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Project on European Integration Indicators
People's Europe

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Forward Studies Unit

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
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
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Executive summary

This report is an attempt to gain a better understanding of public attitudes towards European integration by relating general and specific developments in societal values and expectations to underlying socio-economic trends. The analytical point of departure is the thesis that European values are gradually transformed as societies reach advanced stages of industrialisation and take on post-modern traits. As opposed to 'modern' society, 'post-modern' society is characterised by a popular emphasis on democratic political institutions and individual freedom, a diminishing prestige of science, technology, and rationality, and a rejection of traditional, bureaucratic, and hierarchical authorities. In view of this development, the report: (1) Traces general changes in European values; (2) Analyses the transformation in socio-economic structures, European value patterns, and attitudes towards European integration, based on an analysis of societal change and a grouping of the member states in a number of sufficiently distinct clusters, and; (3) Considers possible consequences for the European integration process.

General value changes in European societies:

Traditional values – marked by respect for established authorities, a hierarchical picture of society, and subordination of the individual to the group – show a general decline to the benefit of universal individualism. To a higher degree than before, European citizens subscribe to values such as the primacy of the needs, desires and wills of individuals, and the questioning of traditional centres of power and authority.

- This gradual shift from traditional values towards post-modern, individualist values characterises the attitudes of European citizens in all areas of life – work, family, politics and religion.
- While this general trend is shared by all EU member states, the gap remains between the more traditional societies in southern Europe and the more post-modern societies in northern Europe, although a significant progress can be detected in the former.
- The replacement of generations is the primary source of this development from traditional values towards post-modern and individualist values. Each generation is less traditional and more post-modern than the preceding, a fact which suggests a long-term structural trend.
- The general development of European value patterns towards a higher incidence of universal individualism and post-modern values, does not imply that all social groups react in the same way to changing socio-economic structures. Rather, the transformation of socio-economic structures enhances the possibilities of some societal groups, while challenging the established ways of life of others. This translates into a value system of some heterogeneity and contradiction, where post-modern and modern value patterns coexist.

Changing values and attitudes to European integration

Despite the general character of the shift in societal values, important national differences persist in the socio-economic structures of the member states, the values embraced by the societies, and the respective attitudes towards European integration. In an attempt to isolate the differences among different EU member states without performing a state-by-state analysis, the report groups the member states in a number of sufficiently distinct clusters.

- **A very sceptical North:** Denmark, Sweden, and Finland form the most homogenous clusters in the EU, with comparable levels of economic development and social welfare, similar socio-cultural profiles, a high propensity of post-material values, and a shared hostility towards European integration. The Danes, the Swedes, and the Finns are the European peoples feeling the least European, and the Nordic countries score the highest for instance in their misconception of the uses of the EU budget. The Swedish population is the most negative to European integration and the EU as such, while the Danes favour economic integration but disapprove of political, and the Finns seem less categorically opposed to the EU than other Nordic citizens.
- **The Benelux countries and France:** While the Benelux countries and France display similar economic profiles (above the EU average in terms of economic development), social and attitudinal indicators would place Luxembourg among the more traditional countries, Belgium and France slightly above the EU average in terms of post-material values, and the Netherlands in the post-modern camp of the Scandinavian countries. In all four states, citizens feel markedly more European and are more positively disposed towards a federal Europe than the average EU citizen. Notably, however, the Netherlands and Luxembourg display a distinctly more Euro-positive profile than Belgium and France with respect to issues such as the support for and perceived benefits from EU membership, the anticipated benefits from the Single Market, knowledge about the EU, and the visibility of the Community institutions in the media.
- **Germanic Central Europe:** In terms of economic development and social and cultural patterns, Germany and Austria share many characteristics which set them apart from other EU member states. The prevalence of post-modern values in Germany is slightly above the EU average, comparable to the level in, for example, France. Despite these similarities, the profiles of Germany and Austria differ substantially as regards European integration, with Germany being closer to the federalist-friendly position of the other founding members and Austria sharing the Euro-sceptic sentiments of the other recent members Sweden and Finland. In view of the highly divergent histories of participation in the European integration process, it is notable that the populations in both countries feel equally detached from the European Union, that they display the same uneasiness in terms of acknowledging a European identity, and that the Germans are the European citizens with the lowest level of confidence in the Community institutions.
- **Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland (the cohesion countries):** Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece show a high degree of convergence as far as socio-economic indicators are concerned. While economic structures and general societal values are distinctly more traditional in these countries than in other EU member states, it is notable that all four, in particular Ireland, have experienced striking socio-economic progress in recent years. These countries are, however, only just about to enter the first stages of post-modernism, with Spain and Ireland leading the way. Support for EU membership has traditionally been high or quite high in all four countries – a support, based more on the perceived economic benefits of European integration than on a desire to see the European Union develop in a federal direction. The populations in all


four countries rate below the EU average in terms of feeling European and of their attachment to the EU.

- **Two big countries with opposing positions on European integration:** The UK and Italy stand out as two countries which cannot easily be grouped with other EU member states, and which in many ways also constitute as each other's opposites. In social and economic terms, the United Kingdom displays a modern profile. Still, post-material values are slightly less prevalent in the UK than in the EU in general. The Euro-scepticism in the UK is only matched by the negative attitudes in the Nordic countries and Austria. But while the British remain extremely reluctant to transfer new competencies to the European level, they are nevertheless, in principle, rather positive towards further political integration. Italy, by contrast, displays a rather traditional social profile, though it is situated above the EC average in terms of economic development. Even if it has caught up in the last decade, Italy is still among the EU member states with the lowest share of the population expressing post-material values. In no member state, however, is the support for European integration as firm as in Italy. While hesitant as to the economic benefits of membership, Italians are staunch supporters of a federal Europe, feel more European than any other population, and are the Europeans most in favour of a wide-ranging transfer of decision-making powers to the EU level.

Consequences for European integration

The results do not permit any simple, clear-cut association between the degree of post-modern values in a society and the population's attitude towards European integration. Culture, historical experiences and traditions act as a prism through which values are transformed, and the process towards post-modern societal values thus effects European societies in different ways. Nevertheless, the report attempts to isolate a number of possible consequences that the shift towards post-modern values may have for popular attitudes towards the EU and the process of integration throughout the Union.

- The arrival of the post-modern society probably means that the time of permissive consensus to European integration among European citizens is over. There is a general dissatisfaction with the way in which the democratic system works both on national and European level. Popular demands for more participation in the European political system are likely to grow louder – a challenge to which the Union will have to respond, or else the detachment of European citizens is likely to be further aggravated.
- Citizens in the post-modern society make other demands on the European Union than those of earlier generations, suggesting that new or more recent issues may gain a greater prominence on the agenda next to economic matters, which are likely to remain important. Given post-modern society's emphasis on security values, the rejection of authority, and the diminishing prestige of science, technology, and rationality, greater importance may become attached to Community action in fields such as environmental protection, the fight against social exclusion, consumer protection and various areas linked to soft security.
- To the extent that the post-modern society raises citizens' demands for democratic participation, and contributes to new issues being addressed at the European level, it is essential that European citizens share a perception of being able to influence the policy-formation process in the EU. In a wider context, this is dependent on a general feeling of belonging to Europe. The gradual emergence of such an imagined community requires efforts both at European and national level.



Introduction

The aim of this report is to gain a deeper understanding of public attitudes towards European integration by relating general and specific developments in societal values and expectations to underlying socio-economic trends in the 15 EU member states.

The study has taken as point of departure the thesis that a change of values occurs in a society when it reaches the stage of advanced industrialisation and then gradually abandons the virtues connected to that particular model to become a post-modern society. Change does not, however, influence each individual society in the same fashion since historical experience, culture and traditions act as a prism through which values are transformed. This report is based on the assumption that all EU member states are adopting the characteristics of a post-modern society (although with quite substantial differences in their socio-economic development and according to specific cultural characteristics). Refraining from drawing any firm conclusion as to the interplay between changing values and attitudes to EU, it is the hope that this report may stimulate further debate on the possible consequences of societal transformation for public support of the process of European integration.

In an attempt to gain additional insight into the formation of attitudes towards European integration in general and the EU in particular, the report analyses the transformation in socio-economic structures, European value patterns, and attitudes towards European integration. The motive behind this exercise is not to show a causal link between the level of post-modernism in a given European society and popular attitudes to the EU, as such a conclusion would be highly hazardous and uncertain. Rather its merits lie in the attempt to show a number of 'instant images' of popular attitudes in different EU member states against the backdrop of changing societal values and, on that basis, raise a number of questions related to the possible consequences for popular acquiescence to European integration. Some of the challenges posed to the integration process by changing societal values are elaborated in the conclusions of this report.

This report is organised as follows: The first section gives the reader an insight into the report's analytical framework which is centred on the thesis of the advent of post-modern societies forwarded by Professor Ronald Inglehart. The second section describes the patterns of societal change among the 15 EU member states. The third section analyses the changing values and attitudes to European integration based on five groups of countries (the Nordic group, the Benelux countries and France, Germanic central Europe, the cohesion countries and, as a separate and heterogeneous group, the UK and Italy). The report draws some conclusions on the likely impact of societal change on popular attitudes and expectations on European integration and the European Union.



1. From a modern to a post-modern society

The point of departure for this analysis is the article of Professor Ronald Inglehart¹ which draws some general conclusions regarding changes in values versus economic and political progress on the basis on the World Values Survey of 1990-91.²

- The 'modern' society comprises industrialisation, occupational specialisation, bureaucratisation, centralisation, rising education levels and a configuration of beliefs and values closely linked with high levels of growth. A society which has reached an advanced level of industrial development undergoes a major change, the parameters of which put less emphasis on economic growth, but more on the quality of life in general and on democratic political institutions in particular - it becomes 'post-modern'.
- The 'post-modern' society is characterised by (1) a shift from scarcity values to security values; (2) a diminishing effectiveness and acceptability of bureaucratic authority; (3) a rejection of the West as a model, and the collapse of the socialist alternative; (4) a growing emphasis on individual freedom and emotional experience, and rejection of all forms of authority; and (5) a diminishing prestige of science, technology and rationality.

It has also been possible to prove (according to Professor Inglehart) that **coherent cultural patterns exist and that these patterns are linked with a given society's level of economic development.** According to this thesis, socio-economic indicators could be used to place different societies on a 'modernisation' axis.³ The indicators singled out by Professor Inglehart are: (1) the level of secondary or higher education (with 0.47 correlation with modernisation and 0.63 with postmodernisation); (2) the percentage of the workforce employed in the service sector (no correlation with modernisation and 0.57 correlation with postmodernisation); and (3) per capita GDP (0.33 and 0.82 correlation respectively). On the other hand, there is a modest negative correlation between post-modern values and economic growth (which is a major value in modern-industrialist societies). Declining birth rates are linked both to modern and post-modern societies as high fertility is connected to traditional values. As far as political change is concerned, this research shows that there is no correlation between the modernisation axis and the number of years of democracy in a society. On the other hand, there is an extremely strong correlation between post-modern values and democracy as such. The interpretation offered is that societies with a strong civil culture (characterised by interpersonal trust, tolerance, solidarity, civil engagement, political equality and civil association) have been able to generate economic growth and therefore attained a high standard of living (not the other way around!). These societies have in turn entered the post-modern era in advance of other societies where the inherent civic culture has been less favourable to modernisation.

¹ Ronald Inglehart, 'Changing values, economic development and political change', *Revue internationale des sciences sociales* (English ed.), No. 145, September 1995, pp. 379-403.

² There are of course other theses on the importance of changing societal values, for instance the work by Paul. H. Ray, *The Integral Culture Survey. A Study of Values, Subcultures and the Use of Alternative Health Care in America*, a report to Fetzer Institute and the Institute of Noetic Sciences, October 1995.

³ The figure is constructed in such a way that in the right hand corner the modernisation axis y='scarcity values' and x='traditional authority' is juxtaposed with the axis in the left-hand corner, y='postmodern values' and x='rational-legal authority'. The indicators furthest up in the left-hand corner are those which are most significant for a postmodern society.

Professor Inglehart's analysis singles out a number of clusters of west European countries on the modernisation axis. There is a Nordic cluster (Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark and Iceland) to which the Netherlands and Switzerland are closely associated. Belgium, Austria, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal form another cluster, while (west) Germany places itself closer to the rational-legal authority value. The difference between these two principal west European clusters is according to Inglehart due to the fact that one cluster is made up by Protestant countries, or those which have been strongly influenced by Protestantism, such as the Netherlands, while the other cluster is made up by Roman Catholic countries. Britain and Canada (and to a certain extent the US) form a cluster of countries with relatively strong security values, but with higher religious-traditional values than many other countries on their economic level. Ireland falls in the same category but with stronger scarcity values because of its relatively less advanced economy (at the time of the study, i.e. 1990-91).

