

ABSTRACT

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## ABSTRACT

The following study investigates how Catholics in the southwestern German state of Baden reacted to German unification in 1871. Although Baden had a Catholic majority, during the Second Empire the state was governed by Protestant liberals, who often discriminated against the state's Catholics. To understand how Badenese Catholics participated in the nation-building project from 1871 to 1914, this work analyzes Catholic reactions to the commemorative discourse that surrounded unification. This discourse was often tinged with anti-Catholic sentiments that alleged that Catholics had been opposed to the unification and that they harbored stronger loyalties to the Pope in Rome than they did to the German Emperor in Berlin. Despite being politically and economically disadvantaged, Badenese Catholics successfully contested this ideological message and instead created an alternative discourse that better represented their own version of Germanness. My analysis illustrates that these Catholics subscribed to a multi-faceted version of German identity. Instead of being subsumed into a Protestant-dominated national identity, they were able to maintain certain pre-1871 elements of their identity, which included loyalties to the Pope, Baden, their fellow Germans in Catholic Austria, as well as Emperor Wilhelm I.

This study also displays how central confessional elements were to the construction of German national identity during the Second Empire. Religious affiliation

to a large extent determined how Germans lived their lives, and confessional loyalties became one of the key components in the new German national identity. Moreover, this work also demonstrates that Catholic and Protestant integration into the new German nation-state should be viewed as an ongoing debate about what constituted German. Although during the last two decades before the First World War, Catholics and Protestants did not clash as frequently over the definition of Germanness as they had during the first two decades of the *Kaiserreich*, they never completely agreed on the exact nature of their national identity. Thus, despite facing numerous political, economic, and social obstacles, Badenese Catholics were able to manifest successfully their own version of German identity throughout the Second German Empire.





NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

NEGOTIATING IDENTITIES: SOUTH GERMAN CATHOLICS AND THE  
FORMATION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY, 1871-1914

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

BY

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
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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Although many German Catholics and Protestants went to war in both 1870 and 1914 filled with nationalist sentiments, they did not concur on the nature of the German nation at either time. Indeed, though they lived side by side in the Second German Empire, they were never able to come to a consensus on what it meant to be German. Analysis of their differing perceptions of national identity highlights the multifaceted nature of the German nation in which Catholic and Protestant versions of Germanness coexisted, sometimes very uneasily. By the 1890s, Catholics and Protestants had reached a contentious agreement on what German could constitute, but this did not mean that either group had been able to convince the other of the exact nature of national identity. Rather, what emerges here is a complex construction of national identity in which Protestants and Catholics interacted with each other to determine the nature/s of Germanness.

In this work, I analyze how Catholics in Baden viewed the commemorations of the wars of unification to provide insights into how Catholics shaped national identity during the Second Empire. Although confessional sentiments played an important role in determining the personal experience of Germans during the *Kaiserreich*, historians long neglected to consider religion one of the important societal forces in the nineteenth century. Until the mid-1980s, most scholars viewed the history of

nineteenth-century Germany as one of linear secularization, in which religion played an increasingly minor role in society.<sup>1</sup> During the early and middle parts of that decade, the publications of Jonathan Sperber, David Blackbourn, Thomas Nipperdey and others signaled a shift in how scholars viewed religious life in Germany. Their research confirmed that while secularization of society occurred, religion and confessional sentiments constituted a major part of everyday life for Germans during the nineteenth century.<sup>2</sup> As they revised the standard interpretation of the “long” nineteenth century as one of slow decline in religious influence, historians recognized how important confessional sentiments were to Protestants, Catholics, and Jews as they negotiated their existence in an increasingly modernizing and urbanizing nation-

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<sup>1</sup> Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973) best represents this view. Exceptions include Christel Köhle-Hezinger, *Evangelisch-katholisch: Untersuchungen zu konfessionellem Vorurteil und Konflikt im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert vornehmlich am Beispiel Württembergs* (Tübingen: Gulde, 1976); Rudolf Lill, “Kirche und Revolution: Zu den Anfängen der katholischen Bewegung im Jahrzehnt vor 1848,” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 18 (1978): 565-575; and Wolfgang Schieder, “Kirche und Revolution: Sozialgeschichtliche Aspekte der Trier Wallfahrt von 1844,” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 14 (1974): 419-454.

<sup>2</sup> Work highlighting the Catholic experience includes: Margaret Lavinia Anderson: *Windthorst: A Political Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); idem, *Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); David Blackbourn, *Class, Religion, and Local Politics in Wilhelmine Germany: The Centre Party in Württemberg before 1914* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); idem, *Marpingen: Apparitions of the Virgin Mary in Nineteenth Century Germany* (New York: Knopf, 1994); Olaf Blaschke and Frank-Michael Kuhlemann, eds., *Religion im Kaiserreich: Milieus—Mentalitäten—Krisen* (Gütersloh: Kaiser, 1996); Werner K. Blessing, *Staat und Kirche in der Gesellschaft: Institutionelle Autorität und mentaler Wandel in Bayern während des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982); Wilfried Loth, *Katholiken im Kaiserreich: Der Politische Katholizismus in der Krise des Wilhelminischen Deutschlands* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1984); Thomas Nipperdey, *Religion im Umbruch: Deutschland 1870-1918* (München: Beck, 1988); Anton Rauscher, ed., *Katholizismus, Bildung und Wissenschaft in 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1987); Ronald J. Ross, *The Failure of Bismarck's Kulturkampf: Catholicism and State Power in Imperial Germany, 1871-1887* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1998); Wolfgang Schieder, ed., *Volksreligiosität in der modernen Sozialgeschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986); Helmut Walser Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870-1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Jonathan Sperber, *Popular Catholicism in Nineteenth Century Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).



state. Despite ongoing secularization, confessional identities still played a large role in determining how citizens lived their lives. Religious affiliation affected where Germans lived, shopped, attended school, what they read, whom they married, and whom they considered their friends.

Scholars like Helmut Walser Smith, Margaret Anderson, and Wolfgang Altgeld now agree that religion was not a by-product of other forces in society, but rather a force that shaped cultural, political, and social actions. The study of German nationalism has been no exception to this trend, though the central role of confessional elements in national identity is still underappreciated. With the exception of Smith's path-breaking study, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict*, and recent studies by Kevin Cramer, Michael Gross and Róisín Healy, there has been little research on how confessional sentiments affected the construction of German national identity.<sup>3</sup> Historians traditionally asserted that Prussian and Protestant values strongly influenced this identity. The Prussian (Protestant) victories over Catholic Austria and France in 1866 and 1870-1871 confirmed for many Germans that Protestantism should play the dominant role in the new nation-state. Consequently, earlier scholars often assumed that German national identity was largely Protestant, and thus relatively little research was conducted into the confessional nature of national identity or how Catholic sentiments affected the construction of this identity. To be sure, Altgeld,

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<sup>3</sup> Kevin Cramer, "The Cult of Gustavus Adolphus: Protestant Identity and German Nationalism," in *Protestants, Catholics and Jews in Germany 1800-1914*, eds. Chris Clark and Helmut Walser Smith (New York: Berg, 2001), 97-121; Michael Gross, *The War Against Catholicism: Liberal Identity and the Anti-Catholic Imagination in Nineteenth Century Germany* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004); Róisín Healy, *The Jesuit Specter in Imperial Germany* (Boston: Brill, 2003); and Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict*.

Horst Gründer, Rudolf Lill, George Windell and others have addressed various aspects of Catholic attitudes towards the nation-state.<sup>4</sup> However, none of them analyzed in detail how Catholics shaped and influenced the construction of their own national identity. Instead, these scholars have focused on how Catholics sought to fit into the unified Empire, without really investigating how or to what extent Catholics helped form a new national identity. My work attempts to fill this scholarly void.

My analysis of how Catholics in Baden viewed the commemorative discourse surrounding the wars of unification illuminates how these Catholics helped shape the construction of a German national identity. Building on Smith's research, my work reinforces the assertion that confessional sentiments constituted an important element of national identity. When Badenese Catholics and Protestants debated the nature of their identity, they often employed confessional terms. Confessional sentiments are a key component of understanding the multifaceted nature of German nationalism. My research demonstrates that Catholics exercised a greater influence on the construction of national identity than previously thought. I contend that these Catholics successfully challenged the Prussian-Protestant hegemony on the construction of identity, suggesting the need for reevaluating Catholic effectiveness at infusing national identity with their own version of Germanness.

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<sup>4</sup> Wolfgang Altgeld, *Katholizismus, Protestantismus, Judentum: Über religiös begründete Gegensätze und nationalreligiöse Ideen in der Geschichte des deutschen Nationalismus* (Mainz: Mathias-Grünewald Verlag, 1992); Horst Gründer, "Nation und Katholizismus im Kaiserreich," in *Katholizismus, nationaler Gedanke und Europa seit 1800* ed. Albrecht Langer (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1985), 65-88; Rudolf Lill, "Die deutschen Katholiken und Bismarcks Reichsgründung," in *Reichsgründung 1870/71: Tatsachen, Kontroversen, Interpretationen*, eds. Ernst Duerlein and Theodor Schieder (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1970), 345-366; and George Windell, *The Catholics and German Unity, 1866-1871* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954).

Although scholars have long assumed that Germany was an incomplete nation-state in 1871, it is only during the last decade that historians have begun to understand exactly how Germans negotiated local, regional, confessional, and social identities in the postunification period.<sup>5</sup> Alon Confino and Celia Applegate have demonstrated the importance of *Heimat* as a vehicle for understanding how Germans cemented a national identity, showing how veneration of *Heimat* enabled Germans to interpret and understand the “National.” Today, most historians subscribe to the notion that Germans in the Second Empire did not abandon their local and regional identities as Württembergers, Bavarians, or Badeners, but that they instead used these identities as means of becoming German. Simply put, one was a German because one was a Badener. These sentiments were not exclusive but rather constituted central components of German identity. Although Prussia certainly played a dominant role first in the unification process and subsequently in the Second Empire, this research rejects the notion that an overarching Prussian identity subsumed other Germans of the Empire. Instead, while they were indeed loyal to the new nation-state and its

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<sup>5</sup> See for example: Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); John Breuilly, ed., *The State of Germany. The National Idea in the Making, Unmaking, and Remaking of a Modern Nation state* (London: Longman, 1992); Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany and National Memory, 1871-1918* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Abigail Green, *Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); James Retallack, ed., *Saxony in German History: Culture, Society, and Politics, 1830-1933* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000); and James J. Sheehan, “What is German History? Reflections on the Role of the *Nation* in German History and Historiography,” *Journal of Modern History* 53 (1981): 1-23.

Emperor, Germans maintained elements of their local and regional identities as vital ingredients of their new national identity.

Research on *Heimat* and other forms of local and regional identity permits a better understanding of how Germans constructed their new *national* identity. What has largely been missing from this picture is analysis of how confessional sentiments affected this process. Although Smith and others have enhanced our understanding of how important religion was to the construction of national identity, much work remains to be done, especially concerning the Catholic experience of the Second Empire. To be sure, there is a voluminous literature on different aspects of Catholic life during the period. The works of Blackbourn, Sperber, Ronald Ross, and Wolfgang Schieder have ensured that Catholics are no longer perceived simply as passive and marginalized victims in the Empire.<sup>6</sup> Despite these advances, however, we still do not fully understand how Catholics located their identities within the newly constructed Germany. Although Altgeld, Windell, Lill, and Gründer have enhanced our understanding of Catholic attitudes towards the nation-state, their work fails to take into account some of the newer approaches, especially how central confessional aspects were to the creation of national identity. While Gründer and Altgeld have hinted that Catholics maintained a different type of identity than Protestants, they have not analyzed in detail exactly how Catholics constructed German identity nor how

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<sup>6</sup> See for example: Anderson, *Windthorst: A Political Biography*; Blackbourn, *Marpingen: Apparitions of the Virgin Mary in Nineteenth Century Germany*; and Ross, *The Failure of Bismarck's Kulturkampf*.

successful Catholics were at maintaining their own identities in the postunification period.

My analysis of public commemorations of German unification as a vehicle for understanding identity formation adds to a large body of existing research. Over the past two decades, scholars have addressed the importance of public commemorations to the construction of identity, establishing that public ceremonies and commemorative monuments were an important means of helping construct identity.<sup>7</sup> Because Protestants in Baden had most of the provincial economic and political power, they controlled most of the construction of these monuments and the ceremonies connected with them. Prominent local Protestants who often rejected the Catholic interpretation of their shared history comprised the majority of members of committees that organized and planned these events and monuments. Especially during the first few years of the Empire, and particularly during the *Kulturkampf*, most of these ceremonies and monuments contained a strong anti-Catholic message.

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<sup>7</sup> On this process in Germany, see for instance: Reinhard Alings, *Monument und Nation. Das Bild vom Nationalstaat im Medium Denkmal—zum Verhältnis von Nation und Staat im deutschen Kaiserreich* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996); Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor*; Dieter Düding, Peter Friedemann, and Paul Münch, eds., *Öffentliche Festkultur. Politische Feste in Deutschland von der Aufklärung bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg* (Rheinbeck bei Hamburg: Rohwolt, 1988); Wolfgang Hardtwig, “Der bezweifelte Patriotismus—nationale Bewußtsein und Denkmal 1786 bis 1933,” *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 44, (1993): 47-75; Reinhart Koselleck and Michael Jeismann, eds., *Der Politische Totenkult: Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne* (Munich: Fink Verlag, 1994); Rudy Koshar, *From Monuments to Traces: Artifacts of German Memory, 1870-1990* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Wilfrid Lipp, *Natur, Geschichte, Denkmal: Zur Entstehung des Denkmalbewußtsein der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1987); Ute Schneider, *Politische Festkultur im 19. Jahrhundert: die Rheinprovinz von der französischen Zeit bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges (1806-1918)* (Essen: Klartext, 1995); and Charlotte Tacke, *Denkmal im sozialen Raum. Nationale Symbole in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995).

Reflecting their interpretation of recent history, Badenese Protestants employed a commemorative discourse that labeled Catholics antinational and highlighted their alleged opposition to unification. However, rather than accepting the Protestant version of national identity, Badenese Catholics challenged the ideological message inherent in this discourse. They created an alternative commemorative discourse that manifested their own version of national identity by boycotting commemorative events, by keeping their children home from school on days when events such as the Battle of Sedan were commemorated, by employing the press to debate the merits of these celebrations, and by using Catholic religious holidays and symbolism to manifest their own view of the German nation.

Baden constitutes a useful case study because it was the only state in Imperial Germany with a Catholic majority governed by liberals and Protestants. I employ the term “liberal” in this work to signify citizens who voted for liberal political parties. In Baden, the National Liberal Party was the most dominant political force during the Second Empire. Although the *Fresinnige* Party came into existence in 1881, it failed to attract much support. Thus, the overwhelming majority of liberals in Baden voted for the National Liberal Party. These Germans generally supported policies advocating economic development such as free trade and commerce, a decrease in the power of the Catholic Church, an emphasis on interconfessional education, and an electoral franchise that privileged property owners at the expense of the working class. Although a minority in Baden, liberals controlled most of the political and economic power. The overwhelming majority of them were Protestants, which meant that they

were more often inclined to support a modernization of society, particularly if it meant a decrease in the power of the Catholic Church. In the post-1871 period, most Badenese Protestants also subscribed to the notion that Protestantism had been a driving force in the process of unification, which placed them in direct conflict with the state's Catholics. Moreover, the fact that the Protestant church was organized at state levels meant that they regularly criticized Catholic loyalties to Rome, which they considered anti-German. The less hierarchical formation of the Protestant church also meant that Badenese Protestants considered themselves more independent and "modern" citizens. They alleged that the centralized structure of the Catholic Church hindered the development of a modern German society and prevented Catholics from realizing their cultural, economic, and political potential. The Protestant milieu in Baden was relatively homogeneous. The vast majority of Protestants voted for the national-liberals and generally supported liberal attacks on the Catholic Church. Although Protestants in many other areas of Germany sometimes divided over the extent and severity of the *Kulturkampf* and other instances of anti-Catholic actions, in Baden, the Protestant camp remained quite unified in their anti-Catholic attitudes. To be sure, there were differences within the Protestant community, but they were minor compared to most other areas in Germany.<sup>8</sup> In Baden, Protestants overwhelmingly supported the national-liberals, while only a small number voted conservative. The Protestant loyalty to the National Liberal Party constitutes one of the main reasons

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<sup>8</sup> Frank Michael Kuhlmann, "Protestantisches Milieu in Baden: Konfessionelle Vergesellschaftung und Mentalität im Umbruch zur Moderne," in *Religion im Kaiserreich*, eds. Blaschke and Kuhlmann, 317-349.

why the party controlled most of the political and economic power for the duration of the Second Empire, which frequently caused conflicts with the more conservative Catholic part of the population.

Baden's often fiercely anti-Catholic state government frequently issued discriminatory legislation aimed at excluding Catholics from the national community. My investigation into how Catholics negotiated these obstacles as they became German helps illuminate how Catholics throughout the Second Empire were able to maintain their traditional identities as part of the new national consciousness. I argue that Catholic integration into the Empire should not be viewed as a gradual acquiescence to a dominant Protestant and Prussian identity, but rather that Catholics instead were successful in maintaining large parts of their pre-1871 identities. In the same way that historians have illustrated how Germans were able to maintain many different local and regional loyalties within their national identity, I contend that Badenese Catholics preserved numerous layered identities as they became members of the new nation-state. Rather than being subsumed into a new official national identity that was based solely on Protestant and Prussian values, these Badenese preserved class, local, regional, and religious loyalties while at the same time being devoted German subjects.

Baden constitutes an ideal study of how Catholics negotiated their national identity not only because it had a Catholic majority and was governed by a liberal and Protestant minority, but also because its location on the fringes of the Empire enabled Badenese to maintain a large part of their regional identities in unified Germany.



Badeners were keen to stress the important roles the state and its Grand Duke had played in the unification process. They used this commemorative discourse to help preserve their traditional identities while negotiating their new national identity. In addition, the provincial conflict between church and state during the 1860s provided a model for the national *Kulturkampf* and its attempt to create a national identity along confessional lines. The relationship between Catholics and Protestants was tense throughout much of the period of this study, which provides insights into how the confessional conflict affected the creation of national identity.

The Badenese confessional camps were not, however, monolithic. The Catholic community was not entirely cohesive, as evidenced during controversy surrounding the declaration of papal infallibility in 1870. Although I devote some attention to the divisions within the Catholic Church, my investigation centers on the Catholic community composed of those who supported the doctrine of infallibility in 1870, which the Protestants generally labeled ultramontane. These Catholics identified closely with the Pope and the international structure of the Catholic Church. They were often conservative, staunch supporters of the Center Party; especially during the first few decades of the *Kaiserreich*, they were predominantly farmers, small artisans, and factory workers. They frequently attended church and were often quite influenced by local clergy and Catholic intellectuals in their economic, cultural, social, and political opinions. While the majority of Baden was ultramontane, a sizeable number of so-called liberal Catholics lived there as well. They were generally more successful politically and economically than the conservative Catholics

and sometimes voted for the national-liberals. Although liberal Catholics exercised some local political influence, particularly during the first two decades of the Second Empire, I focus on conservative Catholics, who constituted the majority of the state's citizens. It should also be noted that most of my subjects were part of the educated middle and upper classes. These Catholics, often local clergy and lay leaders, also exercised a degree of influence on the opinions of lower class Catholics. Although I do not subscribe to the frequent Protestant accusations that Catholic clergy controlled the lives of the members of their congregations, it is clear that there was a certain degree of homogeneity to the conservative Catholic milieu. However, the Catholic voices that emerge in this study belonged primarily to the educated upper and middle classes.

I have chosen Heidelberg, Konstanz, and Freiburg as case studies because they represent a cross section of Badenese society that enables an analysis of different aspects of Catholic life during the Second Empire. Both Konstanz and Freiburg are located in the southern part of the state, a stronghold of pro-Austrian sentiments in the period leading up to unification. Since the eleventh century, Konstanz had been one of the most powerful sites of the Catholic Church in Central Europe. Although Rome transferred much of this power to Freiburg, which became the site of the new archdiocese in 1821, in the wake of the territorial reorganizations at the Congress of Vienna, the Catholic Church remained powerful in Konstanz. The creation of the Freiburg Archdiocese transformed that city into a Catholic clerical stronghold. The church's position in these two cities meant that the local, largely Protestant, urban elites struggled to wrestle power from the church as they strove to modernize the

cities. Hence, the relationship between Catholics and Protestants was often very tense, which affected the construction of national identity. Konstanz and Freiburg shared characteristics that distinguished them from Heidelberg in northern Baden, which had a majority of Protestants and had never been a Catholic stronghold. The relationship between Catholics and Protestants there tended to be more amicable, which provides a useful counterpoint to the conditions in the southern part of the state. Furthermore, there were more *kleindeutsch* supporters in Heidelberg than in the heavily *grossdeutsch* southern part of the state. Although they were among the largest cities in the state, and therefore at the forefront of political, cultural, and economic developments, their histories were different enough to provide for useful comparisons.

During the late nineteenth century, there was much interaction among the three cities. City councils in these three cities often discussed among themselves how to commemorate unification. Although the cities did not celebrate every occasion similarly, their communications still illustrate their cooperation in producing a Badenese commemorative discourse. Moreover, Catholics in these cities often conferred as they decided how to approach certain commemorations. Particularly with the development of a Catholic press, the level of interaction between Catholics around the state increased and aided them in their attempts to create a stronger statewide Catholic community.

Although scholars have analyzed some aspects of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Badenese society, there still are gaps in the provincial historiography. In the late 1970s, Gert Zang's edited volume addressed the Catholic-Protestant relationship,

the actions and attitudes of liberal Catholics, and some of the roots of anticlerical sentiments in Baden.<sup>9</sup> Despite the fact that his and others' work enhances our understanding of the relationship between conservative and liberal Catholics as well as between Catholics and Protestants, none of them have applied their theories to the study of confessional interaction during the process of national identity formation. Although Lothar Gall, Josef Becker, and Manfred Stadelhofer have published valuable, if dated, studies on the Badenese *Kulturkampf* and the National Liberal Party in Baden, there is a need to apply new research tools to these topics.<sup>10</sup> Oded Heilbronner's work on liberalism and the Catholic bourgeoisie in Baden and Ulrich Baumann's stimulating research on the relations between Christians and Jews during the late nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth century represent such attempts.<sup>11</sup> Two other relatively recent works that incorporate newer methods of analysis are Irmtraud Götz von Olenhusen's study of the deviant behavior of Catholic priests in the

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<sup>9</sup> Gert Zang, ed., *Provinzialisierung einer Region: regionale Unterentwicklung und liberale Politik in der Stadt und im Kreis Konstanz im 19. Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt: Syndikat, 1978).

<sup>10</sup> Josef Becker, *Liberaler Staat und Kirche in der Ära von Reichsgründung und Kulturkampf* (Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald Verlag, 1973); Lothar Gall, *Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei. Das Großherzogtum Baden zwischen Restauration und Reichsgründung* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1968); idem, "Die Partei und Sozialgeschichtliche Problematik des badischen Kulturkampfes," *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte Oberrheins* 113 (1965): 151-196; and Manfred Stadelhofer, *Der Abbau der Kulturkampfgesetzgebung im Grossherzogtum Baden 1878-1918* (Mainz: Matthias Grünwald Verlag, 1969). Becker's view of the *Kulturkampf* as a political tool that national liberals used to curtail the Catholic Church is a good example of this slightly outdated treatment of this period.

<sup>11</sup> Ulrich Baumann, "The Development and Destruction of a Social Institution: How Jews, Catholics and Protestants Lived Together in Rural Baden, 1862-1940," in Clark and Smith, *Protestants, Catholics and Jews*, 297-315; Oded Heilbronner, "In Search of the Catholic (Rural) Bourgeoisie: The Peculiarities of the South German Burgertum," *Central European History* 29 (1996): 175-201. Heilbronner., *Catholicism, Political Culture, and the Countryside: A Social History of the Nazi Party in South Germany* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1998) constitutes another useful study, but it is outside the immediate scope of my work.

Freiburg Archdiocese and Winfried Halder's work on Catholic associations in Baden and Württemberg.<sup>12</sup> Halder's study of Catholic associational life provides useful insights into the Catholic embrace of modernity as well as how associations helped create a stronger, more cohesive Catholic community. Olenhusen's study challenges us to reevaluate our view of the Catholic clergy, but it has relatively little relevance to the national identity of Catholics. Last, Dagmar Herzog's fascinating study on the nature of Badenese religious politics during the 1840s, despite its insights into the relationship between Protestants, Catholics, and Jews and the split between liberal and conservative Catholics, is outside the scope of my work.<sup>13</sup> None of these scholars has, however, looked specifically at the experiences of Badenese Catholics as they negotiated a complex web of loyalties during the Second Empire. Much of the historiography of Baden during the *Kaiserreich* still needs revision. My work attempts to fill this lacuna.

I employ the concept of collective memory as an analytical tool to understand better the construction of Catholic and Protestant identities during the Second Empire.<sup>14</sup> Assessing how Catholics and Protestants formed different collective

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<sup>12</sup> Irmtraud Götz von Olenhusen, *Klerus und abweichendes Verhalten* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994); Winfried Halder, *Katholische Vereine in Baden und Württemberg 1848-1914. Ein Beitrag zur Organisationsgeschichte des südwestdeutschen Katholizismus im Rahmen der Entstehung der modernen Industriegesellschaft* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1995).

<sup>13</sup> Dagmar Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion: Religious Politics in Pre-Revolutionary Baden* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

<sup>14</sup> The literature on collective memory is vast. See for example: Alon Confino and Peter Fritzsche, eds., *Work of Memory: New Directions in the Study of German Society and Culture* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002); Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Gillis, ed., *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory* (New

memories of the unification and how these memories interacted with and influenced each other will allow a deeper understanding of the creation of national identity. Because collective memory enables individuals to remember events in which they themselves did not take part, it aids them when constructing an identity. However, what emerges in the analysis of Catholic attitudes towards the commemorations of the unification is that Protestants and Catholics created different collective memories of these events. Moreover, collective memory can also be applied to understand how Badenese Catholics adapted to the new national identity. When they constructed an alternative commemorative discourse to the wars of unification, they were also creating a collective memory that reflected their own identities. This collective memory, which differed from the Protestant one, enabled these Catholics to infuse the new national identity with many familiar elements, which made it easier to accept.

This discussion also suggests that Catholics were quite successful at creating and maintaining a collective memory of the unification that differed from the Protestant one. Pierre Nora was the first scholar to point out that collective memories function in different ways; place a memory in a different context, and it will assume a different shape.<sup>15</sup> Because different groups create memories of events that reflect their social, cultural, political, and economic status, it is vital to consider the contexts in which these memories were constructed. Catholic memories were created in a

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York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Verso, 1983); and Pierre Nora, ed., *Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past*, translated by Arthur Goldhammer, 3 volumes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995-1997).

<sup>15</sup> Nora, *Realms of Memory*, 28.

different milieu than the Protestant ones, and therefore the two often contained different components. Consequently, for the most part of the Second Empire, these collective memories and identities reflected different notions about what it meant to be German. This suggests that the German nation should be viewed as a contested discourse where these memories interacted with and influenced each other.

One of the key reasons why the Protestant and Catholic versions of national identity were so different is their contrasting memories of events of the nineteenth century. Especially in Baden, which had for many years witnessed a fierce struggle between church and state, Protestants and Catholics nourished different memories of the last few decades prior to unification. Protestants based much of their new national identity on the notion that their faith was one of the main reasons why Germany had been able to unify and was now ready to assume one of the most powerful positions in Europe. Thus, Protestant historical memories and identities enabled a positive outlook on both the past and the future. Of course, a large part of this identity was invented. It is now well accepted that “invention” plays a large part in the creation of collective memories and identities.<sup>16</sup> Until 1866, Badenese Protestants had opposed Prussian Minister Otto von Bismarck and Prussia’s policies almost as strongly as their Catholic counterparts. In the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, Badenese Protestants sided with Austria, which they conveniently forgot in the postunification representations of the past. On the other hand, Catholics nourished different memories. In part due to the fierce struggle between the church and state in Baden during the 1860s, Catholics had

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<sup>16</sup> The seminal work on this topic is Hobsbawm and Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition*.

a very different and much more negative set of memories of the years leading up to the unification. The vast majority of Catholics had long been strongly pro-Austrian, which complicated their acceptance of the new nation-state. Finally, the fact that Catholics now were in a minority increased their fears about the unified Empire. Thus, it was difficult for Catholics and Protestants to use these experiences and memories of the recent past to construct a cohesive national identity. Instead, the differing memories of the decades leading up to unification ensured that the two confessions used the wars of unification to construct and strengthen their own views of German national identity.

Throughout the Second Empire, these memories and identities coexisted and clashed with each other, sometimes resulting in their renegotiation. Hence, it is crucial to consider Catholic and Protestant identities in conjunction with each other. They did not exist in a vacuum but rather interacted with each other, which created a different set of circumstances at different points throughout the Empire. Major events such as the *Kulturkampf*, shifts in political power, the turn to colonialism, and an aggressive foreign policy all triggered a reevaluation of collective memories and identities, reflecting the fluidity and instability of their construction. Although towards the end of the nineteenth century there were fewer public Catholic-Protestant disagreements about what constituted Germanness, this did not mean that they had reached a consensus on their national identity. Neither Protestants nor Catholics were able to convince the other of the correct view of the nation. Because of this fact, it is to some extent misleading to speak about integration into the Empire. The term



“integration” suggests that the different versions of Germanness, whether Catholic or Protestant, somehow melted with the other one, which is to misunderstand this process. Instead, by the 1890s, Catholics and Protestants had negotiated an agreement that, though they shared certain elements of their identity that made them all German, revealed there were still many differences between how a Protestant and a Catholic defined Germanness.

These sentiments also serve to reinforce some of the latest research that has been conducted on the German life in the Second Empire. Following the lead of Smith, scholars have begun to view the interaction among different confessional groups as central to a clearer understanding of how Germans shaped their identity. They have moved away from the traditional model of analyzing confessional groups separately, with rewarding results as they have shown that the interaction between the different confessions significantly shaped the experience of the other.

My work builds on theirs, though I do not look specifically at the Protestant experience in Baden during the *Kaiserreich*. However, analysis of how Catholics reacted to the Protestant-dominated official discourse that surrounded unification provides insight into how Catholics used the Protestant *Other* to shape their own identities. Indeed, one of the most important means for Catholics to manifest their own identities was the use of a Protestant *Other*. After analyzing the Protestant version of Germanness, Badenese Catholics most often presented themselves as the opposite of everything Protestant. By labeling Protestants materialistic and accusing them of using nationalism to gain political and economic power, Catholics asserted

their own better understanding of patriotism. Commemorations frequently constituted opportunities for Catholics to employ the Protestant version of nationalism to create their own. Naturally, these Catholics were not always fair in what they attributed to the Protestant version of Germanness, but the content of this interaction is not as important as the interaction itself. After all, Protestants employed similar tactics with their accusations of how Catholics were ready to abandon Emperor Wilhelm for the Pope or how Jesuits were poisoning the German national character. The point here is not so much what was attributed to each confession but rather the interaction between the two.

Catholic distrust of the Second Empire was not solely due to conflicting memories of unification. Catholics were less convinced about the absolute value of the nation-state than their Protestant counterparts. Large parts of their identities were tied into concepts such as kinship, region, religion, and religious community, all of which predated the nation-state.<sup>17</sup> Catholic loyalty to the Pope exemplifies these sentiments. Catholics insisted on maintaining strong loyalties to the Pope in the new nation-state, showing great concern for his well-being, especially in the tumultuous few years following his ousting from Rome in 1870. Although Protestants often used Catholic allegiances to the Pope as “proof” of the Catholic anti-German feelings, they misinterpreted these sentiments. Protestants rejected the notion that Catholic loyalty to the Pope and loyalty to their nation-state were not exclusive emotions but rather complementary. Catholics believed it was indeed possible for them to be fiercely

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<sup>17</sup> Smith, *Nationalism and Religious Conflict*, 61.

loyal to the Pope while at the same time having the same sentiments for Emperor Wilhelm. Although Protestants were intent on removing these loyalties from the national identity, my research demonstrates that they were unable to do so. Instead, Catholics maintained these loyalties as part of their new national identity. This example of the different composition of Catholic and Protestant identities helps explain why it was difficult for the two to agree on what constituted Germanness.

I view the German nation as a cultural construct. Although a national community is based on material-historical realities, the bonds among its members are largely imagined, as Benedict Anderson has pointed out.<sup>18</sup> Thus, to quote Smith, “a nation is primarily a matter of culture.”<sup>19</sup> To be sure, culture does not exist in a vacuum, and political developments certainly affect cultural identities. However, cultural features of a nation are in many instances more important for identity formation than political ones, which has important implications for how Germans created their identities. Although access to power is crucial in ensuring the construction of a particular type of national identity, the success of politically disadvantaged groups such as Catholics to manifest their own sense of identity should not be underestimated. Many scholars have assumed that because Protestants possessed most of the political and economic power in the *Kaiserreich*, they were able to impose their view of national identity on the Catholics. Closer examination of the process of constructing identities, however, makes it evident that Badenese Catholics

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<sup>18</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991), 6-7.

<sup>19</sup> Smith, *Nationalism and Religious Conflict*, 7.

were successful in preserving and manifesting their identities despite political and economical disadvantages during the first two decades of the Second Empire. They used various means, among them the press and associational organizations, to combat the Protestant version of recent history that was so important to the construction of identity. That so many of these activities occurred in the cultural realm suggests that cultural activities were instrumental in the Catholic construction of national identity.

Scholars have traditionally viewed nationalism primarily as a political force, which proclaimed that groups that share certain common bonds such as culture, language, history, and territory should have a right to govern themselves. Emphasis on cultural elements of nationalism illustrates that it could at times be a divisive force rather than a unifying one. To be sure, most Catholics and Protestants in Baden accepted the creation of the new nation-state and were unfailingly loyal to Emperor Wilhelm I. Thus, in a purely political sense, they shared a limited kind of German nationalism. Analysis on the cultural effects of German nationalism, however, produces a more variegated picture of its effect on Germans. Because Catholics and Protestants viewed the composition of their German nation differently, they employed nationalism differently. Especially during the first couple of decades of the *Kaiserreich*, Protestants and Catholics used nationalism to propagate their own view of the nation, which often differed from their confessional counterpart. Their actions reflect the use of nationalism by different societal groups to serve their own ends, which sometimes conflicted with others. What emerges from such an analysis is a multifaceted picture of nationalism that helps explain how it sometimes unified while

at other times divided the nation. Too often, German nationalism has been interpreted as a homogenizing force that made society more cohesive.<sup>20</sup> In fact, it makes more sense to consider German nationalism a space of conflict where Protestant and Catholic versions of Germanness clashed and interacted with each other. The creation of a German national identity was not smooth; instead, it was filled with different components where Catholics and Protestants tried to find space for their respective versions of Germanness.

This insight also calls for a reevaluation of how nationalism worked at the local level. To be sure, nationalism in the Second Empire served as a unifying force, but perhaps not to the degree previously assumed. My research in Baden indicates that in many instances, nationalism preserved and sometimes even intensified already-existing conflicts. Because Baden experienced a very fierce *Kulturkampf* during the 1860s, it strained the relationship between Catholics and Protestants. The first few years of the Empire witnessed an intense focus on strengthening national identity through various commemorative efforts, and it was against this backdrop of a fixation on national sentiments that Catholics and Protestants negotiated their place in the Second Empire. Hence, the nationalist vocabulary that had been popularized during the Franco-Prussian War and the first few months of the Empire served as new tools that both Catholics and Protestants in Baden used to conduct their struggles.

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<sup>20</sup> The classic statement here is Wolfgang Sauer, "Das Problem des deutschen Nationalstaates," in *Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte*, ed. Hans Ulrich Wehler (Köln: Kipenhauer & Witsch, 1966), 407-436. Although he notes that different societal groups could employ nationalism for different ends, Anderson's work assumes that nationalism served to make societies more cohesive.

Not until the late 1890s did nationalism and national sentiments in Baden begin to serve as more of a unifying force for all residents. During the 1890s, the political and cultural climate in the *Kaiserreich* and Baden began to change, causing a transformation in how Catholics and Protestants used nationalism. As local and national Catholics grew more politically, culturally, and economically powerful, they began to support German colonialism and a military build-up, thus establishing Catholics as more “trustworthy” in Protestant eyes. The growing power of Catholic associations and the slow but steady inroads that Catholics made into the cultural and economic arenas forced Protestants to broaden their notions of the nature of Germanness. In addition, the ever more hostile European diplomatic climate after the turn of the century resulted in a gradual shift where nationalism became ever more exclusive. Because of these facts, Catholics and Protestants were more in agreement on how to use nationalism—to strengthen Germany in the face of some of the challenges they faced on the European diplomatic and military scene. Of course, this did not mean that the two confessions were in complete agreement on what constituted the German nation. However, it did mean that they had reached an uneasy agreement that although they constituted different kinds of Germans, nationalist sentiments were used to battle external enemies rather than internal ones. To be sure, there still existed many instances of religious conflict, but these instances were not as frequent as they had been during the first two decades of the *Kaiserreich*.

Because German nationalism was often a divisive rather than a unifying force, my work illustrates the need to examine further the effects of the *Kulturkampf* on the

creation of German national identity. While most scholars now agree that the *Kulturkampf* ultimately failed, and indeed actually strengthened the Catholic community, a better understanding of how the *Kulturkampf* affected the creation of German national identity is still needed.<sup>21</sup> Although the *Kulturkampf* was in part an attempt to create a more homogeneous national culture, it actually divided the German nation rather than unifying it.

My analysis of Sedan Day, which in Baden served as a vehicle to promote the *Kulturkampf*, illustrates how Badenese Catholics used opposition to this holiday to fight anti-Catholic legislation as well as to construct their own version of national identity. The initiating of Sedan Day coincided with some of the fiercest aspects of the *Kulturkampf*, and both Catholics and Protestants in Baden viewed it as a means of anti-Catholic agitation. Confino and others have documented how national-liberals and Protestants failed in their attempt to use Sedan Day as a unifying vehicle, but scholars have neglected to consider fully how important confessional attitudes were to the demise of this holiday.<sup>22</sup> During the debates over the meaning of this celebration, especially during the first few years of the Empire, Catholics argued that the ideological message of Sedan Day celebrations was intended to exclude Catholics from the national community. Catholics often cited *Kulturkampf* legislation, which they argued aimed at eliminating Catholic influence in the new nation-state. By using

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<sup>21</sup> See Ross, *The Failure of Bismarck's Kulturkampf*.

<sup>22</sup> Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor*, 27-51. An important exception is Claudia Lepp, "Protestanten feiern ihre Nation—Die kulturprotestantischen Ursprünge des Sedantages," *Historische Jahrbuch* 118 (1998): 201-222.

the nationalist rhetoric popularized during the Franco-Prussian War and its various commemorations, Catholics were able to oppose not only the commemorative discourse but also the injustices of the *Kulturkampf* laws. Furthermore, the failure of the *Kulturkampf* and the fact that the Sedan Day celebrations did not resonate well with the population both strengthened Catholics in their attempts to infuse German national identity with their own sentiments. As a result, the *Kulturkampf*, and more specifically the nationalist rhetoric used in the conflict, served as a divisive force rather than a unifying one. Although scholars have analyzed many aspects of the *Kulturkampf*, the divisive effect that it had on German national identity still remains relatively unexplored, and my work attempts to fill part of this void.

My analysis also encourages closer examination of how Catholics embraced various aspects of modernity. Although work has been done to revise the traditional view of Catholics as backward and anti modern, many historians still consider them to have lagged behind other Germans in their acceptance of modernity.<sup>23</sup> My research highlights Catholic employment of many features associated with a modern society such as associations and the press, thus casting doubt on their “backwardness.” Badenese Catholics became adept at using the press to strengthen their community, both before and after unification. They long utilized newspapers not only to report on political developments, commemorations, and other important events, but they also used them to ensure that Catholics throughout Germany were aware of any injustice to

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<sup>23</sup> For a good discussion of this literature, see Oded Heilbronner, “From Ghetto to Ghetto: The Place of German Catholic Society in Recent Historiography,” *Journal of Modern History* 72 (2000): 453-495. Halder’s work on Catholic associations in Baden and Württemberg illustrates some of the modern ways that Catholics used these associations.



Catholics in Baden. This was especially important during the *Kulturkampf*, where Catholics in one location could read about the poor treatment of Catholics elsewhere, and it served to strengthen their sense of community.

Catholic awareness of the importance of the public sphere also casts doubts on their allegedly anti modern attitudes. In anticipation of the twenty-fifth anniversary of Pope Pius IX's election as Pope in June 1871, Catholic papers around the state were keen to inform their readership that they needed to take control of the streets on June 16. This very powerful political manifestation also served as an exercise in nation building, and it provides further illustration that Catholics were not only reactionary. Moreover, Catholic embrace of selected elements of modernity also corroborates their ability to manifest their collective identities publicly. Their determination to control the public sphere, their use of the press, and the growing influence of their various associations all served as important means to influence the construction of national identity.

Over the course of the late nineteenth century, Catholics struggled with Protestants in Baden over what constituted their shared German national identity. Despite political and economical disadvantages, including an often fiercely anti-Catholic public sphere, Badenese Catholics influenced the construction of their national identity through the application of familiar loyalties to region and religion to the Protestant version of Germanness. The following chapters analyze exactly how Catholics constructed an alternative commemorative discourse of unification and how this discourse enabled them to manifest their version of German national identity.

## CHAPTER 2

### SETTING THE STAGE: THE CREATION OF A “*LIBERALES MUSTERLAND*”

With unification in 1871, Badenese Catholics, the majority of whom had supported the *grossdeutsch* solution to the German question, confronted the difficult prospect of integration into a nation-state largely constructed on Protestant and Prussian values. Rather than being subsumed by the official national identity, Catholics developed their own interpretation of Germanness based upon a past that differed considerably from the Protestant-Prussian teleological view of the process of unification. Most Catholics imagined a different Germany than that offered by the official nationalist discourse, one more rooted in past traditions and memories than in promises of future glory. They criticized official commemorations, pointing out that such ceremonies did not properly acknowledge “their own past.” By offering their own interpretation of history, they indicated that their identities were rooted in different traditions, customs, memories, and histories. In so doing, they questioned and criticized the official picture of the new German nation-state.<sup>1</sup>

In the ongoing debates over the value and meaning of monuments and public ceremonies, Badenese Catholics repeatedly referred to their ancient religious heritage and culture, which had long served as the basis of their identity. By stressing

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<sup>1</sup> See, for instance, *Freie Stimme*, March 15 and June 6, 1872.

the old cultural and religious components of their identities, they tried to reinforce the compatible nature of Catholicism and Germanness, and they proudly embraced a German identity that emphasized the value of their confession.<sup>2</sup> These ideas bolstered the political and cultural legitimacy of other forms of identity that had been prevalent prior to the nation-state, such as region and religious community, which Catholics considered timeless and much too valuable to forsake.

Baden constituted something of an anomaly among the states comprising the Second Empire. Although Catholics made up two-thirds of the state's population, liberals, whose political program to a large extent focused on reducing the power of the Catholic Church, governed Baden. Intense church-state conflict characterized the decade following the unification of Germany in 1871. Baden constituted a state that conducted one of the fiercest *Kulturkämpfe* in Central Europe. Although relations between them improved slightly towards the end of the nineteenth century, the struggle between the liberal state and the Church dominated much of Badenese society during the Second Empire. When Baden entered the *Kaiserreich*, it did so with a powerful National Liberal Party, but also with a Catholic population growing increasingly determined to maintain its identity despite a fervent *Kulturkampf* that was partly aimed at consolidating the German national identity along confessional lines.

Because of the particular status of Baden in the Second Empire and the

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<sup>2</sup> Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict*, 61. A substantial literature offers a general treatment of Catholic attitudes towards the German national state. See Altgeld, *Katholizismus, Protestantismus, Judentum*; Lill, "Die deutschen Katholiken und Bismarcks Reichsgründung"; Gründer, "Nation und Katholizismus im Kaiserreich"; Rudolf Morsey, *Die deutschen Katholiken und der Nationalstaat zwischen Kulturkampf und Ersten Weltkrieg*, *Historisches Jahrbuch* 90 (1970): 31-64; and Windell, *The Catholics and German Unity*.

importance of its history to the Catholic population, it is necessary to identify the major historical developments of the Grand Duchy during the nineteenth century. This overview will facilitate a better understanding of the choices that Badenese Catholics made when faced with a complex web of old and new identities in the post-1871 period.

### **The Creation and Consolidation of the Grand Duchy, 1806-1848**

The consolidation of the future Grand Duchy of Baden began in 1771 when Margrave Karl Friedrich of Baden-Baden incorporated the Duchy of Baden-Durlach into his own territories. Before the French Revolution, Karl Friedrich, inspired by enlightened absolutist rulers Maria Theresa and Joseph II in Austria, initiated reform. Labeling himself an “enlightened despot,” he attempted to modernize agriculture, improve education, and create religious toleration.<sup>3</sup> Because of the scope of these reforms, the political and social changes that accompanied the French Revolution served more as an intensification of innovations already underway in the Duchy than a sudden break with the past. Even before the dismantling of ancien regimes elsewhere, the southwestern corner of Germany had established the foundations of a strong liberal tradition.

The Grand Duchy came into existence largely due to Karl Friedrich’s opportunistic alliance with Napoleon. The Margrave was fortunate to have as his

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<sup>3</sup> Willy Andreas, “Badische Politik unter Karl Friedrich,” *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins* 26 (1911): 415-445.

main advisor Sigismund von Reitzenstein, an ambitious and well-respected diplomat whose policies were based on the understanding that Karl Friedrich could not afford to challenge the French. Because Reitzenstein conducted all negotiations with France, occasionally agreeing to conditions without prior approval of the Margrave, historians have labeled him the founder of Baden.<sup>4</sup>

Karl Friedrich profited mightily from the secularization that followed the *Reichdeputationshauptschluss* of 1803. To compensate for territories lost to France after the peace at Lunéville in 1801, Napoleon secularized various church lands, abolished monasteries, and transferred religious property from the Catholic Church to the Margrave, who was subsequently elevated to Elector in 1803.<sup>5</sup> These events were difficult to accept for the Church, which had already been under attack for the previous few decades, beginning with the religious reforms of Joseph II.<sup>6</sup> The *Reichdeputationshauptschluss* constituted a dramatic dismantling of a long-existing societal order. Before 1803, most bishops, as well as other members of the high

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<sup>4</sup> Franz Schnabel, *Sigismund von Reitzenstein. Der Begründer des Badischen Staates* (Heidelberg: Hörning, 1927).

<sup>5</sup> Lothar Gall, "Gründung und politische Entwicklung des Großherzogtums bis 1848," in *Badische Geschichte. Vom Großherzogtum bis zur Gegenwart*, ed. Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg (Stuttgart: Theiss, 1979), 14-20; Wolfgang Hug, *Geschichte Badens* (Stuttgart: Theiss, 1992), 194-199; Hansmartin Schwarzmeier, ed., *Handbuch der Baden-Württembergischen Geschichte. Dritter Band. Vom Ende des alten Reiches bis zum Ende der Monarchien* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992), 27-29; Karl Stiefel, *Baden 1648-1952, Volume I* (Karlsruhe: Badische Neueste Nachrichten Badendruck, 1978), 50-56.

<sup>6</sup> Peter Hersche, "Der österreichische Spätjansenismus," in *Katholische Aufklärung und Josefinismus*, ed. Elisabeth Kovács (München: Oldenbourg, 1979), 180-193; Charles Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1618-1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Eduard Winter, *Der Josephinismus. Die Geschichte des österreichischen Reformkatholizismus 1740-1848* (Berlin: Rütten und Loening, 1962).

clergy, had not only been religious leaders but sovereigns as well. In addition, one of the most vital functions of the Church and its agents had been to serve as the backbone of the educational system, and their dismissal triggered angry responses from both clergy and laity. Thus, many communities were deprived of the financial and social stability that monasteries had provided.<sup>7</sup> To complete the process of secularization, in 1807, the newly formed Badenese government issued an edict that regulated the relationship between state and church. It reflected the new circumstances as the state established firm control over most of the activities of the Catholic Church. Among other provisions, it determined that clergy were considered employees of the state, which always gave precedence to civil over canonical law.<sup>8</sup>

The final territorial consolidation of the Badenese lands took place after the Treaty of Pressburg in 1805, when Napoleon transferred ownership of the Breisgau region from the Habsburgs to Karl Friedrich to reward his loyalty during recent wars. In 1806, the electorate was transformed into a Grand Duchy and incorporated in the Rhineland Confederation, where it served as a buffer between France and the Habsburg Monarchy. Napoleon elevated the Margrave to Grand Duke. A major beneficiary of the Napoleonic reorganization of Europe, Karl Friedrich extended his territory from 3,900 to 14,000 square kilometers and increased its population from

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<sup>7</sup> Two very detailed accounts of this process are Hermann Lauer, *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Großherzogtum Baden. Von der Gründung des Großherzogtums bis zur Gegenwart* (Freiburg: Herder, 1927), 12-38; Heinrich Maas, *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Großherzogtum Baden. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Regierungszeit Hermann von Vicari* (Freiburg: Herder, 1891), 1-7.

<sup>8</sup> Lauer, *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Großherzogtum Baden*, 78-81.

some 165,000 to 900,000 people between 1796 and 1806.<sup>9</sup>

Comprising different types of territories such as feudal fiefs, small states, independent cities, and religious domains, most of which had no or few previous ties to each other, the Grand Duchy was initially plagued by grave internal tensions. To many, the recent drastic political, religious, and social changes constituted an unpopular and traumatic break with the past. This aversion stemmed both from the fact that they suddenly had a new ruler and from the taxes that Karl Friedrich collected and passed on to Paris. More importantly, the new Grand Duke had agreed to supply Napoleon with troops if needed. Consequently, in 1812, about 7,000 Badenese soldiers participated in the attack on Russia, of whom only some 100 returned.<sup>10</sup>

The fact that many of the new subjects were hostile towards the new state was of immense importance for Baden's future development. Because the Grand Duchy contained a variety of people with different traditions, histories, and pasts, there was a need for some means of integration. Both Karl Friedrich and his son Karl, who succeeded him in 1811, were ahead of their time in recognizing the need for state-sponsored nondynastic means of integration. A new generation of liberal public officials who had been educated in the spirit of the Enlightenment spearheaded these ideas. Many were convinced that a reorganization of the state administration would dissolve old loyalties and cement a new common identity. Although they launched

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<sup>9</sup> Hug, *Geschichte Badens*, 199; Marion Wierichs, *Napoleon und das "dritte Deutschland."* *Die Entstehung der Großherzogtümer Baden, Berg und Hessen* (Frankfurt: Lang, 1978), 175-177.

<sup>10</sup> Martin Glaser, "Die Badische Politik und die deutsche Frage zur Zeit der Befreiungskriege und des Wiener Kongress," *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins* 43 (1928): 268-317.

two separate attempts, in 1803 and 1809, they were unable to increase people's sense of identification with the new Grand Duchy.<sup>11</sup>

Thanks to a secret treaty with the Habsburgs in 1813, Karl received a guarantee that if he deserted his French ally, his territories would remain intact. However, after a timely switching of sides immediately after the battle of Leipzig in 1813, Baden still faced heavy pressure from Austria and Bavaria, both of which wanted the return of lost territories. Even after the post-Napoleonic Congress of Vienna had confirmed Baden's borders in 1815, the Badenese state remained in flux. Grand Duke Karl had no male heir, and both the Habsburgs and Bavarians watched closely to see how the question of legitimacy would unfold.<sup>12</sup> Still facing the threat of disloyal subjects, especially in the Breisgau, the Grand Duke began considering the demands for constitutional reform in a more favorable light.

Signed by Grand Duke Karl on August 22, 1818, the Badenese constitution was celebrated by contemporaries as the most liberal one in Central Europe, though it still provided for a political system closer to enlightened absolutism than to a modern democracy. Many Germans had already begun to refer to the Grand Duchy as "*liberales Musterland*," and for most of the nineteenth century, Baden remained at the forefront of the German liberal movement.<sup>13</sup> The constitution granted citizens certain

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<sup>11</sup> Willy Andreas, "Friedrich Brauer und die Entstehung des ersten badischen Organisationsediktes vom 4. Februar 1803," *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins* 24 (1909): 628-672; idem, "Zur Beurteilung der badischen Verwaltungsorganisation vom 26. November 1809 und ihre Weiterbildung," *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins* 25 (1910): 308-332.

<sup>12</sup> Glaser, "Die Badische Politik," 306-312.

<sup>13</sup> Gall, *Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, xi-xii.



inalienable rights, including equality before the law, freedom of press, religion, and profession. Restrictions applied to many of these freedoms, however, which significantly reduced their value. The constitution confirmed Baden as a monarchy, with all powers invested in the Grand Duke, who would use them according to the constitution. An upper and lower house (or first and second chamber) constituted the representative part of government. A limited franchise allowed for representatives to be elected to the second chamber. Voting citizens had to be over twenty-five years of age and possess either a public office or *Bürgerrecht*. Consequently, in 1819, only about seventeen percent of the population passed the franchise restrictions. The first chamber primarily consisted of members of the nobility and clergy who had been given seats by the Grand Duke. This system ensured that the ruling strata could employ the first chamber as a check on the power of the “popularly” elected second chamber.<sup>14</sup>

The constitution proved to be a success in consolidating a common Badenese identity. Many historians have labeled the 1820s as the decade when Badeners discovered something resembling national consciousness. The liberal Karl von Rotteck spoke for many when he stated that the constitution was Baden’s birth certificate.<sup>15</sup> Consequently, already at an early stage in the nineteenth century, many Badeners constructed their identities around notions of liberalism and progress that

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<sup>14</sup> For detailed descriptions of the Badenese constitution, see Hans Fenske, *Der liberale Südwesten* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1981), 40-42; Stiefel, *Baden 1648-1952, Volume I*, 237-264.

<sup>15</sup> Hug, *Geschichte Badens*, 212

were reinforced both by themselves as well as other Germans.

Taking advantage of increased opportunities to influence the political process, a new generation of liberals led by Theodor Welcker, Karl von Rotteck, and Johann Adam von Itzenstein emerged in the early 1830s. Many of them were tied closely to the rising fortunes of the bourgeoisie and placed most of their efforts on providing more ample conditions for industrialization. Simultaneously, more radical liberal leaders such as Friedrich Hecker and Gustav Struve appeared on the political scene, demanding a quicker, more radical approach to the modernizing project, complete with demands for social and economic reform.<sup>16</sup> During much of the 1840s, the liberal camp was engulfed in conflicts between moderates and radicals, and after 1845, they were informally split into two separate factions. The latter argued for a more confrontational approach towards the Grand Duke and his ministers, whereas the former advocated limited cooperation as the best way of achieving reform. Hecker and Struve led the radical faction while Friedrich Bassermann and Karl Mathy spearheaded the constitutional, or moderate, liberals.<sup>17</sup>

While political life stabilized rather quickly during the pre-March period, it

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<sup>16</sup> Fenske, "Baden 1830 bis 1860," in *Handbuch der Baden-Württembergischen Geschichte*, ed. Schwarzmeier, 83-88. For biographical information on some of Baden's leading politicians in the pre-March period, see Franz Dor, *Freiherr Hinrich Bernhard von Andlaw, ein badischer Politiker und Vorkämpfer des Katholizismus* (Freiburg: Herder, 1910); idem., *Franz Joseph Ritter von Buß, in seinem Leben und Wirken geschildert* (Freiburg: Herder, 1911); Julius Dorneich, *Franz Joseph Buß und die katholische Bewegung in Baden* (Freiburg: Herder, 1979); Gustav Freytag, *Karl Mathy. Geschichte seines Lebens* (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1888); Hermann Kopf, *Karl von Rotteck. Zwischen Revolution und Restauration* (Freiburg: Rommel, 1980); Heinz Müller-Dietz, *Das Leben des Rechtlehrers und Politikers Karl Theodor Welcker* (Freiburg: Albert, 1968); and Franz Stegmann, ed., *Franz Joseph von Buß* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1994).

<sup>17</sup> Gall, *Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 45-48.

took some time for the Roman Catholic Church to adjust to the new order. Internal divisions in the Church complicated the situation. Following the *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss*, the existing dioceses had been dissolved, and the question of how to reorganize Church administration became a hotly contested issue. After years of discussion, in 1821 Pope Pius VII published the Bull “*Provida sollersque*,” in which he proclaimed the foundation of the *Oberrheinischer Kirchenprovinz* with five bishop seats: Rottenburg, Mainz, Limburg, Fulda, and Freiburg. The Badenese diocese coincided with the borders of the state, with the addition of two small Prussian territories, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen and Hohenzollern-Hechingen.<sup>18</sup>

Having resolved this problem, the Catholic Church and the Badenese government now had to elect a new archbishop for Freiburg. The ensuing conflict over this issue involved fundamental questions regarding the degree of state involvement in religious affairs. Before proceeding to the question of a potential candidate, the two sides had to establish how to conduct the election process. After drawn-out negotiations, they agreed that the Catholic Minster Chapter should choose a candidate, who then had to be endorsed by the government before the Pope confirmed him as Archbishop. This arrangement was to cause many conflicts and an occasional deadlock in the future, as both state and church politicized the election process. Between 1821 and 1827, for example, neither side could settle on a suitable

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<sup>18</sup> Erzbischöflichen Ordinariat, ed., *Das Erzbistum Freiburg, 1827-1977* (Freiburg: Herder, 1977), 75-77; Lauer, *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Großherzogtum Baden*, 113-124.

candidate.<sup>19</sup>

The failure to appoint an archbishop not only reflected the hostile relationship between state and church, but also indicated a split within the Church itself. The southwestern corner of the German lands constituted a liberal enclave within the Catholic Church. Led by one of the best-known clergy members of the early nineteenth century, Ignaz Heinrich von Wessenberg, this faction advocated liberalization of the Church and closer cooperation with the state, ideas that were unacceptable to many Catholics.<sup>20</sup> Wessenberg, the vicar-general of Konstanz from 1802 to 1827, whose religious outlook had been shaped by Joseph II's religious reforms, worked diligently to modernize the Catholic Church. He sought to translate the liturgy into German, establish synods to democratize the Church, increase cooperation with Protestants, and reduce the formal structures of the Church to enable a more immediate religious experience. Wessenberg also argued for a closer cooperation with the state, since the Church would not survive a confrontation. Although these theories alienated conservative Catholics, Wessenberg had many supporters, and his activities in the seminary in Meersburg influenced an entire generation of Catholic clergy. Wessenberg's ideas and the relatively strong tradition of liberal Catholicism would be very important for the future development of the state.<sup>21</sup> As the Badenese bourgeoisie developed, most of its Catholic members

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<sup>19</sup> Maas, *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Großherzogtum Baden*, 23-30.

<sup>20</sup> Lauer, *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Großherzogtum Baden*, 51-71, 88-94, 125-131.

<sup>21</sup> For a good introduction to Wessenberg's ideas, see Karl-Heinz Braun, ed., *Kirche und Aufklärung*–

adopted Wessenberg's ideas wholeheartedly, which provided for a more confidently Catholic bourgeoisie than elsewhere in Germany. Moreover, by establishing a relationship, albeit an uneasy one, between liberalism and Roman Catholicism, Wessenberg's philosophies were instrumental in preparing for the later success of the Badenese national-liberals during the *Kaiserreich*.<sup>22</sup>

The position of Archbishop in Freiburg remained vacant until 1827, when state and Church agreed on Bernhard Boll as their choice. Both Boll and his successor, Ignaz Anton Demeter, were feeble religious leaders who commanded little respect from the clergy and lacked the courage to oppose the state's attempts to undermine the position of the Church further. On numerous occasions, Pope Pius VIII reprimanded the two for failing to defend the interest of the Church. Archbishop Boll's weak character enabled the Badenese state to make many inroads into the Church's power. Most importantly, the Department of Religious Affairs possessed rights of supervision over the Church's finances as well as over how they educated new priests.<sup>23</sup>

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*Ignaz Heinrich von Wessenberg* (München: Schnell und Steiner, 1989); for a more complete treatment of his character and ideas, see Konstantin Gröber, "Heinrich Ignaz Freiherr von Wessenberg," *Freiburger Diözesen Archiv* 55 (1927): 362-609 and 56 (1928): 294-435.

<sup>22</sup> The relationship between liberalism and Catholicism has been discussed by, among others, Thomas Mergel, *Zwischen Klasse und Konfession* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994). His study centers on the Catholic part of the bourgeoisie in the Rhineland, which according to Mergel became less Catholic as they became more immersed in the bourgeois culture. The Catholic bourgeoisie in Baden differed from their confessional brethren in the Rhineland, however, in that they were better able to combine a strong Catholic faith with a bourgeois lifestyle. Mergel has noted this in "Für eine bürgerliche Kirche: Antiultramontanismus, Liberalismus und Bürgertum 1820-1850. Rheinland und Südwestdeutschland im Vergleich," *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte Oberrheins* 144 (1996): 1-31; Oded Heilbronner has made similar observations. See Heilbronner, "In Search of the (Rural) Catholic Bourgeoisie."

<sup>23</sup> Lauer, *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Großherzogtum Baden*, 151-152.

Throughout the 1830s, the Church did not challenge the state's activities, in part because of the listless leadership of the two archbishops, but also because Wessenberg's ideas attracted much support.

Conditions began to change for the Badenese Catholics only in 1837 as they were swept up in the popular religious revival that surfaced throughout the German lands following the Cologne events. Also in 1837, Franz Josef Buß and Freiherr Heinrich von Andlaw were elected as the first two Catholic representatives to the provincial parliament. Both Buß and Andlaw were conservative Catholics, skilled politicians, and accomplished agitators, which brought them to the forefront of the Catholic revival. Largely as a result of these developments, the *Süddeutsche Katholisches Kirchenblatt* was founded in Freiburg in 1840. It provided Catholics with a small, but effective public forum for their views. Buß often contributed to this paper, which helped further boost his popularity.<sup>24</sup> Well aware of his talents as a speaker, he traveled throughout Baden and Germany during the 1840s, organizing large mass meetings, where he encouraged Catholics to remain strong and defiant in defense of their faith. When the revolution of 1848-1849 erupted, Buß was the most well-known and popular Catholic in Germany.<sup>25</sup>

Another important event that carried major implications for the revival of the Catholic Church in Baden was the appointment of Hermann von Vicari as Archbishop

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<sup>24</sup> Becker, *Liberaler Staat und Kirche*, p. 20; Halder, *Katholische Vereine in Baden und Württemberg 1848-1914*, 21.

<sup>25</sup> Halder, *Katholische Vereine in Baden und Württemberg 1848-1914*, 35.

in 1842. In contrast to his two predecessors, Vicari was a staunch opponent of state involvement in religious affairs. Already from the outset of his tenure, he proved that he was not afraid to contest the government, and he immediately replaced many liberal members of the high clergy with more conservative ones, such as Adolf Strehle and Heinrich Maas. Vicari also limited and strictly regulated the political activities of the clergy, which made it difficult for the latter to support the state. The new Archbishop, Buß, and Andlaw led the ultramontanization of Badenese Catholics.<sup>26</sup>

After the relative peace and stability that characterized the political life during the 1830s and early 1840s, relations between the Grand Duke and the liberals deteriorated quickly in the middle of the 1840s, culminating in the revolution of 1848-1849. Many historians focus on the poor economic conditions during the middle of the 1840s as the primary cause of the revolution. Although both urban and rural areas suffered the consequences from meager harvests, the latter were especially vulnerable to economic depressions. From 1815 to 1848, the Badenese population, the majority of which still lived in rural areas, had increased by thirty-six percent. Peasants often complained that there was not enough land for everybody. Because Baden did not employ primogeniture, fertile land had become increasingly divided, causing a significant drop in productivity. The failed harvests of 1845 and 1846 had devastating consequences for many peasants, who were forced to rely on inadequate poor relief.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Lauer, *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Großherzogtum Baden*, 176-178; Maas, *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Großherzogtum Baden*, 133-140.

<sup>27</sup> Hugo Ott, "Die Wirtschaftliche und soziale Entwicklung von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges," in *Badische Geschichte*, ed. Landeszentrale für politische Bildung

Although the majority of the population still farmed at mid-century, Baden was undergoing a slow transformation from an overwhelmingly agricultural state to a more mixed economy. The first surge of industrialization occurred after the Grand Duchy joined the Customs Union in 1835. Textile industries were the first to take advantage of improved infrastructure and a deregulation of trade and commerce. During the 1830s and 1840s, increasing numbers of people found their employment within the industrial sector. In 1847, however, industrial development came to a sudden halt when the largest banking house in Baden, Haber, went bankrupt. As a consequence, Baden's three largest industries went under, leaving almost 6,000 people unemployed and desperate for economic and social reform.<sup>28</sup> Consequently, though the economic crisis of the 1840s was primarily agricultural, the failure of some of the recently founded industries also contributed to the worsening economic and social conditions.

### **The Revolutions of 1848-1849 in Baden**

As news of the February days in Paris spread across the Rhine in 1848, both moderate and radical liberals were quick to take action. At several mass meetings, most notably in Mannheim on February 27 and Offenburg on March 19, they demanded the abolition of feudal privileges, unrestricted freedom of the press, the right to bear arms, and the formation of a German national parliament. On March 2, the Badenese parliament granted many of the liberals' demands. Most importantly,

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Baden-Württemberg, 104-106.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 106-107.



feudal privileges were lifted, which had been the major concern of the large agrarian population.<sup>29</sup>

After the passage of the March 2 decrees, which stilled most of the revolutionary fervor among the peasantry, radical leaders Friedrich Hecker and Gustav Struve were forced on the defensive, and neither was elected to the pre-parliament in Frankfurt. Both men realized that if their revolution was to succeed, they had to take it to the streets. On April 13, Hecker gathered radicals in Konstanz and boldly declared the republic.<sup>30</sup> He intended to march on Karlsruhe, rallying support along the way. He attracted a number of sympathizers, although fewer than he had anticipated. Eventually, about 4,000 joined the so-called Hecker-march. However, he soon realized that after the removal of feudal privileges, most peasants had no immediate interests in continuing the revolution. After a few skirmishes, state troops finally defeated Hecker and his men at Kandern on April 24, 1848.<sup>31</sup>

Hecker and Struve's defeat did not weaken the revolutionary cause. After Hecker fled the country, Struve continued the struggle. Following the generally unpopular Treaty of Malmö in September 1848, he attempted another unsuccessful armed uprising. Both Hecker and Struve clearly miscalculated the degree of popular

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<sup>29</sup> Excellent accounts of the events in Baden in 1848-1849 include Wolfgang Dreßen, ed., *1848-1849: Bürgerkrieg in Baden* (Berlin: Dragenbach, 1975); Willy Real, *Die Revolution in Baden 1848/49* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1983); Franz Vollmer, *Offenburg 1848/49. Ereignisse und Lebensbilder aus einem Zentrum der badischen Revolution* (Karlsruhe: Braun, 1997).

<sup>30</sup> Alfred Diesbach, "Konstanz im Revolutionsjahr 1848," *Konstanzer Blätter für Hochschulfragen* 40 (1973): 97-99.

<sup>31</sup> Real, *Die Revolution in Baden 1848/49*, 56-59.

support for the radical liberals. Although aware of the split among the liberals, they believed that once subsumed in the revolutionary atmosphere, the moderates would join their cause. Contrary to their hopes, however, socialist slogans that accompanied much of the radicals' rhetoric alienated most moderates.

Despite the departure of the two most important leaders of the radical liberals, the movement did not fade.<sup>32</sup> When Frederick Wilhelm IV refused to accept the imperial crown in March 1849, the radicals struck anew. Since it was now evident that the tactics of the constitutional liberals had failed, revolutionaries rallied support by tapping into the dissatisfaction that many people voiced at the failure of the Frankfurt Parliament. Large numbers of people gathered in Offenburg and Rastatt on May 12 and 13, and many government soldiers joined the revolutionaries. The situation became so threatening that Grand Duke Leopold fled to France, calling for Prussian troops to assist him in defeating the rebels. Led by Lorenzo Brentano, revolutionaries on May 14 replaced the old government with civil commissioners, all of whom were radical liberals. They abolished the first chamber and called elections to a new parliament, which Brentano opened on June 10. Despite this apparent success, the revolutionaries were in a precarious position with little prospect of ultimate victory. Prussian troops were threatening the state, and though the rebels attracted much popular support, they stood little chance against the superior Prussian forces. On July 23, the revolutionaries capitulated at Rastatt, signaling the quelling of

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<sup>32</sup> Hardtwig Gebhardt, *Revolution und liberale Bewegung. Die nationale Organisation der konstitutionellen Partei in Deutschland 1848/49* (Bremen: Scheunemann, 1974), 68-70.

the last revolutionary movement in Germany. On August 18, Leopold returned, accompanied by Prussian soldiers, who subsequently occupied Baden for the next two years.<sup>33</sup>

### **Creation of a New Liberal Order and the Catholic Response 1850-1871**

The revolutions of 1848 temporarily improved the relationship between the Badenese state and church. Faced with sometimes very radical rhetoric, both remained on the side of tradition and shared a desire to avoid drastic changes.<sup>34</sup> Although the Catholic Church played only a minor role in the revolution, it proved to be of great importance for Catholics in several respects. Most importantly, the eased restrictions on freedom of association enabled Catholics to found organizations that contributed to their mobilization. In July 1848, Buß and Andlaw formed the *Katholische Verein Badens* with the explicit intent of protecting Catholic interests around the state. Utilizing his personal popularity, Buß traveled throughout the state, calling upon good Catholics to found local chapters of the *Verein*. Despite limited support from the clergy, Buß' rhetorical skill ensured mass mobilization of Catholics and rapid development of the *Verein*. During the summer of 1848, the Parliament in Frankfurt received 1142 petitions demanding a guarantee of the Church's rights in case of a new constitution; 434 of these petitions came from Baden--the highest

<sup>33</sup> Real, *Die Revolution in Baden 1848/49*, 136-144.

<sup>34</sup> For two general accounts of the role of the church during the upheavals, see Wolfgang Hug, "Katholiken und ihre Kirche in der Badischen Revolution von 1848/49," *Freiburger Diözesan-Archiv* 118 (1998): 283-311; and Clemens Rehm, *Die katholische Kirche in der Erzdiözese Freiburg während der Revolution 1848/49* (Freiburg: Alber, 1987).

number (in proportion to population) of any German state. At the first general assembly of the *Katholischer Verein* in Mainz in October 1848, Buß was the logical choice as president.<sup>35</sup>

Amidst the talks of restructuring the German Bund, the leaders of the Catholic Church met in Würzburg in the fall of 1848 to coordinate their policies. The decisions made at this meeting served as guidelines for Badenese Catholics in their struggle against the state during the last half of the nineteenth century. Catholics wanted to restore much of their lost independence vis-à-vis the state. Church and state were to be separated and permitted to conduct their respective affairs without interference from the other. At the conclusion of the conference, participants presented a list of demands: to regain control over much of the educational system, to be able to appoint priests without state supervision, the removal of the placet (formal state approval of certain church actions), complete control over their finances; and the right to found monasteries. Although none of these demands was fully met, these declarations had symbolic value. The Würzburg conference represented the first occasion in the nineteenth century that the most prominent members of the Catholic high clergy took a collective stand against the secularizing policies that had been prevalent in many parts of Germany.<sup>36</sup>

The failed revolutions of 1848-1849 caused a temporary halt to most of the

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<sup>35</sup> Halder, *Katholische Vereine in Baden und Württemberg*, 27-38. For a general account of the activities and importance of Catholic organizations during the revolution, see Heinz Hürten, *Kurze Geschichte des deutschen Katholizismus 1800-1960* (Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald Verlag, 1986), 79-109.

<sup>36</sup> Becker, *Liberaler Staat und Kirche*, 24-25.

activities of the Badenese liberals, and conservatives dominated politics throughout the 1850s. Although the time of reaction did not last as long, nor was it as harsh as elsewhere in Germany, it was almost a decade before the liberals fully re-emerged on the political stage. One of the primary reasons for the relatively mild reaction in Baden was Friedrich I's accession to the throne in 1852. Although he was not officially crowned until 1856, because his brother Leopold II was mentally ill, Friedrich I effectively ruled Baden since the death of Leopold I in 1852.

