1 # Modelling the impact of liner shipping network perturbations on
2 # container cargo routing: Southeast Asia to Europe application
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Abstract

Understanding how container routing stands to be impacted by different scenarios of liner shipping network perturbations such as natural disasters or new major infrastructure developments is of key importance for decision-making in the liner shipping industry. The variety of actors and processes within modern supply chains and the complexity of their relationships have previously led to the development of simulation-based models, whose application has been largely compromised by their dependency on extensive and often confidential sets of data. This study proposes the application of optimisation techniques less dependent on complex data sets in order to develop a quantitative framework to assess the impacts of disruptive events on liner shipping networks. We provide a categorization of liner network perturbations, differentiating between systemic and external and formulate a container assignment model that minimises routing costs extending previous implementations to allow feasible solutions when routing capacity is reduced below transport demand. We develop a base case network for the Southeast Asia to Europe liner shipping trade and review of accidents related to port disruptions for two scenarios of seismic and political conflict hazards. Numerical results identify alternative routing paths and costs in the aftermath of port disruptions scenarios and suggest higher vulnerability of intra-regional connectivity.

Keywords: Liner shipping; Network perturbations; Port disruption accidents, Container assignment model

1 Introduction

61

62 While the effects of market cycles (Stopford, 2009) on the overall stability of liner shipping networks

63 have been the subject of extensive research over the years, what is less known is how the overall liner

64 shipping transport system can be affected by perturbations to the established network topology caused

65 by events such as infrastructure developments, natural disasters or armed conflicts. These perturbations

66 are important because they could significantly alter transportation capabilities between regions or result

67 in accidents that can cause loss of life, injuries, economic loss or damage to the environment (Mullai

68 and Paulsson, 2011). Therefore, understanding the impact of liner shipping perturbations on container

69 cargo routing and their potential related accidents is crucial for decision-makers in the maritime industry

70 who strive at being better prepare for these events.

71   It is unrealistic to expect remove all uncertainty related to the potential effects of the above-

72 mentioned events. However, this uncertainty can be reduced applying quantitative frameworks that

73 model container routing under hypothetical scenarios of network perturbations and examining historical

74 records of accidents related to the events evaluated. Such frameworks, however, are not simple to

75 formulate. The variety of actors and processes within modern supply chains, and the complexity of their

76 relationships have previously led to the development of simulation-based container models whose,

77 application have been largely compromised by their dependency on extensive and complex sets of data

78 which are generally not available in a many cases and regions.

79   One of the earliest attempts to simulate maritime container flows at a global scale was the

80 Container World project (Newton, 2008; Bell et al., 2011). This study proposed a simulation approach

81 in which every ship, port, liner service, shipping line, truck and rail operator was represented by a

82 separate agent. The network was built using actual port rotations published by ocean carriers.

83 Containers were transported via each of the agents operating based on their individual set of parameters.

84 Although the model provided a framework for global-scale container routing, it proved to be too data

85 intensive in an competitive industry reluctant to share the data required to maintain the model (Bell et

86 al., 2011). This limitation hampers the application of such model for scenario analysis in regions where

87 the required data is not available.

88   Alternative research efforts have focused on the development of optimisation-based models that

89   can operate with simpler datasets yet are capable of delivering reliable results using computationally

90   efficient mathematical programs. The network used in these models can be built from published ocean

91   carrier schedules (Zurheide and Fischer, 2012) or computed from a liner shipping network design

92   problem (Agarwal and Ergun, 2008). The objectives in the optimisation-based literature range between

93   minimisation of routing costs (Wang et al., 2013), minimisation of sailing time (Bell et al., 2011),

94   maximisation of profit from an ocean carrier point of view (Ting and Tzeng, 2004) and maximisation

95   of volumes transported (Song et al., 2005). Tran and Haasis (2013) provide a comprehensive review of

96   previous optimisation-based works including additional relevant features such as empty container

97   repositioning, deterministic or stochastic shipping demand, and container routing problems in time

98   extended networks.

99   This study seeks to contribute to the application of optimisation-based models for the analysis of

100   liner shipping cargo flows affected by network perturbations, building upon earlier work by Bell et al.

101   (2013) on cost-based container assignment. The proposed application of this model minimises expected

102   container routing costs in order to assess changes in container cargo flows under scenarios of seismic

103   and conflict hazards affecting the Southeast Asia to Europe trades. We examine previous studies of past

104   similar disruptions in order to discuss their potential related accidents and network parameters affected

105   in the aftermath of the disruption scenarios presented.

106   The cost-based assignment model has a series of features that make it suitable for the requirements

107   of this study: First, the cost dimension is used to model the distribution of flows and aggregates a range

108   of dependencies such as container handling and rental cost, cargo depreciation, and transit time. As

109   such it can be used to model possible variations in costs and times that occur on the aftermath of port

110   disruptions. Second, it includes both port capacity and link capacity constraints that can capture

111   disrupted operational parameters in liner shipping networks. Third, the model uses a virtual network

112   approach (Jourquin et al., 2008) which provides an accurate representation of liner shipping operations

113   and allows to skip disrupted ports within a established port call sequence. Finally, we extend previous

114   formulations adding a decision variable and penalty costs for cargo not transported allowing feasible

115   solutions in cases where disruptions decrease network routing capacity below transport demands.

116   The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology used by

117   first proposing a classification scheme of network perturbations, differentiating between systemic and

118   external. This section describes the cost-based assignment model that forms the core of the perturbation

119   analysis framework. Section 3 provides a case-study focusing on the Southeast Asia to Europe trade

120   where the model is applied in two scenarios of port disruption: seismic hazards and political conflicts.

