

**Text World Theory and the  
Emotional Experience of Literary Discourse**

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# Abstract

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This thesis investigates the emotional experience of literary discourse from a cognitive-poetic perspective. In doing so, it combines detailed Text World Theory analysis with an examination of naturalistic reader response data in the form of book group discussions and internet postings. Three novels by contemporary author Kazuo Ishiguro form the analytical focus of this investigation: *The Remains of the Day* (1989), *The Unconsoled* (1995) and *Never Let Me Go* (2005), chosen due to their thematic engagement with emotion and their ability to evoke emotion in readers. The central aims of this thesis are to develop cognitive-poetic understanding of the emotional experience of literature, and to advance cognitive-poetic and literary-critical understanding of the works of Ishiguro.

As a result of the analytical investigations of the three novels, this thesis proposes several enhancements to the discourse-world level of the Text World Theory framework. In particular, this thesis argues for a more detailed and nuanced account of deictic projection and identification, proposes a means of including readers' hopes and preferences in text-world analyses, and reconceptualises processes of knowledge activation as inherently emotional. Detailed, cognitive-poetic analyses of Ishiguro's novels elucidate literary-critical observations regarding Ishiguro's shifting style, and present new insights into the cognitive and emotional aspects of the interaction between the texts and their readers.

This thesis aims primarily to be a contribution to the fields of stylistics and cognitive poetics. It approaches this theoretically through the application and enhancement of cognitive poetic frameworks, analytically through the investigation of Ishiguro, and methodologically through the utilisation of reader response data in order to direct and support the investigations. However, incidental contributions are also made to cognitive and social emotion theories, and the discussion raises several suggestions for continued interdisciplinary research in the future.

“As in life, so in discourse.”

Paul Werth

(1999: 305)

For my parents and dear friends,

Shelagh and Graham Whiteley

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# Chapter 1: Introduction

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This thesis is intended as an original contribution to the fields of stylistics and cognitive poetics. Its primary purpose is to establish a greater understanding of the emotional aspects of literary reading, through the combination of cognitive-poetic analysis and an examination of readers' responses. The theoretical focus of this thesis is the cognitive-linguistic model of discourse processing, Text World Theory (Gavins 2007; Werth 1999), which has received significant attention in cognitive poetics to date. In particular, Text World Theory is increasingly recognised as a framework which is able account for readers' emotional experience of literary discourse (Gavins 2007; Lahey 2005; Stockwell 2005a, 2009). The following discussion seeks to scrutinise and develop Text World Theory in this respect. Three novels by contemporary author Kazuo Ishiguro form the literary focus of this investigation. Ishiguro's works engage with issues of emotion at a thematic level and also evoke emotions in their readers, but have received little stylistic or cognitive-poetic attention to date.

In this chapter, I introduce stylistics and cognitive poetics; the two related disciplines which underpin my study, in section 1.1 and 1.2. I provide an introduction to the work of Kazuo Ishiguro in section 1.3 and explain why his novels have been chosen as the focus of my analyses. Finally, in section 1.4 I outline the structure of this thesis and explicitly state its principal aims.

## 1.1 Stylistics

Underlying stylistic analysis is the assumption that 'the primary interpretative procedures used in the reading of a literary text are *linguistic* procedures' (Carter 1982: 4). A stylistic approach to literary texts perceives textual meaning, style and effect to be the result of specific linguistic features operating within an interpretative or communicative context. Thus stylistic analysis perceives an inherent link between literary form and interpretation.

In their review of the discipline, Leech and Short (2007) characterise the concerns of mainstream, contemporary stylisticians to be:

how, when we read, we get from the words on the page to the meanings in our heads and effects in our hearts. (2007: 287)

Implicit within this explanation is the notion that stylisticians are concerned not only with the mental aspects of reading ('in our heads') but the experiential, physical and emotional ('in our hearts'). Though I do not follow Leech and Short in drawing such a strong Cartesian division between these phenomena (see section 3.1), the concerns outlined by

Leech and Short are also the central focus of this thesis. This point will be returned to in section 1.2 below.

The name 'stylistics' originates from the discipline's early interest in defining 'style' and differentiating the style of particular authors, but over time stylistic attention has shifted and become principally concerned with textual meaning and effect (see Carter and Simpson 1989:1; Leech and Short 2007: 287). Stylistics in the 1960s and early 1970s was concerned with 'the reification of the text as an artefact' and tended to view the reader as a 'decoder' of a single message 'encoded' by the writer (Wales 2006: 216). Due to the combined influence of reader-response criticism and reception aesthetics in literary theory, and pragmatics and discourse analysis in linguistics, stylistics since the 1970s has been concerned with texts in their 'interactive discourse context' and readers as active constructors of textual meaning (Wales 2006: 216).

Stylistics shares with literary criticism a reliance upon intuition and interpretative skills in the analysis of literature (Wales 2001: 373). However, stylisticians are concerned with relating literary effects or themes to the linguistic features of the text in order to substantiate or even enhance an 'impressionistic awareness' of literary effect (Verdonk 2002: 36). Stylistics provides a metalanguage for the rigorous and systematic discussion of linguistic features, patterns, structures and levels in literary texts (Wales 2001: 213), and seeks to describe both the 'purpose and effect' of this literary language (Verdonk 2002: 4). In addition to a concern with analytical rigour, stylisticians are also committed to the creation of transparent, coherent and accessible analyses which are retrievable and open to falsifiability (Carter and Stockwell 2008: 296; Wales 2001: 373; see also Simpson 2004). By making each interpretative step explicit, stylistic analyses can 'easily be replicated by other readers' (Verdonk and Weber 1995: 1), meaning that interpretations can be shared and debated.

Lodge (1966) notes that stylistics emerged as a distinct approach to literary texts as early as the 1940s (Spitzer 1948; Ullmann 1964; Wellek and Warren 1949), but reviews of the discipline generally regard its period of growth to be the 1960s onwards, when a set of conventions for analysis began to be established (Carter and Simpson 1989; Carter and Stockwell 2008). The stylistic concern with textual craft and impact has links to classical rhetoric (see Verdonk 2006), but modern stylistics was formed through the combined influence of three fields of study (see Fowler 1981; Carter and Stockwell 2008). The first is Anglo-American literary criticism, particularly practical criticism and New Criticism (e.g. Empson 1930; Leavis 1932; Richards 1929), which advocated the 'close reading' of the language of literary texts and, according to Fowler (1981: 12), established an encouraging context for the emerging discipline of stylistics. The stylistic approach differs from these

forms of criticism, however, as it highlights the influence of historical, social and psychological contexts in textual interpretation, rather than regarding texts as 'self-contained verbal artefact[s]' independent of such context (Fowler 1981: 12).

The second influence came from developments in the field of linguistics. Structural linguistics (Bloomfield 1933) and generative grammar (Chomsky 1957) provided precise terminology and frameworks which could be applied to the analysis of metre and syntax in literary texts, and functionalism (Halliday 1973, 1976) added a socio-cultural dimension to the consideration of the way stylistic choices form meaning. From linguistics, stylistics obtained a sense of the importance of 'rigour in descriptive analysis' and 'a scientific concern for transparency and replicability in that description' (Carter and Stockwell 2008: 293), a concern which persists to the present day. Like linguistics, stylistics is also a progressive discipline, engaged in the continual reassessment and development of its models and theories (Wales 2006: 217).

The third area of influence came from European structuralism, in the work of Jakobson (1960, 1968); Barthes (1966, 1967); Todorov (1977 [1971], 1981 [1972]) and others (see Fowler 1981; Carter and Stockwell 2008). They believed that linguistics was the necessary ground of literary study, and established many of the areas still of interest in stylistic work, such as foregrounding, metaphor, genre and the effects of literary defamiliarisation.

Although stylistics combines linguistic and literary-critical influences, the stylistic approach is often met with hostility by those working in its 'parent' disciplines. Wales notes that in academic departments, stylisticians tend to find themselves 'caught between a literature and linguistic divide that has been slow in narrowing' (2006: 214). Carter and Stockwell (2008) describe theoretical and applied linguists in other areas of linguistic study as being 'rather suspicious' of stylistics, due to its concerned with literariness, interpretation and the investigation of artificial rather than natural language (2008: 293). Furthermore, a critique of some of the more impressionistic modes of traditional literary criticism is inherent in a stylistic approach (see Carter 1982: 1-4; Stockwell 2005a, 2008b; Wales 2006: 213) and there is a history of heated debates between stylisticians and literary critics (Bateson 1967, 1968; Fish 1973, 1979, 1980; Fowler 1967, 1968; Mackay 1996, 1999; Short et al 1998; Short and van Peer 1999; Toolan 1990).

Stylistics grew out of interdisciplinary influences and has remained an interdisciplinary field, drawing on literary criticism, narratology, linguistics, psychology, cognitive science, social science and philosophy in its account of the connections between textual organisation and interpretative effect (Lambrou and Stockwell 2007; Carter and Stockwell 2008; Verdonk and Weber 1995: 2). Stylistics is not a unified discipline, but a

broad set of interrelated approaches united by the commitment to rigorous textual analysis. For example, Carter and Simpson (1989) differentiate between two strands of 'literary' and 'linguistic' stylistics; the former concerned with the appreciation and interpretation of literary texts (e.g. Leech and Short 1981) and the latter concerned with developing linguistic theory through literary text analysis (e.g. Banfield 1982, Burton 1980). Other currents in contemporary stylistics include corpus stylistics (Hoover et al 2006; Semino and Short 2004), pedagogical stylistics (Clark and Zyngier 2003; MacRae 1998; Short 1989; Simpson 1992; Widdowson 1975, 1992); feminist stylistics (Mills 1995) and cognitive stylistics (e.g. Culpeper 2001; Emmott 1997; Semino 1997; Stockwell 2002).

It is the latter of these stylistic sub-disciplines, also known as cognitive poetics (Stockwell 2002), which underpins the approach taken in this thesis. Carter and Stockwell (2008) describe cognitive poetics as 'a major evolution in stylistics' (2008: 298), particularly with respect to the role of the reader in literary interpretation. Elsewhere, Stockwell argues that the 'cognitive turn' in stylistics is the latest phase in its natural development, 'from early formalism through pragmatics, then encompassing social, historical, cultural and now cognitive contexts' (Stockwell 2005b: 272). Cognitive poetics is described in more detail in section 1.2. below.

## **1.2. Cognitive Poetics**

Cognitive poetics is an approach to literary study which is informed by research in the fields of cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology. It is highly interdisciplinary, also drawing on work in cognitive science more broadly, including artificial intelligence, philosophy and anthropology (Stockwell 2002: 4; Steen and Gavins 2003: 2; Gerrig and Zimbardo 2009: 233). A cognitive-poetic analysis relates the structure of literary texts to their presumed or observed psychological effects on the reader (Steen and Gavins 2003: 1).

Cognitive poetics emerged as a result of the rise of cognitive linguistics in the 1980s (Vandaele and Brône 2009: 1). Cognitive linguistics is a subdiscipline of cognitive science which connects the human ability to use language with other cognitive abilities such as categorisation, perception, memory and attention allocation (Ungerer and Schmid 2006). A central tenet of cognitive linguistics is that we understand language on the basis of our knowledge of the world, which has arisen out of our embodied interaction with that world (Steen and Gavins 2003: 8-9; see also Ungerer and Schmid 2006). The interests of cognitive linguists, such as figure and ground relationships; knowledge categorization and structure (e.g. prototypes, scripts, schemas); deixis; cognitive grammar and the conceptual basis of metaphor, are related to a literary context within cognitive poetics (see Stockwell 2002).

Cognitive poetics, like stylistics, is also influenced by the formalist and structuralist poetics of the early twentieth century (for a review, see Steen and Gavins 2003: 5-8).

The term 'cognitive poetics' was first used by Tsur in 1982, to refer to 'an interdisciplinary approach to the study of literature, employing the tools offered by Cognitive Science' (Tsur 1982: 1). Since then, multiple variants of the discipline have emerged. Tsur's own approach (Tsur 1982, 1992, 1998, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2008), which draws on gestalt principles of perception and neuroscientific research, is now perceived as an alternative to more 'mainstream' cognitive-poetic approaches, which may be divided still further (Steen and Gavins 2003; Stockwell 2008a). Steen and Gavins (2003: 5) identify two varieties of cognitive poetics: one generally oriented towards cognitive science and the social sciences such as empirical and social psychology (e.g. Gibbs 1994, 2003; Oatley 2002, 2003), and the other more tightly related to the rise of cognitive linguistics (e.g. Burke 2003; Crisp 2003; Hamilton 2003; Stockwell 2002, 2003, 2009). Semino and Culpeper (2002) and Vandaele and Brône (2009) note that some practitioners regard cognitive poetics to be a branch of cognitive linguistics, whilst others conceive of the relationship between these disciplines more broadly, seeing cognitive linguistics as just one of the cognitive paradigms which can feed into cognitive poetics. Furthermore, Stockwell (2005b) describes the existence of two distinct movements in the field: a predominantly North American tradition that emerges more from psychology and linguistics departments, and a predominantly European tradition more associated with stylistics or literary linguistics (see section 1.1 above). More recently, a further variety of cognitive poetics has emerged in the form of cognitive approaches to narratology, which re-examine narratological issues in the light of cognitive theories (see Bortolussi and Dixon 2003; Gerrig 1993; Herman 2002, 2003a, 2009).

The approach in this thesis is most closely aligned with the European, stylistically influenced version of cognitive poetics, as I am concerned with the close linguistic analysis of literary texts. Furthermore, I regard cognitive poetics not as a subsidiary of cognitive linguistics, but as rightfully influenced by a range of cognitive paradigms including empirical cognitive and social psychology (see section 3.1).

Stockwell (2002) describes cognitive poetics as 'essentially *a way of thinking* about literature rather than a framework in itself' (2002: 6). The discipline is comprised of a range of frameworks or approaches, including the following: figure and ground relations (Stockwell 2002, 2003; Tsur 2009); prototypes and schemas (Cook 1994; Gibbs 2003; Jeffries 2001; Lakoff 1987; Rosch 1973, 1975, 1978; Schank and Abelson 1977; Semino 1995, 1997; Stockwell 2002); cognitive grammar (Hamilton 2003; Langacker 1987, 1991, 2002 [1991], 1992, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008; Stockwell 2002, 2009); Conceptual Metaphor

Theory (Crisp 2003; Crisp et al 2002; Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Semino and Steen 2008; Steen 1994, 2002a, 2002b; Turner 2000 [1987], 1991, 1996, 2002); Conceptual Integration or 'Blending' (Brandt 2004; Brandt and Brandt 2005; Canning 2008; Coulson 2001; Coulson and Oakley 2000; Freeman 2000, 2006, 2009; Fauconnier 1994, 1997; Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Grady, Oakley, and Coulson 1999; Hamilton 2002); Text World Theory (Gavins 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2007; Hidalgo Downing 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Stockwell 2002, 2005a, 2009; Werth 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1997a, 1997b, 1999); Contextual Frame Theory (Emmott 1994, 1995, 1997, 2003); and cognitive narratology (Bortolussi and Dixon 2003; Fludernik 1996; Gerrig 1993; Herman 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2009; Hogan 2003a; Semino 2002).

This thesis focuses on the emotional experience of literary narrative, and in cognitive poetics narratological analysis is predominantly approached using 'worlds' theories such as Text World Theory (Werth 1999; Gavins 2007); Contextual Frame Theory (Emmott 1997); Mental Spaces Theory and Conceptual Integration (e.g. Fauconnier 1994, 1997); or Herman's (2002) notion of 'storyworlds'. These approaches are reviewed in section 2.1 in the following chapter. Such theories assume that when processing discourse, readers mentally represent not just the text itself but also that to which the text refers (Bortolussi and Dixon 2003: 16). Though they differ in scope and application, all 'worlds' theories draw upon the 'text as world' metaphor which has gained currency in cognitive psychology, cognitive linguistics and psycholinguistics (Gerrig 1993; Ryan 1998). In the text-as-world metaphor:

the text is apprehended as a window on something that exists outside language and extends in time and space well beyond the window frame. To speak of textual world means to draw a distinction between a realm of language, made of names, definite descriptions, sentences and propositions, and an extra-linguistic realm of characters, objects, facts and states of affairs serving as referent to the linguistic expressions. (Ryan 1998: 138-9)

Ryan (1998) discusses the text-as-world metaphor in relation to the popular 'text as game' metaphor in postmodern literary theory. Though acknowledging the value of both metaphors, she argues that the text-as-world metaphor is better at dealing with ontology and avoids the prescriptivism and elitism inherent in the postmodern approach. Most significantly for the argument presented here, Ryan (1998: 143) suggests that the text-as-world metaphor has the potential to account for the experiential and emotional aspects of literary reading through the notion of immersion (for further discussion of this issue, see sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4). Text World Theory is the cognitive-poetic 'worlds' framework used in this thesis, which encompasses the concerns of several other cognitive-poetic

approaches including cognitive deixis, conceptual metaphor and schema poetics. Section 2.1 of the following chapter justifies my use of Text World Theory over other 'worlds' theories, and the framework is explained in detail in section 2.2.

Due to the connections with stylistics outlined so far, cognitive poetics remains centrally concerned with the rigorous, systematic and replicable analysis of specific texts or textual phenomena. Like stylistics, it is closely related to literary criticism – and Stockwell (2005a) argues cognitive poetics *is* literary criticism, 'among other things' (2005a: 271, see also Allington 2005). However, rather than necessarily generating new interpretations of literary texts, which is of principal value in literary criticism, cognitive poetics is centrally concerned with exploring *how* and *why* particular interpretations are arrived at (Semino and Culpeper 2002: x). There is ongoing debate regarding the status of cognitive poetics in relation to poetic and hermeneutic practice (Brône and Vandaele 2009; Hall 2003: 354-5; Hamilton 2002: 1-3; Jackson 2003, 2005; Stockwell 2005b). Stockwell describes it thus:

Some stylisticians...ask whether cognitive poetics is a study of the mind reading literature (which makes it a form of poetics), or whether it is a study of the interpretations produced by minds reading literature (a form of hermeneutics). (Stockwell 2005b: 268)

Stockwell, persuasively in my view, argues that cognitive poetics entails collapsing the distinction between poetics and hermeneutics. In the Stockwellian model, cognitive-poetic analysis should pay attention to both the mental processes involved in literary reading *and* the meaning and effects of the specific literary text(s) under study. This is certainly the aim of the analyses presented in this thesis, which aim to balance a concern for developing our understanding of the processes behind emotional responses to texts in general with the particular effects of the three novels as examples of literary narrative.

Despite cognitive poetics' hermeneutic claims, literary scholars are generally sceptical about the explanatory power of cognitive approaches (Downes 1993; Gross 1997; Jackson 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005; Vandaele and Brône 2009: 3) in a way which mirrors earlier literary-critical scepticism regarding stylistics (e.g. Bateson 1967, 1968; Mackay 1996, 1999). For example, from his literary-critical perspective, Jackson critiques both cognitive poetics' interdisciplinary aims (Jackson 2003) and the insights which cognitive poeticists claim to bring to literary study (Jackson 2005). He argues (2003) that applying concepts from scientific disciplines to the study of literature is inherently problematic because literary study has both a different object and a different method to scientific research. Jackson views the sciences and the arts as irredeemably divided, because scientific knowledge is founded on empiricism but literary interpretation is not straightforwardly amenable to such study. In his 2005 paper, Jackson argues that in using generalising



cognitive principles to explain literary reading, cognitive poetics tends to be deterministic and that its textual interpretations hold little value (see also Downes 1993; Freeman 1993a, 1993b; Gross 1997). After examining several cognitive-poetic analyses, he concludes that, 'despite regular, enthusiastic claims for radically new insights, the actual application of [cognitive] theories to texts has much too often produced interpretations that are painfully obvious' (2005: 528). Cognitive-poetic metalanguage, he argues, is simply 'new labels for old ideas' (2005: 526) and cognitive-poetic analysis is simply close reading; no different than that performed in New Criticism (2005: 530).

Interestingly, Jackson's critiques are also echoed in internal debates between cognitive poeticists. For example, Tsur (2008) argues that the strand of cognitive poetics represented by Stockwell's (2002) text-book is *not* cognitive poetics in his view. He suggests that Stockwell's analyses simply re-label existing literary-critical terms and do not solve any new problems in literary study. Instead, Tsur advocates his own brand of cognitive poetics, in which cognitive theory is drawn upon only where traditional critical tools fail (Tsur 2008: 123). In a response to Tsur, Stockwell (2008a) argues that labels are important, and that his use of cognitive-poetic terminology is indicative of his view that a cognitive approach should 'augment but ultimately supersede' the linguistic turn in literary study (2008a: 589). Jackson's view of the problematic relationship between scientific and literary enquiry is also mirrored in internal cognitive-poetic debates regarding empiricism, which are discussed later in this section (see also section 3.3).

The critiques and debates described above demonstrate that cognitive poetics is a 'field whose borders remain still disputed' (Stockwell 2008a: 596). Though the discipline is still in its 'relative infancy' (Gavins 2009: 369) it is rapidly expanding and as a result there are numerous sources of what Stockwell (2008a: 591) aptly describes as 'productive tensions' in cognitive-poetic research. Of the various sources of development and debate in cognitive poetics (for a review see Brône and Vandaele 2009; Stockwell 2002: 165-76), two are particularly significant for the present discussion and are considered in section 1.2.1 immediately below. The first is the issue of emotion and the second is the nature of 'the reader', which ties in with issues of empiricism.

### **1.2.1 Emotion and 'the reader' in cognitive poetics**

Though cognitive poetics is strongly influenced by the experientialism of cognitive linguistics, early work in the discipline tended to neglect experiential and emotional concerns in favour of a focus on information processing. This bias can be seen to reflect a similar bias in cognitive science more broadly (Eysenk and Keane 1995: 435; Oatley 2003: 167-8). However, over the last decade or so there has been widespread recognition of the need to devote greater attention to emotion and other phenomenological aspects of literary

reading in cognitive poetics (Burke 2003, 2008; Herman 2009; Miall 2005: 133, 2006; Oatley 2003: 167-70; Robinson 2004: 153-4; Semino 1995: 84, 2009; Stockwell 2002: 171, 2008a, 2009; Tsur 2002: 281, 2008, 2009).

There are several reasons for such claims. Firstly, addressing emotion would bring cognitive poetics in line with advances in cognitive science (Oatley 2003: 168). As Oatley (2003: 168) and Steen and Gavins (2003) point out, the scope of cognitive science now reaches beyond purely cognitive phenomena such as word processing or the storage and retrieval of knowledge, to also encompass 'associations, images, feelings, emotions and social attitudes' (Steen and Gavins 2003: 2). A corresponding emphasis would ensure cognitive poetics remains connected to the disciplines upon which it draws. Secondly, a greater focus on emotion would enable stylistic strands of cognitive poetics to expand upon their consideration of traditional stylistic concerns. Stockwell (2008a) notes that issues of 'aesthetic experience', including emotion, have always been 'strongly implicit' in stylistics (2008a: 592). This is evidenced in the quotation from Leech and Short cited at the beginning of section 1.1 above, which describes stylisticians' interest in both the 'meanings in our heads' and 'effects in our hearts' (2007: 287). It is also demonstrated in stylistic analyses which explicitly address emotion or affect (e.g. Burke 2001; Short and van Peer 1989; Verdonk 2002). Stockwell (2005a, 2008a) suggests that cognitive poetics should be key in the development of an explicitly affective stylistics. A third reason is that a greater focus on emotion would allow cognitive poetics to address the 'significance of reading' beyond text processing (Miall 2006: 45). Miall (2005, 2006) argues that cognitive poetics is too preoccupied with issues of interpretation and as a result neglects the experiential aspects of reading and the activities of readers outside the academy. Stockwell (2005a: 144, 2008b) also suggests that the attention which 'natural' readers pay to emotional and experiential issues in their engagement with literature is under-regarded in academic literary study. Both Stockwell (2005a) and Miall (2005, 2006) claim that a greater focus on emotion would enable cognitive poetics to address the interests and motivations of 'real' or 'natural' readers outside the academy, which would benefit not only cognitive-poetic theory but literary study as a whole. As a result of the above arguments, the cognitive-poetic study of emotion and literary experience is currently a rapidly developing research area to which this thesis aims to contribute (e.g. Burke 2008; Freeman 2009; Gavins 2007; Green 2000: 66; Herman 2009; Kuiken, Miall and Sikora 2004; Lahey 2005; Miall 2006; Oatley 1994, 1999a, 1999b, 2002, 2003; Stockwell 2005a, 2009; van Peer 1997).

A second source of debate and development in cognitive poetics intersects with the arguments of Miall (2005, 2006) and Stockwell (2005a) described above, and pertains to the nature of 'the reader' in cognitive poetics. Like stylistics, cognitive poetics is concerned

with the readerly aspect of literary communication and the 'reader' is studied through a variety of methods. In their review of cognitive-poetic methods, Vandaele and Brône (2009) make a useful distinction between the use of 'first-person introspection' on the part of the analyst and 'third-person observation' through more empirical means (2009: 6). First-person introspection, which Vandaele and Brône (2009: 7-8) note is a common approach in cognitive-poetic research, involves the analyst – a professional, academic reader – explicating their interpretation or experience of the text. Steen and Gavins (2003), along with Miall (2005, 2006) and Stockwell (2005a), note that a key question for the future of cognitive poetics is the extent to which these professional readings bear any relation to what non-professional readers do when engaging with literature. These cognitive-poetic debates mirror those in stylistics (e.g. Fish 1973, 1979, 1980; Toolan 1990), and Wales (2006) makes a similar point when she suggests that future stylistic analysis should concern itself with, among other things, 'the diverse nature of real readers and reading publics' (2006: 216).

This concern for the activities of 'real' readers is intrinsically linked to issues of empiricism. Vandaele and Brône describe first-person introspection as 'indirectly empirical' (2009: 7), because analysts draw upon empirically researched principles from linguistics and cognitive science in the articulation of their analysis (for a similar view, see Stockwell 2005b: 275). 'Third-person observation', however, is directly empirical, meaning (in its widest sense) that it involves the investigation of a 'real' reader 'except the researcher himself' (van Assche 1991: 347). Third-person empirical methods range from the use of informal or anecdotal observations regarding other readers through to more formal qualitative and quantitative studies of reader response, and are reviewed in section 3.3.

Though both indirectly and directly empirical methods are acceptable within stylistics and cognitive poetics, it is a central contention of this thesis that third-person observation is necessary in order for cognitive poetics to address emotional issues. As Stockwell (2005a) points out, emotion is typically regarded as a highly idiosyncratic and subjective aspect of literary experience. Because of this, issues of generalisability are particularly salient for any solely introspective account of emotion in discourse. Empirical methods of some kind are necessary in order to make more wide-ranging claims regarding emotion and literary reading, a fact recognised by several cognitive-poetic investigations (e.g. Burke 2008; Kuiken, Miall and Sikora 2004; Miall 2006; Stockwell 2009). Vandaele and Brône (2009) suggest that a major challenge for the future of cognitive poetics is the reconciliation of 'first-person' and 'third-person' methods (2009: 6). The approach taken in this thesis seeks to reconcile them through combination. The analyses presented here combine first-person introspective analysis with third-person empirical observation,

achieved through the analysis of verbal reader response data collected from face-to-face and online reading group discussions. Section 3.3 provides further discussion of the methods employed to this end.

In sections 1.1 and 1.2 I have provided an overview of stylistics and cognitive poetics, situating this thesis as a contribution to these disciplines, particularly regarding issues of emotion and empiricism. In section 1.3 below I provide an introduction to the work of Kazuo Ishiguro. I explain why his novels have been chosen as the focus of my analyses and outline the contributions which my thesis makes to current literary-critical and stylistic work in this area.

### **1.3 Kazuo Ishiguro**

In 1983 Kazuo Ishiguro was featured on the 'Best Twenty Young British Novelists' list, compiled by the British Book Marketing Council; a list which was an unashamed promotional exercise for contemporary literature, but is also viewed as 'a watershed in the post-war British novel' signalling a new generation of contemporary writers (Childs 2005: 1-2). Many of the authors on that list, including Ishiguro, have since become 'the celebrated stalwarts of contemporary fiction' (Childs 2005: 2) and in the first full length literary-critical investigation of Ishiguro's life and work, Shaffer (1998) notes that Ishiguro 'ranks among England's most distinguished contemporary novelists' (1998: 1). Ishiguro has authored six novels to date: *A Pale View of Hills* (1982); *An Artist of the Floating World* (1986); *The Remains of the Day* (1989); *The Unconsoled* (1995); *When We Were Orphans* (2000) and *Never Let Me Go* (2005), as well a several short stories, screenplays and a story cycle (e.g. Ishiguro 1981, 1983, 1990, 2001, 2009). All his novels have won literary prizes, but perhaps the most notable is his receipt of The Booker Prize for *The Remains of the Day* in 1989 which boosted his profile and popularity (Parkes 2001: 12). Ishiguro's recognition as a major writer in metropolitan literary circles is gradually being matched by commensurate attention in academic criticism, and in addition to numerous articles and book chapters there are several monographs and edited collections dedicated to his works (Lewis 2000; Matthews and Groes, forthcoming 2010; Petry 1999; Shaffer 1998; Shaffer and Wong 2008a; Sim 2006; Wong 2000). The fact that Ishiguro is a popular, contemporary author forms part of the reason why his novels are a focus of this thesis. I am interested in the experiences of 'real', contemporary readers, and therefore have chosen to analyse works by a contemporary author who is recognised both within and outside of the academy. However, Ishiguro's works are also of particular interest in relation to the concerns of this thesis for other more significant reasons which are described below.

Shaffer and Wong (2008b: xi) note that Ishiguro's novels 'defy easy categorisation' in terms of genre or themes, though there are strong connections between them (see below, and Lewis 2000: 133). Central themes include notions of displacement and dignity (Lewis 2000: 2, 15-17); exile (Wong 2000: 4, 22); self, family and nation; (Wong 2000: 22); human relationships (Wong 2000: 22); memory (Petry 1999) and the nature of consciousness and language (Parkes 2001: 18, 20, 26). All the novels are set at points of real or imagined historical crisis and change – for example, post-bomb Nagasaki in *A Pale View of Hills* (1982), post-War England in *The Remains of the Day* (1989) and war-torn Shanghai in *When We Were Orphans* (2000). Despite these particular historical settings, they are not straightforwardly 'realist' and issues of accuracy and authenticity are not paramount (Mason 2008 [1986]: 7-9). Instead, these settings are used as backdrops for the exploration of the 'emotional and mental configurations of his characters' lives' (Wong 2000: 4) which form the most salient aspects of Ishiguro's works. In interviews, Ishiguro repeatedly emphasises his interest in emotional issues; describing his preference for 'themes with an emotional dimension' (Mason 2008 [1986]: 14); the exploration of 'emotional logic' (Shaffer 2001: 6) and the 'emotional arena' of human experience (Vorda and Herzinger 2008 [1990]: 77). Shaffer (1998) aptly describes Ishiguro as 'more a novelist of the inner character than of the outer world' (1998: 8). Ishiguro's novels are the focus of this investigation into the emotional experience of literary discourse because they can be seen to engage with issues of emotion at a thematic level and also evoke emotion in their readers (as evidenced by the reader response data discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6).

In terms of literary theory, Ishiguro is read from a variety of perspectives including psychoanalysis (e.g. Shaffer 1998; Lewis 2000; Robinson 2006; Sim 2006; Westerman 2004), postcolonialism (e.g. Connor 1996; Ferrebe 2005; Griffiths 1993; O'Brien 1996; Sim 2006; Tamaya 1992; Westerman 2004); postmodernism (Lewis 2000; Petry 1999); metafiction (Adelman 2001; Cunningham 1995) and globalisation or internationalism (e.g. Wong 2000; Walkowitz 2007). Of particular significance to the present discussion, Wong (2000) also highlights the emotional themes and effects of Ishiguro's works. From a literary-critical perspective, Wong (2000) draws upon elements of reader response and reception theory (e.g. Iser 1974; Jauss 1982) in order to examine the emotional and experiential aspects of reading Ishiguro. She is particularly interested in the way that the narrators of Ishiguro's first three novels seem to communicate more than they actually say. Wong notes that 'silence is as much an aspect of [the narrator's] stories as they words they eventually utter' (2000: 15) and links such silences to the novels' emotional power. The novels demand a particular 'reading strategy', she argues, as readers must become actively engaged in discerning both 'the fact of [the character's] suffering and what they restrain

from revealing' (Wong 2000: 16, 26). Wong suggests that the participation of the reader and the characterisation of the narrator leads to the establishment of the potential for an 'empathic reader response' between characters and readers (2000: 16).

Though Wong offers an insightful account of the emotional poignancy of Ishiguro's novels, I believe that her analysis largely fails to illuminate the means by which these emotional effects are achieved. She posits that Ishiguro's narrators 'show a human propensity and need for consolation' which adds an 'emotional layer' to the narratives (2000: 19) and that the 'the futility of [the] character's plights, coupled with their ability to remain forward-looking' renders their stories more affecting (2000: 23-4). Describing the narrators as 'deceptive yet sympathetic' (2000: 25), Wong suggests that although their narratives are often unreliable, their 'open admission of real human flaws gains a reader's empathy' (Wong 2000: 24). However, although Wong posits that Ishiguro demonstrates a concern for the 'human psychology' of his characters *and* his actual readers (2000: 17-8), claiming that the novels establish a 'link between the author and the reader' as the latter are 'lure[d] into his tales' (2009: 16), she has no systematic means of discussing readers' cognitive interactions with the texts. Furthermore, she offers only vague description of the linguistic and stylistic aspects of the texts in order to elucidate her claims regarding their effects. Her analysis is limited to mentions of Ishiguro's 'clever use of language' (2000: 17); 'elegantly evocative discourse' (2009: 26); 'evocative narrative style' (2000: 16) and use of 'narrative technique' (2000: 17). In this thesis I approach Ishiguro's work from a cognitive-poetic, Text World Theory perspective which enables a more detailed, systematic and rigorous description of the kind of effects which Wong (2000) identifies. In particular my analyses aim to advance current literary-critical understanding of the effects of Ishiguro's novels by addressing issues of style and cognition.

A further feature of interest in Ishiguro's work is the notion that he has a distinctive style which has shifted (and indeed continues to shift) throughout his career (Lewis 2000; Shaffer 1998; Wong 2000). Each of his novels is narrated in the first person by an often self-conscious, anguished protagonist who, in telling their story, also seeks to disillusion themselves, perhaps as 'a way to seek comfort from a difficult past' (Wong 2000: 5). Narratologists such as Phelan (2005a) and Wall (1994) note that Ishiguro's use of the first-person provides interesting challenges to narrative theory, and regard his works as exemplary of the complex form and effects of this narrative mode (see section 4.1 for further discussion). In literary criticism, Ishiguro's style is typically described through comparison with other authors: his first three novels (*A Pale View of Hills* (1982), *An Artist of the Floating World* (1986) and *The Remains of the Day* (1989)) featuring 'elegant Jamesian prose' in a 'traditional novel form', with his fourth, *The Unconsoled* (1995), becoming more

'Kafkaesque' and experimental (Shaffer 1998: 5). Ishiguro's three earliest novels are often grouped together as a kind of 'informal trilogy' (Lewis 2000: 132-3), and Ishiguro has even described these novels as 'three attempts to write the same book' (Jaggi 1995: 28). The later three novels; *The Unconsoled* (1995), *When We Were Orphans* (2000) and *Never Let Me Go* (2005) are regarded as more diverse in style, with *When We Were Orphans* incorporating a mixture of realism and the experimentalism which typifies *The Unconsoled* (Jaggi 2000: 1; Shaffer 2001: 3-4), and *Never Let Me Go* (2005) representing a return to a more realistic style with a dystopian subject matter. Despite the differences between these latter works, Kemp (2005) proposes that they be dubbed the 'bewilderment trilogy' due to their preoccupation with mystery.

Though there has been significant narratological and literary-critical interest in Ishiguro's style, to date there has been little stylistic or cognitive-poetic investigation into his work. In fact, to my awareness Verdonk (2002) provides the only existing stylistic consideration of Ishiguro's writing. Verdonk's (2002) analysis is concerned with the narrative perspective at the opening of *An Artist of the Floating World* (1986). He discusses the way in which textual cues such as deictics, evaluative lexis, modality and syntax contribute to readers' inferences about the narrator's character. In addition to noting the potential unreliability of the narrator (2002: 32), Verdonk highlights the way textual cues serve to position the reader in relation to the narrative. The narrator's use of the second-person suggests that he is 'talking to somebody in his presence who knows who he is' (2002: 38). Verdonk draws upon 'worlds' theories in order to describe how, as an addressee is not specified by the text, the reader is impelled to fill this 'second-person vacuum' and 'becomes positioned as a participant in the fictional world' (2002: 34-5). In this thesis I am also concerned with the way readers are positioned during their reading and how this influences their emotional experience, thus both continue and develop the points raised by Verdonk (2002). In particular, in Chapters 4 and 5 I highlight readers' projection into multiple roles within the world of the text and the emotional consequences of these multiple projections. In sections 5.3.1, 5.4 and Chapter 6, I also consider the role of knowledge and expectations in readers' emotional experience of Ishiguro's novels.

Due to the constraints of space it is only possible for me to analyse three of Ishiguro's six novels in this thesis: *The Remains of the Day* (1989) in Chapter 4; *Never Let Me Go* (2005) in Chapter 5 and *The Unconsoled* (1995) in Chapter 6. My selection of these three novels is motivated by several factors. Firstly, none of them have received stylistic or cognitive-poetic attention to date. Secondly, I feel that they best represent diverse strands of the theme of emotion across Ishiguro's work. For example, in *The Remains of the Day* (1989) themes of regret and emotional repression are key, as the narrator Stevens' role as a

butler means that he is either unable to realise or unwilling to express his emotions. In *Never Let Me Go* (2005), however, the converse is true; it is emotional expression and verisimilitude which are significant in this tale about human clones bred for organ harvesting. Finally, emotional extremes are foregrounded in the dreamlike world of *The Unconsoled* (1995), where human emotions do not operate in expected or familiar ways. The novels which I do not consider can be seen to overlap both stylistically and thematically with the novels which I do (Lewis 2000: 132; Jaggi 2000: 1). As noted above, *The Remains of the Day* (1989) is often viewed as a stylistic development of *A Pale View of Hills* (1982) and *An Artist of the Floating World* (1986); whilst *When We Were Orphans* (2000) is regarded as a combination of Ishiguro's earlier styles (Jaggi 2000: 1). The selection of novels analysed in this thesis represents a sample of various stages of Ishiguro's oeuvre: *The Remains of the Day* (1989) from his earlier, 'informal trilogy' (Lewis 2000: 132), *The Unconsoled* (1995) as his controversial experimental novel (Shaffer 1998: 5), and his latest novel *Never Let Me Go* (2005). As part of my analysis of the text-worlds of these novels, I provide a cognitive-poetic perspective on the stylistic commonalities and differences across Ishiguro's works.

#### **1.4 The Structure of this Thesis**

The principal aims of this thesis are to develop cognitive-poetic understanding of the emotional experience of literary discourse, and to advance cognitive-poetic and literary-critical understanding of the works of Ishiguro. The thesis consists of seven chapters. The current chapter has introduced the aims and defined the disciplinary parameters and literary focus of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides a critical introduction to the history, context and central principles of Text World Theory; the cognitive-linguistic model of discourse-processing which forms the basis of subsequent analytical investigations. In Chapter 3, section 3.1 reviews the cognitive and social psychological theories of emotion which underpin my augmentations to the text-world framework, whilst section 3.2 provides a detailed assessment of the treatment of emotion in Text World Theory to date, comprising the first review of its kind. In this section I identify the central weaknesses of current text-world approaches to emotion and indicate the areas to which this thesis contributes. Finally, section 3.3 explicates the reader response data which forms a central part of my approach, stating the aims and justifying the methods of my data collection.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 feature detailed discussions of three novels by Kazuo Ishiguro. Drawing upon reader response data and theoretical insights from a range of disciplines, I propose augmentations to the Text World Theory account of emotion in discourse and also provide cognitive-poetic insights into the structure and effects of each literary text.



Ishiguro's *The Remains of the Day* (1989) forms the focus of the discussion in Chapter 4. Although first-person narratives are thought to engender readers' sympathy for the protagonist, I draw upon the comments of 'real' readers in order to argue for a more detailed and nuanced account of reader projection in Text World Theory. I posit that literary reading involves multiple projections of the reader which in turn influence readers' emotional experience.

In Chapter 5 these claims regarding multiple projection are elucidated further through a discussion of Ishiguro's *Never Let Me Go* (2005). Analyses in this chapter examine the connection between textual features and the promotion or problematisation of reader projection, introducing the concept of disassociation (as the reverse of identification). Section 5.4 examines reader hopes and expectations, incorporating the notion of 'participatory responses' (Gerrig 1993) into Text World Theory through the identification of a new class of worlds termed 'participation-worlds'.

Chapter 6 examines Ishiguro's *The Unconsoled* (1995) and is centrally concerned with the detailed investigation of the role of reader knowledge in emotional experience. Using the notion of informativity (de Beaugrande 1980), I argue that the interaction between readers' knowledge stores and textual information has the potential to engender emotion. Furthermore, I present a detailed consideration of the role of emotion knowledge in the discourse-world. This chapter also argues for the incorporation of cutting-edge theories of resonance and attention (Stockwell 2009) into Text World Theory.

Finally, in Chapter 7, section 7.1 provides a unified synopsis of the original contributions made by this thesis. Section 7.2 explores possible future directions for research arising from the analyses presented here, before a final summary of the broader significance of this thesis is provided in section 7.3.

# Chapter 2: Text World Theory

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## 2.0. Preview

This chapter provides an introduction to Text World Theory, the cognitive-linguistic discourse processing framework which underpins the analyses in Chapters 4 to 6. Section 2.1 discusses Text World Theory's history, influences and relation to other 'worlds' theories in cognitive poetics. I argue that the framework is well-suited to investigating the emotional experience of literary discourse because it provides a holistic and experiential approach to discourse processing. Section 2.2 critically reviews the central tenets of Text World Theory, before outlining the role of emotion in early versions of the framework. I establish that Text World Theory would benefit from further development in order to improve its account of the emotional and experiential aspects of discourse processing. This provides a context for the discussion of recent advances in Text World Theory in Chapter 3.

## 2.1. Text World Theory: Preliminaries and Context

Text World Theory is a cognitive-linguistic model of human discourse processing and considers human language in the light of what is known about the mind and brain from disciplines such as cognitive linguistics, cognitive psychology and other cognitive sciences. The theory was originally devised by Professor Paul Werth in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Werth set down the theory's basic foundations in a series of published articles (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1997a, 1997b) and completed a manuscript version of his Text World Theory monograph, but sadly his work was cut short by his untimely death in 1995. His monograph was published posthumously in 1999 following extensive editing by Mick Short, under the title *Text Worlds: Representing Conceptual Space in Discourse* (Werth 1999). Gavins (2007) notes that Text World Theory has 'aroused and sustained the interest of the academic community far beyond Werth's own lifetime' (2007: 2) and indeed, Text World Theory has continued to be applied and developed in a number of exciting directions.

Text World Theory has made most impact in the fields of stylistics and cognitive poetics, particularly in Northern Europe. It is a regular feature in undergraduate and postgraduate courses in linguistics, stylistics, cognitive poetics, narratology and literary theory, and is attractive to students because of the common-sense appeal of its concepts and the significant potential for their involvement in its further development (a fact which is emphasised in texts such as Gavins 2007 and Stockwell 2002). Text World Theory has been augmented and developed through its application to a range of text types, including advertisements (Gavins 2007; Hidalgo Downing 2003b); instructional texts (Gavins 2007);

political discourse (Chilton 2004, Gavins 2007); route directions (Mendes 2005) and various genres of literature including poetry (Hidalgo-Downing 2002; Lahey 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006; Nahajec 2009; Stockwell 2002, 2005a); novels (Al-Mansoob 2005; Gavins 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2007; Hidalgo Downing 2000a, 2000b, 2000c); drama (Lahey and Cruikshank, forthcoming; McIntyre 2004), and multimodal texts (Gibbons 2008). Werth (1999) claimed that Text World Theory could account for the cognitive processes behind the production and interpretation of *all* forms of discourse, and this ambitious vision has attracted particularly close inspection through the work described above. Through such varied applications, the theoretical boundaries and practical applicability of Text World Theory are continually undergoing scrutiny and renewal (Gavins 2007: 7).

The basic premise of Text World Theory is that readers and listeners, speakers and writers, produce and process all fictional and factual discourse by constructing mental representations in their minds, which are called 'text-worlds'. Text World Theory defines discourse as consisting of a text, the verbal or written part of a language event, and its relevant context (Werth 1999: 46). Thus, every discourse is comprised of the 'discourse-world' in which the communication takes place, and the 'text-world(s)' which comprise the participant's mental representations.

In the following sections I examine Text World Theory in relation to possible-worlds theories in philosophy and literary criticism (section 2.1.1), 'mental models' and 'situation models' in cognitive psychology (section 2.1.2) and Mental Space Theory in cognitive linguistics (section 2.1.3). Werth (1999) acknowledges these theories as influential in his development of Text World Theory, though the text-world approach differs in several important respects which will be elucidated. In sections 2.1.3 to 2.1.5 I consider the relationship between Text World Theory and three other cognitive-poetic approaches to mental representation. I explain why Text World Theory is the framework which is best suited to a cognitive-poetic investigation of the emotional experience of literary discourse. Though the above approaches are used by different theorists in somewhat different ways, they can be grouped under the general term 'worlds theories' (as stated in section 1.2) because they are all concerned with the 'extra-linguistic realm' which is imagined when one comprehends a text (Ryan 1998: 139).

### **2.1.1. Possible-worlds theories**

Possible-worlds theories are a form of propositional logic which categorise ontological domains in terms of actuality and possibility. They have their origins in the theological philosophy of the eighteenth century (Leibniz 1985 [1713]), and were initially developed in the philosophy and logic of the 1970s as a means of enabling the extension of truth values to hypothetical entities and situations. Possible-worlds theories have been used as a means

of solving a number of logical and ontological problems concerning issues such as reference, denotation, modal properties and proper names (Hintikka 1967, 1979, 1989; Kripke 1972, 1985; Lewis 1972, 1973, 1983, 1986; Plantinga 1974, 1979; Rescher 1975, 1979). Since the 1980s possible-worlds terminology has been adopted by literary theorists and the notions of possibility and actuality applied to the worlds created by literary texts (Bell 2007, 2010; Doležel 1988, 1989, 1995; Eco 1989; Pavel 1986; Ronen 1994; Ryan 1980, 1991, 1998; Semino 1997). The notion of possible-worlds forms the basis of a number of related approaches across philosophy and literary criticism, which are referred to in the plural in the present discussion.

The central tenet of possible-worlds theories is that the actual world is only one of a number of possible-worlds, and that all propositions should be discussed as relative to a particular ontological domain. Thus, as noted by Girle (2003), 'in possible worlds logic a statement is *true-in-a-world* rather than just true' (2003: 35, my italics). For example, in relation to the actual world, the statements 'Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990' and 'Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1989' are true and false respectively (Semino 1997: 58). However, independent of our knowledge of the actual world, statements such as: 'Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 or it is not the case that Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990' logically will always be *necessarily true*, thus are *true in all possible-worlds* (Semino 1997: 58). Furthermore, a statement such as 'Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and it is not the case that Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990' logically will always be *necessarily false*, and thus are *false in all possible-worlds* (Semino 1997: 58).

A further important concept in possible-worlds theories is the notion of 'accessibility', which pertains to the relations between worlds (Girle 2003: 37; Hughes and Cresswell 1968: 77-8; Lewis 1973: 5; van Dijk 1977: 30). As Hughes and Cresswell (1968) point out, we can conceive of various worlds which would differ in certain ways from the actual one (a world without telephones, for example), but our ability to do this is partly governed by the kind of world we actually live in (1968: 77). From a position within a particular world, other possible-worlds can be seen to be more or less easily conceivable. The relative distance of their ontological relationship to the originating world is measured on a scale of accessibility. Although accessibility is often explained by comparing it to the intuitive notion of the imaginability of a world, it also pertains particularly to the knowledge that we have about other possible-worlds (Hughes and Cresswell 1968: 78; van Dijk 1977: 30; and see section 2.2.4).

In some areas of philosophy, possible-worlds are conceived as parallel universes actualising all potential possibilities, with the actual world constituting a subjective phenomenon (e.g. Lewis 1972, 1973, 1983, 1986). Other possible-worlds theorists (such as Kripke 1972, 1985; Plantinga 1974; Rescher 1975, 1979) hold a more moderate view that

views possible-worlds as mental constructs, with the actual world as the world from which all possible-worlds are derived. Thus, possible-worlds are formed out of the actual world by rational human behaviour – and possible-worlds are connected, but not identical to the actual world. This latter conception of possible-worlds has been adapted with reference to a literary context (Bell 2007, 2010; Doležel 1988, 1989, 1995; Ryan 1980, 1991, 1998; Semino 1997; see also Eco 1989 and Ronen 1994 for a critique of the use of possible-worlds in literary theory). Ryan (1991) suggests that fictional texts create (possible) worlds into which readers can be immersed or transported, but that these worlds only exist as abstract mental constructs of linguistic reference in the actual world. In Ryan's (1980, 1991, 1998) terms, the accessibility of a possible world is dependent upon its closeness (or similarity) to the actual world.

Text World Theory departs from possible-worlds theories in several respects. Firstly, the aims of the Text World Theory are quite different. Possible-worlds theories, Werth notes, were designed as a way to solve logical problems without having to discuss the undefinable, abstract concept of 'truth' (1999: 70). Their focus on propositional logic means that they are not designed nor able to account for the complexity of human cognition and *discourse* processing, which are the central aims of Text World Theory. This is because possible-worlds do not allow for much consideration of functionality (the uses of possible-worlds in discourse and communication) or psychological complexity. Text World Theory, however, is concerned with the conceptual worlds which speakers and listeners, and writers and readers, are responsible for creating during the production and reception of discourse, and has these issues at its heart (Gavins 2001: 34).

Secondly, the Text World Theory notion of a 'world' differs considerably from that found in possible-worlds theories. Werth (1999) argues that possible-worlds are both 'overspecific' because they are 'tailormade' to a single proposition, and 'underspecific' because 'as worlds go, they are minimalistic, containing none of the complexity of anything speakers would recognise as a world' (1999: 70). Thus, for Werth (1999: 80), possible-worlds are reductive because they simplify the content of situations in order to enable their formalisation in logical terms (Werth 1999: 72; 1999: 80). This makes them 'content-free by comparison with what real people normally experience as situations', having 'no more contact with real situations than algebraic formula' (Werth 1999: 80). Werth's text-worlds, on the other hand, are 'rich' worlds, designed as a way to discuss states of affairs systematically, but also in 'something like their normal richness and complexity' (Werth 1999: 72). As far as Werth is concerned, the conceptual worlds which are created during discourse are 'as richly detailed as our direct experience of, and interaction with, the real world' (Gavins 2001: 34). The richness of text-worlds makes Text World Theory more

useful when examining emotional response, as it helps to explain why readers can experience real, sometimes strong emotions in response to their mental representations (for further discussion see section 3.1.4).

### **2.1.2. Mental models and situation models**

'Mental models' (Johnson-Laird 1983) and 'situation models' (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983) are concepts used within cognitive psychological work on discourse-processing. Both stem from the idea that language comprehension necessarily involves 'the construction of a [mental] representation of the state of affairs described in the text' (Zwaan and Radvansky 1998: 162). Though such a claim may seem self-evident, Zwaan and Radvansky (1998) note that up until the early 1980s 'many, if not most, cognitive psychologists viewed text comprehension as the construction and retrieval of a mental representation of the text itself rather than of the situation described by the text' (1998: 162).

When outlining his version of Text World Theory, Werth (1999) acknowledges the direct influence of the concept of mental models (Johnson-Laird 1983) and the relevance of situation models (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983) in his formation of the notion of a text-world (1999: 72-4). Johnson-Laird's concept of the 'mental model' is not restricted solely to discourse processing, and is in fact used more broadly to refer to 'a conceptual space which we use to work out probabilities and inferences' (Werth 1999: 73). Johnson-Laird summarises the functions of these mental models as follows:

...mental models play a central and unifying role in representing objects, states of affairs, sequences of events, the way the world is, and the social and psychological actions of daily life. They enable individuals to make inferences and predictions, to understand phenomena, to decide what action to take and to control its execution, and above all to experience events by proxy; they allow language to be used to create representations comparable to those deriving from direct acquaintance with the world; and they relate words to the world by way of conception and perception. (Johnson-Laird 1983: 419)

Importantly, in the above description Johnson-Laird notes that the representations formed in mental models are comparable to 'direct acquaintance with the world' (1983: 419). Thus, his notion of mental models allows for the type of 'richness' which Werth felt was lacking in possible-worlds theories (1999: 73). Situation models represent the 'people, objects, locations, events and actions described in a text' (Zwaan 1999: 15) and are also rich worlds; for instance Zwaan (1999) and Zwaan et al (2001) suggest they are able to explain the phenomenon of 'vicarious experience' through language (2001: 73). In comparison with possible-worlds, mental and situation models have the potential to contain not only objects or individuals standing in relation to one another, but also more sensory aspects such as 'smell, taste, touch, memory, emotion and so on' (Gavins 2001: 48, Werth 1999: 37). This

notion of richness is central to Text World Theory's concern with the experiential aspects of discourse processing.

Werth (1999) suggests that situation models and mental models are in many ways 'equivalent' to text-worlds (1999: 67) and states that text-worlds 'are...mental models constructed in the process of a given discourse' (Werth 1999: 74). However, Text World Theory cannot be aligned with these cognitive psychological approaches unequivocally. When describing the differences between text-worlds and mental models, Werth (1999) highlights Johnson-Laird's (1983) failure to apply mental models to texts, and suggests that the potential richness of mental models is not realised in Johnson-Laird's examples (1999: 73, for a similar view see Emmott 1997: 44-5). Since the early 1980s, mental and situation models have received significant attention in empirical cognitive psychological research (for a review see Zwaan and Radvansky 1998), however Zwaan and Radvansky note that 'there appears to be a discrepancy between the multidimensionality of situation models on the theoretical plane and their one dimensionality in empirical research' (1998: 163). Indeed, in cognitive poetics and narratology, such discourse-processing research is noted for being well-grounded empirically, though tends to have a 'limited scope' with regards the 'breadth of issues and variety of texts' investigated in these disciplines (Bortolussi and Dixon 2003: 14, for a similar view see Gerrig 1993: 5-7). Significantly, Werth (1999) does not limit his model of discourse processing to the parameters established in cognitive psychology, instead situating Text World Theory within the discipline of cognitive linguistics (see Werth 1999: 18-64 for a review). As such, Text World Theory has a broader theoretical agenda than that addressed by research on mental or situation models, exemplified through its focus on real texts in particular contexts.

### **2.1.3. Mental Space Theory and Conceptual Integration Theory**

A cognitive-linguistic concept which is of central importance in Text World Theory is the abstract notion of cognitive 'space', which Werth defines as 'a set of abstract configurational parameters in the conceptual domain' (1999: 4). The idea that humans understand language through the manipulation of such spaces underpins several cognitive-linguistic approaches, and Werth acknowledges the work of Fauconnier (1985), Filmore (1982, 1985), Lakoff (1987) and Langacker (1987, 1991) as key influences in his development of Text World Theory (Werth 1999: 42-6; 1999: 75-8). Theories about cognitive space, in particular Fauconnier's (1985) Mental Space Theory and Lakoff's (1987) Idealised Cognitive Models, form the basis of two hugely influential advances in cognitive linguistics: Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) and more recently Conceptual Integration (or Blending) Theory (Fauconnier and Turner 2002). Both Conceptual Metaphor and Conceptual Integration theories have been incorporated into

cognitive poetics and are used in textual analysis. In this section I trace the origins of these approaches and their influence on Werth's (1999) Text World Theory, before outlining their relationship in current cognitive poetics.

Mental Space Theory (Fauconnier 1985, 1994, 1997; Fauconnier and Swetsler 1996) is a theory of cognitive semantics which proposes that linguistic meaning is located in mental representations which are cued by linguistic expressions. These representations are known as mental spaces, and the linguistic elements which cue their construction are called 'space builders' (Fauconnier 1985). In addition to linguistic structures, mental spaces are also constructed using comprehender's background knowledge, general cognitive abilities and information from the immediate discourse context (Coulson and Oakley 2000: 178; Fauconnier 1985). Text processing is viewed as the incremental construction of networks of interconnected mental spaces, in which information is partitioned and mappings are established between elements and relations in different spaces (Coulson and Oakley 2000: 177; Semino 2003: 89).

There are some close resemblances between the structure and genesis of Fauconnier's mental spaces and those of Werth's text-worlds, but Werth is critical of the sentence-level focus of early Mental Space Theory (Fauconnier 1985). He writes: 'though Fauconnier's work on mental spaces is ground-breaking, the fact that it is essentially based on a sentence perspective makes it ultimately unsatisfactory as a fully integrated language theory' (Werth 1999: 77). Since the publication of Werth's monograph, Conceptual Integration Theory has been developed and has led to the application of Mental Space Theory beyond the sentence level (e.g. Fauconnier and Turner 2002). However, Werth is also critical of Fauconnier's (1985) treatment of context. Although Fauconnier's single-sentence examples are often preceded by some nominated context, Werth argues that these contexts are merely 'empty logical elements' rather than richly defined situations (1999: 78). Text World Theory departs from this and other cognitive-linguistic models of conceptual space in its focus on the experiential and contextual elements of discourse. It recognises that situational elements such as the immediate physical surroundings and participant's psychological resources have a crucial impact on discourse processes.

Lakoff's (1987) notion of an Idealised Cognitive Model (ICM) is also concerned with the mental representations underlying the production and reception of language. ICMs are simplified mental representations of complex physical and visualisable phenomena such as pulling, pushing, containers, surfaces and so on. According to Lakoff, these ICMs underlie humans' interaction with the world and new understanding is achieved through the process of metaphorically mapping between these ICMs and other non-physical domains. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that such metaphorical mappings form



the basis of all human reasoning and evidence this through the identification of ‘conceptual metaphors’ which underpin everyday expressions (see also Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Turner 2000 [1987], 1991, 1996, 2002). A central example of a conceptual metaphor is LIFE IS A JOURNEY, which can be gleaned from everyday surface expressions such as ‘We’re at a crossroads’. In such metaphors a typically abstract ‘target domain’ such as LIFE is understood by reference to a more concrete or physical ‘source domain’, in this case a JOURNEY.

Werth expresses reservations regarding the ability of Conceptual Metaphor Theory to account for poetic metaphors (1999: 317-8). He argues that due to ‘the poverty of language’ speakers are ‘forced’ to use everyday metaphors to express abstract concepts, but that poetic metaphors are different because they reflect poetic choice rather than expressive necessity (1999: 318). He also criticises the sentence-level focus of this Lakoffian version of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, and uses it to inform his treatment of extended metaphors which underlie entire texts (1999: 313-29, see also Gavins 2007: 146-64; Lahey 2007). Elsewhere, Werth notes that cognitive-linguistic models of conceptual space, such as ICMs and mental spaces, fail to characterise knowledge structures or explain how cognitive spaces might interact with knowledge structures (1999: 46). He draws on research from Artificial Intelligence in order to incorporate such a discussion into Text World Theory (see sections 2.2.1 and 6.3).

Since Werth’s (1999) version of Text World Theory was established, Conceptual Integration Theory has emerged as a significant theoretical advance in cognitive linguistics (Brandt 2004; Brandt and Brandt 2005; Coulson 2001; Coulson and Oakley 2000; Fauconnier 1994, 1997; Fauconnier and Turner 1996, 1998, 2002; Grady, Oakley, and Coulson 1999). Conceptual Integration or Blending Theory can be seen as a development of both Fauconnier’s Mental Space Theory and Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Coulson and Oakley 2000: 176). Blending Theory augments Conceptual Metaphor Theory by postulating that conceptual processes work to amalgamate and integrate mental spaces rather than simply projecting or transposing from one domain to another. A central concept in Blending Theory is the notion of a ‘conceptual integration network’, which is an array of mental spaces in which the processes of conceptual blending unfold (Coulson and Oakley 2000: 178). Networks consist of two or more discrete cognitive domains which are called ‘input spaces’; a ‘generic space’ which contains structures common to all spaces on the network and a ‘blended space’ which contains selected aspects of each input (Coulson and Oakley 2000: 178). Blended spaces often have their own ‘emergent structure’ which arises as a product of imaginative processes of integration and contains elements which do not exist in either of the input spaces (Coulson and Oakley 2000: 178). This emergent

structure has the potential to become a complex mental representation autonomously from its originating inputs (Gavins 2007: 148).

Within cognitive poetics, both Conceptual Metaphor Theory (e.g. Crisp 2003; Crisp et al 2002; Freeman 2000; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Semino and Steen 2008; Steen 1994, Stockwell 2002; Turner 1991, 1996, 2002; Werth 1999) and Blending Theory (e.g. Canning 2008; Dancygier 2006; Freeman 2005, 2006, 2009; Hamilton 2002; McAlister 2006; Sweetser 2006; Semino 2006, 2009; Tobin 2006) have been demonstrated as useful in the analysis of literary texts. As such, both theories extend beyond sentence-level phenomena and provide valuable insights into the effects of entire texts (see also Gavins 2007: 146-64 regarding the incorporation of Blending Theory into Text World Theory). Narayan (2009) even proposes that Blending Theory is able to account for readers' emotional involvement in literary discourse. As her comments form part of a short response article, Narayan (2009) does not provide a comprehensive account of blending and emotion, but makes preliminary proposals regarding the positive correlation between the amount of 'cognitive work' readers have to undergo in order to interpret texts (reflected in Blending Theory) and the 'degree of involvement and empathy' they are likely to experience (2009: 74). Although her points are intended as suggestions, I believe that they reflect some of the problems in using Blending Theory to provide a cognitive-poetic account of emotional response. For example, in her analysis Narayan does not consider the way in which linguistic cues might manipulate (i.e. both increase *and* decrease) reader involvement or how Blending Theory might account for variation in levels of 'empathy' during reading. Furthermore, the connection which she posits between 'cognitive work' and affective response is unlikely to be so straightforward. For instance, texts which are perceived to involve too much 'cognitive work' may in fact result in frustration or simply be abandoned by readers (see section 5.2.1). In order to address these issues one needs a framework which provides a systematic approach to the linguistic cues in a text and which view discourse participants as fully psychologised human beings with variable motivation levels. Text World Theory incorporates these elements, and offers a contextually-grounded approach to literary discourse. Though Blending Theory is celebrated because of its applicability to multiple levels of analysis (Coulson and Oakley 2000: 184), it is not a discourse framework and as such I would argue that alone it has limited potential in accounting for the emotional experience of literary discourse.

#### **2.1.4. Contextual Frame Theory**

Contextual Frame Theory (or, CFT) is a theory of text comprehension devised by Emmott (1997, 2003 see also 1992, 1994, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2002). CFT was under development at the same time as Werth's Text World Theory and the two theories are often noted as

having similarities (e.g. Emmott 2003: 145, 146; Emmott 1997: 56-8; Werth 1999: 82). For example, they are both concerned with the comprehension of discourse rather than isolated sentences and regard mental representations to be central to linguistic comprehension. These mental representations are called 'text worlds' or 'contextual frames' respectively, and both theories propose that they are formed through the interaction between textual cues and readers' knowledge and inferences (see section 2.2.1 for details regarding knowledge in Text World Theory). Furthermore, both theories allow for the notion of embedded representations which emerge from that initial context (see section 2.2.3). Indeed, Gavins (2001, 2007) explicitly recognises the relationship between the two approaches and incorporates aspects of CFT, such as the notion of 'enactors' and 'frame-switches' (which are re-named 'world-switches'), into her development of Text World Theory.

There are, however, important differences between Text World Theory and CFT. Firstly, CFT differs from Text World Theory in terms of scope. CFT is designed to account for the way contexts within fictional worlds are constructed, updated and monitored by the mind. It is also concerned with how contextual information is used for reading processes such as determining the referents of pronouns (Emmott 1994, 1997). Emmott is concerned with fictional *narrative* comprehension alone, and has demonstrated CFT's usefulness in addressing the particular aspects and effects of this genre, such as 'twists in the tale' and plot reversals (Emmott 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2003). Text World Theory, on the other hand, is concerned with all forms of discourse, including but not limited to fictional narrative. As a result of this different focus, CFT includes a consideration of how readers assess and monitor characters and their roles in narratives. For example, Emmott posits that readers track the entities in a text and that information about them is stored in a 'central directory' (1997: 125), but there is no corresponding aspect of Text World Theory. However, CFT does not incorporate any consideration of the context of the discourse itself; the world beyond readers' mental representations of the text. In Text World Theory this is included in the form of the discourse-world (Werth 1999: 83-6; Gavins 2007: 18-34; see section 2.2.1) but CFT has no corresponding level.

The lack of a discourse-world in CFT, I would argue, is a problem when trying to account for the emotional experience of literary narratives. Emmott (2002) proposes that CFT *is* able to address the affective dimension of narrative comprehension, arguing that CFT 'has always been implicitly social and affective since it deals with the relations between characters and a readers' empathy with these characters' (2002: 39). Indeed, Emmott makes several references to empathy throughout her 1997 exposition of the theory (1997: 16-7, 48, 57, 81, 106). In particular she suggests that readers store information about characters

in 'entity representations' (1997: 106), and it is these stores of information which 'enable empathy' (1997: 106). However, without a discourse-world concept, CFT cannot really talk about why particular readers might empathise with different characters, or how feelings of empathy may fluctuate as a discourse progresses for example. In later work, Emmott (2002) provides a valuable counter-argument to claims that mental representations are unable to account for the production of emotion in discourse (Green 2000: 66). She argues that mental representations provide the knowledge that enables us to construct 'social scenes' to which we can respond with feeling (2002: 33). Emmott asserts the importance of mental representations in the emotional experience of literary narratives, noting that 'constructing a context is one step towards producing an affective response to that context' (2002: 37). These ideas are very much advocated within this thesis (for example, see section 4.3.2). However, because CFT has no equivalent to the discourse-world level, which is necessary for the systematic examination of context, interaction and reader response, I believe it cannot advance its account of emotion in discourse. Instead, I argue that Text World Theory is best suited to such an investigation.

#### **2.1.5. Storyworlds**

Within cognitive narratology, a further worlds theory has become prominent in recent years (e.g. Herman 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2009; Margolin 2003). Drawing upon notions of mental representation in cognitive psychology (e.g. Johnson-Laird 1983) and linguistics (e.g. Webber 1979), Herman (2002) coined the term 'storyworld' to refer to the mental representations which readers form in order to process narrative discourse. There are several motivations behind Herman's use of the term 'storyworld'. Firstly, he proposes that it captures the 'ecology of narrative interpretation' (2002: 14), meaning that it extends beyond the sequential emphasis of classical narratology to view narrative interpretation as 'global' and 'integrative' rather than additive and incremental (2002: 14). Secondly, it also emphasises the 'world-creating' power of narrative, meaning narrative's 'ability to transport interpreters from the here and now' (2002: 14), in accordance with other work on 'worlds' in narratology (e.g. Gerrig 1993; Ryan 1991, 1998).

'Storyworlds', like 'contextual frames' (Emmott 1997), differ from text-worlds as they pertain solely to narrative discourse (Herman 2002: 5). Unlike Emmott (1997), Herman places emphasis on non-fictional as well as fictional narratives (2002: 21), and approaches a range of discourse types, including written literary texts, multimodal texts and verbal narratives (e.g. Herman 2009). However, he aligns himself with Emmott (1997) by arguing that the construction of discourse models in narrative contexts requires 'special or distinctive interpretative processes' (2002: 21). He also emphasises the emotive power of

narratives and regards emotion as arising from our vicarious experience of storyworlds (2002: 17; c.f. Gerrig 1993; Ryan 1991, 1998).

As with Contextual Frame Theory (see section 2.1.4 above), Herman's storyworlds concept is not equipped to consider the context of narrative discourse in any systematic way. Furthermore, unlike Text World Theory and Contextual Frame Theory (Emmott 1997), Herman does not seek to provide a rigorous and linguistically-focused framework for examining the interaction between readers and narrative texts. Indeed, at times his use of the term 'storyworld' does not even refer to mental representation. For example, when discussing the difference between fictional and non-fictional narratives, he writes: 'the storyworlds of historical narratives...stand in a different relation to one another than do the storyworlds of fictional narratives' (2002: 16). Here, 'storyworld' is used to refer to the content of the narrative from an external, comparative perspective rather than in relation to the mind of a particular discourse participant, and is thus more analogous to the notion of a possible-world (see section 2.1.1). For these reasons, Herman's storyworlds are useful in terms of their descriptive power, but not appropriate for the investigation of emotional experience.

## **2.2. Text World Theory: Central Tenets**

From the review of its influences and contexts in section 2.1, it should be apparent that Text World Theory is unique in several respects which make it particularly well-suited to an investigation of the emotional experience of literary discourse. Text World Theory is fundamentally a *discourse* framework, concerned with examining not only entire texts, but also the contexts surrounding their production and interpretation (Gavins 2007: 7). Thus, even written communication and narrative discourse are viewed in their situational context; as an interaction between two or more discourse participants who are spatio-temporally and socially situated. For these reasons, Text World Theory does not treat discourse participants as text-processors encountering sentence-level phenomena, or as decontextualised minds generating mental representations, but as human beings with knowledge, experiences, motivations, hopes, and so on, engaged in negotiating a communicative encounter. In addition to recognising the 'situational, social, historical, and psychological factors which play a crucial role in our cognition of language' (Gavins 2007: 9), Text World Theory incorporates rigorous and detailed linguistic analysis in its examination of the mental representations cued by discourse. It is able to track the effect of linguistic cues upon readers' mental representations, making it ideal for close textual analysis. Furthermore, these mental representations, or text-worlds, are richly detailed, dynamic, experiential constructs formed through the interaction between linguistic cues

and the resources of a human mind. In comparison with competing approaches, Text World Theory is capable of addressing a broad range of discourse types, of incorporating and adapting new theories about cognition and language, and providing a holistic approach to the experience of discourse.

In sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.4, I provide a critical review of the main tenets of text-world framework in advance of its application in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. I outline its central premises and highlight areas which remain in need of development. Section 2.2.5 considers the role of emotion in early versions of the theory, which provides the necessary context for my discussion of emotion theories in section 3.1 and more recent work on Text World Theory and emotion in section 3.2 of the following chapter.

### **2.2.1 The discourse-world**

Werth argues that all uses of language presuppose two conditions: firstly, they occur within a situational context, and secondly, they involve a conceptual domain of understanding which is jointly constructed by the producer and recipient(s) (1999: 17). Werth calls these the ‘discourse-world’ and ‘text-world’ respectively, and in Text World Theory both are fundamental components of all discourse situations. Essentially, both the discourse-world and text-world are constructs resulting from human cognitive processes – but the discourse-world is based on resources of direct perception which, Werth notes, we may suppose to be founded on ‘real’ external circumstances (1999: 17). The text-world, on the other hand, is a construct formed from resources of memory and imagination (Werth 1999: 17, and see section 2.2.2 below).

