The Legal Employment Market: Determinants of Elite Firm Placement, and How Law Schools Stack Up

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This article represents the largest study of the labor market for first year associates at elite law firms ever conducted to date and fills a significant gap in legal education literature. Other authors asked the question, "How does Law School P place its graduates relative to Law Schools X, Y, and Z?" I seek to answer a different question: "What characteristics does Law School P possess that make it more successful at placing its graduates than Law Schools X, Y, and Z?" This is a far more useful endeavor. Ordinal rankings have a short shelf life. Even if a researcher managed to eliminate all potential sources of error, his or her rankings scheme would rapidly become dated, and prospective students and other stakeholders would no longer find them useful. After all, ordinal rankings are just that – ordinal rankings. For example, while an ordinal ranking scheme might have Chicago ranked higher than Berkeley and Penn, and prospective law students might find this information useful in the short term, in the long run it is more interesting to know *why* Chicago ranks higher. Does Chicago's small class size give it an advantage, or is it ranked higher in spite of its small class? Is Berkeley penalized because it awards honors/pass/fail grades rather than letter grades, or would it place even worse if it had a traditional system? If Penn changed its policies and began to release class rank information to employers, would its placement become stronger? One cannot attempt to answer any of these questions with ordinal rankings alone.

Every year, more than 50,000 individuals make one of the biggest investment decisions of their lives – deciding which law school to attend, if any at all.[1] When making this decision, some individuals consider subjective factors, such as a school's location, existence of strong

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[1] The Law School Admissions Council reports that about 55,900 applicants were admitted to ABA-accredited law schools in 2004. Of those, about 45,400 chose to matriculate at a law school. *See* The Law School Admissions Council, *LSAC Volume Summary* (2004), *available at* http://www.lsacnet.org/LSAC.asp?url=lsac/data/lsac-volume-summary.htm.

clinical programs, or diversity. However, many applicants place an even higher value on more objective factors, such as cost of attendance and career placement. A legal education is not cheap: law student debt of $80,000 or more is typical, often in addition to undergraduate debt.[2] Naturally, one would expect prospective law students to weigh the monetary costs of attendance – tuition, fees, opportunity cost – against the benefits of expected future earnings and increased job prestige. Unfortunately, many students cannot objectively weigh the costs and benefits of attending specific law schools. While students can find out about costs with relative ease,[3] shockingly little career placement information has been gathered and standardized.

Why have law schools provided so little career placement information when students place such a high premium on it? Some theorists speculate that anti-competitive forces, such as the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American Association of Law Schools (AALS), have tried to standardize legal education and intentionally minimize or downplay the differences between institutions.[4] Others argue that law schools would genuinely like to provide this information, but career survey response rates are so low that it is irresponsible to release anything other than median private and public sector salaries.[5] In any case, an information vacuum exists, and prospective students have been forced to turn to unofficial sources, such as commercial rankings. Law school deans have almost universally condemned such rankings. In a recent letter sent to all law school applicants, many deans describe commercial rankings as "inherently flawed" and encourage applicants to "minimize the influence of rankings on [their] own judgment." The deans conclude by encouraging applicants to gather their own information about law schools.[6]

I agree that commercial rankings such as *U.S. News* are a poor proxy for employment placement information.[7] Every employment-related measure *U.S. News* provides suffers from significant validity problems.[8] Median private sector salary is a poor measure of earning power,

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[2] *See* The Law School Admissions Council, *Financial Aid for Law School* (2004), *available at* http://www.lsac.org/LSAC.asp?url=/lsac/financial-aid-repayment.asp.

[3] Virtually all law schools will provide financial aid packages to their admitted students before requiring them to commit to matriculating. Thus, students can easily compare law schools based on cost.

[4] Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely. *What Law Schools Can Learn from Billy Beane and the Oakland Athletics*, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1507-08 (2004).

[5] Interview with Diane Downs, Associate Dean of Career Planning and Placement, University of Pennsylvania Law School (February 2005).

[6] *See* The Law School Admissions Council, *Deans Speak Out* (2004), *at* http://www.lsac.org/LSAC.asp?url=lsac/deans-speak-out-rankings.asp.

[7] To be fair, *U.S. News* has avoided a direct claim that its ordinal rankings serve as a proxy for employment prospects – the editors instead state that its rankings serve to give prospective students "an independent assessment of the academic quality of programs." However, the editors of *U.S. News* do go on to state that individuals should use *U.S. News* data to compare institutions on several key characteristics, including "how diplomas from various schools will affect [applicants'] earning power" and "how successful the schools are at preparing graduates for the bar exam." *See* U.S. News, *Why does U.S. News rank graduate schools?* (2005), *available at* http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/grad/rankings/about/faq_meth.php; U.S. News, *How to use our lists wisely* (2005), available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/grad/rankings/about/05rank.b.php.

[8] For a thorough explanation of the problems with the *U.S. News* methodology, *see generally* Stephen P. Klein and Laura Hamilton, *The Validity of The U.S. News and World Report Ranking of ABA Law Schools* (1998), *at* http://www.aals.org/validity.html.

for it does not take into account regional variation in associate compensation[9] or differing levels of job prestige,[10] and low survey response rates make the medians for some schools highly questionable.[11] Since many elite private sector employers make hiring decisions prior to the third year of law school, bar passage rates likely tell more about a student's ability to keep a job offer than a law school's ability to get a student a job offer.[12] Even the percentage of students employed at graduation is open to manipulation and tells little about actual career placement.[13]

Several individuals have responded to *U.S. News*'s deficiencies by creating their own non-commercial employment rankings geared towards prospective students. Such rankings vary significantly in quality.[14] Perhaps the most well known rankings scheme was devised by University of Texas law professor Brian Leiter.[15] The main difference between Leiter's study

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[9] Standard market salaries for first year law firm associates vary considerably from region to region, often due to cost of living differences. By looking at median salary alone, schools like Virginia and Emory, which send many graduates to secondary and tertiary markets, appear to place worse relative to schools like Fordham and Cardozo, which send more graduates to high paying areas.

[10] A $125,000 median says little about a school's private sector placement, other than that they are placing a substantial number of graduates in large law firms in major legal markets. While twenty schools report $125,000 private sector medians, the very top schools within this group may send their graduates to far more desirable firms. Law firm prestige is not a meaningless distinction: while most New York City firms might pay $125,000 starting salary, compensation levels can vary greatly for partners and even senior associates. For example, Hughes Hubbard & Reed and Cravath Swaine & Moore are both New York City headquartered firms that pay first year associates $125,000; while the average Cravath equity partner earns $2,110,000 per year, the average Hughes equity partner earns only $450,000 per year. *See generally* The NALP Directory (2005), *at* http://www.nalpdirectory.com (providing first year associate starting salaries); The American Lawyer, *Profits Per Partner* (2002), *available at* http://www.law.com/special/professionals/amlaw/amlaw200/amlaw200_ppp.html (ranking law firms by profits per equity partner).

[11] More than half the schools boasting $125,000 medians have response rates of 85% and below – Stanford (67%), Michigan (77%), Cornell (75%), Northwestern (83%), Berkeley (72%), UCLA (82%), USC (70%), GWU (77%), Boston University (73%), Fordham (85%), and Cardozo (66%). Adverse selection problems are often present in salary surveys: non-respondents typically have significantly lower salaries than respondents. Non-respondents might not respond because they feel embarrassed about their lower salaries, or they might not place a high value on salary and therefore do not feel the need to fill out the survey. Non-respondents might also realize that reporting their low salaries could make their school look bad, and thus choose not to disclose. Because of adverse selection, it is likely that those schools with sub-85% response rates may have private sector medians that are lower than $125,000, thus calling into question the precision of the median private sector salary data reported to *U.S. News*.

[12] Law schools have been known to manipulate even bar exam passage data. *See* Klein and Hamilton, *supra* note 8.

[13] *U.S. News* does not verify employment data or distinguish between legal and non-legal jobs, and some schools have, in the past, hired their unemployed graduates as research assistants to boost this figure. *See* Brian Leiter, *The U.S. News Law School Rankings: A Guide for the Perplexed* (2003), *available at* http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/rankings/guide.html.

[14] Two recent rankings lists employing poor methodology are the National Law Journal's "most mentioned" and "most hired" lists. In addition to not adjusting for regional or sectoral preferences, NLJ's lists did not even adjust for differing class sizes. *See* Angela Cheng, *Georgetown, Virginia Among Most Mentioned*, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (2004), *available at* http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/releases/documents/nlj_000.pdf.

[15] Brian Leiter, *The Most National Law School Based on Job Placement in Elite Law Firms* (2003), *available at* http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/rankings/03_most_national.html. I note that two other researchers have attempted similar studies. John Wehrli's population study preceded Leiter's by seven years, and Michael Sullivan's study was conducted two years after Leiter's study. Because the methodologies employed by the three researchers are remarkably similar, most of the faults with Leiter's study also apply to the Wehrli and Sullivan studies. *See generally* John Wehrli, *Top 30 Law Schools at the Top 100 Law Firms, Adjusted for School Size* (1996), *available at* http://web.archive.org/web/19980520150138/http://wehrli.ilrg.com/amlawnormt30.html; Michael Sullivan, *Law School Job Placement* (2005), *available at* http://www.calvin.edu/admin/csr/students/sullivan/law/index.htm.

and others is that Leiter made a good faith attempt to account for regional differences, firm quality, and class size.[16] Unfortunately, Leiter's study suffers from significant sources of error that make his ordinal rankings a poor tool for prospective law students. Leiter fails to distinguish between recent hires and individuals hired a long time ago, fails to adjust for differing student sectoral preferences and for differing student regional preferences, does not properly adjust for LLM graduates, draws his data from an incomplete and inconsistent information source, made questionable choices regarding which employers to include,[17] uses an arbitrary methodology biased towards large schools,[18] and started his study with a pre-conceived notion of which law schools are "national."[19] Although every study will inevitably suffer from some error, Leiter's highly significant errors all could have allbeen avoided by using proper research methods. [20]

Of course, this begs the question: if existing commercial and non-commercial rankings are heavily flawed, and law schools disclose little or no meaningful career placement information, how can law school deans expect prospective students to gather their own information about schools in order to make informed decisions? The answer is simple: they cannot. Without access to standardized employment placement data, law school applicants are forced to either make decisions based on subjective criteria such as "fit," or use unreliable ordinal rankings such as *U.S. News*. This is an unacceptable state of affairs. I seek to remedy the situation in two ways: developing the first set of standardized regional and national employment placement rankings that take sectoral and regional preferences into account, and identifying several key variables that are strong predictors of national employment placement.

I. Research Design

How, then, does one go about studying employment placement? The American legal market has become so large that no one paper can examine every sector.[21] Although the elite law

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[16] While Wehrli adjusted for class size and quality, he did not take regional differences into account.

[17] Exclusively using the 2003 edition of Vault's guide to determine which employers are elite may be misleading. Even if one assumes that regional Vault rank perfectly correlates with regional firm prestige, one must remember that Leiter's study includes individuals who were hired over a period lasting several decades. While these 45 employers might be the most elite in their region in 2003, they might not have been the most elite in their region in 1983, or 1963.

[18] Leiter himself states that "without a doubt, two of the measures used in calculating the overall rank are sensitive to the number of graduates," and concedes that this favors large schools such as Georgetown and Texas and hurts smaller schools. It is unclear why Leiter chose to include these two measures in his ranking formula knowing the bias it introduces. *See* Leiter, *supra* note 15.

[19] Leiter states that he studied the "usual suspects for the top law schools," "two schools on the cusp of this elite group." and four "very reputable, but presumably less national schools" only "as a check on the reliability of the results." *Id.* Such assumptions are unfounded and no prior research supported such claims. Rather than coming to such a conclusion before conducting his study and limiting his research to such a small number of schools, Leiter should have examined every ABA-accredited law school.

[20] In the research design and methodology sections, I will elaborate more on the flaws with Leiter's study and what steps should have been taken to avoid the errors he introduced.

[21] *See generally* American Bar Association, *National Lawyer Population By State* (2004), *available at* http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/2004nbroflawyersbystate.pdf (quantifying the supply of practicing American lawyers, which currently stands at more than one million); BizStats, *Size of U.S. Markets By Industry* (2003), *available at* http://www.bizstats.com/marketsizes.htm (estimating the dollar value of the demand for legal services, which was about $170 billion in 2001).

firms I examine only represent five to ten percent of the entire legal employment market,[22] such firms generally hire many recent law graduates[23] and pay the highest starting salaries. Many prospective and current law students aspire to such jobs, and are genuinely interested in maximizing their chances at getting hired by such a firm.[24] Furthermore, the data necessary to examine elite firm placement is easily accessible. While I acknowledge the demand for analysis of judicial clerkship placement or public interest hiring, such studies are fodder for other researchers.

Which Firms Were Studied?