121   Lastly, section 4 presents conclusions and outlines future work.

2   Methodology

2.1   Classification scheme for liner shipping network perturbations

124   We define "network perturbation" as any change, positive or negative, to the existing state of main

125   components of liner shipping networks. These include ports (nodes), routes operated by container liner

126   services (links), vessels size (capacity), and transport demands (origin-destination pairs). Whether a

127   perturbation is positive or negative often depends on the point of view of each stake holder. For

128   example, the 1995 Port of Kobe disruption caused by an earthquake diverted local cargo to the ports of

129   Osaka, Nagoya and Yokohama and transhipment cargo to the ports of Busan and Kaohsiung improving

130   their cargo volumes and business. Though the port of Kobe recovered and the local cargo returned,

131   significant transhipment volumes never returned (Lam, 2012). Positive or negative perturbations

132   impacts are not isolated to port disruptions. For example, the improvement of existing infrastructure

133   such as the Panama Canal expansion scheduled for completion in 2016 will relax vessel deployment

134   upper bound constraints through this waterway. Potential impacts include transshipment cargo shifting

135   in the Caribbean area from ports without capacity to receive post-panamax vessels to those with

136   adequate infrastructure to accommodate such vessels (Rodrigue and Ashar, 2015).

137   In order to identify in which scenarios a container routing model can provide a contribution to the

138   analysis of network perturbations, we proposed a classification scheme which differentiates between

139   systemic and external perturbations. This differentiation allows to identify sources of disruptions which,

140   from a modelling stand-point, dictate the main parameters of the network that will be modified.

141   Previous studies have focused on the study of maritime supply chains risk with a focus on port

142   disruptions (e.g. Lam, 2012; Loh and Van Thai, 2014; Mansouri et al., 2010; Qi, 2015). However, this

143   initial non-exhaustive taxonomy is, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt to classify

144   perturbations that impact additional liner shipping network components beyond ports as focal point

145   such as route capacity and factors influencing origins and destinations of containerised cargo. Our

146   proposed classification adapts macroeconomic, operational and competitive factors discussed by

147   Rodrigue (2010) to include perturbations derived from the liner shipping industry while additional

148   environmental and human risk factors are used to capture exogenous perturbations.

149   Figure 2.1 presents and hierarchical representation of the proposed classification with examples of

150   liner network perturbations. Systemic perturbations refer to changes that are intrinsic to the liner

151   shipping industry. These are mainly driven by macroeconomic factors that impact supply and demand

152   of containerized trade; operational factors such regulatory restrictions and industry practices such as

153   "cascade" effects of larger containerships; and competitive factors such as the development of new

154   infrastructure (e.g. London Gateway port). External perturbations refer to changes driven by exogenous

155   factors to the liner shipping industry. These include environmental changes such as the potential use of

156   arctic shipping routes and natural disasters such as earthquakes; and human risk factors such as port

157   labour strikes, piracy and political conflicts.

158   Some of the perturbations shown in Figure 2.1 can be categorised under more than one of the

159   proposed factors due to existing underlying relationships. For example, though "vessel cascade" is an

160   operational measure driven by the increased use of economies of scale, the use of larger containerships

161   is also the result of increased demand volumes (macroeconomic factor) and ocean carriers' strategy to

162   reduce their transportation costs (competitive factor).

163

Figure 2.1: Classification scheme for liner shipping network perturbations.

167   Perturbation scenarios evaluated in this study focus on two cases of port disruptions caused by

168   seismic hazards and political conflicts assuming that in both cases the pertubartions are inevitable. The

169   scenarios were selected in collaboration with the Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies[1] due to their

170   relevance to Southeast Asia as a major production of containerised goods and illustrate potential

171   disruptive effects of environmental and human risk factors (external perturbations) on regional

172   transshipment hubs and trade partner regions such as Europe. The port disruption cases stand to affect

173   the examined port network in different ways including being the root cause for marine accidents, the

174   characteristics of which are illustrated sections 3.1 and 3.2 for the earthquake and political conflict

175   scenario respectively.

176   Port disruptions cases were also selected because they are a common cause of network

177   perturbations and the necessary data for modelling their impact (e.g. recovery time and effects on

178   terminal operability) is often publicly available in historical records. Root-causes for port disruptions

179   such as an earthquake or a tsunami can also offset existing safety plans in port operations leading to

180   greater number of accidents. Previous works have discussed the impact of port disruptions from risk

181   sources other than natural disasters and political conflicts including labour strikes, equipment failure,

182   human errors and terrorist attacks (Lam and Yip, 2012; Lewis et al., 2013; Mansouri et al., 2010). Table

183   2.1 includes a list of various examples of port disruptions that occurred between January 2012 and

184   January 2014 (Qi, 2015) in order to illustrate the vulnerability of the liner shipping industry to these

185   events. For comprehensive reviews of port-centric disruptions affecting maritime supply chains we refer

186   to Lam (2012) and Loh and Van Thai (2014). Similarly, detailed reviews of sources of accidents and

187   incidence in container shipping operations can be found in Fabiano et al. (2010).

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[1] http://www.risk.jbs.cam.ac.uk/

188   Table 2.1: Examples of port disruptions in recent years. Source: Qi (2015).

Date	Event	Port	Consequences
Jan-2012	High winds	Felixstowe and South Hampton	Disruptions in services at the two largest container hubs in the UK.
Feb-2012	Shipping pilots' strike	Antwerp	MSC container services affected over 21 vessels.
Nov-2012	Hurricane	New York/New Jersey	Container terminal operations closed.
Mar-2013	40-day port labour strike	Hong Kong	Reduced dock capacity by 20%, vessels delayed by 2-4 days and some vessels skipping port calls at Hong Kong
Sep-2013	Failure of a quay crane's gearbox	Botany (DP World Terminal)	Sudden and unforeseen vessel slot cancelations.
Jan-2014	Snow storms	New York/New Jersey	Port closure multiple times during and after the storm resulting in 7-10 delays to deliveries.

189

2.2 Cost-based assignment model

191   As indicated in section 1, in order to assess the effects of port disruptions, the network model considered

192   in this study consist of the following container network concepts based on earlier work carried by Bell

193   et al. (2013).

194   -   Routes: A scheduled sequence of port calls operated by a shipping line or alliance. Also known

195   as liner service.

