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**Information Richness and Trust in V-Commerce:
Implications for Services Marketing**

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Information Richness and Trust in V-Commerce: Implications for Services Marketing

Abstract

Purpose: The potential for e-commerce is limited by a trust deficit when traders do not interact in a physical, bricks-and-mortar context. The theory of information richness posits that equivocal interactions, such as ones requiring trust, can be facilitated through communication media that transmit multiple cues interactively. We examine the potential of information-rich virtual worlds to reduce this trust deficit compared with more traditional web-based e-tailing environments.

Design/Methodology: Rather than focusing on stated intentions we adopt an experimental approach to measure behaviour. Participants receive performance-related financial incentives to perform trust games in different information-rich treatments that represent three retail environments: a physical environment representing bricks-and-mortar trade, an electronic environment representing web-based online retailing and a virtual environment representing virtual world retail.

Findings: We find that the two dimensions of trust significantly differ between the treatments. In particular, as hypothesised, both trustiness and trustworthiness are higher in the virtual than in the electronic environment. However, contrary to our hypotheses, physical trade is not associated with greater trust than virtual trade.

Implications: We extend previous research by demonstrating how the information richness of the virtual world interface can promote e-commerce by deepening trust between trading partners. Our research also complements existing work that approaches product and service interfaces through the lens of servicescapes. The findings also contribute towards the development of services marketing practice and the design of e-commerce environments.

Keywords: information richness, trust, e-commerce and v-commerce, virtual worlds, experimental design

Introduction

Electronic commerce (e-commerce) has transformed how business is conducted, how business partners interact and how information is shared between them (Agarwal & Wu, 2015). Different types of e-commerce platform abound. Among them, virtual worlds have been called ‘a significant new market environment for brand-building through experiential customer service interactions’ (Barnes, Mattsson, & Hartley, 2015, p. 12) and their impact on service innovation has been noted (Barrett, Davidson, Prabhu, & Vargo, 2015). Despite their promise, electronic trading environments bear risks in the much greater scope for anonymity. The associated signals that moderate trade in traditional environments are not present in electronic shopping environments. As a result, online shopping is characterised by the lack of trust (Bauer, Albrecht, Neumann, & Haber, 2015, p. 57) and consequently a greater element of risk (Quigley, 2015, p. 7) which may deter consumers. To reduce consumers’ inherent distrust of websites, firms need to develop ways to overcome the lack of physical cues that consumers use to assess quality, safety or security (Beatty, Reay, Dick, & Miller, 2011, p. 2).

Trust is significant in electronic marketplaces (Bansal, Zahedi, & Gefen, 2016) especially as social capital in online activities (Schlichter & Rose, 2013). In the service literature, the role of trust is especially highlighted in the importance of brand credibility and the impact of strong service on increasing consumer trust (Berry, 2000). However, research in this area is still lacking (Bansal et al., 2016, p. 1). The key question for online retailers is how to retain existing customers and provide repeat purchase opportunities (C. Johnson, Hult, & McGowan, 2008). Ostrom et al. (2015) posited thirteen priorities for the service industry, one of which is the need to leverage technology to advance service. V-commerce provides the key to such leverage through building trust as part of online commerce activities. Technology in the v-commerce space may also provide the key to marrying the benefits of bricks-and-mortar spaces while minimising the inherent trust barriers present in e-commerce. This marriage may also shed light on commitment-trust theory and responds to calls for work considering service contexts to refine these foundational theories and to build service knowledge (Ostrom et al., 2015).

These observations raise the issue of how electronic retail spaces should be designed to minimise loss of trust compared to physical retail environments. In the current paper, we address this issue through an experiment based on the theory of information richness which objectively categorises different communication media according to their capacity to carry information and promote shared meaning and understanding when ambiguity exists (Daft, 2013; Rockmann &

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3 Northcraft, 2008). The theory predicts that information richer electronic media such as virtual
4 environments engender greater trust between interaction partners compared to less rich ones such as
5 web interfaces. However, they produce lesser trust compared to face-to-face interactions. We test this
6 notion using an online experiment with participants playing an economic game designed to measure
7 trust in relation to monetary incentives via different media. We find that virtual worlds can be highly
8 effective in instilling trust, which we attribute to their relative information richness. The main
9 contribution of this work is to extend previous research by demonstrating how the information
10 richness of the virtual world interface can promote e-commerce by deepening trust between trading
11 partners. Our research also complements existing work that approaches product and service interfaces
12 through the lens of servicescapes. The findings also contribute towards the development of services
13 marketing practice and the design of e-commerce environments.

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21 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section contains our literature
22 review. We discuss the construct of trust, its significance in the context of electronically-mediated
23 commerce, the theoretical framework we use to examine the relationship between the two and our
24 research questions. The subsequent section outlines our research approach and design. Results are
25 presented next followed by conclusions, including a discussion of findings, limitations, and
26 implications.
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32 33 **Trust, E-commerce and Information Richness**

