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PATTERNS OF CIVIL SOCIETY AFTER  
AUTHORITARIANISM: A COMPARISON OF  
PORTUGAL AND SPAIN, 1970s-2000s  
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## ABSTRACT

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In this paper we argue that patterns of civil society in post-authoritarian democracies are the result of divergent pathways to democracy. Through a comparison of contemporary Portugal (social revolution) and Spain (reform), we show that revolutionary pathways to democracy have a positive impact on the self-organizing abilities of popular groups, thus also contributing to a higher quality of democracy. There are three mechanisms in social revolutionary processes that contribute to this. The first stems from the fact that the masses are the key actor in the revolutionary transformation process, with the power to shape (at least partially) the new rules and institutions of the emerging democratic regime. This results in greater legal recognition and institutional embeddedness between civil society organizations and the state, making it easier, in turn, for resources to be transferred to those organizations. Secondly, as a result of changes to the social and economic structure, revolutions engender more egalitarian societies. Likewise, citizens are given more resources and capacities for collective action. Finally, revolutions tend to crystalize a political culture between elites and the masses in which the principles of egalitarian participation and social change through the action of the people are accepted. This all leads to greater opportunities, resources and legitimacy for the civic action of the common people during the subsequent democratic regime.

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## 1. Introduction

The relationship between civil society and democracy is one of the founding themes of contemporary social science. Although it has not always been the case that a strong and developed civil society aids the consolidation of democratic regimes (Berman, 1997; Riley, 2010; Varshney, 2002), it is nonetheless also true that, at least since Tocqueville, many positive correlations have been noted (Tocqueville, 1994). There are numerous ways in which civil society may contribute towards democracy: the organization of and public competition between interests; the capacity to make government actions more accountable; the establishment of bonds of trust between citizens; and the enabling of a more inclusive, rational and deliberative public debate (Alagappa, 2004; Fishman, 2004; Fung, 2003; Habermas, 1989; Janoski, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Schmitter, 1996; Warren, 2001).

Nonetheless, as important as these factors may be, they are not sufficient to engender a higher quality democracy. If we accept the notion that the essential principle of a democratic society is political equality – the possibility for all groups and individuals to have the same opportunity to express their interests in the public arena and for these to have equal consideration on the part of the authorities – then the role of civil society must be evaluated accordingly. The quality of democracy is thus increased insofar as inequalities in voice, participation and organization of the social groups with the least resources are reduced (Dahl, 1982; Heller, 1996 and 2000; Rueschemeyer, 2005). In mass democracies and in complex societies, beset by wide structural inequalities based on income, wealth, gender,

race or religion, only through the capacity for collective organization can the interests of the common citizen and of those with the least resources – of those generally called the middle and working classes – be protected. From this standpoint, the existence of strong mass organizations (e.g.: unions, cooperative movements, professional associations, women's movements) that will represent the poor, the excluded, and unorganized majorities is essential to ensure that these groups are represented in a democratic regime (Collier and Handlin, 2009; Dahl, 2006; Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens 1997, pp. 324-328; Oxhorn, 2011; Roberts, 1998; Skocpol, 2003; Tilly, 2004, pp. 14-16; Tilly, 2007, p. 110).

This is even more important in post-authoritarian democracies, created in the wake of highly institutionalized, exclusionary and repressive dictatorial regimes. This includes not only countries which are “Third Wave” democratizers (1970s-1990s), such as the more recent democracies in Southern Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia, but also the democracies that followed World War II, such as Japan and Germany. All these societies are historically distinguished by high levels of economic, social and political inequality (Bernhard and Karakoc, 2007; Huber and Safford, 1995; Huber and Stephens, 2012; Karakoc, 2013; Mouzelis, 1995; Stepan, 1986; Ziblatt, 2008 and 2009). And, indeed, it is also in many of these societies that civil societies are weakest (Alagappa, 2004, p. 39; Howard 2002, 158; McDonough, Shin, Moisés, 1998, p. 922).

The causes for such demobilization are known. Police repression and political exclusion during the dictatorships made the creation of vast mass organizations very difficult outside the structures condoned by the regime. At best, only apolitical and local associations were allowed. Attempts to create wide collective organizations at the national scale, such as unions, met with such police and administrative obstacles and hindrances that they could only survive by creating clandestine informal support networks – which reinforced the localism of these organizations. After the transition, organizations that had appeared to be strong and able to mobilize at the na-

tional scale proved much weaker; shortly thereafter, they found it tremendously difficult to gather resources and to recruit and mobilize members to maintain national structures (Fishman, 1990; Oxhorn, 1995).

In addition, a civic culture of generalized suspicion, inherited from the authoritarian period, hampered the creation of horizontal and egalitarian ties between citizens and between different social groups and/or classes. The dictatorships also stimulated mistrust among individuals, as well as isolation and the feeling that only family and very close friends could be relied upon, making it that much more difficult to create collective enterprises which presupposed the establishment of ties between individuals from different social groups (Kubik, 2000). The aversion to associativism that can be found in many of the new democracies also stems from the fact that, during the authoritarian period, citizens were subject to compulsory enrollment in the regime's own associations. The experience of forcible enrollment in youth, labor or leisure organizations led to a sense that association was, above all, a means of control and repression (Schmitter, 1999a; Linz, 1975, pp. 306–310; for Latin American authoritarian regimes see O'Donnell, 1973, p. 49; Oxhorn, 1995a, pp. 257–58; Stepan, 1978, p. 112; Howard, 2002).

However, such hypotheses fail to explain variations in the development of a civil society representative of the middle and working classes present in post-authoritarian democracies. Focusing on the Portuguese and Spanish cases, we see how, despite countless similarities concerning political culture, type of previous non-democratic regime, timing and context of the transition, and duration of the democratic period, the civil societies formed in these countries during the democratic period (1970s–2000s) are radically different. Portuguese civil society became, in most kinds and fields of organizations (both social and political), more dense, institutionalized and organized. The model of civil society present in Portugal is much closer to the ideal of participatory democracy, whereas Spain has a much more demobilized civil society. What can explain these differences?

We argue that they are the result of highly

divergent pathways to democracy, social revolution in Portugal and reform in Spain. Although there has been much research on the relationship between modes of transition from authoritarianism and democratic consolidation (Ekiert and Kubik, 1998; Karl, 1990; Karl and Schmitter, 1991; Linz and Stepan, 1996; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Collier, 1999; Tarrow, 1995), far less is known about the effects of political transitions on the quality of democracies (but see Almeida, Branco, Fernandes, 2012; Anderson, 2010; Fishman 2010 and 2011; Schmitter, 1995). Specifically, we argue that a revolutionary pathway to democracy (Portugal) had a positive impact on the self-organizing abilities of working and middle-class groups, thus contributing to a higher quality of democracy. Social revolutions do not always lead to democratic regimes (on the causes of this variability see Slater, 2009). But they tend to institutionalize mechanisms that stimulate mass political and civic participation (Skocpol, 1997). Thus, democracies born of a revolutionary process tend to provide more opportunities and mechanisms for participation and civic inclusion of the masses in the political life of the nation (Anderson, 2010).

There are three mechanisms in social revolutionary processes that contribute to this effect. The first stems from the fact that the masses are the key actor in the revolutionary transformation process, with the power to shape (at least partially) the new rules and institutions of the emerging democratic regime. This results in greater legal recognition and institutional embeddedness between civil society organizations and the state, making it easier, in turn, for resources to be transferred to those organizations. Secondly, as a result of changes to the social and economic structure, revolutions engender more egalitarian societies. Likewise, citizens are given more resources and capacities for collective action. Finally, revolutions tend to crystalize a political culture between elites and the masses in which the principles of egalitarian participation and social change through the action of the people are accepted. This all leads to greater opportunities, resources and legitimacy for the civic action of the common

people during the subsequent democratic regime.

In a reformist pathway (Spain), however, not only is the regime change driven by the elites within the regime's structures, but these elites seek only purely political change in regime, giving no consideration to the democratization of the social and economic spheres (e.g. through the redistribution of agricultural property). This pathway is less auspicious for the consolidation of a strong civil society. First, social structures inherited from the former regime linger on, adapted to democratic institutions, but nonetheless oligarchic and egalitarian. Indeed, it is common in such circumstances, for clientelistic networks which reinforce the power of traditional elites to be expanded and democratized. Secondly, the new regime's institutions tend to function (e.g. adopting and implementing public policies) in a manner that is closed off from civil society. The legislation on civil society tends to be less liberal and public policy processes tend to be conducted separately, absent consultation and partnerships with civil society institutions. Finally, there is often a lasting culture of hierarchy and deference between government and citizens and between the elites and the common people. In essence, the authoritarian regime's institutional and cultural characteristics tend to remain, which, in time, results in fewer resources and opportunities for the expansion of a civil society that can represent working and middle class sectors.

