View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk

brought to you by CORE

provided by Scholarship@Western

Western Graduate&PostdoctoralStudies

Western University

Scholarship@Western

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

12-2-2016 12:00 AM

# Homeric Kinship on the Margins of the Oikos

Tim Wright
*The University of Western Ontario*

Supervisor
Dr. Christopher Brown
*The University of Western Ontario*

Graduate Program in Classics
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy

© Tim Wright 2016

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd

Part of the Classical Literature and Philology Commons

## Recommended Citation

Wright, Tim, "Homeric Kinship on the Margins of the Oikos" (2016). *Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository*. 4281.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/4281

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

# Abstract

Homeric scholarship has a long history dating back to the 19th century of elucidating Homeric poetry through examining its kinship structures and how kinship is performed. Of particular note has been the focus on the father-child dynamic both *per se* and with respect to its widespread use as a prototype for a diverse range of relationships. Agamemnon, for example, can be profitably viewed as a kind of dysfunctional father to the Achaeans, and many of the *Odyssey*'s characters are implicitly judged based on the extent to which they fill the role of the gentle father (*ēpios patēr*) in various ways. Central to all of this scholarship, however, has been the essentially structural assumption that kinship is a binary concept. Some people are related; others are not. However, recent anthropology has exploded this idea of 'pseudo-kinship', concluding that 'relatedness', the belief that someone even outside of one's genetic or marital family is kin, is a more accurate measure of how kinship actually works than more prescriptive approaches have been.

In light of these conclusions, I attempt to expand upon our understanding of how kinship is portrayed in the Homeric poems by taking claims of relatedness more seriously. In a series of studies, I examine how more marginal relationships, those potentially outside of the patrilocal joint family, namely those involving bastards, slaves, and fugitives, function nonetheless as kinship relations. My model for this approach will be the *oikos*, with the father at its centre. Homeric kinship is portrayed as centripetal, with its various members jockeying for position relative to the patriarch. With this in mind, I focus especially on how my marginal subjects negotiate their position and how their role is portrayed with respect to the patriarch of their *oikos*.

# Keywords

Homer, Epic, Kinship, Family, Bastardy, Slavery, Exile, Relatedness, Teucer, Heracles, Eumaeus, Odysseus, Phoenix, Achilles, Archaic Greece.

# Epigraph

*Patria est, ubicumque est bene*.

“One’s fatherland is wherever things go well.”

– Pacuvius fr. 250 Schierl

τὸ τᾶς ῥικνᾶς χελώνας μναμόνευε·
οἶκος γὰρ ἄριστος ἀλαθέως καὶ φίλος

“Recall what the shrivelled tortoise said: for truly the best *oikos* is also one’s own.”

– Cercidas fr. 7 Lomiento = 2 Powell

# Acknowledgments

Many thanks to my dissertation and examination committees, including Profs. Thomas Lennon, Randall Pogorzelski, Charles Stocking, Aara Suksi, and Ruth Scodel, who drove from Michigan and back in the same day in order to attend the examination.

Particular gratitude is owed to three groups. First, the UWO Department of Classics. As those of you who know me well are aware, my first couple of years here were not the easiest. But I feel very strongly that the whole department rallied around me in a way that was remarkable in my experience. One of strengths of this department is its ability to support its own without coddling them. Second, my supervisor Prof. Chris Brown, who has been a mentor and, really, a benefactor when you consider all the books he has lent me – some of which I even intend to return someday. And he has also been a good friend when I've needed it the most. And finally my wife Heather and our unborn child. Having spent so much time thinking about families over the past number of years, it is fulfilling now to have one of my own.

# Table of Contents

Abstract and Keywords……………………………………………………………….i

Epigraph…………………………………………………………………………...ii

Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………iii

Table of Contents……………………………………………………………………iv

Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………...v

Introduction………………………………………………………………………..1

Chapter 1: Bastards…………………………………………………………………23

1.1: The *Nothos*……………………………………………………………………..23

1.2: Teucer……………………………………………………………………………48

1.3: Heracles…………………………………………………………………………..70

Chapter 2: Eumaeus………………………………………………………………...88

Chapter 3: Phoenix and Achilles as Exiles………………………………………..149

Conclusion………………………………………………………………………..187

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………190

Curriculum Vitae…………………………………………………………………..223

# Abbreviations

I retain the traditional English spelling for Greek proper nouns. Greek words are transliterated unless a specific context is being quoted. I generally follow the *LSJ* and *Oxford Latin Dictionary* in abbreviating ancient sources, but sometimes I expand these in cases of potential ambiguity. Periodicals are abbreviated according to *l'Année philologique*. Other abbreviations are as follows:

DK: Diels, H. and W. Kranz. (1960). *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. 10th ed. Berlin: Weidmann.

*FGrH*: Jacoby, F. (1950-8). *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. Leiden: Brill.

*HE*: Finkelberg, M., ed. (2011). *The Homer Encyclopedia*. Chichester, West Sussex; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

*IG*: (1903- ). *Inscriptiones Graecae*.

*LfgrE*: Snell, B. and U. Fleischer, eds. (1955-2010). *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

*LIMC*: Ackermann, H.C. and J.-R. Gisler, eds. (1981-1997). *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae*. Zürich: Artemis.

*LSJ*: Liddell, G.H., et al., eds. (1968). *A Greek-English Lexicon*. 9th ed. with supplement. Oxford: OUP.

*PMGF*: Davies, M., ed. (1991). *Poetarum Melicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*. Vol. 1. New York: OUP.

*TrGF*: (1971-2004). *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

# INTRODUCTION

This project's objective is to expand our understanding of the portrayal of the social dynamic of the Homeric *oikos* ('household') by examining figures on its margins, namely bastards (especially Teucer and Heracles), Eumaeus in his role as slave, and Phoenix as exile. Fundamental to this study will be the assumption that these characters are portrayed as the kin of the central patrilines of their *oikoi*, namely Telamon/Ajax, Zeus, Laertes/Odysseus/Telemachus, and Peleus/Achilles respectively. This assumption runs against prevailing attitudes about Homeric kinship, and to some extent kinship in antiquity overall, which has tended to be treated as a binary category. For any given individual, a prescribed group of people are family, and everyone else is not. Recent social anthropology, however, has shown this idea to be problematic, and it should be fruitful to examine how a more mobile and contextual approach to the portrayal of kinship in Homeric poetry can elucidate the relationships between individual characters within various kinship groups. Most importantly I observe that kinship, like much in Homeric poetry, is both the basis for and subject of continual negotiation and struggle. Kinship groups can unite against a common enemy, but they are just as capable of internecine discord and even fatal violence.[1] There is constant jockeying for position, perhaps most easily observable among a group's marginal members, who are striving to belong. But these marginal members are no less kin for all that. Their position is simply less secure than that of the more central members. The difference is one of degree rather than kind.

By Homeric poetry, I mean the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Other evidence, especially from

---

[1] See Herzfeld (1985, 11-13) on the tendency of feuding kin groups in a modern Cretan village to come together in the face of an external threat.

Hesiod, the *Homeric Hymns*, and the fragments and epitomes of the epic cycle, will also prove useful, especially when, as with bastards, for example, the evidence in Homer is fairly slight. I will also use later (and especially Athenian) evidence, but only for comparative and supplementary purposes. By itself, later evidence can prove nothing. But when used cautiously in conjunction with evidence from the poetry itself, there can be a cumulative effect. It is now almost universally accepted that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* represent crystallized forms of oral traditions.[2] The different epic traditions, represented by Homeric epic, the Hesiodic corpus, and at least the earlier of the *Homeric Hymns*, are seen as representations of the same bardic practice. There is a growing trend that views these early corpora as "potentially allusive to shared aspects of mytho-poetic traditions, including mythological narratives and the epic phraseology commonly employed to express them."[3] Furthermore, "the relative date of two texts may not well replicate the relative date of their respective performance traditions."[4] This means that we cannot ignore the potentially informative nature of alternative traditions with respect to Homeric epic, even if iterations of these other traditions were transcribed at a later date.[5] This relatively recent development in the general view of Homeric scholarship will be advantageous for my study, since, as I have mentioned, the body of evidence on certain subjects is extremely limited.

Because the use of formulae in early epic is not necessarily a topic of general agreement, it is necessary to outline my approach to them here. M. Parry supplied the classic definition of the Homeric formula: "a group of words which is regularly employed under the same metrical conditions to express a given essential idea."[6] While the work of M. Parry (and his pupil, Lord) constitutes the great watershed moment in Homeric studies, such a definition will satisfy few Homerists today for two major reasons. The first is that it holds metre – as opposed to semantics, for example – to be the primary criterion for the selection of a particular formula. A bard needing to fill out a line in which Odysseus was the subject simply selected an epithet to complete the hexameter. That epithet, regardless of its meaning, communicated nothing more than "Odysseus."[7] On the contrary, while the more common epithets are unlikely to be marked in many contexts, it is simply not the case that they bear no semantic meaning.[8] The second objection is that M. Parry's formulation does not allow the bard to have taken narrative context into account. As Bakker characterizes Parry here, "'essential idea' is thought to exist before its expression, which, in turn, is separate from the narrative context in which a poet uses it."[9] So, 'much-enduring Odysseus' means the same thing each time it is uttered, regardless of context. Again, while it is true that the more common epithets can be relatively colourless in most contexts, the context in which they are applied is not meaningless.[10]

---

[2] Lord (1960), Nagy (1996 and 2004). The collection assembled by Honko (2000) offers some thought-provoking *comparanda*. On my use of 'tradition' and 'traditional', see J.-M. Foley (1999, 13-34) and more recently Bakker (2013, 158-9).

[3] Burgess (2012a, 170).

[4] *Ibid*. 171.

[5] For a more detailed discussion, see Tsagalis (2008). Scodel (2002) takes a more skeptical view.

Various more nuanced conceptions of formulae have subsequently been proposed, and I am inclined to follow closely Bakker's recently formulated 'scale of interformularity'.[11] The basic principle is that, the more a formula is used, the more generic its meaning. Therefore, the most common formulae, such as the more frequently used name-epithet combinations, are unlikely to constitute much beyond "a regularized adaptive response to a recurrent need."[12] In this case, the only quibble with M. Parry would be that, when Odysseus is described as 'much-enduring', it is likely that his capacity to endure is pertinent in the immediate context. But the frequency with which this epithet is used indicates that it is very unlikely to be marked in the vast majority of contexts. On the other end of the scale, the less frequently a formula is used, the more likely it is that its iterations will refer to one another, or that there will be a prototypical character or event to which the other attested iterations refer. So, for example, Stocking has shown that Apollo's recognition of Hermes and Maia in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* (γνῶ δ' οὐδ' ἠγνοίησε ("he knew and did not fail to recognize," 243)) alludes to Zeus' ability to see through Prometheus' trickery (*Th*. 551, the only other attestation of the formula in early epic).[13] But attestations of this phenomenon seem to be fairly rare – although we will see two potential examples in the second chapter. Much more common are uses of formulae somewhere between the two extremes on the scale, where a formula is restricted to a particular character or context. In this case, when such a formula is used outside of its ordinary context, it can often highlight an incongruity or implicitly show how the apparently unordinary context is more like the ordinary context than one would otherwise have thought. This last kind of interformularity is quite useful for the present study because it provides us with another way of seeing how closely associated marginal characters can be with their patriarchs. For example, as we shall see, there are particular formulae ordinarily used only of Odysseus' patriline that are occasionally applied to Eumaeus as well. This would seem to imply that we are to understand a very close association between Eumaeus and Odysseus' patriline. The advantage of Bakker's method is that it allows for formulae to have varying degrees of markedness, as well as showing how a kind of intertextuality is possible even in situations where there is no text.

---

[6] M. Parry (1971, 272); cf. Lord (1960, 30).

[7] This is the so-called ornamental epithet (*epitheton ornans*): J.M. Foley (1999, 213-14).

[8] See, for example, A. Parry (1972).

[9] Bakker (2013, 160).

[10] The best proof of this, I would argue, is precisely some of the evidence adduced by A. Parry in defence of his definition of the formula. He argues that there are particular applications of epithets that are nonsensical, and so it follows that these epithets were applied for the most part without thought for particular context (1971, 331). One example of this is a ship being described as swift (νῆα θοήν, *Od.* 13.167) after it has been turned to stone. A stone ship cannot be swift, but surely the epithet can be understood as deliberately incongruous, or even ironic, in such a context.

[11] Bakker (2013, 157-69). Burgess (2012a) uses the expression 'intertext without text'. Barker and Christensen (2014) provide a fine application of Bakker's approach.

---

[12] Bakker (2013, 163).

[13] Stocking (2013, 189-91). The classic example of this kind of interformularity is μέγας μεγαλωστί ("great in his greatness"), which is ordinarily used of Achilles (*Il*. 18.26; *Od*. 24.39-40), but is applied once to the corpse of Cebriones (*Il*. 16.776) to foreshadow Achilles' death: Burgess (2012a, 171-6).

The present project involves examining the representation of social phenomena in works of fiction. Such an undertaking is problematic to start with, and it is exacerbated in the case of early hexameter poetry by the fact that we have very little contemporary evidence, no matter what one decides to define as contemporary to the *Iliad* and/or the *Odyssey.* In the interests of clarity, then, let me define the parameters of my project more narrowly. Thalmann aptly describes Homeric epic as "a representation rather than a reproduction of reality."[14] And, as with all poetry, the representation offered by the Homeric epics is a skewed one, being essentially from the point of view of a patriarchal, slave-owning aristocracy.[15] The fact that I am looking at social elements of the poem does mean that I will have to be especially aware of the aristocratic and gender biases Thalmann describes. But it is worth emphasizing that my focus is essentially literary. I will come to some conclusions about how kinship and social relationships are portrayed in Homer. In doing so, I am following Graziosi and Haubold in assuming that, although they do not represent a historical society, "from the perspective of historical audiences, the Homeric poems depict a specific stage in the development of the world, the age of heroes […] The world depicted in the poems is a coherent whole which made sense to early audiences."[16] In other words, the culture and society portrayed in the poems are not *ad hoc* inventions. They rather correspond to a common understanding that contemporary audiences shared about the Heroic Age. It is also necessary that, in order for the poems to be effective, they must feature stories that are probable.[17] And it follows from this that the portrayal of the interaction of the poems' characters is sufficiently consistent and plausible to merit systematic investigation. Of course oral poetry is rife with inconsistencies, with local motivation playing a relatively significant role.[18] But a common understanding of such a basic building block of society as kinship is a requirement for the communication of a complex poem, and it is not generally subject to the requirements of a given scene. None of this is to say that the poems represent Greek society at any particular point in time, nor do I intend to imply this at any point. In this set of studies, the goal is merely to examine how closely reading the portrayal of certain marginal kinship roles can enrich our understanding of early epic.

---

[14] Thalmann (1998a, 1). He is referring only to the *Odyssey*, but I see no reason why this description should not apply just as well to the *Iliad* and other early Greek hexameter. Thalmann's statement is likely intended as a kind of corrective for Finley's (1978) brilliant but ultimately positivist treatment of the *Odyssey*.

[15] Finley (1978, 112), Thalmann (1998a, 243-249).

Since the family is so central to this project, it is necessary to define the term. The family has traditionally been the domain of anthropology, and, as a group, anthropologists have roundly rejected the notion that there can be any objective, cross-cultural definition of 'family' or 'kinship.'[19] Even within a given community, there can be fairly significant disagreement about what constitutes a familial relationship. For this reason, the term 'relatedness' is now preferred to 'kinship.' 'Relatedness' describes familial relation from the point of view of *ego*, "without relying on an arbitrary distinction between biology and culture, and without presupposing what constitutes kinship."[20] Relatedness falls into the conceptual category of 'interdigitation,' which refers to the idea that social roles are ultimately determined by the individual's point of view.[21] I will continue to use the term 'kinship' with the understanding that it cannot be objectively defined. The reason for this is that I want to retain the term 'relatedness' for occasions when I wish to emphasize an individual's point of view about a particular relationship.

---

[16] Graziosi and Haubold (2005, 97). On the dangers of conceiving of a historical Homeric society, see especially Snodgrass (1974).

[17] On the probable (*to eikos*) in ancient stories, see Arist. *Po*. 1451a36-8 and Redfield (1994, 56-60).

[18] On local motivation in Homer, see Scodel (1999, 33-47), who examines in great detail how credibility is achieved in Homer and elsewhere.

[19] The most influential proponents of this view are Godelier (2011, 1-10) and Sahlins (2013, 1-59).

For the purposes of this project, then, I will define 'family' as the set of people to whom the poem portrays a given character as related. This set is fluid to a certain degree.[22] After all, like us, a Greek could gain relatives through such means as marriage or adoption. He could also lose them through death or divorce. Again, however, there is the all-important question of point of view. So, for example, Phoenix tells the story of how he was alienated from his father's *oikos* and in his flight reached the house of Peleus (*Il*. 9.447-77), who loved him as a father loves his only darling son (καί μ᾽ ἐφίλησ᾽ ὡς εἴ τε πατὴρ ὃν παῖδα φιλήσῃ/ μοῦνον τηλύγετον (9.481-2)).[23] Then Phoenix in turn, since he could not have children (cf. 9.453-457), worked to make Achilles a son (ἀλλὰ σὲ παῖδα, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ᾽ Ἀχιλλεῦ,/ ποιεύμην (9.494-5)).[24] Phoenix has quite clearly been incorporated into a new *oikos* and lineage as a sort of foster-son/father.[25] He saw himself as severed from his natal household to the extent that he would have killed his father if doing so would not have had such a negative effect on his *tīmē* (‘respect’; 9.458-461).[26] From the point of view of his fellow townsmen and kinsmen (ἔται καὶ ἀνεψιοί), however, he was still a member of his natal *oikos* (9.464-473). In Homeric poetry, therefore, interdigitation can be a significant enough factor that even what *oikos* a character does (or at least should) belong to can be a matter of perspective.

---

[20] Carsten (2000, 5). For a more thorough placement of the term in its scholarly context, see Carsten (2004, 109-162). Fragoulaki (2013, 3-10) uses the concept in his study of interstate relations in Thucydides.

[21] Carsten (2004, 153).

[22] This fluidity appears to be a universal property of kinship: Carsten (2004, 154).

[23] As will become clear, my interpretation of Peleus treating Phoenix 'as if he were his son' is that this is the poet's way of saying that they share a kind of father-son relationship that they do not have the vocabulary to describe more precisely, which has been a frequent problem in many cultures: Carsten (2004, 144-6).

[24] It is true that *pais* ('child'), as opposed to, say, *hyios* ('son'), can have meanings that do not pertain to kinship (Gates 1971, 11). Considering that the relationship between biological fathers and sons is regularly described using *pais*, however (e.g. 9.481, 11.750, *Od*. 16.17), and that it would be absurd to read the present passage as Phoenix making Achilles a boy, it seems unavoidable that he is referring to a father-son relationship.

[25] So Felson (2002a, 41-2 and 2002b, 262-3).

As abstract and relative as these terms and concepts can be, we do need a fairly concrete, corporate unit of kinship around which to base our investigation. This unit must be native to the Homeric poem. *Genos*, while it can often be translated satisfactorily as ‘family’, is not sufficiently concrete. While it does generally appear to refer to a “descent-construct,”[27] the extent and nature of the group to which it refers is very frequently somewhat vague. As C. Patterson puts it, “the *genos* was not a group to which one longed to return or for which one fought.”[28] *Phulon* probably does not refer to kinship at all but to a band of followers.[29] The most suitable unit is in fact one to which I have already referred several times: the *oikos*.[30] The *oikos* is ideal both because it is a fairly well-defined unit and because it problematizes the boundaries of Homeric kinship in fruitful ways. As Thalmann defines the term, the *oikos* “consists of a male head, his family, and their house, but it is more significantly an extended household, which includes also farmland and herds, dependent workers and slaves. As such, it is the basic social unit of ‘Homeric’ society.”[31] Similarly, Walter Donlan says that the *oikos* is a combination of a “kernel kin-group” (i.e. the patrilocal joint family) and non-kin.[32] Significantly, both of these formulations make a distinction between the ‘family’ at the conceptual centre of the *oikos* and the rest, the unrelated, on the margins. It is my contention that some members of the *oikos* outside of the patrilocal joint family are portrayed as kin as well. This is not to say that the *oikos* is the same as the family, or that all members of an *oikos* are necessarily members of a particular family. But it does give us a useful unit to work with. Of particular advantage here is the *oikos*’ spatial component. It is the land on which its members live and raise livestock. But where they live is also frequently an expression of their status and their relationship with the various other members of the *oikos*. For example, it is no accident that Odysseus and Penelope sleep in the palace, while Eumaeus lives in a hut on the outskirts. Odysseus is the patriarch, the centre of the *oikos*, whereas Eumaeus is still a member of the *oikos*, but he is more of a marginal case.

---

[26] For a defence of my use of these un-Iliadic lines, see the third chapter.

[27] Donlan (2007, 36).

[28] C. Patterson (1998, 49). See Fraser (2009, 1-11) on how it is even frequently difficult to tell the difference between *genos* and *ethnos*. For example, *genos* seems literally to refer to a breed of Paphlagonian mules at *Il.* 2.851-2.

[29] Donlan (1985, 295-8).

[30] C. Patterson (1998, 49): “the *oikos*... was the focus of both sentiment and action.”

To reinforce this point, let us return to our example of Phoenix in the *Iliad.* He says that Peleus treated him like a son. Phoenix also worked to make Achilles his son. Despite the fact that Phoenix ends up dwelling on the furthest edges of Phthia (9.484), he does seem to have been a member of Peleus’ *oikos* at least during Achilles’ infancy. In his description of his caregiving relationship with the child Achilles, the iterative ἐθέλεσκες (9.486) and the adverb of frequency πολλάκι (9.490) give the sense that Phoenix’ tending to Achilles was his usual practice. The fact that it was his toiling for Achilles’ sake that made him hope he would make Achilles his son

---

[31] Thalmann (1998a, 9); cf. Wöhrle (1999, 11-48) on the centrality of the head male’s line in the *oikos* and in Homeric epic in general.

[32] Donlan (2007, 35); so Finley (1978, 56-63 and 74-107) and C. Patterson (1998, 44-56). So too Nevett (1999, 12-20 and 2010, 3-4) from a historical point of view. Donlan is concerned with defining the *oikos* of the Iron Age. Since all of his evidence is from Homer, I feel no need to distinguish between his definition and Thalmann’s in this case.

(9.492-496) also seems to imply that they used to live in the same *oikos*, since it reinforces the sense that he played a parental and even maternal role.[33] If this reading is correct, and Phoenix was indeed a member of the *oikos* at that time, then he does not fit comfortably into either of the usual binary categories of the *oikos*, namely kin (patrilocal joint family) and non-kin.[34] Phoenix' description of his relationship with Peleus as like that of a son to a father and with Achilles at least ideally as that of a father to a son indicates that he is trying to incorporate himself into the Aeacid patriline – not in the sense that he occupies a spot on the family tree, but rather in that he gains the benefits of such close relations, for example "in order that you [i.e. Achilles] might save me from unseemly destruction in the future" (ἵνα μοί ποτ᾽ ἀεικέα λοιγὸν ἀμύνῃς (9.495)). Avery shows that Phoenix presents himself "as a second father in order to exert emotional pressure on Achilles to relent, pressure that could not be applied by Odysseus… or by Ajax."[35] It is also the case that, while the extent to which Phoenix' speech actually persuades Achilles is a matter of debate, Achilles does not reject Phoenix' expression of relatedness, but rather himself expresses the warmth of his affection for the old man, points out in a menacing manner that Phoenix is supposed to be supporting him and not Agamemnon, and bids him stay the night so that they can consider together whether to depart for Phthia (9.607-19).[36] This interaction suggests that we are to understand an (at least formerly) intra-*oikos* relatedness between Phoenix and Achilles that does not fit into the category of family as it is formulated in recent classical scholarship. For example, Thalmann and Donlan follow Pitt-Rivers in distinguishing between the categories of 'kin' and 'pseudo-kin'.[37] Pitt-Rivers does at one point offer the suggestion that "it seems advisable to consider as genuine kin those to whom the custom of the society ascribes such status, whatever the criteria for ascription may be, and to regard as pseudo-kin those who achieve the role otherwise."[38] However, in practice he tends to refer to modes of kinship that are achieved through means other than consanguinity or affinity as 'pseudo-kinship.'[39] This presupposition regarding what kinship constitutes in a given community is closely linked to the nature-versus-culture polarity, which is no longer considered a tenable generalization in anthropology.[40] As opposed to viewing the interaction between Phoenix and Achilles as a momentary, figurative usage of kinship, "as when an old man is addressed as 'grandad' [sic] in order to imply intimacy and age difference,"[41] I think it is necessary to take what Phoenix says literally. The long history that he relates is not simply invented for rhetorical convenience. We are surely to understand that he actually did leave his natal *oikos*, join Achilles', and form close bonds within it, bonds which he and possibly Achilles perceive to be kinship. It is precisely ambiguous cases like that of Phoenix with respect to the *oikos* of the Aeacids that I believe require further examination. If we are to take seriously the possibility that marginal members of the *oikos* can be viewed as related to the patrilocal joint family that forms its core, and that all forms of kinship can be fluid to a certain degree, then it would appear that a potentially crucial social dynamic of the Homeric poems has gone under-appreciated.

---

[33] See Hainsworth (1993 *ad Il.* 9.485-495) on Phoenix as at least rhetorically replacing Thetis during Achilles' childhood in this passage.

[34] The tendency has been to view Phoenix as an outsider to the house of Peleus: see especially Köhnken (1975 and 1978).

[35] Avery (1998, 390).

[36] On the warmth of Achilles' response, cf. Hainsworth (1993 *ad Il.* 9.609-10) and Avery (1998, 390).

---

[37] Thalmann (1998a, 124-5), Donlan (2007, 33), both of whom refer to Pitt-Rivers (1977). For our purposes, however, Pitt-Rivers (1968) is more direct.

[38] Pitt-Rivers (1968, 408). It is unclear to me in any case to what the "otherwise" would refer if all kin from the native point of view are eliminated. The examples he provides (408-410) are only nominally kin even from the point of view of *ego*. In this case, surely the relationships simply do not belong in the category of kinship at all.

[39] E.g. *ibid*. 408-9.

[40] Carsten (2000, 9-10 and 2004, 136) and Fragoulaki (2013, 23).

[41] Pitt-Rivers (1968, 408).

Regarding the structure of the Homeric *oikos*, it is, I think, uncontroversial to claim that the male head generally stands at the conceptual centre. We must surely conclude from the *Odyssey*, for example, that a virile male head is a *sine qua non* for a household. Without a continuous Laertid line, Odysseus' *oikos* would simply cease to exist in its current form. It is furthermore the case that, at least to a certain extent, the rest of the household defines itself with reference to the male head. It will be fruitful, therefore, to explore the potential boundaries of kinship in Homer by examining some relationships between the heads of households and characters on the margins of those households. And, while kinship can be enacted in any number of ways, it will be useful to examine briefly two central aspects of kinship in order to illuminate how I intend to proceed. First, kinship unsurprisingly has a decisive influence on the portrayal of identity in Homeric poetry. According to King and Stone's recent study of patriliny in Eurasian cultures, "males alone possess the ability to bequeath to their offspring certain identity categories, or what might be called 'social ontology,' such as membership in a family, tribe, or religious, ethnic, or other group."[42] It is hardly revelatory to observe that a fundamental element of masculine identity in a patriarchal society is the patriline. And, as we have already noted, *oikoi* in Homeric poetry centre around patrilines. It is little wonder, then, that the 'familial ontology' of the marginal family members tends to be centripetal, to be faced toward and to long to approach the centre. For any member of an *oikos* who is not the patriarch, one's relationship with and position relative to him is a vitally important part of their identity.

The second aspect of kinship that I will explore in this introduction is the rearing of children, which is primarily denoted in Homer by the Greek *trephein* and *atitallein*. As we will see, participation in rearing is one of the main reasons one character will give to justify his relatedness to another. Rearing or being reared is seen to create familial bonds, regardless of whether or not bonds of blood or marriage are involved. *Trephein* has a fairly broad semantic range. It seems to have two radically different basic meanings, ‘to make solid,’ and ‘to nourish, rear’, and the general opinion is that the latter is a metaphorical extension of the former.[43] Griffith describes this extension as follows: “Not only… does the act of *trephein* turn inanimate objects literally, and living beings metaphorically, from liquid to solid, but it shapes and improves both.”[44] The idea is presumably that young people and animals require care while they are still too ‘moist’ to have formed fully enough to survive on their own.[45] So, Hesiod’s Silver Generation is seen to by its unfortunate mothers for a century because the children take that long to form (Hes. *Op*. 131). I agree with Griffith, and it is useful to consider some further extensions as well.[46] For example, Calypso describes her keeping of Odysseus in the following terms: τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ φίλεόν τε καὶ ἔτρεφον ἠδὲ ἔφασκον/ θήσειν ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀγήραον ἤματα πάντα (“I welcomed him and looked after him, and kept saying that I would make him immortal and ageless for all days,” *Od*. 5.135-6; similarly 7.255-257 and 23.335-6). Odysseus is hardly a child. He is a fully-formed adult and needs no caretaker. Nor is Calypso any ordinary mother or nurse.

---

[42] King and Stone (2010, 330).

---

[43] Moussy (1969, 39-43), Benveniste (1971, 251-4), Chantraine (1968-1980, s.v. τρέφω), Griffith (2010). Demont (1978, 375 and 1981, 111-12) argues that the two meanings are so dissimilar that they must represent two homonymous verbs; cf. Beekes (2010, s.v.), who is agnostic. Gernet (1955, 26-7) correctly observes that *trephein* is *de rigueur* when a child is raised in a house other than the paternal one, but this hardly captures the whole range of the word’s application.

[44] Griffith (2010, 307).

[45] The corollary to this is that old age is characterized by dryness and a lack of *menos* (‘strength’): Giacomelli (1980, 14).

[46] In addition to the following, other extensions include Zeus ‘rearing’ Achilles as a great pain for the Trojans (μέγα μιν Ὀλύμπιος ἔτρεφε πῆμα Τρωσὶν, *Il*. 6.282; cf. *Od*. 14.175 and *h. Ap*. 305-6, but contrast *Il*. 22.421; cf. Cunliffe (1963, s.v. τρέφω 2) and Achilles’ growing out a lock of his hair for the river Spercheius (*Il*. 23.141-2; see Griffith (2010, 305) on this passage in more detail).

And she is not interested in treating Odysseus like a child. On the contrary, she makes it quite clear that she wants to make Odysseus her husband (5.118-136). Calypso compares her situation to that of Eos with Orion and Demeter with Iasion (5.121-128), but the most obvious extant parallel in early epic is that of Eos and Tithonus in the *Hymn to Aphrodite* (218-238).[47] At the beginning of Book 5 of the *Odyssey*, Eos leaves Tithonus' bed to mark the beginning of the day (5.1-2 = *Il.* 11.1-2).[48] But the couple is not mentioned elsewhere (although Tithonus does appear in Aeneas' genealogy: *Il.* 20.237). The story of Eos and Tithonus is obviously similar to what Calypso would prefer to experience with Odysseus, however, inasmuch as she desires to have a mortal as her immortal husband.[49] While, as Stanford notes, there is no direct evidence that the tradition that produced our *Odyssey* was aware of the story of Eos and Tithonus that we see in the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, Sappho (fr. 58 Voigt),[50] or Mimnermus (fr. 4.2 West), there is a similar use of formulaic language in the *Hymn.*[51] Like Calypso, Eos wants Tithonus to be immortal for all days (ἀθάνατόν τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ ζώειν ἤματα πάντα, 221). While she famously forgets that she also does not want him to age (223-4), she does take care of him in her halls when he grows old and grey, feeding him mortal food and ambrosia (αὐτὸν δ᾽ αὖτ᾽ ἀτίταλλεν ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἔχουσα/ σίτῳ τ᾽ ἀμβροσίῃ τε, 231-2).[52] As N. Richardson points out, *atitallein* is always used of nursing children in early epic.[53] *Atitallein* is virtually equivalent in meaning to *trephein*,[54] so that it is interesting to observe that, in the case of both verbs, the only exception to their being used exclusively of nursing young children or animals is in the case of a goddess taking care of a mortal man whom she desires as a husband. It may be the case that the goddesses wish to make their men more durable by nourishing them in a certain way. One is reminded, for example, of Demeter anointing Demophoön with ambrosia (χρίεσκ’ ἀμβροσίῃ, *H. Dem*. 237).[55] But what we can assert with some confidence is that *trephein* and *atitallein*, which are ordinarily used of nursing children, are also used in the present kind of type-scene to denote a particular process.[56] Outside of this type-scene, however, there is unsurprisingly no example of *trephein* where it is used of the nursing of an adult.[57]

---

[47] See C. Brown (2011) for the tradition on Eos and Tithonus in general.

[48] On dawn formulae, see Austin (1975, 89-97).

[49] Peradotto (1990, 55) refers to *Od.* 5.1-2 as "definite if muted prolepsis" of the desire which Calypso is about to voice.

[50] See Obbink (2009) for the inclusion of the most recent papyrological evidence.

[51] Stanford (1959 *ad* 5.1).

[52] Faulkner (2008 *ad loc.*): "the combination of mortal and immortal food is representative of Tithonus' intermediary status between mortal and divine… Odysseus in contrast receives mortal food from Calypso (*Od.* 5.195-9)." This is true, but it is important to note that Calypso only feeds Odysseus mortal food after it has been established once and for all that he will leave.

In the passive, *trephein* strictly speaking translates as ‘to be reared,’ but, when it appears without an agent, it seems simply to mean ‘to grow up, develop.’[58] So, for example, the formulae ἠμὲν τράφεν ἠδ’ ἐγένοντο (“they were raised and born:” *Il*. 1.251, *Od*. 4.723, 10.417, 14.201) and γενέσθαι τε τραφέμεν τε (“to be born and raised:” *Il*. 7.199, 18.436; *Od*. 3.28), does not generally emphasize the activity of raising a child, but rather the fact that a person or group of people has been born and reached adulthood.[59] In *Odyssey* 4, Penelope addresses her handmaidens, saying, κλῦτε, φίλαι· περὶ γάρ μοι Ὀλύμπιος ἄλγε’ ἔδωκεν/ ἐκ πασέων, ὅσσαι μοι ὁμοῦ τράφεν ἠδ’ ἐγένοντο ("listen, friends. For of all the women, as many as were raised and born with me, the Olympian has given me surpassing sorrow," *Od*. 4.722-3). The reason that Penelope's peers are relevant is because they were born and reached adulthood, meaning that they can be compared to her.[60] Similarly, Nestor has outlived two generations, οἵ οἱ πρόσθεν ἅμα τράφεν ἠδ’ ἐγένοντο/ ἐν Πύλῳ ἠγαθέῃ ("who long ago were raised and born with him in holy Pylos," *Il*. 1.251). This phrase has no point if these generations had not reached maturity before fading away.

---

[53] N. Richardson (2010 *ad* 230-232). As with *trephein*, it is also used of young animals: *Il*. 5.271, 24.280; *Od*. 14.41, 15.174.

[54] Hsch. s.v. ἀτίταλλον [α 8098 Latte]· ἔτρεφον, and also s.v. ἀτίταλλε [α 8099 Latte]· ἀγάπα. μετὰ ἐπιμελείας τρέφε.

[55] Cf. also the newborn Apollo gaining strength once he has eaten nectar and ambrosia (*ad Ap*. 123-129).

[56] On the type-scene, see M. Edwards (1992).

[57] The only other apparent exception is Dolius’ wife, who cares for his (their?) children (σφεας τρέφε, *Od*. 24.389). While Russo et al. (1992 *ad* 24.388-390) say that σφεας refers to Dolius and his sons, I think it refers more naturally to the sons alone. Since Dolius is old (γέρων, 387), one might hypothesize that the sons are adults. However, since, with the exception of the aforementioned type-scene, *trephein* is always used of children elsewhere, we should assume that Dolius’ sons are also children. It is probably a different Dolius who is the father of Melanthius (17.212, 22.159) and Melantho (18.322), since, as Harris (2012, 358) observes, he is apparently not bothered by their murder at his masters’ hands; *contra* Haller (2013, 267-9), who summarizes each side of the argument.

[58] As early as Aeschylus (*Eu*. 664; *Th*. 754), it can refer in the passive to what we would call the gestation of a fetus. This usage becomes standard in Aristotle and the Hippocratic corpus: E. Lesky (1951, 1252). *LfgrE* s.v. τρέφω B suggests that the formation of Aphrodite at Hes. *Th*. 192 and 198 constitutes the same usage, but I think it is rather different.

So, we can see that *trephein* and *atitallein* apply fairly strictly to the care of children (almost always boys) until they reach their youthful prime (ἥβης μέτρον ἵκοντο, *Od*. 11.317).[61] The *hēbēs metron* "marque le passage à la majorité."[62] The rearing of the young until they reach their *hēbē* is at the core of Homeric kinship. The beneficiary of this care then owes a lifelong debt (*threptra*) to his caretaker. The prototype of this reciprocal relationship is the debt that the son owes to his parents, and especially his father.[63] The *Iliad* tends to express this concept in negative terms, since dead warriors are unable to give their parents their due. So, when Simoeisius and Hippothous are killed in the *Iliad*, the poet says of each, οὐδὲ τοκεῦσιν / θρέπτρα φίλοις ἀπέδωκε ("and he did not render to his dear parents return for his rearing," 4.477-8 = 17.301-2). And Achilles laments that he is not at home to take care of his father Peleus as he ages (οὐδέ νυ τόν γε / γηράσκοντα κομίζω, 24.540-1). But, to return again to the example of Phoenix, who, as we have established, demands that Achilles protect him in return for the care he gave him as a child and uses this relationship as the basis for their relatedness, it is clear that the *trephein/threptra* link is not limited to biological parents and their children.[64]

---

[59] Demont (1978, 375) claims that the τράφεν in ἠμὲν τράφεν ἠδ’ ἐγένοντο must refer to the development of the fetus, since it would be a hysterology to say that a child "was raised and born." But this kind of *hysteron proteron* is normal in epic: Heubeck and Hoekstra (1990 *ad Od*. 14.201), who compare θρέψασα τεκοῦσά τε (*Od*. 12.134) and γαμέοντί τε γεινομένῳ τε (4.208).

[60] Because the τράφεμεν at *Il*. 18.436 is active, this iteration of the formula is an exception to my general point. The phrase γενόμην καί μ’ ἔτρεφον αὐτοί (*Od*. 14.141) similarly places emphasis on the rearing because ἔτρεφον is active.

[61] Cf. *Il*. 11.225, 24.728, *Od*. 4.668, 15.366, 18.217, 19.532, Hes. *Op*. 132, fr. 205.2 M.-W, *H. Dem*. 166 = 221; conversely of death: λιποῦσ’ ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην ("having left behind his manliness and youthful prime," *Il*. 16.857 = 22.363), on which formula see T. Barnes (2011), who finds in it an allusion to the death of Achilles.

[62] Gernet (1955, 24 n. 1). In later poetry, the age of majority is called *hōra* (Griffith (2010, 305), citing Mimn. fr. 2.1 West$^2$ in particular).

Eumaeus the swineherd is also informative in this regard, responding to Odysseus' query about his mother Anticleia as follows:

> ὄφρα μὲν οὖν δὴ κείνη ἔην, ἀχέουσα περ ἔμπης,
> τόφρα τί μοι φίλον ἔσκε μεταλλῆσαι καὶ ἐρέσθαι,
> οὕνεκα μ᾽ αὐτὴ θρέψεν ἅμα Κτιμένῃ τανυπέπλῳ,
> θυγατέρ᾽ ἰφθίμῃ, τὴν ὁπλοτάτην τέκε παίδων·
> τῇ ὁμοῦ ἐτρεφόμην, ὀλίγον δέ τί μ᾽ ἧσσον ἐτίμα.
> αὐτὰρ ἐπεί ῥ᾽ ἥβην πολυήρατον ἱκόμεθ᾽ ἄμφω,
> τὴν μὲν ἔπειτα Σάμηνδ᾽ ἔδοσαν καὶ μυρί᾽ ἕλοντο,
> αὐτὰρ ἐμὲ χλαῖνάν τε χιτῶνά τε εἵματ᾽ ἐκείνη
> καλὰ μάλ᾽ ἀμφιέσασα ποσὶν θ᾽ ὑποδήματα δοῦσα
> ἀγρόνδε προΐαλλε· φίλει δέ με κηρόθι μᾶλλον.

> "So, when that woman was alive, even though she sorrowed, then it was rather important to me to ask questions and inquire after her because she herself had reared me along with long-robed Ctimene, her beautiful daughter, to whom she gave birth, the youngest of her children. Along with her I was reared, and she [Anticleia] paid me only a little less respect. But when we both reached our very desirable youthful prime, then they gave her to a man on Same and received boundless recompense. But that woman clothed me in a cloak and tunic, very fine,

---

[63] See Felson (2002a, 36 n. 3). Her definition of *threptra* (35) is also useful: "what you gratefully give back to the parents who reared you." Falkner (1995, 12-17) traces the development of this concept into later periods. See also B. Richardson (1969) on Pl. *Lg*. 4.717b-c and DL 1.7.55.

[64] Cf. Hera's claim to have reared Thetis: ἣν ἐγὼ αὐτή / θρέψα τε καὶ ἀτίτηλα (*Il*. 24.59-60).

> gave me sandals for my feet, and sent me to the field. And she loved me all the more in her heart" (*Od*. 15.361-70).

The reciprocal nature of Eumaeus' relationship with Odysseus' mother is explicit. He made it a priority to ask after her because she tended to him until he and her daughter, who receives no other mention in the poem, came of age. At that point, recompense was due. Ctimene was essentially sold off as a bride and fetched a good price (as well as establishing or strengthening a kinship connection). And Eumaeus went to work for the family as a slave in the fields. Of particular interest in this passage is the claim that Anticleia paid him nearly as much respect as she paid to Odysseus' sister (365), and that she loved him all the more once he had gone off to the fields (370). Both phrases contain comparatives to stress the depth of her regard, so that it seems important to Eumaeus that his childhood caregiver valued him. He presents his labour and solicitude as *threptra*, and this is probably to be taken as a natural attitude. But his assertion of his value in her eyes raises a further point. Like Phoenix, Eumaeus is family to an established and relatively powerful *oikos*. And, like Phoenix, Eumaeus jockeys for position within that system. If someone as central as the wife of the patriarch held him in high regard, then he must be a valuable family member. So, we find that rearing is a central familial institution. It is a means by which one ensures the loyalty and service of one's children and other young members of the *oikos*. And, on the other side, the quality of rearing and the value in which the child is held is a metric of the social status of the child, even when he is fully grown. In other words, rearing is governed by the honour (*tīmē*) culture which is so central to the Homeric poems.[65] In the present passage (365), and ubiquitously elsewhere, the raising of a child is measured in *tīmē*.

---

[65] The bibliography on honour culture in Homer is considerable, but see especially Dodds (1951, 1-27), van Wees (1992), Redfield (1994, 30-68), Cairns (2001), and Scodel (2008, 1-32).

And, as we shall see, the amount of *tīmē* accorded the child by his caretakers is expressed in comparison to the amount given to legitimate children.[66] The *tīmē* conferred upon Eumaeus by the nature of his rearing probably signals the kind of fixed *tīmē* he can expect as a mature adult.[67] So, when Eumaeus claims that Anticleia honoured him only slightly less than her own daughter, he is claiming a status comparable to Ctimene's. While comparison between a daughter's status and a son's is not a straightforward matter, it is evidently the case that it is a mark of special privilege for a slave to receive such treatment.[68] Of course the beggar Odysseus has only Eumaeus' word on this claim, but that is the nature of the honour game. Eumaeus has or wants a certain position with respect to his *oikos*, and he can be expected to say and do what he can to promote himself, even – or indeed especially – at the expense of its unfriendly members. None of this is to suggest that there is much fluidity in the fairly rigid hierarchy in Homeric poetry – although there is some. It is nonetheless the case that even the lowliest of slaves jockeys jealously for position both within society at large and within his *oikos*.

The chapters in this thesis each explore both a role that is felt to be marginal to the *oikos* and a way in which characters occupying this role either attempt to gain position or assert their current one, frequently in creative ways. In the first chapter, I look at bastards. While there are different kinds of bastards in Homeric poetry, they all fall under the rubric of extramarital children. The position of a bastard within an *oikos* can vary dramatically, depending most importantly on the attitude of its more central figures. It is for this reason that I focus on the means by which the bastard's position within the *oikos* can be negotiated by interested parties and what factors can be influential in determining his status. Some exploration of the terminology and fate of bastards is necessary as a preliminary study. Then, using Teucer and Heracles as extreme examples on either end of the spectrum, I conclude that the possibilities for a bastard range from full incorporation into the *oikos* to being cast out and forced to search for a new home. In most available Archaic iterations of the Heracles myth, he is dear to Zeus and entirely unwelcome to Hera. While Hera's hatred plagues him during his mortal life, it appears that he is fully incorporated into the Olympian *oikos* through his posthumous marriage to Hebe, the only daughter of Zeus and Hera. In Teucer's case, he is initially at least tolerated as a member of Telamon's household, particularly as his half-brother Ajax' companion, the two fighting in close and coordinated proximity in the *Iliad*. Interestingly, while it has often been asserted that his archery is a symptom of his bastardy, it is much more likely that he is an archer because of his Trojan ancestry on his mother's side. His mother's Trojan identity ultimately proves catastrophic for him, however, when Ajax commits suicide, and Telamon blames him for this, apparently assuming that Teucer has surreptitiously sided with his mother's people in the war.[69] A fair amount of negotiation is apparently possible in the case of bastards, depending especially upon the attitudes of more central family members and the abilities of the bastard.

---

[66] See the following chapter.

[67] Scodel (2008, 12) distinguishes between fixed *tīmē* and flexible *tīmē*: "high position brings *tīmē* with it; Agamemnon is entitled to *tīmē* because he is king. *Tīmē* can also depend on individual meritorious actions or on a history of achievement. Achilles claims *tīmē* as the greatest warrior." Similarly Wilson (2002, 34-8).

[68] In any case, as we will observe in the first chapter, Homeric poetry surprisingly does not seem to make any distinction between the rearing of a boy versus that of a girl.

In the second chapter, I look at slavery in the person of Eumaeus. As with women, slaves can be intimately located within the innermost confines of an *oikos*, while simultaneously being accorded little of the power, prestige, or personhood of a free man. But the possibility and even encouragement of intimacy can lead to a striking degree of assimilation. Eumaeus' incorporation into Odysseus' *oikos* leads him to adopt the man's persona to the extent that he becomes his double. Using Freud's theory of the uncanny, I examine how, with Odysseus' long absence from home forcing him to work his way back into the centre of his own *oikos*, Eumaeus' similar characteristics and current position on the margins of the household reflect the distance Odysseus still has to travel, even though he has finally reached Ithaca. The end result of all this for Eumaeus is that Odysseus promises to make him and his own doublet Philoetius companions and brothers of Telemachus (*Od*. 21.214-16). While it is unclear precisely what this promotion entails, it is clearly a promotion within the *oikos*. Eumaeus' successful assimilation into Odysseus' *oikos* and his loyalty eventually result in a more central position therein.

---

[69] The suicide of Ajax and Telamon's subsequent exile are not related in Homer, but I will argue that they betray a knowledge of these details.

In the third chapter, I examine Phoenix as exile. He has abandoned the dysfunctional house of his father and has been as closely incorporated into Peleus' *oikos* as he is likely to be. What is of central interest here is not only his position in his new *oikos*, but also how he exploits it rhetorically in his lengthy speech to Achilles (*Il*. 9.434-605). As Thalmann helpfully observes, "the relations between the head of the household and his dependents (or slaves) is [sic] presented in the poem as the paradigm for all hierarchical social relations."[70] In other words, the male head of, say, an army, can be presented metaphorically as the head of an *oikos*. And Phoenix brilliantly takes advantage of the slippage between the metaphorical and literal concepts of the father to argue that Achilles, as the 'son' of Agamemnon, should obey him. In making this implication, Phoenix explores the possibility of violent confrontation between parent and child, and even filicide. He relates to Achilles how his own father cursed him with sterility, and also how Meleager's mother cursed her son with death. The natural reaction of each of these men was to sever ties with the aggressive parent and withdraw. Phoenix' emphasis here is on the mutability of kinship relations. If ties even with one's parents can be severed, then any relationship is necessarily fragile. Phoenix found a new home with a new father. So Achilles has left Phthia never to return. For all intents and purposes, his home is the Achaean camp, and his loyalties lie there. In his speech, Phoenix takes full advantage of his marginal position relative to Achilles by transposing his actual situation onto Achilles' potential future should Achilles not do what the embassy asks. While this speech is ultimately not successful, it does show the malleability of the concept of home and exile as well as the rhetorical potential of relatedness.

---

[70] Thalmann (1998a, 17); so Finley (1978, 83).

# CHAPTER ONE: BASTARDS

## 1.1: THE *NOTHOS*

No detailed study has ever been done on bastardy in Homer,[71] although Ogden has established that it does not carry any especial stigma.[72] But, should the father also have legitimate children, we might *prima facie* expect the bastard's position to be tenuous. While, as we shall see, there are examples of the bastard being at odds with his legitimate brothers over inheritance, the overwhelmingly more common pattern is that of harmony within the bastard's paternal *oikos*. I suggest three reasons for this. First, in honour societies, it seldom hurts to have an extra sword-arm handy.[73] Second, we find that bastards are not infrequently described as having been raised along with their legitimate brothers in their paternal *oikos*, and sometimes even with the same level of care. With one exception, that of Odysseus *qua* beggar, the understanding seems to be that this arrangement tends to foster an intimate relationship of the sort that is perhaps epitomized by Ajax and Teucer. Third, in the extreme circumstance of an *oikos* lacking a legitimate son, a bastard may sometimes stand as heir.[74] At first blush, these three points appear to be at odds with the expectation created by Ogden's theory of 'amphimetric' strife, according to which familial discord can ordinarily be expected to occur in an *oikos* with children from the same father but more than one different mother.[75] And there is no doubt that this is frequently the case later in antiquity.[76] Nor is anyone likely to be surprised that a stepmother might not find her husband's sexual activity with another woman entirely to her liking.[77] However, while we certainly find some evidence of friction between the bastard son and his stepmother – and her natal family more generally – this is almost always where the dysfunction ends. It does not spread to the rest of the *oikos*. On the contrary, the bastard seems to occupy a fairly standard but accepted role that is inferior to but not at all incompatible with that of the legitimate son. That the bastard has a more comfortable position in Homer than in most of later antiquity is not entirely surprising. Most of the characters in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, even the minor, illegitimate ones, were seen to be the illustrious ancestors or even founders of the ruling families of Archaic Greece, no doubt a crucial audience for the performers of the later iterations of the Homeric poems.

---

[71] Diller (1937, 73-7), C. Patterson (1990, 47-50), and Ogden (1996, 21-6) address bastardy in Homer, but mostly only inasmuch as they see it to differ from bastardy in the Classical Period.

[72] Ogden (1996, 22); cf. L. Patterson (2010, 5-12). Contrast Σ A and T *ad* 5.70 Erbse, who say that it was a βαρβαρικὸν ἔθος ("foreign custom") to have children with more than one woman, with T citing *Od*. 1.433 as evidence (on this passage, however, see below). I think that in this case the attitude of the *scholia* reflects the fact that they were written in a later time period.

[73] Pitt-Rivers (1966, 35-9) discusses the advantages of having brothers in honour societies. Cf. *Od*. 16.97-120, where Telemachus laments that he has no brothers to help him drive the suitors out of his *oikos*. See also Hes. *Op*. 342-5.

[74] I do agree with Ogden's (1996, 13-14) argument, however, that there was probably never any consistent legal system regarding bastards before the Classical Period.

Let us begin with the terminology. The Greek term for 'bastardy' is *notheia*, the quality of being *nothos*, bastard or baseborn, which is to be distinguished from the legitimate *gnēsios*.[78] There remains some debate as to whether the early Greek concept of bastardy includes extramarital children or the products of unequal or 'mixed' parents.[79] In Homer, the former is almost certainly the rule, as we will see. And the usual understanding is that the *nothos* in Homer

---

[75] Ogden (1996, 19-21 and especially 24). Eur. *Ion* 599-647 is a later and hypothetical example of why the relationship between son and stepmother was often not harmonious in Greek antiquity.

[76] See, for example, Ogden (1996, 189-99).

[77] For lack of a better option, I use the term 'stepmother' to apply to the bastard's father's wife, even if, as in most cases, their marriage seems to have been prior to the bastard's birth. Certainly the Greek *mētryiē* can refer to both.

[78] Ogden (1996, 17-18) rightly argues that *gnēsios* and *nothos* do not constitute a strict polarity, that we have *gnēsios* on the one hand and *nothos* and *poiētos* ("adopted") on the other. We will not deal with the *poiētos* here, however, as it is not attested early enough.

[79] Ogden (1996, 13-15) champions the former theory; C. Patterson (1990) the latter. Gates (1971) never addresses the term.

– for the word does not appear elsewhere in early Greek hexameter – is the offspring of a heroic father and a concubine or, more generically, a slave-woman.[80] This may or may not be the case. Mothers are mentioned so infrequently in Homer. But even if this understanding is correct, it does not take into account that not all slave-women are equal in Homer. After all, as we will see, a slave-woman can be the daughter of noble parents, or a woman of obscure or even unknown origins. And the *nothoi* from these two women are not necessarily portrayed as having the same status. There are also terms other than *nothos*, such as *skotios* ("shadowy") and *parthenios* ("son of an unmarried woman"), which fall under the same conceptual umbrella. And, as we will see below, these terms can be differentiated fairly clearly from *nothos*, with the former likely applying to a child who has not been acknowledged by his father, and the latter describing the child of a god and a mortal. The existence and precision of these terms further promote the sense that 'illegitimacy' is a fairly variegated concept in early Greek thought.

Donlan, who unfortunately confines his insight to a single paragraph, says that, "while *nothoi* are always identified as such, they are nonetheless full members of the patrilineage."[81] The first claim is probably true, inasmuch as, with one exception (dealt with below), a child with any divine parentage does not seem to be called *nothos* in the *Iliad*. For example, I think we have to assume that the twins Aesepus and Pedasus are born out of wedlock, since their mother is the nymph Abarbarea, and their father, Boucolion, is mortal (6.21-6). But they are not called *nothoi*. In fact, there are a number of sets of twins who could be addressed here, since, as Steinrück has shown, heroic twins tend to result from the union of their mother with more than one male.[82] To cite just one further example, the conjoined twins, Cteatus and Eurytus, are referred to collectively as the Moliones (11.709, 750) after their mother, Moline, or as the Actoriones (2.621, 11.750, 23.638) after Actor, their putative father. But in fact they appear to have two fathers:

---

[80] Buchholz (1881, 2.2.33), Diller (1937, 79 and n. 44), both apparently with unfortunate ideological undertones. To my knowledge, this view has never been challenged, although more recent scholars, with the exception of Donlan (2007, 34) and Ndoye (2010, 259-60), do not tend to reiterate it.

[81] Donlan (2007, 34).

> καὶ νύ κεν Ἀκτορίωνε Μολίονε παῖδ᾽ ἀλάπαξα,
> εἰ μή σφωε πατήρ, εὐρῦ κρείων Ἐνοσίχθων,
> ἐκ πολέμου ἐσάωσε καλύψας ἠέρι πολλῇ.
>
> “And now I would have slain the two Moliones, the sons of Actor, if their father, the Earth-shaker, whose rule is wide, hadn’t saved them, having hidden them from war with thick mist” (*Il.* 11.750-2).[83]

A scholion to this passage reports that, according to Hesiod, the Moliones are nominally (κατ᾽ ἐπίκλησιν) the sons of Actor, but they are the sons of Poseidon by birth (γόνῳ).[84] And this interpretation is usually accepted.[85] However, a papyrus fragment thought to be from the *Catalogue of Women* does not appear to bear this out:

> Ἄ]κτωρ [θαλ]ερὴν ποιήσατ᾽ ἄκοι[τιν
> ]εος γαιηόχου ἐννοσιγαίου·
> ἣ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἐνὶ μεγ]άροις διδυμάονε γείνατο τέκ[νω
> Ἄκτορι κυσαμ]ένη καὶ ἐρικτύπῳ ἐννοσιγαί[ῳ,
> ἀπλήτω, Κτέα]τόν τε καὶ Εὔρυτον…
>
> “Actor made her (Moline?) his [blooming] wife… of the earth-holder, earth-shaker; and she, [pregnant by Actor] and the loud-sounding earth-shaker, gave birth to two twin children [in

---

[82] Steinrück (1999, 396-400).

[83] On the Moliones as conjoined twins, see Gantz (1993, 424-5), Snodgrass (1997, 571-2 and 1998, 28-31); *pace* Giuliani (2013, 35-7). On the form of Μολίονε, see West (1985, 63 n. 73) and Hirschberger (2004, 201). They are more usually called the Molionidae later in antiquity (e.g. Ibycus 285 *PMGF*, Pherecyd. fr. 79a Fowler; cf. Eust. 1321). For a different explanation for the name of the Moliones, see Steinrück (1999, 391), who prefers to derive it from μολεῖν.

[84] Ἡσίοδος Ἄκτορος κατ᾽ ἐπίκλησιν καὶ Μολιόνης αὐτοὺς γεγενεαλόγηκεν, γόνῳ δὲ Ποσειδῶνος (Σ A *ad Il.* 11.750 Erbse = Hes. fr. 17b M-W); cf. Hes. fr. 19 M-W.

[85] Hainsworth (1993 *ad Il.* 11.750). Hirschberger (2004, 202) refers to Actor simply as “der Stiefvater der Aktorione-Molione.”

the halls, terrible children, Cteatus] and Eurytus…" (Hes. fr. 17a.12-16 M-W).[86]

Assuming the restoration of Ἄκτορι κυσαμ]ένη is correct, we have a slightly different account, in which Moline is impregnated by both Actor and Poseidon (on the same night?), a situation potentially not dissimilar to that of Alcmene with Zeus and Amphitryon (Hes. fr. 195.14-56 M-W, on which see the third section of this chapter). This state of affairs is not necessarily inconsistent with the Moliones being simultaneously referred to in the *Iliad* as the sons of both Actor and Poseidon. After all, Heracles is called both the son of Zeus (*Il*. 14.266, 19.132, *Od*. 11.620, 21.26, Hes. fr. 33a.28 M-W; also *h. Hom*. 15.1, 9) and of Amphitryon (*Il*. 5.392, Hes. fr. 25.23, 33a.32 M-W, and possibly also at fr. 26.33), or even both at the same time (*Od*. 11.267-270, Hes. *Th*. 317-18). It is entirely possible in ancient myth for twins to have two fathers.[87] Presumably no distinction seems to be made between the Moliones – as we might expect when one father is mortal and one a god – because they are conjoined twins. Again, however, they are never called *nothoi*, even though they are at least partially extramarital children. The Moliones, in being sometimes called Μολίονε, are very unusually given a matronymic.[88] And West shows how, in Hes. fr. 17a M-W, the twins are attached to Moline's genealogy and not to Actor's or Poseidon's.[89] This association of the Moliones with their mother is consistent with the Greek tendency to attach deformed children, and especially deformed bastards, to their mothers.[90] The Moliones may not be called *nothoi*. But they are hardly ordinary, legitimate children, whether by heroic standards or otherwise.[91] We may say, however, that Donlan is correct to assert that *nothoi* are always referred to as such in the *Iliad*, since they seem based on usage to be defined as extramarital children of mortal parents.

---

[86] On the restoration of line 15, Hirschberger (2004, 203) compares Ζηνί τε κυσαμένη καὶ Ἐπωπέι ποιμένι λαῶν (Asius fr. 1.3 Bernabé); also cf. Hes. *Th*. 125. Pindar refers to Cteatus as Ποσειδάνιος (*O*. 10.26).

[87] Ogden (1996, 134-5) refers to this phenomenon as 'parallel insemination'.

[88] Cf. Robbins (1978, 93) on the rarity of matronymics. Finglass (2007 *ad* S. *El*. 365-7) also compares fr. 564.3 Radt, and Eur. *El*. 933-5 and 1103-4 (cf. also Eur. fr. 1064 Kannicht) for the practice in tragedy of calling children their mother's as opposed to their father's if they show a preference for the former.

[89] West (1985, 62-3).

More importantly, the second part of Donlan's statement, namely that *nothoi* are full members of their patrilineage, also appears to be correct. There are seven men called *nothos* in the *Iliad*: Medon (2.727, 13.694, 15.333), Democoön (4.499), Pedaeus (5.70), Teucer (8.284), Doryclus (11.490), Isus (11.102 and 103), and Cebriones (16.738). There is also a *nothē*, Medesicaste (13.173).[92] They are all given patronymics, although only Doryclus is given a true one (Πριαμίδης, 11.490). Of these eight bastards, five of the six Trojan *nothoi*, namely Cebriones, Democoön, Doryclus, Isus, and Medesicaste are children of Priam, with no mother mentioned for any of them.[93] In addition, all of the male bastards of Priam are killed in battle in the *Iliad*.[94] And, while Medesicaste herself is safe in Pedaeum, her husband Imbrius is killed by Teucer (13.169-74). Priam tells Achilles that he has fifty sons, and only nineteen of these are by Hecuba (24.495-7).[95] But it does not seem to be the case that Priam's children from women other than Hecuba are considered illegitimate. Gorgythion, whom Teucer kills instead of Hector, is called Priam's son (υἱός), and he is never referred to as *nothos*.[96] And his mother, Castianeira is specifically described as married (ὀπυιομένη), presumably at least at some point to Priam (8.300-5).[97] The precise distinction between *gnēsioi* and *nothoi* is therefore not always clear on the Trojan side, at least in terms of the legalities of their birth.[98] They nonetheless are all acknowledged and apparently welcome to contribute to the defence of their house.

---

[90] Ogden (1995, 220-1 and 2009, 118), citing especially *ad Ap*. 311-18 and Plut. *Mor*.. 145d-e. The fact that, at least in later tradition, Heracles kills the Moliones (Ibycus 285 *PMGF*, Pi. *O*. 10.26-34, and Pherecyd. fr. 79a Fowler) could indicate that they are monstrous figures, especially since they are at least partly sons of Poseidon.

[91] Steinrück (1999, 396-8) finds an interesting pattern when he observes that, of the 40 or 41 women who have children by gods in the *Catalogue*, the seven who have twins are all married, and the 33 or 34 who do not are maidens. I am not sure that Bellerophon has a twin, however (Hes. fr. 43a.81-3 M.-W.), and it is not entirely clear in the *Catalogue* whether he has a double paternity: Hirschberger (2004 *ad loc*., who observes that uncertainty about Bellerophon's paternity is typical in the mythological tradition). The clearest indication that Poseidon is Bellerophon's father in this passage would be if the [πα]τὴρ on line 84 refers to Poseidon. This would certainly be consistent with the content of Pi. *I*. 7.43-7. At *Il*. 6.191, Glaucus does refer to Bellerophon as θεοῦ γόνον ("offspring of a god"), but this phrase, which is unique in early Greek hexameter, does not necessarily denote paternity. Eust. 636.4-8 believes that it essentially means *agathos* ('noble') here, but contrast Pi. *O*. 6.36 (θεοῖο γόνον), where the phrase clearly refers to Iamus, Apollo's son.

[92] I agree with Fenik (1968, 18) that G. Strasburger (1954, 21-2) is unjustified in emphasizing that the *nothoi* of the *Iliad* tend to be born from nobles. Almost every character in the *Iliad* has a noble pedigree of some sort. After these eleven appearances of the word *nothos*, we do not see it again until Pindar (*O*. 7.27). Σ b *ad Il*. 16.175 Erbse suggests the distant possibility that Polydora, who is said at *Il*. 16.175 to be the daughter of Peleus, is a *nothē.* But there does not appear to be any good reason to suppose this: Gantz (1993, 227).

