Lecture 4

CORE

Provided by Bournemouth University Re

Freedom-wound: Towards the Embodiment of Human Openness in Daseinsanalytic Therapy

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I take my task here as a kind of weaving. I wish to throw the net wide and show how Martin Heidegger and Medard Boss have offered me an understanding of the human realm, and its grounding in Being, that has intimately informed how I am as a psychotherapist. This human realm, between sky and earth, has been communicated by them not just in philosophically logical ways, but also in evocatively human ways that may be "held" and embodied. It is in this spirit that I wish to use the term "freedom-wound" in order to indicate and evoke what I will call the "soulful space" of being human – how we are grounded in both great freedom and great vulnerability. Such ambiguity may describe the essence of a human kind of openness, and the lived understanding of such ambiguity may be shown to give direction to psychotherapy in the following ways:

a) It welcomes psychotherapy clients to the human realm as wound and freedom. Such "wound" and "freedom" is not merely historical and social, but is given and can be taken up and lived in more welcome ways. There are "wounds" and vulnerabilities that can be avoided or can be "healed," but there is a great vulnerability that cannot. There are many freedoms that can be taken away or fought for, but there is a great freedom (with its responsibility) that cannot. Daseinsanalytically-oriented psychotherapy may give deep permission to clients to encounter and experience a kind of "settling down" into these dimensions as they come through in the unique vicissitudes of their own life, and to take them up and live them forward.

b) It understands so-called "psychopathology" as flights and distortions of the human freedom to which one is called and also as the forms of refusal to the human vulnerabilities and limits that are existentially given. In this respect, one of the ways that Heidegger has served us is to indicate the relevance of grounding the understanding of human being in a larger ontological context from which he or she is not separate. Such non-separation is the ground of a "calling" beyond us yet intimate to us, and as such, cannot be fully understood by humanism, cognitivism or psychologism. So-called "psychopathology" thus goes beyond psychology to the so-called "spiritual" and "moral" realms of our response to "callings" that are not just "within" our "minds" but are "there" in the mutual arising of Being and beings.

Essentially I wish to speak of "belonging to freedom-wound," also metaphorized as "soulful space," between sky and earth, embracing ambiguity. But first I will speak of "belonging to freedom" and then of "belonging to wound." So, although the ideas are intricately interconnected, I would like to proceed by highlighting these emphases as a way of holding them apart in holding them together. I will adopt this artificial device in the following way:

a) A focus on freedom. This section considers the kind of no-thing that we are and how we objectify and turn self and others into "things."

b) A focus on vulnerability. This section considers what has been called "narcissism" and how we can refuse the call to embrace human vulnerability and inter-human vulnerability.

c) Embracing ambiguity: between sky and earth. This section attempts to set out a holistic vision of the interconnection between freedom and vulnerability. The shape of such "occurring together" of freedom and vulnerability is metaphorized as freedom-wound, and alternatively as "soulful space."

d) Towards the embodiment of a human kind of openness. In this final section, I would like to honor Daseinsanalytic understanding as giving direction to therapy and encouraging a particular kind of invitational presence for the therapist to embody. I would also like to indicate, however, how an increasing focus on the "lived body" and "attunement" (which has its seeds in Heidegger and Boss), has nevertheless set me off in a direction with a somewhat different emphasis in terms of psychotherapeutic practice. This has to do with my increasing concern with the notion of a client's access to his or her "experiencing-before-formulations" and the possibilities of client direction "from there."

Belonging to Freedom

I would like to begin by quoting Heidegger (2002) from the *Zollikon Seminars*, the publication that documents his encounters with Boss and psychiatry students. In these quotations I see the seeds of an ontological freedom that can be taken up ontically as a responsibility and task:

"Freedom is to be free and open for being claimed by something." (p. 217)

"Beings are and are not nothing... (human being's) distinction and peril consists of...being open in manifold ways to beings as beings." (pp. 74, 75)

In the *Zollikon Seminars*, Heidegger claims that it is not that he wants to make philosophers out of the psychiatry students whom he is addressing, but that he would like them to become "attentive to what concerns the human being unavoidably" (p. 115), even though this may not be easy to articulate.