We also propose a new typology of pathways to democracy. Although there are numerous typologies for transitions from authoritarianism, we believe they are insufficient when it comes to analyzing the relationship between the process of regime change and the quality of the democracy it engenders. Most focus on the classification of the manner in which the dictatorships ended or on their impact on the possibility of democratic consolidation of the emerging regime (for a critical evaluation see McGuire, 1995, pp. 194-195). The existing conceptual schemes concerning modes of transition are, in fact, equally applicable both to regimes that moved towards democracy and to those that took on new forms of authoritarianism. But they have not been defined in

terms of the quality of democracy. The conceptual map of modes of transition must be adapted to this issue. Thus, the universe of comparison must be limited to consolidated democracies, since it is to them alone that the issue of democratic quality applies. If one's aim is to analyze the quality of democracy, it makes more sense to speak in terms of pathways to democracy than transitions from authoritarianism.

To this end, we propose four ideal-types of pathways to democracy: reform (when the regime's power elites introduce institutional changes towards democracy); rebellion (pressure on the part of popular actors in civil society leads to the introduction of political and institutional changes which lead to the regime change); revolution from above (the power elites in the previous con-democratic context guide the regime transition and introduce both institutional and social and economic changes towards greater democratization); and social revolution (pressure from the popular actors in civil society leads to democratization, not only in the political and institutional structures, but also to democratizing changes in society and economy).

## **2. Patterns of Civil Society in Portugal and Spain, 1960s-2000s**

With the transition to democracy in the mid-1970s, Portugal and Spain both entered, for the first time in their history, into a period of lasting consolidated civic and associational freedom. During each regime's final years, but especially during the years of transition, internal transformations and the process of deconsolidation and collapse of the authoritarian regimes created a unique opportunity for the spontaneous mobilization of the common people and for the establishment of civic and associational freedoms. The years of transition in both countries showed high levels of participation, a wave of associational formation, the birth of social movements and the generalization of protest. They were also marked by high democratic hopes, with widespread sharing by popular actors of ideals and proposals of equalitarian and participatory de-

mocracy (Barreto, 1987; Bermeo, 1986; Branco and Fernandes, 2012; Cerezales, 2003; Ferreira, 1994; Fishman, 1990a and 2011; Graham and Wheeler, 1983; McDonough, Pina, Barnes, 1981; Muñoz, 2000; Pérez-Díaz, 1993; Prata, 1997; Radcliff, 2005a and 2005b; Pinto, 2008; Schmitter, 1995).

During the democratic period, however, the patterns of civil society and civic participation that arose in each country were rather different. By nearly all quantitative and qualitative measures of civil society, Portugal evinced a denser, more egalitarian and more institutionalized popular associativism, on the political as on the social and cultural levels, than Spain. Most reports show that both affiliation and participation in voluntary associations tends to be higher in Portugal. In comparison with Spain, Portugal approached a mass civil society pattern. Regarding one first measure – the percentage of the population enrolled in voluntary associations – Portugal has been, according to most national and international surveys, always ahead of Spain. According to the 1990 World Values Survey, 76.5 percent of Spanish citizens were not affiliated with any organization, while the same was true of only 64.2 percent of the Portuguese population. Laura Ulzurum's surveys also showed that the Portuguese have had a higher rate of enrollment: in 1987, it was 30.6 percent in Portugal and 19.1 percent in Spain; in 1993, 35.9 percent to Spain's 22.3 percent (Ulzurum, 2004, p. 425). Adult enrollment in multiple organizations has also been higher in Portugal: in the early 1990s, 43.6 percent of adults were members of more than one association, while in Spain the number was only 31.2 percent (Ulzurum, 2001, pp.14-15).

During the period of 1999-2002, Portugal and Spain showed, according to Morales and Mota, practically equal levels of enrollment in associations (43 percent and 42 percent, respectively). But the Portuguese were far more dedicated to participating in theirs (58 percent and 49 percent, respectively) (Morales and Mota, 2006, p. 80). Indeed, this has been true of the whole of the democratic period. In 1990, the percentage of members of associations that did volunteer work was higher in Portugal

in activities (34 percent and 32 percent), donations (35 percent and 23 percent) and volunteer work (22 percent and 16 percent) (Morales and Mota, 2006, p. 80). The trend continued in 2006, for an entire range of activities: participating in decisions and debates (57 percent and 40 percent), organizing and leading of meetings (25 percent and 14 percent), making public presentations (17 percent and 12 percent) and elaborating documents (16 percent and 15 percent) (Anduiza, Bonet, Morales, 2006, p. 270).

In Portugal, all kinds of working and middle class organizations, both social and political, have been stronger and denser. Although the Portuguese data for 1978 and 1984 refers both to affiliation and active participation (Bacalhau, Bruneau, 1978; 1984: Bruneau, T., McLeod, 1984) – which may inflate the strength of civil society when compared to Spain – most other surveys which measure membership and participation separately always put Portugal ahead of Spain.

Union density, for instance, is historically much greater in Portugal: 61 percent of the active population in 1975, while Spain in 1978 had only 0.9 percent. In 1990, the Spanish percentage had grown to 18 percent, while the Portuguese held at 32 percent. In 2000, the rate was 25.6 percent in Portugal (Royo 2002, pp. 152-153), while three years earlier in Spain it was 17 percent (Pérez-Díaz, 2000, p. 15). Concurrently, the adult population's rate of enrollment in unions is higher in Portugal: in 1978 and 1984, it was 31 percent and 12.9 percent, respectively (Bacalhau, Bruneau, 1978; Bruneau, T., McLeod, 1984); in Spain, in 1980 and 1985, it was 9 percent and 6.5 percent, respectively (Morales, Mota, 2006, p. 85). And in 2000, the enrollment levels were at 11 percent for Portugal and 7 percent for Spain (Villaverde Cabral, 2000, p. 136).

Affiliation and involvement in sports and leisure associations has also been higher in Portugal. For the early decades of democracy, it was 39.7 percent in 1978 in Portugal and 14 percent in Spain in 1980; and 50.4 percent in 1984 in Portugal and 10 percent in Spain (Bacalhau, Bruneau, 1978; 1984: Bruneau, T., McLeod, 1984; Morales, Mota,

2006, p. 85). According to the 1990 World Values Survey, 5.3 percent of Spaniards and 13.6 percent of Portuguese were members of such organizations (WVS, 1990). For the years 2001-2003, the percentage remained higher in Portugal (8.2 percent) than in Spain (1.5 percent) (Viegas and Santos, 2010, p. 127). Cultural associations also found it easier to recruit and mobilize people for their activities in Portugal (14.5 percent in 1978 and 22.1 percent in 1984) than in Spain (5 percent in 1980 and 9 percent in 1985) (Bacalhau, Bruneau, 1978; 1984: Bruneau, T., McLeod, 1984; Morales, Mota, 2006, p. 85). During the 1990s, the membership rates were lower, but the trend remained: 7.5 percent for Portugal and 5.1 percent for Spain. Membership in professional organizations was also higher in Portugal throughout the democratic period: 6.2 percent in 1978, 10.2 percent in 1984, and 7 percent in the early 2000s. In Spain, the figures were as follows: 3.8 percent in 1980, 5 percent in 1985, 2.6 percent in 1990 and 3.5 percent in the early 2000s (Bacalhau, Bruneau, 1978; 1984: Bruneau, T., McLeod, 1984; Delicado, 2003, p. 235)

Finally, religious associations also gained more ground in Portugal. In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, 4.4 percent, 5.7 percent and 10.5 percent of the Portuguese population were members or participated in such organizations, while in Spain, the number enrolled amounted to just 3 percent (1980), 7 percent (1985) and 5.1 percent (1990) (Bacalhau, Bruneau, 1978; 1984: Bruneau, T., McLeod, 1984; Morales, Mota, 2006, p. 85; World Values Survey, 1990). And for the period 2001-2003, Portugal was also far ahead of Spain: 8.9 percent and 3.2 percent, respectively (Viegas and Santos, 2010, p. 127).

