

Toward a Typology of Civil Society Actors

*The Case of the Movement to Change
International Trade Rules and Barriers*

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Acronyms

ALCA	Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas (<i>Free Trade Area of the Americas</i>)
ATTAC	Association pour la Taxation des Transactions pour l'Aide aux Citoyens (<i>Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens</i>)
CSO	civil society organization
Focus	Focus on the Global South
FTA	free trade area
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
GIN	global issues network
NGO	non-governmental organization
TIMN	tribes, institutions, markets, network
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
US	United States
WTO	World Trade Organization

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Summary/Résumé/Resumen

Summary

This paper proposes a typology of civil society actors based on organizational attributes and worldviews. It then applies the typology to the movement to change international trade rules and barriers. In so doing, it aims to contribute to current debates about the increasing autonomy and influence of civil society, and the growing diversity of civil society actors in the context of globalization.

The paper begins by sketching the current sociohistorical situation. The author argues, from a social evolution perspective, that the age of globalization is characterized by the emergence of a new social form, the “network”. This new social form is giving way to the proliferation of non-state actors and is transforming the nature of social conflict. The author further maintains that under these conditions, civil society actors are gaining leverage, and the sphere of civil society is gaining greater autonomy and is increasingly becoming the locus of social conflict.

Against this sociohistorical context, the paper next proposes a typology of civil society actors. This typology consists of four categories: (i) the formally structured, hierarchical and rationalized *non-governmental organizations* (NGOs); (ii) the amorphous and spontaneous, horizontal, charismatic, cathetic and increasingly reticular *social movements*; (iii) the segmented, flexible, polycentric, synergistic, information-generating *networks* of civil society actors; and (iv) the geographically fixed and temporally discrete, iterative, rhizomatic *plateaus* of civil society actors.

In order to historically situate and socially concretize the typology, the author applies it to the case of the movement to change international trade rules and barriers. Toward this end, four moments of this movement, which correspond to the four categories of the typology, are analysed. As an example of the NGO moment, the author considers Focus on the Global South. For the social movement-type, he analyses the Latin American mobilizations against the free trade areas (FTAs). As an example of a network of civil society organizations, he looks at the Trade Justice Movement. And for an example of a plateau of civil society groups, the author considers the World Social Forum, and specifically how the objective of changing trade rules and barriers has been present in this forum.

The author concludes by elaborating his central normative argument: the process of rationalization desired by civil society actors in order to achieve greater influence has, paradoxically, undercut their legitimacy and emancipatory potential. Thus, for example, the economic and juridical ties weaved by NGOs in order to influence “worldly institutions” – the economy, politics and academia – serve to perpetuate the worldly institutions and are at times instrumentalized by these same institutions in order to legitimize themselves.

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Résumé

L’auteur propose ici une typologie des acteurs de la société civile selon leurs attributs organisationnels et leur vision du monde et l’applique ensuite au mouvement pour changement des règles du commerce international et ce qui y fait obstacle. Il entend ainsi contribuer aux

débats actuels sur l'autonomie et l'influence grandissantes de la société civile et sur la diversité croissante des acteurs de la société civile dans le contexte de la mondialisation.

L'auteur commence par esquisser la situation socio-historique actuelle. Se plaçant dans la perspective de l'évolution sociale, il fait valoir que l'ère de la mondialisation se caractérise par l'émergence d'une nouvelle forme sociale, le "réseau", qui ouvre la voie à une prolifération d'acteurs non étatiques et transforme la nature même du conflit social. L'auteur soutient également que, dans ces conditions, les acteurs de la société civile gagnent en influence, que la sphère de la société civile acquiert une plus grande autonomie et devient de plus en plus le lieu du conflit social.

Dans ce contexte socio-historique, l'auteur propose ensuite une typologie des acteurs de la société civile, qu'il range en quatre catégories: (i) les *organisations non gouvernementales* (ONG), qui ont une structure officielle et hiérarchique et tiennent un discours rationnel; (ii) les *mouvements sociaux*, qui sont amorphes et spontanés, horizontaux, charismatiques, cathectiques et de plus en plus réticulaires; (iii) les *réseaux* d'acteurs de la société civile qui sont segmentés, flexibles, polycentriques, synergiques et générateurs d'informations et (iv) les *plateaux* où se retrouvent des acteurs de la société civile et qui ont une géographie fixe, sont discontinues dans le temps, itératives et rhizomatiques.

Pour situer sa typologie dans l'histoire et lui donner des formes sociales concrètes, l'auteur l'applique au mouvement pour le changement des règles du commerce international et ce qui y fait obstacle. A cette fin, il analyse quatre moments de ce mouvement, qui correspondent aux quatre catégories de la typologie. Il prend comme exemple d'ONG Focus on the Global South. Il étudie les mobilisations latino-américaines contre les zones de libre-échange comme type de mouvement social, et se penche sur une coalition britannique pour le commerce équitable, le Trade Justice Movement, comme type de réseau d'organisations de la société civile. Pour les plateaux où se retrouvent des groupes de la société civile, il choisit l'exemple du Forum social mondial, en étudiant plus précisément la place qu'y tient l'objectif—changer les règles du commerce international et ce qui y fait obstacle.

L'auteur conclut en élaborant son argument normatif central: le processus de rationalisation que souhaitent les acteurs de la société civile pour exercer plus d'influence a paradoxalement réduit leur légitimité et leur potentiel d'émancipation. Ainsi, par exemple, les liens économiques et juridiques tissés par les ONG pour influencer les "institutions de ce monde"—l'économie, la politique et les milieux universitaires—servent à perpétuer ces institutions, qui les instrumentalisent parfois pour se légitimer.

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Resumen

En este trabajo se propone una tipología de actores de la sociedad civil a partir de sus características organizativas y visiones del mundo. Seguidamente se aplica esta tipología al movimiento para cambiar las reglas y los obstáculos al comercio internacional. Con ello se pretende contribuir a los debates en curso sobre la creciente autonomía e influencia de la

sociedad civil y la diversidad cada vez mayor de los actores de la sociedad civil en el contexto de la mundialización.

El documento comienza con un esbozo de la situación sociohistórica actual. El autor argumenta que, desde la perspectiva de la evolución social, la era de la mundialización se caracteriza por la aparición de una nueva forma social denominada la “red”. Esta nueva forma social está dando paso a la proliferación de actores no estatales y está transformando la naturaleza del conflicto social. El autor asevera además que, bajo tales condiciones, los actores de la sociedad civil están adquiriendo mayor peso, y que el ámbito de la sociedad civil está ganando mayor autonomía y convirtiéndose cada vez más en el centro del conflicto social.

Ante este contexto sociohistórico, se propone en este trabajo una tipología de actores de la sociedad civil. La tipología consiste de cuatro categorías: (i) las *organizaciones no gubernamentales* (ONG), formalmente estructuradas, jerárquicas y racionalizadas, (ii) los *movimientos sociales*, amorfos y espontáneos, horizontales, carismáticos, catécticos y crecientemente reticulares, (iii) las *redes* de actores de la sociedad civil, segmentadas, flexibles, policéntricas, sinérgicas y generadoras de información y (iv) los “*plateaux*” geográficamente fijos y temporalmente inconexos, iterativos y rizomáticos de actores de la sociedad civil.

Para situar históricamente y concretar socialmente la tipología propuesta, el autor la aplica al caso del movimiento para cambiar las reglas y obstáculos al comercio internacional. Con este fin, se analizan cuatro momentos de dicho movimiento, que corresponden a las cuatro categorías de la tipología. Como ejemplo del momento de las ONG, el autor considera la organización Focus on the Global South. Para los movimientos sociales, analiza las movilizaciones latinoamericanas contra las áreas de libre comercio. Como ejemplo de una red de organizaciones de la sociedad civil, examina la coalición Trade Justice Movement. Finalmente, como ejemplo de “plateau” de grupos de actores de la sociedad civil, el autor presenta el Foro Social Mundial, específicamente la manera en que se ha presentado en este foro el objetivo de cambiar las reglas y los obstáculos al comercio.

El trabajo concluye con una explicación del argumento normativo central del autor: el proceso de racionalización que desean los actores de la sociedad civil para lograr una mayor influencia ha, paradójicamente, socavado su legitimidad y potencial emancipador. Así, por ejemplo, los vínculos económicos y jurídicos creados por las ONG con el objetivo de incidir en las “instituciones mundanas” (la economía, la política, el sector académico) contribuyen a perpetuar estas instituciones, y en ocasiones las ONG son instrumentalizadas por estas últimas para legitimarse a si mismas.

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I. Introduction

The information technology revolution, the restructuring of capitalism and the end of the Cold War are three factors that have generated, and undergird, the current situation. The first has to do with the shift from the national to transnational frame of reference; “space-time compression” and the “intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole”; and the process of “globalization” and the interconnectivity of the “network society”.¹ The second has to do with the change from the logic of mass production to the logic of flexible specialization; and the shift from industrial to postindustrial, early to late, Fordist to post-Fordist capitalism.² And the third has to do with the shift from the bipolar to the multipolar world; the exhaustion of “real socialism”; the politico-ideological “victory” of liberal-democratic capitalism; and the idea of this worldview as the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992).

Some, however, have argued that what is at stake in the current situation is something much more profound and radical. The changes that were set in motion during the final decades of the twentieth century were not only technological, economic and political in nature, but they also affected the very fibre of social reality. According to them, what we are currently witnessing is a decentering of the basic sociohistorical coordinates of modernity and the basic intellectual coordinates of the Enlightenment. Some believe that these changes can only be compared to those that emerged centuries ago when the idea of the social contract eroded the political legitimacy of the divine right of kings, the market did away with the feudal system and the thinking subject (Descartes’ *ego cogito ergo sum*) annihilated the Scholastic category of being.

A slew of concepts have been proposed in an attempt to glean this more radical understanding of what is at stake: “postmodern condition” (Lyotard 1979), “liquid modernity” (Bauman 2003), “radicalization of modernity” (Giddens 1990), “demodernization” (Touraine 1997), “hyper-modernity” (Lipovetsky 2004), “second modernity” (Beck 2000) and “empire” (Hardt and Negri 2000). Despite their irreconcilable differences and the philosophical issues they raise, all of these concepts challenge us to rethink the way the question of civil society should be posed in 2007; and more specifically, they challenge us to rethink the mobilizations of civil society actors against the international economic order put in place by the Bretton Woods system in 1944,³ the World Economic Forum in 1971, and radicalized by the Washington consensus of the early 1990s and the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.

From the perspective of social evolution, Ronfeldt’s (1996) “tribes, institutions, markets, network (TIMN) paradigm” analyses the meaning of the current situation, and brings out the importance and practical consequences of civil society in 2007. Indeed, this framework looks at the current situation precisely as a problem of the coming to the fore of non-state actors and, specifically within this framework, as a problem of the proliferation of civil society actors and as a struggle for the sphere of civil society.

The TIMN paradigm

Ronfeldt (1996) maintains that four forms of social organization have driven the development of societies:

1. the kinship-based *tribe*, as denoted by the structure of extended families, clans and other lineage systems (I);
2. the hierarchical *institution*, as exemplified by the army, the (Catholic) church and ultimately the bureaucratic state (I);
3. the competitive-exchange *market*, as symbolized by merchants and traders responding to forces of supply and demand (M); and

¹ See Robertson (1992:10–17); Wallerstein (1999); Castells (1998).

² See Touraine (1969); Bell (1973); Piore and Sabel (1984).

³ At this New Hampshire mountain resort, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund were created.

4. the collaborative *network*, as found in the web-like ties among some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) devoted to social advocacy (N).

The TIMN paradigm needs to be understood as both a diachronic and synchronic accounting of society: diachronic because each social form, historically, corresponds to a type of society; synchronic because in advanced, differentiated, rationalized or complex societies these forms drive the logic of the different social realms (see table 1).

The tribal form emerged during the Neolithic Age; it grew out of the need to develop social identity and strengthen social bonds. Historically, it is the tribal form that has determined the ethnic and linguistic dimensions of social groups. All primitive societies were tribal societies ($S_1=T$), and this social form now drives the cultural realm of a society: for instance, nationalistic sentiments, family values, informal and clientelistic relations, and community identity (Ronfeldt 1996).

The tribal form proved to be inefficient in resolving the organizational problems that emerged with the first demographic explosions and processes of urbanization. The second social form, the hierarchical institution, arose in response to these new challenges. To the extent that it gives pride of place to the universality of the *bonum commune* (community) over the particularity of phyletic and blood ties, the institution provides a solution to the problems of authority, legitimacy and power of more complex societies.⁴ Through the institution the state eclipses the tribe, a process that reached its apogee with the absolutist regimes of the sixteenth century. While the societies of, for example, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance were institutional societies ($S_2=T+I$), in 2007, this social form drives the political realm; that is, the modern state has an institutional structure (Ronfeldt 1996).

The development of the idea of individual rights and the growth of the middle class would soon challenge the primacy of the hierarchical institution. This context gave rise to the third social form, the market. The idea of the market was first and foremost a theory of the freedom of the bourgeoisie, an applied moral and political philosophy (Smith 2002). It was argued that through the laws of supply and demand and the price mechanism, the market would equilibrate the interests and passions of the bourgeoisie, thus creating the psychological and material conditions for the social contract (Hirschman 1977). Indeed, in this sense the market form makes possible the transition from mercantilism to capitalism, from a society where the state dominates economic activity, toward a market society ($S_3=T+I+M$); that is, a society where the economic activity of individuals limits the state (Polanyi 1957). Modern social thought has been marked by the debate concerning the idea that the market form should drive the economic realm. Indeed, the Cold War can be understood as a struggle between T+I societies (S_2) and T+I+M societies (S_3). Since 1989, however, the question has been not so much whether the market should undergird the economic realm (for the global economy is a market economy), but rather whether this social form should be applied to other social realms (Ronfeldt 1996).

