THINKING TIME THROUGH DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION:
duration, memory, perception and the virtual time of media events

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A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN
THE FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES
YORK UNIVERSITY
TORONTO, ONTARIO

AUGUST 2013

Abstract

This dissertation examines two ways by which duration can come to be experienced in analog cinema and digital installations: the interstice and the fold. Whereas the interstice is a material fissure that brings about temporal disruptions between shots/images, the fold is the ontological ground upon which the continuous relations between image and mind arise. These two conceptual figures of time are contradictory, asymmetrical and unequal, giving rise to the question: how might duration be examined from two contrasting and contradictory points of view? If interstices present temporal disjunctions, how might temporal continuities also be a valid point of view? The fold introduces a difference by which a different type of thinking might occur about duration: it introduces a rupture in the orientation of thought about the interstice. Each figure is a different node of thinking of the rhizome, making up the multiplicity by which duration can come under scrutiny in media-objectiles. Each is part of the difference that constitutes the whole.

Time is also the method and process by which duration is examined. As method, time is examined through the difference and repetition of the image. Important to the return is the nature of what returns: does the return bring about the same duration, or does it bring difference? Whereas the time-images of cinema give rise to movements between pasts and futures, the digital installations examined give rise to a continual "now," or to presentism. The digital-image as the returning difference to the analog-image presents its ontological difference, producing a

different image of time. As process, the lived time of media-events queries the type

of duration endured in nonlinear, asynchronous time. Pivoting between pasts and

futures, this open and free time of duration gives rise to memories and visions in the

experience of media.

The media examples discussed are Claire Denis's film *L'Intrus* (2004),

Susan Collins's installations *Glenlandia*, *Fenlandia* and *The Spectroscope* (2004-7),

Andrei Tarkovsky's film *Mirror* (1975), Sound Research Laboratories's

performance in Barcelona (1991), Granular Synthesis's performances *Modell 5*

(1997) and *POL* (1998) and Toni Dove's interactive cinema *Spectropia* (2008).

For François

Acknowledgements

Table of Contents

Introduction

Chapter One
Film-philosophy: assembling a field from practices, theory and philosophy

Chapter Two
That interrupting feeling: interstitial disjunctions in Claire Denis's *L'Intrus*

Chapter Three
Continuous Space: the eternal worlds of automechanized art

Chapter Four
Conceptualizing Cinematic Folds

Abbreviations

MI   Deleuze, Gilles. *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*. Translated by
H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1986.

Berg.   *Bergsonism*. Translated by H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam. New York:
Urzone, Inc., 1988.

TI   *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*. Translated by H. Tomlinson
and R. Galeta. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.

LoS   *The Logic of Sense*. Translated by M. Lester, edited by C.V. Boundas.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

Fold   *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*. Translated by T. Conley.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.

D&R   *Difference and Repetition*. Translated by P. Patton.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

FB   *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*. Translated by D.W. Smith.
Continuum: New York, 2003.

AO   Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix. *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism
and Schizophrenia*. Translated by R. Hurley, M. Seem and H. R. Lane.
London: Athlone Press, 1984.

TPA   *Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Translated by B.
Massumi. London: Athlone Press, 1987.

WIP   *What Is Philosophy?* Translated by H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

Introduction

Instants or duration? Opening up a dialogue

Time in cinema has been conceived largely in two ways: as a series of instants or as continuous duration. Since the early experimental years of the medium in development, Etienne-Jules Marey and Eadweard Muybridge, the two progenitors of the apparatus, conceived the movement of images in time differently. Around 1878 Marey recorded the continuous movement of humans, birds and other animals on a single chronophotographic plate. All the movements produced by a figure in space came to be recorded in continuous time through a single camera, in which all successive positions were registered on one fixed plate.[1] Muybridge, on the other hand, developed motion through the serial transitions of fixed frames in artificial time. He recorded each movement produced by a figure on a separate frame. Such a separation was artificial though, in that it was not possible to ascertain how each figure moved from one position to the next. Moreover, because each movement was recorded on a different plate, the passage of time between each movement in the series was unclear.

Marey, in contrast, was able to record the continuous temporality of the movement of figures in space, however, his work suffered from a critical setback as it was visually incoherent. Since all successive movements produced by a figure in space were recorded on a single plate, there was a massive muddle of lines, making

the plate confusing to understand. A continuous record of time was only possible on

a single frame, making his images blurred and increasingly unreadable. Thus, even

though he was able to produce the continuous time of the movements of figures and

objects in space, the illegibility of his images became the limits of his work.[2]

Muybridge's figures, conversely, were discontinuous in time, but visually coherent.

Each movement was distinct and legible, as each movement was produced on a

separate frame. A distinct figure in motion could only be produced by virtue of a

loss in continuous time, a concession that Marey was unwilling to make.[3]

The serial movement of film frames developed by Muybridge became the

standard for films from 1895 on. In the early films of Georges Méliès and Auguste

and Louis Lumière, subjects and objects were shown moving in rapid frame

succession of 16 to 20 frames per second (fps). Mary Ann Doane writes that these

early films mark the event's indexicality and historicity, in addition to constructing

the archive of temporality. They were simply a record of time, which showed great

exuberance in the sheer ability to record movement in time.[4] The famous Lumières's

films, such as W*orkers Leaving a Factory* (1895) or *A Boat Leaving Harbour*

(1897), were single continuous shots that were limited to the length of the 17 metre

film-roll. The entire duration of these films was approximately 50 seconds on screen

and captured the raw material of the workers' lives.[5] Tom Gunning writes that this

cinema did not maintain any illusion of realism, which is prototypical of the classical

narrative that followed this period. This early form before 1907, therefore, belonged

2

to a cinema outside of the narrative impulse of classical continuity, and thereafter continued in avant-garde traditions.[6]

Nonetheless, the understanding that cinema was indexical to real movement and to real duration, much less an archive of temporality, did not sit well with the philosopher Henri Bergson. His assertions recalled Marey's objections to Muybridge's serial frames that they were discontinuous. He wrote that precisely because the filmstrip created serial movement, cinema did not yield real movement, as the gaps between the frames did not generate continuity but rather instants of time. Moreover, because it used the artificial, mechanized time of the projector, the movement produced was artificial. For both these reasons, he considered cinematic time to be different from real duration.

Questions on duration

This question of whether duration in cinema presents the series of instants or is continuous duration was debated often in the early part of the twentieth century, most notably with philosophers, film theorists and filmmakers such as Bergson, André Bazin, Siegfried Kracauer and Jean Epstein. Whether Epstein's writings on *photogenie* in the 1920s or the *Cahiers du Cinema* critics's writings on cinephilia in the 1940s and 1950s, their examinations presented film as the contingent moment, emphasizing the flux of the film.[7] However, while temporality was one of the

3

investigative axis in early film writing, this axis atrophied from the 1960s on with the surge in semiotic, psychoanalytical and ideology studies.[8]

Semiotic, psychoanalytical, ideology studies and cognitivist film-studies placed emphasis on the moment, thereby arresting the filmic flux. Matilda Mroz writes that "there seemed to be a conscious attempt to control and fix cinema's ungraspability by instituting a 'scientific' and rigorous mode of film analysis."[9] Semiotic and structuralist film theories isolated particular filmic fragments in their analysis, which then became repositories of meaning and signification. Moreover, Metz's semiotics, which emphasized the notion of film as "text," established the autonomy and control of the writer.[10] Filmic texts were considered as objects, which established spectatorial distance, emphasizing film's corporeality over its ephemerality.[11] Metz referred to film's fleeting qualities as having a "thousand paralyzing bonds of a tender unconditionality," revealing his uneasiness about film's transient qualities.[12] Barthes's structuralist approach also emphasized still moments over movement in *Image, Music, Text* (1977), in which the film still becomes the "ideal object" by virtue of liberating the image from the narrative impulse and the constraints of filmic time.[13] Moreover, since the 1980s, Bordwell's cognitivist or formalist approach to film theory places emphasis on classical continuity editing, shot angles and framing styles, tending towards isolating moments and fixing filmic flow. In the shot by shot analysis distinctive of his theorization, he embraces the

spatialization and arrestation of the filmic moment rather than introduce or discuss duration.[14]

While the material basis of the celluloid filmstrip is a series of instants, the question of whether analog cinema is a series of instants or continuous duration still comes into debate. In *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (1983/86),[15] Deleuze observed that there was a persistence of vision when watching films. In responding to Bergson's objection that cinema did not produce real continuity,[16] he noted that with modern technological advancements, the gaps in between frames were imperceptible to human perception. The rate of 24fps produces natural perception, and as Paul Douglass has also noted, there is little straining that occurs in perceiving natural movement. The rapid movement of film frames coincides with natural movement, coming to duplicate the experiences of duration in natural life.[17]

Moreover, Deleuze wrote that Bergson's "cinematographic illusion" was an erroneous formula for cinema. Bergson's understanding of cinema as producing false movement was on account of the projector, which he said presented a mechanized movement. Such a movement, he wrote, produced an impersonal, uniform and abstract time. However, Deleuze questioned Bergson's thesis by asking, if the means of producing movement were artificial then would the movement also be artificial? Could the artificially induced movement of the projector produce real movement? In a reversal from Bergson, Deleuze eventually concluded that the movement of a celluloid filmstrip through a projector does present continuous

5

movement. Thus, even though the movement is produced by the artificial,

mechanized means of the projector, the subject's experience is of real movement,

and perception is natural.

In *The Emergence of Cinematic Time* (2002) Doane, however, affirms

Bergson's insistence that cinema presents a series of instants.[18] She writes,

"cinematic representation and celebration of mobility are founded on a basic

stillness or immobility subtended by darkness."[19] Notions of continuity, she argues,

are based on the denial that cinema is a series of instants. Citing a kiss between two

women in a documentary by Thom Andersen, *Eadweard Muybridge,*

Zoopraxographer (1974), Doane writes that "the kiss never really takes place; its

suggestion of union is only illusory, because movement can never be born from a

series of immobilities."[20] Alternately, in *Temporality and Film Analysis* (2012),

Mroz utilizes both the instant and duration to critique works, especially to examine

their interrelation in the temporal flux.[21]

In spite of these fundamental differences, it should be noted that without the

passage of time, cinema, or what is cinematic, does not and cannot exist, hence its

appellations: moving-images and/or time-based media. Whether understood as the

series of instants or as continuous duration, cinema's necessary constitution is time,

and while one of the major tasks of this dissertation will be to examine what type of

duration is produced in the various media works that I examine, my starting point

will be the position that in an image/shot (composed of many frames), the cinematic apparatus produces the continuous duration of natural perception.

In clarifying the terminology that I use here, the concepts of time and duration are not to be considered as different from each other; time is what comes to be directly experienced in pure duration. As Suzanne Guerlac writes, "*Time is the symbolic image of Pure Duration*. It [time] stands in for it [duration] in reflective consciousness; it is what duration becomes when we think and speak it."[22] Pure duration is, therefore, the direct experience of what is symbolically referred to as time.

While I will introduce some claims in this introduction, I will develop and expand them further in the following chapters. I will begin by examining duration in analog and digital media installations not only to probe what type of duration occurs in each medium, but also to explore the images of time produced in each technology. I will extend the discussion on duration outlined above to show two varying processes by which the spectator experiences duration in time-based media works. The first process is the interstice, which is the physical interruption experienced in the transitions from shot to shot in time-images, and the second is the fold, which functions as the ontological ground upon which perception, memory and matter come to fold into each other to make up the experience of duration. These two processes are asymmetrical and unequal to each other, the first being material and

the second ontological. However, I will show that although they are incommensurate, each makes up the multiplicity that constitutes the whole of media.

In pursuing the interstice and fold to consider duration, my work moves in a slightly different direction than is typically undertaken in cinema and media studies. As I will explain in the section on methodology, my approach to time is both methodological and processual. First, time will become the method by which I will undertake an examination of images. That is, in the unfolding of time in media works, the image that returns will present either its difference or identity with the one that preceded it. The image that returns in time will be considered at the local, immediate level and also at the historical level.

At the local level I will consider what occurs in the transitions between shots in analog cinema and whether spatio-temporality is maintained in the flow. I examine what type of return occurs and whether the shot that follows maintains continuity or disrupts it. In the digital installations I will examine whether the return of the pixels, which make up a (digital) frame, maintain or disrupt the preceding flow. Thus, I examine what type of local movement is produced in analog cinema and the digital installations. At the historical level, I will consider analog and digital technologies and whether the digital image is a returning difference in time to the analog image. Time as a methodology will yield local and historical continuities/disruptions in the returning image. Taking up such a method will reveal a work's potential for bringing about the same or newer movements of thinking.

Second, time becomes processual through the workings of the interstice and the fold. Through interstitial disjunctions and in the folding among perception, memory and matter, the experience of duration moves outside the standard time of a clock. Rather than images unfolding as the continuous, linear movement of a past, present and future, interstitial disjunctions and foldings present nonlinear, asynchronous time. These processes unbind media works from chronometric measuring and duration is experienced not by the measurements of seconds, hours or years, but through the relation of movements generated among pasts and futures, which produce virtual times. The interstitial disjunctions between pasts and futures vary the movements of time back and forth and it is in the interstices that virtual connections come to be made. In the workings of the fold, virtual memories of pasts and of futures to come fold into the actual matter of the work being perceived. The virtual time of a media work, therefore, depends on how the work is structured by way of interstitial disjunctions, whereas in the fold, virtual time operates at the level of perception. Duration, thereby, should be understood as the lived time of the media work, in which virtual times are generated through disjunctive pasts and futures and through folding among perception, memory and matter.

In considering time as methodology and as process, I explore how duration comes to be experienced at both the micro and macro levels, as well as scrutinize the experience of time beyond chronometric measurement. Through such an activity I hope to nudge media studies into examining further the vicissitudes of duration that

include temporal media objects. The virtual connections generated in the interstices and in the folds, show the temporal media object's potential for generating newer movements of thought. What occurs in the interstice between two images, or what occurs in the fold between two bodies, gives rise to thinking. In a film or temporal media object, therefore, the connections between shots/images bring about the virtual movements of thought. These virtual movements give rise to a non-concretised, non-chronological time that moves freely and in undirected ways. It is not limited to what has been given. In conceptualizing the virtual times of media, therefore, newer relations in the movements of thinking can come to be produced. By exploring the lived time of media works, experience moves away from time as a measurable and distinct quantity, in which media objects occur as *a priori*, stable and determinable. An examination of the virtual relations produced in the interstices and folds, brings forth a measureless, open time instead, in which media objects are indistinct and in states of flux, perpetually in the making. Such an open time moves beyond what is given and determinable in the images, and therefore also in thinking.

The movements of time will be pursued through Deleuze's two books on cinema, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (1983/86) and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (1985/89)[23] and *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (1993).[24] The cinema books will be used to consider the material processes, functions and formal considerations of the interstice in constructing narrative time in cinema. I will specifically take up the time-images of cinema in the second chapter, but will deviate from Deleuze's

preoccupation with cinema in order to pursue my own interests in digital

installations in the third chapter. Repeating my examination of the interstice in

digital installations, I will consider the difference and repetition produced in the

image of time in the two media.

The interstice

In *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, Deleuze presents a way of thinking images through

the movements of thought. That is, an image gives rise to thought and in the

connection between images, thought is continuously moving from one image to

another. The cut between images give rise to the virtual movements of thinking. The

shots that are cut together in time-images are unrelated, making them spatio-

temporally discontinuous with each other. Rather than follow the continuity of

movement, shots are cut together without following a narrative logic or continuity.

Every shot/image in the film is a fragment of time. Linked together in a disjointed

chain, the spectator encounters each image from what is an outside. They move

away from the "inside" relations found in movement-images, in which the demand

of a narrative continuity governs the whole. In time-images there is no whole to

speak of, because shots are constituted not from the inside relations of a narrative

logic, but from an outside, which is the Open. Each shot is a fragment of the outside,

from which thought comes to be encountered.

The interstice is what forms the linkages in the chain of images. The shots/images being logically unrelated and spatio-temporally discontinuous makes their connections to each other irrational. The irrational connection between images jars the spectator and generates a shock to thought. The shock produced between images, Deleuze writes, produces the virtual movements of thought. The interstice is therefore not only a material and conceptual fissure, but generates a multiplicity of virtual movements in these fissures.

A good example of the time-images of cinema is Claire Denis's film *L'Intrus* (2004), which I take up in the second chapter. In this film there is a constant disruption in the flow of time experienced. The interstices connect the disparate shots to each other in a chain, bringing about a disjunctive flow in the duration experienced. Such temporal disjunctions continuously produce a heterogeneous time. With respect to the digital installations, I consider Susan Collins's *Fenlandia, Glenlandia* and *The Spectroscope* (2004-7). Each installation produces a continuous and singular trajectory of time that occurs without disruptions in the flow. The temporal flow is unidirectional and such a time is homogeneous, as there is no movement beyond the one generated by the movement of pixels on a screen.

In considering these works certain assertions may be made, namely that the time-images found in analog cinema yield a heterogeneous time by virtue of the spatio-temporal disjunctions produced by the interstice. Spatio-temporal disjunctions generate intellectual aporias, which give rise to a multiplicity of virtual connections,

12

increasing the work's potential for the movements of thought to occur. The absence

of interstitial disjunctions in the digital installations, on the other hand, produces a

singular, homogeneous time. A homogeneous time does not generate different states

of experience, which is critical in producing real duration. Moreover, in presenting

the continuous whole of time that spans a year, time in these installations becomes a

distinct and measurable quantity rather than the free and open qualitative experience

of duration. In presenting the whole of time without gaps or disruptions, connections

to the virtual decrease, and such works have less potential for the movements of

thought to occur.

The fold

The fold presents a different viewpoint from which to conceive duration in media.

Deleuze's notion of the fold, as developed in *The Fold*, is based on Gottfried

Wilhem Leibniz's aesthetics of curvature and has been conceived in this dissertation

as the metaphysics by which perception, memory and matter come to fold in time in

the experience of a media event. In other words, as we encounter the world, the

actual conditions perceived of the present, give rise to memory.

In time-based media works, perceptions emerge not merely from the images

being encountered in the present, but also from the telescoping of the "now" with the

images that precede it. Bernard Stiegler has written that the synthesis of the recent

past with the continuing present causes a "cinematic effect."[25] While the cinematic

effect takes into account the synthesis of the recent past with the continuing present, in Deleuze's metaphysics, layers of pasts and futures fold in with the perception of the object. It is in the folds of perception between actual object/image and virtual pasts/futures that the newness of experience comes to be made. However, the same object/image can give rise to many different virtual pasts/futures, generating difference in the experience of the same object.

In perceiving the temporal media object, the spectator encounters its materiality, including its light intensities, sound tonalities, types of movement and density of matter: its genetic elements. These elements fold into perception as they modulate in time, giving rise to micro sensations and inklings. Micro sensations and inklings form shapes that are indistinct and produce thought that is obscure. However, as the object becomes clearer in perception in time, what is indistinct and obscure gives rise to thresholds of thought and consciousness. Perception, therefore, unfolds from the indistinct and obscure to what is distinct and clear.

In the eighteenth century, Leibniz, in his considerations on the monad, showed the impossibility for thinking the subject without the world. He envisioned the world contained in a subject, just as much as the subject was contained in the world. As Gregory Flaxman writes, in Leibniz, "the subject is a point at which the universe sees itself."[26] This relation of enfoldment between world and subject came to be extended to sensation and thought by the philosopher Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten in his *Aesthetica* (1750/58). In it he draws upon Leibniz's theory and

thereby widens his own on aesthetics, moving beyond the narrowness of logic and reason for the production of thought. In his works he includes other forms of thinking beyond the distinct and the clear, proposing instead that the "science of sensate thinking" is critical in the production of knowledge.[27]

In the media works that I will examine, this fluid, enfolding relation of thought to the sensate becomes critical in the movements of thinking. If the temporal media object is understood as an objectile that is becoming in time, it breaks away from a discrete and distinct consideration. Perception of the media object produces sensations and inklings, which produce shapes of meanings, which give rise to thresholds of thought. Understood as fluid and open to becomings in time, a media object generates fluid states of thinking in the duration of media works. In the transient flow of time that comes to be experienced, therefore, consciousness is always in states of flux, continually flowing between clarity and obscurity. The temporal object being in states of flux brings about consciousness that is open-ended and fluctuating.

In the folds of perception, into which memory and images fold, temporal media objects become elastic and fluid forms that undulate in time. The folding of perception, thereby, brings about durational continuities, differing from the disrupted, discontinuous time produced by interstices. In this different mode of experiencing duration, the fold generates a new image of time in media studies. The fold and the interstice are to be understood, however, not as being two separate

elements, but as two elements constitutive of a multiplicity. The image of the fold is

a movement of variation from the interstice, the two being movements of variation

within the whole of media studies. The fold introduces a difference by which a

different type of thinking might occur about duration: it introduces a rupture in the

orientation of thought about the interstice. It generates a different node of thought in

my dissertation and is, as Martin writes, "on a different line [whereby] the rhizome

is able to resume its growth and recompose its forces."[28] In switching to the fold half

way through my dissertation, I hope to generate a variation constitutive of the

multiplicity by which duration can come to be conceived. In chapters four and five,

therefore, I show how the fold generates a difference in how media, whether analog

or digital, might come to be endured in time.

In the examination of media works by Andrei Tarkovsky, Granular

Synthesis, Sound Research Laboratories and others, my work will proceed to show

the processes of perception at work. In chapter four I will start with the micro

perception of matter, which takes on a "shapelikeness" and in chapter five, I will

move on to macro perception, in which the sensate gives rise to consciousness/

thought.[29]

Methodology

The method by which my examination of the interstice and fold will take place

proceeds through Deleuze's third synthesis of time in *Difference and Repetition*

(1968/94). The third synthesis shows that *what* returns in repetition occurs as

difference to what preceded it, producing newer thinking in the history of thought.

Newer methods and concepts, as Williams writes, present the opportunities for

evaluating and revaluing older ones.[30] Difference and repetition bring forth that

mode of thinking that breaks with dogma, the orthodox, the identity with what

comes before, with what is the unconditional given, the presupposition of what is the

moral code or the identification with Law and the State on the basis of past

authority.[31]

In media studies, such a method allows for movement beyond the sensory-

motor images of the movement-image, to create newer connections and to generate

newer futures as "a will to art."[32] In *The Time-Image*, for instance, Deleuze presents

the importance of fabulation, for a new people to come. The creation of new images,

or new types of images, disrupts identification with the older ones, in which the new

image "takes on the political dimension of the constitution of a people."[33] Fabulating

a new people means making a story, a story-*telling* that is an act of the imagination,

which Perrault writes is "the flagrant offence of making up legends."[34] That is, a

political dimension of story-telling is one in which memory or legend of a new

people to come is actively fabulated.

Beyond the creation of the new, there is yet another aspect of difference and

repetition that I take up in this dissertation: the return of the image through time. In

my examination of duration, which occurs through the processes of the interstice and

the fold, each process, when repeated, brings about a difference in *something*. In the repetition of the interstice, difference reveals variation in the nature of the image produced: the digital image returns as difference to the analog image. In the repetition of the fold, difference occurs in the perspectival fields: perception moves continually between micro and macro perspectives. That is, the flux of media objects perceived in time produces corresponding movements in thinking in which, perception moves continually between micro and macro perspectives.

Treating the returning image as difference breaks from some recent cinema/new media scholarship that primarily considers the digital image as the continuation in time of the analog image.[35] Given the difference in the material conditions of the two technologies, I question the idea of continuity by considering the material, formal and conceptual elements at work in the analog and digital image. In inquiring into the difference and repetition of the materiality of the two technologies, I come to examine their structural formations, which give rise to conceptual differences between them. However, paradoxically, despite their material difference, the ability of digital technologies to perfectly simulate the analog image presents a challenge as to whether the two kinds of image are different or similar. While some scholars such as D.N. Rodowick and Lev Manovich present differences between the two, Tom Gunning writes that it is not usually possible to tell the difference, making the two identical.[36] In light of this debate, a systematic unfolding

of their technological planes at work will show their repetitions and variations, and whether the digital image returns as difference to the analog.

I begin this inquiry with Claire Denis's film *L'Intrus*, and then repeat this investigation in the following chapter with Susan Collins's (digital) installations, *Glenlandia*, *Fenlandia* and *The Spectroscope*. In *Spinoza and the Problem of Expression* (1968), Deleuze contrasts Descartes's methodology with Spinoza's, in which Descartes proceeds to investigate from the object, which was clearly and distinctly known, in order to find the processes at work. Spinoza, on the other hand, starts by considering the processes operating and works back to a cause, which was only known indeterminately.[37] Given the uncertainty of knowing at the onset what analog or digital images are, Spinoza's mode of inquiry will be my preferred method. From the processes at work I will consider the type of image produced; this method will be different from proceeding from the identity of the image (as either analog or digital) and then finding the processes at work.

In considering Deleuze's repetition with difference, Sarah Gendron writes that what returns has a dual character and is both affirmative and negative. What makes up the "imperceptible difference" is that which throws the return off centre, away from itself and into another direction.[38] Deleuze writes that within the philosophical tradition, the return of the same has been equated with wholeness and has been affirmed, whereas difference has been equated with lack and negation, and consequently disavowed. Instead, he writes, difference should be understood as

19

reinvigorating and revitalizing thinking.[39] Difference reinvigorates thinking because

what returns occurs as difference to what preceded it. What returns destroys

identification with its antecedent, including a fixed and stable identity in time. Such

a method produces new thinking in philosophy.

Understanding digital media as reinvigorating has at least one implication.

One question that arises is whether the return, which yields difference, always makes

for a positive outcome.[40] The point that Deleuze makes is not that difference is

affirmative or negative, but that difference occurs. Whatever the return presents, the

difference that returns is indeterminate and unknown, bringing both affirmative and

negative qualities. The difference between analog and digital images must be

understood in such a vein: whatever returns is at the onset an indeterminable,

unknowable entity that is qualitatively both affirmative and negative. In the return,

the type of image that returns must be regarded in this way, as having a dual

character. Thus, in chapters two and three I will examine the image that returns in

terms of the relations between the actual and virtual, temporality and spatialization,

memory and information. This method will allow for an understanding of whether

the returning image is in fact a deterritorialization of the analog image and whether

digital media is a new territory of thought.

With respect to the fold I consider the repetition of folding with regard to

topological views, which shift from micro to a macro perspective. Molecular, micro

foldings of matter develop into macro, sinuous folds; the folds of matter produce

differences in perception, in which inklings and micro sensations develop into the conditions of thought and consciousness. Chapter four begins with an examination of the micro and mezzo folds in Tarkovsky's *Mirror* (1975) and chapter five examines the macro folds of consciousness among media-events such as Granular Synthesis's performances *Modell 5* (1997) and *POL* (1998), Survival Research Laboratories's noise performance from 1991 and Toni Dove's *Spectropia* (2008) among others.

The difference and repetition in the two chapters is in the folds of perception. Thus, two issues present themselves: the increase in the surface topology of my examination and the increasing size of the fold. That is, the surface topology of *what* is being examined increases from one to many events, presenting a difference in the *perspectival field* being examined, at the same time as micro foldings distend into the larger fold of consciousness.

But how might the variation in the perspectival fields present difference? The theory of perspectivism, which Deleuze presents in *The Fold*, must be understood through Leibniz's theory of differential relations. Daniel Smith explains that for Leibniz, conscious perception is produced when minute perceptions merge into our conscious perception. For instance, two voices in the background that we may not necessarily be aware of enter our conscious perception. Such conscious perceptions make up singularities or events and produce shifts in thresholds of consciousness. Moreover, these thresholds present differentials by which a fuller understanding of

the object/event as perception might occur. Objects/events are to be understood as being produced through differential relations in conscious perception, rather than by empirical givens.[41] The two perspectives given in chapters four and five occur as the differentials in the perspectival relations in the observations of micro and macro folds. This *shift in perspectival fields* therefore also produces a *difference in perception* and in the *size of the fold*. From the obscure rumblings of micro perception to the clearer perceptions of macro perception the folds become larger, causing a shift in the thresholds of perception.

Whereas in chapter four I consider the basic constitution of the moving image (sound, movement, matter and light) to consider the image in time, chapter five considers the folds between media events, bringing into discussion perception, memory and consciousness. The micro folds of the moving image shift in chapter five towards the possibility of a single interpenetrative circuitry among different media events for the production of the newness of experience. What changes in the repetition is not only the size of the fold, but also the nature of the fields being examined: from image-perception-sensations to image-perception-sensations-events-memory-consciousness.

Overview of chapters

In the first chapter I will present a brief survey of the interconnections among film studies, theory and philosophy over the last century. In doing so I hope to disturb the

limits of film theory and film-philosophy in favour of a more interdisciplinary

approach. I begin by considering how a theoretical or a philosophical approach

should be based not on traditional categories such as narrative and genre in film

studies or duration and perception in philosophy, but rather on the methodological

approach taken in a given examination. I follow this section by presenting the

distinctions between a pedagogical approach and the becoming-philosophical of

film. In the former, philosophical writing sometimes takes film as a tool for

illuminating a philosophical concept, and in the latter, the approach I take in this

dissertation, film or the image itself becomes the cause for philosophical thinking. In

the second half of this chapter I elaborate on the major areas and questions of this

dissertation and then move on to present some current developments in the field and

my own approach to film-philosophy.

I begin the second chapter by examining the time-images of Denis's *L'Intrus*

(2004), inquiring into how the interstice and interstitial repetition function in the

film. This inquiry configures the types of durational flows, revealing three types of

disjunctive synthesis at work in the film: the paradox, divergences and involution.

Delving into Deleuze-Bergson's ontology of pure time and memory, I query the

nature of the disjunctive syntheses in the film in relation to the actual-virtual, the

virtual multiplicity of time-images, the heterogeneous rhythms of the various planes

of consciousness and the workings of a global memory. Central to my concern is the

type of image produced in film's analog technology. Importantly, too, I analyze how these disjunctive syntheses produce the movements of thought.

In chapter three the interstice returns in my examination of digital, automechanized installations such as Susan Collins's *Fenlandia*, *Glenlandia* and *The Spectroscope* (2004-7). I begin by inquiring into the technical processes and material conditions of these works, focusing on the duration of each. By considering the compositional direction, the function of the camera in the production of spatiality, the movement and composition of the pixel, the development of each frame and series, I examine how and what type of duration is produce in the installations. I consider the temporal relations of the whole through Deleuze-Bergson's observations on the workings of virtual and numerical multiplicities and ask whether the transmission system produces the series or simultaneity in the production of the digital image. Last, I examine what types of thought-movements are possible in such a system given the spatialization of duration and consider the image of time produced.

Chapter four shifts focus to the fold. Leibniz's curvilinear aesthetics becomes the theoretical ground for this examination, allowing for thresholds in the experience of sensations and for the continual oscillation in the movements of thought. My analysis begins with how the micro folds among light, sound, movement and matter in time produce micro sensations or inklings. In Tarkovsky's *Mirror* these micro sensations bring about a constant flux between obscurity and clarity in thinking.

Starting at this level, I consider Massumi's intermodularity of the senses in the perception of the image. Changing gears to a mezzo perspective, in the second half of the chapter, I consider what he refers to as the "shapelikeness" of sensory perception to develop my notion of the painterly, auricular/poetic and musical flows of the film. Last, this chapter considers whether and how the sensate might unfold into the movements of conscious thinking.

Continuing to explore the fold and Leibniz's curvilinear aesthetics, I repeat my query in chapter five with a difference. Changing the point of view to a macro perspective, I examine how various events unfold in perception to produce the larger folds of consciousness. My inquiry focuses on the folds among several events by considering Granular Synthesis's performances *POL* and *Modell 5*, Survival Research Laboratories's noise performances and Toni Dove's *Spectropia*. In the experience of an event, I query how virtual memory and perception fold into the present and probe how duration moves beyond the simple measurement of chronometric time, of continuing presents, to include the layers of virtual memory.

Endnotes

[1] Mary Ann Doane, *The Emergence of Cinematic Time*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U Press, 2002), 48-9.

[2] Doane, 60.

[3] Doane, 26.

[4] Doane, 24.

[5] What was previously understood as the spontaneous recording and documenting of the "raw material" life of workers is arguable, however; these events are now being understood as, at least, partially staged.

[6] Tom Gunning, "'Now You See it, Now You Don't': The Temporality of the Cinema of Attractions," in *Velvet Light Trap*, 32 (1993): 4.

[7] Doane 22; Matilda Mroz, *Temporality and Film Analysis*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh U Press, 2012), 15.

[8] Mroz, 13, 20.

[9] Mroz, 20.

[10] Mroz, 20-21.

[11] This approach is different from theorizations that emphasize film's immersive qualities or spectatorial embodiment.

[12] In Mroz, 20.

[13] Mroz, 22.

[14] Mroz, 24.

[15] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1983/86). (Henceforth, *MI*.) The year of publication of the French original precedes the English translation.

[16] This is the first of the three theses on Bergson's movement and the instant that Deleuze takes up in chapter four of *The Movement-Image*.

[17] Douglass, "Bergson and Cinema: friends or foes?," in *The New Bergson*, ed. J. Mullarkey (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), 212.

[18] It is important to note that the earlier writings of Bergson, such as *Matter and Memory*, were radical in comparison to his later works, a difference that Deleuze emphasizes.

[19] Doane, 205.

[20] Doane, 204, 201-203. Until the arrival of electrical power and the three-blade shutter, early silent film produced a flickering effect in which the film flickered between light and darkness. Doane writes that the kiss arrives in the gap between two frames on the celluloid strip, which is a moment of darkness in which nothing is recorded. This moment in early films became a structuring component, activating blindness and invisibility. The gap is recuperated in the narrative by suggesting meaning in and through the persistence of vision. This instant of the kiss, which occurs in the gap, is where the series of instants become cinema.

[21] Mroz, 2.

[22] Suzanne Guerlac, *Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henri Bergson*, (Ithaca: Cornell U Press, 2006), 69. Author's emphasis.

[23] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1985/89), 1. (Henceforth, *TI*.)

[24] Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. T. Conley, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1993).

[25] Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise*, trans. S. Barker, (Stanford: Stanford U Press), 15.

[26] Gregory Flaxman, "Cinema Year Zero," in *The Brain is the Screen*, ed. G. Flaxman, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2000), 93.

[27] In Birgit M. Kaiser, "The Two Floors of Thinking: Deleuze's Aesthetics of Folds," in *Deleuze and* The Fold, eds. S. Tuinen and N. McDonnell, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 217.

[28] Jean-Clet Martin, *Variations: The Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze*, trans. C. Boundas and S. Dyrkton, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh U Press, 2010), 122-24.

[29] Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual*, (Durham: Duke U Press, 2002), 156. This word is a variation on Massumi's "spacelikeness."

[30] James Williams, *Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition*, (Edinburgh: U of Edinburgh Press, 2003), 1.

[31] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. P. Patton, (New York: Columbia U Press, 1994), 131. (Henceforth, *D&R*.)

[32] *TI*, 266.

[33] *TI*, 243.

[34] Perrault in *TI*, 243.

[35] David Rodowick, *The Virtual Life of Film*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U Press, 2007), 30.

[36] Tom Gunning, "What's the Point of an Index? Or, Faking Photographs," *Nordicom Review* 25.1-2, September 2004, 39-49.

[37] Williams, 51.

[38] Sarah Gendron, *Repetition, Difference, and Knowledge in the Work of Samuel Beckett, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze*, (New York: Peter Lang, 2008), Gendron, 12.

[39] Gendron, 12-13.

[40] The digital image has been linked to informatics and calculus and therefore to what is the determinable and the calculable. Such a relation sets it apart from previous understandings of art, which are related to the unknown, the indeterminable and the Open.

[41] Daniel W. Smith, "Genesis and Difference," in *Deleuze and* The Fold, eds. N. McDonnel and S. van Tuinen, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 149.

Chapter One

Film-philosophy: assembling a field from practices, theory and philosophy

Introduction

My inquiry into the interstice and the fold, which includes an examination of

duration, perception, memory, actual-virtual relations and the ontology of the image,

arises from the intersection of media practices, studies and philosophy. In this

undertaking I will move beyond the limits of traditionally defined areas, forming

rhizomatic connections amongst their various conceptual, virtual and material

components to make up a third field that is neither typically media theory or studies

nor philosophy. Indeed, these rhizomatic connections between the fields of film and

media studies and theory and philosophy have formally constituted what is the

relatively newer field of film-philosophy. However, despite the recent constitution of

this newer field of inquiry, the interconnections among theory, studies and

philosophy have been present since the inception of early cinema. In the first part of

this chapter, therefore, I will initiate a survey of some links between these fields to

map out some conceptual developments, sketching out some of the antecedents over

the last century. In presenting these interconnections, I hope to present glimpses of

the theoretical ground and the nature of the topics from which film-philosophy

emerges.

In the second half of this chapter I will lay out the theoretical ground of my inquiry on duration, which will give rise to the specific questions on the fold and interstice outlined in the introduction and central to this dissertation. In this section I will present a detailed understanding of the function, form and conceptual understanding of these two processes. While they are asymmetrical and incommensurate with each other, their differences are to be understood as making up the multiplicity of the whole of media studies. Each forms a different node on the rhizome, constituting a variation in how duration is experienced. This variation will allow me to end this chapter by considering the flux in how meaning is produced and in the instability of meaning itself. By assembling the various components into their particular relations in the chapters, I form the connections among them synthetically, rather than through a natural or historical process. The relations operate from an open outside rather than from the inside of (what might be constituted as) media studies. This method, which disassociates from inscribing traditional filiations or a genealogy, presents an ungrounding of how meaning comes to be produced, as well as of the certainty of meaning itself.

An archeology of film and philosophy

In her introduction to what is film-philosophy, Felicity Colman considers how film's theoretical and philosophical engagements *both* lie in "technological epistemologies" and "event epistemologies." In other words, the continual shifts in media

technologies produce shifts in epistemology, which bring about changes in film theory and philosophical thinking. Whereas Colman's approach shows the interrelationships between changing technologies, which produce shifts in theoretical and philosophical thinking, Daniel Shaw's approach *differentiates* film theory and criticism from philosophy in a way that tries to define each as distinct. He writes, "[w]hat distinguishes *philosophy* of film from the enterprise of film theory, which has a long and distinguished history? What does it mean to talk about a film *philosophically*, as opposed, say, to talking about it psychologically or sociologically?...Are such disciplinary distinctions not merely artificial?"[42] But despite this hesitance, Shaw proposes his first "tentative and commonsensical hypothesis," in which he writes that "philosophising about films is to be distinguished from traditional film theory and criticism by analyzing the terms in which films are being discussed."[43] Accordingly, issues of repression, neuroses or instinctual drives are given to a psychoanalytical approach; when discussing the values of a particular culture or subculture one is applying sociology; when unpacking the semiological "language" of film, one engages in linguistics; and, when one is engaged in a philosophical discussion on nihilism, in considering Kant's good will or in Nietzsche's eternal return, one is doing "philosophy" of film.

While these distinctions appear reasonable on first consideration, a more detailed investigation into film theory and philosophy shows the complex, intertwined and cross-disciplinary nature of film writings: any shot by shot analysis

will show a theoretical as well as a philosophical engagement. Not surprisingly, therefore, Shaw himself writes that in his seminal essay, "A Dialectic Approach to Film Form" (1931), Sergei Eisenstein was doing philosophy "in the best sense of the term," wherein his intellectual montage is grounded in Marxist philosophy.[44] Nonetheless, in his chapter "Philosophical Film Theorists," Shaw sketches out the folding over between film theory and philosophy where, in an attempt to attribute to film the status of an autonomous art form, early film theorists introduce philosophical concepts into their work. Citing Hugo Munsterberg, Eisenstein, Seigfried Kracauer and André Bazin as chief among these theorists, he considers how their works are grounded in traditional aesthetics, drawing upon Kant's formalism, Marx's philosophy, Aristotle's theory of mimesis and Henri Bergson's version of phenomenology, respectively.[45]

In contrast, Colman's "technological epistemologies" takes into account how both film theory and film-philosophy consider form, style, narrative and architecture: both theoretical and philosophical works engage with the technological planes of media landscapes. In considering digital-analog technologies, single-multiple channels, mobile-fixed projection screens (including hand-held devices), DVDs and web-based HDTV, differences in content as well as in the perception of images are generated.[46] Thus while film-philosophy and film theory both consider the technological plane, the former distinguishes itself by its focus on ontology. Changing technologies, moreover, also produce transformations in the forms, styles

31

and narratives of film; these transformations produce alterations in perception and thereby propagate metaphysical shifts in the ontology of film.[47] Changing technologies are therefore inextricably linked to the metaphysical, in which films produced by newer technologies generate their corresponding virtual thoughts and concepts. Transformations in technologies generate shifts in the event of the film itself, producing changes in the epistemology of the event, which creates shifts in thinking. "Event epistemology" may therefore be understood as a shift in thinking, which generates a new system in the ontology of cinema.[48]

While film-philosophy investigates ontology considering, for instance, the sciences of movement, time, space and perception in cinema, presenting what may be the "larger dimensions of representational forms," it nonetheless also allows for a focus on the technical details of the everyday functioning of things and on methods of thinking.[49] However, concepts such as movement or time may be brought to bear in any media work, enabling a theoretical, political or philosophical engagement with it. A philosophical undertaking of film and digital media is different from a political one, the two perspectives being asymmetrical but not oppositional. Additionally, while time and space may be treated aesthetically, politically or on a philosophical plane, it is not merely that the categories themselves come to be treated differentially on the different planes, but that the categories themselves change.[50]

While film theorists consider movement, time, space and perception in cinema, what differentiates film theory from film-philosophy lies only somewhat in the latter's investigation into "the ontology of something," wherein the internal pathways for theoretical or philosophical discussion might become discernable.[51] Complexity arises as theoretical studies utilize screen-based ontologies and philosophical examinations utilize film theory to elucidate a point. A feminist theoretical discussion might enfold aspects of ontology, and vice versa. Even David Bordwell's cognitivist approach, which he defends as being an empiricism that is conceptually free from theoretical structure, presents a presupposition that takes on a philosophical stance.[52] Screen-based ontologies might therefore be theoretical, philosophical or a combination.

What form the screen-based ontology takes depends on the type of *methodological* approach utilized, be it cognitivist, analytical, continental, empirical realist, feminist, formalist, psychoanalytical, phenomenological, postmodern or any other. A psychoanalytical methodology might traditionally be categorized as theoretical, nonetheless, Shaw's first chapter "Philosophical Film Theorists" includes the psychoanalytical approach of Laura Mulvey and Robin Wood.[53] Moreover, a methodological approach might be differentiated further in terms of the specific *categories* of analysis that the writer employs, categories that examine questions of truth, the philosophy of knowledge, skepticism, reality, realism, aesthetics, rhetoric, poetics and others.[54] Perception or ways of seeing necessarily draws from theoretical

study and philosophical thought. Baudry's "Ideological Effects of the Basic

Cinematographic Apparatus" (1970), for instance, analyses the cinematic apparatus

and image construction within a psychoanalytical framework and also in light of

Husserl's idealist philosophy.[55] As John Mullarkey points out, film studies, since the

1960s, has always integrated schools of thought emerging from Freud, Adorno,

Barthes, Althusser, Bourdieu, Lacan, Wittgenstein and others. It has consistently

been an interdisciplinary field, intertwined with versions of linguistics, semiology,

Marxist critical theory, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and others.[56]

From the 1960s onwards, cross-disciplinary analysis flourished in which

structuralist, ideological, linguistic, psychoanalytical, gender, sexuality, postcolonial

and other theoretical perspectives were frequently intertwined with philosophical

questioning. Among these are Roland Barthes's *Image-Music-Text* (1977),

Mythologies (1972) and *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography* (1981).

Barthes's work in cine-semiology and structuralism presents a unique

phenomenology of both textual and somatic excess, reversing the syntagmatic order

of Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception*, in which he writes that the theory

of perception was already the theory of the body.[57] Christian Metz's *Film Language:*

A Semiotics of Cinema (1974) and *Language and Cinema* (1974) are seminal in

formulating the relations between Saussurian linguistics and cinematic language. His

essay, "The Imaginary Signifier" (1975), draws from Freud and Lacan's thought with

respect, for example, to the imaginary signifier in cinema, the pleasure principle in

cinematic experience, identification, the mirror phase, scopic drives and disavowal.[58] Laura Mulvey's ground breaking essay "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" (1975) also references Freud and Lacan's psychoanalytical theory, but for a feminist approach in considering classical Hollywood cinema with respect to subject, subject positioning, the spectator, the gaze, voyeurism and fetishism. Kaja Silverman's essay "Suture" (1983) refers to the metaphor for the relation of the subject to a signifying chain, which she draws from Lacanian thought. She conceives the notion of suture as relations between lack and the inadequacy of the subject's position as opportunities for insertion in cultural discourse.[59] Wood's anthology, *Hollywood from Vietnam to Reagan* (1986), is a Marxo-Freudian ideological synthesis of class, capitalism and culture. His essays, "The Return of the Repressed" (1978) and "The American Nightmare: Horror in the 70s" (1986), analyze sexual politics and draw upon Freudian psychoanalysis, focussing on the instinctual drives of *eros* and *thanatos* to analyze the return of the repressed in horror film.[60] Trihn T. Minh-ha's essay, "Outside In Inside Out" (1989), focuses on knowledge and questions the conceptual frameworks of knowledge-making-acquisition-production, particularly in relation to insiders and outsiders and anthropologist-filmmakers researching African societies.

Since cinema's inception, film theorists have generated philosophically oriented texts. These texts include, most notably, Munsterberg's essay "The Photoplay" (1916); Eisenstein's "A Dialectic Approach to Film Form" (1931);

Rudolf Arnheim's *Film as Art* (1957); Bazin's ontology of cinema in *What is Cinema?* (1954); Kraucauer's *Theory of Film* (1960); and Jean Mitry's *The Aesthetics and Psychology of Cinema* (1963). Likewise, the uptake of film by philosophers themselves began early, with Bergson's writings on cinema in *Creative Evolution* (1907/11), Maurice Merleau-Ponty's "The Film and the New Psychology" in *Sense and Nonsense* (1948/64), and Jean Lyotard's "Acinema" (1991). However, while these philosophers ventured into film, their works have been limited in scope.

More notable and substantive writings on film began in the 1970s with philosophers such as Stanley Cavell and in the 1980s with Noël Carroll and Gilles Deleuze. Cavell's works on film such as *The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film* (1979) and *Cavell on Film* (a collection of essays and interviews, 2005), were influenced by Wittgenstein; Deleuze's two books on cinema, *The Movement-Image* and *The Time-Image* were published in 1983/86 and 1985/89,[61] Carroll's *Philosophical Problems of Classical Film Theory* and *Engaging the Moving Image* were published in 1988 and 2003.[62] More recently, in the last two decades, some noted philosophers's works on film include Slavoj Žižek's *Looking Awry* (1998), *The Fright of Real Tears: Krzystof Kieślowski Between Theory and Post-Theory* (1999) and others; Jacques Rancière's *The Future of the Image* (2003) and *Film Fables* (2006); and Jean-Luc Nancy's *Kiarostami Abbas: The Evidence of Film* (2001) and *The Ground of the Image* (2005).

From these numerous examples it would be possible to say that the movements between the fields of film theory, studies and philosophy have been extensive. In questions related to form, style, medium, reality, ontology, epistemology, perception, aesthetics and others, theoretical studies have been philosophically orientated. In some seminal questions posed in film theory, such as what is cinema, what is the medium, how perception occurs, what is reality and realism, as well as issues of movement, the cut, subject, subject-positioning, the ideological apparatus and so on, philosophical pondering has always been integrated into the thoughts of film texts. Likewise, it is not surprising to note the interest amongst philosophers in writing about film in some of these categories. The boundaries of film theory and philosophy have been porous and flexible, blurring at the edges, at least since Bergson's writings on film in *Creative Evolution* in 1907 and Munsterberg's *The Photoplay* in 1916.

Film and Philosophy: some difficulties in the nature of the field

To the relatively new and emerging fields of "film and philosophy" and "film-philosophy," we can say that the works that have emerged since the early twentieth century are in fact numerous. This flourishing of cross-disciplinary perspectives arising out of theory and philosophy has, in fact, only recently been acknowledged and inaugurated into a new field as film-philosophy. Nonetheless, film-philosophy must be understood as a mutant/bastard/third field and must be differentiated from

the other two. Neither purely film theory nor philosophy, it occurs at the edges of the two fields and holds a foot in both.

While philosophers such as Cavell and Carroll continue to publish newer works,[63] a fresh scholarship emerged in the late 1990s. As might be expected, writings on film-philosophy traverse anything from epistemology to ontology to phenomenology, and from Plato to Kant to Cavell in the newer journals devoted specifically to the field such as *Film and Philosophy* (1994); *Film-Philosophy Journal (1997)*; *Senses of Cinema* (1999); *Deleuze Cinema* (2012) and others. A fair amount of the new scholarship was also influenced by Deleuze's philosophical writings, including his cinema books, as the latter had just been translated into English in 1989. D.N. Rodowick's *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine* (1997) was the forerunner among these works, presenting a comprehensive study of his works to Anglo-American film scholars and to philosophers, in which he attempts to show how cinema is central to the work of contemporary philosophy.[64]

These books and journals spawned another wave of publications and extend, in some cases, to include an analysis of digital media. Some remarkable works are Mark Hansen's *New Philosophies for New Media* (2004) and *Bodies in Code* (2006); Daniel Frampton's *Filmosophy* (2006); Jennifer Barker's *The Tactile Eye: Touch and the Cinematic Experience* (2009); and, John Mullarkey's *Philosophy and the Moving Image: Refractions of Reality* (2009).[65] Very recent studies include the *Journal of Philosophy and the Moving Image* (2010); Robert Sinnerbrink's *New Philosophies of*

Film: Thinking Images; and, Havi Carel and Greg Tuck's anthology, *New Takes in Film-Philosophy* (2011). As is clear from these works, the current field of debate and argument is dense and vigorous.

Carel and Tuck's anthology presents three sections, including a range of approaches to film-philosophy, its limits and readings on three specific filmmakers. Barker's text presents an exploration of phenomenology and embodiment, including the notion that film experiences move beyond merely looking at visual imagery to penetrate and reverberate in the body. Sinnerbrink's volume offers an interesting cross-disciplinary approach among philosophy, film studies and cultural studies as well as readings of particular filmmakers such as David Lynch, Lars von Trier and Terrence Malick. Lastly, Mullarkey's book presents a critical overview of film-philosophy in the twentieth century and takes a turn for a non-philosophy of cinema, in concert with François Larouelle's anti-philosophy. He writes that each of the philosophical takes presented within a film-philosophy framework shows only a singular approach; moreover, since film is an immanent set of processes in hybrid contexts which occur through varied relations, singular frameworks become pretexts for illustrating philosophy.[66] He critiques Deleuze for exemplifying his own philosophy through the examples that he furnishes in his film books. An anti-philosophical approach, on the contrary, would permit us to get away from any definition of film, including of thinking and philosophy, allowing for an openness and "a democracy of thought."[67]

In regarding film as a medium of philosophical debate, there is argument about the validity of whether it is even possible to actually philosophize with film.[68] Thomas Wartenberg discusses four objections, the first being that of generality. General truths, which are characteristic of and essential to philosophy, are not possible in films, because films are specific and particular. Therefore, inasmuch as films are necessarily specific to the narrative, they are unable to communicate general truths. Second, because philosophical texts are necessarily written in explicit form and filmic ones are expressed through visual and narrative form, films cannot offer explicit determinate propositional content, as the visual mode is itself ambiguous. Third is the objection of imposition, wherein a philosopher imposes his/her own philosophical claim upon a film. While one's philosophical interpretation of a film counts as philosophy, overinterpreting the meaning of a film by imposing one's own philosophical ideas upon it is not philosophy. Rather, the task of the philosopher is to present how a certain issue arises in a film. The fourth objection is that of banality in that, even if a film might have philosophical content, it is usually trivial or banal. While art films such as Bergman's *Persona* (1966) or avant-garde films might not fall into this category, a wide range of films would, as they are made for popular appeal.[69]

While Wartenberg offers up these objections for further discussion, even presenting counter arguments to these in the subsection "Modes of the philosophical in film," his overall approach could be understood as an application of philosophical

argument to film. Not surprisingly, such an approach is not effective. This approach

profoundly lacks the ability to understand film as a medium of visual expression that

is deeply sensorial. The direct application of philosophical propositions by explicit

argumentation misunderstands film, and thereby also the endeavour of film-

philosophy. This approach is limited to dialogue, plot, story, narrative and character

motivations because it aims to make philosophical claims, illustrate philosophical

theories, or develop social criticism. While he presents a cursory understanding of

the importance of the visual form in structuralist filmmaking in "Film as self-

definitial," this segment is minimal and unsatisfactory. Ignoring cinematics,

explanations such as Wartenberg's are fixed on the established criteria and subject

matter of academic philosophy, in which a film's importance is achieved by its

ability to illustrate a given philosophical claim.

In such an approach, film is used as a pedagogical tool and film-philosophy

becomes an endeavour in illustrative methodology in which philosophical concepts

are applied to the study of film.[70] This approach also presupposes an answer to the

prior question of whether a film is a viable medium for presenting philosophical

ideas,[71] and draws a parallel between a particular philosophy and a particular film,

which may or may not be intentional. It presumes whether a film is applicable or

appropriate to a given philosophical study and thereby limits its potential to a

particular philosophical engagement. Such a perspective is also manifest in Shaw's

Film and Philosophy, in which he writes that films, which parallel major

philosophies, intentionally or not, are themselves philosophical. In his approach, one

does *philosophy* of film, for instance, when one writes about nihilism and the

meaning of life in Bergman's *Nattvardsgasterna* (*Winter Light*, 1962), or Nietzsche's

Eternal Return in *Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind* (2004), or Kant's goodwill

in *Hotel Rwanda* (2004).[72] In his view, films are remarkable on the basis of their

philosophical import: certain films are important in that they present a particular

philosophical problem, and thus particular films merit study in their capacity to

"flesh out" a philosophical problem. Film itself becomes secondary, serving as a tool

in the study of philosophy. Moreover, this approach differentiates films from each

other on the basis of their ability to reveal (or not) a given philosophical aspect.

Film is a thinking machine: towards a philosophical claim

Another strain of scholarship brings film itself to the fore, rather than play handmaid

to philosophy. This strain of thinking is the becoming philosophical of film, which is

the approach that I take. In the becoming philosophical of film, Mullarkey writes

that film genuinely needs to be able to think, rather than merely illustrate a theory or

a philosophical thought. Being a hybrid medium, it includes different types of

technologies and incorporates many art forms. Its study therefore resists any singular

reductive theorization applied to its processual being that would suppress its "élan

cinematique."[73] Thus, just as a film has come under the influence of different types

of theorization -- semiotic, ideological or psychoanalytic – any such theorization has

ultimately been a totalizing one, insufficient for considering film's multi-componential qualities. Film's multilayered, contextual and processual nature cannot be reduced to a mere illustration of a thought. Rather, it has to be understood as a relational process, enfolding a multiplicity within it. The raw data, apparatus, materiality, textuality; the visual, cognitive and sensorial fields; the ontological worldview and theories related to these different dimensions, make for a stratified or layered approach. This multiplicity within film allows the film to think without the imposition of thought from the outside. That is, film is able to think itself beyond the theoretical positions ascribed to it, which come to define and fix it. In resisting any particular theorization, film becomes a heterogeneous region that holds together many possible universes;[74] in this quality, it is a feral zone, resisting theoretical/philosophical capture. This recalcitrance to our thought, Mullarkey writes, "may well be *its* form of thought too."[75] As it is resistant to capture, we in turn come to think through its multifaceted complexities that go beyond our own thoughts. In thinking through these complexities, something is cogendered between film and ourselves.[76]

Frampton in *Filmosophy* (2006) writes that the early writers on film claimed it to be "thought-like."[77] He writes that by linking film to thinking, Dulac, Bergson and Quesnoy considered film to be a visualization of memory. In 1924, Dulac wrote that cinema was equipped to manifest our psychological and emotional life, in its ability to express dreams and emotion, and Quesnoy, in 1928, considered how

cinema can "feel" time and memory, similar to Proust's novels. Bergson's link between cinema and memory considered whether the former was a model for consciousness, writing, "[i]t might be able to assist in the synthesis of memory, or even of the thinking process."[78]

Considering writings from the early part of the twentieth century, Frampton's research traces how film has been linked to the imagination, the artist's soul, subjectivity, thinking and to forms of consciousness. For instance, he writes that Vuillermoz and Canudo linked film to be similar in form to our subconscious. Vuillermoz, in 1917, considered how each frame acted as a cell in the human brain and compared the camera to perception and editing to the imagination. Canudo, in 1923, considered how cinema had the particular facility of "expressing the soul of the artist" and the "striking faculty of representing immateriality," linking cinema to the subconscious.[79] Frampton writes that along this string of ideas, linking film to thinking, a later scholarship emerged. In 1978, Kawin's notion of "mindscreen narration" considered how a character's mental images, including their thoughts, intentions and emotions presented the subjective world of a character -- his/her mindscreen -- which is the "field of the mind's eye."[80] Wicclair, in 1978 and Carroll in 1988 in their own discussions on phenomenology and film-mind, come to take up Munsterberg's early theories on film's subjective-objective relations.[81]

Important to outline in all these micro-approaches to film is that film induces the spectator to think philosophically and becomes a catalyst for thinking. This

approach is different from applied pedagogy, in which a film is philosophical on the basis of its ability to demonstrate pre-established philosophical claims. Rather than film being handmaid to the tradition of written philosophical texts, in this approach, film images produce an encounter with the subject in which visual and aural images, among other components, generate thinking. Film is the thinking-machine, which generates the philosophical concepts, in the form of visual-sonic images.

Recent developments: Deleuze, duration and the ontology of the moving image

Besides the cognitivist approach set in motion by David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson in the 1980s, recent currents in cinema analysis frequently utilize socio-political approaches. Psychoanalysis, Marxism, Frankfurt School cultural theory, semiotics, gender-sexuality and post-colonial frameworks heavily influence the terms of discussion and analysis of cinema. In coming to consider the importance of duration in cinema, however, Deleuze's two books on cinema and time, *The Movement-Image* and *The Time-Image*, become important. In these books there is a privileged relation between image and thought, in which the image is understood as a continual and fluid movement in time. Taking up Peirce's semiotics, Deleuze argues that cinematic images are neither static nor closed and make up a set of changing relations as they unfold in time. In their movement, they produce signals or signalectic material out of the "plastic mass" that makes them up. The image's plasticity modulates the image in all sorts of ways, including, "sensory, kinetic,

intensive, affective, rhythmic, tonal and verbal (oral and written)," which means that

the meanings produced are not merely arrived at through linguistic means.[82] This

plastic mass is "a-syntaxic and a-signifying" and in its modulations produces a

multitude of different relations, moving beyond the merely linguistic. Deleuze's

cinema books therefore move away from Metz's semiology, which was the

dominant theory in cinema, derived from Saussure's linguistics.[83]

To this moving set of logical relations, Deleuze introduces Bergson's

duration, in which images endure through time. Both cinema books are connected

together by the arc of time. In movement-images, the image of time is indirect and

movement is the primary force. Images follow the sensory-motor regime, in which

the interval between two shots produces the continuous relations among them. Shots

move seamlessly from the perception-image to the action-image, the physical

movement of images producing continuity in the movements of thought. In this

system, time is subordinate to the needs of narrative logic. Movement-images are

therefore the indirect image of time.

In time-images, on the other hand, the direct experience of the event is

produced, in which the narrative is subordinate to time. Each image is a fragment of

time encountered outside of narrative logic. Shots are fragments of time linked

together in a chain, producing disjointedness in their spatio-temporal relations. In

this disjointedness, time itself becomes a force that produces thinking. Encountering

disjointed shots in a chain of images, forces us to think.[84] Thus movement is no

longer the physical movement of images, but the form of change through time. In the encounter of one image to another, thought in relation to time is always changing. The time-image is therefore this relationship between thought and the form of time.[85]

Within a Deleuzian approach, cinema comes to be explored more in terms of the ontology of the image and its sensorial matter, through engagements in sound and image, perception and memory, on the relations of the movement of images, on the indirect and direct relations of time, philosophical and aesthetic matter, which had heretofore been less explored.[86] In *Deleuze, Altered States and Film* (2007) Anna Powell writes that affects impact not only the senses but also the brain, becoming the generator of thoughts and memories.[87] Frampton, similarly, pursues the notion of affects in his conceptualization of "film-mind," in which film presents its own organic condition for thinking, writing that, "the filmind is 'the film itself.'"[88]

Deleuze's metaphysical sense of what a film can do through sensorial and psychological experiences has shifted analysis further into connections with neurological and biological systems, and also toward the empirical, toward observations and encounters that emerge from the film experience itself. This approach moves away from analyzing narrative details and from carrying out cultural-ideological analysis emergent in narrative form, plot and industrial production; instead, it emphasizes such things as affect, the physical impact of the film on the neuro-sensory system, which presents the power to think.[89]

Within the last decade, there has been a rise in scholarship among the different philosophical approaches, including Deleuze's. One of the earliest introductions on Deleuze's cinema books to an Anglo-American film scholarship was Rodowick's *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*. In his extensive study on the ontology of the moving image and duration, Rodowick interjects great depth into some of the major trajectories of Deleuze's conceptualization of movement and the time image, including his three commentaries on Bergson's ontology of the image, together with movement, memory and time. This volume brought a great deal of interest to Deleuze's philosophical corpus and to the ontology of cinema, in turn spawning a series of new works on film-media scholarship, philosophy and Deleuze.

Most recently, Timothy Murray[90] and Rodowick[91] work specifically with Deleuze and include digital works, examining the fold in relation to film and digital media (Murray) and duration and time more intensely (Rodowick). Ian Buchanan and Patricia MacCormack reject the segmentation of Deleuze into cinema and the rest of his philosophy and consider instead how his works might be taken up as a whole. In their anthology they explore the possibility for synthesizing Deleuze and Guattari's books on schizophrenia into a new way of thinking about cinema.[92] Elena Del Rio focuses on Deleuze and Spinoza's affective and kinetic movement of images, in which images have the capacity to affect and to be affected by others. Cinematic images make up the cinematic body, she writes, which is performative.[93] Her book unfolds the speeds and gestures of the performing cinematic body,

examining affect and performance in what she refers to as "affective-performative." These and numerous other publications present an idea of the varied directions taken in the field of film-philosophy over the last decade.

Situating my own work within the field, I focus on duration and the ontology of the image. In taking up the visual, sensorial qualities of sound and moving images flowing in time, by way of the interstice or the fold, I speculate on how images might themselves come to philosophize. Images, rather than merely illustrating or representing given philosophical concepts, actually think for themselves. In other words, as Mullarkey writes, "we would have to learn more about how film concretizes philosophy, about how thought can be visual."[94] By consenting to the aesthetics of the image, a philosophical exchange can occur conveying the details of the medium. In considering images that have a capacity for philosophizing, I move away from anthropocentric and phenomenological observations, towards a non-human "flat ontology." Images in this approach are not representational of human subjectivity, but rather are to be considered as having their own agency, their own subjectivity; they are "real" things in and of themselves and have a first order of reality. As I will try to show in subsequent chapters, images are not a representation of something: images are something. A flat ontology levels out hierarchy in which a dog, tree, mushroom or grain of sand has subjectivity or agency.[95] A flat ontology within the context of media would attribute agency and subjectivity to images, undoing the ontological privileging of human beings. It is necessary to first consider

49

that cinematic or moving images have their own agency and present their affect on us directly.[96] Moving images carry an agency that bears upon the viewing subject sensorially and emotionally, and in doing so, they induce thinking. Thinking and knowledge are produced in this experience with images, an experience that is as valid as any rational thought.[97]

In this dissertation, the language and texts of academic philosophy will be excluded as we move towards the ontology of the image itself. Deleuze's *Movement-Image* and *Time-Image* dispute the over-wrought applications of philosophical concepts to film, proposing that film is "a plastic mass, an a-signifying and a-syntactic matter, a non-linguistically formed matter, though a matter that is not amorphous but semiotically, aesthetically and pragmatically formed."[98] This plastic mass is "a signaletic matter that bears the characteristics of modulations of all sorts of sensorial (visual and sonic), kinetic, intensive, affective, rhythmic, tonal and even verbal (oral and written) [matter]."[99] This plastic mass, the "stuff of which films are made," is encountered in the automatic movement of cinema, cinema's spiritual automaton that presents sensations.[100] Sensations unfold into the movements of thought and this circuit between images and thinking is where Gregory Flaxman writes that we "extract ourselves from chaos."[101] The approach that this dissertation takes is towards this condition that film and digital media present, of the encounter with thought from the outside, an encounter that produces sensations and also the movements of thinking. If images have traditionally been understood as a secondary

order, as representations that are one order removed from the real, this relation becomes reversed here. Such a reversal simultaneously undoes the hierarchy associated with anthropocentric observation. As first order of reality, analog/digital images present their own agency, their own conditions of thinking in human subjects who are continually in processes of becoming, creating and thinking with them.[102]

How images directly affect us by producing sensations and emotions is an important dimension of my work. The engagement with images brings us into a relation with the reality of images, in which the nature of the aesthetic experience brings a cognitive or epistemological import.[103] The images of film and digital media bring sensations to the body, allowing for the movements of thought to occur. Moreover, the hybrid, multi-componential makeup of media works do not allow for their subordination to a singular theorization that would fix and unify their meanings. As heterogeneous zones, they are resistant to theoretical capture and their complexities, on the contrary, takes the spectator beyond their own thinking. Images are to be understood as a visual form of thinking.