In brief, throughout most of the democratic period, Portugal presents a civil society that is more representative of the interests of the working and middle strata, and, at both the social and political level, far denser and stronger than Spain's. This conclusion is concurrent with that of Ulzurum, who also found greater levels of enrollment in social and political associations in Portugal (Ulzurum, 2001, pp. 18-20). And, although the 1999 World Values Survey data indicates a convergence between the

countries, the differing trend reappears in the 2000s, with a stronger civil society in Portugal. As Viegas and Santos show, during the period 2001-2008, Portugal has higher enrollment rates in cultural, social assistance, religious, sports, parents, and residents associations (Viegas and Santos, 2010, p. 123).

This is especially intriguing, since throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Portugal's civil society was always less developed than Spain's. In Portugal and Spain the strength of civil society before and after democratization is not positively correlated. In Spain, between the World Wars (1933), there was one association for 1,556 citizens. In Portugal (1934), there was one for 6,436 (data on voluntary associations in Spain comes from Riley, 2010, p. 85; for Portugal see Martins, 1998, p. 94 and Schmitter, 1999a, p. 115; population levels for Spain come from Shubert, 1999, p. 41, and for Portugal from Cascão, 1993, p. 425). The same difference between the two countries can also be noted for the last years of the dictatorships. A survey taken in Portugal in 1973 showed that only 1 percent of the population believed that organizing a formal group was a worthwhile way to influence the government (IPOPE, 1973, p. 94). Moreover, although working classes suffered mandatory affiliation in the official unions (*sindicatos*), the formation of corporatist organizations was a slow process. Many parishes (*freguesias*) simply lacked these institutions. In 1967, thirty-four years after the foundation of the authoritarian regime, 70 percent of the parishes did not have *Casas do Povo* (Bermeo, 1986, pp. 18-20). Portugal was considered a desert of voluntary associations.

Inversely, in Spain there was a wave of associational formation since late 1960s. Many were actively sponsored by the regime, like local associations of *cabezas de familia* (heads of household) and *amas de casa* (housewives). In 1976, there were more than 4,000 of these local family associations (Radcliff, 2005b, pp. 11-15). The Church supported associations, too, especially to counteract the hardliners of the regime. Finally, starting in the late 1960s, workers' and urban social movements grew enormously and showed very high ca



capacity for mobilization (Castells, 1983; Fishman, 1990). Whereas in Portugal worker and urban protest was quite quiescent, in Spain 1,500,000 hours were lost to strikes in 1966 alone and 14,500,000 in 1975 (Maravall and Santamaría, 1986, p. 77). Moreover, the Spanish regime was more pluralistic than the Portuguese, with a sharper ideological differentiation and competition between factions and organized groups in the regime (especially the Catholics and the Falangists), which since the late 1960s, actively sponsored civil society organizations as a strategy for achieving power and influence in society and in the regime (Linz, 1964 and 1973; Tusell, 1996, pp. 193, 278).

Recent research on the development of civil society in the recent democracies of central and Eastern Europe has highlighted the effect of legacies from the distant past. Ekiert and Foa, for instance, argue that whether new democracies in this area during the 19th century were part of the Russian or Habsburg empires explains differences found today. Those countries which belonged to the Habsburg Empire have a denser and more participative civil society, and a civic culture that is far more liberal than the countries formerly integrated in the Russian empire (Ekiert and Foa, 2010). However, the level of comparison used by the authors is that of areas, rather than countries, which, since several countries are aggregated in each geographical area, makes it difficult to know if a comparison between countries within the same geographical area could lead to some other interpretation, in which the type of pathway to democracy might take on a different role.

In short, levels of development of associational life before and during the authoritarian period cannot explain the current differences between the two countries, since they were always higher in Spain. And the differences that place Portugal ahead of Spain begin to show from the 1970s on, during and after the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. I argue that different pathways to democracy, social revolution in Portugal, and reform in Spain, produced these different outcomes.

### 3. Pathways to Democracy: a Framework for Analysis

In the literature on democratization, the period of transition from authoritarianism has been given an enormous role as an explanatory factor in the possibility of consolidation of democracy (Karl, 1990, p. 277). Although scholars have argued that other factors besides the transition also shape the emerging democracy, there seems to be a consensus that the way transitions unfold will always exert some influence in the type and characteristics of the new democracies (Aguero, 1998, p. 391; Bratton and van de Walle, 1998, p. 10; Cesarini and Hite, 2004, p. 328; Di Palma, 1990, p. 123; Glenn, 2001, p. 193; Munck and Leff, 1999, p. 195; Przeworski, 1991). Since the main trait of the transition period is political uncertainty and fluidity about rules and institutions, the way these are settled and created will have major consequences for the future working of democracy, namely, by determining which groups will have privileged access to power and resources (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 6; Shain and Linz, 1995, p. 7).

The first theories on this issue focused, above all, on whether the transition would lead to a consolidated democracy or back to authoritarianism, either in some new form, or through the return to the previous non-democratic order. The main obstacles to the consolidation of democracy were the previous regime's more conservative factions, or hardliners, and the members of the state's repressive apparatus (the police and armed forces), who could, at any given moment, reverse the process of democratization. Thus, to keep these groups under control, allow them power of decision, and ensure that their interests and position would not be greatly affected were essential tasks for the democratizing coalitions. Most of all, it was crucial that these groups did not feel threatened by excessive popular pressures and demands (of redistribution; of political and civic rights; and especially of transitional justice) during the process

regime's elites negotiated the terms of the new regime with the democratic and moderate opposition, but in which popular participation was either kept at low levels or ignored. Bargains and pacts between elites were decisive for the survival of democracy (Encarnacion, 2003; Karl and Schmitter, 1991; Munck and Leff, 1997, p. 347; Haggard and Kaufman, 1999, p. 75; for a revision, see Valenzuela, 2011). Masses could be mobilized, if at all, only in crucial moments of the transition, just momentarily to reinforce the pro-democracy coalition (Valenzuela, 1989).

The first typologies of transition were designed to capture precisely these dynamics. Granted, Karl also reflected on the quality of these new democracies, when she argued that, although pacts among elites were essential for democratic consolidation, the price of such a transition would be collusion between elites and a scarcely competitive regime, in which political inequality and corruption would tend to prosper (Karl, 1990). All successful new democracies would have to pay the cost of low quality in order to consolidate. However, this approach presented some problems when applied to the study of the quality of democratic regimes, as it failed to take into account the possibility of variations in quality or depth of new democracies.

In fact, a considerable body of research shows that, in new democracies, there is a great deal of variation in several dimensions of democratic quality: types of welfare-state, levels of corruption, parliamentary powers, accountability, human rights, participatory governance and development of civil society (Alagappa, 2004; Anderson, 2010; Ekiert, 2003; Elster, Offe and Preuss, 1998; Huber and Stephens, 2012; Mainwaring and Scully, 2010; O'Donnell, 2007; Ekiert and Hanson, 2003). Yet, using the old models, one cannot explain these variations.

Furthermore, research has shown that not only can mass based transitions help to consolidate democracies (McFaul, 2002), but revolutionary transitions have proved better for augmenting the quality of democracy. First, a peaceful and civil political culture can be brought about by widespread

popular mobilization, collective protest and autonomous citizens' actions (Roberts and Garton-Ash, 2011; Della Porta, 2012). Revolutionary transitions tend to be more peaceful than in the past, as in what Goodwin calls revolutionary reform social movements (Goodwin, 2001, p. 10). It is not correct to argue that revolutions are inherently violent. If some revolutions or popular based transitions have been characterized by widespread violence (e.g. Romania, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Philippines and South Africa), many others were peaceful (e.g. Portugal, Czech Republic, East Germany, Indonesia in 1998, Poland, and South Korea in 1987) (Bunce, 2002, pp. 70-76; Goodwin, 2001, p. 287; Teorell, 2010; p. 115; Thompson, 2004, p. 5; see also Weinstein, 2007). Moreover, many pathways of democratization through pacts, such as the Spanish, were more violent than many other mass-based transitions (Huntington, 1991, pp. 357-359). And in established democracies which went through non-revolutionary pathways to democracy, there was also widespread use of violence by civil society actors (Della Porta, 1995). In this sense, the consolidation and stabilization of democracy, in so far as it depends on the creation of a peaceful and civic political culture, can best be fostered by transitions in which citizens and protest movements play a large role.

