

**‘Greeks without Greece’: local homelands,
national belonging, and transnational histories
amongst the expatriated Greeks of Turkey.**

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Abstract

In this thesis, I focus on the experiences of the Greeks of Istanbul and Imbros/Gökçeada, who were exempted from the compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923. Particularly in the years c.1950-1980, members of these communities were faced with persecution in Turkey, and overwhelmingly left their places of birth to resettle in Greece, their purported ‘national homeland’. Drawing on oral history testimonies, written documentation, and participant observation, I explore how the expatriated Greeks of Turkey appealed to and reworked the past as they attempted to establish belonging in their new place of residence, make sense of their recent historical experiences, and communicate these understandings to others. Part I sets out the conceptual, methodological, and historical background of the thesis. In part II, I consider the representation of self and others by the Greeks of Turkey, arguing that they sought to assert both belonging and distinctiveness within the Greek national community by emphasising the specificities of their own local heritages. Part III investigates the ways in which activists and writers from the expatriated community, in their efforts to raise awareness of their experiences of persecution, adopted and adapted archetypes both from Greek nationalist history and the mnemonic repertoires of other communities, and I discuss these discourses in relation to the recent ‘transcultural turn’ in memory studies. In part IV, I turn my attention to the seasonal, semi-permanent, and permanent return of the Greeks to Imbros after 1988, documenting how these more recent developments have impacted upon the community’s relationship to the Greek state, and the transmission of memory and identity to the younger Greek-born generation. I conclude by suggesting that anthropologists and historians can make significant contributions to current scholarly debates concerning national identity and social memory by examining the internal heterogeneity and malleability of ethnicity and nationhood, and how the transcultural circulation of memories makes its presence felt on particular local communities in particular historical contexts.

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Author's declaration

The work contained in this thesis is the author's, and the author's alone. All supporting work and evidence has been referenced accordingly. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, university. Translations are my own unless otherwise stated. Where no prior convention exists, I transliterate Greek names and text according to the guidelines of the *Annual of the British School at Athens* (2015).¹ Fieldwork conducted for this thesis was approved by the Arts and Humanities Ethics Committee at the University of York. Aspects of chapter 3 have been published as Halstead, H. (2014a). Heirs to Byzantium: identity and the Hellenic-Romaic Dichotomy amongst the Istanbul Greek migrant community in Greece. *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, 38(2), 265-284. Chapter 3 also revises and expands upon ideas initially developed in my Master's dissertation, Halstead, H. (2012). *Heirs to Byzantium: multidirectional narrative and identity amongst the Istanbul-Greek migrant community in Greece*. Unpublished: University of York. MA by research, 29-55. This thesis was written using Dragon NaturallySpeaking voice recognition software. Every effort has been made to correct errors of recognition.

¹ Available at: http://www.bsa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=149 [Accessed on 22 April 2016].

Part I: Introduction

1

Overview, sources, and methodology

In Tassos Boulmetis' film *Polítiki Kouzína*, set against the backdrop of the deportation of Greek citizens from Istanbul in 1964, protagonist Fanis recalled how his parents' bickering 'always began with unimportant details, but always ended with world historical events' (Boulmetis 2003). So, for instance, in a flashback to a family meal in Istanbul in 1959, the Byzantine past was drawn into a household dispute over cookery, after a young Fanis clandestinely mixed cinnamon into his mother's meatballs. Although she initially protested her innocence, Fanis' mother ultimately found herself justifying the use of the spice by implying that Constantine Palaiologos, the last emperor of Byzantium, was known to be in the habit of having his meat prepared with cinnamon. Fanis' father – consuming the meatballs – reacted with incredulity to these claims:

Father: Palaiologos?! Who taught you about Palaiologos?

Mother: It is written in all of the books.

Father: Do not talk about Constantine Palaiologos again, okay? [...] I graduated from the Great School of the Nation [i.e. Phanar Greek Orthodox College, a prestigious school in Istanbul]. They never told us that the Emperor ate meat with cinnamon! (Boulmetis 2003).

In this scene, the most mundane everyday discourse was steeped in the archetypes of the distant past, culinary decisions justified through reference to the dietary habits of a figure who inhabited the city 500 years previously.² I am concerned in this thesis with such 'past presencing', that is 'the empirical phenomenon of how people variously experience, understand and produce the past in the present' (Macdonald 2013:52). This is not merely a question of how contemporaries might talk about the past, nor how particular aspects of the past might endure unchanging in the present, but rather concerns the 'interplay of pasts and presents' (Macdonald 2013:55) through which individuals, consciously or otherwise, simultaneously interpret contemporary situations in view of historical experience and reimagine the past according to present concerns and conceptions (Cubitt 2007a:17; Macdonald 2013:216). More specifically, I am interested in how a group of individuals – in my case, the Greeks of Turkey – who were pressurised into leaving the country of their birth and subsequently resettled in a somewhat ambivalent 'national homeland', appealed to and reworked the past as they

² For a discussion of how food permeates memory, see Sutton (2001).

attempted to establish belonging in their new place of residence, make sense of their recent historical experiences, and communicate these understandings to others.

The thesis is composed of four sections. The first, comprising chapters 1-2, is a methodological and historical introduction: in the present chapter, I outline the structure of my thesis, detail the primary materials to be used, and elaborate upon my methodology for the production of oral history testimonies; and in chapter 2, I sketch out an historical background for the Greeks of Turkey. Parts II and III are each made up of two chapters, prefaced by a review essay that establishes their scholarly and argumentative context. In part II, I focus on the representation of self and others by the Greeks of Turkey, and ask what these can tell us about the relationship between the locality and the nation. In part III, I investigate the ways in which activists and writers from the expatriated community constructed their historical and commemorative narratives, and discuss these discourses in relation to the recent ‘transcultural turn’ in memory studies. Part IV explores more recent developments, by investigating Greek return migration to Turkey and the transmission of memory and identity to the younger Greek-born generation.

Greeks without Greece: thesis overview

My research engages primarily with three bodies of literature – those concerning social memory, national identity, and diaspora – that have in recent years shared two common and overlapping analytical concerns: 1) understanding the relationships between the local, the national, and the global (particularly in light of an increasingly interconnected world); and 2) challenging a perceived ‘methodological nationalism’ bequeathed to each discipline by earlier scholars. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, students of national identity have extensively debated whether globalisation has weakened or strengthened nationalism and national identification, reaching sometimes radically opposing conclusions (Ariely 2012:461). At the same time, there has been renewed interest in the ways in which ‘ordinary people’ experience national identity on local levels, leading some scholars to question the assumed salience of the nation in everyday life, and to criticise earlier work for taking supposedly coherent and tangible national or ethnic groups as the starting points for their analyses (see review essay I). Scholarship on diaspora and transnational migration has likewise argued over the concept of an ‘epochal shift’ from ‘the age of the nation-state to the age of diaspora’ (Brubaker

2005:8), and exhibited concern that previous treatments of diaspora were constrained by simplistic and unidirectional understandings of ‘home’ and ‘host’ rooted in the logic of the nation-state (see chapter 3). Within the field of memory studies, meanwhile, there has been significant discussion as to the impact of globalisation and mass media on the power and coherence of national memory cultures, coupled with a growing dissatisfaction with earlier scholarship for allegedly taking for granted that the nation is the sole or principal mnemonic community commanding people’s allegiance and orientating their memories (see review essay II).

The Greeks of Turkey are a particularly appropriate community through which to develop and reflect upon these research agendas. They have typically been studied either through the lens of ethnicity and nationalism as a community with a relatively unambiguous national or ethnic identity (Alexandris 1980; Alexandris 1992; Alexandris 2004; Vryonis 2005), or as a community that transcends or represents an exception to national distinctions (Babül 2004; Babül 2006a; Babül 2006b; Örs 2006). In part II, I argue that neither perspective takes full measure of the heterogeneity or complexity of national belonging and national identity, nor of the ways in which the latter is adaptable to particular individuals in different local contexts. The Greeks of Istanbul and the island Imbros/Gökçeada, faced with discrimination on the basis of their ethnic and religious identity, overwhelmingly left their birthplaces in Turkey during the period c.1950-1980 and resettled in what many regarded as their ‘national homeland’: Greece. Here they received something of a lukewarm reception, both from a government that saw them as abandoning historic Greek territories, and from segments of the population who viewed them with suspicion due to their Turkish birthplace (see chapter 2). In chapter 3, I consider how the expatriated Greeks of Turkey responded to these challenges to their legitimacy as members of the national community by drawing upon the particularities of their own local heritages. I further this discussion of identity and belonging in chapter 4 by exploring the variable ways in which members of the expatriated community depicted two ‘others’ in their personal testimonies: the Turks and the *Elladites* (or Greeks of Greece). In each case, I describe how the Greeks of Turkey sought to establish their authenticity as members of the Greek national community whilst simultaneously differentiating themselves from the inhabitants of the Greek state.

As I discuss in chapter 2, the Greeks of Turkey commonly express a profound disappointment with the level of support they received from the Greek state, both whilst they were living in Turkey and after their arrival in Greece, and a sense of dismay at the lack of general awareness amongst the Greek populace about their community and its experiences in Turkey. In part III, I investigate how expatriate activists and writers, in their efforts to combat this diplomatic and historical marginalisation and raise awareness of the persecution and expatriation of the Greeks of Turkey in domestic and international forums, adopted and adapted archetypes both from Greek nationalist history and the mnemonic repertoires of other communities. Chapter 5 focuses in particular on the commemorative activities organised by the expatriated Greeks of Istanbul for the anniversaries of the 1955 Istanbul Riots and the 1453 Fall of Constantinople, exploring how expatriate organisations created linkages between local experience and national history. In chapter 6, I examine the ways in which the Greeks of Turkey drew parallels between their own experiences and those of other minority communities, namely the Armenians, the Assyrians, the Jews, and the Kurds. I explore what these discourses might reveal about the transcultural movements of memories, and how these relate to the dynamics of remembrance on local and national levels. Part IV draws together the threads developed in preceding chapters. In chapter 7, I turn my attention to the growing seasonal and permanent return of Greeks to Imbros, considering how the possibility of return has affected the returnees' sense of self and belonging, the relationship of the community to Greece and Greek nationalist history, and the identity of the younger, Greek-born generation that increasingly visit the island in the summers alongside their parents.

Terminology

I collectively refer to the Greeks of Istanbul and Imbros as 'the Greeks of Turkey', by which I mean those Orthodox Christians who were exempted from the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey, distinguished from the 'Asia Minor refugees' (those who were exchanged in 1923) and the 'native Greeks' (loosely speaking, those born in the Greek state).³ I refer to the Greeks of Istanbul as *Polítes* – singular *Polítis* (m.) or *Polítissa* (f.) – a contraction of *Konstantinoupolítes* ('Constantinopolitans'), and use the English adjective 'Constantinopolitan'. My informants generally referred to the

³ The Greeks of Tenedos – neighbouring island to Imbros – were also exempted from the 1923 exchange, but are not dealt with in this thesis.

city as *Konstantinoúpoli* or simply *Póli* (I translate both as ‘Constantinople’). I call the Greeks of Imbros/Gökçeada *Imvriótes* – singular *Imvriótis* (m.) or *Imvriótissa* (f.) – and deploy the adjective *Imbriot*.⁴ This terminology reflects my informants’ own terminological choices, and is not intended to pass comment in any way on the political sovereignty of Istanbul or Imbros/Gökçeada. Members of both communities also called themselves *Romioí* – i.e. Orthodox Christians or the descendants of the Eastern Roman Empire – and/or *Ellines*. Although both words are sometimes translated, particularly in non-scholarly work, as ‘Greeks’, distinguishing between the two terms is important for my purposes (see chapter 3). I translate *Ellinas* (m.), *Ellinída* (f.), *Ellines* (pl.), *ellinismós* (noun), and *ellinikós* (adj.) as Hellene/Hellene/Hellenes/Hellenism/Hellenic, and preserve *Romiós* (m.), *Romiá* (f.), *Romioí* (pl.), and *romiosýni* (noun) in the original Greek, as no appropriate translation exists (although I use the adjective ‘Romaic’). I reserve the English word ‘Greek’ and its derivatives for when it is not profitable (or possible) to distinguish between the Hellenic and the Romaic.

As a collective noun to refer to those *Polítes* and *Imvriótes* who left Turkey after 1923 (the vast majority of both communities), I have settled upon ‘expatriates’. This term is far from perfect, but has been chosen as a compromise that best reflects the diverse experiences of the Greeks of Turkey. Within the community, there is significant uncertainty over how they should categorise themselves, and different individuals present their emigration from Turkey in different ways. Interviewees generally (though not exclusively) avoided the label ‘refugee’.⁵ With the exception of those expelled as Greek citizens in 1964 (who commonly call themselves ‘expellees’), they were not *forcibly* removed from Turkey. At any rate, in Greek discourse the term ‘the refugees’ is typically used to refer specifically to those who left Turkey as part of the compulsory population exchange with Greece in 1923. The umbrella term ‘forced migrants’ would be inappropriate for similar reasons, whilst ‘exile’ has connotations of politically-motivated displacement. Nevertheless, the majority of my informants felt that they had been compelled to leave Turkey by factors beyond their control, and accordingly generally eschewed the term ‘migrant’, lest it be interpreted that they relocated to Greece for economic reasons. Community organisations founded by the Greeks of

⁴ *Imvriótes* is the term typically preferred by the Imbriot Society when publishing material in English. Greek and Imbriot writers also commonly refer to the Greeks of Imbros as *Imvrioi*. For clarity and consistency, I translate *Imvrioi* (and its singular equivalents) as *Imvriótes* (and its singular equivalents) throughout this thesis.

⁵ Rita referred to the *Polítes* as ‘modern refugees’, distinguishing her community in that way from the 1923 refugees, whilst Thanasis dubbed himself ‘the last refugee’ (Rita 21/11/2011; Thanasis 06/02/2012).

Turkey in Greece have often used the terms *ekdiochthéntes* (literally: ‘those who have been driven out’) and *ekpatristhéntes* (‘those who have been expatriated’), and when publishing material in English have typically preferred variations upon ‘the expatriated Greek community of Istanbul’ (Ouzounoglou 2014a). This terminology presents problems of its own, partly as its etymology (from the Latin *ex-* (‘out’) and *patria* (‘fatherland’)) implies a rather unidirectional and static understanding of homeland somewhat inappropriate to the Greeks of Turkey (see chapter 3), and partly because in British usage ‘expat’ is commonly taken to mean an individual living outside their country of birth by choice, often for the purposes of work or retirement. Taken more literally, however, to mean ‘those living outside their native country’, the term ‘expatriates’ has the distinct advantage of covering the diverse range of reasons given by the Greeks of Turkey for their emigration from the country of their birth, from those who were forcibly expelled as Greek citizens to those (few, amongst my informants) who left for personal or economic reasons.

Sources

My principal sources are oral history interviews with *Polítes* and *Imvriótes*, primarily produced during ethnographic fieldwork in Greece (see methodology, below). I conducted six fieldwork expeditions to Greece between 2011 and 2015: in Thessaloniki (November-December 2011); Athens (January-February 2012); Western Thrace (February-March 2013); Thessaloniki/Athens (May-June 2013); Athens (February-March 2014); and Thessaloniki (September 2015).⁶ Additionally, I was invited to join the Imbriot Society on their annual summer return to Imbros in August 2013 (see chapter 7). In total, I collected testimonies from 107 first- and second-generation expatriates (49 *Polítes*, 58 *Imvriótes*; see appendices 1-3), which are referred to in the text by pseudonym and date of interview in the format: (*pseudonym* dd/mm/yyyy). Most informants were interviewed just once – as Alessandro Portelli observed, a twice-told tale with the same interviewer and narrator is at best a ‘surrogate’ (1991:62) – although I had further, less formal discussions with a handful of informants at later dates. I also

⁶ Two interviews were conducted in Sheffield, and one via Skype. I also collected testimonies from members of the Turkish communities in and around Komotini and Alexandroupoli, Greek descendants of Orthodox Christian refugees from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, and Greek expatriates from Tenedos. These are not explicitly dealt with in this thesis, although they often helped to inform my approach. At the outset, I had intended to incorporate the Greeks of Tenedos in my study, but, due to the relatively small size of the community, I was unable to make contact with a sufficient number of interviewees in the time available.

conducted interviews with Giorgos Isaakidis of the Constantinopolitan Society and Nikos Ouzounoglou of the Ecumenical Federation of Constantinopolitans about the work of their respective organisations: both consented to be referred to by name in the thesis.

I located my interviewees in a variety of ways. The expatriate community organisations in Thessaloniki and Athens – in particular the Union of Constantinopolitans of Northern Greece, the Constantinopolitan Society, the Ecumenical Federation of Constantinopolitans (henceforth referred to as the Federation of Constantinopolitans), and the Imbriot Society (on which, see chapter 2) – were crucial, introducing me to their members, and providing a setting both for conducting and arranging further interviews. I branched out from these central contacts through a ‘snowball’ technique (Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame 1981:176), asking interviewees to introduce me to friends and relatives, which helped to ensure the diversity of my sample by reaching those unaffiliated with community organisations.⁷ Other informants were found through mutual native Greek acquaintances, chance encounters, or approaching shopkeepers whose establishments boasted likely-sounding names. Although some practitioners stress the importance of a closely-controlled and strictly-disciplined interview environment (see Yow 1994:55-81 for a particularly prescriptive method), I preferred to allow my informants to choose a setting with which they themselves felt comfortable. Some interviewees chose to conduct interviews in private so that their narrative would not be disturbed, whilst others preferred to be interviewed in public, sometimes involving friends or passers-by in the discussion. As a result, interviews were conducted variously in community organisations, people’s homes, cafés, even, on one occasion, outside a nightclub, and, although most interviews were one-on-one, not infrequently other interlocutors would intervene in the dialogue, often with interesting and productive results.

⁷ There is, nonetheless, something of a gender imbalance in my sample (71% male, 29% female), which can be accounted for in large part by the fact that men (particularly amongst older age groups) were more likely to frequent the expatriate associations than their female counterparts, with the result that it was more difficult to make contact with potential female interviewees. I actively sought to address this imbalance during my fieldwork, particularly by asking contacts and other interviewees to introduce me to female relatives and friends who might be interested in speaking about their experiences. Here too, however, I sometimes ran into difficulties due to the perception seemingly held by some potential interviewees – male and female – that speaking about history (or at least the kinds of history it was often assumed that I was interested in) and talking to a foreign ethnographer were characteristically ‘masculine’ activities. On one particular occasion, for instance, I had arranged by telephone to meet a female informant, only to arrive at the meeting and find that her husband (with whom I had never spoken) had come in her stead.

In addition to these oral histories, I make use of 47 interviews conducted by Turkish researchers and published as *Constantinople, My Nostalgia: Refugee Narratives and the Nostalgia of the Romioí of Constantinople* (Turan *et al.* 2010). This project was conducted as part of Istanbul's tenure as the European Capital of Culture 2010, and was 'designed to find out the nostalgic aspects of Istanbul as pronounced by its former dwellers [...] and their reasons for departure' in order to facilitate 'any programme aiming at preserving the heritage of the city' and to provide 'a positive contribution to the civil dialogue between Greece and Turkey' (Turan *et al.* 2010:243). The interviews were primarily conducted in Turkish and in Athens or Thessaloniki, and were presented alongside biographical information and personal photographs (Turan *et al.* 2010:249). The interviewees' voices have been silenced in the transcripts, and as such it is not possible to determine what questions were asked. It is also unclear to what extent the testimonies have been abridged. So that they can be distinguished from my own oral histories (referred to simply by a pseudonymous given name), I reference testimonies taken from this volume by the informant's *full* name and date of interview (*given name surname dd/mm/yyyy*; see appendix 4). I also take into consideration 50 testimonies from witnesses to the 1955 Istanbul Riots collected by Ekdóseis Tsoukátou, the publisher of the expatriate newspaper *O Polítis* (see below), and published as *Septemvriana 1955: The 'Kristallnacht' of the Hellenism of Constantinople* (1999). These testimonies were mostly solicited by *O Polítis* and sent in by witnesses – sometimes anonymously, sometimes not – although the volume also includes testimonies from the archive of the Constantinopolitan Society, and two testimonies adapted from Leonidas Koumakis' semi-autobiographical novel *The Miracle* (1996; see chapter 6). These testimonies are numbered 1 to 50, and my in-text references to this volume follow this convention, in the format: (testimony *x*).

I incorporate a range of other written materials in addition to these personal testimonies, primarily drawn from the archives of the expatriate organisations. In particular, I conducted an extensive study of the two most prominent expatriate newspapers: the Constantinopolitan *O Polítis*⁸ (particularly issues from 1967 to 2002, from the archive of the Constantinopolitan Society) and the Imbriot *Imvriakí Ichó/Imvros*⁹ (particularly from 1971 to 2002, from the archive of the Imbriot Society). *O Polítis* was founded in 1967 by members of the Association of Hellenic Citizens Expelled from Turkey,

⁸ 'The Citizen' or 'The Constantinopolitan'.

⁹ *Imvriakí Ichó* or 'Imbriot Echo' was renamed *Imvros* in 1975.

although as it emphasised in its inaugural issue it was to cater not just to those Greeks forcibly expelled from Turkey in 1964 but to the entire expatriate Constantinopolitan community (*O Polítis* June 1967). Since then, the paper has been in continuous monthly publication, dealing particularly with issues relating to the Greeks of Turkey and broader Greek-Turkish relations, as well as domestic developments in both Greece and Turkey. It also prints news from other Constantinopolitan communities scattered across the globe, regular features relating to Constantinopolitan history and culture, poetry and serialised fiction or autobiography, press releases from the expatriate community organisations, letters from readers, and obituaries. According to a source at Ekdóseis Tsoukátou, in 2012 the newspaper had 4000 subscribers; the majority of these were resident in Greece, followed by subscribers living in Turkey. *Imvriakí Ichó* was first printed in 1971 by the Imbriot Society in Athens with the intention of filling the gap left by the discontinuation of two Imbriot journals (*Imvriakí Ichó* October 1971). The newspaper is published monthly, bimonthly, or occasionally tri-monthly, and from the January-February 1975 edition its name was changed to *Imvros*. It is first and foremost a community publication and organ of the Imbriot Society, but also deals with issues affecting Greece and Turkey more generally.

Oral history methodology

I initially developed my interview technique by observing the archaeologist Paul Halstead (my father) conducting ethnographic fieldwork with agricultural communities in the Mediterranean. For him, an ethnographic encounter is a relatively informal and fluid conversation, so much so that in a monograph based on his findings he keeps the word ‘interview’ at arm’s-length:

Informants did not sign ‘informed consent’ forms. Some, whom I had known for decades, would have treated any such request with disbelief. Others I met for the first time when I ‘interviewed’ (i.e., talked with) them, and any invitation to sign a printed form would have ended our acquaintance before it began. A few were illiterate, some had failed eyesight, and several died before I thought of writing about what they told me. Informants often provided greatest insight when they strayed from the preplanned questions that a consent form would have covered (P. Halstead 2014:ix).

My approach is similar. I avoided a rigid pre-determined questionnaire that would have risked unnecessarily imposing my own pre-conceived ideas and narrative structure upon my informants’ narratives (P. Halstead 2014:6-7; Portelli 1991:xi, 54; Thompson

1981:294).¹⁰ I began all my interviews by soliciting a ‘life history’ (or ‘life story’, Bertaux 1981a:7), usually with the statement ‘tell me about your life’.¹¹ My intention was to see what topics and themes my informants’ narratives would gravitate towards without external guidance. As Isabelle Bertaux-Wiame, a pioneer of the life history as a sociological tool, argued, ‘[t]he forms of life-stories are [...] as important as the facts which they contain. And because of this, freedom of self-expression is all-important’ (1981:259).¹² For instance, an interviewee’s narrative velocity – ‘the ratio between the duration of the events described and the duration of the narration’ (Portelli 1991:49) – can provide insights into what the past means to people today. Many of my interviewees’ narratives, for example, either emphasised particular incidents of violent intercommunal strife whilst eliding benign aspects of daily life, or stressed harmonious everyday coexistence whilst skipping over intercommunal flashpoints, reflecting divergent contemporary understandings of self and belonging (see Halstead 2014b).

There are, nevertheless, limitations that must be borne in mind when working with these life histories. It is impossible to remove the social presence of the interviewer from the interview context – even if he/she says very little – as testimony is always delivered with an audience in mind (Mann 1998:81-83, 94-96; Portelli 1991:54-55; Portelli 1997:9-10; Thompson 1978:139-140, 157; Tonkin 1992:2, 54). In Portelli’s terms, ‘informants tell [researchers] what they believe they want to be told and thus reveal who they think the researcher is’ (1991:54). Or, as he wrote elsewhere:

Typical beginnings, such as “I have nothing to say,” or even “What do you want me to say,” may be coy manoeuvrings, but they may also indicate that the narrator feels entitled to speak only because of a mandate from the interviewer: I only speak because you ask me to (and, often, I will say what you want to hear) (Portelli 1997:9).

Indeed, whilst the majority of my informants were content to embark upon a sustained opening narrative without significant prompting, a number were reluctant to offer a

¹⁰ As Halstead wrote, although field interviews often defied close control, ‘such lack of discipline proved invaluable, because my questions reflected the limits of my understanding and the most revealing “answers” were unsolicited’ (P. Halstead 2014:6-7).

¹¹ Before beginning interviews, I told my informants that I was conducting research at the University of York, and was interested in hearing their memories of life both in Turkey and Greece. Interviewees were told that their names would be pseudonymised in the final text.

¹² So, for instance, Bertaux-Wiame observed through interviews with retired bakers in Paris that those who remained workmen for their whole working lives tended to recall their apprenticeships negatively and stress exploitation by the master bakers, whereas those who had gone on to become independent bakers ‘seem to have forgotten all this’, remembering that their apprenticeships involved long hours but eliding the persecution of the master (1981:258; 1982:194).

detailed life history – asking, ‘what should I tell you?’ – or sought confirmation that what they were saying was appropriate, and that others had given similar answers.¹³ Equally, informants sometimes assumed that my research would focus on a particular topic or period, and selected the material for their narrative accordingly. At a meeting of the Union of Constantinopolitans of Northern Greece, I was introduced as ‘a young man who is writing a thesis about the Istanbul Riots’, though all I had myself said is that I wanted to write about the memories of the Greeks of Istanbul. After the meeting, I was approached by Ioanna, who immediately launched into a narrative about her life in Istanbul and migration to Greece structured around her experiences during the riots in 1955, delivered at a frenetic pace with liberal back-and-forth between the traumatic experiences of the past and her contemporary nostalgia for the city of her birth (Ioanna 21/11/2011). When we met for an in-depth interview at a later date in the more relaxed setting of her home, the narrative velocity of her life history was notably changed, and her account was furnished with details that were absent in our original encounter (Ioanna 23/11/2011). As this example demonstrates, the content and form of a life history is significantly influenced by the particular context of its capture, as well as narrative genres/archetypes and prior rehearsals typically unavailable to the researcher (Bertaux-Wiame 1982:193; Leydesdorff *et al.* 1999:15; Portelli 1991:61; Schrager 1998:284). Life histories are not ‘transparent self-portraits’ (Tonkin 1992:57) but rather ‘always have to be structured, according to known conventions, in order to convey the desire [...] of this teller to present a self to this listener, at this particular moment’ (Tonkin 1990:34).

It is, therefore, important to recognise that oral histories are inherently subjective and protean, or, in James Clifford’s terms, ‘partial truths’ (1986:6-7). Yet if it was this subjectivity that was commonly highlighted by the discipline’s detractors (as Daniel Bertaux (1981b:31), Portelli (1991:51), and Raphael Samuel (1994:4) have all observed), it may also be its most productive analytical asset (Portelli 1991:ix; 26; Tonkin 1992:8; Thompson 1978:160; Yow 1994:25). Selective emphasis, omission, and even demonstrable historical error in oral accounts can themselves generate important

¹³ For instance, Spyros – whose life history was structured around key historical events affecting the Greeks of Turkey – seemed to seek confirmation from me that his periodisation was appropriate, asking if he should proceed to the 1955 Istanbul Riots after finishing his discussion of the conscription of young men into forced labour battalions during the Second World War (02/12/2011). Occasionally, informants were either reticent about introducing me to other potential interviewees – seemingly worried that this meant they had not provided enough information themselves, causing them to make an attempt to fill in the gaps (cf. P. Halstead 1989:46) – or, conversely, were reluctant to go into detail on particular issues on the basis that other people would be able to cover them more adeptly.

observations about the meaning that individuals derive from historical events (Portelli 1991:15); as Portelli has stressed, ““wrong” statements are still psychologically “true” and may tell us ‘less about *events* than about their *meaning*’ (1991:50-51). In a classic example, Portelli described how the death of Italian steelworker Luigi Trastulli in a 1949 walkout protesting Italy’s signature of the North Atlantic Treaty was subsequently shifted in oral testimonies (collected in the 1970s and 1980s) to street fights in 1953 resulting from the laying off of thousands of steelworkers (1991:13-26). Rather than decry his informants’ ‘faulty memory’, Portelli demonstrated what the chronological shift might reveal about the meaning of the past in people’s minds, noting that the death was difficult to accept in the context of a minor and ultimately unimportant scuffle in 1949, whereas the 1953 layoffs remained ‘the most important dramatic event in the town’s working-class history’ and were therefore a more suitable setting for Trastulli’s sacrifice (1991:15-16). Based on the potential analytical productivity of such distortions, as well as the inevitability of the researcher’s imprint upon an informant’s testimony, Portelli criticised a ‘positivistic fetish of noninterference’ (1991:43) amongst certain practitioners of oral history that ‘turns the dialogue into two monologues: informants supply a monologue of brute facts, while historians and anthropologists will supply – later, from the safety of their desks – a monologue of sophisticated ideas that the informant never hears about’ (Portelli 1997:11-12). Rather, according to his perspective, ‘the changes that our presence [as interviewers] may cause’ might be considered to be ‘some of the most important results of our field work’ (Portelli 1991:44).

For these reasons, after giving my interviewees the opportunity to offer a life history for as long as they wished, I followed up with a more fluid dialogue in which I allowed informants to explore and question my perspectives as well as vice-versa. As Portelli put it, the ‘inter/view’ is a ‘mutual sighting’ between researcher and informant (1991:31), and a respectfully challenging and dissenting interviewer is more likely to gain access to a narrative that dissents from formal or official discourse (1997:12). On occasion, I posed purposefully leading questions in order to see how interviewees would react to my perceived assumptions, or introduced loaded terminology such as ‘identity’ or ‘nation’ to explore how they would respond to these categories. Sensitive, however, to J. Paul Goode and David R. Stroup’s warning that ‘those who go looking for ethnic behaviour will assuredly find it’ (2015:13), I began the dialogic portion of my interviews with more open-ended questions, adopting a ‘wait-and-listen approach’ (Fox

and Miller-Idriss 2008a:556-557) to see what discursive frameworks my informants would choose for themselves. This often required a degree of orchestrated naivety, such that the interviewee, ‘in an effort to teach or inform the interviewer’ (Goode and Stroup 2015:13), might reveal information that would otherwise have seemed too ‘obvious’ to them, or explain and deconstruct familiar categories or narratives for the researcher’s benefit. For similar reasons, I did not attempt to prevent interviewees going ‘off-topic’, as when they did so it commonly opened up interesting and hitherto unconsidered lines of enquiry (cf. Yow 1994:62). In light of Portelli’s criticism of research that omits the interviewer’s voice, thereby giving ‘the impression that a given narrator will always say the same things, no matter what the circumstances’ (1991:54-55), I take care to document below the discursive context in which informants’ narratives were produced. As Elizabeth Tonkin advised, ‘professional historians who use the recollections of others cannot just scan them for useful facts to pick out, like currents from a cake. Any such facts are so embedded in the representation that it directs an interpretation of them’ (1990:27; 1992:6).

Oral histories, following Portelli, are typically ‘told with the present in mind’ (1991:65). They are marked by extensive ‘narrative shuttlework’ between past and present or ‘the use of history as a repertory of examples’ (Portelli 1991:65), and involve ‘grouping together multiple instances [...] matching aspects of experience with the capacities of various pieces of memory to depict them’ (Schrager 1998:295). In Luisa Passerini’s terms, they can ‘be seen as constructions of single mythbiographies, using a choice of resources, that include myths, combining the new and ancient in unique expressions’ (1990:59). Such multitemporality (Macdonald 2013:54-56) makes oral history an ideal methodology with which to explore past presencing, or how the past impinges upon the present (and *vice versa*) and what it means to people in their contemporary lives. It does not follow, of course, that we should unthinkingly equate discourses solicited in the course of an oral history interview with the ways in which people talk about the past on a day-to-day basis. Interviewees may feel freer or more constrained when discussing a particular topic in an interview context than they would with their peers in quotidian interactions, or may simply have recourse to categories that do not serve as salient frameworks in their everyday lives (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008a:555). As Jon Fox and Cynthia Miller-Idriss wrote regarding the utility of formal interviews in exploring the significance of nationhood in everyday life (see review essay I):

Ordinary people's practical mastery of the idiom of the nation, reproduced for social scientists in research settings of their own choosing, does not, in itself, explain the salience of such idioms in everyday life. Rather, it reflects a basic familiarity with the content and contours of nationhood that, when elicited, can be more-or-less competently deployed (2008a:555-556).

Accordingly, I supplement the findings of my oral histories with information drawn from participant observation – most comprehensively through participation in the annual return to Imbros (see chapter 7), but also by attending social and cultural events with members of the communities – as well as conducting interviews in diverse social settings and, in some cases, with multiple participants, in order to observe how changing discursive contexts might influence individuals' narratives. An important benefit of a less rigid and more dialogic approach to oral history production is that it draws us closer to the 'conversational remembering' that David Middleton and Derek Edwards saw as constitutive of collective memory (1990a; 1990b). Nevertheless, I want to emphasise that whilst oral histories may not be able to tell us anything about the *salience* of particular categories or discourses in everyday life, it would be a mistake to assume that their content is somehow created *ex nihilo* at that particular moment in time. Oral histories are not the same as everyday discourse, but they do commonly draw on narratives that have been acquired, developed, and tested in the course of everyday life. As Samuel Schragger has argued:

[T]he oral historian is an intervener in a process that is already highly developed [...] In any such performance there is new and unique creation [in which] the oral historian has a participatory role. But here, as in most circumstances of storytelling, most of what is told has been said before in a related form [...] An account's previous tellings give it validity apart from the moment of the interview. If it belongs to the teller's repertoire of narrative, it is grounded in his or her life and in the social world in which that life is lived (1998:284-285).

In what follows, I attempt to keep in mind 'that versions of events cannot be taken merely as windows upon individuals' mental representations, but have to be studied in their social, conversational context' (Middleton and Edwards 1990b:35), whilst also reflecting the fact that 'remembering is an important part of everyday life and develops so as to meet its demands' (Shotter 1990:128). In other words, I will not interpret oral testimonies as a static representation of how people would talk about the past in any context, but nor will I treat informants' responses to the discursive challenges occasioned by the oral history interview as necessarily alien to those emerging in response to the challenges of everyday life. I will seek to understand oral histories

within their discursive context without disregarding their potential to tell us something about the capacities people have for organising past and present more generally.

2

The Greeks of Turkey

Historical background

In this chapter, I sketch out the historical trajectories of the Greeks of Istanbul and Imbros after 1923, based on a combination of secondary material and first-person testimony. My intention is not to construct an indisputable historical record against which my informants' testimonies might be measured (see Macdonald 1993:14), but rather to provide context for some of the salient narratives offered by my interviewees in later chapters, and accordingly I attempt to document where there is dispute over the unfolding of past events, or discrepancies between the histories written by scholars and those offered by members of the communities themselves.

Istanbul

At the turn of the twentieth century, around 300,000 Orthodox Christians were living in Istanbul and its environs, accounting for around a quarter of the population, and controlling up to half of the economy and up to 80% of the trade (Örs 2006:83; Vryonis 2005:7). They formed a significant part of Istanbul's entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and skilled working class, and in the past some had risen to influential economic positions within the Ottoman Empire, for instance as bankers and even financial advisers to the Sultans (Alexandris 1992:31; Millas 2002:np; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:165; Vryonis 2005:10). Their mother tongue was mostly Greek, albeit with a significant distinctive vocabulary, and whilst some claimed an extended genealogy in Istanbul as far back as the Byzantine Empire, others traced their roots elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire or the Greek state (Örs:80; Tunç and Ferentinou 2012:907).

After the First World War, Greece embarked upon a disastrous military campaign in Asia Minor, precipitating the 1919-1922 Greek-Turkish War. This conflict was brought to an end by the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, by which time a large proportion of Turkey's Orthodox Christian population had been displaced, fleeing to Greece and elsewhere ahead of the advancing Turkish army after the collapse of the Greek forces. In an attempt to solve this post-war demographic chaos, the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations was drawn up, envisaging

a compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey. The defining characteristic for the exchange was religion: Muslims resident in Greece were to be expelled to Turkey, and Orthodox Christians living in Turkey were to be expelled to Greece. At the negotiations, Turkey pushed for the inclusion in the exchange of the Greeks of Istanbul – who had been comparatively unaffected by the conflict as Istanbul had been under Allied occupation – to which Greece was strongly opposed, ostensibly due to the additional demographic pressure this would place on Greece, although the place of the city in the Greek nationalist imagination and fears over the future of the Orthodox Patriarchate were probably equally decisive (Alexandris 1992:84-93; Oran 2004:99).

Ultimately, it was agreed that the Orthodox Christians of Istanbul, as well as those resident on the islands of Imbros and Tenedos (see below), would be exempted from the population exchange, along with the Muslims of Western Thrace in Greece who would act as a counterweight.¹⁴ As Turkey was pushing for proportionality in terms of these exempted minorities, it was agreed that only those Orthodox Christians settled in Istanbul prefecture before 30 October 1918 – called *établis* – would be exempted, as a result of which some 38,000 *Polítes* became subject to the exchange (Alexandris 1992:96; Oran 2004:100). Additionally, Turkey blocked the return of around 40,000 Orthodox Christians who had left Istanbul in 1922 in fear of an impending Turkish takeover of the city, on the basis that they had left Turkey on Allied documents rather than Turkish passports (Alexandris 1992:82, 101). Around 1500 Greeks, along with their dependents, were also expelled because they had served with the British administration during Allied occupation (Alexandris 1992:102). Accordingly, between 1920 and 1924, some 60,000 Greek citizens resident in Istanbul, 40,000 non-exchangeable Orthodox Christians who had left before the signing of the treaty, 38,000 individuals established after 1918, and 20,000 Orthodox Christians from Istanbul's suburbs left the city (Alexandris 1992:104). Around 110,000 Orthodox Christians thus remained in Istanbul after 1923, of whom two thirds, who had been Ottoman subjects, were given Turkish citizenship, whilst one third, Greek nationals who had been established in the city before 30 October 1918, retained Greek citizenship (Alexandris 2004:118; Hirschon 2004a:8). These Greek citizens were not necessarily less

¹⁴ The Muslims of Western Thrace, who have their own grievances with their treatment by the Greek state, are not dealt with in detail in this thesis (for discussion of this community, see for instance Akgönül 1999; De Jong 1980; Demetriou 2006; Featherstone *et al.* 2011; Helsinki Watch 1990; Hüseyinoğlu 2012; Karakasidou 1995; Oran 1988).

indigenous to Turkey than their counterparts who held Turkish citizenship: many had never set foot on Greek soil, and held Greek nationality purely because their forebears had come from former Ottoman territories that became part of the Greek state after Greek independence (Alexandris 1992:281).¹⁵

After a lengthy debate at the treaty negotiations, the Patriarchate was permitted to remain in Istanbul, providing it renounced any political and temporal authority and acted in a spiritual capacity alone.¹⁶ By a Turkish decree of 1923, only members of the Greek Orthodox clergy who held Turkish citizenship were to be eligible for the office of Patriarch (Alexandris 2004:121). Section three of the Treaty of Lausanne granted the Greek minority the right to the free exercise of religion and the free use of any language in public or in private, as well as the right to establish and operate (at their own expense) charitable, religious, educational or social institutions (Treaty of Lausanne 1923: articles 38-40). Turkey undertook to extend the same rights to non-Muslims as Muslims, to treat all inhabitants equally before the law, and to ‘assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion’ (Treaty of Lausanne 1923: articles 38-39). The treaty also stipulated that in any town or region with a significant non-Muslim population provisions should be in place to allow educational instruction in primary schools to take place in the minority’s own language, although Turkey retained the right to also make the Turkish language compulsory in those minority schools (Treaty of Lausanne 1923: article 41). In addition to these safeguards to minority rights put in place by the Treaty of Lausanne, the Greeks of Turkey were also (in theory) protected by article 88 of the 1924 Turkish Constitution, which provided for the complete equality of all citizens regardless of race or religion (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:165). Although in principle the legal position of non-Muslims was thus improved by the Treaty of Lausanne and the Turkish Constitution relative to what it had been in the Ottoman Empire, in practice the role of non-Muslims in Turkish public life declined after 1923 (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:165). Although non-Muslims could be Turkish *citizens*, the perception remained that they could not be *Turks*, which was a serious impediment to their realisation of equal status (Alexandris 1992:139; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:165).

¹⁵ Several informants stated that they did not know whether their friends were Greek or Turkish citizens until the expulsions of Greek citizens began in 1964, or until male Turkish citizens were called up to serve in the Turkish army (Anastasia 05/02/2012; Ioanna 23/11/2011; Konstantinos 05/02/2012; Petros 26/11/2011).

¹⁶ This was a verbal agreement, and was not included in the actual text of the treaty (Alexandris 1992:92-93).

For instance, with the enactment of the 1926 Civil Servant Law, non-Muslims were effectively barred from civil service, as the law required civil servants to be *Turkish* rather than simply Turkish citizens (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:165).¹⁷

The fortunes of the *Polítes* fluctuated in the course of the twentieth century. In the tense post-war environment of the 1920s, there were various transgressions of the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne regarding minorities by both Greece and Turkey (Oran 2004:102; Alexandris 1992:105-142). In the 1930s, a period of Greek-Turkish rapprochement under Eleftherios Venizelos and Mustafa Kemal (beginning with the conclusion of the Ankara Convention in June 1930, which settled outstanding property claims relating to the 1923 exchange) heralded improvements for the Greeks of Turkey (Alexandris 1992:177-180). In October 1930, the Convention of Establishment, Commerce and Navigation was signed, which reiterated the right of those *Polítes* with Greek citizenship to remain in Turkey (Alexandris 1992:179-180; Alexandris 2004:118). In 1933, Turkey permitted the foundation of a community organisation bearing an ethnic appellation in the form of the Hellenic Union of Istanbul, although only Greek citizens were allowed to be members (Alexandris 2004:118). In February 1934, Greece and Turkey entered into a mutual defence treaty by signing the Balkan Pact alongside Romania and Yugoslavia. Yet despite Greek-Turkish rapprochement, some restrictive measures affecting the minority were also implemented by Turkey in the 1930s. In June 1932, apparently in an effort to tackle economic difficulties arising from the depression (Alexandris 1992:185), law 2007 was passed, banning foreign nationals from over 30 professions, and forcing some to emigrate (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:165-166; Turan *et al.* 2010:245; Vryonis 2005:33).¹⁸ In 1934, the Law of Family Names was passed, which required all Turkish citizens to take a surname, and banned surnames denoting, amongst other things, nationality (Alexandris 1992:183). The 1930s also saw the launch of the ‘Citizen, speak Turkish!’ campaign, in which pressure was put on minorities to adopt the Turkish language (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:167; Alexandris 1992:183). Although problems thus persisted for the *Polítes*, Alexis Alexandris has suggested that Turkey’s treatment of its minorities in the 1930s ‘compares admirably’ with other Central and Eastern European nations (1992:191).

¹⁷ According to Çimen Turan *et al.*, under Article 48 of the Civil Servant Law in 1965 the requirement was changed from being a Turk to being a Turkish citizen (2010:245).

¹⁸ The Federation of Constantinopolitans claimed that around 12,000-13,000 Greek citizens left Istanbul as a result of this measure (2014a; 2015a:6).

During the Second World War, in which Turkey remained neutral and Greece fell to Axis occupation, the *Polítes* came under renewed pressure. In 1941, Turkey mobilised non-Muslims between the ages of 18 and 45 into labour battalions to construct roads and buildings in Anatolia (Constantinopolitan Society 2009:15; Turan *et al.* 2010:246). According to Greek sources, the labourers faced harsh conditions and many lost their lives (Constantinopolitan Society 2009:15; Vryonis 2005:33). In late 1942, Turkey adopted the *Varlık Vergisi* or wealth tax, which disproportionately targeted non-Muslims with harsh and sometimes unpayable duties (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:169; Alexandris 1992:215-219).¹⁹ In Istanbul, 87% of the taxpayers were from the non-Muslim population (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:169).²⁰ Debtors were required to pay the tax within 15 days, or within 30 days with interest, and non-payers had their property confiscated and/or were deported to forced labour camps (Alexandris 1992:221-222; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:170; Turan *et al.* 2010:246; Vryonis 2005:34-35). According to the Constantinopolitan Society and the Federation of Constantinopolitans (on which, see below), 21 debtors lost their lives in the labour camps (Constantinopolitan Society 2009:15; Federation of Constantinopolitans 2015a:8). Under international pressure, the tax was abolished in March 1944, non-payers were released, and the outstanding sums were written off (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:170). Although the ostensible purpose of the tax was to tackle inflation (Alexandris 1992:211; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:169) many commentators – both Greek and Turkish – have argued that the intent of the law was to wrest control of commerce from the non-Muslim minorities (Akar cited in Turan *et al.* 2010:246; Alexandris 1992:215-219; Güven cited in Turan *et al.* 2010:246; Oran 2004:113; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:169).²¹

In the post-war period, mutual fears of Soviet expansion led to more cordial Greek-Turkish relationships, and culminated in August 1954 in a formal alliance between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia (Alexandris 1992:234-237). Both Turkey and Greece were concerned by Russian attempts to undermine the ecumenical character of the Patriarchate in Istanbul, leading to some Turkish concessions towards the Patriarch and his Greek flock (Alexandris 1992:237-243). Patriarch Athenagoras I – elected in 1948 –

¹⁹ For instance, Michalis told me that his father was subject to a substantial tax that he was not able to pay on his modest income as a newspaper seller, resulting in the seizure of pieces of furniture from the family home, including Michalis' cot (29/01/2012).

²⁰ Turan *et al.* give the slightly lower figure of 70% for the proportion of the tax paid by Armenians, Greeks, and Jews (2010:246).

²¹ Indeed, some *Polítes* reported that relatives were forced to sell commercial properties in order to pay for the tax (for instance Kalliopi Sofiadou 04/03/2010; Elisavet Kovi 09/03/2010).

reciprocated by taking measures to improve relationships with the Turkish authorities, for instance flying the Turkish flag outside the Patriarchate on Sundays (Alexandris 1992:246-247). In 1954, an agreement between Greece and Turkey set the number of Greek citizens allowed to teach in minority schools in Turkey, and reciprocally the number of Turkish citizens allowed to teach in minority schools in Western Thrace, as well as permitting each country to supply the minority schools in the other with textbooks (Alexandris 1992:249). Tensions over Cyprus, however, and the rise of the Greek Cypriot guerrilla movement EOKA – whose goal was to achieve independence from the British Empire and union with Greece – disrupted this period of reconciliation (Alexandris 1992:253). Segments of the Turkish press accused Greek Orthodox archbishops of raising money to fund the Greek Cypriots, and lambasted the Patriarch for maintaining neutrality (Alexandris 1992:253-254). Popular opinion was also inflamed by the Cyprus is Turkish Association, which was supported by the ruling Democratic Party (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:171).

The 6-7 September 1955 Istanbul Riots, known in Greek as the *Septemvrianá*, occurred against the backdrop of these tensions,²² and are generally agreed to have been state-organised or at least state-sanctioned (Alexandris 2004:119; Campbell and Sherrard 1968:256-257; Güven 2008:9-15; Oran 2004:113; Vryonis 2005:97-99; de Zayas 2007:137-138).²³ The riot was ostensibly triggered by an attack on the birthplace of Kemal in Thessaloniki on the night of 5 September, although later investigations revealed that the explosion that occurred near the house in question was caused by a bomb planted by an agent of the Turkish intelligence services (Oran 2004:113; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:171; Vryonis 2005:94-95). The bombing was reported in the Turkish press and radio the following day, and on the evening of 6 September a crowd of demonstrators gathered in Taksim Square, seemingly primarily made up of students,

²² Although the *Septemvrianá* has commonly been interpreted as closely connected with escalating Greek-Turkish tensions over the future of Cyprus (Calotychos 2003:188; Clogg 1992:153; Foti no date), several scholars have emphasised that the riots are better understood within a broader history of national homogenisation in Turkey (Güven, cited in Foti no date; Güven 2015:45; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:172), a perspective frequently reiterated by the Federation of Constantinopolitans (2013c; 2015a:5, 30; 2015b). Speros Vryonis saw these two concerns as interconnected, writing that the ‘long-term evolution in Turkey’s treatment of its non-Muslim minorities forms a kind of matrix within which the Cyprus conflict was fitted’ (2005:41).

²³ After the riots, the Turkish government initially blamed communist agitators, before suggesting that the riot was a spontaneous popular reaction to events on Cyprus (Vryonis 2005:29; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:172). 17 members of the Cyprus is Turkish Association were tried and acquitted in 1957 (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:172). After a military coup in May 1960 against the Menderes government, several prominent figures within the Democratic Party – amongst them Adnan Menderes and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu – were executed for violating the Turkish Constitution by undertaking actions that included the 1955 riots (Vryonis 2005:522-525, 529).

workers, and residents of nearby villages transported into central Istanbul by the Cyprus is Turkish Association or the Democratic Party (Alexandris 1992:257; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:171; Vryonis 2005:72). Rioters proceeded to attack non-Muslim property, which had apparently been marked in advance by the Cyprus is Turkish Association and the trade unions (Vryonis 2005:104).²⁴ According to Umut Özkirimli and Spyros Sofos, the attack unfolded based on lists of non-Muslim homes and establishments that were in the possession of group leaders, and with weapons that had been distributed to the crowd (2008:171). Several scholars have reported that the police and the army did nothing to stop the rioters, prevented junior officers from interfering, and sometimes even participated in the rioting (Alexandris 1992:264; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:171; Vryonis 2005:186).

The rioters attacked, looted, and in some cases set fire to houses, businesses, places of worship, and schools belonging to Istanbul's non-Muslim populations. Estimates as to the damage caused by the riots vary, although there is a general consensus that around 4000 shops (Clogg 1992:153; Constantinopolitan Society 2009:17; Güven cited in Turan *et al.* 2010:247; Vryonis 2005:551), between 2000 and 4000 homes (Constantinopolitan Society 2009:17; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:171), some 70 to 80 places of worship (Clogg 1992:153; Constantinopolitan Society 2009:17; Güven cited in Turan *et al.* 2010:247), and 20 to 30 minority schools (Constantinopolitan Society 2009:17; Güven cited in Turan *et al.* 2010:247; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:171) were attacked. Based on figures given by the Turkish scholar Dilek Güven, Özkirimli and Sofos estimated that of 5317 buildings targeted, 59% belonged to Greeks, 17% to Armenians, 12% to Jews, and 10% to Muslims (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:171). Contemporary reports from the British and American embassies based on hospital attendance indicated that 60 women were raped (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:172), although many Greek sources cite underreporting and give higher estimates of 200 to 300 rapes (Constantinopolitan Society 2009:17; Federation of Constantinopolitans 2012:2; Federation of Constantinopolitans 2015a:20; Vryonis 2005:220, 224). Estimates as to the number of deaths vary considerably, with most Greek sources offering a figure

²⁴ This accusation was also made by some of my informants, including Petros who recalled people coming through the *Péra* neighbourhood and asking the children playing in the street for the names of their fathers, passing by if they gave a Turkish name or marking the house with a red sign if they gave a Greek name (26/11/2011).

of between 15 and 37 fatalities.²⁵ The rioting also spread to some of the Princes' Islands, a chain of small islands off the coast of Istanbul in the Sea of Marmara. Speros Vryonis has described how rioters were ferried across from Istanbul, allegedly supported by elements of the islands' Turkish population, to attack non-Muslim property on the islands of *Chálki* and *Prínkipos*, although on *Prótos* and possibly *Antigóni* the local Turkish authorities refused to allow the rioters to disembark (2005:182).²⁶ Information from my own interviewees confirmed that incidents occurred on *Prínkipos* (Maria 09/05/2013; Evangelos 08/05/2013) and *Chálki* (Dimitris 30/11/2011) but not on *Prótos* (Nikolaos 30/01/2012), and suggested that *Antigóni* was spared thanks to the actions of a local Turkish policeman (Kyriakos 03/02/2012; Sotiris 08/02/2012; Evangelos 08/05/2013).²⁷

Vryonis lamented that representatives of many groups within Turkish society participated in the riots, and that whilst some 'Muslim secularists (and Turkish communists)' came to the aid of non-Muslims this was 'very limited in extent' (2005:76, 531). A number of my informants did indeed report that they saw friends and neighbours participating in the rioting or directing the crowd to Greek properties, or alleged that their neighbours first protected the Greeks in their own neighbourhood before travelling to another part of Istanbul to join in the rioting there (for instance, Apostolis 03/02/2012; Michalis 29/01/2012; Marios 29/01/2012; Milena 30/11/2011;

²⁵ In the immediate aftermath of the riots, British and American diplomats asserted that one Greek lost his life (Vryonis 2005:212). A 1992 Helsinki Watch report claimed that 15 Greeks lost their lives (1992:8), the same number reported by Turkish author Ridvan Akar (cited in Turan *et al.* 2010:247). A 2009 Constantinopolitan Society report stated that there were 'no less than 17 deaths' (2009:17), whilst in 2012 the Federation of Constantinopolitans reported in excess of 30 deaths (2012:2) and in a 2015 presentation gave a figure of 37 (2015a:20). Vryonis has made the most systematic attempt to establish the number of dead. He noted that the available sources for establishing fatalities are problematic, partly due to confusion over the identification of certain victims, and partly due to the absence of official statistics (Vryonis 2005:213, 581). Indeed, a list of 37 potential fatalities reproduced in an appendix by Vryonis includes unidentified victims whose remains were recovered after the riots or whose deaths were reported in contemporary Turkish newspapers (2005:581-582). Further difficulties are encountered due to the fact that the cause of death is not always clearly established (three of the victims listed in Vryonis' appendix are stated to have 'died from fright'), and that in at least one incident the same victim has been counted twice (Vryonis 2005:213, 582). Additionally, it has been suggested that several victims may have died from their injuries sometime after the riots (Vryonis 2005:213). It is certainly the case that several of my informants traced the subsequent deaths of relatives back to the events of 1955: Rita's father suffered a heart attack after returning home on the night in question, which she held accountable for his death two years later, and Paris felt that a contributory factor in his grandfather's death in around 1960 was the 'great shock to his health' he experienced after his shop was destroyed in the riots (Paris 01/02/2012; Rita 21/11/2011). One of my informants challenged the number of deaths commonly given in such accounts, accusing some of his compatriots of deliberately shifting deaths that occurred at other times to 1955. Vryonis himself concluded that at least 30 Greeks were killed during the riots (2005:213).

²⁶ Vryonis noted that different sources are contradictory as regards events on *Antigóni* (2005:182).

²⁷ According to Evangelos, the local Turkish policeman stopped rioters from the mainland from embarking onto the island at gunpoint, telling them 'I shall kill anyone who disembarks' (08/05/2013).

Rita 21/11/2011). Yet there are reasons to be cautious about Vryonis' pessimistic dismissal of intercommunal assistance as 'very limited in extent'.²⁸ Although frequently absent from published Greek accounts of the *Septemvrianá*, many oral testimonies contained stories of Muslim Turkish friends and neighbours providing support or protection to the Greeks (see also Örs 2006:83 and chapter 4), either by offering cryptic warnings (mentioned, for instance, by Alexandros 11/03/2014; Fotis 01/02/2012; Gerasimos 06/02/2012; Michalis 29/01/2012), advising them to turn on their lights and hang out a Turkish flag in order to mislead the rioters (Fotis 01/02/2012; Panagiotis 24/11/2011),²⁹ opening their houses to provide shelter (Antonis 10/08/2013; Andreas 11/02/2012; Stavros 29/11/2011), diverting the rioters by telling them that there were no Greeks in the area (Mimis 13/08/2013; Rita 21/11/2011), guarding streets or multi-storey apartment blocks and preventing the crowd from entering (Andreas 11/02/2012; Petros 26/11/2011; Tasos 13/03/2014), or personally intervening to prevent acts of violence (Alexandra 22/07/2011).

The *Septemvrianá* has become the centrepiece of the *Polítes'* narratives of persecution in the Turkish Republic (see chapter 5), and in Greek sources is commonly directly associated with the expatriation of the community. Vryonis, for example, wrote that the events of 1955 'destroyed the Greek community of Istanbul in a matter of some nine hours' (2005:27). Certainly, the psychological ramifications of the attack were severe, leaving many *Polítes* with a profound sense of insecurity and despondency as regards the future of the community in Turkey, and several interviewees recalled that fears of a repetition of 1955 were playing on their minds when they did leave the country some years later. Nevertheless, the scale of Greek emigration from Turkey was at this stage comparatively minor. According to the Federation of Constantinopolitans, only around 10% of the community left the country in the immediate wake of the *Septemvrianá*

²⁸ Vryonis calculated, for instance, that in the Ekdóseis Tsoukátou compilation of witness testimonies to the *Septemvrianá* at least 10 of the 50 accounts made reference to warnings or personal intervention by Muslims (Vryonis 2005:531), although my own reading of this volume indicated that there are references to Muslims either protecting or warning Greeks in at least 19 and possibly as many as 23 of the 50 accounts (Ekdóseis Tsoukátou 1999; it is possible that Vryonis felt that some of these warnings were too cryptic to be counted). At least 14 of the 49 testimonies – a conservative figure – collected in *Constantinople, My Nostalgia* mentioned some form of aid being offered by Muslim neighbours (Turan *et al.* 2010). As Hercule Millas argued in relation to the history of the Ottoman Empire, although we must not ignore intercommunal tension and violence, accounts of positive neighbourly relationships deserve our analysis, 'if only because Greek nationalist historians have so often claimed the contrary' (2002:np).

²⁹ Panagiotis remembered an Armenian woman married to a Turkish policeman who lived opposite them shouting across to his mother, 'hang a Turkish flag out of the window!' In the ensuing panic, his mother's red dress was hung out of the window instead of the flag, prompting the neighbour to once again shout across, 'no, not a red dress! A red flag! The Turkish flag!' (24/11/2011).

(2014a). In the remainder of the decade, the *Polítes* were faced with further difficulties. According to the Constantinopolitan Society, in the late 1950s the Greek community was affected by a propaganda campaign pressurising Muslim Turks not to shop at Greek-run businesses, in which leaflets were distributed with slogans such as, ‘this shop belongs to an infidel. Prefer the shop next door, it belongs to a Turk’ (2009:17). The Constantinopolitan Society also reported that at around the same time the ‘Citizen, speak Turkish!’ campaign of the 1930s was reignited (2009:17). In April 1958, the Hellenic Union was shut down after a court ruled that it was engaged in anti-Turkish activities (Alexandris 1992:272).³⁰ After the Zürich agreements established an independent Cyprus, Greek-Turkish bilateral relations improved, and had it not been for the military coup in Turkey in 1960 a renewed friendship agreement might have been concluded (Alexandris 1992:275-276). Nevertheless, these improved diplomatic relationships heralded a better period for the minority between 1959 and 1964 (Alexandris 1992:277).

In early 1964, however, as tensions once again flared in Cyprus, there were renewed problems in Istanbul. In March 1964, ostensibly in retaliation for the murder of several Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus at Christmas in 1963 (Oran 2004:104), Turkey unilaterally denounced the 1930 Convention of Establishment, Commerce and Navigation, and began to expel from Turkey those *Polítes* with Greek citizenship (Alexandris 1992:280-281). According to Alexandris, expellees were forced to sign a declaration by which they admitted to committing currency offences, being members of the banned Hellenic Union, and financing Greek Cypriot guerrilla fighters, and agreed to leave Turkey of their own accord (1992:284; the father of one of my interviewees was expelled in this manner (Lazaros 10/05/2013)). The names of those who were to be expelled were published in the Turkish press, their assets were frozen and their property confiscated, and they were compelled to leave Turkey with little notice, taking only minimal possessions and small amounts of money (Alexandris 1992:284; Constantinopolitan Society 2009:21; Mills 2005:447; Turan *et al.* 2010:248). In addition to those expelled as ‘enemies of the state’, other Greek citizens were forced to leave later when their work permits expired (Lazaros 10/05/2013). Between 12,000 and 13,000 Greek citizens were expelled in total (Mills 2005:447; Oran 2004:104; Turan *et al.* 2010:248; Vryonis 2005:565), and by 1967 almost all Greek citizens had been removed from Turkey

³⁰ Konstantinos told me that his father was among some 15 Greek citizens expelled from Turkey in 1958 as members of this Union (05/02/2012).

(Alexandris 1992:284; Alexandris 2004:119). An estimated 30,000 to 40,000 Turkish citizens followed the expellees out of the country, commonly because members of their family had been expelled as Greek citizens (different members of the same family often held different citizenships, such that an entire family might decide to leave Turkey after one individual was expelled) (Alexandris 1992:284-286; Alexandris 2004:119; Mills 2005:447; Oran 2004:104; Turan *et al.* 2010:248; Vryonis 2005:565). In purely numerical terms, the expulsions of 1964 were thus by far the most damaging single blow for the *Polítes*.

Many interviewees also reported that during the 1960s they were pressurised not to speak Greek in public, and noted the appearance of graffiti or notices on Greek establishments with variations on the theme: ‘every cent that you give to the infidel becomes a bullet which kills our brothers in Cyprus’ (recalled, for instance, by Petros 26/11/2011; Tomas 21/11/2011; Giorgos Karanatsoglan 03/03/2010; Kostas Mavromatis 04/03/2010; also documented by the Federation of Constantinopolitans 2014a). In 1971, the Patriarchate’s ability to train clergy in Turkey was impeded when the theological seminary on *Chálki* was closed by the Turkish authorities, which had potentially serious ramifications as only those holding Turkish citizenship were eligible for the office of Patriarch (see above) (Alexandris 2004:121; Oran 2004:106). After Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 in response to the Greek-sponsored *coup d’état*, there was a further substantial exodus of Greeks from Turkey (Alexandris 1992:294; Turan *et al.* 2010:248). Informants reported an increasingly difficult and fearful atmosphere in this period, in which they were once again afraid to speak Greek in public, and worried that an incident like the *Septemvrianá* might occur again.³¹ Accordingly, by 1975 less than 10,000 Greeks remained, and by the late 1990s there were only some 2500 year-round Greek residents (Alexandris 2004:119; Turan *et al.* 2010:243).

In terms of quotidian intercommunal relationships between the non-Muslim minorities and the Muslim Turkish majority, personal testimonies painted a varied picture (see chapter 4). As I noted in chapter 1, in their life histories many *Polítes* placed emphasis either on harmonious everyday interaction between Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and Turks, or on intercommunal antagonism, distance, and strife (Halstead 2014b:399-405). Several informants articulated both narratives, either when remembering different

³¹ Alexandros recalled that after the 1974 conflict on Cyprus he and his Greek friends shortened their names when addressing one another in public in an effort to conceal their ethnicity (11/03/2014).

periods in time or different neighbourhoods within Istanbul, or in shifting discursive contexts within the interview (Halstead 2014b:408-411). Oral accounts commonly suggested that majority-minority relationships were tenser in central Istanbul and more harmonious in the suburbs or on the Princes' Islands. Generally speaking, male *Polítes* had a greater degree of contact with Muslim Turks than their female counterparts, due to sharing places of work and completing military service together. Mixed marriages were very rare, although not entirely unheard of (Tunç and Ferentinou 2012:910), and many *Polítes*, in particular women, recalled that their parents vehemently discouraged them from forming romantic relationships with Turks. The post-1950s generation of *Polítes* showed greater signs of integration into Turkish society and culture than their parents, largely due to the increased prominence of the Turkish language and culture in the minority schools, as a result of which relationships between Greeks and Turks, particularly in commerce, were on the increase in the 1950s and 1960s (Alexandris 1992:297). Many *Polítes* attended Turkish universities and joined Turkish sports clubs and athletic associations, and talented *Polítes* even represented Turkey internationally.³² The standard of Turkish spoken by members of the Greek minority varied, primarily depending upon their degree of interaction with Turks and length of time spent in the education system, but many were fluent, and some spoke better Turkish than Greek. At home and amongst themselves, most *Polítes* spoke Greek rather than Turkish, although there were a few individuals, such as Minas Orfanidis' father, who spoke only Turkish (03/03/2010).

In accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne, the *Polítes* were predominantly educated in Greek minority schools, in which the classes took place roughly half in Greek and half in Turkish (so, for instance, history, geography, literature, and national studies were taught in Turkish, whilst maths, the sciences, and the Greek language were conducted in Greek).³³ Due to the 1954 agreement between the two countries, the Greek minority schools were supplied with textbooks from Greece, although a number of informants recalled that certain pages relating to Greek national history had been cut out

³² Greek footballer Lefteris Antoniadis, born on *Prínkipos* and known in Turkey as Lefter Küçükandonyadis, was capped 50 times by the Turkish national team, and is one of the Istanbul-based team Fenerbahçe's most celebrated players. Paris Danto's brother played basketball for the Turkish national team, and Elisavet Kovi's husband, Nikos Kovis, was capped by the Turkish national football team (Paris Danto 10/03/2010; Elisavet Kovi 09/03/2010).

³³ Some of my interviewees, for various reasons, attended mainstream Turkish schools. Apostolis felt that attending Turkish secondary school would improve his Turkish language, making it easier for him to gain access to Turkish universities (03/02/2012), whilst Dimitris was forced to attend Turkish primary school after the Greek minority school refused to take him, apparently due to his Russian Orthodox heritage (30/11/2011).

(Alexandros 11/03/2014; Fotis 01/02/2012; Kostas 07/06/2013; Kyriakos 03/02/2012).³⁴ The students at the Greek minority schools observed Turkish national holidays, just as the children in the minority schools in Western Thrace participate in Greek national holidays (see Demetriou 2006). Some interviewees reported that they were unfazed by the compulsory participation in these events, whilst others recalled feigning illness or absconding (Alexandros 11/03/2014; Lazaros 10/05/2013; Maria 09/05/2013; Evangelos 08/05/2013). There were no minority secondary schools on the Princes' Islands, and residents either had to relocate to Istanbul during the school term, or commute daily by boat (Lazaros 10/05/2013). Alongside the minority schools, the Orthodox Church was a focal point of Greek community life in Istanbul, 'the place where you met your friends, the first flirtations' (Fotis 01/02/2012).³⁵ The *Polítes* were generally not involved in party politics, with a few exceptions, and tended not to have strong political leanings to either the left or the right (Apostolis 03/02/2012; Gerasimos 06/02/2012; Marios 29/01/2012; Spyros 02/12/2011; Evangelos 08/05/2013; for exceptions see Halstead 2012:103-114).³⁶ Men who held Turkish citizenship were required to perform national service in the Turkish military.³⁷ Generally, Constantinopolitan women did not work outside the home after marriage, a tradition which has continued for some couples in Greece (Nikolaos 30/01/2012; Sofia 11/02/2012; Spyros 02/12/2011).

Imbros

Imbros/Gökçeada is an island in the Aegean Sea, in the Çanakkale Province of Turkey. Despite becoming part of the Ottoman Empire following the Fall of Constantinople, at the end of the nineteenth century the population was overwhelmingly Greek-speaking and Orthodox-Christian: only 99 Turkish-speaking Muslims were resident on Imbros to

³⁴ Kostas recalled that he and other fellow students were given the task of tearing these pages out, and remarked on the futility of this exercise: 'I remember tearing out pages: first, I would see what the page said!' (07/06/2013) Kostas was born on Imbros but, due to the abolition of the Greek language in minority schools on the island (see below), received his education in Istanbul.