The fourth social form—the network—emerged through the restructuring of capitalism, the information technology revolution and the decline of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The network society ($S_4=T+I+M+N$), in other words, emerged precisely in the context of what was referred to above as the current situation. The network social form, however, should not be confused with networks of social relations. Scholars have long studied networks of social relations such as informal and clientelistic ties, and family and group dynamics. Some have even suggested that network relations—and not, for example, political and economic institutions or cultural frames of reference—are what ultimately make society function or integrate. This perspective has recently been recast as the idea of social capital and has given way to social capital analysis (Fukuyama 1999; Putnam 2000). It was only several decades ago, however, that social scientists began talking about networks as a social form.

⁴ See, for example, the political theories of Thomas Aquinas and Jean Bodin and the theory of “rationalization” of Max Weber.

Table 1: TIMN paradigm

S (Society) _n	Formula	Social form	Epoch in which the form dominated	Historical manifestations	Other examples (social manifestations)	Key social realm/locus of social conflict
S ₁	T	Kinship- based tribe	Neolithic Age (5,000 years ago)	Numerous Neolithic societies; Somalia in the twenty-first century	Extended families; clans; urban gangs	Family/ culture
S ₂	T+I	Hierarchical institution	From the <i>Pax Romana</i> to the Enlighten- ment (first to seventeenth centuries)	Roman Empire and the French absolutist state	Army; Catholic Church; bureau- cratic state	State/ government/ public sector
S ₃	T+I+M	Competitive- exchange market	From the rise of liberalism and through- out the Industrial Age (eighteenth to twentieth centuries)	England and the United States since the eighteenth century; Japan and Chile in the twenty-first century	Merchants; traders, modern firms	Economy/ private sector
S ₄	T+I+M+N	Collaborative and decentralized network	Post-industrial societies (1970– present)	Canada; Japan; United States; Western Europe	NGOs and social movements	Civil society

Note: T = kinship-based tribe; I = hierarchical institution; M = competitive-exchange market; N = collaborative and decentralized network. **Source:** Adapted from Ronfeldt (2006:17–22).

For example, in their studies of activism in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, Luther Gerlach and Virginia Hine found that grassroots organizations were increasingly organizing in “segmented, polycentric, ideologically integrated networks” (SPINs). In a classic article Gerlach elucidated this concept thus:

By segmentary I mean that it is cellular, composed of many different groups. ...
By polycentric I mean that it has many different leaders or centers of direction.
... By networked I mean that the segments and the leaders are integrated into
reticulated systems or networks through various structural, personal, and
ideological ties. Networks are usually unbounded and expanding. ... This
acronym (SPIN) helps us picture this organization as a fluid, dynamic,
expanding one, spinning out into mainstream society (1987:103–145).

It is precisely this idea of network that was developed by Ronfeldt (2006) as the fourth phase of his paradigm.

It is important to differentiate between the network social form and the network-type of civil society actor that form the third category of the typology developed in this paper. The network form is a necessary condition, not only for networks of civil society actors, but also for plateaus. It is precisely the network social form that allows NGOs and social movements to develop into more complex, decentralized and horizontal organizations. Indeed, the network-type and plateau-type are information-age extensions of NGOs and social movements, respectively. This development is possible due to the emergence of the network social form.

The TIMN paradigm thus helps to understand the profound changes that are occurring in the twenty-first century—for example, the passage from modern to postmodern or hypermodern societies—as a passage from T+I+M to T+I+M+N societies. The emergence of this new social form—the “+N”—helps to explain why the conditions of advanced capitalism have, on the one

hand, generated the proliferation of a plurality of non-state actors and of civil society actors, in particular, and, on the other have lead to an increase in the leverage and autonomy of civil society.

“The rise of networks,” argued Ronfeldt and Arquilla (2001:1), “means that power is migrating to non-state actors, because they are able to organize into sprawling multi-organizational networks (especially ‘all-channel’ networks, in which every node is connected to every other node) more readily than can traditional, hierarchical, state actors”.

But, in addition to this technological aspect, the proliferation of non-state actors has also been favoured by the erosion of the legitimacy of the state, a process that has taken form, domestically, through the crisis of the welfare state and, internationally, through the emergence of the paradigm of global governance (Rosanvallon 1981; Meyer et al. 1997).

These non-state actors that are increasingly competing with state actors come from different social realms; they also have different objectives as well as different *modus operandi*. Table 2 presents a typology of non-state actors as a way of conceptualizing these differences. This typology does not attempt to be exhaustive; its purpose is only to bring forth, in a schematic and provisional way, profound differences that exist among non-state actors – differences that are often overlooked by one-sided approaches.

The typology consists of three categories: first, there are the “uncivil” actors such as Al-Qaida, which use (non-legitimized) violent means to annihilate the very foundations of modernity, either for religious or ethno-nationalist reasons (Zanini 2001). Second, the business actors such as the corporations that participate in the United Nations Global Compact and have come to the fore, both in national and transnational contexts, in the name of corporate social responsibility and in the name of sustainable development (Thérien and Pouliot 2006). And, finally, the non-state actors that constitute the object of this study, namely, the civil society actors such as the NGOs and social movements that participate in the World Social Forum (WSF) and mobilize in order to directly democratize democracy.

Table 2: Typology of non-state actors

Type	Doctrine	Example
“Uncivil” actors	Religious and ethno-nationalist claims	Al-Qaida
Business actors	Corporate social responsibility	United Nations Global Compact
Civil society actors	Participatory democracy	World Social Forum

Source: Author’s analysis.

It could be argued that among these three categories of non-state actors, it is the civil society actors that are reaping the most benefits from the combination of the network form and the erosion of the legitimacy of the state. This is clear from the fact that, among all of the social actors (state and non-state), it is the civil society actors that enjoy the most legitimacy in T+I+M+N societies.

It is perhaps intuitive that “uncivil” actors erode their legitimacy through the violent means they deploy and the antimodern projects they defend. The case of business actors is a bit more nuanced, and to understand it one must look at the problem of the normative grounds of society that comes from social theory and social ethics. Indeed, to put it simply, the discourse on corporate social responsibility of business actors is plagued by the limited normative foundations of *Homo oeconomicus*, and whether these limited foundations are, for example, understood as the problem of the limits of utilitarianism or as the problem of the limits of instrumental rationality (Rawls 1971; Habermas 1987). By contrast, as a result of the process of social evolution that the Ronfeldt TIMN paradigm elucidates, civil society actors are gaining in legitimacy.

This social phenomenon is no doubt linked to the growing autonomy of the realm of civil society: in T+I+M+N societies, civil society actors are increasingly becoming the preferential carriers of the normative grounds of society. In this sense, it could be said not only that civil society actors have a comparative advantage vis-à-vis “uncivil” and business actors, but also that the realm of civil society has a comparative advantage vis-à-vis, for example, the public sphere of the state and the private sphere of business. The relationship between actor and realm needs to be understood dialectically as a process through which civil society actors generate the autonomy of civil society, and an autonomous civil society grants civil society actors greater legitimacy.

It is true that the private sector has for some time now been attempting to use the network form to develop innovative managerial designs that could adapt and respond to the growing uncertainty and ambiguity associated with the changing nature of the modes of production (Sabel 2002). The state also has been applying this new social form in an attempt to grapple with complex transnational and regional policy dynamics and public services (Rhondes 1997). Yet, the influence that the network form has exerted in government and business sectors does not compare with the advances this form has exerted in civil society:

Civil society appears to be the home realm for the network form, the realm that will be strengthened more than any other. ... And while classic definitions of civil society often encompassed state- and market-related actors (e.g., political parties, businesses and labour unions), this is less the case with new and emerging definitions—the separation of ‘civil society’ from ‘state’ and ‘market’ realms may be deepening (Ronfeldt 1996:3).

If the Cold War was defined by a struggle over the nature of the economic realm (capitalism versus socialism), the present age is being defined by a struggle over the realm of civil society. Indeed, if modernity was characterized by the decoupling of the economy from the political realm, postmodernity is being characterized by the decoupling of civil society from the economic and political realms. In 2007, the question of how the modes of public discourse will be organized is more important than the question of how the modes of production will be organized.

The way in which the network form is transforming the role of civil society actors and is increasing the autonomy and leverage of civil society can be gleaned by considering the changing nature of social conflict. The underlying idea here is that the information technology revolution, space-time compression and the restructuring of capitalism are generating a shift from hierarchical and centralized struggles where nation-states were the main protagonists to a horizontal and decentralized struggle where a plurality of non-state actors play an increasingly active role; a shift from physical to symbolic violence and struggle; a shift from direct manipulation and coercion to “perception management”; a shift from the classical occupation of geopolitical space to the deterritorialized struggle over the means of communication and other modes of reproduction of social conditions.

Some influential intellectuals—such as Joseph Nye, Jean-François Rischard and David Ronfeldt—have argued that if nation-states are going to successfully negotiate this changing context they need to change their strategies and tactics. For example, nation-states need to push beyond traditional *realpolitik* and economic warfare (embargoes, for example) and move toward public diplomacy, information strategies and the like. It is important to point out here that all of these approaches imply, from different points of view, the strategic importance of civil society and civil society actors.

This idea concerning the changing nature of social conflict underlies, for example, Nye’s (2004:x) notion of “soft power”, which he defined as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments”. He argued that “it arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies”, such that when “our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced” (Nye 2004:x). In fact, Nye’s thesis

was that, under the conditions of late capitalism and globalization, this soft power of persuasion and perception management is replacing the hard power of military and economic might. Along with this shift, civil society emerges as the likely sphere where the struggles of and for soft power are waged. And, similarly, civil society actors become valuable strategic partners and potential adversaries for nation-state operations involving soft power. A thesis that could be developed here is that a nation-state's soft power is directly proportional to the legitimacy that civil society grants it. A recent example of this is the United States intervention in Iraq.

The changing nature of social conflict has also been developed by Rischard with his proposal to develop "innovative policy-making bodies" called "global issues networks (GINs)". To address global issues effectively, the former vice-president of the World Bank has called "for a passage in global affairs from traditional hierarchical government to a kind of networked governance—specifically, the creation of a new form of international public space through global issues networks, each focused on one urgent global issue" (Rischard 2003:24–25).⁵

GINs thus represent a move by nation-states away from unilateralism and the use of military and economic might, and toward partnerships with the non-state actors of a transnational civil society, who have the legitimacy to establish the normative rules of the game and persuade traditional actors to change their behaviour.

But perhaps the most provocative perspective concerning this changing nature of social conflict has been developed by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001:6), with their ideas of "netwar" and "noopolitik"; they defined netwar as an "emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, short of traditional military warfare, in which the protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age".

This new mode of conflict has a "Janus face", that is, it can take the form of a violent struggle that, as suggested above, is being used by religious and ethno-nationalist groups; or it can take on a more peaceful form, as it is being used by business and civil society actors in the name of human rights, progress, democracy and so on. Netwar requires a new vision of statecraft, which Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999:19–22) named "noopolitik", based principally on the "primacy of ideas, values, laws and ethics, as enabled by the emergence of the *noosphere* (an all-encompassing realm of the mind)".

Thus, the changing nature of social conflict, soft power, GINs, netwar and noopolitik point toward the growing autonomy of the sphere of civil society and the increased leverage of civil society actors. This is the background in which I situate the approach taken in this paper.

The approach

To contribute to the current debate concerning the growing autonomy and influence of civil society, and the increasing plurality and diversity of civil society actors—that, following Ronfeldt's model of social evolution, is situated in the T+I+M+N societies—this paper proposed to develop a typology of civil society actors and apply this typology to a specific civil society movement, namely, the movement to change international trade rules and barriers. This section situates these tasks in the context of the debate they address so as to determine their respective methodological and epistemological dimensions.

⁵ Rischard argued that GINs should be developed around, or applied to the following 20 global issues: global warming; biodiversity and ecosystem losses; fisheries depletion; deforestation; water deficits; maritime safety and pollution; a massive step-up in the fight against poverty; peacekeeping, conflict prevention and combating terrorism; education for all; global infectious diseases; the digital divide; natural disaster prevention and mitigation; reinventing taxation for the twenty-first century; biotechnology rules; global financial architecture; illegal drugs; trade, investment, and competition rules; intellectual property rights; e-commerce rules; and international labour and migration rules. GINs, moreover, would be developed in three phases: (i) the constitutional phase, when the network is established; (ii) the norm-producing phase, when the networks begin to analyse the given problems and evaluate the different options and alternatives; and (iii) the implementation phase, when the network attempts to put alternatives into practice by exerting its influence on international actors. "Each network", Rischard argued, "would be enduring, not transitory, allowing it to continue weighing on international reputations. Initially limited membership would increase as each network enters a new stage, continuously evolving over its lifetime" (Rischard 2003:24–25). See also Rischard (2002).

Against the backdrop of the TIMN paradigm, the paper aims to first elucidate a typology of civil society actors. The typology consists of four categories: (i) the formally structured hierarchical and rationalized NGOs; (ii) the amorphous and spontaneous, horizontal, charismatic, cathectic and increasingly reticular social movements; (iii) the segmented, flexible, polycentric, synergistic, information-generating networks of civil society groups; and (iv) the geographically fixed and temporally discrete, iterative, rhizomatic plateaus of civil society groups.

I propose this typology as a strategy for grappling with the problem of the plurality of civil society actors, that is, the problem that different civil society actors not only deploy different strategies, but also have different ways of analysing social problems and conceptualizing their solutions. Indeed, I propose this typology as a way of conceptualizing the fact that different civil society actors have different normative conceptions of globalization, civil society, democracy, justice and so on.

Limited by their respective disciplines and frames of reference, many scholars reduce these differences among civil society actors. This is evident from the NGO-social movement distinction, a distinction that is perpetuated by the division of labour between third sector studies and the sociology of social movements. Thus, while the literature on the sociology of social movements tends to reduce NGOs to social movements, third sector studies tend to reduce social movements to NGOs. And the same can be said about the two other categories proposed here, namely, networks and plateaus: while the first is captured in the new theories of interconnectivity and information management, the latter is captured in the poststructuralist horizon of the multitude as a critique of the essentialism of representative democracy.

And as for those scholars who recognize the plurality that exists among civil society actors, they often fail to do justice to these differences. Some, for example, acknowledge the normative, organizational and operational differences between NGOs and social movements, but then end up categorizing them under the ambiguous term, civil society organizations (CSOs).

