



# THE STATUS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN ZAMBIA:

# CHALLENGES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

#### FOREWORD

Progress towards higher levels of human development can be measured by the expansion of choices and freedoms that the public enjoys. This includes how far the voices of the poor and vulnerable can influence national policy and investment debates and decisions. Having such an empowering public space pre-supposes the existence of effective, responsive and accountable public institutions that can take actions that serve the needs of the people. But they cannot do so alone. While state bodies must play their roles to ensure that the gains of development grow and are accessed in an equitable and just manner, civil society organisations (CSOs) must play a set of complementary roles to develop and adapt locally relevant programmes, provide key development services, ensure a monitoring and 'watch dog' function to make sure things are on track, and most importantly provide and protect the right of the community to actively engage in determining their own paths to greater human development.

However, the mere presence of civil society organisations in a country is not sufficient. Responsible civil society leadership, the capabilities of civil society organisations, the evidence based analysis and reliable data which form the basis for judgement and decisions, and the strategic partnerships that define civil society networks are all essential to a relevant and effective CSO role in the country.

This report analyses this multi-faceted nature of CSOs, whether formal or informal in nature, in order to gain a greater understanding of the characteristics that make them a valued partner in the development process, the challenges they encounter, and the capabilities most needed to play their expected roles. The focus on what are defined as priority capacities is of course a constantly changing scenario, based on evolving demands and expectations by the client community. However, experience shows that some key CSO capacity ingredients remain constant, no matter the context and development trends, such as the capacity to engage in dialogue, and to negotiate based on local needs; the capacity to manage and deliver essential products and services to the community where such is not carried out by others; and the capacity to count, track and monitor the programme actions and investments of state and international partners, so they best serve the needs of the community. And to bring it together, the report highlights the local leadership capacities of civil society and their organisations that enable communities make locally relevant and locally owned decisions on what works best for them.

We hope this report will add to the body of knowledge on civil society role and contributions in Zambia, in the following ways: (i) it serves as an update on the state of civil society organisation in Zambia; (ii) it provides a starting point for dialogue and design of capacity development support to CSOs, to better enable them to carry out their roles; (iii) it facilitates strategic partnership opportunities, between public sector-private sector and civil society to address national development challenges together and iv) it provides opportunities to deepen dialogue and action between civil society and international organisations. In doing so, we hope this report will also indirectly facilitate the enlarging of that public space to constantly engage people, state institutions and partners on the sixth national development plan, and the policies, investments and programmes that derive from it, to ensure they are on track and responsive to evolving needs especially of those who are less fortunate and could otherwise be left behind by the country's progress.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AVAP	Anti-Voter Apathy
BCI	Basic Capability Index
CBOs	Community-based Organisations
CCJDP	Catholic Commission for Justice, Development and Peace
CCMG	Christian Churches' Monitoring Group
CCZ	Christian Council of Zambia
CHAZ	Churches Association of Zambia
CHIN	Children in Need Network
CSI	Civil Society Index
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CSPR	Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
CSUZ	Civil Servants Union of Zambia
EAZ	Economics Association of Zambia
EFZ	Evangelical Fellowship in Zambia
EU	European Union
FBOs	Faith-based Organisations
FDD	Forum for Democracy and Development
FNDP	Fifth National Development Plan
FODEP	Foundation for Democratic Process
GEI	Gender Equity Index
GIDD	Gender in Development Division
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JCTR	Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection
LAZ	Law Association of Zambia
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MP	Member of Parliament
MS-Zambia	Danish Association for International Cooperation
NGOCC	Non-Governmental Organisations' Coordinating Committee
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
PAZA	Press Association of Zambia
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

SACCORD	Southern African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UPND	United Party for National Development
UNZASU	University of Zambia Students' Union
WfC	Women for Change
ZCEA	Zambia Civic Education Association
ZCSD	Zambia Council for Social Development
ZCTU	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
ZEC	Zambia Episcopal Conference
ZANEC	Zambia National Education Coalition
ZNAN	Zambia National Aids Network
ZNBC	Zambia National Broadcasting Cooperation

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Civil Society Index (CSI) is a global, comparative and action-oriented research project organised by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation and conducted by, and for, civil society. The CSI project in Zambia was carried out between 2008 and 2010 by the Zambian Council for Social Development (ZCSD), which is an umbrella organisation for civil society organisations (CSOs) in Zambia supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The CSI is a participatory, action-research project which assesses the state of civil society in countries around the world, in order to generate knowledge to strengthen civil society. It is based on CIVICUS' (2008) broad definition of civil society as *"the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market, which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests."* 

The CSI methodology uses a combination of participatory and scientific research methods to generate an assessment of the state of civil society at the national level. The CSI country implementing team for Zambia used multiple methods which combined primary and secondary data to gather information. Three surveys were conducted: a Population Survey, an Organisational Survey and an External Perception Survey. Besides these, combinations of other outputs were included, such as five case studies. These were undertaken to focus on different key aspects of civil society, including its sectoral and geographical coverage, accountability, impact on policy and the role of corporate social responsibility. The principle outputs include this Analytical Country Report and a Policy Action Brief to follow.

The CSI measures the following core dimensions:

- (1) Civic Engagement
- (2) Level of Organisation
- (3) Practice of Values
- (4) Perceived Impact
- (5) External Environment

These dimensions are illustrated visually through the Civil Society Diamond, which is one of the most essential and best-known components of the CSI project. Figure 1 shows the Civil Society Diamond for Zambia.




FIGURE 1: CSI Diamond for Zambia 2010

All of the dimensions received similar scores, ranging between 57.1% and 60.7%.

Civic Engagement in issues of a political or social nature is rated at 60.7%. However, engagement was seen to have declined compared to the early 1990s, when support for the democratic government was rekindled. The majority of Zambians who do engage in civic activities engage principally in religious activities. This has a negative impact on social development and policy making processes in Zambia.

The Practice of Values in civil society is scored at 59.2%. Democratic processes are in place but there are issues of perceived corruption and the 'personalisation of organisations'. The Level of Organisation score is at 58.3%. From the Organisational Survey, civil society was perceived as being organised but with non-transparent decision-making processes, and with board members of a lower quality than those in the corporate sector, due to internal politics. In some cases, boards are put in place just to fulfil donors' funding conditions. The rating of the Perception of Impact dimension stands at 60.3%, but civil society's influence has been limited by a lack of institutionalised mechanisms and weak links to government policy processes. There are neither laws nor regulations binding government to involve civil society in national policy processes.

Finally, the External Environment is to some extent enabling at 57.1%. However, there are legal restrictions such as the Societies Act, which give government power to regulate civil society in Zambia.

## Strengths and Weaknesses of Civil Society in Zambia

The strengths and weaknesses presented here are a synthesis of various consultations that were held during the CSI implementation process in Zambia, including Regional Consultative meetings, the National Advisory Group and the National Consultative workshop.

The major strengths of civil society in Zambia are:

- Its ability to mobilise into social movements on contentious governance issues.
- Strong sectoral networks among like-minded CSOs.
- CSOs have a strong influence in tackling social issues in the country.

The major weaknesses of civil society in Zambia are:

- The lack of a comprehensive enabling legislation on CSOs.
- The lack of institutionalised mechanisms for citizens' participation in policy-making processes.
- Weak dialogue between government and civil society on governance issues.
- Heavy reliance on donor funding leading to competition among CSOs for funding and a lack of autonomy in devising strategies for development.
- The poor regional distribution of civil society most CSOs in Zambia are concentrated in urban areas, while more intervention is needed in rural areas.

- Duplication and contradictions in activities due to a lack of effective coordination and collaboration within and between sectors of activity, regions and issues.
- High dependence on volunteers and high staff turnover.
- The absence of a code of conduct: some CSOs have abrogated their mandate to pursue their own interests.

## Recommendations

The following recommendations came from various consultation processes in the CSI study:

- Currently the NGO Act No. 16 of 2009 does not apply to churches, clubs, professional groups or organisations, trade unions and religious organisations. As such there is need for further revision of the Act in order to accommodate the types of CSOs which are not covered.
- Civil society should lobby government to reinforce existing structures (such as Sectoral Advisory Groups) in order to strengthen citizen participation in policy-making processes.
- There is need for further inquiry on how dialogue between government and civil society can be strengthened, particularly on issues of governance, participation, human rights and the rule of law.
- It was felt that CSOs are highly dependent on donor funding and usually have no say on how funds should be used. Therefore, there is need for them to develop income generating activities in order to have more independence in their development interventions.
- Since rural communities seem to be underserviced by CSOs, it was felt that there was need for CSOs to spread their activities to rural areas and help in mobilising self-help groups and networking.
- There is need for networking and coordination between CSOs and the Government to avoid duplication and contradiction in development interventions.
- In addition to the guidelines provided in the NGO Act on how CSOs should carry their operations, there was a felt need that CSOs should institute a code of conduct to address matters pertaining to their accountability.

## INTRODUCTION

This report presents findings of the CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation Civil Society Index (CSI) research project on the assessment of the current state of civil society in Zambia, conducted between 2008 and 2010. CIVICUS is an international alliance of more than 800 CSOs in over 100 countries, founded on the principles of strengthening citizen participation and civil society contribution to positive social change globally. The study on Zambia was undertaken by the Zambian Council for Social Development (ZCSD), an umbrella organisation for CSOs in Zambia, with financial and technical assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

This report is organised in six sections as follows:

Section I: Civil Society Index Project and Approach deals with the CSI project approach, research methodology and conceptual framework.

Section II: Civil Society in Zambia gives the conceptual definition of civil society in the Zambian context, as well as a historical perspective of civil society in Zambia. It also shows how legacies of the past have continued to influence the manifestation of civil society in Zambia.

Section III: Analysis of Civil Society in Zambia, presents the CSI findings on the state of civil society in Zambia in relation to the following core dimensions of the CSI framework: Civic Engagement, Level of Organisation, Practice of Values, Perception of Impact, and External Environment.

Section IV: Strengths and Weaknesses of Civil Society in Zambia, highlights in a summary the identified strengths and weaknesses of civil society in Zambia.

Section V: Recommendations, addresses concrete actions, in the form of recommendations by which civil society's role can be strengthened in Zambia.

Section VI: Conclusions, gives an overall impression of civil society emerging from the CSI project in Zambia.

## I CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX PROJECT AND APPROACH

Civil society is playing an increasingly important role in governance and development around the world. In most countries, however, knowledge about the state and shape of civil society is limited. Moreover, opportunities for civil society stakeholders to come together to collectively discuss, reflect and act on the strengths, weaknesses, challenges and opportunities also remain limited. The CSI, a participatory action-research project assessing the state of civil society in countries around the world, contributes to redressing these limitations. It aims at creating a knowledge base and momentum for civil society strengthening.

## 1. Project Background

The CSI first emerged as a concept over a decade ago as a follow-up to the 1997 *New Civic Atlas* publication by CIVICUS, which contained profiles of civil society in 60 countries around the world (Heinrich and Naidoo, 2001). The first version of the CSI methodology, developed by CIVICUS with the help of Helmut Anheier, was unveiled in 1999. An initial pilot of the tool was carried out in 2000 in 13 countries.<sup>1</sup> The pilot implementation process and results were evaluated. This evaluation informed a revision of the methodology. Subsequently, CIVICUS successfully implemented the first complete phase of the CSI between 2003 and 2006 in 53 countries worldwide. This implementation directly involved more than 7,000 civil society stakeholders (Heinrich 2008). This was the first implementation of the CSI in Zambia.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The pilot countries were Belarus, Canada, Croatia, Estonia, Indonesia, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Romania, South Africa, Ukraine, Uruguay and Wales.

