing industries lag behind the comparable US and German sectors in labour productivity by almost one-third. A continuation of current trends would lead to annual GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth of only 1.3 percent through 2025, which is extremely low!

One of the most important problems facing Japan is the huge demographic challenge, namely the ageing and shrinking population. Japan is the world's oldest country and in fact, the population began to decline in 2011. If the current nationwide fertility rate of 1.4 and the close to 0 net immigration continue unchanged, Japan's population of 127 million will drop almost a third by 2060 and two-thirds by 2110. Additionally, Japan has one of the world's longest life expectancies. In 2013, a quarter of the population was age 65 or older; by 2040, that share will rise to more than one-third. In 2014, Japan's dependency ratio reached 77%, meaning that it took 100 working age people to take care of 77 non-working age people. Less workers means a lower GDP, lower household purchasing power, lower investment, etc. It will also lead to a shortage of skills. The higher health and social security expenditures will create increased government fiscal pressures.

The "Three Arrows" of Abenomics (Structural Reforms, Fiscal Stimulus, and Monetary Easing) are seen as a method of addressing Japan's economic issues. Two of the "Three Arrows," monetary easing and fiscal stimulus, essentially jump start the economy, but structural reform is required to sustain the momentum. These structural reforms face strong headwinds from entrenched interests which have long benefitted from the various rigidities.

Monetary easing consists primarily of aggressive monetary easing, or quantitative easing (QE), whereby the Bank of Japan purchases monetary assets in exchange for newly printed money at the rate of ¥80T (\$700B) per year. This can be compared with the strategy of the Federal Reserve of the United States, which, beginning in September 2012, launched a round of quantitative easing (QE3) during which it purchased \$1T worth of monetary assets. Japan has tried this type of solution before, but this time may show better results. Fiscal stimulus was provided by means of a lower corporate income tax rate, but at the expense of a hike in the consumption tax. The difficulty of using very aggressive fiscal stimulus is the government debt, which is greater than twice the national GDP and far exceeds that of other industrialized countries.

The achievements of Abenomics can be expressed in numbers. Since the start of the Abe administration on December 26, 2012, the Japanese economy has been on a gradual recovery trend. Equity prices (75% increase by February 2015), exchange rates (yen-dollar exchange rate climbed from 85.15 to 118.95 by early 2015), unemployment rate (declined from 4.3 to 3.3% in two years), and business conditions all look more favorable.

However, there were negative short-term effects on the Japanese economy from the consumption tax hike (5% to 8%). The real GDP growth rate fell into the negatives in April-September. Another increase in the tax to 10% has been postponed to April 2017.

With continued yen depreciation (currently around 120 yen to one dollar), exports in the October-December 2014 quarter increased by 2.7% from the previous quarter and there has been an increase in corporate earnings. Reductions in corporate tax beginning in 2015 will accelerate the motivation to invest. Consumer sentiment has been improving since

December 2014 and there are signs of a recent resurgence in consumer spending.

The impact of yen depreciation is significant. It expands exports, reduces imports, increases production of import competing goods, encourages domestic and foreign investment, and stimulates economic growth. It also increases the profits of efficient firms and results in price increases which can reduce deflation. Furthermore, it encourages companies to raise wages (they are competing in a tight labour market) and induces more women and seniors into the labour market. Finally, the rise in equity markets promotes a wealth effect which stimulates consumer spending. Essentially, it leads to a virtuous circle instead of a vicious circle.

The oil price shock is a big bonus for Japan since all energy is imported, given the shutting down of nuclear generators. It reduces costs of production and transportation, and increases household purchasing power.

Recently, pension funds have begun to shift away from domestic bonds. The Government Pension Investment Fund and three smaller public pension funds (totalling \$1.3T) are changing their asset allocation to 50% equity. They have set allocation targets of 25 percent each for Japanese and overseas equities, up from 12 percent. They have also boosted foreign bonds to 15 percent from 11 percent, and cut local debt to 35 percent from 60 percent. Alternative investments can make up as much as 5 percent of holdings. These initiatives promote higher equity prices in Japan and greater returns for the pension funds.

Now let us return to the third arrow of Abenomics. As already stated, *The Economist* described the third arrow as follows: “Part of its strength is its breadth: it is less a single arrow than a 1,000-strong bundle of acupuncture needles.”

With Abenomics, we have seen limited accelerated structural reforms and deregulation in some sectors of the Japanese economy. In the energy sector, Abenomics launched the first fundamental reform in 60 years, including opening up the electricity market to small retailers and allowing non-Japanese companies to enter the business (from 2016). This has and will lead to a further boost in competition for retail electricity.

In the areas of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, structural reform has come in the form of accelerating integration of farmlands as agriculture moves from part-time family business to larger scale operations. The reforms have also supported proprietors in agriculture, forestry, and fishery in expanding businesses to include processing, distribution, and sales. Structural reform also encourages companies in other industries to enter agriculture-related businesses. A third major area affected by structural reform is the medical care sector. In November 2013, a reform to commercialize regenerative medicine was enacted. Furthermore, Abenomics introduced an early ratification system for drugs (reduction of the waiting period for ratification from 7 years to 2 or 3 years) and supports the cultivation and processing of cells to be outsourced to external parties.

Accelerated structural reforms and deregulation in Japan have also resulted in the inauguration of National Strategic Special Zones, which are created for carrying out bold regulatory reforms in the fields of medical care, agriculture, employment, etc. Six areas were initially specified. Yabu City, Hyogo was specified as a center for agricultural reform in hilly and mountainous areas, Fukuoka City as a center for employment system reform to promote new businesses, Okinawa as a center for international tourism, and Niigata City as a center for agricultural reform in large-scale farming. Furthermore, the Osaka/Kyoto/Hyogo Area was specified as a center

for international innovation in the field of medical care and general support. Finally, the Tokyo Area (including Kanagawa and Chiba) was specified as an international business and innovation hub, notably regarding urban development, employment guidelines, and medical care for foreigners.

In addition, Abenomics aims to double the stock of Inward Foreign Investment by 2020. This is expected to stimulate competition and bring Japan new ways of doing business, renewed innovation, and new technologies, as well as help it integrate into global supply chains thereby increasing productivity.

In the area of international trade, Japan is pursuing membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement. Previously protected sectors will be open to more competition in a variety of areas and will require structural changes in the spirit of those already mentioned and which may be easier politically to implement as part of a trade agreement package rather than as individual changes. The Agreement also means that new markets will be opened for Japanese exports. Japan already has 15 FTAs (Free Trade Agreements), but all with relatively small countries.

Another key initiative to raise the growth rate of the Japanese economy is to increase the labour supply by encouraging greater labour force participation (women, the elderly, and increased immigration). In order to achieve a labour force increase, there are several strategies in place. One is to raise female labour force participation in the 25–44 age range to about 80 percent by 2040, from 71 percent now, thus narrowing the gap with the United States and Germany and bringing two million additional women into the workforce. Another strategy aimed toward women is to increase the proportion of females in upper management and to reduce the wage gap between women and men. The labour force could also be enlarged if Japan keeps the

elderly working longer by raising the retirement age. Additionally, the government must emphasize labour-saving technologies and organization, as well as consider an increase in immigration.

There are also other potential fixes to the labour market. Japan's longstanding lifetime employment model has contributed to low productivity and consequently legal strictures around lifetime employment have mostly been lifted, making the labour market more flexible in theory. But downsizing is viewed negatively in practice, producing inefficient bureaucracies that lack agility as it is costly to fire regular employees. Workers, too, are reluctant to advance their careers by changing employers, which limits their incentive to develop new skills. In addition, allowing temporary workers, or *haken*, has given flexibility, but at the same time, firms have little incentive to invest in these employees. To combat this, the government can try to encourage changes in attitude and practices.

The educational system requires change for the next generation. Through it, Japan can encourage entrepreneurship, critical thinking, experimentation, and innovation. There should be greater links between schools and industry and the system ought to question traditional ways of doing things. For example, more emphasis ought to be placed on merit rather than seniority. Education can also help the next generation learn about other cultures and the way economies/businesses are organized elsewhere, thereby fostering a 'global mindset'.

A recent Report by the McKinsey Global Institute, *The Future of Japan: Reigniting Productivity and Growth*, aims to explain how a private-sector transformation could revive Japan. The Report suggests that “[C]ompanies have multiple avenues for growing revenues and finding deeper operational efficiencies. These strategies fall into three main categories: adopting global best practices,

deploying next-generation technologies, and organizing for discipline and performance”.³ Such initiatives will generate a more competitive landscape, question accepted (traditional) practices and attitudes, and give cause to think in terms of flexibility rather than rigidity. According to the Report, around one-third of the productivity potential can be captured within four sectors; advanced manufacturing (as companies become more like Toyota, Honda, Denso, and Fanuc), retail, financial services, and health care. I highly recommend the Report for a more in-depth analysis of what Japan needs to reignite its economy.

Abenomics offers promise for lifting the Japanese economy out of stagnation. Much will depend on the success of the structural reforms that form that third arrow.

³ Georges Desvaux, Jonathan Woetzel, Tasuku Kuwabara, Michael Chui, Asta Fjeldsted, and Salvador Guzman-Herrera, *The Future of Japan: Reigniting Productivity and Growth*, March 2015.

The Toyota Way

John-Paul Farag

I'm part of the advanced technology and powertrain group at Toyota Canada and we are tasked with looking at technologies that are coming into the market that are relatively new. Preparing the market, preparing consumers, preparing our dealers, and really trying to educate as many stakeholders as we can. This opportunity allows us to share what we see coming down the pipelines and what it all means, not only for Toyota, but also for the economy in general. So my goal is really to give the perspective of a Japanese company as kind of a complement to the really broad explanation we've just heard.

What I want to do today is give a brief outline about Toyota in Canada, what our footprint looks like here, both from the sales and manufacturing sides and then touch a bit on the Toyota Way, our guiding principles, what makes us who we are as a company, and how we do business. Then I'll speak a little bit about the motivating factors for these new technologies: why are we investing so much energy and so many resources into developing these new technologies, not just from the perspective of the automotive sector specifically, but also as it expands beyond.

We'll also touch a bit on the technology specifically. Not to get too bogged down in the technical details, but we will touch on the types of technologies we are bringing to market, everything from hybrids to hydrogen fuel cells. Then we'll look at what we're doing outside of the vehicle dimension as I mentioned, beyond the automotive scope, in which Toyota is doing a lot, though it might not necessarily be obvious to a lot of people.

We are celebrating our 50th year in Canada this year. When we started operating in Canada we had 48 dealerships across the country, we sold two models, and we sold that first year a grand total of 755 vehicles. So we have come a long way since then. In 1983 we established our first manufacturing operation in Capton, British Columbia, which makes aluminum wheels. It actually opened in 1985, the same year that Toyota announced plans to build an auto-assembly plant in Cambridge, Ontario. The first car from that plant, the Toyota Corolla, rolled off the production line November 30th, 1988, and is actually still on display in Cambridge at the Toyota manufacturing plant. So if you are ever there on a tour you will see it on display in the atrium.

Now as one of two manufacturers from Japan, we have worked very hard to establish ourselves in Canada. We have developed a network now of over 300 Toyota, Lexus, and Scion dealers from coast to coast. We have established all the support systems for those dealers, from vehicle and parts marketing and distribution to financial services, sales, and training. Our own operations and those of our dealers employ thousands of Canadians directly and help maintain thousands of additional jobs at our partners and suppliers. We've also created a cold weather testing centre in Timmons, Ontario and, as I mentioned, the wheel manufacturing operation in British Columbia. Both have global mandates, so again, expanding beyond just the Canadian market.

And, as I mentioned, we also built assembly sites. We have two in Ontario; one in Cambridge and one in Woodstock. Cambridge has been operational for more than 25 years now, while Woodstock, which was the first green field assembly plant in Canada, officially opened for business 7 years ago. These plants build four Toyota models and a Lexus luxury vehicle as well. They

employ thousands of Canadians in well-paid, high-skilled positions. TMMC (Toyota Motor Manufacturing Canada) was the only assembly plant in the country to build both a battery-electric hybrid vehicle and a full electric vehicle. The vehicles we build in Canada account for almost 50% of our Canadian sales. Equally important, our plants are net exporters of vehicles. So the majority of vehicles we build in Canada are sold into the United States.

That gives a brief outline of Toyota in Canada but we have to ask ourselves “how did Toyota as a global company evolve from a company that began making automatic fabric looms into a global manufacturer of vehicles and a leader in the development of advanced technology, both within and beyond the automotive sector?” Toyota’s methods and our philosophies continue to be studied even today and it is these concepts that have really guided Toyota over the years.¹

These precepts are the foundation of what has made Toyota not only a successful Japanese company but also a successful global and Canadian company. They have been handed down over generations and they remain the basic management philosophy for global Toyota operations. They have a simple, timeless message: it emphasizes teamwork, respect for people, and continuous improvement. The Toyota precepts continue even today to guide the company as we grow and transform with the times.

¹ 1) Be contributive to the development and welfare of the country by working together, regardless of position, in faithfully fulfilling your duties

2) Be at the vanguard of the times through endless creativity, inquisitiveness and pursuit of improvement

3) Be practical and avoid frivolity

4) Be kind and generous, strive to create a warm, homelike atmosphere

5) Be reverent, and show gratitude for things great and small in thought and deed

From the Toyota precepts emerged what we call the “Toyota Way.” The Toyota Way really outlines the concepts that make up the foundation of the pillars of our business philosophies. Challenge is one, and that is really to challenge us, to stretch us, and develop us, to creatively reach our goals. *Kaizen*, which I am sure many of you have heard is Japanese for “continuous improvement,” is essentially the systematic problem-solving that never ends, a continuous cycle, where there is always room for improvement. Respect, starts with a respect for people, but is also a commitment to the development of our team members, because at Toyota we recognize that our people are our only appreciating assets. Teamwork is built on that: to take highly developed individuals and have them work together towards a common goal. And finally, what we call *Genchi Genbutsu*, which is Japanese for “go and see,” encourages all of us to go to the source and observe to truly understand the actual situation as opposed to hearing it second-hand.

The Toyota Way overall affects every aspect of our company. It impacts every decision we make as a business, including why and how we develop new products and technologies to bring to market.

That brings us to the motivation that is pushing us to develop these new technologies. I think that everyone in this room could probably agree that the development of the automobile of the past hundred years has had a dramatic impact on human civilization. It has allowed mobility on a grand scale. Today there are about 900 million vehicles around the world and every year that number grows by about 20 million. So we at Toyota have to take the long-term view and see how we can continue to provide mobility to the growing number of drivers and consumers. But to do so we have to plan ahead of time. For some companies, 3-5 years or 5-10

years might be long-term, but at Toyota we are talking anywhere from 20-50 years.

We are really taking that view and looking to see how we can continue to provide these options but do it in a sustainable way. As an automaker we have identified three major environmental challenges that we have to work with. One is the need to work to reduce carbon emissions and greenhouse gases that cause global warming. The second is the need to continue to deal with smog-forming emissions. These are different emissions, which do not necessarily cause global warming, but which do affect the quality of the air that we breathe, especially in busy urban centers. The third challenge is the need to reduce oil consumption and to look for different, diverse sources of energy that we can use to power new technologies.

This kind of gives you a brief glimpse or outline of why there is a need for action right now. Energy demand in the next hundred years is projected to triple what it is today. Although we are going to see renewable energy sources make up a larger portion of that supply, it will not be enough in the initial stages to meet that demand. As a result, you are going to see things like coal and petroleum consumption significantly intensified in the future.

From an automotive company's perspective, finding new energy sources for the technology is only one part of the equation. We need to develop advanced technologies that can improve the actual efficiency of the vehicles, regardless of what type of fuel that we are using. That is why we began development of our Toyota Hybrid Synergy drive. A lot of people think that hybrids are a more recent development, but Toyota actually started working on these several decades ago. We debuted our very first hybrid vehicle at the 1967 Tokyo motor show. But it was not until more recent advancements in engine-computer controls and power

electronics that we were able to commercialize the technology.

I will not get into exactly how a hybrid works in too much detail, but the goal of the hybrid system is to draw on the benefits of two unique power traits. So you have your traditional engine with a gasoline tank, but you also have an electric motor which is powered by a battery on board. Using the two systems together allows drivers to enjoy the benefits of each one while compensating for the downsides of the other. It really is a true synergy and that hints at why we named this the Hybrid Synergy Drive. But the result is a very clean, very quiet, very spirited drive using less fuel, producing fewer emissions, and simultaneously improving performance, which is key. The best part is that the driver does not have to change their driving habits at all. They drive the vehicle, they refuel, and they maintain the vehicle, just like any other conventional car. And we believe that this familiarity is one of the key reasons why hybrids have been so successful since they have been introduced.

Since we launched the first Prius in Japan in 1997, we have witnessed the technology become mainstream. That technology we debuted in Japan is now in Canada and here we sell 11 models. We have sold over 7 million hybrids around the world, including over 100,000 units here in Canada. In fact, last year every two out of three hybrids sold in the country were either Toyota or Lexus.

Contrary to what you may hear, hybrids are not simply a bridge technology or a temporary stopgap until something better comes along. They really do provide a platform upon which new advanced technology powertrains are being built. What I mean is that hybrid technology is both scalable, meaning it works in very different classes of vehicles (anything from subcompacts, to midsize, to SUVs, to luxury performance vehicles), and flexible enough to work on different powertrain designs. So it is not just gasoline

engines that work with the electric motors. You can have different architectures.

You may have been seeing lately what we call the three latest automotive technologies to hit the market. They're really all variations of hybrid technology. They all share common components, common architectures. First are the plugin hybrid vehicles, which are similar to hybrid vehicles. They both have gasoline power and electric power, but they have larger batteries, you are able to plug the vehicle in, drive short trips on electric power, and have that gasoline as a reserve in case you want to drive further distances. Then you have electric vehicles, which are only half of a hybrid, but still use similar components such as electric motors, batteries, and power controls.

There are some challenges with that technology of course. And now you are starting to hear more and more about hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, which I will touch on in just a few seconds and which are also built on a hybrid platform. What that means for Toyota is that because of our experience and our knowledge of hybrid technology we have really been able to position ourselves well to continue to develop and improve these other powertrain technologies as they become more commercially viable.

One particular powertrain technology which is getting quite a bit of attention these days is the hydrogen fuel cell vehicle. Toyota recently announced that we will be launching our first commercially-available hydrogen fuel cell vehicle, the Toyota Mirai, in select regions around the world this year. Now *mirai* is the Japanese word for "future," which is an appropriate name for this vehicle because Toyota truly believes that we are at a turning point in automotive history and that the Mirai represents the future of sustainable mobility.

You may ask yourself, "what makes hydrogen such a promising fuel versus all of the other technologies that

are emerging?” There are a few reasons. Hydrogen fuel cell vehicles are 100% electric vehicles and produce zero emissions. To give some brief background, how they basically work is that you have hydrogen in the tank and when that hydrogen mixes with the oxygen from the air in the fuel cell there is a chemical reaction that creates electricity. You can then use that clean electricity to power your electric motor. So it is essentially an electric vehicle but the source of the electricity is different: it is not coming from the battery, but from a chemical reaction in the fuel cell using hydrogen gas. The only thing that comes out of the tailpipe is water vapour, so it is 100% emissions free.

But unlike most of today’s plugin battery electric vehicles, which have limited driving range, the Mirai can travel almost 500km on a single tank of hydrogen. So it is very much on par with what you are used to in a conventional vehicle. And while plugin electric vehicles can take several hours to charge, the Mirai can refuel in as little as three minutes, which is again very similar to what people are used to. And as we touched on earlier, we think that the success of hybrids is because they are very familiar. And we think that the success of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles really depends on how familiar we can make them to people who are driving vehicles. It makes it more likely for them to be willing to adopt the technology and makes a much easier transition into a new type of fuel.

The fuel itself, hydrogen, can be made from a variety of sources including many clean, renewable energy sources. And because there is now an abundance of clean electric energy available on board the car in the Mirai, it can be used to provide backup power, such as backup electricity to power a home in case of emergencies for up to a week. So you are starting to see these additional side benefits that people may not have thought about before the actual technology started to

hit the road. And that's the kind of innovation we promote at Toyota, which is what people have come to expect from a company that originated in a country known for its technological innovation.

With all these benefits then you ask yourself: "Are fuel cells too good to be true? Is there a catch?" Well, like any new technology, it is not without its challenges. The most obvious one is the need for a hydrogen fuel infrastructure to support the widespread deployment of these vehicles. And while at Toyota we can bring the vehicles to market, it takes a significant amount of collaboration between automakers, government regulators, energy providers, and other stakeholders to really build a dependable and convenient network of fueling stations.

The good news is that that progress is already being made in many regions around the world. Many countries already have a limited number of stations in operation and have plans to expand that network in the coming years. While we are still in the early stages of infrastructure development here in Canada, already you are starting to see discussions happening and programs put in place to support the eventual spread of this technology. So in Canada we do have a long road ahead of us but the important thing is that progress is happening. So we are going to continue to work hard and work with our partners to hopefully make that technology something that will happen and that will help in the future.

The question often arises of how Toyota decides what technology to develop. Is it a gamble on one versus another? The truth is, we believe that there is a role for each technology in the future of mobility. But one common theme that overshadows all of them is that there is definite electrification of the automobile. It has already begun with the widespread adoption of hybrid technology, and it is continuing with plugin

hybrids, with battery electric vehicles, and, as we have just seen, hydrogen fuel cells. The key though is to build the right car for the right place at the right time. That is kind of a mantra we always follow at Toyota. It is important to choose the right technology for a specific application. For larger vehicles that travel longer distances, fuel cells are a great option. Gas-electric hybrids or plugin hybrids are great choices for conventional-type vehicles. And battery electric vehicles are ideal for short distances, maybe small urban community-type vehicles.

Some of you may have had the opportunity to see the Toyota i-Road at the Toronto auto show just last month. It is a personal mobility device that combines the convenience and the maneuverability of a motorcycle with the comfort and the safety of a car. It is fully electric, can seat two people, and travels about 50km on a single charge. The i-Road is already being tested in several car-sharing programs in Japan and in Grenoble, France. While this type of vehicle certainly will not meet the needs of every customer, it does represent the way that Toyota is thinking outside the box when it comes to mobility options.

The truth is that today's commute times are ever-increasing. The Toronto Board of Trade issued a report recently that ranked several Canadian cities among the worst in North America for transportation, congestion, and commute times. More congestion means more pollution, more time and resources wasted, and a higher potential for accidents. This congestion, along with all the environmental challenges that we have discussed already, really forces us as automakers to rethink how we can continue to provide mobility to people all over the world but in a way that is much more efficient. We often take inspiration from nature around us. We see things like flocks of birds and schools of fish that can move in dense packs with great speed and not run into

each other, and we take this inspiration and turn it into innovation.

Now, mobility does not just mean driving to a destination, although that is what comes to mind much of the time. For many people, mobility just means very simple human mobility, which can be a challenge. And that is why at Toyota we are also developing what we call partner robots. And I think that some of you were waiting for that. Of course there's a link between Japan and robots, but those we are working on at Toyota are a bit more specialized.

With an aging population, especially, as you have already heard, in areas like Japan, Toyota believes that we can help improve people's mobility, independence, and quality of life by relying on highly advanced technologies. So we have our human support robot, which operates by voice command or by a tablet. It can pick up objects, suction up thin objects, retrieve objects from high locations, open curtains, and perform other household tasks. We have our Walk Assist robot, which assists a person who has lost the use of a leg and which is attached to the leg to help the user walk more securely and more naturally. And we have Robina, which is designed to provide medical and nursing care or perform housework. It is able to think and move for itself, carry and move objects, and even converse with people.

Just this week, Hirobo, one of two robots Toyota is working on, received two Guinness World Records; one for being the first companion robot in space (it arrived on the International Space Station with the Japanese astronauts in August 2013), and the other for being the robot to have a conversation at the highest altitude (414km above sea level in December 2013). For Hirobo, the main goal is to see how well robots and humans can interact, hopefully leading the way to robots taking a

more active role, not just in assisting astronauts on missions, but in everyday life as well.

Toyota spends \$1 million every hour of every day, 365 days a year, on research and development. We do that because of the work which has led us to continuously improve our vehicles and powertrains, but also because of the work that helps us to lead the industry in the development of things like intelligent transportation systems, autonomous vehicle technology, plugin hybrid and electric cars, hydrogen fuel cell cars, personal mobility devices like the i-Road, and advanced robotics as we have just seen. Since its beginnings as a Japanese company making automatic fabric looms, Toyota has always been a company that looks forward to the future and tries to make things better. And we will continue to innovate new ways to bring sustainable mobility to people all over the world.

It's good to see the macro view of what is happening in the economy, but also to see some examples of what that is turning into in real life. So I hope this has given you a bit of insight into the type of technology just one Japanese-global company is working on.

Under-acknowledged Heroines of the Japanese Economic Miracle

Odmaa Sod-Erdene

Introduction

Japan is well-praised for its successful industrialization and economic growth. Its transformation from a poor nation wrecked by a devastating war to the world's third-largest economy in only a few decades (specifically from 1950-1973), is known as the Japanese "Economic Miracle".^{1,2,3}

There are a vast number of studies in various disciplines, mostly by Western scholars, looking at the factors that facilitated this great accomplishment. Many of these studies suggest that it was the permanent employment policy that distinguished Japan from other industrialized countries and acted as a catalyst for its astonishing economic prosperity and growth.⁴ As the permanent workers were predominantly men, this explanation often eliminated women from the equation.

In general, Japanese women were perceived as delicate, obedient, and caring housewives who belonged at home. They were perceived as irrelevant and were mostly invisible in the tale of the recovery and

¹ Dorothy Robins-Mowry, *The Hidden Sun: Women of Modern Japan* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983).

² Yoko Kawashima, "Female Workers: An Overview of Past and Current Trends," In *Japanese Women: New Feminist Perspectives on the Past, Present, and Future*, Kumiko Fujimura-Fanselow and Atsuko Kameda (eds.), 271-293 (New York: The Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 1995).

³ Larry S. Carney and Charlotte G O'Kelly, "Women's Work and Women's Place in the Japanese Economic Miracle," In *Women Workers and Global Restructuring*, Kathryn Ward (ed.), 113-145 (New York: ILR Press, 1990).

⁴ Representative examples include: Ouchi (1981), Vogel (1979).

reindustrialization of their country. Only recently, due to its post-growth demographic issues, has the Japanese government started to publicly welcome women in the labour force and to encourage them to contribute their skills and knowledge to help save their country from economic stagnation.⁵

Were Japanese women ever present in the development of their economy throughout history? Are they starting to contribute only now because they are no longer old-fashioned and uneducated? In this literature-based research paper, I investigate the role of Japanese women in the rise of their national economy from the end of World War II (WWII) to the 1970s. The findings from this study suggest that their role can be explained by both their direct participation in the labour force as a source of inexpensive labour supply and by their indirect role as human capital developers and consumers associated with their housewife identity.

What is understood as an “Economic Miracle” is, as defined by Valdes, “an economy that experiences high rates of per capita income growth for a long, sustained period of time that enables it to move from being poor to being rich in only a few decades”.⁶ In the aftermath of WWII, Japan was considered a poor nation that lagged in technology, and, moreover, one whose economy relied solely on unskilled labour. The magnitude of wartime destruction both on its productive capacity and social well-being was extensive. According to data in the *Hundred Year Statistics of the Japanese Economy 1966*, Japan lost one quarter of its

⁵ Michael Auslin, “Japan’s Gamble on ‘Womenomics,’” *The Wall Street Journal*, February 26, 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/michael-auslin-japans-gamble-on-womenomics-1424998266>.

⁶ Benigno Valdes, “An Application of Convergence Theory to Japan’s Post-WWII Economic “Miracle”,” *Journal of Economic Education* 3, no. 1 (2003): 61.

capital stock during the war.⁷ However, in the following years Japan's economy grew so dramatically that it became the third largest economy in the world.⁸

One explanation for this miracle is that Japan had the opportunity to generate a huge amount of income from the Korean and Vietnamese wars as well as by receiving a great deal of assistance from the Americans – motivated by a mix of their anti-communist foreign policy and guilt for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.⁹

Additionally, some economists argue that Japan's high savings rate was partially due to the intergenerational generosity motive – people value future consumption (their children) more than present consumption (themselves) – and that its rapid technological improvement was due to the government's increased emphasis on human capital development.¹⁰

Regardless, most scholars agree that along with destruction and humiliation, WWII also brought new information to Japanese people concerning how far behind they were in terms of development.^{11,12} This eye-opening experience further fuelled the emergence of high motivation, high productivity, and hard work by Japanese workers. Over a period of 25 years (1948-

⁷ *Hundred Year Statistics of the Japanese Economy*, Tokyo, Japan: Statistics Department of the Bank of Japan, 1966.

⁸ Carney and O'Kelly, "Women's Work and Women's Place in the Japanese Economic Miracle," 122.

⁹ George Mikes, *The Land of the Rising Yen* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1970).

¹⁰ Valdes, "An Application of Convergence Theory to Japan's Post WWII Economic "Miracle"."

¹¹ Mikes, *The Land of the Rising Yen*.

¹² Valdes, "An Application of Convergence Theory to Japan's Post-WWII Economic "Miracle"."

1972), Japan's per capita income grew at an average rate of 8.2 percent.¹³

Direct Role as Cheap, Flexible Labour

High productivity in Japan's labour force is often praised for its role in economic achievement. A low absenteeism rate of 1-2% and low rates of strike activity were the primary explanatory factors.¹⁴ Also, there is a great deal of equality among workers; but this is not extended between women and men. Brinton's 1993 study reveals that there was not much variation in the wages of Japanese blue-collar male workers who worked in similarly sized firms. Additionally, high productivity was maintained by the nature of the permanent employment system as there were almost no layoffs within a business cycle.¹⁵ Japanese life-long employment creates a strong sense of commitment and a shared community between employers and workers. The permanent employment system that rewards continuous work was gradually stabilized in Japan during the early postwar period.¹⁶

There was a shortage of skilled labour when heavy industries were introduced in Japan. This shortage provoked the owners of large companies to offer firm-specific training and a seniority-based wage system that would discourage inter-firm mobility.¹⁷

As men were attracted to and absorbed by the heavy industry companies, temporary employment became less and less common among male workers.¹⁸ In many small-

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Mary C. Brinton, *Women and the Economic Miracle: Gender and Work in Postwar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

scale companies that relied on temporary workers, women provided extra support in the absence of male employees. Yet these enterprises remained crucial to the economy. The growth and productivity of the oligopolistic firms increasingly depended on the maintenance of their networks of intermediate and small-scale suppliers, subcontractors, distributors, and dealers whose flexibility, dependence, and market vulnerability permitted large conglomerates to externalize their short-term risks, costs of competition, and structural transformation.¹⁹ In order to maintain lifetime employment among core male workers, large numbers of women were hired for peripheral temporary positions. Thus, the dual labour market was created.

Around 37% of working women were employed in small firms and 19.3% in family enterprises.²⁰ Temporary employment increased more for women than for their male counterparts from the 1950s and became overwhelmingly female-dominated by the end of the 1960s.²¹

Women also dominated part-time, or *paato-taimu*, working positions in the rapidly changing economy of postwar Japan. As Brinton (1993) and Gottfried and Hayashi-Kato (1998) further explain, the main difference between *paato-taimu* employment and full-time employment was not in the hours – in fact the weekly hours of *paato-taimu* were almost equivalent to those of full-time employment – but rather the nature of the contracts and subsequent wages, benefits, and job protection. The hiring of *paato-taimu* female workers benefitted companies as they saved on wages and fringe

¹⁹ Carney and O’Kelly, “Women’s Work and Women’s Place in the Japanese Economic Miracle.”

²⁰ Heidi Gottfried and Nagisa Hayashi-Kato, “Gendering Work: Deconstructing the Narrative of the Japanese Economic Miracle,” *Work, Employment and Society* 12, no. 1 (1998).

²¹ *Ibid*, 25-46.

benefits. However, the nature of the work tasks was no longer to “assist” full-time workers. These women were fully integrated into the standard assignments of work tasks in their firms and were employed continuously for years at a single firm, albeit without health insurance, benefits, or holiday pay.²²

The permanent employment system was irrelevant in the peripheral context where part-time or temporary workers were the norm. The job security provided by the permanent system was only for a portion of male workers, around one-third of the total workforce, in large corporations and government sectors.²³ Only a slim portion of women were employed in large firms and most of them were administrative assistants. These secretariat or clerical work positions were considered as essentially supplemental and were mostly regarded as temporary positions for young women before their marriage.²⁴ The women who filled these positions, often young new graduates, were known as “office flowers” and their positions were commonly projected as a means of enhancing one’s marriageability by providing a better opportunity to be found by better-educated and higher status mates.²⁵

In Japanese society, women were hired for a fixed number of years and expected to find a husband, retire for marriage, and raise a family. Even though large numbers of women were receiving a university education and entering the job market, this norm was still persistent. Those who did not get married but had a few years of solid administrative experience and skills were captured by companies as temporary workers. Despite their high productivity and effort, no benefits,

²² Carney and O’Kelly, “Women’s Work and Women’s Place in the Japanese Economic Miracle.”

²³ Gottfried and Hayashi-Kato, “Gendering Work.”

²⁴ Robins-Mowry, *The Hidden Sun*.

²⁵ Ibid.

bonuses, or advancement opportunities were given to them.²⁶

Moreover, from the corporate boardroom to the factory floor, Japanese work culture requires extended hours of work and internal after work socialization which only those who are free from familial responsibilities can fulfill. Thus, the opportunity cost for women to be lifetime employees was high. The age-old concept of *ryosai kenbo*, signifying “good wife and wise mother,” in postwar Japan meant that a good wife should work until marriage, quit her wage-earning job to raise a family, and re-enter the paid workforce as a temporary worker when her children had grown up.²⁷

This pattern was explicit in the M-shaped age distribution curve of women’s employment: high at ages between 20 and 24, lower between 25 and 34 and rising again from 40 to the early 50s.²⁸ This socio-cultural norm laid the basis for men’s advantages and women’s disadvantages in the paid labour market and women’s predominance in the part-time and temporary employment market. The Japanese women’s labour participation model served the needs of capitalist production and to preserve the patriarchal gender contract. Their low-paid, flexible work sustained the employment system in which a select core of male workers reaped benefits at the enterprise-level.²⁹

Women’s dominance in some transitioning industries was crucial in Japan’s postwar growth. One of the biggest industries that employed large numbers of women was the textile industry. The industry is well known for its heavy recruitment of young female short-term labour. Its exploitation of cheap female labour has

²⁶ Gottfried and Hayashi-Kato, “Gendering Work.”

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Robins-Mowry, *The Hidden Sun*.

²⁹ Gottfried and Hayashi-Kato, “Gendering Work.”

been criticized vastly in academic literature.³⁰ During the late twentieth century, many young women from rural areas were joining the textile industry under family pressure for a fixed number of years. They were housed in dormitories, worked extensive hours in the factories, and were paid minimally. Many of these young women suffered from bad health conditions and a vast number of them died of tuberculosis. According to a survey in 1910, only about forty percent of these young women returned home after their term.³¹

This monstrous image of the textile industry exploiting young women changed after WWII as Japan entered a new era of development. Macnaughtan's (2005) study of the textile industry in postwar Japan provides a brighter and less oppressive image of the industry. Although the textile industry was gradually declining due to the introduction of heavy industries in the economy, its role in the development of the early postwar Japanese economy remained important. The working conditions of the textile industry improved significantly as the economy was transitioning to a new era with rapidly growing technological advancement, increasing higher education for young people, and better labour protection as a result of unionization.³²

Young women remained the core source of labour supply in the textile industry, however at this time they were employed by their own will, motivated by their desire for economic independence and personal development. Young women, between the ages of 15-18, supplied the major part of the labour and were

³⁰ Representative examples include: Kagoyama (1970), Hunter (1993), Komatsu (2000).

³¹ Brinton, *Women and the Economic Miracle*.

³² Helen Macnaughtan, *Women, Work and the Japanese Economic Miracle: The Case of the Cotton Textile Industry 1945-1975* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005).

provided dormitory living and few hours of daily schooling for their growth and development.³³

Despite improved working conditions and social protection, there were substantial wage differentials between sexes in the industry. On average, female textile workers were earning only around 47% of male wages.³⁴ The wage gap was wider for older female workers as they were earning less than 40% of male wages.³⁵ These women were in their forties or fifties re-entering the textile workforce after marriage and child-rearing. The seniority wage system was not applied uniformly in the textile industry as the wage decreased for older women while it increased for men.

Another driving force of the wage differentials came from the higher wage allowance allocated to workers who had family dependants. In Japanese culture, as men were perceived as head of the household, women workers generally did not receive such allowances. As the textile industry was in decline and being restructured, they needed a fixed number of years of labour supply and the flexibility of young girls and older women was adequate.³⁶ Thus, these women provided the backbone for the transitioning of the Japanese textile industry during the postwar period.

Another field where female labour dominated was agriculture. Throughout Japanese history, women have played a crucial role in agriculture and this role was not diminished when the sector became less attractive during the industrialization period. In fact, as men shifted to permanent industrial and clerical jobs, women were left to manage the farming, which was generally considered an extension of their housework rather than

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

a job.³⁷ In her ethnographic studies, Bernstein (1996) shows the labour participation and the workload of Japanese farmwomen in the 1970s. The daily activities of the farmwomen not only consisted of taking care of the household chores and the children, but of working in the rice paddies, hunched over for 8-9 hours a day.³⁸

On top of that, these women held part-time wage-paying jobs during the slack period of the rice cultivation cycle. These jobs included positions in small textile factories and construction work. Women were hired for these physically demanding jobs that required hauling heavy boulders, shovelling, climbing down into trenches, and the like. Although men and women were working side-by-side on construction sites performing the same work, women were paid much less than their male counterparts.³⁹

The same wage discrimination existed in almost all sectors such as blue-jeans factories, tobacco production, and nursery care. According to a government survey in 1973, forty percent of all farmwomen took on an outside wage-paying job and contributed to their household income.⁴⁰

These women successfully and miraculously performed their dual role as housewives and farm workers at the cost of their well-being, health, and leisure time. Therefore, women's involvement in both the textile and agriculture sectors emphasizes their direct role in the economy as a source of cheap, flexible labour compensating for their male counterparts' absence.

³⁷ Gail Lee Bernstein, *Haruko's World: A Japanese Farm Woman and Her Community*, Reprinted with an Epilogue (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

³⁸ Bernstein, *Haruko's World*.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

Indirect Role as Caretakers and Consumers

Women played another important role in contributing to the national economy associated with their housewife identity: they were the core human capital developers of the country. According to the technology diffusion theory, which assumes that more human capital allows for more absorption of new technologies and further contributes to higher productivity, Japan worked hard to catch up with countries highly endowed with human capital. The percentage of high school graduates entering university increased from 17.2% to 38.4% from the 1950s to the 1970s.⁴¹ Human Capital theory is based on an idea that “people are forward looking and invest in their education and skills for the purpose of maximizing long-run productivity”.⁴²

The Human Capital Development System in Japan is explained in two dimensions.⁴³ The first dimension includes the social-institutional context such as educational institutions and the labour market. The second, more relevant to the purpose of this paper, is the structure of exchanges that occur within families. This dimension implies that parents, as social actors, are responsible for the human capital development of their children.

