

A TRI-MODAL THEORY OF AGENCY

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

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Abstract

This study aims *to determine the relationship between agency and freedom* and it has developed a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that explains an agent's decisions with a focus on *freedom*. Here, based on Berlin's (1958) ideas we have conceptualised positive and negative sides of freedom with a focus on agency. Meanwhile, agency is defined and measured in three following modes: (A) the *conative* mode is developed based on Sen's (2007) capability approach, (B) the *cognitive* mode is conceptualised based on Weber's (1993) rationality types and Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism, and (C) the *affective* mode is developed based on Weiner's (2010) attribution theory of emotion. A Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is tested and developed in five empirical studies that include 21 in-depth interviews, two surveys on *career choice* of 1063 employees and a *university major* selection of 4086 students in Iran, and finally the theory is applied to one case study that explains an entrepreneur's agency-freedom relationship after a business failure. In summary, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency establishes that freedom matters but having agency to give up freedom in pursuit of one's *values* ought to be the primary aspiration. This study can be exploited in the field of social psychology, appraisal psychology and organisational behaviour to understand an agent's decisions in a social context with a focus on her freedom.

Dedication

This doctoral research is dedicated to my mother who has encouraged me to find my own way and to my father for his endless support.

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The accomplishment of this investigation was only possible thanks to the guidance, professional supervision and encouragement offered by my supervisor Dr Tariq Khan. I am grateful for the devoted time, effort, constructive feedback, and thoughts and creativity-provoking ideas with which you have honoured me.

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I am thankful to the staff of the BFI Reuben Library, who provided a calm and peaceful space where I have written most chapters of this thesis.

I hope that this study will help to better judge decisions; will encourage more individuals to live the life they have reason to value; and will shed light on this understanding that freedom matters but having agency to give up freedom in pursuit of one's values ought to be the primary aspiration.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction and Background

This chapter provides an overview of the background to, and motivation for, the current study. First, it presents the rationale and boundaries of the research and then it outlines the significance, primary objectives, research questions, background and context. The chapter concludes with the contributions and outlines of the thesis.


Agency is an important subject in human behaviour because human beings need to be the agents of their own life (Bandura, 2015; Snow et al., 2015; Gangas, 2015). In other words, individuals need to be in control of what they do/be (Rajala et al., 2016); to create change (Pesch, 2015); to be evaluated according to their own values (Dorrance Kennedy, 2015; Washburn and Nowak, 2015); and to be responsible for their own actions (Lepron et al., 2015) in order to feel happier (Vlase and Sieber, 2015) and to accomplish higher wellbeing (Bosmans et al., 2015). Agency is emphasised as the core construct of professionalism (Jääskelä et al., 2016), creativity, collaboration and dynamism (Paloniemi and Collin, 2012). Thus a large amount of research has been conducted with the aim of understanding agency (Eisenhardt, 1989; McCann et al., 2016). In this line, some researchers have studied agency with a focus on 'motivation' in the field of psychology (Deci and Ryan, 2012, 2008, 2000, 1985), while others have concentrated on person-environment interactions, devoting their research particularly to the cultural (Conner et al., 2015; Sharp et al., 2015) and social aspects of environment (Bandura, 2015, 2012, 1977). Meanwhile, some psychologists have studied agency by investigating how obedient one can become in an authoritative environment (Milgram, 2015, 1963), and how one's voluntary actions are perceived by others (Jabbari and Kheiri, 2016). The problem is that *agency* has hardly been studied with a focus on *freedom* (as necessity). As evidence, recent reviews demonstrate that agency-oriented findings are narrowed to agency-structure in the field of sociology of education (Brock et al., 2016), the agency-action link in the area of policymaking (McCann et al., 2016), the agency-environment association in computer science (Limerick et al., 2015), agency-diplomacy (Holmes, 2016) and agency-emotion (Steele, 2016) relationships in International Relations (IR), the agency-anger connection with a focus on women in violent relationships (Ullman, 2016), the child-mother agency in the context of conflict (Ochen, 2015) and youth agency in education (Hart, 2014), with only a small number of empirical studies on an agent's freedom in decision making (e.g. Baaren et al., 2015) as an agency outcome.

To understand agency it is important to determine its relationship with freedom (Sen, 1999), as the main challenge in understanding agency is that individuals have a tendency to get

involved in counterintuitive decisions (Arlegi and Teschl, 2015) and give up their freedom of choosing the available options that are judged as desirable options (Correia, 2016), either due to “weakness of will” (Davidson, 2014), emotion (Damasio et al., 2015), or when an agent is committed to certain values (Sen, 2011). The additional problem is that the majority of the studies on the agency-freedom literature are conducted mainly in the field of philosophy (Steward, 2015; Ludwig, 2016). Accordingly, the ground-breaking view on agency-freedom is Berlin's (1969) ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ that defines freedom from the two viewpoints of the *positive* (i.e. what/who is the source of action) and the *negative* (i.e. the space within which one is free to exercise her will). The positive freedom recognises the *rational-affect* duality of human beings (Simhony, 2014), while the negative side is about the importance of locating this person in an environment (Haugaard, 2016). Further, there are other philosophers that have not focused primarily on “agency” but their research is closely related, such as the studies on the voices that are subjugated in front of authorities (Bakhtin, 1935; Freedman and Ball, 2004); the studies in the field of sociology particularly in Weber's (1993) theory that argues a modern individual's freedom is bounded by bureaucracy, because one standard way of living is forced on people and they rationalise their decisions according to those norms. Weber (1993) argues that in these modern societies individuals turn into bureaucrats, who have low freedom (Kalberg, 1980). However, the problem is that Weber (1993) and many others are not covering the freedom-agency relationship.

Today, one of the ground-breaking theories on the agency-freedom relationship is in the field of developmental economics, that is Sen's (2010, 2007, 1999, 1977, 1976, 1973) Capability Approach that emphasises the important role of agency in promoting freedom and wellbeing (Gammage et al., 2016), which also fosters national economic development (Gangas, 2015). Recent reviews (Gammage et al., 2016; Robertson, 2015) have repeated Sen's (1985) initial call for more agency-oriented studies on freedom. In this vein, this study draws attention to the problem that the *freedom-agency relationship is not clear* in a way that when one says ‘I chose to be/do something’, it is not clear how agentic the decision is made (Hampshire, 2016) and how her freedom is expanded/contracted by this decision. Figure 1 presents the scope of this research and our aim is *to determine the relationship between agency and freedom*. In this regard, we establish that this relationship can be clarified by evaluating an agent's decision trajectories with focus on her *values* at the *cognitive*, *conative* and *affective* modes of the decision-making process. The following sections present the importance of conducting this study.

Figure 1: The scope of this research



Rationale and the Boundaries of the Research

The question is why it is important to clarify the agency-freedom relationship. It is shown that clarifying this relationship is important from social and personal perspectives (Hitlin and Kwon, 2016; Limerick et al., 2015). From the social view it is important to show how the environment coerces one to obey a set of norms (Brock et al., 2016). No doubt, the members of each social group need to obey certain standards in order for a society to exist and survive (Lubchenco, 1998; Rousseau, 1920). However, the problem is that in many social groups the individual members will lose their own personal agency (Ludwig, 2016). The manifestation of this view is the modern societies in which their individual members are not living according to their own personal values (Cockerham, 2015). However, the problem is that it is not clear what factors influence one to do/be what she has reason to value with respect to social boundaries (Mitchell et al., 2015).

This ambiguity has challenged research to identify the reasons behind the so-called 'counterintuitive' decisions that are made contrary to the rational judgment of external observers (Correia, 2016). In addition, research is struggling to understand the decisions that are made

contrary to an agent's own judgment, due to her "weakness of will" (Davidson, 2014), emotion (Damasio et al., 2015) and/or commitment to certain values (Sen, 1977). For example, why some young Westerners become interested in Radical Islamism and decide to join terrorist groups (Berger, 2016); why some Muslim women protest against the Hijab Ban in public spaces in France (Zempi, 2016; Chantler et al., 2009); why many young students choose to study subjects in which they have no personal interest (Gibbs and Dean, 2015; Rajala et al., 2016); why increasing numbers of employees decide to change their job although they receive generous financial rewards (Shirakawa, 2016; Schulte Steinberg et al., 2015); why employees voluntarily participate in work-related actions that contribute to organisational functions and career growth without the authority's prescription or reward (Wang et al., 2014); and why entrepreneurs choose to undergo the heavy responsibility of starting a new business although they face financial instability and job insecurity (Adam and Fayolle, 2015). The aim of this study is to *determine the agency-freedom relationship* by developing a theory that can be applied to these scenarios and similar cases. Notwithstanding, the present study focuses on the string that connects all of these different examples, which is the link between agency and freedom (as necessary). In this line, the present research has developed a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency and has applied it to one scenario in which an entrepreneur decides to continue with his start-up after a major business failure, even though this decision would limit his freedom to live a comfortable life, enjoying job security and short-term financial satisfaction (see Chapter 6, Case Study).

Understanding the agency-freedom relationship is also important at the individual level. This is because this endeavour sheds light on the axiological constraints that individuals impose on their own decisions (Rainio and Hilppö, 2016). The best examples are modern bureaucrats who are following institutional norms, even when these norms are contradicting their own personal values (Cockerham, 2015). It seems as if modern human beings are blind to the bureaucratic strings on their freedom of choice (Milgram, 1963). In the 1980s, individuals who had lost their agency in modern societies left their comfortable life and travelled to the East in order to find a different cause for living (Bourgeois, 2015). Its best example is the hippie counterculture that is regarded as an important part of massive upheavals of the 1960s concerned with civil rights, Black Power, feminism, gay liberation, and environmentalism (Rorabaugh, 2015). Recently the same endeavour has had vital consequences as some individuals whose agency is contracted in Western societies have found the cause of their life in Radical Islamism (Berger, 2016). On the other hand, those who stay in the developed countries are not immune to the domino effects of living with low levels of agency. As evidence, there are

increasing number of individuals who lose their agency to create change (Rajala et al., 2016), to be creative and innovative (Sullivan, 2013), to be satisfied at work and at home (Cuyper and Witte, 2015), to work with commitment (McGeer, 2015), to stay loyal to their belongings, organisation and co-workers (Domingo, 2015). The employee whose agency is contracted can easily leave her job, even if the organisation has invested in training her and requires her productivity (Kaynak et al., 2015). More importantly, the individuals with low levels of agency do not perceive themselves as responsible for their own actions and they tend to relieve the pressure of commitment and discharge responsibilities to higher-ranked authorities (Lepron et al., 2015). Hence, it is important to study these challenges in organisations and larger social settings (McCann et al., 2016). Further, it is important to identify the agentic factors that associated with an individual's freedom of choice, in order to understand why one makes a counterintuitive or incontinent decision, which are determined contrary to social and personal judgments (Gammage et al., 2016). In this line, the present research focuses on the agency-freedom relationship and the boundaries of this research have been outlined according to this purpose.

The Research Questions

In order to narrow down the investigation and focus on the research aim and objectives, this study has developed the following research questions:

- *First Research Question:* What factors influence one's agency to do/be what she values?
- *Second Research Question:* What is the implication of agency-oriented factors for the expansion/contraction of the agent's freedom?


Aims and Objectives

In order to improve the judgment reliability that observers hold on others' decisions, particularly the choices that are made contrary to external judgment (i.e. counterintuitive decisions) and those decisions that are made contrary to an agent's personal judgment (i.e. incontinent decisions), this study has pursued the following aim and two objectives. In a non-technical way, the present study aims to understand when one says "I chose to do/be something", how internally driven this statement is and the extent to which this decision is bounded by the external factors or the factors that are not within her control due to weakness of will, emotion or environmental constraints. For example, when an employee decides to leave an

organisation and she says “I chose to leave this firm”, the extent to which her decision is emotional, rational, and limited by constraints such as financial limitations. In this vein, a technical way of investigating the internal aspects of the factors influencing one’s decisions is focusing on her agency. Further, a technical way of understanding person-environment interaction in decision making is focusing on freedom. For example, when an employee decides to leave the organisation, the role of values, authorities, and discourse between various standpoints matter in her decision. These elements are captured under the technical umbrella of freedom. Figure 2 presents research aim and objectives, which are presented in the technical terminology of agency and freedom studies:

- *Aim*: Determine the relationship between personal agency and freedom
- *First Objective*: Identify the agency-oriented factors associated with freedom.
- *Second Objective*: Establish how freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors.

Figure 2. Research Aim and Objectives



Input:

Problem: Unclear relationship between agency and freedom.

Input1: Research Questions

Input2: Aim and Objectives

Input3: Existing theories and studies on Agency and Freedom

Process:

- Mixed Method
- Study1, 2 &3: Identify Agency Oriented Factors
- Study4 (Part1&Part2): Establish Freedom Expansion/Contraction based on Agency Oriented Factors
- Case Study: Test Tri-Modal Theory of Agency

Output:

Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that determines agency-freedom link

Contribution:

Freedom matters but agency to choose freedom ought to be more aspirational

Context

To answer the above-mentioned research questions, we use a mixed methodology that includes 21 in-depth interviews, two large surveys (N:1063 and N:4086) and one case study. Due to accessibility issues the empirical data is collected from Iran. The host organisation is a private franchise educational organisation, which is comprised of 450 branches and covers the largest number of students among other private institutions (60%) at pre-university level (455,897 in 2015), with a large number of employees (15,858 in 2015) in 450 rural and urban cities in Iran. This organisation is a private entrepreneurial institution that offers three main educational services: (a) holding biweekly affirmative assessments at national level to test the students' academic performance based on the school curriculum; (b) providing educational support and planning through a personal tutor; and (c) developing educational products including books, videos, and multimedia products.

Outline of the Thesis

This study is divided into nine chapters that are outlined as follows:

Chapter 1: Introduction: this introduces the background of the study to identify the scope of research. It presents an introduction to the boundaries of research to explore what are the novel aspects of this research. The chapter also highlights the original aim, objectives, and research questions followed by the research context and outline.

Chapter 2: Literature Review: this identifies the main gap in the literature regarding the agency-freedom relationship. In this regard, two gaps are identified and supported by the state of the art that leads us towards the research questions and objectives.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology: this shows why and how we use Critical Realism as the philosophical foundation of our research approach to determine the agency-freedom relationship. It justifies why we use mixed methods to pursue our research enquiry. Further, it presents a detailed overview of the research-specific methodological concerns and ethical considerations regarding the notions of agency and freedom.

Chapter 4: Theory Development: this presents the development process of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that starts from a conceptual framework and a Capability-based Decision Model. It explains the limitations of the first model and our attempt to address these shortcomings in the *cognitive*, *affective* and *conative* modes of agency.

Chapter 5: Data Collection, Analysis, and Findings: this chapter has four studies, which are designed to cover the enquiry of the two research questions.

- Study 1, Deductive-Inductive Development: includes seven in-depth interviews on career choice and results in 11 themes of agency-oriented factors according to which the first version of the Evaluation Instrument is developed to identify agency-oriented factors influencing freedom (1st RQ).
- Study 2, Deductive-Inductive Development: an online survey is conducted on a sample of 1063 employees on their *career choice*, using Explanatory Factor Analysis (EFA), the 1st version of the Evaluation Instrument is revised in eight themes that are measured by 10 'self' and 11 'other' factors from the two standpoints of the agents and others.
- Study 3, Deductive-Inductive-Abductive Development and Amendment: another online survey is conducted on a sample of 4086 students on their *university major* selection, using EFA and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), the 2nd version of the Evaluation Instrument is developed with eight 'self' and nine 'other' factors that explain more than 60% of the variance in the data set. The factors are explained by Weber's (1993) rationality types, Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism and Weiner's (2010) emotions in the Attribution Theory of Motivation.
- Study 4, Inductive-Abductive Amendment: 14 in-depth interviews are conducted using the final version of the Evaluation Instrument and all three modes of agency (affective, conative, and cognitive) are empirically developed according to the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. The findings are explained by Sen's (1999) Capability Approach, Weber's (1993) rationality types, Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism and Weiner's (2010) emotions in the Attribution Theory of Motivation.

Chapter 6: Case Study: this applies the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to one case study and determines the agency-freedom relationship of an entrepreneur after a failure when he decides to keep his start-up.

Chapter 7: Theory Evaluation: this identifies the rival theories of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency and compares it with: (a) Deci and Ryan's (2012, 2008, 2002, 2000) Self-Determination Theory; (b) Douglas's (2007, 2004) Grid-Group Cultural Theory; (c) Milgram's (2015, 2009, 1963) Agency Theory; (d) Kruglanski's (1975) Exogenous-Indigenous Attribution Theory; and (e) Bandura's (2015, 2012, 1977) Human Agency Theory. This chapter concludes with the contributions of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to the area of agency and freedom.

Chapter 8: Discussion: this discusses the findings according to the research aim and objectives. The chapter shows why the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is significant in measuring agency level with respect to freedom.

Chapter 9: Conclusion: this concludes with mapping research findings onto research questions, showing that this research has been successful in identifying agency-oriented factors that expand/contract freedom. The limitations and contributions of this study are explained in six areas. This thesis ends by proposing several research questions and calling for future research on the consequential role of agency-outcome (i.e. decision) on agency-freedom linkage, comparing different agency-levels, expanding the empirical aspect of the affective mode of agency, and testing the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in different cultures.


Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter identifies the gaps in the agency-freedom literature that lead us towards our research questions, objectives and the overall aim of *determining the agency-freedom relationship*. Figure 3 shows the overall image of the logical argument that leads us towards the research question, the gaps, objectives and aim. Here, the research problem is that when one says '*I chose to do/be something*', it is not clear how agency-oriented or internally-driven this decision is made. This problem is more complex in understanding incontinent decisions when a decision is made contrary to personal judgment (e.g. a bankrupt businessman decides to gamble, even though she is aware of the harmful consequences of this decision) (David et al., 2015; Davidson, 2014), or counterintuitive decisions that are made contrary to other's judgement (Sen, 1977) (e.g. when Darwin decided to reveal his theory of evolution contrary to the established belief about the origin of species at that time (Smith, 2015)). These examples may seem too extreme in terms of the person-environment dilemma in the decision-making process, but in any decision an individual has to deal with what she wants and what society and environment as a whole require her to do/be (Correia, 2016). Our research problem in a simple way is that it is not clear how internally this statement is made '*I chose to do/be something*'.

This is a crucial problem, as recent findings have shown that similar to the puzzle of internal-external influencers, an emotion-reason interaction is also a puzzle in understanding human decisions. It is found that an individual is not conscious about all of her decision motives (Clark, 2015), and in many decisions the affective and rational factors are opposing (e.g. one makes a rational choice to stop eating sugar, because she is suffering from obesity, but at the same time she is craving for a marshmallow) (Mischel, 2015). These examples about the puzzle of the emotion-reason interaction in decision making (Cian et al., 2015), weakness of will (David et al., 2015), and the person-environment dilemma in the decision process (i.e. the extent to which one is free to do what she personally wants in an environment that limits her actions) (Cockerham, 2015) can be conceptualised in the two notions of 'agency' and 'freedom' and their relationship (Berlin, 1958). In the present chapter we show that although 'agency' is being defined in relation to 'freedom' in the fields of economics (David et al., 2015) and philosophy (Stapleton and Froese, 2016), but the main *gap* in the literature is that agency and freedom are extensively being studied in isolation, and the problem is that their inter-relationship is poorly understood. This chapter reviews the literature to show how we have arrived at this gap and the research questions. Further, we review the literature on why it is important to address these questions.

Figure 3: Logical Argument



Note: Rationale boxes summarise the studies whose findings imply the importance of conducting the present research.

Agency

As mentioned above, a simple presentation of our research problem is analysing how internally driven is the statement '*I chose to do/be something*'. To address this problem, we review the literature on the main notions in this statement that are: (A) '*I*' that is what/who makes the decision (i.e. the decision maker); (B) '*choosing to do/be*' that is the process of decision making (i.e. decision making); and (C) '*something*' that is what the decision maker has chosen to do/be (i.e. decision). Here, we review the literature on each of these three notions with respect to how agency-oriented or internally driven each of these notions are involved in the decision-making process.

Decision Maker

Regarding the '*I*' or what/who makes the decision, there are two camps in the literature, considering that there is a spectrum of views between these two positions. At one end of this spectrum, we have rationalists whose views of the characteristics of decision makers have their roots in the ideas of Gary Becker (1993, 1976) and standard economics, assuming that a decision maker is a rational being (Thaler, 2016), and her decisions can be understood by her utility function, particularly her pecuniary motivations (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). This perspective neglects two important aspects of decision makers: (A) the psychological mode of human beings that is about emotion and the psychological complexities in human behaviour (Kahneman, 2014, 2012; Thaler, 2016; Thaler et al., 2010), and (B) the person-environment interaction that is about the role of norms, identity and social categories on the decision maker (Akerlof and Shiller, 2015; Akerlof, 2016).

In front of this rationalist camp, a behavioural position has been developed that considers a human being's judgmental biases (e.g. Kahneman, 2012; Kahneman and Tversky, 2000), bounded rationality (Chrisman et al., 2014; Simon, 1991), mind-body division (Haidt, 2006a), and emotion-rationality conflict (Damasio et al., 2015) to identify decision makers. This view has considered neuroscientific findings that the automatic side of the brain is in charge of most of the decisions that a human being makes in her life (Arvai, 2013; Deaves, 2012; Denham, 2012). Within this camp, several decision models have been developed with a focus on the influence of different factors on human behaviour such as social identify (Akerlof, 2016a), psychology (Thaler, 2016), biases (Kahneman, 2012, 2003), altruism (Arlegi and Teschl, 2015; Davis, 2004; Sen, 1977), and one's craving for happiness that is not just about pecuniary satisfaction (Layard, 2010, 2006). The behavioural camp considers both the affective and

cognitive sides of human beings, leading an individual to make a decision not only to maximise self-interest and for sympathy, but also for altruistic reasons and for the sake of others (Sen, 1990). Within this perspective, both affective and cognitive modes of decision makers are regarded as the source of rational and planned decisions (Thaler, 2016). In other words, the affective state of being is not dismissed in rational behaviour in favour of the cognitive state (Cian et al., 2015; Kahneman, 2003b, 1991). This position has been supported by the recent findings in the field of neuroscience (see Damasio, 2012, 2004; Damasio et al., 2015).

Hence, research into the question of how internally driven is the statement '*I chose to do/be something*' must be clear about its position regarding the rationalist and behavioural standpoints. In this line, the rationalist camp identifies the '*I*' in '*I chose to do/be something*' as a rational being, who selects the optimum option through cognitive analysis of all of the possibilities and in order to maximise her self-interest (Akerlof, 2016a; Thaler, 2016). On the other hand, the behavioural camp says that the decision maker (i.e. '*I*' in '*I chose to do/be something*') has both affective and cognitive sides (Haidt, 2006a; Kahneman, 2012), and does not solely decide to maximise her selfishness (Chrisman et al., 2014; Sen, 1977a) and her rationality is bounded (Augier, 2001), hence she chooses the satisfying option (Simon, 1990) and sometimes her decisions seem irrational to the external observer (Davidson, 2014, 2001). As evidence, the latter camp is appropriate within the scope of our research problem to show why incontinent and counterintuitive decisions are made. Hence, by following the second camp we arrive at the question '*what factors influence one to do/be something?*' This question has been the focal point of agency-oriented studies such as Bandura's (2015, 2012) theory of agency; Milgram's (2015, 2009) agency theory that focuses on obedience; and Deci and Ryans' (2012, 2008, 2002) self-determination theory that focuses on motivation. In this line, our initial question needs to be rephrased to 'what agency-oriented factors influence one to do/be something?' As evidence, here we have arrived at the notion of agency within the scope of our research problem. In this line, before taking the review of the literature further, it is worth mentioning the research understanding around the following two notions about agency. First, what agency is, with a focus on the definitions of this concept in different disciplines, highlighting the focus of the present study. Second, what the main and recent debates are around the concept of agency and what is the position of the present study regarding the elements that we are investigating in relation to agency.

The review of literature regarding the first question around the definition of agency shows that the idea of agency that is about a human individual being in control, responsible and the master of her own actions is a child of the Enlightenment era (Jääskelä et al., 2016). At that

time one of the main agency-oriented ideas has been that through education one's autonomy over her actions will be fostered (Biesta and Tedder, 2007). This idea has survived, particularly within the realm of education. Since the 1980s this view of the concept of agency has turned into the focal point of several studies, notwithstanding agency has rarely been mentioned in an explicit manner (Eteläpelto et al., 2013). Further, the concept of agency has been used to cover the notions of empowerment, emancipation, and activators of human growth (Mežirov, 1981), while others have linked the expansion of individual agency to community development, implying that empowering the individuals' agency can be interpreted as some kind of cultural action for freedom (Freire, 1970). As evidence, the concept of agency has been defined in relation to freedom. Before going further, it is worth mentioning that this take on agency that defines it with respect to freedom in social setting is the main focus of the present study. We need to position the present study within the scope of agency-oriented studies, because the review of the literature shows that in the social sciences, the notion of agency has been widely used in different fields in relation to other concepts such as autonomy (Bonneville-Roussy et al., 2013), self-efficacy (van Dinther et al., 2011), goals and interests (Mikkonen et al., 2013) and intrinsic motivation (Mackenbach and McKee, 2013). As evidence, the notion of agency has been defined and studied with respect to the concerns of different disciplines and their epistemological and ontological roots (Jääskelä et al., 2016).

In this vein, the social sciences have studied agency with a focus on: (A) an individual's opportunities for active participation in social context and her influence on the world around her (Berger and Luckmann, 1995); (B) agency is studied as a socially constructed theme in relation to social relationships and the source of power (one of the dominant scholars in this area is Foucault (1975)); (C) agency is studied with a focus on the intentional source of actions and its relationship with power and its impact on social events (a seminal work in this area is *Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age* by Anthony Giddens (1991)); (D) agency is defined with respect to an embedded sense of self in interaction with one's surroundings (see Archer, 2007); and (E) agency is being defined in the realm of philosophy in relation to freedom, democracy and human rights and as a manifestation of one's being in relation to others and particularly the sources of power (Berlin, 1970). Overall, the review of the literature shows that the concept of agency is being defined in the social sciences as an "individual's capacity to engage in intentional, self-defined, meaningful and autonomous action which is constrained by power relations and structural, contextual factors" (Jääskelä et al., 2016).

However, the main shortcoming in this above-mentioned definition of agency that has roots in the apparent isolation of different fields (sociology, philosophy, neuroscience and psychology) from each other is that the recent findings in each field have rarely been incorporated into the other fields. For example, neuroscience has rarely included the philosophers' definitions of agency in its studies and vice versa (Limerick et al., 2015). As evidence, agency is defined by philosophers as one's ability to decide based on her own values, to create change, to be responsible for her own actions and to be evaluated based on her own decisions (Sen, 1999). On the other hand, neuroscientists define agency as the "subjective experience of controlling one's actions, and, through them, external events" (Caspar et al., 2016). Meanwhile, social-cognitive psychologists define agency with respect to the source of human action, i.e. an individual's consciousness intentions, self-reflection, and self-regulation (Jääskelä et al., 2016), in which Bandura's (2015, 2012, 1989, 1977) theory of agency is one of the dominant theories in this field.

As evidence, the isolation of agency-oriented studies in different fields leads us an emerging debate in the agency-oriented studies where neuroscientists and psychologists argue that the philosophical definitions of agency are overrated (Smith, 2015), as recent findings in the realm of neuroscience have shown that most of the human decisions are made unconcise and even the conscious decisions are not within her complete control (Caspar et al., 2016). On the same bases, psychologist have found that individual's prefer to dismiss the burden of responsibility and free-will in favour of following orders, because it is difficult to be the source of order (Milgram, 2015, 1965). Hence, the review of the literature regarding the second question of what are the main debates in relation to agency reveals that one of the emerging debates in this area is the extent to which agency is overrated/underestimated in different fields (Smith, 2015). In this regard, the present study believes that agency needs to be understood by careful understanding of the impact of societal structures on opportunities and their influence on destiny. This position is in line with Sen's (1999) position on agency, which consequently implies two things. First, in line with psychologist (e.g. Milgram, 2015; Bandura, 2015) and neuroscientists (e.g. Caspar et al., 2016) the present study says that the self-processing activities of the mind regarding the affective, cognitive and conative modes of human individuals need to be considered in the definition and study of agency. Second, the social context and self-environment relationship of agency needs to be considered in its definition and study, where the latter is possible by defining agency with respect to freedom, as suggested by David et al. (2015). Therefore, we will define agency in the theory that is derived from the literature (see Chapter 4, Part 1) that highlights these two positions regarding the definition of agency, within

the scope of our research problem, aim and objectives. Further, at the end of this study the notion of agency is defined thoroughly in relation to the notion of freedom.

Decision Making

So far, to analyse how agency-oriented is the statement '*I chose to do/be something*', we have reviewed the literature on the notion of '*I*' (i.e. the decision maker). This has led us towards the notion of *agency* and the question 'what agency-oriented factors influence one to do/be something'. Here, we review the literature on the second part of this statement that is about "choosing to do/be", which is about the act and process of decision making that is about the motivations (Akerlof, 2016a; Deci and Ryan, 2012; Thaler, 2016), constraints (Alkire, 2007a; Sen, 2011), and mechanisms (Dovidio and Fiske, 2012; Kahneman, 1991) of the decision process. Similar to the previous section, we review different aspects of the decision process from the two camps that have been identified in the previous section (i.e. the rationalist and the behavioural standpoints).

The main difference between these two camps regarding the decision process is about the individual's motivations. Rationalists believe that pecuniary motivations and utility maximisation can explain human decisions (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010), while the other camp that includes several behavioural economists (e.g. Thaler, 2016), social psychologists (Haidt, 2006; Kahneman, 2012), neuroscientists (Caspar et al., 2016) and some philosophers like Sen (1999) and Gray (2015) believe that pecuniary motivations and utility maximisation are not enough to explain the decision-making process. One of the leading studies in the second (i.e. behavioural) camp is Kahneman's (1991) study on human judgemental biases that sheds light on the great number of biases in judgments and decision making processes. This is linked to the previous argument about decision makers where most human decisions have roots in unconscious and automatic brain activities, thus, decision making process is hardly within the control of human consciousness (Kahneman, 2003, 2002; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984, 1979, 1977).

Building on the so called human side of the decision process, Kahneman (2012) has built a decision theory that explains decision process based on the individuals' attempt to *minimise loss* and to *maximise gain* (Kahneman, 2012, 2003, 1991). Further, behavioural economists like Thaler (2016) have followed the legacy of Kahneman's (2012) ideas about the human side of decision-making analysis and a new strand of behavioural economics has been established that has tried to address the same questions of standard economics, with a human-oriented lens on the decision process. In this line, one of the leading studies in behavioural

economics is *Identity Economics* by Akerlof and Kranton (2010) that tries to add social identity to the explanation of the decision-making process, particularly in the field of economics. Further, some social psychologists have developed some decision theories that explain decision process based on *reciprocity* and *revenge* as the underlining rules of decision making in social settings (Haidt, 2006). The behavioural aspect of the decision process has also been one of the main concerns in the field of organisational and management studies (Jackson et al., 2013). In this regard, one of the leading studies is Simon's (1976) administrative theory that focuses on employees' decision making processes, in relation to the source of authority in the organisations, highlighting that an individual chooses a *satisficing option* instead of the optimum one, given her bounded rationality and the limitations of the decision context. This view is still relevant and there have been several studies on the bounded-rationality and satisficing aspects of the decision-making process (Chrisman et al., 2014).

Although, the behavioural aspect of decision making has had several main advancements based on several seminal works (e.g. Akerlof and Kranton, 2010; Kahneman, 2012; Simon, 1959; Thaler et al., 2014), the studies that have roots in standard economics (e.g. Moscone and Tosetti, 2010; Salehi et al., 2013) that focus on rational models of decision making are still providing relevant implications that can be used to understand human behaviour in social settings (Chetty, 2015). Hence, there is still a debate on how to explain the human decision-making process with respect to the findings of both camps. In this vein, Sen's "Rational Fool" (1990, 1977) is one of the seminal works on this debate that argues that individuals make many decisions to maximise their self-centred interests, but they also make altruistic and other-centred decisions. In this regard, he has suggested three types of decisions that are self-centred, sympathetic and committed actions. Both sympathetic and committed actions are considering the other-centred motivation rather than the selfish aspects of human behaviour, but the different between these two (i.e. sympathetic and committed actions) is that in sympathetic actions one considers others as long as it is not against her self-centred motives, whereas in committed actions one may make a decision that is against her self-centred goals for the sake of others (Sen, 1977).

Although Sen's distinction between different types of other-centred decisions has been received well by several scholars in the field of decision making (Houk et al., 2016), the problem is how to operationalise these ideas to explain decision-making processes (Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015). In this line, it is suggested to focus on the value-laden aspects of decision in relation to others and self in order to understand the decision process (Arrow, 2012; Nussbaum, 2004). Accordingly, the position of the present study is that in analysing the statement 'what

agency-oriented factors influence one to do/be something', we need to focus primarily on the characteristics of that 'something' with a focus on values according to which the decision maker is choosing to/be. Here, the question that emerges is that if that "something" is not narrowed to the rationalist perspective of *maximising utility* and pecuniary satisfaction (e.g. getting more income), then what are its value-laden characteristics and how this will influence our research enquiry.

Decision

So far, to analyse how agency-oriented is the statement '*I chose to do/be something*', we have reviewed the literature on the notions of 'I' (i.e. the decision maker), and the act and process of 'choosing to do/be' (i.e. decision making). This has led us towards the research enquiry of 'what agency-oriented factors influence one to do/be something', and identifying the characteristics of that 'something' beside utility maximisation, with respect to the behavioural camp of understanding human behaviour. In this regard, as mentioned above one of the leading scholars that have focused on this question is Sen (2007, 2004, 1999, 1985), who has argued that utility maximisation and pecuniary motives matter in human decisions, but they are not the only things that matter in understanding human decisions. Sen (1999) develops Capability Approach (CA) and emphasises the role of *capabilities* and freedom of choice, plurality of values, the importance of process as well as outcome in understanding human decisions. CA has turned into one of the seminal works in understanding decisions with respect to values and freedom (Alkire and Deneulin, 2009; Clark, 2005; Nussbaum, 1997; Swain, 2015).

In CA, utility matters within the scope of one's *capability set* (i.e. the potential state of being/doing that one can choose and pursue) to achieve what she *values* (Clark, 2005). This is where the concept of *freedom to do/be what one has reason to value* will become the focal attention of social scientists, economists and philosophers (Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015). There is a wide literature emphasising the importance of understanding capabilities (Alkire, 2007a, 2005; Swain, 2015), and an agent's freedom to turn a capability into a state of being/doing that she has reason to value (Andersson et al., 2012; Clark, 2005; Swain, 2015). In this line to see 'what agency-oriented factors influence one to do/be something', the position of the present study is conceptualising that 'something' as the 'freedom to live the life one has reason to value'. Here, the concept of freedom comes to the attention, because freedom is being defined with respect to the notions that are equally important to study agency, which are values (Berlin, 2014), rational-irrational behaviours (Houk et al., 2016), and self-environment interaction (Carter, 2004).

Before going forward, it is worth defining freedom, even though a full definition of this concept and the notions related to freedom are explained in detail in the following section that is allocated to this concept. In short, freedom is defined in two senses. One sense is about human individual ability to do/be what she wants, and this sense is known as the positive side of freedom (Berlin, 1958). Positive freedom is about the internal aspect of a human being, which includes the rational-irrational modes of being (Houk et al., 2016), the conscious-unconscious aspect of mind, and her emotions. Further, freedom has another side that is about an agent not being interfered with or coerced by others or environment in an intentional way and this side of freedom is known as negative freedom (Berlin, 1958) that includes social contractions and the interaction of an agent with her surroundings. The dilemma of the positive-negative balance of freedom, or the extent to which an individual can do what she values in a social setting, considering the affective-cognitive sources of 'self' and the requirements of living in interaction with other individuals is one of the established and important questions for liberal scholars (Berlin, 1958; Sen, 1999) and policy makers. In some respects, here, we are focusing on the same question too, but through the lenses of agency and freedom. Accordingly, the initial question of how internally driven is the statement '*I chose to do/be something*' is rephrased into *what agency-oriented factors associated with freedom*. The following section shows that there is a gap in addressing this specific question, which makes this enquiry our first research question.

Gap in Agency-Oriented Studies

Table 1 shows the review of the literature on what we know about the question of *what agency-oriented factors influence one to do/be what she values*. According to the findings of the existing studies in Table 1, there are several factors that have found to have an effect on the decisions and consequently different ways of lives that each individual chooses to have. As outlined in the second column of Table 1, these factors include emotion (Kassam, 2015; Lau et al., 2015; Marissa S. Edwards et al., 2016; Zeng et al., 2015), reason (Binkley et al., 2016; Houk et al., 2016), the emotion-reason relationship (Phelps et al., 2014), the rational-irrational way of thinking (Hyland et al., 2015), the conscious-unconscious divide (Cant et al., 2012), constraints (Harstad and Selten, 2013a; MacCallum, 1967; Malawska and Topping, 2016), values (Mitchell and Carson, 2013; Harris et al., 1989), judgements (Heather and Segal, 2015; Pahman, 2016; Reach, 2015) and self-environment interactions (Bleidorn and Ködding, 2013). As evidence, there is a gap in the literature regarding a unified theory that captures all of these agency-oriented factors that influence one's way of life. The final row of Table 1 is about the Heffernan and Wards (2015) study that shows it is possible to develop a theory with respect to human

agency, in order to assess her agency level with respect to the factors influencing it. In this line and relying on the recent findings in the areas of agency, decision making and freedom the present study tries to shed light on the existing gap, by developing a unified theory that identifies the agency-oriented factors associated with *freedom* (i.e. to do/be what she values). So far, through a review of the literature on agency and decision making we have arrived at the first research question and a research gap. Therefore, from this gap we identify our first research objective that is “identifying agency-oriented factors associated with freedom”. In the next section, we show why it is important to achieve this objective, relying on recent findings in this area. Further, we review the literature on freedom in relation to agency.

Table 1: Existing Findings Regarding Agency

Study	Focus	Methodology	Findings	Implications for Us
(Kassam, 2015)	Emotion-Decision	Review of emotion and decision making (35 years)	Decisions can be affected by potent, pervasive, predictable, sometimes harmful and sometimes beneficial emotional drivers.	Emotion matters to understand an agent's behaviour.
(Zeng et al., 2015)	Emotion and behaviour	Meta-analytic review of 24 empirical studies (N = 1759)	The nature of emotion and individual differences influences the decision results.	Emotion matters to compare individuals' behaviour.
(Marissa S. Edwards et al., 2016)	Emotion-environment	Modified grounded theory approach	Emotion influences behaviour and encourages one to be silent in social settings.	Emotion matters to understand an agent's behaviour in social settings.
(Lau et al., 2015)	Emotion-Freedom	Six experiments	Outcome matters even more than process from the subjective view; i.e. it is the outcome of choosing that affects the subjective feeling of freedom, rather than the process of choosing (e.g. participants feel freer when choosing among two equally good options than two equally bad options).	Emotion matters to understand freedom, and one's evaluation of her state of being/doing should be studied to investigate her perception of freedom.
(Binkley et al., 2016)	Reason-Agency	This book includes philosophical papers on agency, reason and action.	Human actions involve different levels of agency-orientations. Some actions happen to us; some actions are reasoned for; some actions are not. To understand human behaviour, the nature of her actions must be studied in relation to her reasoning process.	Reason matters in an agent's actions.
(Houk et al.,	Reason-	Multidisciplinary	Withholding/withdrawing options influence	Reason matters in freedom.