34 35 36 *Conceptualising Trust*

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38 Recent literature has highlighted the key role of trust in commercial interactions generally and in
39 retail trade specifically (Toufaily, Souiden, & Ladhari, 2013). Mutual trust between trading partners
40 is an important lubricant of trade (Gefen & Straub, 2004) whenever asymmetric information creates
41 a potential for opportunism that can only be checked at the transaction cost of monitoring and
42 enforcement (San Martín & Camarero, 2005). At its most general, trust refers to a person's
43 expectation that interaction partners will act in a cooperative manner based on shared norms.
44 However, beneath this surface, trust is a multifaceted concept (Waytz, Heafner, & Epley, 2014, p.
45 113) with multiple definitions and measurements (Grabner-Kräuter & Bitter, 2013; Hupcey, Penrod,
46 Morse, & Mitcham, 2001). One's trust can relate specifically to a particular person and how it
47 develops over the relationship with that person (Mutz, 2005). Alternatively, it can relate to other
48 people generally, such as strangers (Gefen, Benbasat, & Pavlou, 2008). Trust applies to 'conditions
49 of uncertainty and vulnerability' regarding how much one person puts at risk in an interaction
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(trustingness) or how one repays the risk one's partner has invested (trustworthiness) (Kelton, Fleischmann, & Wallace, 2008, p. 365). In psychological terms, trust may be conceptualised as a *belief* regarding other people (cognitive trust), as an *emotional response* to reliance on others, as an *intention* or disposition to trust, or in terms of an individual's *actual actions* (Gefen & Straub, 2004; Komiak & Benbasat, 2004; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2003). As a result a plethora of individual-level measurement scales of trust exist depending on the context of the interaction (Butler, 1991) including *integrity* (Gefen & Straub, 2004; Giffin, 1967), *predictability* (Gefen & Straub, 2004; McKnight et al., 2003; Rotter, 1971), *ability* (Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987; Gefen & Silver, 1999; Gefen & Straub, 2004), *benevolence* (Blau, 1964; Gefen & Straub, 2004; Giffin, 1967; Luhmann, 1979), *dependability* (Rotter, 1980), *honesty* (Kumar, 1996) and *competence* (McKnight et al., 2003). The most common questionnaire-based measurement of trust at the individual level is *generalised* trust towards strangers, which may be aggregated over groups or nations to generate indices (e.g. Inglehart, 1997).

Measuring Trust

While many studies use questionnaires to measure individuals' attitudes and intentions to trust others and to return their trust (Gefen & Straub, 2004; Inglehart, 1997) there are problems with this approach. A host of studies have demonstrated weak or non-existent correlations between different trust survey instruments and participants' observed trust behaviour (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000; Holm & Danielson, 2005). This state of affairs reflects plentiful general evidence from social psychology that questionnaire responses, whether they regard attitudes or intended behaviour, may significantly diverge from actual behaviour (see Chandon, Morwitz, & Reinartz, 2005 for an overview). In particular, there is doubt concerning the validity and reliability of survey measures for a number of reasons: First, survey measures are not incentive compatible, i.e. when a particular survey response is not linked to resulting financial consequence and respondents may, therefore, exercise little mental effort or veracity in answering the question (Verhallen & Pieters, 1984). Second, cognitive factors such as the wording and ordering of the questions, as well as the types of scales presented have been shown to affect the way respondents answer the questions. Third, cognitive dissonance may cause respondents to record answers to achieve consistency with their past attitudes and behaviours. Finally, respondents are known to underreport socially undesirable values and attitudes perhaps due to self-serving biases or strategic considerations. Self-reported intention-to-trust variables, commonly used as proxies for trust, may suffer from the above weaknesses (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001).

While these observations suggest merit in measuring trust - by observing behaviour rather

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3 than through attitudinal responses, such an approach poses practical difficulties. These consist of
4 observing relevant instances of trusting behaviour in participants such as the sharing of personal
5 information, making a purchase or acting on information received (McKnight et al., 2003, p. 337).
6 Even if possible, observational research of this type may be prohibitively costly (Grabner-Kräuter &
7 Kaluscha, 2003, p. 803). An alternative to the collection of data in naturalistic settings comes from
8 experimental research. Here, incentivised individual behaviour is observed in laboratory settings
9 using abstract tasks designed to elicit the behaviour of interest while controlling confounding
10 influences (see Roth (1988) for an overview). In particular, the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, &
11 McCabe, 1995) is commonly used to observe behaviours relating to trust and trustworthiness. In this
12 two-player sequential game, a 'sender' chooses any part of a stake of money to send to a 'receiver'.
13 Whatever part is sent is tripled before the receiver decides how much of it to return to the sender. The
14 sender's payoff is whatever he or she has not sent plus what is received back; the receiver gets
15 whatever he or she has not returned to the sender. The trust game provides measurements of the two
16 dimensions of trust (Camerer & Fehr, 2004). The percentage of the stake the sender sends to the
17 receiver measures *trustingness*, i.e. the risk placed in the interaction partner. The percentage of the
18 received sum the receiver returns measures *trustworthiness*, the degree to which a person repays the
19 trustingness placed in them by the interaction partner.
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31 In theory, a money-maximising receiver would return nothing. In anticipation, a money-
32 maximising sender would send nothing in the first place. In contrast, both players' payoffs are
33 collectively maximal if the sender sends the entire stake before being tripled, and if the receiver
34 returns half of it. This socially more efficient outcome can be attributed to trustingness and
35 trustworthiness respectively, i.e. the fulfilled expectation by the sender that the receiver will return
36 more than the amount sent. The average amount sent in trust game experiments is typically about
37 half of the stake. Receivers tend to return the absolute amount sent to them, i.e. about a third of the
38 tripled amount (e.g. Bolle, 1998; Croson & Buchan, 1999; Willinger, Keser, Lohmann, & Usunier,
39 2003). In the 15 years following its introduction there have been over 150 experimental studies using
40 the standard trust game (N. D. Johnson & Mislin, 2011). This large literature has established a host
41 of factors that affect trustingness and trustworthiness in experiments. These include attitudes toward
42 risk, demographics (culture, gender and age) as well as structural variables in the experiment such as
43 anonymity (see Camerer (2003) for an overview).
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54 *Trust and Physical Interactions*

55 Trust has particular significance in the context of e-commerce. Bricks-and-mortar retail spaces and
56 physical trade benefit from established formal and informal arrangements and the presence of
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3 identifiable partners that reduce transaction cost and risks associated with informational deficiencies.
4 Traditional, but static, electronic retail environments have much greater scope for anonymity as they
5 do not involve physical interactions or signals that moderate trade in traditional environments. In
6 offline spaces, the object of trust is typically a person or entity (firm). However, in an online context,
7 the technology (primarily the Internet) and the firm deploying that technology (sellers and the
8 companies they represent) are the objects of trust (Beldad, De Jong, & Steehouder, 2010; Doney &
9 Cannon, 1997). Customers and prospects in electronic commerce have to trust not only the website
10 but also the company behind the website (Doney & Cannon, 1997). The greater degree of uncertainty
11 that characterises electronic transactions makes them particularly prone to low trust (Grabner-Kräuter
12 & Kaluscha, 2003) due to the relative lack of formal (procedures and regulations) and informal
13 (conventions and customs) arrangements between e-traders, and lesser ability to monitor and enforce
14 compliance (for example, inspecting products and service delivery) (Gefen & Straub, 2004). The
15 result is a greater potential for opportunism in others which necessitates costly negotiating,
16 monitoring and enforcing compliance (Fang et al., 2014). Electronic environments also offer scope
17 for deception, such as lying about gender (e.g. Castelfranchi & Tan, 2001).