The discourse-world, then, is the situational context of a particular act of linguistic communication. Minimally, it must involve two or more human discourse ‘participants’ engaged in a naturally occurring language event (i.e. discourse) (Werth 1999: 83). In face-to-face communication, which Werth takes as the most basic, prototypical discourse-type (1995a: 51; 1999: 85), the discourse-world is the ‘here and now’ of those participants, including all the objects or things which they are able to perceive (Werth 1995a: 49-50). In most written discourses and some instances of verbal communication (such as telephone calls), however, the discourse-world is ‘split’ as participants occupy different spatio-temporal points (Werth 1995a: 54-55). Werth notes that in such cases primacy is placed on the linguistic aspects of the discourse (the text) in order for communication to take place. Gavins (2007) elaborates this idea by positing that during written communication, participants construct a re-creation of a face-to-face communicative situation at the text-world level (2007: 129). Thus, in literary narrative, for example, the narrator becomes a ‘substitute co-participant’ in the discourse (Gavins 2007: 129).

In theory, the text-worlds framework regards discourse participants as fully psychologised: this means that their knowledge, beliefs, memories, hopes, dreams, intentions and other mental aspects are also included as integral aspects of the discourse-world context (Werth 1995a: 52). Werth indicates this most clearly in a diagram which is reproduced as Figure 2.0. below (Werth 1995a). It is designed to show that participants are equipped not only with their physical senses, but also stores of memory and knowledge and an imaginative capacity which is fundamental to the proper consideration of context (Werth 1999: 86).





Figure 2.0. *The Discourse-World* (adapted from Werth 1995a: 52)

In section 2.1, I argued that the discourse-world concept, and in particular its assertion that discourse participants are human beings with knowledge, experiences, beliefs and so on, was a crucial component in the text-world approach. Indeed, in my view, Werth's inclusion of these faculties in his model of the discourse-world is one of the most attractive elements of Text World Theory. However, it must be noted that in actuality, Werth (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1997a, 1997b, 1999) only gives detailed consideration to participant knowledge (which is reviewed below) and does not consider the other mental faculties beyond their inclusion in this diagram (Figure 2.0). Considering the theory's claim to reflect the experiential and contextual aspects of discourse processing, Werth's failure to engage with these faculties is a notable omission. Perhaps even more surprisingly, work in Text World Theory (e.g. Gavins 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005a; Hidalgo Downing 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Stockwell 2002) continued for several years after the publication of Werth's (1999) monograph without addressing this gap in the discourse-world model. It is only with the recent interest in the emotional experience of discourse that further attention has been paid to areas such as participants' political beliefs, memories and personalities – this work is reviewed in section 3.2 below, particularly section 3.2.2 (Gavins 2007; Lahey 2005; Stockwell 2005a, 2009).

Even though Werth (1999) dedicates more attention to knowledge in discourse processing, there are still some problems with his treatment of this area. Knowledge is key to the Text World Theory framework, and the primary basis of discourse is viewed as the transfer of knowledge from the private to the public realm, a process known as ‘incrementation’. Knowledge incrementation underpins all discourse, including communicative acts such as exchanging facts; specifying goals, arguing opinions and expressing emotional states (Gavins 2007: 21). Werth depicts the incrementation process, in a somewhat simplistic manner, in the diagram below:



**Figure 2.1.** *Knowledge Incrementation* (adapted from Werth 1999: 95)

In addition to exchanging knowledge through discourse in the manner depicted in Figure 2.1, Werth notes that all participants have an existing body of knowledge which is crucial to discourse interpretation (1999: 94). This is called a knowledge-base and is divided into four often interrelated areas regarding perceptual, experiential, linguistic and cultural knowledge (Gavins 2007: 21-3, 29; Werth 1999: 94-115). Perceptual knowledge pertains to the things in the immediate environment which are ‘manifest’ to the participants and may potentially figure in the discourse. Gavins (2007) gives the example of a conversation in a sandwich shop, where things which are manifest to the participants are likely to include objects such as ‘a menu board’, ‘a cash register’ and sensory input such as the smells and temperature (Gavins 2007: 22). Experiential knowledge refers to the relative familiarity or novelty of the items concerned (Gavins 2007: 22) and includes sets of knowledge regarding the way certain situations usually unfold – analogous to the notion of ‘scripts’ in Artificial Intelligence (Schank and Abelson 1977). Linguistic knowledge is the structured, systematic and analytical knowledge underlying our use of language, including, for example, knowledge regarding how to form sentences, what words mean and how to articulate an utterance (Werth 1999: 101-2). Cultural knowledge contains all the non-linguistic information available to individuals and groups living in a particular society, including notions like ideology (Gavins 2007: 23; Werth 1999: 97). Compared with linguistic knowledge, cultural knowledge is only partially structured into ‘frames’ (see below); is open-ended in that new information can be generated constantly; and is contingent in that it is not logically necessary or analytic (Werth 1999: 97).

According to the text-world approach, knowledge is stored in ‘frames’, a term which originated in Artificial Intelligence research (e.g. Bobrow and Winograd 1977;



Charnaik 1977; Minsky 1975; Schank and Abelson 1977) and has been influential in cognitive linguistics (e.g. Fillmore 1982, 1985; Lakoff 1987). Werth notes that frames are not well defined in this body of work, but pertain to ‘something like an ‘area of experience’ in a particular culture’ (Werth 1999: 106-7). In trying to pin down the way frames are structured and organised, Werth posits a distinction between propositional and functional knowledge. Propositional knowledge tends to be consciously acquired and retrieved and consists of a set of propositions expressing ‘facts’ of various kinds, such as: ‘Belgium is a kingdom’ or ‘Electricity is dangerous’ (Werth 1999: 102). Functional knowledge consists of sets of acts, which can be physical or mental and (once learnt) functional knowledge tends to be retrieved unconsciously – for example ‘tying a shoelace’, ‘driving a car’ or ‘diagnosing an illness’ (Werth 1999: 102). Werth notes that functional knowledge is derived from our physical interaction with the world (c.f. Lakoff’s (1987) notion of an Idealised Cognitive Model) and propositional knowledge is a ‘higher extension’ of the functional which ‘extends the possibilities of conceptualisation from the physical to the abstract’ (Werth 1999: 111).

Fundamental to the Text World Theory notion of context, then, is the potentially vast store of knowledge which participants bring to bear on their interpretation of discourse. But in addition to recognising this store of knowledge, Werth also proposed a useful means of dealing with it in practical terms. He notes that previous attempts to deal with discourse context have failed because theorists have assumed that they have to define ‘all the information available to the speaker or hearer, which has to mean all the information which might possible occur in the culture’ (Werth 1999: 116). This, as Werth points out, ‘is no less than *all* the knowledge available in principle and in fact to the whole human race!’ (1999: 116). In Text World Theory, the potentially infinite scope of participant knowledge is narrowed down using the principle of ‘text-drivenness’ (Werth 1999: 149). This principle specifies that only *relevant* areas of participants’ knowledge bases are activated during discourse processing, and the relevant areas are indicated by the text itself. Once activated by textual cues, participants’ knowledge frames aid the construction of text-worlds by enabling them to make inferences which flesh-out their mental representations (Werth 1999: 148). For example, Gavins (2007) notes that when reading a novel by Thomas Hardy readers need only activate areas of knowledge specifically required by the text, such as those regarding farming in the nineteenth century, human relationships and the Dorset/Wessex countryside, for instance. As they are not referred to in the course of the text, readers’ knowledge about ‘football matches’ or ‘how to reboot a computer’ will remain redundant (2007: 29).

In face-to-face conversation, participants typically take turns at speaking and creating the text, thus the relevant context for the discourse is jointly negotiated (Werth 1999: 85). Werth argues that a more private version of this negotiation process also takes place in written communication as the text interacts with the reader's existing knowledge (Werth 1999: 48). Thus, processes of knowledge activation and transfer are central to Werth's model of discourse, and in an attempt to capture the way such processes are negotiated during communication he proposes the concept of the 'Common Ground' (1999: 117-55). The Common Ground, according to Werth (1999: 49, 117-55), is the totality of the information which participants have agreed to accept as relevant for their discourse; including information from the text and from the participants' background knowledge and inferences (Werth 1999: 119). Werth uses the notion of the Common Ground in order to account for the way certain propositions are coherent and others incoherent within the context of a particular discourse. He suggests that in discourse, each new proposition from the text is either in the Common Ground already, or represents new information which is yet to be incremented. If the proposition is not already in the Common Ground, it may be incremented if it is seen to be coherent with the Common Ground; fitting the context already established (Werth 1999: 49). If the proposition is deemed incoherent, it will either be rejected from the Common Ground, or interpreted as a conversational implicature, and 'incremented as metaphorical, ironic, etc' (Werth 1999: 49). He also posits that the Common Ground demonstrates the interactive and negotiated nature of discourse, as discourses are essentially '*mutual attempts to negotiate*' a Common Ground (Werth 1999: 49).

There are several problems in Werth's explication of the Common Ground, however. For example, he never specifies the relationship between the Common Ground and the text-worlds which form the basis of his approach. It is not clear whether the Common Ground is a mental representation or some other unspecified mental construct, or how information within it contributes to the building of text-worlds. Though Werth (1999) claims that the Common Ground contains all the information which is 'tacitly accepted' by discourse participants (1999: 49), he gives no indication of what such acceptance involves or how it might be assessed or quantified. As a result, the notion of the Common Ground is perhaps the most flawed aspect of Werth's account of the discourse-world. Though it reflects his view of the dynamic, shifting and negotiated nature of communication, it is highly underspecified and as such lacks explanatory power. In her version of the theory, Gavins (2007) omits the concept altogether.

In an elaboration of his view that discourse is fundamentally a process of negotiation, Werth (1999) proposes the existence of three 'discourse meta-principles',

similar to those proposed by Grice (1975), which regulate interactions in discourse (1999: 49-50). The principle of ‘communicativeness’ states that discourses should normally be assumed to be purposive and efficient (Werth 1999: 49); the principle of ‘coherence’ specifies that entities, events and propositions should be relevant and not introduced to the discourse superfluously (Werth 1999: 50); and finally the principle of ‘cooperativeness’ states that discourse participants ‘tacitly agree to jointly negotiate’ the discourse in accordance with the other principles (Werth 1999: 50). This area of Werth’s framework has also been reviewed in later versions of Text World Theory. Gavins (2001) notes that these discourse principles cannot be said to apply uncomplicatedly in all discourse situations. For example, she notes that some literary fiction deliberately problematises the readers’ creation of text-worlds in order to create particular effects, and that in these cases the author ‘would at least appear to be unconcerned with the “efficiency” of his communication’ (2001: 210). The popularity of such texts is a testament to the fact that failure to adhere to the discourse meta-principles does not render a text uncommunicative on all levels (Gavins 2001: 211). Instead, Gavins (2007) places prominence on the idea of the *willingness* of participants who are engaged in discourse. This is the crucial aspect of the relationship between participants in the discourse world, but participants are not always governed by the discourse meta-principles Werth defined. However, Gavins notes that:

...the wilful nature of all communication leads us to expect, as a norm, that our co-participants in the discourse-world are telling the truth...This is not to say that deception does not take place in discourse, but it is not our prototypical expectation of the motivating force behind an act of communication. (Gavins 2007: 76-7)

Although there are problems in Werth’s model of knowledge use and negotiation, some of which remain to be addressed by future work in Text World Theory, the discourse-world level of the framework is important as it enables situational and psychological context to be incorporated into discourse analysis. In particular, the notion of text-drivenness is very useful in managing the potentially vast scope of discourse context. The analyses in this thesis contribute to the discourse-world level of Text World Theory in several ways which are reviewed in section 3.2.2.

### **2.2.2. Building text-worlds**

The text-world is ‘the situation depicted by the discourse’ or the ‘story’ which is the subject of the discourse (Werth 1999: 87). Text-worlds may relate to the immediate discourse-world context, but also often depict states of affairs from the memory or imagination of participants (Werth 1999: 85). Text-worlds are conceptual: they are the mental representations which participants form in order to comprehend the linguistic part of the

discourse. They are also text-driven; participants construct text-worlds from a combination of the linguistic cues in the text and their knowledge-based inferences.

The discourse-world and text-world are seen as structurally equivalent, meaning that text-worlds can be as richly detailed as the discourse-world. As noted in section 2.1.1, this is an important difference between text-worlds and possible-worlds in philosophy. Texts provide two types of information which contribute to the construction and maintenance of text-worlds in the minds of discourse-world participants, in a similar way to Fauconnier's (1985) 'space builders'. The first are 'world-building' propositions, which give the deictic parameters of the text world: establishing when and where it is located, plus who and what is present within it, and the relationships between these elements. Linguistically, world-builders include spatial locatives and adverbs (in Sheffield, far away); demonstratives (these, those); verbs of motion (come, go); temporal locatives and adverbs (in ancient times, yesterday); variations in tense, definite articles, noun phrases and personal pronouns (Gavins 2007: 35-52; Lahey 2006: 148; Werth 1999: 180-90). In the discourse-world, sentient entities are referred to as 'participants' (Werth 1999: 189), but the sentient entities who exist at the text-world level are known as either 'characters' in Werth's (1999) version of the theory, or 'enactors' in Gavins' (2007, see also Emmott 1992, 1997; Werth 1999: 82). The term 'enactor' is preferred in the present discussion because it captures the sense that there can be multiple versions of the same entities across text-worlds (Emmott 1997: 180-2) and because text-world entities, even in literary text-worlds, are not always characters; they can also be projections of the discourse participants, for example (Gavins 2007). Enactors at the text-world level are assumed to be equivalent to participants in the discourse-world, thus possessing knowledge, memories, hopes, dreams, beliefs and emotions, etcetera (Gavins 2007: 42; Werth 1999: 82).

World-builders set the 'background' or scene of the text world, and the second type of information provided by the text takes the form of function-advancing propositions. Function-advancers describe actions or processes in the 'foreground' of the text-world, and 'propel a discourse forward' in some way (Gavins 2007: 56). Gavins (2007: 56) draws on terminology from Systemic Functional Linguistics (e.g. Halliday 1985, 1994) in order to describe the processes signalled by function-advancers, which generally fall into three categories: material processes (involving some kind of animate or inanimate actor), mental processes (involving a sensor and perceptions, cognitions or reactions) and existential processes (which simply describe the existence of a text-world element). The 'function' which is advanced within a text world depends upon the wider function which participants perceive the discourse to have. For example, function advancers in narrative are seen to be plot-advancing, whereas in descriptive passages they may be scene-advancing or person-

advancing, or in instructive texts they may be goal-advancing (Werth 1999: 191). Werth illustrates some of the typical functions found in discourse in the table below:

Text Type	Predicate Type	Function	Speech Act
Narrative	Action, event	Plot-advancing	Report, recount
Descriptive: scene	State	Scene-advancing	Describe scene
: person	State, property	Person-advancing	Describe character
: routine	Habitual	Routine-advancing	Describe routine
Discursive	Relational	Argument-advancing	Postulate, conclude..
Instructive	Imperative	Goal-advancing	Request, command..
etc.			

**Figure 2.2.** *Function Advancers* adapted from Werth (1999: 191)

From the ‘etc.’ at the bottom left-hand side of Figure 2.2., it is evident that this table was meant only as an illustrative outline of some of the more common discourse functions. The function of a piece of discourse is essentially part of what is negotiated at the discourse-world level. Thus, a speaker or writer within a discourse-world will produce a text containing the function-advancing propositions which they think will best suit their communicative goals, and the listener or reader will formulate a separate interpretation of those propositions which may or may not be the same as the text-producer’s (Gavins 2007: 63-4).

Werth (1999) draws a clear-cut distinction between world-building and function-advancing propositions, but the strictness of this division has been subject to some criticism in later applications of the theory (Gavins 2007; Lahey 2006). Gavins points out that in descriptive texts certain textual elements can have both world-building *and* function-advancing roles (2007: 63) and Lahey (2006) also notes that function-advancers can play a key role in world-building. The central problem appears to be that, despite Werth’s claims regarding Text World Theory’s applicability to all discourse, the majority of the examples in his monograph come from literary narratives. As an example of his bias towards this genre, Lahey (2006: 158, 161) cites Werth’s claim that the spatio-temporal location of a text-world is usually ‘explicitly mentioned linguistically’ at the beginning of a discourse (Werth 1999: 187). Through her analysis of lyric poetry, Lahey establishes that for this discourse-type such locative information is often *not* given at the start of the discourse. Instead, the location of the poetic text-worlds must be inferred by readers from a combination of non-locative noun phrases, and sometimes function-advancing information which cues knowledge frames containing locative content (Lahey 2006: 159, 161). Thus, world-building is much more of an inferential process, as readers assemble ‘clues’ and combine them with

their pre-existing knowledge in order to determine the location of a text-world (Lahey 2006: 157-8). As a result of her investigations, Lahey advises that 'in practice, divisions between linguistic elements in terms of their contribution to discourse processes are not nearly so strict' (2006: 162).

The genre-bias and problems inherent in Werth's world-builder/function-advancer distinction clearly require further research in the future development of Text World Theory. However, in the context of the present discussion, Werth's (1999: 187) claim that 'in normal cases the deictic elements [of text-worlds] are set out overtly' can be seen to accord with the expectations readers have of the opening of literary narratives. For example, in section 5.2 I explore the emotional responses of readers who are faced with ambiguous world-building information at the opening of Ishiguro's *Never Let Me Go* (2005). When world-building information is unclear or absent, this can have an impact upon readers' experience of the discourse and in the case of the readers I investigated, resulted in some strong emotional effects.

### **2.2.3. World-switches and modal-worlds**

In his version of Text World Theory, Werth (1999) used the term 'sub-world' to refer to worlds which originate from within text-worlds and represent some kind of perceived shift away from the parameters of the matrix world from which they emerge. Like text-worlds, 'sub-worlds' also contain world-builders and function-advancers, and can be richly detailed or fleeting and undeveloped. They are cued by the presence of modality, negation, hypotheticality, focalisation and spatio-temporal shifts in the text, and Werth distinguished between three types of sub-world: 'deictic', 'epistemic' and 'attitudinal' (1999: 216). Gavins (2001, 2005a, 2007) has made several important modifications to this area of Werth's theory, and it is Gavins' modifications which are adopted in this thesis. Firstly, Gavins proposes the loss of the prefix 'sub-'. In her analyses of Absurd prose fiction she notes that 'sub-worlds' can in fact form the dominant world in readers' conceptual representation of the discourse. Thus, they are not always subsidiary to text-worlds, and Werth's hierarchical terminology is misleading (Gavins 2001: 194-5, 246). Instead, 'sub-worlds' are renamed non-hierarchically as either 'world-switches' (deriving from Emmott's 'frame-switch' 1997: 147-9), or 'modal worlds' (Gavins 2001: 205, 2005a). With regard to modal worlds, Gavins also brings Text World Theory's treatment of modality in line with accepted theories (e.g. Coates 1983, Simpson 1993). It is common for texts to involve multiple world-switches and modal-worlds, which are described below.

World-switches occur when the spatial and/or temporal deictic parameters established within the matrix world change. Examples from narrative include flashbacks, views of concurrent scenes and incidences of direct speech. World-building elements are

key in signalling a world-switch, through deictic references to time and place for example. World-switches occur because the linguistic features in the text determine that participants have to build new worlds with new deictic parameters (or return to previously created worlds) in order to process the discourse at hand.

Modal-worlds are created by modalised propositions in the text, which express a speaker or writer's attitude to a particular subject. Modalised propositions form conceptual worlds distinct from the matrix world because in order to understand them discourse participants 'conceptualise both the propositions being modalised and, separately, the speaker's attitude toward them' (Gavins 2005a: 13). Modality creates a sense of conceptual distance between the speaker and the modalised proposition, thus the use of a modal term cues the construction of a modal-world which is separate from its originating text-world, and usually contains some as-yet-unrealised situation. According to Simpson's (1993) model, upon which Gavins' (2001, 2005a, 2007) modifications are based, boulomaic modality indicates the wishes and desires of a speaker or writer, for example: 'I *hope* you'll leave'; 'I *wish* you'd leave'. Deontic modality expresses the degree of obligation which the speaker or writer perceives as attached to the performance of certain actions; e.g. 'you *must* leave', 'you *should* leave'. Epistemic modality is concerned with a speaker's confidence or lack of confidence in the truth of a proposition expressed, for example 'You *must* be right' (high level of confidence); 'You *could* be right' (lower level of confidence), and includes perception modality, in which reference to human perception signals epistemic meaning, e.g. 'It's *clear* that you're right'; 'you're *evidently* right'. Thus, following Gavins' augmentations, Text World Theory recognises that boulomaic, deontic and epistemic modal-worlds can be cued by a text. Epistemic modal-worlds are the largest class of modal-worlds, characterised by 'the expression of personal knowledge and belief' (Gavins 2007: 118). Thus, epistemic modal worlds are also created by expressions of hypotheticality, such as conditionals (e.g. 'if you do that I'll eat my hat') which feature remote, unrealised situations separate from the text-world. In narrative, focalisation also forms epistemic modal-worlds, as the world-building and function-advancing propositions are filtered through the knowledge and beliefs of a particular enactor (Gavins 2001, 2007; Lahey 2005).

#### **2.2.4. Accessibility**

World-switches and modal-worlds can be created by participants at the discourse-world level *or* enactors at the text-world level, but as a result have different levels of 'accessibility'. The notion of accessibility in Text World Theory is related to that in possible-worlds theories (see section 2.1.1 above), and arises from the ontological differences between participants and enactors. Participants are real people, and the wilful nature of communication leads discourse-world participants, as a norm, to expect their co-

participants to be cooperative and truthful (Gavins 2007: 76; Grice 1975; Werth 1999: 49-50). A world is 'participant accessible', then, if discourse-world participants are able to use knowledge from their own ontological environment to assess the truth-value and reliability of its contents. As enactors are textual entities that exist in an ontological domain which is distinct from that of the discourse-world participants, the conventions which apply to communication in the discourse-world cannot be presumed to apply to them. Worlds they create are 'enactor accessible', and their contents are held in a type of 'conceptual suspended animation' until participant-accessible evidence regarding their truth value is attained (Gavins 2007:79).

Gavins (2000, 2001, 2003, 2007) demonstrates that these rules of accessibility are often utilised within literary narratives in order to create certain effects (Gavins 2007: 135). For example, in narratives with fixed, first person, homodiegetic narrators (Genette 1980), there is very little participant-accessible information. The vast majority of world-building and function-advancing propositions are filtered through the unverifiable perspective of a character, and the entire discourse is composed of enactor-accessible, epistemic modal-worlds. In such cases, if readers wish to construct a mental representation of the discourse they have no choice but to increment the information obtained from enactor-accessible worlds, and indeed typically do so as a result of their 'sub-conscious processing habits' (Gavins 2007: 141). When readers are reliant upon enactor-accessible information alone, texts can play deliberate tricks upon them – often raising questions about the reliability of the narrator and at some point exposing the instability of the enactor-accessible worlds upon which readers have been relying (Gavins 2007: 141). The novels analysed in Chapters 4 to 6 also feature homodiegetic, fixed focalisation and the effects in these particular cases will be considered in more detail in sections 4.2, 5.2 and 6.2.

### **2.2.5 The roots of emotion in Text World Theory**

The emphasis which Text World Theory places upon context and experience, as outlined in sections 2.1 and 2.2.1, might lead one to expect that it is also concerned with the emotional aspects of discourse processing alongside the cognitive. In truth, Text World Theory's treatment of emotion is something which has only recently been developed and is still in its relative infancy (Gavins 2007; Lahey 2005; Stockwell 2005a, 2009).

In the early sections of his monograph, Werth (1999) clearly suggests that emotions are an essential part of Text World Theory's experiential, context-focused approach to discourse processing. He lists 'emotions and beliefs' as one of the eight characteristics fundamental to the 'human linguistics' which he advocates (1999: 21). Furthermore, when reviewing the basic tenets of a cognitive approach, Werth (1999) explicitly disagrees with Gardner's (1985) claim that cognitive science should include a 'de-emphasis on emotion,



culture and context', writing: 'in the present account [this is]...very much denied' (1999: 25). Werth's awareness of the importance of emotion is also indicated in his discussion of the aims of 'ordinary' as opposed to literary-critical readers, when he notes:

the ordinary reader, I assume, is concerned almost exclusively with extracting meaning from the text, including emotional content, spiritual or moral significance and suchlike (1999: 18)

Though the use of the verb 'extracting' here is problematic as it does not comply with the Text World Theory view that meaning is actively negotiated by discourse participants (Werth outlines this view later in his monograph, e.g. 1999: 118-55), the key element in this quotation is the notion that emotion is integral to the reading experience, and indeed is one of the central motivations for readers' engagement with literary texts.

Though Werth situates emotion within the remit of Text World Theory, his own treatment of the 'emotional content' or effects of discourse is limited. He discusses the expression of emotion through language in two brief sections about attitudinal predicates (1999: 113-5; 1999: 272-3), which he notes, 'express the speaker's **emotional response** towards the proposition embedded below them' (1999: 272, emphasis present in original). In the first section he is concerned with demonstrating the potential range of meanings invoked by predicates within a discourse (rather than sentence-level) context. For example, he considers the use of predicates 'know' and 'believe', noting that:

Believing...suggests in some cases an emotional rather than intellectual attitude towards the information, and in some cases a polite or ironic distancing which suggests a lesser degree of conviction. (1999: 114-5)

Werth's concern with the effects of predicate choice is continued in the second section, where he discusses the use of 'sorry' and 'glad' in three extracts from a Graham Greene novel. Here, Werth is primarily concerned with whether the information held in the propositions following the predicates is given or new and whether the utterances are sincere, polite or ironic. But Werth's approach to emotion is undeveloped beyond these brief discussions. He does not expand upon his comments regarding the relationship between emotion and belief or irony and politeness, for example, and he does not consider other linguistic features which express emotion. Furthermore, his approach seems inconsistent as he does not mention emotion at all when discussing the text-worlds formed by attitudinal predicates (1999: 227-33). Unfortunately, Werth does refer readers to an unpublished article which he claims provides a 'fuller discussion' of attitudinal predicates (Werth: unpublished), but since his death this manuscript has not been recovered.

Werth does mention emotion in several other places in his monograph, but his comments are even less developed. For example, the notion of the 'situation' is central to

Werth's account of the rich, complex worlds involved in discourse production and reception. A situation is a set of entities at a particular time and location; including sentient entities such as participants and characters, their relationships and qualities, and other objects and concepts (Werth 1999: 82). When giving examples of the concepts which form part of situations, Werth writes: 'The term 'concepts' covers all abstractions, emotions etc.' (1999: 82), but this reference to emotion is not expanded upon in his subsequent analyses. At one point, when analysing an extract from a novel by William Faulkner, Werth suggests that certain text-worlds it creates could be characterised as 'emotional' – but this suggestion occurs in parenthesis in the penultimate chapter of his monograph, and is not explained further (1999: 335). He also refers to emotion when discussing metaphor, but only to illustrate the way we understand abstract phenomena such as emotions through reference to the concrete or physical (1999: 313, Lakoff and Johnson 1980).

Thus, although Werth clearly regards emotions as part of discourse, he does not specify how he conceives of 'emotion' and fails to integrate emotion into Text World Theory in any consistent or developed manner. Most significantly, Werth's discussion of emotion is limited to the emotions of characters in novels, and he does not consider the emotions experienced by the speakers, writers, hearers or readers who participate in discourse. Furthermore, he only considers one way in which character emotion might be expressed, overlooking the other factors which may display character emotion in literary discourse such as their behaviour or speech for example. As noted in section 2.2.1, Werth does not go very far in considering the psychological or emotional facets of discourse-world participants, instead focusing on knowledge use and negotiation. Even then, he gives no consideration to the potential relationship between participant knowledge and emotion (see section 6.3).

In the years following Werth's exposition of the theory, text-world theorists largely ignored emotional issues in favour of developing other aspects of the framework. For example, Hidalgo-Downing (2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2003a) makes no reference to emotion throughout her extensive work on negation in narrative and poetry, and in her study of the text-worlds produced by advertising discourse, her brief mention of their emotional appeal (Hidalgo-Downing 2003b: 4) is not developed in her analyses. Likewise, Gavins' (2000, 2001, 2003, 2005a) makes considerable augmentations to Text World Theory, but is largely concerned with information-processing issues and does not explicitly address emotion. It is only very recently that emotion has become a central focus of development in Text World Theory, and this has been pioneered by text-world theorists working in the fields of stylistics and cognitive poetics: notably Gavins' more recent work (2007), Lahey (2005) and Stockwell (2005a, 2009). The work of these researchers is addressed in detail in section 3.2

of the following chapter. Along with Gavins (2007), Lahey (2005) and Stockwell (2005a, 2009), it is also my belief that the explicit consideration of emotion is a necessary development if Text World Theory hopes to account for the experiential and contextual aspects of discourse in the manner it currently claims to.

It is important to note, however, that to date work on Text World Theory and emotion has discussed emotion without paying much attention to how it is defined or what it constitutes (though see Lahey 2005: 265-8 for a brief consideration of socio-evolutionary approaches to emotion). A possible justification for this omission is that these theorists are not attempting to explain emotion *itself*, but rather incorporate a more intuitive sense of it into the Text World Theory framework. For example, Lahey (2005) states that she aims to provide ‘a mechanism by which we may *understand how to understand* emotional response using Text World Theory’, as opposed to explaining emotional response in any other contexts (2005: 264-5, emphasis present in original). In this thesis, my approach is similar to Lahey’s in that my concern is with how emotion may be understood in Text World Theory terms, rather than as a phenomenon outside of discourse. However, I believe that an understanding of how emotion is theorised in other disciplines and outside of discourse can significantly aid this endeavour. As Parkinson (1995) notes, our intuitive ideas about emotion are not always the most reliable source of information regarding how emotions operate. Furthermore, emotion is a very general term which potentially relates to a wide set of phenomena: and considering this term in more detail can only benefit an account of emotion in discourse. Finally, an engagement with theories about emotion from other disciplines is in keeping with the interdisciplinary foundations of Text World Theory and recent work on emotion in cognitive poetics (for example see Burke 2008 and Semino 1997 for cognitive-poetic engagement with emotion theories from cognitive science). In section 3.1 of the following chapter I briefly review some modern approaches to emotion and identify those theories which I perceive to be most relevant to informing the Text World Theory understanding of emotion in discourse. This discussion feeds into my engagement with current approaches to emotion in Text World Theory in section 3.2.

### **2.3 Review**

In this chapter I have provided a critical introduction to the central tenets of Text World Theory, discussing the framework’s influences and context within current cognitive poetics. I have established that Text World Theory has unique potential for the discussion of the emotional experience of literary discourse because of the richness of text-worlds and the discourse-world level of the framework. Although Werth (1999) recognises the importance of emotion in discourse, I have argued that his version of the framework fails to integrate

emotion into Text World Theory in any consistent or developed manner. Such development is, in my view, necessary for the advancement of the text-world framework and is already underway in the work of Gavins (2007), Lahey (2005) and Stockwell (2005a, 2009). Following a review of emotion theories within psychology (section 3.1) the work of Gavins (2007), Lahey (2005) and Stockwell (2005a, 2009) is addressed in section 3.2 of the following chapter.

# Chapter 3:

## Emotion and Reader Response

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### 3.0 Preview

Following the introduction to Text World Theory provided in Chapter 2, the present chapter continues to set out the theoretical and methodological parameters of this thesis. It was noted in section 2.2.5 that although theorists have begun to address emotion using Text World Theory (Gavins 2007; Lahey 2005; Stockwell 2005a, 2009), within this work there has been little engagement with theories of emotion from other disciplines. In section 3.1 I review some cognitive and social psychological approaches to the phenomenon of emotion. I argue that, due to Text World Theory's concern with cognitive and social factors in discourse processing, cognitive and social psychological theories of emotion are particularly suited to informing the Text World Theory understanding of emotion in discourse. In section 3.2 I review current work on emotion in Text World Theory and related disciplines, indicating the areas to which this thesis contributes, before proceeding, in section 3.3, to justify and explain the reader response data I have collected. This reader response data informs the analyses conducted in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, and in section 3.3 I provide information about my data collection and analysis, discussing my methodology in relation to other work in stylistics, cognitive poetics and empirical studies of literature.

### 3.1 Emotion: Definitions and Theories

As emotion is so fundamental to human experience, research into emotion is conducted within and across several major disciplines including anthropology, psychology, computer science, neuroscience, philosophy and literary study. There is a vast amount of research dedicated to investigating emotional phenomena and a similarly vast range of theories about and approaches to the issue. Although the majority of people have an intuitive sense of what the word 'emotion' means when they use it in everyday discourse, within emotion research there is a surprising degree of disagreement and controversy over the term. For example, in their review of emotion literature, Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981) found 92 distinct definitions of the term 'emotion' organised into 11 categories. The difficulty in defining emotion is also illustrated in these comments by social psychologists:

Everyone knows what an emotion is, until asked to give a definition. Then no one knows. (Fehr and Russell 1984: 464).

Historically, emotion has had the reputation of being a particularly perilous swamp, where explorers are more likely to be swallowed up than they are to emerge enriched from the experience. (Berscheid 1982: 47)

Some of this difficulty arises from the fact that 'emotion' is both a folk-psychological concept (meaning that it is used in everyday non-scientific discourse), and a phenomenon of scientific investigation. The relationship between these two spheres is complex. Studies which make conclusions about emotion as a scientific concept simply by examining the use of emotion labels in folk psychology, for example, have come under heavy criticism for failing to recognise that everyday descriptions of emotion are not simply a window into psychological reality (e.g. see Griffiths 1997: 23 on Kenny 1963; Parkinson 1995: 4-8; 1995: 227-63; Robinson 2005: 98-9 on judgement theorists). However, Parkinson (1995) points out that folk psychology 'ideas' about emotion are also hugely influential upon the emotional 'realities' which scientific investigation seeks to target, and that the two realms are in many ways inseparable (e.g. 1995: 261-2).

A further complication is the differentiation between terms such as 'emotion', 'feeling' and 'affect', which are used synonymously in some contexts and as distinct referential terms in others. All these terms refer to aspects of felt experience or phenomenality, but there is no clear consensus regarding their usage. 'Affect' is often regarded as the most general of these terms, encompassing moods, emotions, attitudes and preferences (e.g. Eysenk and Keane 1995: 435; Kuiken et al 2004: 174; Parrott 2001: 4). In contrast, 'emotion' tends to refer specifically to 'relatively brief but intense experiences' though can also be used in a broader sense (Eysenk and Keane 1995: 435). Some researchers argue that emotion refers to a set of (often physically manifest) responses whereas feelings are less structured, private experiences. For example, Damasio (2000) argues that the term 'feeling' should be reserved for the 'private, mental experience of an emotion', while the term 'emotion' should be used to designate 'a collection of responses, many of which are publicly observable' (2000: 42-3). Similarly, Kuiken et al (2004) define emotions as 'discrete and innate psychobiological reaction patterns independent of awareness' and feelings as 'the bodily sense, within awareness' of all aspects of affect. They argue that feelings are more 'subtle' and 'less readily named' than emotions (2004: 174). In other cases the terms are used interchangeably. For example, Robinson (2005) makes no distinction between 'emotion' and 'feeling' and, in his discussion of literary emotions, Opdahl (2002) argues that terms such as 'feeling' and 'affect' are used to 'jettison whatever is uncontrollable or sloppy' (2002: 81) about the study of emotion, thus 'emotion' is his preferred term for all three.

In this thesis I also favour the term 'emotion' when talking about the felt experience of literature. This is because I am primarily interested in the 'relatively brief but intense experiences' which can occur during literary reading. Moods and longer-lasting

states are not part of my central concern, though in section 6.5 I offer some consideration of sensations of ‘resonance’ (Stockwell 2009). However my use of the term ‘emotion’ is quite broad, in that I also regard preferences (i.e. likes and dislikes) to be part of emotion, and I do not attempt to distinguish between emotions and feelings. I believe that it is sufficient to recognise that some aspects of emotional experience are more ‘private’, less easy to name, correspond less easily with set reaction patterns or have different intensities, without needing to distinguish these as ‘feelings’ in the present discussion. This broad use of the term emotion is by no means idiosyncratic; a range of psychological phenomena (including those discussed above) are often grouped under the heading ‘emotion’ (Griffiths 1998: 202; this is also evidenced by journal titles in this field, for example; *Cognition and Emotion*; *Emotion*; *Emotion Review*; *Motivation and Emotion* and so on).

As emotion research is such a wide-ranging interdisciplinary endeavour, there is at present no single theory of emotion which is regarded to be the most definitive, even within particular areas of the field. Parrott notes that:

Although some researchers focus on biology, others on cognition, and still others on social and cultural aspects of emotion, theorists generally recognise that these approaches are interrelated and the complete understanding of emotions requires knowledge of all the levels of analysis (2001: 7)

Similarly, Griffiths (1997, 1998: 202) argues that emotion cannot be brought under a single, general theory, and advocates the preservation and development of successful theories regarding different aspects of the phenomena. In this thesis, therefore, I do not claim that a single, general theory of emotion is most suited to describing emotion in literary reading. I do, however, propose that cognitive and social approaches to emotion are particularly applicable to literary reading, and should be drawn upon in the development of the Text World Theory account of emotion in discourse processing. This is because literary reading, as modelled by Text World Theory, is a cognitive process involving perception, memory and imagination. It is also a social process: involving discursive interaction between people within a particular cultural and spatio-temporal context. In sections 3.1.2. and 3.1.3 below I review some social and cognitive approaches to emotion and in section 3.1.4 I move on to consider literary emotion in particular.

Insights from neuroscience have been gaining appeal within cognitive poetics and literary study more broadly (e.g. Burke 2001, 2008; Byatt 2006; Gibbons 2008; Keen 2006, 2007; Martindale et al 2006; Miall 1995, 2006; Tsur 1992, 2003a, 2008), particularly the discovery of ‘mirror neurones’ which are posited to be a neural basis for empathy (e.g. Botvinick et al 2005; Gallese 2003, 2005; Gallese and Goldman 1998; Gallese et al 2002; Jackson et al 2005; Keysers et al 2004; Rizzolatti et al 1996; Singer et al 2004; Wicker et al

2003). In the present discussion neuroscientific advances are considered where relevant, but neuroscientific approaches to emotion do not form the focus of this thesis. This is primarily because language, an aspect of literature which is of central concern in my approach, is not well understood in neuroscience. Neuroscientific approaches are concerned primarily with the brain regions and neurochemical reactions which are involved in emotion, and there are problems extrapolating from this research to the domain of literary reading. For example, LeDoux, a key researcher in the field of neuroscience and emotion, makes the following comment regarding how to elicit fear in an empirical situation:

while it is possible to use either a simple tone or a spoken sentence as a conditional stimuli, it will be much more difficult to trace pathways involved in fear conditioning to the sentence, since the processing of the sentence is a much more complex and less well understood brain operation. (LeDoux 1998: 148)

Because of this lack of understanding, the use of neuroscientific findings in the literary realm is often reductive as it inevitably shifts focus away from the linguistic, textual and contextual aspects of literary reading (for a similar view see Stockwell 2008a: 591; 2009: 3; Tallis 2008). This reductionism is incompatible with Text World Theory as it is the interaction of linguistic, textual and contextual factors which form its central concerns. Thus, neuroscience will figure only minimally in the following discussion.

### **3.1.1 Cognition and emotion**

In early cognitive psychology an emphasis on the metaphor of the mind as a computer led to a focus on information-processing and, perhaps because it is difficult to think of computers as possessing emotional states, there was a corresponding neglect of the relationship between cognition and emotion (Eysenk and Keane 1995: 435; Rogers 1983: 296; Semino 1997: 150). As there are 'almost constant interactions between cognition and emotion in everyday life' (Eysenk and Keane 1995: 435), this neglect of emotion was recognised as providing only a partial picture of human cognitive functioning. Now there are many theories of emotion which originate within cognitive psychology (e.g. Arnold 1960; Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991; Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1987; Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988; Scherer 2001). Perhaps as a result of this initial split, however, cognitive psychological theories often raise difficulties regarding the precise relationship between cognition and emotion.

Some of the difficulties in characterising the relationship between emotion and cognition are captured in Simon's (1982) description of the two areas. He notes that 'affect' is 'diffuse, hard to describe and harder to differentiate and classify', as well as 'susceptible to continuous gradation in degree, like something...that can be modelled by an analogue



device' (1982: 336-7). Cognition, on the other hand, he describes as 'highly specific, mostly representable by strings or structures of symbols' and 'digital in character'. Affective states change 'continuously' and 'gradually' whereas cognitive structures tend to succeed one another at 'rapid rates' (1982: 336-7). Simon (1982) refers to emotion and cognition as different languages and asks, 'how can two languages that are so radically different, not only in vocabulary and syntax but in their very units of meaning, communicate with each other?' (1982: 337). He concludes that cognition and emotion are separate, independent systems, the latter interrupting the former in moments of affect.

The most renowned debate regarding emotion and cognition is the Zajonc-Lazarus debate of the early 1980s (Lazarus 1982, 1984; Zajonc 1980, 1984; for an overview see Leventhal and Scherer 1987). Zajonc argued for the primacy of affect and its independence from cognition. His research, combined with the more recent studies of LeDoux (1998), suggests that emotional responses such as preferences and fear can occur without conscious cognitive processing. Lazarus, on the other hand, argued that affect was always intertwined with and secondary to cognitive processes. In their review of the debate, Leventhal and Scherer (1987) propose a middle-ground in which:

the mechanisms underlying emotion may indeed be partially independent and separate from those underlying cognition as Zajonc suggests, while cognitive and emotional reactions may be complexly, if not completely, interwoven in virtually all episodes of emotional behaviour, as Lazarus suggests. (1987: 4)

This middle-ground is the position held by many researchers today, who acknowledge that emotion *may* occur independently of cognition, but that in most cases emotion and cognition are complexly interrelated (e.g. Eysenk and Keane 1995: 435; Frijda 2009: 265; Oakley 1993; Oatley 1992: 132; Parkinson 1995: 293; Stich 1983). Ortony, Clore and Collins (1988: 4) suggest that some emotions, such as disgust, seem to involve much less cognitive processing than others, such as shame. Other theorists use the cognition/emotion distinction to propose a continuum of emotional states, from primitive, non-cognitive emotions (e.g. fear) to the highly cognitive (e.g. compassion) (Griffiths 1997; Levinson 1997). I do not wish to dwell upon this debate in great detail here, suffice to say that the approach taken in this thesis is one which advocates the complex interrelation of cognition and emotion. It seems to me that a distinction between cognition and emotion is a theoretical one which is useful to uphold in certain circumstances, but which is hard to disambiguate when examining real emotional experiences.

Literary reading is an example of such an experience, as it patently incorporates cognitive processes and emotional effects. For example, Keen (2006) notes that 'narrative empathy invoked by reading must involve cognition, for reading itself relies upon complex

cognitive operations' (2006: 213). Similarly, Simon (1982) notes that 'every novelist depends on cognitive processes applied to the printed page being able to evoke mood and emotion' (1982: 338, see also Burke 2003; Levinson 1997: 22-4). In his study of emotion and literary reading, Burke (2008) draws upon neuroscientific and cognitive scientific evidence to make a distinction between 'affective cognition' and 'cognitive emotion'; titles which represent the differing importance of emotion in particular processing moments (2008: 52, 2008: 163-5). He argues that literary reading involves both 'affective cognition' and 'cognitive emotion', but that highly emotive moments in literary reading tend to be dominated by the former (2008: 252). Burke's analysis demonstrates the way emotion and cognition are closely interrelated throughout literary reading. In my analyses I do not attempt to specify the balance of cognitive and emotional processes at any given moment in the interpretations I investigate. As reading is a cognitive and emotional activity it seems to me both a good example of the difficulty in separating these phenomena and an example of why they might not need to be separated in the binary way suggested by the Zajon-Lazarus debate. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis, I suggest that processes or operations which are traditionally thought of as cognitive *within cognitive poetics* (such as frame knowledge activation, predictions and inferencing) also have emotional effects or dimensions which have not been fully acknowledged in cognitive poetics to date. I thus assume a connection between cognition and emotion (and vice versa), but I do not presume to specify *what* this connection is in psychological terms. This would require further empirical experimentation which is beyond the scope of this thesis.

I will give more consideration to emotion and cognition in literary reading in section 3.1.4. In sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 below, I consider some of the main features of emotion as identified by cognitive and social psychologists. In particular I draw upon appraisal theories from cognitive psychology (e.g. Arnold 1960; Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991; Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1987; Ortony, Clore and Collin 1988; Scherer 2001) and re-workings of the appraisal theory model in social psychology (e.g. Parkinson 1995; Parkinson et al 2005). Overall I favour models of emotion which recognise both its cognitive and social aspects (e.g. Parkinson 1995; Parkinson et al 2005; Oatley 2009; Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1996). This review feeds into the discussion of emotion in a literary context in the remaining chapters of this thesis.

### **3.1.2 Emotion subcomponents**

As noted in section 3.1, within emotion research there is no widespread agreement regarding a single definitive theory of emotion. There does, however, appear to be some broad agreement regarding the subcomponents of which emotion is comprised (for a summary see Parkinson et al 2005: 3-4; see also Frijda 1986; Gerrig and Zimbardo 2009:


375; Hogan 2003a; Robinson 2005). Indeed, Parkinson et al (2005: 3). note that ‘we can specify the subcomponents which form part of emotion more easily than emotion itself’, and list them as:

1. Objects and Causes  
*Emotions are related to events that happen in the world*
2. Appraisal  
*Emotion implies taking a particular perspective towards events, by liking or disliking what is happening, for example, or treating it as a cause for congratulation or condemnation*
3. Physiological Change  
*When we are emotional, our bodies usually react in some way, e.g. increased heart rate, sweating, blushing etc.*
4. Action Tendencies  
*We often feel strong impulses to act in certain ways, such as running away, hiding, staying very still, withdrawing or embracing*
5. Expression or Display  
*Particular emotions tend to be associated with distinctive muscular movements that can express what we are feeling to others, such as smiling, frowning, clenching fists, leaning forward or turning away*
6. Regulation  
*We often try to do something about one or more of these aspects of emotion, such as trying to influence the course of events, or modify our bodily reactions, gestures and expressions*

(from Parkinson et al 2005: 3-4)

Each particular emotion theory assigns these subcomponents different emphases and causal orders, and differs over which of these features is regarded as the defining aspect of emotion (Gerrig and Zimbardo 2009; Moors 2009; Parkinson et al 2005: 3-4).

Early nineteenth-century theories of emotion, such as the peripheralist approach, assigned aspects such as physiological change, action tendencies and emotion expression the most prominent role in the emotion process (James 1884; Lange 1922 [1885]; see also Damasio 1994 and for an overview Frijda 1986: 177; Gerrig and Zimbardo 2009: 374; Griffiths 1998: 197-8; Parkinson et al 2005: 5-6). In these theories emphasis is placed on the actions of the autonomic nervous system which are peripheral to those of the central nervous system (Gerrig and Zimbardo 2009: 375). In this view, physical bodily changes are what makes emotion ‘emotional’ and ‘a purely disembodied emotion is a non-entity’ (James 1884: 194). Figure 3.0 illustrates the sequence of events in the peripheralist view of the




**Figure 3.0.** *Peripheralist Theory of Emotion*  
(adapted from Parkinson et al 2005: 5 and Gerrig and Zimbardo 2009: 375)

emotion process. Some eliciting stimuli, such as the sight of a bear or an enemy, triggers bodily changes such as trembling or a desire to strike. It is the perception of these bodily changes which then leads to the experience of emotion. Without the bodily changes ‘we could not actually feel afraid or angry’ (James 1884: 190).

Later theories of emotion re-conceptualised this relationship between bodily arousal and emotional experience (e.g. Cannon 1927, 1929), and in the latter half of the twentieth century, psychologists began to argue for the importance of cognitive appraisal in addition to physiological arousal when defining emotional experience (e.g. Arnold 1960; Ellsworth 1991; Frijda 1986; Green 1992; Lazarus 1984, 1991, 1995, 2000; Lazarus and Lazarus 1994; Moors 2007, 2009; Reisenzein 2009; Reisenzein and Doring 2009; Roseman 1984; Schachter 1971; Schachter and Singer 1962; Scherer 2001; Smith and Lazarus 1993).

In the appraisal theory model, our emotional responses depend not upon the specific characteristics of stimulus events, but rather on the way such events are interpreted and evaluated (Parkinson et al 2005: 6). Thus, for appraisal theorists, emotional experience ‘cannot be understood solely in terms of what happens in the person or in the brain, but grows out of ongoing transactions with the environment that are evaluated’ (Lazarus 1984: 124). Appraisal is a process of evaluation then, and emotion occurs when a stimulus is regarded as in some way relevant to an individual’s goals, plans, concerns, expectations, desires, beliefs and coping potentials or agency (e.g.; Frijda 1986; Moors 2007, 2009; Reisenzein 2009; Smith and Lazarus 1993). A typical appraisal theory model of emotion is illustrated in Figure 3.1 below. In this diagram, situational stimuli are appraised as being relevant to the goals, beliefs, desires (and so on) of an individual. This appraisal gives rise to the physiological changes, action tendencies and expressions which constitute an



**Figure 3.1.** *Appraisal Theory* (adapted from Parkinson et al 2005: 9)

emotion (shaded grey). Appraisals thus activate mechanisms of action and bodily resources, and direct attention so that the issue which caused the emotion is made more salient in consciousness (Frijda 1986; Lazarus 2000; Ortony, Clore and Collins 1998). Appraisal also triggers actions which are aimed at coping with or modifying the situation which triggered the appraisal. Thus, appraisal functions to 'allow detection of adaptively consequential situations' (Parkinson et al 2005: 8) and to promote the change or alteration of such situations. It should be noted that Figure 3.1 represents some of the typical features of appraisal theories, but different versions of appraisal theory have different views regarding, among other things, the relationship between appraisal and physiology (e.g. Schachter and Singer 1962; Schachter 1971) and whether appraisal is an antecedent to emotion or a necessary part of it (e.g. Moors 2007, 2009).

There are also ongoing debates regarding what type of process constitutes an appraisal and here the notion of appraisal connects with the issue of emotion versus cognition described in section 3.1.1 above. Some theorists argue that appraisal can be non-cognitive, i.e. does not involve the higher cortical regions of the brain (e.g. LeDoux 1998, Robinson 2005). Other theorists argue that appraisal *is* cognitive, but can be automatic, i.e. does not require attention, time, consciousness or attentional capacity (Moors 2009). Still others suggest that appraisal can be a conscious process in some cases or unconscious in others (e.g. Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1996).

Appraisal is a powerful addition to psychological emotion theories as it offers a compelling explanation for the way the same stimulus can cause different responses in different individuals and different contexts. A good example of appraisal at work is the elation and devastation of the winning and losing fans at a football match: both sets of fans are responding to the same situation, and it is their appraisal of that event which differs (Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988: 4). In terms of disadvantages, Parkinson (1995: 67) notes that there is a lack of clarity regarding what appraisals actually are. Some versions of appraisal theory have problems explaining the phenomenological character of emotions (Reisenzein and Doring 2009: 200). Appraisal theory can also be very individualistic, suggesting that ultimately 'we don't care about things that don't affect our lives (or those of other people we care about) in some way' (Parkinson et al 2005: 7). Furthermore, with their focus on personal beliefs, goals and desires, appraisal theories can overlook the wider social context that makes sense of individual cognitions (Forgas 1981: vii; Griffiths 1998: 200). The way emotion operates within a wider social context is the focus of emotion theories in social psychology and social cognition (e.g. Fiske and Taylor 1984, 1991; Forgas 1981; Hoschild 1983; Marcus and Kittayama 1991; Parkinson 1995; Parkinson et al 2005), and will be considered in section 3.1.3 below.

### 3.1.3 Social theories of emotion

Emotions are social not only because they are typically caused by or related to other people, but also because they form an important part of people's interpersonal relationships, the roles and identities people assume in social interactions and the meanings and influences of particular cultures (Parrott 2001). Parkinson et al (2005: 10) argue that interpersonal, group and cultural factors are implicated in *all* of the emotion subcomponents outlined in section 3.1.2. above.

One of the most comprehensive and compelling explications of a social view of emotion comes from Parkinson (1995) and is later developed in Parkinson et al (2005). Parkinson's argument proceeds from the observation that in everyday folk psychology, emotion tends to be thought of as: 'an individual experience typically caused by something that has happened to the person in question' (1995: 7). Emotion is usually thought to have three distinct levels: the individual (experience of emotion), the interpersonal (communication of emotion) and the representational (ideas about emotion), with the 'essence' of the phenomena located at the level of the individual (Parkinson 1995: 14). Parkinson points out that these folk psychology ideas often form the basis of traditional psychological approaches to emotion; where emotions are regarded to be 'first and foremost [the] reactions of individual subjects' (Parkinson 1995: 17). Furthermore, he argues that psychological research into the individual, communicative and representational levels of emotion have failed to grasp their fundamentally interrelated nature (1995: 17-19).

Contrary to the individual focus of much emotion research, Parkinson proposes that the 'essence' of emotion lies at the interpersonal level. He argues that the interpersonal level forms an unavoidable context for our individual experience of emotion and is partially constructed by the representational aspects of emotion. Thus, emotions are primarily interpersonal, communicative and performative as opposed to being private, individual and intrapsychic (1995: 25, 195). This means that emotions are not simply internal reactions to external events, which are then communicated to others using non-verbal and linguistic means; rather, emotions are actually *always* a communication to some real or imagined audience, and have 'relational rather than personal meanings' (Parkinson 1995: 197). As a result of this approach, Parkinson argues that emotions are best regarded as 'dynamic interpersonal episodes rather than private momentary reactions' (1995: 264). Furthermore, because emotions arise out of unfolding interactions within a social context, they are inextricably linked to the identities and roles which people are performing in these situations (see section 4.3.3).

Though he does not reject peripheralist or appraisal theories outright, Parkinson argues that from his perspective neither of these emotion theories does justice to the

functional significance of emotions in social life. For example, he argues that the peripheralist approach overemphasises the connection between the body and emotion in a manner which leads to 'misguided biological reductionism' (1995: 116). He still regards the body as important within emotion, but primarily because it is a mode of *communicating* our emotions to other people (1995: 116, 200). When critiquing appraisal theory Parkinson notes that appraisal is a logically necessary condition for the attribution of emotion, thus is 'true by fiat' rather than because of an 'empirically established generative relationship' (1995: 27). Appraisal, too, has a role in his model, but as something which is communicated by emotional episodes in a particular context rather than the psychological trigger for a reactive process (1995: 68). He argues that, in appraisal theory, social roles influence emotion *indirectly*, by defining personal values and priorities, for example. Conversely, a communicative approach suggests that emotion emerges *directly* from our identity presentations and the social roles which we are adopting (1995: 224).

Oatley (2009) and Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987, 1996) also advocate a communicative model of emotion, though they conceive of emotions as communications to *oneself* as well as to others. Oatley (2009) notes that: 'although emotions are typically thought of as occurring within people, there is a parallel set of processes, just as important, that occur between people' (2009: 206). Thus in their model cognitive appraisal and the private, intrapsychic aspects of emotion are maintained alongside social, interpersonal functions; whereas Parkinson (1995) places most emphasis on the latter.

As well as a general emphasis on the communicative and relational functions of emotion, work on emotion in social psychology recognises that our shared cultural *knowledge* about emotion is extremely important in our emotional expression and experience and in our interpretation of the emotions of others (e.g. Conway and Beckerian 1987; Fischer 1991; Markus and Kittayama 1991; Parkinson 1990; Shaver et al 2001 [1987]). Parkinson (1995) argues that the 'the way we experience emotion personally is partly constituted by our idea of what emotion is or should be, which derives from everyday discourse' (1995: 15). Thus, he notes that emotions:

cannot be seen as separate from the cultural systems of meaning within which they are experienced, enacted, regulated, and represented. Emotion words, beliefs about the nature and workings of emotions, and emotional attitudes and rules pervade our emotional lives (Parkinson et al 2005: 52)

Parkinson argues that this representational level of emotion (i.e. the way emotion is represented in the discourse of a particular culture) has descriptive, interpretative and constitutive functions:

Emotion representations describe, but never only describe, and do not always describe accurately. Emotion representations interpret but always for some

pragmatic purpose...[and] in some circumstances [emotion representations] contribute to the constitution of emotion episodes. (Parkinson 1995: 262)

Therefore, our cultural ideas about emotion are not an uncomplicated reflection of internal psychological reality but are employed for specific purposes and in some cases influence our experience of emotion. This approach leads to the suggestion that in many circumstances we express and experience emotion 'partly because the rules pertaining to our individual position and cultural identity implicitly or explicitly encourage use to do so' (Parkinson 1995: 199). Parkinson goes on to argue that 'it is simply not the case that people routinely choose from an unconstrained range of emotion options' (1995: 203). Indeed, social constructivist theories of emotion emphasise this social level and give less credence to the biological and psychological 'reality' of emotions (e.g. Averill 1980, 1985; Shott 1979). The importance of emotion representation in our experience of literature will be returned to in sections 5.3.1 and 6.4.

Fiske (1982) notes that emotion is also important in *other* types of knowledge which we have about the world. She suggests that emotions form part of the interpersonal schemas which we use when responding to others in interactions. In particular, she argues that stereotype categories can be linked to affect. This relationship between emotion and knowledge is also important in the following discussion, and is returned to in sections 5.3.1, 6.3 and 6.4.

Viewing emotion as an interpersonal, social and cultural phenomenon as opposed to just an individual, private and biologically-determined one is important in order to capture its full complexity. The social emotion theories reviewed above are compelling because they go beyond our intuitive and often individualistic sense of what emotion is; and offer, in my view, a fresh and convincing perspective on the phenomenon. In terms of disadvantages, Parkinson provides a review of some of the potential problems with his communicative theory (see 1995: 300-4). Most importantly for the present discussion, Parkinson's claim that all emotions are communicative and arise through the performance of social roles may seem illogical when we consider the fact that we often experience emotions alone and in private – when reading a literary narrative, for example.

In response to such an objection, Parkinson argues that even emotions experienced in private can be seen as communications directed at internal or imaginary audiences (Parkinson 1995: 197-8, 220). This claim is supported by Fridlund's (2001 [1991]) research into the 'implicit sociality' behind private facial expressions. Fridlund notes that when we are alone we often imagine social interactants and that many of the faces we make in solitude actually reflect this imaginary interaction (Fridlund 2001 [1991]: 265). Furthermore, Parkinson argues that private emotion is a derivative phenomenon which relies upon prior



experience of interpersonal emotion. Developmental evidence is provided in order to substantiate this position (Parkinson 1995: 269-270, 277 and Parkinson et al 2005: 219-54). Thus, Parkinson maintains that 'any emotion implies identification with some social role', even when this emotion is experienced in solitude (Parkinson 1995: 207). These ideas are returned to regarding discourse roles in sections 4.3.3 and 5.3.

The psychological emotion theories described in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 are typically designed to account for emotions in our everyday interaction with the world. They do not explicitly consider emotions experienced during our engagement with narrative or other forms of art, though in this case Oatley is a notable exception (1994; 1999a; 1999b; 2002, 2003; 2009; see also brief sections of Parkinson 1995: 51, 170-1, 197-8). In section 3.1.4 immediately below, I consider the problems and particularities of emotion in a *literary* context and the ways in which Text World Theory is able to address such issues.

#### **3.1.4 Emotion and literary reading**

In my discussion thus far I have assumed that readers *are* able to experience emotions in response to literary narratives, and that psychological emotion theories are relevant to our understanding of those emotions. However, in philosophical debates regarding our responses to fiction, such an assumption comes under question. In this section I review some key issues in this debate, before going on to describe how Text World Theory is able to reconcile some of these problems. After that, I reconsider Text World Theory in the light of the emotion theories discussed in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 above, and explain how they can be drawn upon in a Text World Theory approach to the emotional and experiential aspects of literary reading.

The fact that readers experience emotions in response to things which they know to be fictional (and thus do not believe to exist) has come to be known as a 'paradox of fiction' and has attracted much theoretical debate (e.g. Currie 1997; Levinson 1997; Matravers 1997; Walton 1990, 1997; Yanal 1999). One possible solution to this paradox is to suggest that though we undeniably have some phenomenological experience when we read fiction, these experiences are actually 'imaginary' or 'make-believe' emotions *not* actual emotions, even though we often name them as such (Levinson 1997; Walton 1990, 1997). For example, Walton (1990: 196-204) suggests that when we are watching a horror film and see green slime approaching us on the screen, we may tense and fidget and scream, but we do not really *fear* the slime in the same way as we would if it was approaching us in the real world. Levinson (1997) and Walton (1990, 1997) argue that we would need to believe the slime is real in order to experience 'real' emotions about it. Furthermore, because we do not act on our fear and flee the cinema or call our relatives, this suggests that the 'fear' we may report experiencing is not fear in the ordinary, 'real world' sense.

The notion that we must believe the objects and causes of emotion to be real before we can experience 'real' emotions is unsupported in emotion research. Gerrig (1993: 182-7) reviews psychological evidence which demonstrates that people often *do* experience strong emotions despite holding beliefs which should undermine them. This leads him to conclude that 'what is real for emotional responses is often not informed by other types of belief' (1993: 188). He argues that our responses to fictional worlds are not unique, because fiction is not a psychologically privileged category (1993: 197). In addition, many emotion theorists acknowledge that the objects and causes of emotion can be real *or imaginary* and include thoughts as well as external events (Damasio 2000: 48; Frijda 1986: 298-9; Hogan 2003a; Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1996; Robinson 2005). Contrary to the assertions of Levinson (1997) and Walton (1990, 1997), it seems that belief in reality is not a necessary precursor to 'real' emotion.

These philosophers also claim, however, that our experience of fear in response to fictional slime is 'make-believe' because we fail to act on it in the same way as we would if the slime was real. In terms of the emotion subcomponents outlined in section 3.1.2, it does seem that some aspects of 'everyday' emotions, such as action tendencies and regulatory processes, are less applicable when responding to fictions. We are unable to intervene and help literary characters, for example, and have no need to move away from approaching dangers if they occur within fictional worlds. However, Gerrig (1993) points out that such inaction can also be appropriate when we are responding to non-fictional text-worlds too. The example he gives, in an extension of Walton's slime example, is watching documentary footage showing slime advancing on a small village in 1959 (Gerrig 1993: 189). Gerrig argues that in this case we may also experience signs of fear, such as tensing and screaming, but would also not flee the room or call our relatives. He proposes, contrary to Levinson (1997) and Walton (1990, 1997), that our failure to act in response to fictional or remote worlds is not because we are experiencing 'make-believe' emotions, but because such action is not functional in the circumstances (1993: 189).

The arguments of Gerrig and a number of other researchers (e.g. Hogan 2003a; Keen 2006, 2007; Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1996: 385; Stockwell 2009) suggest that the emotions we experience in response to literary narratives are best regarded as different from our everyday emotions *in degree rather than in kind*. Such a view is supported by the fact that there *are* similarities between our emotional responses to text-worlds and our everyday emotions. For example, as Stockwell (2009: 77) points out, emotional responses to fiction still involve authentic physiological changes which are real at the moment of experience. Furthermore, they still have objects and causes and can be seen to involve both appraisals and social interaction (e.g. Parkinson 1995; Robinson 2005). I will go on to discuss these

claims from a Text World Theory perspective below. Viewing the emotions we experience as we read literature as similar to the emotions we experience in everyday life also accords with cognitive-poetic assumptions about the status of literary discourse in relation to everyday language and cognition. For instance, cognitive poetics rests upon the notion that the cognitive processes which we use to negotiate our everyday world are also employed when we read literature (Stockwell 2002: 4-5). It makes sense, therefore, to regard the emotions we experience as we read literature as similar to (and involving the same processes as) our everyday emotions.

Text World Theory has the potential to be able to explain why literary emotions may differ in degree from everyday emotions, without having to deny that they are real emotions. Werth (1999) specifies that text-worlds are structurally similar to the discourse-world and potentially as richly detailed. Text-worlds can be (and often are) cognised as equivalent in kind to our real world, and it follows that our emotional responses to such worlds are also equivalent in kind. However, Text World Theory also has the potential to explain how these real emotions may differ in degree from those we experience in everyday life. Text World Theory's ontological stratification is reflective of the boundaries which readers typically draw between text-worlds and the discourse-world, or between fiction and reality. Skolnick and Bloom (2007) empirically demonstrate that children as well as adults are able to distinguish between fictional creations and entities in the real world, and between entities in different fictional worlds. Stockwell (2009) suggests that the difference between the feeling of grief we may experience in the event of a real death and the grief we may experience in response to a lament poem is underpinned by the 'sense that a text-world boundary must be crossed' in the latter but not the former (2009: 139; see also Gavins 2007: 84). Thus, readers' intuitive awareness of the difference between events in text-worlds and in the discourse-world can contribute to their emotional experiences in particular contexts.

Text-world boundary-crossing does not mean that the emotions we experience in response to fiction are always less intense than those we experience in everyday life, however. On the contrary, Keen (2006, 2007) suggests that fictionality 'unleashes the emotional responsiveness' of readers and increases the likelihood of empathic responses which are muted by scepticism and suspicion in everyday life (2006: 220). In such cases, the presence of an ontological boundary can be seen to increase the intensity and likelihood of particular emotions. Some researchers suggest that the emotions we experience in response to literature allow for greater reflection and self-improvement than the emotions we experience in the hustle and bustle of everyday life (Hansson 1996; Hogan 2003a; van Peer 1997: 220). Thus, literary emotions are not seen as derivative versions of everyday

emotions, but a privileged class of experience. Hogan (2003a) is a major advocate of this idea, and draws on Sanskrit literary theory to distinguish between everyday emotions (*bhvani*) and artistic emotions (*rasas*), the latter of which are more removed from self-interest and closer to experiences of religious enlightenment (2003a: 53-4). The notion of ontological boundary-crossing is also useful in explaining the difference between these artistic and everyday emotions.

Through Text World Theory, the cognitive and social emotion theories described in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 can also be applied to literary contexts. Because text-worlds have the potential to be richly detailed representations and are structurally similar to the discourse-world, it seems plausible that the enactors and events within them can interact with our appraisal processes and trigger emotional responses. Indeed, Robinson (2005) advocates an appraisal-theory approach to literary emotion. She argues that literary worlds can activate readers' appraisal processes by making them 'care' about the characters and events therein (2005: 114). When readers sense that their own 'interests, goals and wants' (2005: 114) are tied up with those of the characters, narrative events can trigger appraisals resulting in emotional responses in readers (2005: 113-7). However, Robinson (2005) provides little detail regarding *how* literary narratives might encourage readers to establish such appraisal-relevant connections. Oatley (1994, 1999a, 1999b, 2002; Oatley and Gholomain 1997) suggests that literary text-worlds are simulations in which readers adopt the goals and plans of literary characters. From this perspective, readers experience emotion by virtue of running the goals and plans of characters on their own 'planning processes' (1994: 66). As a result, the character's goals and plans become relevant to the readers' own appraisal processes and readers experience emotions as such plans meet vicissitudes. Because, during reading, text-world enactors are often perceived as equivalent to real people, possessing goals, hopes, imaginations and so on, Text World Theory is useful in explaining how readers' appraisal processes might be activated by fictional texts.

The discourse-world level of Text World Theory also enables the inclusion of readers' own goals and motivations in their emotional experience of narrative. The emotional experience of literary discourse may also be tied up with readers' own desires and goals, thus also accords with appraisal views of emotion. Because discourse participants are seen as willingly engaged in communicative interaction (Gavins 2007), it can be supposed that readers want to create a coherent mental representation of a particular narrative in order to participate in the discourse. However, when textual or contextual factors interfere with this process, emotional responses may ensue (see sections 5.2.1, 5.4, 6.3.1). Different motivations in the discourse-world also result in different

reading styles and aims which may explain variation in emotional responses between readers (this is also noted in sections 3.2.6 and 6.5).

The social approach to emotion described in section 3.1.3 can also be applied to literary contexts using the Text World Theory framework. Central to the social approach is the notion that emotions arise in and through interpersonal interaction, rather than being private and intrapsychic phenomenon (Parkinson 1995; Parkinson et al 2005). Text World Theory is able to map systematically the various interpersonal interactions involved in discourse processing, and as such offers a means of considering how such interactions may influence emotions. Interaction occurs between participants in the discourse-world as they jointly negotiate communication. Interaction also occurs within text-worlds, between enactors who form the subject of the discourse. Furthermore, interaction occurs between discourse-world participants and the enactors which they construct within their text-worlds. Indeed, such relationships have formed the focus of recent work on emotion in Text World Theory, which is reviewed in section 3.2. below. Social psychologists posit that emotions are inextricably linked to the identities and social roles performed by individuals. Text World Theory enables us to consider how, even in solitary acts of literary reading, readers are performing particular social roles or identities through their interaction with a literary text. In sections 4.2, 4.3.3, 5.2 and 5.3 for example, I consider the multiple roles which readers may adopt during literary discourses and their possible emotional effects. Finally, social psychological approaches to emotion recognise that our shared cultural knowledge about emotion is incredibly important in emotional expression and experience. A central premise in Text World Theory is that readers construct text-worlds through the combination of linguistic cues and information from their knowledge-base. In sections 5.3.1, and 6.4, I propose that some of the emotional effects of Ishiguro's novels arise from the interaction between readers' emotion knowledge and the representation of emotion within the text.

The discussion of emotion theories in this section has provided an essential development of Text World Theory. Drawing on theories from cognitive and social psychology, I have established that the structures and processes which already form part of the text-world framework can be regarded as emotionally relevant. These cognitive and social emotion theories enable the augmentation of Text World Theory through the reconceptualisation of its central premises in terms of emotional experience. Text World Theory allows for the formation of richly-detailed mental representations, which can underpin an understanding of literary emotion in terms of the adoption of enactor's goals and the creation of relationships across text-world boundaries. The discourse-world level of the framework can be seen to incorporate the readers' own emotionally-relevant goals

and processes of identity construction, as well as stores of emotion knowledge which are used in discourse interpretation. As such, Text World Theory has the potential to offer unique insights into the emotional experience of literary discourse. Indeed, the investigation of emotion and literary reading within Text World Theory has already begun. In section 3.2 below I review some of the recent developments in this area of research.

### **3.2 Text World Theory and Emotion**

I noted in section 2.2.5. that, despite Werth's suggestions about the importance of emotion in discourse, emotion has only very recently become a central focus of development in Text World Theory. This development has been pioneered by text-world theorists working in the fields of stylistics and cognitive poetics: notably Gavins (2007) who considers the emotional implications of both literary and non-literary discourses; Lahey (2005) who examines emotional responses to lyric poetry; and Stockwell (2005a, 2009) who considers our aesthetic engagement with poetic and narrative texts (including their emotional effects). In this section I consider the way emotion has been approached by these theorists and the key areas which have been established in the Text World Theory account of emotion thus far. I also relate these developments to other work in stylistics, narratology and cognitive poetics where appropriate. Within Text World Theory there has been little cross-scholarly interaction on these issues and the review provided here is the first overall survey of these developments.

#### **3.2.1 Textual features**

The notion that textual features have an impact upon the emotional responses of discourse-world participants is fundamental to the Text World Theory approach. Though text-worlds are created through a process of *interaction* between the text and the reader, the discourse overall is text-driven, as the text nominates particular areas of participants' knowledge as relevant to the discourse in hand. In written discourse, where face-to-face negotiation between participants is not possible, the text is the reader's only access to the information they need in order to participate in the discourse and construct their text-worlds. Thus, Text World Theory analyses draw connections between particular linguistic features or techniques found in the text and their emotional effects (e.g. Gavins 2007; Lahey 2005: 286-8; Stockwell 2009: 144-67).

