



Assembly of Western European Union

DOCUMENT 1519

13 May 1996

FORTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION (Second Part)

The United States and security in Europe

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mr Blaauw, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee: Mr Baumel (Chairman); MM De Decker, Horn (Vice-Chairmen); MM Alloncle, Beaufays, Mrs Beer, MM Bianchi, Briane, Cox, Dees (Alternate: Blaauw), Mrs Fernández Ramiro, MM Hardy, Jacquat, La Russa, Legendre, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM López Valdivielso, Marten, Medeiros Ferreira, Lord Newall, MM Parisi, Pavlidis, Pereira Coelho, Petruccioli (Alternate: Guidi), Pottakis, Schloten, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr Solé Tura (Alternate: de Puig), Mrs Soutendijk van Appeldoorn (Alternate: van der Linden), Sir Keith Speed (Alternate: Marshall), MM Speroni, Valkeniers, Vázquez, Vrettos, Wolter, Zierer.*

Associate members: MM Gül (Alternate: Akcali), Gürel, Yurur.

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.

Draft Recommendation

on the United States and security in Europe

The Assembly,

- (i) Emphasising the need for a dialogue between members of the United States Congress and members of the Assembly of Western European Union on the organisation of security in Europe;
- (ii) Noting that the growing differences of opinion in the United States on its role in European security are giving rise to a somewhat confused debate and contradictory proposals, making it difficult for Europeans to draw proper conclusions;
- (iii) Noting a vacuum in leadership in the organisation of European security given that the United States is more hesitant about systematically taking the lead, while no clear European leadership has yet developed, partly because of Europe's ingrained habit of waiting for guidance from its transatlantic ally;
- (iv) Noting, however, that there can be little doubt about increasing United States reluctance to intervene in regional crises in Europe which are not covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty;
- (v) Recalling that the European NATO members with ground troops participating in UNPROFOR repeatedly warned against lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia;
- (vi) Considering that the United States policy of secretly letting Iran send arms and military instructors to Bosnian Government forces in breach of the arms embargo on the parties to the conflict in Bosnia, has created further tensions between the transatlantic allies;
- (vii) Aware that until now the United States and its NATO allies have officially maintained 20 December 1996 as the date of withdrawal of their troops from Bosnia;
- (viii) Recognising that European NATO members may feel it their responsibility to maintain the peace in Bosnia after the IFOR expiry date, but that they are reluctant to maintain a continued presence of their troops on Bosnian territory without the participation of US ground troops;
- (ix) Noting that a United States decision not to participate in such an operation might inflict serious damage on NATO solidarity and its cohesion;
- (x) Recognising the importance of a healthy European defence industry for the economies, security and defence of Europe;
- (xi) Welcoming the WEU Council's recognition in the Birmingham Declaration that enhanced cooperation in the field of European armaments will be an important part of a European security and defence identity;
- (xii) Recognising that specific cooperative transatlantic defence equipment programmes such as MEADS may be profitable and attractive for both sides from a technological, economic and political perspective;
- (xiii) Noting, however, that there is a continuing heavy imbalance between United States procurement of European armaments and European procurement of United States defence equipment;
- (xiv) Stressing that the United States should open its markets to European defence equipment and genuinely allow a two-way street if it wishes to continue to enjoy access on an equal footing to European defence equipment competitions in the future;
- (xv) Aware that the discussion on NATO's enlargement cannot be removed from the agenda if only because central European states consider membership of NATO as a panacea for all their security problems;
- (xvi) Noting, however, that no unequivocal answer has yet been found to the question of whether enlargement of NATO will enhance or diminish security in Europe, given that not all central European states can become members at the same time and that others will never become members, or might even deprive NATO of the reason for its existence if they were to become members;
- (xvii) Recalling Assembly Recommendation 585 on security and military cooperation in the Baltic Sea area;

- (xviii) Aware of the ongoing discussion on security in the Baltic Sea area which is taking place in different forums, such as the Baltic Assembly and the Nordic Council;
- (xix) Stressing that there is no clear urgency to enlarge NATO before the European Union because of the need to study in depth all aspects of this complicated process while also taking account of the fact that any Union enlargement to take in central European states will not take place before 2002;
- (xx) Welcoming the restructuring of NATO, which should also result in a streamlining of the present command structure and allow for more flexibility and mobility in reactions to possible crisis situations;
- (xxi) Welcoming the agreement on the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces concept, which is to be adopted at the North Atlantic Council's meeting in Berlin in June 1996;
- (xxii) Noting, however, that even with the implementation of the CJTF concept, there will be a grey zone in the organisation of Europe's security without obligations or guarantees in the event of emergencies not covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty;
- (xxiii) Noting that after political approval by the North Atlantic Council to provide NATO assets for a WEU- or European-led operation, the supporting commander, who will be a US officer, will have the right to control the execution of the operation through the assets which are being provided, including the right – in the event of a grave security crisis – to withdraw them before the operation is completed;
- (xxiv) Emphasising that the agreement now reached on CJTF provides Europe with an interim period to start developing and acquiring its own strategic assets in the fields of lift, logistics and C4I, if it seriously intends to develop its own security and defence identity;
- (xxv) Aware of the activities of the WEU Transatlantic Forum, including the summary report on the mission of the Portuguese Chair of the Transatlantic Forum to Ottawa and Washington on 6-10 February 1996,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue and intensify the activities of the WEU Transatlantic Forum, including the organisation of seminars and conferences both in the United States and in Europe, in order to intensify the dialogue on the security and defence of Europe between policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic;
2. Actively investigate the possibilities for further increasing the associate partners' involvement in WEU, in order to enhance European security in a wider context, in particular with regard to possible consequences of a future step-by-step enlargement of NATO;
3. Use the reprieve provided by the agreed implementation of CJTF to coordinate and accelerate preparations to start developing and acquiring Europe's own strategic assets in the fields of lift, logistics and C4I;
4. Draw up, in full and harmonious coordination with the European Union, NATO and the United States, the security arrangements which are needed to ensure a continuing and lasting peace in the Balkans.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr Blaauw, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The security situation in Europe is changing, and the same goes for transatlantic relations. Both in the United States and in Europe, the well-known terms of NATO jargon such as “the bedrock of Europe’s security”, “shared values and interests” and “the indivisibility of the security of the United States and Europe” are still commonly used. Is the meaning of these expressions still the same? The Europeans have slowly but steadily started to establish and develop a European security and defence identity and the United States, without casting doubt on its obligations under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, is gradually making it clear that there may be occasions when it might choose not to intervene and would leave it to the Europeans to act. Combined joint task forces have been established to enable Europeans to conduct military operations without the United States participating.

2. NATO is being restructured, and while this time-consuming process involving a great deal of effort is still under way, central European countries are knocking on its door to be admitted. All this could have been managed quietly and easily if there had been nothing else to trouble the minds of the allies. At the same time, however, a serious armed conflict erupted in former Yugoslavia, obliging both Europeans and Americans to respond and act. Their response and action were not always an example of allied cooperation and even produced mutual incriminations.

3. While there is a determination on both sides of the Atlantic to solve the many complicated issues in a true spirit of cooperation and understanding, one cannot fail to have the impression that the debate is taking place in an atmosphere of embarrassment in which neither the Americans nor the Europeans wish to address the real issues openly.

4. The present report is the result of the discussions the Defence Committee had during its recent visit to Washington and Norfolk in March 1996.

II. The restructuring of NATO’s command structures – a United States view

5. The collapse of the Berlin wall, the ensuing break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegra-

tion of the Soviet Union caused such radical changes in the security environment in Europe that it was quickly understood that a thorough adaptation of NATO to the new circumstances was essential if it were to remain relevant. The changed security environment made the political leadership of the Alliance decide to add new missions to the essential core functions of consultation and collective defence.

6. The new strategic concept, as agreed at the Rome summit meeting of 7 and 8 November 1991, reaffirmed the core functions, but added dialogue and cooperation with European non-NATO members as a new task. In addition, crisis management was also agreed as a new area of activity for NATO. Moreover, enhancement of the role and responsibilities of the European member states was considered an important basis for the transformation of the Alliance.

7. The NATO summit meeting in Brussels on 10-11 January 1994 endorsed the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTF) to make allied assets available to Europeans for conducting military operations in which the United States did not participate (see chapter III). It also endorsed the Partnership for Peace programme, offering European non-NATO states a wide range of possibilities for cooperation with NATO.

8. It is thought that rapid advances in technology and substantial reductions in the defence budgets of almost all NATO member states will make it necessary for the Organisation to carry out a thorough review of NATO’s command structure. The North Atlantic Council meeting to be held in Berlin on 3 June 1996 is expected to ask for this review, which should be completed by the end of the year. The review may ultimately lead to an agreement to have fewer levels of command and smaller headquarters. At the same time, the review may recommend greater flexibility and mobility and the ability to sustain more forces outside the NATO area.