196   -   Links: A physical connection of adjacent pair of port calls served by a route.

197   -   Legs: A virtual transport task executed by a given route.

198   -   Paths: A chain of transport tasks or legs.

199

200   The following assumptions and simplifications are adopted in the cost-based assignment model:

201   -   A single container type is considered, with a fixed set of daily rent and handling costs. This

202   enables the aggregation of data on container flows and liner service capacities.

203   -   An exogenous origin-destination (O-D) matrix is used as demand input for the model. The rate

204   at which containers are shipped does not vary with time.

205   -   Containers are transported by ocean carriers operating fixed liner service routes between ports.

206   Liner services have fixed port call frequency but the arrival at each port is uncoordinated

207   between ships of different services. Hence, container dwell time at each port is assumed to be

208   the inverse of the sum of the service frequencies at each port.

209   -   Route capacity constraints ensure that the flow of containers on each route does not exceed the

210   capacity deployed by the ocean carrier.

211   -   Combined inbound and outbound flow at each port cannot exceed port throughput capacity.

212

213   Our extension on the assignment model presented by Bell et al (2013) includes a penalty cost for

214 each container not transported which allows feasible solutions for instances where the network transport

215 capacity, either port throughput or liner service capacity, is not sufficient to satisfy the transport

216 demand. This feature is desirable for a model capable of quantifying to what extent network

217 perturbations hamper the network capability to re-route existing transport demand.

218   The penalty cost formulation requires an additional decision variable that dictates what cargo to

219 route through the network from the given O-D matrix input. As such, penalty costs inputs for containers

220 not transported must be higher than any routing costs alternatives to ensure that cargo flows are

221 maximised when routing capacity is available.

222   Other costs considered in the model are: container handling cost, container rental cost and

223 inventory cost. Ship operating costs are considered fixed and do not affect the routing decision. In this

224 application, only flows of loaded containers are considered. The repositioning of empty containers is

225 excluded. The model is then formulated as the following linear program (see Appendix for notation):

226   Objective

$$Min\ TRC = \left(\sum_{n\in N}\sum_{a\in A} CHC_n\, x_{a+}^f\right) + \left(\sum_{a\in A} x_{a+}^f c_a + w_{++}^f\right)(CR + DV)$$

$$+ \left(\sum_{r\in O}\sum_{s\in D}(D_{rs} - t_{rs}^f)\right)(PC)$$

(2.1)

227   Subject to

$$\sum_{a\in A_i^+} x_{as}^f - \sum_{a\in A_i^-} x_{as}^f = b_{is}^f \quad for\ all\ i\in I, s\in D$$

(2.2)

$$x_{as}^f \leq w_{is}^f f_a \quad for\ all\ a \in A_i^-, i \neq s \in I, s \in D \tag{2.3}$$

$$k_i \geq \sum_{a \in A_i^-} x_{a+}^f + \sum_{a \in A_i^+} x_{a+}^f \quad for\ all\ i \in I \tag{2.4}$$

$$RC_n \geq \sum_{a \in A} x_{a+}^f \delta_{aln} \quad for\ all\ l \in L_n, n \in N \tag{2.5}$$

$$x_{as}^f \geq 0 \quad for\ all\ a \in A, s \in D \tag{2.6}$$

$$b_{is}^f \begin{cases} -t_{rs}^f & if\ i = r \in O \\ t_{+s}^f & if\ i = s \in D \\ 0 & otherwise \end{cases} \tag{2.7}$$

$$t_{rs}^f \leq TD_{rs} \quad for\ all\ r \in O, s \in D \tag{2.8}$$

228   Objective function (2.1) minimizes total routing cost *TRC* which includes container handling cost

229   on each leg, container rental and inventory cost as a function of the transit time and dwell time at each

230   port and a penalty cost for each container not transported from the original O-D flow demand.

231   Constraint (2.2) enforces flow conservation. Constraint (2.3) sets the container port dwell time as the

232   inverse of the combined service frequencies of the liner services calling at each port. Constraint (2.4)

233   and (2.5) ensure that port throughput and route capacity are not exceeded. The non-negativity constraint

234   is included in (2.6). In (2.7), origin and destination constraints are included where, for transhipment

235   ports, the inbound flow should equal outbound flow. Constraint (2.8) sets the amount of cargo

236   transported to be less or equal to the O-D flow demand.

237   Route capacity inputs for the model adapt a slot capacity analysis approach (Lam and Yap, 2011;

238   Lam, 2011) but with a weekly time window instead of a annual basis. This approach is suitable for our

239   analysis because it relies on publicly available slot capacity data of liner services which is accessible

240   through most ocean carriers' websites. Alternative approaches based on port-to-port container

241   throughput differentiated by liner services would require commercially sensible data which will be

242   difficult or impossible to obtain (Lam, 2011).

243   We assume that ocean carriers determine the number of vessels to be deployed on each route *n*

244   dividing the total voyage time (expressed in days) by the desired route frequency (e.g. weekly port

245   calls). This assumption is derived from the common industry practice of having weekly port calls in

246   competitive liner services. For example, if a complete port rotation takes 56 days, a shipping company

247   will need to assign 8 vessels to achieve a weekly port call frequency. For liner services that operate on

248   a weekly frequency, weekly route capacity RC_n in the model equals to the average containership

249   nominal capacity deployed. Where this is not the case, route capacity across liner services with different

250   port call frequencies can be standardised to the same time window multiplying the average

251   containership nominal capacity by a desired capacity time window and the inverse of the service

252   frequency as follows:

$$RC_n = \left(\frac{\sum_{p=1}^{V_n} NC_{pn}}{V_n} \right) \left(\frac{F}{f_n} \right) \tag{2.9}$$

253   Where

254   NC_{pn} Nominal TEU capacity of vessel p deployed in route n

255   V_n Total number of vessels deployed in route n

256   p Index of vessels ranging from 1 to V_n

257   F Standardised model input frequency in which the capacity will be expressed

258   f_n Port call frequency of route n

259

260   It has to be noted that F is expressed as the actual number of days (or time window) for the service

261   frequency in which the route capacities will be standardised. For example, if the route capacities in the

262   model are standardised to a weekly time window then $F = \left(\frac{7 \; days}{1 \; week} \right)$. The service frequency f_n can be

263   given in the input data or replaced by $\left(\frac{T_n}{V_n} \right)$ where T_n represents the total voyage time for the complete

264   rotation.

