VIRTUOUS VIOLENCE
A SOCIAL IDENTITY APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICS OF PREJUDICE IN INTER-GROUP RELATIONS

Rakshi Rath

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
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~ A social identity approach to understanding the politics of prejudice in inter-group relations

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

University of
St Andrews

This thesis is submitted in fulfilment for the degree of PhD
at the School of Psychology & Neuroscience,
University of St Andrews

28th October 2016

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Abstract

The aim of the thesis is to provide a social identity account of the politics of mobilisation: based on hatred mostly, in contrast with accounts of solidarity. The bulk of the thesis concentrates on exploring how and why is prejudice in the form of hatred mobilised in inter-group relations. Three studies parse the structure of hate discourse of Hindu right-wing groups in India. Study 1 and study 2 are qualitative studies that analyse the production of hate in two mediums of communication, while study 3 is an experimental study demonstrating the reception of hate. The studies analyse the structure of hate discourse with the theoretical lens of a social identity framework to explicate a context of *categories* and *category-relations*, while colouring in the *contents* of the categories with data from India. The first contention is, if a virtuous in-group can be construed as under threat from an out-group, then, the annihilation of the other can be justified as the defence of virtue. In the other words, violence becomes virtuous. The second contention is, the process that motivates out-group hate discourse derives from struggles over intra-group authority. That is, out-group threats are invoked in order to condemn political rivals for in-group power as not representing the group and not defending group interests. This sets up the foil for the leader to position 'self' as the ideal leader who protects and represents the in-group, while undermining the credibility of the political rival. Study 4 is a qualitative study analysing counter-hegemonic discourse on mobilisations against the rhetoric of hatred. Taken together, the first 3 studies argue that hatred is not an inherent feature of individuals or a natural fall-out of inter-group processes, it is mobilised for specific political aims. The fourth study looks at the dimensions with which other leaders counteract the politics of hate; when hatred can be mobilised, so can solidarity. The theoretical implications and limitations have been discussed.

Acknowledgement

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Prologue

Neither a Hindu nor a Muslim will you be,
A child of a human being you are, and a human being you shall be.
(Sahir Ludhianvi, peoples' poet)

Above all, avers the poet, humanity must transcend categorisation. India, a country with well over a billion people residing in 29 states and 7 Union Territories that are largely drawn along linguistic lines, 22 official languages and, at least 7 recognised religions, is the country of the poet's contention. Every school-going child is taught the basis of the Indian national identity: "Unity in diversity". The 'national' narrative is, however, punctuated with group-based religious violence (henceforth, referred to as communal violence) when periodically, the linguistic and regional lines of differentiation morph into unyielding religious identities: Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians come to the forefront.

The history of brutalities in communal relations unfolds like a mottled travesty of peace woven into the larger fabric of a constitutionally secular Indian nation-state. Usually restricted to localised occurrences (to a few districts within a State or spilling over to 2 or 3 States) the severity of the violence ranges from burning a few shops to systematic organized killings. The reference point for the ferocity and sheer size of communal violence in India is the killings of over a million Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs that accompanied the division of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan - the 'Partition' of 1947. It is in this context that Sahir Ludhianvi (the poet of the quote) a Muslim by name and a progressive socialist by ideology, who lived through and witnessed the violence of Partition, resisted the imposition of religious identities. Consider the verse further with the lens of social psychological theories used to frame the thesis (a critical elaboration on the theories of social identity and self-categorization), the first part tells us something about the nature of the social world and how social identities are the cornerstone with which we engage with the world. It is *also* a statement about changing the world, i.e. the act of being defined by social reality (imposed religious categorizations: 'Hindu'; 'Muslim') as much as it is about a definition to create a different social reality ('A human being you shall be'). At a time when mere belonging to the 'Other' group was enough to

become a death warrant, a rejection of religious categories altogether is a statement of re-imagining a different kind of world in which the only category or identity that should matter is one of being human. This is a feat of imagination as much as conviction for it asks us to go beyond even the 'nation', it asks us to be human beings.

There is an assumption implicit in the appeal for humanity about the processes of categorisation (in this case into Hindus and Muslims) that is taken for granted. The notion seems to be that categorisation in and of itself is the root of the problem. If we do away with categorisation, the world would be a better place. Or, if at all, the categorisation must be at a higher level – of being humans, and not of anything less that divides us into various identities. In a sense, categorisation is conflated with discrimination. A social identity approach however, argues that there is nothing inherently evil about the processes of group differentiation or of identifying with different groups. Indeed, it is in groups alone that people come together to challenge oppressive status-quos. Social change is only possible when disadvantaged people come together in a sense of shared social identification, of belonging to an in-group whose membership gives us a sense of 'we'. It is in how this 'we' is defined and the dimension on which the ingroup is differentiated from outgroups that determines the behavioural outcome. The action of good or evil, arguably, has to do with the way people define their groups and the subsequent choices they make, and not in the 'nature' of groups itself.

The question then arises how do we come to these versions of understanding? Who defines this 'we' and decides on the constitution of 'us'? Since, social identities do not merely reflect how we perceive our social world, rather identities and group boundaries have the potential to restructure our social world. It is precisely for this reason that definitions of identities and group boundaries are fiercely contested, because they have important consequences for group behaviour. Social psychologists, Reicher and Hopkins coined the term '*entrepreneurs of identity*' to describe people who argue over how identity is defined in order to influence collective action (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). While social identities are our window to the way the world is organised, it is a project to restructure the nature of such relations in the world too. The verse is a call of resistance to the violence that such categorisations have led to in India. The poet, as a barometer for change and peace would arguably be an example for mobilisation against violence.

What about the call for violence? The following is an example of the kind of mobilisation used to enable genocidal violence against Muslims in Gujarat of 2002.

> "We have woken up to Gujarat now. VHP[1] has been working here for last 15 years, their leaflets are regular features in newspapers, colleges hatred for Muslims, Christians, secular people, only thing that reaches every home is this and people have nothing to counter it…The leaflets say all Muslims have four wives and their population is growing, even though polygamy is more prevalent in Hindus than Muslims."
>
> [p 29, cited in 'Threatened Existence' a report by the International Initiative for Justice] (Abeysekara et al., 2003)

The Vishwa Hindu Parishad is the activist part of the family of Hindu right-wing organisations collectively known as the 'sangh parivar' (a family), of which the fountainhead of ideology is the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The ideology that they propound is known as "Hindutva". A fuller account is given in the introductory chapter and in the studies. Apart from instigating, conducting and engaging in violence, they have also been mobilising opinion by creating literature for dissemination to the public (as noted in the excerpt) to mark out 'enemies' by putting forward particular stereotypes of out-groups. They also conduct spiritual gatherings, organize participation in rituals by co-opting and reinterpreting Hindu symbols to celebrate the superiority of the Hindu religion, to sacralize the in-group as pious and holy. That the mere presence of a Muslim out-group could become a threat strong enough to warrant aggression in the form it took in the Gujarat pogrom, takes considerable amount of skill by the *entrepreneurs of identity* to craft as a plausible scenario in a country where the official census says 80% are Hindus. I shall argue in the thesis, that this aggression against the out-group is sanctioned and even, celebrated. It is the infernal conclusion of a 'moral logic' based on two interlocked premises i) a sacred in-group under the threat of ii) a threatening out-group. This leads to virtuous violence against the out-group (the nuances with which this pairing is yoked together shall be explicated in the chapters on hate

[1] VHP is the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council) – a group that propounds a virulent right-wing Hindu ideology called *Hindutva.* They were responsible for instigating and leading mass killings in the

discourse). This is also borne out in the several investigations that have revealed the 'pride' with which the violence was led and conducted by Hindutva groups.[2]

The subject of enquiry is the craft itself: the process of categorisation used by *entrepreneurs of identity* to mobilise for or against hatred; about *how* and *why* mobilise and seek to define social identities in certain ways, investigating how 'us' and 'them' are demarcated and constituted in political discourse. How is the 'outgroup' so defined as an enemy, and what are the characteristics that are used to colour the stereotype of the 'Other'? What makes 'us'? What and how does the definition of 'we' have an impact on the ways in which the outgroups are defined? The thesis explores discourses in which conditions of exclusion and/ or inclusion are created that determine the versions of social identities and the relations that are constructed among the groups. I shall argue that the there is a political will at play and reasons for putting forth the availability of this information in specific forms of stereotypes. Different *entrepreneurs of identity* put forth different kinds of arguments for the same identity definition leading to fierce contestations of meanings (i.e. *contents*) of social identities. To demonstrate and provide an evidence-based bulwark, the thesis presents research work conducted in India analysing the rhetorical structure and the construction of categories in the popular and elite discourse of the Hindutva ideology. For a flavour of the countervailing processes, the thesis also presents a study on speeches that challenge the right-wing discourse. Together, the studies aim to provide a social psychological perspective to the study of prejudice, anchored in political contexts of mass mobilization and leadership, and to the voices that provide counters to the discourse of hate.

In the introduction to his book, A People's History of the United States, Howard Zinn writes of the perils of an unexamined system of writing, and therefore, allowing the ideological positions of the various actors to pass without an interrogation. He writes, 'the history of any country, presented as the history of a family, conceals fierce conflicts of interest (sometimes exploding, most often repressed) between conquerors and conquered, masters and slaves, capitalists and workers, dominators and dominated in race and sex. And in such a world of conflict, a world of victims and executioners, it is the job of thinking people, as Albert Camus suggested, not to be on the side of the executioners'

[2] (Jain, 2007; Ketan, 2007)

(Zinn, 2003, p. 10). The words that one chooses to describe an event, the myriad descriptions and interpretations that emerge from a supposedly singular event of violence, and the labelling of religious identities of the actors as demarcated into perpetrators and victims, are indicative of the lens one uses to view the world. Indeed, 'pseudo-seculars' is quite the preferred brickbat for people who choose to interrogate the saffron ideology. It is one of the many epithets that many of us would wear with irritable bemusement earlier, and with increasing alarm, henceforth.

When one studies extreme hostilities, writes about the violence and inter-group hatred in a country as huge and diverse as India, there will always be questions around the scope of the research, especially, on the dimensions of the breadth and depth of the phenomenon. Can we really speak of an impact on the general population in a country that has, in spite of the internal violence, retained its sovereignty and principles of democratic functioning? In 2014, a landslide victory in the national general elections ensured a right-wing Government at the centre with the country now firmly being led by Narendra Modi as the Prime Minister of India. The uncomfortable answer, therefore, is yes. We are not looking at a 'fringe' ideology, anymore. The ideologues and the ideology have power gained through democratic means. They enjoy the legitimacy, respectability, and celebratory acceptance of their positions with an uncomfortably large willing audience.

1 Introduction: Theory, Model, Context & Research Strategy

Chapter Synopsis

Broadly, this chapter is divided into 4 parts: Theory (1.1); A model of collective hate (1.2); The context of India (1.3); Research strategy (1.4)

Theory (1.1) is an introduction to psychological research to find answers to the phenomenon of genocide, the development of social psychological theories – group based explanations with a consideration of Sherif's work, and subsequent critique and development of the social identity theories by Tajfel and Turner. We develop a critical social identity approach of mobilisation with accounts of leadership and the mobilisation of prejudice in the form of hatred. The conceptual contours are then drawn upon and presented in the next section in the form of a model of collective hate (1.2) drawn from the mobilisation perspective is detailed and the elements of the model explained; Section (1.3) describes inter-group relations in India with a focus on the communal violence that has characterised the relations, a consideration of the labels that are used to describe the violence, social psychological research conducted in India and a brief background to the ideology of Hindutva. The chapter ends with an explanation of the research strategy (Section 1.4) and an overview of the studies conducted.

1.1 Theory

Genocidal violence, in which people are killed because of the group they belong to, has been one of the disturbing features of human relations in documented form since, perhaps, Columbus 'discovered' the Arawaks in 1493. A colonialist, Columbus, established policies that included the enslavement and *extirpation* of the Native American races (Zinn, 2003, p. 9). The term 'genocide', however, was coined much later in the 20th Century by a Polish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin to describe the brutalities in terms of the "*intentional destruction of groups* [emphasis added]" in Nazi Germany (Hinton, 2002, p.

4). 60 million people were annihilated with mechanical precision in the Holocaust on account of their group membership. The Holocaust, as this genocide is known, was not conducted by 'primitive' people with 'tribalistic' urges but was perpetrated in "post-enlightenment Europe by a people steeped in Western culture and rich in scientific knowledge" (Chalk & Johnassohn, 1990) cited in (Billig, 1996). Social psychological research was transformed by the incomprehensibility of the scale and intensity with which the extermination of European Jews in World War II was planned and executed. While, it could fairly be argued that Columbus was a foreign power to begin with, the same does not hold true for Nazi Germany. The perpetrators symbolised Nazi Germany while the victims were targeted as the 'Other', yet both were arguably still German citizens. The question was, how did a country 'steeped in culture and knowledge' turn on its own citizens and proceed to exterminate millions of people identified only by their 'Other' group membership?

1.1.1 Personification of Evil

At the helm of affairs in Nazi Germany stood Adolf Hitler as evil personified (Kuper, 2002; Staub, 1989, 2003; Waller, 2002). The US Government commissioned two studies to analyse Hitler's motivations and personality. The report officially entitled "A Psychological Profile of Adolf Hitler: His Life and Legend", was formulated for the Office of the Strategic Services (OSS) which later became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and submitted in 1943 by Walter Charles Langer, Professor at Harvard. The report is one of two psychoanalytic reports prepared for the OSS during the war in an attempt to assess Hitler's personality; the other psychoanalytic report is "Analysis of the Personality of Adolf Hitler" by Henry Murray, psychologist and psychoanalyst from the Vienna school of thought at the University of Harvard. The reports contain detailed information about the physical and psychological make-up of Hitler with interpretive analyses of Hitler's relations with his father (p. 94) and mother, particularly after his father died (p. 100). These inter-personal relationships are then explained as the basis for his actions as Fuhrer (Praed, 2005). The question of studying a leader who could devise and oversee mass-murder was of immediate concern, and the guiding factor was thought to do 'evil', one must be evil, and therefore, this must be located in the personal make-up of the leader. As detailed as the descriptions and analyses were, these accounts of personality had not been empirically tested. In 1950, a group of US based researchers

Adorno and colleagues empirically tested the assumption that underlying such prejudiced beliefs were deep-seated psychological motivations. The study combined a variety of techniques seeking to find the personality characteristics that predisposed people to favour fascist politics. The findings of these studies were put forward in The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) that stated that people with such a personality would have the following characteristics a) rigid beliefs in conventional values b) general hostility towards other groups and c) submissive attitudes towards authority figures. This, it was conceived, would explain the nature of the perpetrators, and therefore, the prejudice. (Martin, 2001)

While there are a number of studies and accounts that critique the Authoritarian Personality approach (Billig, 1976) the most relevant critique for this thesis is that the very nature of such theories – explaining prejudice via *individual differences* among people – makes it particularly unsuited to explain how prejudice can become virtually consensual in certain societies. As noted in the first part, genocide has occurred in supposedly 'primitive' societies to 'advanced' ones as well. Inter-group hatred and prejudice also cannot be convincingly explained by cultural differences, given that extreme hostilities between groups and genocidal hate are not specific to any particular culture. It certainly couldn't provide an account for why groups of people could kill other groups of people on account of group membership.

1.1.2 Group & Inter-group studies:

Unconvinced by individualistic explanations, Muzafer Sherif and colleagues designed field experiments to study processes of group behaviour. This marked the beginning of a shift to a group-level analysis of inter-group conflict and prejudice (Billig, 1976, 1996; Platow & Hunter, 2012; Reicher & Haslam, 2014). The three studies were conducted in 1949, 1953 and 1954 with schoolboys attending summer camps in various locations in the Unites States. Though there are three studies, the best known is the 1954 study, otherwise known as the 'Robbers Cave Boys' Camp Study' (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961).

1.1.2.1 The Robbers Cave Boys' Camp Study:

This particular study of 1954 was organised at an area which was surrounded by the Robbers Cave state park in Oklahoma. The study was designed in three stages lasting a week each.

The first stage was in-group formation, where the boys arrived in separately at the camps and were divided into two separate groups. The boys bonded over activities of swimming and hiking. One group named themselves 'the rattlers' while the other group named themselves 'the eagles'. Neither group knew of the existence of the other.

In the second stage of 'intergroup conflict' the boys were made aware of the presence of the other group. They were pitted against each other in a series of win-lose (where the victory of one group most definitely depended on defeating the other group) games like tug of war. The invectives and name-calling went up with things coming to a pass where the boys refused to even share meals in the same mess.

In the third stage of 'reduction of intergroup conflict', the experimenters designed opportunities with a number of built in reconciliatory stratagems for the two groups like watching movies or a bean-collecting competition. However, it was noted that there was no lessening of conflict and or any sign of peace and cooperation. Therefore, the experimenters introduced a series of 'superordinate goals' where the two groups of boys had to work together to solve a crisis. Sherif and colleagues noted that this lead to a decrease in the conflict between the groups and proceeded towards cooperation. It was explained as a functional relationship where competition occurs when there is a conflict of resources and hence the theory he proposed came to be known as the realistic conflict theory (Platow & Hunter, 2012; Sherif et al., 1961)

To put the importance of the experiments in the larger context, the studies brought the focus of study to group behavior and the level of explanation and theorization to groups. As opposed to individual behavior, the boys' acted as group members. The significance of Sherif's studies was the shift from individualistic analyses where he states that personality disorders or individual frustrations cannot be held to account for intergroup phenomena; to study group processes in terms of distinctive group products and with a distinctive level of analysis, i.e., inter-group contexts (Billig, 1976, p. 301) In other words, to understand conflict we need a group analysis looking at the relations between

groups. Where these are competitive there will be hostility, where these are cooperative, these will be harmonious. (Platow & Hunter, 2012)

While appreciating the focus on group-level studies, an extrapolation to the real world, however, brings up a crucial question of explaining psychological underpinnings as simply functional gains and losses. Among the critiques of the theory, one stands out in relevance to the thesis, the problem with the realistic conflict theory is that the theory fails to explain instances when violence occurs, with no possible economic benefit in sight (Billig, 1976). Wars have been fought in the name of ideology more than any economic gain per se (Tajfel, 1972).

There are two points of observation from the Sherif studies that are of importance here, a) Turner and colleagues noted from various other studies conducted that "social groups seem to be more competitive and perceive their interests more competitively than individuals under the same functional conditions" (Turner & Giles, 1981, p. 288); and b) a point that (Tajfel, 1982) noted was that "boys who had become friends before the official intergroup competition started were placed in opposing groups. Their subsequent behavior was affected by intergroup conflict and not by their previous interpersonal attachments" (Tajfel, 1982, pp. 14–15).

1.1.3 Minimal Group Experiments and Social Identity Theory:

Tajfel and colleagues designed a series of experiments to determine the minimum condition in which inter-group discrimination occurs, ie, what are the minimal conditions that will produce negativity towards outgroups? The minimal group studies aimed at exploring the conditions in which individuals display inter-group discrimination (discriminate members of other groups in favour of their own groups). The general question they sought to answer was at which point would members of a group exhibit signs of "categorisation" and "differentiation." These set of experiments came to be known as the minimal group experiments (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971).

In the first study, 14-15 year old schoolboys were divided randomly into two groups *after* being led to believe that the criteria of differentiation was a preference of abstract painters (Klee or Kandinsky) or guessing the number of dots. The participants were asked to allocate money or penalties to a member of each group (in-group and out-group). In the second set of studies (Billig & Tajfel, 1973) it was made explicit that the basis of group membership was randomly designed (as opposed to the previous study).

The additional procedures to ensure minimal conditions were: no instructions were given to the participants on how to allocate the points, they could not communicate with the participants, they were all strangers to each other, i.e. they did not know anything about the person they were allocating the money to except for information of group membership in the experiment, and there was no personal profit or loss from their distribution while portioning points (Tajfel, 1978). In other words, participants were assigned to groups randomly, and factors such as history of conflict, personal animosity, interdependence, individual self-interest and personal economic gain were all controlled for (Haslam, 2001).

The results of the minimal studies suggested that it seemed like merely classifying individuals into groups (on the basis of irrelevant criteria) was enough to induce in-group favouritism (Tajfel, 1981).

The results ostensibly indicated that trivial criteria were enough to harbour identification with an in-group and discriminate against an out-group. One of the major insights of these studies was, when people come to see themselves as members of a group, their behaviour is fundamentally transformed, with *distinct* meanings attached to the behaviour. As Tajfel put it, "This meaning was found by them in the adoption of a strategy based on the *establishment,* through action of a distinctiveness between their own 'group' and the other, between the two social categories in a truly minimal 'social system'. Distinction from the 'other' category … provided an identity for their own group, and thus some kind of meaning to an otherwise empty situation" (Tajfel, 1972, p 39-40 cited in Haslam, 2001).

Tajfel formulated the concept of 'social identity' to account for this behaviour which would later be defined as "that part of an individual's self-concept, which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (s) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1982, p. 255). In other words, group behaviour is underscored by a person's social identity. Social identity then is the pivot with which an individual navigates group membership in a world of many groups. It helps us come together as group members and act as group members purposefully and effectively.

For some, social identity theory has been used to suggest generic processes of intergroup discrimination. For others, though one has to take content into account – thus the way we differentiate from others depends on the *valued dimensions* of social identity (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Haslam, 2012). "This approach serves to transform the understanding of identity in psychology. It stresses the sociality of the construct in at least three ways. First, social identity is a relational term, defining who we are as a function of our similarities and differences with others. Second, social identity is shared with others and provides a basis for shared social action. Third, the meanings associated with any social identity are products of our collective history and present. Social identity is therefore something that links us to the social world. It provides the pivot between the individual and society." (Reicher et al., 2010)

1.1.4 Self-Categorisation Theory

Self-categorisation theory was developed to specify processes of social identification (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). While the theory of social identity sets the framework for understanding processes of social identification, that is, it tells us that shared social identification allows people to act together as group members purposefully and effectively, it does not tell us the 'how' of this process or what makes categories salient or who is representative of the categories. The theory, write Reicher and colleagues 'seeks to clarify the distinction between social identity and other aspects of the self concept, to explain how the self system is organised and what makes any one part of this system psychologically active in a given context' (Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 2010).

Self-categorisation theory draws upon principles of social identity, but while the latter was formulated as a theory of *inter-group* behaviour, self-categorisation is conceptualised as a theory of group behaviour. Turner describes the self categorisation theory as a 'social identity theory of the group' and to specify processes of "how individuals are able to act as a group at all" (Turner et al., 1987, p. 42). The theory addresses the questions that social identity theory raised, to specify the way in which 'social identities are defined and made salient as a function of social context' (Reicher, Haslam, Spears, & Reynolds, 2012; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994).

Self Categorisation Theory helps to expand the Social Identity Theory by arguing that social identity underpins all aspect of group behaviour; in particular, when social identity is salient, people seek to ascertain group norms/values/beliefs and conform to them. Thus the way social identity is defined shapes the way people act together collectively, it creates and directs a powerful social force. This makes the question of how social identity is defined both socially and psychologically important. Significantly too, this specification helps explain not only when and why particular group memberships come to define the self but also how particular individuals achieve standing within the group.

1.1.5 Critical Social Identity Approach:

In the 1970 paper, 'Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination', Tajfel concludes by saying "unfortunately it is only too easy to think of examples in real life where fairness would go out the window, since "groupness" is often based on criteria more weighty than either preferring a painter one has never heard of before or resembling someone else in one's way of counting dots. *Socialisation into "groupness" is powerful and unavoidable; it has innumerable valuable functions. It also has some odd side effects that may – and do – reinforce acute intergroup tensions whose roots lie elsewhere* [emphasis added]" (Tajfel, 1970, p. 187). That we must look to the social world for 'exploring the roots of inter-group relations' is a point that has also been numerously stated in various papers on the social identity framework (Haslam & Reicher, 2006; Haslam, 2012; Reicher & Hopkins, 2004; Reicher, 2001; Reicher et al., 2010). Turner made a similar point arguing that "the issue is not so much why people behave as they do in any given experiment, but rather whether the

models we build to explain that behaviour help us understand what happens outside our experiments" cited in (Haslam, Reicher, & Reynolds, 2012).

Psychological studies conducted within the minimal group 'paradigm' without contextualising the processes of social identity often misstate that the mere categorisation of people into different groups, is enough to create prejudice and racism among the members of different groups. This confuses an analysis of the 'minimal conditions' under which processes of discrimination may originate with a fuller explanation of the conditions under which a specific type of discrimination may occur.

Firstly, the extrapolation of experimental conclusions of controlled conditions with limited options of behavioural choices to explanations of real-world phenomena of extreme hostilities between groups is misleading. In the minimal group experiments, the alternatives that were presented to the participants were limited and imposed by the experimenters. While this was important in the experimental context to pin down the specificities of behaviour under controlled conditions, an extrapolation of the experimental conditions to the social world undermines the importance of the historical, social and political context in which people behave and act in specific ways (Reicher et al., 2010).

Secondly, the notion that generic dislike can translate to genocide is a giant leap. For example, "I do not like you" cannot explain persecution of an entire group of people based on racial, ethnic or religious category. Mere antagonism cannot and should not be equated with a systematic annihilation of people belonging to a particular group (Reicher, 2012). Self-Categorisation Theory adopts a primarily perceptualist approach in saying that identities reflect the organisation of social reality, expressed through the principles of fit as explained earlier. However, SCT also acknowledges another dimension, perceiver readiness, which allows issues of personal history, collective history and ideology to enter the argument. More recently, psychological experimental research has started looking at the effects of in-group boundaries (Castano, Yzerbyt, Bourguignon, & Eleonore, 2002; Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010), in-group glorification, moral disengagement and out-group threat on prejudice. The starting point of the studies is that

prejudice exists as a given. This then, goes back to the idea of prejudice as an inevitable consequence of inter-group relations.

Thirdly, and connected to the first two questions, in particular, it fails to address the need to look at meaning in relation to social identity raising the question of where *content* comes from. The nature of that content is neither given in advance nor is it a function of passive perception. Rather, category content is actively constructed and contested. In other words, it is a matter of mobilisation.

There has been extensive research in the social identity tradition on mobilization processes and the links with social identity construction, with respect to national identity (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001); specifically looking at solidarity literature (Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006); bystander intervention (Levine & Thompson, 2004); a comparison of hate and solidarity discourse (Reicher, Hopkins, Levine, & Rath, 2005); and setting out a model explaining genocidal processes in social identity tradition (Reicher et al, 2008).

1.2 A Social Identity Model of Collective Hate

"…wherever we find prejudice, it has been mobilised, it has been mobilised deliberately, and it has been mobilised for gain…They are about collective action not individual cognition and they primarily involve those who are the targets of prejudice rather than the prejudiced themselves." (Reicher, 2012) The crux of *hostile* inter-group relations is that hatred is mobilized.

This has two key elements: Firstly, social identity content does not simply reflect existing social realities, it is used to create new social realities. That is, there are strategic aspects to the ways in which identities are sought to be defined. To cite an example from India, an Indian identity encompasses a different vision of India, than a Hindutva defined Hindu identity would (as we shall in the subsequent chapters). While, the former emphasizes on the cultural diversity of India, the latter insists on the superiority of the 'Hindu' religion.

This, in turn would have different implications for the rest of India. Secondly, versions of identity do not arise from a lone contemplation of the world. It is not something that one comes to just like that, rather communication and social influence from all sides impact on us with various people telling us what to think. Opinions, discussions, conversations, popular cinema, advertisements, books and newspapers, social interactions and even subtle behaviour gives us clues about how the social world is organized, what our position (privileges and disadvantages) in this world are, and how are other people or groups categorized. To paraphrase Tajfel, we do not live in vacuum (Tajfel, 1972). What we understand of ourselves is informed by the values and norms of the group membership. Staub in his book on 'The roots of Evil' talks about how 'people use available information to divide themselves into an in-group and an out-group.'(Staub, 1989, p. 58) The obviousness with which the label or the operationalisation of 'In-group' is used in social science literature is unhelpful since it suggests that the categorization of self is an automatic process borne of primordial connections. As a consequence, studies posit in-groups as monolithic identities without analysing precisely what are the *contents* of these identities. What does it mean to be a member of a particularly defined ingroup? What are the norms and values that dictate the membership of the in-group? There are a multitude of voices telling us not just how to think but what to think. Some voices among these carry authority and are opinion-makers. Mobilizing opinion for or against with nuanced arguments, drawing upon cultural artifacts, mythologizing history and historicising mythology (Udayakumar, 1997). In the process, historical 'facts' versions are also revised and social contexts recreated. For example, in the Indian example, statistical manipulations are employed to support these manufactured facts. The contexts of mobilizations are not necessarily around the theme of hate, but they are indications of the ways in which people want to restructure the world – the system of thought that guides these social movements, that is, ideology (Billig, 1982). That is to understand hatred or solidarity we have to see it in the context of mobilization. This is explicated in the following arguments.

The first argument is about the importance of analysing the ways in which meanings are constructed around identities that either lead to genocide or even make it seem to be the greater good (Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008). Provided below is a blueprint for the

steps, which shall be explicated in detail with examples in the first two studies on hate discourse.

Identification: Definition of the in-group: The first step is to delineate boundaries of the group, around the questions of who can be members of the group and what does it mean to be a member of the in-group? The core issue is to make the group *insular*, and clearly define the criterion for group membership.

Exclusion: excluding the targets: the demarcation of out-groups is necessarily dependent on the way the in-group is defined. Opotow and colleagues argue that 'moral exclusion' occurs when groups are constructed outside the boundary, consequently harming them is seen as justifiable (Opotow, Gerson, & Woodside, 2005).

Threat: Seeing targets as an inherent threat: Having zeroed in, on the out-groups as targets, it is now important to construe this "other", as a threat to the in-group. As we shall see in the sections using the model to look at data from India, the threats can be construed in multiple ways. Symbolic threats where the in-group is seen to be harmed as the values and what they hold sacred is under threat and realistic threats comprising financial, economic and social harm. The threats are built on the dimensions that are held as important to the in-group.

Virtue: Constituting the in-group as virtuous: we argue, that the perception of threat is dependent on building it as an attack against the value-system of the in-group. All that is held sacred and virtuous to the in-group is projected as being destroyed by the out-group members.

Celebration: Aggression becomes self-defence: In all this, there is a strong moral component to this violence. The ways in which people engage with such morality is described and analysed in the empirical chapters on hate. For now, it is important to note that, far from a moral disengagement perspective, (Leidner et al., 2010), genocidal violence is very much a moral project. In this context prejudice is not a by-product of distorted perceptions or cognitive processing filters, it becomes a tool that produces ideological justifications towards maintaining oppression against out-groups.

The above steps or processes described in the 5 step model of evil are not automatic, and keeping with the meta-theory of social identity that we have argued, these processes are not inherent characteristics of group behaviour or inter-group relations either. The four elements leading to the conviction of morality is not a spontaneous thought of group members, but is very much stoked by would-be leaders who have an interest at stake. Claudia Koonz in her book, the Nazi Conscience warns that 'the potential for racial hatred lurks whenever political leaders appeal to the exalted virtue of their own ethnic community' (Koonz, 2003, p. 274).

Leadership:

Self Categorisation Theory posits a relationship between social reality and social categorisation. The relationship is construed to be perceptual, however, Reicher and colleagues have argued that this would be misstating the core of the theory. (Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005) They propose an approach to the definition of 'social categories' that allow for a focus on the rhetorical categories that are employed in discourse and how this in turn influences the shape of the action. "It is argued that the ways in which categories are defined (their inclusiveness, their content and prototypicality) will shape collective mobilizations (their breadth, their direction and who will influence them). It is also argued that context and categorization will be interdependent such that definitions of the frame of reference (who is included within it and what their respective positions are) will affect category definitions. However, rather than the frame of reference being a given and the categories being consequences, all the relevant terms are seen as open to argument" (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b).

In their book, "The new psychology of leadership: Identity, influence and power" Haslam, Reicher and Platow provide an overview of the Social Identity approach to Leadership. They explicate principles of self categorisation theory to show that to be able to influence people, leaders must show themselves to be a) prototypical of the group, b) as representing the group's interests, c) *entrepreneurs of identity* and therefore, be able to mobilise the group (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011). The analytic structure that we provide in the chapter explicates these principles in sections 3.4.4.1, 3.4.4.2 and 3.4.4.3 of this thesis. We show

how these are put in play in chapter 3 with an analysis of speeches by ideologues and by a particular political leader.

Versions of definitions are contested, and debated upon, by different people. It follows then, that the entrepreneurs must project and convince group members of themselves as prototypical of in-group values (Platow, van Knippenberg, Haslam, van Knippenberg, & Spears, 2006) More so, they must project their version of group-values as the *only way to be*. To do this, they must also contend with in-group rivals who are pitching contesting meanings of group values, membership and prototypicality. Hence, it is essential to discredit the projected "prototypicality" argument of rivals (Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005). The way to do this, as we find in the study on political speeches in this thesis is by defining the rivals as essentially betraying the in-group, by invoking the out-group threat. In some cases, shown as colluding with the out-group to attack in-group values (further explained in chapter 2 and chapter 3). Much of the arguments outlined in the critical perspective have been developed with research work that was conducted in India. The next section outlines the context of inter-group relations in India, and an introduction to the ideology of the right-wing Hindu nationalism in India.

1.3 Context: India

This section outlines the context of inter-group relations in India, and an introduction to the ideology of the right-wing Hindu nationalism in India. The divergences in India provide a rich context for political mobilization of social identities. In the following sub-sections, the context of India is presented from the time of Partition (when the country came to exist independently with the geographical boundaries of the present-day nation), consideration of the prevailing conditions of the various inter-group relations; a consideration of the labels that scholars chose to describe the events of inter-group violence section and a brief background to the ideology of Hindutva that is explored in the analytic chapters.

1.3.1 Partition, prejudice, and Inter-group Relations:

Partition:

In 1947, as British colonial rule came to an end in the subcontinent, India and Pakistan were accorded the status of two independent countries. The sub-continent's Partition came at a cost of the killings of over 100,000 people and the migration of another million to produce the nation-states of India and Pakistan. The division was ostensibly on the basis of religion (Brass, 2003a; Chatterjee, 1988; Lapierre & Collins, 1975; Pandey & Samad, 2007). A mutilation took place on the maps, with a large stretch of India in the middle of East (which eventually emerged as an independent country of Bangladesh in 1971) and West Pakistan (now simply, Pakistan). This mutilation was not just cartographic; it claimed many lives in the bloodshed. In India there were minorities (Muslims) who chose to stay back, as they were Hindus who chose to stay back in Pakistan. Though the violence was largely in the north-western region of Punjab and the north-eastern region of Bengal, the impact of the hatred that accompanied the actual killings reverberated all over India (Brass, 1994, 2003a; Jaffrelot, 2013; Pandey & Samad, 2007; Pandey, 2001, 2006a, 2006c).

Prejudice:

Pandey (2001, p. 16) describes the ramifications of partition in the development of religious prejudice in the following quote, "Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus were all redefined by the process of Partition: as butchers, or as devious others; as untrustworthy and anti-national; but perhaps fundamentally, as Sikhs and Muslims and Hindus alone. All over the subcontinent, for extended periods, at many times since 1947, men, women and children belonging to these communities – yet belonging to different castes, classes, occupations linguistic and cultural backgrounds – have been seen in terms of little but their Sikh-ness, their Muslims-ness or their Hindu-ness. And periodically, Christians have been treated in a similar way." There are two things of importance in the excerpt, firstly, no matter how fluid social identities are, at a given point of time, (in this case, the process of partition) they may crystallised into a solely religious group identity. Secondly, the characteristics of the groups are usually sketched in terms of villainous personality traits

that are used interchangeably with the group identity; call them 'butchers' or call them 'Muslims', the two terms come to be seen as one and the same (Alam, 2008; Anand, 2007; Kakar & Kakar, 2007; Kakar, 1996; Varshney, 2002). This *essentialisation* of prejudiced characteristics comes to be understood as the core-value of the group.

Inter-group relations:

The impact of Partition was a lasting wedge in India-Pakistan relations such that Muslims in India have remained under perpetual suspicion of secretly carrying loyalties for Pakistan. Their loyalty to India is one that needs to be proved every time there is a tension in India-Pakistan relations, like the Kargil war in 1999, or the terror attacks on Mumbai in 2008 or often reportedly even during a cricket match (Harris, 2014) between the two countries. Secular India though enshrined in the Constitution; in popular consciousness became the religious mirror (India for Hindus) for a Pakistan for Muslims. One slogan, circulated frequently among right-wing Hindu parties goes, "there are only two places for the Mussalman: either Pakistan or the graveyard."[3] Compounded by the global discourse of 'war on terror' (Roy, 2003), the international relations between India and Pakistan forms a foil for the many arguments that are made in favour of or against in the Hindu-Muslim relations in India.

Political Parties:

The detailed history of the political parties in India is beyond the scope of this thesis (see (Chaterjee, 1993; Chatterjee, 1988; Johnson, 1973; Lapierre & Collins, 1975; Pandey, 2004; Pandey & Samad, 2007; Pandey, 2006b; Reddy, 2005; Wilkinson, 2005) However, a brief description of the two major parties – Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party are of importance to make sense of the studies and the data analysed, in the thesis.

Congress: When the British left India in 1947, the Indian National Congress (INC) was at the forefront of the freedom movement with a mass mobilisation claiming the length and breadth of country, with leaders representative of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs of the country. It is both reviled and worshipped as the grand old party of India, almost embodying the dreams of a nascent secular constitution in its own foundation (Lapierre & Collins, 1975). The Congress party formed the Government of India at the time of data collection of all the studies included in the thesis. We have explained in further detail the

[3] Mussalman ka sthaan, Pakistan ya Qabrastan

specific nuances and relevance of the ideology and the policies of the Congress party in both chapter 2 and 3 when the rhetoric has alluded to the role of Congress.

Bharatiya Janata Party: The other National party that is of relevance to the thesis is the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This is the right-wing political party propounding Hindutva ideology that currently forms the Government of India.

1.3.2 Hindutva

A professed aim of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the fountainhead of the Hindutva ideology is to put "together the various groups within the Hindu Samaj[4] and to revitalize and rejuvenate the same on the basis of its Dharma[5] and its Sanskriti[6]" [The Constitution of the RSS, article 3; cited in (J. Sharma, 2007)].