9. In NATO, there is across-the-board consensus that the existing command structure is top-heavy, too expensive and incapable of accommodating a possible NATO enlargement. In order to meet present budget constraints, NATO commands will be reduced in number and spread over more countries, depending on how the enlargement progresses. There may also be a more regional approach to the Alliance, with its structure being divided over five regions, one being North

America, and Europe being divided into four regions: north-east, north-west, south-east and south-west. This would result in shorter communication lines and an improved decision-making process.

10. In negotiations on the implementation of the CJTF concept, France proposed the establishment of exclusively European commands and European "double-hatted" commanders – combining a NATO function with a WEU/EU function. In the French view, SACEUR, traditionally a US General, could be flanked by a European deputy who could at times act independently. The United States has always been and will remain highly critical of such proposals to "Europeanise" NATO, unless Europe can manage to establish a coherent policy- and decision-making structure.

11. In the framework of CJTF, it has been agreed, however, that some staff in NATO commands should have an additional responsibility that would allow them to detach themselves and reassemble as a European command in the event of a European or WEU-led operation. Obviously, the staff in question will be able to participate in exercises to train them to carry out their secondary responsibility.

12. The current command structure includes a total of 65 NATO military headquarters, comprising 2 major NATO commands, 8 major subordinate commands, 23 principal subordinate commands (PSCs) and 32 sub PSCs. Less than twenty of these headquarters receive joint NATO funding.

13. When the Committee met with SACLANT on 27 March 1996 in Norfolk, Virginia, General John J. Sheehan explained his views on the restructuring needed. He felt NATO should adhere to certain guiding principles. A strong transatlantic link should be maintained and renationalisation avoided. There should be a capability for out-of-area operations. The maintenance of an effective operational capability within a

streamlined command structure could be facilitated by the introduction of the concept of supported and supporting commanders, while there should be Alliance-wide management of key functional capabilities. The European security and defence identity should be developed within NATO, taking the abovementioned principles into account. The supported/supporting commander concept, one of the key elements in combined joint task forces, was tested during the recent exercises CMX 95 and Strong Resolve 95. It envisages making assets and capabilities of the Alliance available to a supported commander-in-chief.


14. The supported commander is defined as "a commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by higher authority". The supporting commander is "a commander who furnishes augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander". The supporting commander's task is to enhance the supported commander's capability to accomplish his mission by increasing his ability to focus on the assigned task and act decisively with confidence in the support he receives.

15. As an example, SACLANT reminded the Committee that, in his capacity as a supporting commander, he provided the Standing Naval Force Atlantic to SACEUR and AFSOUTH for operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic.

16. As regards the need for alliance-wide management of key assets, SACLANT argued that the establishment of a Commander-in-Chief Support (CINCSUP) in NATO's command structure would be the logical result of fully embracing the supporting commander concept.

17. CINCSUP should, in his view, be the single military commander controlling lift, command, control, communications, computer and intelligence (C4I), research centres and training facilities – the Alliance's key assets – with the help of his subordinate functional commands.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF SUPPORT



18. The present NATO command structure for C4I is not only excessively large and extremely expensive but is also not compatible with national systems or between NATO headquarters. In total 7 733 posts are dedicated to Communications and Informations Systems in order to support old,

manpower-intensive technology which has limited interoperability and is non-mobile.

19. According to SACLANT, a single subordinate commander for C4I could plan, coordinate and manage the C4I systems throughout the

Alliance. He would be better able to understand operational requirements of major NATO commands and represent and explain their needs to the member states, which are responsible for funding. Compatibility, interoperability and efficiency would be ensured.

20. Lift, or transportation, is another vital asset for providing a rapid response in crisis situations. At present, it is a purely national responsibility with no single allied commander in charge. Experience in Bosnia has demonstrated that even with extended planning times and serious coordination efforts, the fact that transportation assets are provided by different nations under national responsibility, leads to inefficiency and congestion at airfields and seaports. In SACLANT's view, general transportation responsibilities and planning should therefore be centralised under a CINCSUP subordinate command in order to make sure that commanders have the ability to move their rapid reaction forces and CJTF headquarters quickly both inside and outside their theatre of operations.

21. SACLANT went further by suggesting that the acquisition of an enabling core capability for lift would provide the initial rapid operational response in crises. This core capability would also provide lift capability immediately available for use in support of a European-led CJTF. If required, this core capability could subsequently be augmented from national sources.

22. In conclusion, it must be admitted that there is considerable room for improving and streamlining NATO command structures. In particular, the concept of supported and supporting commanders, combined with the establishment of Commander-in-Chief support for Alliance-wide management of key assets could lead to reduced costs, a more efficient command structure and enhanced availability of key Alliance assets in crisis situations. It is also recognised that the implementation of these concepts in combination with the CJTF concept would provide an essential contribution in enabling European-led forces to conduct a military operation without the participation of United States military forces.

23. On the other hand, it should be clearly noted that problems may arise if the supporting commander is a US officer. If it is agreed that the supporting officer should have the right to control or inspect both the aim and execution of the European-led operation through the assets which he is supposed to provide, the European security and defence identity would still be dependent on the United States, which controls the assets that are considered essential for European-led operations.

24. If Europe is really serious about the development of its security and defence identity, even within NATO, it should either start to develop and acquire its own assets, or insist on the supporting

commander in the NATO command structure being a European. Apparently, the latter option as proposed in the discussions over CJTF has been ruled out by the Americans. While this is regrettable, it is understandable that the Americans prefer to keep control over the unique and precious assets which they have paid for dearly.

25. It seems obvious that the Europeans have no choice other than to develop and acquire their own assets. The agreement now reached on CJTF provides them with an interim period to put their own house in order. For many years, Europe has ensured its security and defence fairly cheaply, because it has been able to rely on the United States for all possible emergencies. In the foreseeable future, it will still be able to rely on the Americans for North Atlantic Treaty Article 5 emergencies. For non-Article 5 emergencies, there is a non-Treaty-based grey zone. In such cases, either the United States may participate fully and on a voluntary basis in what can be called a NATO operation, or the North Atlantic Council may provide, also on a voluntary basis, CJTF for European-led operations. There are no obligations and no guarantees for these emergencies, but Europe has no choice but to accept this situation simply because it lacks the means to do otherwise.

26. On the other hand, nobody can deny that this inadequate security arrangement can only be accepted temporarily. Europe will have to meet the serious shortcomings in its security and defence by starting to develop and acquire its own strategic assets in the fields of lift, logistics and C4I, without delay, if it seriously intends to develop a European security and defence identity.

III. Combined joint task forces (CJTF)

27. At NATO's January 1994 summit meeting, it was "agreed to adapt further the Alliance's political and military structures to reflect both the full spectrum of its roles and the development of the emerging European security and defence identity, and endorse the concept of CJTF".

28. It was announced that the Council, with the advice of NATO military authorities and in coordination with WEU, would work on implementation of CJTF in such a way as to provide separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or WEU.

29. A CJTF headquarters has been defined as follows:

"... a deployable, multinational, multiservice Alliance headquarters of variable size, formed to command and control, as authorised, combined joint forces of NATO nations, and possibly non-NATO nations, for the purpose of conducting peace opera-

tions out-of-area. A CJTF could also be deployed for WEU-led operations."

30. The CJTF concept should enable the Europeans to have allied, and in particular US, assets at their disposal to conduct a military operation in which the United States does not participate. More specifically, the assets envisaged would relate to the areas of command, communications, intelligence, transport, logistics, etc.

31. The discussion on the CJTF implementation process went on for more than two years and for a long time it was in a stalemate without any progress being made on basic differences. In fact, CJTF was an occasion to discuss the Europeanisation of NATO in a barely disguised framework. For a long time progress in the discussions was blocked by differences of opinion between France and the United States over command and control of CJTF assets, and also over the question of how NATO's integrated military should be used to make the new concept work. A number of the problems regarding the implementation of CJTF have been discussed in recent Assembly reports (Documents 1457, 1468 and 1487).

32. To the relief of many, France and the United States sorted out their differences at the end of February 1996, paving the way for a full-scale agreement by experts on CJTF, which should be approved by the North Atlantic Council at its meeting on 3 June 1996 in Berlin.

33. It is important to note that the CJTF headquarters must be capable of commanding forces which are not part of the Alliance, while providing for the use of NATO assets in support of operations not under NATO command. It is intended to command and control medium-sized operations, including a landforce of corps size, a naval expanded task force and a comparable air component. CJTF headquarters can be land-based, sea-based or sea-based with a capability to go ashore.

34. Essential characteristics of CJTF headquarters are its ability to deploy rapidly, control non-NATO forces and manage all communications, including receiving and disseminating intelligence. It must also be capable of local protection and self-sufficiency for 30 days. The total size of such headquarters will be around 400 personnel, the exact composition and size of the individual staff sections being tailored to its specific mission. The support element and communications and information support group are estimated at an additional 500 and 800 personnel respectively.