3   Problem instance

266   The model proposed in section 2.2 is applied to representative combined network of five liner services

267   shown in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.1. The network was constructed based on existing liner services

268   sourced from the Port Operations Research and Technology Centre (PORTeC) Delos Database[2] to

269   assess the vulnerability of ports in Southeast Asia, namely Singapore, Port Kelang (Malaysia),

270   Jakarta/Tanjung Priok and Belawan (Indonesia). Singapore, Port Klang and Belawan operate in close

271   proximity to the Malacca Straights, which is regarded as one of most crucial maritime routes in the

272   Southeast Asia-Europe trade lane. The Southeast Asia region and its trade to Europe was selected

273   because of its high containerised trade flow and the region's susceptibility to impacts of earthquake and

274   conflict scenarios presented in sections 3.1 and 3.2.

275   Liner service calls beyond this region were represented using two port group centroids, namely

276   Southeast Asia and Europe. The Southeast Asian centroid collectively represents ports located in East

277   Indonesia, East Indochinese Peninsula, Vietnam and Philippines. Given its location, Tanjung Perak

278   (second largest port of Indonesia in terms of TEU throughput) was selected to represent the actual

279   geographical location of the centroid. Jakarta/Tanjung Priok, the main port of Indonesia, has been

280   considered separately from the group, due to its role as a transhipment hub between Southeast Asia and

281   routes toward Europe. The European centroids comprise of hubs in Le Havre, Felixstowe, Southampton,

282   Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg and Bremerhaven. In this case, Rotterdam has been adopted as the

283   physical location of the centroid, given its role as one of the major European transhipment ports.

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[2] http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/portoperations/research/research%20platforms/delos

284

285
286   Figure 3.1: Asia-to-Europe liner services. Nodes: Southeast Asia centroid (A), Singapore (S),
287   Port Klang (P), Jakarta (J), Belawan (B), Europe centroid (E).
288
289

290
291   Figure 3.2: Intra-Asian liner services. Nodes: Southeast Asia centroid (A), Singapore (S), Port
292   Klang (P), Jakarta (J), Belawan (B), Europe centroid (E).
293
294   As shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, services 1, 2 and 5 correspond to weekly Southeast Asia-
295   to-Europe liner services. Vessels in these services fall within the post-panamax range, with an average
296   cargo carrying capacity of 8,000 TEU. Services 3 and 4 represent intra-regional services, offered weekly
297   with an average ship size of 4,000 TEU. Vessels across all services in the model are assumed to operate

298   at 20 knots. Since all liner services operate on a weekly basis, the maximum weekly route capacity on

299   each leg equals to the maximum containership nominal capacity deployed on each liner service.

300   With the exception of Belawan, ports representing the core of the case study network are all

301   positioned among the top 100 in the world in terms of yearly TEU throughput (Containerisation

302   International, 2012). Port capacities used in this case study were estimated based on this port throughput

303   data and the following formulation:

$$k_i = \frac{n_i}{N_i} K_i \qquad (3.1)$$

304   Where

305   k_i Weekly capacity allocated to the sub-network at port i

306   n_i Number of weekly liner services within the sub-network to/from port i

307   K_i Total weekly capacity at port i

308   N_i Total number of weekly liner services to/from port i

309
310   Equation (3.1) is applied to reflect the weekly capacity allocated to the sub-network under

311   investigation (data for each port is reported in Table 3.1). No throughput capacity constraints are applied

312   to the Southeast Asia and Europe nodes given their status as port group centroids.

313
314   Table 3.1: Container handling capacity estimation at network ports.

Port	K_i [TEU]	N_i	n_i	k_i [TEU]
Singapore	513,000	288	7	14,500
Port Kelang	163,000	124	5	7,500
Jakarta	120,000	27	2	9,000
Belawan	15,500	8	4	7,500

315
316   For all scenarios presented in sections 3.1 and 3.2, 18,000 TEU are shipped from the Southeast

317   Asia centroid to the European centroid. External factors that may influence supply and demand were

318   not considered, therefore leading to the assumption that O-D demand volumes would not be affected

319   by the disruptions. Container handling, rental and cargo depreciation costs used in the model are in

320   accordance to the pricing structures used in previous studies by Bell et al. (2013, 2011). An average

321   cargo value of USD 40,000 for loaded containers is used in this numerical example. Table 3.2 presents

322   a summary of these values.

323   Table 3.2: Container handling, rental and depreciation costs.

Container handling costs	
Loading at origin and unloading at destination	400 USD/TEU
Loading at origin and unloading at transhipment port	350 USD/TEU
Loading at transhipment port and unloading at destination	350 USD/TEU
Loading and unloading at transhipment port	300 USD/TEU
Rental and depreciation costs	
Average value of cargo shipped per container	40,000 USD/TEU
Rental cost for full/empty container	4.5 USD/TEU/day
Rate of depreciation for a full container	20 USD/TEU/day

324

325   Penalty costs for containers not transported depend on factors such as type of containers (e.g.

326   refrigerated or dry), the importance of the shipper to the ocean carrier and less quantifiable aspects such

327   as loss of goodwill from the customer (Brouer et al., 2013). Due to the sensitivity of this information,

328   previous studies that utilise these cost components are often not able to publish it. In absence of such

329   data, we adopt Kjeldsen et al. (2011) approach to assign USD 1,000,000 as a penalty cost for each TEU

330   not transported. It has to be noted that this high penalty cost is only included in the model to maximise

331   the flow of containers routed when disruptions reduce network routing capacity below transport

332   demand. As such, it cannot be used to compare re-routing costs when the penalty cost is incurred. For

333   the latter cases, we replace the penalty cost with the assumption that ocean carriers assign sufficient

334   transport capacity to the next available weekly services to transport any pending cargo but incurring a

335   delay of 7 days. We then apply an opportunity cost of 4% per year (Notteboom, 2006) along with the

336   cargo depreciation cost and container rental costs defined in Table 3.2 to estimate the delay costs.