There is no consensus on what constitutes an elite law firm. My first challenge, then, involved distinguishing elite law firms from other law firms. This was no easy task. Ultimately, I settled on this definition: *An elite law firm is both prestigious and profitable.* Not seeking to reinvent the wheel, I relied on two law firm commercial rankings – Vault and the American Lawyer – to measure these characteristics.

Why prestige and profitability? Simply put, these two factors represent the external and internal opportunities available to a typical associate. Prestige represents an associate's external opportunities. While some associates may strive for partnership, the tournament nature of the partnership track dictates that most associates will leave their initial law firm prior to their partnership review. In fact, many associates join an elite firm without having any intention of ever making partner.[25] Such individuals may gain many tangible benefits from working at a more prestigious firm – most importantly, greater lateral opportunities. Thus, by maximizing firm prestige, an individual may maximize his or her chances of obtaining a more desirable second job.

Just as prestige represents external opportunities, profitability represents internal opportunities. Although more and more associates are entering firms without intending to make partner, a significant number of associates continue to join with hopes to become partners one day. For these individuals, profitability represents the carrot at the end of the stick – by choosing a law firm based on its profitability, individuals maximize potential future earnings. However, profitability serves as an indicator of quality even to those who do not wish to become partner. Profitability may correlate with other factors employees find desirable. For instance, a very profitable firm may provide its associates with greater job security, relative to firms that are less profitable.

A. Vault Rank: A Proxy for Prestige

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[22] Wehrli estimated that 4.7% of attorneys working in the United States in 1997 were employed by the nation's top 100 firms. *See* John Wehrli, *Interesting Statistics About the Nation's Largest Law Firms* (1996), *available at* http://web.archive.org/web/19980118225715/wehrli.ilrg.com/lawfirmstats.html.

[23] My research found 15,293 graduates of the classes of 2001, 2002, and 2003 are currently working at these firms.

[24] *See generally* http://www.autoadmit.com/main.php?forum_id=2&hid=172 (discussing legal employment, particularly placement at elite law firms).

[25] Kordana argues that associates choose to work at these firms primarily to improve their lawyering skills and enhance their human capital. *See generally* Kevin A. Kordana, *Law Firms and Associate Careers: Tournament Theory Versus the Production-Imperative Model*, 104 YALE L.J. 1907 (1995).

"Prestige," like "elite law firm," is a term rather hard to define. It is a highly subjective concept, and no consensus has been reached as to what makes one firm more prestigious than another. For this study's purposes, I have defined a firm's prestige as "how the firm is perceived by its peers relative to other firms." While every individual might have his or her own idea of prestige, by aggregating many individuals' perceptions, one can still get a good idea of how a firm is perceived relative to its peers.

As with any qualitative concept, prestige is difficult to quantify. Thankfully, Vault has made a significant attempt to quantify law firm prestige:

> How does Vault come up with its list of the Top 100 firms in the country? The first step is to compile a list of the most renowned law firms in the land by reviewing the feedback we receive from previous surveys, consulting our previous lists, poring over legal newspapers, talking to lawyers in the field and checking out other published rankings. This year, our list was made up of 150 law firms. We asked these 150 law firms to distribute a password-protected online survey to their associates. In total 14,052 attorneys returned anonymous surveys to Vault. Associates from all over the country and the world responded. We heard from lawyers in New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Palo Alto, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, Houston, Dallas, Washington, D.C., Miami, Cleveland, Seattle, Orlando, Phoenix and Atlanta, among many other domestic locations, not to mention London, Paris and beyond. The online survey asked attorneys to score each of the 150 law firms on a scale of 1 to 10 based how prestigious it is to work for the firm. Associates were asked to ignore any firm with which they were unfamiliar and were not allowed to rank their own firm.
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> We collected all the surveys and averaged the score for each firm. The firms were then ranked in order, starting with the highest average prestige score as No. 1 on down to determine the Vault Top 100. Remember that in the Top 100, Vault is not assessing firms by profit, size, lifestyle, number of deals or quality of service; we are ranking the most prestigious law firms based on the perceptions of currently practicing lawyers at peer firms.[26]

While Vault's rankings are certainly not without flaws and biases, they represent the best proxy available for law firm prestige, and current law students are known to consult the annual Vault rankings during the employment process.[27] Therefore, I chose to include in my dataset every law firm ranked in the Vault Top 100 as well as the Vault "Best of the Rest."

B. The American Lawyer Profits Per Partner Rankings

While prestige is an important factor, it is by far not the only one. Law firms are ultimately businesses, and one of the best indicators of any business's success is its profitability. Although prestige and profitability often go hand in hand, that is not often the case. Some firms, while greatly respected by their peers, are not commercially successful, whereas others generate millions in yearly profits but do not command the same respect as many less profitable firms.

Unfortunately, there is no one resource that lists every single law firm in the country and its profits per equity partner (hereafter referred to as "PPP"). The American Lawyer, however,

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[26] Vault, *Rankings Methodology* (2004), *available at* http://www.vault.com/nr/lawrankings.jsp?law2005=7&ch_id=242.
[27] *See generally* http://www.autoadmit.com/main.php?forum_id=2&hid=223 (discussing the Vault law firm rankings).

comes close in its annual ranking of American Lawyer Top 200 law firms based on PPP.[28] Almost all Vault firms appear on the American Lawyer's list, as well as several firms not ranked by Vault. Given the importance of PPP, I also included these firms in my dataset.[29]

Some have suggested that I should have used revenue per lawyer (RPL) rather than PPP. I concede that RPL is a useful measure of a law firm's quality, and when judging a firm's financial viability one might want to examine RPL in conjunction with, or instead of, PPP. However, I chose not to use RPL because I do not believe it is as strong a measure of an associate's potential internal opportunities. Although I concede that PPP is open to some manipulation,[30] it is a better measure of the benefits that come with being an equity partner than RPL.

Which Offices Were Studied?

Unlike Leiter and others, I did not limit myself to only studying a firm's main office, or headquarters. Every domestic office of every Vault and AmLaw PPP firm was studied, for a total of 1295 offices. I excluded international offices in order to avoid the difficulties inherent in such an undertaking. The following table provides a geographical breakdown of the offices examined:

LOCATION OF OFFICES

AK	7	GA	27	MI	20	NJ	39	SC	6
AL	1	IA	3	MN	6	NM	2	TN	6
AZ	12	ID	3	MO	11	NV	6	TX	110
CA	262	IL	58	MS	1	NY	139	UT	9
CO	27	IN	11	MT	3	OH	33	VA	39
CT	22	KS	4	NC	29	OK	1	WA	14
DC	142	LA	4	ND	1	OR	9	WI	12
DE	17	MA	35	NE	2	PA	56	WV	1
FL	82	MD	39	NH	2	RI	3	WY	2

Gathering the Data

The data collection phase was conducted from December 2004 to January 2005.[31] I specifically chose this period to ensure that most of the Class of 2003's law clerks would have finished their clerkships and, if they were planning to enter private practice, join a law firm as an

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[28] *See* The American Lawyer, *supra* note 10.

[29] I acknowledge that some prestigious and profitable "boutique" law firms might have been omitted from my dataset because they are ranked by neither Vault nor the American Lawyer. Unfortunately, no researcher will ever have the unlimited time and unlimited resources required to do a completely perfect and flawless job. At some point, the researcher must make a judgment call and decide when to move on with the project – in this case, I chose to draw the line at Vault's 150 most prestigious firms and the American Lawyer's top 200 firms in PPP. I do not believe the omission of such boutique firms had a significant impact on my findings, since they are few in number and there is no reason to believe that schools differ significantly in the percentage of the graduating class that wishes to work at a boutique instead of a Vault or AmLaw firm.

[30] For instance, some firms may inflate their PPP by making heavy use of non-equity partners.

[31] Although I use the first person singular throughout this section, I had the help of two research assistants – Walter Harris Chen and Alex Tsaivos – during the data collection process. While they contributed to the creation of the dataset, the resulting data analysis and conclusions are my own.

associate. I visited the website of every law firm on either the Vault Top 100, the Vault Best of the Rest, or the AmLaw PPP Top 200 list, in approximate rank order.[32]

I excluded 2001, 2002, and 2003 graduates who earned a JD or JD-equivalent law degree in a foreign country, even if they had earned an American LLM.[33] For the handful of graduates who had earned both an American JD and a foreign law degree, I took note of the American JD but not the foreign law degree.[34] Similarly, for the small number of JD graduates who had an American JD and an American LLM, I counted the JD but not the LLM.[35] I had also decided beforehand to not include non-ABA accredited schools.[36]

Some might wonder why I examined individual firm websites rather than use the online Martindale-Hubbell directory, as previous researchers have done. Martindale-Hubbell's online directory is an incomplete and inconsistent source of information. Several law firms only submit biographical information to Martindale-Hubbell about their partners and counsel, and do not provide the names of their associates, let alone where they went to law school. To illustrate just how much damage excluding a firm's associates can have, I'll use a concrete example. Two of the three elite New York firms Leiter and Sullivan examined have not included their associates in the online Martindale-Hubbell directory – Cravath, Swaine & Moore and Sullivan & Cromwell. According to the dataset Sullivan released, Martindale-Hubbell's search engine found 19 Columbia Law graduates working at Cravath. However, according to Cravath's own search engine, there are 87 Columbia Law graduates working there – including 69 associates not in Martindale-Hubbell![37]

I obtained graduation year and JD school for virtually every law firm in my study through their websites. However, a small number of law firms did not include graduation years in their attorney profiles or, in an even smaller number of firms, did not include associate biographies at

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[32] At each law firm website, I examined the section containing attorney profiles or biographies, with the goal of determining the number of 2001, 2002, and 2003 law school graduates at each firm and which law school conferred his or her JD. At a very small minority of firms, I was able to use a search engine to display all associates in order of law school graduation year. However, most firms did not have such a feature, so to gather this data I manually examined every associate's biography or directory listing and took note of each associate's graduation year and law school for every 2001, 2002, or 2003 graduate. For the small minority of firms that did not distinguish between associates and partners in their attorney listings, I examined every attorney at the firm.

[33] The primary reason I chose to exclude holders of non-American law degrees and American LLMs is lack of information on the geographical and sectoral preferences of foreign law school graduates and LLM students.

[34] Most of these individuals were part of joint degree programs where one earns a foreign law degree, usually from Britain or France, along with the American JD. Multiple American law schools offer such programs, such as Cornell.

[35] Virtually all 2001, 2002, and 2003 JD graduates I encountered had only a JD, and a significant portion of JD/LLM graduates earned their LLM from the same institution as their JD (Cornell, Duke, and NYU in particular have popular JD/LLM options). Furthermore, many of the individuals who had a JD and an LLM earned the LLM part time while working for their firm. Therefore, I do not believe counting JD-conferring institutions but not counting LLM-conferring institutions had any meaningful impact on my findings.

[36] I chose to exclude non-ABA schools because I do not have data on their geographical and sectoral preferences, for *U.S. News* does not profile non-ABA schools. However, this became a moot point since I did not encounter any 2001, 2002, or 2003 graduates of non-ABA schools at any of the firms studied.

[37] *See* Michael Sullivan, *Methodology* (2005), *available at* http://www.calvin.edu/admin/csr/students/sullivan/law/method.htm.

all on their website. For these firms, I had no choice but to use Martindale-Hubbell.[38] I did not use the Martindale-Hubbell search engine to get my results. I do not believe that Martindale's search engine is reliable for this sort of study, since it does not distinguish between associates and non-associates, and includes LLM graduates along with JD graduates. Similarly, it is impossible to search for every single different permutation of a law school's name – while some associates might list their law school in Martindale as "UC Berkeley," others may list it as "U.C. Berkeley," "UCB," "the University of California at Berkeley," "the University of California @ Berkeley," "Boalt Hall," "Boalt School of Law" or countless other variations that a simple search would miss. Instead, as with law firm website biographies, I examined the Martindale-Hubbell individual directory listing of every associate listed as being a part of the relevant firm, and obtained graduation year and JD-conferring institution from those individual listings. When graduation year was not listed, bar admissions year was used as a proxy.[39] For the very small number of firms that did not list graduation dates or bar admissions dates on their websites or on Martindale, I prorated the firm's associates.[40]

II. Underlying Assumptions & Methodology

Assumptions

In an ideal world, researchers would have access to perfect information and would not have to make any assumptions. However, as discussed earlier, law schools have released astonishingly little information about job placement and the elite firm employment process, and much of the information that has been released is not standardized and, in most cases, is also incomplete. When faced with such little information, any researcher attempting to study law school employment placement will have no choice but to make several assumptions. Before discussing the nuts and bolts of my methodology, I will briefly explain and justify the assumptions I had to make to pursue this study.