Secondly, research has also shown that social revolution is a pathway that leads to the creation of deeper democratic regimes and civil societies. This is noted by Anderson, who showed that social capital and civic engagement have been higher in post-revolutionary democracies, like Nicaragua (Anderson, 2010). In the same mold, Viterna and Fallon, argue that gender equality is advanced by transitions in which the masses are able to make a radical break with the institutions and culture of the dictatorship (Viterna and Fallon, 2008). Goodwin and Foran have suggested that democracies born out of revolution, as in the case of Nicaragua, have more progressive welfare states, land distribution, and educational policies (Foran and Goodwin, 1993). For the Portuguese case specifically, Bermeo noted how agrarian cooperatives born of revolu-

tionary land occupations and controlled by the workers became much more efficient than cooperatives which were not under workers' control (Bermeo, 1986, pp. 188 ff.). Finally, the path-breaking work of Robert Fishman has shown that its social revolutionary path from authoritarianism to democracy made Portugal a country where political equality is taken more seriously, elites are more open to the excluded and to popular interests and demands, and policies for the poor and working classes are more egalitarian (employment, housing and labor market policies) (Fishman, 2010; Fishman, 2011, pp. 1–2, 7–12).

What is needed, then, is to establish a framework that can capture the relationships between post-authoritarian democratization processes and the quality of subsequent democracies (on this topic see Della Porta, 2012). The many theories of contemporary democracy have focused on two aspects, which can be combined so as to come to a new understanding of the effects of democratization processes. The first concerns the origins of democracy, namely, whether the transition processes are led by the masses – by popular actors from the civil society, through collective action and protest –, or whether the previous regime's elites are the ones who define the terms and pace of the regime-change process (Bendix, 1996; Collier, 1999; Dahl, 1971; Higley and Gunther, 1995; Markoff, 1996, pp. 22-26; Schmitter and Karl, 1991; Rustow, 1970; Ziblatt, 2006). Although it has been established that democracy may emerge both through pressures from below and from above, by elite initiatives, the impact of these two processes upon the quality of democracy is yet to be analyzed. If the essential principle of a high-quality democracy is that of political equality, then it is eminently reasonable to suppose that transitions in which the masses are the principal driver – not only through collective action, organized in political parties and associations, but through spontaneous movements, revolts, semi-organized resistance, and transgressive and illegal acts – lead to democracies that are more sensitive and open to the interests of popular groups (Bernhard, 2012, p. 119; Bunce, 2003, pp. 170-171; Collier, 1999, pp. 8-12, 16-17; Stepan, 1986; Tilly, 2007, p. 24; Wood, 2001).

From this standpoint, both old and recent processes of democratization present a great deal of variation. There is France, in 1944-46, where an alliance of disparate groups to resist the German occupation, accompanied by the multiplication of spontaneous popular revolts led to the creation of the Fourth Republic. But also the Portuguese revolution of 1974, as well as the democratization processes of the late 1980s and early 1990s in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, the Philippines, South Korea, South Africa and El Salvador. In all of these cases, protest and the spontaneous or semi-organized mobilization of workers, students, religious groups, intellectuals and, in general, the middle classes made democratization inevitable (Schock, 2005; Thompson, 2004, p. 5; Wood, 2001 and 2005, pp. 210-211).

On the other hand, the path to democracy followed by Japan and Germany after WWII, by Colombia and Venezuela in the 1950s, and the more recent cases of Spain, Brazil, Greece, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria (Linz and Stepan, 1996), was initiated by the power elites in the previous non-democratic situation or regime. Such elites could either be military or civilian, national or foreign (e.g., during periods of military occupation following a defeat, as in Japan or Germany after 1945). What really matters for the quality of the emerging democracy is who controls the transition. Usually these elites will later call into negotiation the elites of the democratic oppositions. But deals and pacts with the opposition usually come at later stage.

The second aspect, which is always present in any democratization period, is the degree to which institutional changes are accompanied by changes that democratize the social and economic realms. Pathways to democracy are not just about changes in political institutions (towards universal suffrage, free and fair elections, parliamentary control of government, accountability mechanisms, rule of law, minority rights, and civic freedoms) (Dahl, 1971; Schmitter and Karl,

1996; Ziblatt, 2006) but are also about struggles over the distribution of material resources, symbols, and property. These struggles are democratic in the sense that they involve demands of change over the material conditions of life and calls for a redistribution or more equitable access to economic (e.g. income, wealth, land) and other resources (e.g. education) to the common people and subordinate groups (Herz, 1982 and Stepan, 1986, were the first to stress the importance of this dimension; more recent work includes Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Karl, 1990; Markoff, 1996, pp. 3-4; Stephens, 1989; Ziblatt, 2008; Yashar, 1997). This is a decisive element for the quality of democracy since, as recent research has shown, when structural inequality in resource distribution is very large, the institutional and formal rules of democratic competition are also negatively affected. For instance, a high concentration in land ownership is associated to high levels of electoral fraud and clientelism on the part of the elites – in other words, to a corruption of the democratic spirit of the formal and purely political and institutional rules in themselves (Ziblatt, 2008 and 2009). Measures of this type include land reform, industrial and workplace democracy, nationalization and public control of industry, purges of old regime officials, the creation of universalistic welfare policies (in pensions, subsidies, unemployment benefits, housing conditions) and education systems, corporatist policy-making and progressive taxation (Herz, 1982, pp. 283-284; Stepan, 1986; see also Fishman, 2010 and 2011; Heller, 1996, pp. 2-8; Schock, 2005, p. 9; Stephens, 1979; Wood, 2005, pp. 210-211; Yashar, 1997, pp. 103-105).

Democracies have varied in this dimension as well. Some, like Portugal in 1974-1975, France and Japan after 1945, and Nicaragua in the 1970s, have been able to transform their socioeconomic structures in a more egalitarian fashion (Bermeo, 1999, pp. 124-126; Fishman, 2010; Fishman, 2011, pp. 1–2, 7–12; Foran and Goodwin, 1993; Stepan, 1986). Others have failed to do so, and kept intact highly unequal patterns of land distribution and economic concentration. The Philippines, South Korea,

Karl, 1990, p. 277; Kim, 2004; Schock, 2005, p. 9; Thompson, 2004, p. 5; Wood, 2005, pp. 210-211).

Moreover, these two dimensions are independent, and do not always trend the same. In fact, a new typology of pathways to democracy can be generated by cross-tabulating these two dimensions (Table 1). Some democratization processes led by elites have involved radical changes in economic structure (Japan after 1945), while others have not (Spain after 1977). And some mass based democratization processes have been accompanied by deep societal changes (Portugal 1974-75), while others have not (South Korea in the late 1980s and early 1990s).

*Reform* is the pathway by which elites within the previous non-democratic regime or situation start the transition (Linz and Stepan, 1996, pp. 56-65). The typical case is Spain after 1977. After Franco's death in 1975, King Juan Carlos (head of state) and Adolfo Suarez (Prime-Minister), with the support of large segments of conservative and liberal factions within the regime, approved a law of political reform calling for free elections in 1977. At a later stage, communists and socialists were brought in to support this democratization process. But the consensus between the elites driving the transition was that only political reforms and changes would be implemented, not radical socioeconomic transformations (Colomer, 1991, p. 1297; Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 88; Fishman, 1990). Similar cases can be found in Taiwan (Higley, Huang, Lin, 1998) or Bulgaria where, according to Linz and Stepan, the regime «initiated and never lost control of the transition» (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 333).

When elites within the prior non-democratic regime or situation pilot a process of political, economic and social democratization, featuring profound socioeconomic changes in the direction of wider redistribution of resources, we call it, following the earlier path-breaking definition of Trimberger, revolution from above (Trimberger, 1978, p. 2). Although Trimberger held that only non-democratic regimes emerged from this path, we argue that democratic Japan after 1945 is a case of democratization through revolution from above: during the

period of American occupation, the restoration of civil liberties, establishment of a constitutional monarchy, women's equality and competitive elections was also accompanied by measures designed to improve the quality of democratic life by changing state and social structures. These included collective bargaining, the banning of authoritarian right-wing parties, purges in the state administration, and nationalization of firms which had supported the war. But the major change was land reform, whereby ownership of land was democratized, both by placing legal limits to the amount of land a farmer could own and through forced expropriation (Smith, 1994, pp. 62-63, 154-160).