³⁵ Many interviewees reported that they attended church comparatively infrequently or not at all in Greece. Reasons commonly cited included the fact that the church was no longer the central meeting place for conversing with other Greeks, the suggestion that the ceremonies and liturgies were less authentic in Greece than they were in Istanbul (and Imbros), and an alleged lack of respect amongst the native Greeks for the church and religion (for more detail, see Halstead 2012:42-43).

³⁶ As Dimitris Papagiannis put it, '[w]e *Polítes* do not have a good relationship with politics, we are more interested in food' (08/03/2010).

³⁷ Some interviewees gave a positive account of their national service, insisting that their Muslim Turkish comrades protected them from discrimination (see also Turan *et al.* 2010:260), whilst others – particularly those who served during moments of heightened Greek-Turkish tension – felt persecuted, or even feared for their lives.

9357 Orthodox Christians (Alexandris 1980:6). In 1912, an expanding Greek state took control of the island following the First Balkan War. Although the island should have reverted to Ottoman control after the Treaty of Athens in 1913, due to the outbreak of the First World War the island remained in Greek hands for ten years, and Greek authority over the island was confirmed in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres (Tsimouris 2008:12; Xeinou 2011:145). Following the Greek-Turkish War of 1919-1922, Imbros – alongside its neighbouring island Tenedos – was ceded to the Turkish Republic by the Treaty of Lausanne. The Orthodox Christians of Imbros and Tenedos, like those of Istanbul, were exempted from the population exchange between the two countries. Article 14 of the Treaty of Lausanne dealt specifically with the two islands:

The islands of Imbros and Tenedos, remaining under Turkish sovereignty, shall enjoy a special administrative organisation composed of local elements and furnishing every guarantee for the native non-Moslem population in so far as concerns local administration and the protection of person and property. The maintenance of order will be assured therein by a police force recruited from amongst the local population by the local administration above provided for and placed under its orders.

The agreements which have been, or may be concluded between Greece and Turkey relating to the exchange of the Greek and Turkish populations will not be applied to the inhabitants of the islands of Imbros and Tenedos (Treaty of Lausanne 1923: article 14).

In theory, article 14 granted the Orthodox Christian population of Imbros a significant degree of local self-rule, of a sort not applied to the minority in Istanbul (Alexandris 1980:5-13; Xeinou 2011:129-146). In practice, however, the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty were never implemented, and the Turkish authorities took over direct administrative control of the island (Alexandris 1980:16-17; Xeinou 2011:147). Around 1500 *Imvriotes* who were abroad when the treaty was signed were declared *personae non-gratae* and not permitted to return (Xeinou 2011:147). In 1927, Turkey published the law 1151 dealing with the ‘special administrative organisation’ of Imbros and Tenedos, which put an end to the idea of administrative self-control and brought the islands under central Turkish authority (Alexandris 1980:20-23; Babül 2004:4-5; Tsimouris 2008:59-66).³⁸ Furthermore, the 1927 law provided that all education on Imbros was to be Turkish, secular, and public, preventing the Greek language education that should have been guaranteed by the Lausanne Treaty (Babül 2004:5;

³⁸ According to Alexandris, the provisions of law 1151 were applied to the island even though the law was never officially enacted, and were designed to appease signatories to the Lausanne Treaty by superficially providing an impression of administrative autonomy whilst in practice granting Turkey complete control over the island (1980:20-22).

Constantinopolitan Society 2009:13; Helsinki Watch 1992:14, 28; Tsimouris 2008:130-131).³⁹ Greek-Turkish rapprochement in the 1930s brought some improvements for the islanders – they were, for instance, permitted to elect a local Greek mayor – although during the Second World War some *Imvriotes* were caught up in the forced labour battalions and the discriminatory wealth tax (Alexandris 1980:23; Xeinis 2011:148). In 1946 the Turkish administration attempted (largely unsuccessfully) to settle Muslim Turks from the Black Sea on the island, in what Elif Babül has classified as the first attempts at Turkification on Imbros (Babül 2004:5; Babül 2006b:46; Xeinis 2011:148).

With renewed Greek-Turkish rapprochement in the 1950s, the law 5713 was passed in 1951, abolishing the educational provisions laid out in the 1927 law, and thus permitting minority schools teaching half in Greek and half in Turkish to open in 1952 (Babül 2004:5; Alexandris 1980:24; Xeinis 2011:149). This marked the beginning of something of a golden age for the Greek minority on Imbros, which was accompanied by improvements in the island's infrastructure alongside economic and touristic growth (Alexandris 1980:24; Tsimouris 2008:50). Greek-Turkish tensions over Cyprus in the early 1960s, however, heralded a disastrous decade for the *Imvriotes*, known locally simply as 'the events' (also sometimes referred to as the 'dissolution programme' from the Turkish *eritme programı*). In 1964, the prohibition of Greek language education was reinstated, and henceforth classes took place only in Turkish (Tsimouris 2008:134). As the island's population was still overwhelmingly Greek-speaking, most of the Imbriot children spoke little or no Turkish, which made their education on Imbros highly problematic. As Voula – a child of primary school age in 1964 – recalled:

In my third year of primary school, the Greek language was abolished. The school operated as normal, and I studied in Turkish for one year. I forgot Greek, and nor did I speak Turkish. We had a Turkish teacher then, who, the poor thing, struggled to get us to understand [...] One time, he was explaining and explaining something, he wanted to tell us something, and we looked at him blankly. In the end he drew it for us on the blackboard, he tried to explain it to us using hand gestures, and eventually he became frustrated and he went and banged his head on the blackboard, the poor man! (12/08/2013)

In addition to these practical difficulties, Imbriot parents overwhelmingly felt that their children should learn Greek and not grow up speaking only Turkish (*Imvriakí Ichó*

³⁹ Alexandris stated that in applying this provision Turkey took advantage of 'the fact that the local regime of the islands was not directly subjected to the minority clauses of the Lausanne Treaty' (1980:21). The islanders were permitted a part-time Greek-language teacher for up to one hour per day at their own expense and remaining under the supervision of the Turkish authorities (Alexandris 1980:21).

September-October 1974). As Mirela recalled, after the Greek language was abolished in the schools, her youngest son ‘started to speak to us in Turkish. It was then that we were driven mad and decided to leave’ (10/05/2013). Indeed, it was largely as a result of the school closures that a Greek exodus from the island began (Tsimouris 2008:134). Initially, many children were sent to Istanbul to be educated in the Greek minority schools there, which required either the entire family to uproot to the city, or the children to move without their parents, staying variously with relatives, with strangers, or even in orphanages (Pavlos 29/05/2013; Tsimouris 2008:134).⁴⁰ Decamping to Istanbul involved a major cultural shock for the islanders, who were accustomed to a rural lifestyle and often felt overwhelmed in their new urban environment. Moreover, intercommunal tensions were often running high in Istanbul in the 1960s and 1970s (see above), and the Imbriot children had to adapt to a more tense and controlled environment than that prevailing in the Greek villages on Imbros. Pavlos, who went to live with an aunt in Constantinople at the age of six in order to attend primary school, described the experience as follows:

I was amongst the lucky ones because my father had three sisters who lived in Constantinople, and one of them provided me with hospitality, and treated me like her child. Despite all of that, of course, for a six-year-old child to live without his parents is not the best thing. We are talking about many tears when they dropped me off and left [... It was an] unbelievable change. From being a child of five years who is left to do what he wants [on Imbros], to be taken to school by the hand, to be protected [you became] a prisoner [in Istanbul]. Literally a prisoner [...] (29/05/2013)

Many families and children made the move to Istanbul in the hope that the situation with the Greek-language education on Imbros would be temporary, and that they would be able to return to the island. Ultimately, however, the majority were forced to migrate again, either to Greece or elsewhere, whilst others left for Greece directly from Imbros in their search for a Greek-language education.

At around the same time, the Turkish authorities began to expropriate farming land on the island (ultimately amounting to around 90% of cultivatable land, according to Greek sources; Imbriot Society no date-b; Tsimouris 2001:2-3; Tsimouris 2008:120; Xeinou 2011:150), and militarise the island, which in turn led to restrictions on entrance (Babül

⁴⁰ Most children returned to Imbros during the school vacations.

2004:5; Tsimouris 2008:120; Xeinós 2011:149).⁴¹ These expropriations were particularly damaging as the *Imvriótes* were predominantly agriculturalists (Tsimouris 2008:296). Between 1965 and 1966, Greek olive groves near the village of *Schoinoúdi* were expropriated for the establishment of an ‘open prison’ for serious offenders brought from the Turkish mainland. These free-roaming prisoners committed various acts of vandalism, theft, assault, and even murder (Alexandris 1980:25-26; Babül 2004:5; Tsimouris 2008:120, 145; Xeinós 2011:150).⁴² Meanwhile, from as early as 1966 and particularly during the early 1970s, the Turkish authorities began in earnest to settle Anatolian Turks and Kurds on the island (many themselves from nationalised lands), significantly altering the demographic composition (Tsimouris 2008:121-122; Xeinós 2011:150).⁴³

These measures intensified the exodus of the *Imvriótes*, who declined in number from 5487 in 1960 to 2571 in 1970; in the same period, the Muslim population rose from 289 to 4020 (Babül 2004:6). They mostly migrated to large Greek cities, although some also settled elsewhere, particularly Australia, America, and Europe (Xeinós 2011:152). This was due in no small part to the obstructive stance of the Greek government in issuing visas to the *Imvriótes* for entry to Greece, which was seemingly an attempt to preserve the Greek minority on the island (Tsimouris 2008:271). Many islanders worked around this obstacle by entering Greece via other European countries where the local Greek embassies were unaware of the visa embargo, which sometimes resulted in convoluted and costly detours across the continent (Tsimouris 2008:82; Xeinós 2011:151). Others left the island illegally by boat to neighbouring islands (Tsimouris 2008:256). In 1970, the island was officially renamed Gökçeada, completing the symbolic transition from the ‘Greek’ island of Imbros to the ‘Turkish’ island of Gökçeada (Babül 2006a:52; Babül 2006b:46). As in Istanbul, the conflict on Cyprus in 1974 caused the situation on Imbros to deteriorate further (Imbriot Society no date-b; Tsimouris 2008:146), and during the 1970s and 1980s there were reports of further expropriations, assaults, and murders (Constantinopolitan Society 2009:23, 25; Imbriot Society no date-b). By 1985 only 472 Orthodox Christians remained on the island to 7138 Muslims (Babül 2004:6),

⁴¹ Many interviewees reported that they were left with only mountainous, largely uncultivable land, and that the recompense they were issued by the authorities amounted to a small fraction of the value of the expropriated land. In Kostas’ words, ‘in the end, an olive tree was sold for the price of an egg’ (07/06/2013).

⁴² Giorgos Xeinós referred to the murder of six individuals (2011:150).

⁴³ See Babül (2004:13-16) for an interesting discussion of the differing ways in which the Anatolian and Kurdish settlers conceptualised their relationship to Imbros and to the Turkish state.

and by 2000 there were around 200 Orthodox Christians and 8000 Muslims, an almost complete reversal of the 1923 demographic situation (Babiul 2006a:50).

Before ‘the events’ Imbros had seven principal settlements. The biggest was the capital, known locally as *Panagía Baloméni*, where most of the island’s few Turkish residents were located. The remaining six settlements were villages. Of these, *Schoinoúdi* was the biggest and, due to its proximity to the open prison and the confiscated lands, experienced one of the fastest and most dramatic drops in population in the 1960s. This sprawling settlement – which according to local anecdote was once the biggest village in Turkey – was joined by the mountainous *Agrídia*, the picturesque *Ágios Theódoros*, the seaside village of *Kástro*, the northeastern *Glyký*, and *Evlámpio*, close to the capital. After 1970, five new settlements were created for the Turkish and Kurdish settlers – *Eşelek*, *Şahinkaya köyü*, *Şirinköy*, *Uğurlu köyü*, and *Yeni Bademli köyü* – who have also taken up residence in large numbers in *Panagía* (now *Çınarlı*), *Evlámpio* (*Yenimahalle*), and *Kástro* (*Kaleköy*), as well as in smaller numbers in *Ágios Theódoros* (*Zeytinli köyü*), *Glyký* (*Bademli köyü*), and *Schoinoúdi* (*Dereköy*); until recently, at least, no Turks (or Kurds) had settled in *Agrídia* (*Tepeköy*).

Oral accounts, particularly from older *Imvriótes*, tended to paint a picture of life on the island prior to ‘the events’ as one of hard work and poverty but also autonomy and simplicity. Informants stressed that the islanders produced most of the food they consumed, importing only a few items such as salt, sugar, coffee, cigarettes, or *rakı*.⁴⁴ Imbros did not have electricity until 1970, nor piped water in the houses in earlier years, and communication with the outside world was often difficult. Winters could be harsh, as residents – particularly in the more mountainous villages – were often cut off by snow, and families had to ensure that their larders were well-stocked for the winter months.⁴⁵ Although Imbros is an island, only the residents of the seaside village of *Kástro* had a close connection with the sea, and most *Imvriótes* were farmers rather than fishermen (in contrast to Tenedos where fishing was an important part of the economy) (Tsimouris 2008:296). The island’s numerous churches and chapels were a focal point for the community; as Kostas put it, ‘the church was not just a religious place, but a

⁴⁴ The production of homemade *rakı* – an anise-flavoured spirit – was prohibited due to the state monopoly, although some *Imvriótes* did produce bootleg liquor clandestinely (Argyris 08/08/2013; Damon 08/08/2013).

⁴⁵ Many families kept a pig or lamb that they slaughtered at Christmas, and the Imbriot women traditionally produced handmade clothing (Damon 08/08/2013; Themis 11/08/2013; Orestis 06/08/2013).

place of ethnic expression, where we could all gather together to show that we are Hellenes, that we are something different' (07/06/2013). In common with the Greeks of Istanbul, *Imvriótes* who held Turkish citizenship performed national service in the Turkish army.⁴⁶ As there were few Turkish residents on Imbros prior to the settlements in the 1970s, many *Imvriótes* – in contradistinction to the *Polítes* – only had the opportunity to interact with Turks when dealing with the island's authorities, serving in the Turkish army, travelling to the Turkish mainland (for instance for medical care), or when they relocated to Istanbul.

Greece

Most of the Greeks of Istanbul and Imbros settled in Greece, principally in the urban centres of Athens and Thessaloniki. In Athens, many settled in the seaside neighbourhood of *Palaió Fáliro*, claiming that it reminded them of the Bosphorus or the Princes' Islands, as well as in the adjacent former refugee neighbourhoods *Néa Smýrni* and *Kallithéa*.⁴⁷ They established numerous community organisations in their new places of settlement, mirroring those established earlier by refugees from the 1920s, which served both as social and cultural associations and as pressure groups. The oldest of these is the Constantinopolitan Society, founded in January 1928 by Constantinopolitan refugees who came to Greece as a result of the Greek-Turkish war and the population exchange. Its purpose was to address the particular problems faced by *Polítes* in Greece as well as to preserve Constantinopolitan culture and traditions (Constantinopolitan Society 2008:3). Based in *Kallithéa* in Athens, from the 1930s the Society also undertook charitable social work in the local area, for instance establishing a doctor's surgery, running a canteen supplying food to schoolchildren, and, during the Second World War, operating an orphanage and an infirmary for war casualties (Constantinopolitan Society 2008:4, 8).

When expatriated *Polítes* began to arrive in Greece in growing numbers after 1955, many chose to join the Constantinopolitan Society. During the 1970s, in particular, these expatriates rose to prominence within the Society's organisational structure,

⁴⁶ Like the *Polítes*, some informants had positive memories of their military service, whilst those who served at times of heightened intercommunal tension often experienced difficulties.

⁴⁷ Manos jovially observed that the concentration of expatriates in *Palaió Fáliro* is indicated by the predominance of the characteristic surname ending '-oglou' on the buzzers of its multi-storey apartments (05/02/2012).

taking over from the 1923 Constantinopolitan refugees, and the Society became increasingly active in publicising the persecution of the Greek minority in Turkey, organising seminars, protests, exhibitions, and awareness-raising anniversary memorials (Constantinopolitan Society 2008:14; Isaakidis 2014; see chapter 5). The Society produces its own publications as well as making representations to the Greek government and European and international organisations (Constantinopolitan Society 2008:13). It has worked towards the resolution of issues such as uncertainty over pensions and national service obligations in Greece, as well as the long-standing struggle over the acquisition of Greek citizenship (see below) (Constantinopolitan Society 2008:15). The Society's stated aims also include the protection and development of culture, and it boasts an extensive library as well as supporting research and running seminars about Byzantine history and culture, hosting theatrical, musical, and traditional dance performances, and offering French and Turkish language lessons (Constantinopolitan Society 2008:16, 18, 20, 22, 35). Additionally, it has organised pilgrimages to Istanbul and other places in Turkey, and hosts social events such as the traditional New Year ceremony for the cutting of the *vasilópita* (Constantinopolitan Society 2008:28, 33).

Whilst some expatriates joined the existing Constantinopolitan Society, others felt that there was a need for an organisation that more immediately differentiated between the different circumstances faced by the 1923 refugees and the post-1923 expatriates, and accordingly in 1963 founded the New Circle of Constantinopolitans (Constantinopolitan Union no date-b).⁴⁸ The Association of Hellenic Citizens Expelled from Turkey was founded at around the same time, in order to deal specifically with the problems faced by those Greek citizens forcibly removed from Turkey in 1964, and saw itself as the natural successor to the Hellenic Union established in 1933 for Greek citizens living in Istanbul and dissolved by the Turkish authorities in 1958 (see above) (Constantinopolitan Union no date-c). Since 1981, these two organisations have together constituted the Constantinopolitan Union, based at the Constantinopolitan Cultural Centre in the *Ampelókipoi* neighbourhood of Athens (Constantinopolitan Union

⁴⁸ Although such differences of opinion may have been of crucial significance to some, several informants suggested that geographical proximity and happenstance in terms of one's acquaintances and relatives were often decisive in determining whether *Polítes* became affiliated with one association or the other. Events organised by the expatriate associations at which I have been present have generally been well-attended. Nevertheless, those expatriates who became actively involved in the associations' political or activist endeavours were in a minority amongst the expatriate population at large, and, moreover, many *Polítes*, including several of my interviewees, had no significant involvement with any association.

no date-a). The Constantinopolitan Union and its composite organisations, in common with the Constantinopolitan Society in *Kallithéa*, pursue social, cultural, and philanthropic activities, as well as operating a library and lobbying both domestic and international institutions on issues pertaining to the expatriate community (Constantinopolitan Union no date-a; Constantinopolitan Union no date-b; Constantinopolitan Union no date-c). There are also several expatriate associations outside Athens, such as the Union of Constantinopolitans of Northern Greece based in Thessaloniki, as well as many smaller organisations catering for more specific communities, such as former residents of the Princes' Islands, or the alumni of particular schools in Istanbul.

After two abortive attempts in the 1970s and 1980s to create an umbrella organisation that would unite and provide a common voice for the entire expatriate community, in 2006 the Ecumenical Federation of Constantinopolitans was founded by 25 Constantinopolitan associations in Greece and abroad (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2008:7; Ouzounoglou 2014a). Its stated aims were to unify the efforts of the expatriated *Polítes* and strengthen their ties with the community that remained in Istanbul, in order to study and raise awareness both domestically and internationally of the difficulties faced by the Greeks of Istanbul, Imbros, and Tenedos, provide support for the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and promote measures for ensuring the preservation of a Greek community in Turkey (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2009b). In more recent years, using as its basis resolution 60/147 adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2005,⁴⁹ the Federation has appealed to the Turkish government to offer remedy and reparation to the expatriated Greeks of Turkey, which would include the restitution of Turkish citizenship to former Turkish citizens and their descendants, the restoration of property titles lost due to the circumstances of emigration, the resolution of issues facing the Patriarchate and the minority schools, and the establishment of a repatriation programme for those wishing to return to Turkey (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2015b).⁵⁰ To this end, the Federation has since May 2010 been engaged in direct negotiations with representatives of the Turkish authorities

⁴⁹ 'Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law', adopted on 16 December 2005.

⁵⁰ As of October 2015, progress had been made on several of these fronts, including the restoration of Turkish citizenship to expatriates and the ability of Greek-born descendants of former Turkish citizens to acquire Turkish citizenship (though only from the paternal side), and the re-opening of Greek minority schools on Imbros (see chapter 7) (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2015b).

(Federation of Constantinopolitans 2015b). The Federation also organises an international conference to coincide with the anniversary of the *Septemvrianá*, and since 2007 has assumed responsibility for the annual memorial parade to mark the Fall of Constantinople in 1453 (see chapter 5). The Constantinopolitan Society, the New Circle of Constantinopolitans, and the Association of Hellenic Citizens Expelled from Turkey are all members of the Federation, although there have been significant differences of opinion between the board of the Constantinopolitan Society and that of the Federation, particularly as regards the latter's direct dialogue with Turkey (see chapter 5).

There are, additionally, several Imbriot organisations, both in Greece and elsewhere (Tsimouris 2008:251-255), the largest of which is the Imbriot Society founded in Athens in 1945 (Tsimouris 2008:263). Following a hiatus of almost a decade after 1947, the Imbriot Society began to operate again in 1956, and its principal aims were, firstly, to unite and to provide support for those *Imvriótes* living in Greece – tackling difficulties relating to work and residence permits, citizenship, pensions, *et cetera* – and secondly to support the community remaining on the island (Imbriot Society no date-a; *Imvros* September-October-November 1995; Tsimouris 2008:251). In 1999 the Imbriot Society relocated to new multi-story premises in *Néa Smýrni*, funded by expatriate donations as well as state aid (Tsimouris 2008:267), which with its attached café serves as a social hub for the expatriated islanders. As well as addressing itself to the difficulties faced by *Imvriótes* both in Greece and on Imbros, the Society organises historical and cultural events including theatrical, musical, and dance performances, activities for younger-generation *Imvriótes*, and Turkish language lessons (Imbriot Society no date-a; Tsimouris 2008:268). It is also instrumental in orchestrating the annual summer return to the island (see chapter 7), and like its Constantinopolitan counterparts attempts to raise awareness of the persecution the islanders faced through petitions to domestic and international bodies, and by publishing books and the newspaper *Imvros* (Tsimouris 2008:267). Currently, one of its central preoccupations is the effort to prevent property on the island passing into non-Imbriot hands, and to help younger *Imvriótes* claim rights of inheritance on the island (Tsimouris 2008:251, 269, 276-277; see chapter 7). Giorgos Tsimouris has argued that, by comparison with other Greek diaspora organisations in Greece, the Imbriot Society has tended to be less driven by a nationalist discourse and offered greater criticism of Greek diplomatic indifference towards the Greeks of Turkey (2008:277-278).

Emigration to Greece represented both an escape from fear and harassment and a traumatic and daunting uprooting, and accordingly is recounted in different ways by different individuals in different contexts (see chapter 3 and Halstead 2014b). On the one hand, the expatriates had moved from a country where it was sometimes dangerous to speak Greek in the streets to one where Greek was ubiquitous, and from a country where they were a religious minority to one that overwhelmingly (Hirschon 2010:68) shared their Orthodox Christian religion. On the other hand, many had lost much or all of their financial and material wealth, and their early years in Greece were often difficult. Many interviewees recalled that they or their parents had to work several different jobs in order to make ends meet, commonly taking on lower-paid and less prestigious employment than that which they had undertaken in Turkey. Migration to Greece also represented something of a culture shock for many informants, particularly as the country and its inhabitants often failed to conform to images they had formed whilst living in Turkey. Despite being of the same religion and speaking the same language, the expatriates were distinguishable from the native Greeks by their accent and idiom as well as certain differences of culture and mentality (see chapter 4). Particularly for those who had resided in cosmopolitan Istanbul, first impressions of Greek cities were commonly that they were ‘like villages’ and their inhabitants ‘villagers’ (see also chapter 3 and Örs 2006). As Sotiris put it, describing his arrival in Athens from Istanbul in 1970:

I was born and grew up in an urban environment, where all of the ethnic groups were city-dwellers. Here in Greece, then, the urbanisation of Athens was still underway. And I laughed at the state of the new Athenian, who was still a villager, he wasn’t an urbanite [...] If it was possible they would even have fowl on their balconies! Unthinkable things for someone who has grown up in a city (08/02/2012).

When the Asia Minor refugees arrived in Greece after 1922, they received a sometimes ambivalent, sometimes hostile welcome by the native Greeks, who saw the refugees ‘as somehow less Greek than themselves’ (Karakasidou 1997b:147), questioned their claims to Hellenic identity by deriding them as ‘seeds of the Turks’ (Hirschon 2004a:19), and distinguished themselves as *dópioi*, i.e. ‘natives’ or ‘people of this place’ (Cowan 1997:153).⁵¹ The expatriated Greeks of Turkey sometimes encountered

⁵¹ As Anastasia Karakasidou observed, this self-descriptor referred ‘more to what they *were not*, rather than to what they actually *were*’ and in effect ‘masked internal cleavages and differences among the “local” population’ (1997b:152). For their part, the refugees typically referred to the native Greeks as ‘*Palioelladites*’ (‘old Greeks’), ‘Hellenes’, or ‘Vlachs’ (in this case meaning ‘yokels’) (Hirschon 1998:4). The refugees came from diverse backgrounds and were distinguishable both from each other and from the

comparable (if less severe) antipathy. They found that many native Greeks knew little about the contemporary Greek communities of Istanbul and Imbros or the reasons why they had left Turkey, and that the Greeks of Greece viewed the new arrivals with suspicion. Interviewees recalled that their Hellenic and Orthodox Christian credentials were called into question: ‘did you have churches?’ ‘Did you learn Greek?’ ‘Were you baptized?’ A great many reported that sections of the native Greek population referred to them as ‘Turks’ or derided them, like the refugees before them, as ‘seeds of the Turks’. Michalis and Thanasis both remembered that native Greeks would direct customers to their shops by sending them to ‘the Turk’ (Michalis 29/01/2012; Thanasis 06/02/2012), whilst Michalis’ daughter Theodora was one of several informants to recall that as a child she got into a fight with a classmate who called her ‘little Turkish girl’ (Theodora 19/04/2012).⁵² During the Cyprus crisis in 1974, the native Greek neighbours of Lefteris’ mother started to treat her with suspicion, falling into silence and muttering ‘look out, the Turk is passing’ when she was walking down the road (Lefteris 12/05/2013). Sometimes, the expatriates’ birthplace was betrayed in unexpected ways: Fotis related how a bank worker pegged him as a Turk after noticing that his signature, designed when he was eighteen and still living in Turkey, was written in Turkish (01/02/2012).⁵³

Many informants also expressed profound disappointment with their treatment by the Greek state (see also chapter 4). Chief amongst their grievances was the issue of citizenship. The Greek state is notoriously reluctant to issue citizenship to foreign-born people (Hirschon 1999:169). Amongst foreign-born migrants, a distinction is commonly made between those who are *omogeneís* – i.e. of Greek descent – and those who are

natives by a ‘minutiae of detail’ (Hirschon 1998:246; see also Hirschon 2004a:18-19; Karakasidou 1997b:148-149). Whilst they shared the same religion and, for the most part, the same language with the native Greeks, different refugee groups were distinguishable by, for instance, language and dialect (Hirschon 2004a:19), music and dance (Gauntlett 2004; Hirschon 2004a:18), cuisine (Hirschon 2004a:18), awareness of cultural diversity (Hirschon 2004b; Hirschon 2006; Hirschon 1998:28-30), and even farming practices (P. Halstead 2014:333-334).

⁵² On occasions such as these, the intention on the part of the native Greeks may not *always* have been to offend: in some cases, the label ‘Turk’ might have been intended to refer to citizenship or birthplace rather than ethnicity (see Brubaker *et al.* 2006:213), in much the same way as an individual of Greek descent born in, or who has lived in, the USA or Germany might sometimes be called ‘the American’ or ‘the German’. Nevertheless, such experiences were often deeply upsetting for my interviewees, both invalidating their traumatic uprooting from Turkey, and casting doubt upon an image of Greece as a national homeland; in the words of Markos, ‘I don’t know if they called us Turks out of meanness, but it bothered us because we had suffered at the hands of the Turks’ (04/05/2013).

⁵³ My informants were generally in agreement that such problems were firmly in the past, although it is noteworthy that a number of my younger, Greek-born interviewees themselves reported being called – or mistaken for – Turks by classmates in Greece on the basis of their parents’ birthplace (Eva 13/08/2013; Lia 13/08/2013; Yiannis 15/08/2013).

allogeneís – of non-Greek descent – with the latter category particularly unlikely to be awarded citizenship (Christopoulos 2009:1-16). Although the expatriated Greeks of Turkey would be forgiven for assuming they fell into the former category – especially in the context of irredentist nationalistic rhetoric that made them ‘unredeemed Greeks’ – most were denied Greek citizenship for years or even decades.⁵⁴ In the meantime, the expatriates were required to periodically attend the Aliens’ Bureau in order to renew work and residence permits. Lack of Greek citizenship brought a variety of practical problems, including difficulties in purchasing property, acquiring financial loans, working in the public sector, or voting in elections. Some expatriates lost their Turkish citizenship (most commonly because they had failed to report for their military service) and became stateless persons. Others were afraid to make return visits to Turkey on their Turkish passports, lest they be detained to fulfil unpaid national service. As well as these practical considerations, the denial of Greek citizenship to the expatriates provoked sentiments of rejection – particularly amongst those who had felt that Greece was their national homeland – as well as exacerbating popular suspicion about their ethnicity. Interviewees commonly encountered confusion and even hostility when they presented their Turkish identity papers in banks or public offices. Pavlos, for example, recalled an incident in which an official at the Aliens’ Bureau turned to him and said, ‘and how do I know that you are not a Turk?’ This precipitated an angry exchange that finished with a frustrated Pavlos shouting at the man, ‘you are the Turk!’ (Pavlos 29/05/2013)

Ultimately, principally through action taken by the community organisations, most expatriates who wanted to obtain Greek citizenship were able to do so from the early 1980s onwards.⁵⁵ Most interviewees also felt that by the turn of the century, at least,

⁵⁴ As with the denial of visas to the *Imvriótes*, the most plausible explanation for this impasse lies in the Greek government’s unwillingness to allow the Greek minority in Turkey to disappear (it was commonly suggested by informants that the Patriarchate in Istanbul was instrumental in encouraging this decision). The only exception was those Turkish citizens who were the sons and daughters of *Polítes* who held Greek citizenship, and a handful of Turkish citizens who acquired citizenship through personal connections (Isaakidis 2014).

⁵⁵ The tale of how this impasse was broken was told to me by former Constantinopolitan Society president Isaakidis. According to Isaakidis, an agreement had at length been reached between the Constantinopolitan Society and the New Democracy government of Georgios Rallis for the *Polítes* to be awarded citizenship at a rate of 500 people per year, when the latter’s government lost the October 1981 general election to Andreas Papandreou’s PASOK. Representatives of the Society successfully persuaded the newly appointed Minister of the Interior Stathis Panagoulis to honour the agreement made with the previous administration, but neglected to mention the yearly limitation, and thus enabled unrestricted numbers of expatriates to make successful applications for Greek citizenship. This favourable climate persisted for two or three years, at which point there was another moratorium on citizenship allocation to expatriates, again resolved through direct negotiation with the Interior Ministry. Since then, more and

popular suspicion towards the expatriate community had largely dissipated, and several informants pointed to the 2003 release and subsequent popularity of the film *Polítiki Kouzína* (see chapter 1), with its sympathetic portrayal of the plight of the *Polítes*, as a moment of catharsis in this regard. For many, however, their treatment in the first few decades of their settlement in Greece was a source of profound disillusionment, and it is common to hear expatriates offer variations of the lament: ‘in Turkey we were the Greeks, and in Greece we were the Turks’.

more expatriates have taken the decision to apply for Greek citizenship, although there have occasionally been further bumps on the road. Many expatriates have, for a variety of reasons, chosen to retain their Turkish citizenship (Isaakidis 2014).

Part II: Local homelands and national belonging

Review essay I

Patrída as a local metaphor

Over the past decade, there has been renewed academic interest in the everyday reception and articulation of nationhood by ‘ordinary people’, i.e. non-elites (Brubaker *et al.* 2006; Edensor 2006; Fox and Jones 2013; Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008a; Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008b; Goode and Stroup 2015; Hearn 2007; Miller-Idriss and Rothenberg 2012; Piwoni 2015; Skey 2009; Todd 2015), building on earlier discussions that had attempted to address a perceived imbalance in favour of elite or top-down perspectives in the classic literature on nationalism, typically associated in particular with Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, and Anthony Smith (Billig 1995; Brubaker 2004; Cohen 1996; Confino 1993; Edensor 2002; Eriksen 1993; Herzfeld 1997; Mavratsas 1999; Sutton 1998; Thompson 2001).

In an early intervention in 1993, anthropologist Thomas Hyland Eriksen advocated an analytical distinction between ‘formal nationalism’ – associated with the state, the written word, and mass media – and ‘informal nationalism’ – expressed through civil society, speech, and face-to-face communication (1993:2, 19). Writing in 1996, Anthony Cohen similarly urged scholars of nationalist rituals to discriminate ‘between the intentions of their producers and the readings made of them by audiences’ by taking account of ‘personal nationalism’ or how ‘nationalists refract nationhood through their own personal experience and aspirations’ (1996:804; 807-808; cf. Hearn 2007:663-666). The study of informal nationalism was taken in an important new direction by Michael Billig in 1995, who placed emphasis upon the ubiquitous and unconscious, and therefore largely imperceptible, ‘flagging’ of national identity in the course of everyday life, what he called ‘banal nationalism’ (1995:6-8). Taking issue with previous scholarship for ignoring nationalism in the West due to its familiarity and routinisation, Billig focused not on public ceremonies or moments of national crisis, but on the ‘mindless’ and ‘mundane’ ‘reminders of nationhood’ embedded in everyday life (1995:8-9, 41, 50-51, 58-59); on the ‘unwaved flag’ rather than the ‘waved flag’ (1995:39-43). In 2002 Tim Edensor, in part building on Billig’s account (Edensor 2002:12), similarly argued that ‘national identity is usually neither spectacular nor remarkable’ but rather ‘is generated in mundane, quotidian forms and practices’ (Edensor 2002:vi), which he conceived of as a ‘national habitus’ comprising practical

everyday knowledge, embodied habits, and everyday routines (Edensor 2002:92-96; see also Edensor 2006:531-539). In contrast to Billig, however, Edensor placed greater emphasis on the heterogeneity and dynamism of national identity, stressing that the national habitus is constantly challenged and reworked by everyday performance (Edensor 2002:29, 33, 100-102, 188; although cf. Billig 2009:347-348).

More recent scholarship has confirmed the dynamic nature of nationhood whilst also calling into question its salience as a component of everyday life. In a study of ethnicity in the Transylvanian town Cluj, Rogers Brubaker and colleagues – in contradistinction to Billig and Edensor – emphasised the *weakness* and *intermittency* rather than pervasiveness of nationhood in day-to-day life (Brubaker *et al.* 2006:5-6, 11, 168, 191, 206-208, 219, 237-238, 363). Drawing on Brubaker’s earlier criticism of ‘groupism’ – that is, ‘the tendency to take discreet, bounded groups as basic constituents of social life’ (Brubaker 2004:8) – they conceptualised ethnicity as something one *does* or *becomes* rather than *has* or *is*, something that *happens* in specific contexts rather than *exists* generally (Brubaker *et al.* 2006:208-209). For them, conceiving of ethnicity not as an entity but as ‘a way of seeing, a way of talking, a way of acting’ (Brubaker *et al.* 2006:207) would allow us to challenge ‘overethnicized interpretations’ and avoid uncritically equating ‘the *political* centrality of nationalist rhetoric with the *experiential* centrality of nationness in the lives of ordinary people’ (Brubaker *et al.* 2006:167, 263). In recent years, analysts – including Fox, one of Brubaker’s co-authors – have been drawing on these earlier interventions in an effort to fine-tune a methodology for studying everyday nationhood, using personal testimony, participant observation, and group discussion to focus attention on ‘ordinary people as active producers – and not just passive consumers – of national discourse’ (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008a:539, 555-556; see also Fox and Jones 2013; Goode and Stroup 2015; Miller-Idriss and Rothenberg 2012; Piwoni 2015; Skey 2009; and cf. Smith 2008).

In part I, I contribute to these ongoing debates by exploring what nationhood means to my interviewees, and what they *do* with national identity and national stereotypes in their oral testimonies. I begin, in this review essay, by surveying influential studies of Greek national/ethnic identity⁵⁶ through the lens of everyday nationhood. I suggest that,

⁵⁶ There is in (non-academic) modern Greek no comparable distinction between ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’, both of which are covered by the term *ethnikós* (Deltsou 2000:31; Herzfeld 1997:41-42). Greek *ethnikótita* (‘ethnicity’ or ‘nationality’) cannot be equated with the possession of Greek citizenship or loyalty to the Greek state (Millas 2008:np). In Karakasidou’s terms, ‘the nation of the Hellenes is a

in the Greek case at least, discussion of the quotidian dynamism of nationhood and its active reproduction at local levels has not been quite as lacking as some recent scholarship has tended to imply. At the same time, I consider how the historian Alon Confino's characterisation of the nation as a 'local metaphor' might provide a useful framework for describing the relationship between 'ordinary people' and nationalist discourse.

Patrída as a local metaphor

In a study of nation-building and national identity in Germany and India, Confino and Ajay Skaria criticised existing scholarship for conceiving of the relationship between the local and the national according to a 'logic of transcendence' that focused on 'how elites, modernity, and the nation penetrated and moulded the locality' and 'how the local is historically transcended into higher levels of generality and abstraction' (2002:8-9). According to this logic of transcendence, the local is not itself 'a shaper of nationalism' but rather 'a repository of national belonging created elsewhere', something pre-existing that was waiting for the advent of the nation in order to be nationalised, modernised, or awakened (Confino and Skaria 2002:9). Confino and Skaria argued that such approaches sidelined another kind of local, one which they dubbed the 'other local' (2002:9), a space where the nation was subordinated to, and drew meaning from, the local, as well as *vice versa* (2002:10-12). This local is not exhausted, sublated, or transcended by nationalism, but rather 'continues to live, in the era of nationhood, not so much outside the national but beyond and alongside it' (Confino and Skaria 2002:10).⁵⁷ It is this 'other local' in Greek nationhood with which I am concerned in this review essay.

The notion of the 'other local' drew on Confino's earlier criticism of scholarship on nationalism for its 'failure to encompass the malleability of nationhood' (1993:43). He explored how the nation found expression as a local metaphor through which people 'devise a common denominator between the intimate, immediate and real local place and the distant and abstract national world' (Confino 1993:44). Confino developed this argument through a discussion of the German concept of *Heimat*. This word lacks a

conceptual entity entirely distinct from the citizens of Greece' such that 'many Greeks today are forceful critics of the state and those who work for it, while at the same time they are equally impassioned defenders of the nation' (1997b:26; see also Herzfeld 1997).

⁵⁷ Comparable discussions have taken place within the study of globalisation about the relationship between the local and the global (see, for instance, Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst 2005:1-7).

direct equivalent in English, but is often loosely translated as ‘homeland’, and ‘denotes one’s emotional attachment to a territory conceived as home, be it a small locality or large, abstract homeland’ (Confino 2014:64). In German nation-building, the *Heimat* idea thus represented belonging, but was taxonomically malleable, ‘an interchangeable representation of the local, the regional and the national community’ (Confino 1993:50). A *Heimat* movement rose to prominence in the 1880s, and found expression principally in local and regional *Heimat* associations, *Heimatkunde* (*Heimat* studies) on the school curriculum, *Heimat* museums, and *Heimat* publications (Confino 1993:50-51). The aim of this movement ‘was not simply to represent local communities, but to give meaning to the national whole’, and thereby to ‘endow[] the abstract nation the tangibility of local experience’ (Confino 1993:60-61). According to Confino:

By allowing the localities and regions to emphasize their historical, natural and ethnographical uniqueness and, at the same time, by integrating them all, the *Heimat* idea was a common denominator of variousness. It balanced the plurality of local identities and the restrictions imposed by the imperatives of a single national identity. A thousand *Heimats* dotted Germany, each claiming uniqueness and particularity. And yet, together, the *Heimats* informed the ideal of a single, transcendent nationality (1993:62).

In other words, belonging to the national collectivity in Germany was largely constructed through attachment to one’s local area: ‘[a]rmed with hometown patriotism, every locality wrote its own *Heimat* history, emphasising its own historical importance and inheritance’ (Confino 1993:55) and ‘publiciz[ing] [its] singularity in national and local history’ (Confino 2014:65).

We can draw certain parallels between the importance of the *Heimat* idea in German nation-building, and the significance of the Greek notion of *patrída* in Greek national belonging, a term that we might also translate as ‘homeland’.⁵⁸ Writing in 1910, the folklorist John Lawson observed that if a Greek ‘be asked what is his nation land (*patrída*), his answer will be, not Greece nor any of the larger divisions of it, but the particular town or hamlet in which he happened to be born’ (quoted in Peckham 2001:62). In this sense, *patrída* and the sense of belonging it evoked were firmly rooted in the locality. Yet in Greece as in Germany, ‘the logic of nation-state formation

⁵⁸ It is not my intention to equate these two terms, which have distinct etymologies and histories, but rather to suggest certain commonalities as regards the relationship between the local and the national in Greek and German nation-building. I translate *patrída* as ‘homeland’, although, for etymological exactitude, it could also be translated as ‘fatherland’, which, as Danforth observed, would make the common expression *mitéra patrída* (‘mother fatherland’) something of a mixed metaphor (1995:82).

harmonized extraordinarily well with the persistence of localist ideologies' (Herzfeld 1997:74). As Robert Peckham identified, the construction of Greek national identity was 'closely bound up with the celebration of local, regional identities', expressed through literature, folklore, and local historical and topographical studies (2001:67-68). German *Heimatkunde* inspired a *patridografía* (*patrída* studies) movement in Greece in the 1880s, in which 'the "local" homeland or *patrída* was emphasized as an essential cultural and historical constituent of the national space' (Peckham 2001:76). In line with this movement, school curricula in Greece 'increasingly focused on students' acquaintance with the localities before moving outwards to engage with other larger geographical categories' (Peckham 2001:76), thereby endowing the nation, in Confino's terms, with a sense of 'coziness' by making use of 'personal, recognisable experiences, which were immediately familiar and capable of being projected onto larger entities' (Confino 1993:70). In this way, *patrída*, like *Heimat*, simultaneously represented the locality and the nation, such that, for instance, amongst the Greek refugees from Asia Minor, *patrída* could refer both 'to a physical homeland, from which people were obliged to emigrate' and 'embody the notion of a national collectivity and refer to a national homeland' (Karakasidou 1997b:150-151). Each Greek could envisage the national *patrída* through the lens of their own local *patrída*, and feel belonging to an abstract national collectivity grounded in belonging to a tangible local community.⁵⁹ The national *patrída* thus drew its appeal and durability from its ambiguity and malleability; or, to modify Confino's formula:

To fit every *patrída* in Greece, the Greek *patrída* had to fit no specific one. To enable every Greek to imagine his or her own individual *patrída*, the Greek *patrída* had to fit any place and no place, thus becoming applicable to every local and regional identity in Greece (Confino 1993:66; I have replaced '*Heimat*' with '*patrída*', and Germany/German with Greece/Greek).

Understanding *patrída* as a local metaphor for national attachment helps us to avoid a logic of transcendence that juxtaposes local and national identity and sees the former as subordinate to the latter (Confino and Skaria 2002:9), and instead to perceive how Greeks can be 'at one and the same time, say, local and national' (Confino 1997:1399). Michael Herzfeld spoke of an elderly Cretan man who was moved to tears when relating

⁵⁹ In 1993, against the backdrop of a growing seasonal return to Imbros on the part of the expatriated Greeks (see chapter 7), one writer in *Imvros* captured this interdependency of local intimacy (familiar places and people) and symbols of national unity (common language and traditions) when he characterised *patrída* as 'the world on the scale of man, the familiar environment, our language, our traditions, the earth where the bones of our forefathers are buried, the house in which we were born and the church in which we were baptised, our school, familiar faces, places, paths' (*Imvros* September-October 1993).

an incident in 1866 in which a group of Cretans surrounded by Turks in a monastery killed themselves rather than submitting to their opponents. Herzfeld posed the question:

Is he, at that moment, celebrating kin, local, Cretan, or Greek identity? Only a literalist would insist that we should choose only one level of identification, for his performance resonates at all of them. Yet this adumbration of concentric loyalties runs counter to the exclusivism of nation-state ideology. While the old man might wish to identify with the national ideal, his message is always potentially subversive, because it raises the possibility that one of the less inclusive levels of solidarity might eventually prevail and command a more immediate attachment (1997:81-82).

As this anecdote demonstrates, national identity has a ‘unique capacity to represent the nation without precluding adherence to any number of other identities’ (Confino 1993:44). But there is more to it than that. Herzfeld has also written about Cretan sheep thieves who find justification for their defiance of Greek law by portraying their ‘exploits as emblematic of Cretan daring and of the Greeks’ unquenchable love of independence’ (Herzfeld 1987:45), a cornerstone of Greek nationalist narratives of resistance to the Turks. In this sense, local dissent from national authority can still represent idealised national values (Herzfeld 1997; see below). Cretan sheep thieves can see themselves as *quintessentially* national precisely *because* of their local, Cretan particularities, even as these are in direct defiance of national authority. Put differently, we are dealing not simply with the capacity for an individual to be both national (Greek) and local (Cretan), but with the two as overlapping realms such that national identity is made tangible through local particularity, whilst local particularity takes on broader significance through national abstraction (Confino and Skaria 2002:11). This is the ‘other local’ where the locality and the nation are mutually reinforcing rather than locked in an antagonistic contest in which one must trump the other. I develop these observations in greater detail in chapter 3, but first I turn my attention to Greek national identity, which, notwithstanding its surface simplicity and near universal acceptance in Greece (Just 1989:71), is premised upon the incorporation (and not just the silencing) of local particularities and complexities.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Although for reasons of space I focus below primarily on studies of Greek national identity, it should be noted that the contextual and performative variability of ethnic identity has long been recognised and discussed in other contexts, particularly within anthropology and sociology (see, for instance, Barth 1969; Chapman, McDonald and Tonkin 1989; Eriksen 1991; Eriksen 1995; Eriksen 2001; Fitzgerald 1974; Hall 1996; Macdonald 1993; Schein 1975).

Through the looking glass: continuity, invention, imposition

A key debate in the historiography of modern Greece – as in scholarship on nationalism generally – has been whether modern Greek identity should be conceptualised in terms of awakening (the nationalist and primordialist position), invention (Hobsbawm 1983) or imagination (Anderson 1983) connected with modernisation, or structural and symbolic continuity (the ethnosymbolist perspective; see, for instance, Smith 1998).⁶¹ Greek nationalist scholars, in Anastasia Karakasidou's words, have often tended to 'imply that a Greek nation, apparently impervious to change, has survived since ancient times as a vestibule of high culture in the path to civilisation, both for the world in general and for the Balkans in particular' (1997b:15; a point echoed by Cowan and Brown 2000:12; Danforth 1984:53-58; Mackridge 2012:39-40; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:6; Theodossopoulos 2006:12; Tzanelli 2006:40-42).⁶² To cite one example – far from the most strident but pertinent to the present study – the Greek American historian Vryonis, introducing his account of the *Septemvriana*, declared that:

Along with the Jews, Egyptians, and Italians, the Greeks possess one of the longest, most continuous, and most extensively recorded histories in the Mediterranean basin. Because of this unbroken chronological presence – as well as the role of the ancient element of this history in the formation of Western civilization and Byzantium's contribution to the formation of the civilization of much of Eastern Europe – the Greeks are extremely sensitive to their historical presence as a people (2005:1-2).⁶³

A desire to demonstrate commonality between the ancient and the modern Greeks has been a feature both of domestic nationalist discourse and that of many foreign admirers. The history textbooks used in Greek schools, for instance, have often strived to demonstrate cultural and territorial continuity from prehistory via ancient history to the

⁶¹ Ethnosymbolism emerged as a challenge to modernist interpretations of nationalism, such as those of Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson, and was characterised by an emphasis on the pre-modern origins of nationalism and nationalist sentiment. For a critical appraisal of ethnosymbolism in the Greek and Turkish context, and in particular the work of Anthony Smith, one of its chief proponents, see Özkirimli and Sofos (2008:6-11). See also Özkirimli (2003) for an avowedly anti-nationalist critique of ethnosymbolist perspectives.

⁶² As Dimitris Theodossopoulos observed, the use of the term 'occupation' in Greek historiography to refer to the time when current Greek territories were under Ottoman rule is symptomatic of a tendency to assume that the Greek nation is a timeless and ahistorical phenomenon (2006:14).

⁶³ Alexandris – opening his study of the Greek minority of Istanbul – made comparable remarks about Greek ethnic continuity in Constantinople/Istanbul:

The Greeks have been one of the leading ethnic groups to have inhabited Istanbul. They alone can justifiably claim kinship with the original founders of the city who colonised it in 658 B.C. Similarly, members of this community are considered as *Romioi*, the direct descendants of the citizens of classical Constantinople (or New Rome), the capital of the Byzantine Empire (1992:21).

present day, sometimes blurring ‘empirical archaeological facts and mythology’ in the process (Hamilakis 2003:45, 48, 50, 54-55), whilst numerous non-Greek classicists and folklorists have scoured the Greek countryside for the vestiges of ancient Greek civilisation, such that the contemporary Greeks became ‘nothing more than a blank screen on which we can project our romantic fantasies of ancient Greek life’ (Danforth 1984:53, 64).

Karakasidou – in her exploration of nation-building in Macedonia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (see below) – characterised such nationalist historical narratives as ‘looking-glass histories’ that,

search backwards over the hills and valleys of historical events to trace the inexorable route of a given (or “chosen”) population to the destiny of their national enlightenment and liberation. They transform history into national history, legitimizing the existence of a nation-state in the present-day by teleologically reconstructing its reputed past (1997b:17).

Through the looking-glass, ‘many national scholars in the southern Balkans have failed to recognize the fundamental truism that reality is constructed, as are our cultural representations of Self and Other’ (Karakasidou 1997b:18); to recognise, in Hercule Millas’ terms, that Greeks (and Turks) as national entities did not exist prior to the nineteenth century (Millas 2009:np; Millas 2011:np). The inappropriateness of this national looking-glass is exacerbated by the fact that, before the nineteenth century, what are today national identities were often labour or religious identities: Greeks were called ‘Greeks’ because they were merchants, or Bulgarians ‘Bulgarians’ because they were peasants (Cowan 1997:156; Danforth 1995:59; Mackridge 2009:56), whilst for non-Ottomans, ‘Greek’ meant Orthodox Christian of the Ottoman Empire, in much the same way as ‘Latin’ meant Catholic (Mackridge 2009:47).

In response to these looking-glass histories, several scholars have highlighted the processes of construction and contestation involved in the proliferation of Greek national identity in Macedonia before, during, and after Greek acquisition of territory in the region in 1913. Loring Danforth – in his study of the emergence of a Macedonian national identity and its conflict with Greek nationalism⁶⁴ – argued that nation-building

⁶⁴ Danforth was particularly interested in the conflict that emerged in the 1990s between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) over historical claims to the name and territory of Macedonia. As a corrective to the nationalist positions taken up by both sides, Danforth attempted to offer an alternative ‘third history’ emphasising that Macedonian national identity emerged not in the ninth

in Macedonia involved the imposition of national identities on previously-existing and comparatively fluid ethnic, linguistic, and religious distinctions (1995:57, 61). Under the Ottoman Empire, Macedonia was host to Greek-speaking and Slavic-speaking Orthodox Christians, Turkish-speaking and Albanian-speaking Muslims, and smaller numbers of Vlachs, Jews, and gypsies (Danforth 1993:3), many of whom had no clearly defined national consciousness (Mackridge and Yannakakis 1997:5). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian nationalist movements competed for the allegiance of these populations (Danforth 1995:58).⁶⁵ Danforth described how Greece, after its territorial acquisitions in 1913, pursued an assimilationist agenda in an effort to ‘Hellenise’ the inhabitants of southern Macedonia, particularly targeting Slavic-speaking Christians by changing Slavic toponyms and clamping down on the use of the Slavic language (1993:4; 1995:69-70). This Hellenisation process, comparatively successful amongst the Greek and Albanian-speaking Orthodox Christians and the Vlachs, encountered significant resistance amongst the Slavic-speaking population, some of whom, in Danforth’s terms, ‘came to identify themselves in a national sense as Macedonians, not as Greeks’ (1995:71). By the mid-twentieth century, therefore, comparatively fluid nineteenth-century ethnic identities had been ‘transformed into sharply polarized and mutually exclusive national identities’, and ‘[p]eople who had previously identified themselves primarily as local Macedonians in an ethnic rather than a national sense [...] were forced under very difficult circumstances to adopt a national identity and become Greeks, Bulgarians, or Macedonians’ (Danforth 1995:73).

Karakasidou offered an equally forceful critique of nationalist histories based on research in a central Macedonian village in Greece in the 1990s, which, according to informal local histories, had in the late Ottoman period been peopled by Slavic-speaking agriculturalists, Greek-speaking merchants, Turkish-speaking landowners, and others (Karakasidou 1997b:10). She argued that the apparently ‘primordial sentiments’ that

century (FYROM’s position) nor under Tito (Greece’s position) but in the nineteenth century (1995:56). His work has been criticised both by Macedonian scholars unhappy with his deconstruction of Macedonian national identity, and by Greek scholars who have charged him with demonstrating bias in favour of Macedonian nationalism (on these debates, see Danforth 1997:668; Karakasidou 2000:422).

⁶⁵ Danforth suggested that, initially, Macedonian villagers were able to negotiate and manipulate the national identities propagated by competing national movements (1995:61). According to the contemporary observations of British journalist Henry Noel Brailsford, one Macedonian village had previously identified as Greek but switched to a Bulgarian national affiliation ‘because the Bulgarians had sent the village a teacher *and* a priest, while the Greeks had only sent a teacher’ (Danforth 1995:61; Danforth’s words). Danforth argued, however, that by the end of the century these choices had increasingly become externally-imposed and mutually-exclusive national categories (1993:3; 1995:73).

bound contemporary villagers together as ‘descendants of ancient Hellenes’ were ‘a constructed tradition’ that was ‘not so much a matter of choice or primordial attachment as it was a result of historical contingency’ (Karakasidou 1997b:74). According to Karakasidou, Greek nation-builders transformed ‘the population of a diverse ethnic tapestry into Greek nationals’ (1997b:25) by ‘reviving a vision of Byzantine or ancient Greek culture, and projecting it onto the region’s population through the medium of an increasingly Greek version of Orthodox Christianity’ (1997b:94). Like Danforth, Karakasidou lamented how Greek nation-building ‘imposed a homogeneity on the Macedonian region and its inhabitants’ (1997b:94), such that ‘the boundaries that people once crossed with relative ease were tightened, reified, or closed’ (Karakasidou 1997b:21). In this sense, Greek national identity and history were written over pre-existing ‘localized memories of personal experience’ (Karakasidou 1997b:235). As she wrote elsewhere:

Viewed from above, nation-building “elevates” cultural and ethnic identities from a local and particular context, attempting to replace them with a newly created and propagated national consciousness. Seen from below, from the level of everyday life and social interaction, however, it uproots families, destroying existing patterns of local life, language, and culture (Karakasidou 1993:4).⁶⁶

Karakasidou, in common with Danforth, stressed that for some Macedonian inhabitants – particularly those ‘who had not yet acquired a national identity’ – the acquisition of a Hellenic identity ‘was gentle, even profitable’ (Karakasidou 1997b:72, 227). Equally, she emphasised that the spread of Greek national identity was not simply the ‘result of a heavy-handed acculturation campaign directed by national elites’, but was also a ‘dialectical product of the interaction of state and local interests, in which perceptions of solidarities and differences were reshaped by conflict, challenges, and contests in everyday life’ (Karakasidou 1997b:188).⁶⁷ Nevertheless, she concluded that nation-

⁶⁶ Karakasidou emphasised that this suppression of alternative, localised identities led many of the villagers with whom she interacted in the 1990s to feel uncomfortable acknowledging aspects of their past history or current culture that might be considered ‘non-Greek’, such that ‘a great deal of self-censorship is often exercised [... by villagers] in conversation with outsiders, consciously or not’ (1997b:125).

⁶⁷ In Danforth’s account, there is some ambivalence about the role of individual agency in the acquisition of national identity. Whilst he commonly emphasised the importance of external hegemonic imposition and/or ascription by others (Danforth 1995:59-60, 70, 73, 199, 221-222), he also stressed that ‘it is ultimately the individual who chooses what national identity to adopt, or in some cases whether to adopt any national identity at all’ (Danforth 1995:198). Discussing diaspora communities in Australia, he argued that individuals ‘*are* Greeks or Macedonians because they *choose* to be Greeks or Macedonians’ (Danforth 1995:228), noting that some migrants switched their national identity after relocation to Australia (Danforth 1995:239, 243). He also gave examples of individuals who refused to identify themselves with either (Danforth 1995:231, 236), although he cautioned that ‘it is difficult for a person to preserve or construct a regional or ethnic identity that has no counterpart at the national level’ (Danforth 1995:201).

building in Macedonia – especially for those who had already formed an allegiance to an alternative ethnic or national identity – was ‘nasty, brutish, and short’ (Karakasidou 1997b:72, 227).

Danforth and Karakasidou shared an admirable desire, in Karakasidou’s words, to challenge ‘the charade of modern chauvinism’ and ‘make an effort at dismantling boundaries rather than raising them’ (Karakasidou 1997b:82; Danforth 1997:668-669; Danforth 2003:212). I do not contest their portrayals of the ways in which Greek nation-builders attempted to proliferate Greek national identity in Macedonia, nor of the often damaging implications of these attempts for particular local populations. In terms of understanding the complexities of national belonging *after* these initial processes of nation-building, however, and the range of ways in which national identity might relate to local particularities, both studies are somewhat limited by a logic of transcendence. Danforth contrasted the pre-national ethnic identities of the nineteenth century with the national identities imposed by elites in the twentieth century, and viewed the latter as transcending or sublating the former. Karakasidou, similarly, saw national identity as existing in an antagonistic, one-way, and ultimately destructive relationship with local identities, pre-national heterogeneity replaced by national homogeneity. Although she showed awareness of how nation-building functioned by incorporating local discourse, for instance considering how local village myths of ancestral descent from Alexander the Great linked ‘the locale to the nation of the Hellenes’ (Karakasidou 1997b:32, 36), the locality in her study remained ‘only the context for the national idea’ (Confino and Skaria 2002:8), and the ‘other local’ that continues to exist alongside the nation, adapting and reshaping its contours in the course of everyday life, is left unexplored. Simultaneously, by placing emphasis on the homogenising impact of Greek nation-building in the region, both authors discounted the possibility that Greek identity today might mean different things to different people in diverse local settings.⁶⁸ In this sense, they risked assuming that identity can only be fluid and multifaceted insofar as individuals have access to distinctive ethnic or linguistic heritages, in the process downplaying the performative plasticity of national identity itself. When Karakasidou argued that the nation-building process in northern Greece,

⁶⁸ Although cf. Karakasidou’s discussion of ‘natural enculturation’ amongst Slav-speaking women in northern Greece, in which she emphasised that ‘[a]s long as the meanings behind the symbols of Greek nationhood remain sufficiently ambiguous to permit a latitude of interpretation, Greek national identity need not be incompatible with a Slavo-Macedonian ethnic identity’ (1997a:99).

has been enormously successful. Most of the inhabitants today, regardless of their ethnic background and how their ancestors might have defined themselves 100 or even 50 years ago, conceive of themselves now as nothing less than Greek (1993:5)

she was almost certainly right. But it is also probable that many would conceive of themselves as *more than simply Greek*: to feel, for instance, that they are Greek Macedonian, and that this is different from being, say, Greek Peloponnesian, or that they are ‘native Greeks’ and that this is different from being of refugee descent; and perhaps, moreover, that it is this local particularity that makes them *particularly* Greek (see chapter 3). This is not mere pedantry, nor an attempt to deny the role of coercion and imposition in the proliferation of national identities. Rather, it is to suggest that we cannot understand the contemporary success and appeal of nationalism by focusing on its homogenising effect alone, to the exclusion of how its unifying potential is partly premised on the ways in which it accommodates and, even, is driven by local heterogeneity.⁶⁹

The ‘usable past’: the everyday life of national identity

As K. S. Brown and Yannis Hamilakis observed, ‘[m]any accounts of the construction of Greek national identity construct a picture of a monolithic, imposing, and overarching political and ideological structure (the nation-state) which dominates the lives, bodies, and minds of its citizens’ (2003:6). To a greater or lesser degree, this is the impression created by the studies considered in the previous section. Brown and Hamilakis argued for an alternative perspective, one which would recognise Greek nationalism as a ‘complex and internally fragmented phenomenon’ (2003:8); as Hamilakis put it, ‘the national “usable past” is a matter of constant (and often successful) negotiation in people’s everyday lives’ (Hamilakis 2003:61). In this section, I present the work of several scholars who have paid attention to this ‘usable past’, and suggest that they are better equipped to avoid the logic of transcendence and uncover the different ways in which nationhood becomes meaningful in people’s lives.

In his study of tradition and modernity on the Aegean island of Kalymnos, David Sutton sought to demonstrate that ‘historical consciousness inheres in everyday, sensuous

⁶⁹ It does not follow, of course, that *any* local particularity can or will be assimilated to the national ideal, as illustrated, for example, by the experiences of minority communities such as those created by the Treaty of Lausanne. Nationhood is malleable, but this malleability has its own limits (see Herzfeld 1997, and below).

experience’ and that it is ‘from this everyday experience that reference to the past takes its power’ (1998:207). For Sutton, studies of nationalism had focused disproportionately on uncovering and debunking ‘invented traditions’ and exploring ‘the construction of the past from above’ (1998:6), rather than considering how nationalist movements ‘often achieve their appeal by accommodating themselves to local-level discourses, and by mobilizing already existing cultural ideas’ (1998:174).⁷⁰ He argued, for instance, that Kalymnian indignation over the use of the name ‘Macedonia’ by FYROM was better explained not in terms of a susceptibility to nationalist discourse, but by examining local kinship and naming practices (Sutton 1998:179-191). He pointed to the importance of ‘ancestral names in constructing family continuity’ on Kalymnos, which, he claimed, islanders saw paralleled in the ‘use of historical names in constructing national continuity’ in Macedonia (Sutton 1998:189).⁷¹ This pattern was observable more generally. Kalymnians frequently used local kinship metaphors to explain national politics – referring, for example, to neighbouring countries as ‘bad neighbours’ – and, *vice versa*, deployed metaphors derived from national politics to explain local situations – as when one Kalymnian woman compared her dictatorial father to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (Sutton 1998:124). Through such examples, Sutton was able to demonstrate that national history was a resource that people on Kalymnos actively deployed to make sense of the day-to-day present, a ‘usable past’ (Hamilakis 2003:61) that was not simply imposed by nationalist elites but was ‘grounded in everyday human activity’ (Sutton 1998:10). Moreover, he showed that national history was, in turn, interpreted and made meaningful through local experience, thereby ‘anchoring the imagined community in daily practice’ (Sutton 1998:123). In this way, Sutton drew attention to the interpenetration of national and local experience in everyday discourse, confirming that the durability of nationalism is premised on the mutual accommodation of the nation and the locality rather than (solely) the transcendence of the latter by the former. To borrow terms from Confino and Skaria, Kalymnians ‘imagined nationhood as a form of localness, while [in turn] the immediate local world imparted on the abstract national one a sense of physicality, everydayness, and authenticity’ (2002:11).

⁷⁰ In this regard, Sutton singled out the work of Danforth and Karakasidou for fixating on historicising national identities (Sutton 1998:179).

⁷¹ Although cf. Peter Allen’s review of Sutton’s book, in which he complained that popular indignation over the Macedonia issue occurred across Greece, including in areas that do not share Kalymnos’ kinship naming systems (1999:194).

Fellow anthropologist Herzfeld expressed similar scepticism about top-down approaches to the study of nationalism, which he argued not only disregarded the impact that ordinary people have ‘on the form of their local nationalism’, but also glossed over the fact that ‘national identity comprises a generous measure of embarrassment together with all of the idealized virtues’ (1997:6). As an ‘antidote to the formalism of cultural nationalism’, and in an effort to demonstrate that ‘conceptually the nation-state is constructed out of intimacy’, Herzfeld proposed the concept of ‘cultural intimacy’ (1997:13-14). According to this theory, an intimate knowledge of national imperfection, which is kept hidden from outsiders, is commonly acknowledged in informal everyday discourse, and provides the basis for internal solidarity and communality amongst members of the national community (Herzfeld 1997:3). For Herzfeld, studying this cultural intimacy would allow us to see beyond the ‘deceptively transparent surface’ of the nation (1997:2) and recognise that ‘[t]here is no single “national view”’ except that presented externally in an effort to hide an intimate knowledge of imperfection (1997:171). His argument was not only that such imperfection is kept hidden from national outsiders, but that ‘it is paradoxically the insubordinate values and practices that make patriotism attractive from day-to-day’ (Herzfeld 1997:169), as in the case of the Cretan sheep thieves (see above) who evoked national ideals of resistance and independence as justification for contravening the authority of the Greek state (Herzfeld 1987:45-46).⁷² As Herzfeld put it, people can be ‘fiercely patriotic and just as fiercely rebellious at one and the same time’ (1997:55).

Herzfeld’s study of cultural intimacy flagged the disjuncture between the idealised statism of nationalist discourse and the imperfect contours of nationhood in everyday life. He observed that ‘because national ideologies are grounded in images of intimacy, they can be subtly but radically restructured by the changes occurring in the intimate reaches of everyday life – by shifts of meaning that may not be registered at all in external cultural form’ (Herzfeld 1997:30). In other words, nationalism’s apparently ‘semantically stable terminology’ belies a quotidian plasticity, as ‘nationalism invests certain kinds of identity with a rigidity that they do not commonly possess in everyday discourse’ (Herzfeld 1997:42-43). This has significant implications for how we interpret people’s usages of ethnic or national signifiers. In Herzfeld’s terms, ‘[f]ixity of form

⁷² Although both Greek officials and the thieves themselves consider those involved in animal theft to be deeply patriotic, both also ‘conventionally attribute the incidence of rustling to Turkish influence’ (Herzfeld 1987:45). In this sense, ‘Turkish’ characteristics may be a mark of familiarity and intimacy, partly because they are officially rejected (Herzfeld 1987:45-46).

does not necessarily entail a corresponding fixity of meanings and intentions' (Herzfeld 1997:22). He gave the example of the term 'Vlach', which in Greek discourse could refer to a member of the pastoralist Koutsovlach community, to a northern Greek shepherd more generally, or figuratively to a country bumpkin. For most Greeks, the context in which the term was used would be sufficient for them to ascertain what meaning was intended (Herzfeld 1997:44). Herzfeld referred to these identity labels as 'ethnic shifters' (1997:51). He wrote that, '[n]ational and ethnic terms allow for a surprising amount of semantic slippage; their appearance of semantic fixity allows actors to treat them as though they were existential absolutes rather than counters in a game' (Herzfeld 1997:45).⁷³

The plasticity of national and ethnic labels has also been explored by Jane Cowan and K. S. Brown, in their introduction to a collection of essays on identity in Macedonia. They were critical of the 'endlessly reiterated metaphors of *macédoines*, mosaics and cheese boards' that scholars used to characterise identity and difference in the region (Cowan and Brown 2000:9).⁷⁴ By the logic of such metaphors, Cowan and Brown suggested, conflict in Macedonia was seen as a product of the essential differences between its various inhabitants, and each of its groups was treated as a distinctive component of an ethnic fruit salad, 'maintaining their separate but juxtaposed identities or flavours' (2000:3). Even as scholars 'tirelessly declared' the self-evident "'constructedness" of nations', they thus reinforced a perception of ethnic groups 'as discreet and irreducible "billiard balls" in collision' (Cowan and Brown 2000:3). Consequently, the variability and contingency of identity labels were 'rendered invisible', setting up "'odd equivalences" such that Albanians are considered to be the same whether in the Republic of Macedonia or Kosovo, whilst Macedonians in Greece are the same as Macedonians in Bulgaria' (Cowan and Brown 2000:13). The ways in which individuals responded to national categories and their 'differing orientations to a

⁷³ Nevertheless, although '[r]egularities, which seem to be embedded, are subject to negotiation [...] the deformation of norms requires a skilled appreciation of what others consider the norms to be' (Herzfeld 1997:154). Herzfeld discovered this to his cost, when he followed the example of locals on a Dodecanesean island by referring to the practice of 'setting firecrackers off immediately in front of people' as a 'barbarous custom', only to be angrily reprimanded by a passing islander. As Herzfeld explained:

As a visitor I adopted the term from local speakers, only to discover the hard way that this act of appropriation had in itself been sufficient to change the term's meaning. The moral is clear: (Western) Europeans have a particular obligation to respect the semantically rigid mutual exclusion of Greeks and barbarians. Only those with privileged access to the intimacy of Greek culture may engage in the play of semantic fluidity that permits self-denigration (1997:47-48).