The intersection of a poor welfare system in the postwar period in terms of retirement pensions and the deeply rooted cultural norm of intergenerational ties in families produced anticipation of both emotional and financial help for Japanese parents in their old age.^{44,45} Thus, parents had a strong incentive to invest in at least

⁴¹ Valdes, “An Application of Convergence Theory to Japan's Post-WWII Economic “Miracle”,” 74.

⁴² Ibid, 76.

⁴³ Brinton, *Women and the Economic Miracle*.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Robins-Mowry, *The Hidden Sun*.

one child in order to assure their own financial security in the future. The traditional notion under the Japanese family system that parents could expect to live with a son in their old age, along with the gender stratification of the workplace, caused the preference to be investment in sons' human capital development rather than daughters'. As a result, less young women were encouraged to get a university education and mothers were appointed to an indirect role in the economy as nurturers of their sons. According to Brinton's (1993) study, Japanese women had three times more aspiration for their sons' education than for that of their daughters.

Moreover, since most women were expected to take care of the family and the household chores, women were also nurturers of their husbands. The long hours of the Japanese work system would not have been possible if it was not for the women who completely shouldered emotional and caretaking responsibility for the whole family and left men free from those household duties. The distribution of domestic labour in Japanese families was highly concentrated on wives and barely included husbands. Therefore, women were the core producers of and investors in Japanese human capital, which is often praised as a crucial ingredient of the Economic Miracle.⁴⁶ The importance of this indirect role is summarized in the words of a skilled blue-collar male worker: "We're lucky because we can give up almost everything for our work if we have to, and our family still hold together. If Americans behaved this way, I think the U.S divorce rate would be much higher than it already is..."⁴⁷

A second important indirect role played by Japanese women was that of consumers. Japan's economic

⁴⁶ Brinton, *Women and the Economic Miracle*.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 95.

growth was not as appealing in the daily lives of ordinary people as it looked in macroeconomic data. There was a cost associated with this great economic boom. As Japan entered the league of rich countries, its Gross National Product (GNP) continuously rose, as did housing and commodity prices. In the timeframe of these two decades, the cost of land closer to urban areas increased twentyfold.⁴⁸ There was an increasing imbalance in the economy where owning a television set was easier than having beef for dinner.⁴⁹ The food price was higher in Tokyo than in any other major city in the world.⁵⁰

As keepers of the household budget and being mostly in charge of shopping, women, particularly housewives, were outraged by the inflated price of commodities more than their husbands, who were occupied by their extended hours of work. This frustration incited these women to initiate movements and boycotts that eventually established consumerism in Japan.⁵¹

The Japan Housewives Association, popularly called Shufuren, played a crucial role in pressuring the government for better management of economic growth and quality of life. In 1950, Shufuren initiated product testing for its consumer protection undertakings facilitated by a female professor in science, Takada Yuri.⁵² Due to criticism based on scientific evidence, the government was forced to establish consumer law for quality standards in textiles and correct labeling on food and clothing which, for example, finally made it illegal to sell a can of rabbit meat labelled with a picture of a cow.

⁴⁸ Robins-Mowry, *The Hidden Sun*.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

These consumer boycott movements led by housewives achieved consumer protection law, a system for hearing consumer complaints, the creation of offices and laboratories focused on consumer matters, and the full attention to such issues by government officials.⁵³ Additionally, major corporations such as Toshiba, Shiseido, and Nihon Ham created their consumer divisions.⁵⁴ The restraints on producers to set the price of their products were tightened and the policy on taxing imported food commodities was loosened.⁵⁵ Thus, the dedication and hard work of Japanese women brought better and healthier economic growth for the society.

Conclusion

Women in Japan are usually perceived as kimono-clad, tea-serving, compliant women who do not play any role in the economy. This perception grossly misrepresents the true image of Japanese women, who played an invaluable role in sustaining the great Economic Miracle during reindustrialization.

They provided cheap and flexible labour, offsetting the high cost and rigidity of the mainstream labour force. They filled the spots that became less attractive to men yet remained crucial to the economy as managers of agriculture. They were the main engine of the textile industry and provided a smooth transition for the development and restructuring of Japan's reindustrialization. They bolstered the working power of Japanese men through their role as housewives as well as educated and nurtured the next generation of the labour force as human capital developers. They were the

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

creators of the consumerism in Japan that brought better economic growth policies in the country.

Therefore, the rarely mentioned and underappreciated role of Japanese women in the narratives of the “Economic Miracle” was invaluable. In a modern world where the voice of women is heard and valued more than ever but is not yet equal to that of men, it is crucial to acknowledge the true image of women in history. Especially in societies like Japan, where intergenerational knowledge is highly valued, the best way to empower young women to reach their full potential is to show them how their mothers, grandmothers, and great-grandmothers contributed to the best of their abilities to the development and amelioration of their country.

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POST-GROWTH JAPAN
AND ITS DOMESTIC
POLICIES

JAPON POST-GROWTH
ET SES POLITIQUES
DOMESTIQUES



Abenomics, Succès ou Échec?

Bernard Bernier

Lorsque Shinzo Abe est devenu Premier ministre le 26 décembre 2012, le pays était en difficulté économique. Il venait de connaître une autre année de croissance négative et la déflation, signe d'une économie en décroissance, qui était endémique depuis 1997, s'était amplifiée à la suite de la crise de la subprime aux États-Unis. La triple catastrophe de mars 2011 s'était ajoutée à ce triste bilan.

Abe a voulu redémarrer l'économie en prenant des mesures qui devaient redonner confiance aux Japonais, découragés par deux décennies de croissance nulle, négative, ou faible. Ces mesures, annoncées au milieu de 2013, ont été regroupées sous l'appellation d'Abenomics par les analystes et journalistes. L'objectif fondamental de ces mesures était d'en arriver à un taux de croissance annuelle du PIB (produit intérieur brut) de 3%. Pour cela, il fallait sortir le pays de la déflation. À cette fin, il fallait encourager les exportations, l'investissement, la création d'emploi, et la consommation. Abe a défini une politique à trois volets, qu'il a appelé les « trois flèches »; une politique monétaire, une politique fiscale, et des changements structurels.

Premier Volet: La Politique Monétaire

La première mesure visait à injecter des liquidités dans l'économie. La Banque du Japon s'est mise à acheter des actions et obligations afin d'augmenter fortement la masse monétaire. Le gouvernement a aussi utilisé les fonds de retraite publics pour acheter des actions et obligations. Ces mesures avaient pour objectif, premièrement, d'augmenter le pouvoir d'achat interne, deuxièmement, de produire l'inflation et, troisièmement,

d'abaisser la valeur du yen face aux autres monnaies afin de rendre les exportations japonaises moins chères et donc de les augmenter, et ainsi de favoriser une hausse de la production interne. En même temps, le gouvernement a encouragé la Banque du Japon à maintenir son taux directeur à 0% afin de favoriser l'investissement, ce qui aurait pour effet d'augmenter l'emploi, donc le revenu et la consommation.

Il s'agissait d'une politique audacieuse. En effet, dans la théorie économique habituelle, l'inflation est une conséquence de la croissance. Dans le cas des mesures d'Abe, l'inflation devrait servir de moyen pour générer la croissance. Autrement dit, la relation causale était inversée. Pendant plus d'un an, jusqu'à la hausse de la taxe de vente de 5% à 8% le 1^{er} avril 2014, cette politique avait l'air d'être un succès. Le taux d'inflation sur une base annuelle avait dépassé 2% et le taux de croissance du PIB, qui était de 1,6% en 2013, avait même dépassé 2% au premier trimestre de 2014. Cette politique a aussi entraîné une baisse de la valeur du yen de 20% par rapport au dollar américain entre janvier 2013 et janvier 2015. Malgré tout, les exportations avaient diminué en valeur, de 10% entre décembre 2012 et décembre 2013, et de 3,5% entre décembre 2013 et décembre 2014. Les effets de la politique jusqu'en avril 2014 avaient donc été mitigés, mais la croissance s'était néanmoins reprise.

La croissance de 2013 et jusqu'en avril 2014 s'explique, premièrement, par les achats des familles, en prévision de la hausse de la taxe de vente, deuxièmement, par les dépenses pour la reconstruction du Tōhoku, frappé par la catastrophe de mars 2011, et troisièmement, par les dépenses du gouvernement pour les infrastructures.

Mais dès la hausse de la taxe de vente, et malgré des dépenses gouvernementales croissantes pour tenter d'atténuer les effets de cette hausse sur la

consommation, la croissance est redevenue négative, de l'ordre de -0,5% en 2014. La consommation a diminué, entre autres, les dépenses courantes pour la nourriture et les biens essentiels. Malgré tout, la croissance a repris, mais était plus faible que ce qui avait été initialement annoncé au dernier trimestre de 2014, et le gouvernement prévoit que cette croissance se poursuivra en 2015, même si ce n'est pas une certitude (les derniers chiffres montrent une faible croissance depuis janvier 2015). L'inflation a fléchi plus qu'on avait espéré et elle semble retomber autour de 0% (à cause de la forte baisse des prix du pétrole). Signe inquiétant, les prévisions des dépenses pour les ménages ont diminué, étant donné la stagnation des salaires et une baisse des revenus réels (-3,4% en un an) dans une période où il y a une hausse du prix des biens courants.

La politique monétaire d'Abe était fondée sur le principe selon lequel, en injectant de la monnaie en grande quantité dans l'économie, la consommation reprendrait. En outre, le faible taux d'intérêt devait encourager l'investissement dans la production, ce qui créerait de l'emploi, donc des salaires, et enfin de la consommation. Mais la politique monétaire, dès la hausse de la taxe de vente, n'a pas eu les effets escomptés.

En premier lieu, l'achat des actions et obligations à la Bourse par la Banque du Japon a profité surtout aux institutions financières, aux entreprises dans d'autres secteurs, et aux gens les plus riches, et très peu aux contribuables ordinaires. En particulier, les injections de fonds ont fait augmenter les cours boursiers et les profits, mais seulement pour les grandes entreprises, les entreprises de petite et de moyenne taille (PME) ayant une très faible hausse. Le prix des terrains dans les grandes villes a aussi augmenté. Autrement dit, cette injection de monnaie a profité à ceux qui avaient déjà de

la richesse. Elle a donc contribué à augmenter les inégalités de revenu.

En deuxième lieu, cette accumulation de richesse a fortement encouragé l'épargne des entreprises, qui ont hésité (et pour la majorité hésitent toujours) à investir dans la production, malgré leurs épargnes et le faible taux d'intérêt, étant donné les conditions difficiles du marché interne de la consommation. La politique monétaire, au lieu de faire augmenter les revenus et donc la consommation, a eu plutôt pour effet, en absence de nouveaux investissements et donc de nouveaux emplois, d'abaisser le revenu moyen. Notons cependant une tendance positive dans le marché d'emploi avec la création de près d'un million d'emplois entre décembre 2012 et décembre 2014, mais la grande majorité d'entre eux étant dans des entreprises de moins de 30 personnes, donc avec des salaires faibles. En effet, si on regarde l'évolution des salaires réels, il y a une régression, une baisse de l'ordre de 3,5% entre 2010 et 2014. Premier Ministre Abe a lui-même reconnu le 17 mars 2015 que les salaires stagnaient alors que les prix (et il faudrait ajouter les profits) augmentaient. Mais, signe positif, Toyota et Nissan ont accepté le 17 mars de donner des hausses de salaire d'environ 1% à leurs employés réguliers.

Le problème de la politique monétaire jusqu'au présent, c'est qu'elle a amplifié les inégalités de revenus. Elle n'a pas entraîné les investissements souhaités par les grandes entreprises, qui ont préféré conserver leurs réserves ou les utiliser dans des pratiques spéculatives (en particulier en jouant à la bourse et en spéculant sur les devises et les terrains) en attendant que le marché reprenne, donc il n'y a pas eu d'hausse importante de l'emploi dans les secteurs les mieux payés (une hausse est prévue pour 2016 pour environ 1/3 des très grandes entreprises) et que des hausses de salaire faibles, malgré des hausses importantes de profit. L'écart entre les

salaires des salariés réguliers des grandes entreprises et le reste de la main-d'œuvre s'est amplifié. Or, si on veut s'en sortir durablement de la déflation, augmenter la consommation et, de ce fait, avoir une croissance positive, il faut développer des politiques qui visent directement à augmenter les revenus de la masse et non pas seulement des entreprises et des plus riches.

Abe comptait sur les mêmes mécanismes que Reagan dans son « trickle down economics, » soit, avec l'augmentation du capital des entreprises, il y aurait une augmentation de l'investissement, donc du travail, donc des salaires. Ce qui ne s'est pas passé, ni aux États-Unis dans les années 1980, ni au Japon ces dernières années. Les entreprises, surtout les plus grandes, celles dans lesquelles les salaires sont les plus élevés, sont restées frileuses, thésaurisant leur capital et ne l'investissant pas dans la production. Ce faisant, elles se nuisent à elles-mêmes, en ne distribuant pas de revenu qui pourrait servir à la consommation et donc à la vente de leurs propres produits. C'est cet aspect essentiel de la distribution de la richesse qui a été oublié initialement dans la politique d'Abe. Autrement dit, la politique d'Abe n'a pas encore sorti durablement le pays du cercle vicieux de la contraction de l'économie, bien que cela puisse survenir en 2015 et 2016.

Deuxième Volet: La Politique Fiscale

Abe avait certaines contraintes dans la mise en place d'une politique fiscale expansionniste. Des contraintes causées par la forte dette du gouvernement japonais, de l'ordre de plus de 200% du PIB annuel. Mais, si on voulait relancer l'économie, il fallait des dépenses gouvernementales, d'autant plus qu'il fallait reconstruire les régions du Tōhoku victimes de la catastrophe de 2011. Le gouvernement a donc mis en place des programmes de dépenses publiques, surtout dans les

infrastructures, afin de les rendre plus aptes à résister aux catastrophes naturelles. Le mot-clé dans ces programmes était la « résilience » (*danryokusei*). De plus, le gouvernement prévoyait des dépenses pour la préparation des Jeux Olympiques à Tokyo en 2020. Mais, pour tenter de balancer le déficit et donc la dette, l'ancien gouvernement du Parti démocrate avait prévu une hausse de la taxe de vente de 5% à 8% pour l'avril 2014. Cette taxe devait en plus passer à 10% en octobre 2015. Abe a maintenu le premier volet de cette mesure, pensant que l'économie japonaise pourrait supporter cette première hausse sans nuire à la croissance, surtout en tenant compte des dépenses prévues pour les infrastructures.

Comme on l'a vu plus haut, la hausse de la taxe de vente, qui a augmenté les prix de la consommation, en avril 2014 a eu des effets beaucoup plus négatifs que prévu. La croissance s'est avérée plus fragile que l'on prévoyait et le pays est entré de nouveau en récession. Devant cette situation, le gouvernement a reporté à 2017 la hausse prévue de la taxe de vente à 10%. En même temps, pour tenter de sortir de la récession, le gouvernement a encore une fois eu recours aux dépenses publiques avec un programme de plus de 50 milliards \$US. Autrement dit, on est revenu à une politique expansionniste, après une mesure de retranchement (hausse de la taxe de vente), avec pour résultat une nouvelle hausse du déficit et donc de la dette brute qui s'élève à 230% du PIB.

Mais en fait, la dette nette du gouvernement japonais, quand on tient compte des épargnes des administrations et des surplus de la caisse de sécurité sociale, n'est que de 145%. En outre, étant donné que la dette est détenue en majorité au Japon et que les taux d'intérêt internes sont à moins de 1% sur les bons du trésor et les obligations, le service de la dette dans le budget annuel est plus faible que dans tous les pays

développés, sauf le Canada. Le Japon peut donc se permettre une politique de dépenses publiques, mais en étant prudent.

Le gouvernement a aussi prévu d'abaisser les impôts des entreprises à 31,6 % des revenus d'ici 2016. En contrepartie, le gouvernement veut que les entreprises utilisent l'argent ainsi économisé pour créer des emplois et augmenter les salaires, qui baissent depuis 2013, ce qui augmente la pauvreté (plus haut taux de personnes à revenu insuffisant selon l'OCDE), entre autres des familles monoparentales dont le nombre est en hausse. Cependant, des enquêtes auprès des entreprises démontrent que seulement le tiers des très grandes entreprises prévoient augmenter l'emploi, et qu'elles hésitent à augmenter les salaires, préférant redistribuer les profits aux actionnaires. Si cela se produit, alors la mesure de Abe ne donnera pas les effets escomptés, soit une faible augmentation des revenus et donc peu de hausse de la consommation.

Notons que ces mesures font augmenter les revenus des entreprises, au moment où celles-ci bénéficient déjà d'une hausse des cours boursiers. En même temps, les familles subissent une hausse de leur fardeau fiscal, à cause la hausse de la taxe de vente, donc une diminution de leurs revenus.

Troisième Volet: Transformations Structurelles

Plusieurs transformations structurelles étaient prévues dans la politique de Abe, d'autres étaient suggérées par des analystes. Premièrement, les grandes entreprises et les gouvernements étrangers demandent une ouverture plus grande du marché japonais, en particulier pour les produits agricoles. Le Japon importe annuellement environ 60% de sa consommation totale de produits agricoles. L'ouverture du marché ferait augmenter cette proportion. Les coopératives agricoles, qui appuient en

majorité le Parti libéral-démocrate d'Abe, se sont opposées farouchement à cette ouverture. Malgré cette opposition, le gouvernement s'est engagé à ouvrir davantage le marché interne des produits agricoles. Il a aussi éliminé certaines prérogatives de la Fédération des coopératives agricoles. La libéralisation devrait aussi toucher les produits pharmaceutiques et les services.

Deuxièmement, les entreprises, en plus de bénéficier d'une baisse des impôts, demandent un assouplissement des règles régissant le marché du travail. Elles veulent plus de latitude pour congédier des salariés en période de crise. Ce genre de mesure rendrait le marché de l'emploi plus fluide, entre autres, en diminuant le nombre de salariés ayant la sécurité d'emploi. Cependant, une telle mesure, décriée par les syndicats, risquerait d'abaisser les salaires et donc les revenus, ou bien ferait augmenter les épargnes des ménages pour faire face à une perte d'emploi éventuelle, nuisant ainsi à la consommation nécessaire pour relancer l'économie (les épargnes des ménages ont atteint des sommets en mars 2015).

Troisièmement, un assouplissement de la politique d'immigration a été proposé. L'objectif de cette mesure est d'assurer un approvisionnement en main-d'œuvre pour les secteurs délaissés par les japonais, comme les tâches les moins qualifiées dans la construction et dans la production manufacturière, ou bien dans le service aux personnes âgées. Il s'agirait d'ouvrir les portes à un nombre limité d'étrangers avec des contrats de durée déterminée et non pas d'une immigration permanente. Cette politique est motivée par la baisse de la population au Japon, et surtout par la baisse de la proportion de la population active par rapport aux couches qui ne travaillent pas, surtout les retraités, la natalité faible entraînant une baisse de la proportion d'enfants. Malgré la récession, le Japon a un taux de chômage (sous-

évalué) de 3,6%, ce qui fait que des emplois restent sans candidat.

L'ouverture aux immigrants n'est pas facile au Japon, bien que des sondages récents montrent qu'un plus grand nombre de Japonais sont ouverts à une immigration accrue mais limitée. Malgré tout, il y a résistance, en particulier dans les milieux les plus conservateurs. Par exemple, une chroniqueuse du *Sankei Shinbun* a proposé des mesures semblables à l'apartheid en Afrique du Sud avant 1990, parce que, selon elle, il est impossible pour les immigrants de s'intégrer à la société japonaise qu'ils ne manqueraient pas de ternir.

Il faut ajouter à cela une réforme du système de pension qui n'entre pas dans les mesures de relance de l'économie comme tel, mais qui fait partie des mesures mises en place par Abe. Une première réforme avait été adoptée en 2004, qui avait abaissé les montants payés aux retraités. La nouvelle réforme de 2014 abaisse encore ces montants. En outre, pour assurer le financement du système, le gouvernement a changé les règles de fonctionnement du fonds de pension gouvernemental, afin d'assurer un plus fort rendement des investissements. Le fonds devra diminuer fortement ses achats de bons du trésor, à faible rendement, et augmenter ses achats d'actions et d'obligations, qui sont moins sûres mais qui ont en général des taux de rendement plus élevés.

Enfin, le Premier Ministre Abe a proposé un changement dans les politiques économique touchant les femmes. En effet, il a encouragé les entreprises à embaucher plus de femmes dans des postes réguliers. Pour ce faire, il a proposé aux entreprises de faire des ajustements pour augmenter la possibilité pour les femmes de chercher les emplois dans les grandes entreprises. Il s'agit d'une volte-face importante de la part non seulement du Premier Ministre, qui, au cours de son premier mandat en 2006-2007, avait demandé

aux femmes de rester à la maison afin d'augmenter le taux de natalité, mais aussi pour le Parti libéral-démocrate. Il faut souligner que les grandes entreprises sont toujours réticentes à changer leurs coutumes et donc de faciliter l'embauche des femmes.

Abe propose des changements dans cinq domaines; meilleure conciliation travail/famille, avec une augmentation des postes en garderie et une augmentation de la durée du congé parental sans perdre son emploi; augmentation de la participation des femmes au marché du travail, surtout dans les tranches d'âges de 25 à 40 ans, celles où les femmes quittent leur emploi, souvent de façon permanente; une hausse importante du nombre de femmes cadres supérieures; l'équité salariale; et la suppression de l'avantage fiscal pour les épouses qui restent au foyer sans travailler ou en ayant un revenu inférieur à l'équivalent d'environ \$10,000 US. Il s'agit là de mesures quasi-révolutionnaires dans le cas du Japon.

Conclusion

Il est trop tôt pour dire si les mesures d'Abe sont un succès ou un échec. Jusqu'à maintenant, ces mesures ont eu des effets positifs pendant environ un an, mais la hausse de la taxe de vente a renversé cette tendance et le pays est entré de nouveau en récession en 2014 avec un maintien de l'inflation. La croissance faible semble reprendre depuis octobre 2014, mais il faudra voir comment l'économie évoluera en 2015 et 2016. Une reprise est possible, surtout si l'économie mondiale reprend de la force. Les pays étrangers et les organismes internationaux poussent le Japon à accélérer les réformes structurelles.

Je ne pense pas que certaines de ces réformes aident le Japon à s'en sortir de la récession. Une ouverture plus grande du marché japonais risque de faire baisser la

production interne, en particulier en agriculture. Une plus grande flexibilité du marché du travail risque d'abaisser les salaires, donc le revenu et la consommation. Seuls des changements à la politique d'immigration et les mesures touchant les femmes pourraient avoir des résultats positifs. Dans le cas des immigrants, les effets ne peuvent être que limités étant donné le faible nombre d'immigrants prévu. Quant aux mesures touchant les femmes et le marché du travail, elles ne font que commencer à se mettre en place et elles font face à la résistance des grandes entreprises, mais si elles sont appliquées, même partiellement, elles devraient avoir pour effet d'augmenter le revenu moyen des ménages, à condition que les grandes entreprises changent leurs pratiques d'embauche.

Le pronostic pour le Japon pour les prochaines années est mitigé. Le Japon ne peut se sortir de cette récession que si l'économie mondiale se rétablit. Les signes encourageants du côté des États-Unis vont dans ce sens, et si cela se produit, la croissance de la Chine pourrait reprendre à des taux plus élevés que ceux que ce pays connaît maintenant (mais vraisemblablement pas avant 2016). Par contre, l'Europe ne semble pas près de sortir du marasme. Malgré tout, une reprise limitée en Amérique du Nord et en Chine pourrait permettre au Japon d'augmenter ses exportations, qui ont baissé dans les dernières années. Une hausse des exportations permettrait d'améliorer la balance commerciale négative et d'augmenter la production, donc l'emploi et le revenu.

À mon avis, la croissance ne peut survenir sans des mesures pour redistribuer la richesse, donc pour hausser le revenu moyen et atténuer les inégalités. Or il n'y a aucune mesure, sauf celles touchant les femmes, allant vraiment dans ce sens dans Abenomics. Sans cette redistribution, je ne pense pas que le pays va pouvoir connaître une croissance de l'ordre de 2%, sans parler

de 3%, qui est l'objectif du gouvernement. Comme en Amérique du Nord, le taux le plus élevé auquel on peut s'attendre me semble plus proche de 2%. Les économies d'Amérique du Nord, du Japon, et de l'Europe de l'ouest sont des économies à maturité, pour lesquelles les possibilités de croissance sont limitées. La production industrielle diminue au profit des pays dits émergents, dont la Chine, et la croissance fondée sur les transactions financières comporte le risque de la création d'une bulle spéculative, comme on l'a connue au Japon entre 1985 et 1989 et aux États-Unis juste avant la crise de la *subprime* en 2007. Dans ce cas, une période de croissance fondée sur la spéculation foncière et boursière a été suivie d'un correctif, donc d'une période de récession. Au Japon, cette période dure toujours, malgré un faible regain entre 2003 et 2007 et en 2013.

Les cours boursiers pour les grandes entreprises ont doublé au Japon depuis 2012, fruit de la politique monétaire d'Abe. Mais cette hausse est sans commune mesure avec la rentabilité des entreprises, qui amassent des profits non pas seulement à travers la vente de leurs produits, mais à cause de l'achat par la Banque du Japon des actions et obligations en bourse et à cause des transactions boursières. Tant que la production et les revenus des familles n'augmenteront pas, les dangers d'une nouvelle bulle spéculative sont toujours présents.

Educational Policy in Japan

Julian Dierkes

Thanks, first of all, to the organizers, to the student committee, and to all the volunteers! It has been a great day. Very impressive organization! It is really lovely to see that undergraduates can put this sort of thing on as well. I am going to tell my graduate students how they need to take a page out of your book. Thanks to all of you in the audience. What is the phrase Air Canada uses? “We know you had many choices of different airlines today?” You chose not to go to the panel on Godzilla, instead you came to fiscal policy, educational policy, and old age care. Thank you very much! I suspect there are about 120 people in the other room but we are very happy with this turn out given the sort of topics that we cover here.

Maybe I'll start where Bernard left off, which is that it is a bit too early to tell on a lot of these things. When we talk about post-growth Japan, we know that the high-growth era is over. That is pretty clear and it has been 25 years now. But I don't think we are entirely sure what the new era is. So when that day comes that I am benefitting from great long-term care insurance as Dr. Tiessen discussed, sitting there in my hospice being long-term cared for, I think at that point I will know what era we are at in Japan. But for now I don't think we know. And we see a number of areas where there seem to be changes going on but we cannot quite tell whether they are going to be successes or failures. But there are also many areas where we see institutions that have been built for the high-growth era struggling with adjusting to a non-high-growth era.

Education, I think, is one of the examples where we see a lot of that. But before I get to the post-growth era, I will briefly talk about what education looked like in a

high-growth era just to give you a little bit of a background. Then I will talk about some specific challenges that I see in the educational system and how they are being approached. The sort of 'traditional order' goes from little kids to big kids. I am going to go the other way around starting with universities and then talking about primary and secondary education. I will also talk about an area where I have done lots of research, which is supplementary education. That is out of school, private, for profit, education. Then I will see if I can get all the way to a little bit of an outlook.

Just as a reminder, a quick overview of what exactly high-growth era education looked like. I am doing this really quickly just as a quick overview and only touching on a couple of facets here. If we looked to the prewar era, obviously the education system in Japan was very much state dominated, structured around elitist selection into higher levels of education, and motivated by some notion of service to the country. The educational system was very much built around that.

When we look at the postwar period, we see a different trend which is the massive expansion of education and enrolment in education. So the high-growth era does not only mean economic high growth but it also means that education is growing in a huge way in Japan. It started in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and all the way through. And of course it parallels what happened in other OECD countries like Canada or elsewhere, where we have seen expansion of education everywhere. In this period in Japan, there was a very strong sense that the only way to move up socially, whether that's intergenerationally, so the only way for your kids move up, or intragenerationally, the only way for you yourself to move up, was through education.

Some of that is rooted in very high inheritance taxes. There was virtually no inheritance of wealth in Japan because the taxes are so high upon death. So

education is the agreed-upon way towards social mobility. If you want to do something good for your kids, education is going to be that thing because that is the only way they are actually going to be better off.

During this period, public institutions continued to dominate the education system. That is, the most prestigious institution at all levels were generally the public ones whether that was for primary school, secondary school, or university. It is very much a public education system even though, of course, there are private education institutions at all levels. But at least in the high-growth era, we saw the system dominated by the public institutions. These were ranked in a prestige hierarchy that was generally totally agreed upon. There was very little doubt during the high-growth era which institution was the most prestigious, whether talking about the local primary school or middle school, high school, or university. There was no sense of questioning of those hierarchies and they were very clear to everyone involved.

Educational policy then kept a little bit separate from the educational system itself. Obviously it was reformed massively during the American occupation just after the end of the Asia Pacific war. One of the results of that is that cryptic formula “6-3-3-4”: 6 years of primary, 3 years of junior high, 3 years of high school, and then 4 years of university. The system was fairly rigidly built around the sequence of stages in education. There has always been, in part instilled by the US occupation, but there is a very strong egalitarian ethos to high-growth Japan’s education. Comprehensive high school with no tracking and no ranking other than at the moment of entry, but within the school the classroom, which may be as big as a university lecture for some schools, or may have been at the time at least, addressed the entire group and did not address individual students and their abilities. The real tracking,

if you will, and the selection occur during the movement from one institution to the next, whether that was from primary to secondary, or from secondary to tertiary education. That was where people were tracked and ranked according to some kind of meritocracy.

If we look at the post-growth era, so roughly since 1990, but basically saying if we look at today, here are some of the features that I am going to talk about briefly. I am going to go back to the declining number of students which is going to be one feature. I will look at the different areas of education in the different parts of the systems one by one to see what particular features are examples of the tension between high growth era institutions that are now operating in a post growth situation.

First, if we look at universities, I will separate this roughly into things that are going on domestically within Japan and then how Japanese institutions are interacting with the world and with global education. First, what declining birth rates mean for universities is that there is a declining number of students. So there are fewer kids, which means fewer kids who are growing up to be young adults and potentially going into universities. Keeping in mind that high school completion is now nearly universal in Japan and some kind of tertiary education is not quite approaching universality, but we see big numbers of students going into tertiary education. But institutions are facing a decline in enrollment. I have already told you we have a strong hierarchy of institutions. So the lower-tier universities are already beginning to see situations where they are not getting as many applicants as they could accommodate. Consequently, universities are beginning to admit without admission criteria because they have to take everyone who wants to enroll. We see a real shift there where the selection mechanisms, at least into university, are disappearing to some extent.

The perception of higher education, which is one of the biggest changes to education in the post-growth era, is changing very much. We have already heard from Dr. Bernier that some of the structural transformations have meant precarious employment, for example. The notion that dominated during the high-growth era, that if you go to the right school, you end up in the right company, and that provides lifelong employment, that perception is gone. Those jobs still exist in smaller numbers. But that connection people made to study hard, go to the right school, and get the right job, that automatic transition no longer holds in people's lives.

This has changed the outlook on higher education and education generally such that people are very uncertain now what exactly different levels of education are going to buy them in terms of employment later on. What that means is that even if you go to the most prestigious and the most highly selective higher education institutions, you are not guaranteed a job anymore. So now graduates of universities that we have all heard of, whether public universities or private ones, do not necessarily find jobs anymore in the way that they used to in the high growth era.

There is also, in the general concern with the end of high growth, a concern about the sources of growth. In the 1990s, for example, one of the reasons people thought that Japan was not growing anymore, particularly during the first dot com boom in the United States, was a lack of creativity and entrepreneurialism. To some extent higher education was being blamed for that all along and some of that continues today. There is a sense that what the education system broadly, but especially higher education, is doing is not preparing Japanese students for the kind of economic realities that they might be facing on the job later on. I emphasize that this is a perception of higher education not supplying these kinds of roles or not fulfilling these

kinds of role rather any kind of reality. It is mostly about perceptions. The reality looks slightly different in some of these areas.

Of course, Japan does not quite exist in a vacuum anymore the way it meant to in the 1980s. These days, things look a little bit different. Higher education now is a field that is internationalizing rapidly and that holds for Japan just as much as for anywhere else. Take, for example, university rankings. University rankings for Japan used to be entirely meaningful domestically. No one ever cared in Japan whether York University existed or UBC (University of British Columbia) or anyone else. Because the only rankings that mattered were the Japanese rankings.

Since roughly the 1990s, for all universities, at least in OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, we are now operating in a situation where we are looking at international rankings, particularly our university presidents. Those of us in the faculty trenches are not so concerned with the rankings, I don't think, but our presidents seem to be very concerned as far as we can tell. And that includes Japanese university presidents. They are now looking at York as a potential competitor whereas 20 or 30 years ago York would never have been on the radar. So we certainly see internationalization in that regard.

One of the other things we see in Japanese universities is what I call here (a little facetiously) the University of the Galapagos Islands. And that refers to the broader discussion in Japan of lots of innovation occurring in Japan. Just like in the Galapagos Islands, it only exists there. And that holds for the quality of Japanese universities. For most of us in a Canadian context, what makes the University of Tokyo a top Japanese university is fairly meaningless. It does not score well on the criteria that we rank universities on. Because its main feature is that it is difficult to get into.

But no Canadian students try to get in. So this is not a particularly meaningful criterion to anyone here. The University of Tokyo in a way is the University of the Galapagos Islands because its excellence, such as it is defined, is only meaningful within that context and it does not translate internationally. So we see some of this in the tertiary education sector where we really see a focus on the domestic market only.

English education. It is just dreadful. It is a huge waste of public resources in the sense that there is so much money invested and there is so little result. One of the ways the Japanese government has tried to address this is the so-called privatization of the national universities, for example, where they have been liberated in term of their budget but decision-making is now localized within a university. We haven't really seen much of a response in terms of innovations from these universities. It is really difficult to tell from abroad whether they look any different now than they did when they were not privatized. They pretty much looked the same as far as I can tell.

One of the challenges the Japanese economy has seen in the past is the lack of innovation. At least that has been identified as a challenge. Often times people say that one of the things that has been going on is that we don't have enough graduate students in Japan or enough PhDs or enough innovation at the university level. At the same time of course, lots of innovation happens in the corporate sector in Japan and it has always happened in the corporate sector, even during the high-growth era. Patents that were being filed were primarily filed by corporate researchers, not by university-based researchers. In aggregate there is nothing wrong with that at all. But that discussion really is not happening very much: what it means is that the research is primarily happening in the corporate sector

not at the universities. So we do not see much of an attempt to address that.

We do see a number of programs, most recently the super global universities that have been designated. We have seen centres of excellence, global universities, they have all kinds of fancy names. They are generally very ambitious, sort of like the immigration plans we have already heard about (200 thousand immigrants to Japan, really? 300 thousand foreign students in Japan, really? This decade?) They are generally over ambitious and they are also massively underfunded, in part because the Japanese government is facing such fiscal constraints these days that even when they are trying to address the obvious they find themselves in situations where they are not able to do very well.

Moving on to other levels of education, let us look at primary and secondary education. Again, declining student numbers are a factor. One of the impacts they have had, especially in rural areas now, is that schools are closing. So you have lots of rural areas in Japan where there is no more competition to enter any high school because there is only one high school. The whole notion of competitive selection as a principle that structured and organized Japanese education is disappearing to some extent.

We see, particularly in the past 20 years, a succession of moral panics of education. Whether it's bullying, or the so-called breakdown of classroom discipline, you can read the Japanese media and you would think that mayhem is happening in schools and kids are being murdered in large numbers and it turns out they are not. Most Japanese kids survive school. They all learn how to read and write in Japanese which is really kind of cool for those of us who have had to do that in our lives. It's pretty cool that ten-year olds can do what I cannot or am still struggling with. There are big successes to Japanese education. But the public perception is one of

moral panic. And of decline. “Education these days is just not what it used to be.” There are all kinds of professors my age who talk a lot about that in Japan. But it is a series of moral panics that do not necessarily lead to policy change but which have led to great decline in the confidence and trust of educational institutions in Japan. Schools are looked upon quite suspiciously these days where education is not delivering what it is meant to deliver to the public. In that process, we have also seen a reversal of this public private hierarchy.

Now in some areas, Tokyo is a great example of this, locally the private institutions at the secondary level are more prestigious than the public institutions in a way that was unthinkable 15 years ago. We also see a lot of tensions emerging within the system that are perhaps being exposed to some extent by the critical perception of education. One of the ones that is the most interesting to us, academics, is that when you look at primary education in Japan, it’s very creative and quite hands-off. Math education for example, is very much focused on problem solving skills where teachers really let kids do things on their own more or less. Something happens on April 1st when they enroll in grade seven middle school where that is all gone. Japanese education becomes very rigid. It turns very much towards a lecture style. But the pedagogy turns even more rigid in junior high and high school. That is one of the tensions that is still really not addressed, or that we are still trying to understand anyways. We have the free will primary system to some extent at least and much more rigid lower and upper secondary systems.

We also see big trends these days towards individualization in education. This notion that teachers addressing a classroom of 35 kids of different abilities will teach them all the same things at the same pace has disappeared more or less in Japanese schools. That was one of the founding principles of postwar education

policy. Now parents are demanding more individual attention to students and schools are grappling with how they can supply that in a system that is not funded in a way to really address that necessarily. But in the end, the system is driven by standardized exams that do very little to encourage critical thinking skills. In educational policy meanwhile, there is a general sense of the failure of reforms in the past.

Most prominently, the so-called *yutori* education which was introduced in 2002 with a reduction of content and the textbooks shifting towards project-based teaching in schools was perceived as a massive failure by lots of people and lots of actors, I think, with very little evidence. But it was part of one of these moral panics saying “oh no, there are 20 pages less in a textbook, kids are not learning anything anymore.” Now these reforms have been superseded since 2012 by new textbooks that are more rigid again and focus much more on content in the way that they did before.

More importantly we also see an absence of education politics. Note for example in Dr. Bernier’s presentation, we talked about structural reorganization of the economy. You would think that education might be part of that discussion. It is not. Japanese politicians generally do not say a whole lot about education at all. When they do it tends to be, something we also see in other areas, as backlash. When politicians become active, it is very conservative and tends to be backlash rather than anything else.

That was a quick overview of higher education and primary education. I will turn briefly to supplementary education as a different sector in this whole system. It is a sector that we do not have so prominently in Canada so it has been interesting to me. By supplementary education I mean out-of-school, afternoon programs that supplement education. Some people call them cram schools. These are both exam preparation schools and

remedial education programs to help kids learn. Lots of, in fact most, Japanese children attend these kinds of schools. Certainly at a high school age. There are interesting things going on in that as you get fewer customers, these businesses are actually thriving. These are all for-profit, not public institutions. So fewer kids oddly means more customers. That is in part because of this individualization trend I have talked about. These cram schools used to teach classes of twenty kids and now do one-on-one teaching. If you think of yourself as an education entrepreneur, you sure can charge a lot more for one-on-one teaching than you can for the class of twenty.