1. Albania	14. Ghana	28. Niger
2. Argentina	15. Italy	29. Philippines
3. Armenia	16. Japan	30. Russia
4. Bahrain	17. Jordan	31. Serbia
5. Belarus	18. Kazakhstan	32. Slovenia
6. Bulgaria	19. Kosovo	33. South Korea
7. Burkina Faso	20. Lebanon	34. Sudan
8. Chile	21. Liberia	35. Togo
9. Croatia	22. Macedonia	36. Turkey
10. Cyprus	23. Madagascar	37. Uganda
11. Djibouti	24. Mali	38. Ukraine
12. Democratic	25. Malta	39. Uruguay
Republic of Congo	26. Mexico	40. Venezuela
13. Georgia	27. Nicaragua	41. Zambia

TABLE I.1.1: Countries participating in the CSI 2008-2010 implementation<sup>2</sup>

## 2. Project Approach

The current CSI project approach continues to marry assessment and evidence with reflections and action. This approach provides an important reference point for all work carried out within the framework of the CSI. As such, CSI does not produce knowledge for its own sake, but instead seeks to directly apply the knowledge generated to stimulate strategies that enhance the effectiveness and role of civil society. With this in mind, the CSI's fundamental methodological bedrocks, which have greatly influenced the implementation that this report is based upon, include the following:<sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Note that this list was accurate at the time of publication of this Analytical Country Report, but may have changed slightly due to countries being added and dropped during the implementation cycle.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For in-depth explanations of these principles, please see Mati, Silva and Anderson (2010), Assessing and Strengthening Civil Society Worldwide: An updated programme description of the CIVICUS Civil Society Index Phase 2008-2010. CIVICUS, Johannesburg.

*Inclusiveness:* The CSI framework strives to incorporate a variety of theoretical viewpoints, as well as being inclusive in terms of civil society indicators, actors and processes included in the project.

*Universality:* Since the CSI is a global project, its methodology seeks to accommodate national variations in context and concepts within its framework.

*Comparability:* The CSI aims not to rank, but instead to comparatively measure different aspects of civil society worldwide. The possibility for comparisons exists both between different countries or regions within one phase of CSI implementation and between phases.

*Versatility:* The CSI is specifically designed to achieve an appropriate balance between international comparability and national flexibility in the implementation of the project.

*Dialogue:* One of the key elements of the CSI is its participatory approach, involving a wide range of stakeholders who collectively own and run the project in their respective countries.

*Capacity Development:* Country partners are firstly trained on the CSI methodology during a three day regional workshop. After the training, partners are supported through the implementation cycle by the CSI team at CIVICUS. Partners participating in the project also gain substantial skills in research, training and facilitation in implementing the CSI incountry.

*Networking:* The participatory and inclusive nature of the different CSI tools (e.g. focus groups, the Advisory Committee, the National Workshops) should create new spaces where very diverse actors can discover synergies and forge new alliances, including at a cross-sectoral level. Some countries in the last phase have also participated in regional conferences to discuss the CSI findings as well as cross-national civil society issues.

*Change:* The principal aim of the CSI is to generate information that is of practical use to civil society practitioners and other primary stakeholders. Therefore, the CSI framework seeks to identify aspects of civil society that can be changed and to generate information and knowledge relevant to action-oriented goals.

With the above mentioned foundations, the CSI methodology uses a combination of participatory and scientific research methods to generate an assessment of the state of civil society at the national level. The CSI measures the following core dimensions:

- (1) Civic Engagement
- (2) Level of Organisation
- (3) Practice of Values
- (4) Perceived Impact
- (5) External Environment

These dimensions are illustrated visually through the Civil Society Diamond, which is one of the most essential and best-known components of the CSI project. To form the Civil Society Diamond, 67 quantitative indicators are aggregated into 28 sub-dimensions that are then assembled into the five final dimensions along a 0-100 percentage scale. The Diamond's size seeks to portray an empirical picture of the state of civil society, the conditions that support or inhibit civil society's development, as well as the consequences of civil society's activities for society at large. The context or environment is represented visually by a circle around the axes of the Civil Society Diamond, and is not regarded as part of the state of civil society but rather as something external that still remains a crucial element for its wellbeing.

#### 2.1 Conceptual framework: how to define civil society?

At the heart of CSI's conceptual framework is, obviously, the concept of civil society. According to CIVICUS (2008), civil society is "the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market, which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests." CIVICUS places emphasis on the importance of civil society's role in providing a public space where diverse societal values and interests interact:

The term 'arena' is used to describe the particular realm or space in a society where people come together to debate, discuss, associate, and seek to influence broader society. CIVICUS strongly believes that this 'arena' is distinctly different from other arenas in society, such as the market, state or family. (*CIVICUS, 2008*)

In as much as CIVICUS uses a standard definition of civil society, it recognises the complexity of defining civil society, and that the reality of civil society varies greatly around the world. CIVICUS therefore allows individual countries to adopt their own definitions, provided the adopted definitions are broad enough to cover a wide range of manifestations of civil society in a given country (CIVICUS, 2008). However, in the Zambian study, it was agreed to uphold the CIVICUS definition as it sufficed in the current manifestation of civil society in Zambia.

#### 2.2. Linking research with action

The CSI is not purely an academic exercise, meant to generate knowledge for its own sake. It values putting knowledge to productive use by involving stakeholders in the life cycle of the research process, to contribute and provide recommendations on how to strengthen civil society (CIVICUS, 2008). Implementing the CSI affords an opportunity for civil society actors to network, raise awareness around critical issues, promote participation and reflection, and build capacity for civil society. The CSI also actively involves and disseminates its findings to a broad range of stakeholders including governments, donors, academics and the public at large.




FIGURE I.2.1: CSI Project implementation stages

### 2.3 Civil Society Index Implementation in Zambia

The CSI country implementing team used multiple methods for the study:

A **literature review** exploring existing literature was a first step in preparing for the CSI project. It helped to uncover a wide range of issues, especially with regard to the history and operational environment of civil society in the country.

A **Population Survey** was conducted to gather citizens' views on civil society and to assess their level of involvement in groups and associations. A total of 3,501 completed questionnaires were returned out of 3,661 questionnaires that were administered to households in five provinces, namely: Copperbelt, Southern, Eastern, Lusaka and Northern Provinces.

An **Organisational Survey** provided data on the defining characteristics of civil society in the country. One hundred and twenty CSOs, representing different categories of civil society

and other non-state actors in Zambia, were initially selected using purposive sampling. Ninety CSOs were successfully interviewed.

An **External Perception Survey** was used to measure stakeholders', experts' and policymakers' perceptions of civil society's impact. Forty-five external stakeholders were interviewed and the composition included the executive, legislative and judicial arms of government. Other respondents were drawn from the private sector, the media, academia, international governmental organisations, the donor community and other categories.

Five **case studies** were undertaken focusing on different key aspects of civil society, including its sectoral and geographical coverage, accountability, impact on policy and corporate social responsibility.

**Focus group meetings** were also held in the Copperbelt, Southern, Luapula and Lusaka provinces.

## 3. Limitations of the CSI Study in Zambia

The CSI study in Zambia was not without challenges, particularly regarding the quality of responses. For instance, there were questions on matters connected to contentious issues on which respondents did not feel able to express themselves freely. In some cases, matters were still in courts of law and some respondents, fearing victimisation or being cited for contempt of court, were either hesitant or completely refused to give their views on those matters. To counter or minimise poor responses, the researchers assured respondents of confidentiality. Another challenge had to do with the unwillingness of some CSOs to disclose information on their financial capacity and internal governance mechanisms.

A sampling challenge was that most CSOs are in urban areas and this affected the sample for the organisational survey. In order to strike the necessary balance and ensure data were captured that reflected both rural and urban experiences, the researchers included some organisations that had structures in rural communities. However, even with limitations such as these, the CSI research was able to bring out rich information on various aspects of civil society that can be helpful in guiding and shaping civil society in Zambia.

## II CIVIL SOCIETY IN ZAMBIA

Official name	Republic of Zambia (Short form: Zambia; Former: Northern Rhodesia)
ISO country code	Zm
Capital city	Lusaka (population approximately 2 million)
Other cities	Kabwe, Kitwe, Livingstone, Ndola
Government type	Republic
Independence	24 October 1964 (from UK)
Constitution	1991 (amended in 1996 to establish presidential term limits)
Geography	Southern Africa, landlocked country east of Angola
Area	752,614 sq. km. (290,585 sq. m.)
Terrain	Varies; mostly high plateau savannah with some hills and mountains
Climate	Generally dry and temperate, tropical; modified by altitude; rainy
	season (October to April)
Population	13.3 million
Ethnic groups	More than 70 ethnic groups; main tribes are the Lozi, the Bemba, the
	Ngoni, the Tonga, the Lunda, the Luvale and the Kaonde
Religions	Christianity, indigenous beliefs, Islam, Hinduism
Languages	English (official), with about 70 local languages and dialects, including
	Bemba, Lozi, Kaonde, Lunda, Luvale, Tonga, and Nyanja
Literacy	women: 60.6%; men: 81.6%
Natural resources	Copper, cobalt, zinc, lead, coal, emeralds, gold, silver, uranium,
	hydropower
Agriculture	Corn, sorghum, rice, peanuts, sunflower seed, vegetables, flowers,
products	tobacco, cotton, sugarcane, cassava (tapioca), coffee; cattle, goats, pigs,
	poultry, milk, eggs, hides
Industries	Copper mining and processing, construction, foodstuffs, beverages,
	chemicals, textiles, fertiliser, horticulture
Currency	Zambian Kwacha
Administration	Zambia is currently divided into nine provinces and 72 districts

TABLE II.1.1: Brief country profile of Zambia<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> All the information on the country profile came from one source (Nations Online) except for the administration component, whose source is separately indicated.



FIGURE II.1.2: Map of Zambia

## 1. Concept of Civil Society

Civil society is a widely contested concept both in theory and in practice. It is taken to mean different things to different people. Some people according to Edwards (2004) argue that civil society is a specific product of the nation state and capitalism in the western world. As such, they question the usefulness of the concept in non-Western societies. However, Edwards (2004:3) further contends that civil society engagement can be expressed in different ways according to history and context and that it can be traced as a universal expression of collective individuals, at work in all countries and stages of development. Zambia, like most colonised countries, did not have an environment conducive for the emergence and development of a civil society like those seen in Western democracies. Nonetheless, even under subjugated conditions, there were some forms of societal self-organisation that operated independently of the governing power and which attempted to articulate public

Source: www.mapsofworld.com/zambia/zambia-political-map.html (27/10/10)

interest and influence matters of public concern. However, in its present manifestation, civil society in Zambia can broadly be defined by the definition given by CIVICUS: "the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market, which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests" (CIVICUS, 2008:16). The following section describes the evolution of civil society in Zambia from its beginning to the present.

### 2. Historical Overview of Civil Society

Despite the difficult conditions for its emergence, a civil society has developed in Zambia and Mutesa (2006) argues that it has always been present at the defining moments of Zambia's political history, even when its role has been restricted.

#### **Civil Society before Independence**

The earliest civil society in the territory dates back to the colonial era. It consisted of white settlers, later augmented by immigrants, the emergent middle class and the working class. Early associational groups contributed to the fight against the 'Colour Bar', a system which reserved the best services for whites and left separate inferior services for blacks, Indians and 'coloureds'. They also campaigned against the 'Hut Tax' which was introduced to force blacks to migrate to the Copperbelt as cheap labour for the mines. Civil society also tried to organise against colonial rule in general, dating as far back as the Mwenzo Welfare Association founded by Donald Siwale in 1912 (Mumba, 2010).

In the 1940s, the number of associations rapidly increased in towns along the path of the railway. The nationwide Federation of African Societies was formed and, in 1948, turned into a political party, the Northern African Congress. In 1949, a national union for mineworkers, the Northern Rhodesia African Mineworkers Union, was created, which later became the African Mine Workers Union (Burdette, 1988: 29 in Endo, 1996: 262). Trade unions fought for improved working conditions for miners and demanded a voice in mining decision-making processes (Berger, 1974). Clark (1975) observed that beyond industrial action arising out of labour discontent on economic conditions, the trade unions offered a vehicle for direct nationalist struggle and growing African assertiveness directed at independence.

Religious organisations played a big role during the colonial era. Besides spreading the gospel, churches provided educational and health services and played a role in checking the state (Haynes 1996 in Endo, 1996: 267). The church contributed to the fight against the tax system which was imposed on Africans by the British Colonial office. It also stood in opposition to the formation of the Federation<sup>5</sup> of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the imposition of Indirect Rule regulations<sup>6</sup> (Endo, 1996). Missionary schools also contributed to the emergence of African nationalism, although their influence was mainly among the educated elite. The mission schools, especially the Protestant ones, were a training ground for the African National Congress and United National Independence Party (UNIP) leaders (Rotberg, 1962 in Sichone, 1996).

