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THE BASIS  
OF A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

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A Thesis submitted to the University of  
Western Ontario in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree  
Master of Arts

Assumption College

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# THE BASIS OF A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

## CHAPTER I

### Introduction

The sad turmoil of a world which seems to have lost all sense of direction, is nowhere more in evidence than in the current crop of philosophies of education which appear with a regularity that might appear encouraging were it not for the fact that they seem to arrive at diverse conclusions, and even at contrary conclusions.

A statement taken from one of the authors of the past might well sum up the present situation.

"What then is education, and how are we to educate? As yet there is no agreement on these points. Men are not agreed as to what the young should learn with a view either to perfect training or to the best life. It is not agreed whether education is to aim at the development of the intellect or of the moral character. Nor is it clear, whether in order to bring about these results, we are to train in what leads to virtue; in what is useful for the ordinary life; or in abstract science."<sup>(1)</sup>

And the statement "What is education, and how are we to educate? As yet there is no agreement on these points." is even more true today than it was at the time when Aristotle was exerting his immense genius on the problems which are inherent in a philosophy of education. In the first place, of course, the Philosopher was not troubled by an immense flood of contemporary literature on the subject.

And again he was in the position of a man having a complete philosophy of life, and the fullness of that philosophy was for him the basis on which he built up the answers to the questions that were posed in the field of education. It is not sufficient to say that

"The Philosopher was able to express a definite philosophy of education because he believed that education applied to the entire personality; that education meant always a way of living that led to the achievement of human excellence."<sup>(2)</sup>

because it is precisely at this point that the dispute begins. There is no one who sets out to give a philosophy of education who does not pretend that his system applies to the entire personality; the difficulty and the problems arise when it comes to the point of defining what is meant by the personality. There is no author worthy of his salt who does not hold that his philosophy of education leads to the "achievement of human excellence."; the precise point of dispute arises from the various interpretations of the reality of human excellence. The truth that does give a light on the procedure of Aristotle must be sought in the real metaphysical bases of his philosophy of education.

There is no room for doubting the fact that a philosophy of education is the application of a complete philosophy to the problems that are presented in the domain of education. Nicholas Murray Butler, in his Introduction to

his work "The Meaning of Education"<sup>(3)</sup> states:

"The serious student of education must be a serious student of philosophy as well."

And to quote J. Maritain, in the preface which he has written to Fr. De Hovre's "Essai de Philosophie Pédagogique":

"Le Dr. De Hovre est persuadé à bon droit que toute théorie pédagogique est fondée sur une conception de la vie, et ressortit par suite nécessairement à la philosophie."<sup>(4)</sup>

It is true that a philosophy of education is founded on a conception of the meaning of life, and a philosophy of education, founded on a meaning of life, must of necessity, if it is to be a true philosophy, and not a mere aggregation of opinions, come from a full philosophy, a formal philosophy, and must fulfill all the conditions of a true philosophy. As Mgr. Spalding says "a complete philosophy of education presupposes a complete philosophy."<sup>(5)</sup>

The aim of this work will be to show the bases of a philosophy of education as they are found in the philosophy which is so well called the "Philosophia Perrenis", the perennial philosophy. It is not a philosophy which can be dated to any period of history. It is not a philosophy which can be predicated of any particular group of men. It is a philosophy which has been current from the days of Aristotle down to our own. It is a philosophy which has enriched the culture of Athens as well as Oxford,

of Alexandria as well as Paris. It may be well to note here that the chief criticism directed against philosophy is that its history is just an eternal cycle of the same problems, always posed, and never solved. This, of course, is not a valid objection. The fact that it always poses the same problems is simply the proof that the problems are eternal, and always present, that they are problems which are presented by the very nature of reality, the nature of the world, the nature of life, and the nature of man. The objection which states that they are always posed and never solved is begging off the question. The statement that the problems are never solved can only come from a person who has not understood the solutions, and perhaps has never understood the problems. Dr. E. Pace, wittily and perchance a trifle uncharitably, likens the poser of this objection to the overworked donkey, a stock example in philosophy classroom, who is placed equidistant from two bales of hay and, because he is a donkey, starves to death as he cannot make up his mind which to approach. The critic of philosophy is like the donkey, he cannot make up his mind to approach any truth, but Dr. Pace says that our vocal objector is starving for the truth, and at the same time he is trying to convince the onlooker that if one bale of hay were removed, he would cease to be a donkey.



The fault in this constant criticism lies, not with the philosophy that answers the questions, but with the understanding and the application of the objector.

The truth is that this denial of philosophy and, what is as bad or worse, a prejudice in favour of some false philosophy is at the root of all the failure of the multitudinous theories offered to the educator of today. It is useless to deny that the prejudice exists because it is plainly evident in the offerings that are made to the educating groups by the proponents of many systems of education. As I said, the prejudice may take one of two forms. It may be an anti-intellectual reaction on the part of those who do not realize the intense vitality of the intelligence, or it may be what can be best described as a moral, or perhaps, immoral reaction, on the part of those who wish the human intelligence, as personified in themselves, to be considered the measure of all truth.

A brief summary of the prejudices found in educational principles that are current today is well summed up by

J. Maritain:

"Préjugé de croire à une psychologie scientifique au sens positiviste de ce mot, c'est à dire au sens où les sciences de la nature constitueraient l'unique science, à l'exclusion de toute métaphysique; dès qu'une science a l'homme pour objet. Elle entre dans la catégorie des sciences de valeurs; éliminer la personnalité avec son système de valeurs, c'est nier la nature même de ces départements du savoir et de

la vie; Préjugé de prétendre fonder la pédagogie exclusivement sur la psychologie. ....Si le psychologisme, abandonne partout, règne encore en pédagogie, c'est au plus grand détriment des saines notions d'éducation. Préjugé de prétendre fonder la pédagogie sur la seule pratique empirique. L'expérience pratique est indispensable, mais elle ne se comprend elle-même qu'en raison des principes qui la dirigent. Préjugé de vouloir réduire la pédagogie à la seule méthodologie pédagogique, c'est à dire à ce qui n'est que le matériel de la pédagogie."(6)

The plan that will be followed in this work will be as follows:

The next chapter will deal with the main prejudices that are found in current systems of educational direction, and will consist of an expose of the systems with a criticism of each.

The following chapter will deal with the philosophical truths which should form the bases of a sound system of educational direction. This second section will have two divisions. The first division will treat the metaphysical truths that are immediately connected with the process of education. The second division will treat the psychological truths that are immediately connected with the process of education.

The next chapter will treat the subjective development of the person who is the subject of the educational process.

The plan of this work may seem to be overambitious. But the aim and the claim of the writer is merely to present, in order, the requisite background that, from the very nature

of things, must be present in a philosophy of education  
that will serve the ends of truth.

Notes on Chapter I

- (1) Aristotle, Politics, Basic Works McKeon, Random House, 1941, p. 79.
- (2) Needed: A Directive Philosophy of Education William Kelly, in Thought, June, 1938, p. 198.
- (3) Nicholas Murray Butler The Meaning of Education, p. 3 Introduction, New York, 1915.
- (4) p. viii, Introduction to Essai de Philosophie Pédagogique by Maritain.
- (5) Things of the Mind Spalding, New York, 1907, p. 128.
- (6) p. ix, Introduction to Essai Philosophie Pédagogique by Maritain.

## CHAPTER II

## Current Systems of Educational Direction

## Part I Naturalism

In a very recent issue of one of our Canadian magazines, Maclean's, <sup>(1)</sup> there is an article which is of interest to the student of education. The article in itself is of no great value. It spends several pages describing a school in England where complete self-expression is the rule of life. It describes the life in detail, with special stress on the fact that the only regulations binding on the children are a few prohibitions, e.g., sexual intercourse, and that these few restrictions are in force, not because the educational authorities of the school wish to restrict the pupils but because there might be an unfavourable reaction on the part of the parents and guardians of the children. The reason why this article is of interest to the student of education lies in the fact that a magazine would take the trouble to publish an article of such a nature. It is a recognized fact that any philosophical thought takes a generation and a half to penetrate to the masses of the people; the process consists in having the thought worked out in the mind of the philosopher, then being transmitted, by teaching or by writing, to the next generation who, in

turn, are the teachers and leaders of the succeeding generations of youth. The ideas of this article, which are now being put into practice, have the familiar history. They follow, and enlarge upon, and put into practice the teachings of the Philosophers of Nature of the XIXth century.

The roots of this stress on Naturalism are in themselves anti-intellectual, and even anti-rational. The father of the modern school of naturalism is without doubt Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and it was the publication of his romantic novel "Emile" in 1762 that drew the attention of the world to his naturalistic teachings on the theory of education. "He said that children should be allowed to follow their natural inclinations, instead of being driven to artificial studies which they detested and which corrupted them."<sup>(2)</sup> Left to himself the influence of Rousseau might not have been so great, for it is rather difficult to take seriously a man who proclaims "If I am not a saint, who is?" It matters little that the Queen of France and her ladies played at being dairymaids. But what was of importance was the fact that many of the teachers and writers fell under his influence. David Hume was fond of him and befriended him. Thomas Paine was indebted to him for a large part of his political philosophy. Herder fairly worshipped him. Kant took many of his ideas, and after putting them through his idealistic

categories, spread them throughout Germany. This was the root of the "Back to Nature" movement in the modern world, and the influence of it is still to be felt, in religion, politics, society and, as is clear from the article mentioned above, in the field of educational philosophy.

Of course it is not the raw and unpalatable anti-intellectualism of Rousseau himself that is taught today. The doctrine has been adapted and made respectable by a host of writers. It has been reduced to principles, integrated and made systematic, and its name has been changed to meet the local conditions in which it grew. In France, (3) the teaching gained popularity under the name of Positivism and its protagonists were Renan, Claude Bernard, Taine, Littré, LeDantes and a host of lesser lights. In England it was John Stuart Mill, and above all Darwin and Spencer who spread the ideas of Naturalism and the whole movement came to be known as "Evolutionism". The publication, in 1859, of the "Origin of Species" of Darwin is an important milestone in the progress of Naturalism in the culture of Europe. In Germany it was taken up by the left wing followers of Hegel, Feuerbach, Strauss, Vogt, Buchner, Moleschott and Czolbe. Haeckel gave to Naturalism the title of "Materialism". In Italy naturalistic teachings were spread by Lombroso, Sergi, and Ardigò.

The basic teaching of the Naturalists, and of those later

variations of Naturalism, is concerned with the nature of man.

"The question of questions - the question which is the foundation of all the others and which holds us more than any other is the problem of the place which man occupies in Nature and that of his relations to the Universe."<sup>(4)</sup>

In other words, for the Naturalist, as for all Philosophers, the fundamental question is: "What is the relation of man to nature, of body to soul, of spiritual life to sensible life, of man to the animal?" And the answer which is given to this problem is the axiom which is the base of Naturalistic teaching on all points. The axiom is this: "Nature comes first, man follows: the spiritual factor in life is totally dependent on the corporal and the material."

"La Science approche enfin, et elle approche de l'homme. C'est à l'âme qu'elle s'en prend, munie des instruments exact et perçants dont trois cent ans d'expérience ont prouvé la justesse et mesure la portée. La pensée et son développement, sa structure et ses attaches, ses profondes racines corporelles, sa végétation infinie à travers l'histoire, sa haute floraison au sommet des choses, voilà maintenant son objet .....l'homme est un produit comme toute chose!"<sup>(5)</sup>

The implications of this axiom are immense and the thought is carried over into the whole field of human activity. The guiding principles of life and of all human action are derived from this principle. It is worth while to examine in details the more concrete principles of this school of thought in their application.



The first principle, and the one from which the whole movement derives its name, is that of the sovereignty of Nature.<sup>(6)</sup> The theory of Copernicus is taken as a symbol of the shifting of emphasis from the geocentric theory, that the world was the center of creation, and that man was the summit of all the creatures, to the theory that the world was simply one of many worlds, an insignificant particle, and that man, as all the rest of the world, was a very minute part and a very unimportant part in the scheme of Nature. Closely allied with the theory of Nature as Supreme was the theory of Materialistic Evolution. This theory was a mechanistic one, and held that man was entirely formed, dominated and regulated by forces in Nature, and these forces were matter and movement.