A. Regional Preferences

When adjusting for region, I had no choice but to assume that students choose their initial job based on its geographic location. That is, students who want to work in the Middle Atlantic region will actually work in the Middle Atlantic region after graduation. I feel this is a reasonable assumption for the average student; however, I know this might not always be the case for all students. Some markets are tougher to break into than others, and individuals may have to make trade-offs. For example, an individual who seeks to work in Boston might have problems getting an elite firm job in that region, but may have an easier time getting an elite firm

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[38] All law firms examined through Martindale-Hubbell included their associates in the directory, so the Cravath and Sullivan problem is not duplicated for any firm in this study.

[39] I took into account that different states schedule their swearing-in ceremonies on different dates. For instance, I know that an individual who graduated law school in 2002 and passed the New York bar exam in summer 2002 would not be formally admitted to the bar until early 2003. I also understand that using bar admissions as a proxy for graduation year has some error involved – for example, some clerks do not take the bar exam the summer before they clerk, but take the bar exam after their clerkship finishes. However, the number of associates I looked up in Martindale and used bar admissions year as a proxy for graduation year is insignificant compared to the total size of my dataset, and thus would not impact my overall findings in any meaningful way.

[40] The only firms prorated were Cravath, Shearman, Cahill, and LeBoef..

job in New York. When deciding between making $50,000 in Boston and $125,000 plus bonus in New York, such an individual may choose to work in New York even if Boston is his or her preferred geographic location. In addition, some individuals may have very weak geographical preferences, and may conduct a job search that spans two, three, or perhaps even four regions. Unfortunately, data limitations prevent me from taking this behavior into account. To proceed, I have no choice but to assume that the typical student who wants to work in the Middle Atlantic will work in the Middle Atlantic after graduation.

B. Sectoral Preferences

Similarly, when making sectoral adjustments I had to assume that individuals choose what sector they wish to work in and are not forced into a sector by economic necessity. For instance, I have to assume that an individual working at a public interest organization is working in public interest because he wants to, and not because he could not get a job at a law firm. In reality grades might impact whether an individual works at a law firm or in a lower paying occupation such as public interest. There is some evidence to support this criticism. In their study of legal education and entry into the legal profession, Kornhauser and Revesz concluded that up until a certain threshold, students at NYU and Michigan with low grades were significantly more likely to work in public interest rather than in elite law firms.[41] Once this GPA threshold was surpassed, however, GPA no longer had any predictive power on job choice. Presumably, individuals with GPAs below the threshold were forced into selecting public interest jobs because they were unable to work at an elite law firm, whereas individuals with GPAs above the threshold were able to choose between working for elite law firms and working for prestigious public interest organizations. I acknowledge that this GPA threshold may vary substantially among schools of differing reputation. For example, I do not doubt that the GPA threshold at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School, where 55% of 2002 graduates were unemployed at graduation, is higher than the GPA threshold at the University of Michigan Law School, where only 7.3% of 2002 graduates were unemployed at graduation.[42] Although my measure of the depth of placement at schools such as Cooley might be inflated in my rankings because a larger portion of the student body might have chosen to work in public interest out of economic necessity rather than by true choice, I do not believe that higher ranked schools suffer from this bias. While some students at the very bottom of the class might choose public interest employment out of economic necessity even though they would prefer to work for a law firm, there is no reason to believe that a higher percentage of Columbia or Duke students are forced into public interest jobs than NYU or Michigan students.

C. Firm Quality Maximization

Lastly, I assume that students will seek to maximize firm quality. That is, students would rather work at the most prestigious and most profitable firm possible in their region of choice. I believe this assumption holds true on average, for the more prestigious and more profitable a

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[41] Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, *Legal Education and Entry into the Legal Profession: The Role of Race, Gender, and Educational Debt*, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829 (1995).

[42] U.S. News, *The Top 100 Law Schools* (2005), *available at* http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/grad/rankings/law/brief/lawrank_brief.php. (*U.S. News* premium login required for access.)

firm, the greater the external and internal opportunities available to its employees. However, I acknowledge that some individuals will turn down offers from higher ranked firms and instead choose to work for lower ranked firms in the same region. Individuals might do this for a variety of reasons. For example, interested in tax law may choose a lower ranked firm because although it is lower ranked as a whole, its tax practice group is highly prestigious and better regarded than the tax groups at higher ranked firms. Others might choose lower ranked firms over higher ranked ones if the lower ranked firms require fewer billable hours or offer a better chance at becoming partner. Unfortunately, since no law school releases offer acceptance information to the general public, it is impossible to determine whether this practice is widespread.

I do not believe this is a consequential source of error. Even if some individuals engage in this practice, there is no reason to believe that the average Penn student is significantly more likely than the average Texas or Duke student to turn down a higher ranked firm for a lower ranked firm. As long as there is little or no differentiation from school to school, my assumption is reasonable. In his paper, Korobkin observed that students in the aggregate "tend to wish to work for the most prestigious legal employers, or at least to keep open the option of doing so."[43] No evidence has been presented to cast doubt on this statement.

Adjustments to Total Class Size (n)

Having addressed the underlying assumptions, it is now time to discuss the various adjustments I made to the Total Class Size (n) variable. I reference Leiter's employment placement study in order to demonstrate why some of these adjustments are necessary.

A. JD Graduates

Leiter included LLM classes as part of a school's total class size in his study.[44] Such an inclusion results in negative bias towards schools with LLM programs geared towards international students. Many graduates of such programs do not intend to practice in the United States but instead return to their home countries to work after graduation. Moreover, including LLM graduates introduces an element that makes a rankings set a poor resource for prospective JD students who do not intend to pursue an LLM. Because LLM career placement is not the focus of my research, I excluded LLM students from a school's n, and only included JD students.

B. Period Studied

In order to determine which law schools are doing a good job placing their students at elite firms, one must examine contemporary hiring trends. In his employment study, Leiter did not limit his study to associates hired within the last few years. Instead, he studied all attorneys hired at these firms, whether they were non-partnership track counsel who graduated in the early

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[43] Russell Korobkin, *In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to Coordination and Collective Action Problems*, 77 TEX. L. REV. 403, 409 (1998).

[44] Leiter justifies this inclusion by pointing out that Martindale-Hubbell's search engine does not distinguish between JD graduates and LLM graduates, and therefore he has to include LLM classes as part of total class size to avoid artificially raising the rankings of schools with large LLM programs, such as Georgetown and NYU. *See* Leiter, *supra* note 15. However, this source of error could have been avoided entirely if Leiter had gathered his data using firm websites instead, which not only distinguish between JD and LLM graduates, but are also more reliable.

1990s, senior partners who graduated in the 1960s, or first year associates who graduated in 2002. Leiter acknowledges this problem, and concedes that his study "reflect[s] not only who Ropes & Gray was hiring in 1995, but some of whom they were hiring in 1970." Leiter also acknowledges that this bias had a significant impact on his rankings: schools like Michigan and Duke, which Leiter claims were more prominent in the past, may be artificially inflated in his rankings, while schools like NYU, which may not have been as well regarded in the past but have risen to greater prominence in recent years, may be low ranked relative to their contemporary placement. Leiter attempts to circumvent this problem by stating that his study "invariably reflects a school's reputation among elite firms over a long period of time." Although this may be true, and while his study may have academic merit, it has little practical value for prospective law students or other interested parties, who are primarily concerned with contemporary hiring trends.[45]

In order to isolate contemporary hiring trends, only associates who graduated in 2001, 2002, and 2003 were examined. Therefore, I began by limiting each school's n to the classes of 2001-2003, having obtained these class sizes from the American Bar Association's Official Guide to Law Schools.

C. Domestic Cohort

As stated earlier, I chose to examine only domestic firm offices. Because individuals who have chosen to work abroad are not relevant to domestic placement, I adjusted n by removing the percentage of each graduating class that works outside of the United States. This information for every school was procured from *U.S. News*.[46]

D. Private Sector Domestic Cohort

When making per capita adjustments, Leiter divided the total number of attorneys by graduating class size. However, the percentage of students who choose to go into law firms is not constant among law schools. According to the 2005 edition of *U.S. News*'s law school rankings guide, 80% of Columbia Law School's graduating class of 2002 was employed at a law firm. In contrast, only 72% of NYU's graduating class of 2002 was employed at a law firm. Since NYU graduates are entering private practice at lower rates than Columbia graduates, one can expect that using total class size, all else equal, would artificially inflate Columbia's ranking relative to NYU's. Other researchers have acknowledged this problem in their studies. Wehrli notes that Harvard ranked higher than Yale in his study even though its class is three times larger because "a higher % of Yale grades [sic] enter government service and politics than Harvard."[47]

Since I am only examining elite law firm placement, I must adjust the domestic cohort so that it only reflects those who have made the decision to work in private practice. The percentage of students who go into the private sector varies from school to school. To account

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[45] *See* Leiter, *supra* note 15.

[46] I had to use geographic data for the class of 2002 because data for the class of 2003 is not yet available and data for the class of 2001 is no longer available. I am assuming that geographic distribution does not differ significantly from year to year.

[47] *See* Wehrli, *supra* note 15.

for student sectoral preferences, I used the sectoral data available in *U.S. News* to remove from each school's n the students who went into academia, public interest, business, and other non-firm endeavors. [48]

Judicial clerks posed a dilemma. While clerkships are listed as a separate sector in *U.S. News*, in reality clerkships are only temporary positions for the overwhelming majority of students. Students will typically clerk for a year or two, and then enter another sector, such as private practice or academia. Hence, I cannot simply factor out clerks from n the same way I factored out other sectors, seeing as a significant number of clerks will enter private practice.

To properly adjust for clerks, I had to make one additional assumption – that the post-clerkship sectoral preferences of judicial clerks mirror the sectoral preferences of non-clerks. That is, if 75% of School X's non-clerks go into private practice after graduation, I assume that 75% of School X's clerks go into private practice once their clerkships end.

Data on post-clerkship employment preferences is virtually non-existent. In fact, I only know of one data point available: a Yale Law School study of its 1999-2004 graduates found that 73% of clerks entered private practice after clerking.[49] My assumption projected that 69% of Yale 2001-2003 clerks enter private practice after clerking. While my method clearly is not free of error, the difference does not appear too significant and there is no reason to believe that the error is not evenly distributed among all law schools.

E. Regional Cohorts

Arguably the most significant methodological flaw of Leiter's study was his failure to adjust for regional preferences. Student geographical preferences vary from school to school. For example, according to the 2005 edition of the *U.S. News* law school rankings guide, 78% of Columbia's 2002 graduating class settled in the Middle Atlantic (NY, PA, NJ) region, while only 6% settled in the Pacific (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA) region. In contrast, 9% of Berkeley's 2002 graduating class settled in the Middle Atlantic region, while 75% settled in the Pacific region. Of the 45 firms Leiter studied, only seven are located in the Middle Atlantic region, while twelve are located in the Pacific region. The problem is even more apparent than it seems. Within these regions certain states dominated – 77% of Columbia graduates stayed in New York, and 69% of Berkeley graduates stayed in California. However, while Leiter only studied three New York firms, Leiter included seven California firms, which artificially raised the rankings of schools like Berkeley, UCLA, and Stanford, while artificially lowering the rankings of schools that place a large proportion of graduates in the Northeast such as Columbia, NYU, Penn and Cornell.

Why does this matter? In order for Leiter's rankings to have any efficacy, one needs to assume that students do not have any geographic preferences whatsoever, and will choose jobs based solely upon prestige. Although firm prestige certainly has a major impact on choice of job, it is fair to say that most students primarily pick their jobs first based on location. Leiter concedes this point in his study, and poses the rhetorical question, "How many [students] pick

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[48] U.S. News, *supra* note 42.

[49] Yale Law School, *5 Year Career Development Survey: Class of 1998* (2003), *available at* http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/pdf/Career_ Development/cdo-summary_of_98dataonly.pdf.

Columbia with the goal of big firm practice in Dallas or Portland?"[50] I agree with Leiter's point – as the employment location charts in U.S. News show, few Columbia students choose to practice in Dallas or Portland.   In other words, one would have to assume that a Columbia student would rather work at the #1 Dallas firm rather than the #5 New York firm – an assumption that neither I nor probably Leiter are willing to accept.

My final adjustment to n involves creating nine different n values – one for each regional cohort. As discussed previously, to conduct this study I must assume that law students have clear geographical preferences. When measuring School X's employment placement relative to School Y, I could not simply measure raw national placement if students at the two schools have differing geographical preferences. In order to compare these schools, I had to examine how School X's private sector domestic cohort in the New England region places relative to School Y's private sector domestic cohort in the New England region, and so on for every geographical region.

Ideally, one would divide the United States into many very small regions. Unfortunately, this cannot be done, for *U.S. News*, the only standardized source for regional preferences, breaks down the United States into nine rather large regions:

Region 1: New England – CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT
Region 2: Mid Atlantic – NJ, NY, PA
Region 3: Midwest – IL, IN, MI, OH, WI
Region 4: West North Central – IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD
Region 5: South Atlantic – DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV
Region 6: East South Central – AL, KY, MS, TN
Region 7: West South Central – AR, LA, OK, TX
Region 8: Rocky Mountains – AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY
Region 9: Pacific – AK, CA, HI, OR, WA

Although there is some error involved in using this regional breakdown, no better standardized alternative exists.[51]

Measuring Placement Success

When measuring a school's placement success in a given region, one must consider two variables: depth of placement, and quality of placement. Depth of placement, more commonly

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[50] *See* Leiter, *supra* note 15.