This is working out quite well as an economic model because these moral panics that I have mentioned keep the demand high for supplementary education as people are turning towards alternatives. Parents are willing to pay for anything that will help their kids move into different sectors. The other demographic thing has been happening is that operators are retiring. Cram schools are often run by individuals and many of them started predominantly in the 1970s. So they are now retiring and the owner operated or mom and pop cram schools are beginning to disappear. What that is leading to is corporatization.

We see the emergence of an entire service sector in this stream now that is devoted to education. In that, you see large corporations that have tens of thousands of students. Publicly-listed companies are beginning to form lobbies to talk to the government more directly about these issues, are investing massive amounts in communications technologies for distance teaching and learning, and big data is just on the horizon because often times they give out customized apps or whatever it is for their students to use, which means the collection of data on education is just in sight. So we see a huge sector emerging, even more corporate in Japan than it

was in the past, and which is becoming very much an industry of its own. That is a quick run through on the different parts of education. It was very quick and I can only touch on some aspects. I just wanted to give the overview of the post growth area for education at least.

In conclusion, I would say that I see parallels between what I have described here and what we heard about earlier. Whether it is in the health care sector, or economic policy, or elsewhere, we see this tension between high growth era institutions that continue to operate and to some extent to dominate Japan. But very different circumstances are demanding different kinds of approaches and politicians are having a very hard time grappling with those challenges and tensions. The potential for educational policy at least, is that educational policy in Japan remains highly centralized and the state is playing a very prominent role. So if at some point there were more of a discussion of educational policy and the decision were made to enact reforms, it would still be relatively possible in this sector in a way that is much more difficult for other sectors.

There is potential, I would say, for much more dynamic development and perhaps the corporatization of supplementary education will be one factor in this where you could see innovation. Communications technology or the use of big data might actually make this a forerunner business in Japan in a way that does not exist elsewhere.

Understanding the Ainu Identity

Kelly Lui

The concept of identity has always been intriguing – what distinctively distinguishes one nation from another or individuals within a collective? Is identity constructed or innate? What is the purpose of identity and is it static? By raising these questions, identity provides an essential perspective on international relations, touching on concepts such as citizenship, social justice, and community engagement as well as contributing to understanding individualism within a collective.

In the case of Japan, a homogenous identity has emerged through the transitions of historical periods due to certain visible changing variables of international and domestic influence branding Japan as a “mono-ethnic” population.¹ It is no surprise that the *kozoku kokka* (family-state) ideology has endured amidst historical and political economic changes to shape Japan’s identity as a consanguineous community with the illusion of being nationalistic, including the rise of the *nihonjinron* (theories on “Japanese”). This misleading clarity of a uniform identity has raised many queries, which has brought the ambivalent and “invisible” minority groups into the spotlight through critiquing the processes of assimilation and social Darwinism.

Despite the strong and direct impact of domestic internal forces, the effects of international influences, such as Sinocentrism from China in the Tokugawa era and the Allied Occupation in the Shōwa era, have acted as significant catalysts to the evolution and shaping of the “nationalistic” identity of Japan. By applying Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony to the stabilisation of Japan’s “mono-ethnicity” and

¹ In this paper, I hold the assumption that identity is indeed constructed if not at least built upon.

acknowledging the advent of globalization as precipitating the abundance and accessibility of the sharing of knowledge, this paper aims to focus on the Ainu community and to explore the significance and nuances of the impact of the international community² on the progression of the Ainu identity through its history, suppression, and resurgence in the public sphere.

The Nature of Identity

How is identity created? And for whom is it created? Robert Cox argued that “theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose”.³ The same critical lens will be applied here to show that Japan’s identity has been constructed by certain individuals for the purpose of creating national unity (*kozoku kokka*). Michael Weiner argues that the lasting *kozoku kokka* adapted to historical changes to recreate iconic symbols as seen in historical and modern references in Japanese popular culture (e.g. manga and anime) and through institutions alongside intellectual and cultural exchange during the organization of modernization in the Meiji Period.⁴

By the early 20th century, this reinvented “nationalism” had infiltrated all levels of society, which created a distinction between “self” and “others.” The obvious indicator of difference between the two was material inequality since the “lack of material

² I see the international community as a community with history, resources, support, acknowledgement, and space accessibly enabling minority groups.

³ Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 10 (1981): 128, accessed: 20 December 2014, DOI: 10.1177/03058298810100020501.

⁴ Michael Weiner, “The Invention of Identity,” in *Japan’s Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity*, ed. Michael Weiner (New York: Routledge, 1997): 1.

development provided indisputable evidence of inferiority”.⁵

To sustain this ideology of nationalism, the social sciences provided a sufficient platform for academically proven information justifying the organization of paternalistic policies and administrative processes.⁶ Gramsci explains these dynamic forces by emphasizing that major historical developments or the emergence of a new ruling society are based on a change in intellectual or moral reform – the consciousness. Consciousness can be defined in two ways; either as intersubjective – the nature of norms preserved by social relations; or as a historical structure – the collective images of a specific social group. There may be various collective images that can cause conflicts, thus institutionalization is used to maintain and control internal conflict.

Historical structure is the interrelation of three factors: the organization of production and the causal social forces, forms of state, and world order. As Cox puts it: “changes in the organisation of production generate new social forces which, in turn, bring about changes in the structure of states; and the generalisation of changes in the structure of states alters the problematic of world order”.⁷ Institutionalization can be seen as the root of cultural hegemony in that the creation of these institutions is for the purpose of collective good for the community. However, one must be wary of them since “institutions are particular amalgams of ideas and material power which in turn influence the development of ideas and material capabilities”.⁸ Through understanding Gramsci, we can effectively analyze the growth to hegemony of the Japanese identity and the forces behind it.

⁵ Ibid, 8-11.

⁶ Ibid, 12.

⁷ Cox, “Social Forces,” 138.

⁸ Ibid, 137.

Prior to Japan's resurged "nationalism," Sinocentrism was the dominant ideology, with China as the foundational civilized core and all other groups as the "barbaric" periphery. The dominance of China obliged the barbarians, such as Japan, to pay tribute. Masazumi Maruyama discusses Japan's application of the mimesis of this structure of hierarchy as an act of defensive definitive power for the "Other" in the way that Japan applied it to its relationship with the Ainu.⁹ As Maruyama explains: "the criteria used in this process of coconstitutional identity stress physical, cultural, spiritual, geographical, and linguistic differences, denigrating the Other as not only different but inferior".¹⁰ The Sinocentric ideology was later displaced with the introduction of Western influence, particularly in the situation of territorial clarification of Hokkaido with Russia.

It was there that Japan adapted to acknowledge the Ainu as Japanese in hopes of absorption for spatial advantages.¹¹ This particular situation illustrates the strategic fluidity of the self-preservation of identity when faced with unanticipated external forces whether they are domestic or international.

The Oppression of the Ainu

Before getting into the discourse on the Ainu and the Japanese identity, it is important to discuss the contextualization of Ainu history as Japanese history. David Howell finds himself at odds with whether or not the Ainu's history is subject to that of Japan: risking

⁹ Masazumi Maruyama, "The Ainu: A Discourse on Being Japanese," in *The Emerging Monoculture: Assimilation and the "Model Minority"*, ed. Eric M. Kramer (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 91-92.

¹⁰ Ibid, 92.

¹¹ Ibid, 92-93.

“privileging the state-nation” and “historical imagination” on one hand, and contributing to “a monolithic view of Japanese ethnic and cultural identity” on the other hand.¹² Though an answer may not be directly found, Howell notes three challenges remaining to be resolved; (1) acceptance of Ainu history, (2) lack of sources, and (3) the framework of discussion on minority issues in Japan.¹³

Are these challenges limited to domestic forces? In this section I argue that the influence of international pressure in contextualizing these challenges, as well as the international community, in manifestations such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, provide a viable transnational solution in overcoming these obstacles.

Before we can begin to question who the Ainu are, we must first ask who the Ainu were. It is essential to acknowledge the origins of the Ainu as well as to take note of the placed territorial and existential borders of their community in order to understand the significance of its transcendence amongst the historical and political economic shifts of Japan. The Ainu, from the perspective of the *wajin* (Japanese people), were a hunter-gatherer community with distinctive cultural and religious traditions that inhabited the northern tip of Honshu, Hokkaido, and the Kuriles territory. It is necessary to note the external construction of the Ainu as having one language and one culture – in reality, the placement of different Ainu communities resulted in variable ecological and habitual adaptations as well as language dialects. As in reality they had ranging levels of mobility and modes of life, Ainu as one clump is a *wajin*

¹² David L. Howell, “Is Ainu History Japanese History?” in *Beyond Ainu Studies*, eds. Mark J. Hudson, Ann-elise lewallen, and Mark K. Watson (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2014), 103.

¹³ *Ibid*, 113-114.

misconception.¹⁴ Keeping in mind the holistic intelligence of the Ainu (in comparison to typically being identified as “unsophisticated”), “the lack of a notion of ownership and property, along with the absence of a written system of language [...] proved to be disadvantages for the Ainu in their historical struggle with the encroaching *Wajin*”.¹⁵

The settlement of *wajin* in Ainu communities began trade relations and eventually led to the implementation of the official trading posts and regulations of a market system. These trading posts instigated a biased relationship that discouraged the Ainu from trading freely, increased exploitation, and integrated Japanese norms into the Ainu community – colonialism had taken place.

These trading posts were later monopolized by the Matsumae family, furthering dictated regulations such as limiting trading partners and trading rates. These regulations perpetuated an exclusive system exploiting the Ainu as a labour force rather than a partnership as the market became a hegemonic system.¹⁶ In response, the Ainu retaliated for the purpose of ending the monopoly, only to be defeated. The division in political and socio-economic standing did not allow the Ainu to truly challenge their oppressors until much later.¹⁷

The Evolution of the Ainu Identity

Centralized in a border region, the Ainu were of spatial significance to Japan in the context of political economics and international relations. International

¹⁴ Ibid, 89-90.

¹⁵ Ibid, 89.

¹⁶ Ibid, 94.

¹⁷ Richard Siddle, “Ainu: Japan’s Indigenous People,” in *Japan’s Indigenous Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity*, ed. Michael Weiner (New York: Routledge, 1997), 18-24.

pressure provided a major push in changing Japan's perspective on the Ainu and created a need to absorb the community for its spatial importance. Alexander Bukh comments that the Ainu were categorized at the very bottom of the "cultural hierarchy" in a trilateral relation with Japan and Russia.¹⁸ Changing from the policies of the Matsumae, the purpose behind the new policies implemented was to assimilate the Ainu community in order to assert their Japanese origins as much as they were resisted. As Maruyama notes:

The Japanization of the Ainu included encouraging Buddhism by founding temples while prohibiting Christianity; using Japanese language; wearing Japanese-styled clothes; eating Japanese rice while prohibiting the traditional meat diet; changing names to Japanese style; and prohibiting mustaches, the *Iomante*, and tattoos, which were all essential to traditional assimilation policies over the Ainu.¹⁹

Again, the spatial self-preservation of the Japanese identity due to external international pressures is apparent as a force behind implementing boundaries upon the "Other" through forces of absorption, assimilation, and naturalization, which could be better categorized as exclusion and exploitation.

At the end of World War II and during the Allied Occupation, Japan found itself in a period of reinvention in which it was bonding modernity and nationalism. This placed Japan in an unusual situation where it struggled to balance a "love-hate" relationship with the Western states that pushed for liberalisation

¹⁸ Alexander Bukh, "Ainu Identity and Japan's Identity: The Struggle for Subjectivity," *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies* 28 (2010): 36, accessed: 7 November 2014.

¹⁹ Maruyama, "The Ainu: A Discourse on Being Japanese," 96.

and modernization while attempting to transcend the “Western-defined inferiority” as experienced by its East-Asian neighbours. Yumiko Iida makes the comment: “To embrace modernization, however, was also to pursue the goal implicit in the universal narrative of ‘civilization,’ and that meant, among other things, accepting a lesser identity in the international political representational scheme as a non-Western other”.²⁰

Interestingly enough, despite the “achievements” of this period of post-war Japan in economic growth and liberalisation, there were prominent Japanese voices which discarded this new “native spirit”.²¹ Iida explains this response by arguing that Japan’s realization of its identity and “self” through the imposed “Western gaze” created a paradox: “this is nothing but the posing of Japan’s identity in Western terms which in turn establishes the centrality of the West as the universal point of reference”.²² Iida continues by explaining the struggle for Japan’s self-validation by means of “nationalism” in the following passage:

Here, if we are to speak of ‘nationalism’ we should distinguish this version from varieties rooted in simple expressions of one’s attachment to the nation as a common polity wherein some sense of community is still intact. What characterized Japanese national hegemony at the historical juncture of the 1930s was the exhaustion of the links formerly capable of absorbing and channelling popular sentiments back into the national hegemony as its source of legitimacy. It was only in this context of the

²⁰ Yumiko Iida, *Rethinking Identity in Modern Japan*, London: Routledge, 2002, 12, accessed: 20 December 2014, URL: www.tandfebooks.com/doi/view/10.4324/9780203996386.

²¹ *Ibid*, 2.

²² *Ibid*, 15.

troubled relations between knowledge production and the subject, on the one hand, and between knowledge and the historical world, on the other, that the emperor mythology could play the potent ideological role of transcending the historical ills generated by modernity in a vision of a ‘true Japan’ existing in an alternative time and space outside of modernity.²³

Within this context, the advent of modernization brought about the temporary importance of the Ainu community, as they were a “relic” of the past and a connection to the environment.²⁴ However, not only were the Ainu thought to be racially barbaric, but also, their socio-economic inequality contributed to the justification of their subordination on the basis of existing “innate natural differences” against the backdrop of external pressures to become a modernized Japan.²⁵

Though they were oppressive, the main mode of thought among the Ainu was to remain compliant with the methods of modernization and assimilation since the impression was that it was the only way to preserve the Ainu community.²⁶

Ainu Identity in Modern-Day Japan

At what point is an individual integrated into a community and to what extent does the governing body have to protect its citizens? The concept of citizenship in Japan has evolved and adjusted from its origins of being subjects of the state. Siddle makes the distinction

²³ Ibid, 21-22.

²⁴ Bukh, “Ainu Identity and Japan’s Identity,” 37.

²⁵ Siddle, “Ainu: Japan’s Indigenous People,” 17.

²⁶ Bukh, “Ainu Identity and Japan’s Identity,” 39.

between citizenship (*shiminken*), as fake and constructed, and nationality (*kokusei*), that instigates the authentic “blood-connection”.²⁷ With the support of scholars and academia during the Meiji Period to support the hegemonic ‘mono-ethnic’ culture through literature and other mediums, assimilation was practiced upon the Ainu in hopes of either terminating the culture through integrated education or ‘diluting’ the blood through intermarriage.

It was not until after World War II and during the Occupation that the United States of America authored a new constitution and implemented a different concept of citizenship as seen in Article 14: “All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin”.²⁸ This direct pressure due to Western influence and gaze received a positive response from Japanese communities. However, despite the establishment of these new freedoms, the Ainu were not included and continued to be victims of discrimination because the “essentialized notions of inferior Ainu ‘blood’ served to deny Ainu individuals the opportunities afforded to ordinary Japanese in the period of high economic growth”.²⁹

How does a minority group find support amidst inequality at all levels within a nation? The phenomenon of globalization and the development of the international community have proven to provide a platform for such groups to find resources, support, and acknowledgement. Contrary to the Western influences

²⁷ Richard Siddle, “The Limits to Citizenship in Japan: Multiculturalism, Indigenous Rights and the Ainu,” *Citizenship Studies* 7 (2003): 448, accessed: 7 November 2014. DOI: 10.1080/1362102032000134976.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 453.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

of modernization, the international movement to address the rights of indigenous groups, such as the formation of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (UNWGIP), which called for the full implementation of a radical agenda of indigenous rights”,³⁰ became a positive force for the resurgence of the Ainu community, leading them to fight for their right to be acknowledged as an indigenous community in the 1970s. It is through the acknowledgement of, participation in, and support from international forums that the Ainu found a new platform from which to assert their rights as an ethnic minority – a phenomenon which has allowed certain groups to provide resources and support to one another.

In contrast, on the domestic front Ainu land had been nationalized since 1872, and the implementation of the Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act, which tried to reorganize the Ainu community from one heavily invested in hunting into a community of farmers, was passed in 1899.³¹ Starting in the 1930s, the Hokkaido Utari Association attempted to balance co-existence with multiculturalism, however it only served to show the dominance and power of the state to provide resources and maintain control over the community as well as display the unequal distribution of resources.³² It was not until the 1970s that a generation of radical youths began to challenge these attempts at integration.

In 1984, the Ainu New Law, which encompassed “key rights and guarantees to enable Ainu to gain full citizenship,” political participation, a self-reliance fund that would be handled by the Ainu themselves, “and the

³⁰ Ibid, 454.

³¹ Ibid, 452.

³² Ibid, 454.

rights to cultural identity, in particular the use and revitalization of the Ainu language”,³³ was adopted by the Utari Kyōkai. However, it was the Ainu Cultural Protection Act (CPA) in 1997 that expressed the government’s new openness to multiculturalism.³⁴ However, Siddle argues that policies such as the CPA have been targeting only the preservation of the culture, rather than focusing on the protection and sustainability of the Ainu people – working as tools of de-politicization rather than as tools to improve the situation of the Ainu people.³⁵

As we can see, there is a constant need to remain critical and to question the intention and purpose of policy – for whom is the policy made? And for what purpose? Even questions as basic as these should not be taken for granted.

When questioning what it means to be Ainu today, cultural tourism is a common theme in responses. Lisa Hiwasaki states that in “a study conducted in 1980, 42.6 percent of university students living in Tokyo answered “tourism” to the question: “Which occupation do you think Ainu people are engaged [in] now?””.^{36,37} The integration of the recognized Ainu community as *kanko-ainu* (Ainu in tourism) has been controversial in the discussion of maintaining the authenticity of the culture due to the implications of introducing an economic objective as well as the questionability of its preserving a culture which induces and sustains stereotypes and generalizations. Contrary to this thought, Hiwasaki

³³ Ibid, 455.

³⁴ Ibid, 455-456.

³⁵ Ibid, 449.

³⁶ The study also showed that the same students acquired their knowledge of the Ainu community via the media and tourism.

³⁷ Lisa Hiwasaki, “Ethnic Tourism in Hokkaido and the Shaping of Ainu Identity,” *Pacific Affairs* 73 (Autumn, 2000): 402, accessed: 13 November 2014, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2672026>.

argues for the boons that tourism has brought to the Ainu community by listing the following five advantages: (1) economic stability, (2) conservation of culture, (3) increased awareness and accessible educational information, (4) “creative” responses to Ainu culture, and (5) political visibility.^{38,39} Hiwasaki also elaborates on domestic information exchange through the medium of museums. These cultural hubs allow for the preservation of culture as well as increase its accessibility, both to *waijin* and to new generations of Ainu.⁴⁰

Despite the “preservation” and acceptance of the Ainu culture by these means, it is evident that Ainu individuals still struggle with discrimination in their very own country.⁴¹ During an interview with Hiwasaki, an Ainu shopkeeper repeated stereotypical questions asked to Ainu individuals: “Do you go to the mountains to chase bears in your free time?”; “My, your Japanese is very good. Where did you learn how to speak that well?”; “Do you pay taxes?”; “What do Ainu people eat?”⁴²

Imposed borders, both spatial and existential or social, as a tool of absorption, exclusion or assimilation, and naturalization remain implicit throughout the discourse. As seen in the case of ethnic tourism in Hokkaido, the Ainu are still given a very limited sense of identity in the socio-economic sphere. Mark Watson questions the political geography of the undocumented, “hidden” Ainu outside of their historical situation in Hokkaido.⁴³ It illuminates the issue of why the Ainu are

³⁸ Ibid, 397.

³⁹ Ibid, 402-404.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 407.

⁴¹ Ibid, 402.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Mark K. Watson, “Tokyo Ainu and the Urban Indigenous Experience,” in *Beyond Ainu Studies*, Mark J. Hudson, ann-elise

not properly represented anywhere outside of Hokkaido and contextualizes two concepts; (1) “*localization* or *regionalization* of Ainu issues”, and (2) the plurality of identity dependent on local perspective.⁴⁴ Moving beyond the placed domestic borders that create spatial, socio-economic, and existential barriers seems to rely on Japan’s ability to acknowledge the history and urban progression of the Ainu that extend past ethnic tourism. Building this domestic political placement and understanding of the Ainu calls for a transnational perspective to provide the Ainu with the resources needed to find acknowledgement, ideas, and support in solidarity independent of barriers and borders.

Ainu Identity from the Ainu Perspective

The questions we ask concerning the Ainu should no longer rely solely on how we presently understand them from an external viewpoint, but rather on acknowledging and respecting the Ainu identity through their narrative. This section will consequently aim to understand the Ainu identity from the Ainu perspective. Tin Tin Htun provides an alternative perspective by introducing the social identity theory which posits that individuals choose their identity within, and in response to, their position in a given social system. This strategic essentialism allows identity to be fluid as individuals choose from the options of varying social relations for any given moment and place.

Though the struggle remains present, the theory can be seen in Htun’s conclusions from comparing three minority groups (the three groups being the Ainu, Buraku and Zainichi Koreans) by conducting interviews

lewallen, and Mark K. Watson (USA: University of Hawai’i Press, 2014), 81.

⁴⁴ Watson, “Tokyo Ainu and the Urban Indigenous Experience,” 82.

with fourteen individuals. The compelling quotations from the interviewed individuals illustrate the impact of having direct agency in their experience. One Ainu female participant expressed it as follows: “It’s a part of me and it’s my root. I can’t live separately from it [being Ainu]. It is very important for me and I don’t want anyone to defile it. Well, what can I say, except that it is very important”.⁴⁵ Another Ainu participant commented that “Although I [*jibun*]⁴⁶ want to forget about it [being Ainu], the other people [other Ainu] didn’t let me”.⁴⁷

It is evident then that the often unresolved complexity of identity provides substantial rhetoric on existence and agency as seen here in present-day Ainu. Htun’s study provides understanding of the relationship between minority groups and the majority through the lens of socio-historical relations rather than political economics.⁴⁸ By looking from this perspective, we are able to validate the agency and activism that is occurring at the individual level and in relation with the collective.

This concept of fluidity and complexity in identity and self-agency is further explored in Sunazawa Kayo’s “As a Child of Ainu,” where she reflects upon her coming-of-age experience as an Ainu by recounting memories of her childhood, when she was raised by her Ainu great-grandmother, and as an active transnational Ainu living in Malaysia. Dealing with judgement from a young age, Kayo’s great-grandmother passed on wise and uplifting advice:

⁴⁵ Tin Tin Htun, “Social Identities of Minority Others in Japan: Listening to the Narratives of Ainu, Buraku and Zainichi Koreans,” *Japan Forum* 24 (2012): 3, accessed: 20 November 2014, DOI: 10.1080/0955803/2011.637635, 10.

⁴⁶ The nuance of *jibun*’s pronoun usage of self provides a distinction between the self (the speaker) and the other (the listeners).

⁴⁷ Htun, “Social Identities of Minority Others in Japan,” 18.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 19.

Don't feel bitter about that person, perhaps there was a bad spirit near you then. Bad spirits test in difficult times. And these bad spirits give us an opportunity to think about how to overcome obstacles around us. A person who can overcome these trials will be emotionally charged and will gradually become stronger and more passionate in her life.⁴⁹

These words have influenced Kayo with the mindset of transcendence bringing about a unique personal account of transnationalism. Her travels abroad illustrate the undeniable differences between the Ainu experience and those of other indigenous communities; however, the similarities in experience and the progress of these communities provide hope and support. Kayo revels at the introduction of Māori education in schools and community centres: “I could see the children’s eyes light up and the way they absorbed the knowledge about their culture, language, and their right to live as Māori motivated me to reflect on my own situation as an Ainu person”.⁵⁰ Contextualizing her specific experience as an Ainu person within the international community, Kayo was able to actively support the Ainu community from abroad by organizing workshops, holding discussions revolving around the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and campaigning for the protection of Ainu ecology.⁵¹

Following in her great-grandmother’s footsteps, Kayo ends her account with motivating words for the next generation:

⁴⁹ Sunazawa Kayo, “As a Child of Ainu,” in *Beyond Ainu Studies*, eds. Mark J. Hudson, Ann-elise Lewallen, and Mark K. Watson (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2014), 93.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 96.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, 97.

In the future, many enemies will appear before you. You may not recognize or even see them, but you will be frightened or anxious. Try to look around you because you already have many friends who will protect and support you. These friends and allies may not be near you or within your own homeland, but look harder because sometimes they are in distant lands, ever ready to support you. But most important, look deep within to find the strength to fight for yourselves and your people, because you must not forget that you are Ainu.⁵²

The invaluable significance of recognition and support independent of borders is indubitable, but at the core remains the individual and the opportunity to transcend those borders within.

Conclusion

The historical structure that provided the foundation for the hegemonic “mono-ethnic” identity of Japan can be critiqued by analyzing the intellectual and cultural institutions that sustain it as well as by being conscious of its international point-of-reference. This can be prominently seen in the majority of biased academic information produced, the terminology which is used, and in established institutions providing evidence for unity under the false pretence of social Darwinism. This desire to be seen as a uniform whole based on the value of *kazoku kokka* has transcended and adapted to the shifts in historical structure that have come about due to modernization.

It is evident that international relations have significantly influenced the evolution of both the

⁵² Ibid, 98.

Japanese identity and the identity of the Ainu. From the resurgence of Japan's nationalism to absorption of territory to the pressures of modernization for assimilation and social Darwinism to the acknowledgement of indigenous status, it is more than clear that international relations directly impacts the fluidity of a nation's identity and that of a group. Political economic relations were also identifiable as forces of influence on the Ainu and Japanese identities in that they drew the distinction between the useful productive "self" and the incompetent primitive "others" as well as reinventing the culture of nationalism.

However, there are alternatives to viewing identity and its construction, which is seen in Htun's findings, which utilize the social identity theory, and which is also visible in Kayo's experience. By adopting relevant systems in which policies and administrative processes place a larger focus on individuals, the ability to acknowledge the Ainu identity and its importance within the Japanese identity can prove to be less daunting. It is important to remember that people constitute the foundation for any nation; this represents the continual challenge of individualism within collectivism and its significance for domestic and international relations. After critiquing the placement of the Ainu and the borders on their identity, hope seems to lie with the influence of the international community.

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A photograph of two women standing under a transparent umbrella at night. The woman on the left is wearing glasses and a dark patterned top, and the woman on the right is wearing a light-colored coat. They appear to be in conversation. The background is dark with some blurred lights and structures.

POP CULTURE AND IDENTITY:

Anime, Angura, and Japanese Abroad

LA CULTURE POPULAIRE ET L'IDENTITÉ:

L'Anime, l'Angura, et les Japonais à l'Étranger

The Cultural Odor of Astro Boy

Sandra Annett

Good afternoon! Today, I'd like to read you a slightly edited excerpt from a chapter in my book *Anime Fan Communities: Transcultural Flows and Frictions*. This chapter is on Tezuka Osamu's classic 1963 anime *Tetsuwan Atomu*, better known in the West as *Astro Boy*. For many years, *Astro Boy* was credited in animation scholarship as the "origin of anime." That's not quite accurate: there were hundreds of animated films made in Japan before World War II and Japanese animators kept busy throughout the 1950s doing feature films and commercials for television.

But *Astro Boy* was the first example of a particular kind of anime that we know well today: the televised serial, or children's TV cartoon. Before and during WWII, theatrical animation in Japan and the United States wasn't meant just for children: it was for general audiences, including adults. It was also highly nationalized, especially during the war, when propaganda films were the order of the day. But in the post-war period, advertisers began to see the new medium of television as a way to target their products particularly at children using cartoons. When *Astro Boy* began airing in 1963, it became part of a growing global media system that used animation to attract child audiences. *Astro Boy* may not have been the first anime, but it can be seen as a major early step in the media mix system that would produce global mega-hits like *Pokémon* in the late '90s. It did this by working through a discourse of globalization as "postnationalism."

Postnationalism, as scholar Kenichi Ohmae put it, is the idea that "traditional nation states have become unnatural, even impossible, business units in a global

economy”.¹ Economically and culturally, national borders were thought to be collapsing, leading to a new world of “global flows” and “mediascapes” where, in theory, information should be able to circulate free from the hindrances of cultural specificity. Now in practice, globalization has never flowed that smoothly. The cultural frictions that result when anime are translated and fans raise a ruckus are just as important as the way anime flows from nation to nation. Through *Astro Boy*, I will show how Tezuka tried to make a postnational program that was “culturally odorless” and accessible to children all over the world, and ended up with a work that did impact children in Japan, the US, and Canada – but each in different ways.

To start, let’s go back to the source: the production and distribution of the show.

There have been three separate Japanese television versions of the *Astro Boy* anime; there was the 1963 and 1966 black and white television series, there was the color series produced in the 1980s, and there was an additional series produced in the early 2000s. All three of them have been translated into dozens of languages from Arabic to Tagalog and they have aired all over the world.

But today, I want to focus on the 1963 and 1980 versions; on the English versions along with the Japanese. And just to make things more fun, there have been two separate English dubs just for the 1980 series alone. There was a version produced by Nippon Television with American voice actors that ended up being broadcast mostly in Australia and didn’t get to be shown (or didn’t appear) in a lot of places in the United States, except for few areas. The second version was a separate Canadian version produced in the early ‘80s by

¹ Ken’ichi Ōmae, *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 5.

a Montréal-based distribution company called Via le Monde for the CBC (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation), which was in English and French. To keep these versions straight, I'm going to follow fellow anime scholar Frederick Schodt in calling the Japanese version of the program "*Mighty Atom*," which was Tezuka's own preferred English translation of his title "*Tetsuwan Atomu*." I will call the American and Canadian versions by their official title, which is "*Astro Boy*." Then I am going to call the Japanese-speaking little robot boy character "Atom" and the English-speaking character "Astro." That way, we will always know which version we are talking about at any moment.

The production of *Mighty Atom* began when Tezuka saw American cartoon series like the *Flintstones* and the *Jetsons* that were being aired in Japan and said, "Hey! I can make television cartoons like that too. I can export these. I have all of these vastly popular manga that I can base my new series on and everyone will want to see this." Schodt recounts that Tezuka had anticipated a possible sale to the United States when making the first pilot episode of *Mighty Atom*. And he wasn't wrong to do so.

The program premiered on January 1st, 1963, and by February of 1963, lawyers had put together a draft contract giving NBC Enterprises the option to broadcast 52 episodes of *Mighty Atom* in the United States for a minimum guarantee of around \$520,000 dollars. That was quite a bit in the '60s. It was localized by New York producer-director Fred Ladd and it was broadcast in the United States beginning September 7th, 1963. So, just 8 months after its first Japanese airing, it was airing in the United States in English. As an anime fan, I think that's a pretty good turnaround even today, to get a show out in less than a year. Hence, it's easy to

see *Astro Boy* as a prime example of post-national anime, an anime that's just meant to go global from the start.

In this case though, we have to ask: "what does it mean to be 'post-national'?" What is a post-national anime actually like? In the case of *Mighty Atom*, it would be easy to argue that post-national is just another term for "Americanized." NBC Enterprises' Jim Dodd explicitly noted that his company didn't plan to advertise the fact that the series was being animated in Japan, in part due to lingering post-war animosity. And Schodt reports that Tezuka himself tried to make the show as culturally neutral as possible. He deliberately tried to anticipate the feelings of foreigners and to avoid any imagery that they might regard as too oriental or too exotic. This meant using English lettering in printed papers and on signs and exchanging Buddhist and Shinto imagery for Christian motifs such as churches and crosses. Some American censors thought Tezuka played it way too loose with the Christian imagery and they in fact cut out a lot of the churches and crosses that he put in because they said, "Oh no! This is sacrilegious." Some episodes, in fact, were refused altogether. While Americans said that these were not suitable for children, in Japan, they had different ideas of what was suitable for children to watch.

Nevertheless, Tezuka's intention was to produce a global text by making it less identifiably Japanese and more palatable to the global audience, tacitly imaged as Anglophone and Christian. Tezuka described this style as *mukokusekitekiteki* or "denationalized," a term that would become a catchword for the appeal of anime abroad in the post-national period. That said, I think it's a bit of an oversimplification to call any incorporation of Western imagery into a non-Western text "Americanization." That's what scholars always go for: "Oh, it's all Americanization." Well, it's true that it's not

uncommon for anime creators to aim for cultural neutrality by erasing Japaneseness from their works.

Tomino Yoshiyuki, the creator of the popular *Gundam* franchise, has claimed that he purposely tried to avoid having ethnicity and tried to remove all cultural elements from his science fiction epics. Scholar Koichi Iwabuchi has also cited Oshii Mamoru, the director of the famed *Ghost in the Shell* films, as claiming that “Japanese animators and cartoonists unconsciously choose not to draw realistic Japanese characters if they wish to draw attractive characters.” This leads Iwabuchi to argue that cartoons are culturally odorless commodities or goods in which the producing countries bodily, racial, and ethnic characteristics are erased or softened. The Japanese term for this culturally neutral quality is *mukokuseki*, which is the same kind of term that Tezuka had used, literally meaning something or someone lacking any nationality or ethnicity.

According to Iwabuchi, the desire for cultural odorlessness comes partly from the incorporation of Japanese and other non-western media products into the Western-dominated global distribution network. Thus, it can be seen as a kind of cultural homogenization. But at the same time, Iwabuchi stresses that the Japanese practice of making culturally odorless commodities isn’t just an imitation of American media homogenization. It’s not induced by that kind of “domination” of American media, or a uni-directional flow of culture from the States to Japan. He says that it’s actually the result of de-centered and re-centered integration of production and distribution industries in many nations; each different nation contributed something, however asymmetrically, to the process of making animation global.

Iwabuchi calls this “transculturation” or uses the term “transnationalism” to describe Japan’s approach to media globalization, but in practice, it is a form of post-

nationalism. And that's because this new form of power is based on overcoming a nation-centric view of global cultural power and instead re-centering globalization on multinational corporations and regional trade units. So, just like Ohmae was saying, the nation isn't really our business unit any longer. The nation is going to be a corporation or it's going to be a text, in this case, *Astro Boy*.

When it comes to *Astro Boy*, scholars like Brian Ruh have followed Iwabuchi in stating that *Astro Boy* supports the argument against the idea that the globalization of television and popular culture is necessarily a one-way flow from the United States to the rest of the world. Instead, Ruh argues that *Astro Boy* represents a new localized form of media industry. Looking at the show itself, it does seem like the global circulation of *Astro Boy* involved more than just Americanizing in the show. In practice, every time it was translated it picked up new cultural elements, new influences, or new odors depending on its path of travel.

I'd like to compare the Canadian translation with the American and Japanese versions, and in that way, we can see how deodorization isn't just erasing cultural elements but a process of negotiation, or friction, or even adding things that happens when producers are trying to make something for particular distributors who are concerned with audiences in a particular place. Now, I'm going to look at one simple incident from very early in the series. This is the story of the "Robot Circus."

The 1963 Japanese "Robot Circus" story actually contains references to some really contentious social issues of that day. In this episode, little Atom is sold by his disillusioned scientist trader Dr. Tenma to a circus. Dr. Tenma says, "I made you to replace my son but you can't grow up. You're a robot! I don't want you anymore." And he sells him into a circus (Great little narrative logic there!). Astro Boy is then forced to fight

in this robot gladiatorial arena and there are all these parallels with slaves in Roman times. His ownership papers, which Tezuka had carefully written out in English, declared Astro Boy to be the property of the circus master. But he is rescued from this state of slavery by Dr. Ochanomizu, following the declaration of a Robot Bill of Rights, which is announced on a television news broadcast. You can see this hand turning on a television and there's the Robot Bill of Rights protest. A hundred thousand robots out cheering for their rights. An actual real, timely image of television, given that in August of 1963, just one month before *Astro Boy* aired in the States, television news broadcasts were showing the historic march on Washington in support of Kennedy's Civil Rights Act.

Therefore, audiences at that time would have been recognizing the parallels between the robots and contemporary civil rights protests. The 1963 American dub of this episode kept the protest scene, so Americans would have actually been seeing that image, but they took out the shot of the ownership contract that had, again, been written in English. And they did that because the director Fred Ladd had explicitly stated that it evoked associations with slavery and they didn't want that to stay in the finished product. But without any tangible reference to slavery in the show, the protest of the robots in the American version had less resonance with the civil rights movement and the struggles against racial segregation and discrimination that Tezuka was trying to build in. It kind of makes the protest more fantastic, just like western science fiction movies with robot uprisings. There's always a robot uprising and so westerners are going to see that as a "science fiction thing" and not as a social commentary.

We can say the American version does kind of deodorize the issues of racial discrimination that Tezuka was trying to critique originally. The 1980 colour remake

strays even farther from any kinds of social issues. It avoids any slavery or any protests. In the Japanese colour version, Atom is kind of tricked into signing away his own freedom. He joins a Disney-like circus instead of a gladiatorial arena and there are all these Fantasia-style robot hippos and mechanical flying baby elephants; it is very much a dig against Disney. But, even this apparently more benign version still had to be censored every time it was transported to a different country.

The Canadian adaptation is kind of the blandest of the bland. The Japanese episode had that satirical jab at Disney, and it also had a subtle geopolitics of competition. The deceptive Circus is stated to be in America, Atom is described as an example of super advanced technology, and when Dr. Ochanomizu comes to free him, he says he's "a Japanese scientist" ("*Nihon no kagakusha*"). So we know that the Japanese are the good guys and the Americans are commercial and corrupt. In the American version, they didn't want that in, obviously, as it made the Americans look bad, so they changed the circus to be in Chicago and built a connection with gangsters. This meant that the circus people are tied in with gangsters and it's the underside of American culture, but that's okay, they can be the bad guys. And the renamed scientist, Dr. Elefun, is no longer from Japan. He just says, "In *my country*, we don't accept this." It's a really awkward unnamed "my country."

Finally in the Canadian version, there's no America, there's no Chicago, and there's no country. Japan becomes a city called Futuropolis. And this is where Astro Boy comes from: Futuropolis, a high tech global capital in a stateless post-national world as so many globalization scholars of the 1980s and 1990s forecast. The Canadian version also removes a lot of footage, to the point that the Robot Circus episode begins at what's

nearly the halfway mark of the Australian-American broadcast. Most of the cuts involve violence. The Montréal producers were following stricter Canadian broadcast regulations. They deleted or altered even implied off-screen violence. For example, at one point, the circus master threatens Astro. You see a shadow falling across him and you can hear the sound of a whip snapping off-screen. They took out the whip as it was considered too violent. They took out the sound effect. The end result was that anything that was deemed potentially disturbing was cut so the program would flow smoothly on young Canadian's screens without ruffling any feathers, either public or commercial. In this light, it's easy to see *Astro Boy* as an example of post-national globalization that depends on cultural odorlessness.

But when we look at adaptations of anime, it's important to look not just at what's cut out but also what's added in. Heather Hendershot, who wrote a really good book called *Saturday Morning Censors*, argued that the use of censorship is a social process in which the politics of class, race, gender, violence, and other potentially problematic issues are deconstructed and reconstructed. Censorship also adds things that emphasize divergent understandings of texts. And in this way, the Canadian version of *Astro Boy* can be seen as both removing *and adding* cultural odors, evoking a different set of viewers and different physical practices, different bodies in the act of spectatorship.