Hindutva (literal translation: the *essence* of Hindu) refers to an ideology that traces its first authoritative formulation to the works of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar's "*Hindutva*: *Who is a Hindu?*" (1923), and M.S. Golwalker's "*We or Our Nationhood Defined"* (1936) cited in (Islam, 2006a, 2006b; Powers, 2008; J. Sharma, 2007). As the titles of the books suggest, taken together, this forms the basis of the 'national' project for their stated objectives of a Hindu-rashtra (Hindu nation-state). The books are an exposition on the ideological foundations of the Hindutva movement. This was a formulation in contradistinction to the stated secularism of the Congress Party. Indeed, it also stands against the Indian Constitution that has secularism enshrined in its Preamble.

There are internal contradictions in the way Hindutva has been conceptualized and the dissemination of the original thought to the cadres. Scholars have studied and analysed the founder's ideology and formulation of Hindutva and the internal disagreements (see, Khan, 2011; Sharma, 2007), the difference in teachings and praxis of women's wing and the entirely male membership of the RSS (Bacchetta, 2004; Banerjee, 2003; Basu, 1996; Sen, 2006) films have been made on the mobilization processes (Patwardhan, 1992) and ethnographic documentaries on the training camps organized for young men (Vachani, 1992, 2002). There are certain themes that emerge, in coherence with the overall aim of

[4] Hindu Society
[5] Religious duty
[6] Culture

consolidating 'Hindu' power (Hasan, 2005; Kanungo, 2003; Ludden, 2005; Sarkar, 2005; Spodek, 2010; Veer, 2005). It is only in the process and the way this is deemed to play out by the various actors that is adjusted. It is in this consolidation of power that Billig writes, "the ideology of the dominant group is used to maintain its superiority over subordinate groups. In this the dominant group will often contain ideological specialists, whose profession is to uphold the material power of the group by formulating ideological justifications. Often, claim Marx and Engels, there is conflict between the intellectual and practical wings of the dominant group, but these conflicts should not disguise a basic commitment to the maintenance of their group's dominance" (Billig, 1976, p. 253).

In the same vein of identifying an underlying theme that conjoins the different organizations together, the writer Arundhati Roy says,

> *While the parallels between contemporary India and pre-war Germany are chilling, they're not surprising. (The founders of the RSS have, in their writings, been frank in their admiration for Hitler and his methods.) One difference is that here in India we don't have a Hitler. We have instead, a travelling extravaganza, a mobile symphonic orchestra. The hydra-headed, many-armed Sangh Parivar—with the BJP, the RSS, the VHP and the Bajrang Dal, each playing a different instrument. Its utter genius lies in its apparent ability to be all things to all people at all times.* (Roy, 2009, p. 8)

The Sangh Parivar (or the 'family') refers to the family of organisations in the Hindu nationalist movement. Roy alludes to these various organisations as the arms of the 'Sangh Parivar'. The Hindutva ideology forms the core of this family of the RSS (Rashtriya SwayamSevak Sangh), the VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad) and the Bajrang Dal, whose political arm is the Bharatiya Janata Party (Islam, 2006b; Pardesi & Oetken, 2008; Sharma, 2007; Vachani, 1992, 2002).

1.3.3 Inter-group Research in India

Though far fewer in number than the breadth of the phenomenon demands, there is some social psychological research in India with a focus on Hindu-Muslims relations. Within the framework of intergroup threat theory (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009), work by Tausch and colleagues found that symbolic threat was a predictor of prejudice for Hindus,

and that realistic threat is a predictor of prejudice for Muslims in the context of majority-minority relationships (Tausch, Hewstone, & Roy, 2009). The work of Ghosh and colleagues focuses the lens of inter-group relations theories at the Hindu-Muslim relationships and review studies in India (Ghosh & Kumar, 1991). Sammyh Khan in his PhD thesis on the Hindutva movement presents a social psychological exposition on the structure, contents and inter-group impacts of the movement (Khan, 2011). Sudhir Kakar's psychoanalytic exposition of Hindu Muslim relations provides a compelling picture of the individuals who were involved in violent acts against the outgroups. The study has focussed on exploring the hatred between the groups, either by putting the lens of stereotypes on Muslims (ie, is there something in the character of Muslims or the Islamic faith that brings about such violence) or of looking at the social conditions of the relations as 'given', for example – riots and violence over the cow (Kakar, 1996). However, much more social psychological research is required to understand the complex social context and group dynamics in India. In contrast, the range of scholarship from disciplines other than psychology that have based their work on understanding Hindu-Muslim relations and the advent of Hindutva is fairly large (Brass, 1997, 2003a, 2003b; Das, 2008; Ghosh, 2002; Jaffrelot, 2013; Ludden, 2005; Pandey, 2004; Pandey & Samad, 2007; Pandey, 2006b; Paul R Brass, 2006; Sarkar, 2005; Sen & Wagner, 2005; Sengupta, 2006; Varshney & Gubler, 2012; Varshney, 2001, 2002, 2003). While the scholars across the disciplines generally agree that the Hindutva movement has been accompanied with much violence and strained relations between groups, they have argued that the ferocity of the communal violence is linked with the rise of a Hindu nationalist ideology in India, a rich body of research by scholars of politics who debate the very definition of how the violence is represented in both academic and public discourse is considered in the next section. This argument has implications for the way in which further theorisation and studies are conducted.

1.3.3.1 The construction of Communal violence: riots, pogroms or 'spontaneous violence'?

Inter-religious group violence in India is called 'communal' violence. In the media and nationalistic discourse, communal violence has been treated like 'aberrations'[7] in a

[7] See (Pandey, 2006b, 2006c)

largely peaceful nation. But, scholars across disciplines have grappled with the phenomena of 'riot-production'[8], and have been increasingly voicing their concerns about the role that Hindu nationalism has played. They particularly challenge the idea of a riot in which both sides are seen to be more or less equally responsible for the violence. The label '*riot'* gives closure to the event argues, Gyanendra Pandey. He goes on to argue that riot theorisation in India is misleading (Gyanendra Pandey, 2006b, 2006c). He questions the basis of characterizing the violence as 'riot' and argues that the violence of 1984 in Delhi, 1992-93 in Mumbai and 2002 in Gujarat is symptomatic of pogroms where one group has almost complete dominance over the other group. It is worthwhile to quote the entire passage "As to 'communal riots', it is enough to say that the worst examples of violence against minority religious communities, over the last two decades and more, fail to fit the description in any commonly understood sense of the term." About the '84 anti-Sikh 'riots', 92-93 'riots' and 2002 Gujarat, he further says, "Suffice to recall that, in these as in other instances, hundreds if not thousands of people from the majority community congregated at will for days (sometimes weeks) on end, to attack and loot the persons, property and wealth of the targeted community. The habitations, houses and shops, vehicles and machines, fields and hand pumps, that belonged to members of the minority community were identified and marked out in advance, with the assistance of electoral registers, tax rolls, census data and local informants. The attacks themselves took place with the acquiescence (if not the active encouragement) of the police, the political leadership and even leading ministers in the government, and with almost no fear of counter-attack or loss of life (since the police is ready at hand to ward off and shoot any counter-attackers), or indeed of punishment (since the police and existing political leadership is on their side, and even the judiciary seems to be mindful of the views of the political leadership, if not in agreement with them)." He further states, "These were certainly not 'riots'. They were organized political massacres, feeding on and fanning the hatred and prejudices of a growing segment of the majority community" (p 278, Pandey, 2006c).

An important indication of an almost one-sided attack is the formation of 'minority' ghettoes in the urban areas after the violence. Meena Menon's book on the violence in Mumbai (then, Bombay) traces the trajectory of the lives of the survivors from the

[8] See (Brass, 2003)

violence against Muslims in Bombay of 1992-1993. While members of the majoritarian community (i.e., Hindus) move in relative impunity after the communal violence, members of the minority communities (particularly Muslims in this case) if they ever return to their places live in fear of retribution. Those who do move out face difficulty in finding suitable living accommodation in places where the majoritarian community lives (Menon, 2012). It is telling that such prejudice is not restricted to any particular socio-economic class of the minority community, as evidenced in the experiences of wealthy film actors searching for houses in Mumbai (Gaikwad, 2012) to professors in universities who unsuccessfully searched for rental houses while relocating to Ahmedabad (Dave, 2012; Langa, 2012).

The number of people affected and the conditions of exclusion that are created *overwhelmingly* affects the minority communities. How then can we sensibly understand the ideological conditions, if we insist that 'both Hindus and Muslims, or both Hindus and Christians communities' are affected equally in the violence?

Paul Brass in his extensive scholarship on collective violence in India gives considerable thought to the kind of label that is used to describe violence (Brass, 1994, 2003, 2006). A majoritarian Hindu country where Muslims are the largest minority (and second largest population) with Christians, Sikhs and Parsees forming the rest of the prominent minority communities, in the narrative of an overall national peaceful coexistence, the localized occurrence of *periodic 'riots'* (as the administration likes to characterise the violence) is seen as a regrettable but expected consequence of groups with fundamentally different values living in such proximity. Brass also notes the struggle over the way in which the violence is sought to be represented after the inter-group violence occurs, showing how leaders argue that while the violence by the outgroup is always constructed to be 'systematic', the ingroup violence is said to be of a 'spontaneous' nature (Brass, 2006, p. 47)

The case of anti-Muslim Violence in Gujarat:

On February 27th 2002, the Sabarmati Express carrying Hindu religious-workers caught fire near Godhra in Gujarat, a state in western India. It is unclear if the attack was carried out by Muslim groups (Dhattiwala & Biggs, 2012; Spodek, 2010). Hindu nationalist

groups like the VHP claimed that Muslims had attacked the train. Ostensibly as retribution for Godhra, there was an outburst of anger in the Hindu community that unleashed brutalities on the Muslim community in several areas of Gujarat. The violence that displaced nearly 10000 and killed 2000, which included the burning of an ex-Member of Parliament[9], continued unabated for the next two months. Describing the violence,

> Last night a friend from Baroda[10] called. Weeping. It took her fifteen minutes to tell me what the matter was. It wasn't very complicated. Only that Sayeeda, a friend of hers, had been caught by a mob. Only that her stomach had been ripped open and stuffed with burning rags. Only that after she died, someone carved 'OM'[11] on her forehead.
>
> Precisely which Hindu scripture preaches this? (Roy, 2003, p. 17)[12]

Perhaps Roy asks a rhetorical question, but in social psychological terms and more specifically to our analytic position, it is an important question, for it asks if there is a rationale to this seemingly mindless act. Let us take another look at the act. Engraving a Hindu insignia on is not a mindless act. Consider the act of violation described in the epigraph. If we understand the violation of dead bodies as a battleground, inscribing 'Om' on the forehead is a two-fold message of victory and pride. Victory, as it communicates the total dominance and control that the Hindu community has over the Muslim community; pride, as the 'sacred symbol' is stamped on the forehead of the victim. The violence, then, is also a manner of communication to the outgroup.

The pattern of the violence is specific to the context of Hindutva group norms, however the general principle of the act of violence is not specific to India or Hindutva. A woman's dead body is used as a communication of dominance between two communities. The attackers have left their mark stating that this is not an act that the perpetrators are

[9] Ehsaan Jaffri, a Member of Parliament from the Congress party was dismembered and burnt alive by Hindu rioters.

[10] Baroda is in Gujarat – a state where sustained genocidal violence was unleashed on the Muslim community in 2002, ostensibly to avenge the murder of Hindu workers.

[11] Om is a religious incantation used by Hindus to signify the beginning of any 'auspicious' work.

[12] Arundhati Roy's work is controversial in India and many accuse her of taking a 'license of creativity' as an author of fiction. However this description, excerpted from an article published in a national magazine, is also corroborated by another source: a report by a group of feminist scholars published under the International Initiative for Justice (IIJ)

ashamed of, indeed, it is one that they declare belongs to their community. Questions of identity and citizenship are fraught with gendered sexual violence (Franzway, 2016). That women's bodies are seen as repositories of 'their community's' honour is well-researched by feminist scholars and that violence between two communities are played out on the bodies of women (Sideris, 2003; Zraly & Nyirazinyoye, 2010) Rape and sexual violence have been used as weapons against communities in the Nanjing massacre, the Rwandan genocide, even during the Holocaust (Henry, Ward, & Hirshberg, 2004; Lentin, 2000; Lindsey, 2010; Sideris, 2003; Zraly & Nyirazinyoye, 2010) The violence, scholars have argued signifies, pride. While, the focus of this thesis is not on the specific forms of violence, it is worthwhile to note that an analysis of the norms and values of the group might indicate the kind of violence that might be unleashed. While, this is particularly significant to the arguments made in chapter 2 (p. 40) which we shall return to, it is of import also in terms of the model of collective hate that we explicated in the previous section. The *5th step of celebration:* It can be argued that the burning of the body is symbolic of what happened in Godhra. This is an example of the kind of violence that the perpetrator community wanted the world to know belonged to them. That they were capable of such an action, is a matter of pride to be celebrated, and not one of remorse. In terms of the model of collective hate, this is the culmination of the defence of virtue.

Though the causes and implications of the riots and the nature of the analysis itself has been debated; among scholars of politics, sociology, economics and history, it is generally agreed upon that the ideology of the Hindu right-wing plays a dominant role in fomenting violence (Hasan, 2005; Khan, 2011; Pandey, 2006b; Sarkar, 2005; Veer, 1987). While scholars of politics have done tremendous work in providing nuanced backgrounds and contexts to the occurrence of violence, with regard to state complicity about 'riot production' and inter-religious violence with a definite focus on the perpetrators of the Hindutva ideology, the accounts can not speak about the psychological engagement of the people who adhere to the ideology and of people who would have a psychological stake in identifying with the *construction of the category of the ingroup* in such terms. In other words, we require a social psychological framework drawn heavily from the principles of social identity to make sense of the possible psychological engagement of leaders and followers in the production of hatred.

1.4 Research Strategy

The first part of the thesis is about investigating the social psychological conditions that create antagonisms between groups. In other words, it is about investigating prejudice as a product of mobilisation. Therefore, the research strategy combines methods suitable for exploratory research and confirmation of hypothesis in the form of an experimental study. Language and images are powerful mediums of communication that affect the ways in which we think and act. A 'radical' qualitative approach refocuses the lens on this discourse of communication (Parker, 2005). As social beings we actively engage in making sense of the world around us. A major portion of this is done through the discourse that surrounds us and that we engage in and are used by *entrepreneurs* effectively to impact upon our understandings of the world that we live in (Elcheroth & Reicher, 2014; Fine & Billig, 1989; Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996; Smith, 2008). This thesis explores mobilisations of hate and solidarity (Reicher, Hopkins, Levine, & Rath, 2005), to further develop the social identity model of hate (Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008) by analysing two different modes of communication and experimentally examine one strand of hypothesis that emerged from this model of hate mobilisation.

The nature of the questions and therefore, the varied range of data necessitate both qualitative and quantitative research approaches. Accordingly, the thesis employs qualitative research approaches drawing from the fields of visual anthropology (Katz, 2004; MacDougall, 1997; Uberoi, 2002) and communication (Kjeldsen, 2007; Medhurst & Desousa, 1981; Werner, 2004) and in conjunction with a) the overarching framework of the social identity perspective and in specific, the model of collective hate (Herrera & Reicher, 1998; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher, Hopkins, Levine, & Rath, 2005; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a) to examine (i) visual data, and (ii) live speeches and circulated video recordings of *entrepreneurs of identity* at mass gatherings. A social experiment was also conducted to empirically confirm one of the many potential strands of hypotheses emerging from the qualitative studies on hate mobilisation, drawing on experimental work by Levine and colleagues with a self-categorisation framework by manipulating identity salience (Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005; Levine & Thompson, 2004).

A further consideration of the processes of the specific qualitative research, the applicability and questions of validity is explained and discussed in the specific chapters (2) and (3) of the studies on visual communication and political speeches.

Framework:

The studies aim to analyse and explicate the ways in which primarily, hate is mobilised and further delve layers to the model (Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008) that has been sketched, formally proposed in and to an extent confirmed in other studies of discourse (McKeever, Reed, Pehrson, Storey, & Cohrs, 2013; Verkuyten, 2013). The research on rhetoric in the fields of politics and philosophy (Bitzer, 1968; Cameron, Lapinski, & Riemann, 2000; Hart, 2005; Smith, 2008) have been used as a background to the argument put forth in Billig's work on rhetorical psychology (Billig, 1985, 1988). While the constructs used have been developed from a robust research within the framework of social identity and self categorisation theories, an understanding of the cultural concepts in the data is a pre-requisite to the arguments that are being made.

In other words, we not only *"spell out (y)our assumptions* [emphasis in original]*"* (Silverman, 2005, p. 352), we also interrogate these against the model proposed and delve for further nuances in the data that we analyse. This necessitates a comprehensive and descriptive method of analysis that a qualitative approach accords much more than the conventional quantitative approach (Malterud, 2001; Ormston, Spencer, Barnard, & Snape, 2013; Polkinghorne, 2005).

Cultural data:

Before the first study of the PhD was conducted, we had sketched the processes of inter-group relations that are constructed in rhetoric in a published paper in the section 'mobilising hate' (Reicher, Hopkins, Levine, & Rath, 2005) with examples from Nazi Germany to Rwanda and India. This served as a template for further exploratory research, specifically contextualised in India. Each study has an explication of the cultural relevance of the concepts that are used in both the visual medium and the political speeches to make sense of not just the ways in which identities are sought to be

constructed but also to underscore the emotional attachment and importance of certain symbols as sacred (Anand, 2005; Bhatt, 2000; Das, 2008; Ghosh, 2002; Kakar & Kakar, 2007; Kakar, 1996; Sarkar, 2005; Sengupta, 2006; Sharma, 2012).

Category Constructions & Relations:

For example, in terms of defining the in-group: the Hindu religion follows no specific book and is a profoundly divided society on the lines of caste. We look at the definitions of what has come to represent Hindu. How is it that a religion (Hinduism) which is best known for its lack of cohesion been put together as a monolith unity? How has this cohesion been formed? What are the rationales put forward? What emotions are invoked? What are the unique cultural artefacts of this society that are put to service in these constructions? By whom? How? and why?

Intertwined with the question of the in-group definition is the demarcation of the out-groups. There is enough research done on inter-group relations in India to point towards an obvious construction of a Muslim out-group, and a Christian out-group (Jones, 2007; Kakar & Kakar, 2007; Kakar, 1996; Llewellyn, 2010).

The overall research strategy developed progressively in cognisance of the availability of a set of rich data in the form of visual communication. Qualitative approaches were used in studies 1, 2 and 4. The third study is an experimental confirmation of a hypothesis that emerged from the first two studies.

To put it simply, we used the framework of the hate model as a lens to explore the hate discourse (i.e, the cultural data) from India. The lens, however, is a reflexive model and therefore data was also used back to add layers to the model. This is explicated in details in the specific chapters.

1.5.1. An overview of the Studies

There are four studies in the thesis:

The first set of data collected (Chapter 2, Study 1, p 40 of this thesis) follows the tradition

of ‘discoveries’ in science replete with messy trajectories and accidental findings. The researcher while part of a team exploring among other things, the impact of participation (The Preyag Mela Research Group, 2007) in a mass gathering of primarily Hindu religious orientation, stumbled upon a fairly prominent tent in the middle of this gathering (further details on p 43, of this thesis). The impact of the posters put up within this tent was strikingly out of place in a set up that was ostensibly about spirituality. The violence and torture data set has, therefore, been collected systematically within the framework of opportunistic timing, but without a set notion of what kind of data one was to collect. This lent itself very well to a qualitative approach of analysing the data, combining research from visual anthropology, communication studies and the social identity model of hate. Since the mode of communication was visual and therefore, limited in scope for more nuanced understanding of the arguments given, the next study focussed on political rhetoric in the form of speeches at another gathering.

The second study on political speeches (chapter 3), collected by the researcher, was this time with the specific purpose to follow hate-mobilisers. The data was less accidental and more purposive in intent as the site for data collection was selected a couple of days after the Magh Mela (the gathering) in Allahabad, India. The next major gathering was advertised at the Magh Mela as The Dharm Sansad (religious parliament) and was held a couple of days later. The speeches were recorded over a period of three days, and other material like political pamphlets and a Compact Disc of the speech delivered by a particular leader that was circulated in the place, was also collected and analysed.

The third study (chapter 4) is an experiment designed to confirm a counter-intuitive finding: the more virtuous the in-group, the more the threat sanctioned against a threatening out-group. While the generic format of the hypothesis is from the paper on collective mobilisation of hate (Reicher et al., 2008) and is also a contention of this thesis, i.e, ‘virtuous violence’, the specific contents and the cultural artefacts that were chosen to be used in the design of the instruments emerged from the two qualitative studies of this thesis.

The fourth study (chapter 5) is an examination of mobilisation of solidarity primarily organised by civil society actors with self-identified left-liberal leaning. The rally was

expressly organised with the motive of raising consciousness about the violence of the saffron parties in an anti-Christian pogrom in a place called Kandhamal, in the eastern Indian state of Odisha in 2008. The aim of collecting data from a movement of solidarity with the victims was to explore the *category contents* of the kinds of social identities that are invoked towards the political aim of solidarity building. This study was primarily included to showcase a presence of countervailing voices that mobilise against the hate rhetoric in India.

2 Study 1: Visual Representations of Hate

"Imagery is constitutive. It presents differing visions and helps form the minds of human subjects. Therefore it is crucial that we begin to examine it carefully and critically." (p 31) [13]

2.1 Chapter Synopsis

In this chapter, we set out the introduction to the study with a brief review of studies of visual culture from the fields of visual anthropology and more recently, communication and its impact on influencing people mostly studied in the field of advertisement (section 2.2). This is followed by the research methods adopted by using the model of hate (explained in the previous chapter, section 1.2) in conjunction with methods drawn from the field of anthropology, most notably Geertz's 'thick description', to explore the discourse of hate put forth by a Hindutva section in the form of visual representations (section 2.3). The analysis (section 2.4) is conducted on each poster individually, then brought together in an overall narrative with implications of the model (section 2.5). The chapter concludes with a discussion (section 2.6) and consideration of the limitations (section 2.7).

2.2 Introduction

The study of visual culture is a prominent field of research in sociological and anthropological disciplines. In a book articulating the visual representations of and by the Hindutva movement, (Davis, 2007) argues that "visual iconography plays a fundamental role in the imagining of nationhood." He deliberates on "Anderson's central questions in *imagined communities*: How is it that so many persons have been persuaded to sacrifice and die willingly for something so recently imagined into being as the nation?" and argues that "a visual imagery places us in a better position" to respond to this question. (p. 5).

Though social psychological research is sparse in utilising visual material as data,

[13] (Davis, 2007)

anthropologists have traditionally been interested in the 'visual' as a subject of enquiry. In the field of anthropology, MacDougall remarks "*Anthropology has had no lack of interest in the visual*; *its problem has always been what to do with it*" (p 276, MacDougall, 1997). Visual Anthropology is now an established sub-field of study that includes a range of data such as performance arts, museum artefacts, paintings, posters, photographs (MacDougall, 1997). These are described as forms of 'persuasive' communication. There is a wealth of research on visual representations in the field of communication studies, management especially in advertising and also in political discourse (Pellegrino, Salvati, & De Meo, 2013). Unsurprisingly, the focus in advertisement is in the impact of visual imagery towards attitude change in consumers (Rossiter & Percy, 1980; Slade, 2003). These studies analyse not just the contents, but also argue about the plausible impact that such visual communication might have on the intended audience by analysing the contents of the visual medium. This is worth keeping in mind as one traverses the muddied waters of 'causal' implications and the question of valid interpretations of qualitative data (Cho, 2006; Golfshani, 2003; Whittemore, Chase, & Mandle, 2001) in the following piece of work.

Anthropologists have examined discourse and studied visual imagery, particularly in the form of editorial and political cartoons. Katz (2004) traces the history of posters as a medium of communicating political messages in 1754 when the American President, Benjamin Franklin, sketched a snake cut into pieces with the caption "Join, or Die". This was one of the first visual representations of an argument, exhorting the then British colonies to either unify or perish. More recently, a set of 13 posters depicting the Prophet Mohammed by Danish artists became fiercely contested sites of identity, security and the right to free speech (Hakam, 2009; Kuipers, 2011; Laegaard, 2009; Weaver, 2010).

In 2006, when we stumbled across a set of posters in a VHP tent, set up in the middle of a largely Hindu religious gathering in India that caught our attention for its narrative content of tortured cows and vividly stereotypical caricatures of Muslims as threats, the Danish cartoons that evoked almost worldwide polarised reactions were yet to have been sketched. However, as an Indian researcher conversant with the rhetoric of *banal* prejudice and of being a part of the community of shared cultural repertoire, the use of cows in the set of posters (which could otherwise have been interpreted as part of animal

rights discourse) stood out to me as symbolising the sacred Mother Cow of Hindus.[14] I shall explain the relevance of the cows in further detail in the analysis and discussion sections.

In a book chronicling India's rich history of cartooning, Mushirul Hasan traces and analyses the publication of editorial cartoons published in Urdu in the *Awadh Punch* as a social commentary on the colonial times (Hasan, 2007). Later, work by the sociologist Patricia Uberoi examining the content of posters produced during the 1940's and the early 1960's (when Jawaharlal Nehru was the Prime Minister of India) demonstrates that the 'poster' was an essential tool of mass communication in the visual culture of India (Uberoi, 2002). Those were the days of nation-building and bringing together a country born out of horrific inter-group violence, still firmly within the shackles of colonialism. Building up a secular national identity was of paramount importance to the leaders of the fledgling democracy. This is a point worth noting especially in the overall context of this thesis that the Hindu right has not had an uncontested ride, and that pluralism has been an ideal that was strongly endorsed by the state and populace. Uberoi's research elucidates the contesting ideas of Indian nationalism that find expression in the posters (Uberoi, 2002).

It is important however, to differentiate between the lampooning of power structures, as seen in the analysis of Hasan, and the reinforcement of hate representations of minority communities. The social psychologist, Michael Billig, in his study of racist jokes in the Ku Klux Klan webpages, argues that a distinction must be drawn between jokes that seek to comment on unequal power relations in a society and jokes that seek to derogate minority and oppressed communities, i.e., jokes made within the context of extreme bigotry (Billig, 2001, 2005). In other words, the 'context of reproduction' of the power equation of the groups in question, i.e., the group that is being made fun of and the group that is making the jokes becomes critical in determining which form of humour the cartoons represent. It is within this extreme bigotry of Hindutva ideology (Khan, 2011; D. Reddy, 2011) that the following study is analysed. While, racism and prejudice have been of central concern in the study of social psychology (Blee, 1996; Miller, 2004; Katz,

[14] I shall explain the relevance of the cows in further detail in the sections on establishing validity (2.4) and analysis (2.5)

1991; Reicher, 2001; Reicher, 2012; González, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008), racist humour as a study of enquiry in social psychology is limited (Billig, 2005), political cartoons as subjects of enquiry is rare (Weaver, 2010), and within the framework of critical social mobilisation, this study is, perhaps, one of the first.

As argued earlier in the introduction, the emotions that are sought to be maintained within and between groups are neither self-sustaining nor do we come to our understanding of the world by just ourselves. Communication forms an essential neural system to the body of emotions that sustains the group identity in dissent and in consensus (Reicher et al., 2006). It is therefore, critical that as researchers we look at the variety of ways in which people seek to communicate their ideas with one another. Specifically, looking at the ways in which entrepreneurs of identity would seek to communicate their messages to mobilise people. For social researchers, the *medium* of communication is as important as the contents of *'what is being said'*, or in this case, what is being visualised. It is in this regard that these cartoons can be seen as 'visual arguments' (Hatfield & Hinck, 2006; Shelley, 2001; Slade, 2003; Wekesa, 2012).

2.3 Research Approach

2.3.1 Objective of Research:

The objective of this study is to explore the discourse of hate by analysing the construction of various social identities and their inter-relationships in the visual representation of posters.

2.3.2 Location & Arrangement

The Mela: The posters were put up in a tent hosted by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad in one of the 'largest religious gathering of Hindus' – the Prayag Mela. To give a sense of the enormousness of the site and number of people, the 'Mela' that quite literally translates to 'fair', is an urban site of tents and facilities, mimicking a town that is set up for a month on the banks of the River Ganga and Yamuna at Allahabad, the capital of

Uttar Pradesh in India. This fair continues for a period of just under 30 days with various stakeholders including the state and central Governments, public commissions, religious agencies, the University and the Indian Army involved in the planning, execution and management of this temporary township that sees up to millions of people (BBC, 2001; MacLean, 2003) on certain dates that are deemed auspicious. Researched as a site for managing water, sanitation and hygiene conditions (Baranwal et al., 2015), management of health and infectious disease (Cariappa, Singh, Mahen, & Bansal, 2015; David & Roy, 2016), the experience of living in the Mela (Buzinde, Kalavar, Kohli, & Manuel-Navarrete, 2014) and the various impacts of collective identity and psychological well-being (The Preyag Mela Research Group, 2007), the Mela, by sheer size and population is undoubtedly a formidable site for public communication and mobilisation.

The Poster Tent: The Vishwa Hindu Parishad tent was situated quite near one of the main entrances of the Prayag Mela, next to the tent of the University of Allahabad. This location is of import to the overall sense of the location of this tent and posters in that it was not found in some obscure part of this huge township, rather it had a sense of legitimacy and prominence in the very space it occupied, set up as it were next to the University's tent.

Arrangement of Posters: The tent was designed as a square within a square, and posters were put up on all sides of the walls. The outer walls of the inner square (put up with saffron cloth) contained this particular series of posters. Since the tent had two ways in, which people were using as both entrance and exit, it is not entirely evident from the arrangement the direction in which people were going round the tent. However, we will subsequently show, that two posters form a mini-narrative only when they are read in one particular direction. Having noted that, it is also important to note that the narrative that emerges from the posters is not because of the way in which they were set up but because of the way in which the analytic interpretation holds together as a story. This is a part of the analytic process that shall be explained in the discussion of this chapter (p 104). The researcher noted that people browsed through it as the last set of posters, with a set of demographic posters and noted the participation of a 'guide' at certain points in explaining the messages of the posters, especially to people who could not read the text. In a sense, the posters though static in presentation, were transformed into a dynamic communication medium with people interacting in the interpretation of the text and

images. Some of this interaction was recorded in the form of graffiti on the posters, which has also been taken into account in the analysis.

2.3.3 Procedure:

Medhurst and colleagues, from the field of communication studies, outlined a taxonomy framework for analysing editorial cartoons in a seminal paper. The initial inspection of the posters are guided by the "relative size of objects within the frame, exaggeration/ amplification of physionomical features, placement in the frame, relation of text both caption and balloons." (p 212, Medhurst & Desousa, 1981).

Petersoo (2005) in her PhD thesis on the 'discursive construction of national identities in the Media: Scotland and its Others' reports that most of the methodologies and understandings crop from visual anthropology with no single standardized way of analysing the data. Since then, scholars especially in the field of Visual Communication have drawn on concepts from Anthropology. From the field of Rhetoric and Visual communication, Kjedlsen, argues that '*context is essential* in determining the meaning and rhetorical agency of images' (Kjeldsen, 2014, p. 200). The context not only implies the environment in which the individual images occur, but also, as we shall show, it is in the way in which the analysis brings together the narrative form in the sequence of presentation of the group of images. He further argues that visual argumentation may have a greater role in conveying messages that would otherwise lose the richness of impact in a verbal communication, "Pictures have the potential for a multiplicity of simultaneous codings (transcriptions), allowing them to perform thick representations of events and phenomena. This kind of semiotic thickness can provide a fuller understanding of an issue, and thereby render the importance and strength of an argument salient. Thus, an important rhetorical and argumentative function of pictures, Kjeldsen proposes, is to argue for the significance or severity of a certain problem or the urgency of a situation. The visual aesthetics of pictures are able to function as an integral part of an argumentation we often only reconstruct verbally as thin propositions. However, the visual aesthetics are important precisely because their thickness can create presence and evoke the importance and urgency of a situation. In this way, visual argumentation may help people understand the gravity and importance of the issue at hand" (Kjeldsen, 2015)

Cross-referencing to build a narrative:

A 2004 paper by Werner on 'visual analogies, inter-textuality and cultural memory', explicates the case for inter-textuality in posters and highlights the ways in which the creators of cartoons rely on particular understandings of the readers to convey the message (Werner, 2004). However, none of the studies have looked at a set of posters that come together in a narrative framework. Therefore, the approach we employ is to not just look at individual posters but to see how they work together in different ways to present a nuanced narrative. We have analysed the posters, one after the other, in the order that they were found in the tent. The process of a "thick description" (Geertz, 1973; Kjeldsen, 2014; Ponterotto, 2006) for each poster was followed as described in the next section.

Deciphering the images and stereotypes:

The characters in the posters and the attributes thereafter were deciphered from popular interpretation. This is a technique employed by cartoonists to strike a chord and immediate recognition with the audience. Medhurst and colleagues note, "*No traits, whether physical or psychological in nature can be totally manufactured by the cartoonist. The trait must exist to some extent in popular consciousness or graphic tradition before it can be amplified and caricatured by the artist"* (Medhurst & Desousa, 1981, p. 202). In particular, to establish the validity of the interpretations of the representation of the Muslim figures (Amin, 2004) and the importance of the cow (Jaffrelot, 2013; Jones, 2006; Kakar, 1996) Uberoi's work on posters that divides the posters into two categories, one is of secularism where all religions are given almost equal treatment and the other set where a 'Hindu rashtra' subsumes every other religion in its fold. Critically, the representation is either as Mother India or Mother Cow (Uberoi, 2002) was followed.

Building a narrative:

The analysis of the images and texts has also been cross-referenced in the posters for greater internal validity of the analysis, i.e., while each poster has been analysed in depth at three levels individually, when similar characters of the images occurs in the other

posters, it has been treated as an archetype for the narrative. In a sense, the 16 posters have been treated like a narrative with character building and constructing certain kinds of relationships amongst the characters as reflective of a microcosm of values of the groups that the characters are deemed to represent.

In following a thematic analytic approach (Parker, 2005; Silverman, 2005) much emphasis has been given to the number of times a certain element is repeated in the series, however, my lens primarily, will be guided by *what* is going on in the posters, i.e., the construction of categories and how they are construed to relate to one another. The analytic argumentation of the context is extended in the posters within the guiding framework of the model of mobilisation (Reicher et al., 2008). This would mean looking at the construction of the in-group, the attributes, the outgroup(s) – the definition of which is necessarily dependent on the way the in-group is defined.

The selection of posters:

Out of a corpus of 300 posters, we selected these 16 posters since they were a set of hand-painted posters (the others were printed) and were put up in a row in the tent. 11 of these posters were on one side of the tent, followed with a few posters of demographics (hand-painted) and then 5 more posters painted on the same pattern of the previous ones. We went through several attempts of categorization of posters. The process of 'layering' – of analysing the text, visuals as separate layers and then bringing it together as a whole was followed. Sifting through the data, we selected these posters because of the way they were set up in the tent. They formed a narrative interspersed with demographic posters. We also did have some information on the impact of these posters on the targeted audience by the presence of graffiti on the posters. We used these 'reactions' as a mark of and also substantiation of our analysis of:

1. Who constituted *'us',* the in-group? (By an absence of slang on the figures)
2. Who constituted '*them',* the out-groups? (By slurs scribbled on the figures)

2.3.4 Analytic Lay-out

The posters have been presented in the way they were set up in the tent. The posters are analysed individually in three steps, or 'layers'.

1. The first layer of analysis involves a **description** of the poster at three levels:
    i) image,
    ii) text; and
    iii) graffiti.

2. The second layer is **interpretation** involving analytic categories. Within this, we identify the **categories** by using the descriptions of the first layer of analysis (traits attributed, caricatures). The next step is an elucidation of the relations constructed among these various categories (**category-relations**).

2.3.4.1 Categories:

Analytically, different representations have been categorized into the

- In-group:
- Out-group(s):
- Political Rival:

Stereotypical representations of the members of the groups. Characterization of the in-group members, out-group members and rivals are distinct in the way they have been painted. Since the impact of the poster is primarily visual we also looked at the aesthetic appeal of the figures representing the various categories, and the various kinds of symbolizations used to denote the categories.

2.3.4.2 Category relations

The way in which the categories are understood in relation to one another, i.e.,

Who is with *'us'*? Who is against *'us'*? How are the out-groups depicted in relation to the in-group? Do the rivals truly represent the in-group? What relations are shown to exist between the rivals and the out-group?

2.3.4.3 Summary Table

A table that summarizes succinctly all the elements of the individual poster comprising of categories, representatives of the category, the nature of the attributes of the representatives and the nature of the inter-group relationships.

2.4 Analysis:

Poster 1

Description

1. Image:

The central representation of the poster is of two figures putting a cow to a slaughter-wheel. The background of the poster is a pastiche of the tri-coloured Indian National Flag: with the blue wheel in the centre and the three colours of saffron, white and green in the background.

2. Text:

In bold blue characters (with the saffron background) '*Either change the national symbol,'* followed by '*or shut down mechanized slaughter-houses and stop meat export.*'

In the green background is the following text: *'India's national symbol is a tripartite-headed lion sculpture beneath which, is a horse on one side and a bull etched on the*

other. The 'Ashoka Chakra' is in the middle of our tri-coloured national flag, which is a symbol of ahimsa [non-violence]. Anybody who insults this is punished. But, the Government of India by it's cruel policies is insulting this symbol and committing crimes of national treason.'

3. Graffiti:

The politician's figure has '*you killing a cow, what? has your wife run away with someone?*'; *'send your daughter over to me'* which has then been crossed out with red ink, while the Muslim has *'meet me and I will kill you'* and threats of *'will kidnap your daughter, mother-fucker*.'

Interpretation:

This poster explicitly portrays two threats, one from the Muslim out-group (the figure on the left) and the other from the Government of India (the figure on the right), to the Hindu in-group (a cow).

1. Categories:

The centre of the poster depicts two figures holding a cow onto a wheel with jagged edges. The figure on the left is a Muslim Arab, and the figure on the right is of a politician. The figure on the left is identified as Muslim (out-group) from the chequered pattern of the clothes he is wearing (the stereotypical caricature also occurs in posters 3, 5, 10, 11, 13 on pages 57, 63, 76, 79, 85 of this thesis). In contrast to the other posters however, this Muslim is a wealthy Arab depicted by the long flowing tunic and a typical head-scarf. The figure on the right wears a white dhoti and kurta typified by Indian politicians. In the analytic categories, these figures have been analysed as 'political rival' (also see poster no. 10, p 76).