2016)	freedom	study in Bioethics	one's preferences; i.e. her decision; i.e. if one's rationality is subverted then her freedom to choose is influenced.	
(Hyland et al., 2015)	Rational-Irrational	Experiment (N = 313) and structured equation modelling	Rational or irrational beliefs influence an individual's responses to external stimulus.	Rationality matters in understanding human behaviours in response to the external environment.
(Phelps et al., 2014)	Emotion-Reason	Experiment in the field of neuroscience	Emotional reaction to choice and value calculation matters to understand decision. If emotion changes then choice will change. Emotion and decision variables are related. Emotion influences choices through multiple modulatory neural circuits.	The relationship between emotion and reason matters in human behaviour.
(Cant et al., 2012)	Divided Self	Review on 'near death experience' (NDE) with focus on the conscious-unconscious divide.	Neuro-chemical changes influence human experience.	It is important to understand the divisions in self (e.g. conscious-unconscious) to understand human behaviour.
(Bleidorn and Ködding, 2013)	Self and environment	Meta-analytical review of 50 years of research on self-concept differentiation (N = 54 samples)	Self-concept is fragmented and depends on the contextual background.	An individual's behaviour must be studied with respect to context and external norms.
(Heather and Segal, 2015)	Incontinent Actions	Experiment, 20 heroin users; questionnaire on drug-taking behaviour	Akratic actions are not always involuntary behaviours (e.g. addiction is not a completely involuntary behaviour). People cannot give a reason for preferring incontinent over continent actions; that is why addicts say that they are compelled to behave contrary to their own better	Some decisions are made contrary to the decision maker's judgment. So it is important to study human decisions with respect to self and other evaluations. People cannot bring reason for

			judgment.	their intentional behaviour contrary to their better judgment. So, the soundness of reasons one provides for her behaviour must be studied in agency-oriented factors.
(Reach, 2015)	Weakness of Will or Medical Irrationality	Book on philosophy of mind in medical prescriptions.	An agent can intentionally perform an action that is contrary to her own judgment. This is tested in the case of obese patients. The principle of foresight is the key that helps people to choose remote reward rather than immediate pleasure. The dilemma of autonomy and choice can be addressed through understanding the ethical principles of decision making.	Human behaviours must be studied with respect to the possibility of weakness of will or what is known as medical irrationality that A person is opposing herself.
(Pahman, 2016)	Commitment Actions	Philosophical argument	Not all human decisions can be explained based on the generalised calculus of utility maximising behaviour, as suggested by George Stigler and Gary Becker. One has other-centred motives (altruistic) besides self-interests. Sometimes other-centred behaviours are the actions that are intended contrary to other judgment (e.g. risking one's life in a battle for the sake of others).	Self-centred motives are not the only drivers of human behaviour. People can make decisions contrary to the self-centred way of utility maximising, for the sake of others.
(Strahle and Bonfield, 2015)	Decision Constraints	Empirical test of eight structural factors for last-minute Valentine's Day gift purchases; U method to test the bias classification.	Time serves as decision constraints and decisions made under time constraints are known as Panic Decision Making (PDM)	Human behaviour must be understood with respect to constraints, like time. Temporal constraints must be studied in understanding human behaviour.

(Malawska and Topping, 2016)	Decision Constraints	Apply bounded rationality theory; developing an agent-based model of farmers' decision making on crop choice.	Practical constraints and behavioural factors both affect decisions.	Human behaviour must be understood with respect to constraints. These constraints can be universal or personal.
(Harstad and Selten, 2013b)	Freedom of Choice	Theoretic modelling and experiment	An economic agent does not always optimise. The bounded rationality of an agent is one reason that optimisation does not occur in the decision process.	Optimized decisions are hardly possible to occur due to agent's bounded rationality.
(Mitchell et al., 2015)	Values	Testing stockholder agency framework with respect to value and nature of decision objectives.	Criticized single-objective theories for multi-objective views towards understanding decision making in the multi-objective corporation.	One's values matter in how she behaves. The plurality of values and objectives must be considered to understand decisions.
(Harris et al., 1989)	Emotion and Belief	Three experiments on 3- to 7-year-olds	Emotional reactions of what is being observed depend on the observers' (unconfirmed) beliefs and desires.	Emotion and values are related. Emotion and values influence judgments.
(Heffernan and Ward, 2015)	Modelling Decisions with respect to agency	Integrating normative factors of decision and risk-related factors within the action-based Agency Model of Risk (AMR)	A focus on agency, motivation and values helps to understand decisions. Applying (AMR) help to identify the reasons behind behaviour.	Agency-oriented factors can be conceptualised in a theory to explain human behaviour. So, agency-oriented factors can be identified that associated with freedom.

Why Agency-Oriented Factors Matter: Rationale

Table 2 shows the review of the literature on why it is important to *identify agency-oriented factors associated with freedom* (i.e. the first research objective). The second column of Table 2 points to the rationale of investigating our first research objective. In this line, recent studies have found that human judgments are prone to misattribution (Heller et al., 2015), and this has detrimental consequences for the lives of those who are affected by third-party observers' misattributions (Heerdink et al., 2015). Murphy (2016) has shown that sometimes people make irrational decisions, but attributing irrationality to all human decisions has detrimental policy implications. It is found that our judgments involve many biases (Joo and Durri, 2015), which influence policy-makers' and managers' judgments and everyone whose judgment will influence the lives of others. In this line, if one relies on lay observation (Heerdink et al., 2015), or a pure rationalist lens to understand human decisions, then her judgments are prone to several biases (Kahneman, 2012) and this can have detrimental impacts on the lives of the affected people (Heerdink et al., 2015). Hence, it is important to develop a reliable theory that captures the influence of agency-oriented factors on how people make a decision. In this line, Table 2 shows that recent reviews of attribution studies (Renzi et al., 2015), decision analysis (Puts et al., 2015) and agency (Binkley et al., 2016) have repeated this call that we need to improve our understanding of the way people choose to live with respect to the factors associated with their freedom of choice. Therefore, it is important to fill the gap that is about the lack of a unified theory that identifies agency-oriented factors associated with freedom.

Table 2: Literature on the Rationale behind the 1st Objective

Study	Focus	Methodology	Findings	Implications for Us
(Heller et al., 2015)	Misattribution	Experiment (N = 690); attribution regarding asthma.	Pre-exposure beliefs predict misattributions about post-exposure beliefs.	Lay observers' attributions about the world around them are prone to several biases. So we need to improve the existing understanding about human behaviours.
(Murphy, 2016)	Irrational behaviours and policy implications	Review	Irrational decisions are possible as instances in consumer behaviour, failure to vaccinate children, etc. Irrational behaviours influence policy implications.	Irrational behaviours have policy implications. So we need to identify a reliable set of agency-oriented factors associated with freedom to prevent or at least reduce negative policy implications.
(Joo and Durri, 2015)	Judgemental Biases	Systematic Literature Review with a focus on rational behaviour	Not every decision is rational. Most human decisions are not conscious. There is a gap in the literature to understand normal decision (i.e. the decisions that can be unconscious, unexpected or irrational).	Everyone, even a professional observer, is prone to make judgmental biases about human behaviour. So we need a theory that tackles their observational shortcomings regarding human behaviour.
(Mazar et al., 2008)	Rationalisation	Six experiments in the field of behavioural economy	People are prone to self-deception. Self-deception and dishonesty happen for an agent to obtain benefit but up to the point that she can delude herself about her own integrity.	To understand human behaviour, we need to be careful about their self-deception, and dishonesty. People's "rationalisation" need to be detected.
(Heerdink et	Misattribution	Six experiments;	Emotional expressions	Third-party observers' misattributions have

al., 2015)	Consequences	using the Affect Misattribution Paradigm; meta-analysis	influence attributions. Negative emotions result in negative social function.	detrimental consequences for the lives of those who are affected by their unreliable attribution. So we need a theory that considers all aspects of human behaviour, in order to improve third-party attributions.
(Renzi et al., 2015)	Review of Attribution	Review of 1442 papers published between (1990-2014)	False alarms can undermine the help seeking of potential cancer symptoms. Need for appropriate patient information when investigations rule out cancer.	Attribution studies show misattributions that have a harmful effect on affected people's wellbeing. Attribution literature lacks a theory that considers agency and freedom. So we need to improve our understanding about the attribution process with respect to agency and freedom.
(Puts et al., 2015)	Review of Decision Analysis	Systematic review of 17,343 abstracts, 38 studies were included.	Lack of a theory that identifies factors influencing decisions like cancer treatments. Harmful consequences of shortcomings in the literature. Identifying fear of side-effects in decision analysis.	Misjudgements about decisions harm human wellbeing. So we need to improve our understanding about decision, to be used in the health literacy area.
(Binkley et al., 2016)	Review of Agency	Philosophical review of agency, action and reason	Philosophers have failed to discover a simple grammatical litmus test for agency.	Misjudgements about agency harm individuals' wellbeing. So we need to improve our understanding of agency.

Freedom

So far, from the problem of analysing how internally made is the statement '*I chose to do/be something*', we have arrived at the first research question, that is *what agency-oriented factors influence one to do/be what she values*, which has led us to the first research objective that is *identifying the agency-oriented factors associated with freedom*. The question that emerges from the first research objective is that what we know about freedom with respect to agency. So far, freedom has been studied with a focus on the self and the environment. In the realm of philosophy, Berlin's (1969) *Two Senses of Freedom* is regarded as the most influential work that has focused on both the self and environment aspects of freedom (Gray, 2015). In this regard, Berlin (1969) has defined the 'positive' sense of freedom as *who/what determines an action* that is about the 'self' side of conceptualising freedom. The 'positive' sense of freedom has been developed with a focus on the puzzle of emotion-reason interaction as different sources of rational decision (Damasio et al., 2015; Kassam, 2015), the rational-irrational debate of human decisions (Hyland et al., 2015; Murphy, 2016), and human values (Arrow, 2012). Further Berlin (1969) has developed the 'negative' sense of freedom as the *non-interfered 'space' within which one is free to do/be what she values*.

One of the main contributions to the two senses of freedom, with particular attention to the negative sense of freedom is Sen's (1999) Capability Approach (CA) that conceptualises the non-interfered space as an individual's *capability set* and the limitations within the process of transforming a capability into a *functioning* (i.e. achieved state of being/doing). Capabilities are defined as what an individual can do/be that captures the limitations of the environment on an agent's decision making (Alkire, 2007; Nussbaum, 2003, 1987; Swain, 2015). Further, Sen (1999) identifies the notion of 'functioning' as the state of being/doing after achieving a capability. The emphasis on distinguishing capability from functioning will expand the notion of negative freedom by paying attention to available options (Clark, 2005), limitations (Casenhiser et al., 2013), and the process of turning capabilities into functioning (Alkire and Deneulin, 2009; Andersson et al., 2012; Deneulin and Shahani, 2009). For example, to understand Berlin's (1969) 'negative' freedom through the lens of CA, we pay attention to having certain capabilities (e.g. a bicycle) and the ability to achieve them (e.g. knowing how to ride a bicycle) and the outcome (e.g. riding a bicycle). In this way, the impact of the environment on an agent's freedom is captured with a lens that digs deep into the constraints imposed on an individual's freedom of choice throughout the process of turning a 'capability' into a 'functioning'. In addition, the role of one's unique values and the plurality of different valuable states of being/doing is acknowledged in CA (Andersson et al., 2012).

Last but not least, one of the important contributions of CA to the definition of freedom is focusing on the importance of agency with respect to freedom. As mentioned earlier, Sen (1999) defines agency as one's capability to choose the state of being/doing that she values, to be responsible for her decision and to be evaluated based on her own decisions. However, the question that needs further attention is how freedom (with a focus on both senses of positive and negative) and agency (with a focus on the rational-irrational and emotion-reason aspects of the decision maker) are related. The question is whether freedom and agency are directly related, which means if one has positive and negative freedom then she has agency; or whether freedom and agency are related in an inverse manner, which means that it is possible that one has freedom but lacks agency. To sum up, the question is *how freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors*, with respect to both the 'positive' and 'negative' senses of freedom. Here, by asking the question with reference to agency-oriented factors we are capsulising all aspects of agency in our research enquiry (see the different aspects of agency as discussed in regard to the first research question). Hence, the question is what is the implication of agency-oriented factors for the expansion/contraction of the agent's freedom? In this vein, the following section will review the freedom-oriented literature to see what we know about this question. If we identify a gap in this regard, then this question becomes our second research question, around which we design our second objective.

Gap in Freedom-Oriented Studies

Table 3 shows the review of the literature on what we know about the question of *how freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors*. The second column of Table 3 shows the areas where freedom has been studied. So far, freedom has been studied with respect to the positive and the negative senses of freedom (Berlin, 2014, 1969, 1958); obedience and agency (Bandura, 2015, 2012); the psychological need for authority (Deci and Ryan, 2012, 2008); the positive-negative notions of rational and irrational behaviours (Gray, 2015); the social need for emotion and love (Krause, 2014; Nussbaum, 2004), and the means for nurture human development with a focus on personal and social needs (Swain, 2015).

As evidence, Berlin's 1958 two essays on freedom, which define this concept with respect to the sources of human action (positive) and the boundaries of action (negative) have not been used in the psychological take on freedom that focuses on the mind process of an action (Bandura, 2015) and psychological needs and motivation (Deci and Ryan, 2012). One of the seminal agency-oriented works in the psychological field that has taken insights from the freedom-oriented studies in the field of philosophy is Milgram's (2009, 1963) theory of

obedience. However, as the label of Milgram's (1963) theory represents, the focus of this study is mainly on obedience rather than an explicit focus on agency and freedom (Milgram and Van den Haag, 1978). In this line, the problem is that the most coherent definition of freedom (according to Gray (2015), which is the positive-negative senses of freedom by Berlin (1969), has been adapted in a theory (namely Sen's (1999) CA), but according to Chiappero-Martinetti et al. (2015) research can hardly operationalise CA. Further, as summarised in the second and the third rows of Table 3, the other agency-oriented studies on freedom have relied mainly on proxy variables of authority (e.g. Deci and Ryan, 2012) and obedience (e.g. Bandura, 2015) to study freedom. Hence, there is a gap in the literature in terms of *how freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors*, with a focus on the two senses of freedom and different modes of agency. The following section shows why it is important to address this gap, which is the foundation of our second research question.

Table 3: Existing Findings Regarding Freedom

Study	Focus	Methodology	Findings	Implications for Us
(Berlin, 1970, 1969, 1958)	Freedom from two senses that captures self-space interaction	Theorising human agency in philosophy	Freedom is conceptualised from two senses: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the positive sense - its focus is on self (what/who determined an action) the negative sense - its focus is on external factors that interfere with what the self wants (the space within which one is free to determine what she wants.) 	This comprehensive definition of freedom in the realm of philosophy (Gray, 2015), needs to be expanded with respect to agency (Sen, 1999b), particularly in a multidisciplinary manner that captures recent scientific findings on the three modes of agency.
(Bandura, 2015, 2012, 1989, 1977)	Freedom as Obedience	Theorising human agency in social cognitive theory	Freedom is conceptualised with respect to psychological mode of behaviour (see Chapter 7, Theory Evaluation).	Freedom needs to be studied beyond a latent factor for obedience.
(Deci and Ryan, 2012)	Freedom as motivational need for authority.	Theorising self-determination with respect to motivation in the field of appraisal psychology.	Freedom is studied as a motivational need for authority, to achieve wellbeing, particularly within the realm of psychology (see Chapter 7, Theory Evaluation).	Freedom needs to be studied beyond a latent factor for wellbeing.
(Sen, 2011, 2007, 1999b)	Freedom as Capability	Theorising development as freedom, and	Freedom has turned into the focus of human development.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Freedom needs to be studied beyond capability and wellbeing. Freedom needs to be studied with a

		freedom as capabilities in the field of political economy.	Freedom is studied with focus on its negative sense, within the concepts of capabilities and functioning.	focus on agency.
(Gray, 1980)	Freedom and Rationality	Philosophical argument on Berlin's two senses of freedom.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Berlin's account of freedom is a powerful argument, implying that freedom is about the non-restriction of options. • Although it is right to reject the positive conceptualisation of freedom that depends on rationalist doctrine, due to the shortcomings of this school of thought, positive freedom is necessarily involved in understanding human behaviour. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Berlin's account of freedom is a solid ground to study freedom. • Rationality matters in the study of freedom. • Positive freedom should not be dismissed in favour of negative freedom, just because of irrationality in human behaviour. • To expand freedom, positive freedom must be studied by getting beyond the rationalist doctrine and including the affective mode of agency and the careful study of 'rationalisation', which Mazar et al. (2008) identify as a manifestation of irrational behaviour.
(Krause, 2014)	Freedom and Emotion	Review on the liberalism of love, with a focus on freedom	Review and repeat the importance of Nussbaum's (2003) call for love (i.e. emotion) for liberal democracy.	Emotions matter in the study of freedom.
(Sen, 2013)	Freedom in Society (focus on sustainability)	Political review	Social and biological needs matter but a human being is a reflective creature who can reason about and decides what is valuable for her.	Social context matters in study of freedom, but it must be studied respect for the plurality of values and agency.
(Sen, 1985)	Freedom, Agency,	Political review	Both wellbeing and agency matter in moral lens towards	Freedom should not be studied as a proxy for agency or wellbeing. These concepts

	Wellbeing		human being.	need to be studied thoroughly and independently.
(Swain, 2015)	Freedom, agency, capabilities, advantages	Review of Sen's (1999) Capability Approach (CA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The unique advantages of CA are its ability to give maximum autonomy to an individual, its focus on freedom, capabilities and transforming them into functioning. • CA is built upon the concepts of freedom • CA defines freedom based on Berlin's two senses of freedom 	Freedom needs to be studied beyond the field of philosophy with a focus on agency and capabilities.
(Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015)	Freedom, agency, capabilities, challenges	Review of Sen's (1999) CA	The main challenge of CA is how to operationalise it.	Freedom needs to be studied in a way that the results can be operationalised in different areas.

Why Freedom Expansion/Contraction Matters: Rationale

Table 4 shows why it is important to address the question of *how freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors*. There are several reasons including the important role of freedom on empowering wellbeing and the performance of individual members of social groups particularly in work settings (Wu et al., 2015), improving altruistic behaviours that are beneficial to individuals and society, particularly in organisational settings, such as the Employee Green Behaviour (EGB) (Norton et al., 2015), addressing the problem of invisible “free slavery” where in modern societies people suppress their needs, emotions and expression of their values (Davidson, 2015), understanding the decisions that are made contrary to personal judgments (Davidson, 2014), developing an agency-freedom friendly environment where creativity and innovation is encouraged (Clark and Nye, 2015), reducing the elements of coercion in the environment that undermines individuals’ to become the agents of their own lives and to remain responsible for the impact of their actions (Caspar et al., 2016), and highlighting the existing debate on whether agency and free will are overrated with reference to recent neuroscientific breakthroughs about unconscious roots of behaviours (Smith, 2011). So far, Jääskelä et al. (2016) have shown that it is possible and useful to investigate agency-oriented factors, but there is still a gap in terms of the link between agency level and freedom. Table 4 presents several reasons implying the importance of this research endeavour, which leads us towards our second research objective that is ‘establishing how freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors’.

Table 4: Literature on the Rationale behind the 2nd Research Objective

Study	Focus	Methodology	Findings	Implications for Us
(Wu et al., 2016)	Freedom matters at work	Two surveys (N=215) of North American community college employees, and (N=148), and Chinese state-owned enterprise employees	It is found that having greater freedom within the role will improve the performance and wellbeing of overqualified workers	It is important for the sake of wellbeing and performance of individuals to develop a theory that establishes the implication of agency-oriented factors for the expansion/contraction of the agent's freedom.
(Norton et al., 2015)	Freedom matters for Employee Green Behaviour (EGB)	Investigate the factors mediating and moderating EGB	Required and voluntary EGB are different in terms of the contextual and personal factors. There is a need for multilevel research examining cross-level effects of the factors influencing EGB. Person-environment interaction needs to be studied with a focus on the required-voluntary nature of human actions.	There is a need for a theory that investigates person-environment interactions with respect to agency and freedom, if we want both the person and the social group to benefit from their interaction.
(Davidson, 2015)	Freedom, Agency and modern slavery	Review of Eck's (2014) view on 'modern slaves'	In modern times, we have 'free slaves'. They are those who suppress their emotion; those whose slavery is hidden to them because they have always been slaves. Research needs to focus on the problem of coercion that may not be visible as medieval slavery but still exists in different forms.	It is important to study freedom with respect to agency, if we need to understand incontinent actions.

(Davidson, 1970)	Agency-freedom levels matter to understand incontinent actions.	Logical argument around “how is weakness of will possible?”	There are some actions that are performed with intention, contrary to the agent’s judgment. These are incontinent actions that have three characteristics, they are: (A) intentional, (B) the agent believes that an alternative option is open to her, (C) the agent judges that the alternative option is better.	It is important to study agency with respect to freedom, which is a complex task as human decisions are complex and not always rationally predictable, and it is not possible to simulate them using cognitive models of behaviour.
(Clark and Nye, 2015)	Agency-freedom levels matters for creativity	Philosophical argument in educational philosophy	Agency matters in creativity.	It is important to conceptualise agency if creativity matters.
(Caspar et al., 2016)	Agency in a coercive environment	Neuroscience experiment	Coercion changes the sense of agency in the human brain Being in a coercive environment, people feel a lower sense of agency.	It is important to study agency with respect to the environment and its coercive element. In other words, if we need to diminish the coercive nature of the environment to enjoy the positive outcomes of agency, we need to study agency levels with respect to freedom levels.
(Smith, 2011)	Is agency overrated?	Review of experiments in neuroscience with a look at the philosophical take on agency	Most of our decisions, even the conscious ones, are determined by chemical interactions in the brain. Experiments show that before one acts, her agency-outcome is predictable by tracing the chemical interactions in her mind. There is an ongoing debate about the extent to which free will exists.	There is an emerging call for multidisciplinary research on agency and freedom, as the field of psychology, neuroscience and philosophy are drifting apart on this topic.

(Jääskelä et al., 2016)	Agency-oriented theory	Survey and Factor Analysis	<p>There is a gap in the literature for a research theory and an appropriate tool for assessing agency level. Describing a theoretical foundation and factor structure of a newly developed Theory of Agency of University Students, 10 factors emerge with focus on students' agency: (A) interest and motivation, (B) self-efficacy, (C) competence beliefs, and (D) participation activity, (E) equal treatment, (F) teacher support, (G) peer support, (H) trust, (I) opportunities to influence, (J) an opportunity to make choices.</p>	<p>There is a need for a generic theory that measures agency level, with a focus on freedom, as previous studies have shown that this endeavour is possible and it is useful for human wellbeing and performance. There is a gap in the literature for a theory that measures agency and freedom levels in relation to each other.</p>
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Conclusion

We start from this *problem* that how internally made is the statement '*I chose to do/be something*'. We have shown that answering this question is complex and we have broken down this question into two research questions: (A) *what agency-oriented factors influence one to do/be what she values*, and (B) *how is freedom expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors*? To answer the first research question, we have shown that although recent studies have indicated that emotion (Kassam, 2015; Lau et al., 2015; Marissa S. Edwards et al., 2016; Phelps et al., 2014; Zeng et al., 2015), reason (Binkley et al., 2016; Houk et al., 2016; Hyland et al., 2015), person-environment (Bleidorn and Ködding, 2013; Heather and Segal, 2015), and constraints (Harstad and Selten, 2013a; Malawska and Topping, 2016; Strahle and Bonfield, 2015) matter in understanding why a decision is made, some studies (Binkley et al., 2016; Puts et al., 2015; Renzi et al., 2015) have shown that there is lack of a single theory that captures the impact of all of these various agency-oriented factors on human behaviour. Further, the impact of these agency-oriented factors on an agent's capability to live the life she has reason to value has not been captured in a unified theory that can be operationalised in different fields (Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015). Hence, there is a gap in the literature for a theory that *identifies the agency-oriented factors associated with freedom*. We have shown that it is important to address this gap, because studies (Heerdink et al., 2015; Heller et al., 2015) have shown that due to the lack of this theory, there are many misattributions that are made about the factors influencing an agent's way of life, and these misjudgements have detrimental consequences, particularly on the wellbeing of those who are affected by the policy implications of these unreliable attributions (Murphy, 2015). To address this gap, we have concluded our first research objective that is *identifying agency-oriented factors associated with freedom*.

Further, on the way of *identifying agency-oriented factors associated with freedom*, we have arrived at the question of what is freedom in relation to agency. This is a well-established question that has occupied the mind of several thinkers (e.g. Bakhtin, 1935; Berlin, 1969; Coffman, 2015; Weber, 1993); namely the extent to which one is free to do/be what she values. In this vein, we have arrived at the second important gap in the literature that although freedom has been studied with respect to 'self' and 'space' (Berlin, 1969, 1958), capabilities (Sen, 1999b; Swain, 2015), as a proxy for psychological need for authority (Deci and Ryan, 2012, 2008), as a latent variable for obedience (Bandura, 2015; Milgram, 2015), there is a shortcoming in this literature that we know little about freedom in relation to agency, as suggested by Sen (1999), and repeated in recent studies on the theory of the mind (Correia, 2016; Davidson, 2014, 2001; Smith, 2015). The problem is that this is a very important enquiry to clarify freedom and agency

levels in relation to each other, because recent studies have shown that freedom matters at work (Wu et al., 2015), freedom matters for volunteer behaviours that are useful for both individuals and society (Norton et al., 2015), freedom matters in today's context where we are witnessing several examples of modern slavery (Davidson, 2015). In addition, agency matters for improving an individual's sense of being (Clark and Nye, 2015) and wellbeing (Jääskelä et al., 2016). However, the problem is that different disciplines have studied agency in isolation, thus, some say that human agency is being overestimated by philosophers, while others believe that psychologists and neuroscientists underestimate human agency (Smith, 2015). This is an emerging debate in the field of agency and freedom because as we have reviewed the literature (see Table 1 and Table 3), there is also a gap in terms of conceptualising agency and freedom in relation to each other. Therefore, we have concluded our second research objective that is *establishing freedom expansion/contraction with respect to agency-oriented factors*.

Overall, both of our research gaps point to agency and freedom and their relationship. In this vein, the main missing area in the agency-freedom literature is the lack of a clear understanding of these two notions in relation to each other and their relationship. As evidence, so far the freedom-oriented studies such as Sen's (1999) CA have pointed to this shortcoming and have called for more research on agency and freedom in relation to each other. However, agency-oriented reviews (Limerick et al., 2015; McCann et al., 2016), the freedom-oriented state of arts (Hedgecoe, 2015; Zeng et al., 2015), and decision-oriented reviews (Lehnert et al., 2015; Puts et al., 2015) are not offering a single and unified theory with a focus on the relationship between agency and freedom. Hence, the aim of this study is to fill this gap and to determine the agency-freedom relationship. Overall, these two gaps point to a single bigger gap that is the vague relationship between agency and freedom. Hence, we build our study on determining the agency-freedom relationship through achieving the above-mentioned two research objectives. Overall, the present chapter has shown what we know about the relationship between agency and freedom, and how we have arrived at our research questions, aim and objectives based on the gaps in the literature. In the following chapters we show how we have achieved the aim and objectives.

Chapter 3: Methodology

Introduction

This chapter starts with a clear statement of the research problem, and then it shows what is our plan, philosophical position, methods, ethical and measurement concerns to address this problem. In more detail, this chapter shows the logic of the research enquiry (i.e. inductive, deductive or abductive dimensions) of the present study based on our philosophical paradigm, which is Critical Realism, with a focus on the ontology, epistemology and axiology of our research enquiry. As a result, we present a research methodology that is designed according to these methodological pillars in this study. In sum, this chapter shows why the present study is a scientific enquiry that aims at determining the relationship between agency and freedom.

Research Gap, Problem, and Questions

So far we have shown that to understand how agentic is the statement 'I chose to do/be something', there is a gap in the literature regarding the relationship between agency and freedom and this study aims to fill this gap (see Chapter 2, Literature Review). The problem is how agency and freedom are related. Is agency expansion directly related to freedom expansion and vis-a-versa? For example, what is the agency-freedom level of a gambler who gambles (see Davidson (2014) on weakness of will); one who abstains from eating marshmallow while craving for it (see Mischel's (2015) experiment); one who decides to enter war zones to help civilians thus risking her own life (see Sen's (1990) rationale fool). To address the problem of the unclear relationship between agency and freedom, the present study tries to develop an agency-oriented theory with a focus on freedom. A theory that defines and conceptualises all aspects of agency and two senses of freedom (positive and negative) in relation to each other, and a theory that helps to expand our understanding of an individual's decision behaviour both internal and external to her being. This chapter shows our methodology to fill this gap by developing a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency through a systematic approach of collecting, analysing and interpreting data, within the scope of answering the following questions: (A) what factors influence one's agency to do/be what she values; and (B) what is the implication of agency-oriented factors for the expansion/contraction of the agent's freedom?

Research Paradigm

Our research paradigm is based on Critical Realism (CR) that is a school of thought most recently defined by Bhaskar (1979, 2013, 1978). In this way, our ontological position is that reality exists independently of the human mind, but to a large extent the "real" things are not

readily observable (Tao, 2016). According to CR, within the independent reality there are three dimensions – the “real”, “actual” and “empirical”, and the things that are both “measurable” and “observable” are within the “empirical” domain (Sayer, 2010). This means that in principle there are some things in the “real” and “actual” domains that are not accessible to scientific tools and consequently the present research. CR identifies the ‘real’, ‘actual’ and ‘empirical’ domains of beings. The ‘empirical’ domain includes what a researcher can observe and measure, like the height of an individual that can be measured by a standard ruler; the ‘actual’ domain contains the events that are generated by some mechanisms in ‘real’ domains (e.g. time) (Mingers, 2004); and the ‘real’ domain contains the mechanisms and structure that are not observable, such as the DNA molecules that carry most of the genetic instructions in the growth, development, functioning and reproduction of human beings (Bhaskar et al., 2015).

In the present study, the link between agency and freedom is not observable and measurable by existing scientific tools, in a way that we can use a ruler to measure the height of an individual. Using existing research tools (e.g. questionnaire, interview and case study) we can only measure an individual’s *perception* of freedom, constraints, values, third-party evaluation, capabilities, time and chance. This is the same even in the field of neuroscience, when they (Damasio et al., 2015) are measuring the signals that are traveling among the neuron during the decision-making process to understand how a decision is made. Neuroscientists are not directly measuring the concepts of agency and freedom as they can measure rises and falls in blood pressure. However, the neuroscientific findings can be used to understand how the environment influences an individual’s affective and cognitive ability (in the form of neurons) to determine a choice (Christensen and Gomila, 2012). For example, they can design research in a way that an individual is asked to make a decision in a coercive situation where an external stimulus is pushing her to choose a certain option, and during the decision process they observe whether that external stimulus has changed the pattern signals in the decision-maker’s mind. For example, Caspar et al. (2016) have used the same methodology and they have found that a coercive environment will reduce the sense of agency. As evidence, the scientific findings that are obtained from observable things are used to draw a conclusion about unobservable concepts such as agency and freedom. This logical process to deduce the conclusion is induction and there are many scientific breakthroughs that are developed using inductive logic. For example, Darwin’s (1872) theory of evolution in *The Origin of Species* and Isaac Newton’s (1999) mathematical principles of natural philosophy were developed using inductive logic (Okasha, 2002). Darwin and Newton deduced their theories from a limited number of observations (about the origin of species and the movement of things, respectively) into a

general conclusion about the things that they have not observed and measured (i.e. the evolution of all species and the movement of everything on earth, respectively). Here, to develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, we have the same logic to explain how agency and freedom are related. Our first step is to develop the theory using deduction, when we test the existing theories (e.g. Berlin, 1958; Sen, 1999) about agency and freedom. The second step is induction, when we use the findings and the data that are obtained from the observations (through using interviews and questionnaires) and we draw some conclusion about the relationship between agency and freedom for the first time. The third step is abduction, when we use the existing theory (Bakhtin, 1935; Weber, 1993b; Weiner, 2010) to explain some conclusions that we have made during the induction phase of developing the Tri-Modal theory of Agency (see the next section that outlines the methods and techniques that we have used in these logical steps).

Another ontological question is if something is not observable by the available research tools (see Okasha (2002) for a discussion of different positions about observable features of reality), then whether these things exist. In this line, the present research based on the CR paradigm believes that there are some parts of freedom and agency that are not observable by scientific tools in the social sciences (i.e. they are within the 'real' domain, see **Error! Reference source not found.**), but it does not mean that they do not exist. This is our ontological position regarding the things that are not observable and measurable by scientific tools. Accordingly, our epistemological position is that we can use the existing scientific tools to observe and measure some parts of the 'real' domain that are within the 'empirical' domain. For example, one ontological question is whether emotions exist, given that we cannot see them (sadness, anger, happiness, etc.) in the same way as we can see a chair or a tree. In this regard, we say that emotions exist, but we have access to some parts of emotion that are within the empirical domain that can be observed and measured. In this regard, based on appraisal psychologists and particularly Weiner's (2010) attribution theory of motivation, we measure the motivating impact of emotion with decisions. For example, Weiner says that when one attributes her failure (e.g. a student fails an exam) to an external party (e.g. a bad teacher), then it is possible that this person experiences anger and decides to attack the source of failure (e.g. the student complains about the teacher to the school principals), because the attribution that she has assigned to her situation is external to her and not controllable by her. Hence, the emotion can be measured through analysing the characteristics (i.e. the locus, stability and controllability) of the attribution one assigns to her situation and the decision that is motivated by

that emotion (Rudolph et al., 2013; Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014) (see Chapter 4, Theory Development).

Another example is about how to measure capabilities, as we cannot see one's capabilities as they are limitless (Hodges and Creese, 2013), and the quality of an agent's constraints and capabilities change in her lifetime in different contexts (Alkire, 2007; Nussbaum, 2004). However, it is found that each individual has a perception about her list of decision options, even though due to her bounded rationality this list does not include all of the capabilities that are actually available to her (Avineri and Ben-Elia, 2015; Harstad and Selten, 2013). Therefore, capability set can be observed and measured through one's perception, acknowledging that this set has some members that are not observable and measurable by the researcher. This acknowledgement is one of the methodological concerns that guide the steps of the present research based on the ontological and epistemological position of CR. In other words, we believe that the present research is observing and measuring some parts of the agency-freedom relationship that are within the 'empirical' domain of CR (see **Error! Reference source not found.**), which are the parts of the 'real' that are measurable and observable by available research tools. In this regard, we break down the research questions to identify what type of knowledge we are seeking and how.

Research Epistemology and Objectives

This section presents what knowledge this study is developing and how. The first area of knowledge that we are developing is about the individuals' decisions. Since, in the present study the essence of the relationship between agency and freedom is the decisions that the agent is making (i.e. agency-outcome). This is because our research problem has been developed around this idea that we have poor knowledge when we judge this statement "I chose to do/be something", particularly as it is a puzzle how internally driven this decision is. Hence, even though the relationship between agency and freedom is not measurable and observable (i.e. not all of its aspects are within the 'empirical' domain of CR), we are determining this relationship by investigating how decisions are made with respect to internal and external reasons. Collecting and analysing data about the decisions are possible as there are many theories, studies, and research tools (e.g. questionnaire, interview) and methods on how to study decisions (Ashkanasy and Daus, 2016;), what factors (e.g. emotion, reason, constraints) influence the decisions (Roberts, 2015), and our judgements about decisions (Kahneman, 2014). The second area of knowledge that is developed in this study is about whether these decisions have conducive/conflicting impact on an agent being able to live according to her values. This is

because our definition of freedom is based on 'values', as we say that one is free to live according to her values, and her freedom is contracted if she makes a decision that is in conflict with her values (see Chapter 4, Theory Development). It is established that one's 'values' are measurable through the individual's perceptions about norms and imperatives by research tools (by way of introspection and self-reporting) (Arrow, 2012; Schultz and Zelezny, 1998). Therefore, to determine the relationship between agency and freedom, we develop knowledge about the reasons behind one's decisions and the conflicting/conducive impact of these decisions on one being able to live according to her values.

In this line, to determine the agency-freedom relationship, we need to gather the relevant knowledge from the existing theories on decisions and how these decisions influence one to live according to her values. Hence, our journey to determine the agency-freedom relationship starts from developing these concepts from the existing theories into an agency-oriented theory, namely the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (see Chapter 4, Theory Development). This first step is the theoretical development of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency and it is accompanied by five steps that are empirical development and amendment of our theory (see Chapter 5, Data Collection, Findings and Analysis). During the process of empirical development of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, whenever we test the existing theories on agency and freedom, our philosophical logic is deductive, when we go beyond the existing explanations then our logic is induction, and when we use the existing theories to explain our findings then we are using abduction. In each of the five empirical studies we are using all three logical approaches (see **Error! Reference source not found.**), because previously agency and freedom have been studied in isolation but their relationship has rarely been distinguished (see Chapter 2, Literature Review).

Here, the first research question is "what *factors* influence one's agency to do/be what she *values*." In this question, we are dealing with three notions of 'factors', 'agency' and 'freedom' (as the ability to live according to values). From the decision-oriented research (Avineri and Ben-Elia, 2015; Damasio et al., 2015), agency-oriented studies (Bandura, 2006; Jääskelä et al., 2016), and freedom-oriented studies (Berlin, 1958; Sen, 2011), we know that some aspects of these concepts are measurable and observable (i.e. within the 'empirical' domain) in an individual's perceptions (by way of introspection and self-reporting). However, we acknowledge that there are some parts of reality that are not measurable and observable (such as the internal thought processes and inner feelings) regarding our first research question. Hence, our approach to address these questions is first deductive (when we use existing theories on decision, agency and freedom to test the factors influencing decision in relation to

values); then inductive (when we go beyond what existing theories know about how decisions are made with respect to affective, cognitive and conative modes of agency), and finally it is abductive (when we use existing theories (e.g. Bakhtin, 1935; Sen, 1992; Weber, 1993a; Weiner, 2010) to explain the findings that we have derived from the data.

Table 5 presents how the first research question is addressed to create the knowledge about 'what *factors* influence one's agency to do/be what she *values*', based on our epistemological position within the CR paradigm regarding the source, scope, justification and criteria of knowledge. These criteria are set based on Scott's (2013) categorisation of epistemological positions within CR. Table 5 shows that our first empirical research (Study 1) is designed to test the existing theories on agency and freedom by conducting interviews (see Chapter 5, Study 1). As mentioned above, at this point our research logic is deductive because we are testing the existing theories. Further, at the end of Study 1 we design a questionnaire based on the findings from the interviews and we go beyond the existing theories (see Chapter 5, Study 1, Questionnaire Design). To design this questionnaire we use coding and thematic analysis to analyse the findings, which are the reliable and valid techniques to dig deeper into the data to identify new themes (Silverman, 2016). Therefore, the final phase of Study 1 is inductive, when we work from data to develop a generalisation from the observations.

Further, in Study 2 and Study 3 we will conduct two surveys (N1=1063 and N2=4086) that are nationally representative (see the following section on research context). These two empirical studies are conducted for two reasons: (A) to concise the factors that we have found in Study 1, and (B) to find the agency-oriented factors that are generalisable (Groves et al., 2013). In Study 2 and Study 3 when we test the findings of Study 1, we are using the deductive approach, and later when we go beyond the findings and explore a smaller number of agency-oriented factors and design the final Evaluation Instrument then we are using the inductive approach. In this regard, to explore the survey data to identify agency-oriented factors we run Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) as a statistical technique suggested by Beavers et al. (2013) to be a reliable technique for reducing the factors to a set of distinguishing factors from the data. Further, at the end of Study 3, we run Confirmatory Factors Analysis (CFA) to see if our final factors fit the theory, which is a suggested technique by Brown (2015) for establishing the goodness of fit of the extracted factors (EFA and CFA are explained in detail in Chapter 5). At the end of Study 3, we use Weber's (2009) theory on 'rationality types' to explain the findings (i.e. agency-oriented factors that are designed in the Evaluation Instrument). Thus, at the end of Study 3 we are using the abduction to develop the Evaluation Instrument and Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.

Regarding our second research question, that is 'What is the implication of agency-oriented factors for the expansion/contraction of the agent's freedom?', the concepts of freedom, agency and their expansion/contraction have not been theorised before (see Chapter 2, Literature Review). Hence, to achieve our second objective we try to establish freedom expansion/contraction through measuring how one's decision conflicts/conduces with her affective, cognitive and conative abilities to live according to her values (see Chapter 4, Theory Development). Table 5 shows that two parts of Study 4 and Study 5 are focusing on this endeavour. In the first part of Study 4, we use the Evaluation Instrument that measures cognitive and conative parts of agency-oriented factors (developed in Studies 1, 2 and 3), and apply it to seven interviews to identify the affective mode of agency, as well as to explore how the agent deals with the opposing worldview. Here, first we use the deductive approach when we test the Evaluation Instrument, then we use the inductive approach when we work from data to develop a generalisation from the observations about the affective mode of agency and worldviews (see Chapter 5, Study 4, Part 1). Finally, when we use Weber's (2009) rationality theory, Weiner's (2010) emotion theory and Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism to explain the findings we are using the abductive approach.