The importance of Friedrich I to the politics of Baden during the second half of the nineteenth century can hardly be exaggerated.<sup>37</sup> Married since 1856 to Luise, the daughter of the future Wilhelm I, the liberal Grand Duke was immensely popular with his subjects. Friedrich had received a very broad education, in which liberal historians Ludwig Häusser and Friedrich Dahlmann played important roles. Both Dahlmann and Häusser were admirers of Prussia's history, and as they lectured the young prince on the achievements of Frederick the Great and other famous Prussians, they quickly made him aware how important Prussia was to the future of German politics. During the 1840s, Friedrich attended the universities in Heidelberg and Bonn together with the future generation of leading liberal politicians such as Franz von Roggenbach, Julius Jolly, and August Lamey. They became part of a tightly knit circle, many of

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<sup>37</sup> For a biographical account of the Grand Duke's life, see Alfred Dove, *Großherzog Friedrich von Baden als Landesherr und deutscher Fürst* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1902). Excellent insights into the character of the Grand Duke can be drawn from Hermann von Oncken, ed., *Großherzog Friedrich I. von Baden und die deutsche Politik von 1854-1871. Briefwechsel, Denkschriften, Tagebücher* 2 Vols. (Osnabrück: Biblio, 1966).

whom were *Duzfreunde*.<sup>38</sup>

Roggenbach and Lamey emerged as leaders when the liberal movement began to regroup during the 1850s. Their political program stressed the need to clarify the relationship between church and state, to decentralize administration, and further deregulate trade and commerce. Most importantly, they emphasized finding a solution to the German question.<sup>39</sup>

The liberals rallied public support by exploiting the growing tension between the Catholic Church and the conservative government. After the revolution, political life had come largely to a standstill, and it was not until 1853, when Archbishop Herman von Vicari demanded that the Catholic Church be allowed to conduct its affairs without state involvement, that political activity truly resumed. This first major conflict of the 1850s was triggered by the death of Grand Duke Leopold I in 1852. The Senior Consistory in Karlsruhe demanded that the Catholic clergy hold *Seelenamt* for the Protestant Grand Duke. Vicari, abiding by canonical law, refused and ordered local clergy to hold a simple funeral service with a funeral speech. This constituted a true test of Vicari's power as he asked his clergy to defy the state. In the end, only 60 priests, out of about 1,100, followed the state's directives. Even more importantly, after the event, Vicari punished the ones who had not heeded his orders, while the state did nothing to protect them. The state's inactivity signaled the fact that it was unable to support liberal Catholic priests who faced retribution from the ultramontanes

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<sup>38</sup> Gall, *Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 66.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 63-80.

in Freiburg and only served to increase the ultramontanization of Badenese Catholics.<sup>40</sup>

Emboldened by his success, in 1853, Vicari declared that the state did not possess the right to interfere in religious affairs, and he began to disregard the stipulations that the state had placed on the church. The Archbishop now appointed priests without state approval, opened a new seminary without prior agreement with the government, and completely ignored the placet. When the department of religious affairs reprimanded him, he excommunicated all of its members. The state then placed Vicari under house arrest, which caused an uproar among Catholics, not only in Baden but throughout Germany. In many towns, the situation grew so tense that the government had to dispatch troops to maintain order. The reactions to the Archbishop's imprisonment signaled the revival of political life in Baden. August Lamey, who later became one of the leaders of the liberal struggle against the Church, defended Vicari at his trial in 1854.<sup>41</sup> The trial was a much publicized event and helped re-establish the liberals as a legitimate political force after the failures of 1848-1849. By defending the Archbishop, Lamey rallied popular support as he and the liberals appeared as defenders of individual rights. During the 1850s, liberals maintained an uneasy alliance with the Roman Catholic Church, which contributed greatly to their return to the political mainstream.

This controversy also had serious foreign policy implications for Baden. In

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<sup>40</sup> Lauer, *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche in Baden*, 206-210.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 211-217.

1855, Austria, seeking to strengthen its ties to the south German states, offered to negotiate in this conflict. The Prussians did not appreciate this proposal and sent a young man by the name of Otto von Bismarck to visit Grand Duke Friedrich I. Bismarck, who was very impressed by the pro-Prussian views of the Grand Duke, told the latter that he was going to have to be at the forefront of the battle that Protestants were about to launch against the Catholic Church.<sup>42</sup> Despite Bismarck's efforts, however, Vicari achieved his goal as he forced the conservative government to initiate negotiations with the Vatican to regulate the relationship between state and church in Baden.

The negotiations concerning the Concordat constituted an important turning point in Badenese politics. Had it come into effect, the Concordat would have significantly altered the relationship between state and church, since it was based upon the premise that canonical law provided the Church with the right to negotiate any proposed secular legislation on religious matters. The Concordat furthermore lifted the placet and enabled clergy to communicate freely with Rome; it removed state supervision from the education of the clergy and abolished state control over much of the Church's finances.<sup>43</sup> This represented the fulfillment of many of the demands of the Würzburger conference, most of which were unacceptable to liberals.

These much-debated propositions provided an excellent opportunity for the liberals to seize political power. Encouraged by the recent Italian success against the

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<sup>42</sup> Gall, *Bismarck. Der weisse Revolutionär* (Frankfurt: Propyläen, 1980), 212-213.

<sup>43</sup> Becker, *Liberaler Staat und Kirche*, 35-56.



Austrians in 1859, they initiated a public and political campaign against the Concordat. Liberals argued that not only did this agreement provide the Catholic Church with too much freedom vis-à-vis the state, but because the Concordat would regulate domestic policies, it had to be ratified by the Second Chamber. Since the conservative government had originally not intended to have the Concordat debated, liberals argued that the agreement was unconstitutional.<sup>44</sup> As debates intensified in late 1859 and early 1860, Franz von Roggenbach utilized his personal ties to the Grand Duke, as well as the latter's resistance to a document that many interpreted as too conservative and pro-Austrian, to convince him to dispose of the conservative government.<sup>45</sup> Meanwhile, in the weeks leading up to the vote in the Second Chamber, Archbishop Vicari collected signatures in favor of the Concordat that was presented to the Grand Duke immediately prior to the last debates in the Parliament. More than 80,000 people signed the petition--illustrating the growing mass mobilization of Catholics.<sup>46</sup> Despite this effort, the Second Chamber rejected the Concordat in February 1860, which led to the dismissal of the conservative government. To take its place, a new liberal government under August Lamey came into power, signaling the beginning of a new era in Baden.

The new government constituted the most liberal regime in any German state to that date. With majority support in the Parliament, liberals dominated political life

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<sup>44</sup> Gall, *Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 94-108.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, especially 98-100.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.

during the next five years and passed a number of laws that significantly altered the fabric of Badenese society. Intent on modernizing, they simplified state administration and bureaucracy, reformed the judicial system, created a Department of Commerce, emancipated the Jews, removed the remains of the guild system and created provisions for free trade.<sup>47</sup> Perhaps most importantly, after the installation of the new liberal government, Friedrich I and his ministers spent several months discussing how to regulate the relationship between state and church. On October 9, the Grand Duke presented a set of laws, which remained largely intact until 1918. These provisions established that though the Church would receive a certain amount of freedom, it would not be able to conduct its affairs without state interference. The freedoms of the Church were always regulated to various degrees. For instance, the Church had the right to try its members under canonical law, but only if the defendant agreed to it and if the case did not pertain to the defendant's wealth or personal freedom. Officially the Church had the right to manage its own affairs, though the state had a say in important areas such as education, social policies, and marriages. The main difference compared to the suggested Concordat was that secular law always held precedence over religious.<sup>48</sup>

The first two years of the "New Era" in Baden were relatively peaceful. Negotiations over how to manage the Church's finances jointly were concluded without much disagreement. In a report to the Pope in late 1861, Vicari stated that

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<sup>47</sup> For a very thorough description of these reforms, see *ibid.*, 171-207.

<sup>48</sup> Lauer, *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche in Baden*, 230-237.

though the Concordat had not been passed, he was still hopeful regarding the current situation.<sup>49</sup> Despite Vicari's cautious optimism in 1861, however, the liberals' determination to reform society meant that the prospect of conflict was never far removed. Already from the outset of their rule, liberals declared their intention to reduce the Church's influence over the educational system. Anticipating modernization, liberals argued that schools needed to prepare children better for society, rather than focus so much on preparing them for heaven. Catholics, on the other hand, considered the state's interference in the educational system as just one more step towards a degenerate and immoral society.<sup>50</sup>

In 1863, Lamey appointed the liberal Protestant Karl Knies director of the newly founded *Oberschulrat*. In July of the same year, he published his forty-four *Kniesischen Thesen*, which outlined the future organization of the schools. Among the most controversial suggestions were a reduction of religious education from four to two hours per week, the current confessional schools should be turned into inter-confessional ones (there would still be separate religious education), and the *geistliche Ortschaftsinspektion* was to be replaced by a local *Ortschulrat*. These proposed changes outraged Vicari and the Catholic clergy.<sup>51</sup> To add fuel to the fire, the government did not include the Church in any type of discussions, which left the Catholics with an even stronger resolve to fight these proposed reforms.

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<sup>49</sup> Maas, *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Großherzogtum Baden*, 480.

<sup>50</sup> Gall, *Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 127.

<sup>51</sup> Becker, *Liberaler Staat und Kirche*, 120-127.

The debates in the parliament over Knies's propositions grew increasingly hostile during 1863-1864, and it became evident that the two sides were heading for open conflict. As the Parliament passed the *Schulaufsichtsgesetz* in 1864, the lines of battles had been clearly drawn. This set of laws removed the *Ortschulinspektion*, which had consisted only of clergy, and replaced it with a local *Oberschulrat*, where clergy, teachers, the mayor, and a few elected members would supervise the schools.<sup>52</sup> Roman Catholics interpreted this measure as the first step towards a complete removal of the Church in schools. Vicari published a pastoral brief in which he used extremely sharp language to criticize the latest liberal initiative. In October 1864, Vicari forbade Catholics to partake in these new *Oberschulräte*, even if elected. He furthermore ordered Catholics not to participate in the upcoming elections to the *Oberschulräte*. This passive resistance proved successful: in over 400 of 1,800 election districts, no votes were cast. The state responded by calling a second round of elections, with the added stipulations that there would be a significant fine for people who refused to take an elected position and that only three votes were needed for an election to be considered valid. Although many of these elections still were not conducted according to proper procedure, 1,679 *Oberschulräte* were eventually formed.<sup>53</sup>

Despite its failure to prevent the initiation of the *Oberschulräte*, Catholic resistance increased. The publication of the Papal Encyclical "Syllabus Eronum" in December 1864 bolstered Catholic confidence. In it, Pope Pius IX condemned most

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 132-133.

every phenomenon of the new liberal era.<sup>54</sup> Ridiculed by liberals as reactionary and backward, this papal stance against modernity strengthened most Catholics in their resolve to fight the onslaught of secularization. Also, in 1865, in conjunction with the disputes regarding the elections to the local *Ortschulrat*, the Heidelberg Catholic Jakob Lindau founded the Casino Movement, which mobilized and politicized large parts of the Catholic masses. Originally, Lindau had no other intention than to provide Catholics with a safe haven where they could meet and discuss how to approach the injustices that the state levied upon them. He soon proved to be both a skilled orator and organizer who could rally great numbers of Catholics. A salesman by profession, one of the reasons Lindau attracted so much support was that people considered him a popular leader of the Catholic opposition.<sup>55</sup>

After witnessing the local success of the Casino, Lindau decided to transform it into a “traveling association.” During the spring and summer of 1865, he organized Casinos in many cities around the state, assembling hundreds and sometimes thousands of Catholics.<sup>56</sup> The importance of the Casino Movement for the politicization of the Catholic masses cannot be overstated. Especially in smaller towns and rural areas, Lindau’s agitation concerning the evils of the liberal government met with almost unanimous support. Most Catholics welcomed the opportunity to display

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<sup>54</sup> Hürten, *Kurze Geschichte des deutschen Katholizismus*, 127.

<sup>55</sup> Franz Dor, *Jakob Lindau. Ein badischer Politiker und Volksmann in seinem Leben und Wirken geschildert* (Freiburg: Herder, 1909), 31-35.

<sup>56</sup> A good discussion of this phenomenon can be found in Dorneich, “Die Entstehung der badischen ‘Katholischen Volkspartei’ zwischen 1865 und 1869 im Tagebuch von Baurat Dr. Karl Bader,” *Freiburger Diözesan Archiv* 84 (1964): 315-317; see also Becker, *Liberaler Staat und Kirche*, 142-143.

their aversion to the state's policies. Despite periods of temporary religious revival, Roman Catholics had been on the defensive for most of the century. They were keenly aware that their majority status was decreasing (in 1828, the state contained sixty-seven percent Catholics; in 1900, they were down to sixty-one percent), and the fact that they were underrepresented among the emerging bourgeoisie placed a heavy burden on them.<sup>57</sup> The growing presence of Catholic organizations in the public sphere strengthened the Catholic case as well as escalated the hostility between Catholics and liberals. Communities became increasingly divided as confessional issues dominated local politics.

In addition to the unpopularity of the liberals' confessional policies, their economic reforms met with resistance as well. To be sure, the new decrees spurred an intense period of industrialization. However, it often took place at the expense of the lower middle and lower classes. As an increasing number of people suffered in the transition to a more industrialized society, contemporaries frequently accused liberals of only being interested in aggrandizing their own profits. One of the more important consequences of the hostility towards this economic policy was that it alienated many from other aspects of the liberal movement, which carried grave implications for Roggenbach's foreign policies.

Closely associated with the *kleindeutsche* solution to the German problem, the liberals were well aware of the pro-Austrian sentiments of most Badenese. The state

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<sup>57</sup> The classic statement on the relationship between Badenese Catholics and the development of the modern industry is Martin Offenbacher, *Konfession und soziale Schichtung. Eine Studie über die wirtschaftliche Lage der Katholiken und Protestanten in Baden* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1908).

was divided into three uneven camps on the German question. The *kleindeutsche* group centered on Heidelberg and Karlsruhe and, though relatively small in size, included many significant politicians and business men. The middle areas of the state contained many people who were initially undecided on this issue. After Otto von Bismarck's increasingly aggressive behavior in the Prussian Parliament and in the Schleswig-Holstein affair, however, most adopted a *großdeutsch* position. Finally, the overwhelmingly Catholic southern part of the state contained a very strong pro-Austrian contingent. Because of this complex situation, the liberal government could not afford much discontent on domestic issues since it would eliminate any possibility of reaching consensus on the German question. This is an excellent illustration of the main political problem that the Badenese liberals faced: the intricate ties between domestic and foreign politics. None understood this dilemma better than Roggenbach, who centered his political program on this premise. When he became foreign minister in 1861, his main concern was to unify the German states under Prussian leadership.<sup>58</sup> Because of the prussophile sentiments of the Grand Duke, Roggenbach had Friedrich's unequivocal support.

Although the liberals initially enjoyed popular support, many of their reforms eventually alienated large segments of the population. There were primarily two reasons why Roggenbach and his associates failed to implement their political program. First of all, they underestimated the political power of the Catholic Church. When they began reforming the educational system to reduce the influence of the

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<sup>58</sup>This is discussed in painstaking detail by Gall, *Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 208-279.

Church, an immediate mass mobilization and politicization of Catholics followed. Second, the refusal of both the Grand Duke and many of the liberals to accept the proposed changes that Austria presented at the meeting of princes and electors in Frankfurt in 1863 on how to reform the German Confederation isolated Baden from the other middle states.<sup>59</sup> Not only did this decision place the state in a vulnerable position in case of war, but it also alienated the regime from large parts of its Catholic constituency. Although some liberals supported Friedrich's actions in Frankfurt, his and Roggenbach's rejection of the Austrian proposals constituted a turning point for the liberal government. For his remaining two years as foreign minister, Roggenbach had almost no popular support.

In 1865, the hostility towards the liberal government's economic, educational, and foreign policies had grown so strong that the Grand Duke was forced to remove Roggenbach. His successor, Ludwig Freiherr von Edelsheim, focused on revising Baden's foreign policy. Edelsheim wanted to end Baden's self-imposed isolation by allying more closely with the middle states, which in effect meant a more pro-Austrian policy.<sup>60</sup> As Prusso-Austrian relations turned increasingly hostile, it became apparent that despite the growing number of liberals who advocated neutrality in an armed conflict and the Grand Duke's efforts to mediate a peaceful solution to the dispute, Baden would have to fight on the Austrian side. Facing pressure from every German

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid., especially 239-241.

<sup>60</sup> Friedrich Koepfel, "Baden und die deutsche Entscheidung des Jahres 1866," *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte Oberrheins* 88 (1936): 451-453.



state on its borders, Baden joined Austria as the Austro-Prussian War erupted in July 1866. The government's agony in choosing sides had no equivalent among the majority of the population. The Catholics, comprising two-thirds of the population, almost unanimously supported Austria, and after Bismarck's belligerent behavior over the previous years, many Protestant liberals identified with Habsburg Emperor Francis Joseph as well. When the war began, people of all classes and confessions called for a defense of their German brethren in Austria, who now faced Bismarck's imperialist ambitions. Among large segments of the population, the outbreak of war triggered a dramatic increase in anti-Prussian sentiments, which did not easily fade with time.<sup>61</sup>

Baden played a minor role in the Austro-Prussian War.<sup>62</sup> Its army was only involved in a few minor skirmishes, all of them following the battle of Königgrätz/Sadowa. The soldiers were in a peculiar situation because though they identified strongly with the Austrian cause, many of their high-ranking officers had been openly pro-Prussian up to the onset of war, which certainly affected the army's performance. One indication of how uninterested many officers were in fighting was Bavaria's frequent accusations that the Badenese troops were deserting "the noble cause of the Austrians."<sup>63</sup> After the Prussian victory at Königgrätz, the Badenese

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<sup>61</sup> Newspapers of all political ideologies and religious confessions were filled with tirades against Bismarck's behavior. See for instance *Freie Stimme*, July, 24, 1866.

<sup>62</sup> Gall, *Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 364-368; Koeppel, "Baden und die deutsche Entscheidung des Jahres 1866," 218-259.

<sup>63</sup> See for instance Karl du Jarry de la Roche, *Aktenmäßige interessante Enthüllungen über den badischen Verrat an den deutschen Bundestruppen in dem soeben beendigten preußisch-deutschen Kriege* (München, 1866). The Badenese government composed an answer, authored by Robert von Mohl, *Der Anteil der badischen Felddivision an dem Kriege des Jahres 1866 in Deutschland* (Lahr:

government's attitude towards the war changed quickly. Realizing that Austria was now excluded from the German question, it took appropriate measures. On July 21, the government approached King Wilhelm I of Prussia, asking for a peace treaty, in which Baden agreed to pay a large indemnity. The Prussian General Armin von Beyer was appointed head of the Badenese war ministry and quickly reformed the Badenese military according to Prussian standards. The two states also signed a secret alliance, in which both were guaranteed assistance from the other in case of attack.

The signing of this treaty represented the end of the liberal era in Baden. As the government resigned, the liberals remained the dominant party in the Parliament. However, from now until the unification of the Reich, Friedrich I essentially ruled above the party system. The Grand Duke enlisted his trusted associate, the philoprussian Karl Mathy, to form a new government. Mathy, who died in office in 1868, and his successor Julius Jolly, sought to minimize the influence of the Parliament.<sup>64</sup> The Grand Duke, Mathy, and Jolly were all intent on making Baden a member of the North German Confederation. Bismarck, however, fearing the reactions of the other southern states, would not comply with their wish. Although Friedrich I and other leading politicians were convinced that it was only a matter of time before Baden joined the North German Confederation, large segments of the population remained strongly opposed. Many voiced their displeasure with the "Prussianization" of Badenese society that took place after the signing of the peace

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Geiser, 1867).

<sup>64</sup> Hermann Baumgarten, *Staatsminister Jolly. Ein Lebensbild* (Tübingen: Laupp, 1897), 21-22.

and alliance treaties of 1866. The government was apparently aware of these sentiments, as it often stressed the need to watch for “internal enemies” who were attempting to undermine the interests of the fatherland.

The elections to the new Customs Union in 1868 provided an indication of the resistance that the Prussian-oriented policies encountered. Led by Jakob Lindau, Catholics organized a successful election campaign, which provided stunning results. Although the liberals won the popular vote with 89,000, the Catholics with 78,000 were close behind.<sup>65</sup> Because people interpreted this election as a referendum on the national-liberal policies, the results were disheartening to the government. Not until the escalation of the conflict between France and Germany in 1870 did much of the population, albeit only temporarily, adopt a more friendly attitude towards Prussia and Bismarck.

In the midst of their popular mobilization in 1865-1866, Badenese Catholics had been somewhat taken aback by the Austrian defeat in the war of 1866. To many, the swift (Protestant) Prussian victory and the realization that Austria was now essentially excluded from the German question was difficult to accept.<sup>66</sup> Immediately prior to the war, Catholic opposition to the government had steadily grown stronger, and as the liberals sensed the growing discontent with their domestic and foreign policies, they had begun to test the waters for a possible compromise with the Church.

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<sup>65</sup> Excellent accounts of these elections include: Becker, *Liberaler Staat und Kirche*, 208-214; Dorneich, “Die Entstehung der badischen ‘Katholischen Volkspartei,’” 349-370.

<sup>66</sup> Many examples of these sentiments can be found in Catholic newspapers. See for instance *Freie Stimme*, December 28, 1866; January 17, 1867.

The outcome of the war, however, removed any such possibility. Although not all Catholics were disillusioned by recent events, the Grand Duke's selection of Jolly as the successor to the deceased Premier Karl Mathy in 1868 signified the beginning of their most difficult time. Jolly, who according to contemporaries was the most dedicated of all German "*Kulturkampf* ministers," made the relationship between state and church his primary concern. Considered the personification of all negative traits of liberalism, Jolly became utterly despised among Catholics.

One of the first Catholic experiences with the fierce stubbornness of the new premier was in conjunction with the election of a new archbishop to succeed Vicari, who died in 1868 at the ripe age of ninety-five. In light of the steadily deteriorating relations between Karlsruhe and Freiburg, the inability to unite behind a new candidate should have come as no great surprise. Considering the many reforms that the liberal government was trying to implement, they could not accept an ultramontane archbishop, who would offer resistance to their ideas. Likewise, Catholics would never tolerate anyone whom they suspected of being too government friendly. After a few unsuccessful attempts at nominating a suitable candidate, both sides realized that under present circumstances, no successor to Vicari would be found. This led to a peculiar situation, where the current Dean Lothar von Kübel, from 1868 to his death in 1882, remained auxiliary Archbishop.<sup>67</sup> Although never appointed to the position, Kübel possessed the same powers that he would if elected Archbishop. Kübel, who

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<sup>67</sup> For a detailed, though slightly biased, account of Kübel's life, see Joseph Schofer, *Bischof Lothar von Kübel. Sein Leben und Leiden dargestellt* (Freiburg: Herder, 1911).

for a long time had belonged to the most well-respected and influential members of the ultramontane clergy, successfully led Badenese Catholics through the *Kulturkampf*.

Between 1866 and 1871, the liberal government made several key decisions that indicated that a Badenese *Kulturkampf* was well underway. In 1867, the Parliament issued a law requiring all newly examined priests to pass a state-supervised exam--the *Kulturexamen*--before they were appointed to a parish. The exam covered the fields of philosophy, world history, German literature since Klopstock, and perhaps most importantly, German history since the Reformation.<sup>68</sup> The liberals argued that the knowledge required to pass this test was necessary for a priest in his role as educator on the local level. Vicari and Kübel both refused to recognize the legitimacy of this examination and forbade Catholics to take it. That only two priests took this test is testimony to the power of Kübel. In response, the liberal government did not recognize and later arrested newly appointed priests who were working in their parishes without having passed the exam. Similar to the strong reaction to Vicari's house arrest in 1854, Catholic communities rallied around their threatened clergy. They hid priests, and if the Badenese state arrested one, mass demonstrations often erupted. A clergy member released from prison was met with a hero's welcome when he returned to his parish.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Becker, *Liberaler Staat und Kirche*, 239-243.

<sup>69</sup> For a good discussion of these events, see Schofer, *Sperrgesetz und Sperrlingslos. Ein Ausschnitt aus dem badischen Kulturkampf für das Volk* (Karlsruhe: Badenia, 1930).

In the next step towards reducing religious influence in the schools, the government in 1868 ordered the establishment of interconfessional schools. This decree stated among other things that in communities where both confessions were somewhat evenly represented, the community had to abolish confessional schools and educate Catholics and Protestants under one roof. This was another instance where the government had overestimated its power. Few communities abided by these provisions, and when they did, it was accompanied by confrontations between Catholics and Protestants.<sup>70</sup>

In 1869, Jolly introduced civil marriage, which forced couples to conduct a marriage ceremony at city hall. Catholic clergy especially resented this decree since the institution of marriage had always been closely related with religion and the church.<sup>71</sup> Immediately before the outbreak of war in 1870, Jolly passed another law that stripped the Church of all financial resources that could not be directly linked to religious purposes. This law, which was one of the most significant ones during the *Kulturkampf*, prevented the Church from conducting any type of social activities and drastically reduced its capacity for benevolent work. Scholars have estimated that this decree cost the Catholic Church over twenty million Goldmark.<sup>72</sup> To add further to the now extremely hostile relationship between church and state came the conflicts

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<sup>70</sup> Baumgarten, *Staatsminister Jolly*, 104-108; Becker, *Liberaler Staat und Kirche*, 243-251; Hans Färber, *Der Liberalismus und die kulturpolitischen Fragen in Baden 1850-1870* (Freiburg: Herder, 1959), 286-301.

<sup>71</sup> Becker, *Liberaler Staat und Kirche*, 251-255; Dor, *Jakob Lindau*, 59; Schofer, *Bischof Lothar von Kübel*, 106-118.

<sup>72</sup> Becker, *Liberaler Staat und Kirche*, 265.

regarding the 1870 Vatican council and the declaration of papal infallibility.<sup>73</sup>

In May 1869, as a logical outgrowth of the increased mobilization and politicization of the Catholic masses, Lindau and three other leading Catholic personalities--Ferdinand Bissing, Reinhold Baumstark, and Albert Lender--founded the *Katholische Volkspartei* (Catholic People's Party), which represented a completely different view of the current domestic and foreign policy situation than the liberals. The People's Party advocated the formation of a South German Bund, which would strive to unify all German states, including Austria, in a loose federation. It also demanded that the Church be given complete freedom to conduct its affairs. The party scored an immediate success, securing four seats in the parliament elections in 1869. Although the liberal government did not consider the four Catholic representatives a threat, the presence of these high-profile Catholics served to further consolidate and unify the Catholic opposition.<sup>74</sup>

Despite the fact that Catholics were able to increase their political representation, the three-class voting system ensured that liberals would maintain most of the political power. In Baden, until the electoral reforms of 1905, the franchise was divided into three classes based on paid income tax. The first class usually contained about one twelfth of the enfranchised population; the second class contained the next

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<sup>73</sup> For a good discussion of German responses to the declaration of papal infallibility, see Karl Josef Rivinius, *Bischof Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler und die Infallibilität des Papstes* (Frankfurt: Lang, 1976).

<sup>74</sup> Dorneich, "Die Entstehung der badischen 'Katholischen Volkspartei,'" 373-375.

two twelfths. Thus, the third class contained anywhere from eighty to ninety percent of the electorate. All three classes carried equal weight in the election process, which meant that a vote in the first class usually carried about fifteen to twenty times as much weight as a vote in the third class. The fact that many people in the third class often failed to exercise their voting rights on election days only helped to underline further the unequal nature of this election system. City council elections were carried out in the same fashion, which ensured that Protestant liberals, who vastly outnumbered everybody else in the first two voting categories, were able to maintain most of the municipal and state political power throughout the Second Empire.<sup>75</sup> Protestant liberals benefited greatly from possessing most of the municipal political power. Although the state maintained a certain control on municipal politics, cities could and did exercise a great deal of influence over their own jurisdictions. Thus, for the most part of the *Kaiserreich*, these liberals enjoyed a great deal of local political power. Although the Catholic political party gained a significant amount of political power during the last two decades prior to the First World War, they never were as politically powerful as the liberals, which played an important role in determining the nature of their relationship.

Although suffering persecution throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, Badenese Catholics displayed signs of increasing strength, particularly since the 1850s. The ultramontanization and politicization that had taken place especially

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<sup>75</sup> Dieter Hein, "Badisches Bürgertum. Soziale Struktur und Kommunalpolitische Ziele im 19. Jahrhundert," in *Stadt und Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. Lothar Gall (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990), 85-86.



during the past decade strengthened Catholic resolve to resist the pressure to accept Protestant-Prussian-based national identity after 1871. To be sure, conservative Badenese Catholics were about to face a new challenge from liberal Catholics, who used the controversy surrounding the Vatican Council of 1870 and the declaration of papal infallibility to secede and form their own church, the so-called Old Catholic Church. Although life in certain communities was marked by harsh conflicts between Old Catholics and Catholics, this only bolstered the latter's determination to remain true to their understanding of Germanness, largely based on Roman Catholic values.

At the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War, Baden constituted a state with a population of one and a half million, of which about sixty-four percent were Catholic and thirty-five percent were Protestants. As the relationship between France and Prussia deteriorated, the political and religious situation in Baden was reaching unprecedented levels of tension. Attempting to reap the benefits from a long tradition of liberalism, Jolly and his ministers were intent on maintaining a fast pace of modernization, which caused frequent clashes with the state's Catholic majority. Although the seeds of this conflict had been sown during the past half-century, not until the 1860s and 1870s did the two sides engage in open conflict. Although the liberals had a firm grip on political power, the increasing mobilization, ultramontanization, and politicization of Baden's Catholics had transformed them into worthy opponents. When Germany finally solved its national question based on a *kleindeutsch* alternative, many Catholics hesitated to accept the new nation-state. Drawing upon the increasing strength that they had displayed during the two previous

decades, Baden's Catholics were not simply subsumed by the new Protestant-Prussian-based national identity, but offered their own interpretation of German national identity, which was largely derived from their earlier experiences.

## CHAPTER 3

### CELEBRATING UNIFICATION ON THE FRINGES OF THE EMPIRE: KONSTANZER CATHOLICS AND THE COMMEMORATION OF UNIFICATION

When the citizens of Konstanz celebrated the foundation of the Second German Empire in January of 1871, many expressed hope that the new nation-state would bring peace and harmony to a society that had been characterized by intense conflicts for the past few years. Especially since Max von Stromeier had been elected mayor in 1866, the atmosphere in Konstanz had been marked by confessional and political tensions. Stromeier, one of Baden's leading liberals, had been determined to end Konstanz's economic woes by rapidly modernizing most aspects of local society. More importantly, his modernizing efforts centered on stripping the Catholic Church of many of its economic and cultural resources. Although many of Konstanz's leading businessmen (most of whom were Protestants) supported these endeavors, the majority of Catholics were opposed to the attempts to limit significantly the role of the Church. These reforms had also highlighted the difficult position that Konstanzer Catholics faced during the 1860s and early 1870s. Caught between old regional and religious loyalties and the growing presence of Protestant liberals who stressed the need to integrate the city into Baden, the North German Confederation, and the *Kaiserreich*, these Catholics were forced to reevaluate and renegotiate their identities in a most public manner. Consequently, despite

constituting the overwhelming majority in the city, in 1871, Konstanzer Catholics expressed doubts about entering a nation-state dominated by Prussian national-liberals. Having experienced firsthand the effects of nation-liberal rule, both liberal and ultramontane Catholics were hesitant about the prospect of becoming the kind of Germans envisioned by the Prussian Protestant elites.

This chapter will trace the initial reactions of Konstanzer Catholics to the foundation of the Second Empire. Around the time of unification, Konstanz was a city caught in the midst between Protestant liberals and Catholics as well as between two religious traditions. On the one hand, the city had for several centuries been the site of one of the most important Archbishoprics in Central Europe, which had left a strong legacy of ultramontanism. On the other, during the last decade of the eighteenth century, Konstanz had been greatly affected by Josephine religious reforms and the efforts of Ignaz Heinrich von Wessenberg, one of the most important German Catholic reformers of the nineteenth century. Half a century later, the effects of Wessenberg's reforms were still evident as Konstanz housed a sizeable contingent of liberal Catholics. Because of these often conflicting traditions, it is necessary to trace briefly the recent history of the city in order to better understand some of the responses of the Catholics to the unification of the Empire.

### **Turning Konstanzers into Badenens 1806-1871**

Following the treaty of Pressburg in 1805, Konstanz was transferred to what was soon to become the Grand Duchy of Baden. Having previously enjoyed the

autonomous status of a provincial city in the Habsburg Empire, Konstanzers were now forced to adjust to life under new Grand Duke Karl Friedrich of Baden-Baden. Initially, most locals, especially the older generation, still identified with Austria while many younger inhabitants wanted Konstanz to be incorporated into Switzerland. Because of the city's location on the Swiss border, many were attracted by the relative economic success of their neighbors. Although citizens were not openly hostile to their new ruler, it was still evident that there existed no widespread support for the Badenese state. When the city was officially handed over to Baden on March 27, 1806, most Konstanzers treated the grand ceremony with indifference.<sup>1</sup>

In 1806, Konstanz had 4,419 inhabitants, most of whom made their living from a combination of farming and some form of trade or craft.<sup>2</sup> Even by contemporary standards, the local economy was underdeveloped, and since the Badenese state did not employ primogeniture, fertile land was becoming increasingly scarce. Konstanz was heavily Catholic (almost ninety percent), and similarly to most south German cities, the Church played a dominant role in society. For several centuries, the city had been the seat of one of the most powerful Archbishops in Central Europe, and though their powers had diminished over the last hundred years, the Konstanzer high clergy still enjoyed substantial prestige at the beginning of the nineteenth century.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Gert Zang, *Konstanz in der Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.1. Restauration, Revolution, Liberale Ära 1806 bis 1870* (Konstanz: Stadler, 1994), 9. See also Ludwig Mathy, *Wie Konstanz badisch wurde: Szenische Bilder aus dem Jahr 1806 zu Erinnerung an der Vereinigung Konstanz mit dem Kurfürstentum Baden* (Konstanz: Presseverein, 1906).

<sup>2</sup> Zang, *Konstanz in der Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.1*, 10.

<sup>3</sup> For an in-depth treatment of the conditions of the Catholic Church in Konstanz during these turbulent

For most of the Napoleonic wars, Konstanz remained outside the immediate war scene. Only once, in 1809, did Austrian soldiers enter the city, but after tearing down the Badenese coat of arms displayed on city hall, they quickly left. Although not directly affected by the wars, locals still suffered from having to lodge both French and Badenese soldiers at various times. In a city with an already strained economy, the task of supplying food and ammunition to soldiers was difficult to bear. Consequently, inhabitants accused the new government in Karlsruhe of imposing too many demands on them. These sentiments constituted a recurring theme throughout the nineteenth century, as locals often complained that government officials neglected Konstanz because of its status as a city on the margins of the state.<sup>4</sup>

While other parts of Baden slowly embarked on the industrialization process during the first decade of the pre-March period, little headway was made in Konstanz. Instead of gradually increasing the percentage of people employed within trade and industry, Konstanz witnessed the opposite development during the 1820s and early 1830s. One of the most important reasons for the poor economic growth was the reorganization of the Catholic Church in Baden. Prior to the 1821 transfer of the *Erzbischöflichen Ordinariat* (EO) to Freiburg, Konstanz received about 10,000 Gulden in annual religious fees. In addition, the loss of a number of well-paid positions negatively affected the economy. Many members of the high Catholic clergy had

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times, see Franz Xaver Bischof, *Das Ende des Bistums Konstanz. Hochstift und Bistum Konstanz im Spannungsfeld von Säkularisation und Suppression (1802/03-1821/27)* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1989). See also Helmut Maurer, *Das Bistum Konstanz: Das Stift Sankt Stephan in Konstanz* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1981).

<sup>4</sup> These sentiments dominate much of the discussion in Zang, ed., *Provinzialisierung einer Region*.

earned salaries that were among the highest in Konstanz, and their absence slowed the local economy.

During the discussions concerning the reorganization of the Catholic Church, it soon became evident that Konstanz would not be the seat of the new Archbishop, despite the city's strong Catholic tradition. Following the death of Archbishop Dalberg in 1817, the Badenese government endorsed Wessenberg, who lived and worked in Konstanz, as their candidate. Attempting to convince the curia that he was the most appropriate choice, Wessenberg spent five months in Rome in 1817, answering to various accusations of unchristian behavior. The Pope and his advisors were primarily concerned about Wessenberg's attempts to translate the liturgy into German and his attempts to democratize the Church. The controversy surrounding Wessenberg affected all aspects of society as the Pope was determined to strip the city of all religious power and importance, including moving the EO to Freiburg, which had dire financial consequences.<sup>5</sup>

Konstanz's slow industrialization impaired the development of a local bourgeoisie, and entrepreneurs only began to play a very modest role in city life in the 1830s. Because of the city's location on the Lake of Constance and the Rhine, members of the bourgeoisie focused their initial efforts on the steamboat industry, founding several steamboat companies and shipyards. Locals also began exploring

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<sup>5</sup> Lauer, *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Großherzogtum Baden*, 49-70. For a more general treatment of Wessenberg's life and ideas, see Braun, *Kirche und Aufklärung* and Carl Radlspeck, *Die Nationalkirchliche Idee Ignaz Heinrich von Wessenbergs im Urteil der Flugschriftenliteratur 1803-1821* (Köln: Hänsel-Hohenhausen, 1992).

tourism as a means of stimulating the economy. Throughout the first part of the century, the efforts to make Konstanz attractive to outsiders increased incentives to develop infrastructure and public services.

When Baden joined the Customs Union in 1835, citizens were confident that it would be the turning point for the economy, especially considering Konstanz's status as a border city. In addition, people were convinced that the emerging railroad network would serve to further integrate Konstanz into the Badenese economy. However, despite attempts of local elites to persuade the state government to extend the railroad to the shores of the Lake of Constance, it would be another twenty-five years before the railroad was completed. During this period, few other topics attracted more public attention. Proponents of the railroad argued that there were two main reasons why construction was never started: the Badenese government consciously slighted Konstanz, and more importantly, city elites did not do enough to convince the Grand Duke and his ministers of the importance of this issue.<sup>6</sup> This reflected a growing split among elites in the city as liberals became increasingly frustrated with what they considered the reactionary and antimodern views of most of the ruling strata. To complicate matters further, most of the former were liberal Catholics and Protestants, whereas the majority of the latter belonged to the ultramontane faction, which brought confessional politics into the realm of city development.

Although the period between 1835 and 1848 witnessed modest economic

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<sup>6</sup> Zang, *Geschichte der Stadt Konstanz im Grossherzoglichen Zeit*. Vol. 4.1, 97, 113, 148-149, 197-198, 256-257.



growth, primarily within the textile industry, the improvements did not match the expectations of locals, who began to voice publicly their dissatisfaction. To add further to the tense atmosphere in the city, several religious conflicts took place in the 1840s, all of which were increasingly tied to political issues. In the pre-March period, most conservative Catholics supported the reactionary views of Count Metternich while the majority of liberal Catholics advocated a democratization of society more in line with the ideas of Badenese liberals such as Karl von Rotteck and Adam von Itzenstein. Although Konstanz, primarily due to the presence of Wessenberg, housed a relatively large contingent of liberal Catholics, the proximity to Austria helped strengthen the conservative camp. Combined with the increasing dissatisfaction with the lack of economic development, the religious revival that originated in the late 1830s created an explosive atmosphere.

The first major religious controversy emerged as several high-profile liberal Catholics, utilizing their increased popularity after the revival, became more aggressive in their attempts to reform and democratize the Church. When faced with this development, in addition to the growing importance of the city's bourgeoisie, the vast majority of whom were liberal Catholics, ultramontane Catholics realized the need to engage in public polemic with their liberal foes. The beginning of the 1840s witnessed the increasing consolidation of liberal and ultramontane camps, which remained for several decades. In 1845, a controversial visit by Archbishop Hermann von Vicari triggered a full-blown conflict between liberals and ultramontanes. While in Konstanz, Vicari refused to meet with any liberal clergy members, though some of

them headed parishes of considerable size. The Archbishop's action caused an uproar among liberal Catholics and several hundreds took to the streets, where they clashed with ultramontanes. This event further reinforced the liberal Catholics' conviction that drastic measures were necessary to ensure their religious freedom, and in October 1845, they subsequently founded a chapter of the *deutsch-katholische* church, which opposed the perceived dogmatism within both the Catholic and Protestant churches. Although the *deutsch-katholische* church attracted both Protestants and Catholics, in Konstanz, the vast majority of its members were Catholic. In response, ultramontanes collected names for a petition demanding that all members of the new church be barred from public office, effectively illustrating how closely religious conflicts were tied to local politics. The conflict surrounding the founding of the *deutsch-katholische* church demonstrates the importance of confessional issues to the development of a public sphere.<sup>7</sup>

During the revolutions of 1848-1849, Konstanz played a significant role. Housing a large number of radicals, the city served as the stage where Friedrich Hecker allegedly proclaimed the republic and began his march on Karlsruhe. The widespread revolutionary sentiments can mainly be attributed to the poor economic situation and the inhabitants' growing political awareness. Notwithstanding that some progress had been made since 1835, the city's economy was still underdeveloped, and locals were keenly aware that they were not matching the progress of other areas of

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<sup>7</sup> Alfred Diesbach, *Die deutsch-katholische Gemeinde Konstanz, 1845-1849* (Mannheim: Freireligiöse Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1971).

the state. Although an increasing number of people derived their main income from business or industry, most still had to resort to farming to make ends meet. The mood in the city grew tense after 1845, especially since failed harvests marked the last two years preceding the revolutions. In 1847, over 1/3 of the local population depended on charity to survive, and the city remained in a very agitated state in the months leading up to the revolution.<sup>8</sup>

When the news about the Paris days arrived in Konstanz in March 1848, citizens were convinced that drastic change was imminent. On March 4, the city council published a long list of demands, including complete freedom of press and religion, the right to bear arms, abolition of all feudal dues, and the election of a national parliament. In addition, they formed a large representative body--the permanent committee--which was to hold a weekly meeting until all of its demands had been met. Comprising the majority of this committee, Konstanzer republicans were able to determine the political agenda in the initial stages of the revolution. One of their first actions was to nominate a delegation for the Offenburg meeting. However, the Konstanzers' initial revolutionary fervor was temporarily taken aback as they discovered that representatives from the rest of the state were not nearly as radical. Following intense deliberations in Offenburg, they refrained from declaring the republic, something that leading revolutionary Joseph Fickler had promised his fellow Konstanzers before leaving.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Zang, *Geschichte der Stadt Konstanz im Grossherzoglichen Zeit*. Vol. 4.1, 151-153.

<sup>9</sup> For general accounts of the revolution(s) in the southern part of Germany, please see Franz Vollmer,

In late March, fivehundred Konstanzers armed themselves in response to (false) rumors that the French were about to attack the city. When the French threat did not materialize, these armed citizens remained on the streets to “uphold law and order.” Although this represented a significant intensification of the revolution, it was not until the arrest of Fickler on April 8 that sentiments for an armed uprising began to spread. When Hecker arrived in Konstanz a few days later, he found the city in an uproar. However, despite their brash rhetoric, most Konstanzers were in the end unwilling to join Hecker’s march on Karlsruhe. On April 12, when Hecker called on the crowds to form an army, several people openly opposed him, arguing that a military revolt would not solve their problems. Even the most radical leaders such as Nepomuk Katzenmayer and Eduard Vanotti refrained from officially supporting Hecker. As Hecker surveyed his troops in the pouring rain on April 13, only about thirty people followed him out of the city. To be sure, in the following days, a few hundred more joined his army, but he never attracted the number of supporters he had envisioned. Locals were discouraged by the Prussian troops that were waiting outside the state’s border, providing a limited prospect for success. In addition, most of the revolutionary sentiment in and around Konstanz stemmed from the countryside, and once the Badenese government abolished feudal dues, a major reason for revolting

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*Der Traum von der Freiheit. Vormärz und 48er Revolution in Süddeutschland in zeitgenössischen Bildern* (Stuttgart: Theiss, 1983); idem, *Offenburg 1848/49* For discussion of the events in Konstanz, see Diesbach, “Friedrich Hecker verkündete am 12. April 1848 vom Balkon des Stadthauses Konstanz aus die deutsche Republick–Wahrheit oder Legende?” *Konstanzer Almanach*, 1974, 39-46, and Elmar Fetscher, *Der Konstanzer Bürgermeister Karl Hütlein und seine Zeit* (Konstanz: Verlag der Südkurier, 1987), 152-156.

was removed.<sup>10</sup>

Although Bavarian troops occupied Konstanz after Hecker's defeat, revolutionary sentiment did not disappear. Arrests, persecutions, and trials of supposed revolutionaries were constant features and served to maintain the tense atmosphere. Konstanz's location on the Swiss border also contributed to keeping the revolution alive as many radicals escaped across the border, where they continued their activities.<sup>11</sup> During the winter of 1848-1849, in a similar fashion to many other German states, revolutionaries improved their organization at the grass-root level. Numerous local associations were founded, of which the *Vaterländischen Verein* became the most important one. Members were especially successful in awakening the small but vocal local proletariat, which came to play an important role in the uprising in 1849.

On May 15, 1849, members of the *Vaterländischen Verein* met to discuss the desertion of government soldiers at Rastatt and Grand Duke Leopold's flight to France. They initiated a barrage of criticism of Mayor Karl Hütlein, accusing him of having been too conservative in 1848, causing the first revolution to fail. Many argued that if he was allowed to remain in office, this second uprising would fizzle as well. For the next three weeks, Konstanz was a flurry of political activity as citizens prepared for mayoral elections. Despite the criticism, Hütlein survived the most democratic election in the history of the city. The result indicated that the radical

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<sup>10</sup> Diesbach, "Friedrich Hecker," 41-43.

<sup>11</sup> Fetscher, *Der Konstanzer Bürgermeister*, 156-158.

faction, though still very vocal, was quickly losing support. Voters were likely influenced by the fact that at the time of the election, it was becoming increasingly evident that the Badenese revolution would not be able to withstand the force of Prussian and Hessian troops. When Prussians invaded the state, Brentano and his democratic government fled to Konstanz in a last attempt to delay the inevitable. After only sporadic fighting, Prussian soldiers entered the city on July 11 and a few days later placed the entire region under military occupation.<sup>12</sup>

Following the defeat of the revolution, the Grand Duke and his ministers appointed a new local government and restricted political activity to a minimum. Hessian and Prussian troops occupied the city, placing a considerable burden on the local community. In addition to the financial strain, soldiers imposed heavy restrictions on everyday life. The often abusive treatment locals received at the hands of Prussian soldiers created much animosity, which remained long after the troops had departed.<sup>13</sup> In light of the recent spread of radicalism, in 1852, the Badenese government awarded Konstanz a garrison. Locals expressed delight at this decision, which helped stimulate the economy. However, a repressive political climate and an economic recession characterized most of the 1850s. Largely as a result of widespread emigration to America, the population decreased between 1852 and 1858. The 1850s ended on a positive note as the Badenese government finally decided to

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<sup>12</sup> Gustav König, ed., *Konstanzer Licht-und Schattenbilder seit 1848. Bearbeitet nach den persönlichen Schilderungen des Gürtelmeisters Josef Wirth in Konstanz anlässlich seines 80. Geburtstages* (Konstanz: König, 1911), 17-21.

<sup>13</sup> See for instance, *Konstanzer Zeitung*, 14, 16, 30 July, 1,4,5 October 1849.

extend the railroad to Konstanz in 1858. This news caused an eruption of joy in the city, as citizens were convinced that their economy would finally improve. To a certain extent, they were correct. Although the abolishing of the guilds in 1862 also helped considerably to stimulate the economy, the most important incentive for growth in the 1860s stemmed from the railroad, which was finally completed in 1863.

During the 1860s, Konstanz underwent a slow but steady economic growth. Highly important to the city's development was the foundation of the *Gewerbeverein* in 1860.<sup>14</sup> Comprised of the most prominent members of the city's bourgeoisie, this organization proclaimed as their specific goal to alter the attitudes of locals towards work and leisure. Members spread leaflets and organized meetings where they stressed that Konstanzers could no longer blame outside circumstances for their problems. Inherent in this discourse was a heavy criticism of the Catholic Church and its allegedly negative views of industrialization and modernization, which placed almost insurmountable obstacles on Konstanz's road to a modern society. Members of the *Gewerbeverein* also tied this discussion to the controversy surrounding the Badenese Concordat. Immediately prior to the debates in the Second Chamber, Konstanz was heavily polarized as locals presented petitions for and against the Concordat to the Grand Duke. It is noteworthy that in their criticisms of the proposed agreement, liberals argued that the Concordat would place an insurmountable obstacle on the road to German unification. Sensing the growing force of German nationalism, they argued that if the Grand Duke signed this agreement, it would alienate the

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<sup>14</sup> Zang, *Die Geschichte der Stadt Konstanz im Grossherzoglichen Zeit.* Vol. 4.1, 231.

northern states to such an extent as to make unification impossible.<sup>15</sup> Once again, these conflicts effectively illustrate how intricately tied confessional issues were to all aspects of Konstanzer society, including major issues such as modernization and the German question. Confessional attitudes largely determined attitudes in political, economic, and cultural questions.

The death of Wessenberg in 1860 provided Konstanz's liberals an opportunity to display publicly their increasing strength. Immensely popular with the local population, Wessenberg's funeral was an event of great magnitude. Controversy ensued when the EO refused to send a representative to the ceremony, which, considering that the current Archbishop Hermann von Vicari had worked together with Wessenberg for over half a century, was regarded a tremendous insult. Indicating the importance of the deceased reformer, though the Grand Duke did not personally attend the funeral, he placed an elaborate wreath on Wessenberg's grave a few days later. Liberals took full advantage of all these ceremonies, portraying Wessenberg as an ideal citizen who had always attempted to modernize the Church as well as the city.<sup>16</sup> This discourse illustrates how the discussions on modernization encompassed all aspects of society, from the German question to the future character of the city. Taking place just a few months after the liberals had replaced the conservative government in Karlsruhe, this increasingly aggressive criticism of ultramontanes

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<sup>15</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, 29 February, 16 March, 6, 11 April 1860. For a more general treatment of this conflict, see Becker, *Liberaler Staat und Kirche*, 35-55.

<sup>16</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, 10, 16, 22, 23, 25 August 1860.



indicated that the city was entering a new era.

As was evident in conjunction with the death of Wessenberg, German nationalism had started to take root in Konstanz in the beginning of the 1860s. In 1861, the local singing society participated in the first all-German singing festival in Nuremberg. Upon their return, members reported excitedly about the fellow Germans they had met and the growing sense of unity that was spreading around the German states.<sup>17</sup> In 1862, a local chapter of the *Nationalverein* was founded, though it initially did not attract too much attention. Also in 1862, newspapers encouraged locals with “the right amount of patriotism” to participate in the first commemoration of the battle of Leipzig.<sup>18</sup> This popular ceremony serves as an illustrative example of an invented tradition as contemporaries failed to note that Baden had actually fought on the French side in the battle. This celebration sparked more intense debates regarding the German question. In 1863, members of the *grossdeutsche* camp founded the *Bodensee Zeitung*, arguing that the increasingly liberal *Konstanzer Zeitung* misrepresented facts in this and other discussions. Not surprisingly, the founding of the former caused the latter to become even more openly liberal as the two papers engaged in intense polemics in the years leading up to the war of 1866.

The intricate ties between local and national politics was demonstrated as it became increasingly evident that the two factions in the German question represented two different attitudes towards the future character of the city. Most of the supporters

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<sup>17</sup> Zang, *Die Geschichte der Stadt Konstanz im Grossherzoglichen Zeit.* Vol. 4.1, 270.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

of the *kleindeutsche* solution viewed Prussia as their ideal. Just as Prussians had over the years transformed their state into one of the most powerful entities in Europe, locals envisioned that hard work and the right amount of sacrifices would turn Konstanz into an important city. Adopting the term *Großhungern* as their method of changing the nature of the city, they argued that no sacrifice was too severe on the road to success. However, until 1866, Konstanzer liberals were in a difficult position. Often criticized for being too “Prussian,” many of their ideas alienated the local population. The majority of Konstanzers still remembered vividly the events of 1848-1849 and the subsequent Prussian occupation, and hostile sentiments were still widespread. The supporters of the *grossdeutsche* solution also advocated modernization, but at a more reasonable pace. Despite the changing political climate in the state, the *grossdeutsche* camp dominated city politics until the war of 1866. The majority of Konstanzers championed the plans for unification, but only a relatively small number could envision a German state without Austria.<sup>19</sup>

Following the Austrian defeat in the war of 1866, liberals essentially forced the *grossdeutsche* Mayor Joseph Stadler into resignation. Stromeyer, who had been one of the city’s leading and most vocal liberals for the past decade, succeeded him. Determined to modernize the city at all costs, his policies became a source of great conflicts for the next decade. He first centered his attention on removing Church control of the *Spitalstiftung*. The long-time presence of archbishops and other members of the high clergy had enabled the Church to generate a considerable wealth,

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<sup>19</sup> See for instance, *Konstanzer Zeitung*, 28 December 1863, 23 February, 23, 27 March 1864.

much of which was located in the *Spitalstiftung*. The *Spital* constituted a powerful institution as it provided citizens with several different welfare services. Ever since 1865, liberals had frequently brought the issue of the *Spital* to the forefront of public discussion, attempting to sway public opinion in their favor. After an intense campaign where he made repeated overtures to the Grand Duke and his government, Stromeyer achieved his goal in 1867 as the Badenese government awarded the city complete control over the *Spital*. This decision caused an outrage from the ultramontane Catholics, who claimed that the poor would suffer tremendously from this change.<sup>20</sup>

Emboldened by this success, in 1868, Stromeyer abolished confessional schools, which made Konstanz the first Badenese city to initiate interconfessional schools.<sup>21</sup> Since 1864, liberals had occupied the majority of important posts in the newly founded *Oberschulräten*, and they placed much emphasis on altering the educational system. Following the controversial manner in which Stromeyer had acquired the *Spital* from the Church, this decision made the mayor one of the most despised men in the area. Many conservative Catholics argued, not without right, that a small minority was making decisions that significantly altered the lives of all Konstanzers. To make matters worse, this small minority initiated policies that were completely contrary to the desires of the population. This time, the Church was

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<sup>20</sup> Zang, "Die Bedeutung der Auseinandersetzung um die Stiftungsverwaltung in Konstanz (1830-1870) für die ökonomische und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung der lokalen Gesellschaft," in *Provizialisierung einer Region*, ed. Zang, 307-373.

<sup>21</sup> Werner Trapp, "Volksschulreform und liberales Bürgertum in Konstanz," in *Provizialisierung einer Region*, ed. Zang, 375-434.

determined to offer some resistance. After several weeks of intense debates, the EO excommunicated Stromeyer in 1868, an event that echoed throughout the German lands.<sup>22</sup>

The last two years before the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War witnessed an increased hostility between liberals and Catholics in the city. At this time, Konstanz contained about 12,000 inhabitants, with Catholics numbering almost 10,000. The polarization of local society became clearly evident in the mayoral elections in June 1870. Known as the dirtiest in city history, the elections served as a referendum on the future character of the city. Few citizens on either side of the political spectrum would have denied that they were facing a choice as to how Konstanz should modernize. The liberals argued that the changes that they had implemented since 1866 had already brought some significant economic progress, while Catholics claimed that liberal reforms had been too drastic and that though modernization was necessary, it had to be conducted in a more gradual manner. On June 23, 1870, Stromeyer won the election by a small margin, largely because the opposition had not been able to coordinate their forces. Catholics and Democrats were only united in their opposition to Stromeyer and had failed to form a coherent political program.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Zang, *Geschichte der Stadt Konstanz in der Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.2: Aufschwung im Kaiserreich* (Konstanz: Stadler, 1993), 15-19.

### **The Franco-Prussian War and the Development of a Commemorative Discourse**

Consequently, as relations between Prussia and France grew increasingly hostile in the summer of 1870, the majority of Konstanzers were preoccupied with local politics. Throughout the spring and early summer, newspapers almost exclusively focused on the election and many citizens seemed almost surprised when relations between the two states rapidly deteriorated in mid-July. However, when the city's regiment left on July 17, papers centered their attention on the impending conflict, and the atmosphere in the city changed drastically.<sup>24</sup>

For Konstanz's ultramontanes, the outbreak of war signaled a temporary respite from the misfortunes of local politics and provided them with an opportunity to reestablish themselves as an important societal force. Already on July 19, the Catholic *Freie Stimme* assured its readers that the unjustified belligerence of Napoleon III had caused the war and that the south German states were determined to support Prussia.<sup>25</sup> Reflecting the current political conditions, the papers also stressed that they hoped that the war would bring some unity to Konstanz and the rest of Germany. Citizens quickly became absorbed by the events in the west. Catholics and Protestants alike expressed fears that a French victory would mean disaster for the city, and politicians called upon all men and women, regardless of confession and political opinion, to serve the fatherland, which now incorporated not only the local and regional but the

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<sup>24</sup> See for instance *Freie Stimme*, July 19, 1870.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

national as well.<sup>26</sup>

Despite these official sentiments of unity, events of recent years had created deep-seated resentments that would not easily disappear. Even when expressing support for the war, Catholics remarked that at least this time, all Germans would be fighting on the same side, which constituted an improvement compared to 1866. Still smarting from that defeat, local Catholics predicted that all German soldiers would battle in an “honest and determined” manner, which apparently had not been the case in 1866. They even offered some renewed criticism of the Bavarian effort in the last war, assuring that the German troops would have no difficulties locating the battle fields in France, unlike the Bavarians in 1866, who had claimed that they “could not find the enemy.”<sup>27</sup>

Notwithstanding these tendencies, Catholics and Protestants alike celebrated the first few victories. Both camps interpreted these triumphs as signs of better things to come, and though initially not too aggressive in their nationalist rhetoric, they soon began calling for annexation of Elsass and Lothringen.<sup>28</sup> The victory at Sedan caused the most public excitement as people gathered in the streets to celebrate the capture of Napoleon III. Although both Catholics and Protestants greeted the news of early victories with great relief and excitement, it soon became evident that the two groups viewed this conflict in different ways. Already after a few days of war, *Konstanzer*

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<sup>26</sup> *Freie Stimme*, July 21, 1870; *Konstanzer Zeitung*, July 21, 1870.

<sup>27</sup> *Freie Stimme*, July 21, 1870.

<sup>28</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, October 2, 1870.

*Zeitung* claimed that though internal peace should be protected, locals must not turn a “blind eye” to the activities of the Catholic clergy. Several liberals had been quoted as stating that this war had little to do with the Prussians and the French; instead the Jesuits and their actions at the Vatican Council were to blame for the current hardships. Liberals also claimed that the Catholic hatred of all things Prussian had convinced Napoleon III that he could provoke war without having to face a united German army.<sup>29</sup> These accusations reflected the hostile local political climate prior to war, though it is doubtful how much attention Napoleon paid to Catholic demands to “throw the Prussian [Stromeyer] out of City Hall.”

As it became increasingly evident that Germany would win the war, most Konstanzers turned to the issue of the future character of the nation-state. Liberals were especially active in this debate, pointing out that they had finally been proven correct about the inherently flawed character of a South German Federation. They ridiculed Catholics for having supported this idea, and some claimed that this proved how ignorant Catholics were about foreign policy matters, which in the end would justify banning them from local politics.<sup>30</sup>

One of the most severe conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in Konstanz during the war emerged in mid-November. At a banquet celebrating the conquering of Metz, the Protestant city council member Ernst Zogelmann proclaimed what he labeled a new version of “The Lord’s Prayer.” Modeled on the famous prayer,

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<sup>29</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, July 24, 26, 28; *Freie Stimme*, July 26, August 2, 1870.

<sup>30</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, November 5, 20, 1870.

Zogelmann's version, entitled "A Pious German's Wish," was not directed to God, but to the King of Prussia. Zogelmann pleaded with the King to grant Germans what they had so long been striving for: a unified nation-state. This request in itself would not have offended Catholics, but Zogelmann continued by asking Wilhelm to destroy the power of the "blacks," who were attempting to divide and weaken the German nation.<sup>31</sup> During the following days, Zogelmann's blasphemous speech became the topic of conversation among locals, and Catholics expressed their outrage in a variety of ways. They claimed that to ask Wilhelm to destroy Catholic power was not only futile but also constituted a grave insult of the King's character. Although not a Catholic, Wilhelm had often proven himself to be a man of proper religious convictions. Judging from his frequent praise of God after German military victories, it was evident that he was a pious man who would never deliberately hurt his Catholic subjects. By suggesting otherwise, Zogelmann had insulted the King and should be punished accordingly.<sup>32</sup> As we shall see later, Catholics, though critical of the official commemorative discourse, strove to stress their respect for and loyalty to the future German Emperor, providing additional evidence that Wilhelm on many occasions was located outside the official canon of nationalism. In a similar fashion, the Emperor was also never truly associated with the *Kulturkampf*, though "his" politicians were the ones instigating the legislation.

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<sup>31</sup> The poem was published in its entirety in *Freie Stimme*, November 9, 1870. The banquet took place on October 29, 1870.

<sup>32</sup> *Freie Stimme*, November 9, 1870.



Catholics also argued that Zogelmann's demands for complete disempowerment of the Catholics proved that he and his fellow Protestants were creating divisions among Germans. In addition, his blasphemous speech made clear that he had little or no respect for religion, which was so important to all Germans, whether Catholic or Protestant. Catholics stressed that their clergy members displayed a better sense of patriotism when refusing to support the demands for execution of Napoleon III.<sup>33</sup> Only a German without a deeper understanding of nationalism would call for further punishment of Napoleon III, a man who had already lost everything. This was one of the earliest instances where Catholics displayed a different perception of their national identity. Contrary to most official canons of nationalism, Catholics often stressed the humane aspects of their patriotism. As nationalism grew increasingly populist, they often complained that it appealed to the worst aspects of people, encouraging greed, intolerance, and ignorance. Catholics argued that their ability to display compassion for the fallen enemy made them better Germans.

All Konstanzers greeted the news that Wilhelm had been crowned German Emperor with enthusiasm, and locals again united briefly around success.<sup>34</sup> Towards the end of February, district council (*Gemeinderat*) members began contemplating which types of festivities would be appropriate to celebrate the recent events. Members were acutely aware of the divided nature of the city, as they naively stressed that if celebrated in the appropriate manner, the peace celebration on March 3-4

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<sup>33</sup> *Freie Stimme*, November 12, 1870.

<sup>34</sup> See for instance *Konstanzer Zeitung*, January 19, 1871; *Freie Stimme*, January 21, 1871.

should be a major step towards unifying the community. Consequently, they decided to be quite strict in their guidelines for this festival, emphasizing the need to display Konstanzers as unified and much supportive of the new Reich. Alongside school children of all ages, they invited a wide variety of associations and organizations to participate.<sup>35</sup> They hoped to present a representative cross section of Konstanz society, in which people from different political and confessional groups would partake in the festivities. In a rather unusual move, they specifically stressed that women were invited to attend the banquet at night, though the latter were informed that they would have to dress properly, otherwise they might be refused entry.<sup>36</sup> In their invitation, which was published in all major newspapers, members of the district council also declared that at the banquet everyone who wished to propose a toast would be able to do so. It was not clear whether this offer extended to the women as well. These initiatives suggest that liberal elites attempted to present these celebrations as emerging from below. By encouraging extensive personal participation, they wanted to display how excited Konstanzers were at the prospect of becoming Germans. In addition, by allowing regular citizens to partake actively in the festivities, they hoped to strengthen their grip on the commemorative discourse and to increase personal identification with the ideological message that they hoped to instill in locals. By establishing the framework for these commemorations, liberals

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<sup>35</sup> Stadtarchiv Konstanz (St. AK hereafter), S II 5375. Militär und Kriegssachen: Den deutsch-französischen Krieg 1870-1871. Friedensfeiern und Erinnerungsfeiern. Protocol from district council meeting, February 24, 1871.

<sup>36</sup> The invitation can be found in St. AK, S II 5375.

attempted to solidify their hegemony on this public discourse. If they were able to control the context in which patriotism and nationalism were expressed, they would be in a better position to control the construction of the new German identity.

As for the religious aspect of the ceremony, organizers wanted to eliminate any potential conflicts. On February 24, they approached the Catholic and Protestant parishes with the request that they would ring the church bells in the manner prescribed by the council. They furthermore outlined the contents of the religious celebrations, determining which prayers should be said as well as how long the service would last. Aware of how unusual these demands were, they repeatedly stated how important it was that this celebration presented the city and its inhabitants as supportive citizens of the new Reich.<sup>37</sup> All parishes replied that they would conduct their services according to the wishes of the district council.<sup>38</sup> Organizers were keenly aware of the confessional tensions in the city, and by streamlining the services, they hoped to avoid any possible controversies. They had most likely observed some of the conflicts that had occurred around Baden in the wake of similar celebrations. Often, both Protestant and Catholic clergy members used these occasions to further their own agenda rather than commemorating the sacrifices made by their soldiers. There were frequent reports of especially Protestant clergy who delivered sermons more aimed at

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<sup>37</sup> See note no. 47.

<sup>38</sup> St. AK, S II 5375, replies from the three Catholic and one evangelical parishes that they would oblige by these directions.

re-launching the *Kulturkampf* than promoting unity.<sup>39</sup> Aware of the already fragmented nature of their city, organizers wanted to avert a similar scenario. Catholic clergy members appealed to members of the district council to visit their service, but this request was refused on the basis that people could choose to attend whichever service they wanted.<sup>40</sup>

As is often the case around the Lake of Constance in the wintertime, March 3 was very foggy with poor visibility. Initially upset at the fact that the weather did not cooperate, locals soon discovered that the fog actually enhanced the almost transcendental atmosphere in the city. Public buildings were lit up during the day, and many commented that it seemed as if the celebration took place in magical surroundings. Some locals displayed banners that stressed the unity and future success of the German Reich. The train station was decorated with a painting of Germania with accompanying text: “On the ground lays the poisonous dragon/Which Germania defeated with a strong hand/This was the victory for the just cause/God bless our German Fatherland.” The two-day celebration ended with a banquet in *Konzilsaal*, in which one of the walls was decorated in a suitable manner: Germania offering protection to two figures, representing Rhein and Konstanz.<sup>41</sup> This symbolism made it evident that leading Konstanzers were keen to emphasize the city’s place within the newly founded Reich. Liberals viewed these sentiments as a logical continuation of

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<sup>39</sup> See the discussion pertaining to the celebrations in Freiburg.

<sup>40</sup> St. AK, SII 5375, correspondence between the district council and the parish of St. Stephan.

<sup>41</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, March 6, 1871, contained extensive coverage of the festivities.

their own efforts to economically and culturally integrate the city into Baden. They believed that their efforts to rid Konstanz of its marginal status had finally been rewarded. Stromeyer's "Prussian" behavior was no longer something to criticize, but instead was deemed necessary for the future success of the city. However, not all inhabitants agreed with the messages displayed on the banners. Many Catholics were especially offended by the one that hung on one of the major schools in the city:

"Looking ahead/building on the school/what we cannot see/we trust to the future."<sup>42</sup>

By referring to the initiation of the interconfessional school as one of the reasons why the war effort had been so successful, liberals attempted to legitimize their reforms in the best possible way: by linking these reforms to the strength and success of the German Reich. This issue was especially sensitive to Catholics since they considered the liberal views on education to be particularly harmful to German society. Many sermons contained references to the important role that Catholics and the Church had to play in the educational realm. Catholics also tied this issue to the new nationalist discourse as they often argued that young men and women could only learn the true notions of patriotism within the confines of the Church since the Bible constituted the best source on how to love one's fatherland.

Although many people participated in the celebration, and liberals deemed it a great success, the peace celebration had not created the much-hoped-for unity. One reason for the failure was the local national parliamentary elections that had been held in late February, which had hardened divisions in the city. Although this election at

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

first glance might not seem to be relevant to our discussion, a closer examination of the rhetoric employed during the campaign reveals that it served as one of the first instances in which Catholics and Protestants began to construct the memory of the recent war. Taking advantage of the current political climate, liberals in Baden and around Germany conducted a very aggressive election campaign in which they used the military victory and the unification as proof of the superiority of their policies—all expressed through vocabulary and discourse adapted from the war.<sup>43</sup> The Protestant-liberal campaign focused to a great extent on portraying their opposition from the Catholic People's Party as traitors who had not contributed to the war effort and in some instances even prayed for French victory. The traitorous clergy member became a prominent theme in the election campaign as liberals used the nationalist discourse to promote their political agenda. Most of the topics discussed pertained to the war, and liberals often pointed out that prior to 1870, the Catholic candidate, Franz von Bodman, had advocated a decrease in military spending, which had it been passed, certainly would have led to the demise of the Badenese fatherland.<sup>44</sup> In his campaign, von Bodman was frank about his past policies, admitting that though he was ecstatic that Germany had been unified, he would have preferred the unification process to involve Austria as well. However, he was keen to stress that these sentiments did not prevent him from being a true German and that if elected he would ensure that the

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<sup>43</sup> Zang, *Konstanz in der Grossherzoglichen Zeit*. Vol. 4.2, 24.

<sup>44</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, February 14, 21, 1871.

unified fatherland would become strong, just, and powerful.<sup>45</sup> This was an important statement since it clearly displayed that Catholics subscribed to different notions of Germanness. When von Bodman admitted that he was still very much tied to the Austrian cause, he expressed publicly what many Catholics thought privately. Unfortunately for von Bodman and his fellow Catholics, their assertions that these sentiments did not mean that they were any less German than their liberal and Protestant opponents fell on deaf ears. In a postwar period characterized by heightened nationalist sentiments, any allusions to loyalty to the recently defeated Austrians were sure to provoke accusations of treason and anti-Germanness.

As the election drew nearer, local Protestants intensified their efforts of portraying Catholics as poor Germans who had contributed little, if anything to the war effort. A few days before the election, auxiliary Bishop Lothar von Kübel published a pastoral letter in which he only briefly discussed the recent military and political events, instead focusing on the debate over papal infallibility.<sup>46</sup> Liberals claimed that the pastoral letter proved that Rome was the true *Heimat* of the Catholics. They accused Kübel of being wholly unaware of what the majority of Germans wanted: to continue to celebrate unification. Liberals repeatedly returned to this pastoral letter, emphasizing how it displayed just how alienated Catholics were from the German nation and how important it was that voters take note of Catholic attitudes toward the recent historical events. Political opponents stressed the notion that

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<sup>45</sup> *Freie Stimme*, February 23, 1871.

<sup>46</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, February 21, 1871.

Catholics could not be trusted with political power, since they obviously did not have sufficient knowledge of what Germans considered to be the most important issues of contemporary society. Consequently, not only were Catholics accused of being traitors, but they were also declared unfit to hold political power.

The outcome of the election proved disastrous for the Catholics. Despite the heavily Catholic nature of Konstanz, the liberal candidate received more than twice the votes of his Catholic opponent. This was not an abnormal result, as liberals received twelve out of the fourteen Badenese mandates to the national parliament.<sup>47</sup> Local politicians were quick to utilize this election result as yet another piece of evidence that Konstanzers were tired of the poor Catholic leadership and that the people had faith in the national-liberals to integrate properly the city into the new Reich. Most of their election analyses were framed in nationalist terms, and the fact that the results were celebrated in conjunction with the peace celebration indicates how keen liberals were to tie their political victory to the emerging nationalist discourse. They consistently stressed that people had cast their votes based on patriotic and nationalist sentiments and that voters had recognized their efforts during the past decade to integrate Konstanz into Germany.<sup>48</sup>

The arrival of the troops in the city on March 29, 1871, constituted the last major celebration in the immediate aftermath of the war. Similarly to the previous

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<sup>47</sup> See for instance *Konstanzer Zeitung*, March 6, 1871. For a complete treatment of election results in Baden during the *Kaiserreich*, see Fred Sepaintner, *Die Reichstagswahlen im Großherzogtum Baden. Ein Beitrag zur Wahlgeschichte im Kaiserreich* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1983).

<sup>48</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, March 11, 1871.



commemorations, Konstanzers displayed different attitudes towards this ceremony. A committee comprising the leading men of the city met the soldiers just outside the city and accompanied them to the *Marktstätte*, where a gigantic triumphal arch complete with flower decorations had been built. On the arch, a poem heralded the great sacrifices made by the soldiers. The poem, in a similar fashion to the one on the school, hinted at national-liberal policies as the reason for this great success. The first few lines read: “A people skilled with weapons/skilled in science/can create wonders....”<sup>49</sup> Although not addressing any specific liberal policies, it was clear that the reference to science indicated that the national-liberal program had paved the way for the military victories. Several houses were decorated, and many people appeared in the streets to greet their local heroes. The rhetoric employed at the celebration was heavily laden with nationalist symbols, and speakers lauded the troops as saviors of the fatherland. Still suffering from the dreadful election result, conservative Catholics maintained a low profile both prior to and after the celebration.

While *Konstanzer Zeitung* covered the event in detail, often quoting speeches verbatim, *Freie Stimme* was more reserved in its treatment of this celebration.<sup>50</sup> Although they agreed that this was a memorable day, they were not as excited as their liberal colleagues. Instead, they used this occasion to offer a subtle challenge to the liberal control of the commemorative discourse as they criticized the liberal use of the term “fatherland.” They reminded their readers that in 1866, liberals had been quite

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<sup>49</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, March 30, 1871.