While the poster is a copy of the Indian national flag with the saffron at the top portion, white in the middle and green at the bottom, the centre-wheel of the Indian national flag however has been significantly modified. Indeed, the bold blue headline suggests '*Either change the national symbol...'*, with the suggested *change* being the original wheel of justice into a wheel fashioned like a chainsaw blade, a symbol of violence. The center-wheel or the Ashoka Chakra symbolizes the wheel of law. By turning a symbol of justice

into a slaughter-wheel, a symbol of violence, the poster seeks to portray India as turning against itself. This is the sign of betrayal: 'our own leaders, elected representatives chosen to safeguard our country and our values, are murdering us.' The government of India (rival) is putting 'us' (Hindu in-group) to the slaughter in collusion with the Muslim out-group. The full text of the warning at the top of the poster is '*Either change the national symbol or shut down mechanized slaughter-houses and stop meat export.*'

At the bottom of the poster, is the figure of the national emblem of India, symbolic of governmental authority. This is combined with the text at the bottom of the poster on both sides of the national emblem, that says*, 'India's national symbol is a tripartite-headed lion sculpture beneath which, is a horse on one side and a bull etched on the other. The 'Ashoka Chakra' is in the middle of our tri-coloured national flag, which is a symbol of ahimsa [non-violence]. Anybody who insults this is punished. But, the Government of India by it's cruel policies is insulting this symbol and committing crimes of national treason.'*

2. Category relations:

While the Muslim holds the cow's front legs, the politician pushes the animal from behind. Caught between the pull and push is the cow that the wheel has started to saw through. This could possibly mean, the Hindu (symbolised by the cow) is caught between this nefarious connection of the Muslim and the Indian politician. The out-group and the rival have ganged up against the Hindu (in-group) and are holding the in-group down into torture and annihilation. Enemies and traitors surround the Hindu in-group.

The text '*Either change the national symbol,'* followed by '*or shut down mechanized slaughter-houses and stop meat export* reinforces the image of the Indian Government facilitating and encouraging the vicious attacks of the Muslim out-group on the cow of the Hindu in-group.

Overall message of the poster: The Government of India (rival) in collusion with the out-group has turned against its own people. The Hindu in-group is under threat of annihilation and the Government instead of protecting the in-group, facilitates attacks by the Muslim out-group.

Summary Table

Categories	**Members**	**Representation**	**Attributes**
In-group	Hindu Indians	Cow	Surrounded, Vulnerable, Threatened existence
Out-group	Corporate Muslim	Arab	Rich, conniving
Rival	Government of India	National flag, National emblem, politician, text	Treacherous.
Category Relations			
In-group with rival	The people constituting the Government of India (rival) have betrayed the Hindu in-group and have aided and abetted in the torture and annihilation of the Hindus.		
Out-group with rival	The Muslim Out-group and the Government of India (rival) have joined hands.		
Out-group + rival with in-group	The Government actively helps the Muslim out-group in destruction of the Hindu in-group.		

Poster 2

Description

1. Image:

In the foreground is a man dressed in a suit taunting a poor, in comparison unclothed, person; and on the left side of the poster is another man in a black suit kneeling in front of a cow.

2. Text:

The figure in the black suit*' You, foolish simpleton Brahmin who reveres this animal as mother, eat it's meat! What's there in the milk!"*

Today you'd rather enjoy eating butter made from animal-fat and Pepsi made from cow's meat uprooted the English regime and thrown out the white-skinned English because a small amount of grease (cow-fat) was smeared on a rifle cartridge'.

3. Graffiti:

None.

Interpretation:

This poster depicts a shrewd western out-group, manipulating a gullible Hindu in-group (depicted as foolish).

1. Categories:

This poster creates the values of the Hindu Indian around the character of a poor, gullible Brahmin. The Brahmin identity of the Hindu figure is made clear by the dress-code of typical saffron robes and a shaved head with a little tuft of hair dangling from the back of his head. Further, he is also addressed as *'simple Brahmin fool'* or to use the Hindi term '*ponga pandit'*.[15] It is interesting to note that this poster has used the context of the very same play that they had raised objections against, to add sarcastic connotations to the expression of 'ponga pandit'. It is a taunt to the Brahmin's intellect (or lack of it), and construes a simpleton's gullibility as stupidity instead of innocence. The poster also delineates the Hindutva's stand on the present day Hindu (Indians), mocking them in the text at the bottom of the poster, '*Today you'd rather enjoy eating butter made from animal-fat and Pepsi made from cow's meat'* by contrasting it to the past, when Indians (Hindus) had '*uprooted and thrown out the white-skinned English because a small amount of grease (cow-fat) was smeared on a rifle cartridge'*.[16] The Muslim participation and leadership in this uprising against the British has been erased in the Hindu nationalist narrative, evident from this poster as well.

The out-group of the *white-skin English* (English here does not define nationality per se, but instead is used as a generic term to include all foreigners who are white and speak in English – mostly Americans as representatives of Corporate sectors, in this case Pepsi), is represented by a man attired in a black suit (western clothes), jeers the simple indigenous Brahmin with '*you simpleton, you call an animal, mother? Eat the animal's flesh, what's there in the milk?'* The visual imagery of a civilized man (dressed in suit) taunting a poor, in comparison unclothed, Brahmin to commit a profound violation of Hindu faith frames

[15] Ponga Pandit is a play spoofing the upper caste Brahmins, which incurred the wrath of Hindu fundamentalists.

[16] This incident refers to a time when the British ruled India, and Indians were employed as soldiers in the Army. In 1857, a new rifle was introduced, in which soldiers had to bite off the cartridge to load the bullet. The cartridge was greased with animal-fat of cows and pigs that offended the religious sentiments of Indian soldiers. (Cow is sacred to Hindus, and Muslims abhor pigs). This led to the 'first war of Indian independence' by the Indian nationalist version, or to the 'Sepoy Mutiny of 1857' by the British historians' version.

the enemy as a shrewd character capable of manipulating the simple Hindu in-group to the extent of setting them up against their own mothers.

2. Category relations:

The meaning of the figure on the left side of the poster kneeling in front of a cow is ambiguous. The dress-code of pants and shirt suggests the character is an American corporate worker (also seen in posters 3, 12 on p 57, 82). Given that the out-group is almost always shown as attacking the cow, one possible reading of this particular image is that of the worker shackling the cow. But if the overall message of this poster is taken into account, a second possible interpretation is one of the out-group genuflecting to the Mother Cow. The poster then visually contrasts the glorious past of bringing the British down on their knees for violating Hindu norms (the 1857 conflict) in the background of the poster, with the present in the foreground, where the Hindu in-group is caricatured as a timid and naïve character.

Summary Table

Category	**Members**	**Representation**	**Attributes**
In-group	Hindu Indians	Brahmin	Simple, weak and gullible
Out-group	Western Corporate/ foreign government	White-man in suit.	Conniving, shrewd, manipulative
Category relations:			
In-group with out-group	The out-group (western corporate) is seducing the Hindu in-group to violate cardinal Hindu values.		

Poster 3

Description

1. Image:

On the left is a butcher holding a calf upside down in one hand and an oversized knife in the other, with blood dripping onto the ground near a holy fire in the field. On the right is a farmer holding a bunch of grass in one hand and a hoe in the other.

2. Text:

'*by naming the butcher's cruel act as 'farming' the government* [of India] *is insulting the holy ritual of farming and also the saint-like farmer.'*

3. Graffiti:

All across the Muslim character: on the face: *mother-fucker,* near the waist: *your mother's.*

Interpretation:

This poster visually contrasts the character of the Muslim's (out-group) work of butchery to the Hindus (in-group) work of farming, and textually argues that the Government of India is insulting the Hindus by lumping both the jobs into one category.

1. Category:

The slogan at the top of the poster reads, '*by naming the butcher's cruel act as 'farming' the government* [of India] *is insulting the holy ritual of farming and also the saint-like farmer.'*

The Muslim butcher (out-group) on the left side, holding a calf upside down in one hand and an oversized knife in the other, contrasts against the saintly noble character of the Hindu farmer (in-group) in the right side, holding a bunch of grass in one hand and a hoe in the other, makes for a visual contrast of the group members' characteristics. While the Hindu farmer is portrayed with attractive features and a muscular form, the Muslim butcher has a salacious grin on his face matched by a protuberant stomach.

The previous poster (no. 7) describes that the blood of the cow falling on the land would render it useless for any religious work. In this poster, the calf's blood drips onto the ground, desecrating the sacred Hindu field, perhaps rendering it barren (useless). Farming is as holy and sacred as performing rituals or worship. And the government is insulting the holy act of farming by lumping it together with the butcher's act of violence.

2. Category relations:

This poster sets up relations of opposition between the Hindu in-group and the Muslim out-group. The text contrasts the characteristics of the Hindu farmer as saint-like and holy against the violence of butchery of the Muslim out-group. The Muslim butcher's (out-group) work, portrayed as a cruel act of violence is contrasted against the work of a Hindu farmer which is akin to worship (virtue) illustrated by the holy fire in the field.

Overall message: The government of India is with the Muslim out-group and stands against the Hindu Indian in-group.

Summary Table

Category	Members	Representations	Attributes
In-group	Hindu Indians	Farmer, holy fire	Saintly, pure, virtuous
Out-group	Muslims	Butcher, cow with a slit neck	Uncouth, violent, defilers
Rival	Government of India	Text	Defilers
Category relations:			
Out-group+Rival	The Indian government (rival) equates the Muslim out-group with the Hindu in-group		
Out-group against In-group	The Muslim choice of work is antagonistically opposed to the Hindus choice of work. They desecrate Hindu values.		
Out-group + Rival against In-group	The Government of India with the Muslim out-group is party to the desecration of Hindu land, and Hindu work.		

Poster 4

Description

1. Image:

The land of India with marked sites of religious significance and depicting incarnations of God.

2. **Text:**

In the speech bubble the text reads: *gau syllable is a symbol of sanctity, greatness and compassion in India. That's why many holy places in India start with the syllable 'gau'*; where gau is hindi for cow.

The poster is captioned "the essence of Bharat is cow"

3. **Graffiti:** None

Interpretation:

This poster conflates a religious identity (Hindu) with a national identity (Indian) to demarcate the boundaries of the in-group.

The headline in bold says '*the essence of India is gau'. 'Gau'* means cow in Hindi. At the top right side of the poster is a figure of a person and a cow. The person is

Krishna or Gopal (a Hindu God) painted typically in blue and depicted with a peacock feather on the back of his head and a flute in his hands. Known as the 'divine cowherd', Gopal is accompanied by his favourite animal: the cow (*gau)*. Looking down from the mountains into the land of India, Gopal's thoughts are enunciated in a speech bubble at the top of the poster *'gau syllable is a symbol of sanctity, greatness and compassion in India. That's why many holy places in India start with the syllable 'gau'* [or go].

This poster essentializes the land of India to the land of Hindus by marking sites of religious significance and by depicting incarnations (*avatars)* of God on this holy land, as follows:

Gopal: is another name for God Krishna,. Known as the divine cowherd, Krishna is accompanied by his favourite animal: the cow (*gau)*
Gaumukh: Ancient temples, where pure water always flows.
Godavari: A river that is sacred to the Hindus and has many temples on its banks.
Govardhan: The hill and surrounding area are believed to be the sites where Krishna and performed specific pastimes during his last incarnation on the Earth.
Gokul: Place where Krishna was brought up.
Gopuram: This is an intricately carved tower at the entrance of South Indian temples, depicting a multitude of themes from Hindu mythology. It is an important feature of Hindu temple architecture.
Gautam: Is the historical founder of Buddhism, and is also worshipped as an avatar of God in Hinduism. In this poster Gautam is depicted by a figure meditating under a banyan tree. This is the famous moment of 'enlightenment', when Gautam became Buddha (or the enlightened one).

All of these places have been carefully chosen so that the names begin with the syllable 'go' or 'gau', which means cow in hindi. Hindus revere the cow as mother and hence provider. The poster posits that the essence of (cow)mother pervades every corner of India, from the mountains in the North (painted in the poster) to the *gopurams* in the south.

The poster constitutes holiness and spirituality of the Hindu Indian land from time immemorial. The notion of ancient and holy land follows from the depiction of India as

the birthplace of Gods like Krishna and of the holy site where Buddha attained enlightenment. Hindu Gods have chosen this land to be incarnated. Therefore Hindus are the natural citizens of this sacred place. Hence, only the religious identity of Hindu is in harmony with the national identity of Indians.

Overall message: India is Hindu, Hindu is India.

Summary Table

Category	**Members**	**Representation**	**Attributes**
In-group	Hindu India	Cow, Gods, Holy sites	Ancient, natural, pure, holy, national

Poster 5

Description

1. Image:

The central image of this poster shows two men forcibly holding down a healthy cow and injuring it.

2. Text:

The text at the top of the poster says '*The constitution has allowed the slaughter of incapacitated animals. Taking advantage of this provision, healthy cattle are maimed with cruel equipments openly, and are then chopped to pieces.'*

3. Graffiti:

'there is still time, come under control', 'or else hindus will also suffer the same fate'

Interpretation:

This poster discredits the Government of India (rival) for facilitating the slaughter of the cattle of the Hindu in-group by various out-groups.

1. Categories:

The central image of this poster shows two men (out-group) forcibly holding down a healthy cow (Hindu in-group) and injuring it. While the figure on the right is clearly Muslim with checked clothes and a scruffy beard, the identity of the other figure looks similar to the American corporate worker from previous posters 3, 4 on p 57, 60 of this thesis. Both of them in partnership forcibly hold down an able-bodied (evident from the text) cow. The man on the right has a mask over his face as he directs an instrument to wound the cow.

2. Category-relations:

The Muslim and the American out-groups hunt the cattle (a symbol of the Hindu in-group) slipping by loopholes of the Government of India, and also by manipulation of the law. And the Government's indifference to the issue is also made clear by the claim that such acts of violence are carried out '*openly'* (a sentiment also expressed in poster no.5).

Of particular interest in this poster is the graffiti scribbled on the right side of the poster. It says *'there is still time, come under control', 'or else hindus will also suffer the same fate'* clearly shows that the association of cow-slaughter with Hindu in-group obliteration is not lost on the targeted audience. The first warning is a bit ambiguous, but if put into the broader concerns and context of Hindu fundamentalism, it can be argued that it is a warning to other Hindus to come in line with the fundamentalists' agenda if they want to escape extermination by the hands of the Muslims.

Overall message of the poster deals with the Government of India's (rival) facilitation of cow torture and slaughter (a Hindu in-group symbol) for the Muslim and American out-group.

Summary Table

Categories	**Members**	**Representation**	**Attributes**
In-group	Hindu Indians	Cow	Helpless

Out-group	Muslim, American	Butchers	Barbaric, shrewd.
Rival	Government of India	Text, constitution	Callous, Traitors
Category Relations			
In-group with out-group	The Hindu in-group is under threat of extermination by the Muslims and American (out-group).		
Out-group with rival	Out-group Muslims and Americans manipulate loopholes in the Government's policy. The Government of India (rival) also watches in silence as the out-group carries out the violence.		
In-group with rival	The Government of India (Rival) does not protect the Hindu in-group and allows for extermination of the in-group openly.		

Poster 6

Description

1. Image:

A person is depicted with an oversized knife slaughtering a cow.

2. Text:

The text at the top of the poster says '*international conspiracy to destroy India's natural food resources'*. The text at the bottom of the poster (below the image of the cow) says 'American Cattle Corporation advising India to slaughter 80% of its cows.' And the one below the sand bag says 'nation-betraying poison'.

3. Graffiti: Writing not legible.

Interpretation:

This poster illustrates the American out-group as polluting the naturalness of the Hindu Indian in-group.

1. Categories:

Posturing belligerently with an over-sized butchers' knife in his hands is a man with '*chemical product'* written across his jacket. The man, therefore, is seen as a representative of the American corporation referred to in the text. The Hindu in-group is represented by the cow on the right side.

2. Category- relations:

This poster depicts a symbolic and realistic threat from the American corporate out-group. The poster achieves in visually creating a dichotomy of natural or pure against unnatural or chemical. Posturing belligerently with an over-size butchers' knife in his hands is a man with '*chemical product'* written across his jacket. The man, therefore, is seen as a representative of the stated corporation, thereby positing the American as toxic waste that contaminates the natural and hence pure food of India. Next to him, on the left side is a bag with the sketch of a maize plant with *'urea'* labeled across it. Beneath the bag of urea is a text that says '*nation-betrayer poison'*.

Overall message: The picture constructs the naturalness and purity of Hindu Indian as being poisoned by chemical additives (out-group). The in-groups' indigenous values are pure and natural which is threatened insidiously and contaminated by the enemy.

Summary Table

Category	**Members**	**Representation**	**Attributes**
In-group	Hindu Indian	Cow, text	Pure, natural, indigenous
Out-group	America	Text, human caricature wielding a sword	Unnatural, Pollutants, Poison
Category relations:			
In-group with out-group	The out-group is poisoning the in-groups' food resources, hence attacking the very sustainability of Hindus.		

Poster 7

Description

1. Image:

The top portion of the poster is painted with saffron, white and green with the blue-spoked wheel in the centre, known as the Ashok chakra – or wheel of law. This constitutes the Indian national flag. In the centre of the poster below the flag is a three lion sculpture, which is the national emblem of India, therefore, also an insignia of governmental authority.

2. Text:

The picture is covered with text all over that together reads '*Before independence, India had 300 slaughterhouses for meat export. In independent India, 36,031 slaughterhouses: large-scale meat export. Everyday 3,50,000 animals are killed cruelly.'*

Interpretation:

This poster compares statistics of abattoirs before and after Indian Independence, indicating with colours and insignia that the Government of India (in-group rival) is responsible for the increase in animal slaughter.

1. Categories:

The Government of India is depicted with the national emblem. This is the political rival. The Hindu in-group is portrayed as helpless animals, and the Muslim out-group is alluded to by the way in which the animals have their necks slit.

2. Category-relations:

Before 1947 (Indian independence), the country was under British rule. The overwhelming message is that the Government of India is worse than the foreign government rule. The image and text taken together seem to imply that 'even the British, in spite of eating beef controlled the number of slaughters. But our own government, which should represent our Hindu value system (of revering the mother-cow) allows for a much larger number of cattle slaughter to take place. The Indian Government is neither a government for the Hindus nor does it stand by Hindu value systems. In short, the government is betraying the Hindus.'

The presence of a Muslim out-group is depicted by the figures of animal heads within the zeroes of the number 3,50,000. It is a typical depiction of Islamic ritual slaughter (also shown in previous poster nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 on p 63, 66, 68, 71 of this thesis), keeping in view also of previous posters that illustrate the cow as a powerful representation of the Hindu in-group.

Overall message: Under the aegis of the Indian government (rival), abattoirs (Out-group sites) are set up to slaughter cows (Hindu in-group).

Summary Table

Categories	**Members**	**Representation**	**Attributes**
In-group	Hindu Indians	Cows	Helpless, innocent
Out-group	Muslim	Halaal cattle	Invisible enemy
Rival	Government of India	National flag, national emblem	Traitors
Category Relations			

Out-group + rival	Rival (Government of India) has helped in expanding the number out-group (Muslim) business of abattoirs.
Out-group and in-group	Muslim (out-group) abattoirs slaughtering cows (symbol of Hindu in-group)
Rival and in-group	Rival (Government of India) does not protect the interest of the Hindu in-group.

Poster 8

Description

1. Image:

The foreground of the poster is a stand with incense sticks and a black dome shape sculpture mounted on a stand and in the background there is a person sitting next to a fire with blood dripping from a slaughtered cow into it.

2. Text:

The text dominating the top right side of the poster is a quote by a Hindu leader *brahmalin pujya swami prabhudutt brahmchari ji maharaj* who warns *'All spiritual/religious activities carried out on the land where even a drop of cow's blood has been shed, becomes fruitless.'*

3. Graffiti: None.

Interpretation

This poster builds the Hindu in-group holiness with various Brahmin Hindu symbols in the foreground and contrasts hostility from an out-group (Muslim) in the upper left corner symbolized by a cow with a slit neck.

1. Categories:

A holy Hindu in-group characterised by various religious insignia and a Muslim out-group symbolized by a cow with a slit neck.

2. Category-relations:

The foreground of the poster is dominated by symbols of Hindu ritual worship. From the right is a stand with incense sticks purifying the air around, which is a requirement in every worship ritual. Next to it is a black dome shape sculpture mounted on a stand. This is called a shiva linga (literally translates to Shiva's phallus). Ash-smeared three lines with a saffron dot and flowers over it, this object is worshipped by Hindus as the manifestation of Shiva (The destroyer in Hindu mythology). Next to Shiva's dome shape sculpture mounted on a stand is a Brahmin priest, with his hands positioned in the way of chanting mantras. The identity of the Brahmin priest is made evident by the saffron colour robes, a smear of saffron on his forehead, and a shaved head with a small portion of hair left. The Brahmin in the Hindu caste system (social order) stands at the highest level, and has the sole discretion of reading and interpreting sacred texts. And it is only a Brahmin who can conduct religious ceremonies using the sacrificial fire. Hence, the poster builds the notion of Hindu in-group virtuosity around the characteristics of a Brahmin – who is portrayed as a learned person with dedication to the higher calling of knowledge and spirituality.

At the top left corner of the poster is an illustration of a cow's head with blood dripping down into the holy fire from its slit neck. The slit on the neck of the cow invokes Islamic ritualistic slaughter methods implying that the out-group in this context are Muslim. Thus the Muslim out-group wreaks havoc on religious Hindu activities and also defiles the holy land of the Hindus. And since the very essence of the Hindu group has been portrayed as spiritual/ religious, it in effect means the Muslim out-group is not only

curbing the spiritual growth of the Hindu people, it is eventually destroying the Hindu people themselves.

The overall message of the poster is of a Muslim out-group vitiating the sanctity of the Hindu land and of sacred values.

Summary Table

Category	**Members**	**Representation**	**Attributes**
In-group	Hindu India	Brahmin, sacrificial fire, shiva linga, incense sticks	Scholarly, benign, religious/ spiritual
Out-group	Muslims	Cow with a slit neck	Insidious, defilers.
Category relations:			
In-group with out-group	The Hindu in-group religious/spiritual values are under threat from the Muslim out-group.		

Poster 9

Description

1. Image:

The poster depicts a cow having its gut pulled out by a man holding a blood-stained knife in one hand and the cow's internal organs in the other.

2. Text:

The text at the top of the poster says *'before taking the life of the animal, it's stomach is slit open and filled with air… and then is skinned alive'.*

3. Graffiti: There is a lot of scribbling on the man's face and arms.

Interpretation:

The poster illustrates a cow (symbol of the Hindu in-group) having its gut pulled out by a man (out-group) holding a blood-stained knife in one hand and the cow's internal organs in the other.

1. Categories:

The figure of the perpetrator is of a man dressed in white pants and shirt, possibly an American corporate worker (as illustrated in previous posters 3, 4, 11 on p 57, 60, 79). The Hindu in-group symbolized by the helpless cow.

2. Category-relations:

The cow is put through an agonizing process as the man rips apart the stomach and pulls the internal organs out. The unmistakable grin on the (out-group) man's face contrasts sharply with the nearly lifeless body of the cow (Hindu), depicted with its tongue hanging out. The visual is reinforced by the text in bold blue font, that the animal has been kept alive, through this barbaric process, *'before taking the life of the animal, it's stomach is slit open and filled with air… and then is skinned alive'*.

The overall message is incontrovertible: the out-group enjoys torturing the (Hindu in-group).

Summary Table

Categories	**Members**	**Representation**	**Attributes**
In-group	Hindu Indians	Cow	Helpless
Out-group	Corporate American	Butcher	Sadistic, killers
Category Relations			
In-group with out-group	The out-group takes sadistic pleasure in a long drawn-out torture of the cow (Hindu in-group) before killing it.		

Poster 10

Description

1. Image:

This poster depicts a conversation between a father and son over a shackled and upturned cow with a lacerated neck.

2. Text:

The figure on the left says, "*Father, if it's really necessary to slaughter her, please speed it up. Look, how the poor thing is writhing in pain. I feel… her (cow) pain."*

The figure on the right says, *"Fool, stop talking like a kaafir* [infidel]. *If I do not torture her before I kill her, then according to Islam, her meat would become haraam* [forbidden] *instead of halaal* [permissible]*."*

3. **Graffiti:**

'Mother-fucker' written over the paunch of the figure on the right.

Interpretation:

This poster depicts a conversation between a Muslim (out-group) father and son over a shackled and upturned cow with a lacerated neck (symbolically the Hindu in-group, attacked by the Muslim out-group).

1. Categories:

The relationship between the two characters is made clear from the conversation; the figure on the left refers to the figure on the right as *'abba'* [which means father in Urdu – the language spoken by Indian Muslims]. The Muslim identity of both the characters is also evident from firstly, the stereotypical checked clothes and secondly, by the scruffy beard and skull-cap worn by the father (illustrated in posters - 5, 8, 11, 16 of p 63, 71, 79, 93), and thirdly, by the depiction of Islamic ritual slaughter of the cow.

The portrayal of the cow as a part of the Hindu in-group, has been depicted in all the other posters.

2. Category-relations:

The father is a heavyset figure with a protuberant stomach, brandishing a blood-stained oversize knife in one hand, and pointing a finger towards his son with the other hand. In contrast to the father's physically gross image, the son has a rather slim body and something akin to concern on his face as he pleads '*father, if it's really necessary to slaughter her, then please speed it up. Look, how the poor thing is writhing in pain. I can feel her pain.'* The *'her'* refers to the shackled cow lying in a pool of blood, an image of helplessness, awaiting its death slowly and painfully. The father answers '*Fool, stop talking like a kaafir* [infidel]. *If I do not torture her before I kill her, then according to Islam, her meat would become haraam* [forbidden] *instead of halaal* [permissible]*'.*

This poster attempts to posit a nuanced depiction of Muslims, while showing that violence is inherent in Islam and consequently, its followers as inherently depraved. Even if a Muslim child does have a bit of innocence left in him, the religion itself will force him into violence. The poster insinuates that as per the diktats of Islam, the youngster

must grow up to torture and slaughter cows, hence against the Hindus. The demands of the religion are such that one cannot be a good Muslim and be compassionate at the same time, to be a good Muslim one must necessarily take on violence to be true to the faith. The poster also establishes an image of an unrestrained appetite for violence and meat of an adult Muslim male, visually through gross caricatures of physical features.

Overall message: Even if certain Muslims are concerned, the category norms itself violates the Hindu in-group. The Muslim out-group follows a violent religion whose values violate Hindu values. They will torture and slaughter cows as part of their religious beliefs. Hence, Muslims (are) butchers will always viciously attack the Hindu in-group.

Summary Table

Category	**Members**	**Representation**	**Attributes**
In-group	Hindu India	Cow	Bound, helpless
Out-group	Muslims	Butchers	Barbaric, corpulent
Category relations:			
In-group with out-group	The Muslim out-group is inherently opposed to the Hindu in-group.		

Poster 11

Description

1. **Image:**

This poster depicts an Indian king from the past protecting a cow by chopping of the hands of the butcher on the left.

2. **Text:**

The text at the top of the poster says '*cow-killer' deserves to be slain*. The text next to the coy says '*brave founder of the Hindu kingdom, who chopped off the hand of the cow-murderer butcher.*

3. **Graffiti:** None.

Interpretation:

This poster celebrates a Hindu king (Shivaji) from the past, depicting his power in full glory by chopping the hands of the evil Muslim butcher (out-group).

1. Categories:

The figure on the right is a handsome, aesthetically proportioned, muscular man dressed in a king's attire. He is described as Shivaji in the text, and hailed as the '*brave founder of the Hindu kingdom, who chopped off the hand of the cow-murderer butcher'*. Shivaji is a historical figure who organized resistance against the Mughal empire in India in the early 15th century. The butcher on the right is clearly Muslim, identified by the typical checked clothes, a scruffy beard and skull-cap on his head. The Hindu in-group is denoted by a cow in the background shielded by Shivaji.

2. Category-relations:

A helpless Hindu cow who would have been subjected to a torturous death by the evil Muslim butcher's knife is saved by Shivaji's bravery, whilst the butcher himself (Muslim out-group) as the multi-coloured headline suggests, gets what he deserves: '*cow-killer deserves to be slain'*.

According to the discourse, the Muslim asks for the violence. He incurs the wrath of the Hindus by the religion he follows and also by his choice of undertaking a violent profession. He has the audacity to slaughter cows in Hindu land. In case the audience forgets the target of the butcher's act, the text qualifies the term *butcher* with the violence of *murder* of the *cow.* The Muslim out-group has butchered 'our' (Hindu) cows. In return, the brave Shivaji punished the Muslim by chopping his hands.

This is the poster that depicts the Hindu in an act of violence. As opposed to the cruelty of the Muslims, the Hindu act of violence is '*brave'* and courageous. It is in defence of the weak (cow) that the ancient Hindu king takes up his sword hence the act of violence is actually an act of virtue. Therefore the past is posited as the 'ideal' time when Hindu pride was at its zenith, as opposed to the present 'actual' time when their own elected representatives denigrate Hindus. Analytically, these are the rival Indian politicians (see posters 1, 3, 5, 7 on p 50, 57, 63, 68 of this thesis)

The poster also attempts to present a fraught vision of the future, hinting at who, what and how a true leader of the Hindu in-group should be. Hence, in the present context, the present day Shivaji/s are the Hindutva representatives: the true leaders of the Hindu in-group who are virtuous and brave enough to resort to violent measures against the out-groups that threaten the sacred values of the in-group.

The overall message: Hindu tolerance is replaced with Hindu courage: of being intolerant of intolerance. This poster seeks to legitimise violence against the out-group (Muslim), in a way that turns the act of violence into an act of virtue.

Summary Table

Categories	**Members**	**Representation**	**Attributes**
In-group	Hindu Indians	Cow, Shivaji	Cow: helpless but protected. Shivaji: Brave, fearless, virtuous, true leader of the Hindus.
Out-group	Muslim	Butcher	Corpulent and Guilty.
Rival	Indian politicians	From previous posters	Coward
Category Relations			
In-group with out-group	The Hindu in-group finally emerges courageous, and strikes back the evil Muslim out-group, protecting its cow(mother).		
In-group with rival	The true leader of the Hindu in-group is projected as Shivaji. Only someone like Shivaji will do, other leaders are neutralized.		

Poster 12

Description

1. Image:

This poster also has a pastiche of the Indian flag colours (refer to Posters 1 and 7, on p 50, 68 of this thesis). In the centre is the depiction of an Indian Rupee coin, juxtaposed on a cow and a knife pierces through this amalgamation of the cow and the coin, with a smatter of blood.

2. Text:

The central text in black, blue and pink is, *'Murder of cattle is the murder of the country's finances'*. The smaller text in green is, '*As the murder of cattle increased, simultaneously increased India's poverty, expenses and debts. India is the highest debt-ridden country in the world.'*

3. Graffiti:

None.

Interpretation:

This poster characterizes a symbolic threat of cow-slaughter with a realistic threat of depletion of economic wealth of the country. In this poster the main text in bold reads *'Murder of cattle is the murder of the country's finances'.*

1. Categories:

The text is graphically represented in the centre of the poster by a knife that goes through a cow and the Indian rupee coin. The blood signifies the depletion of the country's wealth as intimately linked with the murder of cattle. This is also explained in the small print text below '*As the murder of cattle increased, simultaneously increased India's poverty, expenses and debts. India is the highest debt-ridden country in the world.'* The background colours of the poster represent the Indian national flag colours of saffron, white and green.

2. Category-relations:

The cow is equated with the economic wealth and financial resource of India in this poster. Hence, the Hindu Indian in-group is under financial threat. The enemy is annihilating the sacred symbol of Hindus: the cow. And this has very real effects on the economic and financial stability of the country.

Summary Table

Categories	**Members**	**Symbols**	**Attributes**
In-group	Hindu India	Cow, national flag	Natural resource, vulnerable under threat of annihilation
Out-group	Unspecified	Blood-soaked sword	Dangerous
Category relations			
In-group with out-group	The Hindu Indian in-group is under threat from an unspecified out-group, which slaughters cows and hence depletes India of		

	its economic and financial resources.

Poster 13

Description

1. Image:

The right side of the poster depicts two Muslim (the analysis is given in the next section) figures slicing the neck of a cow. The left side of the picture is dominated by the picture of a Hindu God (Krishna) feeding a cow within the map of India.

2. Text:

The larger text in blue is, *"In the country of Gopal…."*

The smaller text in black, which is in speech form from the Muslim figure sitting on top of the cow to the Muslim figure slitting the cow's neck, "*Miyaan, she's the mother of the Hindus… with love*"

3. Graffiti:

The two Muslim figures have '*mother-fucker'* scribbled across their arms.

Interpretation:

This poster contrasts Muslims, sadistically butchering a cow (and hence Hinduism) in the foreground, to the Hindu value of nurturing of cows, in the background.

1. Categories:

The right foreground is dominated by two figures, one sitting on a cow, the other slitting its neck. The cow's blood flows into the ground and the killers sit in it. Their Muslim identity is made clear, first, by their stereotypic dress (checked clothes, vests and cap); second, by the amulet on the arm of the butchering figure; third by the fact that the form of killing mimics Islamic ritualistic slaughter; fourthly, and most explicitly, that the sitting figure addresses the other as '*Miyaan*', a term used for Muslims.

The full text of what he says is '"*Miyaan, she's the mother of the Hindus… with love*". Both figures are smiling as he speaks and as the butchery is conducted. The killing, therefore, is portrayed as an attack on Hinduism and the killers are portrayed as sadists who take clear pleasure in what they are doing. The sketch portrays the characters as corpulent and physically gross.

The left of the picture, further in the background, shows a cowherd feeding a cow from his hand. The cowherd is portrayed as the God Krishna, identified typically with a peacock feather on the back of his head and a flute in his hand. He is sketched as an attractive, slim and muscled figure. He is solicitous and nurturant towards the cow. This cow has been Hinduized further by two things in particular, saffron smeared across its head, and by its saffron garland.

2. Category relations:

This poster represents the in-group and out-group relations as fundamentally nihilistic to each other's existence. This relation is represented by the difference in the way cows are treated by the two communities. The cow that is nurtured by the Hindu god himself has a saffron garland of flowers around it's neck, in contrast, the cow in the hands of the Muslim butchers has it's neck slit with two Muslim butchers overpowering the hapless creature. This is symbolic of not just irreconcilable differences between the two

communities but also, shows that violence that leads to annihilation is an inherent characteristic of this inter-group relation.

The profound violation of Hindu ways of life and the threat to Hindu existence that is happening within (Hindu) India – is made explicit by the title at top right: "In the country of Gopal…." (Gopal being another name for Krishna).

Summary Table

Category	**Members**	**Representation**	**Attributes**
In-group	Hindu India	Cow, map of India, Krishna	Peaceful, sacred, nurturant, vulnerable
Out-group	Muslims	Butchers, killers	Murderous, sadistic, venal, threatening
Category relations:			
In-group with out-group	(Hindu) India is violated by Muslims and the very existence of the category is under threat.		

Poster 14

Description

1. Image:

In the centre of the poster are two figures, one sitting on a throne and the other standing in front of him, interacting in a clearly imbalanced relationship of power.

2. Text:

The text at the top of the poster in blue says *'to fight an election, one pot of milk from your cowshed will not do. A suitcase full of notes is required. And that I cannot get from you, I will get it only from slaughterhouses… so…'*. The text at the bottom of the poster says '*the government has given the green signal to major mechanized slaughterhouses in the country.'*

3. Graffiti: None.

Interpretation:

This poster delineates a money-power nexus between the corporate Muslim out-group and Indian politician (rival) against a poor Hindu farmer (in-group).

1. Categories:

In the centre of the poster are two figures, one sitting on a throne and the other standing in front of him, interacting in a clearly imbalanced relationship of power. The person on the throne is an Indian politician, identified by the dress code of white dhoti, kurta and a Nehru cap (so-named because of Jawaharlal Nehru - the first Indian prime minister's – affinity for this kind of cap). The text at the top of the poster is the politician accusing the farmer, saying *'to fight an election, one pot of milk from your cowshed will not do. A suitcase full of notes is required. And that I cannot get from you, I will get it only from slaughterhouses… so…'*. His other hand rests on a black suitcase, presumably full of notes. This suitcase has Al-Kabeer (an Arab Multinational corporation with abattoirs based in India), and has footsteps leading from it to a figure in the distance, sketched like a Muslim wearing checked clothes. The message is visually clear: the money in the suitcase is from Al-kabeer, funded by Muslims. Hence, the Muslim out-group is ruthless in its pursuit and will employ unethical means (money) to justify the end (slaughter of cows.)

The person shaking in front of this politician is a Hindu as illustrated by the dress code in poster 8 and by the green field behind him. The poverty of the farmer is made evident by his attire of just a dhoti around his waist, and by the politician's reply to the farmer's gesture of offering him a pot of milk.

The indictment of the Government supporting slaughter of cows is concluded in the text at the bottom of the: '*the government has given the green signal to major mechanized slaughterhouses in the country.'*

2. Category relations:

The corrupt Government would have the rich Muslims blood money of cattle rather than the poor Hindu farmer's humble offering of a pot of milk. Hence money (Arab out-group)

and power (Government of India - rival) join hands to work against poor hardworking farmers (the Hindu in-group). The primary message of this poster is to discredit the government of India as true representatives of Hindus. Bribed by the rich Muslim out-group, the government of India is represented by a greedy spineless politician who is ready to put the cow symbolically and realistically the Hindu farmers to the slaughter for money.

The overall message of the poster: The government has sold its morals to the Muslim out-group and now stands against the Hindu in-group.

Summary Table

Categories	**Members**	**Representation**	**Attributes**
In-group	Hindu Indians	Farmer	Poor, worried, betrayed
Out-group	Arab corporate, Muslim	Butcher, Al-kabeer suitcase of money	Shrewd, moneyed, powerful, ruthless
Rival	Government of India	Politician, text	Unscrupulous, Traitors
Category Relations			
In-group with rival	The government of India (rival) is against the Hindu (in-group.)		
Out-group with rival	The Muslims (out-group) and the Government of India (rival) share a diabolical relationship of money and power.		
Out-group + rival with In-group	The government of India (rival) facilitates the attack of the Muslim (out-group) against the Hindu (in-group).		