⁷⁴ Karakasidou, for example, referred to Ottoman Macedonia as 'a diverse ethnic tapestry' (1997b:25).

“shared” identity’ were, in the process, given comparatively little thought (Cowan and Brown 2000:13). In contradistinction to such approaches, Cowan and Brown sought to ‘emphasise the contingent and context-specific ways in which identity and difference are expressed, or eschewed’ (2000:3). Like Brubaker *et al.* (see above), they stressed that ethnicity is ‘not always and everywhere an equally salient rubric for organising individual lives, biographies and social relations’ (Cowan and Brown 2000:15). They offered the term ‘inflections’ as an alternative metaphor for identity in the region, one which would reject ‘a notion of the signifier as singular and univocal’, and instead capture how ‘a single word is altered by the particularities of enunciation – tone, colour, voice, emotion – within particular contexts, enabling a rich variability in connotation and, ultimately, denotation’ (Cowan and Brown 2000:20). By exploring the inflections of ethnic identities, Cowan and Brown, like Herzfeld, took ‘the meaning of a word to inhere not in the word itself, but in its enunciation within particular performative contexts’ (Cowan and Brown 2000:20).

In a methodological critique of the field of memory studies, Confino posed the following question:

National memory [...] is constituted by different, often opposing memories that, in spite of their rivalries, construct common denominators that overcome on the symbolic level real social and political differences to create an imagined community [...] Conflicts over memory exist. Differences are real [...] But all of this only begs the question: how, then, in spite of all these differences and difficulties, do nations hold together? (1997:1399-1400).

The above discussion offers us a solution to this conundrum. The terminological stability of ethnic and national categories provides an illusion of fixity and commonality that facilitates large-scale solidarity between co-nationals: everyone ‘knows’ that ‘we’ are all *Greek* and, therefore, ‘we’ are all *the same*. At the same time, the capacity of identity labels to produce variable semantic inflections in everyday performative contexts allows for considerable flexibility in terms of what it *means* for an individual to be ‘Greek’ at any given moment. In fact, because idioms of national belonging and national virtue are so readily subordinated to local particularity (Sutton 1998), ‘being Greek’ is often given substance through the familiar local world rather than the abstract national one. Nationalism is intimately malleable, and therefore comforting and recognisable, but is simultaneously formally static, thereby providing a common denominator that draws together individuals otherwise separated by ‘real social and

political differences' (Confino 1997:1399-1400). In Herzfeld's terms, 'state ideologies and the rhetorics of everyday social life are revealingly similar' (1997:2) in that both 'depend on a semiotic illusion: by making sure that all the outward signs of identity are as consistent as possible, they literally create, or constitute, homogeneity' (1997:30). In this sense, ethnic shifters are semantically neither fixed nor free-floating, but 'hollow' in that they have 'quanta of available empty space that can be loaded with additional properties: more virtues, more glories, more blame' (Theodossopoulos 2006:3). They do not *lack* content, but rather have no *fixed* content beyond their surface form, and can thus be differently configured and reconfigured in order 'to allow new sets of meaning to dwell in their available hollowness' without severely disrupting the illusion of national unity (Theodossopoulos 2006:18, 23).

In this review essay, I have sought to demonstrate that there is a strong body of work that has treated ordinary Greeks 'as active producers – and not just passive consumers – of national discourse' (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008a:539). I have drawn connections between this literature and Confino's characterisation of the nation as a local metaphor, in order to elaborate a conceptual framework for describing how ordinary people experience and construct national attachment through the particularities of their own local experiences. In the next chapter, I pursue this discussion by exploring how the Greeks of Turkey developed their sense of self and belonging as residents of the Greek state after emigration from Turkey.

3

More than simply Hellenic

Belonging and inclusive particularity

The Greeks of Turkey have sometimes been referred to as a diaspora community (Örs 2006:91). But what exactly makes a community diasporic? As Brubaker observed, different definitions and conceptual usages of the term abound, to the extent that one might refer to a “diaspora” diaspora – a dispersion of the meanings of the term in semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space’ (2005:1). In Ulrike Meinhof and Anna Triandafyllidou’s words, diaspora in a ‘narrow sense carries connotations of alienation, displacement, nostalgia and with it a wish to return to a “motherland”’ (2006:200; see, for instance, Connor 1986; Safran 1991). Yet if diaspora, following Walker Connor, thus refers to ‘that segment of a people living outside the homeland’ (1986:16), it is unclear whether the Greeks of Turkey were a diaspora community whilst living in Turkey and were thus *repatriated* to a Greek ‘motherland’, or whether they only became diasporic when they were *expatriated* from Istanbul and Imbros. On the one hand, many informants recalled possessing an emotional attachment to Greece whilst living in Turkey – some would walk past the Greek embassy in Istanbul so as to be able to see the Greek flag, or collect soil on visits to Greece to take back to Turkey – and saw Greece as a national *patrída* that would protect them, or in which they might seek refuge from persecution.⁷⁵ As Gerasimos, who came to Greece as a teenager in 1964, put it to me:

Of course [we saw Greece as a *patrída*], because we are Hellenes, we speak Greek. We are Christians, and we were in a country where everyone was Muslim, and was hostile towards us. So, yes, we saw it as a *patrída*, a place where you would like to live (06/02/2012).

At the same time, however, Greece was for many an alien place, and numerous informants stressed that they never had any intention to cross the Aegean until circumstances forced them to think otherwise. As the newspaper *Imvriakí Ichó* wrote in its inaugural issue:

⁷⁵ Anna – born in Istanbul in 1923, and a resident of the city until emigration in 1937 – remembered her excitement when friends visiting from Greece brought two eggs with them: ‘I still remember those eggs, because I ate eggs from *Greece!*’ (28/11/2011).

In its narrowest sense *patrída* begins from the home, our village, it broadens and it is called Imbros. Away from its shores, from its narrow horizons the meaning of the word *patrís* begins to be lost for us. Away from Imbros what is our *patrída*? Where do we belong? (*Imvriakí Ichó* October 1971).

Furthermore, many expatriates were profoundly disappointed with the reception they received in Greece when they arrived (see chapter 2 and chapter 4): as Vasilis lamented, ‘we saw Greece as a mother *patrída*, but unfortunately Greece did not accept us as her children’ (12/08/2013); or, as a relative of Fani more colourfully put it, ‘we did not return to our mother *patrída*; it was rather a *stepmother patrída*’ (Fani 07/06/2013). This led many interviewees to express a feeling of disconnection from Greece as a physical place. In the words of Thanasis, a resident of Istanbul from his birth in 1953 until emigration in 1971:

Here 90% of Hellenes have the tendency to buy plots of land. I will never buy a plot of land. I bought a house; I bought a car; I bought a shop; I established a business; I’ll buy a second shop: [but] I’ll never buy a piece of earth. That means I am a refugee: I do not have the culture of the land (Thanasis 06/02/2012).

From this perspective, as İlay Romain Örs has written, emigration from Istanbul and Imbros was an act not of ‘return’ but of ‘expatriation’, and the Greeks of Turkey could be seen as ‘a Greek diaspora community *inside* Greece’ whose ‘only homeland’ is Istanbul or Imbros (2006:91).⁷⁶

Yet whilst this represents an accurate description of the discursive positions taken up by some of my interviewees (see below), it fails in three ways to capture the multiplicity of belonging commonly in evidence in expatriate narratives. Firstly, it disregards those who felt that they had two homelands, that they belonged both in the *patrída* of their birth and in the Greek national *patrída*: individuals like Panagiotis – born in Istanbul in 1946 and a resident of Greece since 1963 – who has decided to acquire dual Greek and Turkish citizenship because he has ‘two *patrídes*’ and wants to feel like a ‘free citizen’ in both (24/11/2011). Secondly, it ignores the possibility that a particular place might be

⁷⁶ Aslı Tunç and Ariana Ferentinou similarly wrote of Greek women still living in Istanbul that they ‘do not consider themselves as “migrants” or diaspora subjects. They are *indigenous to Turkey*’ (2012:911; my emphasis). As far as my interviewees are concerned, however, it would be somewhat misleading to say that they felt (or feel) indigenous to *Turkey*, as they were often at pains to emphasise that their *patrída* was *Istanbul* or *Imbros* rather than *Turkey* generally. As Konstantinos put it, ‘our *patrída* was there, but it didn’t have any connection with *Turkey*. In our minds, we separated Constantinople from *Turkey*’ (05/02/2012). It was not uncommon for expatriates to localise their sense of belonging even further, referring to the particular neighbourhood or village in which they were born as their *patrída*: in Stella Skarlatou’s terms, ‘*Panteíchi* [Pendik, a district of Istanbul] was our *patrída*’ (11/03/2010).

invoked as a *patrída* in a certain context for ‘strategic’ purposes. In the pages of the newspaper *Imvros*, for instance, it was particularly common for writers to refer to Imbros as their only *patrída*, and to characterise their presence in Greece as an exile in foreign lands, when they were encouraging their compatriots to direct their energies towards the preservation of a Greek community on the island (see chapter 7), and conversely for them to invoke Greece as their ‘true *patrída*’ (*Imvros* December 1980) when advocating for support from the Greek state or protesting about the treatment of the expatriates as ‘aliens’. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it does not take account of the (somewhat obscure) distinction between the abstract concept of the national *patrída* and the physical territory of the Greek state (Karakasidou 1997b:26). During our interview, Aris initially characterised Greece as his *patrída*, commenting that every group has a place to which they return in times of need, but, when asked if he felt that he was returning home when he migrated to Greece, he responded, ‘no, [it was] like I was going to a foreign place’ (23/05/2013). For him, Greece was a *patrída* in an abstract and collective way, but not a home in a tangible and individual sense, a diachronic historical homeland rather than a contemporary physical one. In Artemis Leontis’ terms, a place becomes a homeland not when it is *inhabited* but when it is *mapped* with history and meaning (1995:3). From this point of view, an individual might feel alienation from the physical territory of the Greek state but simultaneously feel attachment to the abstract Greek homeland, the latter constructed and sustained through attachment to their own local *patrída* (see review essay I, and below). Or, alternatively, they might feel a sense of belonging both to their old *patrída* in Istanbul or Imbros and to their new home in Greece, the two localities made proximate by the encompassing abstraction of the Greek national *patrída*. In this sense, the Greeks of Turkey complicate ‘the very ideas of “home” and “host”’ (Cohen 1997:127) by adhering to a more ambivalent sense of belonging that need not be precisely or singularly ‘located’ in one place or another.

Definitions of diaspora, however, have moved beyond ‘a teleology of origin/return’ (Clifford 1994:306) to focus on the centrality of ‘boundary-maintenance’ and, increasingly, ‘boundary-erosion’ (Brubaker 2005:6). For the Greeks of Turkey, boundary-maintenance – that is ‘the preservation of a distinctive identity vis-à-vis a host society’ (Brubaker 2005:6) – has certainly been a feature of their experiences, both in Turkey, where they attempted to preserve a distinctive identity as Greek-speaking Christians in a predominantly Turkish-speaking Muslim country, and in Greece, where

many distinguished themselves from the native Greeks by emphasising cultural and historical differences (see below and chapter 4). Boundary-erosion, meanwhile, has in particular been emphasised by scholars who saw the dynamics of diaspora as antithetical to those of nationalism. Andreas Huyssen, for instance, argued that whilst national memory ‘presents itself as natural, authentic, coherent and homogenous’, diasporic memory ‘in its traditional sense is by definition cut-off, hybrid, displaced, split’ (2006:85). The expatriated Greeks of Istanbul and Imbros have often been written about in comparable terms, as communities that transcend nationalism and national distinctions (Babül 2004; Babül 2006a; Babül 2006b; Örs 2006; see below). Certainly, the expressions of expatriate identity that I examine in this and the following chapter undermine dichotomous and essentialist concepts of self and other, and disrupt the ‘deceptively transparent surface’ of national identity (Herzfeld 1997:2). I share, however, Brubaker’s scepticism about a ‘conceptual antithesis between nation-state and diaspora’ (2005:10). In a sense, such approaches constitute an extension of the logic of transcendence (see review essay I), as they imply that complex or hybrid identities can flourish only by *transcending* national categories, thereby disregarding the possibility of hybridity existing *within* national categories. As Brubaker observed, whilst ‘[s]ophisticated discussions are sensitive to the heterogeneity of diasporas [...] they are not always as sensitive to the heterogeneity of nation-states’ (2005:10).

In this chapter, I aim to lay bare the heterogeneity of national identity often rendered invisible in juxtaposition between the locality and the nation or the nation and the diaspora. I explore how the expatriated Greeks of Turkey expressed their sense of self and belonging in Greece through the adaptation of two historical legacies: Romaic Byzantium and Classical Hellenism. I demonstrate that the expatriates commonly deployed the particularity of their local heritage *both* to differentiate themselves from the Greeks of Greece *and* to affirm the authenticity of their Hellenic credentials. Responding to the perception of some native Greeks that their Turkish birthplace made their ethnicity suspect, my interviewees commonly emphasised the specificity of their origins in Istanbul and Imbros in order to suggest that they were *particularly* Greek; ‘Grecker’, even, than the Greeks of Greece. Such narratives of *inclusive particularity* suggest that claims to national belonging in Greece may be premised on the accentuation of local heterogeneity as well as the assertion of national commonality.

The Helleno-Romaic dilemma

Patrick Leigh Fermor wrote that ‘inside every Greek dwell two figures in opposition [...] the *Romios* and the Hellene’ (1983:106). He outlined 64 parallel characteristics that distinguish the Romaic figure from the Hellenic one: the *Romiós* is concrete and tangible, whilst the Hellene is an abstract ideal; the former worships the Byzantine Empire and the dome of the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul, whilst the latter adores Ancient Greece and the Parthenon; nevertheless, they share the practice of ‘settling the world’s problems over endless cups of Turkish coffee’ (1983:107-113). The terms Hellene and *Romiós*, sometimes interchangeable, sometimes oppositional, have experienced fluctuating fortunes through the ages.⁷⁷ Although the Ancient Greeks saw themselves as Hellenes in the sense that they were different from ‘barbarians’, prior to the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece in 1832 there was no strictly defined ‘Greece’ or ‘Greeks’ (Just 1989:73). The term *Romioí*, meanwhile, probably originated from the Ancient Greek for ‘Romans’ (Mackridge 2009:51), and indeed the Byzantines called themselves *Romaíoi*, i.e. the inheritors of the Roman Empire (Just 1989:74; Mackridge 2009:48). In the Byzantine period, the label *Romioí* became closely associated with Orthodox Christianity, whilst the term Hellene was commonly equated with paganism and Ancient Greece, although it did not disappear from contemporary usage altogether (Herzfeld 1986:6; Heurtley *et al.* 1965:36; Mackridge 2009:48-9).⁷⁸ The Ottoman Empire took up this terminology, classifying its Orthodox Christian subjects as *Rum*, just as the Turkish Republic would categorise its Greek minority after 1923.

In the build-up to the 1821 Greek Revolution, however, Greek intellectuals – inspired by Western narratives of Classical Greek glory – began to call themselves Hellenes, even though the peasantry who would fight the revolution against the Ottoman Empire continued to self-identify as *Romioí*, that is as Orthodox Christians, and fought less for the glory of Pericles than for freedom from their Muslim rulers (Herzfeld 1986:31; Herzfeld 1997:176; Just 1989:83; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:25). As Herzfeld has discussed, Greek nation-building thus involved two competing visions of Greece and Greek identity: the Hellenic thesis and the Romaic thesis. The Hellenic thesis was ‘an

⁷⁷ On the translation of these two words, see chapter 1.

⁷⁸ According to Peter Mackridge, the use of the word ‘Hellene’ to mean ‘Orthodox Christian’ in the late Byzantium period was ‘a rhetorical conceit confined to a small intellectual elite’, who did not intend ‘to be identified with the ancient Hellenes’ (2009:49). It was only from the late seventeenth century onwards that speakers of modern Greek came to be thought of as the descendants of the ancient Greeks, and this was based on language and region rather than any racial theory (Mackridge 2009:49).

outward-directed conformity to international expectations’ and evoked ‘ancient pagan glories’, whilst the Romaic thesis was ‘an inward-looking self-critical collective appraisal’ that identified with the more recent Byzantine past (Herzfeld 1986:20-23). If the Hellenic was the ideal oriented towards modern Europe, the Romaic represented the familiar, simultaneously the comfort of Orthodox Christianity and the stigma of oriental taint (Herzfeld 1986:20-23; see also Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:21-23).⁷⁹ This contest was played out in debates over the Greek national language (Mackridge 2009:18) and a ‘cartographic anxiety’ over Greece’s territorial boundaries (Peckham 2001:40), as well as through folklore, literature and historiography (Herzfeld 1986; Leontis 1995). Ultimately, it was the Hellenic thesis that became dominant, and the citizens of the new Greek state, in Peter Mackridge’s words, ‘were born again as Hellenes, having realized, as it seemed to them, who they truly were’ (2009:55; see also Just 1989:83).

Yet if this foundling Hellenic identity looked forward to modern Europe and backwards to Classical Greece, its claims to historical continuity had to deal with a gap of some fifteen centuries in the Byzantine and Ottoman periods (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:22, 83, 100). This situation was exacerbated both by the scholarship of Austrian historian Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer – who rejected the notion of modern Greek descent from Ancient Greece, claiming that the modern Greeks were derived from Slavic and Albanian populations of the late Byzantine era – and by the fact that Byzantine Christianity meant more to most of the Kingdom’s population than the legacy of Ancient Greece (Just 1989:85; Millas 2008:np; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:83). A solution was found by revisionist Greek intellectuals in the mid-nineteenth century, most famously the historians Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos and Spyridon Zambelios, and the folklorist Nikolaos Politis (Mackridge 2012:34; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:83-88). Building on Zambelios’ conception of a ‘Helleno-Christian’ Byzantine period that achieved the fusion of ethnicity and religion, Paparrigopoulos reintegrated Byzantium into Greek national history by characterising the Empire as Greek (Mackridge 2012:34; Millas 2008:np; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:84), such that Greeks today ‘learn about their Byzantine heritage first without questioning the validity of modern Greek claims over Byzantium’s history’ (Tzanelli 2006:42). In this sense, whilst it was the Hellenic thesis

⁷⁹ Herzfeld has placed particular emphasis on the centrality of the Western gaze in determining what was acceptable in Greek culture, leading to attempts to purge ‘oriental’ or ‘Turkish’ traces (1987:5, 28; 1997:15). Nevertheless, Mackridge has stressed that the decision of nation-building elites to call themselves Hellenes was not just a fop to the Western imagination, but also helped to clarify a ‘semantic confusion’ caused by the ambiguity and multiple historical meanings of the term *Romioí* (2009:51).

that emerged triumphant from Greek nation-building, its consolidation required the accommodation of aspects of the Romaic legacy (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:101). As Mackridge observed, it is important to distinguish between two different conceptions of this Byzantine past: Byzantium as *Empire* and Byzantium as *Christianity* (2012:38). Whilst dreams of resurrecting the former may have died in the wake of Greek military defeat in Asia Minor in 1922, it is arguable that the latter – on quotidian and informal levels, at least – still resonates more strongly with the residents of modern Greece than does the legacy of Classical Hellenism (Mackridge 2012:38-39).

Although all residents of the Kingdom of Greece thus became Hellenes in the eyes of the Greek state, a Romaic sense of self persisted on local and informal levels, both amongst the native Greeks (even, to an extent, into the present day) and amongst the ‘unredeemed’ Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, who were still officially called *Rum* (Herzfeld 1997:176; Holden 1972:29).⁸⁰ Indeed, the Greeks of Turkey often used the term *Romioi* to distinguish those Greeks born in Turkey from the Hellenes of the Greek state: as Stefanos recalled, when a man came to visit his family from Thessaloniki, ‘we called him “the Hellene” [...] we separated him in some way from us’ (01/12/2011). Sometimes, slightly more specifically, ‘*Romioi*’ was used to refer to those Greeks of Turkey who possessed Turkish citizenship and ‘Hellenes’ to those with Greek citizenship, regardless of birthplace (mirroring the official Turkish distinction between *Rum* and *Yunan*). Accordingly, when Savvas – formerly a Turkish citizen – recalled his first return to Imbros after his acquisition of Greek citizenship, he described himself as returning ‘as a Hellene now’ (14/08/2013). Interviewees also sometimes distinguished Greeks born in Greece (and occasionally Greek citizens born in Turkey) as *Elladites* (singular: *Elladitis* (m.) or *Elladitissa* (f.)), i.e. ‘Greeks of Greece’, thereby preserving a more ecumenical meaning for the word Hellene. As Tasos put it, ‘the *Elladitis* is the Hellene who was born in Greece; the *Romiós* is the Hellene who was born and grew up in Constantinople’ (13/03/2014).

⁸⁰ Hellenes is the more usual term deployed by the residents of Greece today, but, as Herzfeld observed, Greeks sometimes call themselves *Romioi* ‘when they want to emphasize their disrespect for the formal culture and its values’ (1997:176).

'The Romiós is one thing and the Hellene is another'

For the expatriated Greeks of Turkey, the Helleno-Romaic dilemma is a matter of ongoing debate. In a characteristic opinion piece in *O Polítis* in 1988, one expatriate writer expressed disappointment at having recently heard an acquaintance say 'we are *Romioí*. The *Romiós* is one thing and the Hellene is another' (*O Polítis* April 1988). He countered that the term *Romiós* – once preferred by the Byzantines due to the association between Hellenism and idolatry, and later by the Ottomans to prevent the rise of national sentiment amongst Orthodox Christians – was in essence a synonym for 'Hellene' that had 'completed its historical role' (*O Polítis* April 1988). He concluded that, '[t]here is no longer any reason for us to call ourselves *Romioí* as the correct definition of "Hellene" has been historically restored. And of course we are all proud that we are the descendants of Ancient Greece that has given so much to civilisation' (*O Polítis* April 1988). The divergent positions on expatriate identity represented in this article concern both diachronic questions of history and ancestry and synchronic issues of belonging and commonality: should the Greeks of Turkey be distinguished from the Greeks of Greece and the Hellenic legacy, or should they see themselves as the siblings of the former and the descendants of the latter, separated only by happenstance of history and politics?

These wider questions were commonly reflected in my interviewees' oral history testimonies. Some informants used these two terms interchangeably, and when challenged argued that they were essentially synonymous. Others maintained a fairly narrow distinction based on citizenship or place of birth, or treated Hellene as an ethnic label and *Romiós* as a religious one. Many interviewees, however, placed emphasis on one identity to the exclusion of the other, explicitly choosing between the Hellenic and the Romaic legacies. On the one hand, those whose life histories stressed a sense of alienation and exile in Greece, and a longing to return to their *patrída* in Turkey, often presented a Romaic self. Vangelis – born in Istanbul in 1934 and a resident of Greece since 1980 – expressed profound regret about leaving Istanbul and a longing to return, stressing that he was well integrated into Turkish society and had only emigrated to fulfil his wife's desire to leave. He was exceptionally disillusioned with life in Greece, complaining that the native Greeks 'didn't want me, they teased me', and dismissing Greece as a 'degenerate, barbaric land' (Vangelis 03/02/2012). When we first met, he initially described his community as Hellenes, before immediately correcting himself:

You want to know how the Hellenes lived – not Hellenes, *Romioí*, right? There are no Hellenes in Constantinople. They baptised us as Hellenes. We don't have any connection with them (Vangelis 03/02/2012).

He proceeded to disassociate the *Romioí* from the Ancient Greeks, and was critical of the decision of Greek nation-builders to call themselves Hellenes:

Look, the Hellenes finished 2000 years ago. Afterwards came the Byzantine Empire [...] The Eastern Roman Empire. The *Romiós* is a Roman [...] Because the nation of the *Romioí*, of the Romans, was the first nation to rise up within the Ottoman Empire, enthusiastic foreigners called them Hellenes. That was a big mistake, because afterwards, as Hellenes, they began to lose their identity. The identity of the *Romiós* is that which it was within the Ottoman Empire: the Christian Ottoman [...] After [18]21, the Ottoman became a Turk and the *Romiós* became a Hellene [...] Suddenly [Greek revolutionary leader Giorgos] Karaiskakis and co. stand up and claim to be the descendants of Socrates. Such things cannot happen; you cannot erase 1000 years of history and then suddenly go back further [...] I adore Byzantium, or that which they call Byzantium [...] If you read and you know the books, they speak of the Eastern Roman Empire, and that is what it is. I am a *Romiós*. The '*Rum*' is correct. I'm not a Hellene, I'm a *Rum*, *Romiós*, Roman (Vangelis 03/02/2012; see also Halstead 2012:34-35; Halstead 2014a:272-273).

Vangelis' rejection of Hellenic identity, which he saw as a corruption of a more authentic Romaic identity, reflected his deep-seated disenchantment with life in what he called the 'Hellenic reality' (i.e. Greece). By re-centring Greek history on Byzantium and disregarding the ancient Hellenic legacy, he emphasised his feeling of being in exile away from his true home in Istanbul. Ilias, who was born on Imbros in 1923, was similarly embittered with his experiences in Greece after his arrival in 1965, concluding his life history as follows:

I came to Greece. I sold my business because the Turks took our schools [...] They didn't tell us to leave, [but] they took our schools, they also took our buildings. What could you do? So we came here to this place. This place is lovely. God gave it everything: sun, sea; but he gave it immoral people [...] I go about my business with my Turkish identity card. I also have a Hellenic one. Look what I have done to it (21/05/2013).

At this point, Ilias produced his Greek identity card, across the front of which he had scrawled *ÓHI* ('NO') in black marker pen. He explained:

Ilias: "No". It means, "I do not want you".

Halstead: I do not understand. Who wrote "no" on the card?

Ilias: I did. I only got it in order to go to the bank. It is my identity card that I acquired here [in Greece], and I use it only to go to the bank. I do not want anything else.

Halstead: Tell us exactly why you wrote “no” here.

Ilias: I do not want it. I am a Turkish citizen (21/05/2013).

Like Vangelis, Ilias juxtaposed his disappointment with Greek society with positive memories of Turkish society, and accordingly (unlike most of my Imbriot informants, see below) preferred to present a Romaic self:

Ilias: I have good relations with Turkey, relationships that I work to create. Over here, they tell lies. They have stolen from me five times. Five.⁸¹ I say to them, “I am a *Romiós*. I am not a Hellene.” [...]

Halstead [in a later phase of the interview]: You told me that you would describe yourself as a *Romiós* not a Hellene –

Ilias: Look, as a *Romiós*, Orthodox Christian. I wanted to be a Hellene, but a proper Hellene. Not that kind. Not that kind of Hellene. I do not want to be that kind [...] It is a shame: the place is nice, but the Hellenes are immoral.

Halstead: So when you go abroad, what do you normally say? That you are a Hellene, or –

Ilias: No, Turk. Turkish citizen, Turkish citizen (21/05/2013).

Ilias expressed his disillusionment with the Greek state by defacing his Greek identity card, and presenting himself – wherever possible – as a Turkish citizen rather than a Greek citizen. His experiences in Greece had, he felt, tainted the very idea of Hellenic identity, and accordingly he preferred to characterise himself as a *Romiós*. For individuals like Vangelis and Ilias, rejecting Hellenic identity and adopting a Romaic self-presentation was a means of distancing themselves from the Greek state and its inhabitants, affirming a sense of alienation in Greece and belonging in Istanbul/Imbros.

Informants, on the other hand, who presented their emigration from Turkey as an escape from persecution to the safety of Greece, often preferred to place special emphasis upon their Hellenic credentials. Gerasimos – who left Istanbul at the age of 15 when his father, a Greek citizen, was expelled in 1964 – contrasted a feeling of freedom in Greece with one of fear in Turkey, and portrayed Greece as a national *patrída* to which – as Hellenes – they would naturally want to come (see above). He persistently referred to the *Polítes* as Hellenes throughout his life-history narrative, and when I specifically asked how he conceived of his identity, he replied ‘Hellene, without any qualification’ (Gerasimos 06/02/2012). He expressed no particular objection to the application of the label *Romioí* to the Greeks of Turkey, but ventured that it was simply a broader term used to describe Hellenes living outside Greece, and did not see it as in any way distinct from Hellenic identity (Gerasimos 06/02/2012; see also Halstead 2012:30-31; Halstead

⁸¹ This is a reference to five occasions on which Ilias has been a victim of mugging in Greece.

2014a:271). Vasiliki – who was born in Istanbul in 1950 to Greek Cappadocian parents, and relocated to Greece in the late 1970s – similarly evoked an atmosphere of perpetual fear in Istanbul, and suggested that it was the allure of freedom and equality that drew her family to Greece (21/08/2012). Asked to describe herself, she replied: ‘a Hellene of Cappadocia, born in Constantinople to Cappadocian parents, of Hellenic descent. But I never hesitate to say I’m a Hellene. In my life I have never thought of my identity as anything but Hellenic’ (Vasiliki 21/08/2012). When I asked her if she would call herself a *Romiá*, she replied:

I might say it, as a *Romiós* [sic] of Constantinople, but the *Romiós* of Constantinople is still a Hellene. Many use that “*Rum*” to cut the Hellenism of Constantinople from its roots. It is a trap [...] I’ve noticed *Polítes* who – *Romioí*, er, that is to say Hellenes of Constantinople who say, “I am not a Hellene, I am a *Romiós*”. “A descendant”, he says, “of the Roman Empire”. That is an error that was created over the years, and it is like – how can I explain it? – a disavowal of the Greek state that was indifferent towards them. Because, truly, it was indifferent towards us [...] As long as we lived there, we did not feel the mother hugging its child, to put it metaphorically [... For that reason some *Polítes*] renounce their Hellenic descent and say, “we are *Romioí*” [...] It is certainly true that our culture is different from the *Elladítes*, but that does not stop us from all being Hellenes. It has become a bit political, to disrupt the cohesion of Hellenism (Vasiliki 21/08/2012; see also Halstead 2012:31; Halstead 2014a:272).

Vasiliki’s objection was not to the use of the term *per se* – in the extract above, she herself defaulted to calling her community *Romioí* and, because of the context, was obliged to correct herself – but rather the particular performative inflection put on the term by some of her fellow expatriates. Vasiliki was afraid that the use of the term *Romioí* by some *Polítes* carried an implication that she and her community were somehow separate from Greece and the roots of Hellenism (which, as we saw above, was precisely the rationale behind Vangelis’ preference for a Romaic identity).

Several interviewees shared Vasiliki’s concerns, telling me that they avoided the term *Romiós* as they saw it as a method used by the Turkish authorities to separate the Greeks of Turkey from the Greeks of Greece. Evangelos – who was born on the island of *Prínkipos* in the Princes’ Islands in 1945, and came to Greece 20 years later – categorised himself as ‘a Hellene of Constantinople’, and when I put it to him that some *Polítes* call themselves *Romioí* he opined:

The [term] *Romiós* is in some ways bastardised. The Turks did not want to call us Hellenes, so they called us *Rum*. Just like here our people do not refer to them [the Turks of Western Thrace, presumably] as Turks, they call them Muslims, even though they are Turks (08/05/2013).

Marios – who was born in Istanbul in 1941, left for Greece in 1966, and also described himself as a ‘Hellene’ – gave a similar response to the same question:

The word *Romiós* is a misunderstanding. I don’t ever use it. It might be a correct phrase, but because the Turks use it – I mean, *Romioí* are [for the Turks] only those in Constantinople and in Cyprus. Those that are here [in Greece], they call *Yunan*. To separate them, and maybe to split them up. So I don’t use the word *Romiós* at all. I say, “Hellene”, always (29/01/2012).

In attempting to ensure that the Greeks of Turkey were not fragmented from the Greek national body, and to indicate a sense of belonging and legitimacy in Greece, these narrators stressed a Hellenic identity and avoided Romaic distinctions.

Inclusive particularity (1): Polítes and Byzantium

In the above examples, interviewees appeared to take up antithetical perspectives on the Helleno-Romaic dilemma, stressing one identity over another and attempting to maintain terminological consistency throughout their narrative. These terminological choices, however, seemed to be primarily geared towards the articulation of a particular message for consumption by the interviewer: either that ‘we are Hellenes and therefore belong in Greece’ or that ‘we are *Romioí* and have nothing to do with Greece’. It is not, necessarily, to be assumed that these informants would strictly adhere to their chosen label in everyday discourse, and indeed, even within the context of their oral testimonies, they were commonly compelled to correct themselves when they erred. Nor were these alternative positions *per se* as clear-cut and dichotomous as they first appeared. Those who insisted on a Romaic self-presentation were explicitly airing their grievances with the Greek state and its inhabitants, but the precise relationship between this Romaic self and a Hellenic identity remained somewhat ambiguous. Ilias explicated his Romaic identity by cryptically stating that he ‘wanted to be a Hellene, but a proper Hellene’, implying that the *Romiós* might, in fact, be considered the true Hellene. Vangelis, for his part, quite emphatically disconnected his community from the ancient Hellenes, but did not clearly pronounce on the identity of the contemporary Greeks of Greece, leaving open the possibility that they were to be considered as *Romioí* misidentifying themselves as Hellenes. Those who presented a Hellenic self,

meanwhile, were concerned with demonstrating belonging in Greece and national commonality with its inhabitants, but this did not necessarily prevent them from identifying differences between the Greeks of Greece and the Greeks of Turkey based on the latter's Byzantine heritage. Gerasimos generally played down cultural distinctions or social tensions between the two communities, but Vasiliki acknowledged them, characterising the *Polítes* as the 'remnants of Byzantium', though simultaneously stressing that these distinctions did not 'stop us from all being Hellenes'.

Indeed, for many of my informants, Hellenic sameness and Romaic distinctiveness were far from mutually exclusive, and to be a *Romiós* was to be Hellenic, but to be a distinctive kind of Hellene from the Greeks of Greece. Kyriakos was born in Istanbul in 1951, where he completed university before emigrating to Greece in 1975, partly as his partner had left to study in Athens, and partly as he struggled to find work as a Greek in the wake of the conflict on Cyprus in 1974. He had predominantly fond memories of growing up in Istanbul and positive relationships with his Turkish acquaintances, and also recalled that he was quickly integrated into Greek society after his arrival in 1975. He characterised both Istanbul and Greece as *patrídes*, and expressed an emotional attachment to both. When I asked him how he would describe himself, he responded:

How would I describe my identity? I would describe myself as an Orthodox Hellene of Our East [*i kath'imás anatolí*] [...] I mean, I'm not an *Elladítis* [...] I think of my identity as a *Romiós*. Not that I don't love Greece. (Kyriakos 03/02/2012).

For Kyriakos, to be a *Romiós* was to be a Hellene of the *East* rather than a Hellene of *Greece*. Alexandros – born in Istanbul in 1962, and a resident of Turkey until his emigration to Greece in the mid-1970s – explained the usage of the self-descriptor '*Romiós*' in comparable terms:

[When we were living in Turkey] we did not use the word Hellene, because Hellene was certainly a national entity and we did not want it. But we did use the word Hellenism, Greekness [*ellinikótita*]. "The Hellene", meaning that you are a Hellenic citizen, is not something we said. We used the word "*Romiós*". There was a distinction [...] We did not [use the term "Hellene"] in a national sense, as in the state, but in a philosophical sense [...] It does not mean that you are Hellenic with the Greek flag, but that you are Hellenic because you respect the philosophy of Hellenism (11/03/2014).

Stefanos, who was born in Istanbul in 1950 and came to Greece as a teenager in 1964, likewise drew a distinction between the Hellenes of Greece and those of Istanbul. Like

Kyriakos, he placed emphasis upon the primarily harmonious relationships he enjoyed with other ethnic groups in Istanbul, as well as the positive reception his family received from the native Greeks when they resettled in Greece, referring to Thessaloniki as his ‘second *patrída*’. He defined himself as follows:

Ethnicity: clearly Hellenic. For accuracy, we also have to separate the *Romiós*. The *Romiós* of Constantinople was a Hellene but he was something separate. He didn’t think of his identity as Hellenic with the meaning of Greece. He thought of Greece as his *patrída*, if you like; yes, *patrída*. But the *Romiós* of Constantinople was something beyond Greece (Stefanos 01/12/2011; see also Halstead 2012:32; Halstead 2014a:273).

In a separate interview, Stefanos’ younger sister, Tasoula, came to a similar conclusion. Tasoula was less well reconciled to Turkey and Turks than her brother, although she too recalled having Turkish friends as a child, and whilst she felt that the native Greek people had treated them well, she was angry with the Greek state for their failure to support the expatriate community in Greece (on which, see chapter 4). I asked her how she would describe her ethnicity:

Tasoula: [Long pause] Hellene.

Halstead: Not *Romiá*?

Tasoula: What does *Romiá* mean? Hellene, it means. Except it distinguishes that you are the community from Byzantium, from Constantinople. For that reason I am proud that I am a Constantinopolitan – because I am not a simple Hellene (27/11/2011).

Tasoula was proud to be a Constantinopolitan not because it distanced her from Hellenic ethnic or national identity, but because it marked out her distinctiveness as regards the Greeks of Greece: as a *Romiá*, she was a Hellene of Constantinople – of Byzantium – rather than just another Hellene of Greece.

Such distinctions were drawn not only to emphasise pride at a particular local heritage, but also as a counter to the narratives of national *inauthenticity* aimed at the *Polítes* by segments of the native Greek population. Spyros was born in Istanbul in 1930 and came to Greece in 1984. At the beginning of his narrative, detailing the difficulties that precipitated his emigration from Turkey, he used the words ‘*Romiós*’ and ‘Hellene’ interchangeably to refer to his own community, and when asked to clarify explained that the two were one and the same. Later on in the interview, however, as he and Tasoula⁸² began to work each other up when discussing the cultural differences between the

⁸² No relation, but also present during the interview.

Polítes and the Greeks of Greece – particularly in regard to etiquette, discipline, and piety – a clear terminological distinction emerged between the *Romioí* of Istanbul and the Hellenes of Greece. It was, nevertheless, emphasised by both informants that these Romaic distinctions made their community *more* rather than less Hellenic: the *Polítes*, it was alleged, showed greater respect for the Orthodox Christian religion, had a superior knowledge of the ancient Greek language, and positively influenced the culture of the native Greeks after their arrival from Turkey.⁸³ Narratives of this sort reversed native Greek accusations of ethnic illegitimacy, by suggesting that the expatriates were not an alien body within the Greek nation but rather its more (or most) authentic members. As Spyros recalled, when native Greeks made fun of him by calling him a ‘Turk’, he would retort, ‘I hope you are as Hellenic as I am! In terms of religion, in love for your *patrída*’ (02/12/2011).

Assertions of Hellenic authenticity premised on Romaic particularity were common in expatriate testimony. Fotini, born in Istanbul in 1943, relocated to Greece in the 1970s with young Istanbul-born children. In her oral testimony, she recalled that her son was mocked as a ‘seed of the Turks’ by his classmates in Greece. Fotini went to her son’s teacher to complain about this behaviour, protesting to her, ‘look, we are more Hellenic than the Hellenes here!’ (21/11/2011) Moments after she told this story, I asked Fotini how she would define herself. She replied:

Romiá. [Pause] Not Hellenic, *Romiá*. There’s a difference. What are the differences? Well, we had many [different] influences, because Constantinople is a cosmopolitan place. It wasn’t a village, we didn’t have animals. That’s why we call it “The City”, with a big “C”. It is the only city that is written with a capital “C”: Byzantium. And that’s why we want to be Constantinopolitans (Fotini 21/11/2011; see also Halstead 2012:37-38; Halstead 2014a:275).⁸⁴

At first glance, it may seem as though Fotini had contradicted herself: she initially claimed to be archetypically Hellenic, before moments later characterising herself as Romaic and *not* Hellenic. However, to borrow terms from Herzfeld, ‘these usages are inconsistent only if one adheres to the absolutist logic of official ethnicity rather than to the entirely different theoretical underpinnings of ordinary talk’ (1997:45). The ethnic

⁸³ The suggestion that the expatriated Greeks of Turkey enriched native Greek culture is one that is commonly reiterated in both oral accounts and formal publications. The Constantinopolitan Society, for instance, in a publication to mark the organisation’s 80th anniversary, wrote that the *Polítes*, ‘brought to the free *patrída* the thousand-year-old civilisation of Byzantium that illuminated and still illuminates civilised humankind’ (2008:1).

⁸⁴ In the original Greek, Fotini said, ‘That’s why we call it *I Póli*, with a capital “P”’ (21/11/2011).

shifter ‘Hellenic/Hellenes’ was deployed by Fotini both to refer specifically to the Greeks of Greece – from whom she wished to differentiate herself – and to a more transcendent Hellenic ethnicity – of which, due to her Romaic heritage, she was not only a part but a *distinctive* part.

These interviewees, when challenged to define their identities, were keen to separate themselves from a narrow association with the modern Greek state and its inhabitants, and to emphasise the specificity of their Byzantine or Constantinopolitan heritage, and accordingly adopted – to varying degrees – a Romaic persona. Yet this was a *particularisation* rather than a rejection of Hellenic identity: to be a *Romiós* or a *Romiá* was, for these informants, still to be ethnically Hellenic, but to be a different kind of Hellene from the native Greeks. This difference was considered to be rooted, firstly, in the cosmopolitan and urban culture of Istanbul (see also chapter 4 and Örs 2006), and, secondly, in an ethnic and religious authenticity deriving from the community’s Byzantine history. In this way, the Greeks of Istanbul sought to affirm the authenticity of their Hellenic credentials and, consequently, their legitimacy as residents of Greece, by emphasising rather than downplaying the particularities of their own locality and its Romaic heritage. This Romaic legacy – sidelined in Greek nationalist historiography yet commanding considerable popular resonance amongst the modern Greek population (see above) – provided the *Polítes* with an identity that was quintessentially Hellenic yet distinct from Greece; Hellenic, but more than *simply* Hellenic (Halstead 2014a:274).

Renée Hirschon has documented how the Asia Minor refugees who arrived in Greece after 1923 responded to xenophobia from the native Greek population by stressing their own cosmopolitan culture and origins: a ‘knowledge of diversity’ stemming from the refugees’ experience of coexistence with Turks and other ethnicities in the Ottoman Empire, which provided them with a sense of identity that distinguished them from their native Greek detractors (2004b:325-343; 2006:61-78). Örs has made similar observations about the expatriated *Polítes* in Athens, suggesting that their knowledge of diversity from cosmopolitan Istanbul allowed them to differentiate themselves from the native Greeks (2006:87-89). Örs argued that the *Polítes* transcended the Greek-Turkish dichotomy, by rooting their sense of belonging not in Greek or Turkish ethnicity, but in a ‘wider cultural sense of “belonging” [...] specifically centred on the urban cosmopolitan experience of being from Istanbul’ (2006:81). This was an identity premised on claims to descent from Byzantium, a heritage taken to embody the

civilised, urban, and cosmopolitan characteristics that make the community distinctive (Örs 2006:86-88). For Örs, the most noteworthy aspect of this cosmopolitan sense of belonging was that it could include Istanbul residents of all ethnicities/nationalities – including urbanite Muslim Turks – whilst excluding non-Istanbulite co-ethnics – i.e. native Greeks (2006:84-91).⁸⁵ She argued that the *Polítes* occupied ‘a conceptual space between and beyond categories’ (Örs 2006:90), and exhibited a ‘complex identity’ that ‘challenges nationalism’ and ‘shows the limits of established terminologies – including concepts such as diaspora, minority or homeland – which are formed within a nation-state-centred logic’ (Örs 2006:91-92).

Örs was correct to identify that many *Polítes* saw significant cultural differences between themselves and the mainland Greeks, commonly expressed through the urban-rural and multicultural-monocultural dichotomies. As she observed, this cosmopolitan sense of belonging was often deployed to distinguish the *Polítes* from the native Greeks, in certain contexts even excluding native Greeks at the expense of including non-Greek Istanbulites (see chapter 4). She also accepted that many *Polítes* would be ‘more than content’ to be identified exclusively as Greeks (Örs 2006:82) and that few ‘would accept that they are less than Greek’ (Örs 2006:85). Her emphasis, nevertheless, was on the ‘non-negligible segment’ of the community who exhibited ‘a refusal to go along with confinement into one of two opposed camps, in other words, being either Greek or Turkish *only*’ (Örs 2006:82). In this sense, her analysis was underwritten by a logic of transcendence: the adoption of either Greek or Turkish identity was taken to result in confinement and simplicity, and more nuanced understandings of self were only to be obtained by transcending these national categories. The possibility that there is considerable room for manoeuvre *within* national identity was therefore overlooked, resulting in a somewhat lopsided portrayal of the *Polítes*’ understanding of self. For most of my interviewees, a cosmopolitan Romaic heritage, whilst distinguishing the *Polítes* from the native Greeks in one sense, also made them *quintessentially* Hellenic: as the heirs to Byzantium, the *Polítes* could be both *included in*, yet *distinctive within*, the Greek national community.

⁸⁵ Örs presented, for instance, an anecdote in which one *Polítis*, enthusiastically conversing with an Istanbulite Turkish tourist in Athens, referred to his native Greek wife as an ‘infidel’, thereby establishing commonality with the Muslim Turkish woman whilst excluding his non-Istanbulite Greek wife (2006:79-80, 88). He was, however, first keen to establish that the Turkish tourist was really an Istanbulite and ‘not one of those Anatolians’, indicating that this cosmopolitan commonality was closed to non-Istanbulite Turks (Örs 2006:79).

Inclusive particularity (2): Imvriótes and Ancient Athens

[P]erhaps, because we are few, we will continue to be the condemned, discarded, illegitimate children of Greece? [...] Our only sin for which we suffer is that we were born on Imbros, while if we had for instance been born in a neighbouring island (apart from Tenedos) we would be free Hellenic citizens with all of the rights afforded by the Hellenic State. We too want to live as free people as Hellenes. And without having our Greekness [*ellinikótita*] doubted! We are more Hellenes than many Hellenes (*Imvriakí Ichó* January-February 1974).

Elder *Imvriótes*, such as reluctant Greek citizen Ilias (see above), as well as those who lived in Istanbul for substantial periods of time (see Loukas, below), sometimes joined the *Polítes* in categorising themselves as *Romioí* (Tsimouris 2008:300). Generally, however, my Imbriot interviewees preferred to describe themselves as Hellenes and/or simply *Imvriótes*. Giorgos Tsimouris has suggested that a preference for Hellenic identity amongst younger *Imvriótes* may have represented a ‘strategic attempt’ to assert their Greekness in the face of a sceptical native population (2008:300). This may well be the case, although as I have argued above the use of the label *Romioí* by the *Polítes* might likewise be interpreted as a strategy for demonstrating national authenticity. The comparative disinclination amongst my Imbriot interlocutors to refer to themselves as *Romioí* might also be accounted for by cultural and historical differences between them and the *Polítes*. Pavlos – who was born on Imbros in 1970, and moved to Istanbul in order to attend a minority school in 1975 – described something of a culture clash between the two communities:

There was a different culture. In the school that I went to – it was not a big school – most of the children were *Imvriótes*. So we had the upper hand. We were also more wild, in retrospect! [Laughter] Growing up, because as you grow up you understand more things, I realised that the *Polítes* thought of us as a lower class [...] Certainly in Constantinople the people were urban, they were a different class. They ate with a knife and fork, whilst we were villagers (29/05/2013).

In the mid-1960s, a young Fani similarly felt that the *Polítes* looked down on the children from Imbros:

I felt very uncomfortable in the first years as a student in Constantinople. At school, they [the *Polítes*] thought of us in the same way that here [in Greece] they see the Vlachs. We had that particular dialect that we spoke, and the *Polítes* thought of themselves as cultured, regardless of the fact that they did not know how to speak Greek properly by comparison with us [...] Recently, that behaviour has changed, but for many years the *Polítes*, young and old, saw the *Imvriótes* as second-class (07/06/2013).

As members of an agricultural island community, the *Imvriótes* may thus have had comparatively little interest in claiming a cosmopolitan, urban identity rooted in the Byzantine legacy that might be associated with a Romaic self-presentation. At the same time, some may have wished to differentiate themselves from the *Polítes* who *did* commonly characterise themselves as *Romioí*. From this point of view, Imbriot expressions of Hellenic identity may have had to do with differences between them and the *Polítes* as well as with attempts to demonstrate similarity with the Greeks of Greece.

Indeed, the commonplace use of the identity label ‘Hellene’ by the *Imvriótes* did not prevent them from drawing distinctions between themselves and the Hellenes who inhabited the Greek state. Loukas was born in Istanbul in 1967 to Imbriot parents who, as schoolteachers, had moved to the city after the prohibition on Greek language education on Imbros in 1964. He lived in Istanbul until his emigration to Greece in 1992, during which time he spent the summers on Imbros. He attempted to characterise his relationship to Greece as follows:

In Greece I am, okay – [hesitates] I am not an *Elladítis*. I am a Hellene. However, not an *Elladítis*. That is the only way I can describe it, with those words. Because to be an *Elladítis*, at least in the sense that I mean, means that you [...] are limited by experiences formed in a narrow country that is called, geographically, “Greece”. I offer it as a contrast: if I must distinguish, if I have to say I am not something, I am not that, let’s say. As a Hellene, I am not that (Loukas 08/05/2013)

Loukas’ testimony uncoupled the ‘nation’ from the ‘state’. He saw himself as Hellenic, but was keen to underline that this sense of self was not narrowly defined by a relationship to the Greek state or its territorial boundaries; in fact, his Hellenic identity was defined as much in opposition to as through commensurability with the Greeks of Greece. In Loukas’ case, this involved distinguishing the native Greeks as ‘*Elladítes*’, although as often as not my Imbriot informants differentiated themselves without making such terminological distinctions. Markos was born on Imbros in 1953, and initially emigrated to the USA with his family in 1967 before ultimately resettling in Greece as a grown man. Asked how he would describe himself, he responded, ‘a Hellene of Imbros’. In this case, it was the *self* that was the Hellene. Explaining, however, why he felt that the *Imvriótes* required their own communal meeting place, he distinguished the Greeks of Greece as ‘Hellenes’:

One way for people who are migrants, who are from other *patrídes*, to find one another, was to build their own place to meet up. Because only here [in the Imbriot Society] can we talk amongst ourselves, about Imbros, let's say. If we go to another café, or restaurant, whatever, *there might be Hellenes*; and you cannot discuss things with them, because we do not have things in common. We want to have a place where we can talk and remember the past (Markos 04/05/2013; emphasis added).

In this context, the Hellenes had become the other against which the *Imvriótes* were defined (see also chapter 4), the two separated by a lack of common experience. Because the label 'Hellene' can mean different things in different performative contexts, Markos was able to differentiate himself from the Greeks of Greece without calling the 'Greekness' of either party into question. Coming from a different *patrída*, Markos' Hellenic self lacked *local* commonality with the Hellene of Greece, but both could nevertheless remain Hellenes on a *national* level. The variability of these identity labels typically went unacknowledged in my informants' testimonies, allowing them to indicate difference without explicitly flagging it up. Kostas, however, who was born on Imbros in 1963 and came to Greece in 1981, noticed that he had been using the word 'Hellene' both to refer to himself and to distinguish the residents of the Greek state, and remarked upon it as follows:

I don't know if you noticed, that there is a "Hellene". I am a Hellenic citizen, I feel Hellenic, but I do not think of myself as Hellenic with the same meaning as someone who was born in Kalamata [a large city in the Peloponnese] and lives in Athens thinks. To tell you something funny, when my mother hears on the television about some serious crime [that has taken place in Greece], she says, "my my, what things are these Hellenes?" (07/06/2013)

In Confino's terms, Hellenic identity for Kostas represented a 'common denominator of variousness' (1993:63): there were many different ways to be Hellenic, such that commonality on a national level could coexist with a significant degree of local particularity. In light of these comments, I asked Kostas precisely how he would describe his own identity. He pondered his relationship to both Hellenic and Turkish identity, before concluding that he felt more Hellenic because he was from Imbros:

I would say that I was born on Imbros, I am a Hellene, I mean I feel ethnically Hellenic. No one has dared to ask me how I feel in relation to Turkey [...] I have asked to take my Turkish citizenship back [...] I willingly take Turkish citizenship, not only for some practical needs, but because I feel both Hellenic and Turkish [...] So I could belong to both countries and both sides. But, historically of course, I feel closer to the Hellenes, because I am an *Imvriótis*. Imbros was settled by Athenian colonists, okay (Kostas 07/06/2013).

Kostas saw himself as ethnically Hellenic, but this identity became tangible and meaningful through the locality (Imbros) rather than through the nation-state (Greece). He did not feel Hellenic *despite* being from Imbros, but rather that he was a Hellene *because* he was from Imbros.

Indeed, as was the case with the *Polítes*, such local particularity was not only capable of existing alongside national commonality, but could itself *drive* narratives of national belonging. As Tsimouris has observed, the *Imvriótes* commonly deploy ‘as compelling evidence of Greekness’ the specificities of their island’s demographics, history, and built environment: the preponderance of Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians prior to the 1960s, the sheer number of churches and chapels, and references to Imbros in Homer and other ancient texts (2008:185). The maintenance of these characteristics, despite the island’s location within Turkish territory, was a source of particular pride for the community. As the newspaper *Imvriakí Ichó* put it in an appeal for support aimed at a domestic Greek audience:

We were born Turkish citizens, but in the altar of our soul, we kept pure our Christianity and we preserved unaltered the Hellenic traditions. So as genuine Hellenes and Christians we ask the Hellenic press, the Hellenic Authorities to share our pain and to recognise our rights (*Imvriakí Ichó* October 1972b).

In this way, the source of native Greek scepticism over the *Imvriótes*’ Hellenic credentials – that they were born in Turkey rather than Greece – could be turned into an asset that asserted the depth and resilience of a Hellenic identity cultivated outside the embrace of the Greek state.

Nevertheless, appeals of this sort were not premised on a history of displacement from Greece, but on the notion that Imbros constituted a centre of Hellenism in its own right. Just as the *Polítes* drew on the Byzantine legacy to emphasise their national and religious authenticity, so the *Imvriótes* mobilised histories of their island’s distant past to bolster their claims on Hellenic identity. Imbriot historical narratives typically placed emphasis upon the island’s colonisation by Athenians in c.480 BC, and stressed that the history and culture of Imbros were thereafter closely intertwined with Athenian Hellenism despite repeated occupations by Spartans, Macedonians, Frankish crusaders, Ottomans, and others. Imbriot writer Giorgos Xeinós, for instance, in his history of Imbros and Tenedos wrote of the former that, ‘all of the evidence points to the fact that

from the moment that the island became an Athenian cleruchy,⁸⁶ despite its hitherto unadulterated pre-Hellenic character, it was culturally transformed into a miniaturised Athenian state' (2011:28). In a 1977 article, the newspaper *Imvros* voiced its objections to the Greek state's treatment of the expatriated *Imvriótes* as 'aliens' in similar terms:

Aliens, those people who have the same roots in History (as is well known Imbros has been since antiquity a city of Ancient Greece with only small subjugations by the powers of the region) who have the same traditions, the same struggles, the same language, the same religion (*Imvros* August-September 1977).

Writing in 1994, another author in *Imvros* gave the following potted history of the island, again attempting to demonstrate the depth of its Hellenic identity, and its preservation from ancient to modern times, by highlighting references to Imbros by Homer, the intimacy of its relationship to both Classical Athens and the Byzantine Empire, and the resilience of its population in the face of foreign invaders:

Known as '*Imvrou ásty*' [i.e. 'the city of Imbros?'] in Homeric times.⁸⁷ Opposite the Troad, where around its walls Achaeans and Trojans fought with spears for a decade, to give material to the timeless poet to write his immortal epic the *Iliad*, and why not, also his other epic the *Odyssey*. Its first settlers were Pelasgians. Cleruchs of Athens colonised it in the years in which the 'glorious city', was living the peak of its fame. Then, the Imbriot deme was organised according to the Athenian prototype, such that it was called 'Deme of Athens in Imbros'. Even the river-torrent of the island, the 'big river' as they call it today, was then called *Ilissós*[,] like one of the two rivers of the city [i.e. Athens] that Pallas guarded. It encountered the Spartans, Philip [II of Macedon] and the Romans. It embraced Christianity. It was a region of the Byzantine Empire for centuries, not so far from the Queen of cities [i.e. Constantinople], like other parts of today's Greece. It knew the rule of the Franks and from 1460 the rule of the Turks. The expatriations and the persecutions did not stop. Imbros, however, retained its Greekness. And by 1893 it had 9357 Hellenes and only 99 – not even 100 – Turks! (*Imvros* May-June 1994b).

At a conference organised by the Imbriot Society in 1984, one of the speakers likewise deployed the ancient history of the island in an effort to establish the Hellenic credentials of the *Imvriótes*:

The Imbriot people, who happened to inhabit that tender and noteworthy geographic place [i.e. Imbros] for more than 3000 years, are purely Hellenic, descended from an ancient Hellenic race, derived from the crossing of the Hellenes with the pre-Hellenes [...] Its national history began in [...] 480 BC

⁸⁶ A cleruchy was a distinctive variety of Athenian colony: settlers, or cleruchs, were granted plots of land in conquered territories, and were permitted to retain their Athenian citizenship.

⁸⁷ This is a reference to a passage in book 14 of Homer's *Iliad* (Tzavaras 2005/2007).

when it was occupied by the general Miltiadis I, he surrendered it to the Athenians, who settled it with Athenian cleruchs from Attica, and constituted it “in the image and likeness of Athens” and thought of it as their adopted daughter (*Imvros* May 1984).

Similar origin stories were offered by some of my interviewees. Stamatios, who was born on Imbros in 1945 and relocated to Greece in 1963, gave a particularly in-depth narrative of the island’s history. He began by answering his own rhetorical question:

What are the *Imvriótes*? Imbros, in the years of the Athenian democracy, and later in the Roman years, was a deme of Athens. The Athenians, realising that it was a very important location for their defence and for trade from the Black Sea, did that which the Turks have done today: they removed the inhabitants and settled new ones there [...] We *Imvriótes* are a mixture of pre-Hellenes and Athenians (Stamatios 30/05/2013).

Stamatios proceeded to argue that certain rituals and traditions derived directly from the Ancient Athenians, which had passed out of usage in Greece itself long ago, persisted on Imbros into the modern era:

When I went to high school and started to study ‘Introduction to Tragedy’ and I read Homer, things seemed familiar to me [...] I said, “this is all familiar, this is *our* way of life”. And what made a big impression on me was when I started to read Tragedy. Where does Tragedy come from? From the worship of Dionysus. We lived the Dionysian rites, exactly as they were described, until 1964! [...] The ban on public rituals issued by Justinian in 530 [A.D.] never reached Imbros [...] Another celebration which derives from antiquity [...] is the slaughter of the oxen, which is a memory of the hecatomb to Zeus and the gods in Athens [...] Even today, in our burial rites, we have traditions drawn from ancient religion and not Christian religion (30/05/2013).

With these comments in mind, I asked Stamatios if he felt that he was moving to a ‘second home’ when he relocated to Athens in 1963, to which he replied in the negative, suggesting that no cultural or ceremonial legacy of the Ancient Athenians persisted in the modern Greek city. By claiming a ritual continuity with Ancient Greece allegedly lacking in modern Greece, Stamatios portrayed Imbros as a more authentically Hellenic space whose detachment from central authority had enabled ancient traditions to flourish. In this way, Imbros’ geographic marginality was deployed to *reinforce* rather than undermine its inhabitants’ national credentials: their position on the periphery placed them on the margins of the Greek state but at the centre of the Greek national origin story.

Elif Babül has suggested that Imbros might be seen ‘as an “exception” to the national order of things’ within Republican Turkey (2004:3), insofar as the *Imvriótes*’ sense of belonging on the island derived from ‘pre-national forms of belonging through memory, spatiality and locality – in a word, nativity – rather than through citizenship’ (2006a:50-51). In common with Örs, Babül discussed how her informants differentiated themselves from other Greek communities by ‘claiming an identity based on a specific locality’ and characterising themselves as ‘Rums’ (i.e. *Romioí*), which she interpreted as evidence of their sense of ‘marginality’ and ‘in-betweenness’ as regards nationalism and national categories (Babül 2006a:55-56; 2006b:47). Yet as Tsimouris has emphasised, the ‘use of the term “*Romioí*” alternately with the term “Hellenes” amongst elder *Imvriótes* does not place the *Imvriótes* in an intermediate field between the Hellenes and the Turks, but rather *marks out their distinctiveness as Hellenes*’ (2008:112). From this perspective, Imbriot attachment to the locality of Imbros, and their efforts to distinguish themselves from other Greeks, should not be interpreted as necessarily opposed or antithetical to ideas of national belonging. In contradistinction to my informants from the Greek community of Istanbul, my Imbriot interviewees did not commonly present a Romaic persona or draw connections between their community and the legacy of Byzantium. Yet like the *Polítes*, the *Imvriótes* nevertheless emphasised their particularity as Hellenes vis-à-vis the Greeks of Greece by drawing on the specificities of their local heritage. Through narratives of ancient Athenian colonisation of the island and the preservation of its inhabitants’ Hellenic traditions and Orthodox Christian religion under Turkish authority, the *Imvriótes* portrayed themselves as legitimately Hellenic because of, rather than in spite of, their distinctive origins on an island outside the territory of the Greek state. In this way, they hoped to demonstrate – to borrow terms from another speaker at the 1984 Imbriot Society conference – that ‘the *Imvriótes* are not the poor relatives of the Hellenic people but the carriers and continuation of the genuine Aegean civilisation and its pure Hellenic Orthodox tradition’ (*Imvros* June 1984).

Expatriate protoselves

Building upon Ulric Neisser’s concept of the ‘remembered self’,⁸⁸ the psychologist Craig Barclay argued that autobiographical remembering requires the continual

⁸⁸ The sense of self articulated when a past event is remembered in a specific present context (Neisser 1994:1-18).

construction of ‘protoselves’ that are developed through everyday social interactions and tested by the degree to which they are accepted by others (Barclay 1994:70). He wrote that,

protoselves are composed through a skilled process of improvisation such that what is created anew is referenced and firmly tied to the past [...] improvisations yield protoselves constrained by a life lived and a life being lived and by evolving social agreements regarding the range of culturally acceptable selves (Barclay 1994:72).

This ongoing process of identity negotiation was in evidence in the autobiographical testimonies considered in this chapter: interviewees were constantly experimenting with different configurations of self (and other), improvising protoselves in their efforts to make sense of their own identity and to convey this sense of self to the interviewer. At the end of our interview, Andreas – born on *Chálki* in the Princes’ Islands in 1943, and a resident of Greece since 1973 – played across the whole range of the Helleno-Romaic dichotomy in an attempt to arrive at a suitable self-description:

Many of us Constantinopolitans, of course, feel that they are *Romioí*. They make a distinction, they take a stance, they say, “I am a Constantinopolitan, I am a *Romiós* from Constantinople, the others are *Elladítes*”. They make a distinction. But – I too want to be a *Romiós* of Constantinople. Not that it bothers me – I am Hellenic. Not *Elladítis*. Constantinopolitan. *Romiós*. Hellenic Constantinopolitan. Hellenic Constantinopolitan doesn’t bother me (11/02/2012).

Andreas’ musings demonstrate that the performance of nationality is far removed from the superficial simplicity of national identity labels: his attempts to arrive at a suitable self-description were complicated by multiple and overlapping concerns with both distinctiveness and inclusiveness, resolved – in this case – with a protoself that combined a national identity (Hellenic) with a local one (Constantinopolitan).

The national self, nevertheless, is *far* from ‘infinitely multifaceted’ (Eriksen 2001:65). Daniel Albright has drawn a distinction between a ‘conventional remembered self’ and an ‘unconventional remembered self’: whilst ‘the conventional vision of self offers me security; the unconventional one frightens me and frees me’ (1994:39).⁸⁹ Protoselves improvised along the lines of the Helleno-Romaic dichotomy could be conceived of as the expatriates’ conventional remembered selves: whilst the hollowness and plasticity of these categories enabled individuals to make identity meaningful on their own terms,

⁸⁹ Albright, like Barclay, was responding to Neisser’s work on the ‘remembered self’ (see above).

their superficial stability imbued them with a comforting illusion of fixity and homogeneity that could be translated into national solidarity. As I have demonstrated elsewhere – and as is in evidence in some of the testimonies considered above – some interviewees had reason to temporarily escape this conventional self and access a more unconventional, Turkish self (Halstead 2014a:280-283; see also Örs 2006:82). Typically, this was done for humorous purposes, or to critique the Greek state and nationalism generally, or to lampoon native Greek prejudices about the expatriate community (Halstead 2014a:280-283). Nevertheless, these forays into unconventional selves were generally cautious, partial, and temporary (Halstead 2014a:283). Turkish protoselves ran up against experiences of persecution in Turkey, as well as suspicions and prejudices both within and without the expatriate community, and informants generally stayed within the safer conceptual space of the conventional self, which still provided them with ample room for discursive manoeuvre. As Eriksen put it, identity cannot be created ‘out of thin air’, and its performative inflections must always be tested against the expectations of others and remain grounded in personal experience (Eriksen 2001:50, 61-66). The latter point can be illustrated by expanding upon the testimony of Loukas (see above), who was born in Istanbul to Imbriot parents. Asked how he would describe himself, Loukas indicated that he felt both Imbriot and Romaic:

I am an *Imvriótis*, in terms of consciousness. That is to say, Imbriot *Romiós*. That is how I feel. There is also the Romaic child, because I grew up in Constantinople. I also feel like a child of Constantinople, understand? In spirit I am a child of Constantinople, but in body I am a child of Imbros (08/05/2013).

He proceeded to characterise himself as Hellenic, but also to differentiate himself from the Greeks of Greece on the basis of their different life experiences (see above). He concluded by ruminating on his relationship to Turkey:

Beyond that, in relation to our discussion about the current [2013 Gezi Park] protests in Turkey, I feel very strongly about everything that is going on there. I mean, I feel like a part of that community, to the extent that they allowed me to, and to the extent that I am able to overcome those things through which we lived, in order to feel like a part of the contemporary community of Constantinople. And not of Turkey generally, specifically of Constantinople, because Constantinople has its own character which I think is much stronger than Turkey itself as a country (Loukas 08/05/2013).