A natural corollary of the principle of the Supremacy of Nature was the principle that the supreme science was the Science of Nature. Formerly it was held that each science in its own field and using its own proper method was an instrument for the attaining of truth in its manifold aspects. But with the Naturalists the only science was the experimental study of Nature, and the only way to arrive at truth was by this study. The effects of this are carried over to our present day in the obvious fact that the leaders in science are regarded as the great benefactors

of mankind, the prophets and the sages, the new priesthood of truth and the apostles of the new life. It is in this spirit of naturalism that men like Einstein, the physicist, are quoted as authorities on everything from the existence of God to the benefits of the New Look. At least this was the case till the invention of the atomic bomb shook the world out of its complacency, and made men realize that the world of science, without direction and moral ruling was rushing mankind to disaster.

N.B. The evolution referred to in the last page, is not the scientific theory which is held by man, on scientific grounds, that there has been an evolution in the forms of material living things found in our world. This theory stands or falls on its scientific bases. The theory here referred to is the materialistic dogma of the Philosophic Evolutionists who pretend to explain and account for all in the world by the doctrine of material and mechanistic evolution. The method that was sanctified and made the unique method of discovery of truth was called the realistic method, or the experimental method, and from these names we receive the various designations used for the whole philosophy, Scientism, Empiricism or Positivism. The techniques used in this method were observation, experience, induction and experimentation.

Consequent upon this exaltation of Positivism and mechanism was the denial of religion. The various quarrels which were so dominant in the religious field in the recent past have their origin here; the quarrel between Faith and Reason; Superstition and Knowledge; Revelation and Evolution; Science and Religion; Supernaturalism and Naturalism; Dogma and

Scepticism: all these quarrels have their origin in the fact that Naturalism, by pretending to limit truth to mere material and physical and observable things, naturally denied any truth to things which were purely intellectual or were beyond the scope of physical experimentation.

Another consequence of this domination of Positivism was the denial of the rights of philosophy or of metaphysics to their claim of truth. It was the claim of the protagonists of Positivism that philosophy was purely theoretic, abstract and out of touch with the realities of life. The past with all its confusion belonged to philosophy, but the future, bright with the promise of all good things for man, belonged to Natural Science.

But it was man who suffered the greatest reversal in this new scheme of things. The consequence of the denial of the superiority of the soul, of the insistence on the materialistic evolution of man, removed him from his traditional place on the pinnacle of earth and placed him very low in the scale of values. And the dethronement of man led to the lessening of the value of all human action. Art and Literature must be impregnated with the methods and techniques of Naturalism. The clinical description of the facts of life was done by the writers of the school, Zola, Goncourt, Dumas Fils, Flaubert, Beaudelaire, Leconte

de Lisle, Sully Prudhomme and a host of other so-called Realists. The same ideas were carried over to the field of morals, no longer was it a question of what was right or wrong, but a question of what was or was not useful in certain circumstances. In true materialistic manner economic values took the place of moral values, and even Right was reduced to the level of Force. The measure of morals was arrived at by an inductive study of the moral life of various peoples, and the right way of morality was deduced from the moral state of the peoples under study. A striking example of this is to be found in the recently published, and much publicized Kinsey Report on the sexual behaviour of males in America, which was a statistical study of the sex habits of the American male and, as such, has the value of any statistical study, with all its limitations. But the point of interest to the student of educational theory is that he arrived at the conclusion that the sex standards of the people must be changed, because of the findings of the surveyors. This is a clear example of the inroads of Naturalism on the moral order. It was the claim, and the logical claim of the naturalist, that man was a social unit, a cell in the social structure, and had the rights that belonged to a unit of society; in this way the individual was stressed as the unit, but the way was paved for later social-

istic development. The same ideas make the history of man and his culture depend on the physical factors which surround him, to the exclusion of spiritual motivation. These factors were biological and economic, and were the foundations of all culture.

The impact of these principles on education is easy to foresee. The man who embodied and proclaimed the educational principles of Naturalism was Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). They are set forth in a series of volumes which he published from the years 1860 to 1896: 1. General Principles, (1862). 2. Biological Principles, (1864). 3. Psychological Principles, (1870). 4. Sociological Principles, (1876). 5. Moral Principles (1891), and a work on Pedagogy "Education; Intellectual, Moral and Physical", (1898). The tone of his teaching may be clearly gathered from the following quotations:

"....How to develop the body? How to direct the intelligence? How to run business? In what way must one raise his family? How must one fulfill his duty as citizen? In what manner must we use all the goods of nature which are given to man? What is the best way to employ all our faculties for our own greatest good and for that of others? How to live a complete life.....this is the great thing that education must teach. To prepare us for a complete life, this is the end of education."(7)

These are the questions which Spencer asked; what is the answer he gives? In the same work he says:

"..the first condition of success in this world is to be a good animal, and the first condition of national prosperity is that the nation be formed of good animals."(8)

And Herbert Spencer is a representative man of the Naturalistic School of Pedagogy and his influence is widespread. President Charles W. Eliot says in his Introduction to the Pedagogy of Spencer:

"By Spencer, the pedagogical ideas of Comenius, Montaigne, Locke, Milton, Rousseau, Pestalozzi and others were spread on a grand scale among the practicing teachers."(9)

#### Part Two: Criticism of Naturalism

For a philosophical criticism of Naturalism there is but one necessary procedure, and that is the examination of the fundamental axiom of the system and a criticism of that axiom in the light of universally recognized truths. The axiom, as stated above, p. 12, reads: L'homme est un produit comme tout chose. (10) Man, like the rest of the material world is a product of the forces of nature, and "nature", in this axiom, means material nature. The implications of the axiom have been pointed out above, but for the sake of unity three of the main implications will be here repeated.

1. Nature is the great reality. This means that nature is the god of the system.
2. The Science of Nature is the supreme science. That is to say, experimental science is the only source of truth.
3. The laws of nature are immutable. This means that man is determined by material circumstances.

The results of such a system of thought are clear. The freedom of man is destroyed by making him the creature of matter. And with the destruction of freedom comes the destruction of morality, for a man who is not free cannot be a moral agent or have moral responsibility. True Science is destroyed, because by limiting man to matter any real knowledge of things through their causes ceases to have meaning; indeed the very nature of a causal relation is destroyed. And with the destruction of causality comes the annihilation of philosophy which is the knowledge of things by knowledge of their ultimate causes.

Obviously the criticism of the Principles of Naturalism will be based on the fact that, in spite of the claim of the Naturalists to be objective, experimental and realistic, they are in reality limited by their prejudices to a narrow and incomplete conception of both man and nature. They only consider the animal part of man; they fail to take into account his evident reasoning power, his intellectual power and all the spiritual forces that make the complete man. Consequently, their system of education is lopsided because they deal with the inferior aspects of man to the exclusion of the superior aspects. Their scale of values is completely reversed; they place science above religion; they place the body above the spirit; they place matter above form. In short,

their education ceases to be an education and degenerates into an adaptation of man to the material circumstances surrounding him.

This is, I think, a fair statement of the position of the Naturalist in education, and a fair and objective statement of the fatal limitations which such a system imposes, without authority and without reason, on their system of education.

### Part Three: Radical Socialism

The use of the term Radical-Socialism as a title of a section dealing with a philosophy of education should be rapidly explained because of the false notions which might spring to the mind at the use of such dangerous words. The meaning of the words Radical Socialism as used here is this: the theory which places the community at the focal point in all the activities of life. I want to point out that there will be as many forms of Radical Socialism as there are ideas of what the community is, and what the relationship is that exists between the community and its component parts. The fundamental position of the Radical Social School is found in the answer that they give to this question. There is found here a definite reaction to the individualistic theory propounded by Rousseau and his followers, whose insistence



on the independence of the individual from society led to the extremes of self-expression that are found in some modern educational philosophies. But a reaction was bound to set in. There is an open conflict between the desires of the individual and the common good, and in many cases it is obvious that so-called self-expression and independence will lead to social chaos. To avoid this chaotic condition the proper relationship between the individual and the community must be clarified. The position taken by the Radical-Social School is that the society - whatever they may postulate as the social unit - holds the supreme place, and that the individual is subordinate to society and is in a certain sense a product of the society.

There are many and varied expressions of the notion that the society is the end and purpose of the individual. There are numberless degrees of subordination of the individual to the social body. But the basic concept of the subordination of the individual to society is to be found in most of the modern philosophies, and consequently in most of the modern philosophies of education. The first proponents of this school of thought are Auguste Conte and his followers in France, Emile Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl, but the most influential in the English-speaking world is John Dewey, and for the purposes of this work it will be sufficient for us

to examine the main points of his doctrine and present a critique of those views.

John Dewey, the philosophical heir of William James, was born in 1859, an American. He received his degree as Doctor of Philosophy from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, taught at Michigan and Chicago, and spent the remainder of his life as Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University in New York City.

The writings of Dewey may be listed under two headings: those that deal with Philosophy in general, and those that are specifically concerned with the Philosophy of Education. The first group, those of general Philosophy, are, in the order of their appearance: Psychology (1886); Leibnitz (1888); Ethics (1893); Essays in Experimental Logic (1916, Un. of Chicago Press); How We Think (1909, London, Heath and Co.); The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays (1910, Henry Holt, New York); German Philosophy and Politics (1915, Henry Holt, New York); Human Nature and Conduct (1921, London, Allen). He is also the author of numerous articles in various reviews. In the second group, his works on Educational Philosophy, we find the following works; The School and Society (1899); My Pedagogic Creed (1902); The Educational Situation (1903); Moral Principles in Education (Boston, 1905); Interest and Effort (Boston, 1907); How We Think (1912); Schools of

Tomorrow (1915, Dent, London); and a series of articles in the Monroe Cyclopedia of Education. A special edition of the essays of Dewey on education was published in England by Professor Findley of Manchester under the title: Educational Essays by John Dewey, in two volumes.

To arrive at an adequate conception of the views which Dewey holds concerning life, and which he carries over into the field of pedagogy, a brief examination of his fundamental position is in order. The approach of Dewey to life may be summed up in three words, it is pragmatic, it is experimental, and it is socialistic.

Dewey's pragmatic basis is well stated by himself in an article written in October 1924:

"Action takes precedence; without it, thought and knowledge remain useless. Theory is the result of practice. Thoughts, hypotheses, concepts, philosophies must be submitted to the touchstone of the practical life. Considered in themselves they are neither true nor false, they become so in as much as they assure the success or failure of our actions. The most certain touchstone of truth is its practical result; truth is an instrument for moving, satisfying, enriching and ennobling our lives. Everything that is connected with knowledge, thought, with the concepts of life, truth, wisdom and belief must be cited before the tribunal, not of reason nor intelligence, but of action, in the greatest sense of the word."<sup>(11)</sup>

This selection places before us clearly the standard and the measure of all truth in the system of Dewey.

The unique enthronement of induction and the use of the experimental method is another foundation stone of the

pedagogy of Dewey. In his interesting work How We Think he says:

"....the end envisaged is the bringing forth and the fostering of this attitude of mind, this manner of thinking which we describe as scientific."<sup>(12)</sup>

He goes on to state:

"....fruitful and complete thought is possible only when one employs in some way the experimental method."<sup>(13)</sup>

It must be kept in mind that the experimental method, envisaged by Dewey, is not exclusively the scientific method of the European school, in fact it is not primarily this method, but rather it is one of induction applied to common experience. It is the spirit of those who are always quoting the "common-sense way of doing things". And it fits in closely with his notions of the practical value which things must have, as he says:

"....all things must be submitted to the ordeal by fire....trial be services rendered."<sup>(14)</sup>

The term applied when we called the ideas of Dewey "Socialistic" is not used in the ordinary connotation of the word socialistic. We do not mean that it is merely a political theory of common ownership. It is something deeper than that, and for that reason I have qualified it by the adjective "Radical", denoting that his position is one that goes to the root of the matter, and lays the philosophical basis for all

forms of social supremacy. For Dewey social conditions have the predominant place in any philosophy of life. So social problems not only loom large in his philosophy, but the whole fabric of his philosophy is socialized. The direction, the purpose, the ideal, the means employed and the principles of his philosophy of life must find their source and focal point in the needs of society. Speaking of his basic philosophy, Dewey declares:

"Our social organization forces us to accept this philosophy of life."<sup>(15)</sup>

The above description and quotations place Dewey in the position of reformer in the field of life, and make him of necessity a reformer in the field of Philosophy of Education. And he is a reformer with honor even in his own country. H. Suzzalo, in the Introduction which he wrote for Moral Principles in Education, says:

"He (Dewey) is a thinker, whose influence on educational reform is equalled by none."<sup>(16)</sup>

He deeply influenced such men as Prof. Findley in England, and G. Kerschensteiner, the well-known educationalist in Germany, the protagonist of the "Arbeitschule" (the "active school"). Dewey himself demanded a revolution in education:

"These are the radical conditions of life which must be revolutionized, and only a radical pedagogical reform can give satisfaction."<sup>(17)</sup>

He opposes the traditional system of education because it

cannot, in his estimation, fulfill the demands of the present condition of society.