This typology is also an attempt to do justice to the problem of complexity, that is, the problem of the increasing interconnectivity and horizontality of civil society actors in the context of the space-time compression alluded to above and which was conceptualized through the emergence of the new social form, the network. To describe this complexity, scholars often point to the emergence of the “movement of movements” or “network of networks”. But these concepts are just as vague and ambiguous as the notion of CSOs, for lurking behind the idea of a movement of movements or a network of networks are different logics of interconnectivity. The typology attempts to address the problem of these different logics. I develop NGOs and social movements as two basic types of civil society actors that, by linking together, form the other two types of actors: networks of civil society actors are information-age extensions of NGOs, while plateaus of civil society actors are information-age extensions of social movements.

The typology is grounded in a Weberian perspective. I operationalize two ideas of the German sociologist, Max Weber (1946), namely, “elective affinity” and the “routinization of charisma”. Weber’s notion of elective affinity is an attempt to tread a path between, on the one hand, Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche’s reduction of social action to material and psychological interests, respectively, and, on the other, G.W.F. Hegel and Werner Sombart’s idealist and emanationist understanding of social action as the concretization or unfolding of ideas. For Weber, social action is generated by the fusion of both empirical interests and transcendental ideas, that is, it is the result of the attraction or correlation between material and psychological conditions and worldviews such as norms, values, religious doctrines and the like.

The quintessential example Weber gave of elective affinity was the relationship between the sociohistorical conditions of capitalism and the worldview that crystallizes with aesthetic Protestantism (Weber 1996). An important insight implicit in this perspective is the idea of

social actors as carriers of worldviews. Here, the sociology of knowledge replaces the history of ideas to the extent that for Weber what is important is not so much the given doctrine or norm, but rather how this doctrine or norm generates social action, how actors attempt to actualize their worldviews, and how worldviews are transformed by the material and psychological conditions of the actors that attempt to actualize them.

The notion of elective affinity provides a theoretical strategy for conceptualizing the differences among the plurality of civil society actors. Following Weber (1996), the differences between civil society actors can be systematized by correlating the affinities between their respective structural attributes and organizational needs, on the one hand, and their respective worldviews (ideas, norms, values), on the other. Indeed, this Weberian perspective shows the different types of civil society actors as carriers of different normative conceptions of civil society, globalization, justice and the like. Moreover, this perspective brings forth the tension among normative claims, and operational and organizational constraints. Thus, according to this approach—to take an example—the “critique of neoliberal globalization” takes on different social forms depending on whether it is “carried” by an NGO or a social movement, and this inasmuch as the formulation of the problem (neoliberal globalization) and the proposed solution (the other possible world) are limited and structured by the organizational and operational necessities of these different social actors.

The typology also draws on the Weberian idea of the routinization of charisma. By this notion, Weber (1978:part one) was referring to the dynamic by which critical worldviews gradually lose their leverage against the world through the process of rationalization and institutionalization, an idea grounded in his understanding of the social function of religion. Inasmuch as it posited ultimate (that is, world-transcending utopian) values and relativized worldly institutions and practices, Weber further argued that religion provided the critical potential of worldviews and thus was the source of all social change. This world-rejecting potential of religion was rooted in the unique type of legitimacy of charismatic authority, which stands over and against the more conventional forms of legitimacy that ground traditional and rational authority. The archetype of this type of legitimacy for Weber was the charismatic authority that manifested itself through the exemplary or emissary “prophet” that challenged the authority of the “priest” (Weber 1978:part two).

Through the process of secularization, institutional religion lost its sway in modern societies. Yet, the social function of religious ideas, argued Weber and neo-Weberians, would still be present in the form of world-rejecting values (see also Parsons 1968). In this sense, all radical (that is, revolutionary) ideas that challenge the status quo have a religious social form inasmuch as they reject worldly institutions and practices. The paradox for Weber was that in order for the negative gesture of the revolutionary rupture to become a positive constructive gesture, it needed to be concretized and formalized at the institutional and practical levels. Through this institutionalization, critical ideas became increasingly attached to the world and lost their world-rejecting potential, thus becoming mainstream. This is what Weber called the routinization of the charismatic authority.

Working within this Weberian framework, Troeltsch’s (1950) seminal work contrasted the radical world-rejecting ideas of the atomistic and marginalized “sects” with the mainstream world-conforming ideas of the hierarchical and centralized “churches”. This typology, which allowed Troeltsch to make several classical observations concerning the relationship between religious ideas and institutions, can be used as a strategy for conceptualizing the general problem of value actualization among civil society actors. First, following the Weberian notion of the routinization of charisma, Troeltsch (1950) developed the idea that, over time, sects have a tendency to become churches; that is, they have a tendency to lose their radicalism and conform more to the normative demands of worldly institutions.

Second, there is the idea that churches and sects work with what could be called different ontologies of value actualization, with different understandings of the relationship between

ideas and institutions; thus, while churches realistically understand religious values as being embodied in worldly institutions (for example, the ecclesial institutions are understood as sacraments of the Kingdom of God), sects voluntaristically understand religious values as being located either in the interiority of the human being or outside the world. Third, there are the different tensions that churches and sects must grapple with: churches must deal with the homogenization and assimilation of their ideas and practices, while sects must deal with the problem of their fragmentation and lack of efficaciousness.

What if, for example, social movements are considered to be the “sects” and NGOs the “churches” of civil society? This is perhaps a way of grasping, from a social theoretical point of view, the differences that the typology of civil society actors attempts to bring forth.

Weber (1996:123–124) formulated this dynamic by which sects become churches, by which the prophet inevitably becomes the priest, and the revolutionary liberator would inevitably become the oppressor as the thesis of the “iron cage”.⁶ This thesis brings forth one of the fundamental paradoxes of modernity: the dynamic of routinization, which undergirds the process of modernization, on the one hand, generates the homogenization and standardization of social beliefs and practices through institutionalization and, on the other, annihilates the normative foundations of society by reducing human freedom to a problem of functional efficiency. Concentrating on the first of these, the New Institutionalism has argued that, while the classic dynamic of the iron cage was driven by the need for greater efficiency, in 2007 this dynamic is driven by a process of cultural reflexivity that takes form, for example, through professionalization. They refer to this late-modern manifestation of the iron cage as “institutional isomorphism” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Powell and DiMaggio 1991).

Concentrating on the normative problem lurking behind the iron cage thesis, working out of the emancipatory limits of the neo-Marxist tradition, the Frankfurt School understands the Weberian thesis as the problem of the generalization of the positivistic logic of instrumental rationality. According to this perspective, the logic of functional rationality set in motion by the Enlightenment drive for scientific advancement and technological progress generates a negative dialectic that both liberal and Marxist-Leninist historical projects fall captive to (Horkheimer and Adorno 1976). Habermas (1987) recast this second perspective as the problem of the “colonization of the life-world by the system”.

Drawing from the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, Habermas (1987) understood the “life-world” (*Lebenswelt*) as the sphere of society constituted by face-to-face, intersubjective relations that was grounded in and driven by the communicative (comprehensive) rationality of hermeneutic knowledge. The life-world provides society with its normative foundations; it is the source of tradition, identity, values and the like (Husserl 1970). Habermas (1987) contrasted the life-world with the system, the sphere of society constituted by impersonal institutionalized relations that was grounded in and driven by the logic of instrumental knowledge. The system provides modern societies with the mechanisms needed to generate and adapt to greater degrees of complexity (Parsons 1964). Unlike the life-world, which is mediated by everyday language and symbols, the system is mediated by money and bureaucratic power. By colonization of the life-world by the system, Habermas (1987) recast the Weberian thesis of the annihilation of the normative grounds of society as a problem of the penetration of the life-

⁶ The passage reads thus: “The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order. This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which to-day determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt. ... In [Richard] Baxter's view the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the 'saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment'. But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage. ... No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development, entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance. For of the fast stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: 'Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved'” (Weber 1996:123–124).

world by the system, as a problem of the annihilation of the everyday language and symbols by the steering media of money and power (see table 3).

Table 3: Life-world and system

	Definition	Logic	Example	Medium
Life-world	The sphere of society grounded in face-to-face, intersubjective relations	Communicative (comprehensive) rationality of the hermeneutic sciences	Associational life	Everyday symbols and language
System	The sphere of society grounded in impersonal institutionalized relations	Instrumental (functional) rationality of the nomological sciences	Political and economic subsystems	Money and bureaucratic power

Source: Author's analysis.

The social theoretical distinction between life-world and system, and the normative colonization thesis provides another way of conceptualizing the differences that exist among civil society actors. Where do the different types of civil society actors situate themselves: in the life-world or in the system? I argue that while social movements are driven by the logic of the life-world, NGOs are driven by the logic of the system. This explains the struggle for civil society as a struggle between the logic of the system and the logic of the life-world.

As a heuristic device that aims to highlight the normative, organizational and operational differences that exist among civil society actors, the typology needs to be historically situated and socially concretized. Toward this end, the typology can be applied, for example, to different constellations of civil society actors that organize and mobilize around specific social problems in given historical contexts. I refer to these sociohistorical constellations as movements. Thus, just as with the concept *network*, I use the term *movement* in two different ways. First, in the manner of the sociologists who study social movements, it is used in a synchronic sense to refer to that type of group action described above corresponding to one of the four categories of the typology. Second, it is used in a broader diachronic sense to refer to the sociohistorical crystallizations of civil society actors. In the first sense, I refer to social movements as opposed to NGOs. And in the second sense, I refer to the new social movements as opposed to the global justice movement.

In the late 1960s, Touraine argued that the conditions of advanced capitalism were generating the proliferation of such movements. For Touraine (1969), the passage from industrial to postindustrial societies was marked by the changing nature of economic exploitation. Social alienation and cultural mobilizations in the realm of consumption were replacing economic exploitation and social struggles in the realm of production. But these new mobilizations were coming to the fore precisely because information, education and consumption were more than ever bound to production. Thus, for Touraine, the passage from industrial to postindustrial, and modern to postmodern societies was marked by a shift of the locus of social conflict from the realm of labour to the realm of culture. This shift, which has at the same time historical and epistemological dimensions, is essential for understanding why at times labour movements seem anachronistic in the face of the demands of the new constellations such as, for example, the World Social Forum. In 2007, mobilizations organized around the essentialist historical subject, the proletariat, are giving way to mobilizations organized around the fluid cultural-symbolic matrices of identity politics (Butler et al. 2000).

Cattacin et al. (1997) proposed an understanding of the evolution of sociohistorical constellations of movements in terms of the changing nature of the social conflict in question (see also Giugni et al. 2006). Table 4 illustrates this evolution in five phases. The first phase is characterized by the mobilizations of the emerging bourgeoisie against the expansion of the absolutist state that is made possible by that classic liberal worldview that links concrete

freedom to the mechanism of the market. The second phase, situated in the age of industrial capitalism, is characterized by the emergence of the labour movements and their demands against material-economic exploitation made possible by the Marxist critique of political economy. The third phase is marked by the institutionalization of the labour movements through the welfare state, which can be seen in American institutionalism and the Polanyian and Keynesian critiques of the classical liberal model (Veblen 1898). The fourth phase, in which Touraine's observations concerning the rise of the plurality of new social movements can be situated, is marked by the critique of the labour movements' reduction of social emancipation to the instrumental rationality of material-economic conditions. And the fifth phase, which corresponds to the current situation, is characterized by transnational constellations of movements that mobilize against neoliberal globalization.⁷

**Table 4: Evolution of movements
(sociohistorical constellations of civil society actors)**

Phase	Period	Type of movement	Type of mobilization/conflict
I	Seventeenth and eighteenth centuries	Liberal movements	Mobilizations by the emerging bourgeoisie against state expansion
II	Nineteenth century	Labour movements	Mobilizations by the working class (proletariat) against the material-economic exploitation of the liberal state
III	1900–1960	Institutionalization of the labour movement	Incorporation of the demands of the working class into the structure of the welfare state
IV	1960–1999	New social movements	Mobilization of a plurality of civil society actors (student, feminist, ethnic, racial, gay, environmental) against the instrumental rationality of the technocratic society
V	1999–present	Global justice movement	Mobilizations of increasingly transnational, pluralistic and reticular civil society actors against neoliberal globalization

Source: Author's adaption of Cattacin et al. (1997).

Considering the TIMN paradigm developed above, it becomes clear that the emergence of T+I+M+N societies corresponds with phases IV and V of this historical schema. The TIMN paradigm, moreover, suggests that, due in part to the emergence of the network form, these last two phases need to be understood as qualitatively different from the first three phases. This is so because of the proliferation of non-state actors and the growing autonomy of civil society that undergird T+I+M+N societies. As a result, mobilizations are expected to intensify and become more complex and interconnected over time. Historically, this has been the case. Examples of the mobilizations of phase IV are the student, civil rights and anticolonial (ethnic-racial) mobilizations of the 1960s, the anti-Viet Nam war mobilizations in the United States in the 1970s, and the mobilizations against communist regimes in Eastern Europe or the mobilizations against authoritarian military states in the Southern Cone of Latin America in the 1980s.

I focus here on the latest wave of movements, which correspond with phase V of the historical schema, that is, the mobilizations against neoliberal globalization that can symbolically be traced back to the 1999 Battle of Seattle against the WTO ministerial conference.⁸ Several of these movements that mobilize against neoliberal globalization can be identified according to their respective thematic objectives (Ghimire 2005). For example, the following five movements that have been studied by the Civil Society and Social Movements Programme of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) are representative of these new

⁷ Regarding this fifth period, the important work being conducted by the Braudel Center at Binghamton University, New York, should be noted. I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers of this paper for this insight.

⁸ Some have suggested that a more appropriate symbolic starting point would be the beginning of the Zapatista mobilizations in January 1994.

mobilizations: the “anti-debt movement” (Reyes and Sehm Patomäki 2007), the “currency transaction tax movement” (Patomäki 2007), the “anti-corruption movement” (Querijero and Amorado 2006), the “fair trade movement” (Yilmaz 2005), and finally the movement that will be analysed here, namely, the movement to change international trade rules and barriers.