Poster 15

Description

1. Image:

A cow with one leg manacled to a pulley, struggling to escape scalding water.

2. Text:

The bold text in pink at the bottom of the poster reads, '*Before being killed, animals are',* which is followed by the text in blue, '*Tortured'*

The text painted in black, '*Thirsty, hungry & nearly dead animal is thrashed and dragged to the machine. The animal is beaten up incessantly with one leg shackled to the pulley. Then, boiling water is unleashed so that its blood spreads quickly in the body and softens the skin'.*

3. Graffiti: None.

Interpretation:

The process of torture that a cow (Hindu in-group) is subjected to inside a slaughterhouse (the out-group) is depicted in this poster.

1. Categories:

The single picture is of a cow with one leg chained to the pulley, struggling to escape scalding hot water. This is described in the text painted in black, '*The thirsty, hungry & nearly dead cow is thrashed and dragged to the machine. The animal is beaten up incessantly with one leg shackled to the pulley. Then, boiling water is unleashed onto the cow, so that its blood spreads quickly in the body and softens the skin'.*

The poster features an unspecified out-group that tortures the Hindu in-group. However, by a cross-reference to the other posters, it can be reasonably said that since the site of violence is an abattoir, the out-group would either be a Muslim corporate, as depicted in posters 10, 15 (p. 76, 91 of this thesis) or an American corporate in posters 3, 4 (p. 57, 60 of this thesis) operating independently or either of them under the aegis of the Indian Government (posters 9,10,13).

2. Category relations:

The purpose of the text is perhaps to show that the out-group applies imagination in its scheme to torture the living symbol (cow) of the Hindu in-group, while the use of mechanized slaughterhouses speaks of a systematic and ordered process of persecution.

Summary Table

Category	**Members**	**Representation**	**Attributes**
In-group	Hindu India	Cow	Shackled, helpless
Out-group(s)	Unspecified	Machine in a slaughterhouse	Ambiguous
Category relations:			
In-group with out-group	The out-groups systematically persecute the Hindu in-group.		

Poster 16

Description

1. **Image:**

This poster is set inside a slaughterhouse with rows of cows hanging upside down with blood trickling down from their necks.

2. **Text:**

The text at the top of the poster says '*After this, the pulley moves up and the animal hangs down on one leg. The butcher slits the jugular vein of the cow hanging upside down, so that the animal does not die and it's blood drips down slowly.'* The text on the right side of the poster says '*Al-Kabeer, Deonar, slaughterhouses collect thousands of litres of blood everyday.'* The text at the bottom of the poster says '*For votes you make policies in favour of cow-killers, oh evil government, you shed cow's blood…'*

3. **Graffiti:** Scribbled at the side, illegible

Interpretation:

This poster is set inside a slaughterhouse with rows of cows (Hindu in-group) hanging upside down, run by the Muslim (out-group) and the Government of India (rival).

Categories & Category-relations:

The poster visually depicts a row of lacerated cows with blood dripping from their necks. The text at the top of the poster shows that this is a continuation of the narrative started in the previous poster. '*After this, the pulley moves up and the animal hangs down on one leg. The butcher slits the jugular vein of the cow hanging upside down, so that the animal does not die and it's blood drips down slowly.'* Lest, one thinks of the process as mechanical and clinical with no human intervention, the text makes sure to place the blame on human agency: a butcher slitting the jugular veins of the cows, thereby identifying the butcher clearly as Muslim (explicitly illustrated as Islamic ritual slaughter in posters 5, 6, 8 (p. 63, 66, 71 of this thesis).

The text on the right side of the poster positions and describes the site of violence in the abattoirs of '*Al-Kabeer, Deonar, slaughterhouses collect thousands of litres of blood everyday.'* Al-kabeer is an Arab multi national corporation dealing in frozen food, and it has an abattoir near Hyderabad, India. Deonar abattoir is situated near Bombay (now called Mumbai) and is run by the Municipal Corporation of Bombay (a governmental authority). The Muslim out-group is inside our Hindu country, running their abattoirs and slaughtering our cows, but the real villain in this piece is the Government of India, emphasized upon in the text at the bottom of the poster '*For votes you make policies in favour of cow-killers, oh evil government, you shed cow's blood…'.* The cow has already been shown to be a powerful representation of the Hindu in-group. In this context, the Government of India is responsible for enabling the Muslim out-group to set up dedicated sites of violence that slaughter cows and bleed the Hindu in-group. The portrayal of the government is of power hungry representatives who are bleeding their own people, for the sake of votes from the Muslims. It also puts across the deviousness and unethical characteristic of a government that will stoop to any level to hold on to power. In one stroke, the Government is also stripped of any future credibility since its adherence is to power and not to the Hindu in-group. Hence, it follows that to keep this power or votes

the Government is more concerned about the out-group, rather than the Hindu in-group: the category that the Government should truly represent.

Overall message: The Muslim out-group is a direct threat to the Hindu (in-group) by slaughtering our cows. The real culprit also is the Government of India (rival) for aiding and abetting in the crime.

Summary Table

Category	**Members**	**Representation**	**Attributes**
In-group	Hindu India	Lacerated cows.	Shackled, helpless, tortured, annihilated.
Out-group	Corporate sector: Muslims	Names of the abattoirs and description of cow-slaughter in the text.	Barbaric, violent, Butchers.
Rival	Government of India	In the text	Evil, power-hungry, traitor.
Category relations:			
In-group with rival	The Government puts power as its primary concern, even before the Hindu in-group. Hence the rival is not a true representative of the Hindu in-group.		
Out-group + rival	The Government of India befriends the enemy (Muslim out-group) for votes.		
Out-group +rival against In-group	A mutual cooperation exists between the rival (Government of India) and the out-group (Muslim) to bleed the Hindu in-group.		

2.5 Overall Narrative

Qualitative analysis is an interpretative and iterative process (Augoustinous, Lecouter, & Soyland, 2002; Mays & Pope, 1995; Ormston et al., 2013; Polkinghorne, 2005; Silverman, 2005). In the process of analysing each poster individually, and further cross-referencing across the posters for depth of analysis in terms of recurring images, reinforcement of the attributes of these various categories, and the nuances of the relationships of these categories, the researcher noted a distinctive narrative pattern emerging guided by previous research on hate mobilisation.

2.5.1 Model of Hate

For a brief recap of the steps presented in the model on hate mobilisation: the authors (including the researcher) "*present an integrative five-step social identity model that details the processes through which inhumane acts against other groups can come to be celebrated as right. The five steps are: (i) Identification, the construction of an ingroup; (ii) Exclusion, the definition of targets as external to the ingroup; (iii) Threat, the representation of these targets as endangering ingroup identity; (iv) Virtue, the championing of the ingroup as (uniquely) good; and (v) Celebration, embracing the eradication of the outgroup as necessary to the defence of virtue*" (Reicher et al., 2008).

The model is a general framework for a narrative sequence, and it allows for reconfiguration in the elements of the process, as sets of inter-group relations. All the elements come together in one particular poster, in the set that we have analysed, where there is clear evidence of the incitement, indeed, *celebration* of violence. This is brought together in the analytic framework of the 5 step model of hate, rearranged in a sequence that builds up to the poster that brings together the elements of the narrative to one 'climactic', if you will, conclusion. For example, it is possible to construct the narrative of the 5-step model of hate, mutatis mutandis, by just 7 posters in the following sequential visual presentation:



Ingroup identification & virtue

Ingroup virtue, Outgroup Exclusion

In-group Virtue,
Outgroup Threat

Ingroup Virtue,
Outgroup Threat

Ingroup Virtue,
Outgroup Threat

Ingroup Virtue,
Outgroup Threat

Celebration

There are three points to be made about the decision to analyse the posters in the way they occur rather than attempt to fit the posters to the model:

Firstly, the '5 step model of collective hate' was developed by analysing political speeches, i.e., a qualitatively different mode of communication than posters. Therefore, while a literal transposition of the steps is untenable since the mode is different, in a visual mode of the narrative, conceivably some posters would comprise more than one of the steps in each of the individual posters. This is a point that might be misconstrued is the occurrence of the 5 steps in a linear and sequential fashion in the way it is analytically presented, i.e, a mirror transposition of the analytic categories and steps onto the way it would be presented in public discourse.

Secondly, in the light of the social identity framework, this would be a misguided way of looking at the analytic claim of distinction of the 'steps' in the model for a substantive claim. In other words, and it would defeat the contention of what we state in the introduction to the thesis, that these are not a) automatic processes that people engage, b)

the contents of the categories are argued, debated and presented in particular ways in public discourse (Billig, 1985, 1987, 1988, 2003), and, therefore the ways in which *category definitions* are presented and argued about would also necessarily be nuanced, creative, and would be done in a multitude of ways (Elcheroth & Reicher, 2014; Herrera & Reicher, 1998; S Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b) . The model would be stilted and at odds with the meta-theory of the social identity framework that argues about the 'creativity' of the *entrepreneurs* and the followers in building a shared social identity (Haslam & Reicher, 2006; Reicher, Haslam, & Smith, 2012), if the steps are understood to be occurring sequentially in the socio-political public discourse per se.

Therefore, it is important to contend that the *culmination* of the elements of in-group virtue and out-group threat constructed in a way that would lead to a diabolical conclusion of killing is implied by the presence of these elements in the discourse, and need not necessarily occur as a conclusion in a neat narrative.

Thirdly, as an evolving process, this study as has been analysed in the individual posters through the process of iteration, has introduced a further category of analysis – the political rivals. The narrative of virtuous violence presents one part of the larger argument with an evolution in the model for the potential of leadership tussles (i.e, the intra-group dynamics and inter-group violence).

2.5.2 Placing the model of hate in inter-group dynamics & intra-group struggles

The interesting consequence of analysing the posters in the sequence as they occurred was in being able to place the model of hate in a larger framework of group processes, that made use of the celebration of violence as an important outcome of the narrative build-up. We see the dynamic of leadership tussles in the emergence of another analytic category in the form of a political rival. By considering these group processes in describing the larger picture the overall analytic story thus is presented in the following pattern:

1. Inter-group dynamics
    a. In-group definitions and character

b. Out-group definitions and character
c. Relationship between the in-group and the out-groups

2. Intra-group struggles
   a. Political rivals

1. Inter-group dynamics:

In this section, firstly we present an analysis of the in-group character and representation of Hindu India in the posters. Secondly we look at the different characterization and representation of the out-group. And thirdly, we build up from the first two sections, an analysis of the relationship constructed between the groups.

a. In-group definitions and character:

Constituting the in-group virtue:

Though only one poster in the series is devoted entirely to painting the virtues and sacredness of the land of India, (poster 4, p 60 of this thesis) and thereby the inhabitants of this land as Hindu, the rest of the posters also contain elements of this fundamental virtuosity of the in-group. The virtue of the "sacred geography" (Markowitz, 1996) of the land is woven together with the religious demarcation of the Hindu in-group. In every poster, wherever the Hindu human figure is represented, special attention is given to the features of the face. The figure is conspicuous in its aesthetic appeal as opposed to the other figures in the poster. This positive self-image of tolerance and compassion resonates with the idea of Hindus as an essentially peace-loving group of people. The symbol used to represent the innocence and sacredness of the hindu in-group is predominantly the cow. The sacredness of the cow and the elevation of this sacredness as a central tenet of the Hindutva rhetoric has been explored by scholars across disciplines (Freitag, 1980; Jones, 2006; Kakar & Kakar, 2007; Kakar, 1996; Pandey, 2001, 2006c; Puniyani, 2005; Uberoi, 2002).

b. Out-group definitions and character:

The boundaries of the in-group, demarcates every other group that does not fit within the ambit of Hindu values, as an out-group. Theoretically then, there can be

multiple out-groups. In this series, there are 13 posters with a specified out-group threat. 5 posters depict the Muslims as a religious out-group, 4 posters depict the Arab corporate sector backed by Muslims and 3 posters implicate the corporate sector backed by Americans.

Table:

Nature of poster	Quantity	Poster serial numbers
Threat discourse	**15**	(1-3, 5-16)
• Unspecified (either out-group or rival)	**2**	(12, 15)
• Out-group presence	**13**	(1-3, 5-11, 13,14,16)
• Only Muslims ▪ Butcher ▪ Arab corporate	**9** **5** **4**	(1,3,7,8,10,11,13,14,16) (3,8,10,11,13) (1,7,14,16)
• Only American corporate	**3**	(2,6,9)
• Double out-group threat (American corporate + Muslim butcher)	**1**	(5)

The out-group varies, but the overwhelming presence is of the Muslim. Out of the 13 posters portraying out-group presence, 9 depict Muslims either as butchers or as Arab corporates. Given the persistence of the cow image in all the posters, the other religious out-group is Christian (Americans). Just by numbers as well, (9 out of 16 posters) the figure of the Muslim out-group dominates the discourse of threat. Characterized mostly as a butcher (6 out of 10 posters), the figure is unsavoury and pot-bellied, depicting the image of a Muslim butcher wearing a *checked lungi (*a cloth wrapped around the waist) and a soiled vest is in sync with the idea of the unhygienic Muslim "other" – of people who by virtue of religious dictums do not wash themselves frequently enough, in Hindu popular imagination.

c. Inter-group relations:

Threat discourse:

In a country as large as India with a predominantly Hindu population, it takes considerable skill to craft this majority as victims of oppression, almost under a threat of extinction. In this series of pictorial representations, 15 out of 16 posters are devoted to threat discourse in some way or the other. One message that is central to the overall narrative in these posters is of Hindu India under threat from various out-groups. The severity of the threat ranges from an attack on sacred values right up to annihilation of Hindus. Virtuous, non-violent Hindus are portrayed as victims of the salacious out-groups (primarily the religious out-group of Muslims).

The significance of the cow:

Sudhir Kakar, a psychoanalyst who has studied Hindu-Muslim group relations in the context of riots in India, illustrates the narrative surrounding the cow as a symbol in Hindu-Muslim riots, "There is thus an *unarticulated expectation* that an incident around a cow, should belong to the account of a Hindu-Muslim riot even if such an incident did not actually take place*"* (Kakar, 1996, p 44). In the present series of posters, this *unarticulated expectation* is built into all 16 of the posters. The symbol used to denote the in-group in the posters is the cow. In terms of religious significance, the cow is important to both the religious groups, in antagonistically different ways. While the Hindus revere the cow as 'mother', the Muslims perform ritual sacrifices of the cow to purify the meat. To enumerate the significance, quantitatively, the cow is painted in 15 out of the 16 posters, and is still referred to in poster 14, p. 88 without the figure. As a symbol of the in-group, the cow is portrayed as an innocent soul, and as one that was protected and loved by the Hindu God, Krishna (depicted by the figure playing a flute), represented in Hindu mythology as the divine cowherd. Perhaps the most important of all, is the image of the 'mother' - loving, caring and feeding its children, the depiction of gau-mata (mata = mother; gau = cow). One poster that deals with constituting in-group virtues constructs and builds the relationship among all things sacred in the land of India. The name of every sacred place starts with the prefix of "gau" in Hindi (poster no. 4), indeed the "very essence of India" is "gau".

In popular parlance, the cow is the centre around which Hindu-Muslim hostilities are deemed inevitable, sometimes joked about as the divide between cow-worshippers versus beefeaters.

Virtuous Violence:

The poster that exhorts violence against the out-group is a poster where the elements of in-group virtuosity, out-group threat and Hindu leadership are marshalled towards the message of violence in the name of virtue. Poster 11 on p 79 of this thesis portrays Shivaji (Historically, a symbol of Hindu resistance against Muslim dominance) chopping off the hands of a Muslim butcher, while defending the life of the cow. The Hindu, otherwise depicted as a victim of unscrupulous elements, sometimes with an expression of fear on his face or of an inherently moral and upright farmer looking the other way, but mostly as a cow subjected to all sorts of brutal torture in the other posters; is portrayed as a powerful King capable of defending his people by taking violent and extreme measures against the offending out-group in this poster. The alternative interpretation in representing the Hindu as tolerant and suffering figure is of cowardice. Is the Hindu suffering because of the value of tolerance, or is it because of cowardice? This poster of self-defence (poster no. 11) forcefully addresses the concern, symbolically it's a call to Hindu "pride" – to men to take up swords against Muslims, in defence of the motherland. Arguably, the very nature of this poster signifies a critical moment of transformation in the way the Hindu is visualised and exhorted to take action.

2. **Intra-group struggles: political rivals** A finer analysis revealed people in the audience differentiating among religious out-groups and representatives in the Government. The graffiti on one of the posters clearly indicts the present Government with 'Do you still feel Manmohan is right for us?' (Manmohan Singh is the present Prime Minister of India, from the rival Congress party). This led to a re-think of the first stance of a simple dichotomy of in-group versus the out-group. A discerning version of groups came about in the subsequent rounds of analysis with the political rival emerging as a third distinctive category. This was integrated into the theoretical framework of understanding 'violence in the name of virtue', as an intra-group (since the entrepreneurs aim to mobilize the same mass of people) dynamic of leadership

struggles within the framework of inter-group conflicts (in-group versus the out-groups), thereby synthesizing the approach of studying inter-group conflicts as an epiphenomenon of intra-group dynamics. Within the representation of inter-group antagonism, primarily of the Muslim "other" against the Hindu in-group, there is a prominent presence of the Government of India in 6 out of 15 threat discourse posters.

Nature of Poster	Quantity	Poster serial numbers
Threat discourse	15	(1-3, 5-16)
Unspecified threat (either out-group or rival)	2	(12,15)
Only out-group threat	7	(2,6,8,9,10,11,13)
Only rival threat	0	----
Out-group + Rival threat	6	(1,3,5,7,14,16)

Tying into the notion of threat is the government's role in not protecting the Hindu nation, indeed, sometimes colluding with the enemy against Hindus. The discourse seeks to render the government corrupt and devoid of moral values, on the lookout only for its own interests and money. The government is carved out as a separate entity, represented by politicians (explicitly in two posters, nos 1 and 14), and symbolized by the national flag and the national emblem (in posters 1,), and referred to in the text. One poster (no. 14) in particular, shows a politician with a suitcase of money backed by Muslim corporate sector conniving an innocent Hindu farmer. The cunning politician is pictured stating explicitly that meat (of the cow) keeps them in power, not milk, while the poor suffering farmer is shown offering a pot of milk.

The Government is portrayed as a traitor to Hindu Indians in primarily 2 ways: Firstly, by running slaughterhouses and by helping the out-group (Muslim Arabs) set-up abattoirs on Indian soil. Secondly, by passing policies in favour of the Muslim out-group, the Indian government colludes with the enemy.

In all of 6 posters, the government of India is painted as an agent of the Muslim out-groups instead of representing the Hindu in-group.

Rival	6
Facilitates in setting up abattoirs	4
Policies in favour of the out-groups	2

2.6 Discussion & Conclusion

The model that we explored in this study presents several threads for consideration. The following points summarize the key findings:

- The definition of the national in-group as religious
- The positing of in-group virtue – as only the in-group's prerogative.
- The out-group(s) threat of annihilating the in-group: The out-groups do vary, though primarily it is the Muslim.
- Legitimising violence against the Muslims and Christians as self-preservation of the Hindu Indian in-group.
- The in-group rivals (generally the political class, and specifically the political class in power – the Government) shown as colluding with the out-group in annihilation of the in-group.

In a country like India that promotes democratic ideals which has been adopted as a common ideal through constitutional provisions, in general, it could be argued that it is a tricky proposition to call for outright violence against even threatening outgroups. Indeed, Sections 295A[17] and 153A[18] of the Indian Penal Code deal with the matter of inciting hatred and violence "by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious

[17] 295A. Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs. Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of [citizens of India], [by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise], insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 4[three years], or with fine, or with both.

[18] 153A. Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.

beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment" (Central Government Act, 1860). With such Acts in place, it is conceivable that to call for violence must be seen as a 'justifiable' act of self-defence. The ambiguity built in visual work can lend itself to various interpretations and sometimes, can be used as substitutes for language that cannot be employed because of various societal and political constraints (Billig, 2001; Hakam, 2009; Kjeldsen, 2007, 2015). While, that sort of constraint may or may not be a matter of concern for the cartoonists in this tent, sometimes, the posters do not have much to do with 'substituting language' as much as complementing the visual with the text. Hence, sometimes they are just slogans or headlines accompanied by an image, with more text as footnotes to describe what exactly the Hindutva movement wants to convey to the targeted Hindu audience.

Furthermore, one of the interesting results of using "thick description" (Kjeldsen, 2014; Ponterotto & Grieger, 2007) as a method in combination with the theoretical guideline of scrutinising for all category constructs and category relations in the individual posters, was the finding of the political rival as an additional analytic category. Specifically, we found that the relationship that is constructed between the rival and the various out-groups gives a background to the argument of why the model of hate becomes effective in the political logic of the struggle for leadership. In a sense, while the model of hate conceivably spells out the 'how' of the mobilisation based on hate, the leadership tussle might indicate part of the 'why'.

2.7 Limitations

A set of 16 posters drawn from a specific context of the Magh Mela is limited in the generalizability of the findings across the country of India. However, it is evident that the set of posters encourage the audience – which would be pre-dominantly Hindu given the area where it was set up, to think of themselves as victims of Muslim aggression. This is made clear by the graffiti as a level of interaction. It is telling in the way the audience receives the particular images. While we can not claim any direct causal impact of the ways in which this particular model of hate might lead to extreme violence, it is a sobering and indeed, unnerving experience to see in 2016, after two years of BJP

Government in power, people of the Christian faith, Muslim faith[19] and Dalits face extreme violence around issues of beef consumption (alleged and otherwise)[20,21].

The strength of the study in using a combination of qualitative approaches like thematic and thick descriptions guided by a framework of critical social identity theories also is a constraint of the study in that, no one way can be simply 'replicated' for other studies.

While it can be contended that what has been provided in the chapter is a robust guideline for analysing hate rhetoric in visual representations, it is doing so, cautiously, in that this illustrates one possible set of category relations and one of the rhetorical pathways to justifying violence against outgroups. As noted, the limitations also extend to the mode of communication, i.e, posters, that we seek to explore in a different modality in the next chapter on a study on political speeches.

19 http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/next-door-to-delhi-mob-kills-50-year-old-injures-son-over-rumours-they-ate-beef/

20 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-17727379

21 http://www.firstpost.com/india/hyderabad-university-suicide-rohith-vemulas-hanging-must-force-us-to-change-campus-politics-2588448.html

3 Study 2: Political Speeches

"It is useful to remember that no matter where we turn, there is rarely any shortage of elevated ideals to accompany the resort to violence." (Chomsky, 2003, p. 41)

3.1 Introduction

Noam Chomsky's book, 'America's quest for global dominance' is a treatise on the manner and style in which American political leaders present their arguments to different audiences in their project towards 'global dominance'. In a variety of ways, Chomsky shows how American leaders recast military intervention in East Timor, Kosovo and Iraq as necessary 'humanitarian aid intervention'(Chomsky, 2003, p. 45). The 'elevated ideals' are communicated in a variety of ways, chiefly through political rhetoric and speeches. If studies on argumentation through visual imagery are few in the social psychological domain, the opposite holds true for studies on political rhetoric.

British social psychological research has a rich resource of the analysis of political rhetoric in category constructions, like the rhetorical constructions of outgroup threat and the different ways in which the sides can be defined (Herrera & Reicher, 1998), the influence of self-categorisation arguments in anti-abortionist rhetoric (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996), the ways in which leaders seek to influence their audience by representing themselves of the group by putting forth particular interpretations of events (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996); the book, 'Self and Nation' that deals extensively with analysing the ways in which leaders' categorise and constitute these categories towards particular agenda (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001); more recently, a blend of the self categorization theory and discursive methods has been used to show the nuanced ways in which political leaders use constructions of national identity to account for their success or failure in mobilising their given electorates (Burns & Stevenson, 2013); and an analysis of political speeches in Scottish Parliament mobilising for and against the intervention war in Iraq in 2003 (Elcheroth & Reicher, 2014). The studies quoted in this framework that analyse the political speeches (i.e mobilisation rhetoric) all underscore the

centrality of *category constructions* in the arguments and how these are linked to specific actions that are then deemed forward.

In 2 different studies the propositional elements of the 5-step model of hate (Reicher et al., 2008) has been explored and confirmed by analysing rhetoric against immigrants by far-right ideologues. While Maykel Verkuyten uses the model to examine the rhetoric against Muslim outgroup in Netherlands (Verkuyten, 2013), McKeever and colleagues use the same model to analyse rhetoric against Chinese immigrants in Ireland (McKeever et al., 2013). They have confirmed the proposition that an understanding of the 'Other' is necessarily dependent on how the 'we' is constructed. In other words, to understand the violence and prejudice against the out-group, we must look at ways in which the in-group is constructed in the popular imagination.

As argued earlier, popular imagination and how we come to see ourselves as part of a group, i.e, the process of social identification is not a process that one comes to in vacuum. '*Entrepreneurs of identity'* (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 49) are people who are invested in drawing out particular understandings for the ingroup and constituting the outgroups with characteristics that serve towards mobilising the in-group towards violence.

3.2 Research Approach

After the collection of posters from the Magh Mela (a gathering of a largely Hindu audience, but not necessarily one that would associate itself with the Hindutva) we went to the Dharm Sansad, a gathering that was solely organized by the Hindutva forces. The three reasons for doing this were: a) the audience changes from general Hindu to specifically RSS oriented. b) The tone of the meetings, we suspected, would be far more political than the Magh Mela. c) It would give us a far more dynamic range of data in the form of multiple voices, in exploring and constructing the Hindu identity and associated values in the way that the saffron brigade envisages.

There is the written form of persuasion published as newspaper articles, but a more forceful measure of leadership strength (or the lack of it) is bound in oratorical skills of

the leader (Bligh & Robinson, 2010). However, in this study the oratorical skills are used as a secondary confirmation or disconfirmation for places where the meaning of the content might not be clear with just the written translation. There are places where the audience reactions have been instigated in the speech itself, for example, in Togadia's call for boycotting Muslims, he specifically insists that the audience "repeat after him". In a book outlining the timing of audience responses and the ways in which audience are encouraged to join along, John Maxwell Atkinson writes "The strong pressures on members of an audience to act in unison, and the fact that it takes very little to interfere with their capacity to do so have important practical consequences for the sorts of things that can actually be done at public meetings. In particular, people are largely restricted to doing only those things that can be easily coordinated in such a way as to be done together. To this end, special aids are often used to make it easier for large groups of individuals to act as one" (Atkinson, 1984, p. 18). Two of the speakers, Praveen Togadia and Narendra Modi make use of techniques to urge a more direct interaction with the audience. While Togadia instigates the huge audience in short, punchy call backs (described in the analysis), Modi's audience is smaller in number and therefore the form of participation is in applauses and seemingly humorous instances interactions. However, we take most cognisance of the speech itself as a modality to discern the *contents* of the speeches and *what* is being said more than how it is being said.

In the previous chapter, we developed a tentative model from visual representations of the hate rhetoric in

- Firstly, sanctioning extreme hostility against out-groups as an act of virtue by the in-group – the model of collective hate
- Secondly, how leaders use this logic of threat (inter-group relations) to authorize their power within the group (intra-group leadership struggles).

We explore these dynamics in further detail in speeches made by various leaders of the movement at an event called the 'Dharm Sansad' – a religious parliament of the Hindutva ideologues and followers.

3.3 Procedure

3.3.1 Method

The analytic method used as a general approach in analysing the various speeches follows from work done by Reicher and Hopkins in their book, Self and Nation (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Ian Parker's book on qualitative psychology makes a case for discourse analysis. He starts the chapter on discourse analysis by stating that it "provides an ideal opportunity for studying ideology in psychology, if we read it right" (Parker, 2005, p. 88). What constitutes the right way of reading discourse is, as most things qualitative, fraught with positions and counter-positions. Discourse analysis "treats the meanings of terms as deriving from the way they are articulated into chains of meaning that are independent of the speakers" (Parker, 2005, p. 100).

The process of analysis was iterative. We explored the contents of the speeches with the sense that there would be far more nuanced and multi-dimensional analysis of the components of the 5-step model of hate, given that the medium of communication (political speeches with an audience) allows for such expansion. This is worth noting because, we analysed the contents with a theoretical eye that followed up on distinctions that were only slightly hinted upon in the posters (previous study). For example, the quality of the 'past' of the in-group is represented as glorious in only one of the posters, yet in the speeches this forms a central aspect of the way in which the in-group is mobilised. Therefore, the data required a reworking of the analysis from the 5-step model in a different way than the previous chapter.

Secondly, since one of the speeches was given by the then Chief Minister of Gujarat, the only speaker who held political office and headed the state Government, we have focussed much of the analytic lens on the intra-group dynamics of leadership struggles on this particular speech.

3.3.2 Data Corpus:

The speeches that we chose to analyse are the following:

- **Pramila Tai Mende** (Head of the Rashtra Sevika Samiti – the women's wing of the RSS)
- **Kamlesh Bharti** (Speaker from the Matrushakti section of the VHP)
- **Manjulashree** (Invited speaker from South India)
- **Narendra Modi** (The present Chief Minister of Gujarat)
- **Praveen Togadia** (The General Secretary of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad - VHP)
- **Ashok Singhal** (The President of the International, Vishwa Hindu Parishad - VHP).

3.3.3 Site of Data Collection

This photograph was taken at the gathering. It shows a huge saffron podium with many saffron-clad *saints* who were all invited speakers at this conference. Various images of Hindu mythological figures formed the backdrop of this podium. These included an aggressively posturing Ram, Hanuman putting Lanka on fire[22], Bharatmata (Mother

[22] Hanuman is also worshipped as a god: the monkey-god. Lanka is the place where Sita, the wife of Ram, was held captive by Ravana. To rescue Sita, Hanuman set fire to Lanka. The Bajrang dal of the hindutva movement derive their name from Hanuman.

India) spearing a demon and the symbol 'Om'. The slogan in white at the top left corner reads thus:

- Utho jago maa! Durga bankar koti bhujaao mein bal bharkar
Namastak ho phir jag maange, tera ashish bharat maa"

"Arise and awake mother! Become Durga and fill with strength the arms of a crore.
In deference will the world ask for your blessings, Mother Bharat"

Hanging from this stage is a prominent blue banner that was visible from quite a distance proclaiming in red "Bharat is a Hindu nation". The people on the dais are ideologues all dressed in the typical saffron robes, now synonymous with 'saffron' ideology as the ideology of Hindutva is also otherwise known. The invocation to 'Durga' in the text is symbolic of righteous violence (Kinsley, 1988). As Bacchetta notes in the title of her study of the women's wing of the RSS "all our goddesses are armed" (Bacchetta, 2004). India is personified as Bharatmata (Mother India), and is implored upon to become like Durga – the Hindu goddess who saves mankind from demons with her spears. She is beseeched upon to 'give strength' to 10 million arms; so that the world may defer to India for her blessings. People in thousands had gathered for the meetings through the day. Specific groups under the RSS fountainhead congregated for the three-day conference. These groups came in colourful processions, with banners of their regional saffron allegiance. Vigorous dance coupled with chants of 'Jai Shri Ram'[23] and aggressive posturing with weapons marked the entry of a number of processions under different banners from all corners of India. Weapons like the 'trishul'[24] and swords that are symbols of Hindu religious paraphernalia to raise the community consciousness of the Hindu in-group. Indeed, the invocation sets the tone, to 'arise and awake' [from a stupor, ostensibly] to the pride of being India.

The following analysis is of a selection of speeches from the Sansad that were delivered from the podium and from one video CD distributed at this Sansad.

[23] "Jai Shri Ram" roughly translates to 'hail, the lord Ram'.
[24] Trishul is a traditional weapon in the shape of a trident. In Hindu mythology it is also the favoured weapon and therefore, insignia of the god Shiva.

3.4 Analysis

The analytic lay out was structured as responsive to the data set that we analysed. Since, this was largely corroborative of the framework developed in the discussion of the previous chapter on visual representations of hate, we have followed the structure with the analytic categories of in-group, out-group, political rival and leader. These categories are then analysed for their contents – ie, boundaries, values, membership, followed by an analysis of the category-relations and the ways in which they are bound up to one another in the discourse. The excerpts from the data corpus are paragraphs that allow for an in-depth analysis of the context and the content of the arguments that are put forward, allowing enough for an unaccustomed reader to be able to make sense of the except without additional descriptive content, and allowing for us to analytically view and present *category boundaries and contents, category relations, and category prototypes* (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b)

- In-group
    - Boundaries
    - Qualities and Characteristics
    - Ideal in-group
- Out-group (section 3.2.2)
    - Muslims
    - Christians
    - Traitors within
- Inter-group relations (section 3.2.3)
    - Threats
        - Symbolic
        - Realistic
    - Aggression against the Outgroup
- Leadership (section 3.2.4)
    - Self & Rival
    - Constructing the relationship between out-groups and rival
    - Positioning of Self as Ideal Leader

3.4.1 In-group:

In this section, we analyse the different ways in which the in-group is constructed. We look at the definitions of the Hindu in-group, and the boundaries for inclusion or exclusion. This section is divided into three parts:

- The first section analyses the boundary constructions (3.4.1.1)
- The second section analyses the qualities and characteristics of the in-group in the constructed past history and the present times. (3.4.1.2)
- The third section analyses the purported qualities for the ideal in-group in the future (3.4.1.3)

3.4.1.1 Boundary Construction:

The way the in-group boundaries are defined is contingent on the audience it is meant for. For example, in speeches addressed to the audience at the World Hindu Congregation (Vishwa Hindu Sammelan), the meaning of India is blatantly explained in terms of the Hindu identity. Consider, the following three excerpts from three different speeches:

> *This is Bharat – Hindu Nation and it will remain a Hindu nation.* (Kamlesh Bharti)

> *In our constitution, it is stated, 'India, that is Bharat'. I feel that if we are to have a constitution of our Hindu nation, then it should state, 'Bharat, that is Hindusthan'. And if at all we are to write it in English, then, 'Bharat that is Hindusthan'.* (Pramila Mende)

> *Bharat is the Hindu's own land, that's why Hindu society's duty is to bind all of us in the bonds of love, to stand up and defend Bharat's unity and indivisibility* (Proposal 2 Ashok Singhal)

In the above extracts, the boundaries of the in-group are clearly delineated. The national Indian community is defined in terms of a religious in-group: the Hindu. Each of the terms of India, Bharat, Hindustan and Hindu are linked in a way so as to become interchangeable with one another and yet imply only a narrow definition of the Hindu in-group. This deliberate conflation of nation with religion serves a dual purpose: while the larger populace understands 'Hindusthan' to include the entire nation of Indians, it is

clear from the above extracts, that the Hindutva brigade means it specifically as a nation of Hindus. The official discourse, however, uses the same word, with differing meanings. It is this ambiguity in meaning that allows the leaders to use 'Hindusthan' and 'Bharat' to refer to the commonly held view of a larger nation with a larger electorate and yet mean it in the narrowest possible sense. Consider, the next excerpt from Modi's speech that is intended for a diverse audience.

> *I, today, on the soil of Mumbai, have come with a very heavy heart. I cannot imagine why that in a country like India, the innocent citizens of India are thrown into the throes of death. What is the fault of those youth? What is the fault of those mothers and sisters? Someone's brother is snatched away, someone's beloved son is snatched away, and a sister's sindoor is wiped away…* (Page 1 Modi)

Ostensibly this provides a clear definition of the ingroup: it is the country of India and the 'innocent citizens of India' who were the target of the bomb. The idea that the country in general has come under attack is then reinforced by invoking a series of generic relationships which cover the entire population: youth, mothers and sisters, brothers, sons, sisters again. However, this final term in the list is significant since the generic sister is decribed as having her sindoor wiped away. A sindoor is the vermillion spot worn only by married *Hindu* women. Through this usage, then, Modi equates the members of Indian families as specifically Hindu. The ingroup, those afflicted by the Mumbai bomb, is not simply India, but *Hindu* India.

3.4.1.2 Qualities & Characteristics:

Having established the distinctly Hindu essence of Hindusthan and Bharat when quoted by Hindutva leaders, let us look at the ways in which this particular version of the nation is visualised.

> **Family:**
> *All of us Hindus are a part of one family: For saving every Hindus self-respect, all must stand together (Proposal 3 – Ashok Singhal)*

The mother is the sutradhaar that holds the family. If the mother will think, 'in my house [people] will behave according to the Hindu culture', then the strength that she has in her, the strength that God has given to her, the strength of service and duty, to keep everyone bound by her love – on this basis she can build her family as a Hindu family. To build a Hindu nation, this is of utmost importance. Women have a very important contribution to this. How will [we] create a Hindu family? There is no stated way for it. This home will be created by the emotions of the heart.

In this formulation of Bharat, a strong traditional ethos of family is the ideal base for the propagation of the Hindu nation. The *sutradhaar* is not just a word; it is a concept in the Hindu culture of a person who 'brings together the story', in this case, the mother who holds the family together. Importantly, it is the woman as mother who welds the Hindu family and consequently the Hindu nation together. This statement figuratively establishes Hindu women (mothers) as symbolic bearers of national identity. However, there is no detailing of what exactly constitutes such a household. This absence of detail helps in consolidating a religious identity which otherwise is intersected by numerous castes and a multitude of regions. Building a community around the 'emotions of the heart' also suggests that the Hindu way of life is offered as a general way of life in Indian culture, not restricted to a specific religious community. This constant conflation helps to normalise typical Hindu traditions as an identification of Indian culture in general. The supposed fluidity, however, is made rigid by deliberations on not by what Hindu culture is supposed to be, but rather is based on what the Hindu culture is definitely not, i.e. by developing the idea of the presence of out-groups that are different from the Hindu in-group. Consider, the following extract:

Visibility:

All right. This is not our culture. Our culture must be reflected in our clothes, in the application of tilak[25]*. Wear_____, but also make sure that on your face, you have applied kumkum*[26]*. When we come out, we must be able to recognize each other as our own Hindu people. Not just application, but the kumkum must also necessarily be visible.* (Manjulashree)

25 A streak of red or vermillion smeared on the forehead of people who have offered prayers. A distinctly Hindu symbol, usually applied on men.