Research in cognitive poetics, narratology, stylistics and empirical studies of literature also makes connections between linguistic features and their emotional effects. For example, Brewer and Lichtenstein (1981 see also Brewer 1996; Brewer and Ohtsuka 1988a, 1988b; Jose and Brewer 1984) explicitly relate the structural characteristics of narrative to reader's affective responses. They make a distinction between the event

structure (i.e. chronological sequence of events) and discourse structure (i.e. the order in which the events are presented) of narrative and argue that different discourse arrangements of the same event structure produce different patterns of affective response. They conduct experiments to support this hypothesis – linking particular structural features of narrative to the generation of suspense, surprise and curiosity (Brewer and Lichtenstein 1981). They also use this structural-affect theory to explain narrative enjoyment, arguing that narratives involving suspense and resolution, surprise and resolution or curiosity and resolution are better liked, and found partial empirical support for these hypotheses (Brewer 1996). Gerrig (1993) also argues that it is possible to generalise about the ‘participatory responses’ (which are often emotional responses) generated by readers whilst experiencing narrative worlds (see section 5.4). In a similar way to Brewer and his colleagues, Gerrig relates textual features and authorial techniques, such as the omission of information and the delay of resolution, to the creation of suspense (1993: 77-91).

At a more microlinguistic level, stylisticians and cognitive poeticists have investigated the emotional effects of iconicity (e.g. Burke 2001; Freeman 2007, 2009; Leech and Short 1981; Oatley 1994: 55-6; Oatley and Gholomain 1997: 271-2; Tsur 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2009). Iconicity refers to instances where linguistic form mirrors meaning, and these researchers suggest that iconic processes have both a cognitive and affective impact upon readers (Burke 2001: 32). In Burke’s view, iconic textual features can have an emotional effect on readers with minimal cognitive processing; thus syntactic arrangement or particular lineation and sound patterning can create an emotive atmosphere during reading.

In work on reader response, textual features are often thought to be responsible for the *similarities* between different readers’ interpretations and emotional responses to texts, whilst divergences in interpretation and emotional response are attributed to individual readers’ dispositions, knowledge, memories and experiences (Golden and Guthrie 1986; Iser 1978: 92-3; Miall 1990; Short and Van Peer 1989). For example, in an empirical study Goetz and Sadoski (1996) asked participants to rate the intensity of imagery and emotion as they read a short story. They found that even though the precise ratings varied from one reader to the next, there were also noticeable similarities in response both between participants and across two studies. They attribute these similarities to the influence of textual features and suggest they may ‘attest to the skill of the author’ (1996: 48).

The Text World Theory approach complicates such a clear distinction between convergence and textual features on the one hand, and divergence and discourse-world attributes on the other. As all discourse is text-driven, textual features can be seen to underlie both the similarities *and* differences in readers’ responses. This idea is

demonstrated by the empirical research of Miall (1990), who studied the comments of several readers as they read the opening of a short story by Virginia Woolf. He found a remarkable degree of convergence regarding the things which readers noticed and the connections they made across the text, but their resulting interpretations and responses were still divergent. He notes:

...it is quite possible for two readers to make evaluative responses to the same phrases, see the same network of relationships across phrases, and make anticipations at the same moments, yet emerge with opposite readings of a text. Since in discussing texts we normally only discuss the end result of a reading process and don't study the process itself, the existence of a high degree of commonality in responses to the same text seems to have been consistently overlooked. (Miall 1990: 338)

Miall's findings suggest that whilst readers' overall responses and interpretations may diverge, they are still underpinned by the same textual features. This view is also apparent in the Text World Theory analyses of Stockwell (2009) who refers to the same textual features in order to account for divergent readings of 'If' by Rudyard Kipling (2009: 144-67) and Shakespeare's 'Sonnet 116' (2009: 35-9). For example, in Kipling's 'If', the use of the second-person pronoun is the textual feature which underpins divergent interpretations: if readers feel addressed by the second-person pronoun, they will experience stronger and more positive emotional responses to the poem, and if not their reading will be more resistant (2009: 144-52). Similarly, Stockwell relates the ambiguity of the demonstrative pronoun 'this' in the final couplet of 'Sonnet 116' to four possible divergent readings of the text (2009: 35-9). Rather than textual influence being restricted to the similarities between readings, taking a Text World Theory perspective means arguing that the text can be seen to underpin both similarities and differences in readers' interpretations and responses, due to the interaction between textual features and the reader's discourse-world resources. In the analyses presented in Chapters 4 to 6 of this thesis, I also draw upon textual features in order to offer an account of the emotional experiences reported in the reader response data I collected, and note how the same textual features may result in different responses depending upon the reader. Both similarities and differences in response are of course also informed by individual readers' dispositions, knowledge, memories and experiences (their resources in the discourse-world) which will be considered in section 3.2.2 below.

### **3.2.2 Discourse-world resources**

In section 2.2.1. above I noted that Werth's (1995a, 1999) conception of the discourse-world included participant beliefs, hopes, dreams, knowledge, memories, imagination and intentions, but that Werth paid most attention to participant knowledge in his version of



Text World Theory. The significant neglect of the other discourse-world factors in subsequent versions of the theory has only recently begun to be redressed as researchers attempt to include emotion in the framework established by Werth (1999).

In this section I follow Stockwell (2009) in considering discourse-world features as 'resources'. After a study of online reading group data, Stockwell (2009) noted the prevalence of a 'reading as investment' metaphor expressed in propositions such as 'It rewards your effort with a great payoff at the end' and 'you get more out of it on each reading' (2009: 80, see also 2009: 97). In an extension of this metaphor, he usefully reconceptualises participants' discourse-world faculties as resources. This term is adopted here as it emphasises the way such features are utilised by participants during discourse comprehension.

In her analyses of Canadian lyric poetry, Lahey (2005) argues that emotion is an inextricable part of the knowledge and beliefs which readers draw upon when constructing text-worlds. For example, she suggests that a reader's emotional experience of a poem set in Canada will be influenced by the richness of their knowledge about that location, including whether they have experienced Canada first-hand, and what kind of associations Canada has for that reader. If Canada is a familiar location, readers are likely to 'be moved' more or 'feel' more due to the richness of the 'emotional schemata' which form part of their knowledge frame for that location (2005: 277). Lahey suggests that 'emotional schemata' could be bound to knowledge frames regarding all types of entities and situations, which, when drawn upon during text-world creation, can be influential in readers' emotional experiences of discourse (2005: 277-9).

Such a claim is consistent with the social psychological work of Fiske (1982), who claims that knowledge structures such as person-stereotypes have affective associations. In cognitive poetics, Semino (1997) also proposes that knowledge schemas can include positive and negative emotional associations (see section 6.3 for further discussion). Thus, Lahey (2005) incorporates emotion into the discourse-world by adding 'emotional schemata' to Werth's existing category of discourse-world knowledge. Though Lahey does not expand her claims further than this, I believe her proposed augmentations suggest that emotion is implicit within Werth's (1995a, 1999) discourse-world model. Presumably, the other mental resources Werth named; such as memories, dreams, hopes and intentions also have emotional elements which are influential in readers' experience of discourse. I give more consideration to the relationship between emotion and knowledge in sections 6.3 and 6.4.

Other cognitive-poetic approaches to emotion and empirical investigations of reader response make a significant connection between a participant's emotional responses

and the personal memories or experiences which they draw upon when understanding discourse. For example, Seilman and Larsen (1989) investigated the types of memories evoked by a literary versus non-literary text, and found that the literary text tended to evoke more 'actor perspective' memories relating to things which had been experienced by the participants. The non-literary text evoked more memories which were to do with things the participants had only read or heard about ('receiver' perspective memories). They note that literary reading 'seems to connect particularly with knowledge that is personal in the sense that one is an agent, a responsible subject interacting with one's environment' (1989: 174). Furthermore, these memories were cued most frequently at the opening of the texts, suggesting that people initially need to mobilize specific personal information to contextualise the literary world (Miall 2005: 29). Oatley (1994, 1999, 2002; Oatley and Gholomain 1997) posits that our autobiographical memories play a significant role in our emotional responses to literary texts. He suggests that such memories are not just recalled, but are 'relived' when we engage with literary texts, forming an important part of our emotional experience of such discourses (1994: 63, for a similar view see Burke 2008: 55, 185; Hogan 2003b: 157-62, 183). The importance of personal memories in literary reading is also noted by Miall and Kuiken (e.g. Kuiken et al 2004; Miall 1986, 2005; Miall and Kuiken 2002). They note that readers 'weave personal memories into their understanding of literature' (Kuiken et al 2004: 182) and argue that 'a literary text is more likely to speak to [an] individual through its resonances with [an] individual's autobiographical experiences' (Miall 2005: 29). The readerly propensity to draw upon personal memories (both consciously and unconsciously) when reading literature is thought to underlie literature's 'transformative' and therapeutic power (e.g. Burke 2008; Kuiken et al 2004; Scheff 1979). In Text World Theory terms, such research demonstrates the importance of readers' personal memories in the construction of literary text-worlds. It is further evidence that the emotional content of discourse-world resources can create emotional effects when activated during literary reading.

Gavins (2007) also makes a connection between emotion, knowledge and belief, most obviously in her analysis of newspaper discourses. She notes that participants' political beliefs and cultural knowledge can impact upon their emotional experience of such texts. In British culture, particular newspapers are perceived to be aligned with particular political positions, thus 'your choice of newspaper can signify a great deal to other people' (2007: 28). Gavins describes purchasing and reading a *Daily Telegraph* newspaper as part of her research as a 'somewhat painful experience' because she perceives the newspaper to represent social and political opinions which she finds 'objectionable' (2007: 28). She goes on to describe how when reading the *Telegraph*, she feels as though she is in an 'awkward

participatory role' and takes a 'resistant and sceptical' stance towards its contents (2007: 28). Thus, Gavins' cultural knowledge about the 'type' of reader each newspaper has (which she notes is undoubtedly a stereotype), combined with her own political beliefs and ideals, has a direct impact upon her emotional experience of the discourse. When texts cue our discourse-world beliefs and knowledge, particularly when related to political or moral issues, it can have a profound effect upon our emotional experience.

The final aspect of the discourse-world which has received attention in Text World Theory to date is the notion of participant identity or personality. This issue is touched upon in the comments of Gavins (2007) regarding the identity-claims inherent in one's choice of newspaper, but Stockwell (2009) presents the most extensive and innovative consideration of this issue. Drawing upon psychological research, Stockwell advocates the view that personality is dynamic, 'multi-faceted and socially constructed' (2009: 93). He argues that we 'configure both our demeanour to the world and our internal self-sense according to the situation in hand' (Stockwell 2009: 132). Such configurations can involve the modification of our objectives; sense of local and general goals; desire for social cohesion and interaction; sense of past experiences and our consistency with them, and so on (Stockwell 2009: 132). Borrowing sociolinguistic terminology, Stockwell goes on to suggest that readers are able to 'accommodate' their personality pattern to the discourse in hand, in order to engage with the literary characters therein (2009: 153). Thus, Stockwell regards the personalities of discourse-world readers to be part of what is negotiated during discourse. He argues that a reader is best regarded as a series of enactors (2009: 165) or 'psychotextual traces' (2009: 166) which adapt and shift as the discourse progresses. He writes:

In the course of reading, these traces become assimilated by processes of modification and accommodation into a final, fairly consistent reading position that comes to consciousness as the reader's sense of his own interpretation. (Stockwell 2009: 166)

Stockwell also suggests that the extent to which readers are able or willing to accommodate towards the discourse in hand has emotional implications, as resistant readings involve a rejection of such accommodation (Stockwell 2009: 151-2, 159). Stockwell's notion of accommodation is closely related to identification and distance – two further areas of Text World Theory development which are given more detailed consideration in sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.5.

To summarise, Text World Theory and other areas of cognitive poetics have given significant consideration to the discourse-world elements which are influential emotional experience. In the work of Gavins (2007), Lahey (2005) and Stockwell (2005a, 2009),

several of the mental resources and capacities included in Werth's (1995a) rather rudimentary discourse-world diagram (see section 2.2.1 above) have been re-appraised as implicitly emotional. Furthermore, reader identity and personality (and the way such structures are negotiated during discourse) have been identified as emotionally significant. These represent important developments in Text World Theory, and the analyses in this thesis also contribute to the development of the discourse-world level in several ways. Werth (1999: 148) emphasised the importance of inferencing in text-world construction, and in section 4.3. I consider the role of a particular class of inference known as 'mindreading' in readers' mental representations. In section 5.4 I examine the hopes and preferences of discourse-world participants and suggest ways in which these responses may be incorporated into Text World Theory. Sections 5.3.1 and 6.4 suggest that emotion knowledge, as a sub-class of readers' cultural and experiential knowledgebase, is particularly significant in readers' responses to Ishiguro's novels. Finally, in section 6.3, I propose that the interaction between a text and participants' knowledge frames be re-conceptualised as involving processes which are inherently emotional. Throughout my discussions I also highlight the need for further research into the discourse-world level of the framework in the future.

### **3.2.3 Movement: proximity and distance**

As Text World Theory is a spatial framework, it provides a useful means of describing conceptual distance, particularly through the notion of modal-worlds and accessibility (see Werth 1997a, 1997b, 1999: 4-7 for links between physical, temporal and conceptual space in his version of Text World Theory). Accounts of emotional experience in Text World Theory to date have capitalised on the parallels between the model of conceptual space presented by the theory and the ubiquitous metaphorical expression of emotion and human relationships in terms of space (Gavins 2007; Stockwell 2005a, 2009; see also Gibbs 2002; Kovesces 1990, 2000; Lakoff and Johnson 1980). For example, everyday expressions such as 'I can't get through this'; 'I just feel so distant from her' and 'That book really moved me' are underpinned by conceptual metaphors such as EMOTIONAL EFFECT IS PHYSICAL MOVEMENT; EMOTIONAL RELATIONSHIP IS A DISTANCE BETWEEN TWO ENTITIES and EMOTION IS MOTION THROUGH SPACE (Kovesces 2000; Stockwell 2005a: 148). In the Text World Theory framework, these conceptual metaphors can also be applied to the realm of discourse to help account for the emotional experience of participants. Crucial to this idea is the notion that during discourse the inhabitants of the discourse-world and text-world levels have relationships which can be figured spatially (Gavins 2007, Lahey 2005; Stockwell 2005a, 2009: 160). Furthermore, such spatial relationships have both emotional effects and ethical significance.

For example, when Gavins (2007) describes having negative or 'painful' emotional experiences whilst reading the *Telegraph* newspaper, she portrays herself as 'alienated from the discourse-world' and in an 'estranged position in the discourse-world' (2007: 28). Thus she feels distanced from the discourse and the text-worlds being created by that discourse, and this distance is significant in her emotional experience. In seeking to provide Text World Theory with a 'formal mechanism' to account for the emotional experience of narrative, Lahey (2005: 285) proposes that readers experience different levels of emotional involvement depending upon the position they take up within their text-worlds (see 4.2.4 for more details). Stockwell (2009: 160) also argues that readers position themselves in different places relative to the enactors of text-worlds and that these 'ethical positionings' can be seen to 'correlate with the degree of support, acquiescence or resistance in the reading' (2009: 160).

Within stylistics and narratology there are related discussions regarding the effects of narrative 'proximity' and 'distance' on readers' emotions. Such discussions are often motivated by the desire to make a direct link between particular textual features and a corresponding emotional effect. Thus, narratologists such as Booth (1961: 245, 249) and Stanzel (1984: 127-8) suggest there is a connection between internal focalisation or the direct presentation of a particular character's consciousness and the creation of emotions such as sympathy in the reader. Stanzel writes:

The more a reader learns about the innermost motives for the behaviour of a character, the more inclined he tends to feel toward understanding, forbearance, tolerance, and so on, in respect to the conduct of this character. (1984: 127-8)

Stylisticians Leech and Short (1981: 275) also point out that exposure to a character's point of view is likely to establish identification with that character (for empirical work in this area, see Andringa 1996; Gerrig 1993, 1996; Gerrig and Rapp 2004; Rapp and Gerrig 2002, 2006; van Peer and Pander Maat 1996, 2001). These arguments are particularly relevant to the discussion in this thesis, as all three of the novels under analysis are focalised through the perspective of the protagonist. From a Text World Theory perspective, focalised narratives form enactor-accessible epistemic modal-worlds, because all the function-advancing and world-building propositions are filtered through the (unverifiable) perspective of a character. Thus, ontologically, such worlds create *distance* rather than proximity. It is interesting that despite such ontological stratification readers still experience a sense of emotional proximity. Gavins (2007: 131) points out that it is this feature of focalised narratives which makes them well-suited to the creation of interesting and often disturbing narrative tricks where the ontological reality of the discourse is reasserted (2007: 131-43; see also Gavins forthcoming 2010).

In the analyses in this thesis, I seek to complicate the often one-way connections made between conceptual distance and emotional response. For example, in section 5.3 I consider some readers who describe feeling ‘close’ to the narrator of *Never Let Me Go*, but report decidedly negative emotional responses to this proximity. Such experiences seem to contradict the commonly drawn connections between ‘closeness’ and positive emotional connotations. I argue that there are no reliable correspondences between particular emotional valences and movement or positing in conceptual space, and that it is best to regard the particular emotional effects of conceptual distance as negotiated in the ongoing context of the discourse.

The idea of emotional proximity and distance is closely interconnected with the notion of projection, which has become another major aspect of Text World Theory accounts of emotional response. Projection is considered in section 3.2.4. immediately below. The relationships between participants and text-world enactors which are created through identification, sympathy and empathy, are given more consideration in section 3.2.5.

#### **3.2.4 Projection**

Much of the Text World Theory account of emotional experience stems from the idea that language comprehension involves projection. Projection is a psychological ability which, understood metaphorically, involves some conceptual movement towards a different position. The linguistic notion of projection was originally developed in order to explain the way speakers and hearers are able to shift their perspective when producing or comprehending deictic expressions (e.g. Bühler 1982; Green 1992, 1995; Levinson 1983). Deictic expressions in language always originate from a deictic centre or ‘origo’, which is typically the speaker ‘I’, place ‘here’ and time ‘now’ (Bühler 1982). However, we are also able to project or shift our deictic centre, for example when we describe the location of objects in relation to another person; ‘it’s behind you’ or ‘on your left’ (Stockwell 2002: 43). Such deictic projection is thought to be fundamental to our comprehension of any discourse which does not correspond to the spatial and temporal parameters of the discourse-world (McIntyre 2006; Semino 1992: 138), and fulfils different functions in different genres of texts (Gavins 2007: 40).

Most importantly for the present discussion, deictic projection is essential to our comprehension of literary narrative. Galbraith (1995: 46) notes that when we read, our *origo* coordinates are ‘transposed from their usual anchorage in the “I” into an anchorage in the narrative text’ (see also Duchan et al 1995). This means that readers take ‘a cognitive stance within the world of the narrative and interpret the text from that perspective’ (Segal 1995:

15). There is a wealth of empirical evidence, much of which comes from cognitive psychological research into situation models (see section 2.1.2 above), which suggests that such projection occurs during narrative comprehension (e.g. Black, Turner and Bower 1979; Bryant et al 1992; Morrow 1985, 1994; Rall and Harris 2000; Rinck and Bower 1995; Rinck et al 1996). For example, in an experiment investigating the focus of readers' attention, Rinck and Bower (1995) asked readers to memorise a diagram of a building and the objects located within it before they read narratives describing characters' activities and movements in that building. During reading, they were probed with target sentences referring to memorised objects within the building's rooms. They found that readers were able to process target sentences which referred to objects close to the current location of the character faster than those which referred to objects further away. This suggests that readers were experiencing the narrative from the spatiotemporal standpoint of the character. In a review of this area, Zwaan et al (2001) note that 'assuming that the comprehender has a virtual presence in the narrated situation explains a great number of empirical findings' (2001: 78).

In Text World Theory, projection is thought to be a major factor in readers' emotional experience of narratives (Gavins 2007; Lahey 2005; Stockwell 2009), and takes on different significance depending upon how it is conceived. When projection is seen as an ability to *adopt psychologically the spatio-temporal coordinates* of another entity (as the linguistic and empirical accounts described above suggest) it is thought to be the basis for sensations of immersion, engagement and involvement in narratives, as well as their opposites (e.g. Gavins 2007: 40; Lahey 2005: 280-92; Stockwell 2009: 88-9, 95). This type of projection is often expressed and understood in terms of a transportation metaphor, which is common in readers' descriptions of their narrative experiences (e.g. Gerrig 1993; Stockwell 2009: 80, 87). In the transportation metaphor, narrative is seen to 'transport an experiencer away from the here and now' (Gerrig 1993: 3). Thus, we might speak of being 'lost in a book' or transported to a different world when reading narrative. In some cases, readers describe projecting to such an extent that they actually feel they have *become* the character in the narrative world. For example, when describing his reading of a Hemingway short story (featuring a protagonist called Nick Adams), Opdahl writes:

When I read Hemingway's passage, identifying with Nick, I feel the same elements that Nick does. Because I *am* Nick Adams, heating dinner by the fire, I read the word "pot" as not an idea but a concrete object that I pick up... (2002: 67)

Here, Opdahl describes his deictic projection as being so complete that he loses sense of his own *origo* and fully inhabits the spatio-temporal coordinates of the character in the text-world. Such expressions serve to highlight Opdahl's sense of immersion in the narrative,

but I would argue they also highlight the potential pitfalls in using the transportation metaphor to understand projection in literary discourse. As Stockwell (2009: 93) notes, the transportation metaphor seems to suggest that the 'entire, stable entity of the reader' is moved during literary reading and, as in the Opdahl quotation, this leads to the suggestion that the deictic centre and the entire identity of the reader is somehow lost as a result. Such a view is incompatible with the ontological basis and discourse-world context of Text World Theory. Strict ontological divisions are maintained between entities existing at the discourse-world and text-world levels, and furthermore, without a participant situated in the reality of the discourse-world, text-worlds cannot be created in the first place.

Within Text World Theory, then, projection is viewed as a form of *metaphorical mapping* between discourse-world and text-world entities. Thus, Stockwell (2009: 9) characterises projection as part of the general human cognitive capacity for 'taking one domain and mapping it onto another in order to gain access or understanding of the new domain' (see also Kuiken et al 2004). In order to project psychologically into narrative text-worlds, discourse-world participants project a counterpart (Lahey 2005) or enactor (Gavins 2007) of themselves into their text-world. This means that the discourse-world participant is seen to be partially (rather than wholly) represented in the text-world: and remains ontologically bound by the discourse-world. The features which are metaphorically mapped between the discourse-world and text-world versions of the participant vary depending upon the type or level of projection involved. In terms of spatio-temporal projection discussed above, the mapped features are the discourse-world participant's embodied sense of space and location.

However, 'projection' is also often used in a broader sense to mean not only psychologically adopting the spatio-temporal coordinates of another entity, but also *the imaginative reconstruction of other psychological aspects of an entity's perspective*, including their worldview, attitudes, emotions, desires, goals, beliefs and so on. For example, Lahey argues that through projection into the role of a particular enactor, participants become privy to their 'point of view' and 'emotional responses' (2005: 285). Gavins suggests that psychological projection reinforces the equivalence between the text- and discourse-world levels and enables participants to treat text-world entities as 'real', life-like people, who have thoughts, emotions and reactions in the same way as any discourse-world human being (2007: 42-3). In this type of projection, the mapped features are particular human characteristics.

Stockwell (2009) refers to this type of projection as 'mind-modelling' and connects it with research into 'mindreading' within psychology. Indeed, this type of embellished projection is closely related to the notions of 'perspective-taking', 'mindreading' or thought



and feeling ‘prediction’ within psychology (e.g. Baron Cohen 1995, 2002; Carruthers and Smith 1996; Davis and Stone 1995; Gehlbach 2004; Karniol 2003a, 2003b; Malle and Hodges 2005). Broadly speaking, research in this area is interested in the way we are able to imagine and infer the thoughts, emotions and mental states of other people even though we have no direct access to such states. Zunshine (2006) popularised some of these psychological ideas in the field of literary study, and I give ‘mindreading’ and Stockwell’s notion of ‘mind-modelling’ more consideration in section 4.3.

This type of projection is often expressed and understood in terms of a performance metaphor, also identified by Gerrig (1993). In this metaphor, the task of the reader is likened to the task of the actor, as just like actors performing roles, readers must ‘give substance to the psychological lives of characters’ (Gerrig 1993: 17). Text World Theory accounts of emotional engagement also draw upon this performance metaphor. Lahey (2003, 2005) suggests that as readers build up enactors of themselves within their text-worlds during projection, they take on the ‘role’ of a poetic character or addressee within their text-world. Readers are able to inhabit both the role of the ‘reader’ and the role of the ‘addressee’ as they read the poem, for example (Lahey 2005: 281; see also Green 1992; Leech 1969; Short 1996). Through this role ‘enactment’ readers become ‘implicated in the events and situations in the text-world’ (Lahey 2005: 285; see also Gavins 2007: 86). Stockwell’s (2009) account of reader identity also draws on the notion that identity is performed – hence readers are able to accommodate their personalities in relation to particular texts and perform different identities when reading (see section 3.2.2 above). The social theories of emotion described in section 3.1.3 also regard the performance of identity and social roles to be a key factor in our emotional experiences. Current work in Text World Theory focuses on readerly projection in relation to a single role in the text-world (Gavins 2007; Lahey 2005; Stockwell 2005a; 2009). In sections 4.3, 5.2 and 5.3 I argue that during discourse readers are able to position themselves in several roles simultaneously, and that these multiple positionings are influential in their emotional experience.

For now, however, it is worth noting that all Text World Theory work on projection quickly moves into discussions of the *relationships* which are formed between discourse-world and text-world entities as a result of the former’s projective capacity. As noted in section 3.2.3. above, it is these spatially configured relationships which are at the centre of much Text World Theory work on emotion. Projection, particularly in its latter sense, can be regarded as the basis for emotional experiences such as identification, sympathy and empathy which are given more detailed consideration in section 3.2.5. immediately below.

### **3.2.5 Identification, empathy and sympathy**

In a similar manner to ‘emotion’, ‘feeling’ and ‘affect’ (see section 3.1.), there is typically no clear consensus regarding the usage of the terms ‘identification’, ‘empathy’ and ‘sympathy’ (Bray 2007; Kuiken et al 2004: 180; Sklar 2008: 34; Stockwell 2009: 138; Wispe 1987). In Text World Theory it is only Stockwell (2009) who makes a clear distinction between these terms, whilst Gavins (2007) and Lahey (2005) use them more interchangeably (though their accounts of the cognitive mechanics behind these concepts often coincide). Broadly speaking, these terms refer to an emotional experience which arises from a particular relationship between the experiencer and another person (or sentient entity).

I believe it is profitable to regard identification, empathy and sympathy as extensions of the basic human propensity for projection, which was described in section 3.2.4. This view is also suggested in Stockwell (2009), who notes that as a result of our ability to project we are able to:

...imagine alternative scenarios, recall past events and call up future events, cast ourselves into the imagined minds of others, sympathise, empathise, perceive differences and resist them (the basis of world theories). (Stockwell 2009: 9)

However, there are fuzzy boundaries between projection and the phenomena known as identification, empathy and sympathy. In Text World Theory, the best way in which these latter three concepts can currently be conceived is through the notion of degrees of richness in the metaphorical mapping between entities (see below, and Stockwell 2005a, 2009).

Though Lahey (2005) seems to suggest that identification is the projection of an enactor of yourself, in some form, into the text-world, Stockwell (2009) establishes a more specific definition of identification in terms of the reader’s perception of similarities between themselves and the text. Identification arises from an act of comparison, recognition and ‘self-awareness’ on the part of the discourse-world participant (Stockwell 2009: 138). It is: ‘a process of setting the reader’s self-aware personality traits against those of projected characters, in order to resolve both the similarities and differences’ (Stockwell 2009: 88). Gavins (2007: 86) adopts a similar stance to Stockwell, (though, following Kuiken et al 2004, she uses the term ‘implication’ rather than identification). Thus, in Text World Theory identification tends to be regarded as a form of metaphorical mapping between the discourse participant’s ‘self aware personality’ and a text-world enactor (Stockwell 2009: 138). As projection is also figured in terms of such mapping, it is evident that the two concepts interrelate.

Because it is explained as a form of metaphorical mapping, identification is not characterised as an on/off experience but as a relationship with variable degrees. The

extent to which a particular discourse-participant identifies with a text-world enactor is best regarded as something which can be negotiated in the course of the discourse (as in Stockwell 2009) and affected by numerous factors. One factor which may influence identification is the reader's current sense of their self-aware personality, which, as noted in section 3.2.2, can shift and alter in the course of the discourse. Stockwell (2009) posits that readers are able to accommodate their personality towards the discourse in hand, and this process may increase identification as the text progresses, for example. Text-world theorists also seem to agree that identification can be based on instant recognition or more directed cognitive effort depending upon the discourse and participant under consideration (e.g. Gavins 2007: 85-7; Lahey 2005: 286-9; Stockwell 2009: 78-103). In literary discourse readers are likely to be motivated towards identification with a text-world enactor (Gavins 2007: 126-45; Stockwell 2009: 78-103) and therefore identification may increase as a text progresses. Textual features also have the potential to influence the extent of identification: by providing more world-building or function-advancing information for comparison, for example (Gavins 2007; Lahey 2005; Stockwell 2005a, 2009).

The emotional experience of identification is also likely to be influenced by the particular elements involved in the mapping. Hogan (2003a: 140-42) provides a useful distinction regarding the type of similarities which may give rise to identification. He proposes that the similarities we perceive between ourselves and others may be either categorical or situational. Categorical similarities are based on our own 'self-concepts', which are prototypical structures consisting of 'everything a person thinks is true of him/herself, ordered by importance or centrality to his/her understanding' (2003a: 140). For example, my self-concept might include entries like 'female', 'British', 'right-handed'. Situational similarities are based on personal memories of particular experiences (including their emotional associations); such as 'my tenth birthday', 'my wedding day', and so on (Hogan 2003a: 141). Thus, identification can be based on the perception of similar categorical features, or can arise through the perception of similarities in experience, and the domains which are mapped can be seen to influence the degree and emotional experience of that identification.

For example, Gavins (2007) describes her inability to identify with the protagonist of Tom Robbins' *Half Asleep in Frog Pajamas* in terms of both categorical and situational factors. The protagonist, referred to only as 'you' (as the text is written in the second-person), is a financial services worker drowning their sorrows in a bar after having just lost fortunes in a stock market crash. Gavins notes that she 'has no experience at all' of such a situation in her own life, and this is part of the reason behind her difficulty in identifying with the protagonist (2007: 86). In addition to this situational factor, Gavins describes a

mismatch between categorical features (regarding gender, hair colour, nationality, and so on) which further problematise her identification, stating: 'my drink of choice would probably be red wine, not white, my hair has not yet turned grey, I am not American, and I am not male' (2007: 86). She suggests that:

The closer the resemblance between the life of the text-world enactor and the life of the real-world reader, the more likely it is that the reader will be comfortable inhabiting the new projected text-world persona (Gavins 2007: 86).

As such, she found reading the novel an 'uncomfortable' experience and positions herself at a distance from the text-worlds she constructs as she reads it (Gavins 2007: 87). Broadly speaking, in the analyses of Gavins (2007) and Stockwell (2005a, 2009), close identification tends to be associated with positive and more intense emotional responses to the text (see Kuiken et al 2004 for empirical support of this position), whereas in cases where identification is not performed, readers are resistant to the sentiments of the text or the characteristics of particular character. In section 5.3 I introduce the notion of disassociation in order to further develop the idea of readers' conscious resistance to identification and give further consideration to the textual features and emotional valences involved in identification.

The emotional effects of identification can be accounted for using both the cognitive and social approaches to emotion described in section 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 above. In terms of cognitive appraisal theories, identification has the potential to make the text self-relevant, thus has the potential to generate emotions. As noted in section 3.1.4, Robinson (2005) suggests that once readers perceive a character to be in some respect like themselves, they are likely to care about them, meaning that their fate and actions will be appraisal-relevant and result in emotional responses. Furthermore, projection and identification enable readers to infer the goals of the characters, which Oatley (1994, 1999a, 1999b, 2002; Oatley and Gholomain 1997) argues is sufficient to activate their own planning processes and evoke emotions when such plans meet vicissitudes. As noted in 3.2.4 above, it is sometimes useful to conceive of projection as a role-taking exercise in which readers take on the perspective of a particular character (e.g. Gavins 2007; Lahey 2005). Through enacting such roles and experiencing (or not experiencing) identification, literary reading can be seen as a process of making claims about our own identities in relation to others (as in the Gavins example above). In terms of social emotion theories, this activity is inherently emotional. In sections 4.2 to 4.3.3, and 5.2 to 5.3.2, I return to the issue of the sociality of reading in more detail, extending the Text World Theory notion of identification to include multiple characters and other entities (such as the narratee and implied audience) which are involved in literary discourse.

Though Gavins (2007), Lahey (2005) and Stockwell (2009) sometimes employ different terminology, they all draw upon the notions of enactors and cross-world mappings in order to account for the emotional relationships established between discourse- and text-world entities. I believe Text World Theory is able to provide a useful definition and description identification using these means. Empathy and sympathy, however, are less well defined in the work of Gavins (2007) and Lahey (2005) and it is only Stockwell (2009) who makes a clearer distinction between these phenomena. In his model, these relationships are also conceived in terms of mappings and conceptual distance.

Stockwell's framework for describing empathy and sympathy proceeds from the results of a survey he conducted into online reading group data. He found that in addition to the more commonly recognised 'transportation' metaphor for reading (see Gerrig 1993), two other often overlooked metaphors were prominent in readers' descriptions: 'reading as control' and 'reading as investment' (Stockwell 2009: 80). This latter metaphor, Stockwell notes, 'seems exclusively to be used to articulate experiences of emotional or empathic senses' and is the only metaphor in which readers have solely an active role (2009: 80). Used in conjunction with worlds theories, Stockwell argues that this metaphor can help to delineate the distinction between empathy and sympathy.

He outlines an Idealised Cognitive Model of 'investment' and maps it onto an emotional domain, suggesting that the ultimate 'return' on a readers' investment is empathy: 'a bidirectional trans-world mapping between the discourse world reader and the character in the embedded worlds' (2009: 93). Thus empathy involves both investment by the reader, in the form of projection, and a return on this investment, in terms of a related shift in the reader's sense of self, or a 'shift back...towards a realignment of the readerly stance' (Stockwell 2009: 95). Sympathy, on the other hand, is understood in terms of investment without such self-related return. He proposes that sympathy involves projection and the investment of resources, but with the maintenance of sense of 'self awareness of difference' (Stockwell 2009: 143-4). Deictically, sympathy 'involves a reader in the discourse world observing a character in the text-world and their world-switches' whereas in empathy readers make a closer mapping between themselves and the text-world (Stockwell 2009: 93). According to Stockwell's model, a reader's investment in reading is driven by the hope of attaining empathy, as a form of self 'improvement' and as a return on that investment (Stockwell 2009: 94). Readers want to feel that the scale of investment they have to make in the narrative will be returned, and this motivates them to continue reading and investing their time, energy and emotion in the narrative experience.

Stockwell's model captures several aspects of the distinctions between empathy and sympathy drawn in other studies. For example, Sklar (2008) posits that sympathy involves a

greater distance between the sympathiser and the object of their sympathy and crucially involves evaluation or judgement, where empathy does not (2008: 37-40). Tan (1996) also captures this sense of distance in his description of sympathy as a 'witness emotion'. In his treatment of the issue, however, Sklar restricts sympathy to the (often negative) emotions experienced when one perceives another to be suffering. Stockwell makes no similar suggestions regarding the object or emotional valence of sympathy, though his examples come from lament poems in which the text-world enactors can be seen to be suffering in some way.

Many scholars posit that empathy involves a sense of similarity or emotional proximity to another person, and Stockwell's model also captures this idea well. Some scholars, however, argue that in empathy, the empathiser must experience the same or similar emotions to the target in order for empathy to occur (Keen 2006, 2007; Sklar 2008; de Vignemont and Singer 2006). Thus, Keen views empathy as a 'spontaneous sharing of affect' in which we 'feel what we believe to be the emotions of others' (2006: 208). Though Stockwell (2009: 56) describes empathy and sympathy on a 'cline of projection' from 'feeling for...' to 'feeling with...' he does not give much consideration to the matching of emotions in empathy. In Stockwell's framework, it seems that the most important feature of empathy is the way it relates to the self and rewards reading.

Stockwell's framework is a literary specification of Text World Theory; it is designed with literary discourse in mind and he does not suggest that it is intended to elucidate the sympathy and empathy experienced in other types of discourse. This leads to the question of whether there are significant differences between the empathy and sympathy we experience in different discourse contexts. The testing and exploration of the empathy/sympathy framework is, I believe, an important future direction for Text World Theory (for neuroscientific work on empathy, see Botvinick et al 2005; Gallese 2003, 2005; Gallese and Goldman 1998; Gallese et al 2002; Jackson et al 2005; Keysers et al 2004; Rizzolatti et al 1996; Singer et al 2004; Wicker et al 2003).

In this thesis, however, though I refer to empathy and sympathy where appropriate, the focus of my investigation will be on the phenomenon of identification. Particularly, I am concerned in Chapters 4 and 5 with the way identification may be established and manipulated in the interaction between texts and readers. There are two main reasons behind this decision. Firstly, it seems to me that identification as defined above *underlies* both empathy and sympathy: as both involve projection and the establishment of self-other relationships. Empathy, I would argue, is best seen as a form of identification which involves similarity on the emotional plane (as in the accounts of Keen 2006, 2007; Sklar 2008; de Vignemont and Singer 2006) or a particularly close, bi-directional mapping

between self and other (Stockwell 2009). Sympathy, I believe, is best regarded as a phenomenon which is informed by identification, but which also involves other factors: such as resources for being able to help, and evaluation or judgement (as in the account of Sklar 2008).

The view that identification underpins empathy or sympathy is suggested both implicitly and explicitly in other studies. For example, Keen (2007) refers to 'character identification' (which I understand to mean identification with literary characters) and suggests that she sees empathy as a form of such identification, for example, when she refers to: 'the strong, spontaneous kind of character identification that I call readers' empathy for fictional characters' (2007: xxi). The Text World Theory sense of identification and projection also seem to underpin Coplan's (2004) definition of empathy. She classes 'perspective-taking' where 'the empathizer imaginatively experiences the target's experiences from the target's point of view' as one of empathy's fundamental features (2004: 144). Identification, in terms of the recognition of similarities between oneself and another, also underlies Hogan's (2003a) definition of empathy. He writes: 'in every case empathy is based on some sort of similarity...[it] presupposes something that is shared' (2003a: 144). His notion of categorical and situational similarities, described above, are used to categorise the similarities upon which empathy can be based. From my perspective, these similarities are a part of identification. Empathy and identification are also implicitly connected in Stockwell's (2009) account. He notes that:

the degrees of perceived similarity and difference between the poetic world and the reader's world are relevant to the intensity of the empathetic connection. (2009: 97).

Thus, identification can be seen to underpin his use of the term empathy. In a final point, Oatley and Gholomain (1997) explicitly share my view that identification underlies several types of emotional experience. They argue that identification is 'a family of psychological processes that includes empathy, imitation, admiration and recognition of similarities' (1997: 276).

The second reason for restricting my focus to identification is that, whilst identification is fundamental to the Text World Theory approach to emotion, it is actually a very wide and relatively unexplored concept. As I noted above, Text World Theory analyses to date typically connect close identification with positive emotion and distal identification with negative emotion or resistant reading (Gavins 2007; Stockwell 2005a, 2009). However, in the complicated context of a particular discourse, there are numerous factors which could impact upon identificatory processes in the reader and these have not been investigated very extensively. Furthermore, the Text World Theory understanding of identification has not been widely or extensively applied to literary narratives. Lahey (2005)

and Stockwell (2005) focus on lyric poetry; Gavins (2007) considers two narratives written in the third- and second-person respectively, and Stockwell (2009) considers mainly poetry and second-person narrative also. In existing text-world investigations of emotion and literary narrative, there is a distinct bias towards the second-person form, which may be related to stylisticians' general tendency to pick unusual or challenging examples to support their points. First-person novels, the focus of this thesis, have received little attention in Text World Theory work on emotion. Considering stylistic and narratological suggestions regarding the emotive power of internally focalised narratives (Booth 1961; Leech and Short 1981; Stanzel 1984), this lack seems particularly strange. One element of the original contribution made by this thesis is a focus on first-person internally focalised narrative.

### **3.2.6 Other influences over emotional experience**

To conclude this review it is also necessary to mention some aspects of emotional and literary experience which will be considered in this thesis where relevant. The first thing to note is that although I have been discussing Stockwell's (2009) work as a contribution to emotion in Text World Theory, his monograph actually encompasses a much broader range of felt experiences in literary reading, including sensations and the lasting experience of literary resonance. Furthermore, his book utilises Text World Theory only where relevant to his wide-ranging discussion of cognitive aesthetics and the 'texture' of literary reading. Prompted by the reader response data I collected regarding *The Unconsoled* (Ishiguro 1995) I engage with Stockwell's work on resonance in section 6.5 in order to consider how textual features may have influenced the lasting experiences which they describe. Because Stockwell links resonance with attention, I suggest that resonance can be regarded as arising from particular emotional experiences, although the experience of resonance differs from the 'relatively brief but intense' experiences which form the focus elsewhere in this thesis.

Furthermore, there are aspects of literary discourse situations which are important in our emotional experiences but which do not form the central focus of this thesis. Steen (1991a) partitions the study of literary communication into four 'relatively autonomous "moments" of literature', which he calls: production; distribution; reception and post-processing (1991a: 59). The focus of the present discussion is issues of post-processing, which Steen describes as:

those activities with literary texts that are dependent upon a logically prior reception process (i.e. comprehension) of the text, but which can be distinguished from this comprehension process as constituting particular discourse practices within literary communication like interpretation, explications, and teaching. (Steen 1991a: 59)



This post-processing focus accords with the stylistic aims of my approach and the methods I have used in my study of reading experiences (see section 3.3). In other work on emotion and literary reading, attention has been devoted to readers' pre-reading mood and reading location, which have been shown to affect their emotional experience of narrative (Burke 2008; Lahey 2005: 277-8; Stockwell 2009; see also Bower and Cohen 1982). Due to the post-processing focus of my investigations, I am more interested in emotions that occur as a consequence of reading rather than the ways in which mood or emotion can affect reading before it has commenced. Similarly, reading style/strategies and reader disposition are, of course, major factors in our emotional experiences of texts (e.g. Alderson and Short 1989; Hansson 1996; Keen 2006; Short and van Peer 1989; Stockwell 2009; Vipond and Hunt 1984). For example, Stockwell (2009) discusses reading in terms of intensity and the scope of attentional resources which readers apply to their comprehension of the discourse (see section 6.5). Once again, these issues are not central in my approach, though I will draw upon them where relevant in my discussion.

In the following, final section of this chapter I consider the reader response data which I collected as a part of this study. I discuss my methods in relation to other work in stylistics, cognitive poetics and empirical studies of literature, providing information about my data collection and analysis, and the way my data is used in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

### **3.3 The Responses of 'Real' Readers**

In section 1.2.1 I noted that the intersecting issues of emotion and empiricism are important areas of development and debate within cognitive poetics. One of the justifications behind the increasing cognitive-poetic interest in emotion is the idea that such a focus will enable the discipline to improve its account of the interests and motivations of 'real' or 'natural' readers outside of the academy (Miall 2005, 2006; Stockwell 2005a). These 'real' readers, Stockwell (2005a) argues, are primarily concerned with aspects of literature which are often regarded as 'inadmissible' within professional discourse, such as: 'character, empathy, identification, recognition, motivation, story, coherence, feeling, texture, mood, sensation and emotion' (2005a: 144). Both Miall (2005, 2006) and Stockwell (2005a) suggest that engagement with emotional issues would benefit not only cognitive-poetic theory, but literary study more broadly, making it more relevant to the world beyond university walls. The flipside of this argument, of course, is that in order to address emotion rigorously and to be properly experiential in accordance with broader cognitivist principles (see Lakoff 1990: 3, 1987), cognitive poetics needs to pay closer attention to the activities and responses of 'real' or 'natural' readers. In the present section, I examine issues

related to the identity of 'the reader' in cognitive poetics, and explain my decision to draw upon reader response data in this thesis.

In literary study, interest in the activities of readers stems from the 'rise of the reader' in 1970s literary criticism. In the work of German 'reception theorists' such as Jauss (1970) and Iser (1974, 1978), and predominantly North American 'reader response critics' such as Culler (1975), Fish (1980) and Holland (1975) theoretical attention shifted away from concern with the author or the text alone to a focus on the text and reader (Holub 1984: xii; van Peer et al 2007: xvi). Notions of the 'implied reader' (Booth 1961; Iser 1974); 'ideal reader' (Culler 1975); 'informed reader' (Fish 1970); the 'super reader' (Riffaterre 1966); 'resisting reader' (Fetterley 1977) and 'communities of readers' (Fish 1980) emerged in this critical period (see Toolan 1990 for an important critique of reader response and Fish in particular). However, although these approaches privilege 'the reader', they often frame their discussions in terms of 'the hypothetical response of ideal or universal readers' (Bortolussi and Dixon 2003: 8). Bortolussi and Dixon rightly point out that a missing methodological component in these approaches is 'the relationship between the theoretical concept of the reader and the actual readers of real texts' (2003: 8).

From the mid-1970s onwards new methods in the empirical study of the literary reading process were developed, designed in part to address some of the issues regarding the activities of 'real' readers (Miall 2006: 12, 26; Steen 1991a: 63). The empirical study of literature arose from the combined influence of reader response and reception theories in literary study and the emergence of the psychology of reading and empirical aesthetics in cognitive science (Schram and Steen 2001: 3). The empirical study of literature uses scientific methods in its investigation of literary reading (Steen 1991a: 61; van Peer et al 2007: 1-8), thus unlike the introspective, interpretative approach used in the traditional study of literature, analysts adopt a 'strictly observing standpoint' with respect to the activities and interpretations of other readers (Steen 1991a: 61). Research is based upon 'testable theories' and the empirical study of literature aims to produce 'valid and reliable knowledge' in accordance with scientific principles (Schram and Steen 2001: 2). Schmidt (e.g. 1982 [1980]) was a pioneer of this approach, which has developed considerably over the past thirty years particularly in the work of members of the 'International Society for the Empirical Study of Literature and Media' (also known as 'IGEL', Schram and Steen 2001: 1).

As noted in sections 1.1. and 1.2 above, stylistics and cognitive poetics have been significantly influenced by the theoretical and methodological advances in both reader response criticism and the empirical study of literature (Semino and Culpeper 2002: ix). Since the 1970s, stylistics has been principally concerned with the readerly aspect of literary

discourse, and cognitive poetics is regarded as a 'major evolution' of stylistics with respect to the role of the reader in literary interpretation (Carter and Stockwell 2008: 298). As a result of these theoretical and methodological influences, at present cognitive-poetic research incorporates both 'first-person introspection' in the tradition of literary criticism and hermeneutics, and 'third-person observation' in the tradition of empirical approaches to literature (Vandaele and Brône 2009: 6). A similar situation exists within stylistics and narratology, which also have empirical strands (e.g. in cognitive poetics, see Burke 2008; Gibbs 2003; Kuiken et al 2004; Miall 2006; Oatley 1999a, 2002; in narratology, see Bortolussi and Dixon 2003; van Peer and Pander Maat 1996, 2001; in stylistics, see Alderson and Short 1989; Emmott, Sanford and Morrow 2006; Short and van Peer 1989; van Peer 1986). Within stylistics and cognitive poetics there are calls for greater transparency regarding claims about 'the reader', which include specifying who the reader is and avoiding where possible reference to the hypothetical or theoretical 'reader' invoked by reader response criticism and reception theory (Allington and Swann 2009; Jeffries 2001: 331; Wales 2006). Introspective and empirical methods contribute in different ways to the study of readers and reading; the former typically providing detailed case studies of professional readings, and the latter often providing larger-scale surveys of particular aspects of reading (Swann and Allington 2009). In relation to the aims of this thesis, it is my belief that some form of empirical methodology is both necessary for, and particularly compatible with, an investigation of the emotional experience of literary discourse.

Several cognitive-poetic investigations into emotion have already recognised this connection between emotion and empiricism and draw upon the responses of readers other than the researcher (e.g. Burke 2008; Kuiken et al 2004; Miall 2006; Stockwell 2009). As noted in section 1.2.1, emotion is often regarded as a highly idiosyncratic and subjective aspect of literary experience (Stockwell 2005a), and this means that issues of generalisability would be particularly salient for any solely introspective account of emotion in discourse. Furthermore, because there is so much diversity and controversy in theoretical approaches to emotion (as indicated in section 3.1 above), it seems particularly important to draw upon the responses of readers other than the researcher in order to make wider claims about the role of emotion in literary reading. Stylistic and cognitive-poetic analyses typically engage with the views of other professional readers such as literary critics, but non-professional readers are still underrepresented in these disciplines (Steen and Gavins 2003; Wales 2006). As noted above, emotional and experiential factors often form the central aspects of literary discourse for readers outside of the academy, and it seems counterintuitive to ignore these readers when investigating emotional experience. This is particularly the case when one considers that the same cognitivist commitments which underpin cognitive

linguistics also underpin cognitive poetics. Lakoff summarises these commitments as follows:

For me, cognitive linguistics is defined by two primary commitments... The generalisation commitment is a commitment to characterizing the general principles governing all aspects of human language... The cognitive commitment is a commitment to make one's account of human language accord with what is generally known about the mind and brain, from other disciplines as well as our own. (Lakoff 1990: 40)

In the analyses presented in this thesis, I combine introspective analysis of the texts from my own perspective with observations about the activities and opinions of other readers. The other readers include literary critics and professional reviewers (as is common in stylistics) as well as 'real' readers who participated in discussion groups about the novels or posted on the internet. Though I do make theoretical reference to 'the reader' and 'readers' as part of my discussions, my claims about readers are transparently underpinned by either my own experience or the evidence I collected about the experiences of other 'real' readers. Furthermore, I have aimed to represent a range of both professional and non-professional readers in my studies. In taking this approach I endeavour to go some way towards reconciling the first- and third-person approaches identified by Vandaele and Brône (2009), which is part of my original contribution to the cognitive-poetic discipline.

### **3.3.1 Ways of investigating 'real' readers**

In order to investigate the responses or activities of 'real' readers in the transparent manner suggested above, some form of third-person observational, or empirical, method is required. As van Peer et al (2007) note, there is 'no single omnipotent research method... All methods have advantages as well as limitations' (2007: 58). Empirical research incorporates a wide range of methods which need to be chosen according to the aims of each particular study. A central problem for anyone interested in the cognitive processes or emotional experiences involved in reading is that one cannot gain direct access to these processes or experiences in order to measure or observe them (Alderson and Short 1989; Graesser et al 1996; Hunt 1996; Steen 1991b). One can only study reading processes through reader introspection or verbalisation, or the observation of external features such as reading time and eye movement.

In empirical research there exists a major distinction between the adoption of quantitative or qualitative methods (though of course they can also be combined, see Schreier 2001). Van Peer et al (2007) describe quantitative methods as generally 'geared towards testing existing theories or hypotheses' (2007: 58) and useful when 'extensive literature about a field or topic exists' (2007: 58). Qualitative methods, on the other hand, are useful 'whenever one is confronted with a field or topic that has hardly been

investigated and where few theories or hypotheses exist', thus tend to be 'more appropriate to generate new insights and hypotheses' (2007: 59).

Steen (1991b) makes a useful and related distinction between the type of data which can be collected in empirical study of literary reading. 'Non-verbal data' is non-linguistic and takes the form of quantitative measures such as reading or reaction time (e.g. Goetz et al 1993, Vega et al 1996). Steen notes that non-verbal data is harder to collect, because of the equipment which is often necessary, but is easier to analyse as it is simple to average and compare (1991b: 563). Furthermore, non-verbal data can be collected during the online reading process, giving us more direct access to that process, but only regarding a restricted range of phenomena (Steen 1991b: 563-4). 'Verbal data', on the other hand, takes the form of spoken or written linguistic expression, thus can only be collected 'before or after reading' (Steen 1991b: 563-4). Such data is easier to collect, but harder to analyse because it can often be complex (Steen 1991b: 563). Importantly, Steen notes that aspects of literary reading such as the 'actual cognitive, emotive or moral contents of the reading process' are accessible only through verbal methods (Steen 1991b: 564). Indeed, in a survey of empirical studies of literature from the journal *SPIEL*, Steen (1991b) finds that verbal data was the most common form, and this is also the case in the studies which I have reviewed.

The reader response studies conducted as part of this project aimed to collect information about the emotional experiences, attitudes and opinions of readers who read one of three novels by Kazuo Ishiguro. Through collecting the data I was interested to discover:

1. what types (valences, intensities) of emotional experiences readers reported in relation to the novels
2. which (if any) parts or aspects of the novel readers identified as the object or cause of their emotional experiences

Thus, my aims were to collect data about the responses of other readers which I could then use in my analysis of the Ishiguro novels. As I was not concerned with the testing of particular hypotheses, but instead with the generation of new insights regarding the emotional experience of literary discourse, I chose to use qualitative methods in my research. Furthermore, as I was interested in collecting data about the 'cognitive, emotive or moral' contents of the reading process, I chose to collect verbal data (Steen 1991b: 564). As noted in section 3.1.3 above, emotion discourse is important in the manifestation of emotional experience (Parkinson 1995), thus is also particularly relevant to the interests of the present study. Although in the course of my analyses I relate the data collected to the Text World Theory model of emotional experience, it was *not* my aim to test the Text World Theory framework itself empirically. The testing and development of the Text

World Theory framework is conducted theoretically through the analyses in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

Steen (1991b) classifies verbal data in terms of the level of control which the researcher has over the data collected. Maximal control is provided by techniques such as questionnaires or structured interviews with closed questions, ranking and rating tasks (e.g. Andringa 1996; Brewer 1996; Brewer and Lichtenstein 1981; Hakemulder 2001; van Peer and Pander Maat 1996). In such tasks the researcher predetermines the verbal data which are to be collected, and such maximal control often leads to results which are amenable to quantitative analysis (Steen 1991b: 567-8). Medium control verbal data is collected through cloze-procedures or underlining tasks, in which the nature of the verbal data is partly determined by the researcher and partly by the participant (Steen 1991b: 571). In minimal control verbal data it is the participant, not the researcher, who has control over the nature of the data collected (Steen 1991b: 571). Such data is typically analysed qualitatively, using content analysis, for example. Steen notes that when data are collected for 'exploratory purposes', i.e. in order to explore an issue and generate hypotheses for later testing, 'it may be that validity is served by using low-control verbal data' (Steen 1991b: 574). Indeed, because I was interested in anything which the readers themselves reported as salient, I chose minimal control methods in order to avoid imposing structure upon participants' responses.

There are a range of methods which can be used to collect minimal control verbal data. In think-aloud studies (e.g. Alderson and Short 1989; Miall 1990; Short and van Peer 1989; Steen and Schram 1996), readers are asked to read a text and verbalise any thoughts or inferences they make during their reading. These verbalisations can be cued by the researcher at certain points in the text, or readers can be left to think-aloud whenever they feel appropriate. Steen (1991b) argues that compared with other verbal methods, thinking-aloud provides the best access to the online reading process. It provides rich set of data which enables researchers to compare the readings of participants on a moment-by-moment basis. However, thinking aloud can only be practically undertaken in relation to short stories, poems or textual extracts. Furthermore, it necessarily alters the reading process through interruption.

One way around this is to use self-probed retrospection techniques (e.g. Kuiken et al 2004; Oatley 1999a; Seilman and Larsen 1989). In this method, readers are asked to make a mark on their text whenever they are aware of experiencing a particular memory, thought or emotion. After they have read the text, they then go through their markings and explain them to the researcher. The advantage of this approach is that the reading process is only minimally interrupted, but the disadvantage of course is that readers may have forgotten

why they marked the text in a particular manner. Though one could conceivably use the self-probed retrospection technique in relation to whole novels, in practical terms it is still best-suited to shorter texts.

Interviews and questionnaires are another means of obtaining minimal control verbal data (e.g. Berntsen and Larsen 1996; Burke 2008; Halasz 1996; Larsen 1996; van Peer and Pander Maat 2001). Interviews can be structured, semi-structured or unstructured whilst minimal control questionnaires tend to involve open questions or free writing. For the purposes of my study, I was concerned that interviews and questionnaires would inevitably impose structure upon the readers' verbal reports (though see section 3.3.2 below regarding my use of questions in Dataset 1). In particular, I believe that when responding even to unstructured interviews or free writing questionnaires readers are likely to be very aware that they are taking part in an academic study, and this in turn is likely to influence the way they represent their emotional experiences. Miall (2006) notes that academic literary study typically requires readers to 'marginalise their personal experience of literary texts' (2006: 24). Indeed, I would argue that the academy is popularly associated with a de-emphasis on emotion and experience in favour of more analytical and theoretical concerns and wanted to avoid associations with such a view wherever possible. I am not suggesting, of course, that it is possible to obtain more 'direct' or 'honest' access to a reader's cognitive processes and emotional experiences outside of an interview or questionnaire situation. As noted above, we can never have direct access to such experiences through verbal data collected after the reading process, and the reports which readers give are always constructed for the particular discourse context in which they are given (Silverman 2006). It is my belief, however, that framing the data collection in terms of an academic study could have an impact upon the data I wished to collect.

Furthermore, it seems counter-intuitive to collect interview or questionnaire data when readers frequently talk about their narrative experiences unprompted in everyday discourse (Stockwell 2005a). I wanted my verbal data to be as close to this kind of naturally occurring discourse as possible, which meant that it would have to arise from readers in interaction with each other rather than with a researcher and, where possible, out of naturally occurring discourse situations. As such, I decided to collect verbal data from group discussions. Group discussions can be structured and led as a focus group, or can simply involve the recording of participants in conversation regarding a particular topic, but Steen (1991b) identifies such methods as involving the least control on the part of the researcher.

In an article published subsequent to my data collection, Swann and Allington (2009) aptly describe the type of data I was trying to collect. They posit a distinction

between 'experimental' and 'naturalistic' studies of literary reading and argue for the importance of the latter (Swann and Allington 2009: 248; see also Hall 2008; Hunt 1996). 'Experimental' studies are those which seek to isolate and test a pre-specified element of interpretational activity. Swann and Allington note that the need for experimental control leads to a focus on 'rather artificial reading behaviour' (2009: 248) using short or manipulated texts in laboratory-style conditions. Participants are often students in an institutional setting, and interaction between readers is minimal. Conversely, 'naturalistic' studies 'seek to provide evidence of reader activity outside the artificial environment of a reading experiment' (Swann and Allington 2009: 248). They involve readers taking part in an activity they would normally participate in, in their normal environment and engaging with their usual texts, thus seek to prioritise ecological validity over experimental control. A particular advantage for the investigation of narrative is that readers are able to read a whole novel rather than the short stories, extracts or poems which often used in 'experimental' studies of literary reading. Swann and Allington also suggest that a naturalistic focus enables researchers to address questions of meaning and value, which have 'more direct relevance to literary scholarship' (2009: 249). The research undertaken in this thesis is aligned with this 'naturalistic' perspective, and contributes to this growing research area.

However, my project also raises some important issues regarding the use of such data in a cognitive-poetic context, in particular with regard to the type of information I seek to attain. My concerns here are stylistic, and my focus is the emotional effects of three particular novels and the way in which the cognitive-poetic framework of Text World Theory accounts for such emotional issues. The reader response data I collected, however, cannot be treated as though it gives any direct access to the actual emotional experiences or mental representations of readers as they read those novels. As noted above, no methods currently available can provide direct access to the actual experiences of readers, though 'think aloud' protocols are regarded as the best way to access the online reading experience through verbal means (Alderson and Short 1989; Short and van Peer 1989; Steen 1991b). The reports which participants provide in the context of group discussions recorded after the reading experience are likely to be affected by 'post-hoc rationalisation and forgetfulness' (Short and van Peer 1989). Further, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) point out that verbal reports of mental processes are often influenced by stereotypical ideas about explanations for behaviour, particularly if they are collected some time after the process itself (1977: 252, see also Ericsson and Simon 1984). Social and interactional factors such as self-presentation and group dynamics also inevitably shape the reports participants produce



regarding their reading experiences (Allington and Benwell 2007; Myers 2009; Steen 1991b).

Perhaps as a result of these constraints, 'naturalistic' studies of reading as described by Swann and Allington (2009) tend not to address stylistic concerns regarding readers' experience of the particular literary texts under discussion (for a similar observation, see Myers 2009). Instead, attention is directed at the ways in which participants talk about books and the social and cultural practices involved in this type of discourse (e.g. Long 2003; Radway 1987 [1984]). There are a number of naturalistic studies which take a discourse analysis approach to verbal data (e.g. Allington 2007; Allington and Benwell 2007; Barajas and Aronsson 2009; Benwell 2009; Swann and Allington 2009; see also Benwell 2005), drawing on conversation analysis or discursive psychology (see Edwards and Stokoe 2004). Such studies are interested in how book group talk is locally managed and how speakers create accounts of their experiences in order to construct and maintain interpersonal relations. They tend to be uninterested in the content of the discussion beyond its relevance to the immediate interactional context. Indeed, Allington and Benwell (2007) go so far as to propose that any analysis of '*talk about reading*' should in fact be a study of '*talk*' and not a study of '*reading*' (2007: 9, emphasis present in original). In this thesis, such a restrictive approach to naturalistic data is strongly opposed. Though Allington and Benwell (2007) are right to emphasise that talk about reading does not provide any direct access to the psychological experience of reading, I would argue that this does not render such discourse completely irrelevant to the study of reading more generally. As noted in section 3.1.3, social psychologists such as Parkinson (1995) acknowledge that discourse about emotion rarely 'accurately' describes emotion and is always interpretative and partially constitutive of the phenomenon, but nevertheless is an important element in the study of emotion more broadly (1995: 262).

In his review of the use of naturalistic reader response data in stylistics, Myers (2009) proposes that whilst traditional stylistics tries to 'explain the sort of response a trained reader might have to literary texts' (2009: 342), naturalistic data from 'real' readers:

suggest[s] the need to explain such untrained responses as boredom, engagement, identification, resistance, pride at reading quickly, shame at reading slowly, frustration and laughter – the sorts of responses people talk about in reading groups. (Myers 2009: 343)

Myers proposes, in a move which is strongly advocated in the present approach, that stylistics and cognitive poetics can use naturalistic, reader response data as a way of 'broadening the range of responses that stylistics tries to explain' (Myers 2009: 338). In the present study, naturalistic reader response data is collected for this purpose; in order to

access ‘the accounts which readers offer each other’ (Myers 2009: 343) and identify the types of responses for which cognitive-poetic frameworks need to account. I treat the reader response data I collected as having useful implications for the development of the Text World Theory account of literary experience. My study also offers some chance to compare the responses of literary critics and ‘real’ readers, which are mentioned where relevant in my analyses. In the following section I describe my methods of data collection.

### **3.3.2 Methods of data collection and analysis**

I collected three sets of ‘real’ reader data in total, which will be referred to throughout as Dataset 1, Dataset 2 and Dataset 3. Each Dataset involves different participants and pertains to a different novel by Ishiguro. I also used slightly different methods each time, as I sought to include a range of readers and reflect some of the different situations in which readers discuss literary texts. As noted in section 3.2.2, I aimed to collect information about the emotional experiences, attitudes and opinions of readers and was particularly interested in what types (valences, intensities) of emotional experiences readers reported in relation to the novels and which (if any) parts of the novel readers identified as the object or cause of their emotional experiences.

Dataset 1 features three female readers (Participants A, B and C) aged between 24 and 25 discussing their responses to Ishiguro’s novel *The Remains of the Day* (1989). These participants live in various locations across the UK but form a friendship group who customarily meet several times a year at one of their houses. All the participants have a Masters degree in English studies and stylistics. In fact, the group originally met at University where they participated in seminars together. At the time of data collection, they had been in employment (publishing, teaching and PA work) for a year and a half since finishing their Masters course but all continued to read, enjoy and discuss literature in their spare time.

I supplied each participant with a copy of *The Remains of the Day* (1989) about a month before they were due to meet in one of the participant’s homes for a weekend visit. As part of this visit, participants agreed to spend some time discussing the novel and allowed me to record them doing so. Prior to the recording session participants were supplied with an information sheet regarding the nature of the study and signed a consent form, in accordance with ethics guidelines. Participants were also supplied with the following instructions on a slip of paper (these instructions are discussed below):

#### **Suggested Topics For Discussion**

You could talk about...

What you thought/felt:

- about the novel as a whole
- about the character of Stevens

- about the relationships between Mr Stevens and other characters (e.g. Miss Kenton, his father)

In your discussion, please try to refer to specific moments in the novel.

After setting up a digital recording device I left the room whilst the three participants discussed the novel, returning after 45 minutes to end the session. The resultant recording was transcribed in a manner which accurately recorded the content of participants' utterances, although detailed representation of overlapping speech, intonation and so on was deemed unnecessary for the purposes of the study. I then examined the transcript in terms of the objectives of the study and focused upon the points at which emotional experiences and/or related textual features were described. Sometimes readers discussed their emotional experiences using clearly recognisable emotional lexis (e.g. 'sad', and so on), but I also argue in section 4.3.3 that the *manner* in which participants discuss scenes and characters from the novel has interesting implications for the Text World Theory approach to emotion in discourse.

Compared with Datasets 2 and 3 (discussed below), the method employed in collecting Dataset 1 was less 'naturalistic' because the discussion was 'researcher-provoked' rather than naturally occurring (Silverman 2006: 404). The use of suggested discussion topics also distinguishes Dataset 1 from the other Datasets. These suggested topics were provided for two reasons: firstly, the group was not an established book group, thus it was hoped that suggested topics would facilitate their discussion and help participants overcome any awkwardness surrounding the recording situation. Secondly, the topics aimed to encourage 'on-book' discussion (O'Halloran 2008), meaning that the group would not drift away from their discussion of the novel and would address issues which were of interest to me, such as their responses to text-world enactors. As noted in section 3.3.1, the researcher-provoked context of the study and the use of suggested topics undoubtedly influenced the emotional experiences which participants reported. This should be borne in mind throughout the discussion of this Dataset in Chapter 4. However, after the recording session, participants reported that they found the suggested topics easy to discuss and remarked that they were the kinds of things they would have talked about anyway. The ecological validity of the study is reinforced to some extent by the fact that the participants were close friends and accustomed to discussing literature with each other. It should also be noted, though, that because of their educational background, participants are perhaps more representative of academic readers than those outside of the academy.

Dataset 2 features five female participants (Participants A, B, C, D and E) aged between 25 and 35 discussing the Ishiguro's novel *Never Let Me Go* (2005). These participants are members of a monthly book club based in South Yorkshire, and pursue a

range of occupations, including social work and teaching. The group meet at each others' houses and often discuss contemporary fiction. They nominate and choose books themselves, but are influenced by the recommendations of television book clubs. I am also a member of this book group and was present during the discussion. Participants were not aware of the focus of my project beyond the fact that I was researching Ishiguro's novels.

Participants decided to read *Never Let Me Go* (which was Ishiguro's latest publication at the time) independent of my influence, and were kind enough to allow me to record the discussion (this was decided at the meeting prior to the one in which the recording took place). I set up a digital recording device in the living room of one of the participant's houses and, before recording began, the host of the meeting read out an informed consent notice which was composed in accordance with ethics guidelines. The book group discussion then proceeded as normal, with the host introducing the book and starting off the discussion. As noted above, I was present during the discussion and made some contributions, though I also made an effort to minimise my participation in the discourse without appearing unnaturally silent. 76 minutes of discussion data was collected and transcribed in a similar manner to Dataset 1, in order to accurately represent the content of the participants' utterances. Once again, the transcript was examined in terms of the objectives of the study and the points at which emotional experiences and/or related textual features were described.

Dataset 2 has high ecological validity, as it captures a naturally occurring discussion about the novel. Furthermore, participants in this group can be regarded as more representative of non-academic readers as, aside from myself, none of them studied English at degree level. Though my presence during the discussion could be regarded as a distorting factor, this is mitigated to some extent by my established role as a member of the group.

As noted in section 3.3.1 above, several naturalistic reader response studies have made use of book group data (e.g. Allington and Benwell 2007; Fuller 2008; Long 2003; Swann and Allington 2009). The topic and style of the discussion collected in Dataset 2 corresponds with that found in other studies. For example, Long (2003) describes book group discussion as 'playful' and notes that groups tend to be unconcerned with arriving at an 'authoritative reading' of the text under discussion (2003: 147-8). Instead, 'reading group members tend to press books into service for the meanings they transmit and the conversations they can generate' (Long 2003: 148). Compared with Dataset 1, participants in this discussion group generally had more to say about the emotional effects of the text and used more emotion lexis in their descriptions (e.g. 'sad', 'frustrating', 'annoyed' and so on). The comments of readers in Dataset 2 inspired several strands of analysis in Chapter 5.

In section 5.2.1 I examine the frustration which several readers describe experiencing at the opening of *Never Let Me Go* (2005). Readers seemed to experience variable degrees of identification with the text-world enactors, which are examined in section 5.3. Finally, readers' hopes and preferences also seemed important in their experience of the text, and are considered in section 5.4.

Dataset 3 takes a different form to Datasets 1 and 2. Rather than recording and transcribing face-to-face book group discussions, readers' comments regarding Ishiguro's most controversial novel *The Unconsoled* (1995) were collected from the internet. Alongside the proliferation of book groups within contemporary society (Fuller 2008), there are also a number of popular internet-based book clubs and book discussion forums, as well as a huge number of weblogs dedicated to reading. An increasing number of researchers are using the internet as source of data about readers (e.g. Allington 2007; Long 2003: 207-18; Stockwell 2009). An advantage of using such data is that it has high ecological validity; it has not been produced for or in the context of an organised study, thus the comments of participants are not affected by the researcher. Addressing the ethical issues involved in such data collection, Allington (2007) suggests that:

postings made to a message board that appears on internet search engines and does not require the reader to log in should be regarded from an ethical point of view as analogous to letters published in magazines or newspapers, being accessible to anyone who can access the World Wide Web. (Allington 2007: 50)

Following Allington, I have only used discussion data from open-access forums and blogs. Postings from these sites are reproduced without permission and anonymised in my discussion. Dataset 3 is comprised of 5 main sources, referred to by the letters A, B, C, D and E. Each post in these sources is numbered consecutively, so in Chapter 6 relevant posts are referred to in terms of a code (e.g. A6, E13, and so on) which represents the source and the post number in the Dataset. Sources A, B, C and E are discussion threads found on a major internet book discussion forum and major internet-based book club site. Source D is a weblog which features a review of the book followed by extended discussion. Weblog data is also incorporated into source E, as some respondents simply posted links to their own weblogs in the discussion thread. In terms of participants, four participants appear to be involved in thread A; thirteen in thread B; four in thread C and around thirty in thread E (including links to weblogs and related discussions). Source D involves at least 7 respondents, though it is harder to quantify these participants because several contributors are listed as 'Anonymous'. This demonstrates both some of the advantages and drawbacks of using internet reader response data. In a relatively short amount of time, I collected data about the responses of around 50 readers (some of the respondents in A, B

and C have the same avatar thus are treated as the same person). However, it is very difficult to obtain reliable information regarding the identities of these readers: including their gender, nationalities, age, profession and so on. Whilst some respondents have publicly available profiles containing this type of information, most do not.