<sup>50</sup> *Freie Stimme*, March 30, 1871.

confused about the nature of their fatherland, and it was inconsistent to claim now that they all along had advocated this specific solution to the German question. Catholics were becoming increasingly concerned about how liberals construed the previous war to fit the official commemorative discourse that suggested a teleological approach to the wars of unification. Local liberals often praised the previous war as the first necessary step towards unity. They admitted that at the time, many had viewed it as a case of Prussian expansionism, but history has proven that it constituted a required clarification of the relationship between the two great German powers. In their attempts to rewrite the history of the previous war, they always stressed how anti-Prussian the Catholics had been, failing to mention that they had been highly critical of Bismarck and Prussia as well. *Freie Stimme* often focused on outlining and explaining some of the events (in which Bismarck's role was becoming increasingly suspect) that caused the war of 1866.<sup>51</sup> Throughout the next few years, they spent considerable efforts trying to uncover the true reasons for the war, and many of these arguments were subsequently used to attack Bismarck and the liberals' official version of nationalism. As scholars have noted, responses to war are formed both through personal experience and through pre-existing narratives.<sup>52</sup> The act of remembering a war is done through a pre-existing cultural narrative, which aids people to understand the present conflict. One of the problems that Catholics encountered when attempting

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<sup>51</sup> These efforts intensified with time. See for instance, *Freie Stimme*, August 12, 1871.

<sup>52</sup> For a very useful addition to the vast literature on this topic, see T.G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper, eds., *The Politics of War: Memory and Commemoration* (London: Routledge, 2000); see also Peter Burke, "History as Social Memory," in *Memory, History, Culture and the Mind*, ed. T. Butler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 97-113.

to express their memories of the last war was that the official state-sponsored discourse did not provide any frameworks through which Catholics could express their sense of Germanness as well as their view of unification. While liberals, aided by their control of political power, sought to rework the meaning of earlier historical episodes such as the war of 1866 to fit the official narrative, Catholics struggled to preserve an alternative discourse that was threatened to be subsumed by the hegemonic Protestant-liberal discourse.

### **Constructing a *Kriegerdenkmal* in Konstanz**

While busy planning the peace celebration, members of the city council also discussed the need for a monument to celebrate recent events.<sup>53</sup> Swept up in the commemorative craze that characterized most of Germany at this time, it seemed obvious that the city of Konstanz would construct a statue as well. As will become evident in later chapters, cities around Baden all embarked on similar projects during the first few years of the Second Empire. The city council first addressed this matter on February 23, 1871. At this meeting, members initially considered placing a plaque with the names of all participating soldiers on city hall. All agreed that in light of the sacrifices that these soldiers had made, the city would pay for the plaque. After expressing concerns that two commemorative projects (a plaque and a monument) would be too costly, members decided to explore the option of constructing a

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<sup>53</sup> St. AK, S II 3045. Militär und Kriegssachen. Errichtung eines Kriegerdenkmals. Protocol from city council meeting, February 23, 1871.

monument and placing a plaque on the base of the statue. At the same meeting, they also discussed the matter of the proposed *Siegesdenkmal* in Freiburg, which was an issue that caused them many problems during the next few months. Although they were aware that it was supposed to represent the gratefulness of the entire Badenese state, they hesitated to contribute any funds. In their response to Freiburg, they stated that they were considering constructing a monument in Konstanz, which would make it very difficult for Konstanzers to donate any money to the statue in Freiburg.<sup>54</sup>

The city council's attitude to the *Siegesdenkmal* is noteworthy. There is no evidence that at the time of their reply to Freiburg, they had finalized their plans to build their own monument. Furthermore, during the next few weeks, as they refused to answer letters from Freiburg and failed to organize any collection drives, it became increasingly evident that members realized that they should have acted differently. On May 28, the Konstanzers finally replied, reiterating that they would not be able to participate in this project, since the construction of their own monument would empty the funds designated for commemorative activities. They also claimed that since they had made their decision to construct a monument prior to the decision in Freiburg, there was not anything that could be done about the situation. According to the minutes of the city council meetings, this was a blatant lie since no official decision had yet been made concerning the monument in Konstanz.<sup>55</sup> The organizing committee in Freiburg authored a very stern reply to this letter, pointing out that many

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> St. AK, S II 3045, letter to the organizing committee in Freiburg, May 26, 1871.

other Badenese communities were constructing monuments while simultaneously contributing donations to the *Siegesdenkmal*.<sup>56</sup> Faced with the possibility of being singled out as the only major Badenese city that refused to participate in this undertaking, city council members reluctantly agreed to start a collection among locals.<sup>57</sup>

There were several different reasons for this reluctance to participate in a project that most other cities willingly supported. First of all, it had suddenly become evident to the city council that the commemorative events during the last few months had cost a great deal of money. All together, they had spent almost 8,000 Gulden, which considering the city's struggling economy was a substantial amount.<sup>58</sup> Eager in their attempts to present the city as a bastion of Germanness, city council members had overextended their budget. The frivolous spending would greatly affect the construction of their own monument, as the council decided that they could not spend as much as initially planned.

On June 1, the *Gemeindeversammlung* met to consider the prospects for the construction of a monument.<sup>59</sup> The well-known local artist Hans Bauer had produced a model of a Victoria statue, which would cost 4,000-6,000 Gulden to build,

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<sup>56</sup> St. AK, S II 3045, letter to the city council in Konstanz from organizing committee in Freiburg, May 30, 1871.

<sup>57</sup> St. AK, S II 3045.

<sup>58</sup> St. AK, S II 3045. Noted in a protocol from the *Gemeindeversammlung* on June 1, 1871. The *Gemeindeversammlung* was a formal gathering in which voting citizens could attend, though they seldom did, the deliberations of city politicians in regards to municipal administrative issues.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

depending on material. Bauer's model held a laurel wreath (*Lorbeerkrantz*) in one hand and a palm branch (*Palmzweig des Friedens*) in the other, celebrating both the victory as well as the peace that would now dawn on Germany. Interestingly, city politicians stressed that this would not be presented as a Victoria statue. Instead, this was supposed to be a statue modeled upon Nike, the Greek goddess, who according to them was more akin to a "Germanic Virgin."<sup>60</sup> However, these plans failed completely as inhabitants, as well as most politicians, always referred to the statue as Victoria. This should not have been particularly surprising, since Victoria had long since replaced Nike as the goddess of victory. In their attempts to dislodge completely the commemorative discourse from Rome and anything Catholic, politicians did not take into account how deeply ingrained the figure of Victoria was among the population. At this meeting, they also discussed the high costs of the past months' celebrations, and they concluded that though the city could not afford to pay for the entire monument, it would contribute 2,000 Gulden towards the total cost. On June 10, they decided to use marble as the material, which put the final cost to approximately 6,000 Gulden.<sup>61</sup>

Despite this decision, city council members did not seem fully committed to the monument. They waited until November 1871 to start collecting donations, which

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<sup>60</sup> In his report to the *Königliche Preussische Staatsanzeiger* on February 25, 1875 regarding the construction process of the monument, Ludwig Leiner was keen to stress that Nike had been the original model, not Victoria. According to Leiner, the former was modeled on the "...mild-mannered and arts loving Hellas... not the more animalistic and baneful 'Victoria' that stems from the blood thirsty and aggressive Romans. Nike is not only victorious, but because of the victories, she has morphed into a mild, human representation of a German virgin..." St. AK, S II 3045.

<sup>61</sup> St. AK, S II 3045, protocol from meeting of the *Bezirksamt*, June 10, 1871.

greatly increased the difficulties of raising money.<sup>62</sup> Most cities attempted to take advantage of the heightened nationalist pride that accompanied unification, which made citizens more inclined to donate money to commemorative projects. However, almost a year later most of the initial euphoria had disappeared and been replaced with old and often increased hostilities among the population. If not adequately tended to, immediate memories of the fears and joys that accompany wars can evaporate rather quickly, and this was one of the reasons Konstanzers displayed minimal enthusiasm about the monument. In the close aftermath of a war, both soldiers and civilians often experience a need to express and manifest their memories, but often as time passes, that need decreases. While in other cities, newspapers would report how much money had been collected to date and who had provided an especially large donation, the local press in Konstanz almost completely ignored this project, which was quite detrimental to the fund raising. Another important factor why the project never created much enthusiasm was that as confessional hostilities resumed and subsequently increased during the first few years of the *Kaiserreich*, the local Catholic population became quite unwilling to partake in any of the projects that seemingly promoted the official commemorative discourse. The fact that this monument did not aid the Catholic part of the population to express their memories of the conflict, and faced with what they considered a hegemonic commemorative discourse that did not include their own experiences, they were hesitant to support these types of endeavors.

Clearly displeased with the fund raising, members of the city council soon

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<sup>62</sup> St. AK, S II 3045, protocol from city council meeting, November 2, 1871.

realized that they would have to modify their original plans. They had initially envisioned a six-meter-high statue, but as it became evident that they would not be able to raise the required funds, they decided to settle for an approximately two meter tall Victoria figure.<sup>63</sup> In late January 1872, Bauer reported that he would soon present a plaster version of the statue to council members.<sup>64</sup> Although it took until June before the model was ready for inspection, members expressed their satisfaction with the work of the renowned artist. During the next eighteen months, the production process proceeded without major problems. The only question that caused some debate was the location of the monument. Initially, most members had advocated the harbor as the most suitable place, primarily because the many visitors who arrived in the city via the lake would be greatly impressed with this patriotic display. However, after downscaling the monument, many voiced concerns that such a diminutive statue in this prominent place would reflect poorly on the national character of the Konstanzers. Ludwig Leiner was the most outspoken representative of this view and led the attempts to find a more suitable location. After considering almost every square in the city, they finally decided on the *Marktstätte*, agreeing that though the square was prominent enough, it was not so large that the monument would disappear.<sup>65</sup>

*Freie Stimme* used these debates to voice their displeasure at the importance

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<sup>63</sup> St. AK, S II 3045, protocol from city council meeting, January 7, 1872.

<sup>64</sup> St. AK, S II 3045, letter from Hans Bauer to city council, January 24, 1872.

<sup>65</sup> See for instance the discussion in *Konstanzer Zeitung*, June 2, 15, 1872.



attributed to this project. They mockingly noted that it was fortunate that few tourists were present in the city to witness the spectacle of the Konstanzer elite carrying around a plaster model to different places in the city. They were especially critical of Mayor Stromeyer, pointing out that it was rather symbolic to watch the mayor following Victoria wherever she went.<sup>66</sup> These sentiments served as an indirect condemnation of the national-liberal version of patriotism. Catholics were often critical of their opponents for seemingly changing their definition of nationalism to fit a variety of different political, cultural, and economic causes. Catholics argued that the attempted rewriting of the war of 1866 served as an illustrative example of how liberals and Protestants reconstructed history to fit official notions of Germanness. Furthermore, the fact that they were so willing to reconstruct their notions of German national identity indicated that they had a limited understanding of what it meant to be a German. Their definition of the concept was obviously highly superficial and did not contain any profound and deeper understandings of their own identity.<sup>67</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung* promptly used this criticism as proof that ultramontanes did not understand what was important to a German. There was nothing shameful about the way in which the mayor and the rest of the city elite participated in this debate. On the contrary, the importance attached to this matter clearly indicates how dedicated Stromeyer and the liberals were to honor the great events of the recent past.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> *Freie Stimme*, June 20, 1872.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.* An additional example of these sentiments can be found in *Freie Stimme*, December 9, 1871.

<sup>68</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, June 24, 1872.

After having received fifteen centner of French canons from Wilhelm I, the construction process began in early 1873.<sup>69</sup> City council members urged Bauer and the foundry Lenz to make sure that the statue was in place by May 10, which was the two-year anniversary of the signing of the peace treaty. Contrary to the majority of these ceremonies, this one was carried out “without great fanfare.”<sup>70</sup> To be sure, the dignitaries of the city were present and speeches were held, but compared to unveilings in other cities, Konstanz’s was very subdued. Liberals blamed the poor weather, which forced the city council to cancel the participation of school children, but that did not fully explain the lack of enthusiasm. Unveiling ceremonies were always considered an integral part of the monument and the message(s) that it was supposed to convey. Contemporaries were well aware of the importance of making the unveiling as impressive as possible, which would instill respect, admiration, and support for the monument. Most often, speakers heavily stressed the ideological message that accompanied the monument, leaving little or no room for misinterpretation. These types of events also constituted opportunities to unite the population as people gathered in the streets to display their support for a particular cause. The unveiling of the *Siegesdenkmal* in Freiburg constitutes an excellent example of a successful ceremony where local and national officials interacted with

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<sup>69</sup> The production process was actually delayed due to the fact that Konstanzers only received the promised fifteen centner from the Emperor after asking him for it. During his visit to the city in late 1871, Wilhelm had promised to donate the material. However, he had to be reminded in the beginning of 1873 before the metal was sent to foundry Lenz in Nürnberg. See letter from the city council to the Emperor, January 15, 1873. They received a positive response on February 20, 1873. St. AK, S II 3045.

<sup>70</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, May 11, 1873.

the city's inhabitants to produce a festive and educational event.

The absence of a grand ceremony at the unveiling of the monument illustrates several important points. Locals' lukewarm attitude toward the monument was a reflection of the problems and divisions that Konstanzers had faced during the past few years. As had become evident in the press and in the local community, the little unity that the war produced was long gone. The relaunching and intensifying of the *Kulturkampf* heightened tensions between Catholics and Protestants, and the former had become increasingly determined to display their own version of the nation and the events that had led to the unification of the Reich. Although Bauer's statue did not contain any extravagant symbolism, it was still perceived to be located within the official discourse of unification that emanated from Berlin. Most ultramontanes rejected the view of the unification that the monument presented, and it was therefore not surprising that many refrained from participating in the unveiling ceremony. In addition, as we shall see later, the first few months of 1873 were filled with confessional conflicts, which further alienated the conservative Catholics from the official commemorative discourse. The lack of support for the monument also illustrates the disparity between the liberal leadership and the Catholic majority of the population. This disparity was something that Catholics often criticized, claiming that a few men were reforming the city in ways that few people really wanted.

Lack of Catholic support for the statue comes as no surprise, but the absence of enthusiasm for the monument extended to parts of the community that had initially been supportive of the project. The brief report in *Konstanzer Zeitung* regarding the

unveiling provides some clues as to why people had become disillusioned with the undertaking.<sup>71</sup> The paper pointed out that though the monument was quite acceptable, no blame should be placed on the artist for the average result. Although they did not state it explicitly, journalists were very critical of how the city and its inhabitants had approached this project. By failing to raise enough money, the city had forced Bauer to significantly reduce the size of his statue, which had yielded a mediocre outcome. The report, as well as letters to newspapers and the city council, indicate that many citizens were simply ashamed of their small and insignificant statue.<sup>72</sup> In times where national pride was often measured by the size and beauty of a monument and/or the enthusiasm displayed at public ceremonies, Konstanz's failure in both areas did not present the city in a favorable light. Instead of producing a magnificent statue that would prove to the Emperor and the rest of Germany the loyalty and dedication of his new subjects in the southwest, this half-hearted measure reinforced the insecurity and apprehension that many experienced at the prospect of becoming Germans. By comparison, monuments in cities such as Freiburg served as a source of pride for the city's inhabitants and provided them with opportunities to use the ideological message of the monument for local, regional, or national integration. In Konstanz, the fact that *Konstanzer Zeitung*, whose editor, Otto Amman, was one of the staunchest liberals and anti-Catholics in the area, offered this indirect criticism of the liberal elite is

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> A few letters can be found in St. AK, S II 3045. This file also contains a long report from city council member Ludwig Leiner, dated May 25, 1873, on the completed project, in which the criticism from the community is discussed.

highly significant, as the paper usually could find no fault with liberal policies. Of course, Amman's criticism did not only pertain to the liberal elites but also to the majority of Konstanzers who had not contributed enough to the monument. In this case, Amman attributed their lack of commitment to the influence of the antinational Catholic Church.

Konstanzers' reception of the monument had damaged the pride of Hans Bauer as well. In a letter to the city council on May 30, 1873, he voiced his displeasure at the reception his statue had received. He claimed that he had been subjected to much criticism from locals, who had informed him that the general consensus in the city was that the monument was simply "insufficient." He emphasized that when he planned the statue, he had constructed a model whose proportions were ideally suited to a monument much larger than the one he finally built.<sup>73</sup> The diminutive size of the statue was not the only criticism that the city council faced in the following weeks. To meet this barrage of negative sentiments, they appointed a special committee under Ludwig Leiner. In a lengthy report on May 25, he discussed the perceived shortcomings of the monument. Apparently, many locals had approached him and the city council with complaints that the list of soldiers on the monument contained numerous errors. People who did not participate in the war were included, some who did were not, and only one soldier was identified as "Officer," though there were at least three others who deserved similar recognition. In his discussion of these complaints, Leiner addressed several of the key issues accompanying

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<sup>73</sup> St. AK, S II 3045, letter from Hans Bauer to the city council, May 30, 1873.

commemorations.<sup>74</sup>

He stated that he had from the beginning been critical of the suggestion to place the names of participating soldiers on the monument. His opposition to this idea did not only stem from the difficulties involved in confirming that all the correct names were included but also had a more profound reason. He argued that the presence of soldiers' names provided them with too strong of an association to the statue, which should not only honor their deeds but the entire unification process. After all, he stated, who was to say that the efforts on the home front were not as valuable as the ones on the battlefield? Should not all the sacrifices made by civilian men and women be recognized as well? Leiner claimed that despite his protests, the rest of the members were determined to place the names on the monument.<sup>75</sup> It is interesting to note that Leiner, a staunch national-liberal who had been the leading force in this project, now suddenly maintained that the ideological message of the monument was too narrow. Most likely, especially considering that the minutes from the meetings show no trace of his objections, he presented these claims in an attempt to avoid the harsh criticism. However, irrespective of his intentions, his remarks highlight one of the key problems when designing a commemorative effort, especially in a society in which different groups struggle over the control of the memory of the war. This discussion became even more intense because this monument was placed in such a significant public space. In a time period when old elites and the emerging

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<sup>74</sup> St. AK, S II 3045, report from Ludwig Leiner to the city council, May 25, 1873.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

bourgeoisie fought to control the public space of German cities, the monument (and its message) became a highly important part of this struggle. Leiner recounted all the steps that had been taken to ensure that all of the names were correctly spelled and that none was forgotten. The final list had been compared to the military's records and approved by General Strauss. Furthermore, he noted that the city council had placed several notices about this process in *Konstanzer Zeitung*, so if someone had a complaint, there had been sufficient time to correct a mistake prior to the unveiling.<sup>76</sup> It is noteworthy that they did not place any ads in *Freie Stimme*, thereby excluding ultramontanes from this discourse. This fact casts some additional doubts on the sincerity of Leiner's complaints that the commemorative discourse was not inclusive enough.

In his report, Leiner recommended that nothing be done about the plaque, pointing out that though at least one name was misspelled, that did not justify the cost of replacing the whole plaque. He reiterated that people did not realize how expensive these types of projects were, and if they could only fully grasp the difficulties involved in the production process, they would not be so critical. He sarcastically suggested that perhaps new plaques should be placed on city hall, where all people who were remotely connected to the monument could be listed: the ones who fought, the ones who went to church on Sunday praying for victory, the people who organized the construction of the monument, etc. He ended his long report by stating that the original idea of this monument was to express gratitude toward the sacrifices made

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

and to celebrate the victorious war. Both of these tasks had been accomplished in an appropriate manner.<sup>77</sup>

The criticism of the monument and Leiner's response provides insights to contemporary attitudes toward these commemorations. Although most often people supported these initiatives to honor important events and/or people, if they were conducted in an unsatisfactory manner, even people who would be expected to champion these endeavors remained aloof. In his report, Leiner frequently stated that the people offering criticism only did so because they had their own agenda to pursue. What Leiner did not realize (or acknowledge) was that it was precisely this personal agenda that commemorations were supposed to address. Because the commemoration failed to celebrate properly the war and the unification, even veterans were alienated from the discourse that the city council and Hans Bauer constructed. An important reason why this monument was built was to strengthen the "new" national identity and prove that Konstanzers were loyal subjects, but the poor execution of the project meant that none of these objectives were fully achieved. Of course, commemorations often failed to popularize an ideological message among all parts of the population. However, the fact that so many people who under normal circumstances would have been expected to be enthusiastic about this project did not support it suggests that the execution of these commemorative activities played a large role in its potential success. Although the monument occupied a reasonably important position in society

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid. Despite the long and detailed report, the members of the city council decided on May 29 to at least look into what it would cost to alter the plaque. St. AK, S II 3045, protocol from city council meeting, May 29, 1873.



during the following decades, citizens never quite seemed to embrace it wholeheartedly. To be sure, on national holidays, veterans' organizations would gather at the statue, and sometimes official ceremonies would be conducted, but overall, the monument played a comparatively minor role in local society.

### **Additional Commemorative Activities in the Postwar Period**

Although the construction of monuments played one of the most important roles in the commemorations of the unification, the immediate post-1871 period witnessed other events as well, which we will now analyze. Turning back to late 1871, Konstanzers received an opportunity to exhibit their newfound patriotism as Emperor Wilhelm made an official visit in October. Despite the fact that the relationship between Catholics and Protestants had grown increasingly sour during the summer, most citizens were excited at the prospect of entertaining the Emperor as their guest. The fact that Grand Duke Friedrich was so closely connected to the city made locals even more receptive for imperial pomp and circumstance. Although many cities throughout Baden and Germany claimed that they enjoyed a special relationship with their local rulers and the Emperor, Konstanz, even more so than either Freiburg or Heidelberg, did have a special relationship with especially the Grand Duke, but the Emperor as well. The good-hearted and jovial nature of the Grand Duke, who could often be seen chatting casually with citizens during his Sunday strolls through Konstanz, contributed greatly to the popularity of imperial and royal symbols in the city and its immediate surroundings. Even ultramontane Catholics, who elsewhere in

Germany sometimes hesitated to participate in the most extreme examples of veneration for the Emperor, joined in the celebrations, albeit on their own conditions.<sup>78</sup> Scholars have stressed that the Emperor served as an integrative symbol closely associated with the official version of German nationalism.<sup>79</sup> Although that was often the case, the sentiments in Konstanz indicate that despite his obvious ties to the new Reich, the persona of Wilhelm was still located outside the official canon of nationalism, which many Germans opposed.

Despite Wilhelm's popularity, there were still some differences in how Catholics and Protestants approached the festivities. *Konstanzer Zeitung* went out of its way to proclaim its loyalty to the prominent guest. The paper's coverage of the event dominated the news for several days with long and detailed articles analyzing the nature of the celebration.<sup>80</sup> *Freie Stimme*, on the other hand, was much more subdued in its reporting. Although it dutifully described the visit and the reaction of locals, it did so in a more sober manner, omitting most of the references to the greatness of the Emperor that dominated the articles published in *Konstanzer Zeitung*.<sup>81</sup> The difference in press coverage serves as a reminder of how easily the rhetoric and language of the Catholic papers could be interpreted as antinational.

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<sup>78</sup> For analysis of Catholic attitudes towards Wilhelm I, see Blessing, *Staat und Kirche*, esp. 179-181.

<sup>79</sup> See for instance Koshar, *From Monuments to Traces*.

<sup>80</sup> See for instance *Konstanzer Zeitung*, September 9, 12, 14, 1871.

<sup>81</sup> *Freie Stimme* did not reprint any of the speeches held at the festivities, and their reporting was in general quite subdued and devoid of declarations of the supposed greatness of the Emperor. See for instance *Freie Stimme*, September 14, 1871.

Indeed, the comparison is even more illuminating if one analyzes Catholic coverage of the many anniversaries and celebrations of Pope Pius IX's reign. In describing these occasions, the Catholic press used similar adjectives that the liberal Protestant papers used when characterizing the Emperor. Both were portrayed as heroic, courageous, and honorable men who served as great examples and leaders for their subjects. In a society caught up in nationalist frenzy for large parts of the immediate post unification period, the ultramontanes' celebratory discourse surrounding the Pope and the Vatican was certain to offend many opponents.

In the coverage of the Emperor's visit, *Konstanzer Zeitung* repeatedly stated that it was evident that citizens were keen to display their love and devotion to Emperor and fatherland. Locals also stressed that because of the presence of Grand Duke Friedrich, the crowds viewed Wilhelm in a new light.<sup>82</sup> People witnessed the affection between him, his daughter, and son-in-law, and instead of royalty, they became just another set of family members. The good relationship that Konstanzers enjoyed with the Grand Duke now enabled them to get closer to their Emperor.

Arriving by boat from the Mainau, Wilhelm was greeted by Mayor Stromeyer in the harbor, whose welcoming speech contained an abundance of nationalist clichés while also managing to offend ultramontanes. Stromeyer greeted Wilhelm by remarking that the city had finally escaped the dark period that had lasted for so many centuries. No doubt referring to the long period of Habsburg rule, he tied Wilhelm's visit to similar ones by German Emperors during the First Empire. The mayor also

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<sup>82</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, September 14, 1871.

stressed how much the city appreciated the Prussian leadership in the German question, noting that “the more the sun shines on Prussia, the better Konstanz will fare.”<sup>83</sup> Keeping in mind the calls for “removal of the Prussian from city hall” that accompanied Stromeier’s election, these sentiments were clearly not representative of the city’s population. This speech served as another attempt to rewrite the history of German unification. Stromeier’s references to the dark period from which Prussia and Wilhelm had saved the inhabitants naturally disregarded that only five years ago Konstanzers had gone to war against Prussia. Ultramontanes complained bitterly about these attempts to legitimize the teleological and Prusso-centric version of the unification. This official version of local history clearly did not represent the experience of local Catholics, who were forced to create their own memory to be able to ground their identities as Germans in a historical narrative. As we shall see, much of this narrative was created within the confines of the Church and voluntary associations, and Catholics made sure to utilize other types of public ceremonies to manifest publicly their responses to the foundation of the nation-state.

### **Catholic Responses to the Official Commemorative Discourse**

Considering the dominant role that liberals played in the immediate postwar period, how did Catholics experience these first few months as Germans? As indicated above, soon after the unification, liberals and Protestants launched an onslaught on ultramontanes, which forced the latter to define and defend their positions as Germans.

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

In a similar fashion to their brethren in Freiburg, one of the earliest incidents to assert themselves publicly in the community was the twenty-fifth anniversary of Pius IX's reign as Pope in June 1871. The celebrations in Freiburg were the most elaborate ones in the state, so we will leave a more extensive analysis of this important event to the next chapter. However, it should be noted that much of the rhetoric in Konstanz was similar to that in Freiburg, but given the increasingly precarious situation of the conservative Catholics in the former, they placed even more emphasis on the need to use this commemoration as an opportunity to display their aversion to what they labeled the moral demise of German society.<sup>84</sup>

Local Catholics staged a variety of attempts to defend themselves against the accusations of unpatriotic behavior. On the first anniversary of the war, *Freie Stimme* published a lead article concerning the events of the past year.<sup>85</sup> The paper pointed out that July 18, 1870, had witnessed two historical milestones. First of all, the French launched their attack on Germany, which after courageous fighting led to peace and unification. However, ever since the conclusion of the war, many Germans had engaged in internal warfare, using the pretext of the other historical event of July 18: the declaration of papal infallibility as justification for their actions. During the past few months, these so-called Germans had subjected one-third of the population to various allegations of unpatriotic behavior. To refute these accusations, *Freie Stimme* discussed the heroics of local Catholic clergy members during the war, including

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<sup>84</sup> *Freie Stimme*, May 25, June 15, 1871.

<sup>85</sup> *Freie Stimme*, July 22, 1871.

volunteering at the local hospital.<sup>86</sup>

The Catholics remained steadfast in their convictions, drawing support by portraying themselves as martyrs, falsely criticized of a variety of un-German behavior. Catholics often used these accusations as a means of integration. By highlighting the negative qualities of the Protestant national-liberal version of patriotism, they were able to accent their own sense of Germanness simply by being the things that Protestants and liberals were not. Their use of the Protestant-liberal *Other* enabled them to further consolidate and strengthen their own identity. A lead article in *Freie Stimme* in November 1871 constitutes a perfect example of this type of integration.<sup>87</sup> The article claimed that national-liberals considered it patriotic to aid your government in the hunt for Catholics, to label falsely Catholics as enemies of the fatherland, and to persecute local Catholic priests, while preventing them from carrying out their divine duties. Most importantly, liberal patriotism seemed to be based on the notion that German Catholics were *vaterlandslose*, who did not deserve to have a nation to call their own. Without explicitly stating so, the article inferred that simply by not possessing any of these qualities, Catholics were better Germans than their opponents. They often emphasized this last aspect of official nationalism as they pointed out that they never called for the exclusion of anybody from the German nation, which made them better Germans. Of course, this was a slightly idealized picture, as Catholics often engaged in anti-Semitic rhetoric and were sometimes

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid. See also August 15, 1871.

<sup>87</sup> *Freie Stimme*, November 11, 1871.

outright hostile to including Jews in the German nation.<sup>88</sup> Although as Smith has observed, the Catholics did not participate in the anti-Semitic tirades to the same extent as the Protestants, the Catholic community was quite clear that the Jews did not have a place in the German nation. Especially in Konstanz, there were quite a few instances of Catholic anti-Semitism, which Catholics used as means of integrating into the new nation-state. In conjunction with this discussion, Catholics also criticized liberals and Protestants for claiming that Rome was the true *Heimat* for German Catholics. They claimed that their opponents had never understood that though their spiritual home was in Rome, that did not make them Italians. These sentiments tied into their notions that liberals and Protestants only used the concept of national identity as a means to other ends. The latter's preoccupation with materialism and their tendency to use the nationalist discourse to gain material, financial, and economic advantages proved that their Germanness was not as well-founded in the German historical and philosophical tradition.

### **The Development of the Old Catholic Church**

During the first few years of the Empire, ultramontane Catholics in Konstanz did not only face opposition from liberal Protestants but from fellow Catholics as well.

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<sup>88</sup> It is noteworthy that the small Jewish community in Konstanz often faced discrimination. See for instance the discussions regarding the establishment of a synagogue. Zang, *Konstanz in der Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.2*, 97-98. See also Smith, "Religion and Conflict: Protestants, Catholics, and Anti-Semitism in the State of Baden in the Era of Wilhelm II," *Central European History* 27 (1994): 283-315. For a somewhat conflicting view of relations between different confessions in Baden, please see Ulrich Baumann's excellent essay, "The Development and Destruction of a Social Institution."

Mainly due to its long tradition of liberal Catholicism, Konstanz was one of the areas in Germany where Old Catholics were able to establish themselves as a societal force, albeit only for a brief period of time.<sup>89</sup> At first glance, it might appear as if the conflict surrounding the Old Catholics had little to do with issues of national integration, but upon further analysis, it soon becomes evident that national identity and national integration were among the key issues fueling this conflict. Other scholars, most notably Thomas Mergel, have argued that Old Catholics were reluctantly pushed into a close relationship with the state and that nationalist issues were of only minor importance to them.<sup>90</sup> However, a close reading of the conflict in Konstanz reveals that Old Catholics were more than willing to use questions of national identity as one of the means of acquiring support. They placed much emphasis on portraying themselves as better Germans than other Catholics and attempted to use this line of argument to better their relationship with the Badenese state.

Throughout the summer and fall of 1871, city liberals became increasingly aggressive in their confessional rhetoric as they praised Joseph Ignatz von Döllinger as one of the few Catholics who properly combined patriotism and religion. Eager to

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<sup>89</sup> For general accounts on the Old Catholic Movement(s) in Baden and elsewhere, please see Becker, *Liberaler Staat und Kirche in der Ära von Reichsgründung und Kulturkampf*, especially 137-141, 306-309, 331-342; Gröber, "Der Altkatholizismus in Konstanz," 190-248; Maas, *Geschichte der Katholischen Kirche im Großherzogtum Baden*, 282-291; Mergel, *Zwischen Klasse und Konfession*, 282-307; and Johannes Rieks, *Der Altkatholizismus in Baden. Eine Festschrift zur zehnjährigen Bestehungsfeier der badischen Gemeinden, insbes. der in Heidelberg, Ladenburg und Schwetzingen, samt einem Mitglieder-Verzeichnis dieser* (Heidelberg, 1883).

<sup>90</sup> Mergel, *Zwischen Klasse und Konfession*, 283.



portray the ultramontanes as unpatriotic, they argued that a Catholic who accepted the declaration of papal infallibility could not be a good German.<sup>91</sup> Faced with these accusations, ultramontanes connected Döllinger's decision to leave the Church to the recent political and military events. They argued that had not the Catholic powers of Austria and France been defeated in 1866 and 1871 and had not Pius IX been removed from Rome, Döllinger would never have had the courage to oppose him.

Consequently, his actions should be interpreted as an opportunistic ploy, which had little to do with the Catholic faith.<sup>92</sup> In their criticism of the Old Catholic Movement, this was a recurring theme. Ultramontanes often stressed that Old Catholics, the vast majority of whom were liberals, were using the conflict over papal infallibility to strip the Church of resources. Although this constituted a grave simplification of the matter, these allegations were not unfounded as Old Catholics spent much energy focusing on how to acquire as much of the Church's capital as possible. This controversy clearly illustrates how confessional issues transcended many other important issues in Konstanz and that confessional conflicts became the arenas for many other types of conflicts.

The growth of the Old Catholic Movement meant that ultramontanes in Konstanz faced additional challenges in their attempts to integrate into the Second Empire. On April 12, 1872, a number of Old Catholics met in a local inn to discuss the future of the movement. Most of the meeting focused on what was wrong with the

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<sup>91</sup> See for instance *Konstanzer Zeitung*, April 25, 1871.

<sup>92</sup> See for instance *Freie Stimme*, May 6, 9, August 15, 1871.

Catholic Church.<sup>93</sup> Dr. Alfred Marquier claimed that the main problem with the Catholic faith was that it actively opposed progress. To prove his point, he cited the debates concerning the educational system, which indicated how closely tied the Old Catholic Movement was to local liberal politics. Marquier furthermore argued that Catholics, and then especially the Jesuits, were trying to dismantle the new Empire. The Catholic faith was “completely anti-national, which has as its final goal the destruction of the German Reich.”<sup>94</sup> Although the disagreements had little to do with national issues, the Old Catholics consistently accused their opponents of being anti-national. In the midst of the most intense period of the *Kulturkampf*, these accusations were timely as they were bound to attract more supporters to the Old Catholic cause. Some Catholics who were concerned about being labeled un-German in these times of nationalist frenzy were receptive to the Old Catholic assurances that their faith enabled Konstanzers to be both good Catholics and good Germans.

In his speech, Marquier furthermore focused on Konstanz’s historic role in promoting religious progress, which should serve as an inspiration to the Old Catholics. Citing the important role played by Wessenberg in the history of German Catholicism, he claimed that all supporters of progress needed to “...get together and just as the brave heroes from Belfort built an iron wall to stave off the foreign enemy,

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<sup>93</sup> Joseph Laible, *Chronik der Altkatholischen Gemeinde zu Konstanz von 1873-1898* (Konstanz: Buch und Steindruckerei von J. Kuttruff, 1898), 11-12. The meeting is also described in great detail in *Konstanzer Zeitung*, April 14, 1872.

<sup>94</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, April 14, 1872.

so we should also stand together until the inner enemies are all defeated.”<sup>95</sup> His speech left no doubts about the role that the liberal Catholics and Protestants had played in the war, and the role that they needed to play in the Second Empire. The nationalist rhetoric and the invoking of images from the last war, and then especially the battle of Belfort, where the Badenese troops played a major role, proved to be a great success with the audience. Immediately after Marquier finished his speech, the crowd demanded that they should form an Old Catholic community in Konstanz. Although Marquier and Leiner decided that the time was not yet ripe for this drastic step, they elected a delegation that would attend the upcoming Old Catholic meeting in Offenburg.<sup>96</sup>

In January 1873, the anniversary of the foundation of the Reich triggered several months of intense confessional conflicts. At the banquet held to commemorate the events in Versailles, Protestant General Alfred Ströber proclaimed that Germans had displayed great courage on the battlefield, which was now needed again to defeat the domestic enemies.<sup>97</sup> He finished his speech by noting that “just like our Army stood, man by man, chest by chest, against the ones who were threatening our borders, so must we also stand there against the ones who wants to tie our minds to a foreign power...and every one should participate, who has the knowledge: I am a German.”<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Laible, *Chronik der Altkatholischen Gemeinde*, 15.

<sup>97</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, January 19, 1873.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

The last few words are especially noteworthy as they implied that Catholics were not Germans. Outraged at this speech, ultramontane priests used the following Sunday's sermon to answer the accusations against them and their fellow Catholics.<sup>99</sup> Clergy members focused on illustrating the link between the Old Catholic faith and the economic situation in the city, stressing that this was not a religious conflict, but an economic one. The elites of the city were using the infallibility issue to further increase the economic differences between citizens. The Old Catholic Movement was nothing but a cover to access more of the city's wealth.

Following this argument, *Freie Stimme* and *Konstanzer Zeitung* engaged in a fierce discussion of what constituted a true Catholic. The latter proclaimed itself the official organ of the Old Catholics while arguing that the only real Catholics were the ones who rejected the doctrine of papal infallibility. Journalists claimed that ultramontane Catholics comprised a sect that did not deserve to be called Catholic anymore. In the ensuing months, Old Catholics and Protestants often invoked the image of Protestant martyr Jan Hus, who had been executed in the city in the fifteenth century, and they stressed the strong heritage that Hus and Wessenberg had left in the city. *Konstanzer Zeitung* often stressed that locals were fortunate to witness a historic period in the city, in which "the flames which murdered Jan Hus, will serve as a guiding light for the future."<sup>100</sup> The fact that the Old Catholics appropriated Hus's

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<sup>99</sup> Reports of this can be found in *Freie Stimme*, as well as appeals to the Catholics in the city, outlining the dangers of the Old Catholic Movement. See *Freie Stimme*, January 19, 23, 1873.

<sup>100</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, February 4, 1873.

memory is illustrative of the conflation of Protestant and Old Catholic identities. To ultramontanes, the fact that the Old Catholics celebrated Hus only further reinforced their notion that the former had no real knowledge of the Catholic faith. By appropriating the memory of the Bohemian reformer, they were not only able to tie their cause to a well-known historical figure, but they were also able to create a continuous historical narrative from the times of Hus's struggles against Church until the last war against the French Catholics.

In response, *Freie Stimme* published a separate one page appeal addressed to the Catholics of the city. In this proclamation, they outlined the differences between Old and "normal" Catholics in great detail, taking pains to discredit the former as much as possible. Judging from the type of people who supported the Old Catholic movement, it was clear how much they knew about religion and the Church. Ultramontanes pointed out that prior to the Vatican Council, none of these people had been active in the Catholic Church, and many had even been Protestants. Consequently, they were not qualified to interpret the true meaning of Catholicism. The appeal also outlined some of the features that characterized a true Catholic. It reinforced the notion of papal infallibility while strongly refuting the claims that Old Catholics had a right to any of the Church's property.<sup>101</sup>

Early February 1873 witnessed an intensification of the hostilities. Led by Leiner and Joseph Laible, the Old Catholics organized a referendum in which Catholics were encouraged to come and vote yes or no to the declaration of papal

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<sup>101</sup> *Freie Stimme*, January 19, 23, 1873.

infallibility. The date was set for February 10, and in the days preceding the referendum, Old Catholics reiterated that this constituted a sign that Konstanz was prepared to initiate another religious reform movement. They also compared the excitement in the city to the one that had existed on the day that the news of the outbreak of war in 1870 spread. The day was marked by chaos. People from both camps were out in the streets trying to stake claim to the public space of the city. A few skirmishes took place, and one of the leading ultramontanes, Joseph Wirth, was attacked as a mob threw stones through his windows.<sup>102</sup>

Although they claimed otherwise, the results of the referendum must have been a disappointment to the Old Catholics. Despite their propaganda, only 657 people cast their votes against infallibility, and since they claimed that over 3,000 people had attended the preparatory meetings, the low turnout must have been a setback.<sup>103</sup> The result most likely reflected the fact that though many people might have been dissatisfied with certain aspects of their faith, most were not prepared to make an official stance against the Church. Despite the relatively poor showing, Leiner and Laible still hailed the result as a great victory and proceeded to form an official community in Konstanz. On February 22, they presented a petition to the Grand Duke and his government, claiming that a religious congregation of this considerable size possessed a right to use the local churches. *Konstanzer Zeitung* triumphantly printed the reply from Julius Jolly, in which he stated that though they rejected the notion of

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<sup>102</sup> König, ed., *Konstanzer Licht-und Schattenbilder seit 1848*, 80-85.

<sup>103</sup> Results were reported in *Konstanzer Zeitung*, February 13, 1873.

papal infallibility, these Konstanzers were still considered Catholics and consequently had a right to use the churches in their city. They were granted a right to share one of the three Catholic churches, but since ultramontanes would never remain in a church that Old Catholics used, the latter possessed complete control of it.<sup>104</sup> This was a significant victory with broad ramifications. Not only had the Old Catholics been able to acquire control of a significant public space in the city; this decision presented the ultramontanes with a number of different problems. The uprooting of an entire parish was quite disruptive to religious life in the city, and conservative Catholics faced a number of logistical difficulties during the next few years trying to accommodate these unfortunate members of their congregation.

The reaction of local ultramontanes was swift and decisive. Anybody who had voted against the dogma of infallibility was excluded from the Church, which meant that the Catholic Church in Konstanz had officially split. In a city where religion constituted a significant part of everyday life, this division further disrupted the fabric of local society. The conflict in Konstanz attracted nationwide attention. Liberals and Protestants celebrated the efforts of the Old Catholics, invoking the legacies of Hus and Wessenberg while praising the city for always being at the forefront of religious reform. Faced with these challenges, ultramontanes began to more actively contest the official version of the war and the unification process. It was certainly no coincidence that as the oppression of Catholics increased, the more determined they became to display and manifest their own version of Germanness.

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<sup>104</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, February 22, 1873.

In the midst of these debates, the third annual Old Catholic Congress convened in Konstanz on September 10-15, which added fuel to the ongoing debates.<sup>105</sup> The attitude of local authorities was something that caused controversy and further confirmed ultramontane suspicions that they suffered heavy discrimination. In 1869, Mayor Stromeyer had refused to make any public buildings available for the proposed general assembly of German Catholics (*Generalversammlung der Katholiken Deutschlands*). In addition, he proclaimed that a Catholic meeting of this kind would never take place in Konstanz as long as he was mayor, which forced organizers to move it to another city.<sup>106</sup> Conservative Catholics had not forgotten this injustice and were therefore all the more incensed as the city council granted every Old Catholic request. The theater, *Konzilium* building, and city hall were all made available to the delegates. *Konstanzer Zeitung* played a major role in these events, promoting it as the most important meeting since the fourteenth-century *Konzil*. The paper encouraged locals to support the congress and use this opportunity to further distance themselves from the “Jesuit pack” that was spoiling Germany’s national character. They told their readers that “your suffering under the heavy-handedness of Rome’s often half-crazed followers and incendiaries would soon end.”<sup>107</sup> During the congress, 356 delegates from several European states participated in a variety of meetings and events. A few common themes dominated the speeches. Maintaining that ultramontanes were

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<sup>105</sup> The congress is described in detail in Laible, *Chronik der Altkatholischen Gemeinde*, 55-72.

<sup>106</sup> Gröber, “Der Altkatholizismus in Konstanz. Die Geschichte seiner Entwicklung und Bekämpfung,” 230.

<sup>107</sup> As quoted in *ibid.*



completely under the control of the Jesuits and the Pope, Old Catholics viewed themselves as saviors of religious virtue and freedom. They consistently compared themselves to Luther and claimed that German history was about to enter a similarly dramatic phase as during the Reformation.<sup>108</sup>

During the Old Catholic Congress, many conservative Catholics labored to rewrite the history of the wars of unification. Drawing upon new evidence from Italian diplomats, ultramontanes questioned Bismarck's role in orchestrating these wars, attempting to prove that he and his fellow Prussians had been the aggressors in these conflicts. They accused the Chancellor of having negotiated behind the back of his King and quoted him as having stated repeatedly that he was "much more Prussian than German." According to the ultramontanes, in 1866, Bismarck had been prepared to cede (non-Prussian) German territories to France to avoid a conflict. This was cited as evidence of how Bismarck and his liberal supporters defined patriotism. Furthermore, by tracing and presenting Bismarck's plotting in 1866 and 1870, conservative Catholics claimed to have debunked the myth of the unification wars. On both occasions, but especially in 1870, Germans had been told that the fatherland was being attacked and that great sacrifices were needed to save the nation. However, as ultramontanes strove to clarify Bismarck's role in these wars, they criticized the national-liberal notion that there had been something almost holy about the unification process.<sup>109</sup> Instead, they noted that the German lives lost in these wars had primarily

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<sup>108</sup> *Freie Stimme*, September 20, 1873.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*

served to satisfy Bismarck's appetite for territorial gains. The liberals responded angrily to these Catholic aspirations to correct the history behind the wars, which only proved that the Catholics were really allied with the French. Invoking the great efforts during the war, the paper called upon all true Germans to rally around Emperor and the Grand Duke to make sure that Catholics would not be able to further spread their message of deceit and treason.

In the beginning of 1874, *Konstanzer Zeitung* and *Freie Stimme* engaged in a fierce polemic regarding the development of the German Reich. Ultramontanes argued that it had become evident during the last few years that the inner unity that had existed during the war had all but vanished and that Germans were becoming increasingly divided. This development was blamed on Bismarck and the national-liberals, who had deliberately chosen to ostracize more than one-third of the population. *Freie Stimme* claimed that it was unprecedented in history to have a group of people who "fought for the fatherland with courage and blood, be labeled deviant sons of the fatherland, traitors, and disturbers of the peace."<sup>110</sup>

In the same year, Catholics, Protestants, and Old Catholics used the centenary anniversary of the birth of Wessenberg as a forum to debate national identity. Because of the symbolic importance that Wessenberg enjoyed, his memory became heavily contested. In a similar fashion to how ultramontanes utilized various anniversaries connected to the Pope as opportunities to display their strengths, Old Catholics sought to use Wessenberg's birthday to manifest their position in the city. This was a

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<sup>110</sup> *Freie Stimme*, January 3, 1874.

celebration that attracted attention throughout the German lands, and national newspapers debated Wessenberg's merits and flaws. Many arguments were framed in nationalist terms; whether Wessenberg had placed Rome ahead of the German nation constituted one of the most frequently discussed questions. Local Old Catholics attempted to claim Wessenberg as their own, arguing that he had always been mostly concerned about the fate of his fellow Germans and never succumbed to the pressure from Rome. They often stressed that by standing up against Rome, he had served to strengthen the German nation. The discussion about Wessenberg's relationship with the German nation and his supposedly conscious efforts to strengthen it is a perfect example of inventing traditions. At the time of Wessenberg's action, Ernst Moritz Arndt was trying to sort out what constituted the German fatherland and nothing indicated that Wessenberg's actions were motivated by patriotic sentiments. Most of the Old Catholic celebrations turned into tirades against the Catholic Church, as speakers focused on the detrimental role that the papacy had played throughout history while stressing that Wessenberg's most admirable trait had been his determined resistance to Rome. Several speakers drew parallels to the events of 1870 and agreed that had Wessenberg been alive, he would never have accepted papal infallibility.<sup>111</sup>

*Freie Stimme* was quick to answer this challenge and with the assistance of *Badischer Beobachter* stressed that the Old Catholics must stop tarnishing Wessenberg's memory.<sup>112</sup> By extensively citing Wessenberg's letters, ultramontanes

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<sup>111</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, November 5, 15, 1874.

<sup>112</sup> See for instance *Freie Stimme*, November 12, 21, 1874.

tried to prove that though Wessenberg had been a liberal Catholic, there existed no evidence that he would have supported the Old Catholics. No doubt aware of the tremendous symbolic impact that Wessenberg had on locals, ultramontanes went to great lengths to disassociate Wessenberg's memory from the Old Catholics by pointing out that though Wessenberg had been liberal, he had always been determined to avoid a split in the church. The ultramontanes furthermore cited several passages from his writing in which he specifically stated that one of the most important tasks of the Church was to foster a national consciousness.<sup>113</sup> This was a negative form of integration as ultramontanes, who normally were quite critical of Wessenberg's ideas, appropriated his memory only to prevent Old Catholics to reap benefits from associating with the famous religious reformer.

### **Local Catholic Responses to National Events**

Although most Konstanzers were focused on local matters, occasionally national issues came to play an important role on the local level. Most often, these events were interpreted in ways that exacerbated local conflicts. In 1875, the unveiling of the *Hermannsdenkmal* polarized Konstanzers. During these days of supposed national unity and joy, a conflict that emerged over the attitudes towards this monument shook the city. Already a few days after the unveiling, *Freie Stimme* noted that Old Catholics and Protestants had attempted to use the unveiling ceremony and the discourse surrounding it as means of further attacking the Church. This

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

constituted another example where Catholics were not just excluded from the commemorative discourse and reduced to the role of spectator, but where they were attacked by the interpretations of the ideological message that accompanied the statue. They were especially critical of the fact that these people were so harsh in their judgment of the Church, though the Catholic Church had been the main reason for the greatness of German culture of past centuries. Unwilling or unable to base their identities in the recent military and political victories, Catholics elected to stress a different form of Germanness that emphasized cultural accomplishments. In the same article, they reported extensively on the unveiling of a local monument in Meersburg. They highlighted this monument, which honored the sacrifices made by men and women during the Franco-Prussian War, by stating that it was so nice and refreshing to witness a ceremony devoid of *Kulturkampf* rhetoric.<sup>114</sup> Consequently, Catholics were more than willing to celebrate the recent war as long as the commemoration was conducted in a manner which allowed Catholic experiences to be manifested as well.

The annual end of the school year celebration triggered the controversy. As part of the festivities at the *Gymnasium*, Headmaster Schiller read a poem written by one of the students. The poem, entitled “Hermann the Cherusker’s Protest Against the *Hermannsdenkmal*,” described what Hermann’s reactions to the monument might have been had he been alive in 1875.<sup>115</sup> Contrary to expectations, Hermann was not at all pleased, but outraged and wished that he “still had his old strength so that he with

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<sup>114</sup> *Freie Stimme*, August 19, 1875.

<sup>115</sup> *Freie Stimme* published the poem in its entirety on August 26, 1875.

one blow could destroy the statue.”<sup>116</sup> The reason for his wrath was that he could not understand how the builders, who dared to call themselves patriotic Germans, had the audacity to construct a monument to his honor when they were still completely dominated by the Romans. The main reason for his fury stemmed from the fact that by the look of contemporary society, Germans had not properly protected his great victory over the Romans. According to the poem, Hermann did not want to have a monument built until the German nation was unified again, which would not happen as long as Jesuits and other servants of Rome roamed freely throughout the German lands. Hermann was ashamed to witness these developments, especially since they took place in a country where proud men such as Luther had carried out many great deeds. The tone of the poem was very inflammatory and sure to insult Catholics. Among other things, Hermann stated, “We, who beat the Romans/who are now with a bloody hand/chaining you Germans/ and ruining your mind/I do not want to have anything to do with a monument.”<sup>117</sup>

Even from an objective standpoint, the student writing the poem was guilty of some questionable interpretations of German history. *Freie Stimme* immediately pointed out that until Luther initiated centuries of internal division, Germans had been unified and quite powerful.<sup>118</sup> The Catholic Church had been completely innocent in this conflict, which was to be blamed on the Protestants who had plunged Germany

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> *Freie Stimme*, August 31, 1875.

into centuries of despair. The paper also took issue with the glorification of Ulrich von Hutten, who had been nothing but a revolutionary troublemaker. Was the author of this poem aware of the fact that von Hutten had led the French farmers in an uprising that eventually threatened the Germans as well?<sup>119</sup> *Freie Stimme* was highly critical of the author's reference to the abundance of Jesuits in Germany. Had the author not noticed that the German government had passed several ruthless laws which banned all Jesuit activity and forced them into exile? Furthermore, had he not witnessed how the Jesuits had come to the rescue of the fatherland in the last war and how many of them had served so valiantly that they received the Iron Cross?<sup>120</sup> The recital of the poem sparked several different debates which covered topics from the effectiveness of the *Oberschulrat* to the interpretation of German history.

Ultramontanes pointed out that most of the draconian measures that the *Oberschulrat* had initiated, including firing Catholic teachers, had been justified with the need to "preserve the confessional peace." They also focused much of their criticism on the fact that it was unacceptable to expose young children to such harsh *Kulturkampf* propaganda.

The nine hundredth anniversary of the death of the Holy Konrad, after whom the city was named, provided Konstanz's conservative Catholics with an excellent

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<sup>119</sup> Ulrich von Hutten was one of the most prominent German literary figures during the Reformation. In addition to authoring songs and poems, many of which stressed the need for the German nobility to unite and free themselves of the yoke of Rome, he strongly supported and published Luther's works. For additional information on Hutten's life and ideas, please see Hajo Holborn, *Ulrich von Hutten and the German Reformation* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965).

<sup>120</sup> *Freie Stimme*, August 31, 1875.

opportunity to reclaim control of the city's public space.<sup>121</sup> A well-publicized event that attracted famous guests from all over Germany, this celebration constituted a major occurrence for the city's Catholics. Local Catholics were well aware of the importance of the festivities as they repeatedly stated that it was a blessing that this celebration occurred, considering all of the difficulties that local Catholics had faced during the past couple of decades. An estimated 10-12,000 people visited the city and sermons by Kübel and Ketteler attracted over 5,000 people.<sup>122</sup> *Freie Stimme* and other Badenese papers described the festivities in painstaking detail, attempting to instill new faith and strength in the Catholic subjects. Most of the sermons held were quoted at length in the Catholic papers; most of them stressed the need for the faithful to remain strong in the face of all the persecution and injustices that the Church had faced lately.<sup>123</sup> The planning for the meeting was extensive and members of the organizing committee attempted to ensure that all of the high-ranking guests received at least one opportunity to hold a sermon. It is also noteworthy that organizers claimed that they would not engage in any form of polemic with other confessional groups during the celebration. They explicitly stated that despite all of the injustices that had been done unto them, they would not seek out the opportunity for revenge. By stressing the fact that they would focus on being good Catholics and good

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<sup>121</sup> A detailed account of the planning and execution of these events can be found in Gustav Brugier, *Das 900jährige Jubiläum des heiligen Konrad, gefeiert zu Konstanz vom 25. November bis 3. Dezember 1876*. (Freiburg: Herder, 1877).

<sup>122</sup> *Freie Stimme*, December 5, 1876.

<sup>123</sup> See for instance *Freie Stimme*, December 2, 1876.



Germans, locals were able to present themselves as superior to the polemics and accusations that their enemies constantly initiated.

Bishop Ketteler held an impressive opening sermon, which centered on how religion had become increasingly lost in society. He especially stressed the many difficulties that Catholics have had to face during the past few years and how now more than ever, people needed to turn to the Bible as a source of unity and strength.<sup>124</sup> During the three days, sermons covered a wide variety of topics, many of which discussed various types of affection for the fatherland. Kübel among others claimed that St. Konrad was a great patriot, who at all times followed the commands and desires of his Emperor. He also made a point of stating that because of the love for the fatherland and the need to defend it, God also blessed the kind of wars that are needed to secure these things. He also spent much time outlining what one should do to manifest and strengthen one's love for the fatherland. With a clear message to the Protestant national-liberals, the Bishop claimed that it was not enough to be a member of certain associations or to participate in festivities laced with great speeches. No, the love and devotion to the fatherland must be expressed in proper behavior, hard work, and religious dedication—all of which would help strengthen the fatherland.<sup>125</sup>

The military priest Finneisen delivered a whole sermon on the topic of love for the fatherland. From the outset, he noted that nowhere in the Bible does it say that one

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<sup>124</sup> Brugier, *Das 900jährige Jubiläum des heiligen Konrad*, xxviii.

<sup>125</sup> This sermon is reprinted in its entirety in Brugier, *Das 900jährige Jubiläum des heiligen Konrad*, 1-8.

should love one's fatherland. However, this was of little importance as this kind of love is of the kind that is inscribed in every person's heart, just as the love for one's mother. He also made a connection to the geographic location of the city, stating that in few other areas does the love of the fatherland become so important as in a place like Konstanz, where just a few steps would be required to enter another country. Following some initial comments regarding the soldier's love for his fatherland as he fights to defend it against the enemy, he proceeded to discuss the religious foundations of this specific kind of love and devotion. He briefly discussed the amount of love for the fatherland that the old prophets so wisely displayed.<sup>126</sup>

As the celebrations drew to a close, controversy emerged. The local Old Catholic priest, Hoffmann, wrote a letter to *Konstanzer Zeitung* essentially challenging Ketteler to a rhetorical duel, but as *Freie Stimme* noted with great satisfaction, Ketteler would not lower himself to this level.<sup>127</sup> The Catholic paper also argued that though the Old Catholics claimed that their movement was still growing, the numbers in the respective churches on Sunday effectively demonstrated who was winning the battle within the Church. The Old Catholic service was visited by sixty-five people while the regular service had 500-600 visitors. *Freie Stimme* also noted that *Konstanzer Zeitung* had attempted to offer all sorts of different explanations why this celebration took place: to rally the forces before the upcoming *Reichtags* elections or to defeat the Old Catholics. *Freie Stimme* countered by stating that they were offended by the fact

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<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 152-167.

<sup>127</sup> *Freie Stimme*, December 7, 1876.

that their opponents thought that such worldly motives constituted the reason for this celebration. Instead, this was a celebration to express gratitude for all of the great things that the Holy Konrad had done during his life and to ensure that his legacy remained intact. Furthermore, this type of celebration offered local Catholics an opportunity to strengthen their spirit and resolve in a most public manner, which considering the events of the last few years had become increasingly important. In a similar fashion, at the concluding banquet, von Bodmann specifically stressed that irrespective of the treatment that the national and state government had imposed on Catholics, the latter were utterly dedicated and loyal subjects of Wilhelm I, once again reinforcing that the Emperor was excluded from most of the criticism that Catholics offered of the government.

After the conclusion of the festivities, local Catholics expressed delight at the success of the celebration. They stressed that the last few days had provided a good opportunity for not only the city's but Germany's Catholics to display publicly their strength and resolve to persist in the face of the persecution they had faced since the inception of the *Kaiserreich*. They furthermore praised locals for attending the services and ceremonies in great numbers, which had enabled the city to present itself as a bastion of Catholic Germanness. Consequently, it is evident that contemporaries viewed this celebration as an opportunity to brandish their interpretation of what it meant to be a German. Finneisen's sermon on the Bible as the final authority on the characteristics of love for the fatherland demonstrates that these Catholics were actively participating in the construction of a German national identity.

In the immediate postunification period, because of their dissatisfaction with the ideological message accompanying the official commemorative and celebratory discourse emanating from Berlin, local Catholics used opportunities and means such as the ones discussed in this chapter to popularize and legitimize their own version of the German nation. This version, though in many instances not drastically different from the Protestant-liberal one, still contained enough differences to merit frequent public display. Between 1871 and 1876, the Catholics in Konstanz utilized commemorative activities to both express their opposition to parts of the ideological messages accompanying the official discourse as well as to offer their own interpretation of the unification process and the Second Empire, which enabled them to integrate into the new nation-state on their own terms. Because the city had experienced fierce struggles between Protestants and Catholics throughout the nineteenth century, tensions between the two confessions and between liberal and conservative Catholics were high at the time of unification. Rather than eliminating these tensions, however, the popularized nationalist discourse enabled Protestants and Catholics new means to preserve old conflicts in a new setting. As will also become evident in the next chapter's analysis of the Catholic experience in Freiburg, in cities such as Konstanz and Freiburg where confessional conflict had long been a staple of local society, Badenese Catholics and Protestants frequently used each other's version of Germanness as an *Other* when negotiating their own identities. Because both cities were strongholds of clerical power, which often triggered a hostile relationship with local Protestant urban elites, Catholics in both locations were forced to interact with

Protestants when negotiating their identities. However, as was evidenced in Konstanz, this interaction did not mean that Catholics were subsumed into a Protestant version of Germanness, but instead that the two confessions negotiated their own spaces within the new national identity.

## CHAPTER 4

### NATIONALIZING THE ARCHDIOCESE? FREIBURGER CATHOLICS IN THE IMMEDIATE POSTUNIFICATION PERIOD

When the *Siegesdenkmal* in Freiburg was unveiled on October 3, 1876, citizens of the city assembled in the lavishly decorated streets, taking the opportunity to display publicly their affection, love, and devotion to Emperor and fatherland.<sup>1</sup> After more than five years of planning and construction, the time for the unveiling of the monument had arrived. The monument, which *Freiburger Zeitung* labeled one of the most magnificent in Germany, was to commemorate both the heroic efforts of the German military in the Franco-Prussian War and the subsequent unification. The presence of both the Grand Duke of Baden, Friedrich I, and Emperor Wilhelm I at the unveiling would underscore the significance of the statue.

The unveiling of the *Siegesdenkmal* appears at first instance to vindicate the claims of the national-liberal press that the German nation was finally completely unified. A close examination of these events, however, reveals that the seemingly homogeneous commemorative context surrounding the monument was in fact contested and infused with different meanings that could be interpreted in various ways. Caught in a complex web of old and new loyalties, the Catholics of Freiburg

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<sup>1</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, October 10, 1876.

opposed much of the official commemorative discourse that emerged from Berlin, much in a similar fashion to their brethren in Konstanz. The discourse surrounding the construction and reception of the *Siegesdenkmal* indicates that though residents were inclined to embrace certain aspects of their new national identity, they were reluctant to accept portrayal of Prussia, the Hohenzollern dynasty, and Chancellor Otto von Bismarck as the driving forces in the unification process. Despite brief, obligatory references to the glory of Wilhelm I, the commemorative discourse around the *Siegesdenkmal* focused almost solely on the role of Baden's soldiers in the Franco-Prussian War. The planning and construction of the *Siegesdenkmal* illustrates how Freiburgers, irrespective of confession, made their integration into the Second Empire dependent upon the maintenance of local and regional identities. As was evident in the last chapter, this type of integration had taken place in Konstanz as well, but it was even more evident in Freiburg. For many of Freiburg's ultramontane Catholics, however, the ideological message of the monument, though it challenged many notions inherent in the official nationalist discourse, still did not represent their own sense of Germanness. Most of the bourgeois city fathers who spearheaded this project were either Protestants or Old Catholics, while ultramontanes remained largely excluded from this exercise in region and nation building.

To be sure, since the monument served as a means of constructing an alternative memory of the Franco-Prussian War and the unification of the Reich, conservative Catholics could identify with parts of its ideological message. This alternative memory of unification enabled Freiburgers to maintain their local-regional

loyalties while developing national-dynastic loyalties and integrating into the new nation-state. The monument's references to nation and Emperor were sentiments mediated through the regional perspective, which permitted residents of the state to express devotion to their Emperor while also allowing them to legitimize their own past as well as their special regional status in the new Reich. Although Catholics rejected much of the symbolism of the *Siegesdenkmal* as well, the fact that the statue represented the construction of a national identity through a south German perspective increased their acceptance of its ideological message. The fact that the monument offered them an opportunity to manifest part of their regional identities as a vital ingredient of the national identity made it easier for these Catholics to accept the official symbolism of the monument. Thus, the *Siegesdenkmal* illustrates how both regional and religious loyalties constituted important aspects of the Catholic national identity.

This chapter analyzes how Catholics in Freiburg attempted to construct and assert their own sense of Germanness in light of their reactions to the Franco-Prussian War and the commemorative discourse that emerged in the post-1871 period. Although much of the commemorative effort in Freiburg centered on the planning and construction of the *Siegesdenkmal*, Freiburg's Catholics also employed other means to affirm their own identities. As in other cities around the state, even during the war, it became evident that local Catholics and Protestants would disagree on how to construct a memory of the war. Faced with liberal and Protestant accusations of harboring anti-German sentiments, and having only a very limited influence on the



construction of the *Siegesdenkmal*, Freiburg's conservative Catholics resorted to other means of publicly displaying their identities. Since many of the Catholic responses to the official nationalist discourse were influenced by Freiburg's location as a city on the margins of not only the Second Empire but Baden as well, a brief survey of the history of the city since the inception of the Grand Duchy is necessary to better understand the Catholic responses to war and unification.

### **Turning Freiburgers into Badeners, 1806-1871**

Freiburg was one of the south German cities most affected by the territorial changes that accompanied the Napoleonic wars. Until 1803, it was the capital of the Austrian *Vorlande*, thus occupying an important position as the westernmost city of the Habsburg Monarchy.<sup>2</sup> After the Treaty of Pressburg in 1805, the city was transferred to Elector and soon-to-be Grand Duke Karl Friedrich of Baden-Baden. Having belonged to the Habsburgs since 1368, citizens of Freiburg were now forced to shift their allegiances. Because of its relatively large size (in 1809, the city had 9,573 inhabitants), Freiburg immediately became the third most important city in Baden after Mannheim and Karlsruhe, the capital.<sup>3</sup>

Faced with a new ruler and state administration, residents of Freiburg expressed many concerns about their future. In addition to fears that they would be forced to give up their university and military garrison, they were apprehensive about

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<sup>2</sup> Heiko Haumann and Hans Schdek, eds., *Geschichte der Stadt Freiburg im Breisgau. Band 3. Von der badischen Herrschaft bis zur Gegenwart* (Stuttgart: Theiss, 1992), 19.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

the integration of their almost exclusively Catholic city into a Grand Duchy governed by a Protestant Grand Duke.<sup>4</sup> These worries were soon overshadowed by more immediate problems, as Breisgauers struggled to make it through the Wars of Liberation. These wars were taxing for the population, which complicated further their acceptance of the Badenese state, and triggered many complaints about their new rulers. They not only resented that Badeners had to participate in the French attack on Russia but also that their city was forced to quarter thousands of Prussian and other German soldiers after Baden deserted its French ally in 1813. Before the Congress of Vienna, neither Karl Friedrich nor his successor Karl was a popular figure in the city, and citizens were still loyal to the Habsburgs. These sentiments were expressed when the Habsburg Emperor Francis I arrived in Freiburg on December 15, 1813. People lined the streets to greet “their” Emperor, and it was obvious that Freiburgers still considered themselves a part of the Habsburg Monarchy.<sup>5</sup> After the battle of Leipzig in 1813, though the city had belonged to Baden for several years, people started dreaming of a return to the Habsburg Monarchy. This became all too evident in May 1814, when a pro-Habsburg mass demonstration turned into a riot, in which people attacked city hall, tore down the Badenese coat of arms, and replaced it with a double-headed eagle.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See for instance Alfred von Kageneck, *Das Ende der vorderösterreichischen Herrschaft im Breisgau* (Freiburg: Rombach, 2000), 288-290.

<sup>5</sup> Anonymous pamphlet, *Lebhafte Schilderung der Freuden- und Ehren-Bezeugungen, welcher Seiner Majestät dem Kaiser von Oesterreich als Sieger bey Seiner Ankunft in Freyburg den 15then Dezember 1813* (Freiburg: no publisher, 1815).

<sup>6</sup> Ursmar Engmann, ed. *Das Tagebuch von Ignaz Speckle, Abt von St. Peter im Schwarzwald* (Stuttgart:

Although citizens slowly began to come to terms with the new state after 1815, the process of integration was uneven. The nobility and the Catholic Church were least inclined to forsake their old Habsburg identities. Besides the confessional issue, these groups were unwilling to accept the abolition of the privilege state that accompanied the foundation of the Grand Duchy. Contemporaries noted that the 1828 statewide commemoration of the centenary of Karl Friedrich's birth constituted one of the first occasions when Freiburgers enthusiastically demonstrated loyalty to Baden and its ruling family.<sup>7</sup>

During the nineteenth century, Freiburg underwent many changes. From the founding of Baden until the unification of the Second Empire, the city's population more than doubled. The increase was not so much the result of changes in birth and death rates, but rather from the increased immigration to the city that accompanied the developing industry.<sup>8</sup> Although Freiburg's early entrepreneurs began the process of industrialization in the pre-March period, the local bourgeoisie soon became concerned with that city's geographic location on the fringes of the state. After Baden joined the Customs Union in 1835, most of the trade was directed away from France towards other German states, and Freiburg's southern location hampered industrial development. Baden's infrastructure was still evolving and the city became removed from the major trade routes, which shifted most of the industrial development to

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Thiess, 1966), 467.

<sup>7</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, November 26, 27, 1828.

<sup>8</sup> Theodor Zwölfer, *Die Einwohnerzahl der Stadt Freiburg in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (Freiburg: Herder, 1936), 3-4.

Karlsruhe and Mannheim in the northern part of the state. Not until 1845, when the railroad between Offenburg and Basel was completed, was Freiburg reintegrated into the economic life of the state.<sup>9</sup>

During the nineteenth century Freiburg became one of the main arenas for the conflicts within the Catholic Church. Having been made the site of the Archbishop of the Badenese diocese in 1821, the city became closely identified with the Catholic Church and confessional politics for much of the nineteenth century. Although containing a strong ultramontane element, Freiburg was also home to a number of liberal Catholics. The latter, who subscribed to the ideas of Vicar-General Ignaz Heinrich von Wessenberg in Konstanz, were strongly represented in the city during the 1820s and 30s, which provided for frequent clashes with more conservative Catholics. However, after the Cologne events in 1837, and the subsequent Catholic revival, few liberal Catholics remained in the city.<sup>10</sup>

Parallel to developments on the state and national levels, the political climate grew increasingly hostile in Freiburg during the 1840s. Friedrich Hecker and Gustav Struve's radical liberal movement enjoyed a large following in Freiburg, and the two often visited the city to rally further support. The election to city government in 1847 had witnessed a public split in the liberal camp as radicals and moderates argued about

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<sup>9</sup> Albert Kunzenmüller, "Wie Freiburg zu seiner ersten Eisenbahn kam," *Freiburg Almanach* 5 (1954): 121-136.

<sup>10</sup> August Franzen, "Die Zölibatsfrage im 19. Jahrhundert. Der badische 'Zölibatssturm' und das Problem der Priesterehe im Urteil Johann Adam Möhlers und Johann Baptist von Hirschers," *Historisches Jahrbuch*, 91 (1971): 345-383, here especially 366-367.

to what extent society should be reformed.<sup>11</sup> Following the news of the revolution in Paris in February 1848, the city's leading liberals gathered in the tavern *Harmonie* and selected a deputation dominated by radical liberals. This delegation included the city's most prominent men, who traveled to Karlsruhe to demand that the government comply with Hecker and Struve's demands. On March 26, 25,000 people gathered on the *Münsterplatz*, where the black-red-gold flag hung from the famous Catholic dome, to hear Mayor Karl von Rotteck (the nephew of the famous liberal) and Struve speak. Both called for the creation of a republic with a new constitution.<sup>12</sup> Even before Hecker declared the republic in Konstanz on April 12, radicals in the city had called upon Badeners to rise up against the Grand Duke and the government.

When the Hecker-march began, though Rotteck had previously stated that an armed uprising was premature and unjustified, he now declared that the city would remain neutral. Many people interpreted this change of tone as an affirmation of the city's support for Hecker.<sup>13</sup> During April, the rifts in the liberal movement became so serious that street clashes became an everyday occurrence. At the end of April, radical liberals occupied city hall. However, they were quickly besieged by Badenese and Hessian government troops. After a few skirmishes on Easter Monday, the revolutionaries surrendered. Thirty-three people lost their lives in the struggles on

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<sup>11</sup> Bernhard Zilling, *Helfen kann nur die große That...Die Radikalisierung in Baden 1848* (Freiburg: Herder, 1984), 20-26.

<sup>12</sup> Heinrich Schreiber, "Die bürgerlichen Bewegungen in den Jahren 1848 und 1849," *Schau-ins-Land. Zeitschrift des Breisgaugeschichtsverein* 41 (1967): 145-155.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 156.

April 23-24.<sup>14</sup>

Even after this defeat, a strong radical element remained in Freiburg, especially among workers and students. The presence of courts in which accused revolutionaries were tried helped maintain the radical fervor. These trials were well-publicized events, which often unveiled the brutality employed by state troops. Large audiences attended the trials, and they often publicly celebrated the acquittal of an accused.<sup>15</sup>

When Lorenzo Brentano led the third Badenese military uprising, many Freiburger radicals once again took up arms. However, fear and skepticism were the prevailing sentiments in the city. As the fortunes of Brentano's followers started to turn, Freiburg was flooded with fleeing revolutionaries. At one point, the city housed over 10,000 radicals, an overwhelming number for a city with 15,000 inhabitants. Despite complying with Badenese and Prussian troops, Freiburg was occupied on July 7, 1849. The arrival of these soldiers initiated a trying time for the city as the state demanded that inhabitants denounce the hiding revolutionaries. Many radicals were caught, tried, and given harsh sentences. To add to the already difficult circumstances, the city had to quarter the occupying Prussian soldiers for the next two years, which created much aversion against the powerful state in the north.<sup>16</sup>

Because of the important roles that many members of city government had

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<sup>14</sup> Konrad Fisch, Hans Rittner, and Julian Würtenberger, *Die Revolution 1848/49 in Freiburg* (Freiburg: Unpublished manuscript, 1974), 41-44.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 74-75.

