

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

A temporary deficiency in self-control: Can heightened motivation overcome this effect?

Claire L. Kelly <sup>1\*</sup>, Trevor J. Crawford<sup>1</sup>, Emma Gowen<sup>2</sup>, Kelly Richardson<sup>1</sup>, & Sandra I.  
Sünram-Lea<sup>1</sup>

Lancaster University

\*Corresponding author

c.kelly1@lancaster.ac.uk

07751660768

<sup>1</sup> Department of Psychology, Fylde College, Lancaster University, Lancaster, LA1 4YF,  
United Kingdom.

<sup>2</sup> Faculty of Life Sciences, Carys Bannister Building, Dover Street, Manchester, M13 9PL,  
United Kingdom

#### Author Note

The work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council under grant  
number ESRC NWDTTC13.14.

26 Abstract

27 Self-control is important for everyday life and involves behavioural regulation. Self-control  
28 requires effort and completing two successive self-control tasks, typically, produces a  
29 temporary drop in performance in the second task. High self-reported motivation and being  
30 made self-aware somewhat counteracts this effect; performance in the second task is  
31 enhanced. The current study explored the relationship between self-awareness and motivation  
32 on sequential self-control task performance. Before employing self-control in an antisaccade  
33 task, participants initially applied self-control in an incongruent Stroop task or completed a  
34 control task. After the Stroop task participants unscrambled sentences that primed self-  
35 awareness (each started with the word 'I') or unscrambled neutral sentences. Motivation was  
36 measured after the antisaccade task. Findings revealed that after exerting self-control in the  
37 incongruent Stroop task, motivation predicted erroneous responses in the antisaccade task for  
38 those that unscrambled neutral sentences; high motivation led to fewer errors. Those primed  
39 with self-awareness, were somewhat more motivated overall but motivation did not  
40 significantly predict antisaccade performance. Supporting the resource allocation account, if  
41 one was motivated – intrinsically or via the manipulation of self-awareness - resources were  
42 allocated to both tasks leading to the successful completion of two sequential self-control  
43 tasks.

44 *Key words:* Self-control, self-awareness, motivation, antisaccade task

45

46

47

48

49

50

51 A temporary deficiency in self-control: Can heightened motivation overcome this effect?

52 Self-control is the ability required to override or inhibit an automatic/impulsive  
53 response for another, involved in successful behavioural regulation (Baumeister, Heatherton  
54 & Tice, 1994). Self-control can be applied to many situations, such as suppressing emotions,  
55 avoiding distractions at work e.g. checking social media (Otten, Cladder-Micus, Pouwels,  
56 Hennig, Schuurmans, & Hermans, 2014). Self-control is employed regularly every day, and  
57 research has estimated that we use self-control processes approximately three to four hours  
58 each day (Hoffman, Baumeister, Foerster & Vohs, 2012). It is necessary for human social  
59 interaction and there are clear detrimental effects of self-control failure such as crime,  
60 obesity, smoking and drug problems (Hagger, Wood, Stiff & Chatzisarantis, 2010).

61 Despite its importance and regular use, several studies have shown that engaging in  
62 self-control is effortful and when completing two sequential self-control tasks, the first task is  
63 usually performed well but a temporary deterioration in performance in the second occurs  
64 (Hagger et al., 2010). Studies typically employed a sequential self-control depletion paradigm  
65 in which two concurrent self-control tasks were completed. Frequently employed tasks  
66 include the incongruent Stroop (1935) task, a thought suppression task, attention control  
67 video task and an erasing letters task (Carter, Kofler, Forster & McCullough, 2015; Hagger et  
68 al., 2010). We recently implemented another feasible measure of inhibition - the antisaccade  
69 task (Hallett, 1978) - into a sequential self-control task paradigm (Kelly, Sünram-Lea &  
70 Crawford, 2015).

71 The strength model/resource depletion theory of self-control (Baumeister, Vohs &  
72 Tice, 2007) suggested that the temporary deterioration in task performance following self-  
73 control exertion stems from a depletion of limited energy resources. Performing a task  
74 necessitating self-control diminishes those resources and consequently fewer resources are  
75 available, resulting in weakened subsequent self-control performance.

76           Glucose was proposed as the relevant physiological energy resource following  
77 observation that peripheral glucose levels were significantly reduced following self-control  
78 exertion (Fairclough & Houston, 2004) and that glucose relative to placebo administration  
79 restored subsequent self-control performance following prior exertion (Gailliot et al., 2007).  
80 However recent findings have failed to replicate this, challenging the relationship between  
81 glucose availability and self-control performance (Dang, 2016; Kelly, et al., 2015; Kurzban,  
82 2010; Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable & Myers., 2013; Molden et al., 2012; Sanders, Shirk,  
83 Burgin & Martin, 2012). Although these findings do not necessarily imply that there is no  
84 temporary shortage in the energy and more specifically glucose supply centrally, other factors  
85 appear to play an important (but not mutually exclusive) role.

86           For example, level of motivation may be an important moderating factor in self-  
87 control inasmuch as it might ameliorate any self-control deficiency following prior  
88 engagement. That is to say, self-control is a motivated resource and motivation determines  
89 the effort and time spent on certain tasks/behaviours (Salamore, Correa, Farrar & Mingote,  
90 2007). Supporting this, administering a monetary incentive for task completion or being told  
91 that the tasks were important, resulted in an enhanced level of performance in a second self-  
92 control task following initial exertion (Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). Moreover, we  
93 previously observed that high levels of self-reported intrinsic motivation led to enhanced self-  
94 control performance on a second task whereas those low in motivation showed a deterioration  
95 in antisaccade performance after initial self-control exertion (Kelly, et al., 2015).