Finally, Part 2 of Study 4 has the same approach and methods as the first part of study 4, but in addition, here we conduct interviews on four different types of decision in order to expand the generic aspect of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that determines the agency-freedom relationship based on agency-oriented factors (see Chapter 5, Study 4, Part 2). In the second part of Study 4 we start by testing agency-oriented factors that have been developed in the previous studies (i.e. using deduction), then we go beyond by working from data to develop a generalisation from the observations about what is known about the levels of agency and freedom in relation to each other (i.e. using induction), and finally we use Weber (2009), Weiner (2010), Bakhtin (1935), Berlin (1969), and Sen (1993) to explain the findings (i.e. using abduction). At the end of Study 4, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is being developed both empirically and theoretically, through four studies that each have a deduction, induction and abduction phase. Finally, in the fifth study we use the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency on one case study to test all aspects of the theory and to determine the agency-freedom relationship.

Table 5: Research epistemology of the agency-freedom relationship

Study	Question	Focus	Logical Approach	Source of Knowledge
Theory Development*	RQ1	Agency-Freedom	Deduction	Literature
1. Theory Development (Study 1)	RQ1	Factors (Affective, Cognitive and Conative); Values	1 st Deduction 2 nd Induction	Individuals (interview)
2. Theory Development (Study 2)	RQ1	Factors (Cognitive and Conative); Values	1 st Deduction 2 nd Induction	Individuals (survey)
3. Theory Amendment (Study 3)	RQ1	Factors (Cognitive and Conative); Values	1 st Deduction 2 nd Induction 3 rd Abduction	Individuals (survey)
4.1. Theory Development (Study 4, Part 1)	RQ2	Factors (Affective); Values; Worldview	1 st Deduction 2 nd Induction 3 rd Abduction	Evaluation Instrument; Individuals (interview)
4.2. Theory Amendment (Study 4, Part 2)	RQ2	Link between decision; Value	1 st Deduction 2 nd Induction 3 rd Abduction	Tri-Modal Theory of Agency; Individuals (interview)
5. Testing Theory (Case Study)	RQ1 RQ2	Agency-Freedom Relationship	1 st Deduction 2 nd Induction 3 rd Abduction	Tri-Modal Theory of Agency; Individuals (interview)


Note: RQ1: What factors influence one's agency to do/be what she values? RQ2: How to determine the Agency-freedom link with the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency?; (*) Theory Development is in Chapter 4.

Why Critical Realism and its implications

For two main reasons we use Critical Realism (CR) to determine the agency-freedom relationship. First, CR *does not* have the simplistic view of other paradigms like positivism that only relies on identifying the correlated empirical variables, assuming that ‘causal analysis’ is similar to ‘regression analysis’ (Sayer, 2010). Initially, CR has been developed as a philosophical critique against the positivist assumption that knowledge of reality can be gained only through empirical means (Tao, 2013). Further, CR also stands against the idealists’ ontology, claiming that there is no independent reality to human perceptions (Okasha, 2002). As a result, CR is a philosophical position that endorses the idea of an independent reality, but for CR “there is always an interpretive or hermeneutic element in making sense of this reality, particularly in social setting” (Tao, 2013). That is why CR is a philosophical ground that justifies the use of the mixed-method approach. In this line, CR says that “quantitative methods enable us to develop reliable descriptions; to provide accurate comparisons; and to identify patterns and associations” (McEvoy and Richards, 2006, p. 71). For example, here we use survey and factor analysis to work on data in order to identify the patterns of agency-oriented factors and concise them in a generalizable way. Further, in in-depth interviews we identify the affective mode of agency-oriented factors. At the end of the first part of Study 4, all three modes of agency (affective, cognitive and conative) are identified in agency-oriented factors (see Chapter 5, Study 4, Part 1), using both qualitative and quantitative methods. Second, using CR as the philosophical ground to *determine the agency-freedom relationship* is consistent with the other theories used in the present study. In this line, according to Zheng and Stahl (2011) both Sen’s (1999) Capability Approach and Critical Realism are normative theories; they both believe in democracy and pursuit of the “good life”. More importantly, CR focuses on *freedom* similar to the other theories that we use in this study, namely Berlin’s (1969) liberal approach to freedom and values, Weber’s (1993) Rationality Types, and Bakhtin’s (1935) dialogism. All of these theories have a common point that is consistent with CR, as they all can be seen as a critical lens on human behaviour in social settings. The axiological domain of our research enquiry is that the researcher’s values (i.e. lens) are used to interpret the observations (see Chapter 5, Data Collection, Findings and Analysis). In the statistical approach our axiological lens to interpret the result becomes more objective (see Chapter 5, Study 3, Result Interpretation). Further, we develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency within a research methodology that is designed around CR through five empirical studies that have deduction (initially we test what we know in theory and the existing literature on agency and freedom), induction (we work with the data to develop generalisable explanations for our findings, here, we go beyond the existing

explanations for agency-freedom relationships), and abduction parts (when we use existing theories to explain our findings) (see Table 5). Figure 4 shows the input, process and output of this research and the research aim and objectives that are mapped onto the concepts of agency and freedom.

Figure 4: Research aim and objectives



Input:
Problem: Unclear relationship between agency and freedom.
Input1: Research Questions
Input2: Aim and Objectives
Input3: Existing theories and studies on Agency and Freedom

Process:

- Mixed Method
- Study1, 2 &3: Identify Agency Oriented Factors
- Study4 (Part1&Part2): Establish Freedom Expansion/Contraction based on Agency Oriented Factors
- Case Study: Test Tri-Modal Theory of Agency

Output:
 Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that determines agency-freedom link
Contribution:
 Freedom matters but agency to choose freedom ought to be more aspirational

Research Plan

This study is a basic research as it is a fundamental scientific enquiry to develop the agency-freedom relationship. So far, we have outlined that our research methodology includes an initial state of theory development, and then four empirical studies that cover mixed-method approaches based on the CR philosophical paradigm to develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, and finally one case study to test the theory (Figure 5). The detailed explanation of each empirical study, the justification of the use of methods and techniques are in Chapter 5, where we outline data collection, findings and analysis. As presented in Figure 5, we are using both qualitative and quantitative methods due to the scope of our research questions. We use surveys to (A) identify a generalisable set of agency-oriented factors that are associated with freedom of choice, and (B) compare the impact of agency-oriented factors from two standpoints of 'self' and 'other'. Hence, to analyse the survey findings, we use EFA to explore the factors in the data, and then we run CFA to test the goodness of fit of these factors to theory, as suggested by (Brown, 2015). It is worth mentioning here, however, that the surveys identify cognitive and conative modes of agency-oriented factors, and the affective mode is being explored using the interview data.

Further, we use qualitative methods to accompany the quantitative findings in order to: (A) identify 'emotions' that is the affective mode of agency; (B) identify how an individual deals with the opposing worldview by comparing their scores in 'self' and 'other' standpoints of the questionnaire (see Chapter 4, Theory Development for more detail); (C) identify the agent's values; (D) distinguish the agent's rationality types particularly in the cases that two rationality types have similar types of reasoning (see the problem of identifying M.G.'s rationality type in Chapter 6, Case Study); (E) detect 'rationalisation', when an individual is offering an unsound reason for her decision; (F) to study the link between emotion, reason and decision (see Chapter 4, Theory Development and Chapter 5, Data Collection, Findings, and Analysis). Figure 5 shows that the result of the first three studies is an Evaluation Instrument that identifies agency-oriented factors associated with freedom, and the result of the final two empirical studies map this Evaluation Instrument and the agency-oriented factors onto the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. Finally, we apply our theory to a case study that establishes how freedom expands or contracts based on agency-oriented factors.

Figure 5: Research Methods, Tools and Techniques



Objective1: Identify the agency-oriented factors associated with freedom.

Study1: Qualitative Development (Round1)

Tool: extensive in-depth Interview

Technique: Thematic Analysis (N=7)

Study2: Quantitative Development

Tool: Survey on 'Career Choice' (N = 1063)

Technique: Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)


Study3: Quantitative Amendment

Tool: Survey on 'University Major Selection' (N = 4086)

Technique: EFA and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)

Result:

Evaluation Instrument that identifies agency-oriented factors associated with freedom.



Objective2: Establish freedom expansion/contraction based on agency oriented factors.

Study4 (part1): Qualitative Development (Round2)

Tool: Extensive in-depth Interview and Evaluation Instrument (N=10)

Technique: Thematic Analysis


Study4 (part2): Qualitative Amendment

Tool: Extensive in-depth Interview, Evaluation Instrument, and Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (N=4)

Technique: Thematic Analysis, Logical Deduction

Result:

Evaluation Instrument Mapped in to Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that establishes freedom expansion/contraction based on agency oriented factors.



Aim: Determine Agency-Freedom Relationship

Case Study

Tool: Interview, Evaluation Instrument, Tri-Modal Theory of Agency

Technique: Thematic Analysis, Logical Deduction

Result:

Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that determines agency-free dom relationship

Research Methods and Data Analysis Techniques

In Chapter 5 we explain data analysis, reduction, conclusion justification, ethical issues and obstacles that we have encountered when collecting data for each of the four studies presented in Figure 5. Further, the full justification of the methods being used is provided in Chapter 5. Here, we present a short overview of all of the methods and techniques, applied to develop and test the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to determine the agency-freedom relationship. First, we develop the theoretical foundation of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in Chapter 4. Here, we use logical reasoning to develop this conceptual ground from the existing theories on agency and freedom. Second, in Chapter 5 we present four studies that empirically develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.

The first study will conduct systematic in-depth interviews with seven employees, with a focus on the factors that have influenced their career choice. The interview questions are designed based on the elements of the core decision model of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (see Chapter 5, Study 1, Interview Questionnaire Design). To analyse the data, we use coding and thematic analysis, based on the Braun and Clarke (2006) steps to analyse interview data. Finally, we design the first version of the Evaluation Instrument based on the 11 themes that are developed in the interviews and using theories (see Chapter 5, Study 1, Result Interpretation).

The second study is a survey, using the 1st Evaluation Instrument used in the first study, with a focus on the cognitive and conative factors associated with the “career choice” of a sample (N=1063; distributed in 450 cities around Iran) that is representative at the national level of the employees of the host organisation. The survey was conducted through SurveyMonkey (see Chapter 5, Study 2). We run EFA on the data as the data are found appropriate for this technique (see Chapter 5, Study 2, Data Analysis), and in order to concise the factors. As a result of EFA, the 1st Evaluation Instrument is revised into the 2nd version (Chapter 5, Study 2, Result Interpretation).

The third study is another survey, using the 2nd Evaluation Instrument with a focus on the cognitive and conative factors associated with the “university major selection” of a sample (N=4086; distributed in 450 cities around Iran) that is representative at the national level from the students of the host organisation. The survey was conducted through SurveyMonkey (see Chapter 5, Study 3). We run EFA to concise the factors and then we run CFA to test the fitness of the factors to theory (see Chapter 5, Study 3, Data Analysis). As a result, the final version of the Evaluation Instrument is developed into a reliable and valid instrument that measures the cognitive and conative modes of agency-oriented factors. The factors are explained by Weber's (1993) rationality types.

The fourth study has two parts. In the first part, we use the Evaluation Instrument and we conduct ten interviews with some of the students that have participated in Study 2 and we explore the affective mode of agency-oriented factors. The interview questions to identify emotions are designed based on Weiner's (2010) attribution theory of emotion (see Chapter 5, Study 4, Part 1). Further, we test how they deal with the opposing worldview, based on the questions that are designed based on Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism. In the second part of Study 4, we will conduct four other in-depth interviews, with a focus on different decision subjects (i.e. migration, devoting wealth, surviving business failure). In both studies we use thematic analysis to analyse the data, and we get help from theories to explain the findings in order to determine the agency-freedom relationship in these four cases (see Chapter 5, Study 4). At the end, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is developed and we apply all its aspects to one case study to determine the agency-freedom relationship, using the individual's score in the Evaluation Instrument, conducting an interview to identify emotions and worldviews and the link between these concepts. Each of the above-mentioned studies, data analysis, techniques and samplings are explained in detail in Chapter 5 in the sections on data collection, findings and analysis.

Context at Country and Industry Levels

The context of this study is Iran's private education sector. This is a special context for studying the agency-freedom relationship because several historical events have limited Iranians' freedom of choice compared with the other parts of the world, particularly the west (Waites, 2008; Ansari, 2015). Following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the country was dragged into one of the longest internal conflicts that ruined most of its infrastructure (Alvandi, 2014; Wilber, 2014). Since the end of the war in 1988 the country has made several advances in health, education and income (Salehi-Isfahani, 2010; Rad, Naderi, & Soltani, 2011). Due to these macro improvements, the country has witnessed advancements in relation to human development (Palesh et al., 2010). Although these developments have been disrupted by the international sanctions on Iran from 2010 to 2016, the educational sector has dealt with this isolation better than other sectors, mostly because the country relies on its own national curriculum (Savage and O'Connor, 2015) and the main job requirement is to be an expert in a particular academic subject (Park and Lee, 2015). Hence, an increasing number of Iranian university graduates meet such requirements unlike other service industries that require international professional training such as finance and banking (Abtahi & Saadi, 2012; Dehghanpour Farashah Ali, 2013). Also, the private educational sector has provided the most employment opportunities for university graduates (Teferra, 2015) and women in particular

(Esfahani and Shajari, 2012) over the past decade. Hence, the decision of 'career choice' and 'university major selection' are two important agency-outcomes in Iran (Salehi-Isfahani, 2009), and the private educational sector provides a representative sample to test the factors influencing these decisions. The present study has had the privilege of using the sample of 1063 young employees (male and female, aged between 19 and 25 years old) as well as the sample of 4086 students (male and female; aged 18 or 19; before going to university) that are distributed in 450 urban and rural cities of Iran. This is because due to some political concerns collecting data at the national level in Iran is difficult for researchers in the field of humanities (Teferra, 2015).

In this line, it is worth mentioning that in Iran an individual's agentic ability to live the life they value is influenced by Islamic ideology that is dictated by the government (Ali, 2010). Two competing streams of thought have influenced Iranians' way of living over the years. A group of thinkers and policy makers believes that Islam must govern all aspects of life and work (e.g. Ali, 2010; Khan, Farooq, & Hussain, 2010; Branine & Pollard, 2010), while others favour an Islamic society governed by western-style democratic values (Javidan and Dastmalchian, 2003). Whereas the first group of thinkers has tried to produce Islamic guidelines for living and their framework has been widely applied in governmental institutions (Zangouezhad & Moshabaki, 2011), the second group has tried to apply Western practices to Iranian institutions mostly in private industry. For example, according to the Islamic school of thought individuals' practices need to be framed within the Islamic treaties and the Quran, and thus an 'ideological test' of an individual's values is one of the applications of Islamic assessment in governmental institutions (Namazie & Tayeb, 2006). The Islamic ideology does not directly block the diffusion of different values in society as is evidenced by the studies conducted in other countries such as Turkey (Şahin et al., 2013), Egypt (Bakhoda et al., 2012) and Saudi Arabia (Anderson et al., 2012; Bahurmoz et al., 2015). However, it may make the diffusion of non-Islamic values more difficult. Hence, within this coercive ideological context, it is relevant to ask how an agent is free to live according to her own values.

Context at Organisational and Individual levels

This research consists of four studies of which three are conducted in a private educational institution consisting of 450 branches operating as franchises in Iran. This institution has the largest number of students (80%) among private institutions at pre-university level (374,998 in 2013, and 455,897 in 2016) and publications (1360 titles and five million copies in 2016), with an increasing number of employees (11767 in 2013, and 15858 in 2016) in 450 rural

and urban cities in Iran. This private institution is organised in different autonomous franchises across the country that offer three main educational services: (a) holding biweekly affirmative assessments at the national level to test the students' academic performance based on the school curriculum; (b) providing educational support and planning through a personal tutor; (c) developing educational products including books, videos, and multimedia products. The background and the context of each study are explained in detail in the following sections; however, it is worth mentioning that the first four studies are conducted in this organisation. The focal decisions that are analysed in these four empirical studies are the "career choice" of personal tutors of this organisation and the "university major selection" of its students. These two decisions were chosen as the focus of these empirical studies, because the data at the national level were accessible to the researcher.

Before moving forward, it is important to clarify the role of personal tutors, as they comprise the highest percentage of employees in this organisation (85% in 2011, and 84% in 2015). This job, which is the entry level to private educational organisations, covers various roles of teaching, consulting and administrative tasks. University graduates and students constitute the primary applicant pool for this job. This makes our sample on "career choice" representative of person-environment conflict in the agency-freedom relationship, due to the high-stake employment situation of young educated Iranian jobseekers (Salehi-Isfahani, 2013). Further, the other focal decision (i.e. university major selection) of Study 3 represents another agent-environment conflict with a focus on the agency-freedom relationship due to several reasons: (A) the university entrance exam is highly competitive in Iran (Arani et al., 2015); (B) the career trajectory of Iranian youngsters highly depends on their university major at undergraduate level (Salehi-Isfahani, 2011); (C) there is a normative social status attached to one's identity based on her university major (Hussain, 2015). In other words, "university major selection" and "career choice" are the two decisions whose impact remains with the agent in different domains of her life. The sampling for each study is explained in detail in the next chapter (see Chapter 5), where the data collection, analysis and findings are presented.

Ethical Concerns

The concepts of agency and freedom have a normative nature and their measurement involves some important ethical concerns (Buzzelli, 2015; Roberts, 2015). One of the famous research examples on agency that has neglected these ethical concerns is Milgram's (1965) study that involved participants in an experiment without properly informing them about the actual purpose of research. Milgram (1965) has found that 70% of participants followed the

authority's order to harm another person without questioning the eligibility of the source of the order. The detrimental side effects of Milgram's (1965) study on its participants have obliged researchers to refocus on the importance of ethical concerns particularly when they study normative constructs (Baumrind, 2015), such as agency and freedom. Hence, in order to prevent similar detrimental impacts, the present study has carefully followed ethical points in all four studies and the case study: (A) the topic and focus of the study is explained in detail to all participants; (B) the data were collected with the permission of the participants; (C) the findings are reported with the participants' consensus; and (C) the participants are kept anonymous (see Appendix 2 for Ethical Forms).

The code of research ethics of Brunel University ("Research Ethics | Brunel University London", 2014), a set of generic ethical requirements of this university, has been acknowledged in research design, conduct, recording and reporting the present research that involves human participants, within the following steps: (A) anonymous participation in the survey and interviews is not assessed as risky for the participants (Mertens, 2014); (B) voluntary participation and informed consent are considered based on the ethical codes of Brunel University and we have made sure that each participant is adequately informed of the aims, methods, source of funding, any possible conflicts of interest, institutional affiliation of the researcher, the anticipated risks of the study and any discomfort it may entail, as suggested by Evans (2016); (C) the publication of results is done by considering every safeguard of the privacy of the participant, and in a way to minimise the effect of the study on the participants' mental integrity and personality, as outlined by Silverman (2016).

Truthfulness Measurement

The present study is aware of and carefully considers the measurement truthfulness (i.e. reliability, validity, credibility, dependability) of agency and freedom. This is important because every individual has a subjective definition of her freedom (Sen, 1999), and the way she sees the causes of the events and states around her could be different from our technical definition (Heller et al., 2015). Hence, in designing the measurement scales for all the agency-oriented constructs, we consider the two dimensions of 'existential' (i.e. the degree to which the construct pervades through the context) and 'cognisant' (i.e. the degree to which an individual is aware of the presence of that construct) (see Chapter 5, Data Collection, Findings and Analysis). Table 6 shows our particular measurement concerns in designing the Evaluation Instrument, data analysis and interpretation of agency-oriented factors with a focus on freedom:

Table 6: Measurement Rules

Criteria	
Measurement Scale (Survey)	<p>Five-point Likert Scale: The Evaluation Instrument is an aptitude questionnaire and it asks: “On the bases of your direct experience, please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements regarding the reasons behind your decision of (subject of decision): Scale from (Highly likely = 1) to (Not relevant = 5).</p> <p>Five-point Likert Scale Justification: We use a five-point Likert scale because it captures the variation in values and pro-environmental behaviours (Schultz and Zelezny, 1998), which is an appropriate scale to determine individuals’ levels of agreement-disagreement with the statements about agency and freedom in this study.</p>
A priori assumptions	<p>Participants are assumed to be truthful, reasonable, rational beings that have emotions and sometimes they perform incontinent actions (see Davidson, 2014) or counterintuitive actions that are intentional actions contrary to external evaluation and judgement.</p> <p>Emotion and reason have different levels of influence on agents (Kahneman, 2014), but this study is focused on identifying the influences, not their comparative level of importance.</p> <p>Freedom: to measure freedom, we acknowledge that we are not measuring the construct directly; instead we are measuring a subjective understanding of freedom and one’s perception. This shows that there are some parts of freedom in the ‘real’ domain of reality that are not measured in the present study. This refers to our research assumption based on CR that underpins our research findings (see Chapter 3, Methodology).</p> <p>Attribution: To measure attribution, we have the following two measurement considerations:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. First, attribution is studied as <i>reason</i> not <i>cause</i>, while the latter has been the main focus of attribution theories (see Heider, 1944). This means that we measure attribution as a <i>reason</i>, without assuming the mechanical cause-effect relationship. In this study, <i>reason</i> is defined within an agent’s <i>apperception</i> which refers to the <i>conscious</i> process of connecting two or more pieces of knowledge, i.e. the <i>subject of attribution</i> with the Reason and Temporal aspects <i>through</i> the Causative Connective. 2. Second, in this study, we highlight and distinguish between the <i>knowingness</i> and <i>existence</i> aspects of attribution. In this regard, we say that an attribution <i>exists</i> in both the <i>objective</i> and <i>socially constructed</i> (and so subjective) senses. It is important to consider whether attribution is assumed as a part of the objective reality of the world, or as a socially constructed entity (and so subjective, which is an object in one’s subjective perceptions of the world). For instance, a theoretical explanation that connects cause/reason and effect could be produced using an appropriate model of the world that is known to <i>somebody</i> but not necessarily the agent. Alternatively, cause/reason and effect are non-independent, and effect must follow its co-related cause/reason over time. Whether anyone in the world knows of this

connection or can even explain it, is quite a different matter. This last interpretation follows *realism*, whereas the former is *anti-realism* (i.e. proof is needed in order to deem a proposition sound). Here, we acknowledge that each individual may have either of the above realism/anti-realist interpretations of the world, but this study's position is based on critical realism (as explained above in detail). In this regard, we limit *apperception* and *existence* of attribution to awareness in the sense that it can be reasoned about consciously in one's mental models of the world. The attribution therefore becomes amenable to introspection. Thus, regarding the attribution measurement we consider two aspects of Existence and

Apperception. In this line, we identify the following four situations:

1. *Not Chance*: an attribution exists and it is known.
 2. *Unaware Agent*: An attribution exists but it is unknown.
 3. *Luck*: An attribution does not exist and it is unknown (by definition, one cannot know what does not exist)
 4. *Rationalisation*: An attribution does not exist but it is known (It may be the case that the sense in which something exists and is known is to be determined by the agent's specific rationality type (Weber, 1993). In this case, an attribution *exists* if it is entailed within one of the four rationality types of (Weber, 1993) – if it cannot, then it does not exist to the agent! Clearly, this is an anti-realism position. Here we must differentiate between realism/anti-realism positions. How can one know something that does not exist? (see above) This only makes sense if we explain the term *exist* in the sense of anti-realism and *know* in the sense of a *flawed* mental model of the world. Alternatively, we could have a realism position on *exist* (so the attribution is not real), yet an agent can *know* it empirically (i.e. a posteriori) through a flawed process of perception and apperception (see above).
-

Methodological Limitations

This study has faced some methodological limitations. One limitation has been contacting participants living in the rural cities of Iran through Skype in order to conduct an interview. This is because the government has reduced the internet bandwidth in the country for political purposes (Morozov, 2012). As a result, the poor internet connection has forced us to exclude more than 10 interviews conducted by the researcher. Another methodological limitation has been about the specific topic of this research (i.e. freedom and agency), which is a sensitive subject particularly in a religious country like Iran (Waites, 2008). In this vein, we did not investigate some interesting case studies on agency and freedom such as freedom of speech or women's freedom to not wear the Hijab in public spaces in the country. These are well known, interesting and emerging examples in Iran (Ansari, 2015) where the relationship between agency and freedom is complex and needs to be studied further.

Chapter Summary

In summary, this chapter shows that to address the problem of the unclear relationship between agency and freedom, we have designed a mixed-method research enquiry in four studies based on the Critical Realism (CR) philosophical paradigm. We have shown the logical philosophy (deduction, induction and abduction) behind each study and the methods and techniques that have been used. Further, we have mentioned the ethical issues and measurement considerations on our way to develop and test the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, which determined the agency-freedom link. In the following chapter, the data collection, research tools, data analysis, findings, and interpretation of results of the four studies are presented.

Chapter 4: Theory Development

Introduction


This chapter has two parts. First, we developed a conceptual framework around the research objectives in the first part of this chapter. This conceptual framework is built upon the existing literature, relying on the researcher's special lens that identifies the hidden links among the studies on agency and freedom in different disciplines. In the second part of this chapter, we develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency based on the early conceptual framework. The result is a theory to determine the agency-freedom relationship by identifying the *factors* and *mechanisms* that are involved in the agency-freedom relationship. The core of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is the associating concept between agency and freedom that is the agency outcome (decision).

Regarding the first research question that is "*what factors influence one's agency to do/be what she values*", this chapter develops the core model of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that identifies three sets of factors: (A) personal and universal constraints; (B) emotion; and (C) reason. This chapter develops these factors in the model using logical reasoning and insights from the previous theories on freedom-decision (Sen, 2004, 1999, 1990), freedom-rationality (Weber, 1993a), freedom-worldview (Bakhtin, 1935) and emotion-decision (Weiner, 2010). As the core model of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is developed, it identifies three mechanisms that relate agency outcome (decision) to freedom expansion/contraction that are: (A) the **Evaluation** process that determines the *emotion* and *reason* that are generated after making a decision at t1 from the 'self' and 'other' standpoints; (B) a **Feed Backward-Forward Loop** that connects *emotion* and *reason* at t1 to the next decision at t2; and (C) **Capability Realisation** that determines how the agent categorises her opportunities based on *desirability* and *realisable* criteria and how this process continues over *time* with respect to the unintentional consequences (side-effects) of her decisions.

Part 1: Conceptual Framework of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency

This part develops the early conceptual framework of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency according to the research aim and objectives. This section presents the researcher's understanding of the literature regarding agency and freedom. Here, we present the conceptual links that enable us to achieve the aim and to develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. This is the researcher's lens on the literature of agency and freedom that later on will be actualised in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. Figure 6 presents a summary of the concepts that are developed by the researcher in the first part of this chapter, which include what we know and what we don't know about freedom and agency. We know freedom as it is defined based on two senses of freedom by Berlin (1969); the role of authority and rationality types in freedom as defined by Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism, and Weber's (1993) rationality types respectively; constraints that can be logically derived from Sen's (1999) Capability Approach; the affective mode of agency that can be derived from Weiner's (2010) attribution emotions; the cognitive mode of agency that can be defined based on Weber's (1993) four rationality types; and values as defined based on Berlin's (1969) view on freedom. Figure 6 summarises our existing knowledge around the research gap, which at the moment is fragmented and it is unclear that how these two concepts of agency and freedom are related. These concepts are developed in the first part of this chapter and they will become the foundation of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that will be developed in the second part of this chapter that determines the agency-freedom relationship.

Figure 6: Research Gap from the Researcher's Lens



Objective 1: Conceptual link

Table 7 shows the review of the literature, highlighting the conceptual links developed by the researcher between the existing studies and the notions about the first research objective that is *identifying agency-oriented factors associated with freedom*. These notions are the *affective mode* of agency developed based on Weiner's (2010) attribution emotions; the *cognitive mode* of agency that is developed based on Weber's (1993) types of rationalities and Bakhtin's (1935) worldviews and discourse among different worldviews; and the *conative mode* of agency that is developed based on Berlin's (1969) and Sen's (1999) definitions of freedom and volitional behaviour. The fourth row of Table 7 shows that we have identified *decision* as agency-outcome based on the findings about the manifestation of agency in human behaviour, as suggested by neuroscience studies (e.g. Damasio et al., 2015; Damasio and LeDoux, 2012; Damasio, 1999). The fifth row of Table 7 shows that in order to identify agency-oriented factors we focus on the evaluation of both *self* and *environment*, particularly institutions, as suggested by phenomenological institutionalism (Meyer, 2008). The sixth row of Table 7 shows that based on Sen's (1999) CA and in order to identify agency-oriented factors we consider the role of capabilities (the potential state of being/doing), functioning (the achieved state of being/doing), the process of realising and desiring a capability, and assessing the capabilities with respect to constraints involved and their desirability according to an agent's values. The eighth row of Table 7 shows that we build upon the findings of behavioural economics (Mazar et al., 2008) and we get the insight that people may be self-deceptive about the agency-oriented factors that are associated with their freedom, thus, we develop the notion of 'rationalisation' to detect the cases where the agent offers unsound reasons for her agency-outcome. Overall, Table 7 presents our early conceptual framework around the first research objective. The following sections show how these concepts are developed in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in order to identify agency-oriented factors associated with freedom.

Table 7: Literature-Based Conceptual Framework around the 1st Research Objective

Study	Focus	Findings	Our Conceptual Link	Implications for Us
(Weiner, 2010)	Emotion	Emotions influence decisions.	Affective Mode of Agency	Agent's emotions (affective mode) influence her decisions
(Bakhtin, 1935; Weber, 2009)	Person-environment	Way of reasoning (i.e. rationality type), and how the agent deals with the other's influence on her freedom.	Cognitive Mode of Agency	Agent's reasons (cognitive mode) influence her decisions.
(Berlin, 1969; Sen, 1999b)	Freedom and Agency	Decisions are performed by two forces of emotion and reason within a non-interfered space. What/who performed the decision and the size of non-interfered space both matter in understanding freedom.	Conative Mode of Agency	Agent's freedom (conative mode) influences her decisions.
(Damasio, 2005; Damasio et al., 2015)	Decision and agency	Her decisions are a manifestation of human intentions, wants, emotions and reasons.	Agency-outcome is decision	Agency can be studied through decisions.
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977)	Phenomenological Institutional Theory	Decisions are influenced by the environment and particularly the institutions around us.	Evaluation	Agency must be studied in an environment through 'self' and 'other' evaluations of the agent's state of being/doing.
(Sen, 1999b)	Capabilities and Functioning	To understand human decisions, the quality and quantity of their capabilities (i.e. potential state of	Capabilities: potential state of being/doing Functioning: A capability that is	Agent's capabilities, and how they are turned into a state of

		being/doing) and functioning (i.e. achieved capability) need to be analysed.	<p>achieved by volition and desire. Commanding: A capability that is assigned to agent by coercion. Beneficial: A state of being/doing that is evaluated as desirable. Adverse: A state of being/doing that is evaluated as non-desirable. Desirability: value-laden criterion of assessing capabilities and state of being/doing. Realisability: constraint-oriented criterion of assessing capabilities and state of being/doing.</p>	being/doing, must be studied.
(Sen, 1999b)	Resource Limitation	Freedom of choice is limited by the person and the environment.	<p>Personal Constraints: The limitations imposed by self on agency-outcome. Universal Constraints: The limitations imposed by the environment on agency-outcome.</p>	Agent's constraints must be studied.
(Mazar et al., 2008)	Dishonesty and self-deception	People use self-deception and they are dishonest to give a taste of profit without spoiling their positive self-view.	Rationalisation is defined as a situation when one offers unsound reasons for her course of action.	"Rationalisation" in an agent's self-report about her decision behaviour needs to be detected.

Objective 1: Rationale of the Conceptual Link

Table 10 shows the review of literature on why it is important to address the first objective with respect to the conceptual linkage highlighted in the previous section. In summary, Table 10 points to the main reasons behind our conceptual framework of the first objective (i.e. identifying agency-oriented factors associated with freedom). The first row of Table 10 shows that we develop the three modes of agency (i.e. affective, cognitive and conative) in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in order to consider the existing debate on whether agency and free will are overrated. This is in line with Smith's (2015) argument that recent neuroscientific findings regarding human decisions are undermining the concepts of agency and free will as articulated by philosophers and liberal thinkers. Hence, we have conceptualised three modes of agency to be considerate about the different sides of the debate on agency. The second row of Table 10 shows that to prevent misjudgement about agency and freedom, we focus on agency-outcome and its manifestation on decision as suggested by neuroscientists (e.g. Damasio et al., 2015). Hence, the core of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency will be a decision model, which is going to be explained in detail in the second part of the present chapter. This will also consider the role of the environment and how decisions are constructed by institutions as suggested by Meyer and Rowan (1977). Hence, our decision model must have an evaluation part that considers the role of both *self* and *other* on agency-outcome (see the fourth row of Table 10). Following, in line with Sen (1999) we believe that both process and end-points matter in agency-outcome, hence, we use capabilities and functioning notions in the decision model that is the core of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. Finally, we are careful about 'rationalisation' in the way people explain their decision as Kahneman (2012, 2003, 1991) emphasised in his theory of human biases. Hence, we develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency with respect to the possibility of 'rationalisation' in peoples' reasoning for their decision behaviours. The following section presents our conceptual framework around the second research objective, and why this conceptual framework helps to develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in order to establish freedom expansion/contraction with respect to agency-oriented factors.

Table 8: Rationale behind the Conceptual Framework of the 1st Research Objective

(Why) This Conceptual Link	Advantages derived from the literature	Implications for Us
Why three modes of agency?	In order to be able to consider the inter-disciplinary debate among neuroscientists and philosophers regarding the relevance of agency and free will, when most of human decisions are made unconsciously, as emphasised by Smith (2015).	Developing the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that has all three modes of agency, with a foundation in freedom literature.
Why focus on decision as agency-outcome ?	In order to prevent us from making loose judgements about freedom that are rampant in agency studies in the field of social psychology (see Bandura, 2015) and appraisal psychology (see Deci and Ryan, 2012). In line with Damasio et al. (2015), the focus on decision will help to increase the reliability of findings about agency and freedom.	Developing a decision model as the core of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.
Why evaluation from person-environment standpoints?	In order to refocus on the role of institutions and their hidden mechanism in constructing agency-outcome, as Meyer and Rowan (1977) show that it is important to consider how decisions are constructed in social contexts.	Developing an evaluation sections for the core decision model of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.
Why capability-functioning?	In order to emphasise process while considering the end point in decision making and human life trajectory, as Sen (2011) says it matters.	Building the core decision model of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency on capability and functioning.
Why focus on constraints?	In order to highlight the role of constraints such as time that have widely been overlooked in agency-oriented and freedom-based studies, as Heffernan and Ward (2015) have shown.	Considering two levels for the capability decision model, the core of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. The inner level is the Logical Core that includes the constraints that are external to agency, thus, out of her control. The outer shell, that is the

		Affective Shell, is about the constraints related to the agent, like emotion, reason, judgment, and the interaction among them.
Why focus on rationalisation?	Addressing the unreliability involved in self-report research tools as Kahneman (2014, 2012, 2002) has shown several biases and unreliability in the way individuals perceive and explain their behaviours.	Developing a mechanism to identify and detect “rationalisations” in the way people explain their decisions.

Objective 2: Conceptual Link

Table 9 shows the concepts that are developed in the present research, based on the literature on agency and freedom, that help us to develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in order to achieve the second research objective that is *establishing how freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors*. As shown in Table 9, we study decision (agency-outcome) as the link between agency and freedom, based on Berlin's (1969) and Sen's (1999) definitions of freedom. They both have built their definitions of freedom on the decisions that agents make. Here, we highlight the role of decisions as the conceptual link between agency and freedom and the core of understanding of the agency-freedom relationship is a decision model (see Table 7). The other concepts that we have developed to establish freedom expansion/contraction based on agency-oriented factors are: (A) evaluation from the 'self' and 'other' standpoints, based on Davidson's (2014) and Sen's (1977) emphasis on the differences between the judgements made by 'self' and 'other' and their complex influence on decisions; (B) emotions that are generated from the attributions that are made as a result of the agent's evaluating her state of being/doing and the attributions she makes that influence her subsequent decision, based on Weiner's (2010) Attribution Theory of Motivation; (C) the rationality type of the agent that is the way she reasons her decisions and, according to Weber (1993), this will influence her freedom of choice; (D) worldview and the way the agent deals with the opposing worldview, as Bakhtin (1935) says that these mechanisms will also be associated with freedom; and finally (E) *values* and establishing freedom expansion/contraction based on the conflictive/conducive influence of decisions on the agent to live according to her values, which Sen (1999), Berlin (1969) and Weber (1993) have all acknowledged and emphasised the role of morality and *values* in an agent's freedom. At the end, our definition of agency is presented in the final row of Table 9, which is a value-laden concept built upon the existing views on agency and freedom. The next section shows why these concepts fit our enquiry to develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in order to achieve the second research objective.

Table 9: Literature-based Conceptual Framework around the 2nd Research Objective

Study	Focus	Findings	Our Conceptual Link	Implications for Us
(Berlin, 1969; Sen, 1999b)	Decision (Link)	Freedom is to be studied with a focus on decisions in terms of 'self' and 'space'. Positive freedom is about who/what determines <i>decisions</i> . Negative freedom is about the space of <i>decision</i> making.	Decision as the link between agency and freedom.	The core of the agency-freedom relationship is a decision model. Decision is agency outcome. Freedom is necessary for agency. To study positive freedom, divided self, emotion, rationality, values, and constraints must be studied at the personal level. To study negative freedom, capabilities, functioning, process, values from the other's perspective and person-environment interaction must be considered.
(Davidson, 2014, 2001, 1970)	Judgment (self)	Incontinent actions are possible when an agent makes an intentional choice, while she has another alternatives, while the agent judges that the other alternative is better.	Evaluation from the 'self' standpoint: to help understand incontinent actions that are made contrary to self-judgment.	Evaluation from the two standpoints of <i>self</i> and <i>other</i> . Determining impact of agency-oriented factors from the two standpoints of 'self' and 'other' Emotions are studied in two categories of direct (self-reflected) and indirect (perceived). Rationality is studied with respect to self and other. Freedom is studied from the two senses of positive and negative (see Table 3)
(Sen, 1990, 1977)	Judgment (other)	Committed actions are possible when an agent decides against her self-centred goals for the sake of others.	Evaluation from the 'other' standpoint: to help understand counterintuitive actions that are made contrary to common sense (or other judgment)	Evaluation from the two standpoints of self and other. Evaluating a state of being/doing based on 'self' values in relation with norms or 'other' values
	Emotion	Emotions act as decision	<u>Emotions</u> : emotions are	Affective mode of agency is studied based on

(Weiner, 2010)	(attribution)	motives. Evaluation of current behaviour and attributions assigned to that behaviour generate emotions, related to stability, controllability and locus of that attribution.	generated from the attribution made in the evaluation of the self about the self, and self about the other about self. Feed Backward-Forward Look: evaluation of the state of being/doing and its influence on subsequent decision.	the Weiner's (2010) attribution theory of motivation. Emotions are generated from attribution, derved from evaluation. Locus, stability and controlability of attributions determine emotion. Emotion plays as motivator and trigger of subsequent decision.
(Weber, 2009, 1993a)	Rationality type (person-environment interaction)	The way people reason for their actions (i.e. rationality types) associates with their freedom. There are four rationality types: substantive (value laden), practical (goal driven), formal (order driven), theoretical (abstract and external to the agent). Substantive rationality is a way of reasoning that allows agent to flourish freedom. In formal rationality the agent is bounded to standard norms.	Rationality Type: the way an agent reasons for her decisions that is mapped onto her values and associates with her freedom of choice.	Agency-oriented factors need to be mapped onto rationality types to reveal how environment influences freedom. Rationality types influence agency-outcome, thus it is a mode of agency that is associated with freedom.
(Bakhtin, 1935)	Worldview (person-environment interaction)	A coercion of freedom is discourse between sources of authority and those who are under authority. The only way of having discourse that enables people to have	<u>Worldviews</u> : way of reasoning, reason, emotion, values, needs of an agent. <u>Reconciling Approaches</u> : the way worldviews encounter and integrate.	Worldviews and reconciling approaches must be studied to see how one makes a decisions in relation to others.

freedom is dialogue. In dialogism everyone is heard; everyone has her own version of reality; people are being informed and their worldview may be altered in face of each other.