Furthermore, most of the comments about Ishiguro's *The Unconsoled* were located in threads about more general issues such as Ishiguro's works as a whole, or lists of favourite and least favourite books. This meant that I had to take some time to sift out relevant data. I discounted brief mentions of the novel and only included comments which were part of an exchange between several participants or featured lengthy response to the novel. After locating relevant discussion data, I copied and pasted it into a word-processing document, and then treated it in a similar way to the transcripts in Datasets 1 and 2. I draw upon the comments in Dataset 3 throughout my discussion in Chapter 6; in particular considering readers' reference to experiences of disorientation and frustration; the interpretative processes which they utilise in order to explain the unusual aspects of *The Unconsoled* (in section 6.3); and the high prevalence of comments about the resonant power of the text (in section 6.5).

Throughout Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis, the discussion group data described above is woven in to my first-person Text World Theory analyses, both directing and supporting my investigations into the emotional experience of reading Ishiguro's novels. As noted in section 3.3 above, I believe that it is essential to draw upon the views of 'real' readers in any transparent discussion of emotional experience. In each of these chapters I cite extracts from the Datasets, either in the form of extended exchanges or particular utterances regarding a specific topic. These extracts have been transcribed for ease of reading and a list of the transcription conventions used can be found in Appendix 2. Due to space constraints it is not possible to include full transcripts of the Datasets within this thesis. However, in appendices 2 and 3 I provide extended excerpts from the verbal transcripts in order to contextualise the extracts cited in Chapters 4 and 5. Appendix 4 contains all the internet postings which are referred to in Chapter 6, though irrelevant material has been edited out in order to save space. In presenting as much of my data as possible within the constraints of the current format, I aim to provide transparent information about the data upon which my analyses are based.

### **3.4 Review**

In this chapter I have argued that emotion theories from cognitive and social psychology are particularly applicable to the Text World Theory model of discourse, and can be used in order to re-conceptualise the central premises of the framework in terms of emotional experience. I have also reviewed the treatment of emotion in the work of other text-world

theorists, and have identified key areas in need of further research, specifically the phenomenon of identification; the discourse-world elements which influence emotional experience; and the textual features which influence reader response. These features are addressed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis. I have also noted that first-person narratives are underrepresented in Text World Theory work on emotion, an imbalance which the present study aims to redress. Finally, I have argued that the study of 'real' readers is essential in any investigation of the emotional experience of literary discourse and in any cognitivist investigation in particular. I have explained the aims and methods behind my collection of reader response data. I have also provided preliminary information regarding the Datasets which will be used to direct and support the analyses conducted in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

# Chapter 4: *The Remains of the Day*

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## 4.0 Preview

The analyses in this chapter are centrally concerned with examining the role of projection and inferencing in readers' emotional experience of *The Remains of the Day* (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]). Section 4.1 introduces the novel and reviews existing literary-critical and narratological insights into its effects. In section 4.2, I conduct a Text World Theory analysis of the opening sections of the text, offering a cognitive-poetic perspective on the novel. In section 4.3 I argue for the importance of a particular type of inferencing, known as 'mindreading', in readers' responses to the text. I note that whilst the text encourages projection and mindreading with respect to Stevens the narrator, promoting a sympathetic response to his character, the comments of readers in Dataset 1 suggest that their emotional experience of the text was more complex. In sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 I go on to argue for the importance of multiple projections in readers' emotional experience of the novel, drawing upon my own introspective analysis and the responses from Dataset 1. My discussion builds upon previous work on projection in Text World Theory (Gavins 2007; Lahey 2005; Stockwell 2009), arguing that this area of the framework should be expanded to consider the multiple and dynamic roles which are available for readerly projection during literary discourse.

## 4.1 The Impact of *The Remains of the Day*

*The Remains of the Day* (2005 [1989]) is Ishiguro's most successful and well-known work to date. Upon its release the novel was met with overwhelmingly enthusiastic reviews and was the first of Ishiguro's novels to win critical and popular acclaim in the United States (Parkes 2001: 71). Described as 'strikingly original', 'beautifully made' (Strawson 1989), a 'remarkable, strange and moving book' (Faulks 1989) and 'a triumph' (Walsh 1989), the novel won the Booker Prize in 1989 and has since been translated into over twenty other languages and adapted into a successful film (Merchant Ivory Productions, 1993).

The novel is set in 1956 and narrated by Mr Stevens, the ageing butler of an English stately home called Darlington Hall. Darlington Hall had its heyday between the 1920s and 1940s when it was the seat of Stevens' previous master, Lord Darlington. At the beginning of the novel, however, we learn that the house and Stevens' services as a 'real old English butler' (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 130) have been purchased by an American businessman called Mr Farraday. The novel is divided into eight chapters which mark the shifting locations of Stevens' narration. The first, set in Darlington Hall, establishes



Stevens' intention to embark upon a motoring trip through the West Country. Stevens' main motivation for taking this trip is to visit Miss Kenton; an ex-colleague who worked as the Hall's housekeeper some twenty years ago. Miss Kenton is now Mrs Benn and is living in Cornwall though Stevens, encouraged by a letter he received from her which suggested there were problems in her marriage, is hopeful that he will be able to re-recruit her in order to solve staffing problems at the Hall.

Subsequent chapters are narrated from various spatio-temporal points in his journey through the English counties of Berkshire, Wiltshire, Dorset, Somerset, Devon and Cornwall. As well as narrating some of his travelling experiences, including his motoring blunders and the people he meets along his way, Stevens is also preoccupied with recounting his past and pondering the highlights of his extensive butlering career. Stevens has dedicated his whole life to his career, and in particular to the pursuit of 'dignity', which he considers to be the distinguishing mark of a great butler. To Stevens, dignity is equated with a quintessentially English ability for 'emotional restraint'; dignity is the ability to control oneself in moments of strong emotion and maintain a professional demeanour throughout the most challenging of situations (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 44). As he reflects upon his life, however, it gradually becomes evident to both the reader and Stevens that this pursuit of 'dignity' and greatness as a butler has been at the expense of other important aspects of his life. In his unswerving dedication to his ideals, Stevens has sacrificed his own autonomy and spent a lifetime serving a disgraced master who lent support to the Nazis between the World Wars. He has also neglected his relationship with his father and ruined a potential relationship with Miss Kenton.

In fact, although Stevens claims his motives for visiting Miss Kenton are purely professional, it becomes clear that he is also motivated by an unfulfilled romantic attachment to her. This is revealed in a number of ways; for example, he refers to her as 'Miss Kenton' throughout the narrative despite the fact that she is now married. Throughout his travels he re-reads her letter obsessively, speculating about her state of mind. Additionally, as his reunion with Miss Kenton approaches, he becomes increasingly preoccupied with memories of the events which led to her departure from Darlington Hall. Stevens recalls that his relationship with Miss Kenton underwent a significant change in around 1935 or 1936 shortly before she left, and he begins to consider the chain of events which could have caused this alteration, nominating five possible 'turning points' (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 185). In each case, Stevens' immersion in his role as a butler led to his rejection of Miss Kenton.

In the first incident, Miss Kenton comes into his pantry uninvited, bearing flowers and playfully teasing him regarding the sentimental love story he is reading. Stevens

responds by showing her out of his pantry ‘quite firmly’, ruffled by her intrusion into his private realm (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 176). The second incident occurs during their routine evening cocoa meetings, in which Miss Kenton tells Stevens about a male ‘acquaintance’, called Mr Benn, whom she is visiting in her spare time (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 181). This scene, like many others Stevens remembers, contains extensive dialogue. Through her utterances, Miss Kenton mocks Mr Benn and subtly suggests that her affections really lie with Stevens. Talk turns to marriage and Miss Kenton enquires whether Stevens hopes to marry one day. Stevens responds by declaring his dedication to Lord Darlington and his career-related ambitions. In another routine cocoa meeting not long after, Miss Kenton is distracted and tired, possibly because of her evening visits to Mr Benn. In response to her yawning, Stevens calls a permanent end to their cocoa meetings and does not relent when Miss Kenton later suggests reinstating them. The fourth incident occurs after the death of Miss Kenton’s aunt. Stevens wishes to comfort Miss Kenton and knows that he must somehow express his condolences. Despite his intention to do so, however, he seems unable to talk about anything except work and ends up criticising small details in Miss Kenton’s professional conduct. In the final incident, considered in more detail in sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 below, Miss Kenton informs Stevens of her intention to marry Mr Benn and leave Darlington Hall – but not before she has given him several opportunities to intervene. That evening, Stevens remembers standing outside Miss Kenton’s parlour convinced that she is crying on the other side of the door, but being unable to open it.

In the closing chapter of the novel, Stevens sits on a bench on Weymouth Pier two days after his reunion with Miss Kenton, and recounts their meeting. Stevens managed to pluck up the courage to enquire politely whether Miss Kenton is happy with her life and contented with her husband. Miss Kenton replies that on the whole she is happy, however she goes on to say:

But that doesn’t mean to say, of course, there aren’t occasions now and then – extremely desolate occasions – when you think to yourself: “What a terrible mistake I’ve made with my life.” And you get to thinking about a different life, a better life you might have had. For instance, I get to thinking about a life I might have had once with you, Mr Stevens...But each time I do so, I realise before long – my rightful place is with my husband. After all, there’s no turning back the clock now. (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 251)

When he describes his response to her utterance, Stevens explicitly acknowledges the romantic feelings which have only been implied throughout the novel:

I do not think I responded immediately, for it took me a moment or two to fully digest these words of Miss Kenton. Moreover, as you might appreciate, their implications were such as to provoke a certain degree of sorrow within me. Indeed – why should I not admit it? – at that moment, my heart was breaking. (Ishiguro 2005: 251-2)

Shortly after this emotional admission, Stevens falls into conversation with a stranger who has sat next to him on the bench. Whilst talking to this stranger, he experiences a rather melancholy epiphany and realises that his life has been a waste, that he has not achieved the dignity he sought, and that he has been mistaken in his aims. The stranger, who happens to be a retired butler, advises Stevens to stop looking back and focus on enjoying what remains of his days. As the lights are turned on at Weymouth Pier, Stevens resolves to return to Darlington Hall and make renewed effort to engage with his new master.

As *The Remains of the Day* (2005 [1989]) was the first of Ishiguro's novels to be set in England (both *A Pale View of Hills* 2005 [1982] and *An Artist of the Floating World* 2005 [1986] were set in Japan), many reviews and critical pieces regarding the novel are concerned with issues of nationality and multiculturalism with reference to both the novel and its author. Many critics perceive aspects of 'Japanese-ness' in the novel's style and content and are interested in the relationship between the author's nationality and the 'Englishness' the novel represents (e.g. Heron 1989; Iyer 1993; Morrison 1989a, 1989b; Rothfork 1996; Rushdie 1989; Thwaite 1989; see also Parkes 2001: 60-61). The novel is often read as a commentary upon Englishness, and as it is set at a particular moment in post-war Imperial English history, it has also been read insightfully from political and postcolonial perspectives (e.g. Connor 1996; Ferrebe 2005; Fluet 2007; Griffiths 1993; O'Brien 1996; Sim 2006; Tamaya 1992; Westerman 2004). However, as noted in section 1.3, Ishiguro's novels are centrally preoccupied with psychological concerns; he is 'more a novelist of the inner character than of the outer world' (Shaffer 1998: 8). By depicting one man's narration of his life, *The Remains of the Day* explores the means by which such narratives render painful memories of errors and failures more palatable. Stevens' emotional and psychological repression, such as the constant denial of his love for Miss Kenton, has been analysed from a Freudian psychoanalytical perspective as the operations of 'psychological defence mechanisms' (Shaffer 1998: 9; Westerman 2004). Such analyses are concerned with the application of psychological categories to text-world enactors. Of most interest in the present discussion, however, is how Ishiguro's portrayal of Stevens' self-deception is manifested in the novel's narrative technique and, most importantly, how the novel is apprehended and emotionally experienced by readers.

The unreliability of Stevens' narration is a central issue in the text-worlds the novel creates (Lodge 1992; McCulloch 2000; Phelan 2005a; Wall 1994; Wong 2000). Stevens' narrative typically contains omissions and denials, and literary critics comment upon the sense that Stevens' narrative requires 'interpretative work' by the reader (Shaffer 2001: 5). McCulloch (2000) observes that whilst Stevens narrates 'his own, convenient version of

events', his narrative 'repeatedly and subtly signals its own unreliability' so that 'the subtext he tries to suppress becomes increasingly visible' (2000: 33). Similarly, Newton thinks that Stevens' narrative produces 'the appearance of a world which emerges from behind the one he discreetly and courteously escorts us through' and suggests, 'we see that world, mostly unbeknownst to [Stevens], through a sort of discursive double exposure' (1995: 270). Parkes (2001) writes that Stevens' language 'suggests that something else is being said beneath its carefully polished surface' (2001: 31), and Wong (2000) argues that readers must become actively engaged in discerning what the narrator 'restrain[s] from revealing' (2000: 26). These literary-critical accounts emphasise the processes of deduction and inference involved in comprehension of the narrative, and these processes will be examined from a Text World Theory perspective in section 4.2 below.

Narratological approaches have provided a more systematic approach to the unreliability manifest in the novel. In her study of the novel's narrative style, Wall (1994) argues that narrative unreliability is key in demonstrating the conflicts Stevens faces; between public and private personae, professional and human duty, and dignity and emotional expression (1994: 18). Furthermore, she claims that *The Remains of the Day* presents a challenge to established narratological approaches to unreliable narration (e.g. Booth 1961; Chatman 1978, 1990; Prince 1987; Rimmon Keenan 1990). Traditionally, unreliability is conceived of as a clash between narratorial and authorial 'norms and values' which creates a sense of 'ironic distance' between the implied author and narrator. In such accounts, unreliability is often defined as the misreporting of events in which 'the story undermines the discourse'; meaning that the narrator's account of the story appears inadequate in some respect and the implied author establishes a 'secret communication' with the implied reader (Chatman 1978: 233). In her analysis of *The Remains of the Day*, however, Wall highlights the importance of 'the discourse itself' in signalling a narrator's unreliability, a feature which is overlooked in traditional approaches. She also posits that, crucially, there are different types of unreliable narrator; some who consciously and deliberately lie to their narratee; some who simply have a limited perspective due to their 'worldview, ignorance or absent-mindedness' (1994: 22) and others who demonstrate a 'split subjectivity' and are primarily concerned with lying to themselves (1994: 22-3). *The Remains of the Day*, she argues, falls into the latter category and thus 'asks us to formulate new paradigms of unreliability for the narrator whose split subjectivity, rather than moral blindness or intellectual bias, gives rise to unreliable narration' (1994: 23). Wall notes that this category of unreliable narration better reflects the concerns of modern and postmodern fiction which are interested in exploring the nature of human subjectivity as opposed to 'norms and values' (1994: 38).

Phelan (2005a) dedicates a chapter of his monograph on first-person narration to *The Remains of the Day* and, like Wall (1994), argues that ‘existing accounts of unreliability cannot do either [Stevens] or Ishiguro justice’ (2005a: 31). Phelan takes a rhetorical approach to narrative, viewing it as a ‘purposive communicative act’ which is not only a representation of events but also an event in itself (Phelan 2007: 203, see section 4.3.3 for more on the rhetorical approach). Thus he distinguishes his approach to the novel from Wall’s ‘more formal model’ in that he is interested in ‘the reader’s activity’ rather than representations of subjectivity (2005a: 31-2). Phelan notes that established accounts of unreliability (specifically Booth 1961) require the reader to ascertain whether the narrator is being unreliable ‘about facts, values, or both’ (2005a: 34). In *The Remains of the Day* this distinction is difficult to discern, however, because Stevens is ‘complexly reliable and unreliable’ (2005a: 34). Phelan provides an example of Stevens’ unreliability from the ending of the novel. Stevens is narrating his meeting with Miss Kenton and describes his pleasure at Miss Kenton’s ability to confide in him regarding her marital problems. The novel reads:

Miss Kenton did not seem to mind at all confiding in me over these matters and I took this as a pleasing testimony to the strength of the close working relationship we had once had. (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 246, cited in Phelan 2005a: 33)

Phelan notes that by the time they read this sentence in the closing chapter of the novel, readers will have recognised that ‘Stevens’s professional purpose is actually a pretext for his personal interest’ in Miss Kenton (2005: 34). Therefore, readers are likely to infer that:

Stevens’s pleasure in Miss Kenton’s “confiding in [him] over these matters” is a reminder not just of their former close professional relationship but also of the intimacy that they once shared and that he has been hoping, without ever quite admitting it to himself, they could share again (Phelan 2005a: 34)

Phelan notes that, paradoxically, Stevens’ narration cited above *is* reliable to a certain extent, the problem is that it ‘do[es] not go far enough’ in explaining his pleasure at Miss Kenton’s confidence (2005a: 34). Stevens is not being unreliable about facts or values, but instead is unreliable in a different way. Phelan posits that unreliability can occur along several axes; the axes of ‘events’ (facts) and ‘ethics’ (values), as identified by Booth (1961), and the ‘axis of knowledge and perception’ which has not been sufficiently noted within traditional accounts of unreliability (2005a: 34). Thus, in the above extract Stevens gives an insufficient interpretation of an event because of his lack of knowledge or awareness: ‘he does not consciously know – or at least is not able to admit to himself – what we infer about his personal interest’ (Phelan 2005a: 34). Phelan describes Stevens’ unreliability here as his ‘underreading’ of events (Phelan 2005a: 34).

Phelan provides an excellent analysis of *The Remains of the Day* and demonstrates that, at various points in the novel, Stevens' unreliability can be seen to be located along one of the three axes described above. He uses the novel to elucidate six different types of unreliability: three of which require the reader to 'reject' the words of the narrator and 'if possible, reconstruct a more satisfactory account'; and three which require the reader to 'accept what the narrator says but then supplement the account' (Phelan 2005a: 50-1, see Phelan 2005a: 49-53 for an overview of these categories). Crucially for the present discussion, in both cases, readers must 'infer an understanding of the narration different from that offered by the narrator' (Phelan 2005a: 49-50). Here, Phelan's account accords with that of the literary critics (reviewed above) who emphasise the 'interpretative work' (Shaffer 1998: 5) the novel requires from the reader. However, Phelan posits that there are qualitative differences between the rejection or the supplementation of the narrator's words which have ethical implications and encourage readers to make different judgements regarding the narrators and their stories (2005a: 50).

These ethical issues are of central concern in Phelan's work and the rhetorical approach more broadly; which seeks to examine both 'an ethics of the told and an ethics of the telling' in narrative discourse (2007: 203). Because of his interest in ethics, Phelan is also concerned with the closely related area of emotion (e.g. Phelan 1996: 145, 148-9, 153; 2005a: 5, 59; 2007: 203) though his emphasis remains on the consequences which emotional responses have for the 'ethical dimension' of readers engagement with narrative (2005a: 5). In particular, Phelan (1996, 2005) draws upon the work of Rabinowitz (1998 [1987]) to delineate a range of narrative 'roles' into which readers may project into during reading, and briefly connects these projections to readers' emotional experience of narrative. Phelan does not take a cognitive approach to discourse, though I argue in section 4.3.3 that some of the ideas from rhetorical narratology are potentially useful within a cognitive, Text World Theory framework.

In section 4.2 immediately below, I examine the text-worlds created by the opening pages of *The Remains of the Day*. This analysis provides a cognitive-poetic perspective on literary-critical observations about the 'interpretative work' (Shaffer 2001: 5) required by readers and the novel's creation of 'a sort of discursive double exposure' (Newton 1995: 270). It also demonstrates some of the ways in which the text signals its unreliability, specifically through the high frequency of epistemic modality which highlights the limitations of the narrator's perspective (Gavins 2007). This analysis also establishes some of the projections involved in the text-worlds of the novel, which are given further consideration in section 4.3.


## 4.2 The Text-Worlds of *The Remains of the Day*

At the discourse-world level, *The Remains of the Day* features two discourse participants: Kazuo Ishiguro and a particular reader. Because these participants do not share the same spatio-temporal location, the discourse-world is ‘split’ (Werth 1999: 54-5) meaning that primacy is placed on the text of the novel in order for communication to take place. The first page of the novel features the following text:

PROLOGUE: JULY 1956  
*Darlington Hall*

(Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 1)

This short titling provides world-building information which establishes two text-worlds. The first is cued by the term ‘Prologue’, which gives deictic information about the text as an object. In Stockwell’s (2002) terms this is an example of textual deixis as it ‘foregrounds the textuality of the text’ (2002: 46) and its arrangement by an author (2002: 54). Gavins (2007) demonstrates that in split discourse-world situations, participants typically recreate a face-to-face communicative situation at the text-world level. Indeed, the titling here highlights the fact that the novel is a communication between an author and the reader. Thus, the initial text-world formed by readers of the *The Remains of the Day* features projected enactors of both discourse-world participants. Following narratological convention (e.g. Booth 1961; Chatman 1978, 1990; Iser 1974), Gavins (2007) calls the enactor of the author the implied author (2007: 129). In this thesis, I also follow narratological convention by calling the reader-enactor the ‘implied reader’. In Text World Theory terms, the implied author is a text-world enactor whom readers often assume to be a projection of aspects of the discourse-world author (Gavins 2007: 129). Implied authors are effectively present in all the text-worlds of a literary discourse, but are sometimes highlighted by particular textual features (in this case the titling of the novel). This initial text-world is diagrammed as ‘Text World 1’ on the left of Figure 4.0 below (see Appendix 1 for diagram conventions).



**Figure 4.0.** Text-worlds cued by the opening of *The Remains of the Day*

Drawing upon their knowledge of the conventions of the opening of narratives, I posit that readers interpret the second lot of world-building information: 'July 1956/ Darlington Hall' to refer to the setting of the story rather than the situation of the implied author. Thus, Text World 1 is fleeting and undeveloped and participants quickly shift to the parameters of a second text-world, located in July 1956, which they expect to be developed further once they turn the page ('Text World 2' in Figure 4.0 above). In my reading of the novel, I drew upon my knowledge-base in order to flesh out the world-building elements of Text World 2 with further inferences. For example, I recognised 'Darlington Hall' as an English-sounding place name, and 'July' as a summer month in England. Upon turning the page and reading the main narrative, participants glean further information with which to develop Text World 2. The opening paragraph of the novel reads:

[1] It seems increasingly likely that I really will undertake the expedition that has been preoccupying my imagination now for some days. [2] An expedition, I should say, which I will undertake alone, in the comfort of Mr Farraday's Ford; an expedition which, as I foresee it, will take me through much of the finest countryside of England to the West Country, and may keep me away from Darlington Hall for as much as five or six days. [3] The idea of such a journey came about, I should point out, from a most kind suggestion put to me by Mr Farraday himself one afternoon almost a fortnight ago, when I had been dusting the portraits in the library. [4] In fact, as I recall, I was up on the step-ladder dusting the portrait of Viscount Wetherby when my employer had entered carrying a few volumes which he presumably wished returned to the shelves... (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 3, my sentence numbering)

Here, the first-person, present-tense narrative establishes the presence of an unnamed, narrating enactor in 'Text World 2'. Lahey (2005), following Green (1992), Leech (1969) and Short (1996), notes that the presence of a narrator typically presupposes some form of addressee, thus a narratee-enactor is also incremented into Text World 2. In her work on lyric poetry, Lahey (2005) posits that readers will project an enactor of themselves to fill this narratee role unless textual features establish the narratee as a distinct entity. No information about the identity of the narratee is provided in the opening paragraph above, thus readers are likely to project into the narratee-enactor role and feel directly addressed by the narrator as he describes his intention to embark upon an expedition.

The text-worlds created by the opening paragraph of the novel, however, quickly depart from the parameters of Text World 2. Stevens' narrative cues a complex series of multiple world-switches which are partially represented in Figure 4.1 below. The following description is intended as a general illustration of the complexity of these multiple worlds (their specific details are not the central concern here). Almost immediately, the use of epistemic perception modality in the first sentence; 'it seems increasingly likely', cues a world-switch to an epistemic modal-world ('Epistemic Modal World 1' in Figure 4.1).






Figure 4.1. Multiple world-switches in the opening paragraph of *The Remains of the Day*

Further, the use of the modal auxiliary 'will' to signal futurity ('I really will undertake') cues another world-switch, this time to a hypothetical world in which the narrator undertakes an expedition ('Hypothetical Modal World' in Figure 4.1). The tense shift from the present to the present perfect, also in the first sentence, 'has been preoccupying' creates a fleeting world-switch located 'some days' ago in the past, shown as 'World-Switch 1' in Figure 4.1.

The second sentence of the opening paragraph provides further world-building information with which to flesh out the Hypothetical Modal World: the narrator will take the trip 'alone' and in 'Mr Farraday's Ford'. The third sentence creates a flashback to 'almost a fortnight ago' when the idea for the expedition occurred, shown as 'World Switch 2' in Figure 4.1. The phrase 'as I recall' in sentence four cues an epistemic modal-world (Epistemic Modal World 2 in Figure 4.1) as it highlights the fact that Stevens is relying upon memory in his narration of the flashback. Finally, the phrase 'which he presumably wished returned' in the fourth sentence results in an even more complex embedded world structure, as the narrator divulges his assumptions (cueing 'Epistemic Modal-World 3') regarding the wishes ('Boulomaic Modal-World') of another enactor; his employer Mr Farraday (shown to the bottom right of Figure 4.1). The opening paragraph features a high frequency of epistemic modality, the full extent of which is not represented in Figure 4.1. (for example the worlds cued by 'as I forsee it' and 'may' are not included in the above account). It is also peppered with fleeting deontic modal-worlds cued by the use of deontic modality such as 'I should say' and 'I should point out'.

Thus, as soon as Stevens' narration begins, it departs from the spatial and temporal parameters of Text World 2 and creates a series of modal-worlds and world-switches which form the dominant level of the discourse (Gavins 2007). Following Green (1992), the 'content time' of the narrative differs from its 'coding time' in Text World 2. Stevens' specific location in Darlington Hall, his reason for being there, his sensations regarding the surrounding environment and so on, are not detailed by the text. Instead, Stevens' intentions, hopes, memories and inferences form the foreground of the narrative. Furthermore, Stevens does not introduce himself to his narratee, and instead appears to be talking to someone in his presence who knows who he is. Readers are likely to project into Text World 2 in order to fill the narratee-enactor position, but, as Verdonk (2002) points out, 'of course the reader does not know who [the narrator] is and so has to somehow construct his identity on the indirect evidence of what he says' (2002: 38). Indeed, readers are likely to begin using Stevens' narrative as the basis for inferences regarding his character and identity. Such inferences add world-building information to Text World 2 (shown in Figure 4.2. below).

For example, Stevens' use of English is suggestive of his age and class. His use of verbs such as 'undertake', adjectives such as 'finest', and 'most kind' evoke a formal and old-fashioned register which to my mind is suggestive of age. Stevens' location in a house called 'Darlington Hall', which has a 'library' with portraits of Viscounts hung upon the walls, accords with the upper-class register of his speech. Indeed, in my initial reading of the first few sentences of the passage, I inferred that Stevens was an upper-class gentleman (within the novel, Stevens is also mistaken for a gentleman when he visits the village of Moscombe, see Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 190-203). However, this impression is revised when Stevens describes himself 'dusting' whilst stood upon a 'step ladder'. Indeed, when he refers to Mr Farraday as his 'employer' and the owner of a prestigious 'Ford' car, it seems more likely that Stevens is a servant of some kind.

The opening paragraph of the novel is also evocative of Stevens' worldview. In the first sentence he declares his intention to embark upon an 'expedition', but as his narrative continues it emerges that his idea of an 'expedition' is a drive through the South English countryside which will take 'as much as five or six days'. That such a short and unexotic journey is viewed as an 'expedition' suggests that Stevens is unaccustomed to travel and perhaps unused to leaving the confines of Darlington Hall. Indeed, in the next chapter Stevens describes his experience of 'unease and exhilaration' as he drives past the Berkshire border and into unfamiliar terrain (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 24), suggesting that he has spent his entire life within a single English county.


Furthermore, the multiple modal-worlds created by the opening paragraph convey unstated information about the narrator. Gavins (2007) describes modality as one of the 'interpersonal features of discourse' which can 'convey complex emotional states and feelings...to fellow discourse participants' (2007: 91). As noted above, there is a high frequency of epistemic modality in the opening paragraph of *The Remains of the Day*, which pertains to the speaker's confidence or lack of confidence in the truth of the expressed propositions (Simpson 1993). In his modal grammar of narrative, Simpson (1993) associates a preponderance of epistemic modality with 'negative' modal shading, which can create the impression of 'uncertainty, bewilderment and alienation' (Simpson 1993: 53).

Stevens' use of epistemic modality centres around the plans for his expedition, and reflects both the uncertainty of those plans and his hesitancy regarding his impending trip. Indeed, Wong (2000) makes inferences regarding Stevens' emotions in her reading of this opening paragraph, noting that the passage reflects his 'reluctance to face the prospect of an expedition' (2000: 56). In the fourth sentence, Stevens also uses epistemic modality to refer to his inferences about Mr Faraday's wishes ('he presumably wished'), suggesting his uncertainty regarding the mental states of other characters. Through the use of epistemic

modality, future events and the mental states of other characters are held at a conceptual distance, which is suggestive not only of the narrator's penchant for procrastination but his limitations when it comes to interacting with others.

The uncertainty created by the epistemic modality also serves to emphasise the limitations of Stevens' perspective and signal his potential unreliability. Through the multiple embedding of modal-worlds, Stevens' interpretations are held at an ontological distance and are highly inaccessible to the reader. However, in my reading of this opening paragraph, the repetition of the deontic modal auxiliary 'should', in 'I should say' and 'I should point out', counteracted this effect to some degree and made the narrator appear more reliable. Deontic modality expresses the degree of obligation which the speaker attaches to the performance of certain actions (Simpson 1993). This type of modality is typically a characteristic of positively shaded narratives, which Simpson (1993) describes as having a more 'co-operative' feel (1993: 75). Indeed, Stevens uses deontic modality to refer to his obligations as a narrator, thus he appears concerned to present an accurate and detailed picture of events to the narratee. Thus, through the use of modality, the opening paragraph can be seen to establish the 'complexly reliable and unreliable' narration which forms such a central part of the novel (Phelan 2005a: 34).

Figure 4.2 depicts some of the inferences described above, which readers are likely to begin making as they read the opening paragraph of *The Remains of the Day*. The figure shows that Text World 1 has fallen into the background and Text World 2, along with the other worlds created by Stevens narration, forms the focus of the discourse. The shaded box on the right hand side represents the knowledge frames or textual information which were involved in the inferences I made. For example, the text cued my knowledge



**Figure 4.2.** *Fleshing out Text-World 2 with inferences based upon the opening paragraph of The Remains of the Day*

about linguistic register and travel, which led me to make inferences regarding the narrator's class and worldview. Furthermore, the uncertainty of the narrator, expressed through the use of modality in the passage, led me to make inferences about his character. It should be noted that, as they only pertain to the first four sentences of the novel, these inferences are tentative and stand to be confirmed or revised as the novel progresses.

The text-worlds created throughout the novel exhibit a similar relationship to those described above. Each new chapter-heading establishes a text-world defining Stevens' spatio-temporal location at the coding time of the narrative. As his journey is only due to take 'five or six days', readers can assume that Stevens is still temporally situated in July 1956, but spatially his location shifts as his journey progresses. For example, in the second chapter Stevens is in Salisbury (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 23), and in the fourth he is located in Little Compton, Cornwall (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 215). In the opening chapter Stevens makes very little reference to his immediate surroundings, which is perhaps indicative of their familiarity to him. In later chapters, however, he does provide some basic world-building information regarding the location from which he is narrating. For example, in chapter two he describes himself as 'here in this comfortable guesthouse in a street not far from the centre of Salisbury' (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 26), and in chapter four he explains: 'at this moment [I] am sitting in the dining hall of the Rose Garden Hotel...outside the rain is falling steadily' (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 215). This present-tense world-building information tends to be short-lived and, in a similar manner to the opening paragraph, the majority of Stevens' narrative is concerned with his memories of the preceding days or years. Thus, from each of his particular spatio-temporal locations, Stevens' narrative cues a series of world-switches as he discusses his thoughts, opinions, hopes, memories and intentions. As with the opening of the novel, readers must follow the multiple worlds created by Stevens' narration but are also likely to use the information they provide and the means by which they provide it to make inferences about the narrator's character, worldview, state of mind, and so on; fleshing out their text-world representations of the narrator at the coding time of narration.

The preceding Text World Theory analysis provides a cognitive-poetic perspective on the literary-critical and narratological observations reviewed in section 4.1. In particular, it demonstrates the type of 'interpretative work' (Shaffer 2001: 5) involved in processing the discourse of *The Remains of the Day* and provides support for Phelan's (2005a) view that the narrative involves extensive inferencing on the part of the reader. It also provides a clearer picture of the effect of 'discursive double exposure' (Newton 1995: 270) which literary critics identify in the text: as readers construct the text-worlds of Stevens' narrative, they additionally make inferences which flesh-out the text-world from which he narrates.

The constant toggling between these worlds, and the distinction between their contents, creates a doubled picture of narrative events.

The narratological approaches reviewed in section 4.1 regard *The Remains of the Day* as an exemplary specimen of a previously unexamined class of unreliable narration (Wall 1994; Phelan 2005a). Within Text World Theory, *The Remains of the Day* also presents challenges to the accepted account of first-person narration. Gavins (2007) performs some comparative analyses of third-, second- and first-person narration and claims that ‘in homodiegetic narratives with a fixed focaliser...the text-world level of the discourse barely exists at all’ (2007: 132). She explains this with an example from Paul Auster’s novel *Oracle Night*, whose opening sentences read: ‘I had been sick for a long time. When the day came for me to leave the hospital, I barely knew how to walk anymore, could barely remember who I was supposed to be’ (Auster 2004: 1). Gavins posits that this narrative cues a text-world containing the narrator, but that it immediately switches away from this world because of the use of the past perfect tense. Thus:

readers of *Oracle Night* have no information about the spatio-temporal location of their narrator and no world-building or function-advancing information, explicit or inferred, with which to construct this world beyond the presence of the narrator-enactor himself. For this reason, the first world encountered in the novel, the time and place of narration, falls quickly into the background of this discourse process. (Gavins 2007: 133)

Both Gavins (2001, 2007) and Lahey (2003, 2005) claim that first-person fixed focalisation creates a text-world level which is ‘text initial but ultimately immaterial’ (Gavins 2007: 133), and they refer to this as an ‘empty’ or ‘redundant’ text-world (Gavins 2007: 133; Lahey 2005: 140). Though this is the case in the examples they analyse, my analysis of *The Remains of the Day* demonstrates that fixed, first-person homodiegetic narration does not always result in such ‘empty’ text-worlds. In fact, in *The Remains of the Day*, the text-world pertaining to the coding time of the narration – Text World 2 in the above discussion – is fleshed out with both explicit and inferred world-building and function-advancing information. The central difference between *The Remains of the Day* and the narratives studied by Gavins (2007) is that each chapter of *The Remains of the Day* is initially narrated in the present tense, situating the narrator in a particular spatio-temporal location. In his typology of first-person fiction, Romberg (1962) calls the narrator’s situation at the coding time of the story the ‘epic situation’, and notes that this can be directly expressed and ‘tangible’, or not be presented at all (1962: 9). Whilst all narratives have a coding time, only some narratives have an epic situation. This latter term refers not only to the time of narration but also the spatial location and surroundings of the narrator. It seems that, until now, Text World Theory analyses have focused upon first-person narratives in which the

'epic situation' is absent. The analysis above represents an expansion of the Text World Theory treatment of homodiegetic fixed focalisation.

Having established the text-worlds created by the opening of *The Remains of the Day* and having made some initial comments regarding readers' projection into those worlds, in section 4.3 below I go on to consider projection and the novel in more detail. I argue that a particular type of inferencing, known as 'mindreading', is especially important in both the construction and emotional experience of the text-worlds of the novel, and link this to the account of projection provided in section 3.2.4. After analysing the way in which textual cues promote projection into the perspective of Stevens the narrator (in section 4.3.1), I suggest that previous Text World Theory accounts of projection have focused too exclusively upon readers' projective relationships with a single text-world enactor. Drawing upon an analysis of the dialogue in the novel (in section 4.3.2) and the reader response data I collected (in section 4.3.3), I argue that the greater attention should be paid to the multiple projections involved in our emotional experience of literary discourse.

### **4.3 Projection and 'Mindreading' in *The Remains of the Day***

In section 3.2.4 I reviewed the importance of projection in current Text World Theory accounts of emotional experience. Projection is a psychological ability which, when understood metaphorically, involves some conceptual movement towards a different perspective or position. It is thought to be fundamental to the creation and comprehension of any discourse which does not correspond to the spatial and temporal parameters of the discourse-world (Gavins 2007: 40; Semino 1992: 138), and thus is essential in the comprehension of literary narrative (Duchan et al 1995; Rinck and Bower 1995; Zwaan et al 2001). It is also thought to be significant in discourse-world participants' emotional experience of discourse (Gavins 2007; Lahey 2005; Stockwell 2005a, 2009). In Text World Theory, projection is understood as a process of metaphorical mapping between a discourse-world participant and an entity within their text-worlds (Gavins 2007; Lahey 2005; Stockwell 2005a, 2009). In section 3.2.4, I noted that in one sense projection refers to participants' ability to adopt the spatio-temporal coordinates of another entity, involving the mapping of their embodied sense of space and location to a point within the text-world. In a second, broader, sense, projection is used to refer to the imaginative reconstruction of other psychological aspects of another entity's perspective, such as their worldview, emotions, desires, goals, beliefs, and so on. These two types of projection are closely related. In work on the emotional experience of discourse, spatio-temporal projection is commonly linked to sensations of immersion or engagement (Gerrig 1993; Stockwell 2009), whilst broader psychological projection forms the basis for the

establishment of relationships of identification, empathy and sympathy – which are also conceived as metaphorical mappings between a discourse-world participants' 'self-aware personality' and aspects of a text-world enactor (Gavins 2007; Stockwell 2005a, 2009).

In my analysis of the opening of *The Remains of the Day* in section 4.2, I identified two text-world enactors into which readers were likely to project. Following Gavins (2007), I proposed that the split discourse-world resulted in the recreation of face-to-face communication at the text-world level and that readers project into the implied reader enactor in order to engage in the discourse. Furthermore, following Lahey (2005) I noted that readers are likely to project into the narratee-enactor, whose existence is presupposed by the presence of a narrator in Text World 2. These projections are likely to be relatively straightforward for readers because, beyond specifying their existence in the text-worlds, the first four sentences of the novel do not provide world-building information to characterise the implied reader or narratee (Lahey 2005: 269-92). Readers are able to map their embodied sense of location and personal characteristics onto these enactors and, as a result, feel directly addressed by both the implied author and the narrator, which facilitates immersion in the narrative.

The analysis in 3.2 also highlighted the inferential processes which are important in the construction of the text-worlds of *The Remains of the Day*. Stevens' unreliability, manifest in his tendency to deny or omit information (Phelan 2005a; Wall 1994), means that throughout the novel readers are engaged in making inferences regarding his mental states, beliefs, emotions, intentions and so on. Essentially, readers are involved in the imaginative reconstruction of Stevens' perspective based upon textual cues and their own knowledge-base. This apprehension of Stevens' perspective involves projection on the part of the reader. Gavins (2007) notes that psychological projection enables discourse-world participants to treat text-world entities as 'real, life-like people, who have thoughts, emotions and reactions in the same way as any discourse-world human being' (2007: 42-3). Similarly, Lahey (2005) argues that by virtue of projection into a particular text-world role, readers become 'privy to the point of view of that character including [their] perceived or explicitly expressed emotional reactions to things that happen in the text-world' (2005: 285). When reading *The Remains of the Day*, projection enables readers to understand why and how Stevens narrates his tale in the manner which he does.

Within psychology, the inference of other people's mental states, emotions, beliefs and so on is recognised as a special cognitive capacity resulting from our 'Theory of Mind'. In recent years, Theory of Mind has received increasing attention in cognitive approaches to literary study, particularly in the work of Zunshine (2003, 2004, 2006, 2008). Stockwell (2009) provides the first consideration of the phenomenon within Text World Theory. In



what follows, I outline the concept of Theory of Mind before reviewing Stockwell's (2009) proposals regarding Theory of Mind and literary discourse. I then go on to explore the influence of this type of inferencing when reading *The Remains of the Day*.

Cognitive scientific research into Theory of Mind has proliferated over the past thirty years (e.g. Baron Cohen 1995, 2002; Baron Cohen et al 1985, 2007; Carruthers and Smith 1996; Davis and Stone 1995; Premack and Woodruff 1987). Theory of Mind (henceforth ToM) is a psychological term which refers to 'the cognitive system that allows an organism to grasp and reason about minds' (Malle and Hodges 2005: 2). ToM was first introduced in Premack and Woodruff's seminal 1978 paper 'Do Chimpanzees have a Theory of Mind?' (Carruthers and Smith 1996) when it was used quite generally to refer to an individual's ability to impute 'mental states to himself and others' (Premack and Woodruff 1978: 15). Subsequent work in neuroscience and abnormal, developmental and evolutionary psychology has led to the revision and refinement of this general definition. Belmonte (2008) notes that within psychology the meaning of ToM has become increasingly narrow, shifting from the attribution of mental states in general to the attribution of conceptual belief states only (excluding perceptual and volitional states). There has also been much debate regarding the cognitive mechanisms which constitute ToM, at what point they emerge in the developmental process, and whether our ToM ability is based on theorising, simulation, or a mix of both (e.g. Goldman 1992; Leslie 1991; Nickerson 1999; and for an overview see Belmonte 2008; Carruthers and Smith 1996). Advocates of the theorising approach to ToM claim that we infer mental states by applying learnt principles (or theories) to our perception of other people's behaviour and actions (e.g. Goldman 1992), whereas those who advocate simulation propose that we imaginatively simulate another's mental activity with our own in order to draw conclusions about their mental states (Leslie 1991). Still others claim that we use both strategies in order to impute mental states to others (e.g. Malle and Hodges 2005).

The notion of ToM has become increasingly influential in cognitive studies of literature and other narrative forms (MacMahon 2009a, 2009b; Palmer 2004; Worth 2007; Zunshine 2003, 2004, 2006, 2008), and complements research into the attribution of more permanent character traits to literary characters (e.g. Culpeper 2001; Emmot 1997; Schneider 2001). Palmer (2004) and Zunshine (2006) emphasise the role which readers' ToM plays in the comprehension and appreciation of fictional narrative, arguing that readers understand novels primarily through their inferences regarding the minds of the characters. As an example of ToM at work in literature, Zunshine (2006) notes the ease with which readers of Woolf's *Mrs Dalloway* interpret a description of a character 'trembling' as indicative of his 'agitation...joy, and...embarrassment' at meeting an old

friend (2006: 3). She notes that we ‘automatically read a character’s body language as indicative of his thoughts and feelings’ (2006: 3). However, Belmonte (2008) notes that there is increasing divergence between the sense of ToM being used in literary studies and the psychological sense of the term. According to Belmonte, literary studies requires a more ‘domain general ToM’ which contrasts with the increasingly specific notion of ToM used in psychology (2008: 194). For example, in Zunshine’s work, readers’ ToM ability enables them to infer all kinds of mental states rather than simply belief states, including perceptual and volitional states such as being thirsty (2006: 6). In addition, Belmonte highlights the different purposes which ToM serves in each discipline:

For the psychologist, ToM has been a vehicle for understanding evolutionary differences between human and non-human social cognition, clinical differences between normal human cognition and abnormal states such as autism and schizophrenia, and developmental differences between different states of cognitive maturation. For the literary critic, ToM has been a vehicle for understanding the relations between characters in a text, between characters in a text and readers, and between narrator and reader. The psychological sense is thus driven to further differentiation and specification of ToM on the basis of inter-species, inter-individual, and inter-age comparisons, whereas the literary sense retains a general agency within a wide range of texts and settings. (Belmonte 2008: 192)

Belmonte (2008) warns that the subtle differences between the psychological and literary uses of the term ToM means that cross-disciplinary communication is illusory and is likely to result in confusion. However, even within psychology the disagreement over what constitutes ToM has led some researchers to dispense with the term altogether. For example, in a bid to ‘broaden the scope’ of research into mental state inference and ‘escape the tethers of the theory-versus-simulation debate’, Malle and Hodges (2005) use the term ‘mindreading’ to refer to ‘the activity that people perform [when they infer mental states] without making assumptions about what processes and mechanisms underlie this activity’ (2005: 2-3). This broad term ‘mindreading’ incorporates the inference of all types of mental states across interactional contexts, and is a site of multi-disciplinary investigation (Malle and Hodges 2005:2-3). In the light of Belmonte’s (2008) article it is clearly necessary to distinguish the notion of mental state inference in literary contexts from the specific cognitive system referred to by ‘ToM’ in psychology. In this thesis, I follow Malle and Hodges (2005) in using the term ‘mindreading’ to refer to the activity of inferring mental states, without being prescriptive about how those mental state inferences are generated. In doing so I aim to avoid the problems described by Belmonte (2008) regarding the use of ‘ToM’ in cognitive studies of literature.

In his work on Text World Theory and emotion, Stockwell (2009) highlights the connections between psychological projection and readers’ mindreading capabilities. He

notes: 'we assume that others are, in basic mechanics, the same as us, and we anticipate their beliefs, motives, speech and actions accordingly by projecting them in their circumstances' (Stockwell 2009: 132). In response to the problems regarding psychological and literary uses of the term ToM highlighted by Belmonte (2008), Stockwell proposes that a new literary-specific term 'mind-modelling' be used to refer to the way readers use textual cues and inferences to construct an impression of a literary character's mind (2009: 140). His reason for the introduction of this new term is that it 'does not bring with it the contentious baggage of ToM debates' and enables literary critics to continue to work with the broadest sense of ToM 'without irritating psychologists' (2009: 140).

However, in the light of the discussion above, I believe the term 'mindreading' is also capable of achieving these aims without abandoning psychological terminology outright. I see no reason why the term 'mindreading', in the sense used by Malle and Hodges (2005), cannot be applied to a literary context. Text World Theory posits that text-world and discourse-world levels share a structural similarity and, as Werth (1999: 82) and Gavins (2007: 42) note, text-world enactors are often viewed as possessing the same mental faculties as discourse-world participants. As such, a literary specific term is not necessary, because readers' propensity to attribute mental states to text-world entities surely derives from their ability to attribute mental states to real people in everyday life. Whilst I do not adopt Stockwell's (2009) proposed terminology, however, I agree with his claims regarding the significance of mindreading in readers' aesthetic and emotional experience of literary discourse.

Stockwell (2009) analyses a short story by Rumer Godden in order to demonstrate the influence of 'mind-modelling' in the feeling of reading the text (2009: 142-4). His analysis specifies the textual cues which lead to particular inferences and impressions on the part of the reader (2009: 142). For example, he notes that the narrator appears to be a child who has 'highly sensual and sensitive feeling but is relatively inarticulate' (2009: 142). Although it is never explicitly stated in the text, as the story progresses readers infer that the narrator is blind. Stockwell (2009) argues that the story provides 'rich potential' for 'mind-modelling' and this leads to powerful sympathetic feelings the reader (2009: 143). In sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 I continue my analysis of *The Remains of the Day* and consider how the mind-reading inferences I made during my reading of the text influenced my emotional experience of the discourse.

#### **4.3.1 Reading Stevens' mind**

In section 4.2. I noted that when constructing the text-worlds of *The Remains of the Day*, readers are likely to use textual cues and their own knowledge-base in order to make many inferences about Stevens' beliefs, desires, emotions, intentions and so on. This mindreading

is encouraged by the unreliability of Stevens' narration and his (often unintentional) failure to provide readers with the 'full picture' of narrative events. For example, Stevens persistently claims that he is visiting Miss Kenton in a purely professional capacity, whereas readers infer that he is actually romantically motivated. Below, I consider some of the textual cues which influenced my inferences in this respect.

On several occasions Stevens' narrative includes interjections such as 'why should I not admit it?' (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 252) or 'and why should I hide it?' (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 5) – particularly when he is speaking about Miss Kenton. The incidence below is taken from the first chapter when Stevens first mentions Miss Kenton to the narratee. Stevens is describing the reasons behind his decision to embark upon his expedition:

[the fact that] the notion of a trip to the West Country took an every increasing hold on my thoughts – is no doubt substantially attributable to - and why should I hide it? – the arrival of Miss Kenton's letter, her first in almost seven years... (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 5)

This quotation begins with Stevens' past-tense narrative regarding his thoughts, but the interjection 'and why should I hide it?' cues a fleeting deontic modal-world which represents the proposition 'Stevens should hide it'. At first it is not clear what 'it' refers to, and readers must read on in order to ascertain that Stevens is referring to the influence of Miss Kenton's letter upon his expedition plans (this inferred information fleshes out the deontic modal world). This fleeting world led me to make several inferences about Stevens' beliefs and motives. By questioning the contents of this modal-world, Stevens demonstrates his disagreement with the notion that he should be hiding things. Initially this may function in a similar way to the deontic modal-worlds in the opening paragraph, making Stevens seem more trustworthy as a narrator. However, the fact that Stevens felt the need to pose this interjection led me to make mindreading inferences about his beliefs. Specifically, Stevens *himself* is the source of the deontic modality and this interjection suggests that on some level Stevens believes that he *should* be actively concealing things. In my reading of the text, this alerted me to the possibility that he could be being deceptive. Furthermore, even though the implied answer to Stevens' rhetorical question is negative – one should not 'hide it' – his interjection made me wonder why concealment was even an issue. Stevens quickly follows his reference to Miss Kenton with the following:

But let me make it immediately clear what I mean by this; what I mean to say is that Miss Kenton's letter set off a certain chain of ideas to do with professional matters here at Darlington Hall and I would underline that it was a preoccupation with these very same professional matters that led me to consider anew my employer's...suggestion. (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 5).

Stevens' repetition of the phrases 'what I mean' and 'professional' in a single sentence make him appear flustered, and the great emphasis he places upon the non-personal nature of his motives with respect to Miss Kenton seems excessive. This, combined with the interjection described above, led me to make tentative inferences regarding his real motives; which were likely due to personal reasons which he wished to conceal. Drawing upon my cultural and experiential knowledge, romantic motives were a possible explanation. However, the above extracts appear in the early stages of the novel and establish an ambiguity which only further reading can resolve.

Elsewhere in the novel, other aspects of Stevens' behaviour betray his feelings regarding Miss Kenton. At several points during his journey, he re-reads Miss Kenton's letter and obsesses over its details. He finds himself thinking about her words when he is alone, early in the morning or late at night. This behaviour cued my cultural and experiential knowledge about human relationships, leading me to interpret Stevens actions as classic symptoms of infatuation. Furthermore, as their reunion meeting approaches, Stevens becomes increasingly uncertain regarding the implications of Miss Kenton's letter. In chapter one, he claims that her letter contains several hints about her desire to return to Darlington Hall. He states: 'I have, I should make clear, reread Miss Kenton's recent letter several times, and there is no possibility I am merely imagining these hints on her part' (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 10). He remains quite sure of her desires when he lies awake thinking about her letter in chapter 3 (Ishiguro 2005[1989]: 50). Later in the novel, however, Stevens reads her letter again and notes: 'one has to accept the distinct possibility that one may have previously – perhaps through wishful thinking of a professional kind – exaggerated what evidence there was regarding such a desire on her part' (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 149). The day before their meeting, Stevens notes that he 'may well have read more into certain of her lines than was perhaps wise' (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 189). Stevens' increasing uncertainty regarding Miss Kenton's hints reveals that his response to her letter is more indicative of *his* desires than hers. Stevens' obsessive re-reading and strong desires do not correlate with his claims of a 'professional' relationship. Indeed, Wall (1994) notes that in *The Remains of the Day*, the word 'professional' becomes 'a flag for the reader', signalling 'either a disguise for more emotional motives or a defense for [Stevens'] strangely unemotional behaviour' (1994: 23-4). In the evidence reviewed above I made mindreading inferences about Stevens' beliefs, emotions and desires which led me to believe that he had romantic feelings for Miss Kenton. Stevens himself only explicitly realises (or admits) his romantic attachment in the novel's final chapter (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 251-2).

Throughout the novel, readers use the textual cues of Stevens' narrative to make inferences about his mental states. Constructing the text-worlds of *The Remains of the Day*

involves dedicating intense attention to the interpretation of Stevens' perspective, as readers use their projective capacities in order to try and understand why he is narrating in the manner which he does. As noted in section 3.2.3, within stylistics, narratology and empirical studies of literature the notion that exposure to a character's point of view encourages identification or sympathy with that character is well-established (Andringa 1996; Booth 1961; Gerrig 1993, 1996; Gerrig and Rapp 2004; Leech and Short 1981; Rapp and Gerrig 2002, 2006; Stanzel 1978; van Peer and Pander Maat 1996, 2001). In Text World Theory terms, the text provides 'rich potential' (Stockwell 2009: 143) for projection into Stevens' perspective which can, as Stockwell (2009: 142-4) suggests, lead to sympathetic feelings in the reader and the establishment of a 'compassionate connection' with the narrator (Gavins 2007: 103). Wong (2000) describes Ishiguro's narrators as 'deceptive yet sympathetic' (2000: 25) because although their narratives are often unreliable, they have demonstrably 'human flaws' (Wong 2000: 24). Certainly in my reading of the text I felt a great deal of sympathy for Stevens as I came to understand the extent of his feelings for Miss Kenton, and the consequences of his realising them himself too late.

In the discussion group data I collected regarding the novel, all of the participants described the novel as emotionally affecting. However, the responses which they reported in relation to Stevens were distinctly mixed and not always sympathetic. My method of data collection was detailed in section 3.3.2, and the following extracts are taken from Dataset 1, which features three of my female friends (referred to here as Participants A, B and C). Appendix 2 features longer extracts from Dataset 1 in order to contextualise the extracts used in this chapter. In Extract 1 below, participants have just been discussing Stevens' approach to bantering; a social skill which he lacks and seeks to improve throughout the novel. They go on to make some more general comments about their responses to his character:

**Extract 1 – Dataset 1**

**A:** but that's really endearing I I mean I found a lot of his characteristics really really endearing

...

**B:** I don't find that endearing I found it the opposite I found it I just found him so frustrating as a character

**A:** really I found I really warmed to him

Here, Participants A and B report completely opposing views regarding Stevens' character. A similar disagreement occurs later between Participants A and C, shown in Extract 2 below. The group are talking about a scene at the end of the novel (which is given further consideration in section 4.3.3), in which Stevens could have admitted his feelings to Miss

Kenton, but refrained from doing so. As a result of maintaining his dignity and not giving in to his feelings, Stevens experiences a sense of triumph.

#### Extract 2 – Dataset 1

- A: I find that absolutely amazing I cant help admiring it...[that] he's completely selfless in that situation, if he just let himself be ruled by his instincts or whatever he would've burst into Miss Kenton's room and said um 'I love you', that's completely uncharacter but you know would've burst in and told her what he felt, instead he feels triumph from actually denying those emotions and saying 'yes I'm going to be the best butler I can be' [C *trying to interrupt throughout this utterance*]
- C: to me that's actually self indulgent rather than selfless I almost think he indulges himself in this constant sense of triumph
- A: I dunno, I can relate to that, I can relate to why someone would do that...
- B: yeah
- C: yeah but I can't relate to it, he seems so, I dunno, wrapped up in (*mocking tone*) 'I am triumphant oh I triumphed here this is the thing of a great butler'

Again, whilst Participant A reports a relatively positive response to Stevens' character Participant C responds more negatively and regards him as 'self indulgent'. Participant A expresses identification with Stevens when she says she can 'relate' to his perspective, but Participant C states the complete opposite.

It was noted in section 3.3.1 that the accounts which participants provide regarding their reading are inevitably influenced by the context of the discussion group. Here, the opposing views expressed by the participants could have been prompted by interactional factors or group dynamics as much as the influence of the text itself (Allington and Benwell 2007; Myers 2009; Steen 1991b). However I also argued in section 3.3.1 that the comments of participants could be used in order to expand the types of responses which stylistics and cognitive poetics try to explain. Despite the fact that *The Remains of the Day* is narrated in a style which is thought to engender sympathy, I think the comments of these readers suggest that things are rather more complicated. For instance, focusing solely on a readers' projective relationship with Stevens the narrator neglects the influence of the other text-world enactors in the discourse. As Stevens is always alone when he narrates his tale, these enactors exist within the text-worlds Stevens creates as he recounts scenes from his memories. In section 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 below, I give further consideration to the influence of these scenes on the emotional effect of the narrative.

#### 4.3.2 Creating scenes

In their work on the unreliability of Stevens' narrative, both Wall (1994) and Phelan (2005a) remark upon the way in which scenes from Stevens' memory are presented to the narratee. Wall (1994) argues that the scenes Stevens remembers are 'more often than not reliable' because 'convention in unreliable narration almost dictates that we trust scenic presentations' (Wall 1994: 20). She presents Brontë's *Wuthering Heights* as a classic example

of this phenomenon, noting that although the narrators Lockwood and Nelly Dean are considered unreliable in their interpretations of events and judgement of characters, 'the convention that makes this novel possible dictates that the lengthy narrations of events are entirely accurate, even though such a convention raises questions about the limits of memory' (1994: 20). The same situation is created in *The Remains of the Day*, she argues, as unreliability in this novel is manifest not in the narrator's reporting of events themselves but in 'a conflict between the narrator's presentation of a scene and his...interpretative summaries or commentaries' (1994: 20). Similarly, when discussing the inferences which are so integral in readers' interpretation of *The Remains of the Day*, Phelan (2005a) argues that 'Ishiguro guides our inferences not only through Stevens' underreporting but also through the extensive dialogue' (Phelan 2005a: 54). Even though Stevens is sometimes recalling events from over twenty years ago, he provides detailed recreations of the actions and speech of the enactors – indeed, his memories are often presented predominantly through direct and reported speech. As Phelan (2005a) notes, this is a deliberate strategy on the part of the author which enables readers to make inferences about events in Stevens' past and relate these scenes to his present situation. The text-worlds constructed by the scenes which Stevens narrates are influential not only in readers' inferences about text-world enactors, but also their emotional experience of the discourse.

Take, for example, the following extract from the penultimate chapter of the novel. Stevens is sitting in the dining room of the Rose Garden Hotel in Cornwall, remembering the evening when Miss Kenton decided to accept Mr Benn's marriage proposal and leave Darlington Hall. In the following analysis I shall refer to the narrator-enactor of Stevens, who is located in Cornwall in 1956 (the coding time of the narration), as Stevens<sup>1</sup>. When Stevens<sup>1</sup> narrates his memories, he creates a world-switch located in the past containing a projected enactor of himself, which I shall refer to as Stevens<sup>2</sup>. Stevens<sup>2</sup> is not aware of Mr Benn's marriage proposal in the dialogue below (Miss Kenton informs him shortly afterwards). However, their discussion pertains to Miss Kenton's plans to visit Mr Benn that evening:

- 1)...I went down to Miss Kenton's parlour. She was sitting at her table, though
- 2) there was nothing before her and her hands were empty; indeed, something in
- 3) her demeanour suggested she had been sitting there like that for some time prior
- 4) to my knocking.
- 5)'Mr Cardinal is here, Miss Kenton,' I said. 'He'll be requiring his usual room
- 6) tonight.'
- 7)'Very good Mr Stevens. I shall see to it before I leave.'
- 8) 'Ah. You are going out this evening, Miss Kenton?'
- 9) 'I am indeed, Mr Stevens.'
- 10) Perhaps I looked a little surprised, for she went on: 'You will recall, Mr Stevens,
- 11) we discussed this a fortnight ago.'



- 12) 'Yes of course Miss Kenton. I beg your pardon, it had just slipped my mind for  
13) the moment.'  
14) 'Is something the matter Stevens?'  
15) 'Not at all Miss Kenton. Some visitors are expected this evening, but there is no  
16) reason why your presence will be required.'

(Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 224-5, my line numbers)

The text-world formed by Stevens<sup>1</sup>' focalised narrative here includes Stevens<sup>2</sup> and Miss Kenton, in the parlour at Darlington Hall. World-building elements in lines (1) to (4) describe Miss Kenton's posture as she sits at her table, before the direct speech of the two enactors is represented. Direct speech creates a world-switch from the past-tense of the narrative to the present-tense of the time of speech (Gavins 2007: 50; Werth 1999: 221-4). This shift into the present tense and the lack of interpretative interludes on Stevens<sup>1</sup>' part means readers must use the world-switches created by the direct speech to make inferences about the communicative actions of the enactors. In doing so, readers are able to build a coherent text-world representation of their interaction.

Though it may seem that this exchange is about a simple misunderstanding regarding the staff rota, in my reading of the extract I inferred that much more was going on. For example, the information which Stevens<sup>1</sup> provides regarding Miss Kenton's bodily position in lines (1) to (4) enables readers to make mindreading inferences about her mental states. From her lack of activity, I inferred that *Miss Kenton is deep in thought or troubled* about some matter of import. Interestingly, neither Stevens<sup>1</sup> nor Stevens<sup>2</sup> seem to make a connection between her demeanour and her potentially troubled state of mind. Stevens<sup>2</sup> simply proceeds to discuss matters of business with her. Such behaviour appears, to my mind, rather insensitive and I evaluated Stevens<sup>2</sup> negatively at this point. The little 'Ah' before Stevens<sup>2</sup>' utterance in line (8) led me to infer that *he is surprised* by the news of Miss Kenton's intention to leave Darlington Hall that evening, which must mean that *he didn't know about her intention*. These inferences are supported by Stevens<sup>2</sup>' question in line (8), the comment 'perhaps I looked a little surprised' in line (10) and his claim that the information had slipped his mind in line (12). However, Miss Kenton's utterances suggest that *she thinks Stevens<sup>2</sup> already knows about her plan to go out* that evening: in line (7) she refers to the issue as if it is shared knowledge and in line (10) to (11) she cites the time when they discussed it.

In addition to making inferences based on the illocutionary force of their utterances, I also drew upon my knowledge of the characters when interpreting this scene. Because of Stevens<sup>1</sup>' tendency to engage in 'underreading' (Phelan 2005a: 34) and provide an incomplete picture of the events he narrates, I was more inclined to view the utterances of Miss Kenton as most reliable in this exchange. Furthermore, my knowledge of both Stevens<sup>1</sup> and Stevens<sup>2</sup>' tendency to be obsessively fastidious about house matters meant

that it would be quite unusual for him to forget staff rota arrangements in this manner. Miss Kenton's question in line 14: 'Is something the matter Stevens?' led me to infer that *there is something unusual about Stevens<sup>2</sup>' body language or facial expression* in the text-world. This information about Stevens<sup>2</sup>' demeanour led me to infer that *Stevens<sup>2</sup> actually disapproves of Miss Kenton going out*. A plausible reason for Stevens<sup>2</sup>' disapproval, in the light of the romantic connection which readers are likely to have identified by this point in the novel, is that *he does not like Miss Kenton visiting Mr Benn*.

My analysis of the extract above provides a further demonstration of the extent of the mindreading involved in constructing the text-worlds of *The Remains of the Day*. The inferences I described above are listed here:

1. *Miss Kenton is deep in thought or troubled*
2. *Stevens is surprised*
3. *Stevens didn't know about Miss Kenton's intention*
4. *Miss Kenton thinks Stevens already knows about her plan to go out*
5. *There is something unusual about Stevens body language or facial expression*
6. *Stevens actually disapproves of Miss Kenton going out*
7. *He does not like Miss Kenton visiting Mr Benn*

Of these seven inferences, one is the result of an implicature generated by Miss Kenton's question (number 5), and the remaining six are incidences of mindreading, evident through my attribution of thoughts, beliefs or emotions (which are underlined in the above list) to the text-world enactors based upon their speech or behaviour. This type of dialogic scene presentation is common throughout the novel and provides a rich source of information regarding Stevens' perspective. Significantly, however, the mindreading inferences listed above also pertain to my interpretation of Miss Kenton's perspective too. In constructing the text-worlds of this extract it was necessary for me to project into both Stevens and Miss Kenton and imaginatively reconstruct the perspective of both these enactors.

Furthermore, although I would not rate the scene analysed above as one of the most emotive in the novel, the influence of such double projection over my emotional experience of the extract is still evident. I interpreted Miss Kenton's behaviour in lines (1) to (4) as indicative of a troubled mind, and when Stevens<sup>2</sup> failed to respond to this I evaluated him negatively and thought that he was being insensitive. This negative evaluation, however fleeting, is an emotional response to the text and to Stevens<sup>2</sup>' character in particular. This emotional response arose from my projection into the enactors of both Stevens and Miss Kenton and the inferences I made regarding their perspectives on the incident. Though in section 4.3.1 I describe feeling sympathy for Stevens<sup>1</sup> in my reading of the text, here I experienced a much less sympathetic and more negatively judgemental

response to Stevens<sup>2</sup>. I believe this demonstrates some of the complexity involved in readers' emotional experience of the narrative.

Though work on emotion in Text World Theory has emphasised the importance of projection in participants' emotional experience of discourse (Gavins 2007; Lahey 2005; Stockwell 2005a, 2009), it is my contention that these existing approaches fail to pay adequate attention to the multiple projections which are often involved in text-world construction. Taken collectively, the analyses of Gavins (2007), Lahey (2005) and Stockwell (2005a, 2009) consider a range of different text-world enactors and the effects of readerly projection into such roles. For example, previous text-world analyses have considered projection of the reader (referred to here as the 'implied reader') (Gavins 2007); the narratee or addressee (Lahey 2005; Stockwell 2005a, 2009); the 'you' in second-person fiction (Gavins 2007; Stockwell 2009); and literary characters or poetic personas (Stockwell 2009). Furthermore, text-world theorists have briefly recognised the possibility of multiple projections: for example, Stockwell notes that when a literary character has multiple enactors across text-worlds then different 'emotional identifications and empathies' will be generated (2005a: 149; see also 2009: 109-10, 123-31). Gavins notes that the inclusion of enactors (plural) in a text-world 'always results, to varying degrees of intensity, in an empathic identification on the part of the discourse-world participants' (Gavins 2007: 64). Each particular text-world analysis, however, tends to concentrate upon readers' projection with a *single* text-world enactor, and the emotional consequences of the relationship established by such projection.

In my analyses of *The Remains of the Day* in this section and section 4.2, I have suggested that readers project into multiple roles during the discourse, such as: the implied reader; the narratee-enactor; the perspective of Stevens the narrator; and enactors of Stevens and Miss Kenton. In some cases this projection engenders sensations of immersion and engagement in the discourse. In some cases projection involves the imaginative reconstruction of an enactor's perspective and the attribution of mental states and other characteristics to the enactor. I argue that these multiple projections are significant in readers' emotional responses to the text-worlds they create. In section 4.3.3 below I give further consideration to the reader response data I collected about *The Remains of the Day* and argue that the comments of the readers I studied lend support to my claims regarding multiple projection. I also review some approaches to multiple projection within stylistics and narratology.

#### **4.3.3 Multiple projections**

My analysis thus far has emphasised the importance of projection and mindreading in readers' construction of the text-worlds of *The Remains of the Day* (see sections 4.3.1 and

4.3.2). Interestingly, this claim is given further support by the discussion group data I collected regarding the novel. In particular, I found that the *manner* in which participants discussed the novel, rather than the particular opinions which they voiced, appeared particularly significant in this respect. At several points in the discussion, the accounts given by the readers were suggestive of projection into particular text-world enactors. For example, in Extracts 3 and 4 below, Participant C twice equates the discourse-world reader with Stevens' narratee:

**Extract 3 – Dataset 1**

**C:** even with us [Stevens] is trying to maintain that professional dignity, even with this reader

**Extract 4 – Dataset 1**

**A:** Lord Darlington perhaps wasn't as great as [Stevens] thought he was

**C:** or as he tried to make out to the reader at least

Following Lahey (2003, 2005), in section 4.2 I argued that readers are likely to project enactors of themselves into their text-world in order to 'fill the addressee role that is demanded by the text' (Lahey 2005: 282). This projection creates the impression that the reader is being directly addressed by the narrator. Here, Participant C's comments are suggestive of such a projection. Through the use of the pronoun 'us', she includes both herself and the other readers she is addressing in the narratee category. Another more explicit example of reported projection is shown in Extract 5 below:

**Extract 5 – Dataset 1**

**B:** I completely identified with Miss Kenton as was just (*laughs*), I mean it might be my current emotional state and the way that everything is going at the moment with my life, but I just completely identified with her frustration with the situation when someone's not speaking to you

Here Participant B is referring to a scene in which Stevens and Miss Kenton are deliberately not speaking to each other after an argument. She makes a direct comparison between her own life and that of the text-world enactor Miss Kenton. This accords with the Text World Theory concept of identification (Gavins 2007; Stockwell 2005a, 2009), which is defined as a form of metaphorical mapping between the discourse participant's 'self-aware personality' and a text-world enactor (Stockwell 2009: 138, see section 3.2.5). Identification is an act of comparison, self-awareness and recognition on the part of the discourse-world participant (Stockwell 2009: 138), and this is demonstrated in Participant C's reflection upon her own and Miss Kenton's situation.

Extracts 3 to 5 contain quite explicit accounts of projection, but within Dataset 1, I propose that projection is also indicated by other, less explicit means. Consider, for example, Extract 6 below. In this extract, Participant A is referring to a scene at the ending

of the novel in which Stevens and Miss Kenton, after their reunion meeting, bid each other farewell at a bus stop:

**Extract 6 – Dataset 1**

A: It is really is the remains of the day there's nothing...comforting about that just this is what's left of our relationship we're having a conversation about what might have been at a bus stop and you're going back to a person you don't love, who you've just told me you don't really love

Part way through Extract 4, Participant A shifts from speaking in her own voice to speaking as Stevens (indicated by underlining). This is an example of deictic projection; the pronouns 'you', 'me' and 'we' do not refer to entities in Participant A's discourse-world but instead Participant A appears to be adopting the deictic centre of Stevens, referring to himself and Miss Kenton. Interestingly, Participant A is not directly reporting Stevens' speech in the novel here (her utterance bears little resemblance to the exchange in the novel, see Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 252) and instead appears to be expressing her view of Stevens' thoughts and feelings in the scene. Holt (2007) takes a conversation analysis approach to reported speech in discourse, and posits a crucial distinction between reported speech, which features a reporting verb, and incidences when speakers 'enact' the perspective of whomever's speech they are imitating. In this example, Participant A is enacting the perspective of Stevens as part of her speech in the discussion group, which involves temporarily projecting into his perspective.

There are further examples of this type of projection at other points in Dataset 1. In Extract 7 below, readers are discussing a scene from the novel which culminates in Miss Kenton deciding to marry Mr Benn and leave Darlington Hall. I will provide a little more context regarding this scene before considering the participants' discussion of it. In section 4.3.2 I analysed some dialogue between Miss Kenton and Mr Stevens in which Stevens 'pretends' to forget about Miss Kenton's evening plans. This dialogue occurs at the beginning of the scene in question, and shortly after this exchange Miss Kenton provides Stevens with more information about her potential evening activities:

'Mr Stevens, I have something to tell you.'

'Yes, Miss Kenton?'

'It concerns my acquaintance. Who I am going to meet tonight...He has asked me to marry him. I thought you had a right to know that.'

'Indeed Miss Kenton. That is very interesting.'

'I am still giving the matter thought.'

(Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 225)

Around twenty minutes later, Stevens recalls encountering Miss Kenton on the back staircase and the following exchange ensues:

'Mr Stevens, do I understand that you are wishing me to remain on duty this evening?'