#### **Civil Society under Kaunda's Leadership**

After independence in 1964, President Kenneth Kaunda, who ruled the country for 27 years, followed broadly socialist policies and his government provided free access to health care and education from primary school to university. Any type of association formed for mutual or public benefit had to operate under the umbrella and control of UNIP. UNIP created subordinate organs such as Women's League and Youth League, which were meant to address concerns that UNIP could not handle directly. Kaunda devised a system of co-opting different kinds of institutions and critical individuals into UNIP and government wings, subordinating them to the bureaucracy. For instance, members of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) had to have dual membership of the trade union and UNIP. Kaunda could appoint anyone from any walk of life, including traditional leaders, professionals, clergymen and union leaders, to top government positions (Donge 1995: 196; Sichone, 1996 and Chanda, 1995). Elemu notes that, "The notion that citizens needed to be mobilised behind his revolutionary party was central to Kaunda's doctrine" (2010:19). However this approach of co-optation and subjecting people to the bureaucratic structures of the party weakened the associational spirit in Zambia.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The Federation was created in 1953 by the British colonial government among Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi), and was dissolved in 1963.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> A system that required local people to seek permission of Native Authorities before setting up new villages

Some trade unionists, particularly the ZCTU leaders Fredrick Chiluba, Newstead Zimba and Chitalu Sampa,<sup>7</sup> refused to subordinate union interest to those of the party. The labour movement, drawing its power from its relationship to the copper industry, the driving force of Zambia's economy, functioned as an unofficial opposition to the UNIP government (Lungu, 1986). The labour movement opposed Kaunda in many instances, including the first time he wanted to implement International Monetary Fund (IMF) policy reforms (Sichone, 1996; Chanda, 1995). In 1981, union leaders were expelled from UNIP, detained and accused of inciting workers to strike (Burdette, 1988 in Sichone, 1996).

Church groups critical of government policy included the Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ), the Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC), and Evangelical Fellowship in Zambia (EFZ).<sup>8</sup> The churches' approach to the state was collaborative as long as their interests were not at stake. It was only when the country faced a crisis that church leaders felt compelled to speak out on issues of national development (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 44). For instance, the church spoke against Kaunda when the UNIP wanted to introduce 'Scientific Socialism' into the education system between 1976 and 1982. This move was, on one hand, a power game between the state and the church, and on the other, a debate concerning the interpretation of Kaunda's 'Zambia Humanism' philosophy. In the end the churches succeeded in preventing the state from introducing scientific socialism in schools (Lungu, 1986: 400).

Towards the end of Kaunda's rule, churches came out more strongly, exposing the misdeeds of the government (Sichone, 1996: 123). Using the media (*National Mirror* and the *Icengelo*, a Catholic magazine), the churches launched human rights campaigns against social inequalities, government corruption and the violation of citizens' basic rights under the state of emergency, provoking an angry outburst from Kaunda (Sichone, 1996). Besides the labour movement and churches, professional bodies such as the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ), the Economics Association of Zambia (EAZ) and the University of Zambia Students' Union (UNZASU) also gave the government a hard time. In the 1970s, UNZASU opposed Kaunda's support of UNITA in Angola, eventually 'forcing' him to recognise Angola's MPLA government (Sichone, 1996).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Fredrick Chiluba then was ZCTU chairman while Newstead Zimba and Chitalu Sampa served as general secretary and Assistant Secretary respectively. Fredrick Chiluba in 1991 succeeded Kaunda as President of Zambia while Newstead Zimba and Chitalu Sampa served as cabinet ministers in Chiluba's administration.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ) is an umbrella body for ecumenically oriented Christian churches, while the Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC) is an administrative body of the Catholic Church in Zambia, and the Evangelical Fellowship in Zambia (EFZ) is a loose alliance of Evangelically-oriented churches in Zambia.

In 1990, following heightening social and political tensions that compromised Kaunda's legitimacy, different groups, including the intelligentsia, business, workers and churches, came together to mount pressure for the reintroduction of a multi-party system. Kaunda eventually gave in to demands for an early election in 1991, which he lost to the former trade unionist Fredrick Chiluba (Sichone 1996).

#### **Civil Society under Multiparty Political System**

Chiluba's party, the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD), started as a mass movement, formed by people from the labour movement, academics, professionals, business people and others opposed to Kaunda. During his election campaign Chiluba promised to remove all constitutional barriers preventing citizens from realising their full civil and political liberties and to provide a more conducive environment for their full participation in the governance of the country (Fiedler-Conradi, 2003; Ihonvbere, 1996; Donge, 1995; and Chanda, 1995).

However, with the coming of MMD government, the transition resulted in contradictory developments within civil society (Erdmann and Simutanyi, 2003). On one hand, the transition saw a decline in the political visibility of civil society; on the other, it resulted in the formation of hundreds of new organisations. The explanation for the decline in political visibility of civil society is that, with the change of government from a one party state to multi-party state, civil society actors had achieved their main aim. Most civic groups initially identified themselves with the MMD government and felt that it was 'their' government. Other new CSOs that came into existence were formed to cope with the shortfall in government services, especially in the aftermath of the IMF and the World Bank sponsored Structural Adjustment Programme that Chiluba reinstated (Erdmann and Simutanyi, 2003). The Registrar of Societies, the government agency responsible for registering CSOs, had recorded over 1,000 new members by 1996 and the number exceeded 10,000 by 2003, besides countless informal CSOs in rural areas (Fiedler-Conradi, 2003). Some new advocacy NGOs took a more focused interest in human rights, civic education, election monitoring and other specific concerns such as fighting poverty and addressing gender issues, among others.

With regard to government-civil society relations, Fiedler-Conradi (2003: 18) argues that Chiluba proved little different from his predecessor. Noting similarities between Chiluba's MMD and Kaunda's UNIP, Rakner (2003:185) argues that "the MMD had reinstated the one party system in almost all ways other than the name." As Bartlett (2000: 431) writes, "older political logics... do not disappear just because authoritarian regimes are challenged by resurgent societies... rent-seeking and clientelism may actually be re-enforced under newly democratic regimes." Chiluba inherited a one party state authoritarian tradition and patronage politics. When structural economic reforms were adopted, his MMD government did not consult with civil society. Labour union leaders were constantly threatened with dismissal and at one time he even threatened to deregister ZCTU and the Civil Servants Union of Zambia (CSUZ) (Sichone, 1996).

Chiluba employed Kaunda's strategy of taming civil society institutions using various means (Donge, 1995). For instance, shortly after his election victory in 1991, Chiluba declared Zambia a Christian nation so that the church would rally behind him. He introduced a religious affairs desk and appointed a reverend as a Deputy Minister with an office directly under the President and located within State House. Although some evangelical churches welcomed the move, large churches such as the Catholic and Anglican churches were opposed (Mumba, 2010). Just like his predecessor, Chiluba could appoint and dismiss anyone at will without official reasons (Donge, 1995). Chiluba also relied on the Public Order Act in trying to curtail freedom of assembly and association. For any form of assembly, people were required to apply for a police permit at least two weeks in advance. Sometimes the police would refuse to give permits and if the people went ahead and assembled, the consequences of unlawful assembly would fall on organisers (Mumba, 2010).

Towards the end of his rule, Chiluba initiated a move to amend the constitution to make himself eligible as a presidential candidate for the 2001 elections. To solicit support, he started distributing a slush fund to CSOs, including the churches. On two occasions, he mobilised some sections of civil society, including religious and traditional leaders, to march to State House in a show of solidarity with his rule and to justify the need for his continuation in office (Mumba, 2010). The move divided his own government, but the wider public reaction was dramatic. Various organisations and individuals from different parts of society came together and formed an anti-third term social movement popularly known as the Oasis

Forum or Green Ribbon Campaign, which met frequently to discuss ways to prevent Chiluba from manipulating the constitution to his favour.

The Oasis Forum used the private media to raise consciousness among citizens and distributed green ribbons for people to wear to show their support. Civil society activists also led motorists in honking every Friday around 4pm. The police used to arrest those participating, but this could not easily be managed. The CSOs prominent within the Oasis Forum were the three church mother bodies (ZEC, CCZ, and EFZ), NGOCC, Afronet and the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) as well as high-ranking politicians in the opposition camp (*The Post*, 22 February 2001 and Fiedler-Conradi, 2003: 18). Amidst massive pressure, Chiluba announced that he had no intention of seeking a third term, and instead chose Levy Mwanawasa, who also had briefly served as his first Vice-President, to succeed him.

In the Mwanawasa era, more and more CSOs were formed. According to Fiedler-Conradi (2003) there were about 10,000 organisations registered by the Registrar of Societies in March 2003. However, the relationship between Mwanawasa's administration and civil society was hostile. Problems started with Mwanawasa's victory in 2001, which was marred by suspicions of rigging (MS Zambia, 2003). When Mwanawasa staged a 'zero-tolerance' crusade against corruption, targeting senior civil servants as well as Chiluba and his allies, many saw the campaign as highly selective: few people were convicted, and some sections of civil society dismissed it as an exercise in self-legitimisation (Mumba, 2010). Civil society also raised concerns about the appointment of Mwanawasa's relations to senior governmental and diplomatic positions. Another contentious matter was Mwanawasa's strategy of appointing opposition MPs to government, thereby expanding the MMD camp in parliament and undermining the opposition. Some saw this as weakening the spirit of critical parliamentary scrutiny on crucial issues (Phiri, 2004: 34 in Mumba, 2004:30).

To ease the tension between his government and some segments of society, in 2003 Mwanawasa invited opposition parties and civil society groups for a national *indaba*.<sup>9</sup> However, when invitees requested the meeting be postponed in order to give them sufficient time to prepare, Mwanawasa insisted that the meeting proceed. His failure to compromise

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> A Zulu/Ngoni word for public dialogue.

prompted all major opposition parties and CSOs, particularly those behind the Oasis Forum, to shun the meeting (MS Zambia, 2003).

When Mwanawasa initiated a move to revise the constitution, the Oasis Forum insisted on joint participation in setting the agenda before any work could commence. It also made other proposals, such as appointing a technical committee to examine submissions made by the people in previous constitutional review commission reports<sup>10</sup> and then developing a consolidated draft report to be submitted to a constituent assembly before enactment by Parliament. Mwanawasa opposed that approach, arguing that it was not provided for by the constitution. Instead, like his predecessors, he appointed his own constitutional review commission. The Oasis Forum came out very strongly against this and the government at one point responded by banning its operations, arguing that it was not a registered type of association. (The Oasis Forum ignored the ban and continued operating.) The whole process became bogged down in controversies until Mwanawasa announced that it would not be possible to adopt a new constitution before the 2006 general elections (Mutesa, 2006 and Mumba, 2004).

According to Geloo (2004), Mwanawasa criticised CSOs for acting as opposition parties rather than being partners in development. This was during the HIV/AIDS conference held at Mulungushi International Conference Centre in Lusaka. At the same conference, Mwanawasa told UN delegates that NGOs just had a habit of misusing donor money and no one asked them anything. Geloo (2004) further stated that Mwanawasa accused the United Nations for favouring NGOs in the distribution of funds, yet government had elected representatives who were subject to closer scrutiny than civil society groups. He further accused CSOs of being composed of family members who got donor funds under the guise of HIV/AIDS prevention programmes (Geloo, 2004).

Certainly, based on CSI findings, there is a perception even within civil society that some NGOs are bogus. Such organisations include 'MENGOs' (or media NGOs), which are invisible NGOs that effectively exist only in the media, lacking in any constituencies or even

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Zambia has had four constitutional review commissions appointed by Presidents to review the constitution and similar views have been coming out in different initial reports, but not much has been achieved in the provisions.

sometimes offices. There are also 'INGOs' (Individual NGOs), which are one-man or onewoman shows. Zambia also has 'PONGOs' (politically-oriented NGOs), whose figureheads predictably appear in the media speaking for or against the government position on any given issue depending on their inclination.<sup>11</sup> But the existence of such organisations is not a fair reflection of the NGO sector as whole.