For the purpose of analysing attitudes to European integration, it is interesting to note the move towards post-modern values in advanced industrialist societies. This change is taking place in close corroboration with the replacement of generations. Socio-economic indicators (see above) which give a diagnosis of the state of development of a country may in part also predict a shift in values. Inglehart found, however, a strong influence of culture in the process of change as coherent cultural patterns were strongly linked to economic development and even more to the presence of stable democratic societies.

2. Societal change in Europe

On the basis of Inglehart's socio-economic indicators (higher education, percentage of people employed in the service sector and per capita GDP), a short analysis of statistical series pertaining to the 15 EU member states follows hereunder which points towards a tendency towards a general advancement in all EU member states.

Despite some considerable differences among the member states (Belgium has with 98% the highest percentage of 16-18-year-olds enrolled in education or training, while Portugal has the lowest with 65%), poorer member states (Greece, Spain and Portugal) have in general increased the rate of students in university by three between 1975-94, while in other member states the students have doubled (or almost).⁴

The same phenomenon of a relative convergence is observable in the increasing percentage of people employed in the service sector (tables 15-18). The member states with the highest proportion of the workforce employed in the agriculture sector in 1994 (Greece 21%, Ireland 13%, Portugal 12% and Spain 10%), had not surprisingly fewer people employed in the service sector than other member states (ranging from 56% for Greece and Portugal to Sweden with 73% of the workforce). The increase in the share of the population employed in the service sector, however, was as significant (in relative terms more significant) in the countries with a considerable agricultural sector as in those with a small part of the population employed in agriculture. Furthermore, behind such statistical analysis may hide deep socio-economic change, such as the rapid ageing of the Greek agricultural population.

On a comparative basis, GDP PPS per capita has experienced a convergence of sorts, but which has not been of an homogeneous nature. Ireland has caught up significantly compared with the European average (EU=100), reaching 93.8 points in 1996, up from 74.6 in 1991, Spain, for instance, has slid back reaching 76.7 in 1996 compared to 79.3 in 1991. Portugal and Greece have improved their rating on the EU index between 1991-1994 with a couple of points. Among the richer member states, some like Luxembourg have forged ahead from an already privileged top position as compared to the EU average (from 152.2 in 1991 to 165.8 in 1996).⁵

On the basis of this brief analysis, we may deduce that all 15 member states are advanced industrial societies with the reservation that some of them are still in the process of catching up. According to the Inglehart thesis, we may therefore expect that the member states' societies are progressively adopting 'post-modern' values with the poorer member states undergoing the most rapid change while others have been living in a situation of changing values for some time.

The brief analysis based on Inglehart's three principal indicators of socio-economic change would gain, however, from being deepened in order to analyse the nature of societal progress towards post-modernism among the 15 EU member states. Such a deepened analysis would be especially valuable given Inglehart's emphasis on the importance of history, culture and traditions in a given society's adaptation to societal change. We should therefore expect that societal change takes different expressions in the EU member states.

⁴ European Commission, Eurostat, *Basic statistics of the European Union*, 33rd edition, 1996. Tables 13-14 in appendix.

⁵ European Commission, DGII, *European Economy: 1996 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines*, no. 62, 1996.

In terms of demography and family structure, the birth rate indicator points towards a generalised decline to a (very low) European average of 1.48 children per woman in 1992. This trend should be nuanced to the effect that Nordic member states, which were among the first to experience a decline, have recently experienced a rise in birth rates (to 2.09 children per woman in Sweden).⁶ The decline in birth rates in the southern European member states is more recent, and in relative terms stronger, but since high fertility rates (according to Inglehart) are linked to traditional societies, declining birth rates is no clear indicator for post-modernism. Another generalised trend throughout Europe is the increase in age of first-time mothers (table 5). Germany and the Netherlands are the two member states with the 'oldest' first-time mothers (at an average age of over 28 years). Portugal and Austria are characteri

sed by a relative low mean age of first-time mothers at about 25 years. Italy and Spain place themselves somewhere in the middle of the European spectrum, while the UK is the only member state with a decline in the mean age of first-time mothers is registered over more than one year. Concerning the rate of abortion (table 6), the picture looks a bit different since in many countries with quite high rates since the 1970s, the trend is declining (Sweden, Denmark, France, Italy and Finland), while only in those countries with a low initial rate, the trend is pointing slightly upwards (Greece and Spain – no data for Ireland and Portugal).

Turning to the rate of marriage (table 7 and 8, and Social Portrait of Europe), there is a clear difference between the Northern European countries where people get married to a lesser extent than in all other areas of the Union. The trend, however, seems to point at a convergence of sort as the Nordic countries and the Netherlands are experiencing a significant slower decline, or even an upturn in the rate of marriage (the Netherlands and Denmark), while other European member states are experiencing a recent but significant fall in the marriage frequency.

The indicator on the rate of marriage is reflected in the indicator on children born outside marriage (table 4) where Sweden occupies an atypical position with two-thirds of all children being born outside marriage, followed by Denmark, France, the UK and Finland (ranging between 50% to less than 33%). Austria, Ireland and Portugal are placed just above or slightly below the EU average of 23.3 %, while Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain form another cluster with a rate of children born outside marriage of 10-16%, while Italy (8%) and Greece (3%) have by far the lowest rates.

The rates of marriage and of children born outside marriage are interesting to compare with the household composition in the EU member states (table 2). The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden), together with Germany, are the member states with the highest proportion of one-person households – a category which rates higher than any other type of households in these countries. In all other member states, the dominating household type is the traditional family (couples with children). The proportion of this household type is particularly strong in the southern European countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy) and Ireland (ranging between 53.3% in Spain to 46.7% in Italy). Another cluster of the traditional family household is revolving around the EU-average of 37.3% where we find Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria and the UK. Contrary to an often held belief that the Nordic countries, with their lower proportion of traditional family households and higher than average rate of children born outside marriage, would have a corresponding over-representation of lone-parent household is not substantiated by the statistical indicators. In the Nordic countries and Germany,

⁶ European Commission, Eurostat, *Social Portrait of Europe*, OPEC, 1996.

the rate of lone-parent households is by far the lowest among the EU member states. The explanation why the traditional family structure is no longer the most typical household composition in the Nordic countries can be found in a combination of a higher-than-average proportion of couples without children and one-person households. The proportion of lone-parent households is the highest in Ireland, the UK and Belgium, followed by Italy, Austria and Spain. It is also interesting to note that one-person households are especially rare in Greece and Portugal, and that Portugal and Spain have the lowest proportion of couples without children.

There is a generalised trend among the EU member states of a declining proportion of the household income (table 9) being spent on food, indicating a general improvement in the standard of living. The decline is spectacular in Portugal and Greece, where the part of the income spent on food has decreased from approximately 33% in 1985 to 23.6% in 1991 for Portugal and 28.3% in 1993 for Greece. These two countries are, however, still well above the EU-average of 14.6% of the household income spent on food. Luxembourg, the UK, the Netherlands and Germany fall below the EU-average at around 10% of the income spent on food.

The statistical analysis (see appendix) isolates three distinct clusters and two atypical countries concerning the consumption pattern in the EU (Austria, Sweden and Finland not included). The first, and most coherent, cluster is made up by Belgium, Denmark, France and Luxembourg. The second cluster is composed by the southern European countries, Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy, of which the consumption pattern of Portugal is the most atypical within this group. The third is a quite heterogeneous cluster formed around the UK and Ireland, while the Netherlands and Germany each have such an atypical consumption pattern that they did not fit with any other clusters (neither did they form one between themselves).

Lastly, the number of telephone lines in operation per 100 inhabitants (table 19) has experienced a general increase between 1980 and 1994. Sweden (68) and Denmark (60) have by far the most telephone lines per capita, far above the EU-average of 47 in 1994. Finland, Luxembourg, France and the Netherlands form a group situated above the EU-average, while Greece, the UK, Germany, Belgium and Austria hover just above or just below the EU-average. Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Italy are well below the EU-average, in particular the first three countries show a low frequency in that the number of main telephone lines per 100 inhabitant is only about half that of Sweden. This pattern is repeated concerning the number of personal computers per 100 inhabitants (table 20), where again Denmark and Sweden stand out as European champions with 21 and 19 computers, compared to the EU-average of 11 computers per 100 inhabitants in 1994. The increase in the number of personal computers has been quite strong throughout the EU member states, with the exception of Greece (3) and Portugal (3.5), the member states with the lowest frequency of personal computers. This indicator, although pointing towards a general increase in the number of personal computer in the populations throughout Europe, shows an atypical tendency in that the rise has been the fastest where the initial situation was already quite strong, while the increase has been slower in the countries with a weak initial position.

This short analysis has showed a strong converging trend concerning economic development and associated societal change. Despite this similar underlying trend, important national differences persist among the EU member. Furthermore, an advanced level of economic development combined with high living standards is not synonymous with post-modern values. We observe already on the basis on this quite restricted analysis that the EU member states follow a pattern of change determined by their national specificity rather than any 'set' law of change. Such an observation is in line with Inglehart's emphasis on the importance of historical experience, culture and traditions in a given country's transition into post-modernism. It should

also serve as a warning against expecting a sort of automatic adaptation to post-modern values, or a determined formulation of expression of societal change.

In the process of societal change in the EU, we observe the following trends of change: (1) there is still a considerable difference between the Nordic and the southern European countries, where the former are showing some quite distinct post-modern traits, while the latter still have a more traditional expression of society. On the other hand, the Nordic societies seem to have reached a sort of plateau in their post-modernness in that the trend for many indicators is slowing or even sometimes reversing. The Nordic countries have a distinct household composition which is still atypical for the rest of the Union, although a country like Germany is adopting a very similar structure of family versus non-family households. Furthermore, the Nordic countries are progressing faster than other EU member states in terms of the degree of computerisation of households or private persons. (2) The societies of southern Europe and Ireland are probably changing more rapidly than any other member states, a fact in line with the general trend of economic convergence. Rapid societal change gives rise to a heterogeneous pattern of post-modern expression as measured by socio-economic indicators. The traditional family is still the most frequent household type, but at the same time, the rate of lone-parent households is among the highest in the Union. The proportion of one-person households, on the other hand, is among the least frequent. (3) All other member states, despite the advanced economic development and high standard of living, give proof of a mixed picture, sometimes with indicators of post-modernism higher than in the Nordic countries, sometimes more traditional than in the southern European countries. Furthermore, there is no clear distinction between the countries as the post-modernness of a given country depends entirely on the indicator looked at. However, some striking examples may be mentioned. Luxembourg with the highest per capita GDP in the Union and with a high proportion of the workforce employed in the service sector is still a country with quite traditional societal structure. Germany seems torn between enter a full transition into post-modern society and keep to its quite traditional societal structures. The Dutch society has some striking post-modern traits, but again in some dimensions (like the household composition) remain fairly traditional.

3. Changing values in European societies

The value systems of European societies are undergoing a well-documented change. Based on a comprehensive comparison of European values in 1981 and 1990,⁷ a number of trends may be isolated, most notably a decline in traditional values and a strengthening of universal individualism.

Traditional values - marked by respect for established authorities, a hierarchical picture of society, and a subordination of the individual to the group - show a general decline to the benefit of universal individualism. To a higher degree than before, European citizens subscribe to individualist values such as the primacy of the needs, desires, and wills of individuals, and the questioning of traditional centres of power and authority. But, rather than individualist in the egoistic sense, these values are universal, i.e. they emphasise and accept individuals' freedom of choice and the equal rights and value of all human beings. This gradual shift from traditional values towards post-modern, individualist values characterises the attitudes of European citizens irrespective of whether the issue in question is work, family, politics or religion.

To a greater extent than before, the importance of *work* goes beyond the mere earning of one's living. Rather, work is less of an obligation and more intimately connected with social identity and belonging, one's picture of oneself, and self-actualisation. Increasingly, people also value independent or participatory decision-making, questioning the logic of orders and hierarchical work structures.

European values concerning the *family* are also undergoing change, with Europeans generally becoming more tolerant and accepting with respect to non-traditional family behaviour. While there is still a gap in actual behaviour between northern and southern Europe, the values of European citizens tend to converge on a greater tolerance towards social behaviour beyond the traditional family concept, such as living together outside marriage, having children outside marriage, divorces, and homosexuality.

Contrary to what is sometimes argued, Europeans are not becoming less interested in *politics* per se. Rather, to a higher degree than earlier, Europeans tend to prefer active and direct political participation through, for example, petitions and manifestations, instead of traditional and institutionalised forms of political participation, such as elections, parties, and trade unions.

Finally, with respect to *religion*, there is a marked process in Europe towards people becoming less religious in general and less practising in their Christian faith in particular. Europe is slowly entering a post-Christian stage, both in the sense that Christian religious identity is less pronounced than before, and that Europeans, to the extent that they seek spiritual guidance, increasingly turn to alternative and parallel forms of spirituality.