"Traditional education forms citizens who have no sympathy for manual work and who are possessed of no norm which will allow them to conceive the great social and political problems of our epoch."(18)

These key ideas of Dewey: Pragmatism, Experimentalism, and Radical-Socialism, are carried over into all his expressions of pedagogical philosophy.

"Education must be socialized by making the school a cell of real life."(19)

And he states clearly what he means by cells of real life -

"Social insight, social strength and social interest: there is the trinity of moral evolution."(20)

And all branches must be taught in such a way

"..that they will be the means of making the child understand the social community and life."(21)

The capital criticism which Dewey draws upon his system may be made in function of the prime tenets of that system. In the first place, the Pragmatism of Dewey may be subject to criticism because it destroys the certitude upon which knowledge, truth and morality must be based. A system which makes usefulness the measure and standard of human action fails to satisfy the demand of an intelligence for truth, it fails to satisfy the demand of a human will for goodness and the obvious need of the human person for a standard of morals that will satisfy the needs of a rational personality.

In the second place the Experimentalism of Dewey must be submitted to the same criticism as the Experimentalism of the Naturalists, that is, that it only takes into consideration the observable and measurable objects of knowledge, the material things that can be submitted to experimentation and measurement.....leaving the mind in ignorance of the totality of reality beyond the material and the measurable.

And in the third instance, the Radical-Socialism of Dewey must be criticized on the grounds that it errs in making society the supreme criterion, the final and the efficient cause of all that is human in the world. It ignores the rights of the human personality that are proper to it as antecedent to all society.

The points that are offered as criticism here are merely stated. They will be enlarged upon and developed later in their proper place, and reference will be made there to the particular points in philosophies which fail to be realistic and objective in relation to the points under discussion.

An account of the pedagogical philosophy of Dewey, however brief, would be incomplete if mention were not made of some of the more famous names which must be taken in conjunction with Dewey as philosophers of the Radical-Socialism advocated by him. I will not make an exhaustive list, but rather one that is exemplary. The names will be merely those of outstand-

ing educators in various countries, who hold the same theories as Dewey. This is not to state that they are dependent on Dewey for either their ideas or their expression, but to state that they hold the same fundamental positions as Dewey.

Paul Natorp was born in Dusseldorf January 24, 1854. He studied at Berlin, Bonn and Strasbourg. His works on pedagogy are:

1. Several studies on Pestalozzi:
  - J.H. Pestalozzi sien Leben und siene Leden (Aus Natur und Geisteswelt, Leipzig, Teubner 1909)
  - J.H. Pestalozzi's Werke; Gessler's Klassiker der Padagogik (3 Bande, 1905)
  - Idealismus Pestallozzis, (1919)
2. On His own pedagogical system:
  - Religion innerhalb der grebzen der Humanitat: Ein Kapitel zur Grundlegung der Sozialpadagogik, (I.A. Tuingen).
  - Socialpadagogik, Theorie der Willenserzeihung auf der Grundlage der Gemeinschaft (1898)
  - Gesammelte Abhandlingen zur Sozialpadagogil I. Historischer
  - Philosophie und Padagogik (1919)

A sample of his philosophy may be taken in his own words:

"The individual man, properly speaking, is only an abstraction."<sup>(22)</sup>

Paul Beregemann was born in 1863 in Lowenberg in Silesia and was the director of schools in Silesia. His works are:

Aphorismen zur Sozialem Padagogik, Liepzig, (1899)



Soziale Padagogik auf Erfahrungswissenschaftlicher Grundlage und mit Hilfe der induktiven Methode als universalistische oder Kultur-Padagogik, (1900)  
Lehrbuch der Padag. Psychologie, Leipzig, Teubner, (1901).

And a sentence expressing his thought is this:

"It is an illusion to think that man possesses any value by himself and for himself."(23)

G. Kerschensteiner was born in Munich in 1855. At the age of forty, in 1895, he became chief of the teachers at Munich and for twenty-five years was busy in the organization of socially conscious schools in Munich. His writings on education are the following:

Betrachtungen zur Theorie des Lehrplans, (1899)  
Staatsburgerliche Erziehung der deutschen Jugend (1901)  
Die Entwicklung des zeichnerischen Begabung (1905)  
Grundfragen der Schulorganization (1907)  
Der Begriff der Staatsburger lichen Erziehung (1911)  
Bergriff der Arbeitsschule (1911)  
Zwan zig Jahre inn, Schulaufsichtamt (1915)

A revealing sentence from his works gives us the tone of his thought:

"Personal perfection, right and the supreme dignity of personality consists of love for, and sacrifice for the community."(24)

In France, the prime exponent of Radical-Socialism was Emile Durkheim. He was born in 1858 and became Professor of Sociology and Pedagogy at Bordeaux and at Paris. He died in 1917. His works were chiefly on Sociology and he and Levy-Bruhl may be considered the leaders in sociological

thought in the modern world. His explicit writings on pedagogy were few, but his influence was enormous. His underlying principle is stated in his own words:

"La Société est, pour les consciences individuelles, un objectif transcendant."<sup>(25)</sup>

It is true that there was a reaction to the Radical-Social school of pedagogy. The leaders were Otto Willmann, Freidrich Paulsen, W.Toischer, Rein, P. Barth, Benjamin Kidd and several others, who taught a moderate form of educational socialism, wherein the social training of the person takes a very prominent part, but there is a proper proportion and the person is never sacrificed to the transcendent society. But the influences of the Radical-Socialists are very powerful, and are influencing the educational ideas of today. For example, in the magazine published by the Ontario College of Education, the purpose given for the teaching of history is "to prepare pupils to take their places as efficient members of society"<sup>(26)</sup>. Certainly I do not wish to maintain that man, and especially educated man, should not be an efficient member of society. But the purpose of education is something more than making efficient members of society; it is the perfection of each person. Many of the protagonists of modern democracy are following in the steps of the Radical-Socialists in placing society and social usefulness as the norm and end of all existence. It would be well for those who are misled in this

manner to read carefully the Declaration of American Independence:

"We hold these truths to be self evident; that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."

and pay special attention to the use of the word "inalienable" which points out that these personal rights cannot be subservient to the society. As the Report of the Harvard Committee, General Education in a Free Society states:

"It is important, however, to limit the idea of the good citizen expressly by the ideal of the good man."<sup>(27)</sup>

#### Part Four: Nationalism and Statism

A third in the series of educational philosophies with which we must deal is that type of educational philosophy which may be called the Philosophy of Nationalism or Statism. Nationalism or Statism may be defined as that theory which proclaims the primacy of the nation or of the state over that of the person. In this theory the nation or the state rules completely the lives of the persons who are the members of the nation or the citizens of the state. It is then immediately apparent that this philosophy has some things in common with the philosophy of the Radical-Socialists. In the first place, the root problem posited by both schools is the same,

the relation that exists between the individual and the social body. The answer given to this question lays the basis for the answers to the problems of life and education. The Radical-Socialists placed the individual in complete subjection to the social body, but the Nationalists and the Statists go further and place the individual in complete subjection to a determined body politic, to the determined community, in the case of the Nationalists, or to the determined institution, in the case of the Statists. And this close relationship between the two schools is seen in the genesis of the thought of the founders of the school. Fichte, Hegel and Barres, the first spokesmen of this type of thought all began as Socialists, and developed into Nationalists and Statists. And even in the Radical-Socialism of Natorp and Kerschensteiner the center of gravity is seen to be veering from society in general to a particular society, the Nation and the State. The immediate importance of this doctrine is easily discernable today in the growing stress that is laid on strong national governments, on national feeling, and on national pride. Some of the more serious consequences were seen in the late War when the Racial and National theories of Germany and Italy showed their most serious consequences in the attempt to subject other peoples. But the effects are also quite clear in our own countries and in the teachings of our own schools. For example, the history

course and, for that matter, any course which has a content, is pointed toward the fostering of Canadian Nationalism as something quite distinctive and, at the same time, something quite desirable.

To appreciate the philosophy of Nationalism and Statism, it is necessary to discover what is meant by a Nation when the term is used, either in philosophical, educational or political context. The term Nation has many and various significations but they may be reduced to several basic meanings. I will give the basic meanings in which the term is used in the various theories of Nationalism. These theories divide themselves into two general groups:

1. The first group hold the theory that the basic element in Nationalism is something objective, something impersonal or something passive, and the definition on that basis is the means of classifying the various types of thought.
    - a) The Racist Theory which holds that the Nation has a unity of blood and physiology. The chief proponents of this theory were Gobineau and Chamberlain.
    - b) The Geographic Theory which holds that unity of territory, of soils, of climate and so forth are the factors making a nation. The proponents of this theory were Ratzel, K. Ritter, Guyot.
    - c) The United People Theory which holds that each community of people is a nation.
- The above three theories have this in common, that the basis of a nation is unity of language.

- d) The Culture Theory which holds the essence of a nation lies in its peculiar culture. The chief proponent of this theory was Fichte.
- e) The Language Theory which holds that the basis of a nation is unity of language.
- f) The Historical Theory which holds that a nation is formed by the experiences of history, experiences which are common to a certain group of people.
- g) The State Theory which holds that the nation is formed by the State.

These three theories have the common ground of a base that is intellectual, at least in some degree, of unity.

2. The second group of theories holds that the basis of Nationalism is something subjective, something conscious, something personal, something creative.

The various types of this theory are:

- a) The Theory of Self Consciousness which holds that a nation is constituted by a consciousness of its collective life. The chief proponent of this theory was Lazarus.
- b) The Theory of Sentiment which holds that a nation is constituted by the sentiment and belief of the members that it is a nation.
- c) The Theory of an Ideal holds that a nation takes form because of the faith of the members of the group in a common Ideal. This theory was proposed by Spengler.
- d) The Theory of Will which holds that unity of will is the foundation of a Nation. This view was held by Renan.
- e) The Theory of Personality which holds that the nation is a moral personality which has the right to a free development.

This was a view common to many French thinkers on the subject, one of its proponents being Boutroux. (28)

The above enumeration will give a brief, but complete, outline of the various phases that the Nationalistic or the Statist Philosophy will take, and is of importance to the philosopher of Pedagogy because the formation of a nation will have identical causes with the deepening of national spirit, and the aim of the educator in the Philosophy of Nationalism will be to strengthen the national spirit in each subject of education. The danger in this approach is apparent. The subject of education is not the citizen of this or that country, nor of this or that section of any country. The subject of education is a man in the full sense of the word, with all his faculties, and it is as a man that he must be educated. It is true that each man is the citizen of some particular country and partakes of the culture of that country, but any attempt to make the country and the particular circumstances of time and place the norms of education is to neglect the whole notion of education.

It is obvious to us now that the supremacy of the state or the nation in its crudest form, as expressed in the philosophy of Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy can lead to the most inhuman excesses. Indeed, it was apparent long before our

time to thinking men. One of the first to recognize the evils inherent in this theory was the German educational philosopher J. Langbehn (1851-1907) who published his Rembrandt als Erzeiher in 1890, the sixtieth edition of which appeared in 1923, Hirschfield, Leipzig; and in this book is a complete criticism of the ideas of the Nationalist and Statist philosophers. He sums up the noxious results of this theory in the following words:

"The internal forum was sacrificed to the external; the soul to the body; conscience to science; man to the German; virtue to action; the Christian to the citizen; personality to organization; civilization to a culture; education to instruction; life to the school and Christ to Cesar."(29)

This is indeed a scathing indictment, and when we consider that this indictment was written at a time when most of the world was praising the German system of education and our schools and universities were ignorantly aping the German way we are perhaps amazed at the insight of Langbehn. If we leave out the small phrase "man to the German" and substitute the name of many another country, the indictment holds good of many countries today, and we, even here in Canada, could stand a good examination of conscience on the subject. But Langbehn was not the only one, nor was he the greatest in the educational field to realize the dangers in the systems of the protagonists of Nationalism. The name that stands out in opposition to them is that of



Dr. F.W. Foerster. He was born in 1869 and studied in Berlin and in Fribourg. In 1896 he spent some time in prison as a result of his daring to criticize the Emperor. He then left the country and studied in Switzerland, England and America. In 1904 he published his first book Jugendlehre. He taught for some time in Vienna and later (1913) was made Professor of Philosophy and Pedagogy at Munich. But he was forced to retire in 1916 because of his criticism of the education system. He retired to Switzerland only to be recalled after the defeat of Germany to take the position of Ambassador of Bavaria to Berne in 1919. He moved permanently to Lucerne in 1919. Among his general works one of particular interest, because of its title, as well as its content, was Mein Kampf gegen das Nationalistische und Militaristische Deutschland. If the thoughts in this book had been studied, the later and more notorious Mein Kampf would have been ridiculed at its source as it should have been.