[51] There are two significant issues related to using *U.S. News* data for this purpose. First, U.S. News regional employment distributions are not completely accurate for all schools. Fordham, for example, reported to *U.S. News* that it did not know what regions 10% of its graduates were located. Similarly, Cardozo submitted regional distributions that added up to 102% rather than 100%. I corrected for this by prorating these problematic distributions. Second, *U.S. News* regions do not correspond well with the size of legal markets. By putting secondary legal markets like Pennsylvania in the same region as very large markets like New York, schools such as the University of Michigan, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Washington, and countless others that send significant portions of their student body to secondary markets are severely underrated in my study. In fact, a school could theoretically place better in New York, better in New Jersey, and better in Pennsylvania than any of its peer schools, yet still be ranked lower than in its peer schools in the Middle Atlantic region as a whole because of the disparity in the number of jobs in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.

referred to as per capita placement (PCP), represents how successful a school is in placing its students at elite firms. A high PCP rate generally indicates that elite firms are willing to dig deep into the school's class when making hiring decisions. Quality of placement, which one can quantify by developing at a composite of mean Vault/PPP rank, represents the type of firm where a typical graduate will work. A high PCP rate combined with a high mean Vault/PPP rank indicates that a law school not only places its students well at elite firms, but places them at the most elite of the elite firms.

I was able to combine depth and quality in one single variable: total quality score (TQS). The regional TQS equation for School Z is represented as

$$TQS_z = \frac{1}{2}(q_z^{vmu} + q_z^{pppu})$$

Where q_z^{vmu} represents mean Vault rank and q_z^{pppu} represents mean PPP rank. I obtained q_z^{vmu} and q_z^{pppu} through the following equations:

$$(q_z^{vmu}) = [F^1_z*(q_1^{v})+ F^2_z *(q_2^{v})+ F^3_z *(q_3^{v})+…+ F^N_z *(q_N^{v}) + U_z*(250)] / (F^1_z + F^2_z + F^3_z +…+ F^N_z + U_z)$$

$$(q_z^{pppu}) = [F^1_z*(q_1^{ppp})+ F^2_z *(q_2^{ppp})+ F^3_z *(q_3^{ppp})+…+ F^N_z *(q_N^{ppp}) + U_z*(250)] / (F^1_z + F^2_z + F^3_z +…+ F^N_z + U_z)$$

In these equations, F represents the number of individuals at a given school working at one of the elite firms examined, and U represents individuals from the school's domestic private sector cohort who do not work at any of the elite firms. q^{v} represents a firm's Vault rank[52], and q^{PPP} represents a firm's PPP rank.[53]

Adjusting Regional TQS to Account for Differing Labor Market Conditions

The labor market for lawyers differs from region to region. Some regions have more elite jobs available than others, and one region may have a significantly greater ratio of job seekers to available jobs relative to another. In order to compare School Z's performance in Region A relative to its performance in Region B, one needs to adjust for these differences.

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[52] For 2001 graduates, a firm's Vault rank was obtained from the 2002 Vault guide. For 2002 graduates it was obtained from the 2003 guide, and for 2003 graduates from the 2004 guide. Law students typically make final employment decisions during their third year of law school. While it is true that many law students, especially those at higher ranked schools, end up working for the firm they summered with during 2L summer, and thus may have used an older version of the Vault rankings than I am using here, many individuals may attempt to "trade up" employers during 3L OCI or, particularly at lower ranked schools that traditionally place poorly, may obtain an initial job offer during or immediately after 3L year. Given that the number of schools where virtually everyone obtains a firm job through 2L OCI is significantly smaller than the number of schools where most employment outcomes are determined during the 3L year, I feel using Vault rankings available during 3L year is more appropriate than Vault rankings available during 2L year. However, given how Vault rank does not fluctuate too much for most firms, this issue is probably moot.

[53] Firms in Vault's "Best of the Rest" received a Vault score of 150, and firms on the AmLaw PPP list but not ranked by Vault received a Vault score of 200. The U group received Vault and PPP scores of 250.

In order to make this adjustment, for each region, I calculated a benchmark TQS, which represents the placement of a fictitious "average school" in each region. I calculated average school TQS for region r using the same equations used earlier

$$(q_r^{vmu}) = [F^1_r*(q_1^{v})+ F^2_r*(q_2^{v})+ F^3_r*(q_3^{v})+\ldots+ F^N_r*(q_N^{v}) + U_r*(250)\ ]\ /\ (F^1_r + F^2_r + F^3_r +\ldots+ F^N_r + U_r)$$

$$(q_r^{pppu}) = [F^1_r*(q_1^{ppp})+ F^2_r*(q_2^{ppp})+ F^3_r*(q_3^{ppp})+\ldots+ F^N_r*(q_N^{ppp}) + U_r*(250)]\ /\ (F^1_r + F^2_r + F^3_r +\ldots+ F^N_r + U_r)$$

$$TQS_r = \tfrac{1}{2}(\ q_r^{vmu} + q_r^{pppu})$$

where F_r represents every associate working at each law firm in region r, regardless of school attended, and U_r represents every private sector job seeker in region r.[54] The following table lists raw TQS measures for the average school in each region. The larger the TQS value, the fewer, and less prestigious, jobs there are in a given region relative to the number of job seekers.

Region	Raw (unadjusted) TQS
Region 1: New England	216.33
Region 2: Mid Atlantic	190.00
Region 3: Midwest	223.80
Region 4: West North Central	240.52
Region 5: South Atlantic	213.52
Region 6: East South Central	247.52
Region 7: West South Central	226.82
Region 8: Rocky Mountains	241.99
Region 9: Pacific	213.59

As the table shows, Vault/AmLaw jobs are most plentiful in Region 2 relative to the number of job seekers, and are scarcest in Region 6. In order to adjust for these disparities in raw TQS, regional TQS values for all schools were transformed to a 0 to 100 point scale. On this scale, 50 represents the fictitious average school's placement in the region.

Schools with scores above 50 place above average in their region, and schools with scores below 50 place below average in their region. Because of the many problems that arise from low sample sizes, schools that did not send more than 20 students to a region over the three year period examined were not ranked in that region. In addition, Rutgers-Camden and Rutgers-Newark are not ranked in any region, because most firm biographies listed "Rutgers University School of Law" as an associate's degree-granting institution without differentiating between the two campuses. Regional TQS values for schools in each region are located in Appendix A.

This method of regional adjustment is associated with two desirable properties. First, it allows the researcher to account for the varying difficulty of finding employment in each region. That is, if there are fewer jobs available in Region 1 than in Region 2, all else equal, schools that

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[54] Many thanks to Aaron Chalfin for his help in developing this formula.

place a large proportion of their graduates in Region 1 will have a lower rate of placement in elite firms. Second, this method of regional adjustment allows the researcher to account for transitory differences in regional hiring markets as a result of the varying strength of regional economies. For example, the recent recession has not affected all regions in the United States equally. Region 9, especially California, suffered particularly ill effects. As such regional placement of schools that place a disproportionate number of graduates in the California market might reasonably have been expected to have been lower from 2001-2003. Because any regional slump is already built into the benchmark TQS system, no further adjustments for macroeconomic conditions in regional markets are necessary.

III. National Rankings

Aggregating Across Regions

As stated earlier, one cannot create a national ranking merely by looking at raw PCPs or raw mean quality ranks, due to the differences in regional labor markets. To develop a national TQS measure, one must aggregate the regional rankings. However, there is still the dilemma of how to aggregate.

Two possible aggregation schemes immediately come to mind: aggregation by market share, and aggregation by student preferences. In aggregation by market share, each region is assigned a weight based on its share of the legal employment market. For example, if the Middle Atlantic region compromises 33% of the market, placement in the Middle Atlantic region will compromise 33% of the national TQS figure for every school. The formula for aggregation by market share would look like this:

$$TQS^{Nm}_z = r^1*(TQS^1_z) + r^2*(TQS^2_z) + r^3*(TQS^3_z) + \ldots + r^9*(TQS^9_z)$$

where r represents market share. In aggregation by student preferences, each region is weighted based on the regional preferences of students at each school. For example, if 80% of School X's students work in the Middle Atlantic region, Middle Atlantic placement would comprise 80% of national TQS. In contrast, if only 1% of School Y's students work in the Middle Atlantic region, Middle Atlantic placement would only comprise 1% of national TQS. The formula for aggregation by student preferences would look like this:

$$TQS^{Np}_z = p^1_z*(TQS^1_z) + p^2_z*(TQS^2_z) + p^3_z*(TQS^3_z) + \ldots + p^9_z*(TQS^9_z)$$

where p represents the percentage of the school's student body working in the region.

Unfortunately, there is no one model that obviously stands out as correct – both models have their pros and cons. However, I have elected to use Model A, aggregation by market share, for purposes of the national rankings presented in this paper. While Model B might be useful as a measure of rating career services offices, it is not useful as a tool for prospective law students, who may have preferences that differ significantly from the preferences of students at those schools. When attempting to measure national opportunities, it makes sense to assume that the average prospective student may have preferences in line with market share, and find rankings

based on market share useful. Although it is true that not all people conduct a truly national job search and even fewer people have regional preferences that are exactly in line with market share without any deviation, no other alternative model is attractive. Model B has the added disadvantage of ranking schools using criteria that are not consistent from school to school – while School A might have New England placement weighed as 1% and Pacific placement as 35%, School B might have New England placement weighed as 90% and Pacific placement as 0%. When attempting to measure national opportunities, uniformity is necessary, and Model A provides that uniformity. Individuals who disagree with my use of Model A for the national rankings can rely on the regional rankings, or go to the AutoAdmit.com website and create their own national rankings using my dataset.

As with the regional rankings, the raw national TQS values were adjusted to ensure that the average school receives a 50 score. Schools that score above a 50 place above average nationally, and schools that score below a 50 place below average nationally. Because this is a national ranking, schools that did not send a minimum of 20 graduates to at least two geographical regions during the three year period studied were excluded from the national rankings. While a national TQS value was calculated for every law school that met the two region requirement, Appendix B will only include schools that placed a minimum of 50 associates over the three year period studied. Individuals interested in seeing national TQS levels for all law schools are once again encouraged to visit AutoAdmit.com, where the entire dataset shall be available.

IV. What Influences National Employment Placement?

These regional and national rankings, while interesting, are not the meat and potatoes of this paper. Although this paper thus far has focused on calculating TQS, ordinal rankings based on TQS measures alone will have only limited utility to current or prospective students, or to career services professionals. Although it is interesting that Chicago is ranked number one in national employment placement, and that Columbia is ranked significantly higher than Yale, this information alone means little. I do not view these rankings as an answer in and of themselves, but as a starting point to ask far more important questions, such as *why Chicago is ranked first*, and *what factors cause Columbia to place better than Yale*.[55] By answering these questions,

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[55] Some have suggested that Yale's ranking might be deflated due to the nature of the elite law firm hiring process and the requirements for tenure-track positions in legal academia. Successful candidates for a tenure-track law professor position typically finished in the top 5% of their graduating class from Harvard, Yale, or Stanford and obtained a prestigious U.S. Court of Appeals clerkship – if not a U.S. Supreme Court clerkship. Or, to put it in other words, the cream of the crop goes into law teaching. The elite law firm hiring process, however, does not coincide with the law professor hiring process. Elite law firm hiring typically takes placing during the second year of law school, during the on-campus interviewing (OCI) process, where firms send recruiters to campus to interview primarily second year students for summer associate positions – positions that will almost always result in an offer for full-time employment being extended at the end of the summer. However, the highly competitive clerkship application process does not begin until the third year of law school. Individuals at the top of the class at Harvard, Yale, and Stanford contemplating legal academia will often go through OCI during the second year and work as a summer associate during second year summer, but, rather than returning to their summer firm after graduation, will take an appellate clerkship and then enter the job market for legal academics. I do not believe this has a significant impact on these rankings. The per capita placement portion of the rankings is determined by the percentage of 2001, 2002, and 2003 graduates who ultimately work at law firms, and thus individuals who clerk but then do not return to their summer firm after clerking do not negatively impact Yale's depth ranking. However, it is possible that this

prospective law students will know what traits to value highly when considering law schools, and academic administrators can identify ways to make their student bodies more attractive to elite legal employers. This chapter, although shorter than the previous ones, is without a doubt the most important part of this paper.