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19 Further, the typical lack of interpersonal and repeated interactions in the relatively
20 anonymous electronic trading environments tends to reduce the potential for trust. In particular, e-
21 commerce lacks two major aspects of physical co-presence that engender trust between interaction
22 partners. First, physicality raises the awareness of the co-presence of another sentient being
23 accompanied by a sense of engagement with the other (Biocca, Burgoon, Harms, & Stoner, 2001).
24 Secondly, the other's physical presence produces human physiological and psychological
25 mechanisms that can promote pro-social behaviour patterns, including trust. Physical presence
26 allows for non-verbal communication, including a host of involuntary signals such as voice tone,
27 body language, pupil dilation, blushing and perspiration which reveal emotional states that provide
28 information about the other person. For instance, eye contact, touching and proximity are used to
29 signal conversational intimacy, agreement and liking (Argyle & Dean, 1965). Conversely, the
30 relative anonymity and absence of interaction partners in electronic trading environments result in a
31 lack of physiological signals and body language that may lead to significantly reducing trust
32 between them (e.g. Bente, Ruggenberg, Kramer, & Eschenburg, 2008; Cyr, Hassanein, Head, &
33 Ivanov, 2007; Gefen & Straub, 2004; Shin & Shin, 2011). Overall, the flipside of the promise that e-
34 commerce holds is the potential for a trust deficit. In the words of Francis Fukuyama:
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56 trust does not reside in integrated fibre optic cables [...] A "virtual" firm
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58 can have abundant information coming through network wires about its
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3 suppliers and contractors. But if they are all crooks or frauds, dealing
4 with them will remain a costly process involving complex contracts and
5 time consuming enforcement (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 25).
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10 Following the above arguments, we hypothesise that both dimensions of trust would be greater in
11 interactions taking place in physical environments, compared to electronic ones, as follows:
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14 H1: Trustingness is greater in physical environments compared to electronic environments.

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16 H2: Trustworthiness is greater in physical environments compared to electronic environments.
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19 20 *Trust and Information Richness*

21 The issue of low trust in e-commerce is important as both the nature and significance of e-commerce
22 as a part of the overall economy are continuously developing. There is a growing need for marketing
23 researchers and practitioners to design novel information technology mechanisms to establish trust
24 when individuals trade via electronic interfaces (Fang et al., 2014). Such research can consult a vast
25 literature within computer-mediated communication (CMC) studies that deals with medium design
26 and choice. It contains multiple theoretical frameworks including various forms of presence (co-
27 presence, telepresence, social presence, see Nowak and Biocca 2003), immersion (Blascovich et al.,
28 2002), vividness (Coyle & Thorson, 2001), channel expansion and information richness (Daft, 2013).
29 Theories of this kind typically classify different media according to the extent to which their features
30 simulate various aspects of face-to-face interaction (Postmes, Spears, Sakhel, & de Groot, 2001).
31 One popular example is the theory of information richness which posits that a medium's capacity to
32 reduce ambiguity in interactions lies in its ability to transmit rich information, which in turn depends
33 on its objective features (Carlson & Zmud, 1999; Daft, 2013; El-Shinnawy & Markus, 1998; Kock,
34 2004; Rockmann & Northcraft, 2008; Simon & Peppas, 2004). The information richness a particular
35 medium achieves is determined by four criteria (Daft, Lengel, & Trevino, 1987, p. 358). First,
36 *feedback* is the degree to which interaction partners can respond to one another instantaneously.
37 Second, *multiple cues* is the extent to which the message can be accompanied by non-verbal
38 communication or signals from the other's physical presence or social identity. Third, *language*
39 *variety* relates to the range of transmittable symbols such as natural language as well as numerical or
40 graphical information. Fourth, *personal focus* is the extent to which personal (motivations, feelings,
41 perceptions) and situational characteristics can be part of the interaction. Different media are
42 classified hierarchically regarding their ability to transmit rich information through their particular
43 features. Face-to-face is the richest medium followed by telephone, written addressed (e-mail, SMS)
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3 and finally unaddressed documents such as websites.