[93] The only *nothos* whose mother is mentioned is Medon, son of Rhene (2.727-8), about whom we know nothing else. Only Cebriones and Doryclus are mentioned in Hyginus' list of Priam's children (*Fab.* 90). Apollodorus (3.12.5) includes all but Isus.

It is with the *nothoi* on the Greek side that we get a better sense of a home life. In Book 5 of the *Iliad*, Meges kills Pedaeus, son of Antenor, ὅς ῥα νόθος μὲν ἔην, πύκα δ᾽ ἔτρεφε δῖα Θεανώ / ἶσα φίλοισι τέκεσσι, χαριζομένη πόσεϊ ᾧ ("who was actually a bastard, but godlike

---

[94] Patroclus slays Cebriones (16.733-43); Democoön is killed by Odysseus (4.494-500); Doryclus dies at the hands of Ajax (11.489-90); and Agamemnon kills Isus (11.101-9). Of the twenty-two sons of Priam who appear in the *Iliad*, eleven die in battle. Latacz et al. (2003 *ad Il*. 2.727) propose that "generell bot eine Bezeichnung als außerehelicher Sohn die Möglichkeit, bedeutendere Figuren im Kampf sterben zu lassen, ohne Eingriffe in den Kernbestand des mythologische Personals vornehmen zu müssen." So similarly G. Strasburger (1954, 30) and Janko (1992 *ad Il*. 13.694-7). This suggests an artificiality to the inclusion of these bastards which I cannot easily accept.

[95] Cf. Hellanic. fr. 141 Fowler = Σ T *ad Il*. 24.495 Erbse. Apollod. (3.12.5) speaks of a prior marriage to Arisbe, whom Priam gave (ἐκδούς) to Hyrtacus prior to taking Hecuba as his wife.

[96] Gorgythion is listed along with several Iliadic *nothoi* of Priam in Apollodorus (3.12.5) as having been born from women other than Hecuba (ἐκ δὲ ἄλλων γυναικῶν). A *nothos* can be called the *hyios* ('son') of his father: cf. Μέδων… Ὀϊλῆος νόθος υἱός (2.727; similarly 13.694-5 and 15.332-3) and Κεβριόνην, νόθον υἱὸν… Πριάμοιο (16.738).

[97] That Priam is given such a large collection of offspring by a variety of women might be a result of Greek chauvinism. Certainly more than one scholiast finds Priam's polygamy to be typical of the Other: βαρβαρικὸν ἔθος τὸ ἐκ πλειόνων γυναικῶν παιδοποιεῖσθαι ("to have children with very many women is a barbarian custom," Σ A *ad Il*. 5.70 Erbse). The T scholiast says virtually the same thing. One wonders what these commentators made of Heracles' innumerable wives and children. But the scholia to the *Iliad* have a strong tendency to be anti-Trojan: Nünlist (2009, 13). H. Mackie (1996, 161) says of the portrayal of the Greeks and the Trojans in the *Iliad* that "the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differences the poet imagines appear to be descriptive and aesthetic, not prescriptive and evaluative." So Morris (2000, 179).

[98] So C. Mackie (2008, 116): "the *Iliad* seems to make a clearer and more significant distinction between wives and mistresses on the Greek side than on the Trojan side."

Theano reared him carefully, equally with her own children, as a favour for her husband," 5.70-1). Pedaeus is an obscure enough figure that there was orthographical debate about his name in antiquity.[99] But we can infer something from this passage about the relationship between Pedaeus and his stepmother Theano. There appears to have been an exchange of symbolic capital.[100] The ῥα is emphatic here,[101] indicating perhaps that Pedaeus' bastardy should cause some surprise, given the following, namely that Theano should have given him as much care as her own children. The χαριζομένη then motivates this apparently unusual situation by explaining that she reared the boy to obtain *charis* from Antenor.[102] Theano might perhaps have been expected to provide some care for a boy who could potentially benefit the *oikos* as a man. But she could not presumably have been expected to provide the same level of care to him as to her own children. On the other hand, it goes without saying that being in Antenor's good graces could only strengthen Theano's position in his *oikos*. And rearing his bastard son with especial care appears to have been a means to achieve that end. The combination of her interest in *charis* from Antenor and the quantitative (ἶσα) comparison of her treatment of Pedaeus and her own children leads us to read a calculation of symbolic capital into this nexus of relationships. Pedaeus gains a better upbringing, Theano gains the gratitude of her husband, and Antenor adds another son to his *oikos*.

---

[99] Σ A *ad* 5.69 and T *ad* 5.70 Erbse.

[100] On symbolic capital, see Bourdieu (1977, 171-83).

[101] Sometimes referred to as the "visualizing" *ara*. I do not wish to engage here in the debate regarding whether we should prioritize the "consequential" or "visualizing" *ara* in Homer. I see no reason why some usages cannot be one, and others the other. On this debate, see Denniston (1950, 32-3) and Bakker (1993, 16-23) for the visualizing side, and Grimm (1962) for the consequential side.

[102] On *charis* as part of the process of the exchange of symbolic capital, see MacLachlan (1993, 7-10). In Eur. *Andr*. (222-5), Andromache similarly expresses her rearing of Hector's *nothoi* in terms of *charis*, and we have a *scholion* which compares this passage to *Il*. 5.69-71 (Σ MOA *ad* Eur. *Andr.* 224 Schwartz). Stevens (1971 *ad* Eur. *Andr.* 224-5) suggests that the Hectoridae in Hellanic. fr. 31 Fowler are an early reference to Hector's *nothoi*.

The phrase ἶσα… τέκεσσι has several interesting parallels which require some attention. In Book 13, Teucer kills Imbrius, the aforementioned husband of Priam's illegitimate daughter Medesicaste, who, when he reached Troy, lived with Priam and was honoured equally with his children (ναῖε δὲ πὰρ Πριάμῳ· ὁ δὲ μιν τίεν ἶσα τέκεσσι, 13.176). The *nothē* attracted a beneficial marriage alliance for her father, resulting in another sword-arm to defend the city. That Imbrius was treated with respect equivalent to Priam's children must also have reflected positively upon Medesicaste. In this one attested example, at least, the bastard daughter of a particularly powerful man fetches an alliance at least moderately comparable to one that a legitimate daughter could.[103] Similarly, Melanippus, son of Hicetaon and one of Hector's kinsmen (κασίγνητοι), lives with Priam and is honoured in the same way as Imbrius.[104] In fact, the same three lines are used to describe Melanippus' reception at Troy as Imbrius' (13.174-6 = 15.549-51). It may be the case that Priam has enough kin of this sort that formulae were developed to describe their reception at Troy when they come to fight in the War. On the Greek side, Ajax, in Teucer's company, laments the death of Lycophron, ὃν νῷ Κυθηρόθεν ἔνδον ἐόντα/ ἶσα φίλοισι τοκεῦσιν ἐτίομεν ἐν μεγάροισι ("whom, when he was in our halls from Cythera, we honoured equally with our own parents," 15.438-9). Here it is parents instead of children who are the basis of comparison for the amount of *tīmē* given and received. But the sense of proportion is the same. And finally, in a passage we will examine in more detail below, Odysseus fraudulently claims to be the bastard son of an important man, who nonetheless paid him as much respect as his legitimate brothers (ἀλλά με ἶσον ἰθαιγενέεσσιν ἐτίμα, *Od*. 14.203).[105] In the case of all four characters, one of whom is a (fictitious) bastard, and another of whom is the husband of a bastard, men live in an *oikos* and are treated by its central members like the closest of kin.[106] The crucial difference between the four latter cases and Theano's rearing of Pedaeus is that the treatment of Melanippus, Imbrius, Lycophron, and pseudo-Odysseus is measured in terms of *tīmē*, and Pedaeus' in terms of rearing (*trephein*). The similar language used to describe the apportionment both of *tīmē* and of rearing probably implies, as suggested in the introduction, that the rearing bestowed upon a youth can be quantified in a similar fashion – and perhaps even understood as part of the same conceptual space – as the fixed *tīmē* that an adult possesses. As I have argued, a youth receives rearing until he reaches the *hēbēs metron*, at which point he is a man and expected to fend for himself and serve those who reared him. In the present light, it is possible that the kind of rearing a youth receives confers symbolic capital upon him. After all, with the singular exception of the beggar Odysseus, every use of the phrase ἶσα… τέκεσσι appears in the context of the death of the warrior who was reared in such a way. The implication seems to be that, in addition to obtaining *tīmē* from defeating his enemy, the victor in battle receives additional *tīmē* on account of the fact that the man he has killed had fixed *tīmē* partially denoted by the kind of rearing he received.[107] In the case of the bastard Pedaeus, the fact that he receives rearing equivalent to his legitimate half-brothers would therefore imply that his status is also comparable – although certainly by no means equal – to theirs, despite the difference in the circumstances of his birth. If this is correct, then Theano has done Antenor a great favour indeed by placing his son on a par with their shared children. A passage from the *Catalogue of Women* describing Teuthras' treatment of Auge appears to bear this idea out: κούρη]ν δ' [ἐ]ν μεγάροισιν ἐῢ τρέφεν ἠδ' ἀτ[ίταλλε / δεξάμ]εν[ο]ς, ἶσον δὲ θυγατράσιν ᾗσιν ἐτίμ[α ("and, [having received the maiden in] his halls, he reared and [raised] her well, and he honoured her equally with his daughters," Hes. fr. 165.6-7 M-W).[108] We appear to have a variant of the usual Auge narrative. Here the gods probably command Teuthras to take Auge into his home.[109] In any case, Teuthras rears and confers honour upon Auge in equal proportion to his own daughters. It is difficult to construct a chronological sequence from a paratactic series of clauses, and so it is not obvious whether the *tīmē* is to be understood as being conferred upon Auge after or at the same time as she reaches her *hēbē*. This passage does not therefore help us determine whether *tīmē* can be conferred upon children. On the other hand, we can surely assume that Teuthras also raises his own daughters with attention. It is possible that the combination of *trephein* and *atitallein* in line six prevents the comparison between the rearing of Auge and that of the daughters from being made more explicitly or precisely, since the two verbs when used together always refer to the rearing of someone else's children, and usually fosterage.[110] Nonetheless I think it is safe to say that Auge and the daughters receive the same level of treatment and respect in accordance with the same value having been placed upon them.[111] In this light, there would seem to be a fairly precise correlation between the amount or kind of attention paid to a child and the fixed honour he or she possesses in adulthood. And more importantly we observe that, while an equivalence in the quality of rearing is considered to be surprising in the case of the stepmother caring for the *nothos*, a similar expression of surprise is lacking when kin from the paternal family are involved. There is at the very least an acceptable and recognizable domestic arrangement, according to which the *nothos* lives in apparent harmony in the *oikos* and is even accorded a fair amount of honour, if not necessarily from his stepmother.

---

[103] Little more can be said about the *nothē*, since, as far as a I am aware, there are no good comparanda until very late in antiquity. The only other uses of the word have to do with ill-attested variant traditions of particular myths, such as, for example, Pausanias' (9.26.3) claim that it is said (λέγεται) that the Sphinx was Laïus' *nothē*.

[104] The use of *kasignētos* is peculiar here, being the only instance in Homer where it refers to a cousin (Hicetaon is Priam's brother: 20.237-8) and not a brother or half-brother. Σ bT *ad Il.* 15.545 offers that τινὲς δὲ ἔτι καὶ νῦν παρ' Ἴωσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς κασιγνήτους φασὶ καλεῖσθαι ("Even now, some among the Ionians say that relatives are called *kasignētoi*"). Many, such as Chantraine (1960) and Janko (1992 *ad Il*. 15.545-6) have taken this *scholion* at face value, with Hdt. 1.171.6 and 4.104.3 being used as *comparanda* because Herodotus wrote in Ionian. I prefer Gainsford's (2012, 458-9) contention that the T scholiast (*ad loc*. Erbse) is correct when he suggests that what we have at *Il.* 15.545 is an elision of the formula κασίγνητοί τε ἔται τε.

---

[105] This usage of *ithagenēs* is only attested here. It seems literally to mean "born here" but to be synonymous with *gnēsios* in the present context: von Kamptz (1982, 199, discussing Ithamenes at *Il*. 16.586); Beekes (2010 s.v. ἰθαγενής); cf. Poll. 3.21.

[106] Cf. also μὴ δὲ κασιγνήτῳ ἶσον ποιεῖσθαι ἑταῖρον ("don't treat a companion in the same way as a brother," Hes. *Op*. 707) and ἶσα δέ μιν κεδνῇ ἀλόχῳ τίεν ἐν μεγάροισιν ("and he honoured her equally with his devoted wife in the halls," *Od*. 1.432, on which see below). Similar formulations lacking the crucial *īsos* will not be dealt with here (ὃν Τρῶες ὁμῶς Πριάμοιο τέκεσσι/ τῖον ("whom the Trojans honoured in the same way as (they honoured) the children of Priam", *Il*. 5.536-7); εὖ ἔτρεφεν ἠδ᾽ ἀτίταλλεν… ὡς εἴ θ᾽ ἑὸν υἱὸν ἐόντα ("he raised and reared him well… as if he were his own son", 16.191-2); τῇ ὁμοῦ ἐτρεφόμην, ὀλίγον δέ τί μ᾽ ἧσσον ἐτίμα ("Along with her I was reared, and she [Anticleia] paid me only a little less respect", *Od*. 15.365 (discussed in the introduction)); παῖδα δὲ ὣς ἀτίταλλε, ("and she reared her like a daughter", 18.323).

---

[107] This is not to suggest that the acquisition is commensurate with zero-sum *tīmē*: Cairns (2001, 15-16), Scodel (2008, 16-30).

[108] I am less confident about the restoration of κούρην than I am with the rest. Αὔγην (Robert) and κείνην (Grenfell/Hunt) also seem possible. However, it makes little difference for the present purpose which of the three we choose to read, and, as Hirschberger (2004 *ad loc.*) rightly asserts, the poet must be talking about Auge in any case.

[109] So Gantz (1993, 432) and Hirschberger (2004, 338-9), who also relate the better attested version of the myth.

A slightly different situation may be found in the case of Medon, the *nothos* of Oïleus (2.727, 13.694), and therefore the illegitimate half-brother of Oïlean Ajax. Unlike Pedaeus and the other *nothoi*, Medon is a fugitive from his paternal *oikos*. It is twice reported that

> ἦ τοι ὁ μὲν νόθος υἱὸς Ὀιλῆος θείοιο
> ἔσκε Μέδων, Αἴαντος ἀδελφεός· αὐτὰρ ἔναιεν
> ἐν Φυλάκῃ, γαίης ἄπο πατρίδος, ἄνδρα κατακτάς,
> γνωτὸν μητρυιῆς Ἐριώπιδος, ἣν ἔχ' Ὀϊλεύς·
>
> "The one, Medon, brother of Ajax, was actually a bastard son of godlike Oïleus. But he lived in Phylace, away from his fatherland, because he had killed a man, a kinsman of his stepmother Eriopis, wife of Oïleus" (13.694-7 = 15.332-6).[112]

It is sometimes thought odd that Medon should have lived in Phylace, whence Protesilaos came to Troy (2.695; Hes. fr. 199.4-6 M-W), but command Philoctetes' troops (*Il*. 2.724-8). In this light, Janko believes that Medon was originally one of Philoctetes' men but "re-invented to replace Protesilaos," a theory that has gained some currency.[113] Like Willcock, I see no "absolute need for Medon, the substitute commander, to have been resident in the area from which his troops came."[114] Commentators are also wont to dismiss Medon's story of murder and flight as a throwaway device to motivate his emigration (*Lokomotionssaga*).[115] However, Schlunk and others have shown that the reception of the exile is a fairly important leitmotif which runs the length of the *Iliad*, culminating in the last extended simile of the poem, in which Priam clasping Achilles' knees is compared to a murderer seeking refuge in the house of a wealthy man (24.477-84). This leitmotif is traced through a number of exiles, including Tlepolemus (2.661-70), Lycophron (15.431-41), Epeigeus (16.571-6), and perhaps most prominently Patroclus (23.85-8).[116] One might also include Theoclymenus in the *Odyssey* (15.272-8) and Phoenix (*Il*. 9.447-84), although his exile is a self-imposed one.[117]

---

[110] *Il*. 14.201-2 = 14.303-4, 16.191-2, 24.60, *Od*. 19.354-5, Hes. *Th*. 480. This pattern is also observed by Moussy (1972, 163) and Hirschberger (2004, 339). The combination is possibly avoided at *Od*. 11.250 (σὺ δὲ τοὺς κομέειν ἀτιταλλέμεναί τε ("and you look after them and rear them") for this reason, as Poseidon is telling Tyro to raise her own children and not someone else's.

[111] We should, however, bear in mind Felson's (2002a, 36) salutary warning that the rearing of boys should be compared to that of girls only with great caution.

[112] According to Gates (1971, 14) and Gainsford (2012, 441 and 452), in Homer, *adelpheos* is an archaism that can be used indiscriminately of brothers and half-brothers.

The description quoted above of Medon's emigration bears some similarities to the other exiles. We will start with the simile because it necessarily describes a generic stage in the emigration of a murder-exile: ὡς δ᾽ ὅτ᾽ ἂν ἄνδρ᾽ ἄτη πυκινὴ λάβῃ, ὅς τ᾽ ἐνὶ πάτρῃ / φῶτα κατακτείνας ἄλλων ἐξίκετο δῆμον, ἀνδρὸς ἐς ἀφνειοῦ, /θάμβος δ᾽ ἔχει εἰσορόωντας (“as when overpowering delusion seizes a man, who, having killed a man in his fatherland, has reached a township of other men, to the house of a wealthy man, and wonder takes hold of the onlookers” 24.480-2). The generic exile is at a liminal point in his emigration. He has killed a man (φῶτα κατακτείνας) and left his fatherland (πάτρῃ). Having reached the house of a potential host, the simile pauses at the point when the murderer is first noticed.[118] Similarly, Medon is described as having killed a man (ἄνδρα κατακτάς) and left his fatherland (γαίης ἄπο πατρίδος). Since the generic story of the simile ends shortly after this point, the similarities end there. But with Lycophron’s history, for example, we have an account at the same stage as Medon’s: ὅς ῥα παρ᾽ αὐτῷ / ναῖ᾽, ἐπεὶ ἄνδρα κατέκτα Κυθήροισι ζαθέοισιν (“who lived with him [Telamonian Ajax], since he had killed a man in holy Cythera, 15.431-2). Lycophron also killed a man and left. He then came to live (ναῖ᾽) with a new host, just as Medon did (ἔναιεν). Medon’s short history, which is reiterated just before he is slain (15.334-6), is, to a certain extent, as Fenik describes it, “an excellent example, in miniature, of the formulaic technique of biography.”[119] The elements of this little biography contribute to the larger leitmotif mentioned above. On the other hand, his particular combination of characteristics is atypical in the *Iliad*. While Medon’s history as exile fits into a larger theme, he is the only exile who is also *nothos*. Or, to put it the relevant way around, he is the only *nothos* to be driven from home. In fact, of all the portrayals of *nothoi* we have examined so far, Medon’s is the only one that shows even a trace of disharmony in the

---

[113] Janko (1992 *ad Il*. 13.694-7), the only secondary source cited in *HE* s.v. "Medon." Latacz et al. (2003 *ad Il*. 2.727) go further and suggest that the use of Medon in the *Iliad* is an example of how the poem sometimes incorporates *nothoi* as stopgap measures in various subplots. Janko (again 1992 *ad* 13.694-7) also prefers the T scholiast's (*ad* 13.333 Erbse) alternative genealogy for Medon, despite the fact that it would, as he himself points out, fail properly to motivate Medon's murder and exile. C. Mackie (2009, 8-9) suggests that Medon replaces Philoctetes because he is *nothos* and therefore an archer, an argument which I attempt to refute in the section of this chapter that discusses Teucer.

[114] Willcock (1984 *ad Il*. 13.696).

[115] G. Strasburger (1954, 29-30), A. Lesky (1966, 426-8), Fenik (1968, 153-4), Janko (1992 *ad Il*. 13.694-7), Willcock (1984 *ad Il*. 13.696).

[116] Schlunk (1976), who focuses on Medon on 202, and Perry (2010). The simile's importance is analyzed in more detail by Heiden (1998) but is ignored in the two major, recent studies of Homeric similes, W. Scott (2009) and Ready (2011).

[117] Cf. also the case of Amphitryon in Hes. fr. 195.11-13. Martin (1992, 14-21) argues that the persona of Hesiod and his father in *Works and Days* is similar to that of the exile.

---

[118] Theoclymenus is in a similar state when he first meets Telemachus: οὕτω τοι καὶ ἐγὼν ἐκ πατρίδος, ἄνδρα κατακτὰς / ἔμφυλον (“so I too am away from my fatherland because I killed a member of my band”, *Od*. 15.272-3).

[119] Fenik (1968, 153).

*oikos*. While the wording describing Theano’s equitable treatment of Pedaeus certainly allows for the possibility that she could have been less welcoming or even hostile to her stepson, it is nonetheless the case that she accorded him full honour.

The uniqueness of Medon’s situation is noteworthy, therefore, but perhaps not entirely inexplicable. As mentioned above, Medon is the only *nothos* whose mother is named: ἀλλὰ Μέδων κόσμησεν Ὀϊλῆος νόθος υἱός, / τόν ῥ᾽ ἔτεκεν Ῥήνη ὑπ᾽ Ὀιλῆ̨ πτολιπόρθῳ (“But Medon commanded them, the bastard son of Oïleus, whom Rhene had given birth to by Oïleus the city-sacker,” *Il*. 2.727-8). That Rhene is named is possibly significant. There are other Iliadic *nothoi* whose mothers’ absences have been noted. We hear, for example, about Teucer’s mother, Hesione, in later sources (S. *Aj*. 1299-1303, *TGrF* 579a Radt, X. *Cyn*. 1.9., Ov. *Met*. 11.211-20, Apollod. 3.12.7, and Hyg. *Fab*. 89.3-4), but not in the *Iliad.*[120] And Hesione is potentially a figure of interest with respect to the *Iliad*. In the later traditions, she is a Trojan princess, the daughter of Laomedon, given to Telamon by Heracles for his part in the earlier sack of Troy. Obviously this would make Teucer half-Trojan, a fact that is conspicuously not mentioned in the *Iliad*, given that the Trojans are the enemy.[121] The T scholiast is apparently alive to this fact when he glosses ἀστόξενος (‘guest-friend to a city’) as ὁ ἐκ προγόνων ἐπιχώριος, ὡς Ἀτρεὺς Φρυξὶ καὶ Τεῦκρος Τρωσίν (“the native through his progeny, such as Atreus to the Phrygians and Teucer to the Trojans,” *ad Il*. 4.377 Erbse).[122] I suspect that Teucer’s mother is not mentioned because his relationship with his father and half-brother receives emphasis in the *Iliadic* tradition, emphasis which could potentially be undercut by reference to Teucer's Trojan lineage.[123] Medon's mother can receive mention, on the other hand, because his dysfunctional relationship with his stepmother is prominent, even to the extent that it receives its own formula. Ogden's 'amphimetric strife,' then, seems to be an important part of the tradition surrounding Medon. But it scarcely figures elsewhere, except, as I will argue in the following section, in an allusive manner in Teucer's case. In other words, except in the cases of murder and suicide, amphimetric strife does not appear to cause a rift between anyone other than the bastard and his stepmother and her natal kin.

---

[120] Gantz (1993, 400) and Lyons (1997, 198) suggest that Hesione is understood to be involved in Heracles’ struggles at *Il*. 5.638-42 and 20.144-52.

[121] Cf. Higbie (1995, 11-12): “Teukros, the bastard son of Telamon, may reflect in his name the Trojan origins of his mother, Hesione.” So Edgeworth (1985, 27 n. 4) and Gantz (1993, 224). Wilamowitz (1920, 49 n. 1) finds Hesione’s name to be “Asiatin.” This appears all the more likely when we take into account that there is another, Trojan Teucer: Hellanic. fr. 24bc Fowler, Scamon Mytilenaeus fr. 1 Fowler, Lyc. 1301-8, and DS 4.75.

[122] Cf. Σ bT *ad* 8.284 Erbse.

Harmony is most certainly the norm between bastard and legitimate brothers. We catch a glimpse of half-brotherly cooperation when we see the *nothos* Isus driving chariot for his legitimate brother, Antiphus (11.101-6). Similarly Cebriones, *nothos* of Priam, is recruited as charioteer after the death of Archeptolemus (8.311-21), and he apparently continues in that position.[124] Later, Hector leaves a man worse (χερείονα) than Cebriones by the chariot in (12.91-2), implying that Cebriones was in charge of it before then. Finally, Cebriones dies at Patroclus' hands driving Hector's chariot (16.737-43). And it is fighting over his body that Patroclus is slain by Hector (751-822). Of particular interest in the current context is the famous description of Cebriones' corpse: ὁ δ᾽ ἐν στροφάλιγγι κονίης / κεῖτο μέγας μεγαλωστί, λελασμένος ἱπποσυνάων ("but in the whirl of dust he lay, great in his greatness, forgetful of his horsemanship," 16.775-6). It has frequently been noted that the formula μέγας μεγαλωστί is used only three times in early epic, and in the other two instances it describes Achilles (18.26; *Od*. 24.39-40). Since the formula clearly suits Achilles better than Cebriones, and Achilles is a more central character, its application to Cebriones' corpse is usually thought to be an anticipatory doublet of the enactment of Achilles' death in Book 18.[125] Burgess notes that it would be highly controversial to claim that this description of Cebriones "evokes the traditional death of Achilles, for Cebriones in no other way resembles Achilles."[126] But it must be the case that μέγας μεγαλωστί anticipates the sequence of revenge which will ensue, at least inasmuch as Cebriones' death constitutes a part of this motif sequence.[127] From the point of view of kinship, it is also interesting to recall that, while Patroclus is not Achilles' bastard brother, he does occupy a similarly liminal position in Achilles' *oikos*, being an exile whom Peleus took in at a young age (23.85-8). So, Cebriones, Patroclus, Hector, and Achilles are all linked in a sequence of death, and each pair can also be divided into one insider and one outsider.[128] While this does not mean that we should read Cebriones as particularly comparable to Patroclus either, the fact that he occupies the position he does in both the narrative and thematic structures necessarily indicates that we are to understand him as Hector's close companion.[129] We can see, therefore, that, while their position is clearly inferior, brothers and other members of the same patriline are generally portrayed as supportive of and friendly to their illegitimate kin.[130]

---

[123] So Kelly (2007, 57 n. 192). I return to Teucer's relationship with Telamon and Ajax in the following section.

[124] The use of *nothoi* as charioteers among the Trojans has been noted since Friedrich (1856, 222). Trypanis (1963, 289-90) helpfully lists all close kin who fight in close proximity in the *Iliad*.

---

[125] Burgess (2012a, 171-6), with a review of the long history of scholarship surrounding this formula. On anticipatory doublets, see Sammons (2013, 529-36). There is then the debate, not relevant here, about where the *Odyssey* passage comes from. Usener (1990, 105) thinks that it alludes to the *Iliad* 16 passage because the two are nearly identical. Danek (1998, 468) argues – I think rightly – that the passage from *Iliad* 16 appropriates formulae which properly belong to Achilles.

[126] Burgess (2012a, 175).

[127] On the motif sequence, see Nagler (1974, 112-30).

[128] C. Mackie (2009, 4-5) links Hector's killing of Patroclus to Patroclus' killing of Sarpedon (16.426-505), but the proximate cause of Hector's pursuit of Patroclus is Cebriones' death.

[129] One might compare Patroclus to Cebriones as a charioteer. At 17.426-440, Achilles' horses mourn Patroclus as one (ἡνιόχοιο, 427). There is also a famous early seventh-century amphora fragment (Mykonos Museum 666 = *LIMC* s.v. "Achilleus," no. 506) which identifies Patroclus as a warrior on a chariot, and he is accompanied by a charioteer. But Burgess (2001, 75-6) does not think that he is normally a charioteer.

Turning to the *Odyssey*, we find no one explicitly called a bastard at all. However, there are two bastards, who, as does not ordinarily seem to be the case in the *Iliad*, are the sons of slave-women. Because of the nature of the *Odyssey*, these two examples provide more domestic detail than the *Iliad* generally offers, allowing us to flesh out our picture of the bastard in important respects. The first bastard is mentioned on Telemachus' arrival at Sparta. Menelaus' legitimate daughter by Helen, Hermione, is getting married (*Od*. 4.5-9). So is Megapenthes:

> υἱέϊ δὲ Σπάρτηθεν Ἀλέκτορος ἤγετο κούρην,
> ὅς οἱ τηλύγετος γένετο κρατερὸς Μεγαπένθης
> ἐκ δούλης· Ἑλένῃ δὲ θεοὶ γόνον οὐκέτ᾽ ἔφαινον,
> ἐπεὶ δὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἐγείνατο παῖδ᾽ ἐρατεινήν,
> Ἑρμιόνην, ἣ εἶδος ἔχε χρυσῆς Ἀφροδίτης.

> "And he [sc. Menelaus] was bringing from Sparta the daughter of Alector for his son, the strong, well-beloved Megapenthes, who was born to him by a slave woman. For Helen, the gods no longer brought offspring to light, once she had first given birth to a lovely daughter, Hermione, who had the form of golden Aphrodite" (*Od*. 4.10-14).

Megapenthes is clearly the product of an extramarital union between two mortals, but he is not called *nothos*. There are nonetheless markers that he is accorded high value in his father's *oikos*. He is *tēlygetos*, the precise meaning of which is disputed, but it probably describes a child who holds a prominent place in the affections of his parents.[131] In addition, if we believe the early commentators, Menelaus is marrying him into a worthy family. According to Eustathius (1479.23) and a scholiast ($\mathrm{M}^{a}$ *ad Od*. 4.10 Pontani; see also HTVesy and E *ad loc*.), Alector is the son of Pelops and Hegesandra, the daughter of Amyclas. Megapenthes is presumably of especial value to Menelaus because his marriage with Helen has not produced any *gnēsioi*.[132] And in fact "Megapenthes" is likely a speaking name, translating as "Great Sorrow." Von Kamptz contends that Megapenthes is called such because he is an unworthy son to Menelaus,[133] but I think it is more likely that the name is to be linked to Menelaus' suffering on account of the rape of Helen.[134] Helen's absence would have caused a twofold pain. For she herself was gone, along with the opportunity to produce *gnēsioi*. It would seem, therefore, that Menelaus, in the absence of any male offspring from his wife, has invested his future in a child by a slave. C. Patterson goes too far, I think, when she assumes that Menelaus has freed Megapenthes out of desperation for an heir.[135] But let us consider the other evidence from the *Odyssey* before drawing our conclusions.

---

[130] In addition to the preceding examples, also compare the relationship between Ajax and Teucer discussed in the following section.

[131] Ciani (1964-5). The adjective's use at *Il*. 13.470 is clearly sarcastic and insulting, but I see no reason why it cannot be genuine elsewhere. The phrase *ek doulēs* also appears at Theognis 538, Eur. *Ion* 837, and Hdt. 1.7, as well as in later sources; cf. Ar. *Th*. 564-5. See also Ndoye (2010, 223), who argues that, in Homer, "la *doulè* partage le lit de son maitre en tant que concubine et s'oppose ainsi à l'épouse légitime."

Our next child is a figment of Odysseus' hyperactive imagination:

> ʻἐκ μὲν Κρητάων γένος εὔχομαι εὐρειάων,
> ἀνέρος ἀφνειοῖο πάις· πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι
> υἱέες ἐν μεγάρῳ ἠμὲν τράφεν ἠδ᾽ ἐγένοντο
> γνήσιοι ἐξ ἀλόχου· ἐμὲ δ᾽ ὠνητὴ τέκε μήτηρ
> παλλακίς, ἀλλά με ἶσον ἰθαιγενέεσσιν ἐτίμα
> Κάστωρ Ὑλακίδης, τοῦ ἐγὼ γένος εὔχομαι εἶναι·
> ὃς τότ᾽ ἐνὶ Κρήτεσσι θεὸς ὣς τίετο δήμῳ
> ὄλβῳ τε πλούτῳ τε καὶ υἱάσι κυδαλίμοισιν.

---

[132] This reading goes back to Diller (1937, 79). Returning to the present passage, the typically Homeric, paratactic *de*, as opposed to, say, an explanatory *gar* on line 12 makes the precise link between lines 10-11 and 12-14 difficult to assess. Lines 12-14 could simply be an explanation of why no legitimate sons are mentioned, rather than of why Megapenthes is *tēlygetos* in Menelaus' eyes. Cf. Hdt. 5.62, claiming that Pisistratus made his *nothos* son Hegesistratus tyrant of Sigeum.

[133] Von Kamptz (1982, 32 and 207).

[134] Cf. Heubeck et al. (*ad Od*. 4.11); Σ E *ad Od*. 4.11 Pontani: ὁ γὰρ Μενέλαος κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς ἁρπαγῆς τῆς Ἑλένης ἐμίγη τινὶ δούλῃ, καὶ ἔτεκεν υἱὸν καὶ ἐκάλεσεν αὐτὸν φερωνύμως Μεγαπένθην· κατὰ γὰρ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ διὰ τῆν Ἑλένην πένθους ἐτέχθη ("for Menelaus, at the time of the kidnapping of Helen, had sex with a certain slave-woman, and she gave birth to a son and aptly called him Megapenthes. For he was born at the time of the sorrow on account of Helen").

[135] C. Patterson (1990, 48).

> ἀλλ᾽ ἦ τοι τὸν κῆρες ἔβαν θανάτοιο φέρουσαι
> εἰς Ἀίδαο δόμους· τοὶ δὲ ζωὴν ἐδάσαντο
> παῖδες ὑπέρθυμοι καὶ ἐπὶ κλήρους ἐβάλοντο,
> αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ μάλα παῦρα δόσαν καὶ οἰκί᾽ ἔνειμαν.’
>
> “I claim that I am from broad Crete with respect to my kin, the offspring of a wealthy man. And many other sons were reared and born in the *megaron*, legitimate ones from a wife. My mother, a purchased concubine, gave birth to me, but Castor, son of Hylax, whose child I claim to be, showed me as much respect as his legitimate sons. He at that time was honoured by the Cretan people like a god for his vast wealth and praiseworthy sons. But the fates of death went, carrying him to the halls of Hades. And his insolent sons divided his livelihood and put it into lots, but they gave me very little and allotted a dwelling” (*Od.* 14.199-210).[136]

Odysseus *qua* beggar does not use any specific vocabulary to describe his status, but we can infer that he is illegitimate because of the contrast between his birth from a concubine and the fact that the other sons are called *gnēsioi*, which would have no point if he were portraying himself as such as well.[137] That his mother is a slave is made explicit by the reference to her purchase.[138] At this point, the interpretation of the passage becomes difficult, however. Ogden argues in reaction to C. Patterson that the division of the *klēroi* at the beggar’s expense is mentioned because he has been cheated of his normal share, and this certainly seems to be the most natural reading of the passage.[139] On the other hand, it is also possible that Castor’s treatment of a concubine’s child with the same respect as his legitimate children is invented because it would be perceived by Eumaeus as unusual.[140] The legitimate children might be described as insolent by the beggar in their unequal division of the inheritance simply because the beggar interprets Castor's treatment of him as implying that he should have received an equal share, and not because such a division is seen to be normal. While the beggar implies some level of equality between himself and his legitimate brothers when he reports that Castor was renowned for his wealth and his sons – thereby subtly including himself in a collective as if it is a uniform one – the parallel of Megapenthes tilts the scales in Ogden's favour. Megapenthes might be promoted in the absence of a *gnēsios*, but that situation does not apply to Odysseus' invention.

---

[136] It is possible that τράφεν should be τράφον, which in any case could also be read as “they grew up” (Chantraine (1953, 390). See A. Bowie (2013 *ad* 14.202 and 203) for a different reading of this passage.

[137] That these legitimate children are born ἐξ ἀλόχου by way of contrast to the beggar’s concubine mother may be strange. *Alochoi*, who are literally just ‘bed-mates,’ can be either concubines or wives in Homer: C. Patterson (1990, 48), *contra* Lacey (1968, 42).

[138] Cf. von Wickert-Micknat (1983, 139) on *ōnētē*.

[139] Ogden (1996, 23), *contra* C. Patterson (1998, 48).

[140] This is the reading of Buchholz (1881, 2.2.33-4).

The reader may have noticed that I have avoided referring to Megapenthes and the beggar as *nothoi*. As mentioned above, the word does not appear between the *Iliad* and Pindar. Its absence from the *Odyssey* is noted by Ogden, who nonetheless concludes that Megapenthes and the beggar are not to be distinguished from the *nothoi* of the *Iliad*.[141] But surely it is significant that both Megapenthes and the beggar have slaves as mothers, while the same cannot be said for certain of any *nothos* in the *Iliad*. Certainly there are a number of Iliadic *nothoi* whose mothers are never mentioned. But the difference between the two groups remains stark, particularly when we take into account later evidence. For example, it is likely the case that even in Classical Athens, a *polis* that was characterized by an extreme level of concern for the legitimacy of its citizens at the time, *pallakai* ('courtesans') could be kept for the production of free children (Dem. 23.52).[142] It is probable, therefore, that Megapenthes and the beggar are to be understood as having been born from slave women maintained in the *oikos* at least partially for the purpose of producing children by their masters. In this light, the fact that Megapenthes comes *ek doulēs* can possibly be understood not simply as the by-product of Menelaus having enjoyed himself in his spare time, but as the result of a concerted effort to produce an heir in Helen's absence.[143] Of course a son by Helen would be preferable for at least two reasons. Firstly, it would be ideal to pass her desirable lineage on to a son. Secondly, it would at least ordinarily be better for Menelaus' relationship with his in-laws to produce an heir by his wife than otherwise. But any son is better than no son at all. Correspondingly, the beggar's fictional situation with his legitimate brothers is plausible because of the possibility that a concubine's son might inherit. We can certainly imagine that a father's placement of his illegitimate sons on a similar footing as his *gnēsioi* when it comes to their inheritance could be expected to be unpopular with both the legitimate sons and their potentially influential maternal kin, but this does not necessarily mean that the father is categorically prevented from doing so. In this light, the deprivation by the legitimate sons of the beggar's equal share is likely perfectly believable – and even probable – to Eumaeus.[144]

---

[141] Ogden (1996, 21-2). C. Patterson (1990, 47-8) simply assumes that the two are the same as the *nothoi* of the *Iliad*.

[142] On this subject, see Sealey (1984, 113-14), Demand (1994, 29-30), and Kamen (2013, 62-67).

The first description of Eurycleia at the beginning of the *Odyssey* is potentially relevant here as well:

> Εὐρύκλει᾽, Ὦπος θυγάτηρ Πεισηνορίδαο,
> τήν ποτε Λαέρτης πρίατο κτεάτεσσιν ἑοῖσιν
> πρωθήβην ἔτ᾽ ἐοῦσαν, ἐεικοσάβοια δ᾽ ἔδωκεν,
> ἶσα δέ μιν κεδνῇ ἀλόχῳ τίεν ἐν μεγάροισιν,
> εὐνῇ δ᾽ οὔ ποτ᾽ ἔμικτο, χόλον δ᾽ ἀλέεινε γυναίκος.

> "Eurycleia, daughter of Ops, son of Peisenor, whom Laertes once purchased with his property when she was still at the beginning of her youthful prime, and he paid the value of twenty oxen, and he honoured her equally with his dear wife in the halls, but he never mingled with

---

[143] Beringer (1961, 279-80) and Ndoye (2010, 224 and 257) argue for a distinction between the *dmōiē* on the one hand and the *doulē* and the *pallakis* on the other. In the next chapter, I side with Thalmann (1998a, 75-7), who shows convincingly that such nice distinctions are problematic.

[144] Cf. de Jong (2001 *ad Od.* 192-359) on how Odysseus is trying to impress Eumaeus.

> her in bed, and he avoided the anger of his wife” (*Od.* 1.429-33).

Unlike Menelaus’ *doulē* and the beggar’s *pallakis* mother, Eurycleia is given a name, and a good one with proper ancestry (1.429 = 2.347 = 20.147).[145] In fact, Karydas observes that the only other servant or slave whose father and grandfather are named is Eumaeus, and he provides their names himself (15.413-14).[146] Despite her lack of freedom, therefore, Eurycleia is in a different class from these other slave women, which probably helps to explain her purchase-price.[147] No wonder, then, that Laertes accords her such high honour. But the equivalence in his valuation of Eurycleia and his own wife is surely marked – and perhaps even surprising.[148] We probably do not expect a slave woman to be held in the same esteem as a wife whose relationship with her husband is portrayed as a good one. And, if both women are valued equally, there is some potential for amphimetric strife in the *oikos* should both women have sons by Laertes, as Odysseus’ lying tale shows.[149] The significance of Laertes’ decision not to sleep with Eurycleia and avoid Anticleia’s anger, therefore, probably has less to do with sexual jealousy than with a desire to avoid the amphimetric conflict that could result. After all, Autolycus, Anticleia’s father, is portrayed as a man of some influence, and he shows a fairly marked interest in his descendant, Odysseus (*Od.* 19.392-412, 459-66). Another son from an unrelated mother could only serve to harm Laertes’ relationship with Autolycus. On the other hand, Laertes does take something of a risk in the end, because he only manages to sire one son, Odysseus, by Anticleia. And one son might easily die, as the *Odyssey* makes painfully evident.[150] But, by forgoing Eurycleia's potential as a mother to some of his children, Laertes reinforces the investment he makes in his son by Anticleia.[151] She becomes a nurse to Odysseus and eventually to Telemachus (1.434-5, 19.482-3), thereby ensuring her devotion to Anticleia's descendants.[152] In other words, Laertes faces a choice between, on the one hand, maximizing the number of his sons and risking amphimetric strife, and, on the other hand, focusing his investment on sons – or in this case, a son – from Anticleia. That he chooses to focus on Odysseus is likely meant to redound to his credit.

---

[145] Ops and Peisenor are obscure, and Σ PY *ad Od.* 1.429 Pontani says that they are *ad hoc* inventions. But their names are markedly aristocratic in any case: Mühlestein (1987, 40-2).

[146] Karydas (1998, 11 n. 14). See Austin (1975, 165-71) and Karydas (1998, 9-63) for the difference between Eumaeus and Eurycleia on the one hand and the other slaves of Odysseus on the other.

[147] See Heubeck et al. (1990 *ad Od.* 1.431) on the enormous size of Eurycleia’s purchase price. Higbie (1995, 8) compares the variation in status among slave-women in the *Odyssey* to that of charioteers in the *Iliad*.

[148] However, Hunt (2011, 27 n. 12) compares *Il.* 1.112-5, 3.409, 19.290-300. One might also include *Od.* 11.421-3.

[149] Cf. also my examination in a later chapter of Phoenix’ story at *Il.* 9.447-57. Here and *Od.* 14.203 are the only two uses of *pallakis* in Homer. Diller (1937, 73) takes *Il.* 9.447-57 and *Od.* 1.429-33 as “protests against concubinage.” I see calculations on the part of the characters and not moral condemnation from the narrative voice.

We find, then, that bastards occupy a recognizable if relatively inferior position in Homer. They are raised along with their legitimate siblings in a loving environment marred only by an amphimetric strife that is mild compared to that of later texts. However, this amphimetric strife can become more problematic in the case of murder or suicide. On the other hand, in extreme circumstances, bastards may even stand as their father's heir. All of this seems stereotyped and fictitious, and it probably is. Whether we are talking about Bronze Age or Archaic Greece, there is no reason to think that the lot of the bastard could not be considerably more complicated and unpleasant than it appears in Homer. As mentioned above, the bastards in Homer were in many cases considered to be the illustrious ancestors or even founders of the ruling families of Archaic Greece. We expect their portrayal to be idealized. But to observe the way in which they tend to be portrayed, as we have, will help us to analyze the figures of Teucer and Heracles in the following sections.

---

[150] See especially Goldhill (2010) on the meaning of *mounos* at *Od*. 16.117-20. He argues convincingly that *mounos* always "expresses not merely the state of being alone or single, but also a sense of threat or danger" (122). Contrast Hes. *Op*. 376-8, who counsels the auditor to have a single son in order that his estate not be divided on his death. Leaving a single heir has other, later proponents (e.g. Pl. *Lg*. 740b-d, 923cd). One suspects, however, that the Hesiodic narrator is reflecting bitterly on his unfortunate experience with his own brother, Perses, and the distribution of their inheritance (*Op*. 27-41).

[151] Thalmann (1998a, 74-7) comes to a similar conclusion regarding the strategic advantage of having Eurycleia nurse Odysseus. But he and Golden (2011, 148) seem to read Anticleia's potential wrath only in terms of sexual jealousy. Vernant's (1996, 64-5) interpretation is more in line with my own. Pomeroy (1975, 26-7) argues that, in order to breast-feed Odysseus (19.482-3), Eurycleia must have found a way to have a baby "without incurring her master's displeasure." I think Pomeroy may be demanding too much consistency from the poetry here. Certainly, given that Laertes never sleeps with Eurycleia, it may be difficult to see how she could have conceived a child without angering him. On the other hand, such inconsistencies, particularly thousands of lines apart, are not unknown or even necessarily noticeable in oral poetry.

[152] In this light, Karydas (1998, 16-17) compares Eurycleia's attachment to Odysseus and Telemachus to Demeter's initial devotion to Demophoön in the *H. Dem.* Taking a different perspective, Murnaghan (2011, 28) suggests that "Eurycleia is, in many ways, a doublet for Odysseus' mother, Anticleia."

## 1.2: TEUCER

Teucer is the most prominent *nothos* in the *Iliad*, and he appears in his own section for a significant reason. He almost always appears with his legitimate half-brother, Telamonian Ajax, and this seems to highlight his *notheia*. Ajax generally overshadows Teucer, even to the extent that the two are frequently referred to as the two Ajaxes (*Aiante*). This asymmetrical relationship is also evident when the two fight together, with Ajax using a spear and shield, and Teucer a bow and arrow, a combination that many have proposed is a symbolic representation of Teucer's *notheia*. Ajax fighting in the melee supposedly highlights his legitimate birth as compared to Teucer's illegitimacy, with the *nothos* fighting from afar like a coward. However, as I will try to show, archers are not portrayed as cowards in the *Iliad*, nor does archery have any apparent link to *notheia per se*. However, that Teucer in particular is an archer is likely linked to his bastardy in an indirect manner. As I will show, Teucer is the only archer to fight for the Greeks in the *Iliad*. Other Greeks occasionally use a bow, but Teucer is the only archer. The Trojans, on the other hand, have several archers. Teucer's archery, therefore, is likely derived from the fact that his mother, Hesione, is a Trojan. That he favours what is – in the *Iliad*, at least – a style of fighting associated with the maternal side of his family could either be taken to indicate a supreme loyalty to his patriline, since he uses the weapon of his maternal kin against them in defence of his paternal kin; or it could indicate a certain identification with his mother's people. He is certainly suspected of having the latter attitude. We learn from later literature that Teucer's maternal ancestry eventually damns him in his father's eyes, and I contend that the *Iliad* alludes to this unfortunate event in Book 8. When Ajax commits suicide, Telamon apparently comes to the conclusion that Teucer betrayed his brother, and he exiles Teucer as a consequence. That

Teucer's mother is Trojan appears to be the decisive factor in Telamon's deliberation. It is not Teucer's *notheia* that is problematic *per se*. It is rather the suspicion that he is loyal to his maternal family that results in his exile.

Teucer's status as *nothos* is a matter of dispute, but it should not be. Edgeworth claims that the description of Teucer as Ajax' κασίγνητος καὶ ὄπατρος ("brother and from the same father," *Il*. 12.371) "implies that they were full brothers."[153] However, Gainsford has since shown conclusively that *kasignētos* can refer either to a full brother or a half brother.[154] Furthermore, Agamemnon elsewhere addresses Teucer explicitly as *nothos* (8.284).[155] Given that Ajax and Teucer are also treated as half brothers in post-Homeric literature, and that Teucer is always *nothos* (perhaps most notably in Sophocles' *Ajax* and Euripides' *Helen*), there does not seem to be any reason to doubt that Teucer is universally such.[156] In this respect, Teucer is significant because he is by far the most prominent of all the figures in the *Iliad* to be referred to explicitly as a bastard. In this light, it is perhaps unsurprising that, while he is a significant character in his own right, Teucer is nonetheless overshadowed by his half brother, Telamonian Ajax. There are a number of ways in which Ajax overshadows Teucer, the most frequently discussed of which is the so-called 'elliptical dual', *Aiante*. Nagy defines an elliptical dual as one designating A + B, rather than a regular dual, which designates A + A.[157] In the *Iliad*, *Aiante* can be a regular dual and denote Telamonian Ajax and Oïlean Ajax (probably 2.406, 4.519, etc.). *Aiante* can also, although probably less frequently, be an elliptical dual and refer to Telamonian Ajax and Teucer.[158] But it is often difficult to tell with any certainty which pair the dual is designating on a particular occasion. Regardless of the frequency of this usage in attested epic, however, it is clear that it was possible to read *Aiante* as denoting Telamonian Ajax and Teucer.[159] Teucer is overshadowed here to such an extent that it is probably impossible to tell whether he is being referred to in some cases. The greatness of Ajax sometimes subsumes even the name of Teucer.

---

[153] Edgeworth (1985, 27 n. 4); similarly Higbie (1995, 30 n. 15); cf. *Il*. 8.330 and 15.436 = 466.

[154] Lejeune (1960, 22) and Gates (1971, 14-16) had already demonstrated this fairly convincingly, but Gainsford (2012, esp. 441 and 451-2) is decisive.

[155] Proponents of the idea that Teucer is *gnēsios* argue in favour of this line's deletion. On this issue see below.

[156] *HE* 3.848 s.v. "Teucer" for the figure generally. On his bastardy in Sophocles and Euripides specifically, see Ebbott (2003, 50-65).

[157] Nagy (1997, 168), assigning a name to the pattern observed by Wackernagel (1877, 304-6) and picked up by von der Mühll (1930, 30–4).

More difficult to get a handle on is the status of Teucer as archer versus that of Ajax, who is often seen as the prototypical melee combatant in the *Iliad*.[160] The usual view is that through much of early Greek antiquity long-range combat was seen as socially inferior to melee combat. Farron characterizes the consensus more generally as “that the ancient Greeks and Romans regarded military archery as lower class, cowardly, immoral and ineffectual.”[161] While Farron has proved at some length that archers are actually quite effective in the *Iliad*, the remaining three parts of the consensus require some reevaluation.[162] There is certainly a fair body of passages in the *Iliad* which have been cited to support the claim that archers are viewed in a less than complimentary light.[163] The most frequently quoted is Diomedes' diatribe against Paris, who has just hit him in the foot with an arrow:

---

[158] Page (1972, 236-8) argues forcefully for 4.272-85, 13.197 and 201, and there may well be other places; *pace* Simon (2003, 6). Dué and Ebbott (2010, 260) support Page here and also discuss the plausibility of the variant reading Αἴαντε (which would be the elliptical usage) in place of Αἴαντα at 10.53. Edgeworth and Mayrhofer (1987, 187) find support for the elliptical usage of *Aiante* in the *Mahâbhârata*, in which the dual “the two Krsnas” is frequently used to refer to Krsna and his mortal companion Arjuna. Mühlestein (1987, 12-23) explores the possibility of a Mycenaean origin for the Locrian and Telamonian Ajaxes, implying that Teucer was developed later than his half-brother.

[159] In fact, Page (1972, 235-8) follows Wackernagel (1877, 306) in arguing that this would have been the ordinary usage and that *Aiante* applied to the lesser and greater Ajaxes would have been marked.

[160] On Ajax as the prototypical melée combatant, see for example von der Mühll (1930, *passim*) and Mühlestein (1987, 22-3).

[161] Farron (2003, 169). Cf. van Wees (2004, 61-5) and Hornblower (2008, 40-2), both of whom are somewhat skeptical about how pervasive this attitude was. H. Mackie (1996, 49-55) and Kelly (2007, 263-4) review the examples in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* which are taken to prove the inferiority of the bow in Homer. Closest to the mark, in my opinion, is C. Mackie’s (2008, 91-152) demonstration that opinions about archery can be shown to vary to a considerable extent. For example, the archer is open to a considerable amount of antagonism in the *Iliad*. This is not so in the *Odyssey* (102-3 and 234 n. 52). Eur. *Her.* 140-235 is sometimes used to inform our understanding of the portrayal of archery in the *Iliad*, but I think that the social position of archery had altered too drastically by this time for this play to be of any use to us. See George (1994) and Papadopoulou (2005, 137-51) on the place of archery in the *Heracles*.

[162] Farron (2003).

> τοξότα λωβητήρ, κέρᾳ ἀγλαὲ παρθενοπῖπα,
> εἰ μὲν δὴ ἀντίβιον σὺν τεύχεσι πειρηθείης,
> οὐκ ἄν τοι χραίσμησι βιὸς καὶ ταρφέες ἰοί.
> νῦν δέ μ᾽ἐπιγράψας ταρσὸν ποδὸς εὔχεαι αὔτως.
> αὐκ ἀλέγω, ὡς εἴ με γυνὴ βάλοι ἢ πάϊς ἄφρων·
> κωφὸν γὰρ βέλος ἀνδρὸς ἀνάλκιδος οὐτιδανοῖο.
> ἦ τ᾽ἄλλως ὑπ᾽ ἐμεῖο, καὶ εἴ κ᾽ ὀλίγον περ ἐπαύρῃ,
> ὀξὺ βέλος πέλεται, καὶ ἀκήριον αἶψα τίθησιν.

> "Archer, slanderer, ogler of girls, famous for your hair, I wish that you'd make trial of me in arms face-to-face. Then your bow and frequent arrows wouldn't protect you. As it is, you've scratched the flat of my foot and boast in vain. I don't pay it any mind. It's as if a woman or a foolish child had shot me. For the arrow of the man who is weak and of no account is blunt. Differently indeed does the sharp missile travel from my hand, even if it only grazes, and it immediately renders a man lifeless" (11.385-92).

Hainsworth's characterization of this passage is typical: "Diomedes' words are an eloquent expression of the aristocratic spearman's contempt for those who fight at a distance (and often anonymously) with the bow."[164] Indeed, the fact that Diomedes uses *toxotēs* pejoratively does seem to indicate that the term "had enough contemptible connotations that it could be used to diminish the glory of the person or nation using it."[165] But there are several mitigating factors here. First, archers can also be addressed in complimentary terms. For example, in Book 15,

---

[163] This is not the place for an exhaustive study of all the passages which have been suggested as portraying archers negatively. Reasonably extensive analyses may be found in Farron (2003) and C. Mackie (2008, 93-154). However, in addition to what I examine, I note that Pandaros' sneak attack on Menelaus (4.86-126) is not depicted as particularly cowardly because archery is involved, but rather because he is committing an immoral act; so van Erp Taalman Kip (2000, 390-2), *pace* Fenik (1974.196). Contrary to the common assumption (e.g. van der Valk (1952, 271), H. Mackie (1996, 50-1)), sneak attacks do not seem in particular to be sources of disapproval in Homer *per se:* R. Parker (1983, 132-3, van Wees (1988, 5), Dué and Ebbott (2010, 54-5). On the other hand, it is not my intent to deny what Farron (2003, 183) calls "the superior glamour of fighting close to the enemy rather than at a distance."

[164] Hainsworth (1993 *ad loc.*); similarly Erbse (196, 173-7), Fenik (1968, 21), and Ndoye (2010, 262-3).

[165] Farron (2003, 181), who also rightly notes that "it is inconceivable that anyone would taunt an enemy as an αἰχμητής ['spearman']" (182).

Hector refers to the arrows of Teucer as ἀνδρὸς ἀριστῆος… βέλεμνα (“arrows of the best man,” 15.489).[166] And, as Farron notes, Achilles draws an equivalence between dying at the hands of a spearman and an archer (21.275-83).[167] Secondly, it is important to note that Diomedes’ address to Paris here is part of a type-scene that frequently appears in Iliadic fighting. If a warrior is the target of a spear-cast or arrow-shot, and he is wounded but survives, he ordinarily taunts his assailant.[168] If Diomedes’ taunt is particularly vociferous here, it is because of the inappropriateness of Paris’ boast. As Muellner has shown, the formula καὶ εὐχόμενος ἔπος ηὔδα (“and he spoke a word in boast,” 11.379 in the present context) is only used elsewhere of warriors boasting over the corpse of a slain foe. Diomedes is presumably offended because he has understood from Paris’ speech that he is claiming an honour he has not earned.[169] Diomedes, in his response, goes too far in the other direction. His claim that Paris’ arrow has merely scratched him is shown to be false when he suffers intense pain from the removal of the arrow and has to be taken back to the camp on account of the wound (11.396-400). His abuse of Paris as an archer must be seen therefore as more in the nature of flyting, as opposed to an expression of contempt for archers as a group.[170] After all, Diomedes himself has recently gone on a night-raid with Odysseus, who was armed with a bow (10.260).[171] This is not to claim that we should disregard Diomedes' expression of disdain for archery entirely. I am merely suggesting that archery, while it is clearly socially vulnerable to some extent, is not simply an object of contempt.

---

[166] I am uncertain what is meant by ‘best’ here. Cf. Nagy (1999, 26-41) on the epithet *aristos* in Homer in general. It might refer to the fact that Teucer is the best of the Greeks at archery (12.350 = 363, 13.313-14). And the most pertinent passage in this regard is worth quoting: Τεῦκρός θ’, ὃς ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν / τοξοσύνῃ, ἀγαθὸς δὲ καὶ ἐν σταδίῃ ὑσμίνῃ (“Teucer, who was the best of the Achaeans at archery, and good too in close combat,” 13.313-14). The poet clearly does not portray the archer as incapable of holding his own in closer encounters.

[167] Farron (2003, 184), who provides several further examples throughout his article.

[168] Fenik (1968, 31-2), who provides multiple examples. Of particular interest here is the similarity of the response that Diomedes gives to Pandarus when the archer misses him with a spear-cast (5.280-9).

[169] Muellner (1976, 89-92), who also notes that the formula is only used elsewhere of Greeks. I am unclear on what the significance of its use by a Trojan might be.

[170] On this passage as an instance of flyting, see Ready (2011, 120-6).

[171] Dué and Ebbott (2010, 57-62) discuss the significance of this bow at some length.

In Book Thirteen, the Locrians do not follow Oïlean Ajax into battle:

> οὐ γάρ σφι σταδίῃ ὑσμίνῃ μίμνε φίλον κῆρ·
> οὐ γὰρ ἔχον κόρυθας χαλκήρεας ἱπποδασείας,
> οὐδ᾽ ἔχον ἀσπίδας εὐκύκλους καὶ μείλινα δοῦρα,
> ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα τόξοισιν καὶ ἐϋστρεφεῖ οἰὸς ἀώτῳ
> Ἴλιον εἰς ἅμ᾽ ἕποντο πεποιθότες, οἷσιν ἔπειτα
> ταρφέα βάλλοντες Τρώων ῥήγνυντο φάλλαγγας.
>
> "For their dear heart did not remain in firm battle. For they did not have brazen helms thick with horsehair, nor did they have round shields and ashen spears. But they followed along to Ilium, trusting in bows and well-twisted sheep wool, with which they fired in numbers and broke the Trojan lines" (*Il.* 13.713-18).[172]

Schwartz claims that the narrator is indicating here that "Ajax' bowmen… lack the courage for close combat."[173] This reading may be correct as far as it goes, but it seems also to imply that the bowmen lack courage at all. I would argue that they should only be read as lacking courage in the present context, and that the narrator's statement should not be interpreted as an indictment of the Locrians' character *per se*. In other words, the fact that they are bowmen and not melee combatants does not necessarily stem from a lack of moral fibre. I read the γάρ on 714 as causal, meaning that the Locrians do not have the heart to withstand hand-to-hand combat because they do not have bronze armour and spears.[174] Interestingly, Strabo (10.1.13) has οὔ σφιν σταδίης ὑσμίνης ἔργα μέμηλεν, / ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα τόξοισιν καὶ ἐϋστρόφῳ οἰὸς ἀώτῳ / Ἴλιον εἰς ἅμ᾽ ἕποντο

---

[172] It is uncertain what the ἄωτος is in this context, but, if Pausanias 1.23.4 does refer to this passage, as Lorimer (1950, 301) suggests, it might be a sling (σφενδόνη).

[173] *HE* 1.80 s.v. "archery." Janko (1992 *ad* 13.712-18) reads line 718 as redeeming the Locrians in a paradoxical way, which requires us to understand lines 713-17 as condemnatory.

[174] Van der Valk (1952, 272 n. 7) suggests that the Locrians may be archers because they live in a mountainous district.

(“they did not care for the deeds of firm battle, but they followed along to Ilium with bows and well-twisted sheep wool”), apparently in place of 713-17. This variant would strengthen the case that the Locrians are cowards because it fails to explain their unwillingness to participate in hand-to-hand combat with their lack of appropriate gear, instead leaving the fact unexplained. On the other hand, two factors argue against our adoption of these lines. The T scholiast, tentatively suggested by Erbse as quoting Didymus here, favours ἔργα μέμηλεν on 713 because, according to him, the Locrians are described as following the Ajaxes (Αἰάντεσσι, 4.273), using the metaphorical phrase, νέφος εἵπετο πεζῶν (“a cloud of infantry followed,” 4.274). How, the scholiast asks, can the Locrians be described as ordinarily being ranged fighters when they are clearly described as foot-soldiers in Book Four?[175] The argument apparently implied by the scholiast here is that the Locrians do not care for close combat in this particular case, and so they fight with missiles instead. However, it is important to note that the foot-soldiers of 4.274 are never explicitly called Locrians. It is merely assumed that some of them are because they are following the two Ajaxes, and the Oïlean Ajax is followed by Locrians, as at 13.712-18. But, as we have already mentioned in a footnote, Page has persuasively argued that the two Ajaxes named in 4.272-85 are in fact Telamonian Ajax and Teucer, thereby undermining the reasoning of the scholiast.[176] The second reason for preferring the vulgate reading to Strabo’s is that his version requires the πεποιθότες on 717 to be read with the following relative clause, with οἷσιν as its dative complement. While this is certainly possible, the position of the relative pronoun would be awkward, and βαλλόντες works more smoothly with οἷσιν as its instrument, given the consequential force (ἔπειτα) of the clause and the fact that its point is that missile weapons are being put in motion, not relied upon. The best way to understand this passage is therefore that the Locrians do not engage in hand-to-hand combat because they do not have the appropriate equipment. Lack of means and not cowardice is the cause of the Locrians' holding back. After all, Achilles himself, who is surely no coward, does not proceed into battle before he is supplied with appropriate arms.

---

[175] Σ T *ad* 13.713 Erbse.

[176] Page (1972, 236-7).

A passage from Tyrtaeus is sometimes used as a parallel to the state of affairs for long-range combatants in the *Iliad*:

> ὑμεῖς δ᾽, ὦ γυμνῆτες, ὑπ᾽ ἀσπίδος ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος
>     πτώσσοντες μεγάλοις βάλλετε χερμαδίοις
> δούρασί τε ξεστοῖσιν ἀκοντίζοντες ἐς αὐτούς,
>     τοῖσι πανόπλοισιν πλησίον ἱστάμενοι.

> "And you, light-armed men, throw great rocks, cowering under your shields in different places and aiming at them with polished spears, taking a stand near the fully armed men" (11.35-8 W).[177]

While *ptōssein* does unambiguously communicate cowardice, there are several informative reasons to distinguish this passage from earlier epic.[178] First of all, Tyrtaeus appears to be incorporating this group of light-armed warriors into an early form of the phalanx which does not appear in early Greek hexameter.[179] Several interpretations have been suggested for what exactly these *gymnētes* are doing in this passage. To my mind, the most convincing is Irwin's, who proposes that they are cowering under their own shields (ὑπ᾽ ἀσπίδος) and not those of the

---

[177] See Irwin (2005b, 38 n. 8 for a convenient summary of the link that has been proposed between this passage and the kind of warfare described in the *Iliad*. Romney (2014), resurrecting Hartung's conjecture, makes a compelling case for reading ξυστοῖσι τ᾽ ("and javelins") in place of ξεστοῖσιν in line 37. While, as she notes, this would certainly allow us to make better sense of πτώσσοντες by construing it as adversative, I do not think that it affects my argument to read it either way.