96           Increasing levels of self-awareness appears to have a similar restorative effect on  
97 temporary deficiencies in self-control following prior engagement. Focusing attention on the  
98 self can lead to the conscious awareness of the self, a state Duval, Wicklund and Fine (1972)  
99 labeled “objective self-awareness”. Moreover, it results in a process of self- evaluation which  
100 consists of comparing the self to a standard of correctness that specifies a state the self ought

101 to have (Duval, et al., 1972). Specifically, anything that primes an individual about the self,  
102 such as mirrors, hearing one's own voice, cameras can increase self-awareness levels  
103 (Stapleton & Smith, 2013; Wicklund, 1979).

104         Indeed, it has been shown that self-focused attention has important implications for  
105 motivation and self-regulation (for reviews see Carver, 2003; Duval & Silvia, 2001; Gibbons,  
106 1990; Silvia & Duval, 2001). For example, previous research demonstrated a positive  
107 relationship between self-focused attention and self-control. Employing a sequential two-task  
108 depletion paradigm, Alberts, Martijn and De Vries (2011) used a scrambled sentence task  
109 (SST) to induce self-awareness by priming participants with sentences connected to the self,  
110 which began with the letter 'I'. This was administered after the first self-control task - an  
111 auditory suppression task - and before a second self-control task, which measured  
112 perseverance level in a handgrip squeezing task. Those presented with neutral primes showed  
113 a temporary deterioration in self-control performance in the handgrip task and persevered for  
114 less time but inducing self-awareness counteracted this.

115         The finding that motivation and self-awareness moderate self-control performance  
116 support Beedie and Lane's (2012) resource allocation account. This posits that a temporary  
117 deficiency in self-control is reflective of a reluctance to allocate resources to a task because it  
118 is not a personal priority i.e. considered important and/or interesting. Consequently the  
119 response trajectory of a temporary deficiency in self-control performance following prior  
120 exertion reflects a person's low level of motivation; one unwilling to invest resources  
121 (Baumeister, 2014). Applying this to the self-awareness findings, making an individual more  
122 self-aware arguably might prompt them to their performance and motivate them to allocate  
123 resources to a second task despite initial exertion.

124         Alternative models also explain self-control performance deterioration from a  
125 motivational perspective (Inzlicht & Marcora, 2016). Baumeister's amendment to the original

126 resource model suggested that resources are still somewhat diminished during self-control  
127 exertion but if motivated, any remaining resources are allocated to the subsequent task  
128 (Baumeister, 2014; Inzlicht & Schmeichel, in press). The shifting priorities account (Inzlicht,  
129 Schmeichel & Macrae, 2014; Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012), suggests a motivational  
130 attentional shift produces the temporary reduction in self-control; one changes from  
131 completing a compulsory task to wanting to perform enjoyable tasks (Inzlicht, Legault &  
132 Temper, 2014; Baumeister, 2014). The ‘opportunity cost’ model suggests that the motivation  
133 for task completion stems from the opportunity cost associated with the task i.e. perception of  
134 effort. Motivation is high when a task is perceived as less effortful (Kurzban, et al, 2013).

135         The current study aimed to further explore the motivational perspectives on self-  
136 control performance and assessed the relationship between self-awareness and motivation.  
137 We manipulated self-awareness by administering the SST task (Alberts et al, 2011) between  
138 two self-control tasks. Following our previous methodology (Kelly et al., 2015) an initial  
139 Stroop (incongruent vs. congruent) task was paired with an antisaccade task in a sequential  
140 two task paradigm. The prosaccade task was also administered to assess whether completion  
141 of an initial self-control task adversely affected subsequent self-control performance only or  
142 whether the observed effects were extended more generically to other saccade tasks.  
143 Secondly we measured self-reported levels of motivation using the intrinsic motivation  
144 inventory (IMI; McAuley, Duncan & Tammen, 1989). Based on Alberts et al’s (2011)  
145 findings we hypothesised that heightening self-awareness levels would counteract the  
146 temporary deficiency in self-control performance in the antisaccade task following  
147 incongruent Stroop task completion. Further, drawing on our recent findings (Kelly et al.,  
148 2015) we predicted that high motivation would counteract such temporary decline and lead to  
149 sustained antisaccade performance. The relationship between the effects of self-awareness  
150 and motivation on self-control performance were examined to observe whether priming high

151 self-awareness would be an intervention that would increase motivation and subsequently  
152 attenuate any self-control deficiency in performance.

153

## 154 **Method**

### 155 **Participants**

156 We initially tested 61 participants but removed one participant due to the high rate of  
157 erroneous responses made in the antisaccade task (89.29%), which indicated that the  
158 instructions were not fully understood. On average healthy adult participants typically make  
159 20% of antisaccade errors (Hutton, 2008). This resulted in a final sample of 60 healthy young  
160 adults (12 male & 48 female) studying at Lancaster University ( $M_{age} = 22.08$  years). Before  
161 the commencement of the study, a power analysis based on Alberts et al.'s (2010) findings  
162 revealed that this sample size was sufficiently highly powered (0.74) according to Cohen's  
163 (1988) standards. This study was ethically approved by Lancaster University's Ethics  
164 Committee and written informed consent from all participants was provided according to the  
165 Declaration of Helsinki.