26 Vermillion worn by Hindu women on their foreheads.

The tilak and kumkum are bright marks of saffron, smeared across a person's forehead after offering prayers. The kumkum is usually for women and the tilak for men. In the multitude of religious practises, this application of vermillion is appropriated as uniquely Hindu. The speaker's urge to be visible and recognized as distinctly Hindu sharpens the boundary of the in-group against a seamless mass. This marking of membership also dovetails non-committal practises into a politico-religious Hindutva definition of in-group values. The Hindu identity is harnessed to redefine the country of India as a Hindu nation. In this formulation of group category, no other identity other than the Hindu identity is allowed to exist. If at all, other identities are allowed, they must be subservient to the grand fold of the Hindu identity. It also establishes in part, that the Indian national identity is *essentially* Hindu, and conversely only Hindus are (or can be) the nationals (or citizens) of this country. We shall demonstrate the implications of this narrow definition in the following sections. For now, we turn our analysis to the in-group characteristics that are expounded in the session.

Victims:

Every day, friends, every day from every corner of Hindustan, our youth of 22,25,30 years who had gone to the borders to protect our country, become preys to a coward terrorists' bullet, and their dead bodies come back home. Friends, have we ever thought, what crime did those parents commit who had sent their beloved son to the borders to protect this country, to find their son dead? (Modi)

The point here is that victimhood is ascribed to the parents of soldiers, and while one might conceivably ask questions as to the culpability of soldiers in fatal fights, no such questions can be asked of parents. By placing the focus on them, the (national) quality of innocence is exemplified. Throughout the speeches, victimhood is ascribed in different ways to the Hindu in-group, especially in the present circumstances. Other aspects of this in-group are built up in the following dimensions:

Spirituality/ Religiosity:

On this land, God Budhha, God Mahaveer, Adhyashankaracharya, SantBasveshwar, Valmiki, Kabir, Ravidas, Kanakdas, Shankardev, GurunanakDev, Namdev, Narayanguru, Chaitanya Mahaprabhu, Thiruvalluvar, and holy men like Sur, Tulsi and Ramdas were born. Till today,

the entire Bharat sings their songs and prayers as signs of unity, united opinion, and health of the society. (Proposal 3 – Ashok Singhal)

That Bharat necessarily indicates a Hindu nation has been demonstrated in the previous excerpts. These values are further represented by a string of holy people who have lived in India at various points of time. In this particular excerpt, by extension of the logic, therefore, each spiritual/ religious leader who has been quoted is appropriated as Hindu. Buddha and Mahaveer who started movements opposed to the Hindu caste system have also been subsumed in the overarching Hindu fold by elevating them to the status of 'God'. This also serves as a unifying factor across the length and breadth of the country. Guru Nanak, the leader of the Sikhs (a militant branch of Hinduism, now recognized as a separate religion) represents the North of India, while Thiruvalluvar is the God from South India. The differences in language and custom, (even the all-important skin-colour!) of North India and South India are completely obliterated in this paragraph to present the Hindu community as a monolithic identity across India. Hence the emphasis on *entire Bharat* singing in *unity* signifies the health of the Hindu society. This Hindu presence is made vivid by the lack of any Islamic or Christian names in the list of spiritual/ religious men quoted above.

Consider now, another example, involving generic listing used by Togadia to denote India. This time it is a list of places rather than of Holy people.

All of us must think why did Babar destroy Ram Mandir? Did Babar have a fight with Ram? Why did Mahmud Ghazni destroy Lord Shankar's Somnath temple? Did Ghazni have a fight with Lord Shankar? Why did Aurangzeb destroy Kashi Vishwanath? Why did Mohammad Ali Jinnah and his associated Muslim league mutilate our motherland Bharat? Were the people travelling on the Mumbai trains somebody's enemies? Were the devotees in the Hanuman temple of Sankat Mochan at Kashi somebody's enemies? (Praveen Togadia – 13th February)

He lists a series of targets which represent the country under attack, and each item is a specific Hindu site along with the Hindu pilgrims who visit them: Ram's temple at Ayodhya, Somnath temple in Gujarat, Kashi Vishwanath in Gujarat, and also the Hanuman temple. Interestingly, the mention of Jinnah and Muslim league also puts the landmass of India as one religious whole. This is explained in the next excerpt. The

Indian motherland is constructed as sacred, and therefore any attack anywhere on the motherland or on its people is seen as not attempt to annihilate but also an attempt to desecrate the sacred values/ places of the Hindu in-group. Therefore, the Mumbai train bombings is also squeezed in between the questions, following the same logic of a 'Hindu nation constantly under threat.'

> *This country has gone in the way the mothers have shown. Mothers should take a resolute pledge on this sacred 'Triveni sangam'. Today we have all gathered to think on these issues here. This is no ordinary thing. Mother Ganga resides here, Mother Saraswati resides here, Mother Yamuna also resides here – we take our pledges under their guidance. (Kamlesh Bharti)*

While country and mother are generic terms, the reference to geographical features such as rivers as 'mother' is conspicuously Hindu. 'Triveni Sangam' which translates to 'tri-river conjunction' is an allusion to the meeting point of the rivers Ganga, Yamuna and the mythical (Hindu) Saraswati. The importance of identifying geographical features as Hindu places of worship or Goddesses/ Gods serves two purposes: One it helps in building the notion of a continuous historical community. And two, therefore, Hindu community as rightful owners of the land (of Bharat/ Hindusthan/ India) comes from the principle of precedence. Kamlesh Bharti talks of a country that has followed the way of the mothers. As we have already shown this to be only Hindu with rivers as the geographical references, this ties into the notion of an ancient community. By the absence of Muslim configurations or Christian names, the idea of a continuous historical Hindu community is built. The importance of a traditional past, spanning eras is symbolically invoked by naming rivers after Hindu Goddesses. This past is an ideal that is sought for:

> *There has been considerable influence in the cities, but our mothers in the villages have kept our culture alive even today. I am proud to state this. Our mothers in the villages have nurtured and tended our culture, rather than the mothers in the cities. Even here we see it, our mothers from the jungles and villages are in far greater number. It is because; our cultural traditions have grown from the villages and jungles. In the cities, slowly our mothers are shying away from spirituality as well.* (Kamlesh Bharti)

The focus of the afore extract is on dichotomizing the 'past and present' around one single axis which neatly bifurcates into 'pure past' as symbolized by the villages and

jungles and the 'impure present' as symbolized by the cities. Singhal talks of another ideal past, and the way it links to the in-group's present values:

Humanitarian:

According to the Veda, the nation was born out of the meditation of Rishis. Inspired by humanitarian thoughts, the rishis meditated aggressively and the nation was born out of a combination of their strengths. Since the Hindus have stayed here since ancient times, there developed a feeling of 'Us'. This feeling of 'us' also extended to the earth, people, culture, history, Great men, friends and also enemies. (Proposal 3 - Ashok Singhal)

We have already discussed the linkages of Bharat as a distinct geographical location with a Hindu nation. The Hindus are the obvious, the original, the natural inhabitants of this land, as the very names *Hindu* and *Hindustan* testify. The Hindus are pronounced the most ancient and civilized nation in the world, un paralleled in their philosophical and spiritual achievements, accommodating, tolerant, united, luxuriant even - in a fundamental way – unconquerable. In this particular extract, the speaker presents this link as primordial, since *ancient times,* and anchors in the Hindu culture, and like the previous speakers, conflates India with a Hindu nation. Meditation of the Rishis signifies brahmanical forms of rituals and related virtues of purity and exclusion. Humanitarian values are also assigned to the in-group, since they are born of saints who were spiritually pure. The peacefulness of the past, however, translates into 'tolerance' in the present. Consider, the following excerpt from Modi:

Tolerant:

In this country, peace is not a new thing. It's possible that the electronic media have just got to know that we keep peace in this country. There were so many attacks on the Amarnath Yatris [pilgrims], but no one retaliated with even a stone in this country. There were so many attacks on the Amarnath Yatris [pilgrims], but no one retaliated with even a stone in this country. There were attacks on Raghunath temple, but nobody's house was burnt down in this country. In Ayodhya, attacks were carried out on Lord Ram's temple, and also in Varanasi, but not even a stone was thrown. Even in Gujarat, terrorists had entered Akshardham, Gujarat had declared a bandh [strike], but after Akshardham, in Gujarat not even a stone was thrown. (Page - Narendra Modi)

Though the excerpt tinges the in-group with the status of victims, the quality of tolerance

is elaborated upon; Modi describes a 'we' who represent the peaceful country. The 'we' who do not retaliate is therefore, once again, a Hindu we. The extensive geography of a country under siege is a Hindu sacred geography. The India being described as 'this country' is again a Hindu India. And yet, the 'we' has remained calm, and peaceful under concerted attacks. However, Modi also implies that this tolerance is being taken for a ride, and perhaps the times have changed and therefore the qualities of the in-group must also change. This is hinted at in the next excerpts at the Mothers' conference:

> *Where are we standing today? Our mother power is at crossroads today. If she looks behind, then she is reminded of her traditional values and, if she looks ahead she is tempted by the beauty and attractive lifestyle of the Western World. But, our mothers have another characteristic. Even after being tempted, our mothers have not been completed besotted/ trapped in the enchantment. There has been considerable influence in the cities, but our mothers in the villages have kept our culture alive even today.* (Pramila Mende)

The in-group characteristic hinted at in the aforementioned extracts is one of 'untouched purity from ancient times'. Rural spaces constitute the real Hindu nation while urban spaces are an aberration of it. The speaker talks of the times and circumstances as impure but the women have remained intrinsically pure. She also talks of the inherent innocence or strength of spirituality of the Hindu woman. This 'quality' of the Hindu woman has an important meaning in the context of inter-group relations, which we shall come to presently. For now, the Hindu community is constructed as an essentially pure people in constant struggle against bad external influences (quoted as cultural pollution in the next extract). It is also till now, overwhelmingly feminine, and the struggle has been a suffering. Manjulashree from the southern region of India also asks about the extent of 'mother's' role in 'protecting' the Hindu culture in the following piece:

> *How much are we participating in protecting our culture? Please think about it. Maa has become mummy and baap*[27] *has become dummy. Mummy, mummy, mummy – this is how we call out. Mothers are forcing to their children*[28]*, isn't it? The one who dies, in Egypt they call them mummy. So, when the boy or girl calls mummy, it means, "you're dead, you're dead, you're*

[27] Father in hindi.

[28] The speakers words in original.

dead". And yet they are forced by their mothers to call them mummy. What are we doing? (Manjulashree)

The speaker takes the idea of external 'cultural pollution', extends it a step further by way of language, implying that the Hindus render mothers dead when they speak in a different language, where mothers are wished dead, and fathers are nothing better than dummies. This apparent internalization of pollution is brought into focus as the highest level of attack, when one of our own turns against herself, 'And yet they are forced by their mothers to call them mummy.'

3.4.1.3 Ideal in-group:

The state of affairs of the present in-group as opposed to the glorious past has been described so far. The qualities of the Hindu in-group of tolerance, peacefulness, and humanity have also been elaborated. At all times, the links between these qualities and the state of victim-hood of the Hindu in-group has also been clearly brought out. To change the status quo and bring back the glorious past into the future of the Hindu in-group, certain qualities need to undergo a change. Consider the following two excerpts:

This sammelan believes that the word Hindu is national and does not describe a particular religion. Hindu in Bharat is a nation, Hindu is a culture, is a way of life and is a society. Hindu culture is the epitome of unity in diversity. This culture believes in karma, and gives importance to re-birth and good karma. Hindu society does not recognize any one God, but rather recognizes the spark of the divine in every person, and absorbs every path to the divine within its fold. (Proposal 3 Ashok Singhal)

But we are the soldiers of the Hindu nation. What is difficulty for a soldier? For them, what is food? For them, what is convenience? We have come out to fight for the defence of our religious principles (dharm): we are the Dharm warriors. We will fight till the end, until every corner of Hindusthan will fly the saffron flags. (13th February Praveen Togadia)

In the overarching 'national' fold, no other independent identity except for the Hindu is allowed to exist. In the seemingly welcoming stance of recognizing every person as God, the speaker also talks of absorbing every path to the divine within its fold. In other words, the wide range of divergent communities and religions are in the process homogenized

and naturalized into this Hindutva fold. This hindutva is represented as a potential national ethos within which all other religions and communities are justly housed. In the framework of unity in diversity, the only culture that is suitable to be the overarching banyan tree is the Hindu culture. Togadia takes it a step further, since these values of tolerance are under threat of annihilation; it is in defence of the Hindu nation, that tolerance must be substituted with intolerance. India is envisaged as a Hindu nation, marked with saffron flags.

3.4.2 Out-groups

By definition of the in-group in the previous section, we have shown groups like Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs as being a part of the Hindutva definition of the in-group. We have also found mentions of attacks on this in-group by Islamic out-groups over a period of time. In the chapter on visual representations, we consistently found, out-groups constructed along the lines of threat to the cow, and therefore excluded the Muslims and Christians as dangerous out-groups. We show the ways in which out-group constructions are made in front of different audiences. The speeches made at the Vishwa Hindu Sammelan are based on explicit constructions of the out-groups boundaries and qualities while Modi's references are more implicit since the speech was delivered at a different audience, and has also been relayed on national television. This section has been divided into three parts:

- The Muslim out-group: How is the group constituted? What values are ascribed?
- The Christian out-group: How is the group constituted? What values are ascribed?
- The threat within: traitors to the in-group.

3.4.2.1 Muslims

As with the ingroup, so Modi provides an ostensibly clear definition of the outgroup – those who are attacking 'us'. They are, for Modi, self-evidently terrorists – something so obvious that the start of it merely needs to be stated. Hence, almost at the start of the speech he declares: "*This is a fight of humankind. Terrorism is an enemy of humankind*". However this does not explain who the terrorists are. Modi's answer comes in two parts. On the one hand he identifies India's neighbours, Bangladesh and

(especially) Pakistan as sponsors of the terrorists. Thus, he reports one of his own speeches to an audience in Assam where he states that they are tormented by their neighbour, Bangladesh, just as he, coming from Gujarat, is tormented by his Pakistani neighbour. He does not limit culpability to the state but rather implies that these entire nations are at fault. This is even more explicit in the following extract where Modi imagines the reaction when the Indian government revoked the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), something he sees as crippling the fight against terrorism:

> *Tell me friends, the POTA law that was created for the terrorists, the day the Indian Government decided to revoke the law, who would have distributed sweets? Who would have burst crackers? Friends, all of Pakistan was distributing sweets, all of Pakistan was eating sweets. (Page 6 – Modi)*

On the other hand, Modi defines the enemy as specifically 'Jehadi terrorism' and he emphasises the point that not all Muslims are jehadis or terrorist.

> *Friends, the world faces danger from Jehadi terrorism, and Jehadi terrorism does not imply Islam. Every Muslim does not do Jehad. And that is why, knowingly, I am using the term, 'jehadi terrorist'…. Friends, Jehadi terrorism has spread to Indonesia and Malaysia. In spite of being an Islamic country, the leaders of those countries are also worried about jehadi terrorism. The leadership of Indonesia is Muslim, but they are Muslims with liberal thoughts, and even there Jehadi terrorism operates. (Page 16 – Modi)*

Modi goes further, it is not only that Muslims are not (necessarily) terrorists. It is also that terrorists are not (really) Muslims. He states**:**

> "*Friends, terrorists have no religion. I believe in this firmly, that terrorists have no religion. Terrorists are enemies of humankind*" *(page 6 – Modi)*.

However, if in the case of the ingroup, the implied category is narrower than the ostensible category, so for the outgroup there is an implied category that is broader than the ostensible category. Indeed the two definitions are clearly interdependent. If the ingroup is Hindus in general so, in a number of ways, then, Modi implies that all Muslims should be seen as terrorists – or at least suspected as potential terrorists. We can start with

those examples already used to illustrate the ingroup definition. For example, he cites a number of well-rehearsed examples where Muslims in general were seen as attacking Hindu religious sites. The emblematic example is Ayodhya where Hindu nationalists sought to destroy a Mosque, which, they claimed, was built on a sacred Hindu site. The enemy here is Islam in general.

Or again, we showed above how Hindi terms are used wherever 'we' are described. The converse is true where attacks on this 'we' are invoked. Then Urdu terms are used, implying a Muslim community. Indeed even as Modi argues that terrorists have no *religion*, the term he uses is 'Quom' which is an Urdu word, that implies religious community. Implicitly, the audience attaches Muslim with the word, Quom. Hence, though terrorists on the face of it, have no religion, the use of the word Quom implies that the community involved are Urdu speakers - the language spoken by Muslims in India.

To use another example, there is a passage where Modi overtly urges restraint and supports peaceful action:

> *I would like to tell you this brothers, the terrorists aim to spread hatred in the country. It is the responsibility of the citizens of the country, not to allow hatred to spread under any circumstances. Do not allow hatred to spread under any circumstance. This is their aim. (Page 8 – Modi)*

The word Modi uses for 'aim' is actually an Urdu word 'mansuba'. It denotes an implied Muslim community and so, once again, the connection between 'them', the terrorists, and Islam is established. In other places in the speech, he uses a rather different way of making such a connection. That is, even if it is true in principle that not every Muslim is a terrorist, in practice every Muslim could become a terrorist and hence all Muslims become suspect and dangerous. This is most apparent in his account of Ishrat Jehan, a young Muslim woman suspected (though not proven) to be a terrorist and shot dead by the Gujarat police. He links her to Pakistan by claiming that Pakistanis celebrated her acts:

And when after three days, the Khwaja times, which is a Lashkar-e-tayeeba mouthpiece, published an article in Pakistan, that we are proud of Ishrat Jehan who martyred herself in our cause. (Page 9 – Modi)

Then he states that, just like her, the Mumbai bomber may have been a woman who was used (presumably by the Pakistanis) to kill. As he puts it:

Friends, just a while ago, a TV reporter was saying that someone saw a girl planting the bomb. I do not know what the truth is. Girls have been used. The day, Gujarat killed Ishrat Jehan in an encounter, if the police of Maharashtra would have paid heed, then perhaps this girl would not have been born to plant the bomb. (Page 10 – Modi)

The point then, is that even the most innocent Muslims – a woman and a child – must be suspect, since anyone could be manipulated to be a killer. Betrayal to the nation is constructed as intrinsic to the community of Muslims. The theoretical division between 'good Muslims' and 'bad Muslims' thereby made redundant and in this discourse, 'all Muslims deserve to be treated as enemies.' This is not just our interpretation of the text. It was clearly that of Modi's audience. Work by (Atkinson, 1984; Bull & Noordhuizen, 2000) show how audience reactions in timing the applause can be used towards interpreting the tone of the speech and how it is received. At the very point (cited above) where he described terrorists as having no religion, and when he went on to state that the response to the terrorist should be 'hard hitting', the audience responded with whistles, claps and a cry of 'drop bombs on Friday', which was widely applauded. The significance of 'Friday' is not lost - Friday is the Muslim day of prayer. Bombs on a Friday do not in practice differentiate jehadis from any other Muslim. Modi and his constituency mutually recognise who they really see as their enemy. Singhal makes a similar point in his proposal:

Everyday, the Hindi-speaking population of Assam are being shot at by the Muslims infiltrators absorbed by ULFA, and are being forced to flee Assam. (Proposal 2 – Ashok Singhal)

ULFA is the acronym for United Liberation Front of Assam, an organization that has been struggling for a separate identity within the Indian nation. However, this violence too is attributed to the Muslims. The ULFA is an out-group not because of the

secessionist movement it propagates, but because it apparently co-opts Muslims into it's movement. In the next section on inter-group relations (p. 129), we elaborate how these constituted characteristics of Muslims are used to set up vicious animosity between groups. For now, here's an analysis of the construction of other outgroups.

3.4.2.2 Christians

> *Third Vishwa Hindu Sammelan is gravely concerned about the evil conspiracies of magical illusions and false miracles hatched by the church to change the opinion of the people. This Sammelan, finally also demands that the Central Government takes immediate and effective steps to put an end to this conspiracy of opinion-change by the Church, by passing anti-conversion laws. (Proposal 3 – Ashok Singhal)*

The church is designated a wicked conspirator. While the concept of miracle itself is supported, the church is shown to be a propagator of *false miracles*. Essentially, implying that the Church uses deception to convince people to change their opinion. The speaker alleges that people not only change their opinion, but also their religion on the basis of false claims made by the Church. Hence, the call for anti-conversion laws is seen as a measure of stopping the influx of Hindu people into the Christian fraternity. This out-group is characterised as sly and cunning impostors.

3.4.2.3 Traitors

> *For us, one major issue is coming up: that minorities should get reservation. Apparently we dominate over the minorities. But why? In 1947, they said, our culture, tradition and rituals do not match. That's why we need a separate nation. And they got their separate nation. By creating Pakistan, we have given them 100% reservation. And if they cannot be satisfied with even 100% reservation then why are our rights denied?* (Kamlesh Bharti)

By definition of the National Minorities Commission in India, 'minorities' include Christians, Muslims, Parsis, Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists and others. However, it is evident, that by minorities, particularly in this extract, the group points to Muslims. Pakistan, the neighbouring country, is depicted as a place that is completely *reserved for Muslims*. In other words: India for Hindus and Pakistan for Muslims. Extending this line of thought would necessarily put all practitioners of Islam as essentially Pakistanis and not Indians.

This analysis is crucial to understanding Hindu-Muslim relations in India. In this framework of Pakistan as the place of Muslim reservation, the loyalty of Muslims to the Indian nation is always suspect by the majoritarian Hindu community. Later Hindu nationalists have been rather more inflexible in their formulation of the meaning of Hindu nationhood, precisely because the notion of a separate territory gained ground first as an idea and then as a political reality – in Pakistan. For many of these propagandists, the Indian nation has come to be coterminous with the Hindu community. Explicitly or implicitly, Pakistan has become the place where Indian Muslims belong. Importantly, the blame for the creation of Pakistan and therefore the vivisection of the Indian sub-continent into two nation-states is put squarely on the out-group. We shall discuss the impact of such a formulation on inter-group relations in terms of citizenship and rightful ownership later. For now, we look at the other marked out-group.

> *We speak English, eat English, sleep English, and drink English. Very crazy we are for English. Everyone/thing, has become English. When the English left, this is exactly what they said, 'we are leaving but we are leaving behind brown-skinned English.' It is our countrymen who follow the English. They just said, but we are proving them true. We are all striving to prove those English right. We wear pants and shirts. (Manjulashree)*

Though the out-group here has been identified as Christian (as symbolized by the English having ruled India), the message however encompasses a larger group of people. The out-group is represented as insidiously dangerous since it seduces the in-group to change in fundamental ways, in an attempt to assimilate into the Christian out-group. Anybody who wears pants/ shirts, talks in English, indeed, 'eat', 'speak', 'sleep', 'drink' English are to be ostracised as just like the 'English' who dominated the Indians. This tussle is brought about in the following section of inter-group relations. Though clearly, Muslims and Christians constitute the out-group in the Hindutva rhetoric, by their definiton of 'Hindu values' for a 'Hindu nation', any group of people who do not subscribe to their definitions fall outside the boundary of the in-group. This would include people who are born Hindus but do not agree with the Hindutva's definition of being a Hindu. Modi's disdain of such people is apparent in the next excerpt:

> *In Gujarat one Ishrat Jehan, a terrorist girl was encountered by the Gujarat police. And she was shot dead. You would be aware, please remember that day. The entire world's 5 star*

activists had broken loose on Modi. One female youth was killed. This innocent girl was killed. She was riddled with bullets. Not only this, friends, in this state, those 5 star activists and some media friends declared her a martyr and had organized a funeral procession for her. They had gone to cover her in a sheet! (Page 9 – Modi)

Human rights activists are derided as *5 star activists,* implying a frivolous bunch of people, shallow in their understanding of matters of national security. The media is also maligned. They constitute the traitors of the in-group, and hence enemies of the in-group, since they align with the out-groups.

3.4.3 Inter-group Relations

This section focuses on the ways in which the in-group relates to the out-group and vice-versa. We address these questions:

- Along what dimensions are the inter-group relations built on?
- What are the implications of prejudiced representations of the out-group for the in-group?
- In what ways do the boundaries and qualities attributed to the out-group in the previous sections affect the in-group?
- What are the ways in which the in-group is to respond to the out-groups?

3.4.3.1 Threats

In the previous chapter on visual representations, we argued that the cow and the map of India had been used as symbols of the in-group that was brutalized by various out-groups. The relation between the groups is consistently characterized by threat. We had also shown that the in-group is overwhelmingly characterized by qualities of cowardice, naiveté while the out-group is characterized by aggressive qualities. In this section, keeping in perspective the relation of violence between the in-group and the out-groups,

- firstly, we outline the different ways in which the out-groups attack the in-groups. For example: historically, socio-culturally, demographically, economically, financially: various contexts of threats are described, we analyse an excerpt for each context and elaborate the inter-group relations within this context.

- In the second part, we analyse the purported ideal response of the in-group to these threats.
- In the third part, we discuss the impact of representing the out-group in particular ways on the in-group.

Historicity:

There was a time when on the meeting point of Ganga and Yamuna, Saraswati there was a gathering of the holy-men on this land and on our land of Kumbh Taimur Lang had attacked us with the dream [intention] of destroying our Hindu religion forever. (12th February – Praveen Togadia)

All of us must think why did Babar destroy Ram Mandir? Did Babar have a fight with Ram? Why did Mahmud Ghazni destroy Lord Shankar's Somnath temple? Did Ghazni have a fight with Lord Shankar? Why did Aurangzeb destroy Kashi Vishwanath? Why did Mohammad Ali Jinnah and his associated Muslim league mutilate our motherland Bharat? Were the people travelling on the Mumbai trains somebody's enemies? Were the devotees in the Hanuman temple of Sankat Mochan at Kashi somebody's enemies? Until we do not seek the answers to all of these questions, neither will the Hindu be safe on this earth, nor will the Hindu nation be safe. (13th February – Praveen Togadia)

A continuous storyline of recurrent attacks of out-group against the in-group around which only the historical circumstances and actors change, is built. Togadia recounts these attacks as a record of salient events in the history of the Hindu in-group. The attacks from the out-groups are traced through the ages from 997 to 2007, painting demonised images of Muslims. Each of the attacks is presented as an outcome of the ones preceding it. Togadia would have us believe that all the attackers through the ages seem to sprout from one religious community alone. In the first excerpt, Taimur Lang is accused of attacking the Kumbh – which is a Hindu assembly of spiritually inclined devotees and 'Holymen' who gather once very 6-12 years to bathe in the confluence of the rivers Ganga, Yamuna and the mythical Saraswati. It is of specific importance here, since all these speeches were being made at the very same place where supposedly Taimur Lang had attacked years ago, emotionally binding the present Hindu audience to a conjured up image of the past. This also sustains the idea of an ancient spiritual docile Hindu in-group with an equally belligerent Muslim out-group throughout time. While the Mughals:

Babur, Ghazni and Aurangzeb are projected as enemies who plundered and desecrated the temples of Ram (in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh), Shiva (in Gujarat) and the Hindu temple at Kashi (in Uttar Pradesh); Jinnah is accused of vivisecting the sacred body of the motherland India, hence, the very existence of Pakistan as an independent nation is a rupture to the idea of a unified Hindu nation. People who bombed the Mumbai trains in 2006 are also traced with the same lineage. The out-group threat is constituted as ancient and one that has remained unchanged in its fierceness towards the Hindu in-group. The in-group in contrast is feminized as passive victims in the onslaught of persistent masculine violence. By invoking places of worship, not only is an image of spirituality and religiosity of the in-group built, the lack of reaction in spite of such attacks also helps to build the image of a tolerant Hindu people. The places cited that have been attacked by the out-group serve two purposes: it underscores the vulnerability and sheer defencelessness of the in-group while magnifying the viciousness of the out-group. Thus, the out-group is militarized while the in-group is victimized. The events are presented in a schematic and one-sided manner to build 'memories' of suffering of the helpless Hindu in-group, while the chronicity of the assaults builds an image of a monolithic out-group that has pillaged the Hindu in-group through the ages with an intention to desecrate and kill. Desecration is also envisaged in an insidious way; consider, the next excerpt:

> **Socio-cultural**
>
> *Muslims take away at least 2-3 lakhs of our women to Christianity and Islam every year. If this is the rate at which our religious conversion will take place, and Hindu girls become Muslims or Christians, what will we do? Do give this a deep thought. If a man is married then it doesn't matter, but if a woman is married off, then not only is the family destroyed, other families are also destroyed in the process. Her children will be known as half-breeds. Her children will become Muslims, and they will be known as the enemies of our Hindu nation. They do this only to increase their numbers.* (Kamlesh Bharti)

The one clear message in this excerpt is that intermingling between the in-group and out-groups, leading to '*half-breeds',* is unacceptable. The gendering of the relation is clearly spelt out: Muslim and Christian men to Hindu women. In this overwhelmingly patriarchal set-up of relations, the Muslim male is cast as a seductive kidnapper who has one aim alone: to multiply the numerical strength of his group. In doing so, the speaker also denies any agency to the Hindu woman in such a relationship. She also negates the

possibility of love as the basis of any such relationship. Such relationships are deemed sacrilegious to the values of the in-group, and one that must be controlled for. In effect, it also implies that the behaviour of Hindu women must also be policed. We discuss this in further detail in the third part of this section. For now, it would suffice to say that this serves as a warning to Hindu women not to give birth to treacherous children, since they then become the 'threat within:'- One that is born of the Hindu in-group but remains loyal to the out-group. It is left unsaid whether Hindu men are supposed to adopt the same measures to *increase Hindu population.* Singhal cites another kind of population threat in the following excerpt:

> **Demographic**
>
> *Since the past few years, Muslims have been infiltrating from Western Pakistan and Bangladesh. Almost 3.5 crores infiltrators have snaked their way into Bharat. It is for this reason that the population balance in Assam has been disturbed. Now, terrorist activities of the secessionist movements have increased. Everyday, the Hindi-speaking population of Assam are being shot at by the Muslims infiltrators absorbed by ULFA, and are being forced to flee Assam.* (Proposal 2 Ashok Singhal)

The question is one of arithmetic: the larger the number, the stronger the group. The out-group is accused of *snaking* it's way into the in-group's land. Beneath the general message of changing the population balance of the 'Hindus' in the state, lurks the sinister connotation of an out-group that is poisonous and has reptilian qualities of a snake slithering into the in-group. The implication of this threat is also one that is done insidiously, with no one noticing the steady *population imbalance* in the state. ULFA is the acronym for United Liberation Front of Assam, an organization that has been struggling for a separate Assamese identity within the Indian nation. The militancy in the state is not from our homeland India, but is infiltrators and outsiders. And by extension, the ULFA is also an outsider. This has implications in the battle for leadership, which we shall present in the next section. For now, let us focus on another way of constructing threat on the in-group:

> **Economic:**
>
> *And Friends, just as this is terrorism, so also another form of terrorism is Narco terrorism. Friends this is such a kind of poison that it will destroy the youth power of the country. It is a*

conspiracy hatched by our enemies in the way drugs and narcos are destroying the youth of the country. The way youth become drug-addicts; every family needs to be made aware. The mass needs to be made aware. Friends, terrorism is carried out not only with guns and pistols but also with narco terrorism the future generation is being destroyed. This is a huge conspiracy and a planned one. Crores of rupees are invested in this: to destroy the youth, the country's wealth. (Page 16 Modi)

The youth signify strength and hope for any group. When an attack is constructed on this segment of the population, it is not only about the present, it is also an attack to destroy the future of the in-group. The in-group will be bereft of a bright and strong future, by the drain on its youth power and loss to drugs. Modi categorizes this as narco terrorism. He also talks of this as a conspiracy to destroy the in-group, not so much as a business of the mafia. The threats to the in-group are outlined at every level. Likewise, another threat:

Financial:

And likewise friends, another conspiracy in this country is to destroy the financial power of the country through fake notes. The Pakistan embassy in Nepal: from there, fakes Indian notes were confiscated! (Page 16 Modi)

The out-group conspires and launches attacks on the in-group even in embassies. The point about this is embassies are places of foreign countries that enjoy diplomatic immunity within host countries. By this, Modi implies that Pakistan abuses its immunity and the trust accorded to it to assault the Indian in-group.

Annihilation:

Who is to be killed? The terrorist decides. Where is the person to be killed? The terrorist decides. When is the person to be killed? The terrorist decides. How is the person to be killed? The terrorist decides. And how many people were killed, friends. We have lost more soldiers in this proxy war of terrorism, than in any of the actual wars that India has fought. (Page 3 – Modi)

We have shown Modi's characterization of the in-group as representative of entire humanity and the Muslim out-group as representative of terrorists in the previous sections on in-group and out-groups. In this excerpt, the terrorist represents an out-group,

overwhelmingly recognized as Muslim by both the speaker and the audience. In terms of inter-group hostility, the fate or future of the in-group is contingent on the whims and fancies of the out-group. This sort of threat denotes total power of the out-group over the in-group. The out-group controls the fate of the in-group. And the fate in this case is death. This has resonance in studies on *competitive victimhood* where groups feel that there is harm coming from outgroups and that this harm is unjustified (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009). The way in which it is constructed here though, has implications towards violence against the outgroups as shown in the next section.

3.4.3.2 Aggression against Out-group: Celebration

The construction of the various ways in which the out-group threatens the very existence of the in-group has been described, as has the virtuosity and sanctity of the in-group under threat. The threats have not been checked for veracity but for the emotionality that they manage to galvanize in the members of targeted in-group. These are conditions that create ground for extreme hostilities from the in-group against the out-groups. At best, the aggression of the in-group is a righteous act of virtue, at worst; it may be construed as self-defence. The specific way in which the in-group is called upon to act against the out-group is explicated in the next excerpt:

> ***Violence in the name of virtue:***
>
> *With the blessings of the holy-men we are going to create such a situation that if in any corner of the world a Hindu is insulted, then in lakhs of villages, the Hindu will cause devastation. And to create such an armoury for the Hindu society's safety, the VHP has done its work in 72,000 Indian villages. In 41000 villages the Bajrang Dal stands for 'dharm raksha'. In the country's 13000 tribal villages, our literacy campaigns by the name of ekal vidyalaya are on. On 18000 places in the country we are doing our work of trishul daan. Outside India, we are also networking with Hindus in different countries.* (13th February Praveen Togadia)
>
> *This Sammelan also demands that the Muslim infiltrators be thrown out of the country and to start armed war against the terrorist-harbouring country of Bangladesh and teach them a lesson for their actions. (Proposal 2 – Ashok Singhal).*

That is why this Sammelan calls for the Dharma-saviour Hindu society to step forward to save their life-values, principles, and to free Bharat and mother Bharat from terrorists and secessionists by uniting the Hindu society. (Proposal 2 – Ashok Singhal)

What is the second answer to Jihad? Where do they eat from? Who do they work under? Whose cycles do they repair? Whose scooters do they repair? Whose cars do they repair? In whose factories do they work? Tell me, do they work in our places or not? This is why we must expunge Islam. (Praveen Togadia – 13th February)

People say that we cannot do anything against the Muslims because of the numbers. But think of the day when the British were in power, they had the guns, they had power, they had the police and the administration. If we could still agitate and throw them out of the country then why can't we do the same with the Muslims? (Kamlesh Bharti)

The message in the above paragraphs is chillingly clear. This is where the processes and consolidation of group identity, attribution of certain qualities to the out-groups, constituent qualities of the in-group around the dimensions of threat, come together in a potent mix to justify mass scale destruction of the out-group by in-group members. The expunging of the out-group is critical to the in-group's safety. The religious symbol of *trishul* (trident) is the weapon of Shiva – the Hindu God of destruction. In mythology, Shiva is the God who destroys the evils of this world by unleashing a dance of destruction on the enemies. The in-group must become 'Shiva' to save the world from destruction. This becomes a sacred duty not just for ones own self but also for the preservation of the sacredness of the group itself. The 'cause' is more important than the individual members of the group. This extract is also interesting because it seeks to consolidate the Hindu identity across national boundaries. In the case of out-groups, it was apparently this very quality of bonding around the religious identity that made them anti-nationals, and therefore not Indians. What is poison for the out-group is virtuous for the in-group. Of note, also is the fact that the in-group is uniquely blessed by the holy men. It is a religious task that they must embark upon to save all that is sacred and virtuous of the in-group. And this can only be done, by annihilating the out-groups. This destruction must cut across all other dimensions as just like Hindus have borne their suffering together since ancient times, so also, the destruction unleashed must happen in every place Hindus reside.

3.4.4 Leadership: Self & Rival

In the previous section on inter-group relations, the dimension of threat was unpacked in further detail, critically to build the story of aggression of the in-group against out-groups as an act of virtue at best and one of self-defence at worst. In the chapter on visual representation, against the backdrop of inter-group relations, we saw the beginnings of the struggle for leadership, by primarily discrediting the rivals' position of authority in different ways. In this section we set out to explore the centrality of inter-group relations around the dimension of threat, for an understanding of intra-group dynamics of power struggle in further detail. Overall, we will look at the ways in which the leader and rival is characterised and positioned with reference to the in-group and out-groups. In this section, we shall primarily be focussing on the speech by Narendra Modi because, out of the selection of the speakers, he was the Chief Minister of Gujarat at the time of delivering this speech. While the other speakers are ideologues, Modi held political office and it is predicted that there would be a focus on the way an ideal leader should be in his speeches far more than the other speakers who were focusing on other 'cultural' aspects of the VHP's functioning.

- The first section delineates the group membership of the leader and the rival, and then goes on to look at the characteristics of the rival and the leader in opposition to one another in specific contexts.
- The second section describes the rivals' relationship with the out-group.
- In the third section the ways in which the leader is projected as the ideal leader by drawing on examples of the past is discussed.

We have primarily focussed on Narendra Modi's speech, because he is the only elected political leader among the several speakers of the conference.

3.4.4.1 Characteristics

Group membership: Self and Rival

To be able to show authority over a group, one must first belong to the group, or at least propagate the notion of belonging to the group. We present two excerpts around the theme of violence from Modi's speech to elaborate on this:

> ***Self:*** *Friends and sisters who were martyred, I have not come to see the colour of their blood. They are all my brothers. What is his language? What is his community? What is his attire? What is his faith? That has no meaning for me. Each martyred brother is my Hindustani brother. (Page 2 – Modi)*

In a play of language, Modi invokes a series of generic relationships that covers the entire population: friends, sisters, and brother. The final term, however, is significant, since he qualifies the generic brother as *'his Hindustani brother'*. Every group member thereby is tied to him in a familial blood relationship sans communal, regional and religious divide. However, as we have shown earlier in the section on in-group, 'Hindustani' in the narrow definition of the Hindutva brigade refers to Hindu members only, excluding in particular, Christians and Muslims. The ambivalence of 'Hindustani' allows him to invoke the religious/communal category while simultaneously denying accountability for so doing. It allows him to be a part of the Indian in-group as much as of the Hindu in-group. For the leader then, the in-group is family. The emotionality of the relationship is heightened since it is clearly referring to a violence that has 'martyred' his family members.