4 More information-rich media and communication channels are therefore better at handling
5 ambiguous interactions, i.e. situations where the amount of facts and data is not enough for a
6 decision (El-Shinnawy & Markus, 1998). Ambiguity (or equivocality) is a common feature in
7 business (Daft & Lengel, 1986) whereby there are conflicting interpretations and interests that
8 undermine mutual understanding which cannot be solved by *more* information but rather require
9 experience and judgment. Trust in e-commerce is an example of such ambiguous interactions
10 (Rockmann & Northcraft, 2008, p. 109). As we have seen, an individual's decision to trust is
11 associated with risk to the extent that interests between partners are not aligned, and the transaction
12 cost of checking opportunism are prohibitively high. Trust decisions cannot be made merely through
13 analysis and entail both cognitive and emotional responses (Rockmann & Northcraft, 2008) to
14 engage the decision maker's experience and intuition.
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23 When interactions involving trust are mediated electronically, ambiguity is further raised
24 through the absence of physical cues. Conversely, interactions conducted via richer media should,
25 therefore, be associated with greater trust between interaction partners (Rockmann & Northcraft,
26 2008, p. 109) and offer greater scope for combining the benefits of electronic interfaces with the
27 information richness of real, physical retail settings. In ambiguous situations, the richness rather than
28 the amount of information matters to the decision maker. In support, Daft and Lengel (1987) find
29 business managers tend to choose more information rich media when dealing with equivocal and ill-
30 defined situations. Other studies found that evaluations of e-tailing websites are positively related to
31 their information richness (Coyle & Thorson, 2001; Simon & Peppas, 2004).
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38 We may use information richness theory to classify two of the main e-commerce platforms
39 we consider here: websites and virtual worlds. According to the objective criteria of the theory
40 (Carlson & Zmud, 1999; Daft, 2013; Kock, 2004), websites have lower information richness than
41 virtual worlds. When online shoppers use retail websites there is typically no instant feedback or
42 interaction with retailer representatives. Cues and language are impoverished in that they consist
43 solely of unaddressed text and images which, according to Daft and Lengel (1987, p. 359), form the
44 lowest level of richness due to lack of personal focus. On the other hand, individual websites can
45 differ in information richness depending on their particular features (Lu, Kim, Dou, & Kumar, 2014).
46 While still electronic, virtual world retail spaces are commonly designed to transmit richer cues than
47 websites. Retail assistants are often present in the form of avatars with which shoppers can
48 communicate using real-time text chat or audio telephony. This virtual interaction, therefore, allows
49 for personal focus and multiple cues such as the ones transmitted by avatar appearance, gestures and
50 movement.
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Trust in V-commerce

The discussion so far suggests that information-rich media such as virtual worlds may provide an approach to overcoming the potential for a trust deficit associated with electronic commerce. Virtual worlds combine the benefits of the electronic trading environment with the information richness of face-to-face trading through features that compensate for the loss of physical presence associated with e-commerce. Virtual world commerce (v-commerce) is a form of e-commerce where commercial transactions are conducted inside a virtual world. A virtual world is a persistent, three-dimensional computer-based environment where many networked users interact using avatars as their graphical representations (Figures 1 and 2). Interactions include aspects of social life such as pregnancy and birth (Lomanowska & Guitton, 2014), education and learning (Noteborn, Dailey-Hebert, Carbonell, & Gijsselaers, 2014) even the development and understanding of palaeontology (Cunningham, Rahman, Lautenschlager, Rayfield, & Donoghue, 2014).

While virtual worlds began as a platform for gaming they have developed into a more general mode of social and commercial interaction. Virtual world activity is now not only socially (Bainbridge, 2007), but also commercially, significant (Castronova, 2008; Knowles, Castronova, & Ross, 2015a; Prentice, 2007). In virtual worlds, people interact in fully functioning economies based on convertible currencies and the potential for significant returns (Bainbridge, 2007). In such worlds, 'users collect, trade, destroy, produce, and refine virtual resources' just as they would in real worlds (Knowles et al., 2015a). As a result, 3D social virtual worlds have become the 'mainstream Internet application' based on over ten years development in the USA (Zhang et al., 2014, p. 578).

One of the leading virtual worlds to have developed beyond the game-playing origins of this medium is Second Life (SL). As of early 2009, SL has over 15 million registered accounts, and by April 2013, this number had more than doubled to 33 million user accounts (Linden Research 2013). Unlike multi-player, role-playing games such as World of Warcraft, SL has no stipulated goal associated with participation and is purely an online social environment (Greiner, Caravella, & Roth, 2014). SL is open-ended and, therefore, resists classification; its users employ it in a variety of ways including role play, traditional games, social networking and commerce. SL can best be seen as an arena of creativity, with examples of common activities ranging from sport and recreation (e.g. fishing, skydiving) to getting married and raising virtual children. The interface allows for the creation of multifarious objects that can be programmed with behaviour that enables users to accomplish pretty much anything they can imagine.

SL is unusual among virtual worlds in that the intellectual property of any object belongs to its creator. The interface also allows for the immediate and costless transfer of money between users in the form of the Linden dollar (L\$) which is fully convertible at a floating, but relatively stable,

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3 exchange rate with the U.S. dollar. SL facilitates v-commerce because any product can be designed
4 and built by one user, then sold and delivered to another. Also, physical objects can also be sold for
5 delivery outside of SL and vice versa. While not yet on the same scale as web-facilitated commerce,
6 v-commerce through mediums such as SL is becoming increasingly significant (for a summary of the
7 economic decision-making and marketplace characteristics of SL see Duffy (2011)). A typical SL
8 shopping scene can be seen in Figure 1.
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13 Due to their large user base and increasingly developed and vigorous labour, product and
14 service markets (Chambers, 2011), virtual worlds are fast becoming important phenomena for social
15 science research (Knowles, Castronova, & Ross, 2015b). However, existing work regarding the
16 potential of virtual environments in promoting trust is still limited. This paper is intended as a
17 contribution towards this.
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21 As discussed above, electronic environments can be classified in terms of their information
22 richness. Environments richer in information are expected to engender higher levels of trust.
23 Websites and virtual worlds lie on lower and higher ends of the media richness spectrum
24 respectively. As such, in terms of the dimensions of trust, we hypothesise as follows:
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30 H3: Trustingness is greater in virtual-based electronic environments compared to website-based ones.

31 H4: Trustworthiness is greater in virtual-based electronic environments compared to website-based
32 ones.
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36 *Virtual Trust Experiments*