166

### 167 **Procedure**

168 Participants attended one testing session, which lasted on average 30 minutes.  
169 Participants were divided into 4 groups: Incongruent Stroop/low self-awareness, incongruent  
170 Stroop/high self-awareness, congruent Stroop/low self-awareness and congruent Stroop/high  
171 self-awareness. Participants first provided written informed consent and then completed  
172 either a congruent (control) or incongruent Stroop (which required self-control) task. The  
173 SST was then administered with participants instructed to unscramble 20 sentences to form  
174 grammatically coherent statements using 5 out of the 6 words available. Participants either  
175 received the version that primed self-awareness or a control (neutral/low self-awareness)

176 version. Following this, the eye tracking equipment was set up and participants' completed  
177 the prosaccade and then antisaccade tasks. This was considered optimal due to evidence of  
178 carry-over effects between the saccade tasks (Roberts, Hager & Hare, 1994). After both  
179 saccade tasks, participants then completed the IMI, rating how meaningful/important they  
180 found the eye movement tasks to complete. At the end of testing participants were fully  
181 debriefed.

182

### 183 **Materials**

184 **Scrambled sentence task (SST):** Participants were presented with a list of 20  
185 scrambled sentences and instructed to unscramble each one to form a grammatically correct  
186 sentence. The self-awareness version of the task contained sentences which when  
187 unscrambled began with 'I' such as 'I read books for leisure', whereas the neutral (low self-  
188 awareness) task contained sentences, which when unscrambled started with different names  
189 such as 'Catherine reads books for leisure'.

190

### 191 **Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI) [McAuley, Duncan & Tammen, 1989]:**

192 Level of motivation was examined using the 36 items IMI. Participants made their responses  
193 on a 7-point-Likert scale, which varied from '*not at all true*' to '*very true*'. Example  
194 statements that required a response included, 'I thought this activity was quite enjoyable',  
195 'This activity was fun to do', 'I felt like I had to do this' and 'I think that this activity is  
196 useful to me'. An indication of participants' overall level of motivation was provided by  
197 collating and averaging all 36 responses (Li, 2004).

198

199 **Stroop task:** This computerised task involved responding to the colour (yellow, blue,  
200 green, purple or red) of a series of 135 words by pressing relevant keys on a QWERTY



201 keyboard (based on the methodology used by Wallace and Baumeister, 2002). Participants  
202 engaged in either a congruent version (control) of the task in which the ink colour and the  
203 colour words were identical or an incongruent version (depletion), in which they differed i.e.  
204 the word purple was written in green ink. The incongruent task also required one to suppress  
205 this instruction when responding to the colour *Red* and alternatively respond to the written  
206 word. After the Stroop task, which was completed in 4 minutes 30 seconds, participants  
207 answered four questions, which examined different performance outcomes - pleasantness,  
208 level of effort exerted, frustration and tiredness (see Denson, von Hippel, Kemp & Teo, 2010)  
209 – in order to address whether there were differences depending on the two Stroop tasks that  
210 were completed.

211

212 **Saccade tasks:** Participants completed both a 30 trial prosaccade task (an eye  
213 movement is made towards a presented target) and a 30 trial antisaccade (Hallett, 1978) task  
214 (an automatic prosaccade towards the target is suppressed and an eye movement is directed to  
215 the opposite side, away from the target). Participants rested their head on a cushioned chin  
216 rest, which was located 57 cm away from a 19" computer, and the saccade tasks were  
217 presented on the screen. An Eyelink 1000 (SR Research: 1,000 Hz,  $<.5^\circ$  accuracy) recorded  
218 saccadic responses. During both tasks, a fixation cross appeared in the middle of the screen  
219 and after an interval of 1,000 ms, the target – a small green dot ( $.6^\circ$  diameter) - appeared  $8^\circ$   
220 on either the left or to right of the fixation cross. The target and fixation cross both stayed on  
221 the screen for 1,000 ms (overlap), and a 1,500-ms interval preceded the next trial. Target  
222 location was randomised and appeared to the left or right of the screen with equal frequency.  
223 Calibration and validation procedures before each task were completed, which ensured all  
224 recordings were of a good and consistent standard.

225

226 **Analysis**

227 All statistical analysis was performed in R (R Core Team, 2015) using the linear  
228 mixed effects model package; lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). For this  
229 analysis, as participants completed a series of trials, we included a random effect for  
230 participant, to account for individual variation (Winter, 2013). A 2 (self-control condition;  
231 self-control/depletion vs. control) x 2 (self-awareness manipulation; high vs. low/neutral) x 2  
232 (saccade task; prosaccade & antisaccade) mixed factorial design with repeated measures on  
233 the third factor (saccade task) was conducted. We measured saccade performance in the eye  
234 movement tasks based on two specific parameters; saccade latency (response speed) for  
235 correct responses and the rate of erroneous responses (for the antisaccade task only). Saccade  
236 response speed was calculated using the period between the target onset and the start of the  
237 first saccade, with amplitudes of 2° degrees or more. Responses of less than 80 ms and over  
238 500 ms were classified as anticipatory or late saccades, respectively, and removed from the  
239 analysis. For the number of errors committed in the antisaccade task, the total number of  
240 errors (incorrect saccades made towards rather than away from the target) were obtained  
241 relative to the number of correct saccadic responses directed away from the target.