I used regression analysis to identify the factors that are significant predictors of national employment placement and develop a model to predict a law school's national employment placement.[56] This model can be represented using the following equation:

$$NationalTQS = -24.727 + 18.194*Reputation + 0.006*Size - 9.005*NoGrades - 9.136*Numbers + 2.446*Aplus + 6.442*NoRank + 1.440*Classes$$

"Reputation" represents *U.S. News* academic reputation rating.[57] "Size" signifies total class size for the classes of 2001-2003. "NoGrades" represents whether the school uses an honors/pass/fail grading system, where 0 = No and 1 = Yes. "Numbers" represents whether the school uses a numbers-based grading system, where 0 = No and 1 = Yes. "APlus" represents whether the school has an A+ or equivalent grade, where 0 = No and 1 = Yes. "NoRank" signifies whether the school discloses class rank information or class rank cutoffs to either students or employers, where 0 = No and 1 = Yes. Finally, "Classes" stands for the total number of classes taken during the first year of law school.

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practice might impact the firm quality part of the rankings. The most selective and prestigious law firms, such as Wachtell and Cravath, have very high hiring standards, and often only hire individuals who are at the very top of their law school class. The Harvard students Wachtell hires, therefore, are the very best at Harvard – however, if many of those Harvard students ultimately do not accept full-time associate positions at Wachtell because they take an appellate clerkship and then attempt to become legal academics, Harvard's mean Vault/PPP rank would be artificially lower, since many individuals at the very top of Harvard's class will not be working as associates at elite law firms. Schools such as Penn and Northwestern, which send significantly fewer graduates to academia, will not be impacted the same way, since most individuals at the top of the class who obtain appellate clerkships will ultimately work at a law firm after their clerkship ends. While I acknowledge that this bias may exist in my study, I do not know of any way to reduce this bias any further than I already have.

[56] Several readers inquired as to why I did not conduct a regression analysis on individual regions. I posit that law school reputations among practitioners are characterized by heavy regional bias, and that legal employers make significant regional distinctions. In its 2005 rankings, *U.S. News* reported that four law schools share a practitioner score of 3.4 – Boston University (BU), The George Washington University (GWU), the University of Washington, and Wake Forest University. BU is located in Boston, GWU is located in Washington, D.C., the University of Washington is located in Seattle, and Wake Forest is located in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Putting aside the other problems, it may not be appropriate to apply a national practitioner rating to determine employment prospects of these schools that place a large proportion of their graduates in one region. While these four schools might have identical national practitioner scores, these schools may not be perceived as equivalent in all regions, if any. Although employers in New England may view BU as a significantly better school, West Coast employers may consider the University of Washington superior, while employers in the South may prefer GW or Wake Forest graduates. Likewise, New York employers may strongly prefer Fordham graduates to graduates of each of these four schools, even though Fordham's practitioner score is lower. If school reputation differs from region to region, national reputation rankings are inappropriate to use in a regression, for they do not reflect a school's true regional reputation.

[57] Although I believe there are several flaws with the *U.S. News* academic reputation ratings, unfortunately it is the best proxy for institutional reputation currently available. I did not use the *U.S. News* attorney/judge rating because the extremely low response rate for that survey makes its validity highly questionable: only 36% of the practitioners surveyed replied with their rankings. With a response rate this low; the results are likely not representative of how the legal community views these schools. *See* U.S. News, *supra* note 7.

Below are results of this regression:

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.930(a)	.865	.833	6.15242

Coefficients(a)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-24.727	9.022		-2.741	.010
	Total Class Size	.006	.004	.125	1.402	.171
	US News Academic Reputation Rating	18.194	2.054	.820	8.860	.000
	No Grades	-9.005	4.280	-.163	-2.104	.044
	Number Grades	-9.136	2.668	-.250	-3.425	.002
	Does Not Rank	6.442	2.502	.209	2.575	.015
	# of 1L classes	1.440	.717	.154	2.008	.054
	School has A+ grades	2.446	2.292	.082	1.067	.294

a Dependent Variable: NationalTQSb

This regression equation is very strong, for it explains 86.5% of all variation in national employment placement. As the regression output table shows, five of the seven independent variables used in the regression are highly significant predictors of national employment placement. Academic reputation and using a numbers grading system are significant at the 1% level, while using a no grades system and lack of class rank disclosure are significant at the 5% level. The number of classes required during the first year of law school is significant at the 10% level. Total class size and the presence of an A+ or equivalent grade are not significant predictors of national employment placement.

No one should be surprised that a school's academic reputation is the single most significant predictor of its national employment placement. However, what is surprising is that while reputation is a factor, it is not the sole arbiter of national employment placement. As the following table illustrates, the top 15 law schools according to the *U.S. News* academic reputation rankings and the top 15 in my national employment placement rankings are not identical:

U.S. News Academic Reputation	School Name	National Employment Placement	School Name
1	Harvard	1	Chicago
1	Stanford	2	Harvard
1	Yale	3	Columbia
4	Chicago	4	NYU
4	Columbia	5	Virginia
6	Michigan	6	Michigan
6	NYU	7	Northwestern
8	UC Berkeley	8	Yale
9	Virginia	9	Penn
10	Penn	10	Stanford
11	Cornell	11	UC Berkeley
11	Duke	12	Vanderbilt
11	Northwestern	13	Duke
14	Georgetown	14	Cornell
15	Texas	15	Georgetown

If a school's academic reputation was the sole determinant of a school's national employment placement, one would expect the national employment placement rankings to mirror the academic reputation rankings. While there are strong similarities – 14 schools appear on both lists – there are some readily apparent differences. Most notably, two of the schools tied for first place in the academic reputation rankings, Yale and Stanford, are located in the lower half of the top ten in the national employment rankings. Even if one were to argue that the *U.S. News* academic reputation rankings fail to perfectly measure a school's academic reputation, other studies examining reputation and faculty quality, such as the rankings compiled by Leiter, have Yale and Stanford ranked at or near the top.[58]

I do not doubt that Yale and Stanford are among the most prestigious law schools in the United States, and am not claiming that, all else equal, employers would prefer to hire Michigan or Northwestern graduates over Yale and Stanford graduates. However, all is not equal among these schools, and the differences among these schools are not necessarily due to differences in the student body. In fact, the differences between schools like Yale and Stanford and schools like Michigan and Northwestern are due to institutional differences that individual students simply cannot control. Yale, Stanford, Michigan, Northwestern, and the other schools I have examined differ in their grading and rank disclosure policies, as well as the number of courses they require students to complete during the first year of law school. Law students cannot separate themselves from their institution's characteristics. A Yale student cannot have letter grades appear on her transcript rather than honors/pass/fail grades, and a Georgetown student cannot have any class rank information released to any students or employers when Georgetown freely discloses rank cutoffs. A Penn student cannot choose between taking eight, ten, or twelve classes during his or her first year of law school. Therefore, under no circumstances could a Yale student and a Northwestern student ever be completely equal. Simply because these students attend institutions with differing policies, there will always be differences between them unless one institution changes its policies to completely mirror those of the other.

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[58] Leiter ranks Yale and Stanford #1 and #4 respectively in faculty quality. *See* Brian Leiter, *Educational Quality Rankings of U.S. Law Schools* (2003), *available at* http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/rankings/rankings03.html.

In the following subsections, I will examine the institutional policies that are so significant that they can either cause a school's national employment placement to improve or worsen relative to its reputation.

A. Grading Systems

Very few, if any, individuals would argue that employers, particularly prestigious law firms, do not care about grades. In her article *Evaluation in Hiring*, Heather S. Woodson, the chair of Stinson, Mag & Fizzell's recruiting committee, concisely summarizes the importance of grades in the hiring process:

> No matter how much law students wish it was not true, law firms do care about grades and class rank. Every lawyer I interviewed in connection with this article mentioned academic achievement as one of the primary criteria used in evaluating law students. One lawyer described academic record as the "door opener". Without a good academic record, the student may never get a chance to persuade a firm to interview him or her. There are a number of reasons for this. First, it is very difficult in an interview, whether it is 20 minutes or a full day, to evaluate the student's intellectual and analytical ability. High academic achievement is at least an indication that a student "has the bullets" necessary to do well at a law firm.[59]

However, ABA-accredited law schools use several different grading systems, and have differing class rank disclosure policies; top schools in particular seem hesitant to reveal class rank information. An employer cannot simply put a Chicago transcript side by side with a NYU or Yale transcript and determine which individual has a higher class standing. After all, how would one go about comparing a 178 from Chicago with a 3.42 from NYU with one H and three HPs from Yale?

Of course, if employers are willing to put a lot of effort into extensively researching these differing systems, they might be able to come up with a way of comparing these applicants with each other. Woodson, however, states that "Grading systems vary widely among law schools, and most practicing lawyers do not want to spend a lot of time trying to interpret and distinguish these differences."[60] If employers are unwilling or unable to properly distinguish differing grading systems, some schools may have greater success at placing their students, relative to their peer schools, if they implement a grading system that employers find more favorable. My research supports this hypothesis.

Although each individual school's grading system has its own intricacies, previous researchers have been able to classify every school's grading system into one of three groups: a traditional letter grade system, a numbers system, and an honors/pass/fail system (often called a "no grades" system).[61] The unique characteristics of each system are apparent from their names.

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[59] Heather S. Woodson, *Evaluation in Hiring,* 65 UMKC L. REV. 931 at 932 (1997).

[60] *Id.*

[61] *See* Nancy H. Kaufman, *A Survey of Law School Grading Practices,* 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 415, 416 (1994); Jay M. Feinman, *Law School Grading,* 65 UMKC L. REV. 647, 650. Kaufman identified three types of grading systems – letter grade, numbers grade, and "other." The "other" systems included schools that used the honors/pass/fail system, like Yale, as well as schools that used a hybrid numbers/letters system, like Stanford. Feinman identified two types of systems: ordinal systems and interval systems. Schools with ordinal systems had the honors/pass/fail system, while schools with interval systems had either a letter system or a numbers system. I chose to use the letter,

The traditional letter grade system awards letter grades such as A-, B+, C, and F, to students. The numbers system, rather than (or in addition to) using letters, awards numbers as grades. The no grades system, in contrast, either uses pure pass/fail grading or uses pass/fail grading in conjunction with an "honors" distinction. As a general rule, the no grades system has very few gradations available, while the numbers system has many gradations available. In other words, relative to the letter grade system, the no grades system minimizes differentiation among students while the numbers system maximizes differentiation.

Supporters of both the numbers and the no grades systems have argued that these alternative systems are more beneficial to their students than traditional letter grade systems. Those who support the numbers system argue that transcripts that show great differentiation among students provide immense benefits to the top of the class. For instance, Chicago's strong clerkship placement is often credited to its numbers grading system, as it allows for very fine differentiation even at the top of the class. Similarly, those who support honors/pass/fail systems argue that those in the lower half of the class are benefited since it is extremely difficult for employers to differentiate among them.[62]

Both of these claims are probably true, to some degree – the numbers system likely benefits those at the top of the class, and the no grades system benefits those at the bottom of the class. However, the benefits these systems confer to those at the extremes do not come without any costs. Although these nontraditional systems may significantly help those at the top and those at the bottom, they bring about substantial costs to the middle of the class – a significantly larger group – and thus result in a net negative effect on national employment placement relative to the traditional letter system.

Letter Grade Systems

Under a traditional letter grade system, there is relatively little differentiation in the nebulous middle. Law school curves are often designed to generate outliers, and thus it is difficult to differentiate between people in the "nebulous middle" since at many top schools 30-35% of the class gets a B+ and another 30-35% gets a B. Employers can easily distinguish true differences in ability among the 25-30% of the class that consistently gets either As/A-s or Bs/Cs. However, the differences in the rest of the class are not as apparent because of the curve structure, and interviewers – often first year associates who have only recently finished law school themselves – know that the difference between a B+ and a B might not amount to much. This sort of system, meaning one that generates outliers at the extremes but leaves an undifferentiated middle, might not benefit those in the very top of the class, who could one day apply for Supreme Court clerkships, or those at the very bottom, whose failings are obvious, but it seems to strongly benefit the class as a whole, since most of the class ends up in the middle.

number, and honors/pass/fail categorizations because each of these systems is truly unique and it is inappropriate to merge honors/pass/fail systems with some numbers systems, as Kaufman did, or to merge letter systems with numbers systems as Feinman did. Although it is true that some schools, like Stanford, have what appear to be hybrid systems, in reality these systems bear far more resemblance to a numbers system, in that they offer significantly more gradations than a letter system, and the number grade appears on the transcript even if a letter grade is also present.

[62] *See generally* http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=114393&mc=23&forum_id=2 (discussing whether a no grades system results in better employment prospects for the bottom half of the class).

Numbers Systems

The numbers system, by creating a pure bell curve that eliminates ambiguity, allows too much differentiation, to the point where it reduces opportunities for those in the lower end of the middle, whose credentials would look more impressive if employers did not know that they barely got their B+s, or who just narrowly avoided getting a B- instead of a B. A numbers system may also make the bottom of the class look worse than under a letter system, for under a letter system the B- (or C) grade provides an artificial floor for those who did very poorly in a class but did not engage in any academic misconduct that would justify a discretionary F. However, under a numbers system, where the difference between the median grade and the lowest possible non-failing grade can be very large, employers can see just how poorly an individual did in a given class, which could do more damage to an individual's job prospects than a B- or two.