[178] See Irwin (2005b, 38-9) and Romney (2014, 829-31) on *ptōssein* as communicating cowardice.

[179] On Tyrtaeus 11 and the phalanx, see van Wees (2000, 71-2 and 2004, 173-4) and Irwin (2005a, 293-4). On the phalanx' absence from Archaic epic, see Wheeler (1991, 129-31), van Wees (1994a and 2004, 160-70), *pace* Latacz (1977). Van Wees (2000, 156 n. 1) outlines the history of the scholarship on the early development of hoplite warfare.

*panoploi* addressed in the rest of the poem.[180] The *gymnētes* are, by virtue of their shields, hoplites, and they can be distinguished from the *panoploi* based on the fact that, apart from these shields, they are very lightly armed.[181] It has been well-established that differences in level and quality of military equipment were usually – and often deliberately – representative of differences in economic status.[182] In this light, the pejorative *ptōssein* probably reflects the contempt of the aristocratic class for the lower classes, who, while they contribute to the battle, are not able to bear the brunt of the enemy's attack to the same extent on account of their inferior equipment. As Irwin puts it, Tyrtaeus' "agenda is to forge a link between those of a certain elevated economic status and the ideal of martial ἀρετή."[183] We may therefore contrast the *gymnētes* with Oïlean Ajax' Locrians, for example, inasmuch as the *gymnētes* are portrayed as cowardly and presumably less effective than the *panoploi*, whereas the Locrians do not participate in combat at close quarters for the simple reason that they do not have the appropriate equipment. There is also a crucial distinction to be made in terms of their equipment. The *gymnētes* have shields, whereas the Locrians probably do not have them equipped because at least some of them are using bows (*Il.* 13.716-18).

In addition to the kind of equipment they wear, the *gymnētes* appear also to be separated from the *panoploi* by the fact that they use missile weapons.[184] This difference is linked to the variation in armour in the sense that it represents – at least in Tyrtaeus' formulation – the removal of the *gymnētes* from the most dangerous area of battle. Tyrtaeus presumably prescribes the use of missile weapons with the understanding that the *gymnētes* are not in a position to be of more use otherwise. In this way as well, the world of epic is different. For example, like the *gymnētes*, Homeric warriors use stones (*chermadia*) on several occasions (4.517-20; 11.580-3; 12.154-6; 16.772-5; 20.283-8). Included among this number are major aristocratic figures, like Diomedes (5.302-4), Hector (8.321-2), Agamemnon (11.264-6), and Ajax (14.409-13).[185] Similarly, the Homeric poet regularly uses *akontizein* to describe the long-range fighting of upper class figures, such as Odysseus (4.496), Agamemnon (5.533), and Diomedes (8.118). The bottom line is that the army portrayed in Tyrtaeus primarily derives success from maintaining a unified front, whereas the kind of combat described in early epic does not, resulting in a slightly less stratified hierarchy of combatants and styles of combat.[186]

---

[180] Irwin (2005a, 291-6), who addresses and summarizes earlier interpretations.

[181] Possession of a hoplite shield was the minimum requirement for being a hoplite: Hanson (2000, 58-60), van Wees (2000, 132), Osborne (2009, 164-5). I avoid comparing the *gymnētes* to the *psīloi* of classical warfare for the reasons outlined by Irwin (2005a, 291-3).

[182] Cartledge (1977, 22-4), van Wees (2004, 47-60).

[183] Irwin (2005a, 294).

[184] It is unclear to me whether the *panoploi* are to be understood as throwing spears in Tyrtaeus 11 W. However, even thrown spears were clearly treated as a different class of weapon than other missiles, possibly because they doubled as melee and long-range weapons; cf. H. Mackie (1996, 49): "to avoid a spear cast is to evade a close encounter with an enemy." It was not until the Classical Period that spears were used only for thrusting: van Wees (1994b, 145-7).

Although archery does not have a stigma attached to it, it is nonetheless undeniable that hand-to-hand combat is accorded more prominence and attention in the *Iliad* (and the rest of Greek literature besides) than archery and other forms of long-range combat. It is interesting to note in this light that Teucer is an archer and Ajax a melee fighter. In fact, they are the only archer-spearman pair in the *Iliad*, although very little either of them does with the other is unique in and of itself.[187] This close but differentiated pairing is often thought to reflect the fact that Teucer is *nothos* and Telemonian Ajax is *gnēsios*.[188] Certainly, Teucer is not just any long-range fighter. He is the archer *par excellence* in the *Iliad*. He is the sixth-most effective killer, far more noteworthy than any other archer.[189] But, as Kelly shows, none of these kills is particularly important.[190] As noted above, he is called the best of the Greeks at archery (ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν/ τοξοσύνῃ, 13.313-14; cf. 15.489). And he is one of the two archers to whom Apollo gives a bow (15.441).[191] But he loses the archery contest to Meriones because he does not offer a hecatomb to Apollo (23.859-83).[192] And Teucer is quite clearly overshadowed by Ajax, who is the best of the Achaeans after Achilles (2.768, 17.279-80; *Od*. 11.469-70, 24.17-18; cf. *Il*. 13.321-5 and Ibyc. S151.31-4 *PMGF*).[193] This unfavourable comparison perhaps establishes Teucer in a particularly weakened state in light of Ajax's awkward position in the *Iliad*. Criticism involving Ajax has generally reached the conclusion that he comes off rather poorly in comparison with his explicit status as second-best Greek.[194] Finkelberg notes that Ajax and his cohort only receive 2 lines and very little land in the Catalogue of Ships (2.557-8), which is especially stingy when we compare what he offers for Helen in the *Catalogue of Women* (Hes. fr. 204.44-51 M-W).[195] When we add to this the fact that his role in combat in the *Iliad* is essentially defensive,[196] and we note his poor showing in the funeral games for Patroclus (*Il*. 23.733-7, 824f., 841-9), we get the sense that Ajax is being actively diminished.

---

[185] Many of these instances (e.g. 5.302-4; 8.321-2; 20.283-8) are clearly iterations of the same type-scene: Fenik (1968, 33-6). But this hardly detracts from the significance of who it is that hurls the stone in each case.

[186] On battle formations in Homer, see van Wees (1994b, 1-9 and 2004, 153-8); *pace* Latacz (1977).

[187] Fenik (1968, 225-7).

[188] This view is argued most extensively and recently by Ebbott (2003, 37-48).

---

[189] Armstrong (1969, 30).

[190] Kelly (2007, 263-4).

[191] Pandarus is the other: 2.827. There is no similarity between the lines, and so it is difficult to know if we are dealing with formulae. Apollo still favours the Trojan Hector to the Achaean Teucer when Teucer takes a shot at Hector (8.311).

[192] This possibly foreshadows Teucer's victory at Achilles' funeral games (Apollod. *Epitome* 5.5.); so Kullman (1960, 130-1).

[193] Vergados (2009, 154) is particularly explicit on this point: "although Ajax's brother, Teucer, is also a noble character, he certainly is not as great as Ajax."

[194] In addition to the following summary, see van der Valk (1952) and Kirkwood (1965, 60-1), *contra* von der Mühll (1930, 436-8).

[195] Finkelberg (1988); similarly Latacz (2003 *ad Il*. 2.557-8). Several theories have been advanced to explain the difference between the two lists. Rutherford (2005, 115-17 and 2012, 160-1) suggests that the passage from the *Catalogue* is influenced by the growth in Athenian power. And Cingano (2005, 143-52) argues at some length that Ajax is really boasting that he can obtain these places for Helen and not that he has them to give at the time.

[196] Holt (1992, 330-1).

To a certain degree, this diminution of Ajax stands to reason. After all, his end is marked by failure both in the epic tradition and beyond. Because Ajax's loss to Odysseus in the contest over the arms is alluded to at *Od*. 11.543-60 in such a way that the audience's familiarity with the story seems to be understood as given, we generally assume that this contest was a live tradition from early on.[197] While there is no explicit mention of his subsequent suicide, Odysseus' reference to his death (549) seems without point unless we understand that Ajax killed himself out of grief over his loss in the contest. And certainly Ajax's madness and suicide is attested elsewhere in the epic tradition (*Aethiopis* fr. 5, *Il. Parv*. arg., *Il. Pers*. fr. 4.7-8 Bernabé).[198] So it is probably safe to assume that Ajax's loss in the contest, madness, and suicide are understood in the *Iliad* as his eventual fate. With this end in mind, it is not difficult to conceive of Teucer's corresponding fate, which is featured in later sources, in the background to the *Iliad*. Telamon drives Teucer out of his *oikos* after Ajax' death and the sack of Troy, and Teucer settles Cyprus as a new Salamis.[199]

In Sophocles' *Ajax*, Teucer contemplates how Telamon will greet him when he returns home with news of Ajax's death:

---

[197] Kullman (1960, 79-81), Heubeck and Hoekstra (1990 *ad* 11.541-67).

[198] The *argumentum* to the *Aethiopis* ends merely with a quarrel arising between Odysseus and Ajax over the arms of Achilles (καὶ περὶ τῶν Ἀχιλλέως ὅπλων Ὀδυσσεῖ καὶ Αἴαντι στάσις ἐμπίπτει), but Finglass (2011, 27 and n. 67) is convinced that it could not have ended there. Finglass' (28) reading of Αἴας … τήν τε λείαν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν λυμαίνεται ("Ajax spoiled the plunder of the Achaeans", *Il. Parv.* arg. 4) as referring to the destruction of the spoils of the Greeks as opposed to their livestock seems perverse in light of the popularity of the livestock story in later tradition. Ajax's suicide also appears in art from the beginning of the 7th century BCE: Simon (2003, 8-10), Finglass (2011, 28-9).

[199] Pi. *N*. 4.46-7, A. *Pers*. 896-7, Eur. *Hel*. 89-96, Hor. *Carm*. 1.7.21-9, and Vell. 1.1. Teucer goes to Spain in Str. 3.3.3 and Philostr. *VA* 5.5. Teucer's inclusion in the beginning of the *Helen* has long been thought awkward. For an excellent explanation for his presence, see Karsai (1992).

> οὗτος τί κρύψει; ποῖον οὐκ ἐρεῖ κακὸν
> τὸν ἐκ δορὸς γεγῶτα πολεμίου νόθον,
> τὸν δειλίᾳ προδόντα καὶ κακανδρίᾳ
> σέ, φίλτατ᾽ Αἴας, ἢ δόλοισιν, ὡς τὰ σὰ
> κράτη θανόντος καὶ δόμους νέμοιμι σούς.

> "What will this man keep to himself? What sort of ill will he not speak of the bastard born from an enemy's spear, your betrayer, dearest Ajax, out of cowardice and weakness, or with tricks, so that, with you dead, I might have possession of your power and your halls?" (1012-16).

Of course in Sophoclean drama such issues are never simple. Before he kills himself, Ajax charges the chorus to instruct Teucer to convey his son, Eurysaces, who is in every way like Teucer in the circumstances of his birth, home to Telamon to be incorporated into his household (565-70). But, as noted above, it seems generally to be the tradition that Teucer is to be driven out of Telamon's house and to settle Cyprus as a new Salamis, whereas, as Ebbott argues, Eurysaces is to become an Athenian citizen.[200] The contrast between these two fates in fact highlights the unfortunate and awkward position in which Teucer is placed by Ajax's death,[201] and his concern in the Sophoclean passage over how Telamon might react to the news is both believable and serves to heighten tension. What is difficult to account for at first, however, is the specificity of Teucer's concern. That Telamon might rail at Teucer for surviving when the favoured son, Ajax, has not certainly seems plausible. But why would he call him a coward and accuse him of betraying Ajax? The point is probably that Teucer's absence during Ajax' crisis puts him in a poor position. Indeed, in the few fragments we have from a Sophoclean *Teucer*, the plot of which was likely the return of Teucer to Salamis, his rejection by Telamon, and his departure to Cyprus,[202] it is likely that Teucer is in fact put on trial and accused of treachery.[203] The charge of treachery seems to stem from the fact that Teucer is absent when Ajax commits suicide. But exactly what he is supposed to have done is difficult to determine. There is no way of knowing whether the *Ajax* and the *Teucer* were part of the same trilogy.[204] However, whether the passage quoted above foreshadows the trial in the *Teucer* or refers to it independently, Sophocles clearly envisions Teucer's relationship with his father as coloured by the fact that he is *nothos*. In the quoted passage, Teucer does not consider the possibility that he might serve as an heir to Telamon after the loss of Ajax. For him to do so might be hypothetically viable in view of lines 1015-16, but Teucer apparently correctly anticipates that he will be repudiated by Telamon partly on account of his *notheia* (1012-13). And, in fact, Teucer's case may be particularly grim because, as discussed above, his mother, Hesione, is Trojan (1299-1303). In the *Teucer*, Odysseus, who acts as prosecutor, probably argues that Teucer is likely to be a traitor because of his Trojan ancestry on his mother's side (fr. 579 Radt).[205] To sum up, the fact that Ajax dies, Teucer's absence at the time of this death, and Teucer's inconvenient maternal ancestry all conspire to undo the unfortunate archer. It is vital to note, however, that the two former facts would presumably be considerably less incriminating should Teucer have been born a full brother of Ajax and therefore not Trojan, as Teucer's foreboding in the quoted passage implies.

---

[200] Ebbott (2003, 51), citing Plut. *Sol*. 10 and noting his probable connection to the *Choes* festival at Athens.

[201] Easterling (1997, 26).

Much of the dynamic observed in Sophocles is under the surface in Agamemnon's address to Teucer in *Iliad* 8:

---

[202] Frs. 576-9 Radt. On the likely outline of the plot, see Pearson (1917, 214-15) and Heath and Okell (2007, 379-80).

[203] Fr. 579 Radt. Cf. Pacuvius *Teucer* fr. 342/343 Ribbeck = fr. 390 d'Anna = fr. 244 Schierl, probably spoken by Telamon to Teucer: *te repudio nec recipio: naturam abdico: i facesse!* ("I reject you, and I do not receive you. I renounce your birth. Get out of here!").

[204] Heath and Okell (2007, 379-80, with further bibliography in n. 48) are convinced that they are. Finglass (2011, 35-6) is (probably rightly) skeptical.

[205] Teucer's counterargument that his father is Greek is apparently not sufficiently effective, given the final verdict.

> ‘Τεῦκρε, φίλη κεφαλή, Τελαμώνιε, κοίρανε λαῶν,
> βάλλ᾽ οὕτως, αἴ κέν τι φόως Δαναοῖσι γένηαι
> πατρί τε σῷ Τελαμῶνι, ὅ σ᾽ ἔτρεφε τυτθὸν ἐόντα
> καί σε νόθον περ ἐόντα κομίσσατο ᾧ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ·
> τὸν καὶ τηλόθ᾽ ἐόντα ἐϋκλείης ἐπίβησον.
> σοὶ δ᾽ ἐγὼ ἐξερέω, ὡς καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται·
> αἴ κέν μοι δώῃ Ζεύς τ᾽ αἰγίοχος καὶ Ἀθήνη
> Ἰλίου ἐξαλαπάξαι ἐϋκτίμενον πτολίεθρον,
> πρώτῳ τοι μετ᾽ ἐμὲ πρεσβήϊον ἐν χερὶ θήσω,
> ἢ τρίποδ᾽ ἠὲ δύω ἵππους αὐτοῖσιν ὄχεσφιν
> ἠὲ γυναῖχ᾽, ἥ κέν τοι ὁμὸν λέχος εἰσαναβαίνοι.’
>
> “Dearest Teucer, son of Telamon, leader of men, shoot like that, in the hope that you might in some way become a light for the Danaans and to your father, Telamon, who reared you when you were little and took care of you in his house, even though you are a bastard. Set his foot upon good reputation, even though he is far away. And I’ll tell you, as it is indeed possible to accomplish: if aegis-bearing Zeus and Athena should grant to me to sack the well-built citadel of Ilium, in your hand first after mine will I place a gift of honour, either a tripod or two horses, chariot and all, or a woman who will go up to bed with you” (8.281-91).

Buchholz cites this passage as prime evidence that the rearing of *nothoi* in prominent positions in the Homeric household is exceptional and accordingly deserving of comment.[206] Interestingly, Zenodotus deleted line 284, and Aristarchus and Aristophanes athetized it (Σχ T *ad loc*. Erbse), moves which would change the entire tone of the passage. And Wilamowitz agrees with the line’s removal on the grounds that Teucer is not *nothos* in the *Iliad*.[207] But the Hellenistic commentators appear to have objected to line 284 not because they did not think Teucer *nothos*, but because the tone Agamemnon takes toward bastardy in this passage was not felt to be believable. They believe that people in olden times did not think of *notheia* as a source of reproach (ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ὄνειδος ἦν ἡ νοθεία παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς, Σχ bT *ad loc*. Erbse, who then defends the line).[208] They were probably correct in this regard. As Ogden notes, “in the construction of heroic ancestries bastardy played a useful role: it was both an easy device for deriving descent ultimately from a god, and also a convenient device for linking newly invented lines of descent onto heroes that already had established families.”[209] In addition, as we have observed, *nothoi* in Homer are almost universally treated with a fair degree of respect. They are generally inferior in status to their legitimate brothers, but they are not contemned for their illegitimacy.[210] The quoted passage is therefore the outlier from this point of view, and it requires explanation.

---

[206] Buchholz (1881, 2.2.34-5); so Diller (1937, 79 n. 46) and Ogden (1996, 24).

[207] Wilamowitz (1920, 49 n. 1); so Edgeworth (1985, 27 n. 4). See above for a defense of reading Teucer as *nothos* in the *Iliad*.

Martin analyzes Agamemnon’s speech to Teucer and comes to less than complimentary conclusions about the effectiveness of the son of Atreus’ persuasiveness. And he finds this to be typical of his oratorical deficiency throughout the poem.[211] Agamemnon attempts to encourage Teucer not through the usual promise of *kleos* and material reward, but material reward alone.[212] And Kelly finds that this is the only Homeric example of an incentive offered to someone already performing the desired task.[213] Teucer himself addresses this problem when he responds,

---

[208] I cannot agree with the deletion of the line. In 283, ἔτρεφε τυτθὸν ἐόντα is, as Kelly (2007, 57) correctly argues, “reserved for those with an irregularity in that process,” (see also 277-8; cf. *Il.* 6.222, 8.283, 11.223, 13.466, 22.480, 23.85; *Od*. 1.435, 11.67, 15.381, 20.210, and 23.325); similarly Ebbott (2003, 39). Some explanation is therefore required as to why Agamemnon perceives Telamon’s rearing of Teucer to have been irregular. So, removing line 284 simply defers the problem. Apthorp (1980, 25) discards the notion of deletion on MS grounds.

[209] Ogden (1996, 22); so L. Patterson (2010, 5-12).

[210] C. Mackie (2008, 115) finds in Agamemnon’s mention of Teucer’s *notheia* an “oblique allusion to the story of the first sack of Troy.” This may be so, but it still does not explain the implication that one would not ordinarily have expected Telamon to rear Teucer (νόθον περ ἐόντα).

[211] Martin (1989, 116); similarly Kelly (2007, 57) and C. Mackie (2009, 9); *pace* Alden (2000, 157).

[212] Martin (1989, 116); ὥς/τὸ καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται always occurs in the context of an explicit promise or threat (209-10); cf. Kelly (2007, 279): “a speaker who makes this type of prediction is confident in the eventuality itself, and the statement’s persuasive power.”

[213] Kelly (2007, 281), with sixteen Homeric examples of someone being encouraged to perform a new task. Cf. Knudsen (2014, 55): “the exhortation to Teucer… is notable because the situation hardly seems to call for a persuasive speech.” That Agamemnon feels the need to encourage Teucer might also be considered odd in light of the fact that Teucer kills more Trojans than Agamemnon in the poem (Armstrong (1969, 30)), and Agamemnon claims the first reward for himself (μετ᾽ ἐμέ).

Ἀτρεΐδη κύδιστε, τί με σπεύδοντα καὶ αὐτὸν / ὀτρύνεις; (“most glorious son of Atreus, why do you encourage me when I am hastening as it is?”, *Il.* 8.293-4). And it is effectively to Telamon and not to Teucer that Agamemnon offers the *kleos* for Teucer’s own deeds. Agamemnon’s speech is couched in terms of *threptra.* But, unlike in the other cases where this inducement is used, Agamemnon implies that Teucer especially owes Telamon *threptra* because he reared him despite (περ) the fact that he is *nothos*. Martin understandably finds it difficult to tell what Agamemnon’s purpose is in making this argument as he does. Surely it would be more effective to encourage Teucer to think of his father and to offer suitable reward for conspicuous performance. The insult is counterproductive.[214] We find, therefore, that this passage is peculiar in a number of respects. It is the only example of a hero being told to do something he is already doing, and for material reward alone at that. It also contains the only instance in Homeric poetry in which a hero’s *notheia* is the source of insult or portrayed in a negative light. Bastardy might be unfortunate for the *nothos* as compared to legitimacy, but it is not a cause for shame, as we have already established. Agamemnon’s rhetorical incompetence can certainly be stunning. But his speech is hardly the only passage to set Teucer apart in an awkward manner. Some further explanation will be required.

Agamemnon’s attempt to encourage Teucer by recalling his father is, as we have established, a fairly standard tactic. The surprising barb that comes with this usual motivational ploy is, however, potentially significant in light of the passage which immediately precedes Agamemnon’s speech:

---

[214] Martin (1989, 116), who characterizes this insult as a disconcerting use of the *neikos* device, on which see 71-6. Cf. Knudsen (2014, 55): “Agamemnon strikes a discordant note by reminding Teucer that he is a bastard… thus undermining his attempt to put Teucer in a favourable frame of mind.”

> Τεῦκρος δ᾽ εἴνατος ἦλθε, παλίντονα τόξα τιταίνων,
> στῆ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ὑπ᾽ Αἴαντος σάκεϊ Τελαμωνιάδαο.
> ἔνθ᾽ Αἴας μὲν ὑπεξέφερεν σάκος· αὐτὰρ ὅ γ᾽ ἥρως
> παπτήνας, ἐπεὶ ἄρ τιν᾽ ὀϊστεύσας ἐν ὁμίλῳ
> βέβλήκοι, ὁ μὲν αὖθι πεσὼν ἀπὸ θυμὸν ὄλεσσεν,
> αὐτὰρ ὁ αὖτις ἰὼν πάϊς ὣς ὑπὸ μητέρα δύσκεν
> εἴς Αἴανθ᾽· ὁ δέ μιν σάκεϊ κρύπτασκε φαεινῷ.

> "Teucer came ninth, bending his back-stretching bow, and he stood under the protection of the shield of Ajax, son of Telamon. Then Ajax would lift his shield away, and the warrior, looking about, when he had taken a shot and struck someone in the crowd, he, having fallen on the spot, would lose his life. And he [Teucer], like a child entering his mother's protection, took shelter with Ajax. And he [Ajax] hid him with his shining shield" (*Il.* 8.266-72).

We note immediately that Ajax is awarded a proper patronymic, Τελαμωνιάδης, whereas Teucer receives Τελαμώνιος (281).[215] And there are several other elements of this passage which signal Teucer's inferiority. He comes ninth (εἴνατος), a number which Kelly and others have shown to denote incompleteness and insufficiency in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.[216] In this case, Teucer will not be able to turn back the Trojans and will be injured (320-34). The comparison of Teucer ducking behind Ajax' shield to a child seeking refuge with his mother combines two common evocations of the child-and-parent simile. First, this type of simile is frequently used to convey a sense of gentleness and protectiveness on the part of the parent figure for the child figure (e.g. of various Greeks for Patroclus: 16.5-9, 17.1-5, 132-9).[217] Second, the comparison of a warrior to a child is a common method the poet uses to communicate the unworthiness of the warrior (e.g. 2.289, 11.389).[218] In the quoted passage, this type of simile communicates simultaneously Ajax' love and protectiveness for Teucer and also that Teucer apparently requires his protection.[219] Like Agamemnon, then, the narrator diminishes Teucer in a manner atypical of the poem's general treatment of *nothoi*.

---

[215] See Higbie (1995, 7) for the significance of this difference.

[216] Kelly (2007, 57 and 261-3, with bibliography on 261 n. 1).

[217] Moulton (1977, 101 and 141-5) provides further examples.

[218] Further examples are collected by Kelly (2007, 265-7). On the attitude toward children more generally in the *Iliad*, see Ingalls (1998).

I would argue that 8.266-91 can be better understood if we hypothesize that the Iliadic tradition is aware of the eventual falling out between Telamon and Teucer attested later in antiquity. We have already established that the early epics seem to be aware of the madness and suicide of Ajax. Given the close relationship between Ajax and Teucer in the *Iliad*, Telamon's anger at Teucer is not difficult to imagine after Ajax' ignominious death, especially in light of Teucer's admittedly obfuscated Trojan heritage. All else being equal, a *gnēsios* is preferable to a *nothos*, and suspicion can easily arise in such circumstances, as in fact it does in later traditions. By itself, the presence of a *nothos* in a patriarch's *oikos* is not treated as problematic in the *Iliad*, at least as far as the patriarch himself is concerned. But when the story is known to end with the death of the *gnēsios* and the estrangement of the *nothos* from his paternal *oikos*, Agamemnon's aggressive, rhetorical treatment of Telamon's rearing of Teucer may be seen as allusive rather than inexplicable.

In fact, Teucer's Trojan heritage, his imminently antagonistic relationship with his father, his identity as an archer, and his intimate association with Ajax are all closely linked. It is often remarked that the only Greek archers named in the *Iliad* are Teucer and Meriones.[220] We might also include Philoctetes (2.718) and Heracles (5.392-3). But Philoctetes' Heraclean bow is an important motif in the Trojan War.[221] And Heracles' use of a club instead of a bow does not seem to have been envisaged by the time of the *Iliad* (Pisand. T1 Bernabé).[222] Both of these characters are firmly established as archers, and this fact could presumably not easily have been ignored. On the other hand, Meriones cannot properly be called an archer at all. He kills five men with a spear (5.59-68, 13.527-33, 567-75, 16.342-3, 603-5), and there is a lengthy passage describing his search for a replacement (13.159-305). He is even given the epithet δουρικλυτὸς, "famed for his spear" (16.619). On the other hand, his link to archery is tenuous. In Book 10, he gives Odysseus a bow, a sword, and the famous boar-tusk helm (10.260-2).[223] As McLeod demonstrates, the bow is a particularly effective weapon at night, and so it was often used on guard duty.[224] It does not seem especially noteworthy, therefore, that Meriones is equipped with one here – although it is true that Thrasymedes does not provide Diomedes with a bow in the same scene (10.255-9). We note as well that Meriones competes against Teucer in the archery contest at the Funeral Games (23.859-83). Again, I do not find this to be terribly significant, since he also at least nominally competes in the spear-toss against Agamemnon (884-97) as well as in the chariot-race (351, 528-31, 614-15). If anything, Meriones is something of a hybrid, and it is in this light that we should take the one instance where he uses a bow in combat, shooting Harpalion dead (13.650-5). This latter passage is also problematic. As we have observed, earlier in the same book a fairly lengthy passage is devoted to Meriones' quest for a spear, which he finds (159-305). And his slaying of Harpalion is the next time he is mentioned. It is safe to say, then, that Meriones may occasionally use a bow, but he is not an archer.[225]

---

[219] Teucer also retreats to Ajax' side when his bow-string breaks (15.482-3). Ebbott (2003, 39-40) suggests more specifically that the *nothos* is often associated particularly with his mother, and that this simile should accordingly be taken as evoking Teucer's illegitimacy. While this reading is not at odds with my own, I find that the frequency at which this type of simile is used of *gnēsioi* precludes such an interpretation. There is a fragment of a 6th-century Corinthian plaque (Berlin F 764), on which Teucer can be identified crouching behind a shield with his bow drawn; cf. Johansen (1967, 57-61) and Snodgrass (1998, 122-3).

[220] Thomas (1962, 300), Edgeworth (1985, 30), H. Mackie (1996, 52-3), and C. Mackie (2008, 94-134). All of these scholars find Teucer and Meriones to be inconvenient exceptions to their general rule that the Trojans are archers and the Greeks are not. Hopefully my analysis will resolve this problem. Hall (1989, 44-5) finds no ethnic correlation in this respect.

---

[221] So C. Mackie (2009, 4-11), who demonstrates that Philoctetes' later arrival at Troy with Heracles' bow would have been familiar to the audiences of the *Iliad*.

[222] Partly based on visual evidence, Huxley (1969, 102) dates the advent of Heracles' club to late in the 7th century.

[223] Odysseus is prominent as a bowman in the *Odyssey*, but not in the *Iliad.* He fights throughout the poem with a spear, and he does not take part in the archery contest (*Il*. 23.859). On archery in the *Odyssey*, see Crissy (1997) and Andersen (2012).

[224] MacLeod (1988), *pace* Farron (1979-80, 60). Dué and Ebbott (2010, 57-8) discuss the association of the bow with night in Homeric poetry, suggesting that "it may even underlie the compressed simile of Apollo coming 'like night'" (*Il*. 1.47).

Teucer, on the other hand, is very closely tied to his bow. When Zeus breaks his bow-string, he does arm himself with a spear, helm, and shield (15.461-83). But we never hear of him killing anyone after this. And, in fact, as di Benedetto notes, this scene marks the end of Teucer’s contribution to combat in this poem.[226] He is effectively neutralized by the loss of the use of his bow. Teucer, it appears, is the only proper archer to fight for the Greeks in the *Iliad*. In this light, it hardly seems coincidental that he is half-Trojan.[227] We have already discussed how the *Iliad* does not advertise Teucer's Trojan ancestry. But his depiction as archer *par excellence* seems to link him to this past.[228] If Teucer’s weapon is in fact a key to his place in the tradition, it is interesting to recall by way of comparison that Ajax’ shield is similarly a fundamental component of his character.[229] He is especially conspicuous in battle when he is protecting others and during retreats.[230] Teucer, on the other hand, is, as we have established, characterized as an effective killer. We can to some extent, therefore, view the bow and shield as metonyms for

---

[225] So C. Mackie (2008, 118-21). One might say the same of Helenus on the Trojan side, since he only uses a bow once at 13.582-7; so Farron (2003, 183).

[226] Di Benedetto (1994, 202-3), who also describes Teucer’s ‘arming scene’ (15.478-83) as rather brief, a brevity which scholars have long found to be marked: Tsagarakis (1982, 95-6, with bibliography at 95 n. 3). Between this scene and the contest of the bow, the only mention of Teucer is a reminder of the wound he dealt to Glaucus (16.510-12, referring to 12.387-91).

[227] In this light, it is no wonder that Apollo has sided with the Trojans. Cf. C. Mackie (2008, 91): "Troy in the *Iliad* has a very significant connection with archer, one that helps to inform the identity of the city and its people as quite distinct from the Greeks.”

[228] Cf. Lorimer (1950, 183) and Kirk (1990 *ad Il.* 8.267-72) on Teucer’s tactics as ‘Oriental’.

[229] Ajax is above all identified by his great size (e.g. *Il.* 3.225-9; von der Mühll (1930, 435-42)), a characteristic to which the shield is connected in formulae used only of Ajax: Whallon (1966, 7-8), especially emphasizing Αἴας δ’ ἐγγύθεν ἦλθε φέρων σάκος ἠΰτε πύργον (“and Ajax came near, holding a shield like a tower”, *Il.* 7.219 = 11.485 = 17.128).

[230] So Holt (1992, 330-1).

Teucer and Ajax respectively. And *Iliad* 8.266-72 (quoted above) links them closely in the roles of archer and protector. The half-brothers work in a kind of symbiotic relationship. In this light, Teucer's archery does not signify his *notheia per se.* It does, however, function as an expression of his mother's ancestry in his particular case. In other words, there is no apparent link between archery and *notheia* in the Iliad, but Teucer's Trojan ancestry links him to archery in a manner that is relevant to his *notheia*. His effective application of this facet of his maternal inheritance to the service of the Greek side of the war and in concert with his superlatively Greek half-brother signifies his allegiance to his patriline. And Agamemnon's vaguely pejorative reference to Teucer's *notheia* is particularly egregious in its apparent unawareness of how completely he has sacrificed the undesirable half of his bloodline. Agamemnon's reference to Telamon evokes the fact that Teucer's father in turn will fail to apprehend where his loyalties lie. Teucer functionally integrates himself into his paternal *oikos*. But the very manner in which he most symbolically proves this integration, namely by using the weapon of his maternal people against them, similarly highlights the cause for his father's suspicion in the end.

## 1.3: HERACLES

An interesting divine instance of amphimetric strife is the dysfunctional relationship between Hera and Heracles. The stability of the *cosmos* requires that the *hieros gamos* not produce male offspring capable of inheriting Olympus, with Hera, the goddess of marriage, consequently never able to give birth to such a child, the very thing which would ordinarily be the ultimate source of *tīmē* for a Greek woman or goddess. Zeus' attempts to promote his children from outside of their marriage, then, are a constant source of animosity. And this is fairly well-established, at least in the better-attested traditions available to us, as the primary motivating factor behind Hera's unrelenting opposition to Heracles during his mortal life. As we might expect based on the other examples of stepmother-bastard relationships we have, those between Hera and Zeus' many extramarital children are especially discordant because Hera herself never has any worthy, legitimate, male offspring. What remains to be explained properly, I think, is why she comes to love Heracles in many traditions after his apotheosis. The usual explanation, that Heracles is welcomed onto Olympus as a reward for the successful completion of his labouring for Eurystheus, relies on very late testimony. And in any case it is unclear why Hera should come to love Heracles as a result of this achievement. The more likely cause of Hera's change of heart, I will argue, is Heracles' well-attested but under-examined, posthumous marriage to Hebe, the daughter of Zeus and Hera. By marrying his half-sister, Heracles ceases to be merely an unwelcome result of one of Zeus' many infidelities. He becomes Hera's son-in-law and ally.

Heracles is in some respects a challenging subject because, in the words of Karl Galinsky, "the variegated nature of Herakles' traditional qualities prevented him from being frozen in a schematized role."[231] It is unsurprising, therefore, that, according to Aristotle (*Po*. 1451a16 = *Theseis* T1 Bernabé), the epic accounts of Heracles were episodic and weak in terms of narrative trajectory.[232] In many respects, Heracles is more a set of mythemes and superlative characteristics than a figure with a coherent and articulated biography. However, as scholars such as Dumézil and Loraux have shown by example, it can be profitable to view his myths as structured by recurring themes. Using heavily diachronic approaches which encompass a wide range of materials, they have found that, while the figure of Heracles is appropriated in a variety of ways throughout Greco-Roman antiquity and beyond, some of his characteristics remain consistent in nature and emphasis.[233] Following their lead to a certain extent, I assume that, while the figure of Heracles did undergo some fairly important changes during the Archaic period, it nonetheless remained consistent enough to justify some analysis. Interestingly, Heracles' bastardy is not infrequently asserted or denied without argument, and so I think the question merits some inquiry.[234] Having concluded that he is a bastard from a certain point of view, I will then proceed to look at how this helps us to read his brief appearances in early epic in general, and his marriage to Hebe in particular, with more nuance.

As we expect based on how the word behaves, Heracles is never referred to as *nothos* in Archaic literature. He is, after all, the son of a god and a mortal. We have to look as late as 414

---

[231] Galinsky (1972, 4). Two major exceptions are Galinsky (1972) and Loraux (1997, 116-39). Stafford (2012), while valuable, is more of a general overview. See Gantz (1993, 374-466) and Fowler (2013, 260-333) for thorough reviews of the early evidence for Heracles.

[232] So Haubold (2005, 86) interprets the passage. But contrast Barker and Christensen (2014), who argue that both the diegetic narrator and characters in the *Iliad* use a single, consistent Heraclean *fabula*.

[233] Dumézil (1979, 60-3) examines the large number of Heracles' marriages. Loraux (1997, 116-39) focuses on the frequent juxtaposition of super-masculine and feminine qualities. Another example is Csapo (2005, 301-15), who considers Archaic and Classical presentations of Heracles in terms of their various ideologies.

[234] Using Euripides' *Heracles*, Ebbott (2003, 49) provides some fairly meagre argumentation in favour of viewing Heracles as a bastard. Ormand (2014, 117) is adamant that he is not a bastard, while Laurens (1987, 71) contends that he is somewhere between bastardy and legitimacy.

BCE with Aristophanes' *Birds* to find such a reference. Let us begin there. In the pertinent scene, the protagonist, Peisetairos, convinces Heracles that, *pace* Poseidon, he stands to inherit nothing from Zeus in the humorous, hypothetical situation in which Zeus should die and his property be divided:

> **Πε**. διαβάλλεταί σ᾽ ὁ θεῖος, ὦ πόνηρε σύ.
> τῶν γὰρ πατρῴων οὐδ᾽ ἀκαρῆ μέτεστί σοι
> κατὰ τοὺς νόμους· νόθος γὰρ εἶ κοὐ γνήσιος.
> **Ηρ**. ἐγώ νόθος; τί λέγεις;
> **Πε**. σὺ μέντοι νὴ Δία
> ὤν γ᾽ ἐκ ξένης γυναικός. ἢ πῶς ἄν ποτε
> ἐπίκληρον εἶναι τὴν Ἀθηναίαν δοκεῖς,
> οὖσαν θυγατέρ᾽, ὄντων ἀδελφῶν γνησίων;

> *Peisetairos:* "The divine one [Poseidon] is misleading you, you poor man. There's no way you have a share in your father's estate according to the laws; for you are a bastard and not legitimate."
> *Heracles:* "I'm a bastard? What do you mean?"
> *Peisetairos:* "By Zeus, you certainly are, since you're born from a foreign woman. Or how do you think Athena could ever be an heiress, she being a daughter, if you have legitimate brothers?" (Ar. *Av*. 1648-1654).

Peisetairos later refers to the law of Solon (τὸν Σόλωνος… νόμον, 1660), and Pericles' citizenship legislation of 451/0, in which a child was probably defined as *nothos* if he was born to a citizen and a non-citizen, is also pertinent.[235] Dunbar is correct to point out that Aristophanes is probably referring to Solon's law on intestate succession, according to which it is unlikely that *nothoi* were granted the rights of kinship and therefore allowed to inherit. And the definition of Heracles as a bastard because his mother is a foreigner also makes sense in light of the Periclean legislation.[236] The joke is that Alcmene, Heracles' mother, is considered a foreigner to Olympus because she is a mortal. Therefore, by analogy with the relatively recent Periclean legislation, Heracles must be *nothos*.[237]

---

[235] Cf. Solon fr. 50a-b Ruschenbusch. See C. Patterson (1981, 17-19) on this legislation; followed by Kamen (2013, 62-3).

[236] Dunbar (1995 *ad* 1660); so Ogden (1996, 35-6). On the continuous threat to both categories of *nothoi* during the fifth century and beyond in Athens, see Ogden (1996, 44 and 62-3).

The precise significance of the description of Athena as *epiklēros* is unclear. Rogers has suggested to some approval that it is an otherwise unattested cult title.[238] Dunbar also puts forward the possibility that she is being referred to here as the patron goddess of heiresses.[239] In either case, Athena's position as heiress to Zeus' estate is both humorous in the present context and appropriate with respect to the children of Zeus in general and Heracles in particular. The continuing security of Zeus' patriarchy is predicated upon the absence of any heir or other threat to his throne.[240] In the *Theogony*, for example, Zeus secures himself from succession by monopolizing access to Metis ('Cunning'), thereby obtaining control over Athena specifically (Hes. *Th*. 886-900).[241] In fact, as his closest ally and sharer of the aegis and his *mētis*, Athena comes to represent the closest thing that Zeus has to an heir.[242] And her femininity is probably decisive in keeping her from posing a threat. From this point of view, Athena as *epiklēros* can be taken to denote in a humorously quasi-legal way her non-threatening 'heirdom' to Zeus' estate.[243] In this light, Heracles can be seen as a kind of *nothos*, as Peisetairos says. Zeus necessarily denies even his divinely born sons their true heirdom. Figures like Heracles can only emerge even further distant from legitimacy. While it is only natural that Aristophanes should provoke laughter by framing Heracles' lineage in contemporary legal terms, the point that Peisetairos makes nonetheless has broader traction.

---

[237] Ogden (1996, 35-6) on the passage as extra-metrical, meaning that it may reflect an actual legal text.

[238] Rogers (1906 *ad loc*.).

[239] Dunbar (1995 *ad* 1653f.). See Demand (1994.3-4) for general information on the *epiklēros* in classical Greece.

[240] See, for example, Redfield (1993, 36-7) and Bonnard (2004, 34-5). Σ *ad* Ar. *Av*. 1653b Holwerda objects that Ares and Hephaestus are *gnēsioi*. This would depend upon the tradition, and, in any case, Aristophanes is a comedian, not a mythographer.

[241] See also Felson (2011) on how the Homeric Hymns to Apollo (*h. Ap.*) and Athena (*h. Hom.* 28) portray the two gods as allies of Zeus who might have been his rivals.

[242] Wöhrle (1999, 99-106) and Yasumura (2011, 90-6) address in more detail the portrayal of Athena as a kind of non-threatening heir or even quasi-son to Zeus.

[243] See also Stocking (forthcoming), who connects Athena as *epiklēros* in this passage to the Apatouria and patriarchal legitimacy.

Of course the jocular element of this passage must necessarily leave some doubt as to what extent it can be taken to reflect actual views. But Heracles was also quite closely associated with *notheia* at a Heracleion and gymnasium in Cynosarges, an Attic district lying on the bank of the Ilissos in what was a suburb southeast of Athens in antiquity.[244] This complex probably dates back to 490 at least,[245] and it may always have had a stigma attached to it.[246] Plutarch even describes Themistocles' characteristically clever attempt to palliate his activity at this institution by convincing his highborn friends to exercise there with him (Plut. *Them*. 1.2). But it was possibly not until the Periclean reform of 451/0 that *nothoi* as a group became associated with it.[247] As has already been noted, Pericles' law disenfranchised even upper-class children, unless both of their parents were citizens. It was probably in reaction to their disenfranchisement that this new set of upper-class *nothoi* gathered at Cynosarges, associating themselves with the site at least partly because Heracles can be seen as *nothos*. C. Patterson plausibly suggests that, "as a well-known Athenian *not* born from two Athenian parents, Themistocles may have become associated with the cult… in later tradition."[248]

*Notheia* also appears to be linked to Cynosarges in a fragment of Polemon:

---

[244] See Billot (1992) and Eliopoulos (2010) for discussions of the locations of these buildings in Cynosarges. But little can be concluded with any certainty.

[245] Humphreys (1974, 92) on Hdt. 6.116.

[246] So Bremmer (1977, 372-3), especially based on the existence of the phrase *es Kynosarges* ('go to Hell'); see Bremmer (1977, 372 n. 17) for references.

[247] And Themistocles was, in any case, probably not a bastard: Humphreys (1974, 88), C. Patterson (1990, 63), *contra* Lotze (1981, 171) and Ogden (1996, 55-7).

[248] C. Patterson (1990, 64).

> Ἐν Κυνόσαργει μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ Ἡράκλείῳ στήλη τίς ἐστιν, ἐν ᾗ ψήφισμα μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου, γραμματεὺς δὲ Στέφανος Θουκυδίδου· λέγεται δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ περὶ τῆς προσηγορίας οὕτως· ‘τὰ δὲ ἐπιμήνια θυέτω ὁ ἱερεὺς μετὰ τῶν παρασίτων. οἱ παράσιτοι ἔστων ἐκ τῶν νόθων καὶ τῶν τούτων παίδων κατὰ τὰ πάτρια.’

> “So, in the Heracleion in Cynosarges there is a certain stele, on which there is a decree of Alcibiades, and the secretary was Stephanos, son of Thucydides. And in it is said as follows concerning the address [i.e. *parasitos*]: ‘Let the priest sacrifice the monthly offerings with the *parasitoi*. Let the *parasitoi* be selected from among the bastards and their children according to ancestral customs’” (Polem.Hist. fr. 78 Preller ap. Athen. 6.234e = fr. 174 Tresp).

Athenaeus quotes this passage in order to show that the term *parasitos* could be a perfectly respectable one in former times (πάλαι, 6.234c), and most discussion of this passage has accordingly centred around this claim.[249] However, the passage also contains our best and probably earliest evidence regarding *nothoi* and the Heracleion in Cynosarges, namely a decree in which a special ritual association with Heracles is reserved – and even required – for *nothoi* and their descendants.[250] Ogden may be correct to suggest that the inclusion of the sons of *nothoi*, “who could not of course have been *nothoi* themselves in the eyes of the Athenian state,” indicates that the disenfranchised aristocratic *nothoi* had formed a kind of alternative community, which had, by the time of this decree, reached a stage where its replication was seen as a possibility.[251] Both the dating of this decree and the period of time in which this group of *nothoi* rallied at Cynosarges are matters of some dispute. The broadest range of dates for the decree must be 440 to 415, and Humphreys argues that the *nothoi* only used Cynosarges during these years.[252] However, scholars more recently have generally agreed that the decree only represents one stage in Cynosarges' association with *notheia*, that it may in fact go back to 490 or even to Solon's archonship in 594/3.[253] The *terminus ante quem* is found late in the 350s, when Demosthenes claims that Charidemos is enrolled (συντελεῖ) among the *nothoi* in Oreos, "just like the *nothoi* used to be enrolled at Cynosarges here" (καθάπερ ποτ᾽ ἐνθάδ᾽ εἰς Κυνόσαργες οἱ νόθοι, Dem. 23.213-14). Billot plausibly argues that the phrase συντελεῖν εἰς followed by a particular community refers to an obligatory enrolment in that community.[254] The power to conscript would seem to suggest a fairly developed and well-established institution. Presided over by the figure of Heracles, it faded away between the end of the 5th century and halfway through the 4th. Unfortunately, little further is currently known about the particulars of this cultic association. However, we may say in general that the fact that Heracles could fairly clearly be considered a *nothos* in the 5th century probably can be taken to indicate that the concept of his illegitimacy was already there to be appropriated.

---

[249] On the *parasitos*, see Naiden (2012, especially 75-81).

[250] Cf. Phot. s.v. Κυνόσαργες [κ 1214 Theodoridis]· ἐπειδὴ οὖν καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς δοκεῖ νόθος εἶναι, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκεῖ οἱ νόθοι ἐτελοῦντο· οἱ μήτε πρὸς πατρὸς μήτε πρὸς μητρὸς πολῖται (“and yet Heracles seems to be a bastard too because the bastards used to be initiated there: citizens neither from their father or their mother”). And see the comparanda in Theodoridis. Also cf. *IG* $1^3$.134 re: Alcibiades and the Cynosarges. Antisthenes was another, later *nothos* associated with the gymnasium in Cynosarges (DL 6.1.6); cf. Billot (1993, especially 115-16).

[251] Ogden (1996, 201). See also R. Parker (2005, 9-49) on the importance of the *oikos* in Athenian sacrifice, and Stocking (forthcoming) on the association between sacrifice and the patriline.

Some further lexical evidence may be found in two Archaic words that could apply to the extramarital child of a god and a mortal. The first is *skotios*, which literally means "shadowy." It is generally thought to refer to bastardy, but it is used rather obscurely:[255]

> βῆ δὲ μετ᾽ Αἴσηπον καὶ Πήδασον οὓς ποτε νύμφη
> νηῒς Ἀβαρβαρέη τέκ᾽ ἀμύμονι Βουκολίωνι.
> Βουκολίων δ᾽ ἦν υἱὸς ἀγαυοῦ Λαομέδοντος
> πρεσβύτατος γενεῇ, σκότιον δέ ἑ γείνατο μήτηρ·
> ποιμαίνων δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ὄεσσι μίγη φιλότητι καὶ εὐνῇ,

---

[252] Humphreys (1974, 88-9), supported by Billot (1993, 79-80).

[253] C. Patterson (1990, 63-4), Ogden (1996, 200-1), and Jameson (2005, 19.)

[254] Billot (1993, 81).

[255] C. Patterson (1990, 50) and Ogden (1996, 25-6). See Ebbott (2003, 20-9) for the term diachronically. Cf. *LfgrE* s.v., which has the opposite of *skotios* as *amphadios* ('public'); cf. *Od.* 6.288. See also Eur. *Tr.* 44, 252, *Alc.* 989, and especially Hsch. s.v. σκότιος [σ 1125 Hansen] and Poll. 3.21, which seem to be derived from Ar. Byz. fr. 233 Slater.

> ἡ δ᾽ ὑποκυσαμένη διδυμάονε γείνατο παῖδε.
>
> “And he went after Aesepus and Pedasus, to whom the river-nymph Abarbarea once gave birth by blameless Boucolion. And Boucolion, eldest by birth, was the son of noble Laomedon, but his mother bore him shadowy. While shepherding, he [i.e. Boucolion] lay with her in love and bedding, and she [Abarbarea], made pregnant, bore twin sons” (6.21-6).[256]

This passage is somewhat difficult to unravel at first because it is not always immediately clear what the subjects of the various verbs are. But it must be the case that Laomedon is the father of Boucolion with an unnamed female, and therefore that Boucolion is the *skotios*.[257] A scholion to Euripides’ *Alcestis* is useful here, which discusses the possible shades of meaning of this usage. Citing the following definition, Ogden suggests that *skotios* could refer to Boucolion being of some sort of mixed ancestry: σκότιοι· οἱ μὴ γνήσιοι ὄντες τῶν θεῶν παῖδες ἀποθνῄσκουσιν, οἱ μὴ ὄντες ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων θεῶν (“illegitimate children of the gods die, since they are not from gods on both sides,” Σ AB *ad* Eur. *Alc*. 989 Schwartz).[258] I think the point here is that these illegitimate children are ‘shadowy’ because they are mortal and must spend their afterlife in Hades.[259] On the other hand, the scholiast then refers explicitly to the present Iliadic passage when discussing a different usage. He suggests that Boucolion is ‘shadowy’ because he is one of those “born from a marriage unlit by torches” (ἐξ ἀδᾳδουχήτων γάμων γενόμενοι, *ibid.*).[260] So, according to the scholiast, the present use of *skotios* is roughly synonymous with *nothos*.

---

[256] On folktale motif in this passage, see Stinton (1965, 48-50).

[257] Apollodorus lists Boucolion as the son of Laomedon and the nymph Calybes (3.12.3). Boucolion may be an *ad hoc* invention; cf. Nünlist (2009, 243-4) on scholia regarding speaking names, particularly when characters’ fathers are obscure.

[258] Ogden (1996, 25-6).

[259] So L. Parker (2007 *ad* Eur. *Alc*. 988-90).

[260] Eust. 622.43 has very similar wording. Cf. Eur. *Ion* 1473-6: Ion - ὤμοι· νόθον με παρθένευμ᾽ ἔτικτε σόν; / Creusa - οὐχ ὑπὸ λαμπάδων οὐδὲ χορευμάτων / ὑμέναιος ἐμός, / τέκνον, ἔτικτε σὸν κάρα (“alas, did you give birth to me as a bastard child of a maiden?” – “Child, not accompanied by torches or choral dances did my bridal song beget you.” Cf. also 860-1 and *Tro*. 44. On wedding torches in classical Greek poetry, see Ebbott (2003, 23-5), with bibliography.

However, it is interesting to note that Boucolion does not appear in the list of Laomedon's sons later in the poem (*Il.* 20.237-8). This absence may imply that C. Patterson is correct to assert that *skotios* "is suggestive of the circumstances of bastards without the social recognition of their fathers."[261] But we must remain agnostic on this point for lack of *comparanda* of an appropriate date.

The second possible term for the illegitimate son of a god and a mortal is *parthenios* ("child of a *parthenos*"), which is used of Eudorus, son of Polymele, who is raped by Hermes, conceives Eudorus, and then marries Echecles (16.179-192). Because of the assumption that *parthenos* must mean "virgin," there has been some confusion expressed over this term in the present context. After all, Polymele cannot have been a virgin after she was raped by Hermes and gave birth to Eudorus. How, then, can Eudorus be the son of a virgin?[262] Lefkowitz claims that Polymele is indirectly called a *parthenos* here because she is dancing in a chorus of girls for Artemis when Hermes conceives of his desire for her (181-3).[263] However, I am convinced by Sissa's argument that *parthenos* fundamentally means "unmarried, young woman" rather than "virgin."[264] If we apply her definition here, we get good sense by reading Eudorus as the son of an unmarried woman, a state of affairs which was true at the time of his birth. Taken this way, the term might even be thought to confer prestige. The poet names Polymele and provides the story of her rape. An Olympian god lusts after her, has sex with her, and gives her (πόρεν) a worthy son (181-6). Considering how infrequently bastards' mothers are even named in the *Iliad*, the recital of her rape would seem to confer *kleos* upon her.[265] In addition, Hesychius (s.v. παρθένιοι) may also include the river Parthenios (*Il*. 2.854) in the category of *parthenioi.*[266] If this is correct, it is interesting to note that both Parthenios, who is presumably a river deity, and Eudorus have divine ancestry. And some support for the notion that *parthenioi* have divine parentage may be found in Poseidon loosening Tyro's "maidenly girdle" (λῦσε δὲ παρθενίην ζώνην, *Od*. 11.245) in the Odyssean catalogue of women. The *parthenios* would appear therefore to be in a different category than the *nothos* because he has, at least as far as we can tell, one divine parent.

---

[261] C. Patterson (1990, 50) and the lexicographers cited above.

[262] Cf. Janko (1992 *ad Il.* 16.179-181), who translates *parthenios* as "born of a (supposed) virgin." Also cf. Hsch. s.v. παρθένιοι [π 923 Hansen] : οἱ κατὰ τὸν Μεσσηνιακὸν αὐτοῖς πόλεμον γενόμενοι ἐκ τῶν <παρ>θέ<ν>ων. καὶ οἱ ἐξ ἀνεκδότου λάθρα γεννώμενοι παῖδες, ἀπὸ τοῦ δοκεῖν ἔτι παρθένους εἶναι τὰς γεννησαμένας αὐτοὺς ("those born to them from the maidens [or the gods] during the Messenian War. Also children conceived in secret, outside of marriage, on account of which the women who have given birth to them still seem to be maidens"). And Σ bT *ad Il.* 16.180 Erbse: ὁ ἐκ νομιζομένης παρθένου γεννηθείς; similarly Σ A *ad loc.* and Phot. s.v. παρθένιος [π 406 Theodoridis].

[263] Lefkowitz (1993, 22); accepted by Ebbott (2003, 19).

[264] Sissa (1990, 76-82). Contrast Poll. 3.21: παρθενίας δ᾽ ὅν τις ἐκ τῆς δοκούσης εἶναι παρθένου, [βοὺв] νόμῳ συνοικήσας, ἐποιήσατο ("he is a *parthenias* whom someone fathered with a woman who seemed to be a maiden, having come to live with her by custom"). But this does not seem to fit the present context.

So, while Heracles could clearly be considered a *nothos* only slightly later in Greek antiquity, he might potentially have been described as *parthenios* or even as *skotios*, meaning more or less that he is a bastard from the divine point of view. Amphitryon and Alcmene seem technically to be married before Heracles is conceived, but the marriage has not been consummated:

> ἦ μέν οἱ πατέρ᾽ ἐσθλὸν ἀπέκτανε ἶφι δαμάσσας,
> χωσάμενος περὶ βουσί· λιπὼν δ᾽ ὅ γε πατρίδα γαῖαν
> ἐς Θήβας ἱκέτευσε φερεσσακέας Καδμείους.
> ἔνθ᾽ ὅ γε δώματ᾽ ἔναιε σὺν αἰδοίῃ παρακοίτι
> νόσφιν ἄτερ φιλότητος ἐφιμέρου, οὐδέ οἱ ἦεν
> πρὶν λεχέων ἐπιβῆναι ἐϋσφύρου Ἠλεκτρύωνης
> πρίν γε φόνον τείσαιτο κασιγνήτων μεγαθύμων

---

[265] Being raped is, as Lyons (1997, 56-59) shows, one of the only reasons a woman is ever mentioned in a hero's genealogy in Greek literature.

[266] καὶ ποταμὸς Παφλαγονίας Παρθένιος. It is difficult to tell whether the καὶ means that Hesychius is adding another example of the usage we are discussing, or if he is simply listing an example of the word as a proper noun. Parthenios is a common name for Greek rivers, since they were frequently associated with virginity: N. Richardson (1974 *ad H. Dem.* 99).

> ἧς ἀλόχου, μαλερῷ δὲ καταφλέξαι πυρὶ κώμας
> ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων Ταφίων ἰδὲ Τηλεβοάων.
> τὼς γάρ οἱ διέκειτο, θεοὶ δ᾽ ἐπὶ μάρτυροι ἦσαν·
> τῶν ὅ γ᾽ ὀπίζετο μῆνιν, ἐπείγετο δ᾽ ὅττι τάχιστα
> ἐκτελέσαι μέγα ἔργον, ὅ οἱ Διόθεν θέμις ἦεν.
>
> "In fact, he [Amphitryon] had murdered her fine father, having overcome him with might, angered over oxen. And he, having left his fatherland, supplicated the shield-bearing Cadmeans in Thebes. There he inhabited halls with his respectable wife, but without desirable love; and it was not possible for him to set foot on the bed of the well-ankled daughter of Electryon before he had avenged the murder of the great-spirited brothers of his wife and burned with destructive fire the villages of the Taphians and Teleboans, warrior men. For so it was settled for him, and the gods were witnesses to it; for he regarded their wrath with awe, and he strove to complete the great task as quickly as possible, the one which was established for him by Zeus" (Hes. fr. 195.14-22 M-W).[267]

There is much about this passage which has troubled commentators. For example, various speculations have been offered, but the connection remains unclear between Amphitryon's murder of Alcmene's father and her insistence upon his vengeance for her brothers' murder.[268] Whatever this connection may be, however, there is clearly something of a double determination – or at least motivation – at play here. Alcmene sets the price of her virginity as vengeance for her natal family, and Amphitryon is presumably interested in having a wife – especially such an excellent one (1-8) – who is willing to have his children. But the poet explicitly states that Amphitryon completes the task out of fear of the interested gods and especially Zeus. The groom therefore has powerful motives for completing his task. It is particularly interesting that Zeus is described as the primary mover of Amphitryon's task, since a few lines later he weaves (ὕφαινε) Heracles' birth as a δόλος ('cunning plan,' 27-9). Presumably Zeus has sent Amphitryon away in order that he might have access to his bride while she is still a virgin. Exactly how all the pieces of this passage fit together is not obvious.[269] But it is clear that the poet has gone to a fair amount of effort to ensure that Heracles should be born a *parthenios*. And particular emphasis seems to be required in the case of Alcmene's virginity, since, as Steinrück has observed, all seven of the women who have twins in the *Catalogue of Women* are married. It is difficult to tell, given the extremely fragmentary nature of the remains of the poem, but Alcmene may be marked as a partial exception because she does not have intercourse with her husband until after she has been visited by Zeus.[270] The emphasis placed on Alcmene's virginity stands to reason; the status involved is a matter for boasting, at least as far as we can tell from our analysis above of the case of Eudorus.

---

[267] Other, later versions of Heracles' conception are in Pi. *I.* 7.6-7, Pherecyd. fr. 13bc Fowler, Eur. *Her*. 340-6, Diod. 4.9, Apollod. 2.4, Hyg. *Fab*. 29, Tz. *ad Lyc*. 33 and 932.

[268] I agree with Hirschberger (2004 *ad* 16-17) that it is Alcmene who delivers the imperative to Amphitryon (cf. Pherecyd. fr. 13b Fowler). Fowler (2013, 262-3) suggests that the murder of Electryon provides the motivation for the move to Thebes, "Herakles' undisputed birthplace." But he simply describes the war against the Taphians and Teleboans as the price of Alcmene's hand in marriage, making no connection between the two events. Gantz (1993, 374) assumes that Alcmene requires Amphitryon to seek vengeance for her as penance for his transgression against her father. Ormand (2014, 158-9), using especially the scholion to AR 1.747 Wendel, argues somewhat ingeniously that the Taphians had stolen cattle from Electryon before his murder. Alcmene's assignment for Amphitryon could then be read as the reacquisition of familial property in place of *hedna*, with Amphitryon paying penance for his murder of Electryon to boot. The Hesiodic version of Electryon's murder by Amphitryon is uncommon in later traditions; cf. Gantz (1993, 374-5).

But of course this boasting is from the mortal point of view. From the immortal perspective, the mortal offspring, the *parthenioi*, are not necessarily advantageous additions to the family, however peripheral they may be. When thinking of Heracles in this light, the ferocious antagonism of Hera must spring to mind. While the cause of Hera's animosity towards Heracles is not made explicit in early poetry, a certain amount is implied. The Homeric and Hesiodic traditions differ over the purpose of Zeus' fathering of Heracles. In the *Iliad*, Zeus intends Heracles to be a great ruler, but he is frustrated by Hera's cunning mind

---

[269] In addition to the above, other elements have caused confusion. Ormand (2014, 165) notes the incongruity of the all-powerful father of gods and men needing to weave a clever plan, and Fowler (2013, 264) finds the lengths to which Zeus goes to execute his *dolos* to be unparalleled in other myths about him.

[270] Steinrück (1999, 396-8). Ordinarily, when gods have sex with mortal women, the women are virgins; cf. Lefkowitz (1995, 33).

(δολοφρονέουσα, 19.101-33). In the *Catalogue of Women*, as mentioned above, Zeus comes up with a cunning ploy (δόλος and μῆτις) to produce Heracles as a protector from ruin for gods and men (Hes. fr. 195.27-30). Either way, the birth of Heracles appears to be a piece in a high-stakes Olympian game. In the *Theogony*, Heracles plays a part in the cosmic victory of the masculine over the feminine when he slays monsters nursed by Hera (Hes. *Th.* 313-18, 326-32). There is, then, a kind of inverse symmetry between the *dolos* of Hera in Homer and the *dolos* of Zeus in Hesiod. Both deities use their cunning to attempt to gain their way with respect to Heracles and against the interests of the other. The difference is that, in Homer, Hera oppresses Heracles, whereas in Hesiod, Heracles overcomes Hera's creatures. The mortal son of Zeus serves as a proxy for the Olympian couple to play out their cosmic struggle indirectly, avoiding the potentially cataclysmic consequences of more direct means. And what better proxy for such a struggle than the illegitimate son of Zeus? Zeus wishes to promote his son, and Hera to thwart him. Heracles may not be a *nothos* from the mortal point of view, but he certainly seems to play that role among the gods.

But we also note that Hera and Heracles are reconciled after his death and apotheosis. Potentially the earliest attestation of these events (*Od.* 11.602-4) is usually thought to be an interpolation from the sixth century or later.[271] Fortunately we may safely pass it over in favour of two more detailed passages from the Hesiodic corpus:

> Ἥβην δ᾽ Ἀλκμήνης καλλισφύρου ἄλκιμος υἱός, 950
> ἲς Ἡρακλῆος, τελέσας στονόεντας ἀέθλους,
> παῖδα Διὸς μεγάλοιο καὶ Ἥρης χρυσοπεδίλου,
> αἰδοίην θέτ᾽ ἄκοιτιν ἐν Οὐλύμπῳ νιφόεντι·
> ὄλβιος, ὃς μέγα ἔργον ἐν ἀθανάτοισιν ἀνύσσας

---

[271] See most recently Karanika (2011, 1-4) and Burton (2016, 12 n. 41) on this question. Lyons (1997, 9-10) offers a rare argument in favour of the passage's authenticity.