242 **Response speed (latency):** We performed a linear mixed effects analysis to examine  
243 whether self-control condition, self-awareness manipulation and/or motivation influenced  
244 saccadic response speed. Initially we fitted a null model, which included participant as a  
245 random effect. We only had one item (green dot) and thus did not include item as a random  
246 effect. We then ran through a series of models, adding task type (prosaccade & antisaccade),  
247 self-control condition (depletion vs. control) and self-awareness (high vs. neutral/control) as  
248 fixed effects, along with motivation as a covariate. We compared models with fixed effects  
249 and also those with interactions between the fixed effects using the likelihood ratio test.



275 .001].

276

### 277 **Saccade performance**

278 **Response speed (latency).** Comparing the null model to a model, which also included  
279 task as a fixed effect revealed task to be a significant predictor of saccade response speed ( $\chi$   
280  $(1)^2 = 999.78, p, .001$ ); the prosaccade task was performed  $60.48 \text{ msec} \pm 1.77$  (standard  
281 errors) faster than the antisaccade task. Adding self-control condition as a fixed effect to the  
282 model did not improve the model fit, nor did including self-awareness condition and  
283 motivation and their interactions ( $p > .05$ ). Results showed that participants were faster to  
284 perform the prosaccade compared to antisaccade task. The effects of self-control condition  
285 and self-awareness were not significant. Further, self-reported levels of motivation did not  
286 significantly predict response speed in either task.

287

288 **Correct vs. erroneous AS responses.** Firstly fitting a model with self-control  
289 condition (depletion vs. control) as a fixed effect and participants as random effects showed  
290 self-control condition to not be a significant predictor of correct AS responses; those that  
291 engaged in the initial depletion (incongruent Stroop) task ( $M = 17.91, SD = 15.25$ ) committed  
292 a similar rate of errors to those that completed the control (congruent Stroop) task ( $M =$   
293  $18.03, SD = 14.19$ ) [ $\beta = -0.07, SE = 0.28, Z = -0.24, p = 0.81$ ]. We then added self-  
294 awareness to the model, which revealed this not to be a significant predictor of responses;  
295 those primed with self-awareness ( $M = 19.24, SD = 15.78$ ) produced a comparative rate of  
296 errors to those primed with neutral words ( $M = 16.92, SD = 13.73$ ) [ $\beta = 0.17, SE = 0.39, Z =$   
297  $-0.43, p = 0.67$ ]. There was also no significant self-awareness x initial condition interaction  
298 [ $p = 0.74$ ]. Adding self-reported levels of motivation produced no significant effect of

299 motivation [ $\beta = 0.03$ ,  $SE = 0.50$ ,  $Z = 0.07$ ,  $p = .95$ ] nor was there a significant initial condition  
300 x motivation interaction [ $p = 0.14$ ].

301

302

INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

303

304 However a significant 3 way self-control x self-awareness x motivation interaction on  
305 rate of erroneous responses (see Figure 1) was observed [ $\beta = 1.86$ ,  $SE = 0.88$ ,  $Z = 2.11$ ,  $p =$   
306  $0.03$ ]. Examining this interaction further and splitting by self-control condition, for  
307 participants that completed the incongruent Stroop task (self-control task), a negative  
308 relationship between erroneous responses and motivation was observed [ $\beta = - 0.96$ ,  $SE = 0.$   
309  $48$ ,  $Z = - 1.99$ ,  $p = 0.04$ ], indicating that when motivation was high, fewer erroneous  
310 responses were made in the antisaccade task. Although self-awareness alone did not predict  
311 erroneous responses in the antisaccade task [ $p > .05$ ] there was a significant motivation x self-  
312 awareness interaction [ $\beta = 1.58$ ,  $SE = 0.68$ ,  $Z = 2.34$ ,  $p = 0.02$ ]. Those that had previously  
313 applied self-control (in the incongruent Stroop task) and received the self-awareness primes  
314 performed a similar rate of antisaccade errors regardless of their level of motivation to  
315 complete the antisaccade task [ $\beta = 0.66$ ,  $SE = 0.58$ ,  $Z = 1.13$ ,  $p = 0.26$ ]. For participants that  
316 completed the incongruent Stroop task and were not self-primed, level of motivation  
317 predicted erroneous relative to correct antisaccade responses; those high in motivation  
318 produced less erroneous responses than those low in motivation [ $\beta = - 0.98$ ,  $SE = 0.37$ ,  $Z = -$   
319  $2.77$ ,  $p = 0.01$ ] (see Figure 1). These findings were not extended to the control group i.e.  
320 those participants that first completed the congruent Stroop task.

321

322

323

324

**Discussion**

325

326

327

328

329

330

331

332

333

334

335

The current study explored whether the temporary deficiency in performance that is typically observed in the second of two sequential self-control tasks can be overcome by high motivation and increased self-awareness. According to the resource depletion theory (Baumeister et al. 2007) the reduction in performance consistently noted in a second of two sequential self-control tasks stems from self-control being an effortful process that relies on the availability of a limited energy resource, which reduces through exertion. Based on a previous methodological design (e.g. Kelly et al., 2015) we administered either a congruent (control) or incongruent Stroop task to participants followed by the prosaccade and antisaccade eye movement tasks. However, before the saccade tasks we manipulated self-awareness by administering a SST. Self-reported levels of motivation were also measured using the IMI after the saccade tasks were completed.