<sup>16</sup> Rudolf Muhs, "Aus den letzten Tagen einer deutschen Revolution. Was in Freiburg vor 135 Jahren geschah," *Badische Zeitung*, July 7, 8, 1984.

played in inciting revolutions in previous years, the state suspended their activities until 1850. New elections were held that year, albeit without political debate and with the understanding that anyone who had been active in the revolutionary cause would not be allowed to stand for election. Political activity was further stifled due to the fear of the masses that members of the upper classes had developed after witnessing the events of 1848-1849. Instead of addressing how to improve the conditions for the underprivileged, the nobility and local *Honoratioren* sought to further exclude them from the political process, primarily by imposing stricter limitations on the *Bürgerrecht*. These measures proved to be quite successful as the number of enfranchised citizens decreased from about 11 % in 1840 to 6,7 % in 1871. The new three-class voting system also helped limit the local political influence of the middle and lower classes.<sup>17</sup>

Although the first few years after the revolution were characterized by a struggling economy, the middle of the 1850s and the 1860s witnessed a significant economic boom. In 1859, the entrepreneur Eduard Fauler was elected mayor. Although not popular with all Freiburgers, he possessed a keen sense for how to utilize the innovations that accompanied the new liberal era to improve the city. The presence of liberals in city government brought improvements to infrastructure and generally enhanced the conditions for industrialization. Especially the textile and clothing industry developed rapidly during this time, and in 1870, almost seventy percent of the factory workers were employed within this sector. From 1847 to 1865,

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<sup>17</sup> Dieter Hein, "Badisches Bürgertum," 78-79.

the number of people working in companies with more than twenty employees increased by 536 %.<sup>18</sup> One of the consequences of the rapid industrialization and the sudden rise in population was that it fostered tremendous social problems. In some areas of the city, poverty was rampant, the housing situation grossly inadequate, and hygiene and sanitary conditions were often dismal. Some improvements were made in the late 1860s, when a number of factory owners followed the example of Fauler and Karl Mez and started constructing separate housing for their workers. The need for adequate poor relief helped strengthen the position of the Catholic Church, which increasingly focused its attention on the social question. When Freiburg entered the *Kaiserreich*, it was as a city that had to face both the negative and positive effects of the rapid industrialization during the preceding decade.

Because of the presence of the Archbishop and the *Erzbischöfliche Ordinariat* (EO), the tensions within the Catholic Church, and between church and state, constituted a defining characteristic of Freiburg. With the advent of modernization, confessional tensions often ran high. During the 1860s and 1870s, the religious situation in Freiburg represented a microcosm of the one on the state level. The city's Catholics were divided into two camps: ultramontane and liberals. As was the case in many other areas of Baden, the former constituted the vast majority while the latter occupied many of the most important positions in the city and were therefore able to exercise a disproportionate influence on especially secular policies. Freiburg's strongly emerging bourgeoisie contained almost exclusively Protestants and liberal

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<sup>18</sup> Haumann and Schdek, eds., *Geschichte der Stadt Freiburg im Breisgau*, 151-153.



Catholics, who in their attempts to modernize society often clashed with the ultramontane faction led by the Archbishop. In 1870, about ninety percent of the city was Catholic. However, because of the economic and political rise of the bourgeoisie, Freiburg's Protestants had a very disproportionate level of influence.

The reforms that Franz von Roggenbach and his liberal government initiated during the 1860s had immediate consequences on the local level. When the parliament instituted *Oberschulräte* in 1864, ultramontane Catholics in Freiburg greeted the news with dismay. Archbishop Vicari immediately published a pastoral letter in which he called upon all Catholics to oppose these new provisions.<sup>19</sup> To nullify the effects of this action, Mayor Fauler, himself a liberal Catholic, published an announcement to declare his support of the reforms. In 1864-1865, there were many well-publicized cases in which teachers were either criticized or applauded for refusing to follow the directions of the state.<sup>20</sup>

From the early 1850s, Vicari, Buß, and Andlaw had worked to strengthen the position of the ultramontane Catholics. Until the mid-1860s, however, they were largely a nonpresence in the public sphere. In the beginning of 1865, Jakob Lindau's traveling Casino arrived in Freiburg. On February 14, Lindau, Andlaw, and the well-known retired city councilor Karl Bader addressed a mass meeting of Catholics and encouraged them to resist the latest state-sponsored educational reforms. The gathering was preceded by a public argument between Fauler, who had refused to let

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<sup>19</sup> *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, March 23, 25, 1864.

<sup>20</sup> For a good discussion of some of these cases, see Dorneich, *Franz Josef Buß*, 375-376.

the meeting take place in the *Festhalle*, and the organizers of the Casino. Participants ended the Casino by publishing demands for increased freedom for the Catholic Church.<sup>21</sup> Ten days later, Fauler convened a meeting of liberal Catholics, where they distanced themselves from these demands while claiming to represent the true nature of Roman Catholicism. These two meetings were representative of many similar conflicts during the 1860s. When the ultramontanes founded *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt* in 1864 and *Freiburger Bote* in 1867, they started engaging in an often very hostile polemic with the liberal *Freiburger Zeitung* over political and religious issues. Although the city's Catholics briefly united during the war of 1866, the aftermath of the war witnessed a renewal and intensification of the conflicts.

The new liberal government that came into power after the war of 1866 specifically targeted Freiburg with some of their reforms. A decree dated November 14, 1867, stripped the city's Dominican monastery of control over its finances, and the right to supervise the Adelhauser public school as well as its own educational institute. Although this issue triggered indignant protests from both the EO and the local population, the liberal government would not retract the decision.<sup>22</sup> As a consequence of the increased Catholic mobilization and the sharp tone of their protests, the liberal government grew less tolerant of Catholic opposition. The state's refusal to accept Kübel as the new Archbishop did not do much to damage the Catholic cause; on the contrary, Catholics only grew more determined to resist the state's persecutions. The

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<sup>21</sup> Dornreich, "Die Entstehung der badischen 'Katholischen Volkspartei,'" 315-316.

<sup>22</sup> See for instance *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, November 16, 23, December 7, 12, 1867.

last few years leading up to unification were typified by an increasingly tense situation in the city. The relationships between state and the EO and between ultramontane and liberal Catholics were deteriorating rapidly, and Freiburg became a central arena for confessional conflict. The pro-Prussian policies of the Mathy/Jolly government were very unpopular in the city, and inhabitants were quite apprehensive of the prospect of joining the North German Confederation. A growing hostility between the government and the city's Catholics characterized the time immediately before unification.

#### **The Outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War and the Construction of an Immediate Postwar Commemorative Discourse**

When the conflict between Prussia and France escalated in the summer of 1870, Freiburgers became swept up in the nationalist frenzy that characterized the German public response to the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in July.<sup>23</sup> In contrast to other areas in Germany, however, people in Baden did not become completely engulfed in the aggressive nationalist rhetoric prevalent elsewhere.<sup>24</sup> The first few weeks of the war witnessed a common unity that superseded all previous divisions. For a brief period, inhabitants of the city, which at the time numbered almost 31,000, of which 23,000 were Catholics, were no longer Badenens, Protestants,

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<sup>23</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, July 21, 1870.

<sup>24</sup> It is noteworthy that it took until the end of September before the newspapers in Freiburg began to call for annexation of French territories. In other areas of Germany, these demands were made at a considerably earlier stage.

Catholics, or Jews, but Germans. Following the initial euphoria and heightened nationalist pride, tension in the city grew quickly. Because of their proximity to France, citizens were aware of their precarious geographical position. To add further to the sense of uncertainty, soldiers normally stationed in the city were incorporated into the Fourteenth Army Corps and left for France. During the first few weeks of the war, Freiburgers could hear the fighting, which increased their apprehensions of a French invasion.<sup>25</sup> This fear soon passed, however, as the German Army strung together a series of impressive victories, crowned by the stunning defeat of the French forces at Sedan on September 2.<sup>26</sup> As the sense of security increased, many Freiburgers became more aggressively nationalist; in the middle of September, the first demands for annexation of Alsace-Lorraine surfaced in local newspapers.

Because of its location, Freiburg was assigned a military hospital during the war, and in late July, newspapers began calling for civilian volunteers.<sup>27</sup> Throughout the war, wounded soldiers were treated in the *Festhalle* or in private homes. Judging by the number of people who opened their homes to soldiers and/or refugees, Freiburgers were willing to make the sacrifices necessary for victory.<sup>28</sup> Although by volunteering local men and women proved their support for the war, many still

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<sup>25</sup> See for instance *Freiburger Zeitung*, August 30, 1870.

<sup>26</sup> For a general description of the battle of Sedan, see Michael Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War* (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 203-223.

<sup>27</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, July 23, 1870.

<sup>28</sup> Walter Vetter, "Anno 1870/71. Die Freiburger und der deutsch-französische Krieg," *Einwohner-Adreßbuch der Stadt Freiburg im Breisgau* (Freiburg: Herder, 1971), 64-65.

expressed ambivalent feelings about fighting the French. In the past, they had enjoyed a close and friendly relationship with their Alsatian neighbors, and especially during the last months of the war, despite the official nationalist rhetoric, it became evident that many Freiburgers had mixed feelings about this conflict.<sup>29</sup>

The Catholic makeup of the city played an important role in the emerging hesitancy towards the war. Much of the German nationalist rhetoric, especially after the victory at Sedan, explained the collapse of the French forces by claiming that Roman Catholicism had obstructed France's transition to a modern nation-state.<sup>30</sup> The majority of Freiburgers strongly disagreed with this idea and pointed out that Protestants and liberals had misinterpreted the religious aspect of the war. Noting that the declaration of papal infallibility at the Vatican Council in July 1870 had gone almost unnoticed because of the outbreak of war, Catholics maintained that the conflict represented God's way of showing both French and Germans how alienated they had become from the Christian spirit. The suffering brought by the war, not only to Germans and French but to the Pope as well, should remind Christians of all nationalities of how important religion was. This war did not posit one confession against another; instead, it served as a confirmation that in their quest for modernization, Germans must not denigrate the importance of religion.<sup>31</sup> These sentiments illustrated the Catholic resistance towards the modernization reforms that

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 60-61. See also *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, November 16, 1870.

<sup>30</sup> See for example *Freiburger Zeitung*, October 3, 5, 1870.

<sup>31</sup> *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, July 20, 1870.

Badenese liberals had initiated during the past decade. Catholics argued that these reforms were signs that the German national character was increasingly corrupted by the uninhibited striving for modernity.

In their responses to Protestant-liberal claims that Roman Catholicism cost the French the victory, Freiburg Catholics stressed that the French failure did not stem from their Catholic faith, but from their inability to remain good Catholics. They were especially critical of Napoleon III's un-Catholic behavior, citing his decision to assist the Italians against Austria in 1859 as a strong indication of how far he had strayed from his convictions. Local papers stressed that though French Catholics were suffering greatly, this ordeal would assist them in reconnecting with their Catholic faith, which they had gradually abandoned during the past decades.<sup>32</sup>

When Bismarck initiated negotiations with the south German states in November 1870, making it evident that Germans were heading towards unification, Freiburg's Catholics, though delighted at the prospect of a unified Empire, remained hesitant about their immediate future. Gravely concerned about the situation in Rome, they realized that in the aftermath of a German victory the fate of the Pope would become even more uncertain. After French troops left Rome in August 1870, Italian forces chased the Pontiff out of the capital on September 20. Relegated to the small territorial enclave that constituted the Vatican, surrounded by liberal Italian nationalists, the future of Pius IX seemed very unsure. This matter was of great concern to German Catholics, and it occupied their attention for decades to come.

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<sup>32</sup> *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, August 10, 1870.

Inhabitants of Freiburg repeatedly stressed the need to protect the Pope, arguing that if the French were unable to do it, the Prussian government should assume this task. In times of war, statements of the nature, “The interests of Catholicism and Bonapartism are no less than identical,” attracted criticism from other Germans who accused Catholics of enmity towards the fatherland.<sup>33</sup> By repeatedly including the struggles of the Pope in their analyses of the Franco-Prussian war, Catholics employed a non-nationalist discourse, which triggered charges of treason from Protestants and liberals. Catholics refuted these denunciations, claiming that their concern for the Pope did not lessen their loyalty to the German cause. Indeed, these sentiments reflected a Catholic sense of Germanness that differed considerably from the national identity that emerged from Berlin. German Catholics especially, with their strong ties to Rome, had for centuries constructed their identities around the persona of the Pope. When entering the age of the nation-state, with its exclusive focus on national groups, these sentiments further complicated Catholic integration into the Second Empire.

After the initial unity that accompanied the outbreak of war, relations between Catholics and Protestants in Freiburg deteriorated during the last months of 1870, just as they had in Konstanz. Emboldened by the success of the German Army, liberals and Protestants started voicing complaints of Catholic behavior during the war. In this campaign, Catholic priests were especially targeted, and there were several well-publicized cases in which local clergy were accused of praying for French victory. The behavior of Catholic priests during times of war was not a new topic of conflict.

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid.; *Freiburger Zeitung*, August 19, 1870.

After the war against Prussia in 1866, liberals and Protestants denounced Catholic priests for boasting that in case of Austrian victory, all German Protestants would be forced to convert to Catholicism.<sup>34</sup> In 1870-1871, one of the cases that attracted most attention was that of Catholic priest Manfred Burgweiler in Pfullendorf, a rural community on the eastern shore of Lake Constance. During the fall of 1870, Burgweiler reportedly led his congregation in prayer for French victory on several occasions, claiming that a Prussian triumph would greatly endanger German Catholicism.<sup>35</sup> These accusations not only reflected Protestant-liberal concerns about the loyalties of Catholic clergy but also fears about the increased influence of Catholic priests, especially in rural areas. Since the election of Herman von Vicari as Archbishop in 1842, a gradual ultramontanization of the Catholic clergy had occurred. Coupled with the popular religious revival that took place throughout the German lands during the 1840s and '50s, it brought an increasingly powerful local clergy. The influence that local priests enjoyed in their communities intimidated non-Catholics. During the war, many allegations surfaced of Catholic priests convincing entire villages to support the French, which enhanced tensions between the two confessions.<sup>36</sup> The power of local clergy remained a contentious issue throughout the nineteenth century. On several occasions, Catholic priests were arrested in conjunction with elections, accused of persuading their parishes to vote for a particular

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<sup>34</sup> See for instance *Freiburger Zeitung*, February 10, 12, 1867.

<sup>35</sup> *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, August 31, September 7, 1870. See also Erzbischöfliche Archiv Freiburg (EAF hereafter), B2-29, Staat und Kirche.

<sup>36</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, October 7, 13, 1870.



candidate.

The Catholic press around Baden used these allegations of anti-German sentiments to illustrate how the prospect of victory was corrupting many Germans. Catholics in Freiburg referred to the initial Protestant-liberal reaction to the outbreak of war, which had stressed that this was a time when Germans would put aside their political and confessional differences. Catholics claimed that liberals and Protestants only heeded their own advice while the outcome of the war was still uncertain. However, as soon as victory was imminent, the apparent unity disappeared. Freiburg Catholics cited several liberal newspapers that after the battle of Sedan claimed that the primary task in this war was to defeat Catholicism and found an Empire based upon the only true religion--Protestantism.<sup>37</sup> Liberals referred to the imminent defeat of the French and the removal of the Pope from Rome as two major victories for civilization. To accentuate these arguments, many liberal papers cited a letter from the Prussian General Friedrich von Holstein to the French General Gorardin, in which he explained the German victory with the following words: "The future belongs to the Nordic or Protestant race...Catholicism stupidifies...God will remain with the ones who seek progress, which is why he is abandoning the Roman people...."<sup>38</sup> Consequently, during the war, local Protestants began constructing a memory of the war that stressed the confessional aspect. As the conflict drew to a close, the hostility

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<sup>37</sup> *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, October 5, 1870. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between Protestantism and the unification, see Ernst Bammel, *Die Reichsgründung und der deutsche Protestantismus* (Erlangen: Universitätsbund, 1973).

<sup>38</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, October 3, 1870.

towards Catholics only increased. When liberals outlined Germany's promising future, which was sure to follow this military victory, many openly questioned whether there was any room for Catholics in the new Empire: "Should Germany really contain a large part whose *Heimat* is not in Germany, but on the other side of the Alps? After a struggle in which the best blood of the fatherland was spent, that would constitute treason and must under no circumstances be allowed by the nation."<sup>39</sup> Although Catholics had contributed greatly to the war effort, the constructed memory of the war implied that not only had they been useless during these trying times but also that their Catholic faith excluded them from the German nation. Even before any peace treaties were signed, the official nationalist discourse interpreted the impending victory as a signal for Germany to assume its rightful place as the most powerful state in Europe. Freiburger Catholics, on the other hand, placed less emphasis on the "positive" aspects of the war and instead expressed concern about their own future status in the Empire, and the increasing secularization of society and lamented the fate of the Pope. Even in the midst of battle, German nationalist rhetoric tended to divide more than it unified.

Faced with Protestant accusations of anti-German sentiments and assertions that they had no place in the German nation, Catholics in Freiburg recognized the need to refute publicly the ideological messages that accompanied the official nationalist rhetoric. During the fall of 1870, locals held several mass meetings where they discussed these denunciations and the appropriate reply. On October 23, Freiherr von

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid; see also *Heidelberger Tagblatt*, September 24, 1870.

Andlaw addressed a large number of Catholics and encouraged them to stand up for the Pope, regardless of the criticisms that their actions triggered. Claiming that it was the duty of a Catholic to remain always loyal to the Pontiff, Andlaw stressed that these sentiments did not prevent Catholics from being good Germans.<sup>40</sup> To accentuate the importance of this cause, FKK published an announcement on November 16 calling upon Catholics of all nationalities to donate money to a fund that would aid the struggling Pope. Also at the October 23 meeting, Catholics expressed outrage at suggestions from a few of the city's Protestants that one of the premier Catholic symbols in southern Germany--the Freiburg Cathedral--be handed over to the Protestants after the war. The Protestants' argument was rather unsubstantial. They noted that the cathedral had at one point been Protestant and, in light of the recent Catholic defeats, should be returned to them. This claim was not taken very seriously by the leaders of the city and only served to alienate Catholics further from the nationalist discourse and increase tensions between the two confessions.

Although Catholics in Freiburg participated in the celebration of the proclamation of the Reich on January 18, 1871, as in other areas of the state, doubts about their future soon replaced the feelings of elation. To be sure, they were enthused about the new Empire, but the recent successes of liberalism and Protestantism were causes for concern. Even as they celebrated unification, Catholics often stressed that they would not rest peacefully until the Pope had returned to Rome. Catholics entered the new nation-state not only with different expectations about the

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<sup>40</sup> This meeting is discussed in great detail in *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, October 26, 1870.

future but also with a different memory of the Franco-Prussian War. While most Germans constructed their memory around notions of military victories, success, prosperity, and unity, for most Catholics this conflict had additional connotations. Although they were proud of the achievements of the German troops and excited about unification, the accusations of anti-Germanness and the aggressive Protestant nationalist rhetoric, in addition to the situation in Rome, caused Catholics to construct a different memory of the war.

In a similar fashion to other cities around the state, Freiburg celebrated the return of the troops. However, this festive occasion caused some conflict between local Protestants and Catholics. In February 1871, Mayor Carl Schuster and city councilor Karl Mez approached the EO and requested that a local Protestant minister be allowed to hold the celebratory sermon, even though the main religious ceremonies would take place in the Catholic cathedral. Citing canonical law, Capitular Otto Marmon refused this petition, which triggered an argument about the rights of ownership to the cathedral.<sup>41</sup> Although a Catholic church and used by Catholics only, the city of Freiburg owned the building, which meant that depending on the composition of the city council, conflicts were bound to happen. Because of the prominence of the cathedral, both Catholics and Protestants realized the importance of controlling it on days of public commemorations. On several occasions throughout the century, members of the city council decided to flag the cathedral on non-Catholic

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<sup>41</sup> Letter from Schuster and Mez to the EO, March 28, 1871. The answer is dated March 20, 1871. This correspondence can be found in Stadtarchiv Freiburg (St. AF hereafter), K 1/28, Nachlass Schuster.

holidays, which offended Catholics. Although in this case the Protestant minister was not allowed to hold the celebratory sermon, this well-publicized conflict made the city's Protestants aware that they possessed at least theoretical rights to use the church, an insight that caused major conflicts in the 1890s.<sup>42</sup>

During the war, Freiburgers had been almost exclusively interested in the activities of the Fourteenth Army Corps, in which a majority of Badenese soldiers fought under General August von Werder.<sup>43</sup> These first gained prominence in the battle that led to the capture of Strasbourg on September 28, but their most memorable moments came as they besieged Belfort between November 1870 and January 1871.<sup>44</sup> Following an approximately two-month stand-off between the Badenese and French troops, a fierce and bloody battle erupted on January 14. It lasted for three days, until on January 18 the Badenese troops took Belfort. This victory coincided with the proclamation of the Second German Empire in Versailles. After occupying the French city for two months, the soldiers returned home. On March 23, the city organized a large parade, decorated official buildings, and encouraged residents to decorate their own homes festively. Most houses were adorned with yellow and red, the traditional colors of Baden. Few homes sported the Prussian black and white, fewer still elected

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<sup>42</sup> These conflicts are described in great detail in Heinrich Müller, *Oberbürgermeister Otto Winterer. Ein Vierteljahrhundert Entwicklungsgeschichte der Stadt Freiburg* (Freiburg: Herder, 1916), 140-171.

<sup>43</sup> A quick glance at the newspaper coverage of the war makes this evident. See for instance *Oberrheinischer Courier*, August 5, August 16, 1870.

<sup>44</sup> The activities of the Fourteenth Army Corps are described in Vetter, "Anno 1870/71," 60-66. For a thorough description of the war, see Theodor Fontane, *Der Krieg gegen Frankreich, 1870-1871* (2 Vols.) (Berlin: Verlag der königlichen Geheimen Ober-Hofbuchdruckerei, 1873); Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War*.

to use the *grossdeutsch* black, red, and gold.<sup>45</sup>

Although Freiburgers celebrated the return of local soldiers in a cheerful manner, local newspapers reported about hostilities between Protestants and Catholics in surrounding areas. In Zweibrücken, just outside Freiburg, local Protestant priest Heinz Roth used the peace celebration to proclaim that now when the external enemy had been defeated, it was time to root out the internal ones. Attacking social democrats and Catholics, he claimed that their behavior during the recent war proved that there were many *Vaterlandslose* among the true (Protestant) Germans. If Germany was to acquire its place in the sun, these elements had to be removed from the German nation.<sup>46</sup> Roth's sermon represented an early example of the liberal-Protestant attempts to control the commemorative discourse. Many of the commemorative efforts in the first months after the war stressed the religious aspect of the recent war, as Protestants accentuated that Germans should be grateful towards (the Protestant) God for the victory over France. Catholics, on the other hand, argued that it was not altogether clear what their country had achieved in the last war. To be sure, Germany was now unified, which was worth celebrating. They repeatedly warned, however, against the overconfident attitude of their fellow countrymen that accompanied the military victory. The commemorative discourse surrounding unification was littered with references to Germany's greatness and how the rest of Europe now faced the reality of a dominant German nation-state. Although they took

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<sup>45</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, March 24, 1871.

<sup>46</sup> *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, March 29, 1871.

care to emphasize the value of sound national pride, Catholics claimed that other Germans were not behaving in a manner befitting to their supposedly religious character. They never failed to point out that these attitudes were becoming part of what it meant to be German and that these sentiments were signs of how the Protestant-liberal stress on individuality and egocentrism had poisoned the German national character.

May 1871 witnessed the emergence of several conflicts in Freiburg concerning both the commemorations of recent events and over strictly religious matters. Although at first glance it might appear as if confrontations over issues not directly related to the construction of national identity were irrelevant to that process, many of these apparently non related issues had a great impact on the project of nation building. Catholics often employed nationalist vocabulary when engaged in conflicts over seemingly non national issues. Especially with regards to the increasing competition to control public space in Freiburg, Catholics frequently used these opportunities to assert their own sense of Germanness. In the aftermath of the war, the relative peace that had characterized the relationship between the Catholic Church and the state during the war ended, and the hostilities from the prewar period resumed. The recommencing of the *Kulturkampf*, which served in part as an attempt to construct a national identity along confessional lines, immediately repolarized Catholics and Protestants and greatly complicated their efforts to consolidate a new national identity.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> For the interpretation of the *Kulturkampf* as an attempt to construct a national identity along

In late May, certain members of the theology faculty at the university caused a great controversy when they publicly supported Ignaz von Döllinger's opposition to papal infallibility.<sup>48</sup> Although the influence of liberal Catholics had steadily decreased at the university during the past decades, there were still a few among the faculty. Their actions caused an outrage among most Catholics in Freiburg. Not only were they disappointed that some members of the faculty supported Döllinger, but the fact that the university made such negative headlines was a source of embarrassment to the Catholic city. *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt* noted how strange it was that these "so called Catholics" suddenly had become experts on religious matters. Previously, none of them had been among the well-known Catholic personalities of the city; they seldom attended church and never participated in any of the numerous Catholic organizations.<sup>49</sup> Attempting to highlight the ignorance of these liberal Catholics, Freiburg's ultramontanes tried to downplay the significance of the event. One of the main things they stressed in their detailed criticism of the theology faculty was that no Catholic possessed the right to question the decisions of the Pope. This reference to the hierarchical nature of the Catholic Church opened Freiburg's ultramontanes to criticism, as liberal Catholics and Protestants argued that it was inconceivable that decisions made in Rome could carry such importance on German soil. Critics reasoned that since conservative Catholics obeyed these decisions, it

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confessional lines, see Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict*, 19-20.

<sup>48</sup> On Döllinger, see Franz Xaver Bischof, *Ignaz von Döllinger* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1997).

<sup>49</sup> *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, May 24, 1871.



located the base of their identities and loyalties in Rome instead of Berlin.<sup>50</sup>

Faced with a commemorative discourse that largely celebrated a different national identity, Catholics attempted to create an alternative discourse that expressed their own sense of Germanness. To succeed in this venture, they recognized the need for an expanded Catholic presence in the public sphere, which would counteract the Protestant-dominated official commemorative discourse. To control public space became one of the keys to Catholic construction and assertion of national identity. Various kinds of papal anniversaries constituted one of the most important means that Catholics employed to gain control over the public sphere. More so than Protestants, Catholics placed heavy emphasis on celebrating various religious anniversaries. Most were small local festivities. However, the celebration of several major papal anniversaries constituted important occasions that demanded the attention of the entire city and its immediate surroundings. Taking into consideration the context in which these celebrations were staged, it becomes evident that Catholics employed them, at least in part, to display and manifest their own sense of identity.

June 16, 1871, was the twenty-fifth anniversary of Pius IX's election as Pope, which provided Freiburg's Catholics with an early opportunity to display publicly their presence in the city and to offset some of the hostile rhetoric that they had endured during the last six months. Although these celebrations took place throughout the state, since Freiburg was the site of the Archdiocese, the city staged the largest and most important celebration. On June 14, *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt* (FKK)

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<sup>50</sup> See for instance *Freiburger Zeitung*, June 16, 1871.

published a long article outlining the importance of this commemoration. After surveying some of the festivities that were planned throughout Germany, the paper turned to the upcoming events in Freiburg and the importance of publicly celebrating this occasion. The article claimed that though it was self-explanatory that every pious Catholic would honor Pius IX on this day, people should be aware that at the present time, Catholics needed to display their affections for the Church and Pope in a distinctly public manner. Not only had the Pope experienced hardships during the last year, but he had also been distraught at news from Freiburg about the behavior of Protestants and liberal Catholics. To assure him that the city still remained strongly Catholic, Freiburgers needed to display their loyalty in the streets as well as inside the churches.<sup>51</sup>

Catholics deemed the three-day observance a great success. Thousands participated in various celebrations, and their public presence made it evident that though the German government refused to correct the injustices done to the Pope, south German Catholics were unwavering in their support. By partaking in religious services, various types of processions, concerts, and theatrical performances, Catholics in Freiburg displayed that their definition of German national identity had room for loyalty to the Pope. Not surprisingly, Protestants and liberals heavily criticized this celebration, claiming that it only served as further proof what all good Germans already knew—that there is no such thing as a loyal German Catholic.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, June 14, 1871.

<sup>52</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, June 21, 23, 1871.

During summer 1871, new debates emerged in Freiburg concerning the role of the Catholics in the Franco-Prussian War. The more distant the conflict, the more Protestants and liberals tended to “forget” Catholic efforts in the war and instead focused on their allegedly traitorous behavior. Part of their attempts to control the memory of the war, Protestants and liberals ignored the official recognition that various Catholic institutions received for their efforts. In August 1871, Luise, the wife of Grand Duke Friedrich I, traveled to Freiburg to honor the volunteer work of the Sisters of Mercy. In a well-publicized ceremony, she placed a cross on their building and spoke with respect of the important contributions of the nuns.<sup>53</sup> A few days later, the liberal newspaper *Karlsruhe Zeitung* published a lead article arguing that, during the last few years, Baden’s Catholics had proven useless in the defense of the fatherland. Disloyal to their Emperor and without true love for the German *Heimat*, Badenese Catholics had been more of a burden than an asset in the recent war.<sup>54</sup> Catholic newspapers were outraged at these accusations, and Stephan Braun, one of Freiburg’s leading Catholics, published an article in which he encouraged Protestants and liberals to question Luise concerning this matter--she would set the record straight. In addition, he recounted the activities of the Malteser order in painstaking detail. Braun listed every conceivable statistic regarding the monks’ activities during the war, from how many volunteered as doctors and nurses to the number of bandages

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<sup>53</sup> *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, August, 2, 1871.

<sup>54</sup> *Karlsruhe Zeitung*, August 5, 1871.

they applied.<sup>55</sup> Determined not to let Protestants and liberals exclude them from the memory of the war, Catholics took care to refute the false claims that the former used in their attempts to control the commemorative discourse.

### **The Construction of the *Siegesdenkmal***

Although Protestants and Catholics clashed over several different issues in conjunction with the commemoration of unification, the construction of monuments constituted perhaps the most important means of publicly negotiating their identities. Indeed, with the possible exception of the controversies surrounding Sedan Day, the planning and construction of the *Siegesdenkmal* in Freiburg was the most important commemorative effort in Freiburg. Although it is evident that though the planning and construction of this monument first and foremost reflect how residents of Freiburg, irrespective of confession, used this monument to combat the Prusso-centered national identity emerging from Berlin, the discourse surrounding the statue also provides indications of how the city's Catholics manifested their identities. Indeed, that the monument allowed Freiburgers to integrate into the Second Empire by maintaining their local and regional identities indicates how resistant the majority of Badenens were to accept the means of nation building emanating from Berlin. In the end, this resistance made it easier for Catholics to accept at least parts of this particular commemorative discourse.

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<sup>55</sup> *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, August 28, 1871.

After the proclamation of the Reich, the citizens of Freiburg began to address the issue of commemorating the recent historic events.<sup>56</sup> It became evident in early discussions that the memory of the Franco-Prussian War would be commemorated to help maintain local-regional loyalties as the southwest Germans were integrated into the new Reich. On January 23, members of the *Bürgerausschuss* met to consider whether to honor General Werder by making him an honorary citizen of the city.<sup>57</sup> These discussions were similar to others throughout the German lands, where committees took analogous initiatives in the wake of the nationalist exhilaration that accompanied the military victory and unification. Following initial deliberations, however, the members of the *Bürgerausschuss* agreed that rather than limit celebrations to Freiburg, it would be more appropriate to include all the major cities in southern Baden in the commemorative effort. Their logic was simple: since the brave actions of Werder and his men had saved the Badenese state from invasion and subsequent destruction by the French, the entire region needed to display gratefulness towards the troops.<sup>58</sup> The more people who participated, the greater the significance of the project.<sup>59</sup>

The *Bürgerausschuss* sent a memorandum to several cities in south Baden, asking for donations to provide Werder with a ceremonial sword and a small gratuity

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<sup>56</sup> St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/3, protocol from *Bürgerausschuss* meeting, January 23, 1871.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> The term “*Badische Oberland*” refers to the southwestern part of the state.

<sup>59</sup> St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/3, protocol from *Bürgerausschuss* meeting, January 23, 1871.

for each participating soldier. Most communities responded positively; some even included a donation with their answer.<sup>60</sup> Many offered suggestions about what might be another appropriate form of honoring Werder and his troops. From the outset of this initiative, however, it was evident that not everyone agreed on the meaning and value of the commemorative effort. For instance, the town council of St. Blasien, whose members were all conservative Catholics, immediately condemned the proposed monument as a waste of money. Council members declared themselves willing to donate only if the local soldiers were to receive some compensation from the new German nation-state, for which they had so valiantly risked their lives. The ultramontane Catholic city councils in Triberg and Breisach also opposed spending money on anything other than aiding the veterans. Instead of constructing a monument, they argued that funds should provide assistance to wounded war veterans to help them cope with life after the war. In their replies, all three cities made references to the recent Austro-Prussian War. The St. Blasien council expressed dissatisfaction that the veterans of 1866 had not been honored in the same manner as those of the more recent war, although they also had risked their lives to protect their fatherland. Triberg echoed these sentiments, pointing out that many veterans of 1866 had experienced economic difficulties when they returned to civilian life.<sup>61</sup> Not only did the differing opinions demonstrate that even the seemingly most homogeneous

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<sup>60</sup> St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/5. See for instance the answer from Kandern, February 7, 1871.

<sup>61</sup> St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/5, letters to the *Bürgerausschuss* from Breisach, February 9; Lörrach, February 11; and Triberg, February 16, 1871.

local-regional commemorative discourse could be contested but also how differently many Catholics viewed the process of unification compared to the official nationalist discourse.

In the popular Protestant-Prussian memory of unification, the three wars against Denmark, Austria, and France constituted an almost ideal way to achieve unity. According to the official discourse, Germans had been divided for centuries, until the threat of external enemies brought them together in joint defense of their common fatherland. Baden's Catholics found this ideological message impossible to accept for several reasons. First and foremost, they had fought with the Austrians in 1866. Although the liberal government and Grand Duke Friedrich I had hoped to join a Prussian-led unification up until the outbreak of war, the overwhelming majority of the Badenese population supported Austria. It should be pointed out that not until the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War did most Badenese abandon their hopes for an inclusion of Austria in a unified Germany. Consequently, Badenese Catholics were unable to accept the notion that the war of 1866 constituted a logical step on the road to unification. Their criticisms of the failure of the official commemorative discourse to recognize the efforts of courageous Badenese who had supported their fellow Austro-German Catholics illustrated the different collective memory that they had of unification. Badenese Protestants, on the other hand, most of whom had supported the philo-prussian policies of the Grand Duke, Roggenbach, and Lamey, simply suppressed the Austro-Prussian War in their construction of the memory of unification. Baden's Catholics were also critical of the fact that the official

commemorative discourse declared that Germans, in a similar fashion to 1870, had defended their fatherland in 1866. The term “fatherland” meant something entirely different to the Catholics in Freiburg and the Breisgau, which had belonged to the Habsburg Monarchy for several centuries before 1806, than it did to other Germans. As part of their opposition to the construction of the *Siegesdenkmal*, some Freiburg Catholics reminded members of the *Bürgerausschuss* that if the veterans of 1870-1871 were commemorated with a monument, attempts should be made to include the veterans of 1866 in this discourse as well.<sup>62</sup>

The members of the Bonndorf town council first voiced the idea of constructing a monument in one of the larger cities in the area to commemorate recent events. Freiburg, a city that had housed a garrison, would be the logical choice.<sup>63</sup> On February 19, representatives from the major Badenese cities met in Freiburg and decided to go ahead with the construction.<sup>64</sup> The Freiburg city council formed a committee with the task of overseeing the planning and construction of the monument. Most of the members of this body came from the city council itself. However, other important local personalities, such as Mayor Carl Schuster, council members Carl Mez and Adolph Wagner, retired Lieutenant von Boeck, and privy councilor Alexander

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<sup>62</sup> St. AF, Denkmäler/3. This was discussed in a meeting on March 10, 1871.

<sup>63</sup> St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/5, letter to the *Bürgerausschuss* from Bonndorf, February 7, 1871.

<sup>64</sup> This decision was made after a request from several communities in the northern part of the state. The latter thought that if they were to donate money to the project, they should be allowed to participate in the organizational work. St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/2/2.



Ecker were also included.<sup>65</sup> The composition of the committee ensured that almost all important sectors of bourgeois society were represented, including industrialists, politicians, and military officials. Members of the city council made a conscious effort to form a committee that would command respect from the population of both city and state. There was no dearth of potential candidates; many members of the rising bourgeoisie were eager to perform their civic duty publicly, thus establishing themselves as important actors in the local community during the last half of the nineteenth century. Voluntary associations such as this committee became tools of bourgeois emancipation and self-affirmation.<sup>66</sup> Since the majority of the city's bourgeoisie was either Protestant, liberal Catholic, or about to become Old Catholic, the committee did not truly represent the population of the city, the vast majority of which consisted of conservative Catholics.

From the outset of this project, it was evident that the *Siegesdenkmal* would be employed to facilitate integration into the nation-state by maintaining the strength of local loyalties, which enabled Catholic acceptance of parts of its ideological message. In March, the organizing committee sent a *Dankadress* to General Werder, signed by the mayors of the largest cities in Baden. The text of this document indicates how the construction of the memory of this still recent war was adopted to fit the local context. It recounted the major victories of the German Army while stressing the grave danger

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<sup>65</sup> St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/5. The selection of the committee was finalized on March 6, 1871.

<sup>66</sup> See for instance Geoff Eley, "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century," in *Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory*, eds. Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley, and Sherry B. Ortner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 302-304.

that Baden had faced during the conflict. “In the days between January 15 and 17, our people waited anxiously as the enemy, three times as strong and hungry for revenge, attacked our army. It was our brothers and sons who formed the last line of defense....”<sup>67</sup> The text conveyed the notion that had it not been for the heroic efforts of Werder and his men, the French would have invaded the state. The national perspective was virtually excluded from the address, and the only time that it was mentioned was to illustrate how grateful the rest of Germany was towards the Badenese troops for winning the war. “Admiringly, the grateful eyes of all of Germany...went to General Werder, the re-conqueror of our Strassbourg, the savior of south Germany....”<sup>68</sup>

The campaign to collect donations from throughout the state began on June 22, 1871, when the committee published an official announcement. Like the *Dankadress*, this document stressed the important role played by the local troops, which under Werder’s heroic leadership had not only prevented the French from occupying Baden but had also delivered the final blow that caused the French to surrender.<sup>69</sup> Freiburg itself had already set the pace for the campaign by donating 5,000 Gulden.<sup>70</sup> The initial response to the announcement proved extraordinarily positive as donations came from every corner of the state. While many of the donations came from the

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<sup>67</sup> A copy of the letter can be found in St. AF, K1/28, Nachlass Schuster.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> The *Aufruf* can be found in St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/2/2.

<sup>70</sup> St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/2/2, protocol from *Bürgerausschuss*, February 28, 1871.

upper classes, the response from the middle classes was quite positive. Like their willingness to serve on organizing committees, the well-publicized generosity of the local bourgeoisie indicates their eagerness to use this project to establish themselves as important personalities in the community. Since *Honoratioren* still largely dominated politics, the Badenese bourgeoisie used various organizations, associations, and public projects to gain control of the public sphere in the Empire. The construction of monuments offered the bourgeoisie a context in which they could express their aspirations to social, cultural, political, and economic leadership in the Empire. In Freiburg, representatives of both *Bildungs-* and *Wirtschaftsbürgertum* dominated the process of planning and constructing the *Siegesdenkmal*.<sup>71</sup>

The presence of local members of the bourgeoisie in these projects was not uncommon throughout Germany, and certainly not in Baden either. As scholars have pointed out, Baden possessed an active bourgeoisie that participated to a great extent in the development and administration of their cities. Indeed, even in smaller towns, both Catholic and Protestant bourgeoisie used city and commune administration as one of the most important means to heighten their importance in their communities. It is worth noting that though most of the members of the bourgeoisie were Protestant, Baden had a sizeable contingent of Catholics in this class as well. Because of many

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<sup>71</sup> For a discussion of the *Bürgertum* and its relation to the *Denkmalskultur*, see Wolfgang Hardtwig, *Nationalismus und Bürgerkultur* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994); idem, *Geschichtskultur und Wissenschaft* (München: Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, 1990). For a more general discussion on the *Bürgertum* and its role in Imperial Germany, see David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth Century Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Lothar Gall, *Bürgertum in Deutschland* (Berlin: Siedler, 1990); Jürgen Kocka, *Bürger und Bürgerlichkeit im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987).

reasons, one of the most important ones being that Baden did not employ primogeniture, the state had a relatively large pool of citizens who aspired to become part of the *Bürgertum*. Despite the sometimes harsh conflicts with the Catholic Church, certain Catholics were part of this group. To be sure, many of them left the Church; however, many still remained active Catholics.<sup>72</sup>

One of the favored means of collecting donations was to organize events such as concerts and plays whose proceeds would be donated to the monument fund.<sup>73</sup> The committee also publicized the names of the people who had contributed, often including the exact amount of the donation.<sup>74</sup> Members of the Freiburg city council devised a particularly ingenious way to collect money for the *Siegesdenkmal*. In November 1872, they decided to compensate those who had housed soldiers and/or refugees during the war. Those offered this money, however, were encouraged to refrain from collecting it, instead having it directly transferred to the monument's fund.<sup>75</sup> The publicity associated with a large donation could of course turn negative if an individual or community did not contribute as much as contemporaries expected of them. When members of the Konstanz city council initially declined to participate in the campaign, claiming that they had their hands full trying to collect enough money

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<sup>72</sup> Heilbronner, "In search of the (Rural) Catholic Bourgeoisie," 175-200; Hein, "Badisches Bürgertum," 65-96.

<sup>73</sup> St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/3.

<sup>74</sup> Local newspapers often published detailed lists complete with names and amount donated. See for instance *Freiburger Zeitung*, October 11, 1871.

<sup>75</sup> The announcement to encourage people to donate the money that they were about to receive was published on November 21, 1871. St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/3.

to build their own monument, Freiburg city council members criticized them, pointing out that there were other cities in the same situation that had still graciously donated large sums of money for the Freiburg monument.<sup>76</sup> Although the Konstanzer city council certainly could afford to contribute a small amount to the monument in Freiburg, the fact that they were unwilling to do so is noteworthy. This dispute points to the multifaceted web of loyalties that the citizens of the Second German Empire had to sort through when integrating into the new nation-state and how difficult it sometimes could be to forge even regional identities.<sup>77</sup>

When the committee met again in late September 1871, members drafted the invitation to the competition to decide who would construct the monument.<sup>78</sup> Committee members initially disagreed whether they should limit the competition to Badenese artists and sculptors only. They eventually decided to allow artists from the entire Reich to participate, primarily because a national competition would increase the status of the monument. The competition announcement detailed what the monument should illustrate, though artists were left with some room for their own interpretation of the recent events: "...a main part containing an allegorical figure or a

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<sup>76</sup> St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/3., letter from the city council of Konstanz to the organization committee in Freiburg, May 26, 1871. Also, answer from the organization committee to the city council in Konstanz, May 29, 1871. Apparently, the city of Konstanz decided that the publicity would be too negative and eventually donated 84 Gulden. See also pages 103-104 in Chapter 2.

<sup>77</sup> It should also be noted that Konstanz was not the only city to complain about having to donate money to this project. The mayors of Mannheim and Karlsruhe were both initially quite unwilling to organize donation drives in their cities. The mayor of Karlsruhe repeatedly stressed that it was going to be difficult to contribute money to the monument in Freiburg. St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/3, letter from the mayor of Karlsruhe to the organizing committee, February 10, 1872.

<sup>78</sup> This invitation is dated "October of 1871" and can be found in St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/5.

group of figures representing the successful defense of south Germany and especially the Badenese lands...<sup>79</sup> As in the *Dankaddress* to Werder, the committee stressed the local-regional rather than the national-dynastic perspective of the war and subsequent unification. Since the monument was to be a permanent site of memory, the committee wanted to ensure that the memory constructed would facilitate maintenance of local-regional loyalties while also permitting the integrating of Badeners into the Empire on their own terms. The committee set a May 1, 1872, deadline for submissions. In order to confirm and stress the notion that this was to be a popular monument, the invitation declared that all artists had to submit a model of the proposal, which was to be publicly exhibited. The jury would consist of five well-known German artists.<sup>80</sup>

The committee decided to exhibit the twenty best proposals in Freiburg's art museum from May 12 to June 9, 1872.<sup>81</sup> To honor the occasion, the museum was richly decorated with flowers, wreaths, paintings, and busts of Bismarck, Moltke, Friedrich I, and Wilhelm I and others.<sup>82</sup> Judging by the efforts that the organizers made to create an environment filled with patriotic symbols, they were aware of the importance that people attached to these symbols and their roles in the process of identity formation.

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> According to Ute Scherb, the jury consisted of art professors Semper, Magnus, Hähnel, Lübke and Knecht. Ute Scherb, *Das Freiburger Siegesdenkmal—ein badischer Alleingang?* (Freiburg: Unpublished master's thesis, University of Freiburg, 1990), 72.

<sup>81</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, May, 25, 1872.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

The public took great interest in the exhibit. Over 5,000 people attended, which, considering that Freiburg only had 30,000 inhabitants, was a remarkable number. The committee made a nice profit, which it applied towards the cost of the monument. Most of the models were variations on the same theme: a triumphant Germania, illustrating the strength and greatness of the German nation. A few artists attempted to portray the complex relationship between Baden and the new nation-state by including both Germania and Badenia in their monuments. For the duration of the exhibit, the local public opinion was preoccupied with the evaluation of the merits and flaws of the models, and the citizens of Freiburg enthusiastically offered a variety of criticisms. According to newspapers, none of the models was able to excite the public with a proper visual representation of the Franco-Prussian War and the unification of the Reich. The most common complaint was that the models placed too much emphasis on the national perspective.<sup>83</sup> All of the monuments that centered on Germania, regardless of their overall artistic quality, were criticized for failing to consider the important aspects of the Badenese history and the major role that Baden and its Grand Duke had played in the unification process.<sup>84</sup>

Local citizens and the press accused even those artists who had included Badenia in their models of having misunderstood the real relationship between Badenia and Germania.<sup>85</sup> In these models, the former was too passive and seemed to

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<sup>83</sup> See for instance *Freiburger Zeitung*, May 28, 1872.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> *Breisgauer Zeitung*, June 8, 1872.

be in a subordinate role to the latter. There was particular criticism of the few models where it appeared as if Germania was offering protection to Badenia. The public maintained that due to the prominent role that Baden and its soldiers had played in unification, the reverse would better represent the true nature of the relationship between the local and national. Any other type of symbolism would constitute a distortion of the facts and provide a false account of both the Franco-Prussian War and the unification process.<sup>86</sup> This alleged misrepresentation of events proved a sore point for liberals, conservatives, Catholics, and Protestants alike, and the discourse surrounding these models provided an outlet for some of the frustrations that people, despite their nationalist rhetoric, experienced during the unification process. Commentators often pointed out that the people of the city and the state had no interest in commemorating how the mighty Germania saved the weaker and dependent Badenia from the grasp of the French. Not only was this an incorrect account of events, but it also implied that the state of Baden was in a submissive position to the rest of Germany in the new Reich.<sup>87</sup>

Such sentiments can be partly traced to the fact that Baden was the only one of the three southern states that conceded almost all of its demands in negotiations with Bismarck during the last months of 1870. Both Württemberg and Bavaria proved more resistant to the demands of the future Chancellor, which in the end provided

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<sup>86</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, May 29, 1872.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*



them a larger degree of autonomy in the new Empire than Baden received.<sup>88</sup> This issue was sensitive to many Badeners, and they often complained that their state was neglected in both the economic and political realms compared to other German states.<sup>89</sup> Therefore, it became even more important for citizens of the state to make sure that they maintained control over their public space. Many argued that an unconditional acceptance of the ideological message of the official commemorative discourse that emerged from the center would be unacceptable. These people on the margins of the Empire were not prepared to concede control of their public space in favor of the Prussian-dominated national symbolism that stressed the importance of the Hohenzollern family and Emperor Wilhelm I. Control of their local public space became a way of asserting their own identities and counteracting the political, economic, and cultural hegemony that accompanied the official commemorative discourse. As John Bodnar has pointed out, the creation of public memory “help[s] a public or society understand both its past and its present, and by implication, its future.”<sup>90</sup> The construction of a public memory ideally takes place in a public space, where it offers insights into structures of power in a society and questions of loyalty to various institutions. By insisting on constructing a monument that offered a regional interpretation of the process of unification, and by placing it in a prominent city such

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<sup>88</sup> Karl Bosl, “Die Verhandlungen über den Eintritt der süddeutschen Staaten in den Norddeutschen Bund und die Entstehung der Reichsverfassung,” in *Reichsgründung 1870/71*, eds., Duerlein and Schieder, 148-163. See also Gall, *Bismarck*, 447.

<sup>89</sup> Some of these ideas are discussed, albeit on a more local scale, in Zang, ed., *Provialisierung einer Region*. See also Haumann and Schadek, eds., *Geschichte der Stadt Freiburg im Breisgau*, 199-200.

<sup>90</sup> John Bodnar, “Public Memory in an American City: Commemoration in Cleveland,” in *Commemorations*, ed. Gillis, 72.

as Freiburg, Badeners wanted to ensure that the importance of their role in the unification process as well as in the new Empire was made evident. Once again, these types of sentiments made it easier for conservative Catholics to partake in this project. Although few of Freiburg's conservative Catholics played an important role in the planning and construction of this monument, the knowledge that the statue's ideological message, though not in confessional terms, opposed the official nationalist rhetoric enabled ultramontanes to remain relatively neutral.

In their criticism of these models, most journalists were understanding of the faults of the artists. They noted that most of the participating artists lived outside Baden and had not experienced the horrors of the war and the threat of French invasion first-hand. Thus, they should not be judged too harshly for their failure to commemorate the war and the unification of the Reich properly.<sup>91</sup> Most used this argument as a further indication that it was all the more important for the people of Baden to describe and commemorate the events that had taken place in this area during the war in a proper manner. Otherwise, they ran the risk of being neglected in the overall narrative of the Franco-Prussian War. This fear proved unfounded as contemporary histories of the war included sufficient descriptions and analysis of the activities of Werder and his troops.<sup>92</sup> These discussions point to the value people placed on maintaining the originality and uniqueness of their region. During the planning and construction of the *Siegesdenkmal*, local citizens often expressed

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<sup>91</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, May 29, 1872.

<sup>92</sup> See for instance Fontane, *Der Krieg gegen Frankreich*, Vol. II, 714-726, 922-964.

contempt for Prussian descriptions of the dangers the German fatherland faced during the war, arguing that it was only the people of Baden who had the right to discuss the dangers of a potential French invasion.<sup>93</sup> This served to strengthen not only their regional identities, but also, because their region was the one exposed to the gravest danger during the war, which had called for a heroic defense of the fatherland, it enhanced Badeners' sense of importance.

Freiburg's proximity to the French border further complicated the acceptance of the commemorative discourse surrounding unification. This became evident in the public's criticism of these models as too degrading in their representation of the French. As previously discussed, the city's Catholics had already during the war opposed the defamation of the Catholic French. Although many Protestants and liberals had been quite harsh in their descriptions of the inabilities of the French troops during the war, they did not want this denigration to be displayed in such a permanent medium as a monument. Newspapers from across the political spectrum agreed that the city of Freiburg could not identify with an anti-French monument. Journalists pointed out that this monument was to be an integral part of the city for centuries to come, and though locals wanted to celebrate the victory of the war and the unification of the Reich, they had no desire to completely degrade their neighbors in the process.<sup>94</sup> People kept in mind the many years of fruitful cooperation that they had experienced in the past and hoped for in the future. Newspapers cited these opinions as evidence

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<sup>93</sup> See for instance *Breisgauer Zeitung*, June 6, 1872.

<sup>94</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, May 25, 1872.

of the cultured and sophisticated nature of the Badeners. To quote *Freiburger Zeitung*: “Our respect for humanity forbids us to humiliate publicly a neighboring state for hundreds of years to come.”<sup>95</sup> These sentiments reinforced Badeners sense of identity in a positive manner and set them aside from the “official” national identity that made frequent use of the French *Other*.<sup>96</sup>

After intense deliberations, the jury decided to award first prize to the relatively unknown artist Friedrich Moest from Karlsruhe.<sup>97</sup> The choice of an unsung, but local, artist caused much speculation in the newspapers over the fairness of the competition. Journalists agreed that there were other models that were far superior to Moest’s. And although the jury was supposed to have made its decision without knowledge of the identity of the participating artists, people surmised that Moest had been awarded first price because he was from Karlsruhe.<sup>98</sup> The jury also submitted a long list of details that needed to be altered before the final construction of the monument.<sup>99</sup> To be sure, it was not uncommon for a jury to offer suggestions for the improvement of a winning model. In this case, however, the list of recommended changes was more extensive than usual. The fact that a Badenese artist won the

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, May 25, 1872.

<sup>97</sup> St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/5, announcement from the jury, May 29, 1872. For a brief sketch on Moest’s career, see Brigitte Mayer, “Friedrich Moest,” in *Denkmäler, Brunnen und Freiplastiken in Karlsruhe*, ed. Gerlinde Brandenburger, (Karlsruhe: Badenia, 1987), 686.

<sup>98</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, June 2, 1872.

<sup>99</sup> St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/5, announcement from the jury, May 29, 1872.


competition indicates that the committee wanted to ensure that the *Siegesdenkmal* would present local-regional loyalties in an appropriate manner. In general, the people of Freiburg were not too critical of the winning entry, but they did not display great enthusiasm for it either. Most seemed to have accepted Moest's model as perhaps not the greatest piece of art, but one which contained no incorrect or offending symbolism.

Moest envisioned a fifteen-meter monument, consisting of a five-meter bronze statue of Victoria atop a ten-meter pedestal (fifty percent granite and fifty percent iron;<sup>100</sup> see Figure 1). The selection of Victoria as the major figure for this monument indicates the difficulties that accompanied the symbolic issue. As noted above, many artists' choice of Germania drew criticism for placing too much emphasis on the national perspective. Artists also faced the problem that Badenia was relatively unknown as a symbol, which meant that many viewers would have difficulties understanding the allegorical message of the monument. The relative dearth of local-regional symbols suggests another difficulty that people encountered when trying to imagine the region. By choosing Victoria, Moest simply avoided most of these thorny issues while still using a symbol that resonated with the vast majority of the population as representing German might and power.

Moest's statute focuses on the figure of Victoria, who, holding a laurel wreath, stands atop a globe, symbolizing the rise of the German nation to the top of the world. Victoria's solemn gaze is directed downward to the soldiers below her, leaving the impression that even in this triumphant moment, she is mourning the lives lost. Both

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<sup>100</sup> For a detailed description of the monument, see Scherb, *Das Freiburger Siegesdenkmal*, 77-80.



Das Siegesdenkmal zu Freiburg i. B.

Figure 1. The *Siegesdenkmal* in Freiburg. (Reprinted from Otto Funke. *Das Siegesdenkmal zu Freiburg im Breisgau*. Freiburg: Lauber & Mehlhase, 1877).

her hair and clothes seem to be flowing in the wind, providing the notion of her body in forward motion. These details leave little doubt that Moest wanted to express the forward motion of the Empire as it assumed its place as one of the dominant powers in the newly industrializing world. Below the globe upon which Victoria is standing, four soldiers, a gunner, an infantry man, a man with a rifle, and a militia man, are positioned. By clothing two of them (the militia man and the soldier with the rifle) in Prussian uniforms and the other two in Badenese uniforms, it might appear as if Moest struck a “proper” balance between the regional and national perspective. However, upon closer examination, the picture becomes more complicated. The militia man and the soldier with the rifle are clearly the more passive and defensive of the soldiers. Despite looking courageous, they both seem to be hesitant and waiting for assistance. Both the gunner and the infantry man, however, appear to be active, strong, and determined. This symbolism illustrates how the artist wanted the public to view and remember the events of the war. The majority of symbols on the monument illustrate an extraordinary role played by Baden in the unification process, reflecting the alleged impossibility of achieving such a glorious victory over the French had it not been for the valiant efforts of the Badenese troops.

Aware that his monument also needed to reflect some form of national-dynastic loyalties, Moest also included references to Emperor and Reich. On the middle of the foundation, he placed a plaque containing the text of the telegram that Wilhelm I sent to the Empress after the battle of Belfort.<sup>101</sup> In Baden, because of its

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

emphasis on the local soldiers, this telegram was often employed in the commemorative discourse that surrounded the Franco-Prussian War and unification. On almost any anniversary of either the battle at Belfort or the proclamation of the Reich, liberal newspapers reprinted it to remind citizens of the elation that had accompanied this event.<sup>102</sup> Despite its national-dynastic connotations, however, this telegram also reinforced the notion that the victory of the Fourteenth Army Corps had been of utmost importance for the overall campaign. Consequently, even when addressing the national perspective, the symbolism of the monument enabled locals to construct their national identity and express loyalty to Wilhelm I by stressing the importance of their local identities.

Below the telegram was an imperial crown, one of the symbols that drew public criticism. Many complained that two symbols of Reich and Emperor were too many and that it was a shame that the “great” General Werder was not represented on the front of the monument.<sup>103</sup> The committee had intense discussions about what to place on the sides of the pedestal. A variety of ideas were examined before the committee members finally elected to place the imperial crown on the prestigious front side.<sup>104</sup> These discussions continued after the statue was unveiled as locals voiced their displeasure that Werder did not occupy the most prominent spot on the pedestal. Largely as a result of popular pressure, members of the city council decided

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<sup>102</sup> See for instance *Freiburger Zeitung*, January 21, 1872.

<sup>103</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, June 2, 1872.

<sup>104</sup> St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/2/2, protocol from committee meeting, April 21, 1875.



to replace the imperial crown with a bust of the General following Werder's retirement in 1879.<sup>105</sup> Residents of the city as well as of the rest of the state expressed satisfaction upon learning of this change. Once again, this leaves little doubt as to what aspects of the monument the public deemed worthy of emphasizing, and it also indicates that even after the Second Empire had been in existence for almost a decade, the people of Baden were still not willing to concede completely their regional loyalties in favor of national-dynastic ones.

The fact that the battles around Belfort were the last major ones in the war played a role in creating the notion that they had been the decisive ones for the outcome of the war. When constructing this memory, locals often ignored basic facts. It was certainly true that Werder and his troops had survived a hefty challenge during those critical days in January 1871. Considering, however, the overall context of the war, the local population exaggerated the importance of the efforts of the Badenese troops. In reality, Werder and his soldiers had experienced serious difficulties towards the end of the battle. Had they not received assistance from General Edwin von Mantteuffel and his Prussian troops, the Fourteenth Corps would probably not have captured Belfort.<sup>106</sup> Local contemporary accounts almost completely ignored the role of the Prussians. As the planning of the *Siegesdenkmal* progressed, locals overlooked

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<sup>105</sup> St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/5. This decision was made in a city council meeting on April 29, 1879.

<sup>106</sup> Howard, *Franco-Prussian War*, 424-427. He points out that though Mantteuffel did not offer much direct assistance to Werder, the fact that the former was approaching the battlefield with thousands of Prussian soldiers broke the spirit and resolve of the French army.

Mantteuffel's involvement to an even greater extent.<sup>107</sup> An even more remarkable example of inventing traditions was the attempt to make General Werder, in reality a Prussian, into a Badener who had answered the call of his fatherland and valiantly fought off the French attacks.<sup>108</sup>

One of the persistent voices opposing the view of the war that the monument presented was that of Freiburg military historian Friedrich von der Wengen. Beginning in January 1872, he wrote several letters to the organizing committee, arguing that the commemorative discourse offered a distorted account of the recent events. Citing both French and German sources indicating that the heroics of Werder's troops had been considerably exaggerated, he argued that if Mantteuffel had not arrived with his Prussian troops to support the Fourteenth Army Corps, it would have been defeated in the battles around Belfort. Thus, von der Wengen argued that Mantteuffel deserved to be honored rather than Werder.

The correspondence grew increasingly hostile after several of the military historian's letters were published in the *Oberrheinischer Courier*, providing von der Wengen with a public forum for his views. The national-liberal *Freiburger Zeitung* refused to discuss this controversy, realizing how the constructed memory of the war could be tarnished if the public arena for Wengen's views was expanded. The organizing committee continued to dispute his arguments, even though they were

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<sup>107</sup> The actions of Mantteuffel and his troops were never discussed in any of the otherwise very detailed descriptions of the battles that the newspapers offered. See for instance *Freiburger Zeitung*, January, 17, 1872.

<sup>108</sup> *Oberrheinischer Courier*, May 25, 1872.

never able to refute his claims properly. The committee was unable to make the kinds of changes to the monument that von der Wengen was demanding since they would have shifted the focus of the monument from the regional towards the national perspective. This conflict continued until October 1872, when the committee simply stopped responding to von der Wengen's letters.<sup>109</sup>

### **Other Catholic Manifestations of Their National Identity**

While the construction of the monument would take another three years, Freiburg's Catholics were involved in other instances of intense contestation of their national identity. As the Badenese *Kulturkampf* resumed in 1872 and 1873, this time intensified by a full-scale national one as well, the city's Catholics came under increased pressure. In 1873, in a similar fashion to the celebration of Pius IX in 1871, Freiburg's Catholics took advantage of the centenary celebration of former Archbishop Hermann von Vicari's birth on May 13 to stake public claim to the city. As one of the main leaders of the Catholic revival after 1850, Vicari was a revered symbol of the strength of the Catholic Church. Because of his close ties to the city, inhabitants of Freiburg and surrounding areas were especially keen to treasure his memory and were determined to use this celebration to showcase their appreciation of his efforts for the Church. The Catholic press once again reminded people that given

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<sup>109</sup> The correspondence can be found in St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/2/2. See also *Oberrheinischer Courier*, July 16, October 3, 4, 1872.

the current situation it was crucial that they take these celebrations to the streets.<sup>110</sup> Since this commemoration took place only a few days after the passing of the May laws, Catholics were under heavy pressure throughout the Reich. In addition to stressing the need for Catholics to display their strength, the Catholic press also published excerpts from the Archbishop's diary describing his house arrest in 1854. It was no coincidence that these passages were chosen. Since the initiation of the *Kultorexamen* in 1867, an ever-increasing number of Catholic priests had been arrested. The so called *Sperrlinge*, who were forced to carry out their activities in secrecy and under constant threat of discovery, needed encouragement to maintain their resolve.<sup>111</sup> The centenary commemoration of Vicari's birth was a success as it attracted thousands of Catholics from the city and surrounding areas. Immediately after the passing of the harshest *Kulturkampf* laws, the celebration constituted an impressive display of Catholic unity and strength.

In 1875, Catholics in Freiburg and around the state took advantage of two opportunities to celebrate publicly their faith and sense of Germanness. On July 25, Wilhelm von Ketteler, one of the best-known German bishops, had his twenty-fifth anniversary as Bishop. Once again, the eagerness Catholics displayed as they embarked on the planning and celebrating of this commemoration indicates their resistance to the Protestant-based national identity. Most of these public celebrations were accompanied by harsh polemic in the press, both prior to and after the event. In

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<sup>110</sup> *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, May 14, 1873.

<sup>111</sup> *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, June 4, 1873.

the last weeks leading up to Ketteler's anniversary, the liberal *Badische Landeszeitung* and FKK engaged in a fierce debate regarding the importance of the Bishop to contemporary society.<sup>112</sup> The former attempted to downplay the significance of Ketteler to the Catholic cause while FKK answered by discussing in great detail all he had done for the Church. FKK placed much emphasis on Ketteler's great qualities as a human, which they claimed earned him respect among his enemies as well. This was a common trend throughout these debates, as Catholics often stressed the personal qualities of their own, claiming that the Catholic in question constituted a perfect example of a German. Their enemies, on the other hand, were mostly denigrated as shallow, egotistical, and unkind persons, representing a poor example of Germanness. Many times, these characterizations were conducted in national terms, indicating that the opponents of the Catholic cause were not really true Germans, whereas Catholics constituted the perfect embodiment of Germanness.<sup>113</sup>

As far as Ketteler's character was concerned, FKK pointed out that as a true man of God, members of the local and national community respected him. In conjunction with this celebration, the ever-present issue of papal infallibility was once again brought to the forefront of the debate. In an attempt to disgrace Ketteler, Protestants and Old Catholics claimed that prior to the Vatican Council he had been opposed to the notion of infallibility. Ketteler refuted these allegations by admitting

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<sup>112</sup> *Badische Landeszeitung*, June 26, 28, 1875; *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, July 21, 1875.

<sup>113</sup> An excellent example of this can be found in *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, August 11, 1873, where Vicari is seen as an exemplary German while Bismarck is heavily criticized for embodying all the flaws of the German national character.

that he had initially expressed some concerns about certain aspects of the notion of infallibility. As soon as the Council made its decision however, he unconditionally accepted it. This was the main difference between himself (and in the end, every good Catholic) and the Old Catholics and Protestants, who incorrectly believed that they could challenge the decisions of the highest clergy.<sup>114</sup>

Also in 1875, as the host of the General Assembly of Germany's Catholics (*Generalversammlung der Katholiken Deutschlands*), Freiburg and the Catholics of Baden had another opportunity to manifest their strength. This annual event constituted a highlight for Catholics throughout Germany and neighboring countries. Almost every Catholic newspaper carried extensive coverage of the congress, commenting on the debates and the decisions made. The local Catholic press covered the meetings in great detail, often including complete transcripts of the discussions. The Catholics of Freiburg were determined to take advantage of this opportunity to prove themselves worthy hosts of this event, just as Catholics in Konstanz had embraced the anniversary of the birth of the Holy Konrad in 1876 to manifest publicly their presence in their city. Prior to the congress, people were encouraged to participate in as many proceedings as possible, to ensure that the rest of Germany would witness the strength and vitality of the Catholic community. An event of this magnitude was tremendously important to the Catholics in Freiburg as it provided them with an opportunity to control the city's public space. During the several days that the congress lasted, the city was overwhelmed by Catholics who completely

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<sup>114</sup> *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, August 11, 1875.

dominated the urban landscape. Indirectly addressing this issue, on September 1, 1875, *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt* published a long letter from Pius IX to the organizing committee, expressing his delight that Freiburg hosted that year's congress. He encouraged people to gather strength from the presence of other Catholics, which was even more important in these times when liberal regimes in Germany and Europe constantly attacked Catholics.<sup>115</sup>

As opening day drew nearer, masses of Catholics arrived in the city. Contemporaries estimated the number of participants at over 2,000, most of them Germans, but with a fair number of French, Austrian, and Swiss delegates as well. The main events took place in the *Festhalle*, which was the only building large enough to hold all the delegates. Auxiliary Bishop Lothar von Kübel gave the opening speech, in which he outlined the importance of these meetings as means of increasing the strength and unity of Catholics. Besides stressing the value of having so many Catholics gathered in one place, he focused most of his speech on the latest educational reforms at the hands of the liberal government.<sup>116</sup>

In the following speech, Bishop Ketteler provided a good example of how German Catholics viewed themselves and their role in contemporary Germany. Not surprisingly, he was extremely critical of the liberal regime in power, claiming that there was nothing liberal about it--members of the liberal movement were absolutists, just as Louis XIV had been an absolutist ruler in France. Ketteler expressed dismay

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<sup>115</sup> See *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, September 1, 9, 1875.

<sup>116</sup> *Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt*, September 9, 1875.

that liberals based their idea of the modern state on the notion that they could form human beings through application of secular laws. He attacked the liberal argument that schools needed to be reformed to provide for a more nationally integrated and better educated population, claiming that the removal of religious influences in the schools would bring disastrous consequences. In his criticisms, Ketteler revealed how differently Catholics viewed the construction of a nationally conscious population. While most liberals viewed these reforms as prerequisites for a successful transition to a modernized nation-state, Catholics were more inclined to embrace an older version of national identity that stressed ties to the past. Furthermore, Ketteler sharply criticized the notion that the state could shape its citizens. In Ketteler's view, this constituted blasphemy as it seemed to imply that the modern state was assuming the role of God. This argument was a recurring one in Catholic criticisms of the modern state; they often accused liberals of placing entirely too much faith in the powers of the modern state and failing to recognize the important role that religion had to play in the modern society.

Ketteler also took issue with liberal claims that the deregulation of trade and commerce had increased the freedom of Germans. He maintained that one just had to look at the dismal conditions of the factory workers to realize that this was not true. He also addressed the recent economic crash by using a nationalist vocabulary. Claiming that Catholics have always been true to the German fatherland, he argued that the liberal entrepreneurs who caused the recent economic downturn were the true enemies of the fatherland. These liberals had no concern for their fellow Germans, but



instead were only interested in increasing their own fortunes, which in the end caused tremendous suffering to the German nation.<sup>117</sup>

The president of the congress, Freiherr von Bamboldt, gave one of the most important speeches of the event. Briefly outlining some of the major events of the last century, he noted that the last few decades had not been kind to the Catholics, or to any confession for that matter. There had been more wars, more revolutions, more shifts of power than ever before. In his speech, Bamboldt made a comment that was immediately seized upon by his enemies as proof that Catholics were not interested in bringing Germany to the forefront of European politics. Bamboldt stated that though life was simple in the Middle Ages, at least back then people were pious, and they all believed in one God, whom they obeyed. The ruling kings and popes maintained a good grip on their respective power and rarely fought over who would control which aspects of society. During the last century, however, the constant struggles between the church and secular leaders had contributed to an increasingly chaotic and degenerate society, in which individualism and egocentrism constitute the ruling virtues.<sup>118</sup> Both local and national Protestant-liberal press attacked these statements, which they claimed served as irrefutable proof that the influence of the Catholic Church needed to be even further reduced if Germany were to claim its place in the sun.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, September 15, 1875.

Despite the criticism that some of the speeches attracted in Protestant-liberal circles, the Catholics in Freiburg were very pleased with the outcome of the congress. For several days, Catholics, who grew ever more determined to refute the claims that they did not constitute true Germans, dominated the city's public space. To be sure, sentiments such as the ones expressed by Bamboldt illustrated that Catholics, aided by their own interpretation of the German past, subscribed to different notions of Germanness. That did not, however, make them less national than their Protestant countrymen and women.

### **Completion and Unveiling of the *Siegesdenkmal***

During all of these debates, the men responsible for the construction of the *Siegesdenkmal* continued their work. During late 1875, discussions over the location of the monument delayed the construction for a few months. In spring 1876, the committee began to push hard for an unveiling during the late summer or early fall.<sup>120</sup> The main reason for their hurry was that Wilhelm I and other members of the Hohenzollern family often visited the spa in Baden-Baden during the summer, a stay that this year included the celebration of the Empress's birthday on September 29. Keeping in mind that Baden-Baden was only a few hours away, the committee members considered their chances of securing the presence of the Emperor and any other family members at the unveiling to be much greater during the early fall, before the return to Berlin. Already in a letter to Moest in April 1876, the committee stressed

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<sup>120</sup> St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/2/2. The letter to Moest was sent on April 29, 1876.

the importance of completing the monument before a proposed date in early October since that would greatly enhance the possibility of an imperial presence at the unveiling.<sup>121</sup>

The organizing committee was well aware that Wilhelm I often attended these types of ceremonies, making him the premier consumer of the monument culture that emerged in Germany. Wilhelm I was convinced that he needed to undertake many trips within his Empire to manifest both his own legitimacy and that of the nation-state. His role as a consumer of this culture not only lent legitimacy to it, but it also helped popularize the persona of the Emperor.<sup>122</sup> The committee was elated when he accepted their invitation, though he was sorry to inform them that due to poor health, his wife would not accompany him to Freiburg.<sup>123</sup>

On August 18, 1876, a committee was formed to plan the unveiling ceremony. Invitations were sent out to selected dignitaries, including Wilhelm I, Grand Duke Friedrich I, General Werder, Bismarck, Moltke, and Mantteuffel. Werder agreed to attend the ceremony on the condition that he would not be its focus, which indicates that the location of the ideological emphasis of the monument was no secret.<sup>124</sup> In addition to figures of national prominence, the committee invited all of Baden's

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<sup>121</sup> On August 1, the committee finalized October 3, 1876, as the date for the unveiling after consulting with both Lenz and Moest. St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/2/2.

<sup>122</sup> Koshar, *From Monuments to Traces*, 24-25.

<sup>123</sup> St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/2/2, letter from the Office of the Emperor to the organization committee, August 27, 1876.