35. In principle, CJTF headquarters will be formed from assets within the entire integrated military structure, according to a modular approach. On the other hand, it has been agreed to minimise the latter in order to achieve the greatest possible cohesion and effectiveness. The large majority of CJTF headquarters staff will be drawn from the

same headquarters. A few major NATO commands, major subordinate commands or joint multinational headquarters will therefore be designated as CJTF "core" headquarters with a CJTF nucleus staff being part of the peacetime personnel.

36. This nucleus staff, in which all principal staff functions would be represented, wears two hats in carrying out both NATO and CJTF tasks. It is a part of the "core" which can provide an immediate, functional staff capability for CJTF headquarters. Officers from NATO member states which do not participate in NATO's integrated military structure could be attached to such a "core" exclusively for CJTF operations. In the event of deployment of a CJTF headquarters for a specific operation, the nucleus staff will be supplemented by staff from other NATO headquarters and participating states. Within each staff section, one or two staff members would be designated as points of contact for CJTF matters. This "key nucleus staff" would be responsible for informing their "core" headquarters commander on CJTF matters, assist in generic planning, coordinate training of the entire nucleus staff and convey updated information on personnel and resources from their headquarters to the combined joint planning staff database. The nucleus staff would be under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff for CJTF matters (the only member of the nucleus staff not wearing two hats). To set up a CJTF headquarters, these "core" headquarters would be supplemented by modules from other headquarters.

37. After the Council's approval, new discussions will be needed to designate elements of headquarters (cores) and to prepare troops and equipment (modules) for use in operations. According to studies now in progress, three or four existing structures such as SHAPE in Mons (Belgium) or the headquarters of the European Corps in Strasbourg should receive "core" status.

38. In the framework of the compromise reached, the United States has agreed to France's request that CJTFs might sometimes operate under non-NATO commands, such as the headquarters of the European Corps in Strasbourg. The suitability of such headquarters would need to be certified by NATO, and, if necessary, NATO would provide assistance to upgrade them.

39. France, for its part, has agreed that CJTFs would require political approval from the North Atlantic Council. It has also agreed that NATO, having lent equipment for a CJTF, would, in the event of a grave security crisis, have the right to take it back before the mission was completed¹.

1. *The Financial Times*, 25 April 1996.

40. The United States has stipulated that CJTF assets should still be controlled by SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe). SACEUR would have the role of supporting commander, with the right to control or inspect both the objective and the execution of the operation through the assets he is supposed to provide to the Europeans. The upshot of this arrangement will be that through the CJTF, the United States will always have a veto on European military operations.

41. It is emphasised that prior planning, preparation and training will be essential to ensure the successful execution of CJTF operations.

42. A combined joint planning staff will be responsible for the direction, coordination and supervision of the planning tasks which are implemented at the military strategic level in support of the CJTF concept.

43. Early designation of means that are immediately available is intended to facilitate rapid establishment of a coalition as soon as Europeans demonstrate a common political will to resolve a conflict.

44. Contrary to what has been suggested by some, IFOR in its present form is not a forerunner of CJTF deployment because it is a military operation with full US participation, placed from the outset under NATO command. It could become a candidate for CJTF implementation if, after the envisaged withdrawal of US troops, the Europeans decided, in agreement with the signatories of the Dayton Accords, to stay on, using NATO assets for command, intelligence and logistics, for instance.

45. The CJTF concept has already been tested in different forms during exercises such as Strong Resolve 95 and CMX 95.

IV. NATO enlargement

46. At a summit meeting in Cracow in October 1991, the Presidents of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland adopted a declaration which recognised the dangers posed by the break-up of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and stated that their countries' security would be best served by integration in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). They urged full membership of NATO for all European countries.

47. NATO, which had started work on the establishment of a pan-European North Atlantic Cooperation Council, indicated that it was not prepared to entertain the notion of membership for the former Warsaw Pact countries. It maintained this position for some time, but the subject of enlargement nevertheless became part of its discussions.

48. In December 1992, Albania became the first former Warsaw Pact country to apply formally for NATO membership. Also, new appeals for early NATO membership from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were given the cold shoulder by the Organisation.

49. Meanwhile, Russia had begun to put pressure on NATO member states to delay admission of central and eastern European countries. In late September 1993, the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, wrote to leaders in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, warning that opening NATO membership to the former communist states of central and eastern Europe would constitute a violation of the 1990 Treaty on the Final Settlement on Germany.

50. The North Atlantic Council, meeting in Brussels in December 1993, endorsed the "Partnership for Peace" (PfP) concept offering bilateral cooperation to former member states of the Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet republics, but avoided promising them any firm security guarantees or timetable for NATO membership.

51. In a communiqué released after the NATO summit meeting in Brussels on 10-11 January 1994, the heads of state and of government reaffirmed that:

"the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area." They expected "and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to [the] East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe."

52. Meeting with leaders of the Visegrad group in Prague on 12 January 1994, President Clinton declared that "the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how."

53. Relations between NATO and Russia became steadily more complicated with Russia insisting upon special status within the PfP programme as a precondition for its participation, but it finally joined the programme in June 1994 without special status.

54. At the CSCE's biennial summit meeting held in Budapest on 5-6 December 1994, President Clinton and President Yeltsin expressed sharply differing views. President Clinton stressed the United States commitment to NATO enlargement but rejected any attempt to veto such enlargement by a state which was not a member of NATO. President Yeltsin made it clear that enlargement of

NATO to include former Warsaw Pact countries would be regarded as a threat to Russia.

55. The North Atlantic Council, meeting in Brussels on 1 December 1994, reaffirmed its commitment to enlargement, but carefully refrained from setting a timetable or naming new members. It approved a study "to determine ... the implications of membership", due to be completed by the end of 1995.

56. At the G-7 summit meeting in Moscow, the British Prime Minister, John Major, stated "I don't think there is any threatening aspect at all to NATO expansion – nor is there any great hurry about it."² Now that the allies have, for a variety of reasons, started to wonder whether there is any hurry over enlargement, NATO expansion may "suffer death by *ennui* over time"³.

57. Many arguments have been put forward by advocates and opponents of NATO enlargement and it may be useful to summarise them here, although the list is not exhaustive.

(a) *Arguments in favour of enlargement*

58. These fall into three separate groups. The first regards enlargement as a strategic response to possible adverse developments in eastern Europe. NATO expansion, it is said, would strengthen the military position of the West, which could be of importance in the event of the resurgence of a Russian threat. This could occur, it is argued, if democratic reform in Russia were to grind to a halt and Russian politics became dominated by nationalists and old-style communists in favour of an imperialist foreign policy, a component of which might be an attempt to put pressure on former allies and republics of the Soviet Union.

59. NATO must be both clear and strong in its attitude towards Russia. It should always be sure of maintaining the initiative and should therefore not delay too long before enlarging. If NATO adopts a wait-and-see attitude, this could lead to the communists regaining power in the former Warsaw Pact countries. Containment of communism and protection from communist rule were the basic reasons for the establishment of NATO. It should not fail in its duty in this respect, even though the cold war has ended.

60. A second group of arguments considers enlargement to be the guarantee of stability and democracy in central and eastern Europe. It would provide a clear security framework for those countries which are undergoing a potentially unstable transition from communism to democracy. This transition could be threatened by the continuing existence of a security vacuum between Germany and Russia where free rein might be

given to rekindling nationalism and earlier patterns of geopolitical competition and conflict. Potential ethnic strife in a number of countries might possibly lead to regional wars. Instability in that region may also be conducive to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons proliferation⁴. NATO, it is argued, should therefore expand without waiting for future enlargement of the European Union, which is regarded as another important stabilising factor.

61. NATO enlargement could reduce uncertainty in a hypersensitive area of Europe, and the resulting stability on the continent could benefit Russia as well as other countries.

62. Central and eastern European countries also have a need for sensible arrangements for integrating their armed forces in their societies. NATO enlargement would meet the need for security in the new member states and would support the process of democratisation, while helping to integrate the armed forces in the new state structures.

63. Another argument put forward is that many people fear the power of a unified Germany. Pushing NATO's eastern borders to the Polish-Ukraine frontier would be a way of reassuring and anchoring Germany in the West. The German Defence Minister, Volker Rühle, also considers Poland's presence in NATO the best guarantee of a safe Polish-German border. NATO enlargement would transform Germany from a front-line state into the central state in a new Europe.

64. A third set of arguments has to do with relations between the United States and Europe. These concentrate on the United States' policy of using NATO as a vehicle for retaining its influence in Europe, which could advance US interests. The advocates consider it likely that admission of new members would enhance US influence in NATO because the views of those countries on most important security issues are similar to those of the United States⁵. The United States' bid for expansion is also inspired by NATO's critics within Congress, who suggest that the United States may lose interest in maintaining the Alliance unless NATO plays a leading role in stabilising central and eastern Europe. Bosnia is an example. At present, it is argued, Europe cannot take care of its security and meet any significant challenge arising within its own area. NATO therefore has to be preserved in order to ensure that the United States retains its military commitments, guaranteeing Europe's security and defence.