His works on Pedagogy are the following:

a) General Works:

1. Jugendlehre (1904)
2. Lebenskunde (1911)
3. Erziehung und Selbst-erziehung (1917)

## b) Special Works:

1. Schule und Charakter
2. Politische Ethik und Politische Padagogik
3. Sexualethik und Sexualpadagogik
4. Schule und Suhne
5. Lebensfuhrung
6. Jugendseele-bewegung-zeile
7. Bedenken gegen die Einheitsschule
8. Christus und das Menschliche Leben
9. Religion und Charakterbildung

In the course of these works he sets forth a philosophy of education which is complete in most matters. He takes as the subject of education man as he is. The aim of his work is a complete and integrated program of education. He discusses the doctrines of the Nationalists and finds their errors revolting. For him, all the problems of culture are problems of education:

"...tous les problèmes de la culture sont, dans (30) leur racines profondes, des problèmes d'éducation."

And his views on social education are expressed in the following:

"L'éducation social la plus efficace ne se trouve pas dans l'adaptation à la vie sociale, mais dans la trempe du caractère personnel contre la pression des majorités, contre la tyrannie de l'égoïsme collectif, contre l'ivresse des passions nationaux." (31)

The importance of Foerster is that he was the first to raise a loud voice in protest against the evils of a Nationalist and Statist Philosophy of Education. One may be tempted to wonder at the space and time given to him in this work, but the reason should be clear. He was a voice

that was raised in protest long before the evil fruits of the system he condemned were apparent to the world, and the protest he raised should be raised in any country against the exaggerated claims of any state to the prime loyalty of the person. This may sound like treason but, on sober thought it is the only way of safeguarding human beings. And the welfare of human beings must be the prime aim of any educator or philosopher of education.

## Notes on Chapter II

- (1) Maclean's, December 1, 1948, p.6.
- (2) Carleton J.H. Hayes, A Political And Cultural History of Modern Europe, Vol. I, p.543.
- (3) Auguste Conte, Cours de Philosophie Positive, 1824.
- (4) Thomas Huxley, Essays and Lectures, Man's Relations to the Lower Animals, p. 245, London, Cassels.
- (5) H. Taine, 1870.
- (6) May 24, 1543.
- (7) H. Spencer, Essays in Education, Everyman's Library, London, Dent, p.8.
- (8) Idem. p.152.
- (9) Charles W. Eliot, Introduction to Pedagogy of Spencer, p.iii.
- (10) p. 11 above.
- (11) Dewey, October, 1921.
- (12) Dewey, Preface to How We Think, p.1.
- (13) How We Think, p. 99.
- (14) Dewey, German Philosophy and Politics, p. 126.
- (15) Idem. p.105.
- (16) H. Suzzalo, Introduction to Dewey's Moral Principles In Education, p.ii.
- (17) Dewey, School and Society, p.22.
- (18) Dewey, Schools of Tomorrow, p.315.
- (19) Idem, p.174.
- (20) Moral Principles, Dewey, p.43.

- (21) Idem, p.97.
- (22) Pestalozzi, Sozialpadagogik, p.101.
- (23) Paul Bergemann, Soziale Padagogik, p.134.
- (24) G. Kerschenstiener, Begriff des Arbeitsschule, p.13.
- (25) Emile Durkheim, La Détermination du Fait Moral, in the Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie, 1906, p.130.
- (26) The School, Secondary Edition, March, 1941, p.627.
- (27) Report of the Harvard Commission, General Education in a Free Society, p.77
- (28) Boutroux, The French Idea of Nationality, Philosophy and War, p.162.
- (29) J. Langbehn, Rembrandt als Erzeiher, p.260.
- (30) Foerster, Aufgabenu Methoden der Charakterbildung, Ein Vortag; Aarau, 1906, p.7.

## CHAPTER III

In the first section some time was spent in the consideration of the chief schools of thought that are current in modern treatments of a pedagogical philosophy. Those three schools of thought were chosen because they are a summing up of basic errors which are found in today's pedagogy. I am not making the statement that these errors will be found expressed in exactly the same words which I have used to describe them. Nor am I making the assertion that these ideas will be found in their pure form in any of the present day pedagogical experts. But I am making the statement that these are the basic errors, and that error found in modern philosophy will be reduceable to some, or to one, of the above-mentioned schools.

The three schools which were proposed for consideration were the Naturalist, the Radical-Socialist and the Nationalist, or Statist, and the observation was made that their philosophies of education flowed from their philosophies of life. An attempt was made to point out the basic philosophical position of each school, and to indicate the error in that position. The Naturalists were found to hold to a merely materialistic world. The Radical-Socialists were found to hold to the position that goodness was measured utility,

that truth was only ascertainable by induction, and that man had his position only as a member of society and was subordinated to this society. The Nationalists hold the position which maintains, along with the above-mentioned position of the Radical-Socialists, that the concrete society of which man is merely a subordinate part is some definite state or nation.

By statement these positions were reprobated as being erroneous, and the basis for the reprobation was that they were one-sided, partial, limited, that they did not take into consideration the totality of reality, and that both the subject of their educational theories, the aims of their educational practice and the matter of their education was false, not in the sense of an absolute falsehood, for there is no such thing as complete falsehood, but false in the sense that they neglected some truth, or that they stressed some point of truth to the detriment of the whole truth.

The implications of this position are obvious. If previous positions are rejected because they do not give the whole truth, then a position must be offered which does give the whole truth and which offers a complete set of principles which will serve as a basis for a philosophy of life and, by consequence, as the basis for a philosophy of education. The question there posed is where we are to

seek for a philosophy of life that will be complete, that will cover every phase of human life, vegetable, animal, intellectual, spiritual and emotional. And the obvious answer, which may sound a bit flippant, is that the only philosophy that embraces the totality of life is to be found in the philosophy that men down through the ages have developed to meet all the demands of observation, experience and thought. In brief, it is only in the philosophy of Reality that such a complete system will be found. And that philosophy of reality is the classical philosophy of the ancient Greeks, not the idealism of a Plato, not the intellectualism of a Socrates, certainly not in the mere phenomenism of Parmenides, and certainly not in the denial of wisdom of the skeptics, but in the realism of the greatest of the Greeks, Aristotle. The reason for choosing Aristotle as the source of philosophic inspiration is that he was the first to give philosophic explanation to the basic problems that were troubling the minds of the thinkers. To realize the impact of Aristotelian thought on the intellectual world it is necessary to bear in mind that realistic philosophers are seeking, not an ideal system of thought, but a system of thought that will make understandable the realities with which man is faced. The constant problems of reality are always with us, the mind is always confronted



with realities in the world that demand explanation. The problem presented by permanence and change is one that had confronted thinkers from the beginning of recorded thought. What is there in reality that is responsible for change and how can change be explained if there is to be any permanence? The problem of the validity of universal concepts of knowledge was another of the key problems. Was there any validity in the predication of a term derived from one individual to another individual of the same species, and an allied problem, was there any validity at all in the application of transcendental terms to the higher term of the relationship? All these problems were set forth by Aristotle and he offered a solution that is at the root of the classical school of metaphysics. The force and the clarity of his thought are as great today as they were in the days when he enunciated the revolutionary ideas of his metaphysics. The first of these ideas was the Theory of Hylomorphism, the doctrine of matter and form, and by this clear doctrine he made possible the explanation of flux and permanence in the world. The doctrine of matter and form was enlarged to the larger and still more fruitful Doctrine of Act and Potency which made flux and permanence understandable in all things in which they existed. His Doctrine on the Nature of of Universals, that they exist in our minds as universal con-

cepts, corresponding to realities in nature, but in things outside the mind, universals exist, not as universals but in concrete individuals. This statement of the position, later called that of moderate realism, is the one epistemologically that satisfies the demands of reality and of the human intelligence. And, in answer to the validity of predication of a transcendental term to the higher term of a relationship, he formulated for us the rich and profound Doctrine of the Analogy of Being, with the consequent Analogy of Predication. In fine, Aristotle gave the answers to the fundamental problems of philosophy, answers that were and are in keeping with the demands of reason and reality. It is for the above reasons that Aristotle is taken as the starting point for the philosophy that will supply a philosophy of life and education.

I said above that Aristotle will be taken as the starting point of a philosophy of life and education, because it would be quite opposed to the honesty of anyone in search of truth, and incidently to the spirit of Aristotle, to be satisfied with repeating the truth enunciated by the ancient Greek without taking into account the development that his philosophy has undergone down through the ages. In brief, we cannot neglect the commentators on Aristotle, and especially, for us of the western world, we cannot neglect the greatest of

all the commentators on Aristotle, the greatest philosopher that the world has ever known, Thomas Aquinas. I want to point out quite clearly that here we are treating Thomas as a philosopher, not as a theologian, and that we are following him in this philosophy by the light of intelligence. We are making an abstraction from him as a theologian, though it will be pointed out later that it is impossible to have merely a philosophy of education, one must also have a theology of education. And this should be borne in mind, because, though we may omit mention of the theological implications of the matters we mention, we are always conscious of them, for it is impossible, if we are to be objective in our treatment of problems, to neglect such a patent and glaring reality as religion, or to blind ourselves, through prejudice or malice to the objective truths of religion.

There is only one small work of Thomas Aquinas which deals expressly with the philosophy of education, and that is his brief tract De Magistro which is a copy of a scholastic disputation which was held at the University of Paris about the year (1) 1257. But the whole of his immense work is a philosophy of life and an almost explicit philosophy of education because he wrote as a teacher, and in the articulation of each section of his monumental work the aims, procedure, means and technique of his teaching are to be clearly seen. This is pointed out

here, because though the reader may gain a great deal from reading the section De Magistro and a brief summary of the conclusions of that work will be given in this article, most of the quotations that will be used in the next sections of this paper will be taken from the more commonly read works of the Philosopher, the two Summae, and the de Veritate.

Realistic education comprises two essential elements, the metaphysical and the psychological, or, in more simple terms, a philosophy of education is concerned with the objective truth, and with the subjective development of the truth-seeking person. The reason for this is that man, the person to be educated, must develop in himself the subjective elements, that is the intellectual and the moral virtues, and if this development is not to be in a vacuum, there must be a clear integration of this subjective development with the world of reality, with objective truth. The plan that will be followed in the succeeding pages will be the natural outlining of the objective truths, first those truths which form the metaphysical base of philosophy, then those truths which form the base of a sound psychology, and second, an account of the subjective development of the intellectual and moral virtues in the person educated.

Part One: The First Essential Element of Pedagogy:

Objective Truth

The horizon of education is limited only by the capacity of man's mind to come in contact with the realities of being. If one be a lover of wisdom, the entire range of being must be the field of his endeavours in intellectual efforts. It is clear then that mere facts cannot be classified as education and the necessary consequence of this is that order is necessary for a proper knowledge of things. The relationship of things must be established. Individual facts, scientific observations, experiences must be incorporated into the body of knowledge. These units of knowledge become vitalized and part of the living body of truth only when each fact, each observation, each experience is seen to have its significance in respect to the whole. The essential property of the educated man is to see, perceive everything in the light of fundamental ideas. For the essential of order is the establishment of unity in multiplicity. Factual knowledge, if isolated is sterile and barren, but if it is seen in proper relationship to everything that is, it becomes fertile and productive, and the fruit of its productivity is wisdom. There are certain definite objective truths which form the basis and unifying principle of all

knowledge, and we will proceed with an examination, necessarily brief, of these truths as they are set forth for us in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas.