The third pathway to democracy, following the work of Robert Fishman and Theda Skocpol, is social revolution: popular masses, whether semi-organized or acting spontaneously, revolt against the political regime and, through collective action, propose changes designed to radically change, in an egalitarian direction, the social structures (Fishman, 2011 and 2012; Skocpol, 1979). Portugal illustrates the clearest case: on April 25, 1974 a military coup organized by the left wing captain's organization Movimento das Forças Armadas - MFA (Armed Forces Movement) deposed the Estado Novo dictatorship (1933-1974). In its aftermath, a widespread wave of popular mobilization in all sectors of society pushed regime change not only in the direction of political democracy but also to democratize landowning patterns, the state apparatus, companies in the industrial and financial sectors and schools. In interaction with the elites, but most of the time autonomously from them, popular movements introduced deep political and social change (Bermeo, 1986; Fishman, 2010 and 2011; Maxwell, 1986; Pinto, 2001; Santos, 1992).

Finally, rebellion is a pathway to democracy guided mostly by the spontaneous mobilization of people in the streets, by mass action against the political order, but which stops short of attempting significant change in socioeconomic structures. Here, changes are circumscribed to political institutions and their leadership (Ekiert and Kubik, 1999; Huntington, 1996, p. 264; Wood, 2005). The clearest contemporary cases are South Korea and Czechoslovakia. In Korea, the regime was brought down in 1987 through

pressure from a highly militant and oppositional civil society, composed of a national alliance of social movements, students' organizations, unions, and religious groups (Kim, 2004, p. 139). Likewise, in the Czech Republic, in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin wall, the transition to democracy was provoked by the spontaneous insurgency of common people in the streets through demonstrations and strikes (students, workers, public employees) and in partial coordination with opposition groups like the Civic Forum and Public against Violence (Bernhard, 1993; Glenn, 2001; Linz and Stepan, 1996, pp. 111, 323-326).

**Table 1: Pathways to Democracy**

<b>Social &amp; Political</b>	Social Revolution (Portugal)	Rev. from Above (Japan)
<b>Domains of Transformation</b>		
<b>Political</b>	Rebellion (S.Korea)	Reform (Spain)
<b>Civil Society</b>		<b>Regime</b>
<b>Center of Transformation</b>		

In the remainder of this article we compare how pathways to democracy by reform (Spain) and by social revolution (Portugal) had a varying impact on the quality of associational life in the subsequent democratic regimes. Specifically, in Portugal the deep transformations in social and political structures implemented during the revolutionary period led, throughout the democratic regime, to a state-embedded, denser and empowered popular civil society. In Spain, by contrast, the pathway to democracy by reform led to a weak and disempowered popular and middle sectors' civil society.

#### **4. Democratization Pathways and Civil Society in Portugal and Spain, 1970s-2000s**

##### **4.1. Portugal**

Portugal's route to democracy began on April 25, 1974, with a coup by a group of young left-wing middle-rank military officers, called the

Armed Forces Movement (MFA), who deposed the authoritarian New State regime. In effect, the structural reasons for the Portuguese revolution fit neatly into the general theories of revolution: an exclusionary and highly repressive regime, riddled with intense elite conflicts, which collapsed under severe military and financial pressures (on the Portuguese case, the seminal work is Schmitter 1999c; see also Fernandes, 2007; on the causes of revolution see Goldstone, 2003, p. 82; Goodwin, 2001, pp. 47-49; Parsa, 2000, p. 11 and Skocpol, 1979)

The reasons for the coup were at once political and professional. Not only were the professional officers unhappy with the fact that they could be overtaken in promotions by non-career officers, but they believed victory in the colonial war was impossible. A war with no end in sight, for which the regime had no solution, and professional grievances combined to set off the 1974 coup (Maxwell, 1986, p. 110). In its political program, presented soon after the coup, the MFA proposed the creation of a democracy in Portugal (Rezola, 2008, p. 62).

The coup led to the formation of a series of provisional governments, composed of military and representatives of all parties (including the communists), until the first free elections, in April, 1975. But it also unleashed a wave of popular mobilization and associational building unprecedented in Portuguese history, a wave of informal and associative movements concerned with introducing changes and democratizing every aspect of social life. According to Santos, in the wake of the Estado Novo's collapse, there was an «explosion of the widest and deepest popular social movement of the post-war period» (Santos, 1992, p. 27). Between April 1974 and the end of the following year, Portugal went through what is called a social revolution.

A wide variety of associations and movements appeared: political, parents', youth, women's, environmental, neighborhood, unions and workers', cooperatives, farmers', and professional (Branco and Fernandes, 2012, pp. 4-6; Graham and Wheeler, 1983; Franco 2005, 13; Sousa 1994, 504-5; Eloy 1994, 334, 343-44). In major urban centers, neigh-

of housing conditions and local level democracy. The first neighborhood movement was created on April 29, 1974, when some 100 families living in shacks in the Lisbon area occupied vacant houses. A month later, around 2,000 houses all over the main urban centers (Lisbon and Oporto) had been occupied, and were run by elected neighborhood commissions (Ferreira and Pureza, 2002, pp. 107-109).

Leftist and center left students' groups like the Pro-National Unity Commission of Portuguese Students and the Students' Civic Service mobilized thousands of students during the summer of 1974 for campaigns to promote literacy, health education and community development for the poor rural and urban populations (Almeida, 2002, pp. 31-32; Oliveira, 2004). And in workplaces in general, between April and June of 1974, there was an enormous wave of strikes and a movement for the occupation of factories and the state apparatus. Through workers' commissions, popular groups acquired institutional recognition and established a system of control over issues like employment and working conditions (Bermeo, 1986, p. 60; Muñoz, 2000). In the countryside, historically an area of extreme land inequality (latifundia), oppression, poverty and clientelism, major peasant upsurges and land occupations occurred. Movements of landless workers occupied uncultivated lands and created collective farms run by cooperatives and unions (Barreto, 1987, p. 69). In 1975, union penetration in the southern latifundary districts of Beja and Évora was up to circa 60 percent of the agricultural labor force (Bermeo 1986, pp. 6, 44-46). In the North, small tenant farmers' organizations formed the Farmer's Movement (Movimento de Lavradores, MOLA) (Lucena and Gaspar 1992, pp. 139-41).

These movements promoted actions oriented towards the establishment of political democracy and the end of the dictatorship, but also the democratization of the state apparatus (bureaucracy in general, the army, companies, schools, hospitals), and of social and economic life. As Muñoz documented in his analysis of workers' movements and protest during the transition, 57 percent of the collective actions and frames of the workers' movement were utopian, transgressive and radical (illegal occupations of factories and companies) (Muñoz, 2000, p. 142). Also,

as Pinto showed, these movements were able to promote an extensive purge of the dictatorships' officials in the armed forces, local administration, the police, and civil service (Pinto, 2001). In sum, in the words of Kenneth Maxwell, popular social movements were able to eliminate the «old mechanisms of deference and social control» (Maxwell, 1986, p. 124).

Elites in the newly-founded parties and the military had mixed reactions to popular mobilization. The Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português, PCP) and its closest union confederation, the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (Confederação Geral de Trabalhadores Portugueses, CGTP), condemned the strikes; and there were some attempts by parts of the military to repress strikes. But soon these organizations connected with and opened up to popular mobilization, developing strong organizational direct and indirect links with the masses (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 54). Moreover, what emerged from the process was a general positive consensus about the revolution and towards ideals of equality and participatory democracy. All parties and movements, irrespective of other ideological differences, rejected the old regime and presented themselves as revolutionary. Antifascism and consensus about the creation of a participatory and socialist democracy became the ideological cement uniting all the new political and popular forces, both military and civilian (Rezola, 2008, pp. 296-306; on the role of antifascist ideology in the post-1945 democratic transitions see Linz, 1998, p. 34)

The military were the first agent of popular mobilization, thorough the MFA, creating units at the level of prefectures for the purpose of civic mobilization, indoctrination and deep societal transformation (Cerezales, 2003, p. 60; Maxwell, 1986, p. 124; Santos, 1992, pp. 60-63). The MFA's Program for Cultural Activism and Political Enlightenment became the ideological basis of several military-popular civic mobilization campaigns. Aiming to achieve «ample participation of the people in the life of the nation» through the national coordination of schools, local communities, squatter movements and «all cultural associations of the country», its objective was to go beyond simple electoral democracy and to create a participatory and egalitarian democracy (Almeida, 2002, p. 32; Correia, Soldado, and Marujo, n.d., pp. 17-18).