(Sen, 1999b)
Berlin (1969)
Weber (1993)

Value and freedom

One must be free to live the life she has reason to value.

‘Values’ are the benchmarks of measuring agency and freedom levels and their relationship. If a decision conflicts with an agent’s ability to live according to her values, then her freedom is contracted. If a decision is conducive with an agent’s ability to live according to her values, then her freedom is expanded.

Defining freedom with respect to values as “one is free to live the life she has reason to value”. Defining agency as an individual’s affective, cognitive and conative abilities to decide according to her own values, to remain responsible for the result of her decision, to create change in line with her values, and to be judged based on her agency-outcome and her values.

Objective 2: Rationale of the Conceptual Link

Table 10 shows the review of the literature on why it is important to address the second objective based on the concepts highlighted in the previous section (see Table 9). The second and the third columns of Table 10 cover the reasons behind, and the implications of the conceptual framework that we have built to establish around the second objective (i.e. establishing how freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors.) within the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. The first row of Table 10 shows that focusing on decision as the link between agency and freedom is appropriate, because decision is a tangible concept and manifestation of agency and freedom, as other freedom-oriented scholars (e.g. Sen, 1999) have also focused on decision to develop their freedom-oriented theory of human behaviour. Recent reviews show that to study decision, we have access to valid and reliable methodologies that have already been established and tested in many studies (Puts et al., 2015), thus, investigating the agency-freedom relationship through the notion of decision helps us to conduct a multidisciplinary study among the isolated fields of psychology, philosophy and neuroscience (Kahraman et al., 2015). The second row of Table 10 shows that by conceptualising evaluation from 'self' and 'other' standpoints, we are able to address the crucial and open questions of understanding the decisions that are intended contrary to personal judgment (see incontinent actions by Davidson, 2014), and the actions that are intended against self-centred goals and for the sake of others (see commitment actions by Sen, 1977). This is because the dilemma of explaining counterintuitive and incontinent decisions is about the mismatch between self and other judgments. Further, conceptualising emotion based on Weiner's (2010) theory on attribution-emotion-motivation has been suggested by the studies (Reisenzein, 2014; Reisman, 2015) that have focused on the emotional and moral aspect of decisions. Table 10 shows that Conceptualising rationality types based on Weber's (1993) sociology theory has been suggested by the studies (Cockerham, 2015; Kalberg, 1980a) that have focused on person-environment interaction and freedom. Conceptualising worldview based on Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism has been suggested by the studies (Holquist, 2002; Robinson, 2011; White, 2009) that have focused on hidden coercions on the freedom of individuals in the agent-authority relationship. Finally, conceptualising freedom expansion/contraction and agency-oriented factors based on values is because what distinguishes the characteristics of human decisions from the decisions made by other species is human values and morality (Arrow, 2012), as value is the cornerstone of the concepts of freedom and agency (Nussbaum, 2004). So far we have developed the early phases on the theoretical development of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.

In the next part, we start building the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency based on this early conceptual framework.

Table 10: Rationale behind the Conceptual Framework of the 2nd Research Objective

(Why) this conceptual link?	Advantages derived from the literature	Implications for Us
Why decision as the agency-freedom link?	<p>Because: Decision is a tangible manifestation of the abstract concepts of agency and freedom (Sen, 1999b). There are available valid methodologies to investigate decisions in various disciplines (Puts et al., 2015). Decision is a well-known and well-established notion in different sciences (Kahraman et al., 2015).</p>	<p>Determining the agency-freedom relationship becomes the main novelty and implication of the present study.</p>
Why consider evaluation from the 'self' standpoint?	<p>Because recent studies on incontinent actions (Correia, 2016) show that the question of why an agent makes an intentional decision contrary to her own judgment is still open to further research.</p>	<p>Determining the agency-freedom relationship with respect to 'self' judgment will contribute to the studies in the areas of theory of the mind (Davidson, 2014), and free will (e.g. Correia, 2016).</p>
Why consider evaluation from the 'other' standpoint?	<p>Because recent studies on committed actions (Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015) show that the question of why an agent makes an intentional decision contrary to norms, common sense, and against her self-centred goals is still open to further research.</p>	<p>Determining the agency-freedom relationship with respect to 'other' judgment will contribute to the studies in the areas of behavioural economics (e.g. Mazar et al., 2008), and Sen's (1977) idea of rational fool.</p>
Why focus on attribution-emotion in the agency-freedom link?	<p>Because recent studies on attribution emotions (Heerdink et al., 2015) show that the affective mode of agency has rarely been studied with a focus on attributions about the current state of being/doing and its motivational impact on subsequent decisions. Weiner's (2010) theory to investigate emotions through attributions as decision motivator is recently used and acknowledged as an appropriate approach</p>	<p>Determining the agency-freedom relationship with respect to attribution emotions will contribute to the studies in the areas of appraisal psychology (e.g. Rohr et al., 2015).</p>

to understand moral aspects of decision in some studies (Reisenzein, 2014; Reisman, 2015).

Why focus on rationality types in the agency-freedom link?

Because recent studies on rationality types (Cockerham, 2015) show that the cognitive mode of agency has rarely been studied with a focus on rationality types. Further, Weber's (1993) types of rationality are acknowledged and used by several scholars (Cockerham, 2015; Kalberg, 1980a) to understand human behaviour with respect to person-environment interaction and freedom.

Determining the agency-freedom relationship with respect to rationality types will contribute to the studies in the areas of the sociology of agency (e.g. Cockerham, 2015; Kalberg, 1980).

Why focus on worldview in agency-freedom link?

Because recent studies on worldview (Robinson, 2011) show that cognitive and conative modes of agency have rarely been studied with a focus on worldviews and reconciling mechanisms, while pointing to Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism as an appropriate philosophical ground for this purpose.

Determining the agency-freedom relationship with respect to worldviews and dialogism will contribute to the studies in the areas of philosophy of the person-environment interaction (e.g. Holquist, 2002; White, 2009).

Why conceptualise freedom based on values in the agency-freedom link?

Because values are one of the main distinguishing factors of human beings that is the corner stone of the concepts like free will and agency (Arrow, 2012).

Determining the agency-freedom relationship with respect to values will contribute to the studies in the areas of freedom (e.g. Berlin, 1970) and agency (e.g. Smith, 2015).

The Early Conceptual Framework

This thesis aims to *determine the agency-freedom relationship*. So far we have shown that to achieve this aim we need to develop an agency theory that: (a) explains cognitive, conative and affective modes of agency with respect to freedom; (b) measures agency with respect to both the positive and negative sides of freedom; and (c) determines how agency and freedom are related. However, the main challenge in bringing together all of these broad and mostly isolated concepts in a single theory is *determining a way to link them together* (Gangas, 2015; Okkolin, 2016; Pelenc et al., 2015). In this regard, we have developed a conceptual framework that sheds light on the agency-freedom relationship with a focus on *decision* as our basic building block. Figure 7 shows how our early conceptual framework is mapped onto the research aim and objectives as well as the relationship between the focal concepts in this study.

As presented in Figure 7, we have identified three modes of *affective*, *cognitive* and *conative* for agency, in order to be realistic about the role of free will in human behaviour. This is because whether agency and free will are overrated in philosophical stands is an ongoing debate (Smith 2015), since the recent findings in the field of neuroscience show that most human decisions are made automatically (Damasio et al., 2015), and the agency level is highly correlated with the level of coercion of the environment (Caspar et al., 2016; Correia, 2016; Damasio and LeDoux, 2012). Hence, we have identified three modes for agency to welcome the recent findings about emotion (Ashkanasy, 2015; Heerdink et al., 2015; Reizenzein, 2014), reason (Cockerham, 2015; Kalberg, 1980a), and the volitional aspect of agency (Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015a), with respect to freedom.

Figure 7 also shows that we have conceptualised *decision* as *agency-outcome* to use it as a link between agency and freedom, because *decision* is well established in various disciplines (Lehnert et al., 2015; Puts et al., 2015), there are valid methodologies to study decision (Arlegi and Teschl, 2015), and freedom. Further, agency studies have already focused on decisions (see Sen, 2011, 1977). Focusing on *decision* enables us to use the insights from a broader range of knowledge and the result becomes familiar in a wider academic context (Buckareff et al., 2015). Further, being able to make a decision is the necessity of both *positive* and *negative* freedom (Berlin, 1969). Finally, the link between *decision* and *freedom* is emphasised in Sen's (1999) Capability Approach (CA) where freedom is defined as the necessity of human development that won him the Noble Prize for Economics. In CA, Sen (1999) suggests studying freedom by measuring the “effectiveness” of individuals in their own life and society. In the other words, to study freedom Sen (1999) emphasises the need to

examine an individual's agency regarding her ability to make decisions, to create change, to live the life she has reason to value, and to be evaluated based on her decisions.


So far, CA has been expanded in the field of human development (Alkire, 2015; Swain, 2015) with particular focus on the "evaluation" aspect of freedom that is about measuring and comparing individuals' substantive freedom in different societies (Basta, 2016; Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015b). In Chapter 2 (Literature Review) we have shown that in spite of Sen's (1999) emphasis on the importance of understanding the agency aspect of freedom (i.e. "effectiveness" in his terminology), this area has remained underdeveloped. Accordingly, we put a capability-based decision model as the core of our conceptual framework and the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, because a capability-based understanding of decisions has already been attempted in Sen's (1999) Capability Approach to understand agency and freedom, and this concept is well known in freedom studies (Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015), and agency studies (Asah, 2015). The following sections show how the capability-based decision model is built to be the core of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.

However, even if we focus on decisions as the link between agency and freedom, we have shown that there is still a gap in the literature in terms of determining the agency-freedom relationship with a focus on the cognitive, affective and conative modes of the agent in her decisions (see Chapter 2, Literature Review). This is a complex relationship because decisions are sometimes determined contrary to self-judgment (i.e. incontinent actions in Davidson's (2014) terminology) and other's judgment (i.e. counter-intuitive decisions). For example, the literature lacks a theory that determines the agency-freedom relationship of a gambler when she decides to continue gambling contrary to her own judgment; or a peace activist when she decides to enter a protest contrary to common sense, implying that her involvement may threaten her life. The challenging question is what the cognitive, conative and affective levels of the agency of the gambler and the peace activist are and how their positive and negative freedom expands/contracts after exercising their agency (i.e. making the decision). Gambling and entering a peace protest may seem too extreme examples regarding the balance between self and other judgments and the agency outcome (i.e. decision), but it (Correia, 2016) has been shown that in any decision there is a trade-off between self and other judgments. In this line, in many life-changing decisions an agent is evaluating between the internal (i.e. agency-oriented

factors) and external (i.e. constraints or motivators) factors to choose a career, university major, partner, place of living, etc.

In this line, in the early conceptual framework we have identified three modes for agency (affective, cognitive and conative) and we have defined freedom contraction/expansion based on *values* (see Figure 7). In this line we say that freedom is contracted if the agent makes a decision that is in conflict with her values, and freedom is expanded if a decision is conducive to the agent's values. The reason that value is the cornerstone of our theory is because value is the distinguishing concept of human decisions from animals' actions (Arrow, 2012), which is the reason behind having the concepts of agency and freedom in understanding human behaviour (Nussbaum, 2004). At the end, as the relationship between agency and freedom is vague, thus our research enquiry to develop the Tri-Modal Theory of is to shed light on this matter and to *determine the agency-freedom relationship*. Building on this early conceptual framework, in the following sections we develop the central model of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, where every element of the early conceptual framework (Figure 7) is explained in detail and expanded.

Figure 7: Early Conceptual Framework



Part 2: The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency

Background

To develop a theory that explains the agency-freedom relationship and their associating concept that is decision, this study starts from Sen's (1999) Capability Approach (CA) that focuses on freedom, agency and the decision process (Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015b; Lorgelly et al., 2015). CA emphasises individuals' *values*, *opportunities* and the decision *process*. Here, we explain why each of these notions matter in the agency-freedom relationship and how we capture them in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.

Process and Values

Process and values matter in the agency-freedom relationship, because they can contract/expand an agent's freedom as they affect the number and quality of capabilities (i.e. the potential state of being/doing) and the way these options are turned into a state of being/doing (Goldberg, 2016). For example, the state of freedom of Person A, who wants to win an election *by any means*, is different from the freedom level of Person B, who wants to win the same election *fairly*, because the *process* that they have chosen to achieve that end is different. In this line, the present study puts emphasis on the decision process and an agent's values because we define agency as an individual's cognitive, conative and affective ability to decide according to her values, to create change, to be responsible for her actions, and to be evaluated based on her decisions. This is our expansion on Sen's (1999, 1985) idea of freedom with a focus on agency. For example, Person A has higher freedom regarding the number of options that are available to her to win the election compared with Person B, but this study measures their agency level too. Here, we argue that although Person A has higher freedom than Person B, the agency level of Person B is higher than Person A, because Person B is more in control of her decision process and more responsible for the consequences of her choice according to her own values compared with Person A.

The example of a presidential election shows the importance of focusing on an agent's values and decision process in understanding her agency-freedom relationship. In today politics, there are some candidates that are accused of accepting financial support from certain lobbies to win the election (Richards, 2015; Simien and Carr, 2015), while other candidates have a different decision process that limits their capabilities to win the election because they have preferred to reject the financial support based on their own personal values (Johnson, 2016). In the end, the candidate who rejects the financial support and decides to proceed according to her values has made a decision that contracted her negative freedom regarding the number and

quality of capabilities she has compared with the other candidate but the agency of the former is higher than the latter, because the latter has to obey the source of financial support even if her values conflict with what they want her to decide. Hence, it is necessary to determine the decision *process* and the agent's *values* to shed light on understanding the agency-freedom relationship.

Capabilities

Capabilities (or the potential state of being/doing, or opportunities that are defined based on Sen's (2004) CA matter in the freedom-agency relationship as emphasised in Sen CA. For example, having different capabilities distinguishes the freedom of Person A, who has to select from Set A that includes three options of 'being hanged to death', 'being shot to death' and 'being electrified to death' from the freedom of Person B, who chooses from Set B that includes three opportunities of 'being awarded', 'being given a house', and 'being given a car'. Although this is an extreme example, it has been shown (Arrow and Renwick, 2015) that the *quantity* and *quality* of capabilities influence the decision-making process with respect to freedom.

In decision making, the concept of capabilities is tied with the notion of preferences as the quality and quantity of capabilities are affected by an agent's preferences (Arrow, 2012, 1962). However, one of the main challenges in the field of decision making is determining an individual's preferences (Hausman, 2005) in a way that captures the multiple sides of motivation (Grewal et al., 2006), and the complexities of cognitive, affective and conative modes of the decision-making process (Binder, 2014; Okkolin, 2016). For example, if Person B prefers Set A to Set B she has made a counterintuitive decision (i.e. a decision contrary to other's judgement) (Correia, 2016). This could be because this person is committed to certain values (Sen, 1990) if she offers reasons that have stability and robustness then her decision is completely rational and planned (Sen, 2007). For example, imagine that Person B is a political activist who prefers the 'worst' option according to common sense (i.e. to be hanged to death) instead of deciding to be released from jail by betraying her friends to the authorities. Here, Person B has made a counterintuitive decision, but her decision is made according to her *value*, she has created change in the environment, and she has been responsible for her actions (i.e. her decision is agency oriented). If we analyse her decision based only on common sense, then an external observer may regard this decision as irrational.

Due to the same challenges, Sen (1990) in his 'Rationale Fool' acknowledges that understanding one's preferences in counterintuitive decisions is complex. He argues further that besides self-centred decisions, people make decisions to satisfy sympathetic reasons (Graham, 1984) and other-centred preferences (Hausman, 2005). This type of decision that is other centred is designated "committed actions" in Sen's (1990) terminology. The examples of committed actions are deciding to be involved in sustainable activities, or humanitarian aid that may threaten the agent's life. Sen expands his view up to the point that "one may decide to get involved in a committed action because she/he internalized others' goals" (Sen, 1990). However, some (Hatzis and Mercurio, 2015; Sendjaya, 2015) have questioned the reliability of Sen's explanation for counterintuitive decisions ("committed action"). Further, understating counterintuitive decision becomes more complex because people may determine an action contrary to their own personal judgment (i.e. incontinent actions suggested by Davidson, 2001), due to "weakness of will" (Correia, 2016). As articulated in Chapter 2 (Literature Review), the endeavour (Asah, 2015; Corral, 2015; Pülschen and Pülschen, 2015; Arlegi and Teschl, 2015; Dhiman et al., 2015) to understand the reasons behind counterintuitive and incontinent decisions has hardly focused on the agent's freedom. Hence, the important question here is how to determine preferences to understand counterintuitive and incontinent decisions with respect to the agency-freedom relationship.


In this regard, we conceptualise preferences based on the core idea of freedom in this study that *one is free to choose to live the life she has reason to value* that is in line with Sen's (1999) CA. In this line, we need a *value-laden* notion of preferences that captures three modes of agency (i.e. affective, cognitive and conative). Further, this notion needs to capture personal and environmental levels of evaluation. Hence, we expand the concept of preferences to the notion of "desirability" that is value laden, multilevel and includes an agent's volition and capabilities in her decision-making process. In this regard, in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency *desirable* capabilities are commensurate with an agent's *values*. So far, it is established that an agent's capabilities, values, decision process and desirability are the main pillars of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that is developed to determine the agency-freedom relationship. Accordingly, the following sections build the central model of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency on Yorulmaz and Khans' (2008a; 2008b) 'capability-based decision model' that has been the first attempt to explain decision with respect to capabilities with a focus on freedom.

The Early Decision Model

Sen's capability theory was first operationalised to a decision model developed by Yorulmaz and Khan (2008a/b) in order to explain decision with respect to capabilities. This early work acknowledges the *rational* and *affective* domains of decision making, trying to tie them to Sen's theoretical ideas on volition, decision making and capabilities, but this enquiry has remained underdeveloped. In this line, Yorulmaz and Khan identified the importance of *rational* and *affective* reasons on the decision process, but these areas were underdeveloped and remained immature in the theoretical development of the model. The work presented here builds upon the Yorulmaz and Khan model by using their decision analysis for determining the *agency-freedom relationship*. We begin by describing the fundamentals of the Yorulmaz and Khan model and then proceed to discuss where their limitations are and where this current work seeks to contribute. Figure 8 presents the original model of Yorulmaz and Khan (2008a/b).

Yorulmaz and Khan's model represents the two principles of *volition* and *benefit* in decision making. It recognises that people sometimes make free will decisions but other times external forces can influence their decisions and so a resulting decision should not be considered to be entirely based on the freedom to choose (i.e. volition). The issue of benefit arises when determining the outcomes of a decision. Some decisions are *beneficial* while others have more of an *adverse* consequence for the decision-maker's well-being. The basis of the model is the Capability Set, which is comprised of the totality of capabilities available to an agent at a moment in time. This set is dynamic and so can change as a result of decisions made. Capabilities are acted on by two types of factors (internal and external) to render some *realisable* while others remain *unrealisable*. It is the set of realisable capabilities that offer the decision maker the choices. When a decision is made entirely at will, the resulting state of being is considered *functioning*; conversely, where an element of coercion is involved, the state of being that results is known as *commanding*. Certain states arise as a direct consequence of other states and the elimination of certain capabilities. These states are called *consequential/side-effects* because they are not chosen consciously by the agent. Combinations of the level of *volition* and the *benefit* of the resulting state lead to the four resulting end states in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Decision-making model based on the Capability Approach



Note: adapted from "Yorulmaz, N. and Khan, T.U.M. (2008a), A Capabilities Approach to Patient Safety Assessment In Proceedings of 2nd International Patient Safety Congress Antalya, Turkey 25 – 29 March 2008".

The First Model's Features and Limitations

The decision-making model presented in Figure 8 is tailored to our research focus because it can be used to determine both the *factors* and *mechanisms* that influence the agency-freedom relationship. In this line, the Yorulmaz and Khan (2008a/b) decision model acknowledges all factors influencing the capability set and categorises them in the 'Logical Core' (rational domain) and 'Affective Shell' (affective domain) of the model. However, the main limitation of this early decision model is its shortcoming regarding a valid set of theoretical and empirical support for the factors of the Affective Shell. Further, the concept of 'agency' is not defined and measured anywhere in this model. Meanwhile, this decision model has conceptualised the factors of the Logical Core, but it lacks any empirical support to explain how these factors are related to the affective elements. The present study builds upon these limitations and develops the early decision model to become the centre of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. In this line, the Logical Core of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is adapted from the rational factors suggested by Yorulmaz and Khan (2008a) in the early decision model. The Logical Core includes the following domains of constraints that act on the possible agency-outcomes available to an agent:

- a) *Logical constraints*: Often two functionings are mutually exclusive such that both cannot be true or both false at the same time. An obvious example maintains that one cannot do something while simultaneously not doing it. Also, one cannot be considered alive while also being dead. Thus *contradictions* are prohibited in the rational consideration of decision making (Bremer, 2015). Where one capability is realised its complement becomes an unrealisable capability by application of this constraint. Similarly, *contrary* relationships between functionings impose constraints, where two functionings may not be true simultaneously (but may both be false). For instance, one may choose to ride a bus to work, or take a train, but both are not possible at the same time, though it is possible that neither is chosen and one opts to walk instead. Constraints derived from a consideration of logical validity serve to define which choices are *reasonable* (in its strong sense). Note that the issue of soundness is not considered here.
- b) *Physical constraints*: The laws that govern natural phenomena impose constraints on one's decisions through permitting and inhibiting particular actions and states. It is a basic principle of the model that an agent is unable to evade the influence of nature and the laws that describe possibility when arriving at a *possible* choice. So for instance, one may not choose to flap one's arms and fly, become invisible,

abstain totally from sustenance and expect to survive, swim unaided under water for an extended time, and any other feat that would normally entail overcoming a basic law of nature and existence. The rational principle does not allow delusional thinking where one believes in the ability to overcome the limitations inherent in normal life.

- c) *Resource constraints*: In order to attain one's goals it is usual to expend energy, money, time and other resources without which success would be unachievable. Where a goal is both physically and logically attainable in principle, the limiting factor is the availability of the required materials (e.g. economic, emotional) to facilitate achievement. Therefore, where the necessary resources are absent, one's choices are not considered to be *realisable*, which is consistent with the Resource dependence theory (Hillman et al., 2009). As an example, consider the student who wishes to attain a degree without paying tuition fees, without attending classes and without studying. One would not expect this student to succeed in graduating with their chosen degree, even though physics and logic permit success.
- d) *Axiological (self-imposed) constraints*: Where there are no externally imposed constraints from physics, logic and resources, still decision makers introduce their own constraints based on personal *value* systems, which serve to define the *allowable* choices. Often moral, ethical and religious considerations enter the decision-making process and dictate which options become ineligible for a particular decision maker. This type of constraints is highlighted in phenomenological institutional theory (Tolbert and Zucker, 1999) and Weber's (1993) theory on how an individual's way of thinking bounds her course of action (Kalberg, 1980b). Strict adherence to religious law, for example, would exclude marriage for some priests (i.e. Catholic).

The Rational Core just described rests on four domains of constraints: two that are universal (logic and physics) and two that are personal (resources and axiological). Collectively these constraints determine the scope of functionings that are *possible*, *reasonable*, *realisable* and *allowable* for the agent. Beyond what one knows to be possible, reasonable, realisable and allowable, there is the added consideration of what is *desirable* that is the value-laden, multilevel criteria of actualising capabilities. Desirability determines the interaction of three

modes of agency (affective, rational and conative) and it is located at the affective level of the model. Understanding the *desirability* aspect of decision is necessary to explain incontinent and counterintuitive decisions. For example, imagine a policeman in a corrupt police station where it is possible, reasonable and realisable to accept bribes and this police officer's son is very sick and needs to undergo expensive surgery that costs way above the father's savings. How to determine his agency-freedom relationship if he decides to refuse/accept the bribe? In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we shed light on this problem by analysing the *desirability* aspect of the decision. The early decision model (i.e. Yorulmaz and Khan (2008a) is immature in this respect and does not adequately detail the desirability aspect of decision making with a focus on agency and freedom. This aspect is located in the Affective Shell that includes the following three domains:

- a) *Evaluation*: This part anticipates how self and others perceive an agent's behaviour - whether it is approved and encouraged; and how these reactions influence the agency outcome.
- b) *Feed Backward-Forward Loop*: shows how the evaluation result will influence the agent's capability set next time around.
- c) *Capability Realisation*: depicts how the subsequent impact of a decision affects the availability of choices in the next step.

Three Phases of Theory Development

Figure 9 shows three phases of developing the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency based on Yorulmaz and Khan's (2008a/b) early decision model. This is the first version of the extended decision model developed in our research to determine the agency-freedom relationship. This version is published by the authors (Khan and Ghalamchi, 2015) in the British Academy of Management conference.


Phase 1: Capability Realisation: As presented in Figure 9, the first developmental phase of the affective shell is about Capability Realisation that explains how decision makers realise, evaluate, choose and pursue an option from the set of capabilities. As mentioned earlier *process, values, opportunities, and desirability* are important to understand the agency-freedom relationship, which is our extension of Sen's (2004) freedom-decision view and Sen's (1990) theory of the "Rational Fool". For example, when a university graduate in art is looking for a job,

she starts from analysing options in the job markets (i.e. capability set), then based on her personal and universal constraints (i.e. Logical Core) and values (i.e. desirability) she categorises some jobs as her realisable and desirable capabilities (e.g. internship in a museum), and if she applies for this job then she moves towards one of the four boxes in the Evaluation area of the model, which shows the volition and benefit aspects of her state of being/doing after the decision. In this area, the 'side effects' and 'capability sets' need further development.

Phase 2: Evaluation: The second phase of the model is Evaluation that shows how an agent's state of being/doing before and/or after making a significant and conscious decision is evaluated from the self and other standpoints. For example, in the previous example about the art graduate who was looking for a job, in the Evaluation Phase we need to explain how her state of being/doing was evaluated from her point of view and the others. Here, the model requires to be developed with respect to freedom.

Phase 3: The Feed Backward-Forward Loop: The third phase of the model is the Feed Backward-Forward Loop that shows how the *emotion* and *reason* that are generated at the Evaluation phase subsequently influence the next decision. For example, imagine a female job seeker, recently graduated from university and looking for a job in a society that is suffering from gender discrimination. In this situation, she may experience 'anger' towards the employers who reject her application because of her gender, and she experiences hopelessness and she becomes coerced to work in a position that provides her with a lower salary compared with her male counterparts. Further, the negative emotion that she experiences after evaluating her situation may lead her towards being passive, irresponsible and a team-averse employee in the work setting (Ashkanasy, 2015). To explain how all of these emotional and rational factors influence an agent's subsequent decisions, the current version of the model is immature. It particularly needs to explain how emotion and reason interact and influence agency outcome. The developmental process of these three phases of the model is explained in detail in the following sections. The model that is developed at the end of this chapter is the centre of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency and it will be empirically tested and developed in the following chapter.

Figure 9: Extending the Capability-Based Decision Model (1st Version)



Phase 1: Capability Realisation

The first phase of developing the central model of the Tri-Modal of Theory Agency is explaining agency outcome (decision) with respect to freedom. As mentioned earlier, to achieve this aim we focus on an agent's *desirability*, *values*, *decision process* and *capabilities*. The following sections present how these aspects are developed in the Capability Realisation phase of the model.

Phase 1. Desirability and Values

Desirability: This criterion distinguishes capabilities that are commensurate with the agent's *values* (i.e. value-driven options) at the two levels of individual and others (i.e. multi-level), with particular focus on the agent's freedom (i.e. *volitional*). *Desirability* is a multi-level notion because in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency an agent's decision is evaluated in a social context, thus her decision is evaluated at least at two levels of "individual" and "social". *Desirability* consists of an agent's *values*, because in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency freedom is defined as an agent's capability to live the life she has to value, thus it is important to test if a capability is commensurate with her *values*. In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, *desirability* assessment occurs before checking how realisable a capability is, because human beings have "bounded rationality" (Simon, 1990) and they are not able to process all of their available options (i.e. realisable capabilities). Accordingly, several studies in the field of social psychology (Kahneman, 2014; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 2014, 1973) have shown that human mind uses 'heuristic' mechanisms to minimise the number of available options, based on a simple rule of 'maximising gain and minimising loss'. Hence, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is designed in a way that initially assesses the desirability of the agent's capabilities and then considers how realisable they are.

Values: In the early version of the 'capability-based decision model' by Yorulmaz and Khan (2008), there is no trace of *value* in their decision model. Here we add this criterion to the model, because it is the *critical* notion of understanding the agency-freedom relationship, as we say an agent's freedom is *contracted* if she makes a decision that prevents her from living the life she has reason to *value*. In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency *values* are not factual statements (Berlin, 1970; Hume, 1902; Kant, 1998); they are not observable facts that can be deduced empirically, neither are they artificial conventions like mathematics; values are not universal, external to human beings and unchanged by history; they are not accessible to the minds of any rational being (Berlin, 1970; Kant, 1998). *Values* are orders, commands,

“imperatives” (Kant, 1998). *Values* are not objective, but it does not mean that they are subjective, and they are not “reducible to psychology” as Hume (1902) believes (Berlin, 1970). In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, we believe that to understand an individual’s behaviour and in communication with other human beings, there must be existed a *common value* set, as it is in custom, manner, law, tradition and religion (Berlin, 1970). In this line, there is an element of objectivity in values (Berlin, 1958). Here, understanding the foundation of *values* is not within the scope of the present study, but in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we highlight the role of agency in choosing a *value* set to make decisions in order for the agent’s freedom to be evaluated according to those *values*.

Here, consistent with Berlin (1958) and Sen (1999) we believe in the diversity of personal interests and plurality of values. It is worth mentioning, however, that our evaluation criteria to assess capability set is not limited to Sen’s (1999) view in Capability Approach. This is because in his work people only *desire* the things that are both personally valued and valuable in the broader context of the community. For Sen (1999), one ‘ought’ to value what is valuable in society. This is because what one ought to do/be has impersonal validity that refers to stable standards of what should be done or experienced from the normative point of view (Heider, 1944; Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014). Here, consistent with Weber (1993) and Bakhtin (1935), we believe that social values may conflict with personal values and increasingly contract one’s freedom. Sen’s (1999) category identifies individuals in only one outcome box of beneficial-functioning in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (see Figure 9), which does not explain the decisions that are made contrary to the ‘self’ and ‘other’ judgements. To address this shortcoming, we encompass both *personal* and *social* views and accordingly expand Sen’s (1999) criteria of ‘valuable’. In this regard, we evaluate an agent’s capabilities and her realised capabilities (i.e. functioning and commanding) from both the intrapersonal (i.e. the way the agent thinks and feels) and the interpersonal (i.e. the way an agent thinks, feels and behaves in relation to others) (Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014). To determine the agency-freedom relationship we evaluate an agent’s capabilities from the three perspectives of (a) personal, (b) social, and (c) source of authority as presented in Figure 10. The following examples show how one may value something that has no social value and/or vice versa:

- Adverse-Functioning (AF): For example, agents might want to smoke/gamble, but society evaluates these decisions with negative value. In this case, if the agent volitionally smokes/gambles, then she ends up at the Adverse-Functioning (AF) state in the model.
- Beneficial-Functioning (BF): If both personal and social values coincide and the source of authorities do not force the agent to choose something (i.e. the agent volitionally chooses the option commensurate with her values), then this decision leads her towards the Beneficial-Functioning (BF) state. For example, a common value in developed society advocates pro-environmental activities like recycling household waste. In this situation if an agent volitionally decides to recycle her household waste, then this decision leads her towards the BF state of being/doing.
- Beneficial-Commanding (BC): This is when a decision option lacks the values that are personally attached to it, but society values it and sources of authority coerce the agent to choose it, such as the smoking ban in public spaces. A social smoker who wants to smoke but refrains from smoking due to the smoking ban will end up at BC.
- Adverse-Commanding (AC): This is when something is valueless from both the personal and social perspectives, but one is forced to select that. An example of (AC) is to be conscripted into the armed forces and being required to fight in an illegal war for political reasons, like the young Syrian civilians, whose home town is occupied and are forced to fight for ISIS (Jasser, 2014). A soldier can refuse and will not be forced, but there are consequences to refusing an order. Hence, a soldier that participates in that war despite the conflict between her values and illegality of that war will end up at the AC state of being/doing.

Figure 10: Value-Volition Evaluation Criteria





Figure 11 adds the desirability aspect to the first phase of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that is Capability Realisation, which explains how an agent realises, evaluates, chooses and pursues an option from her capability set. For example, when a university graduate is looking for a job, she starts from analysing options in the job markets (i.e. capability set, Node A), then based on her personal and social values she categorises some jobs as her desired capabilities (Node B1), and if she has the required skills and abilities to apply for her desired options then at Node D1, she applies for the desirable options and if she will be accepted in her *desired* and *realisable* job, then she ends up at Beneficial Functioning box in the model. At this stage the Capability Realisation phase of the model needs to clearly determine the decision process (i.e. decision cycles), and consequences (i.e. Side Effects) over time (i.e. Decision Trajectory), before and after the focal decision. These domains are explained in the following sections.

Figure 11: The Capability Realisation Phase developed focusing on Desirability and Values




Phase 1: Process, Time and Scope

The decision *process* matters in understanding both agency and freedom (Vegasana and McKenzie, 2015; Wright et al., 2016), particularly due to the values attached to certain capabilities and the role of time in an agent's life trajectory. For example, judgment about the war refugees' decision to leave their country differs if the analysis starts from observing their state of being/doing from *before* to *after* the war (Anagnostopoulos et al., 2016; Orchard and Miller, 2014). In this line, some (Ajzen, 2015; Armitage, 2015) emphasise the analysis of decision with a focus on its temporal aspect. The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency adds a temporal aspect to the earlier decision model, which implies why we need to understand the Evaluation and Feed Backward-Forward Loop of a decision to determine the agency-freedom relationship. Time passes and the *reason* and *emotion* that are generated after evaluating a decision (at t) feed forward/backward, influencing the agent's subsequent decisions (at $t+1$) as presented in Figure 12. It is worth mentioning here, however, that setting the scope of the impact of an agent's decisions on each other over time is important. Here, it must be acknowledged that decision making is a broad area, extended in metacognition by psychologists (e.g. Kahneman, 2003, 2002), neuroscientists (e.g. Damasio, 2012; Damasio et al., 2015), behavioural economists (e.g. Becker, 1993; Taylor and Brown, 1988) and philosophers (e.g. Gächter and Thöni, 2007). We acknowledge the breadth and depth of this area and the focus of this study is narrowed to the impact of *emotion* and *reason* on the object, subject and process of decision, as long as it associates with freedom. Hence, the scope of our analysis is narrowed to freedom, which means we study the decision object, subject and process once an agent *makes a decision that conflicts with her values*, as presented in Figure 12.

1. **Object of decision:** The agent's capabilities that constitute the decision space (i.e. Berlin's (1969) negative freedom) within which a choice is to be made.
2. **Subject of decision:** The decision itself (e.g. decision to migrate; decision on a career change)
3. **Decision Process:** General problem-solving mechanisms, which are applicable in any situation. The decision processes include an agent's mental process that results in choosing a certain capability from capability set (i.e. Berlin's (1969) positive freedom). Decision processes can be:
 - a. The innate ability to perform abstraction and use heuristics.
 - b. The use of emotional, rational, and random decision-making mechanisms.

Figure 12: Temporal Emergence of the Evaluation and Feed Backward-Forward Phases




Phase 1: Process, Side Effect

One particular notion in analysing human decision with respect to *time* is about the unintentional consequences of decision (Huang et al., 2016; Stoutenborough et al., 2015). Here, the role of *chance* and *luck* in an agent's freedom also comes to attention (Coffman, 2015). The early decision model has acknowledged side-effects (see Figure 8), but this aspect has remained underdeveloped. Side-effects can have contemporaneous and consequential effects. Thus, in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency three types of reasoning are analysed to see whether an agent assigns the reason of her decision to an attribution at the time of decision making (i.e. correlational reasoning) (Kelley et al., 2013), to something in the future (i.e. teleological reasoning) (Collins, 1978) or to a reason in the past (i.e. causal reasoning) (Bargh, 1989).

Figure 13 presents the progression of states and capabilities and how they change from the focal decision (at t), its influence as a side-effect decision (at t) and the subsequent focal decision (at $t+1$). The side-effect decision is linked to the focal decision by a branch ending in the commanding state in the side-effect decision (at t). The side-effect decision is not an intended consequence, thus, the agent cannot avoid it. Both the focal and side-effect decisions (at t) impact on the agent's freedom (at $t+1$) through *reason* and *emotion* (at t) that influence her decision (at $t+1$). The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency says that if a decision (at $t+1$) coerces the agent to dismiss her values then her freedom is contracted.

Figure 13 presents the temporal progression of states that starts with an agent making an important and conscious decision at (t). For example, a young girl decides to migrate to another country to study when she is 18 years old. Migration at the age of 18 is her focal decision. Once she actually decides to migrate, the decision to migrate generates unintended consequences (i.e. the side-effect). As a result, she has to make an unintended decision; for example, she has to leave her family. These side-effects are coerced on the agent. That is why the arrow from the side-effect of the Focal Decision at (t) enters into the commanding states at the Side-Effect Decision at (t). After making the decision to migrate, the agent is entering a different state of being/doing, where she has to make her focal decision at ($t+1$). At this stage, both her Focal Decision at (t) (i.e. migration) and the Side-effect Decision at (t) (i.e. leaving family) will influence her capability set at ($t+1$). For example, if her focal decision at ($t+1$) is about choosing a place to live, her capability set has been influenced by her Side-effect Decision at (t) and she lacks the option of living with her family. Figure 13 shows one cycle of decision making in time. However, in reality there are infinite cycles of side-effect decisions that are imposed on the agent as a result of making one focal decision, and some of these may remain unknown to the agent, due to her bounded rationality.


Figure 13: Side-Effect in the Decision Process



Side-effect decisions emerge AFTER the initiating decision, but may co-occur with the primary functioning that results from the focal decision. However, both the primary and consequential decisions influence an agent's capabilities through the feedback cycle. Figure 14 shows that although the side-effect decision does not directly influence the primary decision, the agent may correctly identify and predict side-effects of the primary decision and take account of the consequences in choosing to act (consider a master chess player thinking 10 moves ahead) both *primary* and *consequential* decisions influence the person's subsequent capabilities through feedback. Figure 14 shows that in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we have expanded Sen's (1999) functioning set to the *primary* state of being/doing plus the *consequential* state of being/doing. The *primary* ones are the self-determined capabilities of focal decisions, and the *consequential* ones are the ending state of being/doing that one arrives at from the side-effects of


her focal decision.

Figure 14: Primary and Consequential Decisions



Developing the temporal mode of the decision model is a crucial step in identifying agentic factors associated with freedom. In this line, Figure 15 shows the dynamic and temporal aspect of the model. At this stage, by using the model we can analyse multiple side-effect decisions, because the focal decision can create multiple unintended consequences. As presented in Figure 15, each focal decision can create multiple side-effect decisions, but the question is how many of them are analysed in each agency analysis. For practical reasons, we analyse one side-effect decision. Explaining side-effects furthermore is not within the scope of the present study, but if a participant in interviews points to an important consequence of her decision, we explain it and map it onto the side-effect part of the model (see Chapter 5, Study 4).

Figure 15: Temporal Dimension of the Decision Model




Phase 1: Process, Reasoning Direction

Due to the temporal mode, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is dynamic and enables us to trace an agent's decision trajectories over time. Hence, it is important to establish what we mean by *before* and *after* a decision, decision cycles, and traveling backward/forward in an agent's life trajectory (see Figure 15). The direction of agency analysis matters because people use the following temporal based types of reasoning (i.e. teleological, casual and correlational).