To illustrate how this works, I want to conclude with a look at *Via Le Monde's* most significant addition to *Astro Boy*, which is an educational segment called "Geronimo's Report." If anyone watched this in the '80s as a child you might remember "Geronimo's Report." It happened at the end of every episode and went something like this: "Oh, it's you Astro," Peabody says. "Hurry, Geronimo is waiting for your report."

Then a computer: “Good day. I am ready to record your report for the archives of the institute. Make it short. Thank you.” Following this prompt Astro Boy recaps everything that happened in the episode and a narrator says:

Have you watched carefully and listened carefully to Astro Boy’s report? Yes, I’m sure you have. Take out a pencil and piece of paper to write down which error, I repeat, which error Astro made on purpose in his report to his computer Geronimo in order to play with you. Did he make a mistake on a name? A place? A detail of the adventure which you’ve just seen? Can you remember what it was? Compare your answer with those of your friends and may the best player win.

Finally, Astro Boy himself says, “And remember friends, our game will continue in the next episode.”

So there’s a little game introduced, followed by the next episode preview. After that, Astro Boy looks directly at the camera and addresses the children who are watching the show. This kind of fourth-wall-breaking segment lasted nearly five minutes in a program that only ran half an hour: five minutes’ worth of basically filler material recapping the episode and previewing the next episode. And the reason for that, first and foremost, was to keep the show in compliance with the broadcasting regulations in Canada and especially in the province of Québec where the French language version of the program was broadcast.

While American children's broadcasting in the 1980s was increasingly deregulated and market-driven under the Reagan administration, Canadian broadcasting worked under a dual public-private setup. So official bodies like the Canadian Radio-television and

Telecommunications Commission, the CRTC, worked together with coalitions of commercial broadcasters and public organizations to create children's programming policy. And along with codes of content regarding ethics, violence, and stereotyping, the CRTC and self-regulating networks created policies that reduced or, in Québec, completely cut commercials during children's programming.

So, when they showed kid's cartoons, there could not be any commercials. This meant that Via Le Monde had to take out all footage that was contrary to the moral and ethical standards of contemporary Canadian society. At the same time they had to fill up five to seven minutes every week that was commercials in Japan and the United States; they created this segment to fill up all that time. But in doing this, they also created a direct personal address to children using a Canadian cultural vocabulary of cooperation and friendship. Thus, in a subtle way, it addresses children as consumers. It creates a sense of playful intimacy with a brand new character so that kids want to own *Astro Boy* stickers, *Astro Boy* lunch boxes, *Astro Boy* pajamas, *Astro Boy* bedspreads, everything you could possibly want. But at the same time, the game itself isn't a commercial. It's not a pitch for *Astro Boy* in the same way that the Japanese *Mighty Atom* actually had Meiji Seika's marble chocolate candy show up in the episode.

Rather, "Geronimo's Report" is designed to teach media literacy and to build community among children. After enjoying the show, they're told to watch and listen carefully, to critically compare two versions of the same story and then to share their interpretations with a group of peers. "Geronimo's Report" makes the practices of spectatorship visible in order to let children use them consciously and reflexively. It also encourages them to build a community of viewers by asking them to compare their answers with those of their friends. So

this community is both physical and virtual since the imaginary Astro Boy calls his viewers his friends and he seems to be watching the episode and commenting with them. The overall aim is participation and education. The ideal of the child is a creative, cooperative student of TV. Such pro-social messages are in keeping with the dominant ideology of cooperation that public-private coalitions of Canadian broadcasters themselves attempted to demonstrate. I have to say, though, that this prosocial attempt to promote good Canadian cooperation did have some unforeseen consequences in the area of reception. Kids were encouraged to think critically and talk amongst themselves and some children were critical of the segment.

I surveyed hundreds of anime fans while I was preparing this book and the Canadian fans I spoke to who remembered “Geronimo’s Report” mainly remembered being frustrated because the little mistakes that he made could be really minor, and the program never gave the right answers. There was no way to prove who got it right. I remember watching the English CBC broadcast when I was eight or nine with a group of children my age and I knew that Astro Boy had misquoted the surface temperature of Venus. The episode was *Atlas vs. Astro: Terror on the Comet*. But my friends didn’t believe that I could actually remember that. They would say, “Well how would you know that’s the answer? Prove it!” And we didn’t have the internet, so we couldn’t just go magically replay the episode. There was no way to prove it. So while “Geronimo’s Report” was aiming to create beautiful cooperation, it didn’t always hit the mark.

In another way though, our cross-talk – and this is a term that’s used in culture theory a lot, cross-talk or debates over the practice of interpretation itself – can be seen as the foundation for more advanced methods of textual exegesis found in fan readings. After all, even as

little kids we were being told how to detect the on-purpose errors made in a representation of a show that was in itself filled with deviations from its Japanese source material. “Geronimo’s Report” was saying that once the story is broadcast, it can be edited, it can be retold. You have to watch and listen carefully to the changes.

One of the key practices of early Western anime fan culture, and one of the first practices I engaged in when I first found out anime is from Japan, was identifying differences between the Japanese and American versions. I loved *Sailor Moon*. I went on the early Internet and found out that this female character was originally a man and that these two characters were lesbian lovers. I thought, “Wow, in Japan this show is completely different.” This is what fans do: they look for the cultural differences from within their local experiences of foreign animated programs.

From our sense of their scent in Canada, we’ve begun to look outwards for other bodies of cultures that seem to be missing. The act of cultural comparison is the beginning of a sense of global flow and friction and the beginning of anime fandom through the media mix. So today, I’ll end where I started by saying that while *Astro Boy* wasn’t the first anime, it was an important first step in the spread of anime and anime fan culture through the media of globalization. Thank you.

Anime アニメ and Popular Culture

© Jay Goulding 歐陽劍

First of all, I want to thank everybody for being here. It's been nearly 20 years actually. Last time I was at the Symposium was the China Symposium of 1996-97 listening to Dashan 大山 (Mark Rowswell), a Canadian who is still a famous stand-up comedian in China. At that time, since I'm mostly a China expert (I do ancient China), I became very interested in *anime* アニメ as a way of studying ancient East Asian cultures. My good friend, Professor Vincent Shen 沈清鬆—he has hundreds of students taking Ancient Chinese philosophy with him at the University of Toronto—wishes he could use popular culture to teach the ancient Far East, and wonders how I do it. I don't have so many students here at York University but I have a lot of people who really know about *anime*, so this is one of the reasons I got involved in it.

Some 30 years ago, I helped start the first courses at York that were called Popular Culture. I wanted to do a course on *Star Trek*. I didn't get *Star Trek* through, although I suggested there were almost 100 universities in the United States that had courses on *Star Trek* and they said: “Well, that's too much fun; you have to have something that's educational.” My response is that you can have education and fun at the same time.

Popular Culture, especially Science Fiction Popular Culture, became a genre that I started with a couple of other people, including the late Professor Ioan Davies at York. And what I've done today is hand everybody a copy of a paper from which we'll refer to a few quotes. Miyazaki Hayao 宮崎駿 did a number of animated films. I'm going to talk a bit about Miyazaki and also Kawajiri Yoshiaki 川尻善昭, who did a movie and a

television series called *Ninja Scroll* (*Jūbei Ninpūchō* 獣兵衛忍風帖). I did a report a few years ago for the Japan Foundation in Tokyo. There were a plethora of countries that did reports. The one that was liked the best was Canada.

A Japan Foundation official from Tokyo told me: “Well, from what you wrote, people in Japan think that people in Canada really know what’s going on because they understand *anime*.” And I said: “Well that’s a very good thing because it’s a tremendous educational tool.” I tend to see things with a little bit of a Chinese eye, so I’ve seen a lot of Japanese *anime* references of very old ancient Chinese themes that look back deeply into the *Kojiki* 古事記 (*Record of Ancient Matters* of 712) and *Nihon Shoki* 日本書紀 (*Chronicles of Japan* of 720) from the Nara Period 奈良時代 (710-794). So, those are some of the references that I have today. Here is a quote from my essay in *Wochi Kochi* 遠近 (Near and Far):

One day in 1989, something intriguing happened. I was watching an episode of one of the most popular television series in the world, *Star Trek: The Next Generation*. I had previously written a book on the original series entitled *Empire, Aliens and Conquest: A Critique of American Ideology in Star Trek and Other Science Fiction Adventures* [Goulding 1985] In this episode, “Where Silence Has Lease” 闇の住人, I was surprised to hear the name Yamato 大和 used to refer to a starship, recalling the WWII battleship and famous *anime* starship in *Space Ship Yamato* (Star Blazers) 宇宙戦艦ヤマト. In a 1989 episode, “The Icarus Factor” イカルス伝説, where Riker and his father

engage in a contest of futuristic martial arts, *ambojitsu* 暗棒術, Japanese writing appears in the background on banners and on the deck of a battle platform in the Enterprise's gymnasium. The Chinese character for "star" 星 appears on the mat of the battle deck. One name on the deck read Yuri ユリ. More discerning eyes can also find the name Kei ケイ (Yuri's partner), Akira アキラ, Tonari no Totoro となりのトトロ and Urusei Yatsura うる星やつら. I said to myself, "this is amazing!" *Star Trek* is advertising Japanese *manga* 漫画 and *anime* アニメ... As it worked out, *Star Trek's* set designers [Michael Okuda] were rabid *otaku* オタク who were repaying the favour to *anime* such as *Dirty Pair* ダーティペア that utilizes *Star Trek* insider references. In several *Trek* episodes, various *anime* code words appeared in Japanese script. In retrospect, *Star Trek*, a leader in popular culture from the 1960's¹ to the 1990's, broadcast in a hundred countries, was obviously playing up to Japanese fans. At the same time, it was unconsciously introducing its successor, Japanese *anime*, which has far eclipsed just about everything in Canadian popular culture in the last decade[s]".²

Japanese *anime* and *manga* 漫画 are the most popular of popular cultural elements. The *anime* revolution began

¹ Jay Goulding, *Empire, Aliens and Conquest: A Critique of American Ideology in Star Trek and other Science Fiction Adventures* (Toronto: Sisyphus Press Inc., 1985).

² Jay Goulding, "Canada: The Soul of Japan Through Anime and Manga" カナダアニメとマンガで教える日本の心 (in Japanese), *Wochi Kochi* 遠近 ("Near and Far") 13 (2006a): 27.

in the late 1990's with *Pokémon's* ポケモン arrival in North America followed by a tidal wave of *anime*. Just fifteen years ago, you would have to go to a comic or science fiction specialty store to find any *manga* at all. I did, at the request of the Japan Foundation for their Tokyo magazine *Wochi Kochi* (Near and Far), go around to a bunch of shops and asked them how much *anime* they had. *Suspect Video* "Toronto's underground video store" would be one of the few places at one time to find *anime*. Now both *manga* novels and *anime* are found in all the mainstream stores. When we had the *World's Biggest Bookstore*, they had some 1700 *anime* DVDs in stock at one time.

What I understand from my PhD student and associate, Christopher Premdas, who is teaching in Toronto high schools, is that they have shelves and shelves of *anime* and *manga* now in their libraries. The smallest of *Chapters* stores might carry 350 *manga* titles and 1,000 volumes. Some of these stores are gone now. We still have the *Silversnail*. I'm sure that *Hairy Tarantula* is still going. Then there's *CyberCity Comics*, *Sci-Fi World* and *The Beguiling*, some of which are still going, which carry anywhere from 500 to 2,000 *manga* titles.³

In Japan, serialized *manga* in comic books is still the starting point for novice authors hoping for novelization, and perhaps a contract for making an *anime* movie. This sequence flows from Japan into Canada. What's popular in Japan becomes popular in Canada. At one time in the 1990s, Canada was a leader in animation before MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) got into it with lots of money, so people would come to school to learn about animation here. We developed a style called ray tracing. You see this in movies like *Ghost in the Shell* (*Kōkaku Kidōtai* 攻殻機動隊) (1995) and other *anime* of that era. It gives

³ Goulding, 2006a, 27-31.

the effect that as you're moving forward, it allows you to see a proportionally shifting vanishing point behind you. Although few of the original Japanese comics are available in Canada, English edition novelized versions of *manga* are as abundant as *anime* movies and television series.

What allows specialty stores across Canada to compete with gigantic chains is their ability to sell complete sets such as full seasons of television series or of *manga* series. Up until 2003, the Bloor Cinema (well, today all this has changed) used to show *anime* on the weekend. We still have *YAMA* (York *Anime* and *Manga* Association) who usually show those films weekly. Its name *yama* 山 means mountain and alludes to the *manga* fan expression *yamanashi ochinashi iminashi* 山無し, 落ち無し, 意味無し (no climax, no punchline, no significance), and also the *yamabushi* 山伏 mountain warriors of *manga* and *anime* folklore. Likewise, the University of Toronto's *anime* club is called UTARPA (U of T *Anime* Role Playing Association). Last year, I had several senior students who were actually a part of that. There are also lots of conventions.

In Canada, the blockbuster films of Miyazaki Hayao, *Princess Mononoke* (*Mononoke Hime* 物の怪姫) (1997) and *Spirited Away* (*Sen to Chihiro no Kamikakushi* 千と千尋の神隠し) (2001) are key departures for discussing the significance of *anime*, and in some cases, introducing Canadians to *anime* for the first time.⁴ In all due respect for the brilliance of Miyazaki's work, Kawajiri Yashiaki's *Ninja Scroll* (1993) movie and subsequent television series *Ninja Scroll: The Series* (*Jūbēi Ninpūchō Ryūhōgyoku Hen* 獣兵衛忍風帖 <龍宝玉篇>)

⁴ Jay Goulding, "Crossroads of Experience: Miyazaki Hayao's Global/Local Nexus," *Asian Cinema* 17, no. 2 (2006b): 114-123.

(2003) were the ones that really caught my students' attention.

My purpose is to get through the popular culture and have a step back down to the depths of things. Popular culture itself is a portal to the past and the future, to the ancient world and the world of science fiction, and a bridge between Eastern and Western civilizations. Miyazaki and Kawajiri's work together represent ways of explaining the intricate relationships amongst Shinto 神道, Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism, and certainly other philosophical overlays.^{5,6} They do so to a wide audience with examples for young and old.

Mononoke whisks viewers away to ancient times where *samurai* 侍 (士), peasants, artisans, merchants, brothel workers, demons, and gods walk the earth together. *Spirited Away* takes us to a Buddhist hell where Shinto gods come to replenish their spirits at a bath house. *Ninja Scroll* reveals a mythical time when the retainers of Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉 (1536-1598) scheme to resurrect the Muromachi Bakufu 室町幕府 against a perceived corrupt Tokugawa 徳川幕府 (1600-1868) government. Now, York often teaches Tokugawa. I've kind of fallen back into Kamakura 鎌倉幕府 (1185-1333), shifting from Norinaga 本居宣長 (1730-1801) to Morinaga 護良親王 (1308-1335), from Genroku 元禄 (1688-1704) to Gentoku 元徳 (1329-

⁵ Jay Goulding, "Three Teachings are One': The Ethical Intertwinings of Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism," in *The Examined Life—Chinese Perspectives: Essays on Chinese Ethical Traditions*, ed. Xinyan Jiang (Binghamton: Global Academic Publishing, Binghamton University, 2002).

⁶ Jay Goulding, "Beginnings: The Global Crossings of Classical Daoism," in *Globalization Dynamics: Psychological, Economic, Technological, and Cultural Intercourses*, ed. Wu Kuang-ming (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2012).

1332), and hence from Tokugawa to Kamakura—so that happens after a while, but both eras are so very popular.⁷

As such, these *anime* stories address questions of ecology, peace and war, loyalty and honour, propriety, and righteousness that touch everyone. From Tezuka Osamu's 手塚治虫 original idea for *Wan Wan Chūshingura* わんわん忠臣蔵 (1963)—Miyazaki's first artistic creation as an in-between—er to all *anime* discussed here, the five Confucian virtues *jin* 仁 (benevolence), *gi* 義 (righteousness), *rei* 禮 (propriety), *chi* 智 (wisdom), and *shin* 信 (faith) are omnipresent. *Anime* and *manga* illustrate valuable lessons in philosophy and religion while promoting Japanese/Canadian inter-cultural understanding.

I would go as far as saying that all *anime* have some reference to the loyalties and intrigues of *Chūshingura* 忠臣蔵 (The Treasury of Loyal Retainers): Lord Asano Naganori 淺野長矩 (1667-1701) and Lord Kira Yoshinaka 吉良義央 (1641-1703), Lord Oishi Kuranosuke 大石内蔵助 (1659-1703) and the 46 *rōnin* 浪人, Ogyū Sorai 荻生徂徠 (1666-1728) and Hayashi Nobuatsu 林信篤 (1644-1732), *bushi* 武士 (the warrior) and *bushi* 節 (*katsubushi* 鰹節, dried Bonito fish).⁸ The fifteenth year of *Genroku* 元禄 generates dozens of volumes written about the incident at the time and thousands of other commentaries in the last 300 years. All of these characters appear time and time again throughout *anime*. One of the pioneers of Japanese

⁷ Jay Goulding, “*Chūshingura*’s 忠臣蔵 Innovation: From Kaishaku 介錯 (Executioner) to Kaishakugaku 解釋學 (Hermeneutics),” in *Japanese Studies Association of Canada 2014 Conference Proceedings*, ed. Jim Tiessen (Forthcoming 2015).

⁸ Ibid.

popular culture, Tsurumi Shunsuke 鶴見俊輔 remarked to Henry D. Smith II that “if you study *Chūshingura* long enough, you would understand everything about the Japanese”.⁹

The 1961 film *Akō Rōshi* 赤穂浪士 was followed in 1964 by 21 television productions of *Chūshingura* in Japan alone. That was 50 years ago. There are dozens of films on *Chūshingura*. We (York University) often use the famous *samurai* actor Satomi Kotaro’s 里見浩太郎 version because it has debates with the lawyers and scholarly advisors. Federico Marcon and Henry D. Smith II have written an intriguing analysis entitled “A *Chūshingura* Palimpsest: Young Motoori Norinaga Hears the Story of the Akō Rōnin from a Buddhist Priest” (2003). They suggest that the “truth” of *Chūshingura* is always shrouded in interpretation or subsequently:

recast into a series of narrations that, passing through successive retellings in the forms of rumors, diaries, memoirs, moral debates, historical tales, oral sermons, theatrical and pictorial representations, novels, movies, and so on, become blurred with fictional imaginaries. This is one way of explaining what Miyazawa Seiichi [宮澤誠一] has described as the ‘capacity’ of *Chūshingura*, which Henry Smith has defined as “the ability of a single story to root itself into the national psyche in a way that encompasses so many issues for so many audiences in so many media.”¹⁰

⁹ H. D. Smith II, “*Chūshingura* in the 1980s: Rethinking the story of the forty-seven ronin,” in *Revenge drama in European renaissance and Japanese theatre: From Hamlet to Madame Butterfly*, ed. K. J. Wetmore Jr. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 187.

¹⁰ F. Marcon, & H. D. Smith II, “A *Chūshingura* Palimpsest: Young Motoori Norinaga hears the story of the Akō rōnin from a

When the first American occupying forces arrived in Japan in 1945, they frowned upon public performances of *Chūshingura* (films, puppet plays, theatre). However, any time you try to suppress popular culture like that, it becomes more popular. By 1947, the *kabuki* 歌舞伎 play *Kanadehon Chūshingura* 仮名手本忠臣蔵 was once again performed.

In the West, popular culture usually invents new things, new expressions, new trends, especially in science fiction, although it has a healthy look back to its past. It moves in a linear fashion. *Star Trek* is a good example. You need a timeline to figure out where you are at any moment.¹¹ In the East, popular culture often re-invents things drawn from a richer and more diverse past. You never need to know where you are because all roads lead to yourself.

The poet Ruan Ji 阮籍 (210-263) of the Wei-Jin 魏晋 said: “If the sage has no house, Heaven and Earth will contain him; if the sage has no master Heaven and Earth will own him; if the sage has nothing to do, he is free to walk under Heaven and on the Earth”.¹² This is not a motion of linearity but instead a ‘reversibility’ of time, a ‘retrograde’ temporality as the Martin Heidegger scholar Kuki Shūzō relates: “...each instance, each present is an identical moment of different times...what is of the past can be of the future, what is of the future can be of the past”.¹³ If you go to U of T, you can

Buddhist priest,” *Monumenta Nipponica: Studies in Japanese Culture* 58, no. 4 (2003): 440-441.

¹¹ Goulding, 1985.

¹² Ruan Ji, quoted in Zhang Shi-Ying, “Heidegger and Taoism,” in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 308.

¹³ Kuki Shūzō, quoted in Jay Goulding, “Kuki Shūzō and Martin Heidegger: *Iki* (いゝき) and Hermeneutic Phenomenology,” in *Why Japan Matters!* vol. 2, ed. Joseph F. Kess and Helen Lansdowne

actually see a facsimile of an original 1632 book of Yagyū Munenori's 柳生宗矩 (1571–1646), *The Book of Family Traditions and the Art of War* (*Heihō kadensho* 兵法家伝書) (1982), and some of the *samurai* sword manuals from the Tokugawa era. Some of those images of *samurai* sword fighting appear in almost every *anime*. And as I've always maintained, you see *kanji* 漢字 strings of traditional Daoist characters in these manuals—thus confirming subtle Daoist origins of Japanese Zen 禪 sword fighting styles.¹⁴

Your mind is like silk. It takes the colour of things around you, so if you distract it by anything, then you're going to be defeated. If you allow your mind to be absorbed by the void (*ku* 空), then you become your opponent's wrists before they draw the sword.¹⁵ It's easier said than done. We saw two people that were practicing swordplay earlier today at lunch who showed you how to do that. Notice that when you have these *katana* 刀 sized swords, you usually have to draw them from a kneeling position, unless you're 6'7" in which case you can simply draw. As I describe in my essay "Tokugawa Traces in 21st Century Japan: Culture and Language in Flux":

In May of 2000, China and Canada launched a joint produced cartoon of *Journey to the West* [Xi

(Victoria: Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives, University of Victoria, 2005), 682.

¹⁴ Jay Goulding, "John O'Neill's Phenomenology: The Copper Rule," in *Scholarship as a Re-source of Hope: John O'Neill's Body of Work Re-Joyced*, ed. Mauro Buccheri and Livy Visano, (Toronto: Founders' College, forthcoming 2016).

¹⁵ Munenori Yagyū, "The Book of Family Traditions on the Art of War," in *The Book of Five Rings: A Classical Text on the Japanese Way of the Sword*, original by Miyamoto Musashi, trans. Thomas Cleary, (Boston and London: Shambhala, 2005), 142, 146.

You Ji 西遊記], adventures of Tripitaka [Xuang Zang 玄奘] and the Monkey King [Sun Wukong 孫悟空], which is popular amongst children on both sides of the Pacific. Although its expressions are modern, its sensibilities are ancient. Japan scooped this many years ago with *Doraemon* [ドラえもん] the blue cat-robot, the most popular *manga* of the last fifty years (Shiraishi 1997, 235). Coming “back from the future,” *Doraemon* has spawned numerous movies, imitating *Journey to the West* and *Star Wars* (McCarthy 1997, 20, 27, 76). Certainly the resilient *Dragon Ball Z* [*Doragon Bōru Zetto* ドラゴンボールZ] is also modelled after *Journey to the West* (McCarthy 1997, 39).¹⁶

The longstanding series (2002 to present) *Naruto* ナルト provides us with many references to *Journey to the West*. First of all, there is the sage Zhuangzi’s 莊子 (369-286 BCE) Daoist image—the butterfly theme throughout. Philosopher becomes butterfly; butterfly becomes philosopher. Basically, you have to put a restraining collar on Naruto, because the nine tailed fox (*Kitsune* 狐) is captured within him—sounds similar to Sun Wukong 孫悟空, the Monkey King.

After 1945, many Chinese characters which were forbidden in Japan emerged again in *anime*; so what happens is the forbidden elements become fashionable. *Naruto* is a very interesting series. You have the *hokage*

¹⁶ Jay Goulding, “Tokugawa Traces in 21st Century Japan: Culture and Language in Flux,” in *Japan in the Global Age: Cultural, Historical and Political Issues on Asia, Environment, Households and International Communication*, ed. Masao Nakamura, (Vancouver: The Centre for Japanese Research, University of British Columbia Press, 2001), 161.

火影, that is the fire shadow of hidden *ninja* 忍者 leaders, and they develop a *ninja* martial arts called Shadow Cloning (*kage bunshin no jutsu* 影分身の術). How a shadow shadows itself is really interesting in *Naruto*. Now obviously, *Naruto* plays on other *ninja* series like Ben Dunn's *manga* series, *Ninja High School* and so forth. As I have illustrated:

In Japanese *anime*, the past doubles into the present, a rift in time allowing the past to become present. The backbone of Japanese civilization pokes through layers of popular culture. Language and culture are phenomenologically interwoven. So, we have a 'corrupt picture' (*manga*); how do we get the whole picture? The awakening of watching *anime* is suddenly being in sync with it, like Hisamatsu Shin'ichi's [久松 真一] Buddhist *en* [縁], 'the moment,' 'the right condition at the right time'... or Dōgen's *uji* [有時], being-time which might compare to the Western idea of *kairos* [καιρός], the 'right time' or Walter Benjamin's *Jetztzeit*, 'nowtime', the *augenblick*, the blink of an eye, an instance, the passing through historicity to fragments of redemption... In 1995, while working on his film *Princess Mononoke* [*Mononoke Hime* もののけ姫, 物の怪姫], Miyazaki Hayao promised that his *anime* would explore the "unchanging basis of humanity, by overlapping the current era of change as we move toward the twenty-first century with the confusion of the Muromachi era [Hence, moving toward a future's past]" (quoted in McCarthy 1999, 185).¹⁷

¹⁷ Goulding 2001, 161-162.

You see bathhouses; you see Shinto purification rituals over and over again in Miyazaki. You see Buddhist monks. You have layers of these things that you can still teach by watching *anime*. Miyazaki was intrigued with the 14th to 16th Centuries, a time of war when forests were destroyed and iron ore was smelted in gigantic quantities.¹⁸ He brings Chaos Theory into practice¹⁹ causing cataclysmic changes through minute disturbances as he folds ancient time into the vortex of that warring period to create an arena of ghosts, goblins, Shinto deities, sword and sorcery:

Mononoke is a ghost term popular in *anime*, referring to a pestilence wielding entity. [There are a hundred terms in Japanese for ghost]. It is as dangerous as *kodama* [木魂, 木靈 tree spirits, echo dryads] are harmless. In this film, we see clans of boars, apes and wolves (metaphors for *ninja*) as *kami* [神] trying to preserve their sacred forest against the onslaught of Lady Eboshi's [Eboshi Gozen エボシ御前] progress and Lord Asano's [Asano Naganori 淺野長矩] war. The latter is possibly a reference to *Chūshingura*. Miyazaki had once attempted an animation of the Heian period [平安時代 (794-1185)]. Eboshi's medieval courtesan robes conjoined with a noble's black hat [*eboshi* 帽子] seem to leave traces of that project (McCarthy 1999, 193, 200). The Forest Spirit [Shishigami 鹿神] tries to prevent peaceful forms from turning demonic

¹⁸ Helen McCarthy, *Hayao Miyazaki: Master of Japanese Animation*, (Berkeley: Stone Bridge Press, 1999) 185.

¹⁹ Jay Goulding, "Wu Kuang-ming and Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Daoism and Phenomenology," in *China-West Interculture: Toward the Philosophy of World Integration*, ed. Jay Goulding, (New York: Global Scholarly Publications, 2008).

but we see massive transformations of *mitama* [御霊] (souls of the dead) as they battle the cruelty of humankind. The all precious iron pellet as a *shintai* [神体] (receptacle for *kami*) becomes an instrument of harm. Even the sly Buddhist monk [Jiko-bō シゴ坊], dawned in a bear's skin, wants to possess it all. Recalling the ancient story of the *Nihon Shoki* (Chronicles of Japan), the monk is on a mission for the emperor who wants to capture the head of the Night Walker [Daidarabotchi ダイダラボッチ] as it transforms. The treacherous monk gets more than he bargains for, just as the emperor does in the original story (Ross 1965, 39). The ecological and humanist themes fold the past into the present throughout *Princess Mononoke* which was [and still is] the top box-office draw in Japanese history... (McCarthy 1999, 47).²⁰

I actually gave a talk some 15 years ago and we had lots of people to see the first *Mononoke*. Everybody sat spellbound until the credits rolled.

The Tokugawa Shogunate has mostly glorified the *ronin* 浪人 from *Chūshingura* to the greatest swordsman Miyamoto Musashi's 宮本武蔵 (1584–1645) *Book of Five Rings* (*Go Rin No Sho* 五輪の書) but also harbours tales of *ninja jonin* 上人, *chunin* 中人 and *genin* 下人. The *ninja* scholar Stephen Hayes explains: “The deeds of *ninja*-bandit heroes such as Sasuke Sarutobi [猿飛佐助], Saizo Kirigakure [霧隠才蔵], and Goemon Ishikawa [石川五右衛門] are glamorized in the children's tales of Japan, just as the stories of Robin Hood, Zorro, and Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid are told in the

²⁰ Goulding 2001, 163.

West today”.^{21,22} Ranging from Sampei Shirato’s [白土三平] pay library comic of 1950’s *Ninja Bugeicho* 忍者武芸帖 (*Chronicles of A Ninja’s Military Accomplishment*) to Ben Dunn’s 1990’s *Ninja High School*, the shadow warrior seems to have materialized in every aspect of popular culture.^{23,24,25}

So again, I said *Ninja Scroll* was one of the important ones for shifting into the culture of *kagemusha* 影武者 (shadow warrior, political decoy). Although the beginnings of *ninja* are legendary, Jeff Yang illuminates the ‘shadowy’ Lin Gui 林鬼 clan of the Shang Dynasty 商朝 (1700-1100 BCE) who were clandestine assassin mercenaries, later wiped out by the very *Daimyo* 大名 who hired them.²⁶ The secrets of Sunzi’s 孫子 *Art of War* (*bingfa* 兵法) is a possible source. Both Chinese martial arts and mysticism converged with the Buddhist monks warriors (*sobei* 僧兵) who resided in caves and forests of the Kii Peninsula 紀伊半島 in 1024. These were the legendary ancestors of *Shugendo Yamabushi* 修驗道山伏 (mountain warrior priests), *sennin* 仙人 (Buddhist wizards), and *gyoja* 行者 (wilderness warrior-ascetics).²⁷

²¹ Stephen K. Hayes, *The Ninja and Their Secret Fighting Art*, (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1990), 31.

²² Donn F. Draeger, *Ninjutsu: The Art of Invisibility*, (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1989), 92-122.

²³ Frederik L. Schodt, *Manga! Manga! The World of Japanese Comics*, (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1986), 70.

²⁴ Frederik L. Schodt, *Dreamland Japan: Writings on Modern Manga*, (Berkeley: Stone Bridge Press, 1996), 327.

²⁵ Gilles Poitras, *The Anime Companion: What’s Japanese in Japanese Animation?*, (Berkeley: Stone Bridge Press, 1999), 95-96.

²⁶ Jeff Yang et al., *Eastern Standard Time: A Guide to Asian Influence on American Culture: from Astro Boy to Zen Buddhism*, (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 109.

²⁷ Hayes 1990, 18.

Kawajiri Yoshiaki's *Ninja Scroll* is my favourite for teaching because people who watch it, and who have never seen *anime* before, say they feel transformed. Kawajiri owns one of the four original animation studios and still works on image boards, so he's still doing things by hand, and of course it takes him a long time. So, there is a film apparently coming out soon which will be *Ninja Scroll 2*. *Anime* shares revelatory imagery akin to the Nara Period's (710-794) Man'yōgana 万葉仮名 script of the *Man'yōshū* 万葉集 (*Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves*), and the Chinese phoneticization of the *Kojiki* (*Record of Ancient Matters*), deciphered by Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長.²⁸

Ninja Scroll explores the sexual fantasy/demonic characteristics of Tokugawa. Names are important in *anime* because they connect ancient Chinese and Japanese images. Kibagami Jūbei 牙神獸兵衛 is the main character. Kibagami Jūbei's family name Kibagami 牙神 means 'divine tusk' or 'divine fang.' One of his opponents is a snake woman who possesses a cast off skin, poisoning both him and his partner/lover Kagero 陽炎. Jūbei has three characters: *Ju* 獸 meaning bestial, *Hei* 兵 soldier (pronounced *Bei*), and *Ei* 衛 guard. He is a divine tusk, beastlike sentinel. Obviously Jūbei's name plays off of the famous samurai Yagyū Jūbei Mitsuyoshi 柳生十兵衛 三厳 (1607-1650).

Now, this is what I've called a *polyphonic textuality*.²⁹ Kagero has a male register for her name that means literally "the scorching sun," popularly nicknamed "heat haze." She has the *hitodama* 人魂 or balls of fire around her—indicating imminent death—and fireflies that burn

²⁸ Jay Goulding, "Pioneers of Globalization: Tokugawa's Cross-Cultural Communications," in *Japan in the Age of Globalization*, ed. Carin Holroyd and Ken Coates, (London: Routledge, 2011).

²⁹ Goulding 2001, 165.

at night. What you see is a character whose name often leaks metaphorically into the context of things around, and into the nearby background; if you're attentive to language, it is one of the ways you can look at this.

As a plot set against the bliss/anguish backdrop of the tenuous Tokugawa peace, we see Tozama Daimyo 外様大名 employing *ninja* to quell uprisings in their territories. This is the story of *Ninja Scroll*. On one such reconnaissance mission to investigate a plague, Kagero, a female *ninja* (*kunoichi* くノ一) battles Tessai (鉄斎) one of the Eight Devils (*bachinin shu* 八人衆) who emerges through the Demon Gate (*Kimon* 鬼門). *Kunoichi* (a secret *ninja* name) is composed of a stroke from the *hiragana* (*ku* く), a stroke from the *katakana* (*no* ノ), and the *kanji* for one (*ichi* 一). Assembled, it is the Chinese character for woman (*nü* 女 or Japanese *onna*). The “Demon Gate Eight” (*Kimon bachinin shu* 鬼門八人衆) are known as such because they come through the torrent of the North-East which is bad luck. Kagero's coincidental joining with another homeless wandering *ninja* Jūbei ends up revealing an elaborate ruse by retainers of Toyotomi Hideyoshi to depose Tokugawa 徳川 and resurrect the *Muramachi Bakufu*, all orchestrated by the clandestine and ruthless Shogun of the Dark, Himuro Genma 氷室 弦馬. As I have previously stated:

This story is a vanguard for an East Asian communicative body, an endless intertwining of visibility and invisibility, bringing cartoon characters to life—more real than real. None of the characters have a home but are united in life/death struggles, the very landscape becoming their abode, disappearing into shadows or in the swirl of leaves or seeing Pure

Land Buddhists disappear from cast off skins. Kagero wishes to embrace what she cannot—the spirit of *bagakure* [葉隠] (Yamamoto's [1983] *samurai* code, 'hiding in leaves') in her loyalty to her Daimyo. Kagero herself is a double edged sword, a beauty who cannot know physical love for her very touch is deadly poison. Her only glimpse of happiness is at the moment of her death: Jūbei's antidote to his own poison is making love to her while she perishes. Her sacrifice is both her salvation and his. [These would otherwise be pretty testy themes for the Western world, as these are getting into hardcore Tokugawa philosophy]. The characters of this story have no homes, no physical possessions, no resting spots. What holds them together as persons or persons between heaven and hell (*ningen* [人間] in Japanese or *renjian* [人間] in Chinese) is the duty or the obligation [*gi* 義] of their own honour.³⁰

In the 1990s, three *Ninja Scroll* prequels appeared: *Ninja Resurrection*, *Ninja Resurrection: Jūbei's Revenge*, and *Wrath of the Ninja*. None are from Kawajiri unfortunately. The first two are set in the early 1600s in a mountain monastery fortress and during Tokugawa's Christian witch hunt, so you see many religious themes. Set in 1581, *Wrath of the Ninja* explores the civil war of *Sengoku Jidai* 戦国時代 (1467-1603), when Oda Nobunaga 織田信長 (1534-1582) decrees a pogrom on *ninja* villages. *Ayame* 綾女 a *kunoichi* (preincarnation of Kagero?) joins with fellow dispossessed *ninja* to challenge the Prophecy of the Enchanted Sword. Each

³⁰ Goulding 2001, 166.

wield magical swords which render them invisible but at a horrible cost.

A *doppelgänger* (*kagemusha* 影武者) as shadow double to *Ninja Scroll* is Mamoru Oshii's 押井守 *Ghost in the Shell* (*Kōkaku Kidōtai* 攻殻機動隊)—attack shell (cast-off skin) mobile unit/team/force. This is an example of older Chinese characters *Kōkaku* 攻殻 (ghost in the shell) resurrected to imitate the sound of a contemporary word for 'turtle shell' or 'carapace' (*kōkaku* 甲殻). When it first came out, it was known as *Bladerunner 2* because it shared a lot of imagery with Phillip K. Dick's story *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep* (1968).³¹ What is remarkable about this story is the mundaneness of the invisible through a melding of traditional East Asian culture, religions and philosophies on one hand, and the embrace of high-tech and its contemporary *mores* on the other.

Again, we see the double folding of time as exemplified by Miyazaki. Everyone in this society [portrayed in *Ghost in the Shell*] relies on thermoptic camouflage to bend light in such a way as to render themselves invisible—a personal cloaking device. Ironically, the desire for artificial invisibility becomes useless when various characters realize they are already invisible: no identities, no memories, no aspirations, no desires. They are already unreal and hence learn to fear neither simulation nor personal possessions. In policing a society of invisibility, the cyborgs Major Kusanagi [草薙素子; cf. Kusanagi-no-Tsurugi 草薙の剣 (Grass Cutting Sword) of *Kojiki* legend] and her partner Bateau [Batou バトー], search for their

³¹ Goulding forthcoming 2016.

own ‘ghosts,’ face their worst enemies—themselves—and adjust to the new programming. The English term ‘ghost’ is used in the Japanese language version. Kusanagi tries to find her way through various forms of floating meditation. The arch enemy, the Puppet Master [Ningyō-zukai 人形使い], merges with Kusanagi as she discards her own physical body and enters the thickness of the invisible while looking at her true self—a childlike emptiness appearing through a blissful ordinary gaze. Even a surveillance society which blurs the distinction between visibility and invisibility is lame against the ancient wisdoms of Buddhist inspired emptiness. Against the backdrop of a technopolis of excess, we see crowds of Chinese workers carrying umbrellas and their hidden stowaways (hungry ghosts tucked neatly underneath them).³²

In *Ghost in the Shell*, you see lonely town squares where there are no people, town squares that you would never see empty in Hong Kong where the film is set. Then you see a path of people carrying umbrellas, 15 or 16 people. The hungry ghosts (Japanese *gaki* 餓鬼 or Chinese *e gui*) hide under the umbrellas. This is a society where the visible disappears into the vague and the murky. One image, in particular explores the idea of the Buddhist interval (*ma* 間).