4. E. Mortimer, "The distant drum ...", *The Financial Times*, 25 January 1995.

5. Bruce Weinrod, "NATO expansion: myths and realities", a Heritage Foundation Special Report to the Senate Armed Services Committee and House of Representatives National Security Committee, 1996.

2. Interview in *Argumenty i Fakty*.

3. *Wall Street Journal*, 23 April 1996.

65. There is even the suggestion that NATO needs to expand for its own sake and for its survival, or, as the United States Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, said on one occasion: "The Alliance must be relevant to the post-cold war situation."

66. It is frequently argued that early enlargement was proposed by the United States partly for electoral reasons at home, given the very substantial Polish and other central and eastern European immigrant vote.

67. If the central European countries in particular were to join, their membership would give NATO the strategic depth as a defence alliance which has been lacking in the past. There is also an ethical argument that Atlantic democracies must fulfil their responsibilities and moral duties, to the effect that countries which over the last fifty years have paid with their freedom for the stability and security of western Europe cannot be left out in the cold.

(b) Arguments against enlargement

68. The arguments against NATO enlargement can, broadly speaking, be divided into two groups: the one supportive of good relations with Russia, the other fearful of undermining NATO as a strong and cohesive security organisation.

69. Those in favour of good relations with Russia argue that NATO enlargement will create new dividing lines and lead to new East-West confrontation. Pro-western liberals in Russia would be accused of throwing away Russia's position as the most powerful state in the region, which could provide the radical nationalists and communists with more opportunities for attaining power and reversing Russia's evolution towards democratic structures and a market-orientated economy.

70. According to Russia's view, NATO's eastward expansion seems to suggest that Russia constitutes a permanent threat to Europe's borders. If there were no threat, there would be no justification for NATO to expand and by doing so it could precipitate the very circumstances it is seeking to avoid. It is said that Russia, witnessing the massive growth of an organisation from which it is now excluded and which the former Soviet Union, rightly or wrongly, perceived as its main security threat, will feel obliged to protect itself and start a build-up of arms and armed forces at its borders. NATO could retort that it has not the slightest intention of threatening Russia, but it should bear in mind that, in strategic considerations, even a perceived threat is a factor that counts.

71. President Boris Yeltsin has gone so far as to say that NATO enlargement would lead to a cold peace. Russia would regard the new European security configuration with an enlarged NATO as

illegitimate since it would be imposed in the face of Russian opposition. The new post-cold war security arrangements which Russia has agreed to are the main reason why NATO expansion would be not only unwise but unnecessary. There is no security vacuum because the restructured OSCE and recent conventional and nuclear arms control agreements give Europe a common security order based on consensus and cooperation. Moreover, enlargement is not necessary because Russia is very weak militarily. Russia's armed forces are in a very poor state, to the extent that the country cannot mount a successful military operation large enough to threaten any central or eastern European country. The guiding principle of any post-cold war European security architecture must be to avoid a new division of Europe or the formation of new blocs. The proposals of some supporters of enlargement to refrain from deploying allied forces on the territory of the new member states smacks of an attempt to introduce second-rate membership with reduced security guarantees.

72. Enlargement would endanger Russian cooperation in the framework of arms control agreements and lead to unwanted pressure on Ukraine, which is concerned that Russia will then seek to accelerate the political and military integration of the Commonwealth of Independent States and transform it into a Russian-led security alliance.

73. There must also, it is argued, be the fear that, in the event of an emerging military threat from Russia, a revived KGB would have no difficulty in recruiting collaborators from among former colleagues in the NATO forces of central and eastern European member states.

74. Recently, opponents of enlargement have come up with new arguments that, among other things, concern NATO itself. Inviting new members into a consensus-based alliance is always risky. If the United States were at present to apply pressure on its reluctant European allies to consent to some hurried scheme of eastward expansion, it might jeopardise vital transatlantic cohesion. The central and eastern European candidates for NATO membership are not used to cooperating in a collective endeavour to face a common threat. From a position of simply having to obey orders from the Warsaw Pact leader, it might take them a long time to adapt to new military cooperation. The Partnership for Peace is therefore the best way forward.

75. Expansion to the east would impinge upon the cohesion of the Alliance. It could paralyse and undermine NATO as it exists today, as increasingly divergent security interests could seriously hamper the process of reaching consensus. Since 1949 NATO has admitted only four new members: Greece, Turkey, Germany and Spain and it is

a well-known fact that two of these long-standing member states are not always inclined to compromise for the sake of consensus. Supporters say that democracy in the former Warsaw Pact countries will be enhanced and consolidated by NATO enlargement, but NATO neither guarantees nor requires democracy. Salazar's Portugal was regarded as a faithful NATO ally because the United States needed the Azores as a base. The 1967 coup in Greece led to seven years of military rule and yet the country remained a NATO member, as did Turkey during the years of military rule.

76. Nor is NATO an effective instrument for promoting free markets or democracy. NATO, unlike the European Union, is not an economic organisation offering capital, market access and economic cooperation.

77. Opponents of enlargement also argue that many candidates are not ready to join NATO. All of them lack modern military equipment, money and technological know-how and their system of command and control is very different from that used in NATO. Although several studies have been published recently, no-one has yet given any reliable estimate of the cost of the accession of new member states, or said who is to pay and how.

78. If NATO is to be enlarged without stationing troops or weaponry in the new member states and without adapting their infrastructure and armed forces to new defence requirements, what then is the value of security guarantees?

(c) Latest developments in NATO's enlargement process

79. During a visit to the central European and Baltic states in April 1996, Mr Javier Solana, Secretary-General of NATO, attempted to explain the NATO enlargement process. He made it clear that, in his view, "free choice of alignment must be the very basis on which any post-Yalta Europe must be built". He did not commit himself to any timetable for enlargement, but emphasised that it would happen. Mr Solana rejected Russian suggestions that the central European countries could only join NATO's political, not its military structures, adding that: "Those who join will be full members with all the benefits and obligations that membership implies. NATO is not interested in semi-detached members."⁶ He repeated that none of the eleven countries currently seeking to join NATO had been ruled out.

80. On the other hand, both the Americans and NATO officials admit that NATO membership will be more difficult for some countries to attain than for others. If Estonia and Latvia for instance were to become members, it would take NATO to Russia's borders – both countries have very large

Russian ethnic minorities and Estonia still has an unresolved border dispute with Russia.

81. A new Rand Corporation study again questions the viability of NATO membership for the Baltic states, also because of potential trouble with Russia. It also doubts whether security guarantees can be given in a crisis where NATO forces would have to travel 1 000 to 1 500 kilometres from their bases in western Europe. This problem could be overcome by a permanent deployment of NATO forces in those countries, but that could only be done at high cost and the provocation in Russia's eyes could be considerable⁷. Among European NATO members, Denmark is the strongest advocate of Baltic membership and has indicated that NATO will have to propose a new strategy if it was not possible for the Baltic states to join the first wave of new NATO member states.

82. In order to meet Baltic security concerns, a suggestion has been made in the United States about creating a separate Baltic security zone which would also include Finland and Sweden. The Baltic states could then become members of the European Union and at the same time be closely tied to the PfP through an institutionalised arrangement.

83. Even at this stage of the enlargement discussion, there is little clarity about the costs, not least because they depend on many imponderables which have not yet been sorted out.

84. A Rand Corporation study shows that costs could swing from a low of \$14 billion to a high of \$110 billion, depending on how robust NATO's force posture in the new member states will be. A Congressional Budget Office study, working on similar assumptions, has put a price tag of between \$60 billion and \$125 billion on NATO's enlargement to take in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In general, however, the Rand study has used less robust military requirements in its analysis of options for defending central Europe.

85. According to Rand, the four new member states would have to pay about \$13 billion to upgrade their forces and military infrastructure. The present 16 member states would have to double NATO's \$1 billion infrastructure budget and improve its capabilities for rapidly moving air and ground forces into central Europe, if necessary. Over the next decade, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States would have to pay an extra \$17 billion, and the other twelve present members an extra \$12 billion. While Rand estimates the cost to the United States at between \$420 million and \$2.4 billion per year, the Congressional Budget Office puts it at a minimum of \$5 billion per year.

6. *The Financial Times*, 19 April 1996.

7. *Defense News*, 22-28 April 1996.

86. Although in public the United States Administration is in favour of enlargement and is not inclined to give in to any Russian pressure concerning this issue, it is perfectly clear it has also understood that there is little point in pushing enlargement at the moment. There is, apparently, an undeclared policy of refraining from any serious decision on enlargement until the political situation in Russia has stabilised, hopefully after the June 1996 presidential elections.