In his encounters with psychiatry students in the seminar series over its ten year history, between 1959 and 1969, Heidegger summarizes the essential insights of *Being and Time*, as well as the sense and spirit of his later work. Within this very broad context that includes a consideration of spatiality, temporality, intersubjectivity, embodiment and language, he speaks in a way that we never lose sight of a "clearing" that makes all things possible. Indeed, as he says explicitly: "spatiality and temporality both belong to the clearing" (p. 225). In other words, space and time are not "independent variables" into which all beings (including human beings) are slotted, but space and time are themselves shaped from the events of the clearing in which human existence intimately participates. That spatiality is the possible then, now and not yet which carries both continuity and discontinuity, that beings can be and body forth, that all things disclose themselves as something and interact in some way; through this all, is the clearing which grounds these possibilities, the "something-eventing" rather than nothing," the "is" that includes both the revealed and the concealed and opens the possibilities of intimate participation.

This "clearing" is not human consciousness as in an idealist fantasy of it. Such a position would enthrone human existence and human consciousness as the source of all this. Nevertheless, human being, as dwelling ecstatically "out there" together with beings and participating in the "clearing" carries the essence of the clearing forward in intimate ways. To quote Heidegger: "He is not the clearing himself, not the entire clearing, nor is he identical to the whole of the clearing as such" (p. 171). Yet human being in his or her essence does carry an opening power that is enacted by his or her embodied perceptions and actions. This is the essential source of human freedom; not fundamentally in the freedom to choose or to act (which is nevertheless part of this freedom), but to be a domain of standing perceptually/receptively open to what is encountered, to be the "there" of being (Dasein).

Why this can be called a kind of freedom is that it gives room to perceptions and meanings. It is a kind of freedom that both reveals and conceals, and which co-participates in the event of Being. Living on the edge of time, I occur as a gathering and am the "there" for the coming together of possibilities and relationships that can be carried forward into the aliveness of something new. It should be emphasized that we are speaking here ontologically: this kind of freedom is something we are rather than something we decide to do or not - it is part of the essence of being human. To quote Askay (2002), "Dasein can only be free in the sense of "freedom of choice" because it is primordially exposed to the free and open dimension (i.e., the clearing) of being in the first place" (p. 312). Yet this is not an absolute freedom, as if everything was inside an individual being's own personal consciousness and as if there was no "otherness." Falling far short of totality, human openness means that it is an openness for..., and this involves an acknowledgement of being claimed by the concerns that come with such "otherness" as well as the claims of one's own situated and embodied existence, its relationality, and the "room" that both otherness and situated existence needs. So "being there" is also a "being there for" - it is essentially an opening that has "care" as its nature.

Michael Zimmerman (1992), in a paper on ethics and responsibility, articulated how freedom is not a human possession. At the ontological level, we "belong" to freedom and can ontically take this up and authentically be of service to the task of freedom which is to "let beings be."

Such given ontological freedom and responsibility to be the "there" can be lived out ontically in different ways. There are multiple ways of being the "there" and perceptually attuning to otherness, such as in boredom, in anger, in sadness, in desire. In appropriating Meister Eckart's notion of "Gelassenheit" or "letting be-ness," Heidegger indicated something of the care-full possibility of freely standing in a serene welcome that allows beings their "otherness" and their own freedom to be. This is the "sky of welcome," the hospitality of home-rooming things and beings that can become themselves more and further. We will return to this ontic possibility of granting freedom based on its ontological foundation when we consider one of the dimensions of psychotherapeutic welcome a little later.

In considering this relationship between the givenness of ontological freedom and it's ontic possibility of being taken up, I would like to move closer to a particular implication of the ontic experience of freedom: a freer and more "spacious" sense of personal identity. This implication may give insight into one of the central liberating powers of psychotherapy.