Loukas’ testimony is an anatomy of expatriate taxonomies of belonging. He saw himself both as Imbriot (due to his parentage) and Romaic (due to his upbringing), which made him Hellenic but, nevertheless, distinct from the Greeks of Greece. He also

felt like a part of Istanbul's society, but emphasised that this sense of belonging was limited by his past experiences of discrimination in that city, and did not translate into a sense of belonging in Turkey generally. In this regard, his expressions of self were built upon, and made meaningful through, local experience: they could be stretched as far as this experience would allow, but no further.

Conclusions

In their discourses on self and belonging, my interviewees drew on two legacies that resonate strongly, if asymmetrically, in Greek nationalism: Romaic Byzantium and Classical Hellenism. Within the expatriate community, there has often been debate over which of these two histories was most appropriate to the Greeks of Turkey, reflected in the preference shown by some informants for one self-categorisation over the other. Whilst those who felt alienated or even rejected in the Greek state often tended to emphasise their Romaic identity, others for whom Greece was a national refuge to which they escaped from Turkish persecution commonly gave salience to their Hellenic self. From this point of view, the Hellenic self represented sameness, and the Romaic self distinctiveness; one had a *patrída* in Greece, the other a *patrída* in Istanbul/Imbros; one self had been repatriated, whilst the other lived in exile. Delving beneath the surface of these terminological distinctions, however, revealed that individuals' notions of identity and belonging were not so easily pinned down. To be sure, many *Polítes* and *Imvriótes* were at pains to differentiate themselves from the Greeks of Greece, and commonly did so by placing emphasis on the particularities of their local heritages: respectively, the urban cosmopolitanism and Orthodox Christianity of Byzantine Constantinople, and the cultural legacy of ancient Athenian colonisation of Imbros, portrayed as having survived in spite of repeated conquests and changes in political authority on the island. These efforts at distinction based on local particularity have led both communities to be interpreted through what we might call a 'cosmopolitan' approach to diaspora (Meinhof and Triandafyllidou 2006:200), which sees diasporic groups as 'caught up with and defined against [...] the norms of nation-states' (Clifford 1994:307), and views the former as characterised by a heterogeneity, hybridity, and in-betweenness absent in the latter.

Such perspectives are compelling insofar as they seek to move beyond the prejudices and exclusions associated with dichotomous and immutable understandings of group

identity, but they are circumscribed by their assumption that attachment to the local is necessarily antithetical to attachment to the national, or, in other words, that ‘a strong identification with locality [...] transgresses notions of ethnicity, religion and citizenship’ (Örs 2006:86). I have sought to demonstrate that the expatriated Greeks of Turkey commonly drew on their identification with a particular local place of origin in order to authenticate their claims to national belonging, and, consequently, advocate for their presence in – and support from – the Greek state. This *inclusive particularity* was simultaneously an act of boundary-maintenance and one of boundary-erosion: it allowed the expatriates to differentiate themselves from ‘those Hellenes’ of Greece whilst also establishing their distinctiveness *as* Hellenes (Tsimouris 2008:112) and, therefore, their membership of a broader national community. This is not to deny the friction that may be generated at the interface between local and national identities, but rather to suggest that there is significant room for manoeuvre within the allegedly ‘narrow confines of national categories’ (Örs 2006:81). The Greeks of Turkey challenged their marginalisation in Greek national history, politics, and diplomacy by articulating their own narratives of national authenticity grounded in local particularity, drawing on history to bypass the modern Greek state and stake a more venerable claim to Hellenic identity.

4

Without barbariansTurks and *Elladítis*

In the May-June 1994 issue of *Imvros*, Kyriakos Bakalis penned a reflective article on the relationship of the Imbriot community to both the Turks of Turkey and the Greeks of Greece. He wrote:

“AND NOW WHAT WILL WE BECOME WITHOUT BARBARIANS?”*

*C. Cavafy (1904)

Every people, every nation, every person in the final analysis faced and faces in each phase of its history or life some “barbarians”. Someone who threatens their existence, their freedom, their autonomy.

We *Imvriótes* have had the misfortune to be faced with [...] two very clear and unscrupulous barbarians: on the one hand the Turk, who made a point of undoing us, and on the other the *Elladítis*, who not only took the decision to not take a stand against the work of the Turk, but even helped him! [...]

[W]e founded our [expatriate] associations [...] and we all gathered together, we talked, we amused ourselves and we remembered those past beautiful years on our island and in our village. And then we cursed and swore at the Turk (he who is uneducated and uncivilised) and the *Elladítis* (who is two times more uneducated and uncivilised) [...]

However, my dear *Imvriótis* – I regret that I will displease you – but things have changed somewhat [...] The barbarians have changed their attitude!

One of them, the Turk, allows us to go freely [...] to the island in the summers and to renovate our houses and our churches [...]

The other, the *Elladítis*, has awakened! Not a week goes by without Imbros being referred to either on TV, or on the radio, in magazines, in newspapers *et cetera* [...]

And now, however, what happens? What will we become without barbarians? [...] Who will we blame for that which happens from here on? (*Imvros* May-June 1994c)

For the author of this article, recent Imbriot history had been determined by the actions (or inaction) of two others: the Turk and the *Elladítis*. His principal message was that the changing stances of both represented an opportunity for the *Imvriótes*: no longer could they place blame for the situation on Imbros on Turkish aggression and Greek indifference, and they were faced with the decision either to consign the island to history or to take action to reclaim it (on this dilemma, see chapter 7). For the expatriated Greeks of Turkey, however, the figures of the Turk and the *Elladítis* provided not just objects of blame for their community’s plight, but also points of reference through which, or in opposition to which, they could process and articulate

their experiences and cultivate a distinctive sense of self. In the previous chapter, we saw how my interviewees deployed their local particularities to simultaneously distinguish themselves from the Greeks of Greece and lay claim to Hellenic identity. In this chapter, I explore how their representations of the Turkish other and the Hellenic other similarly allowed them to pursue both inclusiveness and distinctiveness as regards the Greek state and its inhabitants. Whilst stereotypes of Turkish barbarity, juxtaposed to Hellenic civilisation, served to constitute the expatriates as national martyrs deserving of state support, alternative representations of Turks as honourable and industrious, set against allegations of native Greek unscrupulousness and indolence, functioned as a critical mirror to spotlight shortcomings in Greek society. In both cases, the expatriates claimed a *privileged knowledge* of the Turkish other acquired through lived experience, which they used both to sustain *and* challenge Greek nationalist stereotypes. I draw upon Brubaker *et al.*'s (2006) distinction between 'nominal' and 'experiential' ascriptions of ethnicity in order to consider how and why such stereotypes became expedient and meaningful in individuals' narratives.⁹⁰

Ethnicity as an 'interpretive prism'

Brubaker's criticism of 'groupism' has become a touchstone for studies of ethnicity and national identity, particularly amongst scholars interested in the salience of these concepts in everyday life (see review essay I). Brubaker insisted that the commonplace tendency – both popular and academic – to divide the world up into discrete ethnic groups was, 'what we want to explain, not what we want to explain things *with*; it belongs to our empirical data, not to our analytical toolkit' (2004:9). For him, what we often refer to as groups – African Americans, Whites, Romanians, Hungarians – are in fact categories: 'not things *in* the world, but perspectives *on* the world' (Brubaker 2004:12, 17, 20, 24). Accordingly, he suggested an analytical shift from 'groups' – conceived of as concrete and bounded things-in-the-world – to 'groupness' – moments of cohesion and collective solidarity that *happen* in particular contexts without necessarily pointing to the existence of enduring and tangible *things* called groups (Brubaker 2004:7, 12). Based on ethnographic fieldwork in the Romanian city Cluj, Brubaker and colleagues thus conceived of ethnicity as 'an interpretive prism, a way of

⁹⁰ By contrast to Brubaker *et al.*, I am primarily concerned in this chapter with perceptions of others' ethnicity rather than ethnic claims about the self, and with the narrative contexts in which ethnicity becomes salient rather than its significance – or otherwise – in everyday life.

making sense of the social world’ and ‘a way of understanding and interpreting experience’ (Brubaker *et al.* 2006:15; 358).

As Zsuzsa Csergo has observed, Brubaker *et al.*’s attempts to explore ethnicity and nationalism without evoking the language of groups frequently ran into conceptual problems, due to the difficulty of categorising individuals for the sake of comprehensibility without referring to them as ‘Hungarians’ or ‘Romanians’ in a generalising manner (2008:395). Brubaker *et al.* justified this disjuncture between theory and practice by distinguishing between *nominal* claims to ethnic identity – i.e. the ethnic nationality an individual would select if explicitly asked to choose – and *experiential* ethnicity – i.e. when ethnic nationality becomes experientially relevant and salient in a particular context (2006:209-210). They maintained that when they made reference to ‘the Hungarians’ or ‘the Romanians’ – as they often did – they were talking about individuals’ nominal rather than their experiential ethnicity (Brubaker *et al.* 2006:12). They struggled, however, to persistently observe this dictum, sometimes writing as though individuals who nominally identify as Hungarian or Romanian might be expected to experience ethnicity in particular ways in given contexts, and thereby lapsing into treating Hungarians and Romanians, *pace* Brubaker, as ‘things *in* the world’ rather than ‘perspectives *on* the world’ (Brubaker 2004:17).

I do not attempt to realise Brubaker’s theoretically ambitious yet practically problematic call for scholars to abandon a ‘groupist’ language in their analyses. I do, however, concur with the argument that ethnicity is something one *does* rather than *possesses* (Brubaker *et al.* 2006:208). Ethnic and national identities are not just straightforward labels for referring to specific, clearly demarcated groups of people, but are also devices for interpreting experiences, categorising situations and behaviours, and justifying contemporary stances and arguments about the past (Brubaker *et al.* 2006:15, 224-231). Evidence for this can be found in some of the studies of Greek nationalism and national identity considered above (see review essay I). Discussing views of outsiders on Kalymnos, Sutton observed that perceptions of Americans, Europeans, and the residents of neighbouring islands were all deployed by Kalymnians in different ways, ‘as a foil for those parts of Kalymnian society people want to criticize’ (1998:47). So whilst neighbouring islanders provided Kalymnians with ‘an anatomy of how various foreign (European, Turkish, American) traits “look” when grafted onto a common Greek body’, Europeans represented ‘the “modernist” future’ that Kalymnians saw with some

ambivalence, and Americans stood in for the island's past, 'the good old days, when people were more straightforward' (Sutton 1998:47). Sutton found that he himself, despite being an American, was labelled 'European' by a neighbour based on the perception that he would require the facilities to wash every day. As he wrote:

This example highlights how "European" is not used in any literal sense, since she well knew that I was from the United States; I was only "European" in my desire to bathe frequently (Sutton 1998:37).

To borrow Brubaker's terms, Sutton's neighbour was well aware that the American anthropologist would not identify himself as a European in a *nominal* sense, but nevertheless categorised him as European in an *experiential* sense due to his (supposed) attitude towards hygiene.

Although identity labels are thus evidently closely connected to stereotypes about others, they cannot always be interpreted narrowly as intending to indicate membership of a particular group, but may rather be an attempt to ascribe or explain a particular genre of behaviour. As several scholars have observed, it is not uncommon for a Greek to conceptually identify their own behaviour or that of another Greek as 'Turkish' (Brown and Theodossopoulos 2004:8; Delivoria 2009:111; Herzfeld 1997:30; Kirtsoglou and Sistani 2003:190, 203-206; Sutton 1998:38), without them necessarily meaning to claim or ascribe Turkish *ethnicity*. This is the metaphorical and analogical 'Turk *within*' who 'serves to erect internal [...] boundaries within communities, villages, towns and the state in general' (Kirtsoglou and Sistani 2003:190) and can even act as a critique of the self (Brown and Theodossopoulos 2004:8). During our interview, Tasoula became agitated whilst describing the obstructive stance of the Greek government regarding work and residence permits for the expatriates, and apologised, exclaiming, 'I am becoming a Turk!' Tasoula was not claiming to be ethnically Turkish, but rather drawing on Greek stereotypes of Turkish fanaticism (on which, see below) to idiomatically characterise her own emotional state. Cowan has made comparable observations about the use of ethnic symbols in the central Macedonian town of Sohos. She noted that whilst the Sohoians 'vehemently reject the insinuation that they are anything but Greek', in ritual and everyday life 'they frequently communicate through and place especial value upon linguistic, gestural and celebratory forms which [they] themselves identify as "not Greek"; that is, forms that incorporate Turkish or "Bulgarian" linguistic elements or are *conceptually identified* as Turkish or

“Bulgarian” (Cowan 1997:153). Cowan stressed the disjuncture between the inflections of these labels and the ethnic groups they supposedly evoked:

Ironically, and importantly, what these purportedly “ethnic symbols” seemed *not* to mark was “ethnicity”! I encountered no evidence whatsoever that Sohoians wished to identify themselves as Macedonians (in a non-Greek sense) or Slavo-Macedonians or Bulgarians, nor any evidence that they considered their use of non-Greek forms as *constitutive*, or *evidence*, of one of these identities. Their deployment was not a means to a political end. Rather, they were viewed as intrinsically valuable, as part of the normal fabric of everyday interaction, and as a code for Sohoians to articulate (largely to each other) complex identities, relationships and historical experiences (1997:165).

As an intimate everyday ‘code’, ethnicity permits individuals to categorise and interpret the world around them, articulate their own sense of self and explain the behaviour of others, and make their experiences meaningful to themselves and intelligible to others. I develop these insights below by exploring the fluctuating and overlapping representations of Turks/Turkey and *Elladites*/Greece in expatriate discourse.

Good Turk, bad Turks

It is a commonplace to observe that national identity requires an ‘other’ in contrast to which it is defined (Danforth 1995:20; Eriksen 1995:427; Hall 1996:3-4; Hirschon 2009:83; Mackridge and Yannakakis 1997:2; Millas 2004:144; Spyrou 2002:258-259; Triandafyllidou 1998:594, 598-599). In Anna Triandafyllidou’s terms, nationalism is premised on the assumption that ‘[f]ellow nationals are not simply very close or close enough to one another, they are *closer* to one another than they are to outsiders’ (1998:599). In modern Greece, the ‘significant other’ (Triandafyllidou 1998:600) has commonly been the Turks; as Sypros Spyrou put it, ‘*there are Greeks because there are Turks*’ (2002:259).⁹¹ Negative stereotypes of this Turkish other have often been overwhelmingly prevalent in official, media, and popular representations (Kirtsoglou and Sistani 2003:194-195; Terzis 2004:174-175; Theodossopoulos 2004:29; Yerasimos 1988:40). Dimitris Theodossopoulos found that Greeks in the Peloponnesian town of Patras played ‘Greeks versus Turks’⁹² as children, with the weakest children taking on

⁹¹ Triandafyllidou argued that every nation has at a given moment in time one significant other, amongst any number of potentially significant others, whose apparently “threatening” presence influences national identity (1998:600). Accordingly, for instance, she identified that between 1991 and 1993 the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, rather than the Turks, was Greece’s significant other (Triandafyllidou 1998:604-605).

⁹² As well as ‘Greeks versus Germans’ (Theodossopoulos 2004:34), another ‘significant other’ at various points in Greek history.

the role of the Turks, and when asked what the word ‘Turk’ had meant to them in childhood, most of his informants ‘responded to this question with only one word: “fear”’ (2004:31, 34). Nevertheless, an alternative narrative of harmonious coexistence between Greeks and Turks does exist, emerging particularly in ‘private conversation or during nostalgic recollections’ (Theodossopoulos 2006:16).⁹³ Both Hirschon and Theodossopoulos have pointed to the lack of contemporary contact and shared experience between Greeks and Turks as central to the tenacity of mutually-held negative stereotypes (Hirschon 2009:83; Theodossopoulos 2004:30). Indeed, narratives of harmonious Greek-Turkish coexistence were common amongst Asia Minor refugees who had lived alongside Turkish people, in spite of their traumatic exodus from Turkey (Hirschon 2004b; Hirschon 2006; Hirschon 2009:85-86), whilst Greeks who meet Turks abroad frequently express ‘mutual amazement’ at shared cultural traits (Hirschon 2009:91) and develop more favourable and differentiated perceptions of Turkish people (Bacas 2003; Kirtsoglou and Sistani 2003:202; Theodossopoulos 2004:38).

Unlike most residents of the Greek state, the expatriated Greeks of Turkey did have lived experience of the Turkish other. The degree of interaction that members of the Greek minority had with their Turkish fellow countrymen varied based on a number of factors (age, gender, occupation, area of residence, *et cetera*; see chapter 2). Men, for instance, generally had greater opportunities to interact with Turks than women, whilst those who lived in Istanbul had greater contact than those who lived (or remained) on Imbros. Interviewees sometimes portrayed majority-minority interaction in Turkey as limited and impersonal – particularly stressing that romantic entanglements with Turks were vociferously discouraged by parents – and remembered threats, insults, and physical clashes between the two communities. Several *Polítes*, for example, talked about being showered with abuse or bombarded by stones thrown by Turkish children *en route* to school. As Alexandra recalled:

Unfortunately, every morning and every afternoon we lived with fear, because to get to school I had to pass through a Turkish neighbourhood, and the Turkish children – because we had to wear a uniform from school we stood out from

⁹³ Despite continued Greek-Turkish flashpoints at the diplomatic level – such as the Imia dispute over the ownership of two uninhabited islets in the Aegean Sea in 1996 (Pratt and Schofield 1996) – popular and political gestures of friendship and reconciliation are far from uncommon – as in the ‘earthquake diplomacy’ of 1999 (Ker-Lindsay 2000). James Ker-Lindsay has stressed that this rapprochement should not be seen purely as the direct result of the earthquakes that hit Greece and Turkey that year, but also as the product of pre-existing and more substantive diplomatic negotiations between the two countries, accelerated – but not created – by the natural disasters (2000:229).

them – they used to set up ambushes, and throw stones at us, shouting “the infidels are passing” (22/07/2011).

Accounts of intercommunal harmony were, however, also common in informants’ narratives. Many – particularly, though not exclusively, residents of the Princes’ Islands – were at pains to put across an impression of peaceable fraternity between the Armenian, Greek, Jewish, and Turkish communities, telling stories of interfaith mingling at important religious festivals, intercommunal support and protection during flashpoints such as the *Septemvriáná*, and close friendships that prevailed beyond the emigration of the Greeks. In the words of Andreas, a resident of *Chálki* until 1973, ‘we played together, we grew up together with the Turks. We didn’t have any problems, we were like brothers with the Turks’ (11/02/2012). A number of interviewees recalled heart-wrenching farewells or emotional reunions with Turkish friends: Tasos, choking back tears of his own, told me that when his father left Turkey his Turkish fellow stallholders in the market in which he worked cried ‘even though it was a competitor who was leaving’ (13/03/2014); whilst Andreas recalled that when he was reacquainted with a childhood Turkish friend on a return visit to *Chálki* he embraced him so tight that a pencil he had in his shirt pocket bruised his chest (11/02/2012).

Some informants presented either overwhelmingly positive or unreservedly negative portrayals of Turks and Greek-Turkish intercommunal relationships, reflecting an internal debate within the expatriate community between those derogatorily labelled as ‘Turk-lovers’ for their supposedly idyllic impressions of Turks, and those lambasted as ‘Hellenified’ due to their allegedly ‘uncritical’ absorption of native Greek anti-Turkish vilification (Örs 2006:84). Commonly, however, positive representations of Turks coexisted with negative generalisations in expatriate testimony (Halstead 2014b). As the Istanbul-born sociologist Millas has argued in relation to his own father’s discourse on Turks, it is too simplistic to dismiss such oscillation between positive and negative accounts as mindless contradiction (2006:47-48). Rather, for Millas, it reflected a tendency for narrators to ‘compartmentaliz[e] their perceptions of the Turks in parallel, but not overlapping, domains of experience’, such that stereotypes of the ‘undifferentiated Turk as the ethnic Other’ were kept separate from favourable impressions of ‘actual, concrete people who happened to be the Others’ (2006:48, 57).⁹⁴

⁹⁴ Millas noticed, for instance, that in Greek literature, ‘the Turks appear as negative personalities whenever they are portrayed as abstract characters and as potentially positive individuals when they are presented as concrete persons’ (2006:48); and likewise, whilst in the novels of Turkish writers Greek

In an exploration of Greek Cypriot children's perceptions of Turks, Spyrou correspondingly observed that whilst 'children often resorted to absolute, negative evaluations of the Turks' such that '[t]here are no different kinds of Turks but "a Turk" who is homogenous, undifferentiated and captures the essential nature of all Turks', when asked to elaborate on these impressions most stressed that 'there are both good and bad Turks', and often distinguished in this regard between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks (2002:260-261, 266). In Theodossopoulos' terms, this was a distinction between the particularised Turk – seen as human and similar to the self – and the generalised Turk – perceived as inhuman and hostile to the self (2006:9).

This tendency to differentiate between particular Turks and the generalised other was borne out in many of the testimonies I collected, including those of two of my younger, Greek-born Imbriot informants. Both recalled growing up with a somewhat negative impression of an abstract Turkish other. When, however, on later visits to Imbros with their parents, they encountered Turks as fellow human beings rather than as a 'faceless and nameless' mass, a 'particularization of the generalized Turk' took place (Theodossopoulos 2006:9-10). I asked Eva, who was born in Athens in 1991 to an Imbriot mother and a father from the Princes' Islands, if she remembered what impression she had of the Turks before she visited Imbros for the first time. She replied:

About the Turks generally, it is not that I have a negative opinion, but perhaps I do not have the most positive [opinion] that I could, as I would for another [ethnic group...] I don't see the people themselves negatively, but generally when I say, "that is a Turk" or "Turkey", I might see it slightly negatively. But with an individual personally who is a Turk I do not think I have a problem (Eva 13/08/2013).

Lia – also born in Athens in 1991 to an Imbriot mother – exhibited a comparable response:

Halstead: Growing up, do you remember what impression you had of the Turks?
Lia: Err. Yes [laughs]. Look, certainly it is not the same as "he is a Frenchman, German". I mean, I would say "ah, *the Turk*". I thought of him in a slightly derogatory manner [...] But I personally do not have a problem, because we are okay here, they have received us well, and because we are reconciled things are good (13/08/2013).

In the narratives of both Lia and Eva, a distinction was drawn between actual people who happened to be – nominally – Turks, and ‘the Turk’, an abstract and somewhat ill-defined figure who represented fear and evoked wariness.⁹⁵

First-generation, Turkish-born interviewees often accounted for their mixed experiences of intercommunal relationships, and the discrepancies in their representations of Turks, by drawing similar distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Turks. Some called attention to the attitudes of different groups within Turkish society, for instance contrasting educated or enlightened urban Turks with uneducated villagers or provincials, secularists and Kemalists with Islamists and fundamentalists, Westerners with Easterners or ‘Anatolians’, or moderates/left-wingers with right-wing nationalists.⁹⁶ Interestingly, however, many combined the figures of the ‘good Turk’ and the ‘bad Turk’ into the same individual, distinguishing between the positive behaviour of an individual *Turk* and the collective mob mentality of the same *Turks* together (Halstead 2014b:398-399). Menelaos was born in Istanbul in 1946, and left for Greece in 1989 after his son finished primary school. When I asked him how he would characterise his relationships with his Turkish acquaintances, he responded: ‘one person, one-on-one, is good. As a crowd, when the government stirs them up – [for instance,] a [Turkish] neighbour who knew that the *Septemvriáná* would happen, would not come to tell you, “look, be careful, leave the house tonight, go elsewhere”, nothing [like that]’ (Menelaos 06/02/2012). Tryfon, who was born on Imbros in 1929 and emigrated to Greece after 1964 when the situation on Imbros began to deteriorate, put it rather more bluntly: ‘one Turk is God, [but] if there are three, four together they provoke each other and become dogs’ (21/05/2013). This alleged duality was commonly attributed either to the Islamic faith or to nationalist fanaticism. Lefteris, who was born in Istanbul in 1960 and left for Greece at the age of eight, maintained that the Turks’ religion might cause them to go from friend to foe in an instant:

⁹⁵ Here, as below, my usage of the distinction between nominal and experiential ethnicity is slightly different from that of Brubaker and colleagues, as I am referring to the ascription of ethnicity to *others* rather than ethnic self-identification. In the slightly modified sense that I use it, a nominal ethnicity is a ‘general, context-independent’ characterisation that a narrator would ‘consistently and unambiguously’ ascribe if required to identify another’s ethnic identity, whereas an experiential ethnicity refers to the ‘context-specific’ ways in which ethnicity becomes salient for the narrator in explaining another’s behaviour (quotes from Brubaker *et al.* 2006:209-210).

⁹⁶ Such categorisations often seemed to be assumptions made on the basis of an individual’s behaviour, rather than deriving from concrete knowledge of that person’s provenance, belief systems, or educational levels.

I think it is their religion that causes the problem. You might be a friend of theirs, a very close friend, but due to religion there might come a moment when they kill you, if you say something about their religion. They won't wait to ask you, they might just kill you. We are talking about the uneducated types now, of course, not about the educated people (Lefteris 12/05/2013).

Aris – born on Imbros in 1941, and a resident of Greece since 1969 – spoke favourably of the Turkish character, but likewise claimed that they were easily stirred up by their government:

The Turks, the people, are good. Good? They are very patriotic. If the authorities say, “you will not bother anybody”, nobody will bother you. If they say, “on your feet, kill them”, they are on their feet. Such is their mentality. But if they are in the right frame of mind they are very good, honourable (23/05/2013).

Alexandra, who lived in Istanbul from her birth in 1947 until her emigration to Greece in 1971, similarly juxtaposed the qualities of an individual Turk to the mob mentality of multiple Turks:

The Turks are a people who are guided by their leaders. One-on-one, they are the best thing that God created. One-on-one. But more than two or three, they start to think like a crowd, and if given some direction from the state, they cease to be friendly people, and whatever the country says, that's what they must do. There's no such thing as friend, or mother, or brother. They are a people guided by the leaders, the individual does not have his own free will. Those who think differently are very few. Those who think logically and are cultured people, are perhaps 1 million out of 90 million, and they are easily lost. That's difficult for someone to understand if they haven't lived there, and don't know their manner of thinking and behaviour (22/07/2011; see also Halstead 2014b:410).

This supposed propensity for extremes of behaviour was often used to account for both positive and negative experiences of living alongside the Turks. In a written witness testimony to the *Septemvriáná*, Giorgos Gavriilidis thus wrote:

The Turk has a fanaticism within him, which he shows at bad and good moments. I remember, for example, female Turkish neighbours, helping my mother and embracing our family, our problems. I remember those same people showing the vandals the Greek houses, on that night [in 1955] (witness 43:169).

A stereotype of Turkish fanaticism was here used to account both for the lengths that the Turks will go to in order to lend assistance to their neighbours, and for their hostile behaviour at moments of intercommunal tension. It was, moreover, not uncommon for narrators to allege that the same Turkish individuals exhibited extremes of both honour and violence on the same night during the *Septemvriáná*. Writing about her memories of the 1955 riots, Maria Andreou Kanaki recalled that a group of rioters broke into her

family home, forcing the majority of the family to escape into a neighbouring house, leaving behind her bedridden elderly mother. She described how:

The vandals got into the bedroom where we had placed my mother, and when they saw her in that state, they said to her: “you lie down there mother, do not worry” and they began to break and destroy [the property] (witness 2:66).

This story was also related by Veniamin Kanakis, the grandson of the bedridden woman, who remembered that many of the rioters were acquaintances of his father:

We heard a noise. Immediately a window was smashed [...] As soon as my father heard the noise he ran outside. Half of those gathered there were known to him [...] They said to my father, “you leave, do not stay here, take your family and leave. Do not worry.” [...] The mob went into the house and devastated everything. They broke everything. Nothing remained standing [...] They did not touch my grandmother. “Mama do not worry” they said to her (09/03/2010).

In this example, whilst as a crowd the Turks were portrayed as acting violently, obeying their instructions to destroy Greek property, as individuals they were seen to show respect for the sick elderly woman, ensuring not to harm her and even attempting to reassure her. In a testimony published by the Greek newspaper *Kathimeriní* in 2015, Michalis Vasileiadis similarly alleged that on the night of 6 September 1955 his Turkish doorman, having first protected Michalis’ family – by standing outside the block of flats in which they lived waving a Turkish flag and telling the rioters that there were no Greeks living there – proceeded to join the rioters further down the road and participate in the looting of other Greek properties (Vasileiadis 2015:29-30). Michalis accounted for the doorman’s behaviour in the following terms:

Later I understood why he did it. It was the difference of identity: the unknown *Romiós* who he saw simply as a *Romiós* and I who was little Michalis, my mother Mrs. Katina who cooked and gave him food to eat, who sent him to shop [for her] and gave him a tip[,] and he felt an obligation towards us. The Turk as an individual is an exceptional person, and if you do him a kindness, he will not forget it for 40 years, as his proverb goes. His weakness is one: as a member of a crowd he is beastly (Vasileiadis 2015:30).

Alexandra – who was a young girl at the time of the *Septemvrianá* and was only saved from serious assault by the intervention of a Turkish friend of her father – made a comparable claim about the behaviour of her family’s Turkish neighbours in 1955:

Alexandra: A Turk has a pride, a love that you won’t find in a Hellene, or any other race. But once they become two, three, four, five, a crowd, they start to be dangerous.

Halstead: But some Hellenes were protected [during the *Septemvrianá*] by the Turks?

Alexandra: Our family was protected. '55 was organised from 1950. All the Turks promised to throw a stone at an infidel house. Our friend promised on the Qur'an to throw a stone. So, after protecting our family, he went to go and throw his rock [at another family] (fieldnotes 05/02/2012; see also Halstead 2014b:398-399).

Through the good Turk/bad Turks dichotomy, these narrators found a rationalisation for their life experiences. Stereotypes of Turks as proud, honour-bound, and obedient to authority served to explicate otherwise jarring memories: Turks as individuals – remembered from work, leisure, and the neighbourhood – were depicted as fanatically honourable; but the same people as a crowd – seen as implicated or complicit in attacks on the Greeks – were portrayed as liable to become fanatically violent if dishonoured. In this sense, being a 'good' or 'bad' Turk was not an immutable quality inherent to particular individuals, but rather was dependent on the context in which they were remembered (see also Halstead 2012:99-101; Halstead 2014b:398-399).

Nominal and experiential Turks

I have elsewhere observed that in Greek Cypriot oral testimonies whether a Turkish character was classified as a 'Turk' – and therefore 'bad' and hostile to 'us' – or a 'Turkish Cypriot' – and therefore potentially 'good' and similar to 'us' – sometimes reflected not the actual birthplace of the subject but rather the context of their narration (Halstead 2014b:398). Turkish Cypriots remembered in benign or friendly settings – as fellow villagers or drinking partners – were generally called 'Turkish Cypriots', whilst other Turkish Cypriots remembered in antagonistic settings – such as in verbal confrontations on the dividing 'green line' – were labelled as 'Turks' (Halstead 2014b:397-398). Spyrou has similarly noted that the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash – who stands out in Greek Cypriot children's narratives as an archetypal 'bad Turk' – was generally seen by the children not as a Turkish Cypriot but as a Turk: '[f]or the children', he wrote, 'it makes much more sense to label Denktash as a Turk rather than a Turkish Cypriot because, unlike other Turkish Cypriots, he is seen as evil, similar in that sense to the Turkish occupiers' (2002:266). In Brubaker's terms, individuals who would *nominally* be identified as Turkish Cypriots – that is, if the narrator was directly asked to identify their ethnicity – were classified as Turks in an *experiential* sense – that

is, insofar as their reputed ethnicity became salient in categorising or explaining their behaviour.

I develop this view of ethnicity as an ‘interpretive prism’ (Brubaker *et al.* 2006:15) by exploring the ethnic identities imputed to others in narratives of intercommunal violence and protection during the *Septemvrianá*, drawing on the testimonial compilation *Septemvrianá 1955: the ‘Kristallnacht’ of the Hellenism of Constantinople*, published by Ekdóseis Tsoukátou (1999; see chapter 1). Witness testimonies typically identified the perpetrators interchangeably as ‘Turks’, ‘rioters’, ‘vandals’, or ‘barbarians’, creating a casual equation between members of the mob and the Turkish population generally. One witness, for instance, described the riots as ‘those events during which groups of *crowds Turks fanatics Muslims* destroyed whatever they came across that was Hellenic in Constantinople’ (witness 41:165, my emphasis), thereby equating Turkishness and the Islamic faith with fanaticism and a mob mentality. Rarely was there any serious attempt to discern the composition of the mob, apart from vague (and derogatory) references to ‘Anatolians’, and absent was the suggestion, sometimes found in expatriate discourse, that many of the rioters were Kurds (see chapter 6). Every member of the mob was ‘Turkish’ and, indeed, in several of the testimonies the actions of the rioters were portrayed as *characteristically* ‘Turkish’. One witness wrote that the Turks ‘wild instinct awoke, that afternoon of 6/9/1955’ (witness 22:117), whilst another avowed that, ‘it is well-known that one can only expect such atrocities from the Turks’ (witness 32:145). Two contributors quoted celebrated foreign writers in an effort to substantiate such claims:

[...] I remembered the philhellene V. Hugo, who wrote in one of his poems:

The Turks passed by here,
everything is in ruins,
plunged into mourning.

Yes, sirs, that is what happened on that ill-omened night (witness 21:115).

[...] and then I took the big decision to leave, expatriated, and live elsewhere in another country, wherever in the world, leaving the holy earth where my forefathers lived and which was now trampled upon and contaminated by barbarians, “the blight of Asia”, as George Horton calls them [...] (witness 28:138).

Spyrou observed that for Greek Cypriot children the stereotypical ‘bad Turk’ was ‘a minimised category which includes only those Turks they perceive as being “bad”’, with the result that ‘the national category itself (i.e. Turks) becomes a label for the

negative [aspects] of the “other”, not a label for the nation as a whole’ (2002:269). In other words, whilst all Turks might be *nominally* Turkish in the eyes of the children in the sense that, if pressed, they would identify them as Turkish rather than Greek, it was only in the context of perceived negative behaviour that others became *experientially* Turkish; i.e. that their Turkishness came to *matter*. Likewise, in the above examples, the ethnicity of the antagonists was significant for the narrators insofar as it explained their actions: the actual composition of the rioters and what their motivations might have been for engaging in acts of violence was disregarded in favour of the simpler answer that they did what they did because they were Turkish. It was, in a way, less the *people* who were Turkish and more the *behaviour*.

What, then, of nominal Turks who did *not* behave ‘Turkishly’? As I mentioned in chapter 2, oral accounts of the *Septemvrianá* frequently featured stories of Muslim neighbours, co-workers, and friends warning or protecting members of the Greek community. The testimonies in the *Ekdóseis Tsoukátou* compilation were no exception, and at least 19 of the 50 accounts contained some reference to intercommunal assistance.⁹⁷ In many of these accounts, the authors stressed that their saviours were Turks; in the words of one witness: ‘the neighbours were Turks. We should not forget that the good people were good people and they have a conscience’ (witness 4:75). Some narrators, however, seemed to struggle to reconcile the violence of the mob with the assistance afforded by individual Muslims. Indeed, in 7 of the 19 intercommunal assistance stories, the protagonist was either explicitly presented as not ethnically Turkish or had their Turkish ethnicity ‘qualified’ in some way by the narrator. Of these, four stories featured Kurds. Petros Tsoukatos wrote that his apartment ‘was saved, because our doorkeeper – a Kurd from Van [in eastern Turkey] – Memetis, as we called him, a very good young man of 25-30 years, protected the block of flats where our relatives were staying’ (witness 37:158). Another, anonymous witness was likewise keen to stress that their saviour was Kurdish:

At that moment, our doorkeeper Sadik came to ask us if we had a Turkish flag. However, as all of the tenants were Hellenes, we did not have a flag. In the meantime, they [the rioters] had arrived and were breaking the outer door. Sadik, however, put his body in the way, holding with his two hands the frames

⁹⁷ My reading of these testimonies is that at least 19 – and as many as 23, depending on how you interpret some of the stories – contained references to protection and/or warnings provided by members of the Muslim community to members of the Greek minority (although these sometimes appeared alongside negative stereotypes of the Turks).

of the door and shouting that everyone was away, that only his family was inside and that he would presently hang out a flag [...] And so we were saved. Of course, our doorkeeper was a Kurd and the owner of our block of flats rewarded him the following day (witness 18:107-108).

The house of Konstantinos Katsaros was similarly protected by the doorkeeper. In contrast to the two examples above, Konstantinos seemed unsure of the ethnicity of this doorkeeper, but nevertheless speculated that he might be of Kurdish extraction:

When we returned to Constantinople, our house [...] had been saved, because our doorkeeper Mr. Ömer, perhaps of Kurdish descent, prevented the barbarians from destroying it (witness 35:151).

Simeon Vafeiadis, meanwhile, explained that his shop was saved by a man who was commonly thought to be a Kurd but was, in fact, descended from Armenians:

Our shop did not suffer great damage once again thanks to a Turkish neighbour, an accountant, who as soon as he heard about the events got in touch with a stevedore, Hasan, and told him to run immediately to save our shop. He along with another Kurd stood in front of the shop and did not allow the rioters to destroy it. Thus it was saved with only minor damages. Everybody knew Hasan as a Kurd. In reality, however, he was of Armenian descent. In 1916, during the slaughters [i.e. the Armenian genocide], as a young child, he fetched up with a Turkish family (witness 1:61).

Simeon also described how the neighbourhood in which he lived was saved from damage by a man named Ali Riza, twice stressing that he was a Turk from Crete (presumably a refugee from the 1923 exchange):

Our neighbourhood passed without damage, thanks to a neighbour and friend, Ali Riza [...] Ali Riza was a Turk from Crete and, as we learned later, he stood at the crossroads of our neighbourhood on the central road and did not allow the rioters to pass. Thus, thanks to that Turkish Cretan, the Hellenic houses of our neighbourhood were saved from the catastrophe (witness 1:58).

Despoina Isaakidou similarly specified that the family living opposite her own that provided them with shelter in the middle of the riots was Turkish Cretan (witness 33:147). Another anonymous witness, meanwhile, told the story of a neighbour who protected the women and children of the neighbourhood, and took care to point out that her mother was rumoured to be Greek:

Mrs Chatzer, who had links with all of the Hellenic families there – they said that her mother was a Hellene – took almost all of the young mothers of the village with their children into her house and they stayed the night there (witness 11:90).

Finally, in the testimony of Apostolis Nikolaidis – reconstructed by Leonidas Koumakis and excerpted from his book *The Miracle* (see chapter 6, below) – it was emphasised that the wife of the Turkish Pontic neighbour who offered Apostolis’ family shelter was a crypto-Christian, who ‘went to church every Sunday morning, lit a candle and left without saying a word’ (witness 50:188).

In each of these cases, the narrators placed special emphasis on the peculiar identity of their rescuers, seemingly so as to explain their ‘motive’ for intervening on behalf of the Greeks, or rather to offer an explanation as to why they did not behave ‘Turkishly’ like the ‘Turkish’ mob. It is, of course, quite possible that the protagonists of these stories genuinely were Kurdish (or Turkish Cretan or half Greek or crypto-Christian), even though it is clear in some of these cases that the narrators were drawing on speculation or hearsay rather than detailed personal knowledge of the individuals concerned (as in the case of Mr. Ömer who was ‘possibly of Kurdish descent’). Each of these individuals may indeed have had special motivation to intervene on behalf of the Greeks – the half Greek and the crypto-Christian out of commonality, the Kurds and the crypto-Armenian out of solidarity, and the Turkish Cretans due to memories of living in Greece – although all could also have had special reason not to get involved. What is significant, however, is that these subtle discriminations of origin or family history appeared only in the context of describing such acts of protection. These narrators felt it necessary to qualify the ethnicity of their saviours in this particular narrative context, even though it is likely that these same individuals would be identified as Turks in other contexts. Their imputed ethnicity became experientially relevant insofar as it accounted for their exceptional behaviour: they were not complicit in the general violence of ‘the Turks’ because they were not ‘really Turkish’, or at least more than ‘simply Turkish’. From this perspective, the ascription of a particular ethnic identity to others can be seen as a means to simplify and interpret experience, explaining behaviour both ‘expected’ and ‘unexpected’.

Privileged knowledge (1): the ‘bad Turks’

Alekos, who was born in Istanbul in 1971 but grew up in Athens, observed that the Greeks of Istanbul habitually play devil’s advocate in discussions relating to Turkey and the Turks:

[W]hen Constantinopolitans are amongst one another, they tend to say, “ah, we got on so well in Constantinople, how good things were over there!” But when they speak with *Elladites*, they tell a different story. They talk about their complaints both there where they felt discriminated against and they lived every day in fear, but also their complaints about Greece [... And if] the conversation happens to turn to Turkey, or Greek-Turkish relationships, they take the Turkish side [...] And afterwards the native people here, quite correctly, say, “okay, if things were so good there and they treated you better there and the state was better there, why did you come over here?” And then they reply, “because they did not allow us to speak, we were afraid that our children might engage in mixed marriages and become Turkified, we did not know what would befall us the next day, blah blah blah” [...] The repression that we had there as a minority and the repression that we feel here because everything is in a state of chaos become confused and agitate us (28/05/2013).

As Alekos identified, fluctuations between positive and negative representations of the Turkish other in expatriate discourse reflected not only mixed experiences of intercommunal relationships in Turkey, but also the ambivalent position of the expatriate community in regard to Greece, and their attempts to convey both sets of experiences in different social and narrative situations. In Spyrou’s terms, stereotypes ‘are not immutable attributions’ but rather ‘discursive strategies that take place within specific conversational contexts’ (2002:267). For the expatriated Greeks of Turkey, representations of the ‘good Turk’ served to critique perceived defects in the native Greek character, and thereby to express the expatriates’ sense of disillusionment with Greek society (see below). Stereotypes of the ‘bad Turks’, meanwhile, were, in particular, strategically expedient in the context of justifying the expatriates’ presence in Greece and bolstering appeals for support from the Greek state.

In line with Alekos’ observations, interviewees commonly substantiated their decision to emigrate by juxtaposing a sense of fear and repression in Turkey with one of freedom and security in Greece. As Alexandra put it:

When you leave a place where you feel enslaved, afraid to speak, to live as you want, it’s very difficult. The first years were a little bit difficult, difficult economic conditions. Afterwards, slowly slowly, things got a bit better, and I can say that in 40 years of living in Greece – if you exclude a few unpleasant events – for the most part I thank God that I am in Greece and that I am free. I’m not afraid to wear what I want, to wear my cross, to speak Greek (22/07/2011).

More specifically, narratives of suffering in Turkey provided the expatriates with a means to respond to representatives of the Greek state who urged them to return to Turkey in the national interest. Tasoula, for example, who left Istanbul as a child with

her family in 1964, recalled that her family's response to such suggestions was to invite the officials to try living in Turkey themselves:

We had to go every month to get residence permits. Imagine! And some of those people [the officials in the Aliens' Bureau] said to us, "return home [to Turkey]". And our response was, "we've already eaten the cucumbers there. You, who is complaining to us, go there for a month and eat the Turkish cucumber yourself!" (27/11/2011).

Expatriate writers often had recourse to similar dichotomies. In the newspaper *O Polítis*, stereotypes of Turkey as warmongering and untrustworthy – contrasted to the allegedly civilised and peaceable tendencies of Greece – functioned firstly as a discursive strategy for critiquing Turkish foreign policy towards the Greeks of Turkey and Greece itself. In August 1976, for instance, the newspaper characterised Greece as a 'freedom-loving country *par excellence*' and admonished Turkey for conducting 'an undeclared war against Hellenism' in Istanbul, Imbros, Tenedos, and Cyprus (*O Polítis* August 1976), whilst in a March 1987 piece it asked whether it was possible for a peace-loving country like Greece to work cooperatively with a warmongering one like Turkey (*O Polítis* March 1987). Secondly, however, representations of Turkish aggression could also sustain a critique of Greek policy. *O Polítis*, for instance, commonly prefaced complaints directed at the Greek state with accounts of the persecution the expatriates faced in Turkey, as in a January 1979 article in which the newspaper railed against Greek policy towards expatriates with Turkish citizenship in the following terms:

Amongst the most serious problems faced here by the Constantinopolitans of Turkish citizenship, *omogeneís* [i.e. of Greek descent], those who were *de facto* forced, i.e. by every kind of unbearable Turkish pressure, occasioned by the Cyprus issue, to leave their homes, is, aside from their pensions, the problem of free residence and work, which remains unsolved.

Those *omogeneís* who went to Canada, Sweden or other liberal countries, acquired the citizenship of the country they chose for their new *patrída* [...]

Those, however, who settled in their own *patrída*, in Greece, suffer from myriad hardships [...] and the *omogéneia* of Constantinople, following the successive wounds that it received, without opposition from its natural protector, arrived in its current state, and now those responsible work in vain and the only thing they succeed in doing, unwittingly, is to fill the cash register of the Turkish Embassy with thousands of drachma that it robs from the *omogeneís* with Turkish citizenship [...]

And the *Romioí* [...] are driven like sheep to the slaughter to the Turkish Embassy to pay their poll tax,⁹⁸ so unnecessary because all of them are NOT going to return to the Turkish paradise (*O Polítis* January 1979).

In like manner, *Imvros* often contextualised its complaints towards the Greek state by first reminding its readers of the community's suffering at the hands of the national other, for example writing in 1977 that the *Imvriótes* were treated as aliens in Greece despite being 'victims of Turkish chauvinism' (*Imvros* August-September 1977), or in 1992 that Imbros was a casualty 'not only of Turkish beastliness, but also of non-existent Greek policies' (*Imvros* November-December 1992). In the aftermath of Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, the newspaper likewise paralleled the experiences of the *Imvriótes* with those of the Cypriots (see also chapter 5) in order to provide context for a protest about Greece's reluctance to issue visas to the Greeks of Turkey:

When, thoroughly fed up and resentful from the barbarities of the Turk (that have now become famous in the Panhellenic world, due to Cyprus, although we tasted them long before), the *Imvriótes* asked for visas from the Embassy so as to come here [Greece], to save themselves from the endless torment and anguish, the officials turned them away in the worst way or teased them with the "come tomorrow" and "come the day after tomorrow", so that the people in the end would become weary and abandon their effort (*Imvriakí Ichó* July-August 1974a).

In 1993, meanwhile, *Imvros* reprinted a letter from the Imbriot Society to the Undersecretary for Hellenism Abroad in the Greek government, objecting in similar terms to the charge applied by the Aliens' Bureau to those expatriates with Turkish citizenship for the renewal of their work and residence permits. The authors of this appeal asked the Undersecretary to put himself in their shoes:

Can you imagine, Mr. Undersecretary, the pain of our compatriots who suffered untold hardships at the hands of Turkish ferocity and vulgarity, who lived through the humiliations, the derisions, the degradations, the beatings, the rapes, the murders, the plunder of their houses, the confiscation of their properties, only because they were born Hellenes, because they wanted to call themselves Hellenes, to feel like Hellenes and act as Hellenes[?]

Those same people, Mr. Undersecretary, are called upon at the Aliens' Bureau to prove that they are Hellenes with the confirmation of the Hellenic Embassy in Constantinople! Those people who, if it were possible to examine them ethnically, would have written on their chromosomes only Greece and Hellenic.

⁹⁸ I.e. the sum required for the renewal of their Turkish citizenship. The use of the term 'poll tax' or 'head tax' in this extract is probably intended to evoke the yearly tax or *jizya* levied on non-Muslims by the Ottoman Empire.

From those people the Aliens' Bureau demands and levies 11,000 drachma to allow them to remain in their Mother *Patrída* (residence permits) and another 11,000 drachma in order to allow them to work (work permits) (*Imvros* March-April 1993b).

In these examples, negative stereotypes of Turkish chauvinism were evoked in order to constitute the expatriates as national martyrs deserving of support and compassion from the Greek authorities: because they suffered as Hellenes in Turkey, it was suggested, they should be treated as Hellenes in Greece.

Several expatriates felt that this first-hand experience of the Turkish other placed them in a unique position to advise the Greek government, and the wider Western community, on their diplomatic dealings with the Republic of Turkey. In a June 1976 article, for instance, *O Polítis* complained about alleged Turkish duplicity in the following terms:

Unfortunately we are obliged to observe it first, having painful experience of Turkish tactics, and to declare it with historical proof to all of the Christian world, the Islamic, everywhere, that the Turks live in their own world, with their political arsenal the lie, plunder, [and] treachery (*O Polítis* June 1976).

This was an argument that was often advanced by the Constantinopolitan Society, as part of their efforts to influence Greek and European policy towards Turkey. In 1998, for example, the Society prefaced an invitation to a Greek political party to attend a memorial ceremony to mark the anniversary of the Fall of Constantinople (see chapter 5) with the following remarks:

As is well known the work of the Society, apart from socio-cultural, is also national. The executive committee and the various committees that assist with its manifold works [...] are sensitised to the issues related to Greek-Turkish relationships, [and] have a *first-hand experience of the Turkish way of thinking and acting* and therefore advance thoughts and perceptions to International Organisations [...] always in conjunction with the relevant political and diplomatic organs of the State [...] (Constantinopolitan Society 1998; my emphasis).

Paris, who was himself born in Greece in the early 1950s to a father from Istanbul, and was a prominent member of the Constantinopolitan Society, similarly argued that the *Polítes* were,

the only ones out of the Hellenes who live here [in Greece] who know in substance the character and behaviour of the Turks, something that doesn't show often, because when you meet a Turk, be he a simple person or in some state

capacity – diplomat, politician – you might think he is cosmopolitan, but in a given moment you understand that he has a guile that you cannot always immediately comprehend if you haven't lived through the behaviour of the Turks (01/02/2012).

Nikolaos – born in Istanbul in 1939 and a resident of Greece since 1964 – likewise maintained that the Constantinopolitan Society was founded by,

people who had lived through both the *Septemvrianá* and the expulsions, and know the mentality of the Turk. The Hellenic authorities here still don't know [...] As we were told by our parents, you cannot make a friend of the Turk, because they will catch you unawares. Turkish diplomacy sees many years ahead. Now it does not need to wage a war to defeat Greece, [it achieves it] with money and words. So, we know that they work from below, slowly slowly [...] They dig, dig from below. Here, the Hellenes, the Hellenic authorities, don't know that. That was the aim [of the Constantinopolitan Society], to be able to explain it to the Hellenic government so that they can understand (30/01/2012).

Claiming a privileged knowledge of the Turkish other as first-hand witnesses, these narrators mobilised stereotypes of the 'bad Turks' to lend credence to their efforts to influence Greek foreign policy towards Turkey, and to present their community and its commemorative endeavours as an invaluable asset to the Greek state.

In the above examples, representations of the Turkish other as warmongering and treacherous were juxtaposed to stereotypes of the Greeks as peace-loving and honest. As Brown and Theodossopoulos have emphasised, however, '[s]tereotypes about ethnic neighbours can sustain a critique of the Self as much as the Other' (2004:8). Indeed, negative stereotypes of the Turks could sometimes be turned on the Greek state and its inhabitants. Testifying as a witness to the *Septemvrianá*, Iro Athinaioy made the following aside:

I would like to insert a parenthesis here. The Turks regard the [Turkish] flag like a talisman, they worship it like a God. Not like us here, where we do not see it – unfortunately – not even at our biggest celebrations – 25.3 [Greek Independence Day], 28.10 [Óhi Day] – when the country should be submerged in the colour blue (witness 22:118).

In this case, a stereotype of the 'bad Turks' as fanatic nationalists was deployed to critique a perceived *lack* of patriotism in Greece. Michalis similarly utilised a stereotype of Turkish religious fanaticism in order to critique the discipline of the Greek Armed Forces:

The Turkish soldier is illiterate. He does not have technical knowledge. If he is on his own, what can he do? But because of religion, he will do whatever the officer tells him. Without offering any resistance, without having any opinion of his own. To compare with the Hellenic army, the Hellenic soldier, even if he is on his own, will manage, he will find solutions to problems [... but] there is not that obedience, because the soldier believes that he is equal with the officer, and that is not good in the military (29/01/2012).

The same stereotype of blind obedience to religious authority and lack of individual free will that was commonly used to account for the behaviour of the mob during the *Septemvrianá* here served to raise questions of the normally cherished Greek values of defiance to authority and disregard for hierarchy. In this sense, attributes of the other that were typically presented as undesirable could nonetheless function as critical viewpoints on the idealised virtues of the self.

Privileged knowledge (2): the ‘good Turk’

If the expatriated Greeks of Turkey thus commonly validated stereotypical Greek representations of the ‘bad Turks’ by citing lived experiences of persecution in Turkey, they also challenged them through their first-hand accounts of the ‘good Turk’ whose character was often portrayed as superior to that of the native Greeks. As I have documented above (see chapters 2-3), many expatriates were profoundly disappointed with the reception they received in Greece, and reported significant social and cultural differences between themselves and the native Greek community. Those who had resided in Istanbul, in particular, perceived a contrast with the Greek cities of Athens and Thessaloniki in terms of modernity, urbanism, and cosmopolitanism, whilst informants from both Istanbul and Imbros commonly characterised the Greeks of Greece as impolite, lazy, and corrupt. Expatriate stereotypes of the ‘good Turk’ were frequently grafted onto these criticisms of the ‘*Elladítes*’, functioning – to borrow terms from Sutton – as a foil for critiquing Greek society (1998:47).

A widespread complaint amongst my interviewees was that the native Greeks were rude, unchivalrous, and disrespectful in their day-to-day interactions, and comparisons were often made in this regard to the manners of the Turks. In a joint interview, Fotini and Rita – born in Istanbul in 1943 and 1948 respectively, and residents of Greece since the 1970s – were vocal on this point:

Fotini: One thing I didn't like when I came here [to Greece]: they spoke to me in the singular. I raised my children to speak to strangers in the plural. I go to a shop, and I address the young girl of twenty [the shop assistant] in the plural. And she turns to me and speaks to me in the singular, and it upsets me greatly. Here there was not the respect towards older people that there was in Constantinople. I mean, I get on the bus, if there was someone old on the bus, our mother would say to us, "get up, get up". Whereas here the mother sits down with the child, and the old lady is left standing.

Rita: I'm still in the habit of doing it, and one time I got up on the bus and I said [to an older woman], "sit down, grandma". And she said to me, "who are you calling grandma?" There is no respect here.

Fotini: The Turks, even today, the young people will address the elder people in the plural [...] The Turks, when they see an older person, they go to kiss their hand. And we too, we kissed their hand (Fotini 21/11/2011; Rita 21/11/2011).

Dimitris, who was born on *Chálki* in 1956 and moved to Greece in 1975, was likewise disappointed by the behaviour of the native Greeks:

The Hellenes were always very different compared to us. I still hold onto that mentality. For example, I do not like to swear. Here swearing is their bread-and-butter. They didn't have the same mentality that we had. I mean, a young man on the bus, would not get up for an old woman. Whilst in Turkey they still do that. If you go to someone's house, first you have to kiss their hand. Now maybe that is not a very good thing, but it does show respect (30/11/2011).

Anastasia, who was born in Istanbul in 1939 and came to live in Greece in 1970, voiced similar complaints about the unchivalrous behaviour of her native Greek concierge:

I knew Greece very well. However, I experienced difficulties in the beginning. Small things that were different. One thing, a small thing to which I had become accustomed from my doorman in Constantinople, was that he would help you with your shopping. When I came here, this is in 1970, I had a doorman in my block of flats, and I went shopping with my trolley, and [when I returned] there were stairs for me to get to the lift. And he was sitting there, watching me, he didn't even get up to help. That, for me, was something foreign. Come on now, he sees a woman struggling with her shopping, and he doesn't help? (05/02/2012).

As I noted above, it was not uncommon for such positive accounts of the Turkish character to commingle with negative representations. Lefteris recounted a story in which he was looked after by two Turkish neighbours having badly injured his foot as a child in Istanbul. He concluded this anecdote as follows:

I want to tell you that as people they [the Turks] have a totally different character from the Hellenes. They are much better than us in terms of character. I mean, if you are in the streets and you go and ask somebody for directions, he will take you where you want to go, he will drop whatever he's doing and take you there, in order to look after you. Here in Greece, you won't find that. Or

another thing. When you are on the bus. You get onto the bus, right, you are pregnant, you're very big, right? Here, the young people will run to take the seat before you can get there. In Turkey, the young person will get up so that you can sit. Here they will run to sit down before you. They have a very different mentality as compared to us. They will help you. But: Allah. He might just kill you as well (Lefteris 12/05/2013).

Many expatriates were also exercised by a perceived lack of respect for the church and the Orthodox Christian faith in Greece (on which, see Halstead 2012:42-43). During our interview, Spyros – the octogenarian from Istanbul encountered alongside Tasoula in the previous chapter enumerating on the cultural differences between the expatriates and the native Greeks – embarked upon a theatrical condemnation of native Greek piety by drawing comparisons with the way that Muslims in Turkey behaved in Christian places of worship (this despite having earlier characterised the Turks as fanatically Islamic):

There [in Istanbul] we had respect for the church. Here I saw people going into the church with their hands in their pockets [at this point Spyros stood up, and imitated a native Greek attending church, walking around with his hands in his pockets, shoulders hunched, looking bored and distracted]. The Turks, when they go into the church, take off their hats. Kurds, who come in to see what the liturgy is like, he will take off his hat, sit down and watch (02/12/2011).

Another common grievance, particularly amongst male informants, was that the native Greeks were lazy and dishonest in their work, looking for ways to shirk their responsibilities or to cut corners, and frequently depending upon clientelism (see Halstead 2012:150-157; Halstead 2014a:277-279). This, too, was a favourite topic for Spyros, who contrasted the idleness of Greek workers to the thirst for knowledge demonstrated by the Turks who used to work in his shop in Istanbul:

The Turks, and their children, will say to you, “I don't know, I don't know, how do I do that?” Here in Greece, if you say, “I'll tell you something”, [the native Greek says] “I know, I know”. That's how we withered away. “I know, I know, I know” [...] The Turk will say, “I don't know”. All of the Turks, who came from inner Anatolia to work in our shops, said, “I don't know, how do I do that boss?” And they don't pay attention to what time they will knock off, like here [in Greece] with unionism and such (02/12/2011; see also Halstead 2012:159).

Ilias – the elderly *Imvriótis* who defaced his Greek identity card (see chapter 3) – railed against corruption in the workplace in Greece by similarly drawing a comparison with a Turkish sense of honour derived from their Islamic faith:

The Muslim is afraid of injustice, because of the *haram*⁹⁹ [...] In Turkey, if you were to give the doctor a little envelope [i.e. a bribe]¹⁰⁰ as they do here, he would say no [...] If you treat the Turk to a coffee, he will remember it for 40 years. The Turk will not take money from you. Because he is afraid of the *haram*. Here? Don't ask. We have already said many things about how Greece has become spoilt (21/05/2013).

Several interviewees were also vexed by the political culture of Greece, which they felt tended unnecessarily towards partisanship, disunity, and anarchy. Istanbul-born *Imvriótis* Loukas, for example, spoke critically of political demonstrations in Greece, making contrasts with the (then ongoing) 2013 Gezi Park Protests in Istanbul:

Whenever they have those protests here [in Greece], they break and loot everything. And they are not all agents of the deep state, as the left-wingers allege. It is the culture here, I would say. There is a culture of anarchy, a culture of destruction. A self-destructive mania. And they like to leave rubbish behind them and leave. With all of those things that have been happening in Constantinople in recent days, there has been a very strong community of demonstrators who remain there, after all of these days, to collect the rubbish, to clean up the place, they clean up the place before they leave. That shows a good manner of behaviour [...] And when you try and say that here in Greece, they are bemused, they do not understand what you are saying. They think you are conservative, they will say that you are narrowminded (08/05/2013).

Just as stereotypes of the 'bad Turks' could be used to constitute the expatriate community as the latest martyrs to Greece's quintessential other, so representations of the 'good Turk' functioned as a critical mirror directed at the inhabitants of the Greek state, permitting the expatriates to distinguish themselves from the '*Elladítes*' by drawing attention to virtues purportedly shared by the Turks and the Greeks of Turkey but lacking amongst the Greeks of Greece.

Conclusions

Ethnic stereotypes, as Brown and Theodossopoulos observed, have often been interpreted as 'products of a form of false consciousness', unselfconsciously reproduced by individuals who 'lack the critical capacity to see beyond rumour, hearsay, propaganda and pseudo-science' (2004:3). People, from this perspective, are passive sponges for a monolithic nationalist rhetoric that governs their interpretations and overrides their own experiences. The evidence presented in this chapter, however,

⁹⁹ Sinful actions prohibited by Allah.

¹⁰⁰ For a discussion of the 'little envelope' and other Greek terms relating to corruption and bribery, see Atlantis Host (2015).

suggests that people ‘continuously make choices on when and how to talk about “others”’ (Brown and Theodossopoulos 2004:8); that, in other words, how and why the nominal ethnicity of others becomes experientially relevant varies in different discursive contexts. Ethnic stereotypes, like ethnic identities, rarely have fixed or unambiguous referents (Theodossopoulos 2003:178; Kirtsoglou and Sistani 2003:207-208), even though their continued usage might contribute to the perpetuation of ‘groupist’ understandings of social organisation (Brubaker 2004:16). The expatriated Greeks of Turkey claimed a privileged knowledge of the Turkish other acquired through lived experience, which they mobilised both to validate Greek nationalist stereotypes of the ‘bad Turks’ who are perpetually hostile towards the ‘civilised Greeks’, and to challenge these representations through their own stereotypes of the ‘good Turk’ whose sense of honour and duty stood in sharp contrast to the crudeness and idleness of the native Greeks. These stereotypes were not typically static or immutable categorisations of particular individuals, but rather functioned as malleable and contingent devices for explicating the behaviour of others, interpreting lived experiences, and plotting one’s own place in the world. Stereotypes, as Spyrou put it, ‘have depth, even if their depth is still to some extent stereotypical’ (2002:269).

If ethnic stereotypes are durable and difficult for individuals to shed, it is, therefore, not so much because people are unwitting dupes of nationalist rhetoric, but rather because ethnicity is one of the principal lenses through which their experiences are rendered intelligible. Theodossopoulos reported that his Greek informants from Patras were often keen to critically appraise their unfavourable portrayals of the Turkish other – typically blaming the education they received in school – but as they ‘have no other patterns of historical causality to rely upon except those to which they have been exposed at school’ their efforts ‘rely heavily on the very sources they aspire to criticize’, making it difficult for them ‘to evade the conventional nationalism they would like to defy’ (2004:30-31, 42). In Theodossopoulos’ terms, stereotypes represent ‘convenient guides to the behaviours expected from members of other ethnic groups’, reflecting ‘a strong desire to reach an explanation, an exegesis for events that involve other people’ (2003:178-179). They provide, in other words, straightforward explanations for complex experiences (Spyrou 2002:267). The diverse range of behaviour exhibited by Muslim friends and neighbours during the *Septemvrianá*, for instance, could be accounted for through stereotypes of the Turks as fanatically proud and honour-bound. The violence of the mob, on the one hand, was portrayed as a characteristically

‘Turkish’ response to a perceived threat to the Turkish nation: ethnicity provided an easy explanation as to why otherwise close acquaintances turned on the Greeks in 1955 and became complicit in mob violence. Those who went to sometimes dangerous lengths to protect the Greeks, on the other hand, were commonly either seen to be conforming to the stereotypical Turkish impulse to honour and respect those close to them, or were characterised as not (entirely) ethnically Turkish. In both cases, perceptions of others’ ethnicity served as an explanatory framework for experiences that were otherwise hard to process. These easy answers, however, ‘also nourish our fears and prejudices, and divert our attention from evidence that might lead towards contradictory conclusions’ (Theodossopoulos 2003:179). Explanations of intercommunal violence and solidarity based on ethnicity, for example, typically excused narrators from seeking more complex interpretations of mob violence, and impeded them from developing more differentiated impressions of ‘the Turks’ generally.

Expatriate representations of the Turkish other, nonetheless, had at least as much to do with negotiating their place in the Greek state as with rationalising their experiences in Turkey. By presenting themselves as victims of Turkish chauvinism, juxtaposed to the civilised and democratic values of Greece, the expatriates sutured themselves into Greek nationalist history, thereby challenging the apparent indifference of the Greek state towards the community and its problems in Greece. If it is thus correct to say that the national self is defined in relation to a significant other, it does not necessarily follow that the latter’s defects serve solely to highlight the former’s virtues. In the figure of the honourable and industrious ‘good Turk’, the expatriates found a potent and provocative discursive weapon with which to spotlight perceived deficiencies within Greek society, namely the alleged rudeness, discourteousness, and laziness of its members. Even stereotypical Turkish attributes otherwise presented as unfavourable could in certain contexts foster a reappraisal of idealised Greek values. The same sense of duty and deference to authority often used to account for a Turkish propensity towards mob violence, for instance, could also draw attention to a supposed lack of responsibility and respect in Greece deriving from the normally treasured Greek love of individual liberty and democratic equality. In this guise, the other became a critical mirror for the national self, opening up opportunities for contrast that not only defined its unique attributes but also made conspicuous its flaws.

* * *

In part I, I have argued that ethnicity and national history were domains of active and varied use, negotiation, and contestation in the narratives of the expatriated Greeks of Turkey. By asserting the particularity of their own local relationship to both the national past and the national other, the expatriates sought to establish their authenticity as members of the Greek national community whilst simultaneously maintaining a sense of their distinctiveness vis-à-vis other Greeks. They were not narrowly confined or stifled by national identity, which offered them significant leeway to express heterogeneity, differentiation, and even dissent, although they were often somewhat reliant upon it as an explanatory framework for their life experiences.¹⁰¹ In part II, I turn my attention to the commemorative activities of the expatriated community. I take a broad definition of commemoration, encompassing the ways in which particular events from the past are brought to mind in formal anniversary ceremonies, institutional activism and publication, and individual narrative. In the first half of this thesis, I focused on evaluating the relationship between the local and the national. Part II adds a third dimension to this discussion, by exploring not only the connections between expatriate commemorations and Greek national history, but also how these relate to broader transnational histories associated with global human rights discourse. Accordingly, I begin below with a survey of the recent ‘transcultural turn’ in memory studies.

¹⁰¹ It is, perhaps, unsurprising that a community whose experiences have been defined so much by Greek and Turkish nationalism should have recourse to a frame of reference based around Greek and Turkish ethnicity: to borrow terms from Michael Schudson, it was not so much that my interviewees chose the Greek-Turkish frame, but rather that ‘[i]t chose them. It imposed itself’ (1997:13).

Part III: National and transcultural histories

Review essay II

Everyday multidirectional memory

[T]here is no universal memory. Every collective memory requires the support of a group delimited in space and time (Halbwachs 1980:84).

In this frequently cited extract from his posthumous volume *The Collective Memory*, the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs – a pioneer of the notion that memory is socially determined – envisaged a direct correlation between the vitality of a given collective memory and the persistence of a particular group. For Halbwachs, the contours of individual memory are always determined by that person's shifting relationships to different groups, such that even 'our most personal feelings and thoughts originate in definite social milieus and circumstances' (1980:33). Accordingly, the ease with which an individual can access a particular memory is dependent on their degree of contact with the relevant group (Halbwachs 1980:30, 47), and, ultimately, a collective memory fades away when the group sustaining it ceases to be (Halbwachs 1980:78, 80). Each collective memory thus has a shelf life, 'not exceeding, and most often much shorter than, the average duration of a human life' (Halbwachs 1980:86). Halbwachs' notion that every collective memory depends upon the active support of a particular and coherent group has underpinned much subsequent thought in the area of memory studies (Confino 1997:1392; Craps and Rothberg 2011:517); as Barbara Misztal stated in her 2003 survey of the field, Halbwachs' 'assertion that every group develops a memory of its own past that highlights its unique identity is still *the starting point for all research in the field*' (Misztal 2003:51, my emphasis).