In contrast, consider, the construction of group membership of the rivals, around another instance of violence:

> ***Rival:*** *the Gujarat police encountered In Gujarat, one Ishrat Jehan, a terrorist girl. And she was shot dead. You would be aware, please remember that day. The entire world's 5 star activists had broken loose on Modi. One female youth was killed. This innocent girl was killed. She was riddled with bullets. Not only this, friends, in this state, those 5 star activists and some media friends declared her a martyr and had organized a funeral procession for her. They had gone to cover her in a sheet! And one party's leader, had donated 1 lakh rupees to her family (Page 9 – Modi). Friends, this is what happens, when such excuses are floated, and this sort of funeral processions are taken out, when they are covered in sheets, 1 lakh rupees are sacrificed, then the terrorists will power is strengthened. They think, 'at least some of our relatives are here, we will manage a life. (Page 10 – Modi)*

Modi recounts the murder of a Muslim girl, ostensibly a terrorist, by the Gujarat police. He describes the concern and emotions of the rival political party leaders towards the girl. It is evident that the emotions he feels for the girl: one of disdain, and the way the rivals and social activists: one of concern, are diametrically opposite. Apart from the financial help of the rival to the girl's family, he draws on this to position the rival as part of the out-group, to the extent that terrorists apparently have their way since they are assured that the rival political party will take care of their concerns, just like family members. The rival strengthens the will power of the terrorists. The way Modi feels for his Hindu family is the same way the rivals feel for the terrorist Muslim out-group.

This oppositional group membership of the leader versus the rivals is played out in different contexts, polarizing the characteristics of the leader against the rival in various ways. For example, the commitment required for securing the country against terrorism, by rivals and by the leader, is shown in the following excerpt:

> ***Ardent v/s Shallow:***
>
> *Friends, what effect POTA has on terrorists is subject to debate, but POTA increases the will power of the Indian armed forces. Friends, there was a time when the police forces had a 25 kg 303 rifle. With a 303 rifle the poor fellow could not even run. When acts of terrorism increased in the country, almost every state handed AK 47's to the police force. I would like to ask the Prime Minister, that in this backdrop of terrorism, you are handing AK 47's instead of 303 rifles to the police, but you are not strengthening the authorizing pen. You rescind POTA*[29]*? What is your logic? I would like to understand. What is your logic? Don't do it because the BJP is demanding it… It's been fourteen years in this Mumbai; it's been fourteen years since bomb blast cases have been going. And not even one of the perpetrators has so much as a scratch on him. Not one of the perpetrators has a scratch on him, but it was possible on Gujarat's soil, because the POTA law provided the means to prosecute them. (Page 4 – Modi)*

The rival leadership, which is at the centre of power, is derided as one that takes its

[29] POTA – Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002. The act defined what a terrorist act and a terrorist is and grants special powers to the investigating authorities described under the act. To ensure certain powers were not misused and human rights violations would not take place, specific safeguards were built into the act. Under the new law detention of a suspect for up to 180 days without the filing of charges in court was permitted. It also allowed law enforcement agencies to withhold the identities of witnesses and treats a confession made to the police as an admission of guilt. Under regular Indian law, a person can deny such confessions in court, but not under POTA. The act was misused on several accounts, notably for the arrest of SAR Geelani, a Delhi University lecturer who was sentenced to death by POTA (by the BJP-led Government) but was later acquitted of charges by the Delhi High Court (during the Congress-led Government)

responsibilities lightly. It is not only a lack of concern for the members of the in-group, but also implies a refusal to secure the safety of the in-group, and thereby strengthening the will power of the terrorists. This argument is made in the context of the POTA law (see footnote). In a context of terror, superficiality also implies an inability on the part of the rival to understand the tangible danger that the in-group is facing, as described by perpetrators still on loose in Mumbai. In contrast, Modi feelingly talks of the implementation of the law in Gujarat and his resolve in bringing the perpetrators to justice. He also aligns himself with the strengthening of the *will* of the Indian armed forces, thereby ensuring that he is working towards ensuring the security of the in-group, in the face of terrorism. The leaders resolve is passionate, while the rivals' is shallow.

Consider the following excerpt, on the dimension of courage:

Strength v/s Cowardice:

And as for the country's leaders… they are scared to speak out against terrorism. And when they meet me personally, all these leaders speak the same words that I am speaking. The ones that shout outside, when they come home, they pat my back. I can take names, friends. And this means, they don't have the courage, but want at least someone to do it (Page 7 – Modi)

Modi barely hides his contempt and disgust for the rival even as he uses their cowardice for validating his position of strength. He hints that the behaviour of the rival is different in public and diametrically opposite in personal space. He discredits his rivals as pretenders even in the matter of enmity. According to the leader, the rivals do not even have the courage to stand up to scrutiny in public life, while he is one who speaks his mind honestly, publicly and privately. And yet, he also maintains an integrity that cannot be expected of the rivals. To back up his claims, he suggests that he could give out the names of the rivals who congratulate him secretly. But the fact that he does not give out the names shows Modi as a man who is decent even with rivals. The leader is honest and straightforward as much as the rivals are deceitful. He puts this across rather succinctly in the next excerpts:

Group serving v/s Self-serving

Only those are afraid, who die for their pictures,
I am that person, who dies for India's picture.

I do not care about my picture. (Page 8 – Modi)

I speak at the right time in the right place with the right words. I don't have the habit of spoiling newspaper space by speaking day and night. There are two kinds of leaders, friends. Some leaders believe in siddhi (perfection), and other leaders believe in prasiddhi (fame). (Page 9 – Modi)

It is clear, that his devotion to the group overrides his own self-interest. His strength of conviction apparently emerges from his singular interest in creating a perfect country for his people, and is not interested in the stardom of *newspaper space.* The rivals on the other hand, seem to only live for their pictures to make it to the front page, and popularity ratings. Public accountability is replaced by self-serving propaganda. That his dedication to duty has brought results, is reflected in the next excerpt:

Victor v/s Victim:

So I said in that public gathering and said, 'look brother, Assam's neighbour is Bangladesh, and Gujarat's neighbour is Pakistan. My situation is the same as yours. They are your next-door neighbours, and these are my next-door neighbours. And I said, but there is a slight difference. 'You are tormented because of them, they are tormented because of me.' (Page 12 – Modi)

Assam is ruled by a Congress-led Government while, Gujarat is led by Narendra Modi. Both the neighbouring countries of Pakistan and Bangladesh are Muslim-dominated, marked as out-groups (as shown in the section on out-groups) in the rhetoric of hate. In this scenario, Modi displays his power to dominate over his enemies while the enemy dominates over the rival. The people of Gujarat are victors since Modi leads them, while the people of Assam are victims of violence since the rivals lead them. Ashok Singhal at the Third World Hindu Conference accounts for the reason for such a difference in leadership in another speech:

Nationalism v/s Politics:

This congregation also believes that the terrorist activities in Kashmir, and the increase of Muslim orthodoxy in the country are dangerous to the Bharat's unity and peace. Unfortunately the country's political parties and politicians, inspired by vote-bank politics are appeasing the Muslims. It was because of this sort of appeasement that Bharat was partitioned in the past. Today, the same sort of question marks the entire country again. Will the patriotic Hindu society see the country fragmented again? The time now is not to divide the people by different

party-based selfish politics, but for the patriotic Hindu to break the walls created by these political parties and speak in one united voice for the sake of saving our 'Dharma'. (Ashok Singhal – proposal 2)

Though the generic political party is mentioned, it is significant that the term *appeasement* is used. Congress is accused of *appeasing minorities* and of *vote-bank politics*, in BJP rhetoric. Singhal links the partitioning of the sub-continent to such *appeasement* tactics of the rivals past leaders like Gandhi and Nehru. In turn, this is linked to Indian Muslims and terrorism destabilizing the country of India. The rivals indulge in petty politics over the larger interest of the nation, and allowed the nation to be divided. In a nutshell, Nehru and Gandhi come to represent the Muslim traitorous out-group, while the saffron leaders represent the Hindu society, steeped in patriotism. The rivals represent divisiveness and selfishness in the form of politics; the leaders represent Unity and selflessness in the form of nationalism.

The rivals' link with various sorts of out-groups is discussed in the next section.

3.4.4.2 Rivals & Out-groups

In this section, we quote three excerpts to show Modi's positioning of the rival as antagonists to the country's people.

Rival: *Tell me friends! POTA law that was created to protect against the terrorists, the day the Indian Government decided to rescind the law, who would have distributed sweets? Who would have burst crackers? Friends, the entire Pakistan was distributing sweets, the entire Pakistan was eating sweets. Is this the work you are going to do? How are you going to save the country from terrorists? And this is why it has become difficult to trust their words. The people of this country cannot believe that these people will save them. (Page 6 – Modi)*

Modi indicts the rival leaders, who at present form the Government of India, as agents of Pakistan. Annulling the law that would have strengthened the Indian in-group against terror attacks (described in earlier sections) is linked to far more sinister designs than just shoddy responsibility of the previous excerpts. The effect of the rivals' action is demonstrably shown with the consequent celebration in Pakistan. Thus, the rival makes/

amends and revokes laws of the in-group, not for the benefit of the in-group but rather in the interest of the out-group (which in this case, is Pakistan). From international concerns, the rivals also align with out-groups within the country in the following ways:

> *Friends, I am shocked. What is the Congress party doing? In Coimbatore, there was a bomb blast in 1998. At an election rally, there was a bomb blast. Advani jee was supposed to address the crowd. 58 people were killed. 58 people were sent to their death. Innocent people were killed. All those people are jailed. But you would be shocked to know, friends, in the Kerala assembly, all the political parties united. There are two main parties there – the congress and the communists. And the others are their comrades from the coalition. All of them unanimously, passed the proposal that the main accused of the '98 case, by the name of Madni, the one who is in jail, should be released from prison. What? What? What is the message that you want to give to the country? This! In the Kerala Assembly, and this was done on the auspicious day of Holi. They had called a special session. Friends, a special session! And in this special session, they passed this proposal: that any person who has committed an act of terrorism, he/she will be released from prison. Why? Because, they want to make him a candidate in the elections! (Page 10 – Modi)*

An incident of bombing against the leader is described. Advani was the de-facto leader of the saffron brigade, touted to be the next Prime Minister of the country if BJP won. The person who masterminded the bombing was jailed, but according to Modi, the rival leadership connived to free this man, and then gave him a ticket to fight the elections under the Congress banner. He emphasizes that this decision was taken on Holi – a day auspicious for Hindus. In effect, he warns the audience that the rival leadership are in fact the terrorists themselves. Therefore they have a complete disregard for Hindu sentiments and lives. The identity of this out-group is much clearer in the next excerpt:

> *ULFA – that indulges in acts of terrorism. The ones who kill innocents, kidnaps them. And you… you take them with you in the elections? You gain politically, that's why you join hands with ULFA? With what temerity will you fight against terrorism? Friends, the Bihar election; a supporting party of the UPA, in that election, they used to roam around the election polls with a certain person. Why? Because, his face was like Bin Laden! He looks like Bin Laden! – and this they showed to secure their votes in Bihar! Friends, can you imagine! Even today, even today in India, no matter how strong Ravana was, does anyone ask for anything in the name of Ravana?! And these people roam with Bin Laden? And with what pride! And our friends in the*

media also proudly stated that 'see, he looks like Bin Laden'. I do not know what relationship they share from which life… (Page 11 – Modi)

Modi makes it evident that the rival leadership forms close friendships with out-groups that are known to attack the Hindu in-group. This out-group in particular is Muslim, evidenced by the similarity to *Bin Laden.* The rivals are proud of this association, according to Modi, since they flaunt it as election gimmicks. *Bin Laden* is equated with *Ravan* (the ruler of Lanka and villain in Ramayana, infamous for kidnapping Sita). He goes on to wonder, how closely the rivals are related to Ravan/ Bin Laden.

The rivals are firmly positioned as hostile and perhaps active destroyers of the in-group, and hence, clearly not fit for leading the in-group. In the next section, we show how this vacuum is filled in with instances of good leadership by the saffron brigade. The alternative to the weak, mean, callous, terrorist harbouring rivals is outlined in the following ways:

3.4.4.3 Self as Ideal Leader

The ideal leader is understood in relation to bad leadership of the rivals in the previous sections. In this section we focus on the ways in which Modi draws on several experiences and characteristics to position himself as the only leader fit to lead the in-group:

Visionary:

Friends, I had just gone to Israel. Every person has a dream; of self-respect of their country, to fight for their country. Why can we not build this environment for Hindusthan? For the future of Bharat's new generation, can we not give ourselves up? If our pictures are smeared, so be it, at least the country will be built!

(Page 18 – Modi)

Modi paints his project for *Hindustan:* imagining the resurgent strength of India with Modi as its fountainhead. The craft of leadership lies in visualizing a future that both the followers and the leader can imagine as possible. Modi displays his political acumen well by citing Israel as an example of a strong country: one that India can emulate under his

leadership. For this, he is willing to sacrifice his 'image', and is willing to bear any ignominy in the cause of the in-group:

> ***Brave:*** *What will I do with this image, friends? For what this image? For garlands of flowers? I am ready to be hit with stones, if I can save the life of my country's citizens (Page 9 – Modi)*

The leader leads from the front, and in this case, Modi positions himself before the group. His 'self' is selfless before the lives of the in-group members. He is humble and brave, that the only time he puts himself before the group, is when the group interest lies in doing so. This pledge of action is reinforced in the beginning of the speech, in the middle, and at the end of it as well:

> ***Emotionality:*** *And that is why I have come with a very heart, a very sad heart. To the families who lost their members, to them, I have come to reassure. I have come to reassure those families that the blood of your family's son will bring colour. (Page 1 - Modi)*
> *Friends, I have promised, till there is life within me, I will search these merchants of death one by one and even them out. (Page 7- Modi)*
> *The country's future has to be decided by the country's citizens. It is up to us to end this game played by the merchants of death. We must do it. We will have to do it together. (Page 18 – Modi)*

The leader is emotionally connected with the in-group. He feels their pain, and their loss. The context of speech starts with an incident of violence and a promise of retribution. Modi's leadership promises that there will be extreme consequences for the out-groups to face, especially for the ones that have dared to attack Modi's beloved Hindu in-group, thereby securing the future of the in-group.

3.5 Summary

In this chapter, we added further layers to the model we developed in the chapter on visual representations. The richness of detail in precisely how groups are categorized, constituted and then set up in inter-group relations provided the backdrop to the questions asked: how are conditions for genocide or extreme hostilities sanctioned? And why are

certain stereotypes put forward. To sum up the various strands of arguments generated from the qualitative researches:

1. Particular representations of an out-group are put forth to bolster aggressive leadership on the one hand and undermine rival credibility on the other. The qualities are usually in opposition to one other, the positives attributed to self as leader, and negatives to the rivals. In other words, *category prototypicality* is contested and positioned.
    a. Strong leader/ weak rival
    b. Courageous leader/ Timid rivals
    c. Effective governance of leader/ Mis-governance of rivals
    d. Service before self for leader/ Self before service for rivals
2. Leaders are shown to be of the in-group, and rivals are progressively shown to be of the out-group. This links to the studies showing that *category constructions* are crucial to the ways in which action is solicited. This goes a step further to show that only by positioning oneself as *prototypical* of the group can one then draw the comparison to discredit political rivals by showing the self as the strongest possible choice, in fact, perhaps the only choice (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). This is done in the following ways
    a. Rivals by their silence at the atrocities directed towards the in-group by the out-group, making policies that appease the out-group, allowing the out-groups to attack the in-group's sacred places, actively creating opportunities for the out-group to outnumber in-group.
    b. Leaders by taking strong authoritarian positions against the out-group, recommending and carrying out swift military action in the interests of the in-group, urging members of the in-group to be more vigilant, leading from the front of this aggression.
3. Entrepreneurs of identity evoke out-group threats and hateful representations of out-group to police the behaviour of the in-group (mostly the codes are set for women).
4. The relationship between the in-group and the out-groups is one of threat. Various kinds of threats are constructed:
    a. Sacred – Desecration of temples, attacks on women - symbolized by torture discourse on the cow, and partitioning of the mother-land of India.

b. Economic, financial, citizenship rights, numerical strength,
c. Death – control of fate over the in-group members. Family members death. Annihilation of in-group values and people.

5. Under conditions of threat: the more exclusively virtuous the in-group, the greater the aggression against an out-group threat.

In the next chapter, we draw on data from the qualitative studies to design an experimental manipulation of out-group threat and in group virtue. The position of in-group virtuousness as a reason for sanctioning and carrying out extreme hostilities against out-groups is hypothesised and tested.

4 Study 3: Experiment - Virtuous Violence.

The previous chapters used qualitative analyses to explore the nature of hate discourse in two mediums – visual representations in posters and mobilizations by political speeches. A model that combines intra-group struggles of power within the framework of inter-group hate rhetoric was proposed from these analyses. Among the many interesting issues that emerged, one in particular struck as peculiarly counter-intuitive – the notion that the virtue of an in-group is used to warrant/ justify aggression against a threatening out-group. In this chapter we shall focus on testing the role of in-group virtue in sanctioning inter-group violence.

4.1 Introduction

A key theme that emerged from the previous qualitative studies is that entrepreneurs of hate construct inter-group relations in such a way that under certain conditions, extreme hostilities or the sanctioning of such violence against 'enemy' out-groups are celebrated. It has been contended that these exclusionary conditions emerge from a combination of two things: a) Out-group threat; and b) A virtuous in-group.

The ways in which this internal moral logic that leads up to such a violent conclusion is constructed have been analysed and discussed in the previous chapters. Largely, it is exemplified in poster no. 11 of the first qualitative study in this thesis (p. 66). Recall the poster of a Hindu king chopping off the hands of a Muslim butcher with the caption, "*cow-killer deserves to be slain*". This is also seen in other forms in the exhortation of the political leader's speech in chapter 3 (the second qualitative study of this thesis). Hence, violence becomes virtuous when it is directed against out-groups that threaten a virtuous in-group.

Yet to show that this is how leaders seek to motivate out-group hatred by analysing discourse is not the same as demonstrating that such constructions are effective in creating out-group hatred in the population, or that such conditions will lead to demands

for hostile measures and behaviours against the Muslim out-group. Hence, the aim of this study is to provide experimental data for the contention that the worst or the most stringent forms of repression and suppression happen when an in-group norm of virtue is made salient in conjunction with the presence of out-group threat. In research terms, this study aims to experimentally demonstrate that an in-group norm of tolerance would predict higher violence under conditions of threat, than when the in-group norm is not of tolerance.

4.1.1 The cultural context for the present study:

Since the experiment was to be conducted in India, a cultural understanding of Hindu (Indian) in-group norms and commonly held stereotypical notions of the particular ways in which Muslims threaten the in-group was drawn upon to design materials for the two Independent factors of the experiment. The Dependent Variables outlining various methods for 'effective' suppression and repression of Muslim 'menace' were also developed from themes that emerged from the qualitative studies and from the researcher's cultural experience. Presented below is a background to the development of the materials:

Independent factors:

Virtuous in-group:

"India and Hindu are often equated when defining Indian culture, whose core characteristics are most often taken to be Hindu" writes David Ludden in the introduction to his incisively titled edited book 'Making India Hindu' (Ludden, 2005, p. 4). The Indian in-group is constituted as essentially virtuous and pious and is posited with qualities that are thought to be uniquely linked with Hinduism (see 3.2.1 of this thesis). In particular, 'tolerance' has been emphasized as the basic strain of Hindu civilization. It is to be noted that in the Indian context, 'tolerance' is not understood as a negative term but has strongly moral and positive connotations reflective of Gandhian principles of respect for peaceful coexistence among religious groups informed by the notion that the 'Hindu civilization is basically tolerant'(Veer, 1996). Hence, for this experiment the in-group

norm manipulation was designed to appear Indian with tolerance as the distinctively Hindu characteristic.

Threat:

Extensive studies have been conducted on the impact of realistic threats and symbolic threats, and symbolic threats have consistently been shown to evoke strident reactions as opposed to realistic threats (Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Schneider, 2008; González et al., 2008). However, for the purposes of this experiment, we decided to use realistic threat as an independent variable since the experiment was to be conducted with an impressionable population that would have been directly susceptible to accepting hate discourse without a critical lens. Therefore, we drew on realistic threats from the previous qualitative studies to formulate the items.

A common anti-Muslim joke is '*us five, ours twenty-five'* (Pandey, 2006; Sarkar, 1996), usually caricatured by a figure of a Muslim man surrounded by 4 wives with twenty-five children. This stereotype is rooted in the provisions of the Muslim Personal Law in India that allows for polygamy. As noted in the prologue this particular construction of numerical strength of out-group threat was also used in the leaflets that were distributed in preparation for the Gujarat carnage (see prologue of this thesis). The notion that the Muslims are reproducing and increasing their numerical strength exponentially is a recurrent theme in the hate rhetoric of Hindutva (see 3.2.3.1 of previous chapter).

Also, in a set of posters that were put up in the same tent as the posters that was used for data analysis in the first study, a series of the 'increase in Muslim and Christian numbers' was presented as 'facts' that were then reinforced with statistical figures. These posters were sprinkled with official-looking figures with one punchy headline, capturing the apparent meaning of all those numbers. The numbers were faded prints of district-wise data, but only just, to fit the official look of mouldy Government documents. It was captioned: *Increase in Muslim and Christian population and it's influence on elections.* This fear of the purported increase in Muslim population (Bhagat & Praharaj, 2005) is linked with the notion of the 'Muslim' vote as one consolidated political identity

(Varshney, 2002) as opposed to the loosely based Hindu identity, deeply divided on caste, regional and linguistic lines (Datta, 1993). This idea that the community votes as a single bloc of voters is what is referred to as 'vote bank' politics.[30] That the Muslims with their 'vote-bank' politics will come to 'influence' (or, if one is to accept the Hindutva propaganda, have already started influencing) core issues with greater political clout than the relatively loosely defined majoritarian Hindus is a cause of perpetual panic for most Hindu-Indian citizens. Inculcating and mobilizing the fear of this projected *influence* of the 'Other' on a range of issues from greater electoral power than Hindus to cultural dominance over the Hindus is therefore, central to the threat discourse, and most in India would recognize Muslim 'influence' as a code for threat.

Dependent Variables:

Extreme acts of hatred have a strong 'moral' component. In the trajectory of combining the in-group virtue of tolerance with a fearsome out-group threat, aggression against the out-group is defended in terms of 'tolerance' of the in-group. In other words, since the very value of tolerance is under threat of annihilation, it is in defence of the Hindu nation that tolerance must be substituted with intolerance. Entrepreneurs incite a range of hostile behaviours from the in-group members as 'reasonable reactions', and a complex mix of emotions like anger, frustration, humiliation are mobilized in the service of sanctioning hostility against the out-group (see 3.2.3 of this thesis) The one used to justify the anti-Muslim pogrom in Gujarat of 2002, for instance, was of provoked 'spontaneous Hindu outrage'. The other instances call for direct violence, active repression, and cultural suppression. For example, a Hindu ideologues' call to stop all financial and business transactions with the Muslim community (see chapter 3 of this thesis) or a woman ideologues' exhort to curb inter-mixing between Hindu and Muslim communities especially Hindu women and Muslim men (see chapter 3 of this thesis). For dependent variables, an affect scale measuring anti-Muslim feeling was developed with items culled from previous qualitative research and a few from previously tested studies in India (Tausch et al., 2009). 12 Action-statement items were put together informed by the 'appropriate' reactions that have been proposed by the Hindutva ideologues.

[30] The Congress party is usually accused by the BJP for indulging in 'vote-bank' politics.

4.1.2 Hypothesis:

An interaction effect (Virtue X Threat) is predicted on the DV's. In research design terms, in the conditions with out-group threat present, there will be *more*

(a) negative feelings towards Muslims

(b) cultural suppression of Muslims

(c) repressive action against Muslims

(d) sanctioned violence against Muslims;

in the condition of in-group virtue than the condition with no in-group virtue.

4.2 Methods

4.2.1 Participants

95 Undergraduate Engineering students in an age range of 18-22 and registered as Hindu (religion) in the College admission records.

4.2.2 Design

This is a two factor [2X2] independent subjects design. The first factor is Threat with two levels (Absent/ Present). The second factor is Virtue also with two levels (Absent/ Present). The participants were almost equally distributed in all four conditions. The composition of the four conditions and the manipulations were as follows:

Condition 1 (Appendix 4-b**)**
Virtue (Absent)
Threat (Absent)
= 25

Condition 2 (Appendix 4-c**)**
Virtue (Present)
Threat (Absent)
= 20

Condition 3 (Appendix 4-d**)**
Virtue (Absent)
Threat (Present)
= 23

Condition 4 (Appendix 4-e**)**
Virtue (Present)
Threat (Present)
= 27

4.2.3 Materials:

The material consisted of an 8-page booklet, tailor-made for each of the four conditions: a relevant instruction page followed by the introduction of visual stimuli for the Independent factors of 1) Virtue (neutral or manipulated), and 2) Threat (neutral or manipulated). The next section of the booklet, (pages 5,6,7 and 8) containing the Dependent Variables and demographic questions, was the same for all four conditions.

4.2.3.1 Independent Factors

4.2.3.1.1 Virtue: Manipulation of in-group norm

Virtue was operationalised by getting participants to evaluate visual banners for a website that the researcher had been asked to develop.

The **Virtue-absent** and **Virtue-present** conditions were introduced as unrelated to the actual survey. Participants were informed that the project involved developing a webpage for celebrating the Indian way of life focussing on a unique aspect, which was textiles for the Virtue-absent condition and tolerance for the Virtue-present condition, thus ensuring that tolerance was manipulated as a function of in-group norm, in contrast to something neutral as textiles.

In the virtue-absent condition, a neutral theme was chosen – Indian textiles and participants saw 3 visual banners stressing how textile production is a timeless feature of Indian culture (see appendix 4-b, 4-d). In the Virtue (present) condition the theme was Indian tolerance and participants saw 3 visual banners that stresses tolerance as a timeless attribute of Indian culture (see appendix 4-c, 4-e). Banners in both conditions were designed to keep them as similar as possible with a distinctive Hindu touch, and only the text (Textile/ Tolerance) changed.

So for example, in the Virtue-absent condition, the first banner (see appendix 4-b,4-d) reads “textiles” against a background of the Indian national flag colours. The ‘i’ in “textile” is designed to look like a vermillion smear (worn by Hindus on their forehead). Similarly the first banner in the Virtue-present condition (see appendix 4-c, 4-e) has the

text "tolerance" written across it with the 'o' replaced by the Hindu sign for 'Om'; thereby ensuring that both banners retained a distinctively Hindu strain. The manipulation was therefore ensured as a change of in-group norm. Furthermore, the following **different** instructions were printed for the two (absent/ present) conditions:

> The virtue-absent condition: (Appendix 4-b, 4-d)
> *The webpage will showcase the importance of* ***Textiles in the traditional Indian way of life****. According to the Rig Veda and the Upanishads, the universe is a continuous* ***fabric*** *with a grid pattern upon which cycles of life are painted.*
> ***Indian textiles*** *have evolved with the development of Hindu civilisation and its significance is hallowed by tradition. With this ethos, these three banners have been designed to represent our Vedic civilization through Indian textiles.*
>
> The virtue-present condition: (Appendix 4-c, 4-e)
> *The webpage will showcase the importance of* ***Tolerance in the traditional Indian way of life****. According to the Rig Veda and the Upanishads, the universe is a continuous cycle of karma, with* ***tolerance*** *being the sacred value upon which hinge the cycles of rebirth.*
> ***Indian tolerance*** *has evolved with the development of Hindu civilisation and its significance is hallowed by tradition. With this ethos, these three banners have been designed to represent our Vedic civilization through the sacred value of 'tolerance'.*

To make the story about the webpage appear as authentic as possible, the participants were also asked to rank the banners on aspects pertaining to representativeness and attractiveness of the theme.

4.2.3.1.2 Threat: Manipulation of Out-group Characteristics

Given the prevailing context of aggression against Muslims in the Indian discourse, it was felt that the tricky part was going to be in successfully inducing a positive (threat-absent condition) representation of the Muslim out-group. The conditions (threat-absent/ threat-present) were designed as a cover-page for a survey report simulating the Sachar Committee Report on Minorities, a published Government of India report.[31]

[31] The Sachar Committee Report is a well-known piece of Government document that surveyed and reported about the socio-economic, political and educational condition of minorities (in particular the Muslim community) in India.

Common to both conditions (Threat-absent and present) was the overall framework of a cover-page comprising of a map of India with ten leading personalities from various fields, all bearing Islamic names. In the Threat-absent condition (see appendix 4-b, 4-c) three figures were different than in the Threat-present Condition (see appendix 4-d, 4-e). On the bottom left corner of the map were the words 'Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India' replicating the Sachar Committee Report. The specific differences in both conditions to introduce 'Threat' are outlined as follows:

In the **Threat (Absent) Conditions** (refer: Appendix 4-b, 4-c) the top right corner read '*The Muslim Contribution in India'.*

A brief description followed:

The Threat-absent Condition:

The report indicates three important things:

1. A substantial increase in the contribution of Muslims to India,
2. Muslim contribution in areas of social, economic, political and cultural life of India
3. Muslim contribution to India's pride and prestige in the international arena

Participants were then asked to rank the *level of contribution* that they thought the personalities had to *India's excellence.*

In the **Threat (present) Conditions** (refer: Appendix 4-d, 4-e) the following changes were made:

The heading of the cover-page read: '*The Muslim Influence in India'.*

The Threat-present Condition:

The report indicates three important things:

1. A disproportionate emergence of Muslim influence in India,
2. Muslim authority in areas of social, economic, political and cultural life.
3. A commitment to reshaping the cultural landscape of India.

Participants were then asked to rank the *level of intent* that they thought the personalities had to *take-over India.*

4.2.3.2 Dependent Variables

The Dependent Variables were included in guided by research of the qualitative analyses. An Affect Scale and Action-statements followed by a virtue manipulation check items and 5 identification questions.

4.2.3.2.1 Affect Scale:

15 items were used to measure *Affect*. Participants were asked to rate what they feel when they think about Muslims. They were asked to report the intensity of their emotions on a range of 0 (not at all) to 9 (completely). These constructs were primarily arrived at from the qualitative analyses of the hate rhetoric. These were the emotions that the leaders generated, encouraged and insisted that true Hindus must feel against Muslims. The construct of 'contempt' however, was introduced by one of the researchers as a construct that had been used before to measure anti-feeling towards the out-group (Tausch et al., 2011), and was included because of prior usage.

The Affect scale had the following constructs –
Anger measured by the items Angry, Annoyed, Infuriated
Anxiety measured by Nervous, Apprehensive, Upset;
Threatened measured by Intimidated, Frightened, Vulnerable, Cheated
Happiness measured by Happy, cheerful, relaxed; and
Contempt measured by Contempt, Disdain.

The construct of happiness was deliberately introduced to balance the overall negative affect scale with some positive affect.

4.2.3.2.2 Action-statements

The 12-item Action-statements were pieced together informed by themes that emerged from the qualitative analysis. Repressive Action, Cultural Suppression, Violence against Out-group and Threat manipulation check.

Participants were asked to Strongly disagree signified by four negative signs (- - - -) to Strongly agree signified by four plus signs (+ + + +) on a range of decreasing

disagreement of 4 degrees and increasing agreement of 4 degrees on either side. There was no neutral option available. The themes on which items were included are:

Repressive Action: *'We need strong anti-terror laws to protect our country against Muslim terrorism.'; 'Since Muslims take advantage of Indian tolerance, our aggression against Muslims is an act of self-defence'* and one positively worded (reverse coded) item statement *'For national security, it is not reasonable for the Army and Police to use strong methods to interrogate Muslims suspected of terrorism'*

Cultural Suppression: Three item-statements were used to measure the construct of Cultural Suppression. *'The Muslim call for prayers (Azaan) through loud-speakers should be prohibited'; 'For Indian democracy, Islamic religious teachings by Mullahs should not be tolerated'; and one positively worded (reverse-coded) item-statement, 'Islamic educational institutions like Madrassahs should be allowed to function'.*

Violence against Out-group: Three items that had been scaled reliably in a previous study by (Tausch et al, 2011) were used to measure sanctioned violence against Muslims. *'In general, I sympathise when some Indians use violence against Muslims, even though I do not condone violence itself.'; 'I understand the reasons given by some Indians for the use of violence, even though I do not condone violence itself.';* and *'I support the reasons given by some Indians for the use of violence against Muslims even though I do not condone violence itself.'*

Threat: There were three items that were reverse-coded and put as a threat manipulation check. *'Muslims have contributed positively to Indian culture'; 'Most Muslims are willing to live in peace with others Indians'* and *'Some Muslims have contributed greatly to India's excellence in science and technology*

4.2.3.2.3 Virtue manipulation check and identification:

Though these items were included in the experiment, they have not been analysed in the present study.

4.2.4 Procedure:

4.2.4.1 Pilot:

Both Independent factors, Virtue and Threat, were piloted as manipulation checks with 2 small groups of people (N=20, N=30) in India, and both were found to discriminate significantly.

4.2.4.2 Main Study:

Note: *Since it was not possible for the researcher to be present in India at the time of running the experiment, a senior psychologist in India was entrusted with the responsibility of conducting the experiment in accordance with the academic rigour and ethical standards of UTREC.*

The study was conducted in an engineering college in Bhubaneshwar, Odisha (an Eastern state of India). Prior permission had been taken from a lecturer at the college for her class timings for conducting the experiment. This particular class was chosen because all the students were registered as Hindu, and because the students were already seated in two separate classrooms, as section A and B.

The experiment was introduced to the participants as a survey of Indian attitudes. They were told that this survey was part of a research project of a student and their cooperation and help was solicited. Participants were free to walk out of the class if they didn't want to participate in the research. None did, and the experiment commenced. They were then told that before the survey about the attitudes of Indians (the threat manipulation), there is another small visual survey that their participation is requested for. They were asked to rate visual banners, (given on the second page of their experimental booklets) for a webpage themed around 'Indian value of the year'. This was the virtue manipulation. These instructions were given in both classrooms, one after the other.

All the participants were given stapled experimental booklets specific to the experimental

conditions, containing instructions towards a web-page design (Independent Factor -1) and a survey (Independent Factor-2) followed with response sheets containing the DV's.

In condition 1 (Virtue-absent, Threat-absent), participants were given the experimental booklet contained in appendix 4-b

In condition 2 (Virtue-present, Threat-absent), participants were given the experimental booklet contained in appendix 4-c

In condition 3 (Virtue-absent, Threat-present), participants were given the experimental booklet contained in appendix 4-d

In condition 4 (Virtue-present, Threat-present), participants were given the experimental booklet contained in appendix 4-e

After about 45 minutes, the psychologist who was conducting the experiment on behalf of the researcher requested all the participants from all the four conditions to gather in one room for a debriefing and open question-answer session. The debriefing emphasized that the manipulations and 'facts' that had been given to the participants in the threat-present condition were not true facts per se, but stereotypical constructions of Muslims in hate propaganda. Each 'threat' and dependent variable action-statements were carefully explained as 'constructions' and not 'reality'. And counter-arguments and statistical information was provided to dismantle the connections, especially of the 'Muslim-problem' of population. The role of in-group virtue was explained, and the actual aim of the experiment was disclosed. Participants were also asked to reflect upon the counter-intuitive notion that 'tolerance might actually make us nastier under certain conditions.'

Should they have further questions, they were asked to contact the psychologist who was conducting the experiment on his phone number. A debriefing form containing information about the study, a short description of how public discourses must be scrutinized and the contact information of the researcher and her supervisor (see appendix 4-f) was also given to the participants to take back with them.

4.3 Results

The analysis was carried out in two phases. A preliminary analysis (4.3.1) followed by the Main Analysis (4.3.2)

4.3.1 Preliminary Analysis:

A preliminary investigation of the data was conducted, testing for reliability and ANOVA, which was later changed to ANCOVA, because of the data screening in 4.3.1.1.

4.3.1.1 Gender Effect:

Gender was not conceptualized as a factor in the initial experiment. However, after scrutinizing the data, it was analysed using Gender as an independent variable. Since the gender constitution of the groups have a disproportionately unequal distribution particularly in condition 4 where both the Independent factors Threat and Virtue were manipulated (Males = 21, Females = 6), it was decided to use gender as a covariate to partial out the effect if any, from the dependent variables.

4.3.1.2 Affect Scale:

The reliability of the scale was calculated with the three happiness items reverse-coded and it was found at an acceptable value (α=.85) The scale was further analysed in the main analysis.

4.3.1.3 Action-Statements:

A reliability analysis of the *Action-Statements,* (five items reverse-coded), was found to be at α=.45

An ANCOVA revealed no significant main effects. However, there was a marginally significant[32] interaction (Virtue*Threat), $F(1,90)=3.37$, $p=.07$. On further

[32] (p 166; (Aron, Aron, & Coups, 2007) The authors recommend an increase in the level of significance to 10% (.05 to .1) for exploratory experimental studies conducted within robust theoretical paradigms. Given that the experimental hypothesis emerged from rich qualitative studies and was formulated with a predicted direction in the exploratory stage, it can be argued that Aron's proposition is applicable to the present

analysis of *simple main effects* (groups split by threat), it was found that Virtue had no effect in the Threat-absent condition.

However, a similar analysis in the Threat (present) condition revealed a marginally significant effect of Virtue $F(1,47)=3.18$, $p=.08$. The Mean of Condition (Threat-present and Virtue-absent) = 3.89 is less than the Mean of Condition (Threat-present and Virtue-absent) = 4.26. This lends support to the hypothesis that in the Threat-present condition an introduction of Virtue leads to an increase in the general demand of curb measures towards Muslims.