Now in martial arts, what you do is use a bit of Daoist strategy before fighting, by placing your opponent in an imaginary space called *ma*. In *Ghost in the Shell*, a corridor surveillance camera is rewound and freeze-framed on *the space between* an automatically closing door, and the people who have just walked

³² Goulding 2001, 167.

through it—a space where a person with thermoptic camouflage might be hiding, the *ma* 間:

As the wind rustles through her hair, Kusanagi thinks: “The net is vast and infinite.” Is she referring to the living internet of *Ghost in the Shell* or to Laozi’s [老子] ‘heaven’s net’ (*tian wang* [天網]): “Heaven’s net casts wide. Though its meshes are coarse, nothing slips through” (Lao Tsu 1972, Poem 73) [so you’re between heaven and earth, and that’s all you need]. The *anime* is replete with ghost-like images of fragmented and vetoed reflection through splinters of glass and body parts. Nothing slips through *anime* and *manga*. Fractal, chaotic bits of myth and legend, the vortex of language and culture, intertwine through a ‘web which has no weaver’ (Kaptchuk, 1983).³³

Fitting of *Ghost in the Shell*, our own human centre is hollow yet replete with possibilities and as Zhuangzi relates “hollows are made empty” (*qiao wei xu* 竅為虛).³⁴

Fierce wind relieved, then multitudes of hollows
are made empty.
Do you alone not see them waver, wavering,
quiver, quavering?
Tzu Yu [Yan Cheng Ziyou 顏成子游] said,
‘Earth pipings - these, then, are multitudes of
hollows only.

³³ Goulding 2001, 168.

³⁴ Jay Goulding, “‘Visceral Manifestation’ 藏象: Chinese Philosophy and Western Phenomenology 現象學,” in *Chinese Philosophy and the Trends of the 21st Century Civilization* 中国哲學和21st世紀文明走向, ed. Fang Keli 方克立, (Beijing: Commercial Press Inc., 2003), 393.

Men's pipings - these, then, are rows of bamboo
tubes only.

I venture-to-ask-about heavenly pipings.³⁵

³⁵ Wu Kuang-ming, *The Butterfly as Companion: Meditations on the First Three Chapters of the Chuang Tzu*, (Albany: SUNY, 1990), 136.

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Marie Antoinette, Latex & Hegemony

Akané D'Orangeville

Today I will be talking about the Lolita and Angura communities, sub-culture communities in Tokyo. I will go into detail over the little things but I would just like to mention that I am an anthropologist so I am not going to focus so much on the fashion style itself and its symbolics. Rather, I will focus on the community as that was really the main focus of my research. The community itself, how the members operate, how they relate to each other, how they create bonding, and basically the reason why they are part of that sub-cultural community. The community I will be talking about is a pretty large community that includes two large sub-cultures – one is the Lolita sub-culture and the other is Angura. Then, I will talk about the discourses, the stigma that they experience, and what it is to be Lolita or Angura. I will end speaking on the Cool Japan culture.

So the two sub-cultures I have studied and will be talking about today: one is Lolita, the other is Angura. You will probably realize that these two groups seem very distant from each other. Lolita is very cute, very childish and on the other side you have Angura, which also includes S&M and fetishes. It is highly sexualized, it is very mature in terms of culture, and the image that is projected is very different from Lolita. But interestingly, that is what I expected too. When I started with the Lolita sub-culture, and as I discovered and learnt more about them, I realized that these two sub-cultures are really tight together within one big community. So I will start off with the Lolita.

The Lolita, although the name comes from Nabokov's novel *Lolita*, is not sexual, interestingly. The name Lolita refers only to the childishness of the

fashion style subculture but it does not refer to the sexualized idea we have of the girl in the novel. It is fairly interesting because, in my opinion, it seems very much sexualized as a name that they chose for themselves, but it is not at all. The definition of Lolita is individuals (usually women) whose fashion style, sometimes lifestyle, values, and ideas are inspired by the European aristocracy. The whole image is of the Victorian era in England and also the Rococo era in France. These two project different, contradicting images. The Victorian era is more prudish whereas the Rococo era has this very extravagant image.

People make different choices in what kind of style, in what kind of living they want to embody, and people make choices between these two extremes. They also particularly like fictional characters such as Alice in Wonderland and Marie Antoinette. The variation of Marie Antoinette comes from *Roses of Versailles*, which is a very famous manga and anime from the 1970s. Its whole story is Marie Antoinette and this fictional character who is actually a female but acts like a male. The Lolita style kind of embodies that French aristocratic style. The style includes frills, dresses, etc. This really expressive way of dressing.

The style itself started in the 1980s. It doesn't look at all like the Lolita style we have today, but at the very beginning, they were starting to dress more extraordinarily, different from the normative Japanese feminine identity, and that slowly evolved into a subculture that today is much more defined. Dresses and outfits resemble vintage European clothes, which are modified to add some cuteness. The Lolita population started around the 1980s and mostly grew throughout the 1990s. And its high point was the movie *Kamikaze Girls* (2002) that was released (the novel first and then the movie), which is a story of a Lolita girl and Yankee girl, who is more of a bad girl, becoming friends

and going on adventures. That was kind of the peak, the culminating point, of the Lolita subculture and since then it has been declining slowly.

They have a lot of activities in common with other subcultures; they include, obviously, dressing up in Lolita, shopping, just walking around in the Harajuku area or the Shinjuku district to show themselves off, and also gathering and meeting other Lolita people. They also have numerous music and dance events that take place in Shinjuku. And those events are in common with the fetish subculture. They are localized around Harajuku and Shinjuku. For those of you who travel a bit, around Tokyo you probably saw a lot of Lolita around the Harajuku district, especially on the bridge outside Harajuku station though they are not there anymore.

It is interesting actually how the Lolita subcultures have been more and more policed by authority. The bridge outside Harajuku station used to be a meeting place, a gathering place for the Lolitas and other subcultural community members, but it was considered by authorities to be sort of threatening to the image of Tokyo, the 'clean' Tokyo. There was also the concern that it could turn into some kind of 'deviant activity.' So, they have basically been kicked out from the bridge and that is why they had to move their activities from Harajuku to Shinjuku. Consequently, they are much more active in Shinjuku nowadays.

With that, I'd like to add that there is a law in Japan called *Fueihó*, which was written in the 1920s and forgotten for the longest time, which forbids dancing in public spaces in Japan. That is why dancehalls and dance classes are technically illegal. A few years ago, Shintaro Ishihara, the former Governor of Tokyo, brought it back to clean Tokyo and wanted to get rid of a lot of the illegal activities going on in clubs and in extension of that also began policing music events. So a

lot of events in which Lolita and Angura people take part were either shut down or had to be postponed for a few years.

Some men do participate in Lolita subculture. I will talk about gender identities in a moment, but basically gender identities in Lolita subculture are very flexible so some men do dress up as Lolitas with a feminine figure or feminine dresses. Some men act like a butler or prince and dress up as a butler or prince to accompany girls in their activities.

Now the Angura. Angura (アングラ) comes from the word “underground” (アンダーグラウンド) actually, which has nothing to do with the underground subcultures we see in England or in North America. They simply took the name and it is kind of a Japanese mistranslation of the word. They took it as meaning ‘different.’ Angura is basically S&M, fetish, body modification, gothic, steam punk, cyber punk, so a whole cluster of little subcultures and fashion styles, and it is very fluid. Membership is very fluid so people from the Lolita group go to Angura and within Angura, people often experience and experiment with different fashion styles.

In both subculture styles, Lolita and Angura, there are a lot of subculture tastes. Lolita first has *Ama-loli*, which means ‘Sweet Lolita’ and which has been growing in popularity since the second half of 2000. Within Lolita subcultures, this very sweet, very girly, very childish, very juvenile taste is becoming more and more popular. It is a very extreme expression of cuteness, girlyness, and childishness. On the other hand, we have *Goth-loli*, or Gothic Lolita, which is another one of the most popular subculture tastes. It is Lolita-style dresses with frills, corsets, etc., but with dark colours and imagery of Christianity, which often relates in the Japanese popular mindset to something dark and something deviant. There is also fake blood and

bandages, etc. And of course you have the *Cla-loli*, or Classic Lolita, which is the most basic form of Lolita. Classic means looks are more prudish, so girls who like classic Lolita tend to also like the Victorian era and English imagery. Lastly, there is the *Ouji* style. An ouji is a prince and as I mentioned the Lolita subculture is very flexible, so girls can dress as princes in ouji-style, or guys can dress as ouji to accompany Lolitas.

And now more into the Angura subculture. The Angura subculture, as I said, has many different styles and the fashion lines between Angura tastes are not as clear as in Lolita. In Lolita, it is very funny and amusing in a way because, as I will explain later, although it is really a movement of resistance to normative cultural references, yet among themselves they are very much codified and very strict in how they have to define themselves within the subculture. They are trying to get out of moulding and end up moulding themselves in the end. However, the Angura community is different. They are not as strict in terms of the affiliation and style each member has. So one can be a gothic style as long as it looks dark and gloomy. It is very flexible and very free so they have a lot of diversity in how they express their style.

The gothic genre itself is obviously not exclusive only to Japan. The subculture started in England in the 1980s and the style inspiration comes from 19th century gothic fashion. It then developed slowly into having its own kind of sub-branch in Japan. The gothic Lolita is kind of like the bridge that unites or brings together the Lolita subculture and the Angura subculture.

Another Angura style is the Shironuri. Shironuri is rather recent. There is basically no style associated to it in terms of fashion, but they paint their faces white so they can use them as canvases and be more elaborate with their decoration and make up. I have interviewed a few Shironuri including M, an extremely popular and

well-known Shironuri artist, to see if it has anything to do with standards of beauty of white skin and seemingly it does not. For them it is not about whitening their skin for beauty, it is really about having pure skin so they can draw better on it.

There is also the fetish subgenre of Angura, which tends to be sexually suggestive. They have a fetish S&M subculture and it encompasses a lot of different styles. It technically refers to fetishes and sexual deviances, but in Japan the way they use it, it is not about the fetish itself. Rather, people who have these fetishes call themselves fetish and this is 'their' style. It is a bit of a versatile term and includes S&M and bondage. There are others, but those two are the most popular fetishes in the subculture. And obviously these are private matters so it should not be visible on the outside, but they tend to dress using accessories, goods, colours, and types of clothing that allude to these subcultures.

And lastly, the Steampunk style. Steampunk, just like fetishes and gothic, is not exclusive to Japan but it is growing in popularity in Japan. Steampunk, for those who do not know, comes from science fiction novels and is basically inspired by industrial steam power technology. It is a post-apocalyptic style that started in the 1980s, partly coined by an American science fiction author.

So these two subcultures, Lolita and Angura, the reason why I studied them together and put them together is because they share a common space of subcultural activity and a local economy which is very interesting. I am going to talk later about this space being a space of recovery for the members to resocialize themselves. But before that, they have a number of bars and cafes that are created by members of the community for members of the community. So the members work in these places, consume food there, and obviously they gather there.

These places are really central. These little cafes and bars in Shinjuku are central places for them to gather, get to know each other, and feel safer together for various reasons. These places also host events; music events, dance events, fashion events, or fetish events (in which Lolita girls participate as well just to watch and just to be present). They have numerous amounts of people who really want to be active. They can have an event to attend every week, so it is really an active community that has different events of different types week after week.

Different elements are really significant to these cultures. The first one is authenticity. This is one thing that I have been told over and over, that being a Lolita or dressing as a gothic is not a costume and that it is really important for them. So I repeat it. Obviously since we don't know these things we, and even Japanese people, wrongly tend to see them as a sort of cosplay. Lolita is often associated with cosplay but it is completely different. Cosplay is costume playing; people who dress up as their favourite anime or game or manga characters and go to conventions or simply take pictures. Lolita tends to be put in the same bracket as cosplay, as if Lolitas were also in costume, but a lot of Lolita girls specifically told me to not see their outfits as costumes but as their daily outfit. If they cannot wear it daily for work or for school, it is nonetheless their true self. So the clothes they are wearing represent their true self and on a daily basis when they have to wear their 'normal' clothes, they are hiding themselves just to fit into Japanese society, just because they have to.

The other element is flexible gender identity, which also helps in making this subcultural space a safe space. Members are very flexible in terms of how other members identify, so there is no pressure to choose one gender or another. If someone wants to have a flexible gender identity or no gender identity, that option is very

open to them and no one questions them. This is also true in terms of how one portrays their gender, such as dressing as the other. It is no questions asked for that as well. And lastly, these subcultural spaces are also very flexible and open for LGBT individuals. It is one of the rare social spaces in a very codified Japan where dressing, identifying, and having sexual orientation that is not normative is not questioned and not criticized.

The last elements are agency and empowerment. Particularly women, but also some men, participating in these communities have clearly expressed feeling empowered, feeling much stronger by wearing Lolita or being Angura and by participating in these events. So this is not only about a fashion style. It is not only a hobby. Rather it is about them becoming stronger and learning to become themselves.

The process of members of the subcultures becoming stronger is pretty interesting. I did fieldwork in Tokyo for a few months and I interviewed quite a few Lolita and Angura members. At first, my research was about the discourse that people had about them and their reaction to it. Japanese popular discourse about Lolita especially, Angura a bit less, is very harsh and very mean. The popular discourse simply says that Lolita girls are crazy, are out of their minds; a lot of them have mental health issues, they cut themselves, etc. It is a very negative, very obviously insensitive, discourse that Japanese people in general have about that community. I wanted to ask them if they had encountered this discourse and how they reacted to it and why they kept wearing their clothes. Interestingly, the more I talked to them, the more I realized that it did not bother them as much as you might expect, but that they actually reuse this discourse and reappropriate it for themselves as a new identity.

The definition of *yanderu* (病んでる) is to be sick. They often talk about themselves as being sick, saying:

“I am different, so it is okay. I don’t have to be or respond to Japanese normative values because I’m yanderu. I don’t have to listen to what people have to say.” It is the same with Angura. The Angura is more known for being *hentai*, which means perverted, and they talk about themselves constantly as being hentai. They call themselves hentai and once again have this idea that “I am special and it doesn’t matter what people say about me.” This is a quote from one of the girls I interviewed who works as a hostess in a Cabaret, basically serving people alcohol: “I don’t understand the ‘normal’ sensitivity we’re expected to have ... We’re abnormal and perverted and it’s a compliment. I’m proud of it.”

One thing that is interesting is that to me, the women, and also men, who are in the Lolita and Angura subcultures seem to be strong. They seem to be much more resilient than the common individual, which is actually not the case. The more I interviewed them, the more I realized they had actually been vulnerable once. They had been expelled from school, dropped out from school, were not working, had quit work, were having issues with their family, having mental health issues, or simply having socializing issues. Most of them had been going through difficult times in their lives and had chosen to pick Lolita as a way to cope with it. As well, wearing Lolita clothes is exposing themselves. It makes them even more vulnerable, but to them there is this kind of opposite reaction so when they make themselves even more vulnerable, it in turn empowers them to make them stronger individuals.

To them it is a resistance. It is a resistance visually because obviously they are very outstanding. We see them, we can recognize them from afar. It is a resistance visually, but also culturally and socially, because they know they are drop outs, they know they are not the normative common Japanese person, but they are okay

with it. They learned to be okay with it, and that is because of the dress itself.

They are also extremely critical of Japanese society, of the normativeness of Japanese society. However it is very interesting. They are critical of normativity and of codified Japanese culture and society on one hand while on the other hand, their own subculture is structured exactly the same way as common normative Japanese society. The patriarchal hierarchies are very similar to what we find in Japanese enterprises, clubs, and schools. The leaders are mostly men and a very few women. Men are leaders, women kind of follow that lead and are mostly consumers rather than producers. Producers are mostly men. So these structures and also the hierarchy of who is a senior, who is a junior, are very similar to what we can find in other structures in Japanese society.

The way they expressed why it liberated them is that their dress is not normal and I really like this sentence. A lot of the girls I talked to said "I know I'm standing out and I know I'm special but my dress is my armour. I have gone too far for people to criticize me, for me to take it personally. I know they don't understand me and this really protects me." This blew my mind. I am a very shy person myself and dressing up in Lolita would really kill me. I would hate the attention I would get so I thought they would have the same logic. However they were confident that nothing could hurt them or move them anywhere beyond that. So it is a safe space in that sense. The people altogether have suffered a lot. A lot of members, as explained, have been vulnerable at some point in their life. They all know, they all share this sense of being hurt in the past and having to go beyond it. And the feeling of being safe comes from this shared sense of sensitivity, but also from the fact that they are completely against normative values.

They have learned to resocialize in two ways. One is the local economy as I explained: the cafes and bars

which offer jobs, for example. So people who have completely dropped out of society and who have not had jobs in years can try to relearn, to have a job and have an income by working in these local spaces, bars, cafes, and at events. It is not a lot of money but it does create a bit of income.

The second way is emotional recovery. A lot of them have been feeling socially detached or having social anxiety. Being in a space where people can relate to each other while everyone is being abnormal in their own ways is a way for them to slowly learn to relate to people, to start talking to people, to start to socialize, and to start to slowly move out of it. A lot of the members end up moving out of these places. A lot of girls will quit Lolita, especially when they get married, but it is okay because they have learned in that space how to be more socially functional, which was something with which they had a lot of issues before joining these spaces.

Now I would like to talk about Cool Japan. Cool Japan was a project started by the Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Trade. The project was started in 2002 and became more tangible in 2010. Cool Japan is the reason why we hear a lot about manga and anime outside of Japan. It was mainly started to export and encourage the industry of popular culture and youth culture inside Japan and especially outside Japan. There were a few reasons for this. One was that they needed a new industry to encourage, and with the Japanese economy fluctuating a lot, they needed something else to push forward. Pop culture and youth culture was one industry they targeted for that. Another reason was to create a new Japanese identity to the foreigners' eye.

The idea of the hard-working Japanese salaryman started being outdated, so they needed something refreshing, new, different, and something that could make Japan stand out from the crowd as the hard-

working figure is also in other countries rather than just Japan. They chose popular culture: Japanese pop manga, anime, and street fashion.

A lot of creative industry that had to be developed was encouraged both inside Japan and outside Japan and that included the Lolita and Angura subcultures which are very creative and very visible. And the members were very aware of it. They knew that they were part of this new Japanese identity. They knew that the media would talk about them in a more positive manner than it had in the past, but they did not all particularly like that. Three girls were chosen in the 2000s to be Japan's 'ambassadors of cuteness' and one of them is a Lolita. So they knew they were officialised. They were part of this project and a lot of them were proud that their style, which had been criticized in Japan for the longest time as being childish, as being deviant, was actually internationally recognized and appreciated. That there are actually a lot of Lolita girls outside of Japan and also in Canada.

So they appreciated that on the one hand, but on the other hand, the hypocrisy of the Japanese population criticizing them for so long and then taking their subcultures as something positive because the foreigners liked it, this kind of change in discourse really hurt and shocked them. One of the girls gave this quote, which is really honest: "The medias say that subcultures, like us Lolita or manga and anime, are the new symbols of Japanese society.... But they still think we're disgusting and revolting." So despite Cool Japan these two subcultures are still very fragile, very volatile, floating subcultures. The Lolita population is declining year after year. It is probably going to disappear, but with international recognition and popularity, maybe we will maintain an international Lolita scene.

That is something that is to be seen, but generally the subculture space that seems very meaningless, or

very invisible, has definitely operated as a positive space for a lot of individuals. Young people in Japan, particularly Tokyo actually, have used them to find themselves and to feel stronger and empower themselves.

Identity Formation Amongst Japanese Canadians

Andrea DaSilva

Over time, more complex individual identities emerge among immigrants through day-to-day identity politics in which they seek to clarify who they are in a transnational space.¹

Introduction

The constant movement of people across national borders and resettlement in new communities plays an important role in one's sense of belonging and further affects individuals' ethnic retention and identity. Nevertheless, one cannot simply assume that immigrants will become detached from their ethnic communities, families, or the political matters of their home countries as they integrate into another country. Alan B. Simmons, a Senior Scholar in Sociology at York University in Toronto, notes that while still holding onto the ethnic identities of their home country, immigrants go through different processes to define their ways of belonging in the receiving country.²

Japanese Canadians, in particular, belong to an immigrant population whose first and second generations (pre-war Japanese Canadians) have had a very unique and complex socio-political history of exclusion and marginalization in Canada, which further influenced the nature and process of their acculturation and identity formation as well as that of the third generation (those who were very young during World

¹ Alan B. Simmons, *Immigration and Canada: Global and Transnational Perspectives*, (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press Inc., 2010), 171.

² Simmons, *Immigration and Canada: Global and Transnational Perspectives*, 196.

War II) onwards. The high degree of geographic as well as social mobility and of integration as a consequence of Canadian immigration policies at the time brought about fundamental changes to the Japanese Canadian community.

This paper examines the question of identity formation and intergenerational challenges faced by Japanese Canadians in Canada as a result of exclusion and marginalization during the pre-World War Two (WWII), internment, and post-WWII periods. The high rate of intermarriage between individuals of Japanese origin in Canada, the family ties and structure of Japanese Canadian families, Japanese language retention, and the sense of belonging are only a few of the important factors that contribute to the way that identities are formed and shaped amongst Japanese Canadians in Canada and will be discussed in more detail in this paper.

Ethnic Identity as a Social Construct

When taking into account different historical moments along with different kinds of overall societies, we will attain different views of the term ethnic identity. Thus, before we go any further in discussing the identity formation of Japanese Canadians, the threshold issue is one of definition: what exactly is ethnic identity?

In the pre-modern context, identity is understood as being deeply rooted in tradition, geographical location, and culture or blood bonds. In an advanced modern and postmodern context, it becomes more detached from its original geographical location and traditional roots.³ The constant movement of people across national borders, as well as resettlement, play important roles on one's sense of being and belonging and further

³ Ibid.

affect immigrants' ethnic retention and identity. Thus, identities are the result of an identification process. In other words, they are socially constructed and negotiated by both individuals and social groups in an ongoing process.⁴

The term 'ethnicity' refers to the identification of a particular group. Ethnicity has been defined by demographic denotations such as common language, common religion, and common place of origin. Defining ethnicity is particularly challenging because its characteristics change based on changes in political climate. Scholars such as Phinney and Ong (2007), Quintana (2007), Noro (2009), and Simmons (2010) offer an alternative way of dealing with 'ethnic identity,' approaching it from the developmental perspective. According to this approach, ethnic identity is viewed as a multidimensional dynamic construct that develops over time through the actions and choices of individuals.

Furthermore, the characteristics of ethnic identities may differ amongst various immigrant communities depending on many other contributing factors. For instance, new environments bring up different ethnicities within one's self/self-view. This means that social setting, such as one's immediate family, as well as the above-mentioned community environment, can potentially have an impact on how a person with more than one background views his or her own identity.⁵ When immigrants find themselves belonging to a certain community, their individual identities reshape

⁴ Hiroko Noro, "The Role of Japanese as a Heritage Language in Constructing Ethnic Identity among Hapa Japanese Canadian Children," *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 30, no. 1 (2009): 1-18.

⁵ Noro, "The Role of Japanese as a Heritage Language in Constructing Ethnic Identity among Hapa Japanese Canadian Children."

accordingly. Some may find a community which consists of individuals from their country of origin, others may find themselves affiliating with a community consisting of individuals whose country of origin differs from their own. As a result, people may develop more than one ethnic identity or, in other words, a multi-ethnic identity. This is very characteristic of Japanese immigrants and their children in Canada. In order to fully understand the process of identity formation amongst Japanese Canadians in Canada, we need to familiarize ourselves with the historical background of this group.

Historical Overview

The first settlements of Japanese migrants are noted in British Columbia as early as 1877. In 1901, the vast majority of Japanese immigrants lived in British Columbia.⁶ They were welcomed by employers in British Columbia as a source of cheap labour, however there was pressure from non-Asian residents to limit Asian immigration. As a result, the Gentleman's Agreement in 1908 restricted immigration to 400 labourers and servants.⁷ Anti-Japanese sentiment in the 1930s, aggravated by the Great Depression, provided fertile ground for Japanese Internment during WWII. Canada declared war on Japan on December 7, 1941. Japanese and Japanese Canadians were then forcibly relocated from the Pacific coast and placed in internment camps.

Those of us who were students had to leave our schools or universities. Those of us who owned

⁶ Naoko Hawkins, "Becoming a Model Minority: The Depiction of Japanese Canadians in the Globe and Mail, 1946-2000," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 41, no. 1-2 (2009): 138.

⁷ Ibid.

property (cars and trucks, houses, farms, fishing boats, businesses and so on) had it all confiscated by the Canadian government and later sold without our knowledge while we were still in camps. And our communities (Japanese communities) were broken up to disappear forever.⁸

To facilitate Japanese integration into Canadian society after WWII and to limit the number of Japanese in British Columbia, Japanese were discouraged from living on the Pacific Coast and were forced to either disperse across Canada or to return to Japan until 1947. It was not until March 31, 1949 that the wartime restrictions were fully removed and the right to vote was given to all Japanese Canadian citizens.⁹ Due to the long history of Japanese in Canada, they are the community with the highest proportion of native-born members of any ethnic group in Canada.¹⁰

Overall, Japanese Canadians are economically successful, educated, and well-integrated in Canadian society, particularly considering their historical experience of discrimination in Canada.¹¹ Their rapid and successful integration may be the result of their refusal to see themselves as victims, and instead to show endurance and self-determination.¹² As Hawkins further explains, after WWII “ethnic organizations were replaced with more acculturated organizations ... [and most] Japanese at the time were more concerned about keeping a low profile and rebuilding their lives than

⁸ Frank Moritsugu, “My Experiences During the Second World War,” Presentation at the Annual International Studies Symposium, Toronto, ON, March 29, 2015.

⁹ Hawkins, “Becoming a Model Minority,” 139.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 138.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 137.

¹² *Ibid*, 140.

lobbying for recognition of their human rights”.¹³ According to Kobayashi’s research, just one generation after the internment, Japanese in Canada achieved incomes and educational levels well above the national average.¹⁴

Intermarriage

Although Japanese Canadians endured forced internment and resettlement after WWII, they nonetheless formed communities in Canada, particularly in Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal. While more than half of Japanese Canadians resided in Toronto and Vancouver after the war, living in such large cities they accounted for a relatively small portion of the population and their settlement patterns were more loosely distributed than those of some other ethnic groups.

According to Statistics Canada, in 2006, the proportion of Japanese in Toronto – some 19,000 Japanese among over five million persons – was about 0.37 percent of the general population.¹⁵ More important is a decrease in comparison to 2001, when the census counted 20,000 Japanese (0.43 percent of the general population) in Toronto.¹⁶ As the Japanese community seems to be shrinking with time, perhaps it will become less likely for people of Japanese origin to

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Statistics Canada, *Canada’s Ethnocultural Mosaic: 2006 Census*, Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 97-562-X, Last modified April 2008, <http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-562/pdf/97-562-XIE2006001.pdf>, 30.

¹⁶ Statistics Canada, “The Japanese Community in Canada,” Last modified August 28, 2007, Retrieved from <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-621-x/89-621-x2007013-eng.htm>.

maintain ties and interpersonal relationships within their own ethnic group.

The distribution pattern has continued on a large scale up until today and has brought about fundamental changes in the Japanese Canadian community, with the most notable being frequent marriages outside of the community after the resettlement generation. The third generation (*Sansei*) of Japanese Canadians often grew up in mixed or mainly Anglo–Canadian neighborhoods, thus social interaction resulting in intermarriage is not surprising.¹⁷ Intermarriages have been occurring more rapidly among Japanese Canadians than any other ethnic group in the country. In contrast with other Asiatic groups with relatively higher single ancestry rates in their marriages (Chinese with 86 %, Korean with 94%, and Philippino with 81%), the Japanese single ancestry rate according to the 2001 census was 62%. This signifies that “the Japanese are the visible minority group most likely to marry or live common-law with a partner who does not share their ethnic heritage”.¹⁸

Maintaining Japanese Canadian distinctive ethnic identity may become a concern if the rate of intermarriages by Japanese Canadians continues to rise as it may reduce interaction within the ethnic group.¹⁹ The common characteristic of the *Sansei* is their lack of ties to other Japanese Canadians and Japanese Canadian organizations, mostly marrying Canadians of European descent.²⁰ Furthermore, the smaller the group of Japanese Canadians, the more intermarriages tend to occur, as there is likely to be less pressure to marry a member of the same ethnic group. This is especially true

¹⁷ Tomoko Makabe, “Intermarriage: Dream Becomes Reality for a Visible Minority?,” *Canadian Ethnic Studies/Etudes Ethniques Au Canada* 37, no. 1 (2005): 122.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Hawkins, “Becoming a Model Minority,” 140.

since most Japanese Canadians grow up in ethnically mixed or mainly Anglo-Canadian neighbourhoods. It is a matter of social exposure and consequently it is likely that the majority of Japanese Canadians will soon claim to have at least one ethnic origin in addition to Japanese, identifying themselves as persons of mixed backgrounds.

Family

Japanese Canadians belong to an Asian ethnic group whose traditional (i.e. first generation) Meiji-era value system is similar to the Chinese and Korean value systems, but whose current members, according to the 2006 Census, are largely (63.2 %) Canadian-born, and at least one or two generations removed from an immigrant experience.^{21,22} This offers an opportunity to examine parent-child relationships in a population whose first and second generations have had a unique and complex socio-political history in Canada, and to explore the influence that this has had on the nature and process of acculturation in its third and later generations.

An appreciation of changing structural realities is a main focus of the life course perspective, which underlines the differential impact that the generation-specific socio-structural, cultural, and historical forces may have had on important familial values. For example, Kobayashi argues that the shared experience of racial discrimination and marginalization of *Nisei* (second generation pre-war Japanese Canadians) early in their life course significantly influenced the way they

²¹ Statistics Canada, *Canada's Ethnocultural Mosaic: 2006 Census*, 14.

²² Karen M. Kobayashi and Laura Funk, "Of the Family Tree: Congruence on Filial Obligation between Older Parents and Adult Children in Japanese Canadian Families," *Canadian Journal on Aging/La Revue Canadienne Du Vieillessement* 29, no. 1 (2010): 85-96.

adhere to and understand the traditional *Issei* (first generation pre-war Japanese Canadians) value of the filial obligation to their parents and, as a result, the parents' expectations for social support from their children in later life. *Sansei* children, not having experienced similar socio-political exclusion as children and/or young adults and having grown up in ethno-culturally diverse Canadian communities may have more individualistic (versus familial) perceptions of the idea of social support for their parents.²³

According to Kobayashi's research based on interviewing Japanese Canadian families, understandings of the filial obligation in contemporary Japanese Canadian families were, in many cases, situation-based. For example, according to both older parents and adult children, filial obligation was dependent to a large degree on the health and marital status of the parent (i.e. a change in a parent's health or marital status in later life may be perceived as a motivation or trigger for the child's sense of filial obligation and the parent's expectations of the child for support).²⁴ This understanding reflects the cross-generational process of transformation that this core value has undergone in Japanese Canadian families – that is, to the *Issei*, filial obligation was almost entirely based or dependent on a child's obligation from birth to repay their parents for all of their efforts in giving birth to and raising them, and its enactment was not strongly tied to a parent's gender and/or a change in a parent's status, be it health or marital.

As we can see, family is an important factor in ethnic identification. It helps us understand how identity

²³ Karen M. Kobayashi, "The Nature of Support from Adult *Sansei* (Third Generation) Children to Older *Nisei* (Second Generation) Parents in Japanese Canadian Families," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Gerontology* 15, no. 3 (2000): 185-205.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

is rooted in experience, upbringing, and the environment in which an individual grows up as the cultural traditions and values are first practiced at home.^{25,26} For example, a multiethnic person may identify himself/herself as having multiple identities at home, but when in the environment of their Japanese grandparents, they may experience ‘self’ in terms of their Japanese heritage.²⁷ In this sense, environment, especially the immediate family and upbringing plays an important role on one’s development.

Given the central role played by family, it is even more interesting to see how the influence of family impacts language retention. Language retention may be in question even more so when the parents are of two different backgrounds, and a conflict may arise when deciding whether a child should follow the maternal or paternal ethnic language.

Language

Since language plays an important role in forming and maintaining ethnic identity, we need to look at the link between the two. Language plays an essential role in one’s experiences for pragmatic and social purposes. Not being able to communicate effectively can heighten systemic and socio-cultural barriers to accessing various information and resources. Language is an important aspect of communication that cannot be understood in isolation from the cultural context, especially when it comes to the early stages of life. For example, a child’s use of the Japanese language rather than, or in addition to, English increases the likelihood that they will identify

²⁵ Kobayashi and Funk, “Of the Family Tree.”

²⁶ Noro, “The Role of Japanese as a Heritage Language in Constructing Ethnic Identity among Hapa Japanese Canadian Children.”

²⁷ *Ibid*, 3.

as Japanese because speaking the language may improve the degree of their exposure to the Japanese community.

Although most parents of Japanese origin may have a strong desire for their children to develop their Japanese language skills as well as their Japanese Canadian identities, living environments seem to be the most significant factor when it comes to children's Japanese language proficiency and self-identification. Other important factors include whether the parent(s) experienced living in Japan prior to the birth of their child(ren); the parent's leadership role in their children's linguistic and cultural development; the adoption of Japanese cultural/lifestyle modalities within the family, ranging from food preferences and media consumption to friendship networks with Japanese-speaking people; and the family language use pattern or the use of Japanese in the family.²⁸

Sense of Belonging and Integration

The sense of belonging that accompanies successful integration is affected by the desire to integrate and the level of commitment to the new place or community. The primary reason for migration is to seek a better opportunity for economic progress in a more stable society. Adult migrants leave their past lives behind not only to improve their own standard of living, but also to ensure a better future for their children. During their settlement and integration into Canadian society, immigrants encounter many new challenges associated with securing employment, managing financially, locating housing, accessing medical and social services, and language barriers.

While Japanese Canadians were historically oppressed, they are framed as a community that

²⁸ Ibid.

succeeded despite their negative experience and held a forgiving attitude towards the past. Furthermore, they seem willing and able to overcome the challenges above in order to find a place in Canada. Consequently, it seems that it was around 1991 that the status of ‘successfully integrated’ was ascribed to Japanese Canadians.²⁹ This status, after over one hundred years of oppression and opposition marks a significant change.

One reason for successful integration is that Japanese seem to accept their immigration commitment, decisively choosing to make Canada their long-term home, and successfully achieve economic and educational integration. While trying to find or create a Japanese community, they nonetheless consider Canada to be their new home and strive to contribute to the new community that they join when arriving in the country. As stated by Magat (1999), their perspective is that “wherever you are, that’s your place”,³⁰ a viewpoint which certainly helps them in embracing their life in Canada.

Conclusion

Ethnic identity is an important aspect of immigrants’ ability in today’s transnational world to bridge the gap between their new host country and their country of origin. Since identity is no longer fixed to a particular geography, the approach to ethnic identity is changing over time. During the contemporary period, immigrants experience more than one geographical place and therefore become engaged with different communities; their identities changing in the process. For example,

²⁹ Hawkins, “Becoming a Model Minority,” 148.

³⁰ Ilan N. Magat, “Israeli and Japanese Immigrants to Canada: Home, Belonging, and the Territorialization of Identity,” *Ethos* 27, no. 2 (1999): 119-144.

they adopt multi-ethnic identities, which give them more allowance to self-identify.

As discussed in this essay, the initial Japanese immigrants to Canada, their children, and the generations that have followed have had very different experiences causing their identities to develop differently. In the past, many Japanese faced discrimination, dispossession, internment, and even deportation. Today, Japanese Canadians contribute richly to Canada's cultural, political, economic, and public life. This change is eloquently summarized by Frank Moritsugu: "So for today's young Japanese Canadians—that is our children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren—there aren't many doors that are still closed to them. And if any door is closed, they know how to open it".³¹

Among the other opportunities young Japanese Canadians now have is the opportunity to express identity. As the community develops in new directions, both the culture and the identity implied by the term 'Japanese Canadian' will naturally evolve.

³¹ Moritsugu, "My Experiences During the Second World War."

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Japanese-Brazilian Return Migration: Unmet Expectations

Alexandra Pullano

Introduction

During the early 1900s, beginning in 1909, a number of Japanese labourers migrated to Brazil in the face of economic hardship in Japan. This was mostly due to the fact that the end of the feudal period in Japan generated great poverty among the rural populations. Consequently, in search of a better life, many Japanese farmers agreed (or in some cases were “strongly encouraged” by the Japanese government) to move to a place where there were better opportunities. Thus, in 1907, Japan and Brazil signed a treaty allowing Japanese migration to Brazil.

The initial migration turned into a number of subsequent waves of Japanese migrants, the largest of which was the migration boom following the First World War, until almost two million Japanese migrants were living in Brazil. Beginning in the 1970s however, Japanese and Brazilian fortunes changed, with the countries' economic positions reversing. As a result, Japan-Brazil migration patterns have also reversed with a number of the Japanese migrants to Brazil returning to Japan to benefit from an abundance of job opportunities and high wages. This new migration has been termed the Japanese-Brazilian return migration.

Presented here is an analysis of the origins of this migration and the experience of the migrants once they reached Japan. The first section of the paper will outline the origins of the migration, describing both the reasoning behind the migrants' decision to move and the reasoning behind the government's decision to welcome the migrants. Following this description, the

paper will look at the expectations of both parties about what this migration would bring to Japan and the migrants and what the results would be. The main portion of the paper will then evaluate whether or not these expectations, both economic and cultural in nature, were met and how this affected the experience of the migrants and the Japanese population attempting to accept the new migrants. Finally, we will look into the current state of Japan-Brazil migration patterns.

The paper follows from the hypothesis that the difficulties the Japanese Brazilian migrants experienced while living in Japan were a consequence of unmet expectations both economically and culturally. These unmet expectations also had an effect on deciding whether or not to remain in Japan or return to Brazil.

Origins of the Return Migration

Japanese-Brazilian return migration was triggered by economic and cultural considerations, both in Brazil and in Japan, which produced a reciprocal relationship between the two nations that facilitated the initial migration. Firstly, Japanese descendants in Brazil were pushed into migration due to an economic recession in Brazil beginning in the 1980s. At this time, the Brazilian economy “crumbled and entered a prolonged severe period of crisis, overburdened by foreign debt, hyperinflation and high unemployment”.¹ Japanese Brazilians, who had achieved “urban middle class status”² in Brazil, felt that the comfortable lifestyle they

¹ Takeyuki Tsuda, *Strangers in the ethnic homeland: Japanese Brazilian return migration in transnational perspective* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003): 84.

² Angelo Ishi, “Searching for Home, Wealth, Pride and “Class”: Japanese Brazilians in the “Land of the Yen”,” in *Searching for Home Abroad: Japanese Brazilians and Transnationalism*, ed. Jeffery Lesser (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 77.

had created would slip away as a result of this volatile economic environment. Therefore, some authors have argued that for a number of Japanese Brazilian migrants, returning to Japan became a way to prevent a decline in social status, rather than to seek a better life.³

Faced with declining prospects for future success in Brazil, migration was seen as necessary in order to maintain the lifestyles Japanese descendants had created in Brazil. This was made possible by the fact that the migrants could earn “five to ten times their Brazilian salaries in Japan as unskilled or semiskilled factory workers”.⁴ Initially, the goal of migration to Japan was to make enough money to maintain a certain level of comfort, a goal that was not possible in Brazil at the time.