From a global perspective, taking the Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund and World Bank) as a frame of reference, these could be considered as a coalescing of movements that could be called the global justice movement. Given what I have said thus far, and against all types of essentialisms, one could say that the global justice movement is heterogeneous both in terms of its thematic constellations as well as in terms of its organizational diversity. Table 5 schematically breaks down the global justice movement along these two axes of analysis.

Table 5: The global justice movement: Two axes of analysis

Movement Actor type	NGO	Social movement (SM)	Network (N)	Plateau (P)
Anti-debt (AD)	AD NGO	AD SM	AD N	AD P
Currency transaction tax (CTT)	CTT NGO	CTT SM	CTT N	CTT P
Anti-corruption (AC)	AC NGO	AC SM	AC N	AC P
Fair trade (FT)	FT NGO	FT SM	FT N	FT P
Trade rules and barriers (TRB)	TRB NGO	TRB SM	TRB N	TRB P

Source: Author's analysis.

The global justice movement can be considered, on the one hand, from the point of view of the different types of civil society actors developed in the typology (see table 5). In this case, the focus should be on the affinities that exist between worldviews and structural attributes, and one can see how different civil society types mobilize for different objectives. This would mean working up and down along the columns of table 5. But the global justice movement could also be considered, on the other hand, from the point of view of the different movements. In this case, the focus should be on the different thematic objectives and one can see how the different movements are in fact constituted by different types of civil society actors. This would mean working right and left along the rows of table 5. Each intersection between thematic objective and civil society actor – each square – thus represents a different “moment” of the global justice movement. This moment could be understood from either the point of view of movements or from the point of view of civil society actors. Again, this table represents a schematic way of conceptualizing the plurality, heterogeneity and differences that exist within the global justice movement.

I will apply the typology of civil society actors to one of the movements of the global justice movement, namely, the movement to change international trade rules and barriers, and specifically analyse its four moments (see table 6): Focus on the Global South as an example of the NGO moment; the Latin American mobilizations against free trade areas (FTAs) as an example of the social movement-type; the Trade Justice Movement as an example of a network of CSOs; and the World Social Forum as an example of a plateau of civil society group, specifically how the objective of changing trade rules and barriers has been present in this forum.

Table 6: The movement to change international trade rules and barriers

Types of civil society actors	NGO moment	Social movement moment	Network moment	Plateau moment
Example	Focus on the Global South	Latin American mobilizations against FTAs	Trade Justice Movement	World Social Forum

Source: Author's analysis.

Having thus completed the historical, methodological and epistemological preparatory study, I am now ready to elucidate a typology of civil society.

II. Typology of Civil Society Actors

Table 7 provides a synthesis of the principal attributes of the four types of civil society actors I propose: (i) the formally structured hierarchical and rationalized NGOs; (ii) the amorphous and spontaneous, horizontal, charismatic, cathetic and increasingly reticular social movements; (iii) the segmented, flexible, polycentric, synergistic, information-generating networks; and (iv) the geographically fixed and temporally discrete, iterative, rhizomatic plateaus of civil society groups.

It needs to be stated here that the latter two categories of the typology (that is, networks and plateaus) are homologous with the first two (that is, NGOs and social movements). As it will become clear as each of the categories are elucidated, what are referred to here as networks of civil society actors are information-age extensions of the NGO-type and, similarly, plateaus of civil society actors are information-age extensions of the social movement-type. By this I do not mean to suggest that only NGOs link up to form networks, nor do I mean to suggest that only social movements participate in plateaus. This is obviously not the case. What I mean to suggest rather is that networks and plateaus have modes of operating that are congruous with NGOs and social movements, respectively. Thus, for example, networks attempt to tap into the possibilities of interconnectivity in order to improve their strategies, while plateaus attempt to use this interconnectivity as a way of radicalizing the horizontality and participatory possibilities, the therapeutic and cathetic potential, of civil society groups. These similarities become clearer later in this paper. What is important to point out here is that the typology is also an attempt to grapple with the problem of how the information age is transforming the very composition of civil society.

Five elements were used to construct this typology: structural characteristics; perception and formulation of the problem; modus operandi, that is, strategies deployed to overcome the problem; existing tensions and issues; and the working conception of civil society.

Table 7: Typology of civil society actors

Category	Structural characteristics	Formulation of the problem	Modus operandi	Tensions	Conception of civil society
NGO	Institutionalized and rationalized organization	Specialized, technical, intellectualized and systematic discourse	Monitoring, campaigns, lobbying and project development	Routinization and complicity with the system	Third sector: institutional space between the state and market; normative horizon of representative democracy
Social movement	Pre-institutional and amorphous social relations	Empathetic language of intuition and shared-lived experience and the cathectic potential of symbols	Direct action	Fragmentation and discontinuity	Elucidation of life-world projects through participatory democracy
Network	Flexible and decentralized system of organizations	Specialized, technical, intellectualized and pluralistic discourse	Campaigns and lobbying	Alienation of the individual by the network	Pluralistic communicative structure of identity politics
Plateau	Geographically fixed and temporally discrete, iterative, rhizomatic event	Combination of specialized pluralistic discourse and the empathetic language of the life-world and cathectic potential of symbols	Project construction and reframing	Fragmentation and decentring	Utopian and therapeutic horizon of the "other possible world"

Source: Author's analysis.

Non-governmental organizations

The problem of defining and categorizing NGOs has been well documented (Vakil 1997). Inconsistencies in the use of this nomenclature abound. It has been suggested that the fact that the term “NGO” is often used interchangeably with the terms “private voluntary organizations” and “non-profit organization” points to the lack of an adequate framework for classifying NGOs. The need to clarify these typological issues is undoubtedly an important task for the study of NGOs. I, however, prescind from this issue here for, as mentioned above and as is evident throughout the paper, my aim is not so much to delimit a third sector and categorize NGOs; my aim, rather, is to delimit civil society and categorize the different types of civil society actors.

In other words, in this section NGOs are analysed in contrast to social movements, networks and plateaus. I believe that, when the problem is posed in this way, structural differences should be taken as point of departure. The structural attributes of this or that group, however, are not important in their own right. They are important rather, as already suggested, only to the degree to which they have affinities with different conceptions of the world. Indeed, the material and ideal interests that are overdetermined by structural conditions shape not only conceptions of the way in which the problem of changing trade rules and barriers is posed, but they also shape the way in which globalization, social justice and civil society are conceived.

When discussing NGOs, it is important to begin with the fact that NGOs are the most institutionalized (and thus hierarchical) groups of civil society. The structural attributes of NGOs are typical of the bureaucratic rationalization that undergirds modern hierarchical institutions (Weber 1978:956–958). NGOs have a formal division of labour as represented by their paid, professional staff.⁹ NGOs also have an established financial infrastructure and a continuous financial flow that is driven by the logic of donor contributions, investments, grants and membership dues. Formalized by official bookkeeping and published in annual reports, this financial dimension binds NGOs to the economic and juridical framework of a country. These ties to the institutional framework of a country are made manifest when NGOs attempt, for example, to assure a certain tax status, qualify for certain financial assistance or make certain investments. These institutional ties are now becoming increasingly transnational: in addition to their juridical status at the national level, NGOs are increasingly seeking to obtain, for example, consultative status with the United Nations, the WTO and other international bodies.

NGOs need to construct and justify these institutional ties. This they do through the game of legitimization. Like other modern institutions, NGOs seek this legitimization by proving their operational coherence and transparency through formal accountability mechanisms such as elections, a board of directors, monitoring, standards and codes of conduct, certifications, ratings and reporting (Bendell 2006). But, in addition to their operational coherence, NGOs need to prove their competence and social utility. This is clear when an NGO seeks to establish a formal relationship with the United Nations.¹⁰

Like all the other types of civil society actors, NGOs emerge in response to social problems. In a certain sense, it could be argued that the ultimate justification for all civil society actors is the existence of social problems such as the trade injustices generated by corporate globalization. However, unlike the other civil society groups (and this becomes clearer in the next sections), NGOs interpret social problems and generate solutions through the intellectual rationalization of interpretations of the world that is typical of formal organizations. This is what characterizes

⁹ They have a recognized membership process with membership fees and clearly defined membership roles.

¹⁰ For example, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (1996) Resolution 1996/31 defined three categories of consultative status for NGOs—general, special and roster. To obtain general consultative status, NGOs need to “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Council that they have substantive and sustained contributions to make to the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations”. The second type of status is granted to NGOs “that have a special competence in, and are concerned specifically with, only a few of the fields of activity”. And finally, the “roster status” is granted to those NGOs that “can make occasional and useful contributions to the work of the Council”.

NGO objectives and *modus operandi*. For example, using the formal language, tools and methods of established disciplines, NGOs produce systematic and specialized analyses of the problems they wish to address.¹¹

But NGOs do not only analyse and critique problems, they also propose solutions such as the Tobin tax or the idea to change trade rules and barriers. These solutions are developed through the practical or technical rationalization typical of hierarchical, bureaucratic institutions. It is no longer a question of making the doctrines that have been developed a reality. These can be divided into four interrelated strategies: monitoring, campaigns, lobbying and project development.¹²

Perhaps the clearest manifestation of the level of institutionalization and bureaucratic rationalization that undergirds NGOs is the existence of an increasingly specialized and autonomous discipline of philanthropic, non-profit and third sector studies. What is important to specify here is that this discipline is not only dedicated to the study of a theoretical objective NGO, or third sector, but also to professional training. This fact points to the development of a non-profit, philanthropic and/or NGO career path, with a developed competitive labour market that is attracting elites to receive formal professional training.¹³

NGOs thus are the most institutionalized and rationalized of the civil society actors. As such, NGOs formulate social problems through a specialized, technical, intellectualized and systematic discourse that approximates the approaches of the academic world, think tanks and research institutes. They attempt, moreover, to operationalize their solutions to social problems through monitoring, campaigns, lobbying and project development. These structural and functional characteristics generate a certain operational tension for NGOs. For example, many NGOs run the danger of developing cooperative ties with the institutional framework (the system) they attempt to critique. I alluded to the Weberian problem of the routinization of the critical rupture (*charisma*) as a way of explaining this tension. To summarize the worldview that drives them, it could be said that NGOs are carriers of the idea of civil society as a third sector, that is, as that institutionalized space that is situated between the private (business) and public (state) sectors and which provides the normative horizon of representative democracy. This third sector, moreover, sees the use of the steering media of the system to advance their projects as legitimate, that is, they see the use of money and power as legitimate.

Social movements

The attributes of social movements—structural characteristics, *modus operandi* and worldview—should be understood in opposition to NGOs. Unlike the highly formalized NGOs, social movements are constituted by the pre-institutional and amorphous social relations of the life-world. Social movements formulate social problems through the empathetic language of intuition and shared-lived experience and the cathetic potential of symbols. This is contrasted with the technical and specialized language of the system.

¹¹ In collaboration with research institutes, universities and think tanks, and using the scholastic and technical gaze of experts, NGOs generate fine-tuned alternative views and counterarguments that can sometimes take the formal form of doctrines. These systematic and specialized understandings of the world appear in the form of publications that compare in academic rigour to the most prestigious scientific journals and scholarly texts as well as in the form of the more “popular” periodical newsletters.

¹² Campaigns are an attempt to raise consciousness concerning certain issues or to raise money. The objective here is to encourage citizens to put pressure on their representatives or, in the case of direct referendums, to overturn problematic laws. To carry out these campaigns, many NGOs use marketing strategies and the tools of the information age. NGOs also engage in campaigns and lobbying efforts, with the objective to reach directly the politicians or certain government officials or the international organizations. It is often a function of their leverage that they have a certain power and institutional apparatus over the organization. There is also the funding of local projects, for example, in underdeveloped regions. The fourth strategy brings forth the asymmetries that exist and are perpetuated related to conditionality.

¹³ See, for example, the graduate programmes that collaborate with the International Society for Third Sector Research available at www.istr.org/resources/centers.htm. The majority of these programmes are interdisciplinary in nature, that is, they are initiatives of schools of business, public policy and social work. Drawing on the new institutionalism, one can say that the third sector studies exhibit a type of institutional isomorphism, that is, a type of standardization, homogenization and reflexivity (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

In this sense, social movements critique the intellectualizing gaze of specialized interpretations of social problems for being detached from the meaning structures of the life-world. Social movements, moreover, operationalize their solutions to problems through direct action. This direct action has a therapeutic element, that is, a given direct action or mobilization is already successful in itself. Social movements grapple with operational contradictions and tensions that are diametrically opposed to the contradictions and tensions faced by NGOs: they grapple with the problems associated with fragmentation, discontinuity and lack of efficaciousness. Using the Weberian perspective alluded to above, one could say that social movements generate a charismatic rupture with the system that lacks institutionalization. Social movements are carriers of an idea of civil society as an ideational structure grounded in life-world projects and legitimized through participatory democracy.

The problem of defining and categorizing social movements has been well documented.¹⁴ In the last decade, the conceptual and typological tensions that have undergirded the history of social movement scholarship have specifically manifested themselves through the recent explosion of global activism and transnational contestation (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005). Some, for example, have prioritized the transnational frame of reference, arguing for the existence of a global justice movement (Ghimire 2005), while others have emphasized the national frame of reference, claiming that the classic political opportunity structures are still at play (Giugni et al. 2006). Still others have attempted to tread a path between the national and transnational frames of reference, proposing notions such as complex internationalism (Tarrow 2003).

These are important issues that are central for the development of the sociology of social movements. Yet I am not interested in marshalling forth a sociology of social movements, just as in the previous section the emphasis was not on delving into the particularities of third sector studies. Rather, I take civil society as a contested social realm as a frame of reference and attempt to glean the tensions that exist among different types of civil society groups. With, for example, Bendaña (2006), I am attempting to develop the conceptual, political and organizational tensions that exist between NGOs and social movements. Suffice it to say for now that it is the agonistic point of view that guides the project. How, then, do social movements differ from NGOs? I begin by elucidating the structural attributes of social movements.