This general trend from traditional values towards post-modern, individualist values, is shared by all European societies. But, while the values of Europeans indeed move in the same direction, the well-known gap between the north and the south tends to persist. Citizens of northern European countries are more tolerant towards and more inclined to engage in non-

⁷ *Futurible*, 'L'évolution des valeurs des Européens', numéro spécial 200, 1995; FSU Gilles Bertrand, fiche de lecture no. 961205.

traditional family behaviour. Likewise, Protestant countries tend to be less religious than Catholic. It may thus be concluded that European values develop in the same direction, but that values in southern Europe largely correspond to those of northern Europe ten years earlier.

The replacement of generations is the primary source of this development from traditional values towards post-modern and individualist values. Each generation is less traditional and more modern than the preceding. In fact, every age group is more individualist in orientation in 1990 than in 1981, suggesting a long term, structural trend towards individualist and post-modern values.

While indeed the European Values Study points to a general development of European value patterns towards a higher incidence of universal individualism and post-modern values, this is not to say that all citizens within a given society react in the same way to changing socio-economic structures. Rather, individuals' adherence to post-modern values also depends on factors such as age (already established above) and social group, as well as the way socio-economic changes affect their immediate situation. The transformation of socio-economic structures enhances the possibilities of some societal groups, while challenging the established ways of life of others. This differentiated impact of socio-economic changes on the population at large, translates into a value system of some heterogeneity, although within the general development towards post-modern values.

4. Changing values and attitudes to European integration

The European Values study makes it possible to trace the tendencies of change in Western Europe. They show a marked shift from a belief in traditional structures, be it religion, political institutions, the family or other, towards a stronger emphasis on the individual and his place in the community. In other words, there seems to be a general questioning of the traditional structures in many EU member states.

The situation, however, is much more complex than a simple rejection of old ways, traditions and institutions. The advanced industrial society with its emphasis on knowledge, agility and personal initiative to overcome uncertainty generated by rapid change, is bound to change also the fabric of society and the individual's place within it. The individual citizens respond in different ways to socio-economic and political changes taking place around them, but within a given society, the weight of culture and history should generate a recognisable pattern and attitudes should be forming along these patterns.

In the following section, popular attitudes to European integration in the 15 EU member states are analysed. The analysis is based on the assumption that member states are undergoing a process of value change, driven by economic progress and societal transformation. The change of values is expressed in different ways partly depending on the individual countries' socio-economic advancement and partly on their cultural specificity. The EU member states are grouped together in four rather homogeneous groups. Group number five, however, is composed by two countries that in many ways are each other's opposites, but which also show significantly different characteristics compared to other member states. It is, of course, always hazardous to group countries, all of them showing distinct national traits, but the aim of this report is to illustrate areas within the EU which do represent a recognisable pattern of socio-economic change, societal values and/or attitudes to the EU.

An alternative would have been to base the analysis on differences between regions rather than countries, since many member states are characterised by great inter-regional differences in socio-economic development and societal values. To the extent that reliable and accessible data exists, however, it indicates that a division according to regions does not depart significantly from the general attitudinal patterns of a country. For example, the only countries with regions negative towards EU membership are those which appear as Eurosceptic also in the aggregate, i.e. Sweden, Finland, and Austria. In all other member states, all regions display a majority in favour of EU membership, though of course there are regional variations in the size of this majority.

The transformation of socio-economic structures implies a differentiated impact on the population as a whole translating into sometimes contradictory or even opposing value patterns. The fact that different groups in society react differently to a changing societal environment is bound to have an impact on the formation of attitudes towards the EU and European integration

⁸ Eurobarometer Trends 1974-1994, European Commission, DGX, November 1994; Eurobarometer, no. 44, spring 1996; Eurobarometer, no. 45, spring 1996; Eurobarometer, no. 46, autumn, 1996, idem; Eurostat, *Social Portrait of Europe*, 1996, OPEC; Futurible, no. 200; idem. European Commission, DGX, *EU membership support and unemployment rate 1983-96*, 1997. Appendix of this report.

as such. This is illustrated by, for example, the difference between various occupational groups in the support for Union membership. Self-employed, managers, and white collar workers are distinctly more positive towards Union membership than manual workers, house persons, and unemployed. Likewise, the first three groups, better positioned to enjoy their rights as European citizens, also attach greater importance to the right to live, work, study, invest, and vote in other European countries. The contradictory nature of European value patterns is illustrated by the simultaneous coexistence of post-modern and modern values. For example, European citizens, in a post-modern fashion, designate equal treatment regardless of gender, protection of health and safety at work, and equal treatment regardless of nationality, as the top priorities of European action in the near future. At the same time, however, the most prominent fears of European citizens are often clearly modern: more taxes, deeper economic crisis, loss of small farms, loss of small/mid-sized enterprises, etc. These patterns suggest that we should interpret the development towards more post-modern values as a general trend, which does not preclude the existence of heterogeneous, contradictory, and overlapping expressions of values.

4.1. A very sceptical North

The three member states of Northern Europe (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) are often regarded as among those furthest advanced along the road towards a highly evolved industrial economy. Social indicators, like the number of children born outside marriage, the abortion rate, the rate of marriages, and household composition, place Denmark, Sweden and Finland in a cluster apart from other EU member states (e.g., in Sweden two children out of three are born outside marriage). In relation to indicators of economic development, Denmark, Sweden and Finland join other member states in the group of countries with the highest GDP per capita and number of people employed in the service sector. While the statistical indicators show no special position of the Nordic countries regarding consumption (Denmark had in fact a consumption pattern very similar to that of Belgium, Luxembourg and France), indicators for main telephone lines and personal computers per household put them well in advance compared to other member states.

Surveys show that the Nordic societies are among the most advanced concerning values considered as post-modern. This is clear from the European Values Study where 73% of all Danes in 1990 expressed their preference for post-modern values (desire to participate in the democratic process, freedom of expression, fighting for social rights etc.) as compared to an EU average of 68% (Sweden and Finland not included). Comparisons over time show that Denmark, which in 1981 had the highest level par excellence, has stabilised at a high level of adherence to post-material values, while other European countries have caught up and in some cases even overtaken Denmark between 1981 and 1990. Denmark is characterised by a high level of inter-personal trust (98% say they trust their countrymen) while two-thirds of the Danes express great satisfaction with their life (compared to merely 4% among the Portuguese). Together those who are very satisfied or fairly satisfied represent 96% of the Danish society! Danes are also much more interested in politics than the EU average (both in general and specific EU politics) and express satisfaction with their national democratic system (82% of the Danish population said they were very satisfied/quite satisfied with the national democratic institutions compared to an EU average of 49%).

Finns and Swedes consider their countrymen trustworthy (98% and 88%) and Sweden is the most trusted nation by other Europeans (67% consider Swedes trustworthy compared to the Greeks 43%). The Finns and Swedes are, however, significantly less satisfied with their lives than the Danes (27% and 35% respectively are very satisfied) and place much less trust in their national democratic institutions than the Danes: the Finns express a slight mistrust of their

national government (46% trust and 48% mistrust), but trust their national parliament (55% trust 39% mistrust). The same pattern is repeated for Sweden 40% trust and 46% mistrust in the government and 47% trust and 41% mistrust in the parliament.

The Nordic countries, often grouped together due to a comparable level of economic development, similar social welfare profiles and from the outside-looking similar cultural characteristics, show a marked hostility towards European integration. The nature of their hostility is, however, quite different and worthwhile to investigate further.

In Denmark, the public attitude towards the EU is dependent on which dimension of integration is at stake. On the side of economic/functional integration, it is clear: The Danes support EU membership and think that their country has benefited from being a member on a level at or above the EU average. In a future perspective, the Danes are rather (52%) or very hopeful (8%) that the Single Market will bring benefits - slightly above the EU average - and they have no special desire to leave the EU. On the side of political integration or deepened integration, the picture is different: The Danes see no need for a European government in the building of Europe (13% of the population are in favour as compared to the Italians who are to 70% in favour). They are not in favour of transferring competencies to the EU in social, political, monetary, security, internal affairs or culture. Only in areas related to the protection of the environment, development policies, S&T, fight against drugs and external trade the Danes are in favour of EU decision-making. Denmark is the member state that is clearly the most opposed to a federal European Union (54% of the Danes are unfavourable which is double the score of that of Sweden and Finland which are the second two most negatively disposed member states). It hardly comes as a surprise that the Danes, the Swedes and the Finns end up at the bottom of the list in terms of feeling European (7%, 6% and 4% respectively).

The attitudes towards the EU of Finns and Swedes are quite similar to that of the Danes with some important differences. The Finnish population seems less categorically opposed to the extension of powers to European institutions and, although they are charged with a negative reputation in Finland, their image is not as negative as in Denmark or in Sweden. The Finnish people (57%) would vote to stay in the EU were there a referendum on Finland's EU membership. The Swedish population, on the other hand, stands out as the most negative to European integration and the EU as such. Not only do the Swedes think that their country is not benefiting from being a member (54%, with only 18% who think the country has benefited), they also think EU membership is a bad idea (42% are unfavourable to EU membership compared to 29% of the Danes) and would vote against if there were another referendum on the issue (49% say they would prefer Sweden to leave). Not surprisingly, Sweden is the only EU Member State in which people think there is more to fear (48%) than to gain (43%) from the Single Market. In Finland, people are more optimistic towards the perspective of the Single Market as 28% express fears as opposed to 61% who express hope. On the question of a federal European Union, Swedes are rather hesitant than hostile (30% are for while 26% are against) and the Finns are quite positive (42% for and 26% against). Knowledge about EU and European matters in Sweden and Finland is lower than in Denmark (32%, 39% and 49% respectively) while the awareness in the media of the Commission, the ECJ and the Council of Ministers in all three countries was the highest among the EU member states (in Sweden, 92 % of the population had read or heard something in the media about the Commission). The Nordic member states scored the highest in the EU in their (mis)conception about the share of Community budget spent on officials, meetings and buildings (ranging between 49-53% of the budget compared the real share of 5%).

4.2. The Benelux countries and France

The Benelux countries and France show a number of similar socio-economic characteristics while not forgetting that they each make proof of specific features in some areas. Economic indicators such as GDP per capita, and numbers of main telephone lines and personal computers per 100 inhabitants, show that all four countries are above the EU average in terms of economic development. Luxembourg is exceptional, however, in terms of its GDP per capita, which is far higher than in any other EU member state. The traditional family structure in these countries is still more important in this group than in the Nordic group as the proportion of households composed by adults and children is revolving around the EU-average. Lone-parent households are, however, above the EU-average in Belgium and Luxembourg while in the Netherlands and France, this type of household is represented slightly under or just at the EU level. Luxembourg is the member state with the highest proportion of non-nationals (31.8%) of which almost all originate from another EU country (29%). France differs from the other three countries concerning, for instance, the rate of children born outside marriage, among the highest in the EU with 37.2%, but still considerably lower than in Denmark and Sweden. Luxembourg and the Netherlands have among the highest proportion of their workforce employed in the service sector (together with the UK and Sweden). The Netherlands distinguishes itself from the other three in its consumption pattern, probably in part due to the atypically low desire of the Dutch to own a car or households equipment such as a dishwasher. Many social and attitudinal indicators, however, would put the Netherlands in the post-modern camp of Nordic countries. The Dutch seem to be permissive as far as abortion, divorce and homosexuality are concerned and place themselves very high on the scale for non-adherence to traditional values. 89%, a higher proportion of the population than in any other European country, subscribed to post-material values in 1990. This is a dramatic change compared to 1981 when the figure was 46% - also above the EU average but far behind Denmark's 75%. On the other hand, the Dutch place more importance on civic morality than French or Belgian, but less than the Danes who think that civic morality is very important. The Dutch society is characterised by high inter-personal trust (second highest in the EU with 94% expressing trust in their fellow countrymen), high rate of life satisfaction (very and fairly satisfied amount to 96% of the population).

While the Netherlands and Luxembourg stand out as the two member states having the most trust in national and European political institutions, people in France and Belgium express less trust in their national political institutions (government and parliament) than in the European Commission or the European Parliament. On the post-modern scale, Belgians and French people adopt similar attitudes as far as non-adherence to traditional values is concerned (somewhat above the EU average in terms of post-material values, a position they occupied in both 1981 and 1990) and have the lowest rate of civic morality among the EU member states. The French society is characterised by a below-average trust in fellow countrymen (86% expressed trust) and a quite low rate of life satisfaction (only 12% of the population were very satisfied while 62% were fairly satisfied). Belgian trust even less their countrymen (82% expressed trust, third lowest in the EU) and a slightly higher rate of life satisfaction than in France (just above the EU average with 25% being very satisfied while 62% were fairly satisfied).