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38 Virtual worlds may combine some of the most desirable aspects of physical trading with the benefits
39 of electronic commerce. Such a finding could generate new perspectives in marketing and selling as
40 well as in the broader context of changing business interactions (Greiner et al., 2014). As such, this
41 topic merits further research and investigation. In the current paper we examine the role of v-
42 commerce in instilling trust in online retailing using the trust game experimental approach. The
43 purpose of this paper is to use a trust game experiment to assess whether virtual worlds (as an
44 alternative to e-tail websites) can promote trust between traders in electronic environments. Our
45 objective is to examine whether the two different facets of trust are more prevalent in the virtual
46 context compared with trade in web-based e-commerce settings.
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53 There are a number of reasons in favour of such an approach. As we have seen, existing
54 research suggests that experiments with trust games can generate behavioural measurements of trust
55 that address issues associated with questionnaire research on trust. Further, this approach measures
56 generalised trust in anonymous interactions and not longitudinally, which arguably captures the
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3 nature of most computer-mediated transactions (Gefen et al., 2008, p. 227; Gefen & Straub, 2004, p.
4 410). Another reason is that trust games have been previously successfully used to assess the effect
5 of information richness on trust behaviour. For example, Füllbrunn et al. (2011) compare trust games
6 played in SL with ones conducted in a physical laboratory. Atlas and Putterman (2011) compare trust
7 games in two different SL settings manipulated to vary richness using virtual visual cues. There is
8 also one other study that used trust game experiments in studying e-commerce trust (Keser, 2002)
9 which focuses on the effect reputation management systems, such as published customer ratings of
10 sellers, have on trust. The finding is that both forms of trust game behaviour are enhanced in the
11 experimental treatment representing the reputation management system.
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20 **Research Method and Design**

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23 We have seen that the further progress of e-commerce may be hindered by its potential for low trust
24 between trading partners when information richness is low compared with physical retail. Also, we
25 argued that one promising avenue to overcome this problem lies in information-rich virtual worlds,
26 electronic trading environments that simulate certain aspects of physical and social settings. We now
27 outline how we examined this possibility in our experiment. We first outline our main variables, their
28 measurement, and our treatments. We then discuss the research design including operationalising e-
29 commerce and v-commerce in our experiment to test whether differences in trust game behaviour
30 exist between the two.
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38 *Measures*

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40 Our main research question is whether v-commerce may be a platform to alleviate some of the trust
41 issues associated with e-commerce conducted on less information-rich website environments. In
42 particular, our specific objective is to assess whether trading in virtual environments is characterised
43 by greater degrees of trust. We follow the experimental literature and measure trust as the amount
44 sent by the sender (trustingness) and returned by the receiver (trustworthiness) in a standard,
45 financially incentivised trust game. Further, to vary information richness, our trust games were
46 conducted in three environments of objectively differing information richness, including a website-
47 based one representing the e-commerce environment (EE), a virtual world one representing v-
48 Commerce (VE). We also create a control treatment in a physical laboratory representing physical
49 trade in traditional settings (PE). In the information richness hierarchy, PE is associated with greater
50 richness than the CMC-environments EE and VE. In turn, due to its features, VE is more information
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3 rich than EE. Following the information richness theory, we propose that trust is positively
4 associated with the information richness of the environment within which the two parties interact.
5 Pursuant to our hypotheses, we expect that trustiness and trustworthiness is greater in PE
6 compared to EE or VE and that they are greater in VE compared to EE.
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10 11 *Experimental Design*

12 Our study follows standard experimental economics methodology (Croson, 2005) and involves
13 incentive-compatible tasks, i.e. where the elicited behaviour determines the participant's financial
14 reward. This work builds on previous projects examining behaviour inside virtual worlds
15 experimentally (Chesney, Chuah, & Hoffmann, 2009). Participants were recruited to play
16 incentivised trust games in three different treatments, corresponding with the PE, EE and VE settings
17 described above. In each, participants played in separate groups for senders and receivers
18 respectively. They remained anonymous to each other and were randomly selected throughout. All
19 participants were briefed using written instructions (available upon request) and had to complete a
20 comprehension quiz successfully before being permitted to indicate their decisions. We now discuss
21 how the experimental protocol differed between the three treatments.
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31 *Implementation*