<sup>124</sup> St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/2/1. Werder's request was discussed in a meeting of the organizing committee on September 11, 1876.

ministers as well as representatives of hundreds of different organizations. Among the latter, the city offered some rare praise for the women of the city as they invited members of the *Freiburger Hilfsverein* to attend the ceremony. Leading women in the community had founded this organization immediately after the outbreak of the war, and they proved to be of much value on the home front during the war.<sup>125</sup> This was the first major public occasion on which the city had recognized the efforts of the women. Other than this rather minor note, women were largely excluded from this project as well as from most of the commemorative discourse that surrounded the unification.

The members of the organizing committee went to great lengths to include the entire city in the planned ceremonies. They planned a parade from the train station to the place of the unveiling that was to include the most prominent guests, and they also arranged for several different ceremonies to be held throughout the city. In addition, they were careful to include the Catholic Church in these ceremonies. This was obviously a thorny issue, especially since the Badenese *Kulturkampf* had just reached new heights during the summer and fall of 1876 as the provincial parliament had passed new legislation that abolished confessional schools, which upset Catholics.<sup>126</sup> In addition to the aforementioned Catholic reservations concerning this monument, local Catholics had become increasingly critical of the fact that while monuments were being built all over Germany to celebrate the efforts of the soldiers, Jesuits were

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<sup>125</sup> Otto Funke, *Das Siegesdenkmal zu Freiburg im Breisgau* (Freiburg: Lauber & Mehlhase, 1877), 29.

<sup>126</sup> Becker, *Liberaler Staat und Kirche*, 358-364.

being driven out of the new nation-state. According to most Catholics, the Jesuits had played an important role in caring for the wounded, especially in southern Baden, and some of them had been awarded the Iron Cross for their services.<sup>127</sup> In the first decades after the war, Jesuits and their role in the Franco-Prussian War caused considerable controversy as liberals accused them of having prayed for French victory. Catholics pointed to the courage and love for the fatherland Jesuits had displayed when volunteering for the war effort.<sup>128</sup> Especially in 1874-1875, when reports about mistreatment of Jesuits reached Freiburg and the EO on an almost daily basis, local Catholics were very critical of the actions of both the national and state government.

Consequently, members of the EO found themselves in a difficult position. On the one hand, they were hesitant to associate with celebrations that commemorated an event that in many ways constituted the beginning of the national *Kulturkampf*. On the other, they regularly faced accusations of being enemies of the fatherland who maintained closer and stronger ties to Rome than Berlin. Therefore, if they elected not to participate, it would be interpreted as yet another confirmation of their hostile attitudes towards the Second Empire. Finally, after some negotiating between the organizing committee and Kübel, the latter agreed to deliver a speech that day, not at the monument, but at the Catholic dome. His decision to participate in the ceremony was made easier by the fact that the monument did not contain any anti-Catholic

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<sup>127</sup> These types of debates resurfaced in conjunction with different types of commemorative activities. See for instance *Freie Stimme*, September 9, 1874.

<sup>128</sup> See Michael B. Gross, "Kulturkampf and Unification: German Liberalism and the War Against the Jesuits," *Central European History* 30 (1997): 545-566.

symbolism, nor did it resonate with the official national identity emanating from Berlin. In addition, Kübel was able to convince the committee not to let the Old Catholics participate in the ceremony, which would enable Freiburg's conservative Catholics to stake claim to a small part of the commemorative discourse.<sup>129</sup>

Most local newspapers participated in heightening the anticipation of the day of unveiling. In the days before and after to the ceremony, they were filled with articles, editorials, poems, and songs. "Zum Dritten Oktober 1876," an article published in the *Freiburger Zeitung*, hailed the deeds of Werder and his troops. According to this article, although Werder and his men were faced by an enemy that vastly outnumbered them (the French were said to have had a ten to one numerical advantage), they only had to recall the danger that the women and children at home were facing in order to summon courage to do battle. The article repeatedly stressed that during these three days of *national* danger, it was Werder and his men who held "die Wacht am Rhein."<sup>130</sup> This glorified version of events ignored the fact that the French, while not yet defeated, did not constitute a significant threat to the Germans by January 1871. After the defeat at Sedan, the French army had primarily engaged in a defensive war.

Another page in the *Freiburger Zeitung* contained a song honoring Werder and his troops. This song followed a similar pattern to the article, placing particular emphasis on the unity, courage, and nobility of Werder's troops. It made clear that the

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<sup>129</sup> St. AF, C1/Denkmäler/5, letter from Kübel to the organizing committee, September 30, 1876.

<sup>130</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, October 3, 1876.

unveiling commemorated the role that Werder and his men played in the defense of the Badenese (and German) fatherland. There was no mention of unification, though it is inferred that by exhausting the last reserves of the French enemy, the Badenese troops were the ones who delivered the decisive blow that made possible the proclamation of the Reich and forced the French to surrender.<sup>131</sup> Furthermore, it alluded to the ambivalent meaning of the term “fatherland.” Often, it seems as if the newspapers themselves were unsure what exactly constituted their fatherland. There are numerous examples defining it in local (*Badische Oberland*), regional (Baden), and national terms. This ambivalence indicates that locals were not prepared to accept simply the connotations that the official discourse attached to the term and that they used the term to express their own definition of Germanness. Indeed, the various meanings of fatherland indicate the unstable nature of the nationalizing project.

The newspapers furthermore claimed that the time had finally come for Freiburg and Baden to display the appreciation of its citizens for its brave fathers, sons, and brothers, who risked their lives in order to protect the German border. When the monument was unveiled, it would stand as a symbol to remind this and future generations of the heroic deeds of these soldiers. The *Freiburger Zeitung* praised the Emperor for accepting the invitation to attend the ceremony, and reminded its readers of the last visit that Wilhelm I had made to the city. It took place in September 1870, as the King of Prussia arrived to inspect the dutiful work of the people in the middle of the war. Who does not remember the great speech that he held on the *Karlsplatz* that

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<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

day, encouraging people to maintain their morale in these difficult times? The paper even claimed that already on this chilly September evening, one could tell that the people of the city had long embraced the idea of the unification of the Reich and that the mere presence of the future Emperor prompted many spontaneous expressions of devotion to the Hohenzollern family.<sup>132</sup> This is another example of an attempt to invent traditions. The public did not respond to the future Emperor's visit in the fashion that the newspaper now tried to portray. To be sure, newspaper reports portrayed the city as elated by the presence of the King of Prussia. There was, however, little or no traces of any sentiments expressing a desire to crown him German Emperor.<sup>133</sup>

Newspapers further stressed that although the last few years had been filled with hard work, the love for Emperor and fatherland had only increased since 1871. This love would be manifested in the grandest of manners as the Emperor visited the city.<sup>134</sup> *Oberrheinischer Courier* went to great lengths to emphasize that after witnessing the display of affection and love for the Emperor, no one would doubt that the people of Freiburg and Baden were loyal subjects of Wilhelm I. The paper repeatedly emphasized that the only thing that mattered was for the Emperor to leave the city with a good impression of its inhabitants. He reportedly did not care about the pomp and glamour that surrounded the monument, or even the monument itself.

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<sup>132</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, October 2, 1876.

<sup>133</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, September 21, 1870.

<sup>134</sup> *Breisgauer Zeitung*, October 2, 1876.



Instead, all that concerned him was how the people of Freiburg greeted him.<sup>135</sup> These sentiments indicate that the people of the city were well aware that their monument favored local-regional over national-dynastic loyalties, which made it all the more important for the people of the city to display their love and devotion to the Emperor.

The citizens of Freiburg made every effort to beautify their city on October 3. According to newspapers, the city had seldom looked so attractive as houses and buildings were decorated to mark this event.<sup>136</sup> The Grand Duke and prominent representatives of the city greeted Wilhelm I and his entourage at the train station; cannons were fired and church bells were rung to signal the long-awaited return of the Emperor. Along the parade route, cheering people lined the streets, anxious to get a glimpse of their Emperor. Judging from the number of people that turned out, the inhabitants of the city cherished their Emperor. At the ceremony itself, many renowned members of the local community delivered speeches, the vast majority of which focused most of their attention on the heroic efforts of the Badenese troops during the war.<sup>137</sup> Both the unification and the ties to the Hohenzollern dynasty were celebrated as well, especially since Wilhelm I had been gracious enough to attend this ceremony. Still, most speeches treated the unification of the Reich and the role of the Emperor, Bismarck, and military leaders such as Moltke, as secondary. After the event, a few of the local newspapers even remarked that if one had not known

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<sup>135</sup> *Oberrheinischer Courier*, October 2, 1876.

<sup>136</sup> See for instance *Oberrheinischer Courier*, October 5, 1876.

<sup>137</sup> All speeches are reprinted in Funke, *Das Siegesdenkmal*, 28-51.

anything about the war, one would have believed that had not Werder and his men fought so valiantly, Germany would never have been unified.<sup>138</sup>

Privy councilor Ecker, the chairman of the organizing committee, gave the main speech at the unveiling ceremony. In his address, he asserted that because all of Baden had contributed to the construction of this monument, the *Siegesdenkmal* should be labeled a Badenese monument, which had enjoyed unequivocal support and approval in the entire state. He noted that it was a privilege for the city to be able to present to the Emperor this "...*Siegesdenkmal* that has been constructed by the entire Badenese people."<sup>139</sup> This was at best a half-truth, for communities such as St. Blasien, Triberg, and Breisach had opposed its construction for a variety of reasons. Ecker recounted the process by which the monument came into existence so that all present would "correctly" understand the "true" meaning and symbolism of this statue. The majority of his speech centered on the fear that the people in the Badenese *Oberland* had experienced during the course of the war, how the heroics of the Fourteenth Army Corps had saved the fatherland, and how the "...rest of Germany admired the Fourteenth Army Corps and its leader."<sup>140</sup> Paralleling the ambiguous language that the newspapers employed, Ecker also refrained from offering a more precise definition of the term "fatherland." In addressing the imperial presence, he stated that the city of Freiburg was honored to have the Emperor as its guest. He

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<sup>138</sup> See for instance *Oberrheinischer Courier*, October 7, 1876.

<sup>139</sup> Funke, *Das Siegesdenkmal*, 31.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

quoted the telegram that Wilhelm sent to his wife after the battle of Belfort, reporting that the French had been defeated in the southwest. By reading this telegram, he ensured that the national perspective was recognized. It should be noted, however, that the telegram places the Emperor in an inactive role in the unification process. As its author, he is reduced to the role of medium that reports the military victories that led to unification. Consequently, though he acknowledged Wilhelm's importance in the unification process, as well as his graciousness in attending the ceremony, Ecker was able to ensure that the state of Baden and the city of Freiburg were portrayed as extremely important agents of German unification. Finally, Ecker pointed to the two Badenese and two Prussian soldiers pictured on the monument, which he claimed provided the entire statue with a greater and deeper meaning:

And just as North and South stand here in united defense, this monument should proclaim that the German tribes that fought and bled together should also in the future remain inseparable, and it should serve as a permanent symbol of the re-conquered, united German Fatherland, which we have hoped and fought for ever since our youth, and which has now been given to us by our exalted Emperor and his glorious army.<sup>141</sup>

In his claim that people had dreamed of the unification since their youth, Ecker conveniently failed to mention that Baden and Prussia fought on opposite sides in the war of 1866. Moreover, Ecker's reference to this supposed unity of North and South came at the end of his speech, after he had already established the symbolic context of the monument, which pointed to the important role that Baden had played in the process of unification and its vital role in the new Empire. Hence, the unity of North

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<sup>141</sup> Ibid., 35.

and South was established on the terms of the southern states (i.e., Baden) and was perceived as dependent on an acceptance of the south's own sense of Germanness.

Following Ecker's speech, the Emperor unveiled the statue, whose grandeur reportedly stunned those present.<sup>142</sup> The ceremony ended with the singing of "*Heil Dir im Siegerkranz.*" After the unveiling, the Emperor and his entourage participated in another procession through the city that ended at the famous Freiburg Cathedral, where Lothar von Kübel and other members of the high clergy welcomed them. After a tour of the church, Kübel conducted a separate ceremony, providing the Catholic Church with the opportunity to participate in this commemorative effort on its own terms. Kübel must have been pleased at this privilege as well as the fact that the Old Catholics were denied participation in the official ceremonies. True to their habit of portraying themselves as more patriotic than the Catholics, the Old Catholics hung a banner outside their church: "When the state, as in this case/unites with the church/the Empire stands forever/solid on its foundation."<sup>143</sup> Because Old Catholics were not allowed to participate in the official ceremonies, however, Kübel and his conservative Catholics held the upper hand on this day.

Most local newspapers agreed that the unveiling and imperial visit had been a great success. They praised the city's residents for providing the Emperor with a warm welcome, which surely convinced Wilhelm of the support and popularity that he enjoyed even in this liminal area of the Empire. The newspapers' emphasis that it was

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<sup>142</sup> See for instance *Freiburger Zeitung*, October 6, 1876.

<sup>143</sup> A selective list of some of the banners that were hung around the city can be found in Funke, *Das Siegesdenkmal*, 64-70.

so important that the Emperor had gained a favorable impression of Freiburg and its inhabitants serves as a further reminder that when expressing national-dynastic loyalties, people were more concerned about the immediate impression they had made on the Emperor.

Although Wilhelm I's presence at the unveiling of the monument affirmed the national-dynastic connotations of the statue, the memory of the Emperor's visit faded with the passing of time, while the permanent symbolism of the monument remained, which prioritized the local-regional over the national-dynastic. By securing the attendance of the Emperor, people received the opportunity to demonstrate to him and the rest of the German nation their devotion to the Emperor. However, the monument, as a permanent site of memory, ensured that after this occasion had passed, people were able to continue constructing their national identities through the regional lens. For the duration of the Second Empire, the monument occupied an important space in the city. On most official holidays associated with the unification, some type of ceremony would take place at the monument, which enabled citizens to continue constructing their national identities on their own terms. This is not to say that the people of the city did not cherish their Emperor. There is no doubt that they had great admiration for his persona. Their dedication to Wilhelm I, however, did not mean that they were willing to accept a hegemonic status of Prussia and the Hohenzollern family in the newly founded nation-state.

As we have seen throughout these discussions, the fact that the monument's symbolism stressed the local rather than the national perspective made it somewhat

easier for Freiburg's Catholics to accept its ideological message. Strengthened by the many public manifestations of their own sense of Germanness between 1870-1876, the city's Catholics were able to participate actively in the commemorations of the wars of unification on their own terms. During these first years of the *Kaiserreich*, they seized every opportunity to contest the official German national identity emanating from Berlin and Prussia. As evidenced at instances such as the General Assembly of Catholics in 1875, Freiburger Catholics sought the support of their confessional brethren elsewhere in Germany in their joint efforts to withstand the pressure to assimilate into the new nation-state on Protestant/Prussian conditions. The city's Catholics demonstrated on several occasions that they accepted the *kleindeutsche* solution to the German question. However, because their version of Germanness differed from their Protestant counterparts, they were forced to offer alternatives to the official discourse. By creating an alternative discourse, they ensured that the Protestant anti-Catholic sentiments did not become part of the new national identity. Instead, during the first few years of the Second Empire, Catholics and Protestants in Freiburg used nationalist sentiments to debate what it meant to be German in post-unification times. In a similar fashion to Catholics in Konstanz, Freiburger Catholics employed the nationalist discourse to manifest their own version of Germanness. The analysis of the relationship between Catholics and Protestants in these two cities and how they used nationalist sentiments suggests that Badenese Catholics were active participants in the creation of the new national identity, despite facing economic and political disadvantages. The following chapter will trace the lives of Catholics in

Heidelberg during the first few years of the Empire, which will illuminate a slightly different Catholic experience. Because Heidelberg was a city that enjoyed more amicable relations between Catholics and Protestants, its Catholic citizens faced slightly different circumstances as they negotiated their identities in the post-unification period.

## CHAPTER 5

### A DIFFERENT CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE? HEIDELBERGER CATHOLICS COMMEMORATE UNIFICATION

After the analysis of early Catholic responses to war and unification in Konstanz and Freiburg, it is now time to investigate the reactions of Heidelberger Catholics to the events leading up to and immediately following the unification of the German Empire.<sup>1</sup> As was seen in the previous discussions, Catholics in Konstanz and Freiburg shared similar experiences during the years prior to and after the unification. Although Catholics in Heidelberg certainly were forced to deal with some of the similar anti-Catholic sentiments, they experienced a slightly smoother transition into the *Kaiserreich* than their brethren in the southern part of the state. Of course, this did not mean that their transformation from Badenese Catholics into Germans was conflict-free, but the commemorative discourse was somewhat different in Heidelberg compared to Freiburg and Konstanz. Thus, Heidelberg's Catholics reacted differently to some of the events and commemorations that surrounded unification. Because the Catholic experience around

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<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, the Third Reich and the Second World War witnessed the destruction of many valuable sources in Heidelberg, especially in regards to the city's Catholics. From the early 1860s to the late 1880s, there are large gaps in newspaper, city council, and associational records, which makes it slightly more difficult to analyze reactions of Heidelberger Catholics to the foundation of the Empire. In addition, due to the scarcity of sources, scholars have been unable to compose a comprehensive history of Heidelberg. To be sure, there are several sources that provide glimpses into certain aspects of city life, but no general history of the city. For some examples see Oliver Fink, *Kleine Heidelberger Stadtgeschichte* (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 2005); Elmar Mittler, *Heidelberg: Geschichte und Gestalt* (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1996); and, *Heidelberg—Stadt und Universität* (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1997). These sources, along with many others, do not discuss the political and/or religious history of the city but instead focus most of their attention on cultural and intellectual developments and personalities.



Baden certainly was not uniform, an analysis of the reactions of Heidelberger Catholics to the unification will provide useful clues to how different groups of Catholics responded to these monumental changes. As will become evident, Catholics in Heidelberg enjoyed a more amicable relationship with the city's Protestants, which provided them with a less hostile environment in which to negotiate their changing identities. There were several reasons for the different nature of the relationship between Catholics and Protestants. For one, the population of about 22,000 was more evenly distributed between Catholics and Protestants, with the latter constituting the majority with 13,000. Also, in general, the Catholic population in Heidelberg was less politically mobilized. The city lacked a strong class of Catholic clergy and intellectuals, which existed in both Konstanz and Freiburg. While the latter two had long been strongholds of Catholic power, manifested in the role of the Church (and the university in Freiburg), that was not the case in Heidelberg. The city did not possess a strong Catholic clergy, and the university's theology faculty was Protestant. Moreover, the economic and to some extent the political power was more evenly distributed between Catholics and Protestants in Heidelberg compared to the other two cities under investigation, and it will be useful to evaluate how this more equal relationship affected the construction of the new national identity.

Because of the scarcity of sources, this chapter will not include much information on this city's history until 1866 but instead will focus more on the events between 1866 and 1871. Although this method will provide a slightly different view from the analysis of Catholic reactions in Konstanz and Freiburg, it will still be useful since it will

illuminate Catholic attitudes to the prospect of Germany unification prior to 1871. In addition, despite the paucity of post-1871 sources, the existing ones still enable us to gain brief insights into how Catholics approached the unification of the *Kaiserreich*. To be sure, the scarcity of sources will not allow a similar in-depth investigation as in the cases of Konstanz and Freiburg, but the available material will still provide an adequate picture of the different Catholic experience in Heidelberg. In addition, the situation of Catholics in Heidelberg during the late 1860s and early 1870s was more akin to the situation in Baden and the German Empire during the 1890s, which will provide useful clues into how Catholics successfully integrated in the *Kaiserreich*.

### **Heidelberger Catholics and the Austro-Prussian War**

Similar to the situations in Konstanz and Freiburg, Heidelberger Catholics firmly supported Austria as tensions began to escalate between Bismarck and Habsburg Emperor Francis Joseph I in 1866. Because Heidelberg is located in the northern part of Baden, the city's inhabitants, both Catholic and Protestant, were not as intimately tied to the Austrian sphere of influence, though they were clearly more loyal to their southern neighbor than to Prussia. As an early example of these sentiments, the Catholic *Pfälzer Bote* noted in April 1866 that though Bismarck had enhanced the status of Prussia, he had done so at the expense of other German states, and then especially Austria. The paper further claimed that Bismarck's demands on Austria were completely unrealistic and proved that Prussia was an uncivilized and barbaric state. The paper also maintained that if Bismarck had attacked any country but Austria, he might have been able to gain the

support of the Badenese people; however, his recent actions left true Germans no choice but to support the Austrians.<sup>2</sup> Thus, already before tensions had escalated into war, Catholics in Heidelberg attempted to portray Bismarck and the Prussians as anti-German, who were only concerned about improving Prussia's lot, even at the expense of other German states.

When war broke out, both Catholics and Protestants in the city united behind the Austrians. The Protestant *Heidelberger Zeitung* sharply criticized the Badenese government for delaying support to the Austrians, which not only hurt them but also jeopardized Badenese soldiers.<sup>3</sup> *Pfälzer Bote* reacted to the news of war by publishing an appeal to the city's inhabitants, in which they claimed that Bismarck was violating international and natural law and needed to be stopped immediately. Every true German should do his duty and defend Baden and Austria. The call to action was signed by the city's three most influential Catholics: Jakob Lindau, Ferdinand Bissing, and Leopold Fischer. They argued that it was evident that Prussians, and specifically Bismarck, had no understanding of the true requirements of patriotism and that his actions proved that he only sought to expand Prussia's role in Europe at the expense of other German states.<sup>4</sup> The city's Catholics were fiercely loyal to Baden and Austria in the face of these attacks from the un-German Prussians. Catholics also argued that through their actions Prussia and Bismarck had violated natural laws that every German possessed. Alluding to a

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<sup>2</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, April 7, 14, 17, 1866.

<sup>3</sup> *Heidelberger Zeitung*, July 13, 1866.

<sup>4</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, June 19, 1866.

sense that all Germans possessed a shared set of qualities, characteristics, and inviolable rights, Catholics claimed that Bismarck's violation of these rights proved that he was not a true German. Of course, to label negative characteristics un-German was a very common method that both Protestants and Catholics employed in their struggle for control of the construction of German national identity.

During the first few days of the war, Heidelberg's Catholics were hopeful that Prussia would be quickly defeated. *Pfälzer Bote* reprinted Emperor Francis Joseph's appeal for all Germans to stand up to the Prussian offensive, and the paper maintained that after Bismarck had been defeated, the relationship between the German states would be greatly improved. Badenese Catholics argued that ever since the conclusion of the war against Denmark in 1864, Bismarck's actions had only been designed to benefit Prussia. Indeed, the recent events proved that he was not a German patriot and that he was detrimental to the cause of German unity. Because the Badenese government under August Lamey and Foreign Minister Franz von Roggenbach had been relatively friendly to Bismarck, Badenese Catholics also criticized government officials in this context. It was not uncommon for Catholic newspapers to accuse Bismarck of being anti-German while at the same time implicating the Badenese government in this charge as well. However, Heidelberg's proximity to the Badenese government in Karlsruhe placed *Pfälzer Bote* in a more critical position than other Catholic papers throughout the state. The criticism of Roggenbach, Ludwig Edelsheim (his successor since 1865), and the Badenese government's perceived inability to defend the Badenese and Austrian honor was met with great hostility from the government. While Catholic newspapers in

Konstanz and Freiburg enjoyed a much greater freedom in their ability to criticize the government, the *Pfälzer Bote* soon found itself under attack. Already on July 3, 1866, the paper reported that government officials had seized their issues on five different occasions and that they were under constant pressure to cease their criticism of the government's policies.<sup>5</sup> A few days later, the paper discussed these measures in greater detail as they claimed that they were only defending the rights of all Germans and that the government had misinterpreted their intentions. They furthermore noted that the government's actions towards the paper did nothing to aid the war effort; instead, it only ensured that confessional discord grew across the state and Germany. They maintained that not only had Catholic papers been targeted with sanctions but also that the government was spreading lies about Catholic intentions in case of an Austrian victory. Here, the usual accusations surfaced against Catholics, most notably the claim that in case of an Austrian victory, Catholics would forcibly convert the state's Protestants. *Pfälzer Bote* also reported that the government was spreading lies about Catholic plans to use the war as a pretext to murder Protestants and Jews.<sup>6</sup> The paper responded that these accusations were completely unfounded and that these actions proved that the government was not interested in strengthening and protecting the Badenese fatherland. They noted that the government's intentions to disturb the confessional peace only proved that they were not fully committed to the Austrian and Badenese cause.<sup>7</sup> In

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<sup>5</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, July 3, 1866.

<sup>6</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, July 5, 1866.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

addition to offering support to the Austrians, these arguments also aided Heidelberger Catholics in presenting themselves as better Germans. By labeling the ideas and actions of their opponents as un-German, they sought to strengthen their own connections to the construction of national identity. As has been evident throughout this work, this method of identity formation was quite common among Catholics in the postunification period.

### **Construction of a Memory of the Austro-Prussian War**

Although Heidelberg's Catholics and Protestants had been united in their support of Austria during the war, differences began to emerge as soon as the peace treaty was signed. Protestant papers noted that though it was unfortunate that the Austrians had lost the war, Badenens must now attempt to negotiate a favorable treaty with Bismarck and Prussia. Protestants claimed that Badenens faced a difficult choice: to ally themselves closer with Bismarck or to remain independent and isolated. *Heidelberger Zeitung* advocated the first option, arguing that an isolationist policy would leave Baden vulnerable to the French. To be sure, Protestants in the city were quite unhappy with the outcome of the war, and they were still very critical of Bismarck and his aggressive behavior, but they also realized that the current political conditions forced them to make some difficult choices.<sup>8</sup>

This rhetoric did not sway Heidelberg's Catholics. They were incensed that the Austrian and Badenese governments had accepted defeat so quickly and even noted that "...are we not men enough to continue this struggle? We have a nation (!) of forty

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<sup>8</sup> *Heidelberger Zeitung*, July 22, 23, 1866.

million people who would support us...”<sup>9</sup> To illustrate further this point, on July 21, *Pfälzer Bote* published a letter from Roggenbach to Bismarck, in which the Badenese minister admitted that Prussia needed to play the leading role in German affairs.<sup>10</sup> They were highly critical of the former foreign minister and even accused him of treason. Besides being directly critical of certain specific actions that the government undertook, these sentiments also illustrated the fact that Heidelberger Catholics did not feel that their own government represented their interests. Of course, the recent Badenese *Kulturkampf* made it difficult for Catholics to trust any government policy.

Considering the Catholic statements in the immediate aftermath of the war, it was evident that they were still loyal to Austria. However, Catholics were also aware of the political shift that had taken place and the need to perhaps reevaluate some of their policies. Towards the end of July, *Pfälzer Bote* published a series of articles in which the paper outlined its responses to the new political developments. Although they were still very critical of the Prussian actions, as time passed, they grew more conciliatory. To be sure, the paper made a point to note that Badeners were not as friendly towards Bismarck as several other German states, but they also admitted that the behavior of the Prussians was improving. Especially after the arrival of Prussian troops in the city, they noted that the soldiers were friendly and treated locals with dignity and respect.<sup>11</sup> However, these sentiments did not mean that Heidelberger Catholics were prepared to accept entry into

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<sup>9</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, July 14, 1866.

<sup>10</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, July 21, 1866.

<sup>11</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, July 28, August 14, 1866.

the North German Confederation, something that local liberals and Protestants were strongly considering. Although the latter were mindful of the harsh fate that awaited Austria, they also noted that the war might prove a blessing as Germans would finally be able to unify.<sup>12</sup> Not surprisingly, Catholics in the city took issue with these sentiments. In a long article in the August 9 issue, *Pfälzer Bote* claimed that no matter what had happened in the past, they must make sure that "...the south German way of living and their [south Germans'] love of freedom must be protected....The North German Bund would perhaps make for a strong entity on the outside, but it would be rotting on the inside...."<sup>13</sup> They also noted that proponents of the North German Confederation supported "...German unity, Protestantism, the Customs union, and France..."<sup>14</sup> Thus, it was evident that already in 1866, Badenese Catholics associated a Prussian-led unification with Protestantism, which made them even more opposed to the policies of Bismarck and his allies. It was also clear that they did not believe that the North German Confederation had any long-lasting value. As has been evident throughout our discussions, Catholics tried to present themselves as advocates of a nation-state that was based on strong internal values and not corrupted by Prussian and Protestant materialistic concerns.

Heidelberger Catholics also maintained that the Austro-Prussian War had weakened the German states. They claimed that though Prussia had become stronger, the

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<sup>12</sup> *Heidelberger Zeitung*, July 17, 1866

<sup>13</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, August 9, 1866.

<sup>14</sup> *Pfälzer Bote* August 11, 1866.



war and subsequent territorial changes would make the German states more vulnerable to outside threats. Moreover, Catholics disputed the assertion that the recent war had clarified the German question. On the contrary, the last war had only further confused the relationship between the German states, especially since an increasing number was falling under the Prussian spell.<sup>15</sup>

Although there was some hostility between the Catholic and Protestant camps in the city, and it was clear that they subscribed to different notions about what Baden should do following the war of 1866, it was also evident that these differences were not as pronounced as in Konstanz and Freiburg. While *Pfälzer Bote* had been, and continued to be, critical of Prussia and Bismarck, the paper was not nearly as virulent in its criticism as some of the Catholic papers in Freiburg and Konstanz. This did not mean that Catholics were applauding Bismarck's policies, but it did represent a softer approach to Prussia and its chancellor. These sentiments were probably also a result of the fact that the area around Heidelberg was a stronghold of the *kleindeutsche* view. Most of the Badenese supporters of the *kleindeutsche* alternative to German unification were located around Karlsruhe, Heidelberg, and Mannheim. Also, it is noteworthy that during the Austro-Prussian War, there was much less hostile rhetoric between the two confessional camps in Heidelberg. To be sure, some of the usual accusations that if Austria won Catholics would forcibly convert all Germans to Catholicism did surface, but overall the two confessions enjoyed a better relationship than in Konstanz and Freiburg. This was a trend that resurfaced during the Franco-Prussian War, and it continued for most of the

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<sup>15</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, July 30, 1866.

Second Empire. An indication of this friendlier relationship is that the rate of interfaith marriages in Heidelberg was among the highest in the state.<sup>16</sup> Here, the lack of a militant Catholic clergy probably played a very important role in allowing for more interfaith marriages. Another reason for the seemingly more amicable relationship was that the city had a more equal distribution of Catholics and Protestants, with a slight majority for the latter.<sup>17</sup> Thus, there was less overt Catholic hostility towards the fact that the city's Protestants occupied most of the political, economic, and cultural capital in the city. Conversely, Heidelberg Protestants also tended to be less aggressive towards the city's Catholics since they were not threatened by their numerical advantage. In cities such as Freiburg and Konstanz, Protestants were in a clear minority and thus faced constant pressure from the Catholic majority to relinquish some of their political and economic power. As has been evident throughout this work, this unequal distribution was one of the main reasons why Catholics and Protestants used nationalist rhetoric and the construction of a national identity as means of gaining political, economic, cultural, or social power.

### **Catholic Reactions to the Outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War**

Turning to the outbreak of war in 1870 between Prussia and France, Catholics in Heidelberg initially viewed the increased tension between the two states almost with indifference. They focused most of their attention on the activities at the Vatican

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<sup>16</sup> Smith, "Religion and Conflict: Protestants, Catholics, and Anti-Semitism in the State of Baden in the Era of Wilhelm II," 290.

<sup>17</sup> *Die Katholische Gemeinde Heidelberg* (Heidelberg: Libertas Verlag, 1989), 10.

Council, and the conflict between Prussia and France was almost entirely absent from the news. As the conflict escalated in the middle of July, *Pfälzer Bote* even deemed it necessary to summarize the major events associated with the question of the Spanish succession, since "...many of our readers might not be entirely familiar with all of these complex events..."<sup>18</sup> At first, their reporting displayed a certain amount of neutrality. They assigned partial blame to both camps for the increased tensions, though they were careful to point out that Bismarck and the Prussians were more in the right than their French counterparts.<sup>19</sup> However, as the prospect of war loomed larger, their tone became increasingly anti-French. They maintained that France was acting in an irresponsible manner that threatened to bring chaos to the European continent. Catholics were especially critical of the un-Catholic behavior of Napoleon III and accused him of provoking a war only to improve his domestic situation, which had grown increasingly dire during the last few years. However, it should be noted that though supportive of Bismarck and Wilhelm I, Heidelberger Catholics also claimed that they were somewhat hesitant about the prospect of war. They maintained that this seemed to be largely a Prussian cause and that it was not entirely clear what the other German states stood to gain from a war with France. They also expressed concern for Baden's exposed geographical position. Just a few days before the outbreak of war, they openly questioned if Baden would be able to defend itself and if other German states would

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<sup>18</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, July 14, 1870.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

come to its aid if needed.<sup>20</sup> These types of sentiments illustrate that Germany was far from ready for complete external and internal unification in 1870. Although Heidelberg Catholics were slowly warming to the Prussian cause, they were still not convinced that this was a war they should fight. Of course, these types of statements made Catholics vulnerable to Protestant and liberal accusations of anti-German feelings, which helps explain why the construction of the memory of the Franco-Prussian War and the subsequent unification became so contested.

However, as soon as war broke out, any Catholic doubts about the military conflict disappeared quickly. On July 19, *Pfälzer Bote* reported that citizens across the German lands were ecstatic about the war and that the French enemy had to be defeated at all costs. Catholics also noted that though the Catholic People's Party had not been supportive of the Badenese government in the past, true Germans would now set aside their differences and unite in support of the fatherland. Catholics claimed that their party was one of the most patriotic ones and that they would now receive a chance to prove their worth to Germany.<sup>21</sup> In a similar fashion to Catholics and Protestants around the state, Catholics in Heidelberg suddenly did not display any doubts about what constituted their fatherland. These sentiments also illustrate how fluid the notions of national and regional identity were at this time. Only a few days prior to the war, Heidelberg Catholics had openly wondered whether Prussia's cause was theirs, but as soon as war broke out, these Catholics were united with Prussians, Württembergers, Bavarians, and other Germans.

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<sup>20</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, July 16, 1870.

<sup>21</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, July 19, 1870.

Similarly to the situations in Konstanz and Freiburg, Heidelberger Protestants and Catholics were united in their war efforts for the first few days. However, *Pfälzer Bote* soon noted that there were some Protestant and liberal papers that labeled the Catholics lesser Germans. Already on July 30, the paper had to defend the wartime behavior of Catholics, who were accused of being as indifferent to this war as they had been to defending German interests in 1866. The paper pointed out that it was wrong to compare the two wars. The Austro-Prussian War had been an unfortunate affair between two brothers, which explained Catholic ambivalence towards it. Indeed, the paper maintained that Catholic reluctance to fight the Prussians could and should serve as an indication of their patriotism. Of course, they also pointed out that Protestants had been eager to fight the Prussians in 1866, a fact that was now conveniently forgotten. Heidelberger Catholics furthermore argued that this war was completely different. This time, an outside enemy had attacked the German fatherland, and Catholics were keen to defend German territories against the external threat.<sup>22</sup>

Despite this occurrence of some hostile rhetoric, it is interesting to note that most of the accusations that Catholics faced came from outside the city. Indeed, the Protestant *Heidelberger Zeitung* was much more conciliatory towards the Catholic part of the population compared to other Protestant publications around the state. Throughout the fall of 1870, the paper was very respectful towards the Catholics, and towards the end of the war, they even claimed that it was remarkable to see how loyal the city's Catholics had been during the war effort. They maintained that throughout the war, Catholics and

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<sup>22</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, July 30, 31, 1870.

Protestants had successfully fought side by side.<sup>23</sup> Although there were occasional accusations of Catholic anti-Germanness, these instances were far and few between, and when they did occur, they were mild in comparison to similar ones around the state. As we saw with cases such as the accusations against Manfred Burgweiler in Pfullendorf, liberal and Protestant newspapers often focused on the alleged misdeeds of local Catholics to illustrate Catholic anti-German sentiments. For some of the reasons already alluded to, this was not the case in Heidelberg, where Catholics and Protestants, though not living in perfect harmony, managed to coexist relatively well, even during such a critical time as the Franco-Prussian War.

Although Catholics and Protestants in Heidelberg reacted in similar manners to the war, there were still slight differences in how they viewed the conflict and what it meant for the future of the German states. While the city's Protestants were consumed with thoughts about the glory that the German fatherland would now enjoy, Catholics were more careful in their assessment of the current events. Despite growing increasingly enthusiastic about the efforts of the German troops with each military victory, there were also some concerns for the future mixed in with these positive sentiments, particularly in regards to the minority status of Catholics in the new Empire. Although there were differences between Heidelberger Catholics and Protestants in their responses to the war, there were also marked differences between how the city's Catholics reacted to the war compared to other Catholics around the state. On August 21, even before the victory at Sedan, *Pfälzer Bote* argued that Germans must already begin to

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<sup>23</sup> *Heidelberger Zeitung*, December 29, 1870.

consider what would happen after the war. They maintained that one of the big mistakes that Germans had made after the victory of 1813 was that they had not adequately planned their move towards unification. Thus, they should now begin a discussion about how Germany would unify once the French enemy had been defeated. Quite remarkably, the paper argued that after the war, Germany had to unite under Prussian leadership and elect Wilhelm I German Emperor. Catholics claimed that though the Catholics in Heidelberg and Baden had always been loyal to the Austrians in their struggle with the Prussians, it had now become evident that the former were not strong enough and would not be able to provide adequate leadership in the German quest for unification. Instead, Germans needed to follow the lead of the Prussian king towards a unified nation-state.<sup>24</sup>

Although these were of course very pro-Prussian sentiments, the paper also noted that “black-red-gold” should be the theme for the Empire and that this war constituted the end of Prussian dominance in German affairs. They claimed that Prussia had enjoyed a long history with many glorious moments; however, Germany (though they never defined what they meant by “Germany”) possessed an even longer history, and it was now time for a German nation-state to assume its rightful position in Europe. Catholics also argued that this was the time when Germany would be able to finalize their relationships with France and Austria.<sup>25</sup> Of course, these attitudes were different compared to the ones in both Freiburg and Konstanz, where Catholics had been reluctant to even discuss the prospect of unification until just a few weeks before it was completed. The different

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<sup>24</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, August 21, 1870.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

Catholic attitudes in Heidelberg illustrates that not only did they have a better relationship with Protestants in the city, but their Catholic identities were composed in a slightly different manner. During the latter part of the *Kaiserreich*, it became evident that Catholic attitudes around the state were more uniform; however, at this time that was not yet the case. These notions also serve as an illustration that the state of Baden was not as unified and cohesive as some of its citizens portrayed it to be and that not only did Germans disagree on what constituted the German fatherland, they also disagreed on how to define Baden. Judging by these accounts, Catholics in Heidelberg were more integrated into the North German Confederation than their brethren in the southern part of the state. To be sure, this did not mean that Catholics in Heidelberg would ally themselves with Bismarck rather than with the south Badenese Catholics, but it does illustrate the fluid nature of their identities. As will become evident, on most issues Heidelberger Catholics agreed with Catholics in Konstanz and Freiburg, but there were also instances where they differed. These differences illustrate just how difficult it was for any group to maintain, preserve, and strengthen a cohesive identity during the middle part of the nineteenth century when German society underwent so many drastic changes.

During the fall of 1870, citizens in Heidelberg were relatively unaffected by the war. Compared to both Freiburg and Konstanz, Heidelbergers did not complain about the threat of a French invasion. Indeed, based on newspaper accounts, the war passed without any major distractions to civic life. On December 22, *Pfälzer Bote* reported that the Catholic People's Party had voted to support the creation of a unified Empire. The paper maintained that though this was not an easy decision, it was the right one,



especially considering that it was impossible for Baden to remain independent. In addition, with the recent Badenese *Kulturkampf* in mind, they argued, somewhat naively, that by supporting the creation of an Empire, the party had ensured that Badenese Catholics would be more protected than under the rule of the Badenese government. Hence, to support unification did not represent a capitulation to Prussian interests, but rather a careful plan to protect both the interest of the Church and the Badenese fatherland. In a similar fashion to other Catholic sentiments around the state, it was clear that Catholics in Heidelberg were not completely satisfied with how unification had taken place. However, given the current circumstances, the creation of the *Kaiserreich* constituted the most attractive political alternative.<sup>26</sup>

Although Catholics in Heidelberg displayed slightly different sentiments towards German unification than did some of their brethren in Freiburg and Konstanz, it was still evident that they did not consider the Second Empire the ideal solution to the German question. As *Pfälzer Bote* reported in a subdued manner on the celebrations following the proclamation of the Empire in Versailles, they claimed that though this was a great day for Germany, Catholics would liked to have see an Austrian Emperor at the head of the German Empire. However, they also argued that it really did not matter what they wanted; instead, they had to accept that the German fatherland needed Wilhelm to be its Emperor, and thus every true German needed to support him. The paper maintained that people in Heidelberg, both Catholics and Protestants, had greeted the news of the proclamation of the Empire in a very positive manner and that citizens had gathered as

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<sup>26</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, December 22, 1870.

Germans in the streets to celebrate this news. However, in the same article, they also noted that Catholics around Baden and Germany needed to be watchful as there were already rumors circulating about the recommencement of a *Kulturkampf*, but this time on a national scale. They quoted the Center Party leader Ludwig Windthorst, who warned that now when the French had been defeated, liberals and Protestants had turned their attention to the Catholics, who could expect many attacks in the coming years.<sup>27</sup> Thus, already from the very outset of the Second Empire, Catholics were uneasy about their existence in the new nation-state.<sup>28</sup>

In a similar fashion to the inhabitants of Freiburg and Konstanz, Catholics and Protestants in Heidelberg approached the Second Empire with different attitudes. While the latter viewed January 1871 as the beginning of a glorious time that would transform Germany into one of the most powerful states in Europe, Catholics were a bit more subdued. Of course, Catholics worried about the threat of a national *Kulturkampf*, but also about issues such as the status of the Pope in Rome.<sup>29</sup> The Catholic ambivalence towards this new political arrangement became clear very quickly. Even in the first few days after the foundation of the Empire, Catholics in Heidelberg focused on their fears rather than their hopes for the future.<sup>30</sup> Of course, the fact that Catholics in Heidelberg displayed trepidation before these new times, despite the fact that they had enjoyed a much greater degree of peace and harmony than other Catholics around the state, clearly

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<sup>27</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, January 21, 1871.

<sup>28</sup> For an example of some of these concerns, see for instance Anderson, *Windthorst*, 146-149.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> For example, *Pfälzer Bote*, January 23, 26, 1871.

illustrates the difficult situation Catholics faced in the Empire. Furthermore, it also proves that though Germany had just unified, the new nation-state was not cohesive and that the new national identity was far from stable.

In the beginning of February 1871, both Heidelberg Catholics and Protestants gathered in the streets of the city to commemorate the official capitulation of France. People hung flags on their houses, paraded in the streets, and celebrated this piece of news in a dignified and worthy manner. However, in the aftermath of this celebration, the city witnessed one of the few recorded incidents of public manifestations of anti-Catholic sentiments. In the morning hours of February 2, three drunken men tried to set fire to a local Catholic's house, claiming that he belonged to the "blacks." They failed in their attempts to burn down the house and were subsequently arrested by the police. *Pfälzer Bote* noted that it was unfortunate that some did not understand how to celebrate patriotic occasions and that they were saddened that an act by a few people would ruin the celebration for others.<sup>31</sup> However, other than these relatively mild statements, the Catholic daily did not spend any more time on this incident, which again illustrates the relatively amicable relationship between the two confessions. In other cities, this type of event attracted great attention from Catholics and Protestants alike, and the two confessions would use the occasion to debate the national character of the opposing confession. Also, it should be noted that this was the only incident of anti-Catholic behavior that the local press reported, which is quite different from the frequent attacks that Catholics around the state had to endure. Given the anti-Catholic sentiments that

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<sup>31</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, February 4, 1871.

were evident in both Freiburg and Konstanz, it appears as if Catholics in Heidelberg were in a different situation compared to their brethren in other parts of the state.

Of course, this did not mean that Heidelberg Catholics were completely immune to the abuse that was taking place around Baden and Germany. Following the first elections to the German Parliament in February 1871, *Pfälzer Bote* claimed that it had long been clear that the Catholics would lose since the election districts were divided up in an unfair manner that benefited the national liberals.<sup>32</sup> Protestants and national-liberals argued that the decline in Catholic political power since the elections to the Customs Union in 1868 proved that Catholics were opposed to the new nation-state and that voters had punished the Catholic parties for their anti-German policies.<sup>33</sup> However, according to *Pfälzer Bote*, this decline in political power was not due to voters' disapproval of the Catholic political message; instead, the decrease in political power could be attributed solely to the new election districts.<sup>34</sup> The national-liberals and Protestants countered this argument by maintaining that it was evident that Catholics were anti-German and that they longed for the preunification days.<sup>35</sup> These were not uncommon sentiments as Protestants and national-liberals used any type of Catholic criticism of the new political conditions as evidence that they were opposed to the foundation of the Empire. *Pfälzer Bote* also argued that the national-liberals had been very successful in using the

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<sup>32</sup> See also Hans-Jürgen Kremer, ed., *Mitt Gott für Wahrheit, Freiheit und Recht: Quellen zur Organisation und Politik der Zentrumsparterie und des politischen Katholizismus in Baden 1888-1914* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1983), 41-42.

<sup>33</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, March 6, 1871.

<sup>34</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, March 11, 16, 1871.

<sup>35</sup> *Heidelberger Zeitung*, March 8, 1871.

unification as a means to achieve success in the first parliamentary election.<sup>36</sup> As was the case in other areas of Baden, national-liberals did very well in these first elections, and many viewed it as a confirmation that Germans subscribed to their notion of unification as the apex of a teleological view of history. Of course, this view of history as a straight line leading up to unification was a complete construct as even the Protestant national-liberals had been opposed to Bismarck and his annexationist policies until after the war of 1866. Still, the tone between Catholics and Protestants in Heidelberg was much more conciliatory than in Freiburg and Konstanz. To be sure, there were many instances where both camps engaged in hostile rhetoric, but the changing of the political discourse to include nationalist rhetoric adopted from the war did not happen as quickly here as it did in other parts of Baden. As will become evident later, these antagonistic notions actually become more popular later in the *Kaiserreich*, though they never reached the same heights as they did in other parts of the state.

### **Additional Catholic Displays of an Alternative National Identity**

Catholics in Heidelberg also used the twenty-fifth anniversary in June 1871 of Pius IX's election as Pope as a way of publicly manifesting their presence in the public sphere. However, celebrations were not as extensive as they were in other parts of the state, and they were met with a lot less resistance from Protestants in the city.<sup>37</sup> Although it is of course difficult to pinpoint exactly why Protestants were less inclined to oppose

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<sup>36</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, March 11, 1871.

<sup>37</sup> It is interesting to note that during the days surrounding the twenty-fifth anniversary, *Heidelberger Zeitung* completely ignored these events. In both Konstanz and Freiburg, the Protestant press used this occasion to label Catholics anti-German, whose *Heimat* was located in Rome and not in Germany.

these public manifestations of Catholic identity, it should be noted that Protestants in Heidelberg seemed to be generally more inclined to accept a Catholic version of Germanness. The Protestant approach towards these events was more similar to the ones during the last two decades of the Empire when the economic, political, and cultural power relationship between the two confessions was more equal. Thus, it would seem as if Protestants were better prepared to accept the Catholic version of national identity when the relationship between the two confessions was more equal. Of course, it should also be noted that throughout the nineteenth century, Heidelberg had not served as a bastion of Church power, which had been the case in both Freiburg and Konstanz. In those cities, Protestants were still determined to strip the Catholic Church of as much power as possible, which reflected earlier events during the nineteenth century. Since this was not the case in Heidelberg, Protestants were more inclined to ignore Catholic displays of identity.

In the days leading up to the June 16 anniversary, *Pfälzer Bote* argued that Catholics around Germany and in Heidelberg should use this opportunity to display their gratitude towards the Pope for his great leadership during these difficult times. Catholics argued that this celebration constituted a good opportunity for them to display how strong and united they were, despite some of the problems that they were encountering on the national level.<sup>38</sup> Once again, Catholics in Heidelberg were not too critical of the situation in their own city, but they noted that Catholics were quickly labeled second-class citizens in the new nation-state.

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<sup>38</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, June 15, 1871.

On June 16, 1871, local Catholics gathered in the city and organized a march to a cross dedicated to Archbishop Hermann von Vicari on the Leitenberg outside the city. *Pfälzer Bote* reported that the city's local Casino association had organized the celebration and that people had followed the lead of the city's leading Catholic dignitaries in displaying their strong support for the embattled Pope. Most of the coverage focused on the fact that German Catholics now more than ever needed to support the Pope since other European Catholics, most notably the French, were abandoning him. Also, though the paper discussed the celebrations in Heidelberg, it spilled far more ink describing the celebrations in Freiburg and Rome. As with many other events during this time, by publishing detailed accounts of events in other cities, the paper helped to create an imagined community of Catholics. Throughout the *Kaiserreich*, the Catholic press made good use of this new means of creating and consolidating identities. By publishing accounts of different events and trends that pertained to the Catholic experience in the Second Empire, Catholic newspapers served as extremely valuable tools to create a sense of strength and cohesion among the state's population. This phenomenon was not only evident in conjunction with various commemorations but also during the *Kulturkampf*. Newspapers around the state would keep a close eye on what was transpiring in other communities, and reports from around the state became pivotal in strengthening the Catholic community, particularly in times of crisis and turmoil. In addition, considering that the Catholics in Heidelberg did not have the same kind of exuberant celebrations that took place in other areas of the state, it was useful for them to be able to partake in these events, even if it was just via a newspaper

account. In their reporting, *Pfälzer Bote* was careful to point out that the Pope had reacted very favorably to the Catholic display of support and that this event had strengthened the Catholic community.<sup>39</sup> As a matter of fact, the celebrations in Heidelberg became almost secondary to the ones in Rome and Freiburg. By focusing much of their attention of other events around the state, *Pfälzer Bote* confirmed that though Heidelberg Catholics were in a relatively favorable position compared to many other Catholics around the state, they still needed to be aware of how Catholics in other areas were treated.

Another example of creating and strengthening the imagined community of Catholics appeared in *Pfälzer Bote* a few days later. In their June 20, 1871, issue, the paper discussed the recently published book, *Der Staat und die Kirche im Grossherzogtum Baden seit dem Jahre 1860*, by Prof. Albert Friedberg. This book was heavily critical of the Catholic Church and adopted a very pro-Protestant and national-liberal stance. It was not uncommon for Catholic papers to discuss works that were either strongly pro- or anti-Catholic, and these discussions served an important function in strengthening the Catholic community. In addition to alerting citizens to newly published works, these discussions also informed Catholics about what constituted the official Catholic view of a certain issue. Also, these types of discussion also strengthened the Catholic imagined community. As noted above, these types of discussions would enable leading Catholics to educate their constituents and it ultimately served as an extremely important tool to create a more cohesive community.

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<sup>39</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, June 17, 1871.



For two days, *Pfälzer Bote* analyzed Prof. Friedberg's arguments. He claimed that by having to constantly fight the Catholic Church, the Badenese state had been hindered in its economic, cultural, and political development. Furthermore, he maintained that the Church was too powerful and that if Baden wanted to modernize, the government needed to reduce clerical influence. The paper reported that most of the book focused on a comparison of Prussia and Baden, and given the fact that the author was Prussian, it was no surprise that he was very critical of Baden's perceived lack of development.<sup>40</sup>

*Pfälzer Bote* used Friedberg's arguments to manifest the ill-treatment of Badenese Catholics since 1860. They claimed that though the church laws of 1860 should have guaranteed the safety of the church and the freedom of religion for all citizens, the government had failed to implement these laws correctly. The paper outlined the various abuses that the clergy had been exposed to ever since the national-liberals had come to power. They were especially critical of the *Staatsexamen*, which had done more damage to the Catholic cause than any other law. The paper also chronicled some of the most famous cases of government mistreatment of Catholics. This was another useful way of ensuring that Catholics were aware of the injustices that were being done to them around the state and nation. Especially for Catholics in Heidelberg, who were not exposed to the same mistreatment as many of their brethren, these accounts were valuable tools to strengthen the Catholic community. Last, the paper tied this discussion into the context of the creation of a national identity by criticizing Friedberg's defense of the state's right

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<sup>40</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, June 20, 1871.

to ban certain female orders. *Pfälzer Bote* maintained that these Catholics represented the German spirit better than anybody else and that the state was depriving itself of some of its best assets. This was an argument that constantly resurfaced in these discussions. Catholics maintained that they were the best representatives and defenders of the German national spirit, and by attacking and banning these orders, Protestants were undermining the German national character. Hence, though this issue was not directly related to war and unification, it became tied into the newly popularized nationalist discourse.

### **Construction of a *Kriegerdenkmal* in Heidelberg**

A comprehensive analysis of the commemorative activities that immediately followed the unification of the Second Empire is difficult because of the limited sources. Available sources do, however, provide some insight into how Heidelberg Catholics viewed the foundation of the *Kaiserreich* and the immediate postunification period. In a similar fashion to the other cities analyzed in this work, the city of Heidelberg also decided to construct a monument to honor the efforts of German and local soldiers in the Franco-Prussian War. On June 19, 1871, the Heidelberg city council decided to construct a plaque to honor the local soldiers who had died in the war against France. On the same date, city council officials also decided that they would set aside a special place for these soldiers in the city's most prestigious graveyard.<sup>41</sup> However, after additional discussion, they revised their plans on July 5. Instead of just producing a plaque, they would

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<sup>41</sup> Stadtarchiv Heidelberg (St. AH hereafter), Heidelberger Uraltaktien (HUA) 158-3, Die Errichtung eines Denkmals für die Gefallene im Deutsch-Französischen Krieg 1870-1871, protocol from city council meeting, July 5, 1871.

construct a monument. Although city council records show no indication of the reason for this change, it is pretty safe to assume that since many other Badenese and German states were constructing monuments, the Heidelberger city council did not want to appear unpatriotic by just donating a plaque. Recognizing the expensive nature of this project, the city council agreed to pay for the entire monument by guaranteeing 3,000 Gulden. (This was less than half what Konstanz spent for their monument, and obviously much less than the cost for the *Siegesdenkmal*.) It is also noteworthy that the city did not ask the general population for donations. Instead, the city's elite donated an additional several hundred Guldens, which the city used as part of the payment for the monument. In a speech to the city council, Mayor Schnetzler remarked that because the victorious war had brought national unification, locals must never forget the military and civilian sacrifices. He noted that even as he spoke, there were soldiers in the hospital who had not yet recovered from wounds suffered in the war and that the city and its inhabitants needed to honor these men in an appropriate manner.<sup>42</sup>

A committee was appointed to spearhead the project, led by city councilors Bauernfeind, Desaga, Mays, and Trübner. During the first few months of 1872, they invited artists to produce models of the proposed monument. After much debate, they decided that the local artist Hermann Behagel would receive the honor of designing the monument. Continuing with the local theme, they entrusted local *Bildhauer* Franz Sommer with the construction of the monument.<sup>43</sup> Behagel's winning entry consisted of

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<sup>42</sup> St. AH, HUA 158-3, protocol from city council meeting meeting, December 12, 1871.

<sup>43</sup> *Geschichte und Beschreibung des Krieger-Denkmal in Heidelberg* (Heidelberg: Georg Mohr, 1873), 9.

a three-tiered monument composed of red sandstone. On two sides of the monument, the names of the 157 German soldiers who were buried in Heidelberg were listed. Only four of these soldiers hailed from Heidelberg, but by listing all the soldiers who were buried on the Heidelberg cemetery, the city council ensured that the monument assumed a national as well as regional character. This was important as it served to integrate further the city into the national landscape of monuments. On the other two sides, the monument displayed the *Reichsadler* as well as several wreaths and cannon balls. The top consisted of an obelisk with an elaborate design that contained cannon balls and wreaths. Under one of the wreaths, an inscription listed: “In memory of the German soldiers buried here who fought for the honor and unity of the fatherland in the years 1870-1871. Dedicated by the city of Heidelberg.”<sup>44</sup>

Although Sommer completed the monument in November 1872, the city council decided to postpone its unveiling to the spring to ensure better weather for the ceremony. Contrary to most other unveiling ceremonies around Baden and Germany, the general population was not invited to attend. The ceremony took place on the graveyard where the monument was located. Because space was limited on the site of the monument, only a select number of individuals were invited. Coupled with the fact that there had been no donations from the general population, this underscored the fact that the monument was not a mass-based one. Compared to most other monuments analyzed in this work, common citizens in Heidelberg, whether Catholic or Protestant, had no influence on what the monument would look like, where it would be located, or who would pay for it. To

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 10.

be sure, there were representatives from all major groups of the city, such as the clergy, students, politicians, important businessmen, as well as military officials from Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden. In addition, about twenty relatives of the fallen soldiers had made the trip to Heidelberg and were made honorary guests at the ceremony. However, despite the fact that these people marched in a parade from the center of the city out to the cemetery, which was located outside the immediate city center, popular participation in this project remained limited. Contemporary sources made no reference to any significant popular reception of the monument, which is important. Usually, in order to emphasize that these types of monuments represented popular sentiments, contemporaries were careful to stress that the general population had responded very well to a certain monument. On this occasion, however, it seems as if the monument in Heidelberg was comparatively disassociated from the everyday citizen.

Mayor Krausmann held the plenary speech at the unveiling. After a brief recap of the war, he recounted how the city council in June 1871 had decided to honor the great sacrifice that these Germans had offered the fatherland. He claimed that this monument constituted the least that civilians could do, especially since they were now reaping the benefits of the soldiers' heroics. Furthermore, there were many German soldiers who perished in the war and were not able to witness the glorious achievement that they had accomplished. He also noted that the monument struck a nice balance between the local and national since it honored the efforts of German soldiers from many different areas of the nation-state. Thus, the monument could be seen as a sign of the new national spirit that was spreading across Germany and that had contributed to the successful foundation

of the Empire. The mayor also claimed that the monument would always serve as a reminder of how grateful Germans should be for the unified Empire and how the heroics of these soldiers had answered the prayers of German patriots. The monument should also remind people that the city of Heidelberg was very grateful for what Germans from every part of the country did for their fatherland. Hence, the city should serve as a guiding light for some of the other German cities that had not yet honored the German soldiers in a fitting way.<sup>45</sup> After the mayor had concluded his speech, a Protestant and Catholic priest held two separate prayers. The Catholic priest, Wilfried Herbst, remarked that city inhabitants must never forget the sacrifices made by these people and that the efforts of these men fulfilled the dreams that Germans had held for several centuries. The ceremony ended with the Protestant clergyman Hermann Schellenberg noting that although it was unfortunate that these people had perished in the service of the fatherland, people could rest assured that they were in a better place.<sup>46</sup>

Although this monument was constructed around the same time as some of the other ones that have been analyzed in this work, the one in Heidelberg represented a different type of monument. First of all, because the general population was not invited to participate to any great extent in the planning and/or construction process, the population struggled to identify with the monument.<sup>47</sup> Throughout history, it has always been easier for people to identify with monuments that are perceived to be truly popular.

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 12-13.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>47</sup> Neither archival sources nor newspapers mention any parades out to the monument on national holidays, events that were commonplace in both Konstanz and Freiburg.

In addition, because the monument was placed on the outskirts of the city, it was not readily accessible for Heidelbergers. While the *Siegesdenkmal* in Freiburg was located in the immediate city center, that was not the case in Heidelberg, which made it even more difficult to popularize the monument. This monument was also slightly different because it was designed to honor both local soldiers as well as soldiers from other parts of Germany. To be sure, the people behind the *Siegesdenkmal* attempted to portray it as a national monument as well, but as was evident in the analysis of its symbolism, that was not the case. Both the *Siegesdenkmal* and the monument in Konstanz were more located in the local context. Once again, this serves as an illustration of the fact that the city of Heidelberg, due to its geographic location, was not as provincial as Konstanz and Freiburg. One thing that is clear is that the monument did not attract the same kind of controversy and/or attention as some of the other ones did. This was something that was constructed by the city elite and it does not appear as if it ever became part of the popular consciousness. Thus, as has been evident throughout these discussions, the memory of the Franco-Prussian War and the unification was not as contested in Heidelberg as it was in other areas of the state. While citizens in Konstanz and Freiburg employed the newly popularized nationalist discourse to intensify existing conflicts, locals in Heidelberg initially remained relatively unaffected of the divisive effects of the nationalist discourse.

Despite the limited sources that obstruct the view of how Catholics and Protestants viewed the unification and initial years of the Second Empire in Heidelberg, it is still evident that the relationship between the two confessions was more amicable in the 1860s and 1870s than it was in both Konstanz and Freiburg. Because the city had a more

even distribution between the two major confessions, they seem to have enjoyed a better relationship. Also, as was seen above, the fact that Heidelberg had never been a bastion of Catholic clerical power certainly helped their citizens to a better relationship with their Protestant counterparts. While Protestants and liberals in Konstanz and Freiburg were intent on stripping away as much power as possible from the once-so-powerful Catholic church, no such trends were evident in Heidelberg. Naturally, the Protestant and liberal actions in Konstanz and Freiburg ensured that the relationship between state and church, as well as between Protestants and Catholics, was quite uneasy. However, the absence of these types of conflicts in Heidelberg meant that the two major confessions were able to coexist in a much more peaceful manner. Largely because of these reasons, Catholics in Heidelberg enjoyed a smoother and less conflict-ridden integration into the Second Empire, though conflicts between Catholics and Protestants certainly existed there as well. Of course, this does not mean that Heidelberg Catholics simply changed their identities to German in January 1871, but the lack of strong conflicts between Catholics and Protestants meant that the city's Catholics had one less element to contend with as they negotiated their new national identity in the postunification period.

Although Catholics and Protestants in the city enjoyed a more amicable relationship, there certainly existed conflicts between Catholics and Protestants, and people did try to construct different memories of the Franco-Prussian War and unification, particularly towards the end of the nineteenth century. For instance, the controversies surrounding the celebrations of Bismarck's eightieth birthday in 1895 caused some Heidelberg Catholics to lament how poorly treated they had been and how



their brethren had suffered during the war. However, these alternative memories were created in retrospect and did not adequately reflect reality. Although some of these sentiments certainly reflected how some Catholics experienced the war and unification, contemporary sources really do not support these notions. One of the reasons why Catholics in Heidelberg were more likely in the 1890s to complain about the conditions during the 1860s and 1870s was the fact that by the 1890s Catholics had been able to form a much stronger consciousness, largely due to the *Kulturkampf* and the advent of a more developed Catholic press and associational life. Scholars have documented how the *Kulturkampf* served to strengthen Catholic identity rather than weaken it, and the Catholic press and associational life also served to create a more homogeneous Catholic identity. Hence, during the 1880s and into the 1890s, Catholics all around the state of Baden became acutely aware of how they had been mistreated by local Protestants and/or the state. Thus, even if they lived in a community that enjoyed amicable confessional relations, by the 1890s, the stronger Catholic consciousness would enable them to be more aligned with some of the other sentiments in the state. Consequently, when they constructed the memory of the unification twenty years later, they tended to emphasize the more adverse aspects of the Franco-Prussian War and the immediate postunification period, though this might not reflect adequately the situation in their city. Indeed, one of the things that should be taken away from this chapter is the fact that though the Catholic experience in Baden had many common elements to it, there were certain differences between areas as well, especially in the first few years of the Second Empire. Catholics in Freiburg and Konstanz faced different circumstances than the ones in Heidelberg,

which caused slightly different experiences. After the conclusion of the *Kulturkampf*, Catholics around the state exhibited a more cohesive identity, but as was seen in this chapter, at the time of the unification, Catholics around Baden displayed slight differences in how they approached the commemorative discourse surrounding unification. It should also be noted that the fact that Protestants in Heidelberg refrained from launching into too many of the customary anti-Catholic tirades also meant that the nationalist discourse was more stable and less contested. It was not until later in the *Kaiserreich*, when Catholics in Heidelberg had become fully aware of the injustices done to their brethren around the state, that they engaged fully the Protestant ideological message that surrounded much of the commemorative discourse.

Despite these differences, however, there were certain elements that united Catholics around the state. The next chapter will primarily chronicle Catholic resistance against the Sedan Day, which was a holiday that Catholics around the Empire vehemently opposed. Thus, though Catholics around Baden reacted slightly differently to unification, there were still certain Protestant ideological messages that they all opposed and that in the end aided them in manifesting their own version of German national identity.

## CHAPTER 6

### CREATING ANOTHER KIND OF GERMAN: CATHOLIC OPPOSITION TO SEDAN DAY

During the 1870s and '80s, Badenese Catholics responded in a variety of ways to the official attempts to exclude them from the commemorative discourse surrounding war and unification. This chapter will investigate the most contested of the commemorations: Sedan Day. This celebration merits a closer analysis for a number of reasons. First of all, it created more controversy than any other public ceremony in the immediate postunification period. Second, the debates that ensued in the wake of these conflicts serve as excellent representations of many of the issues that Protestants and Catholics contested as they embarked on the nation-building project. In conjunction with these discussions, we will also examine other public celebrations such as specific battle commemorations and imperial birthdays, which at first glance might not seem to be related to war commemorations. However, closer investigation of these events reveals that city elites utilized a variety of different public celebrations, not all of them directly related to wars, to construct an official memory of wars and unification. War and unification tended to dominate the discourse at most public events, and especially since control of the public space became increasingly important to Catholics and Protestants, they debated these issues in a variety of settings. For instance, the ideological message surrounding imperial birthdays placed

great emphasis on the rulers' roles as *Germans*, and their specific contributions to the unification process. Thus, Catholics faced a difficult choice in how to approach these celebrations. On the one hand, they wanted to express their devotion to the Emperor, but on the other, most of the rhetoric at these events was tinged with strong anti-Catholic sentiments. This discussion will also trace how Catholic attitudes towards the official commemorative discourse changed as the nineteenth century drew to a close. Some of these changes stemmed from the changing political conditions as the National Liberal Party struggled to retain their grip on political power. As Catholics were able to play more important political and economic roles in the Second Empire, they were better able to manifest their own sense of Germanness. To be able to understand fully some of the changes in Catholic attitudes towards the official commemorative discourse, a brief overview of some of the most important political developments is necessary.

### **Badenese Political and Religious Developments, 1871-1914**

During the first few years of the Second Empire, the national-liberals under their controversial leader Julius Jolly dominated Badenese politics. Popular among the state's Protestants and liberals, Jolly's embrace of the *Kulturkampf* alienated Catholics throughout the state. Strengthened by the passing of the May laws in 1873, he categorically refused to negotiate with the EO and passed many decrees regulating the activity of the Church. He shut down most seminaries, imprisoned a majority of Catholic priests, and granted extensive rights to Old Catholics. All of these measures

divided the state and distanced the Catholic majority from the government's political program.<sup>1</sup>

Despite the political hegemony of the national-liberals, Jolly's hard-line policies eventually alienated many Protestants as well. Although most Protestants supported the liberal attacks on the Catholic Church, and though the Protestant community in Baden was much more cohesive than in most other areas of Germany, Jolly's actions finally became too much for some Protestants. As the minister president pushed hard for the complete abolishing of confessional schools, Grand Duke Friedrich, considerably concerned about the increasingly hostile relationship between Catholics and Protestants, only agreed to sign the law into effect if Jolly consented to resign. Understanding that to continue as minister president would be impossible without the support of the Grand Duke, Jolly resigned on September 21, 1876.<sup>2</sup> This event signified a turning point in the relationship between Baden's Catholics and the state.

Friedrich appointed Ludwig Turban to replace Jolly. Contemporaries considered Turban a moderate politician who had remained in the background during most of the struggles between the church and state. Turban and Friedrich cooperated to staff the new administration with ministers such as Franz Ludwig Stösser, who were willing to abolish some of the more draconian measures of the *Kulturkampf*. To the state's Catholics, these decisions cemented and increased the popularity of the Grand

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<sup>1</sup> Schwarzmeier, *Handbuch der Baden-Württembergischen Geschichte*, 173-175.

<sup>2</sup> Becker, *Liberaler Staat und Kirche*, 364-365.

Duke. People around the state praised him for removing Jolly and recognizing the need to normalize relations between Catholics and Protestants.<sup>3</sup> This reinforced the already popular notion that Friedrich never really had been aware of the poor treatment that Catholics suffered at the hands of Jolly and his accomplices.<sup>4</sup>

While the dismissal of Jolly indicated a slight change in religious policies, the Badenese *Kulturkampf* remained in effect, and it was not until 1879 that conditions began to change. Once again, it was the Grand Duke's distress over the religious situation that prompted an improvement for the state's Catholics. At the end of the 1870s, due to the effects of the *Examensgesetz*, 416 Catholic parishes did not have a priest.<sup>5</sup> Concerned about the obvious plight of many of his Catholic subjects, Friedrich was determined to bring the state and the Catholic Church to the negotiating table. Although Lothar von Kübel was initially reluctant to agree to some of the conditions of the proposed compromise, the improved relationship between Berlin and the Vatican following the death of Pius IX and the succession of Leo XIII enabled more fruitful negotiations. In 1880, after lengthy talks, the *Examsgesetz* was changed in a manner acceptable to both parties. This compromise helped normalize relations between Catholics and Protestants. Within a relatively short time, the majority of vacant parishes had been filled, which appeased Badenese Catholics and removed

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 366-367.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 367.

some of the aversion towards the state.<sup>6</sup>

Kübel's unexpected death in August 1881 provided the two sides with an opportunity to further improve their relationship. In the light of the recent successful cooperation, both church and state were keen to fill the Archbishop seat in Freiburg, which had been vacant since the death of Herman von Vicari in 1868. Further facilitating a compromise was the altered political landscape. Although the national-liberals were still in control of the government, their support was steadily decreasing. Whereas they had received over fifty percent of the votes in the elections between 1871-1877, in the beginning of the 1880s, their numbers had declined to around forty percent. Indeed, in the 1881 elections, they failed for the first time since 1859 to obtain an absolute majority in the second chamber of the parliament.<sup>7</sup> Contemporaries debated the reasons for this loss. Many liberals argued that the easing of the *Kulturkampf* had produced a number of new, strongly antiliberal priests who had reasserted control over their parish members. Although many subscribed to this convenient explanation for the party's recent struggles, the reasons were more complicated. First of all, the enormous success that the party had enjoyed for the better part of two decades had made its leaders complacent. They no longer participated with equal vigor in the election campaigns and often ignored the issues voters considered important. Furthermore, the economic depression that hit the state and the rest of Germany after 1873 had caused a general loss of faith in liberal

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 367-368.

<sup>7</sup> Hug, *Geschichte Badens*, 287.

economic policies. Both the Catholic Party and the conservatives had focused much of their election campaigns on the economic issues, and the former even avoided religious questions to concentrate on the poor standard of living.

After drawn-out negotiations, Johann Baptist Orbin was elected new Archbishop in 1882. Orbin placed emphasis on improving the relationship with the Badenese liberals and Protestants. Especially during his first few years as Archbishop, he remained rather passive in religious matters, an approach that significantly improved the relationship with the state. He employed a careful approach in his negotiations with the state. Instead of presenting a long list of demands, which had been the frequent habit of his predecessors, he elected to concentrate on one issue at the time. The government responded favorably to his overtures and permitted re-opening of new seminaries in Freiburg, Konstanz, and Tauerbischofsheim, in addition to scaling back the rights of the Old Catholics.<sup>8</sup> Although the increased cooperation with the government aided the Catholics in their quest to revoke all of the *Kulturkampf* legislation, it also presented them with a political dilemma. No longer able to base their party ideology solely on resistance to the government's policies, they needed to redefine their political identity. The ensuing debates regarding the character of the party greatly diminished popular support for the party. Thus, though the religious situation improved considerably, Catholics were not able to take political advantage of these developments

Orbin became Archbishop at age seventy-five, and his death five years later

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<sup>8</sup> Lauer, *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche*, 329-335.



therefore came as no surprise. He was quickly replaced with the Bishop of Limburg, Johann Christian Roos. The latter enjoyed a reputation as a peaceful man, intent on improving the relationship between church and state, much like his predecessor. Initially, he lived up to the expectations that the government had placed on him; however, after Prussia repealed the vast majority of its *Kulturkampf* laws in 1887, he became much more politically active. Roos used the increasing growth of the social-democrats as a powerful argument why it was so important for church and state to cooperate as much as possible. The new minister responsible for cultural and religious affairs, Wilhelm Nock, presented a series of suggestions for a compromise between the two sides. Although the government did not reject all the legislation passed during the *Kulturkampf*, they eliminated key decrees and debated passing some new legislation favorable to Catholics. Among the more important ones was a recommendation to permit members of religious orders, who were still banned in Baden, to conduct charity work. While the Parliament rejected this particular law, it passed many others, which helped to improve the situation for Catholic clergy and laity in the state.<sup>9</sup> Although the Church was satisfied with the concessions, the laws voted into effect in July 1888 did not mean that the tension between Catholics, Protestants, and the state had come to an end. Many *Kulturkampf* laws were still in effect, though they were not enforced with the same rigor.