Honors/Pass/Fail (No Grades) Grading Systems

While those at the bottom of Yale or Berkeley's class might benefit from their nontraditional honors/pass/fail systems, those in the nebulous middle may have their job prospects impaired because employers cannot distinguish them from the bottom of the class. Those who favor these systems argue that creating very little differentiation helps most students because employers traditionally attach too much weight to grades, and having what amounts to a binary honors/pass grading system (since failures are extremely rare) makes it impossible for an employer to use grades to differentiate most of the class.

Theoretically, employers are supposed to respond by placing very little weight on grades at schools that use this system, and place greater weight on other factors, such as institutional prestige or interviewing skills. Those who favor other systems[63] have pointed out the obvious flaw with this argument: very few, if any, employers recruit exclusively at Yale – the typical law firm might recruit at as many as 25 or 30 law schools. Yale students are not competing just with other Yale students; they are also competing with Harvard students, Columbia students, Penn students, Georgetown students, and a slew of others at the most prestigious schools. While Yale might be more prestigious than Columbia, very few people believe that the reputation gap between them is very large, to the point where most employers would prefer hiring from the very bottom of Yale's class over the top (or even middle) of Columbia's class.

My findings provide strong support for this counterargument. Although there certainly are some lower ranked law firms that do not care about grades and will hire a Yale student simply because he or she attends Yale, those firms would hire Yale students regardless of whether Yale had a traditional grading system or an honors/pass/fail system. However, higher ranked firms, which are more selective and place a high value on grades, are unlikely to change their hiring practices – and, when faced with hiring a Columbia student who they are almost certain is in the middle of his or her class or a Yale student who could be in the middle of the class but could just as plausibly be in the bottom 20%, many firms would rather hire the Columbia student. This is not because these firms feel Columbia is more prestigious than Yale, but because law firms, as businesses, are risk averse in hiring and would rather hire an individual

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[63] *See generally* Daniel Keating, *Ten Myths About Law School Grading*, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 171 (1998).

they know excelled at a slightly less prestigious school over someone about whom they have little meaningful information about from a slightly more prestigious school. In other words, Yale's system, by only creating outliers at the top and then having a "nebulous bottom 70%," likely causes individuals from the middle of Yale's class to go to lower ranked firms than they would otherwise, and thus brings about a net negative effect on employment placement.

There is an additional reason to believe that schools with no grades systems impair the average student's employment prospects. Scholars have theorized that law school grades serve as a motivating factor: by having grades, students are motivated to learn more than they would otherwise.[64] Empirical research suggests that students who take courses on a pass/fail basis are significantly less likely to perform well in those course relative to students taking the courses on a letter grade basis.[65] Richard Lempert, in his article *Law School Grading: An Experiment with Pass-Fail*, discusses the results of an experiment he conducted at the University of Michigan Law School in 1970. In this experiment, second and third year students were allowed to take one course per semester on a pass/fail basis, although not everyone who requested that a course be taken pass/fail would ultimately have that option. Half the students who requested to take a course pass/fail were randomly selected to receive a letter grade, while the other half took the course on a pass/fail basis. During the fifth week of the semester, all participating students were informed whether they were getting a letter grade or a pass/fail grade. Lempert, in order to determine what impact pass/fail grading had on course performance, examined the cumulative GPAs of all participating students. There was no significant difference in the mean cumulative GPA between students who took all their courses for letter grades and those who took a class pass/fail. However, there was a highly significant difference in the grades the two groups earned in the courses taken for pass/fail credit. In those courses, the group enrolled for a letter grade achieved a mean course grade of 3.06, while the group enrolled on a pass/fail basis attained a mean course grade of 2.65.[66] Lempert wrote that "[t]he results of this experiment suggest that if a 'wildcard' type pass-fail system such as the one used in this experiment were to be generally adopted, student performance in pass-fail courses as measured by examination grades would fall off noticeably."[67]

Unfortunately, no researcher has followed up on Lembert's study to examine the impact of taking all courses on a pass/fail basis rather than just one per semester. However, given the significant gap in achievement between the two groups in his study, it is not hard to imagine that Yale students taking their first year courses on a pass/fail basis are earning significantly lower examination grades on their exams than they would under a letter grade system. Although there has been considerable debate, both among legal academics and students, about the meaning of law school grades, only an extreme fringe (if anyone at all) would argue that there is absolutely no relationship at all between examination grades and knowledge of course material. Yale Law alumni, particularly very recent graduates, have often been criticized for being too academic and lacking some of the practical skills possessed by Harvard and Columbia graduates. While some of these comments may be in jest, there likely is an underlying truth to such comments, which

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[64] Steve H. Nickles, *Examining and Grading in American Law Schools*, 30 ARK. L. REV. 411, 427 (1977)

[65] Richard Lempert, *Law School Grading: An Experiment with Pass-Fail*, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1972).

[66] *Id.* at 267.

[67] *Id.* at 284.

then translates into employers preferring to hire students from comparable schools.[68] It is likely that the average Columbia student retains more knowledge from substantive courses, such as torts or contracts, than the average Yale student, simply because all Columbia students are graded on those subjects and will presumably put significantly more effort into their studies than Yale students, who are being graded pass/fail and would likely only do the minimum amount of preparation needed to achieve a passing grade. Yale students, therefore, might require a greater amount of training from employers on average than their counterparts from other schools, and thus employers may prefer to hire from other schools in order to avoid taking on this additional burden.[69]

B. Number of First Year Law School Classes

The number of classes taken during the first year of law school can lessen the negative aspects of both nontraditional systems. Even if the honors/pass/fail system makes it very hard to differentiate the middle of the class from the bottom of the class, the more classes an individual takes under this system, the easier it will be for certain trends to emerge that could make more differentiation possible. If students take twelve classes, the number of individuals who are unable to get even one honors grade will naturally be smaller than if students only took five or six classes – thus, employers could more easily identify individuals at the very bottom of the class, and distinguish them from individuals who are truly in the middle.

While employers may still have difficulty comparing a Yale applicant to a Columbia applicant, the Yale applicant will benefit from having more classes (and more honors grades) on his or her transcript, since even if the employer assumes the worst possible scenario with the Yale applicant's grades, the worst possible scenario is better with twelve classes than it is with only six classes. The same is true of the numbers system, but in the opposite direction: more classes add slightly greater ambiguity, since it allows individuals who might have done poorly in their first term to visibly improve their performance, and thus make it easier to persuade an employer that a very low number grade was an aberration. In addition, those at the top of the class look even better when more classes are required, since sustaining a very high average over the course of twelve classes is harder than over the course of eight classes.

Employers may prefer individuals who attend schools that require many first year courses for another reason. In his research, Gary Negin examined the impact test frequency in a first year torts class had on final examination grade.[70] Negin divided participating students into three groups of 25 students each. Over the course of the term, the first group was given four exams,

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[68] *See generally* Tom Ginsburg & Jeffrey A. Wolf, *The Market for Elite Firm Associates,* 31 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 909, 925 (2004). Many of the elite Chicago law firm hiring partners the authors interviewed stated that it was not worthwhile to interview at Yale due to the school's heavy academic focus. The authors speculate that many of these firms recruit at Yale in order to signal quality to future clients and competitors, and not because they intend to actually hire any students.

[69] Alternatively, one might argue self selection: students who enroll in schools that use honors/pass/fail systems might not care as much about firm prestige and might not be as competitive as students who attend schools that use letter or number systems. However, I do not find this argument persuasive, for nothing in the previous literature would suggest that students at Yale are less competitive or less ambitious than students at Harvard, or students at Northeastern less competitive or less ambitious than students at Suffolk.

[70] Gary A. Negin, *The Effects of Test Frequency in a First-Year Torts Course*, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 673, 674 (1981).

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the second group was given two exams, and the third group only received one final exam.[71] Negin's experiment resulted in highly significant results: the 50 students who had taken multiple exams received, on average, significantly higher grades on the final exam than students who had only take a final exam.[72]

Although Negin focused on raw grade differentiation in only one class, it is likely that a similar effect might take place at schools that require more first year law classes – particularly at schools like Chicago that run on the quarter system, and may break down traditional one term first year courses into two quarter courses. Students at Chicago, by taking many courses that test the same subject matter, may be performing at higher levels in those subject areas than students at comparable schools that have fewer courses and exams. In other words, Chicago students who have earned the median course grade in contracts might have greater knowledge of contracts than Columbia students who earned the median course grade in contracts. This difference in knowledge may well manifest itself on the job, thus giving employers reason to prefer Chicago graduates. Of course, this is based on my own speculation based on my findings and the results of Negin's experiment. In order to confirm or deny this hypothesis, one would have to conduct an experiment similar to Negin's that focuses primarily on this issue.

C. Class Rank Disclosure

My results suggest that the best system overall system uses letter grades but does not disclose class rank or class rank cutoffs to students or employers. Under this system, employers may identify individuals at the very top and very bottom of the class, but cannot with any real accuracy distinguish the nebulous middle since they will not know the exact GPA cutoffs for the top 33% or top 50%. Although those at the extreme top may not do as well as under a numbers system and those at the extreme bottom may not do as well as under an honors/pass/fail system, the class as a whole is better off because the overwhelming majority of the class ends up in the nebulous middle.

Some might speculate that class rank disclosure should not matter at all. After all, if class rank was not disclosed, wouldn't employers respond by attempting to calculate rank themselves? This is a legitimate point, and I concede that there is nothing to stop an employer from engaging in such an activity. However, in his article *Who's "Number One"?: Contriving Unidimensionality in Law School Grading*, Jeffrey Evans Stake makes a persuasive argument as to why not calculating a formal GPA or providing class rank information can benefit students even if employers create their own unofficial averages:

> At the very minimum, we could stop publishing grade point averages and class ranks. Employers can, of course, calculate averages on their own. But in the process of doing so they may realize that the average of an A in Appellate Advocacy and a B- in Property simply does not mean much. Employers may also, in studying the particular grades, pay some attention to the courses and try to determine whether likely job performance is indicated in some of the grades more than others. Furthermore, over time, employers might begin to see patterns in the predictive quality of the data--for example, tax grades might predict

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[71] *Id.* at 675.
[72] *Id.* at 676.

performance as a tax planner, but not as a litigator. Employers could, in other words, get more information out of the data they already receive if they were made to take a longer look.[73]

While Stakes makes a good point, his theory alone may not explain why a school's failure to disclose class rank information benefits its students. Yet rather than examining the effect the lack of class rank disclosure on an employer's perception, one might want to consider the impact disclosing class rank has on students. The field of psychology may provide an answer to this question.

Dr. Andrew Watson, in his landmark study on the psychology of legal education, identified several negative ways in which class ranking disclosure impact law students. According to Watson, "law school education explicitly shapes the character development of law students in certain ways which are detrimental to efficient professional performance."[74] Students who discover that they were ranked in the bottom of the class interpret their ranking as a symbol that they have "failed,"[75] and as a result become both cynical and unemotional,[76] and their people skills become impaired.[77] Other scholars have reported similar behavior among law students. Kissam observed that "many disappointed members of the journeyman and loser classes develop attitudes of hostility, isolation, emotional detachment, and malaise."[78] Himmelstein found that law students with low class ranks will often doubt their ability to be successful practitioners, and will suffer from lower self-confidence and self-awareness.[79]

Surprisingly, researchers have not specifically examined the psychological effects of class ranking disclosure on law students going through the law firm employment process. However, it is not difficult to speculate on the impact these negative traits may have on student behavior. Students who know their exact or approximate class rank might be more risk averse in on campus interviewing due to their greater cynicism, lower self-confidence, and greater identification with their rank. For instance, if a law firm lists top 50% rank as a requirement, individuals who just barely missed out on being in the top 50% may not bid to interview with that firm, believing that they would not get the job; similarly, individuals who know they are in the top 33% but not in the top 25% may avoid interviewing with firms who have a top 25% cutoff. In contrast, students who go to schools where absolutely no class rank information is disclosed to anyone may cast a broader net, since individuals who in reality are in the top 33% but not top 25% may think they are in the top 25%, and individuals who are really only in the top 55% may think they are in the top 50%. While firms often do list rank cutoffs, it is common for firms to not rigidly adhere to them and to allow for factors such as personality compensate for a lower than desired rank.[80] Additionally, if the people skills of law students who are aware of

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[73] Jeffrey Evans Stake, *Who's "Number One"?: Contriving Unidimensionality in Law School Grading*, 68 IND. L.J. 925, 928-29 (1993).

[74] Andrew S. Watson, *The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education*, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 91, 131 (1968).

[75] *Id.* at 119, 130.

[76] *Id.* at 131.

[77] *Id.* at 133.