The MFA gradually evolved from a civic organization at the start of the transition to a revolutionary movement, under the banner Aliança Povo-MFA (MFA-People's alliance). It started by protecting and supporting peasants in the occupied lands and other poor people's movements. Between March and November of 1975, it strengthened its links to the PCP, creating the Council of the Revolution (Conselho da Revolução), a revolutionary committee which, in practice, ruled the country until November 1975 (Downs, 1983, p. 10)

The left and center parties also mobilized and created links with mass-based popular movements. The union movement became unitary under the CGTP, the single union confederation. With resources and support from the Ministry of Labor during the first provisional governments, it was able to expand throughout the country and include the more spontaneous workers' commissions and new unions that were being created (Barreto, 2005, pp. 253-256; see also Logan, 1983). By 1975, it covered at least 50 percent of the labor force (Bermeo, 1986, 60).

The newly-formed parties of the center and center-right also supported the revolution, adopting ideologies and outlooks that were far to the left of their counterparts abroad. The larger of these parties clearly rejected the dictatorship's legacy, calling itself Partido Social Democrata (PSD, Social Democratic Party). The PSD also became a mass party, with a structure encompassing the entire country and with close links to grassroots organizations (youth, women's). In the mid-1970s, in concert with the socialists, it created a new national union confederation, the UGT – União Geral de Trabalhadores (Morlino, 1998, p. 196). Even traditionalist and conservative institutions, such as the Church, accepted revolutionary objectives: some priests and bishops supported parties like the PSD and the Socialists, while others aligned with the extreme left; but all held as priorities of their public agenda issues like social inequality and unemployment (Hamman and Manuel, 1999; Morlino, 1998, p. 163).

As a result of this extreme mobilization linking elites and civil society during the revolutionary period, Portuguese civil society organizations became much more robust and came to play a much more important role in politics than their Spanish counterparts. In Portugal, it became common for agricultural and union organizations to be

in tune with partisan goals (Morlino, 1998, pp. 231) and for parties – both right and left – to rely upon civil society for purposes of electoral mobilization (development, housing, and professional organizations are particularly important) and policy and law-making (Cruz 1988, 109–19; Jalali, Silva and Silva, 2012, p. 69). At the level of contemporary mass attitudes Viegas and Santos also found that membership in associations in Portugal (especially unions, professional and recreational associations) is strongly influenced by party identification (Viegas and Santos, 2010, p. 135). Parties themselves became much stronger and more mobilizing than in Spain. Electoral turnout has been much higher in Portugal: in the mid-1970s it was 91 percent in Portugal (1975) and 76 percent in Spain (1977). Finally, levels of party identification and membership became also higher in Portugal. In 1989, only 30 percent of the adult population in Spain identified with a party; in Portugal 49 percent did (Gunter and Montero 2001, 92; Morlino, 1998, p. 169).

Wider popular mobilization and stronger elite-mass linkages during the transition also promoted more open institutions and laws, which in turn empowered civil society associations throughout the democratic period. The new legislation on freedom of association was very tolerant, the only restrictions being for associations that promoted violent acts or that espoused a fascist ideology. Administrative restrictions, and the possibility of government discretionary intervention in associational life (through the granting of licenses or juridical recognition that it serves the collective interest), which existed in the Spanish case, were suppressed (Mendes, 2008, pp. 30-31). Moreover, highly competitive, mass-based and left-oriented parties stimulated not only the creation of a powerful parliament, but also of one in which associations were consulted in law-making. Parliamentary reforms since the transition have strengthened the role of civil society organizations and citizens' initiatives. Petitions originating from citizens' movements only required one thousand signatures to be discussed in parliament. And it has been common practice for the parliament to call representatives of civil society to settle disputes and promote agreements. It is no wonder then that the number of petitions directed to parliament has grown (Leston-Bandeira, 2002, 150-154).

Moreover, because it was possible for mass action of popular civil society organizations during the transition to mold the state and society in a clearly radical and egalitarian direction, it was easier for these associations to become embedded in the new state regulations and networks of policy-making. Housing was recognized as a social right in the constitution and shanty-town and neighborhood associations received state recognition as participants of local democratic governance. With the creation of the public support programmes for poor neighborhoods during the revolution, neighborhood organizations were grouped in regional and city-wide commissions which worked with the authorities in the definition of budgetary priorities and in the implementation of policies related to housing, water distribution, sewerage, transportation, medical and childcare support (Downs, 1983; Portas and Gago, 1980, p. 238, Pinto, 2008, pp. 4-5; Cerezales, 2003, p. 104; Rodrigues and Stoer, 2000, pp. 51-52). But also in the fields of urban planning and environment, consultation with citizens' organizations became mandatory. In Lisbon alone, civil society associations were consulted in 78 percent of these policy initiatives (Mota, 2005, pp. 117-188).

In the countryside, the law of agrarian reform which ended the regime of latifundia in the south was approved on July 29, 1975 with the support of all major parties, except the small, right-wing Social and Democratic Center (Centro Democrático e Social, CDS). The area under the law covered 40 percent of the national territory; it would be managed in partnership between the State (through local centers of agrarian reform) and organizations representing the interests of landless workers and small producers, called Collective Production Units (Unidades Colectivas de Produção, or UCPs). These were responsible for the allocation of public credit and technical support to farmers, whereas unions were mandated to negotiate salaries, work conditions and subsidies with local state authorities and employers (Barreto, 1987, pp. 46-49, 69). Later on, in December 1976, local cooperatives and unions were reunited within a single state institution responsible for overseeing the cooperative sector (the Instituto Nacional do Sector Cooperativo, INSCOOP) and also given a role in the negotiation and allocation of credit, social security financing, and taxation (Barreto, 1987, p. 42; Bermeo, 1983, pp. 186-189).



Unions and workers' representative organizations were also inserted in policy partnerships with the state at the national level. Collective dismissals required the approval of the Ministry of Labor and consultations with the workers' unions (Garcia and Karakatsanis 2006, pp. 93-94). And the widespread sectoral, enterprise and frame agreements and bargaining between the state, the unions and the employers during the revolution, especially in the nationalized companies, became the framework through which national level corporatism was established in 1983 (Etchemendy, 2011, pp. 8-9, 15-16; Stoleroff, 1990). This national level body, rebaptized Social and Economic Council (Conselho Económico e Social, CES) in 1992, had equal representation of labor and capital. It dealt with labor, employment and economic policy-making, and although complete consensus has not been always the norm, antagonism was not widespread either (Mozzicafreddo, 1997, p. 78). The communist dominated CGTP signed most sectoral agreements and only fully opposed some of the national level agreements (Lucena and Gaspar, 1991, 876-78; Morlino, 1998, pp. 232-233, 277). Finally, the CES extended its competences to social policy, by including representatives of environmental and social welfare organizations (Mozzicafreddo, 1997, p. 78).

Since 1975, state local health services were expanded but also democratized, by allowing representatives of workers' and of local populations to take part in their management (Santos, 1992, p. 217). And religious associations and social welfare federations, like the União das Misericórdias Portuguesas, were recognized as government partners for the definition and delivery of universalistic or quasi-universalistic social policies in the fields of health, welfare, education, and housing (Hespanha et al., 2000, pp. 134-136). Accordingly, the State has financially supported these associations. And, in fact, state funding of the activities and services of these institutions is also higher in Portugal than in Spain (Franco et al., 2012, p. 27).

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#### 4.1. Spain

Spain's pathway to democracy was very different from Portugal's. After the killing of PM Carro Blanco in 1973 by the Basque nationalist organization ETA, the regime went into a crisis, alternating between cycles of liberalization (e.g. the more open statute of political associations, in the subsequent government of Arias Navarro) and repression by Franco's core hardliners. Although during this period civil society mobilization against the dictatorship was quite high (in 1974 alone, strikes grew 62 percent), the government was always in control of the pace of reforms. Only when Franco died, in November 1975, did the new head of State, King Juan Carlos, supported by reformists and technocrats in the regime declare himself in favor of a transition to democracy. Together with Adolfo Suárez, who replaced Arias Navarro as head of the government in July 1976, they dismantled Franco's single party, issued amnesties to political prisoners, and presided over the first free elections. Juan Carlos's greater control over the assembly made it possible to approve a law of political reform (October 1976), in which the assembly dissolved itself, thus clearing the way for democracy. It was only after this series of negotiations between the factions of the regime that Suarez and the King turned to the left and the democratic opposition. A series of negotiations in 1977 made possible the first free elections, won by Suarez' party, the UCD (Colomer, 1991; Fernandes, 2007, pp. 698-99; Linz and Stepan, 1996, pp. 87-114; Maravall and Santamaría, 1986, pp. 79-80)

Spain's pathway to democracy was not only guided from above, it was mainly oriented towards basic institutional and political change. The elites simply had no plan for altering the basic social and economic structures of society; nor was there any opportunity to be taken by popular sector civil society organizations. In order for the transition to be viable, Suarez had to convince the political and economic elites of the dictatorship that that they would be able to prosper in the new regime. The project of political reform was accepted only after the deputies (many of whom would be re-elected in the first free general elections in 1977) received guarantees of continuity and a general amnesty was extended to the officials of the dictatorship (Aguilar, 2001; Maravall and Santamaría, 1986, p. 83). At the levels of local politics, public administration, State schools, army, police, and the judiciary, the personnel of the dictatorship were left intact (Malefakis, 1982, p. 216). The economic elites, too, were reassured that the basic contours of the existing capitalist system would remain unchanged (Maravall and Santamaría, 1986, p. 83).