Similarly to the national *Kulturkampf*, the Badenese version ultimately failed. Despite the fact that the state created great problems for the Catholic Church, the

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 337-339.

resistance offered by both the EO as well as Catholic laity made it impossible for the state to complete their agenda. Indeed, most of these measures strengthened Catholic communities as they united to meet the state's challenge.

Although national-liberals were vulnerable to political attacks during the late 1870s and the 1880s, struggles within the Catholic Party over how to approach the ending of the *Kulturkampf* prevented the latter from taking full advantage of the situation. In the Catholic Party, Theodor Wacker led the faction advocating a hard-line approach to the issue, whereas Frans Xaver Lender supported a more conciliatory approach to the liberal government.<sup>10</sup> The debates grew increasingly hostile until a public argument during the 1885 election campaign completely severed the relationship between the two sides. After realizing that Lender enjoyed more support within the party, Wacker officially resigned his seat while refusing to recognize the legitimacy of Lender's faction. Although the Catholic Party had enjoyed an increasing amount of support, these disputes undermined their credibility among the population. Thus, in the 1887 election, they only managed to acquire nine seats. This poor result forced Lender to retire from politics and created a power vacuum within the party. In 1888, Wacker, together with the prominent Freiburger lawyer Ludwig Marbe, staged a number of rallies throughout Baden to try to revive support for their version of political Catholicism. Wacker's speech at the General Assembly of Catholics in Freiburg in 1888 marked his ascendancy to power and the beginning of a reorganization of the party. He stressed the need to maintain the strong opposition

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<sup>10</sup> Kremer, *Mitt Gott für Wahrheit, Freiheit und Recht*, 25, 32-33, 116-117.

towards the National Liberal Party, especially since so many of the *Kulturkampf* laws were still in effect. Seeking to integrate the Badenese party more fully into the national party structure, he also managed to supervise a name change to the *Badische Zentrumspartei* (Badenese Center Party). Wacker immediately embarked on a reorganization of the party structure, creating three party centers in Konstanz, Freiburg, and Heidelberg. Under his leadership, the party transformed itself from a *Weltanschauungspartei* into more of a *Intressenpartei*, which was more apt to gain political support. Already in 1891, his efforts brought significant results as the party improved its share of seats in the Parliament from nine to twenty-one.<sup>11</sup>

Consequently, when Nokk replaced Turban as minister president in March 1893, the national-liberals were on the defensive. In the elections a few months later, they lost additional seats to the Catholics, which meant that they no longer possessed a majority in the state parliament. Instead, the opposition occupied thirty-three of the sixty-three seats. More importantly, the liberals were unable to reverse this negative trend. Catholics, social-democrats, and conservatives continued to gain seats, and in the mid-1890s, the liberals “only” possessed about forty percent of the seats, a very low number by their standards.<sup>12</sup>

Although religious issues still played a major role in Badenese politics, much of the political life around the turn of the century focused on the need for electoral reform. Catholics and social democrats were the most fervent supporters of some type

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 35-36.

<sup>12</sup> Landeszentrale, ed., *Badische Geschichte*, 82-83.

of reform. In a similar fashion to the rest of Germany, the Badenese liberal *Honoratioren* experienced difficulties adapting to the new mass politics that began to develop in the 1890s.<sup>13</sup> They often complained that if the election system was to be changed according to the wishes of the Catholics and the social-democrats, the lower house would soon be overflowing with members from the lower classes. During the last few years of the century, all major parties offered different suggestions as to how the election system should be altered. Eventually, it was the resignation of Nokk in 1900, who had been one of the staunchest opponents of direct elections, which paved the way for a compromise. During the next three years, representatives from all parties debated the best way to redraw the Badenese constitution. The result was a substantial change of the political system. The introduction of direct, universal (male) suffrage once again placed Baden at the forefront of liberal reform. Both the first and second chambers were expanded and the election districts were redrawn to better represent the new urban society. The special privileges held by nobility and clergy in the first chambers were removed. These provisions ensured that the political life would take on a new shape after 1905.<sup>14</sup>

The fact that elections of representatives to the chambers were to be determined in main and run-off elections opened the possibility for new electoral alliances. In the past, the common opposition to the national-liberals had preserved the harmony among the opposition parties. With the uncertainty about how voters

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.; Hug, *Geschichte Badens*, 287.

<sup>14</sup> Hug, *Geschichte Badens*, 289.

would behave in this new system, the national-liberals became increasingly interested in ensuring support from especially the *Freisinn* and the Democratic Party. The negotiations between the three parties resulted in a pact in which they all agreed not to participate in certain election districts. Both the social-democrats and the Catholic Center remained aloof from these negotiations and conducted independent campaigns.

After the first round of elections, it appeared that the Center Party was headed for an absolute majority—they only needed to win nine of the twenty-three seats that had to be determined in run-off elections. Catholics across the state were jubilant, as it appeared as if they had finally placed themselves in a position to enjoy significant political power. However, to the great surprise of political analysts everywhere, the national-liberals and social-democrats now entered an alliance that all but doomed the Center's chances of reaching a majority. As the result of the run-off elections came in, the Center had failed to win a single seat. Although they were still the largest party, they were far away from a majority, and given the newfound cooperation among the social-democrats and the national-liberals, the prospect for political reform remained poor.

The formation of this so-called "*Grossblock*" caused strong reactions, and not only among the Catholics, who were incensed at this unholy alliance. Large parts of the bourgeoisie, as well as Grand Duke Friedrich, demanded an explanation how the national-liberal leadership had allowed such a dramatic increase in revolutionary influence to take place. Alexander Freiherr von Dusch, the national-liberal leader, tried to assure both the Grand Duke and the voters that this was an entirely pragmatic

alliance and that the social-democrats would not be able to exercise any major influence on the course of Badenese politics. For the Catholics, this alliance constituted a heavy blow. The exhilaration that they had experienced after the first round of elections had been quickly replaced by despair. Despite the remarkable growth in strength, the party would not be able to exercise any major influence on the course of state politics. The last decade prior to the outbreak of World War I was characterized by a political stalemate as passing of new decrees often was dependent upon the cooperation between social-democrats and national-liberals. Although this coalition experienced many problems, it performed better than might have been expected. Especially after the 1909 elections, the two parties proved that they were able to cooperate rather well, and they made sure to set aside any major conflicts and focus instead on issues that they agreed upon. Despite a remarkable amount of success, the last elections prior to the war in 1913 displayed an increase in the support for the Center, while the other major parties drew less support.<sup>15</sup>

As noted above, Catholics around the state were outraged at the alliance between social-democrats and national-liberals. Because Catholics had been able to cultivate their loyalties to the Badenese state in a much different manner since the dismantling of the *Kulturkampf*, this failure was even more hurtful. As will become evident in the discussions regarding Catholic attitudes towards various commemorations, it became increasingly clear that they felt more integrated into Baden and Germany as the nineteenth century drew to a close. The only major issue

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid.; Kremer, *Mitt Gott für Wahrheit, Freiheit und Recht*, 43-44.

of contention between the government and the Church was the ban on the religious orders that was still in effect. The increased political strength of the Center Party enabled the religious leadership to place increasing pressure on both the Grand Duke and the national-liberals. Aided by the number of Center representatives in the first and second chambers, the Church was able to revoke the ban on the missions in 1894; however, the orders were still not allowed to return. Despite presenting a number of different suggestions that would facilitate the return of the orders, the EO was not able to convince the government to change its stance.

Because of the struggles over the religious orders, the appointment of a new archbishop following the death of Roos in 1896 became hotly contested. After almost two years of negotiations and one failed appointment (Bishop Komp died on his way to Freiburg), the two sides agreed on Thomas Nörber from Baden-Baden.<sup>16</sup> The government and the Grand Duke expected him to exercise a calming influence on the agitation from the Center, but that proved false. After a few initial confrontations, Friedrich informed Nörber that he would have to help calm Wacker down before any meaningful negotiations could take place. Because Nörber's appointment was accompanied by a much milder rhetoric from Wacker, it seems likely that the new archbishop was able to convince the political leader to tone down some of his more aggressive argumentation. As a result of the improved relationships, in 1902, the liberal government even declared itself prepared to discuss the reopening of some of the monasteries and even the potential return of some of the religious orders.

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<sup>16</sup> Lauer, *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche*, 353-354.

However, though the liberal politicians might have been ready to accommodate the Catholics, large parts of society was not. The news that the government and the EO were entering negotiations regarding this issue ignited a storm of popular protests around the state. Indicating that the relationship between Protestant and Catholics still remained tense, the so-called *Klostersturm* attempted to influence the government. Refusing to give in to both popular pressure and the opposition of the Grand Duke, the minister president Arthur von Brauer began talks with the EO in 1903. Despite their determination to negotiate, it soon became clear that the government was only prepared to do it on its own terms. Thus, the EO quickly left the negotiating table, citing the inflexible stance of the government as their reason for abandoning the attempt to bring the orders back into the state.<sup>17</sup>

The formation of the *Grossblock* presented Badenese Catholics with an interesting situation. To be sure, they did not possess the political power that they thought they deserved; however, the fact that the social-democrats and the national-liberals differed significantly on the religious issue provided some potential leverage. However, they were unable to achieve any major victories, and the relationship between state and church was pretty uneventful during the last decade before the war. Although the Center Party was unable to facilitate the re-entry of the religious orders into Baden, their political situation had undergone a drastic change since the inception of the Second Empire. Badenese political Catholicism had developed from a disorganized and splintered movement into a major political force that exercised

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<sup>17</sup> Kremer, *Mitt Gott für Wahrheit, Freiheit und Recht*, 152-154.



considerable influence on the political process. As we shall see, this change also manifested itself in transformed Catholic attitudes towards the official rhetoric surrounding wars and unification. However, this change was a slow and often painful process as will become clearly evident in the analysis of Sedan Day.

### **Catholic Responses to Sedan Day**

The annual commemoration of the victory at Sedan proved to be one of the most contested celebrations in early Imperial Germany.<sup>18</sup> Although social-democrats and others abstained from participating, confessional and not class issues were at the forefront of the controversies. Protestants viewed the annual celebration of the military victory as an opportunity to shape the nascent nation-state according to the tenants of liberalism and *Kulturprotestantismus*. Especially during the first two decades of the *Kaiserreich*, the commemorations became manifestations of the supposedly close connection between nationalism and Protestantism. As part of their attempts to control the construction of Germanness, Protestants used this and other commemorations to establish a link between the wars of unification and their confession. This holiday became a vehicle for Protestants to assume the role of sole interpreters of the national history and national identity. They presented these ideas in a manner which supposedly made them incontestable; however, Catholics and others actively protested this view of German history and identity. Thus, few other

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<sup>18</sup> Excellent accounts of Sedan Day include: Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor*, 27-51; Lepp, "Protestanten feiern ihre Nation"; Schneider, *Politische Festkultur*.

commemorations caused more debates regarding the manner in which unification had been achieved and how to shape the new nation-state.

In Baden and other confessionally mixed areas, Sedan Day became an annual forum for contesting the nature of the German nation, and Catholics, Old Catholics, and Protestants clashed (sometimes violently) over what constituted a good German. An analysis of the debates surrounding this celebration will not only highlight the contested nature of Germanness but also reveal some of the methods that Catholics employed to display publicly their own view of the nation. Some scholars have argued that since Catholics seldom organized counter-demonstrations on September 2, they did not utilize Sedan Day to rally support to the same extent as social-democrats, who often staged alternative meetings on the very day of the celebration.<sup>19</sup> However, this interpretation fails to take into consideration the important role that the debates surrounding this annual celebration played in the Catholic community. By using the debates in the media, Catholics and others were able to propagate their own view of the German nation. This constitutes a good illustration of the fact that commemorations and corresponding debates served as more than a means of spreading an officially approved ideological message. Groups such as Catholics and social-democrats used these newly opened avenues of communication to criticize specific features of contemporary German society. These commemorations often enabled various groups to make their voices heard in a more efficient and public way than would otherwise have been the case.

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<sup>19</sup> To a certain extent, this view permeates Schneider's work.

Although receiving an increasing amount of scholarly attention during the past decade, the historiography of Sedan Day still contains significant gaps. Alon Confino and Ute Schneider have attempted to locate this commemoration in the wider context of the creation of a public culture, collective memory, and national narrative. However, neither has considered in depth the importance of the debates surrounding Sedan Day to the Catholic community, though Confino stresses the intimate connections between the Protestant-liberal view of the nation and the celebration. The history of Sedan Day represents yet another means that Protestants and liberals used in their attempts to shape the German nation-state according to their own values. Thus, in many Badenese communities, especially during the 1870s, the festivities became instruments in the fierce *Kulturkampf* that dominated most local societies. It was no coincidence that the popularity of Sedan celebrations concurred with the political dominance of the National Liberal Party. Local Protestant liberals employed these celebrations to affirm their dominant position in society and to appropriate the role as interpreters of Germany's national history. Although Confino is correct when arguing that liberals "...voiced their own ideas of Germany and of German history in a way that made these ideas incontestable....,"<sup>20</sup> he overstates the hegemony of the Protestant-liberal view of the national narrative. To be sure, most of the people who organized Sedan Day were members of their community elite, which lent a certain amount of authority to their message. However, because Confino's study centers on Württemberg, which did not experience a strong *Kulturkampf*, he overlooks the

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<sup>20</sup> Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor*, 58

centrality of confessional conflict to Sedan Day. In Baden, Catholics were quite successful in using the debates surrounding the ideological message that liberals and Protestants presented to manifest their own view of Germany's past and future. Here, the fact that Catholics had already experienced a harsh *Kulturkampf* aided them in their struggles with the Protestant-liberal elite. Already accustomed to discrimination and unjust treatment, Catholics did not let the political and economic power of their opponents prevent them from expressing an alternative sense of Germanness. Moreover, Catholics employed these debates to validate and legitimize their membership in the German imagined community. Although not actively participating in the festivities, Catholics used their opposition to Sedan Day to construct and exhibit notions of Germanness.

Almost immediately after the capture of Napoleon III, a number of Germans demanded that the nationalist exhilaration that had accompanied the military victory should be manifested in a ceremony. Members of the Protestant Association in Bremen first requested an annual celebration in which Germans could showcase their patriotism and love for the fatherland. During the first few months of 1871, the well-known lawyer Franz von Holtzendorff and Johann Caspar Bluntschli, the president of the Protestant Association, discussed initiating an “*allgemeine Volks und Kirchenfest*.”<sup>21</sup> During the 1860s, Bluntschli, located in Heidelberg, had become known as one of the fiercest advocates of the Badenese *Kulturkampf*. Although he and Holtzendorff initially claimed that the celebration would have an intra-

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<sup>21</sup> Quoted in Becker, *Liberaler Staat und Kirche*, 310.

confessional character, their private correspondence reveals their intentions to use it to exclude parts of the population from the German nation-building project. In a letter to Bluntschli in February 1871, Holtzendorff stated: “No law or parliamentary debate can damage the radicals, the socialists, the Jesuits, and the ultramontanes, as seriously as a *Volksfest*, in which people are annually reminded just who the founder of the Empire were, and who the enemies of the German Reich in 1870 were.”<sup>22</sup>

Fully aware of the importance of public celebrations to the nation-building project, Bluntschli suggested turning Sedan Day into a *Bürgerweihe* in which young Germans would pass through an acceptance ritual into the national community. However, Holtzendorff and others deemed these ideas to be too ambitious. Instead, under the auspices of Holtzendorff, eighty-eight liberal *Honoratioren* signed a petition to the Emperor, asking him to initiate an annual “*Volks-und Kirchenfest*.” Most of the signers came from Baden and included Grand Duke Friedrich I. In addition, the Grand Duke personally handed over petitions from forty-nine Badenese communities that supported Holtzendorff and Bluntschli’s initiative. Given the intense nature of the Badenese *Kulturkampf* during the 1860s and the Protestant domination of municipal politics, this level of support was not surprising. Despite these efforts, Wilhelm turned down their request. Although he had several different motives for his actions (one being his dislike of the Protestant Association), his official explanation was that a celebration such as this one should not be organized from above, but instead emerge spontaneously from the people.

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

Following this official rebuke, the Protestant minister Friedrich von Bodelschwingh took up the matter. During summer 1871, he circulated a similar, only more detailed, petition to communities in the Rhineland. His initiative attracted national attention, and local communities throughout Germany began planning a celebration of Sedan along similar lines of the commemoration of the victory at Leipzig in 1813. Only a few cities staged official festivities in 1871, but by 1872, most communities organized some form of celebration.

In Baden, Protestants and Catholics already from the outset contested the nature of this commemoration. For instance, in Konstanz, though the city council did not organize an official celebration in 1871, a number of locals attempted to take advantage of this opportunity to manifest their dissatisfaction with the actions and policies of the Catholic Church.<sup>23</sup> In a similar fashion, a more official celebration in 1872 contained harsh anti-Catholic rhetoric. Having witnessed the surge in nationalist sentiments during the Franco-Prussian war, these locals had learned to use the nationalist rhetoric to criticize certain features of society, and they realized that it could be employed as an effective weapon in the *Kulturkampf*. Most of the speeches held during the 1871 festivities focused on the need for an intensifying of the *Kulturkampf* rather than celebrating the victory at Sedan. Speakers placed the majority of their emphasis on the religious aspect of the war and noted that at Sedan “...the Roman spirit was defeated by the courageous and dutiful Germanic spirit, which was able to deliver a deadly blow to the Jesuits, who had been protected by the

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<sup>23</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, September 5, 1871.

French for so long.”<sup>24</sup> Notwithstanding that the celebration did not attract any major attention, it was still important as it established the tone for future ones that would draw more participants and spectators.

Although substantial anti-Catholic sentiments were present from the outset of the commemoration, the intensification of the regional and national *Kulturkampf* significantly increased the hostility towards Catholics during the festivities. The brief unity that had existed in the wake of war and unification had quickly disappeared and was replaced with struggles over how to remember these momentous events. Already from the outset of these celebrations, they turned into a forum in which liberals and Protestants tried to propagate their view of German history. They had been increasingly successful in connecting the recent war with their faith. In 1873, the liberal association (*Liberale Verein*) in Konstanz organized a celebration complete with a banquet in the *Konzilsaal*. Liberal politician and Old Catholic Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch gave the plenary speech, in which he focused on the connection between the last war and the *Konzilsaal*, where the decision to execute the Czech religious reformer Jan Hus had been taken in 1415.<sup>25</sup> He urged his audience to note that the events surrounding the injustices done to Hus marked the pinnacle of clerical power in Konstanz, and though the last war as well as some of the domestic efforts since 1871 had been successful in the battle against the internal enemy, the war was not yet won. He reminded people that the clerical spirit was resilient and it would

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<sup>24</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, September 3, 1872.

<sup>25</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, September 4, 1873.

require much determination and dedication on behalf of “true” Germans if they were to break the stronghold which the Church had held on local society for so long. He ended his speech by conjuring the spirit of Hus, stating that it was unfortunate that they just could not burn the spirit of the clericals, just as they had burned the religious reformer.<sup>26</sup>

Throughout the *Kaiserreich*, especially during the *Kulturkampf*, Badenese liberals and Protestants frequently compared the current situation to the martyrdom of Hus. They often constructed monuments and organized other commemorative ceremonies to maintain and honor the memory of Hus. For instance, in Konstanz, one of the most controversial topics of the 1860s had been the construction of a monument to celebrate the city’s intimate connection to the Bohemian reformer.<sup>27</sup> Thus, they tied their cause to one of the best-known historical figures in the area, and they were also able to create a continuous historical narrative from the times of Hus’s struggle against Rome until the last war against the papal powers. This view of history fit perfectly with the *kleindeutsche* version that culminated in the unification in 1871. In addition, it excluded Catholics from the commemorative discourse. Even if they had wanted to celebrate the victory at Sedan, they were unable to do so because of the heavy anti-Catholic sentiments that dominated the official discourse. This proved to be very

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, 21 January, 27, 28 March, 10 April 1862. See also Jiri Koralka, “Konstanz als Reiseziel tschchischer Husverehrer um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts,” *Schrr VG Bodensee* (1987): 93-130; St. AK, S II 15226, Die Errichtung eines Hussenstein, 1834-1939. Another illuminating example of Konstanz’s ambivalent relationship to the Czech reformer is the controversy regarding a 1877 decision to change “Paulstraße” to “Husenstraße.” See for instance *Freie Stimme*, August 4, 1877.



important since Germans placed so much emphasis on using these events as basis for their new national identity.

Another typical example of the controversies that took place was the conflicts connected to the school celebrations that had taken place just outside the city. Ceremonies involving children were often the source of some of the most heated debates, especially since, as Confino has noted, “celebrants therefore directed their efforts to the children and the youth whose identity was still in a sense a *tabula rasa*.”<sup>28</sup> In the small town of Tiengen, the local teacher, accompanied by a priest, usually took the children for a walk to explain the significance of the day. Germans attached great importance to Sedan Day as a pedagogical holiday. This was supposed to be an occasion when children of all ages were educated about the great sacrifices made by their fathers and the need to honor those deeds, which was one of the major reasons why this and other holidays became so controversial. Citizens recognized how influential these ceremonies could be to a child, which explains why parents went to such great lengths to ensure that their offspring would not be taught what they considered corrupting ideas. However, this year the city council had assigned the Old Catholic priest Hampp to guide the children, which upset many parents, who subsequently approached the school and asked them to revert the decision. The parents appeared reasonable in their request, suggesting that to make everybody happy, it was probably better to eliminate the role of the priest altogether. Despite widespread support for this appeal, the decision stood. As a result, many parents

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<sup>28</sup> Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor*, 46.

boycotted the celebration and instead organized their own walk from Tiengen to nearby Waldshut, in which over 160 children participated. Although the local clergy and various Catholic organizations praised the parents for taking this worthy initiative, local liberal politicians criticized them heavily. The latter claimed that by separating the Catholic children from the Protestant, Jewish, and Old Catholic ones, they were only serving to further divide the German Reich. Despite the criticism, Catholics stood by their decision, stressing how important it was to provide today's youth with a proper understanding of the recent events.<sup>29</sup> Consequently, they used the national-liberals' own argument as to why some of these commemorations were so important, but instead of exposing their children to the official canon of nationalism, they elected to present their own version of these important events.

This was one of the most common conflicts during the first few years of the *Kaiserreich*. In Konstanz and other cities, Catholic parents often kept their children home on the days when Sedan was celebrated. Naturally, this caused much controversy as liberals and Protestants used this behavior as evidence of how backward Catholics were since they were willing to risk their children's education for their own political and religious purposes. Another reoccurring conflict pertained to the unwillingness of local Catholic clergy members to support publicly the ideological messages that accompanied the festivities, which they manifested by frequently refusing to ring the church bells. This pointed and very public action led to heavy criticism and renewed accusations of hostility towards the fatherland. The refusal to

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<sup>29</sup> *Freie Stimme*, September 5, 1873.

ring the bells constituted a powerful manifestation of Catholic disapproval of the ideological messages surrounding the celebrations. As Protestant churches around the state were ringing on the morning of September 2, the silence of Catholic ones constituted a sharp contrast and disrupted the intended effect of the commemoration. By not participating and indeed often going about their lives as if it was any normal day, Catholics and others were able to destroy the supposedly special character of this holiday. The Catholic disruption of this effort to create an imagined community was quite successful.<sup>30</sup>

Catholics often complained that though their brethren were frequently targets for both verbal and physical abuse, they were not even allowed to offer light-hearted criticism of public figures. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the public sphere assumed ever greater importance in a modernizing German society. Catholics, despite being labeled backward and antimodern by their opponents, were keenly aware of the importance of controlling, or at least participating in, the public arena. They used papal anniversaries and other Catholic holidays to establish their presence in the public sphere, and their criticism of the exclusiveness of Sedan Day reflected similar concerns. Catholics around the state criticized how both local and state government ignored the verbal and sometimes physical abuse Catholics had to suffer at the hands of Protestants. Physical confrontations were not everyday events, but assumed great importance when they happened. Many contemporaries viewed them as a literal manifestation of the struggle for control of the public space that took place between

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<sup>30</sup> Schneider, *Politische Festkultur*, 241.

Catholics and Protestants. Following the 1873 celebrations, *Badischer Beobachter* questioned the Grand Duke and his government: “[Are] we Catholics are without any rights?...since the government does nothing to stop these actions.”<sup>31</sup>

In the wake of unification, liberals and Protestants argued that it was evident by how people celebrated Sedan Day that it had become the new national holiday. Catholics, however, rejected this claim, maintaining that only the veterans association staged celebrations and that people were already growing tired of this commemoration.<sup>32</sup> They also claimed that an increasing number of liberals boycotted the event, joining the ranks of Catholics and socialists, which rendered Sedan Day an increasingly artificial celebration. Indeed, they claimed that the ceremony had developed into “a farce arranged by the [liberal] party leadership...”<sup>33</sup> This interpretation was far removed from the liberal and Protestant attempts of portraying the festivities as something that had emerged from the people. *Freie Stimme* noted: that

It would be more than enough to do it every ten years. The French are just happy that Napoleon is gone, and for us Germans, who are more divided and hostile towards each other than ever before—all because of

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<sup>31</sup> *Badischer Beobachter*, September 5, 1873.

<sup>32</sup> Although Catholics were active in veterans organizations in Baden, Protestants dominated these associations. These associations were supposed to be confessionally neutral, but in reality, their rhetoric and actions often carried traits of anti-Catholic sentiments. See Thomas Rohkrämer, *Der Militarismus der “kleinen Leute”: die Kriegervereine im Deutschen Kaiserreich* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990).

<sup>33</sup> *Freie Stimme*, September 2, 1873.

the *Kulturkampf* that began in those September days of 1870—it would be enough to celebrate the great national-liberal St. Sedan every ten years.<sup>34</sup>

Such statements illustrate how differently Catholics and Protestants viewed the war. It was impossible for Catholics to relate to the commemorative discourse surrounding September 2. While Protestants celebrated it as one of the greatest days in German history, Catholics located the origins of the national *Kulturkampf* in the victory over Napoleon III.<sup>35</sup> Liberal behavior proved that they, who claimed to be the true representatives of Germanness, tried to use Sedan Day to complete their victory over the Catholic Church. In their attempts to prove how limited support for this commemoration was, Catholic newspapers offered detailed accounts from any city in Germany where celebrations had not met liberal and Protestant expectations. They reported extensively on nonexistent decorations, canceled banquets, and poor attendance. They argued that one of the main reasons why the commemoration had failed to gather popular support was its militaristic and chauvinistic nature, which did not fit the pious German national character. This constituted a frequent Catholic complaint and serves as a proper illustration of their attempts to stress the religious aspect of their national identity. Furthermore, the constant references to the defeat of the Catholic French, which would be followed with an onslaught on German Catholics, naturally alienated the Catholic part of the population.

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<sup>34</sup> *Freie Stimme*, September 12, 1876.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

In their criticism, Badenese Catholics also complained that not only did liberals and Protestants condemn them for their alleged disloyalty during the last war, but they were also beginning to blame them for the suffering that Germans had to endure ever since the Reformation. Especially during the first three decades of the *Kaiserreich*, the debates concerning Luther, the Reformation, and the origins and causes of the Thirty Years War intensified, and arguments regarding the role of the Protestant Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus often emerged in the wake of Sedan Day.<sup>36</sup> In their speeches, Protestants and liberals often pointed out that the military victory at Sedan had finally brought the victory that Protestants for so long had sought. Thus, instead of creating unity, the memory of this victory served to further alienate the two confessions from each other as it confirmed the different fates they had suffered as Germans. Catholics also pointed out that the more divided Germans became, the more certain sectors of society insisted on staging public celebrations and commemorations. They sarcastically noted that "...if a foreigner would arrive in Germany, he would think that we Germans did not have a problem in the world, since all we do is celebrate the greatness of our nation."<sup>37</sup> Catholics offered some stinging criticism of this trend and demanded that it stop, otherwise it would completely demoralize the German nation. During the last years of the *Kaiserreich*, these sentiments became commonplace, but Catholics were among the first to criticize this trend of overexposing Germans to commemorative activities.

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<sup>36</sup> Cramer, "The Cult of Gustavus Adolphus," 97-121.

<sup>37</sup> *Freie Stimme*, September 16, 1876.

After the passing of the May Laws in 1873, Catholics had been locked in a fierce battle with the state. In late August 1874, Bishop Ketteler outlined why Catholics should not participate in this commemoration. His criticism focused on the divisive character of this supposedly national holiday. He stressed that if this indeed was a celebration that promoted unity, Catholics would gladly participate in commemorating the military victory that was so important for the foundation of the Reich, to which they had made such an important contribution. He also advised Catholics to pay proper tribute to the sacrifices made by soldiers in the past war. However, as long as liberals and Protestants were in charge of organizing the events, no Catholic could identify with the ideological messages that accompanied the festivities. Protestants and liberals designed the events so that they did not represent the true beliefs of the German people, but instead only illustrated the sentiments of an elite intent on alienating Catholics and others from the nation-state. Hence, the holiday did not adequately represent the collective identity of Germans. Members of the Protestant city elite were misrepresenting the true nature of this celebration: “On Sedan Day, they do not celebrate the victory of the German people against France as much as the victory of their own party over the Church. They want to force the Catholic Church to participate in this celebration, to celebrate its own battle wounds.”<sup>38</sup>

Ketteler also argued that as good Christians, Catholics could not participate in a celebration alongside the same Protestants who were attempting to eliminate all

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<sup>38</sup> Ketteler’s text was reprinted in several newspapers; see for instance *Freie Stimme*, August 29, 1874.

traces of Christianity from the new nation-state. Furthermore, in times when the Pope was under attack, when German priests and bishops were being imprisoned, and when Catholics were subjected to all sorts of discrimination, it would be inappropriate to take part in the celebration of a state that was responsible for so many of these problems. Ketteler argued that the few Catholics who had participated in the commemoration of Sedan had compromised not only their own characters but the characters of Catholics everywhere. At the end of the tract, the Bishop emphasized that as true Germans, Catholics had a duty to pray for the fatherland, but they should do this either on the Sunday before or after the official Sedan Day celebration.<sup>39</sup>

Not surprisingly, Ketteler's argument initiated an intense debate regarding the nature of this celebration and the overall character of the German nation. This is a good example of how the discourse surrounding these events was formulated and reshaped by the interaction between the Catholic and Protestant press and also how the latter contributed to the formation of the German imagined community. Protestant and liberal newspapers criticized the Bishop heavily for not respecting the sacrifices made at Sedan and other battles and argued that this tract once and for all settled the question of the loyalty of German Catholics. If they could not appreciate the commemoration of the possibly greatest victory in German history, they did not deserve to be included in the German nation-state. Some papers even went as far as claiming that Ketteler had secretly been hoping for a French victory at Sedan. As debates intensified, Badenese papers employed increasingly aggressive rhetoric.

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid.



*Freiburger Zeitung* claimed that Catholics around the state were hoping for a French revenge and that drastic measures had to be taken to deal with this very serious threat. The paper maintained that “the blacks have chosen 2 September as a test day for the pure intentions of the German Catholics—they are requesting their own Sedan, to which they should be assisted.”<sup>40</sup> By using the powerful images of war, they were able to evoke a strong response among the population.

Having initially focused primarily on the supposedly anti-German behavior Catholics had displayed in the war, Protestants now used Catholic attitudes toward Sedan Day to prove their unwillingness to become Germans. Attacks often focused on Catholic inability to appreciate the sacrifices made by the soldiers in the last war. These accusations were especially damaging since much of the commemorative discourse surrounding the war and unification justified the loss of lives by claiming that an event of such importance as unification required great personal sacrifice. Since Catholics were not willing to honor the fallen soldiers, they did not deserve a place in the new nation-state.

This was another instance where Catholics displayed a slightly different perception of the unification period and the character of the Empire. As the debates surrounding the commemoration turned into a forum for the current state of the Empire, Catholics were quick to point out the many problems that had surfaced during the last few years. They often pointed out that an increasing number of cities refused to provide financial assistance for the celebrations, citing the strained economy that

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<sup>40</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, September 1, 1874.

affected virtually every sector of society during the *Gründerkrise*. In addition, Catholics maintained that there really was not that much to celebrate in Germany at the moment. Contrary to the Protestant and liberal claims that the foundation of the Empire meant that Germany was about to assume a very powerful position in European and world politics, Catholics cited the deteriorating economy as an indication that the official rhetoric was no more than propaganda. They frequently centered their criticism on the discrimination that they faced from both national and state governments. In addition, they argued that contrary to what Protestants and liberals maintained, the German nation was not more unified now than it had been before 1871. Indeed, many Catholics complained that by using Sedan Day as a vehicle for Protestant, national-liberal policies, bourgeois elites had ruined the memory of a great military victory where Catholics and Protestants from all over Germany had stood together in defense of their common fatherland.

Towards the end of the 1870s, Catholics no longer paid much attention to the specific celebrations that were taking place on September 2 but instead used the occasion to launch attacks on current conditions in society. As the German economy worsened, Catholics were able to utilize their position as outsiders to criticize national-liberal policies. Because they had supposedly not been part of the driving forces in the unification process, Catholics did not have to explain the failure to fulfill the promises made in the post-1871 exhilaration. Indeed, Catholics often pointed out that none of the national-liberal grand visions for the future had been realized, which proved that the sacrifices made by German soldiers and civilians had only served to satisfy the

territorial aspirations of Bismarck and his Prussian cohorts. Although Catholics were careful to point out that their criticism should not be mistaken for anti-Germanness, they repeatedly insisted that the *Kaiserreich* had failed to live up to expectations.

In a lead article published on September 5, 1878, *Freie Stimme* noted that after the first initial economic success, largely triggered by the reparations from France, economic, social, political, and religious conditions had deteriorated compared to the pre-1871 period. Much of the Catholic analysis centered on the effects of the *Kulturkampf*. They pointed out that though they had suffered discrimination prior to unification as well, it had increased drastically after 1871. When analyzing Catholic impressions of the first few years of the *Kaiserreich*, the importance of the *Kulturkampf* can hardly be overestimated. For instance, the article in *Freie Stimme* focused largely on how unjustly Catholics were treated in the Empire. Ever since the conclusion of the war against France, civil rights had steadily eroded, and people were often imprisoned for no reason other than their religious belief. Adding that the economic policies of the national-liberals had accomplished nothing but enrichment of the upper classes, Catholics declared the liberal economic scheme worthless. Finally, the last few years had witnessed a steady moral decline so that murders and robberies were now part of everyday life. These observations were tied into the reoccurring Catholic complaints concerning the liberal and Protestant determination to modernize at all cost. Germans had become too caught up in the financial hysteria that accompanied unification and the economic boom triggered by the reparations from France. As a result, Christian values had been all but forgotten, and Germans were

now paying the price for neglecting the spiritual aspects of their lives.<sup>41</sup>

In conjunction with the debates regarding Sedan Day, Catholics also noted that despite all national-liberal promises of unity and prosperity, none had been fulfilled. On the other hand, all the rhetoric about freedom and unity had simply fizzled out as so many other promises made by Bismarck and the national-liberals. Catholics also used these debates to attack one of the common assumptions about the reason for the German victory in the last war: the fact that the Catholic faith had hindered France's transition to a modern nation-state. Now, a few years after unification, Catholics looked to France and the relative stability that had set in after the Paris Commune and contrasted that with their own experiences in the Second Empire. Once again, the ghost of the *Kulturkampf* loomed large as Catholics noted that the French were well on their way to surpass the Germans, despite all of the destruction that the war had brought. *Freie Stimme* argued in 1876 that given the economic circumstances, it did not seem appropriate to devote so much time, effort, and money to celebrating every significant and insignificant event in the manner that Germans were currently doing. In a time when hard work, piety and religious faith constituted the proper means to get Germany back on track, this constant celebrating was an evil that needed to be eliminated. As already noted, Catholics constituted one of the first groups to criticize the commemorative craze that spread throughout Germany during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> *Freie Stimme*, September 5, 10, 1878.

<sup>42</sup> *Freie Stimme*, September 16, 1876.

Interestingly, Protestants and liberals answered Catholic criticism of the failing economy by attempting to reconstruct the memory of the Austro-Prussian War. Once again in conjunction with the debates regarding Sedan Day, the Protestant press claimed that Catholics had caused this economic crisis. Because of the reparations that Baden had to pay to Prussia—approximately six million—the Catholics had placed enormous restraint on the economy that no liberal policies could correct. Protestants maintained that in 1866, only Catholics had been willing to fight on the side of the Austrians, and consequently, Catholics were to blame for the hefty reparations.<sup>43</sup> Of course, Catholics, who during the past few years had spent considerable time and efforts trying to uncover the true reasons behind the war of 1866, refuted these “ridiculous accusations.” They pointed out that though a few Protestants and liberals had supported the reactionary and annexationist policies of Bismarck, the vast majority had championed the Austrian cause.<sup>44</sup>

The controversy over Sedan Day reached its climax during the 1870s. This should come as no surprise as the immediate postunification period witnessed the most intense commemorative activities. Although Protestant and liberal papers insisted that entire communities participated in the celebrations, a careful reading of these accounts reveals that even among people who had previously supported Sedan Day, the commemoration quickly lost its relevance. For instance, despite *Konstanzer Zeitung*'s

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<sup>43</sup> These claims were discussed throughout the state in 1880. See for instance *Freie Stimme*, September 11, 1880.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

claims that by 1876 the commemoration had assumed national importance, the paper also noted that the city would not stage any official events to honor the day. Towards the end of the 1870s, the paper only published very brief reports on the annual festivities organized by the local veterans' association, which usually attracted a respectable number of participants but without involving the entire community. The resistance offered by Catholics and other groups eventually proved too disruptive for liberals and Protestants, and as the immediate nationalist exhilaration disappeared in the first few postunification years, locals soon lost much of their interest in commemorating Sedan. The liberal and Protestant failure to find any meaningful political symbols that were accessible and acceptable to the majority of Badenians essentially doomed the holiday from the outset. After the initial enthusiasm, both supporters and opponents of the holiday stopped paying attention to it.<sup>45</sup>

Although local veterans' organizations continued to celebrate Sedan Day during the 1880s and '90s, the commemoration received ever less attention from the rest of the population. Especially after the gradual dismantling of the *Kulturkampf*, organizers of Sedan Day failed to attract any great number of participants. To be sure, controversies over a particular speech still occurred, but on the whole, both Protestants and Catholics lost interest in this holiday. During the last decades of the nineteenth century, the only times when Sedan Day attracted attention was when dignitaries happened to make some comments that both Protestants and Catholics attempted to interpret in such a manner that their own view of the nation would be validated. One

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<sup>45</sup> Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor*, 86.

such example was Grand Duke Friedrich's visit to the city of Überlingen in 1889. Attending the Sedan Day celebration organized by the local veterans organization, Friedrich held a speech that citizens in Baden and the rest of Germany discussed at length. Apart from the customary remarks about the importance of remembering the sacrifices made by the soldiers and civilians, he also noted that in times such as these, it was important for all Germans to defend the interests of Germany, both abroad and at home. Never really defining what or whom he was referring to, Friedrich claimed that enemies existed at home who threatened German cities, *Heimats*, and families. Although it is difficult to know exactly what or whom the Grand Duke was alluding to, his subsequent remarks regarding the importance of maintaining an orderly civil society indicates that he was concerned about some of the negative effects that was accompanying German modernization. His caution to parents to ensure that today's youth do not fall prey to some of the temptations of society could perhaps be interpreted as a warning against the ever growing social-democratic threat.<sup>46</sup>

Immediately following his speech, liberal and Protestant papers offered their interpretations of it. Although some maintained that he had referred to the unions and the social-democrats, many immediately seized this opportunity to renew the accusations of anti-German sentiments against the Catholics. These accusations should be viewed in the context of the controversies that emerged regarding the monument dedicated to Giordano Bruno in Rome.<sup>47</sup> Although taking place in Italy,

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<sup>46</sup> The speech was cited in a number of newspapers. See for instance *Freie Stimme*, September 5, 1889.

<sup>47</sup> Debates regarding this monument occupied most of the space in primarily Catholic, but also

this was a topic that attracted enormous attention in Germany, especially from Catholics, but also from liberals and Protestants. During the late spring and summer 1889, German Catholics had expressed great indignation at the behavior of Italian liberals and the disrespectful manner in which they had treated the Pope. On June 9, Italians had unveiled an imposing monument, located in the heart of Rome, to Giordano Bruno, whom they celebrated as a national hero. Bruno had been a sixteenth-century Dominican monk whose interest in newer strands of thought, particularly within astronomy, had drawn the ire of the Catholic Church. After spending most of his life on the run from the Inquisition, he was finally executed in 1600.<sup>48</sup> The debates regarding the monument had renewed the animosity between Catholics and Protestants, especially regarding their view of history. Thus, the Grand Duke's speech was debated in a public sphere that was already heavily polarized as a result of the Italian monument. The controversies regarding Bruno might seem unrelated to the nature of the German national identity, but we must recognize that these debates dominated newspapers for several weeks and spilled over into a number of other issues.

In their responses to the accusations, Catholics displayed that their view of the German nation-state and their place in it had changed since the inception of the Empire. Aside from the usual rhetoric condemning the attempts of Protestants and

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Protestant-liberal, newspapers during June 1889.

<sup>48</sup> For an overview of Bruno's life, see Dorotea Waley Singer, *Giordano Bruno: His Life and Thought* (New York: Schuman: 1950). It should also be noted that though Protestant and liberals defended his person and reputation in these debates, he had been excommunicated from both the Lutheran and Calvinist churches as well.



liberals to divide the nation, Catholics centered most of their arguments on the positive role that they were playing in the modernizing project that Germany was currently undergoing. They pointed to the prominence of the Catholic Church in local communities and how the values of Catholicism helped stabilize families throughout Germany. Although these arguments were not novel, Catholics were also able to point to some additional evidence of their loyalty to state and Emperor. Having grown increasingly strong during the 1880s, the Center Party now occupied an increasingly important position in local and national politics. Now, Catholics could cite a variety of statements from Bismarck in which he praised the Center for becoming a party that participated in a constructive manner in the governing of the Reich. This was quite different from the *Kulturkampf* years when Bismarck singled out German Catholics as enemies of the nation. Many of these statements were a result of the shifting focus of Bismarck's domestic politics. After the passing of the anti-socialist law in 1878 and the slow reconciliation with Catholics, Bismarck was forced to let the Center party play an increasingly active role in national politics. Thus, Catholics throughout the Empire could refer to their active and willing participation in the nation-building project. During the *Kulturkampf*, Catholics would have been hard pressed to cite evidence of their involvement in daily political life. Badenese Catholics were especially keen to refer to their involvement in easing some of the social ills that accompanied modernization. Referring to the "problems" that the Grand Duke had mentioned in his speech in Überlingen, they pointed to their charitable work as proof

of their loyalty and dedication to the German fatherland.<sup>49</sup>

Many Badenese cities ceased to stage official celebrations during the 1890s and early 1900s, and only local veterans organizations continued to mark the anniversary of the military victory. As the nineteenth century drew to a close, many veterans organizations abandoned the celebrations as well. There were many different reasons for this decline in the popularity of the holiday. First and foremost, the failure of the liberals to “produce any meaningful discourse about localness and nationhood.” created a national holiday that excluded much of the national community.<sup>50</sup> Also, the political and social changes during the last two decades of the nineteenth century negatively affected the image of Sedan Day. During the 1890s, political Catholicism and social-democrats began to seriously challenge the stronghold of political power that the national-liberals had been enjoying since the early 1860s. To be sure, the latter were able to retain more of their political power than in most other German states; however, they were often forced to enter into a variety of coalitions to remain the dominant party. Thus, the principal role that local notables had played in the shaping and forming of the holiday was no longer in existence. The introduction of mass politics and the growing strength of the Social-Democratic Party produced a society in which the liberal *Honoratioren*'s view of German history and national identity did not correspond to reality. Beginning in the late 1880s, Protestant national-liberals could no longer attempt to monopolize the vision of German identity that they

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<sup>49</sup> *Freie Stimme*, September 14, 1889.

<sup>50</sup> Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor*, 86.

had tried to present during the Sedan Day celebrations.

Consequently, in 1897, the city council in Freiburg sent out a letter to councils of other major Badenese cities asking whether Sedan Day was celebrated, and if so, in which manner. Most councils replied that though they did not stage any official ceremonies, local veterans organizations organized small commemorations. However, several cities, most notably Mannheim and Karlsruhe, maintained that the day was not celebrated at all. As Germany became increasingly infused with nationalist sentiments during the first decade of the twentieth century, Sedan Day drifted into obscurity. Despite the growing influence of imperialism and colonialism, expansion of the German Navy, and the growth of nationalist organizations such as *Alldeutscher Verein*, Sedan Day failed to attract support. An illustrative example of how insignificant this day had become is the conflict that broke out in Freiburg in 1913. During the previous years, the city council had organized a free concert in the *Stadtgarten* to commemorate the events of September 2. However, the organizers often had trouble attracting a respectable number of spectators; in 1906, they contemplated abolishing the concert since the number of musicians often outnumbered the audience.<sup>51</sup> In 1913, no celebration took place since the *Stadtgarten* was to be occupied by the local theater, which was staging a dress rehearsal of their latest production—*Don Giovanni*. Despite being asked by the city to move their dress rehearsal to a different place, the theater director refused, claiming that nobody cared

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<sup>51</sup> St. AF, C3/472/8, letter to city council, July 30, 1906.

about Sedan Day anyway.<sup>52</sup>

The exception to this trend of decreasing interest in Sedan Day was the twenty-fifth anniversary in 1895. As we shall see later, this and the following year were characterized by more widespread support for war and unification celebrations, even from Catholics. In Heidelberg, for instance, both Protestants and Catholics participated in joint celebrations, which according to the local press signified how unified the German Empire had become. They made a special point to commend the city's Catholics for electing to participate in the festivities. Local Catholic papers noted that though they still did not find it necessary to celebrate Sedan Day every year, they welcomed the opportunity to commemorate the more significant twenty-fifth anniversary of the military victory. Liberals and Protestants praised Catholics for finally displaying proper respect for this momentous event. They also claimed that the fact that Catholics now elected to participate displayed that there were bonds to the fatherland that were simply impossible to neglect.<sup>53</sup> Protestants and liberals compared this behavior with that of the social-democrats, who still refused to partake. These sentiments only reinforce how arbitrarily groups were singled out as either supporters or enemies of the Reich. The group in charge of organizing these events always sought to determine the ideological message that accompanied the celebrations, and depending upon other social, political, economic, or cultural factors, one or more

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<sup>52</sup> This correspondence can be found in St. AF, C3/472/8, letters to and from city council, August 18, 20, 22, 1913.

<sup>53</sup> *Heidelberger Zeitung*, September 2, 1895.

groups were often targeted as outsiders.

In the end, Sedan Day failed to serve as the integrating factor that the liberal and Protestant forces behind it had hoped. Instead of uniting Germans around a single ideological message, the celebration offered Catholics and other marginalized groups opportunities to manifest their own view of the unification process and the characteristics of the German nation. After a couple of decades in which citizens fought over the true meaning of the commemoration, interest declined and even veterans organizations placed less emphasis on celebrating the victory over Napoleon III. However, it should be noted that though Sedan Day divided the population as much as it united, it contributed to an integration of Catholics and social-democrats into the Empire. Although these groups did not subscribe to the notions inherent in the official commemorative discourse, their willingness to present publicly their own interpretation of Germanness offered opportunities for integration into the complex German nation-state. Many previous scholars have neglected to consider the importance of these manifestations for the construction of German national identity. An analysis of Sedan Day indicates the need to slightly reevaluate how different groups in society accessed and employed nationalist rhetoric. Although Catholics were largely excluded from the official commemorative discourse, they were still able to utilize the debates surrounding these festivities to present their own view of German history, the war, and unification. In addition, by challenging many of the Protestant and liberal claims, Catholics were in the end able to alter the official discourse so that it would better represent their own view of Germanness.

### **The Commemoration of Other Important Battles and Various Imperial Holidays**

Naturally, Badenians did not only celebrate the military victory at Sedan, but other significant victories as well. In the middle of January every year, Badenians organized and participated in the commemorations of two historic events: the military victory at Belfort and the subsequent unification. As noted in the discussion regarding the construction of the *Siegesdenkmal* in Freiburg, Badenians attached great importance to the victory at Belfort. They constructed a memory of the last stages of the war that implied that had it not been for the heroic efforts of the Badenese troops, Germans would not have achieved unification in such a glorious manner. Especially considering that Belfort was not a nationally celebrated holiday, Badenians organized a ceremony designed to strengthen their own position in the Second Empire by reinforcing the important role played by General Werder and his troops. The festivities remained similar throughout the years: parades, banquets, religious services, and school celebrations.<sup>54</sup>

Although the commemoration of Belfort was primarily employed to strengthen Badenians local identity, liberals and Protestants also used it to question the Germanness of Catholics. For instance, at a banquet in Konstanz in 1873, Colonel Kraus claimed that Badenians and Germans now had to unite in a similar fashion to the troops at Belfort to defeat the attacks from the anti-German elements that sought to make the new nation-state dependent upon Rome.<sup>55</sup> In the midst of the debates that

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<sup>54</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, January 18, 1872.

<sup>55</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, January 19, 1873.

were to lead up to the passing of the May Laws, these comments should come as no surprise.<sup>56</sup> The battle lent itself well to criticism of certain features of German society. Many of the images conjured up in these commemorations referred to bravery, heroics, courage, and the need to fight for what is valuable, images that were all applied in the *Kulturkampf*. Contemporaries frequently used battle images in the commemorative discourse, a trend that was even more common in regards to the construction of the victory at Belfort. These images were quite useful in launching attacks on Catholics and other supposedly antinational groups.

Faced with hostile rhetoric, Catholics largely ignored the commemorations of the victory. Although some Catholic associations participated in the festivities, most simply abstained from partaking in a celebration marked by often strong anti-Catholic sentiments. Although the anti-Catholic propaganda diminished as the *Kulturkampf* subsided, by that time, the commemoration of Belfort had lost most of its importance and no longer constituted a major event in local society. The diminishing importance attached to the celebration of Belfort could also be interpreted as a sign that Badenians were becoming increasingly integrated into the German state. After the first decade, most Badenians no longer experienced an immediate need to manifest publicly the strength of their own “narrow fatherland,” and while the victory at Belfort was always celebrated in a dignified manner, public participation steadily dwindled as the nineteenth century progressed.<sup>57</sup> The ten-year anniversary of the battle constitutes a

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<sup>56</sup> See for instance *Badischer Beobachter*, January 22, 1873.

<sup>57</sup> See for instance the account in *Freiburger Zeitung*, January 18, 1881.

useful illustration of this trend. Although *Freiburger Zeitung* noted that the day had been commemorated in a worthy fashion, they did not offer any detailed description of the festivities. In their brief report of the day's events, they also noted that only a few locals had heeded the suggestion from the city council to hoist their flags. After a few years of limited popular participation, it soon became a day for veterans' organizations and their families to remember the great battle. The relatively small importance of the commemoration of Belfort becomes even more obvious when compared to the debates surrounding the Sedan Day celebration. While the former was largely ignored by Catholics, Protestants, and Old Catholics alike, the latter triggered intense debates regarding the commemoration as well as the nature and character of the German Empire.<sup>58</sup>

In addition to commemorations of military victories and the foundation of the Empire, imperial birthdays played a significant role in the commemorative discourse surrounding German unification. Although at first glance a celebration of the Emperor's birthday does not seem to have anything to do with commemoration of the war and unification, a closer analysis of the discourse surrounding these events reveals that these occasions were indeed used to construct a memory of the unification process. Citizens not only used these birthdays to celebrate that the Emperor had become one year older but also to present their own view of the course of German history and the Emperor's role in it, and the new national identity, as well as contemporary political, cultural, and economic issues. Especially in the relative

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid. For a comparison, see for instance *Freiburger Zeitung*, September 1, 2, 3, 1881.



turmoil that characterized the immediate postunification period, citizens attached great importance to these events. In addition to illustrating the popularity of the Emperors, this also indicates how important public events and the developing public sphere were to the consolidation of the new national identity. Quite often, Badenians utilized public events seemingly unrelated to the founding of the German Empire to construct a memory of the war that corresponded to their ideological beliefs.

Amid the plethora of public ceremonies in the Second Empire, the Emperor's birthday occupied a prominent place. Largely due to Wilhelm's popularity among all Germans, his birthday was celebrated with fanfare each year. In Baden, the Emperor's close connection to the well-liked Grand Duke Friedrich I only added to his popularity. Although Wilhelm did not visit Baden any more often than other parts of Germany, Badenians claimed that they had a closer relationship with him than other Germans did. As previously noted, Badenese Catholics held their Emperor in high esteem and did not blame him for the injustices that they suffered at the hands of the German and Badenese governments. Catholics respected his religious devotion, and they often praised his engagement in religious questions. When addressing his role in the *Kulturkampf*, Catholics (at least publicly) assumed that he had not been supportive of the many unjust laws passed and that Bismarck and *Kultusminister* Adalbert Falk kept him unaware of the poor treatment of Catholics.

Wilhelm never declared his birthday a national holiday and he refrained from promoting any official celebrations. This attitude did not necessarily stem from an unwillingness to mark his own birthday, but reflected Wilhelm's fear that too many

imperial celebrations would undermine his role as Prussian king. Despite no official endorsement, local communities staged extravagant ceremonies. The festivities followed a familiar pattern: cities were decorated, church bells rang, banquets held, and parades organized. A procession through the local community often constituted the central element of the holiday. In these parades, most local organizations and associations participated, irrespective of their political or confessional views. Since the majority of the members of these organizations belonged to the emerging bourgeoisie, they were able to place a bourgeois stamp on many of the activities. Similar to how members of the bourgeoisie used the construction of monuments to establish themselves in the local community, these parades aided the bourgeoisie in their struggle to control the public sphere and further advance their positions in society. Because of the bourgeois dominance, it should come as no surprise that the Catholics played a relatively modest role in organizing these events. Aside from the obligatory church service, Catholics were not able to shape the official discourse to any great extent.

Despite the Emperor's popularity, the Badenese celebrations of his birthday often failed to attract the desired number of people. Naturally, the fact that the celebrations often took place on a weekday prevented many from participating. In addition, during the *Kulturkampf*, many Catholics and social-democrats boycotted the festivities. Although Catholics were keen to express their loyalty to Emperor, they often refrained from taking part in the celebrations, claiming that the Protestant and liberal insistence on using an official discourse that was dominated by anti-Catholic

sentiments prevented them from participating. Catholics frequently complained that because of the anti-Catholic rhetoric, they were unable to display properly their devotion and loyalty to the Emperor. Protestants often controlled city councils and were thus able to shape the festivities according to their own ideas, which frequently meant excluding Catholics. Thus, this constitutes another example of Catholic alienation in the *Kaiserreich* that they had to overcome to integrate properly into the new nation-state.

Liberals and Protestants attempted to link Wilhelm's Protestant faith to the recent string of military and political successes, often praising him for restoring unity to a Germany divided since the Reformation. Speeches, newspaper articles, and pamphlets used the birthday celebration to revisit the events of the war and once again commend Wilhelm for the determined manner in which he had dealt with the French archenemy. Many of the speeches held at banquets and parades placed great emphasis on connecting the Protestant character of Wilhelm to the recent military successes and the unification of the German people. Hence, the celebration of the Emperor's birthday served as an additional means to commemorate the wars of unification. Much of the rhetoric centered on the Emperor's leadership in solving the German question. Protestants and liberals often cited his courage in dealing with the French as one of the primary reasons why Germany was now unified and looking forward to a bright future. Newspapers often focused on the historical connection between Wilhelm and previous German Emperors, most notably Barbarossa. The linking of the current Emperor to his predecessor constituted an important part of the Protestant-

liberal attempts to rewrite the course of German history to fit their teleological view of the process of unification.<sup>59</sup>

As noted above, Catholics were ambivalent in their attitudes towards this celebration. Although the majority stressed the importance of displaying their love for and devotion to the Emperor, many were hesitant about how to express these sentiments in a public sphere that was decidedly anti-Catholic. Although most Germans were caught up in a nationalist frenzy following the military victory and unification in 1871, relatively few Badenese elected to celebrate Wilhelm's birthday only a few months later. The question of which flag to hoist sometimes created a minor controversy. As already mentioned, anti-Prussian sentiments were strong among large parts of the population, and then especially among Catholics, and many Badenese Catholics refused to display the Prussian flag. To counteract the prevalence of Prussian symbols, numerous Badenese hoisted the yellow papal flag as well, which drew the ire of Protestants and liberals. The latter pointed out that to raise the papal flag on the Emperor's birthday constituted a good indication of where the loyalties of Badenese Catholics were located. This was yet another instance where Protestants and liberals failed to understand fully the complexities of the Catholic version of Germanness, which encouraged the nourishing of loyalties to both Berlin and Rome. To the vast majority of Catholics, the two were compatible, and the hoisting of a yellow flag on the Emperor's birthday did not necessarily mean that one harbored anti-German sentiments. Much to the chagrin of both the Grand Duke and Jolly, the

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<sup>59</sup> See for instance *Konstanzer Zeitung*, March 23, 26, 1871.

celebrations on March 22 failed to attract what they considered an appropriate number of people. They attached much significance to this celebration because it served as an indication of how “German” Badenese were. Contemporaries often compared the celebrations in various states as indications of their loyalty to the Emperor and his nation-state. To ensure proper participation, Grand Duke Friedrich in 1872 made an official decision that this father-in-law’s birthday would be officially celebrated in all major Badenese cities. In a letter from Jolly to Auxiliary Bishop Kübel on March 11, 1872, the minister requested that this year’s birthday be celebrated in a festive manner befitting a great personality such as Wilhelm.<sup>60</sup>

Kübel was conciliatory in his response and decided that on the day preceding the celebration, church bells would be rung, followed by a special service the next day. This special service presented a dilemma for the clergy. Because Wilhelm’s birthday fell in late March, it often interfered with either Lent or Easter. Especially on the few occasions when Easter coincided with Wilhelm’s birthday, such as in 1875, heated discussions were held regarding whether to move the service honoring the Emperor.<sup>61</sup> This became an issue of great importance as it forced Catholics to negotiate--in a most public manner--between their loyalty to the Emperor and their faith. In his directions to local clergy members, Kübel ordered that a *Te Deum* be spoken at the conclusion of the service. Normally, *Te Deum* was not spoken during Lent, but due to the

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<sup>60</sup> EAF, B2-14/13. Kaiserliches und Grossherzogliches Haus: Geburtstagsfeier, letter from Jolly to Kübel, March 11, 1872.

<sup>61</sup> EAF, B2-14/13, letters between Jolly, Kübel, and various congregations. It was finally decided to move the birthday service to March 20.

“extraordinary character of the day,” the auxiliary bishop made an exception. This was a much different attitude compared to the EO’s unwillingness to compromise when it came to events surrounding Sedan Day. However, during the next few years, it became evident that many clergy members did not share his view on this issue. In 1876, Jolly complained to Kübel about the fact that in both 1874 and 1875 several clergy members had excluded Te Deum from their service in honor of the Emperor. Although they never stated that they had left out the Te Deum as a formal protest, Jolly interpreted these actions as disloyal towards the Emperor. Considering the fact that most clergy members included the song “*Heil unserer Grossherzog*” as a replacement, it seems fairly certain that their actions were intended as a form of political protest. Their choice of hymn also reveals something about how unwilling many Catholics were to accept the course of unification, at least initially. Declaring their loyalty to the Grand Duke on a day designed to honor the Emperor constituted a strong indication of their determination to maintain as much of their regional identity as possible. In addition, by declaring their loyalty to the Grand Duke, they had found a “safe” way of protesting. Liberals and Protestants would be hard pressed to fault Catholics for lauding the virtues of their local ruler. Even Kübel was critical of them and not only demanded an explanation for their behavior but also required that it never happen again, lest they were to suffer disciplinary action.<sup>62</sup>

Kübel’s behavior in this matter is indicative of the more appeasing manner in

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<sup>62</sup> EAF, B2-14/13, letter from Kübel to Heilig, March 6, 1876.

which he treated the events surrounding the Emperor's birthday. The conciliatory attitude of the Catholic leadership suggests that they were attempting to create a better relationship with the Badenese state, despite the fact that many of the *Kulturkampf* laws were still in effect. They were also more inclined to cooperate with the state when it came to matters such as honoring the German Emperor, which did not seem to contain any threats towards the Catholic community. It is also interesting to note that despite the fact that the Catholic leadership attempted to improve the relationship with Protestants and the state, many Catholics in the local communities still complained about being mistreated and opposed the EO's friendly attitude towards Jolly and the Badenese government. These disagreements are noteworthy because they provide glimpses into a Catholic milieu that does not match what many contemporaries and later historians considered to be a homogenized environment. Indeed, these complaints reveal that there were sometimes major discrepancies between what they EO deemed to be the right solution to a problem and what locals considered acceptable. This casts doubts on the common assumption that the Catholic masses were tools in the hands of the high Catholic clergy and suggests that there were many more layers to the Catholic milieu than previously thought.

In 1883, clergy member Birk from the small town of Muhlheim outside Freiburg, lodged a grievance, accusing Kübel of failing to protect the interest of the Church in his dealings with the state. Although this complaint reached the EO after Kübel had passed away and been replaced with Johann Baptist Orbin, these discussions provide interesting insights to the relationship between Catholics and

Protestants a decade after unification. Birk was unhappy that in 1878 Kübel had agreed to a suggestion from the Badenese government to hold a common service for both confessions on all political *Feiertage*. Although this was not a new concept (many Germans offered similar suggestions in conjunction with the debates surrounding Sedan Day), this constituted the first time that the Catholic Church had agreed to do it. The suggestion did not pertain to all citizens, only to state employees, who were supposed to set a good example for the rest of the population. Joint services would alternate between Catholic and Protestant churches, and city councils were to determine in which church a particular service would be held. Birk admitted that in theory this was a good idea to improve the relationship between the two confessions; however, in reality, it only caused further discrimination against Catholics. The priest claimed that because Protestants dominated city councils, services were not altering between the churches. Since 1878, eight services had taken place in Protestant churches, while only two had been held in Catholic ones. In addition, Birk forwarded a number of complaints regarding Protestant behavior during the Catholic services. Birk cited a number of instances where Protestants had to be removed from the ceremony because of their laughing, talking, and commenting upon various aspects of the service. Thus, he demanded that this idea should be abolished since it only served to increase tensions between Catholics and Protestants and reinforced the secondary status of Catholics as they were forced to comply with discriminatory measures from above.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> EAF, B2-14/13, letter from Birk to Orbin, August 1, 1883.



Birk was not alone in finding it difficult to comply with policies aimed at furthering the confessional peace. In 1884, the EO received a similar letter from the local priest in Gernsbach. These complaints initiated the beginning of a lengthy conflict that attracted much attention across the state during the 1880s. Initially, Orbin answered these grievances by referring to the importance of protecting the improved relationship between church and state that had accompanied the gradual dismantling of the *Kulturkampf*. However, Orbin's attitude did not reflect adequately the feelings of most Catholic civil service employees, who demanded that the law be repealed. Eventually, Orbin and his advisors realized how strongly many of their fellow Catholics felt about this issue, especially since the last few political celebrations had taken place on a Sunday, forcing civil service employees to miss their regular service. Finally in 1886, the EO approached the government with a request to repeal the law.<sup>64</sup> After some debate, the latter decided that this law indeed had not had the desired effect and instead of creating a more unified society had done the exact opposite. Consequently, on March 17, 1886, the Badenese government decided that all civil servants could attend the service of their own choice. This was an important decision as it reflected the newfound power of the Catholics to alter decisions. Having drawn strength and determination from how they had managed to withstand the *Kulturkampf*, Catholics were increasingly able to influence and shape political and cultural matters. However, this controversy was not yet over. Apparently, some city councils did not follow these new directions and continued to designate a church in which a joint

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<sup>64</sup> EAF, B2-14/13, letter dated February 4, 1886.

service would be held. Both in 1887 and 1889, the city council in Baden-Baden staged official celebrations and parades that ended at a designated church. Despite numerous protests from Catholics, they were forced to participate under the alleged threat of losing their position if they did not comply. When approached by the government, the city council in Baden-Baden claimed that they had never forced anybody to attend a particular service and that the allegations from Catholics were false. The EO continued to press the government to make sure that these new rules were being enforced, and it was not until the beginning of the 1890s that things returned to normal.<sup>65</sup>

### **Wilhelm II and the Change in Official Commemorative Discourse**

After the death of Wilhelm I in 1888 and the accession of his grandson Wilhelm II, the character of the Emperor's birthday celebrations changed quite drastically. These modifications were intimately connected to the different perception that Wilhelm II had of himself and his imperial status compared to his grandfather. While the latter had considered himself a part of the German state and constitutional system, the former regarded his position to be God-given.<sup>66</sup> Over time, this view came to permeate most aspects of German society, and Wilhelm II placed strong emphasis on using his own birthday as a means of spreading this message to unify his

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<sup>65</sup> EAF, B2-14/13.

<sup>66</sup> For a good discussion of this difference, see Elisabeth Fehrenbach, *Wandlungen des deutschen Kaisergedankens, 1871-1918* (München: Oldenbourg, 1969), 99-107.

population. As we shall see, Catholics proved more receptive to the ideological message presented at these celebrations. One of the major reasons for this was the fact that the commemorative discourse surrounding Wilhelm II did not have the opportunity to link his birthday to the wars of unification and the foundation of the Second Empire to any great extent. Furthermore, as far as Catholics were concerned, the situation in the Reich had drastically improved since the abolishing of the *Kulturkampf*, and since Wilhelm II had not had any experience with that or any discriminatory measures against the Catholics, they were much more prepared to participate in the annual celebrations.

One instance in which the new attitudes towards royal birthdays became clearly evident was the 1897 celebration of the centenary birthday of Wilhelm I. Wilhelm II considered the 100<sup>th</sup> birthday as an excellent opportunity to further consolidate the myth of Wilhelm I as the founding father of the German Empire. Given the importance that the Emperor and others attached to this celebration, it should come as no surprise that it created a few controversies. On January 1, 1897, Wilhelm II announced that a three-day celebration would take place, starting on March 21. The festivities would include religious services, banquets, parades, and a variety of artistic performances. To underscore the importance of the events and to ensure proper participation, the Emperor declared these days public holidays. Reinforcing the pedagogical value of this celebration, he also ordered schools to distribute some form of pamphlet to their students, highlighting the historical significance of Wilhelm I.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Schneider, *Politische Festkultur*, 207-209.

Although the type of pamphlet and/or gift varied, they all emphasized how Wilhelm I had made the well-being of the German nation his first priority, which was an attitude that should be emulated by the children of the new generation. This was a lesson that elites constantly tried to reinforce when staging these events. According to the official discourse, citizens needed to be aware of the supposedly self-less manner in which figures such as Wilhelm and Bismarck had lived their lives so that they could emulate these attitudes in their own lives. Germans should always prioritize the well-being of the national community ahead of their own individual well-being.

No other royal birthday celebration during the Second Empire attracted more participants. Contemporaries remarked that even the social-democrats, who normally were so hostile to any type of patriotic celebration, elected to take part this time. Although many Badenese Catholics had previously boycotted the annual birthday celebrations, this time Catholic clergy and laity partook in the festivities. In many parts of Germany, including Baden, this constituted the first occasion where the Catholic clergy actively joined in the civil celebrations outside their own services. Contemporaries labeled this to be very significant, and many argued that it proved that Germany was now truly a unified state.<sup>68</sup> Although this claim might have been a little exaggerated, it still reflected the changes that had taken place during the last two decades. Despite the fact that Catholics were still not completely integrated into the Empire, they were able to play a much more active role in both the local and national community. Thus, contemporaries (and later historians) labeled the centenary

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 214-215.

celebration one of the most prominent public events of the *Kaiserreich*. Heavily regulated from above, and with a strong emphasis on militaristic and nationalistic motives, the ideological message of the celebrations fit well with the current domestic and international policies of Wilhelm II.

In Freiburg, the city council began planning in February 1897.<sup>69</sup> Already from the outset, it was evident that the Catholic leadership would play an active role in both the preparation and execution of the events. When asked by the council in which fashion they wanted to participate, the EO replied that “...on this glorious day, we as true sons of the fatherland want to thank publicly God for the great victories that he bestowed on our Emperor, and for granting us a unified German Empire, which God enabled our victorious Emperor to create.”<sup>70</sup> This reply indicates that not only were Catholics now able to participate in the organization of these events but also just how central the founding of the Empire was to all sorts of commemorative discourses and how determined Catholics were to include religious connotations into this celebration. The EO also decided that in addition to ringing the bells on the evening of March 20, there would be a special service the following day.

In their descriptions of the festivities, locals were proud of the efforts of the Freiburger citizens. All accounts stressed how unified the city had appeared and how great it had been to witness people from different classes, parties, and confessions join

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<sup>69</sup> Information pertaining to this celebration can be found in St. AF, C3/466/2, *Feier des 100 jährigen Geburtstages Wilhelm I.*

<sup>70</sup> St. AF, C3/466/2, letter from EO to city council, February 25, 1897.

to honor the founding father of the Empire. Many of the houses in the city were decorated, and newspapers described in detail some of the more beautiful ones. A grand military parade, headed by the 113<sup>th</sup> Regiment, which had fought so valiantly in the Franco-Prussian War, worked its way through the city and ended in front of the military barracks on Karl's square. Here the main speech was delivered by Professor Fabricius, who painted an eloquent picture of the Emperor as the first German national hero. He repeatedly referred to Wilhelm as a character that should serve as an example for all Germans, young as well as old. Much of his speech focused on how united and powerful Germany had grown since 1871. Reflecting the developments in foreign policy and Germany's entrance into the colonial race, his rhetoric manifested the shift towards the more militaristic and jingoistic nationalism that came to characterize the last decades of the Empire.<sup>71</sup> He also pointed out that in Berlin at that very moment, Wilhelm II was unveiling a grand monument to the honor of Wilhelm I. His attempt to direct people's attention to the monument in the capital illustrates how leading elites in the peripheral areas of the state often tried to construct an imagined community by using the example of monuments and statues. Speakers often made references to similar celebrations in other cities in their attempts to create a homogeneous national community. By directing the attention of the Freiburger citizens to the grand design in Berlin, Fabricius sought to connect the southwestern corner of the Empire with the capital.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> His speech was reprinted in its entirety in *Freiburger Tagblatt*, March 24, 1897.

Although Freiburg Catholics participated fully in these events, they still offered some criticism of them, which reinforced the notion that though slowly integrating into the Reich, they maintained their own understanding of German identity. In the days immediately after the festivities, many Catholics complained that while most of the celebrations had been very appropriate, they found the militaristic nature of many of the ceremonies to be unfitting. They pointed out that originally, the military parade was scheduled to take place on the evening of March 22, after the civil events. However, the city council altered these plans so that the military parade was held at the same time as the civil ceremony in the *Festhalle*. Catholics maintained that this was unfortunate for a variety of reasons. First of all, the military parade attracted a great number of people who would normally have attended the *Festhalle*.

*Freiburger Bote* remarked that too many Germans became too excited at the prospect of “straight lines of military men and their shining weapons.”<sup>73</sup> This was especially unfortunate since it deprived many people of the opportunity to listen to the excellent and highly patriotic speeches that were held in the *Festhalle*. Furthermore, in passing by the *Festhalle*, the military parade had blocked the entrance for a long time, which had also prevented people from attending the civil parts of the celebrations.<sup>74</sup> A few days later, the city council replied in an open letter to the Catholic daily that though they were aware of the conflict between the military and civilian events, the matter had been out of their hands. The council claimed that they had received orders from

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<sup>73</sup> *Freiburger Bote*, March 24, 1897.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

Berlin that the military parade was to be held at the same time all throughout Germany, which left them with no choice but to have the two ceremonies overlap.

If celebrations in Konstanz and Freiburg proceeded without major problems, the events in Heidelberg caused greater controversy. In anticipation of the upcoming festivities, the Catholic *Pfälzer Bote* published a lead article prior to the centenary in which they offered some stern criticism of the excess with which Germans celebrated various events.<sup>75</sup> The daily claimed that the true meaning of these celebrations had long been forgotten, and people were only interested in enjoying themselves and/or making a profit on the various events. In addition, the rhetoric used at the festivities had become so exaggerated that nobody really knew the true meaning of these bombastic words. As a consequence, it had become increasingly difficult to honor respectable men such as the late Emperor, simply because there was no suitable discourse at hand. Furthermore, the abundance of celebrations indicates that Germans had forgotten what made both Prussia and the rest of the country so great: the simple life, hard work, and piety. Catholics often voiced these and similar sentiments in their attempts to reappropriate the commemorative discourse from liberals and others who had ruined it with their inflated rhetoric, which depleted the discourse of true meaning.