Social movements are less institutionalized (and thus more horizontal) than NGOs. They do not exhibit the structural characteristics typical of rationalized, bureaucratic institutions. Social movements are constituted by pre-institutional networks of social relations. They resemble more clientelistic groups, extended family structures and religious associations than modern hierarchical institutions. It is in this sense that they are often described as grassroots organizations. As it becomes clear in this section, social movements use, as their frame of reference, more everyday collective identity than formal social action, more the life-world than the system (Habermas 1987).

Compared to NGOs, social movements lack a formal division of labour; they do not have, for example, a paid, professional staff. The most active members of social movements work on a voluntary basis during their off hours, during their leisure time. Although some social movements have membership fees, generally speaking, social movements have a more informal membership process. In many social movements, membership is implicit, driven more by empathy and collective identity than by formal ascription. Social movements, moreover, do not have an established financial infrastructure; nor do they have a continuous financial flow. Many social movements resolve material and economic constraints through the primitive communism of sharing, bartering and borrowing resources. They function more with the assistance of a parallel market that shuns established price mechanisms and the logic of conventional economics than with the formal logic of investments and government grants. The bookkeeping

¹⁴ See Touraine (1978); Tarrow (1994); Della Porta and Diani (1999).

of social movements is informal; for the most part, social movements do not publish annual reports.

Social movements are less bound to the economic and juridical framework of a society. This follows from their structural attributes. Social movements, for example, do not seek consultative status with the United Nations or other international bodies, and few aim for special tax status at the national level. This significant institutional detachment allows social movements to be more spontaneous and amorphous. Unlike NGOs, social movements do not attempt to build institutional ties with the system. Indeed, social movements refrain from the game of legitimization as played by NGOs. Social movements do not aim to justify their social utility or competence to the system, but rather to the life-world, to the people.

Social movements, moreover, do not seek legitimization through formal accountability mechanisms. While perhaps some social movements hold formal elections, the majority do not have a board of directors, monitoring, standards and codes of conduct, certifications, ratings and reporting. Social movements replace these mechanisms with general assemblies and other forms of direct and participatory accountability. In the final analysis, it could be said that social movements legitimize themselves by doing, by their exemplary prophetic actions. Here, following Weber (1978:241–246, 956–958), the rationalized attachment and bureaucratic “routinization” of NGOs could be contrasted with the “charismatic” “world-rejecting” gesture and “prophetic rupture” of social movements.

Like NGOs, social movements emerge in response to social problems. However, social movements do not interpret these problems through the lens of intellectual rationalization that is typical of NGOs. They do not use the formal language of academic disciplines; nor do they develop specialized, technical analyses of the problems they wish to address. Social movements, for the most part, do not establish working partnerships with research institutes, universities and think tanks. They do not, moreover, generate systematic doctrines; nor do they publish formal scholarly writings. Instead of attempting to solve problems that exist “out there” in the system, social movements attempt to solve problems that they themselves are facing, problems that impinge upon the life-world.

Thus, the cognitive, analytical model of NGOs gives way to the empathetic language of intuition and shared-lived experience; the use of well-founded arguments gives way to the cathetic potential of symbols; cogent explanations give way to testimonies and life stories. Grounded more on existential intelligence than on formal education, the mode in which social movements interpret the problems they aim to overcome brings forth the epistemological biases of those intellectuals that are paid to interpret the world (Bourdieu 1997). In defence of the type of knowledge generated by social movements, organic intellectuals since the time of Antonio Gramsci have critiqued the formal and specialized academic interpretations of the world for their hegemonic complicity with the system. Others, however, have denounced the hostility that social movements have toward scholarly specialized interpretations as anti-intellectualism or populism.

Networks

Networks of civil society actors constitute the third category of the typology. As stated above, networks and plateaus (which are analysed in the next section) are information-age extensions of NGOs and social movements, respectively. This idea can be better explained after having examined NGOs and social movements.

NGOs and social movements are the basic elements, the building blocks of contemporary civil society. They represent not only two different types of social action, but also two different visions of civil society. Grounded in bureaucratic rationality and a realist theory of society, NGOs attempt to institutionally exert influence upon government and business in the name of the life-world. Toward this end, NGOs use the steering media of the system—“power” through

lobbying efforts and “money” through project funding and formal campaigns. Grounded in pre-institutional networks of social relations and a dialectical theory of society, social movements emerge from the life-world in an attempt to generate a utopian rupture with the system. Instead of the steering media of the system, social movements use the cathectic power of symbols and the desire for emancipation.

Networks and plateaus both attempt to use the information technology revolution and, more specifically, what was referred to above as the network social form to improve their effectiveness. Yet each deploys the network form from their particular logic of social action, and from their particular vision of civil society. Thus, for example, networks of civil society groups attempt to use the network form to push beyond the limits of bureaucratic rationality, to extend the scope of civil society and to ameliorate certain problems of stakeholder representation. Plateaus of civil society actors, by contrast, use the network social form in an attempt to radicalize the horizontality of participatory democracy and the cathectic and therapeutic potential of symbols. Again, by establishing these similarities I do not mean to suggest that only NGOs link up to form networks, nor do I mean to suggest that only social movements participate in plateaus. Civil society groups that can be considered to be social movements do participate in networks and, similarly, NGOs participate in plateaus such as the World Social Forum. This dynamic, in fact, brings forth a tension that is perhaps a symptom of the growing complexity of civil society in the information age.

To reiterate the conceptual clarification alluded to at the outset: this paper has used the term network in three different ways. Let me briefly, before moving ahead with my analysis, clarify this semantic issue. It is important to differentiate between the network of social relations, the network form and the network of civil society groups. Networks of social relations are the pre-institutional relations of society. They refer to the face-to-face, intersubjective relations of the life-world as opposed to the teleological rationality of the system. The network form, by contrast, refers to the fourth social form discussed in the first part of this paper, which differentiated, from the point of view of social evolution, between tribes, institutions, markets and networks. The network form is that social form that emerges through the information technology revolution and the growing interconnectivity of the world. And finally, there is the network of civil society group, the third category of the typology, which is understood to be the linking of NGOs and social movements in a flexible organization. These different uses of the term network having been clarified, let me now proceed to unravel the basic characteristics of networks of civil society groups (see table 8).

Table 8: Three uses of the term network

Term	Definition	Interlocutors
Network of social relations	The pre-institutional relations of society formed and perpetuated through intersubjective, face-to-face interaction	Francis Fukuyama Mark Granovetter
Network form	The social form that emerges through the information technology revolution and the growing interconnectivity of the world	David Ronfeldt Manuel Castells
Network of civil society actors	The information-age extensions of NGOs formed by linking civil society actors into segmented, flexible and polycentric organizations	Luther Gerlach Virginia Hine

Source: Author's analysis.

Networks continue to understand social problems within the frame of reference of the specialized, technical and intellectualized discourse of NGOs, but to this perspective they add the postmodern or postindustrial problem of pluralism – that is, networks give pride of place to the importance of a pluralistic discourse. Networks, like NGOs, operationalize their solutions to social problems through campaigns and lobbying, but they abandon the strategy of project development. The elimination of project development programmes from their modus operandi

can be seen as an example of a shift to the idea of solving social problems through the movement of information and perception management, as opposed to material and economic initiatives.

Networks, moreover, must grapple with the tension of alienating the individual through the networks they establish. This is, in a sense, the price they pay for flexibilizing rigid rationalization and decentralizing the hierarchical structures of NGOs. It is the underside of information complexity and connectivity: no longer is the individual at the centre, but a node in the network. If individuals run NGOs, then organizations run networks. Finally, it could be said that networks are carriers of the model of civil society as a pluralistic communicative structure of identity politics. Yet, this communicative structure is still understood within the logic of the NGO as an institutional space situated between the public and private spheres, and it is still the normative horizon of representative democracy.

Plateaus

The fourth category of civil society actors is the plateau. As suggested above, plateaus, like networks, attempt to use the information technology revolution and, more specifically, the interconnectivity and decentralization of the network social form to link up civil society actors. Networks and plateaus use this information technology in the belief that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Plateaus, like networks, are movements of movements or networks of networks. These new organizational forms point to the growing complexity of civil society.

Networks are the information-age correlates of NGOs; plateaus are information-age correlates of social movements. Here, the North and South dichotomy proposed by Bendaña (2006) and others still holds sway, as networks and plateaus have different images of globalization and different modus operandi. Networks are in continuity with the institutional rationalization and specialized knowledge of NGOs. Plateaus, on the other hand, are in continuity with the pre-institutional logic and intuitive knowledge of social movements. Networks attempt to use the network form to increase the effectiveness of consciousness-raising campaigns, while plateaus use this form to radicalize the horizontality of participatory democracy and the cathetic and therapeutic potential of symbols. NGOs become more flexible, and they link up to form networks of CSOs such as the Trade Justice Movement. Social movements become more rhizomatic and link up to form plateaus of civil society actors such as the World Social Forum.

Deleuze and Félix (1980:33) developed the concept of “plateau” in the second volume of their seminal work entitled *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, defining it as a multiplicity connected to other multiplicities by subterranean stems as in a rhizome. A rhizome is a principle of connectivity and heterogeneity, since any point of a rhizome can be connected to any other point. It is also a principle of multiplicity and a principle of rupture and deterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari 1980:3–32). On the one hand, it could be said that rhizomes grow into plateaus; on the other, it can be said that plateaus sprout rhizomes. The circularity is inevitable and desirable, for it does away with the classical ideas of foundations and hierarchies. For Deleuze and Guattari, the rhizome-plateau is a metaphysical as well as a political category. The rhizome-plateau takes seriously the poststructuralist conception of language understood as a decentering of the subject as well as the pluralism of social struggles (feminist, gay, ethnic, racial and so on), alluded to above, as a critique of the essentialism of the Marxist historical subject, the proletariat.

Hardt and Negri (2000) more recently applied the idea of Deleuze and Guattari to understand the rhizomatic multiplicity of alterglobalization networks that are opposed to the process of neoliberal globalization. “This new multiplicity is defined by the ‘event’ and by ‘charisma’ that rises up as power of the singularization of the whole and of the effectiveness of imperial interventions” and is “functional rather than mathematical, and rhizomatic and undulatory rather than inductive or deductive” (Hardt and Negri 2000:41). By a dynamic circulating “the multitude re-appropriates space and constitutes itself as an active subject. When we look closer at how this constitutive

process of subjectivity operates, we can see that the new spaces are described by unusual topologies, by subterranean and uncontainable rhizomes—by geographical mythologies that mark the new paths of destiny” (Hardt and Negri 2000:397).

Chesters and Welsh (2005) used this notion of plateau to describe specifically the new forms of civil society actors. They take as their point of departure the definition of a plateau developed by Massumi:

A plateau is reached when circumstances combine to bring an activity to a pitch of intensity that is not automatically dissipated in a climax leading to a state of rest. The heightening of energies is sustained long enough to leave a kind of afterimage of its dynamism that can be reactivated or injected in to other activities, creating a fabric of intensive states between which any number of connecting routes could exist (1992:7).

For Chesters and Welsh (2005), plateaus of civil society actors are geographically fixed and temporally discrete, iterative and rhizomatic; they are events that become sustained through the circuits of interconnected actors:

Plateau(s) render visible the iterative character and fractal patterning of overlapping networks and make manifest processes of interaction and exchange between global locales, between the virtual and the real, between new social actors and familiar forces of antagonism. They are both geographically discrete and temporally bounded ‘events’ that are simultaneously extensive of space and time, stretched and warped through interaction on e-mail lists, dedicated chat rooms, web logs, text messages, and a variety of mobile technologies. As such, we conceptualize them as moments of temporary but intensive network stabilization where the rhizomatic substance of the movement(s)—groups, organizations, individuals, ideologies, cognitive frames—are simultaneously manifest and re-configured (Chesters 2004:335–336).

The rhizomatic interconnectivity of the multitude focuses on the logic of difference and diversity. Plateaus generate a kind of reflexivity through which new political projects can be developed. They sustain the cathetic potential (energy) of symbols at the local and global frames of reference.

These plateau(s) provide a reflexive impetus for movements, an opportunity to recognize oneself and the points of connection between one’s identity and actions and those of other participants engaged in similar struggles. They also allow for the exploration of difference (identity, politics, strategy, goals) through theoretical and practical innovation, such as cognitive and symbolic reframing...or the construction of distinct spatialities within the one temporality. ... These plateau(s) involve the formulation and shaping of political projects at the local and global levels, further strategic and tactical reflection, skill sharing, and the construction of alternative means of communication and information exchange, as well as the development of mechanisms for the expression of solidarity and mutual aid. Plateau(s) are increasingly a means through which phase transitions occur in movement forms; they precipitate increases in flows of energy, which produce non-linear changes in the system (of relations) conducting that energy. Phase transitions of this type might involve dramatic metamorphoses such as a discrete national campaign group becoming a transnational affinity network, a workers party becoming a movement-party, or they may be far subtler, a ‘leader-less’ culture framed as a ‘leader-full’ culture, for example (Chesters 2004:336).

Thus, plateaus are the radicalization (and, in a sense, logical conclusion) of the increasingly reticular nature of social movements. To understand this radicalization of the horizontality of social movements, I proposed the poststructuralist idea of the rhizome. Structurally, plateaus

can be understood to be geographically fixed and temporally discrete, iterative, rhizomatic events. Plateaus of CSOs combine specialized pluralist discourse with the empathetic language of the life-world. They operationalize their solutions to social problems through a sort of project construction and reframing that is a kind of taking stock and reflexivity that is typical of postmodern social action. As with social movements, plateaus must grapple with the problem of fragmentation and decentering; they must grapple with the lack of efficaciousness of their mobilizations. The model of civil society put forth by plateaus is the utopian and therapeutic horizon of the other possible world. As with social movements, plateaus understand civil society as an ideational structure that critiques the totality of the (dominant) system.