Understood as a form of thinking, images bring together the terrains of film studies, theory and philosophy, in what is now the field of film-philosophy. Drawing from these terrains, my work in film-philosophy straddles disciplinary boundaries, making it something of an in-between. In the chapters that follow, my work moves among analog and digital images, cinema, installations, duration, perception, memory, actual-virtual relations and the ontology of the image. Forming rhizomatic

connections outside of a textual interiority, without genesis, filiation or lineage amongst these components, I hope to perform shifts in how we might come to think media images.[104]

Major areas of inquiry

Having presented the backdrop of my undertaking in film-philosophy, I will now lay the theoretical ground of duration. In order to conceive newer relations in the durational flows of analog and digital media, my specific questions in this dissertation will focus on the processes of the interstice and the fold. In this section, I will introduce their conceptual and material operations, their asymmetry and correspondences, how they operate in analog and digital media, and how each might produce a different image of time.

Whereas duration in the time-images of cinema has been examined elsewhere and the interstice has been analyzed in recent works,[105] their specificity in the examination of an entire film or a digital installation has not.[106] Likewise, even as the ontology of the fold in philosophical texts has been taken up,[107] its operation in media studies remains to be examined beyond the few works noted here. The workings of the interstice will be examined in chapter two, in Claire Denis's film *L'Intrus* (2004) and then reexamined in the next chapter in Susan Collins's digital installations, *Fenlandia, Glenlandia* and *The Spectroscope* (2004-7). In chapter four I take up the fold in Andrei Tarkovsky's film *Mirror* (1975) and then reexamine the

concept in chapter five, in which I take up the folds of perception in various media works such as Granular Synthesis's *Modell 5* (1997) and *POL* (1998); Survival Research Laboratory's noise performance (Barcelona Art Futura Exhibition, 1991), and Toni Dove's *Spectropia* (2008), among others.

The interstice and duration in analog cinema and digital installations

I will present a brief understanding of the interstice before I introduce the five questions concerning how it relates to duration in analog cinema and digital installations.[108] These questions are on how duration unfolds in the workings of the interstice, the image of time produced, the return of the same/difference, the nature of the whole, qualitative and quantitative multiplicity, and the visible-invisible.

The interstice, first conceived by Deleuze in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, is the fracture produced when two shots are spliced together in a sequence. In time-images, because each shot is a different fragment of time, the connection between them is irrational. The movement between shots jars the spectator, generating a shock to thought. What occurs is that the shots spliced together in this system are spatio-temporally discontinuous with each other, making them unrelated. Rather than follow the continuity of movement, shots are spliced together without narrative logic or continuity. Every shot/image in the film is a fragment, an image of time, which presents its own thought. Linked together in a disjointed chain, the spectator encounters each image from what is an *outside* of narrative continuity and logic.[109]

Time-images move away from the mereological relation of movement-images, in that there is no longer the hermeneutic whole of montage systems, but an open outside from which thought comes to be encountered.[110]

Two spatio-temporally disconnected shots/images joined together produces an "in-between." This in-between, Deleuze writes, is the interstice, in which the virtual movements of thought occur. However, even as the interstice's presence comes to signal a place, Conley suggests that its infraliminary nature cannot be presented with the stability of a place.[111] Nonetheless, it is a conceptual and material disjunction in which a multiplicity of virtual movements comes to be generated. The interstice, generated by two discontinuous images linked together, is the focus of my examination in chapters two and three.

While the interstice's operations have been explored in subsequent cinema studies, its analysis in digital technologies is sparse. I have extended Deleuze's interstice of the time-images in cinema to also consider duration in digital installations. In cinema, interstices generate temporal interruptions and random movements of time, which bounce between pasts and futures. However, in the live digital transmission systems of Collins's installations, there are few random movements of time, pointing to the diminished presence of the interstice. In uninterrupted digital transmission systems, their decreased appearance yields a continuous time that presents another type of temporality. A reduction in interruptions opens up the question to what type of temporality comes to be

experienced in the continuous transmission systems of contemporary digital art. As interruptions put thought into contact with the outside, I inquire into the relation between the movements of thought and continuous duration.[112] I ask what the movements of time experienced are in particular transmission systems, and what the potential is for such time for the movements of thought to occur. In such a context I inquire into the role and potential of the disruptive forces of the interstice, first in analog cinema and then in the live digital transmissions systems that endure over the length of a year.

Type of duration and the image of time
The first area will address how duration unfolds in media works by inquiring into the type of duration experienced in both analog cinema and digital technologies (specifically, single-channel, automechanized, digital installations).[113] This part inquires into whether the type of duration produced in the two technologies is ruptured or continuous. This issue is essential given the characteristics of the two media and the conceptual-material forms that they generate. While film typically utilizes the celluloid filmstrip, the projector and the (inert) screen, digital installations utilize pixels in real time transmission systems and the interactive electronic screen. Automechanized, digital installations are instantaneous, continuous and simultaneous in their materiality and functionality, and analog cinema presents pasts and futures, is discontinuous and is serial.

55

In a film or digital installation, depending on whether time unfolds continuously or discontinuously, each will generate a different image of time. This area is important for understanding real duration which, as Bergson wrote, produces a change *in kind* rather than a difference *in degree*. In other words, in a continuous, singular, uninterrupted temporality the same type of duration is experienced throughout. In such a continuous temporality, there will be minor differences in the degrees of temporality but no *real changes* in the kinds of duration experienced. For instance, in mainstream commercial films, continuity in time is a given. This continuity in time is usually the continuous present of the film. While flashbacks and dream sequences are used, these plot devices are used to propel the continuous progression of the narrative's present.[114] Thus, this type of filmmaking (the movement-image) produces a continuous, singular temporality, with differences in degree of the duration experienced.

Another type of duration experienced in film is the discontinuous one. A discontinuous duration proceeds by generating variations in the movements of time. These are Deleuze's time-images in which time moves back and forth between pasts and futures, but not as flashbacks or dreams. In time-images, shots are fragments of pasts and futures that pivot just as in a crystal. The movement between different pasts and futures produces a heterogeneous time, which unhinges any continuity in duration. Such duration has the capacity for producing changes in kind, in the *types*

of duration experienced. The capacity for a media work to produce heterogeneous relations in time that move between pasts and futures, produces real duration.

Whereas repeated pronouncements assert that digital and analog technologies produce the same type of duration and the same type of image, in this dissertation I wish to consider whether they actually do. I will consider how analog and digital technologies actually work in order to understand the duration produced and the makeup of an image. Inquiring into their material, formal and conceptual basis, I will probe how images are produced and how duration endures in particular works. Only upon examining the basic elements of the technologies used can we develop an understanding of the duration experienced and the type of images produced. Analog and digital technologies give rise to two types of mediums and can present a variation in the workings of the interstice. I distinguish celluloid-analog film from digital-computerized technology for their visual, affective, technical and formal differences. This stance departs from the understanding that digital technologies produce images that look similar to analog ones and are therefore the same.[115]

The return: same or difference?

If interstices produce temporal discontinuities in analog cinema, then a question arises concerning the issue of the succeeding shot, what Nietzsche, in a historical context, called the "eternal return."[116] Important to the return is the nature of what returns: does the return bring about the same duration that preceded it, or does it

bring difference? With respect to Denis's *L'Intrus*, I inquire into the nature of the shots linked together in the interstice: what is the nature of the returning shot, of the image that follows? Repeating this question in the next chapter, I inquire into how the interstice operates in digital installations such as *Glenlandia* or *Fenlandia*, where the pixels move laterally along a digital screen. Such a movement produces fissures, rather than temporal disjunctures, and being minor, they are imperceptible to the eye. Thus I consider the temporal unfolding of these works and the type of return that they bring. Do the pixels and frames in the digital installations bring about sameness or difference in their repetitions? Does the type of return that occurs produce the movements of thought? How durational works facilitate the movements of thought and thinking becomes an important current in my dissertation. That is, I question whether the return brings thought into an encounter with the same, or if it presents the possibility for a movement into a beyond outside, into what is as yet the unthought in thought.

The whole

An inquiry into duration requires an understanding into the nature of the whole. The question of the whole in relation to the open outside becomes important in durational works, such as Collins's, which extend over a year. Yet, what does such an extended duration express in relation to *L'Intrus*, a film that is just over two hours long? This difference needs to be examined especially in light of Bergson's assertion that real

58

duration is that which changes continually and of Rodowick's position that a qualitative duration occurs in the camera's movement *through* space. Both these limits make Collins's installations questionable as works expressing true duration, as the installations produce a single continuous temporality and the cameras are immobile and do not move through space. Intuitively it might appear that the expansive period of the installations in and of itself constitutes qualitative duration; however, this proposition needs examination.

Qualitative and quantitative multiplicities

In movement-images, the spatio-temporal continuity among shots occurs by virtue of the plot and narrative. The different parts of the narrative are necessarily composed *in relation* to *the whole* film. This is a mereological relation in which the different parts make up the whole. The whole is therefore constituted by the "inside" relations of the specific narrative and the different parts of the narrative make up the whole of the work.[117]

The parts in movement-images change other parts of the narrative according to the logic of that narrative. For instance, perception of something produces a reaction/action in the character. The parts (the perception-image and the reaction/action-image) therefore, affect each other, changing the whole. In this sense the parts are not quantifiable as they *qualitatively* change the whole.[118] *Nonetheless*, because the sequence of shots in movement-images is spatio-temporally continuous

with each other, the returning shot produces the same spatio-temporality as the preceding one (of the present). In this return of the same, movement-images produce a singular time rather than the interpenetration of different times.[119] The relation of the part to the whole therefore becomes a difference of degree (the differences among various parts constituting the whole) rather than a difference in kind.

In time-images, on the other hand, there is no narrative continuity. Time-images are different fragments of time linked to each other in a chain and are spatio-temporally discontinuous with each other. In this discontinuity, time-images do not have a mereological relation found in movement-images in which the parts make up the whole. In fact, there is no whole to speak of because what is the whole is constituted by the infinite outside (rather than the interiority of a specific narrative), which is indivisible into parts.[120]

In film, when discontinuous shots are linked together in a chain, a heterogeneous movement of time is produced. Each shot is a different fragment of time that plunges the work into a different temporal dimension in which the work flows erratically between different pasts and futures. These varying movements of time produce a confused multiplicity, in that the different times penetrate and fuse into each other, producing what Bergson called a "qualitative multiplicity." A qualitative multiplicity is non-numerical and implies temporal differences rather than spatial differences.[121]

A quantitative multiplicity, on the other hand, is given to numerical or spatial changes. It implies an actual or material change in the numerical constitution of the object and presupposes a numerical multiplicity that is in opposition to the singular or the one: the one-many. Differing from a qualitative multiplicity, which is an "internal multiplicity of succession, of fusion of different times," a quantitative multiplicity would divide and make distinct each different time, producing a multiplicity of exteriority, or the spatialization of time.[122] Thus the former is non-actual, purely internal and without exteriority and produces connections to the virtual. Quantitative multiplicities, being actual, exteriorized and an order, have limited connections to the virtual. Whereas a qualitative multiplicity produces differences in kind, a quantitative multiplicity produces minor differences in the degree of the duration experienced and therefore does not produce real duration. Thus I inquire into whether the analog and digital works examined produce qualitative/quantitative multiplicities and what the images of time are. I examine what type of multiplicity is produced in L'Intrus and in the digital installations.

The actual-virtual circuit, the visible/invisible and the movements of thought
While most studies in analog cinema or digital media present the significance, meaning and importance of the content of artworks, this study will consider the potential of the technologies themselves for the production of thought. Continuous or discontinuous duration is important to the production of thought because of their

relation to the virtual. A temporal continuity presents a singular, continuous time, whereas a temporal discontinuity necessarily shifts among many different times. These shifts produce virtual connections in time between pasts and futures, presenting the potential for the movements of thought to occur. Durational continuities, having fewer movements, produce a homogeneous time. They produce fewer connections to the virtual and therefore they have less potential for the movements of thought to occur. As noted earlier, virtual relations between shots produce the movements of thought. This area inquires into the capacity of analog and digital technologies for their connections to the virtual, which is crucial in producing the movements of thought.

The interstice, crucial in observing the type of duration in images, is also important for understanding the nature of the actual-virtual circuit. The actual is that which is observable, the virtual is the invisible potential. In *Bergsonism* (1988), Deleuze writes that the virtual is the potentiality that is on course to becoming actualized.[123] It is an ungiven potential in relation to the actual. As a consequence, if everything is already given, if an actual image (of the whole) is readily visible, as in the digital installations, what occurs with respect to their (installations') virtual potential? And, conversely, as in *L'Intrus*, when only fragments of time are presented, visibility is reduced. What relations emerge in the connections between the actual and the virtual? I inquire into the implications of this question of the

visible/invisible in relation to virtual multiplicity and connect the virtual multiplicity of media works to their potential for inducing the movements of thought.

This relation of the virtual for producing thought becomes a pressing concern not only in light of digital media's ubiquity, but also for the blurring relation of digital art to information technologies. If artworks now mimic the working of informational systems by tracking, mapping and archiving information flows, they also come to mimic the informational present of data flows, possibly losing their connection to virtual pasts and of futures to come. Bernard Steigler has suggested the connection of digital art to information flows and data processing systems, which come to align it with worlds of informatics and mathematics. This connection raises the question of generating artworlds that are calculable, predictable and determinable, differing remarkably from previous worlds of art in their relation to the open and the unforeseen, as possibilities.[124] A comprehension of the virtual connections generated in the two technologies will point to their potential for producing the movements of thought.

The fold: how the sensate gives rise to thought/consciousness
Finally, the last area for examination and inquiry is how the sensate gives rise to thought or to consciousness in the media works examined. In order to do so I consider Deleuze's *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (1993) with respect to the folding of perception, memory and matter to present the fluidity in the encounter

with media works. Media works, as they endure in time, present variations in sensation. Tiny sensations give rise to indistinct perception, whereas stronger sensations give rise to clearer perception. Perceptions, therefore, give rise to thoughts: indistinct perception gives rise to obscure thought and distinct perception to clear thought.[125] As we are continually sensing the world around us, sensations give rise to thought, which continually move between obscurity and clarity. In light of this sensing function, the folding of perception with the temporal media object shows tenuousness, fluidity and uncertainty in how media events come to emerge. This is different than understanding a work as a clearly defined plane that is immediately understandable and fixed in time, and as one that transmits definable, knowable meanings. In the encounter with a media event, perception unfolds and folds between clarity and obscurity, producing thresholds of thought and meaning.

While Deleuze's *The Fold* does not consider cinema or media, its appeal to the history and theory of art allows for conceptual and formal workings in film and digital media.[126] By considering micro folds in chapter four and macro folds in chapter five, I generate an extensive relationship between the two chapters. Through these chapters I construct a conceptual analysis that successively presents three types of topological views or perspectives of the fold: micro, mezzo and macro.

Starting with a micro perspective in chapter four, the genetic elements of the image – light, sound, movement and matter -- are taken up to consider the modulation of the image in time. This perspective lengthens to include a mezzo

point of view, in which the micro fields enlarge to become the auricular, literary and painterly fields in *Mirror*. The topological point of view lengthens further in chapter five to include macro folds, where I examine how the movements of folding occur among various media events such as the noise performance by Survival Research Laboratory, Granular Synthesis's *POL* and *Modell 5* and Toni Dove's interactive cinema performance *Spectropia*. Chapter five delves into how perception of actual events and the virtual memory of past events/performances fold into each other, bringing about what we experience as the "newness" and complexity of the present moment.

In both chapters I consider how the lived time of media objects comes to be experienced by examining the quadripartite relations among sensation, perception, duration and the ontology of the image. It is in these relations among the perception of an image and the sensations that it produces giving rise to thinking that time comes to be endured. The area upon which this inquiry is based, therefore, parallels the one in the interstice, in that both scrutinize the capacity for producing thought; however, the two operate at different levels. In the interstice, the capacity of the work's structure (movements of pasts and futures) to connect to the virtual is emphasized so that the movements of thought occur. In the fold, how sensations give rise to thought are examined. The former operates at the level of structure, the latter at the level of perception.

In perceiving the world Deleuze writes that perception continually modulates between distinct sensations and obscure ones.[127] Such a relation of sensations to the production of thinking presents gradations and transparencies in the thoughts produced. I inquire into the relation between these thresholds of thought to the virtual. Do virtual relations increase or decrease in the production of clear perceptions? That is, what is the relation of obscure or clear perceptions to the virtual in media art? If virtual multiplicity amplifies the connections to the unknown, to the indeterminate and to the open, then what might clear perceptions bring to worlds of art? If links are oriented towards actual relations where everything is a given, rather than oriented towards the virtual, where might such works take us with respect to the movements of thought? In the works that I examine, I consider how sensations produce thresholds of thought that move between obscurity and clarity, continually making and unmaking the world.

In Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's aesthetics, upon which Deleuze's *The Fold* is conceived, the immediately clear and stable grid of intelligible information, given to the flat plane of Euclidean geometry, changes. His aesthetics are conceived on a curvilinear, hyperbolic plane and are the aesthetics of curvature. On a curvilinear plane, perception, memory and matter, which make up an event, fold into and out of each other and tend to inflect the other. Such an inflection resists any discrete or stable identification of an event. Like the baroque chiaroscuro, a figure of the curved line in which there is a dramatic play between darkness and light allowing for

gradients of visibility and invisibility in figurative paintings, the folds of perception

present degrees of transparency between visibility and invisibility in the temporal

object.[128] The folds of perception lead to an understanding of how movements

between light and shadow, or visibility and invisibility, produce clarity and obscurity

in perception. Perceptual clarity and obscurity are brought about through shifts in the

expression of the temporal object. Shifts in expression generate their relation in the

sensations experienced, bringing about variations in thought.

In my examination of films and media works in chapters four and five, the

oscillation between clarity and obscurity in perception, which presents the condition

for continual variation in thought, is pursued. Chapter four examines how this

perceptual movement might occur in the micro foldings among sound, light,

movement and matter in time. I inquire into the nature of perception and the

movements of thought produced in Tarkovsky's *Mirror*. I conclude this inquiry in

chapter five by mapping how matter, perception and memory fold into each other in

the experience of media events.

Incipient to the folds of matter is perception. Matter and perception are

inextricably connected to each other in that perception occurs in the folds of matter,

in which micro folds bring about micro perceptions and macro folds, macro

perceptions. I inquire into the perception of matter such as art events, in which

inklings and micro sensations arise in perception. I consider how micro sensations

develop into a "shapelikeness"[129] from which the possibility of knowing in the world

occurs. Because art works produce sensations,[130] I will probe how the sensations

experienced can come to make up the folds of consciousness. The major question in

chapters four and five is, therefore: how might the sensate unfold into conceptual

thought? The implications of the sensate for producing thought are consequential not

only to the fine arts, but also to the sciences as expressions of an image become

thought-full and also produce the movements of thought itself.[131] The folds of

perception, which enact the various possibilities for contouring expression on a

curvilinear surface inflect and refract a multitude of expressions to yield an infinity

of thoughts.

A multiplicity: difference in the workings of the interstice and the fold

The workings of the interstice and the fold present their differences from each other,

in that they are remarkably dissimilar and sometimes paradoxical to each other in

their performances. In these differences they are to be understood as two processes

that resist any unitary theoretical and philosophical conceptualizations; however,

their performances might resonate and overlap. In their difference they are to be

understood as two systems that are part of a multiplicity by which duration in film

and digital media comes into examination. As Mullarkey, Rancière, Martin and

others have pointed out, there is no singular theory or mechanism of cinema/media

that can unify or exhaust all its problems.[132] Thus, while I have utilized the interstice

and the fold to examine duration in media, it must be emphasized that each process

presents its particular logic and sense to the examination of media that might

complement, contradict or negate the other understanding. The same matter

examined through another system will probably bear different results.

For instance, in time-images, the interstice generates gaps and fissures

producing aporias and discontinuities in knowledge and duration. The constant

disruption of the image encountered from the outside produces a shock to the neuro-

sensory system and allows for the movements of thought to occur. The fold, on the

other hand, produces a continual line of duration sustaining, seemingly, what would

be a temporal continuity flowing from the perception of micro matter to varying

states of consciousness.

In this temporal continuity of the fold, perception moves constantly between

clarity and obscurity. Objects become fluid, mobile and flexible in time and show

levels of transparency and permeability. Gradients, transparencies and permeability

produce layers of sensation and thresholds of thought, generating the movements of

thinking that range from being diffused, inflected and clear. From a different

viewpoint, in the time-image, the interstice produces the segmenting of

visibility/invisibility. Revealing and concealing, breaking or fracturing vision and

time, the interstice can plunge thought to the invisible depths to later reemerge as a

new one. The interstice's presence insists on breakage in duration and increases the

image's relation to the virtual. Its absence in the digital installations, however,

shows a reduced relation to the virtual and conversely, presents a durational and

visual continuity. Without the presence of the interstice, duration in media ensues

without the temporal interruption of pasts and futures. Proceeding without temporal

or visual breakage, the whole of time becomes visible and spatialized in the digital

installations.

However, this *actual whole* is to be differentiated from the *virtual whole*.[133]

In the digital installations, what we see is the actual single continuous whole of the

work. In the time-images, each shot is a fragment of the virtual whole of Time,

linked together in a chain. *Time* is the *virtual whole* in time-images, and this virtual

whole can never be given, as it extends towards infinity and encompasses the totality

of the universe, including all material and virtual elements. In time-images, shots

arise from this Open outside (rather than from the needs of the narrative), each shot

being a fragment of the virtual whole of Time. Fragments of time linked together in

a chain present the fragmentation of time and space. In the installations, on the other

hand, *space* becomes the *actual continuous whole*. In the latter, which presents the

actual whole, fragmentation in time does not ensue, and the entirety of the

object/work becomes perceivable.

Yet, this continuity of the actual, perceivable whole of the digital

installations is different from what appears in the durational continuity of the folds

of perception. The continuous line of duration makes up greater and smaller wholes,

but these increasing or decreasing wholes are themselves only partial wholes; they

extend in each direction towards the virtual infinitesimal and the infinite, which are

not given.[134] Whereas in the digital works discussed, the continuity of the whole is spatialized and therefore fully perceivable, the continuity of duration in the fold depends on the topological view on a curvilinear plane, or on the size of the perspectival field.

Through this type of examination, I will inquire into the workings of the interstice and the fold, as two different figures by which duration in media are contemplated. The interstice operates as a physical, material fissure, and the fold arises from the ontological ground of philosophy; in this respect they are unequal, asymmetrical and incommensurate. Despite this asymmetry, however, their movements sometimes resonate with the other, giving rise to certain conditions such as those of invisibility/visibility and to the relations of the real-imaginary, interiority-exteriority, and subject-object. However, while certain relations resonate, different processes express differing ways by which duration, the whole, or the virtual come to be distributed. In their resonances and differences, the way that they function in media sometimes parallels the other and at other times elides or traverses the other. In their varying speeds and geometries, they present variations in how the spectator comes into an encounter with the image's asignifying mass, each process presenting a different image of thought. The sensate arrives by the different process in each system, and the movements of thought produced occur, thereby, through varying rhythms and tonalities.

Works in the field and lines of flight

Whereas this dissertation draws upon the work of Deleuze, Bergson, Deleuzians and media scholars, the direction and assemblages created present my own preoccupations with duration and media. While the areas of scholarship considered in this dissertation have been considered in philosophy and media studies, how they have come to be combined in this dissertation is largely of my own experimental design. I have intertwined Deleuze's insights on the interstice, the fold, memory and perception with contemporary issues in media studies.

In considering the interstice and fold through difference and repetition in time, time becomes the method by which the two concepts come to be examined. The interstice is examined first in analog film and then in digital installations. In repeating the inquiry on the interstice material, conceptual and formal differences in analog and digital media emerge. The digital image returns as difference to the analog by way of its limited relations to the virtual, its homogeneous temporality, its continuity and to its spatialization of time. In repeating my inquiry on the fold, macro folds return as difference to micro folds, in which what changes are the perspectival fields. Tiny sensations distend into the larger fold of consciousness, in which the sensate become the condition for conceptual thinking. The processes of perception brought to bear through the folding remain the thing in examination. In repeating my inquiry into the fold, the perspectival fields by which these processes come into examination shift. By considering the interstice and fold through

difference and repetition, time becomes the method by which duration comes into examination.

Time as process performs shifts in media studies. Rather than conceiving time as merely continuous or discontinuous, I show how interstitial repetition and the folds of perception produce the virtual relations of time in media. This approach shifts the understanding of time from being *a priori*, quantifiable and the standard time of the clock, to one where it is processual. Time as a lived process reveals a work's relations with virtual pasts and futures, giving rise to the free and open time of experience, outside of chronometric measurement. Furthermore, in my work on the fold, I attempt to consider cinema through the processes of micro foldings, in which the poetical, painterly and musical flows come to fold into each other in Tarkovsky's *Mirror*.[135] Such an approach differs from those in cinema studies in which a work might be understood through singular frames of art, as either being poetical, painterly or musical, or conversely, through a perspective in which cinema is not a complete art form in itself.[136] In my examination of perception, duration and memory, the flows of various art forms fold into what makes up cinematic art. In my approach to time as process and method, I hope to nudge media studies into conceptualizing newer relationships and performativities, exploring variations in the experience and understanding of time-based media.

Furthermore, my methodological approach to screen-based ontology may be characterized as being philosophical. As Colman writes, the internal pathways for

discussion and examination become more important than the categories themselves.[137] Categories such as duration, perception, memory and the ontology of images cannot be considered in and of themselves to be either theoretical or philosophical; rather, the method by which their analysis takes place makes them theoretical or philosophical.

While my questions on duration have been significantly influenced by Deleuze's works on cinema, aesthetics and philosophy, some of them have also been taken up in different variations by Rodowick and other media scholars such as Murray, Mullarkey and Mroz. While their works converge with mine at certain points, there are also differences among our conceptual assemblages and intentions. For instance, while my work on duration is drawn from Deleuze's concepts of movement and time-images as well as his work on Bergson's ontology of the image, perception and duration, I consider these concepts through the specificities of singular media works.

In Rodowick's *The Virtual Life of Film* (2007) he considers the philosophy of Cavell and draws upon the ontological difference between analog and digital media. The book presents singular insight into the material and conceptual basis of the two technologies, focusing on perceptual realism, the logic of computerization and the photographic arts as historical documents. Working out problems in my own thinking on analog and digital images has been significantly influenced by his books, however, my work also proceeds in a different direction with Deleuze. Where

I consider the two media, I specifically focus on the processes of the interstice and the fold and how they can be used for conceptualizing duration in media. At the same time, while Deleuze's *The Fold* is the metaphysics upon which my notion of the fold has been conceived, I have tried to concentrate its workings to understand media studies, showing how the folds of perception might begin to be conceived in cinema and digital media. While Murray's *Digital Baroque: New Media Art and Cinematic Folds* (2008) has considered the institutional and material folding between text, film and computer, my work focuses quite explicitly on the folds between perception and memory at the micro, mezzo and macro levels, to examine duration in media works.[138] Lastly, Matilda Mroz's *Temporality and Film Analysis* (2012), a work that comes closest to my dissertation in terms of examining duration, focuses on the many ways in which duration is produced in the films that she analyses. For instance, her focus on duration occurs through the structures of looking and imaging, the thematization of passing time and on the fluidity of meaning and significance. My focus lies in how duration is conceived and produced specifically through the workings of the interstice and the fold. Moreover, my preoccupation with analog and digital technologies changes direction from hers.

Uncertainty and meaning

I have considered the workings of the interstice and the fold in order to examine how durational discontinuity and continuity work in analog cinema and digital media.

The interstice and fold are two processual variations, the one a material fissure and the other an ontological ground; their differences pattern two asymmetrical movements.[139] Each makes up a movement of variation in constituting duration as process in media. However, sometimes their differences relay similar movements that cause resonances by overlapping and criss-crossing each other. In these relations of difference and correspondence, the interstice and the fold should not be considered as having separate parts and elements but as having qualitative actual and virtual forces that make up the whole. Each presents a movement of variation in the image of thought produced in what is the whole of media studies.[140]

Such a whole means that the interstice and the fold, in their *actual* discussion here, should be understood as only partially visible, and therefore are continually forming in other discussions elsewhere. They are neither fixed nor stable, and in different contexts will produce different movements and outcomes. In their continual formation, in this study and others, interstices and folds should be understood as not quite complete in their expressions of duration in media. They are to be construed as imagined spaces, whose spatial length, breadth and depth are in discovery.[141] It must be emphasized that my work should be understood in this vein, as speculative and as being in modes of discovery.

Moreover, rather than being drawn from a set of so-called problems that have been defined in media studies as needing solving, my dissertation moves through the many vector flows of material, conceptual and virtual elements criss-crossing each

other. Drawing from film theory, studies and philosophy, the flows at play here are *external* to each other, and do not restore any "inside" relations in media studies.[142] Rather than emerging from an organic relation, of what is film theory, the connections made among components drawn from the three fields is synthetic. I cobble together material, conceptual and virtual elements among philosophical concepts, digital media studies and analog cinema; I regroup and recontextualize them to develop other terrains of possible thoughts and meanings. My preoccupation lies in bringing about shifts and transformations in thinking by connecting disparate texts, artworks and technologies, without "descendants or lineage" to see what appears.[143] That is, my interests do not lie with developing filiations, lineages or in tracing a genealogy in either media studies or in philosophical concepts. Constructed from non-genealogical components, my approach can be understood as being "anhistorical."[144] This dissertation should work as a machinic system from which many movements might arise and modulate in time. The meanings of the different assemblages constructed from duration, perception, virtual objects, the fold, the interstice, the sensate etc., generate different possibilities, as they come together in their variations in the different chapters. The conceptual and material movements of this dissertation arise therefore by willing together various unnatural connections, making for a more experimental approach.

My hope is that this tinkering will bring about collisions, realignments and deviations, destabilizing regimes of signs in media frameworks, to put "meaning in

flux," in Mroz's terms.[145] Meaning attributed to any media work at any rate is unstable, continually shifting and modifying in light of the conceptual frameworks utilized, the points of view revealed and the subjects' emphasis on a particular aspect.[146] Meanings of artworks are always in processes of development, exchange and liquefaction.[147] The shifting ground of meanings require shifting strategies for conceiving works, and such shifts have meant the greater inclusion of philosophical pathways for media studies. My work aims to present duration as a method in media studies in which media might be conceived in a newer way and become "live," changing with viewpoints and subjects in time.[148] Moreover, the interstice and the fold operate as two viewpoints *in the making*, from which media events come to be perceived. As material and conceptual movements, their processes are asymmetrical and unequal, and the image of time that they present elide each other. From the assemblages presented in every chapter, multiple contested meanings may arise, generating a measure of uncertainty and instability for each meaning. For instance, while the interstice presents durational discontinuity and the fold continuity, the two processes are collisional in terms of how time is constituted as either one or the other. Duration constituted through the interstice and fold, then, presents two contradictory positions, but as I will try to show, each is part of the multiplicity that constitutes the whole.

Endnotes

[42] Daniel Shaw, *Film and Philosophy*, (London: Wallflower Press, 2008), 2. Author's emphasis.

[43] Shaw, 3.

[44] Shaw, 3.

[45] Shaw, 4.

[46] See James Bennett, "'Your Window-On-the-World' The Emergence of Red-Button Interactive Television in the UK," in *Convergence*, Vol 14(2): 161-182; Karen Orr Vered, "Televisual Aesthetics in Y2K: From Windows on the World to a Windows Interface," in *Convergence*, Vol 8(3): 40-60; and, Max Dawson, "Little Players, Big Shows," in *Convergence*, Vol 13(3): 231-250.

[47] Felicity Colman, "Introduction: What is Film-Philosophy?," in *Film, Theory and Philosophy*, ed. F. Colman, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's U Press, 2009), 7-8.

[48] Colman, 9.

[49] Colman, 10-11.

[50] Colman, 10.

[51] Colman, 10.

[52] John Mullarkey, *Philosophy and the Moving Image: Refractions of Reality*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 32.

[53] See Shaw, 14-19.

[54] Colman, 11.

[55] Philip Rosen, "Part Three: Apparatus," *Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology*, ed. P. Rosen, (New York: Columbia U Press, 1986), 283.

[56] Mullarkey, 7.

[57] Colin Gardner, "Roland Barthes," in *Film, Theory and Philosophy: Key Thinkers*, ed. F. Colman, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's U Press, 2009), 109.

[58] Rosen, 170.

[59] Rosen, 170.

[60] Shaw, 14-15.

[61] The year of publication of the English translation follows the French original.

[62] His essays, "Film, Emotion and Genre," and "Moving and Moving" were published in 1999 and 2000 respectively.

[63] Cavell's last book is *With Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow* (2005). Noël Caroll has published several other books including two new anthologies, *Philosophy in the Twilight Zone* (2009) coedited with Lester Hunt; and, *Narrative, Emotion, and Insight* (2011) coedited with John Gibson.

[64] Some notable books in the field during this period (not limited to Deleuze) include Gregory Currie's *Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy, and Cognitive Science* (1995); Carl Plantinga and Greg M. Smith's *Passionate Views: Film, Cognition, and*

Emotion (1999); Mary Litch's *Philosophy through Film* (2002); Christopher Falzon's *Philosophy Goes to the Movies* (2002); and, Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit's *Forms of Being: Cinema, Aesthetics, Subjectivity* (2004).

[65] Other notable books include Christopher Grau's anthology, *Philosophers Explore The Matrix* (2005); Robert Pepperell and Michael Punt's anthology, *Screen Consciousness: Cinema, Mind and World* (2006); and, James Phillips's anthology, *Cinematic Thinking: Philosophical Approaches to the New Cinema* (2008).

[66] Mullarkey, 10.

[67] Mullarkey, 12.

[68] These arguments are qualitatively different from the anti-philosophy argument that Mullarkey makes. Mullarkey questions whether films are able to generate philosophy in and of themselves, whereas the *film and philosophy* approach queries whether film has the ability to illuminate philosophy.

[69] Thomas E. Wartenberg, "Film as Philosophy," in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film*, eds. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga, (New York: Routledge, 2009), 549-555.

[70] Colman, 3.

[71] Wartenberg, 549.

[72] Shaw, 3.

[73] Mullarkey, 11.

[74] Martin, 113.

[75] Mullarkey, 11. Author's emphasis.

[76] Mullarkey, 10-11.

[77] Daniel Frampton, *Filmosophy*, (New York: Walflower Press, 2006), 15.

[78] In Frampton, 18.

[79] In Frampton, 19. Also, Frampton writes that Artaud wrote numerous scenarios for his thought-films, the most cited example being *Eighteen Seconds*, in which he attempted to show eighteen seconds of a character's life over the span of an hour or so. In doing so, he considered how, through the character's thoughts, film shows subjectivity. In Munsterberg's *The Photoplay*, he considered whether film was subjective or objective, writing about film's transfiguration of reality, freeing the latter from space, time and causality. In its transfiguration of reality, film moves closer to mind and to forms of consciousness. Gilbert-Lecomte and Balazs saw film as a future form of thought, revealing a different kind of thinking. Balazs in 1945, considered Ruttmann's *Berlin* (1927) to be a "mental documentary," in which the superimposition of images and the abstract montage of the film are a projection of the mind on screen. (Frampton, 15-26.)

[80] In Frampton, 20-21.

[81] Frampton, 22-23.

[82] *TI*, 29; D. N. Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, (Durham: Duke U Press, 1997), 7.

[83] Rodowick, 6.

[84] Rodowick, 122.

[85] Rodowick, 128, 130.

[86] Some notable early works were an anthology edited by Flaxman, *The Brain is the Screen* (2000); Patricia Pisters's *Micropolitics of Media Culture* (2001) and *The Matrix of Visual Culture* (2003); Barbara Kennedy's *Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation* (2002); and, Laura Marks's *Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media* (2002).

[87] Anna Powell, *Deleuze, Altered States and Film*, (Edinburgh: U of Edinburgh Press, 2007), 100.

[88] Frampton, 7.

[89] See Ian Buchanan, "Introduction," in *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema*," eds. Ian Buchanan and Patricia MacCormack, (New York: Continuum, 2008), 5-7. This is also a critique applicable to Deleuze (and Deleuze studies) about which Ian Buchanan writes that Deleuze throws a blanket on the real politick of filmmaking, which excludes ideological or economic analysis. Deleuze had a particular approach to film and was very selective in choosing the films for his *Cinema* books. The films that he wrote about seemed to escape the commodification process. Films by Antonioni, Ozu, Resnais, Passolini and others determined their own path by escaping the psychic clichés of readymade perceptions and memories, and presented the power to think -- one of cinema's special powers. Moreover, Deleuze's fears were not limited to the banality and mediocrity of the majority of films made, which were incapable of realizing the power of thought to change the world, but its descent into state propaganda and manipulation, "'into a kind of fascism which brought together Hitler and Hollywood, Hollywood and Hitler [in which] the spiritual automaton became fascist man.'"

[90] Timothy Murray, *Digital Baroque: New Media Art and Cinematic Folds* (2008).

[91] These include, David Rodowick's *Virtual Life of Film* (2007) and his anthology, *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy* (2010).

[92] Ian Buchanan and Patricia MacCormack's anthology is titled, *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema* (2008).

[93] Elena Del Rio's book is, *Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance: Powers of Affection* (2008).

[94] Mullarkey, 26.

[95] Steven Shaviro, *Without Criteria*, (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009), xiii.

[96] Frampton, 2.

[97] Frampton, 2.

[98] Roland Bogue, *Deleuze on Cinema*, (New York: Routledge, 2003), 39; Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1989), 29. (Henceforth *TI*.)

[99] Bogue, 39; *TI* 29

[100] In Bogue, 39; Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1983/86), 66.

[101] Gregory Flaxman, "Introduction," in *The Brain is the Screen*, ed. G. Flaxman, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2000), 47.

[102] Flaxman, 47.

[103] Birgit M. Kaiser, "Two Floors of Thinking," in *Deleuze and* The Fold, eds. S. van Tuinen and N. McDonnell, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 220.

[104] Jean-Clet Martin, *Variations: The Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze*, Trans. C. Boundas and S. Dyrkton, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh U Press, 2010), 82.

[105] See Tom Conley's "The Film Event: From Interval to Interstice," in *The Brain is the Screen*, ed. G. Flaxman, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2000), 303-325.

[106] While the interstice has been referred to and elaborated upon in several essays, to my knowledge, its particular extensive and intensive workings in a given film has not been undertaken. The issue of current works in the field will be taken up in a subsequent section.

[107] Two works are Timothy Murray's *Digital Baroque* (2008) and Laura Marks's *Enfoldment and Infinity* (2010).

[108] A detailed understanding of the interstice will be presented in chapter two.

[109] *TI*, 178-9.

[110] The open whole is a virtual whole, it is that which lies outside the film's (hermeneutically sealed) narrative continuity and logic.

[111] Conley, 319.

[112] *TI*, 178-9.

[113] "Automechanized" is a term that I have coined in this dissertation to combine the dual senses of what is automatic and mechanized in the installations.

[114] *TI*, 48.

[115] In *The Virtual Life of Film* (2007) Rodowick argues that while digital technologies attribute perceptual realism to the image, giving it the appearance of reality, digital technologies nonetheless have a very tentative link with reality. While even structuralist, experimental or surreal films are produced by recording phenomena occurring naturally, for instance, by zooming onto a point on the wall à la Michael Snow's *Wavelength* (1967), digital images have the capacity to simulate objects and events from nothing, as in *Final Fantasy -- The Spirits Within* (2001). Moreover, digital technologies have the capacity to composite layers, cutting and pasting elements together to produce the appearance of a single unified object. For instance, in 1994, *Mirabella* magazine put together its cover image titled, "Who is

the face of America?" by compositing together images of six different women's faces. Thus while "the face of America" looked perceptually real, it was an entirely simulated image.

It should be pointed out that while digital media *may* be connected to the real, it is not necessarily so. The indexical relation of film to reality and digital media's possible link to reality present several differences in terms of perceptual realism. A major reason is that analog film is indexical to the reality being recorded and digital recordings are not. This critical difference is due to the transcription method of how input-output occurs. In film, the chemical bath responds directly to the light recorded on the photosensitive celluloid strip, the transcription process being the direct, indexical connection between the condition of prevalent light and its record on celluloid. The input and output therefore remain continuous and unbroken. In digital recordings, the camera converts natural phenomena into numerical data, losing the connection with the input (the actual object-image), and therefore to the real. In the transcription process the image is converted into numerical values thus light, hue, luminosity become numerical values arranged on the electronic screen, which is a grid, (rather than film's grains, which flow on celluloid in a fluid manner). Numerical values are abstract, symbolic and representative, and have lost the direct connection to the real. The input and output in digital cameras are therefore discontinuous.

[116] Sarah Gendron, *Repetition, Difference, and Knowledge in the Work of Samuel Beckett, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze*, (New York: Peter Lang, 2008), 8.

[117] Mullarkey, 2011, 90. In *The Movement-Image*, Deleuze presents a mereological relation or the relation of how one part of the film relates to another part, with all the different parts constituting the whole film. The narrative action unfolds through the logic and action of the continuity narrative, in which one part relates to another, to make up the whole. In this cinematic form, the spatio-temporal relation from one shot to the next is maintained and movement occurs as if it were a continuous, unbroken chain of cause and effect of the plot lines. Characters are dependent on movement and action, in which they routinely perceive things (the perception-image) and then act upon the circumstances in which they find themselves (the reaction-image). This chain of perception-reaction is part of the sensory-motor regime of movement-images. A mereological relation therefore follows the logic of cause and effect in the narrative. This relation of movement in images was expressed in the montage systems pre WWII and continues today in commercial, industrial filmmaking. In this type of filmmaking, the different parts add up to make the seamless whole of each film. The montage systems thereby present the "sublime" of this relation, in which perception and reaction shots form the parts of a smooth and continuous physical movement of images that make up the whole film.

[118] Gilles Deleuze, *The Movement-Image*, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1986), 8-10. (Henceforth, *MI*.)

[119] Gilles Deleuze, "Theory of Multiplicities in Bergson," http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=111&groupe=Conf%E9rences&langue=2 (accessed August 5, 2012). Movement-images do not generate the multiplicity of time in which many different times fuse or interpenetrate each other – what Bergson has referred to as a "confused multiplicity."

[120] *TI*, 179. The infinite outside is to be understood as the virtual whole of Time (including all pasts and futures of the entirety of Time), which cannot be divided into parts.

[121] Gilles Deleuze, "Theory of Multiplicities in Bergson," http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=111&groupe=Conf%E9rences&langue=2 (accessed August 5, 2012).

[122] Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, (New York: Urzone, Inc., 1988), 38.

[123] *Bergsonism*, 40-41.

[124] Bernard Steigler, *Technics and Time, I*, trans. S. Barker, (Stanford: Stanford U Press, 2011), 6.

[125] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. P. Patton, (New York: Columbia U Press, 1994), 213. (Henceforth, *D&R*.)

[126] Niamh McDonnel and Sjoerd van Tuinen, "Introduction," in *Deleuze and* The Fold, eds. N. McDonnel and S. van Tuinen, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 3.

[127] Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. T. Conley, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1993), 93.

[128] http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~fellows/hart206/baroque.htm (accessed January 28, 2013. In the baroque chiaroscuro, the play between light and dark produces curved, mobile lines, in which the edges of figure and background merge into and out of each other. Rather than stand out from each other, as clearly demarcated on a defined plane, the boundaries of fields blur into each other.

[129] Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual*, (Durham: Duke U Press, 2002), 156. This word is a variation on Massumi's "spacelikeness."

[130] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, trans. H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell, (New York: Columbia U Press, 1991), 204.

[131] The implications of sensations producing rational thought is especially pertinent in what are generally considered the solely cognate or unemotional fields, such as the sciences.

[132] See Mullarkey, 2009, 1-14; Martin, 119-174; and, Jacques Rancière, "The Gaps of Cinema," *NECSUS -- European Journal of Media Studies*, http://www.necsus-ejms.org/the-gaps-of-cinema-by-jacques-ranciere/ (accessed June 26, 2012).

[133] The actual whole is what is seen in the work. We see the whole of time in the installations. On the other hand, the whole that is virtual can never be given, as it extends towards infinity and encompasses the totality of the universe, including all material and virtual elements.

[134] For instance, "cinema" as a general category, is enfolded in the whole of what are time-based media. Moreover, a particular film is enfolded in other films and in turn, enfolds others.

[135] Matilda Mroz, *Temporality and Film Analysis*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh U Press, 2012), 26. Mroz notes, Tarkovsky considered his works to be "composite cinema."

[136] This point of view is that cinema, which has a propensity to borrow from other art forms, is not a complete art form in itself.

[137] Colman, 10.

[138] Murray, 9.

[139] This aspect of asymmetry is elaborated in the section, "A multiplicity: difference in the workings of the interstice and the fold," of this introduction.

[140] Martin, 123. As noted earlier, the whole is constituted not from the inside, but from the outside. The whole is the totality of the universe, an infinity, which is a virtual relation. The interstice and fold, as two movements of variation, therefore, make up aspects of this totality.

[141] Martin, 216.

[142] Martin, 82.

[143] Martin, 83.

[144] Martin, 82.

[145] Mroz, 4; Martin, 83.

[146] Martin, 216.

[147] Mroz, 4.

[148] Martin, 216.

Chapter Two

That interrupting feeling: interstitial disjunctions in Claire Denis's *L'Intrus*

Introduction

In an interview, Claire Denis discloses:

> Cinema is not made to give a psychological explanation. For me,
> cinema is montage, editing -- To make blocks of impressions or
> emotions meet another block of impressions or emotions, and to put
> in between pieces of explanation, to me it's boring... I think that
> making films for me is to get rid of explanation.[149]

From this point of view we may consider that Denis's films operate outside

explanations, which describe, interpret and clarify narratives, deoccupying what is

the traditional convention or the "maternal grammar" of a classical continuity film

narrative.[150] Explanations, which are part of a traditional filmmaking convention,

present the causal ground of the plot. They propel the film's narrative flow and

chronometric sequence of events,[151] grounded upon the successive passage of what

are the past, present and future of a narrative. While a plot-driven narrative is one in

which chronometric time reveals the heights of sense and intellection, Denis's film

L'Intrus (2004), moves through interstitial disjunctions that effect dissonances, gaps

and discontinuity in the flow of images.

In the quote Denis rejects explanations, and while it may not seem

immediately evident, eliminating explanations becomes important to how duration

unfolds, an important aspect of this chapter and dissertation. Eliminating

explanations removes causal reasoning, which is an integral element of progress in the continuity narrative. Not only are actions delinked from causes, but the action itself, in the conventional sense of the antagonist/hero "doing something," does not necessarily occur. In my broader goal, of considering how duration unfolds in analog cinema, I query in this chapter whether a different narrative form is produced in the elimination of explanations. Furthermore, I question what the relation of this narrative form is to duration. One of the tasks of this dissertation probes *how* the flow of images occurs in time with respect to a film or digital media work. In this chapter I consider what type of duration unfolds without causal reasoning by which the conventional narrative finds it justification for events.

Most importantly, in this chapter, duration in *L'Intrus* will be examined through the workings of the interstice. I will introduce its material, functional and conceptual form in the next section, leading to the three types of durational discontinuities that it produces in the film. The interstice is the link produced when two time-images are cut together. It forms the connecting point between two unrelated shots and therefore its presence signals interruptions and discontinuity in the film's narrative flow. In connecting two unrelated shots, or images of time, the interstice becomes a critical process in constituting the relations, connections, speeds and movements of how we come to experience the flow of the film. In a film, the cut between shots is a process that creates certain connections, constituting the mobile relations of the film's ontogenesis or it's becoming in time. In producing the link

between two images, an interstice can create spatio-temporal discontinuity, generate a paradox, produce difference or heterogeneous time, bear multiple virtuality and form ideas, and in this manner, it constructs entire filmworlds. In these performances, an interstice produces entities by virtue of creating the connections, relations, rhythms and speeds between two shots. Thus I inquire into what type of duration is produced by the interstice in *L'Intrus*. Moreover, in generating the movements between images, I consider whether the interstice is critical in generating the movements of thought.

Second, I inquire into whether the image-flows in *L'Intrus* put thought in relation with the open outside, with the unknown. This encounter with the unknown, with images that enter from an outside, and which we cannot as yet think,[152] lurks at the heart of this inquiry into cinema and media studies. As Deleuze and Guattari write, the non-thought is at the centre of thought itself, having the capability of moving thought beyond experience.[153] In this pursuit of putting thought in touch with the non-thought, Denis's interview quoted above becomes illuminating. By not providing explanations one image becomes linked to another in a random fashion, rather than offer causal relations in the sequence of events presented. Random images linked to each other haphazardly present the spectator with an opportunity to think what their connections might be to each other. A random sequencing of images, therefore, puts thought in touch with what is an unknown, unexplained image, which occurs from outside narrative logic -- an outside that is the non-

thought -- presenting an image sequence that belies the logic of common sense or of rational ordering.

Third, the encounter of images from the outside brings into focus another question tracked throughout this dissertation on interiority. In the non-relation of causes to the production of action in *L'Intrus*, the narrative form moves away from the relations of interiority, to that of an outside. This question therefore considers the interiority and exteriority of the narrative form by way of the image that returns. In maintaining the interiority of the narrative form, spatio-temporal continuities in time are produced; in temporal discontinuities, the narrative form becomes a chain of unrelated images, which connect to an outside. Thus, this aspect of the chapter considers the disruption of spatio-temporal continuities that the returning image brings in its capacity for producing connections to what is the open, unknown, outside, and hence, for producing difference in the movements of thought.

The ability of images to produce the movements of thought is connected to the fourth aspect of this chapter, which will examine the relation of duration to the virtual. This aspect will consider the flow of images in time and whether the duration produced in *L'Intrus* generates connections to the virtual. Thus, if continuity narratives produce what is known and recognizable within the narrative form with respect to the action, characters and narrative development, discontinuous ones produce a disjointed spatio-temporality in the film. A disjointed movement is produced from the relations of the outside, in which the image encountered by the

spectator is an unknown, unrecognizable image. My examination will therefore

consider these two types of narrative forms with respect to the movements of

thought produced and their connections to the virtual.

Last, I will consider how the interstice operates simultaneously in the

production of both the event and the movements of thought. In producing the non-

chronological temporalities among pasts, presents or futures of the events-forming, it

is coextensive with the movements of thought experienced in the film. In this sense

the gaps, discontinuities and transitions, between what is the event-becoming and

what is thought-becoming, share the limits and boundaries brought about through the

interstice. This coextensivity is to be considered as a mobile and unstable relation

that constantly changes throughout the film. In considering thought and the event,

therefore, neither can be said to have an exclusive relation to the interstice, as both

continually fold into and out of the other, creating the whole film. The event-

becoming is also the becoming-thought of the film, each inflecting and responding

relationally to the other through the film's temporal movements. Where appropriate

throughout this chapter, I will examine how the coextensive relation of thought with

event is brought about primarily through the work of the interstice.

This chapter inquires into the disruption of spatio-temporal continuities that

the returning image brings in its capacity for producing difference in the movements

of thought. The maintenance or disruption of spatio-temporal continuities through

the interstice in cinema, therefore, yields two very different relations to duration,

bringing about differences in the image of time. What is more, the question of continuous or discontinuous duration brings into discussion issues critical to film narratives, such as the causal ordering of a plot, the logic of sense and the notion of action and events in time-images. These issues of narrative form will be tied into questions of the actual-virtual circuit, questions of visibility-invisibility, considerations of what makes up the whole, the planes of consciousness and a world-memory. I will begin the next section by setting up the work and function of the interstice itself.

The nervous system of the interstice

In the following pages I will present how interstitial repetition in *L'Intrus* produces disjunctions, syntheses and transformations, configuring the connections and relations between images. I construct three types of relations as marking the film: the paradoxical element; divergences and intensities through lines of flights; and the involution of the image's internal milieu. These three types of disjunctive syntheses, which configure the film's internal relations, connections and associations, produce qualitatively different types of images. And these syntheses, which continually oscillate in their movement through the film, yield a film-world woven in threads that is sometimes comprehensible and sometimes not. The connections, disjunctions and paradoxes experienced through the images' connections to each other therefore continually oscillate between what we can make sense of and what we cannot. This

movement between sense and non-sense creates the film's internal pulse of what is true, moving well beyond what could be relegated to an official film grammar, it's maternal grammar, of plot-action-reaction, where causes lead to actions and where narrative plot lines generate what is knowable and therefore understandable. On the contrary, a zigzagging movement such as the one found in *L'Intrus*, folds between events and thoughts in processes of breakage, aporias and reconnections that leave little room for certainty or for what is knowable.

In the movement-image, the interval[154] links image to image through a rational logic, as Deleuze shows.[155] What is understood to be the convention of continuity editing in the movement-image proceeds by the use of the cut, which utilizes the eye line match, the 180° axis rule, and action-reaction shots, to produce the seamless spatio-temporal continuities of the narrative structure. These and other film techniques make the cut between two images invisible, and the cut therefore creates the false appearance of two images being continuous in space and time. What returns in such a system therefore, through the cut or the interval, is more of the same images; these images, which maintain the spatio-temporal continuity with the ones preceding them, sustain the same movements in space and movements of thought. The repetition of the image, which occurs through the interval therefore, functions as the return of the same. Here there is little cognitive dissonance and the images move by similarity, representation and identity, rather than through

difference. Thus, in the movement-image, the interval operates in fact to produce

continuity, by virtue of artificially creating a continuous spatio-temporal dynamic.

In *L'Intrus*, we find a different regime, one where the links occurring

between images are, on the contrary, irrational. These images generated by irrational

logic are those of the time-image, where disconnected space-times come to be

connected together randomly. These different space-times linked to each other

produce what Deleuze calls the "any-space-whatever," where one image or shot is

connected to the other without a logical reason or cause (given to action in plot-

based narratives, for instance) that disrupts the spatio-temporal continuity of the

movement-image. The cut, which connects one space-time (or image) to another,

therefore, generates the film's direction, its associations, meanings and purposes. In

the time-image these spatio-temporal capsules connect the film's surface in no

particular order which would give it a logical coherence readily understood by the

spectator. The chain of disconnected shots of the time-image therefore disorients the

spectator, whose bearings in space and time become a confusing experience. In

continuity narratives chronometric time determines the spectator's spatio-temporal

orientation; in the time-image, the any-space-whatever becomes an indeterminable,

unlocatable spatio-temporality. In *L'Intrus*, which generates such a disorienting

experience, the any-space-whatever produces the time of the event, which is

coextensive with the movement of thought-becoming; that is, the film's events are

coextensive with the rhythms, movements, associations and paradoxes that compose the movements of thought.

The movement-image and time-image produce experiences that are therefore remarkably dissimilar. Rather than producing the return of the same brought about through the convention of continuity editing, which reproduces the orders of convention and what are known quantities, in *L'Intrus* we find ourselves experiencing unknown qualities and intellectual challenges by virtue of the difference in the succession of images. Interstitial repetition, producing interruptions and dissonance between images, induces a shock to the automatic sensory-motor schema of the movement-image. Instead of a continuous movement of action-affection-reaction, an irrational cut disrupts the "sublime" flow of motorized movement and thought. It introduces a gap between the preceding and succeeding image, which no longer sustain the same spatio-temporal continuity. By creating dissonance and gaps within the narrative, what is the habitual continuity of thought comes to offer an experience of shock. The displacement of one image by another forces the spectator into thinking a new thought and therefore the interstice in its function operates as a micro-projectile, by introducing a new image in the spectator's brain, forcing them to think. The destruction of one thought by another is necessary for the renewal of thought itself, which not only generates a new image but also the conditions for change to occur. And such a new thought also disturbs the boundaries of what is a given (prior) order. The intellectual aporias created by interstitial

repetition, I therefore argue, generate the production of difference, multiply ways of seeing, expand the production of unknown qualities, produce different languages and also create different unexpected associations in the movements of thought.

The three types of syntheses produced by the interstice examined in this chapter constituting the paradoxical element, divergence and intensity and involution, produce disjunctions, syntheses and transformations in the film's trajectory. In the first, the interstice operates to produce the paradox, bringing into focus the paradoxical element which has two sides: sense and non-sense. In considering the paradox I present two examples. In the first I present how the interstice operates to juxtapose the image of the dead and live body of the main character Trebor, and more importantly, in the second example, I show how the image of the scar forged from his heart surgery operates as a virtual event, where the event, as Conley writes, "resemble[s] the trace of a vanishing line with 'thousands of traits.'"[156] Thus although we see the image of the scar marking its importance as event, the operation remains ambiguous and indeterminable, germinating from the sketchy details of class exploitation and an illegal trade in body parts of a "somewhere" in Eastern Europe. The interstitial process in this instance makes the relations between what is real and what is imaginary not only indiscernible, but as Deleuze points out, we no longer even have a place from which to inquire.

Divergences and intensities through lines of flight is the second disjunctive relation that I establish, which occurs through connections in a sequence or in a

series of shots strung together into a chain. Each shot bears no narrative continuity, much less any sort of spatio-temporal flow in the sequence, where each shot takes its own line of flight. The shots are remarkably divergent from each other, however, I try to show how their intensities are similar, allowing the "pitch" of each image to follow into the constitution of the next image. The interstitial moments, in generating the disruption between shots are therefore connected by their intensities, where, in the return of a different image, the movement, and thereby the renewal of thought, become possible. Following an example from one of the film's opening sequences, I move into an analysis of what Bergson has called pure memory. Pure memory, which moves beyond an individual psychological memory, is a world memory to which we all belong. Such a world memory cuts and leaps between what are the different planes of consciousness in *L'Intrus*, offering random fragments of consciousness and aberrant movements of time. By engaging in this method Denis experiments with the creative forces of images, operating through what Bergson called the intuitive method, bypassing the limits of what is knowable and understandable intellectually.

The last type of disjunctive synthesis occurs on a mental or psychic level, rather than in the physical cut between two time-images. The length of the shots themselves present stretches of time which, instead of being cut into, open up to the duration of the universe. Disjunctions, which occur in these types of shots, occur within the duration of a single shot itself, by virtue of the plurality of movements

and speeds found in the characters, landscapes or weather, which proceed by their

internal rhythms rather than through the logic of filmmaking practices (*mise-en-*

scène, direction, composition). These shots are those which, in following the internal

rhythms of the actors, landscapes or objects, transform from scripted direction into

their various becomings. The shots, I argue, involute in between what is script and

environment, becoming what they will. The duration of each shot, drifting through

as passing moments, makes up the singular, impersonal and heterogeneous time of

the film, constituted by what Deleuze calls camera consciousness. All things flowing

before the mechanical camera eye -- the rhythms of the universe -- appear therefore

in the single duration of a shot, replete with diverging movements within it. The

many shots linked by interstices, therefore, make up the entire film. Divergences in a

single shot, and between two shots connected by the interstice, generate the

heterogeneous movements of the single continuous time of a film, which spreads

into the world, expanding such movements to infinity. These many rhythms

participate in what Bergson noted as the virtual whole, constituting the single Time

of the universe.

I conclude this chapter by considering the conditions that Denis offers in

L'Intrus for the production of the movements of thought. Her film pushes to the limit

what is knowable, determinable or explicable, leaving the spectator in pieces. But

from these very pieces, when the faculties are in disarray and unable to form any

coherent coordinates amongst them, a new thought can actually arise, forcing the

spectator to think. The unrecognizability in the flow of images causes a grasping in which different faculties might operate in unexpected, non-habitual ways, impelling a new idea to emerge. In the continual disruptions brought about by the interstice generating intellectual aporias, the spectator struggles to cope cognitively and psychically, forcing the limits of the intellect. Ideas, which Deleuze shows are formed in fractures and connect to actual things, come to be formed in interstitial moments, expressing their connections in images. Ideas, as virtual entities connected to images and forming in the interstice, thereby make up multiple virtualities. Their multiple and approximating relations with images, found in *L'Intrus*, expressing paradoxes, divergences and intensities are therefore always continually forming and unfinished by way of their multiple virtualities. In this sense, ideas are indeterminable and always on edges continually forming, aggregating and becoming with the images.

First type of disjunctive synthesis: the paradoxical element

Cinema is a chain of images in succession where one image cuts into another. As Deleuze writes in *Cinema 2: The Time Image* (1989), in time-images, the image which follows is the image that materializes from the outside. Cutting into the former image, the image emerging from the outside presents thought from the outside. This encounter between the film's ensuing narrative and the outside, presents a shock to thought as the image from the outside breaks up the interiority of

the narrative events by inserting its own presence into the chain. The break up of the film's narrative interiority from the outside produces spatio-temporal, intellectual and affective dissonances. Deleuze refers to such a dissonance between two shots as the interstice, which is at the heart of what makes up the time-images of cinema. [157]

Interstices not only allow for the production of different images to appear producing the changing relations, speeds and affectivity between images, but also continually modulate and generate the virtual connections between two images. The interstice, therefore, which occurs between two images, is where the virtual time of the event unfolds. These virtual events in *L'Intrus* become the sites of my examination in the first type of relation, the paradox. The measureless time given to the interstice is therefore of great importance as it generates the force and propulsion moving the work along. Such a force is not only the physical movement of film-matter, the chain of image-frames which propel through the film projector, but also, more importantly, operates the virtual dimension of the work.

The interstice can produce an interruption or jarring effect in the momentum of images streaming through a film. In its continual repetitions, an interstice can produce a kind of "stuttering," a form of a spasm bringing about a convulsive effect with respect to film's spatio-temporal continuity. A spasm creates disjunctions in the continuous flow of movements and thought where an oscillatory movement swerving back and forth in time is experienced. Such an oscillation or continual state of fluctuation in time and in thought occurs in *L'Intrus*, which moves between what

99

we understand and what we do not. The film's persistent oscillatory movements generate confusion and contradictions and such disorientation is exacerbated by the *récit*, in which the sparing words and fragmentary sentences do not qualify or synchronize with the images. And the images that we see, moreover, seem to appear from out of the blue and do not form connections in our mind with the preceding events or characters. The events, or what takes place in the film, arrive from different directions rather than from a centralizing plot and for that reason, events are constantly forming and disappearing as the film proceeds. They are indeterminate and for that reason indeterminable. The events in the film proceed by movement between what we can make sense of and that which appears to be non-sense.

This oscillatory movement between sense and non-sense occurs, for instance, in what is possibly one of the film's most affective shot where we see the main character, Trebor, being dragged through a snowy landscape by two individuals on horses. The riders then dispose of him in the open wilderness presumably to die, yet in the very next shot, we see Trebor lying in a comfortable bed with warm orange tones softly lighting the room. In such a contradiction, the preceding shot functions as a difference from the latter one, making the two incompossible. Nonetheless, this forking of time, paradox or incompossibility between the two images also functions to operate as the *continuity* of a line which forks and keeps forking throughout the film, while simultaneously advancing the spasmodic affects in the film.

There is a paradoxical element circulating through these two shots, the paradoxical element making each shot resonate with the other. The shots converge with each other and at the same time they are discontinuous and disjunctive. This paradoxical element, therefore, while belonging to each of these series, shows that it has two sides but in each instance we can see that these two sides are never balanced or in equilibrium.[158] Trebor's death and what constitutes his life extend in two different directions: a future and a past of the body. The image of his crooked fingers frozen on his dead body are followed immediately by the warm tones of life in which we see Trebor contemplating in bed in a Swiss hotel. The paradoxical element contained in the body as dead and alive functions thereby through a duality, and simultaneously, through an excess and a lack:[159] an excess by virtue of the production of desire in which Trebor contemplates purchasing a new heart in order to find his lost son and to make up for lost relations, and a lack by virtue of a mute, disgraced and impotent body abandoned in the wilderness. The body's duality generates recognition in both senses: being simultaneously excess and lack, in various states of living and dying.

Rather than understand the paradoxical element as operating in contradiction however, the deadening and livening body must be seen to operate as copresences in that there is an *intrinsic relation* between the two states of the body. While the body exists simultaneously in different states in the film, it is also the same body. In the tradition of what constitutes the logic of sense, Deleuze writes, sense and nonsense

101

have come to be seen as separated from each other. However, he writes, sense must

be seen to have a relation with nonsense, where nonsense becomes the condition of

sense, giving rise to the paradox. The paradoxical element becomes the condition of

the relation between sense and nonsense.[160] Each virtual part of the paradoxical

element must function in relation to it as it expresses itself thorough simultaneity.

Trebor alive simultaneously forms the virtual circuit with him dead. The same object

-- Trebor's body -- expresses the sense of its entire form, including dead and live

states as copresences, creating a paradox in the film. As Massumi shows in Stelarc's

performance *Anesthesized Body*, the body sown up, suspended and cut off from all

expression, rather than being inactive and shut-down, is the chaotic body in ferment:

the body is passive but the mind is restless.[161]

Traditionally, an object's signification is attributed by a non-contradictory

status, where the body in a traditional sense could only be either dead or alive at a

given point in time. Such a non-contradictory status is thereby dislodged in the

paradox. The paradoxical element exists outside traditional signification in that, in

L'Intrus, it exhibits a contradiction of relations within itself by including its

dual/many senses. But it is not difficult to grasp that even while expressing such a

contradictory signification, our cognizance is able to grasp the relation of life to

death. In this cognizance, we can understand how one of the themes comes to

operate in the film, in which Trebor's alienation from the world gives rise to self-

estrangement, in which his heart becomes a foreign body to him. This vacillating

recognition between what are the dead/deadening body and the live/livening one operate through the micro-relations of the interstice which causes a spatio-temporal disconnection in what might either be deadening or livening. The disruption makes possible the direct and instantaneous connection between the two senses and also modulates what is intrinsic and vital with what is alien and unfamiliar.