- A. **Teleological Reasoning.** If one uses teleological reasoning, this means that this person assigns the 'reason' of his/her decision to a state/event in the future (Gelman et al., 2015). By imagining a future desired state of being/doing, the agent interjects by adopting the capability that aligns with that desired future situation. Hence, we explore for empirical factors and map them onto the future if they have a similar nature to teleological reasoning. Consequently, if an agent uses teleological reasoning, then we should travel forward in the model towards the state/event that is identified as a reason behind her decision. Teleological reasoning is the basic building block of the Feed Forward Loop in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. For example, if a social smoker decides to refrain from smoking in public spaces, and her reason for this decision is to prevent incurring a fine, then she is using teleological reasoning and assigns her decision to a reason in the future.
- B. **Causal Reasoning.** If agent uses causal reasoning, then she is assigning the reason for her decision to a state/event in the past (Hastie, 2015). For a reasoning to be regarded as 'causal', there must be an influence between the attributed prior state/event and its effect on the decision (Michotte, 1963). If agent uses causal reasoning, then we travel backward in the model towards the state that is identified as the reason behind the decision. Causal Reasoning is mapped onto the Feed Backward Loop in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. For example, if an employee decides to leave her job and her reason for this decision is her manager's behaviour, then she is using causal reasoning.
- C. **Correlational Reasoning.** If agent uses correlational reasoning, then she is referring to a reason that occurs parallel to the decision, with no identification of any *causal link* between that event and its result (Bukowski et al., 2016). If agent uses a cotemporaneous reason, in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we are careful not to misunderstand correlational and causal reasoning. However, if evidence supports correlational reasoning in the agent's explanation, it can potentially be causal and further evidence is required to be sure about the type of reasoning (Kelley et al., 2013). If an agent is using correlational reasoning, then we do not travel back/forward in the model.

Figure 16 presents a linear interpretation of temporal reasoning of the decision-making process. Accordingly, to explain agency outcome (decision), the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency analyses an agent's types of reasoning to indicate how far forward or backward from S1 (i.e. the state of being/doing at time of decision making) should be travelled in the model. This approach is *imaginary time travel* to set the boundaries of influence in terms of history and prescience. Reflections on one's history and the emergent emotions are *interjected* into the focus of decision through feedback channels; whereas, the anticipation of possible future states is correspondingly *interjected* into the decision process through feed forward conduits. This part of the model requires further empirical development and once we find the agency-oriented factors associated with freedom we map them onto this temporal reasoning, in order to identify the direction and distance of decision analysis over time (see Chapter 5, Result Interpretation of Study 3 and Study 4).

Figure 16: Imaginary Time Travel



Phase 1: Capabilities and Capability Set

To understand the agency-freedom relationship, this study focuses on agency outcome (decision) and capabilities, based on Sen's (2007) CA. Capabilities matter in determining an agent's negative freedom (i.e. the space within which one is free to do/be what she values). For example, Person A is 'fasting' and Person B is 'starving'; they both are at the state of being hungry, but Person A has more expanded negative freedom as she has the *capability* of eating, whereas Person B lacks the capability of eating. As evidence, the freedom space (i.e. Berlin's (1969) negative freedom) of Person A and Person B can be compared by comparing their *capability sets*. Hence, it is important to identify the quantity and quality of an agent's capabilities in order to determine the agency-freedom relationship. In this regard, according to the *desirability* and *realisable* criteria and based on logical set theory, we identify 12 'Family Groups' of capabilities and end states (i.e. commanding and functioning) in the model.

Table 11 shows the membership criteria of these 12 sets as presented in Figure 17. It is important to note that the strength of this study is its particular focus on both Node A and Node B to evaluate capability sets. At Node A, the agent's capabilities are classified based on the *desirability criterion*, which is a *multilevel* notion, evaluated at the *personal* and *social* standpoints and includes *values* and *volition*. At Nodes B1 and B2 capabilities are categorised based on a *realisable* criterion that includes universal (i.e. physical and logical) and personal (i.e. resource-dependent and axiological) constraints. It must be mentioned that "Axiological Constraints" have a special position with respect to agency, in which agent herself imposes limitations on her decision. Self-imposed constraints are similar to Max Weber's substantive rationality (Kalberg, 1980b), and Sen's (1990) 'commitment' actions, as all of these notions try to explain the decisions that are value laden, they are made due to long-term goals, and they can be other-centred (i.e. counterintuitive decisions). For example, one may decide not to tell a lie because of her ethical beliefs, although revealing the truth may violate her self-interest.

Further, as presented in Table 11 at Node B1 and B2 the split of realisable/unrealisable capabilities is not within the agency of the person to determine. At Nodes D1 and D2 the agent finally chooses one of the realisable capabilities, willingly (i.e. ends up at functioning) or due to compulsion by a source of authority (i.e. ends up at commanding). Distinguishing desired, realisable and freely selectable capabilities at Node A, B1-B2 and Nodes D1-D2 enables us to indicate an agent's freedom level, from a negative perspective. This is one of the methodological advantages of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in explaining the agency-freedom relationship that is captured in the model. This is because most of the previous studies on decision-freedom (e.g. Corrigan et al., 2012) mainly focus on what happens at Node D1 and


D2. Therefore, to present a rigorous analysis of each agency outcome (decision) we trace these nodes to show the level of freedom of agents passing these nodes and outcome states.

Table 11: Membership Criteria of Capability Sets

Label	Set	Departure Node	Arrival Node	Membership Criteria
Capability	Set C	Node F-G	Node A	All possible options
Desired Capability	Set D	Node A	Node B1	Personally Valuable & Socially Valuable & Volitional
Undesired Capability	Set U	Node A	Node B2	Personally Valueless & Socially Valueless & Coerced
Desired-Realisable Capability	Set DR	Node B1	Node D1	Desired & Not Limited
Desired-Unrealisable Capability	Set DU	Node B2	Node D2	Desired & Limited
Undesired-Realisable Capability	Set UR	Node B2	Node D2	Undesired & Not limited
Undesired-Unrealisable Capability	Set UU	Node B2	Node D2	Undesired & Limited
Beneficial Functioning	Set BF	Node D1	Evaluation	Both Personally & Socially Desired & Volitionally Chosen
Adverse Functioning	Set AF	Node D2	Evaluation	Personally desired & Socially Undesired & Volitionally Chosen
Beneficial Commanding	Set BC	Node D2	Evaluation	Personally Undesired & Socially Desired & Coerced to be Obtained
Adverse Commanding	Set AC	Node D2	Evaluation	Undesired & Coerced to be Obtained
Side Effects	Set SE	Node D1, D2	Node A	Accidental Consequences of Desiring a Capability

Figure 17: The Capability Set Trajectory in the Model

Set C: {**Set D** {**Set DR** {**Set BF** + **Set SE**} + **Set DU** {**Set SE**} + **Set U** {**Set UR** {**Set AF** + **Set BC** + **Set AS** + **Set SE**} + **Set UU** {**Set SE**}}}



Phase 2: Evaluation


The second phase of the core decision model of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is Evaluation that encompasses the way that an agent evaluates her state of being/doing at t1 and its impact on her decision at t2. According to appraisal psychologists (Rudolph et al., 2013; Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014) the link between *evaluation* and *decision* is through the *emotions* that emerge when an individual self-reflects on her state of being/doing and/or reflects on other's evaluation about her state of being/doing. This study is founded upon this idea that *whatever one's values are she is free to pursuit*. If one lacks any value, she acts based on her instinct, and whatever emotion she feels she is free. This implies that in addition to emotion, a human individual is regarded as a rational being equipped with an intellectual mind that enables her to reason her decisions (Cornish and Clarke, 2014). Hence, to the identify agency-freedom relationship, it is important to consider both the *affective* and *rational* (i.e. emotion and reason) factors that motivate a decision. These two consists of the two modes of agency (i.e. affective and cognitive) in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.

Considering both cognitive and affective modes of agency is particularly important to understand freedom from a positive perspective, which according to Berlin (1969) is about *who/what is the source of determining an action*. For example, one of the reasons that some governments put boundaries on citizens' freedom is that they argue that people make irrational decisions that harm themselves and society (Gray, 2015). For example, the restrictive law of the smoking ban in public spaces is justified according to the same argument that not all human decisions are based on intellectual reasoning (Carroll et al., 2013), in which one calculates a cost-benefit analysis, uses all required information and chooses the best option that maximises her self-interest (Kahneman, 2003). These examples show the importance of identifying the impact of both *affective* and *cognitive* factors that influence an agent to be/do what she has reason to *value*. Here, Davidson's (2001) concept of the "weakness of will" also comes to account that is about incontinent decisions that are made contrary to personal judgement. These examples point to the complexity of reason-emotion interaction as a decision motive. Accordingly, in the following sections we develop the *affective* and *cognitive* factors behind agency outcome in the Evaluation and Feed Backward-Forward Loop of the model.

Phase 2: Emotion

Emotion is the main drive behind most human decisions (Jin et al., 2014; Steele, 2016). Psychologists regard the affective part as the automatic side of behaviour that is hard-wired into the brain through many years of human evolution (Haidt, 2006). However, the role of emotion in our conscious and planned decisions (e.g. university major selection, career choice, marriage, having children, investment, migration etc.) is being underestimated and sometimes distorted by several thinkers (Damasio et al., 2015), including liberal philosophers like Berlin (1969). Since it is complex to determine how emotion operates and guides an agent's behaviour, the role of emotion in the freedom of choice is an underdeveloped area (Nussbaum, 2007). However, psychologists and neuroscientists have made significant progress in terms of identifying the role of emotion in an agent's life (Ashkanasy and Daus, 2016; Damasio et al., 2015; Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014). The present study emphasises the role of emotion in the agency-freedom relationship and uses appraisal psychology and particularly Weiner's (2010) attribution theory of motivation (Figure 18) to determine the impact of an agent's decision at t1 through 'emotion' on her decision at t2. Figure 18 is Weiner's (2010) model that shows how one's decisions will generate certain behavioural consequences that influence her subsequent decisions through emotion (e.g. pride, self-esteem, hope, hopelessness, shame, guilt, sadness and happiness).

Figure 18: Weiner's (2010) Attribution-based Theory of Interpersonal Motivation



Note: Taken from "The Development of Attribution-Based Theory of Motivation: A History of Ideas" by Weiner (2010; p:34).

Getting insight from Weiner's (2010) attribution theory of motivation (Figure 18), we develop the Evaluation Phase of the model by adding the agent's self-reflection process to the decision model. The Evaluation Phase consists of the agent's reflection on her decision from the 'self' and 'other' stand-points. Weiner (2010) shows that when one evaluated the outcome of her behaviour (e.g. success/failure), she experiences certain emotions (e.g. pride/hopelessness). The emotion that is generated through this attribution mechanism is related to the *stability*, *controllability* and *locus* of the *attribution* that she assigns to her behaviour. For example, if one fails in her exam and attributes low ability (i.e. uncontrollable, stable and internal attribution) to this outcome, then she feels hopelessness. On the other hand, if she assigns low effort (i.e. controllable, unstable or internal) to her failure, then she feels shame and/or regret. As evidence, the characteristics of the attribution (i.e. locus, stability or controllability) that one assigns to her behaviour are related to the emotions she feels afterwards (Kelley et al., 2013; Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014).

Weiner's (2010) attribution theory of motivation shows how these emotions that are generated within the evaluation process can either motivate or demotivate one's subsequent decision. In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, our focus is on analysing an agent's decisions, thus, Weiner's (2010) work is an appropriate theory to be used in order to develop the affective mode of agency in our theory. Here, we use Weiner's (2010) theory and expand it in our model by detecting the agent's emotions from two perspectives. We ask the agent to evaluate her decision from her own standpoint (self) as well as the standpoint of others as presented in Diagram 12. Although, some studies (Dimaggio et al., 2008; Damasio et al., 2015) have shown that reflecting on a decision from the other's worldview is cognitively demanding, research (Gryzman et al., 2013) shows that people are aware of the other's worldview and with professional support they may be able to reflect on their own behaviour.

For example, imagine a divorced woman in a religious society like Saudi Arabia or Iran. She may not be sure about the social stigma about her state of being, but she is aware of it and with professional assistance she may be able to reflect on her situation (Travers et al., 2015). Self-reflection from two standpoints in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency can help to improve self-report data collection methods, as research (Härtel et al., 2011) shows that this method of data collection is prone to methodological limitations. In addition, research (Podsakoff et al., 2016) shows a small correlation between self-report and objective measures of behaviour. Therefore, reflecting from 'self' and 'other' worldviews can also improve self-report methods that collect emotion data using within-person variations in behaviour, like daily diary methods (Ashkanasy,

2015). In agency analysis our model helps the agent to reflect on the other's worldview and emotion influences one's behaviour in two ways:

- 1) *Subconscious*: the agent experiences some emotion but she is not conscious of it (e.g. when one faces a bear and runs away frightfully). The emotion experienced by the agent has a subconscious impact (see the upper part of Figure 19, showing the emotions generated from the 'self' standpoint).
- 2) *Rational*: the emotions that the agent perceives by reflecting on how others feel when evaluating her state of being/doing. This emotion is not subconscious and it is at the cognitive level because the agent is using cognitive processes to reflect on the other's worldview (see the lower part of Figure 19, showing the emotions generated from the 'other' standpoint).

Figure 19 shows the emotions that are generated from self and other evaluation as subconscious and rational types of emotions. As presented in Figure 19, we have two black boxes of *emotion* and *rationality* in the model. These black boxes present the complex mental process that generates *emotion* and *reason* (Damasio et al., 2015). We show emotion-reason integration in back box, because the mental process behind their generation is not within the scope of the present study. These two black boxes include some parts of the 'real' domain that are not observable and measurable by scientific tools (see Chapter 3, Methodology). The affects and rationales we use in this study are the *outcome* of these black boxes that are within the 'empirical' domain, based on our research philosophy (i.e. Critical Realism). The arrows leading from the black boxes are the predictions of what the emotions and rational could be. In the model we use the emotions presented in Table 12 and Table 13 that are the extension version of Weiner's (2010) list of emotions in his Attribution Theory of Motivation (see Figure 18). These emotions interject when one evaluates her state of being/doing and assigns the cause of beneficial/adverse or commanding/functioning state to a reason.

Building upon Weiner's (2010) attribution theory, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency shows that if the locus of control is important then the emotion is Class C. If the *stability* of that cause is important then Class S emotions are interjected. If locus matters, then Class L emotions are generated. For example, if the divorced woman in a traditional society attributes the reason of her divorce to an internal reason (e.g. poor personality), then she experiences locus-oriented

emotions that are represented in Class L (e.g. humiliation), consequently she may reject the other marriage proposals (i.e. Latency in decision), which shows that she has been demotivated by the emotion generated by evaluating her previous decision.

On the other hand, if the same woman attributes the reason of her divorce to society and/or to her ex-husband's characteristics, reasons that are not within her *control*, then controllability-oriented emotions emerge and she would experience Class C affects (e.g. anger), which motivates her to go against the cause of her situation. There are many examples that after divorce, ex-partners make a decision and try to harm each other, due to the anger they have experienced after evaluating their previous decision (i.e. divorce) (Berk et al., 2014; Petrican et al., 2015). Finally, if the same woman attributes the cause of her divorce to *stable* reasons (e.g. not being attractive), then it is possible that she feels Class S emotions (e.g. Hopelessness) and becomes demotivated in her future romantic-oriented decisions. The emotional result of agency-analysis will be empirically tested and developed in the Evaluation and Feed Backward-Forward Loop of the model in the following chapters.

Table 12: Emotion Classes Based on Weiner's Attribution Theory of Motivation

Emotion Class	Emotion	Consequence	Motivational Result
Class C			
	Shame	Go away- Latency	Demotivate
	Guilt	Go toward- Persistency	Motivate
	Regret	Go toward-Persistency	Motivate
	Anger	Go against- Intensity	Motivate
	Pity	Choice- Help	Motivate
	Gratitude	Choice- Persistency	Motivate
Class L			
	Pride	Latency/Persistency	Motivate
	Self-Esteem	Latency/Persistency	Motivate
	Humiliation	Latency/Persistency	Demotivate
Class S			
	Hope	High expectancy- Persistency	Motivate
	Hopelessness	Low expectancy- Latency	Demotivate


The role of direct (i.e. generated from the 'self' evaluation) and perceived (generated from reflecting on the 'other' evaluation) emotions on freedom is presented in Figure 19 and Table 13. This table enables us to distinguish between 'self' and 'other' evaluator worldviews, and the functional impact of emotion (i.e. red/green signal) on regulating behaviour, which we adapt and logically extend from moral emotion studies (Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014) that are built upon Weiner's (2010) theory. In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we have customised these emotion lists to the agency-freedom relationship. Figure 19 shows the agent (i.e. self) and the observer (i.e. other) perspectives about the agent's situation. For example, a divorced woman in a religious society may evaluate her state of being/doing as Beneficial Functioning, but it is possible that her relatives and colleagues evaluate her state of being as Adverse Commanding. We expect that the 'self' and 'other' worldviews are divergent due to the distinct *rationalities* and *emotions* each party has when evaluating a similar state of being/doing (Gasper, 2010). For example, in case of the divorced woman in a religious society, if she evaluates her state of being as Beneficial Functioning from her personal standpoint then according to Table 13, it is possible that she experiences *pride* that has a good hedonic side, which motivates her to continue and make a similar decision in her life. However, if she perceives that others in the society evaluate her situation as Adverse Commanding, then according to Table 13 she may experience contempt, disgust, and/or scorn that all are emotions with a bad hedonic characteristic, which may motivate her to decide to change her behaviour and/or ask for help. As evidence, 'self' and 'other' worldviews towards a single decision can generate completely different emotions that lead to divergent decisions. In the following section we explain these disparities by developing the reason side of the Evaluation and Feed Backward-Forward Loop of the model. In addition, the following chapters will test and develop the emotions that are generated from the agent's 'self' and 'other' reflection about the decision under analysis. Our approach to develop the emotion-reason aspect of the model is logical deduction between Weiner's (2010) list of emotion and the notions of agency and freedom in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.

Table 13: Mapping Emotion onto the Model

Worldview	State	Emotion	Function	Hedonic	Signal for Behavioural Change
Self					
Beneficial Functioning					
		Pride	Start	Good	“to go on like that”
		Pride	Stop		“to change behavior”
		Alpha Pride	Start	Good	“to go on the same due to ability”
		Beta Pride	Start	Good	“to go on the same due to effort”
Adverse Functioning					
		Guilt	Stop	Bad	“I should have done otherwise”
		Regret	Start	Bad	“to change my behaviour”
Beneficial Commanding					
		Pride	Start	Good	“to be the same”
Adverse Commanding					
		Shame	Start	Bad	“to go away”
		Embarrassment	Start	Bad	“to go away”
Other					
Beneficial Functioning					
		Admiration	Start	Good	“Go towards and support”
		Gratitude	Start	Good	“Do it again”
Adverse Functioning					
		Anger	Stop	Bad	“Better not to do that”
		Indignation	Start	Bad	“Agitate against authority”
		Schadenfreude	Stop	Bad	“Better not to do that”
Beneficial Commanding					

Envy	Start	Bad	“to compare”
Adverse Commanding			
Contempt	Stop	Bad	“to change behaviour”
Scorn	Stop	Bad	“to change behaviour”
Disgust	Stop	Bad	“to change behaviour”
Sympathy	Start	Bad	“to accept help”

Figure 19: The Agency-Freedom Relationship from the 'Self' and 'Other' Standpoints



Phase 2: Reason and Rationality

Reasons according to which an agent makes a decision play a significant role in her *freedom* (Hindess, 2014). The agent's cognitive mode (Bandura, 2015) and her way of reasoning (i.e. "rationality type") (Kalberg, 1980b) are particularly important to understand her freedom in the modern era in which according to Max Weber "the essence or unique characteristics of the time in which we are living is rationalisation - of tradition, religion, politics, money, sexuality, and the state of the human body" (Turner, 2002). Before going further, it is important to clarify that "rationalisation" in Weber's terminology refers to how an individual brings reasons for her behaviour, that is, which "rationality type" one uses to explain her actions. The present study defines "Rationalisation" differently that is presented at the end of this chapter. Further, the present study gets insight from Weber's rationality types, and accordingly here we believe that the agent's rationality type is particularly important in defining her freedom in relationship with other people and in the social environment.

For example, the way a Muslim man rationalises his decisions leads him to practice certain actions (e.g. asks his wife to wear the Hijab, fasts on certain days of the year, marries more than one woman, prays six times a day, etc.). These rituals may seem irrational in Western society to an atheist or someone else, who believes in a different set of values. Some may defend specific "rationalities" or ways of reasoning and try to reduce the diversity in order to reach to an identical *way of life* (i.e. rationality types) in society. Having similar values and a single way of life (i.e. "rationality types") may help people to live in social groups, but it can contract each individual's freedom to live the life they personally have reason to value (Bakhtin, 1935; Berlin, 1969; Weber, 1993b). Sen (1999) shows that considering the *plurality* of values and diversity of ways of life is important for an agent to do/be what she has reason to *value*. Hence, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency determines the agency-freedom relationship based on the plurality of *values* and diversity of ways of life, as we believe that if an individual accepts the responsibility for her actions then she can live the life she has reason to value to be free and the agent of her life (Sen, 1999). This view has roots in liberal doctrine (Berlin, 1969; Gray, 2015). In this line, we try to identify *reasons* that are manifested by each agent in her unique way of life. Here, we use "rationality types" that is Weber's (1993) definition for the way an agent brings reasons for her decisions or her way of life.

Accordingly, to develop the *reason* side of the Evaluation Phase in the core model of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, we use Weber's (1993) "four types of rationality" that are adapted from Kalberg's (1980) expansion on the original idea. These four rationality types are the ideal types that are tailored to our research enquiry for several reasons. First, Weber defines

rationality with a focus on *freedom* (Cockerham, 2015). Rationality is a disputable concept as some define it as mean-end type of social action, while others like Weber (1993) define it as 'bureaucratisation' and an 'increasing lack of freedom' (Kalberg, 1980b). Weber considers the following four types of rationalities, among which 'substantive rationality' is the only way that directly leads to action based on an agent's personal *values* rather than mean-end justification. On the other hand, the other three types (i.e. practical, formal and theoretical) are mean-end social actions that somehow bound the agent's freedom at the cognitive and/or affective levels to social norms that are established and justified in modern societies (Cockerham, 2015). The following are four types of rationalities that we have also mapped onto Weiner's (2010) attribution emotions and add them to the model for identifying the *reason* side of decision in relation to *emotion*. Table 14 presents the result of mapping Weber's (1993) rationality types and Weiner's (2010) attribution emotions through logical reasoning, which is one of the unique achievements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. The following chapters test and develop this logical mapping with empirical data (see Chapter 5, Study 4).

- a) **Substantive Rationality.** Using substantive rationality, an agent relies mostly on her *values* and *beliefs* that lead her to achieve a long-term goal (Kalberg, 1980). The agent's decision is not necessarily bounded to her own self-interest and may fulfil the interest of a larger number of people. This type of rationality can explain Sen's (1990) *committed* action that the agent makes a counterintuitive decision contrary to 'other' judgement (e.g. behaving ethically although this manner may have detrimental consequences). Since the agent's values hardly change, the *stability* aspect of using substantive rationality dominates other causal dimensions. Hence, the agent who uses substantive rationality possibly experiences Class S emotions (e.g. *hope* or *hopelessness* in Weiner's (2010) list). The length of continuity of this hopefulness/hopelessness is as long as the *values* exist, which may never end.
- b) **Formal Rationality.** Using formal rationality the agent relies mostly on bureaucratic norms, authority's orders and external reasons (Kalberg, 1980). The main motives of this individual are defined by bureaucratic authorities, thus, it is possible that the agent experiences Class C emotions that are controllability-related emotions (e.g. a decrease in pride and self-esteem in Weiner's (2010) list). Using formal rationality, it is conjectured that the agent experiences *fear class* emotions (e.g. anxiety, despair, doubt, dread,

panic, suspicion and angst), and her values change according to the source of authority and through the emotions generated in ruler-ruled conflicts.

- c) **Practical Rationality.** Using practical rationality, the agent relies on the mean-end way of thinking and her decisions are made to lead her towards a pleasant end (Kalberg, 1980). An individual with practical rationality behaves similar to the “rational man” in rational choice theories used in standard economics (Hindess, 2014). The agent’s motives are self-centred. It can be conjectured that the agent experiences Class S Emotions that are stability-oriented (e.g. hope/hopelessness in Weiner’s (2010) list). Here, the length of continuity of hope is shorter than what is experienced at substantive rationality, because hope is as short as reaching for a personal goal (e.g. financial satisfaction). For Sen substantive and practical rationality are aligned, because he is interested in situations where one’s personal values and social norms are in line. But for Weber the scope is different. Practical in Weber’s term is not sufficient for functioning (i.e. free choice), unless it is in line with the agent’s personal values. Our position is that practical and substantive rationality must be distinguished based on the length of the agent’s belief in certain values over time (see identifying rationality type in Chapter 6, Case Study).
- d) **Theoretical Rationality.** Using theoretical rationality, the agent relies on the abstract realisation of her decision (Kalberg, 1980), on external principles that are not necessarily value based. One of its manifestations is choosing a commuter route to go to work based on the reported traffic, received from a news bulletin (i.e. external to the agent). Using these types of reasoning, the occurrence and impact of events are external to the agent, but she has control to decide which set of principles to use. Therefore, the locus and controllability aspect of situations become important for the agent. Hence, it is conjectured that the agent that uses theoretical rationality can experience Class C and Class L emotions (Weiner, 2010), but her decision may easily change depending on external worldviews.

Table 14: Rational Indicators of Causal Dimensions

Rationality Type	Controllability	Stability	Locus	Emotion Class	Emotion	Longevity
Substantive Rationality	Controllable	Stable	Internal	Class S & L	Hope	Hardly Change
Formal Rationality	Uncontrollable	Stable	External	Class L & C	Fear	Change
Practical Rationality	Controllable	Stable*	Internal	Class S & L	Hope	Change
Theoretical Rationality	Controllable	Stable	External*	Class L & C	Pride/Humiliation	Easily Change

Note: * shows the comparative stability of practical and substantive rationalities as values (substantive rationality) are more stable than goals (practical rationality); Chapter 6, Case study, analyses their difference).

Phase 2: Reason and Worldview

In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, understanding an agent's ability to have and raise her "voice" (i.e. a personal worldview that is shaped according to her values and rationality type) is important in determining the agency-freedom relationship. Here, 'worldview' refers to the technical notion of 'voice' in Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism that emphasises freedom and power relationships in discourses between authorities and minorities in a given society. We say that how agent deals with others' worldviews matter in her agency-freedom relationship, because research (Bandura, 2015; Clark, 2015; Gangas, 2015) shows that agency must be studied in relationship with environment, and the other's worldview is a manifestation of environment (or external factors) influencing agency.

As evidence, recent neuroscientific findings (Caspar et al., 2016) have shown that in a coercive environment the sense of agency is diminishing. For example, imagine Person A is an employee, who rejects bribes due to her ethical values, although she lives in a society that is corrupted and bribery is known as a possible, realisable and reasonable act. Here, Person A has a high level of agency that she decides to live according to her values, particularly because it (Foerster, 2013) is shown that self and the environment interact with each other within the concept of agency. Now compare the agency of Person A with Person B, who is another employee in the same corrupted environment, believing that accepting bribes is morally wrong, but she decides to accept bribes because others are doing the same, justifying her action by referring to the invisible contracts in the society. This study argues that Person A has a more expanded level of agency with respect to freedom than Person B, because Person A is living the life that she has reason to value, whereas Person B's freedom to live the life she has reason to value is contracted by external factors. Encountering the opposing worldview of the 'other' applies to any decisions in any society, because there are different ways of life and sets of values that are unique for each individual (Buckareff et al., 2015). Hence, the question is how an agent encounters with the 'other's' worldview when making a decision.

To answer this question, we get insight from Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism, which defines freedom with respect to the discourse between individuals' worldviews. According to Bakhtin (1935) it is a necessity for freedom that all worldviews will be raised, to be listened to be informed and possibly to be altered through this dialogic discourse that never ends. In other words, for Bakhtin having dialogue with the other's worldview particularly with the worldview of authority is a building block of having freedom in society. For example, in the above examples about the two employee's decisions in terms of bribery, if Person B had *dialogue* between her own worldview (i.e. rejecting bribes), and the other's worldview (i.e. accepting bribes), then she

would be able to raise her own worldview and she may have not decided to behave contrary to her own values. In dialogue, there is no single reality and every individual sees the world through her own lens (Burke, 1988; Robinson, 2011; White, 2009). Bakhtin's (1935) dialogic is consistent with Sen's (2007) emphasis on the plurality of values and ways of life as the necessity of freedom.

In order to identify how an agent *reconciles* her own worldview with the others, the conative mode of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is informed from Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism. Here, we are particularly focusing on the situation that worldviews are opposing and an agent needs to deal with them to make an important decision. For example, how a teenager reconciles her worldview that she wants to study art in university, with her parent's worldview that want her to study medicine; how an employee reconciles her worldview of running the project according to her own understanding of the company's mission with her boss's worldview that wants her to operate in a different way. To show how two worldviews are reconciled with respect to freedom, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has developed the following three ways of reconciling worldviews namely *monologue*, *dialogue* and *dialectic* based on Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism.

- a) **Monologue and Dismissing the 'Other' Worldview.** Using monologue and dismissing the opposing worldview of the 'other' implies that the agent is not accepting the opposing worldview. It is conjectured that the agent who uses monologue will experience the *fear* class of emotions (e.g. anxiety, despair, doubt, dread, panic, suspicion, angst) as a result of dismissing the opposing worldview (Table 15). Here, the agent has *control* over her decision. Thus, she may experience controllability-oriented emotions (i.e. Class C), such as gratitude, shame, regret and pity.
- b) **Monologue and Dismissing the 'Self' Worldview.** Using monologue and dismissing the 'self' voice shows that the agent subjugates her worldview in front of others. Hence, it is conjectured that agent is not in control of the situation and she experiences negative controllability-based emotions (i.e. class C) against the 'other' such as the fear class of emotions.
- c) **Dialectic.** Using dialectic, the 'self' worldview and 'other' worldview both remain in the decision process and are being integrated and turned into another worldview that is consistent with the first worldviews. Hence, it is conjectured that the agent experiences both: (a) the emotion related to her type of rationality, and (b) controllability-based emotions,

because this person is not fully in control of reconciling the opposite worldviews to create the third voice.

- d) **Dialogue.** Using dialogue means that agent keeps both her own worldview and the opposing worldview and is being informed by the other's worldview and is being altered. Using dialogue, both the 'self' and 'other' opposing worldviews remain in the agent's mind, but they are informed by each other and may change over time. Hence, it is conjectured that using dialogue this person experiences the emotions that are generated from her rationality type. For example, if one is feeling pride, after involving in dialogue with the opposing worldview her affective state will not change as long as she holds the same rationality type.

In addition, we have mapped the mentioned reconciling approaches onto Weiner's (2010) attribution emotions, in order to see how the worldview aspect of *reason* is related with *emotion*, and how they both motivate/demotivate a decision. Here, to determine the opposing worldview we ask agents to reflect on their decision from the two standpoints of 'self' and 'other' and then we compare these self-reflections. This method of data collection will be accommodated in our questionnaire design in the next chapter, in order to consider person-environment interaction through Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism. Table 15 presents how *dialogue*, *monologue* and *dialectic* ignite certain emotions through the aggravating *controllability* of person over his/her destiny. In the following chapters we will find empirical support for these elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (see Chapter 5, Study 4).

Table 15: Emotion Generated from Reconciling Approaches

Reconciling Approach	Mechanism	Causal Dimension	Emotion
Monologue	Dismiss 'Self' worldview	Controllability	Class C & Fear
Monologue	Dismiss 'Other' worldview	Controllability	Class C & Fear
Dialogue	Keep both 'Self' and 'Other' worldviews, while they are informed by each other and are altered over time	Controllability	Emotion class of 'self'*
Dialectic	Integrated 'Self' and 'Other' worldviews into a new worldview that is consistent with both prior worldviews	Controllability	Class C & Emotion class of 'self' *

Note: Class C emotions are: Anger, Shame, Fear, Pity, Regret and Gratitude. * means that this emotion class may change when the rationality of 'self' changes in dialogue and dialectic

Phase 3: Feed Backward-Forward Loop

To understand the agency-freedom relationship in the model, so far we have developed the theoretical foundation and logical structure, showing what and how *affective* and *cognitive* modes of agency operate in the model, with respect to freedom. Now the question is how these factors that are generated at t1 influence the agent's subsequent decision at t2. According to planned behaviour studies (Ajzen, 2015) the relation between reason-emotion and decision is both *backward* and *forward*, because the emotion-reason that are generated in the *past* and are anticipated to occur in the *future* both influence agency outcome (decision) at t1. Hence, we call this relationship the Feed Backward-Forward Loop.

We develop the Feed Backward-Forward Loop in a way that our theory is able to explain what emotions and reasons have been involved in the agency outcome decision, and whether this decision conflicts with the agent's *values*, because our main argument is that such a decision is contracting her freedom. In this regard, the three sets of information need to be mapped together, which are: (a) the agent's rationality type that reveals the strength of her values and long-term goals; (b) the agent's reconciling approach when facing opposing worldview that reveals which of the 'self' or 'other' worldviews is stronger in her decision making; and (c) agent's *direct* and *perceived* emotions that are generated based on the controllability, stability, and locus of the attribution she assigns to her decision.

In order to map these three sets of information, we deduce 32 possible permutations of the *evaluation*, *standpoints*, *emotion* and their impact on one's decision based on logical reasoning (Table 17 and Table 18). In this line, Table 17 has all of the permutations in which the '**self**' worldview is the *dominating* worldview in discourse between the agent and her environment; and Table 18 covers all possible logical permutations where the '**other**' worldview is the dominating standpoint in the agent's discourse with her environment. To determine the agency-freedom relationship, the first three columns of Table 17 and Table 18 will be filled in by empirical data that agent provides through explaining her decision. The two final columns of Table 17 and Table 18 are filled in based on logical deduction (see Chapter 6, Case Study).

For example, the first row of Table 17 shows that the 'self' worldview is subjugating the 'other' worldview; the agent evaluates her state of being/doing as Beneficial Functioning; as a result the agent experiences pride; she may perceive that others evaluating her situation can experience pride, anger, envy or contempt towards her. This is because, her 'self' worldview subjugated the other's worldview, her values have not been conflicted by her decision, and consequently her freedom is not contradicted by her decision. For example, an employee who

decides to reject bribes in a corrupt environment is a possible candidate where her agency-freedom relationship regarding her decision to reject a bribe can match this row of Table 17.

As another example we explain the first row of Table 18 that implies the situations where the 'other' worldview is subjugating the 'self' worldview. In this situation, if she evaluates her state of being as Beneficial Functioning, this means that she has evaluated her situation as beneficial from the other's perspective but not internally; her agency outcome can conflict with her values, as she anticipates that others can feel anger towards her in the future. Here, we acknowledge the difference between internal-external situations. In this case, as her 'self' worldview is being subjugated by the 'other' opposing worldview, her agency outcome can conflict with her values and her freedom would be contracted. The example of this row could be the employee who decides to accept bribes in a corrupt society, even though being involved in bribery is against her personal moral values. Here, she has subjugated her worldview because she feels uncomfortable in society.

However, to arrive at these conclusions about the agent's level of freedom in Table 17 and Table 18, at first we need to indicate which of the 'self' and/or 'other' worldviews can potentially dominate the other one in cases of opposition. In this regard, to analyse each agency-outcome (decision) we need to collect information about these concepts from both the 'self' and 'other' perspectives, in order to identify the type of rationality and reconciling approach that agent is using. Further, from this information, we deduce what emotion is generated and which standpoint (i.e. 'self' or 'other') is stronger in her decision process. We summarise all the possible permutations of rationality types and reconciling approaches that determine the agent's dominating standpoint (i.e. 'self' or 'other') in Table 16.

As evidence, from the rationality type and reconciling approach we deduce 16 possible permutations that imply the importance of the 'self' or 'other' worldview in the final column of Table 16. For example, the second row of Table 16 shows that one has substantive rationality and uses monologue and dismisses the 'other' worldview, in this situation although she experiences the fear class of emotion (e.g. doubt), the strong standpoint in her decision process is the 'self'. For example, if an employee in a corrupt environment uses monologue and dismisses the worldview of others (i.e. involvement in bribery), then she lives according to her values, but it is possible that she experiences the fear type of emotions (e.g. doubt and anxiety). After identifying which standpoint is stronger in the agent's way of explaining her decision in

Table 16, then the result helps to decide whether we should use use Table 17 and Table 18 to see whether the agent's freedom is contracted as a result of exercising her agency (i.e. decision).

Here, there is a subtle point regarding the agency-freedom relationship. if the agent makes a decision that contradicts her values, then her positive freedom is definitely contracted, even though her negative freedom may be expanded in some ways. For example, comparing the decisions of Person A and Person B regarding bribery, Person B that accepts bribes is contradicting her values, her positive freedom is contracted, while her negative freedom may be expanded (e.g. the bribe expands her capability set). On the other hand, Person A that rejects bribes in line with her values, her positive freedom is expanded, while her negative freedom may be contradicted (e.g. she lacks the bribe and the capabilities it brings to her capability set). The following chapters try to determine the agency-freedom relationship on this basis that is established in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. In the empirical studies (Chapter 5) we try to find empirical support for these rationality types, reconciling approaches and emotions. Finally, the model of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency will be used to explain a case study that includes all aspects of this theory in Chapter 6.

Table 16: Identifying the Dominating Worldview

Rationality	Reconciling Approach	Result of Reconciliation	Attribution Related Emotion	Dominating Worldview
Substantive	Monologue	Dismiss 'Self'	Fear Emotion Class	Other*
Substantive	Monologue	Dismiss 'Other'	Fear Emotion Class	Self
Substantive	Dialogue	Evolving	Hope	Self
Substantive	Dialectic	Integrate worldviews	Hope	Self
Practical	Monologue	Dismiss 'Self'	Fear Emotion Class	Other
Practical	Monologue	Dismiss 'Other'	Fear Emotion Class	Self
Practical	Dialogue	Evolving	Hope	Self
Practical	Dialectic	Integrate Worldviews	Hope	Self
Formal	Monologue	Dismiss 'Self'	Fear Emotion Class	Other
Formal	Monologue	Dismiss 'Other'	Fear Emotion Class	Self
Formal	Dialogue	Evolving	Rationality-Driven Emotion	Other
Formal	Dialectic	Integrate Worldviews	Rationality-Driven Emotion	Other
Theoretical	Monologue	Dismiss 'Self'	Fear Emotion Class	Other
Theoretical	Monologue	Dismiss 'Other'	Fear Emotion Class	Self
Theoretical	Dialogue	Evolving	Rationality-Driven Emotion	Self
Theoretical	Dialectic	Integrate Worldviews	Rationality-Driven Emotion	Self

Note: * means that it may change in the long term depending on the strength of values.

Table 17 and Table 18 have the following characteristics to cover all permutations of the relations of the Affective-Cognitive-Conetive modes of agency in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency:

- ✓ Table 17 shows the emotion-reason and decision relationship in situations where the 'self' worldview is strong, which means the agent is using substantive and/or practical rationality and facing an opposing worldview she uses dialogue and dialectic.
- ✓ Table 18 shows the emotion-reason and decision relationship in situations where the 'other' worldview is strong, which means the agent is using formal and/or theoretical rationality and facing an opposing worldview she uses monologue.
- ✓ In both Table 17 and Table 18, instead of analysing success/failure, which are the focus of attribution studies, we analyse the state of being/doing based on two criteria: (a) whether the state of being is evaluated as *valuable* by personal and social parties (i.e. beneficial/adverse), and (b) whether one arrives at that state *volitionally* (i.e. functioning/commanding). These caveats result in four states of being/doing that are Beneficial-Functioning (BF), Adverse-Functioning (AF), Beneficial-Commanding (BC), and Adverse-Commanding (AC).
- ✓ In both Table 17 and Table 18, the minimum impact of decision on agency is identified. In other words, if at least one mode is contracted by the decision then we identify it as 'one mode is contracted'.
- ✓ In both Table 17 and Table 18, the impact of decision on both positive and negative modes of freedom is mentioned. If at least one sense (positive or negative) is expanded, then it is identified that freedom is expanded. If at least one sense is contracted, then it is identified that freedom is contracted.
- ✓ In both Table 17 and Table 18, delusional situations are excluded (e.g. someone cannot kill someone else and feel free).