With the statistical analysis yielding low reliability, but ANCOVA indicating a pattern, 6 items were re-organised. Items measuring support for violence against the Out-group though used in a different study (Tausch et al, 2011) would also be dropped due to the complex wordings of the item-statements. The experimenter had also received feedback that the participants had difficulty in understanding the meaning and import of those particular items. Though this did not improve the reliability of the 'scale', the results on the ANCOVA showed significant effects and were included in the main analysis.

4.3.2 Main Analysis

The main analysis proceeded on two sets of Dependent Variables a) Affect Scale and b) Action-statements comprising of 6 items (discarding 6 in the preliminary analysis) in two steps:

i) Interaction effect; and

ii) Analysis of simple main effects - Each interaction effect was subjected to a further analysis to check for direction of the effect, i.e. *Simple main effects:* the overall data were split by threat (into low threat and threat) and analysed for effect of tolerance in low threat condition and effect of tolerance in high threat condition.

Everything was analysed keeping gender as covariate.

4.3.2.1 Affect Scale:

The reliability of the scale was calculated with the three happiness items reverse-coded and it was found at an acceptable value (α=.85).

ANCOVA: There was no significant main effect. However, there was a significant interaction effect (Virtue*Threat), $F(1,90)=7.67$, $p=.007$

On further analysis of *simple main effects* (groups split by threat), it was found that Virtue had a significant effect in Threat-absent condition, $F(1,42)=6.83$, $p=.01$. The Mean of Condition (Threat-absent and Virtue-absent) = 3.65 is greater than the Mean of Condition (Threat-absent and Virtue-present) = 2.60. The direction in the difference of Means indicates that introducing Virtue in a Threat-absent condition drops the level of negative feelings towards the Muslim out-group.

A similar analysis in the Threat (present) condition reveals no significant effect of Virtue. However, the Mean of Condition (Threat-present and Virtue-absent) = 2.97 is less than the Mean of Condition (Threat-present and Virtue-present) = 3.33, suggests that in the high threat condition, an introduction of Virtue tends to increase the negative affect towards the Muslim out-group. The direction of the difference in Means lends some support to the hypothesis, even though the difference is not significant.

4.3.2.2 Cultural Suppression & Active Repression:

Though combining the *Cultural Suppression* and the *Repressive Action* into a 'scale' yielded a low reliability score (α=.37), the items when put together discriminated between the conditions.

ANCOVA on the items written for cultural suppression and active repression showed an interaction (Virtue*Threat) effect found at $F=(1,90)$, $p=.04$

An analysis of the *simple main effects* (groups split by threat), revealed that Virtue had no effect in the Threat-absent condition. However, in line with the predicted hypothesis, a similar analysis in the Threat (present) condition revealed a significant

effect of Virtue $F(1,47)=4.57$, $p=.03$. The difference is in the predicted direction since, the Mean of Condition (Threat-present and Virtue-absent) = 4.06 is less than the Mean of Condition (Threat-present and Virtue-absent) = 4.70.

4.4 Discussion:

The hypothesis combined in-group virtue and out-group into a counter-intuitive proposition: under conditions of high threat, greater professed in-group tolerance norm will lead to greater sanction of more stringent actions against the out-group. The key finding is that we do find the expected interactions on the predicted dependent variables, although the exact nature of the interaction is different on different measures.

The interaction on the Affect Scale was significant $F(1,90)=7.67$, $p=.007$. But a further analysis on the simple main effects, revealed that the shape of the interaction was not in the predicted direction. Virtue did not increase negative feelings towards Muslims in conditions of high threat, however, virtue did decrease negative feelings towards Muslims under conditions of no threat $F(1,42)=6.83$, $p=.01$ Though the research hypothesis for the affect scale was disconfirmed, the interesting part is that tolerance has a positive effect as a virtue where out-group threat is absent.

The interaction of virtue and threat on 6 Action-statements analysed together was significant at $F=(1,90)$, $p=.04$ [The Repressive Action action-statement items were: *'We need strong anti-terror laws to protect our country against Muslim terrorism.'; 'Since Muslims take advantage of Indian tolerance, our aggression against Muslims is an act of self-defence*' and one positively worded (reverse coded) item statement '*For national security, it is* ***not*** *reasonable for the Army and Police to use strong methods to interrogate Muslims suspected of terrorism'*. Cultural suppression action-statement items were: *'The Muslim call for prayers (Azaan) through loud-speakers should be prohibited'; 'For Indian democracy, Islamic religious teachings by Mullahs should* ***not*** *be tolerated'; and* one positively worded (reverse-coded) item-statement, *'Islamic educational institutions like Madrassahs should be allowed to function'*.] This was further analysed to determine the shape of the interaction. Virtue had no effect in the condition where threat was absent, however, virtue worked in the predicted direction in the condition where threat is present

at $F(1,47)=4.57$, $p=.03$ Therefore the research-hypothesis on the action-statements in a particular combination was confirmed.

The final hypothesis of *Violence against Out-group* measures did not work. A plausible explanation could be because of the way that the statements were framed. Apart from the complicated sentence structure, while all the other item-statements imply generic support for or against suggested actions, these three items invoked a sense of personal accountability (*'In general, I sympathise when some Indians use violence against Muslims, even though I do not condone violence itself.'; 'I understand the reasons given by some Indians for the use of violence, even though I do not condone violence itself.';* and '*I support the reasons given by some Indians for the use of violence against Muslims even though I do not condone violence itself.*) The manipulation check of threat did not work in the actual experiment. This is an issue that needs further research.

Understanding Threat: The influential intergroup theory by Stephan and colleagues states, "We now believe that in general low power groups are more likely than high power groups to *experience* threats but that high power groups to the extent that they actually perceive that they are threatened will react more strongly to threat" (p 70 Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). The literature on inter-group threat theory suggests that using symbolic threat would have led to a greater possibility of sanctioning violence against the outgroup rather than realistic threat (Pereira et al., 2009; González et al., 2008). Work done by Tausch and colleagues in India, within the framework of intergroup threat theory, show that while realistic threat might be a proximal predictor of prejudice, the findings are constrained by the particular group identities of majority and minority group identities. So for example, for Hindus (majority group) symbolic threat predicted prejudice while for Muslims (minority group) it was realistic threat (Tausch et al., 2009) This is an important finding for the context in which this experiment was conducted on Hindu students. The experiment also carries within it the ethical consideration of ensuring that in the process of participation in the experiment, hate discourse is not inadvertently endorsed. The manipulation of realistic threat instead of symbolic threat was one that was based on an ethical judgment. Since this is not something one can conduct without ensuring further follow up in terms of workshops or sustained engagement with the participants, the researchers decided that a debrief session of 2 hours would not suffice. In

contrast, realistic threat dealing with 'statistics' can be countered as made-up data citing various other sources. Ethically, this was judged to be a more acceptable process within the available time than ending up doing more harm by adding to the discourse of hate with symbolic threat manipulations.

Therefore an intensive debriefing session was organised at the end of the experiment for participants of all conditions dismantling the 'facts' that had been put forward as manipulations, especially noting that social scientists in various papers (Phadke, 1993; Puniyani, 2005; Rohini, 1993; Thapar, 1989) argue that there is little or no truth to the claims of Muslim over-population made by the saffron ideologues.

The results though conservative in significance and effect, shed light on the impact of in-group virtue and out-group threat on emotion and action-statements. In cases of emotion, virtue can lead to decreased negativity for those not threatened, but not for those threatened. In the case of action-statements demanding measures to curb typically Islamic cultural practises, virtue leads to increased negativity for those who are threatened but not those who are not threatened. Interestingly, Stephan and colleagues also note, realistic threats would be expected to lead to more 'pragmatic' responses to the outgroup, as behaviour designed to cope with the threat (Stephan et al., 2009, p. 53).

4.5 Limitations

There are a number of methodological limitations of this study and ethical considerations that must be kept in view before assessing the potential for further studies.

The reliability conundrum: The Action-statements have very low reliability as sub-scales of dimensions of Active Repression, Cultural Suppression, Violence and as an overall scale. However, it is to be noted that when the items for the action-statements were conceptualised, they weren't pre-tested for scale reliability because it was not put together with the larger research interest of developing a scale or test. The items were worded and developed specifically for this experiment. Therefore, culturally embedded items were developed with material informed by the two previous qualitative researches, (see chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis) to discriminate well amongst the four experimental

conditions. For future studies, it would be advisable to fine-tune the measuring instruments for a better sensitive index with pre-tested reliable scales.

The specific sample: The participants were undergraduate engineering students, perhaps not particularly engaged with the political scenario. The results may have been stronger had this been conducted in areas where mobilizations have been active, and perhaps would have yielded very different results with students in those Universities.

Compared to the discourses available in the public space (see chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis), the manipulations used in the experiment, (especially the threat manipulation) was relatively subtle. There is also a considerable distance between the written measures and the behaviours that the researchers were interested in. For this study, the measure that came closest to sanctioning direct action against the out-group i.e. *Violence against Out-group* failed to work altogether. Most obviously the measures need to be addressed and revised carefully. However since, there was an interaction effect found on action-statements in the dimension of cultural suppression and active repression with items that included expressions of antagonism against the Muslim out-group (i.e. *Since Muslims take advantage of Indian tolerance, our aggression against Muslims is an act of self-defence*') and curb measures disallowing Muslims their right to practise their religion (*'The Muslim call for prayers (Azaan) through loud-speakers should be prohibited'; 'For Indian democracy, Islamic religious teachings by Mullahs should* ***not*** *be tolerated'; and* one positively worded (reverse-coded) item-statement, *'Islamic educational institutions like Madrassahs should be allowed to function')* it does lead one to ponder about the significance of how written measures might translate to action, i.e. if they are prepared to say this in class to academics, what might they do in normative contexts, which are more supportive of anti-Muslim action.

As discussed in the previous section on the responses to realistic and symbolic threats, the experiment used realistic threats as dependent variables out of an ethical decision. As noted in the discussion, since realistic threat might be expected to lead to 'realistic' behaviour to cope with threat from the out-group, this might in part also explain the subdued results of the experiment (Stephan et al., 2009).

Further studies might be experimental while revising the measures, one might also analyse actual audiences at rallies and those who see posters – combining our methods between the earlier studies and this one in effect.

4.6 Conclusion:

In conclusion, though, it is fairly acceptable to state that even with subtle manipulations of realistic threat, we still find something disturbing and paradoxical: sometimes, (notably when the out-group is construed as a threat), in-group virtue leads us to be rather supportive of cultural suppression and active repression.

5 Study 4: Counter-hegemonic discourse

"The single story creates stereotypes, and the problem with stereotypes is not that they are untrue, but that they are incomplete. They make one story become the only story."

Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, TedTalk[33]

5.1 Introduction

So far, the research focus has been on the discourse of hate. But, inter-group violence is not the only way in which groups relate to each other or the only way in which *entrepreneurs of identity* seek to mobilize. Political will has also been mobilized in on the basis of solidarity. In a study that analysed the rescue of Bulgarian Jews during the period of Holocaust, 'this was the only case where Jews largely survived within a country that was in the pro-German camp and where, at the end of the war, there were more Jews living than before it started' (Reicher et al., 2006), show that mobilizations were based on solidarity, specifically arguing that the predominant category which was based on national identity was defined and constituted in inclusive ways. (i.e. 'we Bulgarians'). India too has had it's share of fierce resistance and challenge to communal elements by groups of concerned citizens (Puniyani, 2005; Saint, 2002). Counter-hegemonic voices, perhaps not as politically strong and mobilised as the right-wing presently are, have nevertheless persisted in their fight against communal mobilization, sometimes at great personal risk (SabrangCommunications; CounterCurrents, 2012).

This study looks at one such rally of solidarity organized for the victims of anti-christian violence in an Eastern state of India.

5.1.1 Context and Site of data-collection:

In 2008, Kandhamal district in Odisha (an Eastern state of India) was the site of anti-Christian violence. The violence was said to be a 'spontaneous' revenge of Hindus for the murder of their seer, Swami Laxmanand Saraswati. The Swami's murder was carried out by the Maoist party members who had left posters at the site owning up to the

[33] (Adichie, 2009)

murder (Patnaik, 2008). The following anti-Christian violence, according to government figures in Kandhamal district alone saw more than '600 villages ransacked, 5600 houses looted and burnt, 54000 people left homeless, 38 people murdered and 295 churches burnt and destroyed' (Christian Today India, 2011) Fact-finding missions and independent social activist enquiries revealed the presence of the same strain of virulent right-wing discourse that was found in Gujarat 2002, to be prevalent in the justification of the violence in Kandhamal too. What is more, contrary to the claims of 'spontaneous outrage', the preparation and organisation of the violence pointed towards pre-meditated action (for an extensive review see CounterCurrents, 2012).

In 2010, 2 years after the violence, a solidarity forum of concerned citizens organized The National People's Tribunal (NPT) on Kandhamal, in New Delhi on 22-24 August 2010. This forum is a 'countrywide solidarity platform of concerned social activists, media persons, researchers, legal experts, film makers, artists, writers, scientists and civil society organizations to assist the victims and survivors of the Kandhamal violence 2008 to seek justice, accountability and peace and to restore the victim-survivors' right to a dignified life' (Preliminary Findings And Recommendations Of National People's Tribunal On Kandhamal, 2010). For the purpose of this study, I chose this particular gathering of social activists who had come together in Delhi to express solidarity and demand justice for the victims of the Kandhamal violence. The meeting was for two days, which included a peoples' tribunal and an exhibition of photographs and posters designed by peace activists to promote the message of secularism. However, for the purpose of this chapter, I have analysed speeches made by various *entrepreneurs* during a rally of solidarity.

To scope the present study within the framework of this thesis, I chose a set of political speeches that were given in a public rally for expressing solidarity with the victims of violence. There are two reasons for doing this:

i) This set of speeches is specifically counter-hegemonic to the right-wing discourse that has been analysed in the previous chapters.

ii) The site of violence is different. The 'out-group' is different. Instead of an overwhelmingly Muslim out-group in the hate discourse propagated in Northern India, the victims of Kandhamal are Christians.

These speeches were a part of the protest march against violence against Christians in Kandhamal, Orissa. As is evident from the membership of the speakers, they are all ideologically aligned towards the left.

1. AB Bardhan: National General Secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) *(left wing political party)*
2. Alvina Shakil: Akhil Bharatiya Mahila Janwadi Samiti
3. Kavita Krishnan, CPI (Marxist-Leninist) – Central committee Member, President of AIPWA (All India Progressive Women's Association)
4. Durgesh, Secretary AISF (All India Students Federation)
5. Brinda Karat: Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha) from Communist Party of India (Marxist). First woman member of the Politburo.

5.2 Analysis

The analysis follows the thematic categorical analysis structure of exploring the group categories and inter-group relations. We look at the symbolism employed, cultural artefacts if any, and the discourse used to build the group categorizations, looking in particular for emergent themes of inter-group relations and political actor – rival relations. The interpretation of the violence is crucial to the emotive content of the speech. It is also crucial to understanding the subsequent relations developed around the theme of violence: The victims and the perpetrators (inter-group relations), the people who let it happen (political rivals) and the people who took a stand against it (leadership: self)

In-group:

In this section, the analysis focuses on the ways in which the in-group is constructed. What are the boundaries and how is the in-group defined.

'Comrades, remember this Hindustan is made of you, is made of your work, made of your commitment. Hindustan is not made of those people who encourage communalism. Hindustan is

not made of people who divide brothers, who divide this country as Hindu, Muslim, Sikh & Christians. (Durgesh)

The national category is invoked as *Hindustan,* and the composition of this nation is also clearly stated as people who are committed towards the country. 'Labour' is the defining characteristic for membership. Religion is not. The nation is emphasized a product of whoever toils for the country. The ownership of the nation, in a sense, is bestowed back to the people who have been the victims of religious violence, and out from the hands of the communalists. The violence is clearly condemned as *communal* violence. The national identity is constructed as bound in multiplicities, by another speaker in the following way:

Our country has different languages, different communities, different religions… this is the language of our country. This is our beauty. It is not people of just one religion who live here. I would also like to say that it is all these people from different religions, different communities and different languages together who have given this country… fought against the British imperialists, to give us our freedom. Only all of them united can bring about the development and progress of our country.' (AB Bardhan)

The speaker frames a common national identity defined and constituted by diverse multiplicities: different linguistic categories, regional differences, but bound by a common destiny that has been anchored in the freedom of the nation in the shared struggle by all members of the nation. The history of the Indian freedom struggle is alluded to as a combined effort of all the people of India. Importantly, this unity is conceptualized as the thread that binds the citizens, in spite of the divides. The diversity of the Indian people is celebrated as it's *beauty;* in other words, the strength and progress of the nation stems from the diversity.

He further characterizes the victims of the violence not just in terms of the religious community that they belong to, but in a dimension that helps in realigning categorizations from religion to class relations.

Who are our Christian friends who were in Kandhamal and were attacked upon? Very poor people. Very very poor people. Ordinary people. Village farmers and every day wage workers.

People with small trades, who earn their living on a daily basis. They were attacked. (AB Bardhan)

The in-group is defined in multiplicities. The Indian in-group consists of plurality. Heterogeneity is the defining characteristic of the in-group. This in-group is under attack. This is a solidarity with the poor and disadvantaged, in a class-world. A lot of work is put into developing and harnessing the value system of the in-group. Here too, however, crucially the in-group is defined in terms of its multiplicities and diversity. The names Bharat and Hindustan are used interchangeably to denote the in-group. The in-group is particularly defined in qualities of commitment to the building of the nation and more the ownership of the nation is firmly placed with the people of India. That this in-group has been sullied by the violence in Kandhamal is clearly pointed in the next excerpt:

Challenging the communal rhetoric within the framework of democratic functioning of India's Constitution.

When this violence had occurred, then I had gone to meet the Archbishop, because we knew that there was a conspiracy of silence around the attacks and especially attacks on women, - our sister who was raped. I had gone to meet the Archbishop and today I salute the nun and all our sisters in Kandhamal. It is their courage, courage to fight and the courage to not bow down. This is not a small thing my brothers and sisters. At that time, she was only standing with her religious convictions in such a backward area to help those poor people – if she can be raped, then this is a black mark on the entire Indian consciousness and that is why we have come together today. (Brinda Karat)

The interpretation of violence is the pivotal story around which group identities are constructed in identifying the victims, the perpetrators and the bystanders. In this excerpt, the speaker makes the nun emblematic of the violence against the in-group of Indians. The act of violence of rape is constructed to have been committed against the *consciousness* of the whole country. Of importance is the characterization of the in-group as citizens of the country.

Crucially, the victims are not just marked out as Christians, but also the class definitions are brought to the forefront. This recategorizes groups and subsequent construal of inter-

group relations. The recategorization of relations is also brought about in this excerpt: in terms of class: It is the *poor* people who have been the victims of violence. In another excerpt, Kavita Krishnan recategorizes the in-group in terms of caste.

> *The way caste has been used by these fascist communal elements where it is being said that you cannot convert. That this is forced conversion. If someone wants to become a Christian, then he would be under interrogation, and always under suspicion that somewhere someone must have tried lured him away by way of money from Hinduism. His personal choice of becoming a Christian will be under attack. What is the basis of this forced conversion? The entire Hindu society that revolves around caste-system, if the most exploited, and oppressed want to opt out of the caste system and whatever they want to do for their own dignity – they might want to become Christians, they might want to become revolutionary, whatever they want to. But that decision to leave this system, even Baba Saheb Ambedkar had also made this choice, is always under attack. That attack on personal choice is a caste-based attack which is exploited and used by communalist and fascist elements.* (Kavita Krishnan)

Out-group:

The out-group is clearly marked out as the Sangh Parivar.

> *We appeal to our comrades, to struggle for the banning of this Vishwa Hindu Parishad. This is like a virus, which is eroding our unity and our democratic structure slowly but steadily. Groups like the Bajrang Dal and the Shiv Sena are particularly dangerous for our country. On no account, must we tolerate them.* (Durgesh)

> *But, there is a certain organization in our country, whose belief is to fight on the lines of religion and religion-based politics. I would like to draw the attention of everyone towards that Sangh Parivar and their Bajrang Dal. From the past few decades, these people have been attacking minority communities in different places based on communal lines. They targeted the Muslims, they broke the Babri Masjid, in a lot of places they have been rioting, and now, they have also targeted and attacked our Christian brothers.* (AB Bardhan)

Inter-group relations:

As shown in chapters 3 & 4, it is the way in which inter-group relations are construed that forms the basis of justification for proposed courses of actions against out-groups. While this is the key to understanding why genocide is sanctioned and how it is justified in the

discourse of hate; conversely, in the discourse of solidarity, the construal of inter-group relations becomes the central argument for rallying against brutalities. Consider the following example:

> *Because, this is a fight. Today, there is an effort to take our country in the direction of communalism. Against that, this is the real fight – the one that we must stand by – to ensure that our country's secularism remains safe. Today, when there was a tribunal here and a peace rally organized, we can decide upon one thing today's tribunal – when Gujarat happened in 2002, and Kandhamal in 2007 and 2008 – then everyone felt the need for enactment of the communal violence bill.* (Alvina Shakeel)

There is a struggle to reinterpret the violence, and hence, the actors involved in the violence. The speaker posits it as a *fight*, but one that is between *secularism* against *communalism.* This is further explained in the next excerpt:

> *Comrades, Kandhamal is a big black stain on the secular nature of our Bharat, one that can never be erased. This is a stain that has been stamped by the very people who claim to be nationalists. In reality, these people are not nationalists – they are people who want to break the unity of our country. They do not know how to respect the Constitution of Bharat, they do not know how to respect the people of Bharat.* (Durgesh)

Political rivals are construed as representative of the out-group or aligned with the out-group. They are also shown to be in collusion with the out-group. Repeatedly, the Government at the Centre and at the State are incriminated for not acting fast enough, for not providing enough compensation, for keeping quiet, for not bringing the perpetrators to task, for not being concerned enough about the victims' plight and eventually, for not upholding their constitutional duties as representatives of the people. Consider the following excerpts:

> *I think it is time to give a clear memorandum from all the MP's, no matter which party they belong to, except for the Sangh Parivar, with all their signatures that this reality, this reality must come in front of the public.* (Brinda Karat)

I'd like to ask when is a peoples' tribunal required? When the criminal justice system of our country… The criminal justice of our country that should come through as a matter of right, does not exist, then the people have to sit with the tribunal and have to remind the government of the laws. We have to remind the government of how many people were killed, how many women were raped, how many are still homeless – and they can not return to their homes, how few cases were registered and even fewer lodged as FIR's, and for the ones that were registered – there the strong-arm brutal tactics of the VHP stopped people from getting justice from the court. (Alvina Shakeel)

But according to our country's constitution, if anyone knocks the door of justice, the Government should listen. But what happens is opposite: the Government sides with whoever is. The entire criminal system is with them. Whatever has been happening in Kandhamal from the past three years by the VHP and Sangh Parivar, I on the behalf of the Akhil Bharatiya Janwadi Mahili Samiti would like to say that all these challenges are in front of us. Will the Government protect secularism? Will the government protect the minorities? (Alvina Shakeel)

It is shameful, a communalist party like BJP. Given their actions, the party should be blacklisted as a terrorist party. But neither did the Congress at the Centre ban this party and nor did the Naveen Patnaik Government in Orissa take a stern stance. (Durgesh)

The BJP is typecast as communalist and at par with terrorism. Apart from the BJP that is the party responsible for the communal violence outbreak, the other political rivals are also indicted in their inability to stop the BJP. The Congress party at the centre is called ineffectual as is the regional party headed by Naveen Patnaik in the state of Odisha.

However, since the CPI did align with the BJD headed by Naveen Patnaik after a decisive win in the state elections. The CPI cannot be seen to be too harsh against their partner with whom they form the state Government at the state and at the same time, they do need to be seen as condemning the violence without indicting the state Government too much. This calls for a fine balancing act, which would explain the cautious note with which the prominent leaders seek to frame the issue. Consider this excerpt:

Self:

I'd definitely like to speak on behalf of my party, in our country different religions have always had the right to practise their own different rituals. I am neither a Christian, nor a Muslim nor a Hindu. I do not follow any religion. But this is my private and personal matter. I would like to state that in this country if somebody wants to go the church, or the mosque, or gurudwara or temple, that person has complete rights to do so and has every right to practise his or her religion. Nobody can stop him from doing so. (AB Bardhan)

AB Bardhan of the Communist Party positions himself as not necessarily sharing the faith of the various religions groups of the Indian in-group, but, as a leader, of upholding the freedoms accorded by the Constitution of India. The Constitution of India guarantees the freedom to practise to any religion to it's citizens while the state remains secular, i.e. professes no religion. The speaker elevates his party to the same non-partisan values expounded by the Constitution. In other words, the message is twofold: One, he and the party he represents is above religious divides (as he speaks on behalf of the party.) And secondly, he embodies the values of non-partisan, above internal divides of the many groups in India, to represent 'national' whole of India.

Brinda Karat projects this a bit differently:

We are here as citizens of India, we are demanding our dues and we demand to know what are you doing about the criminals who have committed crimes against us? (Brinda Karat)

Aligning with the citizens of India, the *entrepreneur* speaks as a citizen of India, representing the whole country, and also becoming one with them. She speaks from the position of an ordinary person's travails with the justice system of India.

5.3 Discussion

Comparing hate and solidarity discourse in defining the **ingroup:** India here too is under threat, but the symbolism has changed and that makes the difference. The visual representation of the hate discourse was overwhelmingly about the sacralization of the in-group, represented in holy and pious manifestations. For instance, in the analysis of the

posters (chapter 2, p. 40), cows were constructed as the sacred in-group (p. 98) and therefore, a threat to the cows in terms of meat consumption is construed as a threat to the Hindu in-group which sets up the ground for discrimination against the outgroup (p. 96).

In the political speeches mobilising for hate, it is also seen that descriptive terms of 'Bharat' and 'Hindustan' are defined and constituted with specific values till the building of this comes to a point where it is interchangeably used to denote the in-group (chapter 3, p. 114). This is common to both discourses, however, the *nature of the country* in the solidarity discourse is diametrically opposed to the nation imagined in the communal discourse. In the solidarity discourse, the in-group is defined in qualities of commitment to the building of the nation and more the ownership of the nation is firmly placed with the people of India. The People of India are also defined in a multitude of ways, specifically countering the insular definition that is seen in the rhetoric of hatred. This analysis is also supported by previous studies that show that *category construction* is central to the way in which leaders mobilise people (Elcheroth & Reicher, 2014; Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011; Herrera & Reicher, 1998; Klein & Licata, 2003; Reicher et al., 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b).

The second step in analysis of the contents of the category constructions shows that the discourse of hate, the in-group is consistently anchored in ancient traditions and symbolisms of Hinduism, while the discourse of solidarity is based on the tenets of the Constitution of India. This looks like an obvious point when the nature of the ideologies are taken into account, the former as a resurgent Hindu India, the latter grounded in Marxist theory. Though this is an obvious ideological difference between the two discourses what is not so obvious is that this sets the framework for marking out very different out-groups. Mobilisation based on hate and solidarity institutes similar value-systems with the in-group but differs on one crucial dimension that follows from the way in which the in-group has been defined. By definition, the Hindu in-group only allows for a monolithic. In contrast, an Indian in-group's definition by the entrepreneurs of solidarity – insists on the in-group's intrinsic plurality and heterogeneity. Differences are to be respected in the latter's reasoning, while differences are sought to be homogenized in the former's construct.

Out-group: Differences in the construction of the boundaries of the in-group lead to the construction of very different out-groups in the two discourses. So while it is the Muslim and the Christian who is the enemy in the Hindu right-wing discourse, for the entrepreneurs of solidarity it is the communal discourse itself and party that endorses the ideology. In the discourse of solidarity, there is an acknowledgement of the many diverse groups and these groups are not characterised as the enemy or the 'out-group' in the sense that the hate discourse necessarily situates the Christian and Muslim as the enemy out-group(s). This accrues from the very different identity definitions of the in-group in the discourses.

Inter-group relations: It is the construal of inter-group relations and the themes around which these are constructed that form the basis for proposed courses of action: the purported offence against the in-group and the appropriate reaction of the in-group against such offence.

5.4 Limitations

An obvious limitation of the data from the solidarity discourse is the relative lack of in-depth study, both in the larger research context and specific to this thesis. For instance, Gandhi's speeches[34] could have been parsed for ideological content and structure of solidarity discourse. However, temporality and contemporary occurrence (the violence occurred in 2008, the tribunal was put together in 2010) was the rationale used for the particular data set that was chosen. It forms a coherent set of data from various speakers at one platform. Crucially, it was evidently a platform for raising voices against communalism as much as it was for expressing solidarity with the victims of the violence.

This study was included in the thesis focussing almost exclusively on hate mobilization for two reasons; firstly, to acknowledge the existence of countervailing voices to the rabid discourse of hate. Secondly, to give a flavour of the arguments presented within the mobilization perspective. A counter-intuitive notion that the categories used and the psychological engagement with both hate and solidarity discourse might both be the

[34] Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, famously known as Mahatma Gandhi was a prolific writer as much as a staunch pacifist.

same, the difference lies in the way *entrepreneurs of identity* construe a) the in-group, and b) the differentiation chosen for the out-group, i.e. the *contents* of the social identities.

6 General Discussion

The thesis set out to research the *processes* of mobilisation using a critical perspective of the social identity approach on a situated analysis of inter-group relations in India. The studies in the thesis address the following questions: How is hate mobilized? Why is it mobilized? Does a configuration of ingroup virtue and outgroup threat lead to the sanction of violence against the outgroup? How is the rhetoric of hate countered?

6.1 Studies:

The first three studies provided an in-depth investigation of hate mobilization (the first two are intensive qualitative studies and the third study is experimental), while the fourth study analysed the process of mobilisation used in solidarity discourse.

In study 1, an analysis of a collection of 16 hand-drawn posters gathered from a VHP tent was presented. Each poster was analysed on two levels: the image and the texts with three questions guiding the analysis: what are the categories? How are they constituted? And what are the relations constructed among the different categories? The materials were constructed around several themes, which were around a particular story: about a virtuous in-group under threat from an inherently vicious out-group leading to the sanctification of violence as the defence of virtue. The additional layers of leadership tussles in the narrative eventually formed the backbone of the argument to the contention in the thesis.

Study 2 explicated the processes of why hatred is mobilized. It was argued that the construction of inter-group relations around the theme of threat allows for intra-group struggles of leadership to play out. For example, if it is accepted that the pious in-group is under threat from a threatening out-group, it forms the perfect foil to project oneself as the ideal leader and the only leader strong enough to protect the in-group from desecration and annihilation from the out-group. Equally, political rivals are constructed to be leaders of the out-group who are ‘really’ of the out-group, and hence cannot have

either the best interests of the in-group at heart, nor can they truly represent the in-group as a leader.

A note about the methods: The qualitative studies involved intensive analysis of an iterative nature. Frequently sifting through data, rearranging the themes, explaining divergent threads of analysis, thinking about how the thread incorporates into the larger framework (does it say anything more? Does it say anything different?) is an integral part of the refining process of qualitative data. Data informed the coding and then the theory, which was again used as a lens to understand the data. The 'model of hate' analysing the steps that convince people towards genocidal violence emerged after a second and third reading of the data. By the fifth reading, it was clear that there was another process at work too, one which we eventually come to argue would explain 'why' it is that particular stereotypes of out-groups are being put forward. This subsequently became the reason to investigate political speeches of a longer duration which by virtue of the nature of the communication mode would allow for more nuanced arguments by the entrepreneurs than the medium of posters could accord. The site of research for the second study, which was a 3-day gathering of ideologues and thousands of followers, was also distinctly different from the more inclusive version of the 'Mela'.

The third study (chapter 4) was an attempt at experimental verification of one of the many potential hypotheses that emerged from the previous two studies. The hypothesis predicted that under conditions of out-group threat, in-group virtue (the specific manipulation that was used was 'tolerance') will predict greater negativity against Muslims. In other words, the level of threat remaining constant, in-group virtue would determine the level of aggression sanctioned against the out-group (the higher the in-group virtue the greater the aggression against the out-group).

The final study analyses counter-hegemonic discourse and mobilizations against communalism, looking at the ways in which the groups are constituted and inter-group relations constructed. Through the rival and self, leadership is also briefly mentioned, the focus of this chapter was to analyse the ways in which the category-arguments of in-group virtuousness and out-group threat is countered.

6.2 Theoretical implications:

We shall start with inter-group differentiation as distinct from discrimination. The critical perspective on social identity in the introduction explained the need to refocus the lens of social identity on a clause that is usually lost in the postulates drawn from the general outline of the social identity theory, i.e. positive group distinctiveness is sought through differentiation between social groups (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 34). This means, that differentiation between groups is neither automatic nor is it necessarily discriminatory (like negative behaviour towards out-groups). This is the key principle to understanding the differences in the ways in which *entrepreneurs of identity* construct inter-group relations in discourses warranting hate as opposed to discourses leading to solidarity.

In the introduction to this thesis, the term genocidal violence was introduced to describe the brutalities of Nazi Germany. While genocide is often understood in terms of the number of people killed, the definition itself as put forward by Raphael Lemkin "was referring to the *intentional destruction of groups* [emphasis added] as 'genocide'(Hinton, 2002, p. 4). It is worth remembering this quote again in light of the evidence that has been presented in the thesis, ie, the intention in the posters and the political speeches to preserve the in-group sanctity is tethered with the intentional destruction of the outgroups. Central to this thesis was an attempt to rethink the social psychological theorization of prejudice in two ways: firstly, as the pivot on which entrepreneurs mobilise for genocide. In this, specifically to put the research focus on the ways in which the in-group is defined and constituted by entrepreneurs of hate, for it is in the construction of the in-group that the out-group(s) is imagined, defined, constituted and comes to be 'seen' as threat or non-threat. The construction and constitution of the in-group also provides clues towards inter-group relations, groups that are marked out as enemies, construction of potential leaders, discrediting political rivals, and the suggested action.

We have argued that *hostility and/or solidarity* is the end-point or conclusion of socially available racial categories that are made salient and accepted in the relevant context, and not an offshoot of the process of categorisation (Herrera & Reicher, 1998; Leach, 1998;

Reicher, 2001). Identities are not static constructs and that the boundaries, meanings and contents of the social identities are fiercely contested. Hostility is contingent on the acceptance of certain categories, and these are categories that are fiercely debated, constructed and ultimately, contested as well. (Elcheroth & Reicher, 2014; Haslam et al., 2012, 2011; Herrera & Reicher, 1998; Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b)

A five-step model of hate was explicated and researched in the qualitative analyses (Reicher et al., 2008). The following elements are discussed with the understanding that the model is only deterministic in so far as the specific conditions are met in the configured set of relationships:

The in-group was defined and sacralized. The in-group is constituted in terms of sacred and virtuous. The present status of the in-group is defined and constructed in many ways in terms of family, pride, the spiritual core, humanitarian values, tolerant. Such 'moral' characterisations pave the way for subsequent ways in which actions are taken against perceived harm (Gill, 2006; Koonz, 2003; Skitka, 2010; Tileaga, 2007). Experimental studies indicate that such characterisations also have implications for the ways in which ingroup members will condone or condemn actions taken in their name (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010). The ingroup has also been positioned as a victim. Much of the work in the political speeches and almost all the characterisations in the posters studied in the thesis characterise the in-group as helpless. In the poster study, the helpless cow was prominently sketched as the victim of torture inflicted upon by various outgroups. The constitution of the ingroup as the 'real victim' has some substantial resonance with studies on *competitive victimhood* (Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012; Sehgal, 2007) and the consequences of when the threat is construed to be 'unjust' (Bar-Tal et al., 2009). However, studies using the social identity perspective for researching the Alevi identity in shared victimhood also show that the consequences of collective victimhood do not necessarily lead to violence against outgroups (Yildiz & Verkuyten, 2011). The analysis on solidarity discourse also corroborates the point that the ways in which *categories* are *constructed* are central to the ways in which subsequent action can be called upon. This also consequently demarcates the out-group with sharp contours. However, the additional layer that this thesis brings to the work is in showing

that *entrepreneurs of identity* actively work towards building this sense of victimhood in groups they wish to lead as this has consequences for the ways in which the leaders can then construe the 'correct course of action' for the in-group. It was argued that genocide becomes possible, indeed, celebrated when annihilation of an out-group is construed as virtuous. And it can only be construed as moral and virtuous if it is called in the service of saving the 'sacred' in-group. These processes in and of themselves can be seen as harmless, or can be construed as positive (virtuous), but when put together it forms a potent and lethal combination that sanctions violence.

It was argued through the thesis that the interpretation of inter-group violence and the inter-groups hostilities are in fact critical products of an *entrepreneur* or leader's strategy in mobilizing hate to sustain and project themselves as strong leaders. In other words, the answer to why is hatred mobilised is *entrepreneurs* gaining social power through being seen to act for the in-group and marginalising rivals to power by showing how they ignore the in-group and collude with the threatening out-group. Rivals by their silence at the atrocities directed towards the in-group by the out-group, making policies that appease the out-group, allowing the out-groups to attack the in-group's sacred places, actively creating opportunities for the out-group to outnumber in-group are all constructed to progressively and logically argue that rivals are not truly 'representative' of the in-group but rather represent the out-group. They are prototypical of the out-group and hence, by default lose the authority to even belong to the in-group, let alone lead it or protect its interests. By contrast, the positioning of the leader is sketched as taking strong authoritarian positions against the out-group, recommending and carrying out swift military action in the interests of the in-group, urging members of the in-group to be more vigilant, and leading from the front of this aggression.

Why is hatred mobilised? The reasons gleaned from the analysis include the policing of the in-group, entrepreneurs gaining social power through being seen to act for the in-group and marginalising rivals to power by showing how they ignore the in-group or collude with threats to the out-group. It was argued that these are well thought-out strategies of political subversion. The various strategies that leaders use have been studied and the category constructions that leaders use with the nuances of the of the contents have consequences for public action (Burns & Stevenson, 2013; Herrera &

Reicher, 1998; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b). In this case, we argue that the techniques have been used to legitimate one's authority as leader, or show oneself to be *prototypical* of the group, and at the same time to delegitimize the claim of potential rival leaders. As noted in the procedure with concepts drawn from diverse fields, hate rhetoric is not specific to either the RSS/VHP or to India in particular (Hayden, 1996; Lindquist, 2012; Mamdani, 2004; Schabas, 2000; Tabaire, 2008).