87. At present, bilateral technical consultations are taking place between NATO member states and the eleven candidates for membership on a 16 + 1 basis and no formal enlargement discussions are planned until NATO's internal assessment is completed in December 1996. Recently, several critics have for various reasons expressed serious doubts about whether it would be wise to push for early enlargement of NATO, as is still officially being advocated by the United States.

88. Although there seems to be general consensus among NATO member states that continuing with the Atlantic Alliance serves their vital security interests, there is no consensus over NATO's missions. The Alliance, they say, should first be revitalised and transformed through a package of political measures and institutional reforms, as part of a new "transatlantic bargain" between the existing 16 member states, before new members are invited to join. The revitalisation process should be concluded at a NATO summit meeting in the first half of 1997, after the presidential elections in the United States⁸.

89. The Russian Foreign Minister, Mr Yevgeni Primakov, recently declared that Russia was prepared to accept eastward expansion of NATO, provided that it did not imply an allied military force near Russia's borders. Despite the absence of plans to deploy short-range nuclear weapons on the territory of prospective eastern European members, he saw military infrastructure as a source of concern which could influence Russian policy. Mr Primakov reserved Russia's right to respond if its proposals did not lead to a solution⁹.

90. The US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, has repeatedly said that the United States is committed to NATO enlargement, no matter what happens in Russia, but has added that "Russia must not isolate itself"¹⁰. US officials have admitted that it is not the United States' intention to isolate Russia. Although NATO enlargement will not be subject to a Russian veto, events in Russia may have a significant, if not decisive effect on the pace and style of NATO enlargement.

8. Stanley R. Sloan in "NATO's Future: Beyond collective defence", Washington DC, 1996.

9. *International Herald Tribune*, 6 and 7 April 1996.

10. *International Herald Tribune*, 21 March 1996.

V. *The role of the United States in the Bosnian conflict*

91. The armed conflict in Bosnia came to a provisional end with the signing of the Dayton Accords in November 1995. Many considered these agreements as an American triumph after four years of United States reluctance to intervene. Why did the United States not intervene in this conflict three or four years ago? And why did the Clinton Administration change its opinion in the spring of 1995? There was a mixture of motives and political objectives for the US policy as regards former Yugoslavia which made it no less muddled than the often criticised European policy on that issue. The reasons why the US Government put aside its earlier reluctance and pushed actively for an agreement are manifold and are connected with both domestic and foreign policy.

(a) *Why did the United States not interfere at the beginning of the conflict?*

92. Before intervening in a conflict that does not threaten its own borders or those of its allies, a state should at least address the following questions: is military action in the national interest; is there a reasonable chance of success; can the state muster the requisite domestic support; is there a moral motive?¹¹

93. When the conflict in Bosnia was in full swing, reports on refugees, mass-murder and ethnic cleansing caused a public outcry, but this movement was not strong enough to justify military intervention by the United States. The other three requisites were not met. First of all there were not enough strategic arguments for intervention. Although there was a possibility of a spill-over into other regions and countries such as Kosovo, Macedonia and Turkey, it was considered too remote to warrant a response. Unlike Kuwait, Bosnia did not have any strategic raw materials which could have prompted the United States to intervene. The US Administration was well aware that unless it could present a military mission as serving important US national interests, the public would not support even low levels of casualties.

94. An alternative to the direct use of US military force was to give support to the Bosnian Government so that it could defend itself against military aggression. The lifting of the arms embargo was the only effective option that did not risk American lives, but the Clinton Administration did not know the extent of the opposition and how to meet it¹².

11. J. Joffe in "The new Europe, yesterday's ghosts", *Foreign Affairs*, volume 72, No. 1, 1993.

12. P.D. Wolfowitz, "Clinton's first year", *Foreign Affairs*, volume 73, No. 1, 1994.

95. Finally, it was also clear that there would not be any chance of a quick and reasonable success without the loss of many US soldiers' lives, although forceful military action could have succeeded at the very beginning of the conflict. Since, in the early stages, the various parties in the conflict were not prepared to stop fighting, military intervention of a limited scope would only have stopped the mass killing for a while. Besides these reasons, there were also some military objections to intervention such as the difficult terrain and bad weather.

96. Apart from the abovementioned considerations, mainly of a domestic and strategic nature, which dissuaded the United States from intervening, there were also foreign policy considerations which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

97. First of all, the European Union had made it clear that it wanted to cope with "European security" by itself after its failure in the Gulf war. The US was therefore somewhat conveniently obliged to wait and see. Depending on their point of view, some critics called it "shifting responsibility away from the US towards Europe", and others a demonstration of American weakness and inability to lead.

98. Initially, the United States also had no wish to become involved in a peacekeeping mission because that would have obliged its troops to remain neutral. The United States wanted the country to remain multi-cultural and therefore thought it necessary to help the Bosnian Government. It also wanted to support the Bosnian Muslims because it clearly considered them to be the victims of aggression and it was afraid that if the West did not help the Bosnians they would turn to countries like Iran, entailing a risk of fundamentalist infiltration into Europe.

99. The United States was unable to help the Bosnians defend themselves at that early stage, partly because doing so might have endangered the peacekeeping forces that were already there and it faced opposition from its allies and Russia. Therefore there were no possibilities for the US to achieve its goals in the first years of the conflict.

100. In the early phase, the US Administration saw the conflict as a clear-cut case of Serbian aggression. This opinion made it oppose the Vance-Owen plan which gave 43% of Bosnian territory to the Serbs. The Administration made moves to set up a UN tribunal to try Serbs for war crimes, and it proposed to the European allies a programme for lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims and striking the Serbs with air power, with the ultimate aim of restoring Bosnia as a sovereign, multi-ethnic and territorially intact state. When Europe rejected the lift and strike idea, the US Administration came to appreciate

that in this crisis it could only act in concert with the EU and the Russian Federation. So there emerged a profound incompatibility between the Administration's initial objective and the requirements of multilateral action. Unilateral actions might endanger interests carrying greater weight than those that would be secured through such action. Once it became clear that the interests at stake in Bosnia concerned the future of the post-cold war order in Europe and the cohesion and existence of the transatlantic alliance, the US Administration concluded that it would be absurd to pursue a course of action that would estrange the United States from both Europe and Russia while drawing the nation deeper into the Bosnian conflict.

(b) What made the United States change its mind?

101. The US Administration was facing increased domestic pressure to "do something" and as a result, on 11 November 1994, it announced that it would no longer enforce the arms embargo against former Yugoslavia, causing dismay among the European allies and Russia. Republican leaders called the United Nations "totally incompetent" and argued strongly for an aggressive bombing campaign against Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav targets to "paralyse" Serbian society. Secretary of State Warren Christopher responded with the argument that a bombing campaign was unworkable and that only a diplomatic solution was acceptable, but President Clinton declared his willingness to deploy US ground troops to assist NATO in operations to withdraw UNPROFOR troops from dangerous situations. Meanwhile the then French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppé, condemned governments "which teach us lessons daily but have not lifted a little finger to put even one man on the ground".

102. The "dual key policy", which required both NATO and the United Nations to agree on the use of air strikes before any action could be taken, was one of the most serious flaws in the agreements to help UNPROFOR implement its tasks. This deficient command structure often resulted in a delay of several days before the request was implemented, reducing its effect to almost zero.

103. At the beginning of June 1995, at the initiative of the newly-elected French President, Jacques Chirac, the Defence Ministers of NATO and some other European states agreed on the creation of a rapid reaction force under the command of the United Nations. This force consisted mainly of British, French and Dutch troops with the following tasks: retaliate in the event of an attack on United Nations forces; assist isolated units to regroup; support the besieged enclaves of eastern Bosnia; resupply the besieged peacekeepers; and police the UN-declared weapon-free zones. The US Congress opposed a 31% share of

funding, delaying American approval of the rapid reaction force. US officials were concerned that the new force would give the United Kingdom and France undue influence in international policy-making regarding Bosnia.

104. The dramatic fall of Srebrenica, followed by mass executions of many of its male inhabitants, was the result of another of the unsatisfactory arrangements which had been made for the protection of "safe areas". The attack on Srebrenica by Bosnian Serb forces started on 6 July 1995 but the first two air strikes on the Bosnian Serb tanks which were closing in were not carried out until 11 July, while a third air strike was halted after Bosnian Serbs threatened to kill the UNPROFOR soldiers they were holding hostage.

105. There were far too few ground troops deployed to provide effective protection of this "safe area", while requests for protective air strikes were systematically carried out too late and with too little force to have any effect on the attackers.

106. Once Croatia, with the tacit approval of the United States, had regained control of the Krajina region as a result of a military operation, the United States launched a new peace initiative on 9 August 1995, based on the 1994 proposals of the Contact Group (France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom, United States) on territorial division. This time the division roughly reflected the situation on the ground. Two days later, President Clinton vetoed the earlier congressional decision to lift the arms embargo, arguing that ending the embargo would intensify the fighting, jeopardise diplomacy and make the outcome of the conflict in Bosnia an American responsibility.