32 The PE-setting of the experiment was implemented as follows. First, a total of 96 participants, i.e. 48
33 sender-receiver pairs were recruited via standard e-mail solicitation from the participant database of
34 the *Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics* at the University of Nottingham, UK.
35 A total of seven scheduled sessions were conducted in a physical laboratory and, in each, participants
36 were randomly divided into two groups, senders and receivers. Participants were told that their co-
37 participant would be randomly chosen from the other group but would otherwise remain anonymous.
38 Thus, there was no interaction between participants. Participants received written instructions but
39 were also briefed orally on the rules of the trust game. Each participant had to complete a quiz before
40 making decisions to ensure comprehension. The task commenced when all participants correctly
41 completed the quiz. One form was used to record participant identification numbers and the amounts
42 sent, received and returned. The forms first were distributed among senders and collected after
43 decisions were indicated. Subsequently, the forms were shuffled and randomly distributed to
44 receivers to indicate their decisions. Payoffs resulting from both participants' decisions were paid out
45 in cash at the end of each session. Each participant also received a show-up fee of £5 (U. S. \$7.50).
46 In the sessions, participants played the standard trust game as described before with the following
47 parameter values: senders had to choose any part of a stake of £4 (U.S. \$ 6), in multiples of £0.50
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3 (USD \$0.75) to be sent to the receiver. The amount sent was tripled by the experimenter. Receivers
4 had to choose a portion of this tripled amount in multiples of £0.50 (U.S. \$0.75) to return to the
5 sender.
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8 The experimental sessions of the VE-setting were conducted entirely within SL, following an
9 approach that reflected the PE-setting in as much detail as possible. However, some experimental
10 procedures were adjusted to accommodate SL. Unlike scheduled sessions in the laboratory, we
11 solicited participation by approaching online users *in situ* immediately before a particular
12 experimental session in the following manner. Half an hour before a session, we used the search
13 feature in the SL-interface to identify the currently busiest locations regarding number of avatars
14 present. The experimenter then used an avatar to access these locations and to address groups of
15 avatars present using public instant messaging (IM) with a standardised recruitment message in
16 English stating our institutional affiliation and general information about the nature of the task, its
17 duration and incentivisation. Whenever interested users responded, any additional questions were
18 answered, and volunteers informed of the time and venue of the session. This process was repeated
19 for some locations and avatar groups in each until the recruitment of the desired number of
20 participants was complete. In this way, we recruited a total of 60 participants in SL, i.e. 30 sender-
21 receiver pairs. Interested participants were teleported to our virtual experimental laboratory in a
22 dedicated virtual building with controllable access rights and purpose-built furniture. In the briefing
23 stage, participants were given virtual documents containing general information on experimental
24 etiquette, anonymity, confidentiality and incentivisation. The experimenter communicated with
25 participants using either public or private (i.e. one-to-one) IM. Once participants finished reading the
26 briefing documents they were asked to occupy virtual cubicles designed to restrict vision and
27 communication to prevent collusion between them. They were then given virtual documents
28 containing the experimental instructions and a comprehension quiz. The task commenced after all
29 participants completed the quiz correctly. Participants communicated their decisions to the lead
30 experimenter and received feedback via private IM. In the payment stage of the experimental
31 session, participants were paid earnings in L\$ on the spot using the SL payment transfer feature.
32 Regarding experimental parameters, senders chose a division of a L\$1000 stake (U.S. \$4) in
33 multiples of L\$1 to be sent to the receiver. The amount sent was again tripled. Receivers chose a
34 portion of this tripled amount in multiples of L\$1 to return to the sender. Also, participants were paid
35 a show-up fee of L\$ 500 each. A typical experimental session in progress is shown in Figure 2.
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54 Regarding exchange rate, our SL stake differs from that used in the physical setting. However,
55 the lower hourly wage in SL means that participants' potential earnings are comparable in the two
56 settings. According to the standard method for incentive-compatible experiments, participants'
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3 expected money earnings are calibrated in line with their particular opportunity cost of participation
4 (e.g. Friedman & Sunder, 1994). This is commonly estimated using the prevalent hourly wage for
5 casual work. As a result, calibration may need to be adjusted to create equivalent compensation
6 between different types of participant groups in a given experiment. For example, when participants
7 from both developing and developed societies are compared within a single study, their respective
8 experimental earnings are translated into cash at differential rates based on wage levels and their
9 purchasing power at the local level (e.g. Henrich et al., 2004). We adopt a similar approach here. We
10 estimated the opportunity cost of virtual participation using the prevalent rates for virtual labour
11 within SL, sometimes referred to as farming, which is less than the opportunity cost in physical
12 locations.
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20 Finally, our EE-setting was designed to represent the salient features of e-commerce, and we
21 employed a website environment for this purpose. Participants were given the address of a webpage
22 located on our institution's webserver that contained experimental instructions and a comprehension
23 quiz. Question and instruction wording, comprehension quiz questions and experimental incentives
24 were identical to those used in VE. The webpage was designed plainly consisting of only text other
25 than our institutional affiliation and logo at the top against white background. Successful completion
26 of the quiz questions produced a second webpage with the experimental task. Upon completion of
27 this task, the results were e-mailed to an address containing our institutional domain name.
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34 The participant recruitment process was also conducted within SL and followed the protocol of
35 the VE-setting in every detail. The reason is that our experimental results can only reveal the
36 difference between the EE and VE-settings if they are the same in all other aspects, including
37 composition and nature of the participant pool. As our treatment variable is the nature of the
38 electronic interface, i.e. e-commerce versus v-commerce, any additional difference between the
39 corresponding settings would have confounded its effect. All participants were informed to complete
40 the task using a web browser within 12 hours of their recruitment and given a participation code. We
41 completed the data collection for our desired number of senders before recruiting receivers. While all
42 participants recruited as senders were directed to the same page, receivers were given individual
43 webpages containing the amount sent by their randomly-assigned and anonymous senders previously
44 recruited. All participants were paid out using SL's transfer feature once all participant decisions
45 were received. Unsolicited participants directed to the webpages by people other than the
46 experimenters did not have valid participation codes and their responses were not included.
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Results

The dataset our design generated consists of the behaviour we observed regarding trustiness (measured as % of the stake sent by senders) and trustworthiness (% of the received amount returned by receivers). Table I provides summary statistics. Out of our four hypotheses, two (H3 and H4) were supported fully and two (H1 and H2) partially by our data.

Trustiness (H1 and H3)

The first step in our analysis is to test for differences in trustiness between the treatments including the experiment conducted in the physical laboratory setting. We rely on previous literature that supports a meaningful comparison between virtual experimental and standard physical laboratory behaviour. In particular, Chesney et al. (2009) examined to what extent SL can be used as an experimental platform to generate results that may be compared with conventional laboratory studies. These authors experimented with a series of standard incentive-compatible tasks within SL using participants recruited entirely in this virtual world as well as in standard physical laboratories and found that both groups may be validly compared. They, and other studies such as Yee (2006), explored the demographics and social values of SL participants and concluded their profiles are sufficiently similar to those of standard participants to allow such comparisons.

As can be seen in Table I, the average amount sent is highest in the VE-setting (61%), followed by PE (55%) and EE (38%). A Kruskal-Wallis test confirmed that these averages are significantly different ($p=0.0001$). To ascertain which particular conditions differ from one another, we also report pairwise Mann-Whitney tests. As experimental data typically do not obey normality assumptions, non-parametric tests are often preferable (e.g. Davis & Holt, 1993, p. 526). The resulting test statistics for the pairwise comparisons between the three environments are presented in Table II. The results of both tests suggest that there is significantly less trusting behaviour in the electronic trading environment compared to both the physical and virtual setting. Also, no difference between the latter two environments is in evidence. We interpret this as support for H3, but only partial support for H1.