3.1   Earthquake scenario

338   For the earthquake scenario, we consider the seismic hazard at a port (probability of a certain level of

339   ground shaking) and the vulnerability of the port (likelihood of damage to the port due to ground

340   shaking). In many international building codes, the seismic hazard to be considered in the design of

341   earthquake-resistant structures is defined as a level of ground shaking with a 2% probability of

342 exceedance in 50 years (a 2475 year return period). The level of ground shaking is measured using

343 spectral acceleration (SA). Spectral acceleration with a 1 second period (S1) is roughly equivalent to

344 peak ground acceleration (PGA). The values for the ports in the network are obtained from the United

345 States Geological Survey Worldwide Seismic Design Maps (USGS, 2014a). The vulnerability of ports

346 is measured using a Quality of Port Infrastructure rating, which measures business executives'

347 perceptions of their country's port facilities. The rating ranges from 1 to 7, with a higher score indicating

348 better development of port infrastructure. These data are obtained from the Global Earthquake Model

349 (GEM) report on socio-economic vulnerability indicators for earthquake impacts (Power et al., 2013).

350   The earthquake scenario was developed using the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake impacts on the

351 Port of Kobe as a case study. According to the USGS, the Port of Kobe experienced a PGA = 0.315g

352 (Chang, 1996). USGS data indicate that the vulnerability of ports rating in Japan is 5.2. It should be

353 noted that this rating is from 2014 and port vulnerability in Japan in 1995 may have been higher (<5.2)

354 and earthquake impacts resulted in considerable improvements to port infrastructure to reduce

355 vulnerability to earthquakes. The port accounted for 10% of Japan's import and export trade and

356 handled 30% of Japan's container cargo throughput. The port was particularly important for Western

357 Japan as it handled roughly 65% of imports and exports for Kinki, Hyogo and Chugoku and 80% of

358 exports from Shikoku. After the earthquake struck, the port was virtually closed. The first berth for

359 container traffic reopened 2 months after the event and by April, the total trade amounted to only 40%

360 of the previous year. Cargo traffic was diverted to alternative ports, where the main beneficiaries were

361 domestic ports with 50% of container cargo rerouted to Yokohama and 40% to Tokyo and Osaka.

362   In the port network presented in this paper, two earthquake scenarios similar in impacts to the 1995

363 Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake are possible, affecting the ports of Jakarta or Belawan. An earthquake in

364 Jakarta or Belawan with a 2475 year return period has a spectral acceleration, S1 = 0.33g (USGS, 2014a,

365 2014b). Using the conversion equations of Worden et al. (2012), this gives a Modified Mercalli

366 Intensity[3] (MMI) scale of 7.7. Jakarta could therefore experience ground-shaking of a similar level to

---

[3] The Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) scale depicts shaking severity. Source:
http://quake.abag.ca.gov/shaking/mmi/

367   that experienced in Kobe. Jakarta is rated as more vulnerable in the GEM study than Japanese ports

368   (GEM rating = 3.6) and could potentially suffer more damage and therefore take longer to rebuild than

369   the Port of Kobe, increasing recovery time to return the port to its normal operations. Figure 3.4 provide

370   a geographical representation of Southeast Asian ports and regional PGA values.

371

372   Figure 3.3: Earthquake hazard (PGA) - Southeast Asia.
373   Source: Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies

374

375   The impact of accidents resulting in loss of human life, injuries, damages to property and to the

376   environment in the aftermath of an earthquake vary on a case-by-case basis depending on multiple

377   factors such as magnitude of the earthquake, port infrastructure, stacking plan of containers, level of

378   automation, etc. The unforeseen nature of any earthquake also increases the risk of accidents. For

379   example terminal gantry crane or reach stacker operators maybe injured or killed if stacked containers

380   fall near or on them due to the unexpected ground shacking. Similarly, potential of tsunami waves

381   generated by the earthquake can capsize moored vessels or break their mooring during container/load

382   discharge operations.

383   Caselli et al. (2014) list and classify observed risk factors that impacted port operations and

384   surrounding areas in Iquique, Chile after the April 1, 2014 earthquake. These include structural damage

385   to port infrastrucure such as the breakwater wall (building damage), blocking of access routes due to

386   landslides (transportation facilities), shortage of water and electricity (lifeline facilities), loss of one of

387   three available tugboats (transportation facilities), psychological impact due to large amounts of

388   aftershocks (life difficulties), human suffering due to death or injured people (human suffering), damage

389   to fishing boats and facilities (other facilities). Similarly, Kubo et al. (2005) review of impacts of

390   tsunamis on moored ships and ports in Japan and Korea listing potential sources of accident and damage

391   hazards. The latter include landing of the drifting material produced by the tsunami, fire or pollution

392   caused by fuel in vehicles and vessels crashed, ship collisions during habour escape attempts, sand drift,

393   waterway burying, and stranding and ceasing of logistics functions.

394   For modelling purposes, a suggested level of disruption is similar to that experienced in 1995 at

395   the Port of Kobe. The potential sources accidents and damage mentioned above are considered in the

396   aftermath of the Jakarta and Belawan earthquake scenarios and are captured in the following estimated

397   recovery times: the port of Jakarta or the port of Belawan are estimated to be closed for container cargo

398   for 2 months (equivalent to the Kobe disruption). After 3 months, 40% of available port container

399   handling capacity is restored. The system is expected to recover fully after 1 year (with 100% of original

400   capacity being available).