In recent years, however, successive scholars have challenged Halbwachs' taken-for-granted connection between particular groups and particular collective memories (Crownshaw 2011:1; Erll 2011a:2; Rothberg 2010:7; Silverman 2013:176), criticising him for attaching a 'framedness' to memory connoting 'boundaries and a certain stability' (Erll 2011b:10; see also Rothberg and Yildiz 2011:43), and commenting on the unsuitability of his approach for a world marked by globalisation, mass media, and demographic mobility (Huysen 2003:17; Huysen 2011:615; Landsberg 2004:8). In particular, these interventions – which we might loosely group together as studies of 'transcultural memory' (Crownshaw 2011:2) – have attacked the supposition that there is a close link between a given collective memory and a national or ethnic group, a perspective that has typically been associated primarily with the French historian Pierre

Nora and, to a lesser extent, the German Egyptologist Jan Assmann, both of whom followed Halbwachs in, ‘plac[ing] collective identity front and centre’ (Erll 2011c:109).¹⁰²

Nora edited an exhaustive series dedicated to documenting sites of French national memory under the title *Les Lieux de Mémoire*. In his introductory essay, he drew a distinction between ‘real memory’ and history, the latter representing ‘how our hopelessly forgetful modern societies, propelled by change, organise the past’ (1989:8). The absence of real memory in the modern world, Nora argued, led to the consecration of ‘*lieux de mémoire*’ or ‘sites of memory’: archives, monuments, memorials, museums, and even historians that replaced an erstwhile natural and lived memory (1989:8); ‘[t]here are *lieux de mémoire*’, he declared, ‘because there are no longer *milieux de mémoire*, real environments of memory’ (1989:7). It is not, however, the particularities of this argument that have been contested by proponents of a transcultural approach, so much as Nora’s decision to explore sites of memory within the specific framework of the ‘memory-nation’, which in his case meant focusing on a French national memory. Nora has thus been taken to task for ‘bind[ing] memory, ethnicity, territory, and the nation-state together’ (Erll 2011b:7), ignoring the memories of minorities and migrants, and disregarding cultural exchange within Europe and with the French colonies (Craps and Rothberg 2011:517; Erll 2010:310; Erll 2011a:4; Erll 2011b:7; Erll 2011c:25; Graves and Rechniewski 2010:3; Huyssen 2003:97; Huyssen 2011:615; Rothberg 2010:7; Sundholm 2011:1). In the wake of Nora’s study, a plethora of scholars set about documenting sites of memory in other national contexts, thereby entrenching – it is commonly alleged – the assumed connection between collective memory and the nation-state (Erll 2010:310; Erll 2011c:25).

If Nora’s study presupposed an association between collective memory and the nation-state, Assmann similarly envisaged a correspondence between memory and cultural communities. Assmann sought to reformulate Halbwachs’ distinction between memory and history, and consequently Halbwachs’ suggestion that the former has a ‘limited temporal horizon’, by drawing attention to the ‘concretion of identity’ that takes place in ‘objectivized culture’ (1995:127-128; all Assmann’s words). He distinguished between

¹⁰² Halbwachs himself was more interested in smaller-scale mnemonic communities, writing that ‘the nation is too remote from the individual for him to consider the history of his country as anything else than a very large framework with which his own history makes contact at only a few points’ (1980:77).

‘communicative memory’, which is ‘based exclusively on everyday communications’ (Assmann 1995:126), and ‘cultural memory’, the comparatively fixed and stable aspects of memory that are ‘maintained through cultural formation (texts, rites, monuments) and institutional communication (recitation, practice, observance)’ (Assmann 1995:129). For Assmann, what Halbwachs had described as ‘collective memory’ was a facet of communicative memory, and failed to take into account the more lasting cultural memory. Nevertheless, in common with both Halbwachs and Nora, Assmann viewed memory as inextricably linked to group identity, writing that cultural memory ‘comprises that body of reusable texts, images, and rituals *specific to each society in each epoch*, whose “cultivation” serves to stabilise and convey that society’s self-image’ (Assmann 1995:132, my emphasis). This stance – which, like that of Nora, has been hugely influential for subsequent scholars – has earned Assmann criticism during the recent ‘transcultural turn’ in memory studies. Under the influence of these two scholars, in Astrid Erll’s words, ““culture” became slowly but persistently reified’, such that the analytical focus within the field, ‘shifted from the dynamics of *memory in culture* to the specific *memories of* (allegedly stable and clearly demarcated) *cultures*’ (2011b:6).

Students of transcultural memory share a desire to break away from this ‘methodological nationalism’ (Erll 2011a:2; Levy and Sznajder 2006:103), and to explore the ‘expanded field’ (Huyssen 2003:97) in which memories cross or transcend national boundaries. To trace, in Erll’s words, ‘the incessant wandering of carriers, media, contents, forms, and practices of memory, their continual “travels” and ongoing transformations through time and space, across social, linguistic and political borders’ (2011b:11). These interventions have come from a variety of disciplines, but have been driven in particular by studies of Holocaust memory and mediated memory (Craps and Rothberg 2011:517; Erll 2011b:9).

Holocaust memory

Since the 1990s, increasing interest has been shown in the transnational proliferation of Holocaust memory. Besides survivors and their families, as Arlene Stein noted, ‘other groups also tell Holocaust stories’ (1998:519). Significant cultures of Holocaust commemoration have developed both in Germany, the context of perpetration, and in

the United States, the country whose soldiers liberated many of the Nazi camps.¹⁰³ As Hilene Flanzbaum observed, '[m]ost Americans seem so well acquainted with at least some version of the Holocaust that they freely invoke it in metaphor, and often with an inflammatory casualness' (1999a:96-97). Indeed, language and imagery derived from Holocaust memory have entered into diverse national, regional, and local vernaculars, leading many scholars to speak of the 'globalisation of Holocaust discourse' (Huysen 2000:23). From this perspective, the Holocaust could be seen as a contemporary 'moral touchstone' (Kushner 2001; Levy and Sznajder 2002:93), a 'foundational past', in Confino's terms, 'that represents an age because it embodies a historical novum that serves as a moral and historical yardstick' (2012:5; see also Confino 2005:54). No longer narrowly or specifically evoking a memory of Nazi genocide, the Holocaust 'begins to function as metaphor for other traumatic histories and memories' (Huysen 2003:14), or as a 'paradigm or template through which other genocides and historical traumas are very often perceived and presented' (Assmann 2007:14; see also Levy and Sznajder 2004:156).

Scholars have documented the reapplication of Holocaust discourse in a vast range of geographical, situational, and discursive contexts. Interpretive analogies have repeatedly been drawn, for instance, between the Nazi Holocaust and European colonialism (Alexander 2009:52; Confino 2012:29; Hansen 1996:311; Rosenfeld 1999:46; Rothberg 2008:224-225; Rothberg 2009a). During and after the Algerian War of Independence, various groups drew parallels with the Holocaust and with the Nazi occupation of France, particularly in order to criticise the French colonial authorities (Cohen 2001:85-87; Confino 2012:29; House 2010:20-21, 26-27, 37; Prost 1999:171-172; Rothberg 2009a:196-266; Rothberg 2009b:130), but also to attack the Algerian National Liberation Front (Cohen 2001:85), and, on one occasion in 1987, to defend a Nazi facing trial by equating his crimes to those of the colonial French (Silverman 2013:18). The Holocaust was equally a common trope by which journalists, politicians, activists, and citizens alike framed conflict and genocide in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, and in Rwanda in 1994 (Alexander 2009:53; Assmann 2010:111; Flanzbaum 1999a:97; Levy and Sznajder 2002:98-99; Huysen 2003:13, 23, 73; Stratton 2000:241). Whilst the Holocaust has frequently been deployed by Israeli politicians and journalists, for instance in the claims of right-wingers that Israel faces a 'second Holocaust' at the

¹⁰³ Dan Diners has characterised memory of the Holocaust as the unwritten constitution of Germany (cited in Giesen 2009:117).

hands of its Arab neighbours (Moses 2011:96; Rothberg 2011:535), it has also been turned against the Israeli state, both by Palestinians and their supporters who compare the Palestinians to Jewish Holocaust victims and the Israeli authorities to Nazis (Alexander 2009:49; Levy and Sznajder 2006:24; Rothberg 2011:532), and by Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories protesting against a lack of governmental support or efforts to dismantle illegal settlements (Katz and Katz 2009:164; Rothberg 2011:535). Holocaust memory has also been invoked in discussions about nuclear weapons (Alexander 2009:52-53; Minear 1995:354-357; Petrie 2000:52), political violence in South America (Huysen 2003:99; Jelin 2010:74; Molden 2010:80), abortion, women's rights, and gay rights (Assmann 2010:111; Rosenfeld 1995:n.p.; Stein 1998:523-533), race relations in the United States (Flanzbaum 1999b:96-97), Japanese atrocity in China during the Second World War (Levy and Sznajder 2006:5), post-war German expellees from Eastern Europe (Confino 2005:54-55), the Turkish minority in Germany (Huysen 2011:622), the Great Famine in Ireland (Owen 2014:365-366), universal human rights (Alexander 2009:56; Levy and Sznajder 2004; Levy and Sznajder 2006:5), neoliberal capitalism (Saxton 2010:209), and environmental disaster (Rosenfeld 1995:n.p.).

The 'Americanisation' and 'globalisation' of Holocaust discourse have had both their critics and their defenders. On the one hand, some scholars have deplored the metaphorical application of Holocaust memory to other contexts, arguing that it relativised or diluted the suffering of Holocaust victims (see examples in Petrie 2000:50; Rosenfeld 1999:34). Others have interpreted such appropriation as intrinsically uncritical and self-involved. Alvin Rosenfeld, for instance, wrote scathingly that the tendency for Holocaust memory to be 'dragged emblematically into contemporary American debates' was symptomatic of 'an age marked by narcissistic indulgences of a relentless sort', and argued that it was impossible for representations of Nazi crimes to simultaneously 'remain faithful to the specific features of those events and at the same time address contemporary American social and political agendas in all their multiplicity' (1995:n.p.). James Young, in his discussion of the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington DC, similarly lamented that American commemoration of the Holocaust had become a kind of 'national self-congratulatory spectacle', acting to 'reinforce America's self-idealization as haven of the world's oppressed', and even constituting 'a substitute for real action against contemporary genocide' (1999:73, 82). At the same time, scholars have pointed to the possibility that Holocaust memory might act as a screen memory obscuring other histories of violence

and genocide (Craps and Rothberg 2011:518; Hansen 1996:311; Huyssen 2003:14, 16, 99). Accordingly, for instance, it has been suggested that the status of the Holocaust in America as ‘the benchmark of oppression and atrocity’ (Novick 1999:14) has initiated an ‘implicit competition’ (Young 1999:81) or ‘struggle for precedence’ (Assmann 2007:20) between different persecuted communities within American society, and therefore risks not only trivialising other atrocities, but also facilitating or encouraging the evasion of responsibility for American crimes against, for instance, African Americans and Native Americans (see also Stannard 1992).

Yet scholars have also drawn attention to the ways in which Holocaust memory might facilitate and contribute to the articulation of other, lesser-known atrocities, operating, in Huyssen’s words, ‘like a motor energizing the discourses of memory elsewhere’ (2003:99; see also Craps and Rothberg 2011:518; House 2010:24, 31; Landsberg 2004:115; Levy and Sznajder 2006:5; Rothberg 2009a:6, 9, 196; Rothberg 2011:523-524). Gavriel Rosenfeld, for example, responding to David Stannard’s (1992) allegation that American indifference towards the plight of the Native Americans was a result of American preoccupation with the Holocaust, observed that American awareness about the genocide of the Native Americans ‘was hardly more widespread *before* the Holocaust’, and that in fact ‘a growing sense of shame for this dishonourable legacy, and horror of genocide in general, has been advanced, not inhibited, by our growing attention and sensitivity to the Nazi slaughter of European Jewry’ (Rosenfeld 1999:44). Daniel Levy and Natan Sznajder, similarly, answered critics of *Schindler’s List* (on whom, see Hansen 1996) by arguing that as a result of the film ‘a large public was increasingly sensitised to the evils of genocide and the moral responsibility not to stand by and witness the murder of innocent civilians’ (Levy and Sznajder 2002:98). Indeed, for Levy, Sznajder, and fellow sociologist Jeffrey Alexander (to whom I turn next), it was the universal or general moral implications of the globalisation of Holocaust memory that were in particular worthy of scholarly attention.

In an influential essay first published in 2002, Alexander attempted to trace the historical evolution of Holocaust memory from the occurrence of the genocide to the contemporary era, focusing particularly on Holocaust commemoration in the United States. He argued that in the aftermath of the Second World War the Nazi atrocities, whilst ‘clearly perceived as dreadful’ for the victims, were generally understood within the wider framework of an especially brutal conflict, and within a triumphant narrative

of American victory over Nazi evil, and were not singled out for special attention by the American public (Alexander 2009:3, 19-20). This changed, however, in the mid-1960s and 1970s. Under the influence of literary and media representations, the televised Eichmann trial, and the consolidation of the label 'the Holocaust', the Nazi genocide of the Jews came to be seen not simply as typifying Nazi atrocity, but rather as representing evil generally (Alexander 2009:28, 30-31, 38-43). What was 'once experienced as traumatic only by Jewish victims' became a 'trauma for all humankind', and individuals and groups began to invoke the Holocaust in order to 'measure the evil of a non-Holocaust event' or to 'parse ongoing events as good and evil' (Alexander 2009:31, 36, 50, 59). In this way, according to Alexander, the Holocaust became 'free-floating rather than situated', creating a 'universalized symbol whose very existence has created historically unprecedented opportunities for ethnic, racial, and religious justice' (2009:3).

In their analysis of the trajectories of Holocaust remembrance in the United States, Israel, and Germany, Levy and Sznajder similarly argued that the Holocaust was on its way to becoming a 'cosmopolitan memory' (2006:4). They rejected the common assumption that 'memories, community, and geographical proximity belong together', and derided the suggestion that nations are the sole or principal repository of memory as a 'breathtakingly unhistorical assertion' (Levy and Sznajder 2002:89; Levy and Sznajder 2006:2). They claimed that in an increasingly globalised world the 'container of the nation-state [...] is in the process of slowly being cracked', and that accordingly the Holocaust 'has been dislocated from space and time, resulting in its inscription into other acts of injustice and other traumatic national memories across the globe' (Levy and Sznajder 2006:2, 5). Like Alexander, Levy and Sznajder placed emphasis upon the generalised moral potential of this dislocated Holocaust memory, arguing that it 'harbours the possibility of transcending ethnic and national boundaries' and of becoming 'the cultural foundation for global human-rights politics' (Levy and Sznajder 2006:4). They boldly proclaimed, for example, that '[i]t does not take a huge leap to go from identifying with Schindler to taking the ensuing role of liberating Kosovo' (Levy and Sznajder 2006:141). They also made it clear, however, that they were not envisaging a universal memory that would hold the same meaning in every local context

(Levy and Sznajder 2006:8),¹⁰⁴ and, to a greater extent than Alexander, stressed that global Holocaust memory must be ‘reconciled with old national narratives’ such that ‘the result is always distinctive’ (Levy and Sznajder 2006:3).

Notions of the Holocaust’s universality or cosmopolitan moral potential have been widely critiqued. Several scholars have expressed wariness at the notion that Holocaust memory has become dislocated or free-floating, objecting, in Huyssen’s terms, that ‘discourses of lived memory will remain tied primarily to specific communities and territories’ (2011:616; see also Assmann 2010:108; Assmann and Conrad 2010:8; Katz and Katz 2009:157; Manne 2009:144).¹⁰⁵ Equally, many commentators have questioned the predominantly optimistic accounts offered by Alexander, Levy, and Sznajder by drawing attention to contrary examples in which the circulation of Holocaust memory promotes antagonism rather than solidarity, as in the case of the Israel-Palestine conflict where it ‘locks Palestinians and Israelis in a fatal embrace’ (Moses 2011:103; see also Assmann 2010:107, 114; Erlil 2011b:15; Jay 2009:108; Manne 2009:142; Rothberg 2009a:263-265).¹⁰⁶ As Robert Manne put it, ‘Israel is a society divided between a minority for whom the lesson of the Holocaust is the same as Alexander’s – “It will never happen again” – and the majority for whom the lesson is, rather, “It will never happen to us again”’ (Manne 2009:142). Critics have also pointed to the Eurocentric or Western-centric assumptions underpinning universality theories, in the sense that ‘because they are generally better remembered, the atrocities of Europe are perceived as morally more significant than atrocities elsewhere’ (Craps and Rothberg 2011:518; see also Assmann 2010:108; Assmann and Conrad 2010:8).

Indeed, a number of writers have emphasised that the Holocaust and Holocaust discourse should not be studied in isolation, but rather should be considered as part of a broader matrix of racial nation-building and genocide (Huyssen 2011:622; Moses

¹⁰⁴ For instance, during the conflict in Kosovo, the slogan ‘never again Auschwitz’ provided a frame of reference for radically different and opposed stances within German society, deployed by local actors to call both for German intervention and German non-intervention (Levy and Sznajder 2002:99).

¹⁰⁵ For Assmann, memory of the Holocaust is rooted in the cultural context of the West, which ‘corroborates Halbwachs’ view that collective memory is by definition particular and limited, because it is based on experience and cannot be stretched beyond certain bounds to become all-inclusive’ (2010:108).

¹⁰⁶ A. Dirk Moses stridently wrote that, ‘[i]nstead of tending only in a liberal direction of transcultural understanding’, Holocaust memory in the Israel-Palestine conflict typically ‘contributes towards terroristic political action in the form of pre-emptive strikes and anticipatory self-defence to forestall feared destruction’ (2011:91). So, for instance, right-wing Israeli rhetoric that Israel faces a ‘second Holocaust’ at the hands of Iran carries the ‘obvious danger’ that ‘no limits can be set on action to prevent such a catastrophe from happening again’ (Moses 2011:96).

2002:18, 28, 33-36; Stone 2004:128-135). Literary scholar Michael Rothberg has recently made an influential contribution to this thesis, by exploring the construction and evolution of Holocaust memory in the context of decolonisation. Rothberg took as his starting point a claim made by African-American activist Khalid Muhammad that American commemoration of the Holocaust displaces and steals commemorative space from an atrocity much closer to home, namely the 'black holocaust' of slavery (2009a:1-2). He identified this position as symptomatic of the prevalent model for understanding the operation of memory in society, what he called 'competitive memory'. According to his analysis, it has long been taken for granted that in advancing one's own identity and memory, it is necessary to exclude others and suppress their memories (Rothberg 2009a:3-5). It is, therefore, typically assumed that particular memories attached to particular groups are locked in a 'zero-sum struggle', competing over 'scarce' mnemonic space in a contest with clear 'winners and losers' (Rothberg 2009a:3). From the perspective of competitive memory, memories of the Holocaust and other traumas 'crowd each other out': either 'too much emphasis on the Holocaust is said to marginalize other traumas' or 'adoption of Holocaust rhetoric to speak of those traumas is said to relativize or even deny the Holocaust's uniqueness' (Rothberg 2011:523).

Against this competitive model, Rothberg argued for a 'multidirectional' understanding of memory. He rejected the notion that memory is 'ethnic property' (Rothberg and Yildiz 2011:36) and challenged 'the taken-for-granted link between collective memory and group identity' (Rothberg 2011:524).¹⁰⁷ According to Rothberg, memories are no more the exclusive property of particular groups than those groups are the unwitting drones of those memories: 'memories are not owned by groups – nor are groups "owned" by memories' (2009a:5). On the contrary, the borders of memory and identity are 'jagged', and different memories interact within a 'malleable discursive space' where they do not simply compete but are 'subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing', which can take place even across antagonistic social boundaries (Rothberg 2009a:3, 5). Memory is thus 'productive' not 'privative' (Rothberg 2006:307): rather than competitively blocking one another from view, interacting memories of, for instance, the Holocaust, slavery, and decolonisation have

¹⁰⁷ Rothberg criticised, for instance, 'the taken-for-granted link [...] that seems to bind, for example, Jewish memory and Jewish identity and to differentiate them clearly from African American memory and African American identity' (2011:524).

contributed to each other's articulation (Rothberg 2009a:6). In common with Alexander, Levy, and Sznajder, Rothberg was at pains to emphasise the progressive moral potential of multidirectional memory. Although he conceded that memory's multidirectionality might function 'in the interests of violence or exclusion' (Rothberg 2009a:12), he repeatedly stressed that, 'solidarity [...] is a frequent – if not guaranteed – outcome of the remembrance of suffering' (Rothberg 2010:11), and that multidirectional memory's 'productive, intercultural dynamic' has the potential to create 'new forms of solidarity' (Rothberg 2009a:5).

Rothberg distinguished his approach, however, by indicating that memory is not a 'one-way street' (2009a:6). He took these earlier scholars to task for 'overlooking Holocaust memory's dialogic interactions' with other histories, and argued that the concept of the Holocaust's particularity and universality was in the first place produced by the ways in which it was evoked in emerging discourses surrounding slavery and decolonisation (Rothberg 2009a:118-119, 265). In this sense, for Rothberg, the Holocaust was not a 'floating, universal signifier', but rather 'part of a multidirectional network of diverse histories of extreme violence, torture, and racist policy' (2009a:244). At the same time, Rothberg disassociated memory's spatial mobility from the narrow association with globalisation and mass media implied by Alexander and, particularly, Levy and Sznajder. He wrote that whilst 'there can be no doubt that the dynamic of decolonization, transnational capital, and globalized media in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have accelerated the flow of materials of memory across borders of all kinds' (Rothberg 2010:9), memory is nonetheless 'structurally multidirectional', and the intersection of diverse histories in both individual and collective remembrance is timeless and inescapable (Rothberg 2009a:35, 313). Rothberg thus introduced a critical intervention to the literature by challenging the tendency to study Holocaust memory 'solely from the perspective of supposedly autonomous changes in the Holocaust's meanings' (2009a:265), and by uncoupling transcultural memory from the particularities of the post-modern, globalised world.

Mediated memory

As Erll has remarked, 'research on mediated memory can boast a comparatively long record of thinking about how media disseminate versions of the past across time, space, and mnemonic communities' (2011b:9), even though here, too, the Holocaust has often

been the central object of study. Since the early 1990s, Marianne Hirsch has been refining a theory of ‘postmemory’ as a means of describing ‘the relationship that the “generation after” [the Holocaust] bears to the personal, collective, and cultural trauma of those who came before – to experiences they “remember” only by means of the stories, images, and behaviors among which they grew up’ (2012:5). Although these experiences are not, in a literal sense, memories, they were nonetheless ‘transmitted to them [i.e. the generation after] so deeply and affectively as to *seem* to constitute memories in their own right’ (Hirsch 2012:5, 31). Hirsch distinguished two types of postmemory: the vertical ‘familial’ postmemory that is passed generationally from parent to child, and the horizontal ‘affiliative’ postmemory that is conveyed contemporaneously between unrelated members of the same generation (2012:36). In this sense, Hirsch challenged a central tenant of Halbwachs’ theory of collective memory, by suggesting that it was possible ‘to *reactivate* and *re-embod*y more distant political and cultural memorial structures’, such that a postmemory might ‘persist even after all participants and even their familial descendants are gone’ (2012:33; cf. Kansteiner 2014:404).

The notion of an affiliative postmemory that might be taken up by individuals with little or no experiential or familial connection with an original event has been pursued by Alison Landsberg. Landsberg developed a theory of ‘prosthetic memory’ to refer to the phenomenon by which an individual ‘sutures himself or herself into a larger history’ through interaction with mass media at ‘an experiential site such as a movie theater or museum’ (2004:2). Prosthetic memories are ‘privately felt public memories’ in that they ‘derive from a person’s mass-mediated experience of a traumatic event of the past’ (Landsberg 2004:19). A person acquiring a prosthetic memory, moreover, ‘does not simply apprehend a historical narrative but takes on a more personal, deeply felt memory of past events through which he or she did not live’ (Landsberg 2004:2). Directly challenging the relevance of Halbwachs’ model in a global world, Landsberg argued that prosthetic memories ‘differ from earlier forms of memory’ insofar as ‘they do not emerge as the result of living and being raised in particular social frameworks’ (2004:3, 19). For her, under the influence of globalisation and mass media, ‘memories have ceased to belong exclusively to a particular group and instead have become part of a common public domain’, with the result that people can experience as genuine memories ‘that are not naturally – ethnically, racially, or biologically – one’s intended inheritance’ (Landsberg 2004:11, 26). Landsberg readily acknowledged that prosthetic

memories are ‘commodified’ due to their ‘interchangeability and exchangeability’, but also stressed that they ‘are not capsules of meaning that spectators swallow wholesale but are the grounds on which social memories are negotiated’, and can have real effects on individuals’ subjectivities and actions (2004:20-21). Although she conceded that prosthetic memories do ‘not always produce utopian results’, she emphasised that because they ‘feel real, they help condition how a person thinks about the world and might be instrumental in articulating an ethical relation to the other’ (2004:21-22).¹⁰⁸

Andrew Hoskins has similarly argued that globalisation, mass media, and digitisation have replaced ‘old memory’ with a ‘new memory’ that is increasingly ‘manufactured, manipulated and above all, mediated’ (2001:334). In contradistinction to Landsberg, however, Hoskins’ focus was not on Holocaust memory, but on the effects on individual and collective memory of visual mass media (Hoskins 2001) and, later, mobile and Internet communication (Hoskins 2009; Hoskins 2011a; Hoskins 2011b). He theorised a ‘connective turn’, arguing that ‘contemporary remembering’ is driven by the ways in which individuals connect with (and through) a shifting array of digital media, such that every act of remembrance in the present emerges from existing media representations (Hoskins 2009:94; Hoskins 2011a:271-272, 278; Hoskins 2011b:20-21).¹⁰⁹ For Hoskins, the new connective memory is always mediated and, therefore, ‘always already “transcultural”’, insofar as it defies the ‘biological, social and cultural divisions and distinctions of memory and memory studies’ (2011b:21). Whether this applies only to the ‘new mediatized age of memory’ (Hoskins 2009:96), however, or is simply the most dramatic incarnation of an older phenomenon, is a matter of debate (Erll 2011c:132; Erll and Rigney 2009:7). As Erll has written, ‘there is no such thing as a pure, pre-media memory’ (2011c:132), and therefore, with Ann Rigney, ‘no historical document (from St Paul’s letters to the live footage of 9/11) and certainly no memorial monument (from the Vietnam Veteran’s Wall to the Berlin Holocaust Memorial) is thinkable without earlier acts of mediation’ (Erll and Rigney 2009:4).

In this sense, according to Erll, we are ‘dealing not only with a fundamental media-dependence of remembering’, which may be more or less marked in different historical

¹⁰⁸ In this sense, Landsberg echoed Levy and Sznajder’s argument that ‘there is a fallacy in thinking that impersonal representations are somehow fake and not connected to our real emotions and real identities’ (Levy and Sznajder 2002:90).

¹⁰⁹ Hoskins in fact referred to Landsberg’s prosthetic memory as a ‘pre-connective turn perspective on memory’, meaning that her theory ‘barely touches upon the radical networking and diffusion of memory ushered in with the advent of digital technologies’ (Hoskins 2011b:23).

periods, ‘but also with the fact that “the medium is the memory” in that it shapes our acts of remembering in ways of which we are often not even aware’ (2011c:116). This happens in two principal ways: ‘remediation’, or the ways in which “[o]ld” mnemonic forms can [...] be used to make sense of “new” and different experience’, and ‘premediation’, or how ‘existent media circulating in a given context provide schemata for future experience – its anticipation, representation and remembrance’ (Erll 2011b:14; Erll 2011c:142). Significantly, these processes of mediation commonly take place ‘across the boundaries of time, space, and culture’ (Erll 2009:131). Erll examined, for instance, how Indian novels dealing with the 1857 Indian Rebellion extensively remediated contemporary British newspaper accounts filled with ‘wild fantasies of rape and mutilation’, accounts which were themselves premediated by the literary genre of Gothic horror and mediaeval/Renaissance imaginings of hell, i.e. by medial schemata with which the British journalists were familiar (2009:114, 121-124). Seen from this perspective, memory of a particular moment from the past ‘usually refers not so much to what one might cautiously call the “original” or the “actual” events, but instead to a palimpsestic structure of existent media representations’ (Erll 2011c:141). Accordingly, in Erll’s terms, ‘all *lieux de mémoire* (and not only those “belonging” to two different nations) are “shared sites of memory”’: they are shared by different social classes, political camps, generations, religious groups and regional cultures [...] and not least by different media cultures’ (2009:131).

This notion of memory as a palimpsest has more recently been taken up by Max Silverman, a scholar of Francophone film and literature. In common with Rothberg, Silverman was concerned with exploring the interconnectedness of supposedly distinct memories, focusing in particular on the mnemonic relationship between the Holocaust and decolonisation. Silverman argued that ‘memory does not function according to the linear trajectory of a particular ethno-cultural group and lead inexorably to the distinction (and often competition) between different groups’, but rather ‘according to a complex process of interconnection, interaction, substitution and displacement of memory traces’ (2013:28). Describing memory as ‘palimpsestic’, he called for a ‘paradigm of hybrid and overlapping rather than separate pasts’, which would not just identify the coexistence of, or comparison between, different histories, but would also recognise that ‘the historical and physical base of cultural memory is a genuinely composite affair’ (Silverman 2013:18, 179). Silverman shared Rothberg’s conviction that uncovering the ‘interconnecting traces of different voices, sites and times’ might

form the basis for ‘new solidarities across the lines of race and nation’, and, in contradistinction to Hoskins and Landsberg, emphasised that memory ‘has always been deterritorialized in the sense of being a hybrid rather than pure category’ (Silverman 2013:8). For Silverman, it is a fallacy to presume that ‘memory loses its attachment to a particular identity [only] once it moves into the global sphere’ (2011:627), an assumption that rests on the ‘singularity, autonomy, specificity and authenticity of the memory in the first place’ (2013:176).

Everyday multidirectional memory

To summarise, just as explorations of the transcultural circulation of Holocaust memory have helped to undermine the connection between collective memory and group identity, by demonstrating the mobility of a legacy previously assumed to ‘belong’ to a particular group and in a particular place, studies of mediated memory have destabilised the link between direct and indirect experience, and between originality and authenticity (Silverman 2013:176). If there is thus a broad consensus amongst the scholars discussed here on the flaws of earlier approaches, there are nevertheless several unresolved questions emerging from their discussions, which I attempt to address in the following chapters. To begin with, is the transcultural circulation of certain memories a phenomenon peculiar to a globalised or post-national world? Where Alexander, Hoskins, Landsberg, and Levy and Sznajder saw memory as loosed from its traditional moorings by the radical upheavals of globalisation, digitisation, and mass media, Erll, Rothberg, and Silverman challenged the idea that memory was ever firmly ‘territorialised’ to begin with, opening up the possibility, to rephrase Rothberg, that memory is *structurally transcultural* (Rothberg 2009a:35). In Erll’s terms:

What current discourses [...] tend to overlook [...] is that transcultural remembering has a long genealogy. It is actually since ancient times that contents, forms and technologies of memory have crossed the boundaries of time, space, and social groups, and been filled in different local contexts with new life and new meaning. The “transcultural” is therefore not only a category for studying memory in our current globalizing age [...] but a perspective on memory that can in principle be chosen with respect to all historical periods [...] (2011a:4-5).

With this in mind, the common sense distinction between ‘national memory’ and ‘transcultural memory’ becomes blurred, and our attention is turned once again to the ‘great internal heterogeneity’ and ‘many fuzzy edges’ of national memories (Erll

2010:311-312; Erll 2011b:8; Erll 2011c:65). We are led to the recognition that even sites of memory that appear quintessentially national are often in practice transnational and transcultural constructions (Sundholm 2011:2), both in that they rely on 'repurposing' older memory materials of diverse spatio-temporal origin (Erll and Rigney 2009:5), and insofar as they necessitate imaginative identification with people from the (distant) past who inhabited vastly different social and, sometimes, geographical worlds. I take these issues up in chapter 5, exploring the travels and palimpsestic layering of diverse 'memory traces' (Silverman 2013:28) that were inherent in expatriate efforts to carve out a place within Greek national memory. Moreover, precisely because every act of mnemonic 'de-territorialization' requires a subsequent process of 're-territorialization', as Levy and Sznajder themselves recognised (2006:8), it is always possible, if not probable, that the global circulation of memories will 'reinforce national memory communities that at first appearance they seem to supersede' (Assmann and Conrad 2010:9). This is a strand that I develop in chapter 6, by considering instances in which travelling memories sustain rather than challenge national myths and essentialist identities.

Chapter 6 also opens up discussion as to whether the dynamics of memory identified in the transcultural turn constitute a more ethical and inclusive way of remembering violent histories. As we have already seen, proponents of a transcultural approach have often placed emphasis upon the productive ethical and moral implications of the transcultural sharing of memories of suffering in replacing traditional enmities with nation-transcending solidarities. This has led other scholars to caution that 'not every worldwide available object of remembrance will be turned into a cosmopolitan, an ethical, or an empathetic memory' (Erll 2011b:15), and that 'memory may also nurture human rights violations just as human rights is open to political abuse' (Huysen 2011:621). Indeed, as Rothberg has emphasised in a more recent piece of work, memory competition must be considered as an aspect of memory's multidirectionality (2011): if memory is indeed structurally multidirectional, then within this paradigm we must seek to explain not just instances of transcultural solidarity and understanding, but also the construction and perpetuation of hostilities premised upon national or ethnic distinctions. Although I do not necessarily share A. Dirk Moses' assessment that the 'inescapable terror of history insists upon the constant instrumentalization of the Holocaust' and therefore invalidates a 'cosmopolitan' approach to transcultural memory (2011:104) – Moses' position could be said to represent a worst-case scenario where

Levy and Sznajder's account constitutes a best-case scenario – I nevertheless address an imbalance in the literature by more systematically considering instances in which memory's extraterritorial journeys serve to consolidate antagonisms or entrench hatreds, even if they simultaneously produce new transnational solidarities.

Another area of debate concerns the specificity, or otherwise, of the Holocaust as a memory with transcultural reach. As Aleida Assmann has written, if the Holocaust has indeed become a global moral yardstick for measuring atrocity, the question remains as to 'whether this universal norm can only be accessed via the exemplary history of the Holocaust or whether other historic traumas can also serve to back these moral commitments and values' (Assmann 2010:113). Levy and Sznajder did not think that their model was applicable to other histories of violence, noting, for instance, that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima by the United States has not become a 'medium for cosmopolitan remembrance' in the way that they felt the Holocaust had (2006:39). Alexander, meanwhile, pre-empting the criticism that his model might be seen as Western-centric (see above), suggested that scholars might explore the extent to which non-Western communities have developed traumatic memories that 'reach[] beyond issues of national identity and sovereignty to the universalizing, supranational ethical imperatives increasingly associated with the "lessons of post-Holocaust morality" in the West' (2009:69). Rothberg's major contribution to the literature was to challenge such unidirectional perspectives, by suggesting that the apparently transcendent status of the Holocaust as a symbol of evil and suffering was in fact a symptom of the dialogic interactions between Holocaust memory and the memories of other atrocities.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, Rothberg and others who have confirmed his arguments have often done so through reference to Holocaust memory as one of the principal 'vectors' of the multidirectional memory network (House 2010:37). Although I do consider expatriate invocations of Holocaust memory in chapter 6, I focus on the ways in which the Greeks of Turkey articulated memories of suffering in dialogue with other traumatic legacies, most notably those of the Armenian Genocide and the ongoing Kurdish-Turkish conflict. In doing so, I ask whether a model of multidirectional memory developed in reference to the Holocaust, slavery, and decolonisation can be sustained when applied to other contexts of remembrance.

¹¹⁰ Indeed, with regards to the American atomic bombing of Japan, Richard Minear has suggested that the term 'holocaust' came into use to refer to the Nazi genocide and the atomic bombings almost simultaneously, in part due to dialogic interactions between the two legacies (Minear 1995:354-357).

As well as this tendency to focus, in one way or another, on Holocaust memory, scholars of transcultural memory have often relied upon a particular genre of source material, namely the formal and rehearsed representations of the past found in academic or intellectual texts, literature and film, political discourse, and objectivised commemorative culture (monuments, museums, *et cetera*). As numerous interventions into the field of memory studies conducted, in particular, in the late 1990s and early 2000s emphasised, a shortcoming of a source base such as this for studying memory in society is that we must either assume that ‘facts of representation coincide with facts of reception’ (Kansteiner 2002:195), or remain ‘satisfied to recount how the past was publicly represented’ at the expense of learning ‘how collective memories were internalized by individuals’ (Confino 2004:398, 409; see also Confino 1997:1392, 1395; Confino 2000:98; Confino and Fritzsche 2002:4; Erll 2011c:27; Erll and Rigney 2009:9; Novick 2007:28). In Michael Schudson’s terms:

Memory studies suffer from the drunk-looking-for-his-car-keys-under-the-lamppost phenomenon: we look for effective public memory at self-conscious memory sites not because that is where we will find what we are looking for but because that is where the illumination makes looking most convenient (Schudson 1997:3).

Consequently, whilst we know a great deal, for instance, about the formal representation of the Holocaust by writers, politicians, journalists, and activists, we know comparatively little about the extent to which ‘the Holocaust has really entered the life world of broader segments of the population and has repercussions in their “everyday local experiences”’ (Assmann and Conrad 2010:8).¹¹¹ More broadly, we might ask when and how the multidirectional dynamic identified by Rothberg makes its presence felt in people’s lives, and whether linkages – explicit or otherwise – between different historical legacies are a commonplace and unavoidable feature of individual memory or simply a rhetorical tool confined to a ‘small but determined group’ (House 2010:37) of political activists. In other words, to borrow terms from Barry Schwartz, we are left to consider whether distant histories and the memories of others might be ‘invoked unwittingly rather than deliberately, solemnly rather than cynically, broadly rather than narrowly’ (2000:20; on the comparatively unconscious aspects of remembrance, see also Confino 1997:1395; Confino 2004:412; Erll 2011c:116, 174; Schudson 1997:13; Sutton 2008:85, 102).

¹¹¹ Aleida Assmann and Sebastian Conrad were here writing specifically in response to the work of Levy and Sznajder.

Writing in 1997 to criticise the prevalence of what he saw as restrictively political understandings of memory's operation in society, Confino urged scholars to broaden 'the field from the political to the social and the experiential, to an everyday history of memory' (1997:1402).¹¹² The everyday, in this sense, does not refer narrowly to the mundane activities and discourses of daily life, but more broadly to the 'anarchic quality' of remembrance that 'locates memory not only in monuments and museums but also in the ways people make it part of behaviour and of a mental world' (Confino 2004:412). In a similar vein, I suggest that we require an *everyday history of multidirectional memory*, which would explore 'what people actually "do"' (Confino and Fritzsche 2002:5) with the memories of other times, places, and people, and how these 'made a difference in people's lives' and were 'enacted on the local and private level' (Confino 1997:1394).¹¹³ In chapter 6, I embark upon this path, by considering, firstly, the ways in which transcultural memory is deployed 'by specific people with specific agendas' (Erll 2011b:15), and, secondly, the extent to which it is a feature of informal local experience and personal testimony as well as formal political discourse. By paying attention to this 'localizing aspect' of travelling memory (Erll 2011b:15) – the 'locatedness' rather than the hitherto emphasised 'non-location' of transcultural memory (Radstone 2011:111) – I aim to explore how individuals internalise the extra-territorial flows of memory, and thereby to further my discussion about what the past actually means to people in the present.

¹¹² The 'politics of memory' approach criticised by Confino (see also Schwartz 2000) tended to focus on the centrality of power and competition in the construction of public memory, and often maintained a juxtaposition between a manipulative and selective official memory and a benign and truthful vernacular memory (Confino 1997:1401; see, for instance, Bodnar 1994; Popular Memory Group 1982; Thomson 1990).

¹¹³ 'Multidirectional' rather than 'transcultural' in order to take account of the mobility of memory where it does not explicitly cross national or cultural boundaries.

5

‘The Third Fall’Commemorating the *Septemvrianá*

In his foreword to Dimitris Kaloumenos’ *The Crucifixion of Christianity*, a photographic account of the 1955 Istanbul Riots, the Istanbul-born Greek sociologist Neoklis Sarris wrote:

The real Fall of Constantinople, in the sense of the irreparable destruction of its culture and civilisation and its replacement with another city, inhospitable Istanbul [...] took place not on 29 May, 1453 but on the night of 6 September, 1955 (Sarris 2001:15-16).

In this chapter, I explore how expatriate writers and activists created such linkages between temporally disparate moments from the past, relating their local experiences to pivotal events and archetypes from Greek national history. In particular, I focus on how and why the expatriated Greeks of Istanbul commemorated two specific historical events: the 1955 *Septemvrianá* and the 1453 Fall of Constantinople. In discourse surrounding the 1955 anniversary, the two episodes typically became palimpsestically linked (Silverman 2013), such that the events of 1955 came to be seen as a reliving or continuation of those of 1453. In commemorative narratives marking the anniversary of the Fall of Constantinople, meanwhile, the 1821 Greek revolution was commonly superimposed over the last stand of the Byzantines against the Ottomans, so that contemporary Greek freedom was portrayed as dependent upon the sacrifices of the Greeks of Constantinople in 1453. By considering such ‘knotted intersections’ (Silverman 2013:8) in expatriate efforts to write themselves into Greek national history, I aim to demonstrate memory’s multidirectionality (Rothberg 2009a) *within* as well as without national borders and ethnic boundaries.

‘The 300 who stayed to guard Thermopylae’: thinking analogically

During his fieldwork on the Greek island Kalymnos, Sutton noticed that it was commonplace for people to understand contemporary everyday experiences through ‘analogic thinking’, i.e. through both horizontal references to current political situations and vertical references ‘appropriated from the length of Greek history’ (1998:127). For the islanders, Sutton wrote, ‘no event stands on its own, but must always be understood

in the wider context of similar events drawn from other times and other places' (1998:127). In their efforts to represent the persecution and displacement of the Greeks of Turkey, native Greek and expatriate writers alike typically shared this impulse to explain contemporary experience through analogic reference to history. In the immediate aftermath of the *Septemvrianá*, for example, renowned Greek author and Asia Minor refugee Ilias Venezis, writing in the Greek periodical *Néa Estía*, characterised the riots by making comparisons to the flight of Greek refugees from Turkey following the Greek defeat in Asia Minor in 1922:

The unbelievable barbarities of the mob from the other side of the Aegean against Hellenism and Christendom awakens in everyone here in the nation a fearful memory. Greece remembers again the days of 1922 – the days of flames, and wild cries, and blood, and hunted flocks, uprooted people, women and children and the elderly [...]

The days of September of 1955 take us back to the days of 1922. We see now that we were wrong to say that from one moment to another the wild beast might become human. No, it is apparent that this cannot be (Venezis 1955).

On its front page, the Greek newspaper *Emprós* similarly broke the news of the Istanbul Riots by juxtaposing an image of the hanging of Ecumenical Patriarch Gregory V in Istanbul in 1821 for his failure to quash the Greek revolution with an artist's depiction of the arson of churches in Istanbul in 1955, under the headline 'History Repeats Itself' (*Emprós* 10 September 1955). The newspaper *Makedonía*, meanwhile, compared the rioting to the Ottoman conquest of the city in 1453, writing that:

The clamouring of the frenzied crowd, the insults directed at the infidels, the threats of their slaughter, the sounds of shop windows being smashed and shutters being broken, the wailing of those that had been ruined, the futile cries for help of women and children gave the characterisation of a second "Fall" (*Makedonía* 14 September 1955; quoted in Kaloumenos 2001:230).

In 1993, Greek newspaper *Apogevmatini* likewise marked the anniversary of the *Septemvrianá* with an article entitled 'Constantinople Has Fallen', likening 1955 to 1453 and writing that Hellenism had once again come 'face-to-face with the barbarians' (*Apogevmatini* 6 September 1993). As for the Greeks of Imbros, nationalist rhetoric has often likened the few hundred islanders who remained on Imbros to the 300 Spartan warriors of Leonidas who made a last stand against the Persians at Thermopylae in 480 BC (Tsimouris 2001:8), reflecting a broader tendency in post-1821 Greek nationalism to associate the Persians and the Turks as the Asiatic others of Hellenism (Van Steen 2010:90; see also chapter 6).

There was, as we have seen in earlier chapters, something of a disjuncture between this inclusive nationalist rhetoric that made the plight of the Greeks of Turkey a national concern, and the experiences of marginalisation recalled by many expatriates upon their arrival in Greece. As Babül observed, to take the example of the *Imvriótes*-Spartans analogy, whilst those Greeks who remained on Imbros were characterised as the ‘300 Spartans’ and as evidence of the Hellenic character of the island, members of the same community who sought refuge in Greece were commonly perceived as not being Hellenic enough (2006a:55). We might accordingly have expected the expatriate community to eschew such nationalist rhetoric in their own discourse, and this was indeed sometimes the case. In 1974, for example, the newspaper *Imvriakí Ichó* wrote disparagingly of rhetoric likening the elderly residents of Imbros to the Spartans at Thermopylae, condemning the recently departed Greek military junta who ‘did not give us any importance, they sacrificed us saying: “stay in your land to guard Thermopylae. Stay as slaves, in the national interest”’ (*Imvriakí Ichó* July-August 1974a). It is hardly surprising, however, that the expatriates have often found such narrative frameworks to be compelling, ‘link[ing] their own fate to that of the wider Greek nation’ (Tsimouris 2001:8) in the hope of attaining support and empathy from the Greek state and populace, and to endow their struggles with broader meaning and intelligibility. In 1991, for instance, Imbriot Society president Christos Christoforidis, in a message published in *Imvros* after the election of a new committee, extended his greetings to,

the Few, who in difficult times, the most difficult in our History [...] remained There. There, so that the church bell does not cease to chime in the village, so that the last candle does not go out [...] Those 300, like those then, “obedient to their laws”¹¹⁴ guarding Thermopylae (*Imvros* January-April 1991).

In this extract, two histories separated by millennia were blended into a single moment, thereby transforming the elderly community of Imbros into heroic defenders of the nation. In the process, Imbros – geographically and politically marginal to the modern Greek state – was redeemed as the national first line of defence, the frontline in an ongoing struggle between ‘Greeks’ and ‘Turks’. This was reflective of a wider trend in Imbriot discourse: as Christoforidis insisted in an interview with Greek television in 1991 on the occasion of the 28 October Greek national holiday, ‘[t]he borders of Hellenism are in Imbros, are in Fener [in Istanbul], are in Kyrenia [Republic of Cyprus], are in Karpasia [Northern Cyprus]’ (*Imvros* October 1991). By thus expanding the

¹¹⁴ This is a fragment from the Epitaph of Simonides honouring the sacrifice of the 300 Spartans at Thermopylae.

borders of Hellenism from those of the contemporary Greek state to ones that encompassed their own *patrídes*, expatriate activists called the bluff of Greek ideologues who evoked them by name from afar but failed to support and embrace them in practice, and in this way situated their own local history within the broader narrative of Greek national history.

Though such palimpsestic images served largely to incorporate the *Imvriótes* into the national community, they could nevertheless simultaneously be used to critique the actions of the Greek state. In an editorial written in 1993 to coincide with the 70th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, Christoforidis attacked ‘Greek diplomatic timidity and inaction’ on the issue of Imbros by once again comparing those remaining on the island to the 300 Spartans. He wrote:

For 70 years now the *Imvriótes*, left to our fate, fight an unequal struggle with a very powerful but also barbarous state.

For 70 years we resist and we are not defeated.

As then, so now, 300 remain to prevent the barbarous Asian from passing the “opposing shore”.

300 remain to defend the holy and the sacred, our altars and our lands.

300 remain to defend the honour and the worth of the Nation (*Imvros* July-August 1993).

In this sense, the appeal of the national past as a discursive framework for orientating more contemporary experience lay not only in its inclusive and identity-affirming capacity, but also in its subversive or insubordinate potential (Herzfeld 1997:169). Reaching across time and space to cast themselves in the likeness of Leonidas’ Spartans, the *Imvriótes* resisted their marginalisation in Greek diplomacy by turning Greek nationalist mythology on the Greek state, implying that the latter had fallen from a state of grace to which the former still aspired.

In common with Sutton’s Kalymnians, the *Imvriótes* had recourse not only to archetypes from the distant past, but also to contemporary and unfolding political events. Greek media reports of atrocities committed during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, for instance, triggered a series of pessimistic comparisons between Imbros and Cyprus in the newspaper of the Imbriot Society. In the first issue published after the beginning of hostilities on Cyprus, the newspaper printed an article under the heading ‘Cyprus and Imbros’ extensively paralleling the experiences of the two

communities (*Imvriakí Ichó* July-August 1974a), and in a separate article in the same issue expressed a fear that similar violence was imminent on Imbros:

We have ceased talking about schools, buildings and properties. We are gripped by the fear that maybe one evening they will slaughter everyone. Can anyone rule that out after what we have heard and seen committed on Cyprus? (*Imvriakí Ichó* July-August 1974b).

Just as a legend of Spartan resistance to the Persians was remediated or ‘repurposed’ by Imbriot writers in their efforts to represent Imbros’ dwindling Greek community, so the unfolding conflict on Cyprus operated as a premediator through which they anticipated the future fate of their own community (Erl1 2011c:142; Erl1 and Rigney 2009:5). In the years following 1974, Imbriot writers continued to represent the expatriation of the *Imvriótes* in terms of the conflict on Cyprus: in 1977, *Imvros* marked the anniversary of the division of Cyprus by writing that ‘[w]e live and feel the drama of the Cypriots, because Attila¹¹⁵ passed by our islands first’ (*Imvros* June-July 1977), and a year later again drew comparisons not only between Turkish actions on the two islands, but also a perceived inaction on the part of the Greek state in both cases (*Imvros* June-July 1978). My interviewees sometimes had recourse to similar analogies in their oral testimonies: Istanbul-born *Imvriótis* Loukas, for example, said of his childhood visits to Imbros that, ‘we grew up going in the summers to an occupied Cyprus, in practice; because when you talk sometimes with Cypriots, those from the occupied part, you understand that it was the same thing, our experiences were the same’ (08/05/2013).

I develop similar observations below by discussing the commemoration of the *Septemvrianá* and the Fall of Constantinople by the expatriated Greeks of Istanbul. I focus in particular on the anniversary events orchestrated by the Constantinopolitan Society, and commemorative articles printed in the newspaper *O Polítis*, both of which have typically relied heavily on interpretations based on a perceived pattern governing Greek-Turkish relationships across the ages. At the end of the chapter, I consider the anniversary events that have been more recently organised by the Federation of Constantinopolitans, which have tended to disassociate the community’s experiences from the *longue durée* of Greek-Turkish bilateral relations, and instead to locate them within the context of Turkish domestic policy and international human rights legislation.

¹¹⁵ Turkish military action on Cyprus in 1974 was codenamed ‘Operation Attila’.

Commemorating the 1955 Istanbul Riots

The Constantinopolitan Society was founded in Athens in 1928 by Greek refugees displaced from Istanbul and its environs in the wake of the Greek-Turkish war (see chapter 2). Since 1978, by which time post-1923 expatriates had risen to prominence within the organisation's administrative structure, the Society has organised an annual and public memorial day to mark the anniversary of the Istanbul Riots (Isaakidis 2014). The precise content has varied year by year, but the central theme of bearing witness in order to preserve and disseminate memory of past persecution has been consistent, and the events have formed part of a broader effort to raise awareness of the experiences of the Greeks and Turkey both domestically and abroad (*O Polítis* March 1998). The memorial day has generally centred around a photographic exhibition presenting images of the riots – seen by the organisers as essential in confirming the veracity of their claims – and a speech by an invited speaker relating to the *Septemvrianá* or to the history of the Greek community in Istanbul and Greek-Turkish relationships more broadly (Isaakidis 2014). Other features incorporated into the event over the years have included a religious memorial for the victims of the rioting, roundtable discussions and panels of witness testimonies, readings from novels and academic studies dealing with the events, and audiovisual presentations and documentary film screenings. The Society has made a special effort to reach a wider audience amongst the Greek public, particularly on round-number anniversaries, which have commonly been marked by a series of commemorative endeavours. On the 40th anniversary of the *Septemvrianá*, for instance, a full programme of activities was prepared, including radio and television broadcasts and two photographic exhibitions hosted in the War Museum and the Cultural Centre of the City of Athens (Constantinopolitan Society 1995a; Constantinopolitan Society 1995c; Constantinopolitan Society 1995d).

For the Constantinopolitan Society, these commemorative events serve two primary purposes. First and foremost, they are seen as a way to address the perceived ignorance amongst the native Greek population about the plight of the Greeks of Istanbul. As the former president of the Society Giorgos Isaakidis put it to me in an interview:

The Hellenic state does not deal with its own history. The events [of September 1955] are part of the history of the Hellenes, and the people [in Greece] did not know about them. They did not even know if we in Constantinople were Christians, or if we were baptised, or why we spoke Greek. They knew nothing.

So our intention, the basic purpose when we started in '78, was to inform people about those events and of the existence of a notable minority in Constantinople (Isaakidis 2014).

Secondly, the Society is afraid that the grievances of the *Polítes* might be forgotten or disregarded as part of efforts to promote reconciliation with Turkey, what the president of the Society Antonis Lampidis derisively referred to in his introductory speech at the 2012 commemorative event as the 'genocide of memory' undertaken by certain 'well-known circles' within Greece (Lampidis 2012). The Society is concerned that this alleged historical amnesia might in turn breed a political complacency regarding the perceived threat to Greece posed by its Turkish neighbour, and/or be interpreted by the Turkish authorities as a sign of Greek weakness (Constantinopolitan Society 2012a). As the Society wrote on the 40th anniversary of the *Septemvrianá*:

The forgetting of evil is a licence for its repetition and all those who lived through the atrocities of the Turks must remind [others] of them, in order to prevent similar situations in the future that can now be clearly discerned with 'the naked eye'[:] the aggression of Turkey in Cyprus, the Aegean and in Western Thrace (Constantinopolitan Society 1995a).

Accordingly, the Society has lobbied the Greek state to designate 6 September as an official national memorial day, which, they felt, would 'constitute the beginning of the awakening of Hellenism, in order that the expansive schemes of the Turkish chauvinists do not come to pass' (Constantinopolitan Society 1994b; Constantinopolitan Society 1995b).

The newspaper *O Polítis*, particularly in its earlier years, has often pursued a similar line to that of the Constantinopolitan Society in the articles it prints to mark the anniversary of 1955. In September 1979, for instance, it wrote:

The *Septemvrianá* is a fearsome moment in the life of *Romiosýni* [see glossary] that must not be forgotten, because it constitutes the continuation of the official Turkish policy of annihilation against Hellenism[,] that has no end and that may be manifested elsewhere, if Hellenism does not stay alert and united. We see the truth of this today in Cyprus, in the Aegean (*O Polítis* September 1979).

On the 33rd anniversary of the Istanbul Riots, meanwhile, against the backdrop of significant Greek-Turkish bilateral talks, *O Polítis* wondered, 'if the committees that are meeting in Ankara and Athens have remembered what happened in those days in Constantinople in 1955, in order to appreciate accordingly the weight of responsibility that they assume' (*O Polítis* October 1988b). In common with the Constantinopolitan

Society, *O Polítis* saw itself as responsible for preserving the memory of past persecution, and counteracting ‘the apathy of all of the Hellenes, those in government and those not’ towards the unfolding of the events of 1955 (*O Polítis* October 1990). For both organisations, bearing annual witness to the Istanbul Riots, and calling on the Greek government to institute a national day of remembrance on 6 September, represented an attempt to formally inscribe the *Septemvrianá* onto the Greek memorial landscape. In this way, they hoped to tackle a perceived popular ignorance about, and diplomatic indifference towards, the expatriate community, a situation that was seen not only as the root cause of the *Polítes*’ struggles in Greece, but also as a threat to Greece’s future security.

Commemorating the 1453 Fall of Constantinople

There is no official national memorial day in Greece to mark the anniversary of the Fall of Constantinople, in the way that there is for the beginning of the 1821 revolution (25 March) or Greek resistance to Axis invasion and occupation during the Second World War (*Óhi* (‘No’) Day, 28 October). Writing in *O Polítis* in 1987, Kaloumenos lamented that the anniversary ‘has been forgotten by the Hellenic state, the press, the church, and the people’ (*O Polítis* June 1987). For some expatriates, this was symptomatic of a broader trend – deriving firstly from the desire to gain European support during the Greek revolution, and secondly from the need for ideological re-centring after the Greek defeat in 1922 put an end to the ‘Great Idea’ of re-establishing the Byzantine Empire – to sideline the Eastern Romaic tradition in favour of the Western Hellenic legacy (see chapter 3). Seen from this perspective, Greek disregard (on the formal level, at least) for the Byzantine past, and ambivalence towards, or lack of awareness of, the contemporary Greek community of Istanbul, were two components of a wider problem. This interpretation was put forward, for instance, by the president of the Federation of Constantinopolitans Nikos Ouzounoglou, who in an interview with me argued that,

when [Greece] was founded in 1830, one of its basic political doctrines was the disavowal of Byzantium [...] For the Constantinopolitans who remained after 1923, the difficulty was that [successive Greek leaders], to a greater or lesser extent, followed the doctrine that the issue of the minority in Constantinople should not upset Greek-Turkish relationships. Even in ’55 and ’64 you see that Greece resists very tamely [...] Under those conditions, for a long time, the question of the Hellenism of Anatolia was suppressed. The Fall was of course a long time ago, but the *Septemvrianá*, back then [i.e. when the expatriates arrived], was not well known, and is still not well known. And that is affected by

what I said to you before: that the Greek nation-state established after 1830, to a significant degree, was founded on the disavowal of Byzantium (Ouzounoglou 2014a).

It was, to a significant extent, in light of this perception that the *Polítes*' struggles were a by-product of a broader historical amnesia that the expatriate organisations made efforts to mark the anniversary of 1453, hoping in this way to both restore their community and Eastern Hellenism generally to national history, and disseminate knowledge about their more contemporary experiences of persecution.

As we saw in chapter 3, the *Polítes* commonly regarded themselves as the heirs to the Byzantine legacy. The Constantinopolitan Society is an institutional expression of this discourse, presenting itself as the 'successor to the Byzantine tradition' charged with preserving the memory of a period subordinated to the Classical Hellenic legacy in Greek historiography (Lampidis 2014; Isaakidis 2014; quote taken from Lampidis). Since 1931, the Society has correspondingly observed the anniversary of the Fall of Constantinople on 29 May 1453, when the city was taken by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror, and the last Byzantine emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos was killed in battle (Constantinopolitan Society 2008:27). In the 1960s and 1970s, at a time when increasing numbers of *Polítes* were settling in the Greek capital, this anniversary memorial (sometimes co-organised with other expatriate organisations) consisted of the laying of a single wreath before a statuette of Palaiologos inside the old parliament building in central Athens, followed outside by a more extended wreath-laying ceremony in front of the statue of Greek revolutionary hero Theodoros Kolokotronis (Isaakidis 2014). In this guise, the commemoration produced an analogy between 1453 and 1821, assimilating the defenders of Constantinople to the liberators of the nation, but also in the process subordinating the former to the latter, thereby replicating the sidelining of Byzantium in the national narrative.

Several newer and younger members of the Constantinopolitan Society, including Isaakidis, accordingly sought to reconfigure the commemorative ceremony after their election to the executive committee in the late 1970s. They felt that commemorating 1453 in front of a monument to a hero from the Greek revolution was not a fitting way for the *Polítes* to honour the memory of the Byzantine Emperor and his compatriots. As Isaakidis put it, 'what do we Constantinopolitans, gathering together to commemorate the Fall, have to do with Kolokotronis?' (Isaakidis 2014). The format of the

commemoration was therefore changed after 1978. In its new configuration, the event began with a liturgical memorial to the fallen Emperor and his fellow fighters in the Metropolitan Cathedral of Athens, on the nearest Sunday to 29 May. This was followed by a parade attended by members of the expatriate organisations, to which representatives of the Athenian municipalities, the Greek state and church, major political parties, and the Greek Armed Forces were invited. The parade culminated in the laying of wreaths at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier outside the Hellenic Parliament in the central Syntagma Square, in honour of the nameless dead who fell in the defence of Constantinople, accompanied by a rendition of the Greek national anthem (see fig. 1). After the erection of a statue of Palaiologos in the square outside the Metropolitan Cathedral (sometime after 1995), the parade was extended to encompass a memorial service dedicated to the Emperor, including speeches and an additional wreath laying ceremony, again accompanied by the national anthem (see fig. 2). In its revamped format, the 1453 commemoration combined elements common to official Greek national holidays, such as the ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, the performance of the national anthem, and the attendance of important political and religious dignitaries, with features that emphasised the particularities of the *Polítes*, like the venerated hero Constantine Palaiologos and the flags carried by participants emblazoned with the double-headed eagle of Byzantium (see fig. 3). The central location in front of the bustling Syntagma Square, meanwhile, immediately made the event more conspicuous and striking, attracting the curiosity of both native Greeks and foreign tourists.

By publicly observing an anniversary absent from the commemorative calendar of the Greek state, in a manner that both emphasised the expatriates' belonging to the national community and the distinctiveness of their own origins, the Constantinopolitan Society and its associates aimed to fill a perceived void in Greek collective memory. This comes across in the invitations issued by the Constantinopolitan Society to dignitaries that they hoped would attend the event, which typically portrayed the memorial ceremony as a national duty undertaken by the organisation, and implicitly criticised the forgetfulness of the Greek state. Inviting the political party *Synaspismós tis Aristerás kai tis Proódou* (Coalition of the Left and Progress) to send a representative to the 1998 event, for instance, the Society wrote that, 'believing that the past of our Nation must not be forgotten, every year we organise the memorial ceremony for the Fall of Constantinople, at which a commemorative prayer is performed for the last emperor of



Fig. 1 Leonidas Koumakis, author of *The Miracle* (see chapter 6), lays a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier on the anniversary of the Fall of Constantinople, 2004. Copyright Constantinopolitan Society. Reproduced with permission.



Fig. 2 Speeches at the statue of Constantine Palaiologos in Metropolitan Square, 2013. Photograph by the author.



Fig. 3 Members of the Constantinopolitan associations, holding flags bearing the double-headed eagle of Byzantium, observe the wreath laying ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, 2004. Copyright Constantinopolitan Society. Reproduced with permission.

Byzantium and those who fell with him' (Constantinopolitan Society 1998). In a 1999 invitation to the Archbishop of Athens, it was similarly declared that:

The historic Constantinopolitan Society, founded in 1928 by the uprooted Hellenes of Constantinople, celebrates this year 71 years of presence in Greece and of contribution towards the Nation.

The Societies of the Constantinopolitans, continuing the struggle for the preservation of the memory of the Nation, this year, as every year, put into practice the ceremony of remembrance for the FALL OF CONSTANTINOPLE honouring in that way the heroic sacrifice of the final emperor Constantine Palaiologos and his fellow heroic fallen (Constantinopolitan Society 1999).

In this manner, the 1453 anniversary was reconfigured in the guise of an official national holiday that nevertheless gave emphasis to the particularities of the Greek community from Istanbul. After 1978, the 1453 commemoration was thereby subtly changed from one that silently subsumed the *Polítes* into an already established national memorial landscape, to one that visibly and publicly carved out a *distinctive* commemorative niche for the expatriates *within* national memory.

1453 and 1821

In the words of former Constantinopolitan Society president Isaakidis, the primary objective of these commemorative events was ‘to show our presence’: to raise their public profile in Greece, in other words, and thereby to tackle their marginalisation within Greek society and bolster their claims for support from the Greek authorities (Isaakidis 2014). They formed part of a broader narrative of persecution commonly articulated in speeches and publicity materials relating to the anniversaries of 1453 and 1955, reflecting the belief that the *Septemvriana* was ‘not an isolated accidental incident, but part of a series of measures of the Turkish government aimed at the annihilation and uprooting of the Hellenism of Constantinople’ (Constantinopolitan Society 1995a). Archetypally, a poster distributed across Athens by the Constantinopolitan Society in 1979 under the heading ‘The Annihilation of the Constantinopolitans’ presented the expatriation of the *Polítes* as taking place over a period of some 500 years, beginning in 1453 with the Fall of Constantinople. Also included were the ‘intellectual and economic catastrophe’ that followed Greek defeat in Asia Minor in 1922, the *Septemvriana* in 1955 – referred to as the ‘prologue to the complete extermination’ – the expulsions in 1964 – dubbed the ‘final extermination’ – and finally the accusation that in 1979 the Ecumenical Patriarchate was under threat (Constantinopolitan Society 1979; see fig. 4).




Fig. 4 *The Annihilation of the Constantinopolitans* (1979), poster produced by the Constantinopolitan Society. Screen capture from the footage of the memorial event organised by the Constantinopolitan Society for the 560th anniversary of the Fall of Constantinople. Copyright Constantinopolitan Society. Reproduced with permission.

As I suggested at the outset, expatriate writers commonly linked such ‘local’ experiences to seminal moments from the national past, as in the following ‘brief historical detour’ offered by *O Polítis* on the 33rd anniversary of the *Septemvrianá* (substantially abridged):

AN EYE ON HISTORY THAT DOES NOT LIE

[...] The Fall of Constantinople to the Turks, was, by general admission, a historical turning point, [and] not [a] pleasant [one] for our civilisation. Nevertheless, Hellenism struggled for more than four centuries to regain its freedom and continue its political life [...]

However, the Second World War came along and our “friend” Turkey [...] destroyed in the most harsh and hostile manner the *omogéneia* of Constantinople and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos and sneakily sought to occupy the Dodecanese. [Turkey] raised the issue of the Aegean and then taking advantage of the struggle of the Greek Cypriots to shake off the English yoke, put [...] its foot on martyred Cyprus.

Another flourishing Hellenism that lived in Pontus, in Asia Minor and in Eastern Thrace, was lost thanks to the rapacious disposition of Turkey, and now struggles to rescue the ancestral land of Cyprus and the right for the Aegean that has constituted, since the Homeric age, the soul of Greece, to remain Hellenic (*O Polítis* September 1988).

Rather than suffering alone as a result of specific decisions taken by particular Turkish governments after 1923, the Greeks of Istanbul were through such ‘strife narratives’ (Halstead 2014b) drawn into an historically and spatially deep national community of Greek victims. From this point of view, marking the anniversaries of 1453 and 1955, and assimilating these events to a diachronic clash between Greek civilisation and Turkish barbarity, formed part of a general endeavour to demonstrate that the *Polítes* were the victims of a systematic Turkish policy of de-Hellenification in Istanbul.

Following Silverman, however, memory should not be understood simply as a linear series of discrete events, but rather as a ‘composite structure’ involving the ‘superimposition and productive interaction’ of diverse memory traces ‘so that one layer of traces can be seen through, and is transformed by, another’ (2013:3-4). Indeed, the significance that the expatriate community drew from these historical events did not lie solely in their placement in a linear chronological narrative, but also in the ways in which they came to be palimpsestically linked, such that more recent memories were layered over, and reinterpreted through, moments from the distant past (and *vice versa*). To complement the 1453 commemorative parade, the Constantinopolitan Society organises speeches and produces publicity material expanding upon ‘the significance of

the Fall and the sacrifice of those who lost their lives' (Isaakidis 2014). Particular emphasis is placed on the last stand of the Emperor Palaiologos and his soldiers on 29 May 1453,¹¹⁶ which was described as follows in a 2004 English-language flyer aimed at curious tourists stumbling across the wreath-laying ceremony in Syntagma Square:

The Emperor Constantine Palaeologos fights his enemies bravely. There are only dead bodies of his soldiers around him. All the defenders are dead and the Emperor is completely by himself. He is badly wounded, full of blood, with torn clothes and he cries like Christ on the cross:

“Constantinople has fallen and I am still alive? Isn't there any Christian to take (cut) my head off?”

