

CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY

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**The Nature of the British Soldier: Warrior or Weapons
Platform a Philosophical Framework**

Defence College of Management and Technology

PhD THESIS

ACADEMIC YEAR: 2007 - 2014

SUPERVISOR: Prof R Holmes CBE (2007-2011)

Mr N Jones (2011-2014)

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for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

This thesis is an examination of how the nature of the British soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary British society if a spectrum of meaning is imagined that posits a warrior existing at one extreme and a weapons platform at the other. Located within a philosophical setting and indebted to Charles Taylor's modern social imaginaries, a number of sub-questions function as the mechanism used to explore the thesis question in the six research chapters which are: 2, Identity and Narrative; 3, Being and Doing; 4, Clausewitz, Trinitarian War and New Wars; 5, Selected Societal Factors (Death, Risk, and Post-heroic and Feminised Society); 6, The Future Nature of Conflict; and 7, Future Technology.

This thesis provides a basis by which to evaluate the cultural, practical, philosophical and intellectual pressures affecting how the British soldier is envisaged in the UK social imaginary. It also offers a functional framework to understand those roles British society is prepared to tolerate and validate when deploying and utilising the generic soldier. The main conclusions of the research chapters are contained in the following six propositions:

1. The identity of the warrior requires a narrative of war(fare) validated by the society with whom he/she is in relationship. The identity of the soldier does not necessarily require a narrative of war.
2. The distinction between the warrior and the soldier is best framed in the language of 'being' and 'doing'. For the warrior their 'being' is intuited in combat; whereas the soldier requires a narrative that validates the required/expected output.
3. New wars are non-Clausewitzian. Any Western narrative will suffer narrative deflation in the soldier's daily experience in non-Western operational settings.
4. Post-modern, risk averse, post-heroic societies will struggle to generate a non-apocalyptic narrative capable of tolerating significant casualty numbers.
5. The question of intervention in a non-Western, non-permissive operational setting will examine the depth of liberal values in Western societies.
6. Though pragmatic, the development of robotic weapons stands in contradiction to the authenticity of the warrior and robs the West of the vitality of its liberal values.

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Table of Abbreviations

AFS	<i>Armed Forces & Society</i>
AiTR	Automated Targeting Recognition
BAR	<i>British Army Review</i>
BJS	<i>British Journal of Sociology</i>
CMC	<i>Crime Media Culture</i>
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
CSP	<i>Contemporary Security Policy</i>
DCDC	The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
DS	<i>Defence Studies</i>
DSA	<i>Defence and Security Analysis</i>
EA	<i>Economic Affairs</i>
EBW	Effects Based Warfare
ed	Editor
eg	<i>exempli gratia</i> , for example
FT	<i>Financial Times</i>
GPMG	General Purpose Machine Gun
HWJ	<i>Historical Workshop Journal</i>
IA	<i>International Affairs</i>
Ibid	In the same work
IBS	<i>Irish Biblical Studies</i>
IDF	Israeli Defence Force
ie	<i>id est</i> , that is
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ITQ	<i>Irish Theological Quarterly</i>

JBQ	<i>Jewish Biblical Quarterly</i>
JCS	<i>Journal of Classical Sociology</i>
JME	<i>Journal of Military Ethics</i>
JSS	<i>Journal of Strategic Studies</i>
JSP	<i>Journal of Social Philosophy</i>
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEC	Network Centric Warfare
No	Number
OODA	Observe, Orient, Decide, Act
OOTL	Out of the Loop
PDA	Project on Defense Alternatives
PhD	Doctor of Philosophy Degree
PSQ	<i>Political Science Quarterly</i>
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
SPCK	Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge
Them	<i>Themelios</i>
UK	United Kingdom
UN	The United Nations
Vol	Volume

Chapter 1

Introduction

British combat operations will end in Afghanistan in 2014¹. Although UK Forces have been deployed continuously in the country since 2001, the primary focus for the British Army since 2006 has been Helmand Province, in the south west of the country. 'At its peak, in Helmand alone there were 137 UK bases and around 9,500 UK troops'². British operational deployments in both Iraq and Afghanistan have been both costly, in terms of 'blood and treasure'³ and controversial, in terms of legitimacy and popularity⁴. In contrast to other operational deployments⁵, the ferocity of the fighting involving UK Land Forces, first in Iraq and more significantly in Afghanistan, combined with significant casualties over a prolonged period of time, has generated intense public discussion on why British soldiers have fought and died in a country that to many has little to do with the UK⁶.

In contrast and as part of the Government's response to unprecedented flooding across large swathes of Southern England⁷, thousands of soldiers were deployed in support of local/regional agencies⁸. Images of British soldiers filling sandbags and building flood defences in parts of the UK help illustrate the spectrum of activity that may be required of the British soldier. From high intensity war-fighting operations in Afghanistan where from 2008 through to 2011, 308 British military personnel died in service for their country⁹, to thousands of soldiers serving their country by helping stem rising flood waters.

In British Military Doctrine, 'Fighting Power' is that 'ability to fight; to engage combat. It consists of a conceptual component (the ideas behind how to operate and fight), a moral component (the ability to get people to operate and fight) and a physical component (the means to operate and fight)¹⁰. Every soldier in the British Army does the same phase 1 training before undertaking specialist phase 2 training appropriate for role. The concept of the generic British soldier, for the purpose of this thesis, resides in the common syllabus of

universal phase 1 training. There is however, the expectation that the British soldier can move, whenever required, seamlessly from filling sandbags for flood defence to high intensity combat operations, with the death and casualties involved in this type of operation. It is possible that policy makers might sleepwalk into a context where they ask or expect soldiers to move seamlessly from tasks in support of local UK authorities (UK Resilience) to combat operations in an intervention of choice but face the situation where soldiers are either unable or unwilling to perform that role; or to put it simply, a situation might arise where British soldiers choose not to fight. A British Army equivalent of Srebrenica, where Dutch peacekeeping soldiers refused to fight and defend a UN 'safe area'¹¹ or where 15 British naval personnel surrendered without firing a shot at elements of Iran's Revolutionary Guard who approached them in two speed boats¹².

1.1 Research Question and Methodology

This thesis is an examination of the suggestion, that a spectrum or continuum of meaning exists upon which the words 'warrior' and 'weapons platform/battlefield technician' may be located; this will be used throughout the thesis as a philosophical thought experiment.

Therefore, the research question addressed by this thesis is:

If a spectrum between Warrior and Weapons Platform is imagined, what does it tell us about how the nature of the British Soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary British society?

This thesis is indebted to Charles Taylor's philosophical observations concerning modern social imaginaries¹³. According to Taylor, 'the social imaginary is not a set of ideas; rather, it is what enables, through making sense of, the practices of a society'¹⁴; it is 'the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper

normative notions and images that underlie those expectations¹⁵. His focus is primarily Western history and the social imaginary that underpinned the rise of Western modernity¹⁶.

Taylor contends that although our modern social imaginary has been shaped by influential theories, particularly those of John Locke and Hugo Grotius¹⁷ in combination with Reformed Theology¹⁸, it is not identical with them. The revolutionary nature of the consequences contained within the theory associated with Grotius and Locke, Taylor observes, would not have been obvious to those who initially embraced them, though they seem obvious to us today¹⁹. Indeed, 'modern modes of individualism seemed a luxury, a dangerous indulgence'²⁰. However, contained within the logic of the Grotian-Lockean theory of the individual were intellectual drivers that would set in motion changes in the way people imagined their relationship to each other within a community²¹. Instead of a social imaginary based upon some form of Divine order or Platonic-Aristotelian concept of Form, which resulted in a hierarchical sense of society from 'time out of mind'²², the social imaginary began to be infiltrated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by ideas based around the needs of each member of society as an individual capable of establishing a mutual basis of exchange²³.

Inherent within this is the notion of individual rights²⁴, although this took centuries to evolve into its present form. Central to the notion of rights, is the associated concept of free agency and in this 'it also reflects the holder's sense of their own agency and of the situation that agency normatively demands in the world, namely, freedom'²⁵. One expression of this is the notion of the public sphere. Taylor defines this as 'a common space in which the members of a society are deemed to meet through a variety of media...to discuss matters of common interest; and thus be able to form a common mind about these'²⁶. In this space, 'a metaphorical common space'²⁷, people who never met 'understood themselves to be engaged in discussion and capable of reaching a common mind'²⁸. The 'public sphere is, then, a locus

in which rational views are elaborated but should guide government²⁹. Political power, maintains Taylor, is therefore supervised and checked by something outside of that power, but is normative for power³⁰. Political power in this view remains outside of but informed by the common mind formed in the public sphere and which holds the political power to account. Taylor calls this popular sovereignty and is an example of a mutation in the social imaginary that has helped constitute modern society³¹.

The generic British soldier resides in the imagination of the British public within the public sphere and discourse that occurs there. Although political power will deploy and utilise the British Army in a variety of operations, it remains subject to supervision and is sensitive to any common mind reached within the public sphere. In light of this there are a number of sub-questions that may be derived from the main thesis question when viewed through the lens of a modern social imaginary.

- How is identity constructed in contemporary Western society?
- Does narrative shape concepts of identity?
- Is the difference between warrior and battlefield technician the difference between 'being' and 'doing'?
- If the concept of the soldier as weapons platform/battlefield technician represents an instrumental notion of ontology (i.e. a unit of utility), does a focus on 'doing' potentially undermine 'being' and therefore the sustainment of fighting power?
- What societal factors shape where the generic British soldier might be imagined on the spectrum?
- Has war, or is war, changing and what impact does this have on the future nature of conflict and does this in turn impact on what is expected of the generic British soldier?
- How does the development of robotic technology impact upon what is expected of the generic British soldier?

These sub-questions will function as a mechanism by which to explore the implications of the main thesis question:

If a spectrum between Warrior and Weapons Platform is imagined, what does it tell us about how the nature of the British Soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary British society?

For additional clarity and to avoid any misunderstanding of the question this thesis is examining it is important to state what the thesis **is not** seeking to address. It will not seek to answer the question of whether the British soldier should be thought of as either a ‘warrior’ or ‘weapons platform/battlefield technician’. Neither does it seek to suggest or maintain that there has been, or is, some ‘progression’ from the notion of the warrior to the concept of the weapons platform. The use of either concept (warrior and weapons platform) is solely to establish the left and right of arc of the imagined spectrum. The focus of the thesis is not therefore the nature of the warrior, or how this has been understood at various times in history or for that matter upon the battlefield technician/weapons platform, or on whether or not some form of man/machine nexus is emerging. While these are all interesting notions, they are not the question this thesis will examine. Rather the idea of a spectrum with Achilles and a drone pilot as extreme reference points, establishes the space in which the generic British soldier in the twenty-first century may reside in the imaginary of the UK public. The factors examined in this thesis will be presented as forces that may influence how this might occur. As a concept it can be represented in this fashion:




Fig 1

In figure 1, the image on the extreme left represents Achilles, whereas the figure on the extreme right is of a soldier launching a handheld drone and represents the battlefield

technician. The black figure with a question mark above his head represents the generic soldier and the question of where between the left and right of arcs on the spectrum s/he should be located in UK social imaginary. The arrows pointing left and right are a pictorial representation of the factors that may influence where the generic British soldier is located on the imagined spectrum.

To help illustrate the basic idea further, figure 2 offers a pictorial illustration of how an apocalyptic form of public narrative (considered in chapter 2, *Identity and Narrative*) could affect where the generic British soldier might be located on the imagined spectrum. If an apocalyptic narrative is generally accepted by public opinion as being the dominant narrative at the time when the Government decides to commit British soldiers, then it is likely that public opinion will accept those soldiers being involved in high intensity combat.




Fig 2

Whereas, in a low mimesis narrative situation (considered in chapter 2, *Narrative and Identity*) an example of which might be UN Peacekeeping in Cyprus, the UK public may not accept British soldiers getting involved in high intensity combat but would prefer the distance from combat the idea that the battlefield technician suggests. This is illustrated in figure 3.




Fig 3

In ancient warfare combat was something conducted at close range – hand-to-hand fighting with basic implements, clubs, swords, the length of a spear (Hoplite warfare), the range a man could throw a spear, hurl a stone from a sling, project an object from some form

of ballista etc. In the twenty-first century, however, most Western styled militaries can deliver death from across the globe with incredible accuracy. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for example, which are frequently invisible to those on the ground, can deliver significant amounts of ordinance, while the pilot sits half a world away from the death s/he has delivered. The space therefore between the two extreme reference points on our imagined spectrum from this perspective is physically immense. The development of robotic stand-off technology, as chapter 7 *Future Technology* will demonstrate, has produced the very real possibility that individual soldiers will be able to engage targets/enemy at a safe distance many miles away from the machines they operate. In this scenario, combat is no longer conducted at close range. For the purpose of the thought experiment, the spectrum will also function as representing these metaphors:

Warrior = 'at close hand' and experiences 'hand-to-hand combat'
Battlefield Tech = 'at a distance' and 'dislocated experience of the battlefield'


The use of the spectrum within this thesis will also emphasise the relationship of the two extremes and death. It can be represented as:

Warrior = personal death is potentially immediate and violent in combat
Battlefield Tech = death is a dislocated task performed in complete physical safety


To illustrate the practical nature of the spectrum in our thought experiment let us consider the following. The *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) defines the warrior as someone 'whose occupation is warfare; a fighting man, whether soldier, sailor, or (latterly) airman; a valiant or experienced man of war'. It also defines the soldier as someone who, 'serves in an army for pay; one who takes part in military service or warfare'³². In these definitions, a soldier might serve a full career and never once be engaged in combat or experience the 'sight picture'³³ so powerfully depicted by Karl Marlantes in his book *What It Is Like To Go To War*³⁴. Stacking shelves in a Quartermaster's Department is an important and necessary job, as is being a chef, or a pay clerk. However, many tens of thousands of

soldiers have worn their uniforms and performed their respective tasks with dedication and the only time they fired their personal weapon was for their mandatory annual test. In contrast, a Special Forces Team that performs a Halo jump behind enemy lines on a search, capture or destroy mission resides on a different point (whether that is: physically, metaphorically, conceptually, philosophically) on our imagined spectrum.

This thesis will explore six interconnected areas of study that flow from the main research question and the sub-questions that emerge from that. Together they work as an organic whole when viewed in combination, in that each chapter contributes to the construction of a framework within which the concept envisaged in the thesis title can be imagined and approached. This approach is similar to that taken by John Lynn in his book *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*. He states that his ‘conclusions do not run through the entire volume, growing in mass and velocity from chapter to chapter in order to maximize impact’³⁵. Lynn’s idea, as utilised in this thesis may be presented in this fashion:



No one chapter, therefore, functions or is expected to be understood as functioning as a nexus or crux of the thesis. Each factor/subject examined contributes to the modern social imaginary from which an understanding of the generic soldier emerges and is sustained. Another mechanism utilised in chapter 8 (*Analysis and Discussion*) that seeks to work in harmony with this is that of a force field analysis: applied in every change management programme in the Army. This may be pictorially presented in this fashion:



If we assume that the section coloured red in figure 5 represents the space in the social imaginary occupied by the generic British soldier, the driving forces/forces for change and resisting/restraining forces are those aspects within modern UK society that are active in influencing where on our imagined spectrum of meaning the soldier is located in the twenty-first century UK. Each chapter will examine various factors that will play a part in this interaction between driving and restraining forces.

This thesis will examine topics from a range of academic disciplines; the thesis question and sub-questions make this unavoidable. Each chapter will address a distinct subject (s), although in collaboration they are complementary to the whole thesis. Therefore, to offer evidence of competence in that subject matter, the amount of material contained in the endnotes may be greater than might usually be expected. The use of the word ‘nature’ in the title implies a philosophical approach, in that it deliberately seeks to consider the ontological character of the British soldier (i.e. what the soldier is, or expected/required to be

in the UK social imaginary). As a consequence, the emphasis will be philosophical rather than historical. It will address historical as well as contemporary issues, in order to set the subject matter within a relevant context. The metaphysical dimensions of the nature of war, are not only philosophical but also historical, sociological and cultural. Each chapter of this thesis will analyse a distinct subject matter or group of associated factors that when combined may be viewed as a subject area. The unifying tool throughout will be a philosophical tone of examination. Other methodologies, such as interviews, questionnaires, statistical analysis, ethnographical studies, or discourse analysis were considered as being insufficient to provide the metaphysical reflection and subsequent theoretical analysis the research question demanded.

1.2 Literature Review

This thesis examines topics from a range of academic disciplines. Consequently each chapter is its own literature review of the key ideas and scholarly contribution identified for examination in each of the specific domains. Therefore, a comprehensive review of the breadth of scholarship contained in this thesis would be little more than a reproduction of each of the chapters minus their conclusions. This would be both an inadequate approach to adopt and unsophisticated. Consequently, the following literature review will not be a slavish overview of the scholarship that infuses, informs and directs this thesis. Rather, it will offer a more general introduction.

Broadly speaking, military historians have tended to focus upon: the history of war as a general subject³⁶; the great battles or campaigns of history³⁷; the generals who shaped not only the history of their nation but occasionally an entire continent³⁸; or they have focused upon the soldier's experience on the battlefield³⁹. Scholars like Holmes, Keegan and Howard have written authoritatively on the details of major wars, why particular wars were fought,

the politics that lay behind the conflict and even what motivated men to fight, sometimes, in the most appalling of circumstances. Although military history provides an invaluable backdrop against which to construct this thesis, it does not meet the demands of the research question posed earlier. For example, Holmes can speak with authority on the British *Tommy* in the First World War, or the experiences of the Princess of Wales' Royal Regiment (PWRR)⁴⁰ in modern combat. However, his role as an historian is to place events, people, and campaigns into a particular historical context. Whereas, this thesis seeks to address the ontological nature of the British soldier in a much broader cultural, sociological, historical, metaphysical context in order to produce a philosophical framework within which to imagine his/her nature.

Martin van Creveld is both a military historian⁴¹ and an eminent military theorist⁴². His book *On Future War* was and indeed remains one of the most original and influential books written on the subject of war. It not only examined the character of war, it challenged the philosophy of Carl von Clausewitz, contending that it was too narrow and state-centric and failed to accommodate the modern reality of non-state players. His notion of non-trinitarian war and his critique of Clausewitz has generated significant scholarly debate⁴³. Two scholars who have made a significant contribution to the developing theory of 'New Wars' are Mary Kaldor⁴⁴ and Herfried Münkler⁴⁵. While recognising the importance of Clausewitz, both scholars argue that new wars are no longer simply politics by another means. Unlike the military historian, their work resides mainly within the realm of political science⁴⁶. Colin S Gray⁴⁷ is a leading expert in international politics and strategic studies (theory and history) and is perhaps the leading exponent of the Clausewitzian theory of war⁴⁸. His work *Another Bloody Century* is a detailed application of Clausewitzian philosophy and confident refutation of all those who maintain that the nature of war has changed.

The political and strategic theorists briefly mentioned in the previous paragraph, spend some time considering the practical and philosophical nature of war. However, although each makes a contribution to the process of creating the philosophical framework mentioned in the thesis title, the focus of their work is not the nature of the British soldier.

Michael Ignatieff's *The Warrior's Honor*⁴⁹ is not only required reading for many students at the Defence Academy of the UK, it is perhaps one of the few modern books that examines the nature and character of the warrior as that concept found manifestation in the ethnic wars in Africa, the Balkans and Afghanistan. Ignatieff examines the moral disconnect between what he calls 'these new war makers' and 'the liberal interventionists who represent our moral stakes'⁵⁰. As a journalist, academic and politician, his particular view in this book is disturbing. It not only represents the harsh reality of the barbarity associated with largely untrained militia 'warriors' it reflects the huge difficulties liberal human rights organisations like the International Committee of the Red Cross face in war zones where moral restraint is frequently lacking. The narcissism of minor difference⁵¹, Freud's superb and apposite phrase, articulates the inauthentic nationalism that not only tolerates but encourages bloody violence against the other⁵². What his book does not do, neither does it make any pretensions to do so, is examine the nature of the modern British soldier. Like the work of the military historian, theorist and political scientist, *The Warrior's Honor* adds colour and depth to the literary background of this thesis.

Christopher Coker has done more than any other modern scholar to highlight not only the increasingly instrumentalised⁵³ character of a Western approach to war but the philosophical and practical implications of this 'dis-enchantment' of war⁵⁴. A theme that pervades many of Coker's works is the centrality of Greek philosophy and practice in understanding the Western way of war and the extent to which the West in a post-modern age has little requirement for warriors. War, he maintains in *Barbarous Philosophers*, is an

invention by the early philosophers and is ‘their great contribution to the civilizing process’⁵⁵. Not only do the Greeks provide us with our role models and historical archetypes⁵⁶ they were the first to ask the question: what is the true nature of war?⁵⁷ For the Greeks, war was ‘the human thing’⁵⁸ and it is the camaraderie of soldiers on the battlefield that ‘makes war such an intensely human (and even humane) experience’⁵⁹.

Coker maintains that ‘what the warrior *is*, is no less important than what he or she does’⁶⁰. War, he maintains, is both existential⁶¹ and instrumental⁶². But by instrumentalising war, as the West has done, it has made it purely utilitarian and in doing so brought about the death of the warrior⁶³. In *The Future of War* Coker continues to explore the link between, the industrialisation of war, in which war became increasingly more instrumental, the disenchantment of war⁶⁴ through the increasing use of technology and the consequences for the warrior who ‘found himself estranged from his craft’⁶⁵. Some of the themes examined in this book are considered at greater length in *Warrior Geeks*⁶⁶. One of these themes is the importance of the concept of sacrifice. ‘Without sacrifice, war has always been considered morally questionable’ and ‘without sacrifice or the willingness to risk death oneself, war cannot be ‘sacred’, and if it cannot be that it cannot be ethical’⁶⁷. It is the willingness to sacrifice oneself for another that makes war truly human.

In *Warrior Ethos* Coker again returns to the theme of the warrior in Western societies, which he believes is in trouble. In this book, he focuses upon the link between the warrior and killing, something he recognises our post-modern societies do not find attractive⁶⁸. Today, in our overwhelming concern for health we have lost our taste for heroism⁶⁹; ‘if warriors were once venerated they are no longer’⁷⁰. Commenting on America, he notes that it is ‘a culture that knows how to honour the casualties and the dead but not the strength of its warriors’⁷¹. He contends in his conclusion that the warrior’s ethos has been hallowed out in recent years⁷².

Coker's most recent book *Warrior Geeks* further explores many of the topics covered in his previous books. The central premise that provides the structure framing this endeavour is that while acknowledging that technology has had and is having a profound transformative effect upon humanity, Coker wants to challenge the 'geekish' idea that science can explain everything⁷³. He is not hostile to technology or science; he finds common ground with Clark⁷⁴ and Taylor⁷⁵ and observes that the 'interactive world of technology and humanity may mark the next stage in our cultural evolution'⁷⁶. However, a key point Coker wants to make is that technology is not the only companion in humanity's evolution. He goes to some length to demonstrate and argue his contention 'that humanity and war have co-evolved as Thucydides understood, not through the help of science but through observation'⁷⁷. 'What Plato' he maintains 'could not have grasped is the man-machine fusion'⁷⁸.

In developing the theme of Greeks to Geeks, Coker wishes to remind his readers that 'the Greeks have never been far from the minds of educated soldiers'⁷⁹. The developmental trends in weapons technology⁸⁰ not only further instrumentalises war but raises profound questions regarding our own ontology⁸¹. Some he argues 'wish to purge war of its existential and metaphysical elements and render it wholly instrumental'⁸². Coker invites his readers to imagine the possibility of cybernetically, pharmacologically, and genetically enhanced soldiers, fighting without fear, with courage that is pre-programmed, and with abilities far in excess of normal humans, their minds locked in and linked together in an all-embracing neural virtual networked world. While this may be the post-human future that awaits humanity⁸³, he contends that we should not be carried away by it.

Where this thesis differs from the work of Coker is its highly specific theme: 'how the nature of the British soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary British society?' Although a number of the topics examined in his body of work are also addressed in this

thesis, and his work adds additional colour and depth to the literary background of this thesis, it is not grounded in his work.

1.3 *Synopsis*

Having scoped the literature in a broad sense, here is a synopsis of the research chapters in this thesis.

Chapter 2 *Identity and Narrative*. Today, identity is as much a process and something that happens 'between' rather than 'in' or 'to' individuals; it is not 'just there' and once discovered is kept forever. In a post-modern age it is in a continual state of transition, with social identity in a process of constant negotiation. The British soldier exists in the social imaginary of the UK and therefore in a relationship with that society. Consequently this identity is dependent upon the social interaction which validates or invalidates the legitimacy of that identity. Narratives help us make sense of our world, individually and collectively as a society. Therefore the dominant narrative within a society will dictate the identity of its Armed Forces. If that narrative is 'apocalyptic' in character, the identity and thereby the role expected of the soldier may be inextricably linked with war and combat. However, if the dominant narrative in a society is mimetic then the identity and consequent role expected of the soldier is unlikely to be linked with war and combat. The nature of the British soldier exists in a dynamic, living, evolving and symbiotic relationship with his/her society as part of the dialogue that takes place in the public sphere and which emerges as a common mind within a UK social imaginary.

Chapter 3 *Being and Doing*. Extrinsic (instrumental) and intrinsic (existential) motivators are both equally essential in offering an explanation of combat motivation. Human beings cannot be reduced to, and given the status of, an object to be used and then discarded. Effectively engaging the enemy, using individual direct-fire weapons, depends upon much

more than a conditioned response (extrinsic); it requires the will to fight (existential). The professional British soldier, located within a social relationship of mutual exchange within the UK social imaginary, is required to exhibit both.

The distinction between the warrior and the soldier is best framed in the language of 'being' and 'doing'. Any definition must have the sophistication required to reflect a modern army like the British Army and the granularity necessary in discussing the difference between the warrior and the soldier. When viewed through the lens of extreme reference points (Achilles and the battlefield technician/weapons platform) the distance between the two is literally and metaphorically immense. However, within the spectrum imagined in the thesis question, the granularity required becomes increasingly fine when the United Kingdom Special Forces (SAS, SBS, SRR, SFSG, 18SR and JSFAW) are placed on the continuum, along with the Parachute Regiment, the Royal Marine Commandos and the rest of the Combat Arms, who have all distinguished themselves in combat with the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Chapter 4 *Clausewitz, Trinitarian War and New Wars*. The proposition that Carl von Clausewitz identified the universal, eternal truth of war's objective nature is impossible to maintain in anything other than a Cartesian universe. It is a classical Enlightenment argument. The notion that there is only one valid, universal truth that is valid in every context is an article of faith, whose validity can be challenged by the relativist sceptic. Philosophically, the nature of war is not necessarily political. A Clausewitzian model also lies at the heart of international relations and International Law. It assumes that Reality, in relation to international relations, is political. This is a Western construct, derived from a specifically Western (Christian) philosophical, theological and cultural hypothesis.

The dogma that the military is in Afghanistan to establish the conditions for a political solution is a cultured version of the West imposing a Western construct upon a non-Western

culture and society. The British soldier serving in this environment comes into daily contact with the contradiction of his experiences working with local Afghan populations and the geopolitical goals of his/her government and the alliance they form a part of. It is a reality in which religion and culture have a greater sense of validity than a Western construct of political imperatives.

Chapter 5 *Selected Societal Factors*. This chapter will seek to locate this thesis, in the embodiedness of post-modern life, through its consideration of selected societal factors. How the nature of the British Soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary British society' must incorporate powerful and influential societal factors that influence the dialogue that occurs within the public sphere in a UK social imaginary. For example, despite the cultural shift in attitudes towards death in contemporary British society, soldiers who are killed in service for their country are located firmly within civil polity. In a post-modern age, whenever the older rituals and language of death have all but disappeared from everyday public life, an old and largely forgotten attitude towards death has found expression again with its re-interpretation of an ancient funeral ritual for its fallen war dead.

Post-modern societies are increasingly risk-averse. The fear of potential futures dominates the present generating what Beck calls 'real virtuality'⁸⁴. The implication of this is significant. The warrior, historically, accepted the possibility and actuality of intimate violent warfare; whereas the battlefield technician/weapons platform is removed from actual personal contact with the enemy. Societies that are inherently risk-averse may struggle to create and maintain a narrative that sustains the concept of the warrior. The ethical etiquette of avoiding known or imagined risks is a strong cultural driver in reducing the areas of public life in which a display of heroism might be expected or manifested. The UK is not as yet a thoroughly post-heroic society, though there is little reason to envisage that it will not become increasingly so.

The significant number of British deaths and injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan and the consistent level of public support for service personnel, would suggest that the public in the UK is not, at least at this moment, casualty phobic. How an increasingly risk-averse society, manifesting post-heroic traits, will be able to generate a narrative that could sustain significant casualty numbers in future conflicts is a pertinent question. Previous generations who reluctantly accepted high casualty numbers were not marked by the same aversion to risk or manifested the same post-heroic traits. One of the most controversial conclusions of this chapter may lie in the logical consequence of feminist thought on Western societies and their militaries and how this informs how those societies imagine themselves. Historically, the notion of the warrior was essentially male in most cultures. Today, however, concepts such as gender, sex, masculinities and femininities are recognised as being more liquid and malleable than had previously been understood. The ‘narcissism of minor difference’ may finally vanish where boundaries are fluid and ill-defined.

Chapter 6 *The Future Nature of Conflict*. The twenty-first century will continue to be marked by an increasing proliferation of ‘wicked problems’ that defy simplistic answers or approaches. The challenges of globalisation and a globalised media centric communication environment will also continue to generate significant issues for traditional constructs of the nation state. Stabilisation/Intervention operations, in such congested environments, consequently, may well be highly contested by groups or non-state actors opposed to outside Western involvement. Such groups are likely to be adaptive, intelligent and may model their approach upon the experiences of other disaffected groups of non-state actors who were perceived to have stood up to the liberal democracies of the West. It is highly likely that future adversaries will have studied the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan for insight on how to confront a Western style of warfare. Whether or not a manoeuvrist approach to warfare will prove to be a doctrinal triumph or another military article of faith in future ‘wars

among the people', is likely to be further tested in this century. SDSR provided little in terms of the genuine strategic thought required to prepare the British Armed Forces to face the kind of hybrid, asymmetric threat an adaptive, intelligent state or non-state actor presents.

Chapter 7 *Future Technology*. In this chapter future battlefield technology is considered within a variety of contexts: historically; current and on-going technological development; legally; and ethically, philosophically and practically. American success in using advanced technology against its enemies has been mixed at best. In Vietnam the ideological premise underpinning 'techno war' was essentially flawed, leading to a failed tactical use of its technological superiority. The two Gulf Wars in contrast offered, at least initially, an impressive example of what superior technology could achieve. It is likely, however, that future enemies will not make the same mistakes Iraqi forces made. The GI of the twenty-first century is frequently portrayed as a systems operator, where the distinction between man and the machine is blurred. The concept of a 'Nobody' people, living in an atomised cyber-world engaged in warfare akin to a video game, is frightening. Driven by a vision to conduct virtually 'risk free' military operations, the march of semi and autonomous robotic weapons appears unstoppable. Future combat teams will comprise soldiers who accompany robotic platforms on tactical missions. Such a vision fundamentally undermines the historic notion of sacrifice and the willingness to endure loss in the pursuit of one's values and ideals.

This thesis will seek to make a contribution to scholarly research through addressing a question that has not, to this point, been examined in scholarship:

If a spectrum between Warrior and Weapons Platform is imagined, what does it tell us about how the nature of the British Soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary British society?

~~When viewed in combination with the sub questions, identified earlier, explored through a~~ consideration of a number of topics from a range of academic disciplines, this thesis will provide a philosophical framework that might assist policy makers avoid a context where soldiers are asked or expected to move seamlessly from sandbag filling to combat operations in an intervention of choice but face the situation where soldiers are either unable or unwilling to perform that role. This thesis will show how the interaction of the various issues examined, will tie any decision to deploy the Army into public discourse on any deployment.

¹ See <http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/22713.aspx> (accessed 22 Feb 14).

² Ibid.

³ British military operations began in Iraq in 2003 and ended in April 2009. In this period 179 military personnel died on operations, see <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10637526> (accessed 22 Feb 14) for a comprehensive list. In Afghanistan 447 British military personnel have died on operations, see <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10629358> (accessed 22 Feb 14). The financial cost of UK operations in Iraq is thought to have cost approximately £10bn, see <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/editorial-iraq-10-years-on--this-war-damaged-the-uk-at-home-and-abroad-8539583.html> (accessed 22 Feb 14); whereas some have put the cost of operations in Afghanistan at £37bn, see <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/30/afghanistan-war-cost-britain-37bn-book> (accessed 22 Feb 14).

⁴ This is discussed later in the thesis.

⁵ For example: as part of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (enduring); United Nations Protection Force, Former Republic of Yugoslavia; part of NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) and than Stabilisation Force (SFOR) before becoming part of Kosovo Force (KFOR); deployment to stabilise the Government of Sierra Leone.

⁶ For a flavour of the discussion see, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/defence-and-security-blog/2012/sep/20/uk-afghanistan-us> (accessed 22 Feb 14); <http://www.examiner.co.uk/news/west-yorkshire-news/british-soldiers-fighting-dying-afghanistan-4956277> (accessed 22 Feb 14).

⁷ See <http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/research/news/2014/uk-storms-and-floods> (accessed 22 Feb 14).

⁸ See <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/military-support-urgent-flood-defence-inspections> (accessed 22 Feb 14).

⁹ For a detailed list month by month see, <http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2009/sep/17/afghanistan-casualties-dead-wounded-british-data> (accessed 22 Feb 14).

¹⁰ See

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33695/ADPOperationsDec10.pdf (accessed 3 Mar 14).

¹¹ The issues involved in this are profound. However, for a brief overview see of how the Dutch Supreme Court held the Dutch Government to account for the failure of its soldiers see, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/news/netherlands-supreme-court-hands-down-historic-judgment-over-srebrenica-genocide-2013-09-06> (accessed 3 Mar 14).

¹² See http://archive.redstate.com/stories/featured_stories/the_new_soldiers_of_surrender (accessed 3 Mar 14).

¹³ C Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004).

¹⁴ Ibid., p2.

¹⁵ Ibid., p23.

¹⁶ Ibid., 2.

¹⁷ Ibid., p10.

- ¹⁸ Ibid., p150. Taylor does not specifically use the phrase Reformed Theology. Rather he refers throughout this book to Protestant theology. However, he references to Protestant can be described as Reformed because of the theology involved and the church groups identified, i.e. Baptist and Presbyterian.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., p16.
- ²⁰ Ibid., p17.
- ²¹ Ibid., p12.
- ²² Ibid., p9.
- ²³ Ibid., p12-13.
- ²⁴ Ibid., p21.
- ²⁵ Ibid.
- ²⁶ Ibid., p83.
- ²⁷ Ibid., p86.
- ²⁸ Ibid., p85.
- ²⁹ Ibid., p89.
- ³⁰ Ibid., p91.
- ³¹ Ibid., 109.
- ³² See chapter 3 for a fuller discussion of the warrior.
- ³³ This phrase refers to the mental image of deliberately lining a person up in your weapon sights before opening fire. It is not something easily forgotten, regardless of how many years might have passed.
- ³⁴ K Marlantes, *What It Is Like To Go To War* (London: Corvus, 2011).
- ³⁵ JA Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture* (New York: Basic, 2004) pxvii.
- ³⁶ For example, see J Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (London: Hutchinson, 1993); *War and Our World: The Reith Lectures 1998* (London: Hutchinson, 1998); *Warfare: The Triumph of the West*, ed., G Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
- ³⁷ For example, see R Holmes, *Battlefield: Decisive Conflicts in History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); *Battlefields of the Second World War* (London: BBC Books, 2001); M Howard, *The First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); J Keegan, *The Iraq War* (London: Hutchinson, 2004).
- ³⁸ For example, see R Holmes, *Marlborough: England's Fragile Genius* (London: Harper Press, 2008); *Wellington: The Iron Duke* (London: Harper Collins, 2002); *The Little Field Marshall: a Life of Sir John French* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1981).
- ³⁹ For example, see J Keegan, J Gau & R Holmes, *Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle* (London: Harper Press, 2006); R Holmes, *Acts of War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003); *Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914-1918* (London: Harper Collins, 2004); *Dusty Warriors: Modern Soldiers At War* (London: Harper Press, 2006).
- ⁴⁰ Prof Holmes was the Colonel of the Regiment of the PWRR. His book *Dusty Warriors* was written following his visit to the regiment when they were serving in Iraq.
- ⁴¹ For example, see M van Creveld, *Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present* (London & New York: Macmillan, 1989); 'The Eternal Clausewitz' in *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*, ed., by MI Handel, (Abingdon: Cass, 1986) p35-50.
- ⁴² M Van Creveld, *On Future War* (London: Brassey's, 1991). This book was also published under the title, *The Transformation of War*.
- ⁴³ This is examined at length in chapter 4.
- ⁴⁴ M Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999).
- ⁴⁵ H Münkler, *The New Wars* (Cambridge: polity, 2005).
- ⁴⁶ The work of both scholars is examined in chapter 4.
- ⁴⁷ CS Gray, *Strategy For Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History* (London: Frank Cass, 2002); *Another Bloody Century* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005); and *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History* (London & New York: Routledge, 2007).
- ⁴⁸ Gray is a major dialogue partner in chapter 4.
- ⁴⁹ M Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor* (New York: Vintage, 1999).
- ⁵⁰ Ibid., p6.
- ⁵¹ Ibid., p48-71.
- ⁵² Ibid., p56.
- ⁵³ A key point in *Human Warfare* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001) is Coker's contention that Western citizens 'want a more discerning approach to warfare' (p82). However, 'as war becomes more technological it is distancing public opinion and the warrior from its consequences' (p149).
- ⁵⁴ C Coker, *The Future of War: The Re-Enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004) p4-6.

- ⁵⁵ C Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers: Reflections on the Nature of War from Heraclitus to Heisenberg* (London: Hurst, 2010) p8. The supreme insight that philosophy has given us is that the nature of war is paradoxical (p40).
- ⁵⁶ C Coker, *Warrior Geeks: How 21st Century Technology in Changing the Way We Fight and Think About War* (London: Hurst, 2013) pxi.
- ⁵⁷ Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers*, p44.
- ⁵⁸ C Coker, *Warrior Geeks*, p55.
- ⁵⁹ C Coker, *The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007) p83.
- ⁶⁰ C Coker, *Waging War without Warriors: The Changing Culture of Military Culture* (London: Rienner, 2002) p6.
- ⁶¹ This is a somewhat odd use of the word existential, in that the word is an adjective and he is not using it as an adjectival noun. This will be explored further in chapter 3 of this thesis.
- ⁶² Coker, *Waging War without Warriors*, p160.
- ⁶³ Ibid.
- ⁶⁴ This is a phrase used by Max Weber who spoke about the disenchantment of the world. The concept is considered in chapter 3.
- ⁶⁵ Coker, *The Future of War*, p48.
- ⁶⁶ For example 'The Biotechnological Warrior' (p69-79) and 'Cyborg Warriors' (p95-109) in *The Future of War*; 'Designer warriors' in *Warrior Geeks*, p221-280.
- ⁶⁷ Coker, *The Future of War*, p130. See also *Warrior Geeks*, p120-122.
- ⁶⁸ Coker, *Warrior Ethos*, p10.
- ⁶⁹ Ibid., p93.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid., p95.
- ⁷¹ Ibid., p102.
- ⁷² Ibid., p146.
- ⁷³ Coker, *Warrior Geeks*, p278.
- ⁷⁴ A Clark, *Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
- ⁷⁵ Timothy Taylor, *The Artificial Ape: How Technology Changed the Course of Human Evolution* (London: Palgrave, 2010).
- ⁷⁶ Coker, *Warrior Geeks*, p100.
- ⁷⁷ Ibid., p57.
- ⁷⁸ Ibid., p62.
- ⁷⁹ Ibid., pxi. He goes on to note that 'when soldiers get back from Afghanistan broken not only in body but in mind, they are now shown 'Warrior Theatre', a new concept that takes two of the surviving plays of Sophocles and their depictions of traumatised soldiers as a therapeutic device by which to restore soldiers' damaged minds'.
- ⁸⁰ See chapter 5 'The Rise of the Machines' (p147-219) which opens with a very interesting depiction of a future battlefield. Future battlefield weapons will be considered at length in chapter 7 of this thesis.
- ⁸¹ Ibid., p215.
- ⁸² Ibid., p291.
- ⁸³ Ibid., p291.
- ⁸⁴ U Beck, *World Risk Society* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999) p136.

Chapter 2

Identity and Narrative

This chapter will offer an introductory consideration of the complex nature of the subject of identity in general, before exploring in more detail in 2.1.1 ‘Identity in Pre to Post-modern Thought’. In section 2.1.2 ‘The Construction of Identity in Modern Society’ the focus will shift onto how identity is shaped through our social interaction and role in the societies in which we live. Finally in this section, the relatively new concept of corporate or organisational identity will briefly be considered, involving a concise look at the seminal work of Albert and Whetten on organisational identity.

Section 2.2 ‘Narrative’ will consider the question ‘Why War?’ This will involve a consideration of the highly influential *Seville Statement* and its rejection of Darwinian ideas. The role that cultural codes play in creating different narrative genres will be examined, along with the competition between narratives for validity and acceptance within society, otherwise known as genre wars. In ‘Narrative: Society and War’ (2.2.1), the notion of a ‘Genre War’ will be explored along with the role it plays within the compartmentalised nature of a society in which narrative stories emerge, and thereby have their validity contested or affirmed. ‘Narrative: The Military and Society’ (2.2.2) begins with a consideration of the definition of what it means to be a man and how this has changed or altered to suit the actual or perceived needs of a society. This section will examine how a very specific cultural narrative emerged that saw the image of the Army not only radically transformed by the mid nineteenth century, but then used as a model for the ‘salvation’ of a society, which by the end of the century was disturbed by fears of racial degeneracy.

2.1 *Identity*

Technology has shaped not only the world we inhabit but also the stories that make sense of that world. The British theologian T Beattie contends that, ‘to be human is to live an interpreted life. It is to inhabit an imagined world which enables us to make sense of our experiences and to lend coherence and meaning to our lives. We are a story-telling species whose capacity for imagination, memory and language makes us unique among all the many evolved life forms which share our space on planet earth’¹. If we were to take the mythical story of Achilles, the life and actions of this character would be meaningless without a community in which his story could be retold, have meaning, his courage honoured, his example extolled and his legacy secured. His personal desire for glory and a form of immortality would likewise be pointless. If there were no community to remember and recount the story of his exploits, he could never hope to have an immortal name. Identity is often located for some within the stories that make sense of their lives or are told about them within a community that gives that story meaning or validity.

Asking an individual the question, ‘Who are you?’ may appear on the surface a simplistic thing to do. It implies the presupposition that ‘they’ (i.e. that other person) exist and that ‘they’ can both understand the question and also correctly interpret the context in which it is framed. Initially, it appears as though the questioner is seeking information regarding the identity of that individual. As such, one might expect that the one being asked the question will be able to give an equally simple reply. However, any study into the subject of identity rapidly discovers that it is an immensely complex subject. Regardless of age, gender, race, religious beliefs, maturity or academic ability, questions regarding our identity - how it is constructed, validated and expressed - are incredibly difficult to reduce to the simplistic answer initially anticipated.

Our English word ‘identity’ comes from the Latin *idem*, meaning ‘the same’². This is reflected in Shoemaker and Swinburne’s opening sentences regarding the subject of identity, ‘There are two philosophical questions about personal identity. The first is: what are the logical necessary and sufficient conditions for a person P_2 at time t_2 being the same person as a person P_1 at an earlier time t_1 , or, loosely, what does it mean to say that P_2 is the same person as P_1 ? The second is: what evidence of observation and experience can we have that a person P_2 at t_2 is the same person as a person P_1 at t_1 ?³’ Most people, however, - with or without training in philosophy - will live their lives on the assumption that there is a unity linking the different periods of their lives and that in some essential manner they are the same⁴ person at 40 as 35. The notion that there is some form of causal relationship of some description, within an individual’s lifetime, may be traced back to the philosopher David Hume⁵. Today this idea has been described as ‘the unity relation’⁶ or ‘genidentity’⁷. Although many people will instinctively accept that they have some form of unity in their concept of personal identity⁸, the validity of this approach is nevertheless open to criticism.

Underlying this manner of exploring the subject of identity are, and what may be described as, the basic tenants of the Enlightenment Project⁹: also known as ‘modernism’. Implicit in the ideas of the philosophers associated with this ‘project’, Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant (for example), is the belief that truth existed and that it could be discovered through the application of reason and logic. Therefore, identity and its truth could be discovered. Although each philosopher had his own distinct position, their concept of identity essentially regarded the human being as ‘Subject’¹⁰. Viewing man¹¹ as ‘subject’ placed man at a disjuncture with the world. As subject, man was distinct from the world and therefore capable of viewing it in a detached, systematic manner. Consequently, man became the centre and the measure of all things¹². During the later stages of the twentieth century, the certainty and optimism¹³ associated with the ‘Enlightenment Project’ came under devastating attack

from a new and radical form of thinking, known as 'Postmodernism'. The basic tenants of modernism were fundamentally undermined¹⁴. This meant that concepts such as knowledge, truth, history and language were all subjected to the critique of post-modern thinking.

2.1.1 *Identity in Pre to Post-modern Thought.*

Historically, identity was something that simply 'was'. 'In traditional societies, one's identity was fixed, solid, and stable'¹⁵. In the pre-modern world, contends MacIntyre¹⁶, a person's role in society gave him/her their essential identity. These roles, and consequently the identity associated with these roles, were socially constructed. He argues that an individual encountered the world only in relation to the role socially constructed for him. In such a pre-modern society, 'the individual is identified and constituted in and through certain of his or her roles...I confront the world as a member of this family, this household, this clan, this tribe, this city, this nation, this kingdom. There is no "I" apart from these'¹⁷. In this view there were no identity crises or the need to radically rethink one's identity¹⁸. Taylor would refer to this period as a premodern social imaginary, where society was constructed around various modes of 'hierarchical complementarity'¹⁹.

Modernism, however, saw the decline of the pre-modern society. This had the effect of destroying the shared frameworks from which the beliefs and values that ordered life arose. How an individual derived his/her identity now fundamentally changed. Instead of viewing himself/herself in relation to their function in society to understand their identity, the individual took centre stage as 'subject'²⁰. This is not to say that the sense of community completely broke down in the early stages of modernity. It did not²¹. However, modernity created a profound process of change in which the individual had to adapt and readapt. Giddens utilises the image of a juggernaut to express something of the nature of modernity and speaks of 'the sheer sense of being caught up in massive waves of global

transformation²². Although identities' were still relatively fixed in the early stages of modernism, the possibility of new identities expanded as modernity changed the structures of social life and the environment²³. However, with these possibilities came the fear of choosing the wrong identity²⁴ but as chapter 3 will explore, the dignity of the knowing subject was corrupted in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Against this corruption and the horrors of two World Wars a new philosophical model emerged in Europe that removed significance based on knowledge, status or function and assigned it to human action, will and decision²⁵. In existentialist thought, man was not simply 'subject' but was also 'agent'. The existentialist view of man saw identity not as simply 'is' (i.e. 'subject') but as 'becoming' (i.e. 'agent') through his experience and interaction within the external world²⁶. Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche had laid the foundation, which Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger developed in the twentieth century²⁷. Although there are profound differences between the rationalist and existentialist view of human identity, they both share one fundamental tenet: identity is inextricably bound up with our notion of the 'self'. It is on this point that a post-modern critique has been so devastating.

Postmodernist thinkers maintain that there is no 'self'. They reject the belief that there are any absolutes in the objective realm. Nash observes that postmodernism has at its heart an 'eminent "lack of trust" in language as a medium for the representation of truth, its unsleeping attention to the fine print of what is said, its rigorous aim to search out inconstancy, inconsistency and contradiction, and its express intent on the dismemberment of foundational authority'²⁸. This 'dismemberment of foundational authority' has profound implications for the notion of identity. If there are no absolutes (foundational authority) in the objective realm, there can be no absolutes in the subjective realm²⁹. Therefore, if an individual cannot know anything for certain in the objective realm, how can they know anything for certain in the internal, subjective realm?

The 'self', or personal identity, becomes a myth and an illusion³⁰. Indeed, Nash is quite clear on this point when he states, 'postmodern thinking's [original spelling] stress on the impossibility of the subject's self-definition finds its resounding echo in the narcissant's interminable oscillation among a multitude of modes of self-conception and behaviour'³¹. The 'impossibility of the subject's self-definition' enables the postmodernist to maintain that 'I' is meaningless³². If there is no 'I', there can be no identity in the modernist's sense of the word. For the postmodernist, what emerges is a multiplicity of being and realities, each of which is of equal value and importance, though unrelated. This multiplicity of 'beings' can have no objective relationship with each other because in postmodern thought there are no meta-narratives, either externally or internally. Postmodernism has cast identity adrift into a sea of subjectivity without any external reference points, for there can be none in its thought.

Post-modern ideas are grounded in a linguistic indeterminacy³³, which is driven by a 'discourse of suspicion'³⁴ that is compelled to 'deconstruct' all 'texts' or 'narratives' to expose the power issues that underlie them. 'As Derrida says, "the displacement" of "the centrality of the subject", so essential to deconstruction's enterprise, was from the beginning part of what was commonly called a "discourse of suspicion"'³⁵. The decentring of the 'self' was therefore, no mere consequence of postmodernist thinking but an essential part of its project. The only way an individual can 'know' or attempt to 'know' himself or herself, or answer the question 'who are you?' is through the use of language. However, a persuasive dictum in modern academia is that language is a social construct and that all human discourse is conditioned by the socio-political nature of reality³⁶. Language therefore, is a cultural creation expressing the socio-political nature of a particular community.

From this perspective, meaning is ultimately a social construction³⁷. Language, therefore, does not reveal meaning, it constructs meaning. In postmodern thought, the language an individual might use to answer the question 'who are you?' reveals more about

the community from which that individual comes than it does about the individual answering the question. An individual's use of language reveals how their society constructs its basic meanings and values and the weight given to those meanings and values. The postmodernist's 'discourse of suspicion' drives the requirement to deconstruct the 'text' or 'narrative' to uncover the connections between knowledge and power³⁸. 'Although artificial linguistic constructions are designed to convey the illusion of truth, they are actually a cover for the power relationships that constitute the culture'³⁹. What emerges from this reasoning is a linguistic indeterminacy: history, truth and identity become 'islands of discourse'⁴⁰, a state of existence where anything goes⁴¹.

2.1.2 *The Construction of Identity in Modern Society.*

In this section, the focus shifts from identity as an abstract philosophical concept to how identity/identities is/are thought to be formed in modern (Western) societies. The emphasis in modern sociology and psychology, with regard to the subject of identity, is to assert that identity is something that happens 'between' rather than 'in' or 'to' individuals⁴². In other words identity is relational rather than simply being or becoming. Jenkins contends that identity is not 'just there' but needs to be established⁴³ and that this process of establishing one's identity is like the game of 'playing the vis-à-vis'⁴⁴. The 'self' from this perspective now becomes essentially socially relational⁴⁵.

Jenkins' argument may be summarised as follows: 'if identity is a necessary prerequisite for social life, the reverse is also true. Individual identity - embodied in selfhood - is not meaningful in isolation from the social world of other people. Individuals are unique and variable, but selfhood is thoroughly socially constructed: in the processes of primary and subsequent socialisation, and in the ongoing process of social interaction within which individuals define and redefine themselves and others throughout their lives'⁴⁶. Initially it

appears as though this position is similar to the emphasis found in other thinkers. In some respects it appears similar to MacIntyre's argument regarding identity in pre-modern communities and to the thinking of Hegel, Buber and Levinas. There are, however, significant differences.

MacIntyre's argument is that in pre-modern communities the concept of identity was socially constructed, but that it was fixed and given, not negotiated. A blacksmith, for example, was male and had a specific well defined role, standing and position within his community. He did not need to construct his identity; it was given to him. In Hegel's Master/Slave parable both individuals recognised themselves through the encounter with the other. His basic premise was that, we think about others in terms of ourselves⁴⁷. In Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* the central issue is recognition of the self not its creation⁴⁸. Buber's widely read and studied book, *I and Thou*, again focused on the centrality of relationship in a person's establishing of identity. He maintained that it was only when we recognise another as *Thou* do we enter into a proper mode of engagement and can properly be described as *I*. Whereas when the relationship is *I – It* the other is viewed as a means, a thing, and object to be used. Levinas went further by developing the argument that without recognising the relational dynamic that prioritises the other over the self, there is no self⁴⁹. In contrast to Cartesian metaphysics, the 'self' is no longer simply the 'ego', the 'I', the 'subject'. In contrast to the existentialist position, the central theme running through the thinking of MacIntyre, Hegel, Buber and Levinas, is that identity is relational and dependent upon interaction with others.

What makes the emphasis found in modern sociology and psychology distinct, of which Jenkins' position is an example, is that identity is not simply recognised by the 'other': it is an on-going process of negotiation creating and recreating identities. In other words, there is no 'self' without social interaction, which then validates or invalidates that identity.

Commenting on what he refers to as the internal-external dialectic Jenkins states that, 'it is not enough to assert an identity. That identity must also be validated (or not) by those with whom we have dealings. *Social identity is never unilateral*' (emphasis original)⁵⁰. He maintains that individuals seek to 'be' and be 'seen to be' and are involved in 'impression management strategies'⁵¹ when interacting with others. This process of social construction of identities, therefore, is also a process of legitimising an internal image through and by an external source⁵². The real issue for Castells then becomes, 'how, from what, by whom, and for what?'⁵³ Whose definition counts in this negotiation and why? These are vital questions. If Castells is correct, when he maintains, that identities only become identities whenever individuals internalise them and then construct their meaning around this internalised identity⁵⁴, then the adoption of a socially constructed identity is fundamentally an issue of power⁵⁵. The construction of identities then becomes, quite simply, the interplay of power relations. Power not simply to have an identity validated or accepted by the 'other', but to have power in validating the identity of another social actor.

One important area of identity construction in modern society that must be briefly mentioned is that of organisational or corporate identity. Hatch states that organisational or corporate identity 'refers to members' experiences of and beliefs about the organization as a whole'⁵⁶. The concept of organisational identity should not, she contends, be confused with the closely related theme of corporate image. This she maintains 'refers to impressions that an organisation makes on its external audiences'⁵⁷. All organisations and institutions are, by their very nature, relational in that they have no option but to inter-act internally and with the world outside their organisation. As such, every organisation will either consciously or unconsciously have a corporate view of its identity and will, depending on the type of organisation, seek to carefully cultivate the image it projects to the external world.

The seminal work on this aspect of identity is that of Stuart Albert and David Whetten in their article *Organisational Identity*⁵⁸. In this article, Albert and Whetten defined organisational identity as central, distinctive and temporally continuous. They argued that an organisation's identity must have at its core something that is important and essential which distinguishes it from other organisations⁵⁹. However, while seeking to be distinctive an organisation's classification of its identity will not, they contend, simply have one single statement of its identity. Rather, any statement will seek to reflect its ability to change over time and may have an identity that could contain strands that would not normally be expected to be found together in one organisation⁶⁰. Although Albert and Whetten do not cite examples of such an organisation, one such example might be the British Army⁶¹.

2.2 Narrative

One of the historically consistent traits of mankind, throughout the ages, has been his propensity to continually wage war against his fellow man. Why this is so has perplexed scholars and commentators: notably Einstein and Freud⁶². At the very height of Athenian culture and commerce, Greece's golden age was irreparably damaged by the atrocity of the Peloponnesian War⁶³. More recently, the optimism of the Enlightenment, that inspired many utopian ideas in the Victorian Age, were horribly crushed in the industrialised carnage of the First World War. Military historians like Keegan⁶⁴ and Holmes⁶⁵ have written extensively and authoritatively on the details of major wars and the politics that lay behind them. In part they give answers as to why particular wars were fought and what motivated ordinary men to fight in them. Why man should continually fight devastating wars, with all the accompanying disasters that usually follow wars, continues to be an open topic of debate.

The academics who composed *The Seville Statement* (May 1986) state in its opening proposition that, 'Warfare is a peculiarly human phenomenon and does not occur in other animals'⁶⁶. This makes war a human enterprise. In a powerfully worded document, each of

the *Statement's* five articles begins with the declaration that, 'It is scientifically incorrect to say...' This doctrinal affirmation⁶⁷ gives the statement the appearance that it is the settled conclusion of exhaustive scientific research. *The Seville Statement* has five key propositions, they are:

1. **IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT** to say that we have inherited a tendency to make war from our animal ancestors.
2. **IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT** to say that war or any other violent behaviour is genetically programmed into our human nature.
3. **IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT** to say that in the course of human evolution there has been a selection for aggressive behaviour more than for other kinds of behaviour.
4. **IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT** to say that humans have a 'violent brain'.
5. **IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT** to say that war is caused by 'instinct' or any single motivation.

The introduction to the *Statement* gives a strong indication for the main motivation behind composing and issuing it. It states that the 'misuse of scientific theories and data to justify violence and war is not new but has been made since the advent of modern science. For example, the theory of evolution has been used to justify not only war, but also genocide, colonialism, and suppression of the weak'. The second proposition makes it clear that war or violence is not something that has been 'genetically programmed into our human nature'. Although it does not explicitly say so, these statements appear to be a partial denial of what became known as Social Darwinism.

Inherent within the philosophy of Social Darwinism is the inevitability of struggle⁶⁸. 'Nationalism,' as Glover contends, 'was reinforced by the belief in a Darwinian struggle for survival, with the race or nation being the unit taking part in the struggle. Nations unwilling to fight would go under'⁶⁹. This philosophy was epitomised by Bismarck⁷⁰ who stated that 'the weak were made to be devoured by the strong'⁷¹. Many within Europe understood the struggle between nations prior to 1914 as part of the natural order in which only the fittest survived, evolving to higher forms of political organisation⁷². This philosophy left Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary feeling that their position was threatened and

fearful of failing to face up to the challenge of war⁷³. As a consequence both Germany and France developed complicated and detailed plans for the war in Europe that seemed inevitable⁷⁴. The *Seville Statement* is a denial that war is a product of the evolutionary process or as a result of our genetic inheritance. Rather, war 'is a product of culture' made possible 'primarily through language which makes...the co-ordination of groups, the transmission of technology, and the use of tools'.

Adopted by UNESCO and the American Anthropological Association the *Seville Statement* and has been influential since its declaration. However, for Keegan 'there is little that is scientific about it. Science has thus far quite failed to substantiate any of its five articles, some of which are not scientific propositions at all'⁷⁵. To support this frank assertion, he maintains that 'war is too complex an activity for step-by-step genetic mutation to "program" organisms for it'⁷⁶. For Keegan, 'the Seville Statement, in short, is one of hope, not objective truth'⁷⁷. His observations in this regard are valid. Nevertheless, it does make a valuable contribution. It shows, at the very least, that there is no obvious scientific reason that makes war a biological imperative for humanity. The question, 'Why War?' must be explained using a different route.

Although Einstein and Freud could not agree on a definitive answer to the question 'Why War?', a broad consensus does exist today in some circles. Smith observes that, 'popular beliefs and academic theories alike point overwhelmingly to the machinations and interests of elites and the struggle for power and security within and among nations'⁷⁸. He states that, 'within the social sciences there is a general tendency to understand any violent conflict as the product and process of struggles for dominance'⁷⁹. Citing Karl Marx, Max Weber and Charles Tilly, as contributors to this notion of human struggle for power, he contends that,

The vision of an endless, strategic, self-interested quest to dominate, of a grim world where there are weak or dependant cultural constraints upon and motivations for

violent and power-seeking activity seems to be deeply entrenched in Western culture⁸⁰.

Within sociology and political science, according to Smith, the causes of war can be summed up in sentences containing ‘various combinations of words like threat, gain, power, strategy, or ingenious permutations of the mathematical ciphers that stand in their place’⁸¹. An example of this may be seen in the connection many in the West make between the second Gulf War and American desire to acquire control over Iraq’s huge reserves⁸².

Smith argues that ‘we need to start by moving away from the state-centred model of realist political science toward an understanding of society as comprised of multiple, differentiated, reciprocally influencing arenas of activity’⁸³. Implicit within this understanding of how society works or inter-acts with itself is the notion of cultural codes⁸⁴, which are set in binary opposition to one another⁸⁵. These cultural codes are in essence, ‘a kind of cultural DNA’⁸⁶ and function as shared constructs that create a narrative structure which a society uses to convey meaning. These binary codes may be set out as follows⁸⁷:

The civil discourse of motives

Active
Rational
Reasonable
Calm
Controlled
Realistic
Sane

Passive
Irrational
Hysterical
Excitable
Emotive
Unrealistic
Mad

The civil discourse of social relationships

Open
Trusting
Critical
Truthful
Straightforward
Autonomous

Secret
Suspicious
Deferential
Deceitful
Calculating
Dependent

The civil discourse of social institutions

Rule regulated
Law
Equality
Inclusive
Impersonal
Contractual
Groups
Office

Arbitrary
Power
Hierarchy
Exclusive
Personal
Ascriptive
Factions
Personality

Although binary codes are part of the process through which we make sense of the world, they ‘do not offer an instruction manual for what to do next’⁸⁸. What is required for a civil discourse is narrative; the stories used by individuals, groups or societies to make sense of the world and their relation to it. Because the stories told by a group or a society are an essential part of how they understand the world around them, and their role in that world, the form of narrative used must conform to certain genres with well-defined attributes⁸⁹. What distinguishes Smith’s argument from the work of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, is that he combines the idea of cultural narratives with binary codes of civil discourse, creating a structural⁹⁰ approach to understanding cultural narrative, which is more than a philosophical consideration of a subject but has its roots in the ‘development of narratives in the “real world” by “ordinary people” in their responses to an unfolding event sequence’⁹¹.

Developing a model that is derived ‘loosely’ from Northrop Frye’s work, particularly *The Anatomy of Criticism*⁹², Smith maintains that narratives may be grouped under four headings: Low mimesis, Tragedy/Romance and Apocalypse. This is not to suggest, however, that these are the only four genres through which people construct narratives. Rather people move through genre types, from low mimesis⁹³, ‘through comedy, romance, tragedy, and on to heroic and mythic genres’⁹⁴. This process of re-interpretation, or what Smith’s describes as narrative inflation and deflation, depends not only on how the story is perceived to unfold within the community/society/nation, but also how the main characters (Protagonist and Antagonist) change, or appear to change, depending on how their actions are interpreted.

Low Mimesis

Tragedy/Romance

Apocalypse

Character

Moral

mundane

ideals

MOTIVATION

local

national

global

OBJECT OF STRUGGLE

limited

elevated

extraordinary

POWERS OF ACTION

This diagram helpfully sets out how binary codes, or a society's cultural DNA, function in the construction of a narrative, along with the possible narrative inflation and deflation. A story with a low mimesis is limited, local and mundane, where the protagonist and antagonist are essentially similar: 'the predominate narrative for our understanding of everyday politics... in short, all those events that do not seem to have a lot of drama to them at least for us, the distant and emotionally detached audience'⁹⁶. In contrast, tragedy deliberately seeks to connect an audience through an emotional engagement in a plot-line, which enables them to view their own life through the lives of the characters in the unfolding

drama. As a result the narrative moves away from being simply a local, mundane affair, requiring a limited response, to something more profound which may necessitate a greater response because the stakes have risen⁹⁷. According to Aristotle tragedy,

is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude; in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, the several kinds being found in separate parts of the play; in the form of action, not of narrative; through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions.⁹⁸

In this quote the word translated ‘purgation’ is the Greek word *katharismos* (καθαρισμός, ου) meaning ‘cleaning, purification: purification rites’. Greek tragedy could have this ‘cathartic’ effect through the manner in which the audience was invited to become involved with the plot by engaging the feelings and emotions of those watching with the circumstances of the characters on the stage⁹⁹.

The ultimate narrative genre, in terms of consequences in the life of a nation and the potential cost, is without doubt ‘Apocalypse’. In his satirical article on the ever increasing use of hyperbole in public life, Hume states, ‘welcome to the apocalypse auction, where experts and authorities bid up their pet threats to public safety. In competing to win headlines, they all seem to lose a sense of perspective’¹⁰⁰. The word ‘Apocalypse’ comes from the Greek word *apokalypsis* (αποκαλυψις) meaning ‘unveiling, or revelation’¹⁰¹ and is used in the opening sentences in the *Book of the Revelation* regarding the unveiling of ‘Jesus Christ’ (Rev1:1). Because *Revelation* portrays the ultimate crisis for humanity, frequently utilising violent images of judgement, the word ‘apocalyptic’ is now inextricably linked with either a grave crisis for the whole of society or with a doomsday scenario¹⁰². However, Hume’s article shows that ‘the doomsday scenario’ is appearing with alarming regularity in recent news reports, with numerous agencies vying to have their voice heard regarding their specific apocalyptic threat to public safety.

This genre usually deals with events or circumstances of world-historical importance, with events that legitimise the use of language that portrays the very struggle for

either national or world survival. However, because the issues involved are so critical, they are also more readily open to narrative deflation because of the intense scrutiny they come under. Despite this, ‘apocalyptic narratives are the most effective,’ according to Smith, ‘at generating and legitimating massive society-wide sacrifice and are today the only narrative form that can sustain war as culturally acceptable’¹⁰³. Though Smith’s observation is valid for the majority of modern states, Münkler¹⁰⁴ and Ignatieff¹⁰⁵ have shown that a different form of warfare has been emerging in differing parts of the world, where the combatants are not necessarily states but warlords, terrorists and bands of irregular militia¹⁰⁶. Irregular militia and war bands are not under the same constraints as democratic states to create or sustain a narrative for war. Münkler argues that these ‘New Wars’ are more about gangsterism than political goals. The controversy over why America, the United Kingdom and their Allies went to war against Iraq lends weight to Smith’s contention that war is only culturally acceptable to democratic states when an apocalyptic narrative is used to justify it. Consequently, the stated reasons given to justify the United Kingdom going to war against Iraq have been subjected to intense scrutiny. As a result, the story used to explain the use of force has been subjected to narrative deflation for a large number of people in the United Kingdom, who now feel that the government lied about the apocalyptic nature of the narrative used to justify Britain’s involvement in a highly unpopular war.

2.2.1 *Narrative: Society and War*

‘Warfare is a peculiarly human phenomenon and does not occur in other animals’, so *The Seville Statement* affirms. Tragically, warfare and violence among mankind uniquely singles us out as a species. No other animal purposely creates instruments specifically designed to inflict injury or death. Indeed it can be maintained that war, and thereby this trait, is as old as mankind. In tracing the history of warfare Keegan considers the question of

whether ‘pre-man’ was violent towards his own species or not¹⁰⁷. On the question of whether pre-man waged a form of warfare against his fellow man, the eminent military historian notes that this debate ‘is a dangerous one to enter’¹⁰⁸, because the available evidence is open to conflicting interpretation¹⁰⁹. Not only is there disagreement in interpreting potential evidence from the earliest history of humanity. How a society understands a cultural situation today, which may lead to or legitimise war is open to a fiercely competitive array of interpretations. This has been described as ‘Genre Wars’¹¹⁰.

To understand this concept of ‘Genre Wars’ it is necessary to consider briefly the compartmentalised nature of a society in which a narrative story may emerge and thereby have its validity contested or affirmed. Berger and Luckmann, following William James¹¹¹, contend that modern societies are replete with ‘sub-universes’ of meaning, though largely related to their economic surplus¹¹². They state that,

In advanced industrial societies, with their immense economic surplus allowing large numbers of individuals to devote themselves full-time to even the obscurest pursuits, pluralistic competition between sub-universes of meaning of every conceivable sort becomes the normal state of affairs. With the establishment of sub-universes of meaning a variety of perspectives on the total society emerges, each viewing the latter from the angle of one sub-universe.¹¹³

One example they use, of this competition between sub-universes, is that of orthodox medicine and other rivals to that orthodoxy such as homeopathy and Christian Science. Some scholars prefer to use Schutz’s concept of ‘provinces of meaning’¹¹⁴ rather than sub-universes. The main difference between the two ideas is that the change of terminology emphasises ‘that it is the meaning of our experiences and not the ontological structure of the objects, which constitutes reality’¹¹⁵. In other words it is not the sub-universe itself that constitutes reality for an individual but the experience of life while viewing the world from the perspective of that sub-universe.

In the section on identity, it was noted that some contend that there is no ‘self’ in the Cartesian sense of the ‘self’ but rather that an individual has a multiplicity of being and

realities, in which there is an ‘interminable oscillation among a multitude of modes of self-conception and behaviour’¹¹⁶. These ‘modes of self-conception’ or ‘modes of being’, as they are also known, enable an individual to play out different roles, sometimes roles that might be considered as contradictory, without recognising that those modes of being might be contradictory. Glover gives a sobering example of this in his treatment of the My Lai massacre¹¹⁷, in which American soldiers who would have otherwise been considered decent average men, took part in one of the most gruesome atrocities of the Vietnam War¹¹⁸.

Each sub-universe of meaning, or province of meaning, or mode of being will have its own internal norms for making sense of the world from within its own perspective; even with its own moral reference points and standards. As a consequence, two scholars viewing the same event might, as a result of their differing world views, adopt differing and competing interpretations of the same event. Michael Ignatieff gives a classic example of such an occurrence, which also illustrates the notion of a genre war. In his book *Virtual War*¹¹⁹, Ignatieff gives a lengthy account of his dialogue with Robert Skidelsky, in which both men discuss the merit of military intervention by NATO in Kosovo (1999). Ignatieff takes the position that humanitarian intervention to prevent genocide was sufficient cause to over-ride the basic concept enshrined in the centuries old Treaty of Westphalia, namely that of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states by other sovereign states. Skidelsky in contrast could not accept that military intervention in Kosovo by NATO, on humanitarian grounds, could be sustained morally.

Skidelsky’s position was based on three main tenets¹²⁰. Firstly, that the UN was founded on the principle of national sovereignty. States could and should be sanctioned for acts of aggression against other states, but within their borders they were free (with one large caveat) to do what they liked¹²¹. His second point was based on his belief that there were no internationally agreed values or standards or the means to uphold them. Rather, Skidelsky

maintained that NATO was seeking to impose the West's value system on Milosevic, in a manner similar to 'old imperialism'. Thirdly, towards the end of the correspondence between these two writers, Skidelsky states that 'I would have expected more scepticism from you about NATO's claims. My main point, though, is that the NATO action has made the world a more dangerous place'¹²².

Skidelsky's whole approach is underpinned by a hermeneutic of suspicion, which dominates his interpretation of why the West, in the form of NATO with America and the UK taking the lead, took on the role of aggressor. His dismissal of NATO's stated reason for going to war is an example of narrative deflation. By linking the notion of 'old imperialism' with the actions of the Western powers, Skidelsky, whether consciously or unconsciously, was juxtaposing binary codes located within 'the civil discourse of social institutions'. For example his use of the phrase 'old imperialism' conjures up the contrast between, 'Rule regulated' and 'Arbitrary' and between 'Law' and 'Power'. In contrast, Ignatieff's narrative for understanding why NATO intervened to stop more acts of genocide in the Balkans, conformed to a more apocalyptic mode of narration. Ignatieff dismisses Skidelsky's reference to 'meddlesome post-imperialism moralism'¹²³, arguing that the moral values that underpinned the military action were also shared by the Kosovar Albanians. The correspondence between these two scholarly writers reveals how intelligent people can come to diametrically opposed positions while considering the same evidence.

Genre wars almost always precede actual wars¹²⁴. Consequently, competing narratives will reveal a significant amount about the sub-universes that create and sustain them, their motives and ultimate goals and the lengths they are prepared to go to in order to achieve those goals. An example of this can be seen in the narratives that emerged, within the 'sub-universes of meaning'¹²⁵, prior to the Bosnian War. Hedges dogmatically states that, 'the ethnic conflicts and insurgencies of our time, whether between Serbs and Muslims or Hutus

and Tutsis, are not religious wars. They are not clashes between cultures or civilizations, nor are they the result of ancient ethnic hatreds. They are manufactured wars, perpetuated by fear, greed and paranoia'¹²⁶. 'It took Milošević,' he argues 'four years of hate propaganda and lies, pumped forth daily over the airways from Belgrade, before he got one Serb to cross the border into Bosnia and begin the murderous rampage that triggered war'¹²⁷. Ignatieff also maintains that the nationalist rhetoric of Milošević was a language game, in which he created the fantasy of a greater Serbia where the Serbian people would never again be beaten by ethnic Albanians¹²⁸. As the political situation within the former Yugoslavia deteriorated, trust between former neighbours was steadily replaced by suspicion and the growing realisation that safety was only possible within one's own ethnic community. Minute variations between culturally similar groups grew and were portrayed as fundamental differences¹²⁹: Freud's narcissism of minor difference¹³⁰. As the fragmentation of Yugoslavia grew, each ethnic group became its own social 'sub-universe of meaning', which defined itself in opposition to those who had created their own narrative of who and what they were, again in opposition to the 'other'.