The Benelux countries and France, all being among the original six member states of the EU, show a number of similarities as far as their attitudes to European integration are concerned. In general terms, citizens in all four member states feel more European and are more positively disposed towards a federal Europe than the average European. Luxembourg, France, the Netherlands and Belgium are among the six member states (joined by Italy and Ireland) in which the feelings of European citizenship, rather than national or regional, are the highest, reaching a level as high as 25% of the population in Luxembourg (16%, 16% and 15%

respectively, in the other three). Likewise, Luxembourg, Belgium and France are, together with Italy, the four countries in the EU with the highest share of the population feeling attached to the Union (64%, 56% and 49% respectively). The Netherlands diverges substantially from the other three with a figure as low as 27% in popular attachment, only surpassed by Sweden and Finland in the extent to which citizens feel detached from the European Union. It may also be interesting to note that France, as opposed to in the other three, displays a negative relationship between support for EU membership and the rate of unemployment.

The Benelux countries and France share a common profile on the desirability of a development of the EU in a federal direction. The citizens in all four states are among the firmest supporters of a European government responsible to the European Parliament, with the Netherlands standing out as the EU member state most in favour (72%), and Luxembourg, France, and Belgium following closely behind (62%, 60% and 57% respectively). Similarly, these four countries are all among the seven EU member states most in favour of an evolution towards a federal European Union, the Netherlands and Belgium being the most supportive of all (56% and 53% respectively), and France and Luxembourg hovering around the EU average of 45% for and 15% against a federal EU. Finally, there is a consensus among the citizens of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France that those member states which support a development towards federalism, e.g. Benelux and France, should be allowed to go on and achieve it amongst themselves, even if this would result in a two-speed Europe. Together with Germany, these four countries are the member states most supportive of such a differentiated approach to the development of a federal Europe. The Benelux countries and France are also markedly positive as regards the transfer of competencies to the European level. Of all issues – including such questions as defence, currency and immigration policy – there are only five where the Benelux and France (and indeed the average European) would prefer policy to be decided on the national level: health and social welfare, basic rules for broadcasting and press, workers' rights, education, and cultural policy. The one exception is Luxembourg's stance on VAT rates, where it is one of the few countries to advocate national level decision-making. There are, however, a number of significant cleavages also in the values of these four countries. Notably, across a number of issues related to European integration, the Netherlands and Luxembourg tend to be more positively disposed than France and Belgium, which end up below the EC average. At the most general level, the citizens of the Netherlands and Luxembourg display a higher level of support for EU membership (75% and 70% respectively) than France and Belgium (48% and 42%). Not surprisingly, the same pattern also holds true for the questions of whether the member state concerned has benefited from EU membership and how the population would vote if a referendum were held on EU membership "tomorrow". But this cleavage between the Netherlands and Luxembourg, on the one hand, and Belgium and France, on the other, also extends to aspects of European integration beyond the support of EU membership. For example, 69% of the population in Luxembourg and 66% in the Netherlands consider the European single market a hope rather than a threat, while the corresponding figure is 56% and 51% respectively in Belgium and France. Perhaps more surprisingly, this pattern largely extends also to the knowledge about the EU in these four member states, as well as the awareness of the Community institutions in the media. It is notable that the knowledge and media awareness of the EU in France, and to a lesser extent in Belgium, is well below the EU average.

4.3. Germanic Central Europe

Germany and Austria constitute, despite notable differences, a third cluster of EU member states with certain common socio-economic traits and values which make it worthwhile to group these two countries together. In fact, both Germany and Austria often correspond to the EU average, and seldom do they exhibit dramatic values at the ends of the European value spectrum. With respect to the household composition in Austria, the rates of two parent and one-parent households largely conform to the EU average, while in Germany the proportion of one-person households is higher than the proportion of households of the traditional family type. On the other hand, the frequency of one-parent households is below the EU-average. Germany displays markedly more traditional and less post-modern family behaviour than the EU average and (for those indicators where values exist) Austria. The abortion rate in Germany is significantly below that in, for example, the Nordic countries, France, the UK and Italy. Likewise, the rate of children born outside marriage is well below the EU average, and the marriage rate notably above the level in all the Nordic countries, France, and the Netherlands. In terms of ethnic homogeneity, it should be noted that Germany and Austria, together with Belgium, have the highest rates in the EU of non-nationals in the population, Luxembourg excluded (8.5% and 8.8% respectively).

In economic terms, Germany and Austria display very similar profiles. In some cases, this profile corresponds to the EU average, such as in the rates of main telephone lines and personal computers per household. In other cases, such as consumption patterns and the relative importance of different economic sectors, Germany and Austria form a group of their own. In both, the industrial sector employs more people and the service sector less people than in Europe in general. Similarly, GDP per capita is among the highest in the Union in both Germany and Austria.

There is a higher predominance of post-material values in Germany than in the EU in general (no value for Austria), with 72% of Germans subscribing to post-material values, comparable to the level in France and Denmark. Life-satisfaction in both countries conforms exactly to the EU average (81% of the population claiming to be very or fairly satisfied), and both countries also enjoy a high level of interpersonal trust – not only between the citizens of the same country, but also by the citizens of other EU member states. Notable is, however, that in the German case, this high level of trust by other Europeans, is also matched by an unusually high level of distrust (29%). Also perhaps somewhat paradoxical, Germans' satisfaction with the way the democratic system works remains firmly above the EC average, while interest in politics and trust in national and European political institutions is somewhat below. Germans, in fact, are the European citizens with the lowest level of confidence in the Community institutions (21% expressing trust in the Commission and 24% in the Parliament). Austrians are also more sceptical towards to the Community institutions than the average European, but this, on the other hand, is compensated by a high level of trust in the national parliament and government.

The values in Germany and Austria with respect to European integration both reflect the common traits of these countries, as well as the apparent differences, most notably Germany being a founding member and Austria a very recent member of the EU. While the general support for EU membership is somewhat below the European average in Germany, Austria in fact displays the very lowest level of public support (merely 27% of the population considers EU membership a "good thing"). A particular feature of the Germans' support for EU membership, is the firm inverse relationship to unemployment – the higher the level of unemployment, the lower the support for EU membership. In terms of public support for EU membership, Austria is thus more similar to other recent member states such as Sweden and Finland, than to Germany. The same value pattern is reflected in other like variables, such as the

share of the population which perceives the country to have benefited from EU membership, and which would vote against membership if a new referendum were held "tomorrow". In view of these facts, it is notable that Austrians still attach higher hopes to the single market, than, in fact, Germans do (55% and 49% respectively considering the single market a hope rather than a fear).

Along the same pattern as that characterising the two countries' attitudes towards EU membership, Germans are markedly more positive than Austrians with respect to a development of the EU in a federal direction. While Austria, next to the Nordic countries, is highly sceptical towards the notion of a federal European Union or the need for a European government in the building of Europe, Germany shares the federalist-friendly position of the Benelux-countries. Likewise, Germans - like the population of the other five founding members, but in contrast to Austria - think that countries in favour of a federal European Union should be allowed to go ahead, even if this results in a two-speed Europe. With respect to the transfer of decision-making competence to the European level, Germans generally correspond to the EU average and countries such as the Benelux and France, supporting EU competencies in all fields but health and social welfare, basic rules for broadcasting and press, workers' rights, education, and cultural policy. Austrians, however, are considerably more protective of national competencies and would, in addition, prefer that competencies within defence, currency, immigration policy, agriculture and fishing policy, VAT rates, and rules for political asylum, remained or were brought back to the national level.

Despite these differences between Germany and Austria, and the highly divergent histories of participation in the European integration process, the populations in both countries feel equally detached from the European Union (both are below the EU-average with 39 and 36% respectively feeling attached to the EU). Similarly, Germans and Austrians are less inclined than Europeans in general to consider themselves European rather than national citizens (14% and 11% respectively). This uneasiness about European identity is matched, however, by a greater-than-average knowledge about the EU in both Germany and Austria, the latter only being surpassed by Luxembourg. As far as the awareness of the EU in the media is concerned, it is slightly higher than the EU average in Austria and marginally lower in Germany, with the notable exception of the great visibility of the European Court of Justice in German media.

4.4. Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland (the cohesion countries)

Although with obvious cultural differences, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece show a high degree of convergence as far as socio-economic indicators are concerned. According to these indicators the societies of southern Europe and Ireland are only just about to enter the first stages of post-modernism, a trend confirmed by the findings of the European Values Study. Generally speaking, these countries have experienced marked economic progress in recent years, which could lead us to expect a rapid shift towards post-modern values in the close future. A change in values is observable for instance in the younger generations living in big urban areas.

The number of children born outside marriage is among the lowest in the EU in Greece (3%) and Spain (10%), while Ireland and Portugal are situated around the EU average of 23% of all children being born outside marriage. Equally the abortion rate is the lowest in Greece and Spain among the EU countries, and abortion is forbidden in Ireland and Portugal other than for medical reasons. With a lower-than-average rate of divorce and with a higher-than-average rate of marriage, Spain, Portugal and Greece are among the countries in the EU where one-person-households are the least frequent, while the traditional household with two adults and children is represented well above the European average. In Ireland, where divorce was legally impossible

until recently, the household structure is similar as the traditional family structure (two adults with children) is strongly represented. The rate of lone-parent households, however, is well above the EU average (significantly above that of Portugal and Greece). All four countries have a high proportion of the population made up by nationals (97-99% compared to the EU average of 95%).

Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland sometimes go under the label "cohesion" countries because they have been eligible for financial support from the cohesion fund as a result of the state of their economic development (below a 90%-limit of the average EU GDP). Greece, Portugal, and Spain are still significantly below the EU average in terms of GDP per capita (the index of 1996 indicates values of 64.5, 70.4, and 76.7 respectively, with an EU average of 100). Ireland is still below the EU average with an index value of 93.8 in 1996, but has caught up significantly since 1991 (when it was clearly behind Spain, for example). All four countries' pattern of employment by sectors is comparatively similar, apart from the employment structure of Greece which is atypical also in the broader EU perspective with its heavy preponderance of people working in the agricultural sector (21% in 1994) compared to the EU average and to Spain (10%), Portugal (12%) and Ireland (13%). These countries have a slightly larger proportion of people working in the industrial sector than the EU-average, but a much lower rate of employment in the service sector ranging between 56-59% for Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain, compared to the EU service champions, such as Sweden (72%) and the Netherlands (71%). In terms of private consumption, the statistical analysis identified a cluster forming around the southern member states; Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, while Ireland forms a quite homogeneous cluster with the UK. Greece, Portugal and Spain place themselves at the lower end of the number of personal computers owned by private persons (in Greece less than three people per 100 inhabitants have a computer while the corresponding rate is over 21 in Denmark), while Ireland places itself slightly above the EU average. Concerning the number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants, Greece reaches the EU average, while the other three countries fall quite significantly below (between 34-37 compared to the EU average of over 47).

The cohesion countries vary considerably as to the rate of post-material values. As opposed to Portugal, which has the lowest level of all EU member states with only 36%, the propensities of post-material values in Spain (64%) and Ireland (61%) gradually approach the EU mean of 68% (no figures for Greece). In terms of changes over time, it should be noted that Spain in 1981, as opposed to 1990, formed a cluster together with Italy at the lower end of the post-modernity scale (no value for Portugal in 1981). The populations of the southern European countries express a lower life satisfaction than generally in the EU. Portugal is the country rating the lowest with only 4% being very satisfied and 66% being fairly satisfied. Greece has the highest proportion of people saying they are not satisfied with their lives (39%) compared with 52% of the population which feel fairly satisfied. In Spain, more people express satisfaction than in the other southern European countries, but the rate of satisfied Spaniards is still below the EU average (75% express some kind of satisfaction while 24% are dissatisfied). Irish people on the other hand seem to be much more satisfied with their lives ranking above the EU average with 90% expressing strong or fairly strong satisfaction. Portuguese and Greeks neither trust their fellow countrymen (second and fourth lowest among the EU member states), nor do they enjoy the trust of other Europeans (Greeks are the least trusted and the Portuguese are the fourth least trusted nationality). In Spain, interpersonal trust is close the EU average (placed between Sweden and the UK), while the Spanish enjoy the trust of other Europeans to an extent almost comparable to the trust attributed to the French. The Irish case is one of contradiction in that the Irish society is characterised by a high level of interpersonal trust, while the Irish people is among those least trusted by other Europeans in the EU.