'Not at all Miss Kenton. As you pointed out, you did notify me sometime ago.'

'But I can see you are very unhappy about my going out tonight.'

'On the contrary, Miss Kenton.'

'Do you imagine that by creating so much commotion in the kitchen and stamping back and forth like this outside my parlour you will get me to change my mind?'

(Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 225-226)

Even though Miss Kenton appears to be encouraging Stevens to take action and prevent her from going out, Stevens refuses to intervene. Miss Kenton does go to meet Mr Benn, and when she returns some hours later Stevens is still on duty. After exchanging some minor pleasantries, the following events are narrated:

Behind me, Miss Kenton's footsteps came to a sudden halt and I heard her say:

'Are you not in the least bit interested in what took place tonight between my acquaintance and I, Mr Stevens?'

'I do not mean to be rude Miss Kenton, but really I must return upstairs without further delay...'

'...Very well, if you must be rushing off, I shall just tell you that I accepted my acquaintance's proposal.'

'I beg your pardon Miss Kenton?'

'His proposal of marriage.'

'Ah, is that so Miss Kenton? Then may I offer you my congratulations.'

...I started to walk away again but...I heard Miss Kenton say 'Mr Stevens,' and thus turned once more. She had not moved, and consequently she was obliged to raise her voice slightly in addressing me, so that it resonated rather oddly in the cavernous spaces of the dark and empty kitchen.

'Am I to take it,' she said, 'that after the many years of service I have given in this house, you have no more words to greet the news of my possible departure than those which you have just uttered?'

'Miss Kenton, you have my warmest congratulations, but...there are matters of global significance taking place upstairs and I must return to my post.'

(Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 229-230)

In Extract 7 below the discussion group participants are trying to decide which story event was the final straw in Miss Kenton and Mr Stevens' doomed romance. Participant A is arguing that it was the scene that has just been described. She gives her account of it thus:

#### **Extract 7 – Dataset 1**

**A:** several times she [Miss Kenton] says to him [Stevens] 'he's asked me to marry him' and he [Stevens] does nothing

**B:** almost 'what should I do, what do you think I should do?'

**A:** I felt...she wanted him to say 'marry me', like 'here you are on a plate' and she doesn't go far enough because he wont step forward at all, then when she comes back and says 'I've accepted it' and he just says 'Oh congratulations' and she's saying 'I'm handing in my notice' and he just says 'oh well thankyou very much' and then she says something like 'I've worked here for like fifteen years and you cant even say any more than congratulations is that all I mean to you' essentially and at that stage, cards on the table he cannot say anything more

**B:** but all he cares about is being proper and going back to being dignified in front of everyone

**A:** yep

- C: and also perhaps he [Stevens] wanted her to turn it down, perhaps he was waiting to see if she would...turn down the marriage without him having to say anything, perhaps he was waiting for her to do it because for him that's not part of...the professional dignity

What is striking about this extract, and indeed several other points in Dataset 1, is the way the participants seem collaboratively to be remembering and reconstructing the scene. Participant A has the most to say on this topic, but both B and C make supporting overlapping contributions to A's narration. Furthermore, the discussion group are not simply paraphrasing the novel. Their rendering of the scene differs greatly from the linguistic cues found in the text and cited above. For instance, the sense of first-person focalisation is lost and the scene is considerably compressed. The most noticeable difference between the participants' version of the scene and that found in the text is the attribution of mental states to the enactors, in utterances such as: 'she wanted him to say marry me'; 'he cares about...being proper'; 'he wanted her to turn it down'. The text of the novel is dialogue-based like the extract analysed in section 4.3.2, and the desires and beliefs of the enactors are not explicitly stated. Thus, the participants' descriptions are evidence of their mindreading inferences regarding the mental states which underlie the enactors' behaviour.

The participants' report of the dialogue between Stevens and Miss Kenton also differs considerably from the direct speech in the novel. For example, Participant A reports Miss Kenton's speech as: 'I've worked here for like fifteen years and you cant even say any more than congratulations is that all I mean to you'. In the novel, the corresponding utterance reads:

'Am I to take it,' she said, 'that after the many years of service I have given in this house, you have no more words to greet the news of my possible departure than those which you have just uttered?' (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 230)

Rather than attempting to construct a faithful representation of the enactor's actual words through reported speech, the participants seem to be using reported dialogue to convey their interpretation of the enactor's attitudes and the 'subtext' behind their exchanges.

In section 3.3.1 I established that the reader response data I collected cannot be treated as though it provides direct access to the text-worlds or emotional experiences of the participants *as they read the novel*. However, as Text World Theory was designed as a model for all human discourse processing and takes face-to-face interaction as the prototype for all other aspects of communication and cognition (Gavins, 2007: 18), its tenets are also relevant when examining the discourse produced in book group discussions. As the participants communicate, they are creating and negotiating the content of text-worlds in interaction with each other. Their utterances may not provide a reliable picture of

the text-worlds the created during reading, but they can still be used to learn more about text-world construction in general. What is interesting about the text-worlds created in the discussion is the variety of perspectives into which participants project. For example, in the text-worlds being created in Extract 7, participants represent the mental states of both Stevens and Miss Kenton, and Participant A effortlessly shifts between the speech of Stevens and Miss Kenton in order to demonstrate their attitudes towards each other. The participants construct the scene in the third-person ('she wanted him to say...') and in the first-person by enacting the role of text-world entities (e.g. 'what should I do, what do you think I should do?').

Work in conversation analysis suggests that spoken communication typically features such shifts in perspective, particularly in the form of reported speech (e.g. Holt and Clift, 2007; Myers, 1999; Tannen, 1989). Although the Text World Theory framework is based upon a prototype of spoken, face-to-face discourse, and uses this to understand other discourses including written communication and literary narrative (Gavins, 2007; Werth, 1999), the creation and comprehension of multiple perspectives has been given less consideration than it deserves in the Text World Theory approach to literary narrative. Extracts 6 and 7 from my reader response data lend support to my claim that readers are able to projectively imagine the perspectives of multiple enactors when constructing text-worlds. If such perspective-shifting is possible during discussions about *The Remains of the Day*, it seems sensible to suggest that it is also possible when reading the novel.

Further empirical and theoretical support for the idea that reading involves multiple projections comes from a variety of sources; including work in narratology and cognitive poetics. For example, in his cognitive-psychological studies of narrative, Gerrig (1996) suggests that readers are able to switch very quickly between their own, reader-centred perspective and the perspectives of different characters (character-centred perspectives) during narrative comprehension. As an example, he refers to the poisoning scene at the ending of *Hamlet*. In this scene, the audience know that King Claudius and Laertes have poisoned a cup of wine with the intention of murdering Hamlet. Gerrig posits that when the King tells Queen Gertrude not to drink the wine, readers are able to interpret his utterance from both a reader-centred perspective (i.e. they know the wine is poisoned) and Gertrude's perspective (i.e. who doesn't know the wine is poisoned), and must be able to switch between these perspectives in order to understand the characters' behaviour (1996: 136). He argues that our capacity for perspective-switching forms a routine part of ordinary conversation, but is drawn upon to create particular effects within literary narrative discourse (1996: 136). For instance, he posits that readers who fail to factor in Gertrude's ignorance will have 'a far less emotionally charged experience of the scene' (1996: 134).



Gerrig views shifts among perspectives along a 'continuum of representations', from totally reader-centred to totally character-centred (1996: 136). When readers adopt a strictly reader-centred perspective no information is encoded from the particular perspective of any character; whilst at the other end of the scale, the adoption of a strictly character-centred perspective means that readers would not attempt to 'recover one consistent story' from among the various perspectives the narrative represents (1996: 136). Gerrig posits that in ordinary circumstances readers achieve a compromise position between these poles (1996: 137) and provides empirical evidence to support the notion that readers must often create text-representations which are 'partially character-centred' (1996: 141).

Narratologist Palmer (2004) also emphasises the fact that readers construct the minds of multiple characters as they comprehend narrative. As an example, he cites the narrative situation created by the sentence: 'The policeman held up his hand and stopped the car' (2004: 176). The sentence originates from Schank and Abelson's (1977) work on schema theory, where it was used to illustrate the way our real-world knowledge supplements textual information: we infer that there is a 'driver who steps on the brake' even though he or she is not mentioned in the text. Palmer, however, extends this account by arguing that in order to comprehend this sentence, readers must 'create a consciousness for the policeman and the driver and follow their mental functioning' (2004: 176). Thus, he describes the mindreading inferences which readers generate when interpreting even this short sentence. For example, by describing his actions the sentence implies the policeman's perceptions, beliefs and decisions, and also implies the existence of a driver who perceived the policeman, comprehended his sign, believed that they should stop, and took the action of applying the brakes (2004: 176). Palmer calls readers' representations of particular character's minds 'embedded narratives' (extending Ryan's 1986 use of the term), which consist of 'the whole of a character's various perceptual and conceptual viewpoints, ideological worldviews and plans for the future considered as an individual narrative that is embedded in the whole fictional text' (2004: 15). He argues that readers process such narratives 'from the subjective point of view of that character' (2004: 181) and that 'readers read plots as the interaction of those embedded narratives' (2004: 16)

Elsewhere in narratology, one of the most sophisticated models of multiple projection is present in the work of rhetorical narratologists Phelan (1989, 1996, 2005) and Rabinowitz (1998 [1987]). Rhetorical approaches to narrative view narrative as a 'multi-layered event' involving the establishment of relations among tellers, audiences and the story which is told (Phelan 2007: 203; see Booth 1961, 1988; Phelan 1989, 1996, 2005; Richter 1974; Rabinowitz 1998 [1987]; Sacks 1966; and for a review see Phelan 2005b,

2007). Rabinowitz (1998 [1987]) and Phelan (1989, 1996, 2005); ‘third-generation’ scholars working in this rhetorical paradigm, have developed an influential ‘model of audiences’ which posits that any given narrative can involve five distinct audiences (Phelan 2007: 210).

Firstly there is the ‘actual’ or ‘flesh-and-blood reader’ who is ‘the flesh-and-blood people who read the book’ (Rabinowitz 1998 [1987]: 20). In Text World Theory terms, this is synonymous with the participant reader existing in the discourse-world. The second audience is the ‘authorial audience’, described as ‘the author’s ideal reader’ (Phelan 2007: 210). Rabinowitz writes: ‘most authors...design their books rhetorically for some more or less specific *hypothetical* audience, which I call the *authorial audience*’ (1998 [1987]: 21). Phelan (2007) notes that the rhetorical model ‘assumes that the flesh-and-blood reader seeks to enter the authorial audience in order to understand the invitations for engagement that the narrative offers’ (2007: 210). However, Rabinowitz, suggests that readers ‘can often determine what the authorial audience’s response is without sharing it fully’ (1998 [1987]: 36). For instance, ‘a reader can...know...that the authorial audience of *Jane Eyre* finds Bertha unsympathetic – even if, as actual [reader], the...lack of sympathy [is] problematic’ (Rabinowitz 1998 [1987]: 36). The ‘authorial audience’ concept corresponds with the notion of the implied reader (Phelan 2005b: 503) which I utilised in my analysis in section 4.2.

The third audience is the ‘narrative audience’, which Phelan describes as ‘the observer position within the narrative world which the flesh-and-blood reader assumes’ (2007: 210). Phelan (1996) develops Rabinowitz’s account of the narrative audience to postulate that it is:

the actual audience’s projection of itself into the observer role within the fiction. In taking on that role, we will always become believers in the reality of the fictional world; consequently much of our emotional response to narrative derives from our participation in this role. (1996: 145).

This role has not been considered in Text World Theory, though in section 5.2.1 I argue that it may be useful within a Text World Theory approach. The fourth audience is the ‘narratee’, which is the audience addressed by the narrator (Phelan 2007: 210). This concept is synonymous with my use of the term in the analysis in section 4.2. The final audience is ‘the ideal narrative audience’, which Phelan (2007) describes as ‘the narrator’s hypothetical perfect audience, the one he expects to understand every nuance of his communication’ (2007: 210), though this audience may or may not be significant in rhetorical analysis (Phelan 2007: 210).

As there is only one ‘flesh-and-blood reader’ involved in each narrative event, this model of audiences pertains to ‘*simultaneous* roles that the audience of a text can play’

(Rabinowitz 1998 [1987]: 20). The rhetorical approach posits that these multiple audience roles are integral in an account of the 'experience of reading', and uses this model to explicate the emotional and ethical effects of narratives (Phelan 1996: 135-53; Phelan 2005). For example, in *Narrative and Rhetoric* (1996) Phelan links readers' emotional engagement with their entrance into the narrative audience role (1996: 145) and accounts for emotional intensity and distance using the ideal narrative audience, narratee and narrative audience concepts, describing the way in which readers' alignment with these roles fluctuates during reading (1996: 145, 152; see also 2005a). Phelan is careful to point out that the audience model does not seek to provide a single, standard 'delineation of various roles available to the actual reader' (1996: 147). Instead, he writes:

I propose that the [audience] model be taken as a helpful heuristic...It describes the experiences of reading: an entry into a narrative audience, a recognition of a narrator's ideal audience and narratee, an effort to step into the author's intended audience, a relation of those positions to our actual beliefs. (Phelan 1996: 147)

He emphasises that although the entrance into multiple roles is integral to narrative experience, each individual reader, drawing upon their 'different cultural experiences...beliefs, hopes, fears, prejudices, and knowledge', will be led to 'hypothesize different authorial and narrative audiences as [they] infer these positions from the details of any given narrative' (1996: 147). Thus, the audience model provides basis for the sharing of experiences, and a discussion of the textual grounds for those experiences, whilst allowing for differences between readers (1996: 147).

Within stylistics and cognitive poetics, Jeffries (2001) also makes a convincing theoretical argument for the importance of readers' multiple perspectives in literary discourse. She takes a slightly different approach to the studies reviewed thus far, because her focus is on the multiple socio-cultural positions held by real readers in the discourse-world, and the way in which readers can read from several sometimes conflicting positions (2001: 336). Her argument is prompted by work in schema theory (Cook 1994; Semino 1997), which proposes that a general function of literary reading is to change or refresh readers' knowledge structures, known as 'schemas' (Schank and Abelson 1977). She criticises such an approach as simplistic and highlights the fact that many people have schemata which 'are not in tune with the dominant ideology' and thus may be simply 'affirmed' rather than refreshed during literary reading (2001: 334). As an example, she analyses two poems which treat rarely-articulated topics regarding female sexuality. Whilst their approach to female sexuality may be schema-refreshing from the perspective of 'dominant, patriarchal culture' (2001: 335), she posits that many (particularly female) readers may find the poems schema-affirming and experience a 'thrill of recognition' (2001:

334). In fact, she proposes that readers may well be aware of both the schema-reinforcing, schema-refreshing and schema-affirming potential of the poems because they are culturally ‘multilingual’ (2001: 327). This means that because of their ‘simultaneous membership of overlapping cultures’ (2001: 336), readers are able to read the poems from a number of conflicting viewpoints at any one time (2001: 341) As an example, she notes: ‘I can read an article about slimming and manage to store up the advice given for future reference as a slimmer as well as railing against the society that makes fat into a feminist issue’ (2001: 338). Thus, Jeffries proposes that readers ‘not only can, but do, construct some kind of “intended” or “most likely” meaning whilst also constructing [their] own reaction’ (2001: 339). Her comments accord with Rabinowitz’s (1998 [1987]) notion of the ‘authorial audience’, described above. However, Jeffries (2001) notes that the process of reading from multiple perspectives is still ‘shrouded in mystery’ and requires further research (2001: 339).

I believe that Text World Theory is particularly well-suited to an investigation of multiple projection, because it can incorporate the identities and personalities of readers in the discourse-world as well as the multiple enactors which they project at the text-world level (Gavins 2009; Lahey 2005; Stockwell 2009). It also seems to me that there are some interesting parallels between the audience model in rhetorical narratology (Phelan 1996, 2005; Rabinowitz 1998 [1987]) and the expanded notion of projection which I am advocating within Text World Theory. The rhetorical approach is not a cognitive model, but both approaches link emotional response to the projections which readers perform as they experience literary texts. In Chapter 5 I make further steps towards a cognitive-poetic account of multiple projection using Text World Theory.

#### **4.4 Review**

The analyses in this chapter have demonstrated the inferential and projective capacities which are necessary when constructing the text-worlds of *The Remains of the Day*. Following recent work in Text World Theory (Gavins 2007; Lahey 2005; Stockwell 2005a, 2009), I have posited that readerly projection is important in the emotional experience of narrative. However, I have argued for a more detailed and nuanced account of projection in Text World Theory. I have specifically outlined a lack of consideration of multiple projection in Text World Theory to date and have proposed that the framework should dedicate more attention to the complexity of multiple projections in its account of readers’ emotional experience. Introspective textual analysis and the examination of real readers’ ability to engage in multiple projection during conversation, particularly through joint reconstruction and collaborative mindreading, have been provided as evidence to support my proposals. I

have also synthesised Text World Theory with work in cognitive psychology and narratology towards this end.

In Chapter 5 I go on to analyse the textual cues which encourage multiple projection in relation to *Never Let Me Go* (Ishiguro 2005), before moving on from projection to examine the role of reader expectation in emotional responses to narrative.

# Chapter 5: *Never Let Me Go*

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## 5.0 Preview

The study of Ishiguro's *The Remains of the Day* (2005 [1989]) in Chapter 4 highlighted the opportunities for multiple projection which, I argued, form a crucial element in the construction of text-worlds and the emotional experience of the novel. In the present chapter I extend my approach to multiple projection through an analysis of another of Ishiguro's novels, *Never Let Me Go* (2005). I examine the reader response data I collected about the novel and conduct my own introspective analysis in order to further elucidate the influence of multiple projection upon readers' emotions. Drawing upon this evidence, I argue that textual features act to both encourage and problematise readers' projections and identifications, and thus can be seen to exert an influence upon readers' emotional experiences. In particular, I argue that multiple shifting projection can contribute towards an understanding of the mixed emotional responses which the novel appears to engender. In section 5.4 I move on from a focus on projection to consider the hopes and preferences which readers appear to generate as they read the novel. I discuss the importance of such hopes and preferences in readers' emotional experience of the text, and also the challenges they present to the Text World Theory framework.

## 5.1 The Impact of *Never Let Me Go*

*Never Let Me Go* (Ishiguro 2005) received largely enthusiastic reviews upon publication; described as a 'a page turner and a heartbreaker' (Grossman 2005) and 'the best Ishiguro has written since the sublime *The Remains of the Day*' (Yardley 2005). Like *The Remains of the Day*, the novel was short-listed for the Man Booker Prize and has also been adapted into a film (Romanek 2010). Criticism of the novel, when it occurs, often concerns the style of narration, described derogatively by Kermode (2005: 21) as 'dear diary prose', and the revelatory scene in the penultimate chapters which is seen to explain either too much (Menand 2005; Kakutani 2005) or too little (Moore 2005). It is significant that the ending generates such mixed opinions, as the novel is full of unsolved mysteries which are a major factor in its effect.

The novel is narrated by Kathy H., a 31 year old 'carer' living in England in the 1990s. Like many of Ishiguro's narrators, Kathy is primarily concerned with recounting and interpreting her past. Her narrative focuses on the relationships between herself and her two best friends Ruth and Tommy. She met Ruth and Tommy whilst at Hailsham boarding school, a seemingly idyllic institution located deep in the English countryside. Although she

and Tommy always had a special connection, Ruth claimed Tommy as her boyfriend during these school years, turning the trio of friends into a tense love triangle, which eventually led to their separation on bad terms. Sometime later, Kathy, Ruth and Tommy are reunited, but in quite different circumstances.

Whilst at Hailsham, the students are continually told that they are 'special', and they are always aware that they are somehow 'different' from their teachers (called 'guardians') and 'the people outside' the school gates (Ishiguro 2005: 206). Very slowly, it emerges that Kathy, Tommy, Ruth and indeed all their school friends at Hailsham are actually human clones, created to supply a government programme of organ harvesting to aid medical science. Though they dream of working in offices or supermarkets, once they mature clones either become 'donors' and begin donating their organs straight away, or work as 'carers' for a few years in order to take care of existing donors, before progressing to donation themselves. Clones typically undergo four donations before they 'complete'.

After leaving Hailsham, the trio meet again when Kathy becomes a 'carer'; first to Ruth and then to Tommy. Ruth confesses that during their school years she deliberately kept Tommy and Kathy apart, but now she thinks they should be together. Shortly before her death she begs Kathy to reunite with Tommy, and try to achieve a 'deferral'. Rumour has it that Hailsham students who can prove they are in love will receive 'deferral' from their donations, allowing them to live in peace for a few years before they are culled. Ruth has obtained the address of the old Hailsham headmistresses and entreats Kathy to visit them and secure some respite for her and Tommy. After Ruth's death, Kathy becomes Tommy's carer and they become a couple, though their relationship is always tinged with a sense of sadness and lost time (Ishiguro 2005: 234-5). At the climax of the novel, they follow Ruth's dying wishes and visit Madame and Miss Emily, the ex-Hailsham guardians, in order to request a deferral.

During this meeting, the revelatory scene which has caused some critical debate (e.g. Kermode 2005; Menand 2005; Moore 2005), it emerges that human clones have existed since the 1950s, and that their organs became staple supplies in medical science before the ethical implications of their existence were fully considered. Clones were raised in 'deplorable conditions' in government-run centres (Ishiguro 2005: 255), but Hailsham boarding school was a charity-run organisation which aimed to prove that human clones could be educated and cultured and, most importantly, that they had souls. In addition to learning how to read and being taught about sex and relationships, clones were encouraged to produce artwork. The clones' ability to produce art was used to prove that they also possessed souls (Ishiguro 2005: 255). Kathy, Tommy and their friends were 'lucky pawns' in this political game (Ishiguro 2005: 261). However, social opinion about the ethical status

of clones had swayed, and school institutions like Hailsham had been closed down, with clones being pushed 'back in the shadows' (Ishiguro 2005: 259). Most devastating for Kathy and Tommy is the knowledge that the 'deferral' process is nothing but a rumour. It has never been possible for clones to be granted more time before their donations are completed. There is no hope of an alternative future for Kathy and Tommy, and their lives 'must now run the course that's been set' for them (Ishiguro 2005: 260).

After their meeting with Madame and Miss Emily, Tommy faces his fourth donation and requests another carer so Kathy does not have to see him die. By the end of the novel, Kathy's career as a carer is also coming to an end and she is due to begin donations in a few months. The novel ends with Kathy staring out over a desolate rubbish-strewn field, imagining Tommy will appear in the distance and begin walking towards her.

Through its depiction of an alternate, dystopian, 'darkly-skewed' version of contemporary England, *Never Let Me Go* is often read as a treatise on contemporary social, political and scientific issues. Robbins (2007) views the novel as a commentary upon class systems, the ideology of upward mobility and the institution of the welfare state, whilst Sim (2006) notes that the novel depicts the threats and potential consequences of untrammelled scientific development. Most significantly, *Never Let Me Go* appears to be a contribution to bioethical debates and illuminates some of the central moral issues surrounding cloning (Mirsky 2006; Montello 2005; Roos 2008; Sim 2006; Toker and Chertoff 2008). Roos (2008), for example, situates the novel alongside other 'human harvesting' narratives of the early twenty-first century and makes an explicit connection between their concerns and political agendas in the discourse-world (2008: 52). Furthermore, Mirsky's (2006) essay on *Never Let Me Go* was published in the journal *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine*, which demonstrates the perceived relevance of the novel to contemporary scientific debates.

Some reviewers, however, question the novel's function as a contribution to such debates. Kerr (2005) doubts that Ishiguro aimed to issue 'a warning about the ethics of reproductive science' (2005: 1) and instead sees his motive for the cloning aspect of the novel as 'more personal and more literary' (2005: 1). She argues that the cloning backdrop is an ideal setting for Ishiguro to explore some of his preferred literary themes: such as memory and the human self; cliques, loyalty and friendship (Kerr 2005: 1). As noted in section 1.3, Ishiguro often sets his novels at points of real or imaginary historical crisis in order to explore the 'emotional and mental configurations of his characters' lives' (Wong 2000: 4). In a similar way to Kerr (2005), Harrison (2005) asks 'Who on earth could be "for" the exploitation of human beings in this way?' and sees the cloning issue as 'a sleight of hand, eye candy' and a 'cover' for the novel's exploration of more universal, existential issues (2005: 2). He writes:



*Never Let Me Go* [is] really about...repressing what you know, which is that in this life people fail one another, grow old and fall to pieces. Its about knowing that while you must keep calm, keeping calm won't change a thing. (Harrison 2005: 2).

The novel is also read, then (often by the same critics who identify its relevance to scientific debates), as a metaphor for 'the human condition' in general (Harrison 2005; Robbins 2007; Roos 2008; Toker and Chertoff 2008). In such readings the plight of Kathy and the clones is seen as distinctly similar to the plight of everyday non-cloned humans; both facing a certain death and yet preoccupied with seemingly trivial day-to-day details. Morello (2005) writes: 'we realise ourselves in Kathy, and we see her foreshortened and stunted life as not so very different from our own' (2005: 4), whilst Robbins (2007) notes that 'like [Kathy], I depend for my daily dose of contentment on a blinkering of awareness' (2007: 293).

A central issue in critical responses to *Never Let Me Go*, therefore, is the extent to which Kathy and the other clones are recognisably 'human'. This issue forms an integral part of the two main readings of the novel. As a treatise on ethical issues related to cloning Kathy's 'human-ness' has direct consequences for the novel's 'message' regarding the morality of cloning. As a metaphor for the human condition, Kathy's 'human-ness' renders her plight more or less representative. The 'human-ness' of the clones is partially dependent upon the verisimilitude of their emotions (see section 5.3.1). Furthermore, in a novel which probes the extent to which cloned human beings are 'real' people, projection and identification take on a thematic significance. As noted in section 3.2.4 and Chapter 4, it is readers' capacities for psychological projection which enables them to treat text-world enactors as 'real', life-like people who have thoughts, emotions and reactions in the same way as any discourse-world human beings (Gavins 2007: 285). Projection also forms the basis for identification and the establishment of emotional connections between discourse-world participants and text-world enactors. Such processes, I argue, are particularly important in readers' responses to *Never Let Me Go* (see sections 5.2 and 5.3).

Throughout the present chapter I draw upon the responses of 'real' readers from Dataset 2, which I collected by recording a book group discussion about the novel (see section 3.3.2 for details regarding my method). The group involved five female participants, referred to below as Participants A, B, C, D and E. Appendix 3 features longer extracts from Dataset 2 in order to contextualise the extracts used in this chapter. In accordance with the reviews and literary-critical work on *Never Let Me Go*, discussion group participants also seemed to regard the novel as a contribution to contemporary cloning and organ donation debates and spent some time discussing the ethical status of clones. Their discussion also incorporates a range of discourse-world issues, such as contemporary

scientific capabilities; media stories about cloning and genetics such as ‘Dolly the Sheep’ and embryo gene screening; and even the British National Health Service organ donor scheme. Whilst participants did not arrive at an overarching metaphorical reading of the text as some literary critics did, they were concerned with the extent to which Kathy is ‘human’ and ‘like us’. For example, Participant C says: ‘well obviously what they were trying to get at was that it’s science fiction and these are kind of mad clones but actually they’ve got perfectly the life like we’ve all got’.

More, generally, I observed that both the discussion group participants and literary critics often report mixed or conflicting emotional responses to *Never Let Me Go*, such as evaluating the novel negatively overall but suggesting elsewhere that they found aspects of it engaging and emotive. For example, Kermode declares the novel a ‘failure’ by the standards Ishiguro has set himself, but later in the same review he suggests some limited success by acknowledging that the ‘woman who tells the story...is capable in the end of registering, or anyway drawing attention to, the plight of these victims’ (2005: 21). Similarly, Participant B in the discussion group declares that she ‘didn’t like’ the novel and ‘didn’t want to pick it up’, but later describes finding aspects of it interesting: ‘I really wanted to know who they’d all been cloned from.’

In section 5.2 below I analyse the opening of the novel, before going on to discuss the multiple projections which it seems to both encourage and problematise. Section 5.3 then considers various textual cues which influence readers’ identification with Kathy the narrator. In section 5.3.3. I bring my discussion of multiple perspectives together in an introspective analysis of a short but emotive extract from the text.

## **5.2 The Text-Worlds of *Never Let Me Go***

At the discourse-world level, *Never Let Me Go* features two discourse participants; Kazuo Ishiguro and a particular reader. As noted in section 4.2, when discourse-world participants do not share the same spatio-temporal location the discourse-world is ‘split’ (Werth 1999: 54-5) and face-to-face communication is usually recreated at the text-world level (Gavins 2007). *Never Let Me Go* opens with two title pages featuring the setting information ‘England, late 1990s’ and the section heading ‘Part One’, which I believe establish two text-worlds in the readers’ mind. The textual deixis of the opening titles draws attention to the text itself as the construction of an author (Stockwell 2002: 54) and establishes a participant-accessible text-world featuring an enactor of the implied author in communication with an implied reader. As noted in section 4.2, readers are likely to project into the implied reader role as a means of engagement with the discourse. Readers may choose to flesh out this initial text-world (Text World 1 in Figure 5.0) with additional




Figure 5.0. Text-worlds cued by the opening four sentences of *Never Let Me Go*.

world-builders by drawing upon their knowledge of the real-world author, for example. In my reading I was very conscious that the implied author was writing in 2005, and therefore deliberately setting the novel in a counterfactual version of the recent past. The deictic information 'England, 1990s' cues the formation of a second text-world (Text World 2 in Figure 5.0). This world is enactor-accessible as it is created by the implied author, who is an enactor in Text World 1. Once the narrative commences further world-building and function-advancing information is added to Text World 2. The opening paragraphs of the novel read:

[1] My name is Kathy H. [2] I'm thirty-one years old, and I've been a carer now for over eleven years. [3] That sounds long enough, I know, but actually they want me to go on for another eight months, until the end of this year. [4] That'll make it almost exactly twelve years. [5] Now I know my being a carer so long isn't necessarily because they think I'm fantastic at what I do. [6] There are some really good carers who've been told to stop after just two or three years. [7] And I can think of one carer at least who went on for all of fourteen years despite being a complete waste of space. [8] So I'm not trying to boast. [9] But then, I do know for a fact they've been pleased with my work, and by and large, I have too. [10] My donors have always tended to do much better than expected. [11] Their recovery times have been impressive, and hardly any of them have been classified as 'agitated', even before fourth donation. [12] Okay, maybe I *am* boasting now. [13] But it means a lot to me, being able to do my work well, especially that bit about my donors staying 'calm'. [14] I've developed a kind of instinct around donors. I know when to hang around and comfort them, when to leave them to themselves; when to listen to everything they have to say, and when to just shrug and tell them to snap out of it.

[15] Anyway, I'm not making any big claims for myself. [16] I know carers, working now, who are just as good and don't get half the credit. [17] If you're one of them, I can understand how you might get resentful – about my bedsit, my car, above all, the way I get to pick and choose who I look after. [18] And I'm a Hailsham student

– which is enough by itself to get some people’s backs up. (Ishiguro 2005:3, my sentence numbering)

The first-person, predominantly present-tense narrative establishes the presence of a narrating enactor in Text World 2, which automatically presupposes the existence of a narratee-enactor (Lahey 2005). Unlike *The Remains of the Day*, which begins *in medias res*, *Never Let Me Go* begins with the narrator directly introducing herself to her narratee, supplying them with her name, age and occupation. This creates the impression that she is not acquainted with her addressee. When processing the first four sentences of the novel it may be quite straightforward for readers to project into the narratee role as they are likely to share features with that narratee (i.e. they haven’t ‘met’ Kathy before and can appreciate that eleven years as a carer is a long time). However, as the narrative proceeds, this easy projection into the narratee role is disrupted by the ambiguity of the world-building information, described below.

As with *The Remains of the Day*, Kathy’s narration cues a series of modal-worlds and world-switches as she describes her opinions and provides the narratee with some information about her professional history. Kathy does not provide readers with very much information about the physical ‘epic situation’ (Romberg 1962) of her narration, though the opening paragraphs introduce some world-building information which enables readers to begin making inferences about her world and her character. World-building items in the passage cited above include the proper nouns ‘Kathy H.’ and ‘Hailsham’; the pronouns ‘you’ and ‘they’; and the nouns ‘carers’, ‘donors’, ‘bedsit’ and ‘car’. As Stockwell (2000) notes, the openings of novels typically feature some neologisms which are created to refer to fictional characters or locations and usually take the form of proper nouns such as ‘Emma Woodhouse’ or ‘Mansfield Park’ (2000: 18). From the use of the name ‘Kathy H.’ readers are able to draw upon their cultural knowledge in order to infer that the narrator is female. The absence of her surname is marked, however, as an unusual way to introduce oneself. It is suggestive of either a lack of status or the need for anonymity, though the motive for such anonymity is unclear. The proper noun ‘Hailsham’ appears within the noun phrase ‘a Hailsham student’, which led me to infer that Hailsham is some kind of educational establishment. However, Kathy explains that her being a Hailsham student is ‘enough to get some people’s backs up’, but the reason for such hostility is not explained. Whilst readers may infer that Hailsham is a school, at this point in the narrative they are unable to fully comprehend its negative connotations.

The pronouns ‘you’ and ‘they’ nominate entities other than Kathy who are present in Text World 2. Kathy mentions ‘they’ several times, e.g. ‘they want’ [3]; ‘they think’ [5]; ‘they’ve been’ [9]. Because ‘they’ are mentioned with reference to her career length and

achievements, readers are likely to infer that 'they' are Kathy's employers. However, there is something unusual about the way 'they' are referred to. Pronouns are typically used to refer anaphorically to a referent which has already been introduced into the discourse, unless of course the referent of the pronoun is obvious from some other non-linguistic cue (i.e. their presence in the shared discourse-world of the participants). Whilst Kathy appears unacquainted with her narratee, shown by the way she introduces herself and expresses uncertainty regarding their identity ('If you're one of them [a carer]...' [17]), she does not think it appropriate to make it clear who 'they' are. This suggests that she presumes some shared cultural knowledge with her narratee which readers in the discourse-world are not privy to.

Kathy's use of the nouns 'carers' and 'donors' also create the impression that her narratee is in the possession of some knowledge which readers in the discourse-world are not aware of. These nouns are world-building elements because they identify classes of entities and encode relationships between them. Although the occupational term 'carer' is routine in England, Robbins notes that it is unusual and 'mysterious' for American readers who are likely to be less familiar with it (2007: 291). For readers with the cultural knowledge to recognise 'carer' as an occupational title, as I did, the text cues their knowledge frame about this career – including the fact that professional carers typically work with vulnerable sections of society such as the elderly, infirm or disabled. However, when Kathy refers to her charges as 'donors', this did not match with my 'carer' frame nor was a term I recognised for those typically in care. Kathy goes on to describe the processes involved in caring for donors, including 'recovery times' and classification systems featuring adjectives such as 'agitated' and 'calm'. Readers may be able to generate some inferences in an attempt to make sense of these processes, but they are certainly unfamiliar. It becomes evident that the terms 'carer' and 'donor' are neosemes; words which exist in the discourse-world but have taken on a new, and in this case euphemistic, meaning in the context of the text-world (Stockwell 2000: 119-22). In this sense, they mark 'points of differentiation' between the fictional universe and the discourse-world (Stockwell 2000: 155). Their precise meaning is only revealed much later, around a quarter of the way into the book (Ishiguro 2005: 79-81).

Other more familiar world-builders include the nouns 'bedsit' and 'car'. These appear within an embedded modal-world created in sentence 17: 'If you're one of them, I can understand how you might get resentful – about my bedsit, my car, above all, the way I get to pick and choose who I look after.' This sentence cues a hypothetical modal-world ('If') containing the narratee and a further epistemic modal-world ('might') containing Kathy's speculation about their feelings towards her. She suggests three things which this

hypothetical narratee may resent, including her car and bedsit. Though these world-building items are not nominated as present within Text World 2, I posit that readers add them to this world by a process of cross-world inference: if they are things which Kathy's narratee may resent, they are likely to be things which are currently in her possession. Unlike the neologisms and neosemes described above, 'bedsit' and 'car' refer to items which are also present in the discourse-world. These nouns cue relevant frames from readers' background knowledge and allow them to infer further information about Kathy. For example, bedsits are all-in-one living spaces most suited to low income, single occupants and are not a prestigious form of accommodation. Because Kathy lives in a bedsit, in my reading of the text I imagined her car to be small and economical, as opposed to a sports car for example. In addition to fleshing out the text-world, these world-builders signal aspects of the character's social identity. Kathy's value of these items is indicative of her low social status, but Kathy portrays herself as privileged in comparison to other carers. This raises further questions about the precise nature of the 'carer' occupation referred to by the text.

In their efforts to construct a coherent text-world from the information Kathy supplies, it becomes evident that discourse-world readers are not privy to some knowledge which Kathy and others in her world take for granted. Typically, readers assume that the world represented by the text operates in the same ways as the discourse-world until they are presented with information to the contrary. This is known as the 'principle of minimal departure', a cognitive mechanism for efficiency in understanding alternate worlds (Ryan 1991, see also Emmott 1997: 129; Gavins 2007: 12; Stockwell 2002: 96). After reading the opening paragraphs of the novel, however, it becomes evident that the text-world departs from the discourse-world in several ways which are yet to be explained. The text raises questions regarding the omission of Kathy's surname; the identity of 'they' and 'you'; the exact nature of the place 'Hailsham'; the roles 'carer' and 'donor' and the social status of the protagonist. The textual cues problematise readers' projection into the narratee-enactor role, as they do not share the knowledge which Kathy assumes of her narratee.

### **5.2.1 Emotion and problematic projection**

Existing work in Text World Theory has led to several proposals regarding the effect of readers' estrangement from the role of the second-person referent nominated by a text. Lahey (2005) posits that texts quite commonly encourage readers to project versions of themselves (which she calls an 'other-I') into the narratee-enactor position, only for further world-building details to reveal that the addressee is a specific character. She writes:

A reader may begin his or her emotional enactment as an other-I addressee and subsequently be prompted by the text to revise the enactment role and 'dress up in the schemas' of some specific character. This will typically happen where

imperative forms or second person pronouns appear initially to be directed at a generic addressee but subsequent character-specific or situational details alienate the current real reader from the addressee role. (Lahey 2005: 285; see also Fludernik 1995: 106-7).

As an example, she considers the poem 'A Handful of Earth' by Al Purdy (2005: 286). Through the use of the pronoun 'us' Lahey argues that the text specifies a Canadian addressee, and the identity of the discourse-world reader will determine the type of involvement they experience with the poem. Readers who are Canadian, she suggests, will be able to easily project an enactor of themselves into the addressee role. Those who are not Canadian will engage in a process of 'imaginative enactment' (2005: 286) and 'take on what he or she perceives to be the relevant schemata of a Canadian reader' (2005: 286). Thus, it is not the involvement itself but the *type* of involvement being experienced which is revised (2005: 287). Lahey's proposal works well in the context in which it is developed, but with regards the narrative of *Never Let Me Go*, such imaginative enactment is likely to be problematic. The world represented by the text differs from the readers' discourse-world and as a result there is no way they can imagine the schemata of the narratee in order to remain engaged with that role.

With reference to the second-person narrative of Tom Robbins' *Half Asleep in Frog Pajamas*, Gavins (2007) suggests that readers who are unable to follow the projection invited by the text and inhabit the deictic centre of the 'you' it refers to are likely to find the narrative experience unenjoyable and uncomfortable (2007: 86-87). This is similar to Stockwell's (2009) comments regarding Rudyard Kipling's 'If', a poem which systematically attributes admirable qualities such as tenacity and courage to an unspecified second-person addressee (2009: 144-52). Stockwell notes that resistant readers who dislike the text perceive the 'you' in the poem as 'a disjunctive entity bounded by the text world' so that projection is minimal and identification is not performed (2009: 151-2).

In my reading of the opening of *Never Let Me Go*, I felt excluded from the narratee-enactor role and experienced some discomfort from being alienated so completely, but still wished to read on and engage with the text. In my view, current text-world approaches do not seem well equipped to explain this kind of response. Within rhetorical narratology (reviewed in section 4.3.3) the 'narrative audience' role is specified as that which the 'flesh-and-blood reader', or in Text World Theory terms the discourse-world reader, adopts in order to engage with the narrative. The narrative audience is 'the observer position within the narrative world' (2007: 210), and Phelan (1996) notes that by taking on that role 'we will always become believers in the reality of the fictional world' (1996: 145). In Text World Theory terms, this audience role in narratology would be conceptualised as the reader's

projection into the text-world, but not as an enactor nominated linguistically by the text. By this I mean readers adopt a role in the text which is not signalled by the pronouns 'I' or 'you' (in first person fiction), but is still encouraged by textual cues which signal their estrangement from the narratee position. By projecting into the text-world in this way readers experience the narrative as though they were observing the discourse between narrator and narratee rather than being directly addressed by it. The enactor of the reader who forms the narrative audience in the text-world is distinct from that projected into the implied reader role, and distinct from the 'real' reader in the discourse-world by virtue of its belief in the reality of the text-world enactors (Phelan 2005a, 2007).

In rhetorical narratology, Rabinowitz (1998 [1987]) and Phelan (1996, 2005, 2007) argue that the reader must *always* adopt the narrative audience position in order to engage with narrative texts. I do not wish to make such strong claims here, firstly because I believe that certain narratives make it difficult for readers to orient into such a position (see, for example, my analysis of *The Unconsoled* in section 6.2), and secondly because readers who can project into other text-world positions may have no need to adopt the narrative audience role. However, I do posit that the narrative audience role may be useful when explaining readers' continued engagement with a text which deliberately alienates them from the narratee position. By remaining involved in the text-world but from an observer's position, readers may be able to mitigate some of the discomfort of being alienated by the text. Phelan (1996) notes that the positions which readers adopt in relation to the narrative can shift as the narrative progresses. In his analysis of a short story called 'How' by Lorrie Moore, written in the second-person, Phelan notes:

the narrative audience fluctuates in its relation to "You" – sometimes coinciding (and feeling addressed), sometimes observing from some emotional, ethical and/or psychological distance. (Phelan 1996: 151)

He uses these various narrative positions to account for emotional intensity and distance during particular moments in the text (1996: 145, 152). In my reading of the opening paragraphs of *Never Let Me Go*, for the first four sentences I felt able to project into the narratee-enactor role quite easily, but as the text progressed I recognised I lacked the knowledge required to construct a coherent text-world representation of the discourse and shifted into the narrative audience position: observing rather than participating in the discourse of the enactors. As a result I experienced a sense of emotional distance from the narrator, but remained engaged with text-world events.

The uncertainty over the identity of the narratee continues throughout the novel and there are further textual cues which both encourage and problematise reader projection into this role. Until chapter eight, Kathy often directly addresses the narratee as if they were



a fellow clone, and a graduate of an educational establishment like Hailsham. For example, she says ‘I don’t know if you had ‘collections’ where you were’ (38) or, ‘I don’t know how it was where you were, but...’ followed by a fact about Hailsham, such as ‘at Hailsham we had to have some form of medical almost every week’ (Ishiguro 2005: 13, 67, 94). In these cases, the situational details are likely to alienate the reader from the narratee role (Lahey 2005; Fludernik 1995).

Elsewhere in the novel, however, Kathy makes more general attributions of thoughts or opinions to the narratee. For example, when attempting to justify her complicity in a joke designed to humiliate Tommy, she addresses the narratee directly and says: ‘you’ve got to remember I was still young, and that I only had a few seconds to decide’ (Ishiguro 2005: 85). She also uses rhetorical questions such as ‘So why had we stayed silent that day?’ (Ishiguro 2005: 69) and ‘What was so special about this song?’ (Ishiguro 2005: 70), demonstrating an awareness of the narratee’s desire for particular details, which may or may not accord with those of the actual reader. Kathy is very attentive to the needs of her addressee, and often signposts her narrative with markers such as: ‘I should explain about...’ (Ishiguro 2005: 15) or ‘What I’m saying is...’ (Ishiguro 2005: 274). These forms of address could be seen as encouraging the conflation of the narratee and narrative audience roles, as readers feel they are being directly addressed by the character.

With regard to the opening of the novel, some of the readers in my discussion group responded quite differently to the projective problems posed by the text. For them, the difficulty in establishing a coherent text-world representation of the initial few paragraphs seemed to result in a sense of alienation not only from the narratee role, but the role of the implied reader too. Participants B and C described their experiences thus:

**Extract 1 – Dataset 2**

- 1.1 I didn’t want to pick it [the book] up really...from the start it assumed you knew what Hailsham was, its like ‘what is this?’ (Participant B)
- 1.2 At the beginning I wasn’t intrigued I was annoyed that they were kind of going ‘Oooh and we’re donors but we’re not going to tell you what its about’ and nerr, and it was just – I was irritated by that and didn’t want to read it, I was just ‘for fecks sake, just tell me what’s going on, stop fecking...’. (Participant C)
- 1.3 I think that was one thing I didn’t like, at the start it just assumed that you knew what Hailsham was and I was like ‘am I being really thick here that I’ve never heard of this before’ and I was just like, that really annoyed me at the start that it was just assumed (Participant B)
- 1.4 I was so annoyed with the beginning of it just going ‘blah blah blah blah’ (Participant C)

Both participants express strong emotions such as dislike and annoyance in relation to the opening of the novel, as well as reporting that they actually wanted to stop reading the book. Interestingly, both participants use the pronoun 'it' to refer to the novel as an object, rather than 'her' for example to refer to the textual construct of the narrator. Furthermore, both participants link their negative emotion to a sense of exclusion from the implied reader role, either in terms of their expected emotional response, or their implied knowledge-base. For example, when Participant C reports: 'I wasn't intrigued I was annoyed' in comment 1.2, she recognises that intrigue or curiosity are appropriate emotional responses for the implied reader, as well as indicating that her emotional response did not match this role. Likewise, Participant B reports that she worried she was 'being really thick' (comment 1.3) because she had never heard of Hailsham before. This suggests that she thought the implied reader of the novel would recognise this referent and because she didn't, she felt excluded from the discourse and unable to comfortably project into any text-world role. The comments of these readers accord with the view of Jeffries (2001) and Rabinowitz (1998 [1987]), reviewed in section 4.3.3, who note that readers can conceptualise the responses of text's audience without fully sharing those responses – either because of their own discourse-world schemata (Jeffries 2001) or their disagreement with the emotion the text is trying to evoke (Rabinowitz 1998 [1987]: 36). The comments of these readers suggest that, for them, the inability to construct a coherent representation of the discourse between the narrator and narratee led them to question the motives of the implied author and their inclusion in the discourse as the implied reader; which led to a desire to stop reading altogether.

It was noted in section 3.1.4 that the discourse-world level of Text World Theory enables the inclusion of readers' goals and motivations in their emotional experience of narrative. Because discourse participants are seen as willingly engaged in communicative interaction (Gavins 2007), it can be supposed that readers want to create a coherent mental representation of a particular narrative in order to participate in the discourse. However, when textual or contextual factors interfere with this process, emotional responses may ensue. Burke (2008) advocates the idea that readers have goals which they seek to fulfil during literary reading, such as 'our own individual goal as a reader to be emoted by a text' (2008: 53-4). In his discussion of empathy, Stockwell (2009) proposes that readers have a goal to project into the text-worlds they create and experience a 'return' on their investment of discourse-world resources. The annoyance and frustration expressed by these discussion group participants could be explained as a response to the apparently uncooperative aspects of the discourse which problematise the construction of coherent

text-worlds and thus projection into those worlds. In Stockwell's terms, the discourse posed a lack of return on their initial investment, and both participants reported that they only continued reading the novel because they were attending the book club, but otherwise may have abandoned it. This accords with the appraisal theory approach to emotion explicated in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.4, which views emotions as resulting from the appraised relevance of particular situations to our goals and desires.

In section 5.3 I pay particular attention to the notion of identification with some of the enactors in *Never Let Me Go*. As noted in section 5.1, several literary critics and reviewers express the recognition of similarities between their lives and that of Kathy. However, in Dataset 2 and the critical work on the novel reports of identification are distinctly mixed. I argue that the text contains features which both promote and problematise projection and identification on the part of discourse-world participants. This mix of cues contributes to the mixed or conflicting emotions the novel evokes and relates to the novel's thematic concern with the human status of clones.

### **5.3 Textual Cues for Identification**

As outlined in section 3.2.5, identification is conceptualised within Text World Theory as a metaphorical mapping between a discourse-world participant's 'self-aware personality' and the traits of projected characters (Stockwell 2009: 88). It is an extension of readers' projective ability, involving an act of comparison, recognition and self-awareness on the part of the discourse-world participant (Stockwell 2009: 88). Identification establishes some degree of connection or relationship with a text-world enactor and thus has emotional consequences. Typically close identification is associated with positive responses to the text, whilst where identification is not performed readers are often resistant to the sentiments of the text or the characteristics of a particular character (Gavins 2007; Stockwell 2005a, 2009). Though identification is ultimately a reader-driven activity, I posit that texts can also prompt identificatory procedures.

In section 5.2.1 I noted that textual cues work to both encourage and problematise readers' projection into the narratee role. Here I propose that this fluctuation can also encourage or problematise identification with Kathy, as readers feel closer or more distant to her act of narration. For example, when Kathy is describing her childhood at Hailsham she explicitly calls on the narratee to search their memories for experiences and emotions which may match hers, with utterances such as:

I'm sure somewhere in your childhood, you too had an experience like ours that day, similar if not in the actual details, then inside, in the feelings. (Ishiguro 2005: 36)

...like a lot of things at that age; you don't have any clear reason, you just do it...when you're asked to explain it afterwards, it doesn't seem to make any sense. We've all done things like that... (Ishiguro 2005: 19)

Here the reader is being invited to project themselves into both the narratee-enactor role, and by extension, imagine themselves in Kathy's role also. Whether such projection is performed is of course dependent upon the actual reader: their inclination, their personal memories, and their shared cultural knowledge about childhood. However, in the discussion group about the novel there is some evidence that readers performed the identification which the text seems to demand.

In their empirical study of readers' 'self-implication' during literary reading, which is synonymous with the Text World Theory notion of 'identification', Kuiken et al (2004) collected verbal protocols regarding a short story by Katherine Mansfield and Coleridge's 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner'. They used the self-probed retrospection technique (Seilman and Larsen 1989, see section 3.3.1) and identified two indicators of 'self-implication' in their data. In the first, readers made an explicit comparison between aspects of a personal memory and aspects of the world of the text. The comparison was structured like (or directly manifested itself as) a simile, 'A is like B', where memory and story are symmetrical partners in the comparison (2004: 182-3). The second indicator of self-implication was structured like a metaphor, and manifested itself in the data at points where readers used the second person pronoun to 'speak inclusively but still personally' about issues in the text. For example, one of their respondents, referring to a moment in the Katherine Mansfield story when a wife realises her husband has died, says:

It just makes you realise that...your own mortality is something that can make you unable to think clearly...A passage like this makes you realise that some day, perhaps something like that will happen to you and scare the hell out of you... (Kuiken et al 2004: 183)

Kuiken et al argue that by using such forms of second person reference, readers are engaging in a 'metaphor of personal identification', implicitly referring to themselves as a person 'of the same kind' as the character (2004: 184). Unlike the simile structure above, however, in the metaphor the terms of the comparison are asymmetric: the reader is momentarily 'entertaining the possibility' that they are the same as the character ('A is B'), but not that the character is the same as them (2004: 183-4).

Kuiken et al (2004) do not really consider the way in which the context of their study may have influenced their protocols; for example readers produced these similes and metaphors whilst explicating their marked passages to a researcher. However, I also found evidence of such 'metaphors of personal identification' in my discussion group data regarding *Never Let Me Go*, which suggests that readers do use these forms of expression in

more naturalistic discourse. Interestingly these metaphors occur when participants are referring to their childhood memories, which the narrative explicitly encourages readers to drawn upon. They are straight-underlined in the extract below. Participants have been talking about the style and content of Kathy's narrative, when the following exchange takes place:

**Extract 2 – Dataset 2**

- A: ...each time there was something like that Kathy would refer to 'oh and when this happened' and then tells a little tale of something happening and on most occasions you were kind of thinking 'nothing really did happen', it was all...kind of little events which seemed to be a big deal to her or to the people involved but were fairly kind of incidental events
- C: I suppose that's what you remember though isn't it, that's the sort of things that I remember from my own childhood, little kind of stupid things when so and so said something to somebody else but it didn't really mean anything
- E: That's it, yeah, I thought that because it did remind me a bit...of the sort of stuff that you get obsessed about when you're at school and you'd think was really important...I could probably think of some childhood memories I've got that are like she has when you have stupid arguments about hairbrushes or whatever, but you'd never sort of sit and tell someone about them would you, whereas she's like a 31 year old woman and she sort of thinks that's an appropriate topic of conversation for a whole book basically (*laughs*)

Here Participants C and E both use the second person to include themselves in the same class as Kathy the narrator: they are the kind of people who remember certain things about their childhood, or who were obsessed about similar things at school. As well as representing links between an individual and the enactor Kathy, speaker's use of the second-person pronoun also serves to refer to the other participants and encourage identification between participants in the context of the discussion group (Long 2003).

Participants C and E follow up their use of the second-person with comments in the first person (wave-underlined): 'that's the sort of things that I remember'; 'I could probably think of some'. Here they use the first person to explicitly declare their similarity to the enactor (albeit in a modalised form in Participant E's case). Kuiken et al (2004) do not consider the type of identification expressed by first-person comments such as these. However, if the use of the second person pronoun temporarily puts the reader in the same class as the character (I am like her), the use of the first person could be seen to reverse the asymmetry of the identification so that Kathy is put in the same class as the readers (She is like me). Metaphors of personal identification including both 'you' and 'I', could indicate that there is a close cross-world mapping between reader and character because it is

completed in both directions (Stockwell 2005a, 2009). Kuiken et al do not cite any incidences of such first-person identification in their article, though if it did not occur in their data a possible reason may be the topic under discussion. In my discussion group the topic was childhood; something all the respondents had experienced, whereas in Kuiken et al's (2004) studies regarding the Katherine Mansfield story the topic was bereavement.

At the end of Extract 2, however, there is a shift in the way the pronouns are being used. Participant E says 'but you'd never sort of sit and tell someone about them would you' (this is dotted-underlined in the extract). Here the 'you' appears not to be functioning as a metaphor of personal identification with the text-world enactor, but with another class of people from whom the text-world enactor is excluded. Here, Participant E expresses a kind of conscious, reverse identification which I shall call 'disassociation'. She perceives characteristics in a text-world character; namely, the opinion that trivial childhood memories are an important thing to discuss, which she cannot map onto herself. Her utterance creates a class of people who also do not consider childhood memories 'an appropriate topic of conversation for a whole book' (Participant E). The use of the second person pronoun aims to include other discourse-world participants in this class, but specifically excludes Kathy the narrator. Thus the participant explicitly dissociates herself from Kathy here.

In the space of a single utterance, Participant E has expressed identification with and disassociation from Kathy. Specifically, Participant E can identify with Kathy's experiences of childhood but takes issues with her narration of such seemingly trivial memories. It seems to me that a differentiation is being made between two enactors of Kathy. The first, Kathy<sup>1</sup>, is the thirty-one year old narrator-enactor who talks about her childhood memories, and the second, Kathy<sup>2</sup>, experiences that childhood by virtue of being an enactor within the text-worlds which Kathy<sup>1</sup> creates. Participant E seems to identify more closely with Kathy<sup>2</sup> whilst explicitly disassociating herself from Kathy<sup>1</sup> in this utterance. In section 4.3.2 I analysed my reading of an extract from *The Remains of the Day* in which I experienced a negative emotional response to an enactor of Stevens whilst remaining sympathetic to Stevens-the-narrator. The same appears possible in *Never Let Me Go*, as different enactors of Kathy are capable of attracting different levels of projection, identification and disassociation from readers. This proposal adds further nuances to the Text World Theory notion of projection. Different identifications or disassociations with enactors of the same literary character could go some way to explaining mixed emotional responses to that character (see section 5.3.2 below).

Just as identification has emotional implications, facilitating feelings of emotional proximity and empathy or sympathy for a particular enactor, I posit that disassociation also

has emotional repercussions. Essentially, a disassociating reader has identified an aspect of Kathy's character which she doesn't like, and throughout their discussion the participants describe feeling 'irritated' and 'annoyed' by Kathy and her narrative style. It would be tempting to suggest that whilst identification engenders pro-social, positive emotions, disassociation facilitates the experience of more anti-social and negative emotions, but the situation is far from being this simple. As an example, consider these comments from literary critics and reviewers. Robbins (2007) expresses identification with Kathy-the-narrator when he states: 'like her, I depend for my daily dose of contentment on a blinkering of awareness that I myself in better moments would find outrageous and repulsive' (2007: 293). Notice how he uses a simile structure in order to express his sense of identification with Kathy, which is in accordance with Kuiken et al's (2004) observations. However, his sense of shared characteristics with Kathy is actually something which engenders more negative emotional responses, as he finds it 'repulsive' (2007: 293). The combination of identification and disassociation exhibited by Participant E is also indicated in Harrison's (2005) review of the novel. On the one hand, he claims that the novel is about the 'raw, infuriating, completely personal sense of our lives never having been what they could have been' which suggests that, like Robbins (2007), Harrison (2005) perceives correspondences between his situation and that of Kathy. But Harrison goes on to suggest that readers will probably actively desire *not* to be like Kathy:

readers may find themselves full of an energy they don't understand and aren't quite sure how to deploy. *Never Let Me Go* makes you want to have sex, take drugs, run a marathon, dance - anything to convince yourself that you're more alive, more determined, more conscious, more dangerous than any of these characters. (Harrison 2005)

Kerr's (2005) review covers similar ground. Like the discussion group participants, she notes how 'familiar' Kathy's childhood memories feel, and writes 'its like a stripped down haiku version of children everywhere' (2005: 1). But she also describes a prevalent sense of *not* identifying with Kathy when she states: 'We root for Kathy – which is not quite the same thing as identifying with her. For, as authentic as her emotions may be, by definition she's personality challenged' (Kerr 2005: 2).

It seems that this complex state of partial-identification and partial-disassociation with Kathy is an experience which is shared by several readers. The experiences reported by these readers are particularly interesting when it is noted that a central issue in *Never Let Me Go* is the extent to which Kathy and the other clones are human. Despite his realisation of the similarities between Kathy and himself, Robbins (2007) also notes that the novel 'goes deep into the partly existential desire that...keeps me identifying with the uncloned, who do or at least may have a future – so deep as to make the reader wonder which side

Ishiguro is on. And which side we're on' (2007:293). Whilst aspects of the text seem to work towards promoting readers' recognition of similarities between themselves and Kathy, other aspects seem to work towards the opposite and promote readers' awareness of their distance from and difference to Kathy. Above, I considered two examples of these features: identification is facilitated by the way Kathy calls upon the narratee (and thus the reader) to recognise similarities between her childhood and their own; whilst the distancing effect is achieved through the continual shifting of the narratee role meaning that readers feel directly addressed at points in the narrative, and alienated and estranged at others.

The idea that readers can simultaneously experience both identification and disassociation due to the influence of various textual features presents a challenge to stylistic assumptions about distancing or estrangement in narrative. In particular, Simpson's (1993) modal grammar claims that narratives with a preponderance of epistemic modality, like *Never Let Me Go* (see sections 5.3.2 and 5.4.1 below), have an estranging and alienating feel (Simpson 1993: 53, 75). My claims regarding the subtle and sometimes contradictory influence of textual features over readerly positioning adds a greater cognitive complexity to this grammatical model. It also problematises the tendency within stylistics to categorise the experiential 'feel' of a text based solely upon its linguistic features, without a detailed consideration of readers in interaction with those features.

In sections 5.3.1. below I draw on the reader responses from Dataset 2 in order to consider how the representation of emotion in the novel also affects participant's identification with and disassociation from Kathy. Section 5.3.2 then brings together some of the points I have made about multiple projection by analysing my reading of a short extract from the novel.

### **5.3.1 Emotion representation**

Gavins (2007) notes that psychological projection enables discourse-world participants to imagine text-world enactors to be 'living, breathing, thinking entit[ies] with the same kinds of emotions and reactions as any real-world human being' (2007: 42). Through readers' capacity for mindreading (reviewed in section 4.3), their mental representations of text-world entities are fleshed-out with emotions, beliefs and other mental states inferred from the enactors' speech and behaviour. These processes are important in all kinds of literary (and non-literary) discourses, and in section 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. I demonstrated their particular importance in *The Remains of the Day*. Throughout that novel Stevens explicitly denies certain emotions and presents scenes from his memory with little interpretative comment, meaning that readers are dependent upon their inferences in order to apprehend events. As noted in section 4.1, Stevens only really narrates his emotions in the final chapter of the novel when he describes his heart breaking (Ishiguro 2005 [1989]: 251-2). In *Never Let Me*



*Go*, Kathy engages much more openly in the discussion and narration of her emotions both in the present and in scenes from her memory. However, I posit that the way such emotions are represented has the potential to influence readers' identification with and disassociation from her enactor.

Social psychological research emphasises the importance of shared, cultural emotion knowledge in people's everyday interpretation, experience and expression of emotion (Conway and Beckerian 1987; Fehr and Russell 1984; Fischer 1991; Markus and Kittayama 1991; Parkinson 1995; Schwartz and Shaver 1987; Shaver et al 2001 [1987]). Interestingly, Schwartz and Shaver (1987) argue that the reading and writing of narrative fiction provides an exemplary demonstration of the significance of emotion knowledge in interpersonal relations. For example, with reference to scenes from *Emma* and *Anna Karenina*, they write:

In order to understand these scenes – and presumably, to understand similar scenes in real life – a person must implicitly refer to something like mental models of emotion processes. In the same way that ballet, baseball, and religious ceremonies are visible but not intelligible to people who know nothing about them, emotion-laden interactions – especially those described or witnessed only in part – would be unintelligible without reference to implicit emotion prototypes or scripts. (Schwartz and Shaver 1987: 200)

This emotion knowledge, organised into generic representations, almost certainly plays an important part in both social interaction and the comprehension of discourse (Shaver et al 2001 [1987]). In Text World Theory terms, emotion knowledge is part of the cultural and experiential knowledge frames which readers draw upon when constructing text-world representations of the discourse (which receive further discussion in section 6.4). In this section, I propose that the interaction between readers' emotion knowledge and the representation of emotion in literary discourse is potentially influential over readers' own emotional experiences.

The comments of the discussion group participants in Dataset 2 highlighted the influence of emotion knowledge in readers' responses to *Never Let Me Go*. Whilst Participant A comments upon the verisimilitude of the clones' emotions, saying:

the kind of likeness to real human beings was so apparent through the kind of childhood experiences, the interactions, the feelings, the...nature of the relationships, the emotions going on

Elsewhere in the discussion participants raised the idea that Kathy's emotions were different from their own. This topic came up twice and led to quite an extended discussion which is cited below (each utterance is numbered for ease of reference):

### Extract 3 – Dataset 2

- B (1):** I didn't really feel like, her [Kathy's] relationship with Tommy, I don't think they really understood what love was...they just seemed to be like 'well, we're together because we're having sex with each other' but it wasn't actually an emotional thing at all, like that they were in love
- E (2):** Yeah I suppose, because she never says like 'oh', you know, 'the shape of his eyes' or 'the way his hair blows in the wind' there's none of that stuff is there
- A (3):** They had to prove they were in love so they had sex and they did paintings, that was the only things that they ever really learnt about, but they didn't actually, she did care for him but she was his carer, so I didn't really feel really bad for her when she lost him because I didn't feel like they had a huge emotional connection
- D (4):** I did think there were a couple of moments in the book though where, not in a maybe sort of romantic way, but in the way that they were in tune with each other I felt just a few times that was drawn upon, like when they were in Norfolk and they were leaning against the car like I felt a real closeness between them then, but it wasn't necessarily like a romantic closeness...like you say, I don't know whether it would be the way we would experience love
- B (5):** I don't know whether being a clone that was anything to do with it, their emotional capacity, I don't know

### Extract 4 – Dataset 2 (around 15 minutes later)

- C (6):** ...I did feel it was a bit sad that they [Kathy and Tommy] couldn't get their [donations] delayed, but then it almost felt like they didn't really want to...it almost felt like they were just doing it because they thought they could...and Ruth had told them to...
- B (7):** Yeah I was like 'just get on with it, just get it out of the [way]', you know, like 'why do you need to ask permission?' you know
- C (8):** Yeah, why do you need to ask permission, and also why do you want to drag it on any longer than you need to? (*LAUGHTER*) they didn't seem to be enjoying each others' company that much
- B (9):** No
- A (10):** ...if they had gone and it'd been 'oh yeah what you're really in love, oh brilliant yeah you can defer'
- C (11):** They'd be like 'oh now what?'
- A (12):** Would they even know what to do in terms of enjoying a relationship outside of their frame of reference?

Though some literary critics describe *Never Let Me Go* as a 'love story' (Robbins 2007; Roos 2008), in Extracts 2 and 3 participants are discussing their sense of a mismatch between their idea of 'love' and the 'love' which Kathy and Tommy experience in the novel. In particular, participants appear to perceive a lack of romance in Kathy's 'love' (in utterances 1-4, 8) and find it difficult to understand why Kathy and Tommy had to seek permission for their relationship (in utterances 6-12). The discussion suggests that there is a disjunction between the representation of love in the novel and the cultural knowledge about 'love' shared by the discourse participants. Specifically, the participants appear unconvinced by the 'romantic closeness' (utterance 4) or 'emotional connection' (utterance 3) between

Tommy and Kathy, with Participant C remarking that ‘they didn’t seem to be enjoying each others’ company that much’ (utterance 8). There is also some evidence that participants are drawing upon other textual representations of love in their evaluation of the novel (see Hogan 2003a regarding the ubiquity of the love story). For example in utterance 2 Participant E uses reported speech to represent stereotypical ‘romance’ discourse before remarking that there is ‘none of that stuff’. In contrast with Participant A’s comments about the recognisability of the clones’ emotions (cited above), in Extract 2 there is some evidence of disassociation in response to the novel’s representation of love. Participant D says: ‘I don’t know whether it would be the way we would experience love’ (utterance 4), and here the pronoun ‘we’ functions to disassociate the speaker and other members of the discussion group from Kathy and the clones in the novel. This is supported by a comment from Participant B who questions the clones’ ‘emotional capacity’, presumably in comparison with that of humans.

There are various features of the representation of emotion in the novel which could contribute to the responses described by the discussion group participants. Unlike Stevens in *The Remains of the Day*, Kathy’s emotions are often narrated in detail, and in doing so Kathy draws upon familiar modes of expression. For instance, consider the emotion descriptions below (each featuring my underlining):

Even today I’m puzzled by the sheer force of the emotion that overtook me... (Ishiguro 2005: 55)

When I think of that moment now, standing with Tommy...I feel a warmth welling up through me (Ishiguro 2005: 169)

suddenly I felt a huge pleasure – and something else, something more complicated that threatened to make me burst into tears. But I got a hold of the emotion and gave Tommy’s arm a tug (Ishiguro 2005: 170)

In the above examples, Kathy’s narration draws upon conceptual metaphors which are common in Western culture, such as EMOTION IS FORCE (‘the sheer force...that overtook me’); EMOTION IS HEAT/WARMTH (‘I feel a warmth welling up’); EMOTION IS A SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER (‘burst into tears’) and EMOTION IS A WILD ANIMAL (‘I got a hold of the emotion’) (Kövecses 2000; Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Cognitive linguists emphasise the role of such metaphors in the conceptualisation and expression of emotion in everyday life (Kövecses 1990, 2000, 2005, 2006; Lakoff and Johnson 1980). The use of such widely shared conceptual metaphors could be seen as a way to facilitate and encourage identification, as readers are able to recognise and understand Kathy’s emotions. These familiar emotion metaphors suggest that in terms of emotional experience and expression, the world of the text departs only minimally from

that of the discourse-world (in accordance with Ryan's (1991) 'principle of minimal departure'). This could facilitate projection and identification with Kathy as discourse-world participants can imagine the emotions and reactions of her enactor in a similar way to those of real-world human beings.

However, other features of emotion representation in the novel are less recognisable and may be responsible for the sense of disassociation described by participants. In particular, as the discussion group suggest, the representation of love in the novel departs from culturally shared ideas of 'love' in the discourse-world. The text-world enactors' ideas about love are well demonstrated in chapter fifteen, when Tommy reveals his theory about the art they were encouraged to produce at school. Art was a primary focus of Hailsham's curriculum, and every so often a woman known only as 'Madame' would arrive at the school and take especially good pieces of artwork away to be displayed in her 'gallery' (Ishiguro 2005: 30-1). Why Madame took their artwork away was a mystery for the clones, and remained so into adulthood – though once, Miss Emily, the headmistress of the school, let slip that art '*revealed your soul*' (Ishiguro 2005: 173). After hearing the rumours about 'deferrals', Tommy comes up with the theory that their childhood artwork was taken away to provide later evidence of their 'souls', so that Madame would be able to decide whether the clones were really in love or not. He says:

“...Suppose two people say they're truly in love, and they want extra time to be together. Then you see, Kath, there has to be a way to judge if they are really telling the truth. That they aren't just saying they're in love, just to defer their donations...Or a couple might really believe they're in love, but its just a sex thing. Or just a crush. You see what I mean, Kath?...the point is, whoever decides, Madame or whoever it is, *they need something to go on.*”

I nodded slowly. “So that's why they took away our art...”

“It could be. Madame's got a gallery somewhere filled with stuff by students from when they were tiny. Suppose two people come up and say they're in love. She can find the art they've done over years and years. She can see if they go. If they match...what she's got reveals our souls. She could decide for herself what's a good match and what's just a stupid crush.” (Ishiguro 2005: 173, emphasis in original)

The comments of Tommy here contrast, I believe, with predominant views of love as represented in Western romances and culture more generally. For the characters in the text-worlds of *Never Let Me Go*, love is something which someone else can judge: it is something they have to provide documentary evidence for, and something about which they can be wrong. This contradicts predominant Western ideas about love as something which only the individual or couple can judge and which outsiders are not privy to. Furthermore, love is often represented as something 'true' and 'all-conquering' in stereotypical Western love stories – whereas in *Never Let Me Go* Kathy and Tommy's 'love' could be a mistake and cannot overcome the power of the Hailsham guardians. In the world of the clones, even

the most intimate of emotions can (or indeed must) be accessed and approved by external forces. The way the characters speak about love reveals these underlying assumptions which depart from prototypical notions of love in the discourse-world. The mismatch between discourse-world views of love and those expressed in the novel may be a factor in readers' disassociation from the enactors of Kathy and Tommy.

In section 6.4 I give further consideration to the role of cultural and emotion knowledge in readers' emotional experience of discourse. The influence of knowledge upon the text-world positions which readers adopt is also addressed in section 5.3.2 immediately below, as I analyse a short extract from the novel in order to demonstrate the multiple projections it involves. In this section I aim to integrate my main points regarding multiple projection in an introspective analysis regarding the emotional impact of a short extract from the text.