401   ## 3.2   War scenario

402   Developing a war scenario involved historical analysis, the assessment of current "areas of tension",

403   and consideration of current military theory and recent war-gaming exercises. The hypothetical China-

404   Japan war scenario builds on historical tensions and geographical disputes. Claims of sovereignty of

405   the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea and the targeting of naval assets triggers the conflict.

406   Direct action on either country is limited, although military targets in China and Japan's power

407   infrastructure are targeted in missile strikes. One of the areas most affected, and the focal point of this

408   study, is the impact on shipping.

409   The impact of accidents resulting in loss of human life, injuries, damages to property in a war

410   scenario can be evaluated from historical evidence of merchant shipping in areas of political conflict.

411   For example, Navias and Hooton (1996) present a detailed account of the impact of the Iran-Iraq Crisis

412   of 1980-88 on merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf. The toll of this war were hundreds of merchant

413   vessels attacked, more than 400 mariners killed, and economic losses worth millions of USD by owners,

414   charterers and insurance companies (Navias and Hooton, 1996). Even though the main targets were oil

415   tankers, about 40% of the vessels attacked were containerships, bulk carriers, tugs and others (Uhlig,

416   1997). An important aspect of the Iran-Iraq Crisis attacks were their effectiveness at disrupting exports

417   and supply lines of the involved countries proving the vulnerability of neutral-flag merchant vessels

418   operating in war or blockade zones. However, an often overlooked fact is the possibility of conflict

419   escalation when such attacks on neutral-flag vessels provide context for international intervention of

420   naval forces from countries not initially involved. For example, Uhlig (1997) describe how in the Iran-

421   Iraq Crisis, the U.S. used its own registry flag to protect Kuwait's merchant fleet with U.S. naval forces.

422   For our war scenario, an initial naval blockade surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands disrupts

423   shipping routes through the East China Sea (Figure 3.4 – B1). The potential risks for loss of life,

424   accidents, and economic damage and escalation are assumed to be similar to the Iraq-Iran Crisis. As the

425   conflict escalates, the blockade zone increases to an area including Taiwan and the southern part of

426   Kyushu and Shikoku islands (Figure 3.4 – B2). As other nations become involved in a naval standoff,

427   the blockade zone expands further, encompassing access to China, Hong Kong, and Vietnam through

428   the South China Sea (Figure 3.4 – B3). Additional threats to merchant vessels include the use naval

429   mines to protect any exclusion or blockade zone, which present a risk of vessels straying into non

430   designated or known waters. Environmental risks include hypothetical oil spills from damaged vessels.

431   These risks are represented in our model as disrupted connectivity in the form of increased sailing times,

432   reduced transport capacity and increased costs to and from the Asia centroid.

433   In this extreme scenario, where the conflict lasts 9 months, and takes a further 3 months to manage

434   the stand-down of forces, international trading is severely restricted: foreign direct investment decreases

435   by 70% and imports and exports suffer 90% reduction for the belligerent nations. While the main ports

436   of Southeast Asia (Kaohsiung, Tokyo, Busan, Shanghai, and Hong Kong), would maintain almost full

437   capacity through the conflict, the level of activity would be minimal. Manufacturing organisations,

438   particularly foreign-owned entities in China and Japan, would halt operations, through political

439   pressure, safety concerns, or because exporting became impossible as container yards fill due to the

440   blockades. In spite of not being located in the conflict zone, container throughput at the port of

441   Singapore and other regional transhipment hubs may be severely impacted also due to containers

442   accumulated in the yards as cargo traffic to/from the conflict zone is blocked.

443

444

445   Figure 3.4: War scenario blockade regions.
446   Source: Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies

447

448   Table 3.3 summarizes four alternative outcomes of the earthquake and war scenarios are

449   developed. As shown in the table, the consequences of these disruptive events are modelled not only by

450   reducing the capacity of ports, but also affecting the route capacity on legs involving the disrupted port

451   and the costs of shipping through those routes. Transit times to and from disrupted ports are assumed

452 to be increased by 300% immediately after the events and by 100% 2 months after. Resulting changes

453 to route capacity in the scenarios evaluated are estimated using equation (2.9). Except for the war

454 scenario, container handling capacity is reduced to 0% immediately after the events and to 40% 3

455 months after.

456

457

458   Table 3.3: Summary of scenarios and related parameters

ID	Scenario	Event time-frame	Capacity changes
0	Base scenario	None	all ports and routes working at standard operational level
1	Earthquake in Jakarta	a) Immediately after the event	0% port capacity in J +300% sailing time to/from J -16% capacity in Service 2 -46% capacity in Service 4
		b) 3 months after the event	40% port capacity in J +100% sailing time to/from J -3% capacity in Service 2 -12.5% capacity in Service 4
2	Earthquake in Belawan	a) Immediately after the event	0% port capacity in B +300% sailing time to/from B -17% capacity in Service 1 -70% capacity in Service 3 -39% capacity in Service 4 -18% capacity in Service 5
		b) 3 months after the event	40% port capacity +100% sailing time to/from B -5% capacity in Service 1 -46% capacity in Service 3 -7% capacity in Service 4 -7% capacity in Service 5
3	Earthquake involving Jakarta and Belawan simultaneously	a) Immediately after the event	0% port capacity in J and B +300% sailing time to/from J and B -17% capacity in Service 1 -16% capacity in Service 2 -70% capacity in Service 3 -56% capacity in Service 4 -18% capacity in Service 5
		b) 2 months after the event	40% port capacity in J and B +100% sailing time to/from J,B -5% capacity in Service 1 -3% capacity in Service 2 -46% capacity in Service 3 -22% capacity in Service 4 -7% capacity in Service 5
4	War affecting flows in Southeast Asia	a) Severe consequences	+300% sailing time to/from A -17% capacity in Service 1

ID	Scenario	Event time-frame	Capacity changes
		b) Mild consequences	-16% capacity in Service 2
			-53% capacity in Service 3
			-30% capacity in Service 4
			+100% sailing time to/from A
			-17% capacity in Service 1
			-16% capacity in Service 2
			-53% capacity in Service 3
			-30% capacity in Service 4

459

3.3 Application of the cost-based container assignment model

461 The cost-based container assignment model defined in section 2.2 was implemented IBM's OPL

462 language and solved using the CPLEX optimisation engine to evaluate how each scenario stand to affect

463 (or not) the routing of container in the constructed network. Resulting container flows and costs are

464 reported in Table 3.4. In the base scenario, it can be seen that, under normal transport network

465 conditions, the transport demand of 18,000 TEU from Southeast Asia to Europe can be normally

466 satisfied by two services with direct connection to Europe (Services 1 and 2) and transhipment services

467 connecting through in Port Klang (Service 3 connecting to Service 5). The total routing cost of this base

468 scenario is USD 21.7 million.