The powerful affects of this splendid entwining of what is live/livening and dead/ deadening circulates through the entire film creating optical resonances. These are the images in which we see Trebor in various states of sickness, melancholia and stillness or those in which he is biking, walking or swimming, each series forming two chains. The livening/deadening states in each series are intensified aurally by the musical refrains, which are dispersed and echo throughout the film. These sound and image resonances, which function through interruptions brought upon by the interstice, prevent what could have been a singular trajectory of the film's spatio-temporal continuity. The singular linear time found in the movement-image is absent. Instead, we find dispersionary movements where images, rather than relating to actions (as in the movement-image), relate to other images recalled in the time-image.[162] This particular sense of the series generates the varying senses of what is deadening and livening (different states and stages in each), expanding and spreading over the surface of the film. Each image, thereby, becomes copresent with the others. In the time-image, images correspond with other images, and Rodowick writes that such correspondences form chains of associations and memories of

experiences that circulate like infinite reflections of each other in a crystal. These reflections of images echoing and resonating with each other abound in what Deleuze calls the crystalline regime of the time-image.

The disjunctive synthesis functions in this particular instance not only through the initial perception of the paradox but also through its echoes and resonance, which circulate throughout the film. Trebor dying *and* Trebor living form the film's surface of visible signs. They make up the zigzagging expressions which operate through interstitial repetitions, the interstice in this instance functioning as disjunctive synthesis. The paradoxical element thereby contains such a movement within it that proceeds by oscillating between the dual senses of the body that are intrinsically related.[163] But here also lies the synthesis: the paradox has two sides. By virtue of having two sides the paradoxical element creates resonance and echoes into the past and future. The disjunctions in the spatio-temporal order, however, also form a synthesis by virtue of this dual nature or the two sides of the paradox. What is disjunctive also operates by what connects it to the other, in that, what is deadening is connected to what is livening. In this sense the echoes and resonances between the different images of living and dying in the film on the one hand operate by their difference to each other, but on the other, are also intrinsically related to each other forming a synthesis.

Virtual event actual scar

I will proceed next to what I constitute to be a critical and major interstitial moment and also one of the great paradoxes in the film. I will delve into a more detailed examination of the great "spasm" in the film, where I propose the main event of the film is revealed. The nature of this event is paradoxical, as its visibility does not occur within the film. In this sense it is incorporeal and virtual, unfolding within the interstitial moment. Nonetheless, the singularity of this event, which is incorporeal, is powerful, as it distributes its echoes and resonances throughout the film. As noted, echoes and resonances in the time-image are the relations occurring between images, forming chains of associations and memories. In this sense, echoes are repetitions with differences. In the movement-image, the main event becomes the central and critical point within a chain of other minor events of a chronological plot. Such a central point would have been constituted through minor movements leading up to the enactment of the main event. In *L'Intrus's* time-image, however, we see that the event itself becomes incorporeal, and we can only feel its presence through its multiplication and proliferation in its many different interstitial repetitions occurring through the unfolding film. In *L'Intrus*, the echoes and resonances, forming chains of memories, are of this incorporeal event.

If the continually occurring disjunctions generate the film's spasmodic effects, then a great chasm forged right into Trebor's body transmits tremors that echo throughout the film. It is that immense silent scar extending in a straight line on

105

his torso travelling on the skin, a hardened, sewn-up surface. The scar that lines the body is an actual image in the film, a visible sign; the event of the heart transplant however, becoming incorporeal, is its corresponding virtual movement in the film, which is never seen. While we see the massive scar from this operation, we neither see the actual operation, a human-human transplant, nor any of the preparations taking place. We do however see a woman appearing suddenly with x-rays and who disappears as suddenly as she arrives, in addition to money exchanging hands. We are also presented with inklings about who might serve as possible donors in the illegal underground market of buyers of body parts, which by inference could be slavic accents, expressing a "somewhere" in Eastern Europe. Thus, as one of the defining moments in the film, the heart transplant's invisibility is striking for its ability to orient the viewer towards this event. We only see the operation's traceable effects, quite suddenly, when a blind masseuse stumbles her withering hands over what is a massive scar and subsequently through the film we notice Trebor continually stroking it, as if a reminder of both the depths of that surface and also of its untraceable depth.[164] However, we only see fleeting glimpses of this scar, which lines the body's surface. When we see the scar we trace that scar to an operation but we do not see the moment of the operation, which is a discrete moment in the film. We instead endure what precedes and succeeds it, the event of the operation itself becoming incorporeal.

This pivotal event of the operation in the film intersects with the interstitial period. The event is immersed in the interstice, in that all-pervading depth of what is invisible, and all the more potent for being a potential. The event occurs between two different images, a measureless period in the "nothing really happens" of a gap, but in which we find the greatest movements occurring. The event becoming incorporeal remains invisible, implied, circulating on the horizon and functioning in a circuit with the images that do appear. While dissimilar from each other, the images and the event are partial objects, which remain non-totalisable and unable to exist without each other. In this sense the real and the virtual cannot be considered separately. Rather than being two partial objects, as Deleuze writes, the virtual and actual should be understood to make up the total object.[165] In the circuit between the film's virtual events that correspond to the actual images, which reveal bodies and things, lies another movement in the film. This continual pure movement of actual and virtual images, I will try to show in the conclusion of this chapter, forces the movements of thought.

Scar/crack

I will first consider the actual-virtual movements of the scar/"crack," not only on the surface of Trebor's body, but also on the body of the film. The scar's marking is a visible sign and as a visible sign it functions as a remainder (we see how much is *actually* left to heal) and also a reminder of the real crack in the body that it once

107

was (this function is *virtual* and operates here through memory). The actual

operation of the heart transplant, which is the invasive penetration into the body,

constitutes a real event that we never see as it occurs in the interstitial moment. We

can only see the operation through its dual references, as something that is about to

occur and as that which has already occurred. In its post-operational state we see it

by the scar that has marked the body, as something that occurred in the near past, as

a "has been."[166] In its pre-operational state we see it when Trebor anticipates the

heart operation's future moment, as something that is yet to come. Much as the

memory of the operation is drawn out (signaled through the scar) tracing the

movements of Trebor in search of his lost son, the anticipation of the event itself is

also drawn out in the first half of the film. Here, while we see the multiple activities

occurring between Trebor and various parties, which seem unconnected and

unrelated, including e-mail negotiations, bank transactions, endless waiting in hotel

rooms, hands exchanging money, x-rays and medical reports, the event itself occurs

in a flash: so much of a flash that the event in this sense has no present. This main

event instead divides the present into two streams of past and future and advances

two questions: "what will happen?" and "what has just happened?"[167]

Experienced only through its invisibility, the event continues onward to what

appears to be its memory in Trebor's journey across the oceans. In its anticipation

and in its memory, the operation-scar, in its continual presence, enacts its

reverberations throughout, its powerful forces spreading along the film's entire time-

span. *L'Intrus*, one might say, is arranged around this virtual event and this event gives rise to the central paradox of the film. We experience or know about the operation through its anticipation and its pain: as a virtual movement arising in the circuit with the film's actual images. As Deleuze notes, the actual and virtual make up a double series constantly in circuit with each other. And while they are correlates and cannot exist without each other, they do not resemble each other.[168] In this way, the interstitial moments in *L'Intrus*, which link different images randomly connected together, enact this constant play or circuitry between images actually present and the virtual event.

However, not only is the event virtual, but its presence is felt throughout the film in its virtual state. What is the present of the film, is constantly haunted, or as Deleuze writes, in a circuit with the virtual event. The film's present, where the actual images unfold, forms a circuit with the always present virtual. In this sense the present is to be understood as the mobile frontier of the film. The present of the film, inhabited by the virtual, operates through the various states of the operations as anticipation/memory (virtual) and through the different stages of the healing scar that marks Trebor's body (actual). Expressed in another way, the present is the intersecting point of the figure "8" forming continual circuits between actual images and the virtual event. In this sense it must be understood that the present is not merely the actual images, it is that which forms an intersecting point *between* what is virtual and actual. The present is therefore a mobile frontier situated at the limits of

what is actual and virtual *continually* splitting the film on the vertical axis. It occurs

at the (mobile) fold between the two perpetual movements. The actual images of the

scar (including its absence in the first half of the film) are therefore always in circuit

with the virtual event (in anticipation of the operation or as its memory), making up

the present of the film.

But, to be sure, there is yet *another movement of the present* that occurs

transversally to the actual-virtual circuits. A transversal movement is that which cuts

across the strata which, in this case, is the actual-virtual circuit. If, as noted, the

actual-virtual circuit is a vertical line, then the movement of the present cuts across

it. This present is the horizontal trajectory of the film, which chiefly occurs in two

ways. The first of these generates leaps of time, but which progresses in a singular

direction. In this type, the temporal gaps produce visual and temporal disjunctions,

and also intellectual aporias; nonetheless, the present shows the singular and forward

moving trajectory of time. The second type shows a non-chronological present, in

which the film's present continuously flips backwards and forwards, presenting

heterogeneous capsules of pasts and futures. In this sense the horizontal movement

of the present functions as a pivot, jumping between images of past and future times

in non-chronological order. Such duration fissures the film's temporal plane,

bringing into the mix questions such as "what will happen?" and "what has just

happened?" The rotating present incessantly splits the film into moments preceding a

given shot, which does not continue into a past, but shows a future instead. In the

same way, a shot that follows (the present shot) might not necessarily proceed

towards a future, but might lead towards a past instead. Thus, while the movement

of the present is horizontal, it can be non-continuous and also non-chronological.

In a chronologically ordered film, where causes lead to actions and reactions

following the spatio-temporal continuity of the movement-image, the present neatly

divides what is the past and future. In such a regime, the addition of a single random

moment would disrupt the narrative continuity of the film. Nonetheless, such

random moments do arise in the movement-image and these occur by way of

narrative techniques such as the flashback, dream sequences or through the use of

extremely subjective shots. These shots occur as recollection images that restore the

narrative causality within the film's linear time structure which, as Rodowick

explains, remain within the regime of the sensory-motor schema.[169]

Alternatively, in *L'Intrus*, the images arrive non-chronologically throughout

the film, where the interstice continually disrupts spatio-temporal progression.

Through such a process, interstitial repetition interrupts the continuous progression

between the past and future. Continual spatio-temporal disruptions bring about

increasingly shorter time-spans of what are pasts and futures, shredding the film's

surface of time into tiny fissures. These pasts and futures linked to each other as the

any-space-whatever form the labyrinthine time of the present, of Borges's "garden of

forking paths."[170]

In the time-image the incorporeal event, as Conley writes, "is coextensive with a state of extenuation, a condition of being beyond oneself...[where] nothing is contained in an event."[171] An event such as the operation is not thick with the present, it instead stretches out like a line moving on the surface of things unfolding in different pasts and futures. Its affects reverberate into the many folds of the film forming its multiplying echoes and resonances. Pasts and futures are cut into and reverberate with each other continuously in time. Such a structure destroys the possibility of the discreteness of space-time, which lays claim to the real. The event becomes exhausted by all possibilities, cutting up the words and actions of a typical chronological plot, where events and causes propel the narrative. In this cutting up, the film of the time-image moves beyond language, into an outside, leading Deleuze to write, "...now to be done with words."[172] When words evaporate, actions become indecipherable and ambiguous, moving in amorphous ways.

Trebor's journey from France to the South Pacific moves through such an outside beyond words or actions. We see that the present is never that of the now, but always the "folds and creases"[173] moving constantly between pasts and the futures to follow; the present unfolds as Trebor is frequently looking out of windows or pensive in bed, thinking about what is to follow or what came before. The present is always a remote field of activity, without action, in which Trebor feels the "effect of the effect,"[174] the scar reflecting its multiplying images every time he rubs it, or when he looks forward to finding his lost son (the scar in this instance becoming a

112

virtual, incorporeal one). The present has, in this way, "lost its hold and faded" into the future.[175] The past and the future unfold in his distanced and fading present, while he observes young Asian men who laugh at him, when he collapses in his shack by the sea, or while he rests in his hospital bed caught in its resonant tremors, but also as he anticipates a future to come in his hotel bed in Switzerland or by the lake where he rests and swims with his Huskies.

What we are left with are pure images and visions of the any-spaces-whatever. Linking different pasts and futures, they cut into Trebor's anticipation and wandering to the South Pacific. These any-spaces-whatever are of pasts that have been and of futures yet to come. Strung out in a chain they simultaneously reveal their transversal movement, presenting the two-limit conditions of their present: the actual-virtual circuits and the back and forth between pasts and futures, which cut across. The two jointly make up a labyrinthine line stretched out in endless twists and turns, and move as if lost in the nooks and fissures of pasts and futures, the actual and virtual, through constant divergences signaled by interstices. This is aionic time in *L'Intrus*, yielding the unlimited, lost time of incorporeal events.[176] It is the pure and empty form of time, a line that is freed from the thickness of events, actions and plots of the movement-image, making up the pure optical and sound images in *L'Intrus*.[177]

In all these pasts and futures connected to each other randomly, we have arrived at what Deleuze has called the crystal image of time, in which there is no

way to orient ourselves between what is real and what is imaginary. There is a point of indiscernibility, where there is no longer a definable progression of successive presents nor any method by which it would be possible to say that the actual follows the virtual or vice-versa. And as Rodowick points out, these are not merely subjective illusions but rather genuine chasms in which one fades in and the other fades out. Interstitial repetition thereby presents such an inability to distinguish between what is real and imaginary, yielding a paradox, in which we are unable to choose between equally possible yet mutually contradicting narrative explanations.[178] We have no way of knowing in *L'Intrus* whether the wild woman laughing on the dog-sled is real or imaginary, whether Trebor being dragged by the couple to his death is actual or fantasy, whether the head frozen in ice is real or not, whether the heart dripping with blood in the snow is imaginary, whether the dead torso wrapped in tarpaulin is real, or whether the many encounters with the different intruders that watch Trebor through the woods, in his cabin or on the streets are part of his imagination or whether the interviews conducted for finding a substitute son for him were real or not. Cues that would distinguish the real from the imaginary are unavailable. And, as Deleuze muses, we no longer even have a place from which to inquire what is real or imaginary. The reactive and mechanical actions of the sensory-motor regime of the movement-image that present plots, actions and reactions have been replaced by the purely visual time-images where the real-imaginary relations of images have now reached a point of indiscernibility:

114

> ...the distinction between subjective and objective...also tends to lose its importance, to the extent that the optical situation or visual description replaces the motor action. We run in fact into a principle of indeterminability, of indiscernibility: we no longer know what is imaginary or real, physical or mental, in the situation, not because they are confused, but because we do not have to know and there is no longer even a place from which to ask. It is as if the real and the imaginary were running after each other, as if each was being reflected in the other, around a point of indiscernibility.[179]

The empty, disconnected spaces of the any-spaces-whatever of the time-image[180] express the banality and idleness of the characters' lives. The actors are seen but their intentions are revealed only by the amorphous signs of their bodies. Trebor's physical presence is forceful and this physical sense denotes all possibilities in the spectator's impressions of him. What is seen of the characters or locations proceeds with a familiarity that, at best, sheds dim light on the situation. We see the familiar forms of characters wandering around in the woods or in what we comprehend to be city streets; what we cannot understand are their connections, relationships or encounters with each other (who is the woman who breeds the Huskies? who are the young East Asian men?). In what could have been the development of a plot, action or events of chronometric time, we now find purely visual time-images that show the aftermath or a before of what makes up an event. The spectator follows Trebor roaming around on city streets or travelling across continents and we never quite know the nature of what is unfolding before us. In fact we are led to a point where we are uncertain as to what is real and imaginary, physical or mental.

Interstitial repetitions thereby disrupt spatio-temporal continuity and link any-spaces-whatever. Their fleeting existence, however, occur less by their elusive presence than by creating visual disjunctions.[181] Seen and visible, interstices constitute visual ruptures expressing the spatio-temporal differences among images, shots or sequences by creating disjunctions. Their occurrence does not produce ordinary repetitions of continuation and prolongation of the same spatio-temporalities or of thought. Interstitial repetitions do not therefore produce bare repetitions, which reproduce the same identities, ideas or concepts. Instead, interstitial repetitions, enacted in a chain dispersed throughout the film, produce the differential of images, and therefore of thought, in which each image or shot propels its own particular direction in the film.[182]

Left to our own devices, we fabulate through the interstices that link different time-images together. In fabulating thinking is produced. Our thoughts fabulate connections among people, animals and things materializing on the film's visible surface (the actual). The interstices that generate the disjunctions between shots give rise to what is paradoxical, contradictory or unfathomable and thus also, simultaneously, become the moments for fabulation. The actual images that we see, the pure visual and optical signs realized in the any-spaces-whatever, create the disjunctions between pasts and futures that also circulate with the virtual. This constant modulation between pasts and futures, and between the actual-virtual circuits of the any-space-whatever, therefore, executes film's spiritual automation: it

connects the conscious and unconscious in thought and creates, in turn, psychic and

emotional connections in the spectator's internal monologue.[183] In the perpetual

repetition of the interstice there is simultaneously also a continual fabulation of

events, people and things. In fabulating we respond emotionally, psychologically

and psychically to the actual images in the film, where the spectator invariably

creates connections between the spatio-temporal gaps and dissonances. In fabulating

the spectator therefore generates virtual times, which come to proliferate the film.

Interstitial repetition thus constantly enacts the virtual multiplicity in a film.[184]

Second type of disjunctive synthesis: divergence and intensity

On another level, however, the disjunctive synthesis in film can work in a different

way. In *L'Intrus*, it isn't a spoken language, script or dialogue that finds itself written

into the film. Instead, passions are expressed through affective elements that Denis

cuts together: howling dogs, disemboweled heart, frozen head in ice and open, wild

landscapes. In one of the early sequences, for instance, Trebor's dogs begin to bark

as they sense an intruder. This shot is cut to Trebor polishing his shiny dagger,

followed by a brief glimpse of a dead man, followed by Trebor making love to an

unknown woman. Each of these images, cut together in a sequence, is charged with

the varying affects of the series, much like a stone skimming the water jounces from

point to point: howls, sharp gleaming knife, dead man's torso, lovers' embraces. In

what is a continually diverging and multiplying series, we are unsure of what has

just taken place in this sequence. For instance, while death is glimpsed in one of these shots through a dead man's torso, we never do come to an understanding of who the intruder is or why such a killing has taken place. More baffling, the shot of the dead man being wrapped in tarpaulin is succeeded by the two lovers' embrace.

While disjunctions between such shots forming a sequence do not merely become conjunctions by way of suturing, the synthesis in this disjunctive series is one in which divergences are distributed by the many shots linked together in a chain.[185] The disjunctions are not, however, merely connected by virtue of being stitched together to form a continuous whole. Instead, we could say that *divergences persist without being consumed into a continuation* in a manner that allows such diverging shots in a sequence to persist in their own infinite movements. The problem of the "logic of sense," Deleuze writes, is to know how to transcend its form, to cut its syntactical link beyond mere logical contradiction. What Deleuze means is that the sense of logic of a disjunctive synthesis must be found.[186] In the shot sequence referred to above the images are neither logically contradictory, as seen in paradoxical disjunction, nor are they oppositional movements. The basis for the images' linking together is, in fact, unclear in the film. But even such a chain of incompossible, diverging images can become a mode of communication. The important aspect that needs addressing in this type of sequence is the abandonment of what constitutes identity. Through identity opposites can come to be affirmed or similarities can be attributed to two things. That is, in the identification process, we

118

come to classify an object, concept or image as having differences or similarities in terms of their representation. In the process of identification, differences occur from the external comparison between two things, rather than from the pure internal differences of the thing itself. Similarities are therefore produced by the return of the same through its identification with what preceded it. However, once prior identities disintegrate in the return, that is, when what returns occurs as difference to what preceded it, what returns become unhinged in the process of identification. Within such systematization, difference is given a negative attribution. Identity is constituted by the return of the same; what returns is the same identity given to a group or to an idea, becoming inclusionary. Difference, on the other hand, becomes negative and exclusionary.

From such a point of view, we understand the succession of images by virtue of their continuous spatio-temporal relations, which establish the continuity of the narrative through plot progression, cause and effect, or through the events brought about by the flow in the characters' action and reactions. In these movement-images, spectatorial identification stabilizes with the return of the same characters, sets and objects in the narrative. On the other hand, in a sequence where such identification through similarity does not occur, we understand images through negative difference, which performs its task by way of excluding one image from the next.

Instead, we can come to understand *L'Intrus's* chain of different images through positive difference.[187] In the case of two different images that present their

different elements, rather than compare the second to the first by way of the second

image's repetition with the first -- which would present its difference or similarity to

it -- we need to affirm the distance between them as *that which relates to the other*

by virtue of their link in the chain. Drawing from Klossowski, Deleuze writes that in

the return, that which returns dissolves itself. For our purpose here, therefore, each

image or shot cut into the sequence within a disjunctive chain, the returning image,

lacks identity and dissolves itself. The dissolved self, returning, moves as an

intensity of a pure movement, as a pure event. In the return, the dissolved self

"already comprehends difference in itself, the unequal within itself, which,

penetrates all others, across and within multiple bodies."[188] Herein we can say lies

the penetration of one image with another in the sequence through what Klossowski

calls the insufflation of one breath within the other: within a breath is contained

another, within one thought another is contained, and within one machine another

machine.[189] Within one image therefore, another is contained. The emerging

intensity of a single shot expresses a difference, a pre-individual singularity, which

communicates with all other shots *without* forming disjunctions with them. The

intensity passes through all the different images and simultaneously affirms them,

rather than excludes them. The synthesis in this chain of disjunctive images thereby

becomes no longer exclusionary or negative; it takes on an affirmative and positive

sense by means of this mobile entity, which passes through all the disjunctions.[190]

The cuts between the howls, sharp gleaming knife, dead man's torso, lovers' embrace, it could be said, are all charged with an intensity which passes through them all. Intensity here is pure motion or pure spirit and occurs as a pre-individual singularity in the entire sequence; this pre-individual singularity is charged moreover with an intensity that is willed and which possesses an intention.[191] Nietzsche articulates such a will to be *Physis* which, he writes, is superior to the reign of laws as it is the "will that wills itself through all change, amounting to a 'power' opposed to law."[192]

Each different shot in the sequence, therefore, as a field of individuation possesses this pre-individual singularity and intensity which, in passing through the other, takes on that other intensity through the entire sequence. The intensity that we feel in the Huskies' howls passes through another image found in the form of the sharp gleaming knife with its threatening contours and a cold hard surface that shows a malevolent force. The knife then cuts to the image of the dead man's torso and into the lovers' embrace. The changing images lose their forms but the intensity that each image expresses conveys the emotional charge of the entire sequence. Thus we have a sequence, a chain of different images strung together, in which the intensity that passes through them all continually returns in each different image. This affirmative sense of the disjunctive sequence is one in which the images, although different in their spatio-temporal locations, are nonetheless held together by the intensity passing through them all.

Seen from this angle, divergences cease to be of a negative order that excludes other images based on their differential identities. In this way divergences and disjunctions operate through affirmation, through positive difference rather than through a negative difference in which divergence no longer becomes the principle of separation. Positive differences come to be measured by their finitude rather than by their infinite contradictions with each other (the identity of an object constituted in infinite ways is understood by its negative difference from another). Incompossibility between diverging images instead becomes a way of communication rather than separation or exclusion.[193]

Nonetheless, we do need to recognize that these disjunctions are not to be reduced to conjunctions because *they continue to bear differences from each other*: the images in the sequence do diverge from each other. In the case of convergence through identity, such as found in the movement-image in which shots are spatio-temporally continuous, each object would have to lose certain elements of itself in order to be constituted into a definable category that forms its identity. In narrative continuity, convergence through identity becomes possible through the shot-reverse-shot sequence, the 180° axis rule and the eye-line matches which present the spatio-temporal elements within a sequence as unified. Rather than lose their various differential elements to this disciplining, each diverging image in the *L'Intrus* sequence instead returns as a pre-individual singularity, as pure event. As pre-individual singularities, each image opens up to an infinity of possibilities and in

doing so, loses its centre and its self as it passes through all the other images in the sequence. What we have then are intensities of images that are pure events, rather than an identification with shots, objects, events, images or concepts that would convey a narrative continuity. This disjunctive synthesis, therefore, has a centre, which is perpetually decentered and functions to affirm divergence.[194] The passionate and strangely stirring images in the sequence come to be cut together[195] in which the film's line of becoming becomes a broken one.[196] Continuity editing, by which a film achieves its narrative sense in the movement-image, is strained to its limit and altogether lost within the disjunctive sequence of the time-image.

Planes of consciousness

As we have seen so far, movement-images, which present our intellect with the logic of coherently penetrating filmic space and time, collapse in *L'Intrus*. Our orientation in space and time is undermined as we can move only indeterminately through the affective forces of images and through disjunctive syntheses, both of which we experience as confused multiplicities.[197] From one scene to the next the film unfolds through image-impressions without an identifiable plot or narrative. The image-flows lead nowhere and seem to buckle under from presenting an account of anything. The ambiguity and indetermination is also manifest on the impersonal plane, where runaway glimpses of howling Huskies, snowy landscapes and heaving oceanic sighs leave little chance for personally identifying with them; these images

123

do, however, propel their affects through the film. These images also present the affective forces, which are impersonal,[198] creating sensations with their different movements and speeds circulating through the film. The movements and speeds of the different images, added to their varying colour luminosities, light intensities and sound densities, pull the film in different directions, and while we recognize familiar sounds and images, we also become aware of the film's illegibility and intellectual inapproachability.[199] Partially recognizable characters meander through a flow of undulating images without purposefulness, reason or meaning. This flow of images captures the heterogeneous movements of time. This flow further expresses Denis's play with the images through the process of dynamic genesis,[200] or intuition, which endures beyond a maternal language.[201]

The problem with the official grammar of a language is that it imposes a stable and constant word-order chain of command, organizing the world in a particular way. Set within such an ordering, the universe comes to be conceived and understood from a given set of rules rather than from internal experience; feelings and impressions are ordered, organized and governed according to an effecting and correcting logic of a maternal language. A grammar imposed externally from the rules of a language structure can therefore come to alienate the pure qualities that we experience internally, as we function in the world. The demands of social life take on greater practical significance than our internal experiences; language enforces distinctive multiplicity,[202] in that what is imposed from the outside, whether

scientific laws of spatialization or a given film's orientation in space and time, comes into effect. Bergson writes that what happens is that "we instinctively tend to solidify our impressions in order to express them in language."[203] Our fleeting experiences, which are internal to us (in the form of confused multiplicity), become projected within a homogenized space so that "our impressions are constantly changing, wrapping themselves round the external object, which is its cause, adopting its precise contours and immobility."[204]

The affective forces brought about by interstitial repetitions that form a chain of diverging shots, release film from language and from the grasp of a maternal grammar. In a diverging sequence the impressions of our inner duration come to express themselves more freely and their production is attuned more towards real experiences than the law which comes into effect. These freely roving expressions that collide and disappear come to make up *L'Intrus*. Evacuated from the burden of the stable, common and determining elements, the logic and excessive sense of a maternal language of the movement-image, these roving expressive forces instead present their fugitive and unstable sensations. Precarious, these images in the film seem to oscillate between what is decipherable and what is not. Visible are the roving forces in their varied speeds and movements -- human, animal and landscape -- but what is incomprehensible are their binding agents, their connections, relations and continuities to each other. These shots are radically free agents populating the film. Randomly appearing and lacunary, these forces, in effect, present the spectator

with an endless series of gaps in intellectual understanding. These intellectual gaps

are persistent and chronic, imperiling the film with threats of implosion. The living

line *is* a broken line.[205] We see figures and characters walking, biking, driving,

being dragged, city-scapes, open stretches of land and water, animals grazing, dogs

roaming through landscapes, and sometimes, we see their interactions with each

other. However, we never come to an understanding of their relations to each other

or grasp their purpose in the film; each fragment of time is disrupted by another

fragment, making up the filmic chain.

As noted earlier, the recollection of the past in the movement-image

(frequently devised through the use of a flashback occurring in the present) *refers*

spectators to past events. Time in such instances, Deleuze writes, is represented

indirectly based on the chain of presents in the movement-image that leaves us

beholden to a psychological memory.[206] A deeper memory is one that roves through

the depths of time, a "pure memory" that is "in excess of recollection, actuality and

consciousness."[207] Pure memory is therefore a world memory to which we all

belong, one that was Alain Resnais's and one also to be found in Denis's *L'Intrus*.

Such a world memory cuts and leaps between the different planes[208] or fragments of

consciousness, causing disruptions in the mechanized and reactive sensory-motor

regime of the movement-image. None of the images in the film is connected to the

other in successive presents; instead, each opens itself up to time as an "impossible

continuity," as an "aberrant movement" shattering the "sublime flow" from

perception-image to action-image from the inside.[209] The interstitial disjunction occurring in the automatic sensory-motor flow from perception to affection and action creates an internal fracturing in the image, generating an incommensurable space between the two.[210] Here we find Trebor frequently in contemplation looking out of windows, lying awake in bed restless or wandering off to the South Pacific Islands in the search for his lost son. What would be given to the character's action is instead given to Trebor losing himself in his thoughts, to a free and open time that is dislocated and non-localizable. Such stretches of emptied time are aberrant because they are no longer dependent on movement; instead, Deleuze writes, "it is aberrant movement that depends on time."[211]

Rather than connect a character's perception of something to an action, interstitial repetitions link diverging fragments leaping between different planes of consciousness. These image fragments are the various flows of time: from Trebor being dragged in the snow, the interviews conducted to find a substitute son for him, the head in frozen ice, the cacophony of wailing Huskies, the schooner loosing itself to the storm, to the repeating image of the laughing woman on the sled. These are the erratic, dissonant and polyphonic rhythms of a modern symphony, singularities and intensities which, rather than harmonizing, present dizzying, confusing and discordant tongues that seem to emanate from different and sometimes unknown planes of time.

These different flows of time are not subject to the ordered memory of consciousness retrieving what *needs* recollection such as we find in the movement-image in which the character recalls a particular memory in order to explain the actions of a character or the details or an unfolding plot. The flows of time in *L'Intrus* are rather haphazard and random coming to touch each other in time spontaneously through dynamic genesis; they are fragments of the whole of pure memory. Resistant to logic emanating from the continuous flow of a singular consciousness, these random flows occur among the various planes of consciousness, constantly cutting into the film from the outside. Each shot, which is a fragment of time, arises from outside a narrative logic. The whole of the film is constituted through the outside. These flows that constitute the filmic flux are therefore confusing and bewildering to the spectator as their random appearance cannot orient the spectator within the narrative spatio-temporally. Unable to produce the logic necessary for such an orientation, the relations and connections among shots and sequences also lose their links to each other, bringing about confusion.

Such a flustering of images is constituent to what Deleuze maintains is the flow emanating in perception that folds and unfolds between clarity and obscurity. Writing that clarity is "in itself confused [and] it is confused *in so far as it is clear*,"[212] Deleuze presents the movement of ordinary perception, which oscillates continually between its two poles of clarity and obscurity. Williams explains that any individuation is constituent to a series of processes in which ideas, intensities

and actual identities come to be interlinked and interdependent on each other.[213]

These interconnections, dependencies and relations generate individuation. Each image present, such as the scar, Huskies or a field of cows courses through the film, and moves with varying intensities as it unfolds in different sequences. The greater the intensity with which an image or an idea comes to be expressed produces greater clarity in the image; the lesser the intensity, the more obscure an image or an idea will be. At points an image will be expressed with greater intensity than at others, such as that of a heart dripping with blood on ice, or the masseuse massaging the scar; the field of cows or the meeting with some official Japanese men is, on the other hand, less intense. The entire duration of the film comes to express such undulating intensities and obscurities. These fluctuations between clarity and obscurity also create the internal movements of the film. And this internal movement between clarity and obscurity disturbs the maternal grammar of the movement-image, which moves from plot point to plot point through clear definition, if even sometimes purposefully concealing or shading bits of useful information. The logical ordering of a film that is enacted through the force of a plot or through continuity editing wraps itself around pre-givens: around a clarity of ordering that appears from an external, pre-given rule (its maternal language). And as Bergson has noted, such logic flows through the workings of a conscious thought that wraps itself over the internal workings of intuition.

Pearson points out that Deleuze's aim in thinking radical difference[214] is to reveal the difficulty and complexity of intensities and the field of individuation. Intensities, being anonymous matter, do not possess the simple clarity that we may be looking for, seeing how the clear and confused maintain their relation to an idea or an image. This twofold relation between the clear and confused, I would therefore claim, unravels the power of this film in which we are taken through mobile, multiple points of intensities and also through obscure, indiscernible ones that implicate the film's very matter.[215] Each fragment from the plane of consciousness that leaps into the film arises from what we have noted to be world memory that falls into different phyla. While Pearson refers to "phyletic lineages" that would consist of the generally accepted groupings of plants and animals with evolutionary traits,[216] I regard phyla here as the different groupings between organic-inorganic-synthetic systems: non-human animals (Huskies, horses, cows, birds, other animals); landscapes (oceans, lakes, cityscapes, country roads, snowy/green fields of winter and summer); humans (the intruders, Louis, "wild woman," blind masseuse, and others); organic-inorganic assemblages (frozen heart in snow, faces in ice); and synthetic elements (interstices, editing, mise-en-scène etc.).

As noted earlier, this second type of disjunctive synthesis, which is divergent, an intensity passes through a myriad of different images. In this passing of intensity from one image to another we constantly traverse the different phyla in the film (albeit within the class of what constitutes the time-image). In the spectator's

exposure to, for instance, the Huskies' frenzied barking or the tropical storm, we find variables within fields of individuation in the film: it is not possible to fix fields of individuation (dog or storm). While on the one hand the storm and barking Huskies are precisely that, fixed individuations, on a molecular level, however, is it not also possible to say that the intensity given to the barking Huskies is also that of the storm? In the passing of intensity through images, the field of individuation has changed from Husky to storm, but the intensity has returned. What defined the clarity of a field of individuation on a molar level becomes fluid and less clearly expressed on a micro level.[217]

Moreover, the relations that pass between two images such as the Huskies' barking and the storm's fury generate their own varied actual-virtual circuits. These actual-virtual circuits are the realms of "enveloped life,"[218] and in a film, constantly connect the variables within fields of individuation. In these variable relations of the actual-virtual circuits, a film moves between moments of clarity and obscurity. *L'Intrus* brings about such mobility between what is obscure and clear and thereupon enacts not only what makes it singular but also gives rise to its multiplicities.

The chain of disconnected shots presents the multiple and random flows of time. These time-images comprise a world memory that open themselves up to different histories and forms of remembering, to other voices and images including, as Al-Saji writes, "the material universe, animal life, human subjects, [which] are already there in pure memory and demand to be heard."[219] We hear the chattering

winds sweeping over the open seas, Huskies barking, money changing hands, frozen heads in ice and horses galloping. These are the different planes of consciousness of the different organic-inorganic-synthetic systems of random time flows that seem to collide, reveal intensities and slip miraculously from unknown places into the film. The forces of memories from different planes of consciousness rove around, leaping out of the order of chronometric time, a the logic of maternal grammar, revealing the different planes of memory. These are Bergson's pluralities of the different rhythms of duration in which, each rhythm, as Deleuze points out, "is an absolute, and...each rhythm is itself a duration."[220] Duration, here, becomes a heterogeneous continuity. Strung together in a chain, each shot presents its own image of time, the film thereby, presents duration that is continually diverging. The different regions of pure memory in foment, the film is out of chronometric time as it unfolds through disjunctions *and* continuity, which are maintained in the synthesizing present.[221] The present, as I have noted, becomes a synthesizing moment as it stretches into the past and future of this world memory.

Drawing upon the different phyletic fragments, the method by which the film proceeds is in the form of nomadic movements that shift from the personal to the impersonal, from indirect speech to animal howls, to inorganic, impersonal consciousness. These shifts can only occur through the work of the interstice, which continually interrupts each movement; the interstice, in this way, continually jars the film's flow and continuity. These variations create a continual flux in expression

132

where the personal sometimes occupies a foreign territory, as with Trebor's growing

alienation from the world (and indeed from himself) in the image of the dripping

heart severed in the snow. Sometimes the movements express unknown intensive

qualities of familiar spheres such as a city, an animal or humans. In the images from

Southeast Asia we see Korean businessmen conducting their affairs, we also

experience a sense of alienation in the exchange of medical reports and money in

Geneva. The pack of Huskies barking presents an intensity that is fierce. Sometimes

we experience the repetition of similar images, as with the woman laughing on the

sled or with the constant trespass of intruders. In other images we find the humorous,

as in Henry's interviews to find a substitute son for Trebor. By engaging in this

method, Denis experiments with the creative forces of images, not so much by

expressing the merely personal but rather, in operating through intuitive forces as *a*

method, as Bergson appealed to, in order to bypass the limits of the intellect.[222] The

image from the outside can only appear through the workings of the interstice, which

interrupts the preceding flow of thought. The interstitial moment thereby breaks up

the movement of thought, introducing a new image into the mix. It forces a

disruption in the continuity of images, forcing a new thought into consciousness. It

forces us to unthink the habit of image-continuity in chronometric time. The habit of

thinking images and thought within continuous time is the limit of the intellect.

Third disjunctive synthesis: involution

The third type of disjunctive synthesis found in *L'Intrus* occurs by way of the length of the shots themselves and is constituted not by the physical cut but by disjunctions occurring on a psychical or mental plane. If the conventional long-take, such as Hitchcock's famous opening shot in *Frenzy* (1.17 minutes), occurs by carefully designed stage direction, mise-en-scène, cinematography and script writing, then some of the longer takes of *L'Intrus* present a variation from narrative film convention.[223] This type of shot should not be mistaken for the deep-focus shots of *Citizen Kane* either, where characters acting on different planes[224] render their performances according to the written script. A change from these types of shots cannot be achieved through the logic of simple opposition between the movement-image and time-image. In Antonioni's *The Passenger*, which would also be an example of the time-image, we find a long rambling shot spanning 6.15 minutes, but which, as Totaro writes, took several days to compose.[225] Rather, what we have in *L'Intrus* are stretches of time, which in resisting the cut, find themselves opening up to the universe. In this movement of expansion, we might say that the grammar of filmmaking with respect to the shot's mise-en-scène or direction is almost lost. We are caught in the movement of characters (human or non-human) and landscapes, which follow their own internal rhythms rather than the intrusions of an excessive filmmaking logic that follows the rationale of shot composition, direction or which follows a narrative plot or action. In this sense the shots in *L'Intrus* are qualitatively

different by showing ordinary environments where flows of life occur, and by chance, come to be populated by fictional characters. In this sense they combine senses of "documentation" and "fiction" as ensemble.[226]

One aspect of these open, meandering shots in *L'Intrus* is where characters and their movements take up their own speeds and in doing so, they create imperceptible changes, constituting micro-divergences *within* such shots. The long takes of Trebor biking through the countryside or swimming in the lake or the interviews that Henri conducts to find a substitute son for Trebor would constitute such shots. These shots increasingly challenge the notions of identity of the actor as a character whose characterization unfolds in the film performance. As Margulies writes about Chantal Akerman's *Je tu il elle* (1976), the main character is desubjectified escaping the proper subject of enunciation. The character conveys pluralities rather than a unified subjecthood moving between what is "I," "you," "him," "her."[227] Similarly, in *L'Intrus*, we find that Trebor and the interviewees vacillate in between characters and actors, between figure and selfhood. Left to follow his/their bodily inclinations, characters involute between what is script and being, bringing about their various becomings.[228] These becomings constitute micro-shifts from what are the more staged elements of filmmaking as the characters seem to "go their own way," following their own dispositions rather than a script. The logic in *L'Intrus* moves therefore from the requirements of conveying a narrative sense into a loosening of that sense to the point of exclusion, so much so that such

shots are "strained to their limits" in terms of their mise-en-scène, plot or direction. Such imperceptible shifts are slippages produced between acting and the becomings of characters-actors-persons, constituting divergences that occur purely on a psychical level.

Another point of note is that the disjunction occurring in these types of shots occurs within the shot itself, which is drawn out and expansive. Rather than use specific scripts, give precise directions or acting instructions, disjunction occurs by way of the images *involuting* into the internal durations of actors, landscapes and things. Involution occurs therefore in the movement of becoming between what is script and the becoming of actors/landscapes. For instance when we see the Huskies running through the landscapes, snow drifting through city streets or the long oceanic shots, the shots involute transforming into their elemental rhythms and movements. The shot thereby moves between what appears directed and the internal durations of characters-actors, of the weather, of landscapes or of objects such as buildings. The duration of these shots indirectly also carries out their interruptive disjunctions from the other shots, which precede and succeed them in the film.

Last, there are divergences in these shots by virtue of elements within the same shot flying off in different directions. These elements might be a stray bird flying off in the landscape, plastic bags being carried off by a breeze on a city street or leaves rustling in a forest. These "extra" or "supra" moments also generate divergences within the same shot. None of these divergences is formed by the

interstice per say, as physical cuts, yet they make up what constitutes

psychical/mental divergences within a shot. They are not exclusionary or separate

from the shot, but rather become the means for communicating such differences.[229]

In these shots we come to observe that the animals grazing in pastures, the

rhythms of the ocean or snow descending over the cityscape all enact their own time.

The spectator experiences many movements that constitute the impersonality of the

universe: pelting rain, howling Huskies, galloping horses, dripping hearts, sailing

barges, machinery operating: the different elements roving around the film that come

to touch each other intuitively.[230] Through what Smith calls the method of dynamic

genesis or intuition, we come into the film's own singular logic of sense. And it is in

this sense of the shots following their own internal logic which produce divergences,

interruptions and slippage that truth can be said to arise from within them. Rather

than presuming truth as arising from the factual grammar of a maternal language,

which then seeks its own condition, Deleuze demands that sense itself -- the sense of

snow drifting over the city -- should be seen as producing truth, rather than

occurring by way of a grammar of filmmaking that conforms to states of affairs of a

plot. Narrative continuity demands the development of a plot, characters, dialogue

and events in tow. The ascription of truth (and falsity) merely to propositions that

are commanded by a maternal grammar, therefore, remains indifferent to what they

ground, and such indifference, Deleuze notes, is the seductive problem with the

logic of sense.[231]

Time and virtual multiplicity

Images (including sounds) in *L'Intrus* drift into our brain as passing moments, come into being and then vanish into other moments of duration. Duration, Bergson wrote, is experienced as both continuous *and* heterogeneous *and* through a single Time. The notion of virtual multiplicity is one in which a single Time is replete with the heterogeneous movements of the universe. The heterogeneous rhythms of the various planes of consciousness noted above, that come to inhabit *L'Intrus*, each take on their own duration *within* the single continuous time of a shot. Each of these shots, strung into a chain generates the film's involutions, its internal movements that flee the order of Chronos or chronometric time. Furthermore, as Pearson notes, we can come to consider that the notion of a single time does not mean that everything that exists follows the same rhythm of time, or that there is only a single tension of duration in the universe.[232]

Even more, multiple divergences should not be equated to the theory of relativity, which defers to the time units of clocks. To Bergson, clock-time is not a lived time and therefore the time of relativity is not real; virtual multiplicity cannot therefore be confused with the mathematical time that the theory of relativity proposes.[233] Virtual multiplicity, being qualitative duration, is rather to be considered as the time of living systems the durations and spatio-temporal dynamic flows of which are bound up with things in nature and the environment. The

reoccurring shot of Trebor gazing through the window is one such example of being bound up with the world, even as he stands still.

In Deleuze's *Bergsonism*, he makes the case for a single time, in which a single time refers to a whole that is virtual. Moreover, as it is bound up with the virtual whole of duration, a single time refers to a universal and impersonal time, removing time from the problem of an individual conscious observer.[234] Whereas Bergson had presented a single time through the duration of a single perceiving subject as containing all the other fluxes,[235] Deleuze radicalizes this notion of a single time by presenting it as an impersonal time. This notion of an impersonal time is an important point here for two reasons. First, in considering *L'Intrus*, we have come to understand that in the notion of the different planes of consciousness touching each other, each plane moves in time with its own heterogeneous internal rhythm and speed. Each of these planes (each shot), therefore, is constituted as continuous *and* heterogeneous and experienced within a single Time. The divergences occurring on a psychical/mental plane within a single shot noted above (e.g., a dog chasing a fly while a character walks in the woods, where it is raining and the branches are swaying) constitutes its heterogeneity. Second, as we will see below, the notion of impersonal time is important in considering the movements of the universe, which come to be captured through the impersonal, mechanical view of camera consciousness, which is bound up with the virtual whole of duration.[236]

All the heterogeneous flows of time that are experienced are the different rhythms but they, Bergson wrote, can be "a single one, at will."[237] However Deleuze postulates uncomfortably that such a conceptualization presents the duration of a single perceiving subject as the one that contains all the other fluxes. Such a notion would mean, he writes, that "Bergson's whole thesis consists in demonstrating that the fluxes can only be livable or lived in the perspective of a single time."[238] In *Bergsonism*, Deleuze therefore changes the personal and subjective nature of Bergson's duration to that which makes it impersonal by eliminating human consciousness. He writes, "a single duration will pick up along its route the events of a totality of the material world; and we will then be able to eliminate the human consciousness that we had initially available…there will now only be impersonal time in which all things will flow."[239] Similarly, Pisters writes that in filmmaking, in the elimination of a singular human consciousness, such as that of the director's or cinematographer's, we can find Deleuze's notion of an impersonal time in "camera consciousness"[240] as impersonal individuation, or what is referred to as *haecceity*.[241]

Through camera consciousness it becomes possible to record impersonal time in film in which all things that flow before the camera eye -- the rhythms of life -- appear in cinema. In this single duration of a shot, the recording camera is both flux (as a part of the larger movement of the entire film) and also representative of Time (in which all the fluxes of a single shot become engulfed). Here the director's rhythms come to play out, and also those of characters-actors, the temporal

140

movements of landscapes and weather, be it snow falling, cows in a pasture, a bird

flying through a shot or wind rustling the leaves of a branch. Many rhythms come to

be constituted in a single shot recorded by the mechanical eye. In Trebor's gaze

through the window, we also notice the rhythms of the dogs, the landscape and

weather. Here, in a single shot, there is only one time, the duration of the recording

camera, although there is an infinity of fluxes that participate in the same virtual

whole of that shot. (Such fluxes will continue to expand exponentially for the entire

film, which then expands into the movements of the universe.) A single time of the

shot, therefore, implies the different fluxes. Duration as virtual multiplicity,

therefore, is to be found in the impersonal time of camera consciousness, as this

single Time.[242] A shot in this way is a representative of Time, in which all fluxes --

actual and virtual -- are engulfed.

The duration of each shot creates multiple divergences within it by virtue of

the movements arising from the different fluxes. Shots constituting the drift of

different images, linked together through the interstice, multiply further such

divergences. Movements that arise in a shot *and* in the interstitial moments between

two shots create films' ever-expanding heterogeneous continuity to infinity: its single

Time with virtual multiplicity. Here the notion of a machine existing within a

machine onto infinity will be useful in understanding the impersonal single Time of

the universe. A single shot with its multiple rhythms and durations is contained

within the film, which is contained within the single Time of the universe.

Virtual multiplicity and the image of thought

As I have tried to show, each image in *L'Intrus*, which occurs on a different plane of consciousness, flows from the void and offers thought from the outside. The interstice makes possible the continual drift of images into the film-space, opening up the film to the whole outside. The flux of images streaming through before vanishing into the void from which it arises, creates disjunctions and unfamiliarity. Continually moving beyond what is knowable, visible and conscious, each shot from a different plane of consciousness pushes Denis' film to its limit, folding into that which is inexplicable, inscrutable, exhausting. In the serial repetition of the interstice the image returns as an unknown, unrecognized quality, forcing the limits of our own intellectual engagement with it. This unrecognizability in the flow of images forces us to think. In the midst of such strain the different faculties are raised to perform a transcendent exercise as the spectator's senses grasp at the streaming images. Such a grasping, Deleuze writes, is the "education of the senses."[243] Faced with indeterminable, unknown images the faculties continually break down rather than coincide and correlate with others to form what is a determinable or known identity of an object or an idea. Indeed, Deleuze writes that it is in this breakdown or disarray between our various faculties that we actually come to learn anything new. In this breakdown we might come upon unexpected ways of perceiving, remembering or understanding things, in which a given faculty might operate in

peculiar ways, in an unexpected capacity, almost miraculously. Unawares, our

memory might become useful for seeing and our vision for operating cognition. To

this effect, Deleuze writes:

> The limits of the faculties are encased one in the other in the broken
> shape of that which bears and transmits difference. There is no more
> method for learning than there is a method for finding treasures, but a
> violent training, a culture or *paideia* which affects the entire
> individual (an albino in whom emerges the act of sensing in
> sensibility, an aphasic in whom emerges the act of speech in
> language, an acephalous being in whom emerges the act of thinking
> in thought).[244]

Showered by the endlessly repeating interstice, which generates paradoxes,

disrupts thought-flows and multiplies unknown factors, the spectator is left in a

whirlwind of heterogeneous time flows struggling to cope cognitively and

psychically. Interstitial repetition facilitates the breakup of images and therefore the

flow of thought itself, where each image arising from the outside forces the limits of

the intellect, propelling the movement of thought. As Deleuze writes, ideas, by

themselves do not possess an actuality and are therefore purely virtual, as they are

brought about by numerous differential relations that compose them.[245] Ideas

themselves are the thoughts of the *cogito*, and the fractured I of the *cogito* make

them indeterminate. The multitude of thoughts that are generated in the fracturing I,

therefore, exist in their different aggregated ways. Ideas, therefore, necessarily

subsist in these fractures, in the interstice, and "emerge on their edges,"

indeterminate and ceaselessly forming and disappearing.[246]

We can come to see, therefore, how ideas existing in the interstitial fracture between two time-images emerge in states of pure virtuality, in their multiple, indeterminate forms.[247] This indetermination, existing in the state of pure virtual relations, is manifest when we see *L'Intrus's* concluding sequence. The shots move by their pure virtual connections to each other, in the visual-cognitive rupturing produced in the interstitial moments, rather than in the binding of narrative continuity. We fabulate through the different time-images linked together where, out of the blue, we see the same woman who stalks Trebor in Europe. She is pursuing him somewhere in East Asia and then to the Pacific Islands, where she intrudes upon him again when he is deeply ill in hospital. A close-up of her peering face is cut to the scene in a morgue, where a huge scar reveals a corpse's chest. Following only what could be our speculation about who the intruder is, or the image of the scar on the corpse (the identity of which remains unrevealed but which we venture to guess), we come to the film's conclusion. With the infirm Trebor returning home we see images of the coffin being loaded onto a ship with the piercing, invasive noises of operating machinery, followed by images that show the dark presence of expansive waters. The ship's swaying motion ensues as it veers away and then the image cuts to the young man, ostensibly the substitute-son, giving the ailing Trebor some water. Last, we see the nameless woman's unrestrained laughing as she pulls away in her sled drawn by excited Huskies in the snowy wilderness, presumably somewhere in the Jura Mountains in France.

In this concluding sequence, heterogeneous images are linked together by the interstice in which multiple virtualities emerge and ideas come to be generated. Ideas, as pure virtual entities, therefore exist in an inexhaustible state in the interstice. And being indeterminate, ideas, Williams writes, "can only ever be approximated through constructs that reveal aspects of its internal relations."[248] An idea therefore expresses only aspects of an actual thing, such as an image. The image of the scar circulates with its multiple virtualities, of which three of its reciprocal virtual relations may been noted: as the expression of pain for the lost son; the intrusive presence of the foreign heart that is snatched from the bodies of others; and, the mobile frontier that splits the film into its two streams of past and future. By virtue of the scar's expression in something, it reveals the other through a reciprocal relation whereby they come to determine each other. The scar reveals pain, the lost son, the illegal trade in body parts, Trebor's self-estrangement and much more. And just as an equation in differential calculus can never be exhausted, ideas cannot be either. Deleuze shows how ideas and problems are relatable to equations and their differentials. Ideas, he writes, are the "differentials of thought" in which each idea, being available to a differential calculus, means that its imaginative qualities move beyond the utilitarian subordination of thought to things or to a purpose. The important point here is that an idea can be viewed in endlessly different ways which, in turn, reveals its endless significant reciprocal points. But with respect to qualitative multiplicity, these endless differential points of view cannot be reduced

145

to mere numbers, and even more importantly, to some identifiable unity. Rather, a multiplicity is to be understood more through its positive differences, through its continuous variations rather than through its negative difference, which arises from quantitative or numerical values. Williams explains that qualitative states of difference are constituted, for instance, by allowing various shades of a colour to drift through you rather than in counting the actual number of shades a colour has. He writes therefore that we must connect to the pure variations in ideas and sensations (which are finite and affirmative) rather than connect to the actual objects themselves (which are infinite and negative in their differences).[249]

Through these relations between ideas and their qualitative variations, we understand the relations between two time-images brought together through the interstice generating their virtual multiplicity. Thus, an idea emerges in the interstitial moment between two images expressing virtual multiplicity and revealing its many reciprocal points in the two images connected to it. The idea of "pain" or "lost son" or "illegal trade in body parts," which are never articulated in the film as such, come to be generated in the interstices connecting images. In this sense they are never determinate and always forming, adding, eliminating, reforming, always on edges. The sign of the scar operates as a structure of elements in continuous variation, as positive difference, and is resistant to identification as such. The scar functions as a visible sign always in different stages of recovery corresponding to virtual presences throughout the film. And by the film's conclusion it functions fully

outside of Trebor's body, revealing what may be his son's dead body. The relations now between the two actual scars, on two bodies, connected through the interstice, produce in turn their own different virtual multiplicity. The two actual forms that are now two different scars subsequently produce their own virtual relations. The two scars extend and multiply into a relation between two things that spreads into the world. The virtual, is therefore also the totality of ideas and intensities that circulate between the actual images; the actual images, on the other hand, operate by the things that they incarnate in the physical manifestation of objects and things, in signs.[250] Thus, just as experience is not possible outside of ideas, a film is not possible outside of its actual-virtual circuits.

Conclusion

In the time-images of cinema, the interstice forms the points of connection between spatio-temporally unrelated shots, giving rise to visual and cognitive disjunctions. In Denis's *L'Intrus*, I have identified three types of disjunctions at work: the paradox; divergences and intensities; and, involution. In identifying these disjunctions the flow of duration in the film moves continuously through heterogeneous images. Duration in time-images of cinema proceeds, therefore, by discontinuities.

Each image, which is part of the heterogeneous flow, produces visual and cognitive stoppages, gaps and fissures in the film. The spatio-temporal discontinuities linking one shot to another means that with each returning shot, the

spectator encounters the outside. The images arising from the outside break up the interiority of the narrative form. The hermeneutic space of the continuity narrative is undone. Images no longer connect to the psychological interiority of the antagonists' actions by way of causes and effects, but connect to an open, unknown outside. Each image, which is the any-space-whatever, comes to form a link in the chain of disconnected images; each image emerges from the open outside, presenting its own condition of thought. The open outside is the infinite, the virtual whole of Time or what Bergson called pure memory. Each image is a fragment of the whole.

In the any-spaces-whatever, the returning difference in the visual image produces a dissonance and shock in cognitive functioning, forcing the spectator to think. In the space between two disconnected images, visual and cognitive disjunctures are produced, bringing about the movements of thought. Two unrelated images force the faculties to perform beyond the unification that occurs amongst the senses of what is knowable and recognizable. In the grasping that occurs from the unrecognizability or unintelligibility between images/things, Deleuze writes that the faculties break down, generating alternative or new connections and relations among them. New connections might bring thought through vision, or bring speech to an aphasic.

Moreover, in visual disjunctures, which produce cognitive dissonance, a pure virtual space is generated. In the differential relations between two disjointed images, which produce the grasping of the faculties, ideas come to be generated. In

the fractures between images, a multitude of indeterminate thoughts come to form and disappear. In the interstices, therefore, we come to fabulate the many connections in *L'Intrus*, between the people and things. The interstices, which cause fracturing, generate the fabulation of the actual images that circulate in the film. Denis, in not providing explanations in the narrative, brings about spectatorial fabulation about the characters and their actions, which seem to have no purpose; the reasons for their wandering; and their connections to each other. The scar, the intruders, the laughing woman, the frozen head in ice and a host of different images connected together in a chain, are moments of fabulation that bring about the movements of thought.

The actual images, which circulate in the film, thereby, generate their virtual connections. The unknown and indecipherable relations of the actual images bring about their indeterminations and their multiple possible virtual connections to each other. In the interstitial fractures, the connections between two time-images exist in states of virtuality, as partially understandable and as possibilities, rather than as fully known and understandable. Interstices, for their ability to bring about difference in the returning shot, generate multiple virtual connections to each other. Interstitial fractures in generating fissures, gaps and dissonance, produce possibilities for new connections, relations and thinking. Their absence, on the contrary, brings about the return of the same relations through continuity, limiting thoughts to only what is possible through recognizable, known, relations. I will

repeat my inquiry into the interstice again in the next chapter, to examine what type of duration is produced and what the image of time is in the digital, automechanized installations of UK artist, Susan Collins.

Endnotes

[149] Martine Beugnet, *Claire Denis,* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), 20.

[150] The "maternal grammar" of a film refers to the official grammar of one's "mother tongue." In film, the "maternal grammar" would constitute the codes and conventions of traditional classical continuity filmmaking practices. These codes and conventions establish the classical narrative's form and structure, including the film's continuity in space and time. The technical elements which establish the narrative's spatio-temporal continuity occur through the conventions of the eye line match, the 180° axis rule, shot-reaction-shot, cause-action-reaction, plot, denouement and so forth, which are the maternalistic or maternal/official grammar of classical continuity editing.

[151] Christian Metz, "Some Points in the Semiotics of the Cinema" in *Film Theory and Criticism,* Gerald Mast et. al. eds. (Oxford University Press: Toronto, 1992), 174.

[152] Daniel Frampton, *Filmosophy,* (New York: Walflower Press, 2006), 67.

[153] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?,* trans. H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell, (New York: Columbia U Press, 1991), 59.

[154] Tom Conley, "The Film Event: From the Interval to Interstice," in *The Brain is the Screen,* ed. G. Flaxman, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2000), 303-25. In his essay Conley shows that the interval of the movement-image becomes the interstice in the time-image.

[155] The movement-image produces the logic of action and reaction or cause and effect, according to which the plot, narration and events of the film unfold. They are linked through the interval in what Deleuze calls the "sublime" chain of perception-image, affection-image and the action-image, which produce the automatic movements of the sensory-motor regime.

[156] Conley, 307.

[157] What was the interval of the movement image becomes the interstice in the time-image.

[158] Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense,* trans. M. Lester, ed. C.V. Boundas, (New York: Columbia U Press, 1990), 66. (Henceforth, *LoS.*)

[159] *LoS,* 66.

[160] *LoS,* 66-72.

[161] Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual,* (Durham: Duke U Press, 2002), 105-6.

[162] David Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine,* (Durham: Duke U Press, 1997), 90.

[163] *LoS,* 68.

[164] *LoS*, 87. Depths being mixtures of things are formless and chaotic and cannot be traced.

[165] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. P. Patton, (New York: Columbia U Press, 1994), 100-1. (Henceforth, *DR*.)

[166] *LoS*, 159.

[167] *LoS*, 63.

[168] *DR*, 100.

[169] D. N. Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, (Durham: Duke U Press, 1997), 91.

[170] Jorge Luis Borges, *The Garden of Forking Paths* in *Everything and Nothing*, trans. D. Yates, (New York: New Directions, c1999).

[171] Conley, 308.

[172] In Conley, 309.

[173] Conley, 306.

[174] *LoS*, 159.

[175] *LoS*, 159.

[176] *LoS*, 61.

[177] *DR*, 88.

[178] Rodowick, 95.

[179] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: the time-image*, trans. H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1989), 7. (Henceforth, *TI*.)

[180] *TI*, 8

[181] As noted earlier, the interval of the movement-image occurs through the invisible cut in order to maintain the narrative's spatio-temporal continuity.

[182] *DR*, 88.

[183] *TI*, 165.

[184] This point will be discussed further and clarified in the conclusion.

[185] *LoS*, 174.

[186] *LoS*, 174.

[187] *LoS*,172.

[188] *LoS*, 298.

[189] This is of course, Leibniz's monad of the One-All.

[190] *LoS*, 298-300.

[191] *LoS*, 298.

[192] Keith Ansell Pearson, *Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze*, (New York: Routledge, 1999), 83. Pearson writes that Deleuze acknowledges this Nietzschean formalism on the grounds that it has little to say about destruction, revolution and repetition except that *there be* such a phenomena.

[193] *LoS*, 174.

[194] *LoS*, 174.

[195] What I mean here is that the affects transmit the passionate flow between these images.

[196] Pearson, 1999, 126.

[197] Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, ((New York: Zone Books, 1991), 40. See also, Suzanne Guerlac, *Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henri Bergson*, (Ithaca: Cornell U Press, 2006), 62. Confused multiplicities work by qualitative means in which what is experienced in duration forms a heterogeneous, interpenetrating complex that is indivisible.

[198] What I mean by impersonal is that these images occur through a general recognition of what a "howling Husky" or what experiencing the ocean might be. They occur through impersonal recognition of a type such as Husky or ocean. This is in distinction to a personal recognition, brought about through a specific and particular psychological identification of a Husky named "Fido" or a particular strip of coastline in Tahiti.

[199] This inapproachability is interesting because we link our own connections and experiences of Husky or ocean to them, rather than these connections emerging psychologically from the narrative. In this sense the events only show objects without drawing us into them -- we imbue, on the contrary, our own connections to these objects and elements.

[200] Daniel Smith, "From the Surface to the Depths: On the Transition from *Logic of Sense* to *Anti-Oedipus*" in *Symposium Journal*, Vol. 10, #1, Spring 2006, 136.

[201] As noted earlier, a maternal language refers to the mother tongue and thereby, to the conventions of grammar of that language.

[202] Distinctive multiplicities are therefore different from confused multiplicities referred to earlier.

[203] Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, trans. F.L. Pogson, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1959), 130.

[204] In Guerlac, 69. This is Guerlac's own translation, rather than the official English translation.

[205] Pearson, 1999, 126.

[206] *TI*, 38-39.

[207] Alia Al-Saji, "The memory of another past: Bergson, Deleuze and a new theory of time" in *Continental Philosophy Review*, 37(2004), 228.

[208] Here I am referring to Bergson's different planes of memory.

[209] *TI*, 40.

[210] *TI*, 40.

[211] *TI*, 41.

[212] *DR*, 213; Pearson, 1999, 95. Such a clarity would be available to us in the workings of chronometric time rather than in Aionic time.

[213] James Williams, *Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh U Press, 2003), 186.

[214] A radical difference is when difference occurs within an entity's internal milieu, rather than difference produced through a comparison between one entity and another. The latter would be an example of externalized difference.

[215] Pearson, 1999, 95.

[216] Pearson, however, does not clarify this notion in his writing.

[217] The relations between the micro and macro strata will be taken up in detail in chapters four and five. For the purposes of my argument here, it should suffice that the micro is constituted from molecular particles, which are fluid and mobile. The macro is constituted from the molecular, but that which has become (or is becoming) solidified; the molar is therefore less fluid and mobile. The movement from the micro to the macro brings about the stratification and territorialization of an entity, whereas the movement from the macro to the micro brings about the destratification and deterritorialization of entities.

[218] Pearson, 1999, 95.

[219] Al-Saji, 228.

[220] Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 76.

[221] As we saw earlier, the present unfolds the two diverging streams of the future and the past.

[222] See in particular chapter two "Intelligence and Instinct" in Henri Bergson's *Creative Evolution*, trans. A. Mitchell, (London: Macmillan and Co., 1920). Intuition as a method is also taken up by Deleuze in *Bergsonism*.

[223] As I will note shortly, the difference between the long takes of the movement-image and those of the time-images in *L'Intrus*, is qualitative.

[224] The different planes would be namely the foreground, middle-ground and background.

[225] Donato Totaro, "Gilles Deleuze's Bergsonian Film Project," www.horschamp.qc.ca/9903/offscreen_essays/deleuze1.html (accessed 12/6/2005).

[226] I write "documentation" and "fiction" only as short hand and fully appreciate the problematization of such terms as presented in the last few decades in post-structural studies.

[227] Ivonne Margulis, *Nothing Happens: Chantal Akerman's Hyperrealist Everyday*, (Durham: Duke U Press, 1996), 109.

[228] The "becoming itself" is similar to Artaud's theatre of cruelty where the actor unencumbered by scripts or stage direction performs the inclinations of his body in a becoming. A becoming in this way is different from an actor following a script.

[229] *LoS*, 174.

[230] Al-Saji, 227.

[231] Smith, 139.

[232] Keith Ansell Pearson, *Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson and the Time of Life*, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 117.

[233] For an elaborate discussion on Einstein and relativity see Deleuze's *Bergsonism*, 83-5.

[234] Pearson, 2002, 63.

[235] In *Duration and Simultaneity* Bergson writes, "When we are sitting on the bank of a river, the flowing of the water, the gliding of a boat or the flight of a bird, the uninterrupted murmur of our deep life, are for us three different things or a single one at will...There is a fundamental triplicity of fluxes, not simply a succession but a very special coexistence, a simultaneity of fluxes. It is this simultaneity of fluxes that brings us back to internal duration, to real duration" (in *Bergsonism,* 80-1).

[236] The rhythm and speed of rain, of snow falling or the flow of ocean waves, filmed unintentionally in a shot, are captured by the camera's mechanical eye. To this extent camera consciousness is impersonal and able to capture the multiple movements or the flux of the universe. The different flows occurring within a single shot constitute the coexistence or simultaneous flux of a single Time.

[237] *Bergsonism,* 80.

[238] *Bergsonism,* 81.

[239] *Bergsonism,* 82.

[240] Patricia Pisters, *The Matrix of Visual Culture*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 4.

[241] Pisters, 2. *Haecceity* is a term borrowed from the medieval philosopher Duns Scotus to indicate the individuation of non-personal subjects such as the weather, dates, seasons etc. that do not belong to a human subject, and through which the notion of "camera consciousness" can be understood.

[242] *Bergsonism*, 83.

[243] *DR*, 165.

[244] *DR*, 165-6.

[245] *DR*, 279.

[246] *DR*, 169.

[247] *DR*, 169, 199.

[248] Williams, 143-5.

[249] Williams, 6-7, 143-6.