The paper also complained that though the accusations of treason and disloyalty towards the fatherland had decreased during the last few years, it was still quite difficult to offer any sort of criticism of these festivities.<sup>76</sup> Dissatisfied that

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<sup>75</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, March 18, 1897.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*



Catholics did not feel part of the discourse, the paper also noted that the celebration brought back bad memories from times when Badenese Catholics were not accepted as worthy members of the German nation. To reinforce their arguments, they recounted the story of Pater Clemens Faller, one of the most prolific and active Jesuits at the outset of the German Empire. *Pfälzer Bote* listed all of his great achievements, including founding a number of schools and seminaries, and his heroic efforts in the Franco-Prussian War as a doctor. However, instead of being honored, the May Laws forced him to flee his fatherland. He eventually ended up in South America, where he played important roles in a number of countries. By retelling the tragic story of Faller, the paper illustrated that brave, courageous, and able men such as he deserved better treatment from the fatherland that they had served so valiantly. Catholics often used this line of reasoning to illustrate how severely Protestants and liberals had damaged the national community by depriving it of such capable and talented men. These ideas assumed increasing importance as the nationalist rhetoric grew increasingly hostile towards the foreign *Other*, which most often was portrayed as a Slavic threat to the national community.

During the celebrations, Catholics were both directly and indirectly targeted. Prof. Schäfer delivered the main speech, in which he made a number of false statements regarding the role of the Catholics in the unification process.<sup>77</sup> Catholics criticized the professor for not being able to abstain from party politics on this day of supposed national unity. They claimed that his speech reflected how determined

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<sup>77</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, March 24, 1897.

liberals and Protestants still were to exclude Catholics from the public discourse. Many Catholic papers also tied these attacks to the current domestic political crisis. The centenary celebration came in the midst of the debates over the Tirpitz Navy bills, and many Catholics suspected that the celebration was being used to rally nationalist sentiments, which in turn would increase the support for the naval bills.<sup>78</sup> Catholics openly questioned the liberal and Protestant claims that Germany was facing a serious foreign policy crisis. The latter also attempted to divide the German nation by labeling the opponents of the naval bills “unpatriotic.” Catholics, though the Center Party had been one of the supporters of this bill, still resented the practice of excluding parts of the population from the national community. The memory of the *Kulturkampf* was still strong in the Catholic community, and most resented the use of public festivities such as the centenary celebration to strengthen a political agenda.

Despite the fact that controversies emerged on occasion in conjunction with the Emperor’s birthday, most often Catholics and Protestants were able to, if not jointly, at least side by side, celebrate their Emperor. These ceremonies proved to be of great importance to Catholics as they were able to use these occasions to participate actively in the construction of a commemorative discourse. Although this discourse did not specifically address war and unification, these themes were ever present, and Catholic participation in the shaping of these events provided them a means to integrate into the new national state on their own conditions.

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<sup>78</sup> See for instance *Pfälzer Bote*, March 24, 28, 1897.

### Celebrations of the Grand Duke's Birthdays

To an even greater extent than the celebrations of Emperor Wilhelm's birthday, Badenese Catholics willingly participated in the festivities surrounding Grand Duke Friedrich's birthday. Although both a Protestant and a staunch liberal, Friedrich enjoyed great acceptance among Badenese Catholics. Most of the time, the birthday celebrations followed a similar pattern to the ones staged for the Emperor, including parades, religious services, and banquets.<sup>79</sup> The only time in which they caused some controversy was during the most intense stages of the *Kulturkampf*. As was the case with the discourse surrounding the construction of the *Siegesdenkmal* in Freiburg, Badenese Catholics tended to be more accepting of the official discourse when it stressed the value of the regional and local over the national, which was the case with most of the celebrations honoring Friedrich I. Although he had been a strong supporter of the *kleindeutsche* solution to the German question and actively strove to promote and support the policies of the same national-liberal government that staged one of the fiercest *Kulturkämpfe* in Germany, Catholics seldom engaged in any criticism of his rule. In a similar fashion to the reluctance to criticize the Emperor, Catholics were keen to display their love and devotion to their Grand Duke. This was not only because of their sincere love for him but also because they could use him as a means of integration into the Empire. By associating themselves with Friedrich and his actions during the process of unification, though the overwhelming

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<sup>79</sup> For descriptions of the planning of these events, see for instance St. AK, S II 7201, Grossherzogliches Haus. Veranstaltung von Festlichkeiten zu Ehren seiner Königlichen Hoheit des Grossherzogs. 1849-78. For aspects involving the Catholic Church, see EAF, B2-14/13.

majority of Catholics had opposed his policies, Catholics attempted to highlight their own importance in the unification process. As has already been evident, this view did not accurately represent reality and was more representative of Catholic attempts to rewrite history.

Despite the fact that most birthday celebrations proceeded without major problems and/or controversies, exceptions existed. For instance, in Freiburg in 1873, liberals and Protestants used the Grand Duke's birthday to add to the current controversies surrounding Sedan Day and the emergence of the Old Catholic Movement. Although liberals and Protestants both agreed that the birthday was usually celebrated in a dignified manner, this year recent events had produced some complications for the upcoming festivities. The Protestant-liberal *Freiburger Zeitung* claimed that in the past, though Catholic clergy had participated in the special services designed to honor the Grand Duke, they had always done so reluctantly and with "hatred burning in their eyes."<sup>80</sup> According to liberals and Protestants, it was clearly evident that Catholic clergy members harbored little love for the Grand Duke and that they were only interested in undermining Friedrich's position. They offered some scathing criticism of Kübel and his associates, who were allegedly attempting to ruin the German national character and the Badenese state. The paper did not mince words, claiming that the Catholics who supported the doctrine of papal infallibility were allied with the devil and trying to bring about the ruin of humankind.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> *Freiburger Zeitung*, September 9, 1873.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*

Consequently, the paper argued, most Freiburgers had been dissatisfied with these services and had long been searching for more dignified alternatives. Until this year, no such alternative had existed; however, with the foundation of the Old Catholic Church, Freiburgers could once again honor their Grand Duke in an appropriate manner. The paper welcomed Bishop Josef Reinkens, the most prominent Badenese Old Catholic clergy member, to the city. *Freiburger Zeitung* stressed that Bishop Reinkens had only decided to come to Freiburg to provide the city's Catholics with an opportunity to partake in a religious service that would not be directed against the Grand Duke and his state. Since this celebration took place in close proximity to the Old Catholic congress in Konstanz, the daily hoped that Reinken's visit would jumpstart the Old Catholic community in the city.

Despite a few of these instances in which Protestants and liberals utilized the birthday of the Grand Duke to exclude Catholics from the local, regional, and national community, the latter were most often able to participate fully in these celebrations. Furthermore, since this was one of the few public celebrations that remained relatively free from hostile rhetoric, many Catholics used it as a means of integrating into the German Empire. The figure of the Grand Duke was especially suitable for this purpose. In addition to being the son-in-law of Emperor Wilhelm, he had also played an important role in the unification process. Despite the fact that the vast majority of Catholics had opposed the philo-prussian policies of Friedrich in the pre-1871 period, they praised his activities in the post-unification Empire. They often referred to him as "Friedrich the German," and it was clear that they attempted to use their love and

devotion to him as a means of proving their Germanness. Although most regular birthday celebrations contained relatively few references to the events during the 1860s, the celebration of major birthdays such as his sixtieth and seventieth were littered with references to his important role not only as a ruler of Baden but also as a man who cared deeply about all Germans.

The image of the Grand Duke was an important tool for all Badeners in their attempts to negotiate regional and national identities in the postunification period. As has been evident, citizens attempted to protect and preserve as much as possible of their local and regional identities while still portraying themselves as Germans. In the instances where regional and national identities competed for the loyalties of Badeners, less internal strife existed between Catholics and Protestants. Although both camps used Friedrich on occasion as a tool in their struggle with each other, the constructed image of the Grand Duke remained fairly homogeneous. Catholics often remarked that though a Protestant and a liberal, he had been able to make room for the Catholics in his state, which was not something that all state rulers had accomplished.

### **Additional Catholic Displays of Their National Identity**

As we have already seen in conjunction with various celebrations of papal anniversaries, Catholic congresses, and the activities of Catholic associations and organizations, Badenese Catholics strove actively to counter the official discourse surrounding the wars of unification. We have already discussed how they used papal anniversaries and similar events to display publicly their own understanding of

Germanness. In a similar fashion to how the birthdays of emperors and grand dukes were utilized not only to honor them but also to celebrate the founding of the Second Empire, Catholics often used purely religious celebrations as means of demonstrating their status as Germans. One of the more controversial religious celebrations during the Second Empire was the *Fronleichnamtsfest* (Corpus Christi Celebration). The Protestant and liberal attempts to curtail the celebration triggered intense Catholic protests, and many of these debates offer insights into how Catholics viewed themselves and their place in the German nation-state.

The Corpus Christi Celebration had been part of the Catholic festive calendar since a 1264 decree by Pope Urban IV declared that a procession would be held in which the consecrated bread would be paraded through city streets and admired by people as the body of Christ. Thus, the Corpus Christi ceremony is a public celebration of the Holy Communion. Given its public nature and the increasing importance of controlling public space, Catholics attached great importance to this event. In Freiburg, for instance, following the resumption of the festivities after the Napoleonic Wars, the celebration developed into one of the major events of the year. Taking place sometime between late May and mid-June, it often brought thousands of people into the streets to witness the extravagant processions. When the Catholic Church underwent a revival during the mid-nineteenth century, the Corpus Christi Celebration became one of the most important ways of showcasing the increasing strength of the Church.<sup>82</sup> At the same time, as the confessional tensions in Baden

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<sup>82</sup> Eva Kimmich, *Prozessionsteufel, Herrgottmaschinen und Hakenkreuzflaggen. Zur Geschichte des*

increased, the opposition from Protestants and liberals to this celebration grew steadily. The latter frequently attempted to disturb the festivities, and physical confrontations were not uncommon.<sup>83</sup>

As the nineteenth century progressed, Catholics began to change their view of the CCC. Although they still placed most of their emphasis on the religious aspect of the celebration, it became increasingly evident that many Catholics viewed this event as an opportunity to display publicly that despite all of the injustices done unto them, the Catholic community was growing in strength. Although these festivities and rituals did not directly address issues of war commemoration and/or national politics, they still served as an important means of establishing a Catholic presence in the public sphere. For one day, Catholics completely dominated the urban landscape. They often approached city councils with requests to ensure their safety during the parades, and they also tried to convince cities to pay for the decorations of houses throughout the cities.<sup>84</sup> The conflicts with Protestants illustrate how seriously contemporaries treated these events. In a similar fashion to the General Assembly of Catholics and the many papal anniversaries, Catholic showcasing of their identity further assisted their integration into Baden and the *Kaiserreich*. To them, these processions offered an opportunity to ritually confirm their roles in the community. Protestants, on the other hand, viewed them as an attempt to reintroduce religious

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*Fronleichnamfestes in Freiburg und Baden* (Freiburg: Schillinger Verlag, 1983), 26.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 37-38.

<sup>84</sup> For some of these complaints and requests, see EAF, B2-16/6, Disziplin. Dekanatsbericht über die Feier des Fronleichnamfestes.



fanaticism.<sup>85</sup>

The four hundredth anniversary of Martin Luther's birthday was another religious commemoration that created great debate among both Catholics and Protestants and further radicalized their arguments about the nature of German history and national identity. As has been evident throughout our discussions, Luther and the Protestant Reformation played an important role in German commemorations of the wars of unification and the construction of a national identity. Especially with regards to unification, Protestants frequently noted that the German nation was reunited for the first time since the Reformation. To most Protestants, Luther was not only celebrated as a religious reformer but also as a national hero who rid the German nation of the evils spread by the Roman papacy. According to the official discourse, the true German national spirit had only survived the Reformation in the Protestant parts of the country, while Catholics had nurtured a spirit alien to the German character. Thus, the Protestants turned their cause into one of national significance, and to them, Luther was the most German of Germans (*der Deutschesten der Deutschen*). To celebrate and honor Luther became equivalent of celebrating and honoring what was truly German. Most of the celebrations in 1883 ended with singing of the *Deutschlandslied*, which reinforced the connection between Luther and the German national identity.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict*, 100-101.

<sup>86</sup> For an introduction to the relationship between Luther and the German nation see Johannes Burkhardt, "Reformations- und Lutherfeiern. Die Verbürgerlichung der reformatorischen Jubiläumskultur," in *Öffentliche Festkultur*, eds. Düding, Friedemann, and Münch, 212-236, and Hartmut Lehmann, "Martin Luther als deutscher Nationalheld im 19. Jahrhundert," *Luther. Zeitschrift der Luthergesellschaft* 55 (1984): 53-65.

Naturally, Catholics disagreed with these ideas, claiming that it was only because of Luther's heresies that the German nation had suffered for so long. If not for Luther's division of the Church, Germany would have remained unified and strong and would have dominated European politics. In the wake of unification, as Germans used their history as one of the building blocks for their national identity, the controversies over Luther assumed great significance. This celebration served as an important opportunity for Protestants to try to rewrite history to fit their own notion of German history. Protestants were especially keen to connect Luther and the Reformation to the idea of progress. As we have seen on a number of occasions, Protestants always portrayed themselves as the bearer of progress while stressing the need to limit Catholic influence in the Second Empire lest Germany be left behind in the development of a modernized society. Thus, many speakers claimed that not only would Luther have been very happy about the rebirth of the Protestant Empire, but he would also have welcomed the Protestant liberal advances in the realm of industrialization.

Throughout Germany and Baden in 1883, citizens placed great efforts into the planning of the 400<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Luther's birthday. Protestants organized a variety of parades, banquets, and religious services. Many viewed this as an excellent opportunity to upend the Catholic celebrations of various papal anniversaries. Because of the magnitude of this event, the Catholic and Protestant communities engaged in fierce debates regarding Luther and the character of the German national identity. Although at first glance, these debates might seem to pertain to Luther only,

a closer examination reveal that they grappled with more fundamental issues about who constituted the driving forces in the nation-building project. In Konstanz, *Freie Stimme* dedicated several lead articles to the celebrations, rebutting many of the accusations against the Catholic Church that surfaced in conjunction with these debates. In a similar fashion to events such as Sedan Day, Catholics, though naturally excluded from the celebratory discourse, were able to use the controversies surrounding these events to present their own view of German history and their own understanding of Germanness. Although the end of the 1870s and the beginning of the 1880s had witnessed an easing of the *Kulturkampf* in Baden, relations between the two confessions remained strained. Confessional conflicts still dominated local society, and an event such as the Luther celebration triggered an intensification of current conflicts. In many cities, the Protestant request to stage public celebrations caused great controversy. Catholics strongly opposed this idea, arguing while it was acceptable for Protestants to hold religious services, Luther was not deserving of public celebrations. Simply put, he had caused too many Germans too much pain. While Catholics maintained that only Protestants wanted to honor Luther, the latter claimed that because of his status as a national hero, Germans of all confessions would come out into the streets.

Catholics offered several arguments why Luther should not be celebrated as a German national hero, highlighting the difference between the Catholic and Protestant views of history. Catholics pointed out that despite the Protestant claim that Luther had accomplished so much for the German nation, history did not support their

arguments. On the contrary, the centuries following Luther's death had been characterized by a very poor German cultural and artistic life. Indeed, during this time, French literature and culture dominated German society, a fact that did not speak well of the influence of the religious reformer. Consequently, from a national standpoint, the period after the Reformation must be considered a negative one.<sup>87</sup> Catholics also reminded Protestants that Luther had revolted against his Emperor, which should not be celebrated as a memorable deed. If someone were to take similar action today, Protestants and liberals would be the first ones to demand the imprisonment and/or execution of this traitor. Catholics further questioned how Protestants could honor Luther's rebellion against the Emperor while at the same time condemning Catholic passive resistance against the May Laws.

Catholics also criticized Protestants for returning to rhetoric and action of the *Kulturkampf* when planning these events. They remarked that this was an unfortunate development, especially since conditions for Catholics in Baden had slightly improved during the last few years. Now this celebration threatened to reverse these positive developments and relaunch the *Kulturkampf*. Catholics used this argument to prove that Protestants were not at all interested in consolidating national unity but were instead still trying to exclude Catholics from the national community.<sup>88</sup> Indeed, many Catholics labeled the two-day celebration "days of sorrow and pain."<sup>89</sup> They

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<sup>87</sup> See for instance *Freie Stimme*, November 6, 1883.

<sup>88</sup> See for instance *Freie Stimme*, November 8, 10, 1883.

<sup>89</sup> *Freie Stimme*, November 10, 1883.

questioned the Protestant understanding of patriotism since it was clearly evident that the Reformation had caused such great problems for Germans. Catholics portrayed themselves as better Christians, who would pray for their lost brothers, who failed to understand properly the true meaning of patriotism. This conciliatory approach to the conflict provided Catholics with the opportunity to present themselves as benevolent and good Germans who would be patient with the mistakes of their fellow countrymen.<sup>90</sup>

An analysis of the articles published by both Protestant and liberal papers reveals that most of their efforts were spent on discussing Luther's role as a national figure and not his religious teachings. To be sure, Catholics outlined what they considered the most severe flaws in Luther's theories, but that really constituted a minor part of all the material published. Instead, they tirelessly debated Luther's role as a German national hero. Despite the Catholic resistance to the celebrations, throughout Baden most events were staged without any major problems. Although a few minor altercations were reported, the majority of events proceeded as planned. In the end, Catholics simply decided to stay home and ignore the festivities, much in the same manner as most Protestants behaved during the papal celebrations.

As has been evident throughout this chapter, Badenese Catholics were able to shape much of the commemorative discourse during the *Kaiserreich*. Their fierce opposition to Sedan Day illustrates not only their determination to be included in the new national identity, but it also depicts their readiness to use the emerging Catholic

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<sup>90</sup> See for instance *Freie Stimme*, November 13, 1883.

press to combat the propaganda against them. Indeed, the Catholics that emerge in the wake of the struggles surrounding Sedan Day represent members of a community that were determined to integrate into the new Empire on their own terms. The debates surrounding Sedan Day also illustrate how contested the creation of the German national identity was. While many Protestants were able to celebrate annually the capture of Napoleon III as evidence of the strength of the German nation, many Catholics traced the origins of the *Kulturkampf* back to those days in the early part of September 1870. Although there were certainly other reasons besides Catholic resistance involved in the demise of this public holiday, no other factor played such an important role. Both Catholics and Protestants in Baden viewed Sedan Day as a vehicle to propagate the *Kulturkampf* measures, which was one of the many reasons why the celebration became so contested. The fact that the celebration ultimately failed indicates not only that Catholics were successful in maintaining their own view of national identity but also that Catholics and Protestants used nationalist vocabulary to debate their differences in society. Thus, nationalist sentiments did not only unify but at times served to divide the nation, which was certainly the case during Sedan Day. The Catholic success in repelling the accusations of anti-Germanness and treason, in addition to the increasing political success of the Catholics, enabled members of the Catholic community to shape the formation of the public sphere, something that became highly evident in their celebrations of the Corpus Christi Celebration. Catholics utilized these parades to manifest both their religious and civic identity as Germans. Furthermore, the fact that Catholics in all three cities under

investigation opposed Sedan Day also indicates that their opposition aided them in creating a more cohesive society. Although our analysis indicated some differences in how Catholics in Freiburg, Konstanz, and Heidelberg viewed unification, the fact that all of them opposed Sedan Day suggests that events such as these served to smooth out some of the differences and made for a stronger sense of Catholic identity, though there of course still existed certain differences within this community.

Catholic participation in the celebrations of imperial birthdays also testify to their ability to participate in the local commemorative discourse without compromising their own understanding of Germanness. Indeed, the celebrations of the Emperor's birthday offered Badenese Catholics in all three cities an excellent opportunity to present themselves as loyal subjects and true Germans. Despite having to endure some hostile rhetoric at these events, Catholics were able to manifest their dedication to the newly formed nation-states. However, our discussions also revealed that not all members of the Catholic community agreed with the conciliatory policy that the EO adopted towards these celebrations. These instances of dissonance suggest that the Catholic milieu was much more complicated and heterogeneous than both contemporaries and many later historians have assumed. As will become evident in the next chapter's discussion regarding some of the nation-building projects that Catholics initiated and supported during the last decade of the *Kaiserreich*, the Catholic community was often quite divided on how to approach these issues once the immediate threat of the *Kulturkampf* laws had been removed. During the 1870s, and to a certain extent the 1880s, the great majority of the Catholic community had been

highly unified due to their common opposition to the *Kulturkampf*. However, once that immediate threat was removed, some Catholics disagreed on how to protect and further their own interest. In the next chapter we will trace how the more established role of Badenese Catholics affected their integration into the new national identity.



## CHAPTER 7

### REACHING AN UNEASY CONSENSUS: CATHOLIC VIEWS OF THE UNIFICATION DURING THE LAST TWO DECADES PRIOR TO THE GREAT WAR

As we saw in the last chapter, the status of Badenese Catholics was changing towards the end of the nineteenth century. Although they remained socially, culturally, politically, and economically disadvantaged, there were increasing signs that the state's Catholics were beginning to integrate successfully into both their regional milieu and the German nation-state. Especially after the reconstitution of the Catholic People's Party as the Badenese Center Party in 1888, Catholics played a prominent role in Badenese politics and society. Throughout the *Kaiserreich*, the Badenese Center Party was one of the strongest political groupings, thus enhancing the status of its constituency. Their increased political strength, coupled with a strong Catholic presence in the colonial movement and a growing associational life, enabled Baden's Catholics to escape the status of second-class citizens.

This chapter traces how Catholics viewed and helped shape the changing commemorative discourse surrounding the unification of the *Kaiserreich* during the final two decades of the Second Empire. Although contemporaries agreed that Catholics were becoming more "German," in many cases their view of Germaneness still conflicted with the state-sponsored version. This tension was most evident in the

commemorations of former Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. The debates concerning the old statesman underscored that though Germany was now many years removed from the *Kulturkampf*, many of Baden's Catholics were still uneasy about Bismarck's role in these events. Analysis of how Catholics viewed the widespread construction of Bismarck and Emperor Wilhelm monuments that took place in Baden and the rest of Germany at the fin de siècle will illuminate their attitudes towards the founding fathers of the Empire. Although not directly connected to the unification, these projects are still relevant as most of the ideological messages connected to these celebrations centered on the process surrounding unification. Badenese Catholics approached these celebratory efforts with greater enthusiasm than previously. However, despite the increased acceptance of and inclusion in the official commemorative discourse, Catholics still struggled to reconcile with parts of it. Although they were now better able to shape this discourse to suit their own view of the last twenty-five years, they were still reluctant to accept parts of the official discourse. Celebrations were held throughout Baden in 1895 in conjunction with Sedan Day and in January 1896 to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Empire. As was seen in the last chapter, though initially controversial, celebrations of Sedan Day had become inconsequential during the last decade. In anticipation of the twenty-fifth anniversary, however, Freiburg, Konstanz, and Heidelberg all organized large celebrations. In contrast to earlier celebrations, in 1895, Catholics and Protestants both actively participated in remembering the events of 1870. Celebrations followed a similar pattern around the state as organizers attempted to include the entire

population in the festivities.

### **Celebrating the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of War and Unification**

On September 2, cannons were fired in Freiburg at 6 o'clock in the morning to remind people of the events of a quarter century before. During the morning, the three major confessions held celebratory church services, in which clergy asked citizens to remember and honor the sacrifices made by their fellow Germans. From the outset of these celebrations, it was evident that most of the commemorative discourse centered on the efforts of the Badenese soldiers and their efforts in the Franco-Prussian War. Following the services, the city council staged a parade of the city's dignitaries and surviving veterans from the city center to the *Siegesdenkmal* and then to the graveyard where veterans placed wreaths on both German and French graves. Newspapers reported that it was nice to see that the French victims were remembered as well, yet another indication of the noble German spirit.<sup>1</sup> It is evident from the speeches at the cemetery that this celebration was different from many others during the first few decades of the *Kaiserreich*. In other commemorations, speakers not only praised the efforts of the German soldiers, but they also stressed how much Germans had accomplished since unification. Often, this part of the commemorative discourse became the most contested because citizens had different memories of the first few years of the Second Empire. For the state's Catholics, the recommencement of the *Kulturkampf* meant that the immediate postunification years did not have the same

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<sup>1</sup> See for instance *Freiburger Zeitung*, September 3, 1895.

positive connotation as it had for many Protestants and liberals. But, since most of the speeches ignored the postunification years, it was easier for the state's Catholics to participate in these festivities.

Following the ceremony at the cemetery, participants paraded to city hall where the celebration continued with a banquet. The city orchestra initiated the celebrations with a rendition of "Hymn to the Honor of the German Empire," which according to newspapers set the tone for the rest of the celebration. Mayor Winterer gave the plenary speech in which he praised the efforts of the local veterans. He also noted that today's generation should follow the veterans' example. Instead of being satisfied with Baden and Germany's progress during the last twenty-five years, locals must remain pious, hard-working, and disciplined to honor the veterans' sacrifices.<sup>2</sup> This was not an uncommon theme when cities honored the efforts of war veterans. Many members of the war generation believed that younger Germans simply took Germany's strength and unity for granted. However, for Germany to continue to grow stronger and more powerful, the spirit of 1870-1871 had to be at the forefront of the German consciousness.

Despite the controversies surrounding Sedan Day, Catholics in Freiburg participated in these events. *Freiburger Bote* labeled the celebration one of the best ever in the city, and there was no trace of *Kulturkampf* rhetoric during these events. To be sure, the fact that the speeches held during these ceremonies centered on the efforts of the local soldiers made the celebration much easier to support for local

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<sup>2</sup> See for instance *Freiburger Bote*, September 3, 1895. For information in regards to the planning of these events, see also St. AF, C1/Festlichkeiten/1B/8.

Catholics. The Catholics' unconditional acceptance of the commemorative discourse surrounding such an important event as the foundation of the Reich certainly indicates that they were much more integrated in the Empire than had been the case just a few years earlier. As will become evident later in this chapter, much of this integration was due to their increased political strength, as well as an increasingly strong associational life, which enabled increasing Catholic participation in the shaping of local and national society.

Local veterans were honored in similar ceremonies in Konstanz and Heidelberg. Veterans in Baden paraded through their communities and attended speeches lauding them for their sacrifices to the German fatherland. The city council in Konstanz also provided the veterans with a commemorative plaque, which thanked them for their efforts during the unification process. The plaque noted that if not for these select individuals, Germany would not be as unified and strong today.<sup>3</sup> As another means of ensuring that these events were remembered properly, cities also published accounts of the events of 1870-1871. In Freiburg, the local history professor Franz Albert chronicled the great efforts of the Badenese soldiers. In his book, he once again stressed the proximity of Freiburg to the French border and how grateful all citizens should be towards the soldiers who had so valiantly protected the Badenese fatherland.<sup>4</sup> Before the anniversary, city councils had stressed how important it would be to honor the veterans in a worthy manner. For the most part,

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> The booklet can be found in St. AF, C1/Festlichkeiten/1B/8.

veterans led an anonymous existence in their towns, and leading politicians now noted how important it would be to ensure that locals were aware of their existence and what they had accomplished for their local and national communities.<sup>5</sup> Judging from this correspondence, it is evident that public officials experienced a need to remind their constituencies that the veterans' efforts must not be forgotten. In addition, by stressing the veterans' great character, they would be able to use these men as models for today's generation. Hence, they deemed it important to ensure that the veterans were given a prominent place in these celebrations.

During the fall of 1895, both the Catholic and Protestant press ran series of articles recalling the events of 1870. Especially in conjunction with Sedan Day, newspapers published descriptions of the most important battles as well as lists of the Badenians who had died while serving their fatherland.<sup>6</sup> *Pfälzer Bote* published a series of articles entitled "The German Soldier in War" in which they portrayed him as more courageous, pious, and skilled than his French counterpart. In these articles, they also reprinted a telegram that Wilhelm I had sent to Bismarck, in which he stated that once Germany had become unified, it would be very important for citizens to honor these events by constructing different kinds of monuments. These monuments would serve as means of integration for Germans and would also ensure that Germans never forget the sacrifices that these men had done in the service of Germany.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> St. AK, S II 5375, letter from the city council of Konstanz to the one in Pforzheim, July 22, 1895.

<sup>6</sup> See for instance *Pfälzer Bote*, September 6, 1895.

<sup>7</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, September 10, 1895.

Although Protestants and Catholics displayed remarkable unity in celebrating the events surrounding Sedan Day, and though these celebrations reflected increased Catholic integration into the Second German Empire, Catholics also had a different set of memories from those days in 1870. To be sure, Catholics and Protestants both agreed in their assessment of the events of the Franco-Prussian War, but in 1895, Catholics again lamented the fate of Pope Pius IX in 1870. During the Franco-Prussian War, Catholics had been very concerned about the fate of the Pope as French forces left Rome to fight the Germans. These sentiments had caused much strife with the Protestants both during the conflict with France as well as in the immediate post-unification period. Often, Protestants cited these sentiments as proof that Catholics were not true Germans and that their *Heimat* was Rome rather than Baden. As the twenty-fifth anniversary of the sequestering of the Pope to the Vatican approached, Catholics focused much of their attention on this anniversary.

On September 19, the lead article in *Pfälzer Bote* condemned Italians for celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of what the latter labeled their true unification. The title of the article, "The Italian Robbery," reflected the Catholic view of these events. The paper noted that it was evident that Italians failed to understand properly what constituted patriotism. Italians now claimed that the removal of the Pope had constituted an act of nationalism, which had strengthened Italy. Catholics accused Italians of distorting history and misunderstanding the proper meaning of nationalism. Catholics argued that diminishing the power of the Pope should never be celebrated as a nationalistic deed. Thus, it was evident that Italians were far behind the modern

times in comprehending the requirements of nationalism. They were also critical of the fact that the Protestant press noted that the anniversaries of the unifications of Italy and Germany constituted two major events that had ushered in a long period of prosperity and peace for both populations. Catholics argued that true Germans would understand how fundamentally different the two events were. The Italians did not deserve to be commemorated in a similar fashion to the Germans who valiantly fought to protect their fatherland. On the contrary, the Italians had succumbed to greed as they removed the Pope from Rome for materialistic reasons. More importantly, it was un-German of the Protestants to celebrate the German and Italian victories in the same way, thus cheapening the German heroic deeds. Catholics attributed the celebrations in Italy to the whims of a few elite politicians and not representative of the true wishes of the Italian people. They also noted that Protestants had previously ridiculed countries such as Spain and Italy for the lack of progress that they had displayed during the past twenty-five years. Thus, their compliments on the Italian accomplishments since they had limited papal influence rang hollow. *Pfälzer Bote* ended the article by noting that Rome had been, and always would be, the domain of the Pope.<sup>8</sup> This is of course interesting as these sentiments were antithetical to the principles of national sovereignty and nationalism, which were so prevalent during the later part of the nineteenth century.

During the following days, the Catholics returned to these events several times, noting that the church had constituted the oldest basis for a state and that a proper

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<sup>8</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, September 19, 1895.



understanding of nationalism must recognize this fact. They also maintained that these celebrations were not representative of the spirit of the Italian people. Instead, the people who organized these celebrations were only interested in making money on these commemorations, sentiments alien to the true Italian spirit, which was still enumerating from the Pope. Catholics also protested the Protestant assertions that the Pope was reduced to a powerless prisoner in the Vatican. They maintained that the Pope was more powerful than ever before and that the colonial movement had enhanced his power throughout the world. Last, they repeated the argument that Protestants were not able to comment on the status of the Pope since they were not able to understand properly the relationship between the Vatican and the rest of the world. Indeed, they noted that people during these last twenty-five years had constantly misrepresented this relationship. While German Protestants had argued that Catholic loyalties to Rome constituted proof that the latter could never be true members of the nation-state, the relationship was not that simple. Instead, Catholics around the world were able to be loyal to both their nation-state as well as their Pope, and the fact that they were able to maintain both of these relationships actually made them better citizens of their respective states.<sup>9</sup>

What is interesting to note here is that Protestants largely ignored these Catholic sentiments. Although the role of the Pope had been a hotly contested subject between Catholics and Protestants during the initial years of the *Kaiserreich*, these viewpoints were not as controversial anymore. To be sure, this illustrates the fact that

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<sup>9</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, September 23, 24, 1895.

Catholics had become more integrated into the Second German Empire, but it is also a reflection of the improved relationship between the Empire and the Vatican. Ever since the death of Pius IX, the tone between the two parties had been much more conciliatory, which contributed to a greater Protestant acceptance of Catholic loyalties to the Pope. Furthermore, due to the fact that Catholics had played an important role in supporting the strengthening of the military, most notably against the wishes of Leo XIII in 1888, they had proved to the rest of Germany that they were interested in protecting Germany rather than blindly obeying the wishes of the Vatican. Comparing these sentiments to the demands Catholics had made in the early 1870s that the German government ensure the protection of the Pope, it was clear that Catholics were in a much different situation in the 1890s compared to the 1870s.

Following the celebrations of Sedan Day in 1895, Badenese commemorated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the foundation of the Empire in January 1896. However, instead of celebrating the anniversary of the proclamation of the Reich, Badenese cities focused their efforts on the anniversary of the victory of the 113<sup>th</sup> Badenese Regiment at Belfort. City councils did not participate to any great extent in these celebrations, which were instead organized by the local veterans associations. Nonetheless, these celebrations resonated very well with citizens, and locals observed this anniversary with great reverence. Celebrations in Heidelberg and Freiburg were relatively minor compared to the rest of the state, but in Konstanz, the veterans association organized a more extensive two-day celebration. On January 14, local veterans, as well as some who had been stationed in Konstanz during the war, were

paraded throughout the city. Konstanzers had decorated their houses in customary fashion, with the willing participation of both Protestants and Catholics. This should come as no surprise since the commemoration of the battle of Belfort had always been a relatively uncontroversial celebration. Following the parade, veterans and local dignitaries assembled at the theatre. Here, Lieutenant Baumann gave a speech in which he outlined the achievements of the local soldiers during the past fifty years. Throughout his remarks, Baumann stressed the important role that local soldiers had played in local, regional, and national history. He emphasized that locals should not forget that though soldiers had played decisive roles on the battlefields, they had also been instrumental in turning Konstanz into a better city. He argued that the local economy had benefited from the presence of these soldiers and that they had always played a constructive role in the development of the city.<sup>10</sup>

Following Baumann's speech, the local theatre association performed a play entitled "We Deserve the Entire Germany," in which the events of the war were replayed. In addition, the play also chronicled some of the key political developments during the past twenty-five years, and especially how the city of Konstanz had benefited from the efforts of the three Emperors. Most of the play centered on the war and the valiant efforts of local soldiers who had saved the Badenese fatherland from French threat. *Konstanzer Nachrichten* reported that the audience had been very appreciative of the play and that it had constituted a nice way for people to remember

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<sup>10</sup> *Konstanzer Nachrichten*, January 16, 17, 1896. See also St. AK, S II 5375.

the valiant efforts of local soldiers.<sup>11</sup> At the end of the day, Grand Duke Friedrich arrived in the city, and people greeted him at the train station, where it was noted that he had been one of the instrumental figures in bringing about German unity. The celebrations ended the following day with celebratory masses in all of the churches, and it is noteworthy that the Grand Duke elected to attend both Protestant as well as Catholic services, which indicated that the city enjoyed a much greater confessional harmony than in previous years.<sup>12</sup>

Judging from the unified response that Badenese Catholics and Protestants displayed towards the twenty-fifth anniversary of the German unification, it was clear that the state's Catholics were in a much better position than during most of the last twenty-five years. However, none of these celebrations contained much potential for controversy. To be sure, Sedan Day had been perhaps the greatest source of controversy during the first few years of the *Kaiserreich*, but during the past decade, both Catholics and Protestants had largely neglected this holiday. Thus, when it was once again revisited, both confessions were able to embrace the commemoration of this important military victory without engaging in confessional polemics.

Furthermore, since the vast majority of these commemorations centered on the efforts of local soldiers, it was relatively easy for the state's Catholics to participate fully in these festivities. Although the efforts of Catholic soldiers during the war had been a source of controversy for the first few years of the Second Empire, Protestants had

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<sup>11</sup> *Konstanzer Nachrichten*, January 16, 1896.

<sup>12</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, January 17, 1896.

ceased their accusations of Catholic un-German behavior relatively soon after the foundation of the *Kaiserreich*, which enabled both confessions to honor properly the efforts of all German soldiers. Although it is clear that the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Empire indicated a greater Catholic integration into the Second Empire, events such as the commemorations tied to the persona of Bismarck displayed that there were still certain topics related to the unification that caused great conflict between the state's two predominant confessions.

### **Catholic Reactions towards the Development of a Bismarck Cult**

In conjunction with Bismarck's eightieth birthday in 1895, controversy ensued that illustrates how Catholic and Protestant attitudes had changed towards the old statesman. Following the death of Wilhelm I and the brief reign of his son, Friedrich III, Wilhelm II became the new German Emperor on June 15, 1888. Whereas his grandfather had almost reluctantly accepted his role as *Landesvater*, Wilhelm II embraced and cherished his role as the premier figure in German society. This attitude led to an almost immediate conflict with Chancellor Bismarck, who had been accustomed to conducting his political affairs relatively independent of the Emperor. The new Emperor's insistence on shaping especially foreign policy irked the Chancellor and their relationship was strained from the outset. It came therefore as no great surprise when it was announced on March 18, 1890, that Bismarck had resigned. Germans around the Empire greeted this news with mixed emotions. Careful not to seem opposed to the recently crowned Emperor, many remarked that though Bismarck

had offered invaluable services to the fatherland, his age made retirement appropriate at that moment. Naturally, especially in conservative and liberal circles, many were aghast at the disrespectful manner in which Wilhelm II had dismissed the greatest German statesman in history.<sup>13</sup>

Catholics in Baden greeted the news of Bismarck's resignation with a more modest approach than conservatives and national-liberals. Their judgment of Bismarck's legacy was surprisingly neutral, and in some instances almost positive, which serves as an indication that their status in the Reich had changed since the days of the *Kulturkampf*, when they considered Bismarck their greatest enemy. Badenese Catholics did of course note that Bismarck had been one of their fiercest political opponents, especially in conjunction with the *Kulturkampf*. However, they also admitted to a reluctant respect for the great statesman and his efforts to unify Germany, an event that they now labeled the greatest achievement in German history. Catholics also claimed that for most of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, people around the world had considered Bismarck and German Catholics the two most important societal forces in Germany, which they interpreted as proof of their important status in the Empire. They claimed that Bismarck had learned much from the Catholics, and their unwillingness to bow to his pressure had left him in awe of their strength and caused him to alter his policies towards the Church. In addition, they also credited Bismarck with strengthening the Catholic Church and facilitating the integration of Catholics into the nation-state. By launching the *Kulturkampf*,

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<sup>13</sup> See for instance Gall, *Bismarck*, 693, 711-713.

Bismarck had forced the Catholics to rally together and unite in the face of this fierce opposition, and this newfound strength had served the Catholic community well as they gained acceptance as members of the nation-state.<sup>14</sup>

After his resignation, Bismarck lived in an uneasy retirement. Initially inclined to remain involved in German politics, he relatively quickly drifted into status of the revered old statesman who nonetheless was kept outside the political life. Occasionally, a controversy would emerge as conservatives and national-liberals expressed dismay at the policies of the new political leadership, and calls for reinstatement of Bismarck would ensue. However, the relative peaceful existence of the old Chancellor ceased in 1895 when Germans began to plan for celebrations of his eightieth birthday on April 1.

As far as the Badenese cities were concerned, on January 15, 1895, Mayor Wilckens of Heidelberg suggested to Mayor Schnetzler of Karlsruhe that the major Badenese cities should plan a joint celebration of the upcoming birthday.<sup>15</sup> The affirmative response came quickly from Karlsruhe, in which the mayor noted that such a momentous event deserved the full attention of Badenese. After this initial contact, letters were distributed to the mayors of the other large cities, asking them to participate in this venture and to ensure that Bismarck was bestowed the title of Honorary Citizen of the cities in question. At the *Oberbürgermeisterkonferenz* on

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<sup>14</sup> See for instance *Freie Stimme*, March 22, 25, 27, 1890.

<sup>15</sup> St. AH, Heidelberger Uraltaktien (HUA) 219-5, Ehrungen des Fürsten Bismarcks, letter from Wilckens to Schnetzler in Karlsruhe, January 15, 1895.

January 25, the mayors also decided to let Direktor Goetz from Karlsruhe draw up the official letter denoting the title of Honorary Citizen on Bismarck. Indicating that the mayors were well aware that this could prove to be a thorny issue with their constituencies, they also noted that if any of the cities in question would decide against the idea, the remaining ones would still proceed with the initiative.<sup>16</sup> Following this meeting, the mayor of Karlsruhe privately alerted Wilckens to the fact that this matter would likely cause conflict among the local population. In a January 29 letter, he wrote Wilckens that though the vast majority of Badeners would agree that Bismarck had served the fatherland well, his domestic policies, especially in regards to the Catholic Church, would cause debate whether Baden should honor the old Chancellor.<sup>17</sup>

During the following days, city councils around the state discussed this issue, and already from the outset, it was evident that this was to be a hotly contested topic. In the January 31 meeting in Konstanz, a fierce debate broke out as members of the council voiced their opinions on Bismarck's legacy. Although many were in favor, several Catholics expressed dismay at the notion of honoring Bismarck. In a very lively debate, Dr. Mon wanted it on the record that as a faithful Catholic, he could not support this idea. He admitted that Bismarck had certainly served Germany well, especially in regards to foreign policy, but his war on the Church was something that

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<sup>16</sup> St. AK, S II 5576, Staatsorganisation, Reichssachen. Ehrung des Fürsten Bismarcks, report from OB meeting, January 25, 1895.

<sup>17</sup> St. AH, HUA 219-5, letter from Schnetzler to Wilckens, January 29, 1895.



no Catholic could ever forget and which should disqualify him from any public honors. After an intense debate during which the chairman several times had to call members to order, the motion was passed. Out of the sixty-two members present, fifty-two voted in favor, four against, and six abstained. However, Catholics noted that twenty-four members were missing, which they interpreted as a clear sign of their disapproval.<sup>18</sup>

Having initiated the idea, Mayor Wilckens eagerly awaited the results of the voting throughout the state. In his correspondence with the other mayors, he noted with pride that his own city council had passed the motion unanimously. However, as soon became evident, many cities around the state were much more hesitant towards this idea. Although they finally passed the motion, both Mannheim and Pforzheim had large numbers voting against the initiative.<sup>19</sup> Catholics offered the fiercest resistance, but democrats were also in opposition to the idea. Nonetheless, the mayors declared that they would proceed with planning of the individual festivities throughout the state. In the beginning of March, conflict ensued as some cities decided that they did not have the financial means to contribute to the proposed honorary gift. Wilckens and Schnetzler solved this problem by reassuring the other mayors that they would only pay an amount commensurate to the size of each city. In the end, all of the other mayors, despite some misgivings, agreed to pay the suggested amounts.<sup>20</sup> These

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<sup>18</sup> St. AK, S II 5576, report from city council meeting, January 31, 1895.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

events also illustrate how sometimes these commemorative efforts could be misrepresentative of public opinion. In the end, mayors presented all of these cities as equal participants in this project, which obviously was not true.

Until this point, most of these debates had been carried out within the confines of the local political elite, without any direct involvement from local citizens or the press. However, this changed on March 23 when the German Parliament voted not to recognize Bismarck's birthday. The most commonly cited reason why parliament should not congratulate Bismarck was that it would constitute a political act. Because of the politics that Bismarck had advocated, the Center Party and others declared that they would not be able to support the idea. These debates clearly illustrate how closely commemorative efforts were associated with politics, and it furthermore displays just how aware Catholics were of the political importance associated with the official commemorative discourse. What is interesting to note is the fact that this constituted one of the first occasions on which the Center Party was strong enough politically to be able to shape the official commemorative discourse that was so closely tied to unification.

This decision triggered an intense debate concerning the past and present character of Bismarck, in which everybody from the Emperor to the common man voiced their opinion. Because these debates centered on the statesman's political career, they serve as a good illustration of memory construction and how Badenese Catholics and others viewed the course of German history during the preceding thirty years. At the outset of these debates, the national-liberals attacked what they labeled

one of the greatest injustices of German parliamentary history. They interpreted the poor decision of Parliament as another indication of the dangers of a popular democracy. In a leading article on March 26, *Konstanzer Zeitung* issued a stern criticism of the behavior of the Parliament. They stressed that nowhere else in the world would a parliament refuse a simple birthday wish to one of its greatest men, especially not on his eightieth birthday. The paper claimed that the reason for this shameful decision was that Catholic and social-democratic parliamentary members were unable to recognize Bismarck's greatness as a German and instead focused exclusively on his party politics.<sup>21</sup>

The injustice done to Bismarck continued to dominate the pages of *Konstanzer Zeitung* for the following days. They noted that Germans throughout the Empire were incensed at the poor taste of the Parliament in Berlin. In these discussions, several recognizable themes soon became evident. The paper argued that all citizens who possessed a proper understanding of what it meant to be a true German and who understood how to support the construction of a strong nation-state were in favor of congratulating Bismarck. They labeled the old Chancellor the founder of the German Empire and the man responsible for bringing Germany to its place in the sun. Thus, to oppose this motion was not only a sign of how far removed from their constituencies the members of Parliament were, but it also showed that they were lesser Germans than the rest of their colleagues. The paper also questioned why Catholics and

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<sup>21</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, March 26, 1895.

democrats had not opposed the celebration of Bismarck's seventieth birthday.<sup>22</sup>

Although the Catholics never responded to this particular charge, their change of mind should be attributed to the altered political situation in the Empire. Not only was Bismarck no longer in office, which made it less important to placate him, but the Center Party had grown considerably in strength during the last decade and was now in a better position to oppose these kinds of initiatives.

On March 30, Professor Gottlob Egelhaaf published an essay entitled "Bismarck and the South Germans" in *Konstanzer Zeitung*. The purpose of this article was clear. By taking a historical look at Bismarck's life and political career, he attempted to solidify the official view of the retired Chancellor as somebody who had always sought to improve the lives of all Germans. In addition to the usual praise for his foreign policy successes, Egelhaaf noted that Bismarck had a jovial character that had always been very close to the sympathetic south German one. He alleged that the *Kulturkampf* had not been aimed at German Catholics but rather to clear the Church of undue papal influence and dogma as well as to eliminate the antinational efforts of the Jesuits. Still, the tone of these accounts had changed slightly during the past few years. National-liberals and Protestants such as Egelhaaf now admitted that Bismarck had made some mistakes in conducting the struggle against the Church. However, despite this more conciliatory tone, Egelhaaf claimed that any true Christian and German would be able to forgive Bismarck for his political sins. Hence, it now became un-German to still hold a grudge for the few mistakes that the Chancellor

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<sup>22</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, March 27, 1895.

might have made.<sup>23</sup>

Protestants and national-liberals also used the discussion regarding this event to voice misgivings about the development of German society. Not only in Baden, but throughout the Empire, national-liberals experienced difficulties adapting to the new mode of mass politics that developed in the 1890s. Although the Badenese National Liberal Party was able to remain in power, they suffered heavy political setbacks as they struggled to adjust from the mode of *Honoratiorenpolitik* to the more inclusive mass politics that challenged their political hegemony. As a result, they viewed this latest controversy as proof that today's Germans did not understand what was truly important and that they had taken for granted Germany's preeminence in Europe. Resorting to the often-used argument that a people who could not honor its important figures properly was a people in deep crisis, they stressed that ever since the death of Wilhelm I in 1888 there had been several signs that the German nation was deteriorating quickly. They stressed that celebrations such as these had in the past helped strengthen and unify Germans and constituted one of the major reasons why Germany had so quickly been able to establish itself as a world power. Engaging in a rewriting of history, national-liberals and Protestants argued that in the past, all national holidays had been celebrated in a worthy and respectful manner by the entire nation, which had served to further solidify Germany's strength. Lamenting that the recent liberal political setbacks illustrated that Germans no longer respected what made them successful and German, they claimed that materialist ideas were ruining

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<sup>23</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, March 30, 31, 1895.

German society and the national character. They especially singled out the social-democrats and their notion of class struggle as one of the main reasons why liberalism was in decline and threatened to be replaced by an individualistic struggle for materialistic self-fulfillment. They claimed that this individualism, which most Catholics and democrats would have attributed to liberals themselves, was threatening to tear apart German society and weaken the nation-state.<sup>24</sup>

National-liberals also used this opportunity to question the politics of the Center Party. At a time when the party was assuming an increasingly important role in German politics, this conflict provided the national-liberals with an opportunity to revisit some of the supposedly antinational policies of the Center from the past decades. They stressed the continuously fierce Catholic opposition towards Bismarck and the Reich, which allegedly had inhibited the development of the German Empire. Furthermore, Catholics were seen as defenders of the Polish minority in the Reich, and calls for removal of the “Polish supporters” became common during these debates. This constitutes another example of how commemorations such as these were closely interconnected to current political issues. Many Germans had always been ambivalent towards the sizeable Polish minority in the eastern parts of the Reich. The formation and increased popularity of mass organizations such as the Society for the Eastern Marches, which had as one of its main goals to Germanize the eastern parts of the Empire, indicate that this was a topic that assumed ever more popular attention. Notwithstanding the fact that many Catholics were uneasy about the Polish issue, and

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<sup>24</sup>*Freiburger Zeitung*, March 24, 1895.

that many of them even openly opposed an increase in minority rights for the Poles, the Catholics were assumed to be strong supporters of their Catholic brethren. Once again, this was another instance in which the Catholics were accused of placing their religious loyalties above their ethnic ones; they were more interested in enhancing the status of their church in Germany than they were in protecting the national community of Germans.<sup>25</sup>

Faced with this criticism from fellow Germans, Catholics responded in kind to the accusations of anti national feelings. Of course, this was not a novel phenomenon, as they had been forced to do so during the entire existence of the Second Empire, however, the Catholics were now in a better position to offer some constructive arguments as to how the nationalist discourse should be constructed. One of their earliest responses to the criticism was to downplay the importance of this event. Complaining that national-liberals and Protestants treated this controversy as a sign of the apocalypse, Catholics ridiculed the national-liberal and Protestant outrage. Due to their more established political, economic, and social situation, Catholics could now afford to question the inherent importance of these types of events, something that would not have been possible before. Otherwise, Catholics were somewhat more conciliatory in their approach to Bismarck, pointing out that he had indeed been a man who had accomplished good things for Germany, especially in regards to the unification. Accusations of Bismarck's bullish and reactionary behavior, especially towards the south German states and Austria, were absent, and overall, unification was

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

regarded in a positive light, despite the manner in which it had taken place.

After remarking that the importance of Bismarck's birthday had been vastly exaggerated, Catholics noted that Bismarck had for several decades bullied the Emperor, the Parliament, and the German people. However, with the arrival of a new Emperor, Bismarck was quickly reduced to a less important figure, and his power diminished rapidly. This was something that did not fit his temperament, and he quickly decided to resign. By offering this relatively mild criticism of Bismarck, as well as Wilhelm I, Catholics were able to voice their support for the current Emperor. They openly praised him for restoring his position as the most powerful man in Germany and indicated that for national-liberals and Protestants to be upset about this latest turn of events indicated their faltering support for Wilhelm II.<sup>26</sup>

Catholics further argued that one of the main reasons why Bismarck had been denied an official congratulation from Parliament was that he had never been able to reconcile himself to the more democratic mode of politics. This argument positioned Catholics as advocates of a more modern and inclusive society. They portrayed Bismarck as a representative of an outdated world, which was now giving way to a more democratic political process. Thus, they were able to present themselves as the bearers of progress, a role that had been reserved for national-liberals and Protestants ever since the foundation of the Reich. They noted that the same people who in the past had criticized Catholics for opposing democracy were now disputing the democratically taken decision not to honor Bismarck. They argued that though not all

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<sup>26</sup> See for instance *Pfälzer Bote*, March 23, 1895.



Germans might agree with the decision, this was part of a democratic society, which they had supposedly supported for a long time. Catholics also claimed that this latest turn of events displayed the true colors of their opponents. They had never been honest proponents of democracy, but only supported it when it suited their agenda. Now, when Catholics and other elements of German society were able to shape the political process to a much greater extent, liberals were no longer interested in promoting popular democracy.<sup>27</sup>

Catholics furthermore maintained that though they would certainly not have been pleased with the decision of the German Parliament had they been nation-liberals, they would have had to accept the voice of the German people, who clearly did not want this type of attention bestowed upon Bismarck. By using this argument, Catholics portrayed themselves as better representatives of the German people. To be sure, Catholics had always presented themselves as better Germans and more in touch with the true nature of the German character, but they had previously always been forced to present these arguments in a defensive manner. Now, for the first time, they were able to point to the decision of the Parliament as proof that the Catholic version of Germanness was closer to what the great mass of Germans espoused.

In addition, the fact that this controversy was based on the persona of Bismarck also lent some further credibility to the Catholic accusations about the brutish character of the old Chancellor. They did not fail to note that these sentiments, though belated, certainly served as a strong indication of what Germans all along had

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<sup>27</sup> *Konstanzer Nachrichten*, March 28, 1895.

thought of the Prussian Junker. The only difference now was that with a more democratic society in place, these views were not only represented in the public sphere but in the political realm as well.<sup>28</sup> In the March 28 edition of *Konstanzer Zeitung*, the paper quoted an incendiary poem dedicated to the follies of the Parliament, published in several national-liberal papers.<sup>29</sup> Using this poem as evidence of how their political opponents really viewed society, Catholics claimed that the Center Party, despite all the abuse it had suffered throughout the first few decades of the Reich, was the only party that truly understood what would strengthen Germany. Citing their recent support for the military bills, the paper claimed that Catholics were now the ones who best understood the German national character. They also argued that whether a member of Parliament supported the initiative to honor Bismarck was no true indication of his Germanness; instead, people should observe what kind of respect these members displayed for the political institutions of the Reich. Last, they gleefully noted that Bismarck had never been able to defeat the Catholics: not during the unification process, not during the *Kulturkampf* or during any other time of his reign as Chancellor, and certainly not during his time as political retiree.<sup>30</sup>

Despite the great controversy regarding the German Parliament's decision not to honor Bismarck officially, Konstanz, Heidelberg, and Freiburg all organized celebrations on his eightieth birthday. The festivities followed similar patterns

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> *Freie Stimme*, April 1, 1895.

throughout the state, with the most emphasis being placed on a banquet in honor of Bismarck. City councils sent congratulatory telegrams to Friedrichsruh, a gesture that was deemed appropriate even by most Catholics. This fact also serves as an indication of the increased confidence with which Catholics participated in Badenese and German society. Despite the complicated history that characterized Bismarck's relationship with the state's Catholics, only a handful of people opposed sending the telegram, a sign that they were no longer too concerned about the long shadows cast by Bismarck's figure. People in the three cities were asked to flag their houses; however, according to most contemporary reports, many chose not to do so.<sup>31</sup>

On the eve of April 1, city elites gathered to celebrate Bismarck and his contributions to the German nation. Among elaborate decorations, dignitaries gave a number of speeches, outlining the great character of the old Chancellor. Two of the most commonly addressed themes were the need to express how grateful Germans were for Bismarck's lengthy service to them and the importance of these types of events to solidify the national consciousness. Most speakers referred to the discussions of the last few days as signs that Germans were becoming increasingly disassociated from their nation-state and that much work needed to be done to ensure that Germany would remain strong, even though Bismarck had left office. Speakers remarked that Germany was more divided now than it had been for a long time and that it was not inconceivable that they would return to the state of disunity that had existed for over 1,000 years prior to unification. These sentiments served as a

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<sup>31</sup> See for instance *Konstanzer Nachrichten*, April 4, 1895.

criticism of the latest actions and growing presence of Catholics and social-democrats, but they also underscored how important unification had been to the Germans. They portrayed Bismarck as the one man who had been able to alleviate Germans from centuries of division, during which the thought of a unified state had remained nothing but an idea. They revisited Bismarck's political career, stressing how he had always placed Germany's interests above both Prussia and himself. The speeches centered on the 1860s and '70s, and speakers presented a historical interpretation that fit quite well with the official commemorative discourse that had been prevalent in the first few years of the Empire. Bismarck's spirit had shaped Germany into the grand state that it had achieved, and Germans must not forget that spirit, lest they risk falling back into political and diplomatic obscurity again.

Speakers described Bismarck as the guiding light of German history who had set a great example for Germans to follow. Most of these speeches focused on his role in the unification, which was a little bit different from previous commemorative efforts. Although his domestic policies were mentioned, it was usually just in passing. This emphasis on Bismarck's role as the unifier of Germany should not be surprising, given the recent controversies. Since Bismarck's supporters now found themselves in a more defensive position than during the first few decades of the Reich, they chose to stress the accomplishments that almost all Germans appreciated. As we have seen in our discussions, the way in which the nation-state had been unified had become increasingly accepted even by social-democrats and Catholics during the past few years, and it was unlikely that they would offer any strong opposition to these views.

Thus, the commemorative discourse surrounding these events indicated not only how the memory of Bismarck's career was being constructed, it also reflected the new political situation in the Reich. One of the last things that speakers did at these banquets was to read a variety of telegrams that had been sent to Friedrichsruh from all over Germany, which served to enhance the national character of the celebration as all of these telegrams tied Germans into a commemorative web that spanned across national boundaries.<sup>32</sup>

While the first few reports from the festivities contained little political commentary, the national-liberal papers sharpened their tone in the following days as it became clear that Catholics were critical of some of the parts of the discourse. National-liberal and Protestant newspapers focused less on the content of the celebration and instead reflected more on the political career of Bismarck, especially how he had always had enemies who did not understand what was best for Germany. Although they seldom singled out Catholics, it was still evident that the majority of the criticism was directed at them. On April 3, *Freiburger Zeitung* noted that Bismarck had always been a man of the highest integrity who served his country on the basis of his strong moral code and religious beliefs. Even during times when his enemies resorted to lies and deceit to prevent Bismarck from protecting German interests, he always remained true to his Christian policies. This serves as another useful example of the fluidity of the commemorative discourse. Faced with Catholic criticism of the celebration, Bismarck's supporters resorted to questioning the

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<sup>32</sup> See for instance *Freiburger Zeitung*, April 1, 1895.

Germanness of their opponents. They then began to claim that Catholics, by opposing Bismarck on numerous occasions, had stymied the growth of the Empire, and had it not been for Bismarck's steadfast resolve, the Reich would never have reached the strong position that it currently occupied in the world.<sup>33</sup>

The national-liberal and Protestant papers all published extensive accounts of the celebrations in Friedrichsruh. The arrival of the Grand Duke on March 29 was described in great detail, and naturally, the jovial relationship between the two men was heavily emphasized. Papers noted that Bismarck certainly knew that the Badenese Grand Duke had played one of the most important roles in the unification process. The papers dedicated even more space to the visit that Wilhelm II paid to the home of his first Chancellor. Noting that their relationship certainly had been rocky at times, the papers placed most of their emphasis on noting how well the two got along now, and how critical the Emperor was of the decision taken by the German Parliament. The implication was of course that these were the two men who really understood how Germans felt about this whole affair and that they were the true representatives of popular national sentiment. Once again, this serves as an indication of just how apprehensive some of the old elites were at the prospect of a new mass-based society.

So what were then the Catholic responses to this celebration as it was carried out around Germany? As we have already noted, though willing to credit Bismarck with some accomplishments, they were still hesitant about certain aspects of this

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<sup>33</sup> See for instance *Freiburger Zeitung*, April 3; *Konstanzer Zeitung*, April 5, 1895.

project. Compared to many of the earlier commemorations, April 1 did not provide any major controversies. Still, Catholics did not participate to any great extent in these festivities. Many national-liberal papers offered the standard criticism of Catholics, pointing out that they had not flagged their houses. However, given that many Protestant citizens failed to do the same thing, this should not be considered any major divergence from the main ideological currents. What is interesting to note is that for the most part, Catholics were not overly critical of the speeches held at these events. *Konstanzer Nachrichten* for instance opened their account of the festivities by praising Mayor Weber for his speech, noting that it was free from any kind of political content and instead focused solely on Bismarck the man, an effort for which the Catholics were quite grateful, noting how different things had been in the past.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, the paper noted that the speakers had mostly omitted any references to Bismarck's domestic policies, since it would have caused controversy. They forgave speakers for only praising Bismarck, noting that if Catholics were to celebrate one of their own, they would do the same thing.<sup>35</sup> However, the paper could not refrain from pointing out that the *Kulturkampf* and Bismarck's treatment of the Jesuits should serve as reminders that there had been both positive and negative sides to his reign.<sup>36</sup>

Other than these relatively mild statements, the only thing that the Catholics in Konstanz were upset about in regards to the celebration was the hoisting of a flag on

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<sup>34</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, April 3, 1895.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

the Catholic cathedral. They noted that many of the city's religious men and women had been surprised and angry when they saw the flag. However, it turned out that this was a prank done by two men who had somehow gained access to the church without the knowledge of the religious leadership in the town. Leading clergy members pointed out that no official order had been given to hoist the flag and that the mistake had been corrected as soon as people had made them aware of it.<sup>37</sup> Thus, the celebrations in Baden and in the three cities under investigation here proceeded smoothly, which, given the contentious status of Bismarck, illustrate how integrated Catholics had become into the Empire. Still, we should note that the Catholic papers around the state remained critical of some of the events that had taken place elsewhere in Germany. In the days and weeks following this event, they paid close attention to how other areas of the Empire had celebrated the Emperor, and these discussions are indicative how Badenese Catholics had begun to view themselves, their state, and its role in the German Empire. A few days after the celebrations, *Pfälzer Bote* cited several of the poems that various speakers and newspapers had proclaimed to the honor of Bismarck. In contrast to most of the speeches held around Baden, these placed strong emphasis on Bismarck's domestic policies. It is interesting to note that the paper criticized these efforts from a Catholic viewpoint and also used them to portray the Badenese people, both Catholics and Protestants, as better Germans than most. They claimed that despite the complicated relationship that had existed between the two confessions in Baden for many decades, they commended the state's

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<sup>37</sup> *Konstanzer Nachrichten*, April 4, 1895.



population for coming together and celebrating this event in a worthy manner. These arguments were used to emphasize that Badeners understood how to be true Germans while others, who were apparently still stuck in a *Kulturkampf* mood, did nothing to further the German cause. These sentiments are interesting as they clearly display that as Germany had established its role in Europe, and as foreign policy centered on supporting colonial ventures and a military build-up, both of which Catholics had promoted, the latter could use these arguments to portray themselves as true Germans.<sup>38</sup> It also provides evidence that the old north-south split that had characterized the years prior to and immediately after unification was still present. Badeners, whether Catholic or Protestant, argued that they were better Germans and more prepared as their nation-state faced new challenges.

These sentiments were also evident as newspapers reported on the last aspect of this celebration, the visit by the Badenese delegation of mayors to Friedrichsruh on June 14. Many of the state's newspapers, irrespective of political or confessional leanings, reported at length about this event. The conversations between Bismarck and the members of the delegation were reprinted in detail, and they offer some interesting insights into how the Badenese delegation viewed themselves and their role in this commemorative effort.<sup>39</sup> The delegates emphasized how grateful the state of Baden was towards the old statesman for his efforts throughout his career. They noted that in times of severe crisis, such as in the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War, the

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<sup>38</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, April 7, 1895.

<sup>39</sup> See for instance *Freie Stimme*, May 17, 1895.

Chancellor had ensured that the Badenese state was secure in the face of the French threat. Furthermore, the conversation also focused on how the Badenese people had united as one in defense of the fatherland, led by Grand Duke Friedrich. Bismarck was of course very complimentary in his remarks, noting that the state had played a very important role in unifying the Empire, and then especially the Grand Duke. Bismarck remarked that while many citizens had forgotten how to be true Germans, the people of Baden had become ever more German as the Empire grew and expanded its influence. The old Chancellor even made a joke about the fact that the Badenese Parliament must be a much nicer place to work these days, at least when compared to the German Parliament. Furthermore, he noted that Baden had always played a strong role in the creation and consolidation of the Empire. During the unification process the state ensured that the rest of the southern states would support the unification effort, and after the unification had been completed, Baden had always attempted to be one of the premier states in the Empire. The Badenese delegation used these remarks to further bolster their case as one of the important states in the Empire. Claiming that they had played one of the key roles in unifying the Reich, they also stressed their continued support for the Reich and its policies, even when other areas of Germany had been more hesitant to follow suit. Bismarck had also inquired as to how the celebrations of his birthday had proceeded, and the press noted that the Badenese bourgeoisie had celebrated the momentous occasion in a worthy fashion.

### **The Death of Bismarck and Construction of Bismarck Towers**

Throughout his political career, Bismarck had been one of the most controversial figures of the German Empire. Although Bismarck's relationship with German Catholics improved after the easing of the *Kulturkampf*, the old Chancellor had remained a symbol for the mistreatment that many Catholics felt that they had been exposed to for the first few decades of the Second Empire. Nonetheless, Bismarck was obviously one of the most revered men in Germany during the last half of the nineteenth century, and it should come as no surprise that his passing on July 31, 1898, constituted a major event in Germany. For many Germans, the death of Bismarck, approximately a decade after the passing of Wilhelm I, meant that the two giants of the generation that founded the Empire were now gone. For many, this symbolized a generational shift in German politics and society that ushered in a new era in Germany. To Protestants and national-liberals especially, this was vaguely unsettling, especially considering that the policies and actions of the new political and economic leadership often left the old elites unsure about their status. Of course, the advent of a more modern society with a mass-based political system and a more diversified economy did little to alleviate the fears of the old elites, which is one of the reasons why they reacted so strongly to the news of Bismarck's death.

Although the death of Bismarck came suddenly, it was not necessarily unexpected. He had been in declining health for some time, and during the last few days leading up to his death, newspapers published accounts about what was sure to be the end of an era. When the news of his passing was announced, city councils around

Baden met in emergency sessions to decide what would be the proper way of marking the tragic event. All council members, even the most staunchly ultramontane ones, agreed that this constituted an event that needed to be recognized in a variety of ways. In Heidelberg, Konstanz, and Freiburg, the councils decided to ring the church bells between 12-1 pm to let people know of the passing of the old Chancellor. Also, on the same day, members decided to send a telegram to his son and to place a wreath on the cities' Bismarck monument. National-liberal papers carried a black band across the top, and cities were decorated in *Trauergeschmuck*.<sup>40</sup>

Immediately after Bismarck's death, city councils around Baden, as they had done on so many other occasions, asked each other how they would mark this sad occasion. The commemorative discourse and protocol was still not solidified, which serves as another indication of how citizens reevaluated it as they approached new situations. The celebrations were quite similar in all cities and included two official celebrations, one organized by the city and one staged by the university.<sup>41</sup>

Following these initial displays of grief, the cities of Konstanz, Heidelberg, and Freiburg all organized official *Trauerfeiers*. These events followed a similar pattern to the ones that had taken place following the death of Wilhelm I, with no major differences between the cities.<sup>42</sup> The event took place in one of the main banquet halls in the city, which was decorated with flowers, wreaths, busts, and

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<sup>40</sup> St. AH, HUA 219-6, Landes und Reichs-sachen. Die Tod des Fürsten Bismarcks.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. See also St. AF, C3/79/2, Landessachen. Ehrung des Fürsten Bismarck.

<sup>42</sup> For a detailed description of Germans' reactions to Bismarck's death, see Lothar Machtan, *Bismarcks Tod und Deutschlands Tränen: Reportage einer Tragödie* (München: Goldmann Verlag, 1998).

portraits of Bismarck. It is interesting to note that all three cities also had famous quotes from Bismarck on display, among which “We Germans fear nothing but God” was the most popular one. Reporting on these events dominated the national-liberal and Protestant newspapers for the next few days. Similar to the events in 1888 and in 1895, the papers focused most of their coverage recounting Bismarck’s life while stressing the contributions that he had made to the German fatherland. This should not come as a great surprise, given the fact that this was standard procedure when any dignitary passed away; however, we can also trace a different underlying motive to these detailed accounts of Bismarck’s death.

Among the things that many national-liberals and Protestants were concerned about as the century drew to a close was the fact that people were beginning to forget just how much men like Wilhelm I and Bismarck had meant to the German fatherland and how difficult unification had been. They emphasized how Germany had failed to unify on many other occasions throughout history and that it was not until the arrival of these great men that Germany had been able to achieve the goal that so many had desired for such a long time. Hence, it was not so much the fact that the middle and end of the nineteenth century constituted a time when nationalism and national unification were becoming staples of European society, but instead the greatness of these two men that had enabled the creation of the Second Empire. Thus, not only did they enhance the reputation of Bismarck and Wilhelm I, they also tied the fates of these two men to the unification and subsequent rise of Germany, which served to further enhance the official version of German nationalism that Protestants and liberals

had championed ever since the unification.

The ceremony held in Heidelberg will serve as a representative illustration of the nature of these events.<sup>43</sup> After having placed a wreath on the city's Bismarck monument on the day of his passing, the city council decided to hold an official ceremony on August 2 in the main auditorium of the university. To honor the deceased, the room was decorated with black lace and a variety of flower arrangements. All of the city's dignitaries were present, including members of the city council, the rector of the university, and a variety of high-ranking militaries. Professor Schäfer gave the main speech, in which he emphasized that not only Germany had suffered a great loss, but the entire world. Similarly to other speeches around the state, Bismarck was portrayed as the most important man of the nineteenth century, who had always striven to preserve world order and peace. Considering Bismarck's career, this might seem a highly debatable argument; however, this interpretation of Bismarck's actions suited the official version of nationalism very well. By stressing that Bismarck had always wanted to preserve peace, speakers could make the argument that a strong and unified Germany constituted the best means for Europe to maintain its peace and harmony. Dr. Schäfer even suggested that for France, Bismarck's actions had been a blessing, as they were better suited to modernize their country without Alsace and Lorraine. He also noted that due to the fact that France had always harbored revenge feelings towards Germany, Bismarck had been wise to maintain a strong German military. As with many other commemorative events, this

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<sup>43</sup> An extensive description of these events can be found in *Heidelbergs Trauerkundgebung anlässlich des Todes des Fürsten Bismarck* (Heidelberg: Carl Pfeifer, 1898).

fit well into the current political context as Germany was debating whether to support the Tirpitz naval bills. This was also a means of trying to ensure that Bismarck's perceived legacy—the foundation and transformation of the German Empire into a major international power—was not lost on the current generation who had not lived through the humiliating preunification years. Dr. Schäfer argued that the reason why Bismarck was such a great man was that despite what some of his critics argued, he had championed causes for every class, ethnicity, and confession. As in any type of commemorative effort, these sentiments were stressed to enhance Bismarck's reputation and legacy.

Although certain members of the population were present at this ceremony, it was not open to the public. To ensure that the German people received ample opportunity to take leave of their esteemed Chancellor, city councils around the Empire organized public celebrations as well. As the century was nearing its end, mass politics were quickly becoming the new mode of politics, and in order to control this discourse, liberals wanted to control the content of the public celebrations as well.<sup>44</sup> Considering that Bismarck had been one of their closest allies, they attempted to take this opportunity to recapture some of the political momentum. The speeches held at these public ceremonies were dominated by the notion that when Bismarck had been in power, things had been much more stable. To be sure, speakers stressed that Germany was strong as it entered the new century; however, these speeches and texts also contained a certain amount of trepidation as new political currents were sweeping

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<sup>44</sup> See for instance Eley, *Reshaping the German Right*, 19-40, 203-205.

across the country.

In Heidelberg, the public ceremony commemorating Bismarck's death took place on August 7. City council members asked residents to hoist flags on this date, which many did.<sup>45</sup> The main auditorium was decorated with flags and banners, and all local organizations, even Catholic ones, were represented with their flags. The ceremony began with a rendition of Richard Wagner's funeral march, "Siegfried's Death," which set the tone for the commemorative discourse.

Prof. Adalbert Rohrhurst from Heidelberg delivered the main speech, in which he outlined many of the same facts that had been repeated in newspapers and speeches during the last few days. Most of his speech was focused on the great deeds that Bismarck had done for the fatherland rather than the struggles that he had encountered with the Prussian Parliament, the Catholics, and the social-democrats. These sentiments were representative of the speeches in all of the Badenese cities, and it is noteworthy that they omitted Bismarck's struggle with the Catholics, though it constituted a sizeable part of his political career. Thus, speakers focused on Bismarck's actions that everyone agreed had benefited Germany. There were several different reasons for this. For one, both the struggles against the Catholic Church and the social-democrats did not fit well into the commemorative discourse that the leading members of society were trying to propagate. After all, they were more interested in portraying Bismarck as the great unifier and not somebody who had fought against certain elements of the German population, no matter how contrary

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<sup>45</sup> St. AH, HUA-219-6, record from city council meeting, August 1. For information on the organization of the celebrations in Konstanz, see St. AK, S II 5576; for Freiburg, see St. AF, C3/79/2.



their ideas might have been to liberal and Protestant elites. Furthermore, towards the end of the nineteenth century, it had become evident especially that the *Kulturkampf* had not been a great success as it had left Catholics stronger and better organized than before. In addition, the 1890s witnessed the rise of the Center Party to a position of national prominence, and with the rapid growth of the national Catholic Association, it was clear that the German Catholics had not been marginalized but instead were in a position to play important political, social, and cultural roles in the German Empire.