The first of these objective truths is the objectivity of human thought. The meaning of this truth is that human thought is measured by objective reality. The manner in which Thomas Aquinas explains the objective of thought is to be found in the Summa Theologica<sup>(2)</sup> where the question is asked:

"Utrum species intelligibilis a phantasmatibus abstractae se habeant ad intellectum nostrum, sicut id quod intelligitur."

and, in the response to this question, he gives us the doctrine which explains the relationship between the intelligible species in the mind and the object of our knowledge. The intelligible species, the subjective impressions and determinations of our intellect are not the direct objects of thought. They are the means by which we are lead to the direct knowledge of objective reality.

One of the most modern commentators of Aquinas, J. Maritain,<sup>(3)</sup> in his Annexe 'a' of his book Les Degrés du Savoir, explains clearly what is meant by the nature of a sign and states that the species intelligibilis is not the "objectum quod" of knowledge but the "objectum quo". The whole of this appendix will repay careful study. The thing of which we are

primarily aware in the process of knowledge is not the concept of a thing, but the external object of which the species is merely the mental sign. The species expressa in the act of knowledge has a relation of identity with the object; it is the intentional presence of the thing in the mind. The metaphysic behind this is the fact that immateriality is the root of all cognition, both in the active and the passive sense, that is to say, both the subject knowing and the thing known have their respective parts in the process of cognition only in as much as they are immaterial, only in as much as they are formal, in as much as they are in act. A very excellent exposé of this truth will be found in Jos. Gredt's  
 (4)  
Elementa Philosophiae, on immateriality as the root of cognition. The relations of the content of our act of thought to reality consists in the truth of our knowledge. Thomas carefully distinguishes three aspects of truth, all distinct, but all interdependent. The first truth is metaphysical truth, which consists in conformity of things to the intelligence of the first cause, and in this sense everything can be said to be true. The second type of truth is called psychological truth and consists in conformity of the dependent intelligence to the object of the act of intellection, and it is in this sense that the above statement is to be understood. In this second case there is, per se, no falsehood, though per

accidens falsehood may arise from psycho-somatic causes. The third type of truth is called logical or moral truth, and this consists in a conformity of the manifestations of intelligence with the intelligence itself. In this case there is a distinct possibility of error because of the weakness or the malice of dependent beings. The nature of this truth, the psychological truth mentioned as the second truth above, does not presuppose a mechanical similarity between the manner of knowing and the manner of being of the object known. The manner of being, or mode, of the object in the mind is immaterial, intentional, while the mode of being of the object remains exactly what it is in itself. This is proven by Aquinas in the Summa Theologica.<sup>(5)</sup> In the last-mentioned article he says clearly:-

"quod oportet res intellectas hoc modo in seipsis subsistere, scilicet immaterialiter et immobiliter. Hoc autem necessarium non est, quia...."

and he proceeds to give his reasons. While knowledge is derived from experience, as he shows,<sup>(6)</sup> the intellect knows things according to its own nature.<sup>(7)</sup> It is then clear from the teaching of Aquinas that human thought, because of the nature of thought, the nature of the knowing subject and the nature of the thought process, is measured, limited, defined by the object of the process of cognition; that is to say, in human cognition there is to be found objective



truth in as much as the knowing subject is informed by the object of the process of cognition, which is not any subjective phantasm, but the object itself.

The second truth which we are going to consider is the meaning of being. The term that is used in the Latin text is that of "ens" and to the beginner in metaphysics it is apt to present difficulties. But the English rendering of the word as "Being", understood in the sense of anything that has a nature, either actually existing or capable of existing, makes the concept quite clear for us. The difficulty that arises is this: Being is something that cannot be limited to any definite category, nor can the concept of being be made precise without at once limiting the concept of being in general to a particular class of beings. It is this quality of being in general that gives occasion to the proponents of the school of thought which holds that man's intelligence is the measure of things and that clear and distinct ideas of things are the only source of knowledge, to proclaim that being is so vague and indefinite as to be a useless concept. But here precisely is the important point of the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of being. Because the concept is not limited, it enables the mind to embrace all reality in one grand synthesis and to build what is really

a metaphysic, that is, a complete structure of knowledge that rises above the limitations of matter and embraces all reality. The prime intuition of human intelligence is that of being, simply the thingness of a thing, and it is necessary that we acquire all our other concepts by addition to the prime concept of being. The fact that this concept is transcendental, that is, not limited to any division of being, is of paramount importance. It was mentioned above that one of the most fruitful contributions of Aristotle to the study of philosophy was his contribution to the clarification of the Doctrine of Analogy. The core of this doctrine is the fact that all beings have their being in common, no matter how varied they may be. And this point is expressed in more technical language when it is said that though things are simply different (simpliciter diversa) nevertheless they are in a certain way (secundum quid) alike or the same. In the concrete application of this doctrine, the fact that things are simply diverse leaves us without any means of knowledge of them unless they come under the observation of our minds, but the fact that they are secundum quid, the same, is the basis for our analogical knowledge of them. The knowledge that is obtained by analogy is real knowledge of the things under a certain aspect; in the case of the concept of being

it is the aspect of being. Other realities of which knowledge may be had are unity, truth, goodness and, by analyzing the secundum quid sameness we can get a true, though limited, knowledge of many things that transcend our knowledge of many things that transcend our knowledge of the essences of material things. The necessity of a thorough grasp of the nature of analogical being and analogical knowledge is apparent from the fact that knowledge is the science of things, that is, the science of being, and if we are not to truncate our knowledge and limit it to part of its proper object, we must have a firm and adequate grasp of the nature of analogical knowledge. The best sources of a comprehensive knowledge of this doctrine will be Cajetan's De Ente et Essentia which is a very complete treatise on the subject, though a bit difficult in style, a series of articles in the review Scienza Thomista of 1928-29 entitled Doctrina Aristotelica-Thomistica de Analogia, and a series of articles in the review Divus Thomas of 1925 de natura analogia which give a comprehensive outline of the relation of analogy to causality, and the interdependence of the various types of analogical being as the root of analogical predication. M. Maritain in Les Degrés du  
(8)  
Savoir gives a good summary of the teaching.

But of course our knowledge is not limited to analogical knowledge. Analogical knowledge is the contact that we have

with realities which transcend our immediate experiences. Intellectual knowledge penetrates the very essence of material things and makes the knowing subject the possessor of that very essence. But in the cases where the essence of things is beyond the grasp of a dependent intelligence, we are dependent on analogy for the metaphysical principles which will make our knowledge of facts a real science. Intellectual knowledge then, penetrates the essence of things and implies a profound grasp of the very reason of being in things. This is brought out by Aquinas (9) in Summa Theologica where he teaches the nature of the active intellect. He says

"...et intellectos nostros ad hoc, quod de generibus, et speciebus rerum scientiam haberent."

The clear and obvious dependence of knowledge on the principles of being can be seen when we consider that being would not be attained by knowing if knowing did not already belong to the order of being. And the most perfect union of intelligence with all being is by knowledge, for knowledge gives the perfect and intimate union that results from the relationship of identity of the knowing subject with the object known in the intentional manner. (10)

The opposition that this doctrine gives to the theories of Naturalism and Radical-Socialism is already pronounced. The fact that knowledge cannot be limited to observable

facts, and still less to inductive reasoning is a death blow to the fundamental idea of the Naturalist School. The teaching of Aquinas on the transcendental nature of being, of truth, goodness and unity makes the Pragmatism of the Radical-Socialists an obstacle to knowledge rather than a norm and a standard. The inadequacy of these theories is apparent in the light of the fulness of these prime metaphysical truths, and will become more apparent later when the nature of man and his actions are considered.

The third truth that we are going to consider is a consequence of the second truth, and may be expressed as the truth of the source of being. In the last few pages reference has been frequently made to dependent beings, and the context made clear just what dependent being was. It was shown that human intelligence was limited and measured by being, it was shown that human knowledge cannot embrace the totality of being save by analogical knowledge and that human knowledge as well as human modality of being is something dependent. In other words, any dependent being is one that does not exist of necessity but whose existence is dependent on something else. If we are not to lose ourselves in the morass of imagination by trying to picture an indefinite series of dependencies, we will see the absolute reality of a necessary being. The reasoning on this

is clear. We are sure of the existence of limited and dependent beings. Their very limitation and dependence proves the existence of an unlimited and independent being on whom they depend, either remotely or proximately. The remoteness or the proximity does not make any difference but is only mentioned as it is one of the sources of difficulty to the neophyte in philosophy who finds it hard to abstract from concrete imaginations and think in intellectual concepts. This partaking of being by created things (the term created is not merely inserted here, it follows of necessity from the dependence of limited creatures, if they do not exist of necessity, they must be created) proves that they have their source in a being that is not created, that is, in a being whose essence (necessary nature) is identified with his existence. (The personal pronoun here used is done by design, for the actual existence of dependent intellectual creatures demands the existence of a necessary intellectual being, and an intellectual being is a person). This truth is proven by Aquinas in the Summa Theologica, where he asks the question:

(11)  
 "Utrum in Deo sit idem essentia et esse."

and in the second response he says:

"...cum igitur in Deo nihil sit potentiale, sequitur.....; sua igitur essentia est suum esse."

Issue may be taken here with the use of the term Deus or God, but there is no reason to quarrel with the term; if the reality, the independent being, with an identity of essence and existence, exists, the term applied is a matter of indifference. If God is a term that some prejudice makes men eschew, the symbol X may be substituted; the reality remains unchanged. In this manner, human thought is led, gently but definitely, toward the knowledge of a supreme being and this supreme being is the prime mover in the order of knowledge just as he is the prime mover in the order of being. (12)

The object of knowledge is to arrange the date of acts of cognition in perfect unity, to estimate their relative values and to unite them in the synthesis of being.

The end of all knowledge, in the natural order is a metaphysical appreciation of the totality of being, up to and including the supreme being. The intelligence knows things as they are, and they are in conformity to the intelligence of the supreme being. This is what we defined above as metaphysical or ontological truth. This is treated in the Summa Theologica (13) where Aquinas states:

"Veritas etiam rerum est, secundum quod conformantur suo principio, scilicet intellectui divino."

The human and dependent intellect is then capable of knowing truth, and created truth as harmonized and synthesized in being leads to the knowledge of perfect being where

truth in its perfection has its existence. A note of warning must be inserted. They are the product of a strictly rational philosophy and are philosophical truths.

The fourth truth that must come under our consideration is placed in the position immediately following the discussion of truths relative to the supreme being because it deals with God. This truth may be stated as the possibility of supernatural truth. This truth will be dealt with here in a brief manner, but there is no ground for the objection that it is theological truth. The actual existence of a supernatural truth, or the nature of that truth is not the point under discussion; what is being stated is simply the radical possibility of a supernatural order of things. We have seen, that things are because God is. With this knowledge comes a desire to know what God is, but here philosophy is brought to a standstill. It is true that by analogical predication we are able to state that all perfections in their highest form must exist in God, and to deny any imperfections to God. But beyond that we are powerless in the field of knowledge. We have, however, the positive truth that God is all powerful, and that the nature of man is limited, so from these two truths we can draw the very



legitimate conclusion that God can enlarge the capacity of man in the realm of intelligence, and in the realm of loving, so that man can have a fuller knowledge of God, if such a knowledge is granted by God. Our extension in being is measured, not by the narrow limits of our created power, but by the immense power of the Prime Mover. The importance of this truth in relation to the philosophy of education lies in this: A divine elevation is possible; if that divine elevation became actual then the whole process of education would have to take that reality into consideration. It is not the place here, in a work on the strictly philosophical level, to prove the actuality of divine elevation, but the implications of that possibility must be kept in mind, and it will be the duty of the philosopher of pedagogy to investigate the facts of history to see if this divine elevation has taken place, and to formulate his philosophy in function of that elevation.

(On a practical level an example of educational philosophers avoiding their just responsibilities is to be found in the report of the Harvard Committee, General Education in a Free Society where it is stated on page 39:

"Sectarian, particularly Roman Catholic colleges have of course their solution, which was generally shared by American colleges until less than a century ago; namely, the conviction that Christianity gives meaning and ultimate unity to all

"parts of the curriculum, indeed to the whole life of the college, yet this solution is out of the question in publicly supported colleges."