Since 1996, the Zambian government has been trying to introduce legislation to govern NGO operations in the country. In 2007, a draft NGO bill was presented to Parliament for debate, but it was eventually withdrawn in the face of criticism from different sections of society. Critics argued that government was trying to constrain and limit the space for civil society operations in the country by tightening rules regarding the registration, management and operation of NGOs (Mumba, 2010). The bill was eventually passed in 2009.

In certain instances CSOs have cooperated with the government and they have participated in important national policy processes. More often than not, however, the government has been mandated by the donor community to engage civil society in government policy processes, and government actors have very mixed feelings about the outcomes. Sometimes CSOs are just used to rubberstamp government policy decisions. Nevertheless, civil society umbrella organisations and consultation forums have influenced national policy processes such as the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). They have participated in Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) and the formulation of the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) and the Vision 2030 <sup>12</sup> (Mutesa, 2006). Some have been involved in the national constitutional amendment processes.

Civil society in Zambia has shown a potential to contribute considerably to the human, social, political and economic development of the country, even though its operational base has been shaped by an authoritarian tradition. Since the introduction of multi-party politics in the early 1990s, it has gained recognition even in government circles (Mutesa, 2006). However, these are matters that require a close scrutiny and some of them are discussed in the report below, in the appropriate sections.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> This was discussed in the focus group meetings held with civil society stakeholders.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Vision 2030 is a national policy document used as a guiding framework for Zambia's long term objective of becoming a middle income country by the year 2030.

## 3. Mapping Civil Society

CSOs in Zambia are many and varied, sometimes making it hard to develop a uniform typology which embraces all of them. Some are small and not very visible; others are very large, with more formalised structures. Some have a national coverage; others are more localised. Some are membership based (with a defined constituency); others are non-membership based (with no clearly identifiable constituency). TABLE II.3.1 below provides a list of various types of CSOs that operate in Zambia.

#### TABLE II.3.1: List of types of CSOs in Zambia

Faith-based organisations
Trade unions
Women's organisations
Student or youth organisations
Developmental CSOs (for example, NGOs working on literacy, health, or social services)
Advocacy CSOs (civic action, social justice, human rights or consumers' groups)
CSOs active in research, information dissemination, education and training (think tanks,
resource centres, non-profit schools)
Non-profit media groups
Associations of socio-economically marginalised groups (poor people, homeless, landless,
immigrants, refugees)
Social service and health associations (charities raising funds for health research and services,
mental health associations, associations of people with physical disabilities)
Other fund-raising bodies and organisations
Professional and business organisations (chambers of commerce, professional associations)
Community organisations (village associations, neighbourhood committees)
Community-level groups or associations (burial societies, self-help groups, parents'
associations, village associations, indigenous peoples' associations, monasteries, and
mosque-based associations)
Economic interest organisations (cooperatives, credit unions, mutual saving associations,
agriculture)
Ethnic, traditional or indigenous associations or organisations
Environmental organisations
Culture, arts and social and recreational organisations
CSO networks, federations, support organisations
Source: National Advisory Group for the CSI project

This section presents a brief overview of the composition of civil society in Zambia. Two maps were developed during the implementation of the CSI project in Zambia for the purpose of showing a graphical representation of the main actors and factors influencing civil society in Zambia.<sup>13</sup> The maps are products of the discussions between CSOs representatives, members of the Advisory Committee (AC) and the NIT established under the auspices of the CSI project in Zambia. The purpose of this activity was to create two visual 'maps' of influential actors in the country in order to a) identify and discuss the relationship between civil society actors and other influential actors within society at large and b) identify and discuss relationships among influential civil society groups within the civil society arena.


The first map shows the Zambian society makeup, highlighting main actors.<sup>14</sup> The government, the international donor community (such as the World Bank, IMF and the UN) and law enforcement were identified as playing a more dominant role in society. Other social forces that influence the Zambian government identified included parliament, international NGOs, media, local civil society actors such as NGOs, opposition political parties and the church. Several issues such as corruption, HIV/AIDS, high poverty levels and governance were identified as key challenges that the Zambian society faces.

The second map shows CSOs and other actors in Zambia. The map reflects a variety of organisations and institutions. It includes government agencies on one side, while on the other, various local and international non-state actors including professional bodies, trade unions, gender-based groups, human rights groups, faith-based organisations, international NGOs, the media (both state owned and independent) as well as opposition political parties are represented. The presentation is based on how much influence they are perceived to exert on the Zambian society. However, the map does not reflect the relations between them.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> The size and position of the bubble determines the perceived level of influence that different actors have in the Zambian society.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Note that list is not exhaustive of all important actors. The map presents the most influential actors that the NIT identified and collectively agreed upon.

FIGURE II.3.1: Key social forces within Zambian society



CIVICUS Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Zambia

FIGURE II.3.2: Map of civil society forces/actors




FIGURE II.3.3, below shows the Civil Society Diamond for Zambia. The overall range of civil society performance in Zambia is between 57.11% and 60.79%.




FIGURE II.3: Civil Society Diamond for Zambia 2010

# III Analysis of civil society in Zambia

In this section, we present the research findings on Zambia's civil society in the five CSI dimensions: Civic Engagement, Level of Organisation, Practice of Values, Perception of Impact and the External Environment.

## 1. Civic Engagement

Civic engagement is assessed using six sub-dimensions: the extent, depth and diversity of socially-based engagement and the extent, depth and diversity of political engagement. The

overall rating for civic engagement from the CSI population survey is 60.79%. FIGURE III.1.1, below presents the overall scores for the sub-dimensions of civic engagement.




FIGURE III.1.1: Scores on civic engagement


The lack of well-functioning state institutions dampens the spirit of civic engagement (Corella, et al, 2006). Various regimes have used the civic space to their advantage as already indicated in the historical background section above. At the same time, the CSI case study on civic engagement points to deteriorating socio-economic conditions, such as high poverty levels, as contributing to reduced civic engagement in Zambia. Each one of these sub-dimensions of civic engagement is analysed separately below.


#### 1.1 The extent of socially-based engagement

This sub-dimension examines the extent of citizen's engagement in social activities and organisations by looking at the percentage of population survey respondents active in social CSOs and activities. From the findings, 66.6% of the population are to some extent active in social activities. The strongest indicator for this sub-dimension is membership in a socially-based organisation, as 80.6% of respondents belonged to at least one social organisation. However, activism was mostly associated with religious activities.

#### 1.2 The depth of socially-based engagement

This is the second sub-dimension of civic engagement and reveals the percentage of population survey respondents active in more than one organisation or activities using three specific indicators: the extent of social membership; the extent of social volunteering and the extent of community engagement. It found out that only 28.6% of respondents were active in more than one organisation. Social volunteering stood at 31.0%, while community engagement was at 84.2%.





The results do not differ much from the World Bank's, the findings of which in 2005 showed that 35% of the population engaged in social activities. Among the reasons given for low participation in social activities is that people have insufficient time, as they spend much of their time at places of work or in search of money. Sporting and recreational facilities are also said to be either non-existent or run down, especially at district and local levels (World Bank, 2005).

#### 1.3 Diversity within socially-based engagement

This sub-dimension measures diversity among those engaging in social activities in terms of gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status and the division between rural and urban communities. The population survey indicates that active membership is not limited to a specific social group, but cuts across all sections of Zambian society. The overall score for this sub-dimension was 95.7%. Active membership by gender showed 50.3% for males and 49.4% for females. Active membership by age indicated 11.3% for the young, 4% for older people, and 84.7% for others (this data is not, however, calculated into the CSI dimension and Diamond scores). Young people are mostly engaged in sports activities.

In comparison to the 1990s<sup>15</sup> the statistics and findings from the CSI reveal declining levels of socially-based engagement in the country. These findings offer a challenge not only to civil society but the country as a whole, in as far as social capital is concerned. It is through interaction of a social nature that people share information, learn to trust each other and form different networks, which are an important ingredient for solving common problems that affect them.

#### 1.4 Extent of political engagement


This sub-dimension examines levels of citizen involvement in politically-oriented activities, such as participating in boycotts, signing petitions or attending peaceful demonstrations. It also includes the extent to which people belong to organisations such as labour unions, political parties, professional associations, consumer groups, and humanitarian or environmental organisations.

The results from the population survey do not differ much from the ones reported for the extent of socially-based engagement. Social membership stood at 28.6% while political membership was calculated at 29.6%. Political volunteering is relatively higher, at 33.3% compared to a 31% score for social volunteering. This difference could be a result of individuals' attraction to the bribes politicians often gave to political supporters (cadres), particularly during by-elections. Most of the respondents were not registered members of any political party, but many claimed they were sympathetic to political parties of their choice.

#### 1.5 Depth of political engagement

This sub-dimension looks at the portion of the population who are involved in more than one political organisation, in order to assess the depth of their engagement. Indicators are political membership, political volunteering and individual activism. Figure III.1.3 shows the results of the Population Survey.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>Study conducted by Erdmann and Simutanyi on civil society in Zambia (2003).



#### FIGURE III.1.3: Depth of political engagement

From the findings, there are few Zambians who are active in political affairs, just as is the case with social engagement. According to the survey, more than 50% of the population do not engage in activities that are political in nature other than voting. Compared to the early 1990s, when multi-party politics were reintroduced in the country, there seems to have been a gradual drop in citizen participation in political activities over the years. According to Mutesa (2006), citizens are losing confidence in political systems due to the many socio-economic challenges that the country faces.

The return to multi-party politics in Zambia masks a degree of resistance by those in authority to strengthening political engagement among citizens. This was very visible in the controversy surrounding the constitution-making process initiated by President Mwanawasa in 2003, in response to low turnouts in the 1991 elections (Mumba, 2004). As described above, civil society and opposition political parties demanded the adoption of the constitution through a constituency assembly, a proposal which was rejected by the ruling party.

#### 1.6 Diversity of political engagement

This sub-dimension analyses the diversity of social groups who are politically engaged in civil society issues. It analyses the representativeness of the civil society arena in terms of socio-economic, ethnic, gender, rural-urban divides and regional groups participating in civil society.

According to the population survey findings, women's participation in various political processes was lower than men's. Forty-one percent of women surveyed were active members of political organisations compared to a score for men of 59%. This is despite campaigns by government and various CSOs stressing the importance of gender balance in all activities. However, one of the conclusions of the CSI case study on civic engagement in Zambia was that initiatives to 'sensitise' the masses are highly dependent on donor funding. When donor funding is in short supply, activities are hampered.

#### Conclusion


Findings generally show relatively low scores for civic engagement in Zambia. The low scores are indicative of some of the serious socio-economic and political challenges the country is facing<sup>16</sup>. Most people spend time dealing with more pressing needs as they struggle for survival. Economic pressures centred on securing income for a livelihood stand among the major reasons for low participation in civic engagement. This poses great challenges for collectively finding alternative solutions to the social, economic and political problems Zambia faces. As has been noted above, civil society has a big role to play in raising public consciousness on important issues.

# 2. Level of Organisation

The second major dimension of CSI looks at the organisational development of civil society as a whole. The sub-dimensions examined are: internal governance; infrastructure; sectoral communication; human resources; and the financial and technological resources available to CSOs. Civil society in Zambia is, to some extent, well-organised, with an overall score of 58.3%. Most CSOs do have support infrastructure and communication among peers. They also have boards in place, but decision-making processes are sometimes not transparent, or the quality of board members is not as good as those found in the corporate world. Human resources and international linkages are the weakest sub-dimensions of the Level of Organisation for Zambian civil society (FIGURE III.2.1 provides the overall scores for the dimension).

FIGURE III.2.1: Level of Organisation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> For more details see 5.1 of this report.



#### 2.1 Internal governance

The sub-dimension of internal governance assesses the percentage of CSOs that have formal governance and management systems with clearly defined roles and a clear system for their selection. Of the CSOs that responded to the survey, 88.9% have governance structures such as boards in place. This high level can be seen to have arisen due to donor funding conditions. The donors have prescribed minimum standards, which include governance structures, clear reporting lines and different levels of accountability. Most of the CSOs that do not have a clear governance structure are small, usually self-financing CBOs. However, unlike the boards in the corporate world, the quality of CSOs' boards sometimes leaves much to be desired. Boards can be put in place simply to fulfil donor conditions, but their ability to give proper policy guidance is limited due to the internal politics that characterise many CSOs in Zambia. Leading member usually want to have a firm grip on all matters relating to the organisation, thereby providing room for vices with serious ramifications for beneficiaries and the general public. Exhibiting similar vices that CSOs would not like to see in other sectors contradicts their role (Mweshi, 2010).