Turning to the Catholic responses to the death of Bismarck and the subsequent celebrations, their responses were measured towards the old Chancellor. To be sure, Catholics were in general a little more reserved when it came to passing judgment on the recently deceased; however, their apparent appreciation for the character of Bismarck was still remarkable, considering the antagonistic relationship between the two sides.

In all three cities, the Catholic papers carried the news on their first page. The *Pfälzer Bote* labeled Bismarck the “greatest political genius...the greatest statesman of the nineteenth century...” in their ingression.<sup>46</sup> Although they were respectful in their tone, the way in which they described his life was still different than to some of the liberal and Protestant papers. For instance, *Pfälzer Bote* noted that though Bismarck had unified Germany, he did so with questionable means, especially when dealing with the Prussian parliament. Furthermore, they took issue with the liberal and Protestant assertion that Bismarck had been a supporter of individual rights and

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<sup>46</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, August 1, 1898.

freedoms. They pointed to both the *Kulturkampf* and the anti-Socialist laws as examples of the fact that he sometimes had operated outside the law. Still, these aberrations should not divert Germans from all that he had done for them. After all, this had been a man whose body and soul were consumed by politics, which sometimes caused him to act against better judgment.<sup>47</sup> Also, by linking their own fate to the social-democrats, whom they normally were very critical of, the Catholics seemed to be the force that worked for democratizing Germany, which was very much a part of the times.<sup>48</sup>

In regards to the ceremonies to honor Bismarck, the Catholic press maintained a relatively low profile. They focused on his role in unification but also discussed the *Kulturkampf* in some detail. They now thanked Bismarck for launching this battle, since it had helped them grow even stronger as they had to face challenges from the state. They also claimed that the *Kulturkampf* had contributed to integrate Catholics better into the general population. They maintained that because Catholics had been forced to organize to survive in such a hostile climate, they were better adapted to this new and modernized world. Of course, it is questionable how much the *Kulturkampf* helped Catholics become integrated into the new German state, though there is no question that the 1870s made them stronger and stressed the need for political, cultural, and social representation. Catholics were still underrepresented in regards to the sheer number of people participating in the new social fabric in Germany, but their

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> See for instance *Freiburger Bote* August 2, 1898.

increased embrace of various forms of associations and organizations displayed that they were well on their way to adapting to a more modern society.

Despite all this positive attention that Catholics heaped on the recently deceased Chancellor, there were still some signs that they were not entirely comfortable with the commemorative discourse. On August 8, *Freiburger Bote* ran an article questioning why all of the speakers at these events were Protestant and national-liberal. After all, if Bismarck had been such a wonderful German, would it not be fair to assume that persons of other political and/or religious views were included in this discourse? They were especially critical of the fact that the city council in Freiburg had invited the national-liberal Dr. Fabricius, a known opponent of the Church, as the main speaker. Their insistence that he was not an appropriate choice shows that they were clearly aware of the stakes at hand. They once again stressed that they were not opposed to honoring Bismarck; however, it should be done in the appropriate manner.<sup>49</sup> However, due to the fact that even such a staunch opponent of the church refrained from making any incendiary comments against the Catholics during the service shows just how far removed Germany around the turn of the century was from the heydays of the *Kulturkampf*.

Although the Catholic responses to the death of Bismarck are illustrative in displaying just how much they had become integrated into the national commemorative discourse that surrounded the unification and the founding fathers of the German Empire, it is even better for our purposes to analyze their responses to the

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<sup>49</sup> *Freiburger Bote*, August 8, 1898.

almost hysterical desire to construct Bismarck monuments in the wake of his death. After all, it is much easier to refrain from harsh words in a eulogy that will relatively soon be forgotten; it is much more difficult to do so in regards to a permanent fixture of the commemorative landscape, which these monuments were destined to be.

The so-called Bismarck tower occupies a special place in the German commemorative history. As Reinhard Alings has noted, these monuments were constructed largely after the death of the Chancellor, and like no other national monument, they were relatively evenly distributed throughout Germany. Most of these monuments were located at a beautiful place, often on a hill as they were also used as towers from which one could see far into the surroundings. Most of these monuments were a combination of national and local efforts. To be sure, national organizations had on other occasions attempted to have a particular monument constructed in many different places throughout the country, however, none had more success than the Bismarck towers. Hans Walter Hedinger estimates that over 700 monuments were planned and over 500 were built at an estimated cost of almost fourteen million Marks.<sup>50</sup>

On December 3, 1898, the German Student Organization distributed an appeal to all cities larger than 5,000 people that they should construct one of these towers to honor the great statesman. In the appeal, they emphasized that these towers should serve as symbols of the great unity that Germany now enjoyed. These towers would

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<sup>50</sup> Alings, *Monument und Nation*, 139-140, 235. See also Hans Walter Herdinger, "Bismarck-Denkmäler und Bismarck-Verehrung," in *Kunstverwaltung. Bau und Denkmalspolitik im Kaiserreich*, ed. Ekkhard Mai and Stephan Waetzoldt (Berlin: Mann, 1981), 279-304.

connect Germans from all different parts of the Empire, especially on those occasions when huge fires would be lit from them, which would connect them as dots throughout the German landscape. This notion was concurrent with the current view of monuments, which should serve as focal points throughout the German landscape that citizens could use to strengthen their ties to each other and the fatherland. They held a competition to determine which form would be used. The architect Wilhelm Kreis won with an entry that envisioned a tall, ten meters or higher, monument that would have a fire pit at the top that could be used on Bismarck's birthday as well as on the summer solstice, which students celebrated as their national holiday. The Student Organization placed great emphasis on the fact that these monuments should not be too expensive to construct, which would make it easier for cities of all sizes to comply with this request.<sup>51</sup> In addition, Kreis's model was made available to all cities so that they would ensure that all monuments had the same size, shape, and function. To make things even easier, students suggested that if a particular city still could not afford the monument, they could form joint ventures with neighboring towns to share the cost.<sup>52</sup>

The city council in Heidelberg was one of the first to get involved in this process, though not entirely on its own behalf. In January of 1899, even before the announcement of Kreis' winning entry had been made public, the National Student

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<sup>51</sup> Parts of the text from the Student Organization can be found in Alings., 235-236.

<sup>52</sup> The entire text can be found in St. AH, AA 79/13, Gemeinde Vermögen. Die Errichtung einer Bismarksäule.

Organization contacted the city council and asked that it begin a collection for this project. Since Heidelberg was one of the oldest and most prestigious university towns in Germany, if it supported this project, other German cities were sure to follow.<sup>53</sup> In June 1899, the city council asked the city's inhabitants for donations, stressing how important it was that Heidelberg stood at the forefront of this movement. In this appeal, the organizing committee, which contained prominent members such as Mayor Walz, claimed that over 170 German communities had already signed up to join this project, and it was of utmost importance that Heidelberg did not appear less patriotic than other German cities. They also pointed out that this was not a monument that was associated with a particular political or religious affiliation, but instead one that would be accessible to all citizens.

The project in Heidelberg generated numerous donations from both students and the general population. By late 1901, the organizing committee had signed a contract with Kreis, who agreed to construct a roughly fifteen-meter-high tower at an approximate cost of 15,000 Marks. The only issue of contention between Kreis and the committee was the size of the monument. The latter kept pushing for a taller monument, which he argued would better serve the dignified character of a city such as Heidelberg.<sup>54</sup> This of course should come as no surprise as it was in Kreis's interest to construct as expensive a monument as possible. This correspondence also

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<sup>53</sup> A good description of this process can be found in Ursula Schmitt, "Die Bismarksäule von 1903 auf den Heiligenberg," in *Heidelberger Denkmäler, 1788-1981*, ed. Autoren Kollektiv an der Institut det Universität Heidelberg (Heidelberg: Verlag Brausdruck, 1982), 51-56. See also St. AH, AA 79/13.

<sup>54</sup> St. AH, AA 79/13, letter from Kreis to organizing committee, October 17, 1901.

illustrates how many factors were involved in the construction of this monument. These monuments were not only intended as symbols of national unification and strength, but there was also a business side to this that was not to be taken too lightly.

On July 29, the organizing committee and Kreis reached a final agreement, and construction was started shortly thereafter.<sup>55</sup> The construction proceeded without any major problems, and it was unveiled with a torch parade from the city center to the tower on January 19, 1903, the anniversary of the foundation of the Reich. The choice of date signifies that not only was this a monument to honor Bismarck, but it also commemorated his greatest work: unification. The fact that so many cities throughout the Empire were constructing these kinds of monuments and their intent to have them serve as unifying symbols indicate that they were closely connected to the commemorative discourse framing unification, not just Bismarck himself. The population's reception of the monument was warm, and there were no dissenting voices in regards to the cost and/or the appearance of the monument.<sup>56</sup> It is noteworthy that even *Pfälzer Bote* participated actively in this process. The newspaper served as a drop-off station for donations, and the paper also did not voice any particular criticism in regards to the construction or the reception of the monument.<sup>57</sup> Once again, this instance serves as a clear indication that the Catholics in Heidelberg had become very closely integrated into the commemorative discourse.

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<sup>55</sup> St. AH, AA 79/13, protocol from meeting of the organizing committee, July 29, 1902.

<sup>56</sup> See for instance the favorable account in *Pfälzer Bote*, January 20, 1903.

<sup>57</sup> Noted in St. AH, AA 79/13.

It should also be noted that this integration process sped up considerably during the last few years of the nineteenth century, as the city had been engulfed in confessional rhetoric just a decade earlier.

If there were no apparent conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in Heidelberg, the situation was slightly different in Freiburg and Konstanz. In Freiburg, the process to collect money for a monument was quickly underway. The city was actually ahead of the National Student Organization, having on August 12 published in all newspapers, including the Catholic ones, a call for donations to a proposed Bismarck monument. The *Freiburger Bote* played an active role in the process, publishing the appeal and also serving as one of the sites where donations could be made. Initially, the city council sought to combine the proposed monument to Wilhelm I with the one to Bismarck. As news spread of the students' initiative, however, they decided to construct a separate monument to Bismarck.<sup>58</sup> Catholics in Freiburg, though not opposed to constructing a monument to Bismarck, still questioned this decision. They argued that given the great services that men such as Wilhelm I, Bismarck, and General Helmuth von Moltke had rendered the German Reich, it would be more appropriate to construct a monument that would honor all these important men.<sup>59</sup> Catholics claimed that a joint monument would be more

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<sup>58</sup> See *Freiburger Bote*, August 12, 1898. Also, see relevant documentation in St. AF, C3/472/6, Errichtung eines Denkmals für den Ehrenbürgern Bismarck and C3/472/7. Errichtung einer Säule für den Ehrenbürgern Bismarck. It should be noted that the original funds set aside for a joint monument were never used, instead, another collection was taken up and used for the construction of the Bismarck tower.

<sup>59</sup> *Freiburger Bote*, March 24, 1899.



representative of the unity of Germans, and it would serve as a good reminder to the younger population of the great services that these men had rendered the fatherland.

The city council decided to proceed with the construction of a tower, to comply with what the rest of Germany was doing at that time. Slightly differently than in Heidelberg, the city council reached an agreement with the student organization at the university. Both sides agreed that the students would receive the property on which to build the monument, as well as the financial resources. In return, they would be responsible for the construction. Interestingly, the Catholic Church actually donated the property, which would have been unthinkable a few years back.<sup>60</sup> Because the student organization had long been preparing for this moment, they had already chosen a model constructed by the local artist Oscar Geiges. On July 22, the groundbreaking ceremony was held, accompanied by a grand celebration in the main *Festhalle* in the city. Professor Alfred Dove delivered the main speech, entitled “Bismarck’s Importance for Old and Young.”<sup>61</sup> The speech spanned from the beginning of the nineteenth century up until the foundation of the Empire. Dove provided his audience with a brief lecture on the course of German nationalism and how important Bismarck had been as the man who realized the German dream of national unification. He noted that Germany today would not have been so strong had it not been for the man to whom this monument was dedicated and that especially today’s generation would be well served in remembering the harsh preunification

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<sup>60</sup> St. AF, C3/472/7, city council records, June 27, 1899; July 5, 11, 1899.

<sup>61</sup> Alfred Dove, *Bismarcks Bedeutung für Alt und Jung* (Freiburg: Mohr, 1899).

times.<sup>62</sup> According to newspaper reports, Catholics greatly appreciated this speech, which was without political commentary.<sup>63</sup> The speech also illustrates how important it is for nations to be able to not only collectively remember things but also to collectively forget certain aspects of history. We have seen throughout this work how extremely volatile the relationship had been between Bismarck and the Catholics in Freiburg, yet when faced with the proposition of joining the German Protestants in the process of collective forgetting, they showed no hesitancy of doing so. *Freiburger Bote* even remarked how nice it was to have such a beautiful speech at an event designed to honor one of the most important Germans of the nineteenth century.<sup>64</sup> They also pointed out that no Catholic should be criticized for participating in this event, since it was truly a patriotic one.<sup>65</sup>

The monument was quickly completed and unveiled on July 30, 1900. The well-attended ceremony included people from all walks of society, and Mr. Pflieger of the student organization officially thanked the church and city for being so generous in donating the land for this great monument. The local papers complimented the monument, which was described as a fitting tribute to one of the greatest statesmen of the nineteenth century.<sup>66</sup> During the next few years, the students of the city, in a

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid, esp. 6-8.

<sup>63</sup> *Freiburger Bote*, July 25, 1899.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> *Freiburger Bote*, July 28, 1899.

<sup>66</sup> *Heidelberger Tagblatt*, July 31, 1900; *Freiburger Zeitung*, July 31, 1900.

similar fashion to students in Heidelberg, used the monument on April 1 and June 21 for celebrations of Bismarck's birthday and their national holiday. In Freiburg, even the Catholic student organization took active part in these celebrations as they repeatedly asked the city council for their help in decorating the city hall, providing money to buy torches, etc.<sup>67</sup>

If the construction of the two monuments in Freiburg and Heidelberg proceeded without problems, the one in Konstanz proved more difficult to complete. As in the other cities, in 1898, the city council quickly launched an initiative to collect money for a monument. On August 19, Mayor Weber appointed a committee to spearhead the project.<sup>68</sup> After some initial research into what other cities planned to do, the members of the committee decided to publish an appeal to the city's inhabitants to donate money to this project. The appeal stressed the important role that Bismarck had played in founding the German Empire and his continued service for the German people throughout his political career.<sup>69</sup> It is interesting to note that though most Badenese cities had employed Catholic papers in this venture, the people in Konstanz did not contact *Freie Stimme*, nor was the appeal published in the Catholic paper. The organizing committee was initially relatively successful in collecting donations. They received substantial amounts from the local officer corps, some

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<sup>67</sup> The correspondence between the city council and the various student organizations is documented in St. AF, C3/472/7.

<sup>68</sup> St. AK, SII 5577, Staatsorganisation. Reichssachen. Errichtung eines Denkmals für den Fürsten Bismarck, protocol from city council meeting August 19, 1898.

<sup>69</sup> See for instance *Konstanzer Zeitung* September 25, 1898.

business men, and local citizens.<sup>70</sup> However, as time passed, the rate of donations slowed. In March 1900, the committee met and noted that to date they had only received a little over 5,000 Marks, which would not be enough to construct the kind of monument worthy of a man of Bismarck's greatness. Still, they continued to discuss which shape the monument would take, and they noted that it would be a good idea to hire a local artist, which would perhaps encourage Konstanzers to provide more donations.<sup>71</sup> After deciding that they wanted a life-sized figure of Bismarck, the committee invited several local artists to submit models/plans of their works.

Despite this initiative, Konstanzers provided little support for this project. In January 1902, local businessman Gustaf Prym asked the other members of the committee why they had not met in over nine months. He also noted that people had now forgotten about the models that were put together, so that they would have to start from the beginning again if they were to continue this project. In October 1902, the committee finally met again but came to no conclusion about how the project should proceed.<sup>72</sup> Finally, in October 1903, the city council reprimanded the committee for its sloppy work, claiming that it was a shame for the city not to have a monument when other German cities had been successful in honoring the old Chancellor.<sup>73</sup> To make matters worse, in 1904, the city council received a letter from the *Alldeutscher*

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<sup>70</sup> Documented in St. AK, SII 5577.

<sup>71</sup> St. AK, SII 5577, protocol from committee meeting, March 31, 1900.

<sup>72</sup> St. AK, SII 5577, protocol from committee meeting, October 23, 1902.

<sup>73</sup> St. AK, SII 5577, protocol from city council meeting, October 18, 1903.

*Verband*, inquiring about the project. They noted that many cities around Germany, several of them smaller than Konstanz, had been able to construct a monument and that it was really a shame that such a historically important city as Konstanz was dragging its feet when it came to producing a suitable monument.<sup>74</sup> This letter displays that the construction of a local monument was a very complicated process that did not only reflect local circumstances but national ones as well.

Spurned by this letter, the organizing committee began to contemplate building a fountain instead. This form of memorial would be less expensive while still honoring Bismarck and integrating Konstanz into the national commemorative canon. However, despite several suggestions for potential designs, it did not encourage more donations. Around this time, news about the failings of the committee was beginning to cause discord in the local population. In the November 18, 1908, issue of *Konstanzer Zeitung*, an angry reader complained that it was really a shame that the city had not been able to do anything yet. The reader argued that though not all of the city's inhabitants supported Bismarck's ideas, there should still be enough support among locals to produce a monument that would make citizens proud of their city.<sup>75</sup> This letter reflects that this project, despite the official fanfare at the outset, had generated very little support from the local population, including national-liberals and Protestants. Compared to the heavily debated nature of Sedan Day, the project failed to cause any type of reaction among the local population, negative or positive. This

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<sup>74</sup> The letter can be found in St. AK, SII 5577.

<sup>75</sup> *Konstanzer Zeitung*, November 18, 1908.

indicates that residents lacked a strong desire to commemorate Bismarck and that they were tired of the ongoing commemorations throughout their province. As our discussions have revealed, there were numerous projects commemorating many different events and people, and citizens in Konstanz seemed unenthusiastic about yet another project.

In late 1910, Gustaf Prym donated 1000 Marks to the project and proceeded to form his own committee, independent of the city council. In a meeting with the latter, he informed them that he would not stop until the city had its own monument, and it would be a tower, similar to many other cities. Prym announced that Prof. Georg Wikorp would build the monument on the Raitheberg, just outside the city. Being a savvy businessman, he also informed the city council that he would construct a new housing development right below the tower, which should make the council more apt to support him.<sup>76</sup> Following this sales pitch, on February 22, 1911, the city council proclaimed that the tower would be constructed.<sup>77</sup> In 1911, Prym and his committee put out another appeal to locals that stressed that as a celebration of the forty years of peace that Germans had enjoyed as a result of the actions of Bismarck, they should now donate to this monument. This appeal serves as a reminder that supporters of various commemorative efforts used current political, cultural, and economic contexts to gather support for their projects.

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<sup>76</sup> St. AK, SII 13008, Gemeindeverwaltung. Gemeindevermögen. Gebäude. Die Errichtung eines Bismarck-Turmes auf dem Raitheberg bei Konstanz, protocol from city council meeting, November 4, 1910. See also Martin Stather, "‘Über Alles das Vaterland.’ Wie Konstanz zu seinem Bismarckturm kam," *Konstanzer Almanach* 34 (1988): 65-66.

<sup>77</sup> St. AK, SII 13008, protocol from city council meeting, February 22, 1911.

This latest appeal resonated better with the local population, and even the Catholic Church, which owned the land where the monument was to be built, decided to donate the property to the city.<sup>78</sup> Boosted by this news, Prym went hard to work to collect money for the monument. There are several letters in the files from companies and businesses that declared that they at first did not want to give any money, but after a personal visit from Prym, they decided to do so anyway. This is another indication of the difference one person, especially if s/he is an influential member of the community, can make for a project of this nature. Thus, it is important to conduct a detailed analysis of these projects, as their origins might not always be as simple as at a first glance. Prym was also able to attract almost all of the famous people in Konstanz in this project. The famous aviator Count Zeppelin donated 1,000 marks, and when locals witnessed these kinds of actions, it became much easier for them to support this venture. In late 1911, construction began, and after less than a year, the monument was finished. Although Prym had originally told the city council that the monument would cost about 30,000 Marks, the final tally came to over 36,000. The city council decided after much debate to subsidize the difference.<sup>79</sup>

The monument was unveiled on October 18, 1912, with great fanfare. Most of the speeches proclaimed how the magnificent tower represented a symbol of the German unity and strength. The architect Prof. Georg Wikorp gave the plenary speech, which was littered with references not only to Bismarck but to German history

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<sup>78</sup> Stather, ““Über Alles das Vaterland,”” 66.

<sup>79</sup> St. AK, SII 13008, protocol from city council meeting, August 26, 1912.

in general. He noted that next year would be the centenary anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig, where Germans took their first steps towards a unified nation-state. His speech was steeped in references to German mythology, and Bismarck appeared as a man of almost god-like proportions who brought unity and happiness to the German people. (This was not an uncommon theme, as many speakers throughout Germany portrayed Bismarck in terms of a deity.)<sup>80</sup> He finished by noting that though Bismarck had ensured that Germany had been strong and peaceful for many years, different foreign powers now threatened its position. Thus, Germans could not rest on their laurels; this was a critical time in European history, and Germans must continue the great work that Bismarck had started.<sup>81</sup>

What is interesting about this the fiery speech at the unveiling is its positive reception by Catholics. The Catholic *Konstanzer Nachrichten* noted that the celebration had been one of the best ever in Konstanz. They claimed that it had not been characterized by the “*Hurra Patriotismus*” that the national-liberals and Protestants had previously propagated. Instead, this was a celebration of a true love for the fatherland and a measure of the respect that all Germans had for Bismarck, who had done so much for the German people. They also claimed that this monument was well worth waiting for since it represented a good indication of how much locals valued what Bismarck had done for the fatherland. These sentiments reflected an increased Catholic acceptance of Bismarck and his legacy, but they also illustrated that

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<sup>80</sup> Hedinger, “Bismarck-Denkmäler und Bismarck-Verehrung,” 297.

<sup>81</sup> The speech can be found in its entirety in St. AK, SII 13008.



Catholics were being swept up in the new and more aggressive nationalism that was spreading in Germany at this time. Germany had recently suffered several foreign policy setbacks, and they maintained that it was in the best interest of Germans of all classes and confession to stress their own strength and unity in the face of harsher times.

Catholics were more receptive to the commemorative discourse to a much greater extent towards the end of the nineteenth century than in the immediate post-unification years. On the one hand, this was because the commemorative discourse had changed. Especially after the conclusion of the *Kulturkampf*, national-liberals and Protestants were no longer inclined to use these occasions to launch anti-Catholic tirades. On the other, this new commemorative discourse also suggested an increased acceptance of Catholics in the nation-state. Catholic determination to present their own version of Germanness had certainly played a role here, but there were also additional reasons for the increased acceptance of Catholics as worthy members of German society. As Germany entered the twentieth century, colonial ventures and a sharp growth in the size and importance of organizational life became two primary staples of their society. Catholics played important roles in both of these developments, which contributed greatly to their integration into German society. Hence, to understand better Catholic changes towards the commemorative discourse surrounding the foundation of the German Empire, a brief analysis of their involvement in colonial ventures and associational life is necessary.

### Catholic Involvement in the Colonial Movement

As historian Wilfried Loth has noted, German Catholics and the Center Party were initially reluctant to support Bismarck's imperialistic policies.<sup>82</sup> However, as the Catholic bourgeoisie grew in strength, both economically and politically, their interest in colonization increased. Beginning in the 1890s, Catholics began to view colonialism as a religious duty as well as a vehicle to better their status in German society. After experiencing a political backlash following its decision to reject the 1893 bill to strengthen the military, the Center Party embraced colonialism and a military build-up. Until the 1907 elections, the Center consistently supported increased spending on military and colonial ventures, which established them as a more patriotic party. At the same time as the Center became more accepted on the national level, the Badenese Center Party established itself as a government-friendly party on the local level. Throughout this period, Badenese Center politicians went to great lengths to portray themselves as supporters of the Reich, the Emperor, and Baden. Colonialism played an important role in this process as it enabled Catholics to support these initiatives for the same reasons that the Emperor stressed: to strengthen Germany's presence in the colonies, make Germany a stronger world power, gain important natural resources and markets, and promote the spread of Christianity. Finally, because relative confessional peace characterized this period, Catholics

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<sup>82</sup> Wilfried Loth, "Zentrum und Kolonialpolitik," in *Die Verschränkung von Innen-, Konfessions- und Kolonialpolitik im Deutschen Reich vor 1914*, ed. Johannes Horstmann (Schwerte: Katholische Akademie, 1987), 68.

enjoyed better relationship with the ruling national-liberals.<sup>83</sup>

From the 1890s, the Center Party occupied a powerful position in German politics. Because of their increased strength, they alone could decide the outcome of votes on bills associated with the military and colonialism. Catholics assumed that supporting these bills would facilitate integration into the Reich and increase their chances of eliminating some of the remaining anti-Catholic legislation, most notably the ban on certain religious orders. Throughout the 1890s, conservatives and national-liberals both courted the Center, attempting to strengthen the bond between throne and altar. Although they refused to permit the Jesuits back in the country, there was a marked decline in anti-Catholic rhetoric.<sup>84</sup>

The Center Party, both nationally and locally, tried to convince their constituency that supporting colonialism would also benefit Catholic missions as missionaries attempted to convert souls. To be sure, Catholics acknowledged that there were material reasons for supporting colonial ventures; however, they considered these secondary to the religious purpose. Catholics also supported colonialism because it represented an opportunity for the Catholic bourgeoisie to enhance their societal status. By becoming involved in these projects, Catholics were able to present themselves as driving forces in Germany's attempt to enhance its influence around the world. Some scholars have argued that the emphasis on the missionary element of colonialism only served as a way for elite Catholics to sell these ideas to the Catholic

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<sup>83</sup> Kremer, ed., *Mitt Gott*, 54-55.

<sup>84</sup> Loth, "Zentrum und Kolonialpolitik," 70-71.

masses.<sup>85</sup> Although bourgeois Catholics certainly used the missionary aspect to gain mass support for these ideas, it was also evident that Badenese Catholics embraced the missionary goals wholeheartedly. Throughout the 1890s and the first few years of the 1900s, local Catholic newspapers stressed how important it was for Catholics to support the colonial movement, as it constituted one of the best ways to spread the Catholic faith. At a time when both the Catholic and Protestant churches struggled with secularizing trends in society, this became a very important topic for both confessions.<sup>86</sup> Another important factor here was the fact that the Catholics had fallen behind the Protestant missions in trying to establish themselves in the colonies.<sup>87</sup> An analysis of the content of the Catholic press and the *Katholikentage* during the first few years of the twentieth century demonstrates that the colonial movement and the need to close the Protestant gap in the colonies were topics of great concern to many Catholics. The local press often stressed the efforts of local missionaries or orders, and citizens throughout Baden were encouraged to support the efforts of these individuals. This approach made it easier for locals to identify with the colonial missions and increased their appeal.

The *Katholikentage* also served as a tool to propagate and popularize the missions. During the meeting in Breslau 1909, the Catholic Alois zu Löwenstein held a speech in which he outlined the reasons why Catholics should support these

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>86</sup> For illuminating examples of this, see *Freie Stimme*, June 9, 1899; January 22, 1907.

<sup>87</sup> Karl J. Rivinius, "Das Interesse der Missionen an den deutschen Kolonien," in *Die Verschränkung von Innen-, Konfessions- und Kolonialpolitik*, ed. Horstmann, 46-47.

initiatives. In addition to being a good opportunity for the Catholic faith to grow, missionary activities were also part of the duties that every Catholic should fulfill as part of their faith. Catholics needed to support missions with both people and money, otherwise "...Buddha, Mohammed, and Confucius would defeat the Catholic Church."<sup>88</sup> At the end of the congress, delegates passed a resolution in which they proclaimed it a religious and nationalistic duty for Catholics to increase their support for the missionaries.

Catholic papers in Baden published long excerpts from Löwenstein's speech and noted that all delegates had supported his ideas. *Freie Stimme* claimed that it was imperative for local Catholics to follow Löwenstein's advice, and they must not allow the Protestants to win the race for the hedonistic souls.<sup>89</sup> The missionary movement made it possible for Catholics to support something close to their faith while at the same time promoting issues that were close to the Emperor's heart. Catholics could now claim that their actions would strengthen the German nation. By supporting Wilhelm II's fervent desire to increase the number of German colonies, Catholics were able to present themselves as patriotic Germans. While there were some disagreements within the Catholic camp in regards to colonialism, most Badenese Catholics supported these projects. Although Protestant and liberal accusations of Catholic anti-German sentiments grew increasingly rare, they still existed, especially in conjunction with local and national elections. During these times, Catholics often

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<sup>88</sup> Quoted in *ibid.*, 49.

<sup>89</sup> *Freie Stimme*, September 16, 1909.

had to defend themselves against accusations of un-German behavior, and the colonial issue was one of their most commonly cited defenses. To be sure, the confessional rhetoric was weaker than it had been during the first decades of the Second Empire, but remnants of *Kulturkampf* arguments occasionally surfaced. Catholic support for military build-up and colonial ventures protected them against these Protestants accusations.

Coupled with their growing political strength, the Catholics' support for colonialism also increased their presence and confidence around Baden. When faced with accusations of un-Germanness, they could point to several positive remarks offered by the Emperor in regards to the work of Catholic missionaries. Center politicians also claimed that they were involved in these ventures for noble reasons, not just for material gains. These types of sentiments became visible in 1905 as the leading Center politician Mathias Erzberger uncovered many instances of colonial mismanagement and poor treatment of indigenous populations. An intense debate followed, during which Germans were alerted to some of the more negative aspects of colonialism. Although the end result of these debates that continued for two years was that overall funding for colonialism was cut, Center politicians were still able to use these debates as proof that they were involved in colonialism for noble reasons. In the aftermath of the 1907 Hottentot elections, the Center Party refused to allow more German troops to be sent to put down the rebellions in the colonies, a decision that Protestants criticized as un-German.<sup>90</sup> Answering their critics, Catholics maintained

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<sup>90</sup> Loth, "Zentrum und Kolonialpolitik," 79-80.

that they had been among the strongest supporters of imperialist and colonialist policies and that they had done more during the last few years than the Protestants to help spread the Christian faith.

### **The Development of Catholic Associational Life**

Catholic embrace of imperialism and colonial ventures helped establish them as more “trustworthy” Germans in the eyes of Protestants; however, this was not the only way in which Catholics became more integrated into the German nation-state. Another means of Catholic integration was the growing strength of Catholic organizations, and then especially the *Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland*. This organization was founded in 1890, largely due to the influence of Ludwig Windthorst, who viewed it as the most important way to combat the growing threat of social democracy. In Baden, this initiative came timely as it coincided with the reconstitution of the Badenese Center Party. The latter viewed this new organization as a useful tool in unifying and strengthening the state’s Catholics. Catholic clergy also supported this new initiative and as early as 1890 Archbishop Roos stressed the importance of this association. From the inception of the *Volksverein*, leaders were clear that it should serve to educate and teach Catholics how to become more successful citizens.<sup>91</sup> In addition, as Hans-Jürgen Kremer has pointed out, the

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<sup>91</sup> Hans-Jürgen Kremer, “Der Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland in Baden 1890-1933. Ein Beitrag zur Organisations- und Wirkungsgeschichte des politischen und sozialen Verbandskatholizismus,” *Freiburger Diözesan-Archiv* 104 (1984): 211-212; Halder, *Katholische Vereine*, 249-251.

foundation of this organization should also ensure that the Catholic lower classes did not succumb to the social-democratic rhetoric.<sup>92</sup> The formation of a local chapter in Baden was closely tied to the Center Party as nine of the fifteen members of the board were also members of the Badenese Parliament. The well-known Freiburger Catholic Ludwig Marbe was elected the first president.<sup>93</sup>

Despite the support from the Archbishop and leading politicians, it took a while before the *Volkverein* began to take root in Badenese society. During most of the 1890s, leaders in Baden were frustrated at the slow growth of the organization, and they blamed the lack of success on the reluctance of local clergy to participate. Many of the older clergy members who were still active during the 1890s were unwilling to commit to this organization, often a result of the fact that they subscribed to an outdated version of a more static society. It was not until the turn of the century that the *Volkverein* began to make inroads among the Catholic population, and then largely due to the fact that many younger clergy members were appointed parish priests. Having come of age in the 1890s, they embraced the new mass-based society that had developed during the last two decades. Many of them had become members in the *Volkverein* during their time at seminaries, and it was natural for them to continue their efforts as they got out into the parishes. The lack of much confessional strife in the 1890s also negatively affected the movement. Because Badenese Catholics witnessed their political party grow in strength, they were less inclined to

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<sup>92</sup> Kremer, "Der Volkverein für das katholische Deutschland in Baden 1890-1933," 214.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 215-216.



realize the need for these organizations. However, the controversy surrounding the proposed re-admittance of the Jesuits in 1901-1902 as well as an intense advertising campaign by the leaders around the turn of the century contributed to a strong growth rate.<sup>94</sup> In addition, though the *Volksverein* did not grow so rapidly, other Catholic associations did. The Workers Association especially experienced strong growth in the beginning of the 1890s, particularly after Pope Leo XIII gave his blessing to these organizations.<sup>95</sup>

After the turn of the century, and especially after Josef Schofer took over the reins of the *Volksverein* in Baden in 1905, it began to grow rapidly and started to play a very important role in local societies. The organization only had some 9,000 members in 1900, but in 1905, the number had almost tripled. By the outbreak of World War I, the organization had about 65,000 members, which constituted the third highest percentage of Catholic membership among all the German states.<sup>96</sup> The increased cooperation among various Catholic associations also strengthened the *Volksverein*. In addition, out in the communities, leading Catholics stressed how important it was for Catholics to be members of as many of these organizations as possible, and if locals could not afford membership fees, local dignitaries often subsidized the costs.

One of the main reasons why these organizations, and especially the

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid., 225.

<sup>95</sup> Halder, *Katholische Vereine*, 267.

<sup>96</sup> Kremer, "Der Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland in Baden 1890-1933," 226-227.

*Volksverein*, were able to contribute to Catholic integration into Baden and the Second Empire was their efforts to eliminate remnants of the reactionary thinking that had characterized many Catholics during the first few decades of the *Kaiserreich*. They emphasized that Catholics should be active participants in their nation-state, which would enable them to shape social and cultural aspects of society as well as help them in the business world. The *Volksverein* in Baden also stressed that Catholics should take advantage of the progress that Germany had made since 1871.

To accomplish these goals, the *Volksverein* staged numerous events designed to educate the Catholic population. Every year after 1892, the association organized workshops in all major Badenese cities. Participants listened to speeches on how to improve their lives. They also held courses that spanned over several days, such as the “social courses” in which workers were taught to avoid the temptations of the social-democrats and instead to be active within the Catholic associational life. In addition, in major cities, the association would invite famous speakers on a biannual basis. Last, in the local parishes, clergy members were encouraged to hold monthly meetings to discuss these topics. Furthermore, in 1905, the *Volksverein* founded its own press, which contributed to raising its profile. Catholics were now exposed to workshops and speeches as well as different pamphlets which they could take home and study on their own time. Officials encouraged Catholics to spread these pamphlets and booklets among their neighbors so that as many people as possible would receive these messages. The *Volksverein* also published a brochure for their members, which appeared every two months. The fact that the organization in Freiburg sold two

thousand brochures on the topic of social education in 1912 serves as evidence that Catholics were ready and willing to take part in this information.<sup>97</sup> This serves as an illustrative example of a formation of an imagined community. By sharing the same printed material, Catholics became closer connected to each other, but also better integrated into the German nation-state. Through these meetings and pamphlets, Catholics in Baden were kept abreast of developments in their state and in Germany, which enabled them to play a more active role in the cultural, social, political, and economic affairs of Baden and Germany.

The close cooperation between the *Volksverein* and the Badenese Center Party also ensured that Catholics became more integrated into Baden. Especially after the formation of the Great Coalition in 1905, there were increased efforts to coordinate the work of the association and the party. Although the organization claimed to be non-political and only a vehicle for the cultural and social education of Catholics, it was evident that these two entities served each other's interests very well. Through their immediate contact with the Catholic population, they were able to propagate the Center Party's political goals, and they contributed greatly to Catholic identification with the Center Party. This work also enabled the Center Party to homogenize their party, which was important since their supporters stemmed from many different classes and sometimes struggled to find common reference points. In addition, since the *Volksverein* did much of the political work for the party, it enabled members of the latter to focus on other important work, which constituted a distinct advantage to other

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 232-235.

political parties. The *Volksverein* was also very instrumental in aiding the Workers Association. There was a great deal of cooperation between the two, both financially as well as otherwise. As Kremer has pointed out, there was a close correspondence between the topics that the two would discuss. As soon as the *Volksverein* began to stress some kind of topic, the Catholic Workers Association would take up these demands in a more political way very quickly thereafter.<sup>98</sup>

What this meant for the Catholic population is easy to see. Especially during the latter part of the 1890s and the first few years of the 1900s, the importance of the Catholic associations for the continued integration of Catholics into Baden and the Reich cannot be overstated. Not only were Catholics able to take better advantage of economic opportunities, but they were also able to strengthen their own cause in every way to a much greater extent than before. Even for the people who were not members of these organizations, they were still able to get some of the information that was distributed. Catholic papers reported at length about the activities of these local associations, and topics were repeated throughout the pages of the Catholic press.

### **The Construction of Monuments to Honor Wilhelm I**

Finally, we will turn to the construction of monument honoring the late Emperor Wilhelm I. Throughout the Second Empire, Catholics were supportive of the Emperor and honored his birthday and other important milestones. Thus, the construction of monuments to his honor were not nearly as controversial as some of

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 239-241.

the other commemorative efforts, but their prominence in Baden and the Empire towards the end of the nineteenth century merits a brief look at the discourse surrounding these events. As many scholars have pointed out, the persona of the Emperor was perhaps more than anybody else tied to the successful unification of the Empire and the rise of Germany on the international scene.<sup>99</sup> Although Bismarck and military leaders such as Moltke were considered instrumental in unifying the nation-state, Wilhelm I stood above everybody else in this category. The fact that the vast majority of Germans, irrespective of class, ethnicity, or confession, appreciated his personality, especially compared to Wilhelm II, contributed to making him a very popular figure to commemorate. Badeners constructed monuments to his honor not only after his death but also in conjunction with his centenary birthday in 1897, an event that was celebrated with great fanfare throughout the Empire.

Konstanz, though it celebrated the centenary anniversary of Wilhelm's birth in grand style, did not construct a monument to his honor after his death. Although in 1879 local artist Emil Einhardt had presented a bust to the city, which was placed in a park in the center of the city, no additional ventures were undertaken.<sup>100</sup> As became evident during the construction of a Bismarck monument, the city and its locals seemed reluctant to participate in the monument hysteria that was characterizing Germany at the time, so the lack of monument should not come as a great surprise. On March 23, 1888, shortly after Wilhelm's death on March 9, the Freiburg city

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<sup>99</sup> See for instance Alings, *Monument und Nation*, 105-107.

<sup>100</sup> See St. AK, SII 2955, Gemeinde-Vermögen. Die Colossalbüste des deutschen Kaisers Wilhelm I.

council began collecting money for a monument honoring the man who had done so much for the German nation.<sup>101</sup> They encountered numerous difficulties from the outset of this project. To be sure, in the immediate aftermath of Wilhelm's death, the organizing committee received a good number of sizable donations, but as time passed, donations were far and few between. In addition, the committee argued about what type of monument they should build. Some claimed that since the money was not sufficient for a full-sized statue, they should just construct a bust, while others argued that a bust was not worthy enough, especially since just about every city in Germany already had one of these.<sup>102</sup> Furthermore, as the death of Wilhelm became more distant, people maintained that it might be a good idea to include other people who had been instrumental in unifying Germany as well. Among the names that were brought up, Bismarck, Moltke, and Crown Prince Friedrich were among the most popular ones. These were not unusual sentiments, as these three figures were all tied closely together to the unification of the Reich. Towards the later part of the nineteenth century, it was not uncommon for Germans to commemorate several different individuals in one and the same monument. Given the number of statues that were being constructed all over Germany, this was one of the ways in which local communities cut down on expenses while still ensuring that they participated actively in the honoring of important people and events.

Despite the initial effort of the members of the organizing committee, they

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<sup>101</sup> St. AF, C3/467/1, Staatsachen. Die Errichtung eines Denkmals des deutschen Kaisers Wilhelm I, protocol from city council meeting, March 23, 1888.

<sup>102</sup> St. AF, C3/467/1, protocol from committee meeting, May 4, 1889.

were not able to collect enough funds to construct what they considered a worthy monument. During the last years of the nineteenth century, there was a new push for creation of a monument, largely sparked by the centenary celebrations of Wilhelm I's birth in 1897, but once again, despite a promising start, the collection drive was unable to sustain enough momentum. From time to time over the next few years, there were attempts to revive the project, but to no avail. Throughout the entire process, committee members could not reach a decision on what type of monument to construct nor where to place it. As in Konstanz, the success of the projects was not only dependent on the willingness of the people to donate money but also on the abilities of the organizing committee to act decisively. No doubt the slow manner in which the committee in Freiburg was handling this manner did not make it any more enticing for people to contribute money to this project. This also provides evidence that as Germany was entering the twentieth century, many Germans had become rather tired of these commemorative efforts. Since the collective memory of the unification had been secured in statues, text books, and various holidays, the perceived need for new monuments and ceremonies as means to consolidate the German nation-state was not as immediate as it had once been. In late 1913, the committee decided to abandon the project and instead use the money on rebuilding and strengthening local society.<sup>103</sup>

Although citizens in Konstanz and Freiburg failed to produce a monument to Emperor Wilhelm, the people of Heidelberg managed to do so. On March 29, 1888, shortly after the death of the Emperor, the city council voted to construct a monument

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<sup>103</sup> St. AF, C3/467/1, protocol from city council meeting, September 15, 1913.

to honor the great achievements of the late Wilhelm, especially his actions as leader of the great German army that unified Germany in 1871.<sup>104</sup> They formed a committee and began to debate what type of monument that they should build. After the initial collections, in which all types of associations and organizations participated, including the local Catholic student association, they decided on constructing a bust, which at the time was all they could afford. On July 1, 1899, the city council published an appeal in all major newspapers emphasizing how important it was for the city of Heidelberg to construct a monument to Wilhelm's honor. Not only were many other German cities doing the same thing, but they also noted that the city had enjoyed a prosperous economic period, so that there should not be a problem to collect enough money for a great monument.<sup>105</sup> The city council took a very active role in collecting money as they helped organize concerts, plays, and other cultural events where the proceeds would go to the fund for constructing a monument.<sup>106</sup> Over the next few years, donations arrived at a steady pace, and the organizing committee actually decided that they had more money to spend than what was required for a bust.<sup>107</sup> Throughout this whole process, the organizing committee also took great care to

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<sup>104</sup> St. AH, UA 73-1, Gemeinde Vermögen. Die Errichtung eines Denkmals für Kaiser Wilhelm I, protocol from city council meeting, March 29, 1888. See also Meinhold Lurz, *Das Denkmal Kaiser Wilhelm I. auf dem Ludwigsplatz in Heidelberg. Ein Symbol der wilhelminischen Gesellschaft*. Kunsthistorisches Institut der Universität Heidelberg. Veröffentlichungen zur Heidelberger Altstadt. Heft 11, 1975, 1; Ellen Aamot Pabst, *Das Reiterdenkmal für Wilhelm I. auf dem Uni-Platz von K.A. Donndorf* (Heidelberg: Unpublished thesis, University of Heidelberg, 1981), 1.

<sup>105</sup> See for instance *Heidelberger Zeitung*, July 1, 1889.

<sup>106</sup> See for instance St. AH, UA 73-1, protocol from city council meeting, March 22, 1890.

<sup>107</sup> St. AH, UA 73-1, protocol from meeting of the organizing committee, February 19, 1897.



involve the general public. As the plans changed from a bust to a fountain with a bust, they placed the model of the proposed monument on display in the city, encouraging locals to offer their opinions. This shows that this project was much more closely tied into the daily lives of the local population. One of the reasons why the other two projects failed was that they remained hidden from public view. The people in Freiburg and Konstanz had little or no idea what the organizing committee was doing and thus could not offer their opinions, negative or positive, on the proposed models or places for the monument.

On April 4, 1898, *Heidelberger Zeitung* remarked that though it was nice to see that the city had collected enough money to have something other than a bust constructed, and they noted that the structure certainly was innovative, they disliked its aesthetics, which was much too complicated.<sup>108</sup> No doubt influenced by local popular opinion, the organizing committee invited Professors Janssen and Schill, who had designed the structure, to a discussion about how the model could be improved. Although the two artists agreed to the changes that the organizing committee suggested, the latter finally decided to reject their design at the end of 1900. In their justification of their decision, the city council members noted that they did not want to proceed with a monument that obviously did not resonate with the local population.<sup>109</sup>

The committee, bolstered by the fact that people were still donating money to the project, now decided to construct a full-sized equestrian monument of Wilhelm,

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<sup>108</sup> *Heidelberger Zeitung*, April 13, 1898.

<sup>109</sup> St. AH, UA 73-1, protocol from city council meetings, November 13, 14.

similar to the famous statue of the Emperor erected on the Hohensyburg.<sup>110</sup> They invited Prof. Alfred Donndorf from Karlsruhe, who had constructed a Bismarck bust in the city, to come up with a model of the monument.<sup>111</sup> On May 10, 1900, Donndorf presented a model to the city council. Originally, the organizing committee wanted to place only the top of the monument on display; however, since they feared that people might confuse this monument with the last model, they asked Donndorf to construct an entire replica of the proposed monument.<sup>112</sup> The monument was put on display in city hall on October 16, presenting the public yet another opportunity to offer their opinions on the proposed statue. This time, the local reception was much warmer, though the organizing committee still had some minor suggestions to offer Donndorf.<sup>113</sup> After some negotiations between the committee and the artist, on April 30, 1901, a contract was signed between the two parties that declared that he would build the proposed monument on the Ludwigs Square, and that it would be unveiled on October 18, 1901 (Figure 2). Given the short time Donndorf had to complete the project, it should come as no surprise that the date for the unveiling was postponed to December 5, the birthday of Grand Duchess Luise of Baden, Wilhelm's daughter, a fact that was not lost on the organizing committee.<sup>114</sup>

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
<sup>110</sup> For a detailed discussion of this monument, see Alings, *Monument und Nation*, 125-126.

<sup>111</sup> Lurz, *Das Denkmal Kaiser Wilhelm I*, 5.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> *Heidelberger Zeitung*, October 17, 1900. The proposed changes were discussed during a city council meeting on January 7, 1901.

<sup>114</sup> St. AH, UA 73-1, protocol from city council meeting, September 21, 1901.



Das Kaiser-Wilhelm-Denkmal zu Heidelberg  
von Adolf Dondorf

Nach einer Photographie von Ed. von König

**Figure 2.** Emperor Wilhelm I monument in Heidelberg. (Reprinted from Erich Marcks, *Wilhelm I. Rede bei der Enthüllung des Kaiserdenkmals zu Heidelberg am 5 Dezember 1901*. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1902).

The unveiling took place in the presence of a number of famous guests, including Grand Duke Friedrich, his wife, their two sons, and a number of important Badenese military and political officials. The day began with a reception at the train station as the royal family arrived in town. After locals had received an opportunity to greet their rulers during a parade through the city, the dignitaries arrived at city hall. Interestingly, the first piece of music that was played was the same piece that had been played at the peace celebration in 1871, indicating how closely the persona of Wilhelm I was still tied into the unification of Germany. History professor Erick Marcks gave the plenary speech, which was well received by those in attendance.<sup>115</sup> His speech was divided into three parts, the first one outlined why the city of Heidelberg had decided to honor Wilhelm with this monument. Marcks pointed to the fact that the city had come together admirably in the commemorative project to honor the Emperor. He asserted that the monument should be interpreted both as a symbol of all of the great things that had happened to Germany, but also as a symbol of the admirable characteristics that Wilhelm I had possessed. He also claimed that this monument served as a good illustration of the fact that Wilhelm really was the embodiment of the greatness of Germany. As had become evident ever since Germany was unified, it had acquired a more and more important position in Europe, and much of this was of course due to the work of the Emperor. Wilhelm both

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<sup>115</sup> The speech is reprinted in Erich Marcks, *Wilhelm I. Rede bei der Enthüllung des Kaiserdenkmals zu Heidelberg am 5 Dezember 1901* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1902).

provided a good role model and personified the Empire.<sup>116</sup>

In the second part of his speech, he outlined Wilhelm's life. Highlighting certain parts of his personal history, Marcks sought to demonstrate that the Emperor had possessed admirable characteristics such as courage, honor, dignity, and faith. Although surrounded by many strong-minded statesmen, Wilhelm had always been able to maintain power with a firm grip, and the Emperor was always the one who made the final decision, though he was not above taking sound advice. Naturally, Marcks emphasized the fact that Wilhelm I had been one of the first people to recognize the German desire for unification, and he was the one who enabled the realization of this dream. Marcks left others such as Bismarck out of his speech and credited Wilhelm with having single-handedly led Germany to unification.<sup>117</sup> In the third part of his speech, Marcks noted that the equestrian statue was very fitting as it provided locals with a suitable picture of the grandiose and noble nature of the late Emperor, which also symbolized the German spirit.<sup>118</sup>

After the speech, people walked over to the Ludwigs Square, where the mayor held the unveiling speech. In his remarks, Mayor Wilckens noted that it was admirable that the city had decided to construct one of these monuments as Germany was now dominated by a new generation, which had not been fortunate enough to be part of the momentous events of 1870-71. Indeed, there was a risk that this new

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid., 4-7.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., esp. 10-13.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 31-32.

generation would forget the great deeds that people such as Bismarck and Wilhelm had done for the German people if they were not reminded of it by statues such as this one. He furthermore noted that for the older generation, this was also nice because it reminded them that they should be very grateful for these new and better times and that the monument should always serve as a reminder of how Germans had struggled for unity for so long. Last, he noted that these types of monuments should serve as glue that ties the German people ever closer together, neatly summarizing what contemporaries thought about these monuments.

After the unveiling, there was a banquet, during which even representatives of the Catholic Church were among those giving the many speeches. In his short remarks, Catholic Professor Hausrath noted that this statue served the city well, and he also thanked the mayor for being such a good leader, one who long avoided any strife between church and state.<sup>119</sup> In the aftermath of the celebrations, *Pfälzer Bote* noted that they approved of the ceremony and that the monument lacked any offending symbolism. As further proof of how integrated the Catholics had become into the new nation-state was the fact that the paper did not offer any type of criticism of the celebrations. To be sure, the Catholics had always held more positive attitudes towards the Emperor than other officials. It is, however, still interesting that just a few years after Bismarck's death, the Catholics now did not attempt to challenge the official discourse at all. Indeed, they participated in the cementing of the national identity, though they were still a bit more neutral than the national-liberal papers, in a

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<sup>119</sup> Lurz, *Das Denkmal Kaiser Wilhelm I*, 13-15.

fashion similar to the rest of the German population.<sup>120</sup>

Catholic attitudes towards the efforts to honor Wilhelm I illustrate the widespread acceptance of the commemorative discourse surrounding the Emperor. To be sure, there had never been a great deal of controversy in regards to the Emperor, but the early years of the *Kaiserrreich* witnessed some minor disagreements between Catholics and Protestants about how to celebrate him. However, as the nineteenth century drew to a close, Catholics and Protestants were able to find sufficiently large commemorative space to remember Wilhelm, further uniting the Germans. Catholic acceptance of and inclusion in the commemorative discourse relating to events and persons associated with the unification of the Reich also indicate that they had become accepted as worthy members of the German nation-state. Although other factors such as a growing political strength and a strong presence in the colonial movement aided Badenese Catholics as they struggled to become Germans, their refusal to be submerged in the Protestant and national-liberal version of nationalism in the end helped to facilitate their integration into the German nation-state. Although the commemorations of the foundation of the Reich and of such historic figures as Bismarck and Wilhelm I remained somewhat controversial in the 1890s and early 1900s, they were much more coherent than in previous years. Most notably, Protestants and national-liberals usually refrained from including any anti-Catholic rhetoric in these events. This decision reflects both their loss of political and economic power and their inability to shape the commemorative discourse in a way

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<sup>120</sup> *Pfälzer Bote*, December 6, 1901.

that they desired. Catholic insistence on presenting and promoting their sense of Germanness enabled integration into the Empire as Protestants and Catholics were forced to reconcile their competing versions of what it meant to be German. Of course, this did not mean that these commemorations were completely harmonious, but compared to the first few decades of the Second Empire, the commemorative discourse was more homogenous, reflecting a greater sense of unity. Protestants were prepared to accept Catholic versions of patriotism while Catholics were prepared to honor figures such as Bismarck, who had been one of their greatest enemies for much of the *Kaiserreich*. To be sure, there was still confessional conflict as World War I erupted, but Catholics and Protestants lived in greater harmony at that time than they had for many years.



## CHAPTER 8

### CONCLUSION

In this work I have attempted to shed light on how Badenese Catholics negotiated a complex web of loyalties as they integrated into the Second German Empire. Although most Catholics in Baden as elsewhere in the Empire had supported a *Grossdeutsch* solution to the German question, the 1871 unification forced them to accept a new nation-state where they constituted a minority. Many previous scholars have characterized Catholic integration into the *Kaiserreich* as a gradual acquiescence into a dominant Protestant milieu. However, this investigation of Catholic attitudes towards the commemoration of the wars of unification has illuminated how Catholics maintained and manifested their own version of Germanness within the larger Protestant Germany. Despite opposition from Protestant-dominated national and state governments, Badenese Catholics successfully preserved parts of their pre-1871 identities. These sentiments, most notably loyalties to Catholics in Austria and the Pope in Rome, were incorporated into the new Catholic national identity.

We have been able to reach these conclusions by analyzing how Badenese Catholics viewed the official commemorative discourse surrounding the unification of the Empire. By opposing parts of the Prussian and Protestant-dominated nationalist message that surrounded these commemorations, Catholics constructed an alternative discourse that better represented their identities. Thus, throughout the Second Empire,

two different versions of German national identity coexisted, if uneasily. One of the central arguments of this work is that the construction of German national identity in the *Kaiserreich* should be viewed as a continuous debate between the Protestant and Catholic versions of Germanness. These two versions interacted with each other and helped shape the new national identity. The regional and religious affiliations of Badenese Catholics were not subsumed by a Protestant and Prussian-dominated national identity. Instead, competing Catholic and Protestant understandings of German national consciousness constituted national identity in Imperial Germany. Thus, despite being politically and economically disadvantaged, Badenese Catholics were able to exercise great influence on the construction of identity in the new nation-state.

In the initial postunification period, liberal and Protestant elites largely controlled the commemoration of unification, which served as one of the most important building blocks for the new national identity. Because they controlled most of the economic, political, and cultural capital in Imperial Germany, they were able to shape the official discourse to their liking. Already from the outset of these commemorations, it was evident that they would contain an anti-Catholic bias. The fact that Protestant Prussia had defeated two Catholic powers, Austria and France, on the road to unifying Germany was certainly not lost on Protestants in Baden. Although Baden had sided with Austria in 1866, Protestants and liberals elected to neglect this war in their attempt to create a homogeneous national identity based on Protestant values. As Ernst Renan noted over a century ago, collective forgetting is

part of what makes up a nation, and Badenese Protestants conveniently forgot their own pro-Austrian policies in their attempt to fit into the new national identity. In addition, the struggles between church and state in Baden, which witnessed the first German *Kulturkampf*, meant that Protestant and liberal elites utilized commemorations of the unification to attack the Catholic Church. Hence, these commemorations became vehicles that Protestants and liberals used to consolidate their political, economic, and cultural power, which is one of the reasons why they became so contested. These ceremonies were not just a reflection of a community's desire to remember a certain event, but they also constituted means of acquiring and consolidating power in society.

In conjunction with most official acts of commemorating the unification, especially during the first decade of the Empire, Catholics faced various anti-Catholic sentiments. Although this discourse initially placed Catholics on the defensive, their response was anything but conciliatory. Instead of acquiescing to the pressures from the Protestant and liberal elite, Badenese Catholics insisted on maintaining their own view of the German nation, which contained loyalties to both the Pope as well as their fellow Catholics in Austria. By opposing much of the official commemorative discourse, Catholics were able to use the celebrations of German unification to manifest their own identities. With the exception of Sedan Day, previous scholars have often ignored the contested nature of the commemorative discourse, which led to an underestimation of how successful Catholics were at influencing the construction of German national identity. For instance, by utilizing the debates surrounding the

construction of monuments such as the *Siegesdenkmal* in Freiburg, Badenese Catholics drew attention to the plight of veterans of the Austro-Prussian War. By doing so, they ensured that this war, or perhaps more importantly, Bismarck's behavior in the period leading up to the war, was not forgotten. In a similar fashion, Catholic opposition to Sedan Day guaranteed that the often virulent anti-Catholic rhetoric that was part of this celebration never became part of the new national identity. By boycotting official celebrations, by keeping their children home from school, by staging counter-celebrations, and by using the press to debate the merits of the celebrations, Catholics created an alternative discourse.

Throughout these debates, Catholics had to endure frequent accusations of harboring anti-German feelings. Rather than ignoring liberal and Protestant allegations that Catholics were *Vaterlandslose*, Catholics utilized these debates to present themselves as better Germans. Contesting the official discourse, Catholics insisted that Protestants were lesser Germans who simply used nationalist sentiments for other means, such as gaining political or economic power. Hence, Protestants and liberals did not understand the true requirements of patriotism, whereas Catholics nurtured purer nationalist feelings. In these debates, Catholics utilized the Protestant accusations of anti-German sentiments to prove that they were more intent on preserving the strength of the German nation. In a sense, Catholics presented themselves as being the opposite of the stereotypical Protestant, who was allegedly materialistic, divisive, and shallow. In fact, these debates, which most often took place in the press, became one of the most important means for Catholics to manifest

their own identity. Especially during the first two decades of the *Kaiserreich*, Catholics were very adept at using the Protestant *Other* to construct and strengthen their own identities.

While Catholic opposition to the official commemorative discourse surrounding unification constituted one of the most important means of manifesting their identities, they also used other ways of exercising influence on the process of nation building. By publicly celebrating events such as papal anniversaries and other religious holidays, Catholics not only staked claim to the public sphere but also to part of the new German identity. Catholic loyalties to the Pope and Rome constituted the most contentious issues during the initial decades of the *Kaiserreich*. Protestants were reluctant to accept that Catholics were able to maintain loyalties to both Rome and Berlin. To German Protestants, whose church was organized on the state level, there was something inherently anti-German about these loyalties. However, what they failed to understand was that these two identities were not exclusive, but complementary. Badenese Catholics were prepared to sacrifice their lives for the German Empire, as was evident in the Franco-Prussian War, while simultaneously professing a genuine concern for the well-being of the Pope. When Badenese Catholics gathered in the streets to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Pope Pius IX's election as Pope in June 1871, they honored him, but they also engaged in an act of nation building. Especially during the first decade of the *Kaiserreich*, which was characterized by harsh anti-Catholic rhetoric, Catholic displays of their identity enabled them to claim an important part of the public sphere. Considering that the

construction of national identity largely took place in the rapidly growing public sphere, it became crucial for Catholics to exhibit a strong presence in the public arena.

These debates also illustrate how central confessional affiliations were to the construction of national identity. When Catholics and Protestants debated the nature of national identity, they most often did it in confessional terms. The great controversy surrounding the question of how to commemorate Bismarck's eightieth birthday serves as a good example of the fact that confessional sentiments always became a part of the discussion. As Catholics and Protestants debated whether to honor one of the founding fathers of the Empire, they were carrying out a very public debate about the composition of their national identity, and most of this debate centered on religious questions. Although Catholics agreed that Bismarck had rendered great services to the fatherland, they still could not ignore the injustices that he had done to the Catholic Church. By highlighting how Bismarck, who occupied one of the central positions in the Protestant version of national identity, had abused Catholics, the latter presented their own view of their identity and recent German history. By using Bismarck and his supporters as Protestant *Others*, Catholics were able to present themselves as better patriots. These very public controversies reinforce the notion that the construction of German identity was not very cohesive, but should rather be viewed as a constant source of conflict between different groups in German society.

The debates about how to commemorate Bismarck also point to a different Catholic interpretation of nationalism. Supported by the recent historical events,

Protestants and liberals viewed nationalism and nationalist sentiments as a driving force that had unified Germany and would enable the Empire to assume the most powerful position in European society. Thus, the Protestant and liberal version of nationalism did not only look backwards in history, but forward as well. Catholics on the other hand were more hesitant about the absolute value of the nation-state and less optimistic about the future. To be sure, these fears stemmed partly from the *Kulturkampf* and their new minority status in the Empire, but they also reflected the fact that Catholics based their new national identity on old cultural and religious ties that predated the advent of the nation-state. Although consolidation of national states constituted one of the key features of nineteenth-century European society, Badenese Catholics still clung to older non-national aspects of their identity, including loyalties to the Pope. It is important to recognize that this did not mean that Catholics were disloyal to Wilhelm I and the Empire, it simply meant that they comprised their loyalties in a slightly different manner. No matter how fiercely Protestants opposed this version of Germanness, it still became part of the national fabric.

The different Catholic and Protestant interpretations of their national identity also illustrate the need to reconsider the unifying effects of nationalism. To be sure, as the nineteenth century drew to a close, Catholics and Protestants grew more integrated into an increasingly homogeneous nation-state, but the level of homogenization must not be overestimated. By applying the newly popularized language of nationalism, Protestants and Catholics in Baden often used the commemorative discourse surrounding unification to preserve and sometimes intensify already existing

differences. Towards the backdrop of an emerging fixation on the creation of national identity, Catholics and Protestants used the rhetoric surrounding these commemorations to solidify their own views of German history and society. As scholars have demonstrated over the last decade, confessional antagonisms constituted one of the most important aspects of Imperial Germany, and it would be incorrect to assume that nationalist sentiments simply glossed over these differences. Instead, to a large extent, confessional differences came to constitute important parts of German nationalism, which often meant that nationalist sentiments divided as much as they unified.

Given the fact that Protestants and liberals controlled much of the official discourse surrounding unification, did this mean that Badenese Catholics were not as integrated into the *Kaiserreich* as Badenese Protestants? During the first few years of the Second Empire, and especially during national and local *Kulturkämpfe*, Catholics often complained about being labeled second-class citizens. However, Catholic refusal to be marginalized, and their determination to display their identity in a public manner, enabled them to achieve a degree of national integration that they would otherwise not have been able to reach. Here it is important to note that they were not integrated into a Protestant national identity, but into an identity that comprised both Catholic and Protestant sentiments. Furthermore, this means that the level of Catholic and Protestant integration into the Second Empire needs to be reconsidered. Neither confession was able to incorporate the other into an exclusive version of national identity; instead, the two versions coexisted, sometimes uneasily, throughout the



Second Empire. To some extent, it is misleading to speak about Catholic and Protestant integration into the new nation-state. Instead of discussing confessional integration into the new national identity, it would be more appropriate to analyze how Catholic and Protestant versions of identity interacted with and shaped each other to comprise German national identity

Most scholars now agree that Catholic resistance towards the *Kulturkampf* and its attempt to create a nationally unified culture left them stronger and more unified than prior to the conflict between church and state. However, what most scholars have failed to recognize is what this meant for the creation of a German national identity. Because Catholics were able to maintain and manifest their version of national identity throughout the *Kulturkampf* years, and because they were strengthened by this experience, the *Kulturkampf* to some extent divided the German nation. Rather than eliminating the Catholic version of Germanness from the national consciousness, the *Kulturkampf* strengthened Catholic determination to prove their worth and value to Germany. Hence, the *Kulturkampf* did not unify Germans but rather offered Protestants and Catholics opportunities to manifest their different versions of national identity. Furthermore, this illustrates that the German national identity was not a Protestant or Catholic construct, but rather comprised an ongoing debate about what constituted “German.” This in itself does not diminish the power of German nationalist feeling, but it forces a reevaluation of how national identity is composed and recognition that competing versions of Germanness could be part of the national fabric. The internal mechanisms of the construction of national identity were more

complicated and divisive than scholars have previously recognized. In a similar fashion to how Alon Confino and Celia Applegate have shown how the *Heimat* constituted an important building block for German national consciousness, confessional differences also made up different components of the nationalist framework. Just as the local *Heimat* became a vehicle to understand the national, Catholic and Protestant sentiments became vehicles that Badenese used to adapt to the new national identity. If Badenese Catholics could infuse the new national identity with enough familiar sentiments, the adjustment to a new identity would not be as difficult as if they had to adapt to a completely new construct.

In addition to the increased strength that Badenese Catholics gained from surviving the *Kulturkampf*, their increase in political power, the growing success of Catholic associations, and Catholic support for the colonial movement all enabled them to exercise more influence on the creation of national identity. It has been evident throughout this work that Badenese Catholics utilized many aspects of a more modern society to manifest and strengthen their identity. Although during the past decade scholars have begun to revise the traditional view of Catholics as backwards and antimodern, there still needs to be more research done in regards to the Catholic embrace of modernity. Especially after 1890, as mass politics and a growing public sphere increasingly defined German society, Badenese Catholics proved adept at taking advantage of these new conditions. The growing political power of the Badenese Center Party after 1888 enabled their constituents to manifest better their view of German national identity.

After the first couple of decades of the *Kaiserreich*, there were not nearly as many heated debates about the commemorations of the wars of unification. To some extent, this reflected the fact that enough time had passed for Germans to become more comfortable in their new nation-state. However, the decreased tension also stemmed from the fact that Catholics were in a much stronger political, social, and economic position compared to the first decade of the Second Empire. Although still politically, socially, and economically disadvantaged compared to Badenese Protestants, Catholics were closing the gap, which enabled them to exercise more influence on the construction of national identity. Of course, this did not mean that confessional discord was disappearing from Baden and Germany. Indeed, it is one of the central tenets of this research that throughout the *Kaiserreich*, confessional affiliation largely determined how citizens lived their lives. However, during the last couple of decades of the nineteenth century, Catholics and Protestants were more prepared to accept each other's version of national identity. This also reinforces the idea that we have to view nationalism and national identity as a constant negotiation between different forces. Although this negotiating process was not as conflict-ridden by the early twentieth century, it was still fraught with tension as Catholics and Protestants debated the nature and character of the German nation. At the same time, the growing political, social, cultural, and economic power of Catholics meant that Protestants and liberals were not in a position where they could dismiss Catholic versions of Germanness. Instead, by the 1890s, Catholics and Protestants had reached more agreement on what constituted their national identity. Here, it is important to

note that this did not mean that one confession had been subsumed by the other's version of Germanness, but rather that they had agreed on the very complex and varying nature of national consciousness.

In this context, we should also note that the different situations that Catholics in Konstanz and Freiburg encountered compared to the ones in Heidelberg supports these conclusions. During the 1860s and early '70s, Catholics in Heidelberg were in a situation more similar to what Catholics all around Baden were in the 1890s. They were better established; they enjoyed more amicable relationships with the Protestants, and political, economic, social, and cultural power was more evenly distributed. This meant that the two different versions of Germanness were able to coexist better. To be sure, there were still many conflicts between Protestants and Catholics; however, around the *fin-de-siècle*, they had reached an understanding that they needed to coexist in the Empire. This understanding, though it was uneasy at times, still provided for relatively peaceful relations between the two confessions.

Germany's increased involvement in European diplomatic and colonial affairs, which precipitated a slow but steady move of nationalism to the right, also meant that it was easier for Catholics and Protestants to overlook some of their internal differences. As has been already noted, they were both prepared to die for their Emperor, and the fact that the last two decades of the Empire were focused less on the persecution of internal enemies and more on external ones aided in the elimination of some of the differences. Of course, the fact that the focus was more on external enemies than internal also illustrates that the nation-state had grown more stable. By

the 1890s, Catholics and Protestants were more inclined to agree on the purposes of nationalism though they still might disagree on the exact nature of the German nation-state. As the international situation grew increasingly tense, both Catholics and Protestants subscribed to the notion that nationalism should serve to strengthen the German nation. Especially after some of the foreign policy setbacks during the first few years of the twentieth century, both confessions utilized nationalism to strengthen Germany's position on the European diplomatic and political stage. These sentiments were no more evident than in the 1912 Catholic reception of the Bismarck statue in Konstanz. Although this was a man whom they had refused to honor before, they now appreciated the radical nationalist message that accompanied the unveiling of the statue. In the years immediately prior to World War I, both Catholics and Protestants used nationalism to strengthen their own nation in times when the European diplomatic climate was becoming increasingly hostile.

Although this work has mainly focused on the centrality of confessional loyalties to the construction of German national identity, the research into the official commemorative discourse surrounding unification also provided some clues about how Badenians integrated into the Second Empire. Following the theories first proposed by Applegate and Confino, my research supports the notion that though Badenians were not opposed to the unification of the Empire, they were still intent on preserving their own regional identities as part of their new national identity. The symbolism inherent in the *Siegedenkmal* leaves little doubt that Badenese Catholics and Protestants were unwilling to give up their pre-1871 identities for a new Prussian-

dominated construct. The Grand Duchy of Baden had enjoyed a long and illustrious history, and it should come as no surprise, especially given Prussia's reactionary reputation, that Badeners were unwilling to be engulfed into the new national identity. Intent on preserving as much of their local and regional identity as possible, the commemorations of the Franco-Prussian War and the subsequent unification always stressed the centrality of the Badenese troops to the success of these events. The commemorative discourse almost seemed to indicate that had it not been for the Badenese troops and the political efforts of Grand Duke Friedrich, Germany might not have unified. Although this was an invented history, the ideological message enabled Badeners to hold on to their regional identities while negotiating the creation of a national identity. Naturally, this meant that they created a slightly different view of the German nation than existed in Saxony or Prussia. The federalist structure of the Empire also ensured that it was relatively easy for Badeners to maintain parts of their regional identities as they negotiated the integration into the new nation-state. To some extent, the fact that the Empire was so federalized actually enabled Germans to create a stronger sense of national identity as they utilized regional parliaments or royal houses as means to manifest their identities as Germans and Badeners at the same time. Although the negotiation between the local and national was not carried out in the same public and obvious manner as the conflict between the Protestant and Catholic versions of Germanness, the processes were quite similar.

Despite facing opposition and sometimes outright discrimination between 1871-1914, Catholics in Baden were able to maintain their own sense of Germanness

during the Second Empire. Using the commemorations of the wars of unification, Badenese Catholics manifested their own view of German history, the unification process, and the nature of their new nation-state. Despite accusations of anti-Germanness, Badenese Catholics were not lesser Germans, only different from their Protestant counterparts. As the Second Empire grew more stable, and as Catholics grew more politically, economically, socially, and culturally powerful, Catholics and Protestants were able to reach a consensus of what constituted national identity, though this consensus was uneasy at times. This work has demonstrated that confessional attitudes constituted a large part of national identity as well as the fact that Catholics were much more successful in maintaining their own version of national identity than many previous scholars have argued. By actively interacting, often in a hostile manner, with the Protestant versions of German identity, Catholics were able to shape the new national identity to a great extent. Their public manifestations of their version of Germanness ensured that they were able to negotiate their existence in the new nation-state on their own terms, rather than simply being subsumed in a Protestant-dominated national identity.

What emerges here is a multifaceted view of nationalism. It was not simply a cohesive force that unified several different groups in society under one ideology. Rather, in the initial years of the Empire, it could sometimes even intensify already-existing conflicts as citizens debated these against the backdrop of an obsession on the construction of national identity. However, this does not mean that nationalism was an intrinsically divisive force. Ultimately, though they subscribed to different versions

of what it meant, Badenese Catholics and Protestants agreed that they were all Germans. What we should take away here is the fact that nationalism was a force that both pushed and pulled and that it contained many inherent conflicts. Instead of being forced to accept a national identity characterized by Prussian and Protestant values, Badenese Catholics successfully infused German identity with their own understanding of Germanness. Thus, throughout the Second Empire, the construction of national identity constantly changed as the two confessions debated the meaning of identity. However, at the end of the day, citizens in Konstanz, Heidelberg, and Freiburg agreed that they were German, though their versions of that identity might have differed. Badenese Catholics' resistance to the official commemorative discourse and their success in manifesting their own identities suggest that national identity should be considered a very fluid construct in which groups such as Protestants and Catholics offered their interpretation of what it meant to be German in the Second Empire.



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