[250] Williams, 144-6.

Chapter Three

Continuous Space: the eternal worlds of automechanized art

Introduction

In keeping with the broader aims of this dissertation, to examine the image of time

produced in media, I will consider the type of duration produced in digital

technologies. My examination undertakes a repetition in the type of inquiry pursued

in the previous chapter, but in what is a different medium. In this chapter I will

specifically consider *Fenlandia*, *Glenlandia* and *The Spectroscope* (2004-7), which

are live, single-channel, automechanized, digital media installations by UK artist,

Susan Collins.[251] In order to examine the image of time produced, I will consider the

material constitution and the physical processes created by way of the structural

composition of the installations. I will begin by examining the pixels, the real-time

transmission system and digital-frames. These material components, as they come to

be structured within the installations, will be significant in analyzing the processes

operating in the installations, such as the type of movement-flows generated, how

duration unfolds and the image of time produced. From these processes at work I

will consider the relation between the actual and virtual, what constitutes the whole

and the potential of these installations to produce the movements of thought, which

are all central to the concerns of this dissertation. It is from the material and

processual that I will develop the conceptual and formal elements specific to the installations, which will give rise to an understanding of live digital media.

Repetition, as the method of inquiry into the processes of media production, is not so much to compare and contrast analog cinema with digital installations, but rather to delve into the movements of each by examining their affects and the logic of the universes that they come to unfold. In *Difference and Repetition* (1994), Deleuze states the importance of difference as a positive and affirmative quality. He writes that difference should be understood as a difference-in-itself, rather than as a difference *between* two things. The latter presents difference as external, based on the identity *between* two identifiable ideas/things, which subsequently is constituted as negative. He writes that in the history of western philosophy, difference has not been accepted on its own, but only in relation to the self-identity of ideas/objects/things, based on Plato's system of idea, copy and simulacrum. In reversing this understanding of difference, he states that difference, whether small or large, should be understood as being internal to the idea/object. What needs to be grasped, therefore, is that we understand the pure internal relations of an idea or thing, in order to understand it. What we need to understand about a distinctive concept or a thing is its purity, its interiority, its productivity and transportivity.[252] In delving into the particular movements of the installations, therefore, the singularity of their universes come to be revealed in and of themselves, rather than through a comparison with analog cinema.

In repeating my inquiry on the type of duration produced in digital media, different elements seem to emerge: numerical multiplicity, spatiality, continuity, presentism, instantaneity and simultaneity. These elements, rather than be construed as the causes or the known conditions from which my examination proceeded, as already pre-determined and apriori, on the contrary, emerge from the materiality and processes that I set out to examine. In this sense, I have not attempted in any way to devote this chapter to them; they have arisen from my examination, rather than the examination proceeding from them. These elements are the outcome of probing the internal processes of the installations in my inquiry into the types of duration produced in media. Continuity, presentism, numerical multiplicity and spatiality, therefore, arise from the particular structural configurations of the particular installations I examine. They give rise to *one* type of image in the multiplicity that is digital media. It is from processes and compositions such as these and others that digital media, in all variations, come to take shape.

In trying to explore the internal pathways of the installations in question, I begin by examining their technical plane, but also consider their affective plane. The form of content (the technological assemblage) and the form of expression (what comes to be expressed), thereby, are the two sides of the same form. Moreover, such an approach takes into account the "nomadic" essence of the technological assemblage, which explores, experiments and connects, rather than enframes and designates what a technological apparatus will do.[253] After all, technologies in

different aggregations produce differences and cannot be said to have simple causes that produce the same determining effects in different compositions. The vector-flows differ from each other depending on their assemblage -- so also with digital media works, which are varied and wide-ranging. The works that I have selected therefore, *do not* and *cannot* come to establish a singular understanding of all live, single-channel, automechanized, digital media works. A comparable work with minor changes in its technological assemblage might therefore produce a contrasting experience. In short, the vector forces of each different assemblage produce their own internal differences, regardless of whether they are live single-channel or multi-channel digital media works, or for that matter, film.

I have attempted to examine the relations and connections of three similarly functioning works that come to be swept up in the multitude of what are timescapes or durational works. Each of the installations was selected for its lengthy duration, which extended over the period of a year, presenting the opportunity of exploring the type of duration produced. While each installation has a different location, two have cameras located outdoors and the third one is located indoors. With the exception of the locations, they are identical with respect to their structural composition, material components and processual functions. However, despite their similar structuring and processes, each produces a different image given the varying landscape in the different locations. An aspect of this chapter therefore attempts to scrutinize the relationship between the image produced in each work and the type of duration

endured: while the images produced are different, what is the type of duration endured? If the three installations produce three *different images*, can it be assumed that there are also *differences in the types of duration endured?* As we will see, differences in the image cannot assume differences in the types of duration produced. The same type of duration, which is of the continuous present, produces differences in the images.

I argue that the differences seen in the images are produced by virtue of the quantitative relations in the works, rather than in the qualitative relations produced. That is, the progress in the installations comes to be measured by the instantaneous and continuous accumulation of data. The mechanized data-transmission system, which accumulates data every second, generates a complete image on a digital-screen every 21. 33 hours. Such data buildup over the period of a year produces a quantitative multiplicity, in which the parts add up to make the whole. That is, every second amasses on the digital-screen to make up the whole temporality of the installation. There are few qualitative changes in the duration experienced, and what we find instead is the steady and continuous amassing of data, which is of the present.

It is within this context of durational continuity and of quantitative multiplicity that I will come to consider the actual-virtual relations of the works. If the actual whole of time is given, my examination probes the installations' relation to the virtual. In the actualization of every second, the totality of the installation

comes to be visually inscribed. Time becomes a visual representation, the accumulation of data; the experience of time becomes a spatialization of visual data. In this given totality, I consider whether there is a loss in the open and free time experienced in duration, which is critical for generating the unbounded movements of thought. Thus, I question whether works such as these, which map and chart the entirety of time, produce an actual eternity or what Bergson called real duration.

The inquiry into the image of time is only applicable to these specific works, rather than apply generally to all works with similar technological set ups and thematic preoccupations related to temporality. However, having said this, it is also important to note certain tendencies and directions that digital media works have come to reveal in the last decade, for which a certain type of image could come to be developed in future inquiries. For instance, the predominance of mapping, tracking and enumerating objects or phenomena live over long periods of time, set us to experience endless data flows of information. These maps, tracks and charts position us in varied relations with informatics, where thought comes into relations with calculation and mathematics, generating what Stiegler has called a *mathesis universalis*.[254] These worlds of calculation infect everything, including art-worlds. Calculations put the experience of artworks in a particular position in which they come to reflect, inflect and redistribute societal engrossment with the endless mining, collecting and exhibiting of data flows. This type of art production needs to be questioned for its relations to the Open, for producing the indeterminable and for

161

their potential to bring about relations and connections that have not been thought as yet.

The overall objectives of this dissertation extend to this chapter's, in that both inquire into the nature of the return of the works in question. Moreover, I inquire into how time comes to be experienced by considering the temporal relations specific to the installations. I explore the nature of the image of time in live, automated works, which endure over a year. Furthermore, I also seek to consider whether these works put thought in touch with the Open and question whether digital automata bring forth the possibilities for qualitative changes in which new connections, relations and intensities might be experienced. Through these inquiries this chapter delves into the possibilities of the virtual relations of thought with respect to live, single-channel, digital autopresentations.

I will begin this chapter by mapping out the installations' structural and temporal configurations. From this general orientation I will proceed to analyze what characterizes movement in the installations, which will reveal the processes that come to be generated in the works. In order to examine the whole movement in the work, I will individually consider the pixels, frames and then the series as a whole. I will begin with the movement of each pixel and how it is constituted, as that will allow me to approach how each frame is constituted. Following an analysis of how the digital-frame is constituted, I will address the relationship between the two provisional sets of the installations: the camera, situated on remote sites and the

digital-screen, located in various galleries. Finally, I will examine the relationship between the different frames produced in each series. Only when the nature of the relations between the pixel-frame-series can be mapped out can the whole movement of each installation be understood. An understanding of how the whole movement operates will bring insight into the formation of the intervallic period between pixel, frame and series, leading to an understanding of the nature of the duration experienced and the image of time produced. The structural composition will ascertain the flow of time produced from which the processes of the system such as numerical multiplicity, instantaneity and simultaneity will come to be identified. These processes will be critical in considering the conceptual facets of the installations in which ideas of the continuous present, the spatialization of time and the relations of the actual-virtual in the production of thought will be developed.

Contouring the temporal

UK artist Susan Collins creates digital timescapes in her recent works. The three works under consideration in this chapter are *Fenlandia*,[255] *Glenlandia*[256] and *The Spectroscope*,[257] which are live digital transmissions that are generated by remote webcams operating in different locations. Running continually over the period of a year in locations such as Cambridgeshire, Perthshire and in Berkshire (the latter inside a haunted house),[258] the cameras transmitted information instantaneously and continuously, to remote digital-screens located elsewhere. The image transmitted

from these webcams was processed by computer software to produce a pixel every second, which was then transmitted to a digital-screen in various galleries, namely, Babylon Gallery,[259] Threshold Artspace[260] and Warehouse of the Museum of Science and Industry.[261] Additionally, the pixels, generated from the live webcam-images could be transmitted to personal computers as screen savers, after special image capture software had been downloaded. In the galleries, the transfer of pixels to the digital-screens produced an image of the landscape, in which each screen took 21.33 hours to complete. This process continued uninterrupted over the span of a year, with a new image starting immediately without a break, overlaying an older version on the screen. A digital imprint of the image was archived every two hours and also after each screen was completed.

The pixel-transfer, from webcam to software to digital-screen, presented differences in the colour tones, light intensities, the amount of light received each day and the physical movements occurring in the location. In this manner the second-by-second pixel-flow from location to screen captured the "present" of the conditions found on location. With each series spanning over a year, the temporally-oriented installations captured variations in micro-movements and light tones, over seconds, days, months and the four seasons. Seasonal changes produced variations in the light tonalities, changing from the cool blue tones of winter, to the warm golden ones of summer. Nights, lacking light, appear visually as black bands in each frame. The shorter winter days have thicker black bands, whereas summer days have

thinner black bands, given the longer daylight hours. In the landscape series,

Fenlandia and *Glenlandia*, these black bands are oriented horizontally, and in *The*

Spectroscope, where the webcam is located inside a haunted house, the black bands

are oriented vertically.

As a fully completed image was produced every 21.33 hours, Collins

establishes an asymmetry between the time of each frame/screen and the rhythm of

the 24-hour night and day cycle. Due to this asymmetry between the cycles, the

black bands, which are either horizontal or vertical, appear in succession, moving

either from top to bottom, or alternately, from left to right of the screen. The

appearances of these black bands, which vary from screen to screen due to the time

asymmetry, are nonetheless constant and systematic throughout the series. Moving

consistently in one direction within a series, they are reminiscent of signal

interferences characteristic to poor reception in television transmissions.

The return in every screen of the black bands is where, one might say, "the

universe begins to repeat itself."[262] One might ask if it is a simple return bringing

forth a bare repetition or one that brings difference. This inquiry will become one of

the questions of this chapter. As we might note, the variations in sunlight received

each day changes the atmospheric tonalities of these digital paintings from moment

to moment. Movements occurring within the environment, such as a flock of birds,

clouds, cars or people, also change the picture. These moving elements are captured

as fleeting specs or as "stray pixels" on the screen and sometimes, if they hovered in

the space for long periods, their presence is visually inscribed as cloudy material. The continuous temporal recording of each installation produces visible differences in the placement of the black bands on each screen. On the other hand, the seasonal changes produce differences in their width and these increases or decreases occur on a micro level. Over the period of a few weeks such differences enter the horizon of our consciousness and start becoming perceptible, and moreover, these differences become perceptible only when the screens are observed in relation to each other. It would be impossible to notice such changes at the moment of their inception when the digital transmissions actually occur.

While each pixel captures the "now" of the environment, one might ask nonetheless if the present is ever present in these images. While watching pixels migrate every second, in a moment that constitutes the "now," it is only possible to understand the "now" as part of a process that is uncertain and involuting live on screen. The present is therefore never a "firm foundation" but as Birnbaum writes, in a different context, it is "the effect of a play of differences."[263] The differences being the light intensities, atmospheric colours and movements from frame to frame, which are always changing. Moreover, the image on the screen is never quite completed, as it is nearly always in the process of "filling up" one second at a time, to become a completed image. Each new pixel erases an older one from the image laying underneath. The screen is perpetually in stages of doing and undoing, in which a making of the present, undoes the recent past. The present image-in-

166

formation and the past image, therefore, coexist simultaneously on each screen, where each is in various stages of change. This obliteration of the recent past by the "now" presents a sense of ephemerality and of "touching" between them. Once the new image is completed, the process repeats immediately again. However, in the archiving of these images, the past image is completely erased and no longer visually present.

Movement

The remote camera overlooking a landscape/haunted house produces an image of the landscape. A specific point in space of the webcam image is calibrated by computer software into a pixel every second, which is transmitted instantaneously via the internet to a digital-screen located in a gallery. Each digital-screen takes 21.33 hours to complete at the rate of 1 pixel per second (pps). With the understanding that digital imaging is traceable to a materialist reality,[264] we can appreciate that the digital camera used in Collins's works records and transfers the material reality of the landscape or haunted house. In terms of the rate of transmission, Collins's timescapes move at a glacial rate, the software calibrating a mere pixel every second. To give this slow movement some perspective, it is remarkably different from film, which produces natural movement at 24 frames per second (fps) and video, 30 fps. Within the parameters of (contemporary) human perception, therefore, the frame rate of Collins's works can be said to be perceptible, although it occurs as

a micro-movement. A question that concerns our present context therefore is, does this frame rate slowed down in digital media produce a mobile section with real duration? That is, do we have a movement-image, or do we have what Deleuze referred to as an image with movement?[265] The former is a shot with mobile framing, and the latter is a shot with static framing.

In order to consider movement in the digital installations, I will begin by briefly considering natural movement in cinema. Film projectors, which were developed and built to calibrate natural movement have, over time, come to duplicate what we experience as the movements of ordinary life within a given shot. However, in the early days, natural movement was less evident at 19 fps. Natural movement, which was still being calibrated, prompted Bergson to write in *Creative Evolution* (1907) that because the movement of time was regulated in a cinematographic device, it presented a fixed time rate. He argued that the projector, which was a mechanical device, produced artificial movement; cinema presented the illusion of movement rather than real movement. Moreover, he wrote that the celluloid filmstrip did not yield continuity, given the gaps in time between frames.[266] Film frames, strung together in a strip, represented immobile sections, which were artificially pulled to produce movement. However, in his earlier work, Deleuze points out that Bergson was already aware that shots were mobile sections (producing duration) rather than immobile sections (which do not produce duration). In *Matter and Memory* (1896) Bergson had already considered space and movement

168

to be indivisible from each other. A shot, even with a static frame, is already a mobile section with real duration. Whether movements were only occurring inside a static frame or were covered through space in a mobile frame, movement is indivisible from that space. A shot therefore, is already a movement-image, with real duration.[267]

Bergson's criticism of cinema had been that it produced artificial movement. The artificial time of the film projector produced an abstract time by virtue of its set mechanical rate, calibrated in early film projectors at 19 fps. We can find a correspondence therefore in Bergson's criticism of the cinema which might be applicable to Collins's works where, in the different context of digital technology, a pixel is produced by computer software every second. In the installations, pixels move across the digital-screen at a set rate, which is artificially calibrated. Thus, the type of movement produced in the installations needs to be analyzed.

Second, Bergson's criticism of cinema had also been that cinema produced immobile shots, rather than mobile ones. As Deleuze, Rodowick, Bogue and others have written,[268] Bergson's criticism was based on early cinema contemporaneous with his times, where the massive cameras were stationary objects with fixed frames. The movement derived in these images was primitive, in that it took place *in front of* an immobile camera, *inside* a shot. In an immobile shot, an actor could be seen walking across in space, while the shot itself had a static frame. The movement that takes place, therefore, occurs inside an immobile frame, producing the immobile

shot. On the other hand, the dynamic movement of the camera *through* space, achieved in mobile framing arrived later, with the relatively smaller and lighter cameras. In Vertov's *Man with a Movie Camera* (1929), the camera is placed on a bicycle or on a car and moves *through* space. In the shots, therefore, the camera itself moves through space, and such a movement occurs independently from the movements taking place inside the frame, giving rise to the mobile shot.

The immobile shot of early cinema, therefore, added to Bergson's critique that cinema failed to produce real movement found in natural perception. However, as I have already noted, in *The Movement-Image*, Deleuze points out that such shots, *even* if they show primitive movement, are to be understood as being mobile sections of time, as space and movement are indivisible from each other. The mobility of the actor walking through space in a shot produces movement, even though the camera itself is immobile. Immobile shots, thereby, produce real movement that leads to concrete duration. This theoretical background is important for considering movement in Collins's works as I begin to examine her timescapes. Collins's framing is similar to what we find in early cinema, where the camera is immobile, and what movement occurs, takes place in front of a static webcam over the span of a year. Moreover, computer software determines the set pixel rate, which is transmitted live to the digital-screen. Thus, how do we start conceiving movement in her works?

The pixel's movement and its constitution

In Collins's three installations, the camera to digital-screen transmission is a grid-to-grid transfer, in which the number of pixels on each grid – the camera-frame and the digital-screen -- is the same. The number of pixels, which make up the image of the landscape in the camera, matches the number of pixels on the digital-screen. The transfer of a pixel from the first grid to the second occurs through the linear progression of time which, in human perception, creates a seamless moving line of pixels on the digital-screen.[269]

In the continuous recording of the landscape, *each point in space* of the image recorded by the camera is processed by software and transferred second-by-second, as an individual pixel to the digital-screen. In this manner, the pixels's linear progression on the digital-screen, develops into a complete image of the landscape every 21.33 hours. Each pixel, therefore, transmitted every second, represents a *different* time on the *same* image. As a result, each complete image on the digital-screen can be characterized as constituting a block of time spanning 21.33 hours. This electronic transmission from webcam to digital-screen over a year, forms the installations's continuous temporality.

While the camera overlooking the landscape frames the view from a defined and particular perspective, the view itself changes with the different light intensities and movements occurring in the landscape from minute to minute. When a flock of birds flies into the landscape, not only does the whole landscape change, but also the

171

view. This change is one where a minor movement in the landscape changes the image produced in the camera. Any variations occurring in the landscape over time are expressed by a change in the hue, luminosity and intensity of the pixel calibrated and transmitted to the digital-screen. Each pixel, therefore, expresses the material conditions of the variable movements occurring in time in the camera-image, such as the clouds, fog, birds and light intensities. A gradually moving dark cloud will express graying light conditions and linger in the image longer than a fleeting one. Similarly, a cat or car entering and leaving the enclosed frame will depend on its speed or slowness for its micro traces on the digital-screen. The movements of these variable elements are captured in the pixels as their values are calibrated anew every second, and therefore, each pixel's value is directly dependent on the environment and the changes occurring in the landscape.

The relations between the two sets: camera-frame and digital-screen

In considering the relations between the camera and the digital-screen, the grid of the camera-frame corresponds spatially to the grid of the digital-screen, the latter becoming a (magnified) copy of the former. The image that forms on the webcam's viewing grid, however, is different from the image forming on the grid of the digital-screen. Whereas the webcam surveys the entire landscape from a fixed point of view in continuous time, the digital-screen receives pixels from specific points-in-space from the camera-image, to form a complete image every 21. 33 hours. What forms

172

and aggregates over time on the digital-screen are points-in-space generated from the camera-image by software.

The pixel's transmission to the digital-screen instantaneously duplicates the spatio-temporal conditions of the "now" of the landscape. However, this instantaneous duplication is only true for the single pixel that is being transferred at that moment. Since a new pixel is transmitted every second, only the current pixel can present the conditions of the "now" *from a particular point-in-space of the image of the landscape*, and no more. This means that not all movements occurring in the landscape are going to be captured by the current pixel being transmitted on the digital-screen. For instance, if the pixels transmitted from the camera have just started from the top of the camera-image, conditions prevalent in the sky will be transmitted and not those on the ground (grass or cats). The pixel's movement, in this sense, is independent of the movements occurring in the landscape or in the image of the landscape, as it is transmitted from the camera-frame to the digital-screen.[270] The two movements are asymmetrical and do not have a one-to-one correspondence.

While these two movements are asymmetrical, it should also be noted however that the digital-screen does correspond *temporally* with what occurs in the camera-frame. There is a direct and continuous connection between them, albeit this connection is what Bergson characterized, in a different context, as a "thin thread."[271] Thus, even to an isolated system, such as the installations, the duration

immanent to the entire universe (as seen through the camera-eye) is transmitted via this thread to the smallest element: the digital-screen is connected to the duration of the universe by way of the pixel, which is a point-in-space. As a result, even while the movement of the pixel on the digital-screen is autonomous from the movements found in the landscape, what occurs in the latter is instantaneously and continuously transmitted in the form of a pixel, as a line moving across the digital-screen.

There is also a correspondence in the frame-sizes of the camera-frame and digital-screen. Both are electronic grids that communicate with each other, with the size of the digital-screen being larger than the camera-frame. But while there is correspondence in the frame-sizes, the camera-frame and digital-screen are *spatially* separated by virtue of their different locations. Moreover, their functions vary. While the camera-frame designates the image's boundary, the camera itself functions as a recording device, while the digital-screen is the receptacle of the pixel transmission. Because of their different locations and functions, I will temporarily designate the camera and the digital-screen as two different sets. Importantly, the camera and digital-screen, which are in two different locations with differing images,[272] are synchronized temporally through the pixel's movement. This temporal synchronization between the two spaces warrants a further examination. However, before I am able to discuss this correspondence, I will need to consider two other aspects, namely, the relations between the different frames and the overall relations occurring between pixel-frame-series.

Relationality between frames

In the translation of visual matter from landscape to camera-image and from camera-image to digital-screen, the structural configuration of the piece is set. However, despite this determinability, the images that result are to the contrary. Each image produced on the digital-screen every 21.33 hours, is exceptional and shows a remarkable difference to the others in its light intensities, colourscapes, textures, striations, densities, the placement of the black bands and so forth. What I would like to emphasize, however, is that even within a defined and fixed system, fluid and unique images are the outcome. *An unvarying direction and a set rate of the flow in the system results in effects, which are continually variable.* The variations produced in the pixels, and hence each digital-frame or image, is the direct result of the constant variations in the conditions prevalent upon the landscape.

Such variation in movement occurs to a lesser extent in *The Spectroscope*, which is set inside the room of a haunted house, which does not appear to have any visible traces of paranormal activity. In this piece the movement of sunlight filtering through the closed windows produces changes in the levels of light intensity and its direction, in conjunction with the light produced by a large chandelier hanging from the ceiling. Given the non-variable weather conditions and no visible movements inside the "haunted" room, the variability in the image's appearance is limited to the intensity and the length of light received. When variables in the environment are

minimal, the image on the digital-screen reproduces what the camera-image produces with minimal differences. Thus, making predictions as to what will occur in the digital-image would be possible after viewing the installation a few times, as it has fixed variations.

For each digital-screen/frame to produce a difference, therefore, environmental factors, along with the pixel transfer of a point-in-space and the rate of its autonomous movement across the digital-screen, play a role. Regardless of the technology used, the structural composition has a fixed circuitry. The camera produces an image in continuous time of the conditions prevalent in the landscape, software calibrates a point-in-space from that image, in which a pixel from the camera-image is transferred at a fixed rate in linear progression to the digital-screen. Each of these parts produces change in the digital-image.[273]

It must be noted however that the fixed circuitry produces a structural determinacy in the pixel's linear direction and rate of movement on the digital-screen. Movement occurs in only one direction from camera to digital-screen and at a single rate of 1 pps. Subsequently, the relation between the present "now" overlaying the recent past, remains stable *throughout* the series. When the installations were experienced live, the past and the present coexisted simultaneously on the same frame. However, the flow of the present eroding the image of the recent past maintained an unmodified trajectory and an unvarying rate throughout the duration of the installation. In this unidirectional flow and steady

rate, movement occurs, but one that is limited to a singular, regular motion in space, which yields predictability to that movement.

What we have therefore are two interesting and differing outcomes dependent on whether the installation is experienced live or when digging through the archives. When the installations are seen live in the gallery, the spectator experiences the relentless physical flow of each pixel flowing across the digital-screen. Each change in the environment produces a micro-change in its calibration. However, as noted, the movement occurs in only one direction and at a set rate, which becomes anticipated. On the other hand, if one views only the archives, the live activity of the pixels moving across the digital-screen is lost. As a result, the archived images are not experienced as a flow or a movement any more, but only as stills. As still images, they are nonetheless singular expressions, but experienced without anticipating the flow.

The nature of relations between pixel-frame-series

The linear progression of the pixels from the top to the bottom of every screen takes 21.33 hours. After reaching the bottom, it starts uninterrupted from the top again. Each completed screen, therefore, forms an intermediate image in the series, and each series spans a year or more. Each screen (from a total of approximately 411 screens for the year), becomes a section within that series of continuously recorded time. From the fixed camera framing only a single perspective in space is possible.

The immobility of the camera-frame creates an invariable set where, the movements that occur take place *inside* the camera's static frame. The movement occurring in this sense remains "attached" to the elements/objects/things that move within the camera's frame, rather than being freed from it. The swaying of the trees or movements of the clouds, serve as the moving-body in the frame or become the vehicle by which movement occurs in the frame. What we have in all the three installations, therefore, is a single "slice of space" in which movement occurs inside a spatially determined immobile frame. However, if space and movement are to be understood as being *indivisible* from each other, the movements that occur inside this frame, even if simple, produce duration.[274] That is, as noted earlier with Deleuze, movement cannot be separated from space.[275] A fixed space with movements inside produces duration, but now we need to consider the *type* of duration produced. In an immobile frame one needs to consider that movement is limited and attached to what occurs inside the frame and that this type of framing does not produce changes in the states of duration experienced.[276]

In addition to the fixed frame, there are the variable elements such as light, wind and fog. Unknown factors such as stray animals, automobiles and others, also reveal their presence from time to time in the composition of the pixels. However, while these variable elements are a direct translation of the camera's calibration of light values and there is also the independent rate of the pixel's movement, there is yet another element in between that needs to be accounted for. This in between is

invisible but fully present at all times and without its presence there would be no

pixel transmission or art project. In this sense its presence warrants the project's

workability or stoppage. Passing through and connecting the camera to the digital-

screen, it is the electrical circuitry of cable/satellite connections, to whose behaviour

the set is constantly subject. It can cause technical failures, interferences or major

interruptions. This component in the project I would mark as leaving the set partially

open. Fiberglass, wiring or electromagnetic transmission becomes that very literal

thread connecting part to part, and likewise, to the Open. In fact, as the operation is

an autopresentation, it also becomes the installation's connection with the Open.

However, while the electrical circuitry connects a remote webcam to a digital-

screen, it simultaneously also proffers to be a constant menace, threatening the

disconnection of the set from the Open.

 While the electrical circuitry generates the connection or link between the

parts to the Open, it must be pointed out that it is configured to move in a single

direction. In this sense the set is to be understood as being only *partially* open to the

whole, from the camera end. Rather than being open from both ends where changes

in the direction of flows might take place from each end, giving rise to exchanges,

the set is more like our circulatory system in which the valves only open in one

direction. The current "passes through" the art-producing assemblage, which gets

swept up in changes. Since electronic flows operate at microseconds, any minor gaps

in the electron flow, as evinced in the ordinary fluctuations of an alternating-current

circuitry, are largely imperceptible to the senses. The electronic system occurs as a continuous flow in human perception.

We can also note on the other hand that the movement of the pixels is tied to the current and that their movement is dependent on the electron flow. It is important to assess if such a dependency can be constituted as real movement. If the electric current keeps the pixels in motion, it would be hard to understand this causal contingency as a movement *between* part and part. The electrical circuitry allows each pixel to always be in progress allowing each image to continually build up. At this point we need to come to a key understanding of whether the pixel's movement across the screen at a set rate of 1pps is *real* movement or if it is to be considered as an abstract time as Bergson had considered in his critique regarding film projectors.

The rate of the pixel's transmission from the camera-grid to digital-screen is unrelated to the environmental movements occurring in the camera-image. For this reason we could allowably say that it is a calibrated and an abstracted time. In this way, the environmental movements in the camera-image and the pixel, while not unrelated, are independent of the other's movement. While controlled by the electronic system it is in, the pixel moves autonomously, regardless of which movements are transpiring in the landscape, although it corresponds to the camera-image by virtue of its transfer of points-in-space from the camera-image to the digital-screen.

If we constitute the pixels' movements to be the real movement in the installations, we would need to uncover the temporal relations *between* the different parts of the installation. In order for there to be real movement, the pixels' movements would need to *change* or *affect* another part which, in turn, would *qualitatively* change the whole. We could understandably say that the pixels' movement across the screen continually changes the image, which in turn changes the whole series.[277] It would be common sense to observe that the linear progression of pixels from the top to bottom of each screen makes up an image and therefore, the change in the one produces a change in the other. In such a scenario a provisional movement could be said to occur between pixels and a single image on the digital-screen where, changes in the pixels' constitution, changes the image produced.

However, the movement between pixels and image are unequal or of uneven scales. In addition, we also need to consider, as in the montage of movement-images that shot A + shot B = X, in which X is the change produced in the *whole* film. For instance, in shot A and shot B, which are *different* physical movements, a *qualitative* change is produced in the film. The two parts affect each other qualitatively, producing a change in the whole. Real movement is what occurs between two different parts which, when connected to each other, qualitatively affect and produce a change in the other, thereby changing the whole.

Other than the movements occurring inside the camera-frame, dependent on the constant changes in the environment, the change produced in the system that is

Glenlandia, produces little *real* movement.[278] There is the movement of the pixel, however it is independent, and it is unclear how it would bring about a qualitative change. As part of a unidirectional flow, it *does* produce change -- it builds up the image through aggregation -- but this is not a qualitative change. The accumulation of pixels building up the image, in this instance, would be characterized as a quantitative change, producing a difference in degree rather than a difference in kind.[279]

In order to consider the question of *real movement* in these artworks further, whose scopes are nothing less than being timescapes after all, I will dwell in depth on the question of what Bergson called "pure duration." But I will need to question what kind of image of time these live, autopresentations in digital media present. Is this a new image of time? If so, how does it differ from the movement-image or the time-image discussed in the previous chapter? Beyond the specifics of these works however, I will come to inquire into notions of numerical multiplicities, simultaneities, spatialization and presentism, in what are the possibilities offered by live new media works. In order to take up these considerations, I will discuss the pixel, sets, frames and the whole series further, but now in their work as a whole. I will consider an examination of these timescapes from the perspective of real movement and duration.

Duration

When one frames something, a select image is cut out and separated from the Open.

When we observe the pixels moving across the screen in *Fenlandia*, our

consciousness operates by deterritorializing the image from the landscape. Each

completed digital-screen forms an image/digital-frame and over the period of a year,

several hundred frames are generated. When a specific frame is generated, it is

similar to what happens in scientific experiments. For the latter, Bergson writes, our

consciousness operates by isolating and cutting out systems from the whole.[280] But

he also writes that this tendency is exhibited only on a temporary basis. We

eventually recognize that the (entire) isolated system, such as the special image

Glenlandia is part of a larger whole, where all elements of the universe

interpenetrate and are connected with each other.

Moreover, according to Bergson, what connects such an isolated system to

the Open is a thread. Writing that the solar system is connected or attached to the

sun by a "thread" (and this can be a very thin thread), Bergson deliberated that

"throughout the length of this fine thread, the durée immanent to the entire universe

is transmitted, even to the smallest particles of the world where we live."[281] To

summarize, the universe or the Open is connected to all, including the minutest

particles through this thread. It is therefore through this thread that we should be

able to connect one set to another, such as the (provisional) ones established in

Glenlandia and eventually, to the Open. In this sense, the thread would connect the

parts to the whole, where the slightest movement in the part changes the whole entirely. Every minor or individual movement is therefore a part of the movement of the Open, which continually changes. This is the qualitative movement of duration, where duration itself *is movement* and in which there is a qualitative relation between part and whole.[282] The slightest movement of the part qualitatively changes the whole. Duration is not the mere "capture of time," as distant observation or that which occurs through visual representation, rather it is the *actual* or *real* movement between part and part that qualitatively changes the whole. Ultimately, for Bergson, there are no separate and distinct identities in the universe, only vibrations of the Open. Birds, clouds, light intensities, the art project, our consciousness itself, are eventually all flows, each having their own rhythm of unfolding durée that makes up the Open.[283]

Rodowick in *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine* (1997) writes that movement itself is a mobile section (or a mobile framing) of duration or durée.[284] In considering this idea for Collins's works, the movements of the variable elements within the landscape come to constitute a mobile section of duration or durée.[285] The variations in the mobile flux of universal matter, therefore, change the pixel's constitution and such micro-changes, which continually aggregate, second-by-second, also change each image on the digital-screen (a single frame). Correspondingly, a change in a frame also produces change in the entire series. The pixel, in this way, as a part of the image-forming, produces a change in each

image/digital-frame. Furthermore, a frame, which can be constituted as an intermediate image, itself produces change in the whole series. The movement constituted so far, it would seem, passes from the framing of the camera to calibration of the pixel's set rate to digital-frame where, a change in one part produces a change in the entire series. We need to inquire, therefore, what this type of change produced is.

The frames, in continually following the micro-rhythms and micro-intensities of the environmental elements in front of the camera lens, also continually come to be modified. One frame to the next produces the visible signs of movement by virtue of the shifts recorded on each screen. Duration, which is movement, is changed by movement itself. Movement expresses a qualitative change in duration or in the whole. The changes occurring in the frames, as they are experienced live would come to represent the change in duration *visually*. If we are to understand each frame as a moving part, then such a moving part positions itself in relation to the movement of the whole series. If this is the case, we could attribute real movement to the three digital installations.

However, before it is possible to answer in the affirmative I will need to in fact ascertain if each frame is a moving part, and if so, what type of movement is produced in each frame. Given the nature of the pixel transfer from one point-in-space to another at a set rate, I will need to consider if a frame in *The Spectroscope* or *Fenlandia* is a mobile or immobile section of duration. In considering Bergson's

third thesis on movement, Deleuze writes that an instant is an immobile section of movement and movement itself is a mobile section of duration.[286] Given that each frame is produced by an aggregation of pixels, I will need to examine whether a frame in this series is merely an accumulation of instants (of points-in-space), or whether it is in fact a mobile section of duration, which produces real movement.

The whole: temporal relation or spatial accumulation?

I have noted earlier that there is direct correspondence between the two provisional sets, although the movement expressed occurs in only one direction rather than in both. This unidirectional relationship establishes a linear structure. A multi or bidirectional relationship would have, on the contrary, randomized this structural hierarchy, whereby the relations between them might have moved in both/many directions. Moreover, the established rate of the pixel production produces a predictable, determinate movement rather than a random and unpredictable one. In multi/bidirectional relationships, a qualitative temporal movement can emerge, where an alteration in one part comes to *affect* change in another part, transforming the whole. In the works in discussion, on the other hand, a fixed rate and direction has been established where it is unclear to say whether temporal relations, in the manner discussed above, have occurred. The set order of things, from camera-image to digital-screen produces a single continuous formation, a single moving order that is *Glenlandia, Fenlandia* or *The Spectroscope*. A *qualitative* temporal relation, on

the other hand, would be one in which movement occurs *between* parts, each of which would affect and modify the other to produce a change in the whole. That is, there would be movement occurring at different rates and also random movement in the directions between the camera-image and the image produced on the digital-screen. The image produced in one would *alter* the other, producing a change in the whole; except, this exchange from *both sides*, does not occur. Despite not having such a qualitative relation between the parts and whole, there is another type of relation occurring. There are the parts (camera, pixels, digital-screen/frames and series), which make up the whole, however, in this part-whole relation in place of a qualitative multiplicity, in which images affect each other to produce changes in the whole, we have a numerical multiplicity, in which the image is a continuous, accumulative whole.

Numerical multiplicity

The transmission of a pixel from a point-in-space on the camera-image to its corresponding point-in-space on the digital-screen, we must note henceforth, is the transmission of data or information. While the pixels transmit data/information *instantaneously* and *simultaneously* from camera to digital-screen, we must also note that each image is constantly in the process of being built.[287] We must come to terms with this situation to understand the image of time in these particular types of live digital media installations. The digital-screen takes 21.33 hrs. to develop into a full

frame. This time frame then produces a complication, because when we say that there is no gap between camera and digital-screen in the transmission, it can only be partially true. While there is the time of micro-seconds in the transmission of a pixel from camera to digital-screen, it is minor, and does not produce any humanly perceptible gaps, intermissions or stoppages within the piece. The extremely quick rates of electrical currents, which occur in microseconds, are humanly imperceptible and do not alter perception of the installation. The transmission of a pixel every second is perceived as the flow of a moving line, as a continuous flow in time on the digital-screen.

However there is another, more perceptible time, which is more interesting to examine. While there is a continual transmission of information from camera to digital-screen, each digital-screen is always in progress and always forming an image. This image is the unrelenting movement of the present overtaking the visual traces of the recent past. In this sense there is a spatial overlaying, in which a constant movement of the pixels proceeds to fill up each screen. The spatial displacement of the older screen by the newer one exists in a continuous state of distention, occurring over the duration of the installation.[288] The perimeter of this spatial displacement is constantly shifting spatially on-screen in a perpetual state of alteration and is dependent on the relation between the pixel's position on-screen and the end of that digital-screen. There is only one instant (one second or less) when we can say that there is no spatial displacement by the new pixels of the older screen.

This instant occurs only at the bottom when the frame is fully completed and forms a singular image. We should note furthermore that the image produced by the camera-eye and the image generated on the digital-screen will not be identical, given the environmental changes occurring over the period of 21.33 hours for each screen to build up.

In processual works such as these, there is always something happening but not quite arrived at, generating some kind of anticipation for the spectator. The spectator is always in the midst of this movement of progression. The installation is nearly always in a partial phase in which, what is being experienced is at yet unfinished, expanding and constantly filling up with new pixels. To put it another way, the whole of each frame is constituted by this unrelenting movement of "filling up," by overlaying whatever came before. This movement, of being in a single continual process, cannot be understood as the gaps produced in the interstitial period in time-images. Interstitial periods produce virtual relations, where the virtual relations occur in the gap *between two parts* that zigzag between pasts and presents. What is being processed here, on the contrary, is more like an unfinished part, in which its *continuous* accumulation *adds up* to what is the whole frame. There is no temporal gap here to speak of. In this sense the whole frame is constituted by virtue of the sum total of its pixilated parts. These unfinished wholes, at whatever stage of progression they might be on the digital-screen, are numerical in nature and are substantively different in kind from the film-frame.

When we perceive images generally, we perceive them as being "full pictures" or in complete frames. We certainly do not perceive an image by virtue of a pixel forming every second. The internet transmission, which occurs pixel by pixel and progresses line by line, delivers a continuous stream of pixels building up to an image. The installation does not present a stream of fully completed images of what the camera-eye sees, which is a full frame. Most digital media pieces that present observance as part of their project do also present a continuous stream of completed (whole) frames. For instance, Nurit Bar-Shais' piece *FUJI*, was a live installation that presented over two dozen views of Mt. Fuji. Each of the views was a whole image presented in continuous time over the period of four seasons.[289] The instantaneity between the numerous cameras on-site and their digital transmission to computer screens was, therefore, much greater compared to Collins's projects. In Collins's pieces, the instantaneity is partial, comparatively speaking, as it occurs at 1pps, in what is a linear relay of single points of the camera-image, over the period of 21.33 hours. In this sense, each frame or image is a paradox of sorts, in what is ostensibly an *instantaneously* transmitted point, which produces a full image at the *glacial speed* of 21.33 hours.

If we consider film, in order to examine the frame further, a single frame expresses the conditions of the whole: each film-frame is a whole image. In the case of a fade, the whole image fades to or from a black or white screen; in a dissolve, one whole frame dissolves into another whole.[290] The transformation in any ordinary

film fade-in/out or dissolve occurs between two whole film-frames, which are the *parts* that make up the shots, which make up the whole film. The fade-in/out or the movement between two heterogeneous shots, therefore, is the relation of one part affecting another part to change the whole, constituting a *qualitative order*. In the live digital installations the image is, on the contrary, an unfinished and linear progression from the top to the bottom of the screen to make up a whole frame. Frames, produced continually over a year, make up hundreds of frames to produce the entire series. Each frame is formed pixel by pixel and moves along in successive lines horizontally, in descending order,[291] much like the firing electron gun of old television sets. The microstructure of each individual pixel is fully formed and each pixel transmitted is fully defined, coded and distinct in itself.[292] The pixels that make up each digital-screen/image, thereby, move through a *numerical order* to form a whole; that is, they move progressively from $0 \rightarrow 100$.

In presenting the distinction between what is subjective and objective Bergson, in *Time and Free Will*, wrote that the latter can come to be defined by its ability to be known in such a way that it can be divided in an infinity of ways. What is objective can be grasped by thought *before* these divisions occur without anything changing in the object itself. Thus, divisions are *already visible* in the image of the object even when they are not fully realized. These divisions are actually perceived or at least perceptible *in principle*. He writes, "this actual, not merely virtual, apperception of subdivisions in the undivided is precisely what we call

objectivity."[293] What is objective, therefore, has no virtuality, in that everything in it is actual. The digital installations are actual, in which each pixel is the measurement of a single point-in-space and time. It is produced as a value from a point-in-space every second, and therefore, each pixel represents a discrete section of space in time. There is nothing hidden in its constitution or in its workings and because matter, such as a pixel, has no interior as such and hides nothing the pixel is like matter, which Bergson writes, "spread[s] out as a mere surface...[it] is no more than what it presents to us at any given moment."[294]

What we see are pixels forming every second aggregating into an image. This image or frame, we could say, could be divided and subdivided infinitely without changing it in kind. Each image, because it is complete in and of itself, is quantifiable, and therefore divisible into wholes, halves or quarters, or added up to form the sum total of the frames archived. Their addition or subtraction from the series is what presents to the spectator the continuous movement of a whole over the span of a year. Each image or frame can be divided into spatialized units that are infinitely divisible into the sum of its parts, or each frame can be added up into the whole number of frames constituted over the period of a year, where each unit is a true number.[295]

Cinema's time-images, on the other hand, cannot be numerically divided in this manner. In the first instance, there is no "whole" to speak of, as images are fragments of time that appear from the outside. In time-images the whole is the

192

outside, and such an outside cannot be divisible into the number of shots in a film. Each shot is a fragment of the outside, and the links between fragments of time occur in the *virtual* relations between them. Shots do not come into relations with each other through physical continuity in space or time; instead, they are disconnected optical and aural images that relate with each other through virtual connections. The "whole" is, therefore, disconnected fragments of time, linked together through virtual connections. Virtual connections produce the movements of thought, which is real movement. Virtual connections are real movements because they produce changes in the states of duration experienced. Real movement, therefore, produces real duration.

In the movement-images of cinema there is a whole and this whole, rather than being closed is "open upon the world," which is itself the Open.[296] Each shot/set is never absolutely closed and is always connected to the Open, even if by a "thin thread."[297] For this reason, movement-images do not produce a homogeneous or spatialized time.[298] However, there is an organic unity, in which each shot is part of the multiplicity within the whole.[299] In movement-images what produces the movement of the whole is the continuity narrative. Shots are linked to each other in space and time, producing the physical movement of the whole: causes lead to effects and actions lead to reactions. Movement in one shot produces a change in another, qualitatively changing the whole. The whole, therefore, is not divisible into the number of its shots/parts. Shot A + Shot B affect each other to produce a

qualitative change in the whole. For this reason, shots are not a true number that can be infinitely divisible into the sum of its parts to make up the whole.

On the other hand, the ability of *certain types* of digital media installations to divide and add up infinitely, without producing a qualitative change in the whole, is particularly why they are a numerical multiplicity. In the installations, while there is a change in the whole, it is a quantitative change. Each image/frame is a collection of pixels moving from the top of a screen where a new image begins at 0% and proceeds to form a new (actual) whole at 100% coverage of the frame. This numerical accumulation of the whole is exactly the same for the entire series. The (values of) hue, luminosity and intensity converted into a pixel→frame→series, in this manner, *become a quantitative representation of duration rather than being duration, or actual movement itself.* The pixel-as-measure plots points on a graph/digital-screen, rather than generating the qualitative change of the whole.

It must be understood that everything in these installations is actual even if everything is not realized -- the frame and series is continually forming. Both the camera-image and its spatially correlative twin, the digital-screen, have fixed borders established in advance. The frame of the camera-image is static, although environmental elements move in and out of it (the installation's connection to the Open), as with early cinema cameras, where the movements produced only occur in front of the camera. The borders/frame established in these works are neither open nor fluid. Fixed borders, such as these, close and delimit what Rodowick would call

194

their dissolution "into a continually changing series of temporal relations."[300] The

lack of camera movements *into* and *through* space delimits the elements being

filmed from getting caught up in relations with space, which would constitute the

relations that would occur by chance with the Open. In mobile shots, borders would

be continually fluid, dissolving from start to finish and form temporal relations with

the elements, as they move in space.[301] The borders in these live, single-shot works,

on the contrary, can be experienced only as a fixed and singular series of what

appears to be a completely homogeneous space. However, *even though* the frame is

fixed, the system is open to the world on one end. It is therefore not a completely

closed system, as it produces movement albeit minimal. The images that result in

The Spectroscope or *Fenlandia* occur without shifts in their angles, locations or

perspectives, but its connection to the Open on one end, produces the variations in

the images.

However, being a fixed and continuous transmission system spanning over a

year, it does not generate any possibilities in the transitions or movements *between*

its parts. It is a continuous and unvarying transmission system that does not produce

gaps and interruptions between its parts, and as a result, it does not produce virtual

relations. There is only one very long uninterrupted channel to contend with. While

the clouds, fog, movements of the seasons move in and out of the camera-frame,

they nonetheless enter into the preestablished space set by the camera framing. After

the calibration of a point-in-space from the camera-image, that point is transmitted

to the digital-screen. What is immanent to the Open becomes cut out and deterritorialized in the installations, entering into a different relation: the immobile space of the camera-frame. Moreover, the fixed position of the camera-frame disallows it from getting caught up in the "net" of what Bergson called durée. In such a net, the materiality of elements (trees, hills, fog, cats, clouds) would constantly move in the flux of life *in relation* to the mobile/fluid borders of the camera-frame. A relationship, a *temporal relationship* between camera and the Open cannot *fully* occur if the frame remains static. As a consequence, the uniform, hierarchical direction from camera-image to digital-screen, produces an experience of movement that is limited and partial. The unidirectional relation between the parts produces one continuous movement of pixel-accumulation, but this is not real movement.

Establishing a fixed frame with a fixed transmission system reduces the temporal relations *between* the parts (camera←→digital-frame ←→-series) to convey a singular, continuous movement of the whole time. This whole is established by the homogeneous time of the system (there is no real movement among the parts), in addition to the abstract time of the calibrated pixel.[302] However, duration, according to Bergson, is what divides up, and duration divides constantly, presenting heterogeneous movements in time. Such heterogeneous movements in time are not differences in degree, but *changes in kind*; they produce changes in the states of duration experienced. Duration, therefore, cannot divide up without

196

changing in kind; duration yields changes in kind precisely in the process of dividing up.[303] This is why real duration is a qualitative multiplicity. The lack of changes in kind in the live installations do not break up duration. On the contrary, the continuous transmission over a year, presents a singular, homogeneous movement, bringing about a numerical multiplicity.

In fact, the camera-image, the calibration and transmission of the pixel, the digital-screen, the electric current, are the parts arranged in a specific order. Other than the unidirectional order between these automated parts, there seems to be no *real* temporal relationships (as a qualitative movement between them), except for when the spectator enters the space of the works. The differences that occur within each of these works and among them, therefore, may be understood as differences in degree, rather than differences in the kind of duration experienced. In *Glenlandia* and *Fenlandia*, where the varied environmental factors introduce the changes, the differences in light intensities, fog, birds and other varied elements surveyed by the camera-eye through a fixed frame, present a difference in degree in the value of each pixel and no more. With *The Spectroscope*, these differences are even less because the camera is inside a room where there are no environmental changes to speak of. The only changes that occur were in the period of light received, its direction and its intensity. As a result, the images on the digital-screen are nearly identical to the camera-images and to each other.

The images that we see on the digital-screen are largely spatial changes -- the colourscapes, striations and light intensities -- in frame after frame. While these changes produce differences in *how* the images *look*, there is a very low degree of difference produced in the *kind* of duration experienced in the series. Throughout each series, a pixel is transmitted from one point-in-space in the camera-image to the digital-screen. And, because the camera is connected to the Open, the transmission may be considered a heterogeneous space. However, while the elements in the established space are changing (fog, light, clouds), the space itself is immobile by virtue of the fixed frame. We need to consider whether there is movement established between the sections.[304] Thus, what are the sections, and what is, if any, the nature of movement between them?

The sections are the individual digital-frames, of which there are approximately 411 produced over the year. As a new digital-frame begins immediately from the top after it reaches the bottom, the movement between them occurs in continuous time. Such a continuous time does not produce temporal variations (between pasts and futures), making it a homogeneous time. However, while the movement of the present is continuous, there is a layer of the recent-past underneath. When viewing the digital-screen, we come to perceive the present overlaying the past, generating some temporal variation. The touching of the present and the recent past produces a low degree of heterogeneity. The spatial variations found in the live images occur therefore from two elements. The first is the camera's

connection to the Open and the second is from the dynamic layering that occurs between the present and recent past.

We are hard pressed to find the qualitative multiplicity as within *L'Intrus*. *L'Intrus*, we saw, introduces lines of differentiation from shot to shot, which produce differences in kind. A qualitative multiplicity, by which duration or subjectivity is defined, Deleuze writes, "plunges [thought] into another dimension, which is no longer spatial and is purely temporal. It moves from the virtual to its actualization, it actualizes itself by creating lines of differentiation that correspond to differences in kind."[305] Each movement of the film, which is a fragment of time, produces continual relations with the *outside*, producing a heterogeneous time. The shot that returns produces a difference in time, plunging thinking into a different dimension. The difference experienced from shot to shot moves beyond spatial change to create different experiences in time. The temporal movements between pasts and futures constantly generate movements of thinking that puts thought into a relationship with the virtual.

In the installations, on the other hand, in the building up of pixels to form a whole image, the entirety of time is given. In this whole of time we find that the returning image expressed in the digital-frame progresses at the same rate, produces the same type of movement and moves in the same direction throughout the series. And, although there is a partial connection to the Open, this connection produces spatial, rather than a difference in the experience in time. The temporal movement of

199

the installations is uninterrupted, continuous and constant. In the return of what is similar, thought is interiorized and there is very minimal connection to the outside. The "thin thread" that connects the installations to the Open produces limited connections to the virtual. In the uninterrupted durational continuity, the perceived instants of time that are the pixels, which collect on the digital-frame become predictable and foreseeable.[306] The images aggregating on each digital-frame produce the thinking of the same type of movement. Even if we consider the touching between the present and the recent past, this identical movement occurs continuously over the span of a year and does not vary. This continuous, predictable movement does not plunge thinking into different, unexpected dimensions, which is critical for producing the movements of thought.

A continuous whole: a new image of time?

What I had initially set up as two sets, the camera-frame and digital-screen, we can now note to be one system in terms of its temporality. There is a flattening out that occurs in this digital transmission arrangement and we can say that the provisional two sets are temporally connected to each other to form a single system. The sets themselves are spatially separated and have not collapsed into one, but rather, what they generate has become the aggregation or accumulation of one continuous whole as the temporal relations between the two sets are connected in time.

Duration, what changes continually in time, is also the indicator of change itself. Duration, correspondingly, is also changed by movement itself. Just as the camera-frame remains fixed, the direction of the movement of the whole assemblage, from camera to digital-screen, does not change. The various movements of the elements are captured in the pixels-forming every second, but capturing does not express the relation of a movement occurring *between* the discrete elements of the system itself (camera, pixel, digital-screen, frames). The capturing that occurs is a *translation*, in which the real light conditions prevalent in the landscape are *converted* into the numerical value of that pixel on the camera-image. It is an automated, technical application, rather than the generation of something new, which would be a transduction.[307] Moreover, that pixel on the camera-image is electronically copied and transmitted to the digital screen. Capturing, therefore, cannot come to express a qualitative change in duration, between part and part that produces a change in the whole.

What we have is a system in which the pixel transmission between the camera-image and the digital-screen produces the temporal connection between them, making it a continuous whole. The system is fixed and unidirectional and the three installations function largely, although not completely, without producing a qualitative relation among the parts. As I will discuss below, the installations function by instantaneous and simultaneous transmission and this is in remarkable difference to the time-images in *L'Intrus*, which function through seriality. In the

time-image, each image is a fragment in time and functions as a part in a continuous and heterogeneous series: a succession of variegated events, which work through their relations between each other.

In the time-image movement is produced by way of the relations constituted in the *virtual* moments between the heterogeneous shots/images. Movement, thereby, occurs not in the actual images themselves (not in the actual events shown), but in the virtual moments of thinking, between shots. Sutton writes that this is largely the legacy of Muybridge's construction of the cinemascope, where each photogram is a fixed instant in time which, when strung together, produces the perception of movement.[308] Thus we should note that movement is not given in actual images but produced in perception, between instants of time.

In order to have real movement therefore, a closed whole cannot be given, nor is it giveable. In *The Movement-Image*, Deleuze points out that when the whole is constructed, it is assumed that everything is given.[309] But as soon as the whole is given eternity is produced. Such images of eternity are captured in the poses of sculptures from ancient Greece. Time is timeless and stands still; it is no more. Within the totalization of a whole there is no longer any room for real movement (between parts) and therefore, for real duration.

In the *Movement-Image*, Deleuze points out that philosophers considered that the whole was a meaningless notion because it could never be given, nor was it giveable. Bergson, however, changed this understanding by saying that the whole is

not giveable because it is the Open.[310] Because duration changes continually, and

when we find ourselves in a duration, we may conclude that "there exists somewhere

a whole which is changing, and which is open somewhere."[311] Movement-images,

which make up the whole, however, are not a closed world, "they are open upon a

world."[312]

In time-images, where the whole is the outside, and therefore never given,

we experience the movements of bits and pieces, of fragments of time (time-

images), and in the virtual connections between these bits and pieces, in our

perception of them, we occasionally receive glimpses of movement.[313] This is real

movement or pure duration. In the *Movement-Image*, Deleuze points out that

"'immobile sections + abstract time' refers to closed sets whose parts are in fact

immobile sections, and whose successive states are calculated on an abstract

time."[314] Closed sets, therefore, do not produce movement; they are immobile and

do not open up to the world. With respect to the installations, therefore, while the

pixel does present an abstract and regulated time, the installations are open at one

end from the side of the camera, and in being open upon a world, they become "a

register in which time is being inscribed."[315]

Moreover, even while sections may be immobile, movement can be

established between sections, expressing the changing of the whole.[316] In this

understanding, the digital systematization that presents the continuous whole of time

does produce physical movement between the frames. The pixel's transmission from

camera to digital-screen maps what is happening in the landscape and while the systematization is unidirectional and hierarchical, this mapping of movements does produce some varying movement on the digital-screen. But while such a mechanized conversion from camera-eye to digital-screen maps movements, which change from frame to frame, it differs qualitatively from real movement. The movement produced is the incremental accumulation of instants. It is a quantitative spatialization of pixels *as* time, as a representation. It does not produce the temporal experiences of duration itself, which occur in the virtual movements of thought. While the images produce variations in their colours, textures and light intensities from frame to frame, we do not experience any significant difference in states of perception or in states of consciousness. The actual production of 411 frames (or more) in each installation does not produce qualitative changes in states of mind.

The continuous movement of the pixel from one frame to the next does produce a physical change in the images. This is because it follows the same identical path of movement. Each frame that forms follows the repetition of the same movement at the same rate of progression. The frames resemble each other, the ones being formed resemble the previous ones and, as I have suggested, there are some variations in terms of their physical make-up. Despite these variations, however, each frame is a repetition of the same movement that preceded it. The movement of pixels on each frame and between them becomes predictable of future movements. Although the pixels accumulate and the image becomes larger, our state of

perception remains constant. In this regard we must heed Bergson when he writes

that real movement is the transference of a *state* rather than of a thing.[317]

Presentism: simultaneity vs. series

On another note, transmission to the digital-screens in galleries is instantaneous. In

each installation, the camera-frame is coordinated both temporally (pixels) and

spatially (frame) with the digital-screen of a gallery, with the latter frame being

exponentially larger. Each point on the digital-screen corresponds to its spatial

equivalent on the camera-image. This is much like the mathematical grid found in

Renaissance perspective, where the measurements between the landscape/figure and

the grid drawn on the canvas correspond.[318] It must be noted here however that there

is a difference between the digital-screen and Renaissance perspective, because the

latter relied on the peculiarity in our perception of things. In order to accurately

render forms, artists re-configured objects in space in order to produce what was

logically real to human perception from the centre of the image's frame. For

instance, pillars were drawn thicker at the base of buildings becoming narrower at

the top, rather than accurately rendered as actual forms, as straight pillars.[319] In the

digital transmission systems, which are automated, representation does not occur

through the re-configuration of objects in space. What is reproduced is an exact copy

of the hue, luminosity and intensity of the prevalent environmental conditions in the

camera-image. Thus, while there is spatial equivalency in Renaissance paintings

between the grids overlaying the object and image, the image is manipulated to coincide with human perception.

To draw upon another example, in the Hyperrealist art movement from the 70s,[320] an image from a slide was projected onto a canvas affixed to a wall. The image projection, thereby, increased the size of the slide several times, which the artist then painted. One result of these paintings was that they became magnified copies of the slide-image. The slide and the painted canvas corresponded and related to each other in this way. In both, Renaissance perspective and in Hyperrealism, the object (landscape or slide) and image (painting), became copies of each other. However, in each case they were *temporally separated* from each other through the interstitial moment produced (in the act of rendering) between them.

In the live digital media pieces, although the camera-image and digital-screen are not identical reproductions, they are *temporally connected*. The pixel transmits only a micro-section (a point-in-space) of the camera image, the accumulation of which forms an image every 21.33 hours. In all three series, while the camera-image and digital-screen are spatially separated,[321] they are temporally connected. They are temporally connected to each other by Bergson's "thin thread" which, in this case, is the camera's transmission of pixels to the digital-screen every second. While separated by distance, the instantaneity of digital transmissions reproduces the conditions prevalent in the imaging of the landscape on the camera-image. Such an instantaneous transmission is not the same as the seriality or the

succession of shots produced in the time-images of cinema. Seriality *juxtaposes* one

image with another. The pixels are, on the contrary, a *simultaneous* reproduction of

the conditions of the "now" as surveyed by the camera-eye. Within such a

systematization, I have established that the microseconds between each pixel are not

humanly perceivable as natural phenomena and that there is no interstice,

interruption or gap between the parts and the whole of each system: a pixel from the

camera-image appears to be transmitted instantaneously and seems to be seen

simultaneously on the digital-screen.[322]

As noted in the previous chapter, virtual states occur in the interruptions and

interstices between parts, inducing the possibility of changes in states of perception.

In these live, auto-digital systematizations, because the transmission is instantaneous

and simultaneous, there are no intervals or interruptions between the parts. This

continuous, uninterrupted system sets back the production of virtual spaces to a

minimal, leading to the conclusion that within such continuous, uninterrupted

systems, there is a reduced production in the movements of thinking and for the

possibility of newer connections and relations to form.

In the camera-image, the pixel's numerical value is produced through the

conversion of actual light conditions in the environment into a mathematical value.

In the camera-image, each pixel, which is a particular point-in-space, has a particular

value. This measurement is then instantaneously superimposed onto another frame --

the digital-screen. The pixels's movements across the digital-screen are, therefore,

the simultaneous superimposition of points-in-space in time from the camera-image. The pixel's movement in time, therefore, comes to measure simultaneities. At point X we have hue Y, and from these points-in-space accumulating on the digital screen, pixel by pixel, we come to measure time. When we watch the pixel move at the rate of 1pps across the digital-screen, what inevitably occurs is that we end up measuring time as a visual, physical representation. The experience of time becomes a spatialization.

Since the transmission of the pixel from camera-image to digital-frame is instantaneous and simultaneous, the installations do not produce gaps or interstices between the parts. The accumulation of pixels on the digital-screens, frames and series, presents a continuous whole in chronometric time. Each pixel is a unit of time. It is precisely in the absence of interstices that time can come to be measured chronologically, in such a manner. The trajectory of the pixels creates a continuous, physical, quantitative movement of the whole. In the installations there are no temporal gaps produced in which virtual movements might be generated. As we saw in *L'Intrus*, virtual movements are produced in the interstices and also that interstitial time cannot be measured. Heterogeneous movements, in which time bounces between pasts and futures, produce virtual spaces in which thought plunges into a different dimension. Such virtual movements of time cannot be measured nor can they be made measurable visually by plotting simultaneities/points on a graph. Points on a chart mark instants in time which, as Deleuze has written, are immobile

sections of movement. Movement, which is a mobile section of duration, cannot be captured therefore through the plotting of points.[323]

On another related point, Mullarkey writes that within the confines of a homogeneous space, there can only be one possible position of an object at any one time.[324] While the installations do not have a completely homogeneous space, given their connection to the Open, they are very minimally heterogeneous. Moreover, all the system's parts are unidirectional and fixed. This minimal heterogeneity is one in which the pixel is only in one possible position at any given time in its transmission from a point-in-space on the camera-image to the grid of the digital-screen. Its fixed rate and linear progression means that there is little variability, or even the possibility for variation to occur in its movement. To generate virtual possibilities, however, a heterogeneous spatio-temporality would need to be produced by way of generating different rates in addition to bi/multi directional movements between the parts.

In live projections such as *Glenlandia*, pasts and futures have almost disappeared; only the present condition of the "now" hurling over the recent past (the older layer under the new image) is exhibited on the digital-screen. With a present unfolding at a constant rate and continually in a singular direction, there can be no leaping in time between different pasts and futures, which would bring about the virtual movements of thought. The possibility of some virtual movement could conceivably be generated, although it would have to be produced in virtue of a

singular and fixed perspective of the immediate present overlaying the recent past.
Such a possibility would be unlikely.

Having considered the "now" of the installations, the notion of "the" present
must also be considered carefully. The present, Bergson distinguished, cannot be
captured as the understanding of conditions that are settled and bounded, and
therefore must be problematized. Some scholars have erroneously typified Bergson's
attention to the present as the "ambiguity of the present" or an "indefinite field" or a
"temporal hole."[325] Notwithstanding these mischaracterizations, Mullarkey writes
that Bergson wanted to problematize the tendency to homogenize the very
understanding of what constitutes the present. In problematizing "the" present he
drew attention to which present was being attended to. Thus, just as a neonate
endures the span of an hour differently from an adult, we could similarly note that
the "now" of the installations experienced by diverse spectators would be varied.
Bergson, therefore, brings attention to the notion of the present, as that which is
relative and multiple.[326]

The pixel, which is a point-in-space transferred from the camera-image to the
digital-screen, simultaneously reproduces the conditions of the "now" on the digital-
screen. As its movement across the digital-screen occurs, its rate of progression is
independent and does not follow the movements occurring in the camera-image. The
conditions of the "now" are superimposed on the digital-screen *as they occur* at a
point-in-space in time. Not only is this superimposition simultaneous, but we

inevitably end up counting these simultaneities, in which time becomes a measured quality. Each digital-screen/frame is an image, which becomes the measurement of time = 21.33 hours.

With regard to superimposition, Lev Manovich states that in digital compositing, concerns with time have become transposed with those of spatiality. In celluloid film, which is typically constituted from a simple image (the whole frame), the images produce a virtual relation in their juxtapositions to each other. Film, therefore, functions through seriality, in which intervals/interstices produce the temporal relations of one image to another (of part to part). Whereas film works through the series, digitally generated images, including the live transmissions, are produced by compositing layers. In digital processes of mixing, images are no longer simple images which are juxtaposed to each other. They occur in a multitude of combinations: as entirely computer-generated/simulated or as pro-filmic enhanced with layers of transparencies, and all *within* a single image. Thus several layers are digitally composited together to make up a single image.[327] Layering, in which the different transparencies might have different origins and where concerns lie with their seamless blending together (*simultaneity*), rather than in their juxtaposition (*series*), becomes one of the key techniques distinguishing celluloid from digital media. This technique of assemblage, according to Manovich, redefines our concept of the moving image.

As I have analyzed throughout this chapter, if we consider any single frame in any of the three installations, we find that what we no longer have a simple image. Each digital-frame is constituted by the superimposition of the "now," which is a single point-in-space in time of the camera-image, upon the digital-screen. While the demands of these particular installations do not require additional layering, the superimposition of the "now" over the recent past on the same frame extended over the period of a year, does constitute one. Moreover, the accumulation of pixels as instants of time, are seamlessly blended together to form a single image, making up each digital-frame. A single digital-frame/image represents 21.33 hours. Each pixel transmitted every second, represents a *different* time on the *same* image. This type of image is complex and different from analog cinema.

Thus as Timothy Murray comes to inquire in his recent essay, "Time @ Cinema's Future," wherein lies the future of new media art?[328] With the disappearance of the irrational interval and a virtual space, what new is being produced here? What, importantly, are the new movements of thinking, what new thoughts are being generated in the efficacy of the new digital automaton? I will sum up my thoughts on this matter in the concluding paragraphs.