III. The Case of the Movement to Change International Trade Rules and Barriers

These are the four categories of civil society actors that constitute the typology developed in this paper. In this section, I apply this typology specifically to the case of the movement to change international trade rules and barriers. Once again: in the same way that there are different types of civil society actors, there are different moments of the movement to change international trade rules and barriers. The typology demonstrates that there is a plurality of ways of understanding the problem of trade rules and barriers. It demonstrates that changing trade rules and barriers implies in fact different projects. Table 9 provides a synthesis of the four moments of the movement.

When an NGO such as Focus on the Global South mobilizes to change trade rules and barriers, it does so through campaigns, lobbying and community projects to (for example) dismantle the WTO and promote its paradigm of deglobalization. When a constellation of social movements such as the Autoconvocatoria No al ALCA and the Movimiento Boliviano por la Soberanía y la Integración Solidaria de los Pueblos mobilizes to change trade rules and barriers, it does so through (for example) direct action to stop the FTAs in Latin America and promoting the Bolivarian Alternative to the Americas. When a network of civil society groups such as the Trade Justice Movement mobilizes to change international trade rules and barriers, it attempts this through campaigns and lobbying to (for example) change the trade policy of the North and dismantle the WTO. And when a plateau of civil society groups such as the World Social Forum addresses the issue of changing trade rules and barriers, it attempts it through project construction and reframing to end neoliberal globalization and bring forth another possible world.

This is the plurality of structures, *modus operandi* and objectives that constitute the global justice movement, namely, the movement to change international trade rules and barriers that I will now attempt to elucidate.

Focus on the Global South

“Focus on the Global South (Focus) is an NGO with 20 staff working in Thailand, the Philippines and India. Focus was established in Bangkok in 1995 and is affiliated with the Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute.”¹⁵ This is how Focus on the Global South defines itself in the first lines of the “About us” section of its Web site. First of all, Focus explicitly categorizes itself as an NGO. This is significant because Focus has consistently deployed the distinction between NGOs and social movements throughout its history. Indeed, this is far from being a nominalistic or scholastic issue, for the fact that Focus defines itself as an NGO (and not a social movement) is fundamental to its *modus operandi* and its conception of civil society.

¹⁵ See the Focus on the Global South Web site at www.focusweb.org/who-we-are.html, accessed in July 2007.

Table 9: The case of the movement to change international trade rules and barriers

Organization	Category	Objective	Modus operandi
Focus on the Global South	NGO	Dismantle the WTO and promote the deglobalization paradigm	Campaigns, lobbying and community projects
Mobilizations against the FTAs	Social movement	Stop the FTAs and promote the Bolivarian alternative	Mobilizations—direct action
Trade Justice Movement	Network	Change the trade policy of Northern countries and dismantle the WTO	Campaigns and lobbying
World Social Forum	Plateau	End neoliberal globalization and bring forth another possible world	Project construction and reframing

Source: Author's analysis.

Second, Focus has a formal division of labour—it has 20 staff. This, as suggested above, is a characteristic of NGOs. Focus participates in the rapidly growing competitive labour market of the NGO sector and, in this sense, it could be argued that Focus contributes to the institutional isomorphism of this sector. Apart from the formal staff, there is the Board of Trustees, advisors, fellows and the like. In addition, Focus has financial autonomy as demonstrated by its core founders and steady financial flow (see table 10).

Table 10: Focus on the Global South budget, 1999–2005 (US dollars)

Year	Budget	Income/ revenue	Actual expenses	Variance budget- actual expenses	Variance income/revenue- actual expenses
1999	846,001.00	679,951.73	625,846.76	220,154.24	54,104.97
2001	999,300.00	777,216.98	742,227.23	257,072.77	216,227.10
2002	878,253.00	759,532.54	724,791.00	153,462.00	231,311.63
2003	874,000.00	607,312.07	748,829.63	125,170.37	141,517.56
2004	722,200.00	772,588.55	701,242.59	20,957.41	71,345.96
2005	846,000.00	865,041.70	755,290.33	90,709.67	109,751.37

Source: Focus on the Global South Web site at www.focusweb.org, accessed in July 2007.

Third, Focus defines itself as being affiliated with the Social Research Institute of Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, an autonomous research institute founded in 1967 that claims to utilize an “interdisciplinary approach to seek knowledge and understanding of social processes in relation to the economy, society, politics, education, culture, and the environment and the ensuing impacts of changes in these areas”.¹⁶ This close relationship between Focus and the Social Research Institute is characteristic of NGOs. A defining characteristic of NGOs is their close collaboration with research institutes, universities, think tanks and other organizations that are paid to interpret the world. This type of relationship generates Focus’s specialized and technical gaze concerning neoliberal globalization.

And finally, the definition cited contains a geographical or, more precisely, a geopolitical element: Focus is an Asian NGO. It was established in Bangkok and it has offices in India and the Philippines. This geopolitical aspect no doubt shapes Focus’s approach to neoliberal globalization, that is, its approach is no doubt marked by its Asian perspective. But this definition also points to a certain asymmetrical division of labour between Thailand, where

¹⁶ See the Chulalongkorn University Web site at www.cusri.chula.ac.th, accessed in July 2007.

Focus was established, and India and the Philippines, between its central Bangkok offices and its country programmes in Mumbai and Manila (Quezon City). Overcoming these asymmetries has been an organizational and structural issue that Focus has been struggling with throughout its existence.

“Focus combines policy research, advocacy, activism and grassroots capacity building in order to generate critical analysis and encourage debates on national and international policies related to corporate-led globalisation, neo-liberalism and militarisation.”¹⁷ This is how Focus defines its mandate and modus operandi. This definition provides grounds to categorize Focus as a progressive alterglobalization civil society group. Focus’s modus operandi, moreover, is typical of the practical rationalization that characterizes NGOs. The strategies alluded to here – namely, policy research, advocacy, activism and capacity building – are very similar to the type of strategies typical of NGOs. Moreover, the relationship between militarization and globalization is a theme that is specific to the way Focus sees the play of US hegemony and globalization.

This mandate is concretized through three overall goals, namely, to “dismantle oppressive economic and political structures and institutions; to create liberating structures and institutions; to promote demilitarisation and peace-building, instead of conflict”.¹⁸ And these three goals are in turn grounded in Focus’s doctrine of deglobalization, which is a theory of the logic and consequences of neoliberal globalization. But, more importantly, deglobalization is a proposed solution for achieving the other world that is possible. Focus provides a clear and succinct definition of this doctrine: “This term describes the transformation of the global economy from one centred around the needs of transnational corporations to one that focuses on the needs of people, communities and nations and in which the capacities of local and national economies are strengthened”.¹⁹ The doctrine of deglobalization is typical of the specialized understanding of NGOs that generate fine-tuned alternative views and counterarguments.

Focus’s systematic and specialized analysis of neoliberal globalization as well as its proposals for constructing an alternative model have been circulated in a slew of academically rigorous publications.²⁰ In addition, Focus publishes an electronic bulletin entitled *Focus on Trade*, which has become a point of reference for alterglobalization networks; currently in its 127th edition, it combines the analytical rigour of scholarly analysis with the militancy and critical vision of grassroots writings. According to Focus, the purpose of this publication is to provide “updates and analysis of trends in regional and world trade and finance, the political economy of globalisation and peoples’ resistance, and alternatives to global capitalism”.²¹ *Focus on Trade* is translated into Bahasa Indonesia and Spanish (*Enfoque sobre comercio*) and several articles have also been translated into French. The following gives a sense of the different themes addressed by the electronic journal: “Brazil on the threshold; the US on the brink and a Vietnamese view of the journey from Seattle to Doha; and from Thailand, Buddhism and the Bank, the illusion of isolation, plus the story of the villagers who want the Canadian mining company to simply ‘go away’”.²²

¹⁷ See the Focus on the Global South Web site at www.focusweb.org/who-we-are.html, accessed in July 2007.

¹⁸ See the Focus on the Global South Web site at www.focusweb.org/who-we-are.html, accessed in July 2007.

¹⁹ See the Focus on the Global South Web site at www.focusweb.org/who-we-are.html, accessed in July 2007.

²⁰ Some of the more recent of Focus’s books are: *Dilemmas of Domination: The Unmaking of the American Empire: Deglobalisation: Ideas for a New “World Economy”*; and *Anti-Development State: The Political Economy of Permanent Crisis in the Philippines* by Walden Bello and published by Metropolitan Books, Zed Books and the University of the Philippines, respectively; *Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International Trade Negotiations* by Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa and published by Zed Books in 2003; and *Power Politics in the WTO* by Aileen Kwa, published by Focus on the Global South in 2003.

²¹ See the Focus on the Global South Web site at www.focusweb.org/focus-on-trade, accessed in July 2007.

²² See issue 82 of October 2002 on the Focus on the Global South Web site at www.focusweb.org/number-82-october-2002.html, accessed in July 2007.

Focus's modus operandi, goals and doctrine are operationalized through five thematic areas contextualized through three country programmes. This is the logic that drives Focus's operational design, which has been described as follows:

The deglobalisation paradigm forms the basis of Focus's work which spans five thematic areas: Defending and Reclaiming the Commons; Trade; Peace and Peoples' Security; Alternatives and China. ... These thematic areas are complemented by country based programmes in India, the Philippines and Thailand. Teams made up of staff from each of the country offices are responsible for taking forward work on each thematic area.²³

This design has been a continuous tension for Focus; not only concerning the asymmetry between India, the Philippines and Thailand, but also given the changing environment and growth of the organization over the years.

Focus's operational structure has two axes: a thematic axis and a country axis. The thematic axis has evolved over time. For example, in 1999, Focus had four thematic areas that were actually called Paradigm Programmes, namely, trade and investment, security, newly industrializing countries; cultural responses to globalization; democratization and development; and NGOs accountabilities. In 2001, there were four thematic areas: economic and financial liberalization; security and conflict; state, markets and civil society; and culture and globalization. The changes in the thematic axes provide an interesting way to see how Focus has attempted to respond to the changes in the global environment.

The country axis also has evolved. In fact, prior to 2002 there were four country programmes conceptualized under the rubric of the Micro-Macro Issues Linking Programme and identified as: India; the People's Democratic Republic of Lao; Regional and Global; and Thailand. Focus has consistently grappled with the problem of the asymmetrical relationship that exists between the head offices of Focus located in Bangkok and the two country programmes located in Manila and Mumbai.

In fact, Focus's current organizational structure, which an internal review report in 2002 referred to as a double matrix structure, did not crystallize until approximately 2003 through a process of attempting to flatten the hierarchy, adapting to the growing complexity of the issues related to globalization and the decentred and horizontal nature of alterglobalization movements. It was through a process of fine-tuning that the hierarchical and less integrated division of labour between the Paradigms Programme and the Micro-Macro Issues Linking Programme became the thematic area-country programmes matrix. An excerpt of the review that deals specifically with Focus's organizational design and exemplifies the process of institutional fine-tuning reads thus:

There is an immediate need to streamline the organisational structure, systems and processes. There is a need to streamline and reconcile the programme structure with the organisational structure, including responsibility and authority centres. The exercise should also include the repositioning of country programmes in the overall organisational structure in a way that will increase staff connectivity and communication, as well as synergy with thematic programming. In each country programme, it is important that the staff remain connected to the issues that Focus is working on at international level. As we observed in the Thai programme, the integration from the country programme to the global programme comes partly because some staff members are involved at both levels. In this sense, it would be important to define how to strengthen the dynamics between the country programmes and other Focus international activities...The organisation could be seen with a double entry matrix structure, using geographic and thematic divisions (Focus on the Global South 2003:27).

²³ See the Focus on the Global South Web site at www.focusweb.org/focus-on-trade, accessed in July 2007.

Indeed, through the process of operationalizing its mandate and objectives, on the one hand, and fine-tuning its organizational structure (that is, streamlining), on the other, Focus has developed into a matrix-type organization.

Latin American mobilizations against the free trade areas

NGOs tend to pose the problem of changing trade rules and barriers, on the one hand, through the technical lenses of economic theory as a problem of market access, tariffs and the like and, on the other hand, as the problem of the legitimacy and logic of the WTO and the Bretton Woods institutions. This perspective is exemplified either by the debate between, for example, Focus on the Global South and Oxfam concerning the market-access campaign (Bello 2002) or through NGO lobbying against the WTO.

Social movements, by contrast, pose the problem of changing trade rules and barriers as a more general social problem (as opposed to a specific economic problem) that impinges upon the concrete lives of individuals (as opposed to the conditions of the society). The technical arguments concerning market access, tariffs and protectionism are replaced by the common sense, everyday critiques of how the logic of neoliberal globalization leads to problems, for example, of access to water, environmental degradation, privatization of health services and precarious employment. More on the ground than NGOs, social movements interpret the problem of changing trade rules and barriers through national and regional frames of reference, as opposed to the international frame of reference of NGOs.

The Latin American mobilizations against the FTAs are an example of how the movement to change international trade rules and barriers is interpreted and takes form through social movements. Here, the adverse effects of neoliberal globalization on the life-world of different local communities are interpreted as the erosion of national sovereignty, either as the problem of US imperialism or as the exploitation by transnational corporations. Indeed, the research team of the two Latin American country studies that were commissioned by the UNRISD project on *Global Civil Society Movements: Dynamics in International Campaigns and National Implementation*—namely, Argentina and Bolivia—have concluded that in the region the task of changing international trade rules and barriers has taken the form of mobilizations by a plurality of social movement against the FTAs.²⁴

These mobilizations are an example of the evolution of social movements; that is, they are a manifestation of the linking up of different movements and development of massive campaigns. Through their mobilizations against the FTAs, the Latin American social movements have increasingly used information technology and the compression of space and time to link up; but this interconnectivity has also been a result of the dialectical relationship between social movements and globalization: Latin American social movements have become increasingly linked to the extent that the social problems in Latin America have become increasingly regionalized. This interconnectivity, as suggested above, could be called networks. And yet, because the term network is used here to describe another type of civil society group (the one described in the following section), this linking of social movements will be referred to as “campaigns”, “coalitions” or “massive mobilizations”. This is not a purely nominalistic problem: there are organizational reasons for this choice. Social movements not only lack a certain internal structure and coherence, but they also link up as a reaction to a particular problem and not as a result of some type of institutional or organizational necessity. In this case, they linked up because of the proliferation of trade agreements in the context of regional integration.