In terms of popular perceived interest in politics, the Portuguese express by far the least interest in politics (for instance 45% say they are not at all interested in politics compared to the EU average of 20%). The Spanish follow closely thereafter with 37% of the population expressing no interest at all in politics, while close to a third of the population expresses some interest. In Greece and Ireland, public interest in politics comes quite close to the EU average as in both countries a slightly higher proportion of people express a great deal of interest in politics, although slightly more Greeks and Irish express no interest in politics at all compared to the EU average. Part of the answer to the southern European member states' disinterest in politics may be found in the critical attitude towards the functioning of democracy in their respective country. In Greece and Spain, there is a clear trend of increasing dissatisfaction with the way in which democracy works. Both countries have experienced a decline in the rate of popular satisfaction with democracy from a peak in the mid-80s for Greece and in end of the 80s for Spain, to a rate much below EU average in 1994. For instance, in Greece only 28% of the population were quite satisfied with the way in which democracy works compared to an EU average of 44%, and almost half of the population was not very satisfied compared to 35% as the EU-average. In Spain the picture is similar. In 1994 only 30% of the population expressed some satisfaction with the democratic system, while 43% were quite dissatisfied. The Portuguese express a rate of satisfaction with their democratic system quite similar to that of the EU-average, as 47% (44%) claim to be fairly satisfied while 39% are not very satisfied (35%) and 10% (14%) are not satisfied at all. In Ireland, popular satisfaction with democracy is way above EU average. In fact as much as 69% of the population claim to be very or fairly satisfied a rate which may be compared with the countries with highest popular satisfaction, Denmark (82%) and Luxembourg (81%). On the question of the public perception of the reliability of national and European institutions, the picture looks different. In the case of Greece, the rates of reliability of the national government and parliament, as well as those of the Commission and the European Parliament, are substantially higher than the EU average. Maybe the difference in attitude can be explained by a change in the political leadership between 1994 and 1996 (the indicators refer to two different surveys) in the country or quite simply by the two different questions being asked. In Spain the rate of reliability of the European institutions is twice that attributed to the national counterparts, while in Ireland the positive image of political systems as such is reflected in the high rate of perceived reliability (way above the EU average) of both national and European institutions. The Portuguese on the other hand are significantly more sceptical towards the European institutions (the reliability rate is negative) than to national democratic institutions for which the rate of reliability is high.

Support for EU membership has traditionally been high or quite high in all four countries. In 1996, Ireland recorded the highest support for EU membership at 75% together with Italy and the Netherlands. The three southern European countries also support EU membership but to a lesser extent (Greece 51%, Spain 49% and Portugal 45%). Often the reasons behind these countries' support for remaining a member of the EU has been explained in terms of the financial support they receive from the EC structural funds. Such a statement may be corroborated by the fact that the Irish, Greeks and Portuguese perceive EU membership as beneficial to their countries (86% of the Irish, 68% of the Portuguese, 59% and the Greek and 40% of the Spanish). On the other hand, support for European integration as such is equally popular in these four countries in comparison to the EU average. Another interesting indicator of these countries' positive disposition towards the EU is their attitude towards the Single Market which is viewed with hope at a higher degree than in many other EU member states. In fact, the Irish and the Greeks attach the greatest hope to the Single Market within the whole EU. It is also interesting to note that Spain, Portugal and Ireland display a trend of support for EU membership which is negatively correlated to the level of unemployment.

When considering the indicators measuring the attitudes towards political integration, the picture looks quite different. In all four countries, public attitudes towards a federal European Union are quite cool in that they all express less support for such an evolution than the EU average. Ireland while taking a predominantly supportive view on economic integration is almost as negatively predisposed towards a federal Union as Sweden and Denmark. However, on the basis of other political indicators such as the need for a European government or the transfer of new competencies to the EU level, the four countries once again express general support. On the question of a European government, Greece and Ireland express strong support (63% and 60% respectively compared to an EU-average of 54% in favour). Spain falls closely behind the EU-average in its support (50%) while Portugal remains quite hostile (41% in favour). On the question of the establishment of a federal Europe even against the will of one or two member states, Ireland and Spain are firmly opposed to the idea, while Greece and Portugal place themselves just around the EU-average. Interestingly, respondents in all four countries express a high rate of support for a shift of competence to the EU level in areas such as currency, immigration policy, foreign policy and asylum policy. Only on the question of a European defence policy the populations' attitudes are diverging as the Greeks, Irish and Portuguese remain firmly opposed to the idea while a small majority of the Spaniards is in favour of a transfer of defence issues to the European level.

Concerning the feeling of being European, the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Greeks and the Irish feel to a higher degree solely citizens of their own country rather than a citizen of the EU (they all rate below the EU-average). Significantly for the southern European countries is the strong sense of belonging to a particular region rather than to their country or the EU. This feeling is especially strong in Spain (38% as compared to the EU average of 22% who express a strong regional belonging), but also in Portugal the regional identity is quite strong (27%). In Ireland, on the other hand, the feeling of being only Irish is the second strongest in the Union after Finland, but with the interesting difference that quite a high proportion of the Irish also feel as citizens of the EU (16%, equalling the EU-average). The Irish feel to a very low degree a regional attachment contrasted with their strong feeling of being Irish. Similarly, in Greece and Portugal the populations feel a strong attachment to their respective country which is the highest among the EU member states (97% in these countries feel attached to their respective country compared to an EU average of 89%). In general, the citizens in Spain, Portugal and Greece have a lower-than-average knowledge about EU affairs, while the Irish have a degree of knowledge just above the EU average.

4.5. Two big countries with opposing positions on European integration

The UK and Italy stand out as two countries with the common characteristic that they cannot easily be grouped with other EU member states. Moreover, the UK and Italy may in many ways – most notably in the attitudes towards European integration - also be described as each other's opposites.

With respect to social indicators, *the United Kingdom* displays a modern and less-traditional profile. The UK has among the highest rates of children born outside marriage, 34 out of 100, as compared to the EU average of 23% (but still way below the two-thirds of Swedish children born outside marriage). Similarly, the abortion rate in the UK is among the highest in the EU, slightly below that of Sweden and Denmark. While the traditional family structure of two adults and children is slightly less common in the UK than in the Union as a whole, the UK has among the highest rate of lone-parent households in the EU (9%). The rate of one-person households is

close to the EU-average. The proportion of non-nationals in the population (3.5%) is slightly below the EU average, and characteristically, the majority of these are non-Europeans. In economic terms, the UK largely conforms to the EU average. GDP per capita was marginally below the average in the Union in 1996. Likewise, the number of main telephone lines and the number of personal computers per 100 inhabitants lie closely above the EU average. In other aspects, the British economy displays distinctly more modern traits. While the proportion of the British population employed in the agricultural sector is the lowest in the EU (2.3%), the share employed in services is among the highest (69%). In terms of consumption patterns, the UK forms a cluster together with Ireland.

Post-material values are not as common in Britain as in the Netherlands, Belgium, and the Nordic countries, France or Germany. Rather, the occurrence of post-material values in the UK is slightly below the EU average and mirrors the situation in countries like Ireland, Spain, and Italy, with 65% of the British subscribing to post-materialism. British citizens are also neither more nor less prone to trust each other than the average European (86% expressing trust and 9% distrust). 53% of other Europeans express trust for the British, while as many as 39% express distrust. Life satisfaction in the UK is above the European average, with 29% considering themselves very satisfied and 60% fairly satisfied with the life they lead. The British are also more interested in politics than the average European. 13% of all Britons consider themselves very interested in politics, while 41% are interested in politics to some extent (the European average is 9 and 34% respectively). This higher-than-average interest in politics is not reflected, however, in the satisfaction with and trust in the political system. 5% of the British are very satisfied and 46% fairly satisfied with the way democracy works, figures which mirror the European average. When asked to express their level of trust in national and European political institutions, Britons display a firm distrust of both levels of governance. But while the trust in the national parliament and government is just slightly below the European average, the British are, with the exception of Germany, the Europeans who express the least trust in the European Commission (28% trust and 52% distrust) and the European Parliament (29% trust and 52% distrust).

This highly distrustful attitude towards the European Union is reflected in close to all indicators measuring values with respect to European integration. The Euro-scepticism in the UK is only matched by the negative attitudes in the Nordic countries and Austria. At the most fundamental level, support for European Union membership places the UK between Finland and Sweden, with 35% of the population considering EU membership a good thing and 26% a bad thing. Similarly, only 38% of the British judge that the UK has benefited from EU membership compared to 43% who assess the net-benefit to be negative. But for Sweden, the UK is also the Member State which approaches the single European market with the most fear and the least hope. Not surprisingly, these attitudes place the British among the Nordics and the Austrians on the question of how they would vote if a referendum on the EU were held "tomorrow" (52% to stay and 30% to leave).

The British are somewhat less sceptical with respect to political integration in the EU. Attitudes towards the desirability of a federal European Union place the UK on the EU average, with 45% being for and 19% against. While below the European average, a majority of Britons also think that a federal European Union should be established by those countries that so desire, even if this would entail a two-speed Europe. Likewise, on the question of whether there is a need for an elected European government in the further building of Europe, a majority of the British answer in the affirmative (even if the figures are markedly below the European average). The British are, however, extremely reluctant to transfer decision-making power to the EU level. Apart from those areas where the average European would prefer national solutions, the British

also desire to keep decision-making competencies at the national level in the following areas: defence, currency, immigration policy, fight against unemployment, agriculture and fishing policy, VAT rates, and rules for political asylum. In terms of European identity, the British display a complex relationship. Even if the British feel as European as the Belgians, with 15% of the population considering themselves citizens of the EU rather than of the UK or of the region, the British feel anything but attached to the European Union. Only 30% of Britons declare themselves "attached to the EU", compared to 68% "not attached", thus placing the UK behind Austria and Denmark in the level of attachment to the European Union. Finally, while the visibility of the EU is high (the Commission) or very high (the European Court of Justice), it is notable that the level of knowledge concerning the European Union is lower in the UK than in any other member state.


The values in *Italy* are in many ways in sharp contrast to those in the UK. Starting with social indicators, Italy displays a largely traditional profile. The percentage of children born outside marriage is the lowest in the EU next to Greece (8%), and the rate of abortion is firmly below that of Sweden, Denmark, the UK and France (though above, for example, Germany and the Netherlands). With respect to household composition, it is notable that the rate of couples with children in Italy is among the highest in the Union, only slightly lower than that of Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland. Lone-parent households rate somewhat above the EU-average, while one-person households are considerable less frequent than the EU-average, although not as low as in other south European member states. The extremely low level of non-nationals in the population (1.1%, the same as Finland and the lowest in the EU) is also a distinguishing trait of Italian society. In economic terms, the Italian profile is neither clearly modern nor exactly traditional, but contains elements of both. Obviously, this partly reflects the internal differences between the various Italian regions. While GDP per capita in 1996 was slightly above the EU average (and above that of, for example, the UK, the Netherlands, and Sweden), the number of main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants is below and the number of personal computer is far below. Similarly, while Italy belongs to the southern cluster in terms of consumption patterns, the production structure largely conforms to the EU average.

In terms of general societal values, Italy tends to be situated at one or the other of the extremes. Of the ten EU member states included in the European Values study, Italy is one of the countries with the lowest percentage of the population expressing post-material values (63%). It should be noted, however, that Italy has converged substantially towards the EU average in terms of post-modern values since 1981, when it had the lowest value of all EU countries in the survey (18%). Italians are also the people in the EU who trust each other the least. While 69% of the population express trust in fellow countrymen, as many as 28% distrust other Italians. But for the Greek, Italians are also the people the least trusted by other Europeans. 50% of all EU citizens declare trust for Italians, while 41% express distrust. Moreover, very few Italians would describe themselves as very happy with the life they are leading (12%, the third lowest figure in the EU). While Italians are as interested in politics as Europeans in general, they are, however, less satisfied than any other member state population with the way democracy works as 73% of the population express dissatisfaction with the way the democratic system works in Italy. This dissatisfaction is also reflected in the lack of trust for the national government and parliament, which is the lowest in the EU (27% and 29% expressing trust for the respective institutions). On the contrary, however, the European institutions enjoy a higher-than-average trust from Italians compared to other Europeans.

Italians are as positively disposed towards European integration as they are dissatisfied with the Italian political system. In no other EU member state is the support for Union membership as high as in Italy (75% consider it a good thing and only 4% a bad thing). Likewise, 81% of all

Italians would to stay in the EU if a referendum were held "tomorrow", the third highest figure after those of Ireland and the Netherlands. But, the Italian Euro-enthusiasm is not necessarily based on the perceived benefits from EU membership. Only slightly more than the average European do Italians perceive their country to have benefited from EU membership, and do they regard the single European market a hope rather than a fear. Italians are extremely positive towards a continued transfer of competencies to the European level. The only issue where Italy would prefer national level decision-making is health and social welfare (and even there the ratio is 49% versus 46%), i.e. not in areas such as education, cultural policy, or workers' rights.

With respect to the political dimension of integration, Italians are firmly positive, though the degree depends on the question posed. On the question of whether the further construction of Europe requires a democratic European government, Italians are the most positive of all (70% respond in the affirmative and only 12% doubt the need for a European government). If the question is phrased in terms of the desirability of an evolution towards federalism, Italy still occupies a position among the most enthusiastic, but is neither more nor less positive than the other founding members in general. Similarly, Italy is the least positive among the original six as regards the question of whether those countries in favour of a federal structure should be allowed to go ahead amongst themselves, thus contributing to a two-speed Europe. By contrast, Italians are the EU population feeling the most European. As many as 30% consider themselves citizens of the European Union rather than citizens of Italy or their respective regions. When phrased in terms of attachment to the EU, Italy is second to Luxembourg with 58% of the population feeling attached to the European Union, while 37% answer in the negative. While the knowledge in Italy about the European Union largely conforms to the EU average, it is notable that Italy is the member state where the visibility of the EU in the media is the lowest, regardless of whether the institution in question is the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, or the Council of Ministers



5. Conclusion

This report has shown that the 15 EU member states are experiencing a gradual transformation into post-modern societies. Despite the similarity between the European countries, as far as the direction of change is concerned, important national differences persist in societal structures/behaviour and in the degree of adherence to post-modern values.