The experimental study provided in some measures a support to the hypothesis of out-group threat and in-group virtue effects, specifically on demands for greater cultural suppression measures against the out-group. It was particularly counter-intuitive since, the in-group norm that was manipulated was 'tolerance'. The more tolerant the in-group's norms, under conditions of perceived aggression, there is a greater call for punitive measures than where tolerance has not been emphasized or made salient as an in-group norm. Though further studies with better experimental controls are required for stronger significance levels in the study itself, in its present form the results of the study can still reasonably lend support to an existing body of literature on inter-group threat (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Maddux, Galinsky, Cuddy, & Polifroni, 2008; Moskalenko, McCauley, & Rozin, 2006; Stephan et al., 2009; Wagner, Christ, Pettigrew, Stellmacher, & Wolf, 2006; Zárate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004) in proposing an interlocked premise of outgroup threat and ingroup virtue for prediction of violence against the outgroup. It also adds to the body of social psychological experimental work in India with a focus on Hindu-Muslim relations (Ghosh & Kumar, 1991; Tausch et al., 2009) in developing relevant visual instruments for specifying ingroup (Hindu) virtue and realistic (Muslim) threats for experimental manipulation.

A short study of the solidarity discourse with a comparison of the hate discourse confirmed the contention that there is nothing inherently good or bad about categorization process. The psychological processes that lead to actions of solidarity or annihilation are the same, and has nothing to do with either biological impulses or personality traits and neither does it have anything to do with the 'nature' of groups. Rather, it has much to do with the way people define their groups and the subsequent choices they make. In other words, it is in the domain of ideology that lies the difference of whether the way forward is by murdering a group of people or of solidarity. The *content* of social identities

determine the direction of action, and the meaning of *content* is contested by *entrepreneurs* because social identities are the basis of collective action and social influence (Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011; Herrera & Reicher, 1998; Reicher et al., 2006, 2005; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a)

On a general note, the thesis proposes an integration of intra-group processes and inter-group relations to understand how hate is mobilised to sanction genocidal violence. An analysis of the hostilities between groups needs to be refocused within dynamics of leadership struggles, i.e, intra-group power struggles on leadership as an epiphenomenon of inter-group hostilities. Specifically, as a prescriptive note of warning, in any morality discourse of hate and solidarity, we ask for a serious look at how the in-group is defined the boundary and the content, over and above the out-group threat. Seen in isolation in-group virtue is a positive aspect, the elements of the model by itself are not sinister, yet we have demonstrably shown that when put together in a particular combination, it has the potential to lay the conditions for extremely hostile actions.

6.3 Limitations & Potential:

An obvious limitation of the hate discourse is the representativeness of the data to be able to talk of impact on dimensions of a country as huge and diverse as India. The posters and the political speeches clearly give a general overview of the ideology, the specific dynamics of which are localised for regional contexts. However, 'Hindutva's war' as journalists have noted has also shifted focus from the blatant discourse that we find in the studies to subtler nuances (Ramakrishnan, 2012). The characteristics we identify of the hate discourse may come with a qualification that some of the hate discourse takes the form that we have proposed and explored in the thesis. Our argument is not that necessarily *all* hate discourse is about virtue and threat, but rather that threat and virtue constituted in different groups together constitute a warrant for hate. In the context of majority-minority relationships, when the majority begins to feel righteously under threat from a minority outgroup, the potential for genocidal violence becomes terrifying.

This leads to another limitation: In the argument we have sought to go further and argue

that the discourse is not only a warrant for hate from the perspective of the leader, it is also effective in producing hate amongst the population. That is the point of the experimental study. But the study is only one small preliminary investigation. A methodological limitation in terms of the experimental research is the issue of reliability with the scales and an excess of dependent variable items. The sample of engineering students in a college in Bhubaneshwar (a place where relatively less political mobilization against Muslims has taken place) could be a contributing factor too. Had this been administered in universities in Delhi, Gujarat or any of the Northern India cities, the results might have portrayed a more belligerent picture. The political environment in a University set-up would also have made a difference than the usually 'apolitical' science students of engineering colleges. It has a sample of college students who may be atypical of those involved in acts of hate and the measures are problematic in terms of reliability. In terms of the DV's there is a considerable distance between writing about sanctioning violence and actual expressions of hatred. While it constitutes good preliminary evidence, there is obviously much more to do.

The thread of the research that brings up the dynamics on leadership tussles and the ways in which self and rivals are positioned is in the discourse quite prominently. The formation of the arguments and the construction of the rivals' alignment as protectors and facilitators of outgroup threat is a strategic concern for the leaders to position themselves as being the true representatives of the in-group. It would be interesting to experimentally show whether there is an effectiveness of the discourse in increasing support for the speakers over their rivals. It requires experimental study to identify if there are consequences to the discourse.

In none of the studies can we make a claim about the *timing* of the violence that might unfold. So, while the research shows definite promise in understanding the dynamics of inter-group violence, a mobilisation of hatred and in particular the way in which prejudicial stereotypes of 'outgroups' are constructed is a warning bell to the way in which people might be preparing for the physical enactment of violence. Though arguably we can show the build up process, we cannot say *when* the given conditions will ignite the violence (Bohlken & Sergenti, 2010).

The potential of future research is substantial with the number of threads that emerge from the model and further refinement of our understanding of group processes and inter-group violence. The thesis draws from work across academic disciplinary boundaries while retaining a social psychological perspective on the understanding of inter-group conflicts. This is a contribution to the interdisciplinary body of work on inter-group conflicts and dynamics of genocide (Abeysekara et al., 2003; Hinton, 2002; Schabas, 2000) and is a feature that extends beyond the discipline of social psychology. For social psychological research in India, the thesis adds to the body of work by scholars of politics in understanding and identifying why leaders might use particular stereotypes in times of mobilisation.

6.4 Conclusion:

At the very least, this thesis raises questions about the supposed existence of an individual's predispositions towards hatred, received wisdom of 'ancient hatreds' between groups and of seeing hate as an inescapable consequence of inter-group relations. We have demonstrated by way of qualitative and quantitative research that a considerable amount of time, energy and creativity is put into harnessing, sustaining and magnifying hatred between groups by *entrepreneurs of identity* for specific political goals. Ergo, hatred is neither congenital in individuals and nor is it an inevitable consequence of group-life. Rather, it is linked to specific group ideologies that are made by people and can be unmade by them – and the consequences for which they are, therefore, to be held accountable.

The mobilisation perspective in the tradition of social identity approaches is a process theory (Reicher & Hopkins, 2004) and it explicates the conditions and the configurations of a set of inter-group relationships in which the most *likely* pathway of moral logic would lead to seemingly inevitable genocidal consequences. In other words, if an insular ingroup with values it considers uniquely sacred is convinced of an evil outgroup that threatens the very sacredness of the ingroup, it can become a matter of duty and pride for the ingroup to eliminate the outgroup. This is an understanding that is proposed and effectively used by leaders to forward their political purposes of establishing a 'strong'

leadership profile. This is also used to discredit and devalue the strength of political rivals in their claim for leadership of the group. Therefore, prejudice in the form of hatred must be analysed and critically understood in the framework of mobilisation, if we are to counter the rhetoric of hate, effectively.

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8 Appendices:

Materials with reference to Chapter 4

Appendix 4-a: Experimental Study Ethical approval

Appendix 4-b: Booklet for Condition 1 (Virtue-absent, Threat-absent)

Appendix 4-c: Booklet for Condition 2 (Virtue-present, Threat-absent)

Appendix 4-d: Booklet for Condition 3 (Virtue-absent, Threat-present)

Appendix 4-e: Booklet for Condition 4 (Virtue-present, Threat-present)

Appendix 4-f: Participant debriefing form

24 March 2011

Ethics Reference No: *Please quote this ref on all correspondence*	PS7371
Project Title:	Under conditions of threat, do moral values of the in-group lead to stronger endorsement of negative behaviour towards out-groups?
Researchers Name(s):	Rakshi Rath, Stephen D. Reicher, Nicole Tausch
Supervisor(s):	Professor Stepehen D. Reicher

Thank you for submitting your application which was considered at the Psychology School Ethics Committee meeting on the 23rd March 2011. The following documents were reviewed:

1.	Ethical Application Form	23/03/2011
2.	Advertisement	23/03/2011
3.	Participant Information Sheet	23/03/2011
4.	Consent Form	23/03/2011
5.	Debriefing Form	23/03/2011
6.	External Permissions	23/03/2011
7.	Questionnaires and Conditions	23/03/2011

The University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) approves this study from an ethical point of view. Please note that where approval is given by a School Ethics Committee that committee is part of UTREC and is delegated to act for UTREC.

Approval is given for three years. Projects, which have not commenced within two years of original approval, must be re-submitted to your School Ethics Committee.

You must inform your School Ethics Committee when the research has been completed. If you are unable to complete your research within the 3 three year validation period, you will be required to write to your School Ethics Committee and to UTREC (where approval was given by UTREC) to request an extension or you will need to re-apply.

Any serious adverse events or significant change which occurs in connection with this study and/or which may alter its ethical consideration, must be reported immediately to the School Ethics Committee, and an Ethical Amendment Form submitted where appropriate.

Approval is given on the understanding that the 'Guidelines for Ethical Research Practice' (http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/UTRECguidelines%20Feb%2008.pdf) are adhered to.

Yours sincerely

Convenor of the School Ethics Committee

Ccs Prof. S. D. Reicher (Supervisor)
School Ethics Committee

Appendix 4-b

Guidelines:

I'd like to thank you for your time and participation in this research. **There are separate guidelines provided for each section, please read them carefully and answer as truly as you feel.** We emphasize that there are no right or wrong responses. We aim to find out the way *people generally* feel. Your identity will remain anonymous and your responses will only be used to find out the average response pattern. Thank you for your co-operation.

This is a survey designed to understand the social attitudes of Indians.

But before we start the actual survey, I was hoping you would also kindly help me with another project, which is to design a webpage. I would appreciate some feedback on the images that I have developed for the webpage.

The webpage will showcase the importance of **Textiles in the traditional Indian way of life**. According to the *Rig Veda* and the *Upanishads*, the universe is a continuous **fabric** with a grid pattern upon which cycles of life are painted.

Indian textiles have evolved with the development of Hindu civilisation and its significance is hallowed by tradition. With this ethos, these three banners have been designed to represent our Vedic civilization through Indian textiles.

To help me choose the banner that would best represent **Indian textiles** for the webpage, please rate the banners on the criteria scale of 0-5, **where 0=least, and 5=most.**

1	The banner represents the theme of Indian Textiles well.	0	1	2	3	4	5
2	The banner showcases Textiles as an aesthetic part of Indian culture.	0	1	2	3	4	5
3	The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Indian Textiles.	0	1	2	3	4	5

1	The banner represents the theme of Indian Textiles well.	0	1	2	3	4	5
2	The banner showcases Textiles as an aesthetic part of Indian culture.	0	1	2	3	4	5
3	The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Indian Textiles.	0	1	2	3	4	5

1	The banner represents the theme of Indian Textiles well.	0	1	2	3	4	5
2	The banner showcases Textiles as an aesthetic part of Indian culture.	0	1	2	3	4	5
3	The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Textiles well.	0	1	2	3	4	5

Survey on the Social Attitudes of Indians:

In this research, we are interested in understanding what people think and feel about the role of Muslims in India. This has been an issue of considerable concern, and has been the subject of a high level Government committee report. First of all, we shall tell you something about this report and then we ask you for your opinions on a range of questions.



The report indicates three important things:

1. **A substantial increase in the contribution of Muslims to India,**
2. **Muslim contribution in areas of social, economic, political and cultural life of India**
3. **Muslim contribution to India's pride and prestige in the international arena**

Given below are the names of 10 Indian Muslims cited in the report, whose pictures have been shown above. On a scale of 0-5 where **0=least and 5=most**, please put a tick on the number that you think indicates their **level of contribution to India's excellence.**

1	**Shabana Azmi:** Padma Shri, One of India's finest actors (record of 5 National Film awards); Goodwill ambassador for India of the UN Population Fund, Rajya Sabha MP.	0	1	2	3	4	5

2	**Hamid Ansari:** Vice-President of India.	0	1	2	3	4	5
3	**Azim Premji:** Business tycoon, Philanthropist and Chairman of Wipro Technologies Limited.	0	1	2	3	4	5
4	**SY Qureshi:** Chief Election Commissioner of India.	0	1	2	3	4	5
5	**Yusuf Pathan:** Cricketer, powerful right-handed batsman and a right-arm off-break bowler of the Indian cricket team.	0	1	2	3	4	5
6	**M.J. Akbar:** Distinguished journalist, Editorial Director of India Today	0	1	2	3	4	5
7	**Javed Akhtar:** Padma Shri, Padma Bhushan, "National Integration Award" from All India Anti-Terrorist Association, Avadh Ratan from UP Govt. Poet, Activist	0	1	2	3	4	5
8	**Shah Rukh Khan:** One of the world's biggest movie stars with a fan following numbering in the billions. *Newsweek* named him one of the 50 most powerful people in the world.	0	1	2	3	4	5
9	**A. R. Rehman:** Oscar-winning composer, described as the world's most prominent and prolific film composer by *Time.*	0	1	2	3	4	5
10	**APJ Abdul Kalam Azad:** former President of India and scientist who played a pivotal technical and political role in India’s nuclear program.	0	1	2	3	4	5

In this section, we ask about the way people generally **feel** about the Muslim community in India. We are investigating how, **given the prevailing scenario, Indians feel about the Muslim community.**

Please read the statement and answer on a scale that ranges from 0-9, where **0=not at all**, and **9 = completely**.

Please tick the number that indicates the **intensity of that particular emotion.**

When I think of the Muslim community, I feel

No.	**FEELING**	Not at all									Completely
1	Happy	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
2	Vulnerable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
3	Annoyed	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
4	Nervous	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
5	Disdain	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
6	Angry	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
7	Intimidated	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
8	Contempt	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
9	Upset	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	Frightened	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
11	Apprehensive	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
12	Relaxed	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
13	Cheated	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
14	Infuriated	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
15	Cheerful	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

In this section, we ask questions about the way people generally **think** about the Muslim community in India. We are investigating how, **given the prevailing scenario, Indians think about the Muslim community**. Once again, there are no right or wrong responses.

Please read the statements carefully and answer on a scale that ranges from

- - - - = completely disagree to **+ + + + = completely agree.**

- - - - = disagree **100%,** **- - -** = disagree **75%,** **- -** = disagree **50%,** **-** = disagree **25%**

+ + + + = agree **100%,** **+ + +** = agree **75%,** **+ +** = agree **50%,** **+** = agree **25%**

Please tick the box indicating your level of agreement or disagreement with the statements.

	Statements:	Completely Disagree							Completely agree
		----	---	--	-	+	++	+++	++++
1	Muslims have contributed positively to Indian culture.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2	The Muslim call for prayers (Azaan) through loud-speakers should be prohibited.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3	We need strong anti-terror laws to protect our country against Muslim terrorism.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4	Islamic educational institutions like Madrassahs should be allowed to function.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5	For national security, it is **not** reasonable for the Army and Police to use strong methods to interrogate Muslims suspected of terrorism	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6	In general, I **sympathise** when some Indians use violence against Muslims, even though I do not condone violence itself.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7	For Indian democracy, Islamic religious teachings by Mullahs should **not** be tolerated.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8	Most Muslims are willing to live in peace with others Indians.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9	I **understand** the reasons given by some Indians for the use of violence, even though I do not condone violence itself.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10	Some Muslims have contributed greatly to India's excellence in science and technology	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11	Since Muslims take advantage of Indian tolerance, our aggression against Muslims is an act of self-defence.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
12	I **support** the reasons given by some Indians for the use of violence against Muslims even though I do not condone violence itself.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Now we are interested in your views concerning the characteristics of different groups. First, on a scale of 0-9, where **0=not at all** and **9=totally**, please rate each the following **traits** for how much you think they describe **Indians.**

1	Peaceful	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
2	Creative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
3	Non-violent	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
4	Treacherous	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
5	Tolerant	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
6	Patriotic	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Next, using the same scale (**0 = not at all, 9 = totally**) please rate each of the following **traits** for how much you think they describe the **Muslim community**.

1	Peaceful	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
2	Creative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
3	Non-violent	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
4	Treacherous	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
5	Tolerant	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
6	Patriotic	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

In this last section, please answer the questions on a scale of 1-7, (where 1= completely disagree, and 7 = completely agree). We would like to know how important Indian identity is to Indians. Please answer the following questions about the importance of being Indian.

1. Being Indian is important to my self-concept

Completely disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Completely agree

2. I feel strong ties with other Indians

Completely disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Completely agree

3. I identify strongly with India.

Completely disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Completely agree

4. I identify strongly with Indian values.

Completely disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Completely agree

5. I am proud to be Indian.

Completely disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Completely agree

And finally, a few questions about you.

Age:

Gender:

Are any of your relatives married to Muslims?

Do you have any Muslim friends?

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND PARTICIPATION!

Appendix 4-c

Guidelines:

I'd like to thank you for your time and participation in this research. **There are separate guidelines provided for each section, please read them carefully and answer as truly as you feel.** We emphasize that there are no right or wrong responses. We aim to find out the way *people generally* feel. Your identity will remain anonymous and your responses will only be used to find out the average response pattern. Thank you for your co-operation.

This is a survey designed to understand the social attitudes of Indians.

But before we start the actual survey, I was hoping you would also kindly help me with another project, which is to design a webpage. I would appreciate some feedback on the images that I have developed for the webpage.

The webpage will showcase the importance of **Tolerance in the traditional Indian way of life**. According to the *Rig Veda* and the *Upanishads*, the universe is a continuous cycle of karma, with **tolerance** being the sacred value upon which hinge the cycles of rebirth.

Indian tolerance has evolved with the development of Hindu civilisation and its significance is hallowed by tradition. With this ethos, these three banners have been designed to represent our Vedic civilization through the sacred value of 'tolerance'.

To help me choose the banner that would best represent **Indian tolerance** the best for the webpage, please rate the banners on the criteria scale of 0-5, where **0=least, and 5=most**.

1	The banner represents the theme of Indian Tolerance well.	0	1	2	3	4	5
2	The banner showcases Tolerance as an important part of Indian culture	0	1	2	3	4	5
3	The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Tolerance well.	0	1	2	3	4	5

1	The banner represents the theme of Indian Tolerance well.	0	1	2	3	4	5
2	The banner showcases Tolerance as an important part of Indian culture	0	1	2	3	4	5
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1	The banner represents the theme of Indian Tolerance well.	0	1	2	3	4	5
2	The banner showcases Tolerance as an important part of Indian culture	0	1	2	3	4	5
3	The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Tolerance well.	0	1	2	3	4	5

Survey on the Social Attitudes of Indians:

In this research, we are interested in understanding what people think and feel about the role of Muslims in India. This has been an issue of considerable concern, and has been the subject of a high level Government committee report. First of all, we shall tell you something about this report and then we ask you for your opinions on a range of questions.



The report indicates three important things:

1. **A substantial increase in the contribution of Muslims to India,**
2. **Muslim contribution in areas of social, economic, political and cultural life of India**
3. **Muslim contribution to India's pride and prestige in the international arena**

Given below are the names of 10 Indian Muslims cited in the report, whose pictures have been shown above. On a scale of 0-5 where **0=least and 5=most**, please put a tick on the number that you think indicates their **level of contribution to India's excellence.**

1	**Shabana Azmi:** Padma Shri, One of India's finest actors (record of 5 National Film awards); Goodwill ambassador for India of the UN Population Fund, Rajya Sabha MP.	0	1	2	3	4	5

2	**Hamid Ansari:** Vice-President of India.	0	1	2	3	4	5
3	**Azim Premji:** Business tycoon, Philanthropist and Chairman of Wipro Technologies Limited.	0	1	2	3	4	5
4	**SY Qureshi:** Chief Election Commissioner of India.	0	1	2	3	4	5
5	**Yusuf Pathan:** Cricketer, powerful right-handed batsman and a right-arm off-break bowler of the Indian cricket team.	0	1	2	3	4	5
6	**M.J. Akbar:** Distinguished journalist, Editorial Director of India Today	0	1	2	3	4	5
7	**Javed Akhtar:** Padma Shri, Padma Bhushan, "National Integration Award" from All India Anti-Terrorist Association, Avadh Ratan from UP Govt. Poet, Activist	0	1	2	3	4	5
8	**Shah Rukh Khan:** One of the world's biggest movie stars with a fan following numbering in the billions. *Newsweek* named him one of the 50 most powerful people in the world.	0	1	2	3	4	5
9	**A. R. Rehman:** Oscar-winning composer, described as the world's most prominent and prolific film composer by *Time.*	0	1	2	3	4	5
10	**APJ Abdul Kalam Azad:** former President of India and scientist who played a pivotal technical and political role in India’s nuclear program.	0	1	2	3	4	5

In this section, we ask about the way people generally **feel** about the Muslim community in India. We are investigating how, **given the prevailing scenario, Indians feel about the Muslim community.**

Please read the statement and answer on a scale that ranges from 0-9, where **0=not at all**, and **9 = completely**.

Please tick the number that indicates the **intensity of that particular emotion.**

When I think of the Muslim community, I feel

No.	**FEELING**	Not at all									Completely
1	Happy	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
2	Vulnerable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
3	Annoyed	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
4	Nervous	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
5	Disdain	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
6	Angry	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
7	Intimidated	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
8	Contempt	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
9	Upset	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	Frightened	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
11	Apprehensive	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
12	Relaxed	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
13	Cheated	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
14	Infuriated	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
15	Cheerful	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

In this section, we ask questions about the way people generally **think** about the Muslim community in India. We are investigating how, **given the prevailing scenario, Indians think about the Muslim community**. Once again, there are no right or wrong responses.

Please read the statements carefully and answer on a scale that ranges from

- - - - = completely disagree to **+ + + + = completely agree.**

- - - - = disagree **100%,** **- - -** = disagree **75%,** **- -** = disagree **50%,** **-** = disagree **25%**

+ + + + = agree **100%,** **+ + +** = agree **75%,** **+ +** = agree **50%,** **+** = agree **25%**

Please tick the box indicating your level of agreement or disagreement with the statements.

	Statements:	Completely Disagree							Completely agree
		----	---	--	-	+	++	+++	++++
1	Muslims have contributed positively to Indian culture.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2	The Muslim call for prayers (Azaan) through loud-speakers should be prohibited.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3	We need strong anti-terror laws to protect our country against Muslim terrorism.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4	Islamic educational institutions like Madrassahs should be allowed to function.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5	For national security, it is **not** reasonable for the Army and Police to use strong methods to interrogate Muslims suspected of terrorism	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6	In general, I **sympathise** when some Indians use violence against Muslims, even though I do not condone violence itself.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7	For Indian democracy, Islamic religious teachings by Mullahs should **not** be tolerated.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8	Most Muslims are willing to live in peace with others Indians.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9	I **understand** the reasons given by some Indians for the use of violence, even though I do not condone violence itself.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10	Some Muslims have contributed greatly to India's excellence in science and technology	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11	Since Muslims take advantage of Indian tolerance, our aggression against Muslims is an act of self-defence.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
12	I **support** the reasons given by some Indians for the use of violence against Muslims even though I do not condone violence itself.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Now we are interested in your views concerning the characteristics of different groups. First, on a scale of 0-9, where **0=not at all** and **9=totally**, please rate each the following **traits** for how much you think they describe **Indians.**

1	Peaceful	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
2	Creative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
3	Non-violent	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
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5	Tolerant	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
6	Patriotic	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Next, using the same scale (**0 = not at all, 9 = totally**) please rate each of the following **traits** for how much you think they describe the **Muslim community**.

1	Peaceful	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
2	Creative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
3	Non-violent	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
4	Treacherous	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
5	Tolerant	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
6	Patriotic	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

In this last section, please answer the questions on a scale of 1-7, (where 1= completely disagree, and 7 = completely agree). We would like to know how important Indian identity is to Indians. Please answer the following questions about the importance of being Indian.

1. Being Indian is important to my self-concept

Completely disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Completely agree

2. I feel strong ties with other Indians

Completely disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Completely agree

3. I identify strongly with India.

Completely disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Completely agree

4. I identify strongly with Indian values.

Completely disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Completely agree

5. I am proud to be Indian.

Completely disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Completely agree

And finally, a few questions about you.

Age:

Gender:

Are any of your relatives married to Muslims?

Do you have any Muslim friends?

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND PARTICIPATION!

Appendix 4-d

Guidelines:

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The webpage will showcase the importance of **Textiles in the traditional Indian way of life**. According to the *Rig Veda* and the *Upanishads*, the universe is a continuous **fabric** with a grid pattern upon which cycles of life are painted.

Indian textiles have evolved with the development of Hindu civilisation and its significance is hallowed by tradition. With this ethos, these three banners have been designed to represent our Vedic civilization through Indian textiles.

To help me choose the banner that would best represent **Indian textiles** for the webpage, please rate the banners on the criteria scale of 0-5, **where 0=least, and 5=most.**

1	The banner represents the theme of Indian Textiles well.	0	1	2	3	4	5
2	The banner showcases Textiles as an aesthetic part of Indian culture.	0	1	2	3	4	5
3	The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Indian Textiles.	0	1	2	3	4	5

1	The banner represents the theme of Indian Textiles well.	0	1	2	3	4	5
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

The report indicates three important things:

1. **A disproportionate emergence of Muslim influence in India,**
2. **Muslim authority in areas of social, economic, political and cultural life.**
3. **A commitment to reshaping the cultural landscape of India.**

Given below are the names of 10 Indian Muslims cited in the report, whose pictures have been shown above. On a scale of 0-5 where **0=least and 5=most**, please put a tick on the number that you think indicates their **level of intent to take over India.**

1	**Asiya Andrabi:** Leader of an Islamic group (Dukhtaran-E-Millat) that demands the imposition of Islamic Sharia Law in Kashmir as well as separation from India.	0	1	2	3	4	5
2	**Hamid Ansari:** Vice-President of India, former Chairman of the National Commission for Minorities	0	1	2	3	4	5

3	**Azim Premji:** Business tycoon, Philanthropist and Chairman of Wipro Technologies Limited	0	1	2	3	4	5
4	**SY Qureishi:** Chief Election Commissioner of India.	0	1	2	3	4	5
5	**Yusuf Pathan:** Cricketer, powerful and aggressive right-handed batsman and a right-arm off-break bowler of the Indian cricket team.	0	1	2	3	4	5
6	**M.J. Akbar:** Distinguished journalist and writer, current Editorial Director of India Today	0	1	2	3	4	5
7	**APJ Abdul Kalam:** former President of India and scientist who played a pivotal technical and political role in Pokhran-II nuclear test.	0	1	2	3	4	5
8	**Dawood Ibrahim:** Underworld leader and crime boss, and the alleged mastermind behind the 1993 Mumbai bombings.	0	1	2	3	4	5
9	**M. F. Hussain:** Controversial painter who among other things, painted nude Hindu gods	0	1	2	3	4	5
10	**Syed Shah Geelani:** Leader of the Hurriyat, political leader of J&K, separatist leader calling for Kashmir to merge with Pakistan.	0	1	2	3	4	5

In this section, we ask about the way people generally **feel** about the Muslim community in India. We are investigating how, **given the prevailing scenario, Indians feel about the Muslim community.**

Please read the statement and answer on a scale that ranges from 0-9, where **0=not at all**, and **9 = completely**.

Please tick the number that indicates the **intensity of that particular emotion.**

When I think of the Muslim community, I feel

No.	**FEELING**	Not at all									Completely
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Please tick the box indicating your level of agreement or disagreement with the statements.

	Statements:	Completely Disagree							Completely agree
		----	---	--	-	+	++	+++	++++
1	Muslims have contributed positively to Indian culture.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2	The Muslim call for prayers (Azaan) through loud-speakers should be prohibited.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3	We need strong anti-terror laws to protect our country against Muslim terrorism.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4	Islamic educational institutions like Madrassahs should be allowed to function.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5	For national security, it is **not** reasonable for the Army and Police to use strong methods to interrogate Muslims suspected of terrorism	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6	In general, I **sympathise** when some Indians use violence against Muslims, even though I do not condone violence itself.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7	For Indian democracy, Islamic religious teachings by Mullahs should **not** be tolerated.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8	Most Muslims are willing to live in peace with others Indians.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9	I **understand** the reasons given by some Indians for the use of violence, even though I do not condone violence itself.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10	Some Muslims have contributed greatly to India's excellence in science and technology	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11	Since Muslims take advantage of Indian tolerance, our aggression against Muslims is an act of self-defence.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
12	I **support** the reasons given by some Indians for the use of violence against Muslims even though I do not condone violence itself.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Now we are interested in your views concerning the characteristics of different groups. First, on a scale of 0-9, where **0=not at all** and **9=totally**, please rate each the following **traits** for how much you think they describe **Indians.**

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2	Creative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
3	Non-violent	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
4	Treacherous	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
5	Tolerant	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
6	Patriotic	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Next, using the same scale (**0 = not at all, 9 = totally**) please rate each of the following **traits** for how much you think they describe the **Muslim community**.

1	Peaceful	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
2	Creative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
3	Non-violent	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
4	Treacherous	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
5	Tolerant	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
6	Patriotic	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

In this last section, please answer the questions on a scale of 1-7, (where 1= completely disagree, and 7 = completely agree). We would like to know how important Indian identity is to Indians. Please answer the following questions about the importance of being Indian.

1. Being Indian is important to my self-concept

Completely disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Completely agree

2. I feel strong ties with other Indians

Completely disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Completely agree

3. I identify strongly with India.

Completely disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Completely agree

4. I identify strongly with Indian values.

Completely disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Completely agree

5. I am proud to be Indian.

Completely disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Completely agree

And finally, a few questions about you.

Age:

Gender:

Are any of your relatives married to Muslims?

Do you have any Muslim friends?

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND PARTICIPATION!

Appendix 4-e

Guidelines:

I'd like to thank you for your time and participation in this research. **There are separate guidelines provided for each section, please read them carefully and answer as truly as you feel.** We emphasize that there are no right or wrong responses. We aim to find out the way *people generally* feel. Your identity will remain anonymous and your responses will only be used to find out the average response pattern. Thank you for your co-operation.

This is a survey designed to understand the social attitudes of Indians.

But before we start the actual survey, I was hoping you would also kindly help me with another project, which is to design a webpage. I would appreciate some feedback on the images that I have developed for the webpage.

The webpage will showcase the importance of **Tolerance in the traditional Indian way of life**. According to the *Rig Veda* and the *Upanishads*, the universe is a continuous cycle of karma, with **tolerance** being the sacred value upon which hinge the cycles of rebirth.

Indian tolerance has evolved with the development of Hindu civilisation and its significance is hallowed by tradition. With this ethos, these three banners have been designed to represent our Vedic civilization through the sacred value of 'tolerance'.

To help me choose the banner that would best represent **Indian tolerance** the best for the webpage, please rate the banners on the criteria scale of 0-5, where **0=least, and 5=most**.

1	The banner represents the theme of Indian Tolerance well.	0	1	2	3	4	5
2	The banner showcases Tolerance as an important part of Indian culture	0	1	2	3	4	5
3	The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Tolerance well.	0	1	2	3	4	5

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2	The banner showcases Tolerance as an important part of Indian culture	0	1	2	3	4	5
3	The colours/ image of the banner illustrates Tolerance well.	0	1	2	3	4	5

Survey on the Social Attitudes of Indians:

In this research, we are interested in understanding what people think and feel about the role of Muslims in India. This has been an issue of considerable concern, and has been the subject of a high level Government committee report. First of all, we shall tell you something about this report and then we ask you for your opinions on a range of questions.



The report indicates three important things:

1. **A disproportionate emergence of Muslim influence in India,**
2. **Muslim authority in areas of social, economic, political and cultural life.**
3. **A commitment to reshaping the cultural landscape of India.**

Given below are the names of 10 Indian Muslims cited in the report, whose pictures have been shown above. On a scale of 0-5 where **0=least and 5=most**, please put a tick on the number that you think indicates their **level of intent to take over India.**

1	**Asiya Andrabi:** Leader of an Islamic group (Dukhtaran-E-Millat) that demands the imposition of Islamic Sharia Law in Kashmir as well as separation from India.	0	1	2	3	4	5
2	**Hamid Ansari:** Vice-President of India, former Chairman of the National Commission for Minorities	0	1	2	3	4	5

3	**Azim Premji:** Business tycoon, Philanthropist and Chairman of Wipro Technologies Limited	0	1	2	3	4	5
4	**SY Qureishi:** Chief Election Commissioner of India.	0	1	2	3	4	5
5	**Yusuf Pathan:** Cricketer, powerful and aggressive right-handed batsman and a right-arm off-break bowler of the Indian cricket team.	0	1	2	3	4	5
6	**M.J. Akbar:** Distinguished journalist and writer, current Editorial Director of India Today	0	1	2	3	4	5
7	**APJ Abdul Kalam:** former President of India and scientist who played a pivotal technical and political role in Pokhran-II nuclear test.	0	1	2	3	4	5
8	**Dawood Ibrahim:** Underworld leader and crime boss, and the alleged mastermind behind the 1993 Mumbai bombings.	0	1	2	3	4	5
9	**M. F. Hussain:** Controversial painter who among other things, painted nude Hindu gods	0	1	2	3	4	5
10	**Syed Shah Geelani:** Leader of the Hurriyat, political leader of J&K, separatist leader calling for Kashmir to merge with Pakistan.	0	1	2	3	4	5

In this section, we ask about the way people generally **feel** about the Muslim community in India. We are investigating how, **given the prevailing scenario, Indians feel about the Muslim community.**

Please read the statement and answer on a scale that ranges from 0-9, where **0=not at all**, and **9 = completely**.

Please tick the number that indicates the **intensity of that particular emotion.**

When I think of the Muslim community, I feel

No.	**FEELING**	Not at all									Completely
1	Happy	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
2	Vulnerable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
3	Annoyed	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
4	Nervous	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
5	Disdain	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
6	Angry	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
7	Intimidated	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
8	Contempt	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
9	Upset	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	Frightened	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
11	Apprehensive	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
12	Relaxed	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
13	Cheated	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
14	Infuriated	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
15	Cheerful	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

In this section, we ask questions about the way people generally **think** about the Muslim community in India. We are investigating how, **given the prevailing scenario, Indians think about the Muslim community**. Once again, there are no right or wrong responses.

Please read the statements carefully and answer on a scale that ranges from

- - - - = completely disagree to **+ + + + = completely agree.**

- - - - = disagree **100%,** **- - -** = disagree **75%,** **- -** = disagree **50%,** **-** = disagree **25%**

+ + + + = agree **100%,** **+ + +** = agree **75%,** **+ +** = agree **50%,** **+** = agree **25%**

Please tick the box indicating your level of agreement or disagreement with the statements.

	Statements:	Completely Disagree							Completely agree
		----	---	--	-	+	++	+++	++++
1	Muslims have contributed positively to Indian culture.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2	The Muslim call for prayers (Azaan) through loud-speakers should be prohibited.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3	We need strong anti-terror laws to protect our country against Muslim terrorism.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4	Islamic educational institutions like Madrassahs should be allowed to function.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5	For national security, it is **not** reasonable for the Army and Police to use strong methods to interrogate Muslims suspected of terrorism	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6	In general, I **sympathise** when some Indians use violence against Muslims, even though I do not condone violence itself.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7	For Indian democracy, Islamic religious teachings by Mullahs should **not** be tolerated.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8	Most Muslims are willing to live in peace with others Indians.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9	I **understand** the reasons given by some Indians for the use of violence, even though I do not condone violence itself.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10	Some Muslims have contributed greatly to India's excellence in science and technology	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11	Since Muslims take advantage of Indian tolerance, our aggression against Muslims is an act of self-defence.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
12	I **support** the reasons given by some Indians for the use of violence against Muslims even though I do not condone violence itself.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Now we are interested in your views concerning the characteristics of different groups. First, on a scale of 0-9, where **0=not at all** and **9=totally**, please rate each the following **traits** for how much you think they describe **Indians.**

1	Peaceful	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
2	Creative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
3	Non-violent	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
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Next, using the same scale (**0 = not at all, 9 = totally**) please rate each of the following **traits** for how much you think they describe the **Muslim community**.

1	Peaceful	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
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In this last section, please answer the questions on a scale of 1-7, (where 1= completely disagree, and 7 = completely agree). We would like to know how important Indian identity is to Indians. Please answer the following questions about the importance of being Indian.

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Completely disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Completely agree

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4. I identify strongly with Indian values.

Completely disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Completely agree

5. I am proud to be Indian.

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And finally, a few questions about you.

Age:

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Are any of your relatives married to Muslims?

Do you have any Muslim friends?

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND PARTICIPATION!



Participant Debriefing Form

Project Title
Under conditions of threat, do moral values of the in-group lead to stronger endorsement of negative behavior towards out-groups?

Researcher(s) Name(s)
Rakshi Rath
Email – rr95@st-andrews.ac.uk

Supervisor's Name
Professor Stephen D. Reicher
Email: sdr@st-andrews.ac.uk

Nature of Project

This research project was conducted to investigate what leads Hindus to believe that violence against Muslims is acceptable. So, for some people we stressed that India is distinctive due to its virtue and in other conditions we stressed that India is distinctive for its textiles (virtue manipulation). In both conditions we also conflated India with Hindu values. After that we either stressed that Muslims contribute to the strength of the nation or else that they threaten Hindu values in India (threat manipulation). Our hunch was that when we think of Hindus as virtuous, and when we also think of Muslims as a threat to Hindus, then we are more likely to endorse violence. Due to the nature of the study, we were required to withhold the true aim of the study until both manipulations (virtue and threat) were completed.

We hope that you found the study interesting. It may be unsurprising that when Muslims are portrayed as a threat we become more hostile. What might be less expected is the idea that, when we think of ourselves as virtuous, we feel more justified in treating those who threaten us in harsh ways. So we hope that you have found the experience valuable in helping you to think about the things that create conflict in our country. We hope it has also helped you think more deeply about the images and ideas that are presented to us every day in paper, magazines and television programs.

Storage of Data

Your data may be used for future scholarly purposes without further contact or permission if you have given permission on the Consent Form.

What should I do if I have concerns about this study?

A full outline of the procedures governed by the University Teaching and Research Ethical Committee are outline on their website://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/complaints/

Contact Details

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Supervisor: *Prof. Stephen D. Reicher*
Contact Details: *Email: sdr@st-andrews.ac.uk*