#### 2.2 Infrastructure

This sub-dimension concerns the support infrastructure available to civil society in the form of networks. The organisational survey found that 72.7% of the CSOs surveyed are members of a federation, umbrella group or support networks. This is a good indicator.

Umbrella organisations in Zambia are divided along thematic lines. The most prominent include:

- Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR): members are CSOs organised to give input and participate in poverty reduction intervention.
- The Non-Governmental Organisations Coordinating Committee (NGOCC) and Women for Change (WfC): networks of CSOs that promote gender equity and advance women's issues in development.
- The Children in Need Network (CHIN): promotes children's affairs.
- The Zambia Land Alliance: a network organised to promote access and control of land resources to marginalised and disadvantaged groups.
- The Zambia National AIDS Network (ZNAN) and Church Association of Zambia (CHAZ): collaborate and coordinate HIV/AIDS and other health related activities.
- The Zambia National Education Coalition (ZANEC): promotes education issues.
- The Zambia Civic Education Association (ZCEA): promotes civic education in the country.

#### 2.3 Sectoral communication

An important determinant of the strength of civil society is the extent to which diverse actors communicate and cooperate with one another. This sub-dimension explores examples of networking, information sharing and alliance building to assess the extent of linkages and productive relations among civil society actors on issues of common concern. The organisational survey found that over 90% of respondents hold meetings with other organisations and 86.7% exchange information with like-minded organisations. However, the case study on regional and sectoral distribution highlighted lack of effective coordination and collaboration among CSOs in general. From the Organisational Survey findings, it seems communications tend to be more within the membership of umbrella groupings, rather than across the looser networks or alliances formed to address topical issues. In Zambia, CSOs also tend to particularly support one another and easily mobilise into social movements in times of crises. Examples include their collective action against the one party state which led to the transition to multi-party system in the early 1990s and mobilising against Chiluba's third term bid in 2000 (Mumba, 2010).

#### 2.4 Human resources

This sub-dimension reports on human resources available for CSOs and how adequate they are for achieving their objectives. Only 30.7% of the surveyed CSOs claimed to have enough human resources. Most CSOs do not have a sustainable staff base; almost 70% of CSOs depend on volunteers to carry out activities. The main reason is that most donor-funded projects exclude administrative costs such as salaries. The voluntary nature of employment in CSOs brings about a high level of turnover, with people moving from small to bigger CSOs or international and donor agencies for more attractive conditions of service.

#### 2.5 Financial and technological resources

This sub-dimension concerns the financial and technological resources available to civil society. It assesses the level of financial resources available and their sources, for example membership payments, service fees, grants and donations. Technological resources include phones, faxes, computers and internet access. The overall score from the organisational survey on financial and technological resources is at 61.9%. The study further revealed that only 50% of CSOs surveyed had a stable financial resource base. Most CSOs in the country depend on donor funding for their financial sustainability. What is implied from the findings is that, without donor support, most CSOs in Zambia would fail to carry out their activities. In terms of technological resources, 73.9% of surveyed CSOs have access to computers, telephones, faxes and the internet. However, most of these CSOs are from urban areas.

#### 2.6 International linkages

This sub-dimension, which records a low 6.3%, reports the ratio between the number of international NGOs registered in Zambia compared to the total number of international listed on the database of the Union of International Associations.<sup>17</sup>

However, it should be noted that most umbrella organisations and big CSOs are members of international organisations including, among others, the SADC Council of NGOs, International Land Coalition, Africa Youth Initiatives Network, Global Road Safety Partnership, International Council for Social Welfare, Rotary International, Birdlife International, Union Network International, Panos Southern Africa International Council for Voluntary Agencies, Environmental Liaison, CIVICUS Humanist Movement International, World Association of Girl Guides and the African Peer Review Mechanism.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> ZCSD and CIVICUS are grateful to the Union of International Associations for this information.

#### Conclusion

Civil society is, to a limited extent, organised in Zambia. Support infrastructure and communication among peers are not problematic. CSOs have boards in place, but decision-making processes are sometimes not transparent, or the quality of board members is not as good as those found in the corporate world. Human and financial resources are the major areas of weakness negatively affecting their operations. This is because most CSOs seem to depend heavily on volunteers and donor funding for their operations.

## 3. Practice of Values

The CSI does not assume that civil society is by definition made up of progressive groups, nor does it take it for granted that civil society practices what it preaches. Therefore, civil society's internal practice of values is one of the important attributes the CSI assesses. In assessing the extent to which civil society's practices cohere with their ideals, the following sub-dimensions are considered: democratic decision-making governance; labour regulations; codes of conduct and transparency; environmental standards; perception of values within civil society. FIGURE III.3.1 below shows the overall scores in the respective sub-dimensions.

73.30%	81.	81.20%		71.75%	
	34.29%			35.70%	
Democratic decision making	Labour regulations	Code of con & transpare		Environmental standards	Perceptions of values on civil society as a whole
3.1	3.2	3.3		3.4	3.5



From the CSI findings, the code of conduct and transparency (81.2%) score is highest and labour regulations (34.2%) and environmental standards (35.7%) the weakest under the Practice of Values dimension.

#### 3.1 Democratic decision-making governance

This sub-dimension looks at how and by whom decisions within CSOs are made. Of the sample from the organisational survey, 73.3% had democratic internal decision-making processes. CSOs make decisions at different levels. They often have 'congresses' with supreme powers, boards to make policy decisions and secretariats to make management decisions.

However, contrary to the findings in this sub-dimension, Simutanyi (2002) and Mweshi (2010) argue that democratic decision-making is not well practiced in most Zambian CSOs. One of the major constraining factors surrounds what Mweshi refers to as the existence of 'the founder member syndrome'. In such cases, he argues that:

The existence and perhaps the survival of the organisation are inextricably linked to one or just a few individuals. Such personalities can be quite overbearing on other members or staff, and others who may have progressive ideas find it difficult to challenge them and are likely to find themselves unwanted (Mweshi, 2010:110).

The domineering attitude portrayed by a few individuals in CSOs paints a very bad picture for civil society as far as promoting democracy in the country is concerned (Mweshi, 2010). Civil society has been very instrumental in the transition to democracy in Zambia, but such revelations contradict the values civil society stands for, and need to be discouraged. It may even be that democratic structures in CSOs are just window dressing, yet in practice there are undemocratic tendencies among more influential members.

#### 3.2 Labour regulations

The labour regulation sub-dimension looks at the existence of policies regarding equal opportunities, staff membership in trade unions, training in labour rights for new staff and publicly available statements on labour standards. The overall score from the organisational survey on upholding labour standards is 34.2%.

More than half (61%) of the surveyed CSOs had written policies on equal opportunities, 31.1% had training programmes on labour rights, and 35.6% had a publicly available policy for labour standards. However, most CSO members of staff are not employees, but work as

volunteers. As a result, most of them are not members of labour unions. CSOs' weakness in this area could probably explain why they have not been very vocal as watchdogs, in influencing government and the business sector to uphold minimum labour standards (Elemu, 2010).

#### 3.3 Code of conduct and transparency

This sub-dimension looks at whether a code of conduct exists and is publicly available and whether CSOs' financial information is available to the public. Transparency is an essential condition of accountability, representing openness and truthfulness in the dealings of an organisation. In order to fulfil the requirement for transparency, there is an element of discretion that ought to be guided by informed principles of confidentiality and open disclosure.

From the surveyed CSOs, the score on transparency stood at 79.8%. This high score from the CSI project may give an impression that civil society in the country is performing well in this area. However, Mweshi argues that donors and governments have often enjoyed a privileged position in terms of accessing information from CSOs due to their contractual and legal obligations, but there are still some challenges in ensuring CSO transparency in relation to the public, beneficiaries and, in some cases, staff. Most NGOs in Zambia fail to institute a code of conduct due to limited membership or staffing, or the dominance of founder members in decision-making (Mweshi, 2010).

#### 3.4 Environmental standards

The organisational survey found that 35.7% of the CSOs surveyed have environmental policies publicly displayed and enforced. At one of the focus group meetings, it was argued that environmental organisations are more likely to observe and practice environmental standards. From the CSI findings, environmental concerns seem not to be deeply entrenched in Zambia's civil society. This issue was debated at length in a focus group meeting, where it was felt that most CSOs in Zambia are interest groups, and the legal provisions for CSO operation in the country require them to stick to their mandate as endorsed by the Registrar of Societies.

#### 3.5 Perception of values within civil society as a whole

This sub-dimension assesses how CSOs perceive the practice of values such as non-violence, democracy, trustworthiness and tolerance within society.

The score suggests that civil society in Zambia actively promotes democracy at a societal level. There are a number of CSOs that have a specific mandate to promote democracy, the most prominent being Anti-Voter Apathy (AVAP), Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD), and Catholic Centre for Justice, Development and Peace (CCJDP). There have also been coalitions and campaigns dedicated to promoting democracy, such as 'Coalition 2000' for the 2001 elections, or the lobbying on the NGO Bill in 2007 which led to a temporary withdrawal of the bill for further consultations. The Oasis Forum or Green Ribbon Campaign also successfully prevented President Chiluba from seeking a third term of office in 2001.

The use of violence by civil society actors themselves is rare and they often publicly denounce other acts of violence. Results from the organisational survey showed that only 20.5% have witnessed some violence-related events. There has been a lot of media coverage denouncing violent acts and calling for tolerance in parliamentary and local government by-elections. The UNDP (2002) has commended civil society in Zambia for promoting non-violence and peace.

#### Conclusion

Zambian CSOs generally have democratic processes in place, but 'personalisation' of organisations is not uncommon. Most claim to take labour regulations into account and address the gender-specific needs of women and men, but instituting a code of conduct is a challenge for some. CSOs have formed coalitions or public campaigns dedicated to the promotion of democracy, and resorting to violence is rare among civil society actors.

## 4. Perception of Impact

The perceived impact that civil society has on policy, social issues and social attitudes is analysed from the perspective of both observers within civil society and external stakeholders belonging to the state, private sector, media, academia, international governmental organisations and donor organisations.<sup>18</sup> The perception of impact is assessed along the following sub-dimensions: responsiveness; social impact; policy impact; and impact on attitudes. The overall perception of impact from CSI findings in Zambia stood at 60.3%. Scores on individual sub-dimensions on the perception of impact are presented in FIGURE III.4.1 below.




FIGURE III.4.1: Dimension scores for Perception of Impact

From the CSI findings, it is interesting to observe that CSOs themselves and external stakeholders perceive civil society to be highly responsive. The difference in the scores on responsiveness of 72.6% (internal perception) and 71.8% from external observers is very minimal. Civil society in Zambia has been quite active in intervention on social issues such as poverty and public expenditure management. However, success in pushing policy reforms has been limited. This is reflected by the relatively lower scores of 53.7% (internal perception) on CSOs impact on policy. Results from one of the CSI case studies show a lack of institutionalised mechanisms and government mistrust and suspicion as some of the main reasons for the limited impact.<sup>19</sup>

#### 4.1 Social impact

The perceived social impact of civil society from the organisational survey stands at 71.6%, while the score from the external perception survey was 68.2%. These two figures again

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Data for assessing the Perception of Impact is obtained through the population, organisational and external perception surveys, as well as from the case studies.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Case study on civil society involvement in the national budget for more details

show a convergence on the strength of influence CSOs are seen to have in tackling social issues in Zambia. With an overall ranking of 69.9%, the CSI shows that quite many CSOs have had a positive impact on issues surrounding poverty, HIV/AIDS and improving the wellbeing of ordinary citizens. In the CSI case studies' findings is an example of successful changes that can be attributed to CSO intervention on social issues. This is the inclusion of poverty issues and increased resource allocation to the social sector in the Zambian budget. CSOs have also, to some extent, contributed to improved public expenditure management and oversight (see case study on CSOs influence on national budgeting for more information).

In fact, it is worth noting that most CSOs that have come into existence in Zambia after 1993 were formed to cope with the shortfall in government-provided services, especially in the aftermath of the IMF and World Bank sponsored structural reforms (Erdmann and Simutanyi, 2003). Churches, particularly the Catholic Church, have also been actively involved in the campaigns for the promotion of social justice in the country, including the call for debt cancellation (Mumba, 2004).