The analysis into societal change isolated a number of trends of which the most important is the rapid change in the southern European countries towards a more post-modern expression of social behaviour. On the other hand, there is still a marked difference between societal post-modern patterns in the EU member states, where the Nordic countries seem the most post-modern by far, while the southern European countries, and to some extent Ireland, are still some way off from adopting a post-modern societal structure. The remaining member states are showing both post-modern and modern societal traits, as some of them still appear rather traditional like Luxembourg or Austria, while in others, like the Netherlands, France or Germany clear expressions of post-modernism co-exist with more traditional societal structures.

The European Values Study of 1991 re-confirmed the traditional north-south divide between the more traditional societies in southern Europe and the post-modern societies in northern Europe. However, some interesting observations should be added which qualify this rather stereotyped image of Europe: (1) The difference in values is from a general point of view more significant between generations than between nations, i.e. the rate of young people throughout Europe adhering to modern values is likely to be higher than the relative rate of people within an individual country that has adopted post-modern values; and (2) There has been a rapid progress in the poorer member states both concerning their economic development and popular adherence to post-modern values. This trend is very strong in Ireland, which has experienced an impressive growth in national GDP per capita expressed in terms of EU PPS and in a parallel process the rate of the population expressing adherence to post-modern values has risen substantially (European Values Survey). In the case of Spain, a gradual restructuring of the economy can be observed in the composition of employment per sector. In the 1990s, the trend of employment in the service sector has been positive while it has been negative in the agricultural and industrial sectors. Concerning the popular expression of adherence to post-modern values in Spain, the trend points towards a substantial rise between 1981 and 1990. Italy has also experienced a similar development with a very strong rise in popular adherence to post-modern values between 1981 and 1990. For Greece and Portugal the socio-economic indicators show a significant development, but because of the absence of comparable surveys, no firm conclusions can be drawn as to the development of the adherence to post-modern values. Given the development in Spain and Ireland, we may however expect that the post-modern value trend in Greece and Portugal will be taking a similar direction, and that the trend will be strongest among the young and in urban areas; (3) As the generalised trend towards post-modern values looks set to progress further, some European champions will gradually be caught up by other countries. We should therefore expect that the public expression of value change is becoming part of the European citizens' daily lives. Some of these values are being translated into demands for new policy directions or into a more diffuse public discontent with the existing structures, policies or procedures.

The analysis of European value patterns and attitudes to European integration grouped together some countries with either similar socio-economic characteristics and/or similar attitudes to European integration (apart from the last group – the UK and Italy – for which the aim was to


illustrate two countries with opposing national characteristics). The groups are, however, far from homogeneous. The one displaying the most homogeneous characteristics is the Nordic one with a high level of similarity both in terms of socio-economic indicators and popular attitudes on European integration. The other groups show a varying degree of similarities and differences, but still the countries within the groups are more similar between them than between countries in other groups (again with the exception of the last group). Although it is extremely difficult to prove that any indicator would be determining a given country's attitude to European integration, it seems that the following indicators are almost always present in those countries expressing high support for the EU: (1) a strong feeling that the country has benefited from EU membership; (2) high hopes that the country will benefit from further European integration, for example through the Internal Market; and (3) a feeling of attachment to the EU or European integration. Two additional well-known observations may be added: the support for EU membership is higher among the initial six member states than among the others, and membership in its economic dimension receives high popular support in the poorer member states which, in most cases, also accord a quite strong support to political integration. There is however no clear-cut corroboration between the degree of post-modern values in a country and the population's attitude to European integration. It would be tempting to explain Denmark's sceptical attitude to the EU in terms of typical post-modern criticism of the EU (the democratic deficit, too much driven by economic considerations etc). This type of criticism may go a quite long way in explaining the Danish attitude, but is contradicted by the case of the Netherlands where post-modern values find a high expression and the population is amongst the most supportive to European integration in the EU. The same argument could be made in the opposite case looking at Greece and Portugal where the post-modernism is not so advanced and the attitudes to the EU is favourable concerning the economic integration, but quite negative concerning political integration. Clearly, culture, historical experience and traditions as well as the way in which European issues are fed into national political and societal discourse play a great role in the formation of attitudes to European integration. The groups are useful, however, in creating a sort of mental picture about the level of socio-economic development, degree of modernisation in terms of societal values and attitudes to European integration.

Nor may we conclude that the transformation of socio-economic structures pushes all facets of a particular country in the same, post-modern, direction. Socio-economic changes enhance the possibilities of some societal groups, while challenging the established ways of life of others. This differentiated impact on the population at large is translated into a value pattern of some heterogeneity and contradiction, where post-modern priorities such as environmental protection and equal treatment exist next to modern fears such as economic crisis and unemployment.

These reservations should not, however, stop us from considering the impact that the change towards post-modern values may have on popular attitudes towards the EU and the process of integration throughout the Union.

- The time of the European population's permissive consensus to European integration is most likely over. The analysis shows a quite generalised dissatisfaction with the way in which the democratic system works both on national and European level. Demands for amending the 'democratic deficit' of the Union have been heard since some time. Popular demands for more participation in the European system are likely to grow louder – a challenge to which the Union will have to respond or else a deeper degree of detachment between the EU and the European citizens is likely to be result.

- Given the post-modern society's emphasis of security values, rejection of all forms of authority and the diminishing prestige of science, technology and rationality, the Union will be asked with increased intensity to take action in the fields of environmental protection, fight against social exclusion, consumer protection and in various areas linked to soft security (immigration, organised crime etc.). This is illustrated by the response of Europeans to the question of what should be given priority in the EU over the next ten years, where the top areas are the fight against organised crime, against drug trafficking, against Cancer/AIDS, against unemployment, and to protect the environment. At the bottom of the list, we find a European army, protection of European cultures, and protection from non-EU competition. An interesting phenomenon in this context is the awareness that many of our contemporary problems know no frontiers (the effects of globalisation, the spread of organised crime or environmental degradation to mention a few). The national debate in many EU member states is conducted on a basis which recognises the incapacity of individual countries to deal effectively with contemporary problems on their own. With a border-free Europe in the offing, the European level may become the instance towards which people look towards for a solution to their problems. The European level may be expected to take gradually the form of a forum where the definition of contemporary problems are debated and where national actors compare the result of national action. The dimension of sharing the diagnosis of common problems is not enough, however, since the definition of problems and their causes feed expectation as to effective action to resolve them or at least alleviate their impact.
- If this analysis is accepted as one possible outcome from a European-wide transformation into post-modernism, then it follows that the stimulation of a gradual emergence of a popular perception of being able to influence the policy-formation process in the EU becomes vital. Succeeding in stimulating a feeling of having a stake in the integration process is dependent on a general feeling of belonging to Europe, i.e. that the individual citizen feels some sort of emotional attachment to the Union which then in his eyes may gradually evolve into an *imagined community*. The national arena for political discourse is one forum in which such a feeling could be stimulated with national opinion-makers (political parties, journalists etc.) acting as conveyors. The national arena should not function in isolation but should be stimulated by debate in other national arenas so as a European-wide debate gradually emerges. Another forum is the national elite which its capacity to feed images of co-operation versus competition on the European level to the national public opinion.



6. Statistical Appendix

Table 1 : Population by nationality in 1994

| | National | Non-national | Non-national | | |
|-------|----------|--------------|--------------|---------------|-------------------|
| | | | EU | EUROPE non EU | Rest of the world |
| EUR15 | 95,3 | 4,7 | 1,5 | 1,6 | 1,6 |
| B | 90,9 | 9,1 | 5,4 | 1,1 | 2,6 |
| DK | 96,4 | 3,6 | 0,8 | 1,4 | 1,4 |
| D | 91,5 | 8,5 | 2,2 | 4,8 | 1,5 |
| EL | 98,6 | 1,4 | 0,4 | 0,4 | 0,6 |
| E | 98,9 | 1,1 | 0,5 | 0,1 | 0,5 |
| F | 93,7 | 6,3 | 2,3 | 0,6 | 3,4 |
| IRL | 97,4 | 2,2 | 2 | 0 | 0,2 |
| I | 98,9 | 1,1 | 0,2 | 0,2 | 0,7 |
| L | 68,2 | 31,8 | 28,8 | 0 | 3 |
| NL | 94,9 | 5,1 | 1,3 | 1,6 | 2,2 |
| A | 91,2 | 8,8 | : | : | : |
| P | 98,4 | 1,6 | 0,4 | 0 | 1,2 |
| FIN | 98,9 | 1,1 | 0,2 | 0,6 | 0,3 |
| S | 94,2 | 5,8 | 2,1 | 1,7 | 2 |
| UK | 96,5 | 3,5 | 1,4 | 0,3 | 1,8 |

Source: Eurostat, Demography in figures 1997

Composition of the population by nationality in 1994




Table 2 : Percentage of private household by type of household

| | Couples without children | Couples with children | Lone parent families | One-person households | Multi-person households |
|-------|--------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| E | 18,9 | 53,5 | 8,1 | : | 5,8 |
| P | 22,7 | 49,9 | 6,8 | 13,8 | 2,8 |
| L | 21,2 | 38,4 | 7,9 | 25,5 | 5,5 |
| GR | 23,8 | 49,1 | 6 | 16,2 | 4,9 |
| I | 19,4 | 46,7 | 8,5 | 20,6 | 3,1 |
| IRL | 13,7 | 47,9 | 10,6 | 20,2 | 6,9 |
| B | 22,9 | 35,7 | 9,2 | 28,4 | 3 |
| EUR15 | 23,4 | 37,3 | 7,4 | : | 3,8 |
| UK | 27,2 | 32,9 | 9 | 26,7 | 3,3 |
| A | 21,9 | 35,3 | 8,1 | 29,7 | 2,7 |
| F | 24,7 | 38,1 | 7,4 | 27 | 2,1 |
| NL | 22,5 | 33,5 | 6,3 | 30 | 7,7 |
| D | 23,3 | 30,5 | 6,3 | 33,6 | 4 |
| FIN | 30,6 | 26,2 | 4,1 | 31,7 | 6,2 |
| DK | 26,6 | 26,3 | 5,8 | 34,4 | 3,8 |
| S | 32,2 | 19,9 | 3,1 | 39,6 | 5,2 |

Source: Eurostat, Population, households and dwellings in Europe, 1996. Figures from the 1990/91 censuses




Table 3 : Rate of infant mortality between 1960 and 1995

| | 1970 | 1975 | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Greece | 29,6 | 24 | 17,9 | 14,1 | 9,7 | 8,1 |
| Portugal | 55,5 | 38,9 | 24,3 | 17,8 | 11 | 7,5 |
| Ireland | 19,5 | 17,5 | 11,1 | 8,8 | 8,2 | 6,4 |
| Italy | 29,6 | 21,2 | 14,6 | 10,5 | 8,2 | 6,2 |
| United Kingdom | 18,5 | 16,1 | 12,1 | 9,3 | 7,9 | 6,2 |
| Belgium | 21,1 | 16,1 | 12,1 | 9,8 | 8 | 6,1 |
| EUR15 | 23,4 | 18,1 | 12,4 | 9,5 | 7,6 | 5,6 |
| Spain | 28,1 | 18,9 | 12,3 | 8,9 | 7,6 | 5,6 |
| Luxembourg | 24,9 | 14,8 | 11,5 | 9 | 7,3 | 5,5 |
| Netherlands | 12,7 | 10,6 | 8,6 | 8 | 7,1 | 5,5 |
| Austria | 25,9 | 20,5 | 14,3 | 11,2 | 7,8 | 5,4 |
| Germany | 22,5 | 18,9 | 12,4 | 9,1 | 7 | 5,3 |
| Denmark | 14,2 | 10,4 | 8,4 | 7,9 | 7,5 | 5,1 |
| France | 18,2 | 13,8 | 10 | 8,3 | 7,3 | 4,9 |
| Sweden | 11 | 8,6 | 6,9 | 6,8 | 6 | 4,1 |
| Finland | 13,2 | 10 | 7,6 | 6,3 | 5,6 | 3,9 |

Infant mortality per 1000 live births.