The consequence of this was the terrible spectre of ethnic cleansing, acts of unspeakable cruelty and mass murder in a country that had previously been at peace for many decades. The narrative, however, that Milošević created for his people not only took the Serbs back four hundred years to the late feudal world before the European nation-state, the narrative the Serbian people embraced took them from interethnic tolerance and accommodation – to the Hobbesian world of interethnic war'¹³¹. In antiquity Thucydides famously remarked, 'what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta'¹³². This quote forms the basic structure of what has become known as the Hobbesian trap¹³³. Originally translated by Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century,

the basic problem presented by Thucydides has found manifestation in most wars¹³⁴, if not every war¹³⁵. The Bosnian War is just another example.

2.2.2 Narrative: *The Military and Society*

In section 2.1.1 'Identity in Pre to Post-modern Thought' it was noted that in traditional societies identity was something that simply 'was' and that one's identity was fixed, solid, and stable¹³⁶. Identity was culturally shaped by the actual or perceived needs of a particular society or community. This process applies to even the most basic of questions: 'what does it mean to be a man' or 'what does it mean to be a woman'. Braudy maintains that throughout history the definitions of 'man,' 'manly,' and 'masculine' have shifted in response to the prevailing social and cultural demands¹³⁷. In ancient antiquity the Homeric depiction of Achilles, as the archetypal warrior, inspired generations of Greeks¹³⁸. However, as the centuries passed and Greek warfare evolved, what was required by the 'state'¹³⁹ and thereby what was expected of a man also evolved. Achilles was a one man killing machine, effective, brutal and obsessed with personal glory¹⁴⁰. In hoplite warfare, however, what was required was conformity and unity of purpose. The tightly knit formations of the Greek phalanx subsumed individual identity into that of the whole¹⁴¹. One example of this change in emphasis is the tragic example of Aristodemus, one of only two survivors of the legendary battle of Thermopylae.

The main accounts of this Spartan warrior come from the writings of Herodotus. In book VII, Polymnia, of his *Histories*, Herodotus gives the account of the shame Aristodemus endured when he returned back to Sparta.

When Aristodemus returned to Lacedaemon, reproach and disgrace awaited him; disgrace, inasmuch as no Spartan would give him a light to kindle his fire, or so much as address a word to him; and reproach, since all spoke of him as the craven.' However he wiped away all his shame afterwards at the battle of Plataea.¹⁴²

In book IX, Calliope, Herodotus also supplies the account of Aristodemus' determined attempt to regain his honour in the eyes of his fellow Spartans,

The bravest man by far on that day was, in my judgment, Aristodemus - the same who alone escaped from the slaughter of the three hundred at Thermopylae, and who on that account had endured disgrace and reproach: next to him were Posidonius, Philocyon, and Amompharetus the Spartan.¹⁴³

In the *Iliad*, Achilles is the individual warrior seeking personal glory regardless of the cost to his own life. Yet when Aristodemus seeks to regain his honour, and remove his shame by fighting in a very individualistic manner, it was understood differently. Although his personal bravery was recognised, and his shame removed, he received no public honours for his actions in battle, for how could a state honour 'a madman'? The story of Aristodemus is an illustration of how an older paradigm of manly courage could be interpreted as an act of madness by a culture steeped in the Homeric myth.

Throughout history the concept of what it means to be a man, and thereby any link to the military, is a consistently changing one. In the *Iliad*, Nestor, the oldest of the Achaeans, tells his younger companions that 'I have mixed in the past with better men than you...the finest men I have ever seen or shall see'¹⁴⁴, a general belief that has found expression throughout the millennia. Braudy states that 'what is "true" masculinity has also historically been tinged with, even steeped in, nostalgia for a lost masculinity'¹⁴⁵. For many, war has been and indeed is often described as the ultimate crucible in which the reality of manhood can be tested. The allure of heroism and the chance to achieve the glory of a previous generation helps to create the myth of war¹⁴⁶. However, the allure and myth of war depends on the creation of a narrative that gives these notions meaning and value within a society. Paris describes this as 'discovering the pleasures of war' and contends that in the nineteenth century Britain created a popular culture that legitimized war, romanticized battle and portrayed the warrior as a masculine ideal¹⁴⁷. Using the Victorians as an example, we shall

consider how the creation of this narrative required a very specific theological and philosophical view of the world.

Social Darwinism was an integral part of how Britain viewed herself as a nation in the late nineteenth century. Paris notes that, 'in 1859, Charles Darwin published *The Origin of Species*, and while few actually read the book, most literate Britons thought they had grasped its meaning'¹⁴⁸. As in the animal world so in the human world, evolutionary progress was a result of struggle; it was the survival of the fittest. The development of social anthropology underpinned British, and European, elitism. European nations thought that they had risen above the lower nations of the world and represented the highest form of human civilisation¹⁴⁹. 'A vital European advantage was assumed to be cognitive pre-emptiveness. I can write about and analyse you, therefore I am better than you'¹⁵⁰. However, implicit in the notion of racial or national progress is that of racial or national degeneracy. If nations were not on the way up, then they were on the way down¹⁵¹. The counterpoint to this was the nightmare of racial corruption, a contamination that could result in national demise. It is in this context that the Army emerged as providing the medium of salvation¹⁵² from this decay and a model upon which large aspects of society could be based¹⁵³.

Britain during the nineteenth century was in a state of almost perpetual change, subject to immense pressures from within¹⁵⁴ and without¹⁵⁵. What it meant to be British¹⁵⁶ for those living in the British Isles was not fixed but emerged and developed as the century evolved. As the nineteenth century unfolded, the question of how Britain understood herself, became intertwined with the role of the military, and in particular the Army. MacKenzie states that, 'between 1800 and 1900 the reputation of the military in Britain was transformed'¹⁵⁷. Initially this transformation of the Army took place largely in the mind of popular opinion¹⁵⁸, whereas changes in the pay and conditions of the military happened slowly and largely in response to growing popular support¹⁵⁹. Following the successful defeat

of Napoleon in 1815, Britain was left without any major adversary in Europe or particularly on the high seas¹⁶⁰. The Congress of Vienna¹⁶¹ gave something to each of the major powers, effectively allowing Britain to disengage ‘from the Continent, enabling internal and colonial consolidation’¹⁶² and initiating the idea of military non-intervention in Europe. Consequently, the size of the Army in 1815 fell from 204,386 to 92,586 by 1820, with the size of the Navy falling from 85,384 to 23,000 in the same period¹⁶³. In conjunction with this reduction in size of Britain’s military, expenditure on the armed forces also fell significantly from £72,000,000 in 1814 to £15,000,000 in 1830¹⁶⁴.

In the period following the Congress of Vienna, though at peace with the major powers on the Continent, Britain fought a succession of wars which saw her strengthen and increase the size of her empire. These relatively small wars of empire¹⁶⁵, while often quite brief in duration¹⁶⁶, not only expanded the empire but created the impression that Britain’s military strength was greater than it actually was¹⁶⁷. Imperial conflicts, in faraway places, however, provided the material for the rise of the myth of the imperial hero¹⁶⁸ and created the market for publications and books that cultivated a popular militarism within huge sections of British life¹⁶⁹. Because this warfare was far away from the lives of ordinary people the depiction of war was almost entirely romanticised¹⁷⁰ and bore little resemblance to the reality and carnage of war. Paintings of famous war scenes were often little more than idealised fantasies rather than accurate depictions of actual events¹⁷¹. Holmes notes that the approach of popular artists to the First World War was scarcely better¹⁷². One of the most noted examples of this idealised approach to depicting a famous event is the popular story and painting of the sinking of the *HMS Birkenhead* off the coast of Africa in February 1852.

On 26 February 1852, while transporting reinforcements to Algoa Bay, *HMS Birkenhead* struck submerged rocks just off the African coast and sank. The *Birkenhead*, like many of the ships of that age, did not have enough serviceable lifeboats for all of its

passengers. Consequently only 193 of the 643 people on board survived. The officers and soldiers of the 73rd Regiment of Foot¹⁷³, along with the crew, famously helped all the women and children into the lifeboats. The Commanding Officer's order to 'stand fast' was obeyed; there was no panic and no rushing of the lifeboats¹⁷⁴. The actions of the men on the *Birkenhead* are still regarded as an exceptional example of courage and selfless commitment¹⁷⁵. It was no less so for many in Victorian society. At the time, Sir William Napier¹⁷⁶ in a letter to *The Times* sought 'national recognition of the "matchless chivalry" of the officers in charge¹⁷⁷.

Accepting that Hemy's painting of the sinking of the *Birkenhead* is most likely a highly romanticised version of the event, there is little doubt that the actions of the men struck a chord within Victorian society. Poems appeared within weeks of the news extolling the heroic nature of their actions¹⁷⁸. Sir William Napier's reference to the chivalric nature of the officers in charge would have resonated in a society that looked at the chivalric tradition with a mixture of nostalgia and regret¹⁷⁹. In the space of half a century, the popular view of the British soldier had been radically transformed¹⁸⁰. These new heroes of a growing and expanding empire epitomised the knightly virtues of a more noble age¹⁸¹ as well as becoming an example of what true masculinity was, or should be¹⁸². Throughout the mid to late Victorian period, classical and medieval myths were re-created and adapted for new generations, of all ages. Chivalric myths and Arthurian legends were common themes in paintings, poetry, music, literature and even architecture¹⁸³. It is important, however, to understand that this transformation of the British soldier went hand in hand with an enthusiastic attempt to see the British soldier evangelised¹⁸⁴.

Evangelicalism in the mid Victorian period 'further encouraged a sense of national distinctiveness and mission'¹⁸⁵. Although the evangelisation of the Army was largely the result of private evangelical initiatives, it did have government support¹⁸⁶. The desire to

evangelise the Army must also be set beside the widespread belief that it was the burden of the 'white man'¹⁸⁷ to civilise those considered less developed¹⁸⁸. Though British imperialism had a number of aspects to it during the mid to late Victorian period¹⁸⁹, one of the main moral justifications used to legitimise imperial expansion was the Christianising and civilising effect such expansion was thought to have on the peoples 'liberated' from barbarism¹⁹⁰. As an instrument of British imperialism, the British soldier was often portrayed as an 'idealised "Christian warrior"'¹⁹¹, whose military actions paved the way for Christian missionaries to go in after the armed conflict and seek to spread the Christian Gospel¹⁹². Imperial heroes, especially those who died heroically, became the epitome of the 'muscular Christianity'.

As this heroic cult¹⁹³ embedded itself in the social consciousness of Victorian Britain, with its images and stories of fantastic 'daring do' saturating a major part of the literature of that period, it did so against the background of a growing sense of unease and fear. The Crimean War was the first European conflict to be reported on daily in the newspapers¹⁹⁴. As such the serious weaknesses in British military power, in that it was ill-equipped, poorly organised and poorly led, were manifestly evident to an increasingly well-informed British public. This sense of weakness was emphasised when Sebastopol fell to the French rather than the British¹⁹⁵. Shortly after the weaknesses in the British military were exposed, the nation was gripped by the fear of a French invasion in 1859. This caused something of a panic in Britain¹⁹⁶ and resulted in the creation of a volunteer force against the threat¹⁹⁷. Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, British foreign policy in Europe was largely shaped the recognition of its lack of military strength in Europe¹⁹⁸. Herein is one of the great contrasts of late Victorian Britain. During the period when its overseas empire was rapidly expanding, Britain's position in Europe was greatly weakened.

Growing fears of physical degeneracy in the British male were heightened after humiliating defeats during the Boer War at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso, in what

became known as the 'Black Week' of 10-15 December 1899. There had been growing speculation throughout the 1880s concerning the physical degeneracy of the British urban male¹⁹⁹. Although Britain ultimately defeated the Boers, the simple fact that the might of the British Empire struggled to defeat a small force of irregulars seemed to provide empirical evidence of racial decline²⁰⁰. This coupled with the revelation that 'at Manchester in 1899 three out of every five volunteers were rejected as physically unfit'²⁰¹ for military service led to the conviction that the British race was indeed degenerating physically²⁰². These fears led to a government committee being established to look into these increasingly prevalent concerns. The interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration, which reported in 1904, subsequently confirmed many of the fears concerning the physical state of the British male²⁰³.

If the British male was in fact physically degenerating, Britain might lose the struggle for national survival and become prey to stronger nations²⁰⁴. Lurking underneath this fear was the closely related idea that physical deterioration was inextricably linked with decadence, which in turn was thought to be closely related to moral decline²⁰⁵. Victorian Britain had delved deeply into the classics to find examples that inspired a culture obsessed with manly noble virtues. In a similar fashion many Victorians looked to antiquity for parallels with their present situation. Yes England was like Athens, but now it was in danger of resembling Athens in its days of decay²⁰⁶. Although Britain emerged victorious from the Boer War, the war in Africa was readily identified with Athenian defeat at Syracuse²⁰⁷. Similarities were also made between the decay of the Roman Empire and the danger of decadence and decay within Britain and her empire; 'the Romans' Jenkyns noted 'of the first century had differed from the British in being wholly unaware that their empire would ever come to an end'²⁰⁸. The glory of ancient Athens, Sparta, Macedon and Rome had faded into history. Now the spectre of national degeneracy loomed upon Britain. The Boy Scout movement, maintains

Harrison, largely owes its existence to Baden Powell's fear that the British Empire 'would succumb like Rome through national decadence'²⁰⁹.

During the early decades of the nineteenth century less than one per cent of the British public had any direct experience of military life²¹⁰. Until the formation of the various volunteer units in the late 1850s most Victorians had only experienced a vicarious relationship with the military through popular culture, which glamorised and romanticised war in faraway places. Even then, argues Paris, those who joined these volunteer units did little more than take part in 'heroic male fantasies acted out as thousands of men volunteered to be part-time soldiers in the Rifle Volunteers. The opportunity to wear uniform and share in the martial image without any of the hardship or danger faced by the regular soldier proved enormously popular, and men flocked to join'²¹¹. Fear of racial degeneration, coupled with Darwinian theories of the survival of the fittest, created the conditions whereby the army became the model upon which the survival of the nation depended²¹². Bourke has demonstrated that it was widely believed that men who had been drilled in the army were

unlike their civilian counterparts because their bodies had been physically 're-formed into more manly shapes'²¹³. From the turn of the century the ideal body shape for the British male

became the military body. 'It was' she contends, 'only a small step from the belief that the armed forces improved men's physique to the proposal that military drill should be applied to the civilian population'²¹⁴. As this was considered a national problem, it was also believed that the obvious place to begin to address it was in the schools²¹⁵. Although this approach was not universally welcomed, this model or variations of it continued to be used into the 1930s.

2.3 Conclusions

The British soldier exists in the social imaginary of the UK and therefore in relationship with that society. Consequently this identity is dependent upon the social

interaction which validates or invalidates its legitimacy. Unlike pre-modern social imaginaries, based upon modes of hierarchical complementarity, in which identity was given in relation to function, identity in a modern Western social imaginary identity is based upon the principle of free agency and consequently is substantially more complex. Postmodernist ~~theory and sociology~~ has had a profound impact on the construction of identities in the twenty-first century. Today, identity is socially relational. It is as much a process and something that happens 'between' rather than 'in' or 'to' individuals; is not 'just there' and once discovered is kept forever. Identity in a post-modern age is in a continual state of transition. Social identity is never unilateral.

The public relationship of the generic British within British society is dependent upon the social interaction which validates or invalidates the legitimacy of that identity; the same is also true for organisations like the British Army. All organisations and institutions are, by their very nature, relational in that they have no option but to inter-act internally and with the world outside their organisation. As such, every organisation will have a corporate view of its identity and will seek to carefully cultivate the image it projects to the external world. However, the ability of an organisation, like the British Army, to project such an image will be determined by the genre narratives given validity within the wider society, from which it owes its origin and continued existence.

Narratives help us make sense of our world, individually and collectively as a society. Societal narratives that emerge and reflect a common mind with a UK social imaginary will dictate the identity of its Armed Forces. If the dominant narrative in a society is mimetic then the impact upon the military and for the generic British soldier may be profound. In this situation the public may not accept British soldiers getting involved in high intensity combat but would prefer the distance from combat the idea that the battlefield technician suggests, as figure 6 illustrates²¹⁶.

Low mimesis

Fig 6

The example of how the size of the British Army and Navy was slashed, along with defence expenditure in the years immediately following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, is an illustration of how a narrative has a direct effect on how the armed forces are viewed by society and what they are expected to deliver.

If the narrative that emerges in the public discourse is ‘apocalyptic’ the importance of the military’s role will be heightened and will directly affect how the identity of the generic British soldier is understood. In modern Western societies apocalyptic narratives are the most effective in legitimising and sustaining the decision to go to war. In such a narrative, public opinion will more readily accept its soldiers being involved in high intensity combat. This is illustrated in figure 7.

Apocalyptic narrative

Fig 7

However, apocalyptic narratives are vulnerable to the process of ‘narrative deflation’ and will most likely be subjected to careful scrutiny within the public sphere. This debate, which is consciously ‘outside power’, ‘is supposed to be listened to by power’²¹⁷. The extrapolitical status of this discussion is crucial²¹⁸. In effect, the political power is influenced by the discussion that occurs in the public sphere. Therefore, the concept of ‘narrative deflation’ within the context of the genre wars discussed in this chapter, will have a direct effect upon where on the imagined spectrum, defined in chapter 1, the generic British soldier will reside

~~in the UK public imaginary. In a situation where no direct military threat exists to the UK,~~
apocalyptic narratives will be difficult to sustain in the public sphere.

¹ T Beattie, *The New Atheists: The Twilight of Reason & The War On Religion* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2007) p11. The role of narrative within a community or society will be considered later in this chapter.

² C Nash, *the unravelling of the postmodern mind* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001) p18 (the title of this book was published without capital letters).

³ S Shoemaker and R Swinburne, *Personal Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984) p1.

⁴ For a detailed exploration of this issue see, CJF Williams, *What is Identity?* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989) chapter iv 'Same and Self' p59-75 and *Being, Identity and Truth* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) chapter iii 'Selfsame' p42-67.

⁵ For a concise review of Hume's argument on the 'Unity Question' and the 'Identity Question' see, G Vesey, *Personal Identity* (London: Macmillan, 1974) p6-13.

⁶ See J Perry, *Personal Identity* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002).

⁷ H Reichenbach, *The Direction of Time* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1956) p224ff. S Shoemaker, *Identity, Cause and Mind* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003) p234, also cites Reichenbach use of the word genidentity. Reichenbach states that genidentity 'connects different states of the same thing at different times... The conception of physical identity, of an individual thing remains the same through a stretch of time, is based on the properties of this relation' (*The Direction of Time*, p224).

⁸ For example, although our bodies seem to continually change there is some sense in which most will have some awareness that although changing it is essentially the same body. A similar situation exists with regard to our memory. Even though most humans are conscious that their memories are imperfect and incomplete, there is still an innate awareness that each has a mental record of their journey through life.

⁹ A Giddens, 'Modernism and Postmodernism', in P Waugh, (ed.) *Postmodernism* (London, New York: Edward Arnold, 1992) p11.

¹⁰ See M Alsford, *What If? Religious Themes in Science Fiction* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2000) p32-36.

¹¹ Man is used in its generic sense.

¹² GE Veith, *Guide to Contemporary Culture* (Leicester: Crossway, 1994) p73.

¹³ This optimism came from the belief that man, through the pursuit of knowledge, could shape his environment and future for the better.

¹⁴ Commenting on this clash between modernism and postmodernism, Nash observes, 'Thus now the world reaches a crossroads, and there must be a turning'... 'Such "things" as "history" and "truth" will be understood as mere constructions, nodes in a network of artificial signs, representations devoid of the "foundational" status on which such terms – and their consequent modes of oppression- once departed for their very meaning. Many foresee a style of life for all that is open, plural, fluid, in which reality is what we make it' (Nash, *postmodern mind*, p2-3).

¹⁵ D Kellner, 'Popular culture and the construction of postmodern identities', in *Modernity and Identity*, ed., S Lash and J Friedman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) p141.

¹⁶ A MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (London: Duckworth, 1981).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p160-161.

¹⁸ Kellner, 'Popular culture', p141. For a critique of MacIntyre's argument see, S Sayers, 'Identity and Community' in *JSP* (Spring 1999) Vol 30, No1, p147-160.

¹⁹ C Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004) p11.

²⁰ A MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 1967) notes that 'there appears a figure who is absent from moral theories in periods when Plato and Aristotle dominate it, the figure of "the individual"' (p121).

²¹ MacIntyre, *After Virtue* p5, however, takes the extreme view that society no longer exists save a series of fragmentary ideas from the past devoid of the context that gave them meaning.

²² A Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) p183-184. As the title suggests Giddens focuses upon the subject of identity in what he refers to as 'High Modernity'.

²³ Kellner, 'Popular culture', p142.

- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ DA Carson, *The Gagging of God: Christianity Confronts Pluralism* (Leicester: Apollos, 1996) p134.
- ²⁶ For an introduction into this thought form see, S Crowell, 'Existentialism' Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (revision 11 Oct 10) downloaded from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/> (accessed 10 Apr 14).
- ²⁷ For a general introduction into the inter-relation between these great thinkers see, Dialogue 12 'Husserl, Heidegger and Modern Existentialism', in *The Great Philosophies: An Introduction to Western Philosophy*, ed. B Magee (London: BBC Books, 1987) p252-278.
- ²⁸ Nash, *postmodern mind*, p77.
- ²⁹ Veith, *Guide*, p83.
- ³⁰ Kellner, 'Popular culture', p143.
- ³¹ Nash, *postmodern mind*, p89.
- ³² Ibid.
- ³³ Nash, *postmodern mind*, p97.
- ³⁴ Ibid., p77.
- ³⁵ Ibid.
- ³⁶ S Pattison, *Pastoral care and Liberation Theology* (London, SPCK, 1997) p34.
- ³⁷ Veith, *Guide*, p51. For a detailed explanation of this see, KJ Gergen, *Realities and Relationships: Soundings in Social Construction* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 1994). Gergen is a constructionist and gives a comprehensive treatment of how meaning is and can be constructed by and within society.
- ³⁸ E Graham, *Transforming Practice: Pastoral Theology in an Age of Uncertainty* (London, Mowbray, 1996).
- ³⁹ Veith, *Guide*, p54.
- ⁴⁰ P Waugh, *Postmodernism* (London, New York: Edward Arnold, 1992) p6.
- ⁴¹ Nash, *postmodern mind*, p26-28.
- ⁴² *Introductory Sociology*, ed. T Bilton, et.al., (London: MacMillan, 1996) see chapter 1 p7-23.
- ⁴³ R Jenkins, *Social Identity* (London, New York: Routledge, 1996) p4.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., p5.
- ⁴⁵ Sayers, 'Identity and Community', p156.
- ⁴⁶ Jenkins, *Social Identity*, p20.
- ⁴⁷ R Steinhart, 'The Master/Slave Dialectic', downloaded from <http://www.ericsteinhart.com/progress/HEGEL/MASLAVE.HTM> (accessed 17 Apr 14). See also, M Kamal, 'Master-Slave Relationship in Hegel's Dialectic', downloaded from http://unimelb.edu.au/asiainstitute/staffproj/kamal/docs/master_slave.pdf (accessed 17 Apr 14).
- ⁴⁸ Although in Hegel's model, this interaction produced profound consequences for both individuals.
- ⁴⁹ Alsford, *What If*, p46.
- ⁵⁰ Jenkins, *Social Identity*, p21.
- ⁵¹ Ibid., p22.
- ⁵² See, R Barker, *Legitimizing Identities: The Self-Presentation of Rulers and Subjects* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) chapter 2 'Legitimizing identities' p30-40.
- ⁵³ M Castells, *The Power of Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997) p7.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵⁵ See also, Jenkins, *Social Identity*, p23.
- ⁵⁶ MJ Hatch, *Organisational Theory: Modern Symbolic and Postmodern Perspectives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) p257.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid.
- ⁵⁸ This paper was originally published by in *Research in Organisational Behaviour*, (1985) Vol 7 p263-295.
- ⁵⁹ S Albert and D Whetten, 'Organisational Identity', in *Organisational Identity*, ed. MJ Hatch and M Schultz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) p91.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid., p94-95.
- ⁶¹ The British Army exists as a collection of major and minor elements combining to form a coherent whole capable of complex and diverse operations, such as war fighting or peacekeeping. Each major element, Infantry, Artillery etc., is individually distinct though retaining an individual concept of its own identity as opposed to that of the others, while also recognising, embracing and forming a part of the complex identity that is the British Army.
- ⁶² "Why War?", was the question that launched a celebrated correspondence between Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud (1939), P Smith, *Why War? The Cultural Logic of Iraq, The Gulf War, and Suez* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005). It is also the question that J Keegan, *War and Our World: The Reith Lectures* (London: Hutchinson, 1998) begins his series of lectures with. 'The question is doubled edged. I

do not know why men fight wars, though I make an attempt to sketch an answer in the pages that follow' pix.

⁶³ For a thorough introduction into the Peloponnesian War, see V Hanson, *A War Like No Other* (London: Methuen, 2005).

⁶⁴ See his classic work, J Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (London: Hutchinson, 1993).

⁶⁵ R Holmes, *Acts of War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003).

⁶⁶ The Seville Statement. Downloaded from http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=3247&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 24 Feb 08).

⁶⁷ Doctrinal in that it leaves no room in its assertions for any other legitimate position.

⁶⁸ M Howard, *The Causes of War* (London: Temple Smith, 1983) p10. The very concept of struggle is basically inherent within evolutionary theory.

⁶⁹ J Glover, *Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century* (London: Pimlico, 2001) p195.

⁷⁰ M Howard, *The First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p11. Bismarck was the architect of Germany's Empire pre 1914.

⁷¹ Sir B Liddell Hart, *History of the First World War* (London: Cassell, 1992) p2.

⁷² Howard, *Causes of War*, p27.

⁷³ Keegan, *First World War*, p18.

⁷⁴ For a survey of the German position, including the Schieffen Plan, see J Mosier, *The Myth of the Great War* (London: Profile, 2001) chapter 2 'Germany and the Development of Combined Arms Tactics', p31-53; for the French plan, Plan XVII, see, Keegan, *First World War* (London: Pimlico, 1998) p40-51.

⁷⁵ Keegan, *War and Our World*, p20.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Smith, *Why War?* P3.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p4.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid., p5. The 'mathematical ciphers' Smith is referring to are the elaborate calculations contained within the concept known as 'Game Theory'.

⁸² See D Lieberfeld, 'Theories of Conflict and the Iraq War' originally published in *International Journal of Peace Studies* (2005) Vol 10, No2, available from http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol10_2/wLieberfeld10n2IJPS.pdf (accessed 17 Apr 14). ⁸³ Smith, *Why War?* P11.

⁸⁴ For a discussion on the limitations of the symbolic nature of cultural codes see, D Sperber, *Rethinking Symbolism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) chapter 3.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p15.

⁸⁷ As set out in Smith, *Why War?* p15-16.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p17.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p23

⁹⁰ The limitations of this thesis prohibits any discussion of the structural and post-structural debate.

⁹¹ Smith, *Why War?*, p25.

⁹² N Frye, *The Anatomy of Criticism* (Princeton, New York: Princeton University Press, 1957).

⁹³ Aristotle used this word in his work *Poetics* (*Ποητικός*, c.335 BC). Mimesis comes from the Greek verb μιμέομαι, 'to imitate': the noun form of the root is μιμητής, ος, meaning 'imitator', 'one who is like another'.

⁹⁴ Smith, *Why War?*, p20.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p24.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p25. The consistently low turn-out in national elections, in the United Kingdom, may reveal that for a significant section of the populace, politics is a genre of low mimesis.

⁹⁷ See the humorous yet insightful article in the *Times* by Mick Hume, 'Terror? Obesity? It's apocalypse' (2 April 08) http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/mick_hume/article3663178.ece (accessed 5 April 08)

⁹⁸ Aristotle, *Poetics*, chapter vi, translated by SH Butcher, e-text down loaded from <http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext99/poetc10.txt> (accessed 5 April 08).

⁹⁹ For an introduction into how Greek tragedy achieved this cathartic effect on an audience see, A Yarbo Collins, *Crisis and Catharsis: The Power of the Apocalypse* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984). Aristotle maintained that this was best achieved in a complex plot when events in the drama take the audience by surprise (Aristotle, *Poetics*, chapter ix); 'pity is aroused by unmerited misfortune, fear by the misfortune of a man like ourselves' (Ibid., chapter xiii).

¹⁰⁰ See Hume, 'Terror? Obesity? It's apocalypse'.

¹⁰¹ That is, the thing, or the one that is revealed.

- ¹⁰² See N Lawson's article in the *Daily Mail*, 'The Real Inconvenient Truth' (5 April 08), on the way in which the issue of Global Warming is frequently portrayed in apocalyptic tones.
- ¹⁰³ Smith, *Why War?*, p27.
- ¹⁰⁴ H Münkler, *The New Wars* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005).
- ¹⁰⁵ M Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor* (New York: Vintage, 1999).
- ¹⁰⁶ Asymmetric warfare will be considered later in this thesis.
- ¹⁰⁷ Keegan, *History of Warfare*, p115.
- ¹⁰⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p118. Nevertheless he is confident that 'cave art of the New Stone Age undoubtedly shows us scenes of bowmen apparently opposed in conflict' (p119). EC Dolman, *The Warrior State: How Military Organization Structures Politics* (New York: Palgrave, 2004) p16-18, articulates his theory of how the armed hunter/fighter emerged in relation to the communal development of humanity.
- ¹¹⁰ Smith, *War War?* P27-34.
- ¹¹¹ W James, *Principles of Psychology* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).
- ¹¹² The idea being of course that in subsistence societies, which have by their nature limited opportunities, have fewer sub-universes of meaning (P Berger and T Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (London: Penguin, 1967) p102.
- ¹¹³ Ibid., p103.
- ¹¹⁴ A Schutz, *On Phenomenology and Social Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1970).
- ¹¹⁵ 'The Modes of Being, Doing, Teaching, and Discovering', 1995 report to the Joint Meeting of the American Academy of Religion and the Association of Theological Schools, Published by the Association of Theological Schools in 1996. Downloaded from <http://www.illumino.com/mem/selectPapers/modes.html> (accessed 11 Jul 13).
- ¹¹⁶ Nash, *postmodern mind*, p89.
- ¹¹⁷ Glover, *Humanity*, p58-64.
- ¹¹⁸ The notions of sub-universes of meaning, provinces of meaning and modes of being, enables some to compartmentalise what happens in one part of their life from the remainder of their lives and modes of being.
- ¹¹⁹ M Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (New York: Picador, 2000) p71-91.
- ¹²⁰ This is the present author's view of Skidelsky's position.
- ¹²¹ Ignatieff, *Virtual War*, p74. Skidelsky defines the large caveat as the reference in Chapter 7, of the UN Charter, which says that states can be sanctioned for actions which are a threat to peace. However, he then proceeds to argue that 'human rights abuse per se is not grounds for intervention' (Ibid.).
- ¹²² Ibid., p86.
- ¹²³ Ibid., p83. It must be noted that Skidelsky does not actually use this phrase in his correspondence. Rather it would appear that Ignatieff is responding to what he believes Skidelsky is referring to when he uses the phrase 'old imperialism'.
- ¹²⁴ Smith, *Why War?* P116, where Smith discusses the genre war before the actual Gulf War of 1991. An exception to this would be something like America's entry into the Second World War. Having been attacked by the Japanese at Pearl harbour, America responded immediately by declaring war on the Japanese Empire; there was little dissent in the country about going to war.
- ¹²⁵ This phrase is perhaps more suitable to the political situation before and during the Bosnia War than the phrase, 'finite provinces of meaning'. In this instance, belonging to a particular sub-universe of meaning played an integral part in enabling a member of that group to have a sense of belonging, as well as giving them a specific view of the world outside of their group.
- ¹²⁶ C Hedges, *War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning* (New York: Anchor, 2003) p20.
- ¹²⁷ Ibid., p21.
- ¹²⁸ Ignatieff, *Warrior's Honour*, p42. for an excellent discussion on the power and use of the victim motif see, S Riley, "'Not Being Victims Ever Again": Victimhood and Ideology', in *Warrior's Dishonour: Barbarity, Morality and Torture in Modern Warfare* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006) p191-204.
- ¹²⁹ Hedges, *War*, p33, who notes that before the ethnic war in Bosnia, the Croats, Serbs and Bosnian Muslims all spoke the same language, with only minor differences. Although the Croats and the Bosnians used the Roman alphabet, the Serbs use the Cyrillic alphabet. The spoken language of the three groups was virtually identical.
- ¹³⁰ Ignatieff, *Warrior's Honour*, chapter 2.
- ¹³¹ Ibid., p45.
- ¹³² 'The Athenians made their Empire more and more strong...[until] finally the point was reached when Athenian strength attained a peak plain for all to see and the Athenians began to encroach upon Sparta's allies. It was at this point that Sparta felt the position to be no longer tolerable and decided by starting war to employ all

her energies in attacking and if possible destroying the power of Athens' (Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. R Warner (Harmondsworth, 1953)) p77.

¹³³ For example see, Glover, *Humanity*, p131ff.

¹³⁴ Howard, *The Causes of War*, who maintains that, 'you can vary the names of the actors, but the model remains the same' p16.

¹³⁵ Two scholars who specifically note this are, Glover, *Humanity*, chapter 22 p200-223 and J Keegan, *The First World War*, p49-50.

¹³⁶ D Kellner, 'Popular culture and the construction of postmodern identities', in *Modernity and Identity*, ed. S Lash and J Friedman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) p141.

¹³⁷ L Brady *From Chivalry to Terrorism: War and the Changing Nature of Masculinity* (New York: Knopf, 2003) pxiii.

¹³⁸ The myth of Achilles is still very much alive even in this modern age, as evidenced in the Hollywood blockbuster 'Troy', with Brad Pitt in the role of the ancient warrior.

¹³⁹ In this case 'city state'.

¹⁴⁰ See the *Iliad*, 18.121 where Achilles says, 'But now, may I win heroic glory!'

¹⁴¹ See Hanson, *A War Like No Other* (London: Methuen, 2005) who gives an excellent and detailed account of hoplite warfare during the Peloponnesian War.

¹⁴² Herodotus, *Polymnia*, p59. Downloaded from

<http://www.greektxts.com/library/Herodotus/Polymnia/eng/244.html> (accessed 19 April 08).

¹⁴³ Herodotus goes on to say that "The Spartans, however, who took part in the fight, when the question of "who had distinguished himself most," came to be talked over among them, decided- "that Aristodemus, who, on account of the blame which attached to him, had manifestly courted death, and had therefore left his place in the line and behaved like a madman, had done of a truth very notable deeds; but that Posidonius, who, with no such desire to lose his life, had quitted himself no less gallantly, was by so much a braver man than he." Perchance, however, it was envy that made them speak after this sort. Of those whom I have named above as slain in this battle, all, save and except Aristodemus, received public honours: Aristodemus alone had no honours, because he courted death for the reason which I have mentioned. These then were the most distinguished of those who fought at Plataea' (Herodotus, *Histories*, book IX Calliope) p19. Downloaded from <http://www.greektxts.com/library/Herodotus/Calliope/eng/298.html> (accessed 19 April 08).

¹⁴⁴ *Iliad*, 1.260.

¹⁴⁵ Brady, *From Chivalry to Terrorism*, p6.

¹⁴⁶ Hedges, *War*, p84.

¹⁴⁷ M Paris, *Warrior Nation: Images of War in British Popular Culture, 1850-2000* (London: Reaktion, 2000) p13.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p45.

¹⁴⁹ Brady, *From Chivalry to Terrorism*, p318. See also, R Jenkyns, *The Victorians and Ancient Greece* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980) who states that many Englishmen wanted to see themselves as modern Athenians (p334), Spartan with regard to prowess, (p225) and Roman with regard to empire (p334).

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p320.

¹⁵² A Summers, 'Militarism in Britain before the Great War', in *HWJ* (1976) Vol 2 p111.

¹⁵³ J Bourke, *Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain and the Great War* (London: Reaktion, 1999) p11-20.

¹⁵⁴ See M Girouald, *The Return to Camelot: Chivalry and the English Gentleman* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981) chapter 9 for a discussion on the Chartist issue and the fear of rebellion in 1839.

¹⁵⁵ As an example see, JR Davis, 'Britain and the European Balance of Power', in *A Companion To Nineteenth-Century Britain*, ed. C Williams (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004) p34-52.

¹⁵⁶ K Robbins, in chapter one of his book *Nineteenth-Century Britain: Integration and Diversity* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988) discusses the difficulty of accurately defining what 'British meant' for those living within the British Isles. Recognising that the island of Ireland did not become 'West Britain', he focuses on how the English, Scottish and Welsh were 'blended' (p2) to produce the 'British'. In this section the word 'British' will primarily refer to the English, Scottish and Welsh peoples: although it is accepted that many living in Northern Ireland would consider themselves to be politically British.

¹⁵⁷ JM MacKenzie, 'Introduction: Popular imperialism and the military', in *Popular Imperialism and the Military 1850-1950*, ed., JM MacKenzie, (Manchester and New York: St Martin's, 1992) p1.

¹⁵⁸ As an example see, P Anderson, *The Printed Image and the Transformation of Popular Culture 1790-1860* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); P Summerfield, 'Patriotism and Empire: Music Hall entertainment, 1870-1914', in *Imperialism and Popular Culture*, ed., JM MacKenzie (Manchester: Manchester University

Press, 1986) p17-48; JA Mangan, “‘The grit of our forefathers’: invented traditions, propaganda and imperialism’, in *Imperialism and Popular Culture*, ed., JM MacKenzie (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986) p113-139.

¹⁵⁹ See EM Spiers, ‘The Armed Forces’, in *A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Britain*, ed, C Williams (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004) p 85-87, who maintains that it was the Crimean War that revived interest in both the Navy and the Army (p85).

¹⁶⁰ Spiers, ‘The Armed Forces’, p81.

¹⁶¹ Signed June 9, 1815 by Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, France, Portugal, Sweden and Norway (Spain refused to sign in protest over the Italian settlement). For a general introduction to the Congress of Vienna see, <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9075297/Congress-of-Vienna> (accessed 21 May 08).

¹⁶² Davis, ‘Britain and the European Balance of Power’, p36.

¹⁶³ C Cook, *Britain in the Nineteenth Century 1815-1914* (London and New York: Longman, 1999) p221; see particularly ‘The Armed Forces’ p219-235.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.* p221.

¹⁶⁵ Paris refers to them as ‘The Little Wars of Empire’; see *Warrior Nation*, chapter 2.

¹⁶⁶ Many of these wars were relatively brief they could still be extremely violent and costly in terms of human life. For example, British troops under the command of Sir Charles Napier in 1843, and according to his own account ‘butchered’ over 6000 Baluchis as Britain seized and added Sind to British India (Paris, *Warrior Nation*, p21).

¹⁶⁷ Davis, ‘Britain and the European balance of Power’ p42, argues that actual state of British military capability was not fully appreciated by politicians at the time because there was little political will to become involved in European conflicts.

¹⁶⁸ See, JM MacKenzie, ‘Heroic myths of empire’, in *Popular Imperialism and the Military 1850-1950*, ed., JM Mackenzie (Manchester and New York: St Martin’s, 1992) p109-138.

¹⁶⁹ See, Anderson, *The Printed Image and the Transformation of Popular Culture 1790-1860*, who maintains that this medium played a fundamental role in transforming the cultural experience of working people. In this work she focuses particularly on 4 illustrated weekly magazines that attracted and sustained a weekly readership of 1 million or more (*The Penny Magazine*, *The London Journal*, Reynold’s *Miscellany* and Cassell’s *Illustrated Family Paper*).

¹⁷⁰ Paris, *Warrior Nation*, p13-18.

¹⁷¹ For an example of this see Holmes, *Acts of War*, p61-63, who considers the painting by Horace Vernet of Napoleon Bonaparte (1826), depicted leading the attack by the French against the Austrians at the bridge of Arcole (1796).

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p63. He states that, ‘Caton Woodville, with his neatly-bandaged head-wounds, manly and heroic expressions....gives the distinctive flavour of a generation of popular war artists who painted battle in anything but the “woeful crimson of men slain”’.

¹⁷³ The account of the legendary bravery of the 73rd Regiment of Foot forms part of the regimental history of the Black Watch. See <http://www.theblackwatch.co.uk/newsite/history/index.html> (accessed 22 May 08).

¹⁷⁴ Girouald, *The Return to Camelot*, (p13) describes the wreck of the Birkenhead as follows: ‘The roll of the drum called the soldiers to arms on the upper deck. The call was promptly obeyed, though every man knew that it was his death summons. There they stood, as if on parade, no man showing restlessness or fear, though the ship was every moment going down’. Prints of Thomas Hemy’s painting ‘The Wreck of the Birkenhead’ are still available for sale today. For example [http://es.easyart.com/estampas/Thomas-M.-Hemy/Wreck-of-the-Birkenhead-\(Grabado-Multicolor\)-36749.html](http://es.easyart.com/estampas/Thomas-M.-Hemy/Wreck-of-the-Birkenhead-(Grabado-Multicolor)-36749.html) (accessed 22 May 08).

¹⁷⁵ For example one modern reflection on this display of courage regarded it as ‘one of the proudest moments in Britain’s naval and military history. The call, “Women and Children First”, is now common on the scene of disasters the world over’. See, ‘WOMEN AND CHILDREN FIRST’ Commemorating the 150th Anniversary of the Sinking of the *Birkenhead*, The South African Military History Society, *Military History Journal* (2002) Vol 12, No 4, Downloaded from <http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol124bd.html> (accessed 22 May 08).

¹⁷⁶ British general and historian who fought in the Napoleonic Wars.

¹⁷⁷ Girouald, *The Return to Camelot*, p8.

¹⁷⁸ Paris, *Warrior Nation*, p29.

¹⁷⁹ Girouald, *The Return to Camelot*, p19.

¹⁸⁰ The poems celebrating the heroic nature of British soldiers along with the desire for some form of national recognition of bravery stands in contrast with another story from the nineteenth century. For example, it was reported in the London *Observer*, 18 November 1822, ‘that the previous year a million bushels of human and horse bones had been imported from the neighbourhood of Leipzig, Austerlitz, Waterloo and other battlefields. “The bones of the hero and the horse which rode” has been shipped to the port of Hull where they had been

forwarded to Yorkshire bone grinders who had built steam engines for the sole purpose of granulating the bones and selling them off for fertilizer' (Cited in, C Coker, *The Future of War* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004) p15).

¹⁸¹ MacKenzie, 'Introduction' (1992) p3.

¹⁸² Paris, *Warrior Nation*, p28.

¹⁸³ MacKenzie, 'Heroic Myths of Empire', p111.

¹⁸⁴ Summers, 'Militarism in Britain', p109-111.

¹⁸⁵ J Black and D MacRaid, *Nineteenth-Century Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, MacMillan, 2003) p232.

¹⁸⁶ Summers, 'Militarism in Britain', p109.

¹⁸⁷ This is of course a reference to Rudyard Kipling's Poem 'The White Man's Burden'.

¹⁸⁸ M Pugh, *Britain since 1789: A Concise History* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1999) p133.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, chapter 16 'The New Imperialism'. Pugh maintains that there various motives for British imperial expansion. Politically, an important motive was the strategic importance of expansion, in that Britain had been acquiring buffer zones such as Burma and the Punjab. Equally important was the economic pressure upon Britain to seek new markets for trade in the face of the growing protectionism of nations like America.

¹⁹⁰ MacKenzie, 'Heroic Myths of Empire', p113.

¹⁹¹ Paris, *Warrior Nation*, p32.

¹⁹² C Matthew, ed., *The Nineteenth Century*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) in 'Empire and the diffusion of British culture' p147-152, gives a balanced introduction into the positive contributions made by Christian missionaries throughout the Empire. Missionaries, he maintains, 'were frequently welcomed as intermediaries, as sources of aid and protection in the face of invaders...missionaries, already familiar figures and knowing at least something of local languages and protocol, thus played key roles in negotiations' (p148-149).

¹⁹³ MacKenzie, 'Heroic Myths of Empire', p115 specifically uses this phrase.

¹⁹⁴ Davis, 'Britain and the Balance of Power' p40.

¹⁹⁵ Black and Raïld, *Nineteenth-Century Britain*, p233.

¹⁹⁶ Summers, 'Militarism in Britain', p106.

¹⁹⁷ Cook, *Britain the Nineteenth Century*, p220.

¹⁹⁸ Davis, 'Britain and the Balance of Power', p44.

¹⁹⁹ Pugh, *Britain since 1789*, p114.

²⁰⁰ Paris, *Warrior Nation*, p85.

²⁰¹ JFC Harrison, *Late Victorian Britain 1875-1901*, p132. See chapter 6 'Doubts and Anxieties' for a general introduction in the general issue of Victorian fears and concerns.

²⁰² J Bourke, *Dismembering the Male*, p 171. In chapter 4 Bourke gives a comprehensive and thorough treatment to this issue.

²⁰³ Harrison, *Late Victorian Britain*, p133.

²⁰⁴ Davis, 'Britain and the Balance of Power', maintains that 'by the mid-1890s, Salisbury was one of many reflecting on the incessant growth of competition to British power and the possible application of Darwinist theories to international relations' p49.

²⁰⁵ Paris, *Warrior Nation*, p85.

²⁰⁶ Jenkyns, *The Victorians and Ancient Greece*, p293.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p336.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p335.

²⁰⁹ Harrison, *Late Victorian Britain*, p215.

²¹⁰ Paris, *Warrior Nation*, p31.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, p44.

²¹² Summers, 'Militarism in Britain', p112.

²¹³ Bourke, *Dismembering the Male*, p174.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p181. She notes that, 'in 1902, after consultation with the War Office, the Board of Education issued a Model Course of Physical Training based on the Army Red Book. The crucial commands were military ones. Schools were clearly encouraged to employ instructors who had been trained in the Army's Gymnastics Course'.

²¹⁶ In figure 4, the image on the extreme left represents Achilles, whereas the figure on the extreme right is of a soldier launching a handheld drone and represents the battlefield technician.

²¹⁷ Taylor, *Social Imaginaries*, p89.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*

Chapter 3

Being and Doing

3.1 *Introduction*

The research question addressed by this thesis was set out clearly in chapter 1¹. From this a number of sub-questions were derived from the main thesis question when viewed through the lens of a modern social imaginary. In this chapter a concept identified in two of the sub-questions will be examined in detail, that is, the difference between ‘being’ and ‘doing’².

Military books abound with the word ‘warrior’. In US military publications it is ubiquitous³. One might therefore expect to find a detailed and possibly varied array of answers to the question, what is a warrior? Frequently, however, the words warrior and soldier are used interchangeably as though they were synonymous. One example of this is TL Challans’ book *Awakening Warrior*⁴. Section 3.2 Being and Doing: Cartesian or Existentialist’ will examine how a Cartesian approach to viewing and defining man became corrupted. Instead of the nobility of the Cartesian subject, large sections of European society were reduced to a utility whose relevance was in direct proportion to their function within the industrial machine. It will consider the practical impact of this idea as it found expression in the carnage of the First World War.

Section 3.3 ‘Being and Doing: Combat Motivation’ will examine the discussion of what made some men fight in World War Two, when others with the same training and in the same unit did not. It will consider the distinction between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ factors and the impact modern training techniques has had in this this debate. Central to this section is a reflection on Rune Henriksen’s definition of a warrior and the requirement for a sophisticated understanding of a modern army like the British Army and the granularity required when discussing the difference between the warrior and the soldier. Section 3.4

'Being and Doing: Existentialist Thought' will unpack the distinction between 'being' and 'doing' by exploring the questions: what does existential mean, what is authenticity, and what is alienation and how do these ideas relate to the warrior and or the soldier? This examination will provide the basis upon which a definition of what the warrior is will be offered in 3.5 'Conclusions'.

3.2 *Being and Doing: Cartesian or Existentialist*

The Oxford English Dictionary defines the warrior as someone 'whose occupation is warfare; a fighting man, whether soldier, sailor, or (latterly) airman; a valiant or experienced man of war'. It also defines the soldier as someone who, 'serves in an army for pay; one who takes part in military service or warfare'. While dictionaries, by their nature, are succinct in their definition of words, this definition of what a warrior is, is vague. For example, a chef working on an American, nuclear powered aircraft carrier, may indeed easily meet each of the criteria of the dictionary definition. He or she may be an experienced man/woman of war, in that they have seen action in one or both of the two Gulf Wars: in the sense that they were serving on board the carrier as it took part in offensive operations during either or both wars. Chefs on a ship are primarily sailors, albeit with a specific, specialised trade. In our fictional example, this particular chef was an integral part of the aircraft carrier's daily life on active operations and served for pay. It is debatable though, whether or not the role of a chef in this instance would be considered to be that of a warrior. He or she might be considered brave, by members of the general public, to have served in the navy at a time of war. Whether or not, however, they would be viewed in quite the same way as a member of the Special Forces that operated behind enemy lines during this conflict is again debatable.

Definitions, at least to some extent, are classically Cartesian in nature. Descartes' famous, *Cogito ergo sum* 'I think therefore I am' is the foundational bedrock of Western

philosophical thought⁵. Having allowed himself to doubt the existence of everything, Descartes made his now famous discovery, that by the use of reason he could prove his own existence.

Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived; and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something. So that it must, in fine, be maintained, all things being maturely and carefully considered, that this proposition (pronunciatum) *I am, I exist*, is necessarily true each time it is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind.⁶

The importance of this moment in the history of Western thought cannot be exaggerated. Descartes introduced a new form of dualism into intellectual and philosophical thought. In practice what this entailed was the division between the subject, the *ego* 'I', and the objective world outside which could be accessed, analysed and categorised by means of reason and logic. What was 'real' could be examined and discovered by logic. All truth, at least in the West, would now be required to be tested at the bar of reason. The attempt therefore, to define 'what' a warrior is', in this sense is Cartesian, in that it presupposes that it is a substance with fixed identifiable properties, which as a consequence may be known, defined and explained logically.

Cartesian approaches to any subject tend to focus upon mechanistic, rational and logical factors, which depending upon the subject might be considered the correct and logical ones to take. Most patients, for example, would prefer their brain surgeon to be highly skilled, logical and precise. Few needing major surgery of this type would disagree. However, while acknowledging the critical necessity of a precise and logical approach to many aspects of life, existentialist thought has maintained that mechanistic, rational and logical factors are not sufficient in and of themselves to exhaust meaning, especially as it pertains to what it means to be human. Existentialists claim that thinking about human *existence* requires new categories not found in the conceptual repertoire of ancient or modern thought; human beings can be understood neither as substances with fixed properties, nor as

atomic subjects interacting with a world of objects'⁷. In existentialist thought what it means to be, or of being, cannot be fully understood in terms of a universal law of behaviour, 'an aspect that is measured not in terms of an objective inventory of *what* I am but in terms of my *way* of being it'⁸. Neither can the importance of something be exhausted by a mechanistic definition of what something is.

The logical consequence of the Cartesian dualism⁹ of 'subject' and 'object' was profound, particularly with regard to how the world and life itself was understood and interpreted. As the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth rather than the nobility of the Cartesian 'subject', humanity in the modern industrialised age, underpinned by Cartesian, Kantian and Hegelian ideas, had been 'objectified'. Humanity and life itself, along with the external world had been instrumentalised¹⁰ and reduced to the status of an object. Writing against the background of the First World War, the German sociologist Max Weber maintained that the modern world had become 'disenchanted'¹¹; a legacy of the rationalism and on-going process of the intellectualisation of life that had marked the Enlightenment Period¹². For Weber disenchantment was the knowledge or belief that... there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation'¹³.

Logic and reason had replaced myth and magic as the framework to understand and interpret life and the external world. In the pre-modern age, that is the world before the Enlightenment and the ascendant rise of empiricism, the world of our ancestors was an enchanted world. Taylor comments that it was a world of spirits, demons, and moral forces¹⁴. Nietzsche had understood the implications of this for religion. Zarathustra, after coming down from his mountain solitude, announced that 'God is dead'¹⁵. It was not the case that Nietzsche had believed that God existed and then stopped believing. Rather, his use of the phrase 'God is dead' is an indication of his awareness that the logical empiricism of the

Enlightenment had killed the need for God and the morality that a divine order gave. Nietzsche understood that this would ultimately lead to nihilism¹⁶. The universe had been stripped of the logical need for the divine. When Weber spoke of the disenchantment of the world, it was all embrative; no aspect of life held mystery or supernatural, everything could be objectified, classified and exploited.

The recognition that life had become disenchanted is powerfully depicted in the classic film *Metropolis*, where men and women are presented as component parts of the great industrialised machine of modern technological life. Fritz Lang's highly stylistic depiction of the repetitive and monotonous functionalism of industrialised working life, emphasises the extent to which large elements of humanity itself had become an integral part of the on-going technological evolution of life. The majority, i.e. the workforce, were exploited by a minority, who used them as component parts of the industrialised machine. Although Lang's film was based around a popular theme in early twentieth-century science fiction, it echoed real life industrial ideas. Coker maintains that, 'industrial workers were expected to work with machine-like precision'¹⁷. Developing this theme, he cites the work and legacy of Fredrick Winslow Taylor who,

developed a form of behavioural engineering that treated the body as a machine. In doing so, Taylor objectified the human subject by regarding it not as a person who speaks to another subjectively but as a concrete and desubjectified manifestation of laws revealed by natural abstraction¹⁸.

Nowhere is this Taylorite vision explored more disturbingly than in Huxley's iconic book *Brave New World*,¹⁹ where men and women are selectively bred to service the needs of the new world order. The world that Huxley describes is based around the mass production methods of the twentieth-century industrialised factory. The book is set in the future, A.F. 632²⁰, or 632 years After Ford: that is Henry Ford the car manufacturer. In this depiction of the future, Ford has replaced God as the deity in this new world²¹; hymns are even sung to his name:

Ford, we are twelve; oh, make us one,
Like drops within the Social River;
Oh, make us now together run
As swiftly as thy shining Flivver.²²

It is a Pavlovian conditioned world²³ where only the selected few are aware of the true state of humanity. Men and women are little more than animals, without parents or family and educated only as required to fulfil their designated purpose; humanity has now become the perfect utility, with a very specific shelf life of sixty years.

Long before Huxley or Lang, Nietzsche understood that Man had become a ‘commodity’ or ‘utility’ that could be used by the state for its own end. This is clearly seen in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Immediately after the section entitled, ‘Of War and Warriors’, he launches into ‘Of the New Idol’, a poorly veiled, scathing critique of the modern European ‘state’. In this section the prophet Zarathustra speaks,

The state? What is that? Well then! Now open your ears, for now I shall speak to you of the death of peoples. The state is the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it lies, too; and the lie creeps from its mouth: “I, the state, am the people”. It is a lie! It was creators who created peoples and hung a faith and a love over them: thus they served life²⁴.

Continuing his critique, Zarathustra maintains that, ‘many too many are born: the state was invented for the superfluous! Just see how it lures them, the many-too-many! How it devours them, and chews them, and re-chews them!’²⁵. Life as a part of the state for Zarathustra, was ‘universal slow suicide’²⁶. Nietzsche saw through, what he viewed as, the veneer of collective responsibility and saw that the state was a cold, calculating attempt by ‘superfluous people’ to acquire power ‘and especially the lever of power, plenty of money’²⁷. Nietzsche famously remarked that, ‘I see many soldiers: if only I could see many warriors’²⁸. His observation, at least to some extent, was a reaction to the massed, conscripted armies of Europe, which had inextricably led to the industrialisation and thereby disenchantment of war²⁹. To Nietzsche, the massed armies of industrialised European states were fodder to be devoured, chewed and then re-chewed by cold lying monsters cynically using them for their own ends.

Zarathustra was Nietzsche's prophet. He not only reveals that 'God is dead' but announces the new concept of the *Übermensch*³⁰. It is highly unlikely that Nietzsche was seeking to perform some kind of prophetic function towards the populations of Europe in general; that somehow his critique of the modern state was designed to awaken the populous from their delusions. There is a certain ambiguity as to the regard in which Zarathustra, and thereby Nietzsche, held humanity. In the Prologue, the 'Saint' asked Zarathustra why he has left his solitude³¹. 'Zarathustra answered: "I love mankind"³². Yet later in 'Part One', Zarathustra appears to liken mankind/humanity to 'flies', 'your neighbours will always be poisonous flies: that about you which is great, that itself must make them more poisonous and ever more fly like'³³. Recognising this apparent tension in Nietzsche's work, Roberts asks a pertinent question, 'does Zarathustra love "man" only for the sake of the *Übermensch*?'³⁴. The answer to this question is most probably a resounding yes, absolutely. Indeed, as Hollingdale notes, that 'over all these discourses hovers Zarathustra's dictum "Man is something that must be overcome"³⁵. For Nietzsche, humanity in general was nothing more than the background for the *Übermensch*, something to be used for a greater end. Humanity was 'utility'. Where he differed in his understanding of humanity and that he had identified by the 'state' was the purpose of that 'utility'; one was noble because it was the medium through which the *Übermensch* could be revealed in triumph, whereas the other was for the ignoble pursuit of money. However, in both 'man' was a 'utility' to be used.

Chapter 2 of this thesis examined how a specific narrative emerged in Victorian Britain that created an idealised image of war that was almost entirely romanticised³⁶ and bore little resemblance to the reality and carnage of war. The narrative of war in this period was heroic and chivalrous, drawing on a bewildering array of ancient motifs to perpetuate this cultic myth. War was still seen as offering the opportunity for individuals to display true masculinity. Although there are countless stories of individual heroism in the First World

War, this particular war is the horrific example of what an instrumentalised and disenchanting war looks like when fought by industrialised giants. Coker has observed that, 'not only did war serve industry, it had itself become a vast industry. Recognizing this fact, Churchill described the divisions sucked into the battles of Verdun and the Somme as "the teeth of interlocking cog wheels grinding each other"'³⁷.

Death on the various battlefields in Europe of the First World War had been industrialised, a gruesome productivity that generated causality rates unimagined in any previous era. Men were as much matériel for the machine of death as the weapons used by them and against them. It is unsurprising that a philosophy like Existentialism, that placed the emphasis upon the distinctiveness of the experience of the individual at its heart, was highly influential in a Europe that had been brutalised by the massed anonymity of industrialised carnage: 'a philosophy once described by Paul Tillich as "a movement of rebellion against the dehumanization of man"'³⁸. Cartesian metaphysics had led to large sections of humanity being objectified and thereby reduced to a desubjectified utility to be used and defined by what it was able to do within the industrialised machine. In stark contrast, existentialist thought endeavoured to place the emphasis on what it means to be human as opposed to reducing individuals to what they were capable of doing, as units of utility.

3.3 Being and Doing: Combat Motivation

A man or a woman cannot be defined solely in terms of their utility and usefulness to the process of the machine. In this Fredrick Winslow Taylor was fundamentally wrong. When confronted with industrial carnage, those whom he had objectified did not behave as conditioned parts of an inhuman machine. Instead of Pavlovian response, the majority of soldiers, regardless of nationality, responded with remarkable restraint. For example, Holmes has noted that in the German March offensive of 1918 the remarkable thing 'was not how

many British soldiers were killed trying to surrender, but how few. The Germans were remarkably scrupulous about accepting surrender in circumstances when, in hot blood, they might have killed easily out of hand'³⁹. Ashworth has argued that for significant periods during the First World War there were periods were a 'live and let live system' of non-aggression packs or truces between the combatants, sometimes only a few hundred yards apart was unofficially implemented⁴⁰. Regarding British and American soldiers in World War Two, Hastings observes that they 'fought as bravely and as well as any democracy could ask, if the values of civilization were to be retained in their ranks'⁴¹.

Bourke's study *An Intimate History of Killing* offers a contrast, in that she has sought to not simply put killing back into war, but the intimacy of killing⁴². The chapter in her book entitled 'War Crimes' makes for uncomfortable reading. Servicemen of all ranks', she observed 'were unperturbed by most of these acts of lawless killing'⁴³. However, despite the various examples of 'atrocities' cited, she also maintains that 'no matter how thorough the training, it still failed to enable most combatants to fight'⁴⁴. The question regarding the fighting spirit of the British Army in World War Two was something that exercised the high command. In his War Diaries, General Sir Alan Brooke (later Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke) the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), recounts the numerous occasions when Churchill questioned the effectiveness of the Army and its commanders (even down to company commander level)⁴⁵. Later that year Churchill stated to Brooke that 'what we wanted he said were combatants and fighting men instead of a mass of non combatants'⁴⁶. He harangued the CIGS insisting that British soldiers were more likely to be found in YMCA institutions than fighting the enemy⁴⁷.

Combat motivation was and remains critical to military success. 'What is it' asks Henriksen that makes some men soldiers overcome the challenges of combat, and not others?'⁴⁸. Before examining this subject in some detail in 'Competition, Diffidence and

Glory’, Holmes notes ‘an unfashionable and surprising fact, some men actually enjoy war’⁴⁹. Ernst Jünger’s book *Storm of Steel* is an example of an individual utterly at ease in the midst of war⁵⁰. In his discussion of what makes men fight, Holmes considers the following: heightened sense of awareness⁵¹; comradeship and ‘a sense of importance as an individual within the group’⁵²; the strangely wonderful sights which counterpoint the horror⁵³; and ‘triumphing in a shared endeavour’⁵⁴. These factors may motivate the few, ‘but they do little to explain why the majority fight’ he argues⁵⁵. Regarding patriotism, he notes that it has undoubtedly helped persuade men to join up at the beginning of the war⁵⁶ but professional soldiers are encouraged to think of themselves as servants of the state⁵⁷.

In his article ‘The Myth of Intrinsic Combat Motivation’⁵⁸, Bruce Newsome has accessed the combat motivation literature and seeks to establish a clear distinction between what he terms ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ combat motivation. ‘Intrinsic’ motivations, according to Newsome, are ‘rational service, volunteerism, “will”, “warrior spirit”, militarism, nationalism, ethnicity, religiosity and morality’⁵⁹; whereas ‘extrinsic’ motivations are those derived from the military by socialization, training, and other forms of conditioning⁶⁰. Newsome basically dismisses and disregards ideas such as the ‘will’ and ‘warrior spirit’ as nebulous, making the claim that both notions owe their popularity to their association with Carl von Clausewitz, who according to Newsome, never formally separated intrinsic from extrinsic resources⁶¹. In summarising his critique of ‘intrinsic’ motivations he argues, ‘intrinsic motivations to serve may be strong, but just a short exposure to the realities of combat usually destroys a soldier’s prior motivations’⁶². In contrast, ‘extrinsic’ motivations⁶³ which focus on the impact and importance of military training, unit organisation and management, are transitive in that they do not dissipate after the initial shock of combat⁶⁴. Good training, organisation and management, in this thesis, are more tangible and ultimately useful concepts than ‘the will to fight’ or a ‘warrior ethos’.

Newsome's article suffers from its limited historical survey of combat. Any survey of combat throughout the ages will reveal that successful warriors, soldiers and armies appeared to have had a mixture of both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations in combat. Achilles was motivated by glory. Yet despite this, he understood the importance of good protection and was an expert in handling the sword: impossible without dedicated training. Newsome's reference though to the US military's 'industrial approach' joins seamlessly with his own mechanistic approach to combat motivation. What he fails to explain, however, is what actually makes some people actively fight⁶⁵ while others, with the same training, and from the same unit may not actively fight. An important figure in this discussion is Brigadier SLA Marshall.

A soldier in the First World War, Marshall is best known for his work as an official American Army combat historian in the Second World War. During the war he conducted group interviews with soldiers who had been in battle a few days previously. This led to Marshall publishing a book on infantry combat effectiveness, titled *Men Against Fire: the Problem of Battle Command*; it remains controversial even to this day⁶⁶. In this book Marshall argued that only between fifteen and twenty-five per cent of soldiers fired their weapons at the enemy⁶⁷. Although some scholars have sought to question the accuracy of this figure⁶⁸, Grossman is convinced that 'every available parallel scholarly study replicates his [Marshall's] findings'⁶⁹.

Artillery and machinegun fire was a different matter. Grossman argues that the disparity between the individual infantry soldier and soldiers working in teams 'is largely due to the group processes at work in cannon, machine-gun, or other crew-served-weapons firing'⁷⁰. However, by the Vietnam War the firing rate had risen from between fifteen and twenty-five per cent to ninety-five per cent⁷¹. Grossman accounts for the huge jump in firing rates due to 'a form of classical and operant conditioning (à la Pavlov's dog and BF Skinner's

rats)⁷². Despite the enormous increase in the firing rate, the hit rate was sometimes 50,000 ‘bullets fired for every enemy hit’⁷³.

Firing rates are not necessarily the most essential component in battle. Henriksen makes the point that ‘it is relevant to underline the distinction between those who kill in a combat zone, and those who “merely are there”’⁷⁴. He cites Franklin Miller who expresses the distinction in this manner:

Men who actually see enemy troops, put the front sight blade on them, and blow them away. These guys are usually the squad leader and the platoon sergeant. Genuine killers are not to be confused with guys who simply spray an area and happen to kill someone⁷⁵.

For Henriksen, what distinguishes ‘average soldiers from their peers with more pronounced warrior qualities’⁷⁶ is combat mastery, which is itself ‘*revealed* in combat’ [emphasis original]⁷⁷. Will and warrior spirit he regards as something belonging to ‘a human type, whose martial gestation is individual rather than collective’⁷⁸. Like Grossman, Henriksen cites Gwynne Dyer who describes such an individual as a ‘natural soldier’⁷⁹. However, one drawback in citing Miller and Dyer is that both are referring primarily to conscript armies and not modern all volunteer professional armies, such as the British Army.

Modern training techniques have increased not only the firing rate of soldiers⁸⁰ but clearly emphasise the purpose of the combat arms (armoured, armoured reconnaissance, infantry and attack aviation units). In British Army doctrine *Combat Operations* it states that:

Combat elements are those that engage adversaries directly. They manoeuvre and fight, typically employing direct-fire weapons, to gain ground, to find and defeat the adversary, or to acquire information.⁸¹

In the same document it states that ‘at the tactical level, an objective should be clear and attainable, for example seizing a terrain feature or destroying a force’⁸². The role of the combat arms is clear: gain ground, defeat or destroy a force. Recent combat experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated that the British infantry soldier is not only

trained to actively engage his opponent 'employing direct-fire weapons', but will if necessary destroy a hostile force⁸³.

For Henriksen, the soldier's 'commitment to combat is much less pronounced than is the case with the warrior⁸⁴. He defines the warrior as *a soldier with a personal and existential commitment to master and experience warfare, who is willing and able to kill and risk sacrificing his life in combat*' [emphasis original]⁸⁵. He continues 'a warrior is necessarily a soldier first, but not all soldiers, in fact very few, are warriors. Also, to say that a soldier is a warrior is to distinguish him from mercenaries', because the soldier is ultimately serving a political cause⁸⁶. Henriksen maintains that the 'warrior's combat motivation comes from their existential commitment to combat' which is generally appreciated that they will make individual difference to combat by both direct action 'or as primary group leaders'⁸⁷. Drawing on the selection process used by Special Forces, he infers 'that warriors are revealed and that they cannot be made'⁸⁸ and are 'relatively rare'⁸⁹.

Henriksen's examination of 'what makes people actively fight in combat' is a more nuanced and thorough analysis than Newsome's study into the myth, as he defined it, of combat motivation. He offers a reasonable explanation, unlike Newsome, of why some people fight while others with the same training and from the same unit have not done so in the past. By recognising the importance of both extrinsic and intrinsic factors, Henriksen offers a compelling argument that both are essential in understanding why warriors and soldiers fight. Perhaps more importantly, he locates the study in a modern context, as opposed to considering the concept of the warrior in a pre-modern form of Feudal based society⁹⁰. His argument that the warrior is necessarily a soldier, in order to distinguish him/her from unlawful combatants, private actors and mercenaries is helpful, if albeit a specifically Western construct. Ignatieff maintains that the 'new warriors'⁹¹ who form part of some militia or guerrilla group⁹² in a failed or failing state are examples of warriors who 'no

longer play by the rules⁹³. In this context, any notion of the warrior's honour is largely absent⁹⁴. Nevertheless, the distinction between the warrior/soldier and unlawful combatants, private actors and mercenaries is critical to properly understand the concept of the warrior/soldier in a Western setting.

Being



Doing



Though there is much to commend in Henriksen's examination, his distinction between the warrior and the soldier is not as sophisticated as it needs to be to reflect a modern

army like the British Army. He fails to pay sufficient attention to the granularity that exists between someone serving in the Special Forces and someone in the Parachute Regiment (Paras) or the Royal Marine Commandos (Commandos) for example. Although the Paras are one of the main recruiting grounds for the Special Air Service (SAS) and the Commandos for the Special Boat Service (SBS), the commitment to combat by members of the Paras and the Commandos in Afghanistan has been exceptional. In this regard, Guards regiments, Cavalry units (Light Dragoons for example in HERRICK 10), and Regiments of the Line (the Rifles, Mercian, Yorkshire etc) have been involved and distinguished themselves in intense and protracted fighting, killing large numbers of enemy combatants⁹⁵. Even within the United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF) there are a number of elements: SAS, SBS, Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SRR)⁹⁶, Special Forces Support Group (SFSG formally 1 Para but made up of elements of the RAF Regiment)⁹⁷, 18 Signal Regiment⁹⁸ and the Joint Special Forces Aviation Wing⁹⁹. The granularity between the SAS and the SRR is fine, as is the granularity between SFSG and the 2nd or 3rd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment. This idea is emphasised to an even greater extent as all infantry soldiers do exactly the same phase 1&2 training: trainees for the Paras, Guards or regiments of the line all train at the Infantry Training Centre, Catterick; and those wishing to promote to corporal or sergeant in the infantry (including the Paras) do exactly the same promotion course at Brecon.

Any Land Force will have a variety of combat, combat support, combat service support and combat command support elements¹⁰⁰. Combat elements will include armoured, armoured reconnaissance, infantry and attack aviation units. Whereas combat service support includes Royal Logistic Corps, Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Medical Services and Adjutant General's Corp (AGC). Although a modern operation such as Afghanistan can reduce the notion of a frontline to one of semantics¹⁰¹, the commitment to combat required by someone in the AGC is markedly different to someone in an infantry regiment. While a soldier from the AGC may find themselves in combat (an insurgent ambush for example) s/he will not be expected to go on 'fighting patrols' on a daily basis, where contact with the enemy is a daily experience. Without recognition of this granularity, Henriksen's point regarding commitment to combat is not as sophisticated as it needs to be.

3.4 Being and Doing: Existentialist Thought

'The essence' states Henriksen 'of the difference between a soldier and a warrior is this existential commitment'¹⁰². 'Being a warrior' he maintains 'cannot be reduced to instrumental considerations'¹⁰³ and argues that 'to say that a commitment is existential is to define it as irreducible to clear cut drives or calculations of benefit to the individual'¹⁰⁴. He locates the use of the word existential in the context of the warrior's 'commitment to master and experience warfare, who is willing and able to kill and risk sacrificing his life in combat'¹⁰⁵. It is clear that Henriksen makes a clear distinction between 'being a warrior' and 'instrumental considerations' associated with what he does. The warrior's mastery and experience of warfare is based upon 'their intrinsic existential commitment'¹⁰⁶. Using the imagery of the spectrum discussed in chapter 1 the distinction between 'being' and 'doing' may be represented as follows:

Existential

Instrumental

Fig 8

this argument, the Achilles figure is associated with 'being' and 'existential', whereas, the battlefield technician with 'doing' and 'instrumental'. For Coker the warrior..like an ordinary soldier, is a product of both intrinsic and extrinsic factors, or what I would prefer to call the existential and instrumental realms'¹⁰⁷.

'War' Coker maintains 'is *transformative*'¹⁰⁸ [emphasis original] in that war 'allows a warrior to tap into the vein of his own heroism. It allows him to lead an *authentic* life'¹⁰⁹ [emphasis original]. Warriors, according to Coker, are 'three-dimension figures, not two-, because they also subscribe to a historic myth, which is where Achilles becomes important'¹¹⁰. 'The true warrior has a vocation' and 'when he goes into battle for the first time he finds himself. He becomes, to use the language of existentialism, an authentic being'¹¹¹. In *The Future of War* Coker discusses what he describes as 'The Warrior Meme'¹¹² the third of which is authenticity'¹¹³. By the twentieth century, war, he observed, had become more disenchanting for the warrior¹¹⁴ which meant that 'to authenticate his existence on the battlefield' the warrior had to dig deeper into his own subconscious¹¹⁵. To overcome alienation re-engagement with life is required'¹¹⁶, however, as the world entered the nuclear era 'the authenticity meme came under intense challenge'¹¹⁷. 'The attempt' he maintains 'to "authenticate" the warrior was as self-defeating in the 1970s as it had been in World War II. An earlier generation of existentialists' he continues 'like Heidegger, Sartre and Camus had

insisted we accept that alienation is an objective condition of life. Part of what it is to be 'authentic' is to grasp, accept and, perhaps, even affirm this fact'¹¹⁸.

Following Henriksen and Coker it may prove profitable to unpack the distinction between 'being' and 'doing' by exploring further the following ideas: what does existential mean, what is authenticity, and what is alienation and how do these ideas relate to the warrior and or the soldier?