469 A hypothetical earthquake in Jakarta (Scenario 1a) disrupts the network by increasing transit times

470 in Services 2 and 4 which reduces route capacity as shipping companies do not have time to deploy

471 additional vessels in order to compensate for the voyage time elongation immediately after the event.

472 The increase of transhipment through Port Klang surpases its available port throughput capacity and

473 the excess container flows are then re-routed through Singapore. The additional cost to route 18,000

474 TEU from Southeast Asia to Europe is USD 2.7 million (+12.5%) over the base scenario. Two months

475 after the disruption (Scenario 1b), port capacity is improved to 40% and liner service capacity in

476 services calling in Jakarta is significantly restored. Additional disruptions routing costs at this stage of

477 the recovery are USD 1.0 million (+4.7%) over the base scenario. The improvement is the result of

478 reduced transshipment flows through Port Klang.

479 Similarly, an earthquake in Belawan (Scenario 2a) resulting in complete disruption of its container

480 terminal affects route capacity in services 1, 3, 4 and 5. The route capacity reductions increase the use

481   of transshipment alternatives through Port Klang and Singapore which elevate routing costs by USD

482   3.0 million (+13.9%). Two months after the disruption (Scenario 2b), with port capacity restored to

483   40% and affected route capacity significantly restored, increased routing costs are reduced to USD 1.0

484   million (+4.7%) above the base scenario by replacing transshipment flows through Singapore with more

485   direct shipments using services 1 and 2.

486   If Jakarta and Belawan are disrupted simultaneously by a major earthquake (Scenario 3a), all liner

487   services in the network are impacted resulting in a reduction of outbound capacity at the Southeast Asia

488   centroid to 16,319 TEU. This large-scale impact makes unfeasible to meet the weekly transport demand

489   of 18,000 TEU through the network. The remaining 1,681 TEU incur a 7 day delay as described in

490   section 3 resulting in a additional delay cost of USD 340,066 for the containers not routed in the first

491   solution instance. The total routing cost increase is USD 6.3 million (+29.0%) over the base scenario.

492   Two months after the disruption (Scenario 3b), both ports are restored to 40% and liner service

493   outbound capacity at the Asia centroid is restored to more than 20,000 TEU and the total outbound

494   demand can be shipped in one solution instance. These improvements reduce additional routing costs

495   to USD 2.1 million (+9.8%).

496   In scenario 4a, a blockade resulting from a potential political conflict increases sailing time to and

497   from the Southeast Asia centroid by 300%. Such increase reduces available outbound weekly capacity

498   and incresases more expensive transhipment alternatives through Singapore and Port Klang. The

499   resulting cost increase of the blockade is USD 3.1 million (+14.6%). As the regional blockade is reduced

500   (Scenario 4b), transit time to and from Southeast Asia is increases by 100% and transshipment is

501   required only through Port Klang. Resulting cost increase is then reduced to USD 1.3 Million (+6.0%).

502   As summarized in Table 3.4, variations in total costs from the base scenario range from +4.7% in

503   scenario 1b to +29.0% in scenario 3a. Across all liner services, service 3 is the most affected by the

504   disruptions evaluated due to its greater percentage gains in transit times over regional voyages

505   suggesting that intra-regional connectivity would be more susceptible to disruptions.

506

507

Table 3.4: Cost-based model scenario results

Scenario 0 – Total Cost: $ 21,725,800							
	Origin	Destination	Flow [TEUs]	Service n.			
	Asia	Europe	8000	1			
	Asia	Europe	8000	2			
	Asia	Port Klang	2000	3			
	Port Klang	Europe	2000	5			
Scenario 1a - Total Cost: $ 24,439,538 (+12.5%)				**Scenario 1b - Total Cost: $ 22,738,616 (+4.7%)**			
Asia	Europe	8000	1	Asia	Europe	8000	1
Asia	Europe	6000	2	Asia	Europe	7754	2
Port Klang	Europe	625	2	Asia	Singapore	2246	3
Asia	Singapore	250	3	Singapore	Europe	2246	5
Asia	Port Klang	3750	3				
Singapore	Europe	250	5				
Port Klang	Europe	3125	5				
Scenario 2a – Total Cost: $ 24,738,643 (+13.9%)				**Scenario 2b – Total Cost: $ 22,768,763 (+4.8%)**			
Asia	Singapore	3220	1	Asia	Europe	7636	1
Asia	Europe	3412	1	Asia	Europe	8000	2
Asia	Europe	8000	2	Asia	Port Klang	2154	3
Asia	Port Klang	1217	3	Asia	Port Klang	210	4
Asia	Port Klang	2151	4	Port Klang	Europe	2364	5
Singapore	Europe	3220	5				
Port Klang	Europe	3368	5				
Scenario 3a – Total Cost: $ 28,034,207 (+29.0%)				**Scenario 3b – Total Cost: $ 23,857,285 (+9.8%)**			
Asia	Singapore	4085	1	Asia	Europe	7636	1
Asia	Europe	3011	1	Asia	Europe	7754	2
Port Klang	Europe	87	1	Asia	Port Klang	2154	3
Asia	Europe	6720	2	Asia	Port Klang	456	4
Port Klang	Europe	87	2	Port Klang	Europe	2610	5
Asia	Port Klang	2967	3				
Asia	Singapore	608	3				
Asia	Port Klang	1750	4				
Port Klang	Europe	18000	5				
Singapore	Europe	9386	5				
Scenario 4a – Total Cost: $ 24,894,877 (+14.6%)				**Scenario 4b – Total Cost: $ 23,028,490 (+6.0%)**			
Asia	Europe	6632	1	Asia	Europe	7412	1
Asia	Europe	6720	2	Asia	Europe	7754	2
Asia	Singapore	1900	3	Asia	Port Klang	2154	3
Asia	Port Klang	2748	4	Asia	Port Klang	680	4
Singapore	Europe	1900	5	Port Klang	Europe	2834	5
Port Klang	Europe	2748	5				