[78] Philip C. Kissam, *Law School Examinations*, 42 VAND. L. REV. 433, 481 (1989).

[79] Himmelstein, *Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry Into the Application of Humanistic Educational Psychology to the Teaching of Law*, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 590-91(1978).

[80] Woodson, *supra* note 59, at 933.

their low rank are impaired, as Watson observed, they may not interview as well compared to students at schools who do not rank.

V. Where Do We Go From Here?

Some individuals are very open about their desire for law students to make enrollment decisions completely subjectively. *U.S. News*, for instance, printed the following statement from admissions counselor Loretta DeLoggio in its law school guide: "I think anyone who applies to both Cornell and NYU hasn't got a clue what they're doing."[81] Never mind that both schools are clearly wonderful choices if you want a very high chance of earning a $125,000 salary after graduation, and that such schools are so hard to get into that only a fool would not apply to multiple top schools – DeLoggio seems to think that subjective factors such as "fit" should take priority over financial considerations. It is unethical to force all prospective students to make this sort of subjective decision by not providing the standardized data necessary to make an objective decision. While I agree that prospective students should consider geographic location, culture, diversity, and a host of other factors, these students should have the choice to weigh objective factors such as employment placement along with these subjective factors, and make the appropriate tradeoffs at their own discretion.

I have developed the first set of national and regional employment rankings that properly account for student geographical and sectoral preferences as well as differing class sizes, and have identified several highly significant variables that are strong predictors of national employment placement, yet more can still be done. As stated earlier, the information used to generate these rankings is not quite perfect; because law schools have released such limited employment data, I had to rely on law firm websites to obtain information on the 15,293 associates included in my dataset. This is a very good measure of placement, though granted it is not flawless.

An ideal world where employment data for every law school, broken down by all student demographics, is publicly available for use by any researcher who wishes to examine it will never happen, both due to the heavy costs involved as well as anonymity concerns. However, perfect data is not necessary. If law schools were to publicly release any sort of standardized employment data, prospective law students would not need to look at external sources, such as this study, to determine whether attending a given law school is the best choice for them. As discussed earlier in this paper, median salaries and percentage of students employed at graduation is not sufficient, since both measures are flawed and do not allow for true differentiation among law schools.

For most people, law school will be one of the biggest investments of their lives. When deciding where to obtain their legal education, prospective students should have access to basic employment information – which employers recruit on campus, how many students request interviews with them, how many students ultimately interview with each employer, how many callbacks were given to students who interviewed, how many students accepted those callbacks, how many students received offers, how many students accepted offers, and what percentage of

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[81] Loretta DeLoggio, *Quoted in U.S. News & World Report* (2004), *available at* http://www.deloggio.com/homepage/satisfid/quoted.htm.

the entire class received at least one offer from an employer that participates in on campus recruiting. This should be the bare minimum information provided – ideally, schools would also include information about each employer, such as starting salary.

Although some law schools, such as Harvard, already provide this information to their current students, all law schools should publicly provide this information on their websites, or provide a link to a centralized website that would list this information for every accredited law school. Naturally, schools that do a poor job of placing their students will not want to release this data, let alone publicize it. To avoid this problem, I strongly urge the AALS and the ABA to use their power to pressure or require law schools to provide this information to prospective students, just as they provide student attrition and bar exam passage rates. Not only would this decrease reliance on unscientific and unreliable ranking schemes, such as *U.S. News*, it would give deficient law schools an incentive to redirect their resources towards improving employment placement.

Appendix A. Regional TQS Rankings

Region 1: New England – CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT (n = 20 minimum)

School Name	Region 1 TQS	School Name	Region 1 TQS
Columbia	100.00	*Average School*	*50.00*
Virginia	92.16	Fordham	49.90
NYU	87.81	Notre Dame	31.08
Penn	86.80	Connecticut	28.36
Harvard	74.95	Syracuse	24.52
Duke	73.13	Western New England	16.85
Georgetown	70.97	Pace	15.73
Michigan	66.77	Franklin Pierce	13.53
Yale	62.02	Vermont	13.50
Chicago	61.91	Suffolk	13.37
Boston College	59.15	Quinnipiac	6.16
Cornell	57.59	Roger Williams	0.61
Boston University	53.82	Maine	0.00
George Washington	52.18	Denver	0.00
Northeastern	51.88	New England Law	0.00

Region 2: Mid Atlantic – NJ, NY, PA (n = 20 minimum)

School Name	Region 2 TQS	School Name	Region 2 TQS
Chicago	100.00	Cardozo	42.19
Northwestern	99.29	Miami	39.26
Harvard	95.34	Connecticut	37.91
Virginia	90.96	Wisconsin	34.94
NYU	90.89	Iowa	33.04
Columbia	89.23	Vermont	31.78
UNC	88.64	St Johns	31.23
Yale	85.94	Washington & Lee	29.15
Michigan	84.11	Northeastern	26.88
Cornell	80.23	Brooklyn	25.76
Penn	80.01	Franklin Pierce	25.04
Stanford	79.89	Catholic	24.07
UC Berkeley	79.53	Temple	23.25
Texas	77.68	Villanova	22.43
Emory	75.18	Pace	21.43
UCLA	73.77	Suffolk	16.84
UC Hastings	69.49	Pitt	16.83
Boston University	68.51	New York Law School	15.85
Boston College	68.45	Hofstra	15.26
Vanderbilt	67.46	Syracuse	15.08
Howard	67.14	UIUC	13.59
Duke	66.96	Quinnipiac	10.68
WUSTL	65.76	SUNY Buffalo	9.97
Notre Dame	62.08	Penn State	9.93
George Washington	61.60	Seton Hall	9.67
Georgetown	59.95	Albany	7.92
Case Western	56.76	Touro	4.25
American	56.70	Cooley	4.15
Fordham	54.04	Western New England	4.12
William & Mary	51.32	Widener	3.24
AVERAGE SCHOOL	*50.00*	CUNY	0.00

School Name		School Name	
Tulane	48.84	New England Law School	0.00

Region 3: Midwest – IL, IN, MI, OH, WI (n = 20 minimum)

School Name	Region 3 TQS	School Name	Region 3 TQS
NYU	100.00	Case Western	48.47
Penn	97.64	Ohio State	45.46
Vanderbilt	93.85	DePaul	35.59
Chicago	93.20	Syracuse	33.21
Harvard	92.06	Chicago-Kent	28.61
Virginia	84.30	Cincinnati	18.61
Michigan	79.89	John Marshall	18.59
Columbia	79.38	Cleveland State	14.20
Duke	76.43	Indiana – Indianapolis	13.42
Northwestern	75.88	Capital	10.38
Stanford	73.65	Marquette	10.36
Georgetown	68.05	Toledo	8.66
Yale	67.95	Valparaiso	8.21
Minnesota	67.41	Wayne State	7.96
Texas	66.34	Akron	7.77
George Washington	65.12	Northern Illinois	7.18
Iowa	64.77	Michigan State	5.04
Boston College	62.79	Detroit	4.66
UIUC	60.98	Ohio Northern	4.12
Notre Dame	60.01	Dayton	3.87
WUSTL	59.42	Saint Louis	3.24
Tulane	58.63	Southern Illinois	1.70
Indiana – Bloomington	52.21	Louisville	0.00
Wisconsin	51.06	Northern Kentucky	0.00
Loyola Chicago	50.54	Cooley	0.00
AVERAGE SCHOOL	*50.00*		

Region 4: West North Central – IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD (n = 20 minimum)

School Name	Region 4 TQS	School Name	Region 4 TQS
Michigan	100.00	George Washington	37.34
Wisconsin	90.86	Washburn	29.91
Notre Dame	79.90	Saint Louis	26.79
UIUC	60.10	William Mitchell	25.84
Minnesota	59.75	Creighton	24.68
Tulsa	58.57	Hamline	17.99
Harvard	56.36	Missouri – Columbia	16.40
Iowa	56.07	Nebraska	16.40
WUSTL	54.97	Southern Illinois	16.14
Georgetown	50.03	Drake	14.29
AVERAGE SCHOOL	*50.00*	South Dakota	11.50
Missouri – Kansas City	45.94	North Dakota	10.71
Kansas	43.99		

Region 5: South Atlantic – DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV (n = 20 minimum)

School Name	Region 5 PCP	School Name	Region 5 PCP
Chicago	100.00	U of Georgia	30.88
UC Berkeley	93.30	Minnesota	29.33
Harvard	89.33	Iowa	29.03
Columbia	88.72	U of Florida	28.13

School	TQS	School	TQS
Yale	83.86	Wake Forest	28.08
Cornell	77.34	New York Law School	27.63
Vanderbilt	75.95	Villanova	27.12
Stanford	75.03	Memphis	22.83
Duke	74.41	Brooklyn	21.42
Northwestern	74.31	Georgia State	20.74
Michigan	71.29	Toledo	20.74
Georgetown	71.01	Miami	20.35
NYU	70.08	John Marshall	20.09
Virginia	69.36	South Carolina	19.90
Notre Dame	65.39	Florida State	19.44
Penn	63.27	Mercer	16.80
Boston University	63.12	SUNY Buffalo	16.45
Boston College	59.61	Michigan State	15.57
Syracuse	57.91	Mississippi	14.25
George Washington	57.31	Richmond	14.14
Case Western	55.68	Suffolk	13.94
Franklin Pierce	55.56	UC Hastings	13.57
Brigham Young	54.52	Vermont	12.88
Emory	53.79	Temple	12.79
American	53.45	Northeastern	11.38
UIUC	53.13	Widener	11.29
Washington & Lee	52.65	Tulsa	11.23
Texas	52.46	Baltimore	10.17
Kentucky	51.35	Penn State	9.55
WUSTL	50.44	DePaul	8.42
William & Mary	50.39	Nova Southeastern	6.57
AVERAGE SCHOOL	*50.00*	Dayton	6.00
Ohio State	49.67	Oklahoma	5.74
Alabama	48.37	St. Thomas	3.89
U of Washington	45.46	Stetson	3.81
Tulane	45.08	Loyola New Orleans	3.47
Catholic	44.79	Samford	2.89
Tennessee	42.98	North Carolina Central	2.59
Howard	40.86	West Virginia	2.22
George Mason	40.67	Cooley	1.96
Denver	40.50	Florida Coastal	1.22
Kansas	39.65	Campbell	0.00
Saint Louis	39.06	Regent	0.00
UNC	36.49	Appalachian	0.00
Maryland	35.20	Albany	0.00
Oregon	34.66	Valparaiso	0.00
Wisconsin	32.81	Ohio Northern	0.00
Pitt	31.35		

Region 6: East South Central – AL, KY, MS, TN (n = 20 minimum)

School Name	Region 6 TQS	School Name	Region 6 TQS
Emory	100.00	Alabama	5.81
Vanderbilt	62.74	Samford	5.81
Cincinnati	55.24	Mississippi College	0.00
Loyola New Orleans	52.99	Louisville	0.00
Virginia	51.10	Northern Kentucky	0.00
AVERAGE SCHOOL	*50.00*	Washington & Lee	0.00

Tennessee	37.02	Kentucky	0.00
Mississippi	28.29	Appalachian	0.00

Region 7: West South Central – AR, LA, OK, TX (n = 20 minimum)

School Name	Region 7 TQS	School Name	Region 7 TQS
Harvard	100.00	*AVERAGE SCHOOL*	*50.00*
Virginia	96.76	Tulane	47.07
Michigan	86.82	Baylor	44.56
Vanderbilt	86.73	Texas Tech	24.46
Chicago	86.37	South Texas	12.96
Georgetown	78.71	Oklahoma	12.83
Notre Dame	75.66	St. Marys	12.68
NYU	72.66	Arkansas – Little Rock	10.29
Duke	72.44	Louisiana State	8.74
Stanford	69.98	Texas Southern	6.38
Texas	68.36	Tulsa	3.45
Washington & Lee	57.85	Loyola New Orleans	2.26
Houston	57.07	Oklahoma City	2.22
Southern Methodist	56.01	Texas Wesleyan	0.82
George Washington	52.39	Cooley	0.00

Region 8: Rocky Mountains – AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY (n = 20 minimum)

School Name	Region 8 TQS	School Name	Region 8 TQS
Michigan	100.00	Vermont	36.83
Harvard	87.04	Denver	35.08
Texas	82.64	Pacific	27.72
Arizona State	79.45	Tulsa	23.22
Georgetown	77.16	Gonzaga	20.60
Iowa	72.92	Oregon	13.55
Syracuse	63.25	Idaho	11.17
Utah	60.90	U of Nevada – Las Vegas	9.49
U of Arizona	56.51	Montana	5.68
UC Berkeley	56.04	New Mexico	3.25
Brigham Young	55.23	Wyoming	0.00
George Washington	52.66	Chapman	0.00
Colorado	50.87	California Western	0.00
AVERAGE SCHOOL	*50.00*	Cooley	0.00
San Diego	44.88		