In previous papers (Todres, 1993, 1999a), I have discussed the problem of selfobjectification and its releasement, how we are always more than our contexts. (see also Frie, 2003 and Zimmerman, 1981). In not being enclosed upon ourselves, human identity cannot be essentially defined in a "thing-like" way. Human identity can never be finally objectified, it is essentially no-thing. I will emphasize this dimension just for the moment even though it is far from the whole story. But as a counterpoint to a growing technological world-view which has found it useful to isolate objects and things, a meditation on our no-thingness may help us remember how we may get lost in specialized, objectified views of ourselves. Such specialized, objectified views of one's own identity, if clung to too tightly, may forget the "room to move" that the openness of Being has granted us in our essence. In the forgetfulness of our primordial belonging, the need to belong does not go away, even if it means belonging to some "thing," some general category, some specialized turning ourselves and others into grasped objects. This strategy of objectifying self and other has become particularly difficult to sustain in these post-modern times, where the traditional narratives do not easily hold their center and where the task of belonging has become an extremely complex challenge (Todres, 2002).

In carrying out a phenomenological study of clients' experiences of psychotherapy, I was interested in focusing on the kind of therapeutic self-insight that carries a greater sense of freedom (Todres, 2003). A picture emerged in which the complex story that unfolded between therapist and client constituted forms of self and world that were "more than" previous self-definitions. This kind of self-insight was characterized as a direction which freed self-understanding from the objectification of self and other (Todres, 1999a). One generic power of conversational psychotherapy may thus be to help clients recover their sense of human identity in ways that always transcend any form of objectification. As such it could be a humanizing force within a technological society where the pressure to become more specialized, "efficient" and more subject to measurement, has become a powerful value and quest. Time does not permit me to go into some of the more detailed descriptions of this kind of therapeutic experience that arose from this study. However, I would just like to highlight one component of this experience, that is, the nature of the "sense of freedom" that occurs. The invariant structure that was intuited was the experience of "being more than..." and, us such, of moving beyond previous experiences of self-enclosure:

In the experience of "being more than...", a self as agent is recovered in which there is a potentially transcendent quality beyond a self that is reduced to the sum total of its past experiences. On the other hand, such freedom is not absolute freedom. The results of the study revealed how the terms of the freedom arose out of a consideration of personal limits and repetitions. The open space of the freedom only makes sense in relation to these limits and restrictions. (Todres, 2003, p. 202) As a complex historical experience, it is then a situated freedom, and although grounded in no-thingness, "works" in relation to the immanence of "this" embodied, historical situation.

At the end of this analysis, I was prompted to say that the content of particular therapeutic self-insights is not the fundamental point of psychotherapy. Rather it is the *experience* of "being more than" or of "being-as-possibility" that is one of the generic liberating powers of psychotherapy.

Belonging to Wound

In talking of the claim of ontological freedom and the ontic experience of situated freedom we have begun to touch on the nature of a "wounded" kind of freedom that forms "soulful space," the human realm between sky and earth. But we have not yet come explicitly enough to articulating the existential nature of human vulnerability with its task of suffering and sojourning in the human realm and meeting others there. Again I would like to start this section with Heidegger (2001):

"Dasein is that being whose being itself is at issue." (p. 124)

"...being human, as such, is distinguished by the fact that to be, in its own *unique* (my italics) way, is to be this openness." (p. 121)

There is a question and a certain quality of aloneness in this. Just as a great freedom and responsibility is given with human being's intimate participation in the clearing, there is a profound vulnerability that is given with human existence. The source of vulnerability paradoxically "comes from" human being's openness to the world to receive-perceive. And Heidegger has characterized this as "care." Zimmerman (1992) elaborates as follows: "By defining the being of Dasein as care (*Sorge*), Heidegger emphasized that human existence is essentially concerned about itself, other people, and things in the world" (p. 60).

It is as if each of us is formed as a passionate question, an incompleteness that lives with us and to which we respond. This "care" is incarnate in our flesh and shapes the ways that things come to us.

This is the "wound of earth," of walking *this* path rather than *that* path, of loss and the possibility of not-being, of physical pain and the pain of not being at home, of being thrown into this circumstance, culture and time, of being situated and defined by self, body, others, language and culture.