107. After a fresh massacre of civilians at a Sarajevo market by Bosnian Serb bombing at the end of August, NATO responded with operation "Deliberate Force". Apparently impressed by this series of devastating air attacks on Bosnian Serb targets across Bosnia from 30 August to 14 September 1995, Bosnian Serbs began to take notice. At the end of the first day of attacks, it was announced that the Bosnian Serbs would henceforth conduct peace negotiations as part of a team headed by President Milosevic, which was widely regarded as a significant shift in their position. On 14 September, after 850 NATO bombing missions and the first use of Tomahawk cruise missiles in the offensive, Bosnian Serb leaders finally committed themselves to withdrawing their heavy weapons from a 20-kilometre exclusion zone around Sarajevo. In Geneva, on 8 September, representatives of the Contact Group and the foreign ministers of the Croats, Serbs and Muslims signed an agreement on the basic principles for a peace accord. This was followed by a second agreement signed in New York a few weeks later. The agreements included the following prin-

ciples: the continued existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its present international borders; Bosnia would consist of two entities; the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Serbia; both entities would have the right to establish parallel special relationships with neighbouring countries and would hold fully democratic elections.

108. At the beginning of October, President Clinton announced a 60-day ceasefire. The final peace negotiations in Dayton in the first three weeks of November divided Bosnia in two parts: 49% for the Republika Srpska and 51% for the Muslim-Croat Federation, joined by a loose political structure.

109. Europe disappointed Washington by its failure to deal with the Bosnian conflict. On the other hand, the United States policy which finally resulted in the Dayton Accords, based on earlier European efforts, is more than anything else a policy of containment and nobody dares to predict what will be the future fate of the Balkans. US intervention in Bosnia came reluctantly and it was a consequence of the outrage the US public felt over what the United Nations and western Europe had allowed to happen. The UN embargo on arms for the victims of aggression and the passivity of the United Nations in the face of genocidal crimes, first prompted President Clinton to campaign in 1992 to arm the Muslims and then pushed Congress to force Clinton to keep his promise despite Europe's objections. As the IFOR presence will end by December 1996, the Bosnians are expected to take care of themselves thereafter. This will be facilitated by the United States re-arming the Bosnian Government and providing the necessary military training, but few observers would be surprised to see a new outbreak of armed hostilities.

110. Many have noted that the current intervention of the United States has everything to do with the coming elections in 1996. It cannot be denied that President Clinton faced major problems in getting his federal budget and welfare policy adopted and obviously the best way for the Clinton Administration to draw attention away from these problems was to achieve a major foreign success. The link between Clinton's decisions affecting Bosnia and the presidential elections is naturally denied by Administration officials.

111. It has been rightly observed¹³ that the United States did have some interests in Bosnia, some of which are only too obvious such as halting the killing or preventing the conflict from spreading and turning into a Christian-Muslim war. Another even more important reason was to ensure that the conflict did not end in a way that would perma-

13. Th. Friedman, *International Herald Tribune*, 31 July 1995.

nently damage the United States' ties with its European allies, NATO and Russia.

112. Croatia's recapture of Krajina in August 1995 also resulted in creating a more convenient balance of power between the parties to the conflict in Bosnia. The United States had supported the Croatian operation because they were convinced that it would help bring the Serbs back to the negotiating table. With this in mind, one could say that the Dayton Accords were designed at the right time to take advantage of the political momentum created by Croatia's victory over the Serbs in Krajina. This is precisely why, according to its advocates, the Dayton Accords may succeed: they are based on the military situation which was established in August 1995. In addition to this, there was mounting pressure for peace negotiations from Congress and also from the Europeans, who wanted a decision by early autumn on whether to withdraw their troops.

113. Another important reason that led the United States to change its mind and intervene actively, was the need to repair its tainted image in world politics, where it claimed to be an effective trouble-shooter. It is said that the United States' choice to finally get involved in the Bosnian conflict was a choice for post-cold war leadership, but others argue that the American problem is not a lack of power but a decline in its capacity and willingness to use it. US policy in Bosnia does not hold out a guarantee of US intervention in future crises on European territory – it is more a demonstration of an existing power vacuum in European security.

114. The lack of resolution and the failures of the European Union, the United Nations and NATO gave the United States a feeling of dissatisfaction which led it to intervene in the conflict. It wanted to show Europe that if the United States was in charge, it could do the job. Disagreement between NATO members damaged the prestige of the Atlantic Alliance to the great regret of the United States and it felt a strong need for a coordinated powerful action to improve NATO's standing. The need to create consensus within Europe and NATO became a goal in itself. Through its military intervention in Bosnia, NATO showed that it was still a coherent and powerful organisation and this was exactly what it needed after the embarrassments of recent years.

115. Of course, the United States also had moral arguments for intervening. The United States chief negotiator for the Dayton Accords, Richard Holbrooke, said that the fall of Srebrenica and the events that followed provoked the change¹⁴. Furthermore, he observed that President Clinton faced a dilemma because he knew that the United States would get involved in one way or another:

either by helping the UN peacekeepers to withdraw or by sending ground troops.

(c) *Conclusion*

116. The expectations for the future in Bosnia are not altogether bright. Although most people concerned try to have faith in the Dayton Accords, it is admitted that many problems remain. The Muslims and Croats in the Federation do not seem to get along as well as was hoped and there is still a chance that the Bosnian Serbs might want to seek an association with Serbia. More sceptical observers might say that the United States intervened to help the Bosnian Muslims survive, thus enabling its European allies to transfer responsibility for the outcome of the conflict to the United States. In the end, the United States may have to face the reality that the deployment of military force cannot produce a lasting solution but only one that will continue until the foreign troops have left. The present US containment policy in the Balkans has, for the time being, stopped the killing, which is a huge success in itself, but it has stopped short of addressing the basic issue, the status of minorities throughout former Yugoslavia. As a result of this, the parties to the Dayton Accords may again take up arms, breaking the enforced peace. As far as Europe is concerned, there is still the question of what to do next.

VI. Arms for Bosnia

117. Throughout the conflict in Bosnia, the United States and Europeans have been at odds over the question whether the Bosnian Muslims should be re-armed or not. The United States was faced with the dilemma of showing solidarity with its European allies or with the Bosnian Muslims, the latter in order to prevent Iranian fundamentalists from securing a foothold in Europe. It tried to do both and the final outcome may be that in both cases it only succeeded partially. The Bosnians got their arms but because of this the Iranian fundamentalists also gained entry into Bosnia. Europe saw an ally pretending to show solidarity, but in fact turning a blind eye to breaches of the overall arms embargo.

118. At the beginning of April 1996 it became known that, in 1994, covert Iranian arms shipments reached Bosnia-Herzegovina while the US Administration was publicly defending the United Nations arms embargo.

119. According to accounts in the United States press which have not been contradicted by the Administration, the President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, had informed the United States early in 1994 that Iran was offering to supply Muslim forces in Bosnia, through Croatia's offices, with rifles, ammunition, mortars, anti-tank weapons and shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles.

14. *NRC Handelsblad*, 25 January 1996.

After internal consultations which also involved President Clinton, the United States envoy in Croatia was told to say that they had “no instructions” on this question – a diplomatic way of saying that the United States would not object to the arms shipments.

120. Within days, Iranian arms were on their way to Bosnia via Zagreb, where Iran Air aircraft unloaded weapons under Croatian military guard. The Iranian arms shipments certainly contributed to reinforcing the Bosnian forces and helped the Croats, who appropriated 30% of the shipments, to bring the Bosnian Serbs, who were far better equipped with heavy weapons, to a standstill. These shipments are said to have continued until January 1996.

121. According to the *New York Times*, there are also indications that United States diplomats helped to clear a passage through Croatia to Bosnia for convoys containing the arms, although they may not specifically have known that weapons were on board¹⁵.

122. In fact, it should be noted that the United States Congress had always advocated an “arms for Bosnia” policy and, on 11 May 1994, the United States Senate voted narrowly in favour of a unilateral United States breach of the arms embargo imposed on former Yugoslavia. One of the main arguments for this vote was that the embargo violated the right of United Nations member states, including Bosnia, to self-defence. President Clinton, who months earlier had consented to the Iranian arms shipments, repudiated the Senate vote on 25 May, arguing that a unilateral United States decision to ignore the embargo would “kill the peace process, sour our relationship with our European allies in NATO and the UN, and undermine the partnership [that the United States was] trying to build with Russia”.

123. On 8 June 1994, the House of Representatives also voted in favour of unilaterally breaching the embargo, despite interventions by the Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, the Defence Secretary, William Perry, Ambassador Madeleine Albright and Chief of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, who all argued that lifting the embargo would stop the peace process and make the conflict continue without any guarantee that the Bosnian Muslims would be able to recapture one inch of territory.