> ναίει ἀπημαντος καὶ ἀγήραος ἤματα πάντα.
>
> “And the stout son of fair-ankled Alcmene, the might of Heracles, made Hebe, the daughter of mighty Zeus and golden-sandalled Hera, his respectable wife on snowy Olympus, once he had completed the groan-worthy labours: happy man, who, having accomplished great work, lives among the immortals, safe and ageless for all days” (Hes. *Th*. 950-5).
>
> νῦν δ᾽ ἤδη θεός ἐστι, κακῶν δ᾽ ἐξήλυθε πάντων,
> ζώει δ᾽ ἔνθα περ ἄλλοι Ὀλύμπια δώματ᾽ ἔχοντες
> ἀθάνατος καὶ ἄγηρος, ἔχων καλλ[ίσ]φυρον Ἥβην,
> παῖδα Διὸς μεγάλοιο καὶ Ἥρης χρυσοπεδίλου·
> τὸν πρὶν μέν ῥ᾽ ἤχθηρε θεὰ λευκώλενος Ἥρη
> ἔκ τε θεῶν μακάρων ἔκ τε θνητῶν ἀνθρώ[πων,
> νῦν δ᾽ ἤδη πεφίληκε, τίει δέ μιν ἔξοχον ἄλλ[ων
> ἀθανάτων μετά γ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐρισθενέα Κρ[ο]νίωνα.
>
> “Now he is a god, and he has escaped from all ills, and he lives in the very place where the other dwellers of Olympian halls live, deathless and ageless, with beautiful-ankled Hebe for his wife, the daughter of great Zeus and golden-sandalled Hera. Before, the white-armed goddess, Hera, hated him more than she hated any other happy god or mortal man, but now she has come to love him, and she shows him more respect than she does the other gods, except the son of Cronos himself, whose might is broad” (Hes. fr. 25.26-33).[272]

Here, as elsewhere (*h. Hom*. 15.7-8, Pi. *N*. 1.69-72), Heracles’ arrival among the gods appears next to his marriage to Hebe.[273] The fact that Heracles marries Hebe, the personification of youthful prime, is well attested. Hebe appears frequently on vase-paintings depicting Heracles’ introduction to Olympus.[274] The earliest of these is on an unpublished Samian krater dated to the 7th century, on which Heracles and Hebe ride on a chariot into heaven.[275] This same motif can be found on a more complex scene on a Corinthian aryballos, which is dated to ca. 600. On this vase, inscriptions also identify the Muses, Calliope, Apollo, Athena, Aphrodite, the Charites, Zeus, Hermes, and Hera, all of whom appear to be attending the wedding of Heracles and Hebe.[276] After this, more than 125 Attic black-figures featuring the wedding of Heracles have been catalogued.[277] On Attic pottery, Athena often appears both with and without Hebe as a kind of bride (or bridegroom) of Heracles.[278] This likely represents an Attic appropriation of the apotheosis and wedding of Heracles, an event that they claimed to have been the first to acknowledge.[279] Despite this wealth of data, the marriage of Heracles and Hebe has elicited very little scholarly attention. Laurens says that Hebe represents Heracles' dissociation from mortality, and Lyons and Kratzer describe the marriage as a commemoration of Heracles' change in address.[280] This is as far as the analysis goes. I would argue, however, that Heracles' marriage to Hebe is a vital component of the structure of his story, a component without which the arc of his progress from toiling bastard son to Olympian god would be problematic.

---

[272] It is worth noting that these lines are obelized in P. Oxy. 2075. Fr. 229.8-13 is identical to fr. 25.28-33 if we accept what Merkelbach and West supply. Hirschberger (2004 *ad* fr. 25.26-33) suggests that this duplication is the reason for the obelization of fr. 25.26-33.

[273] M. West (1966 *ad* Hes. *Th*. 881-1020 and 947-55) and Stafford (2010, 241 n. 35) argue that the *Theogony* passage is a later interpolation, but they are in the minority. We have no mention of Heracles’ afterlife in the *Iliad*. But, given the general absence of a special afterlife for heroes in the *Iliad* (Redfield (1994, 180-1); cf. *Il*. 23.103-7), we probably have to assume based on 18.117-19 that Heracles is understood simply to be dead or in Hades: Holt (1989, 72).

[274] *LIMC* s.v. “Herakles” 3292-3343; cf. Simon (1979, 102-1 with plates 118/119). Pausanias (2.17.6) saw a relief in the Heraeum in Corinth, on which the wedding of Heracles and Hebe is depicted as overseen by Hera. See Schefold (1992, 33-46) for an overview of Heracles’ apotheosis on late Archaic pottery.

[275] *LIMC* s.v. “Herakles” 3330.

---

[276] *LIMC* s.v. "Herakles" 3331.

[277] See Stafford (2010, 241 n. 36).

[278] Laurens (1987, 62-70), Deacy (2005, 41-43). We ought also to bear in mind Laurens' (1987, 71) salutary warning that it is not always a straightforward matter to identify Hebe iconographically. There is also an Attic red-figure chous (Paris, Musée du Louvre M9 (N2408)), dated by D. Walsh (2009, 236) to ca. 410 BCE, on which there appears a burlesque version of Heracles' apotheosis. Here, he is accompanied by Nike on a chariot drawn by Centaurs. While the scene certainly has a comic atmosphere, Taplin (1993, 9-10) does not believe that it would have been staged as we have it.

[279] On the Attic claim to have been the first to acknowledge his apotheosis, see Holt (1989, 71), who cites Diod. 4.39 and Paus. 1.15.3; Natoli (2004, 158) suggests that Isoc. 5.33 refers to the same tradition. Cf. Shapiro (1983, 12-17) on similar claims from outside of Attica to have been the first to acknowledge the divine Heracles. Moon (1983) discusses the political and social significance of vase-paintings of Heracles' apotheosis in Attic art of this period, particularly with respect to the work of the Priam Painter. Heracles' apotheosis is notably absent from Sophocles' *Trachiniae* and Euripides' *Heracles*, however. But these are probably cases of strategic silence on behalf of the playwrights rather than representations of alternative traditions: Holt (1989, 71-2). On the importance of Heracles in Attica in general, see Stafford (2012, 163-170 and 176-180).

[280] Laurens (1987, 71), Lyons (1997, 56-7), Kratzer (2013, 56-7).

The reason for the lack of interest in Hebe, I think, is that Heracles' acceptance among the gods is typically explained by his performance of the Labours, or at any rate some task or tasks.[281] Since, from this point of view, Hebe merely symbolizes Heracles' apotheosis, it is no wonder that she has largely been ignored. However, to my knowledge, the link between Heracles successfully labouring for Eurystheus and thereby obtaining immortality is only as early as Diodorus (4.10.7).[282] Indeed, if we view this explanation from Hera's perspective, it is not particularly convincing. As we have seen, Hera is an opponent of Heracles and is linked to many of his struggles.[283] Why would she admit him into the Olympian household because he has overcome them? Presumably we should expect her to be angry and not conciliatory when she has been thwarted. Despite this, Gantz says of Hes. *Th*. 950-5 that "the implication must thus seem that the apotheosis [of Heracles] is a reward for his accomplishments."[284] Let us look at this passage more closely. Gantz's suggestion requires us to take τελέσας on 951 and ἀνύσσας on 954 as causal and not merely temporal. While this is hardly necessary, even if we accept this understanding, the result of Heracles' deeds is strictly speaking his marriage to Hebe and not immortality. More importantly, if we look again at Hes. fr. 25.26-33, Heracles' mortal accomplishments are nowhere to be seen. He has rather "escaped from all ills." We note, however, that the marriage to Hebe is mentioned again. In addition, Hebe's parentage occupies an entire line, which is a strange detail to appear if she is merely a symbol of his immortality. I would argue that Hebe represents more than the personification of youthful prime in these passages – although it is certainly a nice touch that Heracles becomes immortal and marries such a deity. It is the *oikos* to which Hebe belongs that is of primary importance. Heracles does not just marry any goddess; he marries the daughter of Zeus and Hera, an extremely rare and presumably valuable product of the *hieros gamos*. In other words, Heracles does not just move to Olympus; he marries into the family. This arrangement helps to explain Heracles' admission onto Olympus from Hera's point of view. We see in the fragment from the *Catalogue* that, not only has she ceased to have a superlative hatred for him, but she has even come to have an exceptional love for him. Since marriage was a fundamental means of establishing alliances in antiquity, it is easy to see how Heracles' arrangement could motivate Hera's otherwise highly confusing change of heart. Heracles is no longer her husband's bastard child. He is now her son-in-law and ally.

---

[281] Galinsky (1972, 16), Stafford (2012, 172). Gantz (1993, 461) suggests the Gigantomachy, and Winiarczyk (2000) a combination of factors, including the Gigantomachy and Heracles' function as an *euergetēs* ('benefactor') and *sōtēr* ('saviour').

[282] See Huxley (1969, 101-2) on the fragments of Pisander, however. One might accept M. West's (1966 *ad* Hes. *Th*. 954) contention that Hesiod explains Heracles' immortalization as a reward for his participation in the Gigantomachy. And so does Pindar (*N*. 1.67-72), who also includes Hebe. But this would still fail to account for Hera's change of heart, since she should probably be understood as having opposed Heracles in the Gigantomachy: Yasumura (2011, 39-57).

[283] On Hera as the cause of the Labours, see Deacy (2005, 38). But I do not claim that this tradition was by any means universal; cf. Fowler (2013, 271-3). Even the opposition between Hera and the mortal Heracles may not have been uniform throughout the ancient Greek world. Giangiulio (1996) offers several cultic examples of Heracles and Hera apparently acting in concert. However, all of his evidence is very late, and it is unclear in most cases whether Heracles is to be considered a mortal or a god.

[284] Gantz (1993, 461); cf. M. West (1966 *ad* 954).

That Heracles needs to be incorporated into this household after his death implies that he was not considered to be a full member of it during his lifetime. The divide for him, therefore, is predicated on his ontological status. Heracles' apotheosis both demarcates his crossing of the boundary between bastardy and legitimacy and itself constitutes one of the prerequisites to his acceptance as legitimate. Both of these aspects of his apotheosis are linked to Hera and her initial opposition to Heracles' recognition as son of Zeus. Hera does not accept Heracles as Zeus' son, and, partly because he is mortal, her opposition proves decisive in determining his kinship identity – at least for the time being. Whether Hera is consulted about the marriage of her daughter could easily have depended upon the storyteller. The bond created is consistent with the usual pattern of using kinship thinking to describe the cosmos. Heracles, the prototypical founder, outsider, and champion of humanity is brought into a lasting alliance with Hera, the most prominent goddess and therefore threat to humanity.

# CHAPTER TWO: EUMAEUS

Like much of the second half of the *Odyssey*, Eumaeus used to be neglected by scholarship, at least relative to the rest of Homer. By contrast, the swineherd has fared much better over the last twenty-five years or so.[285] Of especial importance in this vein has been the fact that Eumaeus is Odysseus' slave. Recent interpretations of Eumaeus' character have hinged on this fact. Most prominently, Thalmann has argued that Eumaeus functions as an expression of Archaic aristocratic ideals about the 'good' slave. In particular, Thalmann contends that the portrayal of Eumaeus as a member of Odysseus' family corresponds fairly precisely to O. Patterson's theory that the master appropriates the basic father-child relationship inherent to most cultures in order to justify the exploitation of his slaves.[286] This insight by Thalmann remains fundamental to our understanding of Eumaeus' character. I would go further and argue that this paternalistic, master-slave relationship also has a profound effect on the portrayal of Odysseus. Eumaeus is more than just Odysseus' 'son' for convenience's sake. On the one hand, there is no doubt that Odysseus is the primary character, and Eumaeus is the secondary. Eumaeus' identity is predicated on the fact that his master exists, that he has certain, praiseworthy characteristics. All of this can be mapped onto a recognizable type of father-son relationship.[287] On the other hand, as I will argue, Eumaeus in turn closely resembles Odysseus. He shares these desirable characteristics to an uncanny extent. In fact, Eumaeus comes to play Odysseus' role on Ithaca in his absence. And, when the master returns, it is through the swineherd's resemblance to him that he most poignantly experiences the gap between his mere presence on Ithaca and his final goal of resuming his role as head of his *oikos*. Eumaeus is not merely a slave. He is his master's double.[288]

---

[285] See, for example, Roisman (1990), Minchin (1992), Ahl and Roisman (1996, 167-88), Louden (1997), Thalmann (1998a), Felson (2002b), Schmidt (2006), Newton (2015).

[286] Thalmann (1998a, 97-100), citing O. Patterson (1982).

[287] So especially Schmidt (2006, 124-5).

Several scholars have anticipated this argument. Scodel, for example, claims without elaborating that "Eumaeus serves as a sympathetic double of a more important character."[289] And this proposal is to some degree an extension of the recent consensus that Eumaeus understands Odysseus as no other mortal does.[290] It is also not unusual for a slave to be identified as a doubling figure in the *Odyssey*. In fact, almost all of the doubles in the poem are slaves.[291] That slaves should consistently be portrayed as secondary characters certainly stands to reason *prima facie*. But if we are to examine the correlation between the role of double and slave in the character of Eumaeus, then it is necessary first to clarify exactly what I mean by 'slave' and in what respects I am claiming that Eumaeus is Odysseus' double. Following this, I examine how this doubling enhances the portrayal of Odysseus by highlighting how his absence can only partially be compensated for by Eumaeus.

First, let us consider whether we can say that Eumaeus is a slave, and what it means to say so. Because *doul*-stem words are so rare in Homeric poetry,[292] there is a long-standing debate about whether figures like the *dmōs* (‘slave’), *tamiē* (‘housekeeper’), *oikeus* (‘house slave’), *amphipolos* (‘handmaiden’), etc. ought to be considered chattel slaves. More recent scholarship tends either to express agnosticism on the point or simply to assume that these figures are slaves without addressing the question.[293] Part of the issue is that *do-e-ro/-ra*, which is sometimes controversially taken to refer to to the chattel slave, is attested in Linear B. Some of the *do-e-ro/-ra* were clearly slaves, but probably not all of them.[294] It does seem tolerably clear, however, that the *doulē* (‘slave woman’) is a chattel slave in Homeric poetry. But it has been suggested either that the *dmōs*, for example, is in a feudal relationship with his master, or that the term is something approaching a euphemism for *doulos*, namely the chattel slave.[295] Regarding the debate surrounding the relationship between *dmōs* and *doulos*, the sentiment expressed by Eumaeus to the beggar is not easily misunderstood:

---

[288] Most scholarly discussions of the double assume that the term is simply understood; see, however, Keppler's (1972, 1-13) insightful discussion. For the present purpose, I will define doubling as a relationship between a primary and secondary character in which the secondary resembles the primary to an uncanny extent. This uncanniness expresses a tension, in this case the tension caused by the fact that Odysseus has reached Ithaca but remains unable to be himself.

[289] Scodel (2002, 157). Cf. Farron (1979-80, 89), who says that Eumaeus can be seen as Odysseus' *alter ego*; so to some extent Bonnafé (1984). Segal (1994a, 164-5) and Louden (1997, 97-106) find a number of striking parallels between Eumaeus and Alcinous.

[290] E.g. J. Roisman (1990, 218-36), Montiglio (2005, 257).

[291] Cf. Fenik (1974, 155-207).

> ‘δμῶες δ᾽, εὖτ᾽ ἂν μηκέτ᾽ ἐπικρατέωσιν ἄνακτες,
> οὐκέτ᾽ ἔπειτ᾽ ἐθέλουσιν ἐναίσιμα ἐργάζεσθαι·

---

[292] *Doulē*: *Il*. 3.409, *Od*. 4.12; *doulosynē*: *Od*. 22.423; *doulion hēmar*: *Il*. 6.463, *Od*. 14.340, 17.323; *douleion eidos*: 24.252; Beringer (1982, 25) includes *Il. Parv.* fr. 22 Bernabé in this list, but it is in Pausanias’ words (10.26.1). The two uses of *doulē* were seen to be grounds for athetization in antiquity. Σ MO *ad Od*. 4.12 Pontani reports that τινὲς τὸ δούλης κύριόν φασι διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε οὕτω λέγειν τὸν ποιητὴν τὸ “θεράπαινα{ν}”· διὸ καὶ τὸ “εἰσόκεν ἢ ἄλοχον ποιήσεται ἢ ὅγε δούλην” [= *Il*. 3.409] ἀθετοῦσιν (“some say that the proper term for *doulē* is *therapaina* because the poet never says *doulē*. Therefore they also athetize, ‘on the chance that he might make you his wife, or even his *doulē*’”). Note that all modern editions print εἰς ὅ κέ σ᾽ instead of εἰσόκεν. See also Eust. 1479.62 and Erbse’s remarks on the scholion *ad Il*. 3.395. Cf. Raaflaub (2004, 23-7) on *eleutheros* in the Archaic Period.

[293] For: Lencman (1966), Debord (1973), Gschnitzer (1976, 50-62), Finley (1978, 58-9, with significant caveats (55 and 71)), Ndoye (2010, 222-6); against: Beringer (1982), Wickert-Micknat (1983, 117), Raaflaub (1997, 639); more recent agnostics: Thalmann (1998b, 25), Hunt (2011, 26). Harris (2012) is the sole exception, concluding that Homeric and Hesiodic poetry portray historical slave societies. See Schmidt (2006, 118 n. 3) for a fuller description of this question in German scholarship. The ubiquitous habit of referring to figures such as Eumaeus and Eurycleia as ‘servants’ only confuses the issue further.

[294] Benveniste (1969, 358-9), Gschnitzer (1976, 3-8), Beringer 1982 (18-19), Garlan (1988, 25-9); see Raaflaub (2004, 19-22) for a review of this question with ample bibliography.

[295] Feudal: Beringer (1982, 22-4); euphemism: Thalmann (1998a, 55-6). The analysis of the word would be greatly simplified if there were agreement on its etymology. Raaflaub (2004, 291 n. 53, with further bibliography) and Beekes (2010 s.v.) assert that it comes from *dōma*, but *damazein* has also been suggested (e.g. Chantraine (1968, 290)); cf. Ramming (1973, 3) for more possibilities.

> ἥμισυ γάρ τ᾽ ἀρετῆς ἀποαίνυται εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς
> ἀνέρος, εὖτ᾽ ἄν μιν κατὰ δούλιον ἦμαρ ἕλησιν.᾽
>
> "*Dmōes*, when their masters cease to give them directions, then no longer are they willing to do proper work. For broad-seeing Zeus deprives a man of half his excellence when his day of slavery takes him" (*Od*. 17.320-323).

Like Gschnitzer and Harris, I find it difficult to interpret this passage as indicating anything other than that each *dmōs* has met his *doulion ēmar*, meaning that a *dmōs* is a *doulos*, a slave.[296] We cannot therefore make distinctions between the status of these two individuals based on terminological grounds. Beringer's claim that the relationship between the *dmōs* and his master is essentially feudal is also disproved by the evidence of the *Odyssey*. As an example, he contends that "not without good reason are the δμωαί never anywhere in the epics portrayed as the concubines or mistresses of their lords, leave alone that the latter would have had a right over the bodies of their δμωαί as some scholars have mistakenly asserted."[297] On the contrary, there are any number of Odyssean examples of the master asserting his absolute right over the bodies of his slaves. The introduction of Eurycleia, quoted in the last chapter, in which Laertes is said to have kept his hands off her in order to avoid the anger (χόλος) of his wife (*Od*. 1.429-33), clearly implies that he could have slept with her. A more graphic example of the power of the master over the body of his slave is Telemachus' overzealous and summary execution of the 'bad' handmaidens (22.457-77). This act has horrified many a modern reader of the poem, but no one suggests that Telemachus does not have the authority to kill them. The suitors' kin gather at the end of the poem to avenge their deaths (24.415-71). No one complains about the handmaidens' fate.[298] The most one might have expected to hear would have been that it is hardly parsimonious to dispose of so much property in such a manner. In addition, like Schmidt, I cannot agree with Gschnitzer and others that "the brute fact of servitude" is avoided in the *Odyssey*.[299] Slaves are sometimes brutally punished, as here, or promised rewards (e.g. at *Od*. 21.213-16), depending on their behaviour.[300] It is fairly evident, then, that in Homer the slave is a chattel slave and that his or her fate is accordingly subject to the whim of the master.

---

[296] Gschnitzer (1976, 62), Harris (2012, 354-5). Santiago (1962) argues that *eleutheron ēmar* (*Il*. 6.455, 16.831, and 20.193) was constructed on the model of *doulion ēmar* (*Il*. 6.463; *Od*. 14.340, 17.323; cf. Thgn. 1213) and is therefore a later development in epic formulaic diction. Gschnitzer (1976, 3 n. 6) and Raaflaub (2004, 24) show that *doulion ēmar* and *eleutheron ēmar* are ordinarily used in constructions which refer to the same event, the onset of slavery. Ndoye (2010, 223-4) appears to assume the same. The only appearance of *eleutheros* outside of this formula is at *Il*. 6.528 with the "wine-bowl of freedom" (κρητὴρ ἐλεύθερος), which Raaflaub (2004, 26) thinks is constructed by analogy with *eleutheron ēmar*. Although *dmōs* is intended only as an illustrative example here, it does often seem to serve as the general term for the slave in Homeric poetry (e.g. *Od*. 17.422-3).

[297] Beringer (1982, 23 n. 33); so, for example, Debord (1973), Garlan (1988, 37), Ndoye (2010, 224 and 257), who argue that specifically the *pallakis* and the *doulē* are concubines; *contra* Gschnitzer (1976, 58). Westermann (1955, 2-5) and Harris (2012, 354-5) are rare holdouts against this trend, but even Westermann (2-3) claims that slavery in Homeric poetry is "so mild that it is difficult to distinguish it at times from patriarchal clientage or serfdom."

When we consider the Homeric slave in light of current, universal definitions of chattel slavery, however, the issue becomes slightly more complex. Shaw, in his introduction to his revised edition of Finley's *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology*, approbatively summarizes Finley's definition of a chattel slave as

> "a person who is systematically deracinated and kept in the status of an isolated being who has no roots, no kin or family claims, and a person against whom such harsh abrogations of personal empowerment and identity are enforced in perpetuity."[301]

This corresponds quite closely to O. Patterson's extremely influential and more extensive formulation in *Slavery and Social Death*. Patterson uses the term 'social death' to refer to

---

[298] The harsh reality of slavery does not seem to be avoided. I also see no reason to follow Risch (1972), Gschnitzer (1976, 12-13), Thalmann (1998a, 18), and Schmidt (2006, 125-8) in considering terms like *dmōs*, *oikeus*, etc. to be euphemistic simply because they are not *doulos*. And *oikeus* (also cf. *oiketēs* and *oikiatas*) in particular is quite well-attested later in antiquity as being more or less synonymous with *doulos*: Benveniste (1969, 358) and Garlan (1988, 21).

[299] Schmidt (2006, 128-30), citing Schlaifer (1936, 93) and arguing *contra* Gschnitzer (1976, 105) and Thalmann (1998a, 18) especially.

[300] Schmidt (2006, 129 n. 66) compiles a number of examples on both sides.

[301] Finley (1998, 12 and 145); similarly Garnsey (1996, 1). For a history of the scholarship on ancient slavery prior to Finley, see Garlan (1988, 1-12).

Finley's definition, although he never acknowledges his debt explicitly.[302] I prefer Finley's descriptive definition to Garnsey's prescriptive (and in my view essentialist) statement that an ancient "slave was property."[303] Slavery was a distinct and changing institution, one which did not always correspond semantically or legally to property – although slaves were often considered to be property – the definition of which also changed considerably over time.[304] The ancient Greeks frequently tried to reduce the slave to a piece of property, but such attempts were never – and could never be – entirely successful.[305] A similar point needs to be made about labour as well. The assumption that labour is a fundamental element of slavery is still prevalent in recent scholarship.[306] There is no doubt that labour is an extremely common purpose of slavery, but it is by no means universal. While it has always been the case that the most common purpose of slavery is labour, the only solid criteria for slavery are deracination and social isolation.[307]

Considering Eumaeus' story by way of comparison to Finley's model, certain resemblances can be found. He was originally the son of a *basileus* ('chief') from the island of Syria somewhere in the East, an idyllic location untouched by hunger or disease (14.403-14). Indeed, the difference between Syria and the 'real world' of Ithaca is perhaps reminiscent of the contrast between Goat Island and the mundane world familiar to the poem's audience (9.116-39), making Eumaeus' subsequent removal from his ancestral home to a life of toil all the more painful.[308] Eumaeus was kidnapped by his nurse and sold by Phoenicians to Laertes (15.415-84). Such a removal and sale corresponds quite straightforwardly to Finley's 'deracination' or O. Patterson's 'natal alienation'. Eumaeus is denied access to his natal kin and transferred to a strange land. We can assume that Eurycleia went through a similar experience when she is reported as having been sold to Laertes (1.429-30). We are not explicitly told that she was kidnapped, but one assumes that she must have been, since she is also given an aristocratic lineage; and we would not expect upper-class parents ordinarily to be understood as wont to sell their daughters into slavery.[309] Again, in the *Hymn to Demeter*, Demeter *qua* Doso concocts a tale in which she is kidnapped by pirates (ληϊστῆρες) and intended for slavery (122-32).[310] These are the only examples in early epic of slaves developed enough to have a backstory and who are not born into slavery. We are therefore forced to conclude that, at least with respect to natal alienation, Homeric slaves are portrayed as chattel slaves.

---

[302] O. Patterson (1982, 17-101), who does acknowledge a great debt to Finley's work in general (xii). Patterson's definition of slavery is essentially composed of three elements: i) domination enforced by violence, ii) dishonour or the denial of honour, and iii) natal alienation. Ndoye (2010, 239-50) and Harris (2012, 356-8) find evidence for each of these elements in the treatment of slaves in the Homeric poems.

[303] Garnsey (1996, 1).

[304] On the slave being considered property in antiquity, see in particular Vlassopoulos (2011) on [Arist.] *Oec*. 1344a23-26 and *Pol*. 1253b33. DuBois' (2003, 6) definition of the chattel slave as a thing or object is more nuanced but ultimately fails due to the same objections. Both Garnsey's and duBois' theses had already been disproved by O. Patterson (1982, 17-27). Harris (2012, 352-3) attempts unconvincingly to show that Patterson's definition is compatible with the concept of ownership. Honoré's (1961) claim that 'ownership' and 'property' are universally consistent concepts across all civilizations is dubious inasmuch as he confines his study to relatively modern Western European and Russian/Soviet data. Cf. de Ste. Croix (1988, 21-2) on the definition of slavery at the League of Nations' Slavery Convention of 1926 as "the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised."

[305] So Vlassopoulos (2011).

[306] For example, cf. Schmidt's (2006, 118 n. 2) definition: "*sklave* bezeichnet einen Menschen, der dauernder Privatzbesitz eines anderen ist und für diesen arbeiten muß." Schmidt is aware of O. Patterson's "haarspalterisch" disproof of this formulation and confusingly responds, "aber in der Summe weiß doch jeder Sklave, ob und daß er Sklave ist" (*ibid*.).

[307] Cf. Rankine (2011, 34-5) on the Homeric slave and labour.

So far, so good. But the question appears more complicated when we consider the other components of Finley's definition, namely the denial of kinship and empowerment or identity. Eumaeus, for example, rather vehemently expresses feelings of relatedness to members of Odysseus' *oikos* (most explicitly at *Od*. 15.363-70).[311] He also claims that Odysseus, had he survived, would have rewarded his good service with a wife, property, and possibly freedom (14.61-7). And Odysseus does eventually promise these things and to make Eumaeus and his doublet Philoetius "companions of Telemachus and brothers" (Τηλεμάχου ἑτάρω τε κασιγνήτω τε), should they all succeed in overcoming the suitors (21.214-16).[312] It is crucial to note that Odysseus offers these rewards as just that: rewards. The possession of property, acknowledged kinship, and even a wife are contingent in this passage upon the approval of and cooperation with the master.[313] From this point of view, Odysseus is perfectly prepared to play cynically into Eumaeus' sentimentality in order to advance his own cause. He could be seen to work on Eurycleia in a similar fashion when she discovers that he is the beggar and turns to inform Penelope:

---

[308] Cook (1992, 266) and Louden (1997, 106) find associations between Eumaeus' Syria and paradise.

[309] Plut. *Sol*. 23.2 (= fr. 31a Ruschenbusch; cf. T8) says that Solon created a law according to which a man was permitted to sell (πωλεῖν) his daughter or sister if she was no longer a maiden (παρθένον). But this should probably be taken to refer to prostitution (Glazebrook (2005, with bibliography) and Kamen (2013, 93); *pace* Ruschenbusch (1968, 42) and Leão and Rhodes (2015, 49)), and, in any case, it applies only to Athens in a later period.

[310] This portion of the *H.Dem.* is dealt with in some detail below. On Doso as opposed to Dos as Demeter's pseudonym, see N. Richardson (1974 *ad H.Dem.* 122). Odysseus invents another story of this type (*Od*. 14.287-98). The Tyrrhenians in *h.Hom*. 7.6-12 may be slavers, but perhaps they should be understood as intending to hold Dionysus for ransom.

αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς
χείρ᾽ ἐπιμασσάμενος φάρυγος λάβε δεξιτερῆφι,
τῇ δ᾽ ἑτέρῃ ἕθεν ἆσσον ἐρύσσατο φώνησέν τε·
'μαῖα, τίη μ᾽ ἐθέλεις ὀλέσαι; σύ δέ μ᾽ ἔτρεφες αὐτὴ
τῷ σῷ ἐπὶ μαζῷ· νῦν δ᾽ ἄλγεα πολλὰ μογήσας
ἤλυθον εἰκοστῷ ἔτεϊ ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν.'

> "And Odysseus sought out her throat with his right hand and took hold of it, and with the other he dragged her closer, and he addressed her: 'Mama, why do you wish to destroy me? You nursed me yourself at your breast. And now, having suffered many toils, I have come to my fatherland in the twentieth year'" (*Od*. 19.479-484).[314]

---

[311] Eumaeus' expressions of kinship will be dealt with in detail below.

[312] For Philoetius as a doublet of Eumaeus, see Fenik (1974, 172-3) and G. Rose (1980, 294). Contrast Nagler (1974, 108-9), who more or less dismisses Philoetius as nothing more than a fulfillment of the requirement that Odysseus be attended by two henchmen.

[313] So Harris (2012, 357).

[314] See below on how *polla mogein* is peculiar to Odysseus and Eumaeus.

Line 480 appears to pick up on the description of Eurycleia’s discovery of Odysseus’ scar: τὴν γρηῢς χείρεσσι καταπρηνέσσι λαβοῦσα / γνῶ ῥ᾽ ἐπιμασσαμένη, πόδα δὲ προέηκε φέρεσθαι (“the old woman, when she had taken it [the scar] in her down-turned hands and felt it, recognized it and let his foot fall,” 467-8). The repetition of *cheir*, *lambanein*, and *epimaiesthai* within close proximity suggests that Odysseus’ actions are to be understood in light of Eurycleia’s. Each feels and grabs the other with his or her hand(s). Eurycleia uses her touch to identify her master. She does not know him until she touches him (474-5). But the parallelism of action is not matched by a similarity of intent. Eurycleia is overjoyed to discover her master and cannot wait to share the good news with Penelope (476-8). Odysseus’ enthusiasm does not equal Eurycleia’s. He feels for her throat and takes hold of it in order to threaten her. And the line-beginning χείρ᾽ ἐπιμασσάμενος is only attested elsewhere of Odysseus contemplating finding the place where Polyphemus’ midriff holds his liver so that he can stab him to death with his sword (9.299-302). I would suggest that, given the infrequency with which we see this line-beginning formula, what we have in the present scene might be a pointed allusion to Odysseus’ struggle with the Cyclops.[315] But this is not fundamental to my interpretation. The point is that such brutality is to be expected between an epic hero and a bloodthirsty monster like Polyphemus. But it is potentially shocking in a domestic setting, especially between a man and his old nurse, who appears only to have his best interests at heart. But he promises to kill her, even though she used to be his nursemaid (τροφοῦ οὔσης σεῦ, 489), if she reveals his identity to anyone else (19.485-90). And, what is more, he refuses her help in ferreting out the disobedient handmaidens (500-2) – although, as Karydas notes, he does accept her assistance in this regard in the end

---

[315] Cf. the furthest point on Bakker’s (2013, 167-9) scale of interformularity, as outlined in the introduction above.

(22.437-45).[316] Again, one could argue that Odysseus' brutality in this scene exposes the threat of violence underlying any system of slavery. And indeed Odysseus' manipulative address to Eurycleia, quoted above, is chilling, to say the least. The use of the affectionate *maia*, for example, serves as a reminder of the long-standing bond between them.[317] And Odysseus' description of the length of time he has been away from their home presumably implies that his old nurse, of all people, should not be the one to destroy him after he has survived twenty years of battle and shipwreck. His further reference to his feeding at Eurycleia's breast is sensually evocative and harsh, especially in light of the fact that he is recalling such a bond while grasping her throat, a similarly sensual but violent act.[318] Odysseus' treatment of his nursemaid in this passage features the threat of violence and the manipulative use of kinship (or perhaps better 'relatedness' here) to get his end, two hallmarks of chattel slavery. In other words, in this case, kinship relations are only of advantage to the master, and the threat of violence is used, as it often is, to enforce obedience and deny empowerment to the slave.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that many scholars have found fault with the *Odyssey* on the grounds that:

> The *Odyssey* parades other people of the island, but largely as stage props or stock types: Eumaeus the swineherd, the old nurse Eurycleia, Phemius the bard, the nameless 'carvers of the meat', the sailors and housemaids and miscellaneous retainers. The poet's meaning is clear: on the field of battle, as in the power struggle which is the Ithacan theme, only the aristocrats had roles.[319]

---

[316] Karydas (1998, 37-42). Olson (1992, 225-6) argues that Odysseus preserves his authority by performing the suggested act at a time of his own choosing.

[317] Cf. Telemachus' use of *atta* ('papa') when threatening Eumaeus (21.369-75).

[318] Cook (2012, 82 and 91), citing the parallel of Metaneira's reaction to Demeter's treatment of Demophoön at *H. Dem.* 242-9, suggests that accusing the nurse of attempting to kill her charge is a motif in the *theoxony* and epiphany theme. Even if this is the case, it hardly detracts from Odysseus' manipulation of Eurycleia.

[319] Finley (1978, 53); cf. Kirk (1962, 366-9), who complains that the portrayal of the servile figures in the *Odyssey* is too flat.

Finley more or less denies here that non-aristocratic figures are represented for their own sake in Homeric poetry. They are merely props in the background of heroic tales. Or, as McConnell characterizes his argument, “the role of underlings in the *Odyssey* is faithfully to underpin aristocratic society, rather than to have individual identities each in their own right.”[320] The assumption here is that the role and portrayal of subordinates in the *Odyssey* are solely determined by the ideology of the oral tradition which produced them. In other words, one should not be surprised by the dismissive attitude shown toward the lower classes in the *Odyssey* because the poem is the product of an aristocratic perspective. But what about Eumaeus, for example, who is a slave and developed in some detail? Donlan and G. Rose contradict Finley and contend that figures like Eumaeus and Philoetius represent an anti-aristocratic pluralization of *aretē*, an attitude which approaches the more recently formulated ‘middling ideology.’[321] But Finley’s argument has subsequently been provided with a more thorough and nuanced expansion by Thalmann, whose reading has probably become the most influential. He says that scholars like Donlan and G. Rose should not be fooled. While Eumaeus is quite developed, having a history, emotions, and affections, his character is nothing more than an expression of an aristocratic perspective “in the service of the poem’s controlled ideological outlook.” Any attempt to read Eumaeus otherwise is necessarily to ignore or “explain away” certain passages of the *Odyssey*.[322] In fact, the portrayal of Eumaeus can be reduced to two themes: (1) Eumaeus loves his kind (*ēpios*) master and wants to preserve his property;[323] (2) the master-slave relationship between Odysseus and Eumaeus is assimilated to family relations. Both of these themes are connected to Eumaeus' status as a slave and serve to soften the hard fact of his slavery in a manner that serves the ideological outlook of the poem.[324] Thalmann's treatment of the *Odyssey* is an important corrective to a long tradition of scholarship which uncritically accepted the poem's presentation of the harmonious relationship between the 'gentle' master and the 'good' slave.[325] An important source of Thalmann's theoretical basis for this analysis is O. Patterson's aforementioned work on social death.[326] Eumaeus, since he is a slave, is socially marginalized. And one common ploy, whether it is applied consciously or unconsciously, is to express the dominance of the master over the slave in terms of 'pseudo-kinship.' The master cares for the slave as a father cares for his son, and the slave owes the master loyalty and frequently labour in return. After all, if the master is like the slave's father, then the slave should no more resent the master's dominance than a son should resent the authority of his father.[327] This constitutes symbolic domination. The master and slave misrecognize the power the master has over the slave by rationalizing it as a kinship relationship.[328] And, as we have already seen, there is justification for reading Eumaeus' relationship with Odysseus in such a way. Eumaeus perceives Odysseus and his *oikos* in familial terms, and Odysseus appears to exploit this perception by offering promotion in his *oikos* in exchange for help in fighting the suitors. My intention here is to expand on this reading by showing ways in which Odysseus and Eumaeus are able to interact with one another within these constraints. Eumaeus' social position is marginal, and even nearly non-existent in some settings. But he has a profound effect upon Odysseus nonetheless.

---

[320] McConnell (2011, 391).

[321] Donlan (1973), P. Rose (1992, 92-140). On middling ideology, see Morris (2000, 113-54).

[322] Thalmann (1998a, 85), referring to such passages as 4.62-4 and 15.324.

[323] On *ēpios* in Homer, see below.

---

[324] Thalmann (1998a, 86-100). Garlan (1988, 40-1) and Ndoye (2010, 239-40) contrast the kind master in Homer with the typically harsh one in the literature of Classical Greece.

[325] Cf. Ndoye's (2010, 239-42) review of earlier scholarship.

[326] See especially Thalmann (1998a, 87-8).

[327] See especially O. Patterson (1982, 19 and 62-5). For examples of this method apparently being utilized in antiquity, see Golden (2011, 134-40).

[328] So Thalmann (1998a, 91). On symbolic domination and misrecognition, see Bourdieu (1977, 171-97).

To begin with, it is necessary to look at this concept of social death more closely. Treating the relationship between Odysseus and Eumaeus as one of symbolic domination is useful inasmuch as it helps us to identify the means by which the dominance of the master over the slave is rationalized. But to characterize the appropriation of a kinship model to express the relationship between Odysseus and Eumaeus as pseudo-kinship is unnecessarily limiting. As was discussed in the introduction, the category of pseudo-kinship is no longer preferred. Rather than prescribe what constitutes 'legitimate' kinship, it is now generally accepted that kinship is better defined from the subject's point of view. When Eumaeus' relationship with Odysseus or Telemachus is expressed in terms of kinship, therefore, it is inappropriate for us to dismiss this claim as 'pseudo-kinship,' implying that his relatedness is somehow illegitimate or imaginary. The fact that this relationship is characterized by an extreme level of domination does not prevent it from being a kinship relationship. After all, that one's kin can be dominating and even abusive is hardly a revelation. The advantage of taking a more flexible approach to the portrayal of slavery here is that it potentially allows us to obtain a more temporally and culturally appropriate view of the poem. As Miller has recently lamented,

> the prevailing concept of institutionalized slavery in fact primarily represents abolitionist depictions of the U.S. antebellum South, with the enslaved as one-dimensional victims of similarly one-dimensional brutal masters. The whip is the dominating symbol.[329]

To O. Patterson, the social reality of slavery may be expressed in what Miller calls the master-slave dyad. The master dominates, and the slave is dominated.[330] While a relationship of domination no doubt characterizes most, if not all, instances of slavery, this does not always prevent a complex and nuanced relationship from forming. And it follows that the *Odyssey* is not necessarily guilty of serving a propagandist function in the interest of slave-owners. Of course, the Homeric poems are told from the point of view of an aristocracy that has a vested interest in maintaining the *status quo* with respect to slavery. But this does not necessarily mean that the only accurate portrayal of a slave must present one who is disgruntled with his situation and possibly even opposes slavery on principle. While many people in the modern world quite reasonably view slavery as a violent and dehumanizing violation of human rights, this quite simply was not the assessment of the ancient world. We have no evidence of abolitionism in the ancient Greek world. On the contrary, while slaves were no doubt dissatisfied by their own slavery, we have evidence of Greek slaves and freedmen who themselves owned slaves.[331] In fact, it seems to have been the case that the Greeks could not imagine a society without slaves.[332] Slavery was a fact of life, like the tide or the fickleness of the gods.[333] In fact, Miller argues, to view the slave as a dominated victim and the slave-master as the dominating monster does a disservice to the slave. The slave is necessarily more than a victim. He is a "vibrantly alive individual." His master might attempt to dehumanize him, but he must always fail.[334] The slaves in Homeric poetry are not historical persons. But it does follow that the depiction of a slave who is more than a victim can be seriously considered as something other than aristocratic propaganda. The less palatable corollary to the latter assertion is that it is also not merely aristocratic propaganda that the relationship between Odysseus and Telemachus and at least some of their slaves is more nuanced than the master-slave dyad allows.[335]

---

[329] Miller (2012, 2).

---

[330] *Ibid*. 20-2 and 31-3.

[331] Meyer (2010, 73 n. 210), Kamen (2013, 28).

[332] Vlassopoulos (2011, 116). None of this of course is to say that slaves did not ordinarily want to be free, as H. Strasburger (1976, 27-9) comes close to claiming.

[333] Cf. Segal (1994a, 169). Also cf. Thalmann (1998a, 75): "Eurykleia is an aristocrat by birth who just happens now to be a slave."

[334] Miller (2012, 21).

The ability to take the character of Eumaeus seriously is of central importance to this chapter because I wish to consider in some detail his identification with Odysseus' *oikos* and especially Odysseus himself in terms of kinship and more broadly identity. And such an endeavour is of little value if the portrayal of Eumaeus is nothing more than an aristocratic view of the ideal slave. I submit, however, that, in addition to the theoretical considerations outlined above, Eumaeus cannot be such a figure entirely. The reason for this is that he is too closely associated with Odysseus, the poem's centre of gravity, to be categorically devalued.

Having established that Eumaeus is a chattel slave, that he has been deracinated, let us now consider the doubling figure and what it means that Eumaeus is a double. The social framework of Odysseus' *oikos* is complex as it is depicted in the *Odyssey*. It is difficult for the audience to apprehend all of the relationships among the various members of the household. Part of the reason for this is the frequency with which different characters mirror one another in various ways in the second half of the poem. And this practice is alluded to in Fenik's suggestive chapter on character doublets in the *Odyssey*.[336] While character doubles are only one type of repetition in Homeric epic, Fenik argues that there are a large number of them in the latter half of the *Odyssey*, and that they are organized around their opposition to or support for Odysseus.[337] This claim must be correct broadly speaking. But it is surprising that Fenik's work in this vein, while it has widely been cited with approbation, has gone undeveloped as far as I am aware.[338] Fenik provides us with considerable assistance, but I would suggest that there are important questions to be asked. For example, there are undoubtedly a number of character doublets in the *Odyssey*, and this fact is consistent with the formulaic nature of Homeric poetry. But does one character's categorization as a double of another preclude the possibility that his or her actions have any peculiar meaning, or is he or she merely a reduplication of the more important, developed character?[339]

---

[335] It is not my intention to dispute, for example, Thalmann's (1998a, 76) argument that "it is no accident that whereas the 'bad' Melantho and her brother were born of slaves, the loyal Eurykleia and, more conspicuously, Eumaios, are of noble birth"; similarly Minchin (1992, 261 n. 9). There is no denying the aristocratic bias in these poems.

[336] Fenik (1974, 172-232).

The usual notion is that, before the advent of Romanticism – and more particularly late-18th-century German Romanticism – the character double is little more than a plot device. Two characters, often twins, are identical in such a way as to drive the story. Throughout the history of comedy, for example, the confusion caused by identical twins who are unaware of each other's proximity has frequently been used as a plot's directing force. Starting with Romantic literature, on the other hand, the double has come to have "psychological depth," often representing alternative possibilities or hidden realities with respect to the self.[340] So, to cite just one example, William Wilson, in Poe's short story of the same name, has a double who serves as an unwelcome conscience, one which he rejects.[341] Of particular importance is the use of the double to evoke the horrific or 'uncanny'.[342] William Wilson's double is effective as such precisely because he is so similar to William that it is uncanny. I would dispute the evolutionary model, however. As I will argue below, there is a similarity between Eumaeus and Odysseus. And, while it may not be horrific, it is certainly uncanny. Of use to us at present, however, is the critical treatment of the double as a manifestation or at least a representation of tension or anxiety.[343] To take one illustrative example from the *Odyssey*, let us consider the figure of Eurynome as a doublet of Eurycleia. Eurycleia may work under the supervision of Penelope during Odysseus' absence – and she presumably also does before his departure – but she is very much the master's creature. As Fenik shows, "she does nothing in the entire poem that is not directly ordered by or connected with Odysseus or Telemachus."[344] Eurynome is correspondingly associated with Penelope, only appearing in connection with her mistress and never exchanging a word with Odysseus or Telemachus.[345] Of particular interest, as Fenik points out, is Eurynome's association with dressing beds. She is called θαλαμήπολος ('chambermaid') at *Od*. 23.293, and she usually fulfils this description, being either found in Penelope's bedroom (17.492-7, 18.158-86), or called upon to fix a bed for the disguised Odysseus (20.4) or for Odysseus and

---

[337] *Ibid. passim*, but summarized on 231-2.

[338] Particular instances of the character doublet receive mention in de Jong (2001). But the theme is never treated at length *per se*, since the book is a commentary. Marks (2003, 212-13) provides a very compelling case for Aetolian Thoas as Odysseus' double in Archaic epic in general; cf. Visser (1997, 599). See also Russo et al. (1992 *ad Od*. 19.248) and Louden (2006, 125-7) on the similarities between Eurybates and Odysseus.

[339] This question is not unlike the debate outlined in the introduction regarding whether we should consider epithets to be meaningful in a particular context.

[340] So Labriola (2002, 70), Vardoulakis (2006, 101-5), Marcus (2011/12, 364-6). Rank (1971, 69-82), on the other hand, finds several ancient examples, focusing especially on Narcissus and his reflection.

---

[341] Rank (1971, 8-33) provides a wealth of further examples.

[342] Freud (1955, 226-36) discusses the literary use of the double in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to produce the horrific or 'uncanny' (*unheimlich*).

[343] Webber (1996, 123-47) and Vardoulakis (2006) in particular emphasize this aspect of Freud's discussion of the double as especially central to its import. To my mind, this formulation satisfactorily takes into account Rank's (1971, 76) earlier objections to similar claims.

[344] Fenik (1974, 190), with a thorough review of Eurycleia's appearances in the poem and their connection to Odysseus and Telemachus. Karydas (1998, 18-20) comes to much the same conclusion as Fenik, apparently without much awareness of his work. Much of Fenik's analysis of Eurycleia and Euronyme as described in the following section is indebted to W. Scott (1918), as he himself acknowledges (1974, 189 n. 94). Cf. also Ramming (1973, 103-4), of which Fenik was probably not yet aware.

[345] So Fenik (1974, 190-1) and Steiner (2010 *ad Od*. 18.164).

Penelope together (23.293-5).[346] And Eurynome's close association with the *thalamos* and Penelope is consistent with the metonymic import which the bed serves with respect to the relationship between Odysseus and Penelope, and in particular to Penelope's sexual loyalty to Odysseus.[347] A touching symbolic resolution to the tension between Odysseus and Penelope is found when Eurycleia, Odysseus' *trophos*, and Eurynome, Penelope's *thalamēpolos*, make the marital bed (23.288-9) on which the couple are about to be reunited.

Emblematic of the contrasting loyalties of Eurycleia and Eurynome is the very different advice they each give to Penelope. Eurynome more or less advises Penelope to consider remarriage (18.170-6) in a speech which Pedrick aptly compares to the bad advice often given by nurses or sisters to heroines in Greek tragedy.[348] We have in Eurycleia's speech, on the other hand, a rare example of a mortal woman giving good advice in Greek poetry. Eurycleia dissuades Penelope from calling for Laertes to drive the suitors out of her house. In addition, she more or less instructs Penelope to go upstairs to her room and act like a woman should (4.744-57), a gentler version of the speech Telemachus gave his mother earlier on (1.346-59). In other words, Eurynome comes close to suggesting that Penelope betray Odysseus, whereas Eurycleia fulfills the role which Telemachus – and Odysseus – would play were he present. So, Eurynome serves as a double for Eurycleia, playing the same role for Penelope as Eurycleia plays for Odysseus. And the mirroring of their respective roles represents the tension caused by the separation of

---

[346] So Fenik (1974, 189-90). While Eurycleia is the only character in the *Odyssey* to be referred to as a *trophos* ('nurse,' 2.361, 4.742, 17.31, 19.15, 21, 21.380, 22.301, 394, 419, 480, 485, 492, 23.25, 39, 69, 289), Ramming (1973, 103) does note that Eurymedousa, the only other *thalamēpolos* apart from Eurynome, is said to have reared (τρέφε) Nausicaa (7.12).

[347] For a thoroughgoing analysis of this metonym, see Zeitlin (1996, 20-7); cf. also Thalmann (1998a, 81-2).

[348] Pedrick (1994, 98-103), citing in particular the nurse's conversation with Phaedra at Eur. *Hipp*. 433-524, and, as a later development, Anna's successful attempt to persuade Dido to explore her passion for Aeneas at Verg. *A*. 4.1-53.

Odysseus and Penelope, just as it comes to represent the resolution caused by their reunion.[349] This is not to say that Eurycleia is nothing more than one half of a binary which shadows the marital relationship of Odysseus and Penelope. Various studies of Eurycleia have shown her to be a complex and interesting figure.[350] But the above analysis does show that she and Euynome are mobilized along one of the lines that separate Odysseus from his *oikos*, and this separation is the main source of tension in the second half of the poem.

We encounter a much more complicated case when we look at Eumaeus as a doubling figure. Fenik does not include him in his list of doubles, although, as we have already observed, this possibility has been anticipated elsewhere. The reason for his lack of inclusion in Fenik, I believe, is that the manner in which Eumaeus plays the double is much more complex and nuanced than in the examples which he puts forward. Nonetheless, there are formal reasons for linking this pair closely.[351] First, Eumaeus is the only character in the *Odyssey* to receive apostrophes from the narrator (14.55, 165, 360, 442, 507, 15.325, 16.60, 135, 464, 17.272, 311, 380, 512, 579, 22.194). This unique situation has been the subject of much discussion. Eustathius suggests that the narrator treats Eumaeus in this fashion out of affection for the slave (φιλῶν τῆς εὐνοίας τὸν δούλον, 2.60.26), a view which has largely met with agreement in modern criticism.[352] It is also interesting to observe with Block that the two mortal characters to receive relatively frequent narrative apostrophe in the *Iliad*, namely Patroclus (16.20, 584, 692-3, 744, 754, 787, 812, 843) and Menelaus (4.127, 146, 7.104, 13.603, 17.679, 702, 23.600), share certain characteristics with the swineherd.[353] All three:

---

[349] The tension that doubles represent in Romantic literature and afterward is not typically resolved in such a pleasant manner.

[350] Olson (1992), Karydas (1998, 8-63), Thalmann (1998a, 74-83).

[351] Bonnafé (1984) thinks it is significant that *dīos* ('godlike') is used of both Odysseus and Eumaeus, and the epithet's distribution in the *Odyssey* is suggestive. Nominative, line-ending δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς is ubiquitous, and the only other character to be described in the same way on a regular basis is Eumaeus (δῖος ὑφορβός, 14.48, 401, 413, 15.301, 16.1, 20, 333, 452, 17.183, 260, 589, 21.359, 22.162). The only other, infrequent recipients of this combination are Orestes (3.306, 11.461) and Echephron (3.439). I prefer J.-M. Foley's (1999, 213-16) assessment that *dīos* refers to a type of character and nothing more specific. Cf. Scodel (2002, 156-60) on Eumaeus' epithets as stressing "simultaneously his humble status and his nobility" (158), with the result that the audience cannot predict how his story will turn out.

> exhibit characteristic traits of vulnerability, loyalty, and vague but poetically essential weakness. All three furthermore define, negatively or positively, by possessing these traits, the protective qualities of the main characters to whom they are complementary – Agamemnon, Achilles, or Odysseus.[354]

While Block convincingly shows that this pattern holds with Patroclus and Menelaus, she essentially ignores Eumaeus.[355] And, in fact, while Patroclus and Menelaus can be seen to be gentler doubles of Achilles and Agamemnon respectively, this is somewhat less clear in the case of Eumaeus. It is, after all, somewhat difficult to find a basis for comparison. Patroclus and Menelaus are shown to be gentle based on their actions in war, whereas Eumaeus' martial activity is confined to a single, straightforward skirmish in his master's *oikos* (22.265-80). Nonetheless, it is worth noting that we first encounter Eumaeus driving his dogs away from the beggar Odysseus:

> ἐξαπίνης δ᾽ Ὀδυσῆα ἴδον κύνες ὑλακόμωροι.
> οἳ μὲν κεκλήγοντες ἐπέδραμον· αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς
> ἕζετο κερδοσύνῃ, σκῆπτρον δέ οἱ ἔκπεσε χειρός.

---

[352] Cf. Σ bT *ad Il.* 16.787 Erbse. So Block (1982, 15-16), Kahane (1994, 111-13), Louden (1997, 108), with further bibliography, and Scodel (2002, 157). Contrast A. Parry (1972, 20-1), A. Edwards (1987, 37), and Reece (1993, 151-2), who characterize these apostrophes as fossilized formulae. Stanford (1959 *ad* 14.55) argues that euphony was the motivating factor behind the use of the vocative in these cases, but A. Parry (1972, 21) shows this to be unlikely, pointing to 14.121 and 401, two third-person alternatives to the formula used at 14.55 and elsewhere. A. Bowie (2013 *ad* 14.55) is agnostic. Cf. J. Griffin (1986, 47) on the praise of Eumaeus at 15.556-7: "that openly laudatory comment departs widely from the normal reticence of the epic narrator." And Kahane (1994, 111) notes that only the narrator and Odysseus' immediate family refer to Eumaeus by name, creating "an affinity between the narrator and those characters sympathetic to Eumaios."

[353] Melanippus is also addressed once at 15.582, and Achilles at 20.2.

[354] Block (1982, 16).

[355] See also A. Parry (1972, 17-21) on Menelaus, and Beck (2005, 81-2 and 2012, 172-4) on Patroclus.

> ἔνθα κεν ᾧ παρὰ σταθμῷ ἀεικέλιον πάθεν ἄλγος·
> ἀλλὰ συβώτης ὦκα ποσὶ κραιπνοῖσι μετασπὼν
> ἔσσυτ᾽ ἀνὰ πρόθυρον, σκῦτος δέ οἱ ἔκπεσε χειρός.
> τοὺς μὲν ὁμοκλήσας σεῦεν κύνας ἄλλυδις ἄλλον
> πυκνῇσιν λιθάδεσσιν.
>
> "Suddenly, barking dogs saw Odysseus. They made a shrill sound and rushed at him. But Odysseus craftily sat down, and his staff fell from his hand. Then he would have suffered unseemly grief by his own farmhouse, but the swineherd followed them swiftly on swift feet and rushed through the gate, and the leather fell from his hand. He shouted at the dogs and chased them every which way with a hail of stones" (14.29-36).

Critics have found a problematic disjunction between line 31 and what follows. The beggar sits down and drops his staff, a time-honoured technique for pacifying aggressive dogs.[356] But then the narrator seemingly forgets that the beggar has used this technique and describes how Eumaeus is required to save him.[357] I would argue that this is an example of a kind of duplication of the actions of Odysseus and Eumaeus, one which we will see again. This duplication is useful in the present context for several reasons. Both Odysseus and Eumaeus display their central characteristics side-by-side with respect to the same event. Odysseus once again shows his craftiness by applying a technique utilized by the cognoscenti, and the narrator ensures our awareness of this with the relatively rare word *kerdosynē* (cunning).[358] Eumaeus, on the other hand, betrays a sort of gentleness in this passage that is typical of the doublet. He does attribute his defence of the beggar to a fear of his blame (κέν… ἐλεγχείην, 14.38), but his reaction says otherwise. His haste in investigating the commotion and, more importantly, his dropping of the piece of leather suggest a genuine concern for the well-being of the vagrant, foolhardy though the trespasser’s lack of foresight may seem. The close similarity between the description of the beggar’s dropping of his staff and the swineherd’s dropping of the leather also suggests a sympathy between the two characters. There is an especially admirable effect from a poetic standpoint when we consider that two rather different actions are being described. As we have established, the beggar rids himself of his staff in a deliberate attempt to pacify the dogs. The swineherd seemingly drops the piece of leather out of shock.[359] These two very different actions, which are described almost identically, in some sense foreshadow the relationship that will develop – or be reestablished.[360] It is interesting to note that, while encountering one or more dogs is a common motif in type-scenes involving the reception of a *xeinos* (‘stranger’ or ‘guest-friend’) into a household (*Od*. 7.91-4, 10.212-19, 14.21-2, 29-32, 16.4-10, 162-3, 17.291-327), these dogs are not aggressive elsewhere. The function of this aggression here may be to provide an opportunity for this evocative foreshadowing. In any case, Odysseus will exert his considerable manipulative abilities in an attempt to recruit Eumaeus to his cause. And Eumaeus, like Patroclus with Achilles, will respond in a sympathetic and even gentle manner, but also more importantly in a manner that is reminiscent of his master.

---

[356] Hainsworth (1961) and Lilja (1976, 19-20), who cite Arist. *Rhet.* 1380a24, Plin. *Nat.* 8.146, Plut. *Mor*. 970e, Σ QV and B *ad loc.* Dindorf, and several more modern examples for this technique. Cook (1999, 129-30) and King (1999, 89-90), on the other hand, argue that Odysseus feigns helplessness here because this would be consistent with the helpless character they claim Odysseus is portraying in the beggar.

[357] Hainsworth (1961); so Heubeck and Hoekstra (1990 *ad* 14.30-2).

[358] Roisman (1990, 219) points out that the only other use of this word in this poem occurs at 4.251 when Helen detects Odysseus despite his *kerdosynē*. She suggests that we should assume based on this parallel that Eumaeus quickly sees through Odysseus' disguise (she also finds several other examples of *kerd-* words used in scenes in which Odysseus "is unmasked" (220)). It is worth noting, however, that *kerdosynē* is also used at *Il*. 22.247 of Athena's successful deception of Hector.

---

[359] Cf. A. Bowie (2013 *ad* 14.34): “the use of similar expressions for Od. and Eum. constitutes the symbolic linking of master and servant;” so Roisman (1990, 218-19). It is also noteworthy that Eumaeus was using the piece of leather he drops to make sandals (14.23-4). And he built and maintained a fine pigsty (5-17), another example of skillful craftsmanship, which is characteristic of Odysseus; cf. Austin (1975.166-8) on Eumaeus’ farm as a reflection of his character.

[360] Some variation of *ekpese cheiros* appears seven other times in Homeric poetry. But its meaning is more bland than one might expect. It is used elsewhere to describe the inability of a warrior to hold onto his weapon because of death or injury in battle (*Il*. 3.363, 4.493, 8.329, 15.421, 465; *Od*. 22.17, where the cup falling from Antinous’ hand is perhaps indicative of his unheroic behaviour and the unmanly manner of his death; cf. Russo et al. (1992 *ad* 22.10 and 17)). At *Od*. 16.13, the present scene is recapitulated when Eumaeus drops wine vessels (ἐκ δ᾽ ἄρα οἱ χειρῶν πέσεν ἄγγεα) at the sight of Telemachus having returned home from abroad. We will look more closely at this passage below.

Eumaeus' sympathy for the beggar Odysseus also increases, reflecting his gradual realization that the beggar closely resembles not only his missing master but also Eumaeus himself. Perhaps the clearest indication of this increasing sympathy is the alteration the swineherd makes to the hospitality he offers to the beggar as the first day progresses. When Eumaeus first welcomes the beggar, he receives the usual wish that his host should enjoy good fortune (14.53-4).[361] Eumaeus responds quite emphatically that such hospitality as the beggar receives is only to be expected:

> Ξεῖν’, οὔ μοι θέμις ἔστ’, οὐδ’ εἰ κακίων σέθεν ἔλθοι,
> ξεῖνον ἀτιμῆσαι· πρὸς γὰρ Διός εἰσιν ἅπαντες
> ξεῖνοί τε πτωχοί τε. δόσις δ’ ὀλίγη τε φίλη τε
> γίνεται ἡμετέρη· ἣ γὰρ δμώων δίκη ἐστίν,
> αἰεὶ δειδιότων, ὅτ’ ἐπικρατέωσιν ἄνακτες
> οἱ νέοι.

> “Stranger, it is not right [or “it is contrary to divine law”] for me to dishonour a stranger, not even if one much worse than you should come. For all strangers and beggars are from Zeus. And our gift is small and dear. For this is the practice of slaves, always fearful when masters – young ones – have the power” (14.56-60).

The triple repetition of *xeinos* (‘guest-friend’) in the initial position seems to add a particular rhetorical emphasis to the fact that the beggar is a guest and therefore due the reception which he receives. And certainly the obligation to receive a guest hospitably is a frequent point of emphasis in the poem. One of the distinctions made between Eumaeus and the suitors, for example, is that Eumaeus passes the tests (πειρητίζων) of hospitality that Odysseus gives him (14.459-61, 15.303-6), whereas the suitors are anything but hospitable, despite the fact that they are aware of their duty to be so (17.483-7). As one of the acceptable hosts in the poem, then,

---

[361] Reece (1993, 29-30) finds eight examples of this type of wish in early Greek hexameter: *Od*. 3.55-9, 7.148-50, 353-5, 14.51-4, 439-41,15.340-42, 17.353-5, *H.Dem*. 135-7, 224-5. He also contrasts the curse Odysseus places upon Antinous in response to his inhospitable behaviour (17.475-6). Grossardt’s (1998, 67) claim that Zeus Xenios is mentioned for the first time in the poem at 14.53 fails to take account of 9.271-2.

Eumaeus is merely meeting social and religious expectation. But a beggar is hardly the typical guest; nor is a swineherd the typical Homeric host, at least in the sense that he no longer plays the role of an aristocrat. In addition, as Reece points out, relationships of *xenia* ('guest-friendship') usually took place between social equals both in literary and historical Greece.[362] On the other hand, neither the swineherd nor the beggar were born into the roles they are playing at this point in the poem. As we have seen, Eumaeus is the son of a *basileus* ('chief', 15.413-14). And Odysseus, not unusually for a Homeric hero, is ordinarily descended from Hermes and therefore ultimately Zeus himself on his mother's side.[363] So, while the swineherd and the beggar are not currently social equals, their fortunes have changed. It is precisely the dissonance between former and current fortunes that creates much of the tension in the latter half of the *Odyssey*. We do not just have a swineherd hosting a beggar. We have a swineherd who used to be a *basileus* unknowingly hosting a beggar who also used to be a *basileus*.[364] This shared dissonance slowly creates a sympathy between the two characters as they come to realize how uncannily similar they are. In addition, as we will develop in more detail, Eumaeus' past and potential future highlights the tension in Odysseus' current situation.

---

[362] Reece (1993, 146).

[363] Technically the prominent tradition according to which Sisyphus rapes Odysseus' mother Anticleia (see Gantz (1993, 175-6)) does not involve a breaking of this line. See the genealogical chart in Stocking (forthcoming).

[364] Cf. Segal (1994a, 173): "the loyal swineherd is equally a royal victim of chance and misfortune." It has often been noted that Odysseus is not Odysseus until he is acknowledged as such by all: Segal (1994a,95-8), Biles (2003), Murnaghan (2011, 1-4). The Homeric notion that one is little more than one's reputation (*kleos*) is brilliantly expressed by Redfield (1994, 34). On *kleos* in the Homeric world more generally, see Olson (1995, 1-23).