²⁴ “Indeed, when one maps out the organizations in Argentina, we do not find any of the types mentioned by the author (per Ghimire in the section he dedicates to the movement to change international trade rules and barriers in his 2005 study). What we find rather is a coalition of social organizations—political, religious, militant groups, syndicates—that come together to reject the liberalization of the market in their respective realms. In Argentina, like in other Latin American countries, the debates concerning international commerce in the last few years have been strongly linked to the initiatives against the free trade areas in the region” (Grimson and Pereyra forthcoming). As for the Bolivian research team, they reached the same conclusion: “In Bolivia, this theme of changing trade rules and barriers is linked to the campaigns and mobilizations against the US-led Free Trade Area of the Americas and other free trade areas” (Mayorga and Córdova forthcoming). (Author’s translations.)

Throughout the 1990s—after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rise of neoliberal governments, for example, in Argentina, Bolivia and Peru—an FTA in Latin American countries was proposed by the United States. On the one hand, the radical Left had laid down its arms and had accepted the basic coordinates of democratic dialogue (Castañeda 2005) and, on the other, the Bretton Woods institutions were gradually increasing their sway in the region.

Recently, however, in the context of the recent shift to the Left (Sader 2006; Touraine 2006), the less-than-perfect track record of the Washington consensus in the region (Stiglitz 2003) and the rise of non-state actors from civil society and business discussed above, the FTAs are no longer a given. In this context, Latin American countries must take seriously alternative trade regimes, which represent, at the same time, different strategies of regional integration: namely, the FTAs (for example, the Free Trade Area of the Americas and the Central American Free Trade Agreement), the Southern Common Market and the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas.²⁵

Spearheaded by the United States and supported by the majority of the economic elites in the region, the FTAs are founded upon continuity with that process of economic liberalization espoused by the Bretton Woods institutions. Combining principles of free trade and South-South cooperation, the Southern Common Market is led by several Southern Cone countries, including Argentina and Brazil. In addition, championed by Venezuela and supported by an increasing number of progressive civil society groups, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas represents the alterglobalization agenda as manifested, for example, by the plurality of regional and thematic forums modelled after the World Social Forum.

Without attempting to be exhaustive, and taking into consideration the studies on the subject that have already been discussed, I will compare the Latin American mobilizations with the FTAs in two contexts: Argentina and Bolivia. This will provide two concrete examples of how the movement to change trade rules and barriers has taken form through social movements.

In Argentina, the movement against the FTAs resulted in the formation of the coalition *Autoconvocatoria No al ALCA, No a la Deuda, No a la Militarización y No a la Pobreza*. Currently, there are 107 civil society actors, the large majority of which could be defined as social movements and which constitute the *Autoconvocatoria No al ALCA*. Table 11 shows the diversity of these actors, which range from human rights groups to religion-based and feminist movements. Indeed, the composition of the *Autoconvocatoria No al ALCA* points to the postmodern diversity of mobilizations. Approximately 50 per cent of the actors come from the ranks of student movements and academic associations, political parties from the radical Left and the more traditional labour movements. The relative importance of community empowerment initiatives and local and thematic social forums should also be underlined.²⁶

Following Tarrow (1993 and 2004), UNRISD country researchers have suggested, that this coalition was constituted by both national and regional processes. While the national processes made possible the territorial expansion of a plurality of movements, the regional processes allowed for the diffusion and articulation of the extraterritorial scope of the coalition. There were two national processes: the first took form through the *Comité de Movilización contra el ALCA*, which was created in 2001 with the support of the union *la Central de los Trabajadores Argentinos*. The second was concretized through the *Frente Nacional contra la Pobreza*, a multisector campaign that ended with a popular referendum in December 2001 (Grimson and Pereyra 2007).

In Bolivia, mobilization against the FTAs took form through a coalition of social movements that was originally called the *Movimiento Boliviano de Lucha contra el TLC y el ALCA* and later became known as the *Movimiento Boliviano por la Soberanía y la Integración Solidaria* de

²⁵ See the Web sites of the FTAs at www.ftaa-alca.org/alca_s.asp; www.cafta.gob.sv; www.mercosur.int/msweb; www.alternativabolivariana.org.

²⁶ See the *Autoconvocatoria No al ALCA* Web site at www.noalalca.org.ar.

los Pueblos.²⁷ Financially supported by the Fundación Solón, this coalition defined itself in 2002 as a “democratic, open, horizontal non-partisan space of all the social sectors, organizations, and institutions that aims to exert the autonomy of the Bolivian people to decide over the future of the country and of the world in which we live” (Mayorga and Córdova forthcoming; author’s translation). As Mayorga and Córdova suggested, this coalition underwent a fundamental transformation: it went from a protest agenda of negation, where it opposed the US-imposed FTAs, to a constructive agenda that stressed the importance of a regional community of countries grounded in a principle of solidarity and not economic profit. This coalition has its genesis in the so-called Water War in Cochabamba in 2000, which was a crisis of the traditional parties, the failures of neoliberal policies and privatization.

Table 11: Composition of the Argentinean self-convened coalition against the Free Trade Area of the Americas

Sector	Number	Percentage
Student movements/academic associations	18	16.5
Political parties	15	13.8
Labour and trade unions	14	12.8
Community empowerment initiatives	13	11.9
Local and thematic social forums	10	9.2
Cultural initiatives	7	6.4
Anti-FTA and alterglobalization groups	7	6.4
Foundations	7	6.4
Human rights organizations	4	3.6
Environmental groups	3	2.7
Religion-based initiatives	3	2.7
Feminist groups	2	1.8
Other types of organizations	6	5.5

Source: Autoconvocatoria No al ALCA Web site at www.noalalca.org.ar, accessed in July 2007.

The Trade Justice Movement

“The Trade Justice Movement is a fast growing group of organisations including trade unions, aid agencies, environment and human rights campaigns, fair trade organisations, faith and consumer groups.”²⁸ This is how the Trade Justice Movement describes itself, and it is clear that it is a network of civil society groups. It also undergirds what is perhaps the most important characteristic of the third type of movement, namely, that it brings together and links increasingly pluralized civil society actors. Diachronically, it links the more classical trade unions with the more postmodern fair trade groups; and synchronically, it brings together a diversity of sectors including religion, education, labour, environment and women.

The Trade Justice Movement is made up of approximately 80 civil society groups with over nine million members. Table 12 categorizes these groups, while a more in-depth analysis of the Web pages of these different organizations helps to further understand the structure of the Trade Justice Movement.

First, this analysis suggested that all of the civil society actors that constitute the Trade Justice Movement are based in the United Kingdom, with the majority based in London and several in Scotland. This corresponds with what was described above concerning the network-type in that the Trade Justice Movement is a Northern civil society group.

²⁷ See the Movimiento Boliviano por la Soberanía y la Integración Solidaria de los Pueblos Web site at www.boliviasoberana.org.

²⁸ See the Trade Justice Movement Web site at www.tjm.org.uk/about.shtml, accessed in July 2007.

Second, as shown in table 12, the analysis revealed that the majority of the groups that constitute the Trade Justice Movement are NGOs. This concurs with the previously stated homology that exists between networks and NGOs. This is reflected in their formulation of the problem of globalization and, specifically, in the fact that the Trade Justice Movement works within the institutional framework of globalization and that it suggests a less radical break, and more reforms. As an extension of NGOs, it is contrasted with the plateau-type represented by the World Social Forum that is discussed below.

Third, several sectors of civil society constitute the Trade Justice Movement: religious, unions, student, women and fair trade, which is typical of a network that attempts to bring together the different groups.

A fourth and final characteristic is that the majority of these groups have either an African or international scope. This brings forth another characteristic that could be called the pretension to universality of the network-type.

Table 12: Composition of the Trade Justice Movement

Type	Number	Percentage
NGO	36	45.0
Church based	23	28.7
Trade union	7	6.7
Social movements	5	6.3
Fair trade	4	5.0
Student organizations	4	5.0
Other	1	1.3

Source: Author's analysis.

These characteristics of the Trade Justice Movement are clearly revealed through its mandate, which is to lobby the United Kingdom government so as to influence its trade policy toward the South.

The UK Government should... Fight to ensure that governments, particularly in poor countries, can choose the best solutions to end poverty and protect the environment. ... End export dumping that damages the livelihoods of poor communities around the world. ... Make laws that stop big business profiting at the expense of people and the environment.²⁹

This is typical of the modus operandi of NGOs that attempt to influence their governments. Focus on the Global South attempts to represent and influence Southern governments; the Trade Justice Movement attempts to influence Northern governments—in this case the United Kingdom.

The Trade Justice Movement uses Jubilee 2000 as a point of reference:

The Jubilee 2000 movement showed the world that by acting together, we can bring about change. By working together on trade—through the Trade Justice Movement—organisations hope to have a much bigger impact than they could ever have if they worked in isolation. Formed at the end of 2000, the goal of the Trade Justice Movement is fundamental change of the unjust rules and institutions governing international trade, so that trade is made to work for all.³⁰

²⁹ See the Trade Justice Movement Web site at www.tjm.org.uk/about.shtml, accessed in July 2007.

³⁰ See the Trade Justice Movement Web site at www.tjm.org.uk/about.shtml, accessed in July 2007.

This notion of fundamental change has to be understood in the context of the North: what is meant here is not the fundamental change of the trade system as proposed by Focus on the Global South, but fundamental change in the sense of changing the orientation of trade rules and barriers.

The organizational structure and internal governance of the Trade Justice Movement reflects the homology with NGOs: the logic of representation and transparency. Yet, for the NGO organizational structure, it was individuals representing the organization. Here, individuals who represent organizations attempt to account for the network. The governing body of the Trade Justice Movement is the Board of Directors, elected annually from and by the membership. Each Trade Justice Movement member organization has the right to nominate a candidate for election at the annual general meeting and each member has one vote in each election.

The Trade Justice Movement Planning Group is appointed annually by the Trade Justice Movement Board of Directors and oversees the coalition's campaigning activities and strategies. It is also responsible for: (i) developing campaign strategies; (ii) deciding campaign policy positions; (iii) leading on the development and delivery of campaign activities; and (iv) supervising working groups to deliver Trade Justice Movement activities, including policy, events, media and parliamentary groups.

The doctrine or programme that undergirds the operations of the Trade Justice Movement is entitled *For Whose Benefit?—Making Trade Work for People and the Planet*. This statement presents a positive agenda for bringing about change that attempts to use the trade system to achieve "sustainable development and poverty eradication".³¹ It is said that although their primary target is the WTO, it can also be applied to other institutions that support neoliberal globalization as well as the local, national and international trade policy government bodies.

The doctrine is divided into four parts and begins with an introduction that puts forth the need to change the trade system. The second section concretely lays out the positive change that the Trade Justice Movement envisions, while the third section elucidates what this positive agenda implies for the WTO. After a brief conclusion, it ends with an annex concerning the gender dimension of trade.

The doctrine argues for the need for trade rules, but at the same time it critiques the narrow commercial logic of the status quo that has systematically favoured Northern countries and multinational companies. From here, the Trade Justice Movement argues:

The challenge facing the international community is to make the trade system reflect the concerns of civil society and work for poverty eradication and sustainable development. It is essential that governments adopt a new approach in the trade negotiations launched in Doha and that this marks the beginning of a new era in trade policy-making, which puts the needs of people and the environment at its heart.³²

Positioning the Trade Justice Movement against the radical alterglobalization interpretation factions of the global justice movement, the doctrine marshals a positive agenda for trade through the enumeration of nine principles: "We stand for trade"; "We stand for rules"; "We stand for democracy"; "We stand for co-operation"; "We stand for fairness"; "We stand for action to eradicate poverty"; "We stand for sustainability and environmental protection"; "We stand for diversity"; and "We stand for negotiations".³³

³¹ See the Trade Justice Movement Web site at www.tjm.org.uk/about/statement.shtml, accessed in July 2007.

³² See the Trade Justice Movement Web site at www.tjm.org.uk/about/statement.shtml, accessed in July 2007.

³³ See the Trade Justice Movement Web site at www.tjm.org.uk/about/statement.shtml, accessed in July 2007.

The third section of the doctrine sets forth what these principles mean specifically for the WTO: “The primary goal of the trade system should be to achieve sustainability and poverty eradication. This requires an appropriate level of regulation to manage trade. Sustainability impact assessments, that use internationally agreed indicators, should be used to inform future trade policy development and measure progress towards this goal”.³⁴

This goal of the Trade Justice Movement is developed through a series of specific measures:³⁵

- The problems that many developing countries are experiencing in implementing existing WTO agreements should be addressed as a priority.
- Meaningful capacity building has to go beyond providing technical assistance to negotiate and implement trade agreements and supporting the activities of developing and least-developed countries in Geneva.
- While huge disparities in the economic and political might of different players remain, a more systematic application of Special and Differential Treatment (S and DT) will be central to any attempt to make trade work better for the poor.
- Agricultural trade rules require significant change.
- A key role for any government is to ensure that all citizens have access to basic services, such as water delivery, housing, health and education.
- Intellectual property rules (including the [Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights] TRIPs Agreement) should be substantially revised to reduce the length and scope of patent protection in developing countries.
- Foreign direct investment (FDI) can make an important contribution to poverty reduction and sustainable development.
- The cost of northern trade barriers to developing countries is estimated at \$700 billion a year in lost export earnings.
- Existing provisions to settle trade policy disputes require serious change.
- Trade can create employment and may enhance workers’ rights.
- Trade rules must not support the unsustainable use of resources.
- The implementation of WTO rules has led to conflict with national measures adopted to meet domestic public concerns.
- The WTO operates within a framework of global agreements.
- The Doha negotiations, launched in November 2001, must be conducted through a process that ensures participation, transparency and democratic oversight.