### **5.3.2 Mixed emotions and multiple roles**

In sections 5.2.1, 5.3 and 5.3.1 I have argued that various textual features affect readers' projections into the text-worlds of *Never Let Me Go*. In this section I bring together some of my points about multiple projection in an introspective analysis of a short extract from *Never Let Me Go*, before moving on to consider reader expectation in section 5.4. I have chosen to analyse this extract from the text because when I read it I found this passage evoked a mixture of emotions. Impressionistically I would describe feeling a mixture of positive emotions such as an affinity towards Kathy and admiration for her optimism and cheerfulness, which were accompanied simultaneously by quite strong negative emotions such as a feeling of great sadness and pity. The passage actually brought tears to my eyes, though it is hardly a climactic part of the story. The extract comes from the opening of 'Part Three', the final section of the novel. Kathy has been explaining the main features of her job as a carer: the long hours and exhausting travelling, the need to keep one's spirits up when donors complete, and the solitude. Throughout this description Kathy sets herself and other competent carers apart from those carers who cannot cope with the job. She explains that though she has suffered all the hardships of working as a carer, she has 'learnt to live' with them. She goes on to say:

#### **Extract A**

[1] Even the solitude, I've actually grown to quite like. [2] That's not to say I'm not looking forward to a bit more companionship come the end of the year when I'm finished with all of this. [3] But I do like the feeling of getting into my little car, knowing for the next couple of hours I'll have only the roads, the big grey sky and my daydreams for company. [4] And if I'm in a town somewhere with several minutes to kill, I'll enjoy myself wandering about looking in the shop windows. [5] Here in my bedsit, I've these four desk lamps, each a different colour, but all the same design – they have these ribbed necks you can bend whichever way you want. [6] So I might go looking for a shop with another lamp like that in its window – not

to buy, but just to compare with my ones at home. (Ishiguro 2005: 204, my sentence numbering)

The text-worlds created by Extract A are shown in Figure 5.1. Text World 2, which was established at the opening of the novel, is still underpinning the multiple world-switches and modal-worlds created by Kathy's narrative. This is because the text provides nothing to signal that the 'epic situation' of Kathy's narrative has changed. Indeed, throughout the novel there is very little world-building information which fleshes out Text World 2. Even though the extract above comes from the final third of the novel, Kathy is still in an unspecified location in England addressing her narratee. Of course, it is very likely that discourse-world readers have fleshed out Text World 2 with inferences about Kathy's character and mental states, but I have not attempted to include these in Figure 5.1. In the following paragraph I briefly describe the text-worlds created by the passage which are shown in Figure 5.1 before moving on to discuss how their various features may have influenced my projection, identification and emotional experience.

The first sentence of the extract cited above cues a boulomaic modal world ('like') expressing Kathy's positive attitude towards the solitude involved in her job. She then goes on to use a double negative: 'That's not to say I'm not looking forward to', which creates two negated text-worlds and qualifies the boulomaic modal world established in the first sentence (see below for further discussion). Sentence two ends with a spatio-temporal world-switch to the end of the year in which Kathy has finished her job as a carer. The third sentence establishes another boulomaic modal-world ('like') before cueing two epistemic modal worlds ('knowing' and 'I'll have'). Werth (1999) notes that although 'will' is normally taken to be the typical denotation of futurity, it is 'perhaps most often used as an epistemic' so 'its "future" sense is in fact the expression of strong probability, based on some kind of evidence' (Werth 1999: 247). Rather than cueing a world-switch to a future time-zone, therefore, 'will' can also be used epistemically to express the speaker's confidence in a particular proposition. I believe this is the case in the extract from *Never Let Me Go*, as Kathy is drawing upon evidence of her previous journeys in order to describe her probable actions. Both 'know' and 'will' express strong epistemic commitment. The fourth sentence cues a hypothetical modal-world ('If') followed by a further epistemic modal world ('I'll'). Sentence five toggles back to Text World 2 and provides some world-building information to flesh out the epic situation of the narrative. The text nominates the presence of four desk lamps in Text World 2, and the proximal deictic 'here' signals that Kathy is actually in her bedsit. This is the first (and only) indication of her location in the entire novel. The final sentence toggles back to the hypothetical modal-world and adds further information about Kathy's activities. The use of 'might' cues an epistemic modal-




Figure 5.1. The text-worlds of Extract A from *Never Let Me Go*

world expressing medium commitment, in which Kathy describes herself looking for such lamps. A fleeting negated world is also cued by the discourse here (not to buy’).

In Figure 5.1 I have also represented some of the knowledge-frames evoked by the textual cues in this passage, represented in the shaded boxes (I consider the problems with naming or identifying such frames in section 6.3). In my reading of the passage, I fleshed out Kathy’s narrative with my own cultural and experiential knowledge. For example, when she refers to ‘the feeling of getting into my little car’ I drew upon my own experience of driving in order to imagine the feeling she is describing. I identify with Kathy here as I recognise the sense of anticipation and pleasure she experiences before setting out to travel independently. The world-building elements which Kathy uses to describe her journey and the places she visits, such as ‘the roads’, ‘the big grey sky’, ‘a town somewhere’, ‘shop windows’, are quite vague and lacking in specific detail. However, in my reading of the text, I drew upon my knowledge of English motorways, English weather and English provincial towns (which is quite extensive as I have lived in England for my whole life) to imagine the scenes Kathy describes. By virtue of drawing on my personal memories to flesh out the text-worlds, I feel as though I recognise the world which Kathy is describing, and this reinforces my sense of identification with her. I also drew upon my knowledge of desk lamps in order to imagine the type with ‘ribbed necks’ which she possesses. I can easily imagine the item she is referring to, and I know that I also own desk lamps of a similar kind. This may seem like a particularly trivial recognition, but for me it meant I understood what Kathy was talking about and established a connection between me in the discourse-world and her text-world enactor.

I believe the scope for identification with Kathy here contributed to my positive emotions in reading the text. Prior to this extract Kathy discusses the solitude of her job as a hardship, but here she is representing herself as someone who can cope with such hardships. In my reading of the text I recognise that, like her, I like to consider myself capable, resourceful and self-sufficient. I admire her cheerfulness in the face of loneliness and hard work. The boulomaic modal-worlds which she creates work to put a positive spin on her situation, and inspire positive emotions in my experience of the text. However, other elements of this passage work to undercut this positivity.

For the majority of this extract, I felt directly addressed by Kathy, suggesting that I could project into the narratee role in Text World 2. Phrases such as ‘that’s not to say’ indicate that Kathy is shaping her narrative with an intended listener in mind, but there are no clues as to the specific identity of this narratee, meaning that readers can project into this role. In my reading of the text, however, the introduction of the deictic information: ‘here in my bedsit’ in Text World 2 worked to destabilise my projection as narratee. I



assumed that the narratee would know where Kathy was narrating from, and because this information was so new to me I felt briefly alienated from this role. When Kathy says 'Here in my bedsit' I imagine her and her interlocutor in that location, but my perspective is more observational and more akin to the narrative audience perspective described in section 5.2.1. Feeling directly addressed by the narrator, I would argue, works to facilitate projection and identification in relation to that entity. Whether readers are positioned as the addressee or observer of the narration, however, they are still able to make inferences regarding the narrator from the way in which they construct their text-worlds.

For example, the use of a double negative in the second sentence creates an interesting effect. When negation is used in discourse, readers conceptualise the proposition which is being negated separately from the text-world in which the negation is expressed (Gavins 2007: 102; Hidalgo Downing 2000a). The first negated world contains Kathy saying something (That's to say), but this world is only fleeting as further negation creates a second, negated boulogmaic modal-world pertaining to Kathy's desire for more companionship (I'm looking forward to a bit more companionship). The use of negation here foregrounds worlds in which Kathy *is* saying that she *does* want more companionship, before negating them. This foregrounding is indicated in Figure 5.1 by the bold lines around the negation-worlds. The double negative means that a positive meaning is derived from these worlds. In effect, the opening sentences could have read:

Even the solitude I've actually grown to quite like. But I am really looking forward to a bit more companionship come the end of the year when I'm finished with all of this.

However, the use of the double negative means that the contents of the negated worlds (in which Kathy desires companionship) are held at some conceptual distance from the originating world. This is indicative of Kathy's attitude towards them. There could be several reasons why Kathy expresses herself in this way, rather than through straightforward assertion. Earlier in the chapter she has expounded the hardships of solitude but is currently claiming that she can cope with it. By representing her desire for companionship at some distance from her current narration her claim to 'quite like' solitude appears more convincing. However, in my reading of the text Kathy's elaborate use of negation is also indicative of her emotions. By expressing herself in this way she avoids having to openly admit her desire for companionship, which seems to signal that she is actually more lonely than she admits.

This sense that Kathy is 'putting on a brave face' is also created by the use of modality in the passage, which is thought to be key in the construction of narrative point of view (Simpson 1993; Gavins 2007). There is a high frequency of epistemic modality in this

extract; and indeed the narrative as a whole. In his modal grammar of narrative, Simpson (1993) distinguishes between texts with a 'positive' shading, featuring high levels of boulomaic and deontic modality, and 'negative' shading featuring high levels of epistemic modality. His framework is designed to categorise entire narratives, but he notes that the use of modality can fluctuate locally within a text for particular effects (1993: 58). The extract from *Never Let Me Go* is a clear example of Simpson's category A narrative (featuring a homodiegetic narrator), with negative shading as epistemic modality is most prominent (this is also evident in the opening paragraph cited in section 5.2). In his analyses of negatively shaded first person narratives, Simpson (1993) associates their modality with a 'distancing' effect and the expression of 'uncertainty, bewilderment and alienation' (1993: 53, 58). The examples he considers often use epistemic modality to express weak or medium commitment (e.g. perhaps, maybe, might). Interestingly, in *Never Let Me Go*, Kathy mostly uses epistemic modality to express a strong degree of commitment to various propositions. The use of the strong epistemic commitment in this extract, I would argue, serves to illustrate the sense of repetitive certainty which Kathy holds towards her work. Coupled with the lack of detail in the world-building features, Kathy's narration of her life as a carer creates a sense of dullness, boredom or predictability. According to Simpson (1993), it is unusual for negatively shaded narratives to include much boulomaic modality. However, in this extract there is a relatively high frequency of this type of modality, as Kathy describes that she 'likes' solitude and 'likes' travelling alone, for example. I believe that the boulomaic modality contributes to the impression that Kathy is cheerful in the face of her difficult job, but this cheerfulness is ultimately undercut by the use of epistemic modality which represents her daily routine in a more onerous light.

In my reading of the text, the way in which Kathy describes her life makes it seem as though she is trying to be cheerful in order to convince both herself and her narratee that things aren't that bad. Because of my close identification with Kathy, but my recognition that she may be masking the true extent of her suffering, I felt a sense of sadness and sympathy for her situation here. As the above analysis hoped to demonstrate, these feelings arose from my projection and subsequent identification with Kathy, but also my engagement with the role of narratee. There are further features in the extract which, I believe, highlight readers' projection into the role of the implied reader and add a further layer to its emotional effect. These occur when there is a disjunction between the knowledge frames evoked by the text and the content of Kathy's text-worlds, in a similar way to the examples analysed in section 5.3.1. For example, the third sentence of the extract, reproduced below for ease of reference, cues a series of modal-worlds:

But I do like the feeling of getting into my little car, knowing for the next couple of hours I'll have only the roads, the big grey sky and my daydreams for company.

The first is a positive boulomaic modal-world in which Kathy describes her enjoyment of independent travel. Two further embedded epistemic modal-worlds are cued by 'knowing' and 'will', and describe her typical journey. As noted above, Kathy's narrative evokes my cultural and experiential knowledge regarding driving, English roads and English weather: a 'big grey sky' is a common feature in England. However, in my reading of the text I also recognised the noun phrase 'big grey sky' as a play on the more commonly collocating 'big blue sky'. This is a result of my cultural knowledge, in which blue skies are viewed as having positive emotional connotations, whilst grey skies have more negative connotations (people who are sad or angry are said to be 'under a black cloud', for example). Kathy is trying to frame her day-to-day experience positively in this sentence, as indicated by the boulomaic modality. However, in my reading of the text, her mention of the 'big grey sky', with its bleak and depressing connotations, clashes with the positive attitude which she is expressing.

Another example of this type of clash occurs at the end of the extract. In sentence four Kathy describes how she likes to go 'wandering about looking in the shop windows' in order to pass the time. In my reading of the text, this statement added to my sense of identification with Kathy (described above) as I also enjoy window shopping from time to time. Kathy then tells the narratee about the lamps in her bedsit, before stating in sentence six: 'I might go looking for a shop with another lamp like that in its window – not to buy, just to compare with my ones at home'. In this sentence, Kathy's view of window shopping departs considerably from my cultural and experiential knowledge about this pastime. Significantly, window shopping tends to involve browsing for items which are both desirable and unattainable, perhaps due to cost or practicality. But Kathy is window shopping for the most mundane household item, of which she already has four. There is a notable disjunction between my cultural and experiential knowledge frames and Kathy's representation of her activities.

Both of the clashes described above suggest that the enactor of Kathy in the text-world does not share elements of my cultural knowledge in the discourse-world. However, this cultural knowledge has led me to make inferences about Kathy's emotions and worldview which evoked sadness or pity in my experience of the discourse. Kathy's version of window shopping is symptomatic of the poverty and restricted horizons of the clones in the novel, and her mention of 'big grey skies' is evocative of the misery of her existence – despite her cheerful tone. The inferences I generated when I read these sections of the novel cannot be seen as part of my projection into the role of Kathy or even the narratee,

because these text-world entities are not necessarily aware of the cultural knowledge which led to my interpretation. Instead, I would argue that by virtue of drawing on cultural knowledge which pertains to my discourse-world, they are indicative of my projection into the implied reader role and serve to highlight the fact that the novel is a communication between an implied author and implied reader. As noted in section 4.2, implied authors are effectively present in all the text-worlds of a literary discourse, but are sometimes highlighted by particular textual features. The implied author and implied reader are thus visible in two of the modal-worlds diagrammed in Figure 5.0 as their presence is highlighted by the text.

After analysing the passage in Text World Theory terms, I believe that whilst my positive feelings of optimism and admiration seemed to arise from my projection into Kathy's perspective, my sense of sadness or pity arose from projection into the narratee and implied reader roles. The notion of projection espoused by Gavins (2007), Lahey (2005) and Stockwell (2005a, 2009) can be extended to incorporate multiple positions which can lead to the experience of mixed emotions during literary discourse.

Social psychological work on emotion offers some compelling support for this connection between emotion and the multiple roles adopted by readers. As noted in section 3.1.3, Parkinson (1995) claims that popular folk psychological ideas about emotion as a private, intrapsychic and biological phenomenon do not reflect the 'reality' of emotional episodes (1995: 5). He argues that emotions have 'relational rather than personal meanings' (1995: 197) and are primarily 'a process of making claims about personal or social identity...in the context of unfolding social encounters' (1995: 169). When reviewing evidence which may challenge this position, Parkinson (1995) considers instances when people might experience one emotion and express another. For example, at a dinner party a guest may express political views which make me angry, but I remain polite and friendly, masking my irritation. Parkinson argues that rather than viewing the emotion I experienced privately to be more 'bona fide' or 'true' (1995: 201) it is more useful to see both the 'underlying' emotion as well as the 'more deliberately constructed one' set against it as arising from 'role positions of one kind or another with respect to specific audiences' (1995: 220). He suggests that the experience of emotional conflict arises when one is 'caught between the conflicting communicational agendas of different potential audiences' (1995: 215), and notes:

The apparent conflict experienced between 'natural' and manufactured feeling may thus be translated into a mismatch between two kinds of socially constructed feeling, one of which happens to be more central to the actor's currently salient social identity. (Parkinson 1995: 214)

Thus, in the dinner party example, my role as supporter of a particular political ideology is the identity role which is most spontaneous and 'natural' to me, and therefore my anger is experienced as a more 'natural' response than the false cheerfulness which arises from a role I have adopted due to the self-presentational demands of the immediate situation. In both cases the emotions are communications to real or imagined audiences in the context of a particular interpersonal encounter. This idea that emotional conflict arises from the multiple roles which constitute our identity is, I would argue, particularly relevant to literary reading. Parkinson notes:

All of us occupy a range of interpersonal roles which are brought on-line as the situation demands. On occasion, more than one available role is relevant...and each of these alternative identities may imply different values which might be expressed in different emotional reactions. (Parkinson 1995: 220)

In relation to the extract from *Never Let Me Go*, it seems to me that the discourse implies a range of interpersonal roles which readers can adopt or perform during discourse processing. Often, more than one available role is relevant, and the different values each role implies may be expressed in different emotional responses to the same piece of text.

This argument is compatible with Stockwell's (2009) view, reviewed in section 3.2.2, that a reader's personality and identity are adaptive and partially influenced by textual organisation during literary reading (2009: 45, 137). He draws on the sociolinguistic term 'accommodation' to explain how readers can adapt their personality pattern in order to engage with literary and fictional minds (2009: 152). He writes:

In literary encounters, if personality were rigid and fixed, immovable and inextensible, then it would be impossible to engage with or appreciate viewpoints that were distant from our own. We would live a literal and limited existence, and would have no need for literary fiction or expression at all. The reader's subjectivity is defined by its points of contact with others, including fictional others, and we might talk of personality as being socially and intersubjectively circumscribed and tested over and over in literature by reinscription. (Stockwell 2009: 136)

In my view, texts provide a range of 'contact points' for readers to interact with. The view that literary reading involves the adoption of multiple positions accords with the notion that reading is an act of identity-construction on the part of the reader. Parkinson (1995) notes that 'the very substance of emotional performance comes from identity presentations' (1995: 224) thus it makes sense to view readerly emotion as arising from the identity presentations which are made during literary reading, both across text-world boundaries and in the discourse-world.

To complete my discussion of projection, I wish to reassert that the idea of multiple projection provides a useful heuristic device with which to account for some of the nuances and complexities in our emotional experience of literary discourse. It is also

clear, however, that further research is needed into projection and the ways in which readers interact with text-world entities in literary discourse. A potential problem with my claims about multiple projection, drawing as they do on narratological principles, is that readers who are untrained in narrative convention may not conceive of the roles of the 'implied author', 'implied reader', and so on, in the formation of their text-world representations. Though I have argued that these various text-world roles can account for some of the reader comments in Dataset 2, the discussion group participants themselves do not display awareness of them. I suggest that this situation may be likened to that of the ontological stratification involved in discourse-processing. Though text-world theorists need to be explicitly aware of ontology in their analyses, Gavins (2007: 76-81, 141) posits that discourse-world participants respond to ontological boundaries and distinctions intuitively or subconsciously, enabling certain texts to manipulate these processing habits. Similarly, multiple projection may influence participants' experience of discourse without being consciously apprehended. However, a further problem is the cognitive effort which multiple projection, as I propose it, may involve. Is it possible for readers to simultaneously 'inhabit' several roles at once, or is it more likely that they switch rapidly between them as proposed by Gerrig (1996, see also Gerrig 1993: 30-40)? This is clearly a matter for empirical investigation which is beyond the scope of this thesis. I believe, however, that a recognition of the multiple projections involved in literary reading will benefit the Text World Theory approach by broadening the range and complexity of emotional experiences for which it can account.

In section 5.4 below I consider the role of readers' expectations, hopes and preferences in their emotional experience of discourse. Drawing upon the comments of discussion group participants and my own introspective analysis I make some further suggestions for the development of the Text World Theory framework.

#### **5.4. Expectations and Emotions**

In section 5.2 I argued that the opening of *Never Let Me Go* presents some challenges to the creation of coherent text-world representations, due to the fact that several world-building elements are undefined or have unexplained significances. This situation prevails for the majority of the novel and arises from the assumption of shared knowledge between Kathy and her narratee coupled with Kathy's own restricted perspective on text-world events. Things which Kathy doesn't understand, such as the emphasis on art in Hailsham's curriculum, are also mysteries to the reader in the discourse-world. For instance, when discussing the importance which Hailsham teachers place on the clones' artwork in the novel, Participant D says: 'that baffled me...that puzzled me right through'. Although the

revelatory scene in the penultimate chapter explains the aims and rituals of Hailsham school, some aspects of the text-worlds of the novel remain unexplained. Participants in the discussion group reported that the novel left them with many ‘unanswered questions’ (Participant D), and indeed much of their discussion is devoted to sharing their confusion or uncertainty with the rest of the group regarding, for example, who the clones were cloned from; how the cloning process was achieved; how the government decided who was going to be a ‘donor’ and who a ‘carer’; and why non-cloned humans found the clones repulsive (several reviewers raise similar questions, e.g. Harrison 2005; Kakutani 2005; Kemp 2005; Menand 2005).

During the discussion, Participant B and D suggest that obtaining answers to their questions was a central aim in their reading of the text. For example, they say:

**Extract 5 – Dataset 2**

5.1 I was really interested, you know when they were trying to find out who they were cloned from, I thought that was really strange but it was quite interesting, I really wanted to know then who they’d all been cloned from (Participant B)

5.2 I kind of hoped right up to the end that I would get all the answers that I wanted and I didn’t and that was a bit frustrating...the bigger stuff about clones and who was in charge...I was really interested in kind of that side of it and I guess it wasn’t about that but you know it kind of left me feeling a little ‘mmm’ (Participant D)

In comment 5.2, Participant D connects her desire for answers and the absence of such answers in the text to emotions such as frustration and perhaps disappointment (suggested by ‘feeling a little “mmm”’). It seems that the text-worlds of *Never Let Me Go* aroused the curiosity of these readers, but did not provide the resolution which they expected. Brewer and Lichtenstein (1981, 1996) suggest that readers respond more positively to narratives which produce surprise and resolution, suspense and resolution, or curiosity and resolution, and regard them as better examples of stories. Their proposals seem borne out by the comments of Participant D in particular, though both Participant B and D express the desire for certain information to be revealed. Elsewhere in Dataset 2, readers express their hopes and desires regarding the potential outcome of the novel’s plot:

5.3 you kind of wanted the happy ending I think, you know, Kathy and Tommy to be told that they could be together and kind of go off into the sunset...but there actually wasn’t a future, there wasn’t any way out of (*trails off*) (Participant A)

5.4 I thought that he was going to run off and I was like ‘Go Tommy, go! Escape!’ (*LAUGHTER, AGREEMENT*) and that never happened and I think that’s deep down what I kind of wanted, the sort of Disney ending of somebody to escape and it just wasn’t going to happen was it (Participant D)

5.5 It wasn't necessarily that I was enjoying it so much as just wanting to finish it really, I just kept thinking something big was going to happen and it didn't really (Participant D)

Participant D has the most to say on this issue, suggesting (in comment 5.4) that she wanted one of the enactors to escape or (in comment 5.5) more generally 'something big' to happen. Participant A also expresses desire for a happy ending for the enactors, though notes that this was denied by the text. It is interesting that both Participant A and D make intertextual references when expressing their desires. The mention of going 'off into the sunset' (comment 5.3) or a 'Disney ending' (comment 5.4) refer to stylised happy endings where the goals of the characters are achieved and plot conflicts are fully resolved.

Much of the book group discussion involves participants expressing and comparing their questions, expectations, hopes and desires regarding the narrative. Though only the second comment cited above explicitly relates these desires to emotional experience, I believe there is an intuitive connection between our emotional experience of narrative and, for instance, the expectations we have about the narrative outcomes or what we hope to occur during the text. This is also suggested by other work in stylistics and empirical studies of literature. For example, Short and van Peer (1989) suggest that readers' evaluative responses to a text (which are incorporated as emotional responses in the present discussion, as explained in section 3.1), are intimately connected to their expectations. They used the think-aloud method to produce written protocols regarding each line of a poem called 'Inversnaid' by Gerard Manley Hopkins. They then compared their protocols with each other and with a stylistic analysis of the poem. One of the several findings which Short and van Peer (1989) discuss is the presence of evaluative remarks in the protocols, even though the experimental design did not call for these responses (1989: 63). Both analysts evaluate the poem negatively in similar places, for example Short poses the question 'Good or not?' regarding the penultimate line (1989: 33) and van Peer describes the ending of the poem as an 'anticlimax' (1989: 34). When analysing the various evaluative or affective responses exhibited throughout their data, Short and van Peer highlight their connection with expectations. They propose that readers have potential recourse to a range of evaluative strategies during reading, with a central factor in such evaluations being the 'psychological mechanism of expectancy' (1989: 65-7). In the poem they consider, such expectancy is influenced by textual features such as structural cohesion (e.g. verb tense, repetition, rhyme, lexico-semantic associations) and functional relevance (e.g. pragmatic inferences about the communication) as interpreted by readers during text processing (1989: 67-8). They extend their observations to apply to all literary discourse, suggesting that 'the reader constantly interprets elements in the text and on the basis of this



interpretation forms an *expectation* with respect to any newly read element' (1989: 68, their italics). Incoming information is matched against previously formed expectations, and they posit that:

the fulfilment of the expectancy in the following part of the story will make favourable evaluations more probable, whilst any failure to fulfil the expectancy may easily lead to unfavourable evaluations. (1989: 66)

Short and van Peer's (1989) proposals suggests that readers' emotional experience is tied up with their expectations, which is in turn influenced by linguistic and contextual features. The fulfilment or frustration of these expectations has emotional or evaluative consequences.

Gerrig (1993) also posits that readers' expectations are significant in their experience of literary discourse. However, Gerrig and his colleagues regard expectations to form a part of the 'participatory responses' which readers experience when engaging with narrative (Albritton and Gerrig 1991; Gerrig 1993, 1996; Gerrig and Rapp 2004; Prentice, Gerrig and Bailis 1997; Rapp and Gerrig 2002, 2006). 'Participatory responses' (henceforth p-responses) arise from readers' active participation in a particular discourse. They are a wide class of phenomena which are intimately related to inferences, but which Gerrig claims do not have the same logically inductive or deductive gap-filling function (1993: 27, 67). Instead, they represent readers' reactions to the events in a narrative; for example, feeling the impulse to shout 'Watch out!' when viewing a film in which a character is under threat (Gerrig 1993: 66); or hoping 'Don't die!' when a character's life is in danger (Gerrig and Rapp 2006: 55). Gerrig notes that p-responses often 'encode highly emotional content' (1993: 66-67), however his focus is primarily on the way such responses are mentally represented rather than their phenomenological aspects. Rapp and Gerrig (2006) state their interest in the 'mental representations of the content of readers' preferences' and how these preferences become 'encoded as part of the ongoing text representation' (2006: 55).

In *Experiencing Narrative Worlds* (1993) Gerrig considers three types of p-responses in detail: the generation of hopes and preferences; the experience of suspense; and the activity of replotting, all of which are related to readers' expectations regarding narrative outcomes. He notes that when readers imagine the potential outcomes of a narrative event, they will often prefer one outcome over another and hope certain outcomes will occur. These hopes and preferences are p-responses. When readers lack knowledge about a particular important outcome, they are likely to experience suspense, which involves a variety of p-responses. In addition, once narrative outcomes have occurred, readers may simulate alternative outcomes in the presence of knowledge about the actual outcome, an p-response which Gerrig calls 'replotting' (1993: 69-93). Gerrig notes that: 'the emotional

power of many narratives will arise from readers' abilities to situate the outcomes an author describes with respect to a range of imaginable alternatives' (1993: 93). Readers' p-responses are closely related to the interaction between these imagined and actual events.

In subsequent empirical work, readers' hopes or preferences have received the most attention (Albritton and Gerrig 1991; Gerrig and Rapp 2004; Prentice, Gerrig and Bailis 1997; Rapp and Gerrig 2002, 2006). Across these experiments, Gerrig et al have found a range of evidence to suggest that rather than being some form of 'epiphenomenal "running commentaries" on the text', p-responses influence readers' mental representations of narrative events (Albritton and Gerrig 1991: 617). For example, Albritton and Gerrig (1991) found that p-responses could influence readers' ability to recall what actually transpired in a particular narrative. They conducted three experiments using experimenter-generated texts in which the characters experienced either positive outcomes (e.g. winning, succeeding, living) or negative outcomes (e.g. losing, failing, dying). Each text also included extra information to encourage readers to prefer either a positive or negative result for the character. For instance, one of the texts described a character training for and running in a marathon. In one version of the text, the character had been lazy in training and taken steroids, which was designed to make readers prefer that she lose rather than win. In another version the character is represented as training extra hard after an injury, designed to influence readers to prefer that she win rather than lose (Albritton and Gerrig 1991: 606). After reading each text, readers were asked to verify sentences regarding the positive or negative story outcomes, either immediately or after a delay. In both cases, Albritton and Gerrig found that p-responses affected readers' ability to verify known information about the story outcomes. Outcomes which were complicit with the p-responses which the texts were designed to evoke were verified quicker than those which were not.

Rapp and Gerrig (2002) conducted a series of experiments (again involving experiment-generated texts) investigating the influence of readers' hopes and preferences on the other inferences they make when reading narratives. In the first round of experiments they found evidence to suggest that readers use their knowledge of the properties of the real world, such as 'the ordinary constraints of time, space and human behaviour' when building mental representations of narratives (c.f. Ryan 1991). For example, one of the texts featured in the experiment told of a child waiting in a crowd outside a stadium in order to obtain the autograph of a baseball player. When the baseball player emerged, the text stated that it took him either 'a minute' or 'an hour' to get into his limousine. Readers were then presented with outcome sentences in which the child did/did not obtain the desired autograph and asked to judge how sensible the outcome sentence

was. Sentence judgements and reading time measurements converged to suggest that readers engage in 'reality-driven analyses' of the temporal coherence of narrative episodes (Rapp and Gerrig 2002: 784). Respondents took longer to read and were less likely to agree with the outcome in which the autograph was obtained in a minute. In the second round of experiments the narratives were altered in order to try and manipulate readers' preferences regarding the narrative outcome. In the autograph story, the child was described as being terminally ill and having a 'lifelong dream' to meet the baseball player – or was replaced by an adult character who was a 'dishonest collectables dealer'. The first experiment, involving the 'hour' or 'minute' time shifts, was repeated with the addition of this preference-generating information. Rapp and Gerrig (2002) found that readers were more likely to agree with story outcomes if they were consistent with their preferences than if they were inconsistent, and took longer to read the story outcome sentences if they were inconsistent with reader preferences. They suggest that readers developed these preferences through a process of 'plot driven analysis', which they set up in contrast to the 'reality driven analysis' described above. Though preferences did not simply override readers' time-based expectations, the results suggest that both reality-driven and plot-driven analyses (thus both probability and preferences) influence readers' beliefs about the likelihood of events, and interact during readers' experience of narratives (Rapp and Gerrig 2002: 787; Rapp and Gerrig 2006: 56).

Rapp and Gerrig (2006) find further evidence for the impact of reader hopes and preferences on their mental representations of narratives. They use experimenter-generated narratives designed to manipulate readers' expectations regarding the success or failure of a character's goals based on contextual information. For example, in a story about whether Charles will win the Senate race, the information that Charles is ahead in the polls functioned as a success-biasing context, whereas the information that he is behind was designed to bias expectations towards failure. Rapp and Gerrig note that readers will have to draw upon their knowledge or memories of the significance of the poll results in Senate races to interpret the narrative (2006: 65). The narratives then had the addition of a sentence designed to evoke reader preferences regarding the success or failure of the characters – such as the failure-biasing information: 'Charles was corrupt, taking bribes and giving favours to companies that polluted the environment' (Rapp and Gerrig 2006: 56). These sentences were combined in various patterns and presented to readers in four experiments, and once again readers' explicit judgements regarding narrative outcomes were measured in addition to their reading times. Overall the results provided converging support for the view that: 'reader's expectations for narrative outcomes are not only a

function of text-specific attributes (e.g. context) but also factors that develop as narratives unfold (e.g. readers desires for particular events and outcomes)' (2006: 63).

The combined research of Gerrig et al suggests firstly (and perhaps uncontroversially) that during narrative processing readers are able to use their inferential capabilities to generate expectations or predictions about what might happen next. These 'predictive inferences' (Rapp and Gerrig 2006: 55) are a widely recognised class of inference within text-processing research, which have both costs and benefits in terms of either confusing or facilitating comprehension (e.g. Cook et al 2001; Graesser et al 1994, 1995; Ide and Veronis 1990; Magliano and Graesser 1991; Magliano et al 1996; McKoon and Ratcliff 1986; Rapp and Gerrig 2006). Such inferences may be based upon real-world (or textually established) rules regarding time, space and human behaviour (Rapp and Gerrig 2002), or may arise from readers' previous experience with narrative conventions (e.g. Gerrig 1993: 66; for an alternative view see Rapp and Gerrig 2002: 787). Secondly, the work of Gerrig et al suggests that readers often have preferences regarding the predictions and expectations which they generate. These preferences can be influenced by a variety of factors including readers' discourse-world morals and the world-building and function-advancing information provided by the text, as the experiments reviewed above demonstrate. Finally their work suggests that readers' hopes and preferences (and other p-responses) are significant in their mental representation of narrative. Rapp and Gerrig (2006) propose that the contents of readers' p-responses, such as 'Don't die!' or 'Watch out!', are mentally represented 'as part of the ongoing text representation' (2006: 55). Furthermore, they suggest that preferences may create a context in which readers' text-representations would be 'enriched with a variety of mental contents' (2006: 55). Thus, if readers don't want a character to die, they may start imagining ways in which the character may escape their death (2006: 55). They also suggest that p-responses interact with a variety of aspects of text-processing and representation, including interacting with the way readers 'encode the likely concomitants of the passage of time' (2006: 56; Rapp and Gerrig 2002).

Rapp and Gerrig (2006) conclude their paper with two provocative suggestions: that models of text-processing 'should be expanded to include the content of participatory responses alongside propositions and inferences' and that 'accounts of narrative comprehension should include some notion of reader wishes and desires' (2006: 66). Their comments relate specifically to situation models (see section 2.1.2) but I believe they are also relevant to Text World Theory. Gerrig (1993: 66-7) makes strong suggestions regarding the emotional significance of p-responses, and it seems to me that an account of such responses could expand Text World Theory's ability to account for the emotional experience of literary discourse. The responses of the discussion group participants cited

above certainly suggest the necessity of incorporating reader desires and hopes for particular outcomes in the text-world approach. In addition, the responses which Short and van Peer (1989) describe lend further support to the idea that readers' expectations are emotionally significant.

However, there are also several challenges in using Text World Theory to address these issues. Whilst inferencing is a fundamental process in the construction of text-worlds (e.g. Gavins 2007: 24; Werth 1999: 7), the generation of predictions and expectations or hopes and preferences on the part of the discourse-world participants have only been fleetingly addressed in Text World Theory to date (see section 5.4.1 below). Furthermore, Gerrig et al use experimenter-generated texts in order to manipulate p-responses, but have not proven the wider application of their findings to complex extended literature. In section 5.4.1 below I consider an extract from *Never Let Me Go* which, in my reading of the text, generated a sense of foreboding and several predictions regarding possible outcomes. This extract is also referred to by Participant D in the discussion group. I consider how my experience of this extract might be accounted for in Text World Theory terms. In doing so I make some preliminary suggestions for the inclusion of Gerrig et al's findings into Text World Theory, whilst highlighting the need for further research in this area.

#### **5.4.1 'Go Tommy, go, escape!'**

Before analysing Extract B cited below, it is necessary to point out that as it is taken from the penultimate chapter of the novel my reading of it is already influenced by my predictive inferences regarding its likely content. The scene it describes comes immediately after Kathy and Tommy's meeting with the Hailsham headmistresses, in which the truth about deferral is revealed and their goal of a future together has been rendered unachievable. Because the meeting with the headmistresses is narrated predominantly through direct speech (c.f. the scene from *The Remains of the Day* in section 4.3.2) there is little interpretative commentary and Kathy and Tommy's responses to the news have not yet been narrated. The extract below describes the enactors' journey home from this meeting. As their goals have been thwarted in such a devastating manner, I predictively inferred that some significant negative reaction or dramatic consequence was to ensue - though was unsure of what form this might take. The extract reads:

- 1) We hardly discussed our meeting with Miss Emily and Madame on the journey
- 2) back...I kept us on the most obscure back roads I knew, where only our
- 3) headlights disturbed the darkness... it seemed to me these dark byways of the
- 4) country existed just for the likes of us, while the big glittering motorways with
- 5) their huge signs and super cafes were for everyone else. I don't know if
- 6) Tommy was thinking something similar. Maybe he was, because at one point,
- 7) he remarked:
- 8) 'Kath, you really know some weird roads.'
- 9) He did a little laugh as he said this, but then he seemed to fall deep into


- 10) thought. Then as we were going down a particularly dark lane in the back of  
 11) nowhere, he said suddenly:  
 12) 'I think Miss Lucy was right. Not Miss Emily.'  
 13) I can't remember if I said anything to that. If I did, it certainly wasn't anything  
 14) very profound. But that was the moment I first noticed it, something in his  
 15) voice, or maybe his manner, that set off distant alarm bells. I remember taking  
 16) my eyes off the twisting road to glance at him, but he was just sitting there  
 17) quietly, gazing straight ahead into the night.  
 18) A few minutes later, he said suddenly: 'Kath, can we stop? I'm sorry, I need to  
 19) get out a minute.'  
 20) Thinking he was feeling sick again, I pulled up almost immediately, hard against  
 21) a hedge. The spot was completely unlit, and even with the car lights on, I was  
 22) nervous another vehicle might come round the curve and run into us. That's  
 23) why, when Tommy got out and disappeared into the blackness, I didn't go with  
 24) him... that's why I was still in the car, wondering whether to move it a little  
 25) further up the hill, when I heard the first scream. (Ishiguro 2005: 269, my line  
 numbering)

This passage creates and updates a text-world located in England in the 1990s, featuring enactors of Kathy and Tommy and objects including their car, their headlights, the roads and the darkness (see Figure 5.2 below). As noted above, I expected the extract to involve the enactors' potentially dramatic response to the news that there was no escape for them. As I read the extract it generated a sense of foreboding and led me to expect that something bad was going to happen, as well as creating a sense of suspense because their reactions are still not detailed. Gerrig (1993) posits that suspense should occur when the reader (1) lacks knowledge about (2) some sufficiently important target outcome, and is further heightened when (3) the target outcome maps out a challenging problem space and (4) the author sustains p-responses over a period of delay (1993: 79). This episode fits the definitions Gerrig suggests, as the reader lacks knowledge about the enactors' responses to their fate and the text also withholds this information, whilst suggesting that their reaction, whatever it is, will be alarming or negative.

It is possible to identify several stylistic features which contribute to this foreboding effect. For example, world-building adjectives such as 'obscure' (2), 'dark' (3; 10), 'weird' (8), 'twisting' (16) and 'unlit' (21) create the impression of isolated and creepy surroundings; staple features in horror stories. There is also high frequency of epistemic modality in the passage, characteristic of the negative shading which is established throughout the novel (Simpson 1993; see section 5.3.2). However, whilst the extract analysed in section 5.3.2 featured a high frequency of strong epistemic commitment, this extract features more weak or medium commitment through the repeated use of modals such as 'maybe' (6), 'seemed' (9), 'I don't know' (5), 'I can't remember' (13). Simpson (1993) notes that transitions into weak or medium epistemic commitment 'often result in a disorienting lack of purchase on events' (1993: 58) and indeed uncertainty is foregrounded in this passage, which adds to the

foreboding effect. Many of the modal-worlds created by Kathy's narrative express uncertainty about Tommy's mental states, for example in lines 5-6; 9-10; 20, which led me to expect that the bad events would relate to Tommy. Kathy's ambiguous reference to 'it' in line 14 also prompts inferences about what Tommy is doing to ring 'distant alarm bells' in her mind.

As I read Extract B up to line 25 I generated a series of p-responses regarding what might happen next. The ones which I can recall include, for example: *Maybe Tommy will commit suicide? Maybe he is going to cry? Maybe he is going to attack Kathy? Maybe he is going to explode with anger like he used to at school? Maybe he is going to try and escape?* The description of the scream in line 25 cues a further predictive inference, as I expected that Tommy would be involved in some unpleasant or horrific situation outside of the car. I can remember imagining a series of possible situations, mostly revolving around the idea that someone or something was attacking Tommy, or vice versa, e.g. *Maybe Tommy is being attacked? Maybe Tommy is attacking a human?* The italicised questions cited above are p-responses because



**Figure 5.2.** *Participatory responses to lines 1-24 of Extract B from Never Let Me Go.* Propositions represented in oval dashed boxes are participation-worlds created by the reader. Modal-worlds and world-switches emanating from the text-world are not shown.

although they rely on the products of inferential processing, they do not have a gap-filling function (Gerrig 1993: 67). This means that it would, I suggest, be possible to construct the text-worlds of Extract B without generating this array of hypothetical scenarios. Instead, they are a feature of my involvement in the discourse, and my desire to know what the reaction of the characters will be or what is happening in the scene. In Text World Theory

terms, it seems that these hypothetical imagined outcomes are neither world-building or function-advancing in that they do not add information to the current text-world created by the discourse. Instead, I posit that they are best regarded as a form of hypothetical text-world which is participant-generated during discourse processing. These worlds are shown in Figure 5.2 above but will be named in the following discussion.

In her work on the cognitive aspects of narrative suspense, Dannenberg (2008) posits that suspense 'stimulates the reader to imagine multiple versions of the story's future' which 'flicker on the edge of his[/her] consciousness' (Dannenberg 2008: 36, 38-9). This observation accords with Gerrig's view of suspense in which readers must consider 'a range of possibilities' and begin forming preferences about the desirability of those possibilities (1993: 77). Dannenberg calls the creation of such imagined alternate scenarios 'liminal plotting', and explains:

This term refers to the reader's semiconscious mental images of possible future events that are logical extrapolations of the action, although they are not depicted in the text itself. ...These images can be called liminal precisely because they are half-formed responses that are evoked in the recipient's mind at the same moment as he processes the scene taking place in the actional present of the narrative. (Dannenberg 2008: 38)

In Text World Theory terms, Dannenberg's notion of 'liminal plotting' would involve the readers' creation of fleeting text-worlds alongside or alternate with the construction of the text-world of the narrative. This seems to reflect the multiple scenarios I imagined when reading the extract from *Never Let Me Go*, shown in Figure 5.2. Dannenberg notes that because liminal plotting divides readers' attention between the events in the narrative worlds (i.e. text-world) and the 'liminal images' in their imagination, it is a highly immersive activity (2008: 38).

Text-world theorists have made some preliminary suggestions about the mental representations which readers create alongside text-world formation, though this remains an undeveloped area. For example, Millward (2002) posits the existence of 'suspended text-worlds' which are created and revised alongside the text-worlds of the discourse. These 'suspended' worlds contain information about the questions and unresolved aspects of the text-worlds, which are updated with partial solutions and resolutions as the discourse progresses. Millward suggests that they could contribute to an account of prediction in discourse-processing. Elsewhere, Gibbons (2010) draws on Dannenberg's terminology to explain the way discourses can create hypothetical worlds containing potential plot outcomes. Her analysis pertains to an extract from a short video called: 'Lost Untangled'; one of a series designed to help viewers of the popular U.S. TV show 'Lost' catch up on storylines which they may have missed. Through a short rhetorical question the video



creates a hypothetical world in which four enactors from the TV show are involved in a romantic relationship. As such, the video suggests a possible outcome of the narrative of 'Lost' the TV show, but does not confirm whether this outcome is actually featured the show. Gibbons (2010) argues that the hypothetical world is thus given a 'liminal status' as readers are likely to bear it in mind as a potential outcome when they are next watching 'Lost'.

The hypothetical text-worlds which I imagined when reading the extract of *Never Let Me Go*, however, differ from those proposed by Millward (2002) because they are individual situations related to the outcome of the plot, rather than being a kind of meta-world in which all uncertainties and questions are stored for future processing. They also differ from those examined by Gibbons (2010) because they are neither created nor referenced by the text itself. Though linguistic features in the extract create a sense of foreboding and uncertainty, heightening suspense and thus providing some text-driven impetus for readers' participatory responses, the particular outcomes which I imagined are not linguistically determined by the text itself. Instead, they are highly dependent upon my cultural and experiential knowledge regarding the way people might react to bad news; my memory of previous events in the discourse (specifically that Tommy was prone to wild emotional outbursts during his time at Hailsham); and my knowledge about narratives in general, such as the high likelihood of a happy ending.

As such, they present a challenge to the Text World Theory framework because they differ from the other types of mental representations it currently includes. I propose these hypothetical worlds be called 'participation-worlds' in accordance with Gerrig's notion of participatory response. This means that they are mental representations created by the hearer or reader during discourse-processing which are not part of the communicated text-worlds, but which both reflect and reinforce participant's involvement in the discourse. Participation-worlds, I suggest, are a form of text-world because they are created from the influence of linguistic cues in the discourse and the reader or hearer's background knowledge. However, it is very difficult to pinpoint any precise linguistic features which may have 'triggered' the p-responses I experienced. In this respect, participation-worlds are not the same as the text-worlds created by the discourse itself because they are only indirectly text-driven, and therefore are not jointly constructed by the discourse participants in the same way as the text-worlds of the discourse. Participation-worlds are perhaps best conceived of as optional extras, created by discourse-world participants alongside the text-worlds of the narrative in an effort to resolve the suspense which the discourse creates, for example. In quality, participation-worlds are more like modal-worlds, because they are mental representations which enable readers to imagine

hypothetical situations or conceptualise unrealised hopes and desires regarding narrative events.

For instance, in my reading of the extract from *Never Let Me Go*, I imagined a range of hypothetical outcomes (represented by fleeting participation-worlds) but hoped most of all that Tommy would find some way to escape. The participation-world which represented Tommy's escape was the one I desired to see realised in the text-worlds of the discourse. Participant D in the discussion group expresses a similar desire when she says:

at the end when Tommy ran out and started screaming when they'd found out and they'd been to see Madame, I thought that he was going to run off and I was like 'Go Tommy, go, escape!' (LAUGHTER, AGREEMENT) and that never happened... it just wasn't going to happen was it (Participant D, comment 5.4)

However, as noted by Participant D, Tommy does not escape. After the suspense is built up throughout the extract cited above, the screaming is revealed to be Tommy having an emotional outburst rather than anything more sinister. Kathy gets out of the car and manages to calm him down, and the enactors simply return to their roles as carers and donors (Ishiguro 2005: 260). The outcome which I preferred, represented in a participation-world, is not realised by the discourse. Thus there is a discrepancy between the hopes of the reader in the discourse-world and the events in the world of the text. In their work on expectation (reviewed in section 5.4. above), Short and van Peer (1989) suggest that during reading, incoming information is matched against previously formed expectations, and that textual convergences or divergences from reader expectation are likely to influence emotional response (1989: 66). In Text World Theory terms, this matching could occur between the content of readers' text-worlds and participation-worlds, with resulting emotional effects. In my reading of the text, the juxtaposition between the content of my participation-world and the content of the text-worlds influenced my emotional responses. Though I didn't evaluate the text itself negatively I did experience more negative affect, such as a feeling of sadness and disappointment as I realised that the enactors would never escape.

Several critics remark that one of the unusual things about the clones is that they do not try to escape their fate and don't even conceive of escape as a possibility (Kakutani 2005; Montello 2005; Toker and Chertoff 2008: 166). Interestingly, this means that the desire for Tommy to escape is a desire of the reader in the discourse-world rather than an example of identification with the goals of the characters in the text-world (c.f. Oatley 1994; 1999a; 1999b; 2002). In the simple, experimenter-generated texts used by Albritton and Gerrig (1991) and Rapp and Gerrig (2002, 2006) the text-world enactors have a clear goal, such as obtaining an autograph or winning a race or election, and reader preferences

are thought to either accord with that goal or oppose it. However, in the responses of the discussion group, only Participant A's comment that she 'wanted...Kathy and Tommy to be told that they could be together' (comment 5.3) could be seen to accord with the goals of the text-world enactors. Other preferences and expectations, both in the discussion group comments and my introspective analysis, relate to the *readers'* desire for more information, a big event to occur, or a happy ending. This suggests that in more naturalistic reading situations participatory responses such as hopes and preferences (and their resulting emotional effects) are related to factors within the discourse-world as well as in the world of the text. In the penultimate chapter of *Never Let Me Go*, the hopes of both the enactors in the text-world and the readers in the discourse-world are unfulfilled. I would suggest that this experience is crucial to the emotional effect and perhaps wider effect of the novel. As Perrine (1970) notes, unhappy endings may cause readers to 'brood over the results, to go over the story in [their] mind, and...by searching out its implications get more from it' (1970: 47).

The concept of participation-worlds provides Text World Theory with a means of incorporating 'liminal plotting' (Dannenberg 2008) and the hopes and preferences of discourse-world participants. In the analysis above I have suggested that clashes or conformities between the content of these participation-worlds and the text-worlds of the discourse can have emotional significance. My proposals are intended as a first step towards incorporating participatory responses into the Text World Theory framework, because such responses are likely to be significant in readers' emotional experience of discourse. However, there are some potential problems with the notion of 'participation-worlds' as I have conceived of them, which may require further investigation beyond the scope of this thesis.

Firstly, as Gerrig (1993) notes, participatory responses are 'a heterogeneous class' which are intimately entangled with inferences (1993: 67-8). There is no detailed taxonomy of p-responses which may begin to help constrain the range or type of responses they involve. As a result, though the work of Gerrig and associates suggests their importance in discourse-processing (e.g. Albritton and Gerrig 1991; Gerrig 1993; Rapp and Gerrig 2002, 2006), p-responses which are not related to hopes and preferences are as yet a relatively unexplored phenomenon. This means that it may be difficult to identify or constrain the limits of participation-worlds in Text World Theory approaches to discourse. This is compounded by the second problem, which is that participation-worlds can represent mental content which is not cued by specific linguistic features in the discourse. As I suggested above, the creation of participation-worlds may be indirectly driven by the text, but their particular content is not necessarily constrained by linguistic features. This

represents a significant departure from Text World Theory as conceived by Werth (1999) and Gavins (2007), and sets a precedent which stretches the boundaries of the framework to its limits. If Text World Theory were to begin incorporating mental representations whose contents were relatively unconstrained by the discourse itself as I have suggested, it may be better equipped to explain certain aspects of our emotional experience of discourse, but it inevitably begins to lose some of its precision and analytical appeal. Werth's (1999) principle of text-drivenness is an ingenious method of streamlining the context of discourse to a level which can be usefully managed by analysts. A central question for Text World Theory is whether it can or indeed should go beyond this principle in order to incorporate participatory-responses in its model of discourse-processing. This is an issue which requires further examination in future expositions of Text World Theory. A final thing to note is that in the preceding analysis I have focused on readers' predictions and expectations at the discourse-level, regarding issues of plot. But of course language processing doubtless involves expectancy on all linguistic levels: phonological, morphological, lexical, syntactic (Short and van Peer 1989; West 2009). Another key question for future research is how these levels of expectancy may influence participants' emotional experience of discourse, and whether Text World Theory is able to incorporate them.

In conclusion, the notion of 'participation-worlds' may help Text World Theory to explain how readers' hopes, preferences and expectations enter into their experience of the discourse. It provides a means of considering the way the text interacts with these participatory responses and how this is significant in the emotions which the text evokes. However, further work is needed in this area in order to determine the suitability of Text World Theory for the representation of this type of emotional experience.

## **5.5 Review**

The analyses in this chapter have extended the work on projection which was begun in Chapter 4 by paying close attention to the textual features which can influence readerly projection and identification. I have extended my incorporation of rhetorical narratology in order to propose that the observational 'narrative audience' position should be recognised in Text World Theory (Phelan 1996, 2005; Rabinowitz 1998 [1987]). In my examination of second-person address in *Never Let Me Go*, I have suggested that readers are able to maintain projection into their text-worlds by adopting this observational 'narrative audience' position. I have also argued that textual features can work to promote or problematise the cross-world mapping which characterises identification, through direct address and the representation of emotion. Drawing upon the responses of 'real' readers

and literary critics I have proposed that 'disassociation' should be recognised as a form of negative connection between discourse-world readers and text-world enactors with the same emotional implications as identification. Furthermore, I have argued that readers' interaction with texts can comprise a combination of projection, identification and disassociation which may go some way to explaining mixed emotional responses. And in order to bring together my points about multiple projection during discourse-processing I have conducted an analysis of a short extract from the novel and traced my projective experiences, drawing upon social psychological theories about emotion in order to explain the significance of multiple role adoption in emotional experience.

The latter sections of this chapter have examined the role of readers' expectations in their emotional experience of discourse. Drawing on the work of Gerrig et al I have suggested that the notion of 'participatory responses' may be incorporated into Text World Theory through a new class of world termed 'participation-worlds'. I have posited that the content of these participation-worlds is then matched with the contents of text-worlds in order to produce certain emotional effects. 'Participation-worlds' are particularly useful when examining readers' expectations or predictions about the outcomes of plot. However, during text-world construction there is also a constant 'matching' process between a readers' knowledgebase and textual information, as textual cues activate reader knowledge frames. In Chapter 6 I pay closer attention to the interaction between readerly knowledge and textual information during discourse-processing, proposing that aspects of this exchange could be reconceptualised as inherently emotional.

# Chapter 6: *The Unconsoled*

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## 6.0 Preview

The analyses in this chapter are centrally concerned with examining the role of readers' discourse-world resources in their emotional experience of Ishiguro's 'experimental' novel, *The Unconsoled* (2005 [1995]). My approach to *The Unconsoled* (2005 [1995]) is informed by the comments of literary critics and 'real' readers posting on internet forums and weblogs, who are typically concerned with ways of 'making sense' of narrative events and explaining the discursal oddity exhibited by the text. As noted in section 1.3, literary critics tend to regard *The Unconsoled* (2005 [1995]) as a stylistic (though not necessarily thematic) departure from Ishiguro's earlier work (Lewis 2000: 133; Shaffer 1998: 5). Section 6.2 provides stylistic support for these observations through an analysis of the text-worlds created by the opening of the novel. In section 6.3 I suggest that the interaction between readers' knowledge-frames and the text are influential in their emotional experience of the discourse: an idea which has only been recognised implicitly in cognitive poetics to date. Section 6.4 extends the observations made in section 5.3.1. and draws on research in social psychology to consider the structure and effect of the emotion knowledge which readers utilise during text-world construction. In section 6.5 I relate these ideas to the phenomenon of 'resonance' as proposed by Stockwell (2009) in order to address the comments readers made regarding the enduring effect of their reading experience.

## 6.1. The Impact of *The Unconsoled*

*The Unconsoled* (1995) is Ishiguro's fourth novel and his most controversial to date. Whilst his previous three works: *A Pale View of Hills* (1982), *An Artist of the Floating World* (1986) and *The Remains of the Day* (1989) were met with widespread critical acclaim, upon release *The Unconsoled* (1995) received markedly mixed reviews and was regarded by some as a disappointing break from form. For example, in the *London Review of Books*, Chaudhuri (1995) declared the novel a 'failure' and in *The Guardian* newspaper, Wood (1995) announced that the novel 'invents its own category of badness'. The novel is often regarded as difficult and less 'accessible' than Ishiguro's previous works; Iyer (1995) describes it as 'suffocating, unyielding and very heavy going', and Jaggi (1995) represents reading the novel as an onerous journey, which is 'uphill for the first half and not copiously signposted' (see also Cunningham 1995, Kellaway 1995). Over time, however, the novel has received increasing acclaim and is often featured in 'best novels' lists in the British press (e.g. Clark et al 2007; McCrum 2006).

Summarising the novel is difficult because the text-worlds it creates depart in many ways from a reader's discourse-world reality and even the conventions of narrative discourse (see sections 6.2 to 6.4 below for further discussion). In addition, the text does not supply any definitive or overarching explanations for the situations and events which are portrayed; instead such explanations are only suggested at and are largely inferred by readers. As such, the summary below is designed to provide an overview of some of the main storylines in the novel, and specific extracts will be considered in more detail in sections 6.2 to 6.4. What is certain is that the novel is narrated by a character named Ryder, who is a famous concert pianist. At the opening of the novel Ryder checks in to a hotel in an unnamed but apparently European city, and appears uncertain as to why he is there. Gradually, through conversations and interactions with hotel staff, local people and city officials, Ryder learns that he is due to give an address and recital at a concert in a few days time. Furthermore, his performance at this concert is a matter of great importance to the city which is gripped in a 'crisis' pertaining to its cultural and musical reputation. This 'crisis' has a much wider significance than one might expect, however, because it seems that a positive resolution is crucial for the success of the city as a whole and the happiness, wellbeing and unity of its people. The city has two famous resident musicians: Brodsky, a once-great conductor who has slipped into alcoholism, and Christoff, a young musician who succeeded Brodsky but whose ideas have recently been discredited. The city needs a new musical hero and there are high hopes that Brodsky can be resurrected to take on this role. Mr Hoffman, the manager of the hotel at which Ryder is staying, is overseeing this resurrection and organising the concert with the aim of staging Brodsky's come-back.

As well gaining a sense of the musical and cultural 'crisis' which overshadows the city, Ryder learns a great deal about the personal problems of the various city inhabitants whom he meets. Mr Hoffman has a problematic marriage and tense relationship with his son, Stephan, which centres around his son's musical ability. Stephan desperately wants to perform at the concert to prove to his parents that he is a talented pianist, but they have abandoned hope in his talent and refuse to acknowledge his skill, even with Ryder's endorsement. Brodsky, the alcoholic conductor, is a somewhat tragic figure who wants more than anything to be reunited with his old flame, Miss Collins. Their relationship ended around the same time as his musical career, and he spends the novel trying to regain them both. Ryder also meets Gustav, the porter of the hotel, who tells him about his daughter and grandson, Sophie and Boris. Gustav is concerned about Sophie's wellbeing and asks Ryder to go and talk to her – as she and Gustav have not spoken since she was a child. Bizarrely, when Ryder goes to meet Sophie and Boris it emerges that he has more connections to the city than it first appeared. The three characters are already acquainted –

and it seems that Sophie is actually Ryder's long-suffering partner, and Boris his attention-starved son or stepson. Sophie, Boris and Ryder have a tumultuous relationship, and their attempts at cosy family life seem doomed to failure, often because Ryder is preoccupied with work and finds it difficult to engage with mother or child. Two other significant characters are Ryder's parents, whom he believes are due to come and see him perform at the important concert. He makes several enquiries regarding their arrival, and when he finally realises they are not coming, he breaks down in tears. Ryder desperately wants his parents to see him play and acknowledge his talent.

The days leading up to the concert are filled with stress and confusion, as Ryder has to attend various meetings and dinners, dedicate attention to Sophie and Boris, and find some time to prepare for his performance. Throughout the novel space, time and human behaviour do not always function in the way one might expect. For example, Ryder makes long journeys only to find he is back in his original location; a conversation in a lift goes on for pages before the lift arrives at its destination; Ryder gives a dinner address in his dressing gown and is rendered inexplicably mute at inconvenient moments. Furthermore, people and places from Ryder's childhood appear everywhere: he bumps into old schoolfriends whilst walking through the city, is convinced that the hotel room is his old bedroom and realises that an abandoned vehicle is his old family car. Further strange occurrences include Ryder's mysterious ability to transcend his first-person perspective and see events which he cannot physically witness, or 'read' the thoughts and memories of people about him (see section 6.3 below). In addition, aspects of the characters' lives seem to mirror one another, with Stephan and Boris echoing Ryder's past, Brodsky and Christoff representing his possible future, and Gustav's treatment of Sophie mirroring Ryder's treatment of Boris (Adelman 2001: 167-78; Lewis 2000: 104, 111-120; Shaffer 1998: 94; Vilar Flor 2000: 166).

The night of the concert arrives forming the climax to the novel. Stephan performs brilliantly, but his parents Mr and Mrs Hoffman walk out before he has finished and remain blind to his talent. Brodsky is run over (possibly by Ryder) on his way to the concert venue and after the amputation of his wooden leg he attempts to conduct the orchestra whilst using an ironing board as a crutch. Despite his Herculean efforts his career revival is a failure and he is rejected by Miss Collins. During the concert Sophie and Boris tend to Gustav the porter backstage, as he has fallen ill and later passes away. Strangely, Ryder does not get to give his speech or his piano recital, but no one seems to mind. After learning of Gustav's death he follows Sophie and Boris onto a tram and, after being rejected by Sophie, is comforted by a fellow passenger and begins eating a hearty breakfast, reflecting positively on his influence in the city.



Literary critics and reviewers typically draw parallels between *The Unconsoled* and the work of canonical writers such as Kafka, Dostoevsky and Beckett (e.g. Adleman 2001: 168-9; Chaudhuri 1995; Iyer 1995; Robinson 2006: 120; Shaffer 1998; Vilar Flor 2000; and see Ishiguro in interview with Jaggi 2008 [1995]: 113-4). This comparison highlights both the 'surreal' or 'absurd' style of the novel and the way in which its challenging nature may be reappraised as a sign of literary achievement rather than failure (Lewis 2000: 107-8; Petry 1999: 148; Robinson 2006: 120; Shaffer 1998: 90, 101; Villar Flor 2000: 162). Despite these claims, however, there has been no stylistic examination of how this absurdism or surrealism is created nor how it may affect readers. In the present discussion I consider some of the unusual or challenging aspects of the narrative from a cognitive-poetic perspective, contributing to literary-critical discussions regarding its style.

In her Text World Theory analyses of absurd prose fiction, Gavins (2000, 2001, 2003, 2007) notes that texts with an apparently uncooperative or 'complex and chaotic' structure are often read cooperatively through 'the metaphorical mapping of [their] structural absurdity onto the day-to-day experience of human existence' (2003: 143). Indeed, many reviews and critical pieces read *The Unconsoled* metaphorically: Ryder's confused and harried existence is seen as a metaphor for the human condition or the postmodern subject (Iyer 1995; Lewis 2000; Maloney 2006; Petry 1999; Robbins 2001; Wong 2000) and Ishiguro himself is quoted as saying:

[*The Unconsoled*] is supposed to be a metaphor for the way most of us have lives that we blunder through, pretending we know where we're going but not really knowing where we're going. (Ishiguro quoted in interview with Olivia 2008 [1995]: 122)

Other critics regard the novel as a metaphorical representation of emotions such as anxiety or stress (Lewis 2000; Wood 1998), whilst Daniel (2007) uses a 'care home metaphor' to make sense of the novel; with Ryder as a delusional resident. In a similar way, the novel is also read metatextually, as a comment upon art and artists (Adelman 2001) or the novel as a medium (Cunningham 1995). Many critics see the novel as a reflection upon Ishiguro's own career as an artist and make inter-textual links between *The Unconsoled*, his previous novels and their public reception (Appleyard 1995; Chaudhuri 1995; Iyer 1995; Jaggi 1995; Lewis 2000: 128; Sim 2006: 168; Shaffer 1998: 91-2). Several analyses perceive parallels between Ryder's experience and that of the reader, suggesting that the novel is a metatextual comment about the act of reading (Iyer 1995; Lewis 2000; Maloney 2006; Robinson 2006; Wong 2000). These metaphorical and metatextual readings demonstrate some of the ways in which readers try to 'make sense' of the novel's strangeness and explain its seemingly uncooperative and confusing features. The textual features which may prompt this search for explanation, and their potential emotional effects, will be examined

in sections 6.2 to 6.4 below. Furthermore, as with the novels examined in Chapters 4 and 5, emotion is thematically significant in *The Unconsole*. It was noted above that human behaviour does not operate in expected ways in the novel, and I argue in section 6.4 that the representation of emotion serves to enhance the unusual and challenging aspects of the narrative. In comparison with the novels analysed in Chapters 4 and 5, which dealt with emotional repression and verisimilitude respectively, the theme of emotional extremes is central in *The Unconsole* (see section 6.4 below). Readers report experiencing a range of emotional responses to the text, which are also examined in sections 6.2 to 6.5.

In this chapter I refer to internet-based reader response data which I collected from open access forums and weblogs (see section 3.3.2 for details regarding my method). Compared with the face-to-face discussions used in Chapters 4 and 5, it is much harder to obtain reliable information about the identities of these readers. In order to anonymise the posts I quote, they are referred to by a number and letter (which pertains to their location in the Dataset) rather than by their internet names. The internet postings which are referred to in this chapter are collected in Appendix 4. *The Unconsole* appears to polarise opinion amongst readers as well as critics, demonstrated by the fact that the book features in threads about both ‘most loved’ and ‘most hated’ or ‘top ten unfinished’ reads. One reader notes: ‘I loved it. And hated parts of it at the same time’ (E11.1), whilst another proposes that it should feature on a thread about ‘books you have read but wished you hadn’t’ (C3). Most of the comments which readers posted are concerned with describing the experience of reading the novel and offering explanations for its unusual narrative features. When describing the emotional effects of the novel, frustration features highly in the accounts which I examined, for example: ‘I had to remind myself to remain calm because it was “just a book”. Every page is endlessly frustrating’ (B6); it ‘makes your innards squirm with confusion and teeth-gritting frustration’ (B13, see also A6; B1; D1; E1; E4, E20). Readers also mention feeling bewildered, disoriented, disturbed or stressed (e.g. B6; B13; D11; E2; E13) and some highlight the humorous or funny parts of the text (e.g. B6; D1; E12; E13; E16; E21). Unlike the literary-critical responses described above, there were no explicitly metatextual readings in Dataset 3, though one reader describes the narrative ‘trick[s]’ and says ‘I loved *The Unconsole* on a purely aesthetic basis’ (E13). Overarching metaphorical readings were also less common, although some readers perceived existential themes in the novel, for example: ‘Who am I? Where am I? What am I supposed to be doing? Profound questions that this novel has enriched for me, without offering any answers’ (D14, see also E16). The most popular explanation for the unusual aspects of the narrative is that it is a dream or designed to be dream-like (e.g. A2; A3; A4; A5; A9; B1; B6; B13; E2; E14; E14.4; E17; E19; E21). Alternatively, several readers suggest

that Ryder has some form of amnesia or memory loss, or is simply insane (e.g. E11.1; E14; E17).

In section 6.2 below I examine the text-worlds created by the opening paragraphs of *The Unconsoled*. In sections 6.3 and 6.4 I use Text World Theory to consider some of the effects and experiences described by ‘real’ readers, paying specific attention to the importance of the discourse-world resources which readers utilise when constructing their text-worlds. Extending observations made in section 5.3.1, I argue that the interaction between readers’ knowledge structures and the text has emotional implications which have only been implicitly acknowledged within Text World Theory to date.

## **6.2. The Text-Worlds of *The Unconsoled***


At the discourse-world level, *The Unconsoled* features the discourse-participants Kazuo Ishiguro and the real reader, occupying different spatio-temporal points in a ‘split’ discourse world (Werth 1999: 54-5). Unlike *The Remains of the Day* (2005 [1989]) and *Never Let Me Go* (2005), *The Unconsoled* features minimal titling which does not supply readers with world-building information regarding the text-worlds of the narrative (such as the time and place of narration). Instead, the title page features a single numeral: ‘I’, marking the first of the novel’s four parts, before the narrative itself begins. This minimal titling is textually deictic, thus could cue a text-world in the readers’ mind featuring an enactor of the implied author and the reader in communication (shown in light grey shading in Figure 6.0 below). However, I would argue that compared with the other novels examined in this thesis, this initial world is likely to be more fleeting or indeed readers may skip over the title page without representing it conceptually at all. As such, the relationship between the implied author and implied reader is not initially reinstated at the text-world level in the same way as it was in the novels analysed in Chapters 4 and 5. The novel’s opening paragraphs, which begin *in medias res*, are quoted below:

[1] The taxi driver seemed embarrassed to find there was no one – not even a clerk behind the reception desk – waiting to welcome me. [2] He wandered across the deserted lobby, perhaps hoping to discover a staff member concealed behind one of the plants or armchairs. [3] Eventually he put my suitcases down beside the elevator doors and, mumbling some excuse, took his leave of me.

[4] The lobby was reasonably spacious, allowing several coffee tables to be spread around it with no sense of crowding. [5] But the ceiling was low and had a definite sag, creating a slightly claustrophobic mood, and despite the sunshine outside the light was gloomy. [6] Only near the reception desk was there a bright streak of sun on the wall, illuminating an area of dark wood panelling and a rack of magazines in German, French and English. [7] I could see also a small silver bell on the reception desk and was about to go over to shake it when a door opened somewhere behind me and a young man in uniform appeared. (Ishiguro 1995: 3, my sentence numbering)

The presence of internally focalised first-person narrative cues an epistemic modal-world because all the world-building and function-advancing information is filtered through the unverifiable perspective of a text-world enactor (Gavins 2007). This initial world is shown as Epistemic Modal-World 1 in Figure 6.0 below. However, the narrative of *The Unconsoled* immediately switches away from this initial epistemic modal-world because of the use of the past tense and epistemic modality in the first sentence ('seemed'). Several further embedded modal-worlds and world-switches form the dominant level of readers' mental representations. The epistemic modal-world cued by the first sentence is followed by two negated text-worlds ('no-one...waiting' and 'not even a clerk'). The second sentence cues an epistemic-modal world set in the past, with further epistemic and boulomaic worlds ('perhaps'; 'hoping') cued by the narrator's inferences about the taxi-driver's thoughts (these worlds are shown in Figure 6.0). This opening paragraph also provides detailed world-building information about Ryder's surroundings; including the presence of 'plants'; 'armchairs'; 'suitcases'; 'the lobby'; 'reception desk', and so on. These recognisable world-builders act as 'headers' which activate discourse-participants' frame-knowledge (Schank and Abelson 1977: 48-50; Stockwell 2002: 78), enabling readers to infer that Ryder is in a hotel even though the text does not explicitly state this. In Figure 6.0 the activation of readers' HOTEL knowledge-frame is shown by the shaded box (see section 6.3 below for further discussion of knowledge-frames and *The Unconsoled*).

Although these opening paragraphs provide a lot of world-building information about Ryder's immediate situation and the objects surrounding him, unlike *The Remains of the Day* (2005 [1989]) and *Never Let Me Go* (2005), neither the titling nor the narrative of *The Unconsoled* explicitly specifies the spatio-temporal location of the narrator's telling. As such, it is difficult to establish a clear sense of the temporal relationship between the content time and coding time of the narrative (Green 1992). The use of the past tense suggests that the narrator is relating events from a spatio-temporal point subsequent to their occurrence, but adverbials such as 'Eventually' (sentence 3), 'was about to go over' (sentence 7) and the use of indirect reference ('a young man in uniform' (sentence 7) rather than 'the receptionist') create a sense of immediacy as if events and perceptions are being presented as-they-happened rather than from a distanced, retrospective perspective. The 'epic situation' of the narrative (Romberg 1962) or the spatio-temporal location of Epistemic Modal-World 1 featuring the narrator in the act of telling, is left unspecified. Therefore, the text-worlds of *The Unconsoled* conform to the account of first-person fixed focalisation given by Gavins (2007: 133) and Lahey (2003, 2005) in which the initial text-world level of



**Figure 6.0.** Text-worlds cued by the opening two sentences of *The Unconsoled*

the discourse is 'empty', save for the presence of the narrator-enactor (the 'empty' status of Epistemic Modal-World 1 is indicated by the grey shading in Figure 6.0).