Region 9: Pacific – AK, CA, HI, OR, WA (n = 20 minimum)

School Name	Region 9 TQS	School Name	Region 9 TQS
Columbia	100.00	Pepperdine	32.60
Chicago	92.05	WUSTL	30.86
NYU	82.44	U of Arizona	29.07
Penn	81.69	U of Washington	26.04
Virginia	76.83	American	24.90
George Washington	75.79	San Francisco	24.33
Stanford	75.12	San Diego	22.21
Northwestern	74.82	Syracuse	21.42
Yale	74.80	Southwestern	21.16
Michigan	73.83	Denver	19.79
Harvard	72.00	Northeastern	16.68
Duke	71.80	Arizona State	15.85

School Name		School Name	
Georgetown	68.30	Iowa	14.90
Cornell	68.15	Oregon	9.61
Boston University	65.60	Chapman	8.62
UC Berkeley	65.50	Seattle	7.95
Boston College	65.29	California Western	5.37
Vanderbilt	63.53	Pacific	5.03
Texas	63.09	Lewis & Clark	3.86
UCLA	60.87	Golden Gate	3.71
USC	57.00	Willamette	3.01
Wisconsin	56.20	Thomas Jefferson	1.43
Notre Dame	53.96	Hawaii	0.00
UC Hastings	52.36	Western State	0.00
Brigham Young	50.63	Whittier	0.00
Minnesota	50.57	Western New England	0.00
UC Davis	50.39	Drake	0.00
AVERAGE SCHOOL	*50.00*	Tulsa	0.00
Santa Clara	48.90	Idaho	0.00
Tulane	43.78	Cooley	0.00
Loyola Marymount	34.13		

Appendix B. National TQS Rankings

The National Rankings (r = 2, F = 50 minimum)

School Name	National TQS	School Name	National TQS
Chicago	92.48	Brigham Young	51.20
Harvard	87.88	William & Mary	50.52
Columbia	85.20	*AVERAGE SCHOOL*	*50.00*
NYU	82.30	Ohio State	49.43
Virginia	81.70	American	48.95
Michigan	78.82	UC Hastings	48.79
Northwestern	78.43	Tulane	48.25
Yale	75.86	Minnesota	47.65
Penn	74.97	Cincinnati	46.60
Stanford	73.59	San Diego	45.45
UC Berkeley	71.87	U of Washington	45.17
Vanderbilt	71.52	Washington & Lee	43.83
Duke	70.31	Wisconsin	43.17
Cornell	69.27	UIUC	40.08
Georgetown	66.71	John Marshall	39.97
Texas	65.69	Catholic	39.30
Boston College	62.51	DePaul	39.27
Boston University	61.67	Iowa	36.38
George Washington	61.32	Villanova	35.87
Notre Dame	60.81	Brooklyn	35.71
UNC	59.78	Pitt	34.95
Emory	59.64	New York Law School	33.81
UCLA	59.58	Temple	32.99
Howard	53.64	Syracuse	32.79
WUSTL	53.37	Pace	31.72
Case Western	53.31	Suffolk	29.29
Fordham	51.33	Northeastern	28.64

Appendix C. Regional Per Capita Placement Rankings

Region 1: New England – CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT (n = 20 minimum)

School Name	Region 1 PCP	School Name	Region 1 PCP
Virginia	77%	George Washington	21%
NYU	73%	Notre Dame	17%
Columbia	65%	Connecticut	12%
Penn	65%	Syracuse	12%
Harvard	51%	Western New England	7%
Georgetown	49%	Pace	6%
Duke	48%	Franklin Pierce	5%
Chicago	44%	Vermont	5%
Michigan	40%	Suffolk	5%
Yale	34%	Quinnipiac	3%
Boston College	34%	Roger Williams	0%
Cornell	32%	Maine	0%
Boston University	25%	Denver	0%
Northeastern	23%	New England Law	0%
Fordham	22%		

Region 2: Mid Atlantic – NJ, NY, PA (n = 20 minimum)

School Name	Region 2 PCP	School Name	Region 2 PCP
UNC	82%	Connecticut	26%
Northwestern	81%	Miami	26%
Chicago	75%	Washington & Lee	26%
Virginia	73%	Vermont	25%
Harvard	69%	Wisconsin	23%
NYU	68%	Northeastern	21%
Columbia	65%	Temple	21%
Penn	64%	Iowa	20%
Michigan	63%	St. Johns	20%
Cornell	62%	Villanova	20%
Yale	60%	Catholic	18%
Texas	59%	Franklin Pierce	17%
UC Berkeley	59%	Brooklyn	16%
Stanford	55%	Pace	16%
UCLA	54%	Pitt	16%
Boston College	52%	Suffolk	14%
Boston University	51%	Syracuse	12%
Vanderbilt	49%	Hofstra	10%
Notre Dame	48%	New York Law School	10%
Duke	48%	Penn State	9%
WUSTL	47%	Seton Hall	9%
UC Hastings	47%	Quinnipiac	8%
Case Western	44%	SUNY Buffalo	7%
Howard	44%	UIUC	7%
George Washington	44%	Western New England	6%
William & Mary	42%	Albany	5%
American	41%	Cooley	4%
Georgetown	40%	Touro	3%
Emory	36%	Widener	3%
Fordham	36%	CUNY	0%
Tulane	31%	New England Law School	0%

School Name	Region 3 PCP
Cardozo	27%		

Region 3: Midwest – IL, IN, MI, OH, WI (n = 20 minimum)

School Name	Region 3 PCP	School Name	Region 3 PCP
Vanderbilt	81%	Loyola Chicago	18%
NYU	73%	Ohio State	17%
Harvard	66%	DePaul	12%
Penn	64%	Syracuse	12%
Chicago	63%	Chicago-Kent	10%
Virginia	62%	Cincinnati	9%
Duke	58%	Indiana – Indianapolis	8%
Michigan	56%	John Marshall	7%
Northwestern	49%	Capital	6%
Columbia	47%	Cleveland State	6%
Georgetown	42%	Marquette	5%
Stanford	42%	Northern Illinois	4%
George Washington	41%	Toledo	4%
Iowa	41%	Wayne State	4%
Minnesota	40%	Akron	3%
Notre Dame	40%	Michigan State	3%
Boston College	39%	Valparaiso	3%
Texas	37%	Dayton	2%
Yale	33%	Detroit	2%
WUSTL	32%	Saint Louis	2%
UIUC	31%	Ohio Northern	2%
Indiana – Bloomington	25%	Southern Illinois	1%
Tulane	25%	Louisville	0%
Wisconsin	21%	Northern Kentucky	0%
Case Western	20%	Cooley	0%

Region 4: West North Central – IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD (n = 20 minimum)

School Name	Region 4 PCP	School Name	Region 4 PCP
Michigan	48%	Creigton	6%
Wisconsin	38%	George Washington	5%
Notre Dame	34%	Washburn	5%
UIUC	16%	William Mitchell	4%
Minnesota	15%	Saint Louis	4%
Tulsa	14%	Nebraska	4%
Harvard	14%	Southern Illinois	4%
Iowa	13%	Hamline	3%
WUSTL	12%	Missouri – Columbia	3%
Georgetown	8%	Drake	2%
Missouri – Kansas City	7%	North Dakota	2%
Kansas	7%	South Dakota	1%

Region 5: South Atlantic – DC, FL, GA, NC, SC, VA (n = 20 minimum)

School Name	Region 5 PCP	School Name	Region 5 PCP
Chicago	95%	Pitt	15%
UC Berkeley	90%	Oregon	14%
Columbia	80%	Minnesota	13%
Harvard	80%	Vllanova	13%
Yale	71%	Wisconsin	13%
Vanderbilt	70%	Iowa	11%

Northwestern	66%	Georgia State	11%
Duke	64%	New York Law School	11%
Cornell	60%	Toledo	11%
Stanford	60%	South Carolina	11%
Michigan	55%	Florida State	11%
Virginia	55%	Miami	10%
Georgetown	54%	Brooklyn	9%
Notre Dame	52%	Memphis	9%
NYU	50%	John Marshall	9%
Boston University	44%	Mercer	9%
Penn	39%	Richmond	9%
Boston College	38%	Mississippi	8%
Syracuse	38%	Michigan State	7%
George Washington	35%	SUNY Buffalo	7%
Franklin Pierce	33%	Northeastern	6%
Emory	33%	Suffolk	6%
Case Western	30%	Temple	6%
American	27%	Vermont	6%
Washington & Lee	27%	Widener	6%
Brigham Young	26%	UC Hastings	5%
William & Mary	26%	Baltimore	5%
Texas	25%	DePaul	4%
Kentucky	25%	Nova Southeastern	4%
UIUC	24%	Oklahoma	4%
Alabama	24%	Penn State	4%
WUSTL	23%	Tulsa	4%
Tulane	21%	Dayton	3%
Tennessee	21%	Stetson	3%
Ohio State	20%	St. Thomas	2%
U of Washington	19%	Samford	1%
Catholic	19%	Loyola New Orleans	1%
George Mason	19%	West Virginia	1%
Denver	19%	Cooley	1%
Kansas	18%	Florida Coastal	1%
Saint Louis	18%	North Carolina Central	1%
UNC	18%	Albany	0%
Howard	16%	Appalachian	0%
Maryland	16%	Campbell	0%
Wake Forest	16%	Ohio Northern	0%
U of Georgia	16%	Regent	0%
U of Florida	15%	Valparaiso	0%

Region 6: East South Central – AL, KY, MS, TN (n = 20 minimum)

School Name	Region 6 PCP	School Name	Region 6 PCP
Emory	15%	Samford	0%
Vanderbilt	6%	Mississippi College	0%
Cincinnati	4%	Louisville	0%
Loyola New Orleans	4%	Northern Kentucky	0%
Virginia	4%	Washington & Lee	0%
Tennessee	2%	Kentucky	0%
Mississippi	2%	Appalachian	0%
Alabama	0%		

Region 7: West South Central – AR, LA, OK, TX (n = 20 minimum)

School Name	Region 7 PCP	School Name	Region 7 PCP
Harvard	66%	Baylor	14%
Virginia	66%	Tulane	13%
Vanderbilt	66%	Texas Tech	9%
Michigan	55%	South Texas	5%
Chicago	55%	Oklahoma	4%
Georgetown	45%	St. Marys	4%
Duke	44%	Arkansas – Little Rock	3%
Notre Dame	42%	Louisiana State	3%
NYU	41%	Texas Southern	2%
Texas	38%	Loyola New Orleans	1%
Stanford	34%	Tulsa	1%
Washington & Lee	27%	Oklahoma City	1%
Houston	23%	Texas Wesleyan	0%
Southern Methodist	23%	Cooley	0%
George Washington	23%		

Region 8: Rocky Mountains – AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY (n = 20 minimum)

School Name	Region 8 PCP	School Name	Region 8 PCP
Michigan	52%	Utah	5%
Harvard	28%	Pacific	4%
Texas	27%	Tulsa	4%
Iowa	27%	Gonzaga	3%
Georgetown	24%	Oregon	3%
Syracuse	20%	Vermont	3%
Brigham Young	12%	Idaho	2%
Arizona State	11%	Montana	1%
UC Berkeley	9%	New Mexico	1%
Colorado	7%	U of Nevada – Los Vegas	1%
U of Arizona	5%	California Western	0%
Denver	5%	Chapman	0%
George Washington	5%	Cooley	0%
San Diego	5%	Wyoming	0%

Region 9: Pacific – AK, CA, HI, OR, WA (n = 20 minimum)

School Name	Region 9 PCP	School Name	Region 9 PCP
Columbia	85%	Pepperdine	14%
Chicago	75%	WUSTL	14%
Penn	63%	U of Washington	13%
NYU	62%	San Francisco	11%
Virginia	61%	Arizona State	10%
George Washington	60%	American	9%
Stanford	57%	Denver	9%
Michigan	55%	San Diego	9%
Yale	55%	Southwestern	9%
Northwestern	54%	Syracuse	9%
Duke	49%	Northeastern	9%
Harvard	49%	U of Arizona	9%
Georgetown	47%	Iowa	7%
Cornell	46%	Oregon	5%
Boston College	44%	Chapman	4%
UC Berkeley	42%	Seattle	4%

Boston University	42%	California Western	2%
Vanderbilt	40%	Lewis & Clark	2%
Texas	38%	Pacific	2%
UCLA	36%	Willamette	2%
USC	32%	Golden Gate	1%
Wisconsin	32%	Thomas Jefferson	1%
Notre Dame	28%	Hawaii	0%
UC Hastings	25%	Western State	0%
Brigham Young	24%	Whittier	0%
Minnesota	22%	Western New England	0%
UC Davis	22%	Drake	0%
Santa Clara	20%	Tulsa	0%
Tulane	17%	Idaho	0%
Colorado	17%	Cooley	0%
Loyola Marymount	14%	Southern	0%