The World Social Forum

The organizers of the World Social Forum define it as “an open meeting place where social movements, networks, NGOs and other civil society organizations opposed to neo-liberalism and a world dominated by capital or by any form of imperialism come together to pursue their thinking, to debate ideas democratically, for formulate proposals, share their experiences freely and network for effective action”.³⁶

The organizers stress the pluralistic and decentralized nature of this event, adding:

The World Social Forum is also characterized by plurality and diversity; it is non-confessional, non-governmental and non-party. It proposes to facilitate decentralized coordination and networking among organizations engaged in concrete action towards building another world, at any level from the local to

³⁴ See the Trade Justice Movement Web site at www.tjm.org.uk/about/statement.shtml, accessed in July 2007.

³⁵ See the Trade Justice Movement Web site at www.tjm.org.uk/about/statement.shtml, accessed in July 2007.

³⁶ See the World Social Forum Web site at www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main, accessed in July 2007.

the international, but it does not intend to be a body representing world civil society. The World Social Forum is not a group, nor an organization.³⁷

The novelty of this type of civil society process—a plateau of civil society groups—is clear from its Charter of Principles.³⁸

Indeed, as the theorist Chesters argued, “The World Social Forum process is a perfect example of movement plateau(s) with its explicit recognition of the value of, and desire for, a space of enunciation, interaction, and iteration that is coextensive with the actions of movement networks and organizations without trying to represent them, or in turn to be represented by them” (2004:337).

Despite its decentralized structure and focus on direct, participatory democracy, the World Social Forum has a governing body, the International Council, which first met in June 2001 and plays the leading role in the development of guidelines and strategies:

It will not be an authority in a power structure, and will not have mechanisms for disputing representation, nor for voting. Although the IC [International Council] must have a balanced make-up in terms of regional and sectorial diversity, it will not be a bureaucratic structure with any claim to representing world civil society. The representativity of the IC will result from its ability to take the WSF to the world level, and to give it roots, organicity and continuity.³⁹

As with the Trade Justice Movement, an example of the network-type civil society actor, International Council members are organizations and at times networks of networks or movements of movements. The members are charged with the following political and operational responsibilities:

- formulating World Social Forum strategies;
- maintaining contact with international movements, campaigns, initiatives, struggles and other events;
- making the World Social Forum a familiar presence in their respective countries and regions, fostering widespread participation and debate on matters and proposals identified by the World Social Forum;
- promoting and supporting the World Social Forum meetings, identifying potential sites and encouraging participation;
- ensuring reciprocal political, thematic and operational action among the different World Social Forums;
- promoting and supporting the formation of committees in their countries;
- collaborating with the World Social Forum organizing committees providing a structure for topics, methodologies, formats, identification and invitations to speakers and exhibitors;
- engaging in fundraising initiatives.⁴⁰

³⁷ See the World Social Forum Web site at www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main, accessed in July 2007.

³⁸ See the World Social Forum Web site at www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main, accessed in July 2007.

³⁹ See the World Social Forum Web site at www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main, accessed in July 2007.

⁴⁰ The composition of the International Council is determined by the following criteria: (i) adherence to the Charter of Principles; (ii) geographical and regional diversity; (iii) sectorial participation—for example, trade unions, social movements, NGOs and the like; (iv) participation by heads of international and regional networks; (v) commitment to the continuity of the World Social Forum; (vi) no pre-set number of members; and (vii) participants include representatives from international and regional entities and organizations, and international networks and coordinators. Moreover, there are two ways of participating in the International Council: as permanent members and as observers; there are currently 150 permanent members and seven observers.

As Whitaker (2000) suggested, the origins of the World Social Forum can be traced back to the 1998 efforts against the Multilateral Agreement on Investments, which were spearheaded by *Le Monde Diplomatique* and Ralph Nader's Public Citizens. This situation gave rise to a series of alterglobalization movements such as the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC), on the one hand, and to the protests in Seattle against the WTO and in Washington, DC, and Prague against the Bretton Woods institutions, on the other. In this context, a group of activists and intellectuals thought that it would be good to bring together the different networks that had crystallized against neoliberal globalization in an event that would be developed in parallel to the annual summit of the World Economic Forum that had been meeting since 1971.

Whitaker explained:

The idea was, with the participation of all the organizations that were already networking in the mass protests, to arrange another kind of meeting on a world scale—the World Social Forum—directed to social concerns. So as to give a symbolic dimension to the start of this new period, the meeting would take place on the same days as the powerful of the world were to meet in Davos (2000:3).⁴¹

The first World Social Forum was held in Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, on 25–30 January 2001. The location was significant because the Porto Alegre government, which was led by the Brazilian Worker's Party, had been developing a new model of participatory democracy of open assemblies. Indeed, it could be said that this idea of participatory democracy was at the heart of the alterglobalization initiatives of the World Social Forum. The radicalism of the plateau structure was an attempt to radicalize the process of participatory democracy.

Grounded in this idea of participatory democracy and globalization "from below", since its beginning the World Social Forum has called for implementation of regional and thematic forums. I analysed the regional and thematic forums from 2001 to 2007 and noticed that the development of these forums over the years has increased. This pattern parallels the increasing number of individuals that have participated in the annual meeting (see table 13). This can be seen in Southern countries, in Latin America in particular, with Argentina and Brazil leading the initiative, followed by Uruguay and Venezuela. A surprisingly large number of regional and thematic forums have been developed in the United States.

As an alterglobalization event that has its origins in a critique of the World Economic Forum and the institutions of neoliberal globalization, one could expect that the theme of changing trade rules and barriers had been present in each of the seven meetings of the World Social Forum. This theme, however, is developed from the point of view of social movements as a life-world problem and not as a technical isolated problem of the system.

For example, at the first World Social Forum, the issue of changing trade rules and barriers was developed as a part of the third theme, "Civil society and the public arena", in the How to Democratize the International Economic Institutions conference, and as part of the fourth theme, "Democracy and citizens' power", in the Democratizing World Authority conference (World Social Forum 2001).

At the second World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, in 2002, the issue of changing trade rules and barriers was developed in the first theme, "The production of wealth and social reproduction", in the event entitled International Trade: Does the South Need "Financing for Development" from the North?, which was developed by ATTAC Germany. This issue was also addressed in a conference dedicated to the WTO, which explored the type of regulations that are needed for the South; and the event was coordinated by Coordination Solidarité Urgence Développement (World Social Forum 2002).

⁴¹ See also Whitaker (2006) on this subject in general.

Table 13: World Social Forum participation and the proliferation of regional and thematic forums

Year	Location	Total number of participants	Number of delegates (representing civil society groups)	Number of regional and thematic forums
2001	Porto Alegre	20,000	4,700	–
2002	Porto Alegre	50,000	12,274	18
2003	Porto Alegre	100,000	20,000	35
2004	Mumbai	74,126	1,653	37
2005	Porto Alegre	155,000	6,872	32
2006	<i>Total</i>	<i>132,000</i>	–	
	Caracas	77,000	19,000	42
	Bamako	15,000	–	
	Karachi	30,000	–	
2007	Nairobi	80,000–120,000	–	–

Sources: World Social Forum 2006b; Netto 2006; UNESCO 2007.

In 2003, the problem of changing trade rules and barriers was addressed in the first thematic area, “Democratic sustainable development”, as part of the conference entitled The Road to Cancún. This event attempted to explore the problems that the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference represented for developing countries: the strategies that civil society groups might take in the preparatory event to Cancun and the ways in which trade can be a means for achieving sustainable and democratic development (World Social Forum 2003).

In 2004, in Mumbai, the issue of trade rules and barriers was developed in the Where Next for the International Trade Campaign? conference organized by Christian Aid, ActionAid Asia, Focus on the Global South, Hemispheric Social Alliance, and the Africa Trade Network. The speakers were Nicola Bullard (Australia), Juan Carlos Alurralde (Bolivia), Rudolf Amenga-Etego (Ghana), John Samuel (India), Hector de la Cueva (Mexico), Walden Bello (the Phillipines) and Martin Gordon (United Kingdom) (World Social Forum 2004).

In 2005, which saw the return of the World Social Forum to Porto Alegre, the problem of trade rules and barriers was addressed in several of the events with the thematic areas of “Social struggles and democratic alternatives: Against neo-liberal domination” and “Peace, demilitarization and struggle against war, free trade and debt” (World Social Forum 2005).

Radicalizing the approach of decentralization and pluralization that characterizes the World Social Forum, the sixth event in 2006 was polycentric. It was held in three different venues—Bamako, Mali; Karachi, Pakistan; Caracas, Venezuela—and the issue of trade rules and barriers was developed in each location.

In the African venue (Bamako), the problem of trade rules and barriers was addressed in two thematic areas: “Globalized liberalism: Apartheid in worldwide scale and impoverishment” and “International trade, debt and social and economic policies” (World Social Forum 2006a).

In the Asian venue (Karachi), the issue of changing trade rules and barriers was developed as part of the thematic area “Trade development and globalization” in the events entitled Trade–WTO–SAFTA: Asia-Pacific Issues, Trade Free and Trade Union Free Zones; International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and Other International Financial Institution’s Control of Economies; Regional Common Trade; and Impact of Neo-Liberal and Globalization Policies.

And in the Americas venue (Caracas), the issue was developed as part of the thematic area, “Imperial strategies and peoples’ resistance”, which aimed to bring together the issue of militarization and neoliberalism. There were at least three events that addressed changing trade

rules and barriers: Commodification of Life and its Legal-Institutional Instruments: Free Trade, Foreign Debt and International Financial Institutions; WTO, the FTAA and FTAs: Multinational Corporations; and New Perspectives for Regional Integration and People's Integration (World Social Forum 2006b; Netto 2006).

In the latest gathering of the World Social Forum, in Nairobi, in 2007, the issue of changing trade rules and barriers was presented in several events: Free Trade Agreements Revisited – US and EU Strategies to Enhance Their Corporate Globalization Agenda at a Moment of WTO Suspension, organized by Our World is Not for Sale; Free Trade, WTO, and Food Sovereignty, organized by Greek Net for an Alternative Agriculture; and WTO: Which Regulation for the Market?, organized by Coordination Solidarité Urgence Developpement (World Social Forum 2007).

IV. Conclusion

In the sociohistorical context (T+I+M+N societies) of the proliferation of non-state actors and the growing autonomy of civil society, I have argued that it is important to distinguish between different types of civil society actors. These different types of actors not only have different structural attributes and *modus operandi*, but also different normative conceptions of globalization, social justice, the problem of changing trade rules and barriers and so on. I drew on the Weberian idea of elective affinity as a strategy for correlating these functional and substantive differences as well as for conceptualizing the idea of these different types of civil society actors as carriers of different normative conceptions of civil society, conceptions that are at times in conflict with one another.

With the Weberian idea of routinization of charisma, I cast the classic distinction between NGOs and social movements according to the inverse relationship that exists between the level of institutionalization and leverage against the world (that is, radicality) of ideas. This inverse relationship brought forth the following diametrically opposed tensions between NGOs and social movements: more institutionalized and thus more attached to the worldly institutions, NGOs are able to exert relative influence; yet this influence is achieved at the cost of the leverage of their ideas. By contrast, less institutionalized and thus less attached to worldly institutions, social movements have less influence; yet they are able to conserve the world-rejecting potential of their ideas, principles, and objectives.

Moreover, in order to account for the problem of complexity that is generated by the information technology revolution (the interconnectivity and space-time compression generated by the network social form), I added two other categories to this NGO-civil society dichotomy. In addition to these two building blocks of contemporary civil society, I proposed the categories of network and plateau, which are the information-age correlates of NGOs and social movements, respectively. That is, while each of these two types of civil society actors attempts to use the network social form to improve their efficaciousness, each deploys this technology of interconnectivity from its own logic of social action and its own model of civil society. Thus, on the one hand, with NGOs, networks of civil society actors attempt to use the network social form to push beyond the limits of bureaucratic rationality, to improve their efficaciousness as well as their transparency. While, on the other hand, with social movements, plateaus of civil society actors use the network social form to improve the possibilities of participatory democracy as well as the cathetic and therapeutic potential of their symbols and language.

The Weberian thesis of the iron cage helped bring forth the normative dimension of this perspective. Paradoxically, the process of formalization, rationalization and institutionalization desired by civil society actors in order to achieve greater influence has the effect of undercutting their legitimacy and emancipatory potential. Thus, for example, the economic and juridical ties weaved by NGOs in order to influence – and perpetuate – the worldly institutions are at times

instrumentalized by the institutions in order to legitimize themselves. I described this new form of social conflict with the ideas of soft power and netwar.

I further developed the iron cage thesis with the help of the Habermasian distinction between life-world and system. Driven by the communicative rationality of hermeneutic knowledge, the face-to-face intersubjective relations that constitute the life-world provide society with its normative foundations. By contrast, the system, that sphere of society constituted by impersonal institutionalized relations grounded and driven by the logic of instrumental knowledge, provides societies with the mechanisms needed to grow and become more complex. Habermas recasts the Weberian thesis of the iron cage as the idea of the colonization of the life-world by the system, that is, as the problem of the penetration of the life-world by the system, as the problem of the annihilation of the everyday language and symbols by the steering media of money and bureaucratic power. I used these two Habermasian categories to frame the different models of civil society used by the four types of civil society actors. NGOs and networks of civil society actors understand civil society from the point of view of the system, while social movements and plateaus of civil society actors understand civil society from the point of view of the life-world. Table 14 classifies these types according to this normative problematic, which is nothing more than the struggle between two different models of civil society, namely, civil society qua life-world and civil society qua system.

Table 14: The problem of the normative foundations of civil society

Normative Ground	Life-world	System
Level of complexity		
Low	Social movements	NGOs
High	Plateaus	Networks

Source: Author's analysis.

I used the typology of civil society actors and its undergirding normative problematic to conceptualize that particular movement of the global justice movement, namely the movement to change international trade rules and barriers. With this framework it can now be seen that, as carriers of the model of civil society as life-world, the Latin American mobilizations against the FTAs and the World Social Forum enjoy the normative foundations to change trade rules and barriers, but lack the money and power that is needed to bring about these changes. As carriers of the model of civil society as system, Focus on the Global South and the Trade Justice Movement enjoy the money and power to change trade rules and barriers, but they lack the normative foundations.

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