Ahl and Roisman (1996, 167-88), developing a thesis first proposed by Roisman (1990), argue that Eumaeus "covertly" recognizes Odysseus in Book 14. This idea has gained little traction (Grossardt's (1998, 69-70) rebuttal is particularly stinging; cf. also Olson (1995, 122-3) and Levaniouk (2011, 11)). There is no good evidence for this covert recognition, and in fact the lack of recognition on Eumaeus' part "generates all the familiar ironies" (Fenik (1975, 29, with these ironies being explored at length from 5-61)); so Hölscher (1939.70) and King (1999, 80 n. 23), some of which we have already touched on. On the other hand, I would suggest that Ahl and Roisman are right to find fault with descriptions of Eumaeus' "naïvety" (e.g. by Grossardt (1998, 66-74) and King (1999)). I see no reason to insist that Eumaeus is somehow deficient because he does not possess the perspicacity to see through a disguise fashioned by Athena herself (cf. especially ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε σ᾽ ἄγνωστον τεύξω πάντεσσι βροτοῖσι ("but come, I will make you unknown to all mortals"), 13.397). The inability of mortals to perceive the gods against their will is a theme in the *Odyssey* (cf. Jörgensen (1904) on the *Apologoi*, Pucci (1987, 85-9), and also Marks (2008, 41), with further bibliography; cf. *H.Dem*. 111)), one which is easily extended here, especially in light of Odysseus' portrayal in the role of a god in the second half of the poem: Bierl (2004, with further bibliography at 44 n. 6).

Returning to the quoted passage, we find that, as peculiar to the present situation as it sometimes seems, most of the content reflects a viewpoint general to the poem. A parallel to Eumaeus' statement that it is not *themis* to dishonour a *xeinos* appears in Book 23, when Eurycleia informs Penelope that Odysseus is the *xeinos* whom all the suitors were dishonouring (Ὀδυσεὺς… ὁ ξεῖνος, τὸν πάντες ἀτίμων ἐν μεγάροισι; 23.27-8). We note that in both passages there is apprehension expressed over the dishonouring (*atīmān*) of a *xeinos*. And, in the present passage, *themis*, as Eumaeus implies, refers to divine law.[365] As will be dealt with in more detail below, Odysseus' return to Ithaca and vengeance on the suitors can be read as a theoxeny, divine punishment for their failure to observe the *themis* of *xenia*. Eurycleia seems to allude to this theme in Book 23, and Eumaeus in turn is doing little more in the present passage than deflecting praise by noting that he more or less has to receive the beggar hospitably, lest Zeus punish him.[366] In addition, the phrase δόσις δ' ὀλίγη τε φίλη τε has frequently been taken as a kind of apology by Eumaeus for the meagreness of the hospitality the beggar is about to receive.[367] But in fact the latter half of line 57 and all of 58 are also spoken by Nausicaa at 6.207-8, and she is hardly in straitened circumstances. In this light, it is more likely that we should understand the δόσις phrase to mean that giving is a minor thing but dear to the receiver, rather than that this particular gift is meagre. The other partial parallel to this phrase from the *Iliad* is much the same, albeit in a very different context. Achilles complains to Agamemnon that his *geras* ('extra apportionment connoting honour') is unjustifiably inferior to Agamemnon's: σοὶ τὸ γέρας πολὺ μεῖζον, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὀλίγον τε φίλον τε/ ἔρχομ᾽ ἔχων ἐπὶ νῆας, ἐπεί κε κάμω πολεμίζων ("your *geras* is far greater, and I go to my ships with something small and dear when I'm worn out from fighting", *Il.* 1.167-8). Agamemnon has just threatened to deprive a major leader of his *geras* in order to replace his own (1.137-9). Achilles' rejoinder is that, even though his *geras* is lesser than Agamemnon's, he has worn himself out earning it. In other words, as with the two passages from the *Odyssey*, Achilles' gift is a minor thing, but dear to him, the receiver.[368] Based on the two other uses of the phrase, then, it seems that Eumaeus is saying that the hospitality he is offering is not a hardship for him, but it is undoubtedly dear to the beggar. At this stage, Eumaeus is polite and welcoming, but measured in his reception of the beggar.

---

[365] *LfgrE* s.v. θέμις BI: "von den Göttern garantierte bzw. gewünschte Lebensordnung."

[366] Cf. especially A. Bowie (2013 *ad* 14.57). One might also compare Hes. *Op*. 717-18 and Thgn. 155-6 West$^2$, where the audience is advised not to contemn poverty.

[367] A. Bowie (2013 *ad* 14.59-60), Newton (2015, 257). The phrase turns out to be rather difficult, unlike similar constructions with more concrete nouns (e.g. τίπτε, Θέτι τανύπεπλε, ἱκάνεις ἡμετέρον δῶ/ αἰδοίη τε φίλη τε ("why in the world, long-robed, revered, and dear Thetis, have you come to our house?", *Il*. 18.385-6 = 424-5).

It is only in the last lines of the passage (14.58-60) that Eumaeus adds to this relatively standard hospitable greeting by implicitly apologizing for what will, at least at first, be a formally appropriate but nonetheless meagre welcome.[369] Eumaeus is ostensibly constrained by the harshness of the young master. The enjambment of οἱ νέοι is particularly interesting.[370] Obviously Eumaeus does not take issue with all masters, since he loves Odysseus. But his specification of young masters could be taken to refer not only to the suitors but also – and perhaps more surprisingly – to Telemachus.[371] While his love of Odysseus' patriline does quite obviously extend to Telemachus (16.11-29), however, he perhaps not unreasonably fears the son (17.188-9). And Telemachus does threaten him at one point, although he is for the benefit of the suitors (21.369-75). Perhaps out of fear, then, Eumaeus is moderate with his hospitality. As Newton notes, even though he is the favoured servant (14.62-4) of an extremely wealthy man (96-8), the hospitality which Eumaeus offers is almost comic in its meagreness and rusticity.[372] But he does fulfill all of the ordinary criteria within his means.[373] He welcomes the beggar into his hut and offers him a seat (48-51). Then he prepares a meal (72-81), drinks wine with the beggar (109-13), and exchanges news (112-84). Only after they have finished the meal does he ask the beggar who he is (185-90). Once their lengthy conversation is over, he provides a bed (518-24). Then, in the morning, he gives the beggar a gift in the form of a staff and himself serves as his escort to the *oikos* of Odysseus (182-203). We find, then, that Eumaeus' reception of the beggar is measured but appropriate, as one might expect of a perfect stranger.

---

[368] Hammer (1997, 347) interprets the Iliadic passage as Achilles presenting himself as a beggar. Other passages also lend the unsurprising impression that giving gifts – and especially gifts of hospitality – is an activity that takes place between *philoi* (οἷα φίλοι ξεῖνοι ξείνοισι διδοῦσι ("such things as dear guest-friends give to guest-friends", *Od.* 1.313); πομπὴ καὶ φίλα δῶρα, τὰ οἱ δίδομεν φιλέοντες ("conduct and friendly gifts, which we give him out of friendship", 8.545)), or that *philoi* themselves are worthy of a gift of ransom (καὶ νῦν φίλον υἱὸν ἐλύσαο, πολλὰ δ᾽ ἔδωκας ("even now you have ransomed your dear son, and you have given much", *Il.* 24.686)). So the φίλη in the present passage might also carry a sense of the conferral of *philia* by the act of giving.

[369] This statement is typical in a *theoxeny*: Kearns (1982, 6).

[370] As A. Bowie (2013 *ad* 14.61) astutely notes, it "is added almost as a corrective." I think this is absolutely correct and in fact that it provides local motivation for the following tangent by Eumaeus about Odysseus (on local motivation in Homer, see Scodel (1999, 33-47)). In lines 59 and 60, Eumaeus could be taken to be iterating a fairly common slaves' view of the master. He quickly corrects himself, however, and then explains the correction. He claims not to fear Odysseus, the man he takes to be his actual master (see below on the theme of the gentle master in the *Odyssey*). Regarding the deeper motivation for the tangent, Grossardt (1998, 67) hits the nail on the head when he says that "für Eumaios Gastfreundschaft… und Treue zur Herrschaft nur zwei äussere Erscheinungsbilder derselben ethischen Gesinnung sind und daher untrennbar zusammengehören."

We note one important additional detail, however. After Odysseus gives his bogus autobiography (192-359), Eumaeus offers him a second, much more generous meal. And it is only at this time that he offers and shares sacrifice (407-56). Both of these actions draw our attention to the fact that something has changed for Eumaeus. He treats the beggar with considerably more sympathy once he has heard his story. The reason for this change, I argue, is that the suffering narrated in Odysseus' lying tale causes him to realize that he and the beggar Odysseus are united by common experience, and most importantly the threat of slavery.[374] In order to bring this out, it will be necessary to examine the lying tale in some detail. There are essentially two strands of scholarship on this lying tale. The first searches for ways in which Odysseus can be seen to be manipulating Eumaeus by inventing autobiographical details with which he might be expected to sympathize.[375] The second sees the lying tale as containing allusions to alternative *Odysseys*, with the present example being the most extensive and therefore most examined one in the poem.[376] Of course these two strands are not incompatible. Odysseus can simultaneously be alluding to alternative *Odysseys* and manipulating details in order to ingratiate himself with the swineherd. It is of fundamental importance, however, that both of these concepts be borne in mind when reading this passage. One can frequently interpret a particular detail of Odysseus' lying tale as motivated by either or both of these factors, and ignoring one or the other possibility can lead to an unbalanced conclusion. The same holds true for the speech as a whole. It is well established that Odysseus' tale has such an impact on Eumaeus because the swineherd has experience in common with the character Odysseus creates. But it is central to my interpretation of this passage below that Odysseus is not simply inventing this story. He is including allusive details, the extent of which it is impossible to determine.[377] Implied by this, however, is the possibility that he actually could have experienced what he is narrating. From this point of view, the similarities between the character of his lying tale and Eumaeus are not entirely points of cynical manipulation. The similarities cast Eumaeus as a kind of counterfactual Odysseus. The auditors of the poem are not necessarily aware of these similarities until Eumaeus tells his own story (15.390-484). But when he does, I will argue, the effect produced is uncanny.

---

[371] *Pace* Olson (1995, 125).

[372] Newton (2015, 269). Reece (1993, 146-8) breaks down the meagreness of Eumaeus' initial hospitality in comparison to the other scenes of hospitality in great detail. The characterization of this scene by Williams (1986, 396) and Reece (1993, 154) as parodic is perhaps excessive.

[373] Reece (1993, 17-39) provides an excellent list and analysis of all of the conventional expectations of the Homeric host.

---

[374] As will become clear, I think Cook (2012 n. 42) is absolutely correct in his decision to use quotation marks around 'lying' and 'false' when referring to this kind of tale: "they are only 'false' in the sense that they do not agree with the primary narrative. They are, however, used to communicate important 'truths' about the characters who relate them and are perfectly authentic 'myths' in their own way." Cf. Arthur (1977, 19): "the falsity is only superficial, for the message of the tale is true." So Walcot (1977, 12).

[375] This strand is immense. The most important examples for our purposes are Austin (1975, 224-53), Finley (1978, 174-5), G. Rose (1980), Hölscher (1990, 212), Minchin (1992, with further bibliography in Minchin (2001, 210 n. 19)), Louden (1997, 100-12), Grossardt (1998, 66-74), and Newton (2015, 269-70). Segal (1994a, 177-8) treats the lying tale as ironic because it is close to the truth.

[376] The idea seems first to have been suggested by Woodhouse (1930, 126-36), although he is primarily interested in finding traces of the 'true' *Odyssey*. It was revived by Reece (1994). Most recently see Tsagalis (2012) and his ample bibliography; cf. also S. West (2012, 125).

There is both internal and external evidence in favour of a so-called Cretan *Odyssey*. The most obvious internal evidence is Odysseus' systematic claim to be from Crete in his lying tales (13.256-7, 14.199-200, 19.172-87).[378] This is particularly significant when we consider how the proem to the *Odyssey* (1.1-10) does not seem to describe the poem which follows particularly well.[379] Of especial relevance for our present purpose is the phrase πολλῶν δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω ("and he saw the cities of many men and knew their mind," 1.3). It is a commonplace of Homeric scholarship to observe that Odysseus does not see many cities in our *Odyssey*. In fact, after Troy, the only location Odysseus reaches that could be called a city is the settlement of the Phaeacians (ἀπὸ πτόλιος, 6.294, 11.156; πόλινδ᾽, 7.14; πόλιν, 7.18). And this remote island hardly appears to fulfil the proem's promise on its own.[380] On the other hand, as Reece has observed, it is during Odysseus' Cretan lies that the lines most similar to 1.3 occur

---

[377] Cf. Levaniouk (2011, 93-108), who argues that the conversation between Odysseus and Penelope at *Od*. 19.104-360 is similarly suffused with Cretan themes and associations. See also Cook (2012, 55-7), with further bibliography.

[378] What follows is a very brief overview of the major points so that we can have some context for a discussion of Odysseus' conversation with Eumaeus. An excellent and more thorough treatment of both the internal and external evidence in favour of one or more Cretan *Odysseys* is Tsagalis (2012). Danek (1998, 285-6) remains agnostic.

[379] Scodel (1999, 79 n. 155).

[380] The settlements of the Cicones (9.41) and the Cimmerians (11.14) are both referred to as cities. But these are extremely fleeting references, and Odysseus could hardly be considered to have gotten to know them.

(πολλὰ βροτῶν ἐπὶ ἄστε᾽ ἀλώμενος (“wandering through many cities of men”, 15.492 = 19.170)).[381] And Eumaeus remarks to Telemachus that the (Cretan) beggar φησὶ δὲ πολλὰ βροτῶν ἐπὶ ἄστεα δινηθῆναι/ πλαζόμενος (“says that he has roamed to many cities of men in his wandering,” 16.63-4). In fact, according to the beggar, even Crete by itself has many and countless men and ninety cities (Κρήτη… / ἐν δ᾽ ἄνθρωποι / πολλοὶ ἀπειρέσιοι, καὶ ἐννήκοντα πόληες, 19.172-4).[382] It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the poem shows more familiarity with the topography of Crete than with the Peloponnese, which Telemachus visits in Books 3 and 4.[383] Eumaeus also reports that an Aetolian falsely claimed that Odysseus had stayed in the house of Idomeneus on Crete while repairing his ships (14.378-89). And Marks argues that this report “alludes to themes that were central to some versions of Odysseus’ return, but were antithetical to the *Odyssey* itself.” This technique involving the deauthorization of competitive epics has been identified elsewhere in the *Odyssey*.[384]

While the external evidence is rather late, it nonetheless remains suggestive. Zenodotus seems to have had some access to a tradition in which Telemachus went to Crete rather than Sparta, in addition to his visit to Pylos. He, and possibly others, read ἐς Κρήτην (“to Crete”) in place of ἐς Σπάρτην (“to Sparta”) at 1.93, and ἐς Κρήτην τε παρ᾽ Ἰδομενῆα ἄνακτα (“and to Crete to the house of the lord Idomeneus”), instead of Σπάρτηνδε παρὰ ξανθὸν Μενέλαον (“to

---

[381] Reece (1994, 159). Segal (1994a, 183) also compares ἐπὶ πολλὰ δ᾽ ἀλήθην (“I wandered through many places”, 14.120), ὅσα δὴ πάθες ἠδ᾽ ὅσ᾽ ἀλήθης (“how many things you suffered and how many places you wandered”, 14.362), and ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἀληθείς (“having wandered over the earth”, 14.380) without making the same connections. On the proem and its relation to the rest of the poem in general, see S. West (1981), Nagler (1990), and Tsagalis (2012, 318-19), with bibliography.

[382] Cf. 19.178-80.

[383] See Burkert (2001, 127-37) and M. West (2014, 87).

[384] Marks (2003, 220-3). On the other hand, A. Bowie (2013 *ad Od*. 14.360-89) suggests that Eumaeus invents the story of the Aetolian “carefully crafted to administer an inherent rebuke to Od.”

Sparta to the house of blond Menelaus") at 1.285.[385] S. West argues that these two variants confirm one another and so cannot be the result of scribal error. She also insists that they could not simply have been conjectures by Zenodotus because they are so obviously out of place in our *Odyssey*. Her claim that these variants must have been strongly attested in his time seems decisive, therefore.[386] Much later, we have it narrated by Dictys Cretensis that Odysseus, either instead of or in addition to travelling to the supernatural areas described in *Od*. 9-12, ends up with Idomeneus on Crete (6.5).[387] Few would suggest that we should take this narration as a wholesale summary of a now lost alternative *Odyssey*. But, in light of the other evidence, it is possible that what we have is a learned treatment of such an *Odyssey* for the amusement of the contemporary literati.[388] Finally, it is worth noting Malkin's observation that Odysseus was an extremely popular heroic ancestor in regional genealogies because of his wanderings, meaning that a Cretan *Odyssey* is not an improbable possibility.[389]

It seems fairly clear, then, that an audience relatively contemporary to our *Odyssey* would have understood that Odysseus' lying tales contain references to alternative, and possibly non-canonical, *Odysseys* in which Odysseus was blown to Crete and visited Idomeneus.[390] Regarding this possibility, Levaniouk makes the fundamentally important point that, contrary to much neoanalytical reconstruction, we are dealing with a branch of the poetic tradition of the *Odyssey*, and not a single poem.[391] And we have virtually no solid information regarding what this tradition would have looked like in precise, narrative terms. Given the likely plurality of iterations of the Cretan tradition, however, it is probably more profitable to think in terms of themes. And in the present context, where we have an allusion – one of many in our *Odyssey* – to a recognizable, alternative tradition, it is safe to say that this Cretan lie which Odysseus constantly tells itself constitutes a theme. In other words, when Odysseus tells an interlocutor one of his Cretan tales, he evokes what I will call a Cretan 'mode' of the *Odyssey*, referring to the traditional referentiality of this type of tale.[392] The auditor is then given to understand that Odysseus is, at least in the wandering portion of his story, providing a metapoetic version of the Cretan tradition, one which can be made to cater to his audience, just as actual bards presumably catered their stories to their audiences.[393] And, in fact, while Odysseus does not appear entirely to be lying when he relates his journey to the Phaeacians in Books 9 to 12, there are good reasons to believe that he is at least not telling the whole truth.[394] To return to the question of Odysseus' longest lying tale and its relationship to Eumaeus, then, the fact that it is a Cretan tale does not simply signal that Odysseus is lying. It indicates metapoetically that he is, at least in the wandering portion, narrating a story that could have happened to him. And, again, if we think in terms of allomorphic motifs, much of what happens to the beggar in this lying tale does happen to Odysseus, as we will see. It is more sensible, then, as Cook argues, not to dismiss the resemblance between Eumaeus' story and Odysseus' lying tale "as a simple intratextual echo, since Homer could have given Eumaios a different biography to which 'Odysseus' could have then adjusted his story."[395] The compilation of themes in the beggar's lying tale is significant, and Eumaeus' in turn is at least partially modelled upon the same cluster.[396] In this reading, Odysseus remains the primary character, and Eumaeus the doublet. The shared themes link them without always being peculiar to the two of them. We may expect as much from epic poetry, which is to some extent always about the human condition.

---

[385] Σ HM *ad* 3.313 Pontani, apparently referring to 1.93 and 1.284-6. Reece (1994, 167 n. 15) reads Zenodotus as he will, but the fact remains that Zenodotus did hold such an interpretation. See also Σ MO *ad* 1.93 Pontani, where it is unclear to whom τινές refers. But it may simply be Zenodotus alone, since τινές can refer to a single scholar: Nünlist (2009, 12), who cites Σ A *ad Il*. 3.11 Erbse, where it refers only to Zenodotus. Some scholia explicitly deny this alternative tradition (e.g. HM *ad* 2.359 Pontani). It is also noteworthy that some MSS confusingly record the line κεῖθεν δ᾽ ἐς Κρήτην τε παρ᾽ Ἰδομενῆα ἄνακτα ("and from there to Crete and to the house of the lord Idomeneus") after the vulgate's 1.93 (see the *app. crit.* in Heubeck et al.).

[386] S. West (1981, 173-4), *pace* M. West (2014, 107-8). Zenodotus frequently comes under fire in Homeric textual criticism, but see M. West (2001, 33-45) for a more balanced view.

[387] There is an Attic red-figure stamnos (*LIMC* s.v. "Idomeneus" I) from ca. 480 BCE, on which Idomeneus (ΙΔΑΜΕΝΕΥΣ) is depicted hanging under a ram's belly and escaping from Polyphemus' cave with Odysseus (cf. *Od*. 9.424-66).

[388] So Reece (1994, 168-9) and Levaniouk (2012, 374).

[389] Malkin (1998, 121-6); so Marks (2003, 220-2).

---

[390] Reece (1994, 157-73) offers one possible version of such a poem. On the distinction between canonical and non-canonical early Greek hexameter, see Nagy (1990, 70 and 1999.7-8), bearing in mind the reservations of Andersen and Haug (2012, 6-7), for example.

[391] Levaniouk (2012, 374-5).

[392] On traditional referentiality, see J.-M. Foley (1991, 38-60).

[393] So Cook (2012, 94). In this sense, we should distinguish Odysseus' Cretan lies from Demeter's Cretan lie in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (119-33), at least inasmuch as we are not aware of a similar tradition regarding Demeter. But cf. Levaniouk (2011, 101-3), who argues that Odysseus' and Demeter's Cretan lies both "connote return, renewal, and epiphany" (103). A more detailed comparison of Odysseus' meeting with Eumaeus and Demeter's conversation with the daughters of Celeus is below.

[394] On the general veracity of Books 9 to 12, see H. Parry (1994), C. Brown (1996, 2 n. 1), S. Richardson (1996), and de Jong (2001.221-3). For one example of Odysseus presenting his story in a manner advantageous to himself, cf. Karanika (2011, 11-17) on his description of his meeting with Heracles in Hades.

Thinking in these terms, the thematic model which primarily governs Odysseus' stay with Eumaeus, and indeed all of Books 13 to 22, is that of his eventual epiphany. This has been well established.[397] To introduce the basic elements of this theme, Odysseus plays the role of a god who disguises himself in order to test mortal *xenia*. In order to receive appropriate hospitality, he tells a lying tale meant to provoke the pity of his host. Then, when he has discovered who is naughty and who is nice, he reveals his true identity and punishes those who have not met his criteria.[398] The most important examples of this in early Greek epic are the present one in the *Odyssey* and in the *Hymn to Demeter* (105-304).[399] Both of these instances, however, are also parts of a series of complex themes and feature only partial epiphanies.[400] The advantage of this comparison for our purposes is that the scene in the *Hymn to Demeter* which is parallel to our meeting between Odysseus and Eumaeus, namely the discovery of the disguised Demeter by the daughters of Celeus (105-68), contains many of the same motifs, not the least of which revolve around their Cretan lies (119-33).[401] The most obvious parallel is that both Demeter and Odysseus appear in disguise, first to the daughters of Celeus and Eumaeus respectively (*H. Dem*. 101-4, *Od*. 13.429-38), thus enabling them to perform tests.[402] The use of the disguise in each case is rather different, however. We have already noted that Odysseus uses his beggar's disguise to test the relevant denizens of Ithaca. Demeter's disguise, on the other hand, is in some sense not really a disguise, having more to do with mourning the 'death' of Persephone.[403] As Redfield says of the slain Patroclus in the *Iliad*, "the dead man must go on a journey, and the impulse of the mourners is to go with him." One symptom of this impulse is self-deprivation, such as Achilles' abstinence from food, sleep, washing, and sex (24.129-31).[404] On Odysseus' disappearance, Laertes similarly removes himself from society and submits himself to a harsh regimen (*Od*. 11.187-96). As Murnaghan observes, "this conception involves the same kind of ambiguity inherent in literal disguises."[405] The mourner becomes nearly indistinguishable from an older person of a much lower class. So Demeter in her mourning naturally appears as if in disguise to the daughters of Celeus. This is probably an allomorph of the *theoxeny* theme, and the result is the same inasmuch as mortals are tested.[406] Eumaeus simultaneously passes Odysseus' first test by treating him hospitably despite his rude appearance and attire, and he provides him with a means into the *oikos*. If we compare the structures of the two passages, then, the daughters of Celeus emerge as the *Hymn to Demeter*'s parallel to Eumaeus. They encounter Demeter sitting by the road (98-111), invite her in (153-68), ask after her history (113-17), are given a Cretan lie (119-33), and introduce her into their household (184-9).[407] So Eumaeus and the daughters of Celeus are both the internal audiences of a Cretan lie, and in parallel circumstances.

---

[395] *Pace* Danek (1998, 285).

[396] Cook (2012, 84).

[397] See Kearns (1982), whose treatment is considerably developed by Sowa (1984, especially 236-72), although her definition of "epiphany" is much broader than the one outlined here; see also Montiglio (2005, 91-2), Louden (2011, 30-56), Murnaghan (2011, 7-10), and Cook (2012, with further bibliography at 57 n. 13). Cf. Clay (1983, 213-39) on the more general concept of *theodicy* in the *Odyssey*.

---

[398] Sowa (1984, 238 and 243-50) contends that all of the major *Homeric Hymns* contain epiphanies. It is worth noting that the *theoxeny* only becomes nearly explicit in the *Odyssey* as late as 17.362-3: ὡς ἂν…/ γνοίη θ᾽ οἵ τινὲς εἰσιν ἐναίσινμοι οἵ τ᾽ ἀθέμιστοι ("to learn who was just and who lawless"). Nagy's (1999, 116) doctrine that the central heroes of Homeric "epic tradition cannot have an overtly religious dimension in the narrative" just holds true in this case. Odysseus sensibly avoids portraying himself in such a manner: τούσδε δὲ μοῖρ᾽ ἐδάμασσε θεῶν καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα ("fate from the gods and their cruel deeds overcame these men here," 22.413).

[399] We might also compare the much later examples of Jason in AR 1.8-11, 3.66-75, and Baucis and Philemon in Ov. *Met*. 8.621-96. The passages in the *Argonautica* are heavily indebted to the *Odyssey*: Lennox (1980), Hunter (1989 *ad* AR 3.66-75), Knight (1995, 133-8), Clare (2002, 20-32). A. Griffin (1991, 68-72) suggests that, while there is no good classical parallel, the Baucis and Philemon story probably has its origin in the Near East; cf. Kenney (2011 *ad* Ov. *Met*. 8.611-724) for further bibliography.

[400] Grossardt (1998, 231-40) provides a fine analysis of the similarity between the two scenes, although his description of the relationship between the two poems as "die Rezeption der *Odyssee* in des *Demeter-Hymnos*" (231) perhaps underestimates the antiquity of the tradition of the *Hymn*. The usual dating of the *Hymn* to the late 7th century or early 6th century (cf. 227 n. 21) does not preclude the possibility that at least strands of the tradition could be much more ancient. Cook (2012) is an excellent and detailed examination of how the epiphany motif interacts with other themes in each of these two poems. See also Bierl (2004, 47-8).

[401] See the chart Sowa (1984, 251) provides comparing the relevant motifs in these two scenes. I would, however, dispute her comparison between the daughters of Celeus (159) and Metaneira (213-15) recognizing Demeter as superior despite her disguise and Telemachus' wondering at his father (16.178-85). Odysseus is not in disguise at this point, after all.

[402] See *ibid*. for these themes in the Phaeacian episode as well. One wonders if Helen's description of her meeting with Odysseus (*Od.* 4.235-64) is not a comparable example.

---

[403] On Demeter's reaction to Persephone's abduction as one of mourning, see DeBloois (1997, 253-4) and Nickel (2003, 77).

[404] Redfield (1994, 181).

[405] Murnaghan (2011, 19 n. 12).

[406] So Pratt (2000, 44) and Suter (2002, 139-40), *pace* Clay (1989, 227-8).

[407] The parallel examples from *Od*. 14 have already been examined. Note, however, that, while Eumaeus' first encounter with Odysseus at 14.29-36 parallels the first encounter at *H. Dem*. 98-111, the 'Maiden at the Well' motif has already appeared with Odysseus' meeting with Athena at 13.102-12 and 221-7. On this motif, see Reece (1993, 12-13).

The broad similarities between the two passages more or less end there, however. But, because of the thematic parallels, it will be informative to provide a comparison of the two lies. The *Hymn to Demeter* is obviously much shorter than the *Odyssey*, and so much of the parallel material is correspondingly abbreviated. This goes for the daughters of Celeus as well. Their role can essentially be described as functional. They fulfill the basic requirements of the scene and then more or less disappear.[408] One result of this abbreviation is that Demeter's lying tale apparently only resonates with the goddess herself. Unlike Eumaeus, the daughters of Celeus are not sufficiently developed for such a purpose. On a more schematic level, however, there are some obvious similarities. The first and the most discussed is the fact that both Demeter and Odysseus claim to come from Crete. As I have already claimed, Odysseus' reference to Crete is at least on one level an evocation of an alternative tradition of the *Odyssey*. Demeter's claim may also refer to some alternative tradition.[409] But this can only remain a hypothesis. Demeter and Odysseus also both begin their tales with professions of honesty (*Od*. 14.192, *H. Dem.* 119-21). And Eumaeus interestingly repeats the beggar's profession (not verbatim) when introducing him to Telemachus (*Od*. 16.61).[410] Tsagalis is surely correct in his observation that there is a certain amount of irony here as well in their claims of veracity.[411] As mentioned above, what they are about to say is not ‘true’, but they nonetheless report stories that are authentic in their own way. In a sense, then, Odysseus and Demeter hide the literal truth while exposing a deeper one. The truth explored in each of their cases is rather different, however, as is appropriate to each story. Demeter further reveals how much she is suffering on account of the loss of her daughter. And, I will argue, Odysseus alludes to important similarities between Eumaeus and himself, namely their shared suffering.

---

[408] N. Richardson (2011, 46) observes that their "youthful innocence and grace resembles that of Persephone and her companions." According to Pausanias (1.38.3), they are supposed to have played some part in performing rites for Demeter and Persephone (τὰ δὲ ἱερὰ τοῖν θεοῖν… δρῶσιν), presumably at the institution of the Eleusinian mysteries.

[409] So Suter (2002, 147-8), although I cannot follow her in her further proposal that "the *Hymn*'s poet has perhaps kept the basic story of this myth but dubbed it a lie because he wants to condemn the tradition as false" (148). We simply do not know enough about this possible alternative tradition to make any specific claims. Tantalizing, however, is Σ *ad* Hes. Th. 914 di Gregorio = Bacch. fr. 47 Maehler: ἡρπάσθαι δὲ τὴν Περσεφόνην φασὶν οἱ μὲν ἐκ Σικελίας, Β[ακχυλίδης] δὲ ἐκ Κρήτης ("some say that Persephone was kidnapped in Sicily. But B[acchylides] says in Crete"). Cf. also M. West's (1966) note on Κρήτης at Hes. *Th*. 971 (*ad loc*.). N. Richardson (1974 *ad H.Dem.* 123) thinks that Κρήτηθεν simply indicates that Demeter is lying. In the same note, he also summarizes the arguments in favour of the theory that the Eleusinian Mysteries had a Minoan origin, and a more detailed and up-to-date treatment of this question may be found in Suter (2002, 169-207). But there can be no definitive answer either way. Levaniouk (2011, 101-3) hypothesizes that Demeter signals her coming epiphany by referring to Crete, much in the manner that Odysseus is thought to in his tale to Eumaeus.

Part of the reason for the difference between the tales of Odysseus and Demeter is the status of their internal audiences. The daughters of Celeus belong to the aristocracy, whereas Eumaeus is a slave who used to be an aristocrat. For this reason, the idea of compulsion (*anankē*), so central to both tales, resonates and contrasts with Eumaeus’ experiences as it cannot with those of the daughters of Celeus, who have not yet experienced life’s vicissitudes. Demeter claims that:

> ‘νῦν αὖτε Κρήτηθεν ἐπ’ εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης
> ἤλυθον οὐκ ἐθέλουσα, βίῃ δ’ ἀέκουσαν ἀνάγκῃ
> ἄνδρες ληϊστῆρες ἀπήγαγον. οἳ μὲν ἔπειτα
> νηΐ θοῇ Θορικὸν δὲ κατέσχεθον, ἔνθα γυναῖκες
> ἠπείρου ἐπέβησαν ἀολλέες ἠδὲ καὶ αὐτοί
> δεῖπνον ἐπηρτύνοντο παρὰ πρυμνήσια νηός·
> ἀλλ’ ἐμοὶ οὐ δόρποιο μελίφρονος ἤρατο θυμὸς,
> λάθρῃ δ’ ὁρμηθεῖσα δι’ ἠπείροιο μελαίνης
> φεῦγον ὑπερφιάλους σημάντορας, ὄφρα κε μή με

---

[410] Richardson (1974 *ad H.Dem*. 120-1) notes in addition that Persephone makes a similar claim to her mother at 406. And so does Hermes to his own father, Zeus (*H.Herm*. 368-9). The variation in the wording of these phrases, which seem relatively formulaic in their meaning, is most perplexing. Vergados (2013 *ad H. Herm*. 368) claims that such statements are generally followed by the actual truth. He is apparently thinking of *Od*. 16.226, 17.108, and 22.420, which seem to me to be formulaic phrases of rather a different sort.

[411] Tsagalis (2012, 319 n. 41). Cf. *Od*. 19.203 and Hes. *Th*. 26-8, on which see Scodel (2001, 115-21).

> ἀπριάτην περάσαντες ἐμῆς ἀπονaίατο τιμῆς.'
>
> "Now I have come against my will over the broad back of the sea, and by force, against my will, by necessity did pirate men lead me away. Then they put in at Thoricos in their swift ship, where the women set foot on land in a group, and the men themselves began to prepare dinner by the ship's stern cables. But my heart had no desire for dinner, which is sweet to the heart. But I rushed out in secret through the dark land and escaped my insolent masters, so that they wouldn't sell me un-bought and have the enjoyment of my value" (*H. Dem* 123-32 Richardson).[412]

It has long been appreciated that, "in the Cretan tale, mother and daughter become closely assimilated in the mother's imagination."[413] Demeter places an extraordinary amount of emphasis on her unwillingness to be driven off, taking up almost a full line of hexameter to say so (124).[414] Demeter perceives her daughter's marriage to Hades as rape,[415] and her lying tale is accordingly preoccupied with volition. Of particular interest is the line-ending ἀνάγκῃ in the dative case.[416] The lying tales of Demeter and Odysseus are both centrally concerned with the weight of necessity. They both yield to it begrudgingly. Eumaeus, on the other hand, is happy with his lot, and he does not portray himself as having been constrained by necessity. The dative of *anankē* is used four times in the *Hymn*, once also with ἀέκουσαν in Demeter's address to

---

[412] Ἀπριάτην jumps out at us because of its rarity. Prior to Pindar (ἀπριάτας, fr. 169a.8 Maehler), it occurs only here, at *Il.* 1.99, and in Odysseus' lying tale (*Od.* 14.317). It appears to be used adjectivally here (N. Richardson (1974 *ad loc.*)) and at *Il.* 1.99 (so Hainsworth (1993 *ad loc.*) and *LfgrE* s.v., *contra* Σ A *ad loc.* Erbse, Cunliffe (1963 s.v.), and Wickert-Micknat (1983, 224)). But it must be adverbial at *Od.* 14.317. One is tempted to posit some significance to the appearance of such a rare word in both of these lying tales, but I am not convinced that there is any.

[413] H. Foley (1994, 125); cf. Clay (1989, 228).

[414] For a less marked example of the capture of an unwilling party, cf. the description of Achilles' abduction of Lycaon, τόν ῥά ποτ' αὐτὸς / ἦγε λαβὼν ἐκ πατρὸς ἀλωῆς οὐκ ἐθέλοντα ("whom he himself once took and brought away from his father's orchard against his will," *Il.* 21.35-6). This passage is examined in some detail below.

[415] Cf. DeBloois' (1997, 246) insightful reading of the juxtaposition of ἥρπαξεν and δῶκεν at the beginning of the *Hymn*: θύγατρα… ἣν Ἀϊδωνεὺς / ἥρπαξεν, δῶκεν δὲ… Ζεύς ("daughter… whom Hades snatched up, and Zeus gave her," 2-3); so Clay (1989, 209); cf. Hes. *Th.* 913-14.

[416] In early Greek hexameter, the dative of *anankē* always appears at the end of the line, except at *Il.* 9.429 and 9.692, which appear to be variants of the same formula. In general, I find Schreckenberg's (1964) thesis that *anankē* is fundamentally defined by the idea of binding to be convincing as far as early Greek hexameter goes. *LfgrE* s.v. ἀνάγκη seems to be more or less agnostic. But I am mindful that this idea does not necessarily underpin its use in later literature: Wooley (1967), Green (2012, 172-3).

This usage of the dative appears essentially to be instrumental: cf. Kühner (1904, §425.11), Chantraine (1953, §105), Schwyzer (1959, 167), all citing *Il.* 11.150 (φευγόντας ἀνάγκῃ).

Helios, in which she says that she heard her daughter being taken away unwillingly (72). Later in the poem, a formula appears twice that is rather ironic in the context of the *Hymn*. Demeter is told that, although they grieve, people endure the gifts of the gods by necessity (θεῶν μὲν δῶρα καὶ ἀχνύμενοί περ ἀνάγκῃ/ τέτλαμεν ἄνθρωποι, 147-8 = 216-17). Interestingly, the latter two uses of the dative of *anankē* seem to resemble the Iliadic passages, while the former are reminiscent of the *Odyssey*.[417] The dative of *anankē* also appears within close proximity of some form of ἀχνύμενοί περ ("although they grieved") four times in the *Iliad* (ἀχνύμενοί περ ἀνάγκῃ, 12.78; ἀχνύμενός περ ἀνάγκῃ, 15.133; ἀχνύμενοί περ… ἀνάγκῃ, 18.112-13 = 19.65-6), and this never happens in the *Odyssey.*[418] The line-ending dative of *anankē* does not appear in the other *Homeric Hymns* or in Hesiod.[419] And in the *Iliad*, the agent imposing necessity is distant and often impersonal. So, for example, Diomedes says to the uninjured Greeks in Book 14, δεῦτ' ἴομεν πόλεμόνδε καὶ οὐτάμενοί περ ἀνάγκῃ ("Come, even though we are wounded, out of necessity let us go to battle," 14.128). One can surmise that the Greeks are compelled by necessity into battle because the Trojans are on the offensive. But this is nowhere to be seen in the speech. More of a borderline case is the withdrawal of the Greeks from the foremost ships in the face of the Trojan assault (τοὶ δ' ἐπέχυντο. / Ἀργεῖοι δὲ νεῶν μὲν ἐχώρησαν καὶ ἀνάγκῃ / τῶν πρωτέων ("But they [the Trojans] poured in. And the Argives gave way from the foremost ships even by necessity", 15.654-6)). The necessity is clearly caused by the advance of the Trojans

---

[417] Schreckenberg (1964, 1-16) and *LfgrE* s.v. ἀνάγκη B3a implicitly make this same distinction without noting the difference between the two poems in this respect.

[418] This is not to say that the sentiment that humans must endure what the gods give is foreign to the *Odyssey* (for example, see *Od*. 4.236-7 and 6.187-90). I am only claiming that this phraseology resembles that of the *Iliad*.

[419] *Anankaiē* appears in the dative in the longer *Hymn to Apollo* (543), but not at the end of a line. Cf. Munson (2001, 30-1), who cites an unpublished presentation by K. Cheshire at the 1998 APA conference claiming that, in Homer, "ἀνάγκη refers to more general or abstract compulsion, while ἀναγκαίη denotes particular instances of it." If this guideline is correct, I am not convinced that it extends to the *Homeric Hymns*.

(τοί), but the source of the necessity is still not linked syntactically to ἀνάγκῃ, nor does it even appear in the same sentence.[420] In the *Odyssey*, on the other hand, the source of compulsion tends to be linked closely to the dative of *anankē*. So, for example, Calypso is described three times as ἥ μιν ἀνάγκῃ / ἴσχει (“the one who constrains him [Odysseus] with compulsion,” 4.557-8 = 5.14-15 = 17.143-4). Similarly, Eumaeus, under compulsion, sends a man to drive a boar to the city for the insolent suitors (τὸν δὲ … ἀποπροέηκε πόλινδε / σῦν ἀγέμεν μνηστῆρσιν ὑπερφιάλοισιν ἀνάγκῃ, 14.26-7). The link between the *anankē* and the suitors is not absolutely explicit in this passage. But they appear side by side, and that the suitors are the source of the compulsion is clear.[421] In addition, lines which feature a redundant emphasis on unwillingness and coercion similar – in kind, if not in extent – to that of *H.Dem*. 124 are not uncommon in the *Odyssey* (e.g. οὐκ ἐθέλουσ’, ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης, 2.110 = 19.156 = 24.146; πόλλ᾽ ἀεκαζομένους, οὐδ᾽ ἤθελον, 13.277; ἀνάγκῃ… οὐκ ἐθέλων, 5.154-5). As far as I am aware, only one such example appears in the *Iliad* (πόλλ᾽ ἀεκαζομένη, κρατερὴ δ᾽ ἐπικείσετ᾽ ἀνάγκη (“much against your will, and powerful necessity will lie upon you”, 6.458)).[422] Compulsion is an important idea in the *Odyssey*. Much emphasis is placed on the fact that Odysseus and his allies must do the best they can despite the various constraints placed on them by hostile gods and malevolent mortals. The heavy weight of necessity frequently evokes sympathy and binds characters together.

---

[420] So *Il*. 11.148-50, 12.178-9, 15.132-4, 197-9, and 343-5, 18.112-13, 19.65-6.

[421] The other, similar uses in the *Odyssey* of line-ending *anankē* in the dative appear at 1.154, 5.154, 7.217, 9.98, 12.330, 14.27, 14.272 and 298, 17.441, 18.76, 22.331, 353, and 451. This closer connection between *anankē* and its cause is not universal in the poem. The three exceptions are at 10.434, 13.307, 15.311. The phrase *hyp’ anankēs* (“perforce”), which is virtually identical in meaning to the dative of *anankē*, and is used only in the formulaic phrase describing Penelope having to finish Laertes’ burial shroud (2.110, 19.156, and 24.146; cf. *Cyp.* fr. 9.3 and Panyas. fr. 3.4 Bernabé), similarly does not emphasize the cause of the compulsion. When Odysseus is himself the one constraining others (*Od*. 9.98), *anankē* lacks negative connotations.

[422] I do not consider phrases like τήν ῥα βίῃ ἀέκοντος ἀπηύρων (“whom they were taking by force from him against his will,” *Il*. 1.430; cf. 7.197, 13.572, 15.186, *Od*. 1.403, 4.646) to be redundant or even necessarily emphatic.

Line-ending *anankē* in the dative appears twice in the lying tale in Book 14. And these instances help us to appreciate how Odysseus subtly highlights his striking similarity to Eumaeus. The beggar reports that, during a raid in Egypt, his men were foolish, and they were routed (14.258-70): ἔνθ’ ἡμέων πολλοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτανον ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ, / τοὺς δ’ ἄναγον ζωούς, σφίσιν ἐργάζεσθαι ἀνάγκῃ (“then they killed many of us with sharp bronze, and others they took alive inland to work for them under compulsion,” 14.271-2).[423] One assumes that working under compulsion refers to slavery here.[424] We can only speculate about what kind of treatment is to be understood in detail, but presumably forced labour in a foreign land involves the kind of systematic deracination outlined above. The tale Demeter tells in the extended quotation above also quite evidently describes the process of enslavement. She is taken very much against her will to a foreign land and is to be sold ‘un-bought’ (ἀπριάτην). The beggar and Doso are also both exceptions within the larger groups of which they are a part. Demeter says that, while many women set foot on land – presumably to be sold as well – she escaped at dinnertime. Oddly, Odysseus’ beggar escapes slavery because Zeus saves him by putting it into his head to supplicate the Egyptian *basileus* (‘chief’, 14.273-83), who spares him out of reverence for the wrath of Zeus Xenios (Διὸς δ’ ὠπίζετο μῆνιν / ξεινίου, 283-4). This is probably a reference to the suitors, whom Eumaeus has just accused at length of not heeding *opis* (‘the watchful eye of the gods’; especially 14.81-8).[425] And so does his double, Philoetius (20.214-16).[426] When we consider that these passages are centrally concerned with the gods' punishment of unjust behaviour, it is no wonder Grossardt finds it ironic that Eumaeus should respond so well to the beggar's report that the Egyptian *basileus* should have thought of Zeus Xenios in a situation where an enemy combatant grabbed him by the knees and made supplication. In such a scenario, *xenia* does not ordinarily apply.[427] Why the Egyptian *basileus* should have such a thought is not entirely clear, but it is noteworthy that Zeus puts the idea into the beggar's head. Divine inspiration is hardly unknown in early Greek hexameter.[428] Here it apparently saves the beggar from slavery. In these two passages, the contrast between the beggar and Doso is informative. They alone out of their respective groups escape. The beggar escapes because he is apparently uniquely favoured by Zeus, whereas Doso escapes because she is not hungry at dinnertime. As we noted above, abstaining from food is one of the forms of self-deprivation that is symptomatic of mourning in Greek literature.[429] Again, Demeter alludes to her daughter's rape in her lying tale. In other words, Doso refuses to accept the *anankē* which oppresses her, just as Demeter refuses to accept the *anankē* which she perceives as oppressing her daughter. Demeter has this luxury because she is a goddess. As we will see, however, the beggar, just like Odysseus, can only rely on the mercy of the gods to free him from *anankē*.

---

[423] This extended passage (14.258-72) is repeated *verbatim* at 17.427-41, with the exception of στῆναι at 17.439 for μεῖναι at 14.270.

[424] So A. Bowie (2013 *ad loc.*).

[425] On this word’s sometimes fraught usage, see Burkert (2001, 95-104).

[426] Elsewhere the roar of the hooves of Hector’s horses is compared to the tempest Zeus rains down during harvest time when men are unjust (16.384-93), not heeding the watchful eye of the gods (θεῶν ὄπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες, 388 = Hes. *Op*. 251); cf. Heracles at *Od*. 21.24-33; also cf. Hes. *Op*. 187 and 706.

As is to be expected from different iterations of the same type-scene, we have observed that the two lying tales in question share a large number of characteristics. Both storytellers portray themselves as victims of necessity, although whether this is the necessity of fate or of the harsh realities of human life is not always clear. One indication of this necessity is the similar, emphatic use of the dative of *anankē*. Odysseus and Demeter also narrate situations in which they alone of their respective groups escape slavery. As we will see, in all three of these respects Eumaeus' autobiography can be distinguished from the lying tales of the former two. Eumaeus, although he has experienced the kind of suffering Demeter and Odysseus relate, does not portray himself as a victim of necessity, and so it follows that he does not tend to colour his narrative with words of constraint and unwillingness – although we are surely to understand that he was deceived into leaving his parents' *oikos*. And finally Eumaeus is not part of a group of saleable victims. He is the victim of opportunism. The reason Eumaeus does not portray himself as a victim of necessity, I will suggest, is that he is depicted as happy with his lot as Odysseus' slave, and so it would be nonsensical for him ultimately to regret his kidnapping.

---

[427] Grossardt (1998, 67).

[428] Cf. especially 3.26-7: Τηλέμαχ᾽, ἄλλα μὲν αὐτὸς ἐνὶ φρεσὶ σῇσι νοήσεις, / ἄλλα δὲ καὶ δαίμων ὑποθήσεται ("Telemachus, some things you yourself will devise in your heart. Others a god will suggest.").

[429] Cf. the later description of Demeter as ἀγέλαστος ἄπαστος ἐδητύος ἠδὲ ποτῆτος ("without laughter, not tasting food or drink," *H.Dem*. 220). Penelope submits herself to a similar regimen when Telemachus disappears early in the *Odyssey* (4.787-90). N. Richardson (1974 *ad H.Dem*. 220) provides a number of further parallels.

The second appearance of line-ending *anankē* in the dative in the lying tale of Book 14 is just a few lines after the first, and it brings us squarely back to the threat of slavery. The beggar stays with the Egyptian *basileus* for seven years, but he is eventually persuaded by a dastardly Phoenician to travel with him to Phoenicia and Libya (14.285-95). The Phoenician persuades him to go to Libya,

> ‘ψεύδεα βουλεύσας, ἵνα οἱ σὺν φόρτον ἄγοιμι,
> κεῖθι δέ μ᾽ ὡς περάσῃσι καὶ ἄσπετον ὦνον ἕλοιτο.
> τῷ ἑπόμην ἐπὶ νηός, ὀϊόμενός περ, ἀνάγκῃ.’
>
> “with the misleading advice that I should convey cargo with him, but really intending to take me for sale and collect a huge payment there. I followed him onboard ship by necessity, even though I was suspicious” (14.296-8).

There are several aspects of this passage that are noteworthy for us. Given that a belated *nostos* (‘homecoming’) is the subject of the *Odyssey*, it is perhaps unsurprising that we see *anankē* so frequently associated with the control of movement.[430] Here again we have the threat of slavery. Similarly, in the final two lines of the quotation from the *Hymn to Demeter* above, Demeter escapes so that the pirates will not sell her (περάσαντες) and enjoy the profit from such a sale. *Peraan* ('to cross to the other side,' or 'to sell') frequently combines the ideas of crossing the sea and the sale of a person, especially in the *Odyssey.*[431] So deracination is at stake again. *Ōnos* ('profit', or 'price'), as opposed to the *tīmē* of the *H.Dem*., seems to be an important word in this portion of the *Odyssey*, being attested six times in Books 14 and 15, and only rarely elsewhere in early Greek epic.[432] In the *Iliad*, *ōnos* is used only of the purchase of Lycaon (21.41 and 23.746). In the *Odyssey*, as we will see, it refers to the purchase-price for a slave four times (14.297, 15.388, 429, and 452) and twice to that of merchants' wares (15.445 and 463).[433] Wickert-Micknat argues that "ὦνος, in der *Ilias* der 'Tausch-Wert' eines Menschen, ist in der *Odyssee* 'Kauf-Wert', und zwar von jeglicher Ware, nicht nur von Menschen."[434] However, if we examine the Iliadic examples, we find that the word is used no differently there than in the *Odyssey*. The poet has just described the abduction of Lycaon by Achilles from his father's orchard (*Il.* 21.34-39):

> καὶ τότε μέν μιν Λῆμνον ἐϋκτιμένην ἐπέρασσεν
> νηυσὶν ἄγων, ἀτὰρ υἱὸς Ἰήσονος ὦνον ἔδωκεν·
> κεῖθεν δὲ ξεῖνός μιν ἐλύσατο, πολλὰ δ᾽ ἔδωκεν,
> Ἰμβριος Ἠετίων, πέμψεν δ᾽ ἐς δῖαν Ἀρίσβην.

---

[430] So Rankine (2011, 41) with respect to 4.557-8 = 5.14-15 = 17.143-4. On the *Odyssey* as a belated homecoming, see Burgess (2012b).

[431] Wickert-Micknat (1983.138-9); cf. N. Richardson (1993 *ad Il.* 21.40-1), who translates the term as "export for sale." Grossardt (1998, 238 n. 57) finds it striking that, when the word is used in this way (citing especially *Od.* 14.297, 15.453, and *H. Dem.* 132), it often begins in the same metrical position.

[432] On *tīmē* in the *H. Dem.* and in the *Homeric Hymns* more generally, see Nickel (2003).

[433] I suspect that either ὦνον or βίοτον is implied at *Od.* 20.383 as well.

[434] Wickert-Micknat (1983, 140). The word is often translated as "ransom" in the *Iliad*, such as in the revised Loeb at *Il.* 23.746.

> “And at that time he took him across the sea to well-built Lemnos, bringing him by ship, and the son of Jason paid his price. And from there a guest-friend, Imbrian Aëtion, ransomed him, and he gave much and sent him to godlike Arisbe” (21.40-3).

Lexica tend to distinguish between *peraan* as “to get to the other side” and “to sell.”[435] The *LfgrE* places the present use in the latter category, but I find this unlikely. Using the combination of the two meanings as described above, better sense can be gleaned from this passage if the word indicates Achilles bringing Lycaon across the sea in order to sell him.[436] Otherwise the present tense of ἄγων is awkward, since it would be strange for Achilles to sell Lycaon on Lemnos at the same time as he was in the process of transporting him there.[437] Once on Lemnos, he finds a buyer to provide an agreed upon price (ὦνον). In other words, he sells Lycaon into slavery.[438] Only then does Aëtion ransom him and return him to his family. The other appearance of *ōnos* in the *Iliad* refers to the same transaction as in line 41 of the present passage. We learn there that the price paid for Lycaon was a mixing bowl (23.740-7). We see, then, that *ōnos* is always used of the purchase price of some commodity, and usually of a slave in the attested literature. Whereas *tīmē* in its commercial senses can variously mean “value” or “compensation,” *ōnos* is more specifically used of a proposed or agreed-upon price in an exchange of goods, roughly corresponding to a common usage of *tīmē* in later Greek.[439] It seems, then, that, in the present passage, the beggar Odysseus is referring to the threat of being sold into slavery.

---

[435] So Cunliffe (1963 s.v. περάω$^1$ and περάω$^2$), and *LfgrE* s.v. περάω I and II. It is possible that περάω$^1$ and περάω$^2$ have two different etymologies, one connected with *perēn* (‘beyond’) and *pernēmi* (‘to export for sale’); cf. Ebeling (1871-85 s.v. περάω).

[436] Similarly at 21.58. Cf. Willcock (1984 *ad* 21.40).

[437] Cf. *Od*. 15.428.

[438] So *LfgrE* s.v. ὦνος 2a, Wilson (1984, 190 n. 49), and Seaford (2004, 35). Cf. *Il*. 22.44-5, where Hecuba laments that Achilles has sold (περνάς) many of her sons on remote islands (νήσων ἔπι τηλεδαπάων); cf. also 21.453-4 and 24.751-2.

Also pertinent to our consideration of Books 14 and 15 of the *Odyssey* is Achilles' mockery of Lycaon for his capture and sale (*Il.* 21.54-63). He sarcastically suggests that the Trojans he has already killed must be about to come back to life, just as Lycaon ἦλθε φυγὼν ὕπο νηλεὲς ἦμαρ ("has come, having escaped his harsh day," 21.57). As N. Richardson observes, this phraseology "would normally refer to death, but can be taken also of Lukaon's westward voyage into slavery."[440] Unsurprisingly, then, it would seem that being used to obtain an *ōnos* for one's captor can at least be presented rhetorically as a form of social death and consequently extreme dishonour. The formulation of Demeter is highly revealing in this context. She runs away so that her captors will not have enjoyment of her *tīmē*. The implication seems to be that, if they had obtained an *ōnos* in exchange for her, she would have suffered a corresponding diminution in her *tīmē* in addition to what she underwent in being captured in the first place. So, to return to Odysseus' lying tale, while it is important to observe that the beggar is twice in danger of being enslaved or sold into slavery, this never actually happens. In the first case, as we have already noted, he manages to become a *xeinos* of the Egyptian *basileus* through divine inspiration. In the second case, he is not overpowered but tricked by a Phoenician into a situation in which there is some danger of his being sold into slavery. But Zeus saves him again, this time by destroying their ship and everyone else on board (14.300-13). So, we have Odysseus claiming that he twice escaped slavery narrowly and only by the grace of Zeus in a story which nods to a tradition of alternative *Odysseys*. It can hardly be accidental that he addresses this tale to a man who has himself been forced into slavery. Odysseus is not merely lying. He is rather referring to a version of this story that emphasizes his similarity to Eumaeus.

---

[439] On *tīmē*, see N. Richardson (1974 *ad H. Dem.* 132) and *LfgrE* s.v. τιμή 1a. On *ōnos*, cf. Hsch. s.v. ὦνος [ω 247 Cunningham]: ὠνή, τιμὴ ἡ καταβαλλομένη ἀντὶ τινος ("purchase, value laid down in exchange for something"). See also Hes. fr. 43a.41-2 M.-W., which is a lacunose and hotly disputed passage. But *ōnos* seems in essence to stand in for the bride-price (*hedna*) for Mestra (on *hedna* in the *Catalogue of Women*, see Ormand (2014, 51-84)). *Hedna* is used of her bride-price *per se* at 21, with the following lines probably listing what Sisyphus promised (ὑπέσ]χετ[ο], 21; cf. ὦνον ὑπισχόμεναι (*Od.* 15.462)). *Ōnos* then appears to be used on lines 41-2 as the general term used for an agreed upon purchase-price. While there must remain some doubt because of the fragmentary nature of the passage, Athena is probably following the common judicial practice of making a general statement about all purchases with respect to this particular one, whose price takes the form of *hedna*. See Hirschberger (2004 *ad* Hes. fr. 37.41-3 = 43a.41-3 M.-W.) for a summary of prior interpretations of this passage, adding Steinrück (1994, 294-7), and subsequently Irwin (2005b, 67-77) and Ormand (2014, 242-4). The other major ancient sources for Mestra's peculiar series of marriages are Ov. *Met.* 8.738-878 and Σ *ad* Lyc. 1393 Leone = Hes. fr. 43b M-W. She notoriously goes unmentioned in Call. *Cer.*

[440] N. Richardson (1993 *ad Il.* 21.53-63); so Wickert-Micknat (1983, 225-6). Cf. above on *doulion ēmar* and *eleutheron ēmar*. Ndoye (2010, 226-36) looks at the slavery of prisoners of war in Homer in general.

In the following book, Odysseus presses this point further by asking Eumaeus for his own story and specifically having him frame it in terms of how he came to be a slave. He tells him to relate whether his city was sacked and he was captured, or ἄνδρες δυσμενέες νηυσὶν λάβον ἠδὲ ἐπέρασσαν / τοῦδ’ ἀνδρὸς πρὸς δώμαθ’, ὃ δ’ ἄξιον ὦνον ἔδωκε (“hostile men took you by ship and brought you over the sea for sale to the halls of the man here, who paid a worthy price,” 15.388-9). We note the competitive distinction between the potentially boundless (ἄσπετον, 14.297) *ōnos* the beggar speculates for himself, and the worthy (ἄξιον) *ōnos* he assigns to Eumaeus, which indicates nothing more than that the offer would be equivalent to Eumaeus’ perceived value. And Eumaeus plays with this word *ōnos* in his autobiography. After describing his homeland and his heritage, Eumaeus describes how a Phoenician trader seduced a Phoenician woman (γυνή, 15.417 and 439), who was working as a slave in his father’s household (415-23). Eumaeus reports how this unnamed woman described her own fate:

> ‘μ’ ἀνήρπαξαν Τάφιοι ληΐστορες ἄνδρες
> ἀγρόθεν ἐρχομένην, πέρασαν δέ με δεῦρ’ ἀγαγόντες
> τοῦδ’ ἀνδρὸς πρὸς δώμαθ’, ὃ δ’ ἄξιον ὦνον ἔδωκε.’

“Taphian pirate men kidnapped me as I was coming in from the country. And, having brought me here to the house of this man, they sold me. And he paid a worthy price (427-9)."

The kidnapping, conveyance across the sea, and sale to a foreigner – a pattern familiar to us by now – would seem to resemble Odysseus' speculations as well as the actual story to follow. But Eumaeus avoids this parallel. After all, Eumaeus is just a child when he is kidnapped, and the unnamed woman takes advantage of her position as his nurse (ἀτιτάλλω, 450) to obtain him as a commodity for her lover: τὸν κεν ἄγοιμ᾽ ἐπὶ νηός, ὃ δ᾽ ὑμῖν μυρίον ὦνον / ἄλφοι, ὅπῃ περάσητε κατ᾽ ἀλλοθρόους ἀνθρώπους ("I could lead him on ship, and he could bring you a huge price wherever you convey him for sale among foreign people," 452-3). To the Phoenician nurse, we can imagine that this kidnapping is commensurate with the injury she has suffered. We are, after all, talking about exactly the same series of actions.[441] Eumaeus' father did not kidnap her himself, but he clearly benefited from her injury by availing himself of her services. But Eumaeus does not seem to agree with this assessment. When discussing his removal from Syria, he uses none of the usual language we have seen applied so far of kidnapping scenes. Neither the Phoenician nurse nor Eumaeus himself are taken against their will, by necessity, force, or otherwise. And the nurse says that she would very willingly (ἐθέλουσά γε) offer Eumaeus as a return for her passage on board the Phoenician ship (449). In addition, when she leads Eumaeus out to the harbour, he follows out of folly (ἑπόμην ἀεσιφροσύνῃσι, 470). This very willingness is pathetic. The child quietly trusts the nurse as she betrays him.[442] And, as in the beggar's tale, there is divine retribution. Although Zeus gives the crew good sailing, Artemis strikes down the nurse. She falls like a bird and is cast overboard to be a find (κύρμα) for seals and fish

---

[441] She also suggests stealing gold from the household (15.448), which is presumably also understood to be consistent with the actions of the Taphian pirates who kidnapped her.

[442] Cf. Golden (1990, 145-63) for *paidagōgoi* and female nurses as especial focal points of the "dialectic of trust and suspicion" owners placed on slaves in Classical Athens.

(475-81).[443] As if the direct action of a god were not clear enough, the blatant dishonouring of the nurse’s corpse goes without punishment, and the smooth sailing continues.[444] Eumaeus portrays the woman as having received her due.

Interestingly, in the middle of the tale, Eumaeus uses *ōnos* twice to apply to wares, a meaning unique to this passage in early Greek hexameter. The nurse encourages the Phoenicians to pursue a purchase price for their wares (ἐπείγετε δ’ ὦνον ὁδαίων, 445), so that they can leave. And later the Phoenicians get the female members of Eumaeus’ father’s *oikos* haggling over prices (ὦνον ὑπισχόμεναι, 463) as a distraction, so that the nurse can escape with Eumaeus and some moveable goods (455-70). This frequent repetition of *ōnos* emphasizes the pejorative depiction of the Phoenicians as greedy and ruthless. Their portrayal probably does not reflect an Archaic Greek prejudice, as is often claimed.[445] On the contrary, van Wees and Peacock have shown that the only two passages in Homeric epic where the supposed prejudice against the Phoenicians can actually be observed are in the present passage and in the beggar’s description of the Phoenician in his lying tale (14.285-95).[446] Note especially that the two speeches feature the only uses attested in the Archaic Era of the probably pejorative *trōktēs* (‘nibbler’, 14.289 and 15.416).[447] Eumaeus and the beggar – maybe at least partially to elicit the swineherd’s sympathy in the latter’s case – take a dim view of the people because of their own potential misfortune at the traders' hands.[448] The Phoenicians are only interested in profit, in finding a good *ōnos* for their wares, be they human or otherwise.

---

[443] One wonders if this phrase is to be understood in the same manner as *Il.* 1.4-5.

[444] Even Elpenor, who is specifically described as not very impressive (10.552-3), can warn Odysseus that he will become a cause of the gods’ wrath (θεῶν μήνιμα) if his corpse goes unburied (11.72-6; similarly Hector to Achilles at *Il.* 22.358-60). Cf. Burkert (1985, 270-1) and M. Clarke (1999, 185).

[445] Finley (1978, 102), Grossardt (1998, 70-3), Dougherty (2001, 116).

[446] Van Wees (1992, 242), Peacock (2011, 25). I would extend this observation to all of early Greek hexameter. Contrast in particular Odysseus’ lying tale to Athena, in which he says that the Phoenicians he hired did not wish to deceive him (οὐδ’ ἤθελον ἐξαπατῆσαι, 13.277).

[447] Cf. Σ Q and V *ad Od.* 15.416 Dindorf, Hsch. s.v. τρῶκται [τ 1599 Cunningham] and τρώκτης [τ 1600 Cunningham], and Heubeck and Hoekstra (1990 *ad Od.* 14.289).

Significantly, however, Eumaeus, when referring to his own sale, does not use the formulae we have looked at so far. After the death and disposal of his nurse,

> 'αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ λιπόμην ἀκαχήμενος ἦτορ.
> τοὺς δ' Ἰθάκῃ ἐπελάσσε φέρων ἄνεμός τε καὶ ὕδωρ,
> ἔνθα με Λαέρτης πρίατο κτεάτεσσιν ἑοῖσιν.
> οὕτω τήνδε τε γαῖαν ἐγὼν ἴδον ὀφθαλμοῖσι.'

> "Well, I was left grieved at heart. And the driving wind and water bore them to Ithaca, where Laertes bought me with his property. So I laid eyes on this land here" (15.481-4).