124. Meanwhile, it had been claimed¹⁶ that, with the tacit consent of the United States Government, Iran had dispatched a force of 400 Iranian revolutionary guards to Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it was training and arming Bosnian government forces. It was further claimed that the United

States Government was ignoring allegations that Iranian arms were being delivered to Bosnia via Croatia in the guise of humanitarian aid. On 14 August, after President Clinton himself had also started to press for a lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia, France’s Prime Minister, Mr Balladur, warned that if the embargo was lifted, 5 000 French UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be withdrawn for safety reasons. European foreign ministers, meeting on 11 September 1994, warned of the “incalculable consequences” of a decision of the sort for which the United States Administration was looking.

125. Domestic pressure on President Clinton apparently became unbearable and, on 11 November 1994, it was announced that the United States would no longer enforce the arms embargo in the Adriatic Sea. The European allies, with whom the United States had until then been monitoring the embargo in a concerted NATO-WEU operation called Sharp Guard, were astonished and described the United States decision as “worrying”. The then Secretary-General of NATO, Willy Claes, pledged to “continue fully and totally all United Nations Security Council resolutions which form the basis of [NATO’s] involvement in former Yugoslavia”.

126. The WEU Council in its Noordwijk Declaration of 14 November 1994 maintained that it intended “to continue to work together in close cooperation with the North American allies. The security of the Alliance and of Europe as a whole is indivisible. The transatlantic partnership rests on a shared foundation of values and interests.”

127. At the same time, the Ministers “reiterated their view that lifting the arms embargo would cause the conflict to escalate further, pose grave risks to the civilian population and to organisations in the field, leading to a situation in which United Nations forces had to withdraw”¹⁷.

128. They further took “note with regret of the United States measures to modify its participation with respect to the enforcement of the arms embargo in the combined WEU/NATO Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic.” ... “Ministers also emphasised that the United States measures would not affect WEU’s determination to continue ensuring compliance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. Ministers reiterated their intention to continue to implement fully the enforcement of all embargoes.”

129. The arms from Iran helped restore the military balance and contributed to the conclusion of the Dayton Accords. But at the same time, Iran may have secured a bridgehead in Europe which it will not give up easily. The Dayton Accords them-

15. *The New York Times*, 20 April 1996.

16. *The Washington Times*, 2 June 1994.

17. Turkey dissociated itself from these paragraphs.

selves call for all foreign fighters within the local armies to leave Bosnia and western allies have exerted pressure on the Bosnians to expel the mujaheddin who came from Iran or elsewhere to help the Bosnian Muslims fight their adversaries. Some have been sent back to their native lands while others have taken Bosnian nationality and are entitled to stay. According to United States officials, about 150 to 200 members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard are still in Bosnia, along with Arab Islamic militants who fought in volunteer units¹⁸. In the future, Iranian advisers may pose a threat to peacekeeping troops and to a secular government in Bosnia.

130. It recently became known that agents from the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security have trained commando units employed by the Bosnian Agency for Investigation and Documentation to kill or capture people accused of war crimes.

131. The United States has called for the disbandment of this seemingly exclusively Muslim intelligence agency within the Bosnian-Croatian Federation because it is a violation of the terms of the Dayton Accords¹⁹.

132. A secret military cooperation agreement concluded in December 1995 between Iran and Croatia, including an Iranian proposal to deliver surface-to-surface missiles to Sarajevo and Zagreb as well as a plan to exchange Croatian and Iranian military personnel, was blocked when the United States received information about it.

133. The fact that the United States consented to Iranian arms shipments is all the more bizarre given that it has consistently preached total isolation of Iran, accusing it of heavily sponsoring terrorism and carrying out a programme to develop nuclear weapons. European governments have committed themselves to a "critical dialogue" while maintaining trade relations, taking the view that isolation will not help Iran change its behaviour. Europe has argued that isolating the Iranian fundamentalist government leaves it without any international diplomatic options.

134. The United States argues that Europe's "constructive diplomacy" will allow Iran's militant mullahs to continue flouting established standards of international behaviour without being held to account.

VII. MEADS

(medium extended air defence system)

135. In February 1995, the United States, France, Germany and Italy signed a memorandum of understanding to develop a medium-range anti-

missile defence system called MEADS (medium extended air defence system). The new system is intended to replace the Hawk and Patriot by a mobile missile with a range of 100 kilometres and capable of intercepting ballistic missiles with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. The procedure for the MEADS programme makes provision for a competition to set up the project definition and validation phase and the selection of one of the two project teams to design and develop MEADS in late 1998. Production should begin in 2005 followed by MEADS entering into service during the following decade. The two competing teams would be Hughes/Raytheon with the European firms Alenia, Aérospatiale, Dasa, Siemens and Thomson versus Lockheed Martin with the same European industries in a different set-up. The project cost is estimated at \$40 billion with the United States contributing 50%, Germany and France 20% each and Italy 10%. However, the four countries which signed the 1995 MOU have not yet succeeded in harmonising their requirements for MEADS. In fact, MEADS has become the subject of a conflict between the Clinton Administration and the Republican Congress over missile defence. The Administration is emphasising theatre missile defence (TMD) with MEADS as a priority programme. The Congress is aiming for a missile defence programme which takes national missile defence as much into consideration as TMD. At present, Congress is giving lower priority to systems such as MEADS than to a core group of four other theatre missile defence systems.

136. In France, a debate is under way over whether to pursue MEADS or instead concentrate on new versions of the SAMP/T, a Franco-Italian ground-launched, medium-range air defence missile which could be modified to include a limited capability against tactical ballistic missiles. The SAMP/T, developed as a replacement for the Hawk and Patriot air defence missiles, has a potential export market estimated at more than \$20 billion. Understandably, the European industry involved in this programme is reluctant to share it with its United States competitors.

137. It is said that French government and industry officials consider MEADS more as a political symbol of transatlantic cooperation than as a viable military or industrial development programme. French defence industrialists say that France has all the basic components for an anti-missile system at its disposal in the fields of missiles, radar and systems.

138. At a meeting of the four participating nations on 15-16 April 1996, France announced that it would be unable to make a commitment to MEADS before completing the final version of its weapons procurement programme law for 1997-2002, which is expected in May 1996 and is to be

18. *International Herald Tribune*, 26 April 1996.

19. *International Herald Tribune*, 26 April 1996.

discussed in parliament by the end of June. Apart from budget constraints, the failure of the four governments to agree on military requirements for MEADS has been mentioned by France as a reason for postponing its commitment.

139. The deadline for launching the MEADS programme has now been postponed until mid-May and it seems unlikely that France will be able to meet it. The other participants have indicated that the deadline could be deferred, if need be, and have stated that French participation at a later stage would still be welcome²⁰. It should be noted that adopting this accommodating attitude cannot have been difficult for them, considering their own reservations about making a firm commitment at this stage.

140. The United States Defence Secretary, William Perry, has said that he considers MEADS as "the most important test of transatlantic cooperation" and he argues that "the United States cannot indefinitely postpone the start of the programme"²¹.

141. In March 1996, however, the United States Senate Armed Services Committee was told that MEADS was a high priority programme but that the government had not yet entered into a commitment to field MEADS because of United States concern over its high (50%) share in the programme²².

142. Why does the United States Administration consider MEADS an important test of transatlantic cooperation?²³ According to Dr Paul Kaminski, Under-Secretary of Defence Acquisition and Technology, the United States' general reasons for transatlantic cooperation in armaments development are threefold:

- cooperative programmes help strengthen the connective tissue between the US and its allies;
- with an increased likelihood of operating in coalition environments, the allied countries need to stress interoperable equipment and rationalised logistics;
- with all allied defence budgets shrinking, equipment which individual allies cannot afford may become affordable through a common effort.

143. The United States is well aware that most of the problems in armaments cooperation have always revolved around narrow national interests

20. *Defense News*, 15-21 and 22-28 April 1996.

21. *Le Monde*, 27 March 1996.

22. *Defense News*, 15-21 April 1996.

23. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Robbin Laird, "Medium extended air defence system and the Euro-Atlantic defence relationship".

being at odds with broader cooperative interests, one of the best known problems being the perception of the United States leading a programme using US technology and a US prime contractor, with European participation being relegated essentially to sub-contractor status.

144. On the other hand, Under-Secretary Kaminski has made no secret of the Administration's opinion on increasing European defence cooperation. Speaking at a public conference, he said that "the concept [of increasing European defence cooperation] ... is welcomed - so long as it doesn't come at the expense of the transatlantic link." Among the possible negative outcomes, Paul Kaminski mentioned:

- closing out US technologies and expertise from European developments and markets;
- development of non-interoperable systems;
- greater costs to the European allies with less security to show for it;
- reinvention of existing technologies when research and development budgets are declining;
- political divisiveness between long-term friends.

145. At first sight, these arguments could be interpreted as evidence of heartfelt concern for the European allies. In particular, the last four arguments are heartwarming. But Europeans should not forget that the first argument is the one that really counts.