Difference and repetition

The material conditions of different technologies give rise to differences in their affective and conceptual matter. When changes in material and technological

212

conditions occur, the forms change, bringing subsequent changes in the affective and conceptual matter. The technologies of film such as the light-sensitive celluloid strip, film-camera, chemical baths, editing, projector and screen, and those of digital technologies such as the pixel composition, grids, algorithms, connectivity/circuitry, computation, transmission systems, interactive screens, bring about differences in the signalectic and sensorial matter. In addition, their differing techniques, such as juxtaposing/seriality and simultaneity/compositing, to name one, present differences in their forms. Differences in the sensorial matter, therefore, point to differences in the technological materiality, techniques and forms of the image. In philosophically considering analog and digital technologies and their relations, significant conceptual differences begin to emerge. The material conditions give rise to visual, sensorial, affective matter, presenting differences in the conditions for thinking each medium and technology.

In repeating my inquiry on the type of duration produced in live, single-channel, automechanized digital installations, different formal elements seem to emerge: numerical multiplicity, spatiality, continuity, presentism, instantaneity and simultaneity. This newer type of matter brings along implications as to what their conceptual differences from analog film might be. However, this line of argument has been contested on grounds of medium specificity, namely that film is not a specific medium, as it cannot be understood to have an essential quality. This statement supposes (correctly) that what film is and does cannot be defined as such,

as its fluid understanding displaces any limitations imposed upon it. And since film

has the potential to be and operate in myriad ways, it cannot be pinned down to be a

specific medium. Its conceptual difference to digital media would therefore be

ineffective.

For instance, the medium of film has typically been defined in different

ways, including as Carroll has written, as having no medium specificity.[329]

Nevertheless, as I have argued throughout this chapter, there are significant

differences in the production of analog and digital images. In order to be able to

consider and acknowledge these differences, I will need to differ to Rodowick's

suggestion that it *should* be possible to invoke the concept of a medium in ways that

do not reduce film to an essentialism.[330]

While pursuits in film have historically been variegated by way of the

different uses of materials, formal styles, movements, hybridizations and

trajectories, an idea of a medium that is flexible needs to be preserved. These

differences need to be acknowledged while also affirming certain common

properties and a history of practices, which allow it to be labeled so. The use of the

word "film" itself allows its differentiation from other forms such as sculpture,

painting or music. Allowing for its plural and flexible practices is key while also

desisting medium-specificity or essentialism. In light of Rodowick's arguments, I

take analog celluloid-film as being a different medium but which is to be understood

as non-essentialist.[331]

Moreover, while traditional filmmaking is a technology and has several techniques, (camera or camera-less, filmic or film-less) it is also a particular albeit, non-essentialist, medium. Digital technology, on the other hand, cannot be understood as a medium unless, as Rodowick deliberates, computers are a medium. It is a technology whereby different media come to be processed, in what Manovich writes is, "a media synthesizer and manipulator."[332] Digital technologies process data in which "computerization turns media into computer data."[333] Hence, music can be numerically manipulated and algorithmically converted into visual data; emotional quotients converted into paintings; and random words selected from the world wide web into poetry. In the case of Collins's installations, environmental conditions were numerically converted into pixel values, which then became digital-images. Digital technology, among other aspects, is the computational process whereby all analogical data such as light or sound can be converted into numerical values and bits of information. This information can then be infinitely manipulated and changed into other forms of data. As Rodowick writes, "[d]igital practices call for transformation, dissemination, recontextualization, and even transmutation into other kinds of perceptual outputs."[334]

According to Rodowick's argument, then, analog and digital technologies need differentiation and cannot be lumped into the supercategory of "moving images," which he charges Carroll of doing.[335] The issue of whether analog and digital technologies, which have different material conditions, produce similar or

215

different types of images, is also one of the inquiries of this chapter. In light of this integration/separation, two aspects need attention: the first that distinction between analog and digital technologies must be maintained in order to understand the specific types of images they generate. And, second, since digital technologies produce newer types of images, there is also a newer type of signalectic matter. As I have tried to show, the two differ ontologically. This second aspect is crucial if we are to distinguish digital images from analog ones given that Rodowick, Manovich and Steigler draw the ill-favored connection between informatics and digital technologies, with Steigler linking information systems with worlds of art.[336]

Whereas cinema's materiality has usually included a camera, celluloid film, projector and screen, it has always been understood to be "moving images," even if in certain films movement was not apparent, notably in Chris Marker's *La Jetée* (1962).[337] As Carroll writes, what cinema needs to show is the possibility of movement, and this it does. However, if we are going to affirm Rodowick's suggestion of keeping digital and analog-film technologies distinct, it is unclear what the moving images of digital technologies might be referred to. As noted in my examination of Collins's installations, the accumulation of instants on a screen, in the form of pixels, is very different from real movement that produces real duration.

Complexifying the issue further, Rodowick questions whether digital images are even images in the conventional sense. Produced by transmission systems that convey information-data, they are akin to signals rather than images. A celluloid

film image, in particular, is a whole image, ontologically different from a digital image, which is produced from pixels and scanning rates. On the other hand Rodowick writes that numerical data, which make up a digital image, have no physical presence. This aspect has been contested by Marks in *Touch* (2002) where she asserts the materiality of the electron in digital technology.[338] In light of these fundamental differences in the image's make-up, digital images are ontologically different from analog-film images. The digital image returns as difference to the analog image.

There is also one more difficulty that rears its head and this difficulty is with respect to nomenclature. The use of a category such as "film" designates its institutional, conceptual and formal practices. "Film," therefore, is more than merely semantics; there is a material and therefore a formal and conceptual difference between film and digital film/media. In the absence of a clear distinction between "celluloid film" and "digital film" in common parlance, it is unclear how one may proceed with respect to the movement of digital images. What is movement in digital images? As I have examined, the movement that occurs takes place through the spatialization of time. And this is not real movement. As filmmaker Babette Mangolte asks, "[w]hy is it difficult for the digital image to communicate duration?"[339]

If cinema is to be considered as the movement of images arising from the projection of a celluloid film-strip on a screen, then the "movement" of digital

images in the installations have been understood as the accumulation of numerical data. Moreover, in "digital film," it is supposed that movement arises from computer-generated algorithms, which Rodowick claims is erroneous. He writes, "movement through virtual space is badly characterized as a mobile frame, for it is not a record of movement through physical space, but a synthesis of motion perspective according to the criteria of perceptual realism. Indeed nothing *moves*, nothing endures in a digitally composed world. The impression of movement is really just an impression – the numerical rotation and transformation of geometrical elements."[340]

In order to resolve this conundrum institutional production, populist understanding and sometimes scholarship revert to a short-hand, in which the two types of movement remain equivalent and undistinguished. This circumstance, which is problematic, will nonetheless have to suffice, until a better terminology evolves. "Digital films," at least for now, will have to be considered "cinema." The understanding of cinema -- institution, form, concept -- will from necessity have to become fluid, moving between celluloid-analog and digital-technologies.

The signalectic matter from digital technologies will be seen to produce cinematic forms, which may alternatively be referred to as cinematics. Cinematic material will include moving images, be they constituted from celluloid or digital technologies. Thus, while undesirable, it remains unclear whether Susan Collins's digital installations might fall into the "cinematic" category. What seemingly

appears to be the temporal movement of the work, especially the durational

unfolding of the images, needs to be problematized, even if it is to be subsumed

under the supercategory of "moving-images." Along this vein, what is cinematic

would therefore include the vast number of experimentations in durational works in

digital media including varied artists such as Eijah Liisa Ahtila, Stan Douglas, Sam

Taylor Wood, Bill Viola, or even James Campbell. However, while this imposed

understanding that digital technologies produce "cinema" may be applied, I will

nonetheless keep the two technologies distinct in the fifth chapter as part of my

examination also dwells on questions of difference in the perception of signalectic

matter.

Conclusion

When one initially encounters the digital timescapes there is some recognition that

the piece is about something unfolding on the digital-screen. A pixel forming and

being transmitted every second to the digital-screen draws our attention to

movements that we come to perceive as a flow of pixels. The formation of a pixel

every second phenomenologically comes to resemble a moving line or a data-flow of

some sort, in which one might be able to decipher a landscape. This decoding

depends on which stage of the digital-screen one enters the piece.[341] Being

processual, one is immediately drawn to the systematic progression of each pixel,

which at some point in time would come to be recognized as a present. The

movement of the pixels transit across the screen overlaying the image that came before. In this overlay, the old and new continually touch each other in what is the newly formed present of each new pixel.

The set-up, where the recent past and present coexist on the same screen and come into relation with each other, produces an extraordinary visual effect in which the present seems to be forging ahead to erase the recorded past. In this temporal flow there is one single movement in the installation, where the disappearing past appears to be devoured by a rapacious "now." Its presence, which is also inscribed and material, will in turn be swallowed. What is emerging now is expected to be eroded by what will come in the immediate future, which imparts an ephemeral and intangible quality to the passing present. Nonetheless, this movement, which occurs continuously throughout the duration of the installation, generates predictability in the temporal movements.

As the spectator stands and gazes at the screen there is a certain insight that there is an unfolding of a "now" being transmitted from an "elsewhere," as its past is being erased simultaneously. There are two presents unfolding concurrently, of the landscape and of the spectator's. In this fundamental encounter with the work, both presents overlap and unfold simultaneously, producing a contingency; herein lies the heterogeneity of the installations.

One finds that upon closer examination, the flowing movement of a line is a succession of pixels forming every second. There is some recognition that the piece

is about the flow of time that comes to be designated by the second-by-second movement of the pixels. We must come to note two important aspects here that time is conceived visually as a flow of pixels, and as time comes to be visually recorded on a screen, it becomes represented and subsequently, spatialized. What we have is a visual translation in which time becomes spatialized in the movement of pixels across the canvas. Contemporary digital media images in recording, mapping and tracking data flows, in the attempt to capture what is temporality, shift the relation of time to space. Temporal relations, in which duration is experienced/experiential (virtual) as that which divides continually, comes to be displaced by a continuous trajectory of (actual) instants of time. What appears to be about time becomes a spatialization, through the accumulation of recorded data (as pixels in this case) on the digital-screen, which is then archived.

Works such as *Glenlandia* and *Fenlandia*, which survey a given environment, or other process-oriented art works, which map the flows of data transmissions, or listening posts, which count specific words/ phrases used over the internet, are all works that offer the translation of data in varied forms. In *The Spectroscope*, the actual light conditions from the environment serve as raw data, which is converted to the numerical value of pixels in the camera-image. Pixels, which are the points-in-space on one grid, are then transmitted to another. In this uninterrupted mapping and tracking of movements in the environment, duration, which is constantly dividing and interrupting, becomes reduced to the continuous,

uninterrupted singularity of the present. Duration, on the other hand, produces the heterogeneous movements of time, creating the virtual movements of thought, which affect and change other pasts and futures. The conversion of light conditions into an actual value of the pixel, which is transmitted to another screen and then accumulates, produces a translation in which the change that occurs in the whole is numerical rather than qualitative. Variations in the colourscapes, textures and luminosity produce differences of degree in the actual images, rather than produce transference in the states of being.

Moreover, the temporal relations between the relative past and the present occur as spatial relations, conceived as a visual representation. What in *L'Intrus* becomes the transduction *between* world and mind remains invisible. What we have here is the continuous and instantaneous translation of data transmitted into an actual visual record of time. Time is information. The digital-screen becomes the visible record of the material conditions, rather than *being more* than such actual conditions. As Lev Manovich asserts, the introduction of the computer produces a paradigm change from concerns with time to those of space.[342]

This displacement of temporality by spatiality also informs an understanding of the relations between the visible and invisible. The contemporary form of art is the art of the visible, where all the material aspects of the image come to be celebrated. In the materiality of the visible, and in the visibility of its material production, Rancière writes, "the essence of the image [is] guaranteed by the very

mode of its material production."[343] The transmission and recording of all details

over the period of a year seeks to bring us a total movement, attempting to make

visible all aspects of the landscape's spatio-temporality. But as mentioned earlier, as

soon as the whole of time is given, eternity is produced. Movement in time occurs

only when that totality is withheld. It is not ironic then that many critics introduce

live new-media works on duration by referring to them as being "timeless."[344] That

timelessness is experienced is precisely because such works do seek to present the

totalization of time, and such a totality is less effective in presenting real movements

between the parts, which produce duration. As Deleuze wrote, the eternal poses of

classical Greek sculpture present a sense that they are "timeless." But when time is

timeless it is no more.

In movement-images, the whole is achieved through the physical movement

of images. Shots (parts) affect and change others to form a qualitative whole. The

movement of shots relate to the logic of an inside with respect to plot and narrative.

Causes give rise to effects, and actions produce reactions in the protagonist,

producing the sublime relations of the narrative whole. While movement-images

produce the physical movements of images to make up the organic whole, time-

images produce the virtual movements of thought, bringing thought into an

encounter with the outside. The whole, in time-images, is the outside. Each shot,

which is a fragment of time, arises from the outside and it is only in the links

between them, in the cracks and fissures that the virtual movements of thought

occur. Here we occasionally receive glimpses of movement in our perception of them.[345] This is real movement or pure duration. What occurs in them remains unsaid and invisible.

The pixels, on the other hand, are the actual physical representation of instants of time.[346] Instants of time are immobile points charted on a digital screen and do not produce real movement. Their accumulation at a particular rate and direction produces images that vary in their colours, hues and textures but qualitative movement cannot be charted by plotting points on a digital screen. They produce a numerical multiplicity in which the whole changes, but only through the accumulation of points. While they present the actual whole, the experience of duration cannot be reduced to spatialization in images. The continuous, actual whole produces few interruptions or gaps reducing its connections to the virtual, which would produce the transference of states in duration. Because the installations are the accumulation of instants at a set rate, which proceed in a single direction, the type of movement produced does not lead to real duration.

The facticity of the world is revealed in its technicity and expression, where the structures of technological organization and utterance become a system of references, which construct the significance of the world.[347] The recording and transmission of data and information by computerization constitutes the facticity of the contemporary world, whereby informatics and art come more and more frequently into a convergence with each other by way of their organizational

tendencies, functionalism and mechanics. The facticity of the pixel moving across the digital-screen in *Fenlandia* carries with it the informational present and the anticipation of what is to come. Yet we understand that in its coming is also its predictability, a repetition which occurs without difference. That is, the pixel's mechanization and formation converts what is indeterminate to what is determinable in the constitution of the possibilities that creates works of art. As Stiegler writes, "Facticity, understood as what makes possible the attempt to determine the indeterminate...forms the existential root of calculation."[348]

Since the continuing integration of computerization in public and private life in the last two decades or so, we have come to see that the forces of calculation organized by facticity have become an essential trait of technics. This force of calculation comes to permeate, designate and form the organizing principles of certain types of digital media artworks which survey environments, map the flows of information, track positions of objects and individuals and chart trajectories. The essence of art and thinking becomes suffused with worlds of calculation, yielding a *mathesis universalis*.[349] These worlds of calculation, information and data transmission enter into relations with thought and thought of the world itself draws upon predictability and what is actualizable. Predictability, by surveying, tracking and mapping, determine actual movements in space and time and comes to reduce the virtual possibilities in the connections, relations and intensities between two

things. This virtual dimension that enters into the relation between two objects is displaced by the continuous flow of information in data transmission systems.

Tracking, mapping and charting information streams is an endless activity, an on-going dispersionary process that Deleuze writes, distinguishes Foucault's nineteenth century disciplinary society from its contemporary form. This contemporary form is the corporatization of society, which has produced various "societies of control." In the societies of control, the image of the mole is displaced by the serpent and the language of the individual and enclosure is replaced by dividuals and codes. Whereas in disciplinary society the production of goods was constituted through what was a definable quantity, such a capitalism of production is now being replaced with a capitalism of the product -- where there is an endless marketability of commodities in the derivative flows of the stockmarket. He writes, "the family, the school, the army, the factory are no longer the distinct analogical spaces that converge towards an owner --- state or private power -- but coded figures -- deformable and transformable -- of a single corporation that now has only stockholders. Even art has left the spaces of enclosure in order to enter into the Open circuits of the bank."[350] Live-art productions, which chart the free-floating movements of environmental factors and track fields of activity, enter into a mapping of presents. These works surf on what is the relentless generation of the present where perpetual data streams modulate its processural flows, which come to

be exhibited in major galleries. This new image of the "perpetual now" displaces the generation of what is concentrated and discontinuous.

In addition to this displacement of concentrated analogical spaces to the free-floating modulation of numerical ones, the digital autopresentation of pixel movements produces another displacement, from memories transducing pasts and futures to what contains the information of the present. Rancière writes, "information is not memory. It is not for memory that it accumulates; it labours only for its own profit. And this profit is that everything is immediately forgotten for the affirmation of the sole abstract truth of the present and that it affirms its power as the only thing up to this truth. The reign of the informational present rejects out of hand, as unreal, what is other than homogeneous process and what's indifferent to its autopresentation."[351] The truth of only the present jeopardizes virtual connections to pasts and futures, impairing the imaginative possibilities produced in the movements of thinking. Dwelling in the perpetual and simple present diminishes the invention and fabulation of what are futures to come, or of people and places that have been.

In trying to arrive at a conclusion therefore, I would need to ask along with Murray, whether live single-channel productions such as those in discussion produce what is the unthinkable.[352] Is Deleuze's material automatism of images, which he so lauded in his cinema books, capable of producing thought from the outside in new media works such as these? With the disappearance of the interval, what new is being produced here? As Murray expresses, "wherein lies the 'future' in the art of

new media?...Might there be a way in which informatics combines with the artistic performance of the digital archive to reinvigorate the placeholder of the 'future' itself, particularly in relation to the complexification of its informational present?"[353] This very important and difficult question can only be addressed through specific works, which might allow moments of complexification of their informational present.

A key aspect of coming to terms with a work of art would be in how one comes to meet or experience what is the fundamental force of an encounter with the work. One would need to ask therefore, whether the fundamental force encountered in any work, including *Glenlandia*, *Fenlandia* or *The Spectroscope*, presents an impression of recognition, a sensation that allows an understanding of its processes, or if it presents an analogy. Does it work upon an understanding between the faculties, which unites them into recognition of something? In these works do I find myself recognizing the connections presented? Or, on the other hand, does a work leave my faculties in pieces, in disarray, in bafflement, and do I, on the contrary, encounter an intensity that forces me to think new connections and relations? Do these works take my faculties to their limits, where I am called to search beyond any solutions reserved in my memory? Do I need to go beyond my particular memory in coming towards what I feel and sense?

Live single-channel media works such as the ones I have examined, it appears, generate a moderate capacity for the virtual movements of thoughts. For

one, the pixel's transmission from one grid to another, its rate of movement across

the digital screen, its accumulation, which produces images, is not an identical print

generated from the camera-image but rather a complexification of the present. The

grids, while spatially separated are temporally connected by a single point-in-space.

Each image/digital-frame is the accumulation of instants in time, and most

impressively, even while the progression of the pixels remains fixed and the

structural composition is static, the images produced are variations. The varying

textures and colours in the images are generated by virtue of the installations's

connection to the Open.

Thus, on the one hand, we have a translation in which light is converted into

the pixel's value, but on the other hand, because the transmission is a microtransfer

of points-in-space, we do not have an identical reproduction. The images produced

on the digital-screen resemble the landscape, but are not exact copies. In the case of

The Spectroscope, however, the limited environmental changes produce fewer

variations from the camera-image. This translation process produces a resemblance,

and the degree of the digital-image's resemblance to the landscape is dependent on

the varying environmental conditions, which generate the differences in each frame.

Each digital-frame comes to present original and spectacular visuals, preserving the

singularities in the ebb and flow of matter, which it receives from the environment.

Thus we have the changes occurring in the environment, but because the

organizational set up of the apparatus is fixed, it delimits environmental interaction

with it and therefore a temporal relation. By virtue of instantaneous simultaneities, from camera-image to digital screen, a nearly homogeneous time is produced. Since there are no differential movements among the parts and there is only the aggregation of pixels on the digital-screen, real movement is not generated. The continuous, uninterrupted movement of each installation does not produce real duration.

The automechanization connects the installations to the Open, but only on one side and in one direction. They connect with the Open but only as the receptacle of those changes occurring within the environment. Given their connections and circuitry, they are unable to interact or produce a relation of movement to it. The fixed camera-framing, singular direction, fixed transmission rate, linear progression and the continuous time of the whole system, remains unchanging. In a preset system such as the installations, the parts generate the same movements, which are repeated in the production of each frame. The variations in the images occur, therefore, by a predetermination in their structure. But because the system is connected to the Open at one end, the images that occur produce a partial difference by virtue of being dependent on the changes produced in the environment.

Does this partial difference produce the capacity for generating thought from the outside? What connects the installation to the Open occurs through a thin thread: the fixed camera-gaze overlooking the landscape. The installation therefore provides the capacity for thought from the Open, but it is severely restrained as the camera

does not interact with the environment and also because the installation's circuitry continues in only one direction. This movement therefore is caught in what becomes anticipated and what is predictable. Such a movement sweeps thoughts into a particular direction, circumscribed to the movement of one kind -- the movement of the present. This movement of the present, I have tried to note, is also the moment of actualization, in which connections to the virtual are diminished as the movements of thought become bounded with what is actual.[354]

Endnotes

[251] "Automechanized" is a term that I have coined in this dissertation to combine the dual senses of what is automatic and mechanized in the installations.

[252] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. P. Patton, (New York: Columbia U Press, 1994), 32. (Henceforth, *D&R*.)

[253] William Bogard, "Deleuze and Machines: A Politics of Technology?" in *Deleuze and New Technology*, eds. M. Poster and D. Savat, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh U Press, 2009), 15.

[254] Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 1*, trans. R. Beardsworth and G. Collins, eds. W. Hamacher and D. E. Wellberry, (Stanford: Stanford U Press, 1998), 6.

[255] The first camera was installed at the Anchor Inn, Sutton Gault in the area of Cambridgeshire known as Silicon Fen. It ran for 12 months from May 2004 until May 2005. This was followed from 2005 to 2006 by cameras at Cambourne Business Park, Cambridgeshire (also Silicon Fen) and at Greenham Common and Bracknell, Berkshire (Silicon Valley). See: http://www.susan-collins.net/glenlandia; http://www.susan-collins.net/fenlandia; and http://www.ucl.ac.uk/slade/sac/spectroscope/home1.html. Accessed December, 2009.

[256] A camera was installed on the banks of Loch Faskally, Pitlochry, Perthshire from 2005 until 2007.

[257] From October 2005, a webcam is transmitted images live from the interior of South Hill Park, a haunted manor house in Bracknell, Berkshire, England.

[258] The installation is meant to capture sightings of ghostly creatures, which live inside the house; until this capture we can all make believe that the house is not haunted!

[259] A solo show featuring digital prints from the Fenlandia archive and a live camera feed from Ely, Cambridgeshire was at Babylon Gallery, Ely from 23 September until 5th November 2006.

[260] Glenlandia was exhibited live at Threshold artspace from 10 September 2005 until 10 September 2006, and online through 2007.

[261] The gallery installation of *The Spectrascope* was commissioned for the StoryRooms exhibition in the 1830 Warehouse of the Museum of Science and Industry in Manchester from 11, October 2005 until 15, January 2006. It has also been exhibited in the US, Germany and Amsterdam at various times between 2005-2007.

[262] Daniel Birnbaum, *Chronology*, (New York: Lukas and Sternberg, 2005), 17.

[263] Birnbaum, 16.

[264] See Laura Marks, "How Electrons Remember," in *Touch*, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2002), 161-175.

265 In Deleuze's *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, a movement-image is a mobile shot, which is a slice of duration. Movement-images therefore produce real movement in time. An image with movement, on the other hand, is a static shot or an immobile shot, typical of early cinema. These shots are those in which the movement that occurs takes place inside the frame, rather than through interaction between the elements being shot (actors, objects) and the film apparatus itself (camera). This aspect will be taken up later in this chapter in greater detail.

266 A critique of the cinematograph is in Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, Chapter IV, "The Cinematographical Mechanism of Thought," trans. A. Mitchell, ed. K. A. Pearson et al. (New york: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 174-236.

267 Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1986), 2-3. (Henceforth, *MI*.)

268 *MI*, 24.

269 A new pixel is formed every second and transmitted in linear progression on the digital-screen. Thus, much like film frames, which produce real movement from stills, the formation of a new pixel every second appears as a moving line in human perception.

270 It should be noted here that this is in difference to the movements produced in the film projector. In the latter's movement, which is also artificial, it nonetheless reproduces natural movement. The movement of the pixel across the digital-screen does not produce natural movement.

271 I will explain this aspect in greater detail in the section on duration below.

272 The camera reproduces the image of the landscape that it surveys. The digital-screen in a galley presents the continuous movements of the pixels, which is a numerical value of the light conditions. These values come to fill in and compose the image.

273 Such results can be seen in single-shot films such as Andy Warhol's *Empire* (1964) or *Eat* (1963).

274 Deleuze takes up this problem in his first commentary on Bergson's thesis on movement. See *MI*, 1-3 and 24.

275 *MI*, 10.

276 *MI*, 24. Duration will be taken up shortly in the passages to follow.

277 Yet, at this point we need to ask two further questions: what is the whole being referred to here especially in view of the fact that it is a continuous and endless flow. Secondly, how and in which ways do the different images qualitatively change the series? What would constitute a qualitative change?

278 By system I mean the actual apparatus that constructs the artwork; that is the camera, digital-screens, pixels, internet connection and so forth.

279 This point about numerical change will be taken up shortly.

280 In *MI*, 10.

[281] In Roland Bogue, *Deleuze on Cinema*, (New York: Routledge, 2003), 24.

[282] *MI,* 10. As Deleuze notes in *The Movement Image*, the relation between parts and the whole is qualitative and not quantitative. That is, the different parts do not *add up* to make up the Whole. Rather, when the minutest part changes, the Whole changes qualitatively.

[283] Bogue, 24.

[284] David N. Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, (Durham: Duke U Press, 1997), 24.

[285] *MI,* 8

[286] Rodowick, 1997, 24.

[287] Being built is in difference to a becoming.

[288] There is a spatial gap here rather than a temporal gap.

[289] The work is active until December 2010 at <turbulence.org.>

[290] A frame, shot, or image, are to be understood as wholes, which are partial in their relation to the whole film. They are not to be understood as having the same relation of the whole of movement, which is taken up later. The latter, implies *the* totality of movement in live digital transmissions. The two senses of the whole, as partial and total, need to be distinguished in this regard.

[291] In *The Spectroscope*, the lines traveled by the pixels are vertical.

[292] Each image's resolution is 320 x 240 and thus 76,800 pixels are updated before a new image starts at the top left of each frame.

[293] In Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 41. (Henceforth, *Bergsonism*.)

[294] In *Bergsonism*, 41.

[295] In *Bergsonism,* 41-2.

[296] *MI,* 10.

[297] *MI,*10.

[298] *MI,* 29.

[299] *MI,* 25.

[300] Rodowick, 1997, 26.

[301] These would, of course, be any of the following variety, where the frames are fluid: panning, zooming in/out, dolly shots, crane shots, car shots and so forth.

[302] In a sense we can relate this to the conventional practice of scientific experiments, where one element is artificially constrained and fixed in space, within the continuous heterogeneity of the other changing elements.

[303] *Bergsonism*, 42.

[304] *MI,* 11.

[305] *Bergsonism*, 43.

[306] As Deleuze points out, when we perceive, we perceive within the haze of folds and perception of objects in time moves between thresholds and gradations.

Perception, rather than being distinct and tangible (Cartesian) occurs in and through the differentials among microperceptions, which give rise to macroperception. The flow of pixels on the digital screen, therefore, comes to be perceived in and through such differentials. Thus, Deleuze writes, "[t]here exists only what is perceived." (This point of moving between the poles of distinct and obscure perception will be taken up in detail in chapters four and five with respect to thresholds and gradations in perception.) See Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. T. Conley, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1993), 93-95.

[307] A translation is the simple conversion from one language to another; a transduction is a catalytic process, in which new entities/things are created. Thus, the conversion of actual light occurring into the numerical value of a pixel is a translation; in this translation, nothing new emerges.

[308] Damian Sutton, "Immanent Images," in *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy*, ed. D.N. Rodowick, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2010), 315; *MI*, 7.

[309] *MI*, 7.

[310] *MI*, 9.

[311] *MI*, 9.

[312] *MI*, 10.

[313] In this, the brain is the cinema; it is where the actual movement unfolds.

[314] *MI*, 11.

[315] *MI*, 10.

[316] *MI*, 11.

[317] In John Mullarkey, *Bergson and Philosophy*, (Indiana: U of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 14.

[318] The movement in a Renaissance grid would be towards a miniaturization, that is, from landscape to painter's eye to canvas. In Collins's pieces, there is also a triple movement, from landscape to camera-eye to digital-screen. The camera-eye functions as an extension of the human eye, but which nonetheless also miniaturizes the landscape, which then is magnified on a gallery screen.

[319] Some of these measurements in Renaissance perspective would be the vanishing point on the horizon, into which objects recede; the perceptual relations between background, middle-ground and foreground; the vertical relations between the foundation of a pillar or a building and the measurements of their heights which would establish their weightiness and substantiate the grounding in the rendition of these structures.

[320] Hyperrealism is also referred to as Superrealism.

[321] In this sense, it is unlikely that the image on the digital-screen can come to be an identical digital copy of the landscape. Moreover, the composition of the pixel is dependent on the environmental factors, which constitute its hues, luminosity and

intensity. Weather conditions substantively change the images produced on the digital-screen, as seen in *Glenlandia* and *Fenlandia*. However, in *The Spectroscope*, there are fewer variations given the stability of the environmental conditions existing inside an empty house. In this case the pixel produces near identical copies of the room.

[322] As noted earlier, there exists what is perceived through the haze of the folds. (See footnote 54.) Moreover, on her website Collins states, "[t]his image was transmitted live at the rate of 60 pixels every minute via the internet." The "live" transmission suggests the instantaneity of the work. See: <http://www.susan-collins.net/glenlandia>

[323] Rodowick, 1997, 24.

[324] Mullarkey, 18.

[325] Mullarkey, 17-8.

[326] In Mullarkey, 17-8.

[327] Note for instance that each frame in *Avatar* took 27 hours to generate. Each frame is produced by layering different images upon it.

[328] Timothy Murray, "Time @ Cinema's Future," in *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy*, ed. D.N. Rodowick, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2010), 360.

[329] Noël Carroll, "What is Cinema?" in *The Philosophy of Motion Pictures*, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 53-79.

[330] David Rodowick, *The Virtual Life of Film*, (Massachusetts: Harvard U Press, 2007), 41.

[331] For a detailed discussion on questions of medium specificity, see Rodowick's second chapter, "What was Cinema?" 25-41.

[332] Lev Manovich, *The Language of New Media*, (Massachussetes: MIT Press, 2002), 26.

[333] Manovich, 45.

[334] Rodowick, 2007, 134.

[335] Rodowick, 2007, 131. Rodowick, moreover, objects that digital images are even images. In his second chapter, "A New Landscape (without image)," in the sub-section, "An Image that is not 'One,'" he analyzes how digital information processing systems are signals rather than images. Drawing comparisons with the two technologies, he analyzes the difference between refresher rates in electronic media and the presence of the "whole" frame in celluloid.

[336] Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*, trans. R. Beardsworth and G. Collins, (Stanford: Stanford U Press, 1998), 6.

[337] Except for when the woman character opens her eyes, the entire "film" is composed from image stills.

[338] Laura Marks, *Touch*, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2002), 174.

[339] See also Rodowick's analysis of movement in 2007, 163-189.

[340] Rodowick, 2007, 171.

[341] If one enters as a new screen has just begun it might be altogether unclear what the subject is about as the live pixels override the older layer underneath; on the other hand, if one enters the piece towards the end, nearing the completion of the screen, greater recognition that it is a landscape occurs.

[342] Manovich, 154-5.

[343] Jacques Rancière, *The Future of the Image*, trans. G. Elliot, New York: Verso, 2009), 9.

[344] Peter Ride, "Timeless -- Time, Landscape and New Media," in http://www.imagesfestival.com/festival/exhibition2006.php?festival_id=20&id=38&type=calendar

[345] In this, the brain is the cinema; it is where the actual movement unfolds.

[346] As Collins states on her website, "[t]his image was transmitted live at the rate of 60 pixels every minute via the internet. It *depicts* the previous 21 hours and 20 mins (approx.) in horizontal bands." (My emphasis.) (See http://www.susan-collins.net/glenlandia>) Each pixel, as noted earlier, is calibrated by software and is a point in space on the webcam. It is transferred via the internet to the digital screen. Each pixel is therefore the physical *representation* of a point in space in time.

[347] Stiegler, 6.

[348] Stiegler, 6.

[349] Stiegler, 6.

[350] Gilles Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control," in *October*, Vol. 59 (Winter, 1992), 6.

[351] In Murray, 365-6.

[352] Murray, 367.

[353] Murray, 360.

[354] Thought can move in any direction as virtual multiplicity.

Chapter Four

Conceptualizing Cinematic Folds

There exists only what is perceived.
                                        --Deleuze[355]

Introduction

From considering interstitial aporias and temporal continuity in the previous two

chapters, I will now move to the concept of the fold, to examine duration in media.

Unlike the interstice, which is an actual, material fissure between two things/shots,

the fold is an ontological process by which perception of the world produces the

impression of things in the mind. Folding is something that occurs in the mind, in

which the virtual relations between the actual objects/fields occur in a free and open

time. The fold that occurs, therefore, is between the actual, material world and (the

real, virtual) mind. In considering the metaphysics of the fold, I will attempt to show

how the duration experienced in the encounter of a media object occurs in the

folding among objects/fields. In the context of cinema, I have referred to this folding

among objects/fields as cinematic folding, which gives rise to a free and open virtual

time. Cinematic folding therefore gives rise to the movement of time between pasts

and futures, experienced outside the chronometric measurement of seconds, minutes

or hours. This time is what Deleuze has called aionic time.

238

The metaphysics of the fold offers a framework that stretches and expands beyond what is traditionally considered to be filmic. Folding not only includes the folding among phenomena that traditionally constitute film but also, more expansively, that film phenomena continue into the world as much as the world continues in them. Such a framework conceptualizes how an image of the world can come to tremble in the mind and proceed into the different worlds of science, philosophy and art. In order to conceive this constant flow between images and mind, we should take into account that there are infinite force fields between them.[356] Corresponding to tremors in science, which echo in art and philosophy, vibrations in film resonate in worlds of painting and poetry. Indeed as Gilles Deleuze has said, "[t]here is no work that doesn't have its beginning or end in art forms."[357]

In order to conceptualize the virtual time of the fold as the framework of this chapter, I will begin by considering Andrei Tarkovsky's film *Mirror* (1975). This work may be characterized as including flows of the auricular/musical, the literary and the painterly, which are fields that fold into and out of each other in the film. What is musical, literary or painterly, however, are the fields that enfold the film, in that they continue and extend beyond it or for that matter, what is filmic. In the extension and continuity of folding beyond a particular film, they arise and pass through a film. Their flows emerge from an outside, continue and then disappear from films into other territories.

In conceptualizing the cinematic as also occurring from fields that extend beyond it, from an outside, I will move beyond the traditional duality of the inside-outside relations between film and world. That is, I will question the traditional duality in which perception occurs specifically in relation to the images being perceived. The interiority of the film's plot and narrative, specific to its diegesis, should be understood now as being open and fluid with the outside.[358] Such a thought will allow me to examine what the cinematic is beyond the interiority of the film-image's actual visibility, which is frequently delimited to the serial movement of film frames. Moreover, I suggest that what is cinematic not only includes the virtual movements between actual images, but also that these virtual movements are asynchronous, in that they fold between the images of the film *and* those of the world, as they occur in the mind. In *Mirror*, for instance, Leonardo da Vinci's drawings and Bach's music generate a kinetic force in which the character, Alexei, as well as the spectator, come to reflect on the works themselves, and not merely as they relate to the film itself.

The twisting and folding that takes place among the fields occurs through that which is impalpable between them. These indiscernible movements, for instance, between the musical and painterly, are the virtual movements occurring in the mind. These virtual movements I will consider to be the invisible spectrum of the perceptible. It is in this virtual time moving between different fields and terrains that duration of media events is experienced. Duration, thereby, should be understood as

occurring in the lived time of media events, in which pasts and futures come to fold and unfold in the perception of matter.

Incipient to the fold is the curvilinear line. This curvilinear line is the line of movement and of perspectivism, which occurs between two fields in hyperbolic or curved space. The curvilinear line is therefore the line that emerges from the folding among micro fields such as sound, light, movement or matter, which swirl around in hyperbolic space. These micro fields of matter are the genetic elements of the image.[359] Micro fields of the genetic elements produce tiny micro foldings among them in the experience of sensory data. Micro foldings of micro matter generate sense perception of tiny inklings that are barely perceptible. Upon aggregation, however, micro perceptions become stronger perceptions, in which inklings develop into the clarity of ideas. What was initially obscure becomes clearer in perception. Micro perceptions, therefore, stretch out to become the larger, macro surfaces of thoughts and consciousness. I will examine micro perceptions in chapter four and then move on to macro perceptions in chapter five. The two chapters will therefore have an extensive relation to each other, in that they move conceptually from an examination of micro foldings and micro perceptions in Tarkovsky's *Mirror* to macro foldings and macro perceptions between media events in the next chapter.

I will undertake a multifaceted approach to this chapter on Tarkovsky's *Mirror*, moving between empiricism and theoretical examination. For the first I will engage in an inquiry of molecular processes, studying how the genetic elements of

the image come to behave on curvilinear surfaces. This study rests on Deleuze's *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (1988/1993), which in turn draws upon Leibniz's study of the monad; it would be accurate to state therefore that the empirical work I undertake stems from an intertwining of my own observations of the film and also from Deleuze's Leibniz and monadology. At their micro level, I will track the genetic elements of the cinematic image as they fold and unfold in time, where the forces of compression come to mold the image in particular ways. From these minor folds I will present an impression of the semi-large mezzo folds in *Mirror* among sense perceptions, of what is becoming painterly, musical and poetical. Such an understanding will allow me to present the relations between the micro forces of the genetic elements and how they come to shape the larger mezzo movements of the film in the workings of a hyperbolic geometry. In the following chapter I will sketch out the larger macro folds among media events from these mezzo folds.

The theoretical aspect of this chapter will trace the relation between the continuous force fields between images and mind in which I will draw upon a discussion of matter and perception. Such a discussion will include Henri Bergson's ontology of images, in which the whole world is understood to be a set of images. Rather than being treated as discrete orders, matter and perception will be understood as continuous flows that resemble each other. Bergson's ontology, which sets out to overcome some of the major impasses in western philosophy between

dualisms such as inside-outside, subject-object or mind-matter, will be of critical importance in my consideration of cinematic folding in this chapter and the next one.

In *Mirror*, the painterly, literary and musical fields fold into and out of each other, where it is not possible to know where each begins or ends. Moreover, the fields extend beyond that which is *Mirror*, their flows arising from and disappearing into the outside. The interstice's aporia or disjunction between images now becomes a continuing topological line which folds between two fields, the distinction between the two occurring in the continuous line. Whereas the interstice is a broken line, the fold carries out the continuous movement of a line that travels between different fields. This topological movement connects fields into continuously greater and greater unbroken wholes. Cinematic folds therefore form by interlocking connections between micro fields of light, sound, matter and movement in time. The folds between micro fields aggregate into larger fields, making up the painterly, poetic, or musical. The folds between these larger fields, as we will see in chapter five, extend towards the differentials between media-events and to the socius itself, ultimately enfolding the entire world. The folding of matter in perception produces continuous duration.

Leibniz's aesthetics of curvature therefore undoes the Cartesian-Euclidean geometry, which offers a flat space and a grid-structure. Within a grid-structure the absolute clarity of perception becomes possible in which objects are separable, distinct and perceived through the abstract unity of rational cognition. In the

243

aesthetics of curvature, on the other hand, bodies are fluid, indistinct and inseparable.[360] It allows for levels of transparencies in perception generated between the continual movements of micro and macro perception.[361] In the perception of a temporal media object light, sound, movement and matter begin to undulate in time. Matter on a hyperbolic plane is not perceived through a stable frame or as being distinctly clear. Rather, a temporal object is perceived fluidly, as it folds and unfolds between obscure and distinct perceptions. Perception is fluid, generating the continual movements of thinking. Levels of perception give rise to thresholds of thought in that obscure perceptions produce unclear thinking and distinct perceptions give rise to clear thought. What generates the fold between image and mind occurs through the level of perception of the material image (whether strong or weak), which folds into thresholds of virtual thought (obscure-clear). The fold between image and mind, thereby, occurs in the perception of things, giving rise to the virtual time of duration in media events.

In *The Fold*, Deleuze also develops the point of view that minute infinite perceptions are formed in relationship to the molecular movements of bodies in hyperbolic, curvilinear space. This idea, drawn from Leibniz's vision of differential geometry, is one in which the curved line traverses and cuts through all matter. The entire universe undergoes curvilinear transformation in virtue of the multitude of microscopic particles swirling through the universe, imbibing matter with active forces.[362] The world conceived in a hyperbolic curved space brings forth an infinite

series of curves and inflections in which an inflection is the elastic point and therefore, an ideal genetic element of the variable curve or of a fold.[363] Within an infinity of curves, each curve is a unique variable, and enclosed within each curve resides a unique point of view. Each of these points of view or inflections generate the plurality of perspectives, an infinite diversity of subjectivity in the varied fields stretched across any scientific, philosophical or artistic endeavour.[364]

A hyperbolic geometry therefore presents multiple perspectives, which include the infinite points of inflection and refraction on a curved surface. A curved surface is a transpositional space that no longer presents a central or unified point as in a grid or on a flat surface; on the contrary, its curvilinear surface reflects and refracts the endless movement of unreal and distorted hyperbolic planes. As Henderson and Krauss write, in early twentieth century art movements, the aesthetics of a hyperbolic, non-Euclidean geometry presented a new sense of modernism. Cubism, for instance, dislodged realism, rationality and the perspective of a centered world, offering worlds that were distorted, fragmented and decentered instead.[365]

I will begin this chapter by developing the notion of a hyperbolic space further, in which I will situate cinema and specifically, Tarkovsky's film, *Mirror*. I start by laying out the micro fields of the image, which fold and unfold in time. This folding and unfolding in perception occurs through the intermodularity between the senses. The image, it is to be noted, is a dynamic field of experience in perception,

which modulates in time. Images, moreover, rather than being in stable states are to be understood as indeterminate as they are in states of becoming as they fold and unfold from different territories. Rather than being delimited by either their mental or material ontological status, they rove anywhere from conceptual to visual to haptic or sonorous forms, filling up the world as they extend, bend and return from one territory to another. In these movements we can already perceive changes in the status of images from being to becoming in the world. This becoming is constituent to the activity of micro perceptions, which oscillate between the levels of sensations experienced. Strong sensations give rise to distinct thoughts and weak sensations give rise to unclear thoughts. In a hyperbolic curvilinear space, therefore, the continual movement of micro perceptions produces layers and layers of transparencies, as perception continually moves between the two poles of distinct and indistinct sensations, which give rise to clarity and ambiguity in thought. These states are different to the clarity, definitiveness, discontinuities and discreteness constructed in the workings of a Cartesian-Euclidean geometry.

Towards curvilinear, hyperbolic spaces
In a hyperbolic geometry the curvature between two dynamic fields, such as sound and light in film, is conceptualized differently from a Euclidean geometry of space. By virtue of the bending surface of a hyperbolic space, the perception of objects in the world is connected to an undulating body unfolding in time. Such a body may be

characterized as having an elastic surface and also as being more fluid than the hard, stable and finite body of Euclidean geometry.[366] The elastic and plastic curvature of a body undulating in time is not absolutely definable and neither is it starkly discrete from others. Instead, it should be understood as being continuous with what it envelopes or what envelopes it, generating a curved surface between them. In a hyperbolic curved space, bodies cohere with other bodies making them continuous, fluid and mobile in their contact, in which they fold amongst each other.

I will trace this continuous movement between bodies enfolding each other in my consideration of the image in *Mirror* in which I will track how the musical, literary and painterly fold into each other. At their micro level fluvia or a multitude of molecules fold and gather into each other forming bodies. The aggregation of tiny molecules, swell into larger surfaces, these larger bodies making up the mezzo folds. Micro surfaces aggregate and fold into greater expansive bodies, which in turn fold to make up the vast curvilinear surfaces of the world and universe. A larger body, therefore, is made up from the aggregation of molecular matter.

However, in keeping with the continual movement of universal molecular flows I will also need to consider micro forces, which apply pressure and change the forms of bodies. Micro forces transform unformed elastic matter into shapes, surfaces and bodies, molding and transforming matter into the elastic architectures of the different media events. These micro forces are "plastic forces" that traverse all bodies, including media practices and conceptual spaces. They are to be understood

as being material, mechanical and conceptual. The intensity of pressure exerted by micro forces, be they mechanical or conceptual, therefore, changes the shapes and surfaces of media bodies, affecting the folds being produced between them. The forces applied to a body not only change that body, which is plastic, but also produces its relational change in another body. For instance, the level of light-intensity produced in an image will not only make an image brighter or darker, but also induce a differential of relations with other images which succeed it in a filmic sequence. Micro forces generating a lightness or heaviness in the image produce micro sensations which, upon aggregation, take on a "shapelikeness,"[367] becoming the larger bodies of, for instance, poetic gesture. Thus micro forces give shape to images along a continuum, effecting changes in the structuring of bodies as well as enabling changes in the direction of their flow.

Just as bodies fold into each other forming greater wholes, we must also note that bodies fold into perception, in which perceiver and perceived form a relation of what becomes that greater whole.[368] As I will show in more detail in the next chapter, perception, or the point from which a view becomes available, forms a circuit with the matter that it perceives and in this relationship, perception becomes internal to matter. In this sense perception and what is perceived fold into each other. Such a point of view must be understood to occur on the curvilinear surface of the earth in which the molecular movements of an image's genetic elements, and their micro perceptions, fold and unfold into each other.

A fold occurs where two strata come into contact with each other, where the active compression of molecular forces result in their twisting in which inner surfaces come to touch outer ones. The fold, therefore, undoes any notion of definitive fields where bounded bodies generate discrete entities. The connections and relations between various strata of inside and outside present gradations and layers of gray zones in perceptions and, therefore, in the transparencies of thought. The connections and relations among the mezzo fields that I track must be seen through such a relation in which the painterly, poetical and auricular/musical, rather than being discrete entities become shapelike as they fold into and out of the other. What this means is that in the image-event *Mirror*, molecular flows of light, sound, movement and matter as they endure in time, take on a shapelikeness at their mezzo levels, developing into perceptual forms, of what becomes painterly, poetic or musical. Conceiving films through molecular flows, therefore, undoes the traditional dualism of what is interior and exterior to filmic bodies, making the continual mobile body of micro flows a media event.[369]

In undoing the Cartesian duality of mind and body, Leibniz rejected any suggestion that perception of a form depend on a body. He considered instead how perceptual experience might occur as an instance of thought. In his theory of the monad he came to write that objects might be experienced as inner spaces, through mental representations, in which the entire world is expressed within the monad. The monadic self is a metaphysical point, existing in an enclosure without doors or

windows, where what is folded inside becomes the virtual, mental envelope of the entire world.[370] What this means then is that the inner folds of perception present all the possibilities and potentialities of what an image can become, carried in its virtual potential, as the rhythms, movements, matter, light intensities and sound frequencies of an image come to fold in our perception in time. From this latter condition of virtual potentiality in the mechanism of perception, I will develop my approach to the folding among the senses in the perception of images in Tarkovsky's *Mirror*.

In the creative moment of difference taking place in a media event, the virtual object is actualized from the realm of thought. Virtuality, therefore, is always in a liminal state of emergence, an abstract realm of immanent potential. Expression is therefore the actualization of such immanence occurring in the duration of a media event in the fold where images meet mind. Monadic selves, which express themselves, are possibilities that become actualized in composite substances. Such expressions are perceived in qualities such as sound, colour, the movement of an object or in other phenomena. Realized in the flux of matter, they shift, vary, migrate and transform, conditioning perception and thought.[371]

Folds within folds

Micro fields of light, sound, movement and matter in time, the genetic elements of the image, come to generate perceptions. The aggregation of micro fields into larger and larger fields generate increasing thresholds of clarity in perception, and these

thresholds are the shapings of larger bodies of what I have characterized as the painterly, poetical and musical in *Mirror*. Perception becomes stronger and more distinct as it comes to recognize shapes and forms, achieving states of increasing clarity. Micro perceptions, therefore, unfold into the clarity of macro perceptions, which are larger surfaces. Micro perceptions, which make up each sense organ, function by their folding and distending movements, presenting the clarity or indistinctness of a sensation, object or concept.

However, while each sense is composed from a mass of micro perceptions, each sense is itself produced from the aggregation of many different senses. It is therefore noteworthy that a particular sense is the aggregation of different senses. For instance, vision is at least accompanied by hearing, touch and balance, while we understand that our sense of taste is accompanied by vision, touch and smell. Visually impaired people are sometimes known to "see" through their ears, in addition to their heightened sense of touch and it is in this spirit that Deleuze writes, "painting is thought: vision is through thought, and the eye thinks, even more than it listens."[372] Brian Massumi, moreover, has conceptualized the interconnection among the senses to be so complete that vision takes place in a "crowded bubble."[373] Vision is produced in a field of experience, which includes not only light and colour, but also movement, balance, sound, tactility and taste.[374] The experience of an image-event therefore has two main components: micro perceptions which fold and unfold

in each sense generating clarity or indistinctness, and that each sense itself is the aggregation of many senses.

Correspondingly, the shaping of a mezzo field, such as the painterly, occurs by a multitude of folds among light, sound, movement and matter, which vibrate in time. Depending on the density of folding among micro perceptions, each sensory organ perceives gradients from clarity to indistinctness, and vision itself folds with other sensory organs to produce a field of experience. In the perception of an image, therefore, vision, tactility, aurality, proprioception and other senses become engaged. The image-event thereby is constituted in the intermodular connection among the different sensory organs in which each sensory perception is interconnected with other sensory perceptions.[375] The folds of perception in a painterly field move continually between the genetic elements of the image, crinkling into minute folds making the sensations we feel obscure or stretching out to macro perceptions, making the field of experience clearer.

What is an image?

But before we can move further, I will need to inquire into the nature of the image itself. Leaping into the chaosmos of images in a film such as *Mirror* sets us chasing a simple yet elusive question: what is an image?[376] We might enunciate by saying that the image is in our line of sight as we view Leonardo da Vinci's drawings, the photographs of Alexei's mother, the actors' performances or WWII events unfolding

before us in *Mirror*. We can also say that an image erupts into thinking as we watch the movement of the long grass swirling in the wind, in the delicate touch of a whispered word, such as when little Alexei whispers "papa," or in the cognitive dissonance of loud machinery at the printing press. Images, we can say thereby, rather than being delimited by their materiality, suffuse the world of the film as they extend, bend and return modulating anywhere through gradients of perception, memory and cognition.[377] They travel between vision, taste, sound and touch. They rove under a dim light unformed, obscure and barely perceptible and speed ingeniously with the clarity of thought elsewhere, passing through events and bodies, and move between qualities and substances. In these movements we already perceive changes. We find that we no longer think *about* an image as it comes into view as a material object on the horizon of our sight that refers *to* a concrete frame in the film. Rather, we can come to say that *an image captures us as we move together through infinite relations in different territories*. Instead of encountering an image set before us we can say, therefore, that we endure a relation through changing mobile connections as we move through the universe of the film. We see that images move us from childhood smells into thinking and from imperceptible sounds into memory. Thinking, memory and perception move between thresholds of clarity and obscurity as they ascend and descend from the qualities and substances of actual images that come to be experienced. And in this mobility we also apprehend that the nature and relations of qualifying what an image is becomes an enterprise in

253

sedating and paralyzing them. When we begin to see the movement of images as they traverse through actual and virtual territories -- sensual, conceptual, perceptual, cognitive, haptic -- we might say that images endure an eternal exodus, perpetually fleeing, dissolving and emerging in an infinity of ways, and that we become with images. An actual image carries into a memory, which then changes the qualities of the actual image being encountered. Such a change necessitates discarding questions on the ontology of the image's being and we inquire instead about its becoming or its ontogenesis: what can the image do?

In a curvilinear geometry, matter not only folds into other matter, as sound folds into light in the make-up of the moving image, but also importantly, perception folds into matter.[378] As we traverse through the different territories matter and perception, or the actual and virtual, form the two indissoluble parts of the whole. The matter of an image being perceived forms a fold with the perceiver. Perception, therefore, occurs in the fold between perceiver and what is being perceived. In this manner it can be said that perception forms a relation of the whole with images as they move through the different (actual-virtual) territories.

Little pricklings, tiny perceptions: micro forces

In the next two sub-sections I will undertake an empirical approach in which I will engage in an examination of how the molecular fields of an image take on the forces that they do in the curvilinear space that occurs between matter and perception. I

will attempt to present how fields of light, sound, movement and matter fold into perception, generating micro sensations. Such micro sensations dwell at the level of the barely perceptible. Before I track how perceptions give rise to micro sensations in *Mirror*, a film which is ultimately sensate, I will need to present several vignettes from the film in the sub-sections to follow. However, a description of the scenes will be insufficient for presenting this film with much justice, as image-flows should be experienced in their powerful intensity as they course through time and in the context of the film; moreover, the linear, linguistic structure of a language-system cannot come to achieve the immediate impact of images on perception.

Nonetheless, I will begin in the middle of *Mirror* where we find ourselves in the midst of an unfolding memory as experienced by Alexei, one of the main characters in the film. As he speaks over the telephone to his pre-teenage son Ignat, who has been left alone in a large apartment, he asks if he likes any girls. Upon Ignat's response that "girls are awful," Alexei starts by recalling his own heart throb when he was Ignat's age during the war, a memory that forks into other bits of memory from his childhood. Alexei remembers that she was a redhead with chapped lips. We see her smiling dressed in an ill-fitting tattered grey coat walking over the frosty landscape. Slipping into his past Alexei moves in and out of memories, unleashing the force of what is a most compelling sequence in the film. Weaving together the flows of personal and social events, Tarkovsky's narrative brilliantly interweaves the deeply emotional minor events of his own childhood with

documentary footage from WWII. The footage, in turn, presents the global scope of events sweeping over Europe and Asia during the war. Shifting between the poetic, historical, political and painterly we find ourselves experiencing the desolation and pain of Asafiev, an orphaned boy. We also listen to a poem written by Tarkovsky's father, Arsnei, as the weary march of nameless soldiers proceeds through mud, snow and along rivers. We see images of the atom bomb detonating; the euphoria experienced at the end of the war; a mass rally celebrating Mao's rise to power as millions wave their copies of the little Red Book. We even find ourselves looking at a reporter filming a dead body on the street, which looks eerily like Hitler's.

Cascading among these shots, almost as an undercurrent, is a glimpse into Asafiev's own little life. As part of WWII training, we see him, along with other boys, learning how to aim rifles in a shooting range. We glimpse the struggles he faces with his peers and instructor as they trudge back and forth, the slow tracking shots following the characters around. The harshness of Russian winters and the desolate countryside are presented in dull grey tones, the scene a glimpse into the misery of war-time routine. Yet, the slow, listless, grey shots with the boys and instructor plodding about on the wooden floor, combined with the dull sounds hanging in the frozen air and the crunching snow below as they walk, is filled with melancholic beauty.

Following a terrifying image of the atom bomb exploding, we are transported from the miserable conditions of war to a particularly beautiful shot; the landscape,

to our astonishment and relief, is now flooded with brilliant sunlight and the squeals of children's laughter. In a scene that looks like it was painted by the 16th century Dutch master Pieter Bruegel, the Elder, we see children sledding and milling about among the snow-covered rolling hills dotted with trees. Their dark coats stand in strong contrast to the white snow as they flitter merrily over them. In mid-ground we see a boy climbing the hill and coming towards the camera; the film's languorous rhythm reveals the boy to be Asafiev, carrying a suitcase. As he approaches the camera he is framed in close-up, his plaintive, almost blank face revealing that he is elsewhere, deep in thought. From the hollow sounds he tries to muster with his pursed lips we perceive that he is trying to whistle, and streaming down his cheeks are tears, which are becoming crystalline in the icy air. He turns, moving a few metres away from the camera and gazes at a tree. In a most surprising occurrence, a little sparrow flies and lands on his head. The flight of this little bird alighting on Asafiev's head is emotional, as it is magnificent.

From this vignette, I would now like to draw upon the micro forces that have been generated. Stimulating the sensory organs, micro forces generate tiny perceptions, inducing the visceral and psychic atmospheres of an image. In the sequence of the shooting range, the dull gray tones of the sky, the barely perceptible hollow cawing of crows while bullets are being fired, the brown, oversized and tattered coats worn by the characters, the dull echoey sounds of snow crunching under the instructor's heavy boots, his slow, languorous movements, and the listless

257

movement of the camera shots, all constitute the imperceptible forces of the elements. The dull gray tones, hollow sounds, slow movements and tactile surfaces are the micro forces, animating and giving expression to not only what but *how* we might come to sense and perceive the moving image. Micro forces shape and contour images, producing endless variations and relations in the light tones, colour gradients, sound underlays and overtones. They can produce subtle alterations in the camera's movement through space and in the image's tactility, as images fold and unfold in time. Micro forces, therefore, produce imperceptible shifts in the strata of a moving image.

In the shooting-range, the gray tonalities of the sky, the long wooden gallery frosted over with ice and the tattered overcoats are some of the visual elements that our eye passes over. The field of vision overlaps with other sense-fields, such as sound, tactility and movement in time in the perception of a moving image. The long overcoats that the boys and instructor wear are thick, baggy, tattered. The shooting range is made up of long wooden beams tied together by thick rope, making the walls of the open-air gallery coarse, worn out, and in addition, layered over with ice. The raw, physical materiality of the objects, as well as the actors' faces, their gestures, affectations and movements, give rise to micro sensations. In perceiving these elements we could say that vision folds not only into our aural sense but also into our sense of tactility, speed and balance. We experience sensations from perceptions gleaned from the images, which fold into each other in our body's

reception to them. As we come to experience the scene at the shooting-gallery, the image modulates between appearing dull, sad and rough-hewn as it flows in time. These micro sensations give rise to melancholic feelings, generating an atmosphere in relation to the moving image. Creating an atmosphere through micro forces through our *experience* of them in time and space is different from verbalizing "melancholia" through, say, dialogue, which would present an abstract *idea* of such a quality linguistically. Moreover, as there is little verbal definition accreting the spatio-temporality of the film, and because the scene occurs as a wave of memory from the past that continually bifurcates from one event to another, the spectator bears an obscure and ambiguous relation with the image-experience.

The flat lighting-scale of this scene distributes light in such a way that it gives all the elements in the pro-filmic space even tones. In such a lighting-scale, darker objects are given more light than lighter objects so that the light reflected back from all the objects is in equal quantities. Flat lighting-scales therefore produce less variability in the colour tonalities of an image, making the micro gradients of light between figure and ground less definable. Elements seen in even, equalizing tones become less dramatic to the eye, producing a continuation between objects, allowing for an imperceptible blurring among them. Producing little differentiation between objects, gray colour tonalities can propagate what is perceived to be a colourless scene. Perceiving little variability in the image means less excitement for the eye as it scans the image. This subtle lack of differentiation to the eye between

the object-ground relations produces micro sensations that have even-tones. In the context of the film, the grey-scale of the images, of snow, ice, long tattered overcoats and wooden beams, produces a dulling effect. As we are drawn further into the sequence, not only is each shot of a long duration, but its slow tracing movement across the figures of the boys, instructor and landscape make the overall action nearly motionless and almost frozen in time. In the lugubrious movements of the long-takes, in which the camera hovers ponderously over the characters, we find our spirits sinking.

The shooting range's drab light tones and the slow takes coax a solitary, more circumspect attitude in the spectator. Layered in between these varying sense perceptions, is the drift of dialogue. Occurring mostly between Asafiev and the instructor, the dialogue's delivery is generally sluggish, transpiring in deliberately drawn-out words, punctuating the scene. In the words which flow to our aural perception in a different scene, we find out from another boy that Asafiev became an orphan during the Leningrad blockade. The tears that stream down the boy's face, the instructor's stiffening up, marked by the hollow cawing layered with the disquiet of firing bullets, the words echo and hang in the empty frozen landscape. The micro forces of the image therefore, which produce the indefinable and vague sensations of dullness, sadness and melancholia, become punctuated by the sparse dialogue, which effectively transforms the spectator's emotional state. The undulating micro forces, which vary from frame to frame, subtly increase or decrease the intensity of the

260

image. They are tiny imperceptible substances able to produce shifts in the physical, mechanical and material spaces of the image The level of exertion applied by micro forces continually shifts the physical, elastic architecture of the film and therefore, also, shapes it's conceptual milieu.

Between murmurings and a vociferous howl

Micro forces modulate the image opening it up to an infinity of possibilities by way of their differential relations, proportions, qualities and geometries. These differential relations give rise to micro perceptions, which are tiny and infinite inklings that are barely felt, hardly sensed and not yet at the threshold of consciousness. Micro forces, thereby, modulate the image producing indistinct sensations, inclinations and feelings. In the scene described in *Mirror*, the gray light tonalities, the slow moving shots and the echoing sounds produce inclinations in the spectator's perception of them, rather than any sense of clarity. These inclinations are a multitude of micro folds created in the image's infinite relations, and they are like "dust...mist or fog."[379] Tiny inklings aggregating in particular ways become great swelling surfaces like voluminous, bulbous crumples which, in turn, little by little, distend and extend into a large sinuous fold. These larger zones are those in which micro perceptions have unfolded into the clarity of macro perceptions that draw upon the clarity of a thought. What are the micro perceptions of grayness, slowness, coarseness and echoes distend into the misery of a child-soldier's training

camp during the war. The aggregation of tiny creases of micro perception, therefore, unfolds into the macro perception of consciousness. These two movements of perception, Deleuze writes, cannot be opposed to each other. Instead, *some* perceptions lead to others. From obscure rumblings we come to perceive a particular sound, dust becomes a colour, a line forms a specific image and inklings become a thought. Thus we can say along with Deleuze that "I project the world 'on the surface of a folding'...," a surface upon which thought folds or unfolds between obscurity and clarity.[380]

Moreover, as vision folds in with auricular, kinesthetic, proprioceptive, somatic, tactile and other senses, a multitude of folds becomes generated. These folds within folds, operating between the mechanisms of micro and macro perceptions, come to sense the flow of time, movement, matter, light and sound of the cinematic image. This sensing of the various fields is an open and free time, and one in which the virtual time of duration unfolds in media encounters.

In what is the development of tiny little folds or inklings opening up to the great fold of consciousness, we come to perceive the clarity of forms and sounds.[381] In a cinematic image this clarity can be of two types. It can emerge at a molecular level through what is initially an abstract or unfocussed shot, which in time reveals an object in a shot (or sequence), producing a local meaning. On a molar level we can say that clarity might be possible at the level of the whole film, in which an intentional consciousness comes into play. Such consciousness would produce

associated meanings that align the film within social, historical, theoretical or philosophical ordering.

In *Mirror*, however, while there are levels of transparency we are hard pressed to find distinct intellectual clarity. In *Difference and Repetition* (1968/94), Deleuze expounds on Leibniz's distinct-obscure and clear-confused perceptions. Distinct perceptions are those that grasp differential relations and singularities, while obscure perceptions are indistinguishable from each other and through which singularities cannot be grasped.[382] In the context of *Mirror*, it would be possible to say that the film largely moves through various states of obscurity in which the spectator is bewildered by the continually changing faces and characters. There is no clarity given as to who the characters and actors are, or their relations to each other; they seem to blur into and out of each other. (At the risk of mixing metaphors, this visual blurring corresponds to Leibniz's [auricular] murmuring sounds of the sea.) The film, in this corresponding sense, moves through various stages of indistinct "murmuring" so to speak. For instance, sometimes the same actor plays two different characters and the spectator is given little reference as to their relations or causal connection. At the beginning of the film we see Alexei's mother played by the actor Margarita Terekhova. Later on Terekhova also plays Alexei's wife in other scenes, blurring her roles continually between wife and mother. Moreover, in a haunting scene shot in slow motion, while still playing the role of the mother, her reflection in the mirror shows a much older woman. This older woman is Tarkovsky's actual

mother, Maria Tarkovskaia, who emerges as an apparition from the future. In another splendid scene, his mother, the same older woman, appears again. In this scene we find Ignat (Alexei's son, who also plays Alexei at the same age) in conversation with another older woman, who is unknown and appears mysteriously. She sits at the dining table drinking tea and talks to Ignat. She asks him to read a selection from a particular book, which turns out to be Pushkin's letter to Chaadeyev from 19 October, 1836. She then suddenly asks him to open the door of the flat. Upon opening the door, Ignat finds the older woman Tarkovskaia waiting. Appearing confused, she leaves almost immediately, saying she had knocked on the wrong door. Upon Ignat's return back to the room the unknown woman has vanished and we find him standing alone, the dilapidated walls and peeling paint enveloping him, signaling memories of a past.

Similarly, in the concluding shots of the film we see three generations of the same family appearing interchangeably on different planes of the screen. In the first of these shots we see Alexei's father as a young man with his expectant wife, Maria, in close-up in the foreground. The second is a medium long-shot in which the grandmother, Tarkovskaia, is walking with young twins in the countryside by a beautiful cottage. One of the twins is Alexei, who is one of the main characters in the film. This cottage is where his (and also Tarkovsky's) early childhood unfolds. Throughout the film pasts and futures rotate back and forth in equal measure, including in this concluding sequence. In fact, the rotation of pasts and futures

creates a blurring among them, making them indistinguishable from each other. The multitude of faces and memories, which fold into and out of each other, generates a chain of confused and indistinct perceptions for the spectator, who is all but lost in the torrent of faces and events, trying to connect family genealogy and history.