Today, we Constantinopolitans, confer honour to Constantine Palaeologos and his soldiers (Constantinopolitan Society 2004).¹¹⁷

In such eulogies, it was frequently suggested that the defiant last stand of the Emperor against the Ottoman Sultan in 1453 sowed the seeds for Greek revolution against the Ottoman Empire in 1821. Speaking at the commemorative ceremony in 2002, for example, the vice president of the Constantinopolitan Society Giorgos Gavriilidis addressed the following epitaph to the fallen Emperor:

Constantine Palaiologos we call you [the] Marbled [Emperor]¹¹⁸ but nevertheless immortal for ever, in mind, in soul, in our hopes and our dreams. Your heroic death gave courage, patience and fortitude under 400 years of slavery for the nation, so that the New Hellenic State would be reborn from its ashes (Gavriilidis 2002).

During the ceremony in front of the statue of Palaiologos outside the Metropolitan Cathedral in 2013, by which time the event was overseen by the Federation of Constantinopolitans (see below), a representative of a Laconian association in Athens¹¹⁹ gave a similar speech in which he first equated Spartan resistance to the Persians in 480 BC with Byzantine resistance to the Ottomans in 1453, before linking both to contemporary Greek freedom. He characterised the Fall as ‘the new Thermopylae where the enemy was allowed to pass only over the bodies of its defenders’, and stressed that ‘if there had been no Leonidas or Palaiologos there would have been no 1821 and the freedom struggle that followed, there would have been no “NO” [to the Italians] in 1940

¹¹⁶ Greek history textbooks dealing with the Fall of Constantinople have likewise placed emphasis on the Emperor's brave defiance and heroic self-sacrifice (Filippidou and Özbaş 2014:31, 34).

¹¹⁷ Note the use of direct quotation and the historical present in this extract, characteristics of Greek storytelling that ‘dramatize[] events and lend[] immediacy’ (Tannen 1983:365, 368).

¹¹⁸ The Emperor's body could not be found after the battle, giving rise to the legend that he was turned to marble by God and secreted near the Golden Gate, to one day arise and take back the city (Herrin 2008:319; Nicol 2002:101-102).

¹¹⁹ Who was in attendance, presumably, because Constantine had been the Despot of Morea at Mystra in Laconia before ascending to the throne in Constantinople.

and the resistance [to Axis] occupation, there would have been no free Greece' (anon. 2013).¹²⁰

The expatriate newspapers typically marked the anniversary in similar terms, tracing Greek insurrection against the Ottomans to the example set by Palaiologos on the walls of Constantinople in 1453, as illustrated in the following examples from *O Polítis*:

The sacrifice of the Emperor was not in vain. The precious blood with which he watered that holy land sprouted the tree of freedom. Without the sacrifice there would have been no Resurrection [1821]. That sacrifice galvanised the souls of the Hellenes (*O Polítis* June 1973).

With his death the Emperor gloriously closed a brilliant and millenary history, the history of the Byzantine Empire and opened a new history, the history of Neohellenism [...]

The sacrifice of the Emperor was the seed for the resurrection of Hellenism (*O Polítis* May 1983).

There in 1453, at the Gate of St. Romanus the Emperor Constantine, alongside other nameless heroes, with his heroic death, stood worthy for the *patrída*. He did not betray history and with his sacrifice cast the seed of the resurrection of Hellenism, which was reborn after 368 years with another sacrifice, this time in Fener, of the Patriarch Grigoris V (*O Polítis* May 1984).

The newspaper *Palmós*, printed in Thessaloniki by the Union of Constantinopolitans of Northern Greece, wrote in similarly poetic terms in 1998:

Making a historical retrospection to the horrible day of 29 May we will see the shining example of sacrifice on the ramparts of the Queen of cities [i.e. Constantinople] by Constantine Palaiologos the last Hellenic emperor. His sacrifice became a legend and the legend brought about the rebirth of the nation. As a result today we live as free Hellenes (*Palmós* May-June 1998).

As I noted earlier in the chapter, although narratives of this kind were constructed in ostensibly normative forms, drawing heavily on recognisable nationalist rhetoric, they could nevertheless be deployed to express dissent from official readings of the past and to critique contemporary national diplomacy. In a document issued on the 39th anniversary of the Istanbul Riots, for instance, the Constantinopolitan Society made the following declaration:

¹²⁰ Discursive linkages between 480 BC and 1453 AD are fairly commonplace in Greek nationalist discourse. Eleni Filippidou and Banu Çulha Özbaş, for instance, observed that Greek history textbooks dealing with the Fall of Constantinople likened Palaiologos' refusal to submit to the Turkish Sultan to the response given by Leonidas to the Persians at Thermopylae (2014:31, 34).

This year when we reach 39 years since the painful anniversary of the *Septemvrianá* and 20 years since the invasion of Cyprus, Greece is obliged to not forget that there are still brothers of ours in their paternal lands who find themselves under the authority of Turkish politics and it [Greece] must follow a more dynamic politics.

As the Constantinopolitan Society we once again this year address the Greek state and we exhort her to wake up and take responsibility for her obligations, because as a People we are strong and have both the power and the will to prevent the day from coming when we would shout alas! GREECE HAS FALLEN (Constantinopolitan Society 1994a).

Mimicking the cry – ‘Constantinople has fallen’ – that purportedly rang out on 29 May 1453 when the walls of the city were breached (Runciman 1965:139), the Society suggested that if contemporary Greek diplomats did not follow the example set by Palaiologos and his fellow soldiers and take action on the perceived threat from Turkey, then ultimately Greece itself might fall to the Turks. In this sense, the Fall of Constantinople was transformed into a national morality tale, the defiant last stand of the Byzantines in 1453 serving as a critical mirror for a perceived *lack* of Greek diplomatic resistance in response to more recent crises such as that of 1955.

The discourses presented in this section inverted the analogy between 1453 and 1821 encapsulated in the older commemorative ceremony hosted in front of the statue of revolutionary fighter Kolokotronis, which subsumed the *Polítes* into an existing national narrative and silenced their local idiosyncrasy. Rather than basking in the reflected glory of the revolutionary heroes of 1821, the expatriate organisations put forward their own martyr-hero in the figure of the last Byzantine emperor, whose heroic sacrifice was portrayed as the spark that ignited the Greek revolution. The putative ancestors of the *Polítes* were thus portrayed as the prototypical Greek freedom fighters, bestowing upon the expatriate community a privileged place within the national narrative. In this way, the expatriates were able to outmanoeuvre their domestic detractors by staking a claim to Hellenic authenticity derived from the idiosyncrasies of their own local history (see also chapter 3), and to critique contemporary Greek diplomacy towards the Greeks of Turkey by making unfavourable comparisons with the defiant last stand of their Byzantine ancestors in 1453.

1453 and 1955

As we saw at the very beginning of the chapter, just as Byzantine resistance in 1453 came to be seen as a rehearsal for Greek insurrection in 1821, so the Istanbul Riots were frequently portrayed as a reliving of the Fall of Constantinople. In a 1987 article, for example, *O Polítis* wrote:

The Hellenes of Constantinople, those uprooted from their homes during and after the wild persecutions of 6/7 September 1955 that they were subjected to by the Turks[,] will recall with pain the persecutions in the dark days that they lived in their historic birthplace, days that resemble the Fall, when the wild swarm of the Conqueror rushed into our Constantinople to loot (*O Polítis* September 1987).

More than simply implying, as in the above extract, a strong resemblance between these two events, such narratives commonly treated the *Septemvrianá* in 1955 as constituting the continuation or completion of the Fall of Constantinople that had begun in 1453. In 1978, *O Polítis* thus declared that, ‘[o]n 29 May 1453 Constantinople was occupied politically. On 6 September it was occupied ethnically by the barbarian’ (*O Polítis* August 1978). In an interview with Greek newspaper *Ta Néa* in 1998, *Septemvrianá* victim Despoina Isaakidou similarly proclaimed that:

For me the Fall of Constantinople happened in ’55. Because after those horrible events *Romiosýni* [i.e., in this case, the Greek population of Turkey] was roused, everyone left, [and] the uprooting happened (*Ta Néa* 12 January 1998).

Shifting the fall of the city from 1453 to 1955 in this manner not only restaged the contemporary local experience of the Istanbul Riots in the guise of an infamous event from national history, but once again carried an implied criticism of the Greek state. For if Constantinople fell not, as commonly supposed, in 1453 (or even in 1922) but in 1955, it followed that Greece gave the city up as lost prematurely when it might, even as late as 1955, have emulated the example of the Byzantines and resisted the Turkish ‘conquest’.

By the logic of such equations, two events otherwise separated by 500 years and numerous differences in historical circumstance were reimagined as components of a single event. As Isaakidis of the Constantinopolitan Society put it, explaining the rationale behind publicity materials like the 1979 poster discussed above, ‘we [always] write, “1453, 1922, 1941, 1942, 1955, 1964”, and that is where the Fall finishes. It

happened slowly' (Isaakidis 2014).¹²¹ From this perspective, the Istanbul Riots came to be reframed in expatriate discourse as the 'Third Fall of Constantinople', the final act of a drama that was initiated in 1453 and for which the groundwork was prepared during the 'Second Fall' in 1922. On the 40th anniversary of September 1955, Archbishop Iakovos of America – who was born on Imbros in 1911 – accordingly penned an article about the *Septemvrianá* entitled 'The Third Fall' in Greek daily newspaper *Kathimerini*. He wrote that:

Hundreds of shops were looted, whilst shopkeepers and employees were evicted and beaten and their merchandise burned to cinders. Churches and schools were looted and holy documents and books were given up to the flames and burned. So passed the third fall that was followed by the third refugee flight to Greece and the unjustifiable invasion of Cyprus and the occupation of two fifths of her land [...]

The above lines are a sparing description of that abhorrent night of 1955, which in terms of persecution and plunder surpassed the night of St Bartholomew (Archbishop Iakovos 1995).

Iakovos here conjured a memory of the *Septemvrianá* that was, to borrow terms from Silverman, 'contaminated by multiple elsewhere' (2013:5): the 1453 Fall of Constantinople, the 1922 exodus of Greeks from Turkey, the 1974 conflict on Cyprus, and even the 1572 St Bartholomew's Day Massacre (on such transnational cross-referencing, see chapter 6).

Young has observed that in Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel's midrashic writings, not only did religious texts provide him with a means to interpret his own contemporary trauma, but this trauma in turn led him to re-evaluate the ancient texts, such that 'his Holocaust experiences have had as great an effect on the ancient archetypes as the archetypes have had on his understanding of new experiences' (1990:106). In a comparable manner, the superimposition of 1453 and 1955 reconfigured the significance of *both* events in expatriate discourse. On the one hand, through its interpretation in terms of the Fall of Constantinople, the *Septemvrianá* ceased to be an isolated act of mob violence situated in the narrow context of policies undertaken by the then Turkish government or the burgeoning Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus, and instead became the 'Third Fall of Constantinople', the culmination of a sustained 'Turkish' assault on Greek Byzantine civilisation. In this sense, the pre-existing

¹²¹ These dates, in order, refer to the Fall of Constantinople, the 'Asia Minor Catastrophe', the conscription of non-Muslims into forced labour battalions, the wealth tax, the *Septemvrianá*, and the expulsion of Greek citizens from Turkey.

paradigm of the Fall of Constantinople premediated memory of the Istanbul Riots, in so far as it acted ‘to transform contingent events into meaningful images and narratives’ (Erl1 2009:114). This made the comparatively less well-known events of 1955 recognisable and intelligible to a Greek domestic audience, casting the *Polítes* as victims of the barbaric Turkish other, and thereby furnishing the expatriate organisations with a resonant language with which to narrate their displacement as a national martyrdom. If the archetype of 1453 thus made the *Septemvrianá* more ‘marketable’ to an external audience, by the same token it rendered it more ‘thinkable’ on an internal level, providing the expatriates with a means to reconfigure raw personal experiences that defied simple exegesis into more readily graspable historical patterns that gave that experience broader meaning and significance.

On the other hand, seen through the lens of 1955, the distant historical events of 1453 took on contemporary resonance and relevance, becoming, in Daniel Knight’s terms, ‘culturally proximate’, insofar as they were evoked not simply as a dispassionate comparative framework, but because those concerned felt that they had in some sense relived the events of the past (2012:356). In expatriate commemorative ceremonies and narratives, personal memories of the Istanbul Riots were transposed onto, or superimposed over, the last stand of the city’s defenders in 1453, such that individuals might come to speak or even feel as though they have a personal connection to events from the distant past. At the Constantinopolitan Society’s 1981 memorial day, Greek journalist and invited speaker Giorgos Karagiorgas – who travelled to Istanbul in the immediate aftermath of the riots – closed his address by explicitly blurring 1453 and 1955, steeping his personal narrative in remediated language and imagery derived from archetypal representations of the Fall of Constantinople. He proclaimed that:

I have given to the photographs of Kaloumenos,¹²² life as I tasted it in the streets of the city, in its alleys, when herds of breathless people ran hastily to avoid the slaughter, those hours of the second catastrophe of Hellenism after the Fall. And as then, the sun over Constantinople darkened, when the Queen of cities was delivered to the hands of the Turks, and I heard in those unspeakable hours a voice brought from THEN cry slowly and moan: “sun shudder and earth groan, Constantinople has been overcome and the hour of our defence is over ...”¹²³

¹²² Kaloumenos’ photographs, which were taken in the aftermath of the *Septemvrianá* and documented the damage to Greek property and churches, constitute a significant part of the corpus of material used by the Constantinopolitan Society for the photographic exhibitions that are a central feature of their commemorative events (the photographs can be found in Kaloumenos 2001).

¹²³ I cannot be sure of the precise provenance of the words quoted by Karagiorgas in this extract, but it seems probable that he intended to evoke similar words purportedly spoken by one Italian soldier to his

The third night of the disaster fell. The dampness of the earth sent its heavy burnt scent across Constantinople. The fear of a repetition of the attack kept the Hellenes awake during the greater part of the night (Karagiorgas 1981).

From this perspective, expatriate commemoration of the Fall of Constantinople could be seen as a type of ‘postmemorial work’, in that it ‘strives to *reactivate* and *re-embody* more distant political and cultural memorial structures by reinvesting them with resonant individual and familial forms’ (Hirsch 2012:33). By identifying 1453 as their own, local historical heritage in this manner, expatriate writers and activists simultaneously wrote themselves into a broader national history.

The Federation of Constantinopolitans

In this chapter, I have focused primarily on commemorative events orchestrated by the Constantinopolitan Society, which, particularly between 1978 and 2006, were run in collaboration with the New Circle of Constantinopolitans and the Association of Hellenic Citizens Expelled from Turkey (Isaakidis 2014; *O Polítis* March 1998). In the remainder of the chapter, I take a look at the more recent commemorative activities of the Federation of Constantinopolitans, which was established in 2006 with the aim of uniting all the expatriate associations in Greece and abroad, and providing a unified voice for the expatriate community (see chapter 2). Although the Constantinopolitan Society is a founding member of the Federation, the two bodies put on separate events to mark the anniversaries of 1453 and 1955, reflecting a divergent outlook on the future of the Greek community in Istanbul and Greek-Turkish relationships generally.

The Federation of Constantinopolitans has since 2010 pursued direct dialogue with the Turkish authorities, on matters such as the reissuing of Turkish citizenship to the expatriated Greeks and their Greek-born descendants, the problems facing the Greek minority schools, and outstanding issues related to Greek property in Turkey (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2013c; Federation of Constantinopolitans 2012:9; Federation of Constantinopolitans 2015a:29-31; Federation of Constantinopolitans 2015b). Federation president Ouzounoglou explained the rationale of these negotiations to me as follows:

brother on the walls of Constantinople on 29 May 1453 upon seeing that the Ottoman forces had breached the city’s defences, as reported in the *Chronicon Maius*, an account of the Fall of Constantinople traditionally attributed to the Byzantine writer Georgios Sphrantzes but now thought to have been authored by Makarios Melissenos in the sixteenth century.

We do not place our issues within national politics, because we do not believe in that road, but we take them [to the Turkish government] directly, because we are citizens of that country. Just because we are Hellenes does not mean that the Hellenic government has to express my opinions (Ouzounoglou 2014a).

Ultimately, the Federation hopes that these talks will encourage Turkey to undertake ‘a programme of repatriation, particularly for young people’ (Ouzounoglou 2014a) in order to prevent the Greek community of Istanbul from disappearing entirely.

The Constantinopolitan Society, by contrast, has eschewed direct communication with the Turkish authorities, maintaining that the plight of the Greek minority in Turkey is a component of Greek foreign policy and should therefore be discussed only through official diplomatic channels (Isaakidis 2014). In particular, the Society has expressed concern that Turkey might use such negotiations to turn the *Polítes* into a conduit for Turkish foreign policy, and thereby both damage the expatriates’ reputation in Greece and weaken the diplomatic position of the Greek state (Constantinopolitan Society 2012b; Constantinopolitan Society 2013a; Constantinopolitan Society 2013c). They have protested, for instance, that the Federation’s petition for Turkey to issue Turkish citizenship to the expatriates’ descendants in Greece, ‘facilitates the plans of Turkish foreign policy to create a “Turkish colony” in Greece’ (Constantinopolitan Society 2012b; Constantinopolitan Society 2013a). The Constantinopolitan Society is also comparatively sceptical about the feasibility of attaining lasting Greek-Turkish reconciliation, and of reinstating a sizeable Greek population in Istanbul, and considers an admission of responsibility on the part of the Turkish government to be a prerequisite for productive bilateral dialogue (Constantinopolitan Society 1997; Isaakidis 2014). As Isaakidis put it to me:

A very simple thing that the Germans did, is that they asked for forgiveness from the Jews [...] For 30 years, we have been asking the Turks to ask for forgiveness, officially, for what they did. They do not even ask for forgiveness from the Armenians. How can you become friends, when the other side does not take responsibility for the damage they have caused? (Isaakidis 2014).

Accordingly, whilst the Society has continued to organise its own memorial day for the *Septemvrianá*, the primary purpose of which is to keep the memory of 1955 in the forefront of Greek popular and diplomatic consciousness, the Federation has since 2008 marked the anniversary through an annual international conference that is more

academic and scientific than commemorative (Ouzounoglou 2011).¹²⁴ Rather than focusing on parallels with events from Greek national history such as 1453 or 1922, the Federation's conferences have sought to identify commonalities between the Istanbul Riots and acts of anti-minority violence in other national contexts, in order to interrogate their common causes and consequences. The inaugural 2008 conference, for example, aimed 'to heighten international awareness of the mechanisms underlying acts of state-sponsored terrorism and ethnic cleansing as illustrated in the cases of *Septemvriana* (Istanbul, 6-7/9/1955), *Kristallnacht* (Crystal Night) (Germany, 8-9/11/1938) and other similar, but less well publicized, events' (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2008:104). This reflected the Federation's belief that events like the Istanbul Riots 'had nothing to do with the Greek-Turkish bilateral relations but were related to the decline of the rule of law principles and democratic rights [in Turkey]' (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2013d). Between 2011 and 2014, the annual conferences similarly focused on how Turkey might provide remedy and reparation for the victims of the Istanbul Riots, in line with the United Nations' 2005 resolution (60/147) on the right for victims of human rights abuses to seek restitution within the framework of international law (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2013c; Ouzounoglou 2011; Ouzounoglou 2014b).

Although the Federation's anniversary conferences share with the Constantinopolitan Society's memorial days the stated aims of preserving the memory of the past and placing it within a wider historical framework, the reasons for doing so, and the salient framework to be used, are thus notably different. Whilst the Society believes that the experiences of the *Polítes* come firmly under the umbrella of a long-standing Greek-Turkish conflict, and therefore are best dealt with through a robust foreign policy, the Federation considers the issues facing the community as arising from a national homogenisation project connected with the decline of democracy and rule of law in

¹²⁴ The Federation has often invited Turkish academics (as well as those from Greece and elsewhere) to speak at these conferences; on the 57th anniversary in 2012, for instance, Turkish political scientist Baskın Oran gave the keynote speech, in which he argued that the Greek minority of Turkey and the Muslim minority of Western Thrace would benefit from cooperating and supporting one another (Oran 2012). Former Constantinopolitan Society president Isaakidis told me that they too invited a Turkish speaker on one occasion, but that he did not attend, apparently – in Isaakidis' estimation – due to the Society's stance towards Turkey (2014).

post-1923 Turkey. Accordingly, in place of a language of national martyrdom, the Federation invokes a discourse of global human rights law.¹²⁵

Since 2006, the Federation has also assumed responsibility for the ceremonial parade to commemorate the Fall of Constantinople. In principle, the format has remained largely unchanged, although the significance that the two organisations attach to the event differs somewhat. At the 2013 ceremony, for instance, speaking immediately before the Laconian representative who characterised the Fall as the ‘new Thermopylae’ (see above), Federation president Ouzounoglou placed emphasis not on the connections between 1453 and Greek national freedom, but on the cultural contribution of Byzantium to contemporary civilisation. He told the gathering assembled at the statue of Constantine Palaiologos that:

The ultimate heroic resistance that was put up by the Hellenes of Constantinople, alongside their fellow fighters from the Christian West, has an exceptional significance for you to remember today, insofar as the defenders were fighting primarily not to protect the fortified Queen of cities, but for the values represented by its ancient tradition with its universal values. The defenders had a deep belief that they were the carriers of Christendom, of Orthodoxy, but also the synthesis of the Hellenic and Roman civilisation. That was the great historical achievement of the Eastern Roman Empire, that it created a synthetic universal civilisation [...] That is the primary reason why we are honouring Constantine Palaiologos and the fallen defenders after 560 years (Ouzounoglou 2013b).¹²⁶

The Constantinopolitan Society, meanwhile, has protested that under the auspices of the Federation the memorial ceremony no longer achieves the purpose that they had envisaged for it after 1978; that is, to stage a memorial day with the trappings of an official national holiday that would serve as a visible demonstration of the community’s presence in Greece and emphasise their place within national history. In 2014, the Society accordingly wrote to the Federation expressing their disappointment with the level of attendance at the parade in recent years, maintaining that when they had organised the event they had always ensured a high turnout from members of the Society, ‘exactly as happens at all national anniversaries’ (Constantinopolitan Society 2014a).

¹²⁵ This is not to say that the Constantinopolitan Society necessarily eschews a more transnational frame of reference: see Isaakidis’ comparisons with the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide (above), and chapter 6.

¹²⁶ At a seminar held by the Federation in 2009 for the 556th anniversary of the Fall of Constantinople, Ouzounoglou similarly stated in his introductory speech that the purpose of the event was to ‘demonstrate the universality of Byzantine civilisation’ (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2009a:3).

In line with these differing perspectives on the significance of the 1453 ceremonial parade, the Society and the Federation operate independent anniversary events, typically featuring talks by an invited speaker or speakers. These two events have much in common, but, as with the *Septemvrianá* commemorations, there are also perceptible differences to be discerned. On the 560th anniversary of the Fall of Constantinople in 2013, for instance, the Constantinopolitan Society hosted retired Greek general Frangoulis Frangos. His speech was preceded by greetings from the Society's president, who characterised the Fall as 'the most shocking event in the martyred journey of our race' (Lampidis 2013), and by the reading of a poem commemorating the heroic sacrifice of Palaiologos by *Prínkipos*-born poet Giorgos Aimilios Eden, accompanied by his daughter on the harp. In the first half of his talk, Frangos characterised Palaiologos as an exemplary Greek martyr whose sacrifice 'laid the foundations for the struggle in 1821' and 'inspires for all time the "NO" of Hellenism', before proceeding to advance the idea that a substantial population of crypto-Christians live in contemporary Turkey (Frangos 2013). His speech was later praised by the Society in the following terms:

With his directness of speech and the outspokenness that distinguishes him, he transported us to that ill-omened day, stressing that we must never forget all of the tragic events that followed up until today and sealed the fate of Hellenism, but also [that we must] demand our justice (Constantinopolitan Society 2013b).

On the same day in 2013, the Federation – in conjunction with the municipality of *Palaió Fáliro*, a neighbourhood of Athens – hosted a talk by Greek professor of economics Michalis Psalidopoulos with the title 'The Fall of Empires and Nations: Thoughts of an Economist'.¹²⁷ The event began with a memorial prayer to the fallen led by the bishop of *Palaió Fáliro-Néa Smýrni*, and an address by the mayor of *Palaió Fáliro*, who, according to a Greek journalist who was in attendance, emphasised that 'such historical moments must teach us about the mistakes that we made in the passing of the ages' so that they are not repeated in the future 'but, conversely, keep us united' (*Vima Online* 3 June 2013). After the main speaker, there was also a concert featuring the performance of dirges about the Fall of Constantinople (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2013a). This event seems to have been representative of the Federation's 1453 anniversaries more generally, in that whilst it incorporated aspects of

¹²⁷ According to Dimosthenis, one of my Imbriot informants who attended this event, Psalidopoulos compared the fall of various empires from different eras (06/06/2013). Dimosthenis contrasted this with what he perceived to be the tenor of the Constantinopolitan Society events, which he summed up as 'the Turks! Those bad people!' (06/06/2013).

a memorial day (such as the religious service) its scope extended beyond a narrow focus on Greek-Turkish relationships. If the Constantinopolitan Society was concerned principally with making the Fall ‘culturally proximate’ as a national trauma and cautionary tale for the future, in an effort to ensure that the *Polítes* were not sidelined in Greek history or diplomacy, the Federation of Constantinopolitans has shown a greater interest in historicising the Fall, by viewing it within a broader historical context rather than primarily through the cipher of Greek national history.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I have explored how both Greek and expatriate writers persistently interpreted the contemporary experiences of the Greeks of Turkey by analogic reference to archetypes from Greek national history. For the expatriates, adopting such rhetoric provided a means to counteract their sense of marginalisation in Greek society and abandonment by Greek diplomacy. Drawing upon the coincidental numerical equivalence of Leonidas’ Spartan warriors in 480 BC and Imbros’ extant elderly population after the 1970s, as well as perceived similarities between Turkish militarisation and resettlement policies on Imbros and Turkish military action in Cyprus in 1974, the *Imvriótes* rewrote their own local suffering as a national drama. In like manner, by identifying themselves with the defenders of Byzantium in 1453, linking this defiant last stand to Greek revolution in 1821, and delaying the ultimate Fall of Constantinople until their own experiences in 1955, the *Polítes* portrayed themselves as both the prototypical Greek freedom fighters against, and archetypal national martyrs to, Turkish aggression and expansionism. By constructing linkages between their own experiences and seminal moments from Greek national history, the expatriates thus drew on their local particularities to establish their belonging as part of the national community (see chapter 3).

If the examples presented here were thus ostensibly normative, replicating Greek nationalist rhetoric for inclusive purposes, they also, following Herzfeld, demonstrated that ‘people know how to adopt the rhetoric of normativity in order to achieve non-normative ends’ (1997:44). By casting themselves in the likeness of iconic and recognisable heroes and martyrs from the recent and distant national past, expatriate writers implicitly and sometimes explicitly cast aspersions on Greece’s contemporary diplomatic record towards the Greeks of Turkey, indicating, for instance, that if the

Greek state had resisted in 1955 as the Byzantines did in 1453 then the city might never have definitively ‘fallen’. In any case, it is noteworthy that although ‘the Turks’ were superficially the chief antagonists in many of the narratives discussed above, expatriate efforts to mark the anniversaries of events like 1453 and 1955 had at least as much to do with their complaints towards the Greek state, and a lack of awareness on the part of the Greek public, as with their grievances with Turkey. The fact that normative representations can sustain insubordinate discourses helps account for the resilience of nationalist readings of the past, as even when expressing dissent from national policy or history local actors often rely upon a national interpretive framework. In this sense, the expatriates might ‘participate through their very discontent’ (Herzfeld 1997:2) in the consolidation and perpetuation of the national frame of reference, reflecting Sutton’s observation that ‘even those [...] who implicitly or explicitly challenge the content of national history, do not [necessarily] challenge its form’ (1998:128).

If expatriate writers and activists’ uses of history in this chapter often seemed measured and deliberate – archetypes from the past conjured up in very particular contexts to serve quite clear discursive purposes – it does not necessarily follow that the past was simply evoked cynically and dispassionately as expedient packaging for personal experience (Knight 2012:356; Schudson 1997:5, 15). For many, a perception of the past as subject to certain rhythms and patterns was a prominent explanatory device for interpreting contemporary events or anticipating their future unfolding, such that they did not only see *convenient comparisons* between different historical moments, but rather felt that they were *reliving* – or were *fated* to relive – the events of the past (Knight 2012:356). From this perspective, widely available historical schemata might *implicitly* govern the reception and representation of new experiences in ways in which individuals are only partially in control (Erl1 2011c:174; Schudson 1997:13). So, for instance, whilst Imbriot comparisons with Cyprus might in one sense be viewed as cynical attempts to harvest the widespread indignation in Greece about Turkish actions in order to generate sympathy for the struggles of the *Imvriótes*, it was also likely that omnipresent Greek media representations of unfolding events on Cyprus seemed so frighteningly plausible to expatriate writers as a model for future experience on Imbros that they were an almost unavoidable frame of reference. Likewise, for the *Polítes*, whilst presenting the 6-7 September 1955 as the culmination of events begun in 1453 and 1922 was certainly politically expedient, it was not a discourse that required significant lateral thinking or substantial rewriting of received historical knowledge, but

was rather one that readily *presented itself* as a ‘common sense’ explanation for complex historical events. In both cases, particular historical archetypes and paradigms were ‘conjured up too instantly for [conscious] calculation to have been the whole story’: even though expatriate activists did ‘indeed rewrite the texts of history’, they did not necessarily ‘choose which texts to work on’ (Schudson 1997:15).

To borrow terms from Kostis Kornetis, however, in many of these instances the relationship to the past was marked less by ‘proximity or affinity’, as in Knight’s case, and more by ‘temporal and semantic distance’ (2010:190-191). Indeed, it was in some ways the distance of 1453, and hence its hollowness and malleability, that made it a compelling interpretive framework for the contemporary experiences of 1955. The past, to paraphrase Kornetis, was made present not in the form of detailed historical knowledge, but in terms of a more abstract repertoire of resonant symbols (2010:190), which could be applied to contemporary events in order to give broader meaning, significance, and intelligibility to personal experience, and were consequently backfilled with personal resonance such that the events of the past *appeared* temporally and semantically proximate. In this way, the palimpsestic relationship between 1453 and 1955 mutated the memory of both events: the Istanbul Riots became the Third Fall of Constantinople, directing their interpretation in terms of a diachronic and interminable Greek-Turkish conflict, whilst the Fall of Constantinople was reactivated but also absorbed by the more recent occurrences of 1955, obscuring much of ‘what one might cautiously call the “original” or the “actual” events’ from view (Erll 2011c:140-141). If the past thus indeed ‘seeps into the cracks of the present’ (Sutton 1998:210), equally the present seeps into the cracks of the past, as individuals attempt to make sense of their experiences, and make them intelligible to others, by thinking analogically.

As this chapter has sought to demonstrate, memory is from this perspective ‘multidirectional’ (Rothberg 2009a) regardless of whether or not it happens to cross artificial ethnic or national borders. If, as Erll argued, ‘all cultural memory must “travel” [...] in order to stay alive’ – must, in other words, be repurposed or reused to transcend the original context of its articulation – it invariably follows that these travels consist ‘only partly in movement across and beyond territorial and social boundaries’ (2011b:12). Moreover, once we peer beneath its linear, unidirectional surface, we can perceive that national memory is itself a palimpsest, drawing together, in the case presented here, such disparate times and places as fifth century BC Thermopylae,

fifteenth-century Byzantium, mid-twentieth-century Istanbul, and late-twentieth-century Cyprus. It was through such multidirectional memory work that expatriate writers excavated a commemorative niche within Greek national memory, reconfiguring the already well-trodden journeys across space and time carved out by nationalist history. The national, then, is also fundamentally transcultural: in Jie-Hyun Lim's terms, '[t]he most frequent misunderstanding of nationalism is that nationalism is national' (2010:138).

The national palimpsest, nevertheless, was not the only mnemonic framework to which expatriate writers had recourse when narrating their experiences of persecution. We have already seen how the Federation of Constantinopolitans – less concerned with integrating the expatriates within Greek national memory, and more interested in facilitating restitution, reparation, and repatriation within the framework of international law – typically structured its commemorative activities not so much through analogic reference to the national past, but by drawing connections across national boundaries in order to place the Greeks of Turkey within the context of global human rights discourse. In the next chapter, I turn my attention to such transcultural cross-referencing, demonstrating that memory is indeed a frequent flyer. I also observe, however, that the articulation of local experience within a transcultural frame of reference is far from incompatible with the maintenance of a national(ist) reading of the past, and may strengthen rather than undermine the assumptions of national memory.

6

‘Kristallnacht in Constantinople’

Transcultural cross-referencing

In this chapter, I focus on how the Greeks of Turkey drew parallels between their own experiences and those of other communities, most notably Turkey’s Armenian and Kurdish communities, and Europe’s Jews. Such mnemonic cross-fertilisation confirms that memories are commonly articulated within a transcultural field of reference, and that different histories of suffering need not necessarily be locked in a competition for primacy (Rothberg 2009a:3-6). Indeed, my discussion lends credence to the suggestion that analogic thinking on a transcultural level might lead to the elaboration of solidarities between different victim communities, or even lay the groundwork for reconciliation between historical antagonists. At the same time, however, I demonstrate that memory’s extraterritorial journeys do not necessarily have ‘cosmopolitan’ (Levy and Sznajder 2006) or even ‘post-national’ implications, and may frequently serve to consolidate rather than undermine national identities and intercommunal antagonisms. I suggest, moreover, that there is need for a distinction to be made between superficial historical comparisons that happen to reach across national or ethnic boundaries, and the more complex ‘knotting’ (Rothberg 2010:7; Silverman 2013:8) of memories and histories put forward in recent scholarship as evidence that ‘memory – individual as well as social – is fundamentally a transcultural phenomenon’ (Erl 2011c:66). This, in turn, has implications for our understanding of how (and when) transcultural memory is experienced by individuals on local levels, and how (and when) it finds expression in their personal narratives and in their day-to-day lives.

‘Ask the Assyrians, Armenians, Kurds’: off-the-peg memories on YouTube

Since the ‘connective turn’ (Hoskins 2011a:271; Hoskins 2011b:20-21; see review essay II), scholars have shown increasing interest in the relationship between memory and web 2.0 platforms such as Facebook (Garde-Hansen 2009), YouTube (Drinot 2011; Goode, McCullough, and O’Hare 2011; Hildebrand 2007), and Wikipedia (Ferron and Massa 2014; Pentzold 2009). Amongst other things, this has included a growing awareness of how collective memories might be shaped and contested through peer-to-peer discussion in digital settings, such as in the ‘comments’ section of video-sharing

website YouTube, described by Paulo Drinot as ‘a crowded, very loud, and very angry debating chamber where everyone speaks at once, no one much listens to one another, and where arguments cannot be formulated without being wrapped in vitriol and invective’ (2011:375). In light of Landsberg’s suggestion that ‘mass culture makes particular memories more widely available, so that people who have no “natural” claim to them might nevertheless incorporate them into their own archive of experience’ (2004:9), I begin my discussion of transcultural cross-referencing by exploring Greek¹²⁸ YouTube commenters’ uses of historical analogy within this rancorous, de-territorialised debating chamber.

I analysed the comments left on twelve YouTube videos dealing, in one way or another, with Greek-Turkish relationships.¹²⁹ Despite the varied subject matter of the videos, the comments almost invariably descended into acrimonious clashes over the historical interactions between the two communities. Typically, these debates pitted Greek and Turkish users offering narratives of harmonious Greek-Turkish coexistence against users from both sides propounding narratives of strife and hostility, and/or Greek strife narrators against Turkish strife narrators (on ‘harmony’ and ‘strife’ in narratives of Greek-Turkish relationships, see Halstead 2014b). Harmony narrators from both communities revelled in shared cultural and linguistic features, told stories of intercommunal harmony in the Ottoman Empire and Cyprus, and greeted one another

¹²⁸ Where possible, I identify in the text the stated ethnicity of users based on the information provided on their YouTube channel, or, occasionally, by extrapolating from their usernames. Users typically wrote in English, Greek, and Turkish, although the comments quoted below were all made in English.

¹²⁹ The selection of these videos was made to include a variety of topics (political, cultural, historical), a range of different stances on Greek-Turkish relationships (antagonistic, neutral, pro-reconciliation), and varying degrees of popularity in terms of number of views/comments. Four of the videos were dedicated to the shared musical heritage of the two communities (‘BEKLEDIM’ (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lFrQ6M6ZRoc> [accessed 1 July 2013]); ‘Fedon-Dostluk Şarkısı’ (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hJYLVYRqBPI> [accessed 1 July 2013]); ‘Greek Turkish Shared Musics – Kizim Seni Aliye (Istemem Babacim)’ (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XPPtZPZ6gzk> [accessed 18 June 2015]); ‘Turkish songs recorded by Greeks in USA (old)’ (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NO8DHSi99bk> [accessed 1 July 2013])), two were concerned with damage dealt to the Greek community during the 1955 Istanbul Riots (‘Istanbul pogrom’ (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lhpvNmQuB04> [accessed 1 July 2013]); ‘Septemvriáná’ (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kKTrOX9U6Xo> [accessed 1 July 2013])), two marked the anniversary of the Pontic genocide (‘19 May Pontian-Greek Genocide’ (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yW256u3ZMmw> [accessed 18 June 2015]); ‘Yenoktonia Pontion – Pontian Hellenism Genocide’ (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=264tbl6wgw> [accessed 18 June 2015])), one condemned the ‘illegal Turkish invasion’ of Cyprus in 1974 (‘Cyprus 1974’ (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iHGXNKus03Q> [accessed 1 July 2013])), one showed the opening scene of the film *Polítiki Kouzína*, that told the story of the Greeks deported from Istanbul in 1964 (‘A touch of spice’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CZ_XI4QvJ5o [accessed 3 July 2013])), and two explicitly constructed solidarities between different communities (‘History of Turkish Ottoman Genocide of Armenians, Assyrians and Pontic Greeks’ (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rwpw5xVKstM> [accessed 18 June 2015]); ‘Kurds Greeks Assyrians Cypriots Armenians united’ (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lHdkrGOWr8> [accessed 18 June 2015])).

with the portmanteau *kalimerhaba*. Meanwhile, Greek and Turkish strife narrators accused one another of a litany of historical atrocities, berated one another with claims of racial impurity and/or sexual impotency, and lambasted harmony narrators from their own communities for ethnic betrayal and historical ignorance, dismissing cultural similarity as being the result of contamination or theft.

In articulating their narratives of suffering and grievance, Greek strife narrators on YouTube not only had recourse to events from Greek nationalist history – such as the ‘Asia Minor Catastrophe’ in 1922 or the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, memories to which Landsberg might say they made a ‘natural’ claim (2004:9) – but also scoured history – and, frequently, the Internet – for comparisons and analogies to bolster their arguments. Commenting on the video ‘Istanbul Pogrom’, for instance, a Greek expatriate from Istanbul and witness to the *Septemvrianá* responded to the suggestion by another user that Greeks have also been guilty of committing acts of violence by writing:

War brings out the worst in people. I don’t doubt that atrocities occurred on BOTH sides during the Greco-Turkish war of 1921-22. Unlike the Turks however Greeks never engaged in government directed genocide. This is a Turkish speciality. Ask the Assyrians, Armenians, Kurds. The atrocities committed against the Greeks of Constantinople occurred during peacetime.

Calling upon other communities to testify as witnesses to Turkish atrocity, this YouTube user attempted to ‘prove’ the veracity, specificity, and severity of his own experiences in 1955 by suggesting parallels with other minorities alleged to have suffered at Turkish hands: saying, in effect, ‘if you don’t believe me, simply ask the Assyrians, Armenians, and Kurds’. In a similar manner, Greek users often implicitly or explicitly likened Turkish actions against ethnic or religious minorities to Nazi atrocities against the Jews. Responding to videos about the Istanbul Riots, for instance, several Greek commenters dubbed the events of 1955 ‘Turkish *Kristallnacht*’ or ‘*Kristallnacht* à la Turkey’, thereby equating the *Septemvrianá* to the Nazi attack on the Jews in 1938, whilst on the video ‘BEKLEDIM’ another Greek user reacted with incredulity to calls for Greek-Turkish friendship and reconciliation by declaring:

We are the victims you fool!!! nazis are the turks!!! remember the genozid on armenians??? greeks??? the p[og]rom in konstantinopel 1955??? how many greeks are left??? 1974 cyprus??? now you will claim the Greeks also did wrong thin[g]s...but not 1955, not the Armenians, not the alevit in sivas [the 1993

Sivas massacre of Alevi intellectuals by a Salafist mob], the[y] burned them alive in a hotel only because they are alevit and this [in] 1993!!!

Shortly afterwards, the same user wrote:

Whats about the jews and the germans [...] with the turks 1922¹³⁰ 1955 1974¹³¹ imia¹³², isaak solomou¹³³ etc. thrace¹³⁴ ägais¹³⁵not long time ago [I] saw pictures [of] behead[ed] kurds (1998) how [many] Greeks are left, armenians you fool...

In these extracts, the experiences of Armenians, Alevis, Cypriots, Greeks, and Kurds were allowed to commingle, thereby broadening the field of victims of Turkish actions, whilst Turkey was villainised and demonised through equation with Nazism. If recent photographic depiction of Kurdish suffering was cited as visual proof of Turkish atrocity, echoes of the Armenian genocide were evoked to emphasise Greek vulnerability, the writer exhorting the users of YouTube not to forget the fate of the Armenians. On occasion, some Greek users even seemed to vicariously enact revenge on Turkey through the envisaged future actions of the Kurds. On the video ‘A touch of spice’, one Greek commenter taunted a Turkish user by stating, ‘[d]o not worry PKK [the Kurdistan Workers’ Party] will fix you well. Your time will come’, whilst on the video ‘*Septemvrianá*’ another Greek user commemorated the victims of the Istanbul Riots with the epitaph, ‘[m]ay the souls of the murdered Greeks rest in Peace. Turkey will pay it. Kurds will bring them the bill’. Whilst references to the Armenian and Assyrian genocides thus served primarily to validate Greek claims against the Turks by providing precedents for Greek victimhood, linkages with the ongoing Kurdish-Turkish conflict additionally allowed commenters to reframe historic Greek suffering in a contemporary setting, providing a present-day visualisation of the past as well as vicarious vengeance for its injustices.¹³⁶

¹³⁰ I.e. the flight of Greek refugees from Asia Minor.

¹³¹ I.e. the conflict on Cyprus.

¹³² This is a reference to the two uninhabited islets at the centre of the 1996 military incident between Greece and Turkey.

¹³³ Tassos Isaak and Solomos Solomou were two Greek Cypriot refugees killed in 1996 during demonstrations in the United Nations Buffer Zone near Deryneia.

¹³⁴ A reference to perceived Turkish designs on Greek Western Thrace.

¹³⁵ A reference to disputes over territorial waters and maritime borders in the Aegean Sea.

¹³⁶ Such expressions of solidarity did not go uncontested, however. When one Greek user responded to the video ‘19 May Pontian-Greek Genocide’ by writing, ‘[e]ven until this day, Kurds go through the same... because they are Kurds, may God stand by them’, he was reprimanded by another Greek user in the following terms:

Do not forget that [at] those period[s] of time Kurds were included in the Ottoman army and Kurds killed a lot of Greeks since the genocide was based in religion. Of course it is wellknown that today in Turkey Kurds are second-class citizens... but we can’t compare what Greeks had gone through with the current oppression of Kurds.

Most YouTube viewers do not post responses to the videos they watch, but amongst those who do comment the level of interaction is high (Thelwall, Sud and Vis 2012:617, 627).¹³⁷ This pattern was borne out in the videos I analysed, in which multiple back-and-forth exchanges between relatively small groups of interlocutors were commonplace. As other studies of YouTube comments have found, whilst these posts were typically characterised not by productive dialogue but by a crude ‘quest for one-upmanship’ (Goode, McCullough, and O’Hare 2011:610), they were nevertheless often simultaneously ‘structured by a desire for understanding by the readers of these comments’ (Carpentier 2014:1011). In other words, YouTube commenters were driven by a desire not only to provoke reactions and belittle their opponents, but also to be perceived by other interlocutors and onlookers as having won the argument, leading to what Goode *et al.* aptly referred to as a ‘Monty Python-esque juxtaposition of substantive reasoning and extreme personal attack’ (2011:611). As both individual comments and the lifespan of extended dialogues on YouTube tended to be short, there was an imperative for users to make their case in the most concise, compelling, and over-the-top manner possible, leading to the repetition of certain tropes that were ‘deployed to *trigger* reactions and to *capture* attention’ (Goode, McCullough, and O’Hare 2011:603). This, in turn, seemed to encourage YouTube users to borrow the memories of other communities in order to maximise the scale of the suffering they accused others of inflicting, and to analogise with infamous and widely recognisable events from history such as Nazi genocide (conforming to Godwin’s Law of Nazi Analogies, which states that ‘[a]s an online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches one’ (Godwin 1994)).¹³⁸

In an analysis of First World War poetry, Geoff Dyer argued that the image of war as horrific had become so clichéd that it had lost its power to express that horror: ‘[w]ar may be horrible’, he wrote, ‘but that should not distract us from acknowledging what a horrible cliché this has become’ (1995:27). Dyer termed these instinctive clichés ‘[o]ff-the-peg formulae [that] free you from thinking for yourself about what is being said’, and warned that ‘[w]henver words are bandied about automatically and easily, their

¹³⁷ According to Mike Thelwall *et al.*’s study, which was based on a large sample of YouTube videos, whilst just 0.5% of viewers who watched a video left a comment, almost a quarter of those comments were replies to earlier posts (2012:617, 627).

¹³⁸ Mike Godwin developed his Law of Nazi Analogies in an effort to create a ‘counter-meme’ that would highlight, and perhaps ultimately curtail, the gratuitous use of Nazi analogies in online discussion (1994).

meaning is in the process of leaking away or evaporating’ (1995:29).¹³⁹ References to the Armenian and Assyrian genocides, the Kurdish-Turkish conflict, and Nazi genocide in YouTube comments might similarly be described as ‘off-the-peg memories’, abstracted and simplified formulae, often accompanied by little historical baggage, that were temporarily borrowed to validate, contextualise, and emphasise Greek suffering. Like Dyer’s clichéd horrors, these off-the-peg memories typically came across as automatic or knee-jerk reactions to particular discursive situations, and often stood in for substantive independent thinking about Greek-Turkish relationships and histories of violence more generally. Greek YouTube users attempted to bolster antagonistic arguments during quickfire debates, and to confirm perceived ‘patterns’ of ‘Turkish’ behaviour, by name-dropping persecuted communities and totemically citing de-contextualised atrocities, in the process simultaneously entrenching hostility towards the Turks and eliding the specificity of different historical events. At the same time, however, off-the-peg memories freed Greek Internet users from thinking about history *on their own*. On the one hand, the construction of parallel histories with Armenians, Assyrians, and Kurds served to endorse and rationalise Greek victimhood, by suggesting that other communities had similar experiences at the hands of the same perpetrators. Meanwhile, analogising with other, more well-known historical atrocities such as Nazi genocide made these claims evocative and intelligible in transnational cyberspace.

My intention here is not to imply a contrast with ‘bespoke’ or ‘tailor-made’ memories – to reinforce, in other words, Landsberg’s problematic distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘prosthetic’ memories (see also Silverman 2013:176) – nor to develop a prescriptive model that would be used to classify different transcultural references. Rather, I aim to draw attention to the fact that not every act of transcultural cross-referencing is evidence of complex and deep-rooted entanglements between different histories, but may sometimes reflect more superficial opportunities for comparison that occur within quite specific discursive contexts (cf. Silverman 2013:18). In other words, there is a distinction to be made between the adornment of narratives of persecution with motifs borrowed from other communities, and the more complex processes of remediation, premediation, and superimposition through which past histories, sometimes quite imperceptibly, leave their mark on contemporary representations. This is a discussion to which I return at the end of the chapter.

¹³⁹ I am grateful to Sebastian Owen for this reference.

It is, perhaps, unsurprising that we should find such transcultural cross-referencing in the ‘de-territorialized world of the Internet’ (Drinot 2011:372), where individuals from diverse backgrounds are able to interact and gain access to each other’s mnemonic repertoires. Indeed, it is notable that both Greek and Turkish YouTube users commonly drew on online sources – in particular, news media sites, Wikipedia, and other YouTube videos – and quite often assigned other users ‘reading lists’ in the form of a series of web links, indicating that they had been ‘shopping’ for or ‘Googling’ appropriate material to append to their narratives. Transcultural cross-referencing, nevertheless, predates the ‘connective turn’ and the advent of interactive web 2.0 platforms (Confino 2012; Cubitt 2007b; Erll 2011a:4-5; Erll 2011b:11; Rothberg 2010:9, 35; Shlapentokh 1999): Geoff Cubitt, for instance, has explored how nineteenth-century French polemicists detected ‘contemporary French meanings in references to England’s turbulent seventeenth-century history’ (2007b:74); whilst Confino has demonstrated that in the 1930s and 1940s opponents and proponents alike often measured the Nazi rise to power against the values of the French Revolution (2012:7). In the rest of this chapter, I accordingly focus on how expatriate writers and activists in offline contexts, in common with the YouTube users cited above, often articulated their narratives of persecution within a transcultural frame of reference.

Parallel histories: Armenians and Kurds

As we have seen in earlier chapters, the newspapers *O Polítis* and *Ímvros* have since their foundation been engaged in a struggle to counteract the marginalisation of the Greeks of Turkey in Greek society, history, and diplomacy, and to represent, publicise, and preserve their memories of persecution in Greek, European, and international forums. These efforts have frequently involved the adoption and adaptation of archetypes from Greek national history (see chapter 5) and/or stereotypes of Turkish aggression or barbarity (see chapter 4), which served to give expatriate local histories meaning and intelligibility by assimilating them to a broader, diachronic Greek-Turkish conflict. For many expatriate writers and activists, nevertheless, it also made sense to interpret and present the persecution of the Greeks of Turkey within a broader frame of reference that included the experiences of other minority communities in Turkey. Particularly from the mid- to late-1970s onwards, against the backdrop of the rise of the PKK and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) as well as increasing activism by Armenian and Kurdish diaspora communities, the expatriate

newspapers began to carry sympathetic articles discussing the 1915 Armenian genocide, Armenian efforts to obtain international recognition for its occurrence, and the armed conflict between Turkey and the PKK. In 1975, for instance, *O Polítis* responded to reports in the Turkish press that Armenian, Greek, and Kurdish diaspora groups were working cooperatively in opposition to Turkey, by declaring on its front page that Greeks should support the efforts of these other communities:

It is about time for these two ancient peoples [the Armenians and the Kurds] to be vindicated. The Turkish chauvinists for centuries now since their arrival in Asia Minor, have thought of nothing but how to exterminate the ethnicities that they found on the land that they conquered by fire and sword. The genocide of the Armenians 60 years ago is known throughout the world just like the persecutions of the Hellenes and the Kurds that have been committed for centuries by the Turks with disregard for morality and humanity, starting with that barbarous *devşirme* that formed the Janissaries, after the Fall of Constantinople and the dissolution of the Hellenic Byzantine Empire, the stronghold of this civilization (*O Polítis* September 1975).

This article appeared in the specific context of a discussion about intercommunal corporation, but before long both the Armenians and the Kurds were making regular appearances in expatriate writing, even when the article in question had no direct relevance to either community. In 1997, for example, *O Polítis* printed an article entitled ‘History Repeats Itself’, which began by enumerating on Greek victories against the Persians – the Battle of Marathon, the Battle of Salamis, and the campaigns of Alexander the Great and Eastern Roman Emperor Heraclius – before equating these confrontations with a contemporary conflict between Greeks and Turks. Within this protracted narrative of Greek-Turkish antagonism, the Armenians and Kurds featured as fellow victims of Turkish aggression:

The place of the Great King [Persian Xerxes I] has been taken by the Turkish invader. For 500 years he has pillaged Hellenic Asia Minor and the Aegean. Various circumstances prevented Hellenism from giving the appropriate lesson to that conqueror. By contrast [due to] their conflicting interests various [presumably Western] countries did not only support [the Turk] but also covered up the genocides he committed against the Hellenes, the Armenians, and the Kurds, genocides that still cast their shame on our world today. And we arrive at the drama of Cyprus and the disregard by the Turkish invaders of all of the votes and decisions of the United Nations [...] Kurds, Armenians and Hellenes ask for justice, awaiting the liberation of their lands on which they have inalienable rights (*O Polítis* September 1977).

Creating links across huge swathes of history, the author of this article drew equivalences between the Persian Wars, the Greek-Turkish conflict of 1919-1922, the

Armenian Genocide, the Kurdish-Turkish struggle, and Turkish military action on Cyprus in 1974, casually eliding the drastically different historical circumstances surrounding these various moments. A comparable (if less chronologically ambitious) narrative was articulated in a 1983 *Imvros* article entitled ‘From Lausanne to Cyprus’, in which the author wrote of Turkish actions on Imbros:

Same formula, same execution. Lausanne and afterwards our uprooting. [The London and] Zurich [Agreements] and after 40% of Cyprus under occupation. Similar of course applies both for the Armenians previously and the Kurds more recently [...] Turkey found in the following decade the opportunity to achieve the final blow on Imbros (the events of 1964, the expropriations, the closure of the schools, terrorism, and much more) (*Imvros* September 1983).

Equating the experiences of the 1923 Greek refugees, the Cypriots, the Armenians, the Kurds, and the *Imvriótes*, the author of this article sought to identify a demonstrable pattern in Turkish foreign and domestic policy, and in this way to develop a schema into which the persecution of the Greeks of Imbros could be placed. The Constantinopolitan Society, in its efforts to publicise the occurrence of the Istanbul Riots in 1955 (see chapter 5), likewise drew equivalences between Armenian, Greek, and Kurdish histories. On the 40th anniversary of the *Septemvriáná*, for example, the Society issued the following declaration:

Although five years separate us from the twenty-first century, even if Turkey tries to put on a European Mask, it continues to be indifferent and to unreservedly trample on human rights. Despite the international outcry, it continues its expansive politics, invading Iraq, as Cyprus in 1974 and Syria in 1938, with the intention on that occasion of exterminating the Kurds. Those measures constitute a continuation of the ethnic cleansing programme of the Turkish government. That programme began to be applied from 1908 and had as its consequence the genocide of millions of Armenians, Hellenes and other people in Asia Minor. The final phase of that schedule was the annihilation of the Hellenism of Constantinople. The application of the programme against the Hellenes of Constantinople continues still today when their numbers are few. Those are the perceptions of today’s “democratic Turkey” as regards human rights. For that reason:

THE CONSTANTINOPOLITAN ASSOCIATIONS: appeal once again to Greek and international Public Opinion, Governments, and Parliaments of all civilised countries (Constantinopolitan Society 1995a).

A particularly systematic effort to parallel the experiences of the Armenians, the Greeks, and the Kurds in this manner can be found in Leonidas Koumakis’ semi-autobiographical novel *The Miracle* (first published in Greek in 1993). Koumakis was born in Istanbul in c.1950, where he lived until his father was expelled from Turkey as a

Greek citizen in 1964. According to the blurb on the inside cover of the 1996 English-language reprint, he wrote *The Miracle* in order ‘to communicate, through both historical evidence and my personal experience, the Turkish policy against Hellenism and beyond’ (Koumakis 1996). The book accordingly incorporates both the personal experiences of the author and his father, and extended historical narratives, the latter typically delivered by characters within the story. In one passage, for instance, the author reconstructs his father’s inner monologue as he sits waiting to learn of his fate at a Turkish police station on one Tuesday in 1964, a day that ‘my father had always considered to be an unlucky day because 29 May, 1453, when Constantinople fell to the Turks, was a Tuesday’ (Koumakis 1996:19). In the book, Koumakis senior ruminates at length on the plight of the Greeks of Turkey whilst he waits, ultimately arriving at the conclusion that the Armenian genocide and the persecution of the Greeks of Istanbul were components of a broader Turkish policy:

Any decisive blows meted out by Turkey during the course of the twentieth century have been inflicted by taking advantage of a “suitable opportunity”. The Armenian genocide that took place during the First World War, the Capital Tax known as *Varlık Vergisi* that was imposed mainly on Turkey’s Greek population in the Second World War, the pogrom of 1955 and the expulsions in 1964 – all these occurred at times when circumstances were “suitable”.
 “Are you Gerasimos Koumakis?” a stern voice asked in Turkish, bringing my father back from his thoughts with a bump. It was the afternoon of 9th July, 1964 (Koumakis 1996:24).

Historical interludes of this sort recur throughout *The Miracle*. The longest occurs towards the end of the story, as the Koumakis family are preparing to leave Istanbul for good. A young Leonidas Koumakis is unexpectedly summoned to the apartment of an elderly Greek neighbour, Mr Kleopas, who proceeds to deliver an extended lecture on Turkish history from which the author quotes verbatim for 18 pages. I reproduce here an abridged version of this narrative:

For 600 years continuously the Turks have practised the only skill nature has endowed them with: destruction and pillage [...]
 What followed [the Hamidian massacres of 1894-1896] was the greatest cold-blooded genocide in the history of mankind. Within the space of just a few months [in 1915], one and a half million Armenians were mercilessly wiped out at the hands of the Turks [...]
 Here Mr Kleopas paused again, quite clearly overcome, drank a few more sips of water and then went on:
 [...] On 9th September, 1922 the Turks invaded Smyrna and spent the next five days in a frenzy of destruction, conflagration and slaughter. Over 150,000 Greeks were massacred by the Young Turks when Kemal entered Smyrna.

Between 1914 and 1922 they killed 323,000 Greeks in the Pontus region and more than 400,000 living on the Asia Minor coast [...]

Next it was the turn of the Kurds, but they proved to be considerably tougher. After holding out for 79 days, the Kurdish revolution ended in a bloodbath in July, 1924. The Kurds are an ancient and historic people who are mentioned by Xenophon [...] The Kurdish uprisings began long before the Greek Revolution of 1821 [...] they paid with their blood for their longing for freedom [...]

[T]he age-old Turkish philosophy that applies at any time and in any place occupied by the Turks: 'The Turks are the only masters in this country. Anyone who is not a genuine Turk has only one right in this country: the right to be a servant, the right to be a slave.'

And the Kurds who are still living in Turkey today, my boy, have this right only. The Greeks who stayed on in Turkey were all wiped out after the events of 1955. The final act of this terrible Greek tragedy is now being played out [...]

Sooner or later, having resolved the Kurdish problem by massacring innocent civilians, they will turn their attention to Cyprus, Western Thrace, and to the Greek islands in the Aegean. The next generation of Greeks will have to do better than the previous one [...] (Koumakis 1996:77-92).

In common with the style of the book generally, this section weaves together two different narrative modes: the first a personal story of how the author left Turkey and bid farewell to his neighbour, and the second an historical narrative that uses this farewell as a means to place Koumakis' personal and familial memory within a broader history. The latter narrative systematically assimilates personal experiences of the Istanbul Riots in 1955 and the expulsion of Greek citizens in 1964 to a chronic history of repression, injustice, and bloodshed in Turkish lands.

In narratives of this sort, the Armenian genocide and the Kurdish-Turkish conflict filled in the empty background space surrounding seminal moments in Greek nationalist history, thereby providing expatriate narratives of persecution with greater spatial breadth and temporal depth. The memories of others served as tropes through which expatriate writers sought to validate, explicate, and communicate their own experiences and ideological stances, both to themselves and to unfamiliar third-parties, and to reassure themselves that they had not suffered alone, but were rather victims of a diachronic Turkish policy of national homogenisation. Similar expressions of commonality and/or solidarity with the Armenians and Kurds were in evidence in some personal testimonies. When I asked Istanbul-born *Imvriótis* Loukas if he had had any Kurdish acquaintances whilst living in Turkey, for instance, he replied, 'I have never met anyone in my life speaking Kurdish. They were afraid, of course. As I was afraid to speak Greek in the street, so they too were afraid to speak Kurdish' (08/05/2013). Reminiscing about the Kurds who used to work in his shop in Istanbul, meanwhile,

Spyros exclaimed that, ‘the Kurds are another race, they are not Turks. Now they are trying to make them into Turks [...] we also had two Armenians [in the shop], and great damage befell them also, the Armenians: 1.5 million’ (02/12/2011). Fotis, born in Istanbul in 1950, likewise proclaimed that the Kurds ‘are a different people, they should have their own country’ (01/02/2012). Nevertheless, in the case of my interviewees, at least, such transcultural analogies were somewhat less prevalent than in formal written discourse.

Comparisons with Armenian and Kurdish experience offered expatriate writers and activists something that the Greek national framework alone could not: resonance and intelligibility on an international level. Indeed, the articulation of such parallel histories was commonplace in expatriate activism directed at a European or international audience. In addition to the Greek-language declaration cited above, the Constantinopolitan Society marked the 40th anniversary of the *Septemvrianá* by issuing a resolution in English with the aim of exposing Turkey ‘in the eyes of global opinion’ (Constantinopolitan Society 1995b). They wrote:

WE PROTEST Turkish expansionist policies, militarist practices and flagrant violations of international treaties regarding the basic human rights of minority populations as well as the ethnic cleansing this country is presently undertaking against minority populations such as the Kurds, the Armenians and the (remnants of) Greeks and a number of religious denominations which are denied the free assertion of their identity (Constantinopolitan Society 1995b).

In a 1994 English-language article, *Imvros* likewise name-dropped both the Armenians and the Kurds alongside other Greek victims of Turkish actions:

[T]o the civilized World: the Treaty of Lausanne must be respected by Tur[key], RESPONSIBLE FOR TWO EXTERMINATIO[N]S in our century: of the Armenians in 1915, and of Greeks of Pontus in 1922. Although only 551 years dates the presence of the Turks in the land, that was glorified for 1000 years by the Byzantine Empire, and for another 1000 years before the byzantines by the Ancient Greeks – now it is time for the Tur[key] to be initiated to the Civilization, guarantor of the human rights. IMBROS and TENEDOS, CYRPUS, the KURDS – a TOUCHSTONE fo[r] the Civilized World to taste his civilization (*Imvros* May-June 1994d).

In a 1995 article discussing Turkey’s relationship with the EU under the headline ‘Let’s Not Allow the European to Forget the Atrocities of the Turk’, *O Polítis* similarly wrote that, ‘[o]ur neighbours [i.e. the Turks] do not change tactic. Only the people and the victims change: Armenians, Greeks, Kurds’ (*O Polítis* April 1995). In 1997, meanwhile,

it printed a gruesome cartoon in which a caricatured Turk, complete with fez and a blooded scimitar, stands at the gates of Europe proclaiming to be European, whilst behind him lie four severed heads labelled, respectively, as the Cypriots, the Kurds, the Armenians, and the Greeks (*O Polítis* November 1997; see fig. 5). There is, in this illustration, no effort to prioritise the suffering of the Greeks – who, lying in the background, are in fact the least visible of the victims – because the implication that the ‘true nature’ of the Turks is hidden behind a European façade is made more arresting by broadening the field of victims, and subsuming Greek victimhood within historical atrocities more recognisable to European ears.



‘Open the gate. I’m a European!’

Fig. 5 ‘Open the gate. I’m a European!’ Cartoon from *O Polítis* November 1997. Reproduced with the permission of Ekdóseis Tsoukátou.

Transcultural cross-referencing of this sort increased in frequency in expatriate discourse throughout the 1980s, and by the 1990s had become commonplace. Although comparatively considered and detailed treatments of Armenian and Kurdish history were sometimes on offer, these references more typically appeared as formulaic motifs, which persistently cropped up in discussions that largely remained focused on Greek suffering, quite often accompanied by little (if any) explanatory context (thus resembling, in many ways, the ‘off-the-peg memories’ on YouTube). Expatriate writers were evidently confident that their readers would immediately understand the relevance of bringing up these two communities, so much so that they were often content simply to mention them in passing by name, as in a 1990 *Polítis* article that referred to the

‘characteristic acquaintance of the Turkish race with genocide (*Hellenes, Armenians, Kurds*)’ (*O Polítis* March 1990; my emphasis), or a 1996 editorial from *Imvros* that characterised the uprooting of the *Imvriótes* as one of the “works of love” of the Turks whose sensitivities have been registered in history towards the minorities of the twentieth century (*Armenians, Pontics, Hellenes, Kurds et cetera*)’ (*Imvros* October-November-December 1996; my emphasis). Repeatedly name-dropped as fellow sufferers of Turkish atrocity, the Armenians and Kurds became part of a regular cast of persecuted minorities totemically cited by expatriate writers whenever they had cause to articulate their own grievances with Turkey.

Analogous histories: Jews and Nazis

For expatriate writers, the histories of the Armenians and the Kurds represented a compelling framework within which to situate Greek narratives of persecution, not least because the accused was the same in all three cases. The connections they envisaged confirm that memory of the Holocaust is not unique as a point of reference through which persecuted communities attempt to understand and represent their own experiences (see review essay II). Nevertheless, a perception of the Holocaust as ‘a standard of evaluation for judging the evility of other threatening acts’ (Alexander 2009:58) did sometimes incline expatriate activists to draw analogies between Turkish actions and the Nazi genocide. In a 1979 article entitled ‘the Holocaust’, for example, *O Polítis* paralleled the experiences of the Greeks and the Jews as victims of persecution, and likened the Turks to the Germans as perpetrators of genocide (*O Polítis* May 1979). In June 1988 the newspaper similarly stated that Turkish military action on Cyprus in 1974 ‘resembles Nazi methods, such as when Hitler attacked Czechoslovakia to liberate, allegedly, the Sudeten Germans’ (*O Polítis* June 1988), and in April 1994 commented that the recent arrest of seven Kurdish deputies by Turkey ‘takes us back to the era of Hitlerism’ (*O Polítis* April 1994). More rarely, explicit comparisons were made between Nazi violence and the persecution of the Greeks of Turkey. A 1992 English-language article in *Imvros* aimed at younger *Imvriótes* living outside Greece thus dubbed the anti-Greek policies on Imbros the Turks’ “final solution” for the island (*Imvros* June 1992), whilst in a 1993 speech reprinted in *Imvros* Yiannis Politis declared that Turkish policy towards the Greeks of Imbros was so crafty that ‘even Hitler’s Nazi regime against the Jews would envy it’ (*Imvros* November-December 1993). In a 2015 press release to coincide with the 60th anniversary of the Istanbul Riots,

meanwhile, the Constantinopolitan Society wrote that the *Septemvrianá* ‘can be compared only to the atrocities of the Nazis of Germany’ (Constantinopolitan Society 2015).

Generally, however, expatriate newspapers shied away from explicit comparisons between their own experiences and the Holocaust of the Jews.¹⁴⁰ In common with many Greek YouTube users (see above), expatriate writers often preferred to draw analogies with Nazi genocide implicitly, by placing the persecution of the Greeks of Turkey in the same narrative sequence as the Holocaust without ostensibly voicing a direct comparison or likeness between the two events. In a 1977 article, *O Polítis* thus associated Turkish genocidal actions against the Armenians and the Cypriots with the Nazi genocide of the Jews, before segueing into Turkish actions in Istanbul, on Imbros, and in the Kurdish regions of Anatolia, which, though not explicitly labelled as genocidal acts, were by association likened to more infamous events that *were* identified as such. The newspaper wrote:

The Armenian genocide found its mimic in the face of Hitler who followed the Turkish example with the genocide of the Jews during the Second World War. Another genocide was committed by the Turks against the Cypriot people, and by the very same [Turks] human rights have been flagrantly violated in Cyprus, Constantinople, Imbros, [and] in Anatolia against the Kurds (*O Polítis* June 1977).