While economic considerations were the main driving force behind Japanese-Brazilian return migration, the migrants were drawn to Japan specifically due to perceived cultural links with what was called the “homeland.” Even though many of the migrants cite their economic goals as the main reason why they migrated, they also “framed it as a return to the homeland that offered the possibility of self-understanding”.⁵ For a descendant of Japanese migrants in Brazil, or for the original migrant, before leaving Brazil, Japan was considered to be the land of their ancestors and therefore, “in some place in his mind, he [possessed] a sense of belonging with regard to Japan, as

³ Ibid.

⁴ Takeyuki Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries: Japanese Brazilian Return Migrants and the Ethnic Challenge of Japan's Newest Immigrant Minority,” in *Multiculturalism in the New Japan: Crossing the Boundaries Within*, eds. Nelson H. H. Graburn, John Ertl, and R. Kenji Tierney, 117-138, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 118.

⁵ Joshua Hotaka Roth, *Brokered Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Migrants in Japan* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2002), 3.

well as the possibility of the myth of return to his ethnic origin”.⁶

In Brazil, many Japanese Brazilians had participated heavily in Japanese culture through music, cinema, and other cultural activities and thus began “looking with nostalgia toward Japan as their ancestral homeland”.⁷ Researcher Takeyuki Tsuda maintains that “it was transnational ethnic connections between the Brazilian *nikkeijin* (those with Japanese ancestry), and the Japanese that directed the migrant flow to Japan”.⁸ In other words, Japan was chosen as the destination country, as opposed to other prosperous countries in Europe or North America, due to the fact that those of Japanese descent in Brazil felt an affinity for, and connection with, the nation, and thus expected that they would connect culturally with the people there and be able to easily return to their roots.

At the same time that Brazil was going through an economic crisis, Japan was experiencing an economic boom that resulted in an abundance of factory jobs and a growing labour shortage. With the economic boom in Japan, the population was becoming increasingly prosperous and educated and thus was more and more likely to refuse to work in factory jobs, leading to job vacancies.

For a while, Japan was reluctant to accept foreign peoples into its work force and during the 1970s the nation “continued to insist on its ethnic homogeneity and refused to accept any unskilled foreign workers”.⁹ Yet labour deficiencies continued to increase and by the late 1980s, the labour shortage was so severe that the

⁶ Elisa Massae Sasaki, “Dekasseguis: Japanese-Brazilian Immigrants in Japan and the Question of Identity,” *Bulletin of Portuguese-Japanese Studies* 4 (June 2002): 113.

⁷ Roth, *Brokered Homeland: Japanese-Brazilian Migrants in Japan*, 18.

⁸ Takeyuki Tsuda, *Strangers in the ethnic homeland*, 90.

⁹ Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries,” 117-118.

government and factories were forced to capitulate to the pressures of global migration.¹⁰ Consequently, firms which were experiencing labour deficiencies “became dependent on foreign workers as the only realistic and cost-efficient source of labour power”.¹¹ With a crisis in Brazil decreasing opportunity there and an economic boom in Japan producing an abundance of well-paid jobs, especially in comparison to Brazilian wages, a symbiotic relationship facilitating migration developed between the two nations whereby Japanese Brazilian migrants filled necessary positions in Japan and simultaneously freed positions for workers in Brazil.

However, this policy was controversial due to the fact that the Japanese government, as well as the population, hoped to maintain the myth that the country was culturally homogenous. An influx of foreign workers, with different cultures and different values, was seen as threatening to this monolithic myth. Consequently, the Japanese government made the decision to reform its immigration laws, introducing a new visa status which was called “long-term resident,” allowing any Japanese descendant, up to the third generation, to legally work in Japan for three years.¹² With this change, Japan attempted to protect the supposedly homogenous character of Japanese society by accepting only foreign workers who, like the Japanese Brazilians, were expected to be familiar with Japanese culture.¹³

It was assumed that, as descendants of Japanese, these migrants would have a “closer cultural

¹⁰ Ibid, 118.

¹¹ Takeyuki Tsuda, *Strangers in the ethnic homeland*, 90.

¹² Ernani Oda, “Ethnic Migration and Memory: Disputes Over the Ethnic Origins of Japanese Brazilians in Japan,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33 (2010): 518.

¹³ Ibid.

background and fewer linguistic barriers”.¹⁴ Tsuda does well to summarize the motivations behind the Japanese government’s stance on welcoming foreign-born Japanese Brazilians, stating that the government, by,

appealing to an ideology of transnational ethnic affiliation with the Brazilian *nikeijin* based on common ancestry [...] was able to acquire a much needed and docile migrant labour force, without contradicting, at least at the level of official appearances, the fundamental principle of Japanese immigration policy that no unskilled foreign workers [would] be accepted.¹⁵

In counterpoint to the assumptions of the Japanese Brazilians, Japan welcomed these migrants under the assumption that they were connected to the nation and that Japan constituted their “homeland.”

Expectations

The construction of Japan as the “homeland” for Japanese Brazilian migrants engendered a set of expectations for how these migrants would integrate into Japanese society. Since this migration was deemed a “return migration” to what was considered the ancestral homeland by the migrants themselves, they believed integration into Japan would be simple, since they considered themselves to be Japanese. Japanese Brazilians, while being socially well integrated in Brazilian society, had continued to “feel culturally Japanese and assert a rather prominent Japanese ethnic

¹⁴ Hosoe Yoko, “Japanese-Brazilians Seen at First Hand: Ethnographic Studies of a New Minority in Japan,” *Social Science Japan Journal* 6 (2003): 255.

¹⁵ Takeyuki Tsuda, *Strangers in the ethnic homeland*, 92.

identity”¹⁶ in which they felt a strong sense of pride. More importantly, in Brazil, the Japanese Brazilians often identified themselves as Japanese rather than as Brazilians. For example, a Japanese Brazilian immigrant in Japan named Fabio stated: “I had convinced myself that I was so Japanese in Brazil and took pride in this, I wanted to be seen as Japanese in Japan”.¹⁷

The assertion of the prevalence of this mindset among the migrants is reinforced by a study done by Lindsey Sasaki which found that since “the majority of [her] subjects were 100% ethnically Japanese, they believed that the Japanese would perceive them also to be Japanese, based on physical appearance and ancestry”.¹⁸ With such a strong identification with the Japanese identity and with their identity being constructed as Japanese while in Brazil, it is not surprising that when migrating to Japan, this migrant group expected “to be accepted as ethnic Japanese descendants”.¹⁹ When returning to what they considered the homeland, it was assumed they would be welcomed as members of that society and be able to successfully integrate into the culture with which they identified.

This expectation of successful integration was shared by the Japanese society, which believed that since they looked Japanese and had Japanese parents, the migrants would share Japanese values and act the way in which the Japanese acted. When making the changes to

¹⁶ Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries,” 119.

¹⁷ Takeyuki Tsuda, “Homeland-less Abroad: Transnational Liminality, Social Alienation and Personal Malaise,” in *Searching for Home Abroad: Japanese Brazilians and Transnationalism*, ed. Jeffery Lesser, 134, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).

¹⁸ Lindsey Y. Sasaki, “The Dekassegui Movement: Identity Transformation of Japanese Brazilian Dekassegui and Arubaito Young Adults to Japan and Upon Return to Brazil,” (Doctoral thesis, Steinhardt School of Culture Education and Human Development, New York University, 2014), 166.

¹⁹ Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries,” 119.

immigration policies in order to allow Japanese descendants abroad easier access to the Japanese labour market, officials believed that the migrants would be culturally similar to the Japanese and would thus be assimilated smoothly into Japanese society. This belief was based on the Japanese ethnic ideology, which “privileges common descent as the basis for cultural affinity”.²⁰ This also corresponds to a belief that because migrants looked Japanese, they must also be culturally Japanese, or as Tsuda puts it, “the ‘racially’ Japanese are assumed to be ‘culturally’ Japanese too”.²¹

Therefore, it was presumed that “the cultural background of the selected migrants would be closer to the Japanese cultural context, implying that they [would] have the possibility of greater ease in integrating into Japanese society”.²² This belief was a result of the strong expectation that since they were raised by Japanese parents, Brazilian *nikkeijin* should have literally “inherited a considerable amount of Japanese culture”.²³

The *Nikkeijin* were supposed to be acceptable migrants, ones that did not threaten the social order of Japan because “as relatives of Japanese, they would be capable of being assimilated into Japanese society without considerations of nationality”.²⁴ Evidently, both the migrants and the Japanese population expected that as descendants of Japanese, integration would not be difficult, based on presupposed cultural affiliation.

Reality

When the expectations of both sides were not met, both the Japanese and the Japanese Brazilian migrants

²⁰ Takeyuki Tsuda, *Strangers in the ethnic homeland*, 92.

²¹ Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries,” 125.

²² Sasaki, “Dekasseguis,” 120.

²³ Takeyuki Tsuda, *Strangers in the ethnic homeland*, 117.

²⁴ Sasaki, “Dekasseguis,” 118.

experienced great levels of disappointment which shaped the way in which the Brazilian *nikkeijin* would settle into Japan. Once the Japanese Brazilians came to Japan, it was clear that they were not as culturally similar to the Japanese as the officials and the population had assumed.

The Japanese population quickly found out that the Brazilian *nikkeijin*, especially those of the second or third generation, who made up most of the migrant population, were not completely fluent in the Japanese language and had essentially become culturally 'Brazilianized'.²⁵ For the Japanese population this was quite shocking and disorienting since there was "a lot of sense of incongruity towards those who [had] a Japanese face but [were] culturally Brazilian".²⁶ The fact that many Brazilian *nikkeijin* were unable to speak the language properly and the reality of their cultural foreignness was "disillusioning and disappointing for most Japanese".²⁷ Therefore, the Japanese population was disheartened when they saw that, even though these migrants looked Japanese and had been raised in Japanese families, they had not completely retained their Japanese culture and values.

Essentially, when the Japanese saw that the migrants were not culturally Japanese, as they had expected, they became "disappointed when they realized how Brazilian they had become".²⁸ Due to this disappointment, the Japanese began to no longer consider the Brazilian *nikkeijin* as culturally similar Japanese descendants in the homeland. Rather the Japanese Brazilian migrants were eventually deemed to be foreigners.²⁹ Therefore, the Japanese Brazilians went from being described as

²⁵ Tsuda, "Crossing Ethnic Boundaries," 118.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 120.

²⁷ Takeyuki Tsuda, *Strangers in the ethnic homeland*, 117.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 116.

²⁹ Sasaki, "Dekasseguis," 125.

Japanese in Brazil to being labelled as foreigners in what was supposed to be the homeland. The Japanese Brazilians, for their part, found it was much more difficult to be considered Japanese in Japan, due to the existence of “an implicit and tacit level of cultural expectations because the Japanese associated race with culture and language as necessary factors in what constituted a Japanese person”.³⁰

Being labelled as foreigners by the Japanese was a shock to the Brazilian *nikkeijin* who had defined themselves as Japanese while living in Brazil. As stated in the previous section, many of the migrants had presumed that their Japanese racial features and their Japanese ancestry would be enough to be considered Japanese in Japan. However, even today, in Japan once they are,

confronted by a narrow Japanese ethno-national identity, in which Japaneseness is defined not only by Japanese racial descent, but by complete Japanese linguistic and cultural proficiency, the Brazilian *nikkeijin* discover that although they feel quite culturally 'Japanese' in Brazil, they are not ethnically accepted in Japan because they appear culturally foreign not only for their lack of Japanese language proficiency, but also for their Brazilian attitudes and behaviour.³¹

This comes as an identity shock to many of the migrants because in Brazil they had been labelled as Japanese by the Brazilian community. In Brazil, “many of the Japanese Brazilians self-identified as *japonês* because of how Brazilian society labeled them based on their

³⁰ Sasaki, “The Dekassegui Movement,” 165.

³¹ Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries,” 120.

physical characteristics”.³² Moreover, they themselves had emphasized their Japanese descent and heritage and had retained a strong sentimental attachment to Japan.³³ As a result of being labelled foreign in a land to which they had previously felt strongly connected, they experienced “a disorienting loss of their ethnic homeland”.³⁴

Therefore, the migrants experienced the effects of an important “ethnic identity shift”,³⁵ where many Japanese Brazilians had to reorient their ethnic identities from Japanese to Brazilian.³⁶ Ironically, the same Japanese Brazilians who had gone to Japan in hopes of becoming more attached to their ethnic homeland came to feel less sense of belonging in and to their ancestral homeland than they had had while living in a different country.³⁷ In migrating to Japan, the Brazilian *nikkeijin* had to reorient their identity as an ethnic minority in the place they had hoped to call their homeland.

Discrimination based on Culture

The Japanese cultural expectations for those who had Japanese features and the Japanese Brazilian migrants’ inability to live up to these expectations resulted in certain levels of discrimination and alienation for the Japanese Brazilian migrants in Japan. Tsuda describes how “most Japanese in local communities and factories [had] not crossed ethnic boundaries by socially accepting the *nikkeijin*, but [had] excluded them as foreigners”.³⁸ In this way, the outsider status conferred

³² Sasaki, “The Dekassegui Movement,” 169.

³³ Tsuda, “Homeland-less Abroad,” 133.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Sasaki, “The Dekassegui Movement,” 171.

³⁶ Tsuda, “Homeland-less Abroad,” 134.

³⁷ Roth, *Brokered Homeland: Japanese-Brazilian Migrants in Japan*, 2.

³⁸ Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries,” 119.

onto the Japanese Brazilians through the label *gaijin* (foreigner) was “reinforced by the ethnic marginalization they [experienced] and the tendency of most Japanese to avoid unfamiliar foreigners”.³⁹ Since the Japanese Brazilians did not act in the way that was expected based on their physical Japanese features, the Japanese found it difficult to interact with the Brazilian *nikkeijin*. There was a specific cultural burden placed on those who “appeared to have a 100% ethnic Japanese face [...] to behave like a Japanese”⁴⁰ therefore when the *nikkeijin* did not, they were greeted with alienation.

Additionally, Tsuda has stated that “the main reason the Japanese do not accept the Brazilian *nikkeijin* is because they perceive the cultural differences of the *nikkeijin* quite negatively”.⁴¹ For example, some Japanese have stated they “do not like to see *nikkeijin* walking around in groups, dressed in a strange manner, speaking loudly in Portuguese, and otherwise behaving in ways that seem alien”.⁴² This lack of acceptance for cultural differences leads many Japanese to be unwilling to engage with the Japanese Brazilians.

This is most strikingly seen in the workplace, where “the alienation that at least some *nikkeijin* have felt in Japan has resulted from their exclusion from the workplace communities”.⁴³ In the workplace, Tsuda found that it was quite rare for the two groups (Japanese and Japanese Brazilians) to interact. Rather, interaction was limited to work instructions.⁴⁴ Japanese managers and workers alike often complained about the Japanese Brazilians, once again citing cultural differences whereby the Japanese perceived the Japanese Brazilians to be

³⁹ Ibid, 120.

⁴⁰ Sasaki, “The Dekassegui Movement,” 172.

⁴¹ Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries,” 126.

⁴² Ibid, 127.

⁴³ Roth, *Brokered Homeland: Japanese-Brazilian Migrants in Japan*, 7.

⁴⁴ Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries,” 120.

lacking in gratitude, initiative, and a sense of group responsibility.⁴⁵

These negative feelings towards Japanese Brazilian cultural attributes carried into housing as well where “Japanese landlords were generally reluctant to rent apartments to Brazilians”.⁴⁶ This was due to the fact that in order to rent an apartment the Brazilians needed knowledge of and compliance with Japanese rules such as maintaining quiet and serious behaviour.⁴⁷ They were reluctant to rent to Brazilians who were often viewed as being loud and resented for partying too late. Conclusively, the disappointment the Japanese felt when they realized the Brazilian *nikkeijin* were more Brazilian than Japanese resulted in a certain level of prejudice and social alienation towards the migrant population.

The Japanese Brazilians responded to this social alienation by reinforcing their Brazilian identities and creating their own communities. The Japanese Brazilians themselves played a large role in their social marginalization, since they responded to the initial Japanese reluctance to interact with foreigners and their rejection as ethnic Japanese “by actively withdrawing in an act of ethnic self-segregation”⁴⁸ thus further differentiating themselves from Japanese society. This ethnic self-segregation resulted in the creation of “extensive self-contained immigrant communities” which included Brazilian restaurants, stores, and nightclubs.⁴⁹ It was through these communities that Japanese Brazilians could obtain the “companionship, social support and mutual understanding, necessary for them to overcome the debilitating effects of social and

⁴⁵ Roth, *Brokered Homeland: Japanese-Brazilian Migrants in Japan*, 61.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 106.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*.

⁴⁸ Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries,” 122.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 123.

self-alienation”.⁵⁰ After experiencing ethnic discrimination upon arrival, the Brazilian *nikkeijin* felt a “resurgence of Brazilian national sentiment and [distanced] themselves by asserting their Brazilian cultural differences”.⁵¹ Essentially, in order to deal with the shock of not being considered Japanese in Japan and having to reconstitute their identity, the Japanese Brazilians returned to their Brazilian culture and communities to create a sense of belonging.

Economic Expectations

In addition to the shock of having to reconstitute their cultural identities, many Japanese Brazilian migrants experienced a decline in economic class upon arriving to Japan, which further hindered their successful integration into Japanese society. As previously stated, many of the Brazilian *nikkeijin* had held an urban middle class status in Brazil,⁵² working as doctors, lawyers, and engineers. However, the jobs being filled by Brazilian *nikkeijin* in Japan were unskilled or semi-skilled factory positions. In this context, not only did the return migrants face a cultural identity crisis while trying to make a life for themselves in Japan; they also faced a professional identity and class identity crisis.⁵³

As migrants who previously held a “middle class socioeconomic status and worked in less alienating office settings” this sudden change in status to unskilled factory positions worked to “add to the general alienation they already experienced in the host society”.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Tsuda, “Homeland-less Abroad,” 147.

⁵¹ Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries,” 123.

⁵² Ishi, “Searching for Home, Wealth, Pride and “Class,”” 77.

⁵³ Ibid, 80.

⁵⁴ Tsuda, “Homeland-less Abroad,” 138.

The challenge here was the Japanese Brazilians' shift from being a positive minority in Brazil, where they are seen as a "successful middle-class minority [...] that is culturally respected," to being a negative minority in Japan where "they [became] low-status factory workers...who [were] culturally despised to a certain extent for their Brazilian behavior".⁵⁵ Such a profound change in the way in which they were viewed by the society in which they were living and the status that they held was a difficult adjustment for the Japanese Brazilian migrants.

Unsurprisingly, the low economic status held by migrants led to further experiences of discrimination. The fact that Japanese Brazilians were working in these less well-regarded positions further aggravated the tensions between the migrants and the Japanese because many Japanese feel that factory work is an inappropriate position for those wishing to be considered respectable.⁵⁶ Therefore, not only were the Japanese Brazilians viewed as second rate Japanese because of their lack of understanding of Japanese culture; they were also seen as not truly Japanese because of their jobs, which were most often reserved for foreign workers and not for true Japanese.

Consequently, as explained in research by Tsuda, "social segregation in their ethnic homeland as cultural foreign minorities [was] further exacerbated by [the fact that] they [became] unskilled migrant workers who [were] a marginalized part of the working class".⁵⁷ The Japanese Brazilians could not be respected by the majority of Japanese society since they were performing low status jobs "which [were] actively shunned and denigrated by most Japanese".⁵⁸ In Japan, these factory

⁵⁵ Takeyuki Tsuda, *Strangers in the ethnic homeland*, 104.

⁵⁶ Roth, *Brokered Homeland: Japanese-Brazilian Migrants in Japan*, 51.

⁵⁷ Takeyuki Tsuda, *Strangers in the ethnic homeland*, 103.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 105.

jobs are described as the 3K factory jobs, where the 3K's represent *kiken* (dangerous), *kitanai* (dirty), and *keitsui* (difficult).⁵⁹ These 3K positions are generally seen to be reserved only for the least educated in society.⁶⁰ Even though this is not the reality, as factory workers the Japanese Brazilians were viewed to be uneducated and were stigmatized and shunned. Clearly then, cultural difference coupled with a low socioeconomic distinction, further reinforced the social alienation experienced by the Japanese Brazilian return migrants in Japan.

Length of Stay in Japan

The original reason for migrating to Japan was an economically motivated desire to earn enough money in a short period of time to be able to maintain a middle class lifestyle when moving back to Brazil. With such difficulties adapting both economically and culturally to Japanese society, it might be assumed that many of the migrants left Japan as soon as they could to go back to the country where they were viewed more positively.

However, after the initial migration, while some migrants did move back to Brazil fairly quickly, a larger number of the migrants ended up staying in Japan longer than they had anticipated. Tsuda found in his research that while many of the migrants wanted to save enough money to return to Brazil to “recover their self-respect in order to enjoy “real life” [they tended to] gradually extend their stay in Japan since the final goal [was] never clearly defined”.⁶¹ In other words, the amount of money that was necessary in order to return

⁵⁹ Ibid, 114.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries,” 81-82.

to Brazil was often not explicitly established and thus it was difficult to know when to return home.

Therefore, even though the migrants continued to consider their time in Japan to be temporary, the settlement of Japanese Brazilians in Japan became quite advanced in the years immediately following the initial migration, with a number of migrants either continuing to prolong their stay or deciding to remain in Japan indefinitely, or, to a lesser extent, permanently.⁶² As a result, with the migrants staying in Japan longer than had been anticipated, another expectation of what the return migration would entail was not fulfilled.

One of the main reasons the migration lasted longer than many had hoped or expected was that many of the migrants did not save as much money as they had anticipated in the two or three years they had wanted to stay in Japan. While saving money was the main motivation in returning to Japan, the migrants soon found that they “could not fully accomplish this desire as life in Japan proved to be extremely difficult to save money”.⁶³ At the outset, most Japanese Brazilian migrants would not engage in much but work and were the first to accept overtime, however this life proved unfulfilling and difficult. Therefore, those migrants who had chosen to stay longer “tended to give up overtime and night shift work in favour of more normal working hours [... and] many began to re-evaluate their goals and priorities as they discovered certain pleasures of life in Japan”.⁶⁴

As more time passed and they had not earned the amount of money they felt they needed, the migrants opted to enjoy their time in Japan more, which in turn further hindered their ability to save money and thus

⁶² Tsuda, “Homeland-less Abroad,” 152.

⁶³ Sasaki, “The Dekassegui Movement,” 308.

⁶⁴ Roth, *Brokered Homeland: Japanese-Brazilian Migrants in Japan*, 97.

extended their stay in Japan. Moreover, many of the migrants, especially the young, were not used to the amount of money they were now making in Japan and the products they found in Japan were more appealing than those in Brazil and thus, as one migrant commented, “for anyone who does not outline a goal of saving money, it is very difficult to save”.⁶⁵

For those who wanted to enjoy life while they were in Japan, saving money did not remain the primary goal guiding behaviour and thus periods of time in Japan were gradually extended as the migrants continued not to save as much money as originally anticipated.

Changing Migrant Patterns

While in the years immediately following the initial migration, especially the 1990s, many Japanese Brazilians continued to remain in Japan in order to make use of their new purchasing power and greater access to consumer goods, the economic incentives to remain in Japan gradually began to lessen as the Japanese economy began to falter and the world went into an economic crisis. With these changing circumstances, many of the migrants in Japan found that the “ability to earn money became nearly impossible when the global economic crisis began that forced the bulk of the Brazilian population to prolong their stay in Japan or return to Brazil unwillingly”.⁶⁶ Those who stayed in Japan faced unemployment, lack of job prospects, salary decreases, and a reduction in the number of both fixed and overtime hours,⁶⁷ making life in Japan and migration to Japan increasingly unappealing. Moreover, with a declining wage

⁶⁵ Sasaki, “The Dekassegui Movement,” 309-310.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 308.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 324.

differential between Brazil and Japan, the amount of money saved in Japan did not mean as much as it once had.

With the difficulties of finding employment in Japan for Japanese Brazilian migrants and the declining need for them in the Japanese labour market, the government created a policy in reverse to the one they had created to allow the migrants into Japan. While the government did try to help by providing an increase in job counseling and language preparation classes for the Brazilian *nikkeijin*, they also created a controversial program called the Pay-to-Go Program.⁶⁸ This program was a voluntary return program for *Nikkeijin*, who had to prove unemployment and legal residency status.⁶⁹ Knowing that many of the migrants remaining in Japan were unable to leave due to lack of funds and wishing to avoid potential social problems involving unemployed Japanese Brazilians, the Japanese government incentivized returning to Brazil by making it easier for migrants to do so. During the 2009 fiscal year, 21 675 Latin American *nikkeijin* workers (Brazilian and Peruvian) accepted the program and returned home.

Evidently, the current state of Brazil to Japan migration is compromised due to the fact that economic and cultural incentives to return to Japan have been undermined and the Japanese government has shifted from policies that encourage migration to policies that actively attempt to remove migrants from Japan.

Conclusion

What is quite clear is that the Japanese-Brazilian return migration did not turn out as the Japanese Brazilian migrants, the Japanese government, or the Japanese

⁶⁸ Ibid, 333.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 334.

population had expected. As a result, the Japanese-Brazilian migration stream has slowed over the years and many of the migrants have returned to Brazil.

Most importantly, the fact that the Japanese-Brazilian migrants could not be considered Japanese was a shock to all parties. The migrants, who had been called Japanese by Brazilian society and had themselves strongly identified with Japanese culture, were surprised to find that the Japanese population did not accept them as Japanese. The migrants had, to a greater extent than they realized, been culturally Brazilianized and thus in the face of strict views of what constituted Japaneseness, they could not be considered truly Japanese, but rather second-rate Japanese. Here, the migrants were a disappointment to Japanese citizens because of the strong belief that anyone raised by Japanese parents should have retained their Japanese culture. The disillusionment when this proved to be false severely hindered the integration of the migrants since the population did not know how to relate to Japanese-looking people who did not act Japanese.

In addition to these cultural disappointments, the unskilled factory work proved to be demoralising to the migrants and saving money proved to be much more difficult than expected, especially when the end goal was not explicitly defined. This economic disappointment turned into longer stays in Japan than had initially been intended. To counteract these disappointments, the migrants created Brazilian communities, which provided support and familiarity for migrants in Japan. These communities, as they became more established, made it easier for many of the migrants to stay longer than they had planned, creating a new ethnic minority in Japan. However, with the Japanese economy in stagnation and the wage differential closing, many are reluctantly returning to Brazil without having achieved their

economic goals and disillusioned with what they had believed to be their homeland.

Unfortunately, current research into Japanese-Brazilian migration is lacking. Much of the research on these migrants was conducted during the initial period of migration in the 1990s. Therefore, what is needed to enhance the body of research on the Japanese Brazilians is more in-depth research into the current Brazilian *nikkeijin* population in Japan and how they are coping in the new economic environment as well as into the population of migrants who have returned to Brazil in disappointment and how this has affected their life in Brazil.

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A busy street scene in Japan. In the foreground, a woman in a white puffer jacket and a pink floral bag looks to the left. To her right, a man in a dark pinstriped suit and striped tie looks forward. The background is a blurred crowd of people and buildings.

**JAPAN AND THE
WORLD:**
Politics and Diplomacy

**LE JAPON ET LE
MONDE:**
La Politique et la Diplomatie

Why Do the Neighbours Fear a 'Normal' Japan?

David A. Welch

First of all, let me say that it is a great privilege and pleasure to be here today. I was very impressed by the organization of the Symposium and by the line-up. I don't normally spend my Sundays coming out to do work again, but when I saw the quality of the program I couldn't resist. It's a great treat to be here. With luck I can be briefer than my allotted time and we can have more time for questions and answers.

The question I would like to address today is, "Why do the neighbours fear a 'normal' Japan?" By "neighbours," I really only mean China and South Korea. Russia is a neighbour, of course, but I do not think Russia fears Japan. We can talk about why not if you would like. North Korea is also neighbour. I do not think North Korea really fears Japan, although I do not claim to understand the North Korean mindset at all, so who knows what they do or do not fear?

China and South Korea have very consistently recently made surprisingly strong statements objecting to recent trends and developments in Japanese foreign and security policy, and these statements use the language of fear. Now one question, of course, is: "Do they mean it?" Are China and South Korea sincere when they attempt to raise warning flags about changes in Japanese foreign and security policy? This is a good question. My answer is that South Koreans are certainly sincere; some Chinese are sincere; other Chinese are not sincere and they use this fear tactically or strategically.

What Korea and China claim to fear is essentially Japan becoming what for decades now we have called a 'normal' country. That was a term first invented by the former leader of the Democratic Party of Japan, Ichiro

Ozawa. When he complained in the 1990s (shortly after the first Gulf War) that Japan was not a ‘normal’ country, he basically meant one thing on the foreign policy side: namely, that Japan—unlike any other country in the world—is not allowed to use military force, even for productive purposes, such as contribution to regional and global stability. This is the result of Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution, which prohibits Japan not only from ever using war as an instrument of statecraft, but also from even maintaining military forces. They do, of course, maintain military forces, and they really are very good military forces (they get around this restriction by calling them “Self-Defense Forces”). This clause is what makes Japan very unusual. No other country has a clause of this kind. In my opinion, this is the main thing that makes Japan an ‘abnormal’ country.

Prime Minister Abe has been trying to make Japan more of a ‘normal’ country. Ideally, he would like either to abolish or to revise Article Nine; he has talked openly about his desire to do that. I think he would like to do it largely because Article Nine, in his mind, is an emblem of shame. It is essentially like a scarlet letter from the old Hawthorne short story. Japan has been forced to wear this scarlet letter since the end of World War II. It’s a symbol of Japan being on probation in an open-ended kind of way. Abe is not a far right-wing hawkish militarist, but he is a proud Japanese, and he thinks that it’s time that the world got over World War II. He would like to see Japan let off parole.

Now, he can’t revise Article Nine. Nobody has ever managed to revise the Japanese postwar constitution. The bar for constitutional amendment is set very high and it is difficult to surmount. However, he has sought to reinterpret Article Nine in a way that enables Japan to be a bit more ‘normal’ in its foreign and security policy. The big innovation is his recent cabinet reinterpretation

of Article Nine to permit collective self-defence. This would just allow the Japanese military to come to the aid of its allies. The United States is the only ally that we are really talking about here. The United States is obliged to help Japanese ships if they are under attack, and they would do certainly that. But constitutionally, most people would say, Japan is not allowed to go to the aid of American ships under attack. There is a strange asymmetry to that. Abe is essentially trying to fix that anomaly. Note that he has not been dramatically boosting defence spending. Nor has he been adding dramatic new capabilities to the Japanese military—for example, nuclear weapons. Japan could get nuclear weapons if it wanted to in about three weeks. That kind of thing is not on the agenda: only collective self-defence.

The reaction from China and South Korea has been rather hysterical. One possible reason for this is that China and South Korea have tangible conflicts of interest with Japan such as territorial disputes. Japan has three territorial disputes. The first one is with China over the Senkaku Islands. The second is with South Korea over what the Koreans call Dokdo and what the Japanese call Takeshima. The third is with Russia over the Northern Territories—but again, as I said, I am not interested in Russia today.

Japan also has maritime disputes with China and Korea, of which the most significant is in the East China Sea. The questions at issue here are: “Which country has maritime jurisdiction? How far out and over what? Which country has drilling rights for oil and gas? How do you decide what the fishing rights are?” In fact, these things are under relatively good regulation. There are, technically speaking, conflicting maritime claims in the East China Sea, but they are not a big deal and on a day-to-day basis they do not give rise to serious conflict.

There are also history issues, such as visits by Japanese prime ministers to Yasukuni Shrine, at which 14 Class A war criminals are enshrined. We can talk about this if you like. I think that the neighbours fundamentally misunderstand the nature of Yasukuni Shrine and the reasons why Prime Minister Abe might wish to visit it.

It is important to note that the Japanese see this issue as a purely domestic issue. They do not believe that China and South Korea even have the right to comment on it. China always gets upset when outsiders comment on Tibet or Xinjiang, claiming that these are domestic issues and no one else's business. The Japanese feel the same way about Yasukuni Shrine. But in any case, Yasukuni is not a national shrine. It has no official status, and there is no official sense in which visiting the shrine represents honouring Class A wartime criminals for committing war crimes. Contrary to public opinion, it is not even dedicated to all Japanese war dead. Abe himself has ancestors enshrined there. Nevertheless, it was very bad public relations on his part to go. The Americans and others begged him not to go. He still went. I think Abe is probably his and Japan's own worst enemy, because, frankly, it was not necessary. There were ways of avoiding antagonizing the neighbours on this issue. But so it goes. By the way, my understanding is that he has tacitly promised not to go back while he is the prime minister, which should be a good thing.

The history issue also rears its ugly head in textbooks. Japanese textbooks do treat the nasty things Japan inflicted on the neighbours before and during World War II very lightly. They gloss over them. To Chinese and Korean tastes they are treated far too lightly. I certainly see that perspective. I also understand why a nationalist such as Prime Minister Abe might not want the history books to engage in auto-flagellation.

No country really likes to beat itself up over the horrors it has committed in its past. I spent the first decade of my life in the United States studying American history as an elementary school child, and I never read anything about the Trail of Tears or about the soft genocide inflicted upon Native people by European colonists. From a Native American perspective, American textbooks treat things far too lightly too. It is not surprising that people disagree on how much self-criticism is appropriate. But it is a real issue with real foreign policy consequences for Japan.

The Comfort Women issue has also been in the news. Nobody denies that many women—primarily Korean, but also Chinese, Indonesian, and even significant numbers of Japanese women—found themselves serving in Imperial Japanese Army brothels before and during World War II. Hard-core right wing Japanese nationalists will tell you that they were all volunteers or prostitutes and that no one was coerced into sexual service. That's nonsense. Large numbers were coerced. The record is very clear on that. It is also clear that some were not. But many were. Again, Prime Minister Abe has done a brilliant job of bad public relations by trying to emphasize that there is no documentary record of the official conscription of Comfort Women for sexual service. Big surprise! What government is going to write that down? This is another issue on which Japan could do a much better job of playing nice. Even just focusing on moral responsibility for pain and suffering would go a long way. But public relations is not Abe's strong suit.

Let me turn now to the question with which I began: "What do China and South Korea really fear about a normalizing Japan?" My colleagues and I at the Centre for International Governance Innovation are engaged in a research project on this topic titled, "Confidence, Trust, and Empathy in Asia-Pacific

Security,” for which we have been compiling a database of all the statements that we can find in the last two years from Chinese and Korean sources that touch on Japan’s rise, its changes, its normalization, and why these things might be of concern. What follows is a preview of what we have found so far.

If you look at Chinese official and non-official statements on the relevant issues, a very interesting pattern emerges. The topic of Japan as an actual or potential military threat to Asia figures very prominently. More than 70 percent of official Chinese statements make reference to a Japanese threat. Unofficial statements—which of course in the case of China are very rarely out of line with official statements—are even more focused on threat.

The history issue arises quite frequently in Chinese discourse, but dramatically less frequently than military threat. There is also a lot of talk about Japan and its untrustworthiness, its hypocrisy, or its duplicitousness. Some statements combine references to threat, to history, and/or to trust. Not surprisingly, if you combine more than one theme, they show up in a smaller proportion of the total number of statements. But it is interesting that there are very, very few Chinese statements that complain solely about history. Many more complain solely about threat. If you look at the overall pattern of references, it is clear that what China seems most concerned about is Japan as a military threat.

South Korea is very different. South Koreans talk about Japan as a threat, but they are far more interested in the history issues. We have found that history alone occupies roughly one-third of South Korean statements about Japan. South Koreans tend not to see Japan as much of a threat.

Contrast the Japanese self-perception. We analyzed official and unofficial Japanese statements about Japan.

It is not surprising that the Japanese generally do not see themselves as a threat, though a very small number of people in Japan actually agree with China and South Korea that Japan is on a dangerous path (these statements are primarily in the left-wing press). Nor do many Japanese tend to think that Japan has failed to acknowledge its historical dark side. Indeed, 86 percent of Japanese people think Japan has adequately acknowledged this and apologized for it.

What Japanese do talk about is Japan's positive role in the region and the world. One major theme is Japan as a constructive country. Another is Japan as a pacifist or defensive country. Not many people yet talk about Japan as a 'normal' country, though of course people like Abe would like to see it become one. There are references to Japan being "restrained," which we interpret as 'restrained in military roles.' Japanese statements frequently refer to Japan as "cooperative," but rarely as a leader or a Great Power. That last one is interesting to me. You would think that a country that wants a permanent seat on the Security Council would represent itself very consciously as a Great Power. Finally, there is a fair amount of talk of Japan as feeling threatened by others.

To give you an example of some of the Chinese discourse that appears in our database, you see talk of Japan "deviating from the path of peaceful development," and headlines such as: "Abe thirsts for military glory".¹ A full-page ad in a Chinese newspaper reads: "Japan Wants War Again," with little mushroom clouds marking the locations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on a map—a not-so-subtle hint that that kind of thing might happen again if Japan were to step out of line.

¹ *Xinhua*, 1 July 2014.

I hardly think that the Chinese need to worry about Japan remilitarizing. Japan is a well-functioning democracy, and even the Japanese don't like the idea of collective self-defence. An *Asahi Shimbun* poll conducted a little less than two years ago showed that of all respondents, only 27 percent supported it— notwithstanding the fact that most Japanese now quite like the US-Japan security treaty, which is a big change from the 1960s and '70s. 59 percent overall oppose collective self-defence, as do 49 percent of self-identifying Abe supporters (37 percent of whom are in favour). Among those who do not support Abe, opposition is overwhelming. So we can reasonably say that even the Japanese people don't like the idea of collective self-defence.

Is there a serious danger of Japan being a military threat to its neighbours? I think this is a ridiculous fear, quite honestly. First of all, China is a lot more populous than Japan. China is getting very wealthy relatively quickly and has been modernizing impressively. By most conventional measures, China now has a larger economy than does Japan, and it far outspends Japan on the military. The idea of Japan invading China again and having any luck seems very farfetched. But even if Japan lusted for military adventure, they do not have the people to do it. Japan's population is old and aging quickly. The soldiers they would have to send into battle to conquer China don't exist. They could send retirees into battle, but retirees do not make great soldiers.

Looking at China's population pyramid today, you can see that the bulk of Chinese are still in their economically productive years and that plenty of young Chinese are available for military service. China's population is aging quickly too, of course, which is the main reason that China is not going to have double digit growth rates again. They have about 15 years' worth of economic growth programmed into the system,

demographically. After that, watch out. The Chinese Communist Party is not going to be able to deliver the growth and prosperity on which acquiescence to its rule depends. Finally, just to round out the picture, South Korea's population pyramid shows a rapidly aging population. At the moment they are still okay; the economically productive age cohort is robust. But it will soon drop off quickly. South Korea is going to have a significant problem maintaining economic growth, just as Japan does now and China will soon.

Overall demographic trends in East Asia point in the direction of peace. Countries tend to have more wars when they have too many young, underemployed males. That is not the case in any of these three countries. However, that does not mean that we will necessarily avoid a serious confrontation over something like the Senkaku Islands. That is a very serious conflict. I do not think that the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute is a serious one; it does not keep me awake at night. But the Senkaku Islands dispute does.