The phrase *priato kteatessin heoisin* is only used to describe the purchase of a slave by a member of Odysseus' *oikos* (1.430 (Eurycleia by Laertes), 14.115 (Eumaeus by Laertes), and 452 (Mesaulius by Eumaeus)). And *priasthai* is not attested anywhere else in Archaic epic, whereas there are a number of other ways to refer to the purchase or sale of a slave. We have already seen the combination of *peraān* and *ōnon didounai/alphanein/haireisthai*. *Peraan* may also be used by itself to describe the purchase and sometimes transportation of a slave (*Il*. 21.58, 78, 102, and 453-4, 22.44-5, 24.751-2). *Ktāsthai* refers to a purchase alone (*Od*. 14.4, 450). And *alphanein* ('to bring in') may appear on its own with a direct object of the profit enjoyed from the sale of a slave (*Od*. 17.250, 20.382-3).[449] As we have seen, *ōnos* appears (usually with *peraān*) in contexts where the sale as opposed to the purchase is the pertinent direction, and the focus is consequently on the profit made from the product. So, even though *ōnon didounai* refers to a payment, it always follows the story of how the item reached the (potential) buyer, thereby placing the focus on the sale and on the profit made from it. In three of the four uses of *priato kteatessin heoisin*, on the other hand, the purchase of the slave appears in the context of that slave's life on Ithaca. The one exception is the present case, where Laertes purchases Eumaeus at the conclusion of his journey from Syria. But the application of the other three examples would tend to indicate that the formula is to be understood directionally in terms of the purchase of the slave and not the sale. This draws the attention of the audience to the acquisition of the slave as opposed to the process of his deracination. He is arriving at his new home, disconnected from his prior suffering. We have recently observed that the audience has just heard the word *ōnos* six times within the last 650 lines, and nowhere else in the poem. With the exception of Mesaulius' purchase by Eumaeus (αὐτὸς κτήσατο οἶος ("he himself alone bought him," 14.450) and πρίατο κτεάτεσσιν ἑοῖσιν ("he purchased him with his own property," 14.452)), who is anyway a member of Odysseus' *oikos,* every reference to the sale of a slave within these lines features the word *ōnos*. If I am correct that *ōnos* is used in these two books in such a way that the focus is placed on the profit made from a sale, this contributes to the portrayal of the slavers in the stories told by the beggar and Eumaeus as essentially greedy and nefarious. We are led by the hostile portrayal of Eumaeus' nurse and her death at Artemis' hands to expect a similar use of *ōnos* at the end of the story. Eumaeus' selection of *priato kteatessin heoisin* turns the tide of his story and contributes to our sense that the conclusion is paradoxically happy, that he will come to flourish in his new home. Laertes' purchase of Eumaeus is dissociated from the treachery and suffering that led to it. The house of Laertes is full of benevolent masters.[450] So, although Eumaeus understands all too well the threat of slavery, he does not treat his own particular tale as unfortunate in the end.

---

[448] Cf. Marks (2003, 217-20) on Odysseus' and Eumaeus' hostility towards Aetolians.

[449] Cf. Seaford (2004, 25 n. 19). In the previous chapter, the beggar's mother, a purchased (ὠνητή, 14.202) concubine, is discussed.

---

[450] Thalmann (1998b, 33-4) is certainly correct to argue that the essential ideological difference between Eumaeus and his nurse is that his nurse betrays the household to which she has come to belong, whereas Eumaeus is loyal – and correctly so from the point of view of the poem. We note that the language used to describe the purchase of the nurse (ἄξιον ὦνον ἔδωκε ("he gave a worthy purchase-price", 15.429)) is in her words, not Eumaeus'.

As we have seen, the biographies of the beggar and Eumaeus share many similarities. But the central one from a thematic standpoint is the threat of slavery – a threat that has become reality in Eumaeus’ case. The poet invokes the Cretan mode of the *Odyssey* with this beggar’s tale, suggesting that what happened to the beggar could also have happened to Odysseus. And in fact throughout the *Odyssey* all manner of dire fates threaten Odysseus. Hence, when he washes ashore in an unknown land, he worries whether he has reached hospitable people or *hybristai* (‘insolent men,’ 6.121-2 = 9.175-6 = 13.201-2). And indeed the *Odyssey*’s prototypical *hybristai*, Penelope’s suitors, threaten to sell the disguised Odysseus into slavery on Sicily (20.382-3). The difference between Odysseus and Eumaeus in this respect is that Odysseus perceives the possibility of slavery as a misfortune, whereas Eumaeus has come to terms with his fate, as unpleasant as the transition may have been.

Nonetheless, they have much in common, which is why Eumaeus sympathizes with the beggar:

> ‘ἆ δειλὲ ξείνων, ἦ μοι μάλα θυμὸν ὄρινας
> ταῦτα ἕκαστα λέγων, ὅσα δὴ πάθες ἠδ’ ὅσ’ ἀλήθης.
> ἀλλὰ τά γ’ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, ὀΐομαι, οὐδέ με πείσεις
> εἰπὼν ἀμφ’ Ὀδυσῆϊ.’
>
> “Alas, poor stranger, deeply indeed have you stirred my heart by saying each of these things, namely how much you have suffered and wandered. But the following at least was not in good order, I think, and you will not persuade me with what you said about Odysseus” (14.361-4).

This is full of common epic formulae, but the beggar’s response to Eumaeus’ own story shares some unique similarities:

> ‘Εὔμαι’, ἦ μάλα δή μοι ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θυμὸν ὄρινας
> ταῦτα ἕκαστα λέγων, ὅσα δὴ πάθες ἄλγεα θυμῷ.
> ἀλλ’ ἦτοι σοὶ μὲν παρὰ καὶ κακῷ ἐσθλὸν ἔθηκε
> Ζεύς, ἐπεὶ ἀνδρὸς δώματ’ ἀφίκεο πολλὰ μογήσας
> ἠπίου ὃς δή τοι παρέχει βρῶσίν τε πόσιν τε
> ἐνδυκέως, ζώεις δ’ ἀγαθὸν βίον· αὐτὰρ ἐγώγε
> πολλὰ βροτῶν ἐπὶ ἄστε’ ἀλώμενος ἐνθάδ’ ἱκάνω.’
>
> “Eumaeus, deeply indeed have you stirred my heart in my breast by saying each of these things, namely how many pains you suffered in your heart. But for you Zeus placed good alongside bad when you, having suffered much, reached the halls of a gentle man who kindly provides you with food and drink, and you live a good life. I, on the other hand, come here in my wandering to many cities of men” (15.486-92).

The similarities between the first two lines are unique to these two passages. *Thȳmon orinein* is a fairly common combination, appearing 30 times in early Greek hexameter. But these are the only occurrences of the second person, *thȳmon orinas*, and we note that they occur in the same metrical position. And there are only two other examples of the verb in *thȳmon orinein* in the second person being used of someone actually (as opposed to hypothetically) stirring up emotion. These involve Odysseus in the first case, and Eumaeus and Philoetius on account of Odysseus in the second.[451] By far the norm for *thȳmon orinein* is a relatively impersonal narrator’s third-person report that someone’s speech stirred the heart of his or her interlocutor.[452] But in the present two cases we have the much more personal, responsive acknowledgement that each has moved the other with his story. The case is much the same with ὅσα δὴ πάθες. Not only is this phrase unique to these two passages, but again a second-person indicative form of *paschein* is quite rare. And it is only used elsewhere of Odysseus and his companions in the *Odyssey* (11.458).[453] Given the close and unique similarity between these two passages, it is highly likely that this is a case of close interformularity, with these two passages referring to each other. It is no wonder, then, that Montiglio finds that, "in the *Odyssey*, only Eumaeus identifies with the wandering stranger, because he himself wandered far from his home and parents."[454] And Odysseus acknowledges their shared experience again when he uses *polla mogein* to describe Eumaeus' suffering. In the *Odyssey*, this phrase is very closely attached to the suffering of Odysseus in particular, and it is also used once of Laertes. Of its fifteen appearances, it describes Odysseus twelve times (2.343, 3.232, 5.223, 449, 6.175, 7.147, 8.155, 19.483, 21.207, 23.101, 169, 338).[455] A variation also appears when Menelaus says that Odysseus πολέας ἐμόγησεν ἀέθλους ("underwent many hardships," 4.170). And, in the last book of the poem, we arrive at Laertes' farm, ὅν ῥά ποτ' αὐτὸς / Λαέρτης κτεάτισσεν, ἐπεὶ μάλ' πόλλ' ἐμόγησεν ("which Laertes himself once obtained, once he had suffered very much," 24.206-7). When Odysseus himself uses the phrase to apply to Eumaeus' experiences, then, he shows his awareness of their similarity and perhaps even hints at a bond of kinship between them.[456] The combination of the unique second-person verbs of emotion and the application to Eumaeus of phraseology peculiar to Odysseus indicates that Montiglio's assessment is surely correct.

---

[451] Odysseus rebukes the Phaeacian Euryalus: ὤρινάς μοι θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισιν / εἰπὼν οὐ κατὰ κόσμον (“you have stirred my heart in my own breast by speaking out of order,” 8.178-9). Note also that (οὐ) κατὰ κόσμον with εἰπὼν only appears elsewhere in Eumaeus’ response to the beggar’s lying tale. The transferral of the speaker of a phrase to its addressee with slight modifications has been observed between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (di Benedetto 2001.9-10), but not, to my knowledge, within the *Odyssey* alone. The final second-person indicative use of *thymon orinein* occurs when Antinous rebukes Eumaeus and Philoetius for weeping over the bow of their master, thereby stirring the heart (ὀρίνετον) of Penelope (21.85-8). The hypothetical examples of *thymon orinein* are Achilles warning Priam twice not to anger him (*Il.* 24.467 and 568), and Patroclus potentially moving Achilles to action (11.792, which is picked up in the first person by Patroclus himself at 15.403).

[452] *Il.* 2.142, 3.395, 4.208, 5.29, 9.595, 11.804, 13.418, 468, 14.459, 487, 16.280, 17.123, 150, 18.223, 19.272, *Od.* 18.75, 20.9, 24.318, Hes. fr. 51.3 M.-W., *H. Ap.* 524.

---

[453] Menelaus' acknowledgement to Antilochus that he has suffered much (πόλλ' ἔπαθες, *Il.* 23.607) is the only other example in early Greek hexameter.

[454] "By contrast, the aesthetic detachment with which the Phaeacians respond to Odysseus is in keeping with their blissful existence, removed from wandering" (Montiglio (2005, 257)).

[455] The appearance of the formula at 3.232 may appear to be an exception, but Nestor is saying what he would prefer if he were Odysseus. *Algea* also appears four times, agreeing with *polla* (2.343, 3.232, 16.19, 19.483), and it may be implied even when it is not used. De Jáuregui 2013.39 discusses the formula's use when Odysseus is supplicating someone.

[456] The other application of the phrase to Eumaeus (16.19) is discussed below.

Eumaeus has a unique understanding of Odysseus.

Eumaeus is not merely similar to Odysseus, however. He also fills his role in several respects. He takes the best care of Odysseus' livelihood (οἱ βιότοιο μάλιστα / κήδετο, 14.3-4), making improvements to the estate on his own (9).[457] He tells Odysseus' Cretan lie for him in an abbreviated form to Telemachus when he appears (16.61-6). He also, as has already been observed, fills Odysseus' role by hosting the beggar as his guest. And here we return at last to Eumaeus' second sacrifice.[458] Of especial note is the following, fascinating passage:

> 'ἄξεθ᾽ ὑῶν τὸν ἄριστον, ἵνα ξείνῳ ἱερεύσω
> τηλεδαπῷ· πρὸς δ᾽ αὐτοὶ ὀνησόμεθ᾽, οἵ περ ὀϊζὺν
> δὴν ἔχομεν πάσχοντες ὑῶν ἕνεκ᾽ ἀργιοδόντων·
> ἄλλοι δ᾽ ἡμέτερον κάματον νήποινον ἔδουσιν.'
>
> "Bring the best of the boars, so that I may sacrifice it for the stranger from far away. And we ourselves will also have some enjoyment, who for a long time have had toil, suffering for the sake of the white-tusked swine. And others eat our labour with impunity" (14.414-17).

This passage is deeply ironic. On the one hand, Eumaeus is surprisingly attempting to be subversive. More than one scholar has invoked two Hesiodic parallels, in which the consumption of the product of someone else's toil (*kamatos*) is the source both of the narrator's fierce disapprobation and of divine anger (*Th*. 594-602, *Op*. 298-307).[459] *Nēpoinos*, in turn, signifies in the *Odyssey* that the suitors have inflicted gratuitous harm without paying appropriate compensation (*poinē*).[460] As A. Edwards points out, "Eumaeus appears to presuppose that an individual, even a slave, ‘owns’ his own physical efforts, and continues to own them even after they have been incorporated into another object or animal.”[461] This, of course, contradicts Eumaeus’ own statement that Odysseus owns this property (14.96-106). He is openly pilfering his master’s stores as a kind of revenge against the interlopers in the palace.[462] The obvious reasons for this are so that he can show the beggar appropriate hospitality in his master’s absence and also enjoy a bonus meal himself (πρὸς δ᾽ αὐτοὶ ὀνησόμεθ᾽).[463] The irony, on the other hand, is manifold. Eumaeus unwittingly steals from his master in order to eat and sacrifice with this same master. And he himself fulfils Odysseus’ own ordinary role as host with such an offering, albeit still on the very margins of the *oikos*. This offering sets Eumaeus and Odysseus apart from the suitors, who do not sacrifice appropriately (14.94), and honours the beggar.[464]

---

[457] Also οἱ βιότου περικήδετο νόσφιν ἐόντος ("he took care of his livelihood in his absence," 14.527). Cf. Penelope's report that Odysseus instructed her to be mindful of his parents in his absence (ἐμεῦ ἀπονόσφιν ἐόντος, 18.268).

[458] Petropoulou (1987) argues that this sacrifice is an offering of first fruits, but it has often been seen as anomalous in Homer, perhaps containing classical elements. See Stocking (forthcoming) for a review of the literature.

[459] A. Edwards (1993, 67-8), Stocking (forthcoming); cf. C. Brown (1997, 75-7) on the 'bee-woman' in Semonides (83-93 West$^2$).

[460] So Stocking (forthcoming). Cf. Wilson (2002, 25) on the *Iliad*: "the word *poinē* is used to signify paying back a loss resulting from gratuitous harm, whether in goods or by suffering a corresponding loss."

The final manner in which Eumaeus plays Odysseus’ role is expressed by his reaction to the sight of Telemachus on his return from his travels. First, he sees him, and, in his shock, ἐκ δ᾽ ἄρα οἱ χειρῶν πέσεν ἄγγεα, τοῖς ἐπονεῖτο / κιρνὰς αἴθοπα οἶνον (“and there fell from his hands the vessels with which he was working as he mixed the sparkling wine,” 16.13-14). The wine vessels falling from his hands are parallel to the symmetry discussed above, when the sandal falls from Eumaeus’ hand (14.34) and the sceptre falls from the beggar’s hand (31). As we established, these are the only examples of this phrase occurring in non-martial contexts.[465] This extends the parallelism established above between Odysseus and Eumaeus to include

---

[461] A. Edwards (1993, 68).

[462] Newton (2015) argues that Eumaeus’ theft constitutes a counter-raid against the suitors.

[463] On the magnitude of the offering here, see Newton (2015, 259 n. 6).

[464] So Stocking (forthcoming).

[465] A. Bowie (2013 *ad Od.* 14.31) suggests Eurycleia’s reaction (19.467-70) as a further parallel, and it may be an abbreviated one.

Telemachus upon his return. There then follows a remarkable simile:

> ὡς δὲ πατὴρ ὃν παῖδα φίλα φρονέων ἀγαπάζῃ
> ἐλθόντ᾽ ἐξ ἀπίης γαίης δεκάτῳ ἐνιαυτῷ,
> μοῦνον τηλύγετον, τῷ ἐπ᾽ ἄλγεα πολλὰ μογήσῃ,
> ὣς τότε Τηλέμαχον θεοειδέα δῖος ὑφορβὸς
> πάντα κύσεν περιφύς, ὡς ἐκ θανάτοιο φυγόντα.

> "And as a loving father welcomes his only, well-beloved son, who has come from a distant land in the tenth year, and for whom he has suffered many woes, so then the godlike swineherd wrapped his arms around godlike Telemachus and kissed him everywhere as if he had escaped death" (16.17-21).

At first blush, this simile can strike the audience as rather pedestrian, and such has occasionally been the interpretation.[466] The return from a distant land of the only son in the simile evokes the fact that Odysseus, both an only son himself and Telemachus' actual father, has just returned from Troy after many years. But here the situation appears at first to be reversed, as it is Odysseus who is to be welcomed by his only son, Telemachus.[467] This passage is part of a network of similes that stretch over much of the poem. The closest simile to the present one is the first to appear in the *Odyssey*, in which Telemachus addresses Mentes: ξεῖν', ἤτοι μὲν ταῦτα φίλα φρονέων ἀγορεύεις, / ὥς τε πατὴρ ᾧ παιδί ("stranger, you say these things in a kindly way, like a father to his son," 1.307-8). Mentes, like Eumaeus, is similar to a father because of his kindliness (φίλα φρονέων).[468] On this note, Felson has convincingly argued that one of the major themes in the *Odyssey* is the effectiveness of the kind and gentle father as opposed to one who opts for more of an Oedipal relationship with his son. And in the poem, Odysseus is the paradigm of the *ēpios patēr* ('gentle father').[469] This point is made by Telemachus, Mentor, and Athena, all of whom say that Odysseus ruled over (βασίλευε or ἄνασσε) his people like an *ēpios patēr* (2.47 = 234, 5.12).[470] Hence Telemachus' sarcastic rebuke of the suitor Antinous, saying that he must care for him well, like a father for a son (μευ καλὰ πατὴρ ὣς κήδεαι υἷος), when he encourages him to remove a stranger from his house (17.397-9). Such advice is hardly the mark of an *ēpios* man, and the implication is that Antinous probably cannot expect to match Telemachus' real father.[471] Returning to Eumaeus, as we noted above, O. Patterson has shown that the ideal of the gentle father can easily be mapped onto the gentle *basileus* or slave-master.[472] And indeed Eumaeus refers to Odysseus as *ēpios* (14.139), a description which the beggar is happy to reinforce (15.489-90). But Eumaeus himself shares this quality to a certain extent as well. Athena, Telemachus, and the narrator all describe him as having kindly thoughts (ἤπια οἶδε(ν)/εἰδώς) about members of Odysseus' *oikos* (13.405, 15.39, 557).[473] This phrase has a meaning very similar to the φίλα φρονέων of the present passage. Eumaeus remains a kindly, paternal presence even for a relatively mature Telemachus.[474]

---

[466] Fränkel (1977, 91), for example, finds little beyond the implication that Eumaeus loves Telemachus so much that his relatively short trip seems like it has taken ten years.

[467] This apparent reversal of father and son would be difficult to account for. Expanding upon H. Foley's (1978) argument about reverse gender similes, however, we might hypothesize that the reversal would indicate that Telemachus is playing his father's role as well as possible under the circumstances. And a great deal of scholarship has been devoted to showing how Telemachus, as childlike as he is before his departure to the mainland, returns to Ithaca willing and able to fill his father's shoes: H. Clarke (1963), Jaeger (1965, 29-34), Austin (1969), Roisman (1994), Heath (2001, 136-44), and Toher (2001, 149-53). Wissmann (2009, 424-5), on the other hand, protests that "it is unclear what Telemachus … was supposed to learn from his trip." And Gottesman (2014) prefers to think of Telemachus constructing authority rather than growing up. Some support for this reading of the present reverse simile may be found in the fact that Telemachus later uses a similar one when he describes Nestor's welcome in terms similar to Eumaeus' (17.110-12). It is noteworthy in this light that the two similes occur after and not before Telemachus' return. However, as I will argue below, this simile probably defies such a straightforward explanation.

---

[468] Podlecki (1971, 82) suggests that this simile extends to Odysseus because of his close connection to Athena.

[469] Felson (2002b). Nestor also fills such a role (15.152, 17.111-12). Contrast Agamemnon's imperative to Odysseus in the underworld: τῷ νῦν μή ποτε καὶ σὺ γυναικί περ ἤπιος εἶναι ("therefore, from now on don't you too ever be kind, even to your wife," 11.441). Cf. also the sarcastic remarks of Mentor (2.230) and Athena (5.8).

[470] During Hector's funeral in the *Iliad*, Helen says that Priam is like an *ēpios patēr* to her (24.770). Interestingly, *ēpios patēr* is not attested outside of a simile. Odysseus himself says in somewhat passive-aggressive terms that Athena at least used to be kindly disposed towards him (μοι πάρος ἠπίη ἦσθα, 13.314). On Athena's disposition towards Odysseus in the *Odyssey*, see Clay (1983, 9-53).

[471] So Fränkel (1977, 90).

[472] Cf. de Romilly (1979, 16): "la douceur que (ἤπιος) exprime est le fait due père envers ses enfants et, par extension, du roi envers ceux dont il a la charge."

[473] On *eidenai* with a neuter plural adjective to express an attitude in Homer, see Sullivan (1988, 95-8).

We also have in this simile the second appearance of *polla mogein* used of Eumaeus. Here, however, there is a unique restriction of this phrase to suffering on behalf of another (τῷ ἐπ'), namely the long lost son. So, while the phrase again reflects an overlapping of Eumaeus and Odysseus, it is limited to a particular member or members of Odysseus' *oikos*, like *ēpia eidenai* above. This implies that at least some of the overlap between Odysseus and Eumaeus is confined to Odysseus' *oikos*. Odysseus is like an *ēpios patēr* for his people (e.g. λαῶν, 5.12), whereas Eumaeus only plays this role in a relatively domestic setting. And finally we find that Eumaeus' embracing and kissing (κύσεν περιφύς) Telemachus can be compared to the greeting of Odysseus by Amphithea, his maternal grandmother (περιφῦσ' Ὀδυσῆϊ / κύσσ', 19.416-17). Closer parallels, however, may be found in Odysseus' both contemplating and then actually kissing and embracing Laertes (μερμήριξε… / κύσσαι καὶ περιφῦναι ἑὸν πατέρ', 24.235-6; κύσσε δέ μιν περιφὺς ἐπιάλμενος, 320) at the end of the poem. We observe both that, as in the present passage, the latter examples appear at the beginning of the line and not the end, and that they take an accusative as opposed to a dative object. This similarity leads me to my final point about the present simile. Scholars have frequently read it as a 'reverse simile.' They observe, as above, that the *comparandum* is Odysseus, the father, who is to be welcomed by his son and not his father.[475] But Odysseus will also be greeted at the end of the poem by Laertes, who has similarly suffered for a long time on behalf of his only son. We note, on the other hand, that he will not do the kissing and hugging but will be the recipient of his son's affection. And there is little doubt that the relationship between Odysseus and Telemachus is also to be read into the simile, given their physical proximity on its occasion. I would argue, however, that it is all three living generations of Odysseus' patriline who are referenced in this simile.[476] It is the fragility of a line of single sons that is the point. Note, for example, the emphasis achieved in the present passage through the similarity between τηλύγετον and Τηλέμαχον, which both scan in the same way, have an accent on the antepenult, and appear in the same metrical position in consecutive lines. Telemachus is, of course, prominent in his family's affection because he is an only son (μοῦνον); as is Odysseus.[477] Eumaeus' reaction in the present simile highlights the fragility of Laertes' line and the euphoria in response to its preservation. The simile also inserts Eumaeus into this line – not in the sense that he occupies a spot on the family tree, but rather in that he duplicates some of these familial roles and potentially benefits from them as well. That Odysseus can only stand by and watch while his double celebrates as he himself cannot is perhaps the most poignant expression of the distance he still has to travel to return to the centre of his *oikos*.

---

[474] Although one must be wary of the documentary fallacy, Severyns (1929) argues with some reason that Eumaeus must be understood to be younger than Odysseus, but of the same generation.

[475] Podlecki (1971, 82), Moulton (1977, 132-3), H. Foley (1978, 8), de Jong (2001 *ad Od.* 16.17-21).

When, in the event of their success, Odysseus promises to make Eumaeus a companion of Telemachus and his son (21.214-16), there is certainly a degree of cynical manipulation on his part. Odysseus is using a technique that we can still observe today, according to which the master takes advantage of the ideology of 'pseudo-kinship' to reinforce the social death of his slaves. And, as we have seen from the language he uses, Eumaeus is invested in Odysseus' *oikos* in a manner consistent with the successful application of this technique. But we cannot so easily dismiss this relatedness, and Odysseus himself is not untouched by this process. He has a double in Eumaeus, who both shares and reflects much of his past, his role, what could have been, and his current, uncertain situation. In this slave, Odysseus finds the first and in some ways the only mortal who can identify with his position. This mutual identification becomes more and more acute in the latter half of the poem until it reaches its climax in the simile at the beginning of Book 16, when Eumaeus is inserted by way of comparison into Odysseus' role as the only son of Laertes and the father of the only son, Telemachus. Although Eumaeus is the focalizer in this simile, Odysseus is nevertheless the sympathetic figure, witnessing another man play his role, a role which has long been an integral element of his own identity, but which also has long been at a remove. In this remarkable passage, the audience experiences the uncanny most poignantly.[478] This simile is also the most effective example of the other most important function of the double, which, as we have noted above, is to represent that tension which is pertinent to the primary figure. In this case, the major tension is Odysseus' inability to be himself, especially in the presence of his longed-for *philoi*, such as, for example, his son. Eumaeus, on the other hand, is under no such constraint, and so he plays Odysseus' role, even to the point of telling his Cretan tale for him. Of course Odysseus is able to reveal himself to his son in short order (16.172-212), but he is still only able to do so temporarily. We find, then, that Eumaeus has a remarkable role to play in the *Odyssey*. He duplicates and elucidates Odysseus on the margins of his *oikos*. He is the first kin he meets on his return. He represents the gap Odysseus must span if he is truly to become himself again.

---

[476] So Suksi (forthcoming).

[477] Cf. *Il*. 9.482, as well as Telemachus' observation that his patriline is marked by single sons (*Od*. 16.113-20); cf. Goldhill (2010) and Eur. *Andr*. 1083.

---

[478] Cf. Freud's (1955, 227) definition of the uncanny as that "which leads back to something long known to us, once very familiar." Odysseus left home when Telemachus was very young, but his identity as the young man's father nonetheless remains important to him even in the tradition of the *Iliad* (2.258-60, 4.350-5).

# CHAPTER THREE: PHOENIX AND ACHILLES AS EXILES

More than any other figure, the exile reveals the extent to which kinship is elastic in Homer.[479] It was partly for this reason that I used Phoenix as an illustrative example in the introduction, showing how kinship is to a large extent a matter of perspective. In this chapter, I expand this treatment, looking first at the concept of exile as it appears in Homer. To discuss this subject at length requires some justification. E. Bowie has recently demonstrated that there is no developed "rhetoric of exile" in early Greek poetry.[480] And, as I will show, this point is reinforced by the fact that there is only one extremely rare word in early epic for the exile, namely *metanastēs*. However, I will quibble with E. Bowie inasmuch as, despite the relative infrequency and brevity with which the exile receives mention in early Greek poetry, there is a fairly developed rhetoric of exile in particular contexts, most notably in Phoenix' lengthy speech to Achilles (*Il*. 9.434-605).[481] The story of Phoenix' departure from his natal *oikos* and his incorporation into a new one far away is effective in part because it is underpinned by a typology of exile that we can observe in miniature ubiquitously in early Greek poetry. Phoenix' identity as exile and incorporated member of Achilles' family is the ultimate persuasive basis of his speech, and it relies on an understanding of how exile stories usually proceed. In particular, the audience can easily appreciate that the sterilization of Phoenix by Amyntor and Phoenix' subsequent avoidance of patricide through going into exile is a variation of the murder-and-flight motif, according to which a hero murders a member of his community, is forced into exile, and resettles elsewhere. But the whole significance of Phoenix' use of his own story cannot fully be appreciated without situating it in its rhetorical context. As I will argue, Phoenix, in his speech to Achilles, appropriates the unenviable lot of the exile as a disincentive. He paradoxically subverts the typology of exile to recast Achilles as one himself should he decide to return home. We learn from Phoenix' brilliant speech just how mobile the concepts of family and home can be. Although Achilles rejects Phoenix' rhetoric, it would be possible for him to conceive of the Achaean camp as his home and Agamemnon as a father figure, especially if he should marry one of his daughters.

---

[479] This is not to say that slavery is preferable to exile: cf. Thgn. 1211-16.

[480] E. Bowie (2007, 22).

[481] On rhetoric in Homer, see most recently Knudsen (2014).

Exile, emigration, and wandering are ubiquitous in ancient Greek literature, a preoccupation which is reflected by the steady flow of scholarship on the subject.[482] To a certain degree, one must agree with Murray, who says of early Greece that "all Hellas was ἀνάστατος, driven from its home by the constant war paths and uprootings of peoples."[483] For example, R. Parker, in his study of ritual pollution, finds no less than 53 people exiled for murder alone in Greek myth.[484] This ubiquity is exacerbated by the fact that, as E. Saïd has famously acknowledged, just about anyone may be considered an exile in a certain sense or from a certain point of view.[485] Seneca the Younger defines *exilium* as "a change of place" (*loci commutatio*, *Dial*. 12.6.1).[486] And he is even concerned that he might seem to restrict the sense (*angustare*

---

[482] Including only major works from the last decade or so, we have Forsdyke (2005), Montiglio (2005), Perry (2010), Garland (2014), and two collections: Gaertner (2007) and Hunter and Rutherford (2009).

[483] Murray (1934, 207); so Garland (2014, 133).

[484] Parker (1983, 375-92). See Forsdyke (2005, 30-79) for several case-studies of exile in the Archaic Period. Also see E. Bowie (2007, 27-49) on the figure of the exile in non-epic poetry of the Archaic Period. J. Roisman (1984-6) summarizes the evidence on exile from the Archaic Period in general. Grasmück (1978) and Seibert (1979) are the most exhaustive treatments of the subject in antiquity generally.

[485] E. Saïd (2000, 179-81). Cf. Plutarch's interpretation in the *de Exilio* (607d) of Emp. DK 31 B 115: οὐχ ἑαὐτὸν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ πάντας ἀποδείκνυσι μετανάστας ἐνταῦθα καὶ ξένους καὶ φυγάδας ἡμᾶς ὄντας ("he indicates not himself, but that, starting with him, all of us here are migrants and strangers and exiles").

[486] Quoted in Perry (2010, 1). I am aware that *exilium* cannot be equated entirely with Greek terms for exile, like *phygē*: Grasmück (1978, 20-9 and 64-102), Montiglio (2005, 30), Gaertner (2007, 2-3). But the two languages conceive of the idea in manners that are similar enough for the very general point I am making at the moment.

*videar vim*, *ibid.*) of the term with such a simple definition. After all, exile is both a complex concept and one that can very easily be extended metaphorically. The earliest Greek example of this kind of metaphorical extension of which I am aware occurs in Hesiod, who says of his father that he left Cyme and sailed to Boeotia, οὐκ ἄφενος φεύγων οὐδὲ πλοῦτόν τε καὶ ὄλβον, / ἀλλὰ κακὴν πενιὴν, τὴν Ζεὺς ἄνδρεσσι δίδωσιν (“not in flight from riches or wealth and happiness, but from dire poverty, which Zeus gives to men,” *Op*. 637-8). Hesiod’s father is conceived of as driven from his native land by poverty. Obviously this cannot literally be true. The poet is mapping the concept of involuntary exile onto leaving one’s homeland in search of a more prosperous life.[487] As various as the uses of exile can be in discourse, whether it be in antiquity or today, however, I intend to restrict my focus in the present chapter to literal exile, namely the migration of a person or persons caused by their forcible or legally enforced removal, or flight from anticipated violence or oppression in their homeland. This definition corresponds more closely to one usage of the Greek *phygē* (‘flight’), or even the Latin *exilium* (‘exile’), than the modern ‘exile’, which is generally restricted to “involuntary departure, sanctioned by political or judicial authorities.”[488] As implied by my definition, *phygē* can also apply to voluntary departure in the sense that flight from anticipated violence or oppression is voluntary. Today we might call a person in the latter situation a refugee or a fugitive. My reason for studying the literal exile or fugitive alone is that his situation is more straightforwardly pertinent to kinship relations than the various metaphorical extensions turn out to be.

---

[487] Cf. Ephorus *FGrH* 70 F 100 = Σ *ad* Hes. *Op*. 633 Pertusi: Ἔφορος δέ φησιν τοῦτον εἰς Ἄσκρην ἐλθεῖν, οὐ δι᾽ ἐμπορίαν ἀλλὰ φόνον ἐμφύλιον ἐργασάμενον (“Ephorus [of Cyme] says that this man [Hesiod’s father] went to Ascra not because of trade, but because he had killed a kinsman”). Obviously we have no reason to believe Ephorus here: M. West (1978 *ad* Hes. *Op*. 638). But his assertion that murder, namely the most common cause of exile in epic poetry, was what drove Hesiod’s father from home perhaps helps to show how easily one thinks of exile in this passage. See below on Arist. fr. 524 Rose and for more on the *metanastēs*. According to Martin (1992, 16-17), Hesiod’s father’s identity as an immigrant also contributes to his rhetorical position as outsider. See Seibert (1979, 2-3) on the difficulty of distinguishing between the two basic meanings of *phygē*, namely ‘flight’ and ‘exile,’ in particular contexts.

[488] Gaertner (2007, 2).

One potential problem with studying the figure of the exile in early epic is that, as opposed to the case of the *nothos* and the *dmōs*, etc., there is no ready term for the exile in early Greek poetry. The usual later word, *phygas*, is not attested in early epic.[489] *Alētēs* ('wanderer'), derived from *alaomai* ('to wander'), only appears in earlier poetry in the latter half of the *Odyssey* and in an elegiac fragment of the late-Archaic poet Asius (fr. 14.1 West). Montiglio says of *alētēs* that it embraces a range of roles from the outcast to the "inquisitive traveler."[490] But in the *Odyssey* and Asius its meaning is fairly specific. In the *Odyssey*, only the disguised Odysseus (17.483, 576-8, 18.18, 20.377, 21.400) and the beggar Irus (18.25, 333 = 393) are called *alētai*. The disguised Odysseus is hardly an outcast. His story is that he escaped kidnapping and enslavement (14.337-59). Odysseus portrays a man who is wandering because of bad luck, not because he fled his home or because he would be *persona non grata* there. He is technically free, but, as someone who wanders, he is a kind of slave to his belly (*gastēr*, 15.344-6, 17.286-9, 473-4, 18.53-4, 376-80), a motif that occurs in the *Odyssey* long before Athena disguises Odysseus (6.130-4, 7.216-21).[491] Turning to Irus, while we do not get his backstory, his description nonetheless accords with our understanding of the disguised Odysseus' professed story. Irus is also a beggar (πτωχός, 18.1; πτωχεύεσκ', 18.2) and the only legitimate figure (as opposed to the disguised Odysseus) on Ithaca who is not tied to an *oikos* (πανδήμιος, 18.1). He wanders about, delivering messages on command (18.7), and, in return, he seems to be fed fairly generously when he comes begging (18.1-3). Here the needs of the *gastēr* are similarly emphasized (18.2-3). The difference is that, while Odysseus is a slave to his *gastēr* out of necessity, Irus' is described as 'greedy' (μάργη, 18.2).[492] For this reason, Irus has sometimes been seen as an early anticipation of the *parasītos*, the comic layabout who "gnaws away ceaselessly and destructively at other people's substance."[493] So, both the beggar and Irus are wanderers in the sense that circumstances force them to wander around and beg for food and shelter. This can result in disrespect and mockery (18.32-50, 99-100). But they are clearly not outcasts; they are vagrants.[494]

---

[489] For the vocabulary of exile in the Classical Period and beyond, see Forsdyke (2005, 9-12).

[490] Montiglio (2005, 3).

[491] See Russo (1992 *ad Od.* 18.44) and Crotty (1994, 130-59) on this motif. Pucci (1987, 173-82) argues that the *gastēr* is treated as a base version of the Iliadic *thūmos* ('disposition') when Odysseus is in disguise. Bakker (2010) develops this thesis, arguing that, like the Iliadic *thūmos*, Odysseus' *gastēr* impels him to complete his *nostos* ('homecoming').

Asius in turn presents a colourful picture:

> χωλός, στιγματίης, πολυγήραος, ἶσος ἀλήτῃ
>     ἦλθε κνισοκόλαξ, εὖτε Μέλης ἐγάμει,
> ἄκλητος, ζωμοῦ κεχρημένος· ἐν δὲ μέσοισιν
>     ἥρως εἱστήκει βορβόρου ἐξαναδύς·

> "Crippled, tattooed, very old, like a wanderer came the fat-flatterer, uninvited, in need of soup, when Meles was getting married. And in the middle stood a hero emerged from mud" (fr. 14 West = fr. 14 Gentili-Prato ap. Ath. 3.125b-d).[495]

Much about this fragment is uncertain, and this will likely remain the case. The security of the text is a matter of debate.[496] And it is unclear whether the fat-flatterer is also the subject of the last clause.[497] If he is, he is rather an odd figure for a hero. But it is clear enough from the vocabulary used to describe him (κνισοκόλαξ… ζωμοῦ κεχρημένος) that he is a glutton.[498] And the fact that he is uninvited (presumably to Meles' wedding) seems to suggest that he is an intruder. A parallel to this figure may be found as early as Archilochus (fr. 124b).[499] In this sense, the *knisokolax* in the Asius fragment is dissimilar to the *alētai* in the *Odyssey* inasmuch as they seem to be accepted – or at least tolerated – not as invited guests but as an unfortunate reality. The *knisokolax*, however, is not an *alētēs* but rather is like (ἶσος) an *alētēs*. I interpret this to mean that he shows up like an *alētēs* would, namely uninvited and with the intention of consuming food. The difference is that, while the *alētēs* is at least tolerated, the *knisokolax* is little more than an intruder. This fragment of Asius helps to confirm that the *alētēs* is not an outcast or an exile so much as a kind of vagrant who lives on the margins of his community and relies on others for sustenance.[500] Because of the extreme marginality of this figure, he will only be of use to us as a contrast in this chapter. If the *alētēs* does have kin, as Odysseus' beggar does, they are far away. Because they are wanderers, no one seems to claim any relatedness with them.

---

[492] So C. Brown (2006, 38 n. 14): "in this way Irus serves as a foil to the returning hero."

[493] Tylawsky (2002, 7-16), who proposes Irus and Odysseus as the first clear examples of this character-type; so also Iannucci (2004, 372-3). Thalmann (1998a, 100-1) and Steiner (2010 *ad Od.* 18.1-100) see Irus alone as a forerunner of this figure. Nagy (1999, 228-32) argues that Irus is to be associated with the related figure of the glutton in blame poetry. And of course the suitors are also important early figures of gluttony: S. Saïd (1979), C. Brown (2006, 38).

[494] For further comparison between the beggar and Irus, see Pucci (1987, 177-8). Hammer (1997, 346) and Horden and Purcell (2000, 385) suggest that this sort of figure would not have been uncommon for most of the human history of the Mediterranean.

[495] On the *stigma* ('tattoo-mark'), see Jones (1987).

[496] Kaibel follows Bergk in suggesting Ἶρος ἀλήτης ("Irus, a wanderer") in place of ἶσος ἀλήτῃ in the first line of the fragment, a line ending which is attested at *Od.* 18.25. This emendation holds some attraction, but it must remain speculative.

The term *metanastēs*, the subject of a fair amount of scholarship, has also been translated as ‘exile’ or ‘outcast’. But there are different schools of thought on this. In terms of etymology, the apparently ancient derivation from μετ-ανα-στῆ-ναι (e.g. Hdt. 9.51.3) is generally rejected, and *μετα-ναι-ειν is now favoured (cf. νάσθη, *Il*. 14.119).[501] So, etymologically, at least, a *metanastēs* would originally have been a migrant. If this is correct, then, as Leumann observes, *metanastēs* is roughly cognate with *metanaietēs* (‘fellow dweller’, Hes. *Th*. 401) and *metanaietān* (‘to dwell with’, *H.Dem*. 87).[502] Two interpretations have arisen from this etymology. The first is that the *metanastēs* is a wanderer, someone who has left his natal community but failed to find welcome in a new one.[503] The second is that he is a former exile, an immigrant, who has failed fully to incorporate himself into his new community.[504] While the former interpretation is favoured by a potential Mycenaean etymology,[505] the latter is universally supported by every subsequent use of the term prior to the death of Alexander. This interpretation would mean that *metanastēs* is more or less synonymous with the later *metoikos* (‘settler from abroad,’ ‘metic’), although not with all of the technical meanings that the latter came to have.[506] And it appears to have gone unnoticed that the ancient and Byzantine lexicographers uniformly make precisely this comparison, presumably drawing it from a common source (μετανάστης· μέτοικος, φυγάς, Apollon. *Lex*. s.v. μετανάστης = *Lexica Segueriana* s.v. = Phot. s.v. [μ 325

---

[497] Edmunds (1981, 229-30) argues *contra* Wilamowitz that he is. But he agrees with Wilamowitz that he is a revenant.

[498] The context of the fragment's quotation in Athenaeus seems to indicate that Athenaeus sees the κνισοκόλαξ in this light as well, as Iannucci (2004, 370-1) shows.

[499] Cf. especially πολλὸν δὲ πίνων καὶ χαλίκρητον μέθυ… οὐδὲ μὲν κληθεὶς <u – x> ἦλθες ("drinking much and unmixed wine… and you came uninvited," 1-3). See C. Brown (2006, 37-8), who compares Pericles, the subject of this fragment, to Irus in the *Odyssey*. He also provides further early examples of gluttons (39 n. 21).

[500] It is possible that the term came to be a poetical form of *phygas* by the Classical Period: φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης, Emp. DK 31 B115.13; φυγὰς δ᾽ ἀλήτης τῆσδε γῆς ἀπόξενος, A. *Ag*. 1282; cf. ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἀλήτης τῆσδε γῆς ἀπόξενος, *Ch*. 1042, although the text is uncertain (Garvie (1986 *ad Ch*. 1042-3)). It is unclear whether the combination of φυγάς and ἀλήτης is a pleonasm, as the *LSJ* entry (s.v. ἀλήτης) would imply, or if it is a hendiadys, with ἀλήτης standing in for ἀλώμενος *vel sim.* (cf. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ πατρῴας φυγὰς ἀλητεύων χθονός, Eur. *Hipp*. 1048, with *alēteuein* being a denominal form of *alētēs* (Beekes (2010 s.v. ἀλάομαι))). But it is tolerably clear that, by the first half of the fifth century, the *alētēs* could be an exile. Garvie (1986 *ad* A. *Ch*. 1042-3) observes that *alētēs* only occurs in Aeschylus on the two lines quoted above. He seems to presume that the lines should be read as mutually allusive, which is sensible considering their similarity, an unusual feature in Aeschylus.

---

[501] For *μετα-ναι-ειν, see Leumann (1950, 183 n. 30), Hofmann (1966 s.v.), Chantraine (1968-80 s.v. μετανάστης), Frisk (1970 s.v.), Beekes (2010 s.v.), *contra* e.g. *LSJ* s.v.

[502] Leumann (1950, 183).

[503] So Chantraine (1968-80 s.v.), Adkins (1972, 14), Schlunk (1976, 205-6), Hainsworth (1993 *ad Il*. 9.648), Hammer (1997, 344-7), Perry (2010, 27-8), Garland (2014, 17).

[504] Leaf (1900-02 *ad Il*. 9.648), Calhoun (1962, 434), Arieti (1986, 23-4), Martin (1992, 18), Kelly (2008, 197), Tsagalis (2008, 123), Beekes (2010 s.v.), Alden (2012, 115). H. Mackie’s (1996, 147-9) position on this question is unclear.

[505] Bartoněk (2003, 184 and 376-84).

[506] On the status of the metic in Classical Athens, see Kamen (2013, 43-54). Unlike the metic, the *metanastēs* cannot be a freed slave. See also (Beekes 2010 s.v. μετανάστης), who describes the word as “an old parallel formation to Att. μέτ-οικος”; so Wackernagel (1957, vol. 2, 246-7).

Theodoridis] = *Synagoge* s.v. = Suid. s.v. [μ 714 Adler]).[507] Herodotus reports the opinion that the Athenians are the only Greeks who are not *metanastai* (μοῦναι δὲ ἐόντες οὐ μετανάσται Ἑλλήνων, 7.161.3). The point is that some people, or at least the Athenians themselves by the time of the Classical Period, seem to have thought of the Athenians as autochthonous (Pi. *I.* 2.18-22, Eur. fr. 360 7-13 Kannicht, Hdt. 1.56.2, Th. 1.2.5, 2.36.1).[508] In other words, the rest of the Greeks came from somewhere else and settled. So *metanastēs* in this passage corresponds to the second interpretation, since by and large the other major Greek populations have settled.[509] Similarly Aristotle transmits the opinion that Hesiod's father was a *metanastēs* who came from Cyme (τὸν δὲ πατέρα φησὶ μετανάστην γενέσθαι ἐκ τῆς Κύμης ἐλθόντα, fr. 524 Rose = Procl. fr. 227 Marzillo = Σ *ad* Hes. *Op*. 633-40 Pertusi). And we know from the Hesiodic corpus (*Op*. 639-40) that his father is supposed to have settled in Boeotia. Again the *metanastēs* seems to have found a new home. Although none of this evidence is conclusive with respect to the Archaic Period or early Greek hexameter, these later sources all seem to have interpreted in a consistent way what was an archaism at the time (although it did not remain so). So the balance of probability is in favour of the *metanastēs* being a kind of resident alien. Such a figure would be ideal for our purposes. Unfortunately the term only appears twice in the relevant corpus, with each example being used in the same formula and of the same situation (*Il*. 9.648, 16.59).[510]

---

[507] Cf. Hsch. s.v. μετανάσται [μ 1029 Latte]· *μέτοικοι ASvgn. φυγάδες vg(AN). σύμμαχοι. Arist. *Pol*. 1278a is also highly suggestive, esp. ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐποίησεν ‘ὡς εἴ τιν’ ἀτίμητον μετανάστην’ [*Il*. 9.648 = 16.59]· ὥσπερ μέτοικος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων (“just as Homer said, ‘like some *metanastēs* without status’; for in the same way the metic is one who has no share of honours”). See also the *comparanda* in Theodoridis’ edition of Photius [μ 325]. Σ M *ad* Arat. 457 Martin, on the other hand, compares the planets (πλάνητες), which always wander, to *metanastai.*

[508] See Cohen (2000, 81-4) for further examples of this idea in the fourth century.

[509] So Wackernagel (1957, vol. 2, 246), who translates Herodotus’ usage here as *Umsiedler*.

[510] Martin (1992, 18-21) and Alden (2012) argue that figures like Phoenix are ‘metanastic,’ meaning that, as *metanastai*, they occupy privileged, advisory rolls. Unfortunately neither Phoenix nor any other figure is actually referred to as a *metanastēs* in our text.

We can see that, with the extremely rare exception of *metanastēs*, there is no noun for the exile in early epic. But there are undoubtedly exiles all the same. To get a sense of the vocabulary that is used, let us consider Theoclymenus' report of his situation to Telemachus in the *Odyssey*, a report which is typical in many ways:

> ‘οὕτω τοι καὶ ἐγὼν ἐκ πατρίδος, ἄνδρα κατακτὰς
> ἔμφυλον· πολλοὶ δὲ κασίγνητοί τε ἔται τε
> Ἄργος ἀν' ἱππόβοτον, μέγα δὲ κρατέουσιν Ἀχαιῶν·
> τῶν ὑπαλευάμενος θάνατον καὶ κῆρα μέλαιναν
> φεύγω, ἐπεί νύ μοι αἶσα κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἀλάλησθαι.
> ἀλλά με νηὸς ἔφεσσαι, ἐπεί σε φυγὼν ἱκέτευσα,
> μή με κατακτείνωσι· διωκέμεναι γὰρ ὀίω.’
>
> "‘So I too am away from my fatherland, since I slew a member of my band.[511] And he had many brothers and kinsmen[512] throughout horse-feeding Argos, and they are greatly powerful over the Achaeans. I got beyond their reach and am fleeing death and a dark fate, since now it is my lot to wander among men. But put me on board your ship, since I have supplicated you in my flight so that they won't kill me. For I think they are chasing me’" (*Od.* 15.272-8).

Theoclymenus is in the midst of the process that the typical exile undergoes in early Greek hexameter. This process can include as many as five steps, but it is often highly abbreviated when it is reported. Theoclymenus' case is useful because it always features the most common vocabulary. The first step is the event that precipitates the flight. Theoclymenus murders a member of his band, which is the most frequent first step in this poetry. Of the possibly twenty exiles in early epic, at least thirteen flee as a direct consequence of having murdered someone, namely Tlepolemus (*Il.* 2.661-70), Medon (13.694-7=15.333-6), Lycophron (15.430-2), Epeigeus (16.571-4), Patroclus (23.83-90), the generic exile in the last simile of the *Iliad* (24.480-2), Odysseus in his lying tale to Athena (*Od.* 13.256-86), an unnamed Aetolian (14.379-85),

---

[511] On the *phȳlon* as a band, see Donlan (1985, 295-8).

[512] Gates (1971, 28-9) persuasively argues *contra* Stagakis (1968) that *etēs* probably means something like ‘kinsman’ rather than ‘friend’.

Odysseus' hypothetical exile (23.118-20), Amphitryon (Hes. fr. 195.11-15 M-W), Hyettus (fr. 257), Achilles (*Aeth*. arg. Bernabé), and Tydeus (*Alcmaeonis* fr. 4 Bernabé; cf. *Il*. 14.119-25).[513] Some form or compound of *kteinein* ('to kill') is used in all of these examples, except in the case of Epeigeus (ἐξεναρίξας (literally 'having despoiled'), *Il*. 16.573). The second step is the actual departure from home, usually, as in Theoclymenus' case, because of fear, although anger is also possible (*Il*. 2.628-9, *Od*. 15.253-4). As here, this departure is often marked by *pheugein* ('to flee,' *Il*. 2.665, 9.448, 478, *Od*. 13.259, 23.120, Hes. fr. 257.3 M-W), and we also see reference to movement away from one's *patris gaia* ('fatherland', *Il*. 13.696 = 15.335, 24.480, *Od*. 23.120, Hes. fr. 195.12 M-W). The third step consists of wandering, presumably in search of a new home. The vocabulary in this step can vary widely (cf. *Il*. 6.200-2, *Od.* 13.272-86), and it is often omitted altogether. The fourth step is the arrival at a potential new home, a step which sometimes involves the supplication of a *basileus*. *Hiketeuein* ('to supplicate') can be used, as with Theoclymenus in the present passage (so *Il*. 16.574, Hes. fr. 195.13 M-W; cf. *Il*. 24.478-84).[514] The fifth and final step is the acceptance of the exile into his new home. Theoclymenus has not yet reached this point, and whether he will is a question that the *Odyssey* leaves open. But nearly all of the other exiles do find one. On the other hand, any or all of the last four steps can be summarized by a simple *naiein* ('to inhabit', *Il*. 13.695 = 15.334, Hes. fr. 195.14 M-W) or *aponaiein* ('to resettle', *Il*. 2.629, *Od*. 15.254). We see, then, that, while there are some common lexical items and even phrases in various passages, the only word or phrase that appears in even a small majority of cases is *kteinein*, which is hardly a rare verb in a poem like the *Iliad*, or even in the *Odyssey*. In addition, although we find that many of the five steps may be observed in the stories of many of the exiles, it is only in Phoenix' narrative (*Il*. 9.444-95) that we see them all. It is also possible that, for example in Tlepolemus' case (2.661-70), some of these steps are not simply omitted but are understood not to have occurred.[515] All the same, this five-step model will be useful as a typology.

---

[513] The poet does not say why Bellerophon goes into exile (*Il*. 200-3), which Alden (2000, 137) interprets as suggesting "that divine favour is capricious." And Hes. fr. 43a.81-91 is too fragmentary to tell if his exile is even mentioned. In Pi. *I*. 7.43-8, he is punished for trying to ascend to the dwellings of the sky (ἐς οὐρανοῦ σταθμούς, 45). See Gantz (1993, 313-16) for later traditions on Bellerophon. In any case, the Iliadic passage is awkward and frequently the subject of grave doubts: Graziosi and Haubold (2010 *ad Il*. 6.200-2). But see D'Alfonso (2008) on this whole question in more detail.

[514] Interestingly, neither *gounazesthai* nor *lissesthai* are ever used. This is probably because *hiketeuein* is the most humbling form of supplication and is often used to refer to the initiation of *xenia* ('guest-friendship'): Gould (1973), Alden (2000, 281-92), Naiden (2006, 8-18).

Since the interaction between Phoenix and Achilles is the most complete, it will stand as our central case study in this chapter. The context in which it appears is difficult and vexing from a textual point of view. The major passages featuring Phoenix in Book 9 of the *Iliad* feature two of the most infamous cruces in all of Homer. To begin with, there are the notorious duals used apparently to refer to two or more of Phoenix, Odysseus, Ajax, and even possibly the heralds Odius and Eurybates (9.182-204). This problem has been the subject of a more than ample amount of study, and there is no need to revisit it all in too much detail here.[516] It must be noted, however, that, of the nine traditional schools of approach to these duals as outlined by Scodel, six argue that Phoenix is left out or at least taken for granted. And all three of the remaining theories have received little support on account of their dubious nature.[517] The reason that Phoenix is left out is generally seen to be either on account of his status being too low or his being simply taken for granted because he is so closely associated with Achilles.[518] While Odysseus and Ajax certainly have higher standing than Phoenix, Phoenix nonetheless retains an acknowledgeable status, ruling over the Dolopians (Δολόπεσσιν ἀνάσσων) on the furthest edges of Phthia (9.484).[519] This plethora of theories goes to show how tenuously Phoenix has often been seen to fit into the poem, from antiquity until today. He was a favourite target of the analyst school, featuring, for example, as the key argument in Page's rearguard defense of this outmoded approach.[520] Page's argumentation is extreme, but his basic point that Phoenix' appearance in *Iliad* 9 is awkward is undeniable.[521] In addition to the duals, why is Phoenix never mentioned before *Iliad* 9 and only sporadically thereafter?[522] He has the longest speech in the poem at 9.435-605, but scarcely figures elsewhere.[523] As Hainsworth puts it, "Book 9 is well integrated into the idea of the *Iliad* but not so well integrated into the text."[524] Phoenix lies at the centre of this tension. There is no straightforward solution to this problem. We can only proceed by examining his story with especial care, particularly since he himself reports it in a rhetorically charged context. He is trying to convince Achilles not to depart for Phthia, but to accept Agamemnon's propitiatory gifts and stay and fight the Trojans.

---

[515] So Garland (2014, 131-2) on Tlepolemus in the *Iliad*.

[516] See Scodel (2002, 160-7) for an admirable and exhaustive summary of the scholarship, adding Louden (2002 and 2006, 120-34).

[517] Scodel (2002, 162-3). She herself argues that the duals refer to Odysseus and Ajax, "and the narrator used them *in order* to cause perplexity" (170). Nagy (1999, 49-55) suggests that Phoenix is left out prior to the embassy's arrival at Achilles' tent, at which point Odysseus is left out. That Phoenix is not a proper member of the embassy is also a frequent claim in the scholia: Σ A *ad Il*. 9.168, 169, 180, 182, 192, 197, bT *ad* 9.168 Erbse.

---

[518] Köhnken (1975 and 1978) remains the major proponent of the former argument, with Tsagarakis (1979) rather vehemently disagreeing. Martin (1989, 236-9) is the most prominent supporter of the latter argument. Kullmann (1960, 133) argues acutely that the relationship between Phoenix and Neoptolemus in the *Cypria* and the *Nostoi* likely closely resembled his relationship to Achilles in the *Iliad*.

[519] So Tsagarakis (1979). While it is true that Phoenix himself makes this claim in a passage which, as I will argue below, is highly rhetorical, it is unlikely that the audience is to think that Phoenix is simply lying in a speech delivered for the benefit of Achilles, who would surely be expected to know.

The argument that Phoenix is taken for granted because he is associated with Achilles is based on the assumption that the diegetic narrator, who uses the duals before Achilles appears on the scene, is adopting Achilles' perspective for the moment. Scodel (2002, 166-7) rightly points out, however, that this *ad hoc* premise is unlikely owing to the fact that the narrator and Achilles tend to have strikingly different perspectives elsewhere.

[520] Page (1972, 297-300); so, for example, Focke (1954, 260-2).

[521] Even Louden's (2002 and 2006, 123-34) recent and brilliant proposal on structural grounds that Phoenix actually is one of the characters referred to by the duals fails to answer the larger questions about Phoenix' role in the *Iliad*.

[522] He leads the fourth company of Myrmidons when Patroclus goes to battle as Achilles (16.196). Athena takes Phoenix' form to have a conversation with Menelaus (17.553-66). Along with Odysseus, Idomeneus, and Nestor, he tries to comfort Achilles and encourages him to eat (19.309-13). And he helps Achilles referee the chariot race at the funeral games (23.358-61). Aristonicus reports that Zenodotus preferred that Poseidon take Phoenix' form over that of an unnamed old man (Σ A *ad Il.* 14.136a Erbse). But this has been condemned by all major modern editions as well as Aristonicus himself.

[523] Cf. Martin (1989, 108): "length is a positive speech value. The assignment of length in speech by the narrator Homer produces our impressions about the importance of a given episode and also of a speaker."

[524] Hainsworth (1993, 55).

Knudsen describes the structure of his speech in Aristotelian terms.[525] The first section (9.434-95), the one with which we are centrally concerned for the moment, uses *pathos*, an appeal to emotion.[526] Phoenix implicitly contends that Achilles owes him goodwill (an *ēthos* argument, namely one based on the character of the speaker) because of his tragic story and good service to Achilles and his family.[527] Knudsen goes so far, and it is unlikely that anyone would seriously disagree. Somewhat less clear, however, is the paradigmatic strategy behind Phoenix' use of his own story.[528] Phoenix sleeps with his father's favourite concubine, is cursed by his father, flees to Phthia, and finds a new life in Peleus' court. How does this undoubtedly interesting series of events pertain to Achilles' quandary?[529] The bT scholion suggests that, just as Phoenix obtained forgiveness for his mistake (ἁμαρτών) in sleeping with his father's courtesan, so Achilles is supposed to seek forgiveness from Agamemnon for his own mistake (ἁμαρτήσας) over Briseis (Σ *ad Il.* 9.449 Erbse). This reading remained the standard one as late as the 1970s.[530] However, it has since been recognized that, while there is some parallel between the concubine and Briseis, it is difficult to see how Peleus' role matches that of Agamemnon. Peleus has nothing to do with Phoenix' activity back home in Hellas.[531] The parallel seems rather to be twofold. First, both Phoenix and Achilles have engaged in a quarrel over a woman with someone more powerful than themselves. Second is the issue of flight. On account of a woman, Achilles has just threatened to return home to Phthia and enjoy Peleus' wealth (9.356-400). He does not frame this potential decision in terms of flight, but it is easy to see the parallel. When Phoenix flees (φεύγων, 448; φεῦγον, 478) his home, he takes refuge with Peleus, who makes him a rich man (μ᾽ ἀφνειὸν ἔθηκε, 483). Phoenix is strikingly a negative *paradeigma*, therefore.[532] This is clear both from the fact that Phoenix is claiming to have done precisely what he is trying to dissuade Achilles from doing, and from what he reports to have followed. He is entirely positive in his description of his treatment at Peleus' hands, but the reality is nonetheless that, as mentioned above, he has come to inhabit the furthest reaches of Phthia, albeit in the capacity of ruler (483-4).[533] The parallel between the two situations is obviously not exact. Phoenix has fled a domestic dispute, whereas Achilles proposes to withdraw from the war against the Trojans. Nonetheless, the implied comparison between Phoenix' flight and Achilles' withdrawal cannot fail to sting the warrior Achilles, despite his occasional implication that he has ceased to care for *tīmē* (e.g. 318-19).[534] Phoenix is playing a delicate rhetorical game here. On the one hand, he paints himself as a negative exemplum with respect to his actions in his natal home. On the other hand, despite having just undermined his own character from a warrior's point of view, Phoenix needs to convince Achilles that he is worth protecting. In other words, he needs to establish that he is owed goodwill (the aforementioned *pathos* argument) for services rendered. This may motivate Phoenix' emphasis on his kourotrophic relationship with the young Achilles (485-95), as opposed to any more typically masculine service he may have performed.

---

[525] Without referring to Aristotle, Held (1987, 247 n. 10) notes that Priam's exchange with Achilles at the end of the poem (I presume he means 24.486-551 and 599-620) has a similar structure.

[526] *Pathos* is central to the entire speech as well: cf. Beck (2012, 66-73) on Phoenix' use of the verb *lissesthai* ('to supplicate') throughout.

[527] Knudsen (2014, 61-2). She outlines the applicability of Aristotelian categories of rhetoric (using Arist. *Rh.*) to speeches in Homer at 38-50. For a slightly different rhetorical analysis of this speech, see Wilson (2002, 96-104). Phoenix' contention becomes explicit only at the very end of this section of the speech (9.492-5).

[528] See Willcock (1964), Held (1987), and Knudsen (2014, 42-4 and 77-9) on the *paradeigma* ('example') in Homer and more generally.

[529] Hainsworth's (1993 *ad Il.* 9.447-77) assessment of the passage as "inconsequential" is perhaps hastily dismissive.

[530] So Schlunk (1976, 204-5) and Rosner (1976, 316-18).

---

[531] So Scodel (1982, 131-3; 2008, 16), Falkner (1995, 118), J. Griffin (1995 *ad Il.* 9.447ff.), Alden (2000, 221-2). My own analysis here is much indebted to Scodel (1982), which remains the watershed moment in the analysis of Phoenix' speech. For a different reading, see more recently Alden (2012, 124-5). The location of Phoenix' natal home in Hellas is a problem. We are told as recently as *Il.* 9.395, for example, that Peleus rules over Hellas; cf. Eust. 762.30 and Page (1972, 304) for more detail. Van Thiel conjectures ἴδον ('I saw') in place of λίπον ('I left') at 9.447, and this would solve the problem.

[532] So Scodel (2002, 169), Wilson (2002, 96), and Ready (2011, 146-7).

[533] See Martin (1992, 16-18) on Phoenix' relatively reduced status in Phthia. Cf. E. Bowie (2007.26 on *Il.* 9.464-70) as giving "a hint of the prosperity on which he was turning his back."

[534] Cf. J. Griffin (1995 *ad Il.* 9.447ff.): "this is what the choice of long life without κλέος could be made to look like; Achilles cannot behave like this."

Phoenix' unimpressive character is built into the structure of his story. The first step, the motivation for his departure, is constructed so as to disappoint the audience's expectations, thereby highlighting that he is to be understood as a negative exemplum. Phoenix introduces his autobiography in a manner reminiscent of Nestor in particular:

> ὣς ἂν ἔπειτ᾽ ἀπὸ σεῖο, φίλον τέκος, οὐκ ἐθέλοιμι
> λείπεσθ᾽, οὐδ᾽ εἴ κέν μοι ὑποσταίη θεὸς αὐτός
> γῆρας ἀποξύσας θήσειν νέον ἡβώοντα,
> οἷον ὅτε πρῶτον λίπον Ἑλλάδα καλλιγύναικα
> φεύγων νείκεα πατρός, Ἀμύντορος Ὀρμενίδαο.