However, half way through the film, from among the many faces and circumstances swirling around, we come to the scene at the shooting range. This scene is important as the flurry of faces and events unfold into the (relative) clarity of form at the end of this sequence. We are transported to this scene immediately after we see Ignat talking to his father on the phone about a red-headed girl with chapped lips. This conversation, we find out only later on (and after several viewings), occurs post WWII. What becomes clearer at this point are the ravages of war gleaned from the diverse clips of documentary footage sown through the various sequences: weary soldiers walking in the mud; Berlin in ruins; the mushroom cloud; the cockpit of a bomber; and others. Tarkovsky deftly interweaves these clips of war footage with the experiences of young Alexei's war training at the shooting range. From these interpenetrations between documentary footage and fiction, between a social and personal history, a measure of clarity arrives: in a flippant comment offered by another boy, we hear that Asafiev has been made an orphan. The social and personal consequences of the war's brutality are reflected in the close up of Asafiev's face upon which the camera hovers for a few brief seconds, punctuating the moment with some clarity.[383]

Thus, from the incongruity between the numerous events and faces joined together, sprinkled with sparse, vague dialogue, some clarity begins to emerge. From Tarkovsky's childhood impressions of war, the misery at the children's shooting gallery and the training of child-soldiers during the war, the spectator begins to weave connections. However, these connections, rather than being distinct or definite, can only be understood to produce relatively greater clarity, and only in comparison to the generally disjointed flow of the images. Thus, while the film distends towards an emerging consciousness, a clear consciousness is tenuous at best. This scene can hardly be understood as providing a distinct understanding of the relations between characters and the unfolding events.

For the most part, however, the film moves in the reverse direction, in which the emerging clearer vision is completely undone. We are swept into the multitudinous depth of micro perceptions where folds divide endlessly, creasing into ever minute ones, of a thousand indistinct murmurings. Terekhova, who plays Alexei's mother Maria, and also his wife Natalia, and Ignat Daniltsev, who plays Alexei at twelve and Alexei's son Ignat, make the continual transitions between pasts and futures of the actors and characters disorienting to the spectator. The oscillating roles between mother and wife, and the two boys, constrain a clear understanding of the film. Moreover, the film makes transitions between black and white, monochrome, sepia and colour, in which the past is not typically associated with black and white, nor is the present linked only to colour. *Mirror*, in such a manner,

266

produces gradients of uncertainties and thresholds of understanding, vacillating between senses of obscurity and a fragile clarity.

In these continually moving transparencies, layering obscure and clear perceptions, we are continually sensing the film. Large or tiny differentials in the image's composition come to be perceived through the receptive organs, in which subtle changes in camera movement can produce the difference between the senses of stability or uncertainty. For instance, a tripod-mounted shot will produce greater stability than a hand-held one, which will produce a lingering or hovering stillness in the image. Similarly, subtle differentials perceived in colour tonalities, gradients of lightness-darkness and sound intensities, can produce shifts in meaning. In the differentials sensed in micro-macro perceptions, perception contracts and distends between the indistinct blur of images and glimmers of intelligibility. This sensing movement is, in effect, how natural perception works.[384]

From acentered to acentered perception

While there is a continual undulation between micro and macro perception, a critical difference between natural perception and perception in film must be noted. *Mirror*, through its close-ups, long-shots and variable camera movements, unhinges the anchoring of the perceiving subject and the world. Thus while setting up an implicit knowledge of the world by way of the variability in camera movements and shots, it also presents a second intentionality for natural perception. With respect to such a

second intentionality, Deleuze's claim is that cinema's perception deviates acutely from natural perception, in that it forces us to think differently and to create new concepts.[385] Rather than present an image, which then becomes the world, cinema presents the world, which presents its own image.[386] In presenting an image, cinema "substitutes an implicit knowledge" that gives rise to a second intentionality, differing from natural perception.[387] For this reason, phenomenology on the one hand condemns cinema for its misconstrued perception and on the other, lauds its ability to uncover new forms of vision between the perceiver and perceived.[388]

In Bergson's later philosophical works, on the contrary, he had depended on cinema to demonstrate normal human perception, claiming them to be similar. In *Creative Evolution* (1907/11), Bergson wrote that cinema was much like natural perception, in that "we take snapshots, as it were, a passing reality...Perception, intellection, language so proceed in general."[389] Bergson was able to compare natural perception and cinema only by ignoring the artificial nature of the cinematographic image (its second intentionality). Ignoring the artifice, he wrote that cinema did not present photogrammes but rather immediate images, as in individual snapshots, which were then strung together like a cinematograph inside us.[390] Cinema presented the movement-image already corrected, by virtue of this stringing together of images. Flaxman writes that his attention to mechanism outweighed his understanding of the synthetic nature of the cinematographic image. While the phenomenologists were willing to admit that perception in cinema was misconstrued

268

and different from natural perception, Bergson regarded cinema as being too much like natural perception, as both the cinematographic image and perception were normal and conventional.[391] Bergson's dismissal of cinema therefore occurs chiefly on account of cinema's analogy to perception.

However, by holding the position that cinematic and natural perception correspond with each other, Bergson renounced a more radical insight he had made in an earlier work. In *Matter and Memory* (1896/1911), when he had written that "instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside the things in order to recompose their becoming artificially,"[392] he had implied a second intentionality for perception in cinema, and such an assertion is more pertinent to my discussion here.

Despite Bergson's later critique of cinema he had insisted on its acentered perception. His model of consciousness presents a state in which matter flows and changes continually, without attaching to points of anchorage or to a centre. It becomes essential to Bergson to reveal however that centres could be formed at any point -- or what Deleuze will call macro perception -- in order for the view to be firmed up instantaneously. Thus, Bergson writes, "I say in consequence that conscious perception must be produced" and that would be the result of an effort of deducing whether the perception was natural or cinematographic.[393] However, he complies that cinema's lack of anchoring did have a distinct advantage in which

perception can move from acentered state to acentered state instead of moving towards a centre, which is a remarkable difference with phenomenology.[394]

Mirror's unhinging of the spectator, as I have tried to show, occurs not only on account of the variable shots from close-ups, long-shots, pans, long-takes, high-angle or low-angle shots, but also these varying shots contain heterogeneous elements (characters, memories, emotions, dreams, documentary footage). The spectator, therefore, moves from one acentered state to another, never attaching to a centre, except at certain moments as noted earlier. These moments emerge only briefly in which a greater level of clarity is generated and where a centre can come to be firmed up before elements dissipate once more into micro flows of obscure murmurings, of faces, memories and rotating temporalities.[395]

The spectator moves through the various rhythms of the film's materiality, the micro forces shaping its physical, mechanical and conceptual spaces. Excepting for the punctual moments of clarity, we find perception moving from one image fragment to another, unable to get a sense of the whole. Moving from one acentered state to another, the spectator finds her/himself drifting through the images. Such a state of drifting is different from being in a self-conscious state of observation and distance, in which the spectator consciously and actively understands, connects and conceives the film's fragmented narrative elements. If the latter were the case then our consciousness of the film would be *about* something. We would perceive a sensible form (a Cartesian-Euclidean geometry) that would anchor the "I" in which

270

the world of the film encountered is understood through a self-consciousness that is intentional.[396]

However, we reside in various states of drift moving in and out of thresholds of conscious perception and states of transparencies.[397] The film vacillates between the two poles of clarity and obscurity, *between* consciousness intentionally produced and that which dissipates into indistinct murmurings. In this sense the mechanical and physical flows of the film, by way of the projector rate, cinematography, mise-en-scène, sound and editing fold into our perception, generating not only sensual perceptions but thereupon, also its conceptual spaces. However, rather than always being conscious *about* the characters' lives or the narrative sequence, as linguistically structured elements occurring in the film, we find ourselves adrift in the images. Brief moments of clarity emerge in this drifting through, which are points of anchorage, in which consciousness takes shape. In Bergson's materialism consciousness, therefore, rather than being *about* something (as in an intentional, active representation or representative of), *is* something, constituted on the plane of immanence.

Matter, perception and images

In order to understand immanent consciousness as becoming, rather than being about a representation of something, the flows between image and mind become imperative to the argument. In order to perceive these flows I will need to discuss at

considerable length Deleuze's conceptualization of the virtual and also Bergson's insights into how perception, matter and images continue to flow into each other, rather than being separated and disconnected elements that are given to a Cartesian-Euclidean geometry. Critical to this section is charting the conceptual flow between matter and consciousness, in which a theoretical exegesis of Deleuze's virtual transcendental materialism will come into discussion.

In a hyperbolic, curvilinear geometry, the folds among light, sound, movement and matter, as they endure in time, are understood to make up the image. Considering that the brain is the screen upon which images unfold, image and mind form a continuity. This continuity allows us to understand the processes of perception at work in the world, whether it be watching a film, reading the news, participating in interactive media or walking in a garden. Deleuze's ontology allows an understanding of how micro matter folds and unfolds in the brain. In the discussion below I will briefly attempt to sketch out how space and consciousness come to enfold and unfold from each other. Such an examination will provide further insight into the folding of micro and mezzo fields in *Mirror*. That is, the micro fields of light, sound, matter and movement produce what I construe to be the painterly, poetical and the auricular/musical fields. These mezzo fields are the virtual relations occurring in the experience of duration. Not only do these mezzo folds generate the film but, as I attempt to track in the next chapter, a virtual topology presents the condition in which different images from different media fold

into each other in perception. Such an understanding will allow us to focus on kinetics and affectivity, as the two conditions that produce media events, confounding questions of medium specificity.

For Bergson, consciousness, objects and matter ultimately were understood as flows or the flux of the world, rather than as discrete or autonomous entities. In Bergson's ontology of images, which will become an entry point into Deleuze's philosophy of the fold, Bergson understood the idea of the image to be in the very interior of things. Such an attempt, Rodowick writes, was to overcome the dualism of what is interior-exterior, realism-idealism and subject-object, dualisms that have run through the major currents of western philosophy.[398] Since the eighteenth century, the image has been considered to be a representation of matter, a representation of a field of something, as knowledge, which exists outside our consciousness, as a secondary order of reality.[399]

Knowledge was also tied to perception in a particular way in philosophical idealism and realism, where knowing is achieved by seeing. In realism, what one represents to oneself is that which is assumed by natural law or through the laws of nature,[400] in what is called "a thing."[401] In idealism, one represents to oneself according to what is presumed to be the laws of thought,[402] what is called "representation."[403] Thus for realists, the orderliness of natural phenomena lies in a cause that is distinct from perceptions themselves. Whether the cause is knowable by an effort of metaphysical construction or it remains unknowable, it is arbitrary. For

idealists, on the other hand, perceptions are the whole of reality and the orderliness

of natural phenomena is a symbol by which possibility is indicated alongside real

perceptions. Thus, in *Bergson: Thinking Backwards*, Moore writes, "for realism as

for idealism perceptions are 'veridical hallucinations,' *states of the subject projected*

outside itself."[404] Moore continues that the idealists and realists thereby present the

more or less old problems of marrying the mental and the physical, the inside and

the outside.[405] In both cases Rodowick writes, however, that the mind, in its pursuit

of knowledge, becomes separated from matter and time including Spirit, which also

exists outside time and matter. Such a separation of mind from matter and time has

been the ontotheological current of western philosophy. Bergson, instead, considers

the continuity between mind, matter and time, writing that "[matter] exists just as it

is perceived; and since it is perceived as an image, the mind would make of it, in

itself, an image."[406] He therefore considers matter and image to be in continuous

flow with each other, yet distinct from human perception.[407]

Thus we come to the crisis in how one order -- consciousness -- passes into

another order -- space. In idealism, this passing between consciousness and space is

resolved through pure images in consciousness, in the laws of thought. In

materialism, on the other hand, this crisis of the connection between what is the

deepest inside with what is the farthest outside is resolved by reconstituting the order

of consciousness through material movements. Such a material movement is

presented in the crystal image of time in Deleuze's *The Time-Image* (1985/89) in

which he presents how the present coexists with the past, an insight from Bergson. The virtual actualizes by differentiating itself into the past and present, which form a circuit with each other. This is the crystal image of time, in which the past and present coexist. This crystalline seed is a micro circuit connecting inner strata with those outside. It is a mode of actualization out of which emerges the expanding circuitry of the universe. The virtual, in circuit with the actual, Alliez writes therefore, occurs in virtue of the real maintaining an ontological indifference among Image, Movement, Matter and Light.[408] Such an ontology he calls a "transcendental materialism."

Deleuze's transcendental materialism

To further address the question of immanent consciousness I will now establish Deleuze's materialist ontology through which greater clarity on the conceptualization of the fold might be achieved. In *The Signature of the World* (2004), Eric Alliez questions what the ontology of the virtual is. He writes that in the ontotheological tradition, the quasi-genetic foundation of idealism allowed for the conceptualization of God's existence to become his real existence based on the very notion of this concept of God. However, by removing the notion of God, the purest form of the logical ideal can be reasoned out: the *a priori* correlation between thought and the most abstract being God, who is emptied of any material substance. This correlation, Alliez argues, is contrary to the simplest formulation of Bergsonian materialism, in

which "the virtual is not actual but as such possesses an ontological reality that contests and exceeds any logic of the possible."[409] Indeed, in the classical argument, existence is taken to be the same thing as the concept, except that existence lies outside of concept, in a context that is different from any sensorial dynamism, in what Deleuze explained as "arbitrarily extracted from the real."[410] This logic of "all or nothing," in which "without this Being or this Form you will have nothing but chaos," prevented the leap into ontology. Such logic presented either the formlessness and groundlessness of the non-being, or the homogeneous chasm in which neither differences nor properties existed.[411] With dialectics, similarly, the negative accounts for actual terms and real relations, as long as they are understood as being separate from the virtual and also from the movement by which they come to be actualized.[412]

This all or nothing logic also characterizes Laura Marks' tracing of the electron in *Touch* (2002), in which the physical quantity of the electron marks the claim to her materialism. It is the physical electron through which Marks makes the assumption that "what is virtual must be immaterial, transcendent," presenting the other side of the matter-consciousness divide.[413] The electron, as physical substance, establishes the material presence of digital imaging, thereby suggesting the inverse correlation that the immaterial is transcendent. When transposed, the logic establishes materiality as that which is non-transcendental. As noted, such a relation presents the classical terms by which existence (material) and concept

276

(immaterial) become equated as either "all or nothing." Instead, Alliez writes that through a Deleuzian ontology of the virtual, the virtual actualizes itself by differentiating itself into the virtual past and the actual present. This differentiation does not occur through negation (dialectics) or similitude (idealism), but through its play of difference, in which new generation becomes possible. A virtual ontology is a materialism, which could be termed a "transcendental materialism," in which matter = energy.[414] Such an ontology opens up the field of virtuality to the concrete totality of the past in which, qua Bergson, time splits into two flows, of presents which pass and another in which pasts are preserved.

Bergson's notion of pure duration differs from its own coexistence by virtue of its bifurcation, of the immediate coexistence of the past with the present. This difference rises up to an absolute potential or the virtual, forcing thought to "begin with the materiality of difference insofar as this materiality designates the new in the making."[415] In this way Deleuze considers the virtual as the pure concept of difference, as the "jouissance of difference" that opens up the virtual to the concrete totality of the past. "Life is the process of difference," Deleuze writes, in which difference is the differenciation that is produced through the movement of a virtuality that is becoming actualized, according to its own internal differentiation.[416] It is in this sense that the virtual is real and material, retaining its objective, ontological consistency and is able to produce its differentiation in the production of the actual. The virtual, Deleuze explains, is "the mode of the non-active, since it

277

only acts in differentiating itself, in ceasing to be in itself, all the while keeping something of its origin. But it is in this very respect that it is the mode of *what is*."[417] This mode of the "what is," Alliez writes, is the "inside of the outside in its powerful non-organic life. In other words, quite precisely, the very matterness [*matièreté*] of being."[418] This *matterness of being*, thereby, displaces the opposition between matter and life through the *continuity* of Bergson's pure duration, in which the *totality of the past exists in the mode of a virtual coexistence with the present.*

In *The Time-Image* Deleuze writes that the virtual image exists outside of consciousness, being neither consciousness nor the psychological state for which it is commonly mistaken. When digging into the past to search for it, we look for these pure virtual images, which only exist in partial modes of actualization. We "leap" into the past, as it were, to place ourselves in these purely virtual images, which have been preserved through time.[419] The present, which is the actual moment, is contemporaneous with the past that passes, its virtual image, the "image in the mirror." In *Mirror*, as the young Terekhova wipes mist off a mirror, she does not see her own image reflected back, but an older woman's – she has a visionary leap into her future. Thus every moment of our life presents these two flows, these two heterogeneous components, in which the actual and virtual, perception and recollection/visions exist contemporaneously.

However, Deleuze writes, pure virtuality does not have to be actualized, as it forms the smallest circuit with it. The circuitry of the actual and the virtual coexists,

forming the smallest circuit of the crystal. The virtual is correlative to the actual, and

this seed serves as a base for all other circuits. This little circuit, or crystalline seed,

has its internal limit, and also an external, reshapable and variable envelope: the

crystallizable universe.[420] The circuitry between the seed and the universe enfolds

everything, "House and Universe, *Heimlich* and *Unheimlich*."[421] Dreams, memories

and worlds, are the variations of the Whole. They are Deleuze writes:

> ...degrees or modes of actualization which are spread out between
> these two extremes of the actual and the virtual: the actual and its
> virtual on the small circuit, expanding virtualities in the deep circuits.
> And it is from the inside that the small internal circuit makes contact
> with the deep ones, directly, through the merely relative circuits.[422]

Thus Alliez writes that it is the virtual that allows a truly transcendental materialism,

bringing forth Deleuze's philosophy of becoming, of immanence, of difference and

of the event.[423]

Deleuzo-Bergsonian ontology

This capacity of the virtual also offers an understanding for Bergson's claim, which

Deleuze sustains that on the plane of immanence, everything is either an image or

matter. Based on this understanding that matter and image are continuous with each

other allows Bergson to overcome the inside-outside, subject-object dualism in his

philosophical treatise. In the first chapter of *Matter and Memory* Bergson develops

his theory of pure perception, which he describes as the "lowest degree of the

mind."[424] Writing that the body is one image among others and that "every image acts on others and reacts to others, on 'all their facets at once' and 'by all their elements'," Deleuze writes that he comes to dislodge the separation between body and image.[425] The body and brain in such a system are themselves images, among an infinite set of other images, constituted on the plane of immanence.[426] The plane of immanence is where movement comes to be established among all the different parts of each system and between the different systems, which "crosses them all and stirs them up together."[427] And this stirring prevents the different parts and systems from becoming a closed set; it is a mobile bloc of space-time, a machinic assemblage of movement-images.[428] On the plane of immanence the body is therefore matter or an image, a plane upon which Deleuze writes, "the movement-image and *flowing matter* are strictly the same thing."[429] However, Deleuze questions that if the body is itself an image, which is movement, and consciousness is itself an image, "how could images be in my consciousness since I am myself image, that is movement?"[430]

As noted above, Bergson distinguishes matter and image from human perception. This distinction leads Deleuze to ask how it is possible to extract human perception from the flowing state of matter. To answer this question we should take note of Rodowick's suggestion that we first start by thinking the plane of immanence as an open whole that cannot be understood as an immobile section; it cannot be thought of as an enclosing frame, which would then make it a spatial abstraction.[431]

In addition, we need to include Moor's suggestion on perception. Writing, if bodies exist then it is sufficient for images to exist and that the existence of images is sufficient for perception to occur. Thus, he presents one important condition for perception: contact. Perception arises from the interactions between ordinary objects and those objects which are like our bodily selves. Thus one of the principal conditions in Bergson's ontology is that a body capable of initiating change must be in contact with its environment and such contact is called perception.[432] If movement on the plane of immanence is of a universal variation, where all mass/bodies are vibratory matter, the smallest atom produces its effect in a changing whole, in which bodies are affected and in turn come to affect each other. The kinetics between the micro flows on the plane of immanence however is, on encounter, still too undefined, unsettled and has not yet consciously arisen. At the original encounter, therefore, it is not possible to distinguish human perception from the flow of matter and images. Thus it is only in the cooling down stages of an encounter, when images start to settle into us that human perception begins to draw out and distinguish itself from the flow of matter and images. This is the stage in which consciousness about something begins to take shape.

In the passages above I have tried to show the processes at work in the perception of an image from the perspective of a Deleuzo-Bergsonian materialism. In this view, image and mind, rather than be understood as separate and distinct orders, should be understood as continuous flows that form a whole. Such a

possibility arises on the plane of immanence upon which flowing matter or an image, are continuities of the other. Within such a flow, in which the body is one image among others, the separation between body and image and also the dualisms between matter-mind, inside-outside and subject-object come to be dislodged. Rather than being discrete, the two orders must be understood as continuities that make up the whole.

In the actualization of virtuality the movement of the virtual is that of differenciation, by which thought is forced to arise with the materiality of difference. And such matterness of thought/being displaces the distinction between matter and virtuality, the virtual becoming differenciated into the real and material. This differenciation presents the conditions for a virtual transcendental materialism, in which we can now come to say that inside-outside, subject-object interiority-exteriority are continuous flows that pass into each other. Matter and image, composed of the same elements, arise in the vacillating curved space of a hyperbolic geometry which fluctuates between immanence and intentional consciousness. Rather than being two separate and distinct entities, which operate discretely, they form a qualitative whole.

In the differenciation of virtuality into the actual, human perception begins to emerge from the flow of matter-images and it is in this movement of differenciation that I will argue that the mezzo folds of consciousness begin to develop. At this juncture, therefore, I will start to draw upon the notion of how micro flows develop

into larger mezzo flows in a curvilinear hyperbolic geometry. These mezzo flows of painterliness, auricular/musicality and the poetical in *Mirror* are to be understood as fields of experience of the perceiving eye, which senses the variation among light, sound, movement and matter in time. It is thereby in the perceiving eye that these fluctuating flows become "formlike,"[433] from the virtual relations generated among the micro fields of the temporal image. In this understanding, the encounter with the temporal image occurs in an unbounded field of sensations, in which the folds of cinema give rise to the free and open virtual time of duration.

Flow of movements

From the tiny folds emerging among light, sound, movement and matter in time, I will now consider their aggregation into the larger vector flows of the film: the painterly, poetic and auricular/musical. Macro fields emerge when the micro elements begin to aggregate into larger fields. From dust appears a line or a colour field, an underlaid sound gives rise to music or poetry. Vibrating micro fields begin to forge identifiable shapes, tones and rhythms of the film. These multiple vectors on a hyperbolic curvilinear surface fold into and out of each other, but also enfold and unfold between *internal* and *external* flows. That is, not only are light intensities enfolded in the rhythms of movement, in the tactility of matter and in sound undertones, as in the shooting range, *but also* that these micro fields fold into perception. Folding between the fields occurs in the mind.

With respect to the latter it must be understood that the folding among the micro fields into the larger mezzo fields and the folding between the extrinsic pleats of matter and the intrinsic folds of perception (image-mind relation), is to be comprehended as the very same movement. This is the same movement because the folding among the micro fields occurs in perception, and as noted earlier, "matter exists just as it is perceived."[434] Suffice to say for now that exteriorities and interiorities fold into each other, making the pathways between matter and perception fluid. I will discuss in greater detail in the next chapter, how the extrinsic movement of matter forms a fold with perception.[435] For the remainder of this chapter, however, it will be enough to say that what is painterly in the film occurs by the intertwining among extrinsic physico-micro fields of light, sound, movement and matter with the intrinsic inklings, sensations, perceptions and memory, in which a continuous undulation endures between exteriority and interiority.

Micro fields of what can be characterized as being *painterly* in a moving image imbibe the movements of painting: light, colour, lines, movement, rhythm, intensity, aurality, taste, balance, textures, shapes and so forth. The becoming-painterly in a temporal medium envelopes a field of variations and proportions among these elements, as they undulate in time. In this regard we come to experience painterliness in an open field of dynamic forces, in which perception folds continually between these mobile elements in time. What is *auricular* is the enfolding pitch, timbre, sonority, tonality, meter and density of sounds, which

include musical harmonies and composition, but also what is tactile, colour-light-based, visual, olfactory, kinesthetic and temporal. What is auricular in a moving image, therefore, folds into the luminosity and hue of colours, patterns of light and into the rhythms and speeds of camera movements through space and in time. Similarly, the forces of *poetic language*, by way of rhyme, metre and resonance, folded into the genetic elements of the image, can be evocative. The dynamism of words can impel the movement of images into routes beyond the merely obvious by way of rhetoric, symbolism, irony, ambiguity, metaphor or metonymy. The force of a word can saturate and enfold light or the movement of matter with an intensity, or throw it off kilter entirely.

To underscore, therefore, the senses operate through the intermodal connections of experience, in which painterliness is not merely vision or sight, but also that which is literally experienced through movement, tactility and aurality in experience.[436] For instance, congenitally blind patients learn to see through aurality: "I see it move, because I hear it."[437] The experience of a painterly, musical or poetic image, therefore, brings into the mix an intermodular system of receptions, which as Massumi writes, are "event perceptions combining senses, tenses, and dimensions on a single surface."[438] What is painterly, musical or poetic might only be differentiated from each other by virtue of variations and relations in light, sound, movement and matter, combined with the field of experience of the perceiving eye. The painterly is not merely vision, but also tactile and aural, just as musicality is aural and visual and

the poetic is rhythmic and imagistic. Angles, scales, tonalities, translucency and speeds come into mobile relations in the variation among the genetic elements. Fields of experience, therefore, cannot be determinable in any measurable or unifiable way except by the perceiving eye, in which these variations come to be experienced. The mezzo flows of poetical, auricular/musical and painterly movements fold into the workings of what becomes the macro image-event, *Mirror*. The duration experienced by the audience moves by way of a continual folding in time, between the event's exteriority and the interiorization of such an event.[439]

Stirrings

> *I don't know what would have happened to the film if the buckwheat*
> *had not blossomed. This was immensely important to me.*
> --Tarkovsky[440]

Out of the seven brilliant films that he made, *Mirror* is Tarkovsky's most autobiographical film and perhaps also his most complex one. Based on memories of his childhood, his family and photographs found in a family album, it is a deeply intimate gaze into the life of the character Alexei, taking us from his early childhood to his untimely death in mid-life. Growing up in the early 1930s, Tarkovsky recreates impressions of a single life interwoven with visions, dreamscapes and documentary footage from WWII. A film without logic or plot, it can only be described as a flow of images cascading through a myriad of associations. Rotating between pasts and futures in which impressions of childhood memories, adult life,

dreams, documentary footage and fiction come to connect, the shots and sequences enter into a fluid relationship with each other.

Tarkovsky and his crew painstakingly set up each scene while working on the shooting script and spent two entire days deciding which plant should grow in the garden between the house and burning shed. Ultimately he decided on a potato plant, which sprouted yellow lilac flowers. In another incident he asked members of the community to sow part of the field in front of his childhood house with buckwheat, as the white flowers were an essential part of his childhood. His childhood house, the well and the shed were, furthermore, rebuilt from photographs in family albums.[441] When all the sets were completed he invited his mother to take a look, which turned out to be to her satisfaction.[442]

In the opening scene we see a young Maria, Alexei's mother, smoking a cigarette. She is sitting on a rough wooden fence overlooking a field of tall grass, which periodically swirls in the wind. This image is reconstructed from a photograph taken of his mother Maria Tarkovskaia in 1932. Her hairstyle, posture, attitude and dress are all carefully recreated in the film. For certain scenes he had the same dress made in varying colour tones for the character, in order to accommodate the changing light conditions of the shoot. In the opening sequence we also see two children who are twins with shaven heads. Tarkovsky, also a twin, recreates the shaven heads from when he himself was a very young child; the bonnet worn by one of the twins in the film is identical to the one that his grandmother had sewn for his

287

twin sister during the war years. The laces on the windows, the washed sheets hung

out to dry, the wooden beams of the house, the large glass vase, the cat sitting on the

windowsill, the white enamel basin collecting rain among numerous other objects

create the atmospheres inside and outside the house, and are all meticulous

recreations of his past. For the shooting range scene describe earlier, he consulted

war experts in order to make sure that the instructor's military cap and the wound on

his scalp were as authentic as possible. The river's current, its colour and depth, the

weeds growing along the embankment were all carefully considered, especially

when actors had to walk past the river in any given scene.

Every aspect of the pro-filmic space, including colour gradients, light

intensities, textures and flows were of the essence to him. Tarkovsky's attention to

detail came from the view that if he was stirred by the special qualities of the

materials utilized, which aroused memories and generated associations for him, then

it would also be possible for audiences to be moved by such objects and textures.

Synessios writes that this process goes even further so that what was an inextricable

part of his childhood was recreated to express the truth of a particular moment of his

life. On set, he and the crew spent most of their time talking together about intimate

aspects, immersing themselves into the atmospheres and the characters of the

film.[443]

However, once filming started, he cast aside the entire shooting scrip, opting

instead to write new scenes and dialogue each day. One of the main characters,

Margarita Terekhova, who plays Alexei's wife and also his mother, was never given the script until the day of the shoot. This was because he did not want her to find out what happened to her, nor what would happen to her in the future; he only wanted her to live through the moments that she would be acting that day. He believed that scripts were merely an occasion for reflection and that they had to be shed once shooting started. A film, he believed, should grow organically from the objects and locations touching the moods of the characters and director, transporting them to their intimate inner spaces. In an interview that he gave in 1985 he said that of all the films he had ever made, *Mirror* was nearest to his concept of cinema. His aesthetic and ethical preoccupations, including his ideas about rhythm, editing, mise-en-scène, framing, his conscience and responsibility as filmmaker, all find voice in this film.[444]

Important to my discussion is the force of his films, which he said should flow from an inner psychological reality, in which the director should generate a unique sense of time. This sense of time he famously referred to as the "time-pressure" of each shot, which is independent from real time. By real time he means to indicate the time of chronologically laid out events of a narrative and also the abstract, standardized time of a clock. By time-pressure, Tarkovsky means the inner sense of time, through which a distinct personal reality can be created. He wrote that the cinematic image was "essentially the observation of a fact flowing in time." Attention to time yielded an abundance of memories, which, in turn, moved freely in time in his films. Cinema therefore raises, in Proust's words, "a vast edifice to

memories."[445] In *Sculpting in Time*, Tarkovsky describes cinema as "a sculpture made out of time," a notion that informs every aspect of his filmmaking, including the camera movements, rhythm, décor, texture, mise-en-scène and editing. Combining these elements together changes the flow of time, creating the distinct "time-pressure" of each shot. Each shot and sequence therefore has its own imprint of time. Rather than editing generating the rhythm of a film, the time-pressure composes the rhythm in which, each shot vibrates with its own internal time and makes the film come alive.[446] Tracking such an internalized time, which spreads through every shot in the film, Tarkovsky generates some of the most brilliant timescapes in cinematic history.

Painterliness

Pursuant to the make-up of each shot's internal time-pressure, which generates the rhythms of *Mirror*, and the painstaking attention given to the mise-en-scène, some of the most deeply affective cinematography in cinema has been created. The sequence noted earlier, in which children are playing in the snowy hills by a river, where, in the concluding shot we see a sparrow alighting on Asafiev's head, is reminiscent of a painting by Pieter Bruegel the Elder. Entitled, *Winter Landscape with a Bird Trap* (1565), Tarkovsky's images makes the painting come alive. The moving images animate the proportions, rhythms, colours and light gradients of the painting. These visions from paintings are not unusual. Indeed, all his films have allusions to

paintings either directly, as in *Andrei Rublev* (1966), which he devoted entirely to the life of the fine icon painter from Medieval Russia, or indirectly, as in the Bruegelian landscape. In this, Tarkovsky's films are painterly in two ways: they directly reference paintings and they adopt the affective gradients of painting.

In one direct reference Alexei, as a young boy of twelve, is looking at a thick massive book placed on a rough wooden table. In this medium close-up shot he is surrounded by trees and foliage enveloping his *dacha* (house) in the countryside. In an earlier scene we see him leafing through this very book, which he now gazes at intently. The spectator perceives that his keen attention to the book makes it special to him. Shortly after, we hear his twin sister teasing him about how she would reveal to their parents that he had stolen it. In an earlier scene, seated by the window enraptured, we see his hands, with fingernails laid under with dirt, leafing through the pages of this thick old tome. Absorbed in its contents, he turns the large pages of what are Leonardo's drawings and paintings. Each drawing is interspersed with tissue paper which, when he turns them, produces tiny, infiltrating sounds. As he leafs through the book music, following from the previous shot, floats into the air; it is Bach's *St. Matthew Passion*. As the minor rhythms of the music softly folds into the densities of Leonardo's drawings, a solemn, deeply personal moment affects the air. It is a transformative moment that takes us into deep quietude, as we absorb its beauty. Touching not only Alexei, but also the spectator's senses, this scene is highly

suggestive of Tarkovsky's personal love of music and paintings, whose myriad references are woven into each of his films.

Even if not presenting direct allusions to old painters, almost any shot that Tarkovsky creates is a painterly composition, and this would be true for any of his films. The colour-tones, light-intensities, rhythms, compositions, the attitude of the characters, their gestures, affectations and postures can only be described as live paintings moving in time. The painterliness of his films emanates from the time-pressure of each shot, the attention apportioned to the mise-en-scène and cinematography, the combination of which generate the transparencies of perception and, correspondingly, the moods and atmospheres of the moments. In recurring visions from his childhood, we see the shaven twins at age five in various scenarios. These scenes, like haunting dreams, weave into the film at various moments. Shot in monochrome and in slow motion, they are mesmerizing, coming to present the unspeakable and deeply emotional forces sweeping through childhood.

In an early sequence we are introduced to the twins when they are little, their two shaven heads joined together in some secretive collusion. Sitting on a wooden bench at a dining table, they giggle and play with each other in whispered tones. A few shots later, after the scene where a shed catches on fire, a cut brings us to Alexei, sleeping peacefully in bed. He is cocooned in layers of white sheets which show lace at the edges. The film is shot in sepia tones, with the barest hints of colour. The hand-held camera sways slightly as it hovers over the bed and we notice

292

his eyelids twitching. Suddenly, he awakens. Sounds float through the air filling up

the atmosphere as we see him staring intently at something offscreen, still entwined

in sheets. The shot cuts to an image that recurs several times in the film. It is a black

and white shot in slow motion in which the tall grass and dense foliage sways in the

breeze. These shots are always softly accented with the hollow sound of wind

blowing through the grass. The sound is still very low, hovering just above what is

barely perceptible, emphasized now with the echo of birdcalls. The camera tracks

through the foliage where, all of a sudden, a gust of wind forcefully bends the young

trees and vines, the sound of the wind intensifying. The shot then cuts back to little

Alexei, who is now lying in bed his eyes wide open. In a whispery, hoarse tone he

calls, "papa." A birdcall thickens the air and we see him rising out of bed, with a hint

of bells ringing, suggestive of a procession of sad-clowns. We see a lace curtain

hanging against the window, the image of the little boy in his dressing gown leaping

out of bed. The folds of the enveloping sheets, the hanging curtains, the strangeness

of the gleaming ornate metal balustrades of the bed-frame, all creating the aura of a

haunted dream. In these dream-shots nothing is explicable; the atmospheres created

are thick with feelings of the unknown experienced sometimes in childhood. In these

dreams, invisible things occur through mysterious silent forces, inducing irrational

fears.

These shot compositions with hints of perceptible sound are intangible,

expressing the enigmatic forces experienced in childhood. These delicate yet

powerful vignettes, shot in black and white and in slow motion, emphasize the qualities of depth, form, pattern and texture rather than emotion, which is suggested more through colour tones. The intensity of sensations experienced in black and white tonalities is much more acute than if experienced in colour film. The varying light tonalities reflecting off the different objects arranged in the mise-en-scène also create greater dynamics between light and shadow, enhancing the image's dramatic qualities. We frequently see slivers of light escaping from his childhood *dacha*, which sometimes appears as a dark haunted house. Tarkovsky's camera, always in motion, weaves between darkness and shadow, between large expanses of drab walls and dimly lit windows, much like the dark and light tones experienced in Rembrandt's Baroque paintings. Black and white tones distinct to dreams bring out the patterns, forms and textures of the voluminous white sheets, the shadows produced by the hanging lace curtains, the folds of the papery-thin cotton nightgown, the dark shadows on the walls, the glimmer of shiny objects. All these forms and patterns articulate the abstract qualities of dreams by emptying the image of colour.

The slow motion of the dream sequences enhances this abstract vision where, what is occurring, follows only an inexplicable strange force. Everything familiar is somehow out of reach, floating away in the night air. Nothing is graspable when Alexei in his loose nightgown approaches the doorway and a white cloth flies miraculously through the adjoining room. The image that follows of his mother

washing her hair is perhaps one of the finest haunting scenes in the entire film. Almost weightless, she dangles her white arms about unsteadily, accompanied by echoed sounds of water dripping from her abundant hair. At this point the light intensity is increased, imparting a silvery glow to the image, making the shot ever so slightly out-of-this-world. The affected rhythm of Maria waving her arms about in slow motion transmits a vaporous weightlessness to the figure, suggestive of an apparition in a Henry Fuseli painting.

Auricular sensations: micro sounds, poetry, music

Accentuating the light and colour, the gestures of the figures, the camera movements and the slow-motion are the beguiling sounds underlaying the film. The sound tonalities are rarely noticed consciously as they hover at a level where they are barely perceptible. Sometimes hinting by presenting undertones and sometimes heightening the image's dream like qualities, they glide through, whisper and haunt the air around and beyond the screen-space. The hollow echoes of familiar birdcalls, Alexei's rasping cry, the faint ringing of bells, the sound of trees bending to a fierce wind and water dripping, fold into the visual qualities of the image. These tonalities appear as sounds floating in the air, cascading back and forth from one shot to another, circulating at various timbres, pitches and volumes. Rather than convey messages or meaningful dialogue they bring the senses to experience feelings that are not yet graspable. These feelings are evocative, bringing the mind into inklings

of pasts; their hints stirring up memories covered with layers of dust. These sounds, full of echoes, generate vague, nebulous feelings, awakening fragments of experience, of uncertain memories. Their reverberation in these dreamscapes kindle and animate the spectator's senses to submerge into the deep pasts of childhood.

Alongside these sound tones, however, is the more perceptible and concrete voice of Tarkovsky's father, Arseni, reciting his poems. His voice punctuates the film at various points. Such a point occurs when the documentary footage of the war is shown. In one particular clip we are shown soldiers walking in long stretches of muck along riverbanks and sometimes in knee-high water. They are weary and worn out, some with guns slung on their backs, some without shoes, some with torn pants. They seem to be pulling thick ropes attached to a crude raft which carries a huge cannon. We hear subtle sounds of water being treaded by soldiers as they walk, occasionally accompanied by the beating of military drums. As the soldiers walk in harsh conditions, we see stoicism in their demeanour. The tones are gray and flat and fill up the scene with a heavy airlessness that is suffused with a penetrating silence. This silence is suddenly pierced with poetic gesture, where the non-diagetic recitation comments and reflects on the condition of human immortality flowing through time through the different generations and into the future. It begins, "I trust not premonitions/ I fear not omens/ I flee not from slander or poison/ There is no death. We are all immortal/ All is immortal/ Fear not death at seventeen/ Nor at seventy/ There is only reality and light." Sweeping the film into poetic gesture, the

voice and images fold into each other. However, the fold produces a dissonance, in which the words of the poem are in counterpoint to the image. What is the weariness of the soldiers is to be considered through the greater condition of humanity, "serving forefather and grandson." In carrying out this movement through time, from one generation to another, the poem tries to console the heavy losses that the men have borne. While the penetrating voice is in sympathy with their courageous and heroic acts, their weary faces and bodies show a less valiant aspect. They are worn out by the brutality of a war.

It is this poem that weaves between the war footage and the aforementioned Bruegelian scene, where children are playing on the snowy hill. Speaking of the future, the poem moves on to "I rise in the stirrups of the future as a boy." At this point the image cuts to the scene where children, like dark little speckles, are playing in the white snow. There is a tree in the foreground and a river running through in the background. A horse draws a sleigh and a boy slides his sled on the snow. We see Asafiev carrying a briefcase climbing up the hill; there is a resemblance here between the weary gait of the soldiers and his own. He stumbles in the snow as he climbs, just like the soldiers walking through mud and then he takes a glance backwards, as if into the past, towards the merry scene. As he climbs the hill the recitation continues: "I am content in my immortality/ With my blood coursing from century to century/ I'll gladly give my life./ For a safe corner of warmth/ If life's swift needle/ Did not draw me on as though I were a thread." Through this recitation

we see him emerging from the background, a small figure which becomes larger in a medium close-up shot. As he walks he is lost in thought, expressing a blank stare. As he stands in front of the camera it is not hard to notice that he is alone, a lonely figure separated from the other children who play merrily with each other. His isolation stands in strong contrast to the vast expanse of the countryside and also, more poignantly, to the poetic text itself, which speaks of being content with immortality. To a young boy who becomes orphaned by war, this sensibility holds little comfort. Image and sound, once again, produces dissonance. The scene is tinged with irony as we hear the idyllic words and come to understand the real conditions suffered by the boy. As the poem draws to an end, the camera has a full close-up of his face. Teardrops are streaming down his cheeks as he bravely tries to muster a whistle; he then looks sideways, into the distance.

Musicality

Perhaps the most moving phrases in the film occur in the folding of music with vision. While there are elements of irony and dissonance between vision and sound, for the most part, vision is synchronized with the sounds that underlay it. Glimpses of light, hints of camera movements, the tactility of the objects, are synchronized with haunting, barely perceptible tones. The film, however, is swept to another level with the darkly intense Baroque musical scores. Set alongside the languid visual elements that are deeply personal, Bach, Pergolesi and Purcell's music set us on an

inward journey throughout the film. Perhaps it is that the attunement between image and sound maintains such perfect pitch at certain moments in the film that their assemblage is transformative. They take the spectator to the depths of contemplation, even towards a spiritual experience.

In one such experience near the end of the film Alexei, as a boy of twelve, along with his mother, have arrived at the house of a doctor's wife. His mother Maria wants the doctor's wife to buy her turquoise earrings, as she needs money. The two women disappear into an adjoining room leaving Alexei waiting in the room alone. What follows is a simple reverie that Alexei has, which turns into a meditation on the cinematic gaze and on the reflection-image. What is important is that this movement inward would not occur with the same intensity were it not for the music, which carries the affective flows of the camera's gaze, Alexei's gaze and the spectator's gaze (and contemplation) seamlessly.

The scene is bracketed by the flickering of an oil lamp accompanied by the faint sound of milk dripping from a table into a pool on the floor. Apart from these hints of sound there is a pervading silence, which all the more accentuates the music when it becomes audible. The room is encompassed mostly in darkness and shadow but for the gold light-tones from the flickering lamp. The walls made from wooden beams have rich brown tones, matching the ornate wooden furniture. The scene is enveloped in stillness as Alexei settles on a wooden stool set in the room; his hands

folded into each other, he appears awkward and out of place. He lacks shoes and his feet are muddy from the long walk earlier. He crouches, his posture caving in.

The shot then cuts to a table with two bulbous potatoes on it, one with half its skin peeled, the peel lying alongside. The small pool of spilt milk accumulating at the edge of the table gives off a chalky white colour that is conspicuous against the dark furniture. Upon hearing a faint sound of liquid dripping, a characteristic Tarkovskian sound-tonality, the camera pans slowly downward. The furniture all along the vertical axis is drenched with milk, which quickly takes on an ominous aura. We see this chalky liquid accumulating in an expanding pool on the floor, the dripping sounds becoming emphasized. At this point a passage from Bach's *St. John Passion* begins to envelop the air almost imperceptibly.

The camera cuts to a shot of Alexei's head, which is set against a broad oval mirror hanging on the opposite wall. Alexei finds himself looking into this oval, immediately transfixed. Unable to turn away from his own gaze he is absorbed in looking at his own reflection, the camera zooming into this reflected image. Suggestive of a Baroque painting, the image is a portrait of Alexei, with the still life of potatoes and spilt milk appearing to his rear, all these elements enframed by the oval borders of the antique mirror. As the music swells, the camera zooms slowly and continuously into the mirror, Alexei's deeply reflective gaze intensifying. Suddenly, the light tonalities change from the soft golden glows into a more bluish,

cooler light. At this point Alexei is deeply lost in contemplating his own image, as is the spectator, the light changing his image subtly so that it is turning into a specter.

This magnificent shot which takes Alexei to an inward passage contemplating his own image, also finds the spectator gazing at him reflecting on his own gaze. This gaze forks into another gaze in which the spectator finds themselves attentive to their own inner states. There are therefore at least three levels of affective movements folding into each other at this point: the camera's gaze, Alexei's and the audience's. This movement of reflections, which springs and emanates continually from the one to the other, is carried out seamlessly by the somber tones of the music. The *Passion*, itself a solemn hymn, is entwined in this flow bequeathing the movement of reflections. The music produces the kinetic force necessary to affect the visual elements and also, in turn, to be affected by them. The auricular folds into micro fields of light, movement and matter, enveloping the spectator's field of experience; it is a transformative moment in the film, in which we come into an encounter with ourselves.

The next shot cuts not to Alexei's reflection, but directly to him as he looks into the mirror. His pale face has some shadows on it, his hair flaming in orangy-red tones, the rich dark wood surrounding him glimmers at certain angles. The camera slowly zooms into a close up, revealing all at once a serious, sad, blank and beautiful countenance. It is a deeply affective moment, nothing short of a powerful intensity.

Virtual movements: mezzo fields

Flows of musicality, painterliness or the poetical, as I have suggested, occur through micro flows, which aggregate and diffuse in time, presenting a constant flux in the film's intensities, rhythms, tonalities and textures. Bach's *St. Matthew Passion*, Fuseli's nightmarish apparitions or Arsenei's poems are not specific to *Mirror*, yet their appearance present micro sensations, aggregating into the very becoming of the mezzo fields. Needless to say, what is musical, painterly or poetical in *Mirror* does not occur by the mere injection of Leonardo's sketches or Bach's musical excerpts, which could be characterized as organized molar fields. Rather, the becoming musical or painterly of *Mirror* occurs by the micro tonalities of sounds, the micro textures of light and colour and the micro movements of the long durational shots to enfold each other. As Massumi writes, "the visual limit-field is [in]sufficient to produce vision."[447] Vision, in fact, is produced from the intermodalities among the various senses, forming an "open... field of experience. The virtual self-standing of vision actually takes place in a crowded bubble."[448] From the multitude of different micro movements emerges the aggregated body of painterliness, a larger body assembled from the various camera movements, colourings, textures, movements, shapes and sounds. Painterliness arises from among the different micro movements that emerge in perception as what is painterly. It emerges from the micro folds between colour, movements, sound and tactility. Painterliness might be characterized, therefore, as a hyperbolic topology of a virtual field of experience.

In the image of Alexei peering into the mirror reflecting on his image there are several micro movements. In this scene we have the rich dark tones of the wood enveloping the room, the gold tones of light from the flickering oil lamp, the music of the *Passion*, the slow pans of the camera hovering in the air or zooming into a close-up of Alexei's face and so forth. As the spectator gazes into the image, each micro field forms relations with the others. Each of these dynamic fields are mobile blocks which become partial objects in which its others maintain their virtual relations in a given moment.[449] In this scene, the visual elements, sound, tactility and camera movements present their flows across each other as partial objects giving rise to the whole -- the cinematic image. And, as Massumi writes, "any whole is virtual."[450] The cinematic image thereby emerges through virtual relations that are imperceptible but, nonetheless, perpetually circulate with the dynamic micro fields. That is, the cinematic image occurs in the folds between micro fields and their virtual hyperbolic topology.

Virtual movement is therefore the greatest movement of what become cinematic, generating poetical and painterly fields of experience.[451] And while virtual movement of the cinematic image is the "indistinctness" of micro movements between fields, Deleuze writes that it generates the "transformation of terms" in which the relations between the various micro fields become modified.[452] Where the greatest movement occurs is also where the duration of thought and perception are altered in their becoming.[453] The virtual event arising in an image can be any two or

more fields, and although imperceptible and never fully formed, temporally makes them its own. Virtual events, thereby, create those relations and speeds that the images' densities accumulate, in between clarity and ambiguity of the perceiving eye.

Thus, rather than draw from what at times have perceived to be two settled and singularising mediums such as poetry and painting, we set forth from molecular relations, from the speeds and movements of two assembling bodies or dynamic fields. Dynamic fields fold into each other through the virtual relations occurring, forming an image. We move from open assemblages into other open assemblages; it is, as Deleuze and Guattari write, the situation of machines connecting to other machines to infinity, and where we also find that "the self and non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever."[454] These dynamic fields are thereby desubjectified, empty of ego, becoming wholly processes. The virtual relations of the cinematic flux generating between fields, moreover, move in the fold between the extrinsic-physico mechanism (organic-inorganic-synthetic *matter*) and the intrinsic-psychic mechanism (desire-spirituality-mental *perception*) in the connection between the poetic and painterly machines.[455] In the associations and synchronizations of dynamic fields in flux, the poetical-historical-painterly-musical in *Mirror* pass into each other making it impossible to know where each body begins and ends in the image. In the virtual relations of the image, the cinematic (and non-cinematic) flux passing across dynamic fields gives rise to sensations of an emerging

form-likeness: musicality, poetics or painterliness. In the scenes where Alexei is leafing through the book of paintings by Leonardo, when he gazes into his reflected image in the mirror or when we see Asafiev climbing the hill, the intermodality among the senses presents its encounter with the object(s). These mezzo fields are emergent, unbounded and also, therefore, fields of experience of the perceiving eye. The folding between fields brings forth the measureless, virtual time of duration, in which objects are in flux and in the making.

Shared terms of measurement: a note

In addition to the folding of extrinsic matter into perception, a brief note needs to be added with respect to the historical and cultural memory planes of images. The interpenetration between film images and spectator brings us into another relationality between image and mind, as images come to be experienced in several dimensions. On the one hand, there are the "shared terms of measurement" that Rancière writes about.[456] These shared terms generate a predisposition to how relations have come to be expressed over time in literature, poetry, the visual and performative arts. Shared terms among the arts, in their aesthetic, social, philosophical or political dimensions have been perceived and come to be understood in certain ways. It is in and through such expressions, in their varied resemblance, similarity or simulation to other events occurring in the world that we can come to perceive them partially or fully (or escape them altogether).[457]

On the other hand, the familiarity and deftness with which Tarkovsky

constructs his cinematic form with respect to such shared measurements might

escape the spectator unfamiliar with these terms. However, while the more particular

forms might escape some, such Bruegel's landscapes, the reference to Pushkin, the

Bach or Purcell's scores, most spectators today would be quite familiar with images

from WWII. Mao's famous portrait, the fervent waving of the little Red Book and

mass rallies, the mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are well

recognized. The circulation of these images forming a world memory of common

images in the western cultural vocabulary, in turn, also generates personal memories.

Accompanying these familiar images are the various musical scores and sound

effects. Scores from classical and popular music, recognizable in themselves, also

form a collective musical vocabulary.

Beyond musical compositions however, there is a stockpile of micro sounds

and micro images, which we have come to perceive and register. These micro

sounds, associated with media images, are the various sound tonalities from which

we are able to sense a dangerous situation or a comical one. Micro images, similarly,

present a short-hand for associated meanings and values in the social realm.

Learned, digested and accreted over years by watching Hollywood and large

distribution films, as well as from television programming, the internet and new

media sources, the specific timbre, pitch and resonance of these sound tones and

image fragments convey common cultural registers, invoking sensations, moods or

307

emotions. These micro sounds and images become the shared terms of measurement from which we come to sense the forces flowing through media machines. In the hands of a creative artist, these common terms may be inverted, combined or divested from their commonly understood measurement, producing nuances in how we come to experience familiar sounds and images.

In coming to terms with the flows between image-mind, it must be understood that movements located outside what is the cinematic continue into the image-event. That is, whatever flows and touches, passes through the image-event and ultimately emerges to an outside. Flows constituted from an outside, pass through an inner space, proceeding to another. Leonardo's sketches or Bach's *Passion* flow into the image-event from an outside, from what is classified as Renaissance art or Baroque music. These movements flow into what is an inner psychological space from which Tarkovsky comes to produce and relay from within his own movements of these, as another fold. In the further folding of movements, therefore, what is outside comes to touch what is inside. Moving through such an inner psychological space (which includes the variations among fields such as drawings, music, dreams and memories), Tarkovsky produces his own singular assemblage of these – *Mirror*. This singular movement emerges into an outside, the image-event. Moreover, in receiving movements from the outside, movements from within are evoked for spectators. In these enfolding spaces the farthest outside comes to touch the deepest inside in the fold between matter and consciousness. The

scene in which Alexei gazes into his own reflection in the mirror, the image folds

and unfolds continuously between micro fields that layer and cascade through it,

creating sensations and impressions. Undulating between the gold micro tones of the

oil lamp, the rich colours and textures of wood furniture, dripping milk and peeled

potatoes, the base tones and harmonic form of the *Passion* along with the languid

camera movements, the event folds not only between character-image-spectator, but

also through a history and through cultural traditions of painting-music-technique.

Memory-images, dream-images, fictive and imaginary spaces are those

virtual, immanent images in stages of becoming. Images, therefore, rather than being

incubated from a self-sustaining and impervious inside, are produced in the folds

between personal memory, a world memory, documentary footage, historical,

cultural and other realms. *Mirror*, therefore, constitutes such an inside-outside space

in which the extrinsic folds of matter (music-painting-documentary footage)

continue into the intrinsic folds of perception (Tarkovsky's childhood-war-dreams-

creative impulses), which then continue into the world (the film itself). This

touching between the inside and its expression to the outside occurs through the

infinite movement of matter folding between infinite worlds and infinite minds,

inflecting and refracting points of view in a curvilinear space. In a universe of

images what is matter and what is consciousness become interpenetrating flows: "an

image is the expression of matter...matter is tantamount to perception."[458] Within

such an ontological materialism it will become possible to say therefore that what is

309

matter and mind form a fold and are continuous flows. The traditional dichotomies of what is inside-outside or what is subject-object will be considered further in the following chapter, in virtue of an ontological indifference among image, movement, matter and light, which are equivalent to each other in the materialism put forward by Henri Bergson.

Conclusion

In considering *Mirror* through its painterly, poetical and auricular/musical flows, I have tried to show how the aggregation of micro folds develop into a shapelikeness. Light, sound, movement and matter unfolding in time can aggregate and swell into surfaces, which become auricular/musical, painterly and poetical. The fold of musicality is the aggregation of various micro fields folding into each other. Pitch, timbre and intensity along with light, colour, balance, materiality, rhythm and movement are factors. Similarly, what constitutes the mezzo fold of painterliness occurs not only from the folding among micro fields of light and colour, but also from movement, rhythm, tactility, sound and balance. Just as pure sound is not sufficient for the auricular experience, the pure visual field is insufficient for producing vision. The different sensory organs come to fold into perception through the intermodular connection among the senses, giving rise to the painterly, poetical and auricular/musical folds. Their connection forms a virtual hyperbolic topology of the moving image.

The folding among fields of micro matter forms shapes, and these shapes take form through virtual relations occurring in the mind. In these virtual connections of folding, duration is experienced as a continuous flow that moves between perception and the temporal media object perceived. The virtual relations experienced in the fold between image and mind, give rise to a free and personal time that is not given to the chronological measurement of time.

In the continuous movement between image and mind, perception folds and unfolds between clear and obscure sensations. Through dialog, words or other linguistic devices in a film, the folds of perception distend into the larger sinuous surface of thought, which bring greater clarity to the media object. On the other hand, such clarity can be destabilized when micro fields fold into each other endlessly. In vague dialog or in the murmuring of sounds, the auricular field becomes cryptic and indefinable. The different sensory organs fold into each other endlessly producing an incomprehensible mass of folds that make perception inchoate and obscure. In these folding and distending movements, in which perception oscillates between indistinctness and clarity, we come to experience the film.

In taking the forms of painterly, musical and poetic shapes, *Mirror* does not unfold through the internalized logic of a story and plot or through linguistic elements that would generate the clarity of thought. Rather, the film produces amorphous shapes. The strands of colour, sound, movement and matter enduring in

time give rise to sensations in the spectator, producing impressions. These impressions, woven together, make up the shapes of the film. These shapes produce gradients of sensation and thresholds of thought, rather than distinct thinking.

From the strands of colour, sound, movement and matter that the spectator connects with, memories come to be evoked. Memories *emerge from* the micro sensations rather than the other way around (that is, memories do not produce micro sensations). Micro sensations evoke the depths, arousing memories in the spectator. From the micro impressions produced, the larger painterly or poetic fields of the film emerge.

Dream-shots, hallucination-shots, vision-shots and other types of shots, therefore, evoke memories and fields of experience in the spectator. From ambient sounds, the monochromatic film stock and high-key lighting looms a strange figure of Maria waving her arms about as she washes her hair in the water barrel. In the capacity of micro sensations to be affected by each other in a virtual topology of the image, the spectator courses through a whirlwind of emotions and sensations from which memories are evoked and fields of experience come to be formed.

From the circulating fragments of time -- the vision-shots, memory-shots, dream-shots -- the spectator experiences their own fleeting connections with them. The different shots are the varying streams of time, of many pasts and futures, and are to be understood as bodies without organs. As they arise in the film, we come to form our own experiences with them. Shots of past memories and of future visions

circulate as free bodies, generating our momentum with them as we move along with them. These shots take us into spaces and emotions specific to the film, and in doing so, they also transport the spectator to their own memories, thoughts and emotions.

In *Mirror*, filmic matter, rather than arriving linguistically through the narrative structure and plot, is encountered through the plastic mass of material, which is a-signifying and a-syntactic. This material is neither a language-system nor a language. The modulation of images between sensory, kinetic, intensive, affective, rhythmic, tonal and other flows makes up the image's signaletic material. In the whirlwind generating from among these forces, neither logic nor reason might be extracted from *Mirror*.[459] Only when language gets hold of this amorphous material that utterances arise, becoming a system of language, which then comes to reference, arrange and categorize thoughts and concepts. Contrary to this end, *Mirror* specifically, and works of art in general, should not be attributed to purposefulness and neither should they be experienced in the logic of reason. By virtue of its sensually formed matter, the image as whole is perceived through the virtual relations occurring among micro fields. In this understanding, Birgit Kaiser writes that Deleuze's Leibniz of *The Fold* suggests a reinvention of aesthetics that turns from the Kantian strain. As Caygill notes, Deleuze provides "a series of complex concatenations between a topology of perception--which stresses the continuity and complexity of a complex and intuition in opposition to Kant's rigorous separation of them--and a theory of affectivity."[460]

The Leibnizian ground of aesthetics is to be found in Alexander G. Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* (1742) and *Aesthetica* (1750/58), works that credit him with being the originator of the discipline of aesthetics. Contrary to the Enlightenment spirit of rationality, especially that of Christian Wolf's, Baumgarten argues for the proper consideration of what was derisively referred to as the lower faculties. Holding that philosophy reduced to logic and reason presents a narrow and limited range of understanding, he advocated overcoming this deficiency by broadening inquiry into the other faculties "of the soul." Aesthetics was this broadening of the field, in which he sought to consider forms of thinking beyond the "distinct." Logic and the "distinct," therefore, were narrow forms of science and knowledge in his estimation, which "reserve[ed] the laws of sensate and vivid knowledge, even if it [knowledge] should not rise to distinctness, in its most precise sense, for a separate science. This latter he [the author] names aesthetics."[461] In his foundational *Aesthetica*, published a decade later, he presents aesthetics as *scientia cognitionis sensitivae*, drawing upon Leibniz's theory of perception, presenting the differentials of consciousness in the relation between the "confused" and the "distinct."[462]

In the return to Leibniz's theory of perception, superseded by Kant's transcendental aesthetics, Deleuze reintroduces the continuity of micro perceptions between the dark depths of the obscure ground and the bright light of a distinct one, and therefore of the continuity between logic and aesthetic truth and also between

sensations and conceptual thought. Sensations enfolded in conceptual thinking bring

the one into relations with the other, wherein Rancière writes that such an

enfoldment points to the power of the sensate itself, in which it is *of* and also *for*

thought.[463] Perceptual experience moves in between distinct and indistinct zones of

sensation, which correspond to clear and obscure thought, undoing the discreteness

between sensation and thought. Forever caught in movements between the

enveloping darkness and the emerging light, we find ourselves wandering in

Tarkovsky's masterpiece, moving into the evening vespers and treading into the faint

rays of an emerging light.

Endnotes

[355] Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. T. Conley, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1993), 94. (Henceforth, *Fold*.)

[356] Eric Alliez, "Midday/Midnight: The Emergence of Cine Thinking," in *The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema*, ed. G. Flaxman, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2000), 295.

[357] Gilles Deleuze, "The Brain is the Screen," in *The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema*, ed. G. Flaxman, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2000), 367.

[358] Whereas a film's diegesis is understood to include all elements of a narrative, whether actually shown or implied, such elements are still internal to the narrative.

[359] *Fold*, 89. Genetic elements are inconspicuous perception constituted, as we will see, from light, matter, sound, movement and time in the image. These genetic elements make up the "differential of consciousness" in our perception of the image.

[360] *Fold*, 5.

[361] This movement between micro and macro perception will be taken up later on and in greater detail in the next chapter.

[362] *Fold*, 7.

[363] *Fold*, 14.

[364] Ted Kafala, "Deleuze's Aesthetics: Curvature and Perspectivism," in *Enculturation*, Vol. 4, No. 2, Fall 2002; 6.

[365] In Kafala, 1-4.

[366] *Fold*, 5-6; Kafala, 2.

[367] Brian Massumi, *Parables For The Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*, (Durham: Duke U Press, 2002), Massumi, 156. This word is a variation on Massumi's "spacelikeness."

[368] Such a whole is always a partial whole in relation to the virtual whole of the universe. Perception will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

[369] Filmic bodies extend from micro elements of light, sound, matter and movement in time to their macro elements, such as diegesis, plot and narrative. Perception in film moves continually between these two poles of micro and macro elements.

[370] Kafala, 5.

[371] Kafala, 7.

[372] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell, (New York: Columbia U Press, 1994), 195. (Henceforth, *WIP.*)

[373] Massumi, 157.

[374] Massumi, 145.

[375] Massumi, 154.

316

[376] *WIP*, 206. The authors write that a chaosmos is a composed chaos rather than merely chaos which art takes on in order to become sensory.

[377] Images, in this sense, are enfolded in perception, just as perception is enfolded in (its relationship to) an image.

[378] The folding of perception into matter will be taken up in greater detail in the next chapter.

[379] *Fold*, 93.

[380] *Fold*, 93. Deleuze is quoting a phrase by Cocteau in this sentence.

[381] *Fold*, 93.

[382] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. P. Patton, (New York: Columbia U Press, 1994), 213.

[383] As noted, this film moves through the various densities of obscure perceptions rather than through distinct ones.

[384] *Fold*, 93

[385] Gregory Flaxman, "Cinema Year Zero," *The Brain is the Screen*, ed. G. Flaxman, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2000), 88.

[386] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1986), 57. (Henceforth, *MI*.) Deleuze writes, "[w]ith the cinema, it is the world which becomes its own image, and not an image which becomes world."

[387] *MI*, 57.

[388] *MI*, 56-7.

[389] Henry Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. A. Mitchell, (London: Macmillan, 1911), 322-3; *MI*, 57.

[390] A photogramme is produced by placing objects on light-sensitive paper and exposing them to light. This technique produces negatives images in which, what is unexposed to light remains white while objects exposed to light present gray-gradients, depending on their translucency/transparency to light.

[391] *MI*, 56-57. Deleuze lists Husserel, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty,

[392] In Flaxman, 89.

[393] *MI*, 57-58.

[394] *MI*, 57-58.

[395] In this sense, the clarity of perception should be understood to occur in a curved space. From within each curve, in an infinite series, the point of inflection presents a unique point of view.

[396] *MI*, 56-57.

[397] This movement is slightly different from Bergson's, in which he writes that self-consciousness must be produced. In my own observation however, we slip in and out of such states of self-conscious observation, rather than self-consciously willing ourselves to do so.

[398] David Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, (Durham: Duke U Press, 1997), 27.

[399] Rodowick, 27-28.

[400] Rodowick, 28.

[401] Roland Bogue, *Deleuze on Cinema*, (New York: Routledge, 2003), 29.

[402] Rodowick, 28.

[403] Bogue, 29.

[404] In F.C.T. Moore, *Bergson: Thinking Backwards*, (New York: Cambridge U Press, 1996), 21. My emphasis.

[405] Moore, 20.

[406] In Rodowick, 28.

[407] Rodowick, 28.

[408] Eric Alliez, "Midday Midnight," in *The Brain is the screen*, ed. Gregory Flaxman, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2000), 93.

[409] Eric Alliez, *The Signature of the World*, trans. E.R. Albert and A. Toscano, (New York: Continuum, 2004), 106.

[410] Alliez, 2004, 107.

[411] Alliez, 2004, 107.

[412] Alliez, 2004, 107-8.

[413] Laura Marks, *Touch*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 178.

[414] *MI*, 58.

[415] Alliez, 2004, 111.

[416] Virtuality, therefore, is to be considered a movement in the direction of the actual. A fuller meaning of differenciation and differentiation can be found in Andrew Murphie, "Putting the Virtual Back into VR," in *A Shock to Thought*, ed. B. Massumi, (New York: Routledge, 2002).

[417] Alliez, 2004, 114.

[418] Alliez, 2004, 114. Alliez writes that this "matterness of being" is to be understood through Deleuze's "the whole of relations." The matterness of being is therefore a virtual quality, which actualizes itself by differenciating itself through its play of difference. That is, being is that virtual potential differenciating itself through its becoming in time.

[419] *TI*, 80.

[420] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema II: The Time-Image*, trans. H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1989), 80-1. (Henceforth, *TI*.)

[421] *WIP*, 186.

[422] *TI*, 81.

[423] Alliez, 2004, 115. See F.N. 64 regarding being/becoming.

[424] In Moore, 23.

[425] *MI*, 58-9.

426 *MI*, 58-9.

427 *MI*, 59.

428 *MI*, 59.