The origin of the word 'existential' dates to the late seventeenth century and comes from the Latin *existentialis*, from *existentia* meaning: '1, existence; 2, that by which essence becomes actual'¹¹⁹. In English it is an adjective and means: '1, of or relating to existence; 2, *Logic* (of a proposition etc.) affirming or implying the existence of a thing; 3, *Philos.* Concerned with existence, esp. with human existence as viewed by existentialism'¹²⁰. The word 'existentially' is an adverb and carries the same meaning as 'existence': '*n.* 1 the fact or condition of being or existing. 2 the manner of one's existence or living, esp. under adverse conditions (a wretched existence). 3 an existing thing. 4 all that exists'¹²¹. When used in association with a human, the word 'existential' implies the 'being' or 'existence' of that person. The reason why it is frequently connected with existentialism is because this philosophical movement explored the concept of what 'existence' means for a human. Unfortunately, 'existential is often thrown around meaninglessly or used in odd ways'¹²². One example would be to say that 'something is existential', without a further qualifying noun.

The word 'existentialism' derives 'from the Danish *existents-forhold* "condition of existence" (frequently used by Kierkegaard), from existential'¹²³. Existentialism is 'a philosophical theory or approach which emphasizes the existence of the individual person as a free and responsible agent determining their own development through acts of the will'¹²⁴. The word 'existentialist' is both a noun and an adjective: (n) 'a philosopher who emphasizes freedom of choice and personal responsibility'; (adj) (relating to or involving

existentialism) "*existentialist movement*"; "*existentialist philosophy*"; "*the existentialist character of his ideas*"¹²⁵. In this thesis the word existentialist will be used to refer to 'thought' or a philosopher within or pertaining to, the existentialist movement or philosophy.

'Being' for humans¹²⁶, or to use Heidegger's word 'Dasein'¹²⁷, is an essential component in seeking to understand what it is 'to be' a person, or what it is to 'exist' as a man/woman. Existentialists normally classify 'Being' in a number of ways: being-in-itself, being-in-situation, being-in-the-world, being-for-others and being-for-itself¹²⁸. A common idea in existentialist thinking is that a person 'suddenly becomes "aware" of their own existence'¹²⁹. 'Awakening' in existentialist thought occurs when a person becomes aware of their own being and of the resultant change this 'awakening' brings in their understanding, perception of and relationship with other people. Essentially, it is the moment when one discovers that one is a distinct and unique individual. Nietzsche described it as 'a time came when one rubbed one's eyes: one is still rubbing them today. One had been dreaming; and the first and foremost dreamers was – Old Kant'¹³⁰. Kierkegaard observes that, 'anxiety is a qualification of dreaming spirit, and as such it has its place in psychology. Awake, the difference between myself and my other is posited; sleeping, it is suspended; dreaming, it is an intimated nothing'¹³¹. What animated existentialist thinkers was their contention that the majority did not live their own lives but rather lived lives expected of them by others, the many, the crowd.

In existentialist thought, authenticity is possible only for those who are awake to their existence, their being. Nietzsche asks, 'what does your conscious say? – "You shall become the person you are"¹³². For Heidegger authenticity was the truth of Dasein because it was 'most primordial'¹³³. He elaborates his position by stating that, 'resoluteness, as *authentic Being-one's-Self*, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating "I", and how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness,

is *authentically* nothing else than *Being-in-the-world?* [all emphases original]¹³⁴. In other words, to live an authentic life means to engage in my own projects, as my own as I live in the world. To be authentic in existentialist terms, the projects I engage in must be mine, because of my own understanding of myself and what it means to be me, free from external constraints and expectations. ‘Authenticity’, according to Crowell, ‘defines a condition on self-making: do I succeed in making *myself*, or will who I am merely be a function of the roles I find myself in’¹³⁵.

The opposite of living an authentic life is that of living an inauthentic one. As one might expect, inauthentic life is the opposite of what it means to live authentically. In *Being and Nothingness*¹³⁶, Sartre uses illustrations of how some construct themselves around the expectation of others. One of his famous examples is that of a waiter. In this illustration the waiter is inauthentic in that he was only playing the role of being a waiter¹³⁷. A person may be described as being inauthentic whenever they are merely occupying a role. An example of living an inauthentic life might be a man who chooses a career path because that particular career path is one that is expected of him by either his family or community. This career is not his own choice but one made for others and their expectation of him; being-for-others rather than being-for-itself.

Existentialists use the word alienation to describe that state whenever the ‘self’ gets a glimpse of what it could be but instantly intuits that it is not that. Sartre’s paradoxical sounding assertion is an excellent illustration, ‘yet the for-itself is. It is, we may say, even if it is a being which is not what it is and which is what it is not’¹³⁸. In other words, and without wishing to sound just as paradoxical, ‘myself’ sees its ‘potential self’ understands that it is not that ‘self’ and lives in the consequent alienation from that ‘potential self’. The result of this is that those who are awake, live with the reality of their alienation and resultant ‘angst’ of that alienation or as Kierkegaard would also describe it, existing in ‘despair’.

The subject of angst or despair is central in much of Kierkegaard's thought. In *Sickness Unto Death*, he argues that there are three kinds of despair: i. despair at not being conscious of having a self '(Despair Improperly So Called)'; ii. in despair at not willing to be oneself; iii. in despair at willing to be oneself¹³⁹. Not to live in despair he argues later in this book 'must mean the annihilation of the possibility of being this; if it is to be true that a man is not in despair, one must annihilate the possibility every instant'. In effect what Kierkegaard is saying is that the only way to be free from despair is to annihilate the possibility of becoming 'one's-self', remaining unaware of one's own potential. To be awake to one's potential is to invite despair, according to Kierkegaard. Indeed he maintains, 'so then it is an infinite advantage to be able to despair; and yet it is not only the greatest misfortune and misery to be in despair; no, it is perdition'¹⁴⁰. To be conscious of one's alienation is to be aware of Dasein's potential and yet it is to accept, as an advantage, the perdition of despair. It is little wonder that Kierkegaard lived a somewhat lonely life.

Going to war for the warrior does not guarantee authenticity in an existentialist sense; someone can be inauthentic in any setting. War creates a very specific and possibly unique set of opportunities (in combat with an enemy, using direct-fire weapons) for an individual to be authentic in a distinctive environment or as Coker described it 'when he goes into battle for the first time he finds himself. He becomes, to use the language of existentialism, an authentic being'¹⁴¹. In existentialist thought looking at the content of someone's life does not reveal authenticity; that would reduce the idea of authenticity to a functional act of utility. Function and utility are concepts that fit easily with the notion of the battlefield technician. An act, in existentialist thought, is *inauthentic* if that act is done for the sake of duty or some other external motive, like the praise of others, or simply because it is what 'one' does. But I can do the same thing *authentically* if, in keeping my promise for the sake of duty, acting this way is something I choose as my own, something to which, apart from its social sanction, I

commit myself because I intuit that such action enables me to realise my own personal project.

For example, as a thought experiment, imagine a foot patrol in Afghanistan which comes under heavy enemy fire. Seeing the gravity of the situation Cpl A decides to take action B, which as a consequence puts his life at great risk. If Cpl A decided upon B because B was expected of him by the others in the patrol, in existentialist thought, he has acted *inauthentically*, because he was playing a part given to him. However, if Cpl A does B because B is how he perceives himself and is owned by Cpl A as his choice in his project of becoming, then Cpl A has acted *authentically*. In this case A's actions are not as a result of role playing but centred in his understanding of who he perceives himself to be. In both cases, Cpl A acts bravely, possibly saving the lives of his men. However, it is only in the latter case that he has succeeded in being *authentic* because he acted as himself and not in relation to a role expected of him. To those in the patrol, A's actions will be highly regarded. However, only Cpl A will know if he has performed as an actor playing a part or acted as himself, revealing someone involved in the process of becoming. Herein lies the fundamental difference. With the role of the actor, his ability to continue in that role is bounded by the part created for him by the expectations of 'others': he cannot go beyond that part for it is not his own, it is the creation of 'others'. Whereas, if A's actions were part of his self-awareness of his own choice, then action B was an integral element of his ontological development (similar to Maslow's self-actualisation).

3.5 Conclusions

A Cartesian approach to a 'subject' tends to be mechanistic, viewing the 'subject/object' as a substance with definable properties and that conform to universal laws of behaviour. This approach tends to focus upon mechanical, rational and logical factors. In


existentialist thought, what it means to be, or of being, cannot be fully understood in terms of a universal law of behaviour, an aspect that is measured not in terms of an objective inventory of *what* I am but in terms of my *way* of being it'. Tragically, the nobility of the Cartesian 'subject' had been reduced by the nineteenth and early twentieth century to a desubjectified utility to be used and defined by what it was able to do within the industrialised machine. However, when confronted with industrial carnage, those who had been objectified did not behave as conditioned parts of an inhuman machine. Instead of Pavlovian response, the majority of soldiers, regardless of nationality, and to their great honour responded with remarkable restraint.

Any definition of what the warrior is, in a Western construct, must firstly reflect a societal model based upon mutual service, in terms of profitable exchange, where the warrior is brought into a specific relationship with society in general. In a Western social setting, this exchange relationship is based upon serving a political cause for pay. It is this that distinguishes the warrior from the mercenary. Secondly, it must be able to accommodate Cartesian and Existentialist thought in terms of both 'being' which is existential and 'doing' which is instrumental. Thirdly, it must offer a basis upon which to distinguish the warrior from the soldier but offers the granularity required to reflect the complexity of soldiering in a modern army like the British Army.

The following definition of what the warrior is, is drawn from each of the three sections in this chapter. A warrior is:

A professional soldier whose individual 'being' is intuited in combat (using direct-fire weapons) and who embracing the cost of their authenticity (killing and risk to life and limb) is prepared to accept the angst of alienation when not in combat.

The use of the words 'a professional soldier' locates this definition of a warrior within a specifically Western social imaginary, and reflects the social and political process of mutual exchange inherent within a social contract. It also follows Henriksen's helpful observation



that distinguishes the warrior from the mercenary. The words 'whose individual "being" is intuited in combat' identifies the warrior as a person who, to use the language of existentialist thought, is awakened to his/her 'being' and their distinct individuality. Their experience of combat provides the context of the 'self's situatedness of-itself' and in that moment, discovers him/herself in a unique and potentially life-changing manner.

The words 'in combat (using direct-fire weapons)' makes a clear distinction between the warrior who engages an enemy combatant 'at close hand' and the drone pilot who is 'at a distance' and has a 'dislocated experience of the battlefield'. It also locates the warrior's understanding of him/herself offering a vivid expression of what it means to be, and the opportunity to be, authentic. This, however, has a cost to the warrior; s/he must embrace the reality and actuality of killing and the risk of being killed in order to experience their own authenticity. A deeper and more profound price the warrior must pay, also reflects the wider professional role expected of him/her and that is 'the angst of alienation when not in combat'. The profession of arms is such that the warrior does not spend the majority of their military service on the battlefield. For much of their military service the warrior will be expected to train and prepare for future operational deployments. In the British Army they are no different in this regard to every other professional soldier. The difference of course for the warrior is that s/he must endure the angst of alienation from the context in which their authenticity has been experienced in a powerful and potentially life-changing manner.

A word of caution is required here. The warrior's preparedness to accept the angst of alienation when not combat, might be pushed to an intolerable level if the tasks required of him/her are not directly related to training and preparation: for battle, combat situations or developing their martial skills. Most infantry soldiers despise the mundanity of barrack life. Various inspections and internal validations of inventory are essential; they are, nevertheless, mind-numbingly tedious. Excessive administration and tasks that have no immediate link

~~with their sense of authenticity might function as a false type of alienation, in that it~~ introduces a secondary removal from the battlefield and his/her martial sense of 'being'. If allowed to continue and measures are not taken to rectify the problem, this might begin to affect the moral component of the warrior's fighting power.

The thought experiment outlined in chapter 1 imagined a spectrum between the Warrior and the Weapons Platform, with Achilles as an example at one extreme and the battlefield technician/weapons platform at the other. Developing this concept further by applying it to the concept of 'being' and 'doing' this idea may be expressed in the following diagram:

Fig 9

In figure 9 the image on the extreme left represents Achilles, and the figure on the extreme right is of a soldier launching a handheld drone and represents the battlefield technician.

~~What this diagram illustrates in the granularity required when considering the distinction~~ between the warrior and the soldier. When viewed through the lens of extreme reference points (Achilles and the battlefield technician/ weapons platform) the distance between the two is literally and metaphorically immense. However, the distance between the two extremes is populated with a spectrum in which the distinction can be less easy to identify. This can be seen within the UKSF (SAS, SBS, SRR, SFSG etc). The granularity is also fine but distinguishable between UKSF and the rest of the Combat Arms. This chapter has demonstrated that a sophisticated understanding of a modern army, like the British Army, is required when creating a distinction between the warrior and the soldier and as figures 8 and 9 have shown this may be framed in the language of 'being' and 'doing'.

¹ For the convenience of the reader it will be reproduced at this point:

If a spectrum between Warrior and Weapons Platform is imagined, what does it tell us about how the nature of the British Soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary British society?

² For the convenience of the reader the two sub-questions are set out below:

- Is the difference between warrior and battlefield technician the difference between 'being' and 'doing'?
- If the concept of the soldier as weapons platform/battlefield technician represents an instrumental notion of ontology (i.e. a unit of utility), does a focus on 'doing' potentially undermine 'being' and therefore the sustainment of fighting power?

³ For example see, *Land Warrior 2000*, which actually refers to equipment, weapons systems used by the US soldier.

⁴ TL Challans, *Awakening Warrior: Revolution in the Ethics of Warfare* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2007).

⁵ For an excellent introductory article on Cartesian Epistemology see, Lex Newman 'Descartes' Epistemology' in *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, (revision 11 Jul 0) <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/> (accessed 5 Apr 14).

⁶ R Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Meditation II.3, 'Of the Nature of the Human Mind; and that it is more easily known than the body', (trans J Veitch 1901) downloaded <http://www.wright.edu/cola/descartes/meditation2.html> (accessed 5 Apr 14).

⁷ S Crowell, 'Existentialism' *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, (revision 11 Oct 10) downloaded from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/> (accessed 10 Apr 14).

⁸ Crowell, 'Existentialism', p7.

⁹ Although the German philosopher Immanuel Kant had taken European philosophical thought beyond Descartes, the dualism that Descartes had introduced in western philosophy still dominated every strand of philosophical debate. That is, however, with the exception of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.

¹⁰ The OED defines the word 'instrumental' as '1.1 Relating to something's function as a means to an end'. When an individual is defined as a means to an end, they are, in effect, reduced to what they do.

- ¹¹ The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization, and, above all, by the “disenchantment of the world”. Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations’ Max Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation’ (1918-1919) taken from Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology*, translated and ed. By HH Gerth and C Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) p155.
- ¹² MH MacKinnon, ‘Max Weber’s Disenchantment: Lineages of Kant and Channing’, in *JCS* (2001) Vol 1, No 3, p329-351, argues that Weber’s concept of disenchantment was as a result of his view that Kant’s reason had failed to deliver the ‘progress’ or rational-ascetic that Kant predicted.
- ¹³ Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation’, p139.
- ¹⁴ C Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2007) p26.
- ¹⁵ Nietzsche first articulates this idea in *The Gay Science*, book 3 section 108 before expounding it in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, translated by RJ Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 2003) book 1.
- ¹⁶ For a useful and succinct introduction into Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism see, KA Pearson, *Nietzsche* (London: Granta, 2005) chapter 9 ‘Nihilism and the Will to Nothingness’ p94-104.
- ¹⁷ C Coker, *Future War: The Re-Enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004) p25.
- ¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹ A Huxley, *Brave New World* (London: Vintage, 2004).
- ²⁰ Ibid., p2.
- ²¹ In chapter 17 during the conversation between the Controller and the Savage, Mustapha Mond announces ‘that there used to be something called God –before the Nine years War’.
- ²² Ibid., p70.
- ²³ See chapter 2, *Brave New World*, and the ‘Neo-Pavlovian Conditioning Rooms’.
- ²⁴ Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p75.
- ²⁵ Ibid., p76.
- ²⁶ Ibid., p77.
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p74.
- ²⁹ See Cooker, *Future of War: The Re-Enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), particularly chapter 1, p1-45.
- ³⁰ *Übermensch* is frequently translated as ‘the Superman’ by scholars.
- ³¹ Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Prologue 2 p40.
- ³² Ibid.
- ³³ Ibid., p80.
- ³⁴ T Roberts, ‘Awaiting Love: Nietzsche’s (Com)Passion’, in SV Hicks and A Rosenberg (eds.) *Reading Nietzsche at the Margins* (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2008) p 95.
- ³⁵ Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p32.
- ³⁶ Paris, *Warrior Nation: Images of War in British Popular Culture, 1850-2000* (London: Reaktion, 2000), p13 - 18.
- ³⁷ Coker, *Future War*, p18.
- ³⁸ As cited in, C Coker, *Waging War Without Warriors? The Changing Culture of Military Conflict* (London: Rienner, 2002) p8.
- ³⁹ R Holmes, *Acts of War: The Behaviour of Men in Battle* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003) p382.
- ⁴⁰ See T Ashworth, *Trench Warfare: 1914-1918 The Live and Let Live System* (London: Pan, 1980).
- ⁴¹ M Hastings, *Armageddon: Battle for Germany 1944-45* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2004).
- ⁴² J Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing: Face to Face Killing in the 20th Century* (London: Granta, 1999).
- ⁴³ Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing*, p173.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., p61.
- ⁴⁵ For example see, A Danchev and D Todman (eds) *War Diaries 1939-1945: Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001) p526. Churchill on this particular occasion called them ‘useless’.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., p558.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid.
- ⁴⁸ R Henriksen, ‘Warriors in Combat – What makes People Actually Fight in Combat?’ in *JSS* (2007) Vol 30, No2, p192.
- ⁴⁹ Holmes, *Acts of War*, p271.
- ⁵⁰ E Jünger, *Storm of Steel* (London: Penguin, 2004). K Marlantes, *What It Is Like To Go To War* (London: Corvus, 2012) offers a contemporary reflection of why men go to war.
- ⁵¹ Holmes, *Acts of War*, p272.

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- ⁵² Ibid.
- ⁵³ Ibid., p173.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid., p274.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid., p284.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid., p285. Holmes maintains that ‘regular soldiers can only have their aversion for politics reinforced by the ebb and flow of foreign policy’ (p285).
- ⁵⁸ B Newsome, ‘The myth of intrinsic combat motivation’, in *JSS* (2003) Vol 26, No4, p24-46.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid., p25.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid., p24.
- ⁶¹ Ibid., p27.
- ⁶² Ibid., p32.
- ⁶³ Which he maintains are more characteristic of British than American literature, Ibid., p33.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid., p41.
- ⁶⁵ Henriksen, ‘Warriors in Combat’, p 194.
- ⁶⁶ Holmes, *Acts of War*, notes that ‘although most modern analysts would disagree with at least some of Marshall’s conclusions, or might suggest that his research methods are not always reliable, there can be no doubting the importance of *Men Against Fire*’ (p13).
- ⁶⁷ SLA Marshall, *Men Against Fire: the Problem of Battle Command* (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, 2000) 54.
- ⁶⁸ For a treatment of how Marshall conducted his research, see JW Chambers II, ‘SLA Marshall’s *Men Against Fire*: New Evidence Regarding Fire Ratios’ in *Parameters* (2003) Autumn p113-121.
- ⁶⁹ D Grossman, *On Killing* (New York: Little Brown, 1995) p xv.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid., p11.
- ⁷¹ Ibid., p35.
- ⁷² Ibid.
- ⁷³ Grossman, *On Killing* p12.
- ⁷⁴ Henriksen, ‘Warriors in Combat’, p 195. Those who “merely are there” is an interesting expression, especially when the most decorated soldier in the First World War was a medic (see Holmes, *Acts of War* p197 and his reference to Private WH Coltman, VC, DCM and Bar, MM and Bar). Combat medics in combination with the Medical Emergency Response Teams (MERT) display incredible courage for those who ‘merely are there’. They are considered an invaluable and essential part of any combat patrol, just as vital to mission success as a rifleman.
- ⁷⁵ Cited in Henriksen, ‘Warriors in Combat’, p 196.
- ⁷⁶ Henriksen, ‘Warriors in Combat’, p 196.
- ⁷⁷ Ibid.
- ⁷⁸ Ibid., p197.
- ⁷⁹ Grossman, *On Killing* p180; Henriksen, ‘Warriors in Combat’, p 196.
- ⁸⁰ Grossman, *On Killing* p179.
- ⁸¹ See Army Doctrine Publications *Operations* p4-7 paragraph 0413. Available https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33695/ADPOperationsDec10.pdf (downloaded 12 Apr 14).
- ⁸² Ibid., paragraph 0513 p5-7.
- ⁸³ Operation Panther’s Claw is one example from Operation HERRICK. See <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/5859653/Operation-Panthers-Claw-how-British-troops-are-hunting-the-Taliban-to-the-end.html> (accessed 12 Apr 14). In this operation by regular British infantry regiments/battlegroups an estimated 200 enemy fighters were killed. An example from Iraq is the so-called battle of Danny Boy. Iraqi insurgents ambushed soldiers from the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders near a checkpoint called Danny Boy, three miles north-east of Majar al-Kabir. In the firefight 20 Iraqis were killed out of an estimated force of 100. See <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10712716/British-soldiers-did-not-murder-Iraqis-in-Battle-of-Danny-Boy-families-now-accept.html> (accessed 12 Apr 14).
- ⁸⁴ Henriksen, ‘Warriors in Combat’, p 199.
- ⁸⁵ Ibid. His use of the word existential will be considered in the next section.
- ⁸⁶ Ibid. He also includes unlawful combatants and private actors as well as mercenaries.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid., p207. Henriksen argues that ‘while a good soldier is not necessarily a warrior, the warriors often become primary group leaders among these soldiers’ (p208). The argument that ‘a good soldier is not necessarily a warrior’ is strong; he is on weaker ground regarding the leadership qualities of the warrior. The warrior may be a good leader, or he may not. Leadership qualities and those of associated with a warrior are not necessarily identical. In *Developing Leaders: A British Army Guide* (Camberley: MOD, 2014) there is no

attempt to limit leadership to a single definition. Instead a number of quotes are used to highlight aspects of this important concept. For example, 'leadership is the capacity and the will to rally men and women to a common purpose and cause and the character which will inspire confidence...but must be based on a moral authority – the truth' (Field Marshall Montgomery p5); 'leadership is the art of achieving more than the science of management says is possible' (Colin Powell, p5); 'leadership is about the ability to inspire, develop and reinforce in ourselves and others the Core Values of the British Army so that we "Do the right thing on a difficult day, when no one is watching"' (Army Recruitment, Training and Development *Leadership Handbook* p5). A warrior may have the ability to develop and inspire others or he may not; indeed he may have little desire to have the responsibility of leading and inspiring others.

⁸⁸ Henriksen, 'Warriors in Combat', p 210.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p219.

⁹⁰ See B Ehrenreich, *Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War* (London: Virago, 1997).

Ehrenreich adopts an anthropological approach to her study of what a warrior is. In chapter 3 'The Warrior Elite' she describes the pre-modern warrior as a predator (p150) who lived off the efforts of those the warrior considered serfs. Although she acknowledges that her generalising about the warrior elites means that she glides recklessly over vast cultural differences and historical changes (p151), she states that 'if there is any excuse for generalizing about warrior elites, it is that they themselves have freely done so' (p151). She cites General Douglas MacArthur's famous image of a 'long gray line' of West Point alumni 'stretching back thousands of years' (p151, 153). What she makes little attempt to do, however, is discuss the implications of the social contact articulated by Locke that effectively undermined societal models of hierarchical complementary (see C Taylor, *Social Imaginaries* p13-16). In a societal model based upon mutual service, in terms of profitable exchange, the warrior/soldier is brought into a different relationship with society in general. The parasite model of the predator is replaced within a society based upon equality and mutual service. The warrior/soldier serves not only his own selfish interests but those of the society that offers the exchange of pay for service.

⁹¹ M Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor* (New York: Vintage, 1999) p124

⁹² Ibid., p125.

⁹³ Ibid., p157. Ehrenreich's portrayal of the warrior as a predator living off others, like a parasite, is relevant in this type of situation.

⁹⁴ Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor* p157.

⁹⁵ See <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newsttopics/onthefrontline/5859653/Operation-Panthers-Claw-how-British-troops-are-hunting-the-Taliban-to-the-end.html> (accessed 12 Apr 14).

⁹⁶ See

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmhansrd/vo050405/wmstext/50405m01.htm#50405m01.html_sbhd5 (accessed 13 Apr 14).

⁹⁷ See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/4928028.stm> (accessed 13 Apr 14).

⁹⁸ See <http://www.army.mod.uk/signals/25870.aspx> (accessed 13 Apr 14).

⁹⁹ See <http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafodiham/aboutus/jsfaw.cfm> (accessed 13 Apr 14).

¹⁰⁰ For a brief description of these elements see Army Doctrine Publications *Operations* p4-7 paragraph 0413. Available https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33695/ADPOperationsDec10.pdf (downloaded 12 Apr 14).

¹⁰¹ Modern conflict will be discussed in chapter 6.

¹⁰² Henriksen, 'Warriors in Combat', p 201.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p199.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p207.

¹⁰⁷ C Coker, *The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007) p6.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p4.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p5.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p7.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p6.

¹¹² C Coker, *The Future War: The Re-Enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004) p47-68. He states that 'the word "meme" was first coined in 1976 to describe the practices, conventions and taboos that codify choices. Unlike a gene, which is copied to the offspring from its parents, a meme by analogy is anything that replicates itself or is copied via memory' (p47).

¹¹³ Coker, *The Future War*. The first according to Coker is 'excellence' (p51-57) and the second 'merit' (p58-63).

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p63.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p65.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p66.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p67.

¹¹⁸ C Coker, *The Future War: The Re-Enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004) p67.

¹¹⁹ See, <http://www.latin-dictionary.net/definition/19790/existentia-existentiae> (accessed 4 Feb 14).

¹²⁰ See the OED.

¹²¹ See the OED.

¹²² See <http://grammarist.com/usage/existential/> (accessed 4 Feb 14) for examples.

¹²³ See <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/existentialism> (accessed 4 Feb 14).

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ See <http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=existentialist> (accessed 4 Feb 14).

¹²⁶ Cooper, *Existentialism*, p60, makes the point that, ‘a dog does not ask itself “What is it to be a dog?”’, or “What is it to exist as a dog?” Therefore the kind of Being which distinguishes humans from all other kinds of Being is partly distinguished by the very asking of the question in the first place. So Dasein is a manner of Being which questions Being. No other entity does this’.

¹²⁷ Heidegger explains his use of this word in this way, ‘the very asking of this question is an entity’s mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about - namely, Being. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term “Dasein”’, M Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans J Macquarrie and E Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967) p27.

¹²⁸ For a brief consideration of this see annex 1.

¹²⁹ S Earnshaw, *Existentialism: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum, 2006) p14.

¹³⁰ F Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* (London: Penguin, 1973) p42.

¹³¹ As cited in S Earnshaw, *Existentialism: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum, 2006) p15.

¹³² F Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* trans W Kaufmann (New York: Random, 1991) section 270.

¹³³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 343.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p344.

¹³⁵ Crowell, ‘Existentialism’, p13-14.

¹³⁶ Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, Part One, chapter 2, ‘Bad Faith’ p46-67.

¹³⁷ See annex 1 for this example from *Being and Nothingness*.

¹³⁸ Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p79.

¹³⁹ S Kierkegaard, *Sickness Unto Death* (downloaded from <http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=2067&C=1863> (accessed 5 Mar 09) chapter 1, ‘That Despair is the Sickness Unto Death’.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., section B, ‘Possibility and Actuality of Despair’.

¹⁴¹ Coker, *The Warrior Ethos*, p6.

Chapter 4

Clausewitz, Trinitarian War and New Wars

4.1 Introduction

There is considerable debate and disagreement among some scholars and writers¹, as to whether war has been undergoing a profound change or evolution in the late twentieth century and early years of the twenty-first century. Proponents of these new wars², as they are frequently referred to, maintain that the classical definition of war is inapplicable to the forms of organised violence witnessed in many modern conflicts; the essence of the argument being that the nature of these ‘small wars’ could be cultural, religious or economic. Others argue that although the character of war may change, its essential nature remains the same³ and fundamentally reject any suggestion that war has evolved. Gray is adamant that ‘war is organised violence threatened or waged for political purposes. That is its nature. If the behaviour under scrutiny is other than that just defined, it is not war’⁴.

This chapter will consider the nature of war both in its classic definition and as it has been described by those who maintain that the ‘new wars’ are, in essence, essentially different. Structurally the chapter will be divided into two main parts. The first will primarily consist in an examination of the classic definition of war, as described by the Prussian Army officer and philosopher Carl von Clausewitz. This will involve a detailed consideration of his work on war’s essential nature. Central to this will be an analysis of the question: is war Trinitarian? The proposition, espoused by some scholars that the universal, eternal truth of war’s nature was articulated by Clausewitz will be carefully examined primarily against a post-modern model. The second part of this chapter will consider the phenomenon described by some as ‘new wars’, including a review of several narratives of war utilized by some to both explain war and identify trends in modern war. It will also examine the role of the state and politics in these ‘new wars’ before considering how International Law, war and terrorism are also understood to interact in relation to them.

4.2 Classic Definition of War

Man's relationship with war has been an enduring reality, so too has his interest in the study of war and warfare. In the West⁵, the classic work of Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, continues to remain influential⁶. The compendium of Flavius Renatus Vegetius, *Concerning Military Matters*, produced sometime around AD390, was translated widely and even used by George Washington⁷. Niccoló Machiavelli, perhaps more famous for his work *The Prince* (1513), also wrote a seven volume work called *Art of War* (1519-20)⁸. In the East, the classic treatise is without doubt Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*⁹. However, particularly in regard to the modern Western way of war, the undisputed classic is Carl von Clausewitz's *Vom Kriege* or in English *On War*¹⁰. The purpose of this section is the consideration of the extent to which Clausewitz's theory of war is applicable in the twenty-first century; it is not a detailed study of *On War*¹¹.

Some vigorously maintain that the use of the concept or term 'new wars' is inappropriate. His modern defenders maintain that *On War* is more than a culturally situated study, influential as it has undoubtedly been. Instead, what commentators like Gray contend is that Clausewitz produced the definitive explanation of the eternal features of war's nature¹². Even van Creveld in his treatment of why Clausewitz's work has been 'able to withstand every kind of political, social, economic and technological change', entitled his paper 'The Eternal Clausewitz'¹³. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, *On War* continues to be a key text the field of military studies; that is for any seeking to understand the essential features of war¹⁴. Although published some 182 years ago (1832) Clausewitz's magnum opus continues to be considered the equivalent of 'a Copernican shift' in military thinking¹⁵. Consequently, this section will also explore the unique contribution that Clausewitz's work made that still resonates so long after its publication.

4.2.1 Clausewitz and the Nature of War

Clausewitz never completed his work *On War*, at least to his own satisfaction¹⁶; only chapter one was ever thoroughly finished in this manner¹⁷. This has given rise to some commentators using phrases like, ‘The Two Clausewitzes’¹⁸ and ‘the younger’ or ‘mature Clausewitz’¹⁹ in an attempt to help reconcile what are thought by some to be inconsistencies²⁰. Gat prefers to argue that ‘the obscurity of Clausewitz’s text has continually left room for conflicting and unhistorical interpretations’²¹. Inherent within this perceived contrast between the younger and the more mature military philosopher’s thought, is the notion that his theory of war might have developed through continual reflection and practical observation. This basic idea that his theory of war may have developed or been refined seems at odds with those who talk about Clausewitz’s discovery or statement of ‘the eternal realities of war’²². If Clausewitz’s thoughts on war developed during his own, short, lifetime it seems reasonable to argue that reflection on the nature, or essence, of war might also have benefited from a further process of refinement or revision, post-Clausewitz. For example, Newton’s three laws of physics were not displaced by Einstein’s general theory of relativity, indeed they were incorporated within it. The significant difference between the two ideas in physics is that Newton’s universe was fixed whereas Einstein’s expanded and was in a state of constant movement. Those historians, who contend that Clausewitz’s theory of war is in essence eternal and universal, and thereby fixed and unchanging, belong more to the Enlightenment world of Newton’s fixed properties rather than the universe that expands and evolves.

Howard observes that ‘apart from the authors of memoirs and narrative histories, writers on war had hitherto fallen into three categories’²³: those who dealt with practical questions such as ‘armament, supply, drill and deployment’²⁴; those who maintained that there were no principles of war and where everything was a matter of individual genesis²⁵;

finally, those who described war as a science, having laws and principles for its conduct. In chapter 3 of *On War*, Clausewitz specifically addresses the question of whether it was appropriate to use the terms ‘art’ and ‘science’ to war. He accepted that ‘all thought is art’²⁶ and ‘that the term “the art of war” was more suitable than “the science of war”’²⁷. Clausewitz maintained that war is an act of human interaction:

We therefore conclude that war does not belong in the realm of arts and sciences; rather it is part of man’s social existence. War is a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed – that is the only way it differs from other conflicts. Rather than comparing it to art we could more accurately compare it to commerce, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is still closer to politics, which in turn may be considered as a kind of commerce on a larger scale. Politics, moreover, is the womb in which war develops...²⁸

It is interesting to note that when Engels wrote to Marx he said, ‘among other things I am now reading Clausewitz’s *On War*. A strange way of philosophising, but very good on his subject... Fighting is to war what cash payment is to trade’²⁹. This allusion to commerce as a form of war is also frequently found in Jihadist writings³⁰. However, Clausewitz was not writing about economics, science or art, these were little more than illustrations to communicate his essential interest. His focus was rather the philosophical consideration of the nature of war: ‘but in war more than any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole’³¹. In the following definition we can perhaps detect something of his mature philosophical reflection on this subject in his confident assertion:

I shall not begin by expounding a pedantic, literary definition of war, but go straight to the heart of the matter, to the duel. War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tried through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his *immediate* aim is to *throw* his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance.

*War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.*³²

Clausewitz’s philosophical world was very much Kantian, in that he believed or accepted that an archetypal form of war existed³³. In other words, he would have sought to identify what it was about war that conformed to the basic Kantian notion of the ‘thing-in-

itself' (*Ding-an-sich*)³⁴. Lenoard contends that 'he looked upon this absolute concept of war as an ideal, a rule, by which to measure all military activities'³⁵. Nietzsche's critique of the inherent philosophical weakness of this rationalist belief did not yet exist. This makes Gallie's comment concerning Clausewitz's intention that 'in this he was almost certainly deluded, obsessed by the would-be philosopher's mare's-nest'³⁶, excessive. He argues that 'there is nothing particularly deep or difficult – or revealing – about our received conception of war. War is, logically as well as physically, a rough-and-ready as well as brutal and bloody affair. And philosophers and military men have been, for once, at one and right in refusing to waste their time in worrying about its essential nature'³⁷. Although he makes some bold assertions, Gallie offers little by way of explanation. Why is war a logically rough-and-ready as well as bloody affair?³⁸ Is there something inherent within war that gives it this philosophical, logical necessity? To make this assertion one must surely have already discerned its essential nature in order to make such a claim. Unfortunately, Gallie does little more than dismiss the very idea, without stating what it is he is dismissing. Although the basic proposition that Clausewitz has identified 'eternal, universal truths' may be questioned as an absolute truth, the fact that his insight into an important aspect of war has spanned three centuries is little less than astounding.

It is clear that in *On War* Clausewitz held to the proposition that not only did war have an objective nature (stated above) but that it also had a subjective nature³⁹. This was an accepted part of German philosophical thought at this time. Gray is correct when he asserts that from this perspective the objective nature of war would remain unchanging⁴⁰. Whether Clausewitz's identification is correct and universal is a matter for debate. The subjective nature of war would be seen in the character in which it manifested itself. In this regard it could, and indeed was subject to change and development, for example, in regard to

technology, application or the size of the armies involved⁴¹. Clausewitz was clear that modern war would have this dual, objective and subjective nature.

Another important dualism in Clausewitzian thought is his notion of limited and absolute war; what he describes as 'absolute war and real war'⁴². Howard maintains that Clausewitz had this distinction in his mind for many years before he sought to give greater clarity to the idea in his later rewriting of *On War*⁴³. In his note of 10 July 1827 concerning his plans for revising *On War*, Clausewitz writes, 'this distinction between the two kinds of war is a matter of actual fact'⁴⁴. In his revised first chapter he outlines the distinction between a theoretical concept and the physical reality of actual war. 'Once the antagonists have ceased to be mere figments of a theory and become actual states and governments, when war is no longer a theoretical affair but a series of actions obeying its own peculiar laws, reality supplied the data from which we can deduce the unknown that lies ahead'⁴⁵. This is classically a form of Platonic thought, in which the physical expression of an idealised form is only an imperfect copy of the perfect ideal⁴⁶.

Immediately following his articulation of this move from the theoretical to the real, or absolute (in his philosophical use of the term) to the limited (realised physical expression), he refers to the subject he mentioned in the second section of his revised first book; that is, the political⁴⁷. For Clausewitz, politics gave war its purpose, shaped its goals and set its desired outcomes. He explained that:

We deliberately use the phrase "with the addition of other means" because we also want to make clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different... The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into subsequent peace... War cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.⁴⁸

Clausewitz uses the political component of war to give the expression of real/limited war its sense of purpose and meaning⁴⁹: 'war is only a branch of political activity; that it is in no

sense autonomous'⁵⁰. However, he also argued forcefully that 'war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force'⁵¹. He dismissed the idea that 'kind-hearted people might of course think that there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed.... Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed'⁵². This was a reaction to those who had argued that the careful marshalling and disposition of troops was enough on occasions to settle a war. He accepted that 'there may be a skilful ordering of priority of engagements in strategy; indeed that is what strategy is all about, and we do not wish to deny it. We do claim, however, that direct annihilation of the enemy's forces must always be the dominant consideration'⁵³. War for Clausewitz was a bloody affair, which had embedded within its nature a propensity to violence in its most extreme forms.

Herein lays a fundamental juxtaposition within Clausewitzian philosophy. On the one hand he maintains that 'the maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect'⁵⁴. War, he argues, is a continuation of political policy by other means; as such it provided the necessary mechanism to give sense, purpose, meaning to the applied use of force. The planned use of force by commanders should also manifest intellect, at both its strategic and tactical application. Whereas on the other hand he also stated that 'to introduce in the philosophy of war a principle of moderation would be an absurdity.... War is an act of violence pursued to its utmost ends'⁵⁵. Howard observes that 'this model of dialectically opposed but linked concepts clearly fascinated Clausewitz, as it did so many of his contemporaries among German thinkers'⁵⁶. Heuser is less charitable in her contention that 'the consequence is.... that Clausewitz never managed fully to think through some of the implications of his own discovery of the relationship between political aims and the conduct of war'⁵⁷.

Liddell Hart, one of Clausewitz's most severe critics, blamed this dichotomy for the destructive manner in which the First World War was conducted on the Western Front⁵⁸. In response Howard notes that 'Clausewitz's defenders could reply that, given the issues that were seen to be at stake, the war could only be settled by such a 'trail of moral and physical forces by means of the latter'⁵⁹. He continues that 'the First World War was conducted as it was not because the major military figures happened to have read Clausewitz, but because it was so determined by the social and political structure of their epoch'⁶⁰. At one level this observation is valid as it places the blame for the carnage of that human apocalypse squarely upon the shoulders of those who made the decisions that led to the major nations in Europe stumbling into war⁶¹. However, if governments and their military staffs were convinced that the theory proposed by Clausewitz was the universal truth of war, this dilutes Howard's defence. It produces a zero-sum approach to a known universal principle that ultimately may have created the conditions in which this war escalated to heretofore unimagined levels of death and destruction. This type of defence is not unlike the one that goes: Oppenheimer was a physicist; the decision to use the atomic bomb had nothing to do with him. The reader must determine for themselves the weight of responsibility upon the noted physicist.

Clausewitz's 'remarkable trinity' is an indispensable, integral part of his philosophy of war⁶².

War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of the government alone.

Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.⁶³

It is tempting to contemplate that this section indicates Clausewitz's mature reflection upon the theory of war, in which he groups together those component parts that in his mind are a philosophically necessary part. The simple and yet striking analogy of war being 'like an object suspended between three magnets' goes some way to encapsulate the essence of his philosophy⁶⁴.

4.2.2 *Is War Trinitarian?*

At the beginning of this sub-section it is essential to offer some parameters as to its purpose. It will not be an evaluation of how influential Clausewitz's theory of war has been⁶⁵. Neither will it offer an exhaustive survey of opinions as to the merit or otherwise of his philosophy⁶⁶. It will however, seek to examine the extent to which Clausewitz established the identification of war's essential nature. This process will help establish the conditions to better explore the concept of 'new wars' in the second section of this chapter.

Clausewitz set himself the task of identifying 'eternal truths about war'⁶⁷. There are a number of scholars today (for example, Gray, Smith, Echevarria etc.) who maintain that he achieved just that. In an article that specifically challenges the whole premise of 'new wars' Smith argues that the very concept is based upon a false premise. He states that 'it is the tactics within war that vary, not the inherent nature of war'⁶⁸. We can see his philosophical premise clearly in his conclusion, 'what we call low-intensity conflict can only be fully understood within Clausewitzian parameters, which embrace the entire spectrum of war'⁶⁹. This only makes sense philosophically, if we accept that Clausewitz 'established the eternal universal realities of war'⁷⁰. The difficulty with this proposition is that the philosophical sceptic might well ask, 'whose reality', 'whose universe' and 'whose truth'⁷¹.

This is not some mere philosophical game, constructed for an abstract proposition that has little practical worth in the 'real world'⁷². The current 'war on terror' or the insurgencies in Afghanistan or Iraq specifically revolve around competing world views that are diametrically opposed to one another. The idea that Clausewitz identified 182 years ago the universal realities of war that are universally applicable in any cultural setting or period of history is impossible to intellectually maintain in a postmodern world where there are no absolutes. Even Kant's categorical imperative is no longer considered universally true in every setting⁷³.

The premise that the nature of war is political is not logically self-evident. Why can the nature of war not be primarily economic or religious? What is it about the 'thingness' of war which makes it political with no possibility of it being anything other? Keegan makes a similar criticism of Clausewitzian doctrine by emphasising the cultural situatedness of this particular philosophy.

His [Clausewitz] decision to ignore Ottoman military institutions flawed the integrity of his theory at its roots. To look beyond military slavery into the even stranger military cultures of the Polynesians, the Zulus and the samurai, whose forms of warfare defied altogether the rationality of politics as it is understood by Westerners, is to perceive how incomplete, parochial and ultimately misleading is the idea that war is the continuation of politics.⁷⁴

Keegan states that the belief in the primacy of politics rather than culture was not specifically personal to Clausewitz but was rather the position of Western philosophers⁷⁵ and a product of Western culture at that time.

Keegan's main point is simple. It is that the identification of politics as the essence of war is itself a cultural phenomenon, sited within the specific philosophical milieu of Enlightenment thinking. Gray, however, completely misses the philosophical point of Keegan's argument. He accepts the important role culture plays in different expressions of warfare. However, Gray then proceeds to maintain that 'the important fact that war is cultural does not diminish the logical and historical authority of the argument that war primarily is

political⁷⁶. What Gray apparently fails to appreciate is the epistemological space that Keegan's argument creates within which culture has just as valid a claim to be the essence of war as politics does. If Clausewitz identified the universal eternal component that defines war, then it would be impossible for any epistemological space to be created. The fundamental issue that all universal truths must confront is the logical difficulty of relativism (whose truth, whose reality etc). Why, from a purely philosophical position, should politics have a more legitimate claim than religion or culture to be the essential essence of war? This question is totally ignored by those who defend Clausewitzian theory of war.

Another scholar associated with being anti-Clausewitzian is Martin van Creveld. The section in his book entitled 'Nontrinitarian War' has given rise to some interesting responses⁷⁷. Van Creveld is not anti-Clausewitz; his article 'The Eternal Clausewitz'⁷⁸ is evidence of his balanced appreciation of the great Prussian's work and its abiding value to those who study war. He argues that it is precisely because Clausewitz sought to delve deeply into the subject itself, rather than concentrate solely on its physical expression, that establishes his enduring worth. In the end, it is precisely this very lack of practicality as usually understood that makes him supremely practical, and able to survive change as well⁷⁹. However, what van Creveld does, much like Keegan and others, is maintain that Clausewitz's claim of universality must be located within the age when this approach to philosophy was accepted as valid. The opening sentence of the sub-section 'Nontrinitarian War' gives the clue to the thrust of what is to follow, 'The Clausewitzian Universe rests on the assumption that war is....'⁸⁰. The argument that van Creveld offers, followed by many others, is that the 'Clausewitzian Universe' is a historically, culturally as well politically, distinct period within a significant, albeit limited, portion of humanity's existence.

The relevance of this cannot be overstated. Any consideration of the current manifestations of war or for that matter of future conflicts must do so with this basic

proposition in mind. There was a time in which the Newtonian universe had been recognised, its properties established and its laws confirmed. Newton's model was the universal model. However, when Einstein discovered the general theory of relativity, humanity's understanding of the universe it now found itself within, had fundamentally changed. The universe was now recognised as being fluid and in a continual state of motion. It still had laws that conformed to certain principles in certain conditions, but the older norms of thinking about the universe had to be seen for what they were, limited. Those who defend Clausewitz do so as if they had not been exposed to the relativism that has swept the certainty of Enlightenment thought away, rendering it as an expression of a culturally biased, and specific view of the world. It is as though *On War* has been given or afforded an exception bubble within which its claim to universality may remain, philosophically unchallenged.

Van Creveld correctly identified that Clausewitz's concept of the 'state' was a particularly 'modern' understanding⁸¹. In this instance 'modern' stands in opposition to whatever came before; although it also has a very specific philosophical concept⁸². The thrust of this strand of his argument is quite simple: the state is a recent European development⁸³ and that before its creation, Clausewitz's threefold division could not have existed. Van Creveld conducts a limited historical survey to provide evidence for his main contention. When 'we retreat from the early modern age into the Middle Ages the distinction between government, army, and people becomes more tenuous still. As the term "feudal" implies'⁸⁴. It is, he contends, hardly possible in this period to speak of governments let alone states. 'Under such circumstances, to speak of war in modern Clausewitzian terms as something made by the state for political ends is to misrepresent reality'⁸⁵. However, when he considers the classical world he accepts that, 'the Clausewitzian Universe appears to be more relevant than it was during the Middle Ages'⁸⁶.

His survey ends with a reflection on the numerous tribal societies all around the world. Those societies, he contends, ‘which did not have the state, also do not recognise the distinction between army and people. Such societies do not have armies; it would be more accurate to say that they themselves *are* armies’⁸⁷. Within the rudimentary nature of tribal organisations, van Creveld sees a link to the future with regard to what he calls terrorist bands. ‘Instead they point to the future, perhaps more so than the world of states from which we seem to be emerging’⁸⁸. His conclusion is succinct: trinitarian war is only one of the many forms of war and even then not the most important⁸⁹.

Some of the responses to those who have questioned the universal validity of the Clausewitzian philosophy of war have been forceful; the use of language at times has been regrettable. Gray is unambiguous in his language; ‘some confused theorists would have us believe that war can change its nature. Let us stamp on such nonsense immediately’⁹⁰. He is of the opinion that those who adopt an alternative position are guilty of wilfully misreading, if not misquoting *On War*⁹¹. It seems a striking thing to imagine either Keegan or van Creveld as confused theorists. In an article defending Clausewitz and his relevance to strategic thought he makes reference to ‘the better scholarship on Clausewitz’⁹². This begs the question: what makes this scholarship ‘better’? Could it be any scholarship that agrees with his position? Smith suggests that a careful and fair-minded evaluation⁹³ dealing with reading Clausewitz, will result in the reader agreeing with his position; Bassford encourages his readers to take a closer look at the issues and that that will enable them to realise the point of Clausewitz’s work⁹⁴; and Echevarria effectively accuses van Creveld of a poor use of history and lack of intellectual rigour⁹⁵. It would appear that any who do not adopt a specific position are therefore guilty of careless reading, being confused or guilty of a lack of intellectual rigour, resulting in nonsense and myth.

One approach used by some who defend the Clausewitzian philosophy of war is to suggest that those who disagree with it have failed to properly understand the significance between the subjective and objective nature of war, as articulated by Clausewitz in *On War*. Gray adopts this particular approach arguing that ‘the continuing authority of Clausewitz’s argument that the “objective” nature of war does not change with technology, or indeed with anything else’⁹⁶, ‘Clausewitz’s theory is completely unfazed by the permanence or impermanence of the character of war’⁹⁷. Gray uses this distinction between the objective and subjective nature in Clausewitz’s theory of war as his basis of understanding ‘*for certain*’ a great deal about future war⁹⁸ [emphasis original].

The philosophical validity of the proposition that Clausewitz established the universal truth concerning the objective nature of war has already been discussed in this chapter. It should be remembered that Clausewitz did not set out to write a purely philosophical treatise. In that regard it is not a work of pure philosophy. Clausewitz sought to ground his philosophical exploration in a ‘real world’ setting so that not only might it be remembered after a few years, but be of use to military commanders engaged in actual war fighting. This however, cannot negate the supposition that *On War* was intended to be a philosophical exploration of the nature of war. That the validity of this part of his work is not dealt with by writers like Gray is striking⁹⁹.

A second and perhaps more nuanced argument is the notion that *On War* presents a primary and secondary trinity¹⁰⁰. In this theory, the primary trinity is:

composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

Bassford maintains that if one ‘look[s] more closely...you will realize that it is really made up of three categories of forces: irrational forces (violent emotion, i.e., “primordial violence, hatred and enmity”); non-rational forces (i.e., forces not the product of human thought or

intent, such as “the play of chance and probability”); and reason or rational calculation (war’s subordination to reason “as an instrument of policy”)¹⁰¹. The secondary trinity would then be the three sets of human actors: the people, the army and the government.

Gray’s interpretation of the relevance of this argument is: ‘If Clausewitz’s trinity is read not as a description of a recent era wherein recognisably modern states had armies, but rather as a description of the most fundamental ingredients of warfare, the idea of “trinitarian war” dies an instant death’¹⁰². He then proceeds to claim that ‘if Clausewitz is deemed persuasive, it would be ridiculous, certainly redundant, to refer to trinitarian war. In this theory, all war in all periods is trinitarian. Indeed, war cannot be other than trinitarian; it is war’s very nature, and an enduring nature at that’¹⁰³. Echevarria develops this theme when he maintains that ‘strictly speaking, then, there is no such thing as trinitarian war because, as any review of history shows, the forces Clausewitz described are present in *every* war, not just the wars of nation-states. If they are present in every war, then the term must fall out as a discriminator. In other words, if the basis for making a distinction, any distinction, disappears, then the distinction itself also vanishes. It follows, then, that since there is no such thing as “trinitarian” war, per se, there can be no such thing as “nontrinitarian” war’¹⁰⁴.

In the final summary of his article Gray states, ‘Clausewitz is not holy writ, only cannon lore’¹⁰⁵. This is a fascinating observation because the argument of a primary and secondary trinity looks remarkably like three non-theologians describing their hermeneutic and subsequent exegesis of a text, without, perhaps, the precision of the professional exegete¹⁰⁶. The idea of a primary and secondary trinity is an interesting interpretation. Firstly, there is an internal logic to it. Secondly, it clearly identifies the distinction in the text of *On War* on this subject, that some perhaps fail to appreciate. Thirdly, it forces those who wish to maintain a different position, to articulate the intellectual basis of any alternative with reference to this carefully constructed argument.

Any examination of this argument should have at least two distinct parts: firstly, it should contain an analysis of the interpretation itself; secondly, a consideration of how that interpretation is used.

Clausewitz does not specifically use the term 'trinitarian war' in the portion of *On War* under consideration. He describes war as 'a paradoxical trinity'. This 'trinity' is then described in two stages: firstly as 'blind natural force' (a description Clausewitz uses to effectively sum up primordial violence, hatred, and enmity), the play of chance and probability, and then its element of sub-ordination, as an instrument of policy. The second stage is Clausewitz's elaboration of what he has just described, in which he interprets his own 'paradoxical trinity'.

There appears to be no textual indication that might lend weight to the argument that Clausewitz was constructing his argument with a primary and secondary trinity in mind. In any analysis of a specific interpretation there would frequently be a consideration of the context in which that interpretation emerged. For example, when did this notion of a primary and secondary trinity emerge? If it has been a consistent understanding of this important aspect of Clausewitzian thought, then this may be considered as adding significant weight to its credibility. However, if it only emerged in direct response to a specific critique of Clausewitzian theory then to borrow a theological expression this might be a case of '*theological ex eventu*' or 'theology after the event'. In other words a reading into the text to draw out from the text, a defence, rather than taking what would appear to be a natural reading of the text. Clausewitz's interpretation of the third element of 'war's paradoxical trinity' would appear to leave little room for divergence, but the political aims are the business of the government alone'. The author of *On War* unmistakably identifies 'an instrument of policy' with 'the political aims of the government'. This is not evidence of primary and secondary concepts but that they are identical and therefore one and the same.

Echevarria's notion, however, that there is no such thing as a 'trinitarian war' because all war is trinitarian and therefore it ceases to function as a discriminator is pure sophistry. The logic of his argument would have Clausewitz establishing a non-concept, which he has just spent considerable time defending from his critics. It is also founded on the premise that there is no other possible interpretation of what Clausewitz's 'paradoxical trinity' means. One may not agree with another's position and seek to articulate those grounds, this is wholly appropriate. However, to assume that there is no other legitimate intellectual position is questionable at best.

4.3 *New Wars*

The term 'New Wars' is frequently linked to Mary Kaldor¹⁰⁷. However, van Creveld's earlier, landmark book *The Transformation of War* and his concept of 'nontrinitarian war' may be identified as the beginning of an intellectual shift away from, or dissatisfaction with, a purely Clausewitzian theory of war. WS Lind's theory of 'Fourth Generation Warfare'¹⁰⁸, written about the same period as van Creveld's book is another example. There have been various other concepts such as, Revolution in Military Affairs, Network Centric Warfare, Effects Based Warfare¹⁰⁹, which have gained ascendancy in some military circles. Gray describes these various theories or concepts as part of an on-going quest for a grand narrative of war¹¹⁰, of which he catalogues twelve 'alternative master narratives'¹¹¹. Of these various 'grand narratives' he endorses the twelfth option: 'Warfare of many kinds are possible, indeed probable. In its political, social, cultural, and strategic essentials, the past history of warfare is the best guide to its future. The historical study of warfare provides invaluable education on what is likely to come'¹¹².

Unlike Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and Effects Based Warfare (EBW)¹¹³, Lind's theory of Fourth Generation War (4GW) and the Revolution in Military Affairs

(RMA) are presented very much in terms of a meta-narrative, that they seek to provide an overarching narrative able to explain a universal concept, which incorporates all the component parts of that particular concept.

In his influential article, 'The Changing face of War: Into the Fourth Generation', Lind did not give a definite period of time for what he calls the 'first generation warfare' (1GW); it was not until his 2004 description of 1GW that he contends it runs roughly from 1648 to 1860¹¹⁴. This period, he argues, represents tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket. The 'second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire'¹¹⁵. The 'third generation' (3GW), which Lind refers to as 'a response to the increase in battlefield power', was based around the German development of manoeuvre rather than attrition tactics¹¹⁶. Lind acknowledges that many of the elements from 3GW will be present in fourth generation warfare (4GW), except that 4GW will merely accentuate them.

4GW is frequently depicted as being apocalyptic in some of its conclusions about the future, which can be imbued with a sense of doom for conventional forces, if not Western civilisation itself¹¹⁷. This critique is distinctly balanced when one reads TX Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone* or 'Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation'¹¹⁸. However, as Gray observes, proponents of 4GW 'tend to write persuasively for the excellent reason that 4GW in good part is an empirical reality: it is substantially true'. He then adds, 'but for a killer caveat, it is not true enough'¹¹⁹. Osinga maintains that from one perspective, 4GW is nothing new; it is only another concept for dealing with insurgencies¹²⁰.

This criticism, though, seems inadequate. It may appear to some as little more than an attempt to defend a Clausewitzian/political approach to the nature of war. One of the central strengths of 4GW is that it seeks to identify an evolution in insurgences, by suggesting that they may have an interconnecting thread of characteristics, such as being sited in a global

context, being media centric and having an ability to effect its target enemy's ability to raise finance in a global market¹²¹. The ideological nature of Jihadist insurgences is not political in nature, as in a Clausewitzian construct, but essentially religious¹²². Habeck observes that immediately after the attacks on 9/11, Americans agonised over what motivated those involved to plan and then execute such a plan. The list offered by analysts, scholars and politicians like President Bush, she remarked, was long and varied. One voice was silent, that of the attackers¹²³. This is not because they had been silent. Far from it, as Habeck's book shows. The point is that the content of their explanation is not something that a Western secular society comprehends or affords the same level of seriousness or weight. The consistent need', she contends, 'to find explanations other than religious ones for the attacks says, in fact, more about the West than it does about the jihadis'¹²⁴.

In other words when one of the extremist Islamist groups argue that they are seeking to fulfil Allah's will, this is interpreted as meaning that the underlying motivator indicates significant poverty, social deprivation, or it is the voice of the excluded. If this economic alienation could therefore be addressed, politically, the religious extremism will dissipate¹²⁵. The social and financial background from and in which some elements of Jihadist extremism has flourished is, in comparison with the affluent parts of the West, poor. Habeck's detailed examination of the theological foundation of some of the Jihadist groups proves beyond reasonable doubt that those who construct these religious theories passionately believe them, even if others do not. The issue that Habeck addresses is that that voice is not granted true explanatory power but is consistently reinterpreted so that the answer is political, social, or economic but not religious¹²⁶. The Clausewitzian model, with its insistence upon the political nature of war is invariably employed by Western militaries¹²⁷. The suggestion that Western governments are therefore dealing with something new raises an interesting philosophical question.

‘When do too many exceptions become a *new* rule or norm?’¹²⁸ Or to put the same question another way, when restoring a classic car at what point does the car being restored become a new or different car and what measure do we employ to judge that¹²⁹. Those who contend that new wars are not new but manifestations of a universal truth with an unending number of subjective characteristics, never appear to address this issue. If for the sake of this thought experiment we think of the role of the media in war, is it intellectually satisfying to contend that this role is essentially the same from the Crimean War, through the two world wars up to the modern insurgences? Are the black and white images from the Crimean War of the same essence as what scholars refer to as the ‘Propaganda of the Deed’ (POTD)¹³⁰?

One of the key findings of a report examining POTD is that ‘does not equate to a single act of terror – it is not an event, it is part of a process of narrative construction, reinforcement and confirmation through deeds’¹³¹. ‘POTD has shifted from territorial to “visual” theatres of operation’. Is this nothing more than propaganda? ‘Propaganda’, as Ignatieff states, ‘has been central to war since the dawn of democracy’¹³². However, he then contends, ‘it took an authoritarian populist from the Balkans to understand the awesome potential for influencing the opinion-base of an enemy, by manipulating modern real-time news to his advantage’¹³³. POTD does not so much re-enforce a narrative, as though engaged in the kind of narrative war discussed in chapter 2. It is a process of creating a living evolving narrative, one which the media corps of Western militaries has huge difficulty responding to quickly. Can this really be the same, in essence or nature, as the propaganda of the early eighteenth century or the black and white photos from the Crimea? ‘When do too many exceptions become a *new* rule or norm?’

Clausewitzian theory is essentially Cartesian¹³⁴ in that it understands the nature of war to be a thing, an object (politics), albeit with a multivariate, adaptable subjective character. This thesis has sought to establish that in this, it is similar to that other Enlightenment theory

of Newtonian¹³⁵ physics. Why should this particular Enlightenment theoretical model not be subjected to the same critique that other Cartesian metaphysical constructs have been? The notion that there is only one universal eternal truth, valid in every context, must be challenged.

4.3.1 *The Role of the State and Politics in War*

The basis of van Creveld's theory concerning 'nontrinitarian' war is his contention that 'war is made predominantly by states or to be exact, by governments'¹³⁶ and that this presumption has not been universally valid both in history and in other non-western cultures such as tribal societies¹³⁷. The issue for Gray is that 'war is organised violence threatened or waged for political purposes. That is its nature. If the behaviour under scrutiny is other than that just defined, it is not war'¹³⁸. However, in the 'new wars' described by Kaldor and Münkler¹³⁹ some of the incredibly brutal, organised violence does not appear to have any easily identifiable government structures responsible either for the violence or opposed to it. In Gray's maxim, it is questionable whether these 'new wars' meet the Clausewitzian criteria. Both Kaldor and Münkler cite the statistic that in the early part of the twentieth century, roughly 90 per cent of those killed or wounded have been described as combatants under International Law. Whereas in these 'new wars' there has been a radical turn around in the statistics. Some 80 per cent of the killed and wounded in these 'new wars' are now civilians and only 20 per cent of those were, or could be considered, 'combatants'¹⁴⁰.

This new type of warfare, according to Kaldor, has to be understood in terms of 'global dislocation'¹⁴¹. Globalisation is central to her argument, by which she means global interconnectedness (political, economic, military and cultural)¹⁴². These new globalised wars are set against the backdrop of failed or failing states, hence the dislocation. Kaldor states that 'the main implication of globalisation is that territorial sovereignty is no longer available'¹⁴³.

This context is perfect for what she calls ‘identity politics’¹⁴⁴. By this she means that identity tends to be associated with the politics of ideas, such as religion, or a label that someone is born with and cannot change, such as an ethnic identifier¹⁴⁵. In these ‘new wars’, she argues, ‘battles are rare, most violence is directed against civilians, and cooperation between warring factions is common’¹⁴⁶. The failure of the ‘state’ in these cases is usually accompanied by a growing privatisation of violence¹⁴⁷. Local warlords take the place of recognised state structures, although their goal is largely financial and for the establishment of prestige¹⁴⁸. ‘The point’, she observes in relation to these wars is that, ‘the modern distinctions between the political and the economic, the public and the private, the military and the civil are breaking down’¹⁴⁹. Her prognosis is gloomy, ‘the new type of warfare is a predatory social condition’¹⁵⁰.

The recent Strategic Defence and Security Review will eventually result in an overall reduction in the size of UK’s armed forces. This will be partly based upon the huge cost financially to the nation, and as a result of the perceived change in the types of threat to the national interest¹⁵¹. Münkler has demonstrated, in contrast, that the ‘new wars’ are not only relatively inexpensive to maintain, due to the abundant supply of lightweight automatic weapons readily available in a global market, but these wars are themselves downright cheap to prepare and wage¹⁵². Like Kaldor he contends that these ‘wars are not waged against a similarly armed enemy but mainly employ long-term violence against large parts of the civilian population’¹⁵³. For Münkler the most important reason why these new wars are so cheap, and therefore easy to start, ‘is that they are funded through asymmetrical relations of exchange imposed upon society’¹⁵⁴. What he means by this is that force becomes the dominate element in exchange, manifested in the threat of violence or in extortion. This attracts young men to a local warlord or militia leader ‘in return for a kind of livelihood and the prospect of an otherwise unattainable reputation’¹⁵⁵.

Ironically, the desire of the international community to alleviate the suffering of the civilian populations not militarily involved in a conflict inadvertently provided additional sources of supplies not only for the needy but also the combatants¹⁵⁶. The constant supply of aid enables the warring parties to be supplied, thereby prolonging the conflict. When the international community, along with the UN, implemented an embargo policy designed to allow these new wars to burn themselves out, it failed in almost every case. Münkler states that a 'shadow globalisation' (interested parties and/or the diaspora) provided the necessary resources for the war to continue. The international community is therefore faced with an unenviable choice: does it stand by and do nothing while civilians starve? Or does it intervene to provide aid, both medical and basic food stuffs, which in turn provides additional support to those engaged in the 'war', as they skim what they need from the aid shipments before the people get what remains¹⁵⁷?

The description and analysis of these 'new wars' does not appear to sit easily within the classic Clausewitzian definition of war; its 'truth' does not appear to be true in the context, or world, that Kaldor, Münkler and Gilbert describe. Clausewitz would have recognised the nature of the relationship between the state and the citizen, as described by Adam Ferguson¹⁵⁸. He likely would have agreed with his main contention. However, the world that Ferguson described has been replaced in some parts of the world¹⁵⁹. Bobbitt maintains that there have been various manifestations of the 'state'. His analysis begins in 1494 when Charles VIII invades Italy and continues up to the present day¹⁶⁰. Bobbitt's argument is essentially that the concept and nature of the state evolved over time adapting to meet the challenges and demands it encountered¹⁶¹. The state as a concept has developed since Clausewitz described the relationship within his 'wonderful trinity' and is in an evolutionary process. 'The gradual transition from the Nation State to the Market State model implies a redefinition of the state's fundamental promises: [from maximisation of the

Nation's welfare] toward maximisation of opportunities for..civil society and citizens'¹⁶².

Does this suggested transition matter to a Clausewitzian theory of the nature of war?

Yes absolutely. The process of globalisation is fundamentally changing the context in which the notion of a Western state should be considered. The recent economic bailout of several European governments illustrates the economic power of non-state players with the influence to undermine or strengthen a country's liquidity. If there has been a clash of wills in this process, (i.e. the state against international money markets) its nature was not political but economic. Secondly, if for the sake of this thought experiment we assume that the evolution of the nature of the state is analogous to the development of an individual's identity throughout their life, we are presented with an interesting question. Most people live their lives on the assumption that there is a unity linking the different periods of their lives and that in some essential manner they are the same person at 40 as 39. However, if the question becomes 'are you the same person now at 58 as you were at 8?', many will answer that they have changed significantly despite an intuitive awareness that in some sense they remain the same person. The notion that the state is somehow the same in essence as it was in the early nineteenth century requires a more detailed defence than has been offered so far by those who maintain the pre-eminence of a Clausewitzian universe. The classic definition of war as a clash of political will is not universally applicable to an analysis of 'new wars'. The genocide, appalling loss of life and limb, the extreme poverty and deprivation associated with these 'new wars' means that they cannot be dismissed as something other than war. This is war, only not war within a Clausewitzian universe.

4.3.2 *International Law, War and Terrorism*

Clausewitz briefly, and rather dismissively, mentions what he refers to as: 'certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as International Law

and custom, but they scarcely weaken it'¹⁶³. The irony is that the international system, as Brown observes, is underpinned by the essential philosophical creation articulated by Clausewitz¹⁶⁴. 'War is a normal feature of international relations, a normal part of the functioning of the international system'¹⁶⁵. Gray describes this as the realist paradigm¹⁶⁶, which shows no convincing evidence that it is undergoing some transformation¹⁶⁷. Brown, however, is not convinced. For him, there is a growing suspicion about what he calls 'state-centricity' because the political conception of war is an example 'of international relations not behaving quite in the way it is supposed to. In reality' he continues, 'the malaise here goes much deeper. A Clausewitzian view of war is an essential requirement for the balance of power to operate; the two institutions stand together, and if, as suggested here, they fall together the whole state-centric edifice is in ruins'¹⁶⁸. Clausewitz's dictum that war is the continuation of politics contains within it the logical consequence that war is a 'phenomenon' that occurs only between states. This logically expresses two related and important derivatives: firstly, that in order for this to occur, the state must have a monopoly or sole ownership of violence; and secondly, that the establishment of a condition of peace can be formally guaranteed on the basis of that monopoly of violence.

Stumpf argues that the emergence of the territorial state in Europe, in conjunction with a secularisation within the legal tradition, saw a growing debate on public International Law regarding how relations between states could be subjected to more formal structures¹⁶⁹. Previously, maintains Stumpf, there had been an understanding of law as 'a metaphysical system, supplemented by a Christological concept of legislation'¹⁷⁰. In a similar fashion, Best writes that International Law 'comes to us soaked in several sorts of reason: the reason of the classical-cum-Christian natural law which originally gave life to the *jus gentium*, the reason of the Enlightenment which made International Law a necessary element of civilised international relations'¹⁷¹. There are several vital observations that may be deduced from this

historical construct: 1. a state-centric understanding of international relations is essentially a Western (Cartesian) paradigm; 2. that peace is the antithetical state to war; 3. the international legal system is both Western in origin and grew out of the theological and philosophical foundations of Judaic-Christian traditions.

The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, UK Ministry of Defence is an example of the statutes of International Law distilled into practical directives and guidance on how it should be applied. Like *Law on the battlefield* the historical, theological and or moral foundations that underpin International Law are simply ignored¹⁷². Rogers makes no apology for his English legal background or the impact of Western ideology¹⁷³. The theological and moral principles that motivated Grotius are simply ignored. A non-moral/ethical approach to law is known as a form of 'legal positivism'¹⁷⁴, which maintains that the conditions of legal validity are purely a matter of social facts. However, theologians and ethicists would contend that Augustine's *lex iniusta non est lex*, 'unjust law is not law' raises the question of whether or not law should ever seek to divorce itself from a moral consideration.

This creates an interesting dynamic especially in regard to how International Law is considered. International Law as a concept, generally only exists only between states. The individual has no role in its classical expression; Stumpf describes this as its blindness to individuals¹⁷⁵. Yet despite this it has been used with a distinct moral element. Referring to the trials at Nuremburg and Tokyo as 'victor's justice', Falk notes that 'dramatizing the criminal accountability of individuals who were acting on behalf of the state did permanently escalate the claims of law in relation to armed conflict'¹⁷⁶. If war is only the extension of politics, a clash of political interest and will, charging individuals with the 'crimes' of a state's policy required a selective understanding of what the law is. This sense of arbitrariness concerning how states use or abuse, apply or ignore International Law has been a consistent feature of modern life.

Lebor describes in great detail how the major world powers did little to stop genocide in Rwanda, but broke no laws in failing to act¹⁷⁷. The perception of indifference or selective application or adherence to International Law is graphically illustrated in regard to the terrorism. Western states, according to Booth and Dunne, have consistently 'sought to deny that states can commit terrorism. The bias of terror has always been "against people and in favour of governments"'¹⁷⁸. States wage war: terrorists are criminals who break the law. Kaldor and Münkler have argued cogently that 'new wars' have changed the parameters of war. Acts of terror perpetrated against civilians eventually prompt calls for military intervention¹⁷⁹. This raises the question: how will those states act? Gross is blunt:

The baffling question is why the United States and some of its allies blatantly employ unlawful means of warfare as they wage asymmetric war against national insurgencies, international terror, rogue countries and state-sponsored guerrilla organisations. Sixty years after World War II and the great humanitarian tide of concern for basic human rights, many nations find themselves resorting to low-tech, primitive, and generally prohibited forms of warfare. Why have liberal democracies now abandoned some of the core principles of humanitarian law as they fight asymmetric wars?¹⁸⁰

Gross contends that the answer lies in what he terms 'Exceptionalism'¹⁸¹; 'emergencies do not overturn or repudiate the laws of war, they simply allow for exceptions'¹⁸². Falk describes it in this manner, 'it is in this context that....leads to government lawyers to grant politicians and military commanders "freedom" from the constraints of the Geneva Conventions, derided as "quaint" embodying restraints that pertain to a different age'¹⁸³. Gross argues that there is evidence that the exceptions are evolving into rules. For Byers, the unilateralism of the United States leads to the making of International Law by exception¹⁸⁴.

Military necessity has consistently been used by states to defend their prosecution of a war¹⁸⁵; except of course where they have been defeated. Raymond observes that typical expressions used in defence of military necessity have the form 'circumstances required that I do X. The rhetorical strategy behind this form of argument is to frame situations of circumscribed options as situations where no alternatives exist'¹⁸⁶. A major difficulty with

this argument is that it is also generally used by those engaged in an insurgency or ‘new war’. Exceptionalism and necessity are themes frequently used by Jihadists. Although some of their rhetoric finds a sympathetic hearing in parts of the Muslim world¹⁸⁷, it is only some of the 1.2 billion Muslims that live around the world. The emptiness of some stereotypes becomes very evident¹⁸⁸. Nevertheless, the various groups that are engaged in a Jihad against the West have a very specific view of International Law, and its state-centric basis:

International Law and governance are likewise rejected by jihadis who view the UN as both a wholly owned subsidiary of the United States and Europe, and as proponent of a legal system at odds with Islam. The idea of International Law is detested for exactly the same reason as democracy: it ignores shari‘a and is based upon the non-Islamic notion that nations can “make up” any laws they please¹⁸⁹.

If one extracts the conspiracy element from these views of the West, there is a great deal about their understanding of the origins of the state-centric system, the legal system and the origins of democracy in the West that is fundamentally correct. That the majority of those who live in the West are unaware of the foundational role Christian theology and philosophy played in constructing the framework that evolved into what is today a largely secularised system is irrelevant. Grotius’ desire to see International Law develop was based upon his Christian theological convictions¹⁹⁰. Jihadists understand the religious foundations of the Western state-centric view and its imposition of politics as the key to conflict resolution as modern expression of imperialism. ‘The truth of the matter is that the latter-day imperialism is but a mask for the crusading spirit, since it is not possible for it to appear in its true form, as it was in the Middle Ages’¹⁹¹. The suggestion, therefore, that an essentially Cartesian model of the world is universally valid, in every construct of reality is self-evidently false. Those who currently stand opposed to a Western construct of the world, appear to be determined to wage war against a system it considers alien to its view of reality.