The emphasis is mine. There is no reason for this solution being out of the question on any a priori grounds. If the Committee had said that there was a grave obligation to investigate this solution, they would have been acting in a reasonable manner, but simply to dismiss it as out of the question, even though it may be true, is to be false to their pretended aim of seeking truth. What they are doing is seeking what they hope to find and closing their minds to objective facts. The attitude is common enough, but it is shocking that such an unphilosophic attitude should be permitted to go unchallenged in the report of a committee which is supposed to represent the highest level of intellectual life in the United States of America. It is inexcusable, particularly in the case where the report is supposed to be the result of an investigation into the present condition of education in the country, and is supposed to embody recommendations for the improvement of conditions. If truth is not sought by such a group it speaks ill for the future educational life of the country and of the rest of the world).

The fifth important truth that we are going to consider is in fact a multiple truth, and deals in a more proximate manner with the principles which are used by the educated man in act of achieving perfection in the intellectual order. The title of this fifth truth is: the validity of the highest principles of thought and being. The use of both the terms thought and being may be thought unnecessary, because if they are principles of being they will be principles of thought, but the term is used advisedly, because they are here considered as principles of being in as far as they

affect the knowing and thinking subject. For the interpretation of life and the universe as a whole, for the harmonization of the individual facts into an organic unit, for the unification of knowledge so that nothing is really known until everything is really grasped, the educated man must constantly apply the principles of metaphysics. These principles must be known, admitted, accepted and lived. The knowledge of these principles is not a difficult task, they are self-evident. For there exists in us certain seeds of knowledge, first principles of knowledge, which one knows immediately, once the intellect comes in contact with reality. (15)

For reasons of clarity, these fundamental principles will be treated separately to show the full force of each principle, and the distinction between them, but it must always be borne in mind that they are closely interdependent, and are self-evident principles. They are unprovable, not because of their obscurity, but because they are luminous with the splendor of truth.

The order in which these principles will be considered will be: the principle of Contradiction, the principle of Identity, the principle of Sufficient Reason, and the principle of Causality. There is some dispute among various authors as to which principle, that of Contradiction or that of Identity should be first in the order of inven-

tion, but that need not delay us here because both are certainly self-evident.

a) The Principle of Contradiction

The enunciation of this principle as a principle of being may be formulated as follows: Being cannot be non-being. And an enunciation of this principle as a principle of knowledge is: We cannot at once both affirm and deny a thing. The force of the principle is immediately apparent, in fact it is so apparent that it may seem a waste of time to enunciate it, but it is of the greatest importance because it is found to be based on the primary intuition of the intellect of being, and the intellectual grasp of being is at the heart of every act of the intellectual faculty. Each intellectual act of man includes the intuition of being. And from that intuition the basic Principle of Contradiction is subsumed in all acts of intellection. This principle rests on the natures of being and non-being, with which the concept is identified and is the primary basis of all other principles. This principle is discussed by Aquinas (16) in the Summa Theologica.

b) The Principle of Identity

This principle may be enunciated as follows: Being is being. This one enunciation holds good for both the order

of being and the order of intelligence. This is the first judgment in the ontological order because nothing is known apart from being, and all that is known is known in function of being. It may seem that this is a sentence without sense but if it is thoughtfully analyzed it will be seen to be an expression of the primary act of judgment that the intellect makes. It is the first, most simple, and most universal of the judgments that is made and it has for its subject, being, and for its predicate, ~~that~~ which belongs to being in the primary sense, being. This is the ultimate in the order of judgments, and all judgments can be reduced to this formula, and function in terms of that formula. For those who are unused to thinking in abstract terms, the illustration used by Chesterton in his book on St. Thomas Aquinas is very helpful. He suggests that instead of using the terms ens est ens, of "being is being" or "a particular being is a particular being", we make use of the simple, homey sentence "pigs is pigs". The force of this example is striking. It shows at one and the same time the insight that Chesterton had into the mind of Aquinas, the all-pervading influence of the Principle of Identity, and the complete and constant contact that the philosophy of the Angelic Doctor has with the concrete, one might almost say vulgar, realities of life.

## c) The Principle of Sufficient Reason

The enunciation of this principle may be as follows:

Every being has its being either from itself or from another.

This is another statement that is obvious. It is not telling you that any being exists, not telling you that any being is dependent. It is simply stating that the being of any thing that does exist is either sufficient in itself, or has its source in some other being. This truth again is self-evident, and perhaps the effort to enlarge it or explain it will only obfuscate it. But there is one amplification of it that it is necessary to present here. Whatever belongs to a thing without belonging to it according to its intrinsic constitution has its sufficient reason, not in that thing but in another. This somewhat negative enunciation is deemed necessary to lead to the point of departure for the consequent principle. It is thought useful to show the relationship of non-sufficiency in a certain limited being to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. It will be again noticed that there is no need to formulate two modes of the principle, one for the ontological order, and one for the intellectual order, for here again we are in the realm of judgment, and the judgment refers directly to things, not to the relationship of things to the intelligence. This princi-

(17)

ple is treated by Aquinas in the Summa Theologica, where he says:

"...hoc autem etsi possit dici de habente formam quod scilicet habeat aliquid, quod non est ipsum."

d) The Principle of Causality

The enunciation of this principle, in its simplest form is as follows: Every effect must have a cause. And this principle follows immediately from the Principle of Sufficient Reason and is directly perceived by the intellect upon the presentation of the object. The process, which is an immediate one, may be broken down in the following steps for the purpose of showing its cogency. The object presented to the intellect is a being, and is perceived as such, and not non-being. The judgment is formed stating that this being is this being with the implied truth that it is not all being, or being in its perfection, therefore it has not in itself the sufficiency of being and is a limited being that must have its reason (ratio) of being from being itself. The causal principle is clear, this being, this limited and, therefore, dependent being is an effect of perfect or complete and independent being. A cause of some confusion may be here avoided if it is made clear that causality is not to be confused with force, a confusion that is fairly

common in these days of physical science. Force is a vector quantity, an abstraction in the mathematical order limited to material beings strictly as material, while causality is a principle in the metaphysical order, as large as being itself. (18)

A phase of the Principle of Causality which must be treated here is that which relates to final causality. The principle of final causality likewise flows from the principle of sufficient reason and may be stated: Every performer of an action acts in function of an end. And its truth is clear from the Principle of Sufficient Reason. All action, all causality must be traced back to the Prime Mover, the Person Who is all being, and therefore all intelligence. And the consequence of this is that all action will take place in function of that intelligence, and so will be intelligent action. Intelligent action means the attaining of some end or purpose, and the use of the proper means to attain that end. The principle therefore is clear, that every performer of an action, acts in function of an end. It is not stated and not meant that every agent is conscious of the end, but that in all action there is a finality.

These are the basic principles that must be kept in mind by anyone who enters the field of pedagogy. For the



acceptance of these principles is the first stepping-stone to the discovery of truth and knowledge. If these principles are ignored chaos will follow, because the intellect will be without a measure, will have to set itself up as the standard of truth, while ignoring the objective demands of things and reality. And if this tragedy takes place, as it has taken place in the lives of some so-called pedagogical experts, it will be, as it has been in the past, the case of the blind leading the blind into deeper and deeper morasses of ignorance and stupidity. These truths are not mental speculations, they are postulates of reality, and the intellect formulates them because it is formed to know reality and is measured by reality. The intellect of man is not the primal source of truth but must be measured by the standard of reality.

The essential point in any philosophical system of education is the acquisition of unity, otherwise education becomes mere fact gathering, and not a human activity. Facts, data and experience must all be gathered together and bound by principles of thought and being. In other words, unity depends on objectivity, and the only philosophy that has objectivity is that which is founded on being in its totality, the philosophy of Aristotle and

Aquinas. The chaos and the confusion of the various schools of modern thought do not come, as they fondly seem to imagine, from their belief in liberty. They spring from an anti-intellectual bias which leads them to deny the limitations of their own intellects; by that I do not mean the accidental limitations of intellectual ability or training, for many of them are endowed with good intellectual abilities. I mean the natural limitation of all dependent intellects on the objectivity of things. I mean the fact that has been stressed so often in the last few pages that the mind of man does not pretend to be, and cannot pretend to be the source of truth nor the measure of being, but must rest content to face the fact that truth is in things formally and causally, and in his mind and intelligence in as far as they conform to the exigencies of being.

Part Two: The Psychological Truths Immediately  
Connected with the Process of Education

The second series of truths with which we are concerned in a philosophy of education is a series of truths dealing with the nature of man - the subject of education. They are classified as psychological truths because they deal with the soul of man, the formal principle of life, the form that makes a man a man and distinguishes him

from the other classes of being. The truths here considered are more proximate in application to a philosophy of pedagogy because they concern themselves with more immediate principles. The order in which they are to be considered is as follows: The incorruptibility of the soul, the nature and powers of the intellect, the nature and powers of the will, the dignity of the human person.

### 1. The Incorruptibility of the Soul

The importance of this principle as a principle of pedagogy is that it establishes the focal point of education. If this life were the sum total of human existence, then the focal point of educative enterprise would be this world; if man's soul is incorruptible, then secularism is an educational falsity. And in the philosophy of Aquinas, the human soul is incorruptible. (19) Here Aquinas asks the very question we ask:

"Whether the human soul is corruptible?"

And here is his reply:

"We must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted in two ways - in itself and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any subsistent being to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the generation or corruption of something else. For generation and corruption belong to a thing in the same way that being belongs to it, which is acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, whatever has being in itself cannot be

"generated or corrupted except in itself; while things which do not subsist, such as accidents and material forms, acquire being or lose it through the generation or corruption of composites. Now it was shown above that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human soul is...."

(20)

In the "above", here referred to, he proves that the human soul, because it exercises intelligence, is subsistent.

The proof is simple. The human intelligence knows many forms in an abstract way; therefore, it is a spiritual subsistent being. To continue the quotation:

"..So that the souls of brutes are corrupted when their bodies are corrupted, while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it were corrupted in itself. This is impossible, not only in regard to the human soul, but also in regard any subsistent being that is a form alone. For it is clear, that what belongs to a thing by virtue of the thing itself is inseparable from it. But being belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. And thus, matter acquires actual being according as it acquires form, while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself, and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist."

Here is a clear proof of the incorruptibility of the human soul either per se or per accidens. The consequences of this truth on a philosophy of education have been pointed out above. A philosophy of education cannot be secularist, because in so being, it would be unrealistic. Here is a condemnation on the basis of reason alone of much that is common in educational circles.

## 2. The Nature and Powers of the Intellect

The second truth in this group treats of the Nature of the Intellect and Its Powers. And the Nature of the human intellect may be stated as:

"Intellectus humanus est potentia cognoscitiva anorganica."(21)

This can be translated to say:

"The human intellect is a non-organic power of knowing."

The proofs of the validity of this definition come from the facts that the human intelligence, as is clear to all, is able to form universal concepts, is able to abstract from individual beings, is able to distinguish between what necessarily belongs to a being and what is accidental. All these powers, which are apparent to any thinking subject, show that the intellect is a knowing power, because it gives knowledge, and it is non-organic because it is capable of forming abstract concepts which are independent of matter. Aquinas treats this truth in the Summa Theologica (22) where he states:

"It is necessary to say that the intellect is a power of the soul."(23)

The powers of the human intellect are summed up in the three intellectual actions which the faculty performs. These are the operations of the intellect, and the argument from

what actually occurs to the possibility of its occurrence is evident; if a thing actually happens, it is able to happen. The intelligence performs these acts; it has the power to do so. The first Power of the Intellect that we wish to observe is that of apprehension. This is the act by which the intellect knows the essence of material things. And it is the primary act of the intellect. When any particular thing is observed by a human being, the concept which is formed in the mind is a universal and essential concept. When we see a tree, the first concept we get is that of tree. This is an evident truth and can be seen by contemplation. The second power of the intellect is that of judgment. The act of judgment is performed when the intellect compares two things and affirms or denies one about the other. Any sentence that is uttered by a human being is the expression of vocal signs signifying the intellectual act of judgement. The third Power of the Intellect is that of reasoning. The power of reasoning consists in the power to compare two judgments and to form a third judgment. This is done by comparing the two terms of the final judgment to a common middle term. The power of reasoning may be exercised in either an inductive or a deductive manner. In induction, the process is from a series of particular truths to a general and hitherto unknown truth. In deduction, the process is from a general and universal truth to a particular truth. These three powers of the intellect must be well understood by the philosopher

of pedagogy, because they are the immediate material with which he is to be concerned in setting forth the principles which must be used in acquisition of knowledge. In themselves they are not difficult, but failure to appreciate their nature, and particularly failure to appreciate their interdependence will lead to considerable error in the area of education. The danger is that judgments will be formed and conclusions drawn that are not justified by the preceding acts of apprehension and judgment.