In a 1985 piece entitled ‘And Yet ... The Nazi-esque Crimes Continue’, *O Polítis* similarly ‘established polluting analogies with Nazism’ (Alexander 2009:45) by once again likening the Holocaust to the Armenian genocide and the invasion of Cyprus. The author of the article rhetorically asked the reader to consider:

What differences are there between the Nazi crimes and those that have been committed and continue to be committed, for twenty years now, against the Cypriots by the Turks? Perhaps Turkey is excused, as the first teacher of genocide, with the extermination of the Armenians, whose blood still asks for justice, and we must leave her free to commit crimes against humanity? (*O Polítis* June 1985).

¹⁴⁰ Much to the dismay of expatriate writer Vasilis Kyrtzopoulos (see below), expatriate narrators were also often cautious in their use of the term ‘genocide’. In 1984, for instance, *O Polítis* characterised the conscription of non-Muslims into forced labour battalions as an attempt to conduct ‘a “mini genocide” of the *Romioí* in the depths of Anatolia’, foiled only by ‘the victory of the Allies against [the Turks]’ “soulmate” the Nazis’ (*O Polítis* June 1984), and even more tentatively in 1988 referred to the ‘eradication, I will not say genocide, of the Hellenes of Asia Minor, Pontus and Thrace’ (*O Polítis* October 1988a).

In such examples, expatriate writers sought to demonstrate the extremity of Turkish actions in Istanbul and Imbros not by directly equating their own experiences to those of the Jews under Nazi occupation, but rather by likening Nazi genocide to Turkish actions elsewhere, and thereby establishing the alleged genocidal propensities of those they accused of inflicting their own suffering.¹⁴¹

There was, nevertheless, one particular analogy between the Nazi Holocaust and Turkish persecution of the Greeks of Turkey that emerged more persistently and explicitly in expatriate discourse: the comparison between the 1955 *Septemvrianá* and the 1938 *Kristallnacht*. This was, as we saw in chapter 5, an analogy often pursued by the Federation of Constantinopolitans. In the proceedings for the inaugural anniversary conference in 2008, for instance, the Federation observed that the Istanbul Riots have been ‘described by some as the “*kristallnacht of Romiosyni*”’ (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2008:104). In a presentation authored in 2012, they similarly wrote that the ‘size of the pogrom is comparable to the Crystal Night in Nazi Germany against the Jewish community 9-10 November 1938’ (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2012:2), whilst in a 2014 presentation marking the 50th anniversary of the 1964 expulsions the Istanbul Riots were described as ‘very much resembling the 1938 Crystal Night in Nazi Germany’ (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2014a). In 2013 and again in 2014, the Federation in fact advertised their annual conference on the Istanbul Riots as the ‘anniversary of the *Kristallnacht* 6-7/9/1955 for the Hellenism of Constantinople’ (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2013b; Federation of Constantinopolitans 2014b). A 2007 English-language presentation by the Federation, meanwhile, contained the following slide that made a particularly systematic effort to compare 1955 to 1938:

THE SIMILARITY OF THE “SEPTEMBRIANA” WITH THE KRISTAL NIGHT OF NAZI GERMANY


- There is a very high degree of similarity between the Kristal Night Riots [that] occurred against the Jewish Minority in Nazi Germany in 8-9/11/1938 and the Events of 6-7/9/1955 in Constantinople.
- The similarities are:
 - The involvement of Provocation
 - Action of Para-state mechanisms and use of storming troops

¹⁴¹ As with references to the Armenians and the Kurds, analogies between expatriate experience and Nazi genocide were comparatively rare in my interviewees’ personal testimonies, with a few notable exceptions: Gerasimos, for instance, accused the Turks of implementing ‘Hitler-esque methods’ in their attempts to eradicate Kurdish ethnic identity, and likened Mustafa Kemal to Adolf Hitler (06/02/2012), whilst Markos, discussing Turkish actions during the 1919-1922 war with Greece, remarked ‘you win a war, but you do not kill everyone, we are not Hitler, only Hitler killed people. But the Turks did that: they slaughtered, they killed, they burned’ (04/05/2012).

- Attack to pre-marked shops and houses
- The attack to sacred Places and Cemeteries
- The orders of not massacres (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2007).

The next slide of the presentation staged a photographic dialogue between *Kristallnacht* and the *Septemvriáná*, juxtaposing an image of the broken shop window of a Jewish business in Berlin in 1938 with one depicting rioters throwing merchandise from a shop into the streets in Istanbul in 1955, and a photograph of the ruined Fasanenstrasse Synagogue in Berlin with one of Patriarch Athenagoras I standing in the looted Church of Saints Constantine and Helen in Istanbul (see fig. 6).

Germany 1938-Istanbul 1955



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Fig. 6 ‘Germany 1938-Istanbul 1955’. Slide taken from the Federation of Constantinopolitans’ PowerPoint presentation *The Tragic Anniversary of the 6-7 September 1955 Turkish State Organised Ethnic Cleansing Night of the Greek Community of Istanbul* (2007). Reproduced with permission.

The Federation of Constantinopolitans has argued that identifying commonalities between events like 1938 and 1955 might contribute to academic understanding of how state-sponsored acts of mob violence are organised and put into practice, in order that similar incidents might be averted in the future (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2008:104). As the Federation’s president Ouzounoglou put it in an article in a Greek newspaper:

[T]he amazing similarity between *Kristallnacht*, organized and executed by the Nazi regime against the Jewish minority on 8-9/11/1938, and the *Septemvrianá*, which happened on 6-7/9/1955 in Constantinople [...] is an interesting subject of study for researchers, which may reveal interesting facts about the planners of the *Septemvrianá* (Ouzounoglou 2013a).

In his interview with me, Ouzounoglou further suggested that there was possibly a direct knowledge exchange between the SS organisers of *Kristallnacht* and the architects of the Istanbul Riots, reflected in some of the similar techniques deployed in both incidents (Ouzounoglou 2014a).

It seems probable, however, that there is more to these analogic references to Nazism in expatriate awareness-raising materials and public pronouncements than academic curiosity. Like the recasting of the *Septemvrianá* as the ‘Third Fall of Constantinople’ (see chapter 5), presenting the Istanbul Riots as ‘Kristallnacht in Constantinople’ is an act of premediation that, consciously or otherwise, helps to ‘make the past intelligible’ (Erl1 2011c:143), both for those who were there (insofar as it provides them with an established language and imagery through which to interpret their experiences, or a sense that they are not alone in having suffered such persecution) and for unfamiliar external audiences (who, in the West at least, are more likely to be familiar with *Kristallnacht*, and for whom the comparison will likely direct an interpretation of the events in Istanbul in 1955). The latter was put forward by former president of the Constantinopolitan Society Isaakidis in his interview with me, as an explanation for why expatriate organisations might draw analogies with the Nazi Holocaust:

The whole world knows about the Jews. There is not a corner of the world that does not know that the Jews were burned by the Germans. About the rest? About the Roma, the homosexuals, about Greece that they burned, about Yugoslavia that they destroyed, about Russia where they killed 3 million. Next to the Jewish Holocaust, that – nobody knows [...] Somebody from China, for instance, will not know about the slaughter of the Armenians or the Christians of Anatolia, but he knows that the Jews were burned in Germany [...] For someone who is foreign, a third party, one must make a comparison (Isaakidis 2014).

Levy and Sznajder suggested that because ‘Jewish victims can come to represent victimhood in general’ (2006:43) it becomes possible for ‘diverse oppressed groups to recognise themselves in the role of the Jewish victims’ (2006:46). Equally significant, however, is that diverse oppressed groups can also recognise their antagonists in the role of the Nazis, and thereby establish the culpability and villainy of their oppressors within a widely-intelligible narrative framework.

Kristallnacht, for some expatriates, thus constituted a compelling archetype with which to interpret and represent the Istanbul Riots of 1955. For one expatriate writer, however, such comparisons between anti-Semitic mob violence and the experiences of the Greeks of Turkey were insufficient, and risked obfuscating the particularity and severity of expatriate suffering. In his 2006 book *Unregistered Genocide: Constantinople September 1955*, Vasilis Kyrtzopoulos wrote disapprovingly of the tendency for Greek and foreign writers to use the terms ‘pogrom’ or ‘*Kristallnacht*’ to characterise the *Septemvriáná*, which, he felt, generated a distorted impression of the Istanbul Riots (2006:22, 79). He suggested that the *Polítes* were wrong to assume that ‘because I am alive, there was no genocide’, and argued that the *Septemvriáná* should be classified as a genocide in terms of international law (Kyrtzopoulos 2006:20, 23). He accordingly embarked upon an extensive effort to demonstrate how the Istanbul Riots, along with other measures targeting the Greeks of Turkey, satisfied the definitions of genocide as laid out by the International Criminal Court and by Genocide Watch (Kyrtzopoulos 2006:100-103, 115-131), which finished with a controversial (to say the least) statistical comparison with the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide:

[L]et’s compare in numbers the Genocide of the *Septemvriáná* with its counterparts of the Holocaust (1933-1945) and Rwanda (1959-1963, 1993-1994).

During the Holocaust the Jewish population was to be found in the lands of 33 modern-day European countries. The number of their victims ranges from 3,800,000 to 6,500,000. Taking into account both of these figures, and the number of Jews who live today in the same areas (1,375,000), we see that around 3% of the population is Jewish. So, by 2005 the Jewish population had been replenished by between 21% and 36% respectively.

At the beginning of the 1990s the population of Rwanda amounted to around 7,000,000 of which around 1,800,000 were Tutsi. Today, the number of Tutsi amounts to 1,250,000 around 15% of the total population. The population has been replenished by 66%. At the beginning of 1950 the number of Hellenes in Turkey amounted to around 145,000 and constituted around 6.9% of the total population of Turkey. Today the Hellenes comprise 0.025% of the total population of Turkey (Kyrtzopoulos 2006:129).

Kyrtzopoulos proceeded to make further comparisons based on the contemporary economic situation of these three groups, before concluding that ‘in the second half of the twentieth century the genocide of the Constantinopolitan Ethnic Group is, from a sociological perspective and in terms of International Jurisprudence and in substance, a reality’ (2006:130-131). Whilst other expatriate writers seemed to envisage (tentative) comparisons with the Nazi Holocaust as a vehicle for interpreting and articulating their own experiences of suffering, Kyrtzopoulos was not prepared to assimilate the

Septemvrianá to other more infamous acts of violence for the sake of demonstrating commensurability. In his effort to ensure that memories of the *Septemvrianá* were ‘written into global history as befits them’ (Kyratzopoulos 2006:18), he accordingly placed the expatriation of the Greeks of Turkey into explicit competition with the genocide of the Jews and the Tutsi, hoping in this way to demonstrate its reality as an act of genocide in the face of alleged indifference from the European community. Kyratzopoulos’ argument vividly reminds us that competition is always a possible outcome of the multidirectional trajectories of memory (Rothberg 2011; see below).

‘Cosmopolitical’ memory?

When Silverman concluded his study of Francophone representations of the Holocaust and colonialism by arguing for a ‘cosmopolitical’ understanding of memory as composed of ‘hybrid and overlapping rather than separate pasts’ that would facilitate the elaboration of ‘new democratic solidarities in the future across the lines of race and nation commensurate with the interconnected world of the new millennium’ (2013:179), he expressed the hopes of many recent scholars that the transcultural dynamics they were identifying might represent a more ‘ethical’ way of remembering histories of violence (see review essay II). The examples of transcultural cross-referencing considered in this chapter suggest that there is some validity in such a position, but also point to the limitations of a cosmopolitical optimism.

As Rothberg observed, it has often been assumed that the memories of different victim communities must interact competitively in a battle over the scarce mnemonic resource of public recognition; that ‘[a]s I struggle to achieve recognition of *my* memories and *my* identity, I necessarily exclude the memories and identities of others’ (2009a:5). If this assumption were accurate, we might expect the juxtaposition of different memories of atrocity in the examples presented above to generate a competitive hierarchy of suffering, what the author Daniel Mendelsohn has aptly termed the ‘my-genocide-was-worse-than-your-genocide thing’ (Hartman, Hoffman, Mendelsohn and Miller 2011:119). Competitive victimhood is certainly an aspect of memory’s multidirectionality (Rothberg 2011), as we saw through Kyratzopoulos’ efforts to raise the profile of the *Septemvrianá* in European discourse by arguing that Turkey’s persecution of its Greek minority ultimately had a more severe demographic impact on its target population than did the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide. Generally,

however, expatriate cross-referencing with Armenian and Kurdish experience actually appeared to be *anti-hierarchical*: expatriate writers were more concerned with constructing rhetorical solidarities premised on the equality and interchangeability of victimhood than with establishing competitive victim stratification, and, accordingly, routinely compromised the specificity of their own experience by asserting its commensurability with that of other ethnic groups within Turkey (that the accused is the same in all three cases is, of course, hugely significant). This provided them with a means to legitimate their narratives of persecution by asserting that other communities had similar experiences at the hands of the same perpetrators, and to visualise and represent the comparatively imperceptible day-to-day discrimination of the Greeks of Turkey through the more concrete analogies of war and genocide. In a December 1990 article, *O Polítis* archetypally wrote that:

Our neighbouring Turkey solved the problem of minorities with the Armenians through genocide from 1915 to 1923, with the Hellenes with another genocide from 1914 to 1922 and with repressions and expulsions from 1955 and later [...] the same genocide was also used against the Kurds, many millions of people (*O Polítis* December 1990).

In narratives of this sort, the writer was not compelled to explicitly label the persecution of the *Polítes* as genocidal, but rather was able to *implicitly* co-opt the arresting narrative framework of genocide by bracketing expatriate experience with that of the Armenians, the Greeks of Asia Minor and the Pontus, and the Kurds. Equating the experiences of the three communities also gave the expatriates a quantifiable human cost with which to represent their comparatively unquantifiable psychological trauma. In the June 1995 edition of *O Polítis*, one expatriate was thus able to enlarge the number of victims of – and, by consequence, the number of witnesses to – Turkish actions, precisely by *not* distinguishing between ‘our’ suffering and ‘their’ similar suffering:

It is lamentable that U.S. policymakers ignore the fact that during the last 70 years, three genocidal campaigns in my native Turkey have left 7.5 million innocent victims among the Armenian, Greek and Kurdish populations (*O Polítis* June 1995).

If parallels with Armenian and Kurdish history thus functioned much like the references to Greek national history discussed in chapter 5, helping expatriate writers to both rationalise their own experiences and communicate them to others, they additionally gave expatriate narratives meaning and intelligibility beyond a Greek-Turkish national conflict, and therefore resonated more strongly with European or even international

audiences. In this sense, placing their experiences of persecution alongside other, more well-known histories of violence *emphasised* expatriate suffering rather than minimising or diluting its severity.

The question remains, however, as to whether such transnational analogic thinking simply served to structure and buttress narratives about the self, or whether it also had a transformative effect on expatriate perceptions of Armenian and Kurdish others. In her discussion of the ways in which individuals acquire mass-mediated memories from other times and places, Landsberg maintained that because such ‘prosthetic’ memories ‘feel real’ they can influence peoples’ perceptions and actions, and even contribute to the articulation of ‘an ethical relation to the other’ (2004:21; see review essay II). Indeed, expatriate invocations of the Armenian genocide and the Kurdish independence struggle were by no means restricted to casual name-dropping within narratives of Greek suffering, and sometimes found expression in impassioned proclamations of empathy, angry denunciations of Turkish actions (and international indifference) towards these communities, or appeals for readers and the Greek public to support their campaigns for recognition or liberation. In 1999, for instance, when PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured by Turkish intelligence services in Kenya *en route* from the Greek Embassy in Nairobi to the airport, there was a strong outpouring of support for the Kurdish leader in *O Politis*. In the March edition, one writer responded to the arrest – and to rumours of Greek complicity – as follows:

Although many years have passed I remember like it was yesterday, when as an adolescent I was passing by the University, along with my mother and she stopped at the set-up tables of the foreign students – and not just that – also signed in favour of human rights, which were being trampled on in various countries of Asia and Africa, against Apartheid, in favour of Amnesty International, against the repression of the Kurds [...] The years passed and the repressed people who found themselves taking shelter in our country multiplied. And I was vexed about why they did not stay in their own country to fight for their rights. However, my parents, who knew many times over the repression of Hellenic minorities in hostile countries and finally hunted took refuge in the mother *patrída*, told me to look upon them with sympathy and to help them as much as possible. Because they too as hunted refugees came here supported only by their strong souls and their few friends.

– But they are dirty, they smell, I said to them, they will give us lice.

– They do not have anything to wash with, they do not have homes or jobs, as soon as they straighten things out they will change immediately. We were the same when we first came as little children to the *patrída* [i.e. Greece].

[...] And yesterday I found my mother shedding tears whilst watching the news.

– We ended up handing him over, we forced him to leave the embassy, everything has been revealed. Poor Öcalan, the Turks are torturing him now. I, however, did not believe it and I sat down [...] and watched the news, for many hours [...] searching to find an explanation, which would justify our actions. And then I saw Aro [nickname for Öcalan] the powerful leader of 30 million repressed people, fatigued, distressed and with the look of a small child who had become lost and was afraid. And I too began to cry. And I know that shortly, when the noise has died down [...] I too will have forgotten that look [...]

There is, however, that burning that remains in the stomach and the guilt that weighs heavily on me. And I know that every time my gaze meets that Kurd, that Iranian, that Albanian and whichever repressed person on this planet, I will be the first one to bow her head in shame. And that hurts. Good morning Kurdistan, good morning Aro. One thousand times sorry (*O Polítis* March 1999).

As Landsberg suggested, when we hear the testimony of another we ‘construct a memory triggered by the testimony that also is closely connected to our own archive of experience’ (2004:137). In this extract, it was precisely by equating the past experiences of her parents as Greeks in Turkey with the contemporary plight of the Kurds that the author of the article came to re-evaluate her prejudice towards Kurdish refugees in Greece: a postmemory (Hirsch 2012) of her parents’ suffering acted as a cipher for engaging with the otherwise intangible suffering of others. We might, in this sense, follow Landsberg in describing the author’s mass-mediated interaction with Kurdish experience in terms of a prosthesis that, facilitated by the equation between the Kurds and her own Greek parents, became ‘a more personal, deeply felt memory’ with the potential ‘to shape that person’s subjectivity and politics’ (Landsberg 2004:2).

The discursive practice of paralleling Greek and Armenian experience with that of the Kurds, furthermore, lends some credence to Landsberg’s suggestion that the transcultural circulation of memories ‘might serve as the grounds for unexpected alliances across chasms of difference’ (2004:3). Both Armenian and Greek writers and activists have in the past commonly held the Kurds accountable for participating in both Ottoman-era and later Turkish anti-minority persecution, in particular the Armenian genocide, the Pontic genocide, and – to a lesser degree – the *Septemvrianá* (although cf. the discussion in chapter 4). From this perspective, incorporating the experiences of all three communities into a narrative of shared victimhood might help to promote intercommunal reconciliation, by stressing their commonality as victims over their differences as antagonists. Indeed, the rhetorical solidarities extended to the Armenians and Kurds by expatriate newspapers and community organisations were commonly

reciprocated by Armenian and Kurdish diaspora organisations in Greece. On the 78th anniversary of the Armenian genocide, for instance, the Armenian National Committee of Greece wrote the following in their newsletter:

The chain of the Turkish expansionist policy begins in **1915** with the extermination of 1.5 million Armenians. **1916-1923** is the turn of 700,000 Hellenes of the Pontus. **1922** the catastrophe of Smyrna and the civilisation of the Hellenes of Asia Minor. **1955** catastrophe in Constantinople and the extermination of 250,000 [sic] Hellenes. **1974** invasion of Cyprus and the occupation of 40% of its land. **1980-1990** a decade of persecution and extermination of the Kurdish people. **1993** threats against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh (*Armeniká Chroniká* April 1993).

In January 1997, the Balkan branch of the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK) sent words of support to the Constantinopolitan Society that similarly paralleled the experiences of the *Polítes* and the Kurds:

The peoples who were victims of Turkish Kemalist racism do not differ from one another. We are the children of the same land of Asia Minor, whatever religion and whatever language we might have. Victims of the same barbarity, we strongly believe that every Kurd is today also a Constantinopolitan of 1941-44, of 1955, of 1964 [...] The Kurdish rebel of the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan carries in his heart the pain and the hope of the Constantinopolitan (*Phoní tou Kourdistán* January-February 1997).

In this extract, contemporary Kurdish guerrilla fighters were portrayed as embodying the persecuted *Polítes* of the past, or as present-day auxiliaries for past Greek victims, carrying into their fight with Turkey not just their own pain but also an affiliative postmemory (Hirsch 2012:36; see review essay II) of Greek suffering in mid-twentieth-century Istanbul. As such examples demonstrate, by the 1990s writers representing all three communities had become fluent in each other's languages of victimhood, trading iconic dates such as 1915 and 1955 from each other's mnemonic repertoires and displaying them as badges of solidarity and tropes to demonstrate the universality of minority experience in Turkey. In line with Landsberg's predictions, such rhetorical solidarities could also be translated into real-world actions: in 1988, for instance, the expatriated Greeks worked collaboratively with Armenian and Kurdish diaspora groups in Athens to organise a protest to coincide with the diplomatic visit of Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal (*Imvros* June-July 1988a; *Imvros* June-July 1988b; Isaakidis 2014).

There are, nevertheless, reasons to be cautious about Landsberg's somewhat optimistic portrayal of a prosthetic memory that has the ability 'to produce empathy and social responsibility' and 'challenge the essentialist logic of many group identities' through a 'sensuous engagement with the past' (2004:9, 21). To begin with, the chasm of difference between the Armenians and the Greeks, on the one hand, and the Kurds, on the other, is not always so easily overcome, and historical enmities may continue to simmer beneath the surface in spite of rhetorical and public expressions of solidarity and communality. Former president of the Constantinopolitan Society Isaakidis, for instance, had the following recollections of planning meetings between the three communities for the 1988 protest:

What is the funny thing, however? The Armenians were slaughtered by the Kurds! So when we had the first meetings, the representatives of the Armenians were sitting next to me, and the Kurds were sitting opposite [...] I said to the Armenian woman, "now we are all sitting down together and we are speaking in a friendly manner, but don't forget that those Kurds opposite us slaughtered you, and others during the *Septemvriana*" (Isaakidis 2014).

Narratives that cut across boundaries and call received historical knowledge into question may encounter severe resistance, and it cannot necessarily be assumed that the historical analogies individuals draw in particular discursive contexts will carry over into other social situations and become a permanent prosthesis to individual subjectivity (see below). As Jim House has observed, whilst 'for some people, there are connections between historical events that appear "self-evident"', for others these links 'are either refused (due to "competing memories") or genuinely not understood as being connected' (2010:37).

Landsberg also maintained that prosthetic memories 'do not erase differences' but rather create 'the conditions for ethical thinking precisely by encouraging people to feel connected to, while recognising the alterity of, the "other"' (2004:9). In some expatriate writing, however, the particularity of Armenian and Kurdish others was sacrificed for the sake of creating commonality of experience with the Greeks. The Armenian genocide and the Kurdish independence struggle were in such cases treated not as distinctive historical occurrences with which, due to their own experiences, the expatriates could empathise, but rather as a *direct reflection* of Greek experience. In a 1995 *Politis* article paralleling the histories of the Greeks and the Kurds, for instance, Koumakis (author of *The Miracle*, see above) was keen to emphasise that 'the dramatic

moments that the Kurdish people are currently experiencing *do not differ* from those that the Armenians in 1915 or the Greeks of Asia Minor lived through' (*O Polítis* May 1995; my emphasis), whilst in 1999 another author in the same newspaper asserted that the *Septemvrianá* could be described as 'a "photocopy" from Pontus, Asia Minor, Erzurum with the Armenians' (*O Polítis* September 1999). Just like the characterisation of the *Septemvrianá* in terms of the Fall of Constantinople (see chapter 5), in such examples old or distant mnemonic forms were *reactivated* but simultaneously *evacuated* in the service of new contemporary meanings. As Erll put it, '[i]n their displacement, memory figures tend to be stripped of their complexity, detached from the details and contextual meanings they originally referred to' (Erll 2011b:14; see also Cubitt 2007a:15, 17).

From this perspective, transcultural cross-references might sometimes be as much (if not more) about the *subject* who is making the connections as about the *objects* of those connections. During his discussion of how Greeks and Turks are represented in each other's literature, Millas described a 'naïvely positive character', who might superficially appear to be a positive representation of the other, but on closer inspection 'is effectively devoid of the ethnic characteristics of the abstract Other; he or she is practically assimilated into "our" group and is not one of "them" anymore' (2004:143; 2006:49-50). In some of the examples considered in this chapter, the Armenians and Kurds might likewise be characterised as 'naïvely positive' others, insofar as they appeared not so much as idiosyncratic communities with distinctive identities and histories, but rather as hollowed-out extensions of the Greek self, fleshing out and providing depth to a protracted narrative of Greek suffering. It does not automatically follow that such expressions of solidarity were 'disingenuous', but rather that the solidarities they envisaged were not necessarily based on a deep *understanding* of others' experiences. As Silverman cautioned, whilst 'imaginative and emotional investment in others' traumas may allow for new solidarities across the lines of race, nation and culture', there is an inherent risk of 'clothing ourselves in others' victimhood, which we have neither experienced nor properly understood, for the purpose of identity and, consequently, participating in a banal culture of empathy which is often more self- than other-oriented' (2013:174). In such cases, expatriate narrators did not 'suture [themselves] into a larger history' (Landsberg 2004:2) so much as they sutured compelling off-the-peg motifs onto their *own* history: a history that was perhaps *augmented* but was not radically *transformed* by this interaction.

The depth and superficiality of multidirectional memory

Elaborating upon his theory of multidirectional memory, Rothberg proposed that different texts or discourses (specifically those involving transcultural analogy) might be plotted along both an ‘axis of comparison’ – with equation at one extreme and differentiation at the other – and an ‘axis of political affect’ – ranging from solidarity to competition (2011:525). He examined, for instance, a controversial email circulated by an American sociology professor in 2009 entitled ‘Gaza is Israel’s Warsaw’, which was accompanied by a photo essay (taken from the website of Norman Finkelstein) claiming that the ‘grandchildren of Holocaust survivors [i.e. the Israelis] ... are doing to the Palestinians *exactly* what was done to *them*’ (Rothberg 2011:537). Both the email and the photo essay equated Palestinian with Jewish suffering, and placed these victims in direct competition, and could therefore be located in the equation-competition quadrant on a map of multidirectional memory. On the other hand, texts such as ‘The Negro and the Warsaw Ghetto’ by W. E. B. Du Bois and ‘Les Deux Ghettos’ by Marguerite Duras, which, Rothberg felt, explored the relationships between the Holocaust and colonialism without ‘erasing their differences or fetishizing their uniqueness’, could be plotted in the differentiation-solidarity quadrant (Rothberg 2011:526-537). Rothberg argued that whilst discourses located in the competition-equation quadrant were distortive and potentially harmful, those in the differentiation-solidarity quadrant, ‘in which transcultural comparison does not simply produce commensurability out of difference’, had greater potential to create ‘arenas where injustices are recognized and new frameworks are imagined that are necessary, if not sufficient, for their redress’ (2011:538).

I have adopted Rothberg’s mapping of multidirectional memory in order to reflect on some of the key examples pursued in this chapter (see fig. 7). Such a diagram, as Rothberg himself stressed, is necessarily ‘schematic’, but might nevertheless ‘provide orientation’ for a wider discussion about the implications of historical and transcultural analogy (Rothberg 2011:525).




Fig. 7 Mapping multidirectional memory based on the parameters described by Rothberg (2011). Discourses taken from my research are plotted in **black**, Rothberg's examples are in **blue**, and examples drawn from the research of others are in **red**. The relative placement of different items within each quadrant is purely notional.

Most references to the Armenians and the Kurds considered in this chapter can be placed in the solidarity-equation quadrant, as, in the process of articulating solidarity between the three communities, they tended to a greater or lesser degree to elide the historical particularities of their respective experiences. They are joined here by the 'off-the-peg memories' of YouTube and Koumakis' *The Miracle*, both of which, despite greatly varying levels of detail, equated the experiences of the Armenians, Greeks, and Kurds in order to more forcefully articulate their own grievances towards Turkey. A competitive logic was also discernible, both in those discourses that disrupted the solidarity between the three communities by equating contemporary Kurdish suffering with that allegedly inflicted by the Kurds on the Armenians and Greeks (competition-equation), and in Kyrtzopoulos' controversial efforts to demonstrate the severity of Greek suffering through competitive contrast with other historical atrocities (competition-differentiation). The 1999 *Politis* article 'Dozmpas Kurdistan, Sorry Aro' that proclaimed solidarity with Öcalan and the Kurds, meanwhile, might tentatively be plotted in the solidarity-differentiation quadrant. Although at first glance it may seem that this text was in the business of equation, the author likening her parents'

experiences to those of Kurdish political refugees, there was also a sense in which the author did not simply compare Greek and Kurdish histories in order to reaffirm a preconceived perception of the Turkish other, but rather drew on the experiences of her parents as *Polítes* to reappraise her perspective on Kurdish suffering and that of other persecuted communities. As such, the text seemed to harbour greater potential for developing a more differentiated awareness of victimhood generally (Rothberg 2011:526). At any rate, however, it is notable (amongst my material at least) that discourses which could be placed in Rothberg's coveted solidarity-differentiation quadrant were few as compared to those that tended towards competition and, particularly, equation. This suggests that although (rhetorical) solidarities may indeed be a 'frequent – if not guaranteed – outcome of the remembrance of suffering' (Rothberg 2010:11), the 'harnessing of the[se] legacies of violence in the interests of a more egalitarian future' (Rothberg 2009a:21) may be comparatively uncommon as compared to the harnessing of these solidarities in a manner that distorts or blurs different histories and/or risks perpetuating historical enmities in relation to a common antagonist.

There is, moreover, another significant way in which we might map multidirectional memory: the relative *depth* of the 'knotting' (Rothberg 2010:7; Silverman 2013:8) that occurs at the intersection between different histories or memories. Both Rothberg and Silverman maintained that their approaches, to use Silverman's terms, dealt not simply with 'parallel histories for the purposes of comparison', but rather with the fact that the 'historical and physical basis of cultural memory is a genuinely composite affair' (Silverman 2013:18). Accordingly, a consideration of memory's inherent multidirectionality should consider not only moments at which different histories are consciously placed alongside one another in particular discursive contexts (the terrain of Rothberg's multidirectional map), but also the more imperceptible journeys across time and space that memory has taken to arrive at its present configuration. These are the relatively unnoticeable processes, in other words, through which old mnemonic forms have persisted in novel, contemporary settings, such that even 'the very fundamentals of what we assume to be Western cultural memory are the product of transcultural movements', from the 'Persian influence on the Old Testament' to the 'French origins of what the Grimm brothers popularized as "German" fairy tales' (Erl1 2011b:11). In this sense, the transcultural movements of memory could also be notionally plotted along a single *axis of depth* ranging from *entanglement* to *superficiality*. Superficiality

in this sense does not denote meaninglessness (see also Landsberg 2004:20-21; Theodossopoulos 2006:3) or even, necessarily, lack of ‘genuineness’, any more than entanglement indicates premeditation or authenticity. The distinction, rather, has to do with the relative strength or solubility of the knotting that connects different memories and histories.

At the entangled end of the spectrum, we would find attachments between different times and places such as the Persian influence on the Old Testament, so deeply entwined that they probably cannot be untangled. At the superficial end, meanwhile, we could place the sort of connections often envisaged by Greek YouTube users and expatriate activists in this chapter, analogies and parallels typically drawn in rather specific discursive contexts: that is, when their originator was attempting to communicate or assert the severity and authenticity of their own suffering. Such superficial memory knots may sometimes be evidence of deeper knotting. The discursive linkage between the *Septemvriáná* and the Fall of Constantinople discussed in chapter 5, for example, drew on the connections constructed by Greek nation-builders between the Byzantine Empire and modern Greece, and between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic; and even the more cursory analogies between Turkish and Nazi perpetrators were dependent upon the multidirectional engagements through which Nazism came to be seen by many communities as an archetype of evil (Rothberg 2009a:244). Many of these shallower connections, however, are notable for their disposability, transience, and intermittency, and could likely be abandoned or reneged upon if necessary without greatly destabilising the narrator’s understanding of self or history. Though they might provide frameworks and schemata through which experiences are interpreted and represented in particular contexts, they will not always or necessarily generate deep, lasting knotting in the tissue of memory. Acknowledging the differentiated depth of multidirectional mnemonic attachments has implications for our understanding of everyday transcultural memory, insofar as superficial memory knots – particularly those that have no counterpart on the deeper level – may be comparatively unlikely to be internalised by individuals and to impact significantly upon their lives and narratives.

Conclusions

The connections between the persecution of the Greeks of Turkey and the histories of other communities envisaged by expatriate writers and activists in their efforts to rationalise and represent their own experiences confirm the implausibility of ‘maintain[ing] a wall, or *cordon sanitaire*, between different histories’ (Rothberg 2009a:313). Whilst broadening the field of victims to include the Armenians and the Kurds helped to explicate, visualise, and substantiate expatriate narratives of victimisation by multiplying the witnesses able to ‘testify’ to the accused’s record of atrocity, analogies with Nazism made these claims resonant and intelligible to unfamiliar audiences and sought to establish the indisputability and severity of Greek suffering and Turkish guilt. Such transcultural cross-referencing might draw certain national groups closer together – perhaps even promoting reconciliation between historical antagonists such as the Armenians and the Kurds – as well as helping to bring comparatively marginalised or poorly-recognised histories to light. Yet there is also a danger that such comparison will ‘simply block insight into specific local histories’ (Huysen 2003:14), particularly insofar as the elision of historical particularity is often a prerequisite for demonstrations of communality. Even worse, it might import ‘a dangerous model of victimization’ (Rothberg 2011:534) from one context to another, as, for instance, in the risk that equating frozen or ongoing conflicts, like the division of Cyprus or the Kurdish struggle for independence, with atrocities like the Armenian genocide or the Holocaust might make the former seem intractable and condemned to an escalating cycle of violence.

There is, moreover, ample evidence in this chapter to suggest that the transcultural circulation of memories might be as likely to strengthen as to abrogate nationalist discourses and national frameworks of remembrance. Staging expatriate suffering as part of a broader and unchanging pattern of Turkish behaviour stretching from the Armenian genocide to the contemporary repression of the Kurds, and drawing implicit or explicit parallels between Republican Turkey and Nazi Germany, only served to fortify hostility towards the Turks as a homogenous community of violent perpetrators, and to consolidate the rhythms of Greek nationalist history. Transcultural cross-referencing, in other words, typically reaffirmed what expatriate writers thought they already knew about the Turks, and made the articulation of more differentiated representations of the Turkish other less likely. Sharing memories of suffering may thus

also involve sharing abstract enmities, and perpetuate rather than dissolve national conflicts and distinctions. In Silverman's terms, the 'perceived solidarities across the lines of race and nation and the construction of hybrid memory are no more progressive per se than the ethnic or national stories they attempt to replace' (2011:627).

Memories are characterised and marked by their 'incessant wandering' both across and within boundaries and borders (Erl1 2011b:11). If it is thus inevitable that different histories will be 'implicated in each other' (Rothberg 2009a:313), it is nevertheless important to recognise that the depth of this knotting is variable. Some connections and superimpositions are so complexly knotted together that they cannot be disentangled, whilst others are more superficial and may be undone with minimal pressure. Comparatively superficial memory knots have been a feature of this chapter. Whether in online debates, formal and public expressions of grievance, awareness-raising materials, or (more rarely) in personal testimony, transcultural historical analogies were typically drawn in rather particular discursive contexts: that is, when people were attempting to validate their narratives and make them intelligible to others. Insofar as these transcultural flows of memory have been internalised by individuals, it was more as a language for talking about suffering than as 'privately felt public memories' (Landsberg 2004:19) that might drastically restructure their perceptions of history, others, or their own identity. It is in this sense that we might characterise such discourses not as 'prosthetic memories' but as 'off-the-peg memories', compelling yet comparatively hollow and 'returnable' motifs that could be temporarily borrowed as explanatory devices, but could also be disregarded or 'placed back on the peg' if necessary without major surgery to self-understanding or received historical knowledge.

* * *

In part II, I have explored how the Greeks of Turkey drew analogies between their own experiences and aspects of both Greek national history and the histories of other communities. The references to national archetypes such as Leonidas' Spartans and the Fall of Constantinople in chapter 5 have much in common with the transcultural cross-references to Armenian and Kurdish experiences in chapter 6, in that they gave broader meaning and significance to contemporary occurrences, and made them intelligible and communicable to others. There was, nevertheless, a potentially significant difference to be discerned between the national linkages explored in chapter 5 and the transcultural

connections developed in chapter 6. Responding to Alexander's discussion of the universalisation of Holocaust discourse (see review essay II), Robert Manne remarked that whilst it might indeed be misleading to speak of "Jewish ownership of the Holocaust", it is equally inaccurate 'to deny that a claim to ownership is indeed often made' (2009:144). Although the transcultural dynamics of memory identified in recent scholarship certainly demonstrate that literal 'ownership' over mnemonic forms is a fallacy that ignores, amongst other things, the ways in which old memories are put to new purposes (Erl1 2011b:14), it is also clear that *claims* to ownership over particular historical legacies may continue undiminished. It could be said, for instance, that expatriate linkages between 1453 and 1955 involved a claim to ownership over the Byzantine past, in a way that comparisons with the Armenian genocide and the Kurdish independence struggle, drawn to demonstrate that other communities had similar experiences at the hands of the same perpetrator, did not. This does not mean that 'national' connections are more 'authentic' than 'transcultural' connections, for as we saw in chapter 5 national memories are in themselves inherently transcultural, even if this is ostensibly hidden from view. It does, however, reflect the likelihood that those transcultural connections which exert their influence most strongly on individuals' lives may be those so deeply embedded that they present their interpretive frameworks inconspicuously.

Part IV: Homelands new and old

7

Welcome to Gökçeada

The Greek return to Imbros

When a visitor arrives on the island that the Greeks call Imbros, they are likely to be greeted with the Turkish words: *Gökçeada'ya hoşgeldiniz*, ‘welcome to Gökçeada’. In the casual summer tourist, this gesture is unlikely to provoke any negative reaction. For many *Imvriótes*, however, returning to their place of birth after years or even decades of exile, to be welcomed to Gökçeada, by residents who mostly arrived on the island after 1964, represents an affront to their sense of belonging on the island as natives. Two elderly returnees described this sentiment as follows:

I will not allow anybody to say to me “welcome”. Where are you welcoming me? You are welcoming me to my own house? [...] Who are you welcoming? I who have been here for 3000 years? (Antonis 10/08/2013).

[When I come to the island] I feel both like a native and like a foreigner. When I come and they welcome me to the place, it offends me. Because he who is welcoming me really is a foreigner. And I say to him, “welcome to you too! I was born here, I have been here for 4000 years. How long have you been here? 30 [years]?” [...] Who are you welcoming? (Themis 11/08/2013).¹⁴²

Since the early 1990s, after restrictions on travel to Imbros were eased, there has been a growing return movement amongst the expatriated Greeks of the island, primarily seasonal but also semi-permanent and even permanent (see below).¹⁴³ In this chapter, I explore narratives of belonging and legitimacy in the Greek return to Imbros, based on oral and written expatriate testimonies as well as my own visit to the island in the company of the Imbriot Society in August 2013. The possibility of return has had a significant influence on the Imbriot expatriate community, reconfiguring their relationship with Greece and Greek nationalist history, facilitating the transmission of an Imbriot identity to the Greek-born generation, and permitting a reconnection not just

¹⁴² These claims to ancestral belonging phrased in the first person singular recall Amira Hass’ anecdote about an elderly Jewish settler in the West Bank who, asked how long he had lived there by an American journalist, reportedly answered, ‘[d]o you see the wad (valley) below? From up here I used to watch Adam and Eve playing with each other’ (2011:177).

¹⁴³ There has been no comparable large-scale seasonal or permanent return of Greeks to Istanbul, although many former residents of the Princes’ Islands do return to spend their summer vacations in their former places of residence. Unlike the *Imvriótes*, the *Polítes* have not typically kept possession of their properties in Turkey, and many of the former Greek neighbourhoods of Istanbul have changed beyond recognition, such that there are no places in Istanbul comparable to the Greek villages on Imbros in which to ‘stage’ an *en masse* communal return.

with lost places but between long-estranged people. Yet the return has also been laden with anxiety and ambivalence, as the community faces everyday challenges to their sense of belonging on Imbros, villages reinvigorated by people but still littered with ruins, and a resurgent but uncertain future on the island.

Scholarship on the Imbriot return has focused in particular detail on the festival for the Assumption of the Virgin Mary celebrated in the village of *Agrídia* on 15 August. At this festival, oxen – donated or paid for by members of the community – are sacrificed as offerings to the Virgin Mary, and their meat, cooked overnight, is freely distributed in the yard of the village church after the morning liturgy on 15 August.¹⁴⁴ Babül and Tsimouris have explored how the festival, since the beginnings of the Greek return, has emerged as a site of contestation for competing claims over history and belonging. On the one hand, the 15 August celebration constitutes a symbolic demonstration of Imbriot belonging on the island, a ritual ‘re-membering’ of place in Tsimouris’ words (Babül 2004:11; Babül 2006a:58-59; Babül 2006b:48-49; Tsimouris 2001:6; Tsimouris 2008:194; Tsimouris 2014:41-43, 48-50). The attendance of Turkish officials at the festival as guests of the Greek hosts provides an opportunity for the *Imvriótes* to establish belonging on the island as natives, and to forge cordial relationships with the local authorities so as to facilitate the continuing return movement (Babül 2004:11; Babül 2006a:59; Babül 2006b:49; Tsimouris 2008:237-239). The Turkish authorities, on the other hand, promote the festival as a demonstration of the island’s cultural diversity, and – in light of the permits they issue for the event each year – as evidence for their tolerance of minority communities (Babül 2004:11; Babül 2006a:58-59; Babül 2006b:48-49; Tsimouris 2008:240; Tsimouris 2014:42). Babül has also explored Greek returnees’ claims to belonging in relation to official Turkish discourse, arguing that whilst the Turkish state’s claims to ownership over the island are premised on sovereignty and law, Imbriot counter-claims draw on memory and narratives of nativity (Babül 2004:2-3, 10-14, 15-19; Babül 2006a:50-51, 57-64; Babül 2006b:45-46, 48-51).

My focus, however, is not on the ‘self-conscious memory site[.]’ (Schudson 1997:3) of the annual festival in *Agrídia* as a ritual of belonging, nor on official or legal channels

¹⁴⁴ Traditionally the sacrifices were performed by the villagers themselves in the village, although in recent years the animals have been killed in a slaughterhouse in the capital on the insistence of the authorities. Since the early 1990s, the composition of the festival’s attendees has transformed dramatically, as increasing numbers of ‘outsiders’ – Greek and Turkish tourists, Turkish residents of the island, foreign researchers – began to attend, such that by 2000 the *Imvriótes* were somewhat ‘lost in the crowd of tourists’ (Tsimouris 2008:228).

of belonging, but rather on the negotiation and contestation of belonging in the everyday experience of the return. This is in part because the size and permanence of the return movement, and by extension the range of settings in which belonging is asserted or called into question, has grown far beyond the centrepiece on 15 August. More broadly, however, it reflects an interest in how belonging is experienced and made meaningful in the mundane settings of daily life, rather than more specifically how it is represented in (or around) public ceremony and official discourse (see review essay II). Though Tsimouris focused on narratives surrounding the 15 August celebration as a reflection of contests over belonging on the island, he also touched upon the ways in which ‘the past is painfully actualized’ on a daily basis for the returning *Imvriótes* as they walk familiar routes, meet familiar faces, and repair their damaged properties (2014:54-55). It is this aspect of the Greek return to Imbros with which I am primarily concerned in this chapter. I explore how the *Imvriótes* themselves talk about the return and the ruins they see around them, the internal debates and schisms that emerge in the course of everyday life, and feelings of belonging and alienation expressed in banal rather than exceptional commemorative settings. In particular, I consider the quotidian challenges to returnee belonging that emerged from the demographic and topographic changes that have taken place on the island, the returnees’ relationships both with the extant local *Imvriótes* and the island’s Muslim settlers, and – especially for the summer vacationers – the manner of their return as visitors rather than permanent residents.




Fig. 8 Cartoon from *Imvros* May 1985. A family of *Imvriótes* is depicted standing in the Aegean Sea contemplating two signposts, one labelled ‘New Imbros’ the other ‘Imbros’. Reproduced with the permission of the Imbriot Society.

Between 'New Imbros' and 'Old Imbros'

When the Greeks of Imbros left the island in droves during the 1960s and 1970s, many feared that they would never be able to return. In 1973, the newspaper of the Imbriot Society wrote that those remaining on the island in anticipation of a reversal of fortunes were living with a 'futile hope' (*Imvriakí Ichó* March 1973). The 1970s and 1980s were for the *Imvriótes* the decades of exile, during which time it was difficult to make even brief return visits. Aside from financial and psychological barriers, return journeys were complicated because Turkey had designated the island a restricted military zone. In order to set foot on Imbros, any returning *Imvriótes* were obliged to obtain a special permit from Çanakkale, and to surrender their passports for the duration of their stay. According to informants who did make the trip, those who were successful in obtaining visas for Imbros were commonly permitted only short stays on the island, whilst others were turned away altogether. Those who did make it to Imbros often recalled a sense of indignation at having to obtain permits to visit the place of their birth. As Vasillis – born on Imbros in 1938 – put it, remembering his visits to the island from Germany in the 1970s:

I came here and I had to go to Çanakkale to take a *visa*, to come to my *home*. Those were difficult times [...] You come to your house and they keep your passport. Because I had come to my house. *My house!* [...] That bothered us a *great deal* (12/08/2013).

Moreover, male expatriates who had left Turkey before undergoing their military service and had not yet acquired Greek citizenship were unable to return to Turkey lest they be detained by the authorities and compelled to fulfil their obligations as Turkish citizens (Christoforidis 1993:165). During this period, the Greek villages on Imbros suffered from decline and neglect: few of the departing *Imvriótes* sold their (remaining) properties, and with no one to look after the empty residences many buildings fell into disrepair (through a combination of natural causes and looting/vandalism).

Faced with the prospect of permanent estrangement from their place of origin, the *Imvriótes* set about reconstructing their community in their new places of settlement. They founded a cultural association, congregated in coffee shops owned by compatriots, wrote and read nostalgic pieces about Imbros in their community newspaper, recreated traditions such as 15 August festival, and discussed the establishment of a 'New Imbros' in Greece where they could return to a rural style of life. In doing so, they were

adhering to the well-established Greek ideology of ‘lost homelands’ (*chaménes patrídes*), which emerged from a nostalgic longing for place expressed in the memories, writings, and toponyms of Greek refugees displaced by the Greek-Turkish population exchange, and had by the 1960s become a central feature of Greek nationalist discourse (Liakos 1998; Liakos 2007:214-215).¹⁴⁵ In February 1965, in light of the deteriorating situation on Imbros, the Imbriot Society took the decision that the construction of a New Imbros was the only way to ensure the community’s survival (*Imvros* September-October-November 1995), and began to appeal to the Greek government to grant them agricultural land in Western Thrace where the *Imvriótes* could ‘revive our lost *patrída* from its ashes, offering to Mother Greece a New Imbros’ (*Imvros* April 1977). This ambition was premised on the notion that ‘Old Imbros’ was a lost cause, as was made plain in the October 1972 edition of *Imvriakí Ichó*:

[U]nited and tightly bounded, with one belief and one conviction, one hope and one dream: to acquire a second *patrída*, a “NEW IMBROS”. Let us not wilfully blind ourselves with false hopes and comforts to the sick. The game is lost. Imbros has escaped our hands [...] A “NEW IMBROS” must howsoever be established (*Imvriakí Ichó* October 1972a).

By 1980, a rural area near Komotini in Western Thrace had been earmarked as the future location for New Imbros (*Imvros* March 1980), which was first visited by the Imbriot Union of Macedonia-Thrace in May 1980 (*Imvros* July-August 1980a), and afterwards by the Imbriot-born Archbishop Iakovos of America alongside the societies of Athens and Thessaloniki in August 1981 (*Imvros* September 1981). The land, it was hoped, would be granted to the *Imvriótes* by the Greek state (*Imvros* April 1977; Pavlos, pers. comm., 4 November 2015), and in November 1981 *Imvros* printed the prototype plans for the first and second phases of the settlement, intended to cover over 400,000 m² (*Imvros* November 1981). The Imbriot community associations had even begun to solicit applications from expatriated *Imvriótes* who were interested in being allocated plots of land in New Imbros (Asanakis 2016b; *Imvros* July-August 1980b).

The large-scale resettlement of the *Imvriótes* in Thrace, however, never came to fruition (*Imvros* May-June 1994a), and ultimately the idea of New Imbros disappeared from the agenda altogether. Financial and practical difficulties were in the main decisive,¹⁴⁶ but

¹⁴⁵ The Athenian neighbourhood *Néa Smyrni* (‘New Smyrna’) in which many *Imvriótes* settled is itself a reflection of this ideology.

¹⁴⁶ The Imbriot Society laid the blame firmly with the Greek authorities for prematurely withdrawing their support for the establishment of a New Imbros near Komotini. In a strongly-worded article in the

the demise of the New Imbros movement also coincided with the re-emergence of ‘Old Imbros’ (Stelios 27/05/2013). After 1988, many of the impediments that had prevented the *Imvriótes* from visiting their island began to dissipate. Since the early 1980s, the Greek government had begun to grant citizenship to the Greeks of Turkey (see chapter 2), permitting those who had lost their Turkish citizenship, and/or left without completing their military service, to cross the border into Turkey without fear of arrest. In around 1993, the Turkish authorities lifted the restricted access to the island, marking the transition of Gökçeada in the eyes of the Turkish government from a military zone to a touristic area (Babül 2004:7; Babül 2006a:56; Babül 2006b:48).¹⁴⁷ By this point, the open prisons near *Schoinoúdi* (see chapter 2) had also been closed down, and the prisoners relocated off the island (*Imvros* March 1992). A brief period of Greek-Turkish reconciliation after the 1988 Davos process also helped to give expatriates the courage to return to Turkey. In line with these developments, the *Imvriótes* began to make tentative return visits, first in the late 1980s (Tsimouris 2001:5), then with increasing frequency throughout the 1990s.

These early returnees were mostly those born in the late 1950s or 1960s, who had migrated either to Istanbul or abroad at a young age (Tsimouris 2001:6; Xeinós 2011:203). Many had not seen each other since childhood, and they congregated on the island during the month of August. Such inaugural visits were marked by caution and nervousness. For many, the first return provoked a reliving of the trauma of their original departure, as described by Kostas, who returned in 1989 having left Imbros as a teenager in 1981:

[When I left for Greece] there was a climate of fear. [On the bus] I was waiting to pass the border to be free [...] The return had similar characteristics. When I return, my eyes are trying to be very keen. I am afraid once again, about what I will encounter, how they will treat me [...] For the first ten years, every time that we crossed the bridge on the way back to Greece from Turkey, we said “oof! We have been saved again!” (07/06/2013).

December 1982 issue of *Imvros*, they complained that the state had failed in its duty to the *Imvriótes*: ‘[w]e wish firstly’, they wrote, ‘to remind everyone that Imbros is the latest in a series of ‘lost *patrídes*’ [...] and afterwards to express our bitterness about the disregard for [our] sacrifice on the altar of the national interest in difficult hours’ (*Imvros* December 1982). The movement finally foundered in the early 1990s, when migrants of Greek descent from post-Soviet states settled in the area that had been earmarked for New Imbros (Asanakis 2016b).

¹⁴⁷ Babül dated the lifting of the restricted zone to 1993, although a March 1992 *Imvros* article included the end of the restricted zone in a list of promising developments that had already occurred (*Imvros* March 1992).

Unsure of how long the favourable climate would last, the young returnees were initially relishing the moment rather than making long-term plans, but when these fleeting pilgrimages became a regular summer tradition the returnees started to look to the future. In the words of Giorgos, a contemporary of Kostas, who first returned in 1991:

We had the impression that we probably wouldn't come again. And so we got on very well in those years, because in essence we were just relaxing [...] We had parties, every day. But when Greek-Turkish relations improved and we realised that we will continue to come to Imbros, all that was shelved. We became serious (14/08/2013).

In August 1992, a group of 104 young returnees drafted and signed an open letter appealing for others to join them in following summers (Christoforidis 1993:167-169), couched in terms of a return to roots and a simpler way of life:

Friends, we are a group of young people whose only common characteristic is our Imbriot identity. This identity did not mean much for most of us and this appeal letter might never have been written. This year, however, we experienced something extraordinary: we came to Imbros [...] As young people we all face every day the problems placed upon us by stress, pollution, commercialism and even human relationships. We believe that this place, with its unique genuineness, its pure soul, and its – as yet – unpolluted nature, provides a unique opportunity for us to escape and simultaneously re-evaluate the impersonal society of our age. Come to our *patrída* so that we can get to know one another, so that we can discover human warmth again and feel the ancient soul of Imbros [...] Let us meet in the land of our fathers. Come to Imbros (*Imvros* September-October 1992).

As the return movement became larger and more sustained, many *Imvriótes* set about rebuilding and refurbishing their family houses that had fallen into disrepair, in order to make them habitable for seasonal or even permanent residence. The mountainous *Agrída* and its neighbour *Agios Theódoros* – birthplace of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I – have probably seen the most dramatic revival, and although there are still ruined houses many have been restored: the Imbriot Society calculated that by 2007 in *Agrída* alone around 180 houses had been rebuilt at a cost of over €4 million (Imbriot Society 2007). A greater proportion of the properties lie in ruin in the sprawling *Schoinoúdi* (*Imvros* May 1991; over 80% according to Tsimouris 2014:47), although here too many returnees have taken pains to rebuild damaged family homes. In these three villages, a summer visitor is thus confronted by an incongruous blend of functioning, inhabited houses and ruined, half-collapsed buildings (see fig. 9, and below).




Fig. 9 Panoramic view of *Schoinoúdi* (Imbros), 2013. Note the juxtaposition between renovated and whitewashed houses and those lying in disrepair and ruin. Photograph by the author.

The number of summer returnees increased throughout the 1990s, and by the turn of the century between 2000 and 3000 *Imvriótes* could be found on the island in mid-August, travelling not just from Greece but also from Australia, Germany, North America, and elsewhere, and usually staying for between one and four weeks (Tsimouris 2001:5). A growing number of these are drawn from the Greek-born generation, who visit the island with their families during the summer vacation, and are henceforth referred to as the ‘young generation’. Many developed an emotional relationship to Imbros (and to one another) before their first physical encounter with the island through their attendance at Imbriot cultural associations (Xeinou 1993:190), although for others it was the visits themselves that prompted an interest in their origins and a stronger sense of commonality with their Imbriot compatriots (see below). Since the 1990s, an increasing number of *Imvriótes* – particularly retirees – have made a semi-permanent return, coming to the island at Easter and staying until October, then wintering in Greece or elsewhere; these returnees are known locally as ‘six-monthers’. Others – again predominantly retirees – have returned to live permanently on the island; I call these individuals ‘permanent returnees’, distinguished from ‘local *Imvriótes*’, which is commonly used by expatriates to refer to those who never left.¹⁴⁸ A significant number of expatriates, nevertheless, have never returned to the island, or did so only to sell/claim whatever remaining property they possessed or to collect sick and elderly relatives (Tsimouris 2008:212). Many of these non-returnees are those who left as

¹⁴⁸ My use of the term ‘local’ to distinguish those who never left from those who have returned is purely for semantic clarity, and is in no way intended to be a qualitative assessment of the returnees’ legitimacy as natives on Imbros.

adults, who prefer to preserve their memories of the island as it was before they left (Tsimouris 2001:6; *Imvros* January-February 1990).¹⁴⁹

If at the beginning of the 1980s Imbros seemed lost to its expatriate population, by the year 2000 seasonal and even permanent return had thus become a real possibility: as Imbriot Society president Christoforidis put it in a speech in 1997, for the young returnees ‘Imbros is not a nostalgic past that we are attempting to revive’, but ‘a reality, a substantial portion of our life’ (*Imvros* April-May-June 1997). This, in turn, led to a re-evaluation of the discourse of ‘lost homelands’ and of the community’s relationship to the Greek state. On 8 March 1988, the president of the Imbriot Society met with Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Yiannis Kapsis to express his frustration that Imbros had not been raised by the Greek side during recent bilateral meetings between the Greek and Turkish prime ministers Papandreou and Ozal (the aforementioned Davos process). Kapsis responded to this criticism by assuring the Imbriot Society that the plight of the *Imvriótes* had not been forgotten, and would be brought to the attention of the Turkish authorities in future meetings (although he also declared that the expropriations of land and property on Imbros were a matter of Turkish domestic policy in which Greece could not intervene, much to the dismay of the Society) (*Imvros* March 1988a). *Imvros* cautiously welcomed Kapsis’ pledge, but also expressed concern as to whether or not the Greek authorities considered the situation on Imbros to be an ‘open question’ and one that might yet be reversible, and accordingly appealed to the Greek government to recognise that ‘Imbros and Tenedos do not constitute “lost *patrídes*”’ (*Imvros* March 1988b). In a 1991 article calling on the *Imvriótes* to pull together to ‘rebuild our *patrída*’ rather than selling their remaining property on the island, and appealing for support from the Greek state and tolerance from the Turkish state, the Imbriot Society likewise declared that, ‘THE *IMVRIÓTES* do not accept “lost *patrídes*”’ (*Imvros* July-August 1991). In 1994, meanwhile, *Imvros* complained that Greece ‘prematurely and without a fight, included Imbros and Tenedos in the lost *patrídes*’ (*Imvros* May-June 1994a). As the return movement became a reality, representatives of the Imbriot Society became increasingly dissatisfied with the assimilation of the

¹⁴⁹ According to estimates by the president of the Imbriot Society, after the opening of the minority schools in *Agios Theódoros* in 2013 and in *Agrídiá* in 2015 (on which, see below), the number of permanent Greek residents on the island reached 350 (of which around 50 are those who never left). Those Greeks who are resident on the island for six months or more of the year now number over 100, and in August there are typically between 2000 and 3000 Greeks on the island. In 2016, Greek residents were in a majority in the villages *Agrídiá*, *Agios Theódoros*, *Glyký*, and *Schoinoúdi* (significantly fewer Greeks remained in, or returned to, the capital *Panagía* and the villages *Kástro* and *Evlámpio*, the latter of which has become part of the capital) (Asanakis 2016a).

Imvriotes and their recent history to a nationalist discourse of ‘lost homelands’, which they identified as both a symptom and possible cause of Greek government indifference. Many came to feel that their only true *patrída* was to be found on Imbros, not in a ‘New Imbros’ within the Greek *patrída* (see fig. 10 below): as the Society declared in a banner that appeared in the newspaper in 1993, ‘the *Imvriotes* have a *patrída*. They have an identity and a 3000 year history’ (*Imvros* March-April 1993a).




Fig. 10 Two photographs from *Imvros* October-November 1987. The caption reads: ‘The tragic fate of the majority of *Imvriotes* who live today in some big city: The houses do not differ greatly from jails, whilst those that they were compelled to leave by force, have already converted to ‘beautiful ruin’. Left: an elderly *Imvriotissa* in her ‘home’, in Athens. (Photograph G. Xeinou). Right: That was once her real HOME. (Photograph Vaso Xeinou).’ Reproduced with the permission of the Imbriot Society.

Confronting ‘the real Imbros’: challenges and prospects

It is the great hope of the Imbriot Society and many of the expatriated *Imvriotes* that the summer pilgrimages to Imbros by its former inhabitants might be metamorphosed into a larger, more permanent and sustained presence for the community on the island. Realising this ambition requires the expatriates to confront what Pavlos – born in *Ágios Theódoros* on Imbros in 1970, and a regular seasonal returnee since the late 1980s – called ‘the real Imbros’. I asked Pavlos whether he had considered making a permanent return to the island, to which he responded:

I have thought about it, and not just now that I have a family, but always [...] On the other hand, things are not simple [...] All of us have the image of the holiday: in August you go, there are people in the villages, all of the doors are open, you go to the sea, *et cetera*. Yes. But if I return, it means that I will be there for at least eleven months, and for one month I will go on vacation elsewhere. There is the reality. The real Imbros starts there (29/05/2013).

Once the month of August is over, the population in the Greek villages dwindles, dropping off dramatically during the winter months. According to residents of *Agrídia*, for instance, whilst there might be as many as 500 people in the village in the summer, in winter there are just 25 (Miltos 06/08/2013; Orestis 06/08/2013; Stamatios 07/08/2013). As permanent returnee Antonis put it, in the winter in *Schoinoúdi*, ‘it is the wind that keeps you company’ (10/08/2013).

There were several practical obstacles standing in the way of the re-establishment of a sizeable year-round Greek population on the island. First and foremost, there was the struggle to retain whatever property titles had remained in the hands of the *Imvriótes* after the expropriations of the 1960s. In 1994, Turkey embarked upon a cadastral survey on the island, requiring property owners to present themselves and prove that they had been the legal owners for at least 20 years and were continuing to make active use of the property (Babül 2004:11-12; Council of Europe Resolution 1625 (2008); Imbriot Society no date-b; *Imvros* March-April-May 1995; Tsimouris 2008:126). Their long-term exile, coupled with the loss of Turkish citizenship by many, greatly complicated this endeavour for the *Imvriótes* (Babül 2004:12; Babül 2006a:57; Babül 2006b:48; Tsimouris 2008:126-127). Properties that were not successfully claimed in this manner passed into the ownership of the state, and challenging such decisions through the courts was an expensive process with no guarantee of success (Babül 2004:12; Babül 2006a:58; Council of Europe Resolution 1625 (2008)). The Imbriot Society has accordingly urged each individual to take personal responsibility for their own estates, and to ensure that their properties do not pass into the hands of any non-Imbriot, maintaining that ‘[n]obody has the right to be indifferent’ about property ownership on the island (*Imvros* March-April-May 1995; see also Tsimouris 2008:126, 211-212). It was in order to ensure that they had the right to claim or inherit property that many expatriates retained, or took pains to re-acquire, their Turkish citizenship, and the Imbriot Society called on all those who could reacquire Turkish citizenship ‘without great sacrifices’ to do so (*Imvros* July-August 1992).

Preserving property titles in the Greek villages greatly facilitates the return of retirees and vacationers in the summer months, but a more sustainable Greek community would also have to encourage working people and their children to (re)establish themselves on Imbros. Language, citizenship, and socio-cultural differences between urban centres such as Athens and Thessaloniki and rural Imbros are all pertinent issues in this regard,

but the two obstacles most consistently identified by potential Imbriot returnees concerned work and education. Although a handful of returnees were able to work in agriculture – Christos, for instance, has assisted with his father’s animal husbandry since his permanent return in 2011 (08/08/2013) – the majority of the cultivatable fields and olive groves owned by the *Imvriótes* were confiscated by the state during the 1960s and 1970s, making the re-establishment of a large-scale agricultural economy amongst the returning Greeks difficult. The recent touristic awakening of the island might provide alternative employment opportunities, and indeed some returnees have established small businesses on the island: Savvas, for instance, has opened a cafe in one of the Greek villages (14/08/2013). In a paper delivered at an Imbriot Society conference on the future of Imbros in 1993, Yiannis Politis correspondingly urged his compatriots not to visit the island only as ‘guests-tourists’, but to take part in the tourism industry as ‘entrepreneurs’ (1993:155). There is, however, some concern amongst the community that Greek involvement in business might create tensions with the resident Turkish population. As café owner Savvas put it:

Many people want us to form large businesses here [...] [But] if three or four of our people open businesses and become competitors [with the Turkish residents], I think there will be a problem. They will look at us a bit like, “ah, we did this and this to get you to leave, and now you return and raise your head again.” For that reason I would prefer people like me to set up small shops, so as not to bother other people so much (14/08/2013).

As I detailed in chapter 2, the abolition of Greek-language education on Imbros was arguably the most significant trigger for the exodus of its Greek-speaking population, and for most young Greek families who might resettle on the island it is a precondition that their children would be able to receive an education taking place half in Greek in accordance with the Lausanne provisions. In September 2013, after almost 50 years without any Greek-language education on the island, the Turkish authorities granted a permit for the opening of a new minority primary school in *Ágios Theódoros*. This development was the result of many years of negotiations involving both Greek and Turkish officials, the expatriate societies, the European Union, and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul. It was followed by the opening of a secondary school and a high school in September 2015, and for the academic year 2015-2016 there are at least 14 students attending the minority schools on the island. The opening of the schools was a hugely significant moment for the community both symbolically and practically, a ‘dream of half a century [that has] become a reality’, in the words of the Imbriot

Society, which provides ‘hope for a new beginning on the troubled land of Imbros’ (Imbriot Society 2013b). The reopening of the minority schools has been a cause for great optimism for many, but has also provoked anxieties about the community’s long-term prospects on the island. Some returnees expressed to me their fears that they would not be able to attract sufficient numbers of students to make the schools viable. Speaking in 2013 before the opening of the primary school in *Ágios Theódoros*, permanent *Schoinoúdi* resident Antonis speculated that the granting of the permit might be a ploy of the Turkish authorities:

I am afraid. Maybe I am wrong, but I’m afraid it will remain an anecdote [...] The Turks behaved cleverly here. “They [the *Imvriótes*] want the school, we [the Turks] will issue a permit to open their own school”. Now they will say, “come on, you were shouting for so many years about how you don’t have a school. I have opened one for you. What is going on? Where are the children?” (10/08/2013)

It is hard to overstate, however, the enthusiasm with which the new schools have been received by many *Imvriótes*, for whom the presence of children on Imbros is a necessary and exciting first step towards creating a future for the Greek community on the island. As six-monther and *Agrídiá* resident Kleopas argued:

It is a chain, one thing will bring another. When you start something, you have to build upon it slowly, you cannot do everything in one go [...] If those children spend their childhood years on the island, they will always come, even 50 years later (09/08/2013).

In this section, I have sought to demonstrate that the post-1988 Greek return to Imbros has been a time of great optimism for the expatriated Imbriot community, tempered, however, by a sense of anxiety regarding its sustainability. As I prepared to take my leave from the Imbriot Society in Athens after a research expedition in June 2013, news filtered through from the island of the murder of a Greek woman by a Turkish woman in *Schoinoúdi*. The attack was a ‘crime of passion’ unrelated to broader Greek-Turkish relations or the problems of the past (Imbriot Society 2013a), but nevertheless triggered an immediate concern amongst Society members that the tragic incident might damage intercommunal relationships and jeopardise the position of the Greek community. The Imbriot Society moved quickly to issue a press release the following day, stressing that ‘this isolated incident should not affect the efforts for reestablishing the links of the Imvrian Community with its native island and the return of as many Imvriotes to the island as possible’ (Imbriot Society 2013a). To the best of my knowledge, no wider

repercussions emerged from the murder, but the incident testifies to an unshakeable fear amongst the *Imvriótes* that at any moment something might occur to destabilise the precarious momentum of the return movement.

‘Native tourists’: belonging in the Imbriot return

Since 1988, the returning *Imvriótes* have been engaged in a struggle not only to address the practical difficulties associated with seasonal and permanent return, but also to re-establish their own sense of belonging on an island greatly transformed during their period of exile. The renovation of family homes (see above) was an important component of this effort. Indeed, many returnees recalled great distress when they were unable to stay in their own homes on their first return to the island. Panagiota – born in 1927 and a migrant to Greece in 1980 – made a return journey to the island in 1989, but was compelled to stay in a hotel as her own house in *Panagía* was leased to a Turkish resident. She described the experience as follows:

One year, we came with my son, and we stayed in a hotel. And when I went out walking and saw our [family] home up there, whilst I was staying in the hotel, I went crazy. I said, “my son, I am leaving, I cannot stay here. Either find me a house to stay in until the rental term is up, or I am leaving” (Panagiota 07/08/2013).