429 *MI*, 59.

430 *MI*, 58.

431 Rodowick, 31.

432 Moore, 26.

433 Massumi, 156. This word is a variation on Massumi's "spacelikeness."

434 Bergson in Rodowick, 28.

435 The creasing into finer folds should therefore suggest that the movement between what is internal and external is increasingly intricate.

436 Massumi, 157.

437 Massumi, 156.

438 Massumi, 187.

439 The issue of what is inside and outside will be taken up in greater detail later in the next chapter.

440 Tarkovsky in Natasha Synessios, *Mirror*, (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), 44.

441 Some of these images have been reprinted in Synessios's book.

442 Synessios, 44.

443 Synessios, 44.

444 Synessios, 47.

445 Andrei Tarkovsky, *Sculpting in Time, Reflections on the Cinema*, trans. K. Hunter-Blair, (Austin: U of Texas Press, 1986), 59.

446 Tarkovsky, 133-121. Tarkovsky did not uphold intellectual or dialectical montage as one of the principles of filmmaking.

447 Massumi, 157.

448 Massumi, 157.

449 Tom Conley, "Translator's Foreword: A Plea for Leibniz," in Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. T. Conley, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1993), xxviii.

450 Massumi, 278, n. 1.

451 In this sense what constitutes a mezzo field of painterliness or musicality cannot have a limit or a boundary condition, as fields of experience are indeterminate and open.

452 *DR*, 105.

453 Gregory Flaxman, "Introduction," in *The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema*, ed. Gregory Flaxman, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2000), 6, 44-5.

[454] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*: *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem and H. R. Lane, (London: Athlone Press, 1984), 2.

[455] The intrinsic-psycho and extrinsic-physico mechanisms form the fold of perception. These mechanisms of perception will be taken up in greater detail in the next chapter.

[456] Jacques Rancière, *The Future of the Image*, trans. G. Elliott, (New York: Verso, 2007), 38.

[457] For instance, gestures, rituals or the use of empty shots in Japanese films are culturally specific.

[458] Flaxman, "Cinema Year Zero," 92.

[459] Synessios, 52. Synessios writes, it took Tarkovsky twenty edits to create *Mirror*, pointing to his refusal to adhere to scripts or a narrative form. He believed that he could not impose his logic or will into the editing process and that he had to let it speak to him. She writes that the editing process was nothing short of mystical.

[460] In Birgit M. Kaiser, "Two Floors of Thinking," in *Deleuze and* The Fold: *A Critical Reader*, eds. Sjoerd van Tuinen and Niamh McDonnell, (London: Palgrave, 2010), 215.

[461] Kaiser, 216.

[462] Kaiser, 216.

[463] In Kaiser, 220.

Chapter Five

The Folding of Media-Events: liquid memory, liquid perception

> *...the infinite fold separates or moves between matter and*
> *soul...the outside and the inside. Because it is a virtuality that*
> *never stops dividing itself, the line of inflection is actualized in the*
> *soul but realized in matter, each one on its own side...inspiring a*
> *new harmony...*
>
> -- Deleuze[464]

Introduction

In the preceding chapter I tried to show that what becomes the film *Mirror* is in fact

the confluence of micro flows among the genetic elements which fold into each

other in the moving image. Their aggregation extends into what are the larger flows,

which I have sketched, emphasizing dynamic fields of perception of what becomes

painterliness, poetic gesture and musicality within the singular filmic event. The

film's macro flows occur therefore by the aggregation of micro flows of the genetic

elements, in which macro perceptions are the product of differential relations

established among micro perceptions.[465] In extending the conceptual personae of the

fold to this chapter, I will continue tracking micro flows and micro movements, but

now in how they produce the folding between media-events and also how such

folding might produce singular experiences. Sound, light, movement and matter as

they endure in time fold amongst each other to constitute the singularity of an event.

I will therefore need to change tenor from the specificity of a single work in order to

consider how perception, matter and the image work in a single interpenetrative circuitry among varied media-events. Such an approach will lead me to address major issues such as perception being internal to matter, the ontology of image-matter and the matter-image, subjectless-subjectivity, the nature of an event and machinic consciousness, all of which are constituent to the relation of folding between media-events. With such an undertaking I ultimately hope to underscore the position that the metaphysics of the fold produces continuities in duration in the encounter with media events. In the folding of images from one event to another, memory and perception come to fold into each other, making the experience of duration continuous. In tracking the enfoldment of memory and perception in duration, the relation of sensation in works of art to the production of thought will be scrutinized.

Rather than establish the theoretical ground from which the exegesis of media-events proceed, I will oscillate between the ground of theory and media analysis, and so advance the interpenetration between theoretical examination and empiricism. In this chapter I continue expanding aspects of perception in Bergso-Deleuze's ontology of the image, as well as present Deleuze's ontology of subjectivity, the event and machinic consciousness.[466] However, while this chapter focuses on Deleuze and Bergson's materialist ontology, these elements will come to be shaped by the liquid wave of the fold, with Deleuze-Leibniz. The fold will become the constant force that molds the discursive elements of this chapter, the

conceptual movements and the shape of the fold being complimentary rather than antagonistic.

Central to my consideration in this chapter, I will present the movements in perception beyond cinema, to show how memory and perception move between images that are cinematic and non-cinematic in the experience of a media-event. The media-events chosen, such as *POL* and *Modell 5*, which are two live performances by the German duo Granular Synthesis, the performances by Survival Research Laboratories, and Toni Dove's *Spectropia*, produce these liquid movements between the cinematic and non-cinematic. Moreover, this movement of liquidity also presents the opportunity for considering the complexity of the present. As I will show, the continuous moving line of the present occurs in the folds, between the perception of matter and layers of memory.

Moving from an introduction of *POL* and *Modell 5*, I consider how it is possible to extract conscious perception between what is "real" in the world and what is the "appearance of the real" (the cinematic image), in the unfolding event. It is from this constant condition in perceptual movement, between the "real" and "appearance" that the major questions and queries of this chapter arise. In trying to grasp the folding between what is traditionally considered non-image-matter (the real) and the matter of an image (cinematic) in contemporary live media-events, I will consider Bergson and Deleuze's ontology of the image. In the folding between perception and media-events, the ontological difference among the genetic elements

323

of the cinematic and non-cinematic image will come into question. Contrary to this understanding I will consider Bergson's postulate that the world is made up of images, wherein the cinematic and the non-cinematic come to be considered equally as images.

The plane of immanence, on which the world is made up of images, perception of what is "real" and "appearance" becomes minor in degree. This condition of imperceptible difference generates an understanding in how perception comes to fold between cinematic and non-cinematic images. In live contemporary performances such as *POL* or Toni Dove's *Spectropia,* images fold from cinematic to non-cinematic ones. Moreover, it should be understood that perception not only folds between the "matter-image" ("real" thing) and "image-matter" ("appearance" of thing), but also into memory.[467] In the folding of perception with memory, the past and present coexist. Actual images fold into the virtual past and in this regard, perception folds among paintings, films, literature, plays, digital media and so on. The folding among events into memory develops a further understanding of how the inside comes to touch the outside in relation to mechanical, physical and conceptual fields. Shifts in these fields cause shifts and upheavals in the fold between the perception of events and virtual pasts.

I will also consider the mechanism of perception itself, which occurs in the fold between the actual and the virtual, in order to track the continuous flow between matter and consciousness. In the experience of *Modell 5*, the euphoric audience

resembles and extends from the vibrating sound and image-matter. Perception of the event occurs, therefore, by a stretching out of vibrating matter to the receptive organ, wherein the inner psychic realm and the actual material vibrations received from the media-event come to form the smallest possible circuitry. In these tiniest of folds I will establish two queries: how do media-events come to fold and unfold from each other and how do differences and repetitions come to be negotiated. In examining what folds into perception as that which occurs between the actual and the virtual, I inquire into the virtual potential of performances. This virtual potential, in its actualization in the different unfolding media-events, comes to present the newness of experience.

One major trajectory of this chapter therefore is related to this fluidity between perception and memory, which folds to form the newness of experience. In the latter part of this chapter I develop this trajectory more fully, showing how perception of media-events folds into memory in works by Grannular Synthesis and Survivial Research Laboratories, how films fold into paintings, as well as how a single interactive media work, such as Toni Dove's *Spectropia*, folds between film, theatre and video games.

The major question of perceptual movement between cinematic and non-cinematic images unfurls the two important trajectories of this chapter. The first, noted already, is related to the fluidity between perception and memory, which fold to form the newness of experience. The second trajectory proceeds in the direction

325

of establishing the materiality of the world in which, Bergson's postulate that the image is at the heart of matter and at all points in space, becomes key to understanding the machinic processes of the world. In understanding the image at the heart of all matter, the nature of images comes to be revealed as luminescence: images are figures of light, possessing visibility from an inside. From this postulate images present their own conditions of consciousness in which, consciousness rather than being about something as a representation *of* something, *is* something. Images, in this sense, are to be understood as a primary order of reality, rather than as secondary (as representations of the real).

A world in which images present their own conditions of consciousness, the eye is the surface which comes to reflect that consciousness. The eye, as reflecting surface, presents the workings of the world that turns away from individualization and from a psychologized subjectivity. From this ground it becomes possible to consider the machinic processes of media-events, which give rise to difference and points of view. The points of view or perspectives achieved by reflecting eyes on a hyperbolic, curved surface are infinite, bringing forth the heterogeneity of difference. Subjectivity or the perspective from which a point of view occurs, therefore, is multicomponential, heterogeneous and non-individuated. Subjectivity, rather than a collection of personal experiences and as the condition of interiority, is instead the point from which the world comes to be reflected, in its objective structuring. From Leibniz's postulate that the world is in the subject as much as the

subject is in the world, the separation of world from subject becomes impossible. Subject and world arise in relation to each other, as an enfolded objective structure, undoing the notion of the subject's independence from world. A subjectless-subjectivity and its relation to world condition the development of Deleuze's machinic consciousness in which, the infinite points of inflection on the curvature of the world establish not only the plurality of points of view, but also that each point within this infinity is a singular difference and a deterritorialized vision.

In light of the above, I will develop how the conceptual persona of the fold presents a movement away from conceiving events through the mechanistic determinability of chronological time. In considering the virtual time of media-events, the twisting of matter occurs in the fold between perception and memory. In hyperbolic space, physical, mechanical and conceptual forces come to exert pressure upon plastic matter, causing the matter of media-events to twist and turn. It is from the condition of perception and memory touching that the various strata given to a media-event curve into and out of the other. A strata's inner realm comes to fold with the outer regions of another, an activity achieved by the folding of matter which exerts forces on that matter. *Amelia*, a dance by La La La Human Steps becomes sculptural and a walk in the countryside with Richard Long becomes a performance. Toni Dove's *Spectropia* moves between cinema, theatre and video games. Perception, arising in the movement of matter that is coming into experience, folds into the virtual past, generating possibilities for new experiences. A scene from

Tarkovsky's *Mirror* folds into a painting by Peiter Breugel, The Elder. The virtual past, in this way, coexists with the unfolding present, coming to provoke and shape the experience of new media-events. The folding between pasts and presents requires that we move away from the application of mechanical time (Chronos) in approaching experiences. The folds of any event yield an infinity of reflections and refractions, which move in multidimensional ways and are unencumbered by clockwork regimes. The time of experiences, thereby, oscillates between internal realms and matter, where virtual pasts come to shape presents and where presents may also continually come to be reformed and reinvented and thereby affect changes in pasts.

Unsettling media frames

As I noted in the previous chapter, the mobility of images traverse from one territory to another, whereby images move from and between sensual, conceptual, perceptual, cognitive and haptic realms. In this mobility, images transform from one quality to another: musical notes plunge into colour, or non-sense words arouse emotional sound textures. In this uncongealing, elastic quality, we might find that apprehending and qualifying what an image is arrests and paralyzes its fluidity. Thus, instead of inquiring about what the image is at defined points in time, we need to inquire into its ontogenesis, its continual states of becoming as it moves through qualities and substances in time and space. Moreover, in the shifting transparencies

of clear and indistinct perception, the sensate gives rise to conceptual forms. Fields of perception aggregate into larger fields, in which inklings and sensual micro perceptions take on "shapelikeness," of thresholds of consciousness. It is with these two ideas, of elasticity and transparencies that I will commence this chapter, pressing into the molecular movements of the image's genetic elements. Elasticity and transparencies unsettle the boundedness of the image, which has come to be codified through its technological plane, for instance, the specificity of slam poetry, performance art, video, sculpture or dance. Indeed, as I have come to examine throughout this dissertation, the image is to be understood as suffusing the world, in excess of its traditionally assigned technical frame, which denotes a specific medium.

The image's genetic elements, which aggregate and form the rhythm and flow of an image, fold among each other, furnishing the senses.[468] Along the continuum between micro and macro processes of perception, we come to perceive layers of indistinctness and clarity in images. In a media-event, light, sound, movement and matter in time, as molecular aggregates on the plane of immanence, circulate in smooth spaces, constituting the universal flux of life. It is over these fluid conditions of bodies' kinetics and affectivity that we begin to geometrise space and time by erecting various frames: performance art, film, video installations, digital video, drawings, animations, diagrams, texts, scripts and so on. Over fluid movements of genetic elements, of bodies propelling through smooth space, frames

of reference come to be constructed solidifying what are tendencies and efforts in motion into the discrete categorization of physical objects. These frames generate stratifying tendencies enabling interpretive practices and ultimately, signifying experiences through the logic of sense assigned to that frame.

The functioning of media forms, thereby, occurs through an overcoding of their effects and standing, where experience becomes bounded and supplanted by the pre-assigned effects derived through the cognitive faculty -- in the (Kantian) mode of *possible experience.* The medium becomes a signifying one and therefore is coded by virtue of its ability to designate possibilities. For instance, such designations would include general pronouncements such as "dance is movement in space," "cinema is narrative," "painting is colour." As if the creative function of art could be containable in the possible experience unfolding within the field designated by the formal structures of that medium. Smith writes that this would mean that such unfolding would occur through the management of the experiences forming; in brief, such experiences would occur, if even partially, by externally applied formation.[469]

While the image's genetic elements constitute the folds of the cinematic image, micro perceptions sense what are the negligible differences of "assent" and "descent" between the "matter-image" and "image-matter."[470] This degree of difference comes to be gauged in the relations, variations and aggregations of vibrating substances, between what is world (real) and image of world (appearance).[471] Perception of matter on the plane of immanence Maurizio Grande

330

writes therefore, is the movement-image minus cinema (the real or non-cinematic) and cinema is the movement-image minus matter (the appearance).[472] This minor difference in the degrees of reality occurs in the modulation of the eye as it perceives material images in the world and cinema's image-matter. That is, in the modulation of the eye there are negligible differences in the degree of perception between cinematic and non-cinematic images. This modulation of the eye, Eric Alliez writes, is Deleuze's lines of double movement in which, the ascent and descent of perception between world and the cinematic image occurs.[473] Such a modulation occurs in the live performances of Granular Synthesis.

Matter, perception and image

In performances such as *POL* (1998), *Modell 5* (1997) and *Noise Gate* (1998) by the German performance duo Granular Synthesis, it is impossible to express where the boundary between live human bodies (a performer and spectators) and the image projections of a performer's body lies.[474] In their expanded cinema performances, there is something indeterminable that occurs between the bodies of audiences and the machine-modulated sound and image projections onscreen: there is a heterogeneous continuity between the performer's live body, the image of the performer's body projected on-screen and the live bodies of spectators. In their immersive installations, on some five to eight giant panels, live digital images of a performer's body are projected. These images course through the panels with

331

extreme rapidity, accompanied by earsplitting sounds. The digital image-sound streams cascade through the giant panels with feverish rhythms in which the images and high-pitched sounds are generated from computers. Coursing through the immense screens, the live image of a performer's body is broken down into two or three frames called "grains," transforming the image-flows into a highly synthetic and artificial sequence. Upon initially encountering this live expanded-cinema performance, the spectator's body enters states of disorder and confusion, as it is pulverized by the event-phenomena. However, with time, the bodies of spectators attune and synthesize with the pulsating images of the digitized body. The computer-generated micro-images, which break down ordinary reality into micro sound-image or grains, generate the variations that make the performances highly mutable. In these media-events, the projected images of the performer's body and the spectators' bodies exist in continuity with each other and thereupon, they are in a perpetual state of flux.

The stretching and folding between the genetic elements of the projected image, as well as the modulation of perception between matter-image and image-matter, requires a closer examination of perception, matter and the image. In the performance, how do we perceive light, movement or sound folding from one image into another? Or, how does perception modulate between the cinematic image of the performer's body and the non-cinematic images of spectators' own bodies? These questions necessitate an inquiry on the linkages and folds between matter and

consciousness, that is, in an exploration of the vinculum between image and perception. Whereas in the previous chapter I considered matter and perception, in this chapter I will take on the task of considering the folding movement *between* consciousness and space in greater depth.

In materialism, the crisis of the connection between what is the inside with the outside is resolved by reconstituting the order of consciousness, through material movements.[475] Bergson's materialist ontology in *Matter and Memory* overcomes the inside-outside dualism in virtue of the continuity between matter and image. He does so by constituting the body to be one image among others in which, "every image acts on others and reacts to others, on 'all their facets at once' and 'by all their elements'."[476] The performer's body, the image of the performer's projected body and the bodies of spectators in space are in continuous kinesthetic relations with each other as they move in synchronicity with each other. Here, what is perception of an image and movement in space become an assemblage of different parts of a continuous whole. This passing of consciousness into space and space into consciousness is resolved in virtue of perception becoming internal to matter itself.

If we recall, in Bergson's theory of pure perception, characterized as the "lowest degree of the mind,"[477] the world is made up of images in which the body and brain are both images among an infinity of other images. Movement occurs among the different parts and between the different systems, where they collide, affect and vibrate on the plane of immanence. This "stirring up" prevents the

333

different parts and systems from becoming a closed set, in which movement of the image and flowing matter are "strictly the same thing."[478] It is a mobile bloc of space-time, a machinic assemblage of movement-images. Thus, in a question that he poses, "how could images be in my consciousness since I am myself image, that is movement?" we may note that Deleuze is suggesting that the body is itself an image, which is movement and furthermore, that consciousness is itself an image.[479] In virtue of this materialist postulate, therefore, the bodies of the performer and spectators are to be considered as matter or an image on the plane of immanence.

In these immersive installations, movement and sonic energy are unleashed at such intense capacities that they generate and induce some form of physical transformation in bodies. Such transformations frequently cause other bodies to resonate with the frequencies produced by the electro-digital machines. At the cellular level, the sonar and visual energy generate the capacity to energize and excite cells plunging the organized, molar body into disarray. The spectatorial body, physically inundated with rapidly cascading images and noise, is overwhelmed by the audio-visual molecular vibrations, which literally pummel its cells through the ear-eye-skin organ. This cellular sensory overload, after reaching its threshold of chaotic movement, begins to adapt to the energy waves being bombarded and eventually becomes synchronous with the audio-visual frequencies that it is being subjected to. Maintaining a level of sympathetic attunement with these frequencies, the cells in the body begin to resonate with the image-sounds. This is a coexistence

of two different durations: cells and sound-image frequencies. When vibrating at the same frequency, the thrust and power of image and sound is not experienced as excess by the body enroute to processes of molecularizing; a synchrony herein emerges between them. Cells have therefore entered into a zone of proximity with the convulsing image-body and sonic-waves, in which organic and non-organic matter fold into each other.

Synchronizing with the sound-image, the molar body becomes molecular. In its liquefying, the body experiences floating sensations, living as it does in an intensified or extreme state of becoming image-sound. In this pulverization and then modulation of the cellular body to the image-sound frequencies, we have two movements: liquefaction and synchrony. The molar body in this sense dissolves into its environment and then comes to synchronize with it. And in this movement we pass from the initial states of chaotic turbulence and obscurity into a synchronization with that turbulence, into a partial clarity of perceptions. From micro perceptions, where an infinity of tiny perceptions form the chaotic states of differential relations in the initial encounter, these chaotic states begin to smooth out somewhat when micro perceptions begin to unfold into the clarity of macro-folds. Such clarity begins to emerge when the liquefied body comes to synchronize with the velocity and frequency of the sound-image. However, it must be noted that a total clarity never emerges, and the thrill of the performance is to maintain states of indeterminacy and obscurity. Granular Synthesis' sonorous and electro-digital performances create

states in which the cells come to resonate at the frequency of sound-image molecules. In this resonance we must understand that the bodies of spectators fold into and modulate with the sound-image frequencies, where it becomes impossible to note where each begins or ends.[480]

How perception arises

In considering that there are minor degrees of difference between what are cinematic and non-cinematic images, the spectator's perception modulates between image-matter (visual images) and the matter-image (their own bodies).[481] In the modulation of the eye among the various images, the performance necessitates that human perception become deducible. In experiences such as these or others, including a musical performance, dance, theatre or film unfolding in time, we need to ask (along with Deleuze) how it is possible to extract perception from the flowing state of matter. In order to consider this question I will first establish how perception arises in order to present an understanding of how human perception can come to be extracted from performances such as *POL* or *Modell 5*.

To answer this question of how perception arises, I will turn to Rodowick, who suggests that the plane of immanence should be understood as an open whole that cannot be understood as an immobile section. The plane of immanence cannot be thought of as an enclosing frame, which would then make it a spatial abstraction.[482] In *POL* or *Modell 5*, movement on the plane of immanence is of a

336

universal variation, where all mass/bodies are vibratory matter, including the spectators, performers and image-projections. The performer's movements produce a chain of resonances, in which her gestures are processed within the computer producing the "grains" or micro fragments of her movements. Within such an assemblage a grain of sound-image, which is the smallest part, produces its effect in a changing whole. Her image projected on-screen as sound-image grains is the vibratory matter, which the spectators encounter. This vibratory matter "expands with heat" in the spectator's initial stages of the encounter. This initial heat of perception, where everything is chaotic, the nascent image perceived by a spectator is not consciously willed and is only to be understood as derived from kinetic energy: the movement of molecules that they are being subjected to generate "exchanges of heat" and are much like "the pull of gravity" on objects.[483] However, as the rhythms of the performance settle into the spectators with time, the heat of the initial encounter cools down and then comes to be "illuminated by the cold light of stars."[484] As perception becomes stabilized or firmed up, micro perceptions distend into macro perceptions, forming thresholds of clarity. Such clarity in perception reveals luminous matter. This luminous matter has induced Deleuze to assert that the entire plane of immanence is made up of Light. Perception, therefore, occurs from this light energy propagating throughout the universe.[485] This is in distinction to the understanding that perception occurs by the organization of the human eye by which one comes to perceive the world as a stable horizon.

337

In a world constituted by images, perception is itself an image -- the perception-image. A perception-image forms only when an image comes to be reflected by an eye. If an image is not perceived by an eye, it is only because it has not come to be reflected in one as yet.[486] For the perception-image to be formed the images propagated into the universe or into the screening/performance space, must come to be reflected by an eye. Thus, for an image such as a perception-image to be formed it is sufficient that a body/eye exist and correspondingly, perception occurs by virtue of the existence of an image. Perception arises thereupon from the interaction among the various images, such as those between ordinary objects and those like ourselves propagating in the world -- between those images projected onto screens and those images like our bodily selves. Thus, rather than perception being a representation or a picture of objects or of things, perception arises from the interaction between images. One of the principal conditions of perception therefore is this contact between images in which, a body capable of initiating change, must be in contact with its environment. This contact between image and environment is called perception.[487]

Perception is therefore not only a means for receiving movement but, in turn, is also connected to an action. It is not a faculty which emerges by adding some sort of subjective accretion to the perceived object. Carried by the brain, perception is, on the contrary, a process of restriction or a subtraction from the world.[488] Because it is impossible to perceive the thing in its entirety, Bergson wrote that "we always

perceive less of it, we perceive only what we are interested in perceiving, or rather

what is in our interest to perceive, by virtue of our economic interests, ideological

beliefs, and psychological demands."[489] It works to translate external sensory-data

flows through the senses into an ensuing motor-action and for this reason, perception

is sensory-motor. Rather than producing representations, perception helps the living

image to navigate and function in its environment and to control and operate in its

surroundings. Applying such control in order to function in one's environment is

acquired by such a subtraction, which removes the noise or extraneous elements that

are in excess of such a function.[490] It removes what is of no interest to its vital

functions in order to carry on its existence[491] and in this sense, it subtracts from an

initial cosmic flow of mutually interacting images.[492] These deletions are temporal

phenomena wherein durée, inherent in matter, is condensed in our perception and the

miniscule differences of rhythms and movements in the material realm, come to be

congealed in a perceived quality.[493] What we ordinarily call representation is

therefore a subtraction, a conversion from all the complex flows of matter into a

selective rendering of an image by perception. An image thereby becomes a

representation by such a process of "cutting out," filtering or by isolating it (the

closed set) from a greater complexity of the open. What is reflected by the selective

eye is a discriminating representation and the organ of perception by selecting what

is of interest to it, comes to reflect the light from the plane of immanence.[494] Such a

selection of the eye to what is of interest and of importance to it, Bergson wrote,

339

occurs by a virtual action.[495] It is important to understand perception therefore as active and as an action within a world of action, rather than as a representation of things.[496]

The images that we *see* in *Mirror*, *POL* or *Noise Gate* are luminous *reflections* of matter and if elements do not appear to the eye, it is because they have not come to be reflected in that eye. Bergson's preferred term for such a perceived property is this capacity of reflecting. The idea Moore writes is that when we perceive, what we perceive is *a reflection* back to us of our possible course of action.[497] As noted above, for an image to be formed it is sufficient that an eye exist. In this sense, the eye, matter and image are all part of the changing whole before us -- the media-event -- and it should be emphasized that none of these can be considered as secondary representations of the other. As Rodowick writes, the eye, matter and brain must be understood as continuous with each other, each of which is caught up in the flux of images.[498]

In Granular Synthesis's performances such as *Modell 5*, the performers, computers, modulated image-body, the electro-digital circuitry coursing through the panels projecting the high-velocity machine-movements, the synthetic sound-image grains and the spectator's participation, create the media-event. In this connection between spectators and installation, bodies enter the zone of indiscernability with the electro-digital circuitry, in which an absolute contact is maintained between them physically, emotionally and psychically. In the flow of movements occurring during

the performance it is impossible to know the moments of shift between cellular

matter and sound-image grains. What we have here is an organism in which minor

differences in the degree of reality perceived between cinematic and non-cinematic

images occur. Fluctuations in perception fold between organic matter and the

synthetic time of machines, where it is impossible to know the moments of shift

between cellular matter and sound-image grains. One recalls Deleuze's meditation

here, where, on the plane of immanence he writes, body=movement:

> External images act on me, transmit movement to me, and I return to
> movement: how could images be in my consciousness since I am
> myself image, that is movement? And can I even, at this level, speak
> of 'ego,' of eye, of brain and of body? Only for simple convenience;
> for nothing can be identified in this way. It is rather a gaseous
> state.[499]

The "I am myself an image that is movement" recalls states of perception for which

there are no spatial or temporal coordinates available, or a stable horizon of the

world. It is the topsy-turvy world of gaseous states of perception where coordinates

are unavailable and matter is obscure, unclear and dense with micro folds. In this

world one experiences a nonstop oscillating movement where the liquefied body

folds between image and movement, between what is the cinematic image and the

non-cinematic image (the "real" body). The eye modulates between the ascent and

descent in perception, between what is image, movement, light, sound and matter of

the performance, in which the degree of difference in the two images is indistinct.

Mind, body and matter in continuity with each other are caught up in the flux that is

the media-event, where it is impossible to know where the grains of image-matter and the cellular body begin or end as they fold into experience.

Perception as internal to matter

So far I have outlined what the conditions for perception are, in that it is the contact between image and environment; it is subtractive and forms the first aspect of subjectivity; and, last, it functions as an active state, perceiving what is of interest to it. However, before it is possible to unfold how human perception can be extracted from the state of flowing matter, as in Granular Synthesis's performances, which move back and forth from cinematic and non-cinematic images, I need to elucidate another critical function. What requires further examination is how what is perceived (matter) and how perception occurs (eye), are to be understood as forming the circuitry of a single whole. Thus, rather than conceiving matter and the eye as outside each other in the traditional sense, conceiving perception as internal to matter will help understand how human perception is deducible from the flowing state of movement-images.

Conceiving perception as internal to matter will also first help us to understand Tarkovsky's approach to editing *Mirror* and therefore, also the flows that make up the film. As noted in the previous chapter, the time-pressure in each shot was important in not only generating but also in organizing the flow between the different scenes and sequences. Rather than edit by following the conceptual lines of

342

a story, the time-pressure of each shot comes to compose the flows of the film and in this sense a shot comes to edit itself according to the internal rhythms and flows of the images. For Tarkovsky it was a matter of recognizing these internal patterns in an image's composition, a task that took seven months and some twenty trials. Each of the previous attempts at editing fell apart because the images did not hold together by an internal connection, their linkages somehow ringing false notes. One day in desperation, as he and his editing crew attempted to reedit the images again, the film suddenly came alive. The scenes and sequences miraculously fell into place and the images flowed into each other, like in a "bloodstream."[500] The film suddenly radiated with luminosity. This "falling into place of the images" we can now understand as the images constituting their own conditions of consciousness.

When images form their own conditions of consciousness we have perception that is internal to matter, rather than being formed from an outside. In developing his materialist ontology, Bergson wrote that perception does not occur with a perceiver situated outside matter, but rather occurs *in* things themselves, just as noted in the *Mirror* example above. Bergson expands on this difficult idea in the first chapter of *Matter and Memory*. He presents a point "P" which, when observed, strikes light to the various cells of the retina, transmitting neurological impulses to the brain. From this it might appear as if perception takes place in the brain; however, the rays that point P emits and the transmission of these rays to the brain *all* form part of the circuitry of a single whole. And most importantly, Bergson notes

that "the luminous point P is a part of this whole; and that it is really in P (in matter itself), and not elsewhere, that the image of P is formed and perceived."[501] This process is not one in which an image forms in an individual consciousness and then projects itself into an exteriorized point P, the more common understanding of perception.[502]

Mirror or POL is to be understood as the expression of matter in continuous movement in the universal flux rather than as the representation of matter arrested at certain points in time. When expression is matter in continuous movement, perception is part of the action and becomes internal to the event. When the body becomes image or movement, there is no internal-external division between a material and image-producing reality that divides the perceiver from what is being perceived. The spectator becomes a part of the whole relation in which perception occurs from within the image flow.[503] In the infinity of images, in which the living image perceives another image and reacts to it, the relation between perceiver and perceived can be understood to be a whole. Hence Bogue writes, "if perception is said to take place in any specific location at all, it is not within the perceiver, but at the object perceived where the genuine qualities reside. Perception is in things, then, not inside the perceiver."[504] From within the connections and relations of the performance unfolding, between performer, mixers, spectators and the electro-digital circuitry, perception takes place.

Put in another way, in an ordinary cinematic shot, the infinity of the universe becomes transformed into it. Each shot from a different position, therefore, re-marks the subject, which prehends the universe.[505] The world is in the subject as much as the subject is in the world, as Leibniz's notion of the monad would indicate. Flaxman writes therefore that "the subject is a point at which the universe sees itself: the subject synthesizes the world from a particular point of view, but the subject also derives from that world, each perspective constituting a self-synthesis -- the 'concentration, accumulation, coincidence of a certain number of converging preindividual singularities'."[506]

In a cinematic shot, which is matter + movement, the image of matter (the shot) is composed from where the subject deduces a perspective, constituting a self-synthesis. That is, first of all, matter forms its own image: the shot or event transpiring is the very matter that forms the image. Second, matter also forms its own perspective. The filmmaker/artist synthesizes the world from a particular point of view. That is, the filmmaker's point of view becomes the perspective from where the image is formed/taken. This perspective, which is formed by the subject, is itself the world: the universe sees itself from the position or point of view that the subject occupies. It is therefore conceivable as Bogue notes that perception is in things and not inside the perceiver. In the case of *POL*, the artists and participants form their own perspectives of the event and therefore, there are many different perspectives of the same event formed. Perception, movement, image and matter, which have minor

345

differences, but as continuities of each other, all form the flow of the media-event. Perception, thereupon, occurs *from within such a material flow* coming to pass, whether it be *Mirror* or the *Modell 5* performance. Perception is constituted therefore *from within the material conditions* making up the luminous matter-object itself, not from an individual, separate consciousness.

As noted earlier, the entire plane of immanence is made up of light energy, which propagates throughout the universe. And in such a universe we might now come to understand that by virtue of perception taking place internally from within that matter, perception occurs in the light-matter (object) itself. The special image (that which perceives -- the perception-image), which exists within the circuitry of light-matter, is therefore also the light-image. If the living image is also a light image, then, as Deleuze observes, "the eye is in things, in the luminous images themselves."[507] And when the "eye is in things," he is responding to Bergson's paradox of the image that "the photograph, if photograph there be, is already taken, already developed in the very heart of things and at all the points in space."[508] With an assertion such as this, Bergson maintained that the photograph is already developed in images, presenting a paradoxical situation. However, Deleuze questions his assertion, writing, "how is it possible to speak of an Appearing, since there is not even an eye?"[509]

Deleuze resolves Bergson's paradox by equating light with matter. The plane of immanence is made up of light in which the fluctuations in light mark out the

346

various images. If images are made up of light we can see how images themselves are "lines or figures of light" or "blocs of space-time." For this reason, cinema understood only as pure movement is no longer enough, as this movement is also light. More than the notion of light being akin to a cinematographic image, it also presents the condition of visibility or of appearing in the world.[510] With appearance comes the actuality of the material world, which is no longer a virtual perception of things.[511] Rather than consciousness operating *as* a beam of light which illuminates things in the dark, light immanent within matter itself *is* consciousness, as a set of images. And it is in this sense that we can come to understand Bergson's paradox above that the photograph is already at the heart of all things and at all points in space.

For Bergson things are already luminous *in themselves*. Consciousness therefore does not have to function *as* a beam of light that is shone upon things in order to illuminate them. Rather than consciousness being *about* something where things become illuminated *by* consciousness, all consciousness *is* something.[512] This proposition brings us back to Tarkovsky's time-pressure shots by which the editing process works itself out. The internal connections between images become crucial to making the images come alive. The luminous images projecting their own conditions of consciousness upon the film suggests that Tarkovsky's part was to recognize this internal flow. That the image preexists itself as primary matter suggests its own movement. Recognizing that movement among images, so that the images are not

347

separated from their own movement, is the task. The image does not become

privileged to Tarkovsky's consciousness in this form, but rather, to its own

conditions. In this sense the images are not given to a human consciousness but to a

machinic one in which, the internal relations among images compose their own

conditions of luminosity and visibility. The relation then is not between human

consciousness and image, but between *image and image*, in which perception is

internal to the images being cut together in sequence.[513] This relation presents the

condition of a machinic consciousness, an idea that I will develop further in the next

few pages.

Such a luminosity or consciousness, therefore, does not emerge in opposition

to the world, but is diffused in the world; it is not an instance of being of a different

nature from the world, it *is* the world.[514] It is the first order of reality, not the second

(as representation). Light, in cinema, is no longer that of a single human

consciousness conditioning images from an outside. Rather, as with *Mirror*, images

comprise their own condition of visibility from an inside: the images are figures of

light.[515] Due to the dispersion of light throughout the universe, cinematic images

become diluted with the light of the atmosphere enveloping them. In cinema or in

expanded cinema, therefore, the luminosity in images can only appear when the

atmospheric lights are lowered. Bergson points out thereupon that it is not a question

about "*how perception arises*" in things, but rather, "*how it* [becomes] *limited*."[516]

Subjectless-subjectivity and the event

In a universe in which matter, eye and perception all occur as continuous flows of each other on the plane of immanence, perception is internal to matter. Such a proposition lays the ground for understanding the universe as machinic. In order to understand movement, visibility and consciousness as machinic for my purpose here, further discussion of perspective and point of view are needed. Such elucidation is necessary lest these terms retreat into a universalist perspectivism that transcends all points of view, or into a banality of "personal experiences" redolent to a traditional subjectivity. Bryant writes that such senses of the terms are frequently predicated on the abolition of difference and alterity which, in fact, need to be preserved.[517]

What is important to grasp is that perspectivism and point of view, while selecting and excluding, do not belong to the subject. Rather, Bryant writes, "a subject belongs to, occupies, or is occupied by a point of view or perspective...Perspective is indeed a condition for the production of truth because it exercises a selection which allows diversity or beings to show forth, to manifest themselves."[518] Moreover, if a perspective does not belong to a subject which makes claims to "my personal point of view," it is also not dependent upon it; that is, a subject need not even be present to the development of a perspective. In this sense perspectives are not individuated, rather, individuals and subjects are individuated/differentiated by perspectives. A perspective is to be understood as a

system or a structure which allows for differentiation to occur in individuated subjects and in this sense, precedes the subject.[519] A perspective is no longer understood as interiority, or as being interior to the subject, but rather as an "objective structure which the subject occupies much as one might occupy a field or plane as a medium of movement."[520] As noted in Leibniz's proposition earlier, the world is in the subject as much as the subject is in the world and therefore, it is not possible to think the subject as separate from world. Bergson's postulate that perception is internal to matter is not in contradiction to the above, as subject and world arise in relation to each other, forming an objective structure.

Thus, rather than retreating into an individuate and personal subjectivity, the traditional notion of the subject who is the "ultimate essence of individuation," is destroyed in such a system.[521] We have now arrived at a subjectivity which is subjectless, understood beyond its typical reference to the individual in what Bains calls a "subjectless subjectivity." Such subjectivity is a "direct, non-discursive auto-possession -- a non-human for itself...A 'fourth person singular'" that is not a Cartesian geometrical space.[522] Such space is a real space, at the intersection of multiple components: material, semiotic, biological and others, comprising all the components making up human subjectivity or interiority.[523] Such a multi-componential subjectivity is a multiplicity of heterogeneous components, underscoring Whitehead's process of concrescence, whereby, "a fragmentary whole emerges, a *unitas multiplex*, a unity in multiplicity."[524] This subjectivity has to be

understood as a whole complex in which all the different components are distinguishable from each other but each forms an indissoluble part of the whole that endures continuous duration.[525] Whitehead writes that such subjectivity is to be understood as an event, as "an occasion of experience," and as a "processual, pathic intensity."[526]

Drawing from this understanding the camera shots, which modulate the eye in a film form the subjectless-subjectivity, the occasion of experience of the event. The point of view of that subjectivity (the shot) is to be understood as presenting what comes to be reflected in that system (cinema) by that eye (the camera-eye), a system with an infinity of views. The world, or for us the world of the media-event, therefore, which is "an infinite series of curvatures or inflections," comes to be reflected in the camera-eye, in which the "entire world is enclosed in the soul from one point of view."[527] Such an understanding of subjectivity brings us to Deleuze's machinic universe.

A machinic consciousness: the heterogeneity of ontological thought

The undistinguished sense between perceiver and what is being perceived noted earlier, also follows through in how Bergson treats the different images -- visual, sonic, tactile and others. Images as things, or images as visual appearances, have minor ontological differences to each other and on the plane of immanence, where movement/matter/image/perception become continuous, image-movement and

matter-flow are indistinct. As we will see, what is "real" and "appearance" maintain an ontological continuity among image, movement, matter and light.[528] The ground has been laid to initiate a consideration into Deleuze's question: how it is possible to deduce human perception from within the state of flowing matter? As I will attempt to present an answer, I will need to distinguish whether the machinic perception found in film is the same as in live performances. My own inquiry concurs with Alliez's conclusion that *all* perception is deduced from a cinematic milieu, that the cinematic milieu forms the genetic elements of all contemporary perception.

In order to consider the implications of Bergson's theory of perception for the cinematic image and for the material world, we have noted Deleuze's turn from Bergson, in which Deleuze equates matter with light (Bergson wrote that matter was movement). In a world consisting of images, Deleuze, in equating matter with light, proposes that *all* images are made from the same "matter" irrespective of whether they are directly perceived by the eye (the "real") or are the cinematic type ("appearance" of the thing).[529] The image, which is a block of light, comes to be formed only when it is reflected by an eye. (That an eye exists is sufficient for an image to exist.) Until such a reflection occurs however, an image remains virtual, its actualization occurring through reflection and within a flow of light. An actualization occurs therefore when *a living image* or *the centre of indetermination* selectively reflects light within this flow and brings into existence a given indivisible circuit of light.[530] If the image is already in things, as Bergson noted, then images

proliferate the universe in their virtual state and it is only in their passing *through living images* that they come to be reflected. This reflection transforms virtual images into their actualization.

If the image did not pass through the centre of indetermination, we would have a mechanical universe rather than a machinic one. We would need to ask then, as Deleuze does, if such a universe of images, in which "every image acts on others and reacts to others, on all their facets ... and by all their elements," is a mechanical universe.[531] Were it not for the intervallic period produced in the centre of indetermination, the chain reaction from perception to affection to reaction of the sensory-motor regime, which produces predictability in the movement-image, would become part of a mechanization process. In starting with the living image on the contrary, which *selectively* reflects light and thereby actualizes the image, the process begins in between perception and reaction, undoing the predictability of a mechanical universe. This gap produced in the centre of indetermination produces the shift between perception and the automatic action upon things, producing unpredictability in the process.

We have seen that in Bergson's materialist ontology there is a difference in degree between the different images on the plane of immanence and that while the relation between two images, such as between cinematic images and other images is there, it is ontologically minor. Bergson's ontological materialism therefore lays open a world in which Eric Alliez writes, "the identity of the real and of the image

353

(that which appears) results in the affirmation of an ontological indifference between

Image [ ], Movement, [ ] Matter [ ], and Light."[532] However, despite this

indifference, Alliez contends that there *is* a slight degree of difference, no matter

how imperceptible, between "matter-image" ("real") and "image-matter"

("appearance"). And this negligible difference Deleuze noted was found in the

"double movement of ascent and descent along lines of differentiation" between

what is matter-image and image-matter.[533] Thus we should understand that while the

difference is negligible there is a degree of difference between images which are

cinematic and those which are non-cinematic; and secondly, while retaining a degree

of difference from each other, they constitute *a continuity* between them.

Taken in the sense above, an ontological indifference means that swirling

about on the plane of immanence, the world is image, movement, matter or light

(keeping in consideration their continual differences in degree to each other). This

Brownian vortex is a world in states of pure molecular vibrations in which the eye is

in the undulating matter. (The eye is in things.) The eye, moving in matter, is

presented with variations in the relations of images to each other. Close-ups, long-

takes, low/high-angle shots or slow motion, present the eye with modulations

reflecting the differential relations emerging among the images moving it from one

acentered state of perception to another. This modulation of the eye is cinema's

camera consciousness that opens out to duration as a whole. Such a camera

consciousness allows for a different perception,[534] which Alliez writes gives rise to

the genetic elements of *all* sound and visual perception. That is, cinema's machinic

consciousness is the genetic element of *all* contemporary perception.

In *Mirror* or *L'Intrus,* it is necessary to understand that it is from camera

consciousness that it becomes possible to deduce human perception (rather than the

other way around that human perception produces a camera consciousness). *From*

the different shots swirling around the anchoring of the "I" is *re*produced,

determining space-times and the horizon of the world. In the differentials of the

varying shots being perceived, the eye modulates from one acentered state to

another. Camera consciousness, thereby, in moving from acentered state to

acentered state suppresses the anchoring of the "I" until, as Bergson wrote, it comes

to be firmed up into conscious perception. It is from camera consciousness therefore

that human perception comes to be deduced and firmed up, in which the anchoring

of "I" takes place. From the differential sound-image elements of a shot, Alliez

writes, human perception "re-produce[s] the anchoring of the 'I'" and the horizon of

the world as a "special image" that is central and privileged.[535] The eye, therefore, in

deducing *from* camera consciousness, comes to determine spatio-temporal

coordinates, coordinates which anchor it on the stable horizon of the world.

Moreover, it is important to note that a machinic consciousness, by way of

presenting camera shots which continually modulate the eye, is no where near what

might be referred to as a unified perception. A machinic consciousness is, in fact,

quite different. In the eye's modulation among the various images Alliez writes that

"we have a metacinema of ontological thought" which, by virtue of the differential relations among sound, optical, spatial, temporal and other elements, enables another perception entirely. This perception differs from the unity of images emergent in phenomenological perception.[536]

Yet at this point we need to pause momentarily as another element needs further clarification. An important consideration in line with my task in this chapter has been to consider the folding among *different* media-events. While camera consciousness is incipient to cinematic perception, I need to question whether such a machinic consciousness also applies to *POL* or the *Modell 5* performances, both of which oscillate from cinematic to non-cinematic images. In order to consider this question of machinic consciousness in the performances, I will first need to consider the folding among fields. I will therefore briefly consider how the modulation between cinematic images and live non-cinematic images in such performances become continuous and smooth. Thus, do images fold imperceptibly between the "appearance" of the real in cinema and that which is "real" in front of the spectator in a live performance?

I have already come to consider this question *partly* by way of Deleuzo-Bergson's ontology of the image. From the condition that the world is a set of images, I have noted that cinematic and non-cinematic images have minor ontological differences on the plane of immanence. In terms of image, light, movement, matter and sound, what becomes "appearance" and what is "real,"

therefore, are to be understood as tiny degrees of differences. As Maurizio Grande writes, "[i]n other words, we can say that matter is the movement-image's plane of immanence *minus cinema*, and that cinema is the movement-image *minus matter*; thus it is one of the degrees of reality and not simply an 'illusion' that is supposed to replace the real."[537]

Having said the above however, it needs to be underscored that while any two fields are to be understood as having imperceptible degrees of differences, including fields constituted from the matter-image and image-matter, *different fields are nonetheless variations*. Thus while the cinematic image and the movement of the personal body are imperceptible degrees of difference, each field is to be understood as having a variation that produces the differentials in consciousness. Each different field connects to another through the fold. The fold is therefore where two fields have entered the zone of indiscernibility. In the fold it is no longer possible to know where one field ends and the other begins. In *POL* or *Modell 5*, the fold brings about the copresence of cellular matter and the electro-digital circuitry. In this sense, Deleuze writes that a fold is of a part, and never a point. It never dissolves into points, but folds into another fold.[538]

In *POL* or *Modell 5*, movement flows from one acentered state to another without establishing a centre or a reference, in which consciousness is something as it endures in time. The electro-digital circuitry's sound-image grains and the spectators' movements are folded into and *continuous* with the other. The fold

between the two fields, therefore, forms the singular flowing body of the image-event. The performer's image-body and the spectators' real-bodies fold without discrete centres or points of reference, becoming one continuous movement in time. It is a mobile bloc of space-time. The event is to be understood therefore as an assemblage of various heterogeneous components folding into each other. The different fields fold into each other to form the individual singularity of a heterogeneous complex.

In returning to the question of machinic consciousness, it should be understood that the electro-digital circuitry generates the drive and propulsion, which the heterogeneous components come to resemble. From this electro-matter that flows without discrete centres or points of reference, perception comes to be deduced. Human perception comes to be *abstracted from* machinic consciousness, making it purely impersonal.[539] As noted, Bergson considered that for the view to be firmed up conscious perception must be produced from the state of flowing matter, which has no points of anchorage.[540] This human perception is therefore deduced *from* camera consciousness. It is from camera consciousness that the "I" comes to be *re*produced and anchored on the horizon of the world from which space and time coordinates become determinable. This machinic, non-human flow, from which perception comes to be deduced, forms the genetic elements of all sound and visual perception.

The modulation of the eye, as it moves in synchrony with the surfaces produced by the electro-digital circuitry, comes to reflect those surfaces. While all the different components make up the heterogeneous relations of the event, cellular matter comes to vibrate and synchronize with the electro-digital circuitry. The performance is therefore similar to the cinematic experience. Just as machinic consciousness in cinema moves the eye from one acentered state to another, the electro-digital vibrations synchronize the movement of the spectators' bodies in the performance. Moreover, given the modulations among the spatial, optical, sonic, temporal and other relations, a second intentionality is produced, in which the images are unsettling and not given to the unity experienced in phenomenological perception. A machinic consciousness, on the contrary, gives rise to a very different, deterritorialized vision, which is the genetic element of all sound and visual perception.

Thus, because cinema suppresses the anchoring of the "I," it allows us to go back upward to the state of pure molecular vibrations of "pure uninterrupted becoming."[541] This becoming, Alliez writes, implies a deterritorialized vision. It is deterritorialized by virtue of no longer presenting the "sublime relations" of the sensory-motor regime, found in movement-images. Movement-images produce an indirect image of time, in which time becomes secondary to the logic and needs of the narrative. Time-images, on the other hand, give us the direct image of time as they produce time internal to the event. Rather than follow the needs of a narrative,

they allow for the "pure uninterrupted becoming" of the event. In giving rise to uninterrupted becoming, they produce an aberrant time, from which the disconnectedness and asynchrony between sound and image, produces a deterritorialized vision.[542]

Moreover, in *L'Intrus* and *Mirror*, images arise from an outside from which thought comes to be encountered. This thought from the outside disrupts and disconnects the narrative flow, producing a new subjectivity. Thought from the outside, Alliez writes, "inscribes our contemporaneity, in the rupture between man and world."[543] This rupturing that cinema produces, is a new form of thinking. This single connection between the inside and outside, which comes to be connected in the brain, allows us "to define thought as the only object-subject of modern cinema and *cinema as the most contemporaneous image of modern thought*."[544] The time-image of cinema generates this new "thinking image," a new image of thought. Linking cinema to this new thinking image, Deleuze writes, "we must no longer ask ourselves, 'what is cinema?' but 'what is philosophy?'"[545] This new thinking that cinema produces, becomes the work of philosophy.

In machinic thinking, therefore, the universe "becomes a cinema in itself, a metacinema."[546] It should be understood however that while Alliez's claim that camera modulation gives rise to the genetic elements of *all* perception is defensible, such a proposition is valid only up to a point. Given the newer and continually emerging digital technologies, computer generated images and algorithms present a

different set of conditions for thinking images. Digital images produce the newest

forms of the image. Nonetheless, as noted in the third chapter, it is uncertain where

this new image of the "perpetual present" takes us with respect to real duration,

thinking and virtual relations.

To sum up certain aspects of this and previous subsections, so far I have

considered that perception is internal to matter and that matter is continuous with

images. With respect to the proposition that in a world of images what is cinematic

and non-cinematic are equally image, I have established three major points. The first

of these is that there are minor ontological differences on the plane of immanence

between what is real and appearance in terms of the image, movement, matter and

light. The world becomes a universe of images or a metacinema in which, what is

image-matter (appearance) and the matter-image (the real) become minor

differences to the senses. The flow among image, movement, materiality and light

constitutes the continuity in perception between image and matter. It is in this spirit

that Bergson wrote that the world is made up of images. Second, while the degrees

of difference among these fields are negligible, their differences need to be

maintained. Such a difference and continuity can be maintained in the metaphysics

of the fold. The folds among the different fields form a temporal continuity of the

image-event. The folds between parts give rise to their continuity. Any event,

therefore, is a heterogeneous complex of the many different fields folded into each

other. Key to understanding the context of folding in this chapter is that the fold is a

virtual relation that gives rise to the *continuity* among fields and that it gives rise to

an open and free time in the experience of temporal media objects.

Third, differentials in the relation between shots modulate the eye, producing

a camera consciousness. The different camera shots produce the eye's modulating

perception, which moves from acentered state to acentered state without establishing

a unified or stable horizon. In live audio-visual performances such as *POL*,

perception folds from the images (electro digital circuitry) to the body, between

cinematic and non-cinematic images without establishing a stable or unified horizon.

In cinema, as in live performances, therefore, we see a machinic perception. Such a

machinic consciousness is the genetic element of all sound and visual perceptions

that inscribes contemporary life.

In the next section I will attempt to draw closer to the mechanism of

perception itself by considering the material movement from sound-image-matter to

the receptive organs in *Modell 5*. I will examine how the mechanism of perception

causes matter and consciousness to fold into each other and moreover, how, in such

a fold, we could start thinking about constituting the different media-events. The

greater folds of media-events arise in perception, in which the traditional dualities of

the inside-outside of matter and consciousness will be dislodged.

The fold between matter and consciousness: the mechanism of perception

The sound and image electro-digital circuitry of *Modell 5* cascades through the gigantic panels in which, vibrating matter undulates with expression. This feverishly vibrating sound and image-matter creates bodily sensations in which cells in the body are first pulverized and then achieve synchronicity with the vibrating matter. Vibrating matter produces molecular movements, which stretch out into the atmosphere and such an extension occurs by virtue of its elasticity. This elasticity is the tendency and effort of vibrating matter extending in motion to the sensory organs. When we perceive sounds and images it is by virtue of such a movement of stretching out from the vibrating matter to the receptive organ. Molecular movements, thereby, resemble the vibrating matter by virtue of a projective geometry, and such a resemblance is equated with *what resembles* -- the participants. The participants in states of euphoria resemble "something," and such a resemblance is an affective quality. The waves of molecular movements resembling the vibrating matter are therefore produced *in* matter, in the form of bodily sensations received by the participants. The euphoria in the performance resembles the sound and image matter; it necessarily corresponds with this relation of extension and resemblance of the vibrating matter.[547] Physical mechanisms therefore work by propagating movement, and just as a stone creates ripples in the water, matter carries vibrations that affect other physical bodies.

363

Thus we have an extrinsic physical causality which, through waves of molecular movements, passes from one body to another, to infinity. The excitation from the sound and image matter extending into the bodies of participants occurs through an impulsion or an excitation of the physico-organic mechanism. There is however yet another causality, an intrinsic, psychic one of perception. Through the psycho-metaphysical mechanism, qualities, which resemble the vibrations contracted through the organism, are perceived by consciousness. The vibrations contracted by the physical body are therefore not merely limited to the physical body itself, as these intrinsic psychic perceptions will resemble the infinite, tiny fluvia of molecular movements.[548] This psycho-metaphysical mechanism of perception is therefore the intrinsic psychic causality of the (material) image, resembling its vibrating matter.

Perception of the intense physical velocities evokes strong vibrations gathered by the receptive organs.[549] The high-pitched sonic frequency and the high-velocity orbiting of the visual images generate disorders in the body through abnormal pulse intensity. While the eye-skin-ear system is aroused, perception does not *reproduce* these frequencies; perception, instead, is *evoked* by the frequency of the vibrating sound-image matter through *resemblance* in the receptive organs, by extension or by projection. In this extending movement, affective qualities are projected and such qualities are the "natural sign" of perception which, in this case, is elation. The psycho-metaphysical mechanism of perception therefore corresponds

364

to the conditions of the receptive organ by the propagation of movement.[550]

Molecular movements therefore produce sensations in fleshy matter[551] and this

relation between matter and perception is one of resemblance, where states of

euphoria come to resemble the sound-image matter in extension. The intrinsic

psychic mechanism therefore resembles the impulsion of the extrinsic movement,

the two mechanisms are therefore the two differential but inseparable halves of a

whole.[552]

As the participants move between states of obscurity and clarity through the

unfolding performance, the thresholds of consciousness achieved correspond to the

vibrations contracted by the organ; conscious perceptions thereby resemble the

vibrations contracted through the organism.[553] Moving in between the two poles of

tiny perceptions and the great fold of consciousness, perception establishes what are

the "inner folds" through the intrinsic psychic mechanism (which receives its

vibrations from the physico-metaphysical mechanism of perception). These inner

folds, Deleuze writes, are like a matter that must be organized into outer pleats. The

folds of consciousness thereby resemble the pleats of matter, in which consciousness

comes to resemble the performance. In this resemblance of perception to matter,

what is intrinsic resembles the extrinsic, producing the fold.[554] The theory of

folding, at its very core, is a quadripartite system: perception straddles tiny

perception and the great fold of consciousness (the inner and outer folds of

perception); and, matter straddles the tiny folds and their amplification on a receiving organ.[555]

The (inner) folds of perception however, which resemble the pleats of matter, come to direct them. Perception, which resembles matter, directs matter. In Leibniz's monadology, God creates matter in conformity with what resembles him, "making men in his likeness." In such a scenario, Deleuze writes that we move from one aspect of perception to another which is "no longer solely the representative of the world" (physical does not flow to the mental), "but becomes the representation of an object in conformity with organs. God endows the monad with organs or the organic body corresponding to its perceptions...I have a body because I have a clear and distinguished zone of expression."[556] That which "I express clearly (the moment having come) will concern my body, and will act most directly on my body, surroundings, circumstances and environment."[557] What is important to note here is that movement flows from the inner folds of perception to the pleats of matter, rather than the other way around. The monad, therefore, *expresses* the world according to its *body*: that which I express concerns my body and acts directly on my body, my surroundings, environment and circumstances. Thus, in Leibniz's *Monadology* he writes, "what happens in the soul represents what happens in bodily organs."[558] The action of bodies upon the soul therefore expresses the world.

Perception occurs in the fold, in what is the smallest possible circuit between the inner psychic realm and the extrinsic pleats of matter, which it resembles,

between the virtual inner dimension and the actual vibratory matter. This fold, between the virtual and actual expresses the two sides of perception, although these two sides express the very same thing -- the world. The world is therefore taken as a double process, in which it is virtuality that is actualized in material bodies.[559] What this means then is that the world exists virtually in all its potentiality with all its possibilities, some of them becoming actualized in bodies. The inner folds of perception, therefore, present all the possibilities and potentialities of what a media-event can become, carried in its virtual potential -- as the rhythms, movements, light, sound and matter come to fold in our perception of them. The intrinsic psychic mechanism of perception presents all virtual possibilities, portending an ideal preexistence of the world, of what a media-event can become. This potential is carried out in the pleats of matter by bodies, in the process of actualization of a media-event. Such a virtual potential also therefore exceeds all of that which makes up the folds of matter: the participants, technologies, techniques, and also what is the pre-signified outcome of a given event.

The mechanism of perception works in such a way that it resembles matter. Perception occurs in the fold between the virtual potential and the pleats of matter, where the virtual potential of perception generates all possibilities for the actualization of matter and events in the world. From this latter condition of virtual potentiality, in the mechanism of perception, I will now develop my approach to the folding of media-events. In the remainder of this chapter I will develop an

understanding of how media-events and perception fold into each other to make up the newness of experience. I will present how the fold generates the connection between the inside and outside, where movements from the outside link to movements produced from within, forming a singular, deterritorialized vision of the world. I have considered that the image, matter and consciousness all form continuities in the flow of a media-event, constituent to the flux of life. Perception is situated internally within this flow of matter in a film or a live media performance. The perceiving eye reflects the light-matter in the universal flux forming a circuitry with it. Towards this end I will now focus on how works by Granular Synthesis fold into performances by Survival Research Laboratories, how paintings can fold into a film and how film, theatre and video games fold into a single interactive media-work, such as Toni Dove's *Spectropia*.

Media Frames as dynamic

Rather than proceed from known fixed entities in the forms of specific media, the movements, rhythms and speeds of media-events fold and unfold in our perception of them. Perception, in reflecting mobile fields of light, sound, matter and movement in time, folds and unfolds into dynamic, elastic fields that are poeti*cal*, musi*cal*, drama*tic* and others. These dynamic fields are in distinction to those frames designated and conceived as singular mediums: poetry, music and drama. As noted earlier, each sense is the aggregation of other micro-senses, their folding and

unfolding generating thresholds of clarity and obscurity in which we are forever sensing the world.

For instance, Fernand Léger's *Ballet Méchanique* (1924) has frequently been referred to as being dance-like.[560] The choreography of camera movements presenting the internal flows between the shots, in addition to the editing, can become the rhythms of dancing. Thus the statement, Léger's *Ballet Méchanique* becomes the rhythms of dancing, ascribes perceptual qualities to the internal movements and rhythms of its shots, and also to its editing. The varied shots of people and geometrical objects in the film generate the internal movements within the shots and also the formal movements between them. The formal movements, when cut to specific lengths of time, form the rhythms of the film, making the accents and tempo of the moving objects dance-like. Dance, moreover, rather than merely denoting a singular field, of a body in movement in space, is constituted from processes in other fields such as musicality, the performative and the dramatic. These fields, in turn, are the aggregations of qualities such as rhythm, stillness, light and sound, which come to compose the movement of an image in time. Micro movements of matter, light and sound in time, therefore, constitute what become the larger bodies of performance, musicality or dramaticality, which constitute the field we can ascribe to as becoming dance-like or that which is dancerly. The rhythmic form of the film, achieved through the camera angles, the length and types of shots, their formal compositions and the editing process, arranged within the scope of the

musical tempo of the sonata rondo pattern, generates the dance-like qualities of

Ballet Méchanique. Similarly, *Amelia,* a dance performed by La La La Human

Steps, are sculptural.[561] The exceedingly quick pirouettes of the dancers' movements

suddenly freeze into eternal poses, invoking sculptural forms in space. Likewise, a

sound poem in performance can take on emotional colours and a walk can take on

the flow of performance art, such as Richard Long's walks through the countryside.

The speeds and relations between at least two fields in visual poetry, such as sound

and textuality,[562] which extend further into other fields such as movement and time,

fold into each other, constituting the "image of sound."[563] Images come to be

generated from folds micro-aggregating, produced among movement, matter, light

and sound in time.

Liquid memory, liquid perception

I will now consider how memory folds into perception in media-events. I will

discuss how, in the encounter with a temporal media object, images from different

past events fold into the present. In particular, I will sketch out how performances by

Granular Synthesis and Survival Research Laboratories (SRL) fold into each other,

as well as consider some notable examples of paintings by Peiter Breugel and James

Whistler with Tarkovsky and Aleksandr Sokurov.

In order to consider how *POL,* an expanded cinema performance folds into a

noise performance by SRL, I will begin by considering the performances as two

370

mobile fields of space-time. The former is constituted by the electro-digital circuitry

of giant sound-image panels and the latter is an assemblage aggregated from old

discarded war equipment and fabulous reinvented machines; both events are

performed live with audiences and make up singular events.

In their 1991 performance at the Barcelona Art Futura exhibition, the

performance given by SRL was so earth shattering that people living one kilometer

from the performance site panicked that an earthquake was taking place and called

in fire brigades and ambulances.[564] In these performances various giant robots such

as the "flame hurricane," "inch crawler," "shockwave cannon" and others produce

high electric currents and hurl flames, water and pressurized air at each other. They

operate in a loose choreography combating with each other in what some people

have described as a "post-apocalyptic monster truck rally." In addition to hurling

flames and using pressurized air, the massive high powered robots and engines blast

sonic frequencies at decibels that make eyeballs and kidneys vibrate at levels only

experienced in war.[565] Extreme nausea, revulsion and the "liquefying" of guts is

experienced, whereupon, spirited fans recommend eye, ear and breathing protection

for the uninitiated. At the cellular level, SRL's machine noises generate the capacity

to energize and excite cells plunging the organized, molar body into disarray. The

body, physically inundated with noise, is overwhelmed by sound molecules, which

literally pummel its cells.

Similarly, with Granular Synthesis, the high energy sonic frequencies plunge

the body into states where the sound is projected at such a feverish pitch that

audiences begin to hear "physiologically" rather than aurally. The spectator's body,

which vibrates beyond levels found in ordinary experience, lives in an intensified

state. In such a state of intensification the body reaches a different threshold.

Frieling writes that in these performances, "the audience physiologically 'hears'

through the body, combin[ing] to create an effect of conscious polarization and the

removal of all perceptive distance from this stream of audio-visual data."[566] The

perceptive distance removed, audiences' bodies begin to resonate intensively.

Visually, SRL's bestial machinic-creatures, such as the flame hurricane or

shockwave cannon, generate jarring and grating robotic movements, presenting a

relation to the disturbing and agitating movement of the performer's vibrating head

in *POL*. The former's mechanize gaits, gestures and poses serve a single aim: to

destroy everything in their path. These performances are reminiscent of B-grade

Godzilla films from Japan made in the 50s that warn of nuclear threats. The

threatening evil qualities of these mechanical creatures are matched by their

exaggerated size, typical of comic-book proportions, as they hurl flames and thunder

across the performance field. The movements of these performing robo-creatures

produces differentials in consciousness from the performer's vibrating head in *POL*.

Nonetheless, their threatening quality, although comical to some extent, somehow

produces a relation in which the one folds into the other. While the robo-creatures

are amusing, they nonetheless also physically threaten the other creatures and therefore, indirectly, also the audience. In the *POL* performance, the threat is less on a physical level than on a psychological one, in that the micro-grains of the image produces the pulverization of the performer's body.

It is therefore less in the visual qualities than in their sonic connection that the two form a relation. The highly charged noise frequencies, pitch and velocities in both performances produce great levels of excitation, even anxiety. In a sense, their relation to each other emerges by their sonic intensity, which physically assaults the spectator. In the SRL performance, the bestial creatures annihilate their opponents by tearing apart, smashing or burning the others. In *POL*, the image of the performer's head moving at super-sonic machinic speeds across the giant panels presents the dehumanization of the body. In both these performances, the psychologically threatening aspects are heightened by the sound frequencies in which, the intensity generated in the present, gives rise to the pulsations experienced from the past. In the actual perception of the SRL event, memories of *POL* begin to emerge.

The differentials among the genetic elements in the two images make up the differentials in consciousness in the perception of the events.[567] The changes in the rhythms, movements, sound and light from one media-event to another, come to be perceived as the variable geometries of the image's genetic elements. The particular differentials fold from one event to another in time as difference to, and also as a

373

repetition of the elements. Perception of the highly sonorous sound densities from SRL's machine-generated noise performance folds into the memory of the highly intense computerized sound of Granular Synthesis. But it should be understood that these perceptions are unconscious and that they do not have an object and do not refer to physical things. The differentials in rhythms, movements, sound and light from one media-event to another are the differential relations that comprise unconscious perception, and in this sense, they have no objects nor do they refer to physical things.[568] Deleuze writes that perception in this sense is hallucinatory, in which one grasps figures without objects: "through the haze of dust without objects that the figures themselves raise up from the depths, and that falls back again, but with time enough to be seen for an instant. I see the fold of things through the dust they stir up, and whose folds I cast aside."[569] The haze through which instants of clarity occur, in which figures come to be grasped, is the haze of infinite tiny perceptions of the vibrating sound-image-light intensities, which invades consciousness and folds with the memory of the other. As we experience the SRL performance, we are therefore always caught in these processes, of trying to perceive within the haze of folding perceptions and memories.