#### 4.2 Policy impact

This sub-dimension looks at how active and successful civil society has been in influencing public policy. According to the Organisational Survey findings, only 53.7% of the CSOs surveyed have been pushing for policy reforms and these have had limited success<sup>20</sup>. Only 20% have had success in at least in one policy-related field. Much as the low success rate (20%) among those few CSOs that push for policy reforms should be a concern, the fact that almost half (46.3%) of surveyed CSOs reporting not advocating policy reforms is also worrisome. This is so particularly if we consider the many policy challenges that Zambia is facing (Matenga, 2010). CSOs and other relevant stakeholders in Zambia must pay particular attention to this area.

From the case study findings, government seems not to value much civil society input in policy processes. There are neither laws nor regulations obliging the Government to involve civil society in national policy processes or to take up CSO submissions. Even where the Government has provided space for civil society to engage in public policy decisions<sup>21</sup>, it has

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> See CSI case study on CSOs' influence on national budgeting processes in Zambia.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> A typical example is the formulation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy

not been able to provide civil society with all the information necessary for effective engagement. Other reasons leading to CSOs' limited impact on policy include a lack of information and knowledge of policy processes, poor use of communication strategies, weak links with other actors, and the Government's perception of CSOs as competitors for donor funding and influence.<sup>22</sup> However, contrary to how Government perceive civil society, findings from the Population survey showed that 63.1% of the Zambian population have trust in civil society.

#### Conclusion


CSO responsiveness in Zambia, as perceived by themselves and external stakeholders, has been quite high. However, their involvement in pushing for policy reforms has had a limited impact. To some extent, they have contributed to improved policy interventions, especially on poverty and public expenditure management. The scores from the organisational and external perception surveys at 71% and 68.2% respectively are very close. CSOs, however, face numerous challenges in influencing policy processes, including a lack of institutionalised mechanisms and government mistrust and suspicion. It is up to the Government, civil society and other stakeholders to provide a more conducive environment for influencing policy.

# 5. External Environment

This section analyses the overall social, economic, cultural and legal environment in which civil society exists and functions. The sub-dimensions include: the socio-economic context; the socio-political context; and the socio-cultural context. FIGURE III.5.1 shows the overall scores from the population survey in these sub-dimensions.

FIGURE III.5.1: Sub-dimension scores for the External Environment

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> See case study on civil society involvement in the national budget



Zambia's socio-economic, political and cultural environment is not very conducive to the flourishing of civil society. The problems begin weaknesses in the prevailing legal framework (the Societies Act of 1957), which is either outdated or otherwise prohibitive of the full functioning of civil society in a democratic era. The many socio-economic and political challenges, including high levels of corruption and intolerance, have also led to citizens' loss of confidence in public institutions (Corella, et al, 2006).

#### 5.1 Socio-economic context


In recent years, Zambia has benefited from high international copper prices and debt cancellation initiatives, but it remains dependent on donor assistance for a significant part of its budget. Zambia's economy has been growing at an average of between 4 and 6% from 2002 and 2006<sup>23</sup> (World Bank, 2008). However, according to Corella et al (2006:16) Zambia's socio-economic situation is likened to a country that has been ravaged by war. From being a middle income country in the 1960s, Zambia is now classified as a least developed country'. The rural-urban dichotomy in Zambia, with the rural areas being the main repository of poverty and underdevelopment, is a particularly worrying disparity.

Poverty in Zambia presents itself in various dimensions, such as lack of access to income, employment opportunities, goods and services, shelter and other basic necessities. The HIV/AIDS pandemic (the national prevalence rate is 16%), has also compounded the poverty situation in the country, as it claims the lives of people in the most productive age bracket. This not only robs the economy of its most valuable human resource, but also transfers the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> This is the period before the global economic crisis.

burden of looking after children to grandparents. According to Corella et al (2006), there is also a growing incidence of child-headed households and street children, which is undermining the capacity of these young people to become self-supporting adults.

Zambia's Basic Capability Index (BCI) score for 2010 is 98%, while the score for Gender Equity Index (GEI) is at 72% (Social Watch, 2010). The BCI uses an average of the number of children who reach fifth grade at school, those who survive until at least the fifth year (based on mortality statistics) and births attended by health professionals.



#### FIGURE III.5.2: BCI and GEI for Zambia 2010

Zambia is ranked 18th highest for perceived corruption among 178 countries, just as it did in 2009 (Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index for 2010). The National Government Baseline Survey of 2004 ranked corruption as one of the three major concerns of Zambian citizens, and 87% of the people interviewed perceived corruption to be a very big problem in the country. Although the President of Zambia launched an official anti-corruption policy in July 2009, concerns have been raised by Transparency International Zambia, over his administration's commitment to fighting corruption. Meanwhile, in the wake of corruption scandals in Zambia's Ministry of Health, some foreign governments have suspended funding to the health sector.

#### 5.2 Socio-political context

This sub-section analyses the basic features of the socio-political context of the country and their impact on civil society. They include: political rights and freedoms; civil liberties (rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights, freedom of expression and belief); and associational and organisational rights. Issues considered include: the extent to which CSOs

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are free to engage in advocacy and criticise government; the legal framework; the extent to which civil society exists and functions independently of government; the extent to which CSOs are free to operate without excessive government interference; and state effectiveness.

The right of association is enshrined in the Constitution, but there is no single piece of legislation that comprehensively addresses civil society. The recently introduced Non-Governmental Organisations' Act No. 16 of 2009 specifically covers NGOs, but does not apply to churches, clubs, political parties, professional groups or organisations, trade unions or religious organisations. These groups are covered by the Societies Act, Cap 119 (1958), the principle piece of legislation providing for the registration of societies. The Societies Act has been accused of being incompatible with the current democratic dispensation, as it gives government excessive discretionary powers to regulate organisations. In particular, sections 13 and 23 give the Minister of Home Affairs and the Registrar of Societies wide-ranging powers to cancel the registration of any society.

Section 4 (1) of Cap 116 is another piece of legislation objectionable to civil society in Zambia. It states that "no organisation may accept assistance from a foreign government or agency except with prior approval of the President in writing." There is also the Public Order Act (1955), enacted by the British Colonial authorities, which gives powers to the police to issue permits for public meetings and to otherwise regulate public gatherings. It is viewed by civil society actors as a control mechanism used by the state authorities to suppress freedoms of assembly and movements (Corella et al, 2006).

According to the Freedom House ratings for 2009, Zambia's civil liberties rating has declined from 3 to 4 between 2008 and 2009, due to new legal restrictions on the activities of NGOs.<sup>24</sup> On the surface, Zambia is an electoral democracy and citizens have political rights and freedoms, but in practice, it has yet to grow to a level where freedom of expression is as meaningful as it should be (Freedom House 2009).

The political situation has been characterised by contentious politics and governance challenges. There have been violent clashes, especially during parliamentary by-elections involving supporters of the ruling MMD and two major opposition political parties (the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Countries are ranked on a scale of 1-7, with 1 representing the highest level of freedom and 7 representing the lowest level of freedom.

Patriotic Front and the United Party for National Development). Physical violence has not been common in Zambia, but sometimes aggression and violence have been directed at members of civil society and journalists thought to be against the leadership. The government sometimes uses the Public Order Act to curtail the freedom of assembly and association.

Freedom of speech is guaranteed in the Constitution, but the Government often restricts this right in practice. The Government controls the state-owned Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC), which dominates the broadcast media. It also controls two widely circulated newspapers (*Times of Zambia* and *Zambia Daily Mail*) through pre-publication review and the journalists' self-censorship. The government has the authority to appoint the management boards of ZNBC and the Independent Broadcasting Authority, which regulates the industry and grants licenses to prospective broadcasters.

Nevertheless, there are several independent broadcasters and newspapers which have the capacity to reach large portions of the population. Conditions are difficult for them, especially those perceived to oppose the government. In some cases journalists have been arrested, detained, and harassed. In August 2009, the government threatened to introduce a bill to regulate the media if it failed to come up with its own regulatory body. The government has yet to pass a much-delayed bill to give the public and journalists free access to official information.

Results from the case study on civil society influence on national budgeting processes indicate that the government welcomes civil society's supplementary role in service delivery. However, when it comes to advocating good governance and calling on the state to uphold the rule of law, the relationship becomes hostile and civil society actors are labelled as enemies of the state, rather than partners in development. The Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD) has on more than one occasion been either threatened or banned from operating, although through court injunctions and societal pressure it somehow remains operational.

#### 5.3 Socio-cultural context

This sub-section describes and analyses the extent to which socio-cultural norms and attitudes are conducive or detrimental to civil society. The sub-dimensions considered are: interpersonal trust; tolerance (for example towards people of a different race, religion, ethnicity, and immigrants/foreign workers, people with HIV/AIDS and homosexuals); and public spiritedness (such as how acceptable people consider avoiding a fare on public transport, cheating on taxes, falsely claiming government benefits, or accepting a bribe in the course of their duties).

Zambians consider themselves quite tolerant, but some discrimination exists based on gender, disability and to a lesser extent against people with diseases such as TB and/or HIV/AIDS. Discrimination against women is especially prevalent in customary courts, where they are considered subordinate with respect to property, inheritance, and marriage. Zambia is also constitutionally a Christian nation, and there is little or no tolerance of same sex-sexual relations and the Zambia Penal code criminalises this and provides for the possibility of imprisonment for such acts.

The level of trust in the Zambian population is very low. According to Transparency International, this is due to high levels of corruption, especially in government. Cases of bribery, extortion, nepotism, fraud, and embezzlement in the recent past have not been uncommon in Zambia. Muyoyeta, Chipola and Elemu (2005) argue that corruption cuts across all sections of Zambian society. According to Tangier (2000), the people of Zambia do not exhibit much devotion to public welfare.

#### Conclusion

The socio-economic, political and cultural environment of the country is not conducive to the full realisation of civic and political liberties. The problems begin with the prevailing legal framework, which is either outdated or otherwise prohibitive for the full functioning of civil society in a democratic era. Citizens have lost confidence in public mass media channels.

#### IV STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN ZAMBIA

The strengths and weaknesses presented hereunder are synthesised from the various consultations that were held during the CSI process in Zambia, including Regional Consultative Meetings held in four provinces (Copperbelt, Southern, Luapula and Lusaka provinces), the NAG and the National Consultative workshop that was held on the 24th

The major strengths of civil society in Zambia are:

- Its ability to mobilise into social movements on contentious governance issues.
- Strong sectoral networks among like-minded CSOs.
- CSOs have a strong influence in tackling social issues in the country.

The major weaknesses of civil society in Zambia are:

- The lack of a comprehensive enabling legislation on CSOs.
- The lack of institutionalised mechanisms for citizens' participation in policy-making processes.
- Weak dialogue between government and civil society on governance issues.
- Heavy reliance on donor funding leading to competition among CSOs for funding and a lack of autonomy in devising strategies for development.
- The poor regional distribution of civil society most CSOs in Zambia are concentrated in urban areas, while more intervention is needed in rural areas.
- Duplication and contradictions in activities due to a lack of effective coordination and collaboration within and between sectors of activity, regions and issues.
- High dependence on volunteers and high staff turnover.
- The absence of a code of conduct: some CSOs have abrogated their mandate to pursue their own interests.

# V RECOMMENDATIONS

This section contains recommendations which synthesise from the various consultations held during the CSI process in Zambia, including Regional Consultative Meetings held in four provinces (Copperbelt, Southern, Luapula and Lusaka provinces), the NAG and the National Consultative workshop that was held on 24 November 2010. These recommendations are not only directed to CSOs, but its partners in the government and the business sector. One of the features of the recommendations is the weakness of civil society, and how to strengthen it.