I believe that this lack of an epic situation has several consequences for the experiential 'feel' of the discourse and is a very important factor in the difference between *The Unconsoled* (2005 [1995]) and Ishiguro's other novels, such as those examined in Chapters 4 and 5. The discourse of *The Unconsoled* consists solely of the embedded enactor-accessible modal-worlds formed by Ryder's past-tense narration, which exist at a considerable conceptual distance from the discourse-world reader (Gavins 2005). Readers

must use the information contained within these worlds in order to construct a coherent representation of the discourse, whilst at the same time the fictionality and potential unreliability of the focaliser is highlighted (Gavins 2001, 2005, 2007). Though both *The Remains of the Day* (2005 [1989]) and *Never Let Me Go* (2005) also consist predominantly of these types of worlds, I would argue that the epic situation which is established in the initial stages of these discourses and returned to throughout makes it easier for reader to orient themselves and project into the text-worlds they create. *The Unconsoled*, however, does not re-establish a communicative situation at the text-world level, and as a result the various discursual roles (such as the implied reader, narratee or narrative audience) which formed a crucial part of the analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 appear less relevant in an account of the text-worlds it creates. The narratee role is not foregrounded in the same way because, unlike Stevens and Kathy, Ryder does not make self-referential comments or use direct address. He does not appear to be self-consciously presenting his memories in the same way as the other narrators, and indeed it seems plausible that Ryder is not consciously narrating to anyone at all. Because the narrator does not appear to be cooperatively addressing a narratee, in my reading of the *The Unconsoled* I felt as though I was experiencing text-world events alongside Ryder rather than as an addressee or overhearer of his discourse. The unusual text-world events are presented with minimal mediation from the narrator-enactor which makes reading the novel both a disorienting and bewildering experience. As noted in section 6.1, several readers in Dataset 3 also described the novel as disorienting, bewildering and stressful (e.g. B6; B13; D11; E2; E13).

A further disorienting feature of the text-worlds of *The Unconsoled* is that the location of the city in which narrative events take place is also made ambiguous. Certain world-builders in the opening paragraphs, such as 'magazines in German, French and English' (sentence 6) suggest that Ryder may be somewhere in Europe, and this inference is supported by world-builders later in the chapter such as a 'Hungarian café' (2005 [1995]: 7), 'Old Town' (2005 [1995]: 13) and proper names such as 'Hoffman' (2005 [1995]: 3), 'Brotsky' (2005 [1995]: 4), 'Gustav' (2005 [1995]: 4) and 'Stratmann' (2005 [1995]: 10). However, the name of the city which Ryder is visiting is never specified by the text and instead information conspires to rule out possible discourse-world counterparts. Interestingly, whilst Ishiguro's other novels have been set in counterparts of discourse-world locations, such as England, China or Japan, the city featured in *The Unconsoled* is never named and appears to be a fictional amalgamation of several European places (see Robinson 2006 for more on the setting of the novel).

So far my analysis has highlighted some of the differences between *The Unconsoled* and the novels studied in Chapters 4 and 5, but there are also similarities. In particular, as

with all Ishiguro's novels, the potential unreliability of the narrator is a central feature (e.g. see sections 4.1, 4.2, and 5.2). As Gavins (2001, 2005, 2007) notes, first-person narratives are dominated by enactor-accessible epistemic modal-worlds and the reliability of the information they contain cannot be verified by readers. As such, discourses employing this mode of narration often cast doubt upon the reliability of the narrators and play 'tricks' on discourse-world participants seeking to construct coherent text-world representations. In the opening chapter of *The Unconsoled* the reliability of Ryder's perspective is undermined by incidences of direct speech and a high frequency of epistemic and perception modality (Simpson 1993). For example, as Ryder is being checked in to the hotel, the receptionist refers to 'Thursday night' and a person named 'Mr Brodsky' and acts as if Ryder should be aware of their significance. Though he is not sure what the receptionist is talking about, Ryder nods along and pretends to understand (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 3-4). Later in the chapter, Miss Stratmann, a representative from the Civil Arts institute who is there to welcome Ryder assures him that his lateness was not a problem, and asks whether he approves of his schedule. Again, Ryder was not aware that he was late and cannot recall seeing a schedule. Nevertheless, he pretends to Miss Stratmann that he understands perfectly (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 11). Up until the fifteenth page of the novel, Ryder's lack of comprehension could be explained as the fault of his interlocutors rather than his own deficiency. However, when he arrives in his hotel room and reflects upon these conversations, it is his reliability which appears suspect:

Clearly, this city was expecting of me something more than a simple recital. But when I tried to recall some basic details about the present visit, I had little success... I thought again about the name Brodsky and this time I had the distinct impression I had either heard or read about him in the not so distant past. And then suddenly a moment came back to me from the long plane journey I had just completed. I had been sitting in the darkened cabin, the other passengers asleep around me, studying the schedule for this visit under the dim beam of the reading light...All this now returned to me clearly enough. Indeed, I could recall the very texture of the thick grey paper on which the schedule has been typed...but try as I might, I could remember nothing of what had been written on that sheet. (Ishiguro 1995: 15)

Here it becomes clear that Ryder's memory is failing him and that he *should* be aware of the significance of 'Thursday night', 'Mr Brodsky' and the contents of his schedule. This passage exhibits a high frequency of epistemic and perception modality (such as 'clearly', 'recall', 'remember') which, as Simpson (1993) notes, creates the impression of 'uncertainty, bewilderment and alienation' (1993: 53). This epistemic modality creates a negative shading (Simpson 1993) which is prevalent throughout the novel and is also a feature of the other Ishiguro novels examined in this thesis. In Text World Theory terms, the passage above creates multiple embedded epistemic modal-worlds, which when coupled with the 'empty'

text-world level, means that the contents of the worlds cued by the discourse are held at a significant conceptual distance (Gavins 2005). The result is quite disorienting, as it emerges that Ryder has arrived at a hotel in an indeterminate city with no clear knowledge of what he is supposed to be doing there – and because he is the only access readers have to text-world events, they are similarly in the dark. In the reader response data I collected, some readers seek to explain Ryder's unusual lack of knowledge by attributing to him some form of chronic memory loss: 'At first, you think Ryder is suffering from some kind of amnesia' (E14); 'one way of looking at it, I suppose, is that the central character suffers from a form of short term memory loss' (D1). However, the respondent in D1 goes on to note that 'that explanation doesn't even begin to provide the key to all of *The Unconsoled's* mysteries'.

Indeed, other aspects of the opening chapter are considered in section 6.3.1 below and raise further doubts not only about Ryder's memory but also his perceptions. In the text-worlds of *The Unconsoled*, time, space and human beings appear to behave differently than in the discourse-world, which compounds the disorienting effects described above. I suggest that readers' emotional responses to the novel are likely to be related to the interaction between the text and their world knowledge, and are also involved in readers' desire to 'make sense' of the text's confusing and challenging aspects. In sections 6.3 and 6.4 below I give more consideration to these elements of the discourse.

### **6.3 Knowledge and Emotion**

The Text World Theory analyses conducted in sections 4.2, 5.2 and 5.3.2 highlighted the importance of readers' knowledge frames in text-world construction. In section 5.3.2, I noted that when textual information clashed with my discourse-world knowledge, it impacted upon my positioning within the discourse and my emotional experience of the text. In this section I review cognitive-poetic approaches to the structure and deployment of knowledge during literary reading and extend my discussion of the role of knowledge in emotional experience. As discussed in section 2.2.1, Text World Theory places great importance upon the role of knowledge in discourse. Discourse itself is regarded as a process of knowledge exchange between participants, and the production and comprehension of discourse would be impossible without the human knowledge resources which are utilised in text-world construction (Gavins 2007: 21; Werth 1999: 94-115). Werth (1999) conceives of knowledge as organised into 'frames' which relate to particular situation-types or areas of experience. Werth's use of the term 'frame' originates from the work of Minsky (1975) in psychology and Fillmore (1982; 1985) and Lakoff (1987) in cognitive linguistics, but the terms 'schema' and 'script' are other popular and roughly synonymous terms for knowledge structures used across cognitive psychology, artificial



intelligence, cognitive linguistics and cognitive poetics (e.g. for the use of schema see Bartlett 1995 [1932]; Chafe 1977a, 1977b; Cook 1994; Rumelhart 1975; Semino 1997; Stockwell 2002, and for script see Schank 1982; Schank and Abelson 1977; Stockwell 2002).

Ryan's (1991) 'principle of minimal departure' (see also Emmot 1997: 129; Gavins 2007: 12; Stockwell 2002: 96) states that when processing narrative discourse, readers typically assume that the world represented by the text operates in the same way as the discourse-world unless they are presented with information to the contrary. This means that they automatically draw upon their knowledge frames regarding the discourse-world in order to comprehend text-world situations. In the first seven sentences of *The Unconsoled*, discussed in section 6.2, world-building information evokes readers' knowledge frames regarding hotels, providing a fairly recognisable context to Ryder's actions. However, later in the opening chapter aspects of the discourse challenge the principle of minimal departure and mark the text-worlds of *The Unconsoled* as quite deviant from discourse-world parameters. Semino (1997) notes that a theory of the organisation of human knowledge is particularly useful when analysing literary texts which go against many of 'the assumptions and expectations readers are likely to have' (1997: 122). Indeed, such theories are particularly useful when considering the effects of *The Unconsoled*. In what follows, I shall consider the way in which knowledge structures are addressed in cognitive poetics before going on to analyse particular extracts from the novel in section 6.3.1.

Within cognitive poetics, psychological and linguistic theories of knowledge structure have been adopted as a means of analysing literary texts, most notably by Cook (1994; see also Cockcroft 2002; Culpeper 2001; Montoro 2007; Semino 1997; Stockwell 2002). Theories about knowledge structure enable cognitive-poetic researchers to analyse the effects of literary discourse in terms of the interaction between the text and the readers' knowledge of the world. Cook (1994) posits that texts can have various effects upon readers' knowledge frames (which he refers to as schemas). Schema 'preserving' discourses simply maintain existing schemata, or add information to existing schemas through schema 'accretion' (Cook 1994: 192; Stockwell 2002: 79). Schema 'reinforcing' discourses are those which strengthen existing schemas in readers' knowledgebase, often those pertaining to stereotypes (Cook 1994: 192). Schema 'disruption' or 'refreshment' occurs when textual information presents a challenge to existing schemas; destroying them, causing new schemas to be constructed or prompting the connection of existing schemas in new ways (Cook 1994: 191).

Cook (1994) uses schema theory to advance a theory of literariness, proposing that texts which are considered literary are those which prompt schema disruption and

refreshment, whilst non-literary discourses such as advertising tend to be schema reinforcing. This claim has attracted some criticism, primarily because of the rather simplistic opposition it poses between the literary and the non-literary (Gavins 2001; Jeffries 2001; Semino 1997). Semino (1997) rightly points out not all literary texts exhibit the deviant and schema-refreshing properties which Cook suggests and that discourse deviation can be evident in non-literary discourses such as advertising. She proposes that texts regarded as literary in fact range on a continuum from schema reinforcement at one end and schema refreshment at the other (Semino 1997). Schema theory as practised by both Cook (1994) and Semino (1997) is also criticised by Jeffries (2001, reviewed in section 4.3.3) who proposes that describing texts as 'schema refreshing' overall overlooks the fact that readers can conceivably bring more than one set of schemata to bear on any text. Thus, whilst a text may be schema refreshing in terms of the way it questions dominant patriarchal or cultural 'norms', it may be schema 'affirming' for those who do not fully identify with those norms, prompting a 'thrill of recognition' for which Cook's model fails to account (Jeffries 2001: 334). Thus, as Jeffries (2001) points out, within cognitive poetics schema theory can lead to rather simplistic analyses which fail to address the nuances of readerly engagement.

There are also further more fundamental problems involved in studying the interaction between knowledge structures and literary texts. Firstly, there are relatively few empirical studies of schema-based language processing (see Edwards 1997 for an exception), and even if there were it would be almost impossible to find empirical evidence contradicting schema theory (Gavins 2001: 41-2; Jeffries 2001: 333; Semino 1997: 149). This is because the theory is not sufficiently constrained in order to generate predictions that can be disproved by empirical means. In addition, both in artificial intelligence and in cognitive poetics, the labelling of frames or schemas is particularly problematic and tends to be carried out on a seemingly *ad hoc* basis. There are no clear constraints on the parameters of frames or their labels, thus it can sometimes seem that they are selected purely in order to suit the aims of the researcher or the discourse under scrutiny. A particularly exaggerated example of this practice is apparent in Culpeper's (2001: 265-285) analysis of schema refreshment in Shakespeare's *The Taming of the Shrew*. Culpeper argues that this text refreshes the readers' SHREW schema through its representation of the character Katherina. However, the idea that all (or indeed most) readers will have a clearly delineated SHREW schema (as opposed to RAT or MOUSE schema, for example) is problematic and highly questionable. As Gavins (2001: 42-3) notes, Culpeper's use of schema theory can be perceived as part of wider cognitive-poetic tendency to attempt to

add 'scientific weight' to what is actually a highly subjective reading (for a similar critique see Allington 2005).

Furthermore, within artificial intelligence research, notions of frames, scripts or schemas were originally designed in order to aid computer programming and help deal with information processing problems such as visual recognition and text understanding (Cook 1994: 9). They are not designed as explanations of real-life human discourse processing and as such there are limits to their application in this area of research (Gavins 2001: 41). In the context of the present discussion, a particular problem with the use of schema theory or the notion of knowledge frames is their failure to address emotional concerns. Presumably, in the context of artificial intelligence in the 1970s, the potential connection between knowledge structures and emotion was unlikely to be a great concern. In the context of human discourse processing, however, the connections between knowledge structures and emotion becomes more relevant.

Despite the psychological and methodological flaws inherent in discussions of knowledge frames, scripts or schemas, these theories of knowledge structure have been enormously influential in cognitive science and linguistics. This is because the notion of schemas or frames provides a common-sense framework for the discussion of the structures and processes of human knowledge and retrieval which, as yet, has not been superseded by an alternative or more satisfactory approach. Within Text World Theory, Werth's use of the concept of knowledge frames is fundamental to his account of the 'text-drivenness' of discourse and enables discourse context to be approached in a systematic and manageable way (1999: 149). In the present discussion, therefore, whilst I acknowledge some of the problems associated with knowledge frames I continue to draw upon these ideas in my analyses. It is also my intention to emphasise the potential connection between knowledge frames and readers' emotional experience of discourse. This observation is certainly not new, as I will explain below. However, it seems to me that Text World Theory approaches to emotion could be improved with a greater recognition of this connection.

In her work on schema theory and poetry, Semino (1997) directly addresses issues of emotion in relation to the knowledge which readers utilise during discourse processing. She notes that Bartlett (1995 [1932]: 206-7), who first used the term 'schema' in cognitive psychology, highlighted the importance of emotional and attitudinal factors in cognitive activities and argues that these interests should be reinstated in cognitive-poetic approaches. Reviewing psychological work on memory and emotion, Semino concludes that 'if affective states can act as retrieval cues, material in memory must be marked according to the feelings that are associated with it' (1997: 151). She incorporates the likely emotional associations of different schemata into her poetic analyses, for example she

identifies scenes typically associated with negative affect states (e.g. losing a loved one), positive affect states (e.g. meeting a loved one) and neutral affect states (e.g. going to the supermarket) and argues that these affect states may be elicited as a result of the activation of readers' schematic knowledge (Semino 1997: 151).

Within Text World Theory, Lahey (2005) briefly posits the existence of 'emotional schemata' which are 'bound to existing knowledge frames' for specific landscapes (2005: 277-9). She notes that landscapes are often associated with particular emotions due to the socio-cultural connections or personal memories they evoke, and goes on to suggest that all types of entities and situations may have associated emotional schemata which are activated when they appear in a discourse (2005: 277; see also Montoro 2007: 79 regarding 'affective schemas'). A similar view is expressed by Oatley, who notes that the memories which readers' draw upon during literary reading can evoke emotions which are 'not just recalled' but 'relived' (Oatley 1994: 63; see also Burke 2008: 55, 185; Hogan 2003b: 157-62, 183; Oatley 1991: 101, 1994, 1999, 2002; Oatley and Gholomain 1997; and see Bower and Cohen 1982; Fiske 1982 in social psychology). Thus, research in this area suggests that emotion may form *part* of participants' knowledge frames, and be experienced as particular knowledge frames are activated during discourse processing.

More implicitly, work in schema theory and cognitive approaches to humour suggest that emotion can arise as a direct result of the *interaction* between readers' knowledge frames and textual information. Cook (1994) makes a brief but significant link between schema disruption and emotional effects when he writes:

My claim is that the primary function of certain discourses is to effect a change in the schemata of their readers. Sensations of pleasure, escape, profundity, and elevation are conceivably offshoots of this function. (Cook 1994: 191)

Here, Cook seems to suggest that schema change can be felt and experienced emotionally, and this idea is also reflected in Jeffries' (2001) claim that texts which 'affirm' readers schemas can result in a 'thrill' of recognition (2001: 334). Though these comments are brief, I believe they are significant and suggest that knowledge frame disruption, refreshment and preservation could conceivably be regarded as having emotional implications. This connection between emotion and frame disruption or change is also implicitly supported by cognitive humour theories such as those posited by Raskin (1985), Attardo and Raskin (1991) and Attardo (2001) (see also Semino 1997: 137; Simpson 1998; 2000; 2003). According to these theorists, the experience of humour centres around the creation of incongruity through frame opposition. For example, Semino (1997) notes that jokes often 'achieve their effect by leading interpreters to activate a particular script and then forcing them to switch to another' (1997: 127). Simpson (2003) provides a useful

stylistic reappraisal of these humour theories and notes that frame opposition is not only the preserve of comedy. He emphasises that the way in which incongruity (the mismatch between textual information and a reader's frame) is interpreted and responded to is largely dependent upon its linguistic and extra-linguistic context (2003: 42; see also 1993). Conceivably, then, texts which challenge or disrupt readers' frame knowledge are likely to engender a range of responses, including emotional responses, depending upon the particular discourse context.

In his account of schema theory, Stockwell (2002) usefully highlights that schema disruption, refreshment and accretion are the outcome of reader-led interpretative processes which mediate the interaction between textual information and reader knowledge (see also Cook 1994: 248). He connects Cook's (1994) typology of schema change with de Beaugrande's (1980) notions of 'informativity', which pertains to how new or expected a particular textual occurrence is, and 'downgrading' which refers to the way in which unexpected or improbable occurrences are assimilated into readers' existing knowledge (Stockwell 2002: 80). He notes that when readers engage with texts which present a challenge or disruption to their frame knowledge, they are motivated to resolve this challenge before schema refreshment is undertaken. In section 6.3.1 below I am interested in the responses which ensue when the text-worlds of *The Unconsoled* make an unannounced departure from the assumptions and expectations generated by readers' discourse-world knowledge. In my analysis I follow Stockwell's (2002) fusion of the theories of Cook (1994) and de Beaugrande (1980), and argue that these interpretative processes can be seen as emotional in several respects.

### **6.3.1 Unreality in *The Unconsoled***

In section 6.2 I analysed the opening sentences of *The Unconsoled* in which Ryder enters a hotel in an unnamed city and is met, eventually, by a hotel receptionist. Continuing on from this, Ryder is checked in to the hotel and the receptionist indicates that he is to follow the porter, Gustav, to his room. This sequence of events forms an unremarkable part of my HOTEL frame which was activated by referential, world-building items in the opening few lines of the text (Werth 1999: 53). Ryder's narration then reads:

...an elderly porter was waiting across the lobby. He was standing in front of the open elevator, staring into its interior with a preoccupied air. He gave a start as I came walking up to him. He then picked up my suitcases and hurried into the elevator after me... As we began our ascent... (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 4-5)

I posit that this sequence of events activates readers' ELEVATOR frame knowledge. In section 6.3, however, I noted that the naming of frames in this manner is particularly problematic. One could argue that the other referential items in the above extract ('suitcases', 'porter' and 'lobby') are also frame-evoking, or could simply assert that all the

referential items in the above passage form part of the HOTEL frame previously identified. I specify an ELEVATOR frame here because readers' knowledge about the features and processes involved in riding elevators is partially challenged by the discourse (more so than knowledge regarding suitcases, for example; see discussion below). As further justification, the activation of knowledge about this area of experience would enable readers to predict the sequence of events which were to follow in the narrative. As noted in section 5.4, the activation of this type of frame knowledge would form part of the predictive inferencing which readers perform automatically in order to (ideally) facilitate comprehension of incoming discourse (Magliano et al 1996; Rapp and Gerrig 2002, 2006). Once activated by textual cues, frame knowledge is used to fill in unstated information and make inferences about textual events. For example, I posit that my ELEVATOR frame includes functional information about the typical sequence of actions involved in using elevators, which enabled me to assume that the elevator doors closed before Ryder and the porter began their ascent, even though this is not explicitly mentioned in the text. Other aspects of my ELEVATOR frame knowledge, which will become relevant to the subsequent discussion, include the fact that elevators are generally small spaces which can contain only small groups of people, and that elevator journeys are typically short in duration (no more than a few minutes). Although I have encountered other types of elevators (e.g. elevators with manual doors, paternosters, enormous elevators which accommodate larger amounts of people), the information presented here forms part of my prototypical notion of an elevator, built up over repeated exposure to similar elevator-related situations (Rosch 1975, 1977, 1978, 1988; Stockwell 2002: 27-40; Werth 1999: 1, 41-2). The elevator prototype which I draw upon to understand the text is obviously culturally determined: for example people who are used to living and working in high-rise buildings may be more accustomed to lengthy elevator rides. In my reading of the text, this elevator-related information is automatically brought to bear on my text-world representation of the discourse and I unconsciously assume that the elevator in the text-world of *The Unconsoled* will operate like the ones I have encountered in the discourse-world.

Once they are in the elevator, Gustav the porter insists on holding both of Ryder's suitcases for the duration of their trip, despite Ryder's concerns that he is dangerously over-exerting himself. Gustav explains that they are 'not going up far', and the two enter into dialogue about Gustav's life as a porter (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 4). Direct speech cues a world-switch from the past-tense of the narrative to the present-tense of the time of speech. Thus, as the characters converse, the text toggles between the epistemic modal-worlds of the narrative and the various speech-induced world-switches. Gustav's utterances

are extremely long, covering several pages of block text, and enter into repetitive detail. For example, a single utterance features the following repetitions:

‘once – oh, it was many years ago now - my wife and I took a short holiday. We went to Switzerland, to Lucerne... Well sir, one day – it wasn’t long after our short holiday in Lucerne... And as I explained to you, sir, I was fresh from our short holiday in Lucerne...I’d seen something different in Lucerne...’ (Ishiguro 1995: 5-7)

As he speaks, Gustav explains that his habit of holding on to client’s bags is a way of demonstrating commitment to the portering profession. Through this display of dedication he, and the other porters of the city, aim to elevate people’s respect and esteem for hotel porters. In my reading of the text I followed Gustav’s lengthy explanations, but remained aware that the pair were conversing in an elevator and that their journey, which Gustav said would not be long, was yet to be completed. The conversation lasts for four and a half pages (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 5-9), and the elevator journey itself for a further two and a half (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 5-11); much longer than I expected it to based on my discourse-world knowledge. Taken alone, the fact that the elevator journey departs in duration from my frame-based assumptions may seem a relatively minor issue. However, the spatial dimensions of the elevator also appear to depart from what one might expect. In my reading of the text, I imagined Ryder and Gustav to be situated in quite a small and enclosed space whilst riding in the elevator; again in accordance with my ELEVATOR prototype. During the last of his lengthy monologues, Gustav makes reference to a ‘Miss Hilde’, who he claims will be able to ‘vouch for what I’m saying’ (Ishiguro 1995: 9). As Ryder asks who Miss Hilde is, he suddenly realises that there is another person in the elevator: a Miss Hilde Strattman.

‘Pardon me, ‘I said, ‘but who is this Miss Hilde you keep referring to?’  
No sooner had I said this, I noticed that the porter was gazing past my shoulder at some spot behind me. Turning, I saw with a start that we were not alone in the elevator. A small young woman in a neat business suit was standing pressed into the corner behind me. Perceiving that I had at last noticed her, she smiled and took a step forward. (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 9)

Ryder’s description of Miss Strattman as ‘pressed into the corner’ reinforces my image of a small, enclosed space. But the adverbial ‘at last’ in the penultimate line of the extract above suggests that Miss Strattman has been present in the elevator since the beginning of their journey, and this is further supported by the fact that she goes on to offer her opinion on Gustav’s speech. In my reading of the text, the sudden appearance of Miss Strattman was quite surprising and posed a serious challenge to my construction of a coherent mental representation of the text. My discourse-world knowledge led me to expect that upon entering an enclosed space like an elevator, the protagonist would be aware of all the

entities inside it. This new world-building information requires readers to engage in 'world repair' (Gavins 2007: 141-2) as they quickly adjust their text-world representation in order to include a new enactor. It also highlights the enactor-accessible nature of the text-worlds created by *The Unconsoled*, and the potential unreliability of Ryder's perceptions as focaliser. *The Unconsoled* is full of such incidences which contradict the assumptions and inferences generated by readers' frame knowledge.

In his work in text-processing, de Beaugrande (1980), provides a useful way of conceptualising such challenges; in terms of first, second or third order 'informativity'. The 'informativity' of a particular occurrence is defined as its relative probability (likelihood and predictability) as compared to other alternatives (de Beaugrande 1980: 103). Thus, if a particular text-world occurrence is highly probable and likely, it has first-order informativity, and requires little processing effort. In Cook's (1994) terms, it is schema reinforcing or preserving (see also Stockwell 2002: 80). For example, if a tree in a text-world described as having a trunk, this is highly expected and forms part of our knowledge about trees, thus has first-order informativity and can be processed easily. When an occurrence is in the middle or lower-middle degrees of probability, it has second order informativity, which Stockwell suggests develops schematic knowledge by accretion (2002: 80). For example, if a tree is described as having multiple trunks, 'we are more interested, but not disoriented' (de Beaugrande 1980: 108); the occurrence may be non-typical but still conceivable. De Beaugrande suggests that the presence of at least some second order informativity is likely to be a standard for most texts – as without this we would quickly find them uninteresting (1980: 107, 114). Third order informativity refers to occurrences construed as being outside the range of more or less probable options (de Beaugrande 1980: 105-7). This level of informativity can cause schema disruption and refreshment, unless some resolution for the disruption can be found (Stockwell 2002: 80). For example, if the tree were described as having no trunk at all, with its branches simply hovering in mid-air, this would have third order informativity. De Beaugrande notes that in such cases readers will 'expect an explanation' or assume that they are dealing with a highly fictional world, which in Text World Theory terms would be seen to depart considerably from discourse-world parameters (de Beaugrande 1980: 108). Thus, when readers encounter the higher orders of informativity, in which they are presented with less probable or highly improbable occurrences, they are motivated to find an explanation for the unexpected material and attempt to assimilate such occurrences into existing knowledge frames (de Beaugrande 1980: 107; Stockwell 2002: 80).

De Beaugrande calls this process of explanation-searching 'downgrading' and identifies three different types of this activity:



If people regress to occurrences of a considerably earlier time to find the motivating pathway, they are doing BACKWARD downgrading; (2) if they wait and look ahead to further occurrences, they are doing FORWARD downgrading; (3) if they go outside the current context, they are doing OUTWARD downgrading. (de Beaugrande 1980: 107)

For example, if in everyday life you were suddenly arrested without warning and for no visible reason, you would likely try to downgrade this third order occurrence by searching your memories for possible reasons for the arrest (backward downgrading). You might decide to wait to be told the reason by a police officer (forward downgrading). Or, you might try to remember other cases where someone was arrested because of mistaken identity (outward downgrading) (de Beaugrande 1980: 108). De Beaugrande suggests that textual communication functions by maintaining 'a continual cycle of disturbing and restoring stability' through the interaction between informativity and problem-solving processes (1980: 114).

To return to the example from the opening chapter of *The Unconsoled*, both the extended conversation in the elevator and the presence of an unnoticed entity in such a confined space have a high level of informativity in de Beaugrande's terms. In my reading of the text, the first of these incidents had second order informativity, as it seemed strange but not wholly unexplainable. I presumed that there would be some reason for the length of the elevator journey given in future text, thus used forward downgrading to explain this occurrence. In terms of my ELEVATOR frame knowledge, I assumed there would be some reason why my prototypical assumptions about the duration of elevator journeys did not apply in this context. The sudden appearance of Miss Stratman, however, I found more alarming and would class as more of a third order incident. However, even this unusual occurrence could be backwardly downgraded through inferences about Ryder's state of mind. Earlier in the text Ryder mentions his lack of energy, and the hotel receptionist tells him 'you must be tired after such a long journey' (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 4). In my reading of the text I assumed that the third-order aspects of the narrative were due to his severe jetlag or exhaustion – an assumption that is given further support at the end of the chapter when Ryder describes his weariness 'engulfing' him and falls into a 'deep and exhausted sleep' (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 14). This third-order occurrence is thus downgraded by recourse to Ryder's unreliability as a focaliser and no further restructuring of my knowledge frames is required.

Perhaps because of its context in text-processing research of the early 1980s, at a time when emotion was not a central concern in the cognitive sciences or discourse analysis, de Beaugrande's (1980) work on informativity and downgrading makes no explicit reference to the emotional aspects of such processing practices. However, I believe that

emotion could be implicated in this account of the interaction between textual information and readerly knowledge in several ways. Firstly, as noted in sections 2.2.1 and 5.2.1, Text World Theory posits that discourse participants are willingly engaged in communication (Gavins 2007). As such, it can be supposed that readers are motivated to achieve coherence in their text-world representations (if at all possible). According to the cognitive emotion theories reviewed in section 3.1.2, an individual's goal or desires feed into in their appraisal processes and are therefore emotionally relevant. When textual information appears incongruous or incoherent, readers could experience this emotionally as it interferes with readerly goals. Secondly, emotion is often noted as having an attention-directing function which orients individuals towards particular objects or goals (e.g. Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991, 2000; Matthews 1998 [1993]; Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1996; Ortony, Clore and Collins 1998; Salovey and Meyer 1998 [1990]). Gerrig (1993: 67) posits that emotional responses to narrative worlds (which are part of his notion of 'participatory responses' reviewed in section 5.4) often provide the impetus for inferencing because of the way they retune readerly attention. If higher levels of informativity were experienced emotionally, perhaps generating surprise, frustration or a less nameable sense of unease, it could explain the way in which readers become motivated to search for resolution through downgrading. Thus, my surprise when Miss Strattman appears in the elevator could redirect my attention into inferring explanations and resolving the incongruity presented by the text. Thirdly, the outcome of these downgrading processes could also be perceived as emotionally relevant. If readers are able to infer a satisfactory explanation for the incongruity in the text they may experience a positive emotion, or perhaps if there is a lack of explanation other more negative emotional responses such as frustration may ensue. It seems to me that the interpretative processes mapped out by de Beaugrande (1980) and the notion of schema manipulation proposed by Cook (1994) could be intimately entangled with the emotion processes set out in cognitive theories of emotion. I should stress that it is not my intention to attempt to establish the precise relationship between emotion and these interpretative processes. This is an area requiring further interdisciplinary research which is beyond the scope of the present thesis. My intention is simply to highlight some of the potential theoretical connections between these areas, and to argue that emotion is implicated in the processes of knowledge activation and retrieval which occur during discourse processing.

Later on in the same opening chapter, there are further unusual narrative events which readers of *The Unconsoled* have to process. Eventually the elevator arrives at the correct floor and Gustav shows Ryder to his room. As Gustav is explaining the room's features and appliances, another third order incident occurs. A condensed version of the passage is provided here:

[1] I followed Gustav around the room while he pointed out switches and other facilities...[2] as he continued with his explanations, waving a hand towards various parts of the room, it occurred to me that for all his professionalism, for all his genuine desire to see me comfortable, a certain matter had again pushed its way to the front of his mind. [3] He was, in other words, worrying once more about his daughter and her little boy.

[4] When the arrangement had been proposed to him several months earlier, Gustav had little supposed it would bring him anything other than uncomplicated delight. [5] For an afternoon each week, he was to spend a couple of hours wandering around the Old Town with his grandson, thereby allowing Sophie to go off and enjoy a little time to herself [6]...then two weeks ago something had happened which the elderly porter had not been able to expel from his mind. [7] He had been walking with Boris past one of the numerous cafes in the Old Town when he has suddenly noticed his daughter sitting inside...alone, a cup of coffee before her, wearing a look of utter despondency. [8] The revelation that she had not found the energy to leave the Old Town at all, to say nothing of the expression on her face, had given the porter quite a shock...[9] it was the recollection of this incident that had leant him such a preoccupied air down in the lobby, and which was now troubling him once more as he showed me around my room. (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 13-14, my sentence numbering)

From around the second sentence of the above extract, something strange occurs. In sentence 2 and 3 Ryder narrates as though he has direct access to Gustav's mind and knows what he is thinking. Even stranger, Ryder uses the adverbial 'once more' which suggests that he has had access to Gustav's thoughts in the past. In the fourth sentence it seems that Ryder's first-person narration has cued a world-switch signalled by a tense change from the simple past ('he was' – sentence 3) to the past perfect ('had been proposed' – sentence 4). However, this world-switch is located 'several months earlier' (sentence 4) and describes an event in Gustav's life which must have occurred prior to his meeting Ryder in the hotel. These features create a problem on two levels. Firstly, as Ryder is a text-world enactor participating in the story, readers draw on their frame knowledge to assume that the constraints of real-world subjectivity apply to him as they would to humans in the discourse-world. Typically, enactors in text-worlds, just like people in the everyday world, are unable to enter the consciousness of others – yet here Ryder appears to achieve direct access to Gustav's thoughts. Secondly, in the text-worlds of the discourse up to this point Ryder and Gustav are strangers who have only just met in the lobby of the hotel. However, Ryder begins narrating events which happened to Gustav some time in the past and before he could logically have known him. Both these factors threaten the coherence of the text-world representations which readers create when processing this extract. In my reading of the text, I found this extract quite disorienting and again found the unexplained shift in perspective quite surprising.

Once again Simpson's (1993) modal grammar of point of view helps to categorise this shift more precisely. Up until page 13 of the novel, *The Unconsoled* falls into the 'A'

negative' category of Simpson's model (1993: 58): as it is narrated in the first-person by a participating character in the story and there is often a high level of epistemic and perception modality providing a negative shading (for example see section 6.2). From the fourth sentence of the extract above, however, the narrative shifts into Simpson's 'Category B Reflector mode' (1993: 75): as it is told in the third-person and is focalised through the perspective of a text-world enactor; 'Gustav had little supposed it would bring him anything other than uncomplicated delight' (sentence 4). In terms of modal shading, sections of this shift into Gustav's perspective are narrated neutrally using categorical assertions, e.g. 'He had been walking with Boris... ' (sentence 7). The narrative also includes features most associated with positive shading, such as evaluative adjectives ('success', 'highly agreeable', 'a favourite café', 'immense satisfaction' (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 13-14)) and some deontic modality: 'obliged him to notice' (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 14). Thus in the space of a paragraph, the novel shifts from a first-person narrative perspective with negative shading, to a third-person narrative perspective with positive shading.

Of course, shifts between first- and third-person narration and different types of modality are not uncommon in narrative fiction (e.g. Simpson 1993: 61). What is most unusual about this example is that Category B narratives are usually narrated by an 'invisible, "disembodied", non-participating character' (Simpson 1993: 55). In this extract, however, the narrator of the third-person section appears to be the same entity as the first-person narrator who is participating in the story. This is indicated by the use of the pronoun 'me' (sentence 2) which occurs before the third-person focalisation to refer to Ryder, and at the end of the third-person focalisation again to refer to Ryder: 'as he showed me around my room' (sentence 9). That Ryder is the entity responsible for both the first- and third-person narrative is lent further support by his comments once the first-person narrative perspective is reinstated, as Ryder gives his opinions about Gustav based on the knowledge he has gained omnisciently:

I had taken a liking to the old man and felt a wave of sympathy for him. Clearly he had been brooding on things for a long time and was now in danger of allowing his worries to attain unwarranted proportions. (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 14-15)

In the text-worlds cued by sentences 2 and 3, Ryder is a flesh-and-blood text-world entity, but in the world-switch instigated from sentence 4, an enactor of Ryder features as a disembodied, omnipresent narrator. Ryder's ability to shift into Gustav's consciousness is a third order occurrence as it challenges readers' frame-based assumptions about the normal rules of human subjectivity and narrative discourse (as captured by narratological and stylistic work in this area, e.g. Genette 1980; Simpson 1993), as well as challenging the ontological boundaries of readers' text-world representations. In Dataset 3, several readers

comment upon the novelty of this unusual aspect of the narrative, which reoccurs throughout the text. They also show evidence of the downgrading processes they went through in order to process this occurrence. For example, one respondent writes:

I found the trick strangely disorienting, and actually doubled back to see whether I had missed a small phrase such as “I found out later” or “he would go on to tell me”. But as I went on with the novel and similar incidents followed, it struck me as a very clever way to play with narrative...The liquidity of perception here is masterfully done, and once I cottoned on to this unique little trick, I quite enjoyed the experience of having the narrative stretch and balloon in unexpected and sometimes humorous directions. (E13)

Gavins (2007) notes that when text-world information leads readers to suspect there has been a mistake in world-building or function-advancing, they may be prompted to pause or re-read the text in order to engage in world repair (2007: 142). The above respondent describes re-reading the section in an attempt to identify clues which would offer an explanation for the unusual shift in perspective. This is an attempt at backward downgrading in order to repair their text-world. When this search yields no results, and the perspective-shifts keep reoccurring, the respondent uses outward downgrading to account for the occurrence as a deliberate narrative trick on the part of the author. At first s/he describes the experience as ‘disorienting’ but when a satisfactory account of the informativity has been attained, the respondent describes their enjoyment and notes that the text was ‘humorous’. This suggests that their emotional experience of the narrative was connected with their ability to account for the strange and challenging aspects of the text.

In this section I have argued that when reading *The Unconsoled*, readers’ recognition of different levels of textual incoherence (or informativity) and their subsequent attempts to resolve this incoherence through downgrading are likely to involve emotions and influence their emotional experience of the discourse. I have been primarily discussing the informativity generated by clashes between readers’ discourse-world assumptions about the workings of space, time and human subjectivity and the way such features operate at the text-world level. In section 6.4 below I go on to consider a further specific area of cultural and experiential knowledge which is often activated during the construction of text-worlds and the comprehension of narrative: participants’ knowledge about emotions and the way in which emotional episodes typically unfold. I argue that another feature of the oddity of *The Unconsoled* is related to its representation of emotion.

#### **6.4. Emotion Knowledge**

In the reader response data I collected regarding *Never Let Me Go* (2005) which was described in Chapter 5, participants spent a significant amount of time discussing the emotions of the text-world enactors. Readers seemed to find the emotions of the clones in

that novel recognisable in some respects, yet unfamiliar in others. In section 5.3.1 I suggested that readers' identification with (or disassociation from) the text-world enactors could be influenced by the representation of emotion in the novel. Whilst identification may be facilitated by the use of prevalent emotion metaphors (such as EMOTION IS FORCE; see Kövecses 2000; Lakoff and Johnson 1980), the representation of love in *Never Let Me Go* (2005) differs from prototypical Western ideas about love. This seemed to encourage disassociation from the characters, as readers questioned the sincerity of the clones' emotions.

In the reader response data and critical commentary I studied regarding *The Unconsoled*, the emotions of the protagonist also often receive comment. In particular, these comments suggest that there is something slightly 'odd' about Ryder's emotions. For example, one reader posting on an internet forum contrasts what s/he perceives to be the unchanging 'stock characters' of the novel with Ryder's often changing attitudes towards them. They write:

[Ryder's attitude towards the other 'stock' characters is] in turns bored, angry, guilty, supercilious, unctuous. Although all of these characters are introduced as if they were strangers to Ryder, some of them apparently have some sort of history with him and others, even on brief acquaintance, assume an emotional significance to him out of all proportion to their status in the "action". His contradictory, even schizophrenic feelings are usually unexplained and unjustified; merely described, as if they're the most natural reactions in the world – even if his attitude toward, say, the "young striver" is completely different on page 204 than it was on page 193. But here is the wonderful thing: Ryder's various states of mind always seem "right". They always correspond to instantly recognizable responses that we all experience every day when we deal with those exasperating characters from central casting known as "other people". (E16)

This reader suggests that whilst Ryder's emotional responses are recognisable, there is also something unusual about them. On the one hand they express identification with Ryder's 'states of mind' and seem to believe that other readers will also experience a sense of recognition; suggested by the use of the first-person plural 'we'. On the other hand, however, Ryder's emotions are described as 'contradictory, even schizophrenic'; 'unexplained and unjustified' and, when occurring in response to other characters, as occurring 'out of all proportion' to their status in Ryder's life. These ideas are echoed in other reader responses and critical commentary. On the same forum, another reader notes that Ryder is 'strangely nonreactive' to certain situations, but 'horrified' by others (E13). Similarly, Lewis (2000) notes that the emotional 'tone' of the novel 'veers dramatically' (2000: 126), whilst Adelman (2001) suggests that Ryder remains emotionally unaffected by encounters which could be 'occasions for insight', and his lack of emotional responsiveness means that 'he learns nothing' (2001: 169). Vilar Flor (2000) highlights the

'inconsequentiality' of Ryder's emotions, particularly in the final scene when Ryder 'sobs with distress' then cheers up 'immediately afterward' (2000: 162). Indeed, several readers comment upon Ryder's emotions at the close of the novel, and this scene will be considered in more detail below.

In section 6.3 I argued that part of readers' emotional experience of *The Unconsoled* is related to the way in which the novel interacts with their discourse-world knowledge regarding time, space and human subjectivity. The comments described above suggest that Ryder's emotions also contravene reader assumptions about the workings of human emotional behaviour. As noted in section 5.3.1, social psychological research emphasises the importance of shared, cultural emotion knowledge in people's everyday interpretation, experience and expression of emotion (Conway and Beckerian 1987; Fehr and Russell 1984; Fischer 1991; Fletcher and Fitness 1996; Markus and Kittayama 1991; Parkinson 1995; Parkinson et al 2005; Schwartz and Shaver 1987; Shaver et al 2001 [1987]). Emotion knowledge is also thought to be important in readers' comprehension of fictional narrative (Schwartz and Shaver 1987: 200). Several studies have sought to discover more about the content of people's cultural emotion knowledge and the way in which such knowledge is deployed in the interpretation of human behaviour. I shall review some of the main features of emotion knowledge identified in this research, before proceeding in section 6.4.1 to consider how the ending of *The Unconsoled* might interact with such knowledge structures.

Folk psychological knowledge about emotion has been shown to be organised in terms of prototypes, with 'emotion' as a superordinate category and particular emotions such as 'happiness', 'anger', 'fear' and 'sadness' forming basic-level categories (e.g. Fehr and Russell 1984, 1991; Schwartz and Shaver 1987; Shaver et al 2001 [1987]). Furthermore, people's knowledge regarding the basic-level categories of emotion is thought to involve prototypical sequences of events or 'scripts' associated with that emotion. Shaver et al (2001 [1987]) asked one hundred and twenty respondents to write descriptions of typical episodes in which fear, sadness, anger, joy and love would be experienced or relate actual episodes regarding their personal experience of these emotions. After coding these written protocols, Shaver et al offer an account of the prototypical features of these basic emotion categories which include information about the typical antecedents, feelings, physiological reactions and behaviour associated with particular emotions (2001 [1987]: 43-48 see also Kövecses, 1990; Russell 1991).

Conway and Bekerian (1987) conclude, after a series of experiments, that emotions are represented in memory at a number of different yet closely related hierarchically organised levels. At the most general level, they posit the existence of 'context-free'

knowledge about emotions; such as the notion that joy is pleasant and involves smiling. This type of semantic emotion knowledge enables characteristic features of different emotions (such as the bodily changes, behavioural impulses and expressions which they typically involve) to be identified and compared (see also Parkinson 1991). Like Shaver et al (2001 [1987]), Conway and Bekerian (1987) also emphasise the importance of situational information in people's knowledge about emotions, which they claim can be drawn from three different sources. The 'basic' level of situational emotion knowledge contains information about the general 'scenes' in which particular emotions occur. For example, joy may be typically associated with scenes involving 'beauty, success, children, reunions' and so on (Conway and Bekerian 1987: 182). 'Specific' situational emotion knowledge consists of scripts which contain particularities about the characters and activities involved (e.g. 'seeing a stunning view'; 'children playing'), and also personal memories which contain highly detailed information about individual emotional experiences (Conway and Bekerian 1987: 181-2).

As Parkinson (1995) notes, there are some problems with empirical studies which seek to delineate emotion knowledge structures; primarily that the context in which participants' emotional ideas are elicited may not be reflective of the emotion knowledge as it is drawn upon in real life (1995: 243-4). He also notes that Conway and Bekerian's distinction between 'scenes' and 'scripts' may be difficult to sustain in applications of their typology (1995: 244). However, these investigations into emotion knowledge suggest that people seem to draw upon a well-articulated and shared representation of what particular emotions involve, which is structured as a narrative sequence unfolding over time and includes specific features which are present when the emotion is experienced.

Parkinson et al (2005) also note that at a broader, cultural level emotion 'ethnotheories' are important in shaping our shared, cultural knowledge about emotion. Ethnotheories are essentially 'theories about emotion' held by particular societies or groups of people, and differ throughout history and across cultures (e.g. see Stearns and Stearns 1985; Stearns 1994). Parkinson et al (2005: 45) note that all societies hold ideas about emotions and their significance; including things like where emotions are located in the body, which emotions are good or bad, what they reveal about a person or that person's situation, and how to deal with them (Parkinson et al 2005: 45). As part of an ethnotheory, emotion knowledge is not simply related to specific emotion words or situations, but is embedded within more general cultural meaning systems. Emotion ethnotheories have a strong normative function and often contain ideas about which emotions are appropriate and which need to be 'managed'. Western emotion ethnotheories generally oppose emotion and rationality, and emphasise the individual, private aspects of the phenomenon.



Parkinson (1995) perceives an individualistic focus in the study of emotion in Western psychology, and suggests that this may be attributable to the influences of Western ethnotheoretical ideas (see also Sampson 1977).

In the light of reader comments regarding the representation of emotion in *The Unconsoled*, I want to consider some of the ways in which this novel interacts with the emotion knowledge which readers bring to bear on text-world construction. For Text World Theory, the social psychological work reviewed above offers a specific picture of a particular aspect of the cultural and experiential knowledge frames which are involved in discourse processing (Gavins 2007: 21-3, 29; Werth 1999: 94-115). In section 6.4.1 I offer an account of the way readers' frame knowledge, and in particular their knowledge about emotion, might interact with the representation of emotion in *The Unconsoled*. In this account the emotion knowledge will be my own, though I will also draw on the prototypes identified by Schwartz et al (2001 [1987]). Furthermore, I also incorporate the notions of mindreading, projection and identification established in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis in order to provide a more integrated picture of my emotional experience of the scene. My discussion in 5.4.1 does not examine the construction of the text-worlds in detail, focusing instead upon the knowledge structures which the text evokes.

#### **6.4.1 Inconsequential emotions in *The Unconsoled***

At the end of chapter 37 Ryder learns that Gustav the porter has passed away. As noted in section 6.1, though at first it seems as though Gustav is simply a porter in Ryder's hotel it later emerges that he is Sophie's father (and hence Boris' grandfather) – thus a member of Ryder's immediate family. When Ryder receives the news of Gustav's death he describes himself as feeling 'great sorrow' (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 525). Shortly afterwards he sees Sophie and Boris walking away from the concert hall presumably on their way home. As he observes them, Ryder notes that although Boris has his arm 'supportively' around his mother, 'otherwise there was nothing about them to alert the casual onlooker to their distress' (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 525). Interestingly, here Ryder's perception of Sophie and Boris' distress is not based upon his interpretation of their behaviour (which ostensibly does *not* display their emotion), but instead can be related to situational knowledge about the emotions typically associated with bereavement. After seeing the pair moving away from him, the chapter ends with Ryder 'hurrying off' (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 527). The text does not explicitly state where Ryder is 'hurrying' to, but readers can infer his intention from the causal links between incidents (Ryder perceives Sophie and Boris, they go out of sight, he begins to move) and their frame knowledge about people's behaviour during times of family bereavement. Though such behaviour differs considerably across cultures (see Parkinson et al 2005: 25-54), my FAMILY BEREAVEMENT frame contains the

information that people tend to gather together once they have heard the bad news in order to offer each other comfort and support (see section 6.3 regarding the problems with labelling frames in this manner). The causal links combined with my frame knowledge led me to make the mindreading inference that Ryder was setting off in pursuit of Sophie and Boris because he intends or desires to offer them consolation. The following chapter opens with Ryder following the pair down a woodland path:

The path cut a completely straight line through the woods so that I could see clearly to the tall iron gate at the far end. Sophie and Boris had already covered a surprising amount of ground, and although I walked as fast as I could, after a few minutes I had hardly reduced the distance between us. I was continually impeded, furthermore, by a group of young people walking a little in front of me who, whenever I tried to overtake, increased their pace or else spread themselves right across the path. In the end, when I could see that Sophie and Boris were about to reach the street, I broke into a run and burst through the young people, no longer caring what sort of impression I created...I then saw, over to my left, a queue in the process of boarding a tram, and Sophie and Boris bringing up its rear...Only by waving frantically did I manage to stall the driver and struggle aboard myself. (Ishiguro 1995: 528)

In my reading of the text I experienced some identification with Ryder here, evident in my experience of emotions such as mild frustration when the young people block his path, and relief when he makes it onto the tram. I was able to infer Ryder's goals via projection and adopt them through identification; and as Oatley suggests I experienced emotions as the enactor's plans met vicissitudes (1994; 1999a; 1999b; 2002; Oatley and Gholomain 1997). Throughout *The Unconsoled*, there are moments when it is possible to establish an identificatory relationship with the text-world enactors in this manner, particularly when Ryder has a clear, recognisable goal such as arriving at a meeting on time or finding the concert hall for his performance. However, these moments of identification are often disrupted or problematised by the text. For instance, once Ryder boards the tram, he inexplicably abandons his pursuit of Sophie and Boris. As he collapses into a seat he realises that he 'must have walked past Sophie and Boris' in his haste to get onto the vehicle (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 528). Once seated he falls into conversation with another passenger who is an electrician and claims to have seen Ryder's parents when they visited the city some years ago. Although Ryder can see Sophie and Boris across the carriage he does not get up to go and see them for some time (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 528-31). In my reading of the text Ryder's behaviour here was quite surprising and had a second order of informativity in de Beaugrande's (1980) terms. Whilst Ryder's recognition of Sophie and Boris' distress and his clear desire to be with them converged with my knowledge about people's behaviour during times of bereavement, once boarding the tram Ryder suddenly appears to abandon the pursuit of his goal in favour of another, less urgent concern (see

section 6.5 for further analysis of this scene). I responded negatively to Ryder's character here; backwardly downgrading his odd behaviour through recourse to his selfish and self-obsessed character traits, which have been exhibited elsewhere in the novel. I also experienced frustration as the identification which was established in the preceding paragraph is problematised by the enactors' actions (or lack of action) which leaves his goal unachieved.

Eventually, Ryder's attention returns to Sophie and Boris again and he gets up and moves towards them. He notices that young Boris has now 'given in to his emotions' and is sobbing into his mother's arms (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 531). As Ryder becomes aware of the intimacy between mother and child, he describes his emotional response thus:

At that moment there was something so private about their comforting of each other that it seemed impossible even for me to intrude. And as I went on gazing at them, I began to feel, for all their obvious distress, a strange sense of envy. (Ishiguro 1995: 531)

Ryder's envy at the sight of his distressed loved ones diverges from my prototypical ideas about emotion in several ways. Firstly, my knowledge about family bereavements and the associated emotional aspects of such occasions led me to assume that Ryder would experience a combination of relief and sadness at being reunited with Sophie and Boris at this time of loss. Secondly, Ryder's envy also diverges from my ethnotheoretical ideas about emotion. One 'should not' feel envious of the relationship between one's partner and child – and even though this emotion is not unimaginable it is, in my culture, a rather 'taboo' emotion and something which a person would be unlikely to openly express. His envy disrupts my frame-based assumptions regarding the scene and has a second order informativity. Again, my response to this frame disruption was to backwardly downgrade the occurrence, interpreting it as an indication of the dysfunctional relationship between the family members and further evidence of Ryder's self-obsessed nature.

Sophie notices Ryder standing nearby and Ryder begins to offer his condolences and apologise for his previous absence (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 531). However, Sophie rejects Ryder's attempts at reconciliation and tells him to leave her and Boris alone:


'Leave us. You were always on the outside of our love. Now look at you. You're on the outside of our grief too. Leave us. Go away.'

Boris broke away from her and turned to look at me. Then he said to his mother: 'No, no. We've got to keep together.'

Sophie shook her head. 'No, it's useless. Leave him be Boris. Let him go around the world, giving out his expertise and wisdom. He needs to do it. Let's just leave him to it now.' (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 532)

Sophie then leads a forlorn Boris off the tram, telling him 'He'll never love you like a real father' (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 532). Ryder calls out to Boris but after 'one last glance' Boris

and Sophie disappear from view (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 532). Essentially, Ryder's wife has just left him and taken away his child. My frame knowledge about relationships marks this as an emotionally significant event, and indeed Holmes and Rahe (1967) found that people rated marital separation and divorce as second and third in a list of the most stressful life-changing events, after the death of a spouse or child. Relationship break-ups are typically associated with negative emotions such as sadness and despair, and in their study of the prototype for the emotion SADNESS, Shaver et al (2001 [1987]) found that the 'loss of a valued relationship' or 'separation' often featured prominently as an antecedent. My idea of the sequence of behaviours and central features involved in the experience of sadness largely concords with the prototype identified by Shaver and Schwartz (2001 [1987]), which



**Figure 6.1.** *SADNESS* prototype, diagram simplified and adapted from Shaver et al (2001 [1987]: 44). The first box contains antecedents, the second, responses and the third, self-control procedures. See original for data regarding frequency of features in the protocols, and further grouping in terms of structure.

is represented in Figure 6.1 above. Following the coding and analysis of their data, they identified 26 prototypical features of the emotion SADNESS and ordered them into sets of antecedents, responses, and self-control procedures to reflect the temporally organised 'scriptlike' structure of their participants' accounts (Shaver et al 2001 [1987]: 42).

In addition to the features identified by Shaver et al (2001 [1987]), however, my emotion knowledge about sadness also contains an association between the temporal duration of the emotion and the severity of the situation which caused it. So, for example, the sadness experienced in response to the death of a loved one is likely to be more protracted than the sadness experienced in response to, say, losing your favourite pen. Furthermore, I also associate a loss of appetite with the experience of sadness, alongside the experience of social withdrawal.

Ryder's emotional response to Sophie and Boris' departure initially converges with what one would expect, as he begins sobbing:

After a while I turned and made my way back to my seat. The electrician smiled cheerfully as I sat down again in front of him. Then I became aware of him leaning forward, patting my shoulder, and I realised I was sobbing. 'Listen', he was saying, 'everything always seems very bad at the time. But it all passes, nothing's ever as bad as it looks. Do cheer up.' For a while he went on uttering such empty phrases while I continued to sob. (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 533)

In the above description there are several aspects which concord with the SADNESS prototype described above. Ryder is initially inactive, only returning to his seat 'After a while'; he begins crying; and calls the electricians' reassurances 'empty phrases' which suggest a negative outlook (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 532). Interestingly, Ryder only becomes aware of his own emotion display as a consequence of the electrician's actions. This lack of awareness of his own emotional state emphasises the severity of his distress, as altered states of perception are associated with extreme emotional experiences. Immediately after the extract cited above, however, the electrician continues to comfort Ryder and suddenly Ryder's emotional response departs from prototypical expectations:

Then I heard him [the electrician] say: 'Look, why don't you have some breakfast. Just have something to eat, like the rest of us. You're bound to feel a little better then. Come on. Go and get something to eat.'

I glanced up and saw that the electrician was holding a plate on his lap on which was a half-finished croissant and a small knob of butter. His knees were covered in crumbs.

'Ah,' I said, straightening and recovering my composure. 'Where did you get that?' (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 533)

Ryder then heads to the back of the tram where a generous breakfast buffet is laid out, and begins helping himself. In de Beaugrande's (1980) terms having a breakfast buffet upon a public tram is a second order occurrence; it is highly improbable based upon my frame

knowledge of trams, but not totally inconceivable. I used outward downgrading to explain the sudden appearance of a lavish buffet as part of the highly fictional world of this genre of absurd text. Ryder's emotional experience in this scene, however, presented a third order divergence from my prototypical frame-knowledge about SADNESS. Most prominently, the temporal duration of Ryder's sadness is unusually short considering the event which caused it. After only sixteen lines of sobbing, Ryder regains his composure, is able to eat a hearty breakfast and begins to reflect cheerfully upon his situation:

I took a plate, glancing up as I did so through the rear window with its receding view of the city streets, and could feel my spirits rising yet further. Things had not, after all, gone so badly. Whatever disappointments this city had brought, there was no doubting that my presence had been greatly appreciated – just as it had been everywhere else I had ever gone. (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 533)

Interestingly, in the prototype identified by Shaver et al (2001 [1987]), behaviour such as becoming active and consciously adopting positive thoughts are part of the self-control procedures associated with the emotion SADNESS. The narrative of *The Unconsoled* does not depart from the prototypical ideas which readers may have about the *features* of sadness, but instead represent Ryder's emotion as occurring at an extreme level of temporal compression out of all proportion with the severity of events.

In the internet-based reader response data about the novel, several readers seemed to find Ryder's short-lived sadness unusual and displayed evidence of the downgrading processes this oddity provoked. One reader uses outward downgrading to suggest that Ryder is deceiving himself about the true impact of Sophie and Boris' departure:

one thing becomes clear for him and the reader – that he has lost the woman he loves, Sophie, and her little boy Boris – and he can deceive himself as to the importance of this as he endlessly breakfasts whilst riding the tram in the closing pages, even whilst contemplating the next chapter in his life. (B13, my underlining)

The respondent in D1 (below) also engages in outward downgrading, and reads Ryder's inconsequential emotions thematically, as part of the larger message of the novel. I would argue that this type of outward downgrading is typical of the metatextual and metaphorical readings present in literary-critical responses to the novel:

This very enigmatic book is, among other things, about the unrealistic, often debilitating expectations parents have of their children, the demands of a life lived in the public glare, and the myopia that allows people to substitute superficial rewards for the things that really matter (in this context, the novel's ending...blew me away) (D1, my underlining)

In response to D1, another reader argues that Ryder's emotion in the final scene is perhaps not as unusual as it seems, and justifies his behaviour through backward downgrading. In

the previous text, Ryder has complained about his hunger and his lack of rest – thus his actions in the tram are explainable by recourse to his other important need to eat and relax:

I'm in two minds about this. Yes, the ending is a lapse into wish-fulfilment on Ryder's part; its relatively trivial (and provisional) quality contrasts with the emotional depths he's at least glanced into...Having said that, it is fulfilment of a sort – look at all the scenes in the book where he's about to sit down and relax, or about to have something to eat, and never quite manages it. I think it cuts both ways. (D5)

In tracing the way *The Unconsoled* interacts with my prototypical, situational and ethnotheoretical knowledge about emotion, I aim to have demonstrated that such knowledge is significant in text-world construction and in readers' emotional responses to the text. Where Ryder's behaviour accords with my assumptions about emotion, I found it easier to identify with him and experienced emotions in accordance with the status of his goals. When his emotional behaviour deviates from ethnotheoretical ideas about appropriate emotions or diverges from prototypical emotion scripts, this also has implications for my emotional response to him and the discourse more generally. In the light of social psychological work on the importance of emotion knowledge in human interaction, this is hardly surprising (e.g. Fletcher and Fitness 1996; Parkinson 1995; Parkinson et al 2005; Schwartz and Shaver 1987; Shaver et al 2001 [1987]). However, I believe that further investigation could provide Text World Theory with important insights into the way discursal representations of emotion contribute to the relationships which are established between discourse-world and text-world entities.

In section 6.5 below I consider a final aspect of the reader responses I collected regarding *The Unconsoled*. Several readers report that the novel has a lasting, resonant effect on them, both in between readings and once the novel is finished. As noted in section 3.1 this lasting effect differs from the 'relatively brief but intense' (Eysenk and Keane 1995: 435) experiences which have been the main focus of the other discussions in this thesis. However, current cognitive-poetic research into 'literary resonance' intersects with some of my points in sections 6.3 and 6.4 regarding the role of attention and knowledge structures in literary experience (Halverson 2005; Stockwell 2009). Though slightly different in quality, it seems to me that resonance can be incorporated into the broad definition of emotional experience adopted in the present discussion. I integrate current theories of resonance with a Text World Theory analysis in order to offer an account the resonant potential of the discourse of *The Unconsoled*.

## 6.5 Resonance

Stockwell (2009) notes that literary reading can often create ‘a tone, an atmosphere in the mind that seems to persist long after the pages have been put down’ (2009: 17). He emphasises the difficulty of accounting for this effect in cognitive-poetic terms, as it is challenging to articulate or define and lends itself to impressionistic description (2009: 17). He calls this experience literary ‘resonance’ and advances a detailed model regarding its creation and effect, which will be examined below. The reader response data I collected regarding *The Unconsoled* suggests that an account of literary resonance is important in accounting for the novel’s effect. For example, consider the following exchange involving three readers discussing their reading experiences. The asterisks indicate that the respondent in A3 and A6 uses the same avatar, thus is presumably the same person:

### Extract 1 – Dataset 3

- A3\*:** I’m just embarking on *The Unconsoled* and finding it incredibly dreamlike, to the extent that after putting it down for half an hour I still felt in a slightly surreal mood, as though the atmosphere of it had stayed with me. It’s really struck me how immediately I’ve become immersed in it.
- A4:** It snagged me in exactly the same way. Even two weeks later (a long time for me) I’m still awed by the experience. I will probably upgrade this to a [five star symbols] as it sticks with me like a bizarre dream
- A5:** ...I had the same experience, in that the atmosphere of the book pervaded real life. I was reading it by the pool on hols and when I got up to do something else, I invariably felt rather peculiar! Having said that...I eventually gave up around [sic] 350 pages in which is very unusual for me. It just became so repetitive and, well, dull and I just couldn’t take any more...
- A6\*:** This is going to sound really odd, but I’m finding the repetitive and frustrating nature of it peculiarly addictive. I’m almost certain I’ll be sticking with it...

These readers appear to be discussing the resonant power of the text; the way in which the novel influences their mood and creates an atmosphere that ‘stayed’ or ‘sticks’ with them, pervading real life in between reading sessions. Many other readers in Dataset 3 also report thinking about the novel long after they have finished or abandoned reading it, for example:

‘I hated reading it, yet think about it more than any other book I’ve ever read’ (D8)

‘A horrible, haunting, work of genius, this book isn’t right, isn’t normal, and I’m sure it will stay with me forever’ (E6)



'the tense, intriguing mood and skewed, shadowy universe it created are still tangible to me days after closing the covers' (E13)

'I read this book nearly two years ago, but, in memory, it still exerts the resonant power that I felt from the second page of the text on to the final [page].' (E16)

'I found it truly transporting. I sometimes wonder if I ever actually finished reading it, or if I've just entered it' (E14.4)

Interestingly, these kinds of comments are not present in the discussion group data which I collected regarding Ishiguro's other novels (Datasets 1 and 2 from Chapters 4 and 5 respectively). This difference may be attributable to the context in which the responses were elicited. Based upon the comparison of my small set of data, the discussion group context seemed to evoke more character and scene-related discussions, whilst the written, internet responses tend offer relatively succinct commentary about the text's overall effects and value. However, context alone seems insufficient explanation for the high frequency of comments about the resonance of the text. When I read *The Unconsoled* (2005 [1995]), I also experienced the 'peculiar feeling' which the readers in Extract 1 describe and found that after putting the book down I would feel slightly disoriented for a moment. This is not something which I experienced when reading *The Remains of the Day* (2005 [1989]) or *Never Let Me Go* (2005). In her piece on the controversy caused by *The Unconsoled*, Kellaway (1995) relates several anecdotes which reinforce the idea that for some readers, the text is particularly resonant. For example, she reports that one critic (who remains unnamed) told her that the novel was giving them nightmares, and quotes Salman Rushdie as saying: 'the book needed to settle in my head for a long time' (Kellaway 1995: 1).

There are several striking things about the comments of the readers in Dataset 3, cited above. Firstly, they are all at different stages in reading the novel, yet all report or recognise this resonant effect. Some readers are mid-way through the text (A3), others have abandoned it (A5), others finished it days, weeks or even years ago (e.g. E13; A4; E16). This suggests that the effect they describe has something to do with the quality of the novel throughout its development, rather than being related to something like plot resolution, for example. Secondly, the readers exhibit a wide variety of responses to the text, as well as recognising its resonant effect. For example, the respondent in E16 declares that they 'hated it'; A6 says that it is both frustrating and 'addictive'; A4 found it 'dull'. It is also interesting to note that the 'transportation' metaphor appears particularly prominent in these responses (Gerrig 1993; Stockwell 2009). The respondent in A3 describes 'embarking' upon the novel and becoming 'immersed in it', and the reader in E14.4 describes it as 'truly transporting'. The 'control' metaphor (Stockwell 2009) is also present in the comment of A4 who describes being 'snagged' (i.e. caught) by the book. In the following discussion, I

draw on the model of resonance proposed by Stockwell (2009) and apply it through a text-world analysis to an extract from *The Unconsoled*. I argue that the text exhibits some of the features which Stockwell (2009) associates with the creation of resonance. I also suggest that the argument I developed regarding the emotional effect of knowledge frame activation and disruption in sections 6.3 and 6.4 could be relevant to a discussion of the resonance caused by the text.

Stockwell (2009) aims to establish a means of discussing the feeling of resonance analytically and in cognitive terms. He draws upon cognitive theories of attention, which are based on theories of visual perception, in order to develop an attention-resonance model. At base, this model proposes that the conceptual space created by literary texts presents an array of cognitive perceptual stimuli for readers, in a similar way to the visual field. In this conceptual space, elements which attract reader's attention are termed 'attractors'. Stockwell offers a stylistic specification of attractors, drawing upon the psychology of attention, gestalt principles and cognitive grammar (Stockwell 2009: 25, 54). He proposes that typical features of good textual attractors include:

- **agency** (noun phrases in active position are better attractors than in passive position)
- **topicality** (subject position confers attraction over object position)
- **empathetic recognisability** (human speaker > human hearer > animal > object > abstraction)
- **activeness** (verbs denoting action, violence, passion, wilfulness, motivation or strength)
- **brightness** (lightness or vivid colours being denoted over dimness or drabness)
- **largeness** (large objects being denoted, or a very long elaborate noun phrase used to denote)
- **height** (objects that are above others, are higher than the perceiver, or which dominate)
- **noisiness** (denoted phenomena which are audibly voluminous)

(see Stockwell 2009: 25 for a longer list)

Readers' attention for particular attractors can be sustained by textual features, either positively through the presence of devices which work to prevent attentional shifts, or negatively through the absence of any shift devices. Elements in the conceptual space which have been deliberately or unintentionally backgrounded or are no longer the focus of attention are described as 'neglected' (Stockwell 2009: 21). Neglect can occur through readerly disengagement and/or as a result of textual patterning, and eventually leads to 'decay' as the element fades out of attention (Stockwell 2009: 21). Clearly, Stockwell's model has links with the study of foregrounding in stylistics and notions of

figure and ground in cognitive linguistics and cognitive poetics; but conceives of figure and ground as a scalar cline of prominence rather than a polar category (Stockwell 2009: 22; see also Short 1996; Stockwell 2002: 13-25; Ungerer and Schmidt 1996: 156-204; van Peer 1986). The attention-resonance model posits that literary reading involves the continual attraction and sustenance or decay of attention in relation to objects and entities in conceptual space, and that this 'cline of resonance' (Stockwell 2009: 22) can be seen to underlie the resonant experience of literary reading.

Stockwell's application of the attention-resonance model focuses primarily on poetic texts, because they involve dense patterns of attraction and neglect and promote a strong intensity of reading (Stockwell 2009: 54). However, Stockwell also proposes that his attention-resonance model is applicable to prose fiction and demonstrates this through an analysis of the opening of Hardy's *The Return of the Native* (1878). This novel opens with an extended descriptive narrative about Egdon Heath, the rural setting of the fictional world. Stockwell notes that 'many readers in discussion report being able to recall this opening, not in specific detail but in the lasting impression of tone and the forceful impact of this setting for the novel that follows' (2009: 49). Interestingly, Stockwell's analysis of the passage attributes resonant qualities to the way in which it confounds readerly expectations and maintains attention upon the landscape rather than the people in the text-world. He writes:

It would not be thought unusual, I think, for a reader to expect a long, nineteenth century novel to begin with a description of the setting for the fictional world; however, the opening to this novel dwells on the scene at some length. It also confounds expectations and cognitive defaults in several other ways, in the form of various cognitive disjunctions, and it seems to me that it is because of the textural quality of this effect that the impact of the passage is significant. (Stockwell 2009: 26)

In the above quotation, Stockwell begins by noting that reader's expectations are influential in their experience of the scene. In the context of the present discussion, it appears that Stockwell is referring to the way in which the text interacts with readers' frame knowledge about nineteenth century novels (I will return to the issue of frame knowledge and resonance below). Later in the quotation, the 'cognitive defaults' and 'cognitive disjunctions' to which Stockwell refers are related to the normal features of 'good' attractors, which were listed above. For example, attractors typically operate along a scale of empathic recognisability, with human speakers as the strongest attractors, followed by human hearers, animals, objects and abstractions (Stockwell 2009: 25). Stockwell (2009: 50) explains that in the Hardy passage the landscape is an extremely strong attractor which is richly anthropomorphised and sustained through topicality. Thus, objects and abstractions

are being pulled towards the opposite end of the empathy scale, which represents a deviation from the cognitive norm which the scale represents (2009: 50). Stockwell also notes that there is a preponderance of syntactic complexity and verbs of motion and progression in the Hardy passage. He posits that this apparent movement and variability contrasts with the sustained focus on the landscape and works to form a cognitive 'disjunction' (Stockwell 2009: 50). In addition, brightness is typically a strong attractor but in the Hardy passage darkness is particularly foregrounded, representing a 'non-normal figuration' of attractors (Stockwell 2009: 52). Stockwell proposes that the way this scene is presented and the way the text delays progression in the manner which readers might expect, is 'what gives the long-lasting resonance of Edgou Heath its persisting character' (Stockwell 2009: 30).

Elsewhere in his monograph Stockwell (2009) engages with Text World Theory in detail, but in his chapter about resonance and attention the framework is not explicitly mentioned. However, it seems to me that his attention-resonance model could be integrated within Text World Theory analyses to provide a discussion of the textual qualities which promote resonance. In the analysis below I draw upon Stockwell's attention-resonance model in addition to analysing the text-worlds constructed by an extract from *The Unconsoled*, and demonstrate how the text may function to promote resonant experiences in the way in which Stockwell suggests. However, unlike Stockwell's example which comes from the opening of a novel, the extract I consider comes from the final chapter of *The Unconsoled*. As such, I suggest that the way the text presents attractors interacts with the inferences which readers have generated through projection and identification during prior reading. I go on to propose that Stockwell's notion of the role of 'cognitive disjunction' in resonance may be approached more broadly to incorporate the type of frame-disruption described in sections 6.3 and 6.4.1.

In the text-worlds created by *The Unconsoled*, all world-building and function-advancing features are internally focalised through the perspective of Ryder. Crudely speaking, the reader 'sees' what Ryder 'sees' and they are in effect at the mercy of Ryder's own attentional processes in gaining access to the fictional world. As noted in sections 6.3.1 and 6.4.1, sometimes features which one would expect to function as strong attractors in Ryder's perceptual field, such as the presence of a human being in an elevator, or the presence of his grieving wife and child in a crowded tram, are not perceived in this way by the focaliser. As an example of this latter situation, consider Extract A from the final chapter of the novel, cited below. This extract is taken from the scene I described in section 6.4.1. in which Ryder urgently follows the recently bereaved Sophie and Boris onto a tram and then apparently abandons his pursuit of them to start up a conversation with a

fellow passenger. Because of my inferences about the relationships between the characters and the emotional significance of their situation, I found this episode particularly disturbing and frustrating. Extract A describes Ryder's actions once he boards the tram:

#### Extract A

[1] The tram lurched forward as I staggered down the central aisle. [2] I was so out of breath I only vaguely registered that the carriage was half full, and only when I collapsed into a seat near the rear did it occur to me I must have walked past Sophie and Boris. [3] Still panting, I leaned to one side and I looked back up the aisle.