Japan: Still a First-tier Nation

Donald Campbell

I'm going to give a slightly broader survey on Japanese foreign policy. I had some fun with the title, because there was a report published a couple of years ago by Japan watchers Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage and a couple of others, who suggested that Japan was no longer a 'first tier nation.' I am not sure what a first tier nation actually is or isn't, and I don't think that Japan ever thought of itself or its foreign policy in that light, even though it was the second largest economic power in the world until fairly recently. It's interesting that Prime Minister Abe found it necessary to refute that, in a significant speech to the US, saying that Japan was a first-tier nation. That's a thread that runs very much through Mr. Abe in his approach to Japan and to foreign policy.

I'm going to spend a moment on Japan and a stronger Japan because I think that sort of sets it up. In spite of claims that saying 'Japan is back' might be a somewhat superficial or perhaps Western view, it is Mr. Abe himself who has announced that Japan is back. Of course, you heard this morning about Abenomics – an economic program to put Japan back on track, so I won't go into that in any great detail. Article Nine and the question of reinterpretation, rather than revision, of the Constitution for collective security has also already been discussed.

I've been a bit struck by the Japanese standard phrases for a whole array of things. Usually it's much more a Chinese or a totalitarian regime that comes out with a whole set of phrases that almost become jingoism. I've noticed quite a number of those finding their way into the many speeches that Abe-san gives. I don't think that we should read too much into that. One

of them is “proactive contribution to peace,” and that really is what I would describe as his foreign policy writ large; the core of the principles of Japanese foreign policy, but without particular reference to any specific surrounding elements of foreign policy. At the same time, as you’ve heard throughout the course of the day, he is talking about a renewed, revived, reinvented Japan even, based on innovation.

This morning, we heard the example of the hydrogen-fueled vehicles at Toyota, and Mr. Abe is talking a great deal about robots, which were also discussed by Mr. Farag. He’s also talking about the role of women and the potential role of women in the Japanese economy, both in terms of Japan and of Japanese foreign policy. He is using the slogan that women should ‘shine.’ That’s rather rich coming from Mr. Abe, given his past record, but in any event, there’s a fairly significant ambition there. He’s also talking about the Smart Platinum society, and the impact that robotics, innovation, and health care will have not only on Japan but also on the Japanese economy.

He’s also talking about a restoration of confidence long term, and I think this is an issue, because Japan is a country that has lost confidence. It’s been in a state of angst. The Japanese have had at least two decades of lost economic growth that have translated into a collective angst. A restoration of confidence will change things fairly significantly if it comes – and I think that it is coming.

Mr. Abe has decided that he is going to make a major statement on the 70th anniversary of the Potsdam Declaration. He has put together a blue ribbon commission made up of a large number of very leading lights throughout Japanese society to work on this. A lot of people are holding their breath on what that will be. Some are saying that he should take the Moriyama 50th anniversary statement and live with that. That, I think,

comes into the issue of a lot of people having questions, more so outside of Japan maybe than inside Japan, about Mr. Abe's intentions.

So, the stated pillars of Japanese foreign policy as enunciated by Mr. Abe, and more coherently by the Japanese foreign minister recently, are three. The first is to strengthen the U.S.-Japanese alliance, the second is to enhance relationships with neighbouring countries (and given what you've heard from other speakers, you know this is a challenge), and the third is to strengthen economic diplomacy as a means of revitalizing the Japanese economy. Certainly the Japan-US alliance is the lynchpin to Japanese foreign policy. The bargain which has been in place all these years is that collective security has been led by the United States for Japan, and in return, Japan has been fairly free to pursue economic growth.

I'm not going to spend a lot of time on the second topic because my colleagues have talked already on the strengthening of the relationship with neighbouring countries. Thus, the third one is strengthening economic diplomacy. In that area, Mr. Abe can do a lot for promoting the revitalization of the Japanese economy and for that, participation in the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is the 14-nation discussion that is going on now, is key. It would require a fairly significant structural reform in the Japanese economy, a third arrow discussion involving the sensitive issues of agriculture and forestry in particular. Mr. Abe has described the program as 'active pacifism.' It is a rather awkward phrase, and apparently it sounds just as awkward in Japanese as it does in English, so we'll see where and how that comes.

Backing up, one of those three major pillars of Japanese foreign policy is a so-called proactive contribution to peace. I don't think that's very different from what we've seen; it's the continuity of Japanese

foreign policy, which has seen very strong support for the United Nations (UN), and its subsidiary organizations. Japan has a long outstanding request to be granted permanent membership (on the Security Council). It has been opposed by China, of course, but that is not the only obstacle, and I don't think that any of the other permanent members are anxious for any enlargement of the permanent members of the Security Council. Japan will be getting a seat, I'm sure, for the eleventh time, on a two-year temporary basis. It's a driving force for arms control and disarmament. The nuclear issue has been used and they have been very prominent in that activity. They've also become much more prominent participants in UN peacekeeping activities and I think they've been involved now in eleven different peacekeeping operations and put about 10,000 people in the field. This aside from the Japanese exercise in Afghanistan, which was not a UN mission.

It has been a tremendous evolution: I was in Japan when the first UN peacekeeping operation was sent off from Sendai in 1995, and it was a huge trauma for the whole country to be sending unarmed peacekeeping officers from the Japan Self-Defense Force abroad. Basically, with that and with their Aid and Development program, which has always been one of the largest in the World, as well as with their activities on the environment and human security, their approach has been very much what I would call a significant force for good.

The other thing that is starting to happen though, and this plays into the regional discussion that we're having, is a great deal of focus on open and stable seas, and the issue of Law of the Sea. I don't think Japan has particularly ever thought of itself as a sea power in the way that the United States is a sea power, or the traditional colonial powers have been sea powers. It's fair to say that China has never really been a sea power,

at least not in modern times. China has been looking for sea access, both from the South Seas and also from Burma and towards the Indian Ocean. That's where some of this competition is really coming from in terms of the seas, and Japan, of course, is stressing not only that it is a democracy, but that the rule of law is what should prevail in that whole discussion.

The issue of international terrorism represents a particular challenge for the Japanese, as they lost ten people in Algeria some time ago and two people to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) more recently. Japan, quite frankly, doesn't know how to deal with this and wishes it would go away. Traditionally, Japan, when faced with these kinds of issues, uses what we used to call Cheque Book Diplomacy, meaning they try to pay their way out of it. They tried it in this case, and of course that didn't work. So they have a particular challenge in terms of the set of international terrorist activities that are going on. If we look at the North-East Asian neighbourhood, and the previous speakers have gone into some detail on that, I won't say much more than that in some cases it's an issue of looking backward or looking forward where the Chinese and the Koreans refuse to forget or forgive, and the Japanese refuse to either remember or acknowledge.

There has been some acknowledgement, but Mr. Abe says that they have to have a policy that is forward-looking. He does not want to look back in spite of his strong and nationalistic intent and his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, but he is very much looking outwardly. I think this is in part because Abe is someone who wants to portray himself as a strong nationalist internally, but very much as a statesman internationally. These two come into some kind of conflict. The perceptions that Japan and China have of each other are one thing, but the truth of the matter is that these economies are now very heavily integrated.

This is, in terms of the trade relationship and in terms of the economic relationship, the anchor for growth, and a revitalized Japan is important for China and the rest of Asia as well, but China is very much at the centre of it. The politics and the economics are somewhat at odds. Another of the standard phrases that comes up, which is the phrase “mutually beneficial based on common strategic interests,” is the phrase that Mr. Abe uses on every occasion when he is asked to describe the state of the China-Japan relationship. There’s a great deal underneath that statement, but that is his formal position on it.

Japan has been making efforts. There is no regional cooperation mechanism to address issues. Last year, I was in Beijing for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders meeting and there was finally a bilateral exchange between the Chinese and the Japanese leadership. I don’t think it lasted more than about ten minutes. Mr. Abe sat beside the Korean president, and that was about it. The foreign ministers have met fairly recently, so there is some discussion going on, but where and how that will come, that is going to be the biggest challenge in what is a fairly tough neighbourhood.

North Korea has been an intractable problem. I was also the Canadian Ambassador in South Korea, and I never believed or dreamed that today we would still have a succession of dictatorships. The Japanese approach to that is basically a very visceral one, as exemplified by the abductee issue. Also, Japan is more immediately threatened than anyone else, except for South Korea, by the range of North Korean missiles. The approach taken by Japan is one of dialogue but also pressure, and also action for actions, and we’ll see where that goes.

In my opinion, it’s in the broader Asian neighbourhood, which includes South-East Asia and

India, that you're finding the real China-Japan competition for influence. Again, Abe's stated principles are directed very much at South-East Asia, where the Japanese are protecting freedom of thought and freedom of speech in the region and where his diplomats on every occasion abroad present Japan as a country with the rule of law and democracy, in contrast with their next door neighbour China. Again, with South-East Asia he is emphasizing that they seize on being governed by rules and laws, rather than by might, and pursue free and open interacting economies through flows of trade and investment. Of course, Japan and several of those South-East Asian countries are members of the negotiating teams for the Trans-Pacific Partnership and China is not. There is a grand design for an Asia-Pacific free trade area which would include China, called the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. This has been under discussion for about fifteen years, and I think we'll probably be talking for another 15 years on that particular issue.

Japan-China rivalry also expresses itself in things like the Asian Development Bank, which is very much a Japanese-led development bank. The more recent decision by China to create an Asian Infrastructure Bank is again looking for influence in both directions and it puts a number of other countries, including Canada, in an interesting situation on how they play it.

One of the things that is quite interesting to me right now is that you have three very strong leaders; Abe in Japan, Xi Jinping in China, and Modi in India. How that will play itself out I don't know yet. We haven't seen that juxtaposition of leadership, certainly, in recent times. Abe is also looking for more fruitful intercultural ties in South-East Asia and a lot of activity has been generated, particularly in fostering interchange among the younger generations. He's also seeking an informal security relationship, or strategy, through what he calls

‘The Democracies’ in the region. What is fundamental to this is that, aside from the US, it would include only Australia, the Philippines, and Korea. I’m not sure if or how that will come, but it is certainly an objective of the Japanese in the region.

I’m going to say one word on the Canada-Japan relationship. As a former Canadian diplomat, I can’t resist the opportunity to say that the Japanese foreign policy and Canadian foreign policy, traditionally, have had a great deal in common, both in terms of our multilateral and our international approaches. There’s been a lot of cooperation on our aid and development programs, in the UN and its agencies, and in peacekeeping over the years. Having said that, our relationship has been ‘under-cultivated.’ This phrase was used recently publicly by the outgoing Japanese ambassador to Canada, and I think that it is absolutely true.

At the same time, I think there is a renewal of interest on the part of Japan and Canada after 15 years or so of benign neglect. We are in the negotiation process for a bilateral economic partnership agreement that has become complicated by our joint participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Sitting on the West Coast, where I spend a significant portion of my time, there is a much greater renewed expression of interest on the part of the Japanese in Canada from a security and supply point of view. They are involved in five of the fifteen liquefied natural gas proposals that are on the table. When I am traveling in Japan I see that Canada is back in some way on the Japanese map in a way that it has not been for a while.

I would like to conclude with some observations. First, for Abe, it’s very much the politics of personality. I find it’s quite interesting because I was in Japan for almost 5 years and we went through five prime ministers. I’m not sure people will remember the names

of more than one or two of them. Nevertheless, I came to the conclusion that in Japan it was more important to have been a prime minister than to be a prime minister and to get back into the Liberal Democratic Party political system. But Abe, certainly the second time around, has surprised a lot of people after his aborted effort the first time. Second, I don't think that there is going to be any real fundamental shift in Japanese foreign policy, in part for some of the reasons that were illustrated earlier. Japan is a democracy. There is not a desire for a significantly different approach to foreign policy, even though Asia and the neighbours of Japan, particularly China, have put effort into different dimensions, such as the rise of Chinese economic power.

For a long time, Japan didn't see itself as Asian. It saw itself as being in Asia, and it was Fukuzawa, the very influential Meiji thinker, who said that Western civilization had advanced so much that Japan must leave Asia to become a modern, industrialized country. So certainly Japan saw itself very much as a 'Western power,' a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, an advanced, developed country in a region that was not in that category. Yet it very much now sees itself as Asian, given the challenges and the opportunities. I think we are going to see more open economic diplomacy.

I also think that Abe really does believe in opening up the economy, and that the TPP is an opportunity to do that. One could call it *gaiatsu*. I'm not sure that it's *gaiatsu* because I'm not sure he sees it internally as such. His challenge, of course, even more than the general population, is going to be his own political party, where there is not a lot of stomach for the kinds of reform that he thinks are necessary. Also, we should never underestimate Japan's ability to renew itself, to reinvent itself. It has done this repeatedly over the years, most

notably with the Meiji Restoration and again after the Second World War. A lot of us have misread Japan throughout the years; for many years we ignored Japan, we then became rather admiring of Japan and its economic prowess, and next we came to envy Japan.

We now tend to be dismissive of Japan as a post-modern society, a bit like Switzerland, but I think there is an opportunity and a capacity in that society to renew itself. More importantly, I think the big question is: “This time around, does it have the energy, and as an aging population, does it have the capacity to undertake significant renewal?” In my opinion, the next couple of years are going to be very interesting. If Abe fails in his Abenomics, in his economic policy, this will be a lurch further backwards. I don’t believe that he’s a militarist, and I also don’t think that he’s an irredentist either. He’s a strong nationalist.

When you really do look at the things he’s looking for, which would and have required reinterpretation of the constitution, they are rather modest. We must recognize that Abe is playing in what has been vividly portrayed as a difficult and dangerous neighbourhood.

From Meiji to Modern: Information Flows between Japan and ‘the West’ from 1853 to 2015

Matthew P. Farrell

Introduction

For over two hundred years Japan remained closed off from the Western world. During this self-imposed isolation, numerous advances and evolutions occurred in ‘the West’ in areas including politics, culture, and technology. The Meiji Revolution in 1868 marked the beginning of a new era of Japanese relations with ‘the West’, spurring a rapid transfer of information from the latter to the former. During this period, Japan demonstrated an immense capacity to innovate and adapt by not only assimilating but also mastering information from foreign sources.

To most observers, Japan’s subsequent ascent to Great Power status at the beginning of the twentieth century was both remarkable and largely unanticipated. Japan’s contemporary status as a notable player on the international stage, in conjunction with its ability to rapidly adopt and adapt Western information, raises a number of questions including ‘to what extent has the flow of information into and out of Japan changed since the Meiji period, beginning in 1868?’

This paper will argue that since the Meiji Restoration, the flow of information between Japan and ‘the West’ has undergone a series of general evolutions which can be categorized based on the direction of information flows and on the nature of the information itself. Between 1853 and the First World War (1914-18), information flowed primarily into Japan and was largely political and technological in nature. In the years after the Second World War (1937-1945), there has been a

tendency for technological and cultural information to flow out of Japan and towards ‘the West’.

The paper’s thesis is informed and influenced by a Critical epistemological perspective whose influence is manifest in the subject of the paper; In undertaking to show the origins and transfer of information, this paper fundamentally examines the production of knowledge. The Critical perspective also impacts the understanding of various components of the argument at hand. Consequently, the first sections of the paper are devoted to defining key terms as they are understood from a Critical perspective and to discussing the assumptions of the methodology. The subsequent section identifies and classifies information flows in the period of the Meiji Restoration and the post-World War II era.

Definitions

In this section, significant terms will be defined in order to clarify usage in the subsequent discussion. The terms defined in this section are information, information flow, and ‘the West’. These terms are essential to a complete understanding of the argument and must therefore be clearly understood in the context at hand.

Given that the fundamental topic of discussion in this paper is the transfer of information between two parties, and given its broad meaning in popular usage, it is pertinent to begin by specifying what is meant by information. For the purposes of the current discussion, information should be understood in its broadest conceptualization, including, but not limited to; knowledge of political norms, cultural practices, and technological advancements. For instance, information may refer to anything from ideologies, to popular media, to machinery.

The term ‘information flow’ is borrowed from telecommunications studies such as Daqing Yang’s 2010

study “Telecommunication and the Japanese Empire: A Preliminary Analysis of Telegraphic Traffic”. In the context of telecommunications, information flows refer to “the content, volume, and direction of information”.¹ Although this limited definition is sufficient for Yang’s study and consequent arguments, in the present discussion it must be broadened to accommodate the comprehensive understanding of information proposed above and to account for the broader scope of information transfer at the international (rather than national) level. Consequently, information flows here refer to noticeable and sustained trends in the transfer of information from one entity to another that leads to behavioural changes and/or socio-cultural shifts in the recipient entity. These flows are categorized in terms of their nature (political, cultural, or technological) and direction (inflow or outflow).

Information flows may for example include the transfer of customs, processes, or goods. In order to constitute information flow, information transfer should persist over the course of at minimum two consecutive administrations or approximately ten years when the government is not directly implicated in the information transfer. Additionally, neither the nature of the information nor the predominant direction of the transfer should change substantially within this timeframe. If either of these criteria are not met, there may be information transfer, but not the macro-level, sustained information flows which are of interest here.

‘The West’ (or variations thereon such as ‘Western’) indicates the collection of North American and Western European states which tended toward Great Power status during key historical periods between 1853 and

¹ Daqing Yang, “Telecommunication and the Japanese Empire: A Preliminary Analysis of Telegraphic Traffic,” *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung* 35, no 1 (2010): 66, Accessed February 6 2015, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20762429>.

2015. In the Meiji period (1853 – 1918) ‘the West’ included Germany, the British Empire, the Netherlands, and the Russian Empire. Between the periods under consideration (1918 – 1945), ‘the West’ included Germany, the British Empire, the Netherlands, the United Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR), and the United States of America (U.S.). In the post-World War II period (1945 – 2015), ‘the West’ took on a new politicized meaning due to the reality of the Cold War, however it will here be considered to include members of both the Western and Eastern blocs without significant regard for their political tendencies during the Cold War.

Information, information flows, and ‘the West’ are essential terms in this paper largely due to the methodological choices which underlie the discussion at hand. Once these terms have been defined it becomes possible to examine the assumptions of the methodology used in the course of the essay, which will be done in the next section.

Methodology

The first methodological assumption is to consider macro-level information flows rather than information transfers. The second is that the nature of information flows can be limited to three dimensions. The third assumption is that information flows between Japan and ‘the West’ can be identified without significant interference from information transfers with other entities.

Since the late twentieth century, the speed of information transfer has increased exponentially due to technological advances such as the telephone and the airplane as well as political advances such as the establishment of permanent foreign missions. Furthermore, individuals and collectives throughout the

World are able to ideate and to share their ideas via information-transfer technology (e.g. communications technology). Based on the speed of information transfer, the plurality of sources of information, and the proliferation of information-transfer technology, it could be reasoned that information transfer, which may take the form of many small bursts of information is more significant than the sustained information flows defined above. This analysis prioritizes micro-level information transfer between actors ranging from multinational corporations to private citizens. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately track or estimate micro-level information transfers and such transfers could hardly be limited to either inflow or outflow. Rather than attempting to examine these micro-level information flows, many of which are extremely brief in duration, this paper focuses on macro-level information flows which are sustained and have discernable long-term effects. This allows for a macro-level discussion that considers information at the level of the state rather than a micro-level discussion fixed in a technically specific context (as in Yang 2010).

Another assumption is that the nature of information flows can be defined in terms of only political, cultural, and technological dimensions. One might propose the use of additional dimensions, considering these three insufficient. For example, information flows could be defined in terms of social, legal, and economic dimensions in addition to political, cultural, and technological dimensions. However, adding more dimensions to the analysis would make it more difficult to identify information flows because information would be disaggregated and therefore the criterion that the nature of information remain consistent for a sustained period of time would be undermined. It is therefore practical to amalgamate various types of information under one of the three

dimensions of politics, culture, and technology. For example, political, cultural, and technological information would involve the reception of foreign diplomats, television programmes, and nuclear power plant designs respectively.

The final assumption in this paper is to focus on information flows between 'the West' and Japan (rather than focusing on any other regions or countries). This may be misconstrued as Eurocentrism. To focus on 'the West', however, is not to say that nearby countries, such as China or Korea, have had a negligible relationship with Japan in terms of information transfer. Rather, 'the West' has been chosen in order to demonstrate the transmission of information between entities which had had nearly no contact before a certain point in time, but which nonetheless developed along similar lines after contact was made. The relationship between 'the West' and Japan presents an interesting example of this situation because it began definitively with the Meiji Restoration and has continued to grow and evolve ever since.

The purpose of the present essay is to examine the flows of information into and out of Japan between the late nineteenth and early twenty-first centuries. A particular methodology has been employed to that end which has three assumptions. First, this paper views information flows at a macro level. Second, the nature of information flows is considered only in terms of its political, cultural, and technological dimensions. Third, 'the West' is identified as the counterpart to Japan (rather than an entity such as China) because the relationship between 'the West' and Japan has an identifiable beginning, the Meiji Restoration, and has experienced continued growth from that point.

Information Flows

A brief discussion of the history of Japan is necessary as a foundation upon which to build to the central theme of information flows. Each of the following subsections will consequently begin with a brief history of the period being addressed and will include a categorization of the predominant information flows in that period.

The Meiji Period (1853 – 1918)

The Meiji Restoration began in 1868, marking the end of the Tokugawa era, which had begun nearly three hundred years earlier in 1600.² 1868 further marks the date of Japan's reopening to the outside world. The process leading to the reopening of Japan began in 1853 when an American fleet under the command of Commodore Matthew Perry arrived in Japan.³ Perry's arrival in Japan, in conjunction with pre-existing internal political struggles,

brought an end to the ascendancy of the warrior class [*samurai*] and replaced the decentralized structure of early modern feudalism [*bakufu*] with a central state under the aegis of the traditional sovereign, now transformed into a modern monarch.⁴

From the economy to the political sphere, after 1853 life in Japan was to undergo a series of changes that would

² George M. Wilson, "Plots and Motives in Japan's Meiji Restoration," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 25, no. 3 (1983): 407, Accessed February 11 2015, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/178622>.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Marius B. Jansen, *The Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 5* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 144.

prepare it for the imminent information flows which had thus far been suppressed by its policy of isolation.

With the Meiji Restoration came a strong desire on the part of the reformed Japanese government to emulate the Western nations that it had rejected up to that point. The consequent efforts of the government to achieve this goal began the flow of information between Japan and 'the West'. At the beginning of the Meiji Period, information flows were primarily political in nature, soon becoming coupled with technological information flows.

In his 1948 article, "Western Influences on the Meiji Restoration", Nobutaka Ike notes that the political change of the Meiji Restoration "was obviously a conscious attempt to adapt Western techniques of government in order to refurbish the old feudal system"⁵ prevalent in Japan prior to the 1860s. This attempt to replicate Western politics constitutes the beginnings of an information transfer, but not an information flow per the definition provided above. In order to identify a sustained political information flow from 'the West' to Japan it is necessary to return to Japanese history.

One of the major stimuli that compelled Japan to an interest in Western political structures was the defeat of China by the British during the Anglo-Chinese War, which took place from 1839-1842.⁶ Seeing war as the exercise of political power abroad, victory in war was considered indicative of strong domestic politics. The defeat of their (geographically) close neighbour made Japanese politicians realize that Western political information might have something to contribute to the existing Japanese political structure. Consequently,

⁵ Nobutaka Ike, "Western Influences on the Meiji Restoration," *Pacific Historical Review* 17, no. 1 (1948): 1, Accessed February 9 2015, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3634763>.

⁶ *Ibid*, 3.

encyclopedic Chinese volumes such as the *Hai-kuo t'u-chih* and *Ssu-chow chih* gained a greater importance in Japan, in part due to the fact that they included content regarding the political structures of 'the West'.⁷ Although the Meiji Restoration did not occur until 1868, the beginnings of information flows into Japan can be seen from 1842 when Japanese politicians began to import Western political information. After 1853, Japan increased its pursuit of Western political information and "intellectuals and officials were able to travel abroad and study Western institutions at first hand".⁸ The experiences of these officials constituted further acquisition and transfer of information.

The historical data provided above demonstrates the commitment of Meiji-era Japan to acquiring Western political information, not only as an isolated instance in the Meiji Restoration, but as a trend dating from at least as far back as 1842 and continuing through 1853 to result in the reconfiguration of the Japanese political structure in 1868. Evidently, given this later transformation of the Japanese political system in the image of Western systems, the political information which entered Japan with the Meiji Restoration was not an isolated instance. Rather, an information flow was established by the Japanese in the mid-nineteenth century via political texts and diplomatic missions in order to develop a new political system which might help to secure a strong place in the twentieth century world. This trend of information transfer and acquisition demonstrated an information flow into Japan which was political in nature.

A strong political foundation was not the only requirement for Japan to become a powerful player on the international stage. In addition to developing

⁷ Ibid, 3-4.

⁸ Ibid, 4-5.

politically, Japan also developed technologically, again drawing on information from Western countries to build its own expertise. To do so, a technological information inflow was established from 'the West' to Japan.

In his 1977 article "Success Illgotten? The Role of Meiji Militarism in Japan's Technological Progress", Kozo Yamamura argues that technological advancement in Japan is primarily the result of military concerns. Although there may be other reasons for technological advancement, this argument is particularly relevant for the current discussion given the interest in Japan's quick ascent to power on the international stage just before the global conflicts of the twentieth century and the definitive role of technology in allowing that rise to take place.

Yamamura states that it was concerns about national security combined with new militarist policies that were

the principal motivation behind creating and expanding the arsenals and other publicly-financed shipyards and modern factories which acted as highly effective centers for the absorption and dissemination of Western technologies and skills".⁹

Such technologies and skills constitute a strong example of technological information. This information was transferred into Japan as the country sought to bring its military to the same level as those of foreign nations. As in the case of political information, this isolated example permits the identification of an information flow when

⁹ Kozo Yamamura, "Success Illgotten? The Role of Meiji Militarism in Japan's Technological Progress," *The Journal of Economic History* 37, no. 1 (1977): 113, Accessed February 2 2015, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2119450>.

coupled with previous information transfer across the Meiji period.

As was stated above, Japan's reopening to the world was precipitated in part by American military pressure and by the Anglo-Chinese War between 1839 and 1842. These two factors also played a part in preparing Japan to seek technological information from 'the West'.¹⁰ Japanese leaders at the time recognized that more advanced Western technology, and not only political structure, had contributed to the superiority of the US and British militaries and sought to replicate it by importing technological information. This continued into the twentieth century, notably prior to the 1904 Russo-Japanese War when Japan undertook "the rapid dissemination of modern [Western] technology" within its "shipbuilding, machinery, and machine-tool industries", for instance by importing European machinery and recruiting skilled European workers in order to have a military on a par with that of the Russian Empire.^{11,12} The continuous Japanese interest in Western military information from the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth century demonstrates a trend which permits the identification of an information flow into Japan that was technological in nature.

Given the rather overwhelming inflow of information into Japan during the Meiji Period, it is difficult to identify information flows from Japan toward 'the West'. This is compounded by contemporary Western countries' ethnocentric values and their consequent resistance to adopting information

¹⁰ "After being forced to sign the humiliating unequal treaties with the Western powers and witnessing also the fate of China, the new Meiji government hastened to expand Japan's military capabilities" (Yamamura, 113-114).

¹¹ Ibid, 121.

¹² This strategy was successful and resulted in the victory of the Japanese Empire.

from a country where “they encountered nothing [...] to jolt their faith in [Western] civilization and progress”.¹³ That is, Japanese technology and political structures seemingly did not have anything to offer ‘the West’ and the corresponding information consequently was not transferred. As such, the information flows between Japan and ‘the West’ during the Meiji Period were unidirectional and took the form of inflows into Japan for the most part. These inflows were political and technological in nature.

The Postwar Period (1945 – 2015)

The period following World War II marks a new phase of Japan’s relationship with ‘the West’. In this period, information flows are of a different nature from those of the Meiji era and have largely changed direction as well. In the postwar period, the primary information flows are technological and cultural and flow from Japan to ‘the West’.

Immediately following World War II, Japan was a nation in tatters. The country was a part of the losing alliance of the war and was the first target of nuclear weapons. Despite this disadvantageous start to the postwar period, Japan is “at the forefront of much of the latest technology”,¹⁴ such that Western nations which fought against it then, now look to Japan as a leader in innovation and technological information.

Japan’s motivation for technological advancement stems in part from the effects of the 1970s oil crisis.¹⁵ In order to avoid succumbing to the potential devastation

¹³ Wilson, “Plots and Motives in Japan's Meiji Restoration,” 413.

¹⁴ Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *The Technological Transformation of Japan: From the Seventeenth to the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 308.

¹⁵ Carter V. Findley and John A. M. Rothney, *Twentieth-Century World* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2011), 408.

of the crisis, funding for research and development in the country was quadrupled, leading Japan to become an exporter of technology by 1980.¹⁶ Japanese investment in innovation continued after the oil crisis was over and Findley and Rothney note that after 1989, there was “a new wave of Japanese-led technological innovation”,¹⁷ implying that technological information was produced in Japan and shared with other entities including ‘the West’. This trend of innovation, information production, and export of technological information from the 1970s through to the 1990s and beyond demonstrates an information outflow from Japan to ‘the West’ which is technological in nature.

Technological information flow from Japan includes communications technology, which has played a major role in conveying cultural information since the Second World War. In the postwar period, cultural information has become increasingly important and cultural information flows between Japan and ‘the West’ are primarily outflows from the former to the latter.

The growth of Japan’s soft power is one notable example of cultural information. In his 2009 article “Japan’s Gross National Cool,” Douglas McGray examines the idea that modern-day Japan is no longer merely accepting cultural trends from ‘the West’, but that it is now producing cultural information for export to ‘the West’. McGray identifies this as a trend from the late twentieth century to the present day. One example of this trend is the popularity of Japanese anime and manga, which contain many elements of Japanese mythology, religion, and history (all of which fall into the category of cultural information), in North America. In *Cinema Anime* (2006), Antonia Levi writes about anime that were available in North America from the

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid, 414.

1960s such as *Astroboy*.¹⁸ She also writes about the “dramatic growth”¹⁹ from the 1990s to the early 2000s of conventions which either incorporate, or are exclusively dedicated to, anime and/or manga (ex. Anime Expo, founded in 1990 and J-Con, founded in 2008). The consistent popularity of anime and manga in ‘the West’ and their export to ‘the West’ demonstrate a transfer of cultural information from Japan, but show only the informal transfer.

It is also important to highlight that the Japanese government supports the export of cultural information. The brand Cool Japan, for example, has been actively promoted by the Japanese government since the mid-2000s with the specific intent of exporting Japanese cultural information. The Japanese government also demonstrated its commitment to the production and dissemination of cultural information when it appointed Doraemon, an iconic anime character both in Japan and abroad, as the Anime Ambassador of Japan.²⁰

The support of the Japanese government for cultural information outflows is particularly important because it shows a link between information flows and foreign policy, specifically a consciousness of the importance of soft power.²¹ Based on the new importance placed on cultural information flows by the Japanese government, it is possible to say that the Japanese understanding of foreign policy has evolved

¹⁸ Antonia Levi, “The Americanization of Anime and Manga: Negotiating Popular Culture,” in *Cinema Anime: Critical Engagements with Japanese Animation*, Steven Brown (ed.), 47 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 46.

²⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Pop-Culture Diplomacy,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, last modified August 14, 2014, Accessed February 7 2015, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/exchange/pop/>.

²¹ Soft power is “the ability to indirectly influence behavior or interests through cultural or ideological means” (Yano, 2009).

over the past 150 years. Whereas in the nineteenth century information flows promoted by the government had the goal of bringing Japan closer to the standards of the West for military reasons, in the twenty-first century information flows are employed to spread the soft power of Japan abroad.

Both informal and governmental initiatives have contributed to outflows of Japanese cultural information in the postwar period. Informal transfers of cultural information beginning in the 1960s have continued and have even been formalized and endorsed by the Japanese government in the twenty-first century. This trend indicates cultural information flows from Japan to ‘the West’.

Unlike those during the Meiji Period, post-World War II information flows between Japan and ‘the West’ are no longer dominated by the transfer of information into Japan. Japan’s commitment to innovation in the post-World War II period has made it a leader in creating technological information and has thus led to a technological information outflow. Simultaneously, technology has facilitated the spread of cultural information between Japan and ‘the West’ resulting in a significant outflow of cultural information from Japan notably as a mechanism of soft power.

Conclusion

Information flows are broad trends in the movement of information from one entity to another. During the Meiji Period there was a tendency toward political and technological information flows from ‘the West’ into Japan. This essay helps to show that this is no longer true in the post-World War II period. Since then, technological information flows and cultural information flows originating in Japan flow towards ‘the West’.

Information flows are extremely helpful in identifying the motivations and concerns of governments as well as other important information such as trends in innovation and development. Maintaining an awareness of information flows should be a priority of any critical observer of international affairs. Although the future is uncertain, such awareness can help make sense what has been and what may yet come to pass.

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Glossary

| Glossaire

3K JOBS:

Factory jobs in Japan which are considered *kiken* (dangerous), *kitanai* (dirty), and *kitsui* (difficult).

Les emplois au Japon qui sont considérés *kiken* (dangereux), *kitanai* (dégoutants), et *kitsui* (difficiles).

ABENOMICS:

An economic policy composed of three arrows proposed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan in 2012.

Une politique économique à trois flèches créée par le Premier Ministre du Japon Shinzo Abe en 2012.

AMERICANIZATION:

Incorporation and influence of Western culture in a non-Western context.

L'incorporation et l'influence de la culture occidentale dans des contextes non-occidentales.

AMA-LOLI:

Sweet Lolita. A style of "Lolita" which tends towards very sweet, girly, or childish styles.

Une subdivision de "Lolita" qui tend à être particulièrement mignonne, féminine, ou infantile.

ANGLO-CHINESE WAR:

A conflict between China and the British Empire from 1839 to 1842 which resulted in the defeat of the Chinese.

Une guerre entre l'Empire britannique et la Chine entre 1839 et 1842 qui a résulté dans la capitulation de la Chine.

ANGURA (アングラ):

A subculture including subcultures and fashion styles such as S&M, fetish, body modification, gothic, steam punk, and cyber punk.

Une sous-culture qui inclut des styles telle que le fétichisme, la modification du corps, le gothique, le steampunk, et le cyberpunk.

ANIME (アニメ):

Animated productions of Japanese origin or inspired by Japanese styles.

Des animations venant du Japon ou inspirées par les styles japonais.

APEC:

See “Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation”

Voyez “Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation”

ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION:

An economic forum for Pacific Rim nations.

Un forum économique pour les nations bordant le Pacifique.

ASSEMBLY CENTERS:

Hastily prepared accommodations for persons of Japanese descent in Canada and the United States before they were sent to detention camps.

Voyez “Centres de Rassemblement”

ASSET BUBBLE:

When assets prices rise at a rate exceeding that justified by valuations, eventually leading to a sudden drop in prices as they correct themselves with valuations.

Le fait pour les prix d’augmenter plus rapidement que les évaluations justifiées, résultant dans une baisse soudaine dans les prix quand ils se règlent avec ces évaluations.

BAKUFU:

Early modern feudalism in Japan.

Le féodalisme pré-modern au Japon.

CAMPS DE DÉTENTION:

See “Detention Camps”

Des centres rapidement préparés au Canada et aux États-Unis pour loger des personnes d’ascendance japonaise pendant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale.

CENTRES DE
RASSEMBLEMENT:
See “Assembly Centers”

Les centres temporaires pour l’hébergement des personnes d’ascendance japonaise au Canada et aux États-Unis avant d’être envoyées aux camps de détention.

CENTRES DE
RÉINSTALLATION
(Relocation Centers):
See “Detention Camps”

Voyez “Camps de
Détention”

CHEQUE BOOK
DIPLOMACY:
Foreign policy which consists of using economic means to improve diplomatic relations.

Une politique qui promeut l’utilisation de moyens économiques pour améliorer les relations diplomatiques.

CHŪSHINGURŪ
(忠臣蔵):
Portrayals of the story of the 47 ronin in Japanese literature, theatre, and film.

Les représentations de l’histoire des 47 ronin dans la littérature, le théâtre, et les films japonais.

CIVIL CODE OF 1898:
A body of private law promulgated in 1898 which is notable for its role in formalizing the patriarchal family system in Japan.

Un corpus de loi privée promulgué en 1898 qui est notable parce qu’il a formalisé le système du patriarcat dans les familles japonaises.

CLAILOLI:
Classic Lolita. The most basic form of “Lolita.” Tends to be prudish and to borrow imagery from the Victorian era.

Le “Lolita” classique. Tend à être prude et d’emprunter l’imagerie anglaise de l’ère victorienne.

CLASS-A WARTIME

CRIMINALS:

Classification used during the Tokyo War Crimes Trial by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East; “Class A” indicates crimes against peace.

Classification utilisée par le Tribunal militaire international pour l'Extrême-Orient pendant le Tribunal de Tokyo; “Class A” indique les crimes contre la paix.

COMFORT WOMEN:

Translated from *ianfu*, a euphemism for *shōfu* (prostitute); this term refers to the women and girls forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army in occupied territories before and during WWII.

Le mot pour *ianfu*, un euphémisme pour *shōfu* (prostitue); référence aux femmes et filles forcées dans l'esclavage sexuelle par l'Armée Impériale Japonaise pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

COMMISSION DE SÉCURITÉ DE COLOMBIE-BRITANNIQUE:

A federal instrument created to manage the internment of Japanese in Canada during the Second World War.

Un organisme fédéral créé pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale pour gérer l'internement des japonais au Canada.

COOL JAPAN:

A project initiated by the Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Trade in 2002 to promote Japanese culture broad.

Un projet commencé par le ministère de l'Économie, du Commerce, et de l'Industrie en 2002 pour promouvoir la culture japonaise à l'étranger.

COSPLAY:

Also known as costume playing; people who dress up as their favourite anime, game, or manga characters.

Le fait de se costumer comme un(e) personnage d'un anime, jeu, ou manga.

CRITICAL
EPISTEMOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE:

A lens which highlights the production and structure of knowledge within the context of existing sets of power relations.

Une approche qui met en relief la production et la structure des idées dans le contexte des relations de pouvoir préexistantes.

CULTURAL
HEGEMONY:

The theory that a ruling class may dominate a diverse society by manipulating that society to prioritize its own culture.

La théorie qu'une classe prépondérante peut dominer une société diverse en manipulant cette société d'une manière qui priorise sa propre culture.

CULTURAL
ODORLESSNESS:

Absence of any specific culture or ethnicity.

Un manque de traits culturelles ou ethniques.

DETENTION CAMPS:

Hastily-prepared camps in Canada and the United States in which many persons of Japanese descent were interned during the Second World War.

Voyez "Camps de Détention"

DOKDO:

Korean name for Takeshima. See "Takeshima"

Mot coréen pour Takeshima. Voyez "Takeshima"

DUAL LABOUR
MARKET:

A system in Japan in which temporary female workers are hired in order to support core male workers.

Un système de travail au Japon dans lequel des travailleuses à temps partielles seront embauchées afin de supporter les hommes qui sont embauchés de façon permanent.

ECONOMIC MIRACLE:

The significant reversal of Japan's economy which led it to grow from its impoverished postwar state to become the World's third-largest economy in only a few decades.

Le renversement complet de l'économie du Japon qui lui a permis d'évoluer d'un état de pauvreté après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale à la troisième économie au monde en quelques décennies.