146. Due to shrinking defence budgets in the United States as well, equipment programmes have been reduced or cancelled and the US defence industry has gone through a ruthless restructuring process, shedding tens of thousands of jobs, a process which only the strongest predators have survived. These giant industries, which have no equivalent in Europe, are engaged in a worldwide battle for markets and customers with the strong support of the United States Administration. As a result of increased European defence cooperation, the US defence industry has lost a part of the European market where it used to have a virtual monopoly. It will leave no stone unturned to regain its European market and MEADS is considered a potentially promising new starting point.

147. Before committing themselves to the MEADS programme, the European governments and defence industries should address a number of related questions. How much chance is there that MEADS will survive as a programme in the ongoing battle between the United States Congress and the Administration over missile

defence systems? It may even fade away after development money has been spent. The United States has a poor record in abiding by such development agreements. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States' unilateral withdrawal from transatlantic programmes such as the modular stand-off weapon, the 155 autonomous precision-guided munition and the NATO identification system was not an encouraging experience.

148. When will NATO finish its study on counter-proliferation requirements? At present, no agreement has been reached on priorities for specific TMD deployments within the Alliance. MEADS is intended to be used by mobile intervention forces, but which allies are likely to operate with US forces out-of-area and beyond the reach of other US-allied theatre missile defence capabilities? A decision on MEADS can only be taken within the framework of a general strategic choice over missile defence systems, giving rise to questions such as whether priority must be given to missile defence of allied territory or of mobile intervention forces. Or should both defence systems be deployed at the same time in order to prevent "catch 22" situations?

149. What will be the consequences of a Euro-Atlantic cooperative MEADS development for the European defence industry? Will it again gradually be pushed into a sub-contractor role or will it gain from the research and development experience in the anti-missile defence systems, especially as regards C⁴ systems which must be interoperable in order to make sure that allied operations are successful?

150. In no way should transatlantic equipment cooperation programmes lead to a weakening of Europe's defence industrial base, which is considered vital for reinforcement of the European security and defence identity.

151. United States calls to revitalise transatlantic defence equipment cooperation will meet with little enthusiasm in Europe as long as the Pentagon does not operate a two-way policy in its acquisition programmes.

VIII. Conclusions

152. What will be the outcome of recent developments in United States policy regarding security in Europe? Before drawing conclusions, it may be useful to sum up some of the most salient aspects of the relations between the transatlantic allies.

153. President Clinton was elected because he promised to concentrate more on domestic issues. Endeavouring to avoid foreign policy as a field of priority action, the President started very actively applying a commercial policy of trade expansion.

The tactics used certainly led to success, but the political consequences were not always positive. Both transatlantic and transpacific relations soon became frayed because US trade demands were seen as predatory and unreciprocated. Given the United States position as the only remaining superpower and the hopes this aroused in crises and conflicts all over the world where states or nations are being threatened, attacked or are breaking up, this abstention from foreign policy did not last very long.

154. The United States soon became involved in the crises in Somalia, Haiti and also, without immediately taking the lead, in former Yugoslavia.

155. Europeans may have a distorted view of United States intervention in the Balkans. The United States does not pretend to have a vision of the future shape of the Balkans and their role in Europe. At present, the main objective of the US Administration is to preserve a peaceful *status quo* in the whole region. Serbia and Bosnia are the focus of this containment policy, but there is certainly more to it than that, which is why 650 United States troops are deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as a warning that neighbouring countries should not interfere. The United States is also active in Albania to prevent destabilising developments in Kosovo and other neighbouring regions.

156. It has also forged defence links with Croatia and Romania despite concerns over their human rights records and commitments to political and economic reform.

157. The United States argues that the parties in the conflict in Bosnia were only prepared to make peace when NATO projected power in a convincing and sustainable way. Bosnia, it says, demonstrated the need for United States and NATO involvement in maintaining European peace.

158. In fact, the United States has from the outset thought that only a firm policy could provide a key to solving the Bosnian conflict. The election of President Chirac in France, who clearly came down in favour of a more aggressive attitude in Bosnia, caused a rapprochement between the United States and Europe, which was accelerated by the dramatic fall of Žepa and Srebrenica.

159. In the US Congress, there is growing scepticism about the transatlantic ties that were so vital for the security of Europe during the cold war.

160. It should be noted that 186 members of the House of Representatives, i.e. nearly half of its total number, were elected in the last two elections. They did not actively participate in the liberation of Europe at the end of the second world war

and the Korean and Vietnam war is history for many of them. In fact, they are the first post-cold war generation of lawmakers in Congress.

161. Many of these younger members of Congress are questioning the guiding principles which have been the basis of United States foreign policy since the end of the second world war. Some of them are not even sure about the value of NATO, arguing that its *raison d'être* was to counterbalance the threat of communism to western Europe, a threat which – they point out – no longer exists in its former dimension.

162. Observers also argue that many of the new members became involved in foreign policy in particular as part of their effort to alter the direction of domestic policy. Their main goal is to reduce the deficit and the size of the federal government.

163. Some go as far as to say that the United States is gradually falling back into a policy of isolationism. However, isolationism in the strict sense of abstention from engagements abroad, is no longer a viable option for the United States. Economic interests cover the whole world, industry relies on exports and on foreign investment and finance. The country as such is not self-sufficient and for many decades now, has no longer been physically secure from an armed attack on its territory.

164. Opinion polls consistently show that Americans are very ambitious about United States world leadership, but that enthusiasm cools when costs and risks are cited. On Bosnia, the US public was not opposed to United States involvement, but it wanted to be convinced that there were good reasons for it.

165. The United States still has its important security commitments in Japan and Europe and is committed to NATO and Russian reform, but the reason for these continuing commitments is that the foreign policy and defence establishment thinks that change could be perilous.

166. During the recent crisis between Greece and Turkey over the island of Imia/Kardak, Richard Holbrooke, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, who does not like to mince words, criticised European foreign and security policy as follows:

“ While President Clinton was on the phone with Athens and Ankara, the Europeans were literally sleeping through the night. You have to wonder why Europe does not seem capable of taking decisive action in its own theatre. ”

167. It was rightly pointed out recently that these words, coming from a man who has done everything possible to refocus United States attention on Europe and to assert its commitment

to European security, should be read as a warning. Europe will put too much strain on that commitment if it does not quickly develop some capacity of its own to manage crises and prevent conflicts within the European theatre²⁴.

168. Notwithstanding all its efforts, Europe has not been capable of preventing or stopping the armed conflict in former Yugoslavia through a common, and in the beginning a less common, approach.

169. The question is: why do people and states in the world take more notice of the United States than of Europe? One vital reason is that, contrary to Europe, the United States is able and willing to convert its material assets into power, notably in the form of troops and weapons, and to deploy them around the world.

170. The results of this approach were again demonstrated in Bosnia. When NATO, with the active support and participation of the United States in “ Operation Deliberate Force ”, launched a series of devastating air attacks on Bosnian Serb targets across Bosnia from 30 August to 14 September 1995, Bosnian Serbs took notice and were soon sitting round the negotiating table and signing the Dayton Accords.

171. In general, there can be little doubt that the United States supports the establishment of a European common foreign and security policy because it believes that its development would make the European Union a more effective partner. It is aware, however, of the many problems still to be solved, such as the hesitation of key member states to relinquish their foreign policy prerogatives in favour of a common approach and the ability to project a credible threat of military power.

172. Both Atlantic partners seem to be too shy to discuss their real feelings and continue to stick plasters over a festering abscess which at some time will have to be removed. In joint communiqués, they continue to use the same phrases as were in fashion during the cold war, while the context has changed out of all recognition.

173. Europe does not have to become a super-power, omnipresent in the world, to wield influence. If, however, it wishes to be an effective regional power, it needs to develop a capacity to act decisively both in a crisis and – even more difficult – in dealing with conditions which may produce a crisis. Ideally, all the various instruments which can be used to deal with crises should be available to a single decision-making body. Europe needs the will to develop power-wielding instruments and the resolve to act collectively and use those instruments.


24. Edward Mortimer, *The Financial Times*, 14 February 1996.

174. It may be true that the crisis in Yugoslavia came too early to test the European common foreign and security policy which was agreed in Maastricht six months after events in Yugoslavia took a wrong turn. Now, five years later, with the United States having announced in 1995 that its troops will leave Bosnia on 20 December 1996, Europe cannot use a similar argument that the intergovernmental conference has not yet finished

and that it is too early to apply an effective common policy. Does Europe prefer to continue discussing the institutional details of a common foreign and security policy or does it wish to act?

175. Failure by the European countries to reunite to fight the main threat in Europe's neighbourhood may prove the fatal blow to everything else that has been accomplished in the cause of European unity²⁵.

25. Jacques Delors, *International Herald Tribune*, 5 December 1995.

IMPRIMERIE  ALENÇONNAISE
Rue Édouard-Belin 2^e trimestre 1996
N° d'ordre 36780

PRINTED IN FRANCE