In function of these three Powers of the Intellect, the types of knowledge which are possible for the intellect of man may be considered here. <sup>(24)</sup>

The first type of knowledge is concerned with human life in the most general manner, and is the most common type of knowledge. It concerns itself with the practical order, and with manners of action. And it consists in making judgments about the use of proper means for achieving certain ends. In this type of knowledge the act of apprehension and the act of judgment about things is taken without much reflection, and the conclusions are formed and acted upon without careful scrutiny of them. The second type of knowledge is concerned with certain ways of thinking about reality. It consists in a reflection of the intellect upon concepts which the intellect recognizes as

concepts and uses these as a basis for further intellectual action. This is the type of knowledge which is found in the philosopher and in the mathematician.

The third type of knowledge is poetic knowledge and it is concerned with things in as much they are the product of creation. This means it abstracts, it judges, it forms conclusions about things, not about concepts, in as much they are the fruit of intelligence and art. This type of knowledge is only possible to the intellect which has so penetrated the essence of beings that it sees them all under the aspect of creation, either the absolute creation of the first cause, or the relative creation of secondary causes. But this type of knowledge does not deal expressly with concepts, it deals with things. The fourth type of knowledge is quite rare and it deals with reality which is incapable of being expressed as a concept, and which is recognized as the ultimate term of the act of knowledge. In other words, it concerns itself with absolute reality which is the term and the end of all knowledge. It is the peak of human connatural knowledge.

The philosopher of pedagogy must be familiar with these types of knowledge. Indeed, he must be thoroughly versed in the intricacies of the first two types, that is to say he must be an authority on the predential and the speculative



aspects of being. It is not necessary that he be familiar with the third and fourth types of knowledge, as indeed it is not given to all to be poets and contemplatives, but he must have a knowledge of what these things mean, their possibility and the fact that they are the crowning peak of heights that may be scaled in human thought. And because they are the arduous heights of thought they should form the ideal and the goal of any philosophical endeavour to place a complete plan of education.

### 3. The Nature and Powers of the Will

The third truth in this group is concerned with the Nature and Powers of the Will. The Will is defined:

"Voluntas human est potentia anorganica, quae simpliciter est imperfectior intellectu, secundum quid tamen est perfectior, quatenus versatur circa res nobiliores anima ipsa, et secundum quid imperfectior, quatenus versatur circa res materiales." (25)

It is translated in this manner:

"The human will is a non-organic power which is, absolutely speaking, inferior to the intellect, but under certain aspects it may be superior as when it centers itself on something more noble than the soul, and under certain aspects it is inferior, as when it centers itself on material things."

The will, then, is a power of the human soul, and it is dependent on the intellect because the will is an appetite which tends to the possession of some good, but the good cannot come into contact with the soul unless it is known

- nil volitur nisi prius cognitum - so the will is dependent on the intellect, but at times, when there is a good placed before the will which is a spiritual good, the will, in tending to that good, is capable of moving the intellect to the possession of that good. And, because it is capable of leading the intellect to a higher perfection, it is superior to the intellect in that particular operation. It is to be borne in mind that the will is an appetite which by its very nature tends to the possession of some good. Anything that is desired by the will is desired by it because it presents itself to the will under some aspect of good. The will does not make a thing good or bad, that is, the human will does not give goodness to a thing; goodness is constituted by the relationship of a thing to the will of the Prime Mover. And that relationship of goodness, which is simply a relationship that implies the truth that the thing desired will in some way add to the perfection of the person willing the possession of it.

The Powers of the Will may be summed up under two headings. The first is the Power of Moving the Person to Act - of acting as the efficient cause of action which will lead to an increase in perfection of the person. And the second is the Power of Freedom.

The first of these Powers is discussed by Aquinas in the  
 (26)  
Summa Theologica and is here quoted from the Basic Writings

of Saint Thomas Aquinas, by A. Pegis, Vol. 1, p.782:-

"....a thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect, and all the powers of the soul..... The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which is related to the universal end moves the powers which refer to particular ends. ....Now the object of the will is the good and the end in general, whereas each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as an agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the antural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our choice."

This truth gives to the philosopher of pedagogy the important position that the will plays in all human thought and action, and makes it essential for him to formulate a philosophy which will include education of the will.

The second truth with which we are concerned is that of the Freedom of the Will. If the will moved of necessity, then there would be no way in which the will could come under the influence of education, and no attention need be paid to it. But, if the will is free, then training in the use of that freedom is an important part in education. This (27) point is treated by Aquinas in the Summa Theologica where he asks the question:

"Whether man has free choice?"

And he replies:

"But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehen-

"sive power he judges something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectical syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And in that man is rational, it is necessary that he have free choice."(28)

And the nature of the Freedom of the Will is explained as follows:

"The proper act of free choice is election, for we say we have free choice because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to elect. Therefore we must consider the nature of free choice by considering the nature of election. Now two things concur in election: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another; on the part of the appetitive power it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of the counsel. ....the proper object of election is the means to the end. Now the means, as such, has the nature of that good which is called useful; and since the good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that election is principally an act of the appetitive power. And thus free choice is an appetitive power."(29)

This teaching on Freedom of the Will is in direct contrast to the basic principles held by the Naturalists, who hold that man is determined in his actions and has no freedom. It also disposes of the doctrines of the Radical-Socialists and the Nationalists who hold that man is merely a unit of a material society and lacking in freedom.

#### 4. The Dignity of the Human Person

The fourth psychological truth that is essential for the philosopher of education is the truth concerning the importance and dignity of the human person. The human person is the subject on whom education is tried, and if his proper dignity and importance are not appreciated, the educationalist is failing in his task. I want to stress here the distinction between the fact of individuality and personality. The individual, as the word implies, is a material thing, undivided in itself and divided from others, and man, as possessing matter may be looked upon as an individual - the Aristotelian-Thomistic Doctrine is that materia signata quantitate is the principle of individuation - but this idea is an abstraction from the world of reality. Man is a person. The meaning of this sentence will be clear from the following quotation of R.P. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. in his work

(39)

Le Sens Commun:

"Individuality which distinguishes us from other members of the same species, comes from the body, from matter which occupies this or that portion of space distinct from that occupied by any other man. By our individuality we are essentially dependent on our milieu, on such and such a climate, on such and such heredity (Greeks, Latins, Saxons). Christ was a Jew. Personality, on the contrary, comes from the soul, it is even the subsistence of soul independent of the body. As a person, Christ is God."

(31)

Further on, he gives us the notions of personality:

"The elements which are proper to personality are perfections in whose notions there is involved no imperfection, subsistence, intelligence and liberty."

And the importance of this truth is stressed by J. Maritain,  
(32)

in Les Degrés du Savoir:

"The notion of personality, no matter how complex it may appear, is before all an ontological notion. It is a metaphysical and substantial perfection which overflows into the order of operations with great psychological and great moral significance."

(33)

And, in The Three Reformers he tells us what that great significance is:

"According to the teaching of St. Thomas, on the contrary, man totally, as an individual is certainly ut pars in the society, and is ordained to the good of the society as the part is ordained to the whole, to the common good, which is more divine (than the individual good) and which merits for this reason to be loved by each one more than his life. But when there is a question of a person as such, the whole order is inversed and it is the society which is ordained to the eternal interests of the person and to his personal good, which is, in the last analysis, the common good of all, I mean God Himself, because each person, as such, is a totality, and each person is ordained directly to God as to his own proper end, and for this reason, in the order of charity he can prefer nothing to himself save God."

(34)

and, continuing, he says:

"The person is for God, and the society is for the person."

From the foregoing truth is drawn that statement which was quoted above from the Declaration of Independence:

"We hold these truths to be self evident: that all

"men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, and among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men...."

From these truths the position of the Radical-Socialists who place the person in an inferior position to the society, and the position of the Nationalists or the Statists, is seen to be entirely untenable, because they neglect the importance and dignity of the human person.

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The above section of this paper has been a brief summary of the objective truths in the ontological and psychological order which are essential material for the philosopher of pedagogy. The plan that was followed, was to show how all our knowledge is dependent on reality and being, and ultimately on the cause of all being. Then we listed the truths concerning the nature of the person who is the subject of education, the nature of the intelligence to be trained, of the will to be developed, and of the personality to be cultivated. With all these truths in mind we can proceed to the consideration of a series of truths which have to do with the subjective development of the human person.

## Notes on Chapter III

- (1) De Magistro will be found in the writings of Aquinas in Quaestiones Disputatae et Quaestiones Duodecim Quodlibetales published in 5 tomes by Marietti at Turin, in tome III, De Veritate, Quaestio XI, p.263-276.
- (2) Summa Theologica, Ia, Q.85, Art. 2
- (3) J. Maritain, Les Degrés du Savoir, p. 775.
- (4) Jos. Gredt, Elementa Philosophiae, Vol IX, p.386.
- (5) Summa Theologica, Ia, Q.50, Art. 2, and in Q.84, a.1.
- (6) Summa Theologica, Q.84, a.6.
- (7) Summa Theologica, Q.84, aa 1-8.
- (8) J. Maritain, Les Degrés du Savoir, II Annexe, de l'Analogie, P.821
- (9) Summa Theologica, Iz, Q.79, a.3
- (10) de Veritate, Q. 10, a.6, ad.2
- (11) Summa Theologica, Ia, Q.3, a.4.
- (12) cf. Quaestiones Disputatae de Intellectu et Intelligibili, Tract 1, c.2.
- (13) Summa Theologica, Ia, Q.16, a.5, ad.2
- (14) Summa Contra Gentiles, III, c.51.
- (15) These truths are stated by Aquinas in Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, Q.11 a.1, and are treated very thoroughly by M. Maritain in Les Degres du Savoir, Chapitre V, La Connaissance Metaphysique, p.399.
- (16) Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, Q.94,a.2, and in de Veritate, Q.10, a.6. and a.8.
- (17) Summa Theologica, Ia, Q.3, a.7.
- (18) Aquinas treats this Principle of Causality in his Commentary de Anima, Bk. 2, 1,13.



- (19) The treatment of this question is found in Ia, Q.75, a.6, and the English text that is used is taken from The Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, edited by Anton C. Pegis, Vol. I, p.291.
- (20) Summa Theologica, Ia, Q.75, a.2.
- (21) J. Gredt, Elementa Philosophiae, Vol. I, p.427.
- (22) Summa Theologica, Ia, Q.76, a.2-a.8.
- (23) Pegis, opus citatus, p.746.
- (24) An excellent account of these types of knowledge will be found in the Etudes Carmelitaines, 23e. Annee, Vol. II, October, 1938, in an article by J. Maritain, L'Expérience Mystique Naturelle et Le Vide, p.116.
- (25) J. Gredt, Elementa Philosophiae, Vol. I, p.469-470.
- (26) Summa Theologica, Ia, Q.82, a.4.
- (27) Summa Theologica, Ia, Q.83, a.1.
- (28) Pegis, opus citatus, p. 787.
- (29) Summa Theologica, Ia, Q.83, a.3.
- (30) Reg. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. Le Sens Commun, p.333.
- (31) Le Sens Commun, p.334.
- (32) J. Maritain, Les Degrés du Savoir, p.458.
- (33) J. Maritain, The Three Reformers, p.31.
- (34) The Three Reformers, p.32.

## CHAPTER IV

## Subjective Development of Man

The objective truths which were described in the past section of this paper must be linked with the subjective development of the human person. Wisdom, which is the truth of contemplating objective reality as springing from the source of all being, cannot be poured into the human mind. Rather, it happens in the mind when the educable assimilates truth in relation to the totality of being. (1) The mind feeding on being constitutes learning. And this learning is a vital process of man. As Aquinas says, knowledge pre-exists in the learner, not in purely passive potentiality, but in active potentiality, that is, when the intrinsic agent is sufficiently able to bring it to perfect actuality. (2) The essential activity of the learner is the most important part of education. Aquinas has a prolonged comparison of the teacher to a doctor of medicine, whose whole function is to remove the obstacles to health, to foster right conditions in which health may assert itself in the body. The teacher has the duty of making the truth available to the educable and of encouraging him in the acquisition of it, and of aiding him. But the essential part of knowledge must come from the person. The subjective development of the person is then the next

step that must be considered.