Source: New Cronos, Eurostat




Table 4 : Percentage of births outside marriage

| | 1970 | 1975 | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Greece | 1,1 | 1,3 | 1,5 | 1,8 | 2,2 | 2,4 | 2,6 | 2,8 | 2,9 | 3 | 3,1 |
| Italy | 2,2 | 2,6 | 4,3 | 5,4 | 6,5 | 6,7 | 6,7 | 7,4 | 7,8 | 8 | 8,1 |
| Spain | 1,4 | 2 | 3,9 | 8 | 9,6 | 10 | 10,5 | 10,8 | 10,8 | 10,8 | : |
| Luxembourg | 4 | 4,2 | 6 | 8,7 | 12,8 | 12,2 | 12,7 | 12,9 | 12,7 | 13,1 | 15 |
| Belgium | 2,8 | 3,1 | 4,1 | 7,1 | 11,6 | 12,6 | 13,6 | 14,1 | 14,5 | 15 | : |
| Netherlands | 2,1 | 2,1 | 4,1 | 8,3 | 11,4 | 12 | 12,4 | 13,1 | 14,3 | 15,5 | 16,9 |
| Germany | 7,2 | 8,5 | 11,9 | 16,2 | 15,3 | 15,1 | 14,9 | 14,8 | 15,4 | 16,1 | 16,8 |
| Portugal | 7,3 | 7,2 | 9,2 | 12,3 | 14,7 | 15,6 | 16,1 | 17 | 17,8 | 18,7 | 17,1 |
| Ireland | 2,7 | 3,7 | 5 | 8,5 | 14,6 | 16,9 | 18,2 | 20 | 21,2 | 22,7 | 24,8 |
| EUR15 | 5,6 | 6,8 | 9,6 | 14,9 | 19,6 | 20,5 | 21,1 | 21,8 | 22,5 | 23,3 | : |
| Austria | 12,8 | 13,5 | 17,8 | 22,4 | 23,6 | 24,8 | 25,2 | 26,3 | 26,8 | 27,4 | 28 |
| Finland | 5,8 | 10,1 | 13,1 | 16,4 | 25,2 | 27,4 | 28,9 | 30,3 | 31,3 | 33,1 | 35,4 |
| United Kingdom | 8 | 9 | 11,5 | 18,9 | 27,9 | 29,8 | 30,8 | 31,8 | 32 | 33,6 | : |
| France | 6,9 | 8,5 | 11,4 | 19,6 | 30,1 | 31,8 | 33,2 | 34,9 | 36,1 | 37,2 | : |
| Denmark | 11 | 21,7 | 33,2 | 43 | 46,4 | 46,5 | 46,4 | 46,8 | 46,9 | 46,5 | : |
| Sweden | 18,6 | 32,8 | 39,7 | 46,4 | 47 | 48,2 | 49,5 | 50,4 | 51,6 | 53 | 67,5 |

Source: New Cronos, Eurostat




Table 5 : Mean age of women at birth of first child

| | 1970 | 1975 | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| EUR15 | : | : | : | : | : | : | : | : | : | : | : |
| Portugal | 24,4 | 24 | 23,6 | 23,8 | 24,7 | 24,9 | 25 | 25,2 | 25,4 | 25,6 | : |
| Austria | : | : | : | : | 25 | 25,1 | 25,3 | 25,5 | 25,9 | : | : |
| Greece | 24 | 23,6 | 23,3 | 23,7 | 24,7 | 25 | 25,4 | 25,9 | 26 | 26,4 | : |
| Belgium | 24 | 24,1 | 24,6 | 24,9 | 26,5 | 26,6 | : | : | : | : | : |
| Luxembourg | : | : | : | : | 26,5 | 26,8 | : | : | : | : | : |
| Ireland | 25,3 | 24,8 | 24,9 | 25,6 | 26,3 | 26,3 | 26,4 | 26,6 | 26,8 | 27 | : |
| France | 23,8 | 24,2 | 24,9 | 25,9 | 27 | 27,2 | : | : | : | : | : |
| Spain | : | 24,5 | 24,6 | 25,4 | 26,5 | 26,9 | 27,2 | 27,1 | : | : | : |
| Sweden | : | 24,5 | 25,5 | 26,1 | 26,3 | 26,5 | 26,7 | 27 | 27,2 | 27,3 | : |
| Denmark | 23,7 | 24 | 24,6 | 25,5 | 26,4 | 26,8 | 26,9 | 27,2 | 27,3 | 27,5 | : |
| Italy | 25,1 | 24,7 | 25,1 | 25,9 | 26,9 | : | 27,4 | 27,5 | : | : | : |
| Finland | : | : | : | : | 26,8 | 26,4 | 27 | 27,2 | 27,3 | 27,6 | : |
| United Kingdom | 23,9 | 24,6 | 25,1 | 25,9 | 27,3 | 27,4 | 27,7 | 27,4 | 27,3 | : | : |
| Germany | : | : | : | : | : | 26,9 | 27,2 | 27,5 | 27,8 | 28,1 | : |
| Netherlands | 24,3 | 25 | 25,6 | 26,5 | 27,6 | 27,8 | 28 | 28,3 | 28,4 | 28,6 | : |

Source: New Cronos, Eurostat




Table 6 : Number of abortions per 1000 women

| | Sweden | Denmark | United Kingdom | France | Italy | Finland | Germany | Netherlands | Greece | Spain |
|------|--------|---------|----------------|--------|-------|---------|---------|-------------|--------|-------|
| 1975 | 7,90 | 10,92 | 5,09 | - | - | - | - | | - | - |
| 1980 | 8,32 | 8,99 | 5,84 | 6,21 | 7,17 | 6,09 | 4,38 | 2,99 | - | - |
| 1985 | 7,30 | 7,68 | 6,23 | 6,12 | 7,22 | 5,47 | 4,28 | 2,36 | - | - |
| 1990 | 8,66 | 7,90 | 6,70 | 5,85 | 5,53 | 4,77 | 3,54 | 2,43 | 1,97 | 1,88 |
| 1993 | 7,75 | 7,07 | 6,05 | 5,34 | 4,93 | 3,97 | 2,66 | 2,56 | 2,34 | 2,28 |

Source: New Cronos, Eurostat




Table 7 : Percentage of unmarried women by age

| | 15-19 | 20-24 | 25-29 | 30-34 | 35-39 | 40-44 | 45-49 | 50-54 | 55-59 |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Belgium | 97,86 | 75,55 | 34,7 | 17,76 | 10,72 | 7,21 | 5,28 | 4,65 | 4,87 |
| Germany | 96,96 | 82,95 | 47,45 | 21,65 | 12,12 | 8,05 | 5,46 | 5,2 | 5,1 |
| Netherlands | 98,88 | 86,61 | 49,91 | 25,14 | 14,85 | 9,38 | 6,1 | 4,91 | 5,06 |
| Ireland | 98,45 | 92,62 | 52,06 | 22,24 | 13,02 | 10,31 | 8,04 | 8,64 | 10,85 |
| France | 98,95 | 89,29 | 52,95 | 29,77 | 17,76 | 11,9 | 8,44 | 7,09 | 6,69 |
| Norway | 99,1 | 90,73 | 59,41 | 32,51 | 17,88 | 10,12 | 6,59 | 5,28 | 4,6 |
| Denmark | 99,1 | 89,93 | 62,79 | 35,59 | 22,99 | 14,09 | 7,44 | 4,87 | 4,33 |
| Sweden | 99,2 | 91,46 | 66,81 | 42,64 | 28,83 | 19,86 | 13,23 | 8,49 | 6,78 |
| Finland | 99,43 | 86,35 | 86,96 | 33,43 | 21,77 | 15,09 | 10,74 | 9,02 | 9,29 |




Table 8 : Percentage of unmarried men by age

| | 15-19 | 20-24 | 25-29 | 30-34 | 35-39 | 40-44 | 45-49 | 50-54 | 55-59 |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Belgium | 99,43 | 91,45 | 53,08 | 28,18 | 16,93 | 11,3 | 8,63 | 7,3 | 7,2 |
| Denmark | 99,7 | 95,88 | 78,54 | 50,57 | 34,93 | 23,4 | 14,11 | 9,2 | 8 |
| Germany | 98,35 | 95,76 | 68,82 | 36,72 | 20,69 | 13,79 | 9,6 | 8,8 | 6,8 |
| France | 99,29 | 97,21 | 68,34 | 40,39 | 24,57 | 15,82 | 10,5 | 8,8 | 9,3 |
| Ireland | 98,21 | 96,93 | 67,43 | 32,71 | 18,44 | 14,5 | 13,9 | 15 | 17 |
| Netherlands | 99,7 | 97,51 | 49,12 | 38,16 | 22,93 | 14,74 | 9,6 | 7,3 | 7 |
| Finland | 99,9 | 93,74 | 72,09 | 46,75 | 32,31 | 23,12 | 16 | 11,9 | 12,4 |
| Sweden | 99,9 | 97,53 | 81,8 | 56,82 | 40,48 | 28,93 | 20,8 | 14 | 11,3 |
| Norway | 99,8 | 97,81 | 76,87 | 48,19 | 29,03 | 17,35 | 11,5 | 8,9 | 8,8 |










Table 9 : Pattern of consumption (in per cent)

| | FOOD, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO | CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR | GROSS RENT, FUEL AND POWER | FURNITURE, FURNISHING AND HOUSEHOLD EQUIPMENT AND OPERATION | MEDICAL CARE AND HEALTH EXPENSES | TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION | RECREATION, ENTERTAINMENT, EDUCATION AND CULTURAL SERVICES | MISCELLANEOUS GOODS AND SERVICES | OTHER EXPENDITURE N.E.C. |
|----------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|---|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Belgium | 19,06 | 6,22 | 24,86 | 6,99 | 4,30 | 12,03 | 6,01 | 15,17 | 5,32 |
| Denmark | 17,94 | 4,75 | 30,03 | 5,23 | 1,91 | 15,96 | 7,85 | 11,62 | 4,70 |
| Germany | 19,23 | 7,29 | 21,01 | 7,80 | 4,69 | 14,46 | 8,82 | 4,30 | 12,38 |
| Greece | 26,11 | 12,45 | 20,74 | 7,89 | 4,62 | 10,13 | 5,47 | 11,42 | 1,18 |
| Spain | 29,14 | 10,68 | 19,67 | 6,43 | 2,38 | 12,49 | 5,52 | 10,72 | 2,92 |
| France | 17,16 | 5,56 | 29,16 | 7,41 | 5,34 | 15,70 | 5,62 | 8,75 | 6,30 |
| Ireland | 25,29 | 6,73 | 15,73 | 5,20 | 2,61 | 12,50 | 7,89 | 13,65 | 10,40 |
| Italy | 25,98 | 9,37 | 19,88 | 7,70 | 2,20 | 15,86 | 6,11 | 9,11 | 3,79 |
| Luxembourg | 17,36 | 7,80 | 25,56 | 8,63 | 4,32 | 12,21 | 7,64 | 13,33 | 3,14 |
| Netherlands | 15,57 | 1,73 | 22,20 | 6,41 | 2,35 | 8,23 | 9,33 | 10,55 | 9,58 |
| Portugal | 36,05 | 8,72 | 14,16 | 7,13 | 3,21 | 14,31 | 3,28 | 10,76 | 2,38 |
| United Kingdom | 17,97 | 6,62 | 26,07 | 5,64 | 1,11 | 10,51 | 7,88 | 17,86 | 6,32 |

Source: New Cronos 97, Eurostat

| | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> | FOOD, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | GROSS RENT, FUEL AND POWER |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | FURNITURE, FURNISHING AND HOUSEHOLD EQUIPMENT AND OPERATION |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | MEDICAL CARE AND HEALTH EXPENSES |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | RECREATION, ENTERTAINMENT, EDUCATION AND CULTURAL SERVICES |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | MISCELLANEOUS GOODS AND SERVICES |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | OTHER EXPENDITURE N.E.C. |