In the Moncloa pacts of 1977, the left (including the PCE and the PSOE) was forced, in order to be accepted in the new regime, to abandon many goals (among which, nationalization, the end of religious private education, and agrarian reform) and to cut its ties to popular social movements (Gunther, Montero, Botella, 2004, pp. 95, 239-241; Maravall and Santamaría, 1986, pp. 84-80). This inhibited the possibility for a mass civil society to develop in Spain. For instance, the urban neighborhood movements, which in the late 1960s and early 1970s were considered the largest of Western Europe, demobilized within a few years, mainly because the parties with which they were most connected (PSOE and PCE) demanded, in order to appease the right, that they tone down their radical and participatory demands (Castells, 1983, pp. 215, 261). In Madrid, by 1979 the PCE-PSOE coalition had depoliticized the movement and imposed a form of urban governance with almost no participation of neighborhood associations (Castells, 1983, pp. 224, 273-274; Hipscher, 1996, p. 291).

Moreover, this pathway of democratization reinforced a political culture within the elite in which technical depoliticization and traditionalistic values (e.g. deference towards authority and the monarchy) were combined (McDonough, Pina, Barnes, 1981, p. 54; McDonough, Pina, Barnes, 1984, pp. 659-660).

Technocrats were empowered within parties and governing teams, both in the right-wing UCD and the leftist PSOE (Gunther 1996, p. 15; Linz, 1975, pp. 266-73; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, pp. 46-47; Tarrow, 1995, pp. 219-21). Unlike in Portugal, policy-making was guided by the notions of austerity, budget control, and low salaries, inflation and public investment (Maravall and Santamaría, 1986, p. 86; Pérez-Díaz, 1996, pp. 49-50). This explains also why in Portugal, despite the fact that it is poorer and economically less developed, there has been a greater effort to create an egalitarian welfare state. For instance, expenses in education, health and social security as percentage of the GDP amounted, in the 2000s, to 26.9 percent in Portugal and 21.8 percent in Spain, although in the early 1970s, during the last years of the dictatorship, Spain invested more in welfare measures (Huber and Stephens, 2012, p. 209).

Institutionally, this policy-making style was supported by a very strong executive. Executive dominance has been much higher in Spain than in Portugal. The parliament had no authority to remove or to give votes of no confidence to particular members of the government. There have always been more laws from the government than from parliament, in contrast to Portugal. And policy priorities were defined mainly by the prime minister's inner core (Gunther 1996, 68-69; Gunther, Montero, Botella, 2004, p. 117; Morlino, 1998, pp. 64-65; Van Biezen, Hopkin, 2005, pp. 107-109).

Weak parliamentarization inhibited the development of regular and institutionalized links between parties and civil society, weakening, in the long run, both parties and voluntary associations. Political parties favored the mobilization of the electorate through personalistic and populist strategies, rather than ideological claims and grass-roots activation (Gunther, Montero, Botella, 2004, p. 95; Van Biezen, Hopkin, 2005, pp. 110-112). The communists had weak links to unions. The communist union, the Workers' Comissions (Comisiones Obreras, CC.OO), always maintained its autonomy from the Spanish Communist Party (Partido Comunista de España, PCE) (Fishman 1989, p. 19). And although, in 1986, the PCE formed the Izquierda Unida (United Left), an electoral front with other left groups and new social movements, it has always remained a very weak organization (Morlino, 1998, pp. 186-193). On the center-right, the UCD was unable to develop a

modern party with a unitary organization throughout the territory, and disintegrated after bitter factional struggles. The UCD became little more than a collection of personalities, unable to develop permanent links to societal organizations and interests, such as the church, Catholic peasants, and business interests. In 1982 the party split, with many joining the socialists and the more conservative going to smaller right-wing parties Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular) and the Social and Democratic Center (Centro Democrático y Social, CDS) (Pappas, 2001, pp. 250–251).

On the center-left, the PSOE became an electoral-professional party run by a small oligarchy, also unable to create ties with the workers' movement. This was even more paradoxical, since, historically, the Spanish socialists had had closer ties to the workers' movement (through the General Union of Workers or Unión General de Trabajadores-UGT) than the Portuguese socialists ever did. In the first years of the transition, the party statutes even required that PSOE members join the UGT. Still, the party as an organization became weak. It had very few members, and party functionaries and elected officials predominated over union leaders in the party's internal power struggles. Members of the UGT's national executive attended party congresses as guests, with no voting rights (Fishman, 1989 and 1990b).

Although the Federation of Rural Workers (Federación de Trabajadores de la Tierra, FTT-UGT) and the Unions of Rural Workers (Sindicatos de Obreros Agrícolas, SOAs), the rural workers' federations of the 1930s, were revitalized by the PSOE in 1977, they did not consolidate and expand as organizations. After 1982, the PSOE even allowed its militants to affiliate with the Unions of farmers and Cattle Breeders (Uniones de Agricultores y Ganaderos, UAGAs), which were actually closer to being organizations of landowners (Estrada 1984, 216). Since then, the PSOE has had better relationships with elite and employer organizations than with popular class groups (Morlino, 1998, pp. 229-231).

Social and economic policy-making became mainly the domain of direct state intervention and not consultative corporatist institutions, as in Portugal (Estrada 1984, 124). Although Spain was known for its *transición pactada* (pacted tran-

sition), on account of the series of agreements between October 1977 (the *Pactos de la Moncloa*) and the spring of 1981 (*Acuerdo Nacional de Empleo*, ANE – the National Employment Agreement), these pacts were mainly the work of political parties and never become institutionalized (Fishman, 1990b, pp. 215-217). An incomes policy agreement was achieved, but unions and employers' organizations did not participate directly in the negotiations. The national leaders of the unions voted on these policies in parliament as members of that body, rather than deal directly with the government (Hamann and Lucio, 2003, p. 63).

During the democratic period, unions usually were not consulted and had no impact on policy decisions (Gunther, 1996, pp. 68–69; Pérez-Díaz, 1999, p. 35). The main body for corporatist negotiation, the Economic and Social Council (Consejo Económico y Social, CES), was created in 1992 to promote cooperation among unions, business, and the government. But the CES could not “take binding decisions and its discussions” were “fundamentally different from the negotiation of the global pacts up to 1986” (Wozniak, 1991, p. 9). Unions, in particular, have been negatively affected by this, because in the absence of state support and encouragement, there are few incentives by which members could be recruited. Contrary to Portugal, most unions were unable to give their members such services as health plans, housing, and pension schemes (Hamann, 1998, pp. 430–35; on Portugal see Morlino, 1995, pp. 357–58 and Royo, 2002, pp. 152–53). Also, labor laws in Spain undermined the power of unions, since they made it easier to dismiss workers, whereas, in Portugal, employment could only be terminated by mutual consent, when a contract ended, or when there was just cause (Hamann, 1998, p. 430).

Related to the fact that there was hardly any recognition of voluntary associations as policy partners, few associations have achieved public status in Democratic Spain (Pérez-Díaz and Novo, 2003, pp. 110–12). State funding of welfare activities of third sector associations is lower than in Portugal (32 percent and 40 percent, respectively) (Franco, 2012, p. 21). In 1987, there were only twenty associations with public status; in 1988, twenty three; and, between 1993 and 1997, 157 (Mota, 1999, 58). Whatever fund-

ing existed, scholars agree that it was discretionary and episodic, and not based on universal and open criteria (Estrada, 1984, pp. 286 ff. and 322, 324).