4.4 Conclusions

The proposition that Carl von Clausewitz identified the universal, eternal truth of war's objective nature is impossible to maintain in anything other than a Cartesian universe. It is a classical Enlightenment argument. The notion that there is only one valid, universal truth that is valid in every context is an article of faith, whose validity can be challenged by the relativist sceptic. The existence of 'new wars' and asymmetric warfare is evidence of models of war that do not fit easily within a state-centric (Clausewitzian) understanding of war. Philosophically, the nature of war is not *necessarily* political. The relevance of this is far reaching.

This chapter has shown that a Clausewitzian model lies at the heart of international relations and International Law. This is again a Cartesian or Enlightenment model. It assumes that Reality, in relation to international relations, is political. This is a Western construct, derived from a specifically Western (Christian) philosophical, theological and cultural construct. In chapter 2 of this thesis the concept of the 'white man's burden' as understood in the late nineteenth century, was briefly considered. It was underpinned by a form of imperial colonialism, in which nations, primarily from a Western philosophical worldview sought to remake the 'primitive' world in its own image. The imperative underpinning the work of ISAF in Afghanistan can, from one perspective, be presented in similar terms. The dogma that the military is there to establish the conditions for a political solution is a cultured version of the West imposing a Western construct upon a non-Western culture and society. Why should the solution not be in certain contexts, religious or purely economic?

ISAF, as a mechanism of Western/International policy, might be seeking to apply a model that lacks validity for many in Afghanistan. The drive to seek and secure a purely political and therefore Western model might continue to run into substantial difficulties. Afghanistan is an ancient country. Its people, however, do not live within a society that has

~~had over three hundred years to imbibe Western philosophical thought forms that underpin its~~ state-centric approach to reality. The British soldier serving in this environment comes into daily contact with the contradiction of his experiences working with local Afghan populations and the geopolitical goals of his/her government and the alliance they form a part of. It is distinctly possible that the ordinary soldier serving in the local district centres or in the 'Green Zone' encounters the clash not simply of cultures but of fundamentally and radically different world views. Constructs in which religion and culture have a greater sense of validity than a Western construct of political imperatives. Afghanistan represents a social imaginary that remains largely untouched by the theory developed by Grotius and Lock. It is in many aspects a feudal society in which the concept of the individual, central to the development of the modern social imaginary in Western society, is largely absent in the rural provinces. As a consequence, modern Western political constructs, simply lack legitimacy to local Afghans, seeking to eke out a living in harsh and difficult conditions.

¹ For example, those scholars and writers working in the field of War Studies.

² For example, see M Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999); H Münkler, *The New Wars* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005) and R Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Vintage, 2008).

³ CS Gray, *Another Bloody Century* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005) p29-54; MLR Smith, 'Strategy in an age of "low-intensity" warfare: why Clausewitz is still more relevant than his critics', in *Rethinking the Nature of War*, eds., I Duyvesteyn and J Angstrom (London and New York: Frank Cass, 2005) p28-64 and AJ Echevarria, 'Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths', Strategic Studies Institute (November 2005) downloaded from <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/> (accessed 30 Sep 10).

⁴ Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, p30.

⁵ C Coker, argues that the Western way of warfare is Greco-Roman, see *Waging War Without Warriors* (London: Rienner, 2002) particularly chapter 3 'The Western Way of Warfare and the Modern Age', p45-60.

⁶ M Howard, *The Causes of War* (London: Temple Smith, 1983) p16, where referring to the reasons for the war between Athens and Sparta he maintains that 'you can vary the names of the actors, but the model remains the same'.

⁷ G Parker, 'Introduction: The Western Way of War', in *The Cambridge History of Warfare*, ed., G Parker, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) p4.

⁸ Clausewitz states that 'I have often found Machiavelli to be a very sound judge of military matters, with some new insights,' in 'Letter to Fichte (1809)' in, *Historical and Political Writings*, ed. and trans. by P Paret and D Moran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p 281.

⁹ *The Art of War*, (trans.) Lionel Giles, available on-line at <http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/132/pg132.html> . See also *Art of War: The Modern Chinese Interpretation, General Pas Hanzhang*, trans. Yuan Shi bing (London: David and Charles, 1987).

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- ¹⁰ C von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by M Howard and P Paret (New York and London: Knopf, 1993)
- ¹¹ The limits of this thesis prohibit such an attempt.
- ¹² Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, p33.
- ¹³ M van Creveld, 'The Eternal Clausewitz' in *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*, ed., by MI Handel, (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 1986) p35-50.
- ¹⁴ For example see: *The US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol1: Theory of War and Strategy 4th Edition*, July 2010 ed., JB Bartholomees, Jr, downloaded from <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/> (accessed 20 Jan 11).
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p4.
- ¹⁶ P Paret, 'The Genesis of *On War*', in C von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed., and trans., by M Howard and P Paret (New York and London: Knopf, 1993) p3.
- ¹⁷ M Howard, *Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p21.
- ¹⁸ B Heuser, *Reading Clausewitz* (London: Pimlico, 2002) has a section with the sub-heading 'The Two Clausewitzes' p41.
- ¹⁹ See, C Bassford, 'Clausewitz and the Nature of War' downloaded from <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Cworks/Works.htm#Nature> (accessed 15 Jan 11).
- ²⁰ For an interesting discussion on some of these points, see: BD Watts, *Clausewitzian Friction and Future War* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Studies, 1996) chapter 4 'Clausewitz's Mature Concept of General Friction' p27-132. Interesting as these inconsistencies or developments may well be, it is not possible to do anything more than indicate awareness of the issue.
- ²¹ A Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to Clausewitz* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989) p200.
- ²² Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, p32. This seems to be the case of an international political theorist straying into the realm of philosophy without the caution frequently shown by philosophers when referring to 'eternal universal realities'.
- ²³ Howard, *Clausewitz*, p22.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, p23.
- ²⁶ Clausewitz, *On War*, p172.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, p173.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*
- ²⁹ RA Leonard, *A Short Guide to Clausewitz On war* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967) p36. Lenin also studied Clausewitz's philosophy of war (*Ibid.*).
- ³⁰ See, M Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006) particularly chapter 5 'The clash of Civilizations, Part I' and chapter 6 'The Clash of Civilizations, Part II'.
- ³¹ *On War*, chapter 1.i p83.
- ³² *Ibid.*, (emphasis original).
- ³³ Leonard, *A Short Guide*, p6-7.
- ³⁴ Notice the Cartesian concept of an object 'thing' as opposed to the Existentialist notion of 'being-in-itself' (see chapter 3 for a fuller treatment of the distinction).
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*
- ³⁶ WB Gallie, *Understanding War* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991) p60.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*
- ³⁸ This is the modern philosophical equivalent of stating that because every swan you have seen is white that logically all swans must therefore be white. This form of logical reasoning has long since been discredited.
- ³⁹ See Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 1 chapter 1.20 and 21 for his use of these terms.
- ⁴⁰ Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, p31.
- ⁴¹ Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 3 chapter 17, 'The Character of Contemporary Warfare,' p258-259 and Book 4 chapter 2 'the Nature of Battle Today,' p266-267.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, Book 8, chapter 2 'Absolute War and Limited War', p700-703.
- ⁴³ Howard, *Clausewitz*, chapter 4 'Limited and absolute war', p49-61.
- ⁴⁴ Clausewitz, *On War*, p77.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p89-90.
- ⁴⁶ This is clearly expressed in *On War* Book I, chapter 1.19 'Frequent Periods of Inaction Remove War Still Further from the Realm of the Absolute and Make it Even More A Matter of Assessing Probabilities', p96. The expression, 'the realm of the absolute,' is most easily understood against a Platonic model.
- ⁴⁷ Clausewitz, *On War*, Book I chapter 1.11 'The Political Object Now Comes to the Fore Again' p90-91.

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- ⁴⁸ Ibid., p605.
- ⁴⁹ Howard, *Clausewitz*, p52 observes that, ‘policy was the guiding intelligence, war only the instrument.’
- ⁵⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 8, chapter 6 B, ‘War Is an Instrument of Policy’ p731-737.
- ⁵¹ Ibid., Book 1, chapter 1.3 p85.
- ⁵² Ibid., p84.
- ⁵³ Ibid., Book 4, chapter 11 p306.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid., Book 1, chapter 1.3 p84.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid.
- ⁵⁶ Howard, *Clausewitz*, p35.
- ⁵⁷ Heuser, *Reading Clausewitz*, p180.
- ⁵⁸ B Liddell Hart, *History of the First World War* (London: Cassell, 1992).
- ⁵⁹ Howard, *Clausewitz*, p68.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid., p69.
- ⁶¹ B Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York: Random House, 1962) was the Pulitzer Prize winning book in that year. Her depiction of the old states of Europe stumbling into war was directly instrumental in shaping the policy of JF Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis. ‘The President said, “the great danger and risk in all of this ... is a miscalculation – a mistake in judgment”. A short time before, he had read Barbara Tuchman’s book and had talked about the miscalculations of the Germans, the Russians, the Austrians, the French, and the British. They somehow seemed to tumble into war, he said, through stupidity, individual idiosyncrasies, misunderstandings, and personal complexes of inferiority and grandeur’. In RF Kennedy, *13 Days: The Cuban Missile Crisis October 1962* (London: Macmillan, 1969) p65.
- ⁶² Howard translates this as ‘paradoxical trinity’.
- ⁶³ Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 1, chapter 1.28 p101.
- ⁶⁴ An analysis of Clausewitz’s ‘remarkable trinity’ will form part of the next section.
- ⁶⁵ However important this endeavour may be the limits of this chapter prohibit such an approach.
- ⁶⁶ There are a number of substantial works on Clausewitz that deal with this matter, several of which have already been referred to in the endnotes of this chapter.
- ⁶⁷ Heuser, *Reading Clausewitz*, p186.
- ⁶⁸ MLR Smith, ‘Strategy’, p50.
- ⁶⁹ Ibid., p51.
- ⁷⁰ To use Gray’s statement, *Another Bloody Century*, p32.
- ⁷¹ The multi-national executive looking out at one of the great cities of the world, like London, New York, Paris, Moscow for example, might well encounter their world in a significantly different fashion to the beggar living rough on the street. Whose expression of reality of New York or London is valid? Could they both be? If they are both valid are they the same and what is this ‘sameness’?
- ⁷² It goes almost without saying, ‘whose real world’ etc. By using the term real world I am referring to the world that the average individual encounters in their daily encounter within the space outside their home.
- ⁷³ However useful some may still find its application today.
- ⁷⁴ J Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (London: Pimlico, 2004) p24.
- ⁷⁵ Ibid., p46.
- ⁷⁶ Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, p59.
- ⁷⁷ Some of these shall be considered shortly.
- ⁷⁸ This article was referenced earlier in this chapter.
- ⁷⁹ Van Creveld, ‘The Eternal Clausewitz’, p46.
- ⁸⁰ Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York and Oxford: Macmillan, 1991) p49. This book was also published under the title of *Future War* by Brassey, a member of the Macmillan Group. It is essentially the same text.
- ⁸¹ Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* p49.
- ⁸² One can use the terms, pre-modern, modern and post-modern.
- ⁸³ T Frame, *Living by the Sword* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2004) p150-154, also maintains that the modern nation-State is a relatively recent concept and development. Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy*, in her consideration of how the concept of the nation state and the Treaty of Westphalia is considered within Jihadist ideology, emphasises that the very idea is regarded within those circles as being a specifically Christian notion (p72-74).
- ⁸⁴ Van Creveld, *Transformation of War* p52.
- ⁸⁵ Ibid. p52.
- ⁸⁶ Ibid., p54.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid., p56 (emphasis original).
- ⁸⁸ Ibid., p57.

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- ⁸⁹ Ibid.
- ⁹⁰ Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, p30.
- ⁹¹ Ibid., p13.
- ⁹² C Gray, 'Clausewitz and the Modern Strategic World', *The Strategic and Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper* no47 (2004) p8.
- ⁹³ MLR Smith, 'Strategy', p39.
- ⁹⁴ Bassford, 'Clausewitz', p8.
- ⁹⁵ Echevarria, 'Fourth-Generation War' p9. His reference is to Fourth Generation War, but it comes after a lengthy 'review' of van Creveld's consideration of, what Echevarria refers to as the 'Myth of Westphalia'.
- ⁹⁶ Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, p32. He then proceeds to cite a lengthy quote from Michael Howard who among other things contends: 'Of course the differences brought about between one war and another by social or technological changes are immense, and an unintelligent study of military history which does not take adequate account of these changes may quite easily be more dangerous than no study at all'.
- ⁹⁷ Ibid.
- ⁹⁸ Ibid., p33.
- ⁹⁹ He seems to assume that Clausewitz's definition of the objective nature of war is valid, today, in this post-modern relativist age.
- ¹⁰⁰ Gray, 'Strategy' p8; for a more detailed treatment see, Bassford, 'Clausewitz', p8-9.
- ¹⁰¹ Bassford, 'Clausewitz' p8.
- ¹⁰² Gray, 'Strategy', p8.
- ¹⁰³ Ibid., p9.
- ¹⁰⁴ Echevarria, 'Fourth-Generation', p8.
- ¹⁰⁵ Gray, 'Strategy', p24.
- ¹⁰⁶ Who would, as a matter of course, establish the interpretative framework and methodology used in any exegesis.
- ¹⁰⁷ M Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*. ML Gross, *Moral Dilemmas of Modern War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) cites her book as synonymous with the concept.
- ¹⁰⁸ WS Lind, 'The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation', *Marine Corps Gazette* (1989); see also TX Hammes, 'Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation', in *Strategic Forum* (Jan 2005) No 214.
- ¹⁰⁹ Each of which will be considered briefly in the course of this section.
- ¹¹⁰ Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, chapter 4, 'Grand Narratives of War, 1800-2100'.
- ¹¹¹ Ibid., p135.
- ¹¹² Ibid.
- ¹¹³ Although individually specific theories, they are not considered as meta-narratives, in quite the same way 4GW is. They represent trends in military thought, reflecting perceived realities in current conflicts. For example, NCW is in essence about integrated IT systems that enable higher commands, field commanders, units, or the individual service person to engage in the fight using the same dominant, real time, information. EBO, is about delivering what its name suggests, Effects Based Operations. In other words operations that are not ends in themselves but are conducted with specific effect at either the local, regional or strategic level. RMA in contrast, is a meta-narrative in that it provides a framework within which the history of warfare can be considered utilising one theory. RMAs refer, in effect, to military revolutions in technology that transformed the practice of warfare, usually with serious consequences for the side who ignored the transformation or who chose not to embrace it. For an interesting introduction into this aspect of RMA, see C Conetta, 'We Can See Clearly Now: The Limits of Foresight in the pre-World War II Revolution in Military Affairs', Project on Defence Alternatives, Research Monograph #12 (02 March 2006). Conetta maintains that recent US visions of military revolution fall into two broad categories: "the info-tech RMA", which focuses on NCW and the "post-modern-RMA" which focuses on asymmetric warfare (p13). Like 4GW one of the main criticisms of this meta-narrative is that it uses 'sometimes arguable historical evidence' (Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, p152).
- ¹¹⁴ Lind, 'Understanding Fourth Generation War', 6 January 2004 p1 (available from <http://www.lewrockwell.com/lind/lind3b.html>)
- ¹¹⁵ Lind, 'Changing Face of War', p23. 1648 is associated with the Peace of Westphalia.
- ¹¹⁶ Ibid. He observes that 'in broad terms, fourth generation seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear'. This is a truncated quote from Lind's article: for a full version see article.
- ¹¹⁷ F Osinga, 'On Boyd, Bin Laden, and Fourth Generation Warfare as String Theory', p17. available from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/boyd/osinga_4gw_boyd_copyright2007.pdf (accessed 12 Oct 2011).

¹¹⁸ TX Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone; On War in the 21st Century* (St Paul, MN: Zenith, 2004); ‘Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into Fourth Generation’, *Strategic Forum*. Downloaded from www.ndu.edu/inss (accessed 30 Sept 10)

¹¹⁹ Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, p144.

¹²⁰ Osinga, ‘On Boyd’, p18.

¹²¹ Hammes, ‘Insurgency’, p3.

¹²² See Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy*.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p2.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p7. She continues, ‘Western scholars have generally failed to take religion seriously. Secularists, whether liberals or socialists, grant true explanatory power to political, social, or economic factors but discount the plain religious statements made by the jihadis themselves’.

¹²⁵ For example, the repeated assertion that the solution to the insurgency in Afghanistan is political and not military.

¹²⁶ RA Pape, *Dying to Win* (London: Gibson Square, 2006) analyses the phenomenon of suicide terrorism, particularly suicide bombers. In his second chapter ‘Explaining Suicide Terrorism’, he maintains that ‘although religious motives may matter and although Islamic groups receive the most attention in Western media, modern suicide terrorism is not limited to Islamic fundamentalism’ (p16). He then argues that ‘even among Muslims, secular groups account for over a third of suicide attacks’. One of Pape’s main conclusions is that, ‘the strategic logic of suicide terrorism is aimed at political coercion’ (p21). Even though this study is in many ways nuanced and meticulous (there are detailed lists of occurrences and details) it still manages to view this topic through a specifically Western interpretative model. ‘Although religious motives may matter’; against what interpretative model does he evaluate this? So the spectacle of seeing potential, individual suicide bombers set against a backdrop of a banner with overtly religious language or scriptural texts, the aim is political coercion? One of the problems with having only a hammer in the tool box is that every job thereafter looks suspiciously nail-like.

¹²⁷ R Thornton, *Asymmetric Warfare* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007) p156, he maintains that Western militaries excel at 3GW.

¹²⁸ ML Gross, *Moral Dilemmas*, p235.

¹²⁹ For example, though the car is a 1950’s classic of some description, the engine however is a refurbished 1990s BMW, the interior from a 2001 Jaguar, the chassis from Ford and the suspension from an Audi. It is still a car but its essence has been changed. Or has it? That is the nature of this thought model.

¹³⁰ For an excellent treatment of this issue see: N Bolt, D Betz & J Azari, *Propaganda of the Deed 2008: Understanding the Phenomenon, The Royal United Services Institute* (2008).

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p2.

¹³² M Ignatieff, *Virtual War*, (New York: Holt, 2000) p52.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ See J Kiszely, *Post-Modern Challenges for Modern Warriors*, The Shrivenham Papers, (December 2005) No5, who states that ‘in conventional warfare the doctrinal approach is essentially Cartesian or reductionist – the first step in problem-solving is to reduce the problem to its essentials and identify a workable solution as quickly as possible – a number of quasi-scientific tools – formulas, templates, “norms”’ (p9).

¹³⁵ Kiszely, *Post-Modern*, p7, uses the same expression.

¹³⁶ Crevel, *The Transformation of War*, p49.

¹³⁷ As was noted earlier, Keegan makes a related point.

¹³⁸ Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, p30.

¹³⁹ H Münkler, *The New Wars*, (Cambridge: Polity, 2005).

¹⁴⁰ Münkler, *New Wars*, p14; Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, p8, p100.

¹⁴¹ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 70.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p3. Within this process she contends that there are many who see themselves as part of a global community of like-minded people and are as yet not politicised (*Ibid.*, p76).

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p86.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p76-86. See also P Gilbert, *New Terror New Wars*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003) p10, who also claims that new wars are manifestations of the politics of identity.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p77.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p90.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p92. Kaldor identifies five types of groups found in these wars.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, see chapter3 for her case study of Bosnia-Herzegovina for examples.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 106.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p107.

¹⁵¹ See the, Strategic Trends Programme, *Future Character of Conflict*, produced by DCDC, MOD.

¹⁵² Münkler, *New Wars*, p 75.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p75. Münkler, specifically identifies the importance of sexual violence in both the strategy and economics of these new wars. Rape has been part of war in every age. However, the emergence of customs and then much later laws that provided protection for non-combatants, (codified in the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War), reduced this heinous practice in conflict. In these new wars, Münkler argues that rape is seen by some belligerents as a form of ethnic cleansing. Women, 'are no longer just booty, trophies or sex objects; they have become the conqueror's main target of attack' (p82). See also P Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect* (London: Rider, 2007), particularly his 'Crimes Against Humanity: Genocide, Rape and Terror' p12ff.

¹⁵⁴ Münkler, *New Wars*, p77.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. See also Ignatieff, *Warrior's Honor*, p57.

¹⁵⁶ Münkler, *New Wars*, p10.

¹⁵⁷ See, W Shawcross, *Deliver Us From Evil* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000). The classic example from recent history was the American intervention in Somalia in 1992 (see chapter 4 'Crossing the Mogadishu Line').

¹⁵⁸ A Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, ed., F Oz-Salzberger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

¹⁵⁹ Ferguson essentially considers why nations cease to be eminent (p200). He traces the rise and fall of great civilisations like Sparta, Carthage and Rome and examines the relationship that virtue played both in their success and subsequently its lack in their demise, 'when' Ferguson laments 'men ceased to be citizens' (p207). His point, of course, was to encourage the role of the virtuous citizen. Nations consist of men, men prepared to fight for their nation (p213).

¹⁶⁰ P Bobbitt, *Terror and Consent* (London: Penguin, 2008) p190-191. He defines the various stages of the state as:

- * The Princely State
- * The Kingly State
- * The Territorial State
- * The State Nation
- * The Nation State
- * The Market State

With the Princely State, the state confers legitimacy on the dynasty; with the Kingly state, the dynasty confers legitimacy on the state; with the Territorial State, the state will manage the country efficiently; with the State Nation, the state will forge the identity of the nation; with the Nation State, the state will better the welfare of the nation; and with the Market State, the state will maximise the opportunity for its citizens.

¹⁶¹ For an older examination of the state, see, KN Waltz, *The State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), first printed in 1954.

¹⁶² This quote is from the 2005 Royal Dutch Shell Scenarios, as cited by Bobbitt, *Terror and Consent*, p11.

¹⁶³ Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 1, chapter 1.2 p83.

¹⁶⁴ C Brown, *Understanding International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1997) p113.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p113.

¹⁶⁶ C Gray, 'World Politics as Usual after September 11: Realism Vindicated', in *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*, ed., K Booth and T Dunne (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002) p226-234.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p227.

¹⁶⁸ Brown, *Understanding International Relations*, p122.

¹⁶⁹ CA Stumpf, *The Gortian Theology of International Law: Hugo Grotius and the Moral Foundation of International Relations* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2006) p2-6.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p2.

¹⁷¹ G Best, *War and Law since 1945* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994) p275.

¹⁷² APV Rogers, *Law on the battlefield* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).

¹⁷³ In his consideration of 'General principles' Rogers notes that, 'the writers of the Enlightenment, notably Grotius and Vattel, were especially influential. It has been suggested that more humane rules were able to flourish in the period of limited wars from 1648 to 1792 but that they then came under pressure in the drift towards continental warfare, the concept of the increasing destructiveness of weapons from 1792 to 1914' (p1).

¹⁷⁴ See, MH Krammer, *Where law and Morality Meet* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) p143-171 for a defence of legal positivism. From a legal positivist perspective, the law is not interested in right or wrong (or how that might be judged) but on whether an act/action was legal. It is only interested in the law and its application. Morality, right or wrong is irrelevant. This is arguably the dominate position within International Law.

¹⁷⁵ Stumpf, *Gortian Theology*, p3.

¹⁷⁶ R Falk, 'Amid Normative and Conceptual Crisis', in *The Law of Armed Conflict: Constraints on the Contemporary Use of Force*, ed., HM Hensel (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) p242.

¹⁷⁷ A Lebor, *'Complicity with Evil': The United Nations in the Age of Modern Genocide* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006) p165ff.

¹⁷⁸ K Booth and T Dunne, 'Worlds in Collision', in *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*, ed., K Booth and T Dunne (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002) p8.

¹⁷⁹ Gross, *Moral Dilemmas*, p233.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p2.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p234.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁸³ Falk, 'Amid Normative', p243.

¹⁸⁴ M Byers, 'Terror and the Future of International Law', *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*, ed., K Booth and T Dunne (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002) p124.

¹⁸⁵ GA Raymond, 'Military Necessity and the War Against Terror', in *The Law of Armed Conflict: Constraints on the Contemporary Use of Force*, ed., HM Hensel (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) p4-10.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p4.

¹⁸⁷ L Freedman, 'A New Type of Terror', in *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*, ed., K Booth and T Dunne (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002) p42.

¹⁸⁸ Booth and Dunne, 'Worlds in Collision', p4.

¹⁸⁹ Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy*, p74. She continues, 'In any case, jihadis believe that Westerners created the current international legal system to protect their own rights and not uphold true (Islamic) justice. One jihadist group traces the origins of International Law to the "exclusively Christian" treaty of Westphalia, arguing that from its very inception, "International norms were established by Christian powers seeking to further their hegemony and protect their interests". Meanwhile, jihadis argue that the basic purpose of the UN is either to allow the West to maintain control over the world's wealth and resources, or to grant legitimacy to their intervention in the affairs of weak countries – most especially in the Islamic world' (p74).

¹⁹⁰ See CA Stumph, *The Grotian Theology of International Law*.

¹⁹¹ Qutb, *Milestones*, p303, as quoted by Habeck, *Ibid.*, p92.

Chapter 5

Selected Societal Factors

5.1 Introduction

It is important to briefly review the concept underpinning this particular chapter because it is significantly larger than would normally be expected in a doctoral thesis. The creation of a philosophical framework for use in examining the nature of the British soldier that was not culturally sited would be fundamentally flawed methodologically. The British soldier does not exist as an abstract idea but literally exists and functions in a socio-political/cultural setting. In this setting, something Taylor calls ‘a metaphorical common space’¹, people who never meet, nevertheless understand ‘themselves to be engaged in discussion and capable of reaching a common mind’². This public sphere is ‘a locus in which rational views are elaborated’ and which will guide government³. This chapter discusses the impact of societal factors and their impact on how the generic British soldier is understood and how this might influence the social imaginary. Instead of creating three distinct chapters of 8000 words each, this chapter will encapsulate the salient points in each section while seeking to present each topic as being an integral part of the tapestry that forms modern social life.

Section 5.2.1 ‘Death as a Cultural and Historical Product’ will primarily focus upon the issue of death, as opposed to the process of dying or the issues involved with palliative care. It will examine death as a cultural and historical product through a consideration of the changing attitudes historically towards death. In section 5.3.2 ‘Death and the Military in the Twenty-First Century’, the possible impact the death of a serviceman/woman has or may have upon the social imaginary will be explored. The second main section in this chapter will consider the concept of the ‘Risk Society’ (5.3.1). It will begin by identifying the basic characteristics of risk and how it is manifested and understood in the twenty-first century.

This study will provide the foundation from which to examine how this post-modern phenomenon has been understood by governments and scholars working in the field of security and international studies in ‘Risk: War and Risk’ (5.3.2).

Section 5.4 will continue to develop the central theme of this chapter, *Selected Societal Factors*, through the consideration of three distinct and yet related ideas. In 5.4.1 the concept of a ‘Post-heroic Society’ will be examined, including the notion of post-heroic warfare. Sub-section 5.4.2 will consider the idea that Western societies manifest a ‘Post-modern Casualty Phobia’. Primarily focusing upon the experience of the United States, it will explore the origin of the idea and the extent to which Western societies are casualty phobic. The final sub-section 5.4.3 will consider the question of ‘The Feminisation of Society and the Military’. The definition of ‘man’, ‘manly’ and ‘masculine’ has shifted in response to prevailing social and cultural demands and how these are imagined in the public space. One of these demands in Western societies has been the cultural and sociological movement of feminism. This sub-section will consider how the hyper-masculinised hegemonic models of masculinity were challenged in the aftermath of World War Two and the implications not only for the notion of masculinity but the developing role of women in Western militaries.

5.2 *Death*

John Donne captures a simple and basic truth in his famous quote, ‘death comes equally to us all, and makes us all equal when it comes’.⁴ Each human being is therefore certain of facing their own distinct, personal death with an absolute conviction that one of life’s few certainties is no respecter of persons, status or wealth. The complexity resides in the recognition that death can be understood, culturally, religiously, sociologically, historically, biologically and as a physical reality. It is therefore necessary to briefly establish the parameters of this section. It is important to also make the initial distinction between death (the end of *vital processes* by which organisms develop or maintain themselves)⁵, dying

(the process that results in the cessation of what is legally defined as life)⁶ and loss and bereavement (how the surviving families, relatives and friends face the cessation of life)⁷, even though all three are interconnected⁸. This section will primarily focus upon the issue of death, as opposed to the process of dying or the issues involved with palliative care. The subject of loss and bereavement will be considered only as it impinges upon how death is viewed in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries and its possible impact upon how the deaths of UK Service personnel are viewed by UK society. The intention of this section is to highlight how social attitudes towards death might impact upon the nature of the British soldier as s/he resides in UK social imaginary.

For the purposes of this section death will be interpreted as ‘the irreversible discontinuation of the vital processes by which we are sustained’⁹. The definition provides a workable starting point from which to build a general framework within which the subject can be considered, without addressing the question of what we are and the conditions under which we cease to be¹⁰.

5.2.1 Death as a Cultural and Historical Product¹¹.

The framework created by Philippe Ariès in his ‘magisterial survey of Western attitudes to death’¹² is a useful point of departure¹³. Ariès gathers up ‘a long chain of centuries, approximately a millennium’¹⁴ (until the middle of the twelfth century) under the phrase ‘Tamed Death’. By this he means that death was such a part of everyday life and expectation that it was embraced as something to be prepared for¹⁵. Firstly, death was something to encounter in bed. Secondly, the ritual of death was presided over by the dying person himself¹⁶. Thirdly, the bedchamber was a public place to be entered freely¹⁷. The prevailing sentiment towards death during this period, according to Ariès is one ‘of

familiarity with death, with neither fear nor despair, half-way between passive resignation and mystical trust'¹⁸.

This attitude towards death was partially altered in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Ariès refers to this as 'one's own death'¹⁹. This period lays the foundation for the two succeeding periods in a quite distinct manner, in that it 'reveals the importance given through the entire modern period to the self, to one's own existence, and can be expressed by another phrase, *la mort de soi*, one's own death'²⁰. One of distinctive manifestations of this development may be discerned in the individualisation of sepulchres or tombs²¹. The majority not wealthy enough to have an individual sepulchre continued to be buried in the great common grave, in France called *fosses aux pauvres*, the ditches for the poor. Ariès describes them as being several yards deep and wide²². Once they had been gradually filled up it was covered with earth. A new one was then opened and an old one reopened²³, the bones removed and taken to the charnel house²⁴. The modern idea of a specific location in which a person could be interred as the perpetual owner was utterly foreign during this period.

Attitudes continued to change towards death in the modern period. The familiar 'ritual became challenged and was furtively pushed out of the world of familiar things'²⁵. Ariès calls this the period of 'thy death'²⁶. Walters maintains that 'people became concerned less with what would happen to their soul or name when they died than how they would manage when their loved ones died'²⁷. The ever-emerging individualisation of society increasingly led to the demise of the community's involvement in the rituals of death. Of much greater importance was the 'will' of the dying person and the survival of the remaining family²⁸. Instead of administering the rituals of death personally, the reading of the will delegated to the next of kin the powers that until that moment 'he had jealously exercised'²⁹. Death had become situated within the private confines of the home, in which the grief of the family was compounded with the fear of living with the practical effects of death. The Victorians,

however, have been described as celebrating death, because of their social rituals associated with public mourning, tasteless ostentation and morbid emotionalism³⁰. Nevertheless, it may be viewed as an attempt to retain some vestige of public ritual, as death became increasingly removed from the public sphere.

The impact of the First World War and the influenza epidemic shattered what remained of the Victorian way of death³¹. Western society had entered what Ariès calls the period of 'Forbidden Death'. He describes it as a brutal revolution in traditional ideas and feelings, a period when death would become shameful and forbidden³². Gorer coined a most distinctive phrase to describe this sociological, historical, and cultural phenomenon. He referred to it as 'the pornography of death'³³. What he meant in using this striking phrase was that while sex had been the great social/cultural taboo of the mid to late nineteenth century (marked by public repression and prudishness), death had replaced it in the twentieth century.

The concept of death as a modern taboo has been challenged by a number of scholars. Dollimore accepts that the way in which death is dealt with and discussed may involve something like denial; however, he argues that 'in philosophical and literary terms there has never been a denial of death'³⁴. Noys shares his opinion. He notes that to speak of death being a modern taboo is too simplistic and fails to deal with the ways in which death is invisible and highly visible in modern culture³⁵. Walter's use of the notion of the 'revival of death' may act as a helpful bridge between those who maintain that death has been a twentieth-century taboo and those who noted the profound sociological and cultural changes in the attitude to death in the post-Victorian age³⁶. The postmodern notion of individual choice underpins what he calls the Sinatra Syndrome, or the desire of individuals to take greater ownership not only of how they face death but also the process of their funeral and how this will be remembered after death³⁷.

The transformation in Western attitudes towards death has been influenced by a multitude of factors, not least of which was the logical outworking of Enlightenment philosophy and the transition between the constitutional orders of ‘the state’. This transition between constitutional orders that characterised ‘the state’ is a useful framework within which to observe the changing attitudes towards death in Western society: specifically, the State Nation – Nation State – the Market State³⁸ (see fig 10).

Fig 10³⁹

<u>Time scale</u>	Pre-16 th century Pre-modern		16 th – late 20 th century Early – Late Modern			Late 20 th century to present Postmodern
<u>Social periods</u>	Renaissance		Enlightenment	Industrial Revolution		Post-Industrial
<u>Ariès’ 4 Periods</u>	Tamed Death	One’s Own Death	Thy Death	Forbidden Death		
<u>Constitutional Orders*</u>	Princely State	Kingly State	Territorial State	State Nation	Nation State	Modern State

*(Bobbitt maintains that there have been six distinct constitutional orders of State since it first emerged during the Renaissance)

One of the characteristics, according to Bobbitt, of the State Nation was that it assumed control (or domestic hegemony) of internal and external relations of its society. For example, internally this meant areas such as property rules, education systems, cultural institutions, and externally, treaties, borders and armed forces⁴⁰. State involvement in the rituals of death can be clearly seen in the control it began to exercise to control the disposal of corpses. Since ancient antiquity the living had made a point of keeping the resting places of the dead at a distance⁴¹, a process that was largely adhered to in Western cultures. However, the demographic shifts that occurred during the Enlightenment and subsequent Industrial Revolution meant that urban areas began to subsume areas that had been considered outside the city or town limits. Cemeteries were now embedded within the community of the living. Serious public concerns about rotting corpses, partially covered with soil, the removal of human remains and their storage led to state intervention and the embryonic form of what

would become the complete bureaucratisation, medicalization, rationalisation and professionalization of death⁴².

In 1837 all deaths in England had to be registered. Walters observes that although some may have wished to live at the fringes of society avoiding paperwork, it was impossible to get through death without it⁴³. The medical professions have had an immense impact in the matter of death⁴⁴. Average life expectancy at birth for a male in 1901 was 34 and 49 for a female. In 2001 it had risen to 77 for a male and 81 for a female⁴⁵. The defining feature of the Nation State, according to Bobbitt, was the well-being of its people and to realise this through legal action⁴⁶. This was not sociologically without price.

As medical treatment became more sophisticated it frequently required complicated machinery, which in itself rendered the patient increasingly invisible as a person. The hospital is still regarded as a place of healing; however, it was a place of healing rather than care. Doctors became obsessed 'with maintaining life at all costs'⁴⁷. Though admirable in many respects, this attitude did lead to the practice of hope being suggested when there was little to be anticipated. 'To admit that effective treatment is no longer possible is like admitting defeat'⁴⁸. In Kübler-Ross' studies into dying and the medical professions, she found that doctors and nurses found it difficult to speak openly or listen to the dying patient. She discovered that patients who were terminally ill had to wait twice as long as other patients before a nurse would respond⁴⁹. In Western societies, the general experience was that many dying people were neglected and left to die lonely and in pain⁵⁰.

The hospice movement was a response to this phenomenon and came from the broader 'death awareness movement'⁵¹. With the rise of the role of the state coroner, the medical professions, the hospice movement and the professional undertaker, death was no longer an individual matter but could 'be the result of a vast and anonymous operation carried out upon us'⁵². Not only this, it became a process that in many instances was conducted at a

distance from the home. The family's access to the remains of their loved one was now mediated through the death certificate from a doctor or the permission of the coroner, the registration of the death with the local authority, and the work of the undertaker. In this sense death had become dislocated from the community.

5.2.2 *Death and the Military in the Twenty-First Century.*

The main focus of this sub-section is the consideration of aspects of death and the military in the twenty-first century as it could possibly impact upon any narrative construct that seeks to address the nature of the British soldier. It is not intended to be an exhaustive examination of every conceivable element of death in our present cultural, political and social context.

Regardless of the century or the historical snapshot of human involvement in warfare chosen, 'death and wounds are an inseparable part of battle, and confront the soldier in a myriad guises'⁵³. Citing Steiner, Coker reminds his readers that death was once the overriding theme of literature... death in battle had meaning in such a world. In our world it doesn't⁵⁴. While it is reasonable to maintain that our post-modern cultural context may not ascribe the same meaning to death it would have been afforded in the literature of the *Iliad*, it does not necessarily follow that it will be without meaning. Perhaps more importantly, it does not follow that its meaning should be considered as inadequate or less authentic to that from antiquity. For example, Ben-Ari has discerned the existence of what he refers to as an appropriate cultural script which validates the notion of a good death⁵⁵. In this case, should his argument prove valid, the notion of 'a good death', at least to some extent presents the possibility of ascribing some element of value and therefore some degree of meaning to death.

Culturally, according to Ben-Ari, good deaths represent ideals that enact a symbolic ‘victory over corporeal and social demise and the regeneration of life, while bad ones do the opposite, leaving survivors despairing and helpless in the face of meaninglessness and evil’⁵⁶. In a military context, the social script that offers this symbolic victory over meaninglessness, involves death in combat-related activities and the retrieval of the whole body or all of its parts; the conduct of official commemorations (remembering within the soldier’s unit) and some psychological resolution for the next of kin⁵⁷. Ben-Ari does, however, highlight a critical component to this cultural script; the involvement of soldiers killed in combat is located within an armed conflict or intervention that is considered by that particular society (i.e. in which the social script has validity) as being noble or a good cause⁵⁸. Although the issue of risk, risk aversion and casualty aversion will be considered later in this chapter, it is worth noting at this juncture that it is frequently argued that a society’s attitude towards casualties or indeed casualty aversion is often presented as being directly linked to this notion of a ‘good’ or ‘noble cause’.

Ben-Ari’s treatment of the concept of a good death is located within a body of current scholarship that focuses upon the armed forces and society. His observations concerning the civil and military social script will provide a useful framework within which to explore the issue of death and the military in the twenty-first century further in this part of the thesis. Although, it is hugely difficult to be exhaustive in any treatment of a subject, Ben-Ari fails to address a number of important issues. His reference to death ‘in combat-related activities’ seems to suggest that all deaths in a theatre of operations are caused by the enemy. They are not. He does not address what the military call ‘blue on blue’, the oxymoron ‘friendly fire’ or the politically sensitive ‘green on blue’⁵⁹. Accidental death on the battlefield, even in the midst of battle, can appear ‘utterly pointless’⁶⁰. Of the questions asked by grieving relatives of soldiers killed on active service, ‘how was he killed?’ is among the first to be raised⁶¹.

Death in contact with the enemy in a war-zone like Helmand is one thing; death as a result of a vehicle rolling into an irrigation ditch in the 'green zone' is another.

There is also no reflection of the political nature of the death of the soldier in Ben-Ari's articulation of the cultural script within which the notion of a good death resides. It has already been noted that Noys reflected the notion that Western culture is dominated by a politics of death, thanatopolitical. In contrast King has contended that both the British public and media regard soldiers killed in either Iraq or Afghanistan as 'beyond politics'⁶². He asserts that the dead of Helmand – and even more so Iraq – are honoured in spite of the cause⁶³. A critical part of King's argument is based upon his idea of how the soldier is remembered. According to King, although the fact that they have died as soldiers is not forgotten, a renegotiation has in effect taken place. By way of contrast he refers to the cultural situation following the First World War. In this instance, the identity of those who died in this war remained that of a soldier and therefore King maintains, as a member of the nation. However, the dead from the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns have been domesticated. Now the dead soldier's 'family relations have become central to his identification in the moment of remembrance. Decisively, the soldier's domestic relations have now become primary'⁶⁴. The focus upon the human dimension of the death of a soldier killed enables the public to mourn for them as relatives, as though they (the public) had become imaginary family members⁶⁵.

The effect of this domestication and renegotiation is to place the death of an individual soldier beyond party political politics. If King's argument were considered persuasive, it would indicate that Ben-Ari's contention that a link was necessary between a soldier's death and a noble cause, in order for it to be considered as a good death, is not essential in every case. Value is not located within the merits of the operation but within the normal human relationships of British society. This creates the conditions in which strangers

can empathise with the family and relatives of the fallen service person. What this argument might create though, is the idea that the dead soldier is a victim.

‘Witnessing Wootten Bassett: An Exploration in Cultural Victimology’ is the title of Walklate, Mythen and McGarry’s article examining the repatriations at the town of Royal Wootten Bassett⁶⁶. The image of the British soldier as victim has a powerful history. The enduring mythology of the First World War ‘Tommy’ as a victim endures to this day in modern Britain. It continues to remain both influential and resistant to a disinterested, critical study of historical evidence. Harry Patch’s frequent assertion that war is nothing more than murder, chimes well with the popular image of the British soldier being led into a pointless oblivion. It abides as a haunting image of British soldiers being lead like lambs to the slaughter⁶⁷, immortalised in the TV series *Black Adder Goes Forth*⁶⁸. The image of a lost generation is also not as accurate as the popular mythology suggests. One third of British males of military age never served in the armed forces ‘and, that despite the vast numbers of injured, nearly ninety per cent... actually *survived* the war’⁶⁹ [emphasis original]. Despite the mythology of Douglas Haig & Co as cold-blooded slaughterers of innocent lambs⁷⁰, modern historical research has cast doubt on the accuracy of this. ‘Military historians have pointed out that Haig’s strategy of mass battles actually won the war, however bloody they were’⁷¹.

How groups remember⁷², or even if they remember is a hugely complicated subject, much discussed but with very little agreement⁷³. Collective memory is socially framed⁷⁴. ‘When people come together to remember, they enter a domain beyond that of individual memory’⁷⁵. The man of private memory (*homo psychologicus*) and the man of socially determined public memory (*homo sociologicus*)⁷⁶ is essentially one engaged in negotiation, suppression, distortion and interpolation⁷⁷, in the marketplace of private or corporate associations⁷⁸. In his observations on the witnesses of war Winter maintains,

Those people are involved in memory work, that is, public rehearsal of memories, quite often *not* in order to create social scripts or schemata for the interpretation of the war. They act in order to struggle with grief, to fill in the silence, to offer something symbolically to the dead, for political reasons. The dead are forgotten; peace does not last; memorials fade into the landscape⁷⁹ [emphasis original].

Hugh McManners' book⁸⁰, *Forgotten Voices of the Falklands: The Real Story of the Falklands War in the Words of Those Who Were There*, powerfully illustrates Winter's final point.

In his work on war, personal narratives and commemoration, Hynes considers the issues of memory, narrative and victimhood. He argues that in the process of myth-making, personal narratives both share in its creation and perseverance⁸¹. Later in his article he states, 'personal narratives are not victims' stories either; no man with a weapon in his hand can be entirely a victim...every narrator believes himself to have been to some degree an agent in his personal war, and agents aren't victims'⁸². The work of Walklate, Mythen and McGarry, however, creates space for the inclusion of another dimension to the notion of the soldier as victim or agent. They maintain that while the narrative of the soldier as hero is retained in the UK, 'it has been twinned with a seemingly paradoxical emphasis on the soldier as victim'⁸³. They recognise that the social expectations associated with soldiering do not lend themselves to understanding the soldier as a victim, which in itself implies vulnerability, weakness and passivity⁸⁴. The hypothesis they offer is that in Britain it is possible to 'mourn the loss of individually valuable men and to simultaneously reject the purpose of their death. Distant war on television is one thing...but when distant harms are paraded through the streets of the UK this creates a void for public sentiment, arguably one which has been filled by the mourners of Wootton Bassett'⁸⁵.

The image of a cortège driving slowly through a British market town brings this consideration neatly to Ben-Ari's third component in the social script of a good military death. Such a death 'involves the wholeness of the body, or at least the retrieval of all its parts

in order to re-make it, to assemble it as a whole again'⁸⁶. In her comprehensive treatment of the subject, Samet notes that in the Vietnam War, what could be described as 'a battlefield impulse turned into a national preoccupation for the United States'⁸⁷. The apparent nobility of this gesture, she maintains, captured the American imagination, and was easier to 'articulate than the less intuitive nobility of peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention'⁸⁸. Up to and including the Falklands War the British practice had been to bury the dead where they had fallen⁸⁹. Soldiers killed in the civil unrest or 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland and those whose lives had been lost in the humanitarian and peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations in the Balkans, although returned to the UK did not receive the repatriation those who have been killed in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts have received⁹⁰.

In the First World War the sheer scale of death became a vital matter of sanitation just as much as of morale and military exigency⁹¹. Notions of decency had to be altered. It was not uncommon for a ghoulish attitude towards the remains of the dead to immerge. 'After heavy rain, corpses floated down the trenches, and were sometimes used to patch up the sides of trenches'⁹². With regard to the question of ownership of the body of the soldier, this was unequivocally answered; it was the property of the state⁹³. As such, a more pragmatic approach to the vast numbers of dead bodies had to be adopted than that which would have normally been accorded the burial of a dead person in the UK. As a consequence, and partly because of the limited number of army chaplains, many of the formalities of the religious burial were adapted to meet the needs of the situation. Mass communal graves were common at different stages of the war. However, as Bourke notes, this did not prevent some kind of religious service being performed over the dead⁹⁴. As to the notification of families of the fate of their next of kin, the accepted practice even up to the Korean War had been to publish the names of the casualties in long lists including rank and regiment in *The Times*⁹⁵. The current practice and MOD policy is for every family to have a sufficient number of Casualty

Notifying Officers to notify the next of kin of the dead or injured soldier of what has happened. The processes are continually monitored and revised in line with ‘best practice’⁹⁶.

Samet contends that retrieving the fallen reinforces connections between the soldier and civic life⁹⁷. Although her examination of the notion of ‘leaving no warriors behind’ is primarily sited within American culture, it is consistent with recent British experiences⁹⁸. What is not in question is the ancient practice of recovering the fallen dead from the battlefield. In the *Iliad*, Samet notes that the imperative to retrieve a fallen comrade’s body from the field regardless of the tactical cost, suggests the pre-eminence of the dead over the living⁹⁹. Richards has demonstrated how the treatment of the enemy dead in antiquity is remarkably similar ‘from Hector to Bin Laden’¹⁰⁰. The image of the lifeless body of Hector dragged behind the chariot of Achilles in triumph before the walls of Troy, finds a striking echo with the image of an American Ranger dragged behind his killers’ jeep through the streets of Mogadishu. The mistreatment of the enemy dead was and is used as a weapon against the living. Although Greek warfare had evolved by the time of the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens from that depicted in Homeric epic, Pericles’ funeral speech at the end of the first year of war locates the city-state’s war dead within Athenian civic polity. Samet observes that Abraham Lincoln re-imagined Pericles’ oration for his famous Gettysburg address¹⁰¹, in which an American President like his ancient Athenian counterpart located the civil war dead with the nation’s history and civic polity.

5.2.3 Conclusions

Cultural, social, religious attitudes to death, dying and bereavement have been shaped by many factors. The emergence and greater awareness of individuality and the philosophical ideas that under-pinned this helped shape how death was understood and encountered within social groups. What had been a settled attitude towards death for millennia, changed (in

historical terms) with increasing speed as it adapted to meet new ideas and concerns. This, coupled with evolving constitutional orders, created the conditions in which attitudes and practices towards the dead were adapted to fit the social script of a particular generation/period. This observation may offer some explanation for the many conflicting ideas considered in the sub-section on death and the military in the twenty-first century. The post-modern mind is perfectly at ease with holding competing ideas and concepts without the compulsion to create a unifying meta-narrative of a single harmonious approach. Ben-Ari's observation that a social script exists within which the death of a soldier may be considered as good, is valid. It is however, juxtaposed beside the issue of the soldier being regarded as victim, hero and agent.

The public expressions of sympathy evidenced in the repatriation of British soldiers through Royal Wootton Bassett, suggests two other important concepts. Firstly, that although the fallen are beyond party politics the public (some might contend national) expression of remembrance locates them firmly within civil polity. The domestication of the identity of the dead professional soldiers facilitates this delicate juxtaposition. Secondly, Royal Wootton Bassett created the opportunity for a re-interpretation of an ancient funeral ritual. In a postmodern age, whenever the rituals and language of death have all but disappeared from every day public life, an old and largely forgotten attitude towards death found expression again. At least in this very specific sense, death became part of everyday public life.

5.3 *Risk*

No element of modern-day life is free from some form of risk analysis. This section will consider the concept of the Risk Society and its main characteristics (5.3.1 'Risk Society'). This will form the basis for an examination of how the modern phenomenon of risk has impacted upon international politics, particularly in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks

on 9/11(5.3.2 'Risk: War and Risk'). The sub-section will conclude with a brief survey of the different methodological approaches, identifiable within scholarship and their distinctive characteristics.

5.3.1 *Risk Society*

How 'risk' has been understood over the centuries has changed; indeed even the meaning of the word has altered reflecting this change¹⁰². In his study of the subject Bernstein begins by seeking to establish the link between gambling and fate¹⁰³. 'Gambling...puts us head-to-head against the fates, with no holds barred'¹⁰⁴. Time, he maintains, is the opposite side of the coin to risk¹⁰⁵ 'for if there were no tomorrow there would be no risk'¹⁰⁶. In the ancient world, life was lived in the face of fate or chance, the 'whim of the gods', or in the Judaeo/Christian tradition 'the will of God'. In the classical age, security 'referred to tranquillity and freedom from care'¹⁰⁷. However, the natural, human desire to have a peaceful sense of well-being did little to quench humanity's 'search for a better life on earth'¹⁰⁸. This was a time, Coker reminds us, when a different grammar was used to make sense of or interpret risk. There existed, he contends, the notion of a 'good risk' provided, that is, people had the courage to take it¹⁰⁹.

Life in the twenty-first century is very different. Modern life, Furedi contends, is marked and dominated by a culture of fear¹¹⁰. This naturally raises the question of whether life in the twenty-first century has actually/literally become more dangerous. While life in the Middle Ages was hazardous, there did not seem to be a notion of risk in any traditional culture¹¹¹. For Giddens, the 'idea of risk is bound up with the aspiration to control things and in particular, the idea of controlling the future. Therefore, although the idea of a "risk society" might suggest a world that has become more hazardous, it is not necessarily the case'¹¹².

The popularity of the phrase ‘risk society’ is usually attributed to the work of the German sociologist Ulrich Beck¹¹³. Beck, in contrast with many social commentators, rejects the use of the term post-modern¹¹⁴. Instead, he prefers to use the term ‘reflective modernization’¹¹⁵. For Beck, social change is more suitably divided up into three stages: ‘pre-modernity’, then ‘simple modernity’ and finally ‘reflexive modernity’¹¹⁶. In this division, ‘simple modernity’ is coextensive with industrial society and ‘reflexive modernity’ with what Beck calls, ‘risk society’. ‘Risk may be defined as a *systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself*. Risks, as opposed to older dangers’, he argues, ‘are consequences which relate to the threatening force of modernization and to its globalization of doubt. They are *politically reflexive*’¹¹⁷ [emphasis original]. A risk society in Beck’s analysis ‘is a catastrophic society’. What he means by this is that ‘the exceptional condition threatens to become the norm’¹¹⁸. The logic of this argument is that what would previously have been regarded as exceptional increasingly takes on the characteristics of normality.

Like Giddens, Beck locates the centre of risk consciousness in the future. ‘In the risk society, the past loses the power to determine the present. Its place is taken by the future, thus, as something non-existent, invented, as the “cause” of current experience and action’¹¹⁹. Although many risks are ontologically non-existent, other than as one of many potential futures, their effect in the present is such that the very possibility constrains actual experience and action. Beck refers to this as ‘a real virtuality’¹²⁰. Commenting on this Rasmussen notes that, ‘it is not the present actions that are to produce future results, but perceived future results that produce present actions’¹²¹. This is what Beck refers to as ‘the risk trap’¹²².

In such a social context, risks are no longer the dark side of opportunities. They can, however, frequently become market opportunities¹²³. There is no risk, according to Giddens, that cannot be described without reference to a value. ‘When there is a clash of the different

types of risk, there is a clash of values and a directly political set of values¹²⁴. Once the notion of ascribing a value to risk is established as a principle, an economic and political set of cost benefits is also introduced; for example, 'how much wealth should be sacrificed for how much health'¹²⁵. Douglas and Wildavsky illustrate the issue by considering the so-called battle for clean water in America¹²⁶. While this case may in itself be somewhat dated, the issues involved are not. There are 4.5 million known chemicals, with some 45,000 in commercial use¹²⁷. It takes, they argue, the use of some 300 mice in experiments conducted over a 2 to 3 year period, 'and about \$300,000 to determine whether a single suspect causes cancer'¹²⁸.

The reality of the situation is that the public are exposed continually to both natural and manmade chemicals within the water system¹²⁹. The determination of just how much exposure is safe generates a value. This value has, at the very minimum, an economic and political component to it; 'how much wealth should be sacrificed for how much health'. The number of risk related values with this particular case, are innumerable. This is only one example, in one area of modern life. For Furedi, the widespread public perception of fear, particularly with regard to the multitude of risk is evidence of what he describes as 'society's free-floating consciousness of risk'¹³⁰.

The ubiquitous sense of fear, according to Gardner, is one of the great paradoxes of our time. He makes the point that 'we are the healthiest, wealthiest, and longest-lived people in history'¹³¹. It is not simply the perception that fear pervades almost every aspect of modern life; rather what imbues fear with its insidious character for those living in a post-modern age, is its liquid character. Zygmunt Bauman has pioneered the notion that concepts like Fear and Love are liquid in nature¹³². He contends that 'fear is at its most fearsome when it is diffuse scattered, unclear, unattached, unanchored, free floating, with no clear address or cause'¹³³. Despite this they are, he maintains, 'dangers whose probability we can (or believe that we

can) calculate'¹³⁴. The modern response to this belief is the creation of more risk assessments and contingency plans, illustrating further the paradoxical nature of reflexive modernity. It is a powerful metaphor of risk's omnipresence in twenty-first century Western culture.

There was a time, Durant observes, when 'if science said something was good for us, then it was good for us'¹³⁵. However, in a post-modern age, science no longer holds the key to allaying public fear concerning the infusive nature of risk. Gardner is blunt when he maintains that 'fear sells. Fear makes money'¹³⁶. For Furedi 'suspicion towards science is particularly intense. Instead of trusting the expert opinion of the scientist, many people are disposed to look for a hidden agenda'¹³⁷. While accepting that many scientists seek to be objective and rational, Beck contends that 'sciences' rationality claim to be able to investigate objectively the hazardousness of a risk permanently refutes itself. In dealing with civilization's risks', he argues, the sciences have always abandoned their foundation of experimental logic and made a polygamous marriage with business, politics and ethics – or more precisely, they live with the later in a sort of "permanent marriage without license"¹³⁸. Douglas and Wildavsky also make the claim that science is often polarised and politicised resulting in profound disagreements within the scientific community¹³⁹. This suspicion stands in juxtaposition with modern society's increasing reliance both upon science and the technologies that much of modern life depends upon¹⁴⁰.

Another recurring theme within the literature on risk is the ethical dimension associated with it. This is largely derived from a societal appreciation that once risk has been identified, there is both the obligation to act, or modify one's behaviour, accordingly and responsibly in light of the perception of risk or actual risk¹⁴¹. Furedi notes that 'the prescriptive consequences of the etiquette constructed around risk consciousness have been widely commented on'¹⁴². In his reflection on this point, Beck states 'that determinations of risks are the form in which ethics...is resurrected *inside* the centres of modernization'¹⁴³

[emphasis original]. The ethics associated with risk and risk management/avoidance has introduced an ethical system and cultural etiquette that provides an alternative way of regulating human conduct. ‘This is’, Furedi argues, ‘an authoritarian morality that believes that it has the right to judge, censor and punish. Paradoxically, it presents itself as non-judgmental and as the protector of the powerless’¹⁴⁴.

The conclusion he draws from this is uncompromising. He maintains that this moralist imperative has created a puritanical climate in modern life, one that could not have been achieved through traditional means¹⁴⁵. For example, he contends that where conventional morality failed to control society’s attitude towards sex, particularly with regard to the sexual revolution, risk introduced the basic concept that sex was a profoundly risky affair¹⁴⁶. Today recreational ‘unsafe’ sex is increasingly dismissed as irresponsible¹⁴⁷. The impact of this moral imperative, however, which has a ringing similarity to Kant’s categorical imperative, has grown and has arguably spread into most areas of life, for example: how much a person should eat, and the cost to society of obesity or any form of eating disorder; how much alcohol one should consume and calls for government taxation to limit or control the intake of alcohol. ‘Irresponsible’ behaviour that might incur a financial cost or burden to others has created a twenty-first morality that is, it can be maintained, more invasive than any other previous morality.

5.3.2 *Risk: War and Risk*

There are known knowns; there are things we know we know. There are known unknowns; that is to say that there are things that we know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns – there are things we do not know, we don’t know¹⁴⁸.

When Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense of the United States, uttered this statement, many openly laughed at the apparent incomprehensible nature of the argument¹⁴⁹.

When he was subsequently awarded the ‘Foot in Mouth’ prize, the BBC in its report of the

accolade referred to 'his now legendary remarks'¹⁵⁰. However, many students who study the subject of risk in an age of war and uncertainty recognise that the US Secretary was speaking clearly and cogently, albeit using the language of risk and precaution¹⁵¹. The 'unknown unknowns' statement, in hindsight was the public articulation of a specifically new way of doing strategy¹⁵². It encapsulated the ontological sense of insecurity that pervaded not only America's sense of security but also many Western governments.

Although Beck's notion of a 'world risk society' had been hugely influential among sociologists, the explosion of interest in the concept of risk in the field of International Relations and War Studies has only emerged relatively recently¹⁵³. Jarvis has suggested that one of the central reasons why Beck's thesis was embraced so readily was in no small part due to its timing¹⁵⁴. He states that, 'Beck could not have foreseen that the publication of his first work on world risk society in May 1986 would coincide with a catastrophe of monumental proportions, namely the explosion of the nuclear power plant at Chernobyl, Ukraine, on 25 April'¹⁵⁵. While this observation is self-evidently true concerning the coincidence of timings¹⁵⁶, what he fails to recognise was the profound insight that Beck offered concerning the paradox of late modernity/postmodernity with regard to the sense of ontological insecurity in Western societies. There is general agreement in the literature on risk that the end of the Cold War, the rapid growth of trans-national commerce, globalisation, the actual or perceived spread of international terrorism, the imminent fear of catastrophic climate/environmental damage, heightened governmental and public fears concerning risk¹⁵⁷.

A pertinent example of the liquid or debounded¹⁵⁸ nature of risk¹⁵⁹ is clearly evident in what has become known as the 'precautionary principle'. It was first used, maintains Williams, in the United Nations World Charter for Nature adopted by the General Assembly in 1982 and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development where the concept

came into regular use¹⁶⁰. In this declaration the precautionary principle is defined in this manner:

Where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as reason for postponing cost effective measures to prevent environmental degradation¹⁶¹.

The use of the word precaution when associated with risk means the prudent handling of uncertain or highly vulnerable situations¹⁶². What is hugely significant in the Rio Declaration is the commitment to act even in the absence of certainty or hard scientific evidence. However, what is perhaps even more significant is the implicit moral imperative to act in the absence of empirical evidence.

9/11 has been and continues to be one of the few truly global and epoch-making events of late modernity¹⁶³. After 9/11, Al-Qaeda was not simply another terrorist group¹⁶⁴; unlike, for example, Hezbollah, the IRA or the Shining Path groups, which were generally associated with a specific country or territory. Al-Qaeda post 9/11 was proof that ‘a parallel globalisation of terror’¹⁶⁵ existed alongside the economic, trade, political and social components of globalisation. Only three weeks after the attack on the Twin Towers, Paul Wolfowitz stated that ‘we must recognise that these strikes were not just an act of war – they were a window into our future’¹⁶⁶. The picture outside the window did not make for pleasant viewing. Just as global capitalism appeared to be outside the control of states¹⁶⁷, globalized security risks¹⁶⁸ created an image of a world where risk was endless¹⁶⁹ and enemies had become products of our imagination¹⁷⁰ or our prejudices¹⁷¹. The heightened sense of fear following 9/11 coupled with the subsequent expansion of ill-defined if tangible threats resulted in the focus of many Western governments shifting to future risks, undesirable possibilities and the question of an appropriate response.

If the West had been given a look at its future, the precautionary principle demanded a prudent response. For the Bush administration, the ‘War on Terror’, resulting in the

intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq was considered an appropriate response. Just as in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, the lack or otherwise of empirical evidence was not considered a justification for inaction. In regard to the invasion of Iraq, the Americans insisted that they could not wait for conclusive evidence of his [Saddam Hussein] WMD programme¹⁷². 9/11 had created a distinct, political, narrative framework for the American administration through which everything was interpreted and re-interpreted. It is important to note that the precautionary principle is not philosophically incoherent¹⁷³. However, when governments take the path of precautionary intervention in an attempt to manage risk, short, medium and longer-term unforeseen consequences may and can call into question the original intention of the intervention. This is frequently referred to as the boomerang effect¹⁷⁴. It might also be expressed as the law of unintended consequences. It is questionable whether or not Americans feel existentially safer after the billions of dollars spent and the many tens of thousands of lives lost in the War on Terror¹⁷⁵.

Within the literature on risk and security studies three schools or distinct approaches can be discerned¹⁷⁶: Critical Risk Studies, Political Risk Studies and Global Risk Management¹⁷⁷. Each of these schools will be briefly considered in turn.

In Critical Risk Studies the focus is on risk governance, the practices of governments and companies¹⁷⁸ and the political rationality associated with this¹⁷⁹. Scholars who adopt this approach have been heavily influenced by the work of Michel Foucault¹⁸⁰. Consequently, they are frequently referred to as post-structuralists¹⁸¹. Aradau and van Münster argue that the ‘war on terror’ is not the advent of the risk society, contra Beck, but rather ‘a new form of governmentality that imbricates knowledge and decision at the limit of knowledge¹⁸². Consequently, ‘risk can be understood as a *dispositif*¹⁸³ to govern social problems in Michel Foucault’s sense of the term¹⁸⁴. The notion of a *dispositif*, according to Aradau and van Münster, enables all risks to be inked in a continuum, regardless of whether they are

everyday risks or catastrophic risks¹⁸⁵. The result of this is that ‘risk management is seen not so much as concerned with governing risk, but with governing social problems and society itself *through* risk’¹⁸⁶ [emphasis original]. Or in simple terms, the focus is not on the ‘why’ a risk situation has arisen but on the ‘how’ it is to be governed. What counts is not whether terrorism can be controlled or not, but the dispositif that is being deployed to make action upon the contingent occurrence of terrorism thinkable and practicable¹⁸⁷.

One of the main strengths of this approach to understanding risk in security studies is the determined focus upon the governmental approach to make action against risk intelligible and practicable. However, as Hameiri contends it is unable to explain why risk management has become so important at this particular historical period and secondly and more importantly, they cannot explain variation in the adoption of risk depictions and modes of governance in different functional areas and geographic regions’¹⁸⁸.

Political Risk Studies primarily considers risk analysis across the disciplines of political science, economics and international business, its historically disparate methodological strands and its impact on states, markets and transnational actors in the international system’¹⁸⁹. Those who espouse this approach, openly aim at providing problems to specific problems¹⁹⁰. Central to the goal of problem solving is the belief that empirical evidence exists and must be analysed when considering how to manage risk. In his critique of Beck’s world risk society, Jarvis repeatedly refers to the lack of empirical evidence to support Beck’s influential thesis, the implication of course being that such evidence not only exists but Beck did not make use of it when constructing his concept of a world risk society. After a detailed consideration of GDP figures, government spending and tax revenue, Jarvis states emphatically that Beck’s use of globalisation fails many empirical tests with relatively crude postulations. There is little empirical evidence, he confidently maintained, that supported Beck’s suggestion that the state was in systematic retreat, ‘that its fiscal base has been

eroded, or its expenditure abilities reduced'¹⁹¹. The global financial meltdown would suggest that the empirical evidence used by Jarvis to critique Beck was not as compelling as he maintained.

The strengths of this approach, however, in dealing with risk are that it seeks to produce solutions to problems based upon empirical evidence and that this approach is not restricted to international relations or security studies. However, as amply demonstrated in Jarvis' critique of Beck's theory of a world risk society, many sociologists have called into question the validity of objective truth claims especially when working in cultural settings¹⁹².

One of the central tenets of Global Risk Management is the distinction between threats, which are quantifiable and 'can be precisely identified and measured on the basis of the capabilities an enemy has to realize a hostile intent'¹⁹³ and risk, which is about the unforeseen, the potential and the possibility of harm¹⁹⁴. Threats are predominantly a feature of the present, whereas risks can transcend time and space¹⁹⁵. 'Threats are finite because they emanate from a specific actor, with a limited amount of resources to support capabilities. Risks are infinite'¹⁹⁶. Often referred to as a 'weak' constructivist approach¹⁹⁷ because it (Global Risk Management) accepts the premise of Beck's world risk society¹⁹⁸, its primary objective is the consideration of how risk can be managed in a world of debounded risk where the notion of security, at least offered by the state nationally and internationally, becomes increasingly obsolete¹⁹⁹. The main exponents of this position are Christopher Coker, Yee-Kuang Heng, Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen and Michael J. Williams. Despite their differences, these scholars agree that the concept of risk has taken over how we think about security, particularly our thinking on war and strategy²⁰⁰.

Yee-Kuang Heng maintains that a new vocabulary is needed to reconceptualise war in the post-Cold War era so that it can be sited within the cultural phenomenon that is twenty-first century risk management²⁰¹. When applied to war studies, risk management does not

seek correctionalism²⁰² but rather the application of what he refers to as utilitarian, 'less than heroic' strategies designed to simply reduce systematic risks²⁰³. In other words using risk management principles is not about trying to fix or correct a problem. The goal is only to mitigate it, and manage it to an acceptable level²⁰⁴.

The main thrust of Rasmussen's work *The Risk Society at War*, is that strategic studies had clearly defined the nature of threats²⁰⁵ and that this was subsequently translated into a means-end rationality that was in turn capable of bureaucratic administration²⁰⁶. The history of strategy in the twenty-first century, according to Rasmussen, is entering a new chapter, precisely because society itself has changed into a risk society²⁰⁷. The challenge for strategic studies is great. The UN and International Law are examples of the culmination of a means-end rational logic²⁰⁸ and function as bodies that have effectively outlawed war²⁰⁹. Both reflect, and are products of, a very specific and historic understanding of threat and how that threat should be countered or restricted. Rasmussen argues that both bodies are therefore ill equipped to deal with issues that are not directly related to state-on-state confrontations²¹⁰. 'It is transnational organisations like al-Qaeda that present a challenge, because they reject the nation state as the unit of politics and replace loyalty to a state with loyalty to a faith'²¹¹. Consequently, strategic studies must acquire new insights into risk in late modernity by employing reflexive strategies²¹², so that it might acquire the rules to guide it²¹³ in an age of risk.

A comprehensive example of war as risk management is Coker's *War in an Age of Risk*²¹⁴. Like the other scholars in this school, Coker accepts Beck's basic premise of a world risk society²¹⁵. Having given up on utopian ideals²¹⁶ 'the West', he argues, 'is no longer in the business of building a New World Order but managing the Global Disorder instead'²¹⁷. Insecurity and not security is the norm because the risk society grasps that the future cannot be secured²¹⁸. What it can do, however, is seek to make it safer. Consequently, when this

principle is applied to war, military force is largely applied to one end, managing what he terms the 'wild zone', the fragile states and failing societies²¹⁹. War in an age of risk has become so complex²²⁰, where everything is interconnected²²¹, moves at a remarkable speed²²² generating unintended consequences²²³ that the primary consideration in modern warfare is consequence management, rather than some kind of decisive Clausewitzian victory. 'In the risk age life is too complex,' he contends, 'to be reordered, and even if this were not the case, war is too imperfect an instrument to do the reordering'²²⁴. Consequently, 'we are now in the business of "managing" insecurity or enabling greater or lesser stability'²²⁵.

Global Risk Management is the analytical application of insights into risk in a security context that have been drawn from the research of leading sociologists. The main contribution this approach offers is its ability to philosophically examine the implications of risk in a security setting, particularly war, while simultaneously applying concepts from other academic disciplines. It seeks to explain 'why' risk has the impact upon societies and governmental responses to risk in an age of uncertainty. It also offers a critique of the way risk is manifested, thereby suggesting clues as to a potential response. However, and this is an observation applicable to philosophy itself²²⁶, Global Risk Management does not offer an effective 'how' risk should be handled. To use a medical analogy, it is akin to identifying that a patient is sick and being able to offer a cogent explanation of the origins of the sickness and the ability to outline its symptoms but is unable to offer the patient any credible medical intervention to cure the sickness.

5.3.3 Conclusions

Risk has always been part of what it is to be human. Every advance or stage in our developmental journey as a species has involved risk and the consequences associated with progress. However, how risk is understood in the twenty-first century and our reaction to it is

fundamentally different than earlier periods of history. The Enlightenment project offered advances in science, technology and industry at a previously unimagined pace. The certainty that characterised the philosophical underpinnings of modernity has been replaced in this post-modern age with a fundamental suspicion of authority, absolutes and the existence of universal laws or norms. Beck's reflective modernisation therefore does not adequately reflect this cultural dynamic. Although the phrase seeks to maintain a direct, albeit reflective, link with modernity and the Enlightenment project, it nevertheless fails to give sufficient weight to the fear that accompanies, as a practical consequence, the rejection of intellectual, scientific and universal absolutes. Not even science, on which so much of life in this century depends, is trusted to have all the answers. The 'free-floating consciousness of fear' is only one manifestation of the rejection of Enlightenment certainties in the 'risk society'.

Globalisation offers unparalleled opportunities while simultaneously generating an almost unlimited source of potentially devastating risks, such as non-state international terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. Far from the 'New World Order' envisaged at the end of the Cold War, governments are faced with a future characterised by known and unknown (but anticipated) threats and an innumerable number of potential risks. The window to the future imagined by Wolfowitz still does not make for pleasant viewing. Governments are ensnared in what Beck calls 'the risk trap'. Although many risks are ontologically non-existent, other than as one of many potential futures, their effect in the present is such that the very possibility constrains actual experience and action, creating 'a real virtuality' that itself becomes determinative. The various schools of thought adopted by scholars in security and international studies are testimony to how complex and insolvable the issue of risk must be for governments, not least because of the moral etiquette constructed around risk and the ethical imperative to avoid unnecessary risk. Western societies that are increasingly fearful of risk and consequently are also increasingly risk averse may well be deeply suspicious of

narratives that seek to legitimise the use of military force and of asking its Armed Forces to accept risks that they as a society actively seek to avoid.

5.4 *A Post-Heroic and Feminised Society?*

The extent to which Western societies can now be legitimately described as post-heroic or are thought to embody a post-heroic condition, was discussed at an international conference at the Faculty of History, University of Oxford in March 2011. Key questions the conference sought to address were: does the condition exist? If it exists, does it posit an alternative set of military values for the modern age? Does this condition directly affect the relationship between military and civilian casualties and the nature of the relationship a society is prepared to accept? What is the relationship between self-sacrifice, citizenship and masculinity?²²⁷ This section will further develop the theme of the chapter through a consideration of three distinct and yet potentially related ideas: a post-heroic society (condition); casualties and public opinion; and finally the feminisation of Western society.

5.4.1 *Post-heroic Society*

The assumption implied in the concept of a post-heroic society, or post-heroic condition for that matter, is the idea that societies have reached a stage where the need for heroes as classically defined is no longer required. The *Concise Oxford Dictionary* defines ‘the heroic age’ as that period in Greek history before the return from Troy, in which the legends of the heroes were set²²⁸. The *Oxford Dictionary’s* definition of hero is ‘a person, typically a man, who is admired for their courage, outstanding achievements, or noble qualities: *a war hero*’. It is clear from this definition that any suggestion that the age of heroes ended with the Greeks before their return from Troy is unsustainable. Individuals²²⁹ or groups²³⁰ have been admired for their ‘courage, outstanding achievements, or noble qualities’

in almost every age. However, in an age obsessed with the management of risk and the ethical imperative to avoid unnecessary risk, the cultural context within which words derive their contemporary meaning is, it can be maintained, significantly different to previous ages²³¹. In this section, post-heroic will therefore refer to the notion that the classical ideal of the heroic figure, i.e. noted for their courage, noble qualities, a war hero, resides uneasily in a risk-averse society.