> "So, dear child, I wouldn't then be willing to be left far from you, not even if a god himself should undertake to scrape off my old age and make me young and in my prime, as when I first left Hellas, which is full of beautiful women, fleeing reproaches from my father, Amyntor, son of Ormenus" (9.444-8).[535]

The invocation of a lost youth followed by a transitional phrase like οἷον ὅτε to introduce a story from this youth is not dissimilar to Nestor's habit (e.g. οἷον, 1.263; ὡς ὁπότ᾽, 11.671). Based on the parallels involving Nestor, I suggest that, up until the end of line 446, the poet creates the expectation of a glorious story from Phoenix' youth, ideally one involving martial valour.[536] We also note that the closest verbal parallel to Phoenix' transition comes from the *Odyssey*, when Circe encourages Odysseus and his companions to eat and drink until they recover their vigour, "as when you first left your fatherland of rough Ithaca" (οἷον ὅτε πρώτιστον ἐλείπετε πατρίδα γαῖαν / τρηχείης Ἰθάκης, 10.460-1). Given that these men left home when they were twenty years younger to fight in the Trojan War, making them virile, warlike figures, this parallel would seem to support my reading. But Phoenix disappoints the expectation created when he says, in the very next line, that he left home in flight from a domestic dispute – and one with his father no less.[537] The use of *neikos* ('dispute') is possibly significant here. This noun and the denominal *neikein* can refer to war, but the pertinent usage here is a dispute between two parties or, more narrowly, negative criticism levelled by one party at the other.[538] *Neikos* leads to bitterness, anger, and even war. When it comes from one's father, it is something to be endured, as the sons of Priam do (*Il.* 24.248-69).[539] To get angry or flee is by no means praiseworthy in a son.[540] That Phoenix is to be understood as a negative exemplum in this case is unmistakeable.

---

[535] On the sense of scraping away old age in this passage, see S. West (2001, 12 n. 44) and C. Brown (2014).

[536] Schadewaldt (1966, 83-5) compares the structure of Phoenix' speech to Nestor's storytelling practice. On how Nestor uses his youthful war stories to his advantage, see Martin (1989, 106-9) and Allan and Cairns (2011, 117-19 and 135-6).

But what precipitates this quarrel between father and son is not immediately clear. Phoenix' narration in this portion of his autobiography is in some ways as problematic as the duals from earlier in Book 9:

---

[537] Note that the quarrel (νεῖκος) that breaks out in Nestor's story (*Il.* 11.670-2) is of a more valorous sort.

[538] Distinguishing between *neikos* and *eris* ('strife') is not always a simple matter. Some scholars, such as Nagy (1999, 309-14), seem not to draw any distinction at all. But see Hogan (1981), who, while he finds *eris* to be pejorative in Homer and Hes. *Th.*, predictably does not in Hes. *Op*. Nagler (1988) acknowledges this distinction while finding none himself in actual practice. *LfgrE* s.v. νεῖκος B also makes the useful point that *neikos* often refers to an event which is a subsidiary of *eris*.

[539] Paris even endures Hector's *neikos* (3.38-59, 6.325-333). Odysseus discourages Alcinous from criticizing (νείκεε) Nausicaa on the grounds that she has acted appropriately (*Od.* 7.303-7). There is no suggestion, however, that Alcinous would be out of line in doing so. One could also argue that Achilles rejects (*Il.* 9.391-2) Agamemnon's offer to make him his son-in-law (9.141-56) at least in part because he would have to endure the kind of *neikos* (e.g. 2.376) that he can now reject; cf. Calhoun (1962, 456), Wilson (2002), and Allan and Cairns (2011, 123). Nagy (1999, 222-42) contends that *neikos* in the *Iliad* reflects the praise and blame traditions of Greek poetry. And Martin (1989, 68-77) explores some of the rhetorical conventions in *neikos* discourse in the *Iliad*.

[540] It is not clear to me whether Amyntor's *neikea* constitute an instance of flyting (on which see Martin (1989, 65-77) and Ready (2011, 197-209)). Wilson's (2002, 98) claim that "the account of Phoinix's quarrel (*neikos*) with Amyntor is meant to evoke Achilleus' quarrel with Agamemnon" is attractive, but I am not convinced that there is sufficient evidence to show that the reference is so specific.

> ὅς μοι παλλακίδος περιχώσατο καλλικόμοιο
> τὴν αὐτὸς φιλέεσκεν, ἀτιμάζεσκε κ᾽ ἄκοιτιν,
> μητέρ᾽ ἐμήν· ἣ δ᾽ αἰὲν ἐμὲ λισσέσκετο γούνων
> παλλακίδι προμιγῆναι, ἵν᾽ ἐχθήρειε γέροντα.
> τῇ πιθόμην καὶ ἔρεξα·

> "[Amyntor], who was angry with me on account of a concubine with beautiful hair whom he himself held dear, and he had contempt for his wife, my mother. And she was always at my knees, supplicating me to sleep with the concubine in his place so that she might come to loath the old man. I obeyed her and did it" (9.449-53).[541]

There is much about Phoenix' story that is unsavoury. Amyntor's preoccupation with a concubine, while it is hardly praiseworthy, is not particularly problematic *per se*. It is apparently only fear of his wife's anger that prevents Laertes from having sex with Eurycleia (*Od*. 1.429-33). And Agamemnon is not ashamed to announce before the assembled Achaean host that he wants to keep Chryseis, even comparing her favourably with his wife, Clytemnestra (*Il*. 1.111-15). But the preference by Amyntor and Agamemnon of concubines to their own wives is folly, especially in contrast with Laertes' prudence, because it creates an "unhealthy domestic situation."[542] On the other hand, Phoenix again hardly emerges without blemish himself, since he favours his mother over his father and commits something approaching incest.[543] The phrase ἵν᾽ ἐχθήρειε γέροντα is perhaps surprising. Assuming the text is sound, it cannot seem to mean anything other than that the purpose of Phoenix' having sex with the concubine would be that she would come to loath his father, presumably by comparison with the younger man. The scholiasts express the belief that women lose sexual interest in old men when they have had experience of young and more vigorous men because old men are not as potent.[544] And this seems to be the understanding here.[545] But why would he care if she loathes him? Her feelings about him would hardly affect his access to her.[546] I would argue that the fact that Amyntor is angered by Phoenix' action must mean that he is in love with the concubine (φιλέεσκεν, 9.450).[547] The only reason he cares about her feelings is that he cares about her. We might perhaps be reminded of concubinage later in antiquity. While a man's relationship with his concubine (*pallakē* after Homer, starting in Hdt. 1.84.3, 1.135, etc.) is certainly less dignified than the one he has with his wife, concubinage is frequently, and even typically, portrayed as more affectionate than marriage.[548]

---

[541] In translating the *hapax* προμιγῆναι, I am following Σ A *ad loc*. Erbse: πρὸ τοῦ πατρὸς μιγῆναι ("to have sex before his father"). Cf. Eust. 762.47: ἣν ὁ πατὴρ Ἀμύντωρ οὔπω μὲν ἔγνω… εἰς τοῦτο δὲ ἀνέτρεφε ("The father, Amyntor, did not yet know her… he was bringing her up for this purpose"). Falkner's (1995, 117) suggestion that it is a euphemism for rape is unlikely both because there is no apparent reason for coming to such a conclusion and also because it is hard to see how Phoenix raping a concubine would be perceived as such by an ancient audience.

[542] Falkner (1995, 117).

[543] So *ibid*. and Felson (2002b, 262). There is, however, S. *Tr*. 1221-9, where Heracles orders his son, Hyllus, to marry his concubine, Iole. That he is talking about marriage is beyond dispute: Segal (1994b). And it is worth noting that Hyllus objects that she is responsible for the deaths of his parents (1232-7), and not that such a marriage would be problematic on account of her having had sex with Heracles. As far as I can tell, the nearest parallel to Phoenix' seduction of his father's concubine is as late as I *Corinthians* 5.1 (so A. Edwards (1987, 225)).

In fact, Amyntor's preoccupation with his concubine also helps to explain his apparently self-destructive sterilization of his son. Consider how the gruesome deed is described:

> πατὴρ δ᾽ ἐμὸς αὐτίκ᾽ ὀϊσθείς
> πολλὰ κατηρᾶτο, στυγερὰς δ᾽ ἐπεκέκλετ᾽ Ἐρινῦς,
> μὴ ποτε γούνασιν οἷσιν ἐφέσσεσθαι φίλον υἱόν
> ἐξ ἐμέθεν γεγαῶτα· θεοὶ δ᾽ ἐτέλειον ἐπαράς,

---

[544] Σ b *ad Il*. 9.452 Erbse: ῥᾷστα γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἀφίσταται γέροντος γυνὴ νέα πειραθεῖσα νέου καὶ ἰσχυροτέρου ἀνδρός· ἧττον γὰρ οἱ γέροντες ἀφροδισιάζειν δύνανται ("for a young woman is wont to stand aloof from an old man, if she has had experience of a young and more vigorous man. For old men are less potent at sex"). The T scholiast and Eust. 762.45 express a similar view. The phrase did not meet with universal approval, however. The T scholiast also records that γέροντα was sometimes emended to γέροντι, an idea which is not without appeal. But having to read *echthairein* as 'to be a source of hatred' or 'to make hateful to' here is far from ideal, although cf. ἀπεχθαίρει at *Od*. 4.105 and S. West (2001, 4 n.13). Alden (2000, 218-20) discusses how the Greeks took a dim view of favouring the mother over the father.

[545] Cf. Mimnermus' lament that an old man is "loathsome to children and without value for women" (ἐχθρὸς μὲν παισίν, ἀτίμαστος δὲ γυναιξίν, 1.9 West$^2$). West's plausible emendation of γυναιξίν to γυναικί would make the old man without value to his wife as opposed to women as a group.

[546] Cf. S. West (2001, 4): "the concubine's inclinations are of secondary importance."

[547] Cf. *Od*. 18.325: ἀλλ᾽ ἥ γ᾽ Εὐρυμάχῳ μισγέσκετο καὶ φιλέεσκεν ("but she kept having sex with Eurymachus and held him dear").

[548] Kapparis (1999, 12-13, with primary sources cited on 9).

> Ζεύς τε καταχθόνιος καὶ ἐπαινὴ Περσεφόνεια.

> “My father learned about it straightaway and cursed me greatly, and he called upon the hateful Erinyes, that I should never set on my knees a dear son born from me. And the gods accomplished the curses, subterranean Zeus and dread Persephone” (9.453-7).[549]

Falkner observes of this passage that Amyntor’s “excessive interest in his concubine has destroyed his son and perhaps doomed the *oikos* to extinction.”[550] This is true if Phoenix is Amyntor’s only son. Phoenix does not mention any brothers, but would that be the only means by which Amyntor could maintain his *oikos*? Surely he could produce children by his favoured slave woman (ἐκ δούλης, *Od*. 4.7), as Menelaus does. Of course, for Menelaus, to use such a method to produce an heir is an alternative measure, Helen having produced no sons (4.10-14).[551] Amyntor, on the other hand, has a wife who has had a son, and one who has reached his youthful prime (ἡβώοντα, *Il*. 9.446) at that. The closest parallel to this situation in early Greek hexameter epic is Odysseus’ Cretan lie that he was born from a concubine (παλλακίς, *Od*. 14.203). And, as we noted in the first chapter, Odysseus claims that his father treated him just as well as he treated his legitimate children. But of course the legitimate children were quick to assert their superior position on the death of the father (14.199-210). Rather than read Amyntor as essentially committing suicide by ending his line, therefore, it seems more likely that we are to understand the preference of the *pallakis* to Phoenix’ mother and her consequent jealousy and anger as motivated at least in part by the threat of the creation of an alternate line, one which could potentially receive equal or even more favour from Amyntor.

---

[549] On οἷσιν as referring to Phoenix’ knees rather than Amyntor’s, see Steinrück (1998).

[550] Falkner (1995, 117). S. West (2001, 8-9) and Alden (2012, 124) argue persuasively that a reference to castration underlies this passage.

[551] One other potential parallel to this situation may be found in Euripides’ *Andromache*. Andromache, who has had a son by Neoptolemus, is the object of violent aggression from his apparently barren wife, Hermione. While it is left as a matter of doubt whether Andromache’s son would be accepted as heir by the Phthians in the event of Hermione’s continued inability to bear children (cf. Andromache’s sarcasm at 201-4), this is clearly a source of concern to Hermione (32-5, 155-62). Of course the context is rather different, as the *Andromache* is likely concerned with the issue of bigamy in the setting of a late 5th-century *polis*: Torrance (2005), Vester (2009).

Returning to the question of Phoenix' speech in its rhetorical context, however, we have already established that he portrays himself as a negative exemplum for quarrelling with his father and then running away. But this would seem at first blush to be undermined by Amyntor's apparently disproportionate response. After all, the effect achieved by portraying Phoenix as a negative exemplum is considerably lessened if Amyntor is straightforwardly a worse one. We must consider parallel examples of this story-type in order to obtain some sense of how such drastic action by the father would be perceived. We will find that, while filicide is hardly portrayed as a palatable act, it does not seem to be entirely unacceptable in particular contexts. Unfortunately for us, this sort of treatment of a son at the hands of his father is extremely rare in antiquity. This is hardly surprising. Deliberate destruction of a mature, male descendant was close to suicide. A mother might be considered capable of such a thing in extreme circumstances, but surely not a father.[552] One is consequently forced to stray rather far afield in search of parallels to Phoenix' story, the closest of which I am aware is most fully laid out in Photius' epitome to Conon, a mythographer from late in the 1st century BCE:

> ὥς Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Πάριδος καὶ Οἰνώνης, ἣν ἐγήματο πρὶν ἢ τὴν Ἑλένην ἁρπασαι, παῖς Κόρυθος γίνεται, κάλλει νικῶν τὸν πατέρα. τοῦτον ἡ μήτηρ Ἑλένῃ προσέπεμψε, ζηλοτυπίαν τε κινοῦσα Ἀλεξάδρῳ καὶ κακόν τι διαμηχανωμένη Ἑλένῃ. ὥς δὲ συνήθης ὁ Κόρυθος πρὸς Ἑλένην ἐγένετο, Ἀλεξανδρός ποτε παρελθὼν εἲς τὸν θάλαμον καὶ θεασάμενος τὸν Κόρυθον τῇ Ἑλένῃ παρεζόμενον καὶ ἀναφλεχθεὶς ἐξ ὑποψίας εὐθὺς ἀναιρεῖ.

---

[552] But even examples of maternal filicide are extremely rare in Greek literature: see Mastronarde (2002 *ad*. Eur. *Med*. 1282). "Perhaps this is because society so much abhors the murder of children that it refuses to regard it as anything but the rarest and most outrageous of deviations" (Easterling (1977, 186)). And it is worth noting that even the most famous example of this, Medea's murder of her sons by Jason, may have been a Euripidean innovation. Σ B *ad* Eur. *Med*. 9 Schwartz transmits the story that Euripides was accused of being bribed by the Corinthians for transferring the blame for the murder onto Medea. How seriously we take this claim would partially depend upon the dating of Neophron's *Medea*: Page (1938, xxx-xxxii), Knox (1977, 193-6), Luschnig (2007, 85 and 97-8); *pace* Mastronarde (2002, 52-4).

> "How of Alexander Paris and Oenone, whom he had married before he abducted Helen, a son, Corythus, was born, surpassing his father in beauty. His mother sent him to Helen, trying to stir envy in Alexander and contriving something bad for Helen. Once Corythus had become close to Helen, Alexander entered the bedroom at some point, saw Corythus sitting next to Helen, and killed him straightaway in a suspicious fit of pique" (*FGrH* 26 F 1.23 = 23 Brown).

In response, Oenone curses Paris and prophesies his destruction (*ibid.*). Parthenius, apparently citing Hellanicus, adds the detail that Corythus fell in love (ἠράσθη) with Helen on his arrival at Troy (34 Lightfoot). We can only trace this story back as far as Hellanicus (*FGrH* 4 F 29 = fr. 29 Fowler) in the fifth century, and the figure of Corythus is only rarely attested elsewhere.[553] Oenone herself, while eventually quite a popular figure, does not appear any earlier, unless Lobel's hesitant supplement to Bacchyl. fr. 20D.3 Maehler is correct.[554] In light of the late date of the sources and the peculiar nature of the story, this tale about Paris, Oenone, and Corythus is in all likelihood a local myth, possibly associated with a particular cult, which would be consistent with the antiquarian tastes of Conon and Parthenius. Nonetheless, it shares such obvious similarities to Phoenix' autobiography that it will be useful to examine it for typological reasons. The anger of Oenone at Paris is usually read as an example of the motif of "the mortal who is loved by a nymph or goddess and punished for his unfaithfulness."[555] However, Sourvinou-Inwood also finds in this story an example of the son disturbing the ordinary succession of his patriline by favouring his mother's interests over his father's.[556] According to

---

[553] Lyc. 57-60, where he is apparently sent by his mother to spy on the Trojans (Σ *ad* 57 Leone, with no mention of the subsequent altercation with Paris); Dictys 5.5, where he is killed by a falling roof. For allusions see Fowler (2013, 528-9, esp. n. 24).

[554] It is unpopular: M. Brown (2002, 167), Fowler (2013, 528 n. 23), Hornblower (2015 *ad* Lyc. 65). But Stinton (1965, 43) defends it with some plausibility. On Oenone's popularity, see *LIMC* s.v. "Oinone". That she is absent from Euripides is possibly significant, considering the playwright's obvious preoccupation with Paris' early life: Stinton (1965, 13-40).

[555] Stinton (1965, 45). First suggested by Rohde (1960, 117-20), and also followed by Lightfoot (1999, 391) and M. Brown (2002, 169). Egan (1971, 156) compares Potiphar's wife.

[556] Sourvinou-Inwood (1991, 251-8), and her model is adopted by Forsdyke (2005, 254-5) and Alden (2012, 123-4).

Sourvinou-Inwood, this story type has four basic characteristics.[557] I have altered them slightly to fit more precisely with the data she adduces. First, the son initiates hostility with his father, or at least the father perceives him to be doing so. Second, another woman (or other women, in the case of Periander and Lycophron below) motivates the son's aggression by somehow reducing his mother's position vis-à-viz his father, often simply by supplanting her. Third, the father retaliates, resulting in death or a death-like state (i.e. exile, sterility, blindness, etc.) for the son. Fourth, the father does not die, but he is harmed. I would also add a fifth characteristic, namely the retaliatory curse, usually by the father against the son, but, in the case of Corythus, by the mother against the father, and partially as retribution for the murder of the son.[558] We can see in the case of Corythus that Paris understands him as having a physical relationship with Helen, and that it is Oenone's jealousy which ultimately causes what might be a misunderstanding. The epitomator is careful to say that Corythus and Helen are sitting together and not lying together. But what is Corythus doing in Helen's *thalamos* ('bedroom') in the first place? Surely it is not particularly surprising that Paris possibly misconstrues the situation. If, as in Hellanicus' version, Corythus is smitten with Helen, then Paris' anger is all the more understandable, even though his reaction is excessive.[559]

A second parallel may be found in Theseus' curse on his son, Hippolytus, the earliest and most detailed extant version of which is probably Euripides' second play on the subject.[560] Aphrodite causes Phaedra, Theseus' wife and Hippolytus' stepmother to conceive of a terrible longing (ἔρωτι δεινῷ, Eur. *Hipp*. 28) for Hippolytus. When she realizes that she cannot have him, she kills herself and accuses Hippolytus of rape in her suicide note (856-86). Theseus, upon reading the note, calls upon Poseidon to kill Hippolytus (887-90) and also casts him out of Athens (971-80). No sooner does Hippolytus leave Athens than he is fatally wounded, thus fulfilling Theseus' prayer (1173-1248, 1316-19). One might debate which of these elements predates Euripides, but Gregory compellingly argues that Phaedra's unfortunate lust for Hippolytus, her false accusation, and Theseus' curse "constituted the unalterable core of the Hippolytus myth."[561] If this is correct, then all five of the characteristics are met in this tale as well. What may be a Euripidean elaboration is the emphasis he places upon the conflict between the interests of Hippolytus and those of Phaedra's children. When Phaedra contemplates suicide, her nurse tries to dissuade her by arguing that she will be betraying her sons, who will lose their share in their father's house (πατρῴων μὴ μεθέξοντας δόμων, 306), presumably because they will not have their mother to protect their interests in the face of an elder brother.[562] Interestingly, the brothers are consistently referred to as *gnēsioi* (309, 963, 1455), whereas Hippolytus is *nothos* (309, 962, 1083). Barrett probably rightly argues that Hippolytus is considered *nothos* because his mother, the Amazon Hippolyta, is a *pallakē* from the spoils of war.[563] One unsurprising implication of the nurse's argument is that Hippolytus should be treated as an enemy because, contemporary Athenian legalities aside, he poses a threat to Phaedra's sons, particularly with respect to their patrimony.[564] The better-attested Euripidean iteration of this myth at least to some extent treats it as an object lesson in the problems underlying amphimetric strife, hardly a surprising twist in light of the particular aversion to any kind of ‘mixed’ household in contemporary Athens.[565]

---

[557] Sourvinou-Inwood (1991, 252).

[558] Parental curses were apparently considered to be particularly efficacious: Pl. *Lg*. 931b-c; cf. Gregory (2009, 42).

[559] Pi. *O*. 7.27-30 is a comparable situation, although it does not feature filicide.

[560] On the few traces we have of Euripides' less popular *Hippolytus* (so-called *Kalyptomenos*: fr. 428-47 Kannicht), see Barrett (1964, 15-45), Gibert (1997), Hutchinson (2004), and Gregory (2009).

---

[561] Gregory (2009, 36), using M. West's (1999, 33) distinction between fundamental and secondary elements of a myth, which seems to me to be essentially a structuralist model.

[562] So Barrett (1964 *ad.* 304ff.).

[563] *Ibid.*, although it is worth noting that she is never called such in the play, nor is there any attestation of Euripides ever using the term. There is certainly no doubt that Phaedra is Theseus' wife.

For the third and final parallel, Sourvinou-Inwood compares Lycophron and Periander in Herodotus (3.48-53).[566] Lycophron, having learned from his maternal grandfather that his father Periander has killed his mother, refuses to speak to his father and is consequently barred from the *oikoi* of Periander’s people (3.50). And anyone who speaks to him is to pay a fine to Apollo (3.52.1). Lycophron is eventually sent to Corcyra, and he only agrees to return years later on the condition that Periander move to Corcyra. Lycophron is then murdered by the Corcyraeans to prevent Periander from moving there (3.52-3). This story can be seen to fit Sourvinou-Inwood’s model. Lycophron is certainly perceived by his father as initiating hostility, albeit in a somewhat passive-aggressive manner. And, while Herodotus, being in some respects slightly lacunose, says nothing about the murder of his wife beyond the simple fact that it took place (τὴν… Μέλισσαν … ἀπέκτεινε, 3.50.1), Diogenes Laertius reports that Periander ὑπ᾽ ὀργῆς βαλὼν ὑποβάθρῳ ἢ λακτίσας τὴν γυναῖκα ἔγκυον οὖσαν ἀπέκτεινε, πεισθεὶς διαβολαῖς παλλακίδων, ἃς ὕστερον ἔκαυσε (“killed his pregnant wife in a rage, either by by striking her with a stool or by kicking her, having been persuaded by the slanders of his concubines, whom he later had burned alive,” 1.94 = Periander T 9 Gentili-Prato). Diogenes is considerably later than Herodotus, but the fact that his supplement perfectly fits Sourvinou-Inwood’s typology surely helps to support her basic claim that ancient myths and narratives are structured "according to particular models of organizing experience."[567] One also perhaps gets a hint of what Diogenes reports in Herodotus as well. While Periander murders his wife in Book Three, Herodotus later claims that he subsequently had sex with her corpse (5.92η3). This behaviour could possibly constitute a twisted reunion scene following Periander's discovery that his courtesans have slandered his now deceased wife.[568] In any case, it seems tolerably clear that Lycophron's hostility towards his father is a delayed reaction to his mother's murder through the machinations of Periander's concubines. I would further argue that Periander's retaliation results in a death-like state for Lycophron even in the short term, since, as we have already established, exile is often seen as a sort of death-like state. Sourvinou-Inwood also argues that Periander's decrees, barring Lycophron from the *oikoi* of his people, and forcing anyone who speaks to him to pay a fine to Apollo, function as curses. Lycophron is treated as if he is polluted by these decrees.[569]

---

[564] Cf. μισεῖν σε φήσεις τήνδε, καὶ τὸ δὴ νόθον / τοῖς γνησίοισι πολέμιον πεφυκέναι (“will you say that she hates you, and indeed that bastardy is by nature hostile to legitimate children?”, 962-3).

[565] Cf. Ebbott (2003, 85-107), who treats this aspect of the play at considerable depth.

[566] Sourvinou-Inwood (1991, 245-84).

That the father could potentially be cleared of wrongdoing in some of these tales is probable. The Conon epitome is too brief to give us any sense of the tone of Paris' relationship with Corythos. But in the *Hippolytus*, Artemis informs Theseus that, as far as she and Poseidon are concerned, Theseus is to blame for his son's misfortune because he did not do the appropriate research before cursing his son (1320-4). This implies that Theseus would have been justified in cursing Hippolytus if he had been guilty of raping Phaedra. In a similar vein, Herodotus has Lycophron's sister, admittedly hardly a divine authority, firmly take Periander's side in the dispute (3.53.2-5).[570] Of particular note is the aphoristic statement, πολλοὶ δὲ ἤδη τὰ μητρώια διζήμενοι τὰ πατρώια ἀπέβαλον ("and many before now have thrown away their father's property in seeking their mother's," 3.53.4). As Asheri et al. suggest, this probably refers to inheritance suits, in which, at least in Attic law, an heir could potentially be disinherited by his father if he put too much effort into claiming his maternal inheritance.[571] At issue, of course, is Periander's tyranny, which he wishes Lycophron to inherit, and so it is natural for the sister to speak in such terms. But this statement really encapsulates the whole dispute between father and son. Periander's position is pretty clearly that loyalty to one's mother may be all well and good, but, if it comes at the expense of allegiance to the father, then it is foolish and even reprehensible to side with the mother. To conceptualize this tension in terms of material inheritance is advantageous because it helps his argument. He is offering Lycophron Corinth, whereas Melissa is dead, and her father, Procles, has been captured as retribution for letting Lycophron on to Melissa's fate (3.52.7).

---

[567] *Ibid*. 245.

[568] On how this act fits the larger portrayal of the tyrant in Herodotus, see Soares (2014, 227-30). Eidinow (2007, 262 n. 60) compares Paus. 3.17 and suggests that Periander is really trying to appease Melissa's shade when he sends messengers to the *necromanteion* in Thesprotia (Hdt. 5.92η2).

[569] Sourvinou-Inwood (1991, 259).

We might say in general, therefore, that filicide by the father in these stories is an extreme but probably not entirely unacceptable expression of power over the hierarchy of women in his household. The son is perceived to be attempting to assert himself in this respect, and the father finds the manner in which he does so to be utterly intolerable. To return to Phoenix and Achilles, then, it would seem that Phoenix is again presenting himself in a less than complimentary light for rhetorical purposes. His sterilization by Amyntor is harsh, but it is not beyond the pale. Phoenix' bedding of his father's concubine, on the other hand, certainly is, particularly in light of her importance to the old man. Earlier, we rejected the idea that Phoenix is implicitly comparing Peleus to Agamemnon in his autobiography. It is more likely, in fact, now that we have examined Sourvinou-Inwood's story-type, that he intends Amyntor to be understood as the Agamemnon figure. As Phoenix should not have quarrelled with his father over a concubine, so Achilles should not do so with Agamemnon, who is after all a kind of putative father-figure for Achilles.[572]

---

[570] Asheri et al. (2008 *ad loc.*): "the whole of para. 4 is composed of five maxims or sayings… more apt to the father than to the daughter." The sister addressing her brother with ὦ παῖ ("child," 3.53.3) also suits a parent more than even an elder sibling (Golden (1985)). On the other hand, while she has received instructions from her father (διδαχθεῖσα ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς, 3.53.5), the speech is probably not meant to be read as a verbatim delivery of Periander's words. For example, ἄπιθι ἐς τὰ οἰκία ("go away home," 3.53.3) would be awkward if spoken to Lycophron from Corinth.

[571] Asheri et al. (2008 *ad loc.*). Cf. πατρῷα καὶ μητρῷα λέγονται τὰ ἐκ πατέρων καὶ μητέρων ἀποθανόντων καταλειπόμενα τοῖς τέκνοις ("what is left from deceased fathers and mothers to their children is called *patrōia* and *mētrōia*, *Fragmentum Lexici Graeci* 57, Hermann (1801, 327)); also cf. Phot. s.v. πατρῴων, πατρίων καὶ πατρικῶν [π 494 Theodoridis] as well as the comparanda in Theodoridis' edition.

The full effect of Phoenix' autobiography as a negative *paradeigma* can only be felt, however, when it is compared to the Meleager tale that Phoenix tells later in his speech. The structural similarities between these two sections of the speech are significant and deliberate. So, that we find another example of filicide in the Meleager tale – this time of the maternal variety – is hardly coincidental. Unlike with paternal filicide, maternal filicide is never justified, and, as in the present case, it is frequently motivated by an excessive and inappropriate loyalty to the mother's natal family. In his Litae parable, Phoenix tells the story of the anger of the great warrior Meleager at his mother, Althea, who has cursed him with death (*Il*. 9.565-72). Phoenix is almost certainly alluding to a tradition that predates the *Iliad*, meaning that the poet is not necessarily inventing any particular detail in an *ad hoc* fashion.[573] Phoenix references Meleager as another *paradeigma* – in this case a negative one. Meleager refused an ample gift from the

---

[572] Wilson (2002) argues very persuasively that Agamemnon tries to make himself into a father figure for Achilles, but Achilles refuses. On Agamemnon as an undesirable father figure for Achilles, see Avery (1998), Wöhrle (1999, 17-22), and Felson (2002a, 39-40).

[573] Tsagalis (2014, 240-1) summarizes the history of the argument showing that the poet alludes to a **Meleagris* here. For the more cautious position, see Currie (2015, 290-1) with bibliography.

Aetolians in exchange for fighting, only to fight later in any case when the gift was off the table. Achilles, therefore, should avoid this possibility and fight now.[574] Meleager also rejected the entreaties (*litai*) of those dear to him, only relenting when his wife Cleopatra took part (9.574-99). Achilles should be wary of following Meleager here as well, lest he provoke the anger of the gods by refusing entreaties (9.513-23).[575]

Having established the rhetorical context of Phoenix' reference to Meleager, then, let us consider the tale itself. As I have said, its structure is strikingly similar to Phoenix' autobiography in many places. Interestingly, while the parallels between the two stories to the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon have often been noted, very little detailed comparison between them has been done *per se.*[576] We begin with a war between the Curetes and the Aetolians (9.529-33), paralleling the *neikea* of Amyntor mentioned above. The origin of the quarrel is in each case neglect by the father. Amyntor neglects his wife, Phoenix' mother, and Oeneus neglects Artemis in his sacrifices (9.533-7). The result of this neglect is the anger of Phoenix' mother and Artemis (χωσαμένη, 9.534; χολωσαμένη, 538) respectively. We must infer that Phoenix' mother is angry, which is the usual reaction to suffering dishonour (ἀτιμάζεσκε, 450).[577] In order to obtain *tīmē* in an honour society, one must be born with it, take it from somebody else, or be given it by way of reciprocity. The victim of such an attempt normally experiences some form of anger, be it *cholos* ('anger'), *kotos* ('resentment'), or, in particular cases, *mēnis* ('wrath'). And there are also the common verbs *cholousthai* ('to feel *cholos*') and *chōesthai* ('to be angry').[578] While there are distinctions between these terms, we will not concern ourselves overmuch with semantics here. The anger of Phoenix' mother is structurally parallel to that of Artemis and Achilles, even if the precise quality of their anger may be different in each case.[579] Next, the anger of the one parent indirectly stimulates anger in the other parent against the son, who is then effectively cursed with death. We have already observed how Amyntor is enraged by Phoenix and curses him with sterility when he finds out about the concubine. Althaea's reaction to Meleager's accidental (?) murder of her brother, which is ultimately a result of Oeneus' negligence, is strikingly similar to Amyntor's:

---

[574] The significance of this myth to Achilles' situation is well-studied: see especially Willcock (1964, 147-53), Rosner (1976, 320-7), and Nagy (1999, 103-9). Alden (2000, 191-290) provides what is probably the subtlest and most thorough analysis of all, showing how Phoenix cleverly, although not always consistently, rhetorically places Achilles in a double bind.

[575] Kakridis (1949, 20-7 and 151-64) famously observed that the various entreaties of a hero by his *philoi* are typically organized into an "ascending scale of affection." Strangely, the friends are promoted ahead of their usual position in Phoenix' Meleager tale. Willcock (1964, 150) and Lohmann (1970, 258-61) suggest that this is a rhetorical amplification of the importance of friends, implicitly encouraging Achilles to listen to the present delegation with more sympathy. But there is no evidence that this ascending scale of affection existed before the tradition reflected here (Alden (2000, 242)), so it is difficult to assert anything with certainty.

Much has been made of Achilles' later anticipation of the Greeks coming to entreat him at his knees (περὶ γούνατ'… λισσομένους, 11.609-10) to fight again, as if they have not already (cf. 9.501, 520, 698, not to mention the parable of the Litae at 502-14). Page (1959, 305-7) is characteristically vociferous in observing the apparent contradiction. But Alden (2000, 181-92) is probably correct to argue that, while they do offer entreaty (*litē*), they do not engage in the more debasing supplication (*hiketeia*). This interpretation places great importance on the περὶ γούνατ' at 11.609 (cf. Schadewaldt (1966, 81): "die Achaier haben den Achill im I nicht 'kniefällig'… gebeten"; also cf. Beck (2012.72-3)), but it may very well be correct.

[576] Lohmann (1970, 268-9), Bannert (1981), and T. Walsh (2005, 191-4) are notable exceptions.

> τῇ ὅ γε παρκατέλεκτο χόλον θυμαλγέα πέσσων,

---

[577] "The narrator can also make it clear that a character is angry without using any word for emotion" (Scodel (2008, 52)). Cf. once again Laertes' decision not to sleep with Eurycleia, thus avoiding the *cholos* ('anger') of his wife, Anticleia (*Od*. 1.429-33). The anger of the spurned woman must similarly be inferred of Proetus' wife at *Il*. 6.160-5.

[578] This is not an exhaustive list. Extensive treatments of Homeric terms for anger may be found in Considine (1966), Adkins (1969), and T. Walsh (2005). Bannert (1981) specifically compares the *cholos* of Amyntor and Meleager to the anger in Achilles' quarrel with Agamemnon. The precise meaning of *mēnis* in the *Iliad* is a highly controversial question. With the exception of Agamemnon and Aeneas in individual instances (1.247 and 13.460 respectively), Achilles is the only mortal to have *mēnis* (e.g. 1.1, 488, 9.517), probably indicating that his anger is somehow divine in nature. Scodel (2008, 52-3), however, makes a compelling case for *mēnis* denoting anger that is effectual. For more detail, see especially Watkins (1977), Muellner (1996), T. Walsh (2005, 10-14 and 192-4), Scodel (2008, 49-73).

[579] Some of these terms can sometimes be used of the same emotion in any case. For example, *cholousthai* ('to feel *cholos*') and *chōesthai* ('to be angry') are apparently interchangeable at *Il*. 1.80-1, 9.534-8, and 9.533-5. T. Walsh (2005, 192-3) demonstrates that *cholos* is the technical term for the kind of anger that stimulates the withdrawal of a hero, and he cites examples of the *cholos* of Phoenix, Menelaus, and Achilles. One quibble with this parallel is that, as I will discuss below, the one example of *cholos* being used of Phoenix is at 9.459, the provenance of which is problematic. And Plut. *Cor*. 32.5 reads τρέψε φρένας ("changed my mind") in place of παῦσεν χόλον ("checked my anger"). Nonetheless, T. Walsh's evidence is otherwise convincing, and, as I will argue below, the *cholos* of Phoenix can easily be understood. On anger as a part of this story type's structure, cf. 9.524-5 and J. Griffin (1995 *ad loc.*).

> ἐξ ἀρέων μητρὸς κεχολωμένος, ἥ ῥα θεοῖσιν
> πόλλ᾽ ἀχέουσ᾽ ἠρᾶτο κασιγνήτοιο φόνοιο,
> πολλὰ δὲ καὶ γαῖαν πολυφόρβην χερσὶν ἀλοία
> κικλήσκουσ᾽ Ἀΐδην καὶ ἐπαινὴν Περσεφόνειαν,
> πρόχνυ καθεζομένη, δεύοντο δὲ δάκρυσι κόλποι,
> παιδὶ δόμεν θάνατον· τῆς δ᾽ ἠεροφοῖτις Ἐρινύς
> ἔκλυεν ἐξ Ἐρέβεσφιν, ἀμείλιχον ἦτορ ἔχουσα.

> “He [Meleager] lay beside her [Cleopatra], brooding over his painful anger, angered by the curses of his mother, who, grieving over the murder of her brother, prayed to the gods many times; and she, kneeling, the folds of her gown wet with tears, also beat the nourishing earth many times with her hands, calling on Hades and dread Persephone to give her son death. And Erinys, who travels in darkness and has a pitiless heart, heeded her from Erebus” (9.565-72).

The Iliadic presentation of Meleager’s murder of his maternal uncle (9.543-5) is more allusive than descriptive. But it differs from the two fuller and later narratives in Bacchylides (5.94-154) and Ovid (*Met*. 8.425-546), according to whom Meleager murders two uncles.[580] In each of these versions, the result is the same: Meleager is killed by his mother through supernatural means. As I have said, though, the Iliadic version is remarkably similar to the curse of Phoenix by Amyntor. In both cases, the parent curses the son in anger (449, 454, 567). Amyntor calls upon the Erinyes (454), whereas Althaea calls to Hades and Persephone (569). And it is interesting to note that Hades and Persephone fulfil the curse for Amyntor (456-7), whereas Erinys (only one?) does so for Althaea (571-2). In each case, the punishment is an eye for an eye. Phoenix has somehow deprived Amyntor of his concubine and therefore offspring by her, and so he is cursed with sterility. Meleager has murdered Althaea’s brothers, and so he is cursed with death. Phoenix and Meleager both suffer at the hands of a parent for neglecting the kinship interests of that parent.

---

[580] Willcock (1964, 148-54) provides a more detailed comparison and contrast. There are two Hesiodic variants. In fr. 25 M.-W., Meleager is apparently not Althaea’s son at all (14), and he is probably killed by Apollo for some reason (12-13; cf. Paus. 10.31.3). And again, in fr. 280 M.-W., Apollo probably kills him (2-3), possibly because of a curse (9-10).

The final apparent similarity between the two tales is problematic. Phoenix and Meleager are both unsurprisingly angry in response to their parents' curses (458-61, 565), resulting in their withdrawals (478-9, 555-6).[581] But lines 9.458-61 are of famously dubious provenance:

> τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ βούλευσα κατακτάμεν ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ·
> ἀλλά τις ἀθανάτων παῦσεν χόλον, ὅς ῥ᾽ ἐνὶ θυμῷ
> δήμου θῆκε φάτιν καὶ ὀνείδεα πόλλ᾽ ἀνθρώπων,
> ὡς μὴ πατροφόνος μετ᾽ Ἀχαιοῖσιν καλεοίμην.
>
> "I conceived of a plan to kill him [Amyntor] with sharp bronze. But one of the gods stopped my anger. He put in my heart the talk of the people and the many reproaches of men, so that I should not be called a patricide among the Achaeans."

This is entirely absent from extant papyri and manuscripts of the *Iliad*, appearing in full only in Plutarch (*Mor*. 26F), who claims that Aristarchus excised them (ἐξεῖλε) out of fear (φοβηθείς). The source of the fear adduced by Plutarch is generally thought to be the fact that the passage features the contemplation of patricide, a subject that does not appear elsewhere in Homer and may have been seen as inappropriate to the Iliadic tradition.[582] The scholarly community is split on whether these lines should be retained. Wolf famously included them, but no major modern edition does without cruces at the very least. Similarly, Apthorp and Griffith, while they acknowledge that the lines are very much Homeric in style, argue forcefully against their inclusion in any kind of vulgate edition.[583] But this stance is by no means universal.[584] That such a split exists is surprising. While the lines undoubtedly fit almost seamlessly into our *Iliad*, the fact that not even the scholia show any awareness of them seems to indicate that Plutarch found the lines in some non-Aristarchan source.[585] We should not simply disregard the passage, however. It is more than likely that it is taken from an alternative tradition, such as the *Cypria* or the *Aethiopis*.[586] And one can easily see how these lines made their way into some version of the *Iliad* at some point. As Alden has observed, Phoenix' contemplation of patricide is strikingly similar to Achilles drawing his sword as if to kill Agamemnon at the onset of the quarrel (*Il*. 1.188-92).[587] And, as in Phoenix' case, it is a god, this time Athena, who manages to dissuade him (1.193-222). In addition, as we have already noted, Agamemnon is a kind of putative father figure for Achilles, so it is clear how Phoenix' consideration of literal patricide could have been seen to be appropriate to his speech. While the lines do not belong in modern editions of the *Iliad*, it is possible that they correspond to an Archaic tradition about Phoenix. Furthermore, even if our iteration of the *Iliad* is not drawing upon this particular tradition about Phoenix, I would hazard nonetheless that these lines would not have been entirely out of place in the tradition referenced. As discussed above, murder is, as far as we can tell, the most common cause of fugitive status in early Greek literature about heroic characters. And, as Apthorp observes, Phoenix' fugitive status in light of these four lines becomes a slight variation of the 'homicide and flight' theme, where Phoenix' flight is presented as an alternative to patricide.[588] Since, as we have argued, Phoenix' story is probably not spun from whole cloth by the poet, it is likely that contemplated or even enacted patricide was the cause of his flight in at least one version current at the time of our *Iliad*. As we have seen in other cases of anger, Phoenix' homicidal rage is probably understood, therefore, even in the absence of 9.458-61. As was frequently the case in Archaic epic, the audience would largely have been aware of the tradition abbreviated in Phoenix' speech.

---

[581] Scodel (1982, 130 n. 9) maintains that Phoenix' anger is implied by οὐκέτι πάμπαν ἐρητύετ᾽ ἐν φρεσὶ θυμός ("no longer did my heart in my breast hold me back at all," 9.462). While similar expressions are used to describe the suppression of anger at 1.192 and 9.635, the closest parallel is actually applied to a man resisting the urge to flee (13.280). Without the four preceding lines, I would argue that the audience could quite easily interpret this phrase as referring to flight, especially since he does actually flee (9.448). Elsewhere, both Phyleus (2.629) and Polypheides (*Od*. 15.254) migrate on account of anger at their fathers (ἀπενάσσατο πατρὶ χολωθείς).

[582] A thorough review of the evidence and prior scholarship on the question of the 'authenticity' of these four lines may be found in Apthorp (1980, 91-9). More recently, see Scodel (1982, 130), S. West (1982), Hainsworth (1993 *ad loc.*), J. Griffin (1995 *ad loc.*), Alden (2000, 221 n. 16), and S. West (2001).

[583] Apthorp (1980, 91-9), J. Griffin (1995 *ad loc.*).

[584] Wilamowitz (1920, 66 n. 2), Cairns (1993, 51), and Wilson (2002, 201 n. 77) are just a few examples of the widespread attempt to retain the passage.

---

[585] M. West (2001, 208) suggests that this source might have been Seleucus.

[586] So Kullmann (1960, 133) and S. West (2001, 11), who observes that Phoenix delivers an autobiography after Achilles' death in Q.S. 3.460, a scene which could possibly be derived from the *Aethiopis*.

[587] Alden (2012.124-5).

[588] Apthorp (1980.96-7). It is probably a combination of the 'homicide and flight' theme and the 'anger and withdrawal' theme.

We find, then, that the Phoenix and Meleager stories share remarkably similar structures. On the one hand, this is hardly surprising. They frame a single speech and are essentially used for the same rhetorical purpose (namely as *paradeigmata*). It is easy to see how stories about reciprocal anger between parent and son, and the catastrophes that ensue, are relevant to Phoenix' attempt to dissuade Achilles from prolonging his withdrawal from combat in light of his problematic relationship with Agamemnon. But what is the strategy behind including references to filicide and parental curses? One could argue that they just happen to be fundamental elements of two stories that are otherwise relevant. But then why bother to provide such details when we know that audiences would have been familiar with the two stories, and filicide is such an unpleasant – and therefore potentially distracting – subject? That this is a coincidence is especially dubious in light of the fact that, as we have noted, filicide is such an uncommon subject in classical literature. I would argue that Phoenix' strategy in including these details is manifold. The first point is rather hyperbolic in its execution. In each case, the focus of Phoenix' iteration of these stories is on the reaction of the son to the aggression of the parent. Phoenix, contrary to the wishes of his kin, flees (9.464-78) in response to his father's curse. And, as we have already noted, Meleager withdraws in anger at his mother. While one might debate whether Phoenix in particular presents his own decision to flee as mistaken, there is no doubt that the rhetorical purpose of this portion of the story is to convince Achilles not to depart for Phthia as Phoenix did. And the point of the Meleager story is explicit: Achilles would be wise not to emulate his withdrawal (9.600). Part of the reason why these comparisons might be considered effective is the stark contrast between the different causes of dispute. Phoenix and Meleager withdraw because of the deadly curses their parents have placed upon them. Achilles has withdrawn because Agamemnon has confiscated his favourite concubine, and he refuses to yield even when Agamemnon offers to return Briseis and compensate him handsomely for the slight. This contrast quite blatantly ignores several aspects of Achilles' complaint, but it is potentially effective from a rhetorical point of view.[589] Why can Achilles not give in when he has only suffered relatively slightly?

The second point has to do with how Phoenix conceptualizes home versus away and family versus friends, foes, and strangers. According to Ready, "Phoinix asks Achilleus to return to the battle and… to preserve the 'house' by acknowledging his role as son and saving the father figure."[590] Ready's use of 'house' is apt. It metonymically locates the collective identity of Achilles' (or anyone's) family at wherever the patriarch happens to be. A surprising result of this formulation is that, from a certain point of view, home is where the father is. And this is precisely why Phoenix' autobiography is relatively effective. Because he is rendered sterile, murdered in a way by his father, his relationship with Amyntor becomes intolerable. The natural consequence of this is his flight and eventual incorporation into the house of Peleus. In effect, he redefines his identity by selecting a new locality to call home and a new man to be his father figure. There is, then, a certain mutability in kinship identification here. And Phoenix attempts to take advantage of this mutability by encouraging Achilles to protect him as a kind of father figure (9.492-5). This is a rather daring and ultimately self-defeating manoeuvre, since Phoenix himself has just claimed Peleus as a father figure as well. If Achilles' best course is simply to protect his father figures, the most obvious decision would be to return to Phthia with Phoenix in tow, a prospect which in fact he does consider once Phoenix has said his piece (617-19).

---

[589] To my mind, Wilson (2002) remains the most convincing study of the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon.

[590] Ready (2011, 146).

The other implication of the parallel Phoenix draws between his own past and Achilles' present situation is the association of Phoenix' natal home with the Achaean camp. This reversal, to my mind, is the most brilliant rhetorical strategy in Phoenix' speech. Through drawing a parallel between his own story and Achilles', Phoenix implies that Achilles' returning to Phthia would be the equivalent of his own flight from his father's home. To Achilles, home is presumably his father's *oikos* and the land where he spent his youngest days. But the parallel Phoenix draws cleverly recasts the Achaean camp as home and Phthia as away. Add to this Phoenix' careful insertion of himself into Achilles' patriline and his presence at the Achaean camp, and the implication gains some rhetorical force. If Phoenix' interpretation of the situation were to hold sway, Achilles would become an exile if he embarked on a *nostos* ('homecoming') at this time.[591] Meleager, on the other hand, because it is his mother who has cursed him and not his father, does not have to leave home in order to emancipate himself. As I have attempted to show, the father is the conceptual centre of the functional Homeric household. The mother is ordinarily also located at the centre, but in a restrictive manner; she is supposed to remain there at all costs.[592] She is constrained by the *oikos*. She does not define its parameters. And her position is far less secure, being dependent upon the father or a strong son. In Althaea's case, she has most definitely placed herself outside of Oeneus' household by favouring her natal kin, namely her brother(s), over her son. So Meleager can simply retreat into his father's household to mark his protest to Althaea's betrayal. Given that the father's household is the location to which Achilles is proposing to retreat as well (356-63), one might suppose that Phoenix is alluding to this possibility when he refers to Meleager's withdrawal. But the rest of the story makes it clear that Achilles' current position in his tent in the Achaean camp is the relevant parallel. Achilles and Meleager are both crucial to the success of their armies; they both grow angry with a (at least putative) parental figure and withdraw, receiving and rejecting the appeals of those close to them in order of increasing importance; and they both finally relent on account of their closest companion. Meleager retreats to the centre, whereas Achilles retreats to the periphery. Phoenix subtly recasts Achilles' tent in the Achaean camp as home. By doing this, he encourages Achilles to conceive of leaving the Achaean camp before the conclusion of the war as entering a fugitive status, abandoning *oikos* and father.

---

[591] So Perry (2010, 55): "Achilles might like to view his departure as a principled and exemplary retreat (*Il.* 9.357-372, 417-418), but Phoenix responds by using the parallels between Achilles' situation and his own experience of exile to suggest that in leaving for Phthia Achilles will in fact be acting in a manner that will mark him out as an exile, or something dangerously close to it, rather than as a hero."

In a certain way, Achilles is also capable of thinking of the Achaean camp as home. As we have observed above, he complains that Agamemnon has treated him like an ἀτίμητον μετανάστην ('resident alien without status,' 9.648 = 16.59), the closest we come to a noun for 'exile' or 'fugitive' in Archaic epic. As the best of the Achaeans, Achilles is but one step removed from the centre of the group. But Agamemnon, in depriving Achilles of his prize, has, in Achilles' eyes, relegated him to something like what Phoenix would have been at the time of his first acceptance by Peleus.[593] By complaining that he is being treated in such a manner, Achilles necessarily implies that he should be honoured as a full member of the group. His claim, if we understand the term *metanastēs* correctly, is not made in terms of kinship but rather of membership in a polity. But the conception of the polity requires a set of *oikoi*.[594] When he withdraws, he retreats to the margins of the polity and lives like a resident alien. But, as I have argued, Phoenix' great rhetorical move is to present this group as Achilles' home. And, if the Achaean camp is an *oikos* or set of *oikoi*, Agamemnon is undoubtedly its patriarch. As cleverly as Phoenix masks this implication, the logic of his argument requires Achilles to submit to Agamemnon as a father figure. And, in fact, this appears to be precisely what Agamemnon has in mind when he offers Achilles one of his daughters in marriage (9.144-7).[595] Given that Phoenix cannot change the terms of the offer when his turn to speak comes, it is little wonder that Achilles, who is no fool, does not significantly alter his position in response to the old man's speech.

---

[592] On women in domestic space in the Archaic Era, see Konstantinou (2016, 1-5), with bibliography.

The exile, then, shows what is perhaps the greatest extreme of the potential mobility of kinship. Fathers can kill or sterilize their sons, and sons can supplant their fathers or flee into exile. But the exile is not necessarily permanently deprived of kin. He can find a new home and even draw near to its centre.[596] While the exile is not a central figure in Homer, Phoenix' rhetoric uses his autobiography to show how mobile the concept of home can be. From a certain point of view, the entire Achaean army has come to a new home in a kind of exile of war. They have lived in the same place for ten years; surely this must have become their home to some extent. For Achilles, as for Phoenix, his new home is the last he will ever know. As we have observed, the exile is often portrayed as an outsider, or at the very least a figure who can only approach a new centre through a long and painful process. But murder, death, and flight are so native to the Homeric poems that it becomes impossible to see Phoenix or any exile as an outsider in any meaningful sense. In a world full of such vicissitudes, one takes home and family where one can find it.

---

[593] Martin (1992, 18-21) and Alden (2012) maintain that Phoenix' status is always 'metanastic'. But, while we can only be approximate with the term, the kind of honour Peleus pays him over time (9.481-4) would seem to suggest that he re-obtains an aristocratic status.

[594] So Kurke (1991, 8-9), with R. Parker (2005, 10-13) adding considerable nuance.

[595] So Rosner (1976, 318) and Wilson (2002).

[596] In colonization myths, he can even found a new home and line: L. Patterson (2010, 1-12).

# CONCLUSION

We have examined several examples of kinship relationships between figures on the margins of the *oikos* and those at the centre, in the latter case either the patriarch or one of his sons. We have found that the *oikos* is centripetal, with the more marginal members seeking the respect of the patriarch and his sons. In many passages, we have observed that the nature of the relationship between a marginal character and the centre of his *oikos* is a vital element of his identity. While one might object that this portrayal of marginal figures is little more than aristocratic propaganda, recent anthropological research has demonstrated that this kind of self-identification with respect to a central male authority has been observable throughout Eurasian history.[597] The unsurprising corollary to this is that any attempt to ingratiate oneself with an authority other than the patriarch is only acceptable if it is not perceived to be at his expense. And, as one might expect, this is especially the case with female figures of authority, such as the mother. So, for example, Teucer's use of the bow is all well and good as long as it is in service of his father's people. But when the least suspicion is raised regarding his conduct, the fact that his mother is Trojan is ruinous to him. And, in a similar vein, Phoenix' acting on his mother's behalf over such a relatively petty issue as a concubine results in his sterilization and ultimately in his emigration from his native land. The centripetal nature of the *oikos* can be a heavy burden for those unwilling or unable to commit their absolute loyalty.

The figures on the margins of the *oikos* are generally portrayed as occupying relatively static positions, as much as they might strive for promotion. So, I have argued that our *Iliad* reveals some awareness of the tradition that Teucer will soon be accused of attempting to inherit

---

[597] See especially King and Stone (2010).

Telamon's estate at Ajax' expense. But in every surviving iteration of the Teucer myth, Telamon forces him to seek his fortune elsewhere. And Phoenix might be understood to entertain some hope of living closer to the centre of activity, should Achilles come to occupy Peleus' seat. But in general he seems to indicate that he is fortunate to be in his current position (e.g. *Il.* 9.480-4). On the other hand, Heracles does appear to be promoted through marriage from bastard to son-in-law, albeit in a manner only possible or appropriate for a god. And Odysseus promises to treat Eumaeus (and Philoetius) like Telemachus' companion and brother, although it is unclear what exactly this is supposed to involve in practice. Such promotions as these suggest that some mobility is not absolutely outside the bounds of plausibility. But the general impression is that the structure of the *oikos* is quite static, with characters like the suitors threatening chaos rather than an alternative hierarchy.

It is also the case that these centripetal relationships can illuminate the patriarchal centre of the *oikos*. A powerful example of this is the interaction between Odysseus the beggar and Eumaeus. Eumaeus lives on the very edges of Odysseus' *oikos*. But it is nonetheless through him, as much as through Penelope or Telemachus, that we are able to come to appreciate the difference between the Odysseus who wanders into other people's houses and the Odysseus who is a central *basileus* ('chief') on Ithaca and patriarch in his own *oikos*. Eumaeus shows us what it is that Odysseus has lost and what he stands to regain. And in the *Iliad*, Phoenix, although he subtly misrepresents the state of affairs for rhetorical reasons, is able to use his autobiography to present Achilles' situation in a fresh light. While it is arguable whether Achilles is particularly affected by this rhetoric in the grand scheme of things, the poet does not have Phoenix deliver the longest speech of the poem without reason. The logic of Phoenix' tales requires Achilles to conceive of Agamemnon as a paternal figure, which in fact he is in a way. Through the story of his own relocation, Phoenix is able to communicate to Achilles the gravity of the decision he is about to make. Achilles rejects the parallel in the end, but Phoenix does persuasively portray the Achaean camp as a kind of home for Achilles, which it must have become at least to some extent after so many years. Figures like Eumaeus and Phoenix may be marginal in the *oikos*, but they can paradoxically be used by the poet to treat the most intimate, domestic issues with their patriarchs.

Teucer, Heracles, Eumaeus, and Phoenix are just a few examples of figures on the margins of the *oikos* in Homer. It is my hope that the present work has suggested the advantage of thinking in a more flexible manner about early kinship. In addition, I hope also to have shown that focus on some of the more minor characters in Homer can be fruitful. If the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* really are just two examples of individual iterations of longstanding traditions, then it stands to reason that many of the apparently peripheral characters included in these poems must be abbreviated versions of – or at least references to – larger and more developed portrayals in other traditions or in other iterations of the same tradition.[598] Where possible, therefore, examination of some of these characters with the same level of scrutiny and resourcefulness as has been applied to more central figures could potentially yield results as interesting as I hope the present series of studies has been.

---

[598] To some extent, these fuller versions are the subject of neoanalysis: cf. Willcock (1996) and Burgess (2009, 58-85). But neoanalysis has primarily been occupied with the more important figures of the *Iliad* especially.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adkins, A.W.H. (1969). “Threatening, Abusing and Feeling Angry in the Homeric Poems.” *JHS* 89: 7-21.

_______. (1972). *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece: From Homer to the End of the Fifth Century*. New York: Norton.

Ahl, F. and H.M. Roisman. (1996). *The* Odyssey *Re-Formed*. Ithaca and London: Cornell UP.

Alden, M.J. (2000). *Homer Beside Himself: Para-Narratives in the* Iliad. Oxford, New York, et al.: OUP.

_______. (2012). “The Despised Migrant (*Il*. 9.648 = 16.59),” in Montanari et al., eds.: 115-32.

Allan, W. and D. Cairns. (2011). “Conflict and Community in the *Iliad,*” in *Competition in the Ancient World*. eds. N. Fisher and H. van Wees. Swansea: Classical P of Wales, 113-46.

Andersen, Ø. (2012). “Older Heroes and Earlier Poems: The Case of Heracles in the *Odyssey*,” in Andersen and Haug, eds.: 138-51.

Andersen, Ø. and D.T.T. Haug. (2012). “Introduction,” in Andersen and Haug, eds.: 1-19.

Andersen, Ø. and D.T.T. Haug, eds. (2012). *Relative Chronology in Early Greek Epic Poetry*. Cambridge and New York: CUP.

Apthorp, M.J. (1980). *The Manuscript Evidence for Interpolation in Homer*. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

Arieti, J.A. (1986). “Achilles’ Alienation in *Iliad* 9.” *CJ* 82.1: 1-27.

Armstrong, C.B. (1969). “The Casualty Lists in the Trojan War.” *G&R* 16.1: 30-1.

Arthur, M. (1977). “Politics and Pomegranates: An Interpretation of the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*.” *Arethusa* 10.1: 7-47.

Asheri, D. et al. (2008). *A Commentary on Herodotus: Books I-IV*. Oxford and others: OUP.

Austin, N. (1969). “Telemachos Polymechanos.” *CSCA* 2: 45-63.

_______. (1975). *Archery at the Dark of the Moon: Poetic Problems in Homer’s* Odyssey. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: U of California P.

Avery, H. (1998). “Achilles’ Third Father.” *Hermes* 126.4: 389-97.

Bader, F. and P. Chantraine, eds. (1972). *Mélanges de linguistique et de philologie grecques offerts à P. Chantraine*. Paris: Klincksiech.

Bakker, E.J. (1993). “Discourse and Performance: Involvement, Visualization and ‘Presence’ in Homeric Poetry.” *ClAnt* 12: 1-29.

_______. (2010). “Remembering the *Gastēr*,” in Mitsis and Tsagalis, eds: 37-50.

_______. (2013) *The Meaning of Meat and the Structure of the* Odyssey. Cambridge: CUP.

Bannert, H. (1981). “Phoinix’s Jugend und der Zorn des Meleagros.” *WS* 15: 69-94.

Barnes, T.G. (2011). “Homeric ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην.” *JHS* 131: 1-14.

Barker, E. and J. Christensen. (2014). “Even Heracles Had to Die: Homeric ‘Heroism’, Mortality and the Epic Tradition.” *Trends in Classics* 6.2: 247-77.

Barrett, W.S., ed. and comm. (1964). *Hippolytos*. Oxford: Clarendon P.

Bartoněk, A. (2003). *Handbuch des Mykenischen Griechisch*. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

Beck, D. (2005). *Homeric Conversation*. *Hellenic Studies* 15. Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies.

_______. (2012). *Speech Presentation in Homeric Epic.* Austin: U of Texas P.

Beekes, R. (2010). *Etymological Dictionary of Greek*. Leiden Indo-European Etymological Dictionary Series, v. 10/1-2. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

di Benedetto, V. (1994). *Nel laboratorio di Omero*. Torino: Einaudi.

_______. (2001). “Reuses of Iliadic Patterns in the *Odyssey*.” *RCCM* 43.1: 7-14.

Benveniste, E. (1969). *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes.* 2 vols. Paris: Éditions de Minuit.

_______. (1971). *Problems in General Linguistics*. trans. M.E. Meek. Coral Gables, FL: U of Miami P.

Beringer, W. (1961). “Zu den Begriffen für ‘Sklaven’ und ‘Unfreie’ bei Homer.” *Historia* 13: 1-20.

_______. (1982) "'Servile Status' in the Sources for Early Greek History." *Historia* 31: 13-32.

Bierl, A. (2004). "'Turn on the Light!' Epiphany, the God-like Hero Odysseus, and the Golden Lamp of Athena in Homer's *Odyssey* (Especially 19.1-43)." *ICS* 29: 43-61.

Biles, Z. (2003). "Perils of Song in Homer's *Odyssey*." *Phoenix* 57.3/4: 191-208.

Billot, M.-F. (1992). "Le Cynosarges, Antiochos et les tanneurs. Questions de topographie." *BCH* 116.1: 119-156.

_______. (1993). "Antisthène et le Cynosarges dans l'Athènes des V$^{e}$ et IV$^{e}$ siècles," in *Le Cynicisme ancien et ses prolongements*. Paris, 69-116.

Block, E. (1982). "The Narrator Speaks: Apostrophe in Homer and Virgil." *TAPA* 112: 7-22.

Boardman, J. (1986). "Herakles *in extremis*," in *Studien zur Mythologie und Vasenmalerei. Festschrift für Konrad Schauenburg*. eds. E. Böhr and W. Martini. Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 127-32.

Bonnafé, A. (1984). "Eumée divin porcher et meneur d'hommes." *BAGB* [no number]: 180-94.

Bonnard, J.-B. (2004). *Le complexe de Zeus: représentations de la paternité en Grèce ancienne*. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne.

Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. trans. R. Nice. Cambridge: CUP.

Bowie, A.M., ed. and comm. (2013). *Odyssey: Books XIII and XIV*. Cambridge and New York: CUP.

Bowie, E. (2007). "Early Expatriates: Displacement and Exile in Archaic Poetry," in Gaertner, ed.: 21-49.

Bradley, K. and P. Cartledge, eds. (2011). *The Cambridge World History of Slavery*, Vol. 1: *The Ancient Mediterranean World.* Cambridge: CUP.

Bremmer, J.M. (1977). "ΕΣ ΚΥΝΟΣΑΡΓΕΣ." *Mnemosyne* 30.4: 369-374.

Brown, C.G. (1996). "In the Cyclops' Cave: Revenge and Justice in *Odyssey* 9." *Mnemosyne* 49.1: 1-29.

_______. (1997). "Iambos," in *A Companion to the Greek Lyric Poets.* ed. D.E. Gerber. Leiden and New York: Brill, 13-88.

_______. (2006). “Pindar on Archilochus and the Gluttony of Blame.” *JHS* 126: 36-46.

_______. (2011). “To the Ends of the Earth: Sappho on Tithonus.” *ZPE* 178: 21-25.

_______. (2014). “Vipers and Lost Youth: A Note on Old Age in Early Greek Epic.” *CQ* 64.2: 825-8.

Brown, M.K., ed and comm. (2002). *The Narratives of Konon*. München and Leipzig: K.G. Saur.

Buchholz, E. (1881). *Die homerischen Realien*. Vol. 2. Leipzig: Engelmann.

Burgess, J.S. (2001). *The Tradition of the Trojan War in Homer and the Epic Cycle*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP.

_______. (2009). *The Death and Afterlife of Achilles*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP.

_______. (2012a). “Intertextuality without Text in Early Greek Epic,” in Andersen and Haug., eds.: 168-183.

_______. (2012b). “Belatedness in the Travels of Odysseus,” in Montanari et al., eds.: 269-90.

Burkert, W. (1985). *Greek Religion*. trans. J. Raffan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP.