- ✓ An example in Table 17: Imagine when Bill Gates decided to establish his charitable foundation, presumably he was volitionally making this decision, which puts him in the first row of Table 17, because he was following his values, experiencing *pride* because both he and others evaluated his state of being/doing as *beneficial-functioning*. Some people *admired* him and some *envy* him. The *contempt* and/or *anger* of some people did not force him to make a decision that conflicts with his values, and he had *substantive rationality* that is based on his values that hardly change.

Table 17: Relationship of Affective-Cognitive-Conative Modes of Agency with strong 'self'

Self	Direct Emotion	Other	Percieved Emotion	Value	Freedom	Agency
BF	Pride	BF	Pride-Admiration-Gratitude	Conduced	Expanded	All Modes Expanded
		AF	Anger-Indignation-Schadenfreude	Conduced	Expanded	One Mode Contracted
		BC	Envey	Conduced	Expanded	One Mode Contracted
		AC	Contempt-Scorn-Disgust-Sympathy	Conduced	Expanded	All Modes Contracted
AF	Guilt-Regret	BF	Pride-Admiration-Gratitude	Conflicted	Contracted	One Mode Contracted
		AF	Anger-Indignation-Schadenfreude	Conflicted	Contracted	One Mode Contracted
		BC	Envey	Conflicted	Contracted	One Mode Contracted
		AC	Contempt-Scorn-Disgust-Sympathy	Conflicted	Contracted	One Mode Contracted
BC	Pride	BF	Pride-Admiration-Gratitude	Conduced	Expanded	One Mode Contracted
		AF	Anger-Indignation-Schadenfreude	Conduced	Expanded	One Mode Contracted
		BC	Envey	Conduced	Expanded	One Mode Contracted
		AC	Contempt-Scorn-Disgust-Sympathy	Conduced	Expanded	One Mode Contracted
AC	Shame-Embarassment	BF	Pride-Admiration-	Conflicted	Contracted	One Mode Contracted

Gratitude				
AF	Anger- Indignation- Schadenfreude	Conflicted	Contracted	One Mode Contracted
BC	Envey	Conflicted	Contracted	One Mode Contracted
AC	Contempt- Scorn-Disgust- Sympathy	Conflicted	Contracted	All Modes Contracted

Table 18: Relationship of Affective-Cognitive-Conative Modes of Agency with strong 'Other'

Self	Direct Emotion	Other	Percieved Emotion	Value	Freedom	Agency
BF	Pride	BF	Pride-Admiration-Gratitude	Conduced	Expanded	All Modes Expanded
		AF	Anger-Indignation-Schadenfreude	Conflicted	Contracted	One Mode is Contracted
		BC	Enve	Conduced	Expanded	One Mode is Contracted
		AC	Contempt-Scorn-Disgust-Sympathy	Conflicted	Contracted	One Mode is Contracted
AF	Guilt-Regret	BF	Pride-Admiration-Gratitude	Conduced	Contracted	One Mode is Contracted
		AF	Anger-Indignation-Schadenfreude	Conflicted	Contracted	One Mode is Contracted
		BC	Envey	Conduced	Expanded	One Mode is Contracted
		AC	Contempt-Scorn-Disgust-Sympathy	Conflicted	Contracted	One Mode is Contracted
BC	Pride	BF	Pride-Admiration-Gratitude	Conduced	Expanded	One Mode is Contracted
		AF	Anger-Indignation-Schadenfreude	Conflicted	Contracted	One Mode is Contracted
		BC	Envy	Conduced	Expanded	One Mode is Contracted
		AC	Contempt-Scorn-Disgust-Sympathy	Conflicted	Contracted	One Mode is Contracted
AC	Shame-Embarassment	BF	Pride-Admiration-Gratitude	Conduced	Contracted	One Mode is Contracted

AF	Anger- Indignation- Schadenfreude	Conflicted	Contracted	One Model Contracted
BC	Envey	Unviolated	Contracted	One Mode is Contracted
AC	Contempt- Scorn-Disgust- Sympathy	Conflicted	Contracted	All Modes are Contracted

The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency: The Complete Model

Figure 20 presents the final version of the model that is developed in this chapter, which is the centre of determining the agency-freedom relationship in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. It presents all of the developmental aspects of this chapter in three phases of (1) Capability Realisation, (2) Evaluation, and (3) the Feed Back-Forward Loop. So far, we have explained how Capability Realisation operates in the model. Here the *affective* and *rational* sides of agency are visualised in the Evaluation and Feed Backward-Forward parts of the model (Figure 20). The elements of the model that are emotional based, are in the feedback loop where one's evaluation of her current state (Nodes E1, E2, E3) influence her subsequent decision (Node A, B1, B2, D1, D2), through the direct and perceived *emotion* generated from her evaluation (Node E3). The association between the "*rationality type*" part of reason and *emotion* is presented at Node F. The relation between the "*worldview*" part of reason and *emotion* is presented at Node G.

It is worth mentioning, however, E3a is proximal but E3b is distal from the agent due to the relative detachment from the agent. E3a is proximal to E1 and E2 because it represents the direct emotions (the emotions the agent feels are in her affective domain). E3b is distal to the agent so it is located far from E1, E2, because it presents the emotions that the agent perceives and they are in her cognitive domain. The four types of *reconciling worldview* and *rationality types* are presented in the Feed Backward-Forward Loop of the model, and the arrows leading from them feed into both the rational and emotion box. This is according to the logical link between reason and emotion that has been established in the previous section (see Table 16, Table 17 and Table 18). The reason and emotion that are generated from the Evaluation Phase feeds in two black boxes and their analysis is beyond the scope of this research. However, the outcome of the emotion and rational boxes feeds into the agency-outcome (i.e. decision), which is in line with our philosophical position (see 'empirical' domain in Chapter 3, Methodology).

The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency traces the impact of these emotions and reasons on the decision object (i.e. capability set) at Node J. The arrow from the decision object to the Capability Realisation phase is **dotted**, in order to show the passage of *time* and the temporal aspect of analysis at Node A. In addition to Figure 20, Table 19 presents the genotype (i.e. a group of elements having similar constructs) and phenotype (i.e. the observable construction of the elements) of the model. Further, Figure 21 presents the time sequence of the model's elements. In the following chapters we try to find empirical support for both the reason and emotion side of the theory. We use surveys and interviews to empirically develop the Tri-Modal

Theory of Agency, and then we apply this theory to a case study to determine the relationship between agency and freedom.

Figure 20: The Tri-Model Theory of Agency (Complete Core Model)





Table 19: Genotype-Phenotype of the Model

Element	Genotype of Cell	Phenotype of Agent
Node A	Influenced by affect and rational, personal cost-benefit analysis of capabilities based on: The senses of value and volition decision maker's emotions and values	Agent categorises Capabilities in two sets: Desired: Capabilities that are both valuable and volitional Un-Desired: Capabilities that are either non-valuable or non-volitional
Node B1	Limited desired capabilities based on the rational core constraints of the model: Logical Physical Axiological	Agent is coerced to categorise Desired Capabilities in two sets: Realisable Desired: desired capabilities that are achievable Un-realisable Desired: Desired capabilities that are not achievable due to constraints.
Node B2	Limited non-desired capabilities based on the rational core constraints of the model: Logical Physical Axiological	Agent is coerced to categorise non-desired capabilities in two sets: Realisable Un-Desired: Un-desired capabilities that are achievable Un-realisable Un-Desired: Undesired capabilities that are not achievable due to constraints.
Node C	Accidental properties of realising a capability. Flow unintentionally Unintended consequences of desiring something Not the purpose and focus of the decision	Agent aims to reach a desired state and in parallel unintended consequences occur as the accidentals of desiring something.
Node D1	Choosing a desired and realisable capability, and in this decision: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sense of value is evaluated from two sides of personal and social • Sense of commanding is evaluated from two sides of personal and source of authority • Volitional choice is possible • Decision maker is conscious • Side-effects are generated 	Agent is free from any force or source of authority and volitionally chooses a capability that has both personal and social value. This leads her to the "Beneficial Functioning" state.
Node D2	Choosing an undesired and	Agent chooses:

	<p>realisable capability. This decision has following genotypes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sense of value is evaluated from two sides of personal and social • Sense of commanding is evaluated from two side of personal and source of authority • This is not a volitional choice <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decision maker is not conscious • Side-effects are generated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A capability with personal value, without social value, without being coerced. This leads her to “Adverse Functioning” State. • A capability without personal and social value, but being coerced. This leads her to “Adverse Commanding” state. • A capability without personal value, with social value, with being coerced. This leads her to “Beneficial Commanding”.
Node E1	At S1, evaluating state of being/doing, using certain “rationality type” based on her values, goal and principles.	Making a decision, the agent evaluates her then state of being/doing, using substantive, practical, formal and/or theoretical rationalities.
Node E2	At S1, evaluating state of being/doing, encountering the opposite worldview of ‘others’, makes the decision maker deal with the opposite worldview and the strength of her own worldview is being tested.	Making a decision, the agent evaluates her state of being/doing, but if she encounters an opposite worldview, she must use a reconciling approach of dialogue, monologue, or dialectic to integrate her own (i.e. ‘self’) and the other’s worldviews. This situation shows the strength of her worldview in front of the other’s worldview.
Node E3 (a & b)	At S1, evaluating state of being/doing, from dual worldviews of ‘self’ (E3a) and ‘other’ (E3b), attribution emotions are generated that influence the subsequent decision (i.e. Des1).	Making a decision, the agent evaluates her state of being/doing from dual worldviews of ‘self’ and ‘other’. This generates self-directed and perceived emotions that are combined (in the emotion black box) and result in influential emotion on decision making.
Node F	At S1, using a certain rationality type shows the strength, locus and stability of decision maker’s values, goals and principals.	The type of rationality the agent uses to make a decision shows the quality and strength of her rationale. If the agent uses: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ‘Substantive Rationality’, then her values and long-term goals are internal, stable and controllable. • ‘Formal Rationality’, then her values and goals are external, unstable, and uncontrollable.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Practical Rationality', then her values and goals are internal, unstable and controllable. • 'Theoretical Rationality', then her values and goals are external, controllable and unstable.
Node G	At S1, facing the opposite worldview tests the strength of the 'self' worldview in decision making.	<p>The way one deals with the opposite worldview shows the strength of her view.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If one uses monologue and dismisses the agent's own worldview, then her 'self' worldview is weaker than the other's. • If one uses dialogue and dismisses the other's worldview, then her 'self' worldview is not strong enough to deal with the opposition. uses dialogue and being informed and keeps the opposite worldview, then her 'self' worldview is strong enough to accept the existence of multiple worldviews. • If one uses dialectic and takes into account the opposite worldview in her decision, then her 'self' worldview is strong enough to deal with the opposition.
Node H	The self-directed emotions, the other's perceived emotions, rationality-oriented emotions, worldview-oriented emotions are combined and result in an emotion that influences decision.	The agent feels certain emotion after evaluating her decision.
Node I	Type of rationality and reconciling opposite worldviews set the rationale of the decision maker.	The agent makes a decision based on her rationale that is combined of her values, goals and principles that are developed after facing opposite worldviews.
Node J	The agent's <i>rationale</i> and <i>affect</i> face each other and the strong one wins the decision. If the result decision contradicts agent's values then her freedom is contracted to the same extent.	The agent evaluates her state of being/doing at S1, from the 'self' and 'other; worldviews. This results in certain emotions. Meanwhile, she is using her values and dealing with an opposite worldview (if one exists) and this result in her rationale.

Figure 21: Time Sequence of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in the model



Detecting Rationalisation


To determine the agency-freedom relationship, this study is measuring agentic-factors from the two standpoints of 'self' and 'other' as presented in Figure 22. In this way, we can detect whether an agent is exercising 'rationalisation'. The present study defines 'rationalisation' as *substituting the real reason of a decision with a comfortable and unsound reason* in two conditions. One condition of 'rationalisation' is when the agent has made a decision due to *emotional* intentions and she is substituting the actual motive with a rational reason when self-reflecting on her decision behaviour. For example, imagine Person A has chosen to study art at a particular university even though she is not interested in art and the actual reason behind her decision is that her friends are going to the same university doing art. In this case, it is possible that Person A substitutes the real reason that is emotional with a rational reason when she explains why she has made that decision. In this line, several studies (Mazar et al., 2008; Rohr et al., 2015) have shown that people are prone to attribute a comfortable reason instead of reporting their emotional motives to protect their self-esteem. To address this issue, in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency the reasons behind a decision are measured with the same set of scales two times from the two perspectives of 'self' and 'other'. Studies show that helping people to self-reflect on their behaviour contributes to the internal validity of self-report data collection methods (Duke et al., 2015). Further, having two worldviews on one issue helps to facilitate self-distancing in self-reflection (White et al., 2015). This helps to measure the within-person variation to which research (Ashkanasy, 2013) shows studies on emotion need to pay further attention. Hence, through analysing the mismatches between the agent's 'self' and 'other' worldviews on a similar construct we can identify unsound reasons (i.e. 'rationalisation'). For example, if Person A answers the same question about her university major selection once from her 'self' and another time from the other's (e.g. her parent's) worldview, then it is possible that she reports two contradictory reasons. For instance, in this case 'self' worldview could be that "I chose it because I liked this major", whereas the 'other's' worldview could be "my parents think that I chose it only because my friends are doing this major". The mentioned opposing 'self' and 'other' worldviews can help us to indicate whether there is any emotional reason involved in her decision through further qualitative analysis of the agency outcome.

In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, the second condition for 'rationalisation' is when an agent does not truly understand the intention behind her behaviour and she offers a comfortable reason to make sense of her course of action. This type of 'rationalisation' has been emphasised in various fields of 'sociology' (Weber, 1993), psychology (Baynes, 2015) and neuroscience (Solms and Leuzinger-Bohleber, 2016). Supporting this statement, neuroscientists

(Clark, 2015) have shown that there is a large body of human behaviour that is not within her control and one is not conscious and aware of. Meanwhile, psychologists (Baynes, 2015) refer to human unconsciousness to explain such behaviours. In this line, Weber (1993) in his 'Basic Concepts in Sociology' underlines that any 'meaningful' course of behaviour has *emotional* and/or *rational* intention, whether or not the people involved *understand* the meaning of it. Weber further argues that although the line between 'meaningful' and 'responsive' behaviours is blurred, the aim of social enquiry must be to stay objectively detached from the research subject while shedding light on the true intentions behind social behaviours. For example, although it may not be possible to determine the actual agency-freedom relationship of an agent who determines a counterintuitive or incontinent decision, research can find some reliable reasons that are true for their relationship in different contexts. Weber says that this aim is possible by gaining knowledge of the whole social situation around that behaviour to determine the intentions behind meaningful behaviours.

In this vein, this study aims to determine the agency-freedom relationship by analysing a meaningful behaviour, i.e., important decisions an individual makes in her life (e.g. career choice, university major selection, etc.) with respect to all three modes of agency (i.e. affective, cognitive and conative). Hence, in order to gain a comprehensive knowledge about these three modes, in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we have collected data on *affective* and *rational* reasons behind one's decision from the two standpoints of 'self' and 'other'. As presented in Figure 22, these affective and cognitive modes of agency can acquire different values as different individuals experience countervailing emotions and believe in different values (Bukowski et al., 2016). In the following chapters that we develop the empirical side of the theory, we consider this dual worldview (i.e. 'self' and 'other') to determine the agency-freedom relationship with careful attention to detecting 'rationalisation' in an agent's self-reflections on her decision.

Figure 22: Dual Worldviews of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency



Chapter Summary

This chapter has developed a model that is the core of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency upon a capability-based decision model initially proposed by Yorulmaz and Khan (2008a). The early decision model has two parts of the Logical Core that is about logical constraints, and an Affective Shell that is about what factors influence decision and how. This chapter develops and expands that early decision model towards the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in a way that (a) explains cognitive, conative and affective modes of agency with respect to freedom, (b) measures agency with respect to both the positive and negative sides of freedom, and (c) determines how agency and freedom are related.

In order to determine the *agentive factors*, the present chapter has developed the early model's Affective Shell in three following phases. The first phase is Capability Realisation that identifies how an agent chooses a capability from her opportunity set. In this line, we have identified how an opportunity is selected based using the principles of logical set theory; how an opportunity is assessed by the agent based on Desirability and Realisable criteria; and how an agent's decision process continues over *time* with a focus on the unintentional consequences of her decision. In the second phase this chapter has developed the Evaluation part of the model that identifies how *emotion* and *reason* are generated and how they influence an agent's next decision. Finally, in the third phase this chapter has identified how emotion and reason feed backward and/or forward into the agent's decision trajectories (i.e. established the relationship of affective, cognitive, and conative modes of agency). The cognitive mode is developed based on Weber's (1993) rationality types; the conative mode based on Sen's (1999) capability approach and Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism and their relationship is established with the affective mode of agency through Weiner's (2010) theory of attribution emotion. These phases provide a theoretical foundation to address the research questions by determining the *factors* and *mechanisms* that determine the agency-freedom relationship based on logical deduction and the knowledge accumulated in other theory. In the following chapters we test and develop these elements empirically.

Chapter 5: Data Collection, Findings, and Analysis

Introduction

The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has been developed theoretically in the previous chapter and this chapter presents its empirical development and amendment. Table 20 presents an overview of this chapter in four studies that altogether: (A) explain *cognitive*, *conative* and *affective* modes of agency with respect to freedom; (B) measures agency with respect to both positive and negative sides of freedom; and (C) determines how agency and freedom are related. In summary, this chapter presents the following four studies:

- I. **The first study** is a “qualitative development” that is administered through conducting seven extensive in-depth interviews based on the main elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. As a result, the first version of the Evaluation Instrument is developed, that is a research instrument for addressing the first research question that is *determining the agency-oriented factors associated with freedom*. The philosophical logic to develop the first version of the Evaluation Instrument has been firstly deductive, when we test the elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in interviews (see interview results in Study 1), and secondly inductive when we work with data to find generalisable themes about agency-oriented factors (see thematic analysis and design of the Evaluation Instrument in Study 1).
- II. **The second study** is a “quantitative development” of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency through conducting an online survey via SurveyMonkey, analysing the “career choice” of personal tutors. Of 12,160 personal tutors in 450 rural and urban areas in Iran, 1,260 respondents have filled in the 1st version of the Evaluation Instrument online; 1063 valid responses were obtained. As a result of factor analysis the 1st version is revised into the 2nd version of the Evaluation Instrument. The philosophical logic to develop the 2nd Evaluation Instrument has firstly been deductive when we test the first version, and then inductive when we run EFA to extract a concise number of factors that particularly represent the cognitive and conative modes of agency-oriented factors.
- III. **The third study** is a “quantitative amendment” of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency through conducting another survey with a focus on the “university major selection” of students. This survey was also administered online through SurveyMonkey. The 2nd version of the Evaluation Instrument is used. Data were collected from the 455,897 cohort of students in 450 rural and urban areas in Iran. We have managed to collect 4,260 responses, among which 4,086 valid responses were obtained. As a result of factor analysis, the questionnaire is revised in to the 3rd version of the Evaluation Instrument. This research instrument is developed to accomplish the first research objective that is *determining the agency-oriented*

factors associated with freedom. The logical philosophy in Study 3 is similar to Study 2 with one difference that at the end of Study 3, we use Weber's (1993) theory of rationality types to explain the findings. Hence, the final round of analysis in this study is abductive.

IV. **The fourth study:** identifies the affective mode of agency, reconciling approach and rationality type as well as the link between three modes of agency (cognitive, conative and affective) in order to address the second research objective, which is *establishing the implication of agency-oriented factors for the expansion/contraction of the agent's freedom*. The 4th study has two following parts:

- a. **(Part 1)** is the second round of the “qualitative development” of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency through conducting extensive in-depth interviews with 10 students, who had participated in the second survey. As a result, empirical evidence for the affective side of agency, reconciling approaches, and rationality types are collected and the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is developed by empirical data. Here, we use deduction when we test the agency-oriented factors of the Evaluation Instrument, then we use induction when we work in the data to identify the affective mode of agency oriented factors, and worldviews, and finally we use abduction when we use Weiner's (2010) attribution theory of motivation to explain the affective mode and Bakhtin's (2010) dialogic theory to explain the worldviews.
- b. **(Part 2)** is a “qualitative amendment” of the Tri-Modal Theory of agency through conducting extensive in-depth interviews with four individuals about four different life-changing decisions (i.e. migration, devoting wealth, not migrating, and keeping up a start-up business after failure). Due to the generic aspect of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, the participants in this study were not necessarily from the host organisation of the first four studies. Part 2 of Study 4 has two main results. First, it is established how freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors. (i.e., second objectives achieved). Second, its results help to develop a case study methodology to apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency on different agency-outcomes. The next chapter uses this case study methodology and develops M. G's case study as a complete application of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. The philosophical logic that we have used in this study is the same as that of the first part of Study 4.

Table 20: Data Collection and Analysis, and Finding Chapter Overview

S	Method	RQ	N	Participants	Focal Decision	Mode	Before Analysis	Analysis Technique	Analysis Outcome
1	Interview (2013)	RQ. 1	7	Personal Tutors	Career Choice	Skype	Elements of Tri-Modal Theory of Agency	Thematic Analysis Coding	11 Themes of Agentic Factors (1 st Evaluation Instrument)
2	Survey (2014)	RQ. 1	1063	Personal Tutors	Career Choice	Online (Survey Monkey)	11 Themes (1 st Framework)	EFA, CFA	8 Themes of includes 10 'Self' & 11 'Other' Agentic Factors (2 nd Evaluation Instrument)
3	Survey (2015)	RQ. 1	4086	Students	University Major Selection	Online (Survey Monkey)	8 Themes (2 nd Framework)	EFA, CFA	8'Self' Factor & 9'Other' Agentic Factors; Mapped to Weber's Rationality Types (3 rd Evaluation Instrument)
4. p1	Interview (2015)	RQ. 1&2	10	Students	University Major Selection	Telephone	8-'Self' and 9-'Other' Evaluation Instrument	Thematic Analysis, Coding	Map 3 rd Evaluation Instrument to Reconciling Approaches, Rationality Types and Emotions. Link freedom to agency.
4. p2	Interview (2016)	RQ. 1&2	4	Musician, entrepreneur, IT specialist, manager.	Migration; Starting business; Wealth devotion.	Face to Face	8-'Self' and 9-'Other' Evaluation Instrument	Thematic Analysis, Coding	

Note: Research Question1 (RQ1) is "What factors influence one's agency to do/be what she values?"; RQ2 is "What is the implication of agency-oriented factors for the expansion/contraction of the agent's freedom?"; Focal Decision is the decision under study in that research; EFA Explanatory Factor Analysis that is calculated using SPSS; Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is analysed using Lisrel.8 on Dell Latitude E747. S stands for Study.

Study 1: Qualitative Development (1st Round)

Study 1 is the first step to empirically develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, conducted in August 2013, focusing on the first research objective that is to *identify the agency-oriented factors associated with freedom*. This study focuses on “career choice” as the focal decision. Via Skype we have conducted extensive in-depth interviews with seven personal tutors. Before conducting interviews, the questions were sent to the participants and the interviews were conducted based on the answers that participants had already provided to the questions. According to Baggio et al. (2014) this method helps respondents to engage in the interview. To consider ethical issues (Slade and Prinsloo, 2013), we made sure about the voluntary participation, informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality of the result. With respect to the above-mentioned ethical issues, we recorded the interviews. In order to analyse the data, the researcher carefully listened to the recorded interviews twice; during the first time the repeated themes were identified, and in the second time the participant’s answers to each question were transcribed word by word, in order to make sure that everything was collected thoroughly. According to Bartlett (2012) this method improves the measurement accuracy of qualitative analysis. The interviews are conducted in Farsi. The data were initially transcribed in Farsi then translated into English. To confirm accurate translation, data were translated back from English to Farsi. The following sections present our sampling approach, measurement scales, data analysis technique, results and the result interpretation of the first study.

Study 1: Sample

All seven participants were personal tutors for more than one year in the host organisation. To recruit volunteer participants, the research aim and rationale were announced on the organisation’s official website and they were asked to send us their information if they were interested in participating in the interviews (see Appendix 2). After one week, 10 personal tutors sent us emails, showing interest in being interviewed about their “career choice”. Among these 10 personal tutors we managed to conduct interviews with seven, particularly due to technical difficulties in connecting with rural areas in Iran through Skype. This is because the government restricts internet bandwidth (Morozov, 2012). As presented in Table 2, three participants are from Tehran and the rest are living in other cities around the country. The sample is diverse regarding the age, gender, university major and participant’s evaluation regarding the “desirable” and “realisable” aspects of their “career choice”. The participants’ self evaluation of their “career choice” after making the decision is indicated in the last two columns of

Table

21.

Table 21: Participants in Study 1

ID	Age	Gender	From	Tenure	University major	Desirable	Realizable
B.K	40	M	Tehran	5	Education	Beneficial	Functioning
M.B	26	M	Dehdasht	6	Electronic Engineering	Beneficial	Functioning
M.F	29	F	Orumiye	3	Physics	Beneficial	Commanding
N.M	21	F	Tehran	4	Industrial Engineering	Adverse	Functioning
N.L	20	F	Sarab	2	Nursery	Beneficial	Functioning
S.S	33	F	Tabriz	3	Accounting	Adverse	Commanding
S.R	27	F	Arak	4	Agricultural Engineering	Adverse	Commanding

Note: the Desirable and Realizable aspects are assessing the participants' state of being/doing after their career choice, based on the assessment criteria mentioned in Chapter 4, Theory Development.

Study 1: Measurements (Interview Questions)

As the first empirical step to determine *what factors influence one's agency to do/be what she values* (RQ1), seven extensive in-depth interviews were conducted on the main aspects of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, which are *desirability, realisability, side-effect, environment, capabilities, state of being/doing*, and *emotion* aspects of the agency-freedom relationship (Figure 23). Accordingly, Table 22 shows 52 questions designed based on the theoretical foundation of these seven elements. These questions were sent to the participants prior to the interviews. Following is a summary of their theoretical background (see Chapter 4, Theory Development, for more detail):

- I. **Desirability** is freedom aspect of agency that is a *value-laden* and *multilevel* criterion of capability realisation that includes the *volitional* aspect of decision making. The items of this construct are developed based on Berlin's (1958) view on *value* and *volition*.
- II. **Realisability** is a constraint-laden criterion of capability realisation that includes *universal* and *personal* constraints that are located in the Logical Core of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. The items of this construct are developed based on decision constraints in Sen's (1999) Capability Approach (CA), as well as the basics of logical and physical possibility.
- III. **Environment** refers to the external aspect of limitations on agency with a focus on the role of institutions and opposing worldviews. The items of this construct are designed based on Weber's (1993) rationality types and Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism.
- IV. **State of Being and Doing** focuses on the process-outcome notion of the agency-freedom relationship that is built upon the capability-functioning distinction in Sen's (1999) CA that says both endpoint and process matter when investigating freedom and agency.
- V. **Emotion** is the affective aspect of agency and its items are developed based on Weiner's (2010) attribution theory of motivation.
- VI. **Side Effect** is about the temporal nature of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that considers the consequential of decisions on one's life trajectory in terms of freedom and agency.
- VII. **Capability** is the options an agent potentially has and how they can flourish into the state of being/doing.

Figure 23: Interview Questions based on the Elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency




Table 22: Interview Questions

Interview Questions on six elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency

Desirability (Volition)

Did you choose to be a personal tutor as your first preference?
What were your other alternatives and why did you not choose them?
Did you feel any limitation when you were deciding to work as a personal tutor?

Desirability (Value)

Do you think being a personal tutor in this organisation is beneficial to your career life?
Do you think being a personal tutor in this organisation is beneficial to your personal life?
Do you think being a personal tutor in this organisation will help you achieve your life ambitions?

Realisability

Did you have any other preferable job alternatives but becoming a personal tutor prevented you from actualising that choice?
Were you limited in any way by any longstanding illness, disability, infirmity, or mental health problem to choose to become a personal tutor rather than your other more preferred job?
Did you face any environmental difficulty (e.g. another preferable job was far from you and you could not travel there on a regular basis) when you were deciding to become a personal tutor?
Could you say that you have chosen to become a personal tutor, because you had physical constraints that did not allow you to choose what you like the most?
Did you choose to become a personal tutor because of financial reasons?
Did you have any preferable job alternative that you could not choose it because you lacked the required skills and experience?
Did you have all of the requirements to choose the job that you preferred the most?
Could you say that one of the reasons that you have chosen to become a personal tutor is because you could not choose your most preferred jobs, as you did not have enough requirements?
Did you have any preferable job alternative that you could not choose because it was against your beliefs?
Did you have any preferable job alternative that you did not choose because it was against your religious beliefs?
Did you have any preferable job alternative that you did not choose but your explanation is not convincing for others who have different personal beliefs about religious, tradition or ethical issues?
Could you say that one of the reasons that you have become a personal tutor is the rules and beliefs that you set for yourself?

Side Effects

While making decisions, did any accident happen that prevented you from choosing another job that you had preferred more than the job of personal tutor?

Did the consequence of your previous decisions prevent you from choosing another job (decisions such as choosing your university major, or decision to move to another city)?

Environment

Which of the following institutions always had a great influence on your decisions, and particularly your choice of becoming a personal tutor (e.g. legal, religious, cultural, political, economic, social, organisational, professional, or other)?

How did this institution affect you to choose to become a personal tutor?

In this institution, with which social group do you identify with?

What common factors can you see between yourself and other members of this group that allows you to align with this social group?

How does your decision to become a personal tutor contribute to your relative position within this social group that you are influenced by?

How important was your social group in your decision to become a personal tutor?

Is there any social group in your life that would disapprove of your decision to become a personal tutor?

How did their evaluation influence your decision to become a personal tutor?

State of being/doing

What other alternatives did you have, when you were choosing to become a personal tutor?

Would you feel differently, if you had chosen your second most preferable alternative that you had when you decided to become a personal tutor?

How differently would the social group that you identify with have responded if you had chosen your second most preferable alternative?

Emotion

What did you feel when this organisation accepted you as a personal tutor and you were to choose to work in this role? (rank the highest 5 and the lowest 1) (Anger, Happiness, Hope, Hopelessness, Gratitude, Shame, Regret, Surprise, Happiness, Sadness, other)

Why did you choose to become a personal tutor? (Rank the lowest 1, and the highest 5, and explain)

Do you say that "I become a personal tutor because...?"

of my family.

of my friends.

of my social group.

of my university.

other employers rejected me.

I put effort into it.

I have studied hard in the past.

have not tried enough to find another job.

I have not studied enough in the past.

I was not persistent enough for other jobs.

I was not able enough for other jobs.

my abilities and talents.

I could not do another job.

my abilities matched the job requirements.

this job's tasks match with my IQ level.

I was not lucky enough to find another job.

I was lucky.

other luckier people choose this job.

accident.

I found about it out of luck.

Please rank the following reasons based on their influence on your decision to become a personal tutor:

Ability, Effort, Others, Luck.

Study 1: Analysis (Thematic Analysis and Coding)

The qualitative content analysis used in Study 1 is presented in Table 23. This is based on Zhang and Wildemuths' (2010) guidelines for analysing qualitative content and Braun and Clarke (2006) following six phases of thematic analysis: (A) familiarising with data, (B) generating initial codes, (C) searching for themes among codes, (D) reviewing themes, (E) defining and naming themes, (F) producing a final report that maps themes to research aims and objectives. As a result, the following 11 Themes are generated that present cognitive, conative and affective modes of agency with respect to freedom.

Table 23: Qualitative Content Analysis Criteria of Study 1

Qualitative Analysis	Content
Procedure	Interview
Data preparation	<p>Designing interview questions based on the five constructs of the agency-freedom relationship in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.</p> <p>Transcribing data word by word in Farsi then into English. The data is translated back to confirm accurate translation.</p> <p>Collecting similar parts in categories.</p>
Define unit of analysis	<p>Searching for the expressions of an idea.</p> <p>Searching for similar ideas.</p>
Develop categories / coding schema	<p>Developing new coding generated based on the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.</p> <p>Coding of 'Freedom Awareness' for the conative mode of agency based on Berlin's (1969) definition of freedom.</p> <p>Coding of 'Impact of Commodities' for the conative mode of agency based on Sen's (1999) CA.</p> <p>Coding of 'Teleological Reasoning', 'Causal Reasoning', 'Correlational Reasoning', 'Logical Reasoning', 'Impact of Third-party Evaluation', 'Impact of First Party Evaluation', and 'Ontology of Attribution' for the cognitive mode of agency based on Weber's (1993) practical and substantive rationality.</p> <p>Coding of 'Impact of Affective State' and 'Awareness of Affective State' for the affective mode of agency based on Weiner's (2010) Attribution Theory of Motivation.</p>
Test coding schema	<p>Checking the text for coding.</p> <p>Revising coding and checking the coding consistency.</p> <p>Identifying pair themes.</p>
Coding all the text	<p>Adding new themes to coding.</p> <p>Combining similar codes.</p>
Assess the coding consistency	<p>Rechecking the coding 15 times by researcher and colleagues.</p> <p>Checking the reliability of coding.</p> <p>Linking related literature to each theme.</p>
Draw conclusion	<p>Identifying relationships within categories.</p> <p>Generating Themes from the coding result.</p> <p>Measuring each theme from 'Self' and 'Other' perspectives.</p> <p>'Self' standpoint: Agent's self-reflection on her own decision.</p> <p>Other standpoint: Agent's self-reflection on other's evaluation of her decision.</p> <p>Designing the 1st version of the Evaluation Instrument based on Themes.</p>

Study 1: Result (11 Themes)

The result of the thematic analysis is 11 themes (coding detail is available in Appendix 1). The *cognitive* mode of agency is coded by seven themes of 'Logical Reasoning', 'Teleological Reasoning', 'Casual Reasoning', 'Correlational Reasoning', 'First Party Evaluation', 'Third Party Evaluation', and 'Ontology of Attribution'. The *conative* mode of agency is coded by two themes of 'Freedom Awareness' and 'Impact of Commodities'. Finally, the *affective* mode of agency is coded by two themes of 'Impact of Affective State' and 'Awareness of Affective State'. Table 24 presents the coding result with reference to the evidence from the interviews. These findings accomplish the first three phases of the Braun and Clarke (2006) thematic analysis (i.e. (A) familiarising with data, (B) generating initial codes, and (C) searching for themes among codes). The following sections will present the results of the remaining two steps that are: (D) reviewing themes, (E) defining and naming themes. At the end of Study 1, we present the final step of thematic analysis (i.e. (F) producing a final report that maps themes to research aims and objectives) in the Result interpretation section.

Table 24: Reviewing, Defining and Naming Themes

Theme	Definition	Direct Evidence
Freedom Awareness	Agent over/under estimates her freedom, implying that sometimes the two concepts of 'agency' and 'freedom' are misused for each other.	<p>M.F: "I had freedom of choice between my options, I didn't have many options. There was no force on me from my family to choose between the options I had."</p> <hr/> <p>S.R: "This organisation provided a job opportunity that may not be the best option, but it is good for many. They feel satisfied, as they think that at least they have somewhere to go as an office. The thing is that they are educated but they could not find a job in their own major."</p> <hr/> <p>N.M: "I was thinking that it is better not to migrate at that time, as I was funded to my family and I liked Iran. I could not leave my belongings. External things put shadow on my first two choices and forced me to go for the third or fourth option; but this choice is still my priority." "The greatest limitation after becoming personal tutor was that I could not study for a PhD, which was my best alternative."</p> <hr/> <p>M.B: "It is true that my ideal was to become a professor at Stanford University, but the situation would not let me to do that. I cannot fight with all of the things around me, so I am pushed to make this decision. Saying that I am forced, well, it is not a right word; I want to say that because of the situation I made another decision, but still I freely made this decision."</p>
Ontology of Attribution	Agent provides contradictory reasons for her decisions.	<p>M.F: "They interviewed me for this job. So it could be because of effort that I became a personal tutor. But, actually none of these things such as luck, family or effort was the reason behind my decision. I found this job by accident, because I was looking for a job. It could be because of my city and lack of sufficient job opportunities."</p> <hr/> <p>N.M: "Ability and wisdom are more important than effort for this job. "To be hired I did not make any effort. After the interview I was easily accepted as a personal tutor." "As Islam says, 'one minute's thinking is much better than years of praying'. It means that you must first think then try. This is true about my decision as well. First I thought about what I wanted, then I put in the effort. I do not say luck; I say God's will."</p>

Teleological Reasoning	Agent assigns the reason of her decision to a state/event in future.	<p>S.S: "I was not thinking about the future at the beginning and I wanted to do my job in the best way, but from the second year I decided to progress in my job."</p> <hr/> <p>S.R: "Honestly speaking, I could not achieve what I wanted financially and professionally in this job."</p> <hr/> <p>N.M: "I always wanted to prepare myself for a big managerial role." "I was thinking that I would have job security in this organisation."</p> <hr/> <p>N.L: "When I was accepted into university, I was thinking that it is the time to practice what I was thinking about in the past and to become a personal tutor."</p> <hr/> <p>M.B: "I was feeling that this job did not have a good future." "I had this dream, something like a fairy tale wish of establishing my own educational institution one day."</p>
Causal Reasoning	Agent assigns the reason of her decision to a state/event in past.	<p>S.S: "If I took this organisation's exams when I was a student, I might have chosen a major in university that I have liked and I would have worked in it." "About four years ago I was an accountant in our family firm. At that time, I wanted to start a job that has innovation in it, because accountancy is a routine job and you do some repetitive tasks every day."</p> <hr/> <p>M.G: "I have some belongings that I could not leave them and leave for another country." "When I was doing my undergrads, I was thinking about working in the scholarship section of this organisation in my city, because I used to use this organisation's scholarship when I was a student myself."</p>
Logical Reasoning	These themes refer to the line of reasoning that is	<p>M.F: "I tried to find a job to earn some money while having some free time to study. I tried to achieve it. I was not making a decision."</p>

	<p>not logically sound, or refer to anti-realist thinking, or a flawed reasoning (see Chapter 3, Methodology).</p>	<p>S.R: “I didn’t make a good decision, because when I was making this decision, I was too young, only 19 years old and I was thinking that I was making a right choice.” “I never thought that I was making a wrong choice.”</p> <hr/> <p>M.B: “At that time, I freely made this decision to stay and not leave my belongings. Now I can change myself into another person and forget about my family and leave the country.”</p>
<p>Third-Party Evaluation</p>	<p>Agent assigns the reason of her decision to a third party; a source external to the agent.</p>	<p>S.R: “I was never thinking that I would become unemployed and doing a job that no one regards as a real job.”</p> <hr/> <p>M.F: “In my friends’ jobs like teaching in a private university in our city, you do not have so much freedom. In that job I had to do favours to some special students’ in scoring their exam. I left the job because I did not see this as a good thing to do. So I did resign and did not go there any more, while my friends stayed there. They had no problem with such a thing!”</p> <hr/> <p>S.S: “When I was in high school, I did not participate in this organisation’s exams, despite my family’s pressure to attend at least two exams. Unfortunately, I was lazy at that time and I did not go.”</p> <hr/> <p>S.R: “At the beginning, my father did not like me to study an agricultural major in university, but he had no objection to me choosing the role of a personal tutor in this organisation. After my father, it is my husband who has no objection against me working in this organisation and he supports me financially”. “When I say that I have a degree in agriculture engineering, they look at me in a way that it seems I have done nothing important. In Iran, agricultural jobs are not easy to find.” “The educational system in Iran does not look at agricultural majors as an academic choice.”</p> <hr/> <p>N.M: “There are many people who told me that I made a wrong choice, but I laughed at them all, because I know what I am doing.”</p>

		N.L: "I sometimes have different religious beliefs, but I must not show them, because they may think differently about me."
		M.B: "I felt that their perception about me had changed. It seemed that they were saying that "M.B did not make a very correct decision".
First Party Evaluation	Agent brings reasons for her decision that are rooted in how she/he evaluates her situation from her own standpoint.	N.M: "I think my mother's and my families' influence is positive and I accept them. I believe in their words. "I made the decision, but my mother had a great role." "I have consulted with one of the Sharif University's best professors, who is an expert in entrepreneurship. He told me that you would make a mistake if you start your business. The females' age of entrepreneurship is not your age and you know nothing at the moment. At the end, I think that I made the right choice."
		N.L: "Mainly, the concerns that we have in our family influence me. I do not accept many people and I only believe in my family; as my brother says that I don't listen to anyone outside the family."
		M.B: "Although they had different views about me, I did what I liked. I did not pay attention to what others say."
Correlational Reasoning	Agent assigns the reason of her decision to state/event that occurs in time of decision making.	N.M: "At that time, I did not have the required experience, I was too young for it, and my character was not developed." M.B: "At the same time, I was feeling a prospect for myself and I liked to assess my teaching ability when I entered into the role of personal tutor." "At the same time, there was a pharmaceutical firm and I was supposed to do its electronic jobs, but I was feeling that this job did not have a good future."