Post-heroism reflects the idea that modern society is no longer motivated by the same heroic concepts that marked earlier periods of history. ‘Willingness to kill or die for the cause of one’s socio-political community appears to be a phenomenon of an historical stage that Western states have long left behind or an indicator of nationalistic or religious fanaticism’²³². Luttwak describes this as ‘a new season of war’, which he maintained was a consequence of the passing of the Cold War²³³. One of the first scholars to specifically focus upon the idea of post-heroic warfare, Luttwak argued that the Napoleonic type of warfare, with its grand purposes and the decisive employment of substantial forces in large operations²³⁴, was faced with a significant demographic change emphasized by the end of the Cold War²³⁵. Wars fought for grand purposes, Luttwak maintains, implies a willingness on behalf of countries to accept casualties in large numbers²³⁶. One of the characteristics of post-heroic war is the ideal of low casualty rates, ‘in order of priority, military personnel, civilian populations, and, if possible and profitable, the enemy’²³⁷. Luttwak ascribes the modern fear of casualties²³⁸ to the demographic change in birth rates²³⁹. In pre-industrial and industrial societies, it was common for families to have anywhere from 4 to 9 children²⁴⁰. In contrast, in post-industrial societies the statistical average is 2.1²⁴¹. He makes the point that infant and child mortality rates were tragically high in pre-industrial and industrial societies. Consequently,

To lose a young family member for any reason was always tragic no doubt, but death in combat was not the extraordinary and fundamentally unacceptable event that it has

now become. Parents and relatives who approve when their children decide to join the armed forces, now react with astonishment and anger when they are actually sent into combat, and they view their wounding or death as an outrageous scandal, rather than as an occupational hazard²⁴².

The first post-heroic war, according to Luttwak, was NATO's intervention against Serbia for the sake of Kosovo²⁴³; the NATO campaign against Serbia being an example of what he would term, post-heroic military policy²⁴⁴. Hobsbawn called it the first 'consumer war'²⁴⁵, Ash referred to it as the first 'post-Westphalian' war²⁴⁶ and Coker refers to it as an example of humane warfare²⁴⁷. One of the key features of this policy according to Luttwak, is that 'U.S. ground forces are not available as instruments of U.S. foreign policy, except under very unusual conditions'²⁴⁸. His rhetoric of NATO's deliberate casualty avoidance in the Kosovo campaign, for example releasing ordinance from what he terms 'from an ultra-safe 15,000 feet', is scathing²⁴⁹. 'In the calculus of the NATO democracies, the immediate possibility of saving thousands of Albanians from massacre and hundreds of thousands from deportation was obviously not worth the lives of a few pilots'²⁵⁰. Although it can be maintained that there is no single European way of war²⁵¹, one trait shared by many Western democracies is a profound sensitivity to the impact upon public opinion of military casualties.

Politicians in most if not all Western countries are exceptionally conscious of the need to garner public support in the decision-making process to commit their forces to armed conflict or indeed war²⁵². Even if public support is broadly supportive at the beginning of a campaign it cannot be taken for granted that it will endure throughout it. Coker makes an astute observation when he comments that, 'it is the public today that tends to desert, to insist that forces be pulled out'²⁵³. The ever-present specter of the propaganda of the deed²⁵⁴ ensures that any armed conflict is conducted in several theatres simultaneously. Therefore, while a particular incident in a campaign may have little operational effect on the ground, it could generate strategic effect within public opinion of the country concerned and consequently on the world stage. This is especially true in a country that manifests traits of a

post-heroic society. Manigart's study into Belgium's withdrawal of its ground forces from Rwanda highlights this point²⁵⁵.

On the 7th of April 1994 ten Belgium paratroopers were killed by Hutu government troops while assigned to protect the Rwandan prime minister. This was the largest loss of Belgian military personnel killed in combat since the Korean War²⁵⁶. Manigart contends that the overwhelming public reaction to these deaths led not only to the immediate withdrawal of all Belgium's military forces from the country, but it tragically precipitated the subsequent genocide²⁵⁷. What had been anticipated as a 'risk free' 'Club Med' holiday, according to Manigart, provided the basis for a fundamental reassessment of government and national policy. 'In postmodern societies that are more and more risk averse, and where "zero dead wars" have become a normal expectation, this fact can greatly complicate the recruitment and retention process for armed forces relying on the marketplace for filling their ranks'²⁵⁸.

In 1997 a special Parliamentary commission by the Belgian Senate was established under pressure by the victim's relatives²⁵⁹. One of the recommendations emerging from this commission was the requirement that the government and the military should make sure everything was done to guarantee the maximum safety of military personnel and to obtain maximal guarantees for the security of the troops in the field²⁶⁰. Manigart's study into societal attitudes in Belgium revealed that the public continued to regard 'the military as a high-risk occupation, even though it is objectively less the case than before'²⁶¹. Although the public image in Belgium of its Armed Forces was positive, the prestige of the military remained low compared to other professions because it is still considered a dangerous occupation²⁶². The deaths of ten paratroopers, while undoubtedly tragic and heartbreaking for the families of those killed, would not normally be expected to generate strategic effect on the battlefield.

This case, however, illustrates the sensitivity that surrounds military deaths in post-modern societies and the global strategic effect a small number of military deaths can have. Although this it maybe suggestive of a societal post-heroic condition, it does not establish it. In section 5.2.2 ‘Death and the Military in the Twenty-first Century’ it was maintained that public expressions of sympathy evidenced in the repatriation of British soldiers through Royal Wootton Bassett and latterly Carterton, placed the fallen beyond party politics but firmly within civil polity. The many thousands who ‘publicly pay their respects’ at a repatriation of a fallen British soldier or at the funeral service are doing more than identifying with the personal loss of a family. The personal attendance at memorial services of recently killed service personnel, and for that matter at Remembrance Day services, are public statements that the death of the soldier(s) warranted public recognition through their attendance. The issue is not whether the UK is an entirely post-heroic society; Royal Wootton Bassett²⁶³ clearly demonstrates that it is not. Rather the issue is that the areas of public life in which a display of heroism might be expected or manifested have been in a process of steady decline in Western, post-modern, risk-averse societies.

5.4.2 Post-modern Casualty Phobia

It is frequently maintained that America, and for that matter most Western governments and peoples, had developed such a profound dread of war casualties that this specific phobia directly influenced national policies²⁶⁴. This alleged phobia or dread of large numbers of casualties appears to stand in direct contrast to either the history of Western countries or their willingness to suffer eye-wateringly large casualty numbers during either civil wars²⁶⁵, the First and Second World Wars or the Korean War²⁶⁶. Bennett and Flickinger note in their brief historical survey on this subject, that America’s reluctance to confront the Nazi threat was greatly influenced, in part, by the fear that any such war would result in

heavy casualties²⁶⁷. Despite this, after Japan attacked Pearl Harbour, America was prepared to pay a heavy cost; in the Second World War the US lost 250,000 – 260,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen²⁶⁸.

Casualty figures from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, of British and US military personnel, would suggest that the notion of casualty phobia is more complex than counting numbers²⁶⁹. This section cannot offer a comprehensive treatment of this complex subject²⁷⁰. Nevertheless, it will consider the idea of casualty phobia or casualty aversion and its alleged impact upon policy, particularly US policy²⁷¹. This section will also examine the main suggested reasons for this phenomenon.

It is important to define what is meant in the phrase casualty phobia or casualty aversion. Smith makes the point that ‘concern for casualties is healthy; casualty aversion or phobia is not’²⁷². Record, however, states that ‘casualty aversion is healthy; casualty phobia is not’²⁷³. While the distinction between Smith and Record may well be only semantic, it is nevertheless important to carefully define the concept of casualty concern as opposed to casualty aversion or phobia. The idea that a state should be concerned about military casualties should not come as any surprise. Levy maintains that the state has sought a balance between the capacity to employ military force and the domestic limitations deriving from the low level of legitimacy for sacrifice²⁷⁴. This was reflected in the Weinberger doctrine of 1984, which proposed the rules for avoiding costly military operations that were considered low priority²⁷⁵. The same basic tenet is explicitly noted in the US Army’s Field Manual 100-5, the American people expect decisive victory and abhor unnecessary casualties. They prefer quick resolution of conflicts and reserve the right to reconsider their support should any of these conditions not be met²⁷⁶. In essence, ‘the public would always like to pay less of this cost if possible, but a non-zero human cost does not mean the public will oppose war’²⁷⁷.

This, however, supposes that ‘the public’ is some form of homogeneous whole. They are not and different sections of ‘the public’ may take or adopt different positions on this subject²⁷⁸. In America, according to Smith, 30-35 per cent of the public are what he terms ‘solid hawks’; 20-25 per cent are ‘defeat phobic’²⁷⁹; 20 per cent are casualty phobic²⁸⁰; and 10-30 per cent are ‘solid doves’ and who are opposed to almost all use of force²⁸¹. Consequently, there is usually a base of public opinion that can be built upon by political actors²⁸². For Smith, ‘casualty aversion, strictly defined, refers only to that segment of view between convinced hawks and persistent pacifists’²⁸³. Gelpi, et.al., suggest that we should understand public opinion as existing on a continuum of casualty sensitivity, ranging from the minimally sensitive to the maximally sensitive²⁸⁴. This is a much more nuanced view of public opinion than has sometimes been presented.

America’s ‘zero-deficit mentality’²⁸⁵ in the Balkans was an operational driver that had tactical implications; bombing from 15,000 feet in Kosovo is a very public manifestation of this mentality. The Weinberger doctrine articulated in 1984 and the US Army’s doctrinal awareness of the need to avoid unnecessary casualties are examples of the profound change in tone concerning how both the government and the public understood core national interests. Scholars frequently cite the experience and remembrance of the Vietnam War as the source of America’s casualty phobia or of its ‘zero-tolerance’ to casualties in the later decades of the twentieth century²⁸⁶.

Vietnam, according to Coker, was America’s first ‘postmodern’ war²⁸⁷ and the most searing war experience for America since The Civil War²⁸⁸. It was also the first war in which combat imagery was widely available²⁸⁹ and where censorship was virtually non-existent²⁹⁰. Although public support for this war showed little change up to the Spring of 1968 despite the Tet offensive²⁹¹, disenchantment with the war grew and spawned a mass anti-war movement. Returning American troops were vilified for their cruelty and received no victory

parades and no national acts of expiation²⁹². The search for ‘the lessons’ of Vietnam dominated strategic discussions in the years following the inglorious evacuation of the U.S. embassy in Saigon²⁹³. Vietnam produced, according to Record, a generation of political and military leaders that was much more reluctant to use force²⁹⁴ and if it did, it would have to adhere to a different political and military policy. It was this generation of politicians and military leaders who directed the withdrawal of American forces from Lebanon and Somalia²⁹⁵ and implemented the ‘zero-tolerance’ policy in Bosnia and Kosovo.

It was widely believed that the American public could not stand the body bag factor²⁹⁶ as a result of its experience of the Vietnam War. The deaths of eighteen US Rangers in Mogadishu on the 3rd of October 1993 is frequently cited as evidence of how negative public opinion and media pressure forced President Bill Clinton to withdraw American Forces from Somalia²⁹⁷. John Mueller made the observation that, ‘in essence, when Americans asked themselves how many American lives it was worth to save hundreds of thousands of Somali lives, the answer came out rather close to zero’²⁹⁸. He went on to state that, ‘the British, Canadians, French, and others came to this same conclusion regarding their own soldiers’²⁹⁹. The images of dead American soldiers, stripped naked and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, were and remain shocking. For Dauber the photographs of the dead soldiers work as ‘*enthymemes*, that is they are arguments that invite the reader to supply the final missing conclusion, in this case that the circumstances mirror those of Vietnam’³⁰⁰. He continues and states that, ‘unlike Desert Storm, this was no Nintendo War’³⁰¹. Did public opinion, fuelled by the powerful images of dead American soldiers, and combined with media pressure change America’s involvement in Somalia. Or has this episode been misinterpreted as Smith contends?³⁰²

The response in the American media to the media coverage from Mogadishu was dramatic³⁰³. At the time, maintains Smith, about 40 per cent of Americans believed that their

forces should be withdrawn. However, 'up to 60 per cent wanted to send in more forces to punish the perpetrators of the outrage'³⁰⁴. In his analysis of the role of the media in the Somalia crisis, Mermin contends that if television inspired American intervention in Somalia, it did so under the influence of governmental actors'³⁰⁵. If this were indeed the case, it seems a reasonable assumption to make that a similar relationship possibly existed in the aftermath of the deaths in October 1993³⁰⁶. Burk notes that the rhetoric about public intolerance of casualties 'may simply mask an intra-elite struggle'³⁰⁷ taking place in the US administration at the time of the American deaths. Although the popular image is of a rapid withdrawal of American troops, Mueller notes that 'after the Somalia fiasco, the Americans stayed on for several months and, since none were killed, scarcely any attention was paid or concern voiced'³⁰⁸.

Nevertheless, what is referred to as the 'Dover Test' is a powerful concept³⁰⁹. This is reflected in the article written by Ted Rall (an American citizen) published on the Al Jazeera website³¹⁰. Rall's argument is not subtle. 'What about the bodies? During the 1960s and early 1970s television viewers and newspaper readers in the US were regularly treated to images from the front that prompted even the most fervent proponents of the war to question themselves'³¹¹. In essence he laments that while Vietnam was a total media free-for-all, the US media have, in his opinion, accepted government censorship, effectively hiding the truth of America's wars. Rall's article is hardly a scholarly piece of work. It is however, evidence of how powerful and politically sensitive images of dead soldiers, in this case American soldiers, returning home in flagged draped coffins is thought to be³¹².

American political elites, according to Kaplan, hold as 'an article of faith' that the public are unwilling to tolerate combat deaths³¹³. 'The public', he states 'is defeat-phobic, not casualty-phobic'³¹⁴. In contrast, Reagan and Clinton may have been reticent because the group most likely to recoil from casualties happens to be the very elites who attribute the

tendency to the public³¹⁵. Opinion polls following the attacks on September 11, 2001 showed that a large majority supported military action, even if it meant thousands of American deaths and the war lasting years³¹⁶. Julian Glover's analysis of opinion poll for the *Guardian* during one of the bloodiest periods in Afghanistan for UK forces concludes that support for the war in the UK had increased, although he makes the point that it is not a popular war³¹⁷. For the American public, 'so long as the president is not panicking at the sight of casualties, neither will the public'³¹⁸. The American public are not indifferent to the human cost of American foreign policy; however, casualty rates have not driven public attitudes towards the Iraq War³¹⁹. Under the right conditions, the public will continue to support military operations even when they come with a relatively high human cost³²⁰.

In their analysis of public opinion, Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler, conclude that public tolerance of the human cost is shaped by the intersection of two crucial attitudes: belief about the rightness or wrongness of the war and beliefs about the likely success of the war³²¹. They contend that those who are sceptical of the rightness of the war yet expect to win may be willing to pay higher costs than those who believe in the case yet expect to lose³²². How does the public interpret success? Gelpi et.al., state that,

The American public does not measure success in terms of whether U.S. soldiers are being killed or wounded nor whether the terrorists and insurgents are being killed or wounded. The measures adopted by the public are rather different, and indeed come closer to the winning-the-hearts-and-minds idea that most experts (and Bush administration rhetoric) would identify as the critical factor³²³.

It is important to recognise that President George Bush was reliant upon the work of Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler and that their work has been subjected to a critical review by other scholars within the research community³²⁴. Berinsky and Druckman for example have raised methodological concerns, that 'gives some hesitation to the conclusions of Feaver, Gelpi and Reifler'³²⁵. One of the main criticisms of the scholars from Duke University is their contention 'that support for the war is heavily influenced by pre-existing political judgments

and the balance of elite rhetoric'³²⁶. Although this is a well-made point, it does not of itself necessarily undermine the main conclusions of Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler. Any perceived failure to take cognisance of any pre-existing political judgments, does not alter the actual responses of members of the public to a survey at a given point in time.

At a superficial level there appears to be considerable similarities between the reaction of the public in Belgium to the deaths of the 10 paratroopers in Rwanda and the public outcry in America over the 18 Rangers in Somalia. Both incidents appear to lend weight to the notion that Western countries had become casualty-phobic. However, as this examination has shown, American public opinion is more complex and nuanced. Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler's suggestion of a continuum of casualty sensitivity harmonises well with Smith's breakdown of American society: 30-35 per cent solid hawks; 20-25 per cent defeat phobic; 20 per cent casualty phobic; and 10-30 per cent solid doves. With regard to the withdrawal of American forces from Somalia, the intra-elite struggle in American politics, combined with a public belief that there was little chance of military success in Somalia, is a more credible explanation for the withdrawal of American forces than simple casualty phobia; especially as there had been a massive public appetite to send additional troops to exact punishment on Aidid's forces. The significant number of US and UK deaths and injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan and the consistent level of public support for American and British service personnel, in their respective countries, would suggest that the public in both countries are not casualty phobic, as some have maintained. The phenomenon of Royal Wootton Bassett, and the public expressions of sympathy at the loss of British military personnel, would also demonstrate that the public in the UK has a genuine concern about military casualties.

5.4.3 *The Feminisation of Society and the Military*

Taylor reminds us of the fundamental importance of equality in our social and political lives' in a Western social imaginary³²⁷. Instead of being 'a society permeated by relations of personalized hierarchy' we have gone over to one based on impersonal equality³²⁸. Old forms have been dissolved and replaced by a general and impersonal recognition of equal status³²⁹. This journey however was not simple. Equality as an ideal, for the elites who embraced it³³⁰, would have meant a different thing for women in the eighteenth century. Indeed, Taylor notes that there had been a recurring fear 'that men might lose their manly virtues and become "effeminate"'³³¹. This section will briefly consider the idea that Western societies reflect a process of feminisation³³² and the impact this has had on women in the military and whether or not they should serve in combat roles. The relevance of this section is directly linked to 'how the nature of the British soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary British society.'

For the vast majority of cultures, war has been the context in which a man could define himself as a man³³³. Until the introduction of modern weapon systems³³⁴ male bodies were better suited to wielding heavy metal (bronze or iron) weapons; men are 'generally taller and more robust than female[s], with longer thicker muscles, and larger lungs, heart, and limb ratios, as well as the inability to become pregnant and thereby sacrifice valuable fighting time³³⁵. Masculinity, argues Braudy, has been tinged with, even steeped in, nostalgia for a lost masculinity and consequently embodies a myth of an historical connection with past models³³⁶. The Victorian love affair with chivalric myths and Arthurian legends is only one example of this historic nostalgia³³⁷. In America, just at a time when 'the New Woman threatened to feminize the public sphere, the Second World War provided a crucial opportunity for men to demonstrate characteristics such as strength, bravery, and usefulness that had been called into question during the 1930s'³³⁸. Posters calling upon American men to

mobilise for war portrayed the male physique in comic book proportions, with steel-like bodies, chiselled jaws, and dogged determination, prepared to do battle with equally comic book-like depictions of the hyper-masculinised Nazi fatherland³³⁹. For Jarvis, the male body was used to literally and symbolically represent the health of the American nation³⁴⁰.

‘The hyper-masculinised hegemonic models offered during World War II’³⁴¹ were idealised in the narratives contained in the films that endeavoured to represent this ‘good war’³⁴². The film *Sands of Iwo Jima*, released in 1949 starring John Wayne, is an example of this narrative creation³⁴³. However, as Carrigan, et.al., note, ‘most men do not really act like the screen image of John Wayne or Humphrey Bogart’³⁴⁴. The cultural image of the idealised nuclear family, with the husband as the hard working, courageous head of the family, is contemporaneous with this and located in popular mythology in the decade of the 1950s; although, as Evans contends, ‘for millions of people in Britain and the USA this dream had no basis in fact or lived experience...it was nevertheless an influential dream in which cohesive nuclear families were sustained by male labour in the workplace and female labour in the home’³⁴⁵. This dream while having some basis in lived experience³⁴⁶, had a large, completely fictional aspect to it. The film *Saving Private Ryan*, or the TV series *Band of Brothers* is a more realistic depiction of actual combat than the *Sands of Iwo Jima*.

Feminist scholars ruthlessly attacked what they and their supporters defined as hegemonic masculinity, along with its socio-political, economic and cultural implications³⁴⁷. Hegemonic masculinity³⁴⁸, according to Connell, is dominant in what he describes as the gender order in societies, including all other masculinities and femininities in that society³⁴⁹. Although this form of masculinity is frequently held up as an ideal form of masculinity³⁵⁰, Connell maintains that few men actually meet the ‘normative standard’³⁵¹. For Seidler, the origins of modern notions of masculinity may be traced to the scientific revolutions of the seventeenth century, and as a result men have ‘suffered from an identification of our

masculinity with our reason'³⁵². The dualism introduced by Cartesian metaphysics, according to Brittan, created a sharp division between the body and society, the person and the context and between man and woman³⁵³. The philosophical equation of subject and object (dualism), created simplistic notions of binary formulas: for example, subject/object, man/woman, winners/losers, and oppressors/oppressed.

Although early manifestations of industrialisation created appalling conditions for men, women and children³⁵⁴, working and middleclass women contested their economic dependence on men as the factory system developed³⁵⁵. However, the rise of Fascism with its naked reassertion of male supremacy and the subsequent world war to defeat it halted the move towards equality for women that had been evident in many Western countries³⁵⁶. The women's liberation movement of the 1960s and 1970s, also described as second wave feminism³⁵⁷, should be viewed as one element in the process of questioning of Enlightenment certainties (binary formulas) after the Second World War. The challenge from feminism in this period was frequently and deliberately confrontational. Radical feminists charged men as being women's enemies and oppressors; the 'Redstocking Manifesto' claimed that 'all men have oppressed women' and that 'we do not need to change ourselves, but to change men'³⁵⁸. While the focus of feminist critique in the twenty-first century has shifted to the analysis of gender and masculinities, men can still on occasion be portrayed as violent aggressors, with a 'propensity to the enactment of paranoid-schizoid fantasies'³⁵⁹.

One of the principle projects of the feminist movement was the application of a deconstructionist methodology with the intention of undoing gender or what Gardiner calls a 'feminist degendering movement'³⁶⁰. Evans contends that 'the influence of Michel Foucault was pivotal in determining arguments which accounted for sexual identity in terms of constructed "discourses" rather than naturalistic givens'³⁶¹. For many feminists, gender itself was a socially constructed discourse and many of the gender inequalities evident in Western

societies were the result of men and women being socialised into different roles³⁶². Since gender does not exist outside of history and culture, argues Brittan, both masculinity and femininity are subject to a process of reinterpretation³⁶³. Needless to say, there is considerable debate between the nature or nurture camps as to whether gender is biologically determined or socially conditioned and learned³⁶⁴.

In recent years, the nature of this debate has itself come under criticism by some sociologists. Rather than seeing sex as biologically determined and gender as culturally learned, they argue that we should view both sex and gender as socially constructed products³⁶⁵. Older binaries, comments Gardiner, seem simplistic and potentially distorting³⁶⁶. Even the concept of what is masculine is fluid and open to a variety of interpretative models³⁶⁷. The protracted fight for the right of gay men to be officially accepted in the militaries is one example. Halberstam's article, 'An Introduction to Female Masculinity: Masculinity without Men' is another recent example³⁶⁸. Outside the military, concern has been raised in some quarters that the ratio of male teachers to female teachers in British primary schools is creating a feminisation of primary education. Skelton argues convincingly that the issue has little to do with the sex of the teachers, or a statistical examination of ratios, but rather the models of school governance and practice, which she maintains is masculine rather than feminine³⁶⁹.

The feminisation of Western society cannot be reduced to a simplistic zero-sum conception of power³⁷⁰ or that gender traits historically associated with women such as 'a special relationship to peace and pacifism'³⁷¹ now pervade Western societies. Rather, it should be located in the recognition that life in a post-modern world is fluid and complex. Issues of gender, sex and masculinities are, at least in large part, social constructs and consequently undergo continual negotiation and renegotiation³⁷². The masculinity epitomised by John Wayne in the *Sands of Iwo Jima* no longer enjoys unrivalled, or unchallenged

dominance³⁷³. Consequently, the process of denaturalisation³⁷⁴ has had a significant impact upon Western militaries.

Post-modern militaries³⁷⁵ were restructured to offer both a 'peace dividend'³⁷⁶ and to reflect the profound changes the end of the Cold War was thought to have inaugurated. In a unified Germany, for example, the appropriate normative image of the role of soldier in the new democratic state was discussed and implemented³⁷⁷. In the UK the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 reflected changing public attitudes towards employment roles for women³⁷⁸. The end of the Cold War, concern about male recruiting and continuing public pressure for better career opportunities for women in the military, resulted in increased integration for women within the military and an increased access to a wider range of roles³⁷⁹. This process has been far from smooth. In both the UK and America, women faced sexual harassment³⁸⁰, assault³⁸¹ and discrimination. Recent studies, however, have demonstrated just how much progress has been achieved in postmodern militaries³⁸². The influence of some forms of feminist critique, however, in this process has been mixed³⁸³. For Titunik, the first wave of gender integration in the military has been successful; women fit 'extraordinarily well into the military culture and have successfully internalized its norms'³⁸⁴. The change in public opinion towards gender equality in every sphere of public life, and the successful integration of women into the armed forces, has resulted in women today being eligible for military service across the various Corps, Arms and Branches³⁸⁵, with the exception of the Infantry, the Armoured Corps and the Marines.

The British Government is required by a European Community Equal Treatment Directive to review the exclusion of women from certain ground close combat environments every eight years³⁸⁶. The last review was undertaken in 2010. The statement by Defence Personnel Minister, Andrew Robathan on 29 November 2010, reiterated the UK government's position of excluding women from certain roles in the military³⁸⁷. In his

statement the Minister said that their capability is not in doubt; they win the highest decorations for valour and demonstrate independence and initiative'. However, he also stated that the evidence of whether they should be required to fight face-to-face with the enemy is inconclusive³⁸⁸. Commenting on this the BBC Defence correspondent Caroline Wyatt, said that 'there has been little or no public clamour for change in the UK, and little from within the armed forces or from women themselves serving in Afghanistan'³⁸⁹. The conclusion from the study undertaken by the UK Defence Science and Technology Laboratory into the role of women in combat roles found that they were unable to 'identify any empirical, scientific data examining the effects of women in close combat teams, especially within the UK Armed Forces, and it appears currently that no such information exists'³⁹⁰. The report went on to state that, 'information provided by those nations that do employ women in combat roles suggests that there is little evidence of a negative impact on the effectiveness, cohesion or readiness of military teams, a finding which is supported by the academic literature'³⁹¹.

In America the pressure to open combat roles to women has been growing. Unlike the situation in the UK one of the main intellectual arguments revolves around the issue of military service and citizenship. Snyder states that most discussions about the role of women in the military curiously fail to mention citizenship; a feature, she maintains, which dates back to ancient Greece and the civic republican tradition³⁹². Col McSally, the most senior combat pilot in the USAF³⁹³, argues that 'from the birth of our nation, citizenship provided certain rights like voting, but those rights were connected to the obligations of paying taxes, jury duty, and military service if needed..Citizens' rights and responsibilities should be gender neutral'³⁹⁴. Col McSally's argument is premised on actual experience of combat in an asymmetrical theatre of war like Afghanistan. She correctly contends that the notion of a frontline is largely irrelevant and that all military personnel must be prepared and capable of actively participating in any engagement with enemy forces³⁹⁵. In February 2012, the

Pentagon announced that the military was formally opening up thousands of jobs to women in units closer to the front lines to better reflect the realities of modern warfare³⁹⁶. The plan also included allowing selected women officers to undergo the Marine training course. In October it was announced that the two officers who volunteered to take the course failed to complete it, along with thirty of their male colleagues³⁹⁷. In January 2013 the US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta announced the intention to lift the restrictions on women serving in combat roles³⁹⁸.

The purpose of this section was not to make a judgement on the merits or otherwise of the notion that Western societies have become feminised but to briefly consider some of the main historical and philosophical arguments that have been and are associated with this phenomenon. The feminisation of Western society cannot be reduced to some vulgar zero-sum contest between winners and losers. Rather, it is the story of how simplistic binary formulas deriving from Enlightenment rationality became outmoded in the second half of the twentieth century. Life in a post-modern, twenty-first century is distinctly more complex and fluid than that depicted in the films or deriving from the myth of the 1950s, resulting in concepts such as gender, sex, masculinities and femininities being liquid and malleable.

5.5 Conclusions

This chapter has examined selected societal factors and their impact on how they might influence the social imaginary through the discussions that occur in the public sphere, from which a common mind may emerge. Any narrative construct that seeks to address where the generic British soldier resides on the continuum imagined in the thesis question³⁹⁹, must incorporate powerful and influential societal factors such as, how death is understood within that society; how risk shapes, influences or controls the ordinary lives of that society's citizens or indeed the government of that society; does the idea of a weapons platform sit

~~more at ease with a post-heroic~~ ontological character; does it have an attitude towards the casualties consistent with combat operations; and how does the modern phenomenon of the feminisation of Western societies effect where on the continuum the generic soldier should reside?

Despite this cultural shift in attitudes towards death in contemporary British society, soldiers who are killed in service for their country are located firmly within civil polity. This chapter has shown that in a post-modern age, whenever the older rituals and language of death have all but disappeared from everyday public life, an old and largely forgotten attitude towards death found expression again with its re-interpretation of an ancient funeral ritual for its fallen war dead.

The post-modern rejection of absolutes and its fundamental scepticism of authority creates the environment in which apprehension about potential risks perpetuates a 'free-floating consciousness of fear'. Post-modern societies are, as a consequence, increasingly risk-averse. The fear of potential futures dominates the present generating what Beck calls 'real virtuality'. The implication of this is significant. The warrior, historically, accepted the possibility and actuality of intimate violent warfare, whereas the battlefield technician/weapons platform is removed from actual personal contact with the enemy. Societies that are inherently risk-averse may struggle to create and maintain a narrative that sustains the concept of the warrior. The difficulties inherent in this scenario are magnified if risk-averse societies are also intrinsically post-heroic.

The ethical etiquette of avoiding known or imagined risks is a strong cultural driver in reducing the areas of public life in which a display of heroism might be expected or manifested. The UK is not a thoroughly post-heroic society. The public remembrance of the fallen in armed conflict and the respect shown in the repatriation of soldiers killed on active service would suggest that a significant percentage of the general public value and appreciate

~~martial notions of sacrifice, valour and duty. Inevitably, there is a tipping point when the~~
balance between recognition and subsequent acceptance of the need of the heroic wanes and
gives way to increasing reluctance to manifest heroic traits. There is little reason to envisage
that the UK will not become increasingly post-heroic.

The significant number of British deaths and injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan and the
consistent level of public support for service personnel, would suggest that the public in the
UK is not, at least at this moment, casualty phobic. It does have a profound concern about
casualties and the families of servicemen and women. Whether or not this acceptance of
relatively high numbers of casualties in combat operations will continue to be the case in any
future armed conflict, is uncertain. Previous generations who reluctantly accepted high
casualty numbers were not marked by the same aversion to risk or manifested the same post-
heroic traits.

One of the most controversial conclusions of this chapter may well be the logical
consequence of the sub-section on the feminisation of Western societies and their militaries.
As the twenty-first century develops it seems highly likely that the concept of the warrior will
become increasingly gender neutral. Historically, the notion of the warrior was essentially
male in most cultures. Today, though, concepts such as gender, sex, masculinities and
femininities are recognised as being more liquid and malleable than had previously been
understood. The 'narcissism of minor difference' may finally vanish in post-modern societies
where boundaries are fluid and ill-defined. This, however, may well be dependant upon the
character of future conflict and the wars that the British Armed Forces may be engaged in.

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- ¹ C Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004) p86.
- ² Ibid., p85.
- ³ Ibid., p89.
- ⁴ As cited in *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, ed., EM Knowles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) p275. The actual reference is from John Donne, *LXXXSermons* (1640) 8 March 1621/2.
- ⁵ Luper, 'Death', *The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (May, 2009) downloaded from: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/death/> (accessed 10 Dec 2011). See 2.1 'Comparativism' for the example $IV(S, W_E) = G(S, W_E) + B(S, W_E)$ p1.
- ⁶ See, B McNamara, *Fragile Lives: Death, dying and care* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2001) chapter 1 'Life in the face of death'; J Warren, *Facing Death* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004) chapter 1 'Fears of death'.
- ⁷ The undisputed classic in this field is E Kübler-Ross, *On Death and Dying* (London: Tavistock, 1970) and the five stages of grief. See also E Kübler-Ross, 'On Death and Dying', in *Therapeutic Grand Rounds Number 36* (1973) p174-179, which was a paper given to doctors in America based upon her landmark book and studies. Although hugely influential her work has, nevertheless, been the subject of criticism, see T Walter, *The Revival of Death* (London: Routledge, 1994) p70-78.
- ⁸ G Scarre, *Death* (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2007), prefers to distinguish between the notions of dying, death and being dead, which he notes 'may be conveniently characterized as, respectively, a process, an event and a state' (p5).
- ⁹ Luper, 'Death', p2. Scarre, *Death*, contends that, 'it is doubtful whether it is possible to arrive at a single and univocal definition of death that will accord with our intuitions in all circumstances' (p6).
- ¹⁰ The central nub of the issue is located in what has been described as 'the shadowy boarder between life and death', which 'is a political matter' B Noys, *The Culture of Death* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2005) p11. The technical term used by scholars to describe this is thanatopolitical.
- ¹¹ Noys, *The Culture of Death*, p10. The focus in this sub-section will centre upon how death has been and is understood in a Western context.
- ¹² Walter, *The Revival of Death*, p14 concerning the work of P Ariès, *Western Attitudes toward Death: from the Middle Ages to the present* (London, New York: Boyars, 1976). Walter acknowledges the criticism made of Ariès work; nevertheless, he repeatedly uses the phrasing created by Ariès to help articulate the broad features that are discernible through Western history concerning how death has been understood. AN Hamscher, 'Death and Dying in History', in CM Moreman (ed) *Teaching Death and Dying* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) p157, recognises that although more descriptive than analytical, Ariès' central observations have been confirmed by more recent scholarship.
- ¹³ Hamscher, 'Death and Dying', p156.
- ¹⁴ Ariès, *Western Attitudes*, p2.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., p7. He states that we should not imagine that death was a wild beast that had been tamed. Rather, because it was such an integral part of life, 'we shall all die' (p55) people accepted it as such.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., p11.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., p12.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., p103.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., p27.
- ²⁰ Ibid., p55.
- ²¹ Ibid., p46.
- ²² Ibid., p22.
- ²³ Ibid.
- ²⁴ A charnel house was the place where the bones of the dead were kept. The exact destination of one's bones was of little concern, according to Ariès, as long as they remained near the saints or the church, the altar and the Holy Sacrament. During the Middle Ages human bones were used to decorate the area surrounding the charnel house; this became known as a form of accepted funeral art.
- ²⁵ Ariès, *Western Attitudes*, p105.
- ²⁶ Ibid., p55-82.
- ²⁷ Walters, *Revival of Death*, p15.
- ²⁸ Ariès, *Western Attitudes*, p64-66.
- ²⁹ Ibid., p65.
- ³⁰ See Noys, *Culture of Death*, chapter 1.
- ³¹ Ibid., p2.
- ³² Ariès, *Western Attitudes*, p85ff.
- ³³ G Gorer, 'The Pornography of Death' in *Encounter* (October 1955) p1-4.
- ³⁴ J Dollimore, *Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture* (New York: Routledge, 2001) p126.
- ³⁵ Noys, *The Culture of Death*, p3.

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- ³⁶ Walter, *The Revival of Death*, seeks to trace the historical movement from traditional to modern to neo-modern death (p185).
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, p33.
- ³⁸ P Bobbitt, *Terror and Consent* (London: Penguin, 2008) p190-191. The State Nation is contemporaneous with the start of the nineteenth century, the Nation State with the late Victorian period to the late twentieth century and the Market State with the end of the twentieth and the start of the twenty-first century. This framework offers a little more precision than the terminology of pre-modern, modern and post-modern periods used earlier to describe the major philosophical developments in the last four centuries. The transition between the State nation and the Nation State took place within that period philosophers would normally describe as the high-watermark of modernity (modern) and the gradual rejection of its meta-narratives and the authority structures that are associated with that period.
- ³⁹ This matrix of framework is intended for *illustrative* purposes only, in order that the overlay of three differing structures may be visualised, each superimposed one above the other. Rather than simple linear lines, as suggested in the diagram, the reader should attempt to imagine these three structures co-existing within three-dimensional space interweaving and co-existing harmoniously together.
- ⁴⁰ Bobbitt, *Terror and Consent*, p193.
- ⁴¹ Jon Davis, *Death, Burial and Rebirth in the Religions of Antiquity* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999).
- ⁴² See Walter, *Revival of Death*, part 1 p9-22 and p162-163.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, p11.
- ⁴⁴ P Ballard, 'Intimations of mortality: some sociological considerations', in P Badham and P Ballard (eds) *Facing Death* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1996) p10.
- ⁴⁵ Data taken from www.sociology.org.uk/sc_shop_pdf/sc?AS4QA_family_e.pdf (accessed 29 Feb 2012).
- ⁴⁶ Bobbitt, *Terror and Consent*, p194.
- ⁴⁷ Walters, *Revival of Death*, p29.
- ⁴⁸ Ballard, 'Intimations of mortality' p10.
- ⁴⁹ Kübler-Ross, 'On Death and Dying', p176.
- ⁵⁰ McNamara, *Fragile Lives*, p3.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁵² Noys, *Culture of Death*, p13.
- ⁵³ R Holmes, *Acts of War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003) p176. His chapter 'Pale Battalions' provides an excellent survey of the soldier's experience of the reality of death and injury on the battlefield.
- ⁵⁴ C Coker, *The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007) p55.
- ⁵⁵ E Ben-Ari, 'Epilogue: A "Good" Military Death', in *AFS* (Summer 2005) Vol 31, No 4, p655.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p655-656.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p656.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p657.
- ⁵⁹ Green on Blue are incidents were Afghan forces (or those dressed in Afghan uniforms) open fire or engage ISAF troops.
- ⁶⁰ Holmes, *Acts of War*, p192.
- ⁶¹ The author was the Senior Chaplain for Task Force Helmand during HERRICK 10. During this tour the Task Force lost 78 soldiers (71 British, 4 Danes and 3 Estonians) between May and October 09. This reference comes from first-hand experience of working with the families of soldiers killed on active service in a number of theatres of operation.
- ⁶² A King, 'The Afghan War and "postmodern" memory: commemoration and the dead of Helmand', in *BJS* (2010) Vol 61, No1, p4.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, p21.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p15.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p18.
- ⁶⁶ S Walklate, G Mythen and R McGarry, 'Witnessing Wootton Bassett: An Exploration in Cultural Victimology', in *CMC* (2011) Vol 7, No 2, p149-165.
- ⁶⁷ NA Sørensen, 'Remembering the Great War', in *Narratives of Remembrance*, ed., M Børch (Odense: Odense University Press, 2001) p37.
- ⁶⁸ This TV series is perhaps the only access many young people have of the image of the First World War.
- ⁶⁹ M Snape, 'Civilians, Soldiers and Perceptions of the Afterlife in Britain During the First World War', in P Clarke & T Claydon (eds), *The Church, and The Afterlife and the fate of the Soul* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2009) p372.
- ⁷⁰ Sørensen, 'Remembering the Great War', p56.
- ⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² This is a hugely important subject in-and-of-itself. However, it is beyond the scope of this section to do anything more than refer to it as it assists the primary focus of the section.

⁷³ J Winter and E Sivan, 'Introduction' in J Winter and E Sivan (eds), *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p1.

⁷⁴ J Winter, 'Setting the Framework' in, J Winter and E Sivan (eds), *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p6.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ This language is used by Winter (ibid., p10) to highlight the negation that must take place between the private memory of an individual and the dominant, socially constructed memory that is publically endorsed.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p13.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p29.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p17-18.

⁸⁰ H McManners, *Forgotten Voices of the Falklands: The Real Story of the Falklands War in the Words of Those Who Were There* (London: Ebury, 2007).

⁸¹ S Hynes, 'Personal narratives and commemoration', in, J Winter and E Sivan (eds), *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p207.

⁸² Ibid., p219.

⁸³ S Walklate, G Mythen and R McGarry, 'Witnessing Wootton Bassett' p153. See also, H McCartney, 'Hero, Victim or Villian? The Public Image of the British Soldier and its Implications for Defence Policy' in *DSA* (2011) Vol 27, No 1 p43-53. She maintains that 'the convergence of two long-term trends ... has led to the portrayal of the soldier as a victim by a variety of diverse interest groups' (p47). 'The first is the trend in British society towards celebrating victimhood' (p47) and the second is 'by viewing soldiers as victims, their agency is removed. They become "objects rather than subjects of their destiny"' (p47). One of the consequences of this is that the 'rise of the soldier-victim image has also helped to modify the old stereotype of the soldier as a villain' (p48).

⁸⁴ S Walklate, G Mythen and R McGarry, 'Witnessing Wootton Bassett' p154.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p155.

⁸⁶ E Ben-Ari, 'Epilogue: A "Good" Military Death' p657.

⁸⁷ ED Samet, 'Leaving No Warriors Behind: The Ancient Roots of a Modern Sensibility' in *AFS* (Summer 2005) Vol 31, No 4, p623.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p625.

⁸⁹ L Rolls & G Chowns, *Meeting the Needs of Those Bereaved Through a Military Death: Findings From a Literature Review and Scoping Study* (Commissioned by *Forces Support*, November 2011) p19.

⁹⁰ Currently, soldiers who are killed while serving in a non-operational environment outside of the UK (for example in a land-traffic incident or as a result of an adventurous training accident) are not afforded a military repatriation.

⁹¹ See, J Bourke, *Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain and the Great War* (London: Reaktion, 1999) chapter 5 'Re-membling' p210-252.

⁹² Ibid., p215.

⁹³ Ibid., p211.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p216.

⁹⁵ A King, 'The Afghan War and "postmodern" memory' p8.

⁹⁶ For example, the article by P Cawkill, 'Death in the armed forces', in *Bereavement Care* (2011) Vol 28, No 2, p25-30, is out-of-date, even though it was published in 2011. The author of this thesis (at the time of writing) was the Chief Instructor at the Armed Forces Chaplains' Centre and involved in the restructuring of the current Casualty Visiting Officers' course, delivered by the college on behalf of the Director Personnel Operations (Army).

⁹⁷ Samet, 'Leaving No Warriors Behind' p626.

⁹⁸ The retrieval of a dead British soldier by RAF personnel and Royal Marines is a potent example. Marines were strapped onto the weapon pods of Apache attack helicopters and flown into a 'hot' landing zone to extract their fallen comrade. The Marines received awards for gallantry.

⁹⁹ Samet, 'Leaving No Warriors Behind' p628.

¹⁰⁰ S Richards, 'De Cura Pro Mortuis: Treatment of the Dead in War and Conflict from Hector to Bin Laden' in *The Defence Academy Year Book 2011* (Shrivenham: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2012) p45-54.

¹⁰¹ Samet, 'Leaving No Warriors Behind' p624.

¹⁰² D Lupton, *Risk* (London: Routledge, 1999) p5.

¹⁰³ PL Bernstein, *Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk* (New York, Chichester: Wiley, 1999) p11 see his 'The Winds of the Greeks and the Role of the Dice'.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p11.

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- ¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p15.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁷ C Coker, *War in an Age of Risk* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009) p62.
- ¹⁰⁸ Bernstein, *Against the Gods*, p19.
- ¹⁰⁹ Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, p64.
- ¹¹⁰ This is the title of his book, F Furedi, *Culture of Fear* (London, New York: Continuum, 1997, 2002) and his *Culture of Fear Revisited* (London, New York: Continuum, 2006).
- ¹¹¹ A Giddens, 'Risk Society: the Context of British Politics', in J Franklin, ed., *The Politics of Risk Society* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998) p 27.
- ¹¹² Ibid.
- ¹¹³ U Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 1992).
- ¹¹⁴ A Giddens, *Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006) p119.
- ¹¹⁵ Beck, *Risk Society*, p1-3 and 153ff.
- ¹¹⁶ Ibid., p3. It should be noted that this description comes in the introduction to *Risk Society* written by Scott Lash and Brian Wayne. The idea that society is moving towards a new aspect of modernity, a reflexive modernity permeates the whole book.
- ¹¹⁷ Ibid., p21.
- ¹¹⁸ Ibid., p24.
- ¹¹⁹ Ibid., p34.
- ¹²⁰ U Beck, *World Risk Society* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999) p136.
- ¹²¹ MV Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) p38.
- ¹²² Beck, *World Risk Society*, p141.
- ¹²³ Beck, *Risk Society*, p46.
- ¹²⁴ Giddens, *Risk Society*, p30
- ¹²⁵ M Douglas and A Wildavsky, *Risk and Culture* (California: University of California Press, 1983) p67.
- ¹²⁶ Ibid., p50-53.
- ¹²⁷ Ibid., p53.
- ¹²⁸ Ibid.
- ¹²⁹ Beck, *Risk Society*, p33 uses the same example of chemicals within systems which produce drinking water.
- ¹³⁰ Furedi, *Culture of Fear*, p22.
- ¹³¹ D Gardner, *Risk: The Science and Politics of Fear* (London: Virgin, 2008) p 11.
- ¹³² See, Z Bauman, *Liquid Fear* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006).
- ¹³³ Ibid., p2.
- ¹³⁴ Ibid., p10.
- ¹³⁵ J Durant, 'Once the Men in White Coats Held the Promise of a Better Future...' in J Franklin, ed., *The Politics of Risk Society* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998) p71.
- ¹³⁶ Ibid., p15. This is a less sophisticated way of saying much the same thing as Giddens.
- ¹³⁷ Furedi, *Culture of Fear*, p130.
- ¹³⁸ Beck, *Risk Society*, p29.
- ¹³⁹ Douglas and Wildavsky, *Risk and Culture*, p65. See chapter 3 entitled, 'Scientists Disagree' p49-66 for a fuller treatment of their position.
- ¹⁴⁰ See Furedi, *Culture of Fear*, p131.
- ¹⁴¹ Risk can be often a matter of perception. For example, flying is often regarded as one of the safest means of travel and yet many people have a fear of flying and prefer to use other means of transport, such as driving, which is statistically more dangerous.
- ¹⁴² Furedi, *Culture of Fear*, p152. He then uses the example of smoking and what he refers to as the stigmatization of smoking and those who smoke.
- ¹⁴³ See Beck, *Risk Society*, p28. See also M Douglas, *Acceptability According to the Social Sciences* (London: Routledge, 1986) particularly chapter 7 'Risk-Seeking and Safety First' p73-83; Giddens, 'Risk Society' p30.
- ¹⁴⁴ Furedi, *Culture of Fear*, p156.
- ¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p165.
- ¹⁴⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁴⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁴⁸ Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defence, 12 February 2002. This famous quote was used during a Press conference when the Secretary of Defence sought to answer questions concerning the absence of evidence linking weapons of mass destruction with Iraq.
- ¹⁴⁹ See <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GiPe1OikQuk> (accessed 21 Aug 2012).
- ¹⁵⁰ See <http://bbc.co.uk/1/hi/3254852.stm> (accessed 21 Aug 2012).

¹⁵¹ Yee-Kuang Heng, *War as Risk Management: Strategy and Conflict in an Age of Globalised Risks* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006) p10.

¹⁵² MV Rasmussen, 'It Sounds Like a Riddle': Security Studies, the War on Terror and Risk' *Journal of International Studies* (2004) Vol 33, No 2, p383.

¹⁵³ See KL Petersen 'Risk Analysis - a Field Within Security Studies' *European Journal of International Relations* (2011) p2. In her survey of articles published in International Relations literature, in which risk was the topic of the article, she demonstrates that there were 0 in 2004 but 590 in 2010.

¹⁵⁴ Darryl S.L. Jarvis, 'Risk, Globalisation and the State: A Critical Appraisal of Ulrich Beck and the World Risk Society Thesis' *Global Society* (2007) Vol 21, No1, p10.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Unless that is one believes in conspiracy theories.

¹⁵⁷ See, Yee-Kuang Heng, *War as Risk Management*, p15.

¹⁵⁸ The word debounded refers to the notion that something cannot easily be restricted to any one specific location or setting.

¹⁵⁹ For example see, William Clapton, 'Managing risk within international society: hierarchical governance in the Asia-Pacific' in *Australian Journal of International Affairs* (2009) Vol 63, No 3, p417.

¹⁶⁰ M Williams, 'Revisiting Established Doctrine in an Age of Risk' *The RUSI Journal*, (2005) Vol 150, No 5, p49.

¹⁶¹ Principle 15. See <http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/I> (accessed 21 Aug 2012).

¹⁶² A Klinke and O Renn, 'A new Approach to Risk Evaluation and management: Risk-Based, Precaution-Based, and Discourse-Based Strategies', *Risk Analysis* (2002) Vol 22, No 6, p1074.

¹⁶³ Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, p12, discusses whether or not 9/11 was a historical watershed. Mindful that historians using 20:20 hindsight observe historical watersheds, he however, is reluctant to describe 9/11 as a watershed preferring to use the term 'historical turning point'.

¹⁶⁴ The use of the word terrorist may appear pejorative; in that one man's terrorist may well be another's freedom fighter. For example, the IRA was considered a terrorist group by the government of the UK, while for many in America they were continuing the cause of Irish freedom from British colonialism.

¹⁶⁵ This phrase was used on page 4 of the prepared testimony of Paul Wolfowitz to the Senate Armed Services Committee (4 October 2001) entitled, 'Building a Military for the 21st Century'.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p1.

¹⁶⁷ D Egan, 'Globalization and the Invasion of Iraq: State power and the enforcement of neoliberalism', in *The Routledge Handbook of War and Security: Iraq and Afghanistan*, ed., S Carlton-Ford and MG Ender (London and New York: Routledge, 2001) p189. See also, Shahar Hameiri, 'State Transformation, Territorial Politics and the Management of Transnational Risk' in *International Relations* (2011) Vol 25, No 3 p381-397, who argues that 'the management of transnational risk in practice could also be seen as part of the process of state transformation' (p390).

¹⁶⁸ W Clapton, 'Risk and hierarchy in international society' in *Global Change, Peace & Security* (2009) Vol 21, No1, p29. He concludes that, 'the problem is that many English School works, including those that have explicitly focused on constitutional change within international society, have done so through the lens of a 'modernist' framework. This framework insufficiently captures the effects of globalisation and new forms of temporally and spatially de-bounded risks that lead to a Western emphasis on policing territories perceived to be potentially dangerous so as to mitigate the production and emergence of such risks' (p34).

¹⁶⁹ Coker, *War in a Age of Risk*, p75, citing President Clinton.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p74.

¹⁷¹ See E Steuter and D Wills, 'Making the Muslim enemy: The social construction of the enemy in the war on terror', in *The Routledge Handbook of War and Security: Iraq and Afghanistan*, ed., S Carlton-Ford and MG Ender (London and New York: Routledge, 2001) p257-267.

¹⁷² Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, p100.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p101. There is significant agreement among environmentalists on what action is necessary to effect positive climate change, which would suggest that failure to take some action would be manifestly unwise.

¹⁷⁴ Rasmussen, *Risk Society*, explores this issue at length in chapter 4 'Doctrines: precautionary principles and anticipatory defence' p91-140. He contends that 'the development of risk society has been marked by a transformation in the enforcement of policy from deterrence to the management of risks' (p136).

¹⁷⁵ For an excellent treatment of this see, O Kessler and C Daase 'From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics', in *Alternatives* (2008) Vol 33, p211-232. They maintain that, 'how the unknown is framed and conceptualized—that is, how uncertainties and enemies are presented as risks—determines what kind of knowledge regime and thus power relations might evolve as soon as this style of thinking is applied in practices of governance' (p214).

¹⁷⁶ For a survey of the various schools/positions adopted by scholars see: KL Petersen 'Risk Analysis'; A Kline and O Renn, 'A new Approach to Risk Evaluation and management'; Shahar Hameiri, 'State Transformation, Territorial Politics and the Management of Transnational Risk' *International Relations* (2011) Vol 25, No 3, p381-397; W Clapton, 'Risk in International Relations' in *International Relations* (2011) Vol 25, No 3, p280-295.

¹⁷⁷ These are the definitions offered by Petersen in her survey, 'Risk Analysis'. While there is broad agreement as to the philosophical nature implicit within the three schools, each scholar adopts their own distinct definition. For the purpose of this thesis and operating within the limited word count, this thesis will use Petersen's definitions as a working framework.

¹⁷⁸ Petersen, 'Risk Analysis', p9.

¹⁷⁹ Hameiri, 'State Transformation, Territorial Politics', p282.

¹⁸⁰ For example, C Aradau and R van Münster, 'Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future' *European Journal of International Relations* (2007) Vol 13, No1, p89–115; G Mythen and S Walklate, 'Criminology and Terrorism: Which Thesis? Risk Society or Governmentality?', in *British Journal of Criminology* (2006) Vol 46, No 3, p379–98.

¹⁸¹ Structuralism emerged from the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure. Although Saussure did not publish his theories, notes taken by students of his lectures were published posthumously (SJ Grenz, *A primer on Postmodernism*, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996) p114). Rather than focusing upon a historical understanding of linguistics, Saussure argued that language should be seen as a complete and internally coherent system, one sited within a cultural structure and context. The main theme of structuralism is that you can only understand something once you relate it to the wider structures within which it operates' (M Thompson, *Philosophy*, (London: Hodder, 2006) p212). Post-structuralism was a reaction to structuralism. As a movement, it was hugely sceptical of unifying structures of meaning, maintaining that every structure reflects the cultural biases that created them and the power-bases that sustain them. It is marked by a rejection of totalising, essentialist, foundationalist concepts and linked with a number of noted French intellectualists (for example, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, although Foucault was initially associated with structuralism). The post-structuralism of Derrida, however, would have been very distinct to that of Foucault.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p91.

¹⁸³ A dispositif, according to Foucault, consists of 'discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions' (Foucault, Michel, *The Confessions of the Flesh*, in Colin Gordon (ed.) *Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) p184, as cited by C Aradau and R van Münster, 'Governing Terrorism Through Risk', (p97).

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p97.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p98.

¹⁸⁶ Hameiri, 'State Transformation, Territorial Politics', p282.

¹⁸⁷ C Aradau and R van Münster, 'Governing Terrorism Through Risk', p108.

¹⁸⁸ Hameiri, 'State Transformation, Territorial Politics', p282.

¹⁸⁹ Darryl S.L. Jarvis & Martin Griffiths, 'Risk and International Relations: A New Research Agenda?' in *Global Society*, (2007) Vol 21, No1, p3.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p3. Petersen maintains that it 'therefore does not attempt to critically read the practices of risk management' (Petersen, 'Risk Analysis', p13).

¹⁹¹ Jarvis, 'Risk, Globalisation and the State', p40. In this article Jarvis states that 'the fiscal crisis of the state' as argued by Beck, 'has thus not materialised, nor does it display any evidence of doing so in the near future' (p35). He then proceeds to maintain that, 'as for the policy autonomy of states being "strait-jacketed" by globalising forces that demand conversion to neo-liberal policy agendas, fiscal conservatism and laissez-faire systems, there is little evidence of such homogenization' (p36).

¹⁹² See, Douglas and Wildavsky, *Risk and Culture* chapter 3 'Scientists Disagree' p49-66.

¹⁹³ Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War*, p1. See also, Heng, *War as Risk Management*, p12.

¹⁹⁴ MJ Williams, '(In) Security Studies, Reflexive Modernization and the Risk Society', in *Cooperation and Conflict* (2008) Vol 43, No1, p57-79. He discusses the distinction at length p65-68.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p66.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ Weak social constructivism is the view that human *representations* of reality — either linguistic or mental representations — are social constructs. Strong social constructivism claims not only that representations are socially constructed, but that the *entities themselves* to which these representations refer are socially constructed (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-social/>).

¹⁹⁸ W Clapton, 'Risk in International Relations', in *International Relations* (2011) Vol 25, No 3, p284 refers to scholars in this school as 'Beckians'. This is too strong a designation and quite simplistic. Scholars who have

found Beck's thesis compelling do not slavishly follow Beck in every detail. For example, Yee-Kuang Heng, *War as Risk Management*, who states that 'Beck is not without his flaws' (p13).

¹⁹⁹ Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, p76-83. Coker discusses the 'social contract' between the citizen and the state.

²⁰⁰ Petersen, 'Risk Analysis', p11.

²⁰¹ He maintains that America as the undisputed global superpower is without existential material threats on a scale posed by the Soviet Union (p153). China or Russia may eventually develop military forces with the intent to harm the West but they do not pose an existential threat at the present (p10). 'In a globalising world without immediate survival threats, the West has also emphasised elusive security threats' (p15).

²⁰² Yee-Kuang Heng, *War as Risk Management*, p77. Correctionalism is the principle that a particular problem requires correction. In the case of a failing state, this might involve fixing failing systems and structures. Success in any intervention would therefore be understood in the extent to which the problem had been corrected.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p148.

²⁰⁴ The NATO campaign in Kosovo to stop the Serbian government from ethnic cleaning is one example cited by Yee-Kuang Heng (see chapter4). The initial goal was not regime change but a change in policy, focused upon the humanitarian disaster unfolding in this part of the former Yugoslavia.

²⁰⁵ Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War*, p2.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p5.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p41.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p193.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p192.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p202.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, p195.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p42.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p193.

²¹⁴ Yee-Heng, Mikkel Rasmussen and Michael Williams are former students of Coker.

²¹⁵ Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, p71.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p68. Coker maintains that we have given up on utopian ideals like forging a New Jerusalem or a socialist utopia

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p35.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p6.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p35.

²²⁰ See chapter 3 'War in an Age of Risk', p62-102.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, p69.

²²² *Ibid.*, 'The Dangers of Speed' p109-114.

²²³ *Ibid.*, p112. Coker argues that the speed and ease of the Allied victory in the second Gulf War created a situation where the Iraqi people might well have been occupied but did not feel decisively beaten (p112-114). The Americans had to deal with their catastrophic success, in which the crushing victory on the battlefield 'which provokes an insurgency is no success at all' p113.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p171.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p172.

²²⁶ Philosophers ask questions and interrogate ideas and assumptions; philosophy rarely offers answers to specific problems.

²²⁷ These questions were taken from the conference publicity document, 'Post-heroic Warfare: An international conference held by the Oxford Programme on the Changing Character of War, in collaboration with the US Army War College and the Australian Land Warfare Centre' http://ccw.modhist.ox.ac.uk/Post_heroic~_home.html (accessed 21 Aug 2012). For a summary report on the conference see, 'Colloquium Brief: Post-Heroic Warfare?' by Conor Tucker and Erin Fitzgerald <http://www.strategicstudies.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Colloquium-Brief-Post-Heroic-Warfare/2011/2/17> (accessed 21 Aug 2012).

²²⁸ *The Concise Oxford Dictionary*, ed., RE Allen (London & New York: BCA, 1994) p552.

²²⁹ For example, the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom who have been given awards for gallantry and, or, outstanding service to their comrades and nation is striking evidence of this. For example, see the Operational Honours and Awards lists http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/Defence_News/HistoryandHonour/OperationalHonoursAndAwardsList23March2012.htm (accessed 21 Aug 2012).

²³⁰ The story of the Dutch Resistance movement in World War 2 is a classic example of group heroism.

²³¹ Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, p64.

²³² 'Post-heroic Warfare: An international conference' p1.

²³³ EN Luttwak, 'Toward Post-Heroic Warfare', *Foreign Affairs*, (1995) Vol 74, No 3, p109.

- ²³⁴ Ibid., p113. In using this phrase Luttwak is seeking to make the point that ‘grand purposes often imply the decisive employment of large forces in large operations, in true Napoleonic fashion’.
- ²³⁵ See, EN Luttwak, ‘“Post-Heroic Warfare” and Its Implications’, (1995) Center for Strategic and International Studies http://www.nids.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/1999/sympo_e1999_5.pdf (accessed 21 Aug 2012).
- ²³⁶ Luttwak, ‘Toward Post-Heroic Warfare’, p115.
- ²³⁷ Christophe Wasinski, ‘“Post-Heroic Warfare” and Ghosts—The Social Control of Dead American Soldiers in Iraq’, in *International Political Sociology* (2008) Vol 2, p113.
- ²³⁸ Casualty rates and public opinion will be considered in the next section 5.4.2.
- ²³⁹ Luttwak, ‘Toward Post-Heroic Warfare’, p115.
- ²⁴⁰ This author’s father was one of eight children: three children died before the age of five and five survived into adulthood.
- ²⁴¹ Luttwak, ‘“Post-Heroic Warfare” and Its Implications’ p135.
- ²⁴² Ibid.
- ²⁴³ EN Luttwak, ‘Give War a Chance’, in *Foreign Affairs* (1999) Vol 78, No4, p40.
- ²⁴⁴ See EN Luttwak, ‘A Post-Heroic Military Policy’, in *Foreign Affairs* (1996) Vol 75, No 4, p33-44. Although the Kosovo campaign postdates the publication of this article, the central points he makes in it are elaborated in the article ‘Give War a Chance’ which does focus upon the NATO intervention against Serbia.
- ²⁴⁵ C Coker, *Humane Warfare* (London & New York: Routledge, 2001) p17.
- ²⁴⁶ Ibid.
- ²⁴⁷ Ibid., see chapter 1 ‘Humanising War’ particularly p17-23.
- ²⁴⁸ Ibid., p139.
- ²⁴⁹ Luttwak’s analysis of the air campaign is unsophisticated. For example, he makes no mention of the cost to Gen Wesley K Clark who ultimately lost his job because he fell out of favour with his political masters, according to M Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (p111-112).
- ²⁵⁰ Luttwak, ‘Give War a Chance’ p41.
- ²⁵¹ Pascal Vennesson, Fabian Breuer, Chiara de Franco and Ursula C. Schroeder, ‘Is There a European Way of War? : Role Conceptions, Organizational Frames, and the Utility of Force’, in *AFS* (2009) Vol 35, No 4, p628-645.
- ²⁵² See chapter 2 in this thesis for a discussion on this reality.
- ²⁵³ Coker, *Humane Warfare*, p57. He cites the decisions to pull American forces out of Mogadishu after the firefight that left 18 soldiers dead and earlier from Beirut after a car-bomb killed 241 Marines.
- ²⁵⁴ See chapter 4 of this thesis.
- ²⁵⁵ Philippe Manigart, ‘Risks and Recruitment in Postmodern Armed Forces: The Case of Belgium’ in *AFS* (2005) Vol 31, No 4, p559-582.
- ²⁵⁶ Ibid., p559.
- ²⁵⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁵⁸ Ibid.
- ²⁵⁹ Ibid., p560.
- ²⁶⁰ Ibid., p561.
- ²⁶¹ Ibid., p562.
- ²⁶² Ibid., p574-5.
- ²⁶³ The funeral services in October 2012 of two female police officers, Constables Fiona Bone and Nicola Hughes, shot dead while on duty in Manchester was another example of many thousands of mourners publicly paying their respects to public servants killed while serving their communities.
- ²⁶⁴ For example, J Record, ‘Collapsed Countries, Casualty Dread, and the New American Way of War’, in *Parameters* (Summer 2002) p4-23, contends that Saddam Hussein’s belief in American dread of casualties born out of its defeat in Vietnam and rapid withdrawal from Lebanon encouraged him to invade Kuwait. Record notes that ‘Saddam believed that he could inflict more casualties on US Forces than domestic American political traffic would bear’ (p13). See also section 5.4.1 post-heroic society and the example of NATO’s policy on the use of airpower during the Kosovo conflict.
- ²⁶⁵ The American Civil War for example, arguably the first example of the total war that would become the general pattern of war in the first half of the twentieth-century.
- ²⁶⁶ Although President Truman famously referred to this as a police action.
- ²⁶⁷ SE Bennett and RS Flickinger, ‘Americans’ Knowledge of US Military Deaths in Iraq’, April 2004 to April 2008’, in *AFS* (2009) Vol 35, p589.
- ²⁶⁸ Ibid., p590.
- ²⁶⁹ The UK military loses in Operation TELIC were 179 servicemen and women, of which 136 were killed in action. US military loses since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom until 31 August 2010 were 4487, of which 3492 were killed in action and 32,000 wounded (figures taken from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle->

[east-11107739](#) accessed 27 Oct 2012). Since the US led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, 435 British servicemen and women have been killed (figures taken from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10629358> accessed 27 Oct 2012). US military personnel killed in Afghanistan total 2144 servicemen and women. In total there has been 3213 ISAF NATO troops killed since the invasion (figures taken from <http://icasualties.org/oef/> accessed 27 Oct 2012). The UK and US figures were correct on 27 October 2012. The UK government do not officially release the number of wounded soldiers injured on active service in Afghanistan. However, the number injured during HERRICK 10 and 11 was approximately 1000.

²⁷⁰ The word limit simply prohibits any comprehensive treatment. The purpose of this section is to briefly consider casualty phobia as a selected Societal Factor.

²⁷¹ The focus on casualty phobia within a primarily US context reflects the depth of research undertaken within this cultural setting. The example of the Belgium paratroopers and articles by Israeli scholars, cited in this section, suggest that there may be common traits in Western societies and therefore a US focus may offer a helpful mechanism to examine this phenomenon.

²⁷² H Smith, 'What Costs Will Democracies Bear? A Review of Popular Theories of Casualty Aversion', in *AFS* (2005) Vol 31, No 4, p488.

²⁷³ Record, 'Collapsed Countries', p12.

²⁷⁴ Y Levy, 'The Second Lebanon War: Examining "Democratization of War" Theory', in *AFS* (2010) Vol 36, No 5, p799. It is important to note that while Levy is focusing upon Israel's experience the main concepts are remarkably similar to that of other Western countries.

²⁷⁵ Smith, 'What Costs Will Democracies Bear' p495-496. For a more detailed treatment of this doctrine see, CA Stevenson, 'The Evolving Doctrine on the Use of Force', in *AFS* (1996) Vol 24, No 4, p515; KJ Campbell, "'Once Burned, Twice Cautious": Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine', in *AFS* (1998) Vol 24, No 3, p357-374.

²⁷⁶ US Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (1993), 1.2 'The American View of War', downloaded from http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/genesis_and_evolution/source_material/FM-100-5_operations.pdf (accessed 27 Oct 2012).

²⁷⁷ C Gelpi, PD Feaver and J Reifler, 'Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq', in *International Security* (Winter 2005/6) Vol 30, No 3, p10.

²⁷⁸ For a useful exploration of this see, MG Ender, DE Rohall and D Matthews, 'American undergraduate attitudes towards the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan', in *The Routledge Handbook of War and Society*, ed. S Carlton-Ford and MG Ender (London and New York: Routledge, 2011) p294-305. This study only focuses upon a specific group within American culture, despite the cultural diversity contained within the group. For a broader breakdown of public opinion see, J Carroll, 'Slim Majority Supports Anti-Terrorism Action in Afghanistan, Pakistan', *Gallup* August 8, 2007, downloaded from <http://www.gallup.com/poll/28333/Slim-Majority-Supports-Anti-Terrorism-Action-Afghanistan-Pakistan.aspx?version=print> (accessed 19 Oct 2012). This poll assess the opinion across the main political parties in America; J Carroll, 'Iraq Support Split Along Racial Lines', *Gallup* September 14, 2004, downloaded from <http://www.gallup.com/poll/13012/Iraq-Support-Split-Along-Racial-Lines.aspx> (accessed 19 Oct 2012); J M. Jones, 'In U.S., Half Say U.S. Should Speed Up Afghanistan Withdrawal', *Gallup* March 15, 2012, this poll considers opinion across the age spectrum.

²⁷⁹ Smith, 'What Costs Will Democracies Bear', states that these are people that are 'ready to support force but are also willing to abandon a failing mission' (p499).

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, Smith defines this group as 'willing to abandon a mission in the event of casualties'.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*

²⁸² *Ibid.*

²⁸³ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁴ Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler, 'Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq' p10.

²⁸⁵ Coker, *Humane Warfare*, p78-79. Coker cites US 'Force Protection' in Bosnia as an example of a zero tolerance to casualties.

²⁸⁶ Record, 'Collapsed Countries', states that, 'the phobia is rooted in the Vietnam War (and seemingly revalidated in Beirut and Somalia)' p12.

²⁸⁷ Coker, *Humane Warfare*, p36.

²⁸⁸ C Coker, *War and the 20th Century* (London: Brassey's, 1994) p243.

²⁸⁹ C Dauber, 'Image as Argument: The Impact of Mogadishu on U.S. Military Intervention', in *AFS* (Winter 2001) Vol 27, No 2, p206.

²⁹⁰ Bennett and Flickinger, 'Americans' Knowledge of US Military Deaths in Iraq' p591.

²⁹¹ S S Gartner and GM Segura, 'War, Casualties, and Public Opinion', in *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* (1998) Vol 42, No 3, p284.

²⁹² Coker, *Humane Warfare*, p36.

²⁹³ APN Erdmann, 'The US Presumption of Quick, Costless Wars', in *Orbis* (Summer 1999) Vol 43, No 3, p364.