In living a human life we come with the seasons, with dryness and wetness, with the rhythms of darkness and light, of going away and coming back, of continuities and great discontinuities, with its Janus-face of both potential anguish and renewal. Framing and permeating this all is finitude; there, in the possibility of not being, and there, in the fragility of flowers, in the beauty of a sunset and in the passing of a smile.

I want to say that the essence of all this speaks of an existential vulnerability that is the foundation of its specific circumstances. And this is the "wound" of human openness that grounds the experience of vulnerability. The very nature of the human sojourn carries an inevitable question: how to live with the implications of this wound that speaks of an unfinished self that cannot be irrevocably grasped, that speaks of temporal uncertainty, and that speaks of falling from the oneness of belonging? It is far better to try to deny such vulnerability; to embark on a voyage of great refusal. And here we come to narcissism.

"Narcissism" as a technical term within the field of psychopathology has been characterized as a whole style of being-in-the-world that tries to defend against the great vulnerability of feeling needy and incomplete. Something of the understanding of such a possibility for living can be indicated with reference to the myth of Narcissus. Essentially, a beautiful young man becomes fixated and fascinated by an illusion: that his image in a pool of water can be grasped and possessed. He becomes enamored of this surface image of himself to the exclusion of all other possible relationships. The core quest is to become at one with the beautiful picture. This story can be taken as a metaphorical indication of trying to avoid the vulnerability that comes with openness and relationality by pursuing a quest that tries to live as if it were possible to be in control of the source of "otherness." Like all of us, Narcissus finds himself in the human realm feeling a sense of disconnection from an absolute guarantee of "nourishment" and continuity. This is a state of vulnerable longing, of being in need, of feeling the ways we are not complete. To quote Perikles Kastrinidis (1998, p. 179): "To be human means to be torn." So Narcissus embarks on the journey of great refusal. By binding himself to himself, he attempts to "puff up" and maintain forms of selfsufficiency that strain against the spoiling of such self-sufficiency.

The psychoanalytic tradition has been helpful in considering a number of strategies of living that are implicated in the narcissistic journey. These include trying to turn the "self" into something "objective" that can be held onto, into a beautiful "thing" that is stable and admired, or into an ideal fantasy that is "above it all;" of seeking others as "mirrors" of one's wholeness and completeness, or of "merging" or identifying with another or group who seems fixed, strong, ideal or special. With different emphases and nuances, these psychoanalytic writers have indicated the different strategies of self-sufficiency: how to deny the acknowledgement of aging and death, how to pretend to be in the stance of "I don't need." In these ways the flight from openness, relationality and vulnerability are pursued. The futility of this quest as an absolute possibility is finally indicated in Narcissus's mood of despair in which, in one version of the story, he kills himself.

The story also implies a different possibility, the existential task of embodying openness and vulnerability, the possibility of bearing this wound and even finding it as a gate and passage to that which is humanly possible and which I will metaphorize as "soulful space," the intertwining of freedom and vulnerability. But before that, I would like to indicate the gift of "belonging to wound."

This gift involves what Eugene Gendlin (1997a) calls the "life forward direction" which may require an openness to what may come in vulnerability. In this vulnerable openness there is a leaning towards the life that is not yet, and the "newness" of being touched by an aliveness that always includes the possibility of pain. So we are accompanied on our sojourn by this vulnerability that knows the softness of flesh and the joy of welcoming the one who returns. This "hunger" for what may come is not just towards the past, as if to be at one with a mother at the beginning, but rather a leaning into the matrixnot-yet, the freshness of what presents itself. In the flow of relational life there may be a nourishment of the play of home and adventure, the gift of belonging to wound. So there is an existential wound that one can bear, that remains open and does not contract into self-enclosure. The one from home is transformed by this adventure and such a "self" is never self-enclosed but is always in the openness of relationships.

So we come back to freedom and towards the intertwining of freedom and wound in soulful space; the freedom of being incomplete; the nourishing brightness that can come in such unknowing, carrying with it the possible tenderness of the human space of welcome.