ENEMY ALIENS

(Étrangers Ennemis): Designation given to persons of Japanese descent in Canada and the United States during the Second World War.

Voyez "Étrangers Ennemis"

ETHNIC IDENTITY:

To identify oneself with a particular ethnic group.

S'identifier avec un groupe ethnique.

ÉTRANGERS

ENNEMIS (Enemy Aliens): See "Enemy Aliens"

Nom donné aux personnes d'ascendance japonaise au Canada et aux États-Unis pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

FREE TRADE AREA OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC:

A free-trade area proposed by Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation members.

Une zone de libre-échange proposée par les membres de la Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.

FUEIHÓ:

A law written in Japan during the 1920s forbidding dancing in public spaces.

Une loi au Japon qui date des années 1920s interdisant la danse dans les espaces publiques.

GAIATSU:

Pressure applied by one nation on another.

Le fait pour un État de mettre la pression sur un autre.

GAJJIN:

Foreigner.

Étranger.

GENCHI GENBUTSU:

A Japanese expression meaning “go and see.”

Une expression japonaise signifiant “allez voir.”

GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT OF 1907

(*Nichibei Shinsbi Kyōyaku*):

An informal agreement between the United States (USA) and Japan to improve relations per which the USA would not impose restrictions on Japanese immigration and Japan would not allow further emigration to the USA.

Un traité non-officiel entre les États-Unis et le Japon pour améliorer leurs relations selon lequel les États-Unis n'imposeraient pas de restrictions sur l'immigration japonaise et le Japon ne permettrait plus l'émigration aux États-Unis.

GOTH-LOLI:

Gothic Lolita. A popular “Lolita” subculture which incorporates dark colours and Christian imagery.

Gothic Lolita. Une subculture de “Lolita” qui incorpore les couleurs foncés et le symbolisme chrétien.

GOVERNMENT PENSION INVESTMENT FUND

(GPIF):

An independent administrative institution established by the Japanese government.

Une institution indépendante administrative établie par le gouvernement japonais.

GREAT POWER STATUS:

Recognition of a sovereign state's ability to exert its influence globally.

La reconnaissance qu'une nation a la capacité d'influencer les relations et occurrences mondiales.

HAIKUO TU-CHIH:

A work published by Wei Yuan in 1844 on the geography and material conditions of foreign nations.

Une publication écrite par Wei Yuan en 1844 traitant la géographie et les conditions matérielles des nations étrangères.

HAKEN:

Temporary worker.

Un(e) employé(e) temporaire.

HENTAI:

Perverted.

Pervers.

HIGH-GROWTH ERA:

The postwar period during which Japan experienced significant economic and socio-political growth.

La période de l'après-guerre pendant laquelle le Japon a connu une importante croissance économique et socio-politique.

IE:

Household.

Famille.

INFORMATION FLOWS:

Noticeable trends in the adoption of information originating in one entity by another entity, particularly when that information takes the form of customs, processes, or goods.

Des tendances importantes dans l'adoption de l'information créée dans une entité par une autre entité, notamment l'information en forme de coutume, de processus, ou de bien.

INWARD FOREIGN INVESTMENT:

Investment from a foreign entity into the local or national economy.

L'investissement étranger dans l'économie locale ou nationale.

IOMANTE:

An Ainu ceremony traditionally involving the sacrifice of a brown bear.

Une cérémonie Ainu comprenant traditionnellement le sacrifice d'un ours brun.

ISIS:

See “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant”

Voyez “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant”

ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT:

A militant group which has been active since 1999 and which proclaimed itself a caliphate in 2014.

Une groupe militante active depuis 1999 et qui, en 2014, s’est auto-proclamé un califat.

ISSEI:

The first generation of Japanese immigrants.

La première génération d’immigrants japonais.

JAPAN HOUSEWIVES ASSOCIATION:

See “Shufuren”

Voyez “Shufuren”

JAPAN SELF-DEFENCE FORCES:

Japan’s domestic armed forces, which have participated in multiple peacekeeping missions abroad.

Les forces armées domestiques du Japon, qui ont fait partie de plusieurs opérations de maintien de la paix à l’étranger.

JAPONÊS:

Portuguese for “Japanese.”

Portugais pour “japonais.”

JINGOISM:

Patriotism in the form of aggressive foreign policy.

Le patriotisme en forme de politiques étrangères agressives.

KAIZEN:

Continuous improvement.

L’amélioration continue.

KANKO-AINU (Ainu in Tourism):

Ainu who portray or maintain traditional Ainu lifestyle and/or culture for the purpose of tourism.

Des personnes Ainu qui présentent ou pratiquent la vie et/ou la culture traditionnelle Ainu pour sa valeur touristique.

KOKUSEI:

Nationality.

Nationalité.

KOZOKU KOKKA (Family-

state):

The idea of Japan being a single family, with the Emperor as the father and the population as his children.

L'idée du Japon comme une seule famille, avec l'Empereur comme le père et la population comme ses enfants.

LOLITA:

Individuals whose fashion style, and sometimes lifestyle, values, and ideas are inspired by the European aristocracy; A movement which began in the 1980s.

Les individus dont la mode, et quelquefois la mode de vie, les valeurs, et les idées s'inspirent de l'aristocratie européenne; Un mouvement commencé aux années 1980s.

MANGA (漫画):

Comics created in Japan, or, less commonly, outside of Japan but in Japanese.

Des bandes dessinées créées au Japon, ou créées hors du Japon mais écrites en japonais.

MASS EVACUATION:

See "Mass Expulsion"

Voyez "Mass Expulsion"

MASS EXPULSION:

The forced expulsion of persons of Japanese descent from the Pacific West coast during the Second World War.

L'expulsion forcée des personnes d'ascendance japonaise du Côte Pacifique pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

MEIJI REVOLUTION:

See "Meiji Restoration"

Voyez "Meiji Restoration"

MEIJI RESTORATION:

The period of change beginning in 1868 during which Japan abandoned its policy of isolationism.

La période de changement au long de laquelle le Japon a abandonné l'isolationnisme.

MIRAI:

Future.

Futur.

MUKOKUSEKITEKI:

Denationalized. See
“Cultural Odorlessness”

Dénationalisé. Voyez
“Cultural Odorlessness”

MUKOKUSEKI:

See “Cultural Odorlessness”

Voyez “Cultural
Odorlessness”

NATIONAL STRATEGIC
SPECIAL ZONES:

Six economic zones
designated by the Japanese
government as areas in
which dramatic regulatory
reforms may be carried out.

Six zones économiques
nommées par le
gouvernement japonais pour
être les sites des réformes
dramatiques.

NICHIBEI SHINSHI

KYŌYAKU:

See “Gentleman’s
Agreement of 1907”

Voyez “Gentleman’s
Agreement of 1907”

NIHON NO

KAGAKUSHA:

A Japanese scientist.

Un(e) scientifique japonais(e).

NIKKEIJIN:

Used to describe an emigrant
or the descendants of
emigrants from Japan.

Un émigrant ou les
descendants d’un émigrant
japonais.

OCCUPATION

CONSTITUTION:

The 1947 Constitution of
Japan which was largely
influenced by the Allies
following Japan’s defeat in
World War Two. Notable
for its renunciation of
military force.

La Constitution du Japon
créée en 1947 suite à la
capitulation du Japon durant
la Deuxième Guerre
mondiale. Était largement
influencée par les Alliés et
est notable pour sa
renonciation de la force
militaire.

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN:

The occupation of Japan by the Allies (led by the United States) following Japan's defeat in World War Two.

L'occupation du Japon par les Alliés (gérés par les États-Unis) suite à la capitulation du Japon pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

OUII:
Prince.

Un prince.

PAATO-TAIMU

(Temporary Employment): Part-time working positions in Japan. Characterized by lower wages, less benefits, and less job protection than permanent employment.

Des emplois à temps partiels au Japon. Caractérisés par une moindre rémunération, moins de bénéfices, et moins de sécurité d'emploi que l'emploi permanent.

PAY-TO-GO PROGRAM:

A voluntary program created by the Japanese government to encourage *nikkeijin* to leave Japan.

Un programme volontaire créé par le gouvernement japonais pour encourager le départ des *nikkeijin* du Japon.

PEARL HARBOR:

Site of a surprise attack by the Japanese military against an American naval base on December 7, 1941. Led to the entry of the United States into the war.

Le site d'une attaque brusquée contre une base navale américaine par le militaire japonais le 7 décembre, 1941. A mené les États-Unis à entrer dans la guerre.

PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT:

A system in Japan wherein companies rarely dismiss employees.

Un système au Japon dans lequel les entreprises ne congédient que rarement les travailleurs.

POLITIQUE FISCALE:

One of the Three Arrows of Abenomics. Refers to reducing corporate taxes and increasing sales tax.

Une des trois flèches d'Abenomics. Consiste à la réduction des impôts des entreprises et la hausse de la taxe de vente.

POLITIQUE MONÉTAIRE:

One of the Three Arrows of Abenomics. Refers to the injection of cash into the economy.

Une des trois flèches d'Abenomics. Vise à injecter des liquidités dans l'économie.

POSTNATIONALISM:

A lens which posits that traditional nation states have become unnatural, and even insignificant entities.

L'idée que l'état-nation traditionnel n'est plus l'unité pertinente dans le monde actuel.

POTSDAM DECLARATION:

The declaration calling for, and defining the terms of, Japan's surrender during World War II.

Un document qui exigeait la capitulation du Japon pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

PROTECTED AREA

(Zone Militaire):

A 100-mile area on the West coast of Canada and the United States in which persons of Japanese descent were not permitted to reside.

Voyez "Zone Militaire"

QUANTITATIVE

EASING (QE):

Aggressive monetary easing; A strategy whereby the national bank purchases assets with newly minted money in order to increase the quantity of money in circulation.

L'assouplissement quantitatif agressive; Une politique selon laquelle la banque nationale achète des actifs avec l'argent créé ex nihilo afin d'accroître la masse monétaire.

REGISTRATION CARD:

A unique form of wartime identification issued to all persons of Japanese descent over the age of 16 in Canada.

Une pièce d'identité obligatoire pour toute personne d'ascendance japonaise au Canada âgée de plus de 16 ans pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

RELOCATION CENTERS

(Centres de Réinstallation):
See "Detention Camps"

Voyez "Camps de
Détenation"

RETURN MIGRATION:

The return of Japanese emigrants from Brazil to Japan.

Le retour au Japon des émigrants japonais au Brésil.

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR:

A conflict over imperial conquests between the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan from February 8, 1904 to September 5, 1905.

Un conflit entre l'Empire Russe et l'Empire Japonaise entre le 8 février, 1904 et le 5 septembre, 1905 pour des conquêtes impériales.

RYOSAI KENBO:

A Japanese expression meaning "good wife and wise mother." The idea that a woman has a duty to look after the family.

Une expression japonaise signifiant "bonne marie et mère sage." L'idée qu'une femme a une obligation de s'occuper de la famille.

S&M:

Sadomasochism;
Gratification, especially sexual, acquired by inflicting or receiving pain.

Sadomasochisme; La gratification, notamment sexuelle, comme conséquence d'infliger ou de recevoir la douleur.

SAMURAI:

Warrior class in feudal Japan.

Combattants au Japon féodal.

SANSEI:

Third generation Japanese migrants.

La troisième génération de migrants japonais.

SENKAKU ISLANDS:

A group of islands located east of China and west of Okinawa Island whose territorial sovereignty is disputed by China, Taiwan, and Japan.

Un groupe d'îles à l'est de la Chine et à l'ouest d'Okinawa dont la souveraineté territoriale est disputée par la Chine, le Taiwan, et le Japon.

SHIMINKEN:

Citizenship.

Citoyenneté.

SHINTO:

One of the largest religions in Japan. A traditional religion of Japan.

Une des religions les plus répandues au Japon. Une religion traditionnelle du Japon.

SHIRONURI:

A subculture in which individuals paint their faces white in order to act as a canvas for elaborate decoration and make up.

Une sous-culture dans laquelle des individus blanchissent leurs visages afin de les utiliser comme des toiles pour la décoration élaborée.

SHUFUREN (Japan Housewives Association):

An organization created by Japanese women in the mid-20th century to pressure the government for better management of economic growth and quality of life.

Une organisation créée par des femmes japonaises au milieu du 20^{ième} siècle pour faire la pression sur le gouvernement de mieux gérer la croissance économique et qualité de vie.

SINOCENTRISM:

An ideology which holds China to be the central core and other groups to be peripheral.

Une idéologie selon laquelle la Chine est au centre et les autres sont à la périphérie.

SMART PLATINUM SOCIETY:

A form of society in which the standard of living of the elderly would be raised thanks to technology.

Une manifestation de société où le niveau de vie des personnes âgées serait augmenté grâce à la technologie.

SOCIAL DARWINISM:

The theory that individuals are subject to natural selection. Often employed in the 19th and early 20th centuries to justify racism, domination, and assimilation.

La théorie que les individus sont sujet à la sélection naturelle. Souvent utilisée à la fin du 19^{ième} siècle et au début du 20^{ième} siècle afin de justifier le racisme, la domination, et l'assimilation.

SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY:

The theory that an individual's self-identification is impacted by their role as part of a collective.

La théorie que l'auto-identification est influencée par le rôle de l'individu comme membre d'une collective.

SSU-CHOU CHIH:

An encyclopedic compilation by Lin Tse-Hsü concerning foreign (primarily European) nations.

Une compilation encyclopédique par Lin Tse-Hsü concernant les nations étrangères (principalement les nations européennes).

STEAMPUNK:

Subgenre of science fiction that incorporates technology and aesthetic designs inspired by 19th-century industrial steam-powered machinery.

Sous-genre de la science-fiction qui incorpore la technologie et les images inspirées par les machines à vapeur du 19^{ième} siècle.

SUBCULTURE:

A group of individuals within a culture that differentiates itself from the parent culture to which it belongs.

Une groupe d'individus à l'intérieure d'une culture qui se différencie de cette culture.

SUPPLEMENTARY
EDUCATION:

Private, for-profit education which may take the form of exam preparation schools or remedial education programs, among others.

L'éducation privée et à but lucrative qui peut prendre la forme des écoles de préparation aux examens ou des programmes de rattrapage, entre autres.

TAKESHIMA:

Japanese name for a group of islets in the Sea of Japan which are controlled by South Korea but contested by Japan.

Nom japonais pour un groupe d'îlots dans la Mer du Japon qui sont sous le contrôle de la Corée du Sud mais qui sont contestés par le Japon.

TASHME:

A family detention camp near Hope, British Columbia.

Un camp de détention près de Hope, Colombie-Britannique.

TECHNOLOGY
DIFFUSION THEORY:

A theory which posits a correlation between human capital, technology absorption, and productivity.

Une théorie qui postule une corrélation entre la capitale humaine, l'absorption de la technologie, et la productivité.

TEMPORARY
EMPLOYMENT:
See "Paato-taimu"

Voyez "Paato-taimu"

THREE ARROWS:

The three prongs of Abenomics; monetary easing, fiscal stimulus, and structural reforms.

Voyez “Trois Flèches”

TPP:

See “Trans-Pacific Partnership”

Voyez “Trans-Pacific Partnership”

TRAIL OF TEARS:

A series of forced relocations of Native American nations in the United States following the Indian Removal Act of 1830.

Une série de déportations forcées des amérindiens aux États-Unis suite à la Indian Removal Act de 1830.

TRANSFORMATIONS

STRUCTURELLES:

One of the Three Arrows of Abenomics. Refers to the liberalisation of certain sectors of the economy and various corporate reforms.

Une des trois flèches d’Abenomics. Consiste à la libéralisation de certains secteurs de l’économie et de nombreuses réformes touchant aux entreprises.

TRANSNATIONALISM:

A lens that describes the increased interconnectivity between individuals and the decreased significance of national borders.

L’idée que les frontières nationales ont moins d’importance et que conséquemment des diverses entités peuvent contribuer à une seule production.

TRANS-PACIFIC

PARTNERSHIP:

A proposed economic free trade agreement between several Pacific Rim countries.

Un accord de libre-échange proposé entre plusieurs pays bordant le Pacifique.

TRICKLE DOWN
ECONOMICS:

The theory that economic benefits for the rich will aid the economy and consequently benefit the entire population.

La théorie que les bénéfices économiques pour les plus riches bénéficieraient à l'économie et conséquemment à toute la population.

TROIS FLÈCHES:
See "Three Arrows"

Les trois volets d'Abenomics; la politique monétaire, la politique fiscale, et les transformations structurelles.

UTARI KYOKAI:
The Hokkaido Utari Association. An organization operated by and composed of Ainu.

La Hokkaido Utari Association. Une organisation gérée par et consistant de personnes Ainu.

WAJIN:
The predominant native ethnic group of Japan.

Le groupe ethnique natif prédominant au Japon.

WAR RELOCATION
AUTHORITY:
A federal instrument created to manage the internment of Japanese in the United States during the Second World War.

Un organisme fédéral créé pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale pour gérer l'internement des japonais aux États-Unis.

YANDERU (病んでる):
A Japanese expression meaning "to be sick."

Une expression japonaise signifiant "être malade."

YASUKUNI SHRINE:

A Shinto shrine located in Chiyoda, Tokyo; Controversial for listing the names of 1,068 war criminals (including 14 Class-A war criminals) in commemoration of those who have died for the Empire of Japan.

Un sanctuaire Shinto à Chiyoda, Tokyo; Controversé dû au fait qu'il liste 1,068 criminels de guerre (y inclus 14 criminels Class-A) en commémoration de ceux qui sont mort pour l'Empire Japonaise.

YUTORI EDUCATION:

A Japanese educational policy introduced in 2002 which reduced the content of the primary school curriculum.

Une politique japonaise touchant à l'éducation qui était introduite en 2002 et qui a réduit le contenu du programme d'enseignement primaire.

ZONE MILITAIRE

(Protected Area):
See "Protected Area"

Une zone s'étendant 100 miles de la côte occidentale du Canada et des États-Unis pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale pour exclure les personnes d'ascendance japonaise.

Matthew P. Farrell

Chair and Editor-in-Chief

Matthew Farrell is an alumnus of Glendon College, where he completed an iBA, Bilingual, Specialized Honours in International Studies, as well as a Certificate of Law and Social Thought. He is currently pursuing an MSc in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (expected 2016). He is particularly interested in supranational and regional dynamics, human rights regimes, and Law.

Matthew's previous published works include "L'Union de l'Économie et de l'État: Un Analyse Néo-Gramscien de la Défaillance de la Mondialisation et ses Effets au Bangladesh" (2015) in *The Undercurrent: The Canadian undergraduate Journal of Development Studies* and "Humanitarian Intervention and the Rwandan Genocide: Nothing More Than a Band-Aid Solution" (2013) in the *Glendon Journal of International Studies*. He has also served as an editorial board member for *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*.

As Logistics Coordinator for the 20th Annual International Studies Symposium, Matthew appreciated the opportunity to explore and share the history and unique qualities of Japan. In his role as Chair and Editor-in-Chief of the Independent Study Committee on Japan, he is glad to have had the opportunity to make the proceedings of the Symposium and selected essays available for dissemination through the present work.

Kelly Lui
Associate Editor

Kelly Lui recently completed her undergraduate studies at Glendon College with an iBA Double-Honours in International Studies and Philosophy, as well as a Certificate of Law and Social Thought. She is currently continuing her research interests in political borders, identity construction, and ecology through York University's Master in Environmental Studies program.

As the Media & Communications Coordinator for the 20th Annual International Studies Symposium and Editor of the Japan Symposium publication, Kelly is grateful for the entire interdisciplinary process. She hopes that the accessibility of the publication provides meaningful resources to all those interested in Japan as well as the International Studies Symposium course.

Sandra Annett – Wilfrid Laurier University

Sandra Annett is an assistant professor in the Department of English and Film Studies at Wilfrid Laurier University, specializing in digital and new media studies. Her first book, *Anime Fan Communities: Transcultural Flows and Frictions*, was released in December 2014 by Palgrave Macmillan.

She has also published articles in journals such as *Transcultural Studies*, *The Journal of Postcolonial Writing*, *The Journal of Adaptation in Film and Performance*, and *Mechademia* (forthcoming). Her research interests include digital cinema, animation, and Japanese popular culture. Her hobbies include modular origami and swing dancing.

Bernard Bernier – Université de Montréal

Bernard Bernier is a professor in the Department of Anthropology and a member of the East Asian studies programme at l'Université de Montréal. He received his Ph.D. from Cornell University in 1970 and has been at l'Université de Montréal since that time.

The topics of his research on Japan have included folk religion (Ph.D. thesis), philosophy, changes in agriculture and rural society, labor relations and company organization, factory automation, and young urban women's vision of career and marriage. Theoretically, his interests have included social change, globalization, and ideology. His latest book was on changes in labor in Japan, and a new book prepared jointly will soon be published on the topic of Youth in Japan.

Donald Campbell – The Japan Society

Don Campbell was Canada's Ambassador to Japan from 1993 to 1997. In 2003 he was appointed by the Prime Minister to be the Canadian Co-Chair of the Canada Japan Forum 2000. Don is currently Senior Strategy Advisor at Davis LLP.

In his distinguished career with Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade he also served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister's Personal Representative for G-7/G-8 Summits. Deputy Minister of International Trade, Ambassador to South Korea and Assistant Deputy Minister, United States Branch. He is the current International Co-Chair of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council and a member of the Board of The Japan Society.

Andrea DaSilva – Student Contributor

Andrea DaSilva graduated with a Bachelor of Arts, Bilingual, Honours in International Studies from Glendon College, York University, and is also a High Honours graduate from the Social Service Work Immigrants and Refugees Diploma Program at Seneca College. Andrea is passionate about global dynamics between countries and cultures and has an interest in the development of state-citizen relationships.

Andrea had the unique opportunity to explore many aspects of Japanese culture in her role as Internal Coordinator for the 20th Annual International Studies Symposium and as a participant of the 2015 Japan-Canada Academic Consortium (JCAC) International Student Forum at Université Laval, Quebec.

Julian Dierkes – University of British Columbia

Julian Dierkes is an associate professor and the Keidanren Chair in Japanese Research at the Institute of Asian Research of the University of British Columbia where he teaches in the MA Asia Pacific Policy Studies program. Julian received his Ph.D. in sociology from Princeton University.

He is the author of *Guilty Lessons? Postwar History Education in Japan and the Germanys* (Routledge 2010), the editor of *Change in Democratic Mongolia* (Brill 2012), and a co-editor of *The Global Intensification of Supplementary Education* (Emerald 2013). His research has focused on the contemporary Japanese education system. Follow him @jdierkes.

Akané D'Orangeville – Université de Montréal

Akané D'Orangeville is a Ph.D. candidate in anthropology at l'Université de Montréal, currently working on subculture communities in Tokyo. Her research interests include Japanese youth, juvenile delinquency, subcultures in Tokyo, multiethnic and multiracial individuals (particularly “hafu”) and mental health among youth. She is also a Kendo instructor (4th dan) at the McGill University Kendo Club.

John-Paul Farag – Toyota Canada Inc.

John-Paul Farag is a Manager with the Toyota Canada Inc. (TCI) External Affairs department. He was later appointed to the position of Manager in the Advanced Technology and Powertrain department where he is responsible for the education of various technologies with Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations, the media, and the general public.

John-Paul holds a Bachelor of Engineering Science in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Western Ontario and a Master of Business Administration from the Edinburgh Business School (Heriot Watt University). He was also a Student Trustee on the Niagara Catholic District School Board and Vice-President of the Ontario Student Trustees Association.

Jay Goulding – York University

Jay Goulding is a Professor in the Department of Social Science, York University where he has been Programme Coordinator for Social and Political Thought. His expertise is in classical and modern Chinese philosophy, as well as Japanese philosophy, hermeneutics, and phenomenology.

He has published a variety of articles on Chinese and Japanese culture and thought. He is currently working on a book manuscript, *Culture and Philosophy: East and West* (400 pages) that explores an intersection between Chinese, Japanese and Western philosophy and popular culture. In 2015, Professor Goulding was recognized by the *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* as a distinguished scholar in Chinese, Japanese, and comparative philosophy.

Frank Moritsugu – Nikkei Voice

Frank Moritsugu is an oldtimer in the grandest sense of the word. Born in Port Alice, British Columbia, he was still in his teens when he was hired by Tom Shoyama as writer for *The New Canadian* immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor. When WW2 broke out, Mr. Moritsugu was separated from his family. Despite the treatment accorded his family, Frank enlisted in the Canadian army, served honourably in intelligence work, and was discharged after the war. Winning the best editorial award in the annual Canadian University Press competition set him on his career in journalism over the course which he worked for *Maclean's*, *Canadian Homes & Gardens*, *Toronto Star*, and the *Montreal Star*. In his retirement, he has been publisher of *Nikkei Voice*, for which he currently writes a regular column.

Alexandra Pullano – Student Contributor

Alexandra Pullano graduated from Glendon College, York University in June 2015 with an International Bachelor of Arts in International Studies as well as a Certificate of Bilingualism. Her interests throughout the program included international development, foreign policy, and diplomacy, as well as law. Alexandra is currently a law student studying at the University of Ottawa with the goal of working in human rights and social justice law.

As Co-Project Coordinator for the 20th Annual International Studies Symposium, Alexandra enjoyed showing the innovative, cultural, and economic realities of Japan and the way in which Japan interacts with the world.

Greg Robinson – Université du Québec à Montréal

Greg Robinson is Professor of History at l'Université du Québec À Montréal. A specialist in North American Ethnic Studies and U.S. Political History, he is the author of several notable books including *A Tragedy of Democracy: Japanese Confinement in North America* (Columbia University Press, 2009), winner of the 2009 History book prize of the Association for Asian American Studies and *After Camp: Portraits in Mid Century Japanese American Life and Politics* (University of California Press, 2012), winner of the Caroline Bancroft History Prize in Western U.S. History. Professor Robinson writes a regular column, "The Great Unknown and the Unknown Great," for the *San Francisco Nichi Bei Weekly*. He is an editorial board member of the *Journal of Transnational American Studies*.

Odmaa Sod-Erdene – Student Contributor

Odmaa Sod-Erdene holds a BA Double-Honours in Economics and International Studies from Glendon College. She is currently pursuing her Masters of Arts in Economics at the University of British Columbia. Her main interest areas include international economics, development studies, gender, and income inequalities.

As Panelist Coordinator for the 20th Annual International Studies Symposium, she enjoyed working with many distinguished Japanese Studies scholars. Studying the rich and unique history of Japan, particularly of Japanese women, provided her with new perspectives and inspirations, and was an experience for which she is very thankful.

David Welch – University of Waterloo

David A. Welch is CIGI Chair of Global Security at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo, and Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation. His 2005 book *Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change* (Princeton University Press) is the inaugural winner of the International Studies Association ISSS Book Award for the best book published in 2005 or 2006, and his 1993 book *Justice and the Genesis of War* (Cambridge University Press) is the winner of the 1994 Edgar S. Furniss Award for an Outstanding Contribution to National Security Studies. His articles have appeared in *Asian Perspective*, *Foreign Affairs*, *International Security*, and others. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1990.


Alexandra Welsh – Student Contributor

Alexandra Welsh graduated from Glendon College with an Honours BA in International Studies. She hopes to pursue a career in law in the not-for-profit sector. Alexandra's previous publications include "Women of the Jungle: Guerrillas on the front lines of the FARC-EP" (2015) in the *Glendon Journal of International Studies*.

In the role of Co-Project Coordinator for Glendon College's 20th Annual International Studies Symposium, she enjoyed discovering the Japanese community in Toronto and exploring its relationship with Canada.

Bernard Wolf – York University

Bernie Wolf is Professor Emeritus of Economics and International Business at the Schulich School of Business, York University, where he is Director of the Certificate in Managing International Trade and Investment Program. His areas of research include international business education, foreign exchange movements, international trade, prospects for the global economy, and global restructuring of manufacturing industries. Professor Wolf was on the editorial board of two major journals as well as on the executive boards of several scholarly organizations including the Association of Japanese Business Studies. In addition to his academic work, he has acted as a consultant and advisor to a number of multinational firms and SMEs in Canada, as well as to various governments.



GLENDON'S 20th ANNUAL
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES SYMPOSIUM

JAPAN SYMPOSIUM

shining a light on the land of the rising sun

Sunday, March 29, 2015

HISTORY OF THE SYMPOSIUM

The Annual International Studies Symposium is a project entirely conceived and managed by students. It was initiated during the 1995-1996 academic year by a group of highly motivated students, eager to deepen their knowledge and experience of foreign countries or regions and the relations between Canada and those countries or regions.

This highly demanding course has five main components; a series of seminars, the organization of an international colloquium, a field research trip to the country of study, the submission of a research essay on aspects of the country concerned, and the publication of the proceedings of the Symposium and students' essays.

To date, the following countries and/or regions have been discussed; Cuba (1995-1996), China (1996-1997), South Africa (1997-1998), the European Union (1998-1999), the Middle East (1999-2000), South East Asia (2000-2001), Brazil (2001-2002), Russia (2002-2003), India (2003-2004), The Great Lakes Regions of Central Africa (2004-2005), Mexico (2005-2006), Turkey (2006-2007), Egypt (2007-2008), Venezuela (2008-2009), Iran (2009-2010), Hispaniola (2010-2011), Germany (2011-2012), the Korean Peninsula (2012-2013), and The United States of America (2013-2014). This year's Symposium marks the 20th anniversary of the project and the country which has been chosen for study is Japan.

While many, inside and outside the university, make significant contributions to this annual event, the key to the project's success lies mainly in the boundless enthusiasm, dedication, and creativity of the students.

ITINERARY

08:00 Doors Open to the Public

Breakfast, Tea and Coffee in the Atrium

09:00 – 9:15 Opening Ceremony in Room A100

Welcome by Alexandra Pullano and Alexandra Welsh

Lead Project Coordinators, International Studies Symposium

Opening Remarks by Principal Donald Ipperciel

Principal, Glendon College, York University

09:15 – 9:45 Keynote Address - Room A100

Introduction of Keynote Speaker by Dr. Awalou Ouedraogo

Associate Professor, International Studies, York University

Keynote Address by Mr. James Heron

Executive Director, Japanese-Canadian Cultural Centre

10:00 – 11:45 Concurrent Morning Panels

Panel A: History and Memory: Japanese Communities during WWII

Panel B: The Economy Under Abe and Looking Ahead: Economy,

Business, and Technology

11:55 – 13:20 Lunch in the Glendon Dining Hall

Japanese cuisine provided by Edo Restaurant

Cultural performances by Sakuramai (Traditional Yosakoi dance) and;

Mu Mon Kai Dojo (Iaido swordplay demonstration)

13:30 – 15:15 Concurrent Afternoon Panels

Panel C: Post-growth Japan and Its Domestic Policies

Panel D: Youth and Pop Culture: From Godzilla to Naruto

15:30 – 17:15 Final Afternoon Panel

Panel E: Japan and the World: Politics and Diplomacy

17:15 – 17:30 Closing Remarks and Acknowledgements in Room A100

Closing Words on behalf of the International Studies Symposium

Organizing Team by Alexandra Pullano and Alexandra Welsh

Lead Project Coordinators, International Studies Symposium

17:30 – 20:00 Wine and Cheese Reception in the BMO Skyroom

Performances by Anna Ishihara and by;

Members of the Glendon Musical Ensemble

French, Japanese, Mandarin, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish interpretation will be provided in Room A100

WHY JAPAN?

This year, for Glendon College's 20th Annual International Studies Symposium, the team decided to pick a country that was unique in both its domestic culture and its contribution to global politics. Japan fits this description beautifully. While it has managed to maintain the continuity of a single imperial line over hundreds of years, it has a complex past and an ever evolving future. Japan is particularly interesting to the team as it is a state that built its own path to development. While Japan is a modern nation, it reached this point in a very unique way; by mixing new techniques with age old traditions. The members of the team wanted to examine this in more detail. Other research interests of the members of this year's Symposium team lie in various fields regarding Japan, ranging from popular culture to the future of technology. As such, the team thought it appropriate to choose Japan, a state that has a rich history and a fascinating future.

THE TEAM

Alexandra Welsh, Co-Project Coordinator
Alexandra Pullano, Co-Project Coordinator
Assia Belhassan, Financial Coordinator
Andrea DaSilva, Internal Coordinator
Matthew Farrell, Logistics Coordinator
Kelly Lui, Media & Communications Coordinator
Luc Pokorn, Public Relations Coordinator
Vanessa Pukal, Fundraising Coordinator
Odmaa Sod-Erdene, Panelist Coordinator

PANEL A

The Economy Under Abe and Looking Ahead: Economy, Technology, & the Environment



DR. RICHARD BEASON, University of Alberta
Having served as a Research intern at the former Ministry of Trade and Industry, Visiting Scholar at the Ministry of Finance in Japan and at the Bank of Japan, and Senior Economist at HSBC in Tokyo and Chief Strategist at UBS, Dr. Beason is also author of many scholarly articles and co-author of two books.



DR. BERNARD M. WOLF, York University
As Professor Emeritus Economics and International Business at the Schulich School of Business, and on the editorial board of two major journals and several executive boards of scholarly organizations including the Association of Japanese Business Studies, Dr. Wolf has had a keen interest in the Japanese bearings and automotive industry for over forty years.



JOHN-PAUL FARAG, Toyota Canada INC.
Manager with the Toyota Canada Inc. (TCI) External Affairs department where he is now responsible for the promotion and education of Toyota Hybrid technology and other technologies with Government agencies, NGO's (Non-Governmental Organizations), the media, and the general public.



Moderator: DR. LORNA WRIGHT, York University
Currently Executive Director of the Centre for Global Enterprise and EDC Professor of International Business at the Schulich School of Business, Dr. Wright is also the founding director of the Centre for Canada Asia Business Relations at Queens University, co-founder of the Asian Business Consortium, and inaugural director of the Centre for Global Enterprise at York University.

PANEL B

History and Memory: Japanese Communities during WWII



DR. GREG ROBINSON, Université du Québec à Montréal
A specialist in North American Ethnic Studies and U.S. Political History, he is the author of several notable books such as "A Tragedy of Democracy. Japanese Confinement in North America" (Columbia University Press, 2009), winner of the 2009 History book prize of the Association for Asian American Studies.



FRANK MORITSUGU, Nikkei Voice
An "old timer" in the grandest sense of the word: Mr. Moritsugu experienced living in an internment camp and honourably served in intelligence work for the Canadian army during WWII. Leaving the army, he found his way into journalism and eventually became a founding member of Nikkei Voice.



Moderator: CATHERINE ISHINO, York University
Upon discovering the Japanese-American internment, while reading her high school US History textbook in 1968, Catherine became personally and actively involved in it. Since then she has documented it by creating multimedia discourse. For further reference see: <http://www.catherineishino.org> and <http://ishinoportfolio.wordpress.com>.

PANEL C

Post-Growth Japan and its Domestic Policies



DR. JAMES TIESSEN, Ryerson University

Having served as President of the Japan Studies Association of Canada, Visiting Scholar at the Asian Institute, Munk Centre of Global Affairs and Visiting Research Fellow at the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research in Tokyo, Dr. Tiessen studies Japanese healthcare, particularly its hospitals, the core of that system.



DR. BERNARD BERNIER, Université de Montréal

Receiving his Ph. D. from Cornell in 1970, Dr. Bernier's topics of research in Japan have been folk religion, philosophy, changes in agriculture & rural society, labor relations & company organization, factory automation, and young urban women's vision of career and marriage. His latest book was on changes in labor in Japan.



DR. JULIAN DIERKES, University of British Columbia

Associate professor and Keidanren Chair in Japanese Research at the Institute of Asian Research of the University of British Columbia. His research has focused on the contemporary Japanese education system and he is the author of "Guilty Lessons? Postwar History Education in Japan and the Germans". Follow him @jdierkes.



Moderator: DR. YUKARI TAKAI, University of Windsor

Faculty advisor of the Japan Symposium team, Dr. Takai is establishing herself as an expert on the history of migration and demographic change. Her most recent study of migratory patterns into and throughout the Quebec/New England region in the 19th and 20th centuries offers a new framework for examining the immigrant experience.

PANEL D

Youth and Pop Culture: From Godzilla to Naruto



DR. SANDRA ANNETT, Wilfred Laurier University

Author of "Anime Fan Communities: Transcultural Flows and Frictions" and of several published articles in journals such as *Transcultural Studies*, *The Journal of Postcolonial Writing*, *The Journal of Adaptation in Film and Performance*, and *Mechademia* (forthcoming). Her research interests include digital cinema, animation, and Japanese popular culture.



DR. JAY GOULDING, York University

Having extensive expertise in classical and modern Chinese philosophy, hermeneutic, and phenomenology, Dr. Goulding is currently working on a book manuscript, "Culture and Philosophy: East and West", exploring an intersection between Chinese, Japanese, and Western philosophy and popular culture.



AKANÉ D'ORANGEVILLE, Université de Montréal

A Ph.D. candidate in anthropology at Université de Montréal, currently working on subculture communities in Tokyo, Akané's research interests include Japanese youth, juvenile delinquency, subcultures in Tokyo, multiethnic and multiracial individuals (particularly "hafu") and mental health among youth.



Moderator: DR. CARY TAKAGAKI, York University

A Professor in the Department of Languages, Literatures & and Linguistics, Dr. Takagaki teaches *Citing the Classics: The 'Premodern' in Modern Japanese Literature and Film*, and *Contemporary Japanese Culture and Society* at York University.

PANEL E

Japan and the World: Politics and Diplomacy



DR. JACOB KOVALIO, Carleton University
Recipient of a 2014 Foreign Minister of Japan's Commendation for contributions to the study of Japan and to Canada-Japan relations, Dr. Kovalio is past president of the Japan Studies Association of Canada (JSAC) – Canada's leading organization for the promotion of Canada-Japan ties. Currently, he is president of Japan Pacific Consulting.



DR. DAVID A. WELCH, University of Waterloo
CIGI Chair of Global Security at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo and Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation. His 2005 book "Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change" is the inaugural winner of the International Studies Association ISSS Book Award for the best book published in 2005.



DONALD W. CAMPBELL, The Japan Society
Currently Senior Strategy Advisor at Davis LLP, a Canadian national law firm, Don was Canada's Ambassador to Japan from 1993 to 1997. In 2003 he was appointed by the Prime Minister to be the Canadian Co-Chair of the Canada Japan 2000, a commission established to recommend to the governments of Canada and Japan measures for the improvement of the bilateral relationship.



Moderator: DR. AWALOU OUEDRAOGO, York University
A beloved Associate Professor at the Department of International Studies at Glendon College. His research interests include the history and philosophy of international law, war, its regulations and alternatives, human rights and humanitarian law, peaceful settlement of disputes, states responsibility, and post-conflict peace building in Africa.

* For the complete bio of each Panelist and Moderator as well as the title of their presentation, please visit <http://www.japansymposium.com>, and click on the "Panels" tab.

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



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


Population Pyramid (2014)





Statistical Handbook of Japan 2014, Statistics Bureau Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, 2014, <http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/pdf/2014all.pdf>, 15.




Japan is a nation of tradition and innovation and which now faces an array of new challenges. In a region filled with tension, Japan seeks to maintain a strong international position, while on the domestic front, the impact of socio-political, demographic, and economic changes have begun to make themselves known.

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