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- ²⁹⁴ Record, 'Collapsed Countries' p12.
- ²⁹⁵ See J Mermin, 'Television news and American intervention in Somalia: The myth of a media-driven foreign' *PSQ* (Fall 1997) Vol 112, No 3, p385.
- ²⁹⁶ Dauber, 'Image as Argument', p205.
- ²⁹⁷ James Burk, 'Public support for peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the casualties hypothesis' *PSQ* (1999) Vol 114, p54.
- ²⁹⁸ John E Mueller, 'Policy principles for unthreatened wealth-seekers' in *Foreign Policy* (1996) Vol 102, p31.
- ²⁹⁹ Ibid. Mueller offers no evidence for his confident statement.
- ³⁰⁰ Dauber, 'Image as Argument', p214. For example, he cites how it was impossible for American soldiers to distinguish between civilians and combatants. The images of Somalis standing around dead American soldiers holding assault rifles while dressed in civilian clothes immediately conjured up images from the Vietnam War for the American people.
- ³⁰¹ Ibid.
- ³⁰² Smith, 'What Costs Will Democracies Bear' p488.
- ³⁰³ See Dauber, 'Image as Argument' (p215-217) for a flavour of the media reports on the killings.
- ³⁰⁴ Smith, 'What Costs Will Democracies Bear' p496.
- ³⁰⁵ Mermin, 'Television news and American intervention in Somalia' p386.
- ³⁰⁶ Smith, 'What Costs Will Democracies Bear', maintains that 'the deaths occurred in the midst of internal debate about appropriate strategies' (p496).
- ³⁰⁷ Burk, 'Public support for peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia' p78. For Burk, this struggle may have revolved around the distribution of war making powers between the President and Congress. In this setting the media would have had ample political support and 'well informed sources' to lend weight to the various positions taken by it.
- ³⁰⁸ Mueller, 'Policy principles for unthreatened wealth-seekers' p32.
- ³⁰⁹ The 'Dover Test', according to LF Kaplan in 'Willpower' in *The New Republic* (September 8-15, 2003), p19-22, was designed by Hugh Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during the Clinton era. Sheldon asked, 'Is the American public prepared for the sight of our most precious resource coming home in flag-draped caskets into Dover Air Force Base?' (as cited by Kaplan 'Willpower' downloaded from <http://www.tnr.com/article/willpower> accessed 30 June 2012). Smith, 'What Costs Will Democracies Bear' p498 and Dauber, 'Image as Argument' p207-208 also specifically refer to the 'Dover Test'.
- ³¹⁰ Red Rall, 'Censorship of war casualties in the US' downloaded from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/07/20117258316765540.html> (accessed 19 Oct 2012).
- ³¹¹ Ibid.
- ³¹² The image of a row of flag draped coffins is used to powerful effect in the 2012 Bond Film *Skyfall*. M, played by Dame Judy Dench, is shown standing poignantly in a room by herself with the flag draped coffins of eight operatives killed in an attack on the London headquarters of M16. This particular scene formed part of the cinematic trailer to promote *Skyfall*. *Skyfall* is not an academic work. However, the use of this image in such a high profile worldwide 'blockbuster' when Britain is still engaged in active operations in Afghanistan is striking. It is possible that in seeking to set the film in contemporary culture, the director was seeking to invite the audience to make the link with the news footage of the repatriation of actual British service personnel killed on active service.
- ³¹³ Kaplan, 'Willpower' p19.
- ³¹⁴ Ibid., p20. He forcefully maintains that even during the Vietnam War, where he argues the myth of a risk-averse public was born, public sensitivity to casualties depended upon its faith in the eventual success of the mission.
- ³¹⁵ Ibid., p21.
- ³¹⁶ Ibid.
- ³¹⁷ Julian Glover, 'Survey of public opinion on Afghan conflict finds support, and doubt' *The Guardian* (13 July 2009) downloaded from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/jul/13/public-opinion-poll-afghanistan-war> (accessed 14 September 2012). The author of this thesis was the Task Force Helmand, Senior Chaplain during this period. It was one of the bloodiest in operation HERRICK. During HERRICKs 10-11 Task Force Helmand lost 131 British, Danish and Estonian soldiers, with approxametly 1000 injured.
- ³¹⁸ Kaplan, 'Willpower' p22.
- ³¹⁹ Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler, 'Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq', p8.
- ³²⁰ Ibid.
- ³²¹ Ibid.
- ³²² Ibid., p32.
- ³²³ Ibid., p40

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- ³²⁴ AJ Berinsky and JN Druckman, 'The Polls-Review Public Opinion Research and Support for the Iraq War', in *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring 2007) Vol 71, No1, p127.
- ³²⁵ *Ibid.*, p128. They argue that support for the war is heavily influenced by pre-existing political judgments and the balance of elite rhetoric'.
- ³²⁶ *Ibid.*, p139.
- ³²⁷ Taylor, *Social Imaginaries*, p74
- ³²⁸ *Ibid.*, p152.
- ³²⁹ *Ibid.*, p148.
- ³³⁰ *Ibid.*, p24
- ³³¹ *Ibid.*, p81.
- ³³² M Evans, *Gender and Social Theory* (Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2003) p87. Evans contends that the debates on this process have become significant.
- ³³³ L Braudy, *From Chivalry to Terrorism: War and the Changing Nature of Masculinity* (New York: Random, 2005) pxx.
- ³³⁴ The modern assault rifle is significantly lighter than the early flintlock rifles. This makes modern assault rifles easier to carry, aim and fire. There are exceptions of course. A General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG), not including 500 rounds of 7.62mm link ammunition, requires significant upper body strength to carry. With the introduction of the British SA80 (A1) and its heavier barrelled variant, the Light Support Weapon (LSW), the British Army re-designated the GPMG from a section (8 soldiers) weapon to a company (120 soldiers) support weapon. However, operational experience in Iraq and particularly in Afghanistan has resulted in the GPMG being reintroduced as a section based weapon. In addition rifles using 7.62mm ammunition, which are heavier weapons than the SA80 (A2) have also been reintroduced in patrols.
- ³³⁵ Braudy, *From Chivalry to Terrorism*, p9.
- ³³⁶ *Ibid.*, p6. Braudy cites the myth of Gilgamesh as evidence of just how far back into antiquity this nostalgia stretches.
- ³³⁷ This was considered in chapter 2 of this thesis.
- ³³⁸ CS Jarvis, *The Male Body at War: American Masculinity during World War II* (Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004) p 185.
- ³³⁹ *Ibid.*, p186.
- ³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*
- ³⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p191.
- ³⁴² *Ibid.*, p188.
- ³⁴³ *Ibid.* It is interesting to note that unlike many other actors, (for example, James Stewart, John Agar, Richard Egan, Douglas Fairbanks Jn, Lee Marvin) John Wayne saw no military service in WW2. Another actor who played 'action hero' roles and saw no military service was Errol Flynn. Flynn, the embodiment of the swashbuckling hero was, allegedly, plagued with poor health and had his applications for military service rejected.
- ³⁴⁴ T Carrigan, B Connell and J Lee, 'Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity', in *The Masculinity Studies Reader*, ed., R Adams and D Sarvan (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) p122.
- ³⁴⁵ Evans, *Gender and Social Theory* p83.
- ³⁴⁶ Although actors like John Wayne pretended to be heroes on screen, Britain and America had many thousands of actual heroes decorated for outstanding bravery during WW2. While feminist scholars have subjected the idealised image of the 1950s to severe criticism, the 'myth' must have had at least some basis in fact for a great many who lived through the aftermath of WW2. The enduring nature of the myth would suggest that many find some resonance with the image of nuclear families living in tight-knit communities.
- ³⁴⁷ For an useful introduction see, JK Gardiner, 'Introduction', in *Masculinity Studies and Feminist Theory*, ed JK Gardiner (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001) p1-29; R Wiegman, 'Unmaking: Men and Masculinity in Feminist Theory', in *Masculinity Studies and Feminist Theory*, ed JK Gardiner (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001) p31-59; RW Connell, 'The History of Masculinity', in *The Masculinity Studies Reader*, ed., R Adams and D Sarvan (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002); Arthur Brittan, *Masculinity and Power* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).
- ³⁴⁸ Connell, *Masculinities*, defines this as, 'the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer of gender practice (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women' (p77). Giddens, *Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006) states that 'Connell sets out one of the most complete theoretical accounts of gender. His approach has been particularly influential in sociology because he has integrated the concepts of patriarchy and masculinity into an overarching theory of gender relations' (p462).
- ³⁴⁹ Connell, *Masculinities*, p78.
- ³⁵⁰ Giddens, *Sociology*, p465. Giddens cites Arnold Schwarzenegger, rapper 50 Cent and businessman Donald Trump as examples of those who embody this form of masculinity.

³⁵¹ Connell, *Masculinities*, p79.

³⁵² VJ Seidler, *Rediscovering Masculinity: Reason, Language and Sexuality* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989). He maintains that 'our conventional political traditions and differences assume an inherited conception of masculinity as impersonal, objective, disinterested' (p183).

³⁵³ Brittan, *Masculinity and Power*, p15.

³⁵⁴ Evans, *Gender and Social Theory* p63. She argues that those who campaigned for protective legislation in the workplace did so on the basis of keeping women and children out of the worst excesses of the new factory system.

³⁵⁵ Connell, 'The History of Masculinity' p250.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Gardiner, 'Introduction' p2.

³⁵⁸ Redstockings Manifesto,

http://www.redstockings.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=76&Itemid=59 (accessed 24 Oct 12). An important part of this movement was the idea of consciousness raising. Women were invited to tell their stories in groups. In this way, women were able to identify with the experiences of other women and gain a wider perspective on their own situations. For a useful discussion of this see, Seidler, *Rediscovering Masculinity* p178ff.

³⁵⁹ NJ Chodorow, 'The Enemy Outside: Thoughts on the Psychodynamics of Extreme Violence with Special Attention to Men and Masculinity', in *Masculinity Studies and Feminist Theory*, ed., JK Gardiner (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). Chodorow's work is heavily dependent upon a Freudian approach to psychology.

³⁶⁰ Gardiner, 'Introduction' p3.

³⁶¹ Evans, *Gender and Social Theory* p84.

³⁶² Giddens, *Sociology*, p460.

³⁶³ Brittan, *Masculinity and Power*, p1.

³⁶⁴ See Brittan, *Masculinity and Power*, as only one example of how this issue is discussed at great length in the literature on this subject.

³⁶⁵ Giddens, *Sociology*, p461.

³⁶⁶ Gardiner, 'Introduction' p12.

³⁶⁷ See, M Simpson, *Male Impersonators: Men Performing Masculinity* (London: Cassell, 1994). Although dated, this book nevertheless reflects the struggle for the masculinity of homosexual men to be recognised as a masculinity in its own right.

³⁶⁸ J Halberstam, 'An Introduction to Female Masculinity: Masculinity without Men', in *The Masculinity Studies Reader*, ed., R Adams and D Sarvan (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) p355-374. Halberstam focuses upon 'Tomboys' and how when the girl is young it is often presented as a 'natural' desire for greater freedoms but is punished when it threatens to extend beyond childhood into adolescence (p358). Later in her article she contends that Western society has refused to admit ambiguously gendered bodies into social relations (p362). One example of this is the binary division of toilets. In one of her more memorable questions she asks, 'are butch dykes women?' (p363). Her point is actually very simple; many women manifest gender traits that are masculine and that these forms of masculinities are equally as valid as others.

³⁶⁹ C Skelton, "The 'Feminisation of Schooling' or 'Re-masculinising' Primary Education?", in *International Studies in Sociology of Education*, (2002) Vol 12, No1, p77-96.

³⁷⁰ Seidler, *Rediscovering Masculinity*, p177. Zero-sum constructs envisage winners and losers. This construct is difficult to maintain in a postmodern world with its complexity of social multiverses.

³⁷¹ Chodorow, 'The Enemy Outside' p252, notes that many feminists maintain this precise point.

³⁷² See chapter 2 of this thesis and the sociological understanding of how individual identities are negotiated.

³⁷³ Brittan, *Masculinity and Power*, observes that there are many men who have consciously attempted to construct life styles which they hope are non-sexist and egalitarian and there are others who have not made the slightest concession to feminism (p183).

³⁷⁴ Evans, *Gender and Social Theory* (p84) uses this phrase to describe the scepticism that certain roles must be filled by either men or women.

³⁷⁵ This phrase usually refers to Western militaries and their adjustment to a post-cold war environment. See *The Postmodern Military*, ed., CC Moskos, et. al., (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). The use of the term in this section will refer primarily to Western militaries. Martin Shaw, *Post-military Society* (Cambridge: Polity, 1991) focuses on the same post-cold war issues facing Western societies with a particular emphasis upon the pacification of Western democracies and the marginalisation of their respective militaries from the general consumer culture those societies.

³⁷⁶ This refers to the financial benefit governments expected in the reduction of military spending, primarily achieved through a reduction of its armed forces. The UK's Strategic Defence Review of 1998 is the formal

articulation of this concept. See http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-20825848E50E/0/sdr1998_complete.pdf (accessed 24 Oct 12).

³⁷⁷ See, S Mannitz, 'Redefining Soldierly Role Models in Germany', in *AFS* (2011) Vol 37, No 4, p680-700.

³⁷⁸ See C Danker, 'The United Kingdom: The Overstretched Military', in *The Postmodern Military*, ed., CC Moskos, et. al., (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) p41.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ In the UK, the MOD implemented a series of studies into harassment of Servicemen and Servicemen in partnership with the Equal Opportunities Commission. After a series of high profile racial and gender related harassment cases brought against the MOD, and the Army in particular, Equal Opportunity training was introduced as mandatory. As an example of the MOD use of surveys to gather information on this issue see, <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence?CoporatePublications/ConsultationsandCommunications/Surveys/SurveysOther/> (accessed 6 Nov 12).

³⁸¹ M Morris, 'By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture', *Duke Law Journal* (1995) Vol 45, p651-781 makes uncomfortable reading and illustrates just how severe sexual assault had been upon women in certain elements the US military.

³⁸² For example see, J Hickee Lundquist, 'Ethnic and Gender Satisfaction in the Military: The Effect of a Meritocratic Institution', in *American Sociological Review* (2008) Vol 73, p477-496. She concludes that, 'most of the explanatory power emerges in the final models, indicating that women and minorities believe their quality of life, level of pay, and promotional opportunities are far better in the military than in civilian society' (p494). See also, Orna Sasson-Levy, 'Feminism and Military Gender Practices: Israeli Women Soldiers in "Masculine" Roles', in *Sociological Inquiry*, (August 2003) Vol 73, No 3, p 440-65. Although the focus of this study is the experience of women in the Israeli Army, many of the issues are remarkably similar to those identified in other Western militaries.

³⁸³ For example see, LL Miller, 'Feminism and the Exclusion of Army Women from Combat', in *Gender Issues* (1998), p33-64. She argues that, 'by treating gender differences as entirely socially constructed, activists have failed to equip military women with the tools to understand physical differences or to challenge arguments based on those differences. By simultaneously portraying women soldiers as helpless victims of sexual harassment and yet potentially fierce warriors in battle, activists have put forth contradictory images that undermine their efforts' (p35).

³⁸⁴ Titunik, 'The First Wave' p247.

³⁸⁵ 71% of posts are open to women in the Royal Navy, 67% in the Army and 96% in the RAF. See <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11864815> (accessed 6 Nov 12).

³⁸⁶ P Cawkill, A Rogers, S Knight, & L Spear, *Women in Ground Close Combat Roles: The Experiences of other Nations and a Review of the Academic Literature* (2009) DSTL/CR37770 V3-0, p1.

³⁸⁷ See the BBC news report on this, 'UK infantry ban on women soldiers remains, MOD rules' <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11864815> (accessed 6 Nov 12).

³⁸⁸ Ibid.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ Cawkill, et. al., *Women in Ground Close Combat Roles*, p42.

³⁹¹ Ibid.

³⁹² R Claire Snyder, 'The Citizen-Soldier Tradition and Gender Integration of the U.S. Military' in *AFS* (2003) Vol 29, No 2, p185.

³⁹³ Col ME McSally USAF, *Women in Combat: Is the Current Policy Obsolete?* Unpublished Research Report, Air War College, Air University, (2007). Col McSally was the first woman in U.S. history to fly a fighter aircraft into combat. In June 2006, she completed a tour as the first woman to command a combat aviation squadron, during which she led her A-10 fighter squadron into combat in Afghanistan in 2005.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., p47-48.

³⁹⁵ The same argument is used by the Service Women's Action Network (SWAN) in their *Women in Combat The Facts* (<http://servicewomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Final-Women-in-Combat-Fact-Sheet-10.4.12.pdf>) (accessed 6 Nov 12).

³⁹⁶ See <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16975751> (accessed 1 Nov 12). The BBC report included the following section: 'We believe that it's very important to explore ways to offer more opportunities to women in the military', Pentagon Press Secretary George Little told a briefing on Thursday. He added that while the review has been 'thorough and extensive', the military will continue to look for ways to expand opportunities for women in the armed forces. The Service Women's Action Network gave the policy a qualified welcome.

³⁹⁷ See, Allison Churchill, *Two Women Drop Out Of Infantry Course, And Two More Sue To Go To Combat*, The Business Insider, 17 Oct 2012, <http://www.businessinsider.com/as-two-women-sue-to-go-to-combat-two-drop-from-marine-course-2012-10> (accessed 1 Nov 12). See also, <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2012/10/17/first-women-fail-marine-infantry-officer-course.html?comp=700001075741&rank=1> (accessed

1 Nov 12). One of the two women passed the combat endurance test at the beginning for the course but had to withdraw for unspecified medical reasons. The second woman failed the endurance test.

³⁹⁸ See, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/01/24/women-combat-change-panetta/1861995/> (accessed 7 July 13). The report goes on to say that men and women will have to meet the same requirements to serve in the infantry or other combat roles.

³⁹⁹ For the convenience of the reader the thesis question is reproduced below:

If a spectrum between Warrior and Weapons Platform is imagined, what does it tell us about how the nature of the British Soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary British society?

Chapter 6

The Future Nature of Conflict

6.1 *Introduction*

Conceptually, chapter 4 is a philosophical exploration of the nature of war. Chapter 6 in contrast, is an examination of the current thinking in government and scholarship concerning the nature of future conflict and the wars that British Forces may be engaged in. Or put another way, chapter 4 established the conceptual skeleton and chapter 6 attempts to place some flesh on the bones of chapter 4 by examining the anticipated operational *Sitz im Leben* of service for the British soldier set within the overarching context of what the nature of future conflict will look like and the type of adversaries the generic soldier can expect to face.

The public sphere associated with a Western social imaginary¹ is ‘the locus of discussion potentially engaging everyone’² where ‘rational views are elaborated that should guide government’³. Although an ‘extrapolitical’ concept, it nevertheless is supposed to be listened to by political power⁴. ‘With the modern public sphere,’ maintains Taylor, ‘comes the idea that political power should be supervised and checked by something outside’⁵. This concept is so common to us that Taylor observes that ‘we have trouble even recalling what it was like before’⁶. The question this thesis is examining is:

If a spectrum between Warrior and Weapons Platform is imagined, what does it tell us about how the nature of the British Soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary British society?

The relevance of this chapter is based on the premise that the nature of war in combination with the type of future conflicts, and their environments, involving the UK’s Armed Forces, may directly influence how the nature of the British Soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary British society’. Public doubt about British involvement in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan⁷ is one example of an on-going discussion in the public sphere that

has informed political considerations. The decision of the House of Commons regarding UK military involvement in Syria is a recent example⁸. The prime minister in response to the defeat in the House of Commons said, 'people are deeply concerned about the chemical weapons attacks in Syria, but they want us to learn the lessons of Iraq'⁹.

In his book *Strategy for Chaos*, Colin Gray states that 'politics rules'¹⁰. It is therefore necessary to begin with an examination of 'HM Government's Assessment of Security and Defence' requirements and planning assumptions (6.2). One of the central components in this section will be a consideration of the government's 'Conceptual Framework' (6.2.1) set against its strategic goals, core objectives and the series of threats identified in the National Security Strategy. This will also involve an analysis of the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review and the assumptions contained in Future Force 2020. Sub-section 6.2.2 will examine how Government's conceptual framework was received by commentators, security experts and scholars.

The second main section in this chapter (6.3) will explore 'Future Conflict: Themes and Expectations'. Therefore in 6.3.1 'Trends and Drivers' the subjects of increasing instability, globalisation, climate change, contested resources, urbanisation and ideological radicalisation will all be assessed against the background of future conflict and their influence upon it. Sub-section 6.3.2 will explore the implications of the Western way of war juxtaposed an adaptive adversary. Although the US and UK militaries had little difficulty in defeating the Iraqi military in Gulf War II, both struggled against the insurgencies that evolved in Iraq and subsequently in Afghanistan. This sub-section will consider the notion that a manoeuvrist ideology was unsuited against an adaptive asymmetric enemy. Sub section 6.3.3 'Hybrid Threats' develops the previous sub-section by seeking to unpack why US and UK forces were unprepared to deal with an effective and determined insurgency. In sub section 6.3.4 the concept is further explored through examining the idea that the 2006 war between Hezbollah

and Israel may become the paradigm of future conflicts between Western and non-Western state and non-state actors. In this sub-section the implications for the British Army in future contested/urban environments will be examined.

6.2 HM Government's Assessment of Security and Defence

The publication of the UK's National Security Strategy (NSS)¹¹ and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)¹² in October 2010 had been much anticipated¹³ and was guaranteed to generate significant political, economic and scholarly comment and critique¹⁴. The background and political context to the SDSR was complex. Writing less than a year before the general election in 2010, Cornish and Dorman maintained their belief that the global economic crisis was about to overwhelm government spending which in turn would have extensive implications for defence: indeed they suggested defence in the UK was in greater trouble than many realised¹⁵. Although the Labour Government produced an NSS in 2009, calling it an 'Update', it had not conducted a comprehensive Defence Review since 1998. In other words, although it was prepared to talk about policy ends, it failed to produce a document outlining the ways and means of achieving those stated ends. In July 2009, the Defence Secretary, Bob Ainsworth, announced that a Defence Review would be conducted in the next Parliament¹⁶. It was. Not by a Labour Government, but a Conservative/Liberal Democrat, coalition government.

In the second paragraph of the 2010 SDSR the financial drivers that pervade the entire document are clearly set out, 'restoring a strong economy is critical to sustaining the effectiveness of our national security'¹⁷. This reflects Duncan Sandys' Defence White Paper in 1957, which states that, 'Britain's influence in the world depends first and foremost on the health of her internal economy and the success of her export trade. Without these, military power cannot in the long run be supported'¹⁸. The speed with which such a comprehensive

Defence and Security Review was undertaken and completed was breathtaking. What makes this all the more notable is that it was conducted while UK forces were engaged in an on-going war in Afghanistan¹⁹.

6.2.1 *Conceptual Framework*

In May 2010 the prime minister established a National Security Council (NSC)²⁰. The NSC according to No 10 'is the main forum for collective discussion of the government's objectives for national security and about how best to deliver them in the current financial climate... A key purpose of the Council is to ensure that ministers consider national security in the round and in a strategic way'²¹. There are currently three ministerial sub-committees of the Council, their tasks are to consider²²:

- threats, hazards, resilience and contingencies including a restricted group to consider intelligence matters,
- nuclear deterrence and security,
- the UK's relationship with emerging international powers.

In addition, the government created the role of a National Security Adviser (NSA) on 12 May 2010; the role is a prime ministerial appointment and based in the Cabinet Office. The NSA heads up a team called National Security Secretariat, and formulates the NSC's structures. The Parliamentary, Intelligence and Security Committee hold the NSA and National Security Secretariat to account.

The NSS was created to achieve two main objectives: 1, to set out the government's analysis of the strategic context in which the UK finds itself; 2, to define the high-level objectives (ends) which would guide the overall strategic approach²³. It is abundantly clear in the introduction that the coalition government wished to give the impression that there was a distinctive and new approach to this NSS, as opposed to those conducted by the previous Labour government. One recurring theme throughout this document and the subsequent SDSR is the specific articulation of a 'whole of government' approach to security. In paragraph 0.11 we read about 'a whole of government approach, based on a concept of

security that goes beyond military effects. It places greater emphasis on domestic resilience and a stable global environment²⁴. The government's core objectives in part 1 and 2 of the NSS are:

- ensuring a secure and resilient UK – protecting our people, economy, infrastructure, territory and way of life from all major risks that can affect us directly; and
- shaping a stable world – actions beyond our borders to reduce the likelihood of specific risks affecting the UK or our direct interests overseas²⁵.

In its analysis of the security context, the NSS states that, 'we face a real and pressing threat from international terrorism' (1.2) of which 'Al Qaeda remains the most potent terrorist threat to the UK' (1.3). It recognises that traditional espionage continues to pose a threat (1.7) as does terrorist groups linked to Northern Ireland (1.7). However, embedded in this security analysis, is the assertion that the largest single challenge facing the Government, affecting security and all other areas of public policy, is the urgent task of returning the nation's finances to a sustainable footing (1.9). In paragraph 1.11 it states that 'we face no major state threat and no existential threat to our security' and that although many future wars will be among the people, resembling the insurgency in Afghanistan (1.26), the next 20 years may see threats from a range of sources (1.33).

One of the most critical sections in the NSS is the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA)²⁶. This risk assessment forms the basis on which the NSC made its decisions 'about the relative national security capabilities and where to focus investment and savings' in the SDSR²⁷. It is based, according to the NSS, upon subject-matter experts, analysts and intelligence specialists' identification of existing and potential threats over the next five to twenty year horizon (3.7). The NSC 'identified 15 generic priority risk types, and allocated them into three tiers' (3.14). Tier one is considered to be the highest priority and is based on four groups of risks:

- International terrorism and or a significant increase in levels of terrorism relating to Northern Ireland.

- Hostile attacks upon UK cyber space by other states and large scale cybercrime.
- A major accident or natural hazard which requires a national response.
- An international military crisis between states, drawing in the UK.

The risk of major instability, insurgency or civil wars that may create an environment that terrorists can exploit to threaten the UK is a second tier risk type. The ends of the NSS are achieved through eight new National Security Tasks, which the SDSR will, according to the NSC, provide detailed information about the policies the government will pursue to achieve its two core objectives (4.02).

Part one of the 2010 SDSR begins with a detailed outline of the eight national security tasks and planning guidelines²⁸. It is clear that the ‘whole of government’ approach articulated by the NSC in its NSS is continued in the SDSR. There is an unambiguous desire to view security as a blended approach across the whole of government. The UK’s international development programme while seeking to reduce poverty as an overall objective, nevertheless also has the strategic objective of making an effective contribution to national security. This is intended to tackle the root causes of instability through coupling civilian and military stabilisation capabilities in combination with targeted programmes in countries posing the greatest threat to the UK. It is only in national security task 3, ‘Exert influence to exploit opportunities and manage risks’ that the planning assumption requiring a strategic capability of a military based ability to project power to deter, or contain potential threats is introduced. This is significant. The 2010 SDSR was widely anticipated because there had not been a Defence Review since 1998, a point emphasised by the coalition government in SDSR paragraph 1.3. Indeed in the introduction to the SDSR it states that, ‘we must avoid the twin mistakes of retaining too much legacy equipment, or tying ourselves into unnecessary capabilities’ (1.3). Placing the UK’s military capabilities within the wider conceptual framework of security, SDSR effectively establishes the parameters within which the huge

cuts to those capabilities can be justified. Defence, the SDSR repeatedly maintains, must play its part both in the stated security tasks and in the rebalancing of the UK economy²⁹.

In security task and planning assumption 5, there is the requirement to have ‘military capabilities to help protect the UK from major terrorist attack’, and maintain ‘an independent ability to defend the Overseas Territories militarily’. In security task and planning assumption 6, there is the requirement to have Armed Forces capable of both stabilisation and intervention operations’ along with ‘the military ability to help evacuate UK citizens from crises overseas’. In security task and planning assumption 8 there is the stated desire to focus on capabilities valued by allies, especially the United States, and an undertaking to share military capabilities with allies such as France, while maintaining a defence industrial and technological policy that secures independence of action for our Armed Forces.

In part 2 ‘Defence’ there is a brief note on the future character of conflict. In this it states that:

Globalisation increases the likelihood of conflict involving non-state and failed-state actors. State on-state conflict will not disappear, but its character is already changing. Asymmetric tactics such as economic, cyber and proxy actions instead of direct military confrontation will play an increasing part, as both state and non-state adversaries seek an edge over those who overmatch them in conventional military capability. As a result, the differences between state-on-state warfare and irregular conflict are dramatically reducing³⁰.

Based on this assessment of the future nature of conflict and for planning purposes, military operations, as envisaged by SDSR, are divided into: standing comments³¹, intervention operations³², and stabilisation operations³³. These are then further divided into: non-enduring operations³⁴ and enduring operations³⁵. General Wall (Chief of the General Staff) refers to these interventions as ‘in some way discretionary rather than linked to self-interest or direct self-defence’³⁶. SDSR states that these new Defence Planning Assumptions envisage that the Armed Forces will be sized to conduct:

- an enduring stabilisation operation at around brigade level (up to 6,500 personnel) with maritime and air support as required, while also conducting:

- one non-enduring complex intervention (up to 2,000 personnel), and
- one non-enduring simple intervention (up to 1,000 personnel).

Alternatively:

- three non-enduring operations if we were not already engaged in an enduring operation;

or:

- for a limited time, and with sufficient warning, committing all our effort to a one-off intervention of up to three brigades, with maritime and air support (around 30,000, two-thirds of the force deployed to Iraq in 2003).

The imagined Future Force 2020 in SDSR is comprised of three broad elements: The Deployed Force³⁷; The High Readiness Force³⁸; and The Lower Readiness Force³⁹. It then addresses the key resources (means) of delivering the security tasks and planning assumptions for each of the three armed Services⁴⁰.

In 2.A.7 the capabilities of the Land component of Future Force 2020 are laid out.

They will include:

- five multi-role brigades (comprising armoured, mechanised and light infantry)
- 16 Air Assault Brigade
- precision Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System
- a new range of medium weight armoured vehicles
- protected support vehicles
- heavily armoured vehicles (including Warrior, AS90, Titan and Trojan and Challenger)
- range of Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities
- Army helicopters (including Apache and Wildcat)
- Military Stabilisation Support Group (MSSG)
- counter IED capability
- a fully deployable divisional headquarters, with a second to prepare and train subordinate forces
- Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)⁴¹

The consequence of this policy direction means that, the SDSR directed the Army to: significantly reduce the number of regional non-deployable brigades from 10 to 8; reduce the UK's support to ARRC; reduce its deployable divisional HQs from 2 to 1; reduce the number of deployable brigades from 6 to 5; reduce the Challenger 2 capability by 40 per cent; reduce its AS90 capability by 35 per cent; and rationalise wider equipment holdings⁴².

The formal response by the Army to the planning assumptions in the SDSR was issued in July 2012 in a document called, *Transforming the British Army: Modernising to face an unpredictable future*⁴³, known simply as *Army 2020* within the service. The first strap-line in this brochure is the declaration that this work ‘has been carried out by the Army, for the Army’⁴⁴. It asserts that this transformation will provide highly adaptable capabilities and that it will ‘for the first time’ fully integrate Regulars and Reservists within a single force structure. In the section ‘Force Development Deductions’, it affirms that brigade and divisional levels of command will be reset and that it will have armoured infantry as the core capability. It promises to ‘institutionalise the integration of “soft effect” into manoeuvre and reset the precision/suppression balance of fires. In the section ‘Structural Changes’ it refers to the requirement in the SDSR to make adjustments that will enable the right balance of capabilities to fulfil its role in a Joint and Multinational environment. This rebalancing will be achieved through the reduction of 23 units from across the Army. Critical to the delivery of *Army 2020*, according to the document, is the full integration of the Reserves into the Army structure. Without this, the reduced regular force would be unable to complete all of the tasks set out in the SDSR. The envisaged integrated force of 112,000 will be achieved by 2020.

6.2.2 Reception and Evaluation of the Government’s Conceptual Framework

SDSR is viewed as being ‘fundamentally flawed by parliamentarians, defence professionals and expert commentators alike’⁴⁵. Even the basic premise on which the whole process was constructed was challenged and presented as questionable⁴⁶. Although the SDSR promised a radical reassessment, Ritchie maintains that the final result was a largely ‘cost-cutting opportunity that missed a crucial opportunity to challenge prevailing assumptions about what defence and security mean for British citizens in a post-9/11 era of complex globalization’⁴⁷. The question that Ritchie asks is entirely reasonable. It asks a basic, first

order question: are British grand strategic objectives best served through having significant expeditionary war-fighting capabilities? Does the NSS or SDSR articulate the reasons why Britain requires the capacity to deploy ‘three brigades, with maritime and air support (around 30,000, two-thirds of the force deployed to Iraq in 2003)?’ This seems a pertinent question whenever the NSS specifically states (1.11) that ‘we face no major state threat and no existential threat to our security’.

Taylor maintains that the 2010 SDSR ‘did not change things too much on the policy front’⁴⁸. Indeed when Labour’s SDR and the coalition government’s SDSR are placed side-by-side, the essential idea of what kind of military actor the UK should be is virtually identical⁴⁹. In the 1998 SDR it states that, ‘As a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council and as a country both willing and able to play a leading role internationally we have a responsibility to act as a force for good in the world’⁵⁰. In the 2010 SDSR the opening sentence states that, ‘Our country has always had global responsibilities and global ambitions. We have a proud history of standing up for the values we believe in and we should have no less ambition for our country in the decades to come’. The Foreign Secretary William Hague in a speech at Georgetown University declared that, ‘In Britain we have never shirked - and under this government never will shirk - the international responsibilities conferred on us by our economic and military strength...So Britain will remain a first rate military power and a robust ally of the U.S. and in NATO well into the future. As Secretary Clinton recently said, the U.K. “will remain the most capable partner” for U.S. forces’⁵¹. However, in his speech Hague wants to ‘correct the mistaken idea that we are in some way sacrificing our national defence to meet budget deficits. Strong defences require strong finances’⁵².

This speech encapsulates the inherent tensions and weakness of the 2010 SDSR. On the one hand the new coalition government had to deal with an economic crisis. It had made the political decision as outlined in the NSS and SDSR that defence had to play its part in

rebalancing the deficit. Every government is required to make political/financial calculations. That said, the same government also wanted to retain its global and international status as a major political player and ‘first rate military power’. It is difficult therefore to avoid arriving at a similar position to Cornish who observes that the ‘strategy review could be characterized as yet more “muddling through” – an outcome which was foreseeable and to which the UK seems innately predisposed in some way’⁵³. Dover and Phythian conclude that ‘the SDSR was little more than a collection of separate, rather than joined-up and meaningfully prioritised, statements of broad national interest designed to reassure the military, parliament and public that the forthcoming defence cuts were strategic rather than simply Treasury-led’⁵⁴. Similar concerns were apparently shared by the then Defence Secretary Dr Liam Fox shortly before the SDSR was finalised for publication. In a letter to the prime minister he maintains that, ‘frankly this process is looking less and less defensible as a proper SDSR and more like a ‘super CSR’⁵⁵ [comprehensive spending review].

The political decision to balance the UK’s finances was both a political necessity and an expedient course of action. However, as Gray notes, ‘defence debaters appear not to have noticed that Britain chooses, rather than is compelled, to spend approximately £35 billion a year on defence out of a total annual government expenditure of around £700bn. There is no physical, legal, moral or divine set of reasons why Britain could not choose to spend very much more or very much less on defence’⁵⁶. Although there may not be the reasons mentioned by Gray, there are historical lessons that Prins argues have been ignored or forgotten⁵⁷. He is of the firm opinion that ‘today’s governing class seems to feel no shame about its ignorance of history, nor does it seem aware of how risky that ignorance can be’⁵⁸.

The central argument in Prins’ paper is that the tension between balancing the budget and how much could be spent on defence is a frequent occurrence in British history. For example, Lord Chatfield⁵⁹ when speaking about Treasury reaction to the second Defence

Requirements exercise (July 1935) recalled, 'Time after time the Services were told that the financial dangers to the country were greater than military ones'⁶⁰. One cannot help but think that this has a strikingly familiar tone to it. Commenting on the Ramsay MacDonald coalition government, Prins contends that, 'the Ten Year Rule was used to justify "taking a gap" in capabilities in the language of the 2010 defence review, which was likewise underpinned by a Ten Year Rule logic'⁶¹. Today, the financial concerns of the Treasury in the 1930s may be viewed as narrow and difficult to comprehend with the real threat of war looming over Europe.

For many scholars, the UK's decision to intervene militarily in Libya is not simply the latest example of defence planning assumptions being made to look inadequate by world affairs. What makes it quite distinct is that OPERATION ELLAMY⁶² was undertaken within a few months of the publication of the SDSR. In this it is remarkably similar to the Nott Review in 1981 that brought about 'significant naval cuts, only for the 1982 rescue of the Falklands Islands to rely fundamentally on a naval task force'⁶³. In the 2010 SDSR it states - in relation to retaining an aircraft capability until the new class of carrier is introduced - that, 'we cannot now foresee circumstances in which the UK would require the scale of strike capability previously planned'⁶⁴. There seems little doubt that had the UK retained the aircraft carrier Ark Royal and its Harrier aircraft that these would have been an ideal and cheaper option than flying sorties from Italy using Typhoon in combination with Tornado⁶⁵. This however, is a second or third order issue. The first order issue is that within a few months, the coalition government had broken its own planning assumptions based upon its own recently published strategic posture. Dover and Phythian are blunt in this respect, 'SDSR has been fatally undermined by the decision to intervene in Libya'⁶⁶.

6.2.3 Conclusions

The Libyan campaign may be presented as a continuation of British preparedness to intervene militarily when the government makes the political calculation to play a major role on the world stage using 'hard power'. Any government must react to world events in relation to the political judgements and assessments it makes at the time of crisis. Equally, each government must make its assessment of its strategic aims and objectives in light of its assessments of the global context the UK must function in. In this, the establishment of an NSC along with an NSA is a positive development. The NSS correctly, it seems to the author, views security as wider than military/defence capabilities. Cyber attacks (warfare) are a contemporary reality. It was wholly appropriate that the NSS and SDSR reflect this. Equally, the desire to configure the Armed Forces so that they are prepared and equipped to contribute to delivering UK defence and strategic aims post Iraq and Afghanistan was necessary and required. However, the traditional tension between Treasury requirements and strategic capabilities has generated that most British of outcomes: a carefully crafted muddle. In the conclusion of its review of the 2010 SDSR, the Parliamentary Defence Committee contends that:

The Government appears to believe that the UK can maintain its influence while reducing spending, not just in the area of defence but also at the Foreign Office. We do not agree. If the UK's influence in the world is to be maintained, the Government must demonstrate in a clear and convincing way that these reductions have been offset by identifiable improvements elsewhere rather than imprecise assertions of an increased reliance on diplomacy and 'soft power'. If the Government cannot do so, the National Security Strategy is in danger of becoming a 'wish list' that fails to make the hard choices necessary to ensure the nation's security⁶⁷.

6.3 Future Conflict: Themes and Expectations

Predicting the future is fraught with difficulties. The IMF economist Prakash Loungani observed that, 'the record of failure to predict recessions is virtually unblemished'⁶⁸. The central premise of Gardner's book, *future babble*, is that expert

predictions not only fail but do so with an uncanny predictability. The 1970s, he claims, was an example of the enormous demand to know what might lie ahead, whether that was in regard to oil, terrorism, recession, unemployment, deficits and debt⁶⁹. Most of the predictions made by experts in the 1970s, he asserts, turned out to be wrong, some hilariously so⁷⁰. His reflection of the work by psychologist Philip Tetlock is a sobering reference point from which to continue any exploration of anything associated with the future. Tetlock, according to Gardner, recruited 284 experts – political scientists, economists, and journalists – whose jobs involve commenting or giving advice on political or economic trends⁷¹. Guaranteed anonymity, each expert offered their assessment on the future, with Tetlock and his team collecting 27,450 judgements about the future in all. The conclusion of this experiment, according to Tetlock, was that ‘the experts would have been beaten by ‘a dart-throwing chimpanzee’⁷².

6.3.1 *Trends and Drivers*

Despite the difficulties in predicting the future, this sub-section will nevertheless briefly outline the trends and drivers that are expected to shape the context of future conflict and the operational environment that the British Army may be expected to conduct military missions in.

Increasing instability: Shortly after the start of hostilities in the first Gulf War, President George Bush delivered his famous ‘New World Order Speech’⁷³. However, far from an anticipated and hugely optimistic ‘New World Order’, following on from the hoped for peace dividend⁷⁴, the general consensus today is that the trend is towards increasing instability and opportunity for confrontation and conflict⁷⁵. ‘Arguably, the world is becoming more complex with, *inter alia*, the rapid movement of ideas, people, capital and information’⁷⁶. As a consequence, national governments and world bodies, such as the UN, face what scholars refer to as ‘wicked problems’⁷⁷. These are problems of such complexity that they defy the

logic of process driven management⁷⁸. Coker maintains that they cannot be solved only 'managed until someone finally decides to stop managing it, or the managers run out of resources, time or money'⁷⁹.

Globalisation. The imagined 'New World Order' emerging after the demise of the Cold War was to some extent based upon a continuation of the nation state. However, what arguably was not envisaged was 'the end of the constitutional order of the twentieth century nation state'⁸⁰. As noted earlier in this thesis, the very concept of the state has evolved since its emergence. Its latest iteration in liberal Western democracies according to Bobbitt, is what he refers to as the 'market state' with a defining characteristic being the requirement to offer its citizens choice⁸¹. One of the key features of globalisation is 'likely to be the continuing internationalisation of markets for goods, capital, services and labour which integrates geographically dispersed consumers and suppliers'⁸². Choice is no longer restricted to the local high street or trip to the nearest city. The internet or World Wide Web has opened up a 'virtual' global market place that exploded 'into ubiquity within a couple of decades'⁸³. It is highly likely therefore that there will be 'winners and losers in a global economy lead by market forces'⁸⁴. This in turn may lead to increased global 'inequality within and between societies,' which in turn may lead to 'disorder, violence, criminality, terrorism and insurgency'⁸⁵.

Climate Change. This has been a major international political issue for many years⁸⁶. It is also a vivid example of the kind of 'wicked problems' confronting the international community⁸⁷. 'It is', Coker explains, 'a highly complex policy issue involving multiple causal factors, such as energy-intensive industries and energy consumers, and new emerging powers like China, are a key part of the solution'⁸⁸. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change⁸⁹ is an international treaty designed to set emissions targets for signatories to the protocol and illustrates Coker's point. Although most

developed nations signed the treaty, the US did not ratify it and Canada later withdrew. This withdrawal reveals just how contentious agreement is on how best to tackle the issues⁹⁰. Unfortunately, 'global emissions have showed no sign of slowing down..In that sense, the Kyoto protocol has been a failure'⁹¹. Regardless of why Kyoto failed to generate the hoped for change in emissions, there is a general consensus that climate change will be a significant factor in the twenty-first century. The threat of rising sea levels due to the melting ice caps, progressive thermal expansion of the oceans and the increasing acidity of sea water may well have a serious effect upon available land for habitation and agriculture⁹².

Contested Resources. The twentieth century saw an unprecedented rise in the world's population, rising from 2.6 billion in 1950 to just over 6 billion in 1999⁹³. In October 2011 it was widely reported that it had reached 7 billion⁹⁴. UN predictions are that the human population will reach 8.9 billion by 2050⁹⁵. It seems reasonable therefore, to conclude that the demand for resources will only increase. Although 'the earth is blessed with vast quantities of most vital materials – water, arable land, minerals, timber, and fossil fuels – there are practical limits to what can be extracted from the global environment'⁹⁶. Vasquez and Henahan argue that historically, 'territorial issues are usually the ones that are involved in war'⁹⁷. They also suggest, however, that globalisation may enhance the prospects for peace as 'major states will have no economic need to claim the territory of other states'⁹⁸. Klare also contends that global market forces will encourage negotiated solutions to most conflicts over resources⁹⁹. There will, he contends, be many instances where resource scarcity will become critical. In this instance conflicts, he describes as 'resource wars', will revolve around the pursuit or possession of critical materials¹⁰⁰. DCDC's evaluation on this is simple and direct, 'some states will regard the security of their food and water supplies as issues of national survival and will act accordingly'¹⁰¹.

Urbanisation. One of the most notable global transformations of recent years has been the change from a predominantly rural world to an urban one¹⁰². According to the UN, North America remains the most urbanised of all the major geographical areas with 82 per cent of the population living in urban areas¹⁰³. In Latin America the figure is 79 per cent, in Europe 73 per cent, 64 per cent in Asia, whereas Africa still has the lowest percentage with 39 per cent¹⁰⁴. In 2006 the global urban population exceeded the rural population for the first time¹⁰⁵. Hills is convinced that urbanisation will provide a critical interactive context for many future operations¹⁰⁶. DCDC shares this assessment. The Future Operational Environment (FOE), according to this concept paper, will be congested. In particular, densely populated urban and littoral regions, especially those lacking effective governance, will provide havens in which criminal elements, terrorists and insurgents shelter, organise and operate¹⁰⁷. It will also be a cluttered environment, providing opportunities for concealment and in which few spaces are likely to remain neutral 'with hospitals, schools and places of worship forming part of the operating landscape'¹⁰⁸. Consequently, potential adversaries 'are likely to contest any and all environments, often using novel asymmetric methods'¹⁰⁹.

Ideological radicalisation. Modern history is full of examples of ideological clashes between various ethnic, religious and cultural groups¹¹⁰. The invention of the printing press revolutionised the ability to convey new, often radical ideas¹¹¹. Further technological advances¹¹² provided greater flexibility in spreading ideas to an even greater audience using a variety of methods. The ubiquitous growth of the internet is the latest manifestation of this phenomenon. Today the lives of millions of people are a mixture of their daily 'real' world and a 'virtual' existence¹¹³ or have seamlessly fused both through social media networks such as Facebook, MySpace or Twitter. While the internet has offered an unparalleled access to information and ability to communicate with family and friends instantly over incredible distances (for example, Skype), it has also been used for darker and more sinister ends¹¹⁴.

Tensions between religions have existed for many centuries. Historically, religion has been used either to justify violence or it has been the pretext for violence. Although the major world religions are not inherently violent, conflict is often a characteristic associated with aspects of their histories. For example, ‘the Sunni – Shi’a contest is thirteen centuries old’ notes Peters before arguing that ‘we have re-entered the long river of struggles over elemental issues: God and blood’¹¹⁵. The assessment by DCDC is that although religious ideology will continue to be a generally ‘positive influence on behaviour, it may also be a source of tension and conflict’¹¹⁶. Burleigh contends that the internet has not only facilitated this, it has provided a combination of nationhood and morality for elements of Islam which has radicalised many¹¹⁷. The use of the internet in promoting ideological radicalisation is not limited to religious radicalisation. Lonsdale maintains that ‘certain non-state actors are defined and exist as strategic players almost entirely due to cyberspace’¹¹⁸.

6.3.2 *The Western Way of War confronts Adaptive Adversaries*

Like the last Labour government¹¹⁹, the present coalition government’s general assessment is that the UK does not face a major state, or existential, threat to its security. The 2010 *NSS* also stated that ‘although many future wars will be among the people, resembling the insurgency in Afghanistan (1.26), the next 20 years may see threats from a range of sources (1.33). At least two deductions can be taken from this: firstly, that a conventional attack by a major state is unlikely; and secondly, that future wars that may involve UK forces ‘will be among the people’¹²⁰, resembling the insurgency NATO forces have encountered in Afghanistan and derive from a range of sources. When Labour published its *SDR* in 1998 it also concluded that, ‘the emergence of democratic states throughout Eastern Europe and in Russia means that there is today no direct military threat to the United Kingdom or Western Europe. Nor do we foresee the re-emergence of such a threat’¹²¹. There is, however, no reference to potential insurgent threats or ‘wars among the people’, although there is a

reference to ‘low-intensity conflict’¹²². Within five years of the 1998 *SDR* being published the strategic and tactical environment confronting the UK and Western governments had changed. Why?

The concept of insurgency is not new¹²³. A classic historical example is the Jewish revolt led by Judas Maccabaeus against larger Seleucid armies¹²⁴. In the First World War, TE Lawrence understood that local tribal tactics confounded ‘ordinary’ tactics¹²⁵; his reflections are now quoted in both UK and US COIN doctrine¹²⁶. Perhaps one of the most widely read theories on how to defeat a larger conventional opponent is Mao Zedong’s *On Guerrilla Warfare*¹²⁷. Britain¹²⁸ and America¹²⁹ both have a long history of countering various forms of guerrilla warfare/insurgency. The question therefore that confronts the student is why did the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan appear to catch both militaries by surprise?

To consider the American military first, perhaps one of the fundamental reasons is that ‘the predominate view of the U.S. military as a whole is that its role is to “fight and win the nations wars,” it would seem unlikely that the military would embrace counterinsurgency’¹³⁰. Rather than being exceptions that prove the rule, according to Davidson, America has had two centuries of experience fighting small wars, countering insurgency and engagement in nation building¹³¹. It is World Wars I and II that are the exceptions in American military history¹³². A central reason why the American military failed to learn, maintains Davidson, from its own extensive history is that it struggled to become a ‘learning institution’¹³³ and quickly forgot many of the lessons learned from hard fought experience¹³⁴. Counterinsurgency was also incompatible with the way it wanted to fight war¹³⁵. Written in 1999 following an experiment on battlefield digitisation Leonhard observes that, ‘by the end of the experiment, we had retrained ourselves in our beloved attrition theory: Warfare was ultimately about killing the enemy with battlefield fires faster than they could kill us. The Army continues to insist that the best way to defeat an enemy in war is through long-range destructive fires’¹³⁶. One is

reminded of the US policy of Shock and Awe¹³⁷. Dower is blunt in his assessment, ‘American leaders drew no serious lessons about irregular warfare from Afghanistan – or from the earlier quagmire in Vietnam’¹³⁸.

After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the British Army ‘adopted a manoeuvrist approach to the conduct of all operations’¹³⁹. In a brief analysis of the 2006 Lebanon War, DCDC concluded that Hezbollah ‘exploited an Israeli inability to conduct combined arms air/land manoeuvre’¹⁴⁰. The British Army’s stated position is that ‘the ability to conduct what is called combined arms manoeuvre is, and always has been, at the heart of an army’s ability to fight effectively’¹⁴¹. One cannot help wondering why therefore, the British struggled against the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Is it a simple matter of learning how to conduct manoeuvrist operations better, or is it possible that a manoeuvrist approach to twenty-first century counterinsurgency has profound limitations? One potential limitation is that it suggests that a military victory is possible against a non-state actor in such an insurgency. The review of the 2006 Lebanon war by the Winograd Committee¹⁴², according to Gal, was mistaken in the ‘belief that a “clear military victory” had been possible’¹⁴³. In other words, even after the war the Israeli state was still thinking in a traditional format that a military victory is possible against a non-state actor such as Hezbollah.

Regarding the British and the insurgency in the south of Iraq, Ledwidge is uncompromising. Far from victory, his assessment is that by 2007, the Americans thought that the British had been ‘basically defeated in the South’¹⁴⁴. He asserts that of the 7,000 soldiers in Basra only 200 were available for patrolling the streets of Basra¹⁴⁵. This is hardly a manoeuvrist approach to counterinsurgency. Ledwidge is just as harsh in his assessment of the British approach to Afghanistan. He asserts that regarding the British approach to Helmand, ‘the counterinsurgency lessons of the old campaigns of imperial history had been ignored’¹⁴⁶. Like their American ally, British forces had struggled to become a ‘learning

institution¹⁴⁷. The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan perhaps illustrate the possibility that manoeuvre warfare has limitations¹⁴⁸, against a determined counterinsurgency.

6.3.3 *Hybrid¹⁴⁹ Threats.*

Prior to the attacks on 9-11, bin Laden was convinced that ‘superpower America would prove acutely vulnerable to non-state, low-intensity, asymmetrical warfare’¹⁵⁰. The insurgencies that emerged in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and then evolved in Afghanistan would appear to give credence to this evaluation. There is, however, nothing specifically new in bin Laden’s observation. Large conventional armies (for example, armies that are configured to fight against other similarly configured armies) have consistently encountered serious military problems when confronted by an asymmetrical opponent with the desire and the will to mount a determined opposition¹⁵¹. What the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, is how unprepared the America and UK militaries were to deal with an effective and determined insurgency.

The Cold War generated specific military threats¹⁵². Threats, unlike risk, can be calculated with a degree of accuracy¹⁵³ and a strategy developed to meet the ends and means at the disposal of one’s enemy to realise those ends¹⁵⁴. The result in the West, according to Black, was the ideology of a very specialised and very high-cost military¹⁵⁵. When used in a conventional role, it was devastatingly successful against the Iraqi Army in 1991. Indeed, the first Gulf War not only appeared to be a model for future war but was presented as a triumph of technology and the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs¹⁵⁶. UK defence planning then moved, however, from a Cold War threat-based approach to a capabilities-based approach in the 1998 SDR¹⁵⁷. In essence it retained a broad spectrum approach to conventional capabilities, albeit on a smaller post-Cold War scale. The peacekeeping operations in the

Balkans, the intervention in Sierra Leone and Gulf War 2¹⁵⁸ appeared to validate the UK's move to a manoeuvrist posture and capability.

In its analysis of the future character of conflict DCDC asserts that 'smarter adversaries have adapted to counteract the Western preferred way of warfare'¹⁵⁹. Non-state and state actors have studied the Western way of warfare in order to avoid its strengths and exploit what they consider weaknesses¹⁶⁰. China and Iran are examples of state actors who have developed asymmetric capabilities in response to the threat posed to them by the West¹⁶¹. Non-state actors, most without the resources of states like Iran and China¹⁶² nevertheless have a wide range of options at their disposal. Commentators like TX Hemmes are convinced that Fourth-Generation War (4GW) is an example of the type of warfare Western states now face and can expect to face in the future¹⁶³. Although the concept of 4GW has been heavily criticised¹⁶⁴, there is a broad consensus that Hemmes' analysis of modern insurgency and its characteristics is accurate¹⁶⁵. Hemmes contends that:

It uses all available networks – political, economic, social, military – to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency...4GW makes use of society's social networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous generations, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military forces...Fourth-generation wars are lengthy – measured in decades rather than years¹⁶⁶.

Freedman, who cites the quote above contends that, 'it is hard to think of any recent conflict, including those involving clashes of regular forces, which did not involve the use of social, economic and political instruments in conjunction with the military'¹⁶⁷. His observation is self-evidently true but that is to miss the central point¹⁶⁸. 4GW, at least to some extent, articulates some of the reasons why experienced professional armies and their respective governments, each with extensive political structures have struggled badly against the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Critics like Freedman do not appear to recognise that there are major distinctivenesses in a twenty-first century operational environment. From the emergence of the first web pages

in 1991, the World Wide Web today is accessed by billions of people and offers virtually instantaneous access to incredible amounts of information. Today, an attack on a potential enemy target, resulting in unintended civilian casualties, is more than an unfortunate reality of war; it can have potentially strategic consequences¹⁶⁹. The battle of the narratives is critical¹⁷⁰. Professional armies understand that an adversary may well conduct a successful operation¹⁷¹. However, with a global media and significant social and political transparency in Western states, an inconsequential military incident may be transformed in a strategic event¹⁷².

One subject that generates significant comment within the military, governments and media circles is ‘lawfare’¹⁷³. It can be maintained that this particular issue is an increasingly prominent characteristic of hybrid conflicts¹⁷⁴. For example, Burleigh makes the contentious claim that ‘certain legal firms simply migrated from defending IRA Provos to representing Islamist jihadists in their grim determination to thwart the police’¹⁷⁵. Admiral Boyce, a former Chief of the Defence Staff, has voiced concern that the armed forces are ‘under siege’, and ‘pushed in the direction in which an order could be seen as improper or legally unsound’¹⁷⁶. The idea, however, of the military being under ‘legal siege’ according to Ledwidge is nothing new¹⁷⁷. For example, soldiers serving in Northern Ireland during ‘the troubles’ were required to adhere to the rules of engagement contained in the ‘Yellow Card’. The concept of lawfare, argues Dunlap, is more complex than simply an enemy tactic¹⁷⁸. He contends that it is a legitimate and serious activity to ensure that the military adheres to the rule of law and democratic values¹⁷⁹. He does, however, concede that ‘such rules encourage the enemies to do exactly what we do not want them to do. That is, they surround themselves with innocents so as to immunize themselves almost entirely from attack’¹⁸⁰.

The article by Dunlap is nuanced and carefully argued. While it can be maintained that the basic tenants of his argument are sound, it is specifically related to the US legal system.

The UK government and military face a more complex legal environment than its US ally. A number of hugely significant cases have either been examined by the European Court of Human Rights or are in the process of going through the courts at the moment involving the British military and specifically the Army¹⁸¹. The operational impact of the rulings already given and the potential impact of the judgements yet to be decided are enormous, particularly in an operational environment of modern insurgency¹⁸². It is possible that the ability to conduct interventionist operations might in the future be framed, not by the foreign policy of the UK Government but by the European Court of Human Rights, in such a manner that generates a strategic and operational effect, one that may offer potential adversaries significant scope for exploitation (for example, that UK forces failing to apply the European Convention on Human Rights are consequently unlawful). This could be hugely damaging in any battle of competing narratives. Potential adversaries may not be as concerned to apply the principles of International Law or the European Convention on Human Rights¹⁸³.

6.3.4 *Intelligent Adversaries and the Spectre of Urban Warfare*

Hezbollah is an interesting case in this regard. Hezbollah is not a state but a state within a state, a political/religious movement and the largest real-estate owner in Lebanon¹⁸⁴. Although it had prepared for an anticipated but unspecified future war against Israel, it had not anticipated the severity of the Israeli response to the July 12 kidnappings¹⁸⁵. Embedded in Hezbollah's strategic planning was the concept of exploiting 'the perceived weakness of the IDF and to ensure that Hezbollah would survive Israeli assault for long enough to allow international pressure to restrict the IDF's actions¹⁸⁶. Hezbollah used high-technology asymmetric warfare¹⁸⁷ against a Western styled military force, while simultaneously relying on international pressure to restrict Israel in its military response. Today, much of Europe has turned its back on war and has culturally rejected it¹⁸⁸. The outcry of protest against the US

for its refusal to either condemn Israel's attack on Hezbollah and its delay in calling for a cease-fire¹⁸⁹ came as no great surprise. Indeed, it is entirely possible that such a vehement reaction by many in Europe to Israel's attack had not only been anticipated but factored into Hezbollah's strategic plan.

Despite 650-750 fighters killed in the war compared to Israel's 119 combat fatalities¹⁹⁰, Hezbollah was widely perceived to have won the war¹⁹¹. According to John Keegan this is because it has 'been widely misunderstood, largely because the anti-Israel bias in the international media'¹⁹². Simms offers this insightful observation, 'I found myself wondering whether Hezbollah might not have suffered a setback, but was too clever to admit it; and whether the Israelis might not have scored a long-term success, but were too narrow-minded to realise it'¹⁹³.

In his study of *How the Weak Win Wars*, Arreguín-Toft maintains that historically 'since 1816 strong actors have won more than twice as many asymmetric conflicts as weak actors'¹⁹⁴. This, however, has not been the trend in the later part of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. He suggests that there are four competing explanations for this: the nature of the actor; arms diffusion; interest asymmetry and his own, strategic interaction¹⁹⁵. The central thesis of Arreguín-Toft's concept of strategic interaction is succinct: 'when actors employ similar approaches (direct-direct or indirect-indirect) relative power explains the outcome: strong actors will win quickly and decisively. When actors employ opposite strategic approaches (direct – indirect or indirect – direct) weak actors are more likely to win, *even when everything we know about power says they shouldn't*' [emphasis original]¹⁹⁶. Cohen-Almagor and Haleva-Amir make the same essential point in their consideration of the Winograd Committee's work and the Israeli government's decision to go to war. They state that 'the way to respond to guerrilla warfare is by guerrilla warfare'¹⁹⁷. Arquilla and Ronfeldt's argument is similar; however, they maintain that it takes networks to fight

networks¹⁹⁸. The logic of Arreguín-Toft's concept of strategic interaction is simple: when states employ conventional tactics (direct) against a non-state actor employing an asymmetric insurgency (indirect) the non-state actor is more likely to succeed.

Arreguín-Toft recognises that strong actors lose wars for a variety of reasons, for example: against the Boer, the British approached the conflict 'piecemeal, ill-equipped, and ill trained'¹⁹⁹; the US had the right forces to defeat the NVA but 'it had systematically gutted its COIN capabilities'²⁰⁰; and the Russians 'were unsuited in every imaginable way to prosecute a COIN war in mountainous terrain'²⁰¹. His central thesis offers an imaginative framework to analyse why the weak win wars. It seems, at least to this student, intuitively correct that a conventional force structure configured to fight a similarly configured force will struggle against an adversary who deliberately avoids major direct battles but chooses to settle for a long process of harassment and attrition. This situation is made significantly more problematic if the adversary simultaneously seeks to prosecute a coordinated media operation to a receptive world press.

It is likely that in the future the British Army will get drawn into operations in the urban and littoral regions where the majority of the world's population live²⁰². Such an eventuality will present the government of the time with significant challenges. In her study on future war in cities, Hills contends that Western politicians and public will have difficulty in accommodating the realities of urban warfare²⁰³. The reason for this is very simple; the reality of war in an urban context has remained 'remarkably consistent across the decades'²⁰⁴. There are, she argues, three linked and dominant trends over the last 60 years: the tenacity defending forces usually display; the advantage that accrues to the side with least regard for civilians; and the increasing irrelevance of restraint in the face of heavy losses²⁰⁵. The dilemma that consequently confronts democracies, Hills maintains, is identifying the proper balance between protecting one's own troops and collateral damage²⁰⁶. 'War fighting', she

asserts, 'usually results in close combat in which a soldier's experience, training, cunning and motivation are more valuable than advanced technology or innovative doctrine..Such war makes the regression of industrialised societies to pre-industrial styles of war²⁰⁷. Any intelligent, future adversary will undoubtedly see both the attraction and the tactical advantage an urban environment offers against a conventionally configured high-tech manoeuvre army.

In the first section of this chapter, it was noted that the British Army is planning to rebalance itself as it is restructured following the direction contained in the 2010 *SDSR*. This process is called *Army 2020*. The Army, according to Phillips, is 'reverting back to the combined arms manoeuvre approach'²⁰⁸. Recently Exercise *Agile Warrior* was run as an experiment to determine if the Army was ready to meet the demands of operating in urban areas. The conclusion, according to Phillips is that, 'the Army is not ready, in both preparedness and capability terms, for the demands of future urban operations'²⁰⁹. The Army's planning is based on the emergence of 'hybrid threats' and is drawing heavily from the experience of Israel in its war with Hezbollah; it is therefore, planning for states and non-states to exploit all modes of war²¹⁰. Whether or not a manoeuvrist approach is correct is a matter of debate²¹¹. Hope makes the point that the promises of manoeuvre warfare support only preparations for short, decisive wars'²¹². He argues that in manoeuvre doctrine, 'manoeuvre becomes an end in itself'²¹³. The operation post-Gulf War II in Iraq and OPERATION HERRICK in Afghanistan were anything but short and decisive. One cannot help but think of the Stanley Baldwin's famous statement 'that the bomber would always get through'²¹⁴. This was an untested article of faith rather than a calculated military doctrine based upon careful analysis, as the events of the Second World War showed.

It is possible that the development of multirole brigades that draw from a range of assets might assist in intelligently managing complex, contested and cluttered operational environments. If this concept can be embedded within a manoeuvrist approach, it might offer additional

competences. Indeed, the integration of Reserves capabilities into its future force structure might be a foundational key in rebalancing the Army for future operations in complex urban settings. Ledwidge makes the point that Reservists have civilian skills essential to the running of any society²¹⁵. The interaction between the Army and other agencies is understood as a vital part of any operation among the people²¹⁶. It seems self-evident that someone whose normal 'day job' fulfils an essential part in the running of a normal society will have a capability that a professional infantry/armoured/artillery officer simply may not have. However, Davidson's assessment of interagency between the US military and non-military organisations is salutatory. She states that it is only 'PowerPoint deep' and reflects a lack of theoretical consensus²¹⁷. The same lack of theoretical consensus exists, according to Phillips, in the British Army regarding how to achieve interagency coherence²¹⁸. It is, however, worth noting that the same Generals and senior officers, who according to Ledwidge, displayed a tragic lack of strategic planning in Iraq and Afghanistan, are the very same senior officers and Generals undertaking the restructuring of the Army²¹⁹.

6.4 *Conclusions*

The New World Order envisaged following the end of the Cold War has not materialised in the fashion expected by many Western governments. The end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries have been marked by an increasing proliferation of 'wicked problems' that defy simplistic answers or approaches. This combined with the challenges of globalisation and a globalised media centric communication environment has generated significant issues for traditional constructs of the nation state. Climate change, the prospect of contested resources, discontented losers in a global economy all contribute to the context within which 'wicked problems' may have to be confronted. Added to this mix is the reality of increasing global urbanisation; there is little evidence that this trend will do anything other than increase over the next ten to twenty years. Stabilisation/Intervention operations in such

~~congested environments, consequently, may well be highly contested by groups or non-state actors opposed to outside Western involvement.~~

Ideological radicalisation may well continue to be a persistent feature of twenty-first century life. Ancient conflicts may continue to find violent expressions fuelled by pockets of radicals who because of the globalised communications environment will have a reach disproportionate to their profile. On-line communities of the disaffected will not only re-enforce their specific worldview/interpretative framework but may seek opportunities to manifest their perceived grievances using vehicles of otherwise legitimate concern resulting from demographic changes, climate changes and the impact of an increasingly globalised market. Such groups are likely to be adaptive, intelligent and may model their approach upon the experiences of other disaffected groups of non-state actors who were perceived to stand up to the liberal democracies of the West. It is highly likely that future adversaries will have studied the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan for insight on how to confront a Western style of warfare.

The 2006 Israel/Hezbollah War may become a paradigm for other non-state and some state actors for how to confront a Western way of warfare. Although the UK and the US may seek to draw some comfort from their assessment that Israel failed to conduct manoeuvre warfare, the strategic performance of the UK in Iraq and Afghanistan may offer some cause for concern. This implies no criticism of the tactical performance of British soldiers 'on the ground' against a determined adversary. Indeed, the courage and professionalism of the British soldier in Afghanistan stands in the best traditions of the Army. However, Exercise *Agile Warrior*, appeared to show that the British Army is not presently configured, ready, or equipped to confront the type of hybrid threat anticipated in a complex, congested urban operational environment against an intelligent adversary determined to avoid fighting British forces in a conventional manner. It is possible, however, that if the increase in the Reserve Force is achieved and fully integrated into the British Army as anticipated, that this might offer critical additional capabilities that will be essential in future 'wars among the people'. Whether or not a manoeuvrist approach to warfare

~~will prove to be a doctrinal triumph or another military article of faith in future ‘wars among the people’, is likely to be further tested in this century.~~

SDSR that ‘carefully crafted muddle’ provides little in terms of genuine strategic thought required to prepare the British Armed Forces to face the kind of hybrid, asymmetric threat an adaptive, intelligent state, non-state actor presents. In budgetary terms the 2010 SDSR has been a successful CSR. However, as a genuine attempt to rebalance UK forces in preparedness to face the likely nature of future conflict, history will judge of whether or not HMG’s decision to take capability holidays for a decade, while still conducting major land based operations, was a master-stroke of careful and balanced judgment. Or perhaps it will rank beside the long list of spectacularly disastrous political decisions that generated short-term savings at enormous medium and longer term costs.

¹ C Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004) p86.

² *Ibid.*, p87.

³ *Ibid.*, p89.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p90.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p99.

⁷ For a flavour of the discussion see, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/defence-and-security-blog/2012/sep/20/uk-afghanistan-us> (accessed 22 Feb 14); <http://www.examiner.co.uk/news/west-yorkshire-news/british-soldiers-fighting-dying-afghanistan-4956277> (accessed 22 Feb 14).

⁸ See <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23892783> (accessed 21 Apr 14).

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ CS Gray, *Strategy For Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History* (London: Cass, 2002) p271.

¹¹ HM Government, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy* (London: The Stationary Office, 2010).

¹² HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence Review* (London: The Stationary Officer, 2010).

¹³ C Yorke, ‘Politics, Process and Organization’, in *Evaluating the 2010 Strategy Review* (London: Chatham House, 2010) p5.

¹⁴ This specific point will be considered in 6.2.2.

¹⁵ P Cornish and A Dorman, ‘National Defence in the age of austerity’, in *IA* (2009) Vol 85, No 4, p734. In Labour’s NSS 2009, *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Update 2009 – Security for the Next Generation* (London: The Stationary Office, 2009) section 53, p14, the financial crisis and global downturn is specifically highlighted as the context of addressing international issues.

¹⁶ AM Dorman, ‘Making 2+2=5: The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review’, in *DSA*, (2011) Vol 27, No 1, p78. Ainsworth also promised a Green Paper, which was published in February 2010.

¹⁷ SDSR, p9, (1.2).

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- ¹⁸ Cited in Cornish and Dorman, 'National Defence' p736.
- ¹⁹ Dorman, 'Making 2+2=5', refers to this as the elephant in the room. He makes the point that previous reviews had taken place after conflicts rather than during them.
- ²⁰ <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-security/groups/national-security-council> (accessed 3 April 2013).
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² Ibid.
- ²³ HM Government, 'Fact Sheet 1: Our Approach to National Security', https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62483/Factsheet1-Our-Approach-National-Security-Strategy.pdf (accessed 4 Apr 2013).
- ²⁴ Although Gray 'wonders in what style the UK government believed it operated prior to its proud discovery of comprehensiveness'. CS Gray, 'Strategic Thoughts for Defence Planners' in *Survival* (2010) Vol 52, No 3, p176.
- ²⁵ HM Government, *NSS*, 0.16.
- ²⁶ There is an explicit undertaking to review the full NSRA every two years (3.11). The annual report to Parliament on the NSS and SDSR review Dec2012 can be found at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/83774/121126-WMS-on-Annual-Report-to-Parliament.pdf (accessed 4 Apr 13). There is no substantive change to position taken in 2010.
- ²⁷ HM Government, *SDSR*, 1.5.
- ²⁸ National security tasks and planning guidelines (*SDSR*, p11-12).
- ²⁹ A fuller critique of the NSC, NSA, NSS and SDSR will be contained in section 6.2.2.
- ³⁰ HM Government, *SDSR*, p16.
- ³¹ These are permanent operations essential to our security or to support key British interests around the world.
- ³² These are short-term, high-impact military deployments, such as our deployment to Sierra Leone in 2000.
- ³³ These are longer-term mainly land-based operations to stabilise and resolve conflict situations primarily in support of reconstruction and development and normally in partnership with others, such as our continuing contribution to coalition operations in Afghanistan.
- ³⁴ These last less than six months, typically requiring a force to be deployed and then withdrawn without replacement. Examples might include evacuation of UK citizens (as in Lebanon in 2006) or a counter-terrorist strike operation.
- ³⁵ These last for more than six months and normally require units to carry out a tour of duty and then be replaced by other similar units.
- ³⁶ General P Wall, 'The Ethical and Legal Challenges of Command', in D Whetham (ed.), *Ethics, Law and Military Operations* (London: Palgrave, 2011) p221.
- ³⁷ This includes forces already deployed in Afghanistan or in the South Atlantic, including the nuclear deterrent.
- ³⁸ This force is designed to allow a rapid reaction to a crisis. It is expected that it will be a balanced range of land, air and maritime capabilities.
- ³⁹ This includes those recently returned from operations.
- ⁴⁰ The SDSR sets out in section A 'Future Force' the key resources for the Naval, Land and Air Forces. However, because the focus of this thesis is the *Nature of the British Soldier*, only the Land component will be highlighted.
- ⁴¹ The UK no longer has sufficient Land Forces to generate a corps.
- ⁴² Rationalise is widely understood to mean cut.
- ⁴³ See http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/Army2020_brochure.pdf (accessed 5 Apr 2013).
- ⁴⁴ *Army 2020* p1
- ⁴⁵ R Dover and M Phythian, 'Lost Over Libya: The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review – An Obituary', in *DS* (Sept2011) Vol 11, No 3, p420.
- ⁴⁶ See, N Ritchie, 'Rethinking security: a critical analysis of the Strategic Defence Review', in *IA* (2011) Vol 87, No 2, p355-376.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid., p355. For him, the key question should have been rather, whether British security would be better served having a 'human-centric' rather than a 'state-centric' foundation (p356).
- ⁴⁸ T Taylor, 'The Limited capacity of management to rescue UK defence policy: a review and a word of caution', in *IA*, (2012) Vol 88, No 2, p234.
- ⁴⁹ There are significant differences in terms of force numbers between the two Defence Reviews. For example, the 1998 SDR required the Army to have 3 armoured brigades, 3 mechanised brigades and 1 airmobile brigade. However, the language used to describe what each review was intending to achieve is virtually identical.
- ⁵⁰ HM Government, *The Strategic Defence Review* (London: The Stationary Office, 1998) (no.21).
- ⁵¹ Foreign Secretary William Hague, 'International security in a networked world', delivered at Georgetown University, Washington DC, 17 Nov, 2010. The full text can be downloaded from

<http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/129769-international-security-in-a-network-world-british-foreign-secretary-william-hague> (accessed 8 April 13).

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ P Cornish, 'Indecision by Design', in *Evaluating the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review* (Chatham House, 2010) p4.

⁵⁴ Dover and Phythian, 'Lost Over Libya', p437.

⁵⁵ This letter was leaked to the Daily Telegraph. See, T Harding, 'Liam Fox: Defence Cuts Will Have Grave Consequences', *Daily Telegraph* (28 Sept 10). See, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8031383/Liam-Fox-defence-cuts-will-have-grave-consequences.html> (accessed 8 April 2013).

⁵⁶ CS Gray, 'Strategic Thoughts for Defence Planners' p175.

⁵⁷ G Prins, 'The British Way of Strategy-Making: Vital Lessons For Our Times', *RUSI*, Occasional Paper, Oct 2012, p1-25.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p2.

⁵⁹ Lord Chatfield was First Sea Lord and chairman of the Chiefs of Staff sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 1933-1938.

⁶⁰ Cited in Prins, 'The British Way of Strategy-Making' p10.

⁶¹ Ibid., p7.

⁶² This was the UK operational name for British military intervention.

⁶³ Taylor, 'The Limited capacity of management to rescue UK defence policy', p223.

⁶⁴ HM Government, *SDSR*, p23.

⁶⁵ Dover and Phythian, 'Lost Over Libya', p436. In his evidence to the Defence select committee, CJA Cope, Political Editor, *Warship World Magazine*, stated that, 'It does not take a mathematical genius to realise that operating GR9s from a carrier lying just outside Libyan territorial waters has simply got to be substantially cheaper than flying Tornados and Typhoons from their base in Italy the 600 or so nautical miles to Libya and then back again, with VC10/ Tristar refueling en route—not to mention the massive logistical support train by air and overland' (see <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/950/950vw04.htm> accessed 9 Apr 13). Cope observed that based on the MOD's own figures the annual cost of keeping the Ark Royal was £35 million. This he suggested was significantly cheaper than the land based option from Italy. Although a state-of-the-art fighter, there were serious concerns that the use of Typhoon had as much of a political role in the campaign as it did a tactical one, see <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8448774/Libya-RAF-Typhoon-fighters-carry-out-first-ever-attack.html> (accessed 9 Apr 13).

⁶⁶ Dover and Phythian, 'Lost Over Libya', p421.

⁶⁷ The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy - Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 761, 3 August 2011. For the full text see, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/761/76106.htm#a12> (accessed 1 Apr 13).

⁶⁸ As cited in D Gardner, *future babble: Why Expert Predictions Fail and Why We Believe Them Anyway* (London: Virgin, 2010) p13.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p16.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid., p25.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ For a copy of the full text see, <http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/bush-war.htm> (accessed 12 Apr 13). In it he contends that:

This is an historic moment. We have in this past year made great progress in ending the long era of conflict and cold war. We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order -- a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations. When we are successful -- and we will be -- we have a real chance at this new world order, an order in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the U.N.'s founders.

⁷⁴ See D Braddon *Exploding the Myth? The Peace Dividend, Regions and Market Adjustment* (Bristol: University of the West of England, 2000). Braddon maintains that with few notable exceptions, the expected peace dividend after the end of the Cold War failed to materialise (p182).

⁷⁵ See, DCDC, *Future Character of Conflict* (MOD UK, 2010) p4; DCDC, *Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040* (MOD UK, 2010) p15;

⁷⁶ DCDS, *Joint Concept Note 2/12: Future Land Operating Concept* (MOD UK, 2012) p2.