Tableau 10 : Distance between consumption profiles



| | Belgium | Denmark | France | Luxembourg | Portugal | Greece | Spain | Italy | Ireland | United Kingdom | Germany | Netherlands |
|-------------|---------|---------|--------|------------|----------|--------|-------|-------|---------|----------------|---------|-------------|
| Belgium | 0,00 | 0,36 | 0,32 | 0,15 | 1,29 | 0,78 | 0,66 | 0,59 | 0,62 | 0,31 | 1,12 | 0,79 |
| Denmark | 0,36 | 0,00 | 0,34 | 0,42 | 1,81 | 1,35 | 0,95 | 0,68 | 0,99 | 0,39 | 1,20 | 0,80 |
| France | 0,32 | 0,34 | 0,00 | 0,40 | 1,75 | 1,23 | 1,06 | 0,72 | 1,09 | 0,87 | 0,66 | 0,93 |
| Luxembourg | 0,15 | 0,42 | 0,40 | 0,00 | 1,38 | 0,55 | 0,64 | 0,54 | 1,01 | 0,50 | 1,22 | 1,07 |
| Portugal | 1,29 | 1,81 | 1,75 | 1,38 | 0,00 | 0,61 | 0,30 | 0,47 | 1,11 | 1,90 | 2,11 | 2,62 |
| Greece | 0,78 | 1,35 | 1,23 | 0,55 | 0,61 | 0,00 | 0,25 | 0,47 | 1,31 | 1,31 | 1,82 | 2,17 |
| Spain | 0,66 | 0,95 | 1,06 | 0,64 | 0,30 | 0,25 | 0,00 | 0,12 | 0,75 | 0,96 | 1,46 | 1,79 |
| Italy | 0,59 | 0,68 | 0,72 | 0,54 | 0,47 | 0,47 | 0,12 | 0,00 | 0,67 | 0,91 | 1,00 | 1,53 |
| Ireland | 0,62 | 0,99 | 1,09 | 1,01 | 1,11 | 1,31 | 0,75 | 0,67 | 0,00 | 0,68 | 0,88 | 0,88 |
| UK | 0,31 | 0,39 | 0,87 | 0,50 | 1,90 | 1,31 | 0,96 | 0,91 | 0,68 | 0,00 | 1,57 | 0,75 |
| Germany | 1,12 | 1,20 | 0,66 | 1,22 | 2,11 | 1,82 | 1,46 | 1,00 | 0,88 | 1,57 | 0,00 | 1,05 |
| Netherlands | 0,79 | 0,80 | 0,93 | 1,07 | 2,62 | 2,17 | 1,79 | 1,53 | 0,88 | 0,75 | 1,05 | 0,00 |



Medium term strategy tree diagramme



Long term strategy tree diagramme










Table 11 : Consumption of food in percentage of total consumption

| | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| EUR15 | 16,8 | 16,4 | 15,9 | 15,3 | 15,1 | 15 | 14,6 | | | |
| B | 17,9 | 17,7 | 17 | 16,5 | 15,8 | 15,5 | 15,3 | 14,5 | 14 | 13,4 |
| DK | 16 | 15,4 | 15 | 15,2 | 15,3 | 14,8 | 14,8 | 15 | 14,6 | 14,1 |
| D | 13,1 | 12,9 | 12,6 | 12,3 | 12,4 | 12,2 | 11,8 | 11,4 | 11 | 10,6 |
| EL | 32,9 | 32,3 | 31,9 | 30,8 | 31,1 | 30,3 | 29,6 | 28,4 | 28,3 | |
| E | 21,5 | 21,3 | 20,2 | 19,2 | 18,7 | 18,5 | 17,7 | 15,2 | | |
| F | 16,8 | 16,6 | 16,2 | 15,9 | 15,6 | 15,4 | 15,2 | 14,7 | 14,4 | 14,1 |
| IRL | 22,6 | 20,6 | 20,6 | 19,4 | 19,4 | 18,6 | 18,6 | 18,6 | 18,4 | 17,3 |
| I | 21,5 | 20,7 | 19,8 | 18,8 | 18,3 | 17,8 | 17,4 | 17,1 | 17,1 | 16,6 |
| L | 14,9 | 14,5 | 13,6 | 13 | 12,2 | 11,9 | 10,9 | | | |
| NL | 12,9 | 12,6 | 12,4 | 12,3 | 12,2 | 11,9 | 11,6 | 11,5 | 11,2 | 11,1 |
| A | 17 | 16,7 | 16,4 | 15,9 | 15,5 | 15,4 | 15,2 | 14,9 | 14,7 | 14,1 |
| P | 33 | 27,7 | 27,4 | 25,6 | 25,2 | 25,2 | 23,6 | | | |
| FIN | 19,6 | 19,3 | 18,3 | 17,4 | 16,6 | 16,2 | 16,3 | 16,3 | 16 | 15,7 |
| S | 18,2 | 18 | 17,2 | 16,7 | 16,4 | 16,1 | 15,1 | 14,3 | 14,4 | |
| UK | 13,5 | 13 | 12,4 | 11,7 | 11,4 | 11,4 | 11,5 | 11,3 | 10,9 | 10,6 |




Table 12 : Percentage of households having a car, 1994

| | have a car | cannot afford a car | do not have any car for other reasons |
|-----|------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| B | 77 | 7 | 16 |
| DK | 59 | 16 | 25 |
| D | 74 | 4 | 22 |
| EL | 56 | 24 | 20 |
| E | 68 | 16 | 16 |
| F | 78 | 7 | 15 |
| IRL | 65 | 18 | 17 |
| I | 77 | 4 | 19 |
| L | 83 | 4 | 13 |
| NL | 59 | 7 | 33 |
| P | 55 | 28 | 17 |
| UK | 69 | 12 | 19 |

source: Eurostat Yearbook '96




Table 13 : Percentage of young between 16 and 18 years old enrolled in schools and other educational institutions

| | |
|-------|----|
| P | 64 |
| EL | 66 |
| UK | 67 |
| E | 73 |
| A | 79 |
| EUR15 | 80 |
| DK | 81 |
| IRL | 87 |
| NL | 89 |
| FIN | 90 |
| D | 91 |
| F | 91 |
| S | 91 |
| B | 97 |




Table 14 : Length of compulsory schooling

| | First age | Full-time | Part-time |
|-----|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| B | 6 | 9 | 3 |
| DK | 7 | 9 | |
| D | 6 | 10 | 2 |
| GR | 5.5 | 9 | |
| E | 6 | 10 | |
| F | 6 | 10 | |
| IRL | 6 | 9 | |
| I | 6 | 8 | |
| L | 4 | 11 | |
| NL | 5 | 11 | 2 |
| A | 6 | 9 | 2 |
| P | 6 | 9 | |
| FIN | 7 | 9 | |
| S | 7 | 9 | |
| UK | 5 | 11 | |




Table 15 : Employment by sector in 1991

| | Agriculture | Industrie | Services |
|---------------|-------------|-----------|----------|
| BELGIQUE | 98 | 1051 | 2537 |
| DANEMARK | 149 | 724 | 1713 |
| ALLEMAGNE | 957 | 11190 | 16386 |
| GRECE | : | : | : |
| ESPAGNE | 1345 | 4168 | 7095 |
| FRANCE | 1257 | 6424 | 14106 |
| IRLANDE | 154 | 322 | 633 |
| ITALIE | 1823 | : | 12672 |
| LUXEMBOURG | : | : | : |
| PAYS-BAS | 293 | 1645 | 4459 |
| PORTUGAL | 799 | 1600 | 2207 |
| GREAT BRITAIN | 567 | 7147 | 17222 |
| AUTRICHE | 256 | 1284 | 1923 |
| FINLANDE | 198 | 682 | 1448 |
| SUEDE | 143 | 1250 | 3031 |




Table 16 : Employment by sector in 1994

| | Agriculture | Industrie | Services |
|---------------|-------------|-----------|----------|
| BELGIQUE | 108 | 1082 | 2558 |
| DANEMARK | 127 | 670 | 1728 |
| ALLEMAGNE | 1171 | 13261 | 21408 |
| GRECE | 788 | 894 | 2104 |
| ESPAGNE | 1164 | 3530 | 7034 |
| FRANCE | 1128 | 5830 | 14750 |
| IRLANDE | 151 | 335 | 716 |
| ITALIE | 1550 | 6429 | 12045 |
| LUXEMBOURG | 5 | 44 | 114 |
| PAYS-BAS | 262 | 1532 | 4769 |
| PORTUGAL | 522 | 1442 | 2476 |
| GREAT BRITAIN | 534 | 7087 | 17890 |
| AUTRICHE | 266 | 1236 | 2206 |
| FINLANDE | 171 | 541 | 1326 |
| SUEDE | 139 | 980 | 2817 |




Table 17 : Percentage of employment by sector in 1991

| | Agriculture | Industrie | Services |
|---------------|-------------|-----------|----------|
| BELGIQUE | 2,66 | 28,51 | 68,83 |
| DANEMARK | 5,76 | 28,00 | 66,24 |
| ALLEMAGNE | 3,35 | 39,22 | 57,43 |
| GRECE | : | : | : |
| ESPAGNE | 10,67 | 33,06 | 56,27 |
| FRANCE | 5,77 | 29,49 | 64,75 |
| IRLANDE | 13,89 | 29,04 | 57,08 |
| ITALIE | : | : | : |
| LUXEMBOURG | : | : | : |
| PAYS-BAS | 4,58 | 25,72 | 69,70 |
| PORTUGAL | 17,35 | 34,74 | 47,92 |
| GREAT BRITAIN | 2,27 | 28,66 | 69,06 |
| AUTRICHE | 7,39 | 37,08 | 55,53 |
| FINLANDE | 8,51 | 29,30 | 62,20 |
| SUEDE | 3,23 | 28,25 | 68,51 |




Table 18 : Percentage of employment by sector in 1994

| | Agriculture | Industrie | Services |
|---------------|-------------|-----------|----------|
| BELGIQUE | 3,00 | 29,00 | 68,00 |
| DANEMARK | 5,00 | 26,00 | 68,00 |
| ALLEMAGNE | 3,00 | 37,00 | 60,00 |
| GRECE | 21,00 | 24,00 | 56,00 |
| ESPAGNE | 10,00 | 30,00 | 60,00 |
| FRANCE | 5,00 | 27,00 | 68,00 |
| IRLANDE | 13,00 | 28,00 | 59,00 |
| ITALIE | 8,00 | 32,00 | 60,00 |
| LUXEMBOURG | 3,00 | 27,00 | 70,00 |
| PAYS-BAS | 4,00 | 23,00 | 71,00 |
| PORTUGAL | 12,00 | 32,00 | 56,00 |
| GREAT BRITAIN | 2,00 | 28,00 | 70,00 |
| AUTRICHE | 7,00 | 33,00 | 59,00 |
| FINLANDE | 8,00 | 27,00 | 65,00 |
| SUEDE | 4,00 | 25,00 | 72,00 |





Table 19 : Main telephone lines¹ in operation per 100 inhabitants

| | 1994 | 1990 | 1985 | 1980 |
|----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| United-Kingdom | 48,55 | 44,13 | 38,20 | 31,42 |
| Sweden | 67,96 | 68,34 | 62,78 | 58,00 |
| Spain | 37,51 | 32,44 | 24,31 | 19,34 |
| Portugal | 34,78 | 24,04 | 13,99 | 10,13 |
| Netherlands | 50,90 | 46,42 | 40,18 | 34,57 |
| Luxemburg | 54,96 | 48,11 | 42,04 | 36,25 |
| Italy | 42,90 | 39,40 | 30,74 | 23,07 |
| Ireland | 34,61 | 28,04 | 19,86 | 14,20 |
| Greece | 47,73 | 38,86 | 31,37 | 23,55 |
| Germany | 47,65 | 40,19 | 32,69 | 26,22 |
| France | 54,58 | 49,50 | 41,66 | 29,51 |
| Finland | 55,05 | 53,55 | 44,65 | 36,38 |
| Denmark | 60,00 | 56,64 | 49,73 | 43,45 |
| Belgium | 44,75 | 39,25 | 31,05 | 25,01 |
| Austria | 45,85 | 41,70 | 36,02 | 29,02 |
| EUR-15 | 47,38 | 42,07 | 34,50 | 27,19 |

Source: ITU, EUROSTAT, OECD, Communication indicators for major economies.



¹ A main line is a telephone line connecting the subscriber's terminal equipment (telephone set, facsimile machine) to the public switched network and which has a dedicated port in telephone exchange.

Table 20 : Personal computers per 100 inhabitants

| | 1994 | 1993 | 1992 | 1991 | 1990 |
|----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| EUR15 | 11,00 | 9,69 | 8,66 | 7,46 | 6,44 |
| Austria | 10,59 | 9,26 | 8,21 | 7,04 | 6,21 |
| Belgium | 13,84 | 12,49 | 11,15 | 10,00 | 8,83 |
| Denmark | 21,13 | 17,92 | 15,47 | 13,39 | 11,48 |
| Finland | 15,72 | 14,21 | 12,89 | 11,37 | 10,03 |
| France | 10,10 | 9,24 | 8,47 | 7,90 | 7,28 |
| Germany | 12,96 | 11,60 | 10,45 | 8,88 | 7,86 |
| Greece | 2,88 | 2,60 | 2,23 | 1,95 | 1,77 |
| Ireland | 13,96 | 12,88 | 12,10 | 11,35 | 10,55 |
| Italy | 7,20 | 6,14 | 5,45 | 4,58 | 3,70 |
| Luxembourg | . | . | . | . | . |
| Netherlands | 15,60 | 13,67 | 14,69 | 12,94 | 11,30 |
| Portugal | 3,53 | 3,24 | 3,04 | 2,84 | 2,63 |
| Spain | 7,02 | 6,14 | 5,10 | 3,96 | 2,91 |
| Sweden | 18,79 | 16,75 | 14,88 | 13,11 | 11,57 |
| United Kingdom | 14,04 | 11,93 | 9,98 | 8,27 | 6,88 |

Source: ITU, EUROSTAT, OECD, Communication indicators for major economies.