Belonging to Freedom-wound: Embracing Ambiguity in "Soulful Space"

Belonging to freedom-wound, we are intimate with "being-in" and "being-with." In these terms, the openness of Being is not forgotten and the nature of such openness is *in* its "withness" and *in* its "in-the-worldness." This may be taken together with Heidegger's (2001) earlier quote that: "Beings are and are not nothing..." (p. 74). Heidegger is indicating a "being-open" that is never separate from "being open for...", the claims of one's unique situatedness. A further and more explicit quote from Heidegger (2001) takes this further: "Now how is it with consciousness? To stand in the clearing, yet not standing like a pole, but rather to sojourn in the clearing and be occupied with things" (p. 225).

Belonging to freedom-wound can translate into the ontic capacity to welcome historical incompleteness and human vulnerability. Ongoing participation rather than the survival of a "fixed" self can become welcome. In such free participation one is changed *in* the participation, and thus one "wears" the freedom to be vulnerable in an existential way. The mood of this is not just a serene "letting be-ness," but rather the moods of being moved and touched in many different ways at different times, the gift of wound. Through these moods and multiplicities there may also be the poignant taste of being willing to be the "there," to be hospitable, and to be a unique place of gathering for a new "showing" of historical event-ing (Richardson, 2002). We could also put it this way: the recovery of our no-thingness paradoxically empowers the freedom to be someone-in-particular and incomplete.

To bear and take up the marks of finitude in our own carrying forward, and the marks of another in our sojourn, brings us most fully to the characterization of "soulful space."

In being "more than" any way we objectify ourselves and in being "more than" any way our contexts objectify us, there may be a sense of great space and freedom. At its edge may be Bodhidharma's "vast space, nothing holy." However, this is not the same as the more complex phenomenon I wish to call "soulful space." It is possible to become too enamored with "free presence" and the resolution of human vulnerability into vastness.

"Soulful space" takes its essence in human participation and historical relationality. Intimately within this sojourn, there is a mixing of "what one goes through" alone and with others, the stretching of the seasons, and the specific vulnerabilities that are more complex than a "serenity" of vastness. Rather, this is the taste of belonging between sky and earth, the "we-feeling" of mutual vulnerability.

In living forward we carry the given freedom of "more than" any objectification of ourselves and others, and in living forward we carry the given vulnerabilities of situatedness and finitude. We are able to say "givenness" because we do not start with beings, but with the grounding of beings in Being. Such belonging to freedom-wound provides the possibility of an intersubjectivity that grants both freedom and empathy; a "soulful space" where we can deeply meet fellow carriers of freedom-wound.

This is the human realm that is possible, that which Narcissus would reject. This is the ambiguous space (Sallis, 1973) that asks for both intimacy and aloneness, self-assertion and love, productivity and play, home and adventure; an ambiguity that forms a deep motivation and creative tension in the human heart. Within this context, so-called "psychopathology" can be understood as a flight from the openness of freedom and the refusal of such vulnerability. And here we finally come to the practice of Daseinsanalytically-oriented psychotherapy.

Towards an Embodiment of Human Openness

A question that now arises: how may a Daseinsanalytically-oriented psychotherapy be informed by a lived understanding of "belonging to freedom-wound"?

Heidegger traces the Greek roots of the word "analysis" to also mean "to loosen." And this implies bindings. In this regard he has referred to metaphors of "unravelling a woven fabric." One could say that conversational psychotherapy in general addresses the repetitions and premature ways that we have defined ourselves and others. But more distinctively, the analysis of human being's relation to Being as belonging to freedom-wound, places Daseinsanalytically-oriented psychotherapy within an ethical context and conscience that is "there," beyond the relation between drives and society. This "calling" is something Boss was very attentive to. He used it as a basis from which to understand psychopathology and as a basis from which to characterize the Daseinsanalyst's essential activity. I would like to briefly acknowledge these two contributions before moving on to my own increasing emphasis on the "callings" of the lived body.

a) Psychopathology as Truncated Existential Possibilities

Condrau (1986) has characterized the essential question in relation to illness as: "How is a person's freedom to carry out his potentialities impaired *at any given time*; *what* are these potentialities; and with respect to *which* entities does this impairment occur?" (p. 69) By means of italics Condrau emphasizes the words "how," "what" "at any given time" and "which" potentials. Thus, contained within this understanding of illness is how it is in relation to living forward, its context and meaning. One may say: "so far, so psychoanalytic." But note that he is not as interested in the "why" question – for him, a focus on "why" is speculative, philosophically unsustainable, and may obscure the phenomenological presence to, and description of, the specific potentialities that cannot be carried out.