[4] The carriage was divided into two distinct sections separated by an exit area in the middle. [5] In the front portion, the seating was arranged as two long rows facing one another, and I could see Sophie and Boris sitting together on the sunny side of the tram not far from the driver's cabin. [6] My view of them was obscured by some passengers standing in the exit area hanging onto straps, and I leaned further over into the aisle. [7] As I did so, the man sitting opposite me – in our half of the carriage, the seats were arranged in pairs facing one another – slapped his thigh and said:

[8] 'Another sunny day by the look of things.'

[9] He was dressed neatly, if modestly, in a short zip-up jacket, and I supposed he was some sort of skilled workman – an electrician perhaps. [10] I smiled at him quickly, upon which he began to tell me something about a building he and his colleagues had been working on for the past several days. [11] I listened to him vaguely, occasionally smiling or making an assenting noise. [12] Meanwhile my view of Sophie and Boris became further obscured as more and more people rose to their feet and crowded around the exit doors. (Ishiguro 2005 [1995]: 528-9, my sentence numbering)

As noted in section 6.2, focalised narratives create epistemic modal-worlds, and furthermore the precise spatio-temporal location of the modal-worlds which constitute *The Unconsoled* remains ambiguous throughout the novel. Extract A cues an epistemic-modal world (Epistemic Modal-World 1 in Figure 6.2 below) set at some point in the past, in the city which Ryder is visiting. World-building information in the first sentence includes the 'tram' and the 'central aisle'. The tram is initially established as an attractor as it is given agency and topicality and personified through the use of the verb 'lurched' (sentence 1). In sentence 2 and 3 the attraction of the tram is sustained through referents such as 'seat' and 'carriage', though Ryder becomes the most attractive element in the text-world from the second half of sentence 1 through to the end of sentence 3. This is because the text features lots of function-advancing information regarding Ryder's actions: he 'staggered', 'registered', 'collapsed', 'leaned', 'looked' and is 'panting' (sentence 1-3). As such, Ryder is presented as the most active entity in the text-world and is given topicality by repeated presence in the subject position. Ryder's attractiveness is maintained by non-shift devices




Figure 6.2. The text worlds cued by sentences 1-9 of Extract A, *The Unconsoled*.

(Stockwell 2009: 33), such as the representation of the other people on the tram as an attribute of a text-world object; 'half full', rather than as individual human attractors.

Though Ryder boarded the tram as part of his frantic pursuit of Sophie and Boris, the focus upon the tram and Ryder in these initial sentences works to neglect Sophie and Boris. Though they are mentioned in sentence 2, syntactically they are relegated to the final clause of a lengthy compound-complex sentence and in terms of text-worlds they are nominated as existing with an embedded epistemic modal-world cued by the modal 'must' (Epistemic Modal World 2 in Figure 6.2). Significantly, this means that Sophie and Boris exist as enactors within Ryder's thoughts ('only then did it occur to me that I must...') rather than as enactors in his physical surroundings. I would argue that this functions to reduce the attractiveness of Sophie and Boris, because they are situated at some conceptual distance from the matrix world. Even within Epistemic Modal World 2 (shown in Figure

6.2 above), Ryder has topicality and is the most active entity, whilst Sophie and Boris are represented as static. The way in which textual features work to promote the neglect of Sophie and Boris is particularly interesting considering that in the preceding text they had been the object of Ryder's attention. Sophie and Boris are not actually nominated as existing within Epistemic Modal-World 1 until the fifth sentence, and in my reading of the text this delay created suspense as I waited to find out if they were actually on board the vehicle (Gerrig 1993: 79).

As Ryder leans forward to look down the tram in sentence 3, cognitive norms of attraction might lead one to expect that his eyes would be drawn immediately to the human faces which he recognises in the crowd. However, sentences 4 and 5 feature a series of world-building information about the layout of the tram. The use of the passive construction ('The carriage was divided'; 'the seating was arranged') places inanimate objects in the topical position and relegates human agency. This, I would suggest, creates the kind of cognitive disjunction which Stockwell (2009) identified in his analysis of Hardy; as the text is promoting inanimate objects as attractors where one would expect human enactors. This disjunction is particularly prominent as, prior to this extract, the narrative has established the potential existence of two enactors who are highly relevant to Ryder in emotional terms. Finally, half way through the fifth sentence, Sophie and Boris are described as sitting in the tram (in Figure 6.2, their late addition as enactors in Epistemic Modal-World 1 is indicated by curved brackets). They are situated, however, on 'the sunny side of the tram' and this mention of brightness works to distract attention from these inactive enactors back onto the vehicle. Throughout sentences 4 and 5, then, inanimate objects which constitute the tram are promoted as attractors and though Sophie and Boris are nominated as existing in the text-world, they are not represented as strong attractors in the manner which one would expect, quickly falling into neglect.

This neglect is compounded by the physical occlusion of Sophie and Boris in sentences 6 and 12 of Extract A, as Ryder's view is obstructed. Stockwell (2009) uses the term 'occlusion' to describe any textual patterning which results in a shift of attention from a previously focused figure to another. Occlusion promotes the neglect and eventual decay of the previously focused figure if they are not mentioned again for the duration of several clauses (Stockwell 2009: 22). Indeed, in sentences 7-11, Sophie and Boris (and the tram) fade out of attention as Ryder instead becomes preoccupied with the passenger sitting near him. This man is established as an attractor through reference to his noisiness; he 'slapped his thigh' (sentence 7), and his role as a human speaker. In past tense narratives such as *The Unconsoled*, direct speech cues a world-switch into the present-tense which could reinforce the man's role as an attractor (sentence 8). In sentences 10 and 11 the attractiveness of the

man is sustained through repeated reference ('him', 'he') but he appears in the object position and Ryder is re-established as the strongest attractor through his topicality. The final sentence of the extract mentions Sophie and Boris, once again reinstating them as attractors, but they are not active, nor do they hold the subject position in the sentence. The 'people' are better attractors as they are both spatially higher ('rose') and more active than Sophie and Boris, who are gradually occluded. Throughout Extract A, then, textual features work to neglect Sophie and Boris and strengthen the attractiveness of other objects and entities in the text-world, in direct contrast to their importance for the focaliser. This creates a sense of attentional disjunction which underpins the frame-related disruption described in section 6.4.1. I would suggest that for readers who have identified with Ryder's goals in the preceding passage (as I did), the delay in referring to Sophie and Boris initially creates suspense and eventually frustration as their continual neglect disrupts cognitive 'norms' and renders Ryder's goal unachieved.

The pattern of attraction and neglect in this extract creates several cognitive disjunctions in Stockwell's (2009) terms. Ryder's perception does not operate in the way one might expect, and recognisable, human enactors are neglected whilst inanimate objects function as attractors. This disjunction is even more prominent when readers' prior knowledge about the situation and emotional relationships between the characters is taken into account. As such, I posit that like the Hardy text examined by Stockwell (2009), *The Unconsoled* can be seen to deviate from cognitive 'norms' in a manner which could be relevant to the text's resonant power and the disorientation reported by its readers. Though it is not possible to reach definite conclusions regarding the whole novel from this short analysis, *The Unconsoled* does seem to involve a vast amount of unusual or deviant textual choices throughout. It would be interesting to conduct a larger-scale examination of the pattern of attraction and neglect in the novel in order to examine how often these deviations occur, though such investigation is beyond the scope of the present discussion.

Instead, I wish to emphasise the potential relevance and usefulness of Stockwell's attention-resonance model for Text World Theory discussions of emotional effect. Firstly, it seems to me that the integration of Stockwell's attention-resonance model into Text World Theory is both workable and pertinent; as both world-building information (e.g. the presence of objects and properties such as brightness) and function-advancing information (e.g. the subject/object positions and verbs) fit with Stockwell's inventory of textual attractors. The richness of text-worlds as opposed to other models of conceptual space (see section 2.1) means that sensual features such as noisiness and brightness can be regarded as part of readers' mental representations. Text World Theory can also account for the presence of cognitive 'norms' in readers' discourse-world knowledge which are involved in



the recognition of disjunctions at the text-world level. Secondly, in my analysis the pattern of attraction in the extract from *The Unconsoled* seemed directly related to my feelings of suspense and eventual frustration; suggesting that Stockwell's model could have particular relevance in the examination of emotional response.

In his analysis of resonance, Stockwell (2009) focuses on the cognitive disjunctions caused by features at the micro-linguistic level, but also makes the broader claim that texts which feature: 'shocking, jarring, deviant or just unusual textual choices can jolt a reader into attentiveness' and result in the experience of resonance (Stockwell 2009: 22). In sections 6.3.1 and 6.4.1 I analysed the way in which surprising and deviant features of *The Unconsoled* threaten frame disruption and prompt readers to engage in downgrading processes. As noted in section 6.3.1, downgrading involves the redirection of attention as readers attempt to explain the informativity of textual elements. It seems to me that Stockwell's attention-resonance model may also work on a more macro-linguistic level, and that resonance may be likely to ensue as a result of the systematic disruption of readers' discourse-world frame knowledge. Indeed, in her account of cognitive resonance, Halverson (2005) regards it as a macro-linguistic phenomenon related to schema (or frame) activation during reading. She posits that cognitive resonance is caused by either the coactivation of the same schema by different textual means; or the activation of two distinct but interrelated schemas which have partial structural isomorphism (2005: 104). Though her claims differ from mine in that she is concerned with schema reinforcement rather than potential disruption, her analysis also implies that the way textual information interacts with readers' schemas is attention-directing and contributes to the formation of thematic continuity and coherence across a text (2005: 107). I posit that *The Unconsoled* could be regarded as manipulating readerly attention on both micro- and macro-linguistic levels and in a manner which makes it potentially highly resonant for those who have the disposition to read it at a high level of intensity (for more on reader disposition, see Stockwell 2009: 44-5).

In this section I set out to examine the resonance described by readers of *The Unconsoled*, and have applied Stockwell's (2009) attention-resonance model in order to make some preliminary observations regarding the text's effects. I have suggested that Stockwell's model be incorporated into Text World Theory analyses in order to aid the framework's account of the emotional and experiential aspects of discourse processing. I have also argued that my work on the knowledge frames which are disrupted by the text can be seen as impacting upon reader's attention and thus also contribute to the resonance of the novel. However, my discussion has also highlighted the need for further research in several areas, including the relationship between attention and emotion in discourse

processing; the connection between micro- and macro-linguistic elements in the creation of literary resonance, and the incorporation of these features into Text World Theory.

## **6.6. Review**

The analyses in this chapter have highlighted the importance of the interactions between attention, textual information and readers' knowledge frames in their emotional experience of discourse. Following Stockwell (2002) I have linked de Beaugrande's (1980) notions of informativity and downgrading with Cook's (1994) schema theory in order to examine the interpretative processes involved in reading *The Unconsoled*. Drawing on cognitive emotion theories (reviewed in section 3.1.2) which specify that emotion is goal-related and attention-directing, I have suggested that informativity and downgrading could be viewed as parts of emotional processes. I have also drawn upon social psychological research (reviewed in section 3.1.3) in order to examine the structure and deployment of emotion knowledge when reading *The Unconsoled*. I have argued that such knowledge is important in readers' emotional responses to texts, particularly in the establishment of relationships between discourse-world readers and text-world enactors. I have also investigated the resonant properties of the *The Unconsoled*, discussing Stockwell's (2009) attention-resonance model and its implications for Text World Theory analyses. In addition to proposing that aspects of Text World Theory be reconceptualised as inherently emotional, the discussions in this chapter have also identified several areas which are ripe for development in future applications of the framework. The following chapter concludes this thesis by considering the main innovations put forward over the course of the preceding chapters and the wider implications of the project as a whole.

# Chapter 7: Conclusions

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## **7.0. Preview**

This chapter provides a concluding discussion of the main findings and wider implications of this thesis, outlining directions for future research. In section 7.1 I review the central proposals generated as a result of the analyses in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, and summarise the contributions which this thesis makes to four main areas: Text World Theory (in section 7.1.1); literary-critical understanding of Ishiguro (section 7.1.2); cognitive and social emotion theories (in section 7.1.3); and cognitive poetics more broadly (in section 7.1.4). Section 7.2 considers some of the directions in which the present project may be expanded or developed in the future, before section 7.3 provides a final summary of the broader significance of this thesis.

## **7.1 Central Contributions**

The primary aim of this thesis has been to develop cognitive-poetic understanding of the emotional experience of literary discourse through the combination of detailed Text World Theory analysis and the examination of readers' responses. A further aim has been to advance cognitive-poetic and literary-critical understanding of three works by contemporary novelist Kazuo Ishiguro. In the course of this discussion, theories from cognitive psychology, social psychology, narratology and other areas of cognitive poetics have been synthesised with Text World Theory in order to augment its account of emotional experience in discourse. In this section I review the contributions made to Text World Theory, literary criticism, emotion theory and cognitive poetics.

### **7.1.1 Text World Theory**

This thesis has been primarily concerned with augmenting the discourse-world level of Text World Theory, which has remained underdeveloped in recent enhancements of the framework. Though Werth (1995a, 1999) suggests that the discourse-world incorporates participants' knowledge, dreams, hopes, beliefs, memories, intentions and imagination, his account focuses solely upon knowledge. Further attention has only been paid to the discourse-world level as a result of the increasing interest in the emotional experience of literary discourse (Gavins 2007; Lahey 2005; Stockwell 2005a, 2009). However, the proposals put forward in such work are not comprehensive and have not been extensively applied. For example, the notions of projection and identification remain relatively under-scrutinised, and issues such as the emotional significance of knowledge activation and participants' hopes and preferences have not been addressed. The analyses in Chapters 4, 5

and 6 contribute to the development of the discourse-world level of the framework in several ways.

Firstly, I have argued for a more detailed and finely nuanced account of deictic projection within Text World Theory, which in turn will improve its account of participants' emotional experience. Though previous work in Text World Theory has recognised that readers may project into a range of text-world roles (such as the implied reader; the narratee; the 'you' in second-person fiction and other literary characters and poetic personae), it has focused on the establishment of a relationship between a discourse-world participant and a *single* text-world enactor (Gavins 2007; Lahey 2005; Stockwell 2005a, 2009). In Chapter 4 I embarked upon the first examination of multiple projection, arguing that readers are able to project simultaneously into a number of roles during literary reading. My claims were elucidated and supported with evidence from the reader response data I collected (Dataset 1). In this Dataset, real readers' tendencies to reconstruct scenes collaboratively and enact joint mindreading is suggestive of their ability to imagine multiple perspectives. My approach to projection was further developed through the effective synthesis of Text World Theory with aspects of cognitive psychology and rhetorical narratology. In section 5.2.1, I integrated the notion of the 'narrative audience' (Phelan 1996, 2005; Rabinowitz 1998 [1987]) into Text World Theory in order to explain readers' continued engagement with texts that deliberately alienate them from the narratee position through certain forms of address.

Secondly, I have also argued for a more detailed and nuanced consideration of the phenomenon of identification, which is another key concept in current text-world approaches to emotion (Gavins 2007; Lahey 2005; Stockwell 2005a, 2009). Although identification is ultimately a reader-driven activity, in Chapter 5 I argued that textual features are also responsible for the promotion and problematisation of identificatory processes. Furthermore, in section 5.3 I introduced the concept of disassociation, which refers to a conscious, reverse identification in which readers expressly reject the mapping of characteristics between themselves and a text-world enactor. I argued that readers are able to experience identification and disassociation simultaneously in relation to different text-world enactors of the same literary character, supporting my earlier claims regarding multiple projection. I also suggested that varying degrees of projection, identification and disassociation in relation to multiple text-world enactors can lead to the experience of mixed emotions during literary discourse. These claims were supported with insights from social psychology and the analysis of pronoun use and metaphorical expression in the comments of literary critics and real readers (Dataset 2).

Thirdly, with the intention of addressing readers' discourse-world hopes and preferences using the text-world framework, in section 5.4 I incorporated Gerrig's (1993) notion of participatory responses into Text World Theory. This was achieved through the identification of a new class of worlds at the text-world level, termed 'participation-worlds'. These worlds are mental representations created by the hearer or reader during discourse-processing which both reflect and reinforce their involvement in the discourse. I argued that they are similar in quality to modal-worlds, in that they enable readers to imagine hypothetical situations or conceptualise unrealised hopes and desires regarding narrative events. Where clashes or conformities arise between the content of readers' participation-worlds and the text-worlds of the narrative, emotional responses may ensue. Because they are only indirectly text-driven, participation-worlds differ from the types of mental representations previously included in Text World Theory. The identification of such worlds stretches the boundaries of the text-world framework and raises questions about its scope and limitations, which are discussed further in section 7.2.1 below.

Fourthly, I have further enhanced the detail of the discourse-world level through my discussion of knowledge and emotion in Chapter 6. In section 6.3, I incorporated the notions of informativity and downgrading (de Beaugrande 1980) into the text-world account of knowledge retrieval and activation. I argued that the interpretative processes mapped out by de Beaugrande (1980), along with the notion of schema manipulation proposed by Cook (1994), can be perceived as intimately entangled with the emotion processes set out in cognitive psychology. Furthermore, drawing on approaches in social psychology, in section 6.4 I presented a detailed consideration of the role of emotion knowledge in the discourse world. I highlighted the importance of prototypical and ethnotheoretical knowledge about emotion in both text-world creation and the emotional experience of discourse, specifically relating such knowledge to the promotion and problematisation of projection and identification.

Finally, in section 6.5 I argued for the incorporation of cutting-edge theories of resonance and attention (Stockwell 2009) into Text World Theory in order to expand the framework's ability to address emotional effect. This augmentation was prompted by the high frequency of comments regarding the resonant effect of *The Unconsoled* in reader response data (Dataset 3). Through the application of Stockwell's (2009) attention-resonance model to an extract from *The Unconsoled*, I established the workability of an integration of Stockwell's framework within the parameters of Text World Theory. I also proposed that Stockwell's micro-linguistic focus could be broadened to incorporate macro-linguistic elements such as the knowledge retrieval and activation mentioned above.

The modifications to Text World Theory put forward throughout the course of this thesis offer an enhancement of the framework and, in particular, to ongoing research into the emotional experience of literary discourse. In addition to providing the first review of existing approaches to emotion in Text World Theory, I have built upon this existing research and developed Text World Theory in several new and innovative directions. In section 7.2 below I consider a number of directions for future research arising from the present project.

### **7.1.2 Kazuo Ishiguro**

This thesis puts forward a new contribution to literary-critical understanding of Ishiguro's novels as, to my knowledge, the present study is the first cognitive-poetic investigation of his works. Most significantly, the analyses in this thesis have provided an original perspective on the emotional themes and effects of Ishiguro's novels.

My analysis of *The Remains of the Day* in Chapter 4 contributed to literary-critical understanding of this text and Ishiguro's other first-person narratives. Though first-person narration is typically thought to engender cooperative feelings of sympathy for the protagonist, the reader comments in Dataset 1 suggested that engagement with the protagonist was more complex. I argued that readers engage in multiple projection when creating the text-worlds of the novel, and that their emotional responses to *The Remains of the Day* are also influenced by the presence of other text-world enactors and the projective opportunities which their existence provides. Furthermore, my analysis of *The Remains of the Day* contributed to literary-critical observations about the 'interpretative work' required by readers of the text (Shaffer 2001: 5). I specified that mindreading inferences were a particularly important class of 'interpretative work' necessary in the construction of the text-worlds of this novel.

In Chapter 5, I argued that textual features in *Never Let Me Go* work both to promote and problematise identification with the protagonist, subtly manipulating readers' emotional responses. In particular, I drew an original connection between the theme of emotion and the emotional responses of readers. In *Never Let Me Go*, Kathy's emotions are often represented through the use of Western conceptual metaphors about emotion (Kövecses 1990, 2000; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999), reinforcing their verisimilitude and, I argued, readers' identification with the narrator. The representation of love in the novel, however, differs from prototypical Western ideas about this emotion, which encouraged disassociation in the readers I examined. Drawing upon reader reports of partial-identification and partial-disassociation, I argued that the text promotes a complex positioning of the reader which is thematically significant to the novel as a whole.

Chapter 6 provided a cognitive-poetic perspective on the experimentalism of *The Unconsoled*, through a detailed examination of the way the text repeatedly disrupts readers' knowledge about time, space, and human behaviour. I related such disruptions to the emotional experience of readers, who are prompted to search for explanations in order to maintain the coherence of the discourse. I also provided a detailed analysis of the unusual representation of emotion in *The Unconsoled*, noting that when Ryder experiences sadness at the close of the novel, his emotion occurs at an extreme level of temporal compression and out of all proportion with the severity of events. I argued that when Ryder's emotional behaviour converges with readers' emotion knowledge, it is easier to identify with his character. However, in *The Unconsoled*, human emotions often operate in unexpected or unfamiliar ways which in turn have an impact of readers' emotional experiences.

In section 1.3 I noted that the emotional poignancy of Ishiguro's writing has been recognised in literary criticism (Wong 2000), but argued that such discussions have limited explanatory power. My own analysis of Ishiguro's novels has provided a rigorous and systematic approach to the stylistic features of each text, and the cognitive processes involved in the interaction between text and reader. This has enabled a detailed discussion of the elements which contribute to their emotional effects. Interestingly, my discussion of the novels has highlighted a connection between their thematic concern with emotion and the emotions of readers. Social psychologists emphasise the importance of shared emotion knowledge in human interaction, and in the course of my analyses I have discovered that the representation of emotion in each novel can be seen to influence readers' emotional experience of the discourse. Furthermore, my cognitive-poetic analyses have provided detailed insights into the stylistic commonalities and differences between Ishiguro's works. Critics often divide Ishiguro's oeuvre into two 'trilogies' and regard *The Unconsoled* to be a significant stylistic break from form. Whilst all the novels I examined share a predominantly first-person narrative perspective; feature negative modal shading (Simpson 1993); and foreground issues of narrator reliability, the text-world investigations presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 support literary-critical observations regarding the stylistic departure represented by *The Unconsoled*. I have established that the key difference between this novel and the other texts considered in this thesis is the lack of an 'epic situation' (Romberg 1962) and hence a lack of any seemingly cooperatively-oriented narrative featuring direct address to a narratee. In section 6.2 I argued that this lack of an epic situation impacts upon the experiential 'feel' of the discourse, contributing to the disorientation described by readers in Dataset 3.

### **7.1.3 Cognitive and social emotion theories**

Through the discussion of cognitive and social psychological emotion theories in section 3.1 and the analyses in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, this thesis has also aimed to contribute to ongoing research in theories of emotion. I have argued that cognitive and social emotion theories are particularly applicable to literary reading and, using the Text World Theory framework, have applied these emotion theories to the literary discourse situation. The theoretical synthesis begun in this thesis adds a detailed, stylistic dimension to discussions of the interaction between texts and readers' emotion processes. This attention to stylistic detail in the discussion of emotion builds upon existing broader psychological work on emotion and literature (e.g. Gerrig 1993; Oatley 1994, 1999a, 1999b, 2002, 2003; Robinson 2005; Schwartz and Shaver 1987).

### **7.1.4 Cognitive poetics and stylistics**

As already stated above, the central aim of this thesis has been to contribute to cognitive-poetic understanding of the emotional experience of literary discourse. So far, this review has concentrated on the innovative enhancements I have suggested to Text World Theory, literary criticism and emotion theory. This section outlines some of the other ways in which the present project has aimed to contribute to cognitive poetics and stylistics more broadly.

The findings discussed in section 5.3 provided further empirical support for Kuiken et al's (2004) notion of the metaphorical basis of identification. I found similarities between the 'metaphors of personal identification' identified by Kuiken et al (2004) and the expressions of literary critics and readers in Dataset 2. I also proposed an extension to Kuiken et al's observations regarding the asymmetric relationship established by the metaphoric use of the second-person. In my data, readers often followed up second-person claims with comments in the first-person. I argued that this could be seen to reverse the asymmetry of the identification, signalling a close cross-world mapping between reader and character (Stockwell 2005a, 2009).

My discussion in section 6.3 adds to current cognitive theories of knowledge structure and knowledge handling. Specifically, I followed Stockwell (2009) in linking de Beaugrande's (1980) notion of informativity with Cook's (1994) theory of schema disruption, and developed this theoretical synthesis further through an explicit discussion of emotion. Building upon explicit and implicit references to emotion in previous cognitive-poetic work in this area, I argued that the interaction between readers' knowledge frames and textual information can be reconceptualised as inherently emotional. Furthermore, my analysis in section 6.4 highlights the importance of a particular class of knowledge, pertaining to emotion, in readers' narrative understanding.



In section 5.3 my claim that readers can simultaneously experience both identification and disassociation due to the influence of various textual features presents a challenge to stylistic assumptions about distancing or estrangement in narrative. Simpson's (1993) modal grammar suggests that the experiential 'feel' of a text can be determined through the examination of its linguistic features. Thus, for example, Simpson (1993) claims that texts with a negative modal shading tend to have an estranging or distancing feel (1993: 53, 75). My analyses suggest that textual features can work together to exert a subtle and sometimes contradictory influence over reader positioning. This adds a greater cognitive complexity to grammatical models of estrangement, and suggests that detailed consideration of readers in interaction with texts is necessary in an examination of experiential effect.

Finally, the analyses in this thesis have aimed to enhance existing cognitive-poetic methods by incorporating naturalistic reader response data into cognitive-poetic investigations. I have demonstrated, in accordance with the proposals of Myers (2009), the way in which such data can profitably be used in order to shape and support stylistic analysis and advance cognitive-poetic frameworks. As noted in sections 1.1.2 and 3.3 above, there is a growing connection between the exploration of emotion in literary discourse and the use of empirical methods to investigate the responses of readers other than the researcher. Compared with purely introspective analysis, such methods increase the generalisability of the discussion and enable resulting proposals to be more wide-ranging. Vandaele and Brône (2009: 6) suggest that a major challenge for the future of cognitive poetics is the reconciliation of 'first-person' and 'third-person' methods. In this thesis, I have attempted to reconcile them through combination, and have endeavoured to present transparent analyses which are related to 'real' readers; either myself, literary critics or the participants in my datasets. Though my data has its limitations (discussed below), I believe that my combination of methods is a workable model for future work in Text World Theory and cognitive poetics more broadly. Further future directions suggested by the present study are considered in section 7.2 below.

## **7.2 Future Directions**

Following my review of the central aims of this thesis above, in this section I consider areas which could be developed and expanded in future research. Section 7.2.1 considers future directions for Text World Theory, whilst 7.2.2 considers the implications of my discussion of reader response. Finally, in section 7.2.3 I propose a series of research questions which are relevant to future interdisciplinary work in cognitive poetics, the empirical study of literature, and cognitive and social psychology.

### **7.2.1 Text World Theory**

The analyses in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 suggest a number of future directions for the further development and expansion of Text World Theory. Firstly, as my modifications to the text-world framework are based upon my study of three first-person narratives, there is clearly potential for the theoretical developments I have proposed to be applied and tested in relation to a wider range of literary texts. In such research, a guiding question might be the extent to which my claims regarding multiple projection, identification and disassociation, emotion knowledge and resonance apply both to other narratives and other literary genres such as poetry or multimodal texts. Secondly, although the present discussion has aimed to contribute to the ongoing development of the discourse-world level of Text World Theory, there remains a clear need for further research into this level of the framework. Specifically, the role of participant attention, motivation and disposition require examination, and existing modifications require further testing and expansion. I believe that continued scrutiny of this domain should be a priority in future augmentations to Text World Theory.

A further key question for future text-world research into the emotional experience of literary discourse is the degree to which Text World Theory could or should be extended to account for non-linguistic phenomena. In section 5.4 I proposed that the notion of 'participation-worlds' be incorporated into Text World Theory as a way of accounting for the mental contents of readers' emotionally significant hopes and preferences during literary reading. However, the inclusion of 'participation-worlds' moves Text World Theory away from its linguistically-focused, text-driven approach to mental representation and marks a significant departure from Text World Theory as conceived by Werth (1999). Such an augmentation stretches the framework to its limits and, whilst improving its ability to explain certain aspects of our emotional experience of discourse, inevitably contributes to the loss of some of the theory's precision and analytical appeal. Further work is needed in order to determine Text World Theory's suitability in accounting for this and other types of emotional experience which emerge as part of our wider involvement with discourse. I have argued that Text World Theory has unique features which make it well suited to a cognitive-poetic examination of emotional experience, but the examination of its limitations is also necessary in a thorough scrutiny of its value.

### **7.2.2 Reader responses**

As noted in section 7.1.4 above, the analyses presented in this thesis aim to improve upon current cognitive-poetic methods by using naturalistic reader response data to direct and support cognitive-poetic investigation. However, there are necessary limitations to the data I collected as part of this study which suggest areas for future development.

Although I collected a rich set of data regarding each of the novels, the present study is limited by the relatively small quantity of data which I was able to examine within the parameters of the project. Each dataset contained reader response data from a single context; either a face-to-face discussion group, or the internet. Future work on reader response could involve the synthesis of a wider range of naturalistic data (for example, several face-to-face discussions between a range of participants, in addition to internet data). Furthermore, it would be interesting to combine and compare the findings of naturalistic data with more empirical data, such as that collected by think-aloud methods, for example (see section 3.3.1). Drawing on a combination of naturalistic comments and think-aloud responses could enable stylistic and cognitive-poetic analyses to examine and investigate a greater range of 'real' responses. A further area for future consideration is the type of responses which are encouraged by particular contexts. Based upon the comparison of my small set of data, I found that face-to-face discussions tended to involve greater engagement with particular scenes and characters from the novel, whilst the internet data seemed more focused on overall summaries. This is further reason to draw upon data from a range of contexts, but future research could also examine whether this pattern is found in relation to other texts or whether it is specific to the datasets I examined. Finally, an interesting line of research would be the comparison of the present datasets with other reader responses about the novels by Ishiguro. For example, future investigations could examine whether other book group discussions about *The Remains of the Day* feature the collaborative scene reconstruction which featured so heavily in Dataset 1. With regard to *Never Let Me Go*, do other readers express frustration at the opening pages and a desire to stop reading the novel? Furthermore, a comparison between the written responses to *The Unconsoled* collected in Dataset 3 and a face-to-face discussion about the novel would likely yield interesting results. The use of data from a wider variety of sources would doubtless further the methods used in the present discussion, which has been necessarily limited in its scope.

### **7.2.3 Interdisciplinary research**

In this section I suggest future directions for interdisciplinary research into the emotional experience of literary discourse, which have been raised by the present interdisciplinary study. Below, I propose a series of research questions which are of relevance to future work in cognitive poetics, the empirical study of literature, empirical cognitive psychology and social psychology.

Firstly, the notion of multiple projection is central to the claims made in this thesis. However, there is scope for the further, empirical and psychological investigation of this phenomenon, specifically regarding the way in which projection takes place. Do

participants project into multiple perspectives simultaneously, or do they engage in a rapid shifting between perspectives (or a combination of both)? Can the theoretical distinction between spatial projection and embellished projection discussed in section 3.2.4 be empirically validated? Is there any evidence to connect projection with emotional experience? These are some of the research questions whose investigation would directly benefit accounts of the emotional experience of literary discourse.

Following Stockwell's (2009) attention-resonance model, I believe that the relationship between attention and emotion in literary reading is set to become a key area of future cognitive-poetic research. There is scope for further investigation into the theoretical connections I posed between knowledge frame disruption and emotional processes. Can processes of schema activation and disruption be perceived as interacting with emotional processes of attention re-direction? Can empirical evidence be found for such a connection?

In addition, the findings of this thesis suggest the need for further examination of the connection between emotion representation and emotional experience. How do discursal representations of emotion contribute to the relationships which are established between discourse-world and text-world entities? Does a convergence between readers' emotion knowledge and the emotional behaviour of text-world entities always encourage identification? How might cultural and experiential differences in participants' emotion knowledge effect their engagement with particular narratives?

Finally, I have drawn upon major emotion theories in cognitive and social psychology in order to underpin my analyses of the emotional experience of literary discourse. However, as noted in section 3.1, emotion research is a wide and diverse interdisciplinary area with a proliferation of approaches and theories. Future research into emotion and literature could continue to integrate insights from this interdisciplinary area in order to advance our understanding of the emotional experience of literary discourse.

### **7.3 Thesis Review**


My aim in this thesis has been to examine the emotional experience of literary discourse through a combination of cognitive-poetic theory and the investigation of reader response. The constraints of space and time have meant that I have focused this study on the emotional experience of three, first-person narratives by contemporary author Kazuo Ishiguro. My examination of the potentially vast area of emotion has been further narrowed by my focus on cognitive and social approaches to the phenomenon, and additionally by my intention to build upon existing work in Text World Theory and cognitive poetics. Finally, my approach has been further refined through the reader

response data which has directed and supported my investigations. The resulting analyses have proposed several original augmentations to the Text World Theory framework and contributed to literary-critical understanding of Ishiguro. It is hoped that the present study will also stand as an important theoretical and methodological contribution to cognitive poetics, expanding the discipline's widening horizons and enhancing its relevance to the experience of real readers. Most crucially, I hope that this thesis serves to promote further investigation into our engagement with and enjoyment of literature.

# Appendix 1

## Key to Text World Diagrams


Diagrams follow the conventions established by Werth (1999) and Gavins (2007).




Text-World



Foregrounding



Knowledge frames and inferences being used in text-world construction.

  
 Lines show connections  
 between worlds



Participation-World

### Modal-Worlds



Boulomaic



Deontic



Epistemic



Hypothetical

w-s	World-Switch
neg	Negation
ds	Direct Speech

In some diagrams the text-world cues/contents are represented by short quotations from the text alone (e.g. 'it seemed')

### Abbreviations in worlds:

#### World-builders

- t. = time
- l. = location
- e. = enactors
- o. = objects

#### Function Advancers

- relational, behavioural and existential processes
- ↓ material and mental processes

# Appendix 2: Dataset 1

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## Transcription Conventions:

The data has been transcribed as prose for ease of reading.

, . Commas and full-stops are used to aid reading and do not always indicate pauses.

- Dashes are used to signal incomplete utterances.

‘ ’ Inverted commas are used to show reported speech and question marks to indicate questions.

... Ellipses indicate sections omitted for brevity – in the appendices these are kept to a minimum and only elide repetitions and fillers, in the chapters they can indicate more significant omissions.

() Comments in round brackets supply extra information about non-linguistic aspects of the transcript, in lower case they refer to the actions of the speaker e.g. (*laughs*) and in uppercase the actions of the group e.g. (*LAUGHTER*).

[] Comments in square brackets are my additions, to aid clarity or make other comments about the discourse, such as noting a high frequency of overlaps (which have not been transcribed).

(2) Numbers in brackets indicate pauses in seconds – only long pauses over 1 second are represented in the transcript.

xx Signals indecipherable words/utterances.

Below are contextualising extracts from Dataset 1 regarding *The Remains of the Day* (1989). Underlining indicates the passages cited in Chapter 4.

### Extract 1 – Dataset 1

A: yeah he's [Stevens] got an image of what he should be but not actually what he wants to be cos like [*overlaps*] when he's reading the sentimental novel he almost comes some way- he says something like 'why should I be ashamed to admit it', I did at times find it find it erm interesting or amusing these stories even though they were kind of frivolous and ridiculous so he almost kind of admits that he enjoyed it but even now kind of looking back on his own life he couldn't just say 'hey wasn't I silly not to be able to say I enjoyed reading love stories' he has to be able to say it was because he was interested in the language and it was to do with etiquette and manners

C: but the study of banter does a similar thing, him its this- its not just that he cant- again it goes beyond- its an art that has to be learned in a precise manner and [*overlaps*]

A: and its probably more natural and frivolous than he

C: yeah and he thinks it should be somehow- and yet he's probably quite good at it if he actually lets

A: but that's really endearing I mean I found a lot of his characteristics really really endearing

C: like he's like 'I must learn it' and 'if I see something funny and I try and do three witticisms'

B: I don't find that endearing I found it the opposite I found it I just found him so frustrating as a character

A: really I found I really warmed to him

C: His response to his father I found quite

A: I found that so moving I found that so- I really got that I really feel like I just thought yeah that is the most dignified thing he could possibly have done and that is what your

father would have wanted you to do, even the way it looks yeah it does seem cold and really cold and heartless

### **Extract 2 – Dataset 1**

**B:** yeah cos on the night when Miss Kenton tells him [Stevens] she's getting married he goes and stands in his usual position for an hour to wait for everyone to come out of the drawing room and remarks on how triumphant he is that he's maintained so much dignity

**A:** yeah

**C:** he does it constantly

**B:** yeah he's just got this constant kind of- he's triumphant about it but how far is it- well its certainly not true by the end

**C:** he does it all the way through though

**A:** I find that absolutely amazing I cant help admiring it, like I just- I cant help admiring it that he just completely he's completely selfless in that situation, if he just let himself be ruled by his instincts or whatever he would've burst into Miss Kenton's room and said

**C:** yeah but

**A:** um I love you that's completely uncharacter but you know would've burst in and told her what he felt, instead he feels triumph from actually denying those emotions and saying 'yes I'm going to be the best butler I can be' [C trying to interrupt]

**C:** to me that's actually self indulgent rather than selfless I almost think he indulges himself in this constant sense of triumph

**A:** I dunno I can relate to that I can relate to why someone would do that, I can relate to it

**B:** yeah

**C:** yeah but I cant relate to it, he seems so, I dunno, wrapped up in (mocking tone) 'I am triumphant oh I triumphed here this is the thing of a great butler'

**A:** I think this is because he is motivated by- he genuinely believes his happiness lies there

**C:** I think he wallows in it

**A:** he believes his happiness lies there, he can't- I think it genuinely believes it lies there so why you're saying I must do this I must do this my happiness defi- is gonna be defined if I do this [C trying to interrupt]

**C:** what by selflessness?

**A:** no by being

**B:** by being great

**A:** by being great

**C:** but does that not mean selflessness to be a great butler surely that implies selflessness if he's going to achieve- because it is at the denial of every single

**A:** yeah [overlaps]

**C:** but I think he wallows in it in that kind of selfless attitude

### **Extract 3 – Dataset 1**

**B:** we are almost more aware of his [Stevens'] feelings that he is but then there's a really telling line that I'm trying to find where basically he just says how one event can completely... completely destroy your dreams, and its just a really telling line in one of the final, erm (2) one of the final passages... [Finds line in novel] 'There was surely nothing to indicate at the time that such evidently small incidents would render whole dreams forever irredeemable', like, that line really affected me when I read it I just thought, he



spends all like, that's page 189 by the way erm, he spends 189 pages pretending that its just a professional relationship that he has with Miss Kenton and then one line, which just almost slips out without him really meaning to just gives it all away I mean I know its been obvious before but I just found that a really xx

**C:** for me that almost smacks of his character as a whole though that I think- for me part of his narration is characterised by this- even with us he is trying to maintain that professional dignity even with this reader that xx there's a sense of I've still got this professional dignity in that he's somehow trying not to let it slip and occasionally you're right it comes through in a line and its amazing in some ways perhaps the transparency of, you know, of this professional veneer that he values so much pervades everything, even his mind etc, its so sort of- he's just locked in it isn't he and I think occasionally you know we know there's something- there's hints of it constantly throughout, and even at the end you're right that one line where she says 'a life with you Mr Stevens' and then its just he's like 'my heart was breaking' [*clicks fingers*] and that's it, and that's all you get and he's just locked again back into this whole you know almost this so British kind of veneer of 'I will not show

**B:** any emotion

**C:** any emotion oh the bus is here we'll probably never meet again, bye'

#### Extract 4 – Dataset 1

**A:** But he [Stevens] doesn't- he says but- he says several times erm he doesn't believe that a butler should ever be off duty unless you're completely on your own, he says if you're ever in the presence of anyone you must inhabit [*overlaps*] the butler he says something like it mustn't be a cloak that you take on and take off when you feel like it it must inhabit you and I genuinely think that he's striving for something that he thinks

**B:** will make him happy

**A:** will make him happy and I think the ending he suddenly realises not only is he not happy but that he's been he's been misguided and its just a horrible horrible thing to realise, its like the ultimate regret

**C:** [*overlaps*] the ending is crushing

**B:** crushing

**A:** its not just him saying 'oh if I had done a few things differently'

**C:** no it isn't its 'my whole life is negated by my'

**A:** 'I didn't want that', and he cant really I don't think he even gets quite- I think I've probably taken that one step further than he takes it

**C:** no I don't I don't

**A:** I don't think he consciously admits that he didn't want that, I think he admits that certain things went wrong i.e. Lord Darlington perhaps wasn't as great as he thought he was and perhaps

**C:** or as he tried to make out to the reader at least

**A:** and as a result he wasn't as great a butler

#### Extract 5 – Dataset 1

**B:** yeah and I think that's why you know how you said you identify with him A

**A:** yeah

**B:** I think that I didn't identify with him I completely identified with Miss Kenton and was just

C: mmm...

B: (*laughs*) I mean it might be my current emotional state and the way that everything is going at the moment with my life but, I just completely identified with her frustration with the situation when someone's not speaking to you

A: I can understand that I can totally see why she would be so frustrated yeah it must be absolutely maddening for somebody to be that closed all the time

B: but it makes me wonder [*overlaps*] I wonder how you read it, do you like- because I saw him as so unreliable I read back and thought they were probably actually together, I do-

A: oh no I didn't go that far

B: did you, how far did you go with that?

C: I didn't think I read them together, I read it as just one of those things where there's those constant near misses there was moments where- and then off suddenly he'd be-

B: cos I, I I dunno I reread it, I looked back and thought and felt that they might've- they were more together than he's ever willing to admit

### **Extract 6 – Dataset 1**

A: and do you know that really is the remains- that is the dregs though that meeting, them having that conversation at the bus stop in the rain

C: is the remains of the day

A: really is the dregs, it is really the remains of the day there's nothing there's nothing positive about that nothing

C: she's got he's telling her

A: comforting about that's just 'this is what's left of our relationship we're having a conversation about what might have been at a bus stop and you're going back to a person you don't love, who you've just told me you don't really love [*overlaps*]

C: what have they got left of their lives as well though

B: and will spend months wishing that you'd not gone'

A: I mean that is just the dregs

C: she says there are moments of utter desolateness and he almost hits one at the end doesn't he, but then he sort of- he manages to stop himself and block it out but, you do wonder like the rest of their lives

A: but I think that really its too late then, I don't see that as the turning point I just see that as like really tragic

C: the bus stop just kind of sticks the nail in the coffin

### **Extract 7 – Dataset 1**

A: I think its too late by that stage I think that she gives him the chance when she's telling him that she's been proposed to

C: she never loved him

A: no no no earlier on

C: oh yeah oh n- [*overlaps*]

A: several times she says to him 'he's asked me to marry him' and he does nothing

B: almost 'what should I do what do you think I should do?'

C: what I felt she was saying she wanted him to say 'marry me' like they were really 'here you are on a plate' and she doesn't go far enough because he wont step forward at all, then when she comes back and says 'I've accepted it' and he just says 'Oh

congratulations' and she's saying 'I'm handing in my notice' and he just says 'oh well thank you very much' and then she says something like

B: 'I used to mock you'

C: 'I've worked here for like fifteen years and you can't even say any more than congratulations is that all I mean to you' essentially and at that stage, cards on the table he cannot, he cannot say anything more

B: but all he cares about is being proper and going back to being dignified in front of everyone

A: yep

C: and perhaps also perhaps he wanted her to turn it down, perhaps he was waiting to see if she would turn it down on her own as part of her own kind of you know professional- to turn down the marriage without him having to say anything perhaps he was waiting for her to do it because for him that's not part of again the professional dignity

B: that's why I find that the passage with Lisa the maid so telling

A: yeah

B: because there's almost no point in it being there, like well there is obviously a point but the- its literally two or three pages about this girl who comes in- when they discuss no other maids by name really all the way through

C: no none of the other maids

B: and its just about a girl running away with an under butler who

C: and not fulfilling

B: and not fulfilling her professional kind of destiny

## Appendix 3: Dataset 2

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Below are contextualising extracts from Dataset 2 regarding *Never Let Me Go* (2005). For transcription conventions, see Appendix 2 above.

### The opening of the discussion, featuring Extracts 1.1; 1.2; 2; and 5.4 – Dataset 2

B: So shall we just kick off just say what people generally felt about it (3) I don't mean to put you on the spot [A] but obviously you didn't like it

A: No I didn't (LAUGHTER)

B: Its probably a book that's taken me the longest time to read, usually I have it read in a week but it took me at least two weeks to read it if not longer, [1.1] I didn't want to pick it up really and read it and then when I did I'd read like one chapter and then set it back down again. I just didn't understand what they were trying to get at the whole way through. From the start it assumed you knew what Hailsham was, its like, what is this? And then why do people look at them funny? And you don't really realise until over half way through the book that they're clones, they go on about being donors but you don't know what they're being donors for (laughs), and then I didn't like that they had to- I guess because they're clones they still needed permission whether they wanted to donate or not and that just seemed like against free will and that was a bit weird as well cos they went to ask Madame if they were allowed to not be donors basically so they could be in

love and that seemed a bit strange that they couldn't just make the decision for themselves

- E: Yeah you're right actually because it doesn't really say how they keep control of them does it (AGREEMENT)
- D: Yeah that was a question that went through my mind cos at the end when Tommy ran out and started screaming when they'd found out and they'd been to see Madame, [5.4] I thought that he was going to run off and I was like 'Go Tommy, go, escape!' (LAUGHTER, AGREEMENT) and that never happened and I think that's deep down what I kind of wanted, the sort of Disney ending of somebody to escape and it just wasn't going to happen was it
- A: Yeah cos actually like you say there was nothing really stopping them, well nothing that was apparent in the story that was stopping them from just- cos obviously they looked like regular people
- B: Well that's what I wasn't sure about either because people were funny around them so I didn't know whether they looked a bit different and then why could they not reproduce as well? I didn't understand why they couldn't
- D: I guess, I presumed they'd been genetically engineered maybe so they couldn't (AGREEMENT) (4)
- C: I think I thought pretty much the same as you, I was getting irritated by it, because essentially its science fiction isn't it, but it's not written like science fiction and I was just [1.2] at the beginning I wasn't intrigued I was annoyed that they were kind of going 'Ooh and we're donors but we're not going to tell you what it's about' and nerr, and it was just- I was irritated by that and didn't want to read it
- A: Yeah
- C: I was just 'for fecks sake, just tell me whats going on, stop fecking' (trails off)
- B: It's a really like deep topic but it was written quite childish because she was talking about her time when she was a child and it kept like just going 'Oh yeah and I told you about this bit a while ago and then like, and this links on to this' and it was, you know, as if a child was writing it as they remembered things, kind of (2)
- C: I suppose they were trying to- well I mean obviously what they were trying to get at was that it's science fiction and these are kind of mad clones but actually they've got perfectly the life like we've all got but, I don't know, it came across a bit like, a bit too angst ridden, the characters were a bit too 'Oh and then this happened and then we had a discussion over our hairbrush and then five years later it came back oh no' and then, you know (AGREEMENT, LAUGHTER)
- A: It was, because [2] each time there was something like that Kathy would refer to 'oh and when this happened' and then tells a little tale of something happening and on most occasions you were kind of thinking 'nothing really did happen', it was all very subtle wasn't it, it was all very kind of understated kind of little events which seemed to be a big deal to her or to the people involved but were fairly kind of incidental events
- C: I suppose that's what you remember though isn't it, that's the sort of things that I remember from my own childhood, little kind of stupid things when so and so said something to somebody else but it didn't really mean anything
- E: That's it, yeah, I thought that because it did remind me a bit of being, of the sort of stuff that you get obsessed about when you're at school and you'd think was really important and then it turned out not, but I think like now I would never sit and - I could probably think of some childhood memories I've got that are like she has when

you have stupid arguments about hairbrushes or whatever, but you'd never sort of sit and tell someone about them would you, whereas she's like a 31 year old woman and she sort of thinks that's an appropriate topic of conversation for a whole book basically  
(laughs)

### Extract 1.3 – Dataset 2

**B:** I think that was one thing I didn't like, at the start it just assumed that you knew what Hailsham was and I was like 'am I being really thick here'

**D:** No I felt that

**B:** 'that I've never heard of this before' and I was just like, that really annoyed me at the start that it was just assumed

**C:** And near the end as well it was quite interesting that they kind of all kept thinking that they saw it [Hailsham] and nobody ever went back to it and it kind of made me partly think 'oh well did it exist in the first place?'

**D:** Aaaaaah

**C:** You know was it just some kind of mad thing where 'ooh it was all just a dream' you know and then they made it up, or Ruth made it up like the horses were made up, 'would you believe it' or something (AGREEMENT) I mean I assume that wasn't the case but it's a bit weird

**D:** It could have gone any way like that though couldn't it really

**C:** Yep I wouldn't have been surprised

### Extracts 1.4 and 4 – Dataset 2

**C:** I was quite surprised that I wasn't sad at the end actually because I'm normally a bit kind of overemotional about characters in books and you get into it a bit too much don't you, but I just wasn't at the end of this one because by the end of it I was sick of reading it actually (LAUGHTER)

**B:** Yeah I couldn't wait to just get it finished, I was like 'right its done' (claps hands)  
(LAUGHTER)

**A:** Back to Marian Keyes

**B:** Yeah lets get some Marian Keyes read (LAUGHTER)

**C:** That's exactly what it was like because [1.4] I was so annoyed with the beginning of it just going 'blah blah blah blah', I mean it was- [4] I did feel it was a bit sad that they couldn't get their xx [donations] delayed but then it almost felt like they didn't really want to you know get their donations put off, it almost felt like they were just doing it because they thought they could and they'd see if they could try

**E:** And Ruth had told them to do it

**C:** and Ruth had told them to, yeah

**B:** Yeah I was like 'just get on with it, just get out of the xx [way]' you know like, 'why do you need to ask permission?' you know

**C:** Yeah why do you need to ask permission and also why do you want to drag it on any longer than you need to (LAUGHTER), they didn't seem to be enjoying each other's company that much

**B:** No

**A:** But again didn't their frame of reference- they'd been so kind of conditioned to what their life entailed that actually you then think like you say, if they had've gone and it'd been 'oh yeah what you're really in love, oh brilliant yeah you can defer'

C: They'd be like 'oh now what'?

A: Would they really know what to do in terms of enjoying a relationship outside of their frame of reference?

B: And he wasn't very well anyway so he couldn't really've enjoyed himself that much

A: Carrying a bag of kind of

E: A colostomy bag or something (*LAUGHTER, NOISES OF DISGUST*)

### **Extract 3 – Dataset 2**

A: There was no sense that they were getting any support was there cos if you think you know being a carer in our regular world is a tough job and actually they were going through something quite horrific actually with people that they did have a- well she did, people that she had a real friendship connection with and like you say she just seemed to be driving around like a loner just kind of bearing all of that herself as part of her identity of being a kind of 'strong carer reliable and really good at my job', I don't know that seemed

E: Yeah cos it did end with her doing that as well so she stopped and was a bit sad and then she went 'then I just got back in my car and carried on going to wherever I was supposed to be' sort of thing [3]

B: I didn't really feel like, her relationship with Tommy, I don't think they really understood what love was, or like the people in the cottages the older couple and things, I was just thinking about that, they just seemed to be like 'well, we're together because were having sex with each other' but it wasn't actually an emotional thing at all, like that they were in love,

E: Yeah I suppose, because she never says like 'oh', you know 'the shape of his eyes' or 'the way his hair blows in the wind' there's none of that stuff is there

A: They had to prove they were in love so they has sex and they did paintings, that was the only things that they ever really learnt about, but they didn't actually- she did care for him but she was his carer, so I didn't really feel really bad for her when she lost him because I didn't feel like they had a huge emotional connection

D: I did think there were a couple of moments in the book though where, not in a maybe sort of romantic way, but in the way that they were in tune with each other I felt just a few times that was drawn upon, like when they were in Norfolk and they were leaning against the car like I felt a real closeness between them then, but it wasn't necessarily like a romantic closeness but they did have sort of like a connection but, I don't know, like you say, I don't know whether it would be like the way we would experience love but

A: I don't know whether being a clone that was anything to do with it, their emotional capacity, I don't know

D: Because there are parts of the brain as well aren't there that are sort of to do with emotions and stuff, I don't know, you could go right into it and stuff (*LAUGHTER*)

C: Yeah its just a story! (*LAUGHTER*)

D: It isn't reall (*LAUGHTER*)

### **Extract 5.1 – Dataset 2**

B: I was really interested, you know when they were trying to find who they were cloned from, I thought that was really strange but it was quite interesting, I really wanted to know then who they'd all been cloned from (*AGREEMENT*) and why would someone

want to be cloned? cos that made me think that wherever they'd got their donations was when that person they'd been cloned from was ill but I wasn't sure

**C:** And did they know that they were being cloned? Or did they just take material from them when they were born or something?

**B:** Cos I couldn't work out, I was trying to think in my head – I think I've probably seen a movie or something before, you know that like someone's paid to be cloned kind of thing so that in the future they would be able to get or- I think there was a movie about that or something (*laughs*) that I might have watched and that's what made me think, maybe, cos they seemed to think they were from people who were the scum of the earth didn't they, like that's what Ruth was kind of implying, that they were all from hookers and stuff like that but I didn't, I couldn't work out, that confused me because then I thought are they orphans of hookers and you know like I got really confused then about what they actually were, I don't think it actually confirmed it until later really that they were actually clones

### Extracts 5.2 and 5.3 – Dataset 2

**D:** I think it- for me it left a lot- sort of towards the end of the book, well when I finished it, I had more questions unanswered than- [5.2] I kind of hoped right up to the end that I would get all the answers that I wanted and I didn't and that was a bit frustrating just in terms of, because it was so focused on her and her relationships and how they kind of went through the story, the bigger stuff about the clones and who was in charge and I know it said something about the government's programme but that was it, you know, and I kind of- cos its science fiction, I was really interested in kind of that side of it and I guess it wasn't about that but you know it kind of left me feeling a little 'mmm'

**A:** Yeah cos I suppose the bit where they go and meet Madame and whatever the other woman's called is kind of like the most unravelling of it that you get isn't it (AGREEMENT), where its kind of revelation about exactly what, well not exactly what, but to a large degree what's been going on at Hailsham and how that fits with other kind of cloning projects, and actually, I think for me, you then kind of yeah saw that actually they had had a privileged lifestyle in relation to these other clones out there who were living a pretty kind of dire existence and a less human kind of experience than what they were having at Hailsham (4) But yeah I mean the kind of, because its set you know in the 90s and its kind of pretty modern day, it is like you say the science fiction element is kind of, would that, could that ever be possible? That that could actually exist?

**E:** Yeah I don't know, I don't know how believable I found it, probably not [*laughs*]that believable

**A:** I don't think that that- I can't see that happening cos I think things like cloning actual organs maybe, but making a person and then not giving them any rights, that doesn't seem like something

**D:** I don't know how they'd get away with that

**A:** Yeah (AGREEMENT) (2)

**B:** But its interesting isn't it in terms of that issue about cloning and sort of genetic modification and stuff, you hear all the time the arguments don't you for and against where someone will say 'Oh its for the good of- all the diseases we can cure' and then there's other people saying 'But it's wrong and its just morally wrong' and I suppose it tapped into that a bit for me you know, like that kind of dilemma (2)

A: Cos they did have- that's the thing isn't it- they did have the kind of likeness to real human beings was so apparent through the kind of childhood experiences, the interactions the feelings the you know kind of trivial nature of the relationships, the emotions going on but actually it was hard until you knew what the bigger picture was to really fully differentiate between them and real human beings and then to think that their lives were actually predetermined and they were fated from the word go to have a life that simply follows these particular stages and then 'you become a donor, and then that's the end of it', because they've got personalities and relationships going on I think then it kind of hits you how kind of wrong it is and would be, because [5.3] you kind of wanted the happy ending I think, you know, Kathy and Tommy to be told that they could be together and kind of go off into the sunset and you know enjoy a future but there actually wasn't a future, there wasn't any way out of (trails off)

E: Yeah its really bleak isn't it

### Extract 5.5 – Dataset 2

A: talking about it I'm not sure that I would've stuck with it because I think it was a bit hard with where it was going and what was happening, because it's a bit kind of like sprawling themes isn't it but actually nothing really happens that's very interesting, its more a kind of tracking back and thinking 'oh actually now looking back I can see that its quite interesting' now like I say you've got the bigger picture and what it's all about but reading through its like 'yeah a-', you know, there's no event there's nothing really happening to grab your attention or to grab you kind of interest really

D: But I felt that's one of the reasons why sort of revealing it slowly over the story keeps you engaged because I guess its that thing that you get with books sometimes when you're like, or well I sort of felt that I wanted to finish it because I did want some answers and although I didn't get them all, and it wasn't necessarily that I was really enjoying it so much as just wanting to finish it really, I just kept thinking something big was going to happen and it didn't really apart from you know sort of like the odd bit when they reveal things and I just felt a bit horrified about their situation

## Appendix 4: Dataset 3

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Below are the extracts from Dataset 3 which are referenced in Chapter 6. Ellipses indicate omissions for brevity. Square brackets indicate my additions for clarity/anonymity. 'X' or a post number replaces names.

### **A2 Re: 2008 [Book Club] Discussions**

I found it [*The Unconsoled*] an amazing, if bizarre, experience...Extremely European, on the one hand, and incredibly new world on the other. It felt like a giant dream/nightmare/dream...

### **A3 Re: 2008 [Book Club] Discussions**

I'm just embarking on *The Unconsoled* and finding it incredibly dreamlike, to the extent that after putting it down for half an hour I still felt in a slightly surreal mood, as though the atmosphere of it had stayed with me. It's really struck me how immediately I've become immersed in it.



**A4 Re: 2008 [Book Club] Discussions**

It snagged me in exactly the same way. Even two weeks later (a long time for me) I'm still awed by the experience. I will probably upgrade this to a ☆☆☆☆ as it sticks with me like a bizarre dream.

**A5 Re: 2008 [Book Club] Discussions**

I must have been reading this the same time as you [A3]. I had the same experience, in that the atmosphere of the book pervaded real life. I was reading it by the pool on hols and when I got up to do something else, I invariably felt rather peculiar! Having said that, ultimately I didn't get on with it to the extent that I eventually gave up around 350 pages in which is very unusual for me. It just became so repetitive and, well, dull and I just couldn't take any more. I don't mind books where nothing much happens but where nothing happens at it's probably a dream anyway, well I'm afraid that was more than my prosaic mind was prepared to accept.

**A6 Re: 2008 [Book Club] Discussions**

This is going to sound really odd, but I'm finding the repetitive and frustrating nature of it peculiarly addictive. I'm almost certain I'll be sticking with it, though I've not yet got as far as you did with it - I'm at around p.200, I think. (I don't get through books v quickly unless I'm on my hols or something.) There are lots of 'why?'s in my head and I'm hoping there might be answers, or at least pointers to answers to some of them by the end.

**A9 Re: 2008 [Book Club] Discussions**

[Regarding the characters mirroring aspects of Ryder] I had an inkling about that, particularly with the boy. I think it is so dreamlike, that it leads in the direction of that particular interpretation, that is to say it seems likely that characters encountered within a dream are likely to be representations of your own self, or of (say) a significant other or parent. I also think it's fairly strongly signalled by the device of Ryder's recounting intimate anecdotes about characters he's supposedly just met. Looking forward to posting my thoughts on the Ishiguro thread eventually (which I know is unlike me 😊).

**B1 Re: Kazuo Ishiguro**

...everyone was expecting another subtle, shy study like his earlier novels. What they got was a strange story of a concert pianist called Ryder... Scenes do not follow logically from one another. The sense of frustration is immense. What seemed clear to me as I read the book was that it was a dream story - which is not to give anything away as this too is now hinted at on the paperback...

**B6 Re: Kazuo Ishiguro**

*The Unconsoled* - boy oh boy. He [Ishiguro] spent six years writing it? He must be quite a masochist. From time to time, I had to remind myself to remain calm because it was 'just a book'. Every page is endlessly frustrating. It's a bit like Fawltly

Towers - it's absurd and sometimes it's funny, but mostly it's just annoying because after a while it becomes unbearable watching a person being tortured and bullied and not being able to do anything about it. And because it's all a dream (this becomes obvious after the first 10-20 pages; the narrative is full of 'conventions' of a dream, such as the illogical sequence of events, shifting of space and time) it's the most symbolical of all his novels. Now, I wasn't happy with the metaphor in *Never Let Me Go*, so you can imagine how I felt being faced with - literally - dozens of symbols he offers for interpretation on each page. I think that he knew this novel could not meet with favourable reviews or popularity among readers, because a novel about stress turns the reading experience itself into stress... I think Ishiguro wanted to do something different with this novel and he put quite a lot at stake. He handled the complicated structure admirably and his style is as smooth as ever (if anything in this book can be called 'smooth'). But I didn't enjoy it. I can't imagine myself wanting to read it again.

**B13 Re: Kazuo Ishiguro**

It took me so long to read this book and unlike X who managed to dip in and out of the process, I engaged in a re-read after my long pause, which prolonged the agony. And by the conclusion it was doubtful who would win at being more stressed out by the experience – the narrator Ryder, or me the reader? By far the most agonising read I have ever come across, *The Unconsoled* maddens and infuriates, and makes your innards squirm with confusion and teeth-gritting frustration... Negotiating the dream-landscape... Ryder struggles to identify what it is that he should be doing at any time... He struggles through three sleepless days (and how the reader is aching for him to sleep properly)... One thing becomes clear for him and the reader – that he has lost the woman he loves, Sophie, and her little boy Boris – and he can deceive himself as to the importance of this as he endlessly breakfasts whilst riding the tram in the closing pages, even whilst contemplating the next chapter in his life. It is so dense and tortuous that it was difficult to understand fully and appreciate what everything represented in it; I would have great difficulty re-reading this, but I have to admit that it is a definite ★★★★★ read.

**C3 Re: Top Ten Unfinished Books**

Maybe [there] could be a follow up thread of books you have read but wished you hadn't. *The Unconsoled* would be right up there at the top of my list.

**D1** ...One way of looking at it, I suppose, is that the central character suffers from a form of short-term memory loss (à la the protagonist in the film *Memento*). But that explanation doesn't even begin to provide the key to all of *The Unconsoled's* mysteries. Ishiguro plays with time and space... On a conventional plane, the book just doesn't hold together. This is indeed a nightmare of dislocation, as a reviewer put it. And yet, remarkably enough, Ishiguro's themes shine through this confused tapestry. This very enigmatic book is, among other things, about the unrealistic, often debilitating expectations parents have of their children, the demands of a life lived in the public glare, and the myopia that allows people to substitute superficial rewards for the things that really matter (in this context, the novel's ending, with Ryder happily regarding a sumptuous buffet laid out in front of him in a city tram,

blew me away). Despite my own fascination with this book, I can understand others not getting drawn into it the way I was...entire passages are very frustrating (from a structural point of view, you have to be at least a little interested in surrealism, otherwise the irritation level is very high). I also have this theory that if it's the first Ishiguro you read, you'll hate it...(Something I haven't mentioned about the book, incidentally, is that it is also very very funny in parts)...

- D5** Quote D1: *the myopia that allows people to substitute superficial rewards for the things that really matter (in this context, the novel's ending, with Ryder happily regarding a sumptuous buffet laid out in front of him in a city tram, blew me away)*  
I'm in two minds about this. Yes, the ending is a lapse into wish-fulfilment on Ryder's part; its relatively trivial (and provisional) quality contrasts with the emotional depths that he's at least glanced into...Having said that, it is fulfilment of a sort - look at all the scenes in the book where he's about to sit down and relax, or about to have something to eat, and never quite manages it. I think it cuts both ways. (This is very much my favourite Ishiguro, and one of my favourite novels.)
- D8** Don't take *The Unconsoled* as a typical example of KI's work. I hated reading it, yet think about it more than any other book I've ever read. It's a dream, a fucking bad one at that, but beautiful.
- D11** I was hooked on from the moment it became evident that there's something incredibly strange in the book, in the first 20 pages...after that the book remained a roller coaster ride into...surrealism. The build up towards the last few pages is fully worth the 4 page conversations between strangely reminiscent characters of the book, and it kept me on tenterhooks all the time. I disagree with most of the people who call the book boring or tedious...*The Unconsoled* is without a doubt one of the most engrossing reads I have come across, leaving a person more and more bewildered.
- D14** I have told quite a number of people that *The Unconsoled* is my favourite book, and I am just now re-reading it to confirm why...[The novel is] a metaphor for life, perhaps...Who am I? where am I? what am I supposed to be doing? who are you? profound questions that this novel has enriched for me, without offering any answers...
- E1** ...This book can be very frustrating...[It] is meant to be humorous though the title might have suggested otherwise...Landscape and time are key in the novel. About a quarter into the book one would encounter rapid swerve of landscape (this can be annoying and confusing at first)...Engrossing read.
- E2** Perhaps I shouldn't review this -- because I was unable to finish it (in fact I barely made it through the first third. Not, I hasten to add, because of any defect in the writing -- this is quite obviously the work of a master writer. The story reads like someone relating a dream, but this is a dream that goes on and on. As I do much of my reading in bed, prior to sleep, this book had a most peculiar and disturbing effect upon me -- the narrator's voice got into my head and I found myself

continuing his story in my own dreams. I found this so disturbing, in fact, that I preferred to give up and try something less demanding. Perhaps I will try again, sometime.

- E4** This book is not for the faint of heart... I found myself largely frustrated with the weirdness and unsatisfied with the characters (who are mostly self-centered and angst ridden). Not a book I could recommend to too many people.
- E6** A horrible, haunting, work of genius, this book isn't right, isn't normal, and I'm sure it will stay with me forever. Let me try to explain. The book is halfway between a dream (or nightmare) and reality...it's a long, slow book...it is utterly unique, engaging, and yet left me feeling really horrible...
- E11.1** ...The story revolves around a world famous pianist who travels to a city, in Europe somewhere but we're never told where exactly,...Ryder seems to be suffering from some sort of amnesia at first. We don't really know anything about him, and he doesn't really seem to know anything about himself either. As we read through the novel it becomes increasingly dreamlike...Perhaps it isn't dreamlike, maybe it is more his insanity...I don't know. I pretty much have no clue what this novel was about. And yet I liked it. Yes, it was sometimes frustrating to be so totally in the dark about what was going on, but at the same time it is very well written. Ryder is an ass, no bones about it, but he is also extremely well-drawn and engaging. The writing is wonderful...Personally I loved it. And hated parts of it at the same time.
- E12** ...I'm surprised more people don't mention is that it's absolutely hilarious in places. Ishiguro nails the comedy of manners flawlessly, in a fashion both modern and timeless. "An ox, an ox, an ox!". The first Ishiguro I've read. Close to perfection.
- E13** ...it would be quite a challenge to write a stranger book than this one... Ishiguro really captures the shifting sands of perception that mark a dreamlike consciousness...[A] sense of inappropriate behavior is a constant throughout *The Unconsoled*...Nobody seems to notice, for example, when Ryder shows up to a fancy dress event in his dressing gown and slippers, and Ryder himself is strangely nonreactive when a journalist and photographer who are interviewing him commence talking about him as if her weren't present...On the other hand, he is horrified when the mourners at a funeral stop their sobbing to flock around him and deluge him with manic adulation... But the strangest narrative quirk of *The Unconsoled* is the way in which Ryder occasionally takes casual notice of a long, complicated back-story just by looking at a person, in the same way that he might notice a runny nose or a lipstick smudge. The first time this happens, as Gustav is showing him around his hotel room, I found the trick strangely disorienting, and actually doubled back to see whether I had missed a small phrase such as "I found out later" or "he would go on to tell me." But as I went on with the novel and similar incidents followed, it struck me as a very clever way to play with narrative...The liquidity of perception here is masterfully done, and once I cottoned on to this unique little trick, I quite enjoyed the experience of having the

narrative stretch and balloon in unexpected and sometimes humorous directions...I loved *The Unconsoled* on a purely aesthetic basis. I'm not sure what lasting messages or morals I'll take away from it, beyond a sense of the universality of human fears and fallibility, but the tense, intriguing mood and skewed, shadowy universe it created are still tangible to me days after closing the covers.

- E14** ...At first, you think Ryder's suffering from some sort of amnesia, rather similar to condition of the protagonist in *Memento*, existing in a permanent present...But things get odder when Ryder goes to a cinema showing '2001: A Space Odyssey' - which for the purposes of this narrative stars Clint Eastwood and Yul Brynner. It's when Ryder fails to notice this that a new explanation presents itself. He's dreaming.
- E14.4** There's a subculture of Ishiguro groupies who love *The Unconsoled* best of all. I'm in it and so's me mum. The whole effect of the book is soporific, firstly because it's a dream but also because it's like the boringness of someone telling you about their dream times five hundred pages, and even though that doesn't sound particularly rewarding, I found it truly transporting. I sometimes wonder if I ever actually finished reading it, or if I've just entered it.
- E16** I read this book nearly two years ago, but, in memory, it still exerts the resonant power that I felt from the second page of the text on to the final...Aside from Ryder, the narrator, all of the book's many characters emerge fully formed and, essentially, unchangable, on their first appearance. There's the worrywort, the bitter spouse, the cynic, the crusading idealist, the disapproving parents: stock characters of every stripe. And yet, somehow, these characters exist in a gelatinous world where everything is in flux. What changes, though, is Ryder's attitude towards one or the other of them -- in turns bored, angry, guilty, supercilious, unctuous. Although all of these characters are introduced as if they were strangers to Ryder, some of them apparently have some sort of history with him and others, even on brief acquaintance, assume an emotional significance to him out of all proportion to their status in the "action". His contradictory, even schizophrenic, feelings are usually unexplained and unjustified; merely described, as if they're the most natural reactions in the world -- even if his attitude toward, say, the "young striver", is completely different on page 204 than it was on page 193. But here's the wonderful thing: Ryder's various states of mind always seem "right". They always correspond to instantly recognizable responses that we all experience every day when we deal with those exasperating characters from central casting known as "other people"... Ishiguro has created a world which is at once patently unreal and uneasily real, both pathetically sad and absurdly funny.
- E17** This book took me two attempts to get through it. Although not the most enjoyable of Ishiguro's novels - being sucked deep into Ryder's dream / madness isn't a pleasant experience - it is undoubtedly a masterpiece, with delicate layers of meaning so finely crafted that you only notice them subconsciously.

- E19** Have you ever had one of those dreams where you are trying to get somewhere but things keep going wrong?...This book is one of those dreams, described in detail for 500 pages...One thing I liked was that it was never made obvious that it was a dream...The effect of a dream was created through confused logic - events narrated as if they made sense, but with a big contradiction in them...
- E20** I remember reading this after a colleague told me it was 'unreadable'. Yet the initial frustration one has at its circular, repetitive narrative eventually becomes almost hypnotic.
- E21** ...I've just finished it [the novel]...It was, as people have already said, full of pathos and humour (Bruno was "the greatest dog of his generation!") and sucked me deeper and deeper into Ryder's world with every page, from the 'Is he dreaming? He must be dreaming!' feeling of the first chapter, through to not wanting him to wake and the dream to end at the finish...

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