Trustworthiness (H2 and H4)

We now turn to the analysis of trustworthiness regarding amounts returned by receivers. Table I suggests higher trustworthiness (38%) in the VE-settings to both EE and PE, while there is a relatively small difference between the average of these (24% and 27% respectively). Again, we conducted a Kruskal-Wallis test for differences in these averages, which was highly significant

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3 ($p= 0.0001$). To examine pairwise differences, Mann-Whitney tests were performed in a pairwise
4 fashion and confirm higher trustworthiness in the virtual environment compared to the other two
5 settings, which, in turn, exhibited no significant difference between them (Table III). However, as
6 receivers' decisions are made under perfect information regarding the decision of senders, we also
7 used a multivariate testing method as amounts returned potentially depend on the corresponding
8 amounts sent by the sender. The equation was estimated using the ordinary least squares technique
9 and produced the results reported in Table IV. We used the VE-data as a baseline and introduced
10 dummies for the other two settings as independent variables along with the amount sent, which were
11 regressed on amount returned. Again, the results offer support for H4, but only partial support for
12 H2. The regression results show significant negative coefficients for EE and PE, confirming that
13 virtual world receivers returned more controlling for the amounts they were sent. However, the latter
14 variable is insignificant, suggesting trustworthiness is not significantly explained by trustingness.
15 This result is in line with some previous studies. In our dataset, we did not record the amount
16 returned by receivers who were sent zero amounts, as they had no decision to make. If instead, we
17 record zero returns for these cases, the amount sent becomes a significant predictor in the regression.
18 Previous studies approach this issue in different ways, which may explain why some find amounts
19 sent to be significant (e.g. Croson & Buchan, 1999) while others do not (e.g. Berg et al., 1995;
20 Willinger et al., 2003)

31 32 33 34 35 **Discussion**

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38 The objective of this paper was to assess the role of v-commerce in promoting trust in computer-
39 mediated transactions thereby responding to calls for more research into the role of context and
40 trustee attributes (e.g. Bansal et al., 2016) and the stumbling blocks to firms adopting virtual worlds
41 (Yoon & George, 2013). This research also adds to the discussion of e- and v- commerce and, in
42 particular, the deeper understanding of real benefits rather than hyped expectations (Wasko, Teigland,
43 Leidner, & Jarvenpaa, 2011).

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46 Our research is unique in that it focuses on trust behaviour rather than attitudes. Our findings
47 show that traders' trust anonymous others and that trust is returned. Further, trust differs significantly
48 between web-based e-commerce and virtual environments. Both trustingness and trustworthiness are
49 significantly higher in the virtual commerce setting compared with the static electronic setting. To
50 the extent that our experimental design appropriately represented these settings, and that our chosen
51 measures of trust are valid, we may conclude that v-commerce is capable of promoting trust in
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3 computer-mediated transactions to the equal of bricks-and-mortar settings, though we acknowledge
4 that further research is warranted.
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6 Based on participants' actions, no difference in trusting behaviour could be detected between
7 the physical and virtual environments. However, there is a difference in trustworthiness, with
8 participants' actions highlighting a greater degree of trustworthiness in the virtual setting compared
9 with the physical setting. These findings are interesting as trustingness involves expectations of
10 others' reciprocity. A sender may have ample reason to be more suspicious of an online trade with a
11 faceless (anonymous) person. However, the representation by an avatar becomes the surrogate for
12 physical interactions with the inherent trust that such an interaction would bring. Further, while
13 trustworthiness is not characterised by the actions of another person, the greater returns made by
14 virtual environment participants may also reflect the information richness generated by this medium,
15 thus correcting the trust deficit.
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18 We therefore find that trust is no less and sometimes greater in the virtual compared to the
19 physical environment, contrary to our hypotheses H2 and H4 based on information richness theory.
20 In this theory the physical environment is the most information rich and should harbour a greater
21 capacity for mutual trust. Our result chimes however with that of Füllbrunn et al. (2011) who also
22 find higher trustworthiness by SL-receivers than by those in their physical laboratory. While our
23 experiment was not designed to uncover the reasons for this unexpected result, there are two
24 possibilities from other studies. One is a reduction in social inhibition in virtual contexts that may
25 temper trust in physical settings (Chesney, Coyne, Logan, & Madden, 2009). Another is that virtual
26 environments may be associated with cooperative social conventions that developed based on shared
27 particular interests. For example, Becker and Mark (2002, p. 36) suggest virtual technologies may
28 have an "integrative social effect, and [...] counteract the tendencies of fragmentation and
29 individualization in modern societies". Further work in this direction is needed.
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32 In comparison with a physical setting, the virtual space offers the same indicators for trust
33 (trustingness) and greater potential for trustworthiness far more than the e-commerce or static online
34 space. Thus, the virtual setting combines both the best features of a traditional brick-and-mortar retail
35 environment with the economics of scale and global reach of e-commerce. Future research focussing
36 on the physical, e- and v-commerce conditions across multiple service situations and communities
37 would be worthwhile to aid deeper understanding of trust in different contexts and with different
38 types of trades and traders. The implications for marketing practitioners and online businesses are
39 significant. For example, e-businesses need to consider trust implications for their commerce space
40 and look to strategies and tactics to promote both dimensions of trust. In particular, e-tailers may
41 exploit virtual world technology as a surrogate for the trust indicators inherent within brick-and-
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3 mortar environments. One possibility is to clearly establish information richness within virtual
4 worlds, possibly through the graphical representation of users by avatars, and the options to display
5 information about them (e.g. their social activities), in order to simulate aspects of physical, social
6 networking and recreate an artificial but acceptable substitute for face-to-face interactions.
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10 Additionally, trust may be increased through the use of a virtual world element as part of the
11 online interface where customers experience information richness in the form of employees' avatars
12 as well as other customers' avatars. SL successfully engenders information richness (Nowak &
13 Biocca, 2003) in a far advanced manner than simply adding a social touch (e.g. personalised
14 welcome message or photographs of smiling people) to the presence of a static website (Gefen &
15 Straub, 2004). Our results show the potential for commerce within virtual worlds to bridge the gap
16 between physical and electronic trades by exploiting the advantages of both. Information richness is
17 critical as it represents the indicators of trust to prospective and current customers thereby reducing
18 risk and uncertainty in trial behaviour and reinforcing positive aspects associated with repeat
19 purchase behaviour (brand and community building, referrals and loyalty).
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23 While rapid technological change presents constant challenges for marketing practitioners, it
24 also offers opportunities for the development and implementation of new strategies. For example,
25 simulations of physical social networks may change frequently in real-world applications, such
26 changes can be replicated in the virtual commerce world. Just as a customer may prefer a particular
27 shop assistant at their regular shop, online customers could be given the option to select a preferred
28 avatar (or virtual shop assistant). Online customers could also be given options to further engage
29 with avatars, such as referring them to their friends, customising them to suit preferences (and to
30 build upon trust through appearance or manner), assigning personal shopping avatars to provide
31 advice on purchases for self or others or arrange online group shopping excursions and shopping
32 clubs.
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36 The last decade has seen immense growth in the number of virtual worlds, their users and
37 consequently, the market size of virtual economies. For example, as of 2014, among the over 1
38 million active SL users alone, total in-world transactions amounted to U.S. \$ 3.2 billion (LindenLab,
39 2013). Besides SL, virtual worlds such as World of Warcraft and Entropia Universe have also seen
40 significant growth in their user base and economies (Nazir & Lui, 2016). Such growth has attracted
41 real-world companies and individual entrepreneurs to seek new commercial opportunities in virtual
42 economies. Virtual supermarkets are expected in the near future (Khan & Brouwer, 2016). Apart
43 from commerce, virtual worlds will also have a place in the future for entertainment and education.
44 Within education, for instance, a large number of established institutions have a presence within
45 virtual worlds including University of Illinois, Carnegie Mellon University and Harvard University
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3 (Downey, 2014). Our findings contribute to the process of engendering trust to oil the wheels of such
4 virtual economies and activities.
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6 Finally, for service companies, the implications for trust on behaviour highlights an
7 opportunity to stimulate consumption and reduce purchase or trial uncertainty, and the need to
8 carefully craft a servicescape which leverages information richness and trust signals.
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10 Our conclusions have to be somewhat qualified to account for the general limitations of our
11 study. First, for the reasons explained previously, our approach was not to study trust in naturalistic
12 settings or as attitudes or intentions, but as observed behaviour in abstract, interactive and
13 incentivised decision tasks between players of an economic game. While this feature of our study is a
14 novel contribution to the trust in e-commerce literature it may be argued that the trust game
15 constitutes too great an abstraction from realistic commercial situations to generate reliable
16 conclusions regarding richer occurrences of trust in naturalistic scenarios. On the other hand,
17 irrespective of the abstractness of the task, trust game behaviour does measure some aspect of trust,
18 especially to the extent that it is incentivised. Also, it is exactly this abstraction that allows us to distil
19 the essence of trust behaviour without other confounding influences (Camerer 2003).
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22 Secondly, one may be suspicious of the specific validity and reliability of experimental results
23 generated in a virtual environment lacking the control of physical laboratories. However, there is
24 support for SL-experimentation which has been shown to be capable of reproducing the results of
25 experiments conducted in standard, physical laboratory experiments across a number of experimental
26 tasks (Chesney, Chuah, et al., 2009). Moreover, the study of a virtual world, and in particular the
27 collection of behavioural data there, represents a novel feature of our work in this paper.
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29 Similar to other experimental studies (e.g. Henrich, 2000), our sample size is relatively
30 modest when compared to studies based on surveys which reflects experimental economy and
31 logistical challenges. However, the analytical techniques we use (especially non-parametric
32 techniques) account for number of observations and the potential for non-normal distribution of data
33 and still generated significant results. Further studies to replicate our findings would be a welcome
34 addition to the literature.
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37 It should also be noted that our approach to varying information richness as an experimental
38 treatment effect involves presence between experimenter and participant, not between participants.
39 Participants' particular co-players are absent and strictly anonymous in all our settings. Further
40 research could explore the relational nature of trust in more detail.
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43 While our results are suggestive of the efficacy of the artificially-created information richness
44 inherent in virtual worlds, the study was not designed to uncover the underlying reasons for them.
45 The most likely source of virtual trust may indeed lie in the way it is designed to simulate aspects of
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3 the physical world, including human physical signals and non-verbal communication such as
4 gestures and body language. Future work in this direction seems warranted.
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Table I Summary statistics of trustiness (% sent) and trustworthiness (% returned)