It is in this spirit that Boss, his colleagues and students have studied and articulated the particular existential potentials that are truncated in different pathological forms. I cannot do justice here to these descriptions that have been pursued amongst other places in Boss's books: *The Content and Meaning of Sexual Perversions* (1949), *Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis* (1963), and *Existential Foundations of Medicine and Psychology* (1979). Suffice it to say that such a "seeing" of specific existential potentials gives the "illness" a direction and "calling." For example, Boss could recognize in the case of a sadistic pervert, the extremely frustrated desire to be at one with a lover, where the patient could only express the wish to devour and own (Boss, 1963, pp. 186-208). And here we come to the second important contribution, a contribution to practice:

b) Anticipatory Care and the Invitational Presence to "Let Be"

Boss saw in Freud's "free association" the seeds of a practice that could be re-framed within a deeper existential context. Initially, he was not as interested as Buber or the objectrelations theorists in the phenomenon of interpersonal encounter in itself as the major focus for therapeutic activity. Building on Heidegger's notions of "anticipatory care" and "letting be-ness," he wished to invite patients to become more "open to" what addressed them as they dwelt with, and attended to, their experiencing. He understood how such "experiencing" was not "inside" and separate from the world, but always in the relational presence of the potential callings and claims of being-there, between sky and earth. In anticipatory care he thus had great faith that if he turned patients back towards "themselves" rather than towards him, the relation between Being and beings could begin to do its work of restoring existential possibility and the re-membering of belonging to freedom-wound. The direction "comes from there" and he deeply welcomes and gives permission to this possibility, even encouraging this direction by means of his "why not" question. The therapist's attention in this mode is thus a listening for the healthy potential that is implicit. Such an attention is embodied in a certain kind of invitational presence and raises the question: how is it possible, accompanied by a lived understanding of freedom-wound, to represent such callings in a way that a client can authentically integrate them and to take them up as her own? And here we come to a direction for practice that I have personally increasingly pursued with greater emphases, that of the "lived body" as a primordial form of participative knowing in all this.

Therapist as Experiential Guide and Existential Companion

I am increasingly interested in what I would call experiential-existential psychotherapy. In my view, this focuses essentially on two things. Firstly, the therapist's own existential presence to "freedom-wound" that allows her or him to be a place of welcome and permission. And secondly, the therapist's ability to honor and facilitate the client's experiential process, moment by moment, as it is engaged in attending to the growing edges of her or his experiencing. It is with this latter concern that I have considered the notion of attunement, the lived body, and how experiencing becomes open to a vast range of implicit meanings and callings that move within our bodily relation to self-world-happening; and how language can serve such opening and appropriation.

This is a large subject and I would just like to indicate the central import of Eugene Gendlin's philosophy of implicit entry for psychotherapy. Let me start with Heidegger and my sense of how, at times, he stood in the mystery of Being: the extent to which self was open, the extent to which he grounded the "said" in the "unsaid," how being-in-the-world always transcended its forms and intrinsically exceeded linguistic capture. To quote Heidegger, "What is sayable receives its determination from what is not sayable" (1975, p. 78). And I come from there to Gendlin, perhaps through Merleau-Ponty, and say that the lived body, as shepherd of participation, and as a relationship of belonging to being-in-the-world, provides forms of relational knowing of how callings and meanings first come to us.