The haze becomes thicker sometimes in contemporary interactive digital media art works, in which the dynamic fields of film, video games and theatre become enfolded within a single performance. In Toni Dove's interactive cinema, which utilizes both cinematic time and real-process time of digital media, the actual-

virtual circuits multiply in light of such continual temporal movements.[570] In her

interactive installation *Spectropia*, we have nomadic time in which the *actual*

narrative itself wanders between different historical periods, producing a haze of

folding perceptions.[571] The past is no longer that which is merely the individual

spectator's memory, but is also the past of the narrative. This means that the past

becomes a collective memory that spectators participate actively in its making. Such

a narrative time that moves fluidly between pasts and futures not only allows for the

rambling between the different historical periods to occur by "collapsing time" as

Scott writes, but also by how the complexified haze of the present comes to be

enfolded in the web of the different historical periods.[572]

    The narrative itself starts in 2066 with a young archeologist Spectropia who,

in search of her father, is transported to 1930s New York. When her time traveling

machine short-circuits, she ends up in the body of another woman. This narrative

gives rise to the movements between three historical periods: the future (2066), past

(1930's) and present. The virtual past and future fold into the actual present as

players or participants navigate through the interactive digital movie by way of their

physical movement and speech. Their physical actions trigger video segments,

which are uploaded from computers to the gallery screen. Audience members,

assisted by trained performers, can then use physical cooperation to spontaneously

unfold dialogue between onscreen characters, by speaking to them, which generates

a response in real time. Spectators, thereby, navigate through cinematic spaces,

move a character's body, as well as alter and create the soundtrack. As a performative interactive space that uses a mix of motion sensors, vocal triggers, speech recognition and synthesis, *Spectropia* folds between theatre, cinema and video games. Transporting the body between pasts and futures, the physical body extends itself into the virtual space of cinema, by executing choices in the narrative flow.

What folds in perception, therefore, is that which occurs between what is actual and virtual, between the actual haze of images unfolding in the performance and memory. Matter, in this interactive cinematic performance, is becoming through a multitude of interactions and through memory, which is virtual. In *Spectropia*, perception continually modulates between the actual and virtual in the flux of matter. While perception navigates and functions in its environment, the fold of perception is between the actual haze of what is present (the various actual narratives presented, of pasts and futures) and a virtual past. Needless to say, just as the movements of the world change from moment to moment, they also change in the performance, accumulating over the length of the performance and forming a common, yet specific memory for each participant.[573] From this common memory in the performance, the events transpiring come to fold into each other and be perceived. In this fold, the virtual potential[574] of the media-event comes to express itself. This virtual potential is one in which (the common) memory and the unfolding present are synthesized in perception, to produce the continual "new" of experience.

376

What we have are different times enfolding each other: the past enfolds our

experience of the performative present. The fold of perception therefore circulates

between the virtual and the present, bringing us once again to the "curve of time" in

which the present, as Bergson wrote, becomes indivisible. This indivisibility of the

present is a continuous, heterogeneous movement in which, perception of sensations,

feelings and potentialities move continually between pasts and futures. Perceptions

of the present therefore continually fold between different virtual times. Our bodies,

in this sense, have virtual extensions in space, stretching out towards pasts and

futures. What is important to point out is that while the current body extends into

virtual pasts and futures, an image that survives in our pure memory comes to fold

into the haze of the present. Such an image, which survives in memory and is

materialized into the present, becomes actually lived. An image that is recalled from

the past therefore coexists with the present event, and then comes into a repetition as

it endures in the present.

Difference & repetition

Recalling an image from the past is a psychic repetition however and occurs in the

difference of the present moment. Thus, on the one hand, when I experience an

image in an SRL performance, I recall an image from my pure past, in what was the

performance *POL*. Such a calling into the present from the pure past materializes the

virtual potentialities of that image and in my calling up such an image I make it

active, making it capable of *provoking* movements[575] as I interact with a film or a digital media work. The materialization of an image from the past therefore comes to coexist with the present. Importantly, the present itself undergoes a repetition with a difference in our experience even of the same film, video or interactive work -- making the experience a new one in time. Similarly, the present image may also change how the past will come to be perceived in a future moment.

Tarkovsky's *Mirror* has drawn several comparisons to the Dutch master Peiter Breugel's painting, *Winter Landscape with a Bird Trap* (1565). The sequence in *Mirror* in which children are playing in the snowy hills by a river, recalls this painting. Tarkovsky's moving images makes the painting come alive, capturing the proportions, rhythms, colours and light gradients of the darkly spotted figures playing. Similarly, with Aleksandr Sokurov's *The Second Circle* (1990), a film in which the son sits motionlessly by his father's coffin, recalls a painting by James Whistler, *Arrangement in Black and Gray* (1871). Whistler's portrait of his mother is awash in dark tones -- her long dress and the dreary curtains take up the greater part of the space in that painting. In both instances, perception folds between the paintings and films, where the light intensities, formal compositions, gestures, movements and stillness fold from the one to the other. But as Rancière points out in *The Future of the Image*, it is not merely a simple likeness that occurs between two images. It is more than mere resemblance, more than a bare repetition. Neither Tarkovsky nor Sokurov's films could be said to be faithful reproductions of the

original paintings in the least. What occurs is an interplay of operations that produces, on the contrary, an alteration of resemblance, an alteration that Rancière writes is necessary in what we call art.

Tarkovsky's *Mirror*, in which the light intensity and colour, the movements of children playing in the background and their squeals, generates sensations of joyfulness similar to the Bruegel. Nonetheless, Asafiev's situation as a boy who is orphaned in the war, offers an interplay of operations to that image of children playing in the painting. The one image folds into the other in our perceptual field of the two. However, as the scene unfolds, we come to interact with it in the complexified present -- as a difference from the memory of that painting. Tarkovsky's reference to the Bruegelian landscape is uncoupled from its original meanings or intentionalities.[576] The sensations perceived through the colours, movements, depth-of-field and sounds recall the Bruegel, and all the while presenting the sensations of the gay scene, Tarkovsky proceeds to the image of an orphaned boy who, as he is shot in close-up, shows tears streaming down his face. A double operation occurs here, in which the close-up of Asafiev occurs as a fragmentation through a cut. The cheerfulness of the landscape is undercut by the boy's tears which, when shown in close-up, presents the action in its essence, as a repetition with a difference. Images in this sense are not intransitive. Alterity, Rancière writes, enters into the very composition of images.[577]

The changes in the rhythms, movements, sound and light from one media-event to another come to be perceived as the variable geometries of the image's genetic elements in which particular rhythms, movements or sounds fold from one event into another as they are separated by the interval of time. In folding, the intrinsic mechanism of perception presents virtual potentialities, which come to be actualized in media-events. Macro perceptions, Deleuze writes therefore, are the product of differential relations established among micro perceptions. The differential relations of what comes to be perceived in consciousness are brought about by an unconscious psychic mechanism of perception.[578] The continual movement of images in perception folds between the actual and virtual, between the unfolding haze of what is present and the virtual potentialities of a past that selects and provokes, giving rise to the differential relations of the unfolding, complexified present.

Conclusion

The image-event's psycho-physico flux[579] passing across dynamic fields gives rise to feelings and sensations that fold from one event into another. From the manic intensities of becoming in *POL*, to the winding memories and luminescent skies of *Mirror*, to the grating and jolting motion in SRL's robotic performances, events circulate continually in the fold of perception between the actual haze of the present unfolding and the real virtual presence of time. The virtual past materializes with the

unfolding present, provoking the movement of thought in the present, in which

memories coexist. Virtual movements become materialized as inklings, feelings and

sensations, which begin to arise and take shape with consciousness. In this

movement arising the monad expresses the world: I express what happens to my

body as I experience the event. The experience of the event is that which I will

express concerning my body, my surroundings, environment and circumstances.[580]

Such a folding and unfolding in time among matter, memory and perception

performs the interplay of the differential relations in consciousness, generating the

newness of experience in art works.

In a world of images, cinematic images and non-cinematic images are to be

understood as images with imperceptible degrees of differentiation between them.

On the plane of immanence, the identity between what is "the real" and "the

appearance of the real" becomes a matter of degree, their ontological difference

becoming minor in terms of how light, matter, movement and sound come to be

perceived. The luminous matter of images, which present the conditions of

consciousness in and of themselves, come to be reflected in the eye.

In the time-images of cinema, thought is encountered from the outside,

rupturing the hermetically sealed world of the narrative. In this rupture, an

asynchronous, deterritorialized vision is produced, which is the most

contemporaneous image of thought. In time-images, the outside constantly interrupts

the narrative sublime through the constantly changing shots. The close-up, long take,

the hand-held hovering shot, high-key lighting, the empty shot and others, all

modulate the eye in which, the state of flowing matter constantly changes from one

shot to the next.[581] The eye, therefore, comes to perceive from this machinic flow.

From this machinic flow of differential matter, space-time coordinates come to be

established. Perception, therefore, comes to be *abstracted from* the conditions of a

machinic consciousness in cinema, making perception purely impersonal.[582] This

machinic, non-human flow of differential matter forms the genetic elements of all

sound and visual perception inscribed in contemporary life.

With respect to the folding between cinematic and non-cinematic images, as

in *Modell 5* or *POL*, movement similarly flows from one acentered state to another.

From cinematic (appearance) and non-cinematic images (the real body), matter

flows without a centre of reference or a stable horizon. Image-matter and matter-

image is that in which audiences' bodies and the performer's projected images of the

body are imperceptible degrees of variation in perception. In these performances it

becomes impossible to know the distinction between live bodies and sound-image

grains. Cellular matter folds into the electro-digital circuitry entering the zone of

indiscernability, in which the various components form an indivisible unit. This unit

is a space-time assemblage. It is the singularity of an event unfolding in time.

It must be underscored, nonetheless, that while the two fields are minor

degrees of variation, they *are* variations. Cellular matter and the electro-images are

two bodies that overlap and continue into each other. What folds, therefore, are the

two parts (a fold is of a part and never of a point).[583] Cellular matter and the electro-digital circuitry are two dynamic fields which form a fold, maintaining *continuity* between them. The fold between the two parts is what gives rise to their continuity. The fold is a virtual relation that arises in the connections among fields. It gives rise to an open and free time in the experience of temporal media objects.

The folding among fields in the mind gives rise to the complexified present. The complexified present is that newness brought into the fold of experience, where the outside of the event comes to touch the virtual inside of memory, making up the curve of time. This touching is Deleuze's "pure force of becoming" in which we are carried by the dynamism of the momentum, where we are affected and come to affect other bodies in a continually shifting whole.[584] Swept into this momentum, we experience a loss of ground in which thought no longer clings to a pre-given identity nor can it be unified; rather, the folding between event and virtual past generates difference in the repetition. The introduction of the outside to the inside therefore is the occasion for a new relation, inducing a new thought. The unknown, unperceived, chance encounter of images in media-events, therefore, continually reinvent thoughts, bringing Flaxman to iterate that "chance introduces invention into thought... The rule is -- improvise."[585] The impetus for art is to experiment, improvise, tinker. Artists are tinkerers and experimenters of materials, incorporating familiar materials in unusual ways at their maximal creativity, the folds in the material base continually regenerating and reinventing the movements of thought.

Images, which produce sensations, force us to think. Works of art, which induce sensations are, machines for thinking. In the fold between the actual image and virtual pasts of memory, the sensations experienced catalyze a kind of thinking. Thought is moved by the intensity of sensations as sensations bring about thresholds of thought that are thinkable. The folding of the image-event before us with virtual pasts produces such singular intensities that bring about thresholds of thought. Thinking, therefore, turns to sensations and to art, which is constructed for this very purpose of producing sensations.[586] The folding of perception of the various media-events into virtual memory brings about the complexified present and introduces difference into thought in time.

Endnotes

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[464] Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. T. Conley, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1993), 35. (Henceforth, *Fold*).

[465] *Fold*, 89.

[466] This includes Deleuze's turn away from Bergson.

[467] As will be noted below, images are figures of light and the condition of consciousness is incipient to an image. In this sense the image is to be understood as real, as a primary rather than a secondary order of reality. Thus, the scare quotations denote the traditional understanding of the thing as "real" and the image as the appearance of the "real," drawing our understanding to what is traditionally considered real.

[468] Images, as I will note more clearly below, flow between mental and material states.

[469] Daniel W. Smith, "From the Surface to the Depths: On the Transition from *Logic of Sense* to *Anti-Oedipus*," *Symposium Journal*, 10.1 (Spring 2006): 138-9.

[470] Eric Alliez, "Midday/Midnight: The Emergence of Cine Thinking," in *The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema*, ed. G. Flaxman, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2000), 293-4.

[471] Alliez, 294. Our senses perceiving cinematic images and non-cinematic images perceive minor differences. This aspect of perception will be taken up in detail later on in this chapter.

[472] See n. 6 in Alliez, 300.

[473] Alliez, 293.

[474] See:<granularsynthesis.info/ns/?goto=home> These performances are also available on YouTube. Accessed May, 2006.

[475] In idealism, on the other hand, this passing between consciousness and space is resolved through pure images in consciousness.

[476] Gilles Deleuze, *The Movement-Image*, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1986), 58-9. (Henceforth, *MI*.)

[477] In F.C.T. Moore, *Bergson: Thinking Backwards*, (New York: Cambridge U Press, 1996), 23.

[478] *MI*, 59.

[479] *MI*, 58.

[480] As noted earlier, there is no subject, only a coexistence of durations.

[481] This modulation of perception between image-matter and the matter-image will be taken up in greater detail in the section, "A machinic consciousness."

[482] David Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 31. When the flow of life is cut out of the whole and represented, a spatial abstraction is generated.

[483] Rodowick, 31.

[484] Rodowick, 31.

[485] Light energy, I might add, bends and deflects on the curvilinear surfaces of hyperbolic space, producing reflected and refracted light that offer worlds of distortion, fragmentation and decentering in twentieth century art movements.

[486] Rodowick, 31.

[487] Moore, 26.

[488] John Mullarkey, *Bergson and Philosophy*, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000). 43. In *Movement-Images*, Deleuze writes that the first material moment of subjectivity is subtractive: when we perceive things, we subtract that which is of little importance to us. See *MI*, 63.

[489] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema II: The Time Image*, trans. H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1989), 20. (Henceforth, *TI*.)

[490] Roland Bogue, *Deleuze on Cinema*, (New York; London: Routledge, 2003), 32-3.

[491] Mullarkey, 43.

[492] Bogue, 32-3.

[493] Mullarkey, 43.

[494] Bogue, 32-3.

[495] Moore, 27.

[496] Mullarkey, 44. The brain, likewise, is also action, rather than a theatre for observing.

[497] Moore, 29.

[498] Rodowick, 31.

[499] *MI*, 58.

[500] Natasha Synessios, *Mirror*, (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), 52.

[501] Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer, (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2004), 38. (Henceforth, *M&M*.); Bogue, 32.

[502] *M&M*, 37.

[503] Perception occurs from within this circuitry regardless of whether it is a live one as in *POL*, or not.

[504] Bogue, 32.

[505] Gregory Flaxman, "Cinema Year Zero," in *The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema*, ed. Gregory Flaxman, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2000), 93. Alfred Whitehead describes prehensions as concrete modes of analysis of the world. To prehend something is to have a concrete idea or concept of that thing. However, prehension is not merely a mode of thinking. A prehension is a process of appropriation of an element of an actual entity, or of an element, which is derived from an actual entity. A prehension of an object, or of an element of an object, changes the internal constitution of the prehending subject. Prehension is a process by which an actual entity, or prehending subject, becomes itself by

appropriating elements from other actual entities. Thus, the becoming of an actual entity occurs through a concrescence of prehensions. See: <http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/whitehead.html>

[506] Flaxman, 93.

[507] In Bogue, 34; *MI*, 60.

[508] In François Zourabichvili, "The Eye of Montage," in *The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema*, ed. G. Flaxman, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2000), 143; *MI*, 60.

[509] In Zourabichvili, 145; *MI*, 59.

[510] As Flaxman points out, Deleuze credits Foucault for developing the notion of visibility in which what can be articulated becomes visible. While Foucault's emphasis was on the former (the articulated), Deleuze's is on the latter (visibility). Flaxman, 25.

[511] Zourabichvili, 145. As noted in chapter one, the virtual and actual are always in circuit with each other.

[512] *MI*, 60, Zourabichvili, 145.

[513] Zourabichvili, 144-6.

[514] *MI*, 61.

[515] Zourabichvili, 146.

[516] In Zourabichvili, 145.

[517] Levi Bryant, *Difference and Givenness: Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence*, (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2008), 152.

[518] Bryant, 152.

[519] In common parlance, the notion that X or Y perspective would have eventually been articulated, shows the validity of this idea. In science, it is usually suggested that if X scientist had not discovered Y, another scientist would have eventually discovered the phenomenon. Perspectives, therefore, precede the subject.

[520] Bryant, 152.

[521] Paul Bains, "Subjectless Subjectivities," in *A shock to thought:expression after Deleuze and Guattari*, ed. B. Massumi, (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), 103.

[522] Bains, 105.

[523] A "real" space would include the virtual and material.

[524] Bains, 103.

[525] Bains, 104.

[526] Bains, 104.

[527] *Fold*, 24; Bryant, 153.

[528] Alliez, 293.

[529] Since everything is an image, the "thing" itself is an image -- a "matter-image."

[530] The circuit formed here is between what is perceived ("matter-image"), perception and the perceiver.

[531] *MI*, 58-59.

[532] Alliez, 293.

[533] Alliez, 294.

[534] Cinema, offers a range of diverse shots such as close-ups, long-shots, different angles and other shots, substituting an implicit knowledge and a second intentionality for the conditions of natural perception. Thus one image interacts with another image in a way that is not centered, stable or what is called natural perception. Presenting such a wide range of shots, cinema, moreover, lacks a centre of anchorage, moving perception from one acentered state to another, and such a tendency gets closer to what constitutes the plane of immanence, in which everything is in states of pure molecular vibrations.

[535] Alliez, 294.

[536] Alliez, 294.

[537] In Alliez, 300, n. 6. Author's emphasis.

[538] *Fold*, 6.

[539] Alliez, 294, *MI*, 58.

[540] *MI*, 226 n.4.

[541] Alliez, 294.

[542] Alliez, 298.

[543] Alliez, 299.

[544] Alliez, 300. Author's emphasis.

[545] Alliez, 298; *TI*, 280.

[546] Alliez, 294.

[547] *Fold*, 96.

[548] *Fold*, 96.

[549] *Fold*, 95.

[550] *Fold*, 96-7.

[551] *Fold*, 96.

[552] *Fold*, 97.

[553] *Fold*, 97.

[554] *Fold*, 97.

[555] *Fold*, 97.

[556] *Fold*, 98.

[557] *Fold*, 98.

[558] In *Fold*, 99.

[559] *Fold*, 104-5. Leibniz suggests, the body needs the soul to become substantiated or realized. Thus, it is not that the body realizes, but rather, in the body something comes to be realized through which it becomes real or substantiated.

[560] This film is available in its entirety on YouTube.

[561] This entire performance is available on YouTube. See part 1 of 7.

[562] Sound, for instance, which could constitute an element, is understood more accurately as a field given the range of sound frequencies, pitch, intensity, rhythm and tempo. The same could be said about light frequencies and image-matter.

[563] Tom Conley, *Film Hieroglyphs: Ruptures in Classical Cinema*, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1991), 218. In doing so, I am attempting to extend the category that Etienne Gilson has shown to be at work in the literary tradition in which he writes that, film depends on writing (see in Conley, *n7*). It is necessary for the working of the cinematic presented here that the "interfields" need to be stretched to the movements of the world, including the virtual.

[564] Many of SRL's performances can be seen on YouTube. Their website is: www.srl.org. Accessed March, 2010.

[565] Julian Blom, "Survival Research Laboratories," in *Sci-Fi Aesthetics*, ed. R. Armstrong, (Academy Group Ltd, 1997), 58.

[566] Granular Synthesis. *POL*. http://www.medienkunstnetz.de/works/pol/video/1/. Accessed May, 2006; *Modell 5*. granularsynthesis.info/ns/?goto=home. Accessed May, 2006.

[567] *Fold*, 89. Genetic elements are inconspicuous perception constituted from light, matter, sound, movement and time in the image. The genetic elements therefore make up "a differential of consciousness" in our perception of the image.

[568] *Fold*, 93.

[569] *Fold*, 94.

[570] Each *actual* past of the narrative therefore necessarily circulates with a virtual one, multiplying the fissures between the actual and virtual exponentially.

[571] Toni Dove, *Spectropia*. http://tonidove.com/interface.html Accessed December, 2009.

[572] Jill Scott, "Restructuring Time," in *New screen media: cinema/art/narrative*, eds. M. Rieser and A. Zapp, (London: BFI Pub., 2002), 196.

[573] As noted earlier, subjectivity is to be understood as an event and as an occasion of experience.

[574] The inner folds of perception present all the possibilities and potentialities of what a media-event can be, carried in its virtual potential -- as the rhythms, movements, light, sound and matter come to fold in our perception of them.

[575] Perception is active.

[576] Such a movement goes both ways -- Tarkovsky's images are also uncoupled from their meaning or intentionality if the Bruegel is seen after the film.

[577] Jacques Rancière, *The Future of the Image*, trans. G. Elliot, (New York: Verso, 2007), 3.

[578] *Fold*, 95.

[579] A psycho-physico flux would include all virtual and material elements.

[580] *Fold*, 98-9.

[581] As noted in the previous chapter, film presents a second intentionality.

[582] Alliez, 294, *MI*, 58.

[583] *Fold*, 6.

[584] Gregory Flaxman, "Introduction," in *The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema*, ed. G. Flaxman, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2000), 45.

[585] Flaxman, 45.

[586] Flaxman, 12-13.

Conclusion

> *If thought searches, it is less in the manner of someone who possesses a method than that of a dog that seems to be making uncoordinated leaps.*
>
> --Deleuze[587]

In chapters two and three of this dissertation, I considered the difference and repetition of the interstice as the mechanism by which to examine duration in the time-images of cinema and in the automechanized digital installations. In the last two chapters I considered the difference and repetition of the fold, generating an understanding of how perception and memory endure in time in the experience of media events. In each chapter, my aim was to consider the difference and repetition of how duration comes to be endured in the mechanism of the interstice and in the metaphysics of the fold. Time was the method by which the interstice and fold came into examination in which their micro (local) and macro (historical) levels were scrutinized. Time was also considered as processual, in which the duration of media events were observed through interstitial disjunctions and in the folding among fields. Through my observations I have tried to shape how the interstice and fold produce the virtual relations of time in media events. This shaping was conveyed through the five major inquiries mapped out in the first chapter.

From these five areas of inquiry, I will conclude my observations on the interstice and fold. I will summarize the differences produced in the image of time in the time-images of *L'Intrus* and in the digital installations *Glenlandia, Fenlandia* and

391

The Spectroscope. I will wrap up how duration unfolds in these works by way of the interstice and then draw upon the potential of these works for the movements of thought to occur. The next section will bring to an end my discussion on the machinic processes of media production that give rise to a machinic consciousness, in which thought encounters the non-thought. I will attempt to show how a non-human, machinic consciousness is produced by the asymmetrical movements of the interstice and fold, the one being a horizontal temporal heterogeneity, the other occurring through a perspectival topology. I will next consider the emergence and vanishing points forming patterns of visibility-invisibility in media works, in which I bring to an end my discussion on the relations of the whole, on matter and consciousness, subject-object relations, and what constitutes the inside and outside in the works taken up. I will conclude by picking up the thread with which I began, on the image of time, but this time specifically focusing on the digital image. Summarizing and noting its difference from the time-image will present a brief opportunity to observe the workings of contemporary digital media practices and on the possibilities of future practices.

The interstice and fold: resonances and incommensurability

The field of queries undertaken by way of the interstice and the fold show that the two form different images of thought. Their formal, conceptual and material qualities, as well as their processual relations, of *how* media come to be examined,

are incommensurable. The interstice operates as a physical mechanism by which media's conceptual and formal ground comes to be made. The fold operates as the ontological ground from which media events come to be perceived. However, while this difference of physical mechanism and ontological ground presents processual variation in approaching questions of duration, at times their conceptual and material forms generate resonances with each other.

A resonance between two fields, Jean-Clet Martin writes, shows "a multicomponential ensemble, formed from relations of resonance between melodic curves (*courbes*) alien to each other."[588] A resonance between two elements, rather than showing a reflecting image or having a symmetrical correspondence, is a relaying movement. In the same way, the theoretical considerations of the fold and the physical process of the interstice have to be understood as relaying movements of duration in terms of their formal, conceptual and material make up. Thus while the interstice and fold are understood as incommensurate movements, their conceptual and material resonances relay movements between them to make up the complex whole. Each must be regarded as a variation of the innumerable curvatures of the surface, each presenting a different image of thought. Whether a practical or a theoretical field,[589] the interstice and fold are to be understood as singular concepts, each concept including a multiplicity of components.[590] And while they present a difference to each other, they are non-oppositional and singular. Moreover, each has its unique generative, transformational and diagrammatic element through which

new movements of thought might be produced for itself. In having a multiplicity of components, concepts continually transform through time and are historically and genealogically inexhaustible. The interstice and the fold are nomadic movements in continual processes of transition, coming to be territorialized, deterritorialized and reterritorialized. In the making and unmaking of concepts Martin writes, "each builds bridges near other concepts that occupy the same plane,"[591] the bridges between concepts producing resonances among them. The bridges between the interstice and the fold generate resonances among their conceptual, formal and material realms. Nonetheless, while the interstice and the fold generate resonances among them, they are also asymmetrical and incommensurate because one is a physical mechanism and the other is a theoretical ground.

My work in this dissertation has been to unravel the movements of the interstice and fold in relation to specific media works. In this sense the interstice and fold have "pulled thoughts along," sometimes through diverging paths.[592] Both the interstice and the fold move through various strata of visibility-invisibility, series-folding, disruption-continuity, planes of consciousness-perspective; these images of thought, as Deleuze writes, "[guide] the creation of concepts."[593] The images of the interstice and fold that I have presented occur through a mental geometry, in which each geometry has depended on the perspective being formed at a given moment in time. What is caught and reflected by the eye presents a cutting out from the complexity of the world, a subtraction and a limitation, which at each moment

becomes contingent on a variation of factors, whereby certain elements are estimated

to be more important than others. This tentativeness on each geometric shape

presents moments of uncertainty, each mental shape projecting its singular

dimension.[594] Each concept becomes a shape drawn from a tangle of conceptual,

formal and practical concerns, which sometimes resonate between, sometimes

traverse the boundary divide, and sometimes proceed elliptically from, the other.

Deleuze writes that an image of thought is not merely its method, but

something deeper, "a system of coordinates, dynamics, orientations: what it means

to think and to 'orient oneself in thought.'"[595] Each field therefore generates its

orientations and trajectories, presenting its interferences with the other.[596] In this

dissertation I have attempted to compose such a mental space, in which I have

delved into the dimensions, the system of coordinates, and the range of possibilities

generated by the interstice and the fold. I bring this exploration to an end with a

diagrammatic schematization of this mental space in the remainder of the conclusion

below, drawing together zones of resonance and the vanishing points of each terrain.

The interstice and the image of time

The difference in the workings of the interstice in analog and digital media is critical

as it brings forth its own condition of operations and relations in each, allowing us to

consider the difference in the image of time produced. By bringing about a

difference in the analog and digital image, the interstice produces an analysis of the

two media, as its own kind of thought.[597] In examining the workings of the

interstice, differences emerge with respect to two fundamental and interrelated

operations: in how duration unfolds and in the relation between the actual and

virtual.

In *L'Intrus*, the interstice produces the sense of the paradox, aporias,

invisibility and imperceptibility, generating the film's virtual multiplicity. Time

unfolds through discontinuities in the film, in which images are irrationally

connected to each other; various shots are linked in disordered ways, erratically

breaking up the film's temporal planes into pasts and futures. Moreover, in these

temporal gaps, fissures and aporias, the actual-virtual connections come to multiply,

producing a qualitative multiplicity.

In the digital installations, *Glenlandia*, *Fenlandia* and *The Spectroscope*,

time unfolds uniformly over the span of an actual year. The movement of the pixels

proceeds in only one direction, yielding the singular temporality of continuous

presents in which, gaps, interruptions or aporias are altogether eliminated. The

installations are what Henri Bergson refers to as a "multiplicity of exteriority"[598] or a

multiplicity of space, in which *spatial division* produces the differences between

frames. While a multiplicity of exteriority produces a difference, it is a difference in

degree of spatial changes made, rather than a change in the kinds of states

experienced. The pixels and frames function as parts that allow for an unlimited

subtraction, addition or division of the whole series, producing a numerical multiplicity.

In a qualitative duration, the whole is indivisible into its parts, showing that parts cannot be added, subtracted or divided to make up the whole. The part alters the entire dimension of the work, opening out to duration as a whole. A change in kind occurs when the part "plunges" into a different dimension, transiting from the spatial or actual to the virtual dimensions of the work. Deleuze writes that real duration is that which produces a constant change in kind by "plung[ing] into another dimension, which is no longer spatial, and is purely temporal."[599] The part, in plunging the work into a different temporal dimension opens out to the whole of duration, it qualitatively changes the experience of the whole and in this sense, the whole is not divisible into its parts. Evacuated from spatiality, the temporal dimension puts us in touch with the virtual.

In emerging from this plunge, the virtual is also that which is on its path to becoming actualized. The virtual is the movement of actualization itself, it is that potential on course to becoming actualized. As seen in the digital installations, this *movement* of actualization is lacking because the pixels and frames, which make up the form of the image, are already given. And even though not everything is realized, everything on the digital screen is the actual.[600] In the steady uninterrupted continuity of pixels streaming across the digital screen, the work does not plunge into a different dimension. Other than the transmission of the actual pixels, which

make up each frame, there are few other relationships experienced. As Bergson writes, everything is "already visible in the image of the object."[60] Duration in the installations occurs by a spatialized representation, in which temporal experience is flattened out into representation. In this visibility, the digital installations reduce their connections with the virtual.

Movements of thought

In examining the operations of the interstice as it functions in the two media, some fundamental differences are produced in how each creates the potential for new movements of thought to arrive. The presence of the interstice increases connections to the virtual, producing greater divergences and variances for the movements of thought to occur. The operation of the interstice produces its own logic and thinking by virtue of generating sensations, which give rise to the movements of thought. The erratic, irrational cuts of *L'Intrus* arrive from the open outside and shift continually between pasts and futures. They introduce a profound unrecognizability and unknowability in the movement between shots, forcing the limits of intellectual engagement with the world; they force the movements of thinking.

In the digital installations, to the contrary, the movement of the pixels on the digital grid produces a single continuity and is conspicuous by the absence of the interstice which would produce disruptions in the spatio-temporality. A pixel transmitted every second produces a frame approximately every 23 hours, and while

there is variability in each frame with respect to the hue and luminosity of colours, there is little qualitative change in terms of the temporality of the piece. What returns, therefore, produces the same *direction* and the same *type* of movement in the pixels. The movement always presents the force of a continuous present and this present offers little variation in the movements of thought. The spiritual automaton of the cinema which, through the interstice, introduces a new thought from the outside, becomes the automaton in the digital installations that produces little variation in the movements of thought.

The return of the same brings about a mechanistic world in which being and becoming are neither distinct nor opposed to each other. D. N. Rodowick writes that in the history of philosophy, what used to be considered true was understood through the eternal and changeless, as the constant of time. What was "true" was given to a constant law, to principles of identity and of contradiction. Truth was something preexisting in time and was passively discovered.[602] Instead, if thought is always changing, as in time-images, what is true becomes an activity, and thought is in relation to time, which is always changing. *L'Intrus*, in forcing the movements of thinking, make thought an act.[603] In the film, thinking is an act, a form of becoming as a movement in time. In each shot arriving from the outside, what returns is difference, which brings variation and multiplicity. The world of *L'Intrus* is in continual change; it is a nonmechanistic, unstable, undeterminable world that is constantly becoming and in flux.

Each returning image in the film presents a new fragment in time. This encounter brings difference to thought which is no longer beholden to what preceded it. In this returning difference, the images falsify the narrative logic found in movement-images. In the organic narration of movement-images, or as I have tried to show in the digital installations, what returns is the same. Rodowick writes that in organic narration, the images that return seek to identify with the self-same as that which is True: it confirms "the image of Truth."[604] Truth occurs as the repetition of the same through identification that confirms, or as resolution in the narrative, rather than as difference. In time-images, in the difference of each returning image, falsification is built into the narrative logic. This falsification of narrative logic gives rise to what Nietzsche called the "powers of the false." Deleuze points out that the artist's power of falsification or to falsehood gives rise to fabulation and for imagining a new world and for a new people to come, as a political act. The will to falsification is an affirmative thought that is artistic, active and creative.[605] Through such a will Roland Bogue writes that "life becomes 'the active force of thought' and thought would become 'the affirmative power of life...Thinking would then mean *discovering, inventing, new possibilities of life.*'"[606]

Thinking as the machinic flow of matter: towards a machinic consciousness
In the automated flow of matter from the outside that forces thinking, time-images are the "spiritual automaton" for Deleuze through which film becomes the

autonomous thinking machine. The images that arrive, flow automatically, forcing

the brain into contact with what is unknown and undefined. In this sense the spiritual

automaton is also the viewer, whose encounter with the images produces thinking.

Bogue writes that the spiritual automaton is both the viewer and the images, in

which mind is immanent within the images. This relation is rather like the mobius

strip in which the inside and outside lack absolute differentiation and become one

continuous form.[607]

The spiritual automaton is therefore a mode of thought through which images

from an outside are encountered. These images from the outside are alien images

which, heretofore, are as yet unknown. The erratic sequences of time-images

produce affects or forces, which Deleuze and Guattari write are beings in and of

themselves, generating another way of thinking.[608] The forces that shock the body

arrive by images that are a-signifying, a-syntactic and formed non-linguistically.[609]

Thinking, therefore, does not occur by linguistics but by this pre-linguistic image-

matter which has its own logic. It is a language in which "images and signs, are of

another nature."[610] In this way time-images give rise to a seeing function in which,

as Deleuze has famously written, the brain is the screen of cinema upon which

images unfold.

Pure duration is the continuous heterogeneity in the flow of matter, and

important to the automatic movement of image-matter is the interstice, which

produces qualitative changes in the movements of thoughts. Whether by the

projection-machine of cinema or by the transmission system of digital technology, the machinic flow of matter produces the movements of thought. However, while the movement of matter in the installations is unidirectional and produces the return of the same, time-images put thought into contact with the outside. In as much as time-images force us to think from an outside, Artaud writes that film also allows us to encounter the darker, unknown forces, which are "concealed beneath things, the images -- crushed, trampled, slackened, or dense -- of all that swarms in the lower depths of the mind."[611] These images, Daniel Frampton explains, are those which we "cannot think: [as they are] beyond our experiences."[612] And in having this capacity, Artaud writes, film's automatic projection has the capability of moving beyond human thought, liberating thought from human thinking.

The idea that film puts thought in touch with the unthought is central to Deleuze's philosophical opus with Guattari, and extends to his thinking on cinema. The plane of immanence, they write, is "that which must be thought and that which cannot be thought. It is the nonthought within thought."[613] The fold between what is the most intimate inside and the farthest outside brings together this distance and proximity of thought, the "to-ing and fro-ing" producing the infinite movements of thought.[614]

In time-images the mechanism that produces the unthought is the interstice by virtue of the irrational connection produced between two different images. Many images of this type come to mind in *L'Intrus*. We find a heart dripping with blood in

the snow, a face frozen in ice and the image of the unknown woman laughing, as she glides through the snow on a sled drawn by Huskies. In *Mirror*, there are at least a dozen of these, three of these being the image of long grass swirling in the wind, water dripping from ceilings, and the apparition of the mother flailing her arms after washing her hair in a barrel of water. The automated movements of the installations, on the other hand, while they liberate thought from human thinking, have a scarcity of connections to the virtual, producing a limitation upon the heterogeneous movements of thought. Their potential to move beyond human thinking is limited to a singular movement of thought.

Although thinking occurs in the machinic flow of matter in both media, in time-images, the dynamic complexity in the heterogeneous movement of matter propels the movements of thought. In their ability to propel diverse movements, the time-images of cinema think what we cannot: film thinks what we cannot think.[615] The internal connection in the relation of image to image becomes important to understanding that images are not given to a single human consciousness, but to a machinic one. Having separated from the movements of the world, the images produce internal relations among themselves, composing their own conditions of luminosity and their own movements of thought. In this internal relation, images produce their own conditions of consciousness, outside of a human one.

What becomes non-individuated when examined from the metaphysics of the fold, is perspective and/or point of view, which does not arise from a single thinking

human subject. In fact, a point of view is to be understood as part of a structure: a point of view, rather than being individuated by a thinking subject, is one that comes to be reflected in an objective structure. In this sense a point of view precedes the thinking human subject and is the point of differentiation of a structure. For instance, in Bresson's films, characters speak in flat monotones. This flat delivery is disconnected from any particular character that would reflect an interior monologue. Rather, as Bogue writes, such a speech occurs from an outside of narrative relations, which is part of a free indirect vision, not given to any particular individualized character's point of view.[616] In this sense what the character utters precedes the character, and rather than being individuated, the character's speech could be given by any other characters in the film: the objective structure of the speech precedes the character's utterance. In such a relation, subject and object are enfolded into each other in which, as Leibniz noted, the world is in the subject as much as the subject is in the world. Perspective, traditionally given to the individual and to interiority, shifts to a view on an objective structure, which a subject occupies in time. Perspective, and therefore thought, becomes non-individuated, a subjectless-subjectivity and machinic in such a system of relations.

Thoughts generated are part of this objective structure, arising and receding *in relation* to it, rather than independently of it. A structure, such as the world of any media-event, produces "an infinite series of curvatures or inflections" and an infinity of views, which come to be reflected in as many spectatorial eyes.[617] In *POL* or

Modell 5, the performers, spectators and electro-digital circuitry make up the objective structure. In this live event, cellular matter folds into the electro-digital circuitry in which live bodies and sound-image grains enter the zone of indiscernibility. The experience of events occurs from this state of flowing matter, in which perception moves from one acentered state to another. Conscious human perception comes to be deduced from this heterogeneous complex of the performers' image-body and the spectators' real-bodies, without discrete divisions or points of reference. This heterogeneous complex becomes the flowing body of the image-event and it is impossible to know where one ends and the other begins, as image-matter (appearance) and matter-image (body) fold into each other as an indivisible whole. The electro-digital circuitry generates the movements of thought.

In cinema, the eye comes to be modulated by the variations presented in the relations of images. Long shots, close-ups, high-angle, slow motion and others come to make up the movements presented to the eye, which is undulating in this matter. The images produce a non-human vision, in which the eye becomes a "floating eye" freed from any stable point of view.[618] This modulation of the eye gives rise to a machinic perception *from which* human perception comes to be deduced. Space and time coordinates come to be established, anchoring the "I" from this undulating matter, giving rise to a camera consciousness that opens out to duration as a whole. Camera consciousness, therefore, sets in motion the continual modulation of the eye and presents a vision that is not unified.

Perception folds with image-matter (cinematic-appearance) or matter-image (non-cinematic-real). Perception in media-events, such as *POL*, *L'Intrus* or *Spectropia*, folds into images or the electro-digital circuitry, giving rise to a machinic consciousness. Such a consciousness constitutes the objective structure, whose curves produce inflections and refractions, the perspectives on an objective structure. The movement of folding among these occurs between the haze of the actual perception (the images being encountered) and the virtual memory of pasts, bringing about the complexity of the present moment.

Cinema's time-images and the images of digital media, when examined through the workings of the fold and interstice, give rise to the sensate in bodies which bring about awareness and allow for the movements of thought to occur. The relation of image to image (interstice) and the relation of perspective to objective structure (fold), generate the automatic production of images in both mechanisms and in both media. The two concepts introduce a terrain in which images themselves think and are an automatic, non-human form of thinking. In the interstice, aberrational movements of thought occur through an outside whereas in the fold, differential perspectives occur through an infinity of refractions and inflections of matter on an objective structure. Non-human, automatic thought, as Frampton writes, allows us to think what we could not have thought: "[t]he unthought is a thought 'outside' thought -- Deleuze's new cerebral images define themselves through this relation of the inside and the outside -- an unsummonable, inexplicable,

undecidable, incommensurable outside."[619] Non-human, automatic thinking replaces

regular vision by presenting different points of view. It produces, Deleuze writes,

"the genesis of an 'unknown body'...like the unthought in thought, the birth of the

visible which is still hidden from view."[620]

Emergences and vanishing points: visible-invisible

While the interstice and fold both produce sensate matter essential to the movements

of thought and for generating conceptual knowledge, their temporal planes might

erroneously be seen to generate differences in the experience of time. While

interstices produce spatio-temporal gaps, fissures and aporias, folds produce

continuities by bodies being enfolded in other bodies. From a topological

perspective, however, bodies enfolded in other bodies present continuities *and*

differences with each other. It must be noted therefore that ultimately, in this

examination, *both* the interstice and fold produce continuous heterogeneity

necessary for real duration. However, while the outcomes of these two concepts

resonate, their processes differ.

While the fold presents its own particular logic and sense in the examination

of media, its difference to the interstice is processual and formal, more than its

outcome. That is, matter examined through each figure shows a dissimilar travelling

route, generating differences in the terms and conditions that they engage and draw

upon. Nonetheless, interstices and folds both produce qualitative multiplicities in

their relations to the virtual. For instance, while interstices produce gaps and fissures in knowledge and duration, increasing relations to the virtual, the continual line of duration in the folds between bodies appears and disappears from a topological point of view.[621] This appearance-disappearance is due to the twisting and coiling up of matter in the folds between bodies, making bodies appear and vanish. The folds between bodies bring about patterns of visibility-invisibility, resonating with interstitial repetitions.

Just as the interstice breaks up vision and time, so too does the fold, plunging thought into the depths. However, there is a difference in how this rupturing occurs. While the interstice produces aporias, the twists and turns of folds produce gradations and transparencies. For instance, in *L'Intrus*, in the cuts between howling dogs-Trebor polishing his dagger-a glimpse of a dead man being wrapped in tarpaulin-Trebor making love to a woman, we have a diverging series. Each shot presents its own line of flight in a chain of disjunctive images. In this chain, the image that recedes dissolves itself, and what returns is not an image that retains the identity of the previous shot, but an intensity. This intensity is of a pure movement, a pure event, which each changing image conveys. Intensity here is pure motion or pure spirit and occurs as a pre-individual singularity in the entire sequence. This pure spirit is the pure uninterrupted becoming of the event, which gives rise to the direct image of time. The returning intensity of each shot is the only continuous

aspect conveyed, because in a disjunctive chain, what links two shots becomes the invisible. The disjunction between shots is *total*, occurring in the form of aporias.

In examining time-images from the mechanism of the fold, there are *gradations* and *thresholds* by which bodies emerge from or sink into the depths. What arises and fades from view is related to the elasticity and mobility of the fold between perception and image. Levels of obscurity present degrees of understanding that is sometimes faint and at others distinct, the movements of thinking ranging between the poles of confusion and clarity. Bodies come to be viewed in the shadowy light of dawn and dusk, in which contours disappear into darkness generating hints and suggestions. Inklings in perception build up to the great fold of consciousness, bringing about moments of clarity. At other times, clarity unfolds into the minute crinkles and creases of unclear perceptions, making things obscure. Such fluctuations occur in a sequence of shots in *Mirror* during Asafiev's journey. The shots of him at the shooting range with other children are interspersed with documentary footage from WWII; he later reemerges in a shot in which he walks up a hill. In this entire sequence, movements of thought vacillate from senses of confusion to fragile clarity, from the puzzlement of seeing children at a shooting range to when a child soldier informs the instructor that his parents died during the Leningrad siege. The liquid relations of the fold between image and perception allow for thresholds and gradations in the movements of thinking, beyond that of concretization, the latter occurring through narrative detail, explicit dialogue or

through the ordering of cause and effect. The elasticity in the fold between perception and image allows for conceptual shapes to emerge and fade with varying transparencies, showing shades of visibility that dissolve into the darkness or light. In sensing the world perception moves continually between distinct and obscure perception in which media objects are in states of flux, perpetually in the making. Such an open time moves beyond what is clear and determinable in the images, and therefore also in thinking.

The whole

What constitutes the whole in film and digital media when examined through the relations of the fold, may be understood in at least two ways. First, the world of a film is suffused in other worlds such as those of other films, documentaries, art forms, histories, literature, etc. What constitutes film phenomena therefore occurs by the virtual relations of folding and enfolding of fields, a fold between two fields creating a force.[622] A spiritual force, or thinking, is therefore produced by the act of two fields folding together. In *Mirror*, worlds of art make up its force fields, in which the painterly, poetic and auricular fold into and out of each other. In the mechanism of the fold, the continuous line of duration extends in each direction to make up infinitely smaller and greater wholes, not only with respect to a film, but also to the history of film. In this sense, a film enfolds other films and is in turn enfolded by others, referencing conventions, technological innovations, styles,

histories and other fields. Any decreasing or increasing wholes should be understood as only a partial whole however, as each whole enfolds the infinitesimally small or is enfolded by the infinitely large, which are virtual spheres.

Second, with respect to perspective in film or digital media, the whole is to be understood as including these virtual spheres, the outer regions into which images evaporate approaching the dazzling conditions of white light or receding into total darkness. The continuous line of duration disappears and emerges between these regions of virtuality, in the liquid relations of the folds between matter, perception and memory. Perspective, therefore, occurs in relation to the whole, which is constituted by the entire objective structure, which includes all virtual-actual relations; it is internal to the whole and does not occur outside structure. Perspective and structure therefore make up the relations of what constitutes the whole. Depending on the perspective that the subject (artist) occupies, regions may or may not be perceptible to the senses, although their presence might hover and be sensed at the edges of conscious perception.

The actual makes up the images in a film, installation or media-event, constituting what is perceptible from a differentiated point of view. The actual, however, does not include the virtual whole of time, which presents the totality of all possibilities or differentiations. The actual is what has come to be actualized from such an infinity of virtual possibilities (differenciation). A perspective is this

actualization. The world of a film or an installation that comes to be actualized by the artist is a singular actualization from all virtual possibilities.

The interstice, on the other hand, links fragments of time together from the whole of pure memory. What is visible in time-images are the disjoined slivers of Time. In *L'Intrus*, the organic-inorganic-synthetic assemblages of human, non-human, landscapes and synthetic elements make up the temporal planes, which Deleuze refers to as the different planes of consciousness. We encounter animals, characters and actors biking, walking or being dragged in the snow; we see cows grazing in fields of grass, dogs barking, snow falling in city streets among other shots. Importantly, however, we never quite come to understand the relations among the different shots. Each shot is a fragment of time that is disrupted by another, constituting the "impossible continuity" of the film: each shot presents an aberrant movement that opens up to duration as a whole. The erratic and dissonant shots linked together in a chain arise from different temporal planes. Rather than arising from the necessity of a plot attending to the needs of a narrative, these haphazardly emerging temporal planes constitute what Deleuze writes are fragments of the whole of pure memory. Each actual shot, arising from a different plane of consciousness, is a fragment of the virtual whole of pure memory or a world memory. Each fragment constitutes the force of a memory that leaps out of the order and logic of chronometric time, presenting duration that diverges from what precedes or succeeds it. Such a series of fragments generates a continuous multiplicity. These fragments

are Bergson's pluralities of the different rhythms of duration that make up the whole,

a continuous heterogeneity, in what he calls pure duration. The whole of Time,

therefore, is constituted by the heterogeneity of different times.

The relations of matter-consciousness, subject-object and inside-outside

On the plane of immanence, upon which image and matter are the same thing, it is

not possible to distinguish perception from the flow of matter and images. Within

such a flow, the body is one image among others, and separation between the two

orders of body and image, matter and mind, inside and outside and subject and

object come to be eliminated. Moreover, in the process of differenciation, in which

the virtual comes be actualized into the material and real, the matterness of thought-

being displaces the distinction between matter and virtuality. In the process of

differenciation, as Alliez writes, thought is forced to arise with the materiality of

difference on the plane of immanence. Matter and consciousness, rather than being

understood as two separate and distinct orders, are to be considered as forming the

qualitative relations of the whole. Deleuze's transcendental materialism brings forth

the conditions in which matter and virtuality arise, revealing the two sides of

perception from which the world comes to be expressed.[623] In perception, therefore,

the world in all its infinite possibilities exists as a potential, presenting all the

potentialities of what a media event can become, which perception comes to

actualize in a double process. On the plane of immanence, therefore, matter and

virtuality are in states of immanence and exist as potentialities, which come to be actualized by perception in a media event.

The event therefore, examined through the process of interstitial disjunctions or by folding, presents its distinctions. In the perception of an event, pasts, futures and unfolding presents dynamically weave together through interstitial disjunctions or twist and fold into each other. Each mechanism presents a difference to the other in the way that an event comes to be examined, generating a different image of thought. A different image of thought therefore gives rise to different visual, affective, technical and formal differences.

In both the fold and the interstice, what constitutes the outside is continually in touch with the inside. Likewise, the orders constituting subject-object relations become indiscernable in the experience of media-events. However, the mechanism of the interstice continually dislodges a given shot, forcing the engagement with an outside, whereas in the fold, matter continually enfolds or is enfolded within other fields. In this relation, their movements differ, the former is a broken line that is horizontally oriented, the latter, a continuous line on a curved hyperbolic surface. In interstitial disjunctions, the visible-invisible relation works by aporetic disjunction, the invisible bringing forth virtual connections. In the fold, what is visible appears on the surface from a topological point of view, in which matter disappears into the twists and folds of the virtual depths or heights. What is hidden from a given topological point of view, is matter's increasing or decreasing virtual wholes,

extending to the infinitesimally minute or to the enveloping, colossal universe. Visibility in the fold is therefore dependent on changes in the perspective or in the point of view from which an event comes to be perceived.

In examining *POL, Modell 5* or any media-event through the fold, a synchrony emerges between the spectators' bodies folding into the sound-image molecules. Cells resonate and enter the zone of proximity with sound-image molecules and it becomes impossible to denote where each cell and molecule begins or ends. Organic and non-organic matter fold into each other giving rise to conditions of consciousness that dissolve inside-outside regions. Perception arises from the conditions emerging from the event itself, including the interactions between various images such as those objects propagating in the world and our selves. Eye-matter-image are all parts of the changing whole of the media event, and the event's qualities emerge from the eye's capacity for reflecting these qualities. For an image to be formed, it is sufficient that an eye exist; images come to be formed as the eye is modulated in things, in matter, in the event itself, the eye reflecting the event's qualities. In reflecting the image's qualities, what the eye "sees" is already an action, the third movement of subjectivity. What the eye reflects is therefore not a passive condition. As Flaxman points out, the subject is in the world as much as the universe is in the subject, "the subject synthesizes the world from a particular point of view…the subject is a point from which the universe sees itself."[624]

In the interstice the event comes to be examined processually through the *broken line* of a horizontally oriented series, where the interiority of thought encounters a disrupting outside. This constant interruption and contact between the *inside* and the *outside* of relations brings forward a jarring heterogeneity that leads to questions of what a film is. In the time-images of *L'Intrus*, the different planes of consciousness show runaway shots of howling Huskies, snowy landscapes and oceanic depths. In addition, we also glimpse a heart dripping with blood in the snow, a head frozen in ice and random people emerging and disappearing without the logic of a continuous interiority, associated with the cause and effect of the movement-image. What is external to the film-event enters the inside by way of a disrupting and disjunctive logic that presents intellectual aporias that frequently do not reveal the relations between two images.

With respect to the fold in Tarkovsky's *Mirror*, the documentary footage from WWII, da Vinci's drawings, Bach's *St. John Passion* or Arseni Tarkovsky's poems enters the pro-filmic space as non-diagetic elements. The documentary footage, painterly, musical and literary movements enter from an outside and fold into the characters' ponderings or with Tarkovsky's own musings, to make up the various shots in the film. Moreover, the spectator's gaze of the camera zooming into Alexei as he gazes at his reflection in the mirror, presents the infinite movements of enfolding insides and outsides. The spectatorial-gaze is enfolded in the camera-gaze, which draws upon the character gazing at his own reflection in the mirror. These

movements of folding and enfolding gazes further draw the spectator into an inner

contemplation by which he/she becomes attentive to his/her own internal states.

Furthermore, the allusion to Breugel's *Winter Landscape* and the inclusion of

Tarkovsky's own childhood experiences, which are constructed in detail, enter the

work. But these random images of time, whether in *Mirror* or in *L'Intrus*, and

whether examined from the mechanism of the interstice or through the fold, enter a

point of indiscernability. In either case it becomes impossible to know whether a

shot functions as a character's memory or is a figment of their imagination and

fantasy. Neither is it possible to know whether the shot is objectively oriented as part

of the narrative, or as we see in *Mirror*, presents aspects of the filmmaker's personal

memories. Tarkovsky moves from filmmaker, subject and character in which, as

Deleuze writes, "the self and non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any

meaning whatsoever."[625] These types of encounters make the cinematic/media event

indiscernable and indistinct with respect to the relations of the real-imaginary,

inside-outside or subject-object. The inside passes through into the outside, where as

Rodowick puts it, "perception occurs in space, memory occurs in time."[626] In

Deleuzo-Bergson's ontology, it is no longer tenable to understand relations of

inside-outside, subject-object through Caterisan dualisms in which each is a distinct

and separate field. The actual-virtual continually form a circuit and pass into each

other.

Similarly, the film/media event, whether examined by way of the fold or interstice, not only expresses elements constituted from an outside, but is also enfolded in history, in technological changes and in the socio-cultural traditions of the visual and performative arts, making it impossible to know where each begins and ends. Moreover, as Rancière writes, the shared terms of measurement in how relations come to be presented over time in the literary, musical or visual arts, or in philosophy and science, have come to be perceived in certain ways. Their references in a film might therefore produce a familiarity by which we come to perceive them fully (as with the mushroom clouds in the documentary footage or da Vinci's drawings in *Mirror*), sometimes partially (as with the Breugel reference), or might escape them altogether (the head in frozen ice as an intellectual aporia).

In the encounter of the inside with the outside, in both the interstice and the fold, the non-cinematic becomes cinematic. What enters the field of the image-event is cut out from the environment, either by way of abrupt disjunctions in the interstice, or by degrees of vanishing points in the fold. By either method, images come into a relation with other images, and in such a system, they become desubjectified and wholly processes. In the relation of image to image, therefore, images are cut off/dissolved from narrative requirements, leaving us with pure images and visions that produce their own particular movement. Shots are connected to shots in the any-spaces-whatever of interstitial disjunctions; in the fold, different fields fold into each other in perception. In both, the undeterminable connection

between shots removes the cues that would distinguish the real from the imaginary or the physical from the mental. The any-spaces-whatever of the interstice, or in the fold between image and mind, both dislocate the logic of cause and effect. Shots connecting or touching illogically, either by way of the broken horizontal line, or by the enfolding-folding of shots, generate a differential in the image-series. The spatio-temporal difference between shots generates moments of fabulation in which thinking is produced in the circuits between actual-virtual images. This constant modulation of the actual-virtual generates film's spiritual automaton, putting thought in touch with the non-thought. This dynamic momentum between thought and non-thought is Deleuze's "pure force of becoming," making up the curve of time.[627] No longer the occasion for a pre-given identity, thoughts become instants for continual reinvention, presenting the occasion for a new relation to occur.

Through my inquiry I have tried to show that the interstice and the fold present two approaches to examining duration and images in media production. While they are asymmetrical and incommensurate with respect to their processes, their movements, sporadically, also produce resonances, yielding similar conceptual and material forms.

Each produces machinic consciousness and puts thought in touch with non-thought and the actual in touch with the virtual. Each produces regions of visibility-invisibility and dissolves the orders constituting the subject-object, real-imaginary and inside-outside relations. However, while their outcomes correspond, the

processual pathways by which their conceptual and material movements come to be patterned, by way of their coordinates, dynamics and orientations, the two form different images of thought.

New image of time: presentism

The automated digital installations, *Glenlandia*, *Fenlandia* and *The Spectroscrope*, present a difference in the image of time produced. In these works, time comes to be spatialized in the form of an image that represents the continuous now: presentism. While what enters the environment produces changes in the image's composition, the installations' unidirectional bearing produces a predictability of the now. The pixels moving across the screen carry with them the continual informational present, and as they generate the same temporality, they only bring about the continuous now. This continual now anticipates the future in a predictable return. This temporal predictability does not produce difference in states of consciousness, but brings about the return of the same type of image.[628] From one frame to the next, time in the installations is thought through only in the form of the present, which remains unchanging and self-identical.

Second, the transmission and recording of data on the digital screen presents what is the visible surface of time. Time, as a visible surface, expresses a conversion from experience to its spatialization. This visible surface of the actual image, therefore, comes to constitute the facticity of the contemporary world. Time is no

longer something that is experienced, but that which is signified as the surface of what is seen. Importantly, time in these works is of a secondary order, of representation and signification rather than as active force, as creative or as becoming.

Third, in the surveying and tracking of environments and in the mapping of information data flows, worlds of art come into contact with the forces of calculation. Bernard Stiegler writes that at the root of predictability lies calculation, which attempts to determine what is undeterminable.[629] In digital installations such as these, the essence of art and thinking becomes infused with worlds of calculation, yielding what he refers to as a *mathesis universalis*.[630]

Last, the unidirectional and continual mapping of the present, which arrives as the predictable, foreseen future, changes our relation to the heterogeneous time experienced in time-images. The temporal variance of pasts and futures in time-images, which brings about the modulation between the actual and virtual is reduced to the actual and to what is interior to thought, to what is the same returning movement. In a numerical multiplicity time is converted to the continuous spatialization of visible surfaces, rather than plunging thought into a different temporal experience. The time-images of *L'Intrus* and *Mirror* are therefore *ontologically different* from the installations' digital images. The image of time changes from one that is a continuous multiplicity to one that is merely continuous,

from moving between memories and futures to merely the present, bringing profound implications to worlds of art.

It should be emphasized that while the installations discussed here present a return of the same, they represent *aspects* of what makes up the durational works of digital media rather than the totality of all digital media productions. The automated processes of digital media works in their tracking, mapping and surveying of environments and of ecologies, need to be modulated to generate greater temporal variations. Such variations would occur by the introduction of randomness in order to bring about the actual-virtual circuits necessary for the movements of thought to occur. Without generating temporal variations, digital works are frequently predisposed to remain connected to algorithmic calculations and to predictability in their operational systems. While randomness might be introduced into algorithmic functions, such a constituted randomness would also follow a predictable logic. Unpredictability, therefore, depends on how randomness is generated in computational systems.

Variations can be introduced into the narrative sequencing by software.[631] The ordering of the various shots comes to be linked together in real time and changes each time a work is viewed. Software sequencing introduces a level of unpredictability to the cinematic structural forms, however, even within such works, the mutable form becomes part of the predictability. The parameters of randomness have been set ahead of time, making the unpredictability part of the algorithmic

sequencing. In such works, shots have been pre-designed and constitute the database

from which such unpredictability might arise. Thus, notably, while the sequencing of

the shots presents an unpredictability, such unpredictability does not arise from an

infinity (the virtual whole), but from a *finite* set of actual shots available in the

database. In this sense, these works are semi-random as randomness is available only

in a particular manner and in the form of narrative sequencing. Furthermore,

randomness arises only from within the limitation of pre-designed shots. Such

software sequencing should be understood as once again producing a numerical

multiplicity, rather than a qualitative multiplicity. The whole in such works occurs

more by the addition and subtraction of given shots rather than from the infinite

possibilities available in what is the unthought, alien outside. These images produce

the return of what has already been preconceived (and is available in the database)

and therefore, these images are part of what becomes predictable.

In closing, it should be said that the image worlds of digital media that

exclusively draw upon the possibilities of what computer clocks and algorithms

offer, have often only partially been satisfactory in contemporary art. Instead, works

that utilize digital media *and* also move between memories and futures to come have

provided a way out from the tsunami of digital automatons. Toni Dove's *Spectropia*,

and some others, lead digital art worlds in this direction.[632] While digital

technologies present a different ontology of the image, changing the material

conditions and therefore sensorial, affective and conceptual matter, these in and of

themselves do not present the conditions of real duration, as examined in the works

discussed here. What is necessary for real duration is continuous heterogeneity, in

the continually changing directions in movements through time and space, so that

differences of kind in states of consciousness are produced. In the random

connections to the outside, in disruptions to the interiority of thought and in

generating aporias, connections to the virtual multiply. Difference in the movements

of thought enacts a political will to imagine the creative possibilities of new worlds.

What is important in a media event, therefore, is not merely its technical

plane, but that social, technological and semiotic components criss-cross, making up

its "ontological intensity."[633] Such a criss-crossing of the different vectors generates

the event's dynamism, creating a shape from infinite possibilities. As Pearson writes,

"the 'machinic' is a mode of evolution that is specific and peculiar to the 'becoming'

of alien life."[634] Machinic evolution, therefore, not only comes to bear upon the

machine-machine connection, but also to organic-inorganic-synthetic ones. A media-

event should function in a relationship with other virtual and actual machines,

should cross many thresholds, genuses and species and work by invention,

connection and involution. Media-events should transform determinate points into

indeterminate ones so that the ontological boundaries between subject-object, inside-

outside, visible-invisible become confused and multiply the unknown factors, testing

the limits of the faculties. It is therefore fitting to end with a quote from Deleuze:

"Culture [...] is an involuntary adventure, the movement of learning which links a

sensibility, a memory and then a thought, with all the cruelties and violence

necessary...'"[635]

Endnotes

[587] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* trans. H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell, (New York: Columbia U Press, 1991), 55. (Henceforth *WIP*.)

[588] In John Mullarkey, *Philosophy and the Moving Image: Refractions of Reality*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 79.

[589] Each field must be understood as being enfolded by and as enfolding other fields.

[590] Jean-Clet Martin, *Variations: The Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze*, trans. C. V. Boundas and S. Dyrkton, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh U Press), 173.

[591] Martin, 173.

[592] Martin, 128.

[593] In Martin, 128.

[594] Martin, 129.

[595] In Martin, 128; Deleuze 1995, 148.

[596] Martin, 128.

[597] Daniel Frampton, *Filmosophy*, (New York: Walflower Press, 2006), 8-9.

[598] Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, Trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 38. (Henceforth, *Bergsonism*.)

[599] *Bergsonism*, 43.

[600] The pixels move in a horizontal orientation from the top of the screen to the bottom. The time it takes to fill each frame is 23 hours; in this sense, the image is not immediately realizable.

[601] *Bergsonism*, 40-41.

[602] D. N. Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, (Durham: Duke U Press, 1997),130.

[603] Rodowick, 130-33.

[604] Rodowick,134.

[605] Rodowick, 135.

[606] In Rodowick, 135. Author's emphasis.

[607] Roland Bogue, *Deleuze on Cinema*, (New York: Routledge, 2003), 178.

[608] *WIP*, 164.

[609] Bogue, 39.

[610] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1989), 262. (Henceforth *TI*.)

[611] In Frampton, 66-7.

[612] Frampton, 67.

[613] *WIP*, 59.

[614] *WIP*, 59.

[615] Frampton, 67.

[616] Bogue, 177.

[617] Gilles Deleuze, The *Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. T. Conley, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1993), 24, (Henceforth *Fold*); Levi R. Bryant, *Difference and Givenness*, (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern U Press, 2008), 153.

[618] Bogue, 177.

[619] Frampton, 69.

[620] Deleuze in Frampton, 70; *TI*, 201.

[621] Perception of these lines, of bodies enfolding each other, may differ at each point of view, such as a mezzo (or surface) point of view or that taken from the internal depths. For instance, from a surface point of view, lines of continuity (of enfolded bodies) would appear and disappear differently from a topological view, presenting a variation in the geometrical shapes and forms perceived.

[622] Forces do not produce folds; rather, the folding between two fields produces a force.

[623] Bogue, 32. Perception, as noted in chapter two, is not passive as it is not the representation of an object. Perception, to the contrary, is active and occurs as a subtractive movement, taking what it wills from the environment and becoming part of the movement.

[624] Gregory Flaxman, "Cinema Year Zero," in *The Brain is the Screen*, ed. Gregory Flaxman, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2000), 93.

[625] *Fold*, 89.

[626] Rodowick, 92.

[627] Gregory Flaxman, "Introduction," in *The Brain is the Screen*, ed. G. Flaxman, (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2000), 45.

[628] The whole time of the work being given, without interruptions or change in direction, ironically presents a lack of movement. As soon as a whole is given, Deleuze writes, eternity is produced. When everything is given, there is no longer any room for real movement to occur, which is necessary for real duration.

[629] Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*, trans. R. Beardsworth and G. Collins, (Stanford: Stanford U Press, 1998), 6.

[630] Steigler, 6.

[631] For instance, in Stan Douglas's *Win Place and Show* (1998) or in Lev Manovich's *Soft Cinema* (2005).

[632] Other notable artists would include Jill Scott, James Campbell, Stan Douglas, Sam Taylor-Wood, Douglas Gordon, Eija Liisa Ahtila and Bill Viola.

[633] Felix Guattari, *Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm*, trans. P. Bains, (Indianapolis: Indiana U Perss, 1995), 34-5.

[634] Keith Ansell Pearson, *Viroid Life*, (New York: Routledge, 1997), 139. In this regard, human development through the ages must be seen as a becoming of alien life.

[635] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. P. Patton, (New York: Columbia U Press, 1994), 165-6.

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433

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437

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