	Environment					
	PE		VE		EE	
Behaviour	% sent	% returned	% sent	% returned	% sent	% returned
Mean	55.47	26.87	61.17	38.49	38.48	24.47
Mode (percent)	50 (22.9) 100 (22.9)	33.33 (28.2)	100 (36.7)	50 (40.7)	30 (15.6) 50 (15.6)	0 (25)
Std. Dev.	35.53	18.86	37.09	21.34	29.1	26.06
Observations	48	39	30	27	32	32

Table II Differences in trustiness (% sent)

Environment	PE	VE	EE
PE		$t = -0.68 (0.5)$ $U = 654.00 (0.49)$	$t = 2.25 (0.027^{**})$ $U = 544.50 (0.027^{**})$
VE			$t = 2.67 (0.01^{**})$ $U = 313.50 (0.018^{**})$

Notes: Significance tests reported in terms of t -statistics and Mann-Whitney U . Two-tailed p -values in parentheses. $** p < 0.05$; $*** p < 0.01$.

Table III Differences in trustworthiness (% returned)

Environment	PE	VE	EE
PE		$t = -2.33 (0.02^{**})$ $U = 316.00 (0.006^{***})$	$t = 0.45 (0.66)$ $U = 509.00 (0.18)$
VE			$t = 2.23 (0.03^{**})$ $U = 230.50 (0.002^{***})$

Notes: Significance tests reported in terms of t -statistic and Mann-Whitney U . Two-tailed p -values in parentheses. $** p < 0.05$; $*** p < 0.01$.

Table IV Regression results for trustworthiness (% returned)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	<i>p</i> -value
Constant	38.12	0.000***
Amount sent	0.005	0.95
Physical ^a	-11.62	0.039**
Electronic ^b	-13.88	0.026**
<i>F</i>	2.2	0.093
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.036	
Observations	98	

Notes: ^{a,b} dummies for physical and electronic environments respectively. ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

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Figure 1 Second Life avatars in a shop



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Figure 2 An experiment in Second Life



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