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- ⁷⁷ See HWJ Rittel and MM Webber, 'Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning' in *Policy Science* (1973) Vol 4, p155-169 and C Coker, *War in an age of risk* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009) p128-129.
- ⁷⁸ DCDC, *Future Land Operating Concept*, p2.
- ⁷⁹ Coker, *War in an age of risk*, p156.
- ⁸⁰ P Bobbitt, *Terror and Consent: The Wars For The Twenty-First Century* (London: Penguin, 2008) p11.
- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p44-51.
- ⁸² DCDC, *Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040* (MOD UK, 2010) p20.
- ⁸³ D Betz and T Stevens, *Cyberspace and the State: Toward a Strategy for Cyber-Power* (London: Routledge, 2011) p13.
- ⁸⁴ DCDC, *Global Strategic Trends*, p20.
- ⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p22.
- ⁸⁶ The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development being an early example of international concern.
- ⁸⁷ Coker, *War in an age of risk*, p155.
- ⁸⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁹ See, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php (accessed 12 Apr 13).
- ⁹⁰ Thomas Schelling, an economist and professor of foreign affairs, has some interesting views on this. See Harfords' blog - <http://timharford.com/2005/12/lunch-with-the-ft-thomas-schelling-and-the-game-of-life/> (accessed 21 Apr 14).
- ⁹¹ This claim is made in the Guardian article, 'Has the Kyoto protocol made any difference to global omissions?' (26 Nov 12), see <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/blog/2012/nov/26/kyoto-protocol-carbon-emissions> (accessed 12 Apr 13).
- ⁹² DCDC, *Global Strategic Trends*, p21.
- ⁹³ MT Klare, *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* (New York: Henry Holt, 2001) p15.
- ⁹⁴ See <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-15391515> (accessed 12 Apr 13).
- ⁹⁵ See <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange2/WorldPop2300final.pdf> p4 (accessed 12 Apr 13).
- ⁹⁶ Klare, *Resource Wars*, p18. He cites a recent study that 'the earth lost nearly one-third of its available natural wealth between 1970 and 1995 as a result of human activity' (p18).
- ⁹⁷ JA Vasquez and MT Henehan, *Territory, War and Peace* (London & New York: Routledge, 2011) p13. In their detailed analysis, Vasquez and Henehan suggest two propositions, 'once boundaries are mutually accepted, the probability of war between neighbours becomes unlikely; (6) the frequency of war in a historical system can vary depending upon whether it has established widely accepted and precise norms governing territorial disputes and transfers' (p12).
- ⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p204. This is premised on the idea that when states become 'liberal trading states (as opposed to seeking self-sufficient empires) they are considerably less prone' to go to war (p200).
- ⁹⁹ Klare, *Resource Wars*, p23.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰¹ DCDC, *Future Character of Conflict*, p5.
- ¹⁰² A Hills, *Future War in Cities: Rethinking A Liberal Dilemma* (London: Frank Cass, 2004) p4.
- ¹⁰³ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: *World Urbanization Prospects, the 2011 Revision* (New York, 2012). See http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Analytical-Figures/Fig_1.htm (accessed 12 Apr 13).
- ¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁵ DCDC, *Future Land Operating Concept*, p2-2.
- ¹⁰⁶ Hills, *Future War in Cities*, p27.
- ¹⁰⁷ DCDC, *Global Strategic Trends*, p88.
- ¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p89.
- ¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*
- ¹¹⁰ For an excellent treatment of this see, M Burleigh, *Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism* (London: Harper, 2008).
- ¹¹¹ The spread of Reformation ideas would have been greatly hindered without the printed word and the ability to print large numbers of tracts and books. Young and Jesser maintain that 'until the emergence of the printing press, public opinion was governed by the teachings of the Church or the demands of the State' P Young & P Jesser, *The Media and the Military* (London: MacMillan, 1997) p20.
- ¹¹² For example, railways became a fast method of carrying newspapers to different parts of a country; electric telegraph and wireless communication then delivered even faster methods of delivering news; until radio and then TV offered a capacity that eclipsed anything before it in terms of reach and speed.

¹¹³ C Coker, *Warrior Geeks: How 21st Century Technology in Changing the Way We Fight and Think About War* (London: Hurst, 2013) uses the illustration of ‘a secretary who works on a computer keyboard, or a games player who spends hours a week fighting the *World of Warcraft*. All have “terminal identities”’ (p209).

¹¹⁴ The scale of pornography available on the internet and its easy accessibility is but one example.

¹¹⁵ R Peters, *Wars of Blood and Faith: The Conflicts That Will Shape the Twenty-First Century* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2009) p5. Peter’s central point throughout his book is that the most basic of human issues will shape many of the conflicts of the twenty-first century.

¹¹⁶ DCDC, *Global Strategic Trends*, p133.

¹¹⁷ Burleigh, *Blood and Rage*, p470. He states that, ‘the tens of thousands of Islamist sites represent the electronic birth of a nation, because they provide the Islamist equivalent of anthems, flags, patriotic poetry, heroes, martyrs, and bloodcurdling injunctions’.

¹¹⁸ DJ Lonsdale, *The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future* (London & New York: Frank Cass, 2004) p188. He contends that ‘often these groupings can only function effectively within the realms of the infosphere’ (p188).

¹¹⁹ HM Government, *NSS*, 2009.

¹²⁰ This is one of the main contentions of R Smith in his highly influential book, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Vintage, 2008). Although largely drawn from his experiences as a UN commander in Bosnia, the central point of ‘war among the people’ is one that has gained traction as a phrase among students at Staff College. However, the extent to which this is embedded within UK counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine is debatable. See *Army Field Manual: Countering Insurgency*, Vol 1 Part 10 (Jan 2010). UK COIN is based upon three inter-related tasks, Shape – Secure – Develop, and within each task are a number of contributory tasks (see 4.3- 4-18). However, although kinetic operations may well be inevitable in countering an insurgency, protecting ‘the people’ among whom the war is fought, rather than simply killing insurgents, may yield greater benefits (see F Ledwidge, *Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan* (New haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011) p188-191.

¹²¹ HM Government, *The Strategic Defence Review* (London: HM Stationary Office, 1998) chapter 1, para 3.

¹²² *Ibid.*, ‘Future Military Capabilities’ para 14.

¹²³ See, *Field Manual: Countering Insurgency*, chapter 2 ‘Insurgency’.

¹²⁴ See 1 and 2 Maccabees.

¹²⁵ TE Lawrence, 27 Articles, *The Arab Bulletin*, (20 Aug 1917) see

http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_27_Articles_of_T.E._Lawrence (accessed 15 Apr 13). The quote is from the fifteenth of Lawrence articles. The ordinary tactics would refer to standard British Army tactics.

¹²⁶ Lawrence is quoted in *Field Manual: Countering Insurgency*, p1-8 and the US Army’s FM3-24, p1-3 (there are numerous references to him throughout this manual).

¹²⁷ Mao Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (1937) see,

<http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/FMFRP%2012-18%20%20Mao%20Tse-tung%20on%20Guerrilla%20Warfare.pdf> (accessed 15 Apr 13). The interesting aspect of this is that this translation is by a retired US Marine Brigadier, published in 1961 and made available to the US Marine Corps in 1989 to offer the reader insight into this type of warfare.

¹²⁸ See *Field Manual: Countering Insurgency* ‘Case study 1: The Development of Doctrine of Countering Insurgency’ which outlines the various pamphlets and manuals from Callwell’s *Small Wars* (1906) through *Counter Insurgency Operations* (2001) to the 2009 *Field Manual: Countering Insurgency*.

¹²⁹ For a detailed development of American doctrine see J Davidson, *Lifting the Fog of Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War* (Michigan: Michigan University Press, 2011) chapter 2, ‘Two Centuries of Small Wars and nation Building’ p27-66.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p13.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, see chapter 2. On p36 she notes that irregular warfare, as these operations were also known as, was ‘inappropriate for professional soldier’.

¹³² See RM Cassidy, ‘Back to the street without joy: counterinsurgency lessons from Vietnam and other small wars’, *Parameters* (Summer 2004) Vol 34, p75, where he refers to ‘big wars against other big powers’.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p65.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p45.

¹³⁵ See RR Leonhard, ‘A Culture of Velocity’, in *Digital War: A View From the Front Lines*, ed., RL Bateman (New York: iBooks, 1999) p137.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ For an article that looks at the transformation from ‘Shock and Awe’ to counterinsurgency see, KI Sepp, ‘From ‘Shock and Awe’ to ‘Hearts and Minds’: the fall and rise of US counterinsurgency capability in Iraq’ in

Third World Quarterly (2007), Vol 28, No 2, p217-230. The story of the Iraqi civilian killed by a '50 cal' round a few metres from his home illustrates the point starkly (p220).

¹³⁸ JW Dower, *Cultures of War* (New York & London: Norton, 2010) p439. He goes on to state that 'faith in brute force goes far to explain the failures of intelligence and imagination that were exposed on September 11 and in the war of choice against Iraq. At the same time any reasoned criticism of this orthodoxy was dismissed as "subversion," "defeatism" – or, put in secular theology, heresy' (p439).

¹³⁹ *Field Manual: Countering Insurgency*, case study 1-4.

¹⁴⁰ DCDC, *Future Character of Conflict*, p19.

¹⁴¹ DCDC, *Future Land Operating Concept*, p2-9.

¹⁴² For a review of this see, R Cohen-Almagor and S Haleva-Amir, 'The Israel-Hezbollah War and the Winograd Commission', *Journal of Parliamentary and Political Law* downloaded from, http://www.hull.ac.uk/rca/docs/articles/WinoReport_2ndLebanonWar.pdf (accessed 19 Apr 13). ¹⁴³ As cited in Coker, *War as Risk*, p121.

¹⁴⁴ Ledwidge, *Losing Small Wars*, p46.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p39. He contends that the majority were engaged in securing their own bases. Ledwidge is not critical of the performance of British soldiers in this regard, rather, the force ratio in relation to the size of the job British troops were asked to perform were utterly inappropriate (see chapter 5 p131-2).

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p95.

¹⁴⁷ *Field Manual: Countering Insurgency*, refers to 'periods of doctrinal stagnation' (case study 1-4).

¹⁴⁸ That is if manoeuvre warfare is restricted to physical manoeuvre warfare, rather than understanding it as a concept that can translate into a complex social context.

¹⁴⁹ The *Field Manual: Countering Insurgency* maintains that 'we must resist the compartmentalisation or categorise conflict as, for example, 'conventional' or 'hybrid'. However, the notion of hybrid threats is useful because it forces consideration of the full range of conflict challenges' (1-4). The use of hybrid in this section will refer to a multivariate approach to the conduct of warfare, whether that is hard military power or soft power, such as the effective use of narrative and interaction with the media for tactical, operational or strategic effect.

¹⁵⁰ Dower, *Cultures of War*, p438.

¹⁵¹ J Black, *War: Past, Present & Future* (Thrupp: Sutton, 2000) p253-256.

¹⁵² MV Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) p2.

¹⁵³ For example, if you know your adversary has 400 main battle tanks, and are aware of their capabilities and weaknesses, then a plan can be formulised to deal with this specific threat.

¹⁵⁴ Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War*, p3.

¹⁵⁵ Black, *War: Past, Present & Future*, p251.

¹⁵⁶ J Black, *War in the New Century* (London & New York: Continuum, 2001) p91.

¹⁵⁷ Dorman, 'Making 2+2=5', p80.

¹⁵⁸ This is a reference to the conventional, war fighting phase and not the emergence of an insurgency in Basra and the south.

¹⁵⁹ DCDC, *Future Character of Conflict*, p7.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p18.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p17. For example, Iran has developed the 'combined use of submarines, mines, shore batteries, missiles and a wide variety of heavily armed small craft, all of which have been integrated so as to neutralise the more capable warships of the Western navies' (p17). 'China has followed a different course and has moved away from the concept of massed armies' (p17). 'In order to meet contemporary threats it has developed a major cyber-warfare capability and an anti-satellite programme' (p17).

¹⁶² Although Iran is believed to have equipped, trained and financed, amongst others, Hezbollah (DCDC, *Future Character of Conflict* p17).

¹⁶³ TX Hemmes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St Paul, MN: Zenith, 2004). See chapter 14, 'The Characteristics of Fourth-Generation War' p207-223.

¹⁶⁴ For example, see M Evans, 'Elegant irrelevance revisited' in T Terriff, A Karp and Regina Karp (eds) *Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict: Debating fourth-generation warfare* (London & New York: Routledge, 2008) p67-74. Evans' main argument is that Hemmes has not paid rigorous enough attention to strategic analysis and historical chronology (p68). This results, according to Evans, in strategic generalisation, poor military history and flawed conceptual analysis (p71).

¹⁶⁵ See M van Creveld, 'It will continue to spread', in T Terriff, A Karp and Regina Karp (eds) *Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict: Debating fourth-generation warfare* (London & New York: Routledge, 2008) p54-57. Van Creveld says that 'Hemmes is to be congratulated on his effort to open our eyes to the nature of the problem much the world is facing. It is, however, not enough'... 'Apart from telling us that the

future is flexibility,” he does not provide a detailed case study that might tell us how 4GW can be defeated’ (p56).

¹⁶⁶ Hemmes, *The Sling and the Stone*, p208.

¹⁶⁷ L Freedman, ‘War evolves into the fourth generation: A comment on Thomas X. Hammes’, *CSP* (2005) Vol 26, No 2, p257.

¹⁶⁸ Like most 4GW critics Freedman zeroes in on Hemmes’ ‘selective history and poor theory’ (p262). However, it is difficult to think of any argument that is so comprehensive that it is immune the critique of being selective.

¹⁶⁹ For example, a NATO air strike on two petrol tankers after it had been hijacked by insurgents resulted in not only a number of insurgents being killed, a large number of civilians were also killed as a result of the airstrike (See <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6137938/Nato-air-strike-in-Afghanistan-kills-scores-of-Taliban-militants-and-civilians.html> (accessed, Aug 11).

¹⁷⁰ DCDC, *Future Character of Conflict*, p6.

¹⁷¹ Success for an insurgent may involve little more than attempting an attack, regardless if it has little long term effect.

¹⁷² DCDC, *Future Character of Conflict*, p12.

¹⁷³ See CJ Dunlap, ‘Lawfare Today: A perspective’, in *Yale Journal of International Affairs* (2008) p146. Dunlap was at the time of writing this article the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the US Air Force.

¹⁷⁴ International Law developed extensively following the end of WWII. This development was intended to regulate the conduct of warfare between states and is essentially a body of law between states. For a comprehensive treatment of international law and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan see, A Conte, *Security in the 21st Century: The United nations, Afghanistan and Iraq* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).

¹⁷⁵ Burleigh, *Blood and Rage*, p453.

¹⁷⁶ Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, quoted in ‘Lawyers besiege army over Iraq abuse’, *Guardian*, 25 July 2005.

¹⁷⁷ Ledwidge, *Losing Small Wars*, p175.

¹⁷⁸ Dunlap, ‘Lawfare Today’ p148.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., In the Guardian article ‘Lawyers besiege army over Iraq abuse’, it notes that ‘Shiner, the human rights lawyer of the year, rejected accusations he was an ‘ambulance-chasing lawyer’ out to make money. He said: ‘It’s a matter of public record that my law firm has sunk tens of thousands of pounds into these cases. We pursue [these cases] because we think it reflects badly on all of us if our armed forces can kill and torture civilians with impunity’.

¹⁸⁰ Dunlap, ‘Lawfare Today’ p149.

¹⁸¹ For example, see the case of, Al-Skeini and others v. the United Kingdom (for a summary see, <http://sim.law.uu.nl/sim/caselaw/Hof.nsf/2422ec00f1ace923c1256681002b47f1/633ad799ef9f29a0c12578c4002db6c9?OpenDocument> (accessed 17 Apr 13).

For the UK government’s official response to the ECHR rulings see:

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/162261/responding-human-rights-judgments.pdf.pdf (accessed 17 Apr 13).

¹⁸² In the case of Al-Skeini v The UK, one of the implications of this ruling is that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) can apply extra-territorially. This might have a dramatic impact upon article 2 ‘The Right to Life’. For a discussion on this see, D Korff, *The Right to Life: A Guide to the implementation of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights* (downloaded from: http://book.coe.int/sysmodules/RBS_fichier/admin/download.php?fileid=3015 (accessed 17 Apr 13).

¹⁸³ DCDC, *Future Character of Conflict*, p9.

¹⁸⁴ Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, p121.

¹⁸⁵ S Biddle and JA Friedman, ‘The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defence Policy’ (2008) downloaded from <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/> (accessed 5 Dec 10).

¹⁸⁶ DCDC, *Future Character of Conflict*, p19. Biddle and Friedman noted that Hezbollah had a lack of sizeable reserves and focused its heaviest concentration of fighters in prepared defensive positions, resembling NATO’s Cold War strategy of delaying a Soviet conventional attack (‘The 2006 Lebanon Campaign’ p74).

¹⁸⁷ For a detailed account of the level of sophisticated technology Hezbollah deployed and used against Israel, including, unmanned aerial vehicles, anti-armour systems, anti-aircraft systems, low signature, asymmetric stealth and technological surprise see, AH Cordesman, G Sullivan and WD Sullivan, *Lessons of 2006 Israeli – Hezbollah War* (Washington: CSIS, 2007) p99-117.

¹⁸⁸ CS Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History* (London & New York: Routledge, 2007) p277. He contends that Europe’s historical experience of war has resulted in this cultural rejection of war (p277).

¹⁸⁹ E McAskill, 'Limited cast spells doom for peace process', *Guardian* 26 July 2006, downloaded from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jul/26/syria.israel3> (accessed 17 Apr 13). The strap line begins with, 'The US has won more time for Israel to continue its military offensive'.

¹⁹⁰ Biddle and Friedman, 'The 2006 Lebanon Campaign', p33.

¹⁹¹ For example, see C Harman, 'Hezbollah and the war Israel lost', in *International Socialism* (11 Oct 06) downloaded from <http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=243> (accessed 18 Apr 13). Harman's view of the conflict is unsophisticated and shows little understanding of the nature of the actual conflict, or the high-tech use of advanced weaponry that Hezbollah deployed and used. The principle would appear to be that if a non-state actors survives against a Western state it has prevailed.

¹⁹² John Keegan, 'Why Israel will go to war again – soon', *The Daily Telegraph*, 3 Nov 2006, downloaded from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3633843/Why-Israel-will-go-to-war-again-soon.html> (accessed 19 Apr 06). He rejects that it was any kind of defeat. Rather he contends that, 'It was certainly an Israeli setback, but the idea that the IDF had suddenly lost its historic superiority over its Arab enemies and that they had acquired military qualities that had hitherto eluded them was quite false. Hizbollah suffered heavy losses in the fighting, perhaps as many as 1,000 killed out of its strength of up to 5,000 and it is only just now recovering. What allowed Hizbollah to appear successful was its occupation of the bunker-and-tunnel system that it had constructed since June 2000, when the IDF gave up its presence in south Lebanon, which it had occupied since 1982'.

¹⁹³ B Simms, 'Hezbollah have suffered a setback' *Social Affairs Unit*, 24 Aug 2006 downloaded from <http://www.socialaffairsunit.org.uk/blog/archives/001080.php> (accessed 19 Apr 13).

¹⁹⁴ I Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005) p3. In the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, the non-state actor was perceived to be the 'weak' actor in this instance.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p6. The four competing concepts are then tested throughout the remainder of the book.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p18.

¹⁹⁷ Cohen-Almagor and Haleva-Amir, 'The Israel-Hezbollah War' p17.

¹⁹⁸ J Arquila and D Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and the Military* (downloaded from <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/external/congress/terrorism/phase1/netwars.pdf> (accessed 8 May 13). They conclude that, 'the West must start to build its own networks and must learn to swarm the enemy, in order to keep it on the run or pinned down until it can be destroyed'.

¹⁹⁹ Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*, p220.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p221.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

²⁰² DCDC, *Future Land Operating Concept*, p2-2.

²⁰³ Hills, *Future War in Cities*, p164.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p142.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p144.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p245.

²⁰⁸ M Phillips, *Exercise Agile Warrior and the Future Development of UK Land Forces* (London: RUSI Occasional paper May 2011) p15.

²⁰⁹ M Phillips, *Army 2020: Roles, Capabilities and People* (London: RUSI, Occasional paper June 2012) p15.

²¹⁰ Phillips, *Exercise Agile Warrior*, p16.

²¹¹ See, I Hope, 'Misunderstanding Mars and Minerva: The Canadian Army's failure to define an Operational Doctrine', in *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* (2002) Vol 4, No 4, p16-35.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p17.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p18.

²¹⁴ Baldwin made this speech on 10 November 1932. It is likely that Baldwin's comments were based upon the position of Lord Trenchard. During the inter-war period Lord Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff, developed the philosophy underpinning the strategy for the use air power in any future conflict. In a memo entitled 'The Object of an Air Force' Trenchard argued that not only would the bomber always get through to its objective, the targets would not always be military and that some objectives would result in civilian casualties (cited in D Saward, 'Bomber' Harris: *The Authorised Biography* (London: Cassell, 1984) p33-34). This became known as the Trenchard doctrine (H Boog, 'Harris - A German View', in *Despatch on War Operations*, ed. S Cox (London: Frank Cass, 1995) pxi). A similar, though more blunt, approach was taken by the Italian air general and strategist Giulio Douhet, who had won particular notoriety for his open advocacy of mass terror-bombing to break the moral of civilian populations (G Wright, *The Ordeal of Total War 1939-1945* (New York: Evanston, Harper, 1968) p174). Although Douhet was more direct in his language, the Trenchard doctrine amounted in reality to much the same thing.

²¹⁵ Ledwidge, *Losing Small Wars*, p232.

²¹⁶ This point is made repeatedly in each of the publications produced by DCDC and cited in this chapter.

²¹⁷ Davidson, *Lifting the Fog of Peace*, p187.

²¹⁸ Phillips, *Exercise Agile Warrior*, p4. He explains that, 'at the moment there is inadequate awareness about how defence should or can engage with other departments and agencies to meet its requirements for the adequate understanding of an area of operation'.

²¹⁹ Ledwidge, *Losing Small Wars*, chapter 5.

Chapter 7

Future Technology

7.1 Introduction

Today, much of Europe has turned its back on war and has culturally rejected it¹. While this may not necessarily be the case for the UK, the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan has created a sense of war-weariness in the nation². Evidence of this may be detected in the discussion over potential military action against the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. There was obvious reluctance in London, Paris and Washington to see Western ‘boots on the ground’³ and it was public knowledge that the main option under consideration was the use of missile strikes⁴. Nevertheless, the UK Government's motion to support military intervention in Syria was defeated by 285 to 272 votes in the House of Commons in August 2013⁵. In his response the Prime Minister said, ‘it is very clear tonight that, while the House has not passed a motion, the British Parliament, reflecting the views of the British people, does not want to see British military action. I get that, and the Government will act accordingly’⁶. In his response the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Ed Miliband said, ‘that the House of Commons had spoken “for the people of Britain”... ‘People are deeply concerned about the chemical weapons attacks in Syria, but they want us to learn the lessons of Iraq’⁷. Although the UK government’s motion was defeated in regard to military action in Syria, stand-off, remote and robotic weapons offer the potential to engage in military action remotely, whenever the political climate is permissive.

This chapter will explore the concept of the soldier, who, operating a weapons system remotely, functions as a battlefield technician or weapons platform. The spectrum articulated in the thesis question was also intended to represent the following metaphor:

Warrior = ‘at close hand’ and experiences ‘hand-to-hand combat’.
Battlefield Tech = ‘at a distance’ and ‘dislocated experience of the battlefield’.

As set out in chapter 1 the use of either concept (warrior and weapons platform) is solely to establish the left and right of arc of the imagined spectrum. This thesis does not seek to suggest or maintain that there has been, or is, some 'progression' from the notion of the warrior to the concept of the weapons platform.

The focus of this chapter will be on the 'at a distance and dislocated experience of the battlefield' as encountered by the soldier when functioning as a battlefield technician/ weapons system. This will be achieved by a consideration of the weapons systems that soldiers are either using or trialling and the ethical, philosophical and practical implications associated with using robotic weapon technology in combat. It is in this regard that role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), particularly in regard to some of the legal concerns over their use in targeted or extra juridical killings will be considered. Although UAVs are normally controlled by airmen rather than soldiers, they are used in support of land based operations and many of the issues surrounding their use are likely to be replicated if or when remote operated land based weapons systems are used by ground troops against enemy forces.

7.2 Future Technology: A Context

The ability to kill one's enemy at a distance has been and continues to be an attractive proposition for decision makers or leaders of state and non-state actors. 'From the javelin and the arrow' notes Fuller 'to the super-fortress and the rocket bomb, the very power to destroy, first slowly and then at terrific speed, has intoxicated man⁸. Technology has caused the conduct of war to change and change again⁹. As the Industrial Revolution changed the conduct of war¹⁰, and the First World War accelerated the development of automotive technology, Singer is convinced that 'the war on terror' will accelerate the development of robotic technology¹¹.

The First and Second World Wars left a deep and indelible mark upon those countries who felt its full force. Many Western countries after the end of the Second World War simply turned their backs on war, culturally rejecting it¹². Indeed, the growth and development of International Law, the 4th Geneva Convention, the creation of the United Nations and the European Convention on Human Rights are all mechanisms designed to limit war and define its parameters morally and legally. Despite this, war and warfare have remained a consistent feature of life since the end of World War 2. One can therefore understand the American desire to replace men with machines; this has been an official policy, according to CH Gray, ‘since World War II’¹³. Coker maintains that the West has instrumentalised war, viewing it as purely utilitarian, while the existential dimension that made war a human activity has been eroded¹⁴. The irony of course, is that while the West attempts to make war more humane through its use of technology, war/warfare in a non-western setting has become increasingly less humane¹⁵.

Vietnam was the first conflict to witness the use of cybernetic warfare¹⁶; it was also a conflict that saw the application of a managerial/bureaucratic systems approach to warfare¹⁷. The result as Bousquet states was a dramatic failure¹⁸. ‘Weapon for weapon the United States should have won the war. But wars are not fought by weapons’, argues G and M Friedman¹⁹. Neither are wars won by the simple application of military and industrial processes. A seminal work on this in relation to the Vietnam War is James Gibson’s *The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam*²⁰. Gibson argues that ‘technowar’ essentially focused upon maximising the enemy’s body count, regardless of means. He maintains that ‘by adopting microeconomics, game theory, systems analysis, and other managerial techniques’, the Kennedy administration advanced ‘limited’ war to greater specificity, making it seem more controllable, manageable, and therefore more desirable as foreign policy²¹. The context to the

adoption of these various managerial techniques, according to the Friedmans, is the rise of what they refer to as the scientist strategist²².

‘Modern warfare’, they contend, ‘has always borrowed from the technology of the modern scientist in such fields as explosives, civil engineering, and aeronautical engineering, but such enterprises were not seen as central to military success’²³. In contrast the Second World War proved and validated the worth of both the scientist and technology to the military²⁴. The development of the atomic bomb, according to the Friedmans, required the military to ask the scientists who created it not only how to use it but how to develop a strategy for its use²⁵. ‘The scientists, having no intrinsic understanding of a military analysis, naturally turned to their own frame of reference – scientific method and mathematics’²⁶ and embraced a concept called ‘operations research’²⁷. In this methodology a ‘common sense’ approach was considered an insufficient mechanism for management. ‘Mathematical precision was necessary’²⁸ and the scientists of the Rand Corporation applied a mathematical model to nuclear warfare²⁹. The industrialist and later US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara³⁰ developed the concept of ‘operations research’ by seeking to apply it to non-nuclear warfare. Instead of choosing ‘strategic goals, McNamara generated analytic principles and operational norms’³¹. These were then translated into ‘precise increments of force to achieve the desired end’³². The great success story of this process, systems approach to conflict was the Cuban missile crisis. It is no surprise therefore, that quantitative methodologies permeated the Vietnam War³³; it had proven so successful in the Cuban missile crisis.

America’s incremental approach to the use of force in Vietnam is one distinctive feature of their approach to this conflict. Johnson, according to Lonsdale, was conscious of escalating the war, fearing that China or the Soviet Union might be brought into the war. ‘In the early stages of the war, Johnson was reluctant to conduct large-scale conflict for fear of

distracting attention away from his domestic political programme³⁴. In this political context, the methodology employed by the US has an internal logic to it. The use, for example, of technology and quantitative methodologies are epitomised in the US bombing campaign known as 'Rolling Thunder'. In this campaign some of the world's most advanced bombers were utilised, while the overarching methodology remained faithful to the industrial theory³⁵. To aid American delivery of their technological superiority, the US deployed an unprecedented telecommunications network in the field in Vietnam and a wide scale cybernetic system that operated on similar principles to US domestic air-defence systems³⁶. As a result, incredible volumes of data were generated. However, rather than providing excellent actionable intelligence on enemy movements, the sheer quantity of information frequently overloaded the system³⁷ significantly reducing its value³⁸.

The methodology and logic is succulently emphasised in Gibson's contention that 'General William Westmoreland's strategy of reaching the "crossover point", defined as when the enemy casualties exceeded replacements, *The Perfect War* demonstrated the war manager's logic in not having US soldiers occupy land, but instead moving them relentlessly around the country in helicopter and mechanised search-and-destroy operations in order to kill Vietnamese opponents as quickly as possible'³⁹.

Victory should have been a forgone conclusion. Indeed, the story is told of how when the Nixon administration took over in 1969 various pieces of information were fed into a Pentagon computer concerning the US and North Vietnam. When asked when the war would be won, the computer apparently replied, 'You won in 1964'⁴⁰. One of the fundamental problems, maintains Bousquet, was that the systems approach used in Vietnam, 'assembled under cybernetic warfare had been designed to combat other similar systems'⁴¹. While a complex war like Vietnam cannot simply be reduced to the influence of systems analysis⁴², nevertheless, it was a major contributory factor in why the US failed to defeat what appeared

to be a militarily inferior opponent. It also highlights an important point; technology or its application was not in itself the panacea it was presented to be before the Vietnam War.


Two striking examples of the successful application of technology and the Western way of war are the two Gulf Wars (1990-91 and 2003⁴³). In 1991, despite having significant conventional capabilities, compared to other states in the region, and substantial time to prepare their defences against an American-led coalition, the Iraqi military were swept aside and comprehensively defeated in only 100 hours after the commencement of the ground campaign. Benbow notes that ‘the conflict therefore appeared to be a convincing vindication of post-Vietnam developments in US military doctrine and training as well as confirming the potential of various new technologies introduced in the 1970s and 1980s⁴⁴. For Gibson the ‘1991 war against Iraq at first seemed like a complete validation of ‘Technowar’⁴⁵. The Gulf War thrust the concept that a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) had or was occurring in the mainstream of strategic studies and military planning⁴⁶.

Although the basic concept of RMA was briefly considered in chapter 4⁴⁷ it is necessary to unpack this subject a little further. In his detailed treatment of this subject, Gray argues that there have been three great RMAs⁴⁸. He accepts that there have been other kinds of RMAs, of varying magnitude and in different periods, however, he maintains that all RMAs share a common structure⁴⁹. Nevertheless he does want to ‘alert readers to the fact that a decade of intensive and extensive work on the subject has left answers even to the most basic of questions’⁵⁰. Gray’s note of caution in 2002 was well judged. In 2000, for example, Steven Metz proclaimed that ‘speed, knowledge, and precision will minimise casualties and lead to the rapid resolution of wars, thus minimizing the problems associated with the challenges to the political utility of force’⁵¹. Such claims, however, must be weighed against the harsh realities of the violent and bloody insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and the high



fatality rates among US and UK forces. Metz though was only one of a great many proclaiming the absolute certainty of the information and technological RMA.

Two early and key proponents for RMA were Alvin and Heidi Toffler. Their books, *The Third Wave* (1980) and *War and Anti-War* (1993) were hugely influential⁵². The central thesis was that human civilisation was entering a third wave, the information age⁵³. According to Bousquet, in the ‘hands of RMA evangelists, The Third Wave translated into a



vision in which the future of the military was computers, information networks, and precision munitions⁵⁴. A key tenet of this RMA is information⁵⁵. ‘A military’ argues Metz, ‘which




masters network-centric warfare, will achieve information superiority, reach out long distances with precision weapons and collapse an enemy’s will through the shock of rapid and closely linked attacks⁵⁶. The Toffler’s imagined that this could also be achieved using a much smaller force⁵⁷. Donald Rumsfeld adopted the concept, favouring a ‘minimum force using high technology weapons’⁵⁸ and planned a smaller ‘transformed’ force that he believed

could achieve the same results as an older, much larger force⁵⁹.

The spectacular success of the war fighting phase of the Second Gulf War initially appeared to confirm the expectations of the RMA advocates⁶⁰. A smaller, networked, enabled force using all arms manoeuvre warfare in conjunction with precision munitions swept through the Iraqi military, however, as Singer observed ‘not all was well with the

revolution’⁶¹. He maintains that ‘the business assumptions behind network-centric warfare had been particularly selective’⁶². What had appeared as a ‘shiny picture of techno-

supremacy’ was in reality, according to Singer, a cobbled together, hodgepodge military-built networking technology that frequently crashed or suffered badly in the desert heat as equipment designed for use in the office struggled on the battlefield⁶³. For Cordesman though, much of the asymmetry between the US and British forces and their enemy ‘was the



result of the fact that the United States was using a new mix of strategy, tactics and


technology and Iraq was not⁶⁴. Many of the key weapons systems, he maintains, took decades to evolve and can be traced to Vietnam and other conflicts⁶⁵.

7.3 Examples of Battlefield Technology

One of the most distinctive characteristics between the first and second Gulf Wars, according to Keegan, was the brevity of the air campaign⁶⁶. This was due, he maintains, to the precision of the weaponry delivered and that this in itself marked a revolution in accuracy since 1991. This however, stood in stark contrast with the experience of the infantry soldier, who after the war-fighting phase had to deal with a growing and violent insurgency and cope with a rapid growth in the complexity and use of Improvised Explosive Devices or IEDs⁶⁷. According to DL Wright, 'it took a while for these lessons to catch up to the leaders at the Pentagon and the policy makers in Congress who controlled the purse strings that would lead to technology advancement and fielding new equipment'⁶⁸.



In 1972 Lt Col Peter Miller invented and used a remote control platform that became known as the Wheelbarrow⁶⁹. Described as a Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) this application of technology has been labelled as the single most influential factor in the evolution of bomb disposal techniques. They maximise the amount of work that the bomb technician can carry out from a distance, reducing the risk to life significantly. Initially the wheelbarrow was controlled by cables (90 metres long) attached to a control box. Today modern examples can be operated remotely from as far as 1.25 miles away using radio control⁷¹.



The Wheelbarrow

The Talon, designed by Foster-Miller a wholly owned subsidiary of QinetiQ⁷², and the PackBot, designed by iRobot, are two of the latest editions of an ROV⁷³.



The Talon (Foster-Millar)


PackBot⁷⁵ (iRobot)

Some designs like the UK MOE's Dragon Runner are designed to be 'man'-portable.

The Dragon Runner⁷⁶

Building upon the commercial success of the Packbot, iRobot introduced the Warrior⁷⁷.

Warrior



Foster-Miller likewise has produced a larger version of the Talon; this is called SWORDS (Special Weapons Observation Reconnaissance Detection System).

SWORDS⁷⁸

On their website Foster-Miller state that:

The SWORD variant will further extend the versatility of this platform and it can be used to protect ground forces and operate in dangerous and hazardous environments. The operators, who can be located some distance away, are able to control their missions from a position of relative safety. Of significant importance is that the operator remains in direct control of the SWORD at all times and a person has to make the final decision to engage the target⁷⁹.


The SWORD variant is already being replaced with an even more advanced robotic weapons platform called the MAARS (Modular Advanced Armed Robotic System).



MAARS⁸⁰



The South Korean SGR-1 sentry robot is one example of how robotic technology may influence how defensive positions are guarded in remote locations that require constant vigilance. Samsung Techwin America has also produced a mobile security robot.



STAR-1


The STAR-1 is an autonomous enhanced version of the Mini STAR vehicle. It is reported that it can detect targets at up to four (4) kilometres (approximately 2.5 miles) and a laser rangefinder helps track them at up to two (2) kilometres (approximately 1.2 miles), with distances halved at night⁸². These vehicles are designed to provide mobile surveillance in large spaces such as armament depots or in hazardous environments⁸³.

The US Navy's MK15 Phalanx Close in Weapons System was originally designed to identify and fire at incoming missiles or threatening aircraft⁸⁴. This is a 'last defence' system against targets that have gotten past all other defence systems. However, the MK15 was given a land-based role in protecting military camps in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this role it became known as Counter Rocket Artillery Mortar technology or CRAM⁸⁵.




MK15 Phalanx (Ship role)

Robotic or autonomous weapons platforms are not limited to bomb-disposal, reconnaissance, sentry duty (static or mobile) or even as close-in last defence systems against missiles or incoming artillery shells. The range of battlefield technology available almost covers the entire range of military arms. For example:



The JUMPER (autonomous artillery for ground forces)

According to reports this weapons platform only needs to be located on a flat surface and requires no crew⁸⁶. Each unit has a total of 8 missiles, each with a range of 50 kilometers and is guided either by its own internal GPS or can home in on a laser designation⁸⁷.



K10 AFV

This particular vehicle is claimed to be the world's first fully autonomous AFV designed to supply a self-propelled 155mm artillery shell.

Multirole Combat Vehicle

MQ-9 Reaper


Source: Crown Copyright



Lockheed Martin's Squad Mission Support System (SMSS)


On their website Lockheed Martin state that 'four SMSS vehicles were successfully tested by soldiers in Afghanistan in 2012 as transport and logistics vehicles to lighten the load for

soldiers in combat operations⁹⁰. The company also revealed that they had successfully conducted controlled tests via satellite from a distance of 200 miles in February 2013.



Oshkosh's TerraMax

The TerraMax is another autonomous vehicle. However, this particular example uses short-range radars to enable it to navigate without relying solely on the use of GPS or direct input from a human operator. It apparently has the capacity to plot its own course to its designation using its own radars⁹¹.



Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

The use of UAVs in war is not a new phenomenon. The Teledyne Ryan AQM-91 Fire Fly flew 3,435 missions in Vietnam, however, because of the classified nature of their use and missions, there was little public knowledge of their relative success⁹².



Today many states (including non-state actors like Hezbollah) have either developed their own range of UAVs or have simply bought versions commercially available. UAVs come in a range of sizes and capabilities, with some carrying sophisticated weapons systems. For example:

The Desert Hawk

The Raven

*The Elbit Hermes 450 WatchKeeper*⁹³

*The Predator / MQ-9 Reaper Hunter / Killer*⁹⁴

*The Taranis*⁹⁵

The Taranis (named after the Celtic god of thunder) is a prototype stealth combat vehicle developed for the UK MOD by BAE Systems.

Soldier / individual advanced technology

XOS by Sarcos

The XOS is a second-generation robotic suit, developed by Raytheon, for the US Army. It is described as a ‘wearable robotic suit’ that enhances the ‘human strength, agility and endurance capabilities of the soldier inside it’⁹⁶.

HULC by Lockheed Martin

The HULC is another example of an exoskeleton designed for the individual soldier⁹⁷.

The Land Warrior integrated fighting system for USA infantry soldiers

The US Land Warrior integrated fighting system was originally designed to enable the individual infantry soldier to have ‘enhanced tactical awareness, lethality and survivability.

The systems integrated into Land Warrior are the weapon system, helmet, computer, digital and voice communications, positional and navigation system, protective clothing and

individual equipment'⁹⁸. In other words, the individual soldier forms part of an enhanced and comprehensive tactical system'⁹⁹. In his book *Warrior Geeks*, Coker seeks to show, broadly speaking that 'humanity and war have co-evolved' and that not only did it mould the way humans understood themselves, it also determined the way they fought it¹⁰⁰. His contention is that war helped create different ideas about human nature across time and different cultures but that today technological changes are rewriting our understanding of what it means to be human¹⁰¹.

7.4. *Man and his Use of Technology*

The blurring of man and the machine 'is in essence the post-human condition'¹⁰². Some commentators adopt a positively evangelical approach to the question of humans and technology. Andy Clarke in his book *Natural Born Cyborgs* argues forcefully that humans are natural-born cyborgs¹⁰³. When our technologies actively, automatically, and continually tailor themselves to us and we to them – then the line between tool and user becomes flimsy indeed'¹⁰⁴. Consequently, he finds the term post-human a dangerous and mistaken image¹⁰⁵. His illustration of the humble wristwatch as an example of the transparent symbiotic relationship we already have with technology is compelling¹⁰⁶. Approaching the relationship between man and technology from an evolutionary scientific perspective, Timothy Taylor contends that it is not possible to understand man's evolution apart from his development and use of technology¹⁰⁷. It was our use of technology, he maintains, that altered our physical and mental evolution¹⁰⁸. The argument that to be human is to have some form of relationship with technology, regardless of whether that is a flint knife, bladed farming tool, sword or clock is difficult to resist¹⁰⁹. That man can have a positive relationship with technology is not, however, the main area of concern. Rather it is the speed of technological development and issues that this is producing.

Lanier maintains that a tiny group of engineers have tinkered with our direct cognitive experience' in regard to technology¹¹⁰. It is, however, the speed associated with this that is so striking. Referring to the pace that computer technology has developed Lanier offers this analogy: 'it's as if you kneel to plant a seed and it grows so fast that it swallows your whole village before you can even rise to your feet'¹¹¹. Singer has suggested that 'a knight of the Middle Ages could go their entire life with maybe one new technology changing the way they lived'¹¹². The exponential change in computer technology is encapsulated in 'Moore's law'¹¹³. Kurzweil contends that 'we won't experience one hundred years of technological advance in the twenty-first century; we will witness on the order of twenty thousand years of progress (again, when measured by *today's* rate of progress), or about one thousand times greater than what was achieved in the twentieth century'¹¹⁴.

The rapid development of technology calls humanity's ability to cope with, let alone master, these changes into question. There is the possibility that humanity will simply continue to be passively changed by technology as its development outstrips our capacity to master the changes. Douglas Noble suggests that educators in America may have unwittingly adopted a framework of a larger military/scientific enterprise¹¹⁵ and that schools 'serve as both laboratory and production site'¹¹⁶ for the production of 'mental material'¹¹⁷. He claims that 'the underlying goal of military attempts to understand human capacities is the eventual replacement of human beings by autonomous weapons and battlefields'¹¹⁸. In the same book, CH Gray states that 'just as modern war required modern soldiers; post-modern war needs soldiers with new military virtues who can meet the incredible requirements of high-technology war'¹¹⁹.

Whether or not the US military has deliberately sought to influence the educational system in America to meet its own requirements is a matter of debate. There is none however, concerning the purpose underpinning the development by the US Army of the computer

game called *America's Army*, released on the 4th of July 2002. It was deliberately offered as a free download specifically for online play¹²⁰. Those associated with the project offered some explanation as to the original purposes of the project:

America does not know the real Army. In contrast to previous eras, today's citizens have relatively few portals of insight into the Army as a profession. Increasingly, youths and those who influence them are in touch with an Army that does not exist, but is instead the product of Hollywood, the media and marketing¹²¹.

Since its launch this game has had over 9 million registered users and has gone through several versions: the latest being *America's Army 3* in 2009¹²². Not only did this project become a public relations sensation, recruitment for the Army rose significantly¹²³.

The success of this project stands in marked contrast to an earlier attempt at using a computer game for military purposes. In 1995 a Marine Corps Lieutenant and Sergeant had the radical idea of altering the hugely popular video game *Doom*¹²⁴ to teach soldiers certain skills at a low cost. Although it received considerable media attention at the time¹²⁵ it failed to achieve anything like the success of *America's Army*. According to Urlocker and Smith one of the reasons 'for this was that senior leaders simply did not understand the potential of the new technology'¹²⁶. Chambers *et.al.*, observe that 'Gen Y moves easily through the digital economy, having never known a world without computers. For Gen Y, technology is the defining element of their lives. Unfortunately, the Army runs last among the services in Gen Y's perception of technological sophistication'¹²⁷. In the space of a few years senior leaders within the US Army not only grasped the significance of computer games and the internet but sought to tap into its potential.

America has not been alone in its development of computer games as an effective means of inculcating its message within a specific youth culture. In 2001 the Syrian publisher dar Al-Fikr released the game *Under Ash* which depicts the 'plight' of a young Palestinian man during the second intifada¹²⁸. In 2003 the Central Internet Bureau of Hezbollah released the game *Special Force*¹²⁹: 'a first person shooter based around the armed Islamic movement

in South Lebanon¹³⁰. Many of the objectives of Hezbollah echo those underpinning *America's Army*¹³¹. Unlike many video games produced in the West, *Under Ash* and *Special Force* are considered to be 'the first truly realist games in existence'¹³². In contrast, games like *America's Army* are considered to be realistic, rather realist. For Galloway the central distinction between realistic and realist is narrative. The narrative of *Under Ash*, he argues, is not fantasy escapism but rather it takes on an almost documentary quality depicting current scenarios¹³³. It is this weaving together of narrative and lived experience that makes *Under Ash* a realist game rather than another first-person-shooter game.

One of the important distinctions between the *America's Army*, *Under Ash* and *Special Force* is the depiction of who the enemy is. In a first-person-shooter game this is a central element in the development of a game's internal narrative. In *Under Ash* and *Special Force* the enemy is clearly defined. It is Israel and in particular the Israeli Defence Force¹³⁴. In contrast those who developed *America's Army* have been careful to create an abstract enemy; something Allen calls the 'unreal enemy'¹³⁵. This according to Allen, 'is an enemy with minimal cultural, linguistic, or ethnic indicators and therefore one which is simultaneously anonymous yet potentially anyone...everywhere and nowhere at once'¹³⁶. The ambiguous nature of the enemy in *America's Army* illustrates Galloway's point that it is realistic rather than realist in terms of narrative. That said, what *America's Army*, *Under Ash* and *Special Force* may reflect is the potential of embedding 'real social critique in players' experiences of their virtual worlds'¹³⁷. In other words, they share the belief that modern youth culture can be heavily influenced through the use of technology that offers a version of life embedded within a virtual world.

Although there have been a number of studies that have suggested that 'violent video games are related to aggressive cognitions, affect and behaviour'¹³⁸, Weber et.al., maintain that 'there is still a controversial discussion about the validity of these' studies¹³⁹. Other

studies have cast doubt on the suggestion that violence in computer games is actually rewarding for those who play them¹⁴⁰. A suitable degree of caution is therefore warranted in making judgements about the effects of on-line gaming, especially first-person-shooters such as those described in this section. However, a number of scholars continue to raise substantial concerns over the metaphysical impact of technology and life in the virtual world of the internet. For example Coker maintains that ‘we know that technology is changing our habits and lifestyles and sometimes even our identity; what we do not know is whether the virtual world in which we now live at least part of our lives is changing us culturally’¹⁴¹. One of the consistent features of many of the robotic weapon platforms identified earlier in section 7.3 is that they have been designed to be used by a youth generation who have spent a significant part of their lives in a virtual computer world.

The work of Baroness Susan Greenfield in this field is particularly relevant¹⁴². In the past, previous generations had the options of being *Someone* or *Anyone*¹⁴³. However, in the twenty-first century there is now a third option: being *Nobody*¹⁴⁴. The *Nobody* world’, according to Greenfield, ‘is the province of cyber space’¹⁴⁵. She notes that in a recent survey ‘a child in the UK spends, between their tenth and eleventh birthdays, on average 900 hours in class, 1,277 hours with their family, and 1,934 hours in front of a screen – be it television or computer’¹⁴⁶. ‘The screen based lifestyle’ she contends ‘is an unprecedented and pervasive phenomenon...prolonged and frequent video-gaming, surfing and social networking cannot fail to have an unprecedented and transformation effect on the mental state of a species whose most basic and valuable talent is a highly sensitive adaptability to whatever environment in which it is placed’¹⁴⁷.

Potentially, one of the most significant aspects of this is in regard to our capacity to be empathetic. Greenfield cites a report based on a study of 1,400 college students in the USA, where the participants ‘showed a decline in empathy over the last thirty years, with a

particularly sharp drop in the last decade¹⁴⁸. While she accepts that a declining ability to be empathetic and the popularity of the internet does not prove a causal link, she does however, suggest that it is a starting point for further investigation¹⁴⁹. An internet addiction, Greenfield speculates, may lead to ‘an absence of an internally generated past or planned future, in favour instead of just the atomised present. Could one stark and extreme possibility be that, in the end, such people may have simply *no* identity?’¹⁵⁰ (emphasis original). Taken together, the picture offered by Greenfield is quite terrifying: a ‘*Nobody*’ people, living in an atomised cyber-world of a perpetual now, potentially deficient in their capacity to empathise with others and devoid of personal identity. The use of robotic weapons systems by operators dislocated from the battlefield will generate significant legal and ethical questions.

7.5 Conflict: Some Legal Issues in Using Robotic Weapons Platforms

On the 24 May 2013 President Obama publically announced that the overall programme for the US use of ‘drone¹⁵¹ strikes’ would be subjected to tighter oversight and follow stricter targeting rules¹⁵². Despite this announcement the speech was nevertheless also interpreted as a strong and continued commitment to the use of drones by the Obama administration¹⁵³. While the UK’s use of UAVs such as the Predator or Reaper is not as extensive as that of the US¹⁵⁴, the relocation in 2013 of flight operations from the US to RAF Waddington in England generated significant protests by peace campaigners opposed to the use of drones flown from the UK¹⁵⁵. The debate concerning the use of this particular weapon’s platform continues to generate significant interest from a range of parties¹⁵⁶.

The use of robotic platforms in conflict is not new; therefore, it is important to clarify how the term robotic will be used in this section. The word robot ‘was first coined by the Czech playwright Karel Čapek who derived it from the Czech word *robota*, which meant forced labour’¹⁵⁷; it also had a secondary meaning of ‘drudgery’¹⁵⁸. Čapek’s play R.U.R.

(Rossum's Universal Robots) is similar in tone to Fritz Lang's film *Metropolis*, particularly in regard to the production line nature of the modern factory. According to Singer a robot is a machine 'with three key components: "sensors" that monitor the environment and detect changes in it, "processors" or "artificial intelligence" that decides how to respond, and "effectors" that act upon the environment in a manner that reflects the decisions, creating some sort of change in the world around the robot'¹⁵⁹. The exact level of autonomy associated with individual robotic machines can vary greatly¹⁶⁰. Unmanned robotic weapons are often divided into three categories:

Human-in-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can select targets and deliver force only with human command;

Human-on-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can select targets and deliver force under the oversight of a human operator who can override the robot's actions; and

Human-out-of-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that are capable of selecting targets and delivering force without human input or interaction¹⁶¹.

Many of the issues associated with the use of UAVs like Predator and Reaper, may also in the future be associated with the use of some of the infantry specific robotic weapon platforms highlighted in section 7.3. Consequently, the focus will be upon both UAVs and weapon systems like the MAARS.

UAVs are an accepted part of the military inventory of many states¹⁶² and even some non-state actors¹⁶³. There is a general expectation that not only will UAVs become more prevalent, they might eventually take 'over most or all of the tasks currently undertaken by manned systems'¹⁶⁴; it is even anticipated that they will become more autonomous in the future¹⁶⁵. The position of the UK on the legal status of UAVs is very straightforward:

Most of the legal issues surrounding the use of existing and planned systems are well understood and are simply a variation of those associated with manned systems. An aircraft, whether manned or unmanned, is commanded and therefore its use is governed by the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) in 2 ways. Firstly, weapons law guides whether a weapon and its generic uses are lawful; secondly, targeting law determines whether the use of a particular weapon is lawful on a specific mission or in specific circumstances. This also defines the framework for the Rules of Engagement (ROE). 2 The LOAC is based largely on the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1997 Additional Protocol 1, of which the UK is a signatory¹⁶⁶.

The logic of this is simple. If the weapon fired from a UAV is the same as that fired from a manned platform and is in compliance with weapons law, the use of that weapon is legally compliant. A Hellfire missile is a Hellfire missile, regardless of the platform from which it is fired¹⁶⁷. Secondly, if a target is engaged it is done so in compliance with the UK's ROE, which are composed in relation to the LOAC¹⁶⁸. The legal reality however, is much more complicated, regardless of this simple declaration by the UK's MOD.

The issue is not one of using direct or indirect fire in support of troops actively engaged in hostile action against a clearly defined target, such as enemy fighters. A missile launched from a manned or unmanned platform in this instance is not the central point legally; there may well be an ethical point but that will be considered later. In active contact with enemy forces, the LOAC is often quite straightforward, and if it is not 'UK forces go to great lengths to avoid civilian casualties, at times risking mission failure as a result'¹⁶⁹. However, when war is fought among the people, in theatres of operation like Iraq and Afghanistan, the tactical situation can be fiendishly complex. Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge, giving his perspective on the use of drones in Iraq, stated that 'post-modern conflicts confront us...with ambiguous non-linear battlespaces'; in this context 'UAVs can be a useful asset in classic three-block warfare...' because 'they can be sent into areas assessed as being too dangerous for ground troops in the broad reconnaissance role'¹⁷⁰. It is the use of UAVs as an independent capability to achieve military and or political effect that generates so much of the recent controversy. This is particularly the case in relation to civilian casualties in situations of 'targeted' or as some prefer to define them, 'extra-judicial killings'¹⁷¹.

Commentators like Conor Friedersdorf are uncompromising. It is his contention that 'the Obama Administration isn't just assassinating an unprecedented number of individuals. It is doing so in a secret, unaccountable manner'¹⁷². Legal opinion on the legitimacy of targeted

or extra-judicial killing is divided. Experts like Mary O'Connell are adamant that the US policy is contrary to International Law¹⁷³ which she argues, prohibits the right to kill outside of actual armed conflict¹⁷⁴. She utterly rejects the US administration's argument that its use of drones is an act of self-defence against legitimate combatants¹⁷⁵. For O'Connell terrorist acts are akin to acts of criminality rather than an act of armed aggression that would legitimise an armed response¹⁷⁶. In her opinion, the use of 'combat drones' is illegal under International Law¹⁷⁷. Other legal experts like JJ Paust maintain that 'self-defense can be permissible against non-state actor armed attacks, and measures of self-defense can occur in the territory of another state without special consent of the other state or imputation of the armed attacks to that state as long as the measures of self-defense are directed against the non-state actors'¹⁷⁸.

Some contend that the reason for this stark division within eminent legal opinion is the simple reality that 'international law, accustomed to regulating actions by states, is in uncharted legal territory when dealing with non-state actors and their involvement in the changing face of war'¹⁷⁹. This, however, is a concept that O'Connell rejects utterly¹⁸⁰. Because O'Connell makes the assumption that inter and trans-national terrorists are criminals rather than combatants, she does not adequately address how the US, or any other state for that matter, should deal with those who are alleged to have plotted or are plotting terror attacks against US and Allied forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Gross suggests that terrorists and guerrillas maintain two stances. 'On the battlefield', he observes 'they are something like combatants; off the battlefield and at the time they are targeted, they are something like civilians or some other non-combatant'¹⁸¹. He maintains that guerrillas are not civilians 'who lend an occasional hand...but fighters who maintain their status off the battlefield as they prepare for battle, lay plans, tend to their weapons, and maintain their fighting capability'¹⁸². In this regard, Etzioni asks an interesting question, 'why

would one hold that we ought to grant extra rights to people just because they fight us in an unfair way (so to speak), and, at the very least, illegally, seems difficult to comprehend'¹⁸³. While some may sympathise with Etzioni, perhaps a partial answer to his question may be found in article 148 of the Lieber Code, which expressly forbids assassination, designating it as an 'outrage'¹⁸⁴. The Lieber Code, however, was not constructed against the context of modern transnational terrorism or with combatants who deliberately reject on principle International Law. In his examination of the implications of the Lieber Code, Gross argues that 'it is best to understand targeted killing as an adaption of the war convention that permits soldiers to kill one another in the absence of uniforms'¹⁸⁵. Until there is an agreed international protocol on the use of UAVs, legal opinion is likely to remain deeply divided and their continued use, highly contentious.

While a remotely controlled robotic weapons platform like the MAARS system could be used to attack the occupants of a building (be that house, factory, compound etc.,) the current technology is such that it is unlikely that it would make tactical sense to operate it thousands of miles away. Nevertheless, it is possible that the issue of targeted killing could generate similar legal challenges to those associated with UAVs. For example, the operator of the MAARS is removed from the immediate contact area just like the operator of the UAV. The attack itself could be designed to kill a specific target or targets using remote technology, without endangering ground troops in any attack. The use of thermal imaging capabilities combined with rocket propelled grenades and GPMP machine gun might offer a form of precision strike against a target. Although this may sound like a scene from a science fiction film like *Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines*, it would seem only a matter of time before the robotic weapon platforms being tested at the moment (see section 7.3) enter into operational service. Consequently, the ethical, philosophical and practical implications of using this technology could be significant and will form the core of the next section.

7.6 Conflict: Ethical, Philosophical and Practical Implications of Using Robotic Weapons

The existence of battlefield robotic weapons technology is an established reality. Indeed Singer notes that Congress has ordered the Pentagon to show a preference for unmanned systems; 'if the US military was going to buy a new weapon it would now have to justify why it was not a robotic one'¹⁸⁶. Although Coker maintains that 'the future is not destiny, it is a choice'¹⁸⁷ he is convinced that 'robots are on the march...and there is no going back'¹⁸⁸. Few would disagree with his observation that the coming of robots is a cultural watershed, a Rubicon we have decided to cross¹⁸⁹. It is not difficult to grasp some of the practical attractions robotic technology offers. Gordon Johnson, of the Joint Forces Command at the Pentagon, said: 'they don't get hungry, they're not afraid, they don't forget their orders. They don't care if the guy next to them has just been shot. Will they do a better job than humans? Yes'¹⁹⁰. The first practical implication, therefore, is the recognition that conflict in the twenty-first century will see an increasing use of this technology and of the debate concerning the ethical and philosophical use of these weapon systems.

The concept of human-robot interaction (HRI) is an 'ever-growing research field with connections to both the military and civilian application'¹⁹¹. Soldier-Robot teams are no longer the product of science-fiction writers¹⁹² but the subject of serious and detailed academic research¹⁹³. 'An important feature of future battlespaces,' Barnes and Evans contend will be a greater use of intelligent systems to supplement traditional manned forces'¹⁹⁴. Using intelligent systems however, has generated difficulties for their operators¹⁹⁵. Studies have shown that 'gunners were not able to conduct their primary task effectively if a second robotic task was added to their inventory'¹⁹⁶. To help overcome this it was found that using automated targeting recognition aid (AiTR) helped operators overcome their attentional deficits'¹⁹⁷. Automation is considered to be 'an obvious solution to the increased

workload of future military systems'¹⁹⁸. In the conclusion of their overview Barnes and Evans state that 'future robots will be able to make many tactical decisions on their own'¹⁹⁹.

One of the major areas of concern both practically and ethically is the extent to which the human component is the weakest link in the chain. Significant studies have been conducted to determine the safe human-robot ratio, which apparently is $N_h=N_v+N_p+1$ (where N_h is the number of humans, N_v is the number of vehicles, N_p is the number of payloads and the +1 is a safety officer)²⁰⁰. A recurrent theme in this study is the phrase 'out-of-the-loop' or OOTL. In this instance the 'loop' refers to the decision-making loop, articulated by John Boyd during the Korean War, which became known as OODA (observe, orient, decide and act)²⁰¹. Whenever a system has higher degrees of automation 'it is harder for the human to react to a problem correctly in time because the human does not retain the necessary situational awareness for control of the process'²⁰². In the future, the decision-making loop will not be measured in minutes but microseconds²⁰³. The MK15 Phalanx (section 7.3) offers one particular example of this. The seconds between the identification of an incoming missile or shell leaves little human response time; in this regard it is a 'fast defence' automated system. While few would find the use of this form of autonomous weapons platform controversial, the example of Iran Air Flight 655 may offer a salutary example of what can happen when autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons systems make a catastrophic error and are not over-ruled by their human operators.

On the 3rd of July 1988, Iran Air Flight 655, a European built A300 Airbus, was shot down by two missiles fired by the USS *Vincennes*²⁰⁴. The Aegis computer system on-board the USS *Vincennes* determined Flight 655 to be an Iranian F14 fighter jet²⁰⁵ with hostile intent²⁰⁶. According to Singer, throughout this incident the Aegis system was on semiautomatic mode. Although the hard data was telling the crew of the US warship that the aircraft was not a fighter jet, 'not one of the eighteen sailors and officers on the command

crew was willing to challenge the computer's wisdom'²⁰⁷. In this instance, having the human 'in the loop' failed to correct a computer error that led to the deaths of 273 humans on board Flight 655. Part of the human tragedy in this particular incident was that the human operators deferred to the wisdom of the computer rather than overrule a profound mistake²⁰⁸. Because the crew believed an F14 fighter jet was descending to attack they convinced themselves that the hard data (i.e. that the civilian jet was actually ascending²⁰⁹) was incorrect. Arkin refers to this as the 'human psychological problem of "scenario fulfilment"'²¹⁰.

One of the major areas of concern for many is the development of what some refer to as killer robots, or Lethal Autonomous Robots (LARs)²¹¹; in other words, robot weapons systems capable of taking the decision to kill without direct human involvement in a specific decision. On the 30th May 2013, the UN Special Rapporteur Christof Heyns in his address to a UN sponsored conference on LARs held in Geneva began by asking:

Is it acceptable, from the perspective of protecting life and human dignity, that any kind of weapon that is used to kill humans - whether in peace or war - will be controlled by autonomous robots? ... This is really a huge jump for humanity to say, we are now going to allow machines to kill human beings²¹².

Groups like Article 36, Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School's International Human Rights Clinic also contend that the development of LARs should be banned²¹³. Although the UK Government has stated that 'the operation of weapons systems will always be under human control'²¹⁴ this has not satisfied opponents of LARs (i.e. Article 36). What does 'human control' mean in the context of the microseconds involved in the decision-making loop? It is possible that although humans may remain technically in the loop, they may function more as 'a supervisor who serves in a fail-safe capacity in the event of a system malfunction'²¹⁵. Sadly the example of the USS *Vincennes* illustrates that this is far from full-proof.

The battlefield has always been a dangerous place²¹⁶. Despite the controversy over LARs, the use of robots has already saved the lives of thousands of soldiers in Iraq and

Afghanistan²¹⁷. According to Singer ‘they simply make too much sense to the people who matter²¹⁸. Although focusing upon remote and semi-autonomous weapons platforms (primarily UAVs) Strawser contends that there is a moral duty to use non-human weapons systems rather than place humans in harm’s way²¹⁹. Arkin, however is much more strident in his advocacy of the case for ethical autonomy of robotic systems²²⁰ being ‘convinced that they can perform more ethically than human soldiers are capable of performing²²¹. Arkin cites the disturbing evidence of the report from the US Surgeon General’s Office (2006) which assessed the battlefield ethics and mental health of soldiers and marines deployed on Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ as supporting evidence. ‘It is unrealistic’, he argues, to expect ‘normal human beings to adhere to the Laws of Warfare when confronted with the horror of the battlefield, even when trained’; this he maintains is the case for the use of ethical autonomy in unmanned systems²²². One advantage, Arkin sees, of having autonomous systems working as part of a soldier-robot team is the potential ability of the robot to monitor ethical behaviour on the battlefield, might lead to a reduction in ethical infractions²²³.

Throughout history, soldiers have committed acts of savagery and barbarism. Bourke states that in the Second World War ‘servicemen of all ranks were unperturbed by most...acts of lawless killing’²²⁴. In his book *On Killing*, Grossman describes ‘the dark power of atrocity’²²⁵. Viewed from one perspective, the findings from the report from the US Surgeon General’s Office (2006) may be presented as Arkin has done. However, as Tonkens observes, Arkin’s use of the statistics in the 2006 report is not as overwhelming as he suggests²²⁶. Using the same set of statistics, Tonkens contends that ‘the great majority of soldiers, despite their flaws and limitations, do not intentionally mistreat non-combatants’²²⁷. Indeed, there is significant evidence that the resistance *to kill* is so strong that ‘in many circumstances, soldiers on the battlefield will die before they can overcome it’²²⁸. Modern conditioning techniques though have made a significant impact on this point²²⁹. Sadly, the cases of torture

and abuse in Iraq²³⁰ reveal that although the majority of US and British soldiers have acted in accordance with the very highest of ethical values, some have not²³¹. Nevertheless, Arkin's point that the presence of robots on the battlefield might act as a moral reference point is appealing²³². This however, is not the central issue; rather, the very idea of using autonomous robots capable of killing humans on the battlefield is the main focus of scholarly debate.

The British robotics expert Noel Sharkey is a prominent opponent of the development and use of autonomous weapons²³³. He acknowledges that there is a desire in the American military to use robots as force multipliers on the battlefield with the soldier as the 'nexus for initiating a large-scale robot attack'²³⁴. In regard to the concept of in-the-loop, to, on-the-loop and out-of-the-loop²³⁵ he notes that there is a 'continuum from totally human operated to fully autonomous'²³⁶. The fundamental problem, as he sees it, with supervised systems is the speed with which decisions will have to be made²³⁷. Whereas, with so called intelligent systems, he was absolutely convinced that 'no robot or AI system can determine the difference between a combatant and an innocent civilian. No visual or other sensing system is up to that challenge'²³⁸. He invites his readers to 'just think of children being forced to carry empty rifles or of insurgents burying their dead'²³⁹. For Sharkey no AI system is capable of having the situational awareness necessary of understanding other people's intentions and their likely behaviour²⁴⁰. Does the US 'really want to have a robot represent them as a strategic corporal?'²⁴¹,

Anderson and Waxman contend that there is an 'incremental march toward automated technologies'²⁴². Both they and Singer use the threat of snipers as an example. A number of robot makers have already added 'counter sniper' capabilities to their machines²⁴³. If the technical ability exists to identify and engage a sniper that shoots at peacekeepers²⁴⁴, some Western populations might not understand why such technology was not used to help avoid casualties²⁴⁵. However, this defensive/counter-punch capability is dependent upon 'the robot

executing its own programming²⁴⁶ and raises the question of ‘what constitutes the tipping point into’ permissible/impermissible autonomy²⁴⁷. This raises an interesting question. How can militaries hope to win hearts and minds by sticking armed robots in the face of an occupied population?’²⁴⁸ Will the use of LARs take us further away from ‘the responsibilities we owe our fellow human beings’?²⁴⁹

Ignatieff observes that ‘the tacit contract of combat throughout the ages has always assumed a basic equality of moral risk: kill or be killed. Accordingly violence in war avails itself of the legitimacy of self-defence. But this contract is void when one side begins killing with impunity’²⁵⁰. Soldiers have always lived, as Coker phrases it, ‘in the same community of fate’ as their enemies²⁵¹. It is this willingness to sacrifice, argues van Creveld, that ‘represents the single most important factor’ in modern war. ‘War does not begin when some people kill others; it starts at the point where they themselves risk being killed in return’²⁵². Kahn describes it in this manner, ‘combatants are allowed to injure each other just as long as they stand in a relationship of mutual risk’²⁵³. It is the willingness to sacrifice life that redeems war²⁵⁴, and in this process it reveals a nation’s true values and purposes. It is sacrifice that makes war humane²⁵⁵, a human experience. LARs offer a vision of inhumane war regardless of how sophisticated they are, because they are not sentient beings with an understanding of sacrifice.

The ultimate purpose of war, as classically defined, is peace²⁵⁶. But what if war becomes largely risk-free through the use of robotic weapons?²⁵⁷ While there is little ethical merit in refusing to use a weapon simply because one’s enemy does not have access to it²⁵⁸ war could increasingly resemble little more than an advanced computer game²⁵⁹, in which the operator of the LAR engages digital images or pixels on a screen²⁶⁰. The fear inherent in this context is that ‘the elimination of icons on a computer screen might make the experience feel the same way for otherwise normal troops’²⁶¹. Physical dislocation might increasingly lead to

moral disengagement²⁶². What then of something that resembles a first-person-shooter video game, where the individual is under no physical threat of death from any engagement with an enemy (despite this the US Government had planned to award UAV pilots with a medal that ranked higher than a Bronze Star with valour for their contributions)?²⁶³ Aerial and land-based robotic weapons systems offer a version of war in which many of its terrible realities are greatly reduced (at least for one side), perhaps even making their use increasingly more attractive²⁶⁴. However, as Kahn has argued, ‘the pursuit of national interests through military means is restrained by the expectation of loss. If that expectation disappears, what are the sources of constraint?’²⁶⁵ Rather than the brutal cost of war being the greatest incentive to peace, LARs and UAVs perversely not only make war more likely but encourages terrorism as the natural response to their use²⁶⁶. ‘Riskless warfare may be a prescription for short-term success and long-term disaster’²⁶⁷.

7.7 Conclusions

This chapter has placed future battlefield technology within a variety of contexts, for example: historically; in terms of current and on-going technological development; legally; and ethically, philosophically and practically. The desire to use a technological advantage in order to kill one’s enemy, especially at a distance, is very old. In recent history, the example par excellence is America. However, American success with its use of advanced technology against its enemies has been mixed at best. In Vietnam the ideological premise underpinning techno war’ was essentially flawed, leading to a failed tactical use of its undoubted technological superiority. The two Gulf Wars in contrast offered, at least initially, an impressive example of just what could be achieved when an enemy failed to take measures to counteract the reality of overwhelming technological superiority. It is highly unlikely that

~~future enemies will make the same mistakes Iraqi forces made when faced with such 'techno war'.~~

Section 7.3 briefly considered examples of future battlefield technology and noted the increasing drive towards semi and fully automated support and weapons systems. The land warrior integrated fighting system, envisages the individual soldier as part of an enhanced, computer integrated, tactical weapons system. The GI of the twenty-first century is portrayed as a systems operator, controlling his/her semi or autonomous systems across the range of combat and combat support functions. The implications of this will be explored in chapter 8. The ability of man to keep pace and master this technology is a pressing issue for many commentators. Humanity may well be natural born cyborgs as Clarke maintains. However, the sheer speed of technological change and the manner in which it may affect our sense of our identity is cause for concern. Greenfield's picture of a *'Nobody'* people, living in an atomised cyber-world of a perpetual now, potentially deficient in their capacity to empathise with others and devoid of personal identity, is truly frightening.

The vision of a risk free ability to conduct military operations is fraught with legal, practical, ethical and philosophical problems. The use of UAVs to kill one's enemies on and off the battlefield is hugely contentious. It is only the opening acts of what may well become the increasing drama concerning use of lethal semi- and fully autonomous weapons systems, where the soldier functions as a technician dislocated from the immediacy of the battlefield. While some may imagine robotic weapons systems that come straight out of a Hollywood film, in reality the march towards the use of LARs is likely to be incremental. For example the merging of two or several existing components to produce a new capability is not necessarily problematic, especially if those components already comply with existing weapons law. However, in the case of robotic weapons systems, the question of where the permissible tipping point is between meaningful human control and allowing machines to

~~make their own tactical decisions, will become even more complex in this incremental march.~~

Although the use of various forms of robotic machines became common in Iraq and Afghanistan, the concept of human-robot combat teams as an increasing standard operating procedure is, as far as this author is concerned, inevitable. Future combat teams will comprise soldiers who accompany robotic platforms on tactical missions, while a larger group of operators will monitor/command and supervise, the robotic machines deployed on the ground.

The ethical implications of this approach to future combat are profound. Even if Arkin is correct and an advanced ethical programme can be developed for robotic systems, operational success is not merely a matter of either killing your enemy in greater numbers or of stopping your enemy from killing you. War among the people imagines a battle of narratives as much as actual kinetic battles. America, it could be argued, was not defeated militarily in Vietnam. That however, was utterly irrelevant to the overall outcome of the war. If peace is the ultimate outcome of war (otherwise it is morally questionable), willingness to sacrifice and suffer loss is likely to continue to be as important in the future as it has been in the past. Peace must be established between people, and until robots are considered to have rights equivalent to those of humans, it cannot be between people and robots. What chance of peace if one side uses robotic weapons systems to enforce their will while simultaneously placing their own humanity in question?

¹ CS Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History* (London & New York: Routledge, 2007) p277. He contends that Europe's historical experience of war has resulted in this cultural rejection of war (p277).

² The Guardian editorial on Thursday 5 July 2012 reflected this: 'UK defence: an army for a war-weary nation. The Army 2020 plan is as much a statement of national war-weariness as it is a reflection of costs and threats'. See <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jul/05/army-cuts-war-weary> (accessed 11 Apr 14).

³ See <http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/415689/UK-risks-war-with-Syria-Army-chief-warns-Britain-must-be-ready-to-act-over-crisis> (accessed 21 Apr 14) and <http://www.msnbc.com/the-daily-rundown/pentagon-spokesman-no-boots-the-ground> (accessed 21 Apr 14).