Faithful to the depth of bodily relational understandings, we could say that the way we are bodily in situations exceeds any precise formulation or patterning of it. This place of excess is where meanings can be felt before they are thought. Such a "felt sense" indicates a pre-reflective understanding of one's specific experience that functions intelligibly. Gendlin's notion of attending to a "felt-sense" that is bodily grounded, builds on Heidegger's understanding of how emotional attunement opens the world in different ways. But Gendlin notes that the "felt sense" can include but is "more than" than emotional attunement. For example, you may wish to sense into an experience that you had of a hot summer's night, just being in that. This whole experience is carried by the body and is "more" than the heat, "more" than the emotion of it, "more" than who you were with, "more" than other personal times and places that resonate with the hot, summer's night. All this is implicated in it and very specific. Gendlin (1992) has referred to this as an "unseparated multiplicity," in which the lived body functions as the background knowing of a situation-for-one-as-a-whole before lifting out or formulating its distinctions. He wants to remind us how the body is intimately implicated in what things mean, in that we live our relation to meanings through bodily participation in the world.

Heidegger is indicating something similar when he writes of *Befindlichkeit* as "locating" or "finding-oneself-in-relation." And interestingly, focusing on and languaging the possible distinctions within "the more", that is given by the felt-sense, can change and "carry forward" the "more" in productive ways. So moving existentially is both an embodied and languaged process. It is this bodily sense of what we "carry" that pre-figures our capacity to be open to the tasks of "being-there" as freedom-wound; it is both a receptive-perceptual as well as an emotional capacity, and the lived body carries its spatial and temporal shapes.

Also, such experiential entry into one's own location is a continuity with contextual potentials that "come from" the relational vastness of being-in-the-world. Who knows how far this goes? Yet such gatherings are very specific. To quote Gendlin: "Whenever we enter the experiencing of anything that is being talked about, we immediately find an intricacy with vast resources that goes beyond the existing public language" (Gendlin, 1997b, p. 37). So this kind of "locational dwelling" and "self finding" presents both our "carried" relatively fixed meanings as well as the implicit "moreness" from where fresh living-as-possibility and livingas-letting-be-ness can be constituted - "freedom-wound." The essence of deep psychotherapeutic change is then in the client's growing trust that is two-fold. Firstly, through experience that s/he can be productively informed and nourished by her or his matrix, that which is given with the lived body's capacity for a recollection of being: home. Secondly, through the experiencing of his or her capacity to take up and "live forward" new meanings, fresh perceptions and engagements: adventure. It is then no wonder that depth psychology has concentrated so much on "mother" and "father." The increasing trust of an unmediated belonging to home and adventure empowers a sojourn that enters the complexity of "soulful space," between sky and earth. Experiential-existential psychotherapy then holds fast onto the understanding that although one cannot walk for another, accompaniment is both possible and helpful.

While Boss took Heidegger's existential of "bodying forth" into the specific arena of psychosomatic medicine – how meanings may be lived or truncated – he may not have focused sufficiently on the implications of the lived body's attunement for psychotherapeutic practice.

In my view, Gendlin provides a practice that emphasizes an experiential knowing, a knowing by virtue of being, an intimate inhabiting, an "embodying of the presence of things that is pregnant with meaning" (Ferrer, 2002, p. 122). To put this another way, bodily experiencing is the place where the presence of "more than orderly patterns" of what comes can gather. Such bodily-mediated intricacy is greater than conceptualization. So, how to protect and facilitate this "fertility" and "generativity"? This is what Gendlin has been concerned with – how to honor and give phenomenological respect to the lived process by which languaging and embodying interact.

We are only on the way towards understanding the nature of the invitation to clients to bodily dwell with pre-separated multiplicity, to be the practitioners themselves of "how" they find words which carry forward presence, and of how therapists embody and language such service. For the therapist to be both a guide and a companion; this may be the challenge.

I would like to end with some words from Leonard Cohen (2001), who for me invokes one of the moods of "soulful space." It is from a song called "Here it is," and the luxury of it is that I don't even need to sing:

Here is your sickness. Your bed and your pan; And here is your love For the woman, the man.

May everyone live, And may everyone die. Hello, my love, And my love, goodbye.

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