336

337

338

339

340

341

342

343

344

345

346

347

348

The findings revealed that performing an initial self-control task *per se* did not predict subsequent self-control performance. The current data suggests a complex relationship between self-control exertion, priming of self-awareness and level of motivation for correct, compared to erroneous, antisaccade responses. Level of motivation only predicted antisaccade performance when participants were not primed on self-awareness; those low in motivation committed more erroneous responses than those high in motivation. Thus only participants with low motivation to perform the second self-control task showed the typical self-control depletion effect consistent with the self-control literature (Hagger et al., 2010), i.e. a temporary deficiency in self-control ability in the second task following prior exertion. When participants were primed on self-awareness, motivation did not predict subsequent self-control performance. This opens up the possibility that priming self-awareness led to an increase in motivation, which in turn counteracted any temporary deficiency in self-control. These findings are in line with previous research that demonstrated i) differences in

349 subsequent self-control performance following the initial exertion of self-control based on  
350 motivation, and ii) no difference in self-control performance for individuals who were  
351 exposed to an explicit manipulation of motivation (Alberts et al., 2011; Kelly et al., 2015;  
352 Muraven and Slessarva, 2003). According to Wicklund (1979), raising self-awareness  
353 increases motivation, as the individual is made aware of their performance level, which  
354 subsequently increases the motivation to perform a task well (Wicklund, 1979).

355         The findings suggest that an individual who is motivated to complete a task – either  
356 through manipulation of self-awareness or intrinsic high levels of motivation – will  
357 successfully engage in a subsequent task of self-control despite earlier self-control exertion.  
358 This supports growing evidence that one’s level of motivation rather than limited resource  
359 capacity influences changes in self-control performance over time (Molden, 2013).

360         Although the findings are consistent with a motivational account of self-control, the  
361 question arises to what extent motivational factors can compensate for limited resources  
362 (Alberts et al., 2011). According to the resource allocation theory (Beedie & Lane, 2012)  
363 resources (i.e. glucose) will be assigned based on one’s intrinsic level of motivation to  
364 complete that task. However, it is as yet unclear which underlying mechanisms determine this  
365 allocation of additional energy resources. Specifically, understanding the neurochemical  
366 mechanisms behind these findings is needed (Legault & Inzlicht, 2013).

367         High levels of motivation could trigger an arousal/activation response resulting in  
368 energy in the form of glucose to be directed to specific brain areas for successful task  
369 completion. Specifically, being motivated to perform a task may have led to activation of the  
370 sympathetic adrenal medulla (SAM) axis, which results in the release of adrenaline  
371 (epinephrine) from the adrenal medulla and leads to increase in blood glucose levels. This is  
372 in line with recent research, which showed that increasing motivation led to an increase  
373 and/or maintenance of blood glucose levels associated with maintenance of performance

374 levels during the second self-control task. This suggests that being motivated allows  
375 allocation of energetic resources to a task which in turn prevents performance decrements  
376 (Kazén, Kuhl & Leicht, 2015).

377 Another potential underlying mechanism that might mediate maintenance of  
378 performance levels are dynamic changes in dopamine activity. Dopamine activity has been  
379 associated with a number of psychological processes including motivation. Potts, Martin,  
380 Burton and Montague (2006) have suggested that allocation of resources to limited-capacity  
381 systems might be regulated by dopaminergic reward system input. In the current context,  
382 increased dopaminergic activity could be linked with high motivation and the subsequent  
383 allocation of energetic and/or cognitive resources to a task. This is supported by recent  
384 conceptualisations of dopamine, which suggests the involvement of dopamine beyond solely  
385 reward processing (Salamone & Correa, 2012). In particular, the role of dopamine, in the  
386 nucleus accumbens (NA) is considered to be more wide ranging and linked to the  
387 engagement of effort and decision making (Salamone, et al., 2007).

388 More specifically, it has been argued that dopamine controls the amount of energy  
389 one expends in achieving a goal, particularly when it is considered valuable and important  
390 (Salamone et al., 2007). When dopamine levels are higher, one is more engaged in an activity  
391 and injects more resources into its completion (Beeler, Frazier & Zhuang, 2012). For  
392 example, Treadway et al (2012) observed lower levels of dopamine led one to favouring less  
393 effortful tasks whereas enhanced dopamine levels made one willing to expend effort for a  
394 reward. In addition, an inverted U shape relationship has been observed between dopamine  
395 level and sequential self-control performance (Dang, Xiao, Liu, Jiang & Mao, 2016).  
396 Participants with 'medium' dopamine levels – as measured by eye blink rate (EBR), which is  
397 considered a valid measure of dopamine levels (Karson, 1983). – performed well i.e. less



398 erroneously in a second task of self-control (the antisaccade task) despite initial exertion in a  
399 Stroop task compared to those with higher or lower levels.

400         However, more research is needed to elucidate the role of dopaminergic systems in  
401 the complex relationship between self-control, motivation and resource allocation,

402         Consequently based on the existing evidence, the findings support Beedie and Lane's  
403 (2012) resource allocation account that being motivated resulted in resources being allocated  
404 to task. Although Baumeister's (2014) amended resource theory accounts for the moderating  
405 effect of motivation, it still posits that resources are depleted following self-control exertion,  
406 and as more recent research findings have failed to observe this (Kelly et al., 2015; Molden et  
407 al., 2012; Sanders et al., 2012) an account of targeted resource allocation (Beedie & Lane,  
408 2012) seems more appropriate. It is difficult to refute a resource perspective fully,  
409 specifically given the evidence on the resource accounts and also given that glucose is an  
410 essential energy resource for the brain and vital for cognition. Thus it seems plausible that  
411 glucose is required for self-control albeit other factors are likely to moderate this relationship.