- Currently the NGO Act No. 16 of 2009 does not apply to churches, clubs, professional groups or organisations, trade unions and religious organisations. As such there is need for further revision of the Act in order to accommodate the types of CSOs which are not covered.
- Civil society should lobby government to reinforce existing structures (such as Sectoral Advisory Groups) in order to strengthen citizen participation in policy-making processes.
- There is need for further inquiry on how dialogue between government and civil society should be strengthened, particularly on issues of governance, participation, human rights and the rule of law.
- It was felt that CSOs are highly dependent on donor funding and usually have no say on how funds should be used. Therefore, there is need for them to develop income generating activities in order to have more independence in their development interventions.
- Since rural communities seem to be underserviced by CSOs, it was felt that there was need for CSOs to spread their activities to rural areas and help in mobilising self-help groups and networking.
- There is need for networking and coordination between CSOs and the Government to avoid duplication and contradiction in development interventions.
- In addition to the guidelines provided in the NGO Act on how CSOs should carry their operations, there was a felt need that CSOs should institute a code of conduct to address matters pertaining to their accountability.

# VI CONCLUSIONS

The conclusion seeks to highlight some of the most important findings as well some relevant issues that emerged from the CSI implementation process in Zambia. The CSI project comprehensively explored different dimensions of civil society such as the extent to which Zambians engage in social and policy-related initiatives, the degree of institutionalisation that characterises civil society, the extent to which civil society practices some core values, the extent to which civil society is able to impact on the social and policy arena, and the operating environment. The CSI data matrix on both CSOs' own perceptions and those of the

general populace, CSOs are portrayed to be strong. However, according to the results of the case studies, this seems not to be the case<sup>25</sup>. This can be partially attributed to the socioeconomic, political and cultural environment of Zambia which is not conducive to the full realisation of civic and political liberties. The problems begin with the prevailing legal framework, which is either outdated or otherwise prohibitive of the full functioning of civil society in a democratic era. The CSI study established that there is currently low civic engagement compared to the past, and that citizens have lost confidence in public institutions, due to high levels of corruption and poverty.

CSOs in the country are organised to some extent. They generally have democratic processes in place, although issues of corruption and personalisation are not uncommon. Most CSOs take labour regulations into account and address the gender-specific needs of women and men, but instituting a code of conduct is a challenge for some. CSOs have formed coalitions or public campaigns dedicated to the promotion of democracy, and resorting to violence is rare among civil society actors. They have support infrastructure, and communication among peers is not problematic. CSOs also have boards in place, but decision-making processes are sometimes not transparent, or the quality of board members is not as good as those found in the corporate world. Sometimes, boards are just put in place as a formality, to fulfil donor funding requirements.

Human and financial resources are the major challenges that affect civil society. Most CSOs depend on volunteers, and for funding there is heavy dependence on donors. CSOs have been involved in pushing for policy reforms, although their impact has been limited due to lack of clearly established channels and mechanisms as well as government mistrust and suspicion. It is also worth noting that to some extent, CSOs have contributed to improved policy interventions, especially on poverty and public expenditure management.

From what has been revealed by study, civil society has a great potential to contribute to the development of Zambia. However, much needs to be done by civil society actors, the government and other stakeholders, particularly in the area of governance, if the full potential of civil society is to be realised.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> For more details refer to CSI case studies.

The implementation of the CSI project in Zambia has given evidence-based information on the state of civil society and some of the major challenges that it faces affecting its level of contribution in the country. The CSI project implementation not only exposed the state of civil society in Zambia, but also provided a rare opportunity for various CSOs and other actors, including government officials, by bringing them together to engage and share views on various issues of governance of Zambia. It is interesting to note that during the CSI national workshop, different stakeholders, including CSOs and government officials, were able to reason together on possible ways of addressing weaknesses of civil society, including how to deal with the regulatory framework, which is one of the major challenges that affects civil society performance in Zambia.

The next step in the CSI project is to follow-up these findings with a policy action brief, which will be disseminated to various stakeholders for the purpose of addressing some of the major challenges identified with civil society operations in Zambia.

# APPENDICES

# APPENDIX 1. LIST OF CSI ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Bairbre Fee	United Nations Development	Programme Analyst	
	Program UNDP		
Bronah Chilemu	Kuomboka Youth Group (Western	Programme Manager	
	Province)		
Emely Sikazwe	Women for Change	Director	
Dorothy M	Ray of Hope (Southern Province)	Management Director	
Sichamba			
Emily Mwale	Program Against Malnutrition	Management Information Systems	
Banda	(PAM)	Officer	
Francis Chaibela	Registrar of Societies	Executive Officer	
Fredrick	Green Living Movement	Director	
Chambanengu			
Lucky Sichula	Media Institute of Southern Africa	Parliament and Politics	
	(MISA) Zambia	Chair/Editor in Chief, Advocate	
		Newspaper	
Kiss Brian	Gender Research in Africa into ICT	Project Director	
Abraham	for Empowerment (GRACE)		
Michael S	Mufumbwe Caring Mothers	Coordinator	
Akufuna	(MUCAMO)		
Preston Viswamo	Bethesda-Zambia	Project Coordinator	
Emily Mwale	Program Against Malnutrition	Management Information Systems	
Banda	(PAM)	Officer	
Mandy Kaoma	Ministry of Community	Planner	
	Development and Social Services		
	(MCDSS)		
Dorothy M	Ray of Hope	Management Director	
Sichamba			

Zindikilani	Organisation Development and	Executive Director
Jimmy Daka	Community Management Trust	
	(ODCMT)	
Rufus Mukusulo	Luminary	Project Coordinator
Sam Kapembwa	Zambia National AIDS Network	Program Officer - Information and
	(ZNAN)	Communication
Henry Machina	Zambia Land Alliance (ZLA)	Director
Humphrey	Danish Association for International	Senior Programme Officer
Elekani	Cooperation (MS-Zambia)	
McDonald	Forum for Democratic Process	Information Officer
Chipenzi	(FODEP)	

# APPENDIX 2: NATIONAL WORKSHOP PARTICIPATION LIST

Name	Organisation	Position
Sam Kapembwa	Zambia National AIDS	Communication Officer
	Network	
Mwanza Zulu	Zambia Prevention Care	Admin Officer
	And Treatment	
Luchembe M K	Forum For Youth In Zambia	National Coordinator
Chilufya		
Lewis Mwape	ZCSD	Programme Coordinator
Rev Aaron J Chilunjika	Full Proof Mission	Director
Dr Charity Musamba	Foundation For Democratic	Executive Director
	Processes	
Humphrey Sikapizya	ZCSD/Idasa Southern Africa	Country Project
		Coordinator
Suzan Chilala	Chongwe Women's District	
	Association	
Charles Sibeene	WILDAF	Accounts and Admin
		Officer
Kabaso Bwalya	ZCSD/ZAMSOF	Information Officer
Banji Mukonze	ZCSD/ IDASA	Project Assistant
Mathew Musukwa	ZANIS	Reporter
Theresa Chewe	SACCORD	Programmes
Lucky Sichula	Advocate Publishers and	Chief Executive Officer
	Media Consultant	
Gershom Kabaso	Acems-Mission Inl	Programmes Coordinator
Bronah Chilemu	Kuomboka Youth Group	Acting Ex-Director
Rudo Phiri Mumba	UNZA	Lecturer /Researcher
Mulenga N Stanslous	Kitwe YMCA	Training Coordinator
Elekain Humphrey	AAIZ	Head of Governance
Charity Musamba	FODEP	Executive Director
Zindikilani Jimmy	ODCMT	Executive Director
Daka		

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Lois Kayumba	ZCSD	Project Assistant
Mary Tembo	ZSF	Vice Chairperson
Gertrude Banda	ZCSD	
Sylvia Banda	ZCSD	Assistant Admin
Matilda Nchenkwa	ZCSD	Office Assistant
Anne Kreft	GTZ	Intern
Brighton Phiri	The Press Freedom	Research And
	Committee	Information
Keisha Nonde	AVAP	Lobby and Advocacy
		Officer
Bonnie Tembo	AVAP	Executive Director
Lee Haamunji	Cuts-International	Assistant - Capacity
		Building
Rev Michael Gondwe	Council Of Churches In	Chairperson Social
	Zambia	Justice and Economics
Mercy Mweda	ZNBC	News Writer
Mutale Mambo	LAZ	Legal Intern
Paul Chaaba	Farmer Organisation	Program Coordinator
	Support Programme	
James Musonda	National Assembly	Professional Assistant
Musonda Chimfwembe	Centre For Transformational	Programme Coordinator
	Communication	
Mukwasa Faith	Community For Human	Assistant Project Officer
	Development	(Intern)
Wanye S Siafwa	Societies	Registrar
Nkonde Chola	Inkumbu Community	Programme Officer
	Response	
Beatrice Nsonge	Luminary Foundation	Director
Mukusula		
Moonga Mumba	UNZA	Lecturer / Researcher
Rakesh Katal	Concern WW	Country Director
Mary Mumba	CWDF	Coordinator
Hazel Choolwe	KAMU	Coordinator

Preston Viswamo	Gilgal Foundation	Executive Director
Michael S Akufuna	Mucamo	Coordinator
Chileshe M Nsama	CSO APRM/CARITAS	Assistant Coordinator
Boyd Phiri	Zambia Daily Mail	Deputy Feature Editor
Daniel M Simate	Ray Of Hope	M and E Officer
Chilongoshi Julius	NAC/ Livingstone	DACA
Rev Patrick Mwanza	CCZ/ECZ	
Audrey Mwale	ZCSD	PLO
Chanda K Phiri	Alututse Orphanage CARE	National Coordinator
Angela Mwanamwege	Alutuse Orphanage Care	Counsellor
Chilyango F Chiwele	Liutemb M	Lecturer
Mweenge Chimfwebe	ZCSD	IAO
Mubanga Samba	Runsky Of Justice	Human Rights
		Management Officer
Thulan H Maunda		Public Service Delivery
		Officer
Emily Mwale Banda		Committee Member
Maureen Chitundu	РАМ	EPS
Davis Sichalwe	ZSCD Eastern	PLO
Agnes K Mwamba	Zambia Alliance Of Women	Book Keeper

# APPENDIX 3. CSI DATA MATRIX

1) Dimension: Civic			
Engagement			60.79
1.1		Extent of socially-based engagement	66.60
	1.1.1	Social membership 1	80.60
	1.1.2	Social volunteering 1	72.80
	1.1.3	Community engagement 1	46.40
1.2		Depth of socially-based engagement	47.93
	1.2.1	Social membership 2	28.60
	1.2.2	Social volunteering 2	31.00
	1.2.3	Community engagement 2	84.20
1.3		Diversity of socially-based engagement	95.73
	1.3.1	Diversity of socially-based engagement	95.73
1.4		Extent of political engagement	28.70
	1.4.1	Political membership 1	29.60
	1.4.2	Political volunteering 1	31.80
	1.4.3	Individual activism 1	24.70
1.5		Depth of political engagement	36.27
	1.5.1	Political membership 2	32.70
	1.5.2	Political volunteering 2	33.30
	1.5.3	Individual activism 2	42.80
1.6		Diversity of political engagement	89.54
	1.6.1	Diversity of political engagement	89.54
2) Dimension: Level of organisation			58.34
2.1		Internal governance	88.90
	2.1.1	Management	88.90
2.2		Infrastructure	72.70
	2.2.1	Support organizations	72.70
2.3		Sectoral communication	89.40