From the discussion of the nature of man in the last section, it is clear that the subjective development of man consists in the building in of habits, intellectual and voluntary. The intellectual habits, (or virtues, since they are good habits) with the contemplation of truth as their object, are indispensable for learning; but for living the life of virtue, which is the end of life, the voluntary, or moral virtues are a sine qua non. Action is directed to the attainment of perfection, and man must direct the progress of his perfection by the dictates of reason. (3)

To perform this work well, his reason must develop certain habits, which are determinants of the faculty, and which assist the faculty to operate perfectly. (4) There ought to be as many habits as there are function in man because the habit is the stamp of reason on human activities, and the influence of reason ought to be extended to the entire domain of human life. (5) The truly educated man is the man with the most fully developed habits, not only because man's human faculties are perfected in proportion to the development of habits, but because then man is being guided by reason with ease, efficiency and consistency. (6) As a determination or qualification of man, superadded either to his nature or to the operation for which that nature exists,

habit is not a passing determination but one difficult to uproot; it becomes a second nature by deliberate, conscious and repeated effort. <sup>(7)</sup> In building habits, we are harnessing pre-existing forces; we are not creating new forces. Inborn capacities are not enough; reason must step in and organize a definite pattern, must make a man master in his own house.

### Part One: The Intellectual Virtues

Intellectual Virtues are habits in the intellect. That is, they are dispositions and modifications of the intellect which enable it to act with ease, efficiency and consistency. It must be stated here that Aquinas distinguishes between the intellect as speculative and the intellect as practical, and the force of this distinction comes from the starting point of different intellectual operations. The method of operation is the same, but the starting point of the speculative reason is the form or essence of a thing; the practical reason starts from an end that is intended. The speculative intellect is concerned only with the truth of things; the practical intellect <sup>(8)</sup> not only knows things but causes them. And we have two different sets of Intellectual Virtues, those perfecting the speculative reason, understanding, science, and wisdom, and those perfecting the practical reason,

(9)  
art and prudence.

The first objects of our consideration are the virtues perfecting the speculative intellect. And the one that we will consider first is the virtue which is formed in the intellect by the disciplining of the intuitive function of the intellect, the virtue of understanding. This intuitive function is not to be understood in the sense of the object being immediately present to the intellect; it means simply the first act of the intellect, which is the act of simple apprehension which was described above when the power of abstraction was proven to be one of the powers of the intellect. Understanding is the intellectual virtue which perfects the speculative intellect in its grasp of first principles, the principles of being which are self evident. (10)  
The possession of this virtue guarantees that relationship between the intellect and the whole of reality - the totality of being - which constitutes a very important element in the education of a man. This virtue is basic for the development of education as it contains in itself the seeds of all the sciences. (11)

The second virtue of the speculative intellect that is to be treated here is the virtue which perfects the speculative intellect and disciplines it in the analytic function, the virtue of knowledge. This is the virtue which perfects

the intellectual power which is most properly that of man. Though it is true that man possesses the power of grasping some things immediately, his proper operation - that which distinguishes him from all types of intelligent beings - is reasoning. This reasoning is a movement of the intellect from a truth which is known to a truth which is hitherto  
(12)  
unknown. The reasoning process begins with an act of intellection, the immediate grasp of a principle, and ends with another simple act, an analysis by which the nature of the object is known. The habit which perfects the intellect in the act of drawing conclusions is the intellectual  
(13)  
virtue of science or knowledge. It is like all the other intellectual virtues in this, that it has truth for its object. The truth it seeks is that which can be deduced from principles furnished by the exercise of the virtue of understanding. It is a detailed and logical knowledge which analyzes each section of the scientific field. Scientific progress, which is the aim of this virtue, is reached by the application of the principles of being to  
(14)  
deeper levels or reality. The failure to achieve this habit on the part of the learning subject, or the failure to exercise this habit leads to retrogression and disintegration in the knowing subject.

The third virtue of the speculative intellect which is to be treated here is that virtue which disposes and discip-

lines the intellect in relation to its synthetic functions. This virtue is the intellectual virtue of wisdom. The whole aim of education is an integrated knowledge or reality. The method that must be followed by man is the piecemeal approach in which each object must be carefully scrutinized, each part carefully analyzed, the relationships with other things noted. But the aim of the knowing process is the synthesis of all facts, experiences, deductions and intuitions into a complete unity, the unity of being, the harmony of reality. (M. Maritain points this fact out in the title of his works Les Degrés du Savoir which reads, Distinguer pour Unir). This synthetic, comprehensive vision of the whole of reality is made possible by the virtue of wisdom. It completely perfects man's speculative reason. It harmonizes and orders the work of the virtues of knowledge and understanding. Wisdom, by the synthesis it makes of the realities of being, fixes its gaze on the first cause of being, the perfection of being, the all-being, whom we call God. Wisdom establishes the relationship of all participated truth with the final truth. The aim of true education is the contemplation of final truth and this contemplation of final truth is attained when the intellect has developed the virtue of wisdom. The keen vision of wisdom guards the hierarchy

(15)

of values in being, for it not merely concerns itself with things as things, but with things as true. Wisdom is the peak of the Intellectual Virtues, and the delicate and heady fruit of education. And as any education can be judged by its fruit, so an appreciation of, a comprehension and the fostering of the supreme virtue of the speculative intellect is imperative for the philosopher of education.

In the above the matter discussed was matter relating to the speculative order, but in the philosophy of Aquinas there is the same detailed care devoted to the practical order and an analysis is made of the virtues necessary to perfect man in his activity as well as in his speculation. In the order of activity Aquinas distinguishes between the activity of man which is concerned with actions of making (factibile) and actions which are concerned with doing (16) (agibile). The virtue which perfects the practical man as maker is the virtue of art and that which perfects man as the doer of actions is the virtue of prudence.

Art is the habit disposing the human intellect by which external actions produce a due end through determined means. It is concerned with products which are distinct (17) from the agent who makes them. As contributing to the perfection of the whole man in relation to the totality of being, art is an imprinting of the personality of the artist



not only on the masterpiece of his own life, but on the canvas of the world. It is the sharing of the dependent creature in the creative activity of the first cause, with all the limitations proper to the creature. Its true sphere is the discovery of means to attain its own end and it produces the things necessary for man's perfection. In either (18) the fine or the useful arts, the artist does not possess the habit of art if he fails in his ordination of means to an end.

All the actions which are performed by the agent as an artist are human acts. Art has its social and its individual values. But art has nothing to do with making a man good, for man is truly good only when his goodness is integrated with all his thoughts and actions, that is, he is truly good only when he is morally good. The term morally good means simply that he uses the proper means to attain a good end properly and in keeping with right reason. It is because the ultimate end of man and the end to which all others are subordinated is the last perfection of man, the knowledge and love of the cause of all being, that morality, in its largest sense is always concerned with the relationship of man to his first cause. Morality is the domain of reason. And reason is directed in the attainment of moral perfection by the virtue of prudence. The purpose of education is the perfection of the subject, man, and that

perfection must be the moral perfection. It is true that perfection lies primarily in contemplation, but it is expressed and lived also in action, in the exercise of virtues in the external world. The exercise of moral virtues depends on the possession of the intellectual habit or virtue of prudence. There can be no moral virtues without prudence, and no prudence without moral virtues. The explanation of this doctrine is the explanation of the subjective development of man. Man always acts for an end, and the conception of the end is the beginning of moral action. Prudence as the recta ratio agibilium directs this action. The relation of prudence to good living is the nexus between the subjective development of man for learning, and the same development in living the good life. Prudence is essential to the moral virtues, and as an intellectual virtue proceeding from first principles, is impossible without the virtue of understanding. Theoretically, the other four Intellectual Virtues may be had by one who fails to look upon the true goal of education, but for the attainment of the proper goal of education, prudence is an absolute necessity. Metaphysics, first philosophy, is architectonic in the speculative order; prudence is architectonic in the practical order, and must be the virtue stressed in the practical order by the philosopher of education.

## Part Two: The Moral Virtues

In the system of Aquinas the subject of education must be prepared for living, and so the Intellectual Virtues are not enough, because as we saw in the last section of this paper the will has the force of an efficient cause in relation to human acts. We must, therefore, spend a brief time in considering the virtues which dispose the will to proper, easy and efficacious action. It is true that reason is the first principle of human action precisely as human, but the command of the intellect is not tyrannical, it is political.<sup>(19)</sup> Rebellion is always possible and that is why the appetite (will) of man needs habits, virtues, by which it is subjected to the demands of reason. The orientation of an educated man to the proper goals is the work of the Moral Virtues. A man may know that the Moral Virtues must not exceed the mean or rule of reason, but it is not always easy to determine the boundary line of excess or defect. This is the work of the counsel, judgment and precept of prudence. Balance and sanity are given to life by acts of counsel; remembrance of the past, understanding of the present, shrewdness in grasping future events, comparing the data thus obtained, and docility to the opinion of others. When this process has been completed, reason makes the final judgment on the suitability of the definite series

of means which are chosen by the will. The final and principal act of prudence is an act of command. Prudence is a requirement for learning and a necessity for living, and the Moral Virtues are the necessary complement of prudence. The balance of a harmonious life, the subordination of the sense life to the reason, and of the reason to the first cause is effected by the Moral Virtues with prudence as the lever.

We will limit ourselves here to the root virtues, the virtues to which all the others can be reduced. St. Thomas states that the Intellectual Virtues are incomplete, because they only perfect one faculty in man; the Moral Virtues are interested in making the whole man good. And education for living consists in conforming the whole man to the order of reason. This ordering can exist in the reason itself, in the virtue of prudence; or it can be imposed on actions, the virtue of justice; or it regulates the passions, the virtues of temperance and fortitude. In short, there is a four-fold subject for the Moral Virtues; reason is modified by prudence, the will by justice, the concupiscible appetite by temperance and the irascible appetite by fortitude. The whole man is integrated by perfecting the sources of human acts, and personallity is integrated in proportion as the educated person grows in all the virtues. Disintegration is caused by the free play of the appetites and is a con-

(20)

flict with the fundamental order of the rational appetite.

+ + +

It is at this point that we reach a conclusion in our philosophical truths that are of importance in the realm of education. Certainly there are more truths treated by Aquinas, and truths which are necessary for the proper education of man. But they are truths of the supernatural life, and have not their proper place in a philosophy of education which limits itself to the truths known by reason and does not treat of revealed truth. Aquinas, in his philosophy of education says that the action of man must be crowned with the infused Moral and Theological Virtues, but this matter is not within the competence of the philosopher.

### Conclusion

I will make a brief recapitulation in order that we may view the entire structure of integration that Aquinas sets forth in his philosophy of education.

- I The objectivity of reality, and the possibility of mind attaining this objective reality.
- II The truth that learning, in relation to the intellect, viewed in its theoretic function demands the presence of knowledge, understanding and wisdom. And in the practical workings of the intellect it demands the habits of art and prudence.
- III Education for living postulates prudence in the reason and justice perfecting the will.
- IV The concupiscible and irascible appetites need the perfection of temperance and fortitude.

This philosophy of education deals with fundamentals.

It insists that truth can only be had by the constant, persistent labor of the human mind making an objective trek into the world of reality. Only then can the intellect hope to penetrate into the heart of things that are proposed to it, acquire an accurate judgment about creatures and avoid making the common mistakes about the end of life by synthesizing everything in the light of the universal cause. This is the foundation of solid philosophy and must be taken by the philosopher of education as the basis in all his work.

## Notes on Chapter IV

- (1) Aquinas, de Veritate, Q.1, a.1
- (2) Aquinas, De Magistro, art. 1
- (3) Summa Theologica, Ia, Q.4, a.1
- (4) Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, Q.49, a.4.
- (5) Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, Q.57, a.60.
- (6) Aquinas, de Veritate, Q.20, a.2.
- (7) Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, Q.52, et Q. 53
- (8) Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, Q.57, a.1.
- (9) Locus Cit. aa.2,3,4.
- (10) Locus Cit. a.2.
- (11) Op. Cit. Q.51,a.1
- (12) Summa Theologica, Ia, Q.79, a.8.
- (13) Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, Q.57, a.2.
- (14) Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, Q.52, a.2.
- (15) Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, Q.3, a.3.
- (16) Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, Q.57, a.1, as 1; aa.3,4.
- (17) Locus Cit. a.5 ad 3.
- (18) ibid, ad. 1
- (19) Summa Theologica, Q.81, a.3, ad 2.
- (20) Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, Q.61, a.1.

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