412         Interestingly in the current study, performance differences were only observed for  
413 correct compared to erroneous responses and not for response speed in the antisaccade task.  
414 As expected prosaccade responses were significantly faster than antisaccade responses,  
415 however neither self-awareness nor motivation directly influenced response speed. This  
416 replicates our previous study (Kelly et al., 2015), which only observed performance  
417 differences based on motivation level for errors performed. This implies a more direct  
418 motivational effect for erroneous compared to correct antisaccade response, which were not  
419 influenced by the effects on response speed. As a result the evidence more strongly supports  
420 the observation that being highly motivated counteracts the effects of self-control deficiency  
421 following prior exertion.

422           Although we replicated Alberts et al's (2011) design with the implementation of a  
423 SST to induce self-awareness, it would be interesting if further research expanded these  
424 methods by directly manipulating self-awareness possibly with a mirror, for example, to  
425 further assess the link between self-awareness and self-control. Moreover, it would also be  
426 beneficial to build on the findings on the relationship between self-reported motivation and  
427 self-control by further manipulating levels of motivation to assess in more detail whether  
428 motivation has an ameliorating effect on self-control deficiency in a similar way.

### 429           **Conclusions**

430           This study investigated the effect of self-awareness and motivation on self-control  
431 performance over time and observed whether a temporary deficiency in performance in the  
432 second task following prior exertion could be restored. The findings revealed that following  
433 the exertion of self-control, self-reported levels of motivation significantly predicted the rate  
434 of erroneous responses for those not exposed to the self-awareness primes. When self-  
435 awareness was induced, there were no differences in antisaccade responses based on  
436 motivation level. This arguably supports a motivation resource account; following the  
437 application of self-control, if one is motivated to perform a second self-control task –  
438 stemming from self-awareness resulting in one wanting to perform well or if this is not  
439 induced, based on how interesting and/or enjoyable the task or tasks were perceived to be –  
440 this has a restorative effect on a temporary deficiency in self-control ability, leading one to  
441 allocate resources and perform the second task well. This supports the idea of self-control  
442 performance based on more targeted allocation of resources rather than depletion and shows  
443 that interventions targeted at motivation can help overcome the effect of impaired self-control  
444 performance following prior exertion.

445

446

## 447 References

- 448 Alberts, H. J., Martijn, C., & De Vries, N. K. (2011). Fighting self-control failure:  
449 Overcoming ego depletion by increasing self-awareness. *Journal of Experimental*  
450 *Social Psychology, 47*(1), 58-62. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2010.08.004
- 451 Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). *lme4: Linear mixed-effects models*  
452 *using Eigen and S4*. R package version 1.1–7. 2014. Retrieved from [http://CRAN.R-](http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=lme4)  
453 [project.org/package=lme4](http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=lme4).
- 454 Baumeister, R. F. (2014). Self-regulation, ego-depletion, and inhibition.  
455 *Neuropsychologia, 65*, 313-319. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.08.012.
- 456 Baumeister, R. F., Heatherton, T. F., & Tice, D. M. (1994). *Losing control: How and*  
457 *why people fail at self-regulation*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- 458 Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., & Tice, D. M. (2007). The strength model of self-  
459 control. *Current directions in psychological science, 16*(6), 351-355. doi:  
460 10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.00534.x
- 461 Beedie, C. J., & Lane, A. M. (2012). The role of glucose in self-control: another look  
462 at the evidence and an alternative conceptualisation. *Personality and Social*  
463 *Psychology Review, 16*, 143-153. doi: 10.1177/1088868311419817
- 464 Beeler, J. A., Frazier, C. R., & Zhuang, X. (2012). Putting desire on a budget: dopamine and  
465 energy expenditure, reconciling reward and resources. *Frontiers in integrative*  
466 *neuroscience, 6*. 1-22. doi: 10.3389/fnint.2012.00049
- 467 Botvinick, M., & Braver, T. (2015). Motivation and cognitive control: from behavior to  
468 neural mechanism. *Psychology, 66*(1), 83-113. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-  
469 015044
- 470 Carter, E. C., Kofler, L. M., Forster, D. E., & McCullough, M. E. (2015). A series of meta-

- 471 analytic tests of the depletion effect: Self-control does not seem to rely on a limited  
472 resource. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 144(4), 796.  
473 doi:10.1037/xge0000083.supp
- 474 Carver, C. S. (2003). Self-awareness. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), *Handbook of*  
475 *self and identity* (pp. 179-196). New York: Guilford.
- 476 Cohen, J. (1988). *Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition).  
477 Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- 478 Dang, J., Xiao, S., Liu, Y., Jiang, Y., & Mao, L. (2016). Individual differences in dopamine  
479 level modulate the ego depletion effect. *International Journal of*  
480 *Psychophysiology*, 99, 121-124. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2015.11.013
- 481 Dang, J. (2016). Testing the role of glucose in self-control: A meta-analysis. *Appetite*, 107,  
482 222-230. doi: 10.1016/j.appet.2016.07.021
- 483 Denson, T.F., von Hippel, W., Kemp, R. I., & Teo, L. S. (2010). Glucose consumption  
484 decreases impulsive aggression in response to provocation in aggressive individuals.  
485 *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*. 46, 1023–1028. doi:  
486 10.1016/j.jesp.2010.05.023
- 487 Duval, T. S., & Silvia, P. J. (2001). *Self-awareness and causal attribution: A dual-systems*  
488 *theory*. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
- 489 Duval, S., Wicklund, R. A., & Fine, R. L. (1972). Avoidance of objective self-awareness  
490 under conditions of high and low intra-self discrepancy. In R. A. Wicklund & S.  
491 Duval (Ed.), *A theory of objective self-awareness* (pp. 15-22). New York: Academic Press.
- 492 Fairclough, S. H., & Houston, K. (2004). A metabolic measure of mental effort. *Biological*  
493 *psychology*, 66(2), 177-190. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2003.10.001
- 494 Gailliot, M. T., Baumeister, R. F., DeWall, C. N., Maner, J. K., Plant E. A., Tice, D.