508

4   Conclusions and future work

510   The main contribution of this paper is the application of a cost-based container assignment methodology

511   for assessing the vulnerability of a multi-port system against natural and man-made disruptions.

512   Changes to route and port capacity parameters allow to capture potential effects to the network on the

513   aftermath of port disruptions while a penalty cost extension to previous model formulations allows

514   feasible solutions even when capacity is diminished below transport demands. The virtual network

515   approach used in the model allows to skip disrupted ports within liner services. The latter is a common

516   measure taken by ocean carriers to mitigate the financial impacts on their established services. The

517   feasibility of solutions for instances of network routing capacities below transport demands and the

518   ability to skip disrupted ports are desired capabilities of a suitable methodology for the analysis of

519   container routing in disruptive scenarios.

520   Calibration and numerical applications of the model were carried translating historical data on

521   previous events and hazard forecasts into operational functionality disruptions and recovery intervals

522   for two cases of port disruptions: seismic hazard and political conflicts. For these disruption cases, the

523   Southeast Asia to Europe corridor was investigated as case study trade lane due to its global strategic

524   importance in terms of cargo volume and potential consequences from a chain effect of failures. Results

525   suggested higher susceptibility of the intra-regional connectivity and demonstrated the applicability of

526   the cost-based assignment model to improve the understanding of cargo re-routing and operational cost

527   impacts in the scenarios evaluated. Changes in parameters such as sources of disruption, structure of

528   network services, O-D flow pairs, functional impacts, recovery intervals and operational costs extend

529   the applicability of this model to a wider range of port disruption cases discussed in the literature such

530   as labour strikes, operational accidents, terrorist attacks, and port congestions providing a quantitative

531   framework for their analysis.

532   Due to its exemplifying purpose, the network instance used in the scenarios presented make large

533   use of secondary data, leaving room for further refinements in selection of data sources and calibration

534   inputs. Such future data improvements are supported by the linear program approach used in the

535   proposed formulation of this study which allows extensions of the model to wider more-realistic

536   networks while still allowing the problem to be efficiently solvable with commercially available

537   solvers. The cost minimisation formulation in the model may also be replaced in future applications by

538   a profit maximisation or a cargo prioritisation approach to allow for cases where certain cargo must be

539   routed first in a network incapable of transporting all O-D flows. Examples of such cases include

540   humanitarian relief goods or high value cargoes prioritised over less valuable shipments.

541   A fully developed application of the container assignment model (e.g. including empty container

542   repositioning and liner network design capabilities) could provide shipping lines and logistics providers

543   with a tool for the evaluation of hazardous events, allowing them to estimate the operational and

544   financial consequences of cargo flow redistributions. Accident analysis at container terminals that

545   benefit from sudden surges in cargo from disrupted ports could also help improve the understanding

546   and modelling of connected risks of port disruptions. Additional applications may help policy-makers

547   in evaluating the robustness of networks and the associated strategic importance of container terminals,

548   supporting decision making processes and orientating investments on port infrastructures.

549   Successful applications in a resilience context could then be extended to evaluate the effects of

550   other relevant large-scale perturbations to the liner shipping industry such as new infrastructure

551   developments or environmental-driven changes. For the latter purpose, this study has also proposed a

552   classification scheme of maritime network perturbations in order to identify events beyond port

553   disruptions that could alter relevant parameters in liner shipping operations where applications of the

554   cost-based assignment model or similar methodologies can be used as decision support tools.

555   5   Acknowledgments

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649

650

651   **Appendix: Model notation**

652

Sets		Subsets		Indices	
A	Legs	A_i^+	Legs entering port i	a	for legs
O	Origin ports	A_i^-	Legs entering port i	i	for ports
D	Destination ports	A_n	Legs on route n	l	for links
I	All ports	A_n^t	Legs on route n	n	for routes
N	All routes	L_n	Links on route n	r	for origin ports
L	All links			s	for destination ports
T	Leg types			t	for leg types

653   **Parameters**

654   c_a Sailing time on leg a, including loading and loading times at the ends

655   CHC_n Container handling cost for route n

656   CR Rental cost per unit time per container

657   TDF_{rs} Total demand of full containers to be transported from origin r to destination s

658   DV Depreciation per unit time per full container (inventory cost)

659   δ_{aln} 1 if leg a uses link l on route n, and 0 otherwise

660   f_a Frequency of sailing on leg a

661   k_i Maximum throughput capacity at port i

662   PC Penalty cost for full containers not transported

663   RC_n Capacity of route n

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665   **Decision variables**

666   t_{rs}^f Flow of full containers from origin r to destination s

667   x_{as}^f Flow of full containers on leg a en route to destination s

668   w_{is}^f Expected dwell time at port i for all full containers en route to destination s

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670   Leg types T are origin-to-destination (o-d); origin-to-transhipment (o-t); transhipment-to-

671   transhipment (t-t); and transhipment-to-destination (t-d). The following conventions are used to

672   simplify the notation (Bell et al., 2013): $x_{a+}^f = \sum_{s\in D} x_{as}^f$, $w_{++}^f = \sum_{i\in I}\sum_{s\in D} w_{is}^f$, $t_{+s}^f = \sum_{r\in O} t_{rs}^f$.

673