It was to avoid this feeling of alienation that Vasillis – returning to visit the island in 1993 after a 15 year absence – chose to sleep amongst the ruins of his family home in *Agrídia* rather than seek out rented accommodation: as he explained it to me, ‘I could not pick up my suitcase and go to another house; I wanted to sleep here’ (12/08/2013).

Even once individual family homes were renovated, however, returnees still faced daily reminders of the island’s traumatic recent history through their encounters with ruined houses whose owners never returned, and expropriated lands that used to belong to the community. When I asked Dimitra – who was born in 1939 and is now a six-monther on the island – how the ruins in *Agrídia* made her feel, she responded with a rich description of life in the village in the 1950s and 1960s, before making the following contrast with the contemporary situation:

I remember all of that, you understand? Good things, lovely things. And yesterday, when I passed by the house of my cousin, I lent on the fence of the yard with both of my hands, and I thought, “what is man, and what becomes of

him?” The buildings, and the houses, everybody leaves, the people die, and the houses have become ruins. What can you say? I remembered the olden days, at that moment (09/08/2013).

Antigoni – born in *Schoinoúdi* in 1975, a resident of Greece since 1983, and today a seasonal returnee to Imbros – similarly described how the ruins and expropriated areas provoked in her a feeling of disinheritance:

My feelings are mixed [...] You feel that the house in which you live is yours: that is mine and nobody can touch it. You see, however, the ruins, the bits that they have taken, and I don't know if they can ever become ours once again [...] I mean, it is theirs. As much as we might want to believe otherwise, it used to be Hellenic but they have conquered it (13/08/2013).

Panagiota recalled with anger and dismay one particular summer when she spotted one of her father's former fields out of a bus window, which had been expropriated by the state and given to Turkish settlers to cultivate. She told the story as follows:

I mentioned that it was our field, and somebody on the bus said to me, “get down there and harvest it, if it belongs to you”. I said, “I should go down there and steal from my own field?” I was struck by tears. There was a pear tree in that field, which my father had planted. Below the field they [the new owners] had a grocery, and I asked those Turkish ladies, “that tree, did it bear fruit this year?” “It was full,” they replied. And I said, “did you not leave one pear for me to eat, it was my father that planted that tree. It is our field”. And they said to me, “it was yours; now it is ours” (Panagiota 07/08/2013).

On one afternoon during my own stay on Imbros, I went out walking with summer returnee Kostas in *Agrídia*, who beckoned me to follow him along a short-cut. After we had struggled up a narrow, ascending gap between two ruined houses littered with roof tiles and fallen masonry, Kostas turned to me and said, ‘sorry I brought you this way. I always remember it from when I was a child, as a path lined with people drinking coffees’ (fieldnotes 8 August 2013; see fig. 11). Operating in the 2010s on memories from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the returning *Imvriótes* experience an uncanny encounter with a place in which familiarity and strangeness collide awkwardly (Tsimouris 2008:212). For the returnees, the ruins literally and figuratively disrupt the flow of everyday life in the villages, conjuring up unbidden memories of the past and those who peopled it, and threatening to derail their renewed sense of ownership over the island.



Fig. 11 Looking back along the path in *Agridia* (Imbros) walked by Kostas and the author in August 2013. Photograph by the author.

Surveying the juxtaposition between the lively streets bustling with tourists and the ruined houses of *Agios Theódoros* in mid-August, Pavlos remarked to me that ‘sometimes you have the unpleasant feeling of being a tourist’ (fieldnotes 8 August 2013). Indeed, for seasonal returnees such as Pavlos, the brevity of the summer sojourns, and the fact that they coincided with the peak of the tourism season on the island, often heightened the disorientating notion that they had become, in the words of one writer in *Imvros*, a ‘foreigner in the land where you were born and became a man, in your own *patrída!*’ (*Imvros* July-August 1992). Panagiota coined the term ‘native tourists’ to describe these concurrent and paradoxical sentiments of belonging and alienation:

Panagiota: Now people come, as you know, from all the corners of the earth. Native tourists [chuckles].

Halstead: Native tourists?

Panagiota: I call them native tourists, because they left for faraway places, yet most come in the summer. Some have houses, some ruined, some do not [...]

Halstead: Do you feel like that, like a tourist?

Panagiota: Yes, yes. I mean, I feel like a foreigner. When we meet [Turkish people] on the boat, and they ask, “where are you from? Are you natives or

not?” I say “I was born here, where are *you* from?” [...] This is our *patrída*, home (07/08/2013).

It was not uncommon for the local *Imvriótes* who never left the island to characterise the summer returnees in comparable terms (Tsimouris 2008:217). These few hundred, primarily elderly islanders are proud at having remained on the island, and have often for years resisted their relatives’ attempts to transport them to Greece (Tsimouris 2001:9). When I asked Patroklos, a nonagenarian and local resident of *Ágios Theódoros*, whether he had ever considered leaving, he replied in no uncertain terms, thumping the table for emphasis: ‘I leave? I never once thought that I could leave from here [thumps table]. I did not think once [thumps table] about leaving from here. And nor did I leave. I did not go anywhere’ (08/08/2013). Katerina, a local resident of *Agrídia*, similarly exclaimed to me in jest: ‘I say, “until the last, I will hold aloft the flag, I will not abandon the Hellenic flag!”’ (06/08/2013) These local *Imvriótes* experience a somewhat ambivalent relationship to the summer returnees. Though they are undoubtedly happy to see old familiar faces, particularly returning relatives and children who have resettled abroad, it was often suggested to me by both returnees and elderly locals that the summer sojourners spoil the serenity for those that remained: as Katerina put it, when I asked if she was pleased that the *Imvriótes* had started to return, ‘I will tell you: I am not so much because, you know, when you have become accustomed to your peace and quiet [laughter]’ (06/08/2013). For many of these local *Imvriótes*, yearly witnesses to the disjuncture between the carnivalesque month of August and the hardships of winter, the summer returnees were simply ‘tourists’. Fokas, who left for Greece in 1975 but now once again lived permanently on the island, recalled that in the 1990s,

the older people saw us as strangers, even our own people. “The tourists have come,” they would say. Old people. Our people. Of course, they had lived many years here alone, and they saw us as tourists (13/08/2013).

Babis – who emigrated to Australia in 1970 and now returns on-and-off in half-year stints – reported a similar indifference amongst the local population towards the returnees, suggesting that the former felt the latter had acquired pretensions in their host countries:

Now the old people say, “ah, they [the returnees] will all leave. They are tourists”. [But] they don’t think of me as a tourist, they see me as a local. Why do they see me as a local? Because I don’t return as though I went to Australia and now I’m “Somebody”. I return and I become exactly the same as them (12/08/2013).

The perception that the presence of the seasonal returnees is purely recreational and makes little contribution to the long-term prospects of the community was even shared by permanent returnee Miltos, who had left the island for Greece in 1969 in his twenties but now resides on Imbros permanently. He had the following to say:

Now people come to the village, but they come as tourists. And tourism is not what we want, for me to come to my *patrída* as a tourist. I have to come to do something, to sow something, to take advantage of whatever has remained. Not the 10 days, “tra la la, bla la la”, we come, we sing and dance, and we leave again, and we throw our money about. If I was coming for tourism, I would go to some other island [...] Six-monthers are tourists [too]. If they want a touristic programme, they should go elsewhere. They do not help at all (Miltos 06/08/2013).

Not surprisingly, many returnees vociferously rejected their appellation as ‘tourists’. In the words of permanent *Schoinoúdi* returnee Mimis:

I never felt like a tourist, because a man does not feel like a tourist at home. He must not feel so. Regardless of the fact that some of our people called us tourists [...] The older people called us tourists, for them of course we are tourists, but I do not accept being a tourist in my house (13/08/2013).

Permanent *Schoinoúdi* resident Antonis similarly remarked that, ‘I never felt like a tourist, I didn’t allow myself to feel like a tourist’ (10/08/2013), whilst seasonal returnee Babis, asked if he had ever felt like a tourist, responded ‘no, I feel like a real *Imvriótis*, because I am *real*’ (12/08/2013). Running through statements of this sort was not only a strong sentiment of belonging to Imbros, but also a defiant insistence in not allowing that sense of belonging to be called into question.

The returnees’ daily interactions with the island’s Muslim settlers, as well as the former’s perception of how the latter saw the returning Greeks, presented further occasions for the assertion and contestation of belonging. Since 1960, the island has been extensively settled by Anatolian Turks and Kurds, who took up residence in the capital, five new settlements, and some of the Greek villages (particularly *Kástro*, but also in smaller numbers in villages with extant Greek populations such as *Ágios Theódoros* and *Schoinoúdi*) (Babül 2004:14-16). My interviewees almost unanimously agreed that the island’s Muslim residents were friendly and welcoming towards the returning *Imvriótes*, and several observed that the opportunity for the returnees to interact with Turks on a daily basis had helped to replace a negative image of the generalised Turk as a hostile other with a more positive impression of particularised

Turks as human beings (Theodossopoulos 2006:9; see chapter 4). In Istanbul-born *Imvriotis* Loukas' terms:

We gather together there [on Imbros] in the summer, and we recycle not just the bad things and the hatred and such, but also new experiences and needs. And we have our houses, and you must get a builder, a Turk, [you must] speak to the taxi driver, as a friend, afterwards at your wedding his wife brings you a present, she knits a jacket for your child, and after that they become people (08/05/2013).

For their part, the island's Turkish authorities have formally welcomed the return of the Greeks, portraying their presence as a demonstration of Gökçeada's multiculturalism (in a manner that nevertheless typically sidelines Imbriot experiences of persecution and expatriation in favour of a narrative of equality and tolerance) (Babül 2006a:60, 63; Babül 2006b:50; Tsimouris 2014:40-41, 47-48). In a 2013 interview with the newspaper *Çanakkale Olay*, for instance, Gökçeada's Turkish mayor Yücel Atalay encouraged the *Imvriótes* to return and take their place in the local economy:

That is our biggest dream. With luck they will come. It is our great expectation. At the moment, we are able to accommodate around 500 families [...] We must make them entrepreneurs [...] With them Imbros will move forward [...] We have always treated everyone equally, we have not separated anyone. We behaved the same towards everyone. We gave everyone the opportunity to work. Until now no incident has occurred. Imbros can become a very beautiful model, a model applicable across the whole country (*Gökçeada Gazetesi* 10 June 2013; translated by Valeria Antonopoulou).

The returnees' reactions to such expressions of welcome are somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, cordial intercommunal relationships have greatly facilitated the return movement, and invitations for the Greeks to participate in the touristic development of the island present a possible means by which the seasonal return might be made more permanent and sustainable (echoing Politis' arguments at the 1993 Imbriot Society conference (see above)). As we saw at the outset, however, accepting this invitation also meant tacitly acknowledging that it is the Turkish authorities who have the right to welcome or 'accommodate' the *Imvriótes* rather than *vice versa*, an implicit challenge to the returnees' sense of historical belonging and nativity on the island. As permanent *Schoinouði* resident Mimis put it when I asked about his relationships with the village's Muslim inhabitants: 'they have welcomed us. Now, you will say to me, "they have welcomed you in your *patrída*?"' Unfortunately, that is the way it is' (13/08/2013).

The returning Greeks also provide a significant seasonal injection into the local economy (Babül 2004:10; Babül 2006a:57; Babül 2006b:48), buying produce from shopkeepers and stallholders in the capital, hiring local labour to renovate their houses, travelling around the island in taxis driven by Turks, and when necessary renting hotel rooms operated by settlers. This fact is not lost on the returnees, many of whom felt that the island's Muslim population saw them as visiting tourists rather than returning natives. In the words of six-monther Vasillis:

Now they want us. Especially those that have businesses and shops. They wait for us, saying “when will August arrive when all of those Hellenes will come?” [...] Many say, “if you Hellenes don't come, the following year we will leave” [...] Especially us six-monthers, every Sunday we go to the market (12/08/2013).

Cafe owner Savvas concurred, attributing the settlers' positive reception of the *Imvriotes* to the latter's economic contribution: ‘the Turks have accepted our return’, he declared, ‘because they think of us as tourists. They say, “great, come here, leave your money”. That was the idea of the authorities. We come for three or four weeks, spend plenty of money, and we leave’ (14/08/2013).

If the returnees were thus afraid that they were nothing more than touristic consumers in the eyes of the island's authorities and settler populace, they simultaneously had to confront the possibility that they themselves had become *objects* of touristic curiosity. As Politis remarked in his 1993 speech (see above):

As strange as it may seem to you, the only touristic interest which Imbros has to offer, are the half-ruined houses and the handful of Christian traditions of the few inhabitants of the island (1993:151).

Gökçeada's mayor estimated that, in the year 2012, 320,000 Turkish tourists visited the island (*Gökçeada Gazetesi* 10 June 2013; translated by Valeria Antonopoulou). Though it would be inaccurate to suggest that these huge numbers were drawn solely by the island's Greek history (most come for the beaches and the windsurfing), it is nonetheless part of the appeal for many Turkish tourists (Babül 2004:7), who not only attend ceremonial events like that on the 15 August in *Agridia*, but also make daily visits to the Greek villages throughout the month of August, soaking up the atmosphere and taking photographs of the Greek houses (reflecting something of a broader multicultural nostalgia in contemporary Turkey (Babül 2004:8; on which, see Komins 2002; Mills 2005; Mills 2006; Pamuk 2005; Türeli 2010)). Characteristically, a Turkish

journalist who visited the island in 2012 affectionately wrote about the ‘picturesque’ backstreets of *Agrídia* and the cheerful Greek-speaking old ladies (*Today’s Zaman* 3 June 2012). As Babül has discussed, a number of Istanbul Turks have even bought houses in some of the Greek villages, and see themselves as part of the effort to preserve the Greek cultural heritage of the island (2004:9). Permanent returnee Christos spoke favourably to me about the ‘cultivated’ and ‘educated’ Turks who had recently acquired former Greek houses in *Ágios Theódoros*, observing that,

they attempt to preserve the physiognomy of the village in the old-style, for it to be recognisable as a Hellenic village. They too do not want it to change from that perspective: I can tell you that they work harder to preserve it than our people! (08/08/2013).

Several of my interviewees also saw the influx of Turkish tourists as an opportunity to inform ordinary Turks about the plight of the island’s Greek community that is conspicuously absent from official pronouncements and tourist brochures: Antonis, Fokas, and Savvas each had stories of eliciting sympathetic and even tearful responses from visiting Turks who had sought an explanation for the ruined and abandoned Greek villages (Antonis 10/08/2013; Fokas 13/08/2013; Savvas 14/08/2013). Nevertheless, these visitations were sometimes a cause of discomfort for the returnees. Yiannis, a member of the young Greek-born generation summering in *Agrídia*, offered me the following impressions about the presence of Turkish tourists in the village:

First of all I think it is good because the island becomes more well-known, tourism will increase [...] On the other hand, I can say that I don’t like it so much, sometimes when I see them taking photographs, because I feel that they are doing it because we are something totally different from them, something so strange, with the negative meaning of strange (15/08/2013).

Pavlos similarly lamented that when he sees Turkish tourists circulating with cameras in *Ágios Theódoros* he sometimes feels ‘like the Native Americans on their reserve’ (fieldnotes 08/08/2013). As we walked together through the village on an August afternoon, we passed a delicatessen blaring out Greek music. When I remarked that it was interesting that the *Imvriótes* had started to open businesses like these, Pavlos corrected me: ‘that is a Turkish shop. It is run by Turks. They probably play the Hellenic music to appeal to the Turkish tourists’ (fieldnotes 08/08/2013). Six-monther Themis, meanwhile, explaining his reservations about the 15 August celebration in *Agrídia*, told me that he had the uncomfortable feeling that it was a staged performance:

We come here, for parties and dances, I see it and I am saddened even more. I don't know how other people see it. They go and they force themselves to dance. Where did they find that good humour? Inside their souls are crying. It is like they put us on a stage, the Turks put us on a stage to watch us, and when the performance finishes they leave (11/08/2013).

The Greek returnees to Imbros experience an island transformed not only by the decay of its Greek villages, but also by its touristic awakening. Whilst the possibility of participating in this tourism industry might provide the *Imvriótes* with employment opportunities and therefore make permanent return more feasible, it also generates anxieties amongst those uncomfortable with the notion that their return to the place of their birth is simply feeding the local Turkish economy. Equally, though they may feel affronted by the suggestion that it is they who must be welcomed by the settlers rather than the other way around, in turn the flow of Turkish tourists into the Greek villages provides the *Imvriótes* with the opportunity to themselves play the role of hosts to Turkish outsiders. In this sense, the returnees' everyday interactions with the growing tourism industry simultaneously undermine and strengthen their sense of belonging on the island: treated as tourists in the capital, they are themselves visited as natives in their villages.

'When you return to your patrída': the young generation

In a 2012 speech given in Istanbul to mark the publication by a Turkish university of a monograph about the *Imvriótes*, Imbriot Society president Christoforidis described what he called a 'modern Imbriot identity' that had been inculcated amongst foreign-born and foreign-raised *Imvriótes* through the 'to-and-fro between foreign countries and the village on the island' (Christoforidis 2013). For Christoforidis, it was hugely significant that this second-generation Imbriot identity had been developed through physical encounters with the island rather than purely in cultural associations abroad, permitting the young generation to develop their own relationship to Imbros as a contemporary place (Christoforidis 2013).¹⁵⁰ Indeed, interviewees from the young generation who

¹⁵⁰ There is something of a contrast to be made here with the Greek-born generation of *Polítes*, who have typically not had the same opportunities to frequent their parents' former places of residence in Istanbul. Accordingly, whilst the young generation *Imvriótes* spoke about Imbros as a contemporary, living environment and often eschewed lengthy historical narratives, young generation *Polítes* tended to invoke Istanbul not as a *place* but as a *history*: as Mitsos – born in Istanbul in 1976 but raised in Greece from a young age – put it, 'the community is here [in Greece], but the history is there [in Istanbul]' (06/06/2013). The possibility of 'return' for the young generation *Imvriótes* has, nevertheless, exerted its influence even on those who have not yet been able to visit, who frequently described developing an emotional attachment to the island through the Imbriot Society in Athens – dubbed a 'little Imbros' by Natasha

were regular visitors to the island unanimously concurred that they had developed a strong sense of belonging on Imbros derived from their summer experiences. Eva, for instance, who visited the island for the first time in 2011, explained that, ‘when I come to Imbros I feel very at ease [...] It may not be my home here, but I feel like I am at home on the island. And there may be Turks here, and I may not know the language or be able to talk, but I feel very nice, I do not feel like I am in a foreign place’ (13/08/2013). Yiannis – born in Thessaloniki in 1996, and a regular visitor since 2000 – described how he developed a similar feeling of homeliness in *Agrídia* as the summer population grew larger:

Halstead: How would you describe your first trip to Imbros?

Yiannis: I think it was amongst my favourite visits [...] When you return to your *patrída*, both the trip and the memories that it brings are lovely.

Halstead: And have you ever felt at all like a tourist when you come here?

Yiannis: Look, in the beginning, I felt like a guest, because most of the houses were in ruins, and the Turkish population was dominant [...] Now, in the last few years, because most of the houses are inhabited again, and with the six-monthers the Greek population has become more prevalent, especially in our village, I feel like I belong to this community (15/08/2013).

Later on in the same interview, Yiannis explained that he had decided to apply for Turkish citizenship in order to be able to inherit his family home in the future. I asked him whether he had any fears that his friends in Greece would react badly to this decision, to which he responded:

If we had had this conversation two years ago, I would have been very certain that I did not want to take Turkish citizenship, because I believed that I would “become a Turk”. But afterwards I sat down and thought about it, and, slowly slowly, I came to feel more Imbriot than Hellenic. So I thought that whatever they may say in Greece, it doesn’t bother me [...] Because as I told you the Hellenes behaved towards the *Imvriótes* as though they were Turks, and the *Imvriótes* isolated themselves somewhat, they became like a different family, embedded, of course, within the Hellenic community, but somehow different. And now that we come to the island, and I start to learn the history and meet other young people, I feel Imbriot [...] So I feel Hellenic, of course, but increasingly I feel Imbriot (Yiannis 15/08/2013).

(07/06/2013) – and a yearning to make the journey to Imbros. As Christina put it, ‘hearing constantly about Imbros, seeing photographs of the island, we feel like we are on the island when we come here [to the Society]’ (07/06/2013); or, in Paschalis’ terms, ‘I think of it [Imbros] as my *patrída*, even if I was not born there and have not been’ (07/06/2013). When I asked Maximos – who was born in Athens in 1999, and had origins from both Imbros and Tenedos, but had by 2013 only managed to visit the latter – where he would say he was from, he responded:

Maximos: From Imbros, I think of myself as being from Imbros, it is more in my heart than Tenedos. If somebody asks me, the first word I will say is “Imbros”.

Halstead: And Athens, when would you say that?

Maximos: Athens? Towards the end (06/06/2013).

Through the experiences and friendships he has gained on the island, Yiannis has developed a local Imbriot ‘inflection’ (Cowan and Brown 2000:20; see review essay I) to his Hellenic ethnic identity, which has not led him to drastically re-evaluate his relationship to the country of his birth, but rather allowed him to feel distinctive within it; Hellenic, that is to say, but different from other Hellenes (see chapter 3). In his own words:

[My grandfather told me] that the Hellenes [of Greece] were very ambivalent, and treated the *Imvriotes* not as Hellenes but as Turks [...] Us, as *Imvriotes*, we belong: we are Hellenes, we simply didn’t have the fortune to join the Hellenic state [...] We are in some way, not different exactly, simply as *Imvriotes* we are otherwise united [i.e. they have a distinctive kind of solidarity]. When you see an *Imvriotis* you think of him as your fellow countryman more than you would a Hellene [...] So certainly I feel that Imbros is my *patrída*, and Thessaloniki too, simply Imbros is something separate (Yiannis 15/08/2013).

Christoforidis, in his 2012 speech in Istanbul, expressed his hope that this second-generation Imbriot identity, ‘precisely because it continues to be developed *also* in Turkey’, might enable the *Imvriotes* to ‘continue in some way to remain a part of modern Turkish society and attempt to establish a dialogue with Turkish society’ (Christoforidis 2013). For him, the permanent resettlement of young generation *Imvriotes* on the island ‘constitutes perhaps the last opportunity for the rebirth of a culture that belongs to Turkey that it might continue to offer something to Turkey’ (Christoforidis 2013). Regardless of whether or not this represents a plausible scenario for the future, however, it was clear that for my young generation interviewees the prospect of acquiring a wider sense of belonging to contemporary Turkish society was some way off. In common with their Turkish-born parents and grandparents, they tended to mentally separate Imbros from the rest of Turkey, or even, more specifically, to separate the Greek villages on the island from the rest of Gökçeada. In summer visitor Lia’s words, ‘as familiar as we feel in the village, where we feel like natives, when we are at the border we feel foreign, I personally feel like a foreigner’ (in interview with Eva 13/08/2013). Eleni likewise observed that, ‘I do not feel like a tourist here [in my village], but if I go across to Çanakkale I am a tourist’ (15/08/2013), whilst Takis, during the same conversation, explained that, ‘when I am in my village [...] and I feel that I am with Hellenes, and people that I know, I do not feel like a tourist [...] I feel like I am in my place, but when I am with the Turks, I feel like I am in another country’ (15/08/2013). This somewhat spatially constricted sense of belonging made it harder for the young generation *Imvriotes* to envisage their permanent

resettlement on the island, and although all expressed a desire to continue their seasonal visits, most were hesitant about the prospect of living on Imbros permanently. Some of the obstacles they cited were common to Greeks all over Greece whose parents or grandparents migrated from rural to urban settings (such as the lack of employment opportunities, or the cultural differences between Greek cities and Imbriot villages), but others were particular to the case of Imbros (the language barrier, for instance, and the scarcity of Greek residents on the island). In Eva's terms, 'it is not the same thing to live alone with the Hellenes, and to live with the Turks that you do not know well' (13/08/2013). In this sense, we might say that the youth of Imbros is torn between a desire to belong to Imbros and the seeming impossibility of belonging to Gökçeada.

The participation of the younger generation in the Greek return to Imbros was a source of great enthusiasm for many of my older interviewees. Retired six-monther Stamatios, for instance, approvingly pointed out to me that on one day in August 2013 he had been able to count 45 children in the central square of *Agrídia*, more than the total number of permanent residents in the winter months (07/08/2013). Permanent *Schoinoúdi* returnee Mimis likewise praised the efforts of the young generation, even if their exuberance might spoil the peace and quiet of the older returnees:

Because I have spent many Augusts here – celebrations, parties for the youth, all of that – I guess you could say that I'm tired of it [...] It is lovely because it enlivens the island [...] It is lovely regardless of the fact that I have grown tired of it. But it must happen. It is our culture and tradition, and our *patrída* is brought to life by its traditions (13/08/2013).

There was, nevertheless, for some of my interviewees a nagging concern that the young generation's presence on the island was impermanent, and that their youthful parties would not outlast the passing of their parents and grandparents. Antonis, for example, felt it most unlikely that many of the summer visitors would become permanent residents:

The young people come here. On 13 August [at a party for the youth in *Schoinoúdi*] you will find a *dámpa doúmpa* [i.e. deafening club music]. Nothing more [...] It would be a great surprise if two or three of those – it won't be more than two or three who will take root here. It is not possible [...] Eh, as long as it lasts (10/08/2013).

Permanent returnee Miltos concurred, suggesting that the young generation would cease to visit Imbros once their parental safety net disappears:

They like to come here for the freedom of the *la la la, bla bla bla*. Within a month, they want to leave, they become bored [...] If I leave, I who does the cooking, looks after the house, *et cetera et cetera*, and they cannot come and find everything ready, they will not come again (06/08/2013).

For their part, the second-generation *Imvriótes* readily acknowledge that the character of their visits differs somewhat from that of their parents and grandparents, but also emphasise that their desire to prolong their relationship with the island is genuine. As Lia put it:

Lia: For us young people it is a bit different, because the truth is we come for holidays. But we get on very well because kids from all over the world come. We might not socialise during the year but we gather every summer here, and we make very close friends [...] and a summer does not pass that we do not think of going to Imbros.

Halstead: So for you it is tourism?

Lia: Yes, truth be told it is more touristic in my mind than [for] my mother who comes here for work, to do things with the house and such, whilst we come for holidays, because we go swimming, we see our friends: it is different, certainly. But there are other parameters, because this house will pass to us when we grow up, we want to continue to come, even if our parents cannot (13/08/2013).

Indeed, to dismiss the young generation's attachment to Imbros as purely recreational would be to do them a disservice. Their own accounts of the role that they play in the summer return were marked by a clear self-awareness as regards both the ways in which their activities might be perceived by older *Imvriótes* and the inevitability that they must connect with the island on their own terms. In Yiannis' words:

The older people, who were born here, who lived the traditions traditionally, for them it was a reality. Now we who come here, we want to live them as they lived them, but simply things have changed [...] We never lived the times that they lived, and nor was there video for us to be able to see how they lived, how they celebrated, we simply know the tradition. And so we, as young people, celebrate in our own manner, as *Imvriótes* who are coming back to their *patrída* (15/08/2013).

As Christoforidis argued in Istanbul in 2012, in order for the Imbriot community 'to envision a new future on the island' it is essential that the young generation be able 'to create a new narrative of their own upon the contemporary soil of their *patrída*' (Christoforidis 2013).

Conclusions

Discussing international policy on refugee repatriation, Elazar Barkan lamented that the *right to return* for refugees enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had become a *rite of return*, a rhetorical stance rather than a practical response to expatriation: '[t]he right of return', he wrote, 'becomes more of a rite than a right when politicians support the demand rhetorically and use it as an easy escape from finding an actual solution to real crisis' (2011:236). Such *rites of return* have certainly been practised by Turkish politicians as regards Turkey's expatriated Greek minority: Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has on several occasions invited the Greeks to return to Turkey (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2012:8), and as we saw above Gökçeada's Turkish mayor has specifically called on the *Imvriótes* to come back to the island. Over the last quarter of a century, the expatriated Greeks of Imbros have been engaged in a struggle to turn these *rites of return* into a concrete and sustainable *right to return*. This has involved addressing not only practical difficulties relating to property rights, citizenship, language, education, and employment, but also the question of how to reconcile a sense of belonging to Imbros with the contemporary reality of Gökçeada: the ruins, the tourists, the expropriated lands and those who now live and work there, the perception of the returnees in the eyes of the local *Imvriótes* and Turks alike, and the ways in which the young generation's Imbros might differ from that of their parents and grandparents. Recalling his first return to Imbros in 1996 after a 20 year absence, six-monther Themis spoke of the difficulty he had retracing once familiar paths:

I went to our buildings, our outhouses, I went to our fields: unrecognisable. Because I knew the area very well – I even used to know what trees were where – I used to be able to walk the path at night without lights. But now I go there in the day and I cannot walk it, because everything has fallen into ruin (11/08/2013).

Since 1988, the expatriated *Imvriótes* have walked once again on the island of their birth. Yet for now at least, they must do so along paths littered with ruins, both literal and psychological.

Conclusions

Greeks without Greece

Coming here [to Greece], the first thing you feel is the freedom that you are in your place: a Hellene in Greece. Because that is how we felt over there: Hellenes without Greece. When we came here, suddenly we were Hellenes in Greece, wherever you went it was Hellenic, in the churches, in the schools, in the hospitals, wherever. You constantly hear and speak Greek, you are not afraid (Markos 04/05/2013).

The mentality of the Hellene was totally different from the *Romiós* [...] They called us “seeds of the Turks”. We left there as infidels, and we came here as seeds of the Turks [...] We are a group of people who essentially have two *patrídes* and no *patrída* (Maria 09/05/2013).

In this thesis, I have explored how the expatriated Greeks of Turkey interpreted and represented their disorientating and often fragmentary experiences of belonging and alienation in two nation-states: Turkey, the country of their birth, where they were periodically persecuted on the basis of their ethnic and religious identity; and Greece, their purported national *patrída*, in which they encountered both reassuring similarities and striking differences between themselves and the Greeks of Greece, who were sometimes ill-acquainted with their plight or viewed them with suspicion due to their Turkish birthplace. Part II of the thesis focused on how they responded to these ambivalent experiences by emphasising the specificities of their own recent and more distant local historical heritages. As I documented in chapter 3, members of the expatriated community self-defined, variably, as *Romioí* and as Hellenes. For some, especially those with particular grievances towards the Greek state, a Romaic identity separated the expatriates from the Hellenic residents of Greece, a discursive position that prompted others within the community, fearful of opening up a chasm between the Greeks of Turkey and the Greeks of Greece, to eschew the label *Romioí* and emphasise their Hellenic selves. For many *Polítes*, however, a Romaic self-identification rooted in the Byzantine legacy – officially sidelined yet popularly resonant within Greece, and according to Greek nationalist history the period when pagan Hellenism merged with Orthodox Christianity, a cornerstone of modern Greek identity – served as a means to *simultaneously* differentiate themselves from the inhabitants of Greece *and* affirm that they themselves were particularly Hellenic. My informants from the agriculturalist Imbriot community were generally less inclined to characterise themselves as cosmopolitan *Romioí*, but nonetheless drew on the particularities of their own locality in

an effort to demonstrate the authenticity, specificity, and venerability of their Hellenic credentials through tales of their island's colonisation by Ancient Athenians, and the preservation of its Hellenic traditions in spite of repeated occupations and the absence of protection from the Greek state. These narratives of 'inclusive particularity' indicate that national belonging may be constructed through attachment to the local rather than simply in opposition to it, and through the accentuation of local heterogeneity as well as the assertion of national commonality, and accordingly highlight the limitations not only of approaches premised on the existence of coherent and uniform ethnic communities, but also those based on an antithesis between the supposed simplicity of national identity and the complexity of local or diasporic identities.

In chapter 4, I discussed how the Greeks of Turkey claimed a 'privileged knowledge' of the Turkish other acquired through their personal experiences of living in Turkey, and how they deployed ethnic stereotypes supposedly derived from this intimate knowledge to both explicate historical occurrences and substantiate contemporary claims about self and other. In some contexts, members of the expatriate community endorsed Greek nationalist stereotypes through representations of the 'bad Turks' who are violent, impulsive, and readily roused by nationalist ideologues. This served not only to explain their experiences of popular persecution in Turkey by individuals that sometimes included those they had thought of as friends, but also to counteract a perceived indifference on the part of the Greek state and populace by depicting the expatriates as martyrs to Greece's quintessential other. At other times, however, expatriates placed emphasis upon the virtues of the 'good Turk' who is honourable, respectful, and industrious, a representation which commonly functioned as a means to critically appraise the alleged untrustworthiness, crudeness, and idleness of the inhabitants of Greece. These contrasting stereotypes of the Turkish other were not necessarily targeted at separate and clearly demarcated groups within Turkish society, but were rather used to explain the contingent behaviour of others in particular situations, such that an individual who was said to exhibit the tendencies of the 'good Turk' in one context might be depicted as complicit in the violence of the 'bad Turks' in another. By the internal logic of such stereotypes, it was the same fanatical sense of honour amongst the Turks that accounted for both extremes of violence and extremes of courtesy, in much the same way as the Greeks' archetypal love of individual liberty and democratic equality clarified their irreverent and anarchic tendencies. From this point of view, ethnicity and ethnic stereotypes can be viewed not simply as static and immutable

categorisations, but as components of a more malleable mental apparatus through which individuals seek to interpret the behaviour of others and represent their own understandings of self.

Part III of the thesis concentrated on the efforts of expatriate activists and writers to represent the persecution of the Greeks of Turkey through historical analogy, and considered what an analysis of these narratives might contribute to recent scholarly interest in the transcultural dynamics of remembrance. In chapter 5, I explored how the Greeks of Turkey sought to counteract their marginalisation within Greek history and diplomacy by casting themselves in the likeness of exemplary heroes and martyrs from Greek nationalist history. In the late 1970s, the Constantinopolitan Society began to publicly mark the anniversaries of the Istanbul Riots and the Fall of Constantinople, hoping in this manner to raise awareness amongst the Greek public of the expatriates' experiences of discrimination in Turkey. In these commemorative ceremonies, as well as in associated publicity materials and articles printed in community newspapers, expatriate memory activists often compared their own experiences during the riots in 1955 to the last stand of the Byzantines against the Ottoman Empire in 1453, and presented the latter as a necessary precursor to the Greek revolution in 1821. The Greeks of Imbros, meanwhile, drew comparable analogies between the political and demographic changes instituted by Turkey on Imbros during the 1960s and the aftermath of Turkish military action on Cyprus in 1974, and between the few hundred remaining elderly residents of their island and the 300 Spartan warriors of Leonidas who stayed to defend Thermopylae from the Persians. Such discourses reframed local experience as a national cause, but also carried an implicit criticism of contemporary Greek diplomacy for its failure to live up to the archetypes of the past, providing further evidence for the malleable and subversive potential of nationalist rhetoric. The dynamic interplay, moreover, between spatially and temporally distant moments contained in these commemorative narratives illustrates that the mobility of memory identified in recent scholarship applies equally to the construction and reconfiguration of the past *within* nation-states, and not just to memories that conspicuously traverse artificial national, cultural, or social boundaries (themselves often erected through the multidirectional memory work of nation-builders who equated contemporary communities with those of the distant past).

Chapter 6, nevertheless, considered historical cross-referencing that did explicitly cut across ethnic and national distinctions. I focused on the ways in which members of the expatriated Greek communities drew parallels between their own experiences and those of other minority communities within Turkey (in particular, the Armenians, the Assyrians, and the Kurds), and how they analogised between Turkey's treatment of these minorities and Nazi persecution of the Jews. Such discourses confirm that memories, often thought of as being aligned with particular groups of people or rooted in certain temporal or spatial contexts, frequently migrate and interact with one another. Moreover, they do so in a manner that might generate solidarities or even promote intercommunal reconciliation, rather than leading inevitably to competitive and acrimonious clashes over the singularity or specificity of victimhood. I cautioned, however, against interpreting references to other times and places as necessarily reflecting complex and deep-rooted mnemonic entanglements that might significantly impact upon people's understandings of self, others, and history in local and everyday contexts. References by expatriates to the experiences of others tended to appear in quite specific discursive contexts, and in fairly invariant and interchangeable forms. Whether in online peer-to-peer debates, public awareness-raising materials, or formal historical accounts, expatriate writers and commenters typically had recourse to abstracted or 'off-the-peg' motifs borrowed from the histories of other communities when they felt the need to more forcefully and recognisably articulate their own grievances towards Turkey. In this guise, transcultural cross-referencing was liable to reinforce existing nationalist understandings of the past rather than encouraging new and more ethical or cosmopolitan histories, and to perpetuate negative representations of a shared antagonistic other in spite of (or, in this case, perhaps because of) its capacity to simultaneously facilitate intercommunal solidarities between different groups of victims.

In part IV, I developed my broader discussion of the relationship between the locality and the nation through a specific case study: the return of the Greeks to Imbros. During the 1970s and 1980s, when even short-term return to Imbros seemed implausible, the expatriated *Imvriótes*, in common with other Greek communities with origins outside the territory of the contemporary Greek state, focused on commemorating their locality as part of the national pantheon of 'lost *patrídes*', and attempting to establish a 'New Imbros' on Greek soil. After 1988, however, circumstances on Imbros began to change, facilitating seasonal, semi-permanent, and even permanent return, and precipitating a

struggle not only to tackle the practical obstacles involved in the re-establishment of a Greek community on the island, but also to confront a multitude of daily challenges to the returnees' sense of belonging in a locality greatly transformed by changes to its demographics, its built environment, and its touristic status. The possibility of returning to a locality with (at least in the summers) an active Greek community somewhat sets the *Imvriótes* apart from the Greeks of Istanbul, and has had a noticeable impact upon the former's relationship to Greece and the identities of their Greek-born descendants. For first-generation Imbriot activists, the realisation that Imbros might not be 'lost' to its former Greek inhabitants provoked an increased sense of dissatisfaction with the diplomacy of the Greek state. This led not so much to the *abandonment* of the rhetoric of 'lost *patrídes*', but rather its *redeployment* as a discursive device for criticising a perceived inactivity or fatalism on the part of Greek politicians and diplomats. For the younger, Greek-born generation, meanwhile, experiences of visiting Imbros alongside their parents and grandparents have fostered a greater emotional identification with the island as a contemporary physical place as opposed to a bygone cultural or historical inheritance. This did not necessarily prompt them to supplant a national Hellenic sense of self with a local Imbriot one, but rather inclined them to reimagine their Hellenic identity in terms of a different locality (i.e. Imbros rather than Athens or Thessaloniki). Even for those born *inside* Greece, national identity and statehood were not inextricably bound together, and the relationship between the locality and the nation was not invariably a zero-sum conflict between competing and incompatible claims on individual belonging and selfhood.

* * *

This thesis has sought to demonstrate the limitations not only of a *methodological nationalism* that reflexively places the nation at the centre of scholarly analyses of identity and memory (see chapter 1), but also of a *methodological cosmopolitanism* that exclusively locates heterogeneity and complexity *between* and *beyond* rather than *within* established categories. The evidence presented in part II did not necessarily call into question the salience of ethnicity and nationhood as prominent paradigms through which the Greeks of Turkey orientated their identities and memories: for many of my interviewees, these categories formed something of a conceptual and explanatory horizon within which their life experiences were habitually plotted and made meaningful. What my discussion did suggest, however, is that there is greater room for manoeuvre *within* these horizons than is sometimes supposed, and that ethnicity and

nationhood can be reworked and re-tasked by ‘ordinary people’ in order to articulate a fairly diverse range of discursive positions, some of which may be partially or wholly at odds with the identities or histories formally proliferated by the organs of the state. Nationhood, like memory, is multidirectional, and our analyses should pay attention to the different and mutable ways in which it becomes meaningful (or otherwise) in diverse local contexts.

As I observed at the beginning of part III, memory studies has been driven in important new directions in recent years, particularly by scholars working in the fields of literature, media studies, and Holocaust studies, who have posited more dynamic, interconnected, and transcultural understandings of social memory and its relationship to group identity, and have even suggested that these perspectives might herald novel, post-national, and/or more morally productive ways for people to understand the past (and the present). Historians and anthropologists can make an important contribution to this analytical paradigm shift, by writing an *everyday history of multidirectional memory* (see review essay II) that more systematically considers how these theoretical models – developed in large part through reference to macro-level socio-historical processes, and literary or mass-mediated representations of the past – might apply to the study of particular local communities in particular historical contexts. Part III of this thesis argued that such a research agenda should not focus solely on memories that happen to cross artificial social or cultural borders, but rather begin by recognising that the multidirectional dynamics of memory might be as complicit in the maintenance of national boundaries as they are necessary for their tearing down.

Appendices

Appendix 1 – List of interviewees: *Polítes**

Pseudonym	D.O.B.	Place of birth	Gender	Date of migration	Reason for leaving	Citizenship (in Turkey/ present)	Date of Interview
Adamantios	1978	Istanbul (Ágios Stéphanos/ Yeşilköy)	M	1996	Family reasons	Turkish/ Turkish	10/05/13
Alekos	1971	Istanbul (Péra/ Beyoğlu)	M	1971	Parents' decision	Turkish/ Greek (1981)	28/05/13
Alexandra	1947	Istanbul	F	1971	Discrimination/ fear	Turkish/ Greek	22/07/11
Alexandros	1962	Istanbul (Ágios Stéphanos/ Yeşilköy)	M	1978	Discrimination/ economic situation after Cyprus	Turkish/ Greek	11/03/14
Anastasia	1939	Istanbul	F	1970	Deteriorating situation after 1964	Turkish/ Turkish	05/02/12
Andreas ^a	1943	Chálki/ Heybeliada (Princes' Islands)	M	1973	Deteriorating situation (associated with Cyprus)	Turkish/ Greek and Turkish	11/02/12
Anna	1923	Istanbul	F	1937	Education/ family left	Greek/ Greek	28/11/11
Apostolis	1955	Istanbul (Péra/ Beyoğlu)	M	1975	Discrimination (associated with nationalism)	Turkish/ Greek (1986)	03/02/12
Artemis	1987	Istanbul	F	2005	Studies in Greece	Turkish/ Turkish	15/05/13
Dimitris	1956	Chálki/ Heybeliada (Princes' Islands)	M	1975	Seeking new experiences	Turkish/ Greek (Turkish pending)	30/11/11
Evangelos	1928	Istanbul (Yedikule)	M	1964	Discrimination	Turkish/not specified	08/05/13
Fotini ^b	1943	Istanbul	F	1973	Deteriorating situation	Not specified	21/11/11

Fotis	1950	Istanbul (Péra/ Beyoğlu)	M	1976	Deteriorating situation/ partner left	Turkish/ Greek (1980)	01/02/12
Gerasimos	1949	Istanbul	M	1964	Father expelled as Greek citizen	Turkish/ Greek (1964)	06/02/12
Ioanna	1944	Istanbul	F	1964	Parents' decision	Turkish/ Greek (1982)	21/11/11; 23/11/11
Iraklis	1947	Istanbul	M	1964	Father expelled as Greek citizen	Greek/ Greek	11/02/12
Konstantinos	1944	Istanbul	M	1959	Father expelled as Greek citizen	Greek and Turkish/ Greek	05/02/12
Kyriakos	1951	Istanbul	M	1975	Discrimination in employment/ partner left	Turkish/ Greek (1982)	03/02/12
Lazaros	1948	Prínkipos/ Büyükkada (Princes' Islands)	M	1964	Father expelled as Greek citizen	Greek and Turkish/ Greek	10/05/13
Lefteris	1960	Istanbul (Yedikule)	M	1968	Discrimination/ fear	Turkish/ Greek	12/05/13
Manos	1941	Istanbul (Şişli)	M	1972	Deteriorating situation/ friends left	Turkish/ Turkish	05/02/12
Maria	1959	Prínkipos/ Büyükkada (Princes' Islands)	F	1971 ^c	Fear	Turkish/ Greek and Turkish	09/05/13
Marios	1941	Istanbul	M	1966	Fear/friends left	Turkish/ Greek (1980)	29/01/12
Menelaos	1946	Istanbul (Skoutári/ Üsküdar)	M	1989	Deteriorating situation	Turkish/ Turkish	06/02/12
Michalis	1940	Istanbul (Péra/ Beyoğlu)	M	1971	Deteriorating situation	Turkish/ Greek	29/01/12
Milena	1950	Istanbul (Şişli)	F	1964	Deteriorating situation	Turkish/ Greek (1972)	30/11/11
Mitsos	1976	Istanbul	M	1982	Parents' decision	Turkish/ Greek	06/06/13

Nikolaos	1939	Istanbul	M	1964	Relatives left	Turkish/ Greek (1982)	30/01/12
Panagiotis	1946	Istanbul (Péra/ Beyoğlu)	M	1963	Expulsions (indirectly)	Turkish/ Greek and Turkish (2011)	24/11/11
Petros	1946	Istanbul (Péra/ Beyoğlu)	M	1964	Deteriorating situation/ reached age for military service	Turkish/ Greek (1985)	26/11/11
Rita ^b	1948	Istanbul (Péra/ Beyoğlu)	F	1976	Deteriorating situation	Turkish and Greek/not specified	21/11/11
Sofia ^a	1955	Istanbul (Péra/ Beyoğlu)	F	1975	Not specified	Turkish/ Turkish	11/02/12
Sotiris	1946	Istanbul	M	1970	Love (<i>érotas</i>)	Turkish	08/02/12
Spyros	1930	Istanbul	M	1984	Fear/partner left	Turkish/ Greek (1971)	02/12/11
Stavros	1947	Istanbul (Yedikule)	M	1963	Discrimination	Turkish/ Greek (1974)	29/11/11
Stefanos	1950	Istanbul (Péra/ Beyoğlu)	M	1964	Not specified	Turkish/ Greek (1982)	01/12/11
Tasos	1949	Istanbul	M	1964	Father expelled as Greek citizen	Greek and Turkish/ Greek	13/03/14
Tasoula	1953	Istanbul (Péra/ Beyoğlu)	F	1964	Not specified	Turkish/ Greek (1980)	27/11/11
Thanasis	1953	Istanbul	M	1971	Discrimination	Turkish/ Greek (1981)	06/02/12
Theodora	1967	Istanbul (Péra/ Beyoğlu)	F	1971	Parents' decision	Turkish/ Greek	19/04/12
Theodoros	1951	Istanbul	M	1973 ^d	Studies abroad/threat to family home	Turkish/ Greek	07/02/12
Tomas	1928	Istanbul (Yedikule)	M	1964	Deteriorating situation	Turkish/not specified	21/11/11

Vangelis	1934	Istanbul	M	1980	Declining minority population/ partner wanted to leave	Turkish/ Greek (1981) and Turkish	03/02/12
Vasiliki	1950	Istanbul (Yedikule)	F	1977	Not specified	Turkish/ Greek (1992)	21/08/12

* Dates in *italics* are approximate. ^a Interviewed together. ^b Interviewed together. ^c 1971 (school in Greece); 1975 (as a family).

^d 1973 (studies in England); 1976 (to Greece).

Appendix 2 – List of interviewees: *Imvriotes**

Pseudonym	D.O.B.	Place of birth	Gender	Date of migration	Reason for leaving	Citizenship (in Turkey/ present)	Date of Interview
Amarillis ^b	1934	Imbros (Schoinoúdi)	M	1963	Declining minority population	Turkish/ Greek	21/05/13
Antigoni	1975	Imbros (Schoinoúdi)	F	1983	Discrimination	Not specified	13/08/13
Antonis	1941	Istanbul	M	1964 - 1974 (Australia)	Deteriorating situation	Not specified	10/08/13
Argyris ^a	1927	Imbros (Agios Theódoros)	M	1984	Son taken ill in Greece	Turkish/not specified	08/08/13
Aris	1941	Imbros	M	1969	Declining minority population/ discrimination	Turkish/ Greek and not specified	23/05/13
Babis	1951	Imbros (Agríδια)	M	1970 (Australia)	Not specified	Not specified	12/08/13
Christos	1958	Imbros (Agios Theódoros)	M	1977	Deteriorating situation/lack of Greek language education	Turkish/ Greek (1988) and Turkish (2012)	08/08/13
Damon	1936	Imbros (Agríδια)	M	1975	Deteriorating situation	Not specified	08/08/13
Despoina ^c	1926	Imbros (Agios Theódoros)	F	1966 (Istanbul); 1970 (Greece)	Lack of Greek language education	Turkish/not specified	12/08/13
Dimitra	1939	Imbros (Agríδια)	F	1974 (Istanbul); 1982 (Greece)	Lack of Greek language education	Turkish/not specified	09/08/13
Dimosthenis	1943	Istanbul	M	1949 (Istanbul); 1972 (Greece)	Discrimination	Turkish/ Greek and Turkish	06/06/13
Eleni	1968	Imbros (Agríδια)	F	1973	Lack of Greek language education	Turkish/ Greek (1982) and Turkish	04/06/13
Evangelia ^d	1933	Imbros (Agríδια)	F	1966	Lack of Greek language education	Turkish/ Greek (before 1983) and Turkish	12/08/13

Fani	1958	Imbros	F	1964 (Istanbul); 1971 (Greece)	Discrimination	Turkish/ Greek and Turkish	07/06/13
Fokas	1964	Imbros (Agríδια)	M	1964 (Istanbul); 1975 (Greece)	Discrimination	Turkish/not specified	13/08/13
Giorgos	1965	Imbros	M	Not specified	Not specified	Not specified	14/08/13
Ilias	1923	Imbros (Glyký)	M	1965	Discrimination	Turkish/ Greek and Turkish	21/05/13
Katerina	1939	Imbros (Agríδια)	F	Never left	n/a	Not specified (Turkish)	06/08/13
Kleopas	1941	Imbros (Agios Theódoros)	M	1966 (Central Africa); 1979 (Greece)	Not specified	Turkish/not specified	09/08/13
Kostas	1963	Imbros (Agríδια)	M	1981	Studies in Greece	Turkish/ Greek (1987)	07/06/13
Kyriaki ^c	1960	Imbros (Agríδια)	F	1966 (Istanbul); 1970 (Greece)	Lack of Greek language education	Turkish/not specified	12/08/13
Leonidas	1937	Imbros (Agios Theódoros)	M	1977 (Ismir)	Discrimination	Turkish/ Turkish	08/08/13
Loukas	1967	Istanbul	M	1992	Finished university/ work	Turkish/ Greek (1999) and Turkish	08/05/13
Markos	1953	Imbros	M	1964 (Istanbul); 1967 (America)	Discrimination	Turkish/ American (1972)	04/05/13
Miltos	1944	Imbros (Agríδια)	M	1969	Not specified	Turkish/ Greek and Turkish	06/08/13
Mimis	1955	Istanbul	M	1981	Not specified	Turkish/not specified	13/08/13
Minos	1933	Imbros (Schoinoúdi)	M	1964 (Istanbul)	Discrimination	Turkish/ Turkish	13/08/13
Mirela	1947	Imbros	F	1973	Lack of Greek language education	Turkish/ Greek (1982) and Turkish	10/05/13

Orestis	1934	Imbros (Agríδια)	M	1948 (Istanbul); 1968 (Greece)	Employment came to an end	Turkish/not specified	06/08/201 3
Panagiota	1927	Imbros (Panagía)	F	1980	Discrimination	Turkish/not specified	07/08/13
Pantelis	1959	Imbros (Panagía)	M	1977	Studies in Greece	Turkish/ Greek (1988) and not specified	27/05/13
Pavlos	1970	Imbros (Agios Theódoros)	M	1975 (Istanbul); 1987 (Greece)	Lack of Greek language education (1975)/ discrimination (1987)	Turkish/ Greek and Turkish	29/05/13
Petroklos	1919	Imbros (Agios Theódoros)	M	Never left	n/a	Turkish/ Turkish	08/08/13
Pyros	1961	Imbros (Agios Theódoros)	M	1974	Not specified	Turkish/ Greek (1982)	21/05/13
Sakis	1930	Imbros (Schoinoúdi)	M	1946 (Istanbul)	Not specified	Not specified (Turkish)	10/08/13
Savvas	1960	Imbros (Agríδια)	M	1974	Discrimination/ lack of Greek language education	Turkish/ Greek (1988)	14/08/13
Sokratis	1940s	Imbros	M	1974	Not specified	Turkish/ Greek (1984) and Turkish	30/05/13
Stamatios	1945	Imbros (Agríδια)	M	1963	Studies in Greece	Turkish/not specified	07/08/13
Stelios	1958	Imbros (Schoinoúdi)	M	1970	Deteriorating situation/lack of Greek language education	Turkish/ none (Greek pending)	27/05/13
Themis	1944	Imbros (Agríδια)	M	1966	Discrimination	Turkish/not specified	11/08/13
Tryfon ^b	1929	Imbros (Agios Theódoros)	M	After 1964	Deteriorating situation	Turkish/ Turkish	21/05/13
Vasia ^a	1930	Imbros (Agios Theódoros)	F	1984	Son taken ill in Greece	Turkish/not specified	08/08/13

Vasilis	1938	Imbros	M	1961 (Germany); 1980 (Greece)	Expropriations of land	Turkish/ Greek (1980s) and Turkish	12/08/13
Voula ^d	<i>1955</i>	Imbros (Agrídia)	F	1966	Lack of Greek language education	Turkish/ Greek (1983) and Turkish	12/08/13
Zacharias	1957	Imbros	M	1966 (Istanbul); 1977 (Greece)	Lack of Greek language education (1966)/military service (1977)	Turkish/ Greek (1988)	03/06/13
Zoe	1957	Istanbul	F	1975	Felt oppression from all directions	Not specified	07/06/13

* Dates in *italics* are approximate. ^a Interviewed together. ^b Interviewed together. ^c Interviewed together. ^d Interviewed together.

Appendix 2 – List of interviewees: *Imvriotes* (continued)*

Pseudonym	First return	Current frequency of return
Amarillis ^b	Not specified	Not specified
Antigoni	1990	Seasonal
Antonis	<i>1989 - 1999</i>	Permanent resident
Argyris ^a	1990s	Permanent resident
Aris	<i>1999</i>	Not specified
Babis	1992	Six months of the year
Christos	1988	Permanent resident (since 2011)
Damon	Immediately	Nine months of the year
Despoina ^c	2002	Six months of the year
Dimitra	<i>1987</i>	Six months of the year (or more)
Dimosthenis	Not specified	Seasonal
Eleni	2001	Seasonal
Evangelia ^d	(1972) 2000	Seasonal
Fani	1987	Seasonal
Fokas	1988	Permanent resident
Giorgos	1991	Seasonal
Ilias	Immediately	Seasonal
Katerina	n/a	Never
Kleopas	<i>1990</i>	Six months of the year
Kostas	1989	Seasonal
Kyriaki ^c	After 2002	Seasonal
Leonidas	n/a	Ten months of the year
Loukas	<i>mid 1990s</i>	Seasonal
Markos	<i>1990</i>	Seasonal
Miltos	1989	Permanent resident
Mimis	2011	Permanent resident
Minos	Immediately (never left Turkey)	Ten months of the year (since 2000)
Mirela	1991	Seasonal (until 2009)
Orestis	1995	Six months of the year
Panagiota	Immediately	Seasonal
Pantelis	1989	Seasonal
Pavlos	1987	Seasonal
Petroklos	n/a	Never
Pyrros	1993	Not specified
Sakis	1982	Permanent resident
Savvas	1988	Not specified
Sokratis	<i>2001</i>	Infrequently, if ever
Stamatios	1989	Six months of the year
Stelios	Never	Never
Themis	(1969, 1973, 1975) 1996	Six months of the year (since 2000)
Tryfon ^b	Not specified	Not specified
Vasia ^a	1990s	Permanent resident
Vasilis	1993	Six months of the year
Voula ^d	(1972) 2000	Seasonal
Zacharias	<i>1988</i>	Seasonal
Zoe	Not specified	Not specified

* Dates in *italics* are approximate. ^a Interviewed together. ^b Interviewed together. ^c Interviewed together. ^d Interviewed together.

Appendix 3 – List of interviewees: Greek-born generation*

Pseudonym	D.O.B.	Place of birth	Descent	Gender	Frequency of visits to Turkey	Citizenship	Date of Interview
Christina ^a	1985	Greece (Athens)	Imbros (mother)	F	Periodic	Greek	07/06/13
Efthemis	1971	USA	Istanbul (both parents)	M	Not specified	Not specified	10/05/13
Eleni ^b	1991	Greece (Athens)	Imbros (mother)	F	Seasonal	Greek	15/08/13
Eva	1991	Greece (Athens)	Imbros (mother) Princes' Islands (father)	F	Seasonal	Greek	13/08/13
Filipos ^b	1993	Greece (Athens)	Imbros (mother)	M	Seasonal	Greek	15/08/13
Kosmas	1986	Greece (Athens)	Istanbul (both parents)	M	Seasonal	Greek and Turkish	04/06/13
Lakis	1987	Greece (Athens)	Imbros (both parents)	M	Seasonal	Greek	31/05/13
Lampros	1986	Greece (Athens)	Istanbul (both parents)	M	Once	Greek	30/05/13
Lia	1991	Greece (Athens)	Imbros (mother)	F	Seasonal	Greek	13/08/13
Maximos	1999	Greece	Imbros (both parents)	M	Never	Turkish	06/06/13
Miltiadis	1986	Greece	Imbros (mother)	M	Seasonal	Greek	06/06/13
Natasha	1987	Greece	Imbros (father)	F	Periodic	Greek	07/06/13
Paris	1951	Greece (Athens)	Istanbul (father)	M	Not specified	Greek	01/02/12
Paschalis ^a	1976	Greece	Imbros (both parents)	M	Never	Turkish	07/06/13
Takis ^b	1993	Greece	Imbros (both parents)	M	Seasonal	Greek	15/08/13

Vyron	1985	Greece (Athens)	Istanbul (both parents)	M	Once	Greek	06/06/13
Yiannis	1996	Greece (Thessaloniki)	Imbros (mother)	M	Seasonal	Greek	15/08/13

* Dates in *italics* are approximate. ^a Interviewed together. ^b Interviewed together.

Appendix 4 – Testimonies from *Constantinople, My Nostalgia* (2010)

Name - Greek	Name - Turkish	D.O.B.	Place of Birth	Gender	Date of Migration	Reason for leaving	Pages	Date of Interview
Stella Skarlatou	Stella Skarlatu	1916	Istanbul (Pendik)	F	1924	Compulsory population exchange	49-51	11/03/10
Veniamin Kanakis	Benyamin Kanakis	1940	Istanbul (Fener)	M	1959	Studies abroad	53-57	09/03/10
Giorgos Kechagiadopoulos	Yorgos Kehayadopoulos	1939	Istanbul (Tarlabaşı)	M	1964	Lack of favourable conditions	59-61	10/03/10
Giorgos Karanatsoglan	Yorgo Karanaçoğlan	1942	Istanbul (Kurtuluş)	M	1964	Difficulty finding work	63-65	03/03/10
Faidon Papadopoulos	Fedon Papadopoulos	1954	Istanbul (Kadiköy)	M	1964	Difficult conditions/insecurity after expulsions of relatives	67-69	09/03/10
Themistoklis Pachopoulos	Themistoklis Pahopoulos	1945	Istanbul (Sanatya)	M	1964	Expulsions/education	71-75	10/03/10
Amaryllis Georgantidou	Amarillis Georgantidu	1931	Istanbul (Kadiköy-Bahariye)	F	1964	Husband lost job/relatives left/thought worse to follow	77-80	09/03/10
Georgios Lefkaros	Georgios Lefkaros	1946	Istanbul (Beyoğlu)	M	1964	Father expelled as Greek citizen	81-84	10/03/10
Stratis Arvanitis	Istrati Arvanitis	1947	Prinkipos (Princes' Islands)	M	1964	Expulsions	85-88	09/03/10
Krystallia Karvounidou	Kristalya Karvunidu	1939	Istanbul (Yeniköy)	F	1964	Expulsions	89-92	08/03/10
Giannis Dokmetzioglou	Yanis Dökmecioğlu	1945	Istanbul (Fener)	M	1964	Studies abroad	93-96	04/03/10

Stylianos Roidis	Istilyanos Roidis	1928	Istanbul (Beyoğlu)	M	1965	Propaganda against the Greeks/ Cyprus issue	97-100	09/03/10
Nikolaos Apostolidis	Nikolaos Apostolidis	1936	Istanbul (Beyoğlu)	M	1965	Expulsions	101-104	09/03/10
Spyros Kyriakopoulos	Spiros Kyriakopoulos	1943	Istanbul (Beyoğlu)	M	1965	Difficulties he faced	105-106	08/03/10
Paris Danto	Paris Dado	1934	Istanbul (Kurtuluş)	M	1965	Looking for work	107-108	10/03/10
Lena Anapnioti	Lena Anapnioti	1944	Istanbul (Yeniköy)	F	1966	Father lost his job/ fiancé left	109-111	09/03/10
Kalliopi Sofiadou	Kalyopi Sofiadu	1944	Istanbul (Edirnekapı)	F	1966	Could not find work as a teacher	113-115	04/03/10
Stella Mina	Stella Mina	1945	Istanbul (Arnavutköy)	F	1966	Expulsion of fiancé	117-119	04/03/10
Vasiliki Xyda	Vasiliki Ksida	1954	Prínkipos (Princes' Islands)	F	1969	Feeling of insecurity	121-126	10/03/10
Froso Lina Arvanitaki	Froso Lina Arvanitaki	1947	Istanbul (Kurtuluş)	F	1971	Fear over employment	127-131	10/03/10
Dimitra Dourmazer	Dimitra Durmazer	1947	Istanbul (Tarlabaşı)	F	1971	Father lost his job/ feeling of insecurity	133-135	04/03/10
Kostas Mavromatis	Kostas Mavromatis	1949	Istanbul (Beyoğlu)	M	1971	Invited by cousins to leave Turkey	137-140	04/03/10
Michail Mavropoulos	Mihail Mavropulos	1943	Imbros	M	1972	Insecurity	141-146	09/03/10
Antonis Ventouris	Andon Venturis	1952	Istanbul (Tarlabaşı)	M	1972	Expulsion of uncles/ effects of Cyprus issue	147-150	11/03/10
Maria Oikonomou	Maria Ikonomu	1958	Antigóni (Princes' Islands)	F	1972	Father did not want her to marry a Turk/most of family had left	151-154	21/03/10

Minas Orfanidis	Mina Orfanidis	1952	Istanbul (Yedikule)	M	1972	Felt persecuted	155-158	03/03/10
Thanasis Tsimpis	Tanaş Çimbis	1945	Istanbul (Yeniköy)	M	1972	Uncertain future/ friends and relatives left	159-162	06/03/10
Rea Stathopoulou	Rea Stathopulu	1950	Imbros	F	1973	Unable to find work	163-166	10/03/10
Nikos Ouzounoglou	Nikos Uzunoğlu	1951	Istanbul (Kadiköy)	M	1973	Studies abroad	167-172	09/03/10
Markella Limnidou	Markella Limnidu	1938	Istanbul (Beyoğlu)	F	1973	Brother left in 1964	173-175	10/03/10
Vasiliki Papagiannaki	Vasiliki Papayanaki	1950	Istanbul (Kurtuluş)	F	1973	Friends left	177-178	11/03/10
Pavlis Moschalis	Pavlis Moshalis	1915	Çukurcuma	M	1974	Friends left	179-181	11/03/10
Afroditi Natsi	Afroditi Naçi	1948	Istanbul (Yeniköy)	F	1974	Cyprus issue	183-185	11/03/10
Maria Tsiropoulou	Maria Çiropulu	1962	Prínkipos (Princes' Islands)	F	1974	Studies abroad	187-190	10/03/10
Toula Alektoridou	Tula Alektoridu	1949	Istanbul (Kurtuluş)	F	1974	Could not get a job as a teacher or a civil servant	191-194	11/03/10
Eri Ansalto Marinaki	Eri Ansaldo Marinaki	1953	Istanbul (Beyoğlu)	F	1975	Love (<i>érotas</i>)	195-196	11/03/10
Fofi Raptopoulou	Fofi Raptopulu	1957	Prínkipos (Princes' Islands)	F	1975	Poor relations between Athens and Ankara	197-200	10/03/10
Ivi Mittakou	Ivi Mittaku	1955	Antigóni (Princes' Islands)	F	1975	Brother left because of Cyprus issue	201-202	08/03/10
Makrina Filidou	Makrina Filidu	1953	Istanbul (Kumkapı)	F	1977	Sister and her family left	203-204	08/03/10
Elisavet Kovi	Elisavet Kovi	1952	Istanbul (Talihame-Beyoğlu)	F	1978	Wedding	205-207	09/03/10

Voula Paraskevi Fanariotou	Vula Paraskevi Fanaryotu	1958	Istanbul (Arnavutköy)	F	1978	Father unemployed because of Cyprus issue	209- 210	11/03/10
Ioanna Kotsopoulou	Ioanna Koçopulu	1939	Istanbul (Yedikule)	F	1979	Thinking of future for her children	211- 213	03/03/10
Dimitris Papagiannis	Dimitris Papagiannis	1948	Istanbul (Taksim)	M	1980	Friends and relatives all left	215- 218	08/03/10
Christos Isaakidis	Hristo Isakidis	1941	Prinkipos (Princes' Islands)	M	1980	Relatives were in Thessaloniki	219- 221	03/03/10
Iakovos Ventouris	Iakovos Venturis	1919	Istanbul (Kurtuluş)	M	1980	Family of his wife was expelled/ felt harassed/ children left	223- 225	11/03/10
Angeliki Vigka	Angeliki Vinga	1963	Istanbul (Yeniköy)	F	1982	Studies abroad	227- 229	11/03/10
Kristi Psalti	Kristi Psalti	1964	Istanbul (Kurtuluş)	F	1983	Friends and relatives all left	231- 233	03/03/10

Glossary

Asia Minor Greeks/Asia Minor refugees: Orthodox Christian refugees forcibly expelled from Turkey and relocated to Greece as a result of the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations agreed upon by Greece and Turkey in 1923.

Elladítis (m.)/*Elladítissa* (f.)/*Elladítes* (pl.): Greek(s) of Greece (or, sometimes, those in possession of Greek citizenship).

expatriates/expatriated Greek community of Turkey: Orthodox Christians from Istanbul and Imbros, exempted from the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey, who left Turkey and resettled in Greece (particularly between the 1950s and the 1980s).

expellees: Greek citizens expelled from Turkey in 1964.

Hellene (m.)/Hellene (f.)/Hellenes (pl.)/Hellenism (noun)/Hellenic (adj.): Translations of the Greek words *Éllinas* (m.)/*Éllinída* (f.)/*Éllines* (pl.)/*ellinismós* (noun)/*ellinikós* (adj.). Sometimes used to refer collectively to all Greeks, and sometimes used specifically to designate the Greeks of Greece, or those in possession of Greek citizenship.

Imvriótis (m.)/*Imvriótissa* (f.)/*Imvriótes* (pl.)/Imbriot (adj.): Greek(s) of Imbros.

omogéneia (noun)/*omogeneís* (adj.): Literally ‘homogeneity’ or ‘homogenous’, these terms are typically used to refer to individuals of Greek descent born or living outside Greece.

native Greeks: Translation of the Greek *dópioi Éllines*, used to distinguish Greeks born in – or with roots in – the Greek state from the *omogéneia*, i.e. those of Greek descent born outside Greece (and their descendants). Amongst my interviewees, the term was sometimes used to differentiate those with roots in Greece from those with roots in Anatolia (including the Asia Minor refugees and their descendants), and sometimes more generally to refer to all of the Greeks of Greece whom the expatriates encountered when they relocated from Turkey.

Polítis (m.)/*Polítissa* (f.)/*Polítes* (pl.)/Constantinopolitan (adj.): Greek(s) of Istanbul.

Romiós (m.)/*Romiá* (f.)/*Romioí* (pl.)/*romiosýni* (noun)/Romaic (adj.): Sometimes used to refer to all modern Greeks, and sometimes used specifically to designate the Greeks of Turkey.

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