- 495 M., L. F. Brewer, et al (2007). Self-control relies on glucose as a limited energy  
496 source: Willpower is the more than a metaphor. *Journal of Personality and Social  
497 Psychology, 92*, 325-326. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.92.2.325
- 498 Gibbons, F. X. (1990). Self-attention and behavior: A review and theoretical  
499 update. *Advances in experimental social psychology, 23*, 249-303. doi:  
500 10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60321-4
- 501 Hagger, M. S., Wood, C., Stiff, C., & Chatzisarantis, N. L. D. (2010). Ego depletion  
502 and the strength model of self-control. A Meta-analysis. *Psychological Bulletin, 136*,  
503 495-525. doi: 10.1037/a0019486
- 504 Hallett, P.E. (1978). Primary and secondary saccades to goals defined by instructions.  
505 *Vision Research, 18*, 1279-1296. doi: 10.1016/0042-6989(78)90218-3
- 506 Hoffman, W., Baumeister, R. F., Foerster, F., & Vohs, K. D., (2012). Everyday  
507 temptations: An experience sampling study of desire, conflict, and self-  
508 control. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102*, 1318-1335. doi:  
509 10.1037/a0026545
- 510 Hutton, S. B. (2008). Cognitive control of saccadic eye movements. *Brain and cognition, 68*,  
511 327-340. doi: 10.1016/j.bandc.2008.08.021
- 512 Inzlicht, M., Legault, L., & Teper, R. (2014). Exploring the mechanisms of self-control  
513 improvement. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23*(4), 302-307. doi:  
514 10.1177/0963721414534256
- 515 Inzlicht, M., & Schmeichel, B. J. (2012). What is ego depletion? Toward a  
516 mechanistic revision of the resource model of self-control. *Psychological Science*,  
517 7,450-463. doi: 10.1177/1745691612454134
- 518 Inzlicht, M., Schmeichel, B. J., & Macrae, C. N. (2014). Why self-control seems (but may not

- 519           be) limited. *Trends in cognitive sciences*, 18(3), 127-133. doi:  
520           10.1016/j.tics.2013.12.009
- 521 Inzlicht, M., & Schmeichel, B. J. (In Press). Beyond limited resources: Self-control failure as  
522           the product of shifting priorities. In K. Vohs & R. Baumeister (Eds.), *The Handbook*  
523           *of Self-regulation* (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition). New York: Guildford Press.
- 524 Inzlicht, M., & Marcora, S. M. (2016). The central governor model of exercise regulation  
525           teaches us precious little about the nature of mental fatigue and self-control  
526           failure. *Frontiers in psychology*, 7. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00656
- 527 Karson, C. N. (1983). Spontaneous eye-blink rates and dopaminergic systems. *Brain*, 106(3),  
528           643-653. doi: 10.1093/brain/106.3.643
- 529 Kazén, M., Kuhl, J., & Leicht, E. M. (2015). When the going gets tough...: Self-motivation is  
530           associated with invigoration and fun. *Psychological research*, 79(6), 1064 -1076. doi:  
531           10.1007/s00426-014-0631-z
- 532 Kelly, C., Sünram-Lea, S-I., & Crawford, T. (2015). The role of motivation, glucose and self-  
533           control in the antisaccade task. *PLoS ONE*, 10 (3), e0122218. doi:  
534           10.1371/journal.pone.0122218
- 535 Klinger, J. (2013). *Examining mechanisms of self-control improvement*. (Unpublished  
536           Master's thesis), University of Waterloo, Canada.
- 537 Kurzban, R. (2010). Does the brain consume additional glucose during self-control  
538           tasks? *Evolutionary Psychology*, 8, 244-259. doi: 10.1177/147470491000800208
- 539 Kurzban, R., Duckworth, A., Kable, J. W., & Myers, J. (2013). An opportunity cost model of  
540           subjective effort and task performance. *The Behavioral and brain sciences*, 36(6),  
541           661-679. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X12003196
- 542 Legault, L., & Inzlicht, M. (2013). Self-determination, self-regulation, and the brain:

- 543           autonomy improves performance by enhancing neuroaffective responsiveness to self-  
544           regulation failure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *105*(1), 123. doi:  
545           10.1037/a0030426
- 546   Li, W. (2004). *Examining the relationships between ability conceptions, intrinsic motivation,*  
547           *persistence, and performance* (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation). Louisiana State  
548           University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, Louisiana.
- 549   Lurquin, J. H., Michaelson, L. E., Barker, J. E., Gustavson, D. E., von Bastian, C. C.,  
550           Carruth, N. P., & Miyake, A. (2016). No Evidence of the Ego-Depletion Effect across  
551           Task Characteristics and Individual Differences: A Pre-Registered Study. *PloS*  
552           *one*, *11*(2), e0147770. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0147770
- 553   McAuley, E., Duncan, T., & Tammen, V. V. (1989). Psychometric properties of the Intrinsic  
554           Motivation Inventory in a competitive sport setting: A confirmatory factor analysis.  
555           *Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport*, *60*, 48-58. doi:  
556           10.1080/02701367.1989.10607413
- 557   Molden, D. C., Hui, C. M., Scholer, A. A., Meier, B. P., Noreen, E. E., Agostino, P.  
558           R., & Martin, V. (2012). Motivational versus metabolic effects of carbohydrates on  
559           self-control. *Psychological Science*, *1*, 1137-1144. doi: 10.1177/0956797612439069
- 560   Molden, D. C. (2013). An expanded perspective on the role of effort phenomenology in  
561           motivation and performance. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, *36*(06), 699-700. doi:  
562           10.1017/S0140525X13001118
- 563   Muraven, M., & Slessareva, E. (2003). Mechanisms of self-control failure: Motivation and  
564           limited resources. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *29*(7), 894-906. doi:  
565           10.1177/0146167203029007008
- 566   Otten, R., Cladder-Micus, M. B., Pouwels, J. L., Hennig, M., Schuurmans, A. A., &

- 567 Hermans, R. C. (2014). Facing temptation in the bar: counteracting the effects of self-  
568 control failure on young adults' ad libitum alcohol intake. *Addiction, 109*(5), 746-753.  
569 doi: 10.1111/add.12446
- 570 Potts, G., Martin, L. E., Burton, P., & Montague, P. R. (2006). When things are better or  
571 worse than expected: the medial frontal cortex and the allocation of processing  
572 resources. *Cognitive Neuroscience, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18*(7), 1112-  
573 1119. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2006.18.7.1112
- 574 Roberts, R., Hager, L., & Hare, C. (1994). Prefrontal cognitive processes: working memory  
575 and inhibition in the antisaccade task. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,*  
576 *123*, 374-393. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.123.4.374
- 577 R Core Team (2015). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation  
578 for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. Retrieved from <http://www.R-project.org/>.
- 579 Salamone, J. D., & Correa, M. (2012). The mysterious motivational functions of mesolimbic  
580 dopamine. *Neuron, 76*(3), 470-485. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2012.10.021
- 581 Salamone, J. D., Correa, M., Farrar, A., & Mingote, S. M. (2007). Effort-related functions of  
582 nucleus accumbens dopamine and associated forebrain circuits.  
583 *Psychopharmacology, 191*(3), 461-482. doi: 10.1007/s00213-006-0668-9
- 584 Sanders, M. A., Shirk, S. D., Burgin, C. J., & Martin, L. L. (2012). The gargle  
585 effect: Rinsing the mouth with glucose enhances self-control. *Psychological Science,*  
586 *23*, 1470-1472. doi: 10.1177/0956797612450034
- 587 Silvia, P. J., & Duval, T. S. (2001). Objective self-awareness theory: Recent progress and  
588 enduring problems. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5*(3), 230-241. doi:  
589 10.1207/S15327957PSPR0503\_4
- 590 Stapleton, P. B., & Smith, H. (2013). Health locus of control, self-awareness, and integrative



- 591 eating styles in university students. *The International Journal of Healing and Caring*.  
592 13(2), 1-23. Retrieved from [http://works.bepress.com/peta\\_stapleton/37/](http://works.bepress.com/peta_stapleton/37/)
- 593 Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. *Journal of experimental*  
594 *psychology*, 18(6), 643. doi: 10.1037/h0054651
- 595 Treadway, M. T., Buckholtz, J. W., Cowan, R. L., Woodward, N. D., Li, R., Ansari, M. S., ...  
596 & Zald, D. H. (2012). Dopaminergic mechanisms of individual differences in human  
597 effort-based decision-making. *The Journal of Neuroscience*, 32(18), 6170-6176. doi:  
598 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.6459-11.2012
- 599 Wallace, H. M. & Baumeister, R. F. (2002). The effects of success versus failure  
600 feedback on further self-control. *Self and Identity*, 1, 35-41. doi:  
601 10.1080/152988602317232786
- 602 Winter, B. (2013). A very basic tutorial for performing linear mixed effects analyses. *arXiv*  
603 *preprint arXiv:1308.5499*. Retrieved from [http://www.bodowinter.com/tutorial/](http://www.bodowinter.com/tutorial/bw_LME_tutorial2.pdf)  
604 [bw\\_LME\\_tutorial2.pdf](http://www.bodowinter.com/tutorial/bw_LME_tutorial2.pdf)
- 605 Wicklund, R. A. (1979). The influence of self-awareness on human behavior: The person  
606 who becomes self-aware is more likely to act consistently, be faithful to societal  
607 norms, and give accurate reports about himself. *American Scientist*, 67(2), 187-193.  
608 Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27849150>
- 609  
610  
611  
612  
613  
614  
615  
616  
617

618 Figure caption

619 *Figure 1: The relationship between motivation, self-awareness manipulation and self-control*  
620 *condition for the proportion of erroneous antisaccade responses.*

621

622

623

624

625

626

627

628

629