_______. (2001). *Kleine Schriften I: Homerica*. ed. C. Riedwig. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Burton, D. (2016). “Immortal Achilles.” *G&R* 63.1: 1-28.

Cairns, D.L. (1993). *Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature*. Oxford: OUP.

_______. (2001). “Affronts and Quarrels in the *Iliad*,” in *Oxford Readings in Homer’s* Iliad. ed. D.L. Cairns. Oxford and New York: OUP, 203-19 = *Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar* 7 (1993): 155-67.

Calhoun, G. (1962). “Polity and Society: (i) The Homeric Picture,” in Wace and Stubbings, eds.: 431-52.

Carsten, J. (2000). “Introduction: Cultures of Relatedness.” in *Cultures of Relatedness: New Approaches to the Study of Kinship*. ed. J. Carsten. Cambridge; New York: CUP. 1-36.

_______. (2004). *After Kinship*. Cambridge and New York: CUP.

Cartledge, P.A. (1977). "Hoplites and Heroes: Sparta's Contribution to the Technique of Ancient Warfare." *JHS* 97: 11-27.

Chantraine, P. (1953). *Grammaire homérique*. Vol. 1. Paris: Klincksieck.

_______. (1960). "Note sur l'emploi homérique de κασίγνητος." *BSL* 55: 27-31.

_______. (1968-1980). *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque: histoire des mots*. 4 vols. Paris: Klincksieck.

Ciani, M.G. (1964-5). "La parola omerica τηλύγετος." *AIV* 123.157-166.

Cingano, E. (2005). "A Catalogue within a Catalogue: Helen's Suitors in the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women* (frr. 196-204)," in Hunter, ed.: 118-52.

Clare, R.J. (2002). *The Path of the Argo: Language, Imagery and Narrative in the* Argonautica *of Apollonius Rhodius*. Cambridge: CUP.

Clarke, H.W. (1963). "Telemachus and the *Telemacheia*." *AJPh* 84.2: 129-45.

Clarke, M. (1999). *Flesh and Spirit in the Songs of Homer: A Study of Words and Myths*. Oxford: Clarendon P; New York: OUP.

Clay, J.S. (1983). *The Wrath of Athena: Gods and Men in the* Odyssey. Princeton: Princeton UP.

_______. (1989). *The Politics of Olympus: Form and Meaning in the Major Homeric Hymns.* Princeton: Princeton UP.

Cohen, E.E. (2000). *The Athenian Nation*. Princeton: Princeton UP.

Considine, P. (1966). "Some Homeric Terms for Anger." *AClass* 9: 15-25.

Cook, E. (1992). "Ferrymen of Elysium and the Homeric Phaeacians." *JIES* 20: 239-267.

_______. (1999). "'Active' and 'Passive' Heroics in the *Odyssey.*" *CW* 93: 149-67 = (2009), Doherty, ed.: 111-34.

_______. (2012). "Epiphany in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* and the *Odyssey*." *Papers of the Langford Latin Seminar* 15: 53-111.

Cousland, J.R.C. and J.R. Hume, eds. (2009). *The Play of Texts and Fragments: Essays in Honour of Martin Cropp*. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Crissy, K. (1997) "Herakles, Odysseus, and the Bow: *Odyssey* 21.11-41." *CJ* 93.1: 41-53.

Crotty, K. (1994). *The Poetics of Supplication: Homer's* Iliad *and* Odyssey. Ithaca and London: Cornell UP.

Csapo, E. (2005). *Theories of Mythology*. Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell.

Cunliffe, R.J. (1963). *A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect*. New ed. Norman: U of Oklahoma P.

Currie, B. (2015). "*Cypria*," in *The Greek Epic Cycle and Its Ancient Reception: A Companion*. eds. M. Fantuzzi and C. Tsagalis. Cambridge and New York: CUP.

D'Alfonso, F. di. (2008). "La Terra Desolata: Osservazioni sul destino di Bellerophonte (*Il*. 6.200 -202)." *MH* 65: 1-21.

Danek, G. (1998). *Epos und Zitat: Studien zu den Quellen der Odyssee*. Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Deacy, S. (2005). "Herakles and his 'Girl': Athena, Heroism and Beyond," in Rawlings and Bowden, eds.: 37-50.

DeBloois, N. (1997). "Rape, Marriage, or Death? Gender Perspectives in the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter*." *PhQ* 76.3: 245-62.

Debord, P. (1973) "Esclavage mycénien, esclavage homérique." *REA* 75: 225-40.

Demand, N. (1994). *Birth, Death, and Motherhood in Classical Greece*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP.

Demont, P. (1978). "Remarques sur le sense de ΤΡΕΦΩ." *REG* 91.2: 358-384.

_______. (1981). "La polysémie d'un verbe grec: τρέφω, 'cailler, coaguler, nourrir, élever' (Homére, Hésiode, Aristote, *Météor*. 354 b 36)," in *Études de littérature ancienne*. Vol. 2. Paris: P de l'École normale supérieure,111-122.

Denniston, J.D. (1950). *The Greek Particles*. 2nd ed. rev. K.J. Dover. Oxford: OUP.

Diller, A. (1937). *Race Mixture among the Greeks before Alexander*. Urbana: U of Illinois P.

Dodds, E.R. (1951). *The Greeks and the Irrational*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: U of California P.

Doherty, L.E., ed. (2009). *Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Homer's* Odyssey. Oxford and New York: OUP.

Donlan, W. (1973). "The Tradition of Anti-Aristocratic Thought in Early Greek Poetry." *Historia* 22.2: 145-54.

_______. (1980). *The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece: Attitudes of Superiority from Homer to the End of the Fifth Century BC*. Lawrence, KS: Coronado P.

_______. (1985) "The Social Groups of Dark Age Greece." *CP* 80.4: 293-308.

_______. (1993). "Duelling with Gifts in the *Iliad*: As the Audience Saw It." *ColbyQ* 29.3: 155-72.

_______. (2007). "Kin-Groups in the Homeric Epics." *CW* 101.1: 29-39.

Dougherty, C. (2001). *The Raft of Odysseus: The Ethnographic Imagination of Homer's* Odyssey. New York: OUP.

DuBois, P. (2003). *Slaves and Other Objects*. Chicago and London: U of Chicago P.

Dué, C. and M. Ebbott. (2010). Iliad 10 *and the Poetics of Ambush. Hellenic Studies 39*. Washington, DC.

Dumézil, G. (1979). *Mariages indo-européens: suivi de Quinze questions romaines*. Paris: Payot.

Dunbar, N., ed. and comm. (1995). *Aristophanes: Birds*. Oxford: Clarendon P; New York: OUP.

Easterling, P.E. (1977). "The Infanticide in Euripides' *Medea*." *YCS* 25: 177-91.

_______. (1997). "Constructing the Heroic," in *Greek Tragedy and the Historian*. ed. C.B.R. Pelling. Oxford: Clarendon, 21-38.

Ebbott, M. (2003). *Imagining Illegitimacy in Classical Greek Literature*. Lanham, MD and Oxford: Lexington.

Ebeling, H., ed. (1871-85). *Lexicon Homericum*. Leipzig: Teubner.

Edgeworth, R.J. (1985). "Ajax and Teucer in the *Iliad*." *RFIC* 113: 27-31.

Edgeworth, R.J. and C.M. Mayrhofer. (1987). "The Two Ajaxes and the Two KRNAS." *RhM* 130.2: 186-8.

Edmunds, L. (1981). “The Cults and the Legend of Oedipus.” *HSCP* 85: 221-38.

Edwards, A.T. (1987). *Homer: Poet of the* Iliad*.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.

_______. (1993). “Homer’s Ethical Geography: Country and City in the *Odyssey*.” *TAPA* 123: 27-78.

Edwards, M.W. (1992). “Homer and Oral Tradition: The Type-Scene.” *Oral Tradition* 7: 283-330.

Egan, R.B. (1971). *The Diegesis of Konon: A Commentary with an English Translation*. Diss., Michigan.

Eidinow, E. (2007). *Oracles, Curses, and Risk among the Ancient Greeks*. Oxford and New York: OUP.

Eliopoulos, T. (2010). “Athens: News from the Kynosarges Site,” in *Neue Forschungen zu griechischen Städten und Heiligtümern: Festschrift für Burkhardt Wesenberg zum 65. Geburtstag*. eds. H. Frielinghaus and J. Stroszeck. Möhnesee: Bibliopolis, 85-91.

Erbse, H. (1961). “Betrachtungen über das 5. Buch der *Ilias*.” *RhM* 104: 156-89.

Erbse, H., ed. (1969-1988). *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem*. 6 vols. Berlin: de Gruyter.

van Erp Taalman Kip, A.M. (2000). “The Gods of the *Iliad* and the Fate of Troy.” *Mnemosyne* 53.4: 385-402.

Falkner, T.M. (1995). *The Poetics of Old Age in Greek Epic, Lyric, and Tragedy*. Norman: U of Oklahoma P.

Farron, S. (1979-80). “The *Odyssey* as an Anti-Aristocratic Statement.” *Studies in Antiquity* 1.1: 59-101.

_______. (2003). “Attitudes to Military Archery in the *Iliad*,” in *Literature, Art, History: Studies on Classical Antiquity and Tradition*. eds. A.F. Basson and W.J. Dominik. Frankfurt am Main and others: Peter Lang, 169-84.

Faulkner, A. (2008). *The* Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite*: Introduction, Text, and Commentary*. Oxford; New York: OUP.

Faulkner, A., ed. (2011). *The* Homeric Hymns*: Interpretative Essays*. Oxford: OUP, 2011.

Felson, N. (2002a). “*Threptra* and Invincible Hands: the Father-Son Relationship in *Iliad* 24.” *Arethusa* 35.1: 35-50.

_______. (2002b). “Paradigmes de la paternité: pères, fils, et prouesses athlétiques/ sexuelles dans l’*Odyssée* d’Homère,” in *La mythologie et l’Odyssée: Homage à Gabriel Germain*. eds. A. Hurst and F. Létoublon. Geneva: Droz, 259-72.

_______. (2011). “Children of Zeus in the *Homeric Hymns*: Generational Succession,” in A. Faulkner, ed.: 254-279.

Fenik, B.C. (1968). *Typical Battle Scenes in the* Iliad*: Studies in the Narrative Techniques of Homeric Battle Description*. Wiesbaden: F. Steiner.

_______. (1974). *Studies in the* Odyssey. Wiesbaden: F. Steiner.

Finglass, P.J. (2007). *Sophocles:* Electra. Cambridge and New York: CUP.

_______. (2011). *Sophocles:* Ajax. Cambridge and New York: CUP.

Finkelberg, M. (1988). “Ajax’s Entry in the Hesiodic Catalogue of Women.” *CQ* 38.1: 31-41.

Finley, M.I. (1978) *The World of Odysseus*. rev. ed. New York: Viking P.

_______. (1998) *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology*. expanded ed. B.D. Shaw. Princeton.

Focke, F. (1954). “Zum *I* der *Ilias*.” *Hermes* 82.3: 257-87.

Foley, H.P. (1978). “‘Reverse Similes’ and Sex Roles in the *Odyssey.*” *Arethusa* 11: 7-26 = (2009). Doherty, ed.: 189-207.

_______. (1994). *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter: Translation, Commentary, and Interpretive Essays.* Princeton: Princeton UP.

Foley, J.-M. (1991). *Immanent Art: From Structure to Meaning in Traditional Oral Epic.* Bloomigton and Indianapolis: Indiana UP.

_______. (1999). *Homer’s Traditional Art*. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP.

Forsdyke, S. (2005). *Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy: The Politics of Expulsion in Ancient Greece*. Princeton: Princeton UP.

Fowler, R.L. (2000-2013). *Early Greek Mythography*. 2 vols. Oxford and New York: OUP.

Fragoulaki, M. (2013). *Kinship in Thucydides: Intercommunal Ties and Historical Narrative*. Oxford: OUP.

Frame, D. (2009). *Hippota Nestor*. *Hellenic Studies* 37. Washington, DC.

Fraser, P.M. (2009). *Greek Ethnic Terminology*. Oxford and New York: OUP for the British Academy.

Fränkel, H. (1977). *Die homerischen Gleichnisse*. 2nd ed. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Freud, S. (1955). *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud.* Vol. 17. trans. J. Strachey. London: Hogarth P.

Friedrich, J.B. (1856). *Die Realien in der* Iliade *und* Odyssee. Erlangen: F. Enke.

Frisk, H. (1970). *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch*. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

Gaertner, J.F. (2007). "The Discourse of Displacement," in Gaertner, ed.: 1-20.

Gaertner, J.F., ed. (2007). *Writing Exile: The Discourse of Displacement in Greco-Roman Antiquity and Beyond.* Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Gainsford, P. (2012). "Sibling Terminology in Homer: Problems with ΚΑΣΙΓΝΗΤΟΣ and ΑΔΕΛΦΕΟΣ." *CQ* 62.2: 441-465.

Galinsky, G.K. (1972). *The Herakles Theme*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Gantz, T. (1993). *Early Greek Myth*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP.

Garlan, Y. (1988). *Slavery in Ancient Greece*. trans. J. Lloyd. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP.

Garland, R. (2014). *Wandering Greeks: The Ancient Greek Diaspora from the Age of Homer to the Death of Alexander the Great*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UP.

Garnsey, P. (1996). *Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine*. Cambridge and New York: CUP.

Garvie, A.F., ed. and comm. (1986). Choephori: *Aeschylus*. Oxford: Clarendon P.

Gates, H.P. (1971). *The Kinship Terminology of Homeric Greek*. Baltimore: Waverly P.

George, D.B. (1994). "Euripides' *Heracles* 140-235: Staging and the Stage Iconography of Heracles' Bow." *GRBS* 35.2: 145-57.

Gernet, L. (1955). *Droit et Société dans la Grèce ancienne*. Paris: Recueil Sirey.

Giacomelli, A. (1980). "Aphrodite and After." *Phoenix* 34.1: 1-19.

Giangiulio, M. (1996). "Le héros fondateur, l'espace sacré de la déesse. Notes sur Héraclès et les sanctuaires d'Héra du Péloponnèse à la Grande Grèce," in Jourdain-Annequin and Bonnet, eds.: 215-233.

Gibert, J. (1997). "Euripides' Hippolytus Plays: Which Came First?" *CQ* 47.1: 85-97.

Giuliani, L. (2013). *Image and Myth: A History of Pictorial Narration in Greek Art*. trans. J. O'Donnell. Chicago: U of Chicago P.

Glazebrook, A. (2005). "The Making of a Prostitute: Apollodoros' Portrait of Neaira." *Arethusa* 38: 161-87.

Godelier, M. (2011). *The Metamorphoses of Kinship*. Trans. N. Scott. London and New York: Verso.

Golden, M. (1985). "*Pais*, 'Child' and 'Slave'." *AC* 54: 91-104.

_______. (1990). *Children and Childhood in Classical Athens*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP.

_______. (2011). "Slavery and the Greek Family." in K. Bradley and P. Cartledge, eds.: 134-52.

Goldhill, S. (2010). "Idealism in the *Odyssey* and the Meaning of *mounos* in *Odyssey* 16," in Mitsis and Tsagalis, eds.: 115-27.

Gottesman, A. (2014). "The Authority of Telemachus." *ClAnt* 33.1: 31-60.

Gould, J. (1973). "*Hiketeia.*" *JHS* 93: 74-103.

Grasmück, E.L. (1978). *Exilium: Untersuchungen zur Verbannung in der Antike*. Paderborn: Schöningh.

Graziosi, B., and J. Haubold. (2005). *Homer: The Resonance of Epic*. London: Duckworth.

Graziosi, B., and J. Haubold, eds. and comm. (2010). *Homer:* Iliad, *Book VI.* Cambridge, UK; New York: CUP.

Green, A. (2012). *The Concept of* Anankē *in Greek Literature before 400 BCE*. Diss., Exeter.

Gregory, J. (2009). “A Father’s Curse in Euripides’ *Hippolytus*,” in Cousland and Hume, eds.: 35-48.

Griffin, A.H.F. (1991). “Philemon and Baucis in Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*.” *G&R* 38.1: 62-74.

Griffin, J. (1986). “Homeric Words and Speakers.” *JHS* 106: 36-57.

Griffin, J., ed. and comm. (1995). *Homer:* Iliad *Book Nine*. Oxford: Clarendon P.

Griffith, D. (2010). “ΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ ΓΑΛΑ (*Odyssey* 9.246).” *CPh* 105.3: 301-308.

Grimm, J. (1962). “Die Partikel ἄρα im frühen griechischen Epos.” *Glotta* 40: 3-41.

Grossardt, P. (1998). *Die Trugreden in der* Odyssee *und ihre Rezeption in der antiken Literatur*. Bern: P. Lang.

Gschnitzer, F. (1976) *Studien zur griechischen Terminologie der Sklaverei*. Vol. 2. *Untersuchen zur Älteren, insbesondere homerischen Sklaventerminologie*. Mainz: V der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, in Kommission bei F. Steiner.

Hainsworth, J.B. (1961). “Odysseus and the Dogs.” *G&R* 8.2: 122-5.

_______. (1993). *The* Iliad*: A Commentary*. *Volume III: books 9-12*. Cambridge: CUP.

Hall, E. (1989). *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy*. Oxford: Clarendon P.

Haller, B.S. (2013). “Dolios in *Odyssey* 4 and 24: Penelope’s Plotting and Alternative Narratives of Odysseus’ νόστος.” *TAPA* 143.2: 263-292.

Hammer, D. (1997). “Achilles as Vagabond: The Culture of Autonomy in the *Iliad*.” *CW* 90.5: 341-66.

Hanson, V.D. (2000). *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece*. 2nd ed. Berkeley: U of California P.

Harris, E. (2012). “Homer, Hesiod, and the ‘Origins’ of Greek Slavery.” *REA* 114.2: 345-66.

Haubold, J. (2005). “Heracles in the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women*,” in Hunter, ed.: 85-99.

Heath, J. (2001). “Telemachus ΠΕΠΝΥΜΕΝΟΣ: Growing into an Epithet.” *Mnemosyne* 54.2: 129-57.

Heath, M. and E. Okell. (2007). “Sophocles’ *Ajax*: Expect the Unexpected.” *CQ* 57.2: 363-80.

Heiden, B. (1998). “The Simile of the Fugitive Homicide, *Iliad*. 24.480-4: Analogy, Foiling, and Allusion.” *AJPh* 119.1: 1-10.

Held, G.F. (1987). “Phoinix, Agamemnon and Achilles: Parables and Paradeigmata.” *CQ* 37.2: 245-61.

Hermann, G. (1801). *De Emendenda Ratione Graecae Grammaticae*. Vol. 1. Leipzig: Gerhard Fleischer.

Herzfeld, M. (1985). *The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in a Cretan Mountain Village*. Princeton: Princeton UP.

Heubeck, A. et al. (1990). *A Commentary on Homer’s* Odyssey*, Volume I: Introduction and Books i-viii.* Oxford: Clarendon P.

Heubeck, A. and A. Hoekstra. (1990). *A Commentary on Homer’s* Odyssey*, Volume II: Books IX-XVI*. Oxford: Clarendon P.

Higbie, C. (1995). *Heroes’ Names, Homeric Identities*. New York and London: Garland.

Hirschberger, M., ed. and comm. (2004). *Gynaikōn Katalogos und Megalai Ēhoiai: ein Kommentar zu den Fragmenten zweier hesiodeischer Epen*. Munich: Saur.

Hofmann, J.B. (1966). *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Griechischen.* München: R. Oldenbourg.

Hogan, J.C. (1981). “Eris in Homer.” *GB* 10: 21-58.

Holt, P. (1989). “The End of the *Trachiniae* and the Fate of Herakles.” *JHS* 109: 69-80.

_______. (1992). “Ajax’s Burial in Early Greek Epic.” *AJP* 113.3: 319-31.

Honko, L., ed. (2000) *Textualization of Oral Epics*. Berlin and Hawthorne, NY: de Gruyter.

Honoré, A.M. (1961). “Ownership,” in *Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, A Collaborative Work*. ed. A.G. Guest. London: OUP.

Horden, P. and N. Purcell. (2000). *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of the Mediterranean History*. Singapore: Blackwell.

Hornblower, S. (2008). “Warfare in Ancient Literature: The Paradox of War,” in *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare*. Vol. 1. ed. P. Sabin et al. Cambridge: CUP, 22-53.

Hornblower, S., ed. and comm. (2015). *Lykophron:* Alexandra. Oxford: OUP.

Hölscher, U. (1939). *Untersuchungen zur Form der* Odyssee*: Szenenwechsel und gleichzeitige Handlungen*. Berlin: Weidmann.

_______. (1990). *Die* Odyssee. *Epos zwischen Märchen und Roman*. 3rd ed. München: Beck.

Humphreys, S.C. (1974). "The *Nothoi* of Kynosarges." *JHS* 94: 88-95.

Hunt, P. (2011). "Slaves in Greek Literary Culture." in K. Bradley and P. Cartledge, eds.: 22-47.

Hunter, R., ed. and comm. (1989). *Apollonius of Rhodes:* Argonautica, *Book III*. Cambridge: CUP.

Hunter, R., ed. (2005). *The Hesiodic* Catalogue of Women: *Constructions and Reconstructions*. Cambridge, New York, et al.: CUP.

Hunter, R. and I. Rutherford, eds. (2009). *Wandering Poets in Ancient Greek Culture: Travel, Locality, and Pan-Hellenism*. Cambridge and New York: CUP.

Hutchinson, G.O. (2004). "Euripides' Other *Hippolytus*." *ZPE* 149: 15-28.

Huxley, G.L. (1969). *Greek Epic Poetry from Eumelos to Panyassis*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP.

Iannucci, A. (2004). "Asio 'parodico'? Lettura di un frammento elegiaco," in *Samo: storia, letturatura, scienza: atti delle Giornate di studio, Ravenna, 14-16 novembre 2002*. Ed. G. Cerri. Pisa: Istituti editoriali e poligrafici internazionali, 367-78.

Ingalls, W.B. (1998). "Attitudes towards Children in the *Iliad*." *ECM/CV* 42.1: 13-34.

Irwin, E.K. (2005a). *Solon and Early Greek Poetry: The Poetics of Exhortation*. Cambridge and New York: CUP.

_______. (2005b). "Gods among Men? The Social and Political Dynamics of the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women*," in Hunter ed.: 35-84.

Jaeger, W. (1965). *Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture*. Vol. 1. trans. G. Highet. New York: OUP.

Jameson, M. (2005). "The Family of Herakles in Attica," in Rawlings and Bowden, eds.: 15-35.

Janko, R. (1992). *The* Iliad*: A Commentary. Volume IV: books 13-16*. Cambridge: CUP.

de Jáuregui, M.H. (2013). “*Emar Tode*: Recognizing the Crucial Day in Early Greek Poetry.” *ClAnt* 32.1: 35-77.

Johansen, K.F. (1967). *The* Iliad *in Early Greek Art*. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.

Jones, C.P. (1987). “*Stigma*: Tattooing and Branding in Graeco-Roman Antiquity.” *JRS* 77: 139-55.

de Jong, I.J.F. (2001). *A Narratological Commentary on the* Odyssey. Cambridge; New York: CUP.

Jourdain-Annequin, C. and C. Bonnet, eds. (1996). *Héraclès, les femmes et le féminin: Actes du colloque de Grenoble, 22-23 Octobre 1992*. Brussels and Rome: Brepols.

Jörgensen, O. “Das Auftreten der Götter in den Büchern ι-μ der Odyssee.” *Hermes* 39 (1904): 352-382.

Kahane, A. (1994). *The Interpretation of Order: A Study in the Poetics of Homeric Repetition*. Oxford: Clarendon P.

Kakridis, J.T. (1949). *Homeric Researches*. Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup.

Kamen, D. (2013). *Status in Classical Athens*. Princeton: Princeton UP.

von Kamptz, H. (1982). *Homerische Personennamen: sprachwissenschaftliche und historische Klassifikation*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Kapparis, K.A. (1999). *Apollodorus ‘Against Neaira’ [D.59]*. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter.

Karanika, A. (2011). “The End of the *Nekyia*: Odysseus, Heracles, and the Gorgon in the Underworld.” *Arethusa* 44.1: 1-27.

Karsai, G. (1992). “Teucros dans l’*Helene* d’Euripide.” *Pallas* 38: 217-26.

Karydas, H.P. (1998). *Eurykleia and her Successors: Female Figures of Authority in Greek Poetics*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Kearns, E. (1982). “The Return of Odysseus: A Homeric Theoxeny.” *CQ* 32: 2-8.

Kelly, A. (2007). *A Referential Commentary and Lexicon to* Iliad VIII. Oxford and New York: OUP.

_______. (2008). “Performance and Rivalry: Homer, Odysseus, and Hesiod,” in *Performance, Iconography, Reception: Studies in Honour of Oliver Taplin*. eds. M. Revermann and P. Wilson. Oxford and New York: OUP.

Kenney, E.J., comm. (2011). *Ovidio* Metamorfosi*: Volume IV (Libri VII-IX)*. Milano: Fondazione Loranzo Valla.

Keppler, C.F. (1972). *The Literature of the Second Self*. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona P.

King, B. (1999). “The Rhetoric of the Victim: Odysseus in the Swineherd’s Hut.” *ClAnt* 18.1: 74-93.

King, D.E. and L. Stone. (2010). “Lineal Masculinity: Gendered Memory within Patriliny.” *American Ethnologist* 37.2: 323-36.

Kirk, G.S. (1962). *The Songs of Homer*. Cambridge: CUP.

_______. (1985). *The* Iliad*: A Commentary. Volume I: books 1-4*. Cambidge: CUP.

_______. (1990). *The* Iliad*: A Commentary*. *Volume II: books 5-8.* Cambridge: CUP.

Kirkwood, G.M. (1965). “Homer and Sophocles’ Ajax,” in *Classical Drama and Its Influence: Essays Presented to H.D.F. Kitto*. ed. M.J. Anderson. New York: Barnes & Noble, 53-70.

Knight, V. (1995). *The Renewal of Epic: Responses to Homer in the* Argonautica *of Apollonius*. Leiden: Brill.

Knox, B.M.W. (1977). “The *Medea* of Euripides.” *YCS* 25: 193-225.

Knudsen, R.A. (2014). *Homeric Speech and the Origins of Rhetoric*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP.

Konstantinou, A. (2016). “Hestia and Eos: Mapping Female Mobility and Sexuality in Greek Mythic Thought.” *AJP* 137.1: 1-24.

Köhnken, A. (1975). “Die Rolle des Phoinix und die Duale im I der *Ilias*.” *Glotta* 53: 25-36. = (2006). *Darstellungsziele und Erzählstrategien in antiken Texten*. ed. A. Bettenworth. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 12-21.

_______. (1978). “Noch einmal Phoinix und die Duale.” *Glotta* 56: 5-14. = (2006). *Darstellungsziele und Erzählstrategien in antiken Texten*. ed. A. Bettenworth. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 22-9.

Kratzer, E. (2013). "A Hero's Welcome: Homecoming and Transition in the *Trachiniae*." *TAPA* 143.1: 23-63.

Kullman, W. (1960). *Die Quellen der* Ilias *(troischer Sagenkreis)*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.

Kurke, L. (1991). *The Traffic in Praise: Pindar and the Poetics of Social Economy*. Ithaca: Cornell UP.

Kühner, R. (1904). *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*. vol. 2.2. ed. B. Gerth. Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung.

Labriola, P. (2002). "Edgar Allan Poe and E.T.A. Hoffman: The Double in 'William Wilson' and *The Devil's Elixirs*." *International Fiction Review* 29: 69-77.

Lacey, W.K. (1968). *The Family in Classical Greece*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP.

Latacz, J. (1977). *Kampfparänese, Kampfdarstellung und Kampfwirklichkeit in der* Ilias, *bei Kallinos und Tyrtaios.* München: Beck.

Laurens, A.-F. (1987). "Identification d'Hébé? Le nom, l'un et le multiple," in *Image et société en Grece ancienne*. eds. C. Bérard, C. Bron, and A. Pomari. Lausanne: U de Lausanne, 59-72.

Leaf, W., ed. and comm. (1900-02). *The Iliad*. London and New York: Macmillan.

Leão, D.F. and P.J. Rhodes, ed. and comm. (2015). *The Laws of Solon: A New Edition with Introduction, Translation and Commentary*. London: Tauris.

Lefkowitz, M. (1993). "Seduction and Rape in Greek Myth," in *Consent and Coercion to Sex in Marriage in Ancient and Medieval Societies*. ed. A.E. Laiou. Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 17-38.

_______. (1995). "The Last Hours of the *Parthenos*," in *Pandora: Women in Classical Greece*. ed. E.D. Reeder. Baltimore: Trustees of the Walters Art Gallery and Princeton UP, 32-8.

Lejeune, M. (1960). "Hittite kati-, grec κασι-." *BSL* 55: 20-6.

Lencman, J.A. (1966). *Die Sklaverei im mykenischen und homerischen Griechenland*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.

Lennox, P.G. (1980). "Apollonius, *Argonautica* 3.1ff. and Homer." *Hermes* 108.1: 45-73.

Lesky, A. (1966). *Gesammelte Schriften. Aufsätze und Reden zu antiker und deutscher Dichtung und Kultur*. ed. W. Kraus. Bern: Francke.

Lesky, E. (1951). *Die Zeugungs- und Vererbungslehren der Antike und ihr Nachwirken*. Mainz: Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur.

Levaniouk, O. (2011). *Eve of the Festival: Making Myth in* Odyssey 19. *Hellenic Studies* 46. Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies.

_______. (2012). "Οὐ χρώμεθα τοῖς ξενικοῖς ποιήμασιν: Questions about Evolution and Fluidity of the *Odyssey*," in Montanari et al., eds.: 369-409.

Leumann, M. (1950). *Homerische Wörter*. Basel: Reinhardt.

Lightfoot, J.L., ed. and comm. (1999). *Parthenius of Nicaea: The Poetical Fragments and the* Ἐρωτικὰ Παθήματα. Oxford: Clarendon P.

Lilja, S. (1976). *Dogs in Ancient Greek Poetry*. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica.

Lohmann, D. (1970). *Die Komposition der Reden in der* Ilias. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Loraux, N. (1997). *The Experiences of Tiresias: The Feminine and the Greek Man*. trans. P. Wissing. Princeton: Princeton UP.

Lord, A.B. (1960). *The Singer of Tales*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP.

Lorimer, H.L. (1950). *Homer and the Monuments*. London: Macmillan.

Lotze, D. (1981). "Zwischen Politen und Metöken: Passivbürger im klassichen Athen?" *Klio* 63.1: 159-178.

Louden, B. (1997). "Eumaios and Alkinoos: The Audience and the *Odyssey*." *Phoenix* 51.2: 95-114.

_______. (2002). "Eurybates, Odysseus, and the Duals in Book 9 of the *Iliad*." *ColbyQ* 38.1: 62-76.

_______. (2006). *The* Iliad: *Structure, Myth, and Meaning*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP.

_______. (2011). *Homer's* Odyssey *and the Near East*. Cambridge and New York: CUP.

Luschnig, C.A.E. (2007). *Granddaughter of the Sun: A Study of Euripides'* Medea. Leiden: Brill.

Lyons, D. (1997). *Gender and Immortality: Heroines in Ancient Greek Myth and Cult*. Princeton: Princeton UP.

Mackie, C.J. (2008). *Rivers of Fire: Mythic Themes in Homer's* Iliad. Washington, DC: New Academia Publishing.

_______. (2009). "The Earliest Philoctetes." *Scholia* 18: 2-16.

Mackie, H. (1996). *Talking Trojan: Speech and Community in the* Iliad. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

MacLachlan, B. (1993). *The Age of Grace:* Charis *in Early Greek Poetry*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP.

Malkin, I. (1998). *The Returns of Odysseus: Colonization and Ethnicity*. Berkeley: U of California P.

Marcus, A. (2011/12). "Telling the Difference: Clones, Doubles and What's in between." *Connotations* 21.2-3: 363-96.

Marks, J.R. (2003). "Alternative Odysseys: The Case of Thoas and Odysseus." *TAPA* 133.2: 209-26.

_______. (2008). *Zeus in the* Odyssey. *Hellenic Studies* 31. Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies.

Martin, R.P. (1989). *The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the* Iliad. Ithaca: Cornell UP.

_______. (1992). "Hesiod's Metanastic Poetics." *Ramus* 2: 11-33.

Mastronarde, D.J., ed. and comm. (2002). *Euripides*: Medea. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge UP.

McConnell, J. (2011). "Eumaeus and Eurycleia in the Deep South: Odyssean Slavery in *Sommersby*," in *Ancient Slavery and Abolition: From Hobbes to Hollywood*. eds. E. Hall, R. Alston, and J. McConnell. Oxford and New York: OUP, 385-407.

McLeod, W. (1988). "The Bow at Night: An Inappropriate Weapon?" *Phoenix* 42.2: 121-5.

Meyer, E.A. (2010). *Metics and the Athenian Philai-Inscriptions: A Study in Athenian Epigraphy and Law*. Stuttgart: Steiner.

Miller, J.C. (2012). *The Problem of Slavery as History: A Global Approach*. New Haven, CT and London: Yale UP.

Minchin, E. (1992). "Homer Springs a Surprise: Eumaios' Tale at *Od*. ο 403-84." *Hermes* 120.3: 259-66.

Mitsis, P. and C. Tsagalis, eds. (2010). *Allusion, Authority, and Truth: Critical Perspectives on Greek Poetic and Rhetorical Praxis*. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter.

Montanari, F., A. Rengakos, and C. Tsagalis, eds. (2012). *Homeric Contexts: Neoanalysis and the Interpretation of Oral Poetry*. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.

Montiglio, S. (2005). *Wandering in Ancient Greek Culture*. Chicago and London: U of Chicago P.

Moon, W.G. (1983). "The Priam Painter: Some Iconographic and Stylistic Considerations," in *Ancient Greek Art and Iconography*. ed. W.G. Moon. London: U of Wisconsin P, 97-118.

Morris, I. (2000). *Archaeology as Cultural History: Words and Things in Iron Age Greece*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Morris, I., and B. Powell, eds. *A New Companion to Homer*. Leiden; New York; Köln: Brill.

Moulton, C. (1977). *Similes in the Homeric Poems*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.

Moussy, C. (1969). *Recherches sur ΤΡΕΦΩ et les verbes grecs significant 'nourrir'*. Paris: C. Klincksieck.

_______. (1972). "Sur ἀταλός, ἀτάλλω, ἀτιτάλλω," in Bader and Chantraine, eds.: 157-168.

Muellner, L.C. (1976). *The Meaning of Homeric εὔχομαι through Its Formulas*. Innsbruck: Institut für Sprachwissenschaft der Universität Innsbruck.

_______. (1996). *The Anger of Achilles: Mēnis in Greek Epic*. Ithaca: Cornell UP.

Munson, R.V. (2001). "*ANANKE* in Herodotus." *JHS* 121: 30-50.

Murnaghan, S. (2011). *Disguise and Recognition in the* Odyssey. 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Murray, G. (1934). *The Rise of Greek Epic*. 4th ed. Oxford: Clarendon P.

Mühlestein, H. (1987). *Homerische Namenstudien*. Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum.

von der Mühll, P. (1930). *Der große Aias*. Basel: Friedrich Reinhardt. = (1976). *Ausgewählte kleine Schriften*. Basel: Friedrich Reinhardt, 435-72.

Nagler, M.N. (1974). *Spontaneity and Tradition: a Study in the Oral Art of Homer*. Berkeley: U of California P.

_______. (1988). "Towards a Semantics of Ancient Conflict: Eris in the *Iliad*." *CW* 82.2: 81-90.

_______. (1990). "Odysseus: The Proem and the Problem." *ClAnt* 9.2: 335-56.

Nagy, G. (1990). *Pindar's Homer: The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP.

_______. (1996). *Homeric Questions*. Austin: U of Texas P.

_______. (1997). "Ellipsis in Homer," in *Written Voices, Spoken Signs: Tradition, Performance, and the Epic Text*. eds. E. Bakker and A. Kahane. Harvard UP: Cambridge, MA and London, 167-89.

_______. (1999). *The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry*. Rev. ed. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins UP.

_______. (2004). *Homer's Text and Language*. Urbana and Chicago: U of Illinois P.

Naiden, F.S. (2006). *Ancient Supplication*. Oxford and others: OUP.

_______. (2012). "Blessèd Are the Parasites," in *Greek and Roman Sacrifice: Ancient Victims, Modern Observers*. eds. C.A. Faraone and F.S. Naiden. Cambridge and others: CUP, 55-83.

Natoli, A.F. (2004). *The Letter of Speusippus to Phillip II*. Stuttgart: Steiner.

Ndoye, M. (2010). *Groupes sociaux et idéologie du travail dans les mondes homérique et hésiodique*. Becançon: PU de Franche-Comté.

Nevett, L.C. (1999). *House and Society in the Ancient Greek World*. Cambridge: CUP.

_______. (2010). *Domestic Space in Classical Antiquity*. Cambridge, New York, and others: CUP.

Newton, R.M. (2015). "Eumaeus Rustles up Dinner." *CJ* 110.3: 257-78.

Nickel, R. (2003). “The Wrath of Demeter: Story Pattern in the *Hymn to Demeter*.” *QUCC* 73: 59-82.

Nünlist, R. (2009). *The Ancient Critic at Work: Terms and Concepts of Literary Criticism in Greek Scholia*. Cambridge and New York: CUP.

Obbink, D. (2009). “Sappho Fragments 58-9: Text, Apparatus Criticus, and Translation,” in *The New Sappho on Old Age: Textual and Philosophical Issues*. eds. E. Greene and M.B. Skinner. Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies.

O’Brien, J.V. (1993a). “Hera, Nurse of Monsters,” in *Woman’s Power, Man’s Game: Essays on Classical Antiquity in Honor of Joy K. King.* Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci.

_______. (1993b). *The Transformation of Hera: A Study of Ritual, Hero, and the Goddess in the* Iliad. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Ogden, D. (1995). “Women and Bastardy in Ancient Greece and the Hellenistic World.” In *The Greek World*. ed. A. Powell. London: Routledge, 219-44.

_______. (1996). *Greek Bastardy in the Classical and Hellenistic Periods.* Oxford: Clarendon P.

_______. (2009). “Bastardy and Fatherlessness in Ancient Greece,” in *Growing up Fatherless in Antiquity*. eds. S.R. Hübner and D.M. Ratzan. Cambridge and New York: CUP, 115-19.

Olson, S.D. (1992). “Servants’ Suggestions in Homer’s *Odyssey*.” *CJ* 87.3: 219-27.

_______. (1995). *Blood and Iron: Story and Storytelling in the* Odyssey. Leiden and New York: Brill.

Ormand, K. (2014). *The Hesiodic* Catalogue of Women *and Archaic Greece*. New York: CUP.

Osborne, R. (2009). *Greece in the Making, 1200-479 B.C.* 2nd ed. Milton Park and New York: Routledge.

Page, D.L. (1972). *History and the Homeric* Iliad. Berkeley and Los Angeles: U of California P, [first pub. 1959].

Page, D.L., ed. and comm. (1938). *Medea*. Oxford: Clarendon P.

Papadopoulou, T. (2005). *Heracles and Euripidean Tragedy*. New York: CUP.

Parker, L.P.E., ed. and comm. (2007). *Alcestis*. Oxford and New York: OUP.

Parker, R. (1983). *Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion*. Oxford: Clarendon P.

_______. (2005). *Polytheism and Society at Athens*. Oxford and others: OUP.

Parry, A. (1972). "Language and Characterization in Homer." *HSCP* 76: 1-22.

Parry, H. (1994). "The *Apologos* of Odysseus: Lies, All Lies?" *Phoenix* 48.1: 1-20.

Parry, M. (1971). *The Making of Homeric Verse: the Collected Papers of Milman Parry*. ed. A. Parry. New York and Oxford: OUP.

Patterson, C.B. (1981). *Pericles' Citizenship Law of 451-50 B.C.* New York: Arno P.

_______. (1990). "Those Athenian Bastards." *ClAnt* 9.1: 40-73.

_______. (1998) *The Family in Greek History*. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard UP.

Patterson, L.E. (2010). *Kinship Myth in Ancient Greece*. Austin: U of Texas P.

Patterson, O. (1982). *Slavery and Social Death*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP.

Peacock, M. (2011). "Rehabilitating Homer's Phoenicians: On Some Ancient and Modern Prejudices against Trade." *AncSoc* 41: 283-97.

Pearson, A.C. (1917). *Sophocles: The Fragments*. Amsterdam: Hakkert. [1963 reprint]

Pedrick, V. (1994). "Eurycleia and Eurynome as Penelope's Confidantes," in *Epic and Epoch: Essays on the Interpretation and History of a Genre*. S.M. Oberhelman, V. Kelly, and R.J. Golsan, eds. Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech UP, 67-114.

Peradotto, J. (1990). *Man in the Middle Voice: Name and Narration in the* Odyssey. Princeton: Princeton UP.

Perry, T.P.J. (2010). *Exile in Homeric Epic*. Diss., Toronto.

Petropoulou, A. (1987). "The Sacrifice of Eumaeus Reconsidered." *GRBS* 28.2: 135-49.

Pitt-Rivers, J. (1966). "Honour and Social Status," in *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*. ed. J.G. Peristiany. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 19-77.

_______. (1968). "Pseudo-Kinship," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. Vol. 8. ed. D.L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free Press. 408-13.

_______. (1977) *The Fate of Shechem: or, The Politics of Sex: Essays in the Anthropology of the Mediterranean.* Cambridge: CUP.

Podlecki, A.J. (1971). "Some Odyssean Similes." *G&R* 18.1: 81-90.

Pomeroy, S.B. (1975) *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity*. New York: Schocken. [1995 reprint with new preface].

Pratt, L. (2000). "The Old Women of Ancient Greece and the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*." *TAPA* 130: 41-65.

Preller, L., ed. (1964). *Polemonis Periegetae Fragmenta*. Amsterdam: Hakkert.

Pucci, P. (1987). *Odysseus Polutropos: Intertextual Readings in the* Odyssey *and the* Iliad*.* Ithaca and London: Cornell UP.

Raaflaub, K. (1997). "Homeric Society," in Morris and Powell, eds.: 624-48.

_______. (2004). *The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece*. Revised ed. Trans. R. Franciscono. Chicago and London: U of Chicago P.

Ramming, G. (1973). *Die Dienerschaft in der Odyssee*. Diss., Erlangen.

Rank, O. (1971). *Double, a Psychoanalytic Study*. ed. and trans. H. Tucker, Jr. Chapel Hill: U of N Carolina P.

Rankine, P. (2011). "Odysseus as Slave: The Ritual of Domination and Social Death in Homeric Society," in *Reading Ancient Slavery*. eds. R. Alston, E. Hall, and L. Proffitt. London: Bristol CP, 34-50.

Rawlings, L. and H. Bowden, eds. (2005). *Herakles and Hercules: Exploring a Greco-Roman Divinity*. Swansea: Classical P of Wales.

Ready, J.L. (2011). *Character, Narrator, and Simile in the* Iliad. Cambridge and New York: CUP.

Redfield, J. (1993). "The Sexes in Hesiod." *Annals of Scholarship* 10: 31-61.

_______. (1994). *Nature and Culture in the* Iliad: *The Tragedy of Hector*. Expanded ed. Durham: Duke UP.

Reece, S. (1993). *The Stranger's Welcome: Oral Theory and the Aesthetics of the Homeric Hospitality Scene*. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P.

_______. (1994). “The Cretan Odyssey: A Lie Truer than Truth.” *AJPh* 115.2: 157-73.

Ribbeck, O., ed. (1962). *Scaenicae Romanorum Poesis Fragmenta*. 2nd ed. Hildesheim: Olms.

Richardson, B.E. (1969). *Old Age among the Ancient Greeks*. New York: Ams P.

Richardson, N.J. (1993). *The* Iliad*: A Commentary. Volume VI: Books 21-24*. Cambridge: CUP.

_______. (2011). “The *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*: Some Central Questions Revisited,” in A. Faulkner, ed.: 44-58.

Richardson, N.J., ed. and comm. (1974). *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter*. Oxford: Clarendon P.

_______. (2010). *Three Homeric Hymns: to Apollo, Hermes, and Aphrodite: Hymns 2, 3, and 5*. Cambridge, UK and New York: CUP.

Richardson, S. (1996). “Truth in the Tales of the *Odyssey*.” *Mnemosyne* 49.4: 393-402.

Risch, E. (1972). “Les traits non-homériques chez Homére,” in Bader and Chantraine, eds.: 191-8.

Robbins, E. (1978). “Cyrene and Cheiron: The Myth of Pindar’s Ninth *Pythian*.” *Phoenix* 32.2: 91-104.

Rogers, B.B. (1906). *The Birds of Aristophanes*. London: George Bell and Sons.

Rohde, E. (1960). *Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer*. 4th ed. Hildesheim: G. Olms.

Roisman, H.M. (1990). “Eumaeus and Odysseus: Covert Recognition and Self-Revelation.” *ICS* 15: 215-38.

_______. (1994). “Like Father Like Son: Telemachus’ ΚΕΡΔΕΑ.” *RhM* 137: 1-22.

Roisman, J. (1984-6). “The Image of the Political Exile in Archaic Greece.” *AncSoc* 15-17: 23-32.

de Romilly, J. (1979). *La douceur dans la pensée grecque*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

Romney, J.M. (2014). “Cowering *Gumnētes*: A Note on Tyrtaeus Fr. 11.35-8 W.” *CQ* 64.2: 828-32.

Rose, G.P. (1980). “The Swineherd and the Beggar.” *Phoenix* 34.4: 285-97.

Rose, P.W. (1992). *Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth: Ideology and Literary Form in Ancient Greece*. Ithaca: Cornell UP.

Rosner, J.A. (1976). "The Speech of Phoenix: *Iliad* 9.434-605." *Phoenix* 30.4: 314-27.

Ruschenbusch, E. (1968). *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des athenischen Strafrechts*. Köln and Graz: Böhlau.

Russo, C.F., ed. and comm. (1965). *Scutum*. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

Russo, J., et al. (1992). *A Commentary on Homer's* Odyssey*, Vol. III: Books XVII-XXIV.* Oxford: Clarendon P.

Rutherford, I. (2005). "Mestra at Athens: Hesiod fr. 43 and the Poetics of Panhellenism," in Hunter, ed.: 99-117.

_______. (2012). "The *Catalogue of Women* within the Greek Epic Tradition," in Andersen and Haug, eds.: 152-67.

Sahlins, M. (2013). *What Kinship Is – and Is Not*. Chicago: U of Chicago P.

Saïd, E. (2000). "Reflections on Exile," in *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 173-86.

Saïd, S. (1979). "Les crimes des prétendants, la maison d'Ulysse et les festins de l'*Odyssée*," in *Études de littérature ancienne*. Paris: P de l'École normale supérieure, 9-49.

Sammons, B. (2013). "Narrative Doublets in the Epic Cycle." *AJP* 134.4: 529-56.

Santiago, R.A. (1962). "Observaciones sobre algunos usos formularios de *ēmar* en Homero." *Emerita* 30: 139-50.

Schadewaldt, W. (1966). *Iliasstudien*. 3rd ed. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. [1987 reprint].

Schefold, K. (1992). *Gods and Heroes in Late Archaic Greek Art*. trans. A. Griffiths. Cambridge and New York: CUP.

Schlaifer, R.S. (1936). "Greek Theories of Slavery from Homer to Aristotle." *HSCP* 47: 165-204 = *Slavery in Classical Antiquity*. (1960). ed. M.I. Finley. Cambridge: W. Heffer, 93-132.

Schlunk, R.R. (1976) "The Theme of the Suppliant-Exile in the *Iliad*." *AJPh* 97.3: 199-209.

Schmidt, M. (2006). "Die Welt des Eumaios," in *Geschichte und Fiktion in der homerischen* Odyssee. ed. A. Luther. München: C.H. Beck, 117-38.

Schreckenberg, H. (1964). *Anankē: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Wortgebrauchs*. München: Beck.

Schwartz, J. (1960). *Pseudo-Hesiodeia: recherches sur la composition, la diffusion et la disparition ancienne d'œuvres attribuées à Hésiode*. Leiden: Brill.

Schwyzer, E. (1959). *Griechische Grammatik*. Vol. 2. ed. A. Debrunner. Munchen: Beck.

Scodel, R. (1982). "The Autobiography of Phoenix: *Iliad* 9.444-95." *AJPh* 103.2: 128-36.

_______. (1999). *Credible Impossibilities: Conventions and Strategies of Verisimilitude in Homer and Greek Tragedy*. Stuttgart and Leipzig: Teubner.

_______. (2001). "Poetic Authority and Oral Tradition in Hesiod and Pindar," in *Speaking Volumes: Orality and Literacy in the Greek and Roman World*. ed. Janet Watson. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 109-38.

_______. (2002). *Listening to Homer: Tradition, Narrative, and Audience*. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P.

_______. (2008). *Epic Facework: Self-Presentation and Social Interaction in Homer*. Swansea: Classical P of Wales.

Scott, J.A. (1918). "Euronyme and Eurycleia in the *Odyssey*." *CQ* 12.2: 75-9.

Scott, W.C. (2009). *The Artistry of the Homeric Simile*. Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Library & Dartmouth College P.

Seaford, R. (2004). *Money and the Early Greek Mind: Homer, Philosophy, and Tragedy*. Cambridge and New York: CUP.

Sealey, R. (1984). "On Lawful Concubinage in Athens." *ClAnt* 3: 111-33.

Segal, C. (1994a). *Singers, Heroes, and Gods in the* Odyssey. Ithaca: Cornell UP.

_______. (1994b). "Bride or Concubine?: Iole and Heracles' Motives in the *Trachiniae*." *ICS* 19: 59-64.

Seibert, J. (1979). *Die politischen Flüchtlinge und Verbannten in der griechischen Geschichte: von den Anfängen bis zur Unterwerfung durch die Römer*. 2 vols. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Severyns, A. (1929). "L'age d'Eumée, porcher d'Ulysse." *RBA* 8: 853-5.

Shapiro, H.A. (1983). "*Hērōs Theos*: The Death and Apotheosis of Herakles." *CW* 77: 7-18.

Simon, E. (1979). *Die griechischen Vasen*. München: Hirmer.

_______. (2003). *Aias von Salamis als mythische Persönlichkeit*. Stuttgart: F. Steiner.

Sissa, G. (1990). *Greek Virginity*. trans. A. Goldhammer. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP.

Snodgrass, A.M. (1974). "An Historical Homeric Society?" *JHS* 94: 114-25.

_______. (1997). "Homer and Greek Art," in Morris and Powell, eds.: 560-98.

_______. (1998). *Homer and the Artists: Text and Picture in Early Greek Art*. Cambridge; New York: CUP.

Soares, C. (2014). "Dress and Undress in Herodotus' *Histories*." *Phoenix* 68.3/4: 222-34.

Sourvinou-Inwood, C. (1991). *'Reading' Greek Culture: Texts and Images, Rituals and Myths*. Oxford: Clarendon P.

Sowa, C.A. (1984). *Traditional Themes and the* Homeric Hymns. Chicago: Bolchazy-Carducci.

Stafford, E. (2010). "Herakles between Gods and Heroes," in *The Gods of Ancient Greece: Identities and Transformations*. eds. J.N. Bremmer and A. Erskine. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 228-244.

_______. (2012). *Herakles*. London and New York: Routledge.

Stagakis, G. (1968). "*Étēs*, in the *Iliad*." *Historia* 15: 408-19.

Stamatopoulou, Z. (2013). "Reading the *Aspis* as a Hesiodic Poem." *CPh* 108.4: 273-85.

Stanford, W.B., ed. and comm. (1959). *Homer:* Odyssey. 2 vols. 2nd edition. London: Bristol Classical P. [2003 reprint].

de Ste. Croix, G.E.M. (1988). "Slavery and Other Forms of Unfree Labour," in *Slavery and Other Forms of Free Labour*. ed. L.J. Archer. London and New York: Routledge.

Steiner, D., ed. and comm. (2010). *Odyssey: Books XVII and XVIII*. Cambridge and New York: CUP.

Steinrück, M. (1994). "Sisyphe, Aithon et le Jugement de la Déesse: Pseudo-Hésiode Fr. 43a 41-43 M.-W." *Maia* 46.3: 291-8.

_______. (1998). "Meine Knie/ seine Knie. Zu *Ilias* 9.455." *RhM* 141.3/4: 209-14.

_______. (1999). "Molione (fr. 17a M-W) und die Zwillingsregel im pseudo-hesiodischen *Frauenkatalog*." *Maia* 51.3: 389-400.

Stevens, P.T., ed. and comm. (1971). *Euripides:* Andromache. Oxford: Clarendon P.

Stinton, T.C.W. (1965). "Euripides and the Judgment of Paris." *JHS* Supplement 11. = (1990). *Collected Papers on Greek Tragedy*. Oxford: Clarendon P, 17-75.

Stocking, C.H. (2013). "Sacrifice, Succession, and Paternity in Hesiod's *Theogony*." *Mètis* 11: 183-210.

_______. (Forthcoming). *The Politics of Sacrifice in Early Greek Myth and Poetry*. CUP.

Strasburger, G.P. (1954). *Die kleinen Kämpfer der Ilias*. Diss., Frankfurt am Main.

Strasburger, H. (1976). *Zum antiken Gesellschaftsideal.* Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

Suksi, A. (Forthcoming). "Clytemnestra's *Odyssey*: The Multiple Audiences of *Agamemnon* 896-974."

Sullivan, S.D. (1988). *Psychological Activity in Homer: A Study of ΦΡΗΝ.* Ottawa: Carleton UP.

Suter, A. (2002). *The Narcissus and the Pomegranate: An Archaeology of the Homeric Hymn to Demeter.* Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P.

Taplin, O. (1993). *Comic Angels and Other Approaches to Greek Drama through Vase-Painting.* Oxford: Clarendon P.

Thalmann, W.G. (1998a) *The Swineherd and the Bow: Representations of Class in the* Odyssey. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP.

_______. (1998b) "Female Slaves in the *Odyssey*," in *Women and Slaves in Greco-Roman Culture: Differential Equations*. eds. S.R. Joshel and S. Murnaghan. London and New York: Routledge, 23-35.

Theodoridis, C., ed. (1982). *Photii Patriarchae Lexicon*. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter. [2013 reprint.]

Thomas, H. (1962). "Lands and Peoples in Homer," in Wace and Stubbings, eds.: 284-310.

Toher, M. (2001). "Telemachus' Rite of Passage." *PP* 56.3: 149-168.

Trypanis, C.A. (1963). "Brothers Fighting Together in the *Iliad*." *RhM* 106.4: 289-97.

Tsagalis, C. (2008). *The Oral Palimpsest: Exploring Intertextuality in the Homeric Epics*. *Hellenic Studies* 29. Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies.

_______. (2012). "Deauthorizing the Epic Cycle: Odysseus' False Tale to Eumaeus," in Montanari et al., eds.: 309-48.

_______. (2014). "Preface." *Trends in Classics* 6.2*:* 239-46.

Tsagarakis, O. (1979). "Phoenix's Social Status and the Achaean Embassy." *Mnemosyne* 32.3/4: 221-42.

_______. (1982). *Form and Content in Homer*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.

Tylawsky, E.I. (2002). *Saturio's Inheritance: The Greek Ancestry of the Roman Comic Parasite*. New York: Peter Lang.

Usener, K. (1990). *Beobachtungen zum Verhältnis der* Odyssee *zur* Ilias. Tübingen: G. Narr.

van der Valk, M. (1952). "Ajax and Diomede in the *Iliad*." *Mnemosyne* 5.4: 269-86.

Vardoulakis, D. (2006). "The Return of Negation: The Doppelgänger in Freud's 'The Uncanny.'" *SubStance* 35.2: 100-116.

Vergados, A. (2009). "The *Iliad* and the Unity of Sophocles' *Ajax*," *Ἀντιφίλησις: Studies on Classical, Byzantine and Modern Greek Literature and Culture: in Honour of John-Theophanes A. Papademetriou*. eds. E. Karamalengou and E. Makrygianni. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 154-60.

Vergados, A., ed. and comm. (2013). *The* Homeric Hymn to Hermes*: Introduction, Text and Commentary*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Vernant, J.-P. (1996). *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece*. Revised ed. trans. J. Lloyd. New York: Zone Books.

Vester, C. (2009). “Bigamy and Bastardy, Wives and Concubines: Civic Identity in *Andromache*,” in Cousland and Hume, eds.: 293-305.

Visser, E. (1997). *Homers Katalog der Schiffe*. Stuttgart: Teubner.

Vlassopoulos, K. (2011). “Greek Slavery: from Domination to Property and back again.” *JHS* 131: 115-30.

Wace, A.J.B. and F.H. Stubbings, eds. (1962). *A Companion to Homer*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.

Wackernagel, J. (1877). “Zum homerischen Dual.” *ZVS* 23: 302-10 = *Kleine Schriften*. (1969). 2nd ed. Vol. 2. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 538-46.

_______. (1957). *Vorlesungen über Syntax*. Vol. 2. 2nd ed. Basel: Birkhauser.

Walcot, P. (1977). “Odysseus and the Art of Lying,” *AncSoc* 8: 1-19. = (2009), Doherty, ed.: 135-54.

Walsh, D. (2009). *Distorted Ideals in Greek Vase-Painting: The World of Mythological Burlesque*. New York: CUP.

Walsh, T.R. (2005). *Fighting Words and Feuding Words: Anger in the Homeric Poems*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Watkins, C. (1977). “À propos de μῆνις.” *BSL* 72: 187-209.

Webber, A.J. (1996). *The Doppelgänger: Double Visions in German Literature*. Oxford: OUP.

van Wees, H. (1988). “Kings in Combat: Battles and Heroes in the *Iliad*.” *CQ* 38.1: 1-25.

_______. (1992). *Status Warriors: War, Violence and Society in Homer and History*. Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben.

_______. (1994a). “The Homeric Way of War: The *Iliad* and the Hoplite Phalanx (I).” *G&R* 41.1: 1-18.

_______. (1994b). “The Homeric Way of War: The *Iliad* and the Hoplite Phalanx (II).” *G&R* 41.2: 131-55.

_______. (2000). “The Development of the Hoplite Phalanx,” in *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*. ed. H. van Wees. London: Duckworth and the Classical P of Wales, 125-66.

_______. (2004). *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities*. London: Duckworth.

West, M.L. (1985). *The Hesiodic* Catalogue of Women*: Its Nature, Structure, and Origins*. Oxford: Clarendon; New York: OUP.

_______. (1999). "Ancestral Curses," in *Sophocles: Essays Presented to Sir Hugh Lloyd Jones*. J. Griffin, ed. Oxford and New York: OUP, 31-45.

_______. (2001). *Studies in the Text and Transmission of the* Iliad. München and Leipzig: Saur.

_______. (2011) *The Making of the* Iliad*: Disquisition and Analytical Commentary*. Oxford: OUP.

_______. (2014). *The Making of the* Odyssey. Oxford: OUP.

West, M.L., ed. and comm. (1966). *Hesiod:* Theogony. Oxford: Clarendon P.

_______. (1978). *Hesiod:* Works and Days. Oxford: Clarendon P.

West, S.R. (1981). "An Alternative *Nostos* for Odysseus." *LCM* 6.7: 169-75.

_______. (1982). "Crime Prevention and Ancient Editors (*Iliad* 9.458-61)." *LCM* 7: 84-6.

_______. (2001). "Phoenix's Antecedents: A Note on *Iliad* 9." *SCI* 20: 1-15.

_______. (2012). "Odyssean Stratigraphy," in Andersen and Haug, eds.: 122-37.

Westermann, W.L. (1955). *The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity*. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.

Whallon, W. (1966). "The Shield of Ajax." *YCS* 19: 7-36.

Wheeler, E.L. (1991). "The General as Hoplite," in *Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience.* ed. V.D. Hanson. London and New York: Routledge, 121-70.

von Wickert-Micknat, G. (1983). *Unfreiheit im Zeitalter der homerischen Epen*. Wiesbaden: F. Steiner.

von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. (1920). *Die* Ilias *und Homer*. 2nd edition. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung.

_______. (1927). *Die Heimkehr des Odysseus; neue homerische Untersuchungen*. Dublin: Weidmann. [1969 reprint].

Willcock, M.M. (1964). "Mythological Paradeigma in the *Iliad*." *CQ* 14.2: 141-54.

_______. (1996). "Neoanalysis," in Morris and Powell, eds.: 174-89.

Willcock, M.M., comm. (1984). *Homer: Iliad XIII-XXIV*. London: Bristol Classical P. [2002 reprint].

Williams, F. (1986). "Odysseus' Homecoming as a Parody of Homeric Formal Welcomes." *CW* 79.6: 395-7.

Wilson, D.F. (2002). *Ransom, Revenge, and Heroic Identity in the* Iliad. Cambridge and New York: CUP.

Winiarczyk, M. (2000). "La mort et l'apothéose d'Héraclès." *WS* 113.1: 13-29.

Wissmann, J. (2009). "Athena's 'Unreasonable Advice': The Education of Telemachus in Ancient Interpretations of Homer." *GRBS* 49.3: 413-452.

Woodhouse, W.J. (1930). *The Composition of Homer's* Odyssey. Oxford: Clarendon P.

Wooley, A. (1967). Review of Schreckenberg 1964. *AJP* 88.2: 228-32.

Wöhrle, G. (1999). *Telemachs Reise: Väter und Söhne in* Ilias *und* Odyssee *oder ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der Männlichkeitsideologie in der homerischen Welt*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.

Yasumura, N. (2011). *Challenges to the Power of Zeus in Early Greek Poetry*. London: Bristol Classical P.

Zeitlin, F.I. (1996). *Playing the Other: Gender and Society in Classical Greek Literature*. Chicago: U of Chicago P.

# Curriculum Vitae

## Areas of Academic Interest

Greek epic and tragedy; kinship and gender in antiquity; the late Roman republic.

## Education

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ph.D. | University of W. Ontario | Classics | 2016 |
| M.A. | University of W. Ontario | Classics | 2010 |
| B.A. | University of Alberta | English and Classics | 2008 |

**Doctoral Dissertation:** *Homeric Kinship on the Margins of the* Oikos

## Teaching Experience

| | |
|---|---|
| 2nd-year Greek | 2015–17 |
| Greek Epic in Translation (3rd-year) | 2014 |

## Most Recent Teaching Assistantships

| | |
|---|---|
| Introduction to Classical Studies | 2015 |
| Ancient Greek Science | 2014 |
| Ancient Greek Religion | 2013 |
| Introduction to Classical Studies (two semesters) | 2012-13 |

## Most Recent Research Assistantships

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| to Prof. Kyle Gervais | Dept. of Classical Studies, UWO | 2016 |
| to Prof. Charles Stocking | Dept. of Classical Studies, UWO | 2015 |
| to Prof. Kyle Gervais | Dept. of Classical Studies, UWO | 2014 |
| to Prof. Jonathan Burgess | Dept. of Classics, U. of Toronto | 2011-12 |

## Most Recent Awards and Honours

| | |
|---|---|
| Ontario Graduate Scholarship | 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016 |
| J.P. Bickell Foundation Graduate Fellowship in Classics | 2011 |

## Conference Presentations

| | |
|---|---|
| "An Uncanny Meeting: Eumaeus as Odysseus' Double," *Voyages and Journeys in Antiquity*, University of Western Ontario | March, 2016 |

| | |
|---|---|
| “Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner: Heracles as Bastard,” *The Classical Association of Canada Annual Meeting*, Toronto | April, 2015 |
| “Caesar’s Use of Sulla’s Name in the *Bellum Civile*,” *The Classical Association of Canada Annual Meeting*, Dalhousie | May, 2011 |

**Service**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Speakers Committee | Dept. of Classical Studies, UWO | 2013-14 |
| Graduate Affairs Committee | Dept. of Classical Studies, UWO | 2014-16 |

**References**

Available upon request.