Impact of Commodities	Agent points to influence of commodities on her decision.	<p>M.B: “The world was somehow against me making this decision. I chose it because of interest and ability that I felt from within.”</p>
“Impact of Affective State” AND “Awareness of Affective State”	Agent points to influence of emotion on her decision.	<p>M.B: “At that time my main feeling was hope, but sometimes you may feel hopelessness.” “I felt gratitude towards this organisation and I liked to return its favour.” “Being connected with students and helping them satisfy me and that is why I liked to do this job.”</p> <hr/> <p>N.M: “When I was doing my masters’ dissertation I started a project with great enthusiasm and worked hard, but because of my personality I could not continue, because after some defeats I become hopeless.” “Because of my personality, I had left all my previous jobs when I became hopeless.”</p> <hr/> <p>S.R: “At the beginning my father’s negative signals disturbed me. Other also reacted in an unpleasant way, when they found out that I was studying agriculture. At that difficult time, being in this organisation and working with students was energising.”</p>

Study 1: Result Interpretation

Here, the result of Study 1 is interpreted by mapping the themes onto the research aims and objectives. The first study's findings indicate 11 themes. To *determine agency-oriented factors associated with freedom*, we try to consolidate these 11 themes into a smaller but still representative set of latent factors associated with freedom. According to Creswell (2014) factor analysis can provide a suitable solution to reduce the number of items while keeping the meaning, but this technique is appropriate for quantitative data. Hence, we have considered running a round of quantitative data collection on the themes. In this regard, we have designed an appropriate research instrument (i.e. questionnaire) to apply a survey and to establish the extent to which each of the 11 themes is genuinely associated with the agent's freedom. This questionnaire becomes the Evaluation Instrument of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that *identifies agency-oriented factors associated with freedom* (i.e. the first research objective). Hence, collecting data using the Evaluation Instrument and running Explanatory Factor Analysis (EFA), the agency-oriented factors associated with freedom will be identified. The following sections will show how this research instrument is designed based on the 11 themes.

Study 1: The Evaluation Instrument (1st Version)

To design the Evaluation Instrument, we rely on the findings of the first study and the theoretical foundation of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. The findings support the idea that each theme has an 'existential' and 'cognisant' aspect, because the participants' understanding and definition of the notions of freedom, attribution and agency are not similar to our technical definitions (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed explanation). The 'existential' aspect refers to the extent to which each theme exists when an agent makes a conscious, deliberate and important decision. The 'cognisance' aspect points to two conditions of 'rationalisation' that is the extent to which the agent is providing a sound reason for her choice. The 'cognisant' aspect of each theme shows that the agent may lack the knowledge/awareness about that theme. Hence, in the Evaluation Instrument we identify two constructs of 'existential' and 'cognisant' to measure each theme. The 'existential' aspect can be measured by asking the agent about the influence of certain factors on her decision, but the 'cognisant' aspect requires a detection method for 'rationalisation', as explained in the previous chapter (see Chapter 4, Theory Development).

According to the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, the 'cognisant' aspect of themes is measured from two standpoints of 'self' and 'other' and the findings are interpreted as following. The agent can control the 'self' aspect but she cannot control the 'other' aspect of the themes, i.e. this aspect roots in the Logical Core of our theory (see Chapter 4). Meanwhile, the 'self'

aspect is mapped onto the Affective Shell of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that is developed empirically and includes *influencers* that are milder form of *constraints* that the decision maker is prepared to violate in favour of other *constraints*. Given a capability set available to a decision maker, the *constraints* influence the agent at the 'Logical Core' of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency; this produces a capability set that is realisable; then the *influencers* are imposed on the agent at the 'Affective Level' of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency and it produces the final 'realisable' and 'desirable' capabilities.

Accordingly, to design the Evaluation Instrument, first, we ask a series of questions derived from each theme's constructs and dimensions that indicate the 'existential' aspect of each theme. This part is labelled the 'self' agency-oriented factors. Second, to indicate the 'cognisant' aspect of themes, we ask a set of similar questions, but this time the participant is required to answer them from the standpoint of others. The respondent's answers to these series of questions are collected as the 'other' agency-oriented factors. Finally, to indicate whether a respondent is 'rationalising', we compare her 'self' and 'other' answers. Table 25 presents the rules according to which the Evaluation Instrument is designed.

Table 25 is developed based on the findings of Study 1 (i.e. thematic assumptions) and these are mapped onto theoretical insights in the literature. We consider these assumptions in data collection and when determining the agency-freedom relationship, using the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. In addition to the a priori assumptions presented in Table 25, the findings of Study 1 also show that sometimes participants say that nothing has influenced their decision (see the Ontology of Attribution in Table 24). This implies that we need to detect whether the decision is because of "luck" or whether this person is 'rationalising'. To address this challenge, we correlate the 'ontological' dimension of attribution (derived from our thematic analysis) with Weiner's (2010) causal dimensions of attribution (Stability, Locus, Controllability) in order to identify the sound reason. As explained in the methodology chapter, Chapter 3, we acknowledge the participants' way of thinking that could be realism or anti-realism. Hence, both 'existence' and 'apperception' aspects of attribution are considered. This means that any attribution can be identified as "not chance" (existed and known), or Unaware Agent (existed but unknown), or Luck (not existed and unknown), or Rationalisation (not existed but known) (see Chapter 3, Methodology).

Table 25: Design Rules of the Evaluation Instrument

Measurement Rule	<p>Pair Themes have 'self' and 'other' Measures.</p> <p>Measurement Scales shows that each theme has three constructs and several dimensions based on its definition.</p> <p>Questions are designed inductively from the interview material. We choose an example of the characteristics of each construct's dimension, because: (A) these examples are frequently repeated in interviews, and (B) they are at the level of lay person thinking.</p> <p>Order in the questionnaire is that first the 'self' and then the 'other' questions are asked.</p>
Measurement Scale	<p>Score Measurement: the participant's total score of each factor, which is measured by summing up the score of each item, divided by the total score possible for that factor (i.e. a percentage).</p> <p>Number of questions for paired themes: we try to keep the equivalent number of items for 'self' and 'other' questions (preferably five item for each view), in order to keep the consistency among the themes. However, this harmony may change as a result of factor analysis in quantitative studies.</p>
A priori Assumption about Decision	<p>'Self' and 'Other' Judgment and type of decision: here, we have two assumptions about the decision type based on Davidson's (2014) incontinent actions and Sen's (2004) commitment actions:</p> <p>If an intentional action is contrary to 'self' judgement, then it is an incontinent action (that is based on Davidson's (2014) incontinent action).</p> <p>If an intentional action is contrary to 'other' judgment, then it is a counterintuitive action (that is based on Sen's (2004) commitment action)</p>
A priori Assumption about Rationalisation	<p>Rationalisation: sometimes people make subconscious or emotional decision through heuristic mechanisms, but they try to formulate a rational explanation, believing that a rational explanation is a true explanation (Kahneman, 2012). Further, the findings of study 1 show that sometimes people know that they are rationalising but they only accept it after the fact.</p>
A priori Assumption about Self-Reflection	<p>Self-reflection: sometimes people cannot accurately reflect well on their behaviour, as self-reflection requires high cognitive endeavour (Travers et al., 2015). Hence, we measure the items from the two perspectives of 'self' and 'other', as it helps respondents to put themselves in a position of 'other' and this helps them to evaluate their decision through self-distancing and it is found that "self-distancing facilitates adaptive self-reflection" (White et al., 2015).</p>
Measuring	<p>Logical Reasoning: The theme of logical Reasoning that measures the soundness of the agent's logical</p>

<p>“Logical Reasoning” theme</p>	<p>argument is being measured through comparing ‘self’ and ‘other’ scores that measure similar constructs. In other words, Logical Reasoning is measured through detecting rationalisation, because unsound logical reasoning is an example of “Rationalisation” that is defined in this study as the incidences when an attribution does not exist but the agent refers to something as an attribution (see Chapter 3, Methodology).</p>
<p>Measuring Affective related themes</p>	<p>Affective Related Themes: Here, the themes that are related to an affective state (i.e. “Affective State” and “Awareness of Affective State”) are measured through the link between <i>attribution</i>, <i>reason</i> and their logical link with emotion. This is because in this study emotion is investigated based on Weiner's (2010) attribution theory of motivation, which implies that certain emotions are generated when one (agent) evaluates her situation (decision) (see Chapter 4, Theory Development). Hence, in the Evaluation Instrument we have the measurement scales of <i>attribution</i> and <i>reason</i> and we try to find a reliable pattern that further based on Weiner's (2010) theory we link to the emotion list. Finally, we test these links and Weiner's emotion using in-depth interviews and a case study (qualitative methods; see Study 3 and Study 4), which are highlighted (Chase et al., 2015) as more appropriate tools to detect emotion than quantitative methods. Further, this mixed method is in line with our philosophical paradigm (i.e. Critical Realism), saying that there are some parts of the “real” in social behaviour (Luke and Bates, 2015), such as emotion (McKee et al., 2015) that are not observable but some of their aspects are in the empirical domain that can be measured, like the attributions that initiate emotions. Thus, we use qualitative methods to find some aspect of the ‘real’ domain regarding emotion.</p>
<p>Measuring Freedom-related themes</p>	<p>Freedom: To measure freedom-related themes we consider three following a priori: First, the ‘existential’ dimension of freedom is articulated in the way that <i>freedom is possessed regardless of conscious awareness</i>, so it may be possible to find oneself in a free state, but due to apathy (not lack of capabilities) feel no desire for any option. Otherwise, if we constrain freedom to depend ‘sufficiently’ on the conative aspect, then freedom becomes very much determined exclusively at a psychological level. Hence, in this study “apathy” does not preclude freedom and this construct has two dimensions of <i>psychological</i> and <i>ontological</i>. Second, in this study the ontological aspect of freedom covers negative aspect, thus, the number and quality of capabilities are measured, which is in line with Sen's (1999) definition of negative freedom. (see Chapter 2, Literature Review). Third, to measure the ontological aspect of freedom, we consider the meaning of “equivalence” of</p>

capabilities based on an agent's *values* that are indicated based on her rationality type. This is because in this study the agency-freedom link is conceptualised based on an agent's *values* consist with liberal thinkers (Berlin, 1958; Sen, 1999) as we say that *one must be free to live the life she has reason to value*. Hence, in the present study a priori assumption is that two entities have equivalent impact, as long as they equally satisfy the agent's pursuit to live the life she has reason to value.

Pilot Study

The 1st version of the Evaluation Instrument is applied in a pilot study of (N=20) and as a result the wording of the questions is revised based on the feedback received from the participants.
First Step: We sent the questionnaire that indicated the impact of each of themes on their decisions.
Second Step: We interviewed the same participants and qualitatively indicate the misunderstanding due to the wording and design of the questionnaire.

The findings of Study 1 and the theoretical concerns as mentioned in Table 25 have been summarised in Table 26 that presents the eight themes of agency-oriented factors as well as their definitions, dimensions, and constructs that are designed in the Evaluation Instruments *to identify agency-oriented factors associated with freedom* (the 1st research objective). Following, Table 27 is the 1st version of the Evaluation Instrument that includes 84 question items to measure these eight themes from the two standpoints of 'self' and 'other'. Each standpoint accounts for 42 items to measure the eight themes. The next section is Study 2 that uses the 1st version of the Evaluation Instrument and applies it in a survey that analyses the 'career choice' of 1063 personal tutors.

Table 26: 1st Evaluation Instrument, Theme, Dimensions, Constructs

Theme	Definition	Dimensions and Sub-Dimensions
1) Freedom Awareness	<p style="text-align: center;">Construct 1: Freedom</p> <p>Freedom Awareness is about the conative mode of agency. Here, freedom is defined based on Berlin's (1969) positive and negative definitions of freedom as following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> I. Positive freedom is about what/who is the source of determining an action. Here, we identify the <i>psychological</i> dimension to measure positive freedom that includes the <i>volition</i> and <i>connotation</i> aspect of agency. II. Negative freedom is about the space within which agent is free to do/be what she values, without external interference. Here, we identify the <i>ontological</i> dimension that includes <i>number</i>, <i>equivalence</i> and <i>independence</i> of options to measure negative freedom. <p style="text-align: center;">Construct 2: Cognisance Aspect</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The degree to which agent is aware of the presence of freedom. <p style="text-align: center;">Construct 3: Existential Aspect</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The degree to which freedom pervades through the context. Considering the fact that people do not necessarily define freedom in our technical sense “as there are many kinds of freedom (some valuable, some detrimental, and some trivial) and ‘freedom’ means very different things to different people” (Sen, 1999). 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> I. Psychological: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Volition</i>: If there is only one capability available whether this person has the volition to choose it. b. <i>Connotation</i>: Whether or not an agent has the motivation and drive to choose an option. For a person to be free, they must experience a momentary stimulation directed towards the prospective action (see Chapter 3, Methodology). II. Ontological: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Number of Capabilities</i>: At least one capability exists that an agent can volitionally transform it to functioning. b. <i>Equivalence of Capabilities</i>: Whether the available options are equivalent (see Table 6 for equivalence criteria), in terms of their future emotional impact, their side effect, and the evaluation third-party (see Chapter 3, Methodological concern of freedom measurement). c. <i>Independence of Capabilities</i>: Are these options independent from each other, meaning that there is no constraint from choosing one on pursuing another?

2) Ontology of Attribution

Construct 1: Attribution

This theme includes *cognitive* mode of agency and it is defined in a mechanistic view, according to the purpose of attribution that is to identify a 'reason' for an occurred circumstance. For a reason to be accepted as an attribution, it must correspond to following formal semantic: (Subject of Attribution ~ Causative Connective ~ Reason).

In this study, we build upon attribution theories (e.g. Graham, 1991; Kelley et al., 2013) and we only accept the presence of attribution that through analysis we can identify a link between these three parts. Otherwise there is no attribution for behaviour under analysis (see Chapter 3, Methodology for more detail on existence of attribution).

Hence, attribution has following four dimensions:

- I. *Subject of Attribution*: State of being/doing to which an individual is attributing a reason. For example, being a teacher is a subject of attribution.
- II. *Causative connective*: The semantic connection between reason and subject of attribution, such as: for, because, as, etc.
- III. *Reason*: This is a motivator and it can have two forms of State and Event.
- IV. *Temporal*: If the reason is past oriented, then it is a causal reasoning. If the reason is future oriented, then it is teleological reasoning. If the reason is present oriented, then person is using Correlational Reasoning (see Chapter 3 for more explanation).

Construct 2: Existential Aspect

- The degree to which attribution exists for decision.

Construct 3: Cognisance Aspect

- The degree to which agent is aware of an attribution for her decision (see Chapter 3 for detail)

- I. **Subject of Attribution**: (In Study 1, study 2 it is *career choice*; in Study 3 it is *university major selection*)
- II. **Causative connective**
- III. **Reason/Equivalent to cause**:
 - a. *State*: to which a person is assigning her subject of attribution. Here, it is functioning/commanding.
 - b. *Event*: to which a person is assigning her subject of attribution. Here, it is either side effect, feedback or evaluation.
- IV. **Temporal**:
 - a. *Future Oriented*
 - b. *Past Oriented*
 - c. *Present Oriented*

explanation).

3) Third Part Evaluation

Construct 1: Third Party

This theme is about all three modes of agency (*cognitive*, *conative* and *affective*) and it is defined because “third party observers do not have direct access to agent’s thoughts, so their cognitive biases, preferences, emotional and well-being concerns influence their attributions” (Foster, 2013; Xiaoping, 2013). Here, we explore three questions to explain third party evaluation:

- I. *Who is evaluating?* Third parties can be implicit (like institutions), or explicit (like a tangible observer). The characteristics (such as trustworthiness and credibility) of the third party are important.
 - II. *How is the evaluation done?*
 - a. *Expedience Rules:* Legally sanctioned rules. When institutional norms are perceived as appropriate and useful to the agent.
 - b. *Social Obligation:* Morally governed rules.
 - c. *Taken for Granted Rules:* Culturally supported and conceptually correct rules.
- III. *What is the evaluation?* Type of Evaluation is important. Graham and Barker (1990) show that if one is praised for success and not blamed for failure, then it is inferred that he/she is lower in ability than those who received natural feedback. Hence, we measure the *valance* of evaluation (positive, negative, neutral), and whether it is motivational/not.

Construct 2: Existential Aspect

- The degree to which agent’s way of decision making (i.e. rationality type) is influenced by

I. Who evaluates:

- a. *Implicit/Explicit:* Whether third party is tangible (e.g. specific person), or it is intangible and implicit (e.g. an institution).
- b. *Characteristics:* Whether third party is regarded as trustworthy, credible and influential.

II. How evaluates:

- a. *Expedience Rules:* This related to institutional logic, implying legally sanctioned rules. When institutional norms are perceived as appropriate and useful to the agent.
- b. *Social Obligation:* Morally governed rules.
- c. *Taken for Granted Rules:* This related to institutional logic, implying culturally supported and socially accepted rules.

III. What evaluates:

- a. *Valence:* Positive, Negative, or neutral quality of evaluation of others about decision.
- b. *Motivator/not:* whether the evaluation is encouraging or discouraging.

environment through social groups and institutions (i.e. the extent to which the agent has Weber's (1993) theoretical, practical or formal rationalities).

Construct 3: Cognisance Aspect

- The degree to which the agent is aware of the impact of her social group (that includes the institutions to which the agent belongs) and self-identity. This is regarded as a construct, because based on Sociological institutionalism (phenomenological type), most of an individual's choices are occurred by non-decision actions rather than rationalised, fully informed and purposive actors' choices (Meyer, 2010). Actors may explain their decisions as rational and purposive, but it is a non-decision action constructed by institutions.

4) First Party Evaluation

Construct 1: First part evaluation

This theme includes *conative* and *affective* modes of agency and it is about the agent's reflection on her own decisions. Here, we answer two questions to define First Party Evaluation:

- I. How one reflects on her decision? According to social identity theory (Tajfel and Billic, 1974) three following mechanisms are possible.
 - a. *Social Categorisation*: "People categorise themselves in different categories based on colour, income, belongings, beliefs, religion, occupation, education" (Tajfel and Billic, 1974).
 - b. *Self-Identification*: "People adopt the identity of the group they have categorized themselves as belonging to" (Tajfel and Billic, 1974).

I. How:

- a. *Social Categorising Factors*
- b. *Social Adapting Norms*
- c. *Social Comparing Norms*

II. What:

- a. *Valence*: Positive, Negative, or neutral quality of assessment of behaviour.
- b. *Motivator/not*: Level of importance of self-reflection on subsequent behaviours.

c. *Social Comparison*: “People in explaining their behaviour overestimate the influence of internal factors and underestimate the circumstantial ones” (van Heerden, 1999). “People tend to attribute their success to internal factors and their failure to external forces” (Jones and Nisbett, 1971).

II. What is the personal evaluation? A person’s evaluation of her decision. Here, the *valence* of evaluation is identified to show if one has negative/positive assessment and the degree to which an agent values her own judgment.

Construct 2: Existential Aspect

- The degree to which social group and self-reflection exists when agent makes a decision.

Construct 3: Cognisance Aspect

- The degree to which agent is aware of her social group and self-reflection.
-

5) Teleological Reasoning

Construct 1: Teleological Reasoning

This theme is the cognitive mode of agency and it is defined as a *future oriented* reasoning (i.e., the state/event to which people attribute their decision is in the future). Being the agent of your life means that you have ‘values’ and ‘goals’. Here, we say agent’s self-interests can be *integral* or *incidental*. If it is incidental, then they are non-consequential to your life. If they are integral, then they form the basis of your goals. Here, we use Sen's (1990) goal-driven motivation in ‘Rational Fools’ that explains decision behaviour as motivated by: 1) Self Interest, 2) Self Welfare Goal, and 3) Self-Choice goal. Accordingly, the behaviour motivated by these three is called: 1) Self-Centred, 2) Sympathy, 3) Commitment. Here, counter-

I. Decision Motivators:

- a. *Ethical Preference*: Moral and ethical concerns.
- b. *Subjective Preference*: Needs and desires of the self-motivate agent.

II. Decision Type:

- a. *Self-Centred Choice*: Decision motivator is agent’s self-interest.
 - b. *Sympathy*: Decision motivator is self-welfare goal. When concern for others directly affects one's own welfare. (E.g. If the knowledge of torture of others makes you sick)
 - c. *Commitment*: choosing to do
-

intuitive decisions cover commitment actions (see Chapter 3, Methodology).

Construct 2: Existence Aspect

- The degree to which Teleological Reasoning exists.

Construct 3: Cognisance Aspect

- The degree to which agent is aware of Teleological Reasoning.

something that leads to an outcome that the agent does not subjectively prefer. (If the knowledge of torture of others makes you think it is wrong and you are ready to do something to stop it, although this action may conflict with your personal interest; it is a case of commitment.)

6) Causal Reasoning

Construct 1: Causal Reasoning

This theme is about the cognitive mode of agency and it is defined as a *past oriented* reasoning that means that the state/event to which people attribute their decision has occurred in past. Here, we define it according to Automata Theory (Hopcroft, 2016), causal reasoning consists of states (the state of being/doing in time of making decision, and current state of being/doing), and transitions. As the agent sees a trigger (Cause), she/he makes a transition (or Decision) to another state. According to its transition she is arrived at her current state.

Construct 2: Existential Aspect

- We only accept causal reasoning when can identify link between previous state and transition to next state.

Construct 3: Cognisance Aspect

- If a person mentions causal reasoning in her statements, we say she is cognisant of it.

- I. **Current State:** The mental and physical state of decision maker in time making the choice.
- II. **Result State:** The mental and physical state of a decision maker after making a decision.
- III. **Impulse/trigger (Cause):** Whether an impulse initiates state change (i.e. decision).
- IV. **Transition:** whether the agent undergoes state transition by making a decision.

7) Correlational Reasoning

Construct 1: Correlational Reasoning

This theme is about the cognitive mode of agency and it is a contemporaneous reasoning. This means that the state/event to which people attribute their decision is in the

I. Correlation

- a. *Person:*
 - b. *Stimulus:*
 - c. *Time:*
-

present. According to Kelley (1973) people assign the reason for an action to the factors that co-varies most closely with that action. The reason of an event must be present when the event occurs and absent when the event fails to occur. To make correlational reasoning, people need to have access to 'Consensus', 'Distinctive' and 'Consistency' information resources, then they attribute causality on the basis of correlation. According to the Kelley et al. (2013) co-variant model, people take into account three types of evidence to make an attribution:

- I. *Person*: Consensus Information; the extent to which other people behave in the same way in a similar situation. All people have the same behaviour if it has high consensus. If no one does so it has low consensus.
- II. *Stimulus*: Distinctive Information, the extent to which an agent behaves in the same way in similar situations.
- III. *Time*: Consistency Information: the extent to which an agent behaves similarly every time that the situation occurs.

Construct 2: Existential Aspect

- The degree to which agent is using correlational reasoning.

Construct 3: Cognisance Aspect

- The degree to which an agent has access to consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information to make a correlational reasoning.

II. **Subject of Attribution:**

- a. *State*: people's state of being/doing to which they assign their decision.
- b. *Event*: the incident happens when the agent is making the decision.

8) Impact of Commodities

Construct 1: Commodities

This theme is about the conative mode of agency. It is defined based on resources that enable an agent to achieve her valuable life. Sen (1999) says that commodities

Commodities:

- I. Tangible Resources
 - a. Individual Physiology: like health, personal abilities, talent, IQ, gender,

(such as a bicycle) are considered as an input, but their value depends upon an individual's ability to convert them into valuable functioning (such as riding a bicycle). Hence, we define following dimensions to measure commodities:

I. *Tangible Resources*

II. *Intangible Resources*

Construct 2: Existential Aspect

- The degree to which commodities exists for an agent.

Construct 3: Cognisance Aspect

- The degree to which an agent is aware of the commodities.

age, etc.

- b. Local Environment Diversity: like geographical, demographic, economic, cultural, social assets.

II. Intangible Resources

- a. Variation in Social Condition: like one's access to education, security, community relation. Also one's class, ethnic, race, etc.

- b. Differences in relational perspective: Commodities in relation to agent's culture, religious, norms,

- c. Distribution within the family: The way commodities are distributed in family.
-

Note: For more detail in the definition of the constructs (e.g. freedom, attribution, constraints) see Chapter 4, Theory Development.

Table 27: The Evaluation Instrument (1st version)

Theme	'Self' Questions	'Other' Questions
Freedom Awareness	<p>When I decided to become a Personal Tutor,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. Psychological: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Volition: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q1. I genuinely wanted it. b. Connotation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q2. I had the drive. II. Ontological: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Number of Capabilities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q3. I could have chosen a different job. b. Equivalence of Capabilities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q4. All of the jobs available were equally acceptable to me. c. Independence of Capabilities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q5. Becoming a Personal Tutor did not prevent me from doing another job. 	<p>When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, I <i>believe</i> that others thought that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. Psychological: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Volition: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q1. I genuinely wanted it. b. Connotation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q2. I had the drive. II. Ontological: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Number of Capabilities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q3. I could have chosen a different job. b. Equivalence of Capabilities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q4. All of the jobs available were equally acceptable to me. c. Independence of Capabilities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q5. Becoming a Personal Tutor did not prevent me from doing another job.
Ontology of Attribution	<p>When I decided to become a Personal Tutor,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. State/Temporal: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Q1. Because of my previous state. b. Q2. Because of my state, when making the decision. c. Q3. Because of the state I aimed to reach. II. Event/Temporal: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Q4. Because of a circumstance that happened before I made the decision. b. Q5. Because of a circumstance that happened just when I was making decision. c. Q6. Because of a circumstance that I expected to happen after my decision. 	<p>When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, I <i>believe</i> that others thought that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. State/Temporal: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Q1. Because I was unemployed before that. b. Q2. Because I was looking for a job. c. Q3. Because I aimed to have career progress. II. Event/Temporal: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Q4. Because before that I could not find another job. b. Q5. Because when I was looking for a job I found this organisation is looking for a Personal Tutor.

c. Q6. Because I expected to be promoted in future.

**Impact of
Third
Party
Evaluation**

When I decided to become a Personal Tutor,

- I. Who evaluates:
 - a. Implicit/Explicit:
Q1. Because of the evaluations of others I know.
 - b. Characteristics:
Q2. Because others' evaluation was important for me and I believed that it was to my benefit.
- II. How evaluate:
 - a. Expedience Rules:
Q3. Because the way this organization is operating is appropriate for its workers.
 - b. Social Obligation:
Q4. Because working in this organisation is in line with my morals and ethics.
 - c. Taken for Granted Rules:
Q5. Becoming a Personal Tutor was not a result of serious decision-making process, but it was an expectation from me as a university student in Iran.
- III. What evaluate:
 - a. Valence:
Q6. *Because others had a positive evaluation.*
 - b. Motivator/not:
Q7. Because others encouraged me.

When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, I *believe* that others thought that:

- I. Who evaluates:
 - a. Implicit/Explicit:
Q1. Because someone advise me.
 - b. Characteristics:
Q2. Because someone whom I believe advise me.
- II. How evaluate:
 - a. Expedience Rules:
Q3. this organisation is Waqf and I can have indirect influence on life of poor students.
 - b. Social Obligation:
Q4. I do have some rules for myself that prevent me from doing some jobs that others do.
 - c. Taken for Granted Rules:
Q5. It was obvious for me to choose this job.
- III. What evaluate:
 - a. Valence:
Q6. *Because people around me said it is a good decision.*
 - b. Motivator/not:
Q7. Because others pushed me to do so.

Impact of

<p>First Party Evaluation</p>	<p>When I decided to become a Personal Tutor,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. How one self-reflect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Social Categorising Factor. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q1. Because, people that are similar to me in terms of level of education, family background, ethnic group, values and concerns are working here. b. Social Adapting Norms. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q2. Because, I could adapt the way people work in this organisation to become similar to them. c. Social Comparing Norms. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q3. Because, we are more successful than others who are not working in this organisation. II. Personal Evaluation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Valence: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q4. I made a true decision to become a Personal Tutor in this organisation. b. Motivator/not: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q5. My own evaluation on my decision is very important for my subsequent choices. 	<p>When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, I <i>believe</i> that others thought that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. How one self-reflect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Social Categorising Factor. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q1. Because some people that I know and are similar to me are working in this organisation. b. Social Adapting Norms. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q2. Sometimes I do not behave based on my personal beliefs, because others around me may misjudge my act. c. Social Comparing Norms. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3. My gender was not important in becoming a Personal Tutor, but it would be for promotion to higher-level jobs. II. Personal Evaluation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Valence: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q4. I can see that people Around me do not look at Personal Tutorship as a proper job. b. Motivator/not: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q5. I consulted with others, and I chose what was appropriate for me.
<p>Teleological Reasoning</p>	<p>When I decided to become a Personal Tutor,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. Motivators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Ethical Preference: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q1. Moral and ethical concerns are important on my exercise of decision. b. Subjective Preference: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q2. Maximising my self-interest and 	<p>When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, I <i>believe</i> that others thought that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. Motivators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Ethical Preference: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q1. Because, it allows me to influence the education of poor students. b. Subjective Preference:

satisfying my needs are important.
 II. Decision Type:
 a. Self-Centered Choice:
 Q3. It is very important that my decision helps me to achieve my personal goals.
 b. Sympathy:
 Q4. It is important that my decision helps me to achieve my goal while it has positive influence on the lives of others.
 c. Commitment:
 Q5. Sometimes I decide against my personal interest, to achieve a moral and ethical satisfaction.

Q2. Because, I like this role, consulting, teaching, and working with students.
 II. Decision Type:
 a. Self-Centered Choice:
 Q3. Because, I learn job experience to promote to better jobs, earn more money and satisfaction.
 b. Sympathy:
 Q4. Because, I can transfer my knowledge to more students, while strengthening my teaching skills.
 c. Commitment:
 Q5. Because, for me my career prospect is not as important as the influence I make in society.

Causal Reasoning

When I decided to become a Personal Tutor,
 I. State:
 Q. My geographical, physical and emotional state, in the time of decision making is important.
 II. Impulse (Cause):
 Q. It is like an impulse pushes me to make decision.
 III. Transition:
 Q. After making the decision, my physical and mental state will change.
 IV. Causal Process:
 a. Enabling State:
 Q. My specific physical and mental state must enable me to choose what I want.
 b. State Change:
 Q. The outcome of the decision must satisfy

When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, I *believe* that others thought that:
 I. State:
 Q. Because, I was a young university student looking for a part-time job to earn some money.
 II. Impulse (Cause):
 Q. Because, I found the job of Personal Tutorship.
 III. Transition:
 Q. After becoming a Personal Tutor, my situation has changed.
 IV. Causal Process:
 a. Enabling State:
 Q. My state of being a young student, having this organisation's requirements enabled me to choose this job.
 b. State Change:

	the reason that pushes me to make that choice.	Q. Because, I was looking for a job and I could be employed as a Personal Tutor.
Correlational Reasoning	<p>When I decided to become a Personal Tutor,</p> <p>I. Person: Q1. There were many others applying for this job.</p> <p>II. Stimulus: Q2. Because I just wanted to become a Personal Tutor.</p> <p>III. Time: Q3. I always wanted to become a Personal Tutor.</p>	<p>When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, I <i>believe</i> that others thought that:</p> <p>I. Person: Q1. I think it was a popular thing to do.</p> <p>II. Stimulus: Q2. I liked to be a Personal Tutor.</p> <p>III. Time: Q3. I was always thinking about being a Personal Tutor.</p>
Impact of Commodities	<p>When I decided to become a Personal Tutor,</p> <p>I. Tangible: a. <i>Individual Physiology</i>: illness, disability, age, gender. Q1. I had personal physiological limitations. b. <i>Local Environment Diversities</i>: Q2. The environment constrained me.</p> <p>II. <i>Intangible</i>: a. <i>Variation in social condition</i>: Q3. I had social limitations.</p> <p>b. <i>Differences in relational perspective</i>: Q4. Conventions and customs limited my choices.</p> <p>c. <i>Distribution within the family</i>: Q5. I was discriminated among my family.</p>	<p>When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, I <i>believe</i> that others thought that:</p> <p>I. Tangible: a. <i>Individual Physiology</i>: illness, disability, age, gender. Q1. I had no shortcomings such as illness, disability, age limitation, or gender limitation.</p> <p>b. <i>Local Environment Diversities</i>: Q2. My choices were limited in the city I was living.</p> <p>II. <i>Intangible</i>: a. <i>Variation in social condition</i>: Q3. None of these applies to me: Lack of access to education, security, being ethnic minority.</p> <p>b. <i>Differences in relational perspective</i>: Q4. My family situation never limited my</p>

choices.

c. *Distribution within the family:*

Q5. I had similar opportunities as my
siblings.

Note: ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ items for similar themes are measured with similar theoretical foundation and items; the wording of some questions is different in the ‘self’ side with the ‘other’ standpoint based on the participants’ expressions in Study 1. Here, in line with Willis (2004) we use interview data as a way to improve questionnaire design. “Waqf is an endowment made by a Muslim to a religious, educational, or charitable cause” (Blackburn, 2008).

Study 2: Quantitative Development

To identify agency-oriented factors associated with freedom (i.e. the first research objective), the present study applies the 1st version of the Evaluation Instrument on a survey and runs Explanatory Factor Analysis (EFA) to consolidate the eight themes (Teleological Reasoning, Casual Reasoning, Correlational Reasoning, Freedom Awareness, Impact of Commodities, Ontology of Attribution, First Party Evaluation, Third Party Evaluation) into a smaller but still representative number of factors. The 1st Evaluation Instrument is translated into Farsi and the wording of the questions is revised according to the pilot study (see Table 27). As a result of the pilot study, the researchers decided to present the questions both in Farsi and English. Data were collected from a cohort of 1,260 personal tutors in 450 rural and urban cities in Iran. Of 1,260 respondents, 1,063 are used in the analysis as valid data. Participants evaluated the factors influencing their career choice in the host organisation. The size and nationwide distribution of the sample make it representative of *career choice* of young adults in Iran; the decision that is found in several studies (Hussain, 2015; Salehi-Isfahani, 2011; Salehi et al., 2013) to be a crucial agency outcome in personal and social life of these young adults. Finally, we use the findings of this study to revise the 1st Evaluation Instrument and in the following study we apply the 2nd version of the Evaluation Instrument in another survey as the “quantitative amendment” of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.

Study 2: Analysis (EFA)

We run Explanatory Factor Analysis (EFA), which is an appropriate statistical technique with respect to our objective that is *to identify agency-oriented factors associated with freedom*. Here, we try to consolidate our eight themes that are measured by 84 items in the 1st version of the Evaluation Instrument into a reliable research instrument with a smaller number of measurements that have no redundancy and repeated measurement. For this purpose, we run EFA to identify the underlying dimensions that explain the correlations between the set of variables. According to Kim and Mueller (1978) “EFA is an interdependence technique in that an entire set of interdependent relationships is examined without making the distinction between dependent and independent variables”. Mathematically, each item is expressed as a linear combination of underlying factors. The co-variation among the variables is described in terms of a small number of common factors.

Using SPSS, we follow these steps to conduct EFA. First, the correlation matrix is calculated and reports the factor loadings (which are simple correlations) between each variable and the factors. Second, it rotates factors and determines the number of factors. We use a

Varimax procedure to rotate the factor matrix into a simpler matrix for interpreting the result. In this way, according to Kim and Mueller (1978), each variable has non-zero or significant loadings with only a few factors, if possible with only one. By construction, as a result of using a Varimax rotation procedure our factor scores are uncorrelated and therefore there is absolutely no chance of *multicollinearity* if these served as independent variables. Finally, we interpret factors by calculating factor scores and mapping them to theoretical constructs in the 1st Evaluation Instrument. In this line, we identify the items that are not loaded to the components and decide whether to keep them in a revised Evaluation Instrument with respect to theory. Finally, the 1st Evaluation Instrument is revised to be used in another survey to which the same statistical technique (i.e. EFA) as well as Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) will be applied and the results will *identify agency-oriented factors associated with freedom*.

It is worth mentioning here that EFA is applied on 42 items of 'self' and 42 items of 'other', separately. This is because theoretically these two standpoints are identified as independent in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (see Chapter 4, Theoretical Development). Statistically, we can run EFA on 'self' and 'other' items, because their correlation matrix Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin statistic are near one (.881 and .856, equivalently) and their Chi-Square in Bartlett's test of Sphericity (12632 and 14532, equivalently) are found significant with p-value (.000) (Beavers et al., 2013). These findings show that EFA is an appropriate technique for this data.

Study 2: Result ('Self' Standpoint)

Table 28 presents eigenvalues, loadings and variance of 'self' factors. The factors with eigenvalues greater than one are used (Beavers et al., 2013); so here we can extract 10 common factors. Secondly, we seek common factors, which cumulatively account for a large percentage of the total variance (typically at least 60%). As evidence, the first 10 factors combined account for a cumulative total of 57.59% of the total variance. The variance is lower than 60% and we also use a scree plot to decide the right number of factors. Figure 24 is the scree plot of the eigenvalues against the number of factors in the order of extraction. The point just before the scree indicates the 'right' number of factors so, again, 10 factors seem reasonable. Hence, we use the first 10 'self' factors.

Table 28: Eigenvalues, total loadings and variance of 'self' factors

Component	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	7.61	18.13	18.13
2	5.27	12.55	30.67
3	1.90	4.52	35.19
4	1.75	4.17	39.37
5	1.67	3.97	43.34
6	1.51	3.59	46.92
7	1.25	2.98	49.90
8	1.15	2.74	52.64
9	1.07	2.55	55.20
10	1.00	2.39	57.59
11	.98	2.33	59.92
12	.91	2.17	62.09
13	.89	2.12	64.21

Figure 24: Scree Plot of 'self' factors




Table 29 presents the component matrix of the first 10 'self' factors and maps them onto the theoretical constructs. The first column in this table presents the new labels of each factor that is assigned based on the theoretical themes. For example, the first factor is labelled 'Goal Orientation' because the items of Sen's (2004) goal-oriented motivation (sympathetic, self-centred, and committed actions) are correlated with the first factor (.81, .78, and .74, equivalently), with ($r > .6$). The first row of Table 29 shows that this factor has the greatest eigenvalue (7.61) and explains the highest variance (18.13) in the dataset among all 10 'self' factors. This finding indicates that the main agentic factor that distinguishes respondents, in terms of their freedom is value-laden and goal oriented, which are the characteristics of Weber's (1993) substantive rationality. Our threshold for factor loading to extract the items is (.03), and there are five factors that are found significant but they have only moderate to low correlation that we keep them in the revised Evaluation Instrument, which are (e.g. .44, .45, .45, .34, .32) for the items of (psychological dimension of freedom awareness, first party evaluation, attribution to previous state, correlational reasoning (people), and teleological reasoning).