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- ⁴ See <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10270209/US-intelligence-to-justify- looming-missile-strike-against-Syria.html> (accessed 22 Apr 14).
- ⁵ See <http://www.channel4.com/news/syria-crisis-debate-parliament- cameron-miliband-video> (accessed 21 Apr 14).
- ⁶ See <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130829/debtext/130829-0004.htm> (accessed 22 Apr 14).
- ⁷ See <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23892783> (accessed 21 Apr 14).
- ⁸ JFC Fuller, *Armament and History: A Study of the Influence of Armament on History from the Dawn of Classical Warfare to the Second World War* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1946) px. Fuller wrote this just after the atomic bomb had been dropped.
- ⁹ M van Creveld, *Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present* (London & New York: Macmillan, 1989) p297.
- ¹⁰ C Coker, *Humane Warfare* (London: Routledge, 2001) states that ‘with industrialisation the tactical formations and tactics of war also changed’ p48.
- ¹¹ Singer, *Wired For War*, p69.
- ¹² Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations*, p277.
- ¹³ CH Gray, *Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict* (London & New York: Routledge, 1997) p174.
- ¹⁴ Coker, *Waging War Without Warriors*, p160.
- ¹⁵ Coker, *Human Warfare*, p5.
- ¹⁶ See, A Bousquet, *The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity* (London: Hurst, 2009) p154.
- ¹⁷ See, G&M Friedman, *The Future of War: Power, Technology & American World Dominance in the 21st Century* (New York: Crown, 1996) p226-252.
- ¹⁸ Bousquet, *The Scientific Way of Warfare*, p154.
- ¹⁹ Friedman, *The Future of War*, p243.
- ²⁰ James Gibson, *The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam*. This book was also republished in 2000 by with a new introduction by the author. For a fascinating insight into Gibson’s argument see the lengthy and detailed interview posted on YouTube, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o_GH07cCx-I (accessed 6 May 13).
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, p80.
- ²² G&M Friedman, *The Future of War*, chapter 2 ‘Soldiers and Scientists: The Origins of Military Failure’ p39-68.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, p43. As evidence of this premise they note that Britain sent distinguished physicists to the front as ordinary soldiers rather than recognise them as national assets.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, p44.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, p49-50.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, p51.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, p52.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, p53. G&M Friedman argue that the mathematical model of nuclear warfare was essentially independent of the realities of political life and even common sense.
- ³⁰ McNamara served as Secretary of Defense in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, p59.
- ³² *Ibid.*, p60.
- ³³ *Ibid.*, p64.
- ³⁴ Lonsdale, *The Nature of War*, p159.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, p146.
- ³⁶ Bousquet, *The Scientific Way of Warfare*, p156.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*
- ³⁸ According to Bousquet, ‘The models on which war managers relied were equally faulty. Trapped in a mindset which treated war as a purely technical problem to be solved through overwhelming application of *materiel* according to scientific methodology, these officials failed to grasp the sheer determination of their opponents and the extent of the success of their political strategy (*Ibid.*, p157).
- ³⁹ Gibson, *Perfect War*, pvii.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p160.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁴² Most scholars who focus upon this systems approach recognise this. For example, see Lonsdale, *The Nature of War*, p226-227; Bousquet, *The Scientific Way of Warfare*, p160; G&M Friedman, *The Future of War*, p66-68.
- ⁴³ This refers to the initial conventional war fighting phase and not the subsequent insurgencies that followed.

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- ⁴⁴ T Benbow, *The Magic Bullet? Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs* (London: Brassey's, 2004) p59. For a fuller analysis see chapter 3 'The 1990-91 Gulf War and the RMA' p55-76.
- ⁴⁵ Gibson, *Perfect War*, px. Later in his introduction he argues that the reported victories associated with the use of precision weaponry tarnished.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p176.
- ⁴⁷ It was noted that RMA is a meta-narrative in that it provides a framework within which the history of warfare can be considered utilising one theory. RMAs refer, in effect, to military revolutions in technology that transformed the practice of warfare, usually with serious consequences for the side who ignored the transformation or who choose not to embrace it.
- ⁴⁸ CS Gray, *Strategy For Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History* (London: Frank Cass, 2002) chapters 6-8. According to Gray the three grand RMAs are: those revealed in the French Revolution and Napoleon; in the First World War; and in the nuclear age.
- ⁴⁹ For example see his nine step RMA Life cycle (*Ibid.*, p75-81). One can take from this that although many may seek to identify an RMA others may simply a continuation of an already established concept.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p82.
- ⁵¹ S Metz, *Armed Conflict in the 21st Century: The Information Revolution and Post-Modern Warfare* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000) pviii.
- ⁵² For example see, Benbow, *The Magic Bullet?* P17, who refers to the Toffler's as 'the most influential example of this school of thought' and Bousquet, *The Scientific Way of Warfare*, p216.
- A and H Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival At the Dawn of the 21st Century* (London: Little Brown, 1993). The Toffler's Third Way (their description) argues that 'the agricultural revolution of 10,000 years ago launched the first wave of transformatory change in human history; that the industrial revolution of 300 years ago triggered a second wave of change; and that we, today, are feeling the impact of a third wave of change' (p9-10). Their first book didn't mention war (p9) however, in *War and Anti-War* they explain what they term as Third Wave war (p51-56) and the importance of transforming the US from a second wave military to a third wave. In chapter 9 'Third Wave War' they predict that 'the day may well come when more soldiers carry computers than carry guns' (p71).
- ⁵³ CS Gray, *Strategy For Chaos*, p36, calls the social-wave theory 'elegant in its simplicity, for all its grandiosity, reductionism, and casual dating'. He accepts that there is certainly 'a broad-brush validity' to their claims (p37). That said he also contends that, 'The concept of information-age warfare, beyond being a tautologically necessary truth, may carry much less strategic meaning than some RMA theorists would have us believe'.
- ⁵⁴ Bousquet, *The Scientific Way of Warfare*, p216.
- ⁵⁵ Lonsdale, *The Nature of War*, p49. See also Metz, *Armed Conflict in the 21st Century*, p35-38.
- ⁵⁶ Metz, *Armed Conflict in the 21st Century*, p36.
- ⁵⁷ A 'Third Wave brigade of 4,000 – 5,000 troops', according to the Tofflers would be able 'to do what it took a full-sized division to do in the past' (A and H Toffler *War and Anti-War*, p77).
- ⁵⁸ AH Cordesman, *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003) p163.
- ⁵⁹ Lonsdale, *The Nature of War*, p52. He also notes that the number of US soldiers deployed in 2003 was half that used in 1991.
- ⁶⁰ Singer, *Wired For War* p188, 'early success in Iraq seemed to indicate once again that the networked-centric way of war had changed everything...The network-centric crowd cited that the key wasn't that the United States was using fundamentally different weapons than its previous war, but that the networking into information technology had proven 'central to American military dominance'.
- ⁶¹ Singer, *Wired For War*, p188.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, p189.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, p190.
- ⁶⁴ Cordesman, *The Iraq War*, p159.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p160, 163.
- ⁶⁶ J Keegan, *The Iraq War* (London: Hutchinson, 2004) p142.
- ⁶⁷ DL Wright, *Iraq Full Circle: From Shock and Awe to the last Combat Patrol in Baghdad and Beyond* (Oxford: 2012, Osprey) p95.
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p95. For a vivid account of the experiences of British soldiers of the **Princess of Wales Royal Regiment** (PWRR) in the southern Iraqi city of Basra, see R Holmes, *Dusty Warriors* (New York & London, 2007).
- ⁶⁹ See, P Stephens, 'The evolution of the ROV' downloaded from http://www.defencemanagement.com/article.asp?id=180&content_name=EOD&article=4485 (accessed 26 Apr 13). Stephens is a former Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) or bomb technician with the British Army with 24 years' service.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² QinetiQ is a British company, see, <http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/gadgets/4258963> (accessed 27 Apr 13).

⁷³ See Singer, *Wired For War* chapter 1 'Introduction: Scenes From a Robot War' p19-41 for a general survey of the other variants made by competing manufacturers.

⁷⁴ On the Qinetiq website the manufactures state that, 'Talon robots are a family of powerful, durable, lightweight, remotely operated, tracked vehicles that enable the operator to be positioned up to a kilometre away from the danger point. Talon robots are widely used for EOD, reconnaissance, communications, sensing, security, defence and rescue operations. They have all-weather, day/night capabilities and can navigate virtually any type of terrain. The flexibility of the Talon architecture facilitates straight forward integration of sensors and accessories making it a highly versatile platform and one which requires a low logistic footprint' (see <http://www.qinetiq.com/news/PressReleases/Pages/talon-robots-demo-swords-at-dsei.aspx> accessed 27 Apr 13).

⁷⁵ The iRobot website states that, 'iRobot's combat-proven unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) perform multiple missions and save lives every day. More than 5,000 UGVs have been delivered to military and civil defense forces worldwide, successfully performing search, reconnaissance, bomb disposal and other dangerous missions while protecting those in harm's way' (see http://www.irobot.com/global/en/explore_irobot/government_industrial_robots.aspx accessed 27 Apr 13).

⁷⁶ The Dragon Runner robot is the UK MOD's 'lightweight, back-packable, multi-terrain robot capable of detecting a variety of devices without putting the operator in harm's way, which helps bomb disposal experts find and deactivate improvised explosive devices (IEDs)' (see <https://www.army.mod.uk/equipment/23256.aspx> accessed 27 Apr 13).

⁷⁷ Singer, *Wired For War*, calls the Warrior a mobile platform with a USB port on top (p25). Approximately 5 times larger than the PackBot the Warrior can 'run a four-minute mile for five hours, while carrying 100 pounds. Yet it is agile enough to fit through a doorway and go up stairs' (Ibid., p24).

⁷⁸ Foster-Millar state that the SWORDS is:

- Rugged all-terrain, all-weather tracked vehicle with day/night capability
- Weighing around 200 lb (90 kg), it's man-portable, easily transported and instantly ready for use
- US Army safety confirmation for M249 Squad Automatic Weapon and M240 Medium Machine Gun (pending). Can be equipped with mounts for M16 rifle, Barrett .50 calibre, 40 mm grenade launcher and M202 anti-tank rocket systems
- High flotation and traction for operations in soft sand, mud, snow or heavy brush and can climb stairs, negotiates rock piles, and can traverse concertina wire
- Controlled by RF from an attaché-sized operator control unit (OCU)– the TALON is widely regarded by user community as being amongst the easiest robot to operate, particularly in a hostile environment
- Vehicle speed of up to 5.5 mph (8 kmh)

See <http://www.qinetiq.com/news/PressReleases/Pages/talon-robots-demo-swords-at-dsei.aspx> (accessed 27 Apr 13).

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ On its website Qinetiq states that, 'One of the most innovative capabilities of MAARS is the ability to apply non-lethal force by projecting the operator's voice through mounted loudspeakers, or alternatively to pulse a green, eye-safe laser to dazzle people. In addition, MAARS' two-way communication features allow the operator to interact from a safe distance. MAARS also has the capability to launch 40mm less-lethal ammunition, such as bean bags, smoke, star clusters and pepper spray, and lethal ammunition. If lethal action is required, an operator can launch 40mm high-explosive grenades or engage with the powerful M240B medium machine gun firing 7.62mm ammunition'. See, <http://www.qinetiq.com/news/pressreleases/Pages/qna-ships-first-maars-robot.aspx> (accessed 4 May 13). Singer observes that loudspeaker enables the user of the MAARS system to warn any insurgents 'that resistance is futile' (Singer, *Wired For War* p111). No doubt that some readers would recall that this phrase is synonymous with the spics called the Borg in the *Star Trek the Next Generation* series. The Borg are essentially a cyborg blend of human and machine. Fox News referred to the Talon / SWORDS platform as the 'G.I. of the 21st Century' (Cited in Singer, *Wired For War*, p31).

⁸¹ The SGR-1 has been deployed in the Demilitarised Zone by South Korea. The photo depicts a surrendering enemy soldier. See, 'Losing Humanity' Human Rights Watch, <http://www.hrw.org/print/reports/2012/11/19/losing-humanity>

⁸² See <http://www.sourcesecurity.com/news/articles/co-1437-ga.7914.html> (accessed 28 Apr 13).

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Singer, *Wired For War*, p38.

⁸⁵ Ibid. Singer notes that the Mk15 was known by sailors as R2-D2 because of the cylindrical shell that tilts and moves in circles. He also comments that the CRAM version had an unfortunate incident, ‘R2-D2 apparently once mistook an American helicopter flying over Baghdad for the Emperor’s Death Star. It locked in on the chopper to shoot it down, as if it were a rocket with some funny rotors spinning on the top. So CRAM had to be reconfigured to avoid any ‘blue on blue’ friendly fire incidents’.

⁸⁶ See, <http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/international-politics/4961-iai-introduce-jumper-new-autonomous-artillery-ground-forces.html> (accessed 28 Apr 13).

⁸⁷ Ibid. In the same report it states that the ‘JUMPER system provides the maneuvering force commander with autonomous, immediate, and precise fire regardless of weather and visibility conditions. Thus, a significant effect is achieved against a variety of target types, especially in urban operations where collateral damage is a major concern. The missile is armed with several possible warheads for fire missions that require prompt and accurate response’.

⁸⁸ See http://www.samsungtechwin.com/product/product_05_01_01.asp (accessed 29 Apr 13).

⁸⁹ This vehicle is about the size of a golf cart (Singer, *Wired For War*, p111) and has been designed to provide a wide range of functions from reconnaissance, much like the manned scout vehicles CVRT, while having the capability to directly engage with an enemy target using its heavy machine guns, anti-tank missiles and a variety of non-lethal weapons (see, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/gladiator.htm> accessed 4 May 13).

⁹⁰ <http://www.lockheedmartin.co.uk/us/news/press-releases/2013/february/mfc-021913-LM-SMSS-UnmannedVehicle.html> (accessed 28 Apr 13).

⁹¹ For a fuller account see, http://www.army-guide.com/eng/article/article_2254.html (accessed 28 Apr 13). For an example of it plotting its own course see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1pl_Pont_Zk

⁹² Singer, *Wired For War*, p55.

⁹³ This UAV is a surveillance vehicle and based upon the Israeli Hermes 450 UAV. The WatchKeeper is a joint UK and Israeli company venture for the UK MOD. See <http://www.aviationweek.com/blogs.aspx?plckblogid=blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckcontroller=blog&plckscript=blogs&plckelementid=blogdest&plckblogpage=blogviewpost&plckpostid=blog%253a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7post%253a1d3ee0cb-33bd-4f0b-be8a-819838a48d04> (accessed 29 Apr 13).

⁹⁴ Although the Predator was originally designed as a surveillance vehicle, the decision to arm it with Hellfire missiles was taken after 9/11 (see Singer, *Wired For War*, p35). The MQ-9 Reaper Hunter / Killer UAV is a development of the Predator and is capable of carrying a variety of weapons systems. For a general introduction to this development and weapon specifications see <http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/predator-uav/> (accessed 29 Apr 13). The RAF has bought a number of the MQ-9 versions and currently flies them from RAF Waddington, see <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-lincolnshire-22320275> (accessed 2 Apr 13).

⁹⁵ In the *Daily Telegraph* report on its unveiling it stated that, ‘a spokesman for the MOD added: “Tarans is the first of its kind in the UK. Unmanned Air Vehicles play an important role on operations, helping to reduce the risks faced by military personnel on the front line”’ (<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9797738/British-stealth-drone-to-undergo-first-test-flight.html> accessed 29 Apr 13).

⁹⁶ See <http://www.army-technology.com/projects/raytheon-xos-2-exoskeleton-us/> (accessed 29 Apr 13).

⁹⁷ For an overview see, <http://www.lockheedmartin.co.uk/us/products/hulc.html> (accessed 29 Apr 13).

⁹⁸ See, http://www.army-technology.com/projects/land_warrior/ (accessed 29 Apr 13). This article highlights that although this system was quite advanced in its development, the US Department of Defense announced the proposed cancellation of the Land warrior System.

⁹⁹ It is difficult not to recognise the similarities between this level of integration and that of the human functioning with Lang’s giant machine in *Metropolis*, only this time the battlefield has replaced the industrialised factory.

¹⁰⁰ Coker, *Warrior Geeks*, p57.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid., p24.

¹⁰³ A Clark, *Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p3. In this book he seeks to establish one of his main points in the first few pages. ‘The human mind’ he states, ‘if it is to be the physical organ of human reason, simply cannot be seen as bound and restricted by the biological skinbag’ (p4).

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p7.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p6. He is convinced that ‘what makes us distinctively human is our capacity to continually restructure and rebuild our own mental circuitry, courtesy of an empowering web of culture, education, technology, and artefacts’ (p10).

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p39. His point is that for millennium humans did not always keep precise time. As a consequence, ‘the transition from a natural-time society to our present arrangements for work and play was mediated by a long thread of technological evolution’ (p40). Clark then unpacks the implications of asking someone if they know the time as opposed to asking someone if they know the meaning of an obscure word. The clock and wrist watch are only two of what he describes as old technologies (the pen, paper, books, written words, numerical notations) that comprise the invisible props and aids that scaffold and empower our daily thought and action (p43).

¹⁰⁷ T Taylor, *The Artificial Ape: How Technology Changed the Course of Human Evolution* (London: Palgrave, 2010).

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p33. The main purpose of his book is not concerned about ‘why, but how we gained intelligence. I want to know *how it was that we did not remain stupid* when evolutionary pressure should have made brain expansion beyond the chimpanzee level physically possible’ (emphasis original) p29.

¹⁰⁹ In Taylor’s book, *The Artificial Ape*, p77, he discusses the progressive refinement of tools that occurred over time (he mentions his belief that some date as far back as 2.52 million years).

¹¹⁰ J Lanier, *You are not a gadget* (New York; Knoff, 2010) p6. According to his publishers, Jaron Lanier is known as the father of virtual reality technology (taken from brief bio inside dust cover).

¹¹¹ Ibid., p8.

¹¹² Singer, *Wired For War*, p101.

¹¹³ Ibid., p97. Although this particular law relates the microchip doubling in speed, it is also used to depict the exponential rate of technological progress in general. Moore’s law states that transistor density on integrated circuits doubles about every two years. See http://download.intel.com/museum/Moores_Law/Printed_Materials/Moores_Law_Backgrounder.pdf (accessed 8 May 13). See also Lanier, *You are not a gadget*, p101-102.

¹¹⁴ R Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near* (downloaded from <http://www.hfg-resources.googlecode.com/files/SingularityIsNear.pdf> (accessed 23 Apr 13). This book was originally published by Viking in 2005.

¹¹⁵ DD Noble, ‘The militarization of learning and intelligence in US education’, in L Levidow and K Robins (eds) *Cyborg Worlds: the military information society* (London: Free Association Books, 1989), p15.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.,

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p34.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p33. Noble contends that the purpose is to reduce people to their generic cognitive components (p32). In a disembodied, decontextualized and depersonalised state, humans can become adaptable to any and all technological man/machines systems (p32).

¹¹⁹ CH Gray, ‘The cyborg soldier: The US military and the post-modern warrior’, in L Levidow and K Robins (eds) *Cyborg Worlds: the military information society* (London: Free Association Books, 1989), p43. He recognises ‘that post-modern war calls for more than one type of soldier. At a minimum there must be those who can perform almost mindlessly under extreme conditions that most humans cannot bear’ (p51).

¹²⁰ See, R Allen, ‘The Unreal Enemy of America’s Army’, in *Games and Culture* (2011) Vol 6, No 1 p38.

¹²¹ Maj C Chambers, TD Sherlock and Maj P Kucik, *Connecting With America: The Army Game Project*, (June 2002) p59, downloaded from http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2002/6/Documents/Chambers_0602.pdf (accessed 25 May 2013).

¹²² Allen, ‘The Unreal Enemy of America’s Army’, p43.

¹²³ See M Urlocker and R Smith, ‘How the US Army Got Game’ in *Strategy & Innovation* (p2) downloaded from www.modelbenders.com/papers/Got_Game.pdf (accessed 23 May 2013).

¹²⁴ Ibid., p1

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p5.

¹²⁷ Chambers, et.al., *Connecting With America*, (p59).

¹²⁸ AR Galloway, ‘Social Realism in Gaming’, in *Game Studies* (2004) Vol 4, No 1, p8-9: downloaded from <http://gamestudies.org/0401/galloway/> (accessed 20 May 13). On the official website it states that the various scenarios in the game ‘are all based on true stories’, see, http://www.underash.net/en_download.htm (accessed 26 May 13).

¹²⁹ *Special Force 2* was released in 2007. See, N Robinson, ‘Video Games, Persuasion and the War on Terror’, in *Political Studies* (Oct 2012) Vol 60, No 3, p517.

¹³⁰ Galloway, ‘Social Realism in Gaming’, p8.

¹³¹ Robinson, ‘Video Games’, p517.

¹³² Galloway, ‘Social Realism in Gaming’, p8. Robinson, ‘Video Games’, (p518) also makes the same point.

¹³³ Galloway, ‘Social Realism in Gaming’, p9.

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- ¹³⁴ See, H Tawil Souri, 'The Political Battlefield of Pro-Arab Video Games on Palestinian Screens', in *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* (2007) Vol 27, No 3, p536-551.
- ¹³⁵ Allen, 'The Unreal Enemy of America's Army', p40.
- ¹³⁶ Ibid., p52.
- ¹³⁷ Robinson, 'Video Games', p519.
- ¹³⁸ R Weber, KM Behr, R Tamborini, U Ritterfeld and K Mathiak, 'What Do We Really Know About First-Person-Shooter Games? An Even-Related, high Resolution Content Analysis', in the *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* (2009) Vol 14, p1017.
- ¹³⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁴⁰ See, KA Mathiak, M Klasen, R Weber, H Ackermann, SS Shergill and K Mathiak, 'Reward system and temporal pole contributions to affective evaluation during a first person shooter video game' downloaded from <http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/12/66> published 12 July 2011 (accessed 25 May 13).
- ¹⁴¹ Coker, *Warrior Geeks*, p124.
- ¹⁴² Baroness Greenfield has been Professor of Synaptic Pharmacology since 1996 at Oxford. Her book, *You and Me: The Neuroscience of Identity* (London: Notting Hill, 2011) represents the latest findings in neuroscience.
- ¹⁴³ Ibid., p114.
- ¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p115.
- ¹⁴⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁴⁶ Ibid. She states that 'the two types of device are converging' (p115).
- ¹⁴⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p118.
- ¹⁴⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p127.
- ¹⁵¹ Although the correct terminology is an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) the use of the word 'drone' has become ubiquitous in the media and common usage. In this section the word drone will be used interchangeably with the term UAV.
- ¹⁵² See 'UN rapporteur Emmerson hails 'historic' Obama drone vow' <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22653476> (accessed 28 May 13).
- ¹⁵³ See, T McKelvey 'Obama shows a strong commitment to the drone programme' <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22646446> (accessed 28 May 13).
- ¹⁵⁴ The UK primarily uses its UAVs in support of land operations in Afghanistan whereas the US has used them in other countries, for example, Pakistan, Somalia and the Yemen. See, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22653476> (accessed 28 May 13).
- ¹⁵⁵ For example see, 'Hundreds of anti-drone protesters march against UK flight-control centre' in the *Guardian* 27 Apr 13, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/27/anti-drone-protestors-march-uk> (accessed 28 May 13).
- ¹⁵⁶ For example, some UK Churches have raised serious concerns. See, S Hucklesby, P Lee, P Morrison, E Reed and P Schulte, *Drones: Ethical Dilemmas in the Application of Military Force* (2013). This document was jointly commissioned and published by the Baptist Union of Great Britain, the Methodist Church and the United Reformed Church. The document highlights various ethical concerns on the use of UAVs. For an overview of the issues the group primarily dealt with see, <http://www.jointpublicissues.org.uk/drones-ethical-dilemmas-in-the-application-of-military-force/> (accessed 28 May 13). Some other organisational bodies have produced reports highlighting concerns over the use of UAVs. See, *Losing Humanity*, published by Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Harvard Law School's International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) (19 Nov 12) download from <http://www.hrw.org/print/reports/2012/11/19/losing-humanity> (accessed 20 Nov 12).
- ¹⁵⁷ Coker, *Warrior Geeks*, p19. The play, with an English translation by David Wylie can be downloaded from <http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/c/capek/karel/rur/act0.html> (accessed 28 May 13).
- ¹⁵⁸ Singer, *Wired For War*, p66.
- ¹⁵⁹ Singer, *Wired For War*, p67.
- ¹⁶⁰ 'Losing Humanity', p3.
- ¹⁶¹ Ibid.
- ¹⁶² For a brief introductory history see: H McDaid and D Oliver, *Robot Warriors: The Top Secret History Of The Pilotless Plane* (London: Orion Media, 1997); LR Newcome, *Unmanned Aviation: A Brief History of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2004); SJ Zaloga, *Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Robotic Air Warfare 1917-2007* (Oxford: Osprey, 2008).
- ¹⁶³ Hezbollah is one example. See, Singer, *Wired For War*, p164; and <http://news.sky.com/story/1082972/israeli-jet-shoots-down-hezbollah-drone> (accessed 25 Apr 13) for an example of a more recent alleged use of drones by the same non-state actor.

¹⁶⁴ *The UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems* (MOD Joint Doctrine Note 2/11, 30 March 2011) Chapter

p1. Newcome, *Unmanned Aviation*, p134.

¹⁶⁵ *The UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems*, chapter 5-1. For a fuller treatment of the various legal issues see, T Gillespie and R West, 'Requirements for Autonomous Unmanned Air Systems set by Legal Issues', *The International C2 Journal* (2010) Vol 4, No 2, p2: (Defence Science and Technology Laboratories, UK), available from <http://www.dstl.gov.uk/html4/journal/v4n2.html> (accessed 28 May 13).

¹⁶⁷ For example, the rate of fire and general utility of a General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG) is a known and predictable quantity. Its cyclic rate of fire (750 rounds per minute) will not alter whether a human finger is on its trigger or whether one of the robotic weapons platforms, highlighted in the previous sub-section, is causing it to discharge. Its cyclic rate will continue to be 750 rounds per minute. See, <http://www.army.mod.uk/equipment/23226.aspx> for a detailed overview of the GPMG's characteristics and capabilities (accessed 8 May 13).

¹⁶⁸ This is laid out in detail in, *The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict*, UK Ministry of Defence, (Oxford: OUP, 2005).

¹⁶⁹ Hucklesby, et al., *Drones: Ethical Dilemmas*, p9. This report recognises that the UK has a different approach from its key ally the US on the use of drones.

¹⁷⁰ B Burridge, 'UAVs and the Dawn of Post-Modern Warfare: A Perspective on Recent Operations', in *RUSI Journal* (Oct 2003) p21-22.

¹⁷¹ For example see, JA Sluka, 'Death From Above: UAVs and Losing Hearts and Minds' in *Military Review* (March-April 2013) p89-95; Tom Engelhardt, 'Gods and Monsters: Fighting American Wars From on High', *Truthout*, Tuesday 13 Apr 2010 <http://archive.truthout.org/tom-engelhardt-gods-and-monsters58552> (accessed 27 May 13).

Engelhardt argues that the American administration is acting like the gods of Greek mythology, who live a great distance from the lives of ordinary mortal men but who act quite freely from above, frequently dealing out death from above.

¹⁷² C Friedersdorf, 'Obama's Execution of the Drone War Should Terrify Even Drone Defenders' *The Atlantic*, 12 Jul 2012 downloaded from <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/07/obamas-execution-of-the-drone-war-should-terrify-even-drone-defenders/259704/> (accessed 29 May 13). G Greenwald refers to US policy on the use of UAVs as 'America's Drone Sickness' and a 'policy of rampant slaughter'. See, G Greenwald, 'America's Drone Sickness', in *Salon.com*, 19 Apr 2012, downloaded from http://www.salon.com/2012/04/19/americas_drone_sickness/ (accessed 29 May 13). Greenwald is a former Constitutional and civil rights litigator. T Juno, 'The Lethal Presidency of Barack Obama' in *Esquire* Aug 12, downloaded from <http://www.esquire.com/features/obama-lethal-presidency-0812> (accessed 28 May 13) maintains that President Obama has made 'killing rather than capture of individuals the option of first resort'

¹⁷³ ME O'Connell, 'Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009', *Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper* No. 09-43 (Nov 2009) downloaded from <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144> (accessed 29 May 13). O'Connell is, Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law and Research Professor of International Dispute Resolution—Kroc Institute.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p2.

¹⁷⁵ She contends that 'an armed response to a terrorist attack or a nuclear weapons program will almost never meet these parameters for the lawful exercise of self-defense' (p15).

¹⁷⁶ She maintains that, 'terrorist attacks are generally treated as criminal acts because they have all the hallmarks of crimes, not armed attacks that can give rise to the right of self-defense' (p15). 'A government may only resort to military force if the use of force by an opposing armed group is significant. In other cases, international human rights law restricts governments to the use of force permissible to police in responding to violent crime' (p16).

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p26.

¹⁷⁸ JJ Paust, 'Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of US Use of Drones in Pakistan' in the *Journal of International Law & Policy* (2010) Vol 19, No 2, p279.

¹⁷⁹ PM Cullen, *The Role of Targeted Killing in the Campaign Against Terror*, downloaded from <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA471529> (accessed 26 May 13). Col Peter M Cullen is the Staff Judge Advocate, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) at Fort Campbell, US. Cullen was a significant dialogue partner in Prof Mary O'Connell's paper, 'Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones'.

¹⁸⁰ O'Connell, 'Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones', maintains that, 'there is no need for new rules. If terrorist suspects are located in a state other than the United States, the U.S. may offer assistance. The *jus in bello* will apply if there is an armed conflict in the state. Peacetime criminal law applies if not' (p17).

¹⁸¹ ML Gross, *Moral Dilemmas Of Modern War: Torture, Assassination and Blackmail in an Age of Asymmetric Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) p105.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ A Etzioni, 'The Great Drone Debate', in *Military Review* (March-April 2013) p8. Gross, *Moral Dilemmas Of Modern War*, makes a similar point, 'following the rules of law enforcement would extend greater rights to guerrillas and terrorists than regular combatants enjoy. This is counterintuitive...something is amiss.' (p104).

¹⁸⁴ Article 148 states that 'the law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile government, an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by a captor more, any more than modern law of peace allows such intentional outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage'. The Lieber Code may be downloaded from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp (accessed 20 May 13). Francis Lieber had been asked by President Lincoln to formulate the rules of war to be used by the Union Army. It was promulgated as General Orders No 100, 24 April 1863. In his examination of the Lieber Code, Gross notes that the Allies rarely targeted individuals for assassination: the killing of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto a rare example (Gross, *Moral Dilemmas Of Modern War*, p104).

¹⁸⁵ Gross, *Moral Dilemmas Of Modern War*, p107.

¹⁸⁶ Singer, *Wired For War*, p65.

¹⁸⁷ Coker, *Warrior Geeks*, p150.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., p151.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p152.

¹⁹⁰ Cited by T Weiner, 'New Model Army Soldier Rolls Closer to Battle', *The New York Times*, 16 Nov 2005 downloaded from

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/16/technology/16robots.html?_r=0 (accessed 30 May 13).

¹⁹¹ A William Evans III, 'An Introduction to Human-Robot Interaction in Military Applications' (p3) in *Human-Robot Interactions in Future Military Operations*, ed., M Barnes and F Jentsch (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010).

¹⁹² Coker, *Warrior Geeks*, chapter 1 'Hacking the Future' spends some time looking at various themes within science fiction and how those who developed their themes were commenting more on their own understanding of their life settings than simply trying to predict the future.

¹⁹³ See, MJ Barnes and AW Evans III, 'Soldier-Robot teams in Future Battlefields: An Overview', in *Human-Robot Interactions in Future Military Operations*, ed., M Barnes and F Jentsch (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010) p9-29.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., p10.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p14-15.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p14.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p18. Barnes and Evans acknowledge that 'in practice, automation is often impractical and it presents its own problems. Humans tend to over-rely and under-rely on automated systems depending on the tasking environment'.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p23.

²⁰⁰ RR Murphy and Jennifer L Burke, 'The Safe Human-Robot Ratio' in *Human-Robot Interactions in Future Military Operations*, ed., M Barnes and F Jentsch (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010) p33. In their work they refute the suggestion that a 1:1 ratio is safe (p35). They maintain that a 2:1 or 3:1 was considered a safer ratio (p35).

²⁰¹ See, WC Marra and SK McNeil, 'Understanding "The Loop": Regulating The Next Generation of War Machines', in the *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy* (2013), Vol 36, No 3, p10. They ask, 'Why did American F-18 fighter planes get the better of Soviet MiG-5 jets during the Korean War? Air Force pilot and military strategist John Boyd's answer to this question transformed the military's approach to victory in battle. Boyd's insight was that in a dogfight, the advantage lay with the fighter pilot who could make faster and more accurate decisions than his opponent, and who was able to throw his opponent's decision-making "loop" out of sync. Boyd distilled human decision-making using a four-step process: *Observe, Orient, Decide, Act*. In Boyd's "OODA Loop," a person first *observes* the world around her, gathering data about her environment through the array of human senses. Second, she *orients* herself, or interprets the information she has gathered. Third, she weighs the potential courses of action based on the knowledge she has accumulated and *decides* how to act. Fourth and finally, she *acts*, or executes the decision she has made'. Although they acknowledge that this OODA loop is not without its flaws (p11), it is nevertheless a useful lens for understanding system design. The figure below is their depiction of Boyd's OODA Loop.

²⁰² Murphy and Burke, 'The Safe Human-Robot Ratio' p46.

²⁰³ Singer, *Wired For War*, p357.

²⁰⁴ The video footage of the actual event clearly shows two missiles being fired by the *Vincennes* on the 3 July and records the reaction of the crew members to the successful strike. See the BBC documentary available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=50sYFs6p7lk> (accessed 14 Jun 13).

²⁰⁵ See, GC Wilson, 'Navy Missile Downes Iranian Jetliner' *Washington Post* (Monday, 4 July, 1988) downloaded from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/flight801/stories/july88crash.htm> (accessed 2 June 13).

Iran accused the United States of a 'barbaric massacre' and vowed to 'avenge the blood of our martyrs.' President Reagan in a statement said he was 'saddened to report' that the *Vincennes* 'in a proper defensive action' had shot down the jetliner. 'This is a terrible human tragedy. Our sympathy and condolences go out to the passengers, crew, and their families We deeply regret any loss of life'.

²⁰⁶ In the BBC documentary (see above) the *Vincennes* warned the unidentified F14 fighter jet to alter course. The *Vincennes* also gave a warning to 'the unidentified aircraft' that was approaching its position. Flight 655 was on its correct flight path. The *Vincennes* had entered Iranian national waters in pursuit of small gun-boats. However, it is highly unlikely that the crew of Flight 655 recognised that they were the intended recipients of the warnings as they were broadcasting the correct IFF signal.

²⁰⁷ Singer, *Wired For War*, p125.

²⁰⁸ The USS *Vincennes* was a TICONDEROGA-class cruiser. It had a crew of 33 Officers, 27 Chief Petty Officers and approximately 340 Enlisted sailors. It had a displacement of 9,600 tons and cost approximately \$1 Billion dollars. It was armed with two MK26 missile launchers capable of firing a range of missiles, Harpoon missile launchers, MK46 torpedoes, two MK45 5-inch lightweight guns and two Phalanx CIWS. In addition it carried two SH-60 Seahawk helicopters. For a fuller description see, <http://navysite.de/cg/cg49.html> (accessed 14 Jun 13).

²⁰⁹ See the US Senate's, Committee On Armed Services' *Investigation into the Downing of an Iranian Airliner by the USS "Vincennes"*, available at <http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/ir655-sasc-19880908.html> (accessed 15 Jun 13) which states that Flight 655 was using a civilian IFF and ascending not descending.

²¹⁰ RC Arkin, 'The Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems', in *JME* (2010) Vol 9, No 4, p333. Arkin cites the case of the USS *Vincennes* as a possible example of how the problem of 'scenario fulfilment' might have contributed to the downing of Flight 655.

²¹¹ See, Article 36, *Killer Robots: UK Government Policy on Fully Autonomous Weapons* (April 2013) available from <http://www.article36.org/cat4-weapons-review/killer-robots-uk-government-policy-on-fully-autonomous-weapons-2/> (accessed 23 May 13). Article 36 is a UK NGO concerned with policy and legal controls to prevent harm from weapons. In March 2012 the organisation called for a ban on fully autonomous armed robots.

²¹² See <http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/unifeed/2013/05/geneva-lethal-autonomous-robotics/> (accessed 24 May 13).

²¹³ See, Article 36, *Killer Robots* and HRW and IHRC *Losing Humanity*.

²¹⁴ Lord Astor of Hever (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Defence; Conservative), House of Lords debate, 26 March 2013. See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldhansrd/text/130326-0001.htm#st_14 (accessed 16 Jun 13). Lord Astor also maintained that the MOD had 'no intention of developing systems that operate without human intervention'. The issue here is that Lord Astor may well have been entirely correct when he spoke. However, intentions change as situations develop that challenge previously held views.

²¹⁵ PW Singer, 'Robots at War: The New Battlefield', in *The Wilson Quarterly* (Winter 2009) p7, where he quotes a retired Army Colonel Thomas Adams.

²¹⁶ See R Holmes, *Acts of War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003) chapter 4 'A View of the Field' p148-175.

- ²¹⁷ PW Singer, 'Gaming the Robot Revolution: A Military Technology Expert Weighs in on Terminator Salvation', in *Slate* (22 May 2009) available from http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/life_and_art/2009/05/gaming_the_robot_revolution.html (accessed 16 Jun 13).
- ²¹⁸ Singer, 'Robots at War' p7. See also, N Sharkey, 'The Automation and Poliferation of Military Drones and the protection of Civilians', in *Law, Innovation and Technology* (2011) Vol 3, No 2, p229-240.
- ²¹⁹ BJ Strawser, 'Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles', in *JME* (2010) Vol 9, No 4, p344. Strawser calls this the principle of unnecessary risk, which he considers to be uncontroversial (p344) and a sound moral principal. He does offer 'one important caveat: The justification of remotely controlled weapons in war here assumes that their employment is done as part of a fully justified war effort meeting both *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* criteria' (p348).
- ²²⁰ See, RC Arkin, 'The Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems', in *JME* (2010) Vol 9, No 4, p332-331.
- ²²¹ *Ibid.*, p334. See, U.S. Surgeon General's Office, *Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) IV Operation Iraqi Freedom 0507*, Final Rep., Nov. 17, 2006, available from http://www.combatreform.org/MHAT_IV_Report_17NOV06.pdf (accessed 16 Jun 13).
- ²²² *Ibid.*, p338. 'The primary goal remains', he contends 'to enforce international humanitarian law or the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) on the battlefield in a manner that is believed achievable, by creating a class of robots that not only comply with the restrictions of international law, but in fact outperform human soldiers in their ethical capacity under comparable circumstances. If successful this will result in the saving of non-combatant life and property, ideally without erosion of mission performance. It is too early to tell whether this venture will be successful' (p339).
- ²²³ RC Arkin, 'Ethical Robots in Warfare', in *IEEE Technology and Society Magazine* (2009) Vol 28, No 1 p30.
- ²²⁴ J Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing: Face to Face Killing in 20th Century Warfare* (London: Granta, 1999) p173.
- ²²⁵ D Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (New York: Back Bay, 1995) p202-213.
- ²²⁶ R Tonkens, 'The Case Against Robotic Warfare: A Response to Arkin', in *JME* (2012) Vol 11, No 2, p160.
- ²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p161.
- ²²⁸ Grossman, *On Killing*, p4.
- ²²⁹ *Ibid.*
- ²³⁰ See C Coker, *Ethics and War in the 21st Century* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008) p88-91 who takes issue with what he regards as American 'Unspeak' ('a mode of speech that persuades by stealth') which encourages a form of 'ethical blindness'.
- ²³¹ Among the examples that could be sited, the torture at Abu Ghraib and the torture and murder of Baha Mousa are sufficient to illustrate the point.
- ²³² Tonkens, 'The Case Against Robotic Warfare' p158. He maintains that 'one of the most appealing roles for autonomous robots in war would be to evaluate the conduct of human soldiers and the overall justness of wars in general'.
- ²³³ See, N Sharkey, 'Cassandra or False Prophet of Doom: AI Robots and War', in *IEEE Intelligent Systems* (July/August 2008) p14-17; 'Saying "No!" to Lethal Autonomous Targeting', in *JME* (2010) Vol 9, No 4, p369-383; 'The Automation and Proliferation of Military Drones and the protection of Civilians' in *Law, Innovation and Technology* (2011) Vol 3, No 2, p229-240; 'The inevitability of autonomous robot warfare', in *International Review of the Red Cross*, (2013) p1-13. Sharkey deliberately uses the word inevitability to emphasise his point that fully autonomous robot warfare is not inevitable.
- ²³⁴ Sharkey, 'Cassandra or False Prophet of Doom' p16.
- ²³⁵ Sharkey, 'Saying "No!" to Lethal Autonomous Targeting' p376.
- ²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p377. The model he cites is that of the US Navy, which he describes as: (i) scripted; (ii) supervised; (3) intelligent. For Sharkey, the two most important are supervised and intelligent. For a more detailed treatment of this see, PM Asaro, 'What should we want from robotic ethic?' in *International Review of Information Ethics* 6 (2006) p9-16.
- ²³⁷ *Ibid.*, p378. He contends that 'as unmanned drones react in micro – or nanoseconds, the humans will no longer be "in the loop" but rather "on the loop" – monitoring the execution of certain decisions'.
- ²³⁸ Sharkey, 'Cassandra or False Prophet of Doom' p16.
- ²³⁹ Sharkey, 'Saying "No!" to Lethal Autonomous Targeting' p379.
- ²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²⁴¹ Sharkey, 'Cassandra or False Prophet of Doom' p16.
- ²⁴² K Anderson and M Waxman, 'Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers', *Columbia Law School: Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper*, Group paper Number 12-313 (2012) p3.

- ²⁴³ Singer, 'Robots at War' p6.
- ²⁴⁴ Anderson and Waxman, 'Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers' use this image (p5).
- ²⁴⁵ D Howlader and J Giordano, 'Advanced Robotics: Changing the Nature of War' in *Journal of Philosophy, Science and Law* (2013) Vol 13, p6. It should be noted that Howlader and Giordano were using a more generic example of the using of robotic systems that offered an alternative to human casualties.
- ²⁴⁶ Anderson and Waxman, 'Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers' p5.
- ²⁴⁷ Ibid., p11.
- ²⁴⁸ Sharkey, 'Cassandra or False Prophet of Doom' p16.
- ²⁴⁹ Coker, *Ethics and War*, p152. Coker makes the point that 'we enter a new century knowing all too well that our ethical imagination is still failing to catch up with the fast expanding realm of our ethical responsibilities' (p152).
- ²⁵⁰ M Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (New York: Picador, 2000) p161.
- ²⁵¹ Coker, *Ethics and War*, p150.
- ²⁵² M van Creveld, *On Future War* (London: Brassey's, 1991) p273.
- ²⁵³ P Kahn, 'The Paradox of Riskless War', in *Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly*, (Summer 2002) Vol 22, p 3.
- ²⁵⁴ Coker, *Warrior Geeks*, p262.
- ²⁵⁵ Singer, *Wired for War*, p432.
- ²⁵⁶ See Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers*, chapter 10 'War and Peace' p129-138. He begins by quoting from St Augustine's master peace *The City of God*, 'Wars themselves then are conducted with the intention of peace, even when they are conducted by those concerned to exercise their martial prowess in command and battle' (Book XIX, chapter 12).
- ²⁵⁷ This is a consistent fear in much of the literature (already cited in this chapter) opposed to LARs.
- ²⁵⁸ See, D Whetham, 'Remote Killing and Drive-By Wars in *Protecting Civilians in Asymmetric Conflict: Theoretical and Practical Issues for the 21st Century*, Lovell & Primoratz (Eds), (Farnham, Ashgate, 2012) . 209. Whetham regards such a notion as perverse.
- ²⁵⁹ Coker, *Warrior Geeks*, p127-132 asks if war will be seen as a video game.
- ²⁶⁰ Whetham, 'Remote Killing' p204 asks, 'how much easier then must this be if the person 'pulling the trigger' is 8,000 miles away to begin with? There is no need to look anyone 'in the eye' — they are just pixels on a screen'.
- ²⁶¹ Singer, *Wired For War*, p395.
- ²⁶² Sharkey, 'Saying "No!"' p371. See Coker, *Warrior Geeks* (p125-127).
- ²⁶³ See, 'Pentagon Cancels Controversial Unmanned and Cyber Medal' downloaded from <http://news.usni.org/2013/04/15/pentagon-cancels-controversial-unmanned-and-cyber-medal> (accessed 27 July 13). A 'distinguishing device' attachment will be affixed to existing medals rather than continue with the UAV/ Cyber medal, which according to the article cited, was ranked above the Bronze Star with valour.
- ²⁶⁴ For example, see Hucklesby, et.al., 'Drones: Ethical Dilemmas' p7-8.
- ²⁶⁵ Kahn, 'The Paradox of Riskless War' p7.
- ²⁶⁶ Ibid. p6. Kahn contends that, 'this means that the asymmetrical capacities of Western—and particularly U.S. forces—themselves create the conditions for increasing use of terrorism. This, in turn, creates a cycle of destruction outside of the boundaries of the battlefield, with its reliance on the distinction of combatants from non-combatants'.
- ²⁶⁷ Ibid., p7.

Chapter 8

Analysis and Discussion

8.1 Introduction

As articulated in chapter 1 and re-emphasised throughout, this thesis is an examination of the suggestion that a spectrum or continuum of meaning exists upon which the words ‘warrior’ and ‘weapons platform/battlefield technician’ maybe located. The idea of a spectrum with Achilles and the soldier as a battlefield technician/weapons platform at extreme ends of the imagined spectrum, establishes the space within which the generic British soldier in the 21st Century may reside in the social imaginary of the UK public. The focus throughout the thesis has been on the generic British soldier as imagined in the public sphere in twenty-first-century Britain and not upon what a warrior is or whether or not there has been some evolutionary journey from an Achilles warrior figure to a man/machine nexus. Consequently, the research question addressed in this thesis has been:

If a spectrum between Warrior and Weapons Platform is imagined, what does it tell us about how the nature of the British Soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary British society?

Located within a philosophical setting and indebted to Charles Taylor’s modern social imaginaries, a number of sub-questions were derived which functioned as the mechanism used to explore the thesis question in the six research chapters. They were:

- How is identity constructed in contemporary Western society?
- Does narrative shape concepts of identity?
- Is the difference between warrior and battlefield technician the difference between ‘being’ and ‘doing’?
- If the concept of the soldier as weapons platform/battlefield technician represents an instrumental notion of ontology (i.e. a unit of utility), does a focus on ‘doing’ potentially undermine ‘being’ and therefore the sustainment of fighting power?
- What societal factors shape where the generic British soldier might be imagined on the spectrum?
- Has war, or is war, changing and what impact does this have on the future nature of conflict and does this in turn impact on what is expected of the generic British soldier?

- How does the development of robotic technology impact upon what is expected of the generic British soldier?

The research chapters may be envisaged pictorially like this when placed on a spectrum of meaning:

Fig 11

Figure 11 offers a suggestion of how they might exist on the continuum of meaning for illustrative purposes only. One advantage with this diagram is that it visually highlights that most of the subjects examined in this thesis reside on some form of imagined sliding scale. For example, the difference between 'risk acceptance and risk aversion' is a concept that the 'man on the Clapham omnibus' will intuitively grasp. 'He' will readily grasp the possibilities of the two potential extremes and is likely to appreciate that when one moves the two extremes in sync towards the centre, a point will be reached where definition becomes difficult. In a similar fashion our 'man on the Clapham omnibus' will also intuitively grasp

the concept that an Achilles figure (involved in hand-to-hand combat) may be imagined residing at an extreme, whereas a soldier operating a robotic platform (remotely, miles from the battlefield) resides at another.




Fig 12

Figure 12 invites the reader to imagine the various subjects discussed in this thesis residing in a three dimensional setting. The complexity of the image illustrates, in a helpful manner, the multifaceted nature of various concepts co-existing as ideas in any construct of the public sphere. Any modern Western social imaginary, where societal existence is imagined, will be hugely complex. However, there is an important drawback to this approach. It presupposes that the realm, in which the generic British soldier resides in the twenty-first century, is singular. In chapter 4 the concept of sub-universes of reality or modes of being was discussed. In a postmodern world of multiverses, such a singular approach is clearly inadequate. While this objection has utility, nevertheless figure 12 offers at least one possibility of how some of the issues might exist in a multi-dimensional world of interacting and connecting thought and ideas.

This is the nature of the theoretical, philosophical framework this thesis envisages. It is not the systematic analysis or examination of an existing theory. Rather it is a construct within which different subjects have been considered with the purpose of enhancing our understanding of how any interaction between the subjects selected assist in comprehending the effect that collaboration might have on the research question. As humans we live an interpreted life in which the narratives we create enable us to make sense of the world around us as we construct, invest and give meaning to our lives. The British soldier exists within a lived setting, shaped and moulded by a multitude of social, cultural, political, religious, philosophical, historic, economic and technological theories, ideas, or constructs. The nature of the generic soldier in the twenty-first century emerges from the crucible of this community of themes and is continually shaped and moulded by that interaction.

8.2 *Using the Philosophical Framework*

One way of imagining how this framework might be used is to imagine a bespoke, if fictional, 3D graphic equaliser (for illustrative purposes only see figure 13).

Fig 13

In their simplest forms, stereo equalisers are a mechanism for the user to set the balance they require between simple bass and treble components of a music track. Most car stereo systems have them. Equalisers used by professional musicians, in contrast, are significantly more complex. A graphic equaliser offers the user the advantage of seeing a visual representation of the subtle changes made in the frequency response of the audio system. With most home recording studio software, the user has the option of a number of pre-set functions that can then be individually tailored by the user to achieve the exact tone he/she is seeking (for

example, small, medium, large concert hall or church or music hall). When using a graphic equaliser, the user can visually see the changes taking place.

The limitations of this approach are clearly obvious and are similar to those raised for figures 11 and 12. Although this thesis has maintained that there is a link between the narrative used to explain/justify an operation involving British troops and how UK society responds in relation to the validity of that narrative, the reader should exercise caution in imagining (using the analogy of the graphic equaliser) that setting a societal tone or response to an armed intervention is akin to an invisible hand sliding various controls along predetermined paths. Public opinion may be affected by a variety of sources, and is a powerful motivator for politicians directly effecting how issues (for example, large numbers of casualties) are interpreted. As noted earlier in this chapter, a postmodern society is complex and multivariate. The manner of any interaction between the subjects discussed in this thesis and an armed intervention will reflect the complexity of UK society. Nevertheless, as an intellectual device to envisage how the various topics discussed in this thesis might interact, this image of a graphic equaliser might offer a useful imaginative model.

Each of the sections and sub-sections in the thesis can be visualised as representing a single slide control with the position of each control making a direct contribution to the overall ability to create the required conditions in which an interventionist operation can be conducted and sustained. For example, if a situation arises in which there is an existential threat to UK security, (like that posed by Nazi Germany in the 1930s), it is probable that the narrative setting in this context will be apocalyptic and therefore override or dominate other factors such as risk aversion. In such a context, the British soldier will be expected to fight and sustain casualties in defence of her/his home, family and way of life. In other words, if the narrative setting is apocalyptic, the settings on the remainder of the graphic equaliser are largely irrelevant so long as the threat to the British way of life retains that characteristic.

Thankfully, the government's assessment is that the UK does not face such a threat. However, as the NSS indicated, the UK does face a number of serious threats, for example from international terrorism (including terrorism within Northern Ireland), insurgency and civil wars that might affect our strategic interests. The question of whether or not these threats will warrant a military intervention is much less clear-cut.

To facilitate further analysis, while incorporating the imagery of the graphic equaliser, the various chapters and their sections will be reduced to six propositions drawn from the content and conclusions of each chapter. This will provide a more succinct summary of the main arguments of the thesis.

8.3 Six Propositions

1. The identity of the warrior requires a narrative of war(fare) validated by the society with whom he/she is in relationship with. The identity of the soldier does not necessarily require a narrative of war.
2. The distinction between the warrior and the soldier is best framed in the language of 'being' and 'doing'. For the warrior their 'being' is intuited in combat; whereas the soldier requires a narrative that validates the required/expected output.
3. New wars are non-Clausewitzian. Any Western narrative will suffer narrative deflation in the soldier's daily experience in non-Western operational settings.
4. Post-modern, risk averse, post-heroic societies will struggle to generate a non-apocalyptic narrative capable of tolerating significant casualty numbers.
5. The question of intervention in a non-Western, non-permissive operational setting will examine the depth of liberal values in Western societies.
6. Though pragmatic, the development of robotic weapons stands in contradiction to the authenticity of the warrior and robs the West of the vitality of its liberal values.

8.4 Analysis

Proposition 1. The identity of the warrior requires a narrative of war(fare) validated by the society with whom he/she is in relationship with. The identity of the soldier does not necessarily require a narrative of war.

Adaptive, intelligent and determined adversaries will seek to either mitigate or nullify the technological advantage of an opponent. In Afghanistan NATO has a huge technical advantage over the Taliban. However, while ISAF soldiers have access to some of the most sophisticated weapons currently available in support of operations, the character of the environment is such that the fighting frequently resembles a low-tech, if high-intensity, conflict. The casualty rate during 2010-2011 for British soldiers was, in ratio terms, the highest since the Korean War. It is likely that this pattern of warfare will continue whenever Western militaries are tasked with confronting non-state actors drawn from a wide diaspora, particularly if any deployment is in a non-Western context. The operating environment will be (particularly if urban) congested, cluttered, contested, connected and constrained and in a globalised media centric age, tactical engagements may resemble strategic indicators. Conflict in this setting will likely be violent, bloody, and messy with large numbers of casualties both civilian and military. In 'war among the people' fighting is frequently at close quarters, with the engagement range between adversaries measured in metres rather kilometres. In this context, the generic British soldier needs to reside in the UK social imaginary towards the Achilles end of the spectrum than that represented by battlefield technician.

In a military intervention of choice (for example, not involving national survival but nevertheless requiring British soldiers to become involved in combat operations) the narrative required to justify and sustain such an operation would be located away from low mimesis and towards the apocalyptic end of the spectrum of figure 10. Although the UK is not yet casualty phobic, there has been an increasing trend to see soldiers killed on operations in Afghanistan as victims rather than agents or subjects of their own destiny. The paradoxical juxtaposition of the modern, volunteer soldier being seen as both hero and victim, if killed in the context of his/her profession of arms, will systematically erode the validity of the

narrative underpinning the military intervention. Such erosion will also have a direct impact upon the social dialogue in the public sphere that enables socially constructed identities to be internalised legitimately. The increasing public perception of the victimhood of fallen British soldiers and the interpretation of the soldier's death as a form of scandal, acts as a powerful counterbalance to the creation and sustainment of a narrative of war(fare) that validates the identity of the generic soldier as a warrior in British society.

In contrast, peacekeeping operations that carry a significantly lower risk of death and injury (UK peacekeeping operations, such as in Cyprus) require a narrative closer to the low mimesis end of the spectrum. In this scenario, the professional soldier is a force for good, operating in a relatively benign environment. In this context he is neither hero nor victim. Rather, as a professional he is simply discharging his duties as laid down in his/her standard operating procedures.

Proposition 2. The distinction between the warrior and the soldier is best framed in the language of 'being' and 'doing'. For the warrior their 'being' is intuited in combat; whereas the soldier requires a narrative that validates the required/expected output.

In the case of peacekeeping operations or those in support of civil authorities (for example, Op OLYMPICS, where the Army supplied thousands of troops or in the case of a civil emergency, such as major flooding) the role of the soldier is defined, very appropriately, by what they do and the tasks they perform. This of course would change in the case of a national emergency in which the security of the UK was under direct threat from an external (or as with Northern Ireland, an internal) enemy. In this case, as noted earlier, the soldier would be expected to fight. For the warrior, it is the actuality of fighting, and risk to life and limb, from which they intuit their 'being' in the experience of combat. It involves the deliberate taking of human life, not merely as a consequence of following a series of set procedures that culminate in life being lost but as a direct and deliberate act of will on the part of the warrior. Extrinsic conditioning has improved the soldier's performance in direct

contact with an adversary. However, with the warrior it is the intrinsic motivation to authenticity that motivates him/her to actively fight, undoubtedly drawing from their extrinsic training and skillset.

If soldiers are defined by what they do, the question may be raised concerning the validity of using British soldiers in combat operations in a non-Western setting, effectively intervening in 'someone else's war'. Any narrative constructed to justify this 'use' of British soldiers, in such a setting, would be subjected to severe criticism (genre wars) specifically on the issue of whether it was a legitimate use of soldiers. The recent experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan will only accentuate any debate. This goes to the heart of the issue of identity and how the nature of the British soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary British society. If the public view his/her nature as being towards the Achilles end of the spectrum, there will be an acceptance that it is entirely appropriate for the generic British soldier to be deployed in potential combat roles in a non-Western setting. If on the other hand, the British Army is thought of as being a fourth emergency service (alongside the Police, Fire Brigade and the Ambulance Service) then the use of the soldier in interventionist combat roles will be more difficult to sustain. Someone may then ask, 'can the generic soldier not do both roles' (combat and civil emergencies)? The answer is that s/he has combined both roles in the past; Bosnia and Kosovo are two examples. In a 'three-block war' the soldier may be required to move seamlessly between roles. However, in order to perform the role of 'sandbag filler', or 'petrol tanker driver' or 'fire fighter' and combat soldier fighting insurgents, the identity of the warrior/soldier must be sociologically available, validated and sustainable in that society, both during and after that intervention.

Proposition 3. New wars are non-Clausewitzian. Any Western narrative will suffer narrative deflation in the soldier's daily experience in non-Western operational settings.

Total war is the logical conclusion of trinitarian war. The instrumentalised character of Clausewitzian war was graphically manifested in the First and Second World Wars. Wars of national survival, or that are perceived as having that apocalyptic nature, will inevitably necessitate every element of that nation/society contributing to the survival of the whole. Consequently, those American soldiers who fought and died in their thousands on the island of Iwo Jima or British soldiers who fought and died in their thousands in the battles of North Africa did so in the belief that although far away from their native land, they were defending their nation and fighting for the survival of their way of life. In this context the only real calculation is twofold: 1, fight to defend one's national way of life; 2, accept the imposition of an alternative, alien, definition of what that way of life should look like or be expressed. In contrast, interventions of choice are not premised on an existential threat to UK security. UK participation in military interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Libya are recent examples of missions that posed no existential threat to UK security. New wars are another.

The narrative that British soldiers are in Afghanistan to help establish the conditions in which a Western sponsored, Afghan specific, political construct will not only be successful but help keep Islamist terrorism off British streets has been subjected to much debate. The lived experience of the soldier in Helmand province in Afghanistan, working from his Forward Operating Base (FOB), Patrol Base (PB) or Check Point (CP) brings him/her into daily contact with the contradiction of his experiences working with local Afghan populations in light of the geopolitical goals of his/her government. As British combat operations near their conclusion in 2014, Helmand still resembles a feudal, tribally based society, with little evidence of modern Western political systems/constructs. Like the British soldiers who fought in North Africa during World War Two, the modern soldier has fought vicious battles thousands of miles away from his native country that have been bloody and costly. However, unlike World War Two the intervention in Afghanistan was not a war of national survival. In

2009 the FLET¹ for many FOBs, PBs and CPs was only 400 metres from the base. The daily attrition of sniper attacks, IEDs, ambushes, challenged the narrative that a Western sponsored political solution was possible in an ancient land with no experience of Western politics and where many locals had never ventured further than the next valley.

Proposition 4. Post-modern, risk averse, post-heroic societies will struggle to generate a non-apocalyptic narrative capable of tolerating significant casualty numbers.

In the later part of the twentieth century much of Europe turned its back on war and culturally rejected it. Not only has post-modern philosophical thought had a profound impact upon most, if not all, Western societies, many are marked by a growing risk aversion and may be described as displaying post-heroic traits, especially with regard to casualty rates. In the context of military interventions involving post-heroic societies, the public tend to desert first and then insist that forces are pulled out as a consequence. In terms of the framework envisaged in figures 10 and 11, the societal factors alluded to in proposition 4 are located firmly towards the battlefield technician end of the spectrum. If these factors were either imagined as a single or as several control slides in figure 12 (graphic equaliser) the specific societal settings (for example the weight given by a specific nation to each factor) will be determinative in establishing the extent of any narrative authorising military intervention. Therefore, if the narrative genre is less than apocalyptic, proposition 4 will govern the nature of a society's participation (reflected in national caveats) and will be directly related to the number and types of casualties that a post-heroic society is prepared to tolerate.

Politicians in Western democracies are extremely sensitive to military casualties resulting from interventions of choice and that are not directly related to national survival. Although the UK is not casualty phobic, the societal factors in proposition 4 will nevertheless be a significant contributor in establishing (using the imagery of figure 12) the threshold beyond which the narrative used to justify military intervention will suffer significant deflation. This will become more prominent if the modern focus upon the fallen soldier as a

husband, father, son, and brother, for whom the public becomes imaginary family members, continues after Afghanistan in any future interventions. Some recent documentaries² have focused upon the human element of the soldier's experience and the subsequent impact that has had upon the family of the soldier. Often this is juxtaposed with the attitude of the MOD. By focusing upon individual stories, the viewer is implicitly invited to identify what the impact would be upon their own family. One consequence of this is to bring the validity of the intervention under the spotlight of public opinion in a distinctly individual and human manner. For example, is intervention in X worth the lives of Y British soldiers? In the Kosovo air campaign, the suspicion was that a mission was not worth the life of a single NATO pilot.

Proposition 5. The question of intervention in a non-Western, non-permissive operational setting will examine the depth of liberal values in Western societies.

Many Western societies espouse liberal values such as those enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and The Fourth Geneva Convention (4CIV). Adopted in 1949, 4CIV was largely borne out of a desire to define humanitarian protections for civilians in time of war and to outlaw the practice of total war. Modern International Law is derived from and has built upon its principles. Although 194 countries are signatories to 4CIV, the later part of the twentieth and early part of the twenty-first centuries have been marked by vicious conflicts and civil wars in various parts of the world. Sadly, inter-racial conflicts (such as witnessed in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo) have been a consistent blight upon modern human history. The conflict in Syria is the latest example of a civil war exacting a horrific price on its civilian population, including the accusation that chemical weapons have been used. Not unlike the situation concerning the inter-ethnic warfare in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995, the question of military intervention by Western powers was once again a pressing political topic in 2013.

The issue is not whether Western states, particularly European states, are serious about the liberal values they espouse (for example, ECHR and 4CIV). Rather proposition 5 asks a question concerning whether or not the depth of those values is sufficient to justify and validate a military intervention in a non-Western and possibly non-permissive operational environment in support of the liberal values they advocate. In essence it asks the question, ‘what price is a liberal society prepared to pay, to protect the basic human rights of civilians who are not part of that society but who are nevertheless caught up in horrific warfare?’ To use the analogy of the graphic equaliser (figure 12) the control slide that might represent liberal values may actually have little impact even if it is placed at its maximum setting. Other societal factors (other control slides) such as casualty tolerance, risk aversion, and a post-heroic society, may simply nullify it, rendering it practically ineffective. Although convinced of the importance of the truth of their liberal values, many within the West are extremely reluctant in committing troops in support of those values.

Proposition 6. Though pragmatic, the development of robotic weapons stands in contradiction to the authenticity of the warrior and robs the West of the vitality of its liberal values.

UAVs along with other robotic weapons platforms, provides those Western states who have invested in this technology with a capability of a precision military strike with no risk to the human operator. It also affords Western states the option of a limited form of military intervention, while avoiding the difficulty of casualties to those involved in controlling the remote platform. Not only is it a pragmatic approach to advanced technology but it is a logical development of an instrumentalised form of war(fare). It is, however, the antithesis of the concept of the warrior. If proposition 5 questions the depth of the West’s liberal values, the increasing use of stand-off robotic weaponry confirms that sacrifice in pursuit of those values is an increasingly difficult concept to justify in risk averse, post-heroic societies. The acceptance of risk, and preparedness to share in the community of fate historically accepted

by combatants on the battlefield and the willingness to pay the price required in defence of those values a society holds as inviolable, are principles that have always been understood and accepted as elemental parts of war. This raises an interesting juxtaposition: those who espouse the highest of values are frequently reluctant, even unprepared, to use military force in defence of them, while those whose values are less noble are willing to fight to maintain that which in the West might be considered ignoble (for example, the systematic slaughter of 800,000 Tutsis by the Hutus). This is one example of the 'say – do' gap. Those who espouse liberal values failed to intervene in a meaningful manner that might have prevented this genocide.


The military intervention by UK forces in Iraq and Afghanistan combined with intense fighting in both operations, particularly in Helmand, has demonstrated that the generic British soldier has been able when required to function at the interphase between the warrior and the soldier. There have been many thousands of times in Afghanistan (particularly HERRICK 10-12) when the soldier (to use figure 11) was clearly within the area 'close quarter combat', 'major risk' and 'warrior' and far removed from the battlefield technician. One question however, that this analysis poses, drawn from all six propositions, is whether or not UK society is prepared to continue to accept the generic British soldier residing in an area that is ideally suited to war among the people.

Despite the lack of a major state or existential threat to UK security, the British Army still possess, even after SDSR and Army 2020, a formidable capability to intervene militarily virtually anywhere in the world. It has the ability to deploy an armoured division, augmented with sea and air components, as part of an international alliance. The rapid development of robotic weapons platforms, however, could potentially offer a substantially modified version of this scenario. It is an interesting thought experiment to ponder how British society would respond to the following offers: 1, the option of placing British soldiers deliberately in harm's

way to uphold UK/Western values; or 2, of using robotic weapons in pursuit of UK national strategic aims. Though pragmatic, the development and use of robotic weapons platforms may also be seen as a confession that the concept of sacrifice in defence of one's values/principles is increasingly unsustainable in many Western societies.

8.5 Concluding Comments

Every generation is shaped and moulded by its experiences and the stories created to make sense of that experience. The attacks on 9/11 created the circumstances in which an apocalyptic style of narrative emerged that for a period of time altered the manner in which the various factors discussed in this thesis interacted. For much of the 1990s the UK had been in the forefront of military interventions of choice. In contrast, soldiers who served in the British Army during the period 1970-1989 are readily identifiable by the limited number of



The concept of a spectrum of meaning, upon which the generic British soldier exists in the UK social imaginary, is a useful framework by which to examine how the nature of the British soldier is imagined. In the case of a threat to national survival, the issues are rather straightforward. When the situation is less than apocalyptic in narrative terms, the discussion in the public sphere will become much more contested and complex. Future military interventions in a non-Western operational setting will inevitably be interpreted by UK society in the context of Iraq and Afghanistan. Social commentators will ask the public whether or not any proposed intervention is not only legally and morally justified but worth the potential loss of life and life changing injuries that such interventions of choice entail. This societal dialogue will bring the identity of the British soldier into focus. The closer that imagined identity is towards the end of the spectrum typified by Achilles, the more likely UK society, or at least a majority, will accept the British soldier being deployed in a combat role in war among the people in defence of liberal values. The development of robotic weapons platforms, however, offers many Western countries another option. Stand-off weapons provide the possibility of a limited military involvement, at little cost to the nation employing this technology. Valuing sacrifice and accepting sacrifice are not necessarily the same things. A nation may remember its fallen war dead with grateful thanks, while simultaneously rejecting the concept that such a sacrifice is either a current requirement or tolerable. Remote controlled weapons platforms, at least initially, offer a form of risk-free war. It is likely that the only context, in which valuing and accepting sacrifice is considered acceptable, will be an apocalyptic narrative of national survival. If UK society cannot continue to embrace the organic link between preparedness to accept sacrifice in defence of its values and principles, it is possible that it may be more willing to view the generic British soldier as closer towards the weapons platform/battlefield technician end of the spectrum.

It is entirely possible that the MOD is unaware that the control slides this chapter has postulated exists or that the central thrust of this thesis is a practical reality that should be addressed or at the very least understood. Policy makers might sleepwalk into a context where they ask or expect soldiers to move seamlessly from sandbag filling to combat operations in an intervention of choice but face the situation where soldiers are either unable or unwilling to perform that role. It is, it seems to this author, a reasonable and practical question to ask where on the imagined spectrum the generic British soldier resides. Once this question is addressed a force field analysis, a concept applied in every change management programme in the Army, could be developed to help understand how the interaction of the various issues examined in this thesis will tie any decision to deploy the Army into public discourse on any deployment. One possible force field analysis, extrapolated from the charts in chapter 8, might look like this:

Fig 14

Once the nature of the generic British soldier has been placed on the spectrum imagined in this thesis, the force field analysis suggested in figure 14 could offer a basis upon which to evaluate the cultural, practical, philosophical and intellectual pressures affecting how the British soldier is envisaged in the UK social imaginary. This in turn would provide policy makers with a functional framework to understand those roles British society is prepared to tolerate and validate when deploying and utilising the generic soldier. This thesis has articulated the issues involved in locating where on the spectrum the generic soldier may be imagined, whereas figure 14 offers a construct for anyone wishing to take the work forward by offering an imaginative framework of the opposing forces involved in seeking to reposition the soldier in public discourse.

¹ Forward line of enemy troops.

² For example, the BBC Panorama Special 15 July 2013 'Broken by Battle'.

Being in Existentialist Thinking

Being-in-itself. Being as it is in itself, without reference to, or dependent upon, anything else. According to Sartre, 'for the being of an existent is exactly what it appears'¹, 'being is the ever present foundation of the existent; it is everywhere in it and nowhere'². Sartre sums up his thoughts on this in this manner by simply stating, 'Being is. Being is in-itself. Being is what it is'³.

Being-in-situation. This is the premise that as humans we exist in-situation. Flynn explains that, 'not only does this mean that we are not disembodied spirits floating above the material universe... to exist in situation underscores that we are an integral part of the universe and the cultural world that envelops it. Less than angels, we are more than machines'⁴. Sartre maintained that this involved two elements, firstly our 'facticity', that is things like our race, nationality, talents, limitations and the others with whom we have dealings with⁵. The second element is 'the process of transcendence'⁶. Sartre argues, that 'the for-itself can not appear without being haunted by value and projected towards its own possibilities'⁷. In other words, individuals can always go beyond their present facticity; they can become. *Being-in-the-world.* This refers to our consciousness of being-in-the-world, or as Husserl referred to it as 'inhabiting the life-world'⁸. In *Being and Time* Heidegger explores the way Dasein relates to other entities⁹. He argues that, 'there is no such thing as the "side-by-side-ness" of an entity called "Dasein" with another entity called "world"'¹⁰. Cartesian metaphysics, which underpins all scientific investigation, posits the central idea that we are a detached observer from that which is observed¹¹. What Heidegger is essentially arguing is that we are not detached observers but immersed within the world in which we live. *Being-for-others.* This refers to our relatedness and interaction with others and is often linked with two other existentialist themes, 'bad faith' and 'inauthentic'. It also involves how others

affect the way we feel (feelings of shame, pride, etc.). In *Being and Nothingness*¹², Sartre uses illustrations of how some construct themselves around the expectation of others. One is of a woman who agrees to go out with a particular man, but tries to hide from the reality of the situation, especially as the night continues. The second is of the waiter, playing the part of the waiter for others. For Sartre, he may look like a waiter, behave like a waiter but he is not a waiter,

It is not that I do not wish to be this person or that I want this person to be different. But rather there is no common measure between his being and mine. It is a ‘representation’ for others and for myself, which means that I can only be in representation. But if I represent myself as him, I am not he; I am separated from him as the object from the subject, separated by nothing, but this nothing isolates me from him.¹³

In effect, what Sartre is saying is that when a person plays at being something, they are ‘being-for-others’ rather than for themselves.

Being-for-itself. Sartre’s definition of this sounds somewhat paradoxical. He reasons, ‘yet the for-itself is. It is, we may say, even if it is a being which is not what it is and which is what it is not’¹⁴. He appears to be arguing that there is a sense in which ‘being-for-itself’ is, although he makes no attempt to define where, or in what kind of state it indeed is or could be. To put it crudely, there is a sense in which my Dasein is for-itself, realised and complete. In this Sartre comes suspiciously close to Plato’s idea of forms existing in perfection outside our realm of imperfection. However, this is not what my Dasein is and what it could be is not yet realised. It is very similar to the point made by Kierkegaard ‘awake, the difference between myself and my other is posited’¹⁵. Awake Dasein is intuitively aware of what it is and may become, however, the present reality for the existentialist is one of not yet. However, being-for-itself contains within it the desire to make choices that will enable it to achieve its ultimate goal of completeness.

- ¹ JP Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans HE Barnes (London: Methuen, 1957) pxlv.
- ² Ibid., plxiii.
- ³ Ibid., plxvi.
- ⁴ TR Flynn, *Existentialism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) p 65.
- ⁵ Ibid., p66. Sartre's description of 'The Facticity of the For-Itself' is found in *Being and Nothingness* p79-84. On page 83 he states, 'this perpetually evanescent contingency of the in-itself which, without ever allowing itself to be apprehended, haunts the for-itself and reattaches it to being-in-itself – this contingency is what we call the facticity of the for-itself'.
- ⁶ Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p95 'The For-Itself and the Being of Possibilities' p95-102. However, for his detailed treatment on this see chapter 3 'Transcendence' p171-218.
- ⁷ Ibid., p96.
- ⁸ D Moran, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000) p182.
- ⁹ M Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans J Macquarrie and E Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967) Part One, chapter 2 'Being-In-The-World in General as the Basic State of Dasein' p78-86.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., p81.
- ¹¹ See J Reynolds, *Existentialism* (Chesham: Acumen, 2006) p25.
- ¹² Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, Part One, chapter 2, 'Bad Faith' p46-67.
- ¹³ Ibid., p60.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., p79.
- ¹⁵ As cited in S Earnshaw, *Existentialism: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum, 2006) p15.

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