Instead, associations developed clientelistic relationships with the State and the party in government. This tended to benefit mainly elite organizations. Employers and agrarian groups have kept a 'family relationship' with the public sector or personal links with deputies and ministers (Estrada, 1984, pp. 286 ff. and 322, 324; Gunther, 1996, pp. 68–69; Pérez-Díaz, 1999, p. 35). But after the transition there was also the consolidation of networks of mass clientelism. In the Southern region of Andalucía, Spanish socialists used rural unemployment benefits, channeled through the party machine and the UGT local branches, to exchange for electoral support. These benefits had been created during Francoism, and used by municipalities to fund public works to employ rural workers. But democratic governments expanded them to avoid rebellion in the south, first, during the transition, through unemployment commissions with union presence and later, after 1982, through local party officials and employers.

Although between the late 1970s and mid-1980s a peasants' movement for agrarian reform emerged, organized by the agrarian wings of the FTT and CCOO as well as by the Union of Rural Workers (Sindicato de Obreros del Campo, SOC), and with ties to the recently-formed regionalist Andalusian Labor Party, it achieved only some media attention. Land occupations were very few, and the amount of land and material benefits given to rural workers was considered a failure (Herrera and Markoff, 2011, pp. 465, 468). This has prevented the development of modern cooperatives and rural workers' associations in Southern Spain (Watson, 2008; Robles-Egea and Aceituno-Nunes, 2012).

Finally, Spanish civil society was further disempowered because many of the old legal restrictions of the dictatorship's legislation of freedom of association continued during democracy. Although the 1978 constitution consecrated the principle of freedom of association, it maintained the requirement of a *declaración de utilidade pública* (declaration of public utility), granted through very discretionary mechanisms; this depended on the council of ministers, and it was reserved only for associations that were deemed to promote welfare, education, culture, and sports. Not only did these legal criteria exclude po-

litical or professional associations, they also allowed the State to dissolve associations if the authorities considered their aims or the actions of their members (even when not acting during organization's activities) to be a criminal «offense» (*delito*). As this was not clearly typified in the law, this legislation was then frequently used by the Spanish authorities to forbid associations or demonstrations that might be critical of the government of the day (Pérez-Díaz and Novo 2003, p. 109; Rivacoba and Tartièrre, 2004, pp. 14-17).

## 5. Conclusion

This article presented a new argument concerning the origins and types of civil societies in post-authoritarian democracies. We have argued that those democracies that are born of social revolution have a denser, more participative and egalitarian civil society than those of democracies that come out of a pathway of reform. Unlike other scholars, such as Jack Goldstone (2001, p. 169), we have found strong evidence that social revolution contributes to the quality of democracy, in so far as it promotes the consolidation and institutionalization of civic organizations representing the popular and middle sectors. Furthermore, we have found strong empirical support for questioning theorizations which hold that social revolutions lead to democracies that are weakly consolidated, either because the moderates are defeated by the radicals, or because the revolutionary goals of economic and social transformation are incompatible with the construction of a political democracy, based on elections and parliaments (Di Palma, 1990, pp. 68-70; Karl, 1990, p. 278; Karl and Schmitter, 1991, p. 274; Shain and Linz, 1995, p. 21). The Portuguese case falsifies those assertions, since radical social and economic transformations toward greater democratization were undertaken simultaneously with political democratization, i.e., while strengthening the power and centrality of parliaments and elections. Moreover, in so far as it is essential for democratic consolidation that there be mass organizations (associations and parties) that will serve as channels of communications between masses and elites, provide clear ideological alternatives, and serve as agencies for the socialization of values, mobilization and participation, (Hagopian, 1990, pp. 163-165; Mainwaring, 1999), then the Portuguese case shows higher quality and better con-

solidation than the Spanish. It is here – and not in Spain – that we find there is greater party identification, mass parties and higher electoral participation.

What are the consequences for the quality of democracy of the remaining two pathways to democracy, rebellion and revolution from above? We cannot provide, in these pages, an in-depth comparative study of these other cases, but we believe there is data suggesting that the pathway of social revolution also leads to more egalitarian democracies than the pathways of rebellion and revolution from above. However, these two pathways also leave specific dilemmas for the subsequent democracies.

In South Korea, we see how a pathway to democracy through rebellion in 1988 led to a civil society with a strong presence in the public arena, able to make strides towards greater equality. In this country, there is an immense variety of civic groups, which tend not only to form movements on the national scale (e.g. unions, religious, consumers', women's', farmers', and teachers' groups) but also collective platforms in which different groups and social interests combine to call for democratizing transformations in the system (Kim, 2004, pp. 148-149). The actions of such coalitions have resulted in the trials of former presidents of the authoritarian period and in promoting the creation of an egalitarian welfare-state, through the establishment of a basic income and the enactment of universalistic measures in pensions and healthcare. Moreover, these campaigns have imbued the population with strong feelings of political efficacy (Kim, 2004, p. 150; Lee, 2012, pp. 28-32).

At the same time, this is a highly confrontational and often violent civil society in its relations with the authorities (Kim, 2004, p. 152). This is due to the fact that democratization did not affect the economic sphere or the state's structures. The economy, the parties and the state were left in the hands of the old elites, rather than democratized. The campaigns to reform the economy, in which industrial companies are concentrated in the hands of a small nucleus of families (the so-called chaebol) came to naught. As Kim notes there was no «progress in economic democratization» (Kim, 2004, p. 157). Parties, too, remained clientelistic, regional-based organizations, very much based upon the elite of the previous dictatorship, and, especially, dependent on and financed by the powerful chaebol (Lee, 2012, p. 40). Unions were forbidden by law to fund and support the par-

ties, which greatly impedes popular access to the institutions responsible for public policies (Cotton, 1997, p. 98). And the parliamentary committees in charge of elaborating public policies in areas such as commerce, industrial relations, health and welfare always ignored civil society organizations (Kim, 2004, pp. 150-151). In South Korea, the transition placed social movements and voluntary organizations at the center of politics. But their relationship with the parties and the state is hostile and conflictual.

The pathway of revolution from above, exemplified by Japan after 1945, engendered a dense and participatory civil society during the democratic period (Tiedemann, 1982, p. 204). However, very rarely do civic movements of a national scale, such as those in South Korea or Portugal, emerge; groups tend to be small and local. Although institutionalized, supported by the political parties and embedded in the welfare system, Japanese civil society presented a relatively limited and conservative number of views (Pekannen, 2004, p. 224; Pharr, 2000, p. 190). The issue here is not so much violence as the alienation of a part of the regime's citizens, since many voices and interests are excluded from the highly conservative dominant values (Ōtake, 2000).

Once again, this type of civil society is a product of the pathway to democracy. The process of revolution from above created a new rural middle class, made up of family farmers who, thanks to land reform, had more resources for economic activity and for collective associational action, strongly linked to the dominant party the Liberal Democrats. However, this was not done under the aegis of an egalitarian and emancipating ideology, but under that of conservative, anti-leftist values (Krauss and Pekkanen, 2011, p. 14; Pharr, 2000, pp. 190-193).

Finally, there is a new set of questions raised by this inquiry. How can one explain each country's choice of pathway to democracy? How long do the legacies of the transition context endure? What other legacies or factors might gradually dilute the impact of the pathway to democracy taken by each society? Is the typology we sketched valid for other historical periods of democratization (e.g. interwar Europe), or does it only hold for post-authoritarian democracies? And, for the post-authoritarian democracies as a whole, is this

the most appropriate typology for the analysis of democratization processes in the context of highly inegalitarian societies, as historically found in Southern Europe, Latin America and Asia, or can it fruitfully be applied to the new democracies of Eastern Europe, where levels of social inequality have historically been lower? Finally, what is the relationship between consolidation and quality of democracy? These two processes have been treated separately, but our study seems to indicate that the causes of democratic consolidation and quality are the same. Accordingly, those democracies in which the principle of political equality is weaker tend also to find it more difficult to develop the organizations and institutions required for democratic consolidation. These are questions which must now be addressed in work to come.

## ENDNOTES

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1. In other democratic regimes a similar pattern can be observed. In Eastern Europe, according to Bernhard, civil society was strong both before and after the transition in Poland; weak before the transition, but then strong after in Czechoslovakia; and, in Hungary, weak before and after the transition. Alfred Stepan makes a similar argument for Latin America. See Bernhard, 1993 and Stepan, 1997.

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