	2.3.1	Peer-to-peer communication 1	92.10
	2.3.2	Peer-to-peer communication 2	86.70
2.4		Human resources	30.70
	2.4.1	Sustainability of HR	30.70
2.5		Financial and technological resources	61.95
	2.5.1	Financial sustainability	50.00
	2.5.2	Technological resources	73.90
2.6		International linkages	6.36
	2.6.1	International linkages	6.36
3) Dimension: Practice of Values			59.25
3.1		Democratic decision-making governance	73.30
	3.1.1	Decision-making	73.30
3.2		Labour regulations	34.29
	3.2.1	Equal opportunities	64.40
	3.2.2	Members of labour unions	2.25
	3.2.3	Labour rights tranings	31.50
	3.2.4	Publicly available policy for labour standards	39.00
3.3		Code of conduct and transparency	81.20
	3.3.1	Publicly available code of conduct	82.60
	3.3.2	Transparency	79.80
3.4		Environmental standards	35.70
	3.4.1	Environmental standards	35.70
3.5		Perception of values in civil society as a whole	71.75
	3.5.1	Perceived non-violence	79.50
	3.5.2	Perceived internal democracy	60.00
	3.5.3	Perceived levels of corruption	31.00
	3.5.4	Perceived intolerance	87.80
	3.5.5	Perceived weight of intolerant groups	88.90
	3.5.6	Perceived promotion on non-violence and peace	83.30
4) Dimension: Perception			60.34

of Impact			
4.1		Responsiveness (internal perception)	72.60
	4.1.1	Impact on social concern 1	77.00
	4.1.2	Impact on social concern 2	68.20
4.2		Social Impact (internal perception)	69.90
	4.2.1	General social impact	71.60
	4.2.2	Social impact of own organisation	68.20
4.3		Policy Impact (internal perception)	53.70
	4.3.1	General policy impact	65.90
	4.3.2	Policy activity of own organisation	61.90
	4.3.3	Policy impact of own organisation	33.30
4.4		Responsiveness (external perception)	71.85
	4.4.1	Impact on social concern 1	77.80
	4.4.2	Impact on social concern 2	65.90
4.5		Social Impact (external perception)	67.50
	4.5.1	Social impact selected concerns	75.00
	4.5.2	Social impact general	60.00
4.6		Policy Impact (external perception)	69.60
	4.6.1	Policy impact specific fields 1-3	81.40
	4.6.2	Policy impact general	57.80
4.7		Impact of CS on attitudes	17.24
	4.7.1	Difference in trust between civil society	1.30
		members and non-members	
	4.7.2	Difference in tolerance levels between civil	4.58
		society members and non-members	
	4.7.3	Difference in public spiritedness between	0.00
		civil society members and non-members	
	4.7.4	Trust in civil society	63.10
5) Contextual Dimension: Environment			57.11
5.1		Socio-economic context	55.58
	5.1.1	Basic Capabilities Index	73.00
L	5.1.2	Corruption	28.00
	5.1.3	Inequality	49.20
	5.1.4	Economic context	72.10

5.2		Socio-political context	60.81
	5.2.1	Political rights and freedoms	65.00
	5.2.2	Rule of law and personal freedoms	54.17
	5.2.3	Associational and organizaitonal rights	66.67
	5.2.4	Experience of legal framework	80.00
	5.2.5	State effectiveness	38.20
5.3		Socio-cultural context	54.94
	5.3.1	Trust	7.90
	5.3.2	Tolerance	66.38
	5.3.3	Public spiritedness	90.53

### **APPENDIX 4: SUMMARIES FOR CASE STUDIES**

Presented below are summaries of five case studies that the NIT undertook as part of the CSI project in Zambia. This document only provides overviews and key findings of each case study. More information on individual case studies can be accessed through CIVICUS website.

#### Case study 1: Status of Accountability among CSOs in Zambia

The aim of the study was to investigate and generate information on the status of accountability in a selected sample of civil society organisations in Zambia. The study has demonstrated that CSOs in Zambia have gained prominence as a voice for the poor and voiceless. Many of them have endeavoured to speak for the poor and marginalised sections of the society. In order to achieve both internal and external accountability; CSOs have put a number of mechanisms including: financial and administrative mechanism, policy and procedures manual, holding of AGMs and submitting of annual returns to the Registrar of society. The study established that accountability among CSOs seem to be more inclined to transparency in administering finances. Regulation is yet another important aspect of accountability which the paper has discussed. With regard to regulation the study found out that most CSOs in Zambia prefer self regulation as opposed to statutory regulation if they are to provide effective checks and balances to the government.

However, on the other hand, most CSOs have been criticised as not being so democratic on the basis that they seem to be centred on very few individuals who in most cases tend to be the founders of those CSOs. This factor is argued to be counterproductive as it has the potential of compromising on their accountability.

The study established that CSOs have strived even under difficult circumstances to ensure accountability even though this cannot be said for all of them as there are still pockets of CSOs that are still facing difficulties in this area. The study also established that accountability processes in Zambia more inclined to serving the interests of the most influential and powerful groups such as donors and government to some extent. The study therefore concludes that there is need to look beyond technical managerial accountability mechanisms and focus more on enhancing participatory accountability processes with emphasis on empowering the intended beneficiaries.

#### Case study 2: Sectoral and Regional Distribution of Civil Society in Zambia

This study was aimed at identifying the sectoral and regional distribution of civil society in Zambia. The findings revealed that by distribution, there are more CSOs operating in Lusaka. Forty-nine percent of CSOs are concentrated in Lusaka alone. Partly, this can be attributed to the fact that Lusaka is the capital city for Zambia and as such it has a fair concentration of a number of economic activities and also attracts a lot of people from all walks of life. The recent upsurge in economic activities in the North-Western province of Zambia necessitated by the opening of Kansanshi and Lumwana mines have facilitated an increase in the number of CSOs operating in the province. The study revealed that the province had the second largest number of CSOs in the country.




Figure 1: Regional distribution of CSOs in Zambia

In terms of sectoral distribution of CSOs, the study has revealed that education, youth and child development organisations have the highest number of CSOs standing at 43%. These seem to be among current donor funding priority areas as they relate to Millennium Development Goals. The Governance thematic Group had 13% and this can be attributed to the importance placed on issues of Governance. Additionally, the HIV/Aids thematic group stands at 11% (Figure 2 below shows the sectoral distribution of CSOs in the country).




Figure 2: Sectoral distribution of CSOs in Zambia

According to NAC (2008), since the early 1990s, with the increased availability of funding, there has been a ten-fold increase in the number of civil society organisations (CSOs) working in HIV in Zambia – involved in a wide range of roles. The case study created a good starting point for identifying CSOs distribution in different sectors as well as their regional distribution in Zambia.

# Case study 3 : An Assessment of Civil Society's Impact on the National Budgeting Process in Zambia

The aim of the study was to assess the impact of civil society on the national budgeting process in Zambia. It examined the potential influence of CSOs in all stages of the budgeting process, from the drafting stage through to the implementation stage, and it also examined whether governments actually take these interventions and influences seriously.

To accomplish its aim, the study assessed the involvement of CSOs in all the four stages of national budgeting in Zambia, which are Drafting, Legislative and Approval, Implementation and Auditing stages. With regard to the drafting stage, the study revealed that though this stage is open to CSOs, they do not take part in the drafting stage nor are they allowed to be

part of the related meetings. They only participate directly through Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) which consists of representatives from government, civil society, private sector and cooperating partners. It was also established that although government receives submissions made by civil society, CSOs are not given the chance to see the drafted document of the budget before it is presented to parliament.

After the drafting stage follows the Legislative stage which is the presentation of the budget to the National Assembly for approval. At this level, the study revealed that CSOs are involved in analysing the budget and making submissions before the Joint Estimates Committee. However in this regard the study established that the proposals made by civil society are not always taken into consideration, and CSO representatives are only allowed to hear the budget presentation in parliament.

The implementation stage comes after the legislative one and this covers the period when budget policies are carried out by the responsible government departments. Monitoring and control also occurs during this phase and that is to ensure that spending and revenue collection adhere to the plan as set by the budget. Implementation begins when the permanent warranties are granted to line ministries. The study established that CSOs conduct independent evaluations on how projects are done. CSOs representatives acknowledged conducting budget tracking and monitoring activities on allocated amounts, especially focusing on poverty reduction funds in rural areas. The study, however, noted that CSOs also had complaints in regards to lack of information on disbursements of allocations from the national to district levels. These restrictions to information made the task of monitoring government expenditure, at provincial and district levels, particularly difficult for CSOs.

The last stage of the budget cycle is the audit stage and this includes a number of activities intended to measure the effective use of public resources, which is done by the Auditor General's office who audits or evaluates the public accounts. The study established that civil society does not play any role in the audit. All the work is done by the Auditor General and the related ministries. In the same vein the study revealed that civil society has been advocating for a revival of this system, and inclusion on the Public Expenditure Review Framework in the budgeting process but government has been reluctant in implementing this process. However, respondents from MFNP indicated that some prominent CSOs, including EAZ, Caritas Zambia, Transparency International Zambia (TIZ) and the Forum for

Democratic Process (FODEP), have been able to hold discussions with the Auditor General's Office, in order to review the Auditor General's report.

At this point, it suffices to mention that the Zambian government policy is said to be ambiguous on the role of the civil society in the budgetary process. Mudenda, Ndulo and Wakumelo, (2005) pointed out that government does provide an opportunity to civil society to submit proposals to the budget, but it is not obliged to take CSOs submissions into account. CSOs also lack information on the processes and capacity to effectively interact with the public institutions, in order for them to make meaningful submissions.

The study highlighted both the opportunities and challenges CSOs face in their endeavour to influence important national programmes such as the budget. The findings of the study will therefore enable the stakeholders in issues of public policy to see the need for the development of a legal and policy framework for civil society participation in the budget process and other national programmes. This will help to clarify the extent of civil society's role in the in the national programmes budget process inclusive and how they can participate meaningfully.

#### Case study 4: Assesing Civic Engagement Trends in Zambia

The aim of this study was to assess the processes and trends in civic engagement in Zambia. It examined how civil society (in Zambia) engages with the government on political and socio-economic issues. Civic engagement in Zambia has assumed a very important role in the development process of the country. This can be attributed to the realisation that, alongside the state and market, civil society is a critical factor in promoting good governance and people-centered development and determining the level, pace and equity of a country's economic, social and political development. The study revealed that CSOs do have considerable strength and influence to inspire active citizenship participation in governance issues, as well as democratic governance in general. It was also established that the Zambian people believe that civic engagement is an essential element in achieving and advancing the viable social and political objectives put up by the country, as such the study was quick to point out that the effectiveness of individuals is dependent on political influence.

Despite the positive realisations depicted above, the study established that there was lack of independence in the functioning of state institutions such as Anti-corruption Commission (ACC). The study also revealed that the current constitutional provisions grant too much power to the President, thereby limiting wider participation in reforms meant to inspire confidence in citizens. The other pressing challenge that even those stakeholders like CSOs who are willing to take an active role in conscientising people in various activities of the social and political nature, their capacity to operate is limited by their weak financial position as most CSOs are highly dependent on donors. The implication of this is that where donor funds are in short supply, the activities of the CSOs are hampered greatly.

This study provided a starting point for examining the trends in civic engagements in Zambia, and understanding the myriad of challenges that characterise it. In future, there is need, among other things to strengthen the capacities of CSOs that operate at national level to extend their representation and meaningful participation at all levels in order to capture individual participation and engagement in civic matters. There is also need for continuous research and sensitisation programmes on civic engagement.

# Case study 5: Corporate Social Responsibility practices in Private Sector and Civil Society Organisations in Zambia: Assessing Relationships

This study assessed the relationship between civil society and the private sector by examining corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities from a Zambian perspective. It aimed at assessing the environment in which civil society operates as well as assessing whether the private sector is able to complement the activities of civil society through CSR. The study established that the relationship between civil society and the private sector changes, depending on the situation in which they occur. This can entail CSOs playing a watchdog role to ensure that the private sector lives up to international or national standards in environmental protection, human rights and labour laws. It could also entail a civil society/ private sector partnership in community-building, through activities such as sports development, or the fight against HIV/AIDS. Or it could ultimately entail a donor relationship where civil society solicits support from companies on behalf of the people they work with and for.

With regards to the aspect of community-building partnership based relationships, the study revealed that some CSOs and the private sector work together in communities by providing health care services, education and addressing issues of cultural promotion. Civil society has been offering technical support to the private sector by helping the business sector in developing HIV/AIDS strategies in work places. This is being done by NGOs, such as Zambia Workplace AIDS Partnership (ZWAP), who are using their knowledge and technical expertise to gain access to both big and small companies. This group of NGOs also offers workshops to help companies come up with care and prevention initiatives (Deidre et al. 2009:1). The study also revealed some private sector organisations do donate funds to community self-help groups through NGOs and CBOs. In most cases, NGOs and CBOs approach companies for financial and material support, but at times, companies may also choose the NGOs to partner with, or may donate directly to the community. However, the study revealed that some companies do not have specific funding reserved to support civil society activities and initiatives in their CSR policies. As such when civil society approached them requesting for support, corporations often rendered their support according to the availability of funds at a given time.

The case study findings also established in some instances, CSOs do clash with the private sector, on issues as in environmental protection, where civil society plays the watchdog role. Despite such clashes, the two have been able to work together and their relationship is being strengthened through CSR.

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