Table 29: 'Self' Component Matrix, Themes, New Labels

Factor	New Label	Eigen Value	Var.%	Theme	Items	Factor Loading
1		7.61	18.13	Goal Orientation		
				Teleological Reasoning, Sympathetic Goal	I can give my knowledge to students.	.81
				Teleological Reasoning Sympathetic Goal	This job allows me to help poor students.	.78
				Teleological reasoning Committed Action	Through personal tutorship I positively impact in society and that is more important than satisfying my personal interests.	.74
				Teleological Reasoning Motive	I like teaching and consulting students.	.72
				Teleological Reasoning Self-centred Goal	Personal Tutorship drives me to reach my goals.	.62
				First Person Evaluation	I believe that I made a right choice.	.58
				Teleological Reasoning	I find career experience that is useful for y future.	.58
				Teleological Reasoning	I can influence the poor students' education because this organisation is Waqf.	.55
				Freedom Awareness (Psychological Dimension)	I believe that I freely chose this job.	.44
			First Party Evaluation	We Personal Tutors help students more than the others.	.45	
2		5.28	12.56	Causal State and Trigger		
				Ontology of attribution (present state)	I think due to the state of job market when I was looking for a job.	.76

		Ontology of Attribution (previous state)	I think because before Personal Tutorship, my other choices were limited.	.71
		Ontology of Attribution (Present event)	I think because something happened when I was looking for a job that I decided to become Personal Tutor.	.64
		Ontology of attribution (previous event)	I think because I did not have personal relations to be employed in other jobs.	.61
3		Causal Transition		
	1.90	4.52		
		Causal Reasoning Transition	After becoming a Personal Tutor my state has changed.	.67
		Causal Reasoning Transition	I had the job requirements, I applied for Personal Tutorship and after being hired my state has changed.	.62
		Causal Reasoning	Because my state and abilities were in line with this organisation's requirements and for this job.	.59
4		Impact of Commodities		
	1.75	4.18		
		Environmental Limitation	I was under negative discrimination and resources were not evenly distributed among us.	.82
		Family Limitation	My family situation was against me and limited my options.	.79
		Physiological Limitation	I had a shortcoming such as illness, disability, and age or gender limitation.	.61
5		Social Identifier		
	1.67	3.98		
		Social Identification	I think it is a usual job for university students.	.78

			Social Identification	Because I was a student, who was looking for a job and earning income.	.76
6			Third Party Evaluation		
	1.51	3.59			
			Third party Evaluation (who)	Environment/others were influential on my decision.	.74
			Third party Evaluation (who)	Someone specific recommended this job to me.	.69
			Third Party Evaluation (motivator)	Others encouraged me.	.67
			Third Party Evaluation (Valence)	Others had positive idea about me becoming a Personal Tutor.	.60
7			Ontology of Capabilities		
	1.25	2.98			
			Equivalence of Capabilities	I believe that my other alternatives were as good as Personal Tutorship.	.77
			Number of Capabilities	I believe that I had other alternatives.	.72
			Independence of Capabilities	I believe that I could have chosen another job at the same time.	.70
8			Third Party Evaluation (who)		
	1.15	2.73			
				I think the environment influenced me to become a Personal Tutor, not a specific personal or institution.	.65
9			Attribution to Future State		

	1.07	2.55		
			Attribution to Future State	I think due to the state that I expected to reach through this job.
				.69
			Attribution to Previous state	I think due to my state of employment before this decision.
				.45
			Correlational Reasoning (people)	I think because those who are similar to me choose this job.
				.34
			Teleological reasoning	I find career experience that is useful for my future.
				.32
10			Ethical Rules	
	1.00	2.39		
			Ethical Rules	I have my own rules that prevent me from doing some jobs.
				.86

Note: the results are round up to two decimal points for clear presentation.

Study 2: Result ('Other' Standpoint)

Table 30 presents eigenvalue loadings and variance of 'other' factors. As explained above only the factors with eigenvalues greater than one are used. So, we have extracted 11 common factors. The second reason that these 11 factors are extracted is that we seek for common factors that cumulatively account for a large percentage of the total variance (typically at least 60%). As evidence, the first 11 factors combined account for a cumulative total of 63.86% of the total variance. Figure 25 is the scree plot of the eigenvalues against the number of factors in the order of extraction, according to which, again, 11 factors seem reasonable.

Table 30: Eigenvalues, total loadings, variance of 'other' factors

Component	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	7.56	18.02	18.02
2	5.23	12.45	30.47
3	2.40	5.72	36.19
4	2.01	4.80	40.99
5	1.74	4.15	45.13
6	1.68	4.01	49.13
7	1.50	3.57	52.70
8	1.30	3.09	55.80
9	1.19	2.83	58.63
10	1.16	2.75	61.38
11	1.04	2.48	63.86
12	.97	2.30	66.17

Figure 25: Scree Plot of 'other' factors




Table 31 presents the component matrix of the first 11 'other' factors and maps them onto the theoretical themes. Similar to 'self' factors, here, the first column in Table 31 presents a new label for each component that is assigned based on the theoretical definition of the items that are loaded to that factor. Similar to 'self' factor the first factor that is labelled 'Goal Orientation' is value laden and goal oriented, which are the characteristics of Weber's (1993) substantive rationality. This finding is another insight showing that the first agentic factor that can explain 18.01% of variance among individuals in terms of freedom is the extent to which they decide based on their *values*. Similar to 'self' factors, here our threshold for factor loading to extract the 'other' items loaded to each factor is (.03). Here, there are three items that are significant but they have moderately low correlation with the components (i.e., .45, .46, .32), which are (First Party Evaluation, Teleological Reasoning, and Causal Reasoning (State)).

Table 31: 'Other' Component Matrix, Themes, New Labels

Factor	New Label	Eigen Value	Var.%	Theme	Items	Factor Loading		
1		7.56	18.01	Goal Orientation				
				First Party Evaluation	I made a right choice when I became a Personal Tutor.	.77		
				Volition	I had the drive.	.74		
				Third Party Evaluation	Moral and ethical concerns motivated my decision.	.72		
				Third Party Evaluation	Because working in this organisation is in line with my ethical beliefs.	.70		
				Connotation	I genuinely wanted this job.	.70		
				First Party Evaluation	My personal evaluations largely influence my future decisions.	.66		
				First Party Evaluation	We Personal Tutors help students more than the others	.45		
				Teleological Reasoning	I tried to make a decision that satisfies both my preferences and those of others.	.46		
2		5.23	12.45	Impact of Commodities				
						Social Limitation	I had social limitations.	.86
						Conventional Limitation	Conventions and customs limited my choice.	.85
			Environmental Limitations	The environment limited my career choice.	.82			

		Family Limitations	My family limited my career choice.	.77
3		Causal State and Event		
	2.40	5.71		
		Ontology of Attribution present state	Because of my state when I was making this decision.	.81
		Ontology of Attribution previous state	Because of my previous state before this decision.	.80
		Ontology of Attribution present event	Because of what happened just when I was choosing this job.	.70
		Ontology of Attribution previous event	Because of what happened before this decision.	.69
4		Third Party Evaluation		
	2.01	4.80		
		Third Party Evaluation (who)	Certain people's evaluations influence my decisions.	.78
		Third Party Evaluation (who)	Because I trusted others' evaluation of my decision.	.76
		Third Party Evaluation (what)	Because others encouraged me.	.73
		Third Party Evaluation (what)	Because others had positive judgment.	.70
5		Causal Transition		
	1.74	4.14		
		Causal Reasoning Transition	After making this decision, my state would change.	.84

			Causal Reasoning Enabling State	My state when I was making the decision enabled me to transform into a new state.	.81
			Causal Reasoning Intriguer	Something intrigued me, I made this decision and my state had changed.	.80
6			Self-Centred Motivation		
	1.69	4.00			
			Teleological Reasoning Self-centred goal	Maximising my self-interest motivated me to make this decision.	.84
			Teleological Reasoning Self-centred decision	In my decision I tried to satisfy my self-interest.	.86
7			Correlational Reasoning		
	1.45	3.58			
			Correlational Reasoning (people)	There were many others applying for this job.	.83
			Correlational Reasoning (Time)	This job always has applicants.	.78
8			Social Identifier		
	1.23	3.09			
			Social Identification	Typically, people similar to me choose this job.	.75
			Social Identification	I have many common points with my colleagues.	.77
9			Attribution to Future State		
	1.19	2.83			

			Attribution to future state	Because of what I expected to happen after my decision.	.74
			Attribution to future state	Because of the state that I aimed to reach through this decision.	.65
			Causal Reasoning, State	My geographical, physical and emotional states at the time of decision making were important.	.32
10			Quality of Capabilities		
	1.16	2.75			
			Equivalence of Capabilities	All of my job opportunities were equally valuable to me.	.62
			Independence of Capabilities	This job did not prevent me from doing other jobs.	.61
			Third Party Evaluation	Because this organisation's management is to the benefit of Personal Tutors.	.46
11			Number of Capabilities		
	1.04	2.48			
			Number of Capabilities	I could have chosen a different job.	.64

Study 2: Result Interpretation

So far, we have identified 10 'self' and 11 'other' *agency-oriented factors that are associated with freedom*. The interesting finding is that the *value-laden* agentic factor can explain the highest variation from both 'self' and 'other' standpoints (18.13 and 18.01 equivalently) in people's decision making in terms of freedom. In other words, having Weber's (1993) substantive rationality is the most distinguishing agentic-factor in terms of freedom. However, at this stage we will not map the factors onto different parts of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, because we are going to revise the Evaluation Instrument based on the findings of this study in order to conduct another survey as the Quantitative Amendment phase that finalises the agentic factors.

To revise the Evaluation Instrument according to the findings of Study 2 there are three main challenges. First, as presented in Table 32, there are 21 items that are found significant but they have moderately low correlation with the extracted factor. The question is whether to lose them or keep them in revised version of Evaluation Instrument. Second, there are two factors (i.e., Ethical Rules, and Third Party Evaluation "who") that are only extracted at the 'self' standpoint, and three factors (i.e., Correlational Reasoning, Self-Centred Motivation, and Number of Capabilities) that are only extracted at the 'other' stand point. Keeping them in the Evaluation Instrument will disturb the harmony of having similar measurement scales at the 'self' and 'other' sides. Third, among the factors that are extracted at both 'self' and 'other' sides, some have different numbers of items loaded to them. For example, the factor of Goal Orientation has 10 items at the 'self' stand point, whereas it has eight items at the 'other' side. Overall, the latter two challenges are about this question of how to keep the harmony of factors at the 'self' and 'other' standpoints in the revised Evaluation Instrument.

In line with Brown (2015), our approach to overcome these challenges is primarily being loyal to theory and then trying to keep the harmony of factorial models; here, for 'self' and 'other' measurement scales. This means that we keep the items as long as all of the theoretical constructs and dimensions are kept in the Evaluation Instrument. In this line, Table 13 shows why we keep seven items that are significant but they have moderately low correlation in the revised Evaluation Instrument. The third column in this table shows if the item is the only representative of its theoretical dimension. If the items represent a theoretical dimension in isolation, then we keep it in the revised Evaluation Instrument. For example, we keep Qo36 (i.e. question 36 of the 'Other' side) as it is the only item that represents the "Stimulus", that is the sub-dimension of "Correlational Reasoning", but we lose Qo14 (i.e. question 14 of the 'other'

side) as it is not the only item that measures “Who” that is the sub-dimension of “Impact of Third Party Evaluation”.

Table 32: Insignificant Items from EFA (Study 2)

Item	Theme, Dimension, Sub-Dimension	Isolated/not	Lose/ Keep
(other) Q3. I could have chosen a different job.			
	Freedom Awareness; Ontology of Capabilities; Number of Capabilities	Dimension: No Sub-Dimension: Yes	Keep
(self) Qs2. I believe that I worked hard to become a Personal Tutor.			
	Freedom Awareness; Psychological; Connotation	Dimension: No Sub-Dimension: No	Keep
(self) Q16. I have some rules for myself that prevent me from doing some jobs that others do.			
	Impact of Third Party Evaluation; How; Social Obligation	Dimension: No Sub-Dimension: Yes	Keep
(self) Q17. It was obvious for me to choose this job.			
	Impact of Third Party Evaluation; How; Taken for Granted;	Dimension: No Sub-Dimension: Yes	Keep
(other) Q26. Maximising my self-interest is important in my decision.			
	Teleological Reasoning; Motivator; Subjective Preference;	Dimension: No Sub-Dimension: Yes	Keep
(other) Q27. In my decisions I try to maximise my self-interest.			

Teleological Reasoning; Motivator; Subjective Preference;	Dimension: No Sub-Dimension: Yes	Keep
(other) Q35. There were many other students applying for this job.		
Correlational Reasoning; Person;	Dimension: Yes Sub-Dimension: Yes	Keep
(other) Qo36.I became a Personal Tutor because I have exceptional characteristics.		
Correlational Reasoning; Stimulus;	Dimension: Yes Sub-Dimension: Yes	Keep
(other) Q37. This job always has applicants.		
Correlational Reasoning; Time;	Dimension: Yes Sub-Dimension: Yes	Keep
(other) Q38. I had personal physiological limitations.		
Impact of Commodities; Tangible; Individual Physiological limitation;	Dimension: No Sub-Dimension: No	Lose
(other) Q15. Because the way this organisation operates is appropriate for its workers.		
Third Party Evaluation; How; Expedite Rules	Dimension: No Sub-Dimension: No	Lose

(other) Q17. Becoming a Personal Tutor was not a result of serious decision-making process, but it was an expectation of me.		
Third Party Evaluation; How; Taken for Granted;	Dimension: No Sub-Dimension: No	Lose
(self) Q23. I think that I made a right choice.		
Impact of First Party Evaluation; Personal Evaluation; Type;	Dimension: No Sub-Dimension: No	Lose
(self) Q40. I did not have access to educational facilities or resources in society to choose my favourite job.		
Impact of Commodity; Intangible Resources; Social Limitation;	Dimension: No Sub-Dimension: No	Lose
(self) Q20. I think this is a usual job for university students.		
Impact of First Party Evaluation; How; Social Categorization Factors;	Dimension: No Sub-Dimension: No	Lose
(self) Q11. Because I expected to be promoted in future.		
Ontology of Attribution; Event Temporal; Event, Past	Dimension: No Sub-Dimension: No	Lose

(self) Q14. Because someone whom I believe advised me.

Impact of Third Party Evaluation;
Who;
Characteristics;

Dimension: No
Sub-Dimension: No

Lose

(self) Q21. Because sometimes I do not decide based on my beliefs to prevent wrong judgments.

Impact of Third Party Evaluation;
How;
Social Adapting Norm;

Dimension: No
Sub-Dimension: No

Lose

(other) Q29. Sometimes I decide against my personal interests to achieve moral and ethical satisfaction.

Teleological Reasoning;
Decision Type;
Self-centred Choice;

Dimension: No
Sub-Dimension: No

Lose

(other) Qo31. Something like an impulse pushed me to make this decision.

Causal Reasoning;
Impulse

Dimension: No
Sub-Dimension: Yes

Lose

(self) Q31. I think because I found the job of Personal Tutorship.

Causal Reasoning;
Impulse

Dimension: No
Sub-Dimension: Yes

Lose

Study 2: The Evaluation Instrument (2nd Version)

Finally, Table 33 presents the revised Evaluation Instrument in which we have: (A) kept at least one item for all of the theoretical dimensions of the first Evaluation Instrument, and (B) kept the harmony of items at the 'self' and 'other' standpoints. Table 33 is the revised Evaluation Instrument based on the findings of Study 2, according to which the number of items at the 'self' and 'other' standpoints has reduced from 42 to 36. This version of the Evaluation Instrument will be revised for a second time in Study 3, which is a survey on 'university major selection'. In this regard, we revise the wording of the questions according to its focal decision. In this line, the 'other' is indicated as "parents", because the respondents are students at the age of 18 and 19 and Padilla-Walker et al. (2013) have shown that at this age for these young adults the main other, whose evaluation influences their decisions, is their family and particularly their parents. However, in this version of the Evaluation Instrument (Table 13) we have tried to revise the wording of the items to be generic rather than decision specific. This helps us to use the final Evaluation Instrument for *identifying agency-oriented factors associated with freedom* for any type of decision.

Table 33: Evaluation Instrument (2nd Version)

Other	Self
Other Factor 1: Goal Orientation	Self Factor 1: Goal Orientation
<p>I. <u>Theme: Freedom Awareness</u></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">a. Psychological Freedom</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">i. Volition:</p> <p style="padding-left: 60px;">Qo1. He/she genuinely wants this opportunity.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">ii. Connotation:</p> <p style="padding-left: 60px;">Qo2. He/she has the drive.</p> <p>II. <u>Theme: Impact of Third Party Evaluation</u></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">a. How</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">i. Social Obligation</p> <p style="padding-left: 60px;">Qo3. Because this choice is in line with his/her ethical beliefs.</p> <p>III. <u>Theme: Impact of First Party Evaluation</u></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">a. What</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">i. Valence</p> <p style="padding-left: 60px;">Qo4. He/she is making the right choice.</p> <p style="padding-left: 60px;">Qo5. His/her personal evaluations largely influence his/her future decisions.</p> <p>IV. <u>Theme: Teleological Reasoning</u></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">a. Motivators</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">i. Ethical Preference</p> <p style="padding-left: 60px;">Qo6. Moral and ethical concerns motivate his/her decision.</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">b. Decision Type</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">i. Sympathetic Action</p> <p style="padding-left: 60px;">Qo7. He/she tries to make a decision that satisfies both his/her and our preferences.</p>	<p>I. <u>Theme: Freedom Awareness</u></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">a. Psychological Freedom</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">i. Volition:</p> <p style="padding-left: 60px;">Qs1. I believe that I freely choose my major.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">ii. Connotation:</p> <p style="padding-left: 60px;">Qs2. I believe that I worked hard to be able to choose this major.</p> <p>II. <u>Theme: Impact of Third Party Evaluation</u></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">a. How</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">i. Expedience Rules</p> <p style="padding-left: 60px;">Qs3. I can influence others by choosing this major.</p> <p>III. <u>Theme: Impact of First Party Evaluation</u></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">a. What:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">i. Qs4. This major drives me to reach my goals.</p> <p>IV. <u>Theme: Teleological Reasoning</u></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">a. Motivators</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">i. Ethical Preference</p> <p style="padding-left: 60px;">Qs5. Because this major allows me to help others.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">ii. Subjective Preference</p> <p style="padding-left: 60px;">Qs6. I like this major.</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">b. Decision Type</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">i. Self-centred Choice</p> <p style="padding-left: 60px;">Qs7. I will be educated and that is useful for my future.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">ii. Sympathetic Action</p>

Qs8. Because my decision is good for me and others.

iii. Committed Action

Qs9. Through this major I can positively impact in society and that is more important than my personal interests.

V. Theme: Correlational Reasoning

a. Time

Qs10. I was always thinking about studying this major.

**Other Factor 2:
Impact of Commodities**

**Self Factor 4:
Impact of Commodities**

Theme: Impact of Commodities

I. **Tangible Resources**

Qo8. The environment limited his/her choices.

II. **Intangible Resources**

Qo9. He/she has social limitations.

Qo10. Conventions and customs limited his/her choice.

Qo11. His/her family limited my opportunities.

Theme: Impact of Commodities

I. **Tangible Resources**

Qs11. I have a shortcoming, such as illness, disability, age or gender limitation.

Qs12. My opportunities are limited because of my result in Concour.

II. **Intangible Resources**

Qs13. My family situation was against me and limited my options.

Qs14. In my family, I faced negative discrimination and resources were not evenly distributed among us.

**Other Factor 3:
Causal State and Trigger**

**Self Factor 2:
Causal State and Trigger**

Theme: Ontology of Attribution:

I. **State-Temporal:**

a. **Past:**

Theme: Ontology of Attribution:

I. **State-Temporal:**

Qo12. Because of his/her previous state, before this decision (.796).

b. Present:

Qo13. Because of his/her current state when she/he is making this decision. (.811)

II. Event Temporal

a. Past:

Qo14. Because of what happened before this decision (.696).

b. Present:

Qo15. Because of what happened just when he/she is making this decision (.700).

a. Past:

Qs15. I think because before this decision, my other choices were limited.

b. Present:

Qs16. I chose it due to its current popularity.

II. Event Temporal

a. Past:

Qs17. Because before this decision something happened that I could not achieve the result that I wanted in Concour.

b. Present:

Qs18. I think because something is happening now that I am choosing this major.

III. Theme: Impact of First Party Evaluation:

I. How

a. Social Comparing Norms:

Qs19. I think because of my family status and situation I am choosing this major.

**Other Factor 5:
Causal Reasoning**

**Self Factor 3:
Causal Reasoning**

Theme: Causal Reasoning:

I. State:

Qo16. His/her geographical, emotional and physical state is important when he/she is making this decision.

II. Transition:

Qo17. After making this decision, his/her state will change.

III. Enabling State:

Qo18. His/her state, when he/she is making this decision, enables him/her to transform into a new state.

IV. State Change:

Theme: Causal Reasoning:

I. Transition:

Qs20. After being accepted for this major in university, my state will change.

II. Enabling State:

Qs21. Because my state and abilities are in line with this university major's requirement.

III. State Change:

Qs22. I have the required score in Concour, I apply for this major, and after being accepted in this major my

Qo19. Something triggered him/her, he/she will make this decision, and his/her state would change.

state will change.

**Other Factor 4:
Third Party Evaluation**

**Self Factor 4:
Third Party Evaluation**

Theme: Impact of Third Party Evaluation

I. Who

Qo20. Certain people's evaluation influences his/her decision.

Qo21. Because he/she trusts others' evaluation of his/her decision.

II. What

a. Valence

Qo22. Because others have positive judgment.

b. Motivator

Qo23. Because others encourage him/her.

Theme: Impact of Third Party Evaluation

I. Who

Qs23. The environment is influential on my decision.

Qs24. My parents recommend this major to me (.689).

II. What

a. Valence

Qs25. Others have positive ideas about me choosing this major.

b. Motivator

Qs26. Others encourage me.

**Other Factor 8:
Social Identifier**

**Self Factor 5:
Social Identifier**

I. Theme: Impact of First Party Evaluation

II. How:

Qo24. Typically, people similar to him/her choose the same way.

Qo25. He/she has many common points with those who choose the same major.

Qo26. He/she and those who choose the same major are more successful.

I. Theme: Causal Reasoning

a. State:

Qs27. Because I am a student, who has studied and passed Concour for this major.

b. Theme: Correlational Reasoning

i. Person:

Qs28. I think this is a popular major for students.

ii. Stimuli:

Qs29. My specific situation makes me choose this major.

**Other Factor 9:
Attribution to Future**

I. Theme: Ontology of Attribution:

a. State/Temporal

Future State:

Qo27. Because of the state that he/she aims to reach after this decision.

b. Event/Temporal

Future Event:

Qo28. Because of what he/she expects to happen after his/her decision.

**Self Factor 9:
Attribution to Future**

I. Theme: Ontology of Attribution:

a. State/Temporal

Future State:

Qs30. I think due to the state that I expect to reach through this major.

b. Event/Temporal

Future Event:

Qs31. Because I expect to progress in future.

**Other Factor 11:
Ontology of Capabilities**

I. Theme: Freedom Awareness

a. Ontology of Capabilities

i. Number:

Qo29. He/she can choose a different way.

ii. Equivalence:

Qo30. All of his/her opportunities are equally valuable to him/her.

iii. Independence:

Qo31. This choice does not prevent him/her from perusing his/her other options.

**Self Factor 7:
Ontology of Capabilities**

I. Theme: Freedom Awareness

a. Ontology of Capabilities

i. Number:

Qs32. I believe that I have other alternatives.

ii. Equivalence:

Qs33. I believe that my other alternatives are as good as this major.

iii. Independence:

Qs34. I believe that I can choose to do

another major at the same time.

Extension: Components that are found only on Subjective or Objective Side

**Other Factor 6:
Self-Centred Motivation**

I. Teleological Reasoning

a. Motivator:

Qo32: Maximising his/her self-interest is important when he/she is making this decision.

b. Decision Type:

Qo33. In his/her decisions he/she tries to maximise his/her self-interest.

**Other Factor 7:
Correlational Reasoning**

I. Correlational Reasoning:

a. Person:

Qo34. There are many others applying for this major.

b. Stimulus:

Qo35. He/she chooses this option because he/she has exceptional abilities.

c. Time:

Qo36. This option always has applicants.

**Self Factor 10:
Ethical Reasoning**

I. Impact of Third Party Evaluation

a. How:

i. Social Obligation:

Qs35. I have some rules for myself that prevent me from choosing other majors that others do.

ii. Taken for Granted:

Qs36. It is obvious for me to choose this major.

Study 3: Quantitative Amendment

Study 3 is the Quantitative Amendment phase of our research methodology *to determine agency-oriented factors associated with freedom*, which is the final step towards achieving the first research objective. Study 3 is a survey and its measurement scale is the Evaluation Instrument that has been revised in the previous survey (i.e. Study 2). Participants are young male and female adults at the ages of 18 and 19, randomly selected from 455,897 students of the host organisation that are distributed in 450 rural and urban areas in Iran. The online questionnaire is distributed through SurveyMonkey via the host organisation's official website for two weeks from the 5th of June 2015. As a result of the pilot study, the questionnaire is presented in both Farsi and English. We have managed to collect 4,200 responses, among which 4,086 valid responses were obtained that is representative sample for *determining agency-oriented factors associated with freedom*, with a focus on the agency outcome of 'university major selection' that is regarded as one of the most important decisions young adults make in their life (Salehi-Isfahani, 2011).

Study 3 aims to statistically concise the agency-oriented factors for the final round. In this regard initially we run EFA to concise the 'self' and 'other' factors. The rotation method used in the analysis is Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. It is worth mentioning here that EFA is applied on 36 items of 'self' and 36 items of 'other', separately. As explained in the previous study, this is because theoretically these two standpoints are independent in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in order to identify 'rationalisation' (see Chapter 4, Theoretical Development). Statistically, we can run EFA on 'self' and 'other' items, because their correlation matrix Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin statistic is large (.895 and .874, equivalently) and their Chi-Square in Bartlett's test of Sphericity (37474.48 and 38773.66, equivalently) are found significant with p-value (.000). These findings show that EFA is an appropriate technique for this data set.

Secondly, we run Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to evaluate the fitness of final models of 'self' and 'other'. Finally, to interpret the findings, we map the 'self' and 'other' factors in the final version of the Evaluation Instrument and map them onto other elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (i.e. rationality type, reconciling approach, and emotion). In the next study, we use the final Evaluation Instrument in the second round of qualitative development of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency *to establish how freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors*, which is our second research objective.

Study 3: Result ('Self' Standpoint)

Table 34 presents the result of EFA on 'self' factors that includes the eigenvalue, total loadings and variance of 'self' factors. As explained above only the factors with eigenvalues greater than one are used. So, we have extracted 8 common factors at the 'self' standpoint. The second reason that these 8 factors are extracted is that we seek common factors that cumulatively account for a large percentage of the total variance (typically at least 60%). Here, the first 8 factors combined account for a cumulative percentage of 57.48% of the total variance. Figure 26 is the scree plot of the eigenvalues against the number of factors in the order of extraction, according to which, again, 8 factors seem reasonable at the 'self' stand point.

Table 34: Eigenvalues, total loadings, variance of 'self' factors (Study 3)

Component	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	6.47	18.00	18.00
2	5.08	14.11	32.09
3	2.30	6.38	38.47
4	1.92	5.34	43.81
5	1.54	4.27	48.09
6	1.31	3.64	51.73
7	1.04	2.89	54.62
8	1.03	2.86	57.49
9	.95	2.65	60.14
10	.86	2.39	62.53
11	.81	2.26	64.79

Figure 26: Scree Plot of 'self' factors (Study 2)




Table 35 presents the component matrix of the 8 'self' factors and maps them to the theoretical constructs in the early Evaluation Instrument. Similar to the previous study, the first column in this table presents the new labels of each factor that is assigned based on the theoretical themes. Inconsistent with the findings of the previous study, here, the first factor is *value laden* and *goals oriented* as the items of Sen's (2004) goal-oriented motivation (self-centred, sympathetic, and committed action) are correlated with the first factor (.76, .79, and .65, equivalently), with ($r > .65$). The first column of Table 34 presents the new labels of each factor that are assigned to them according to the theoretical foundation. The findings indicate that the final 8 'self' factors are: (1) Motivation, (2) Social Status, (3) Third Party Evaluation, (4) Capabilities, (5) Expectations, (6) Intangible Resources, (7) Effort and Ability, and (8) Desire Intensity. The items loaded to these factors are marked by their question number in the Evaluation Instrument, in order to show how the order of the previous Evaluation Instrument is revised in this study. For example, the questions of 3rd to 9th in the Evaluation Instrument are loaded to the first factor labelled as Motivation and the 1st item is loaded to the 6th factors, and the 2nd item is loaded to the 7th factor in the revised Evaluation Instrument. These findings help us to finalise the Evaluation Instrument based on the statistical evidence.

The findings in the first row of Table 35 indicate that a *value laden* and *goal oriented* factor of Motivation has the greatest eigenvalue (6.47) and explains the highest variance (17.98%) in the data set among all 8 'self' factors. This finding is another insight showing that the main agentic factor that distinguishes respondents, in terms of their freedom is *value laden* and *goal oriented*, which are the characteristics of (Weber, 1993) substantive rationality. Further, our cut-off point for factor loading to extract the items loaded to each factor is (.30). Here, there are seven items that are significant but they have moderately low correlation (i.e., .50, .36, .54, .50, .50, .54, and .44), which are the items of (s35, s16, s15, s12, s27, s10, and s36 equivalently). Note that here, 's' means 'self' factor. The only item that is excluded from the 'self' model in the final Evaluation Instrument is s23 that has measured Third Party Evaluation (How), which is being measured with s24 and s25.

Table 35: 'Self' Component Matrix (Study3)

Factor	Label	Eigen	Var.%	Theme, Dimension	Item	r
1		6.47	17.98	Motivation		
				Goal Orientation, Impact of Third Party Evaluation, How	s3. I can be an influential person through choosing this major.	.76
				Goal Orientation, Impact of First Party Evaluation, What	s4. This major drives me to reach my goals.	.71
				Goal Orientation, Teleological Reasoning, Motivator, Ethical Preferences	s5. This major allows me to help others.	.79
				Goal Orientation, Teleological Reasoning, Motivator, Subjective Preferences	s6. I like this major.	.65
				Goal Orientation, Teleological Reasoning, Decision Type, Self-Centred Choice	s7. I will be educated and this is useful for my future.	.70
				Goal Orientation, Teleological Reasoning, Decision Type, sympathetic Action	s8. This decision is good for me and others.	.65
				Goal Orientation, Teleological Reasoning, Decision Type, Committed Action	s9. Through this major I can create an impact on society that is more important than my personal interests.	.78
				2		5.08
Impact of Commodities, Tangible Resources	s11. I have a shortcoming, such as illness, disability, age, or gender limitation.	.60				
Causal State and Trigger, Ontology of Attribution, Event-Temporal, Past	s17. Because before this decision something happened that I could not achieve the result that I wanted in Concour.	.69				

		Causal State and Trigger, Ontology of Attribution, Event-Temporal, Present	s18. I think because something is happening now that I am choosing this major.	.67
		Causal State and Trigger, Impact of First Party Evaluation, How	s19. I think because of my family status and situation I am choosing this major.	.53
		Social Identifier, Correlational Reasoning, Stimulus	s29. My specific situation makes me choose this major.	.65
		Ethical Reasoning, Impact of Third Party Evaluation, How	s35. I have some rules for myself that prevents me from choosing other majors that others do.	.50*
3		Third Party Evaluation		
	2.30	6.38		
		Casual State and Trigger, Ontology of Attribution, Present State	s16. I choose it due to its current popularity.	.36*
		Impact of Third Party Evaluation, Who	s24. My parents recommend this major to me.	.73
		Impact of Third Party Evaluation, What, Valence	s25. Others have positive ideas about me choosing this major.	.80
		Impact of Third Party Evaluation, What, Motivator	s26. Others encourage me.	.84
		Social Identifier, Correlational Reasoning, Person	s28. I think this is a popular major for students.	.61
4		Capabilities		
	1.92	5.34		
		Freedom Awareness, Ontology of Capability, Number	s32. I believe that I have other alternatives.	.87
		Freedom Awareness, Ontology of Capabilities, Equivalence	s33. I believe that my other alternatives are as good as this major.	.89
		Freedom Awareness, Ontology of Capabilities, Independence	s34. I believe that I can choose to do another major at the same time.	.83

5			Expectations	
	1.54	4.27		
			Causal Reasoning, Transition	s20. After being accepted in this major in university, my state will change. .61
			Ontology of Attribution, State-Temporal, Future	s30. I think due to the state that I expect to reach through this major. .69
			Ontology of Attribution, Event-Temporal, Future	s31. Because I expect to find a good job in future. .63
6			Intangible Resources	
	1.31	3.64		
			Freedom Awareness, Psychological, Volition	s1. I believe that I FREELY choose this major. .55
			Impact of Commodities, Intangible Resources	s13. My family situation limited my options. .78
			Impact of Commodities, Intangible Resources	s14. In my family, I was under negative discrimination and resources were not evenly distributed among us. .62
			Ontology of Attribution, State Temporal, Past	s15. I think because before making this decision, my other choices were limited. .54*
7			Effort and Ability	
	1.04	2.89		
			Goal Orientation, Freedom Awareness, Psychological, Connotation	s2. I believe that I have WORKED HARD to be able to choose this major. .59
			Impact of Commodities	s12. My opportunities are limited because of my result in Concour. .50*
			Causal Reasoning, Enabling State	s21. Because my state and abilities are in line with this university major's requirements. .60

		Causal Reasoning, State Change	s22. I can get the required score in Concour, I apply for this major, and after being accepted in this major my state will change.	.70
		Ethical Reasoning, Impact of Third Party Evaluation, Taken for Granted	36. It is obvious for me to choose this major.	.44*
8		Desire Intensity		
	1.03	2.73		
		Social Identifier, Causal Reasoning, State	s27. Because I have studied to pass the Concour to be able to choose this major.	.50*
		Goal Orientation, Correlational Reasoning, Time	s10. I was always thinking about studying this major.	.54*

Note: (*) significant items with moderately low correlation that are kept in the 3rd Evaluation Instrument due to theoretical necessity.

Study 3: Result ('Other' Standpoint)

Table 36 presents the results of EFA on 'other' factors, including the eigenvalue, total loadings and variance of 'other' factors. As explained above only the factors with eigenvalues greater than one are used. So, we have extracted nine common factors at the 'other' standpoint. The second reason that these nine factors are extracted is that we seek common factors that cumulatively account for a large percentage of the total variance (typically at least 60%). Here, the first nine factors combined account for a cumulative total of 64.06% of the total variance. Figure 27 is the scree plot of the eigenvalues against the number of factors in the order of extraction that, again, nine factors seem reasonable at the 'other' stand point.

Table 36: Eigenvalues, total loadings, variance of 'other' factors

Component	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	6.93	19.25	19.25
2	5.39	14.96	34.21
3	2.41	6.71	40.91
4	1.92	5.34	46.25
5	1.48	4.11	50.36
6	1.44	4.00	54.36
7	1.33	3.69	58.05
8	1.14	3.17	61.22
9	1.02	2.84	64.06

Figure 27: Scree Plot of 'other' factors




Table 37 presents the component matrix of nine 'other' factors and maps them onto the theoretical constructs in the early Evaluation Instrument. As explained above, the first column in this table presents the new labels of each factor that is assigned based on the theoretical themes of the items that are loaded to that component. The findings indicate that the first 'other' factor is *value-laden* as two items that are about ethical issues (i.e. o3 and o6) are highly correlated ($r > .7$) with the first factor (.83 and .72, equivalently). Note that here 'o' means a question at the 'other' standpoint. The first column of Table 37 presents the new labels of each factor that are assigned according to the theoretical foundation. The findings indicate that the final nine 'other' factors are: (1) Motivation, (2) Third Party Evaluation, (3) Intangible Resources, (4) Social Status, (5) Expectations, (6) Popularity, (7) Social Group, (8) Capabilities, and (9) Self-interest. The items loaded to these factors are marked by their question number in the Evaluation Instrument, indicating how the order of the previous Evaluation Instrument is revised as a result of EFA in this study. For example, the questions of o17, o18, o19, o27, and o28 are loaded to factor 5 that shows the order of 'other' factors in the Evaluation Instrument is going to be revised in the second version. As mentioned earlier, these findings help us to finalise the Evaluation Instrument, using the results of EFA and CFA. Further, the findings in the first row of Table 37 indicate that a *value-laden* and *goal-oriented* factor of Motivation has the greatest eigenvalue (6.92) and explains the highest variance (19.25%) in the data set among all of the nine 'other' factors. This finding is the fourth insight showing that the main agentic factor that distinguishes respondents, in terms of their freedom is *value-laden* that is mapped to Weber's (1993) substantive rationality. In other words, *using substantive rationality distinguishes one from other individuals in terms of her freedom*.

Our threshold to extract the items loaded to each factor is ($r \geq .55$). There are four items (o5, o19, o26, and o35) that are found significant but their correlation with their component is moderately low (.52, .50, .53, and .43 equivalently). However, we keep these four items in the 3rd version of the Evaluation Instrument because of the theoretical necessity. This is because if they will be omitted then we will miss a theoretical dimension to *determine agency-oriented factors associated with freedom*. However, two items are excluded from the Evaluation Instrument that are o7 (measuring Teleological Reasoning, Decision Type, Sympathy) and o16 (measuring Casual Reasoning, State). These two items are excluded because they have moderately low correlation with their factor, and at the same time we have two other items (o6

and o18) that measure the same theoretical dimensions with higher level of correlation (.72 and .61 equivalently).

Table 37: 'Other' Component Matrix (Study3)

Factor	Label	Eigen	Var.%	Theme, Dimension	Item	r
1				Motivation		
		6.93	19.25			
				Freedom Awareness, Psychological Freedom, Volition	o1. He/she genuinely wants this opportunity.	.76
				Freedom Awareness, Psychological Freedom, Connotation	o2. He/she has the drive.	.76
				Impact of Third Party Evaluation, Social Obligation	o3. Because this choice is in line with his/her ethical beliefs.	.83
				Impact of First Party Evaluation, What, Valence	o4. He/she is making the right choice.	.57
				Impact of First Party Evaluation, What, Valence	o5. His/her personal evaluations largely influence his/her future decisions.	.52*
				Teleological Reasoning, Motivators, Ethical Preference	o6. Moral and ethical concerns motivate his/her decision.	.72
2				Third Party Evaluation		
		5.39	14.96			
				Third Party Evaluation, Who	o20. Certain people evaluation influences this decision.	.71
				Third Party Evaluation, Who	o21. Because he/she trusts others' evaluation of this decision.	.83
				Third Party Evaluation, What	22. Because others have positive judgment.	.83
				Third Party Evaluation, What	23. Because others encourage him/her.	.82
				First Party Evaluation, How	24. Typically, people similar to him/her choose the same way.	.64
3				Intangible Resources		

	2.41	6.71		
			Impact of Commodities	o8. Environment limited his/her choices. .81
			Impact of Commodities	o9. He/she has social limitations. .81
			Impact of Commodities	o10. Conventions and customs limited his/her choice. .81
			Impact of Commodities	o11. His/her family limited my opportunities. .76
4			Social Status	
	1.92	5.34		
			Ontology of Attribution, State-Temporal, Past	o12. Because of his/her previous state, before this decision. .76
			Ontology of Attribution, State-Temporal, Present	o13. Because of his/her current state when she/he is making this decision. .72
			Ontology of Attribution, Event Temporal, Past	o14. Because of what happened before this decision. .78
			Ontology of Attribution, Event Temporal, Present	o15. Because of what happened just when he/she is making decision. .75
5			Expectations	
	1.48	4.11		
			Causal Reasoning, Transition	o17. After making this decision, his/her state will change. .72
			Causal Reasoning, Enabling State	o18. His/her state, when he/she is making this decision enables him/her to transform into new state. .61
			Causal Reasoning, State Change	o19. Something triggered him/her, he/she will make this decision, and his/her state would change. .50*

			Ontology of Attribution, State-Temporal, Future	o27. Because of the state that he/she aims to reach after this decision.	.60
			Ontology of Attribution, Event-Temporal, Future	o28. Because of what he/she expects to happen after his/her decision.	.59
6			Popularity		
	1.44	3.99			
			Correlational Reasoning (Person)	o34. There are many others applying for this major.	.82
			Correlational Reasoning (Time)	o36. This option has always applicants.	.82
7			Social Group		
	1.33	3.69			
			Impact of First Party Evaluation, How	o25. He/she has many common points with those who choose the same major.	.67
			Impact of First Party Evaluation, How	o26. He/she and those who choose the same major are more successful.	.53*
			Correlational Reasoning, Stimulus	o35. He/she chooses this option because he/she has exceptional abilities.	.43*
8			Capabilities		
	1.14	3.17			
			Freedom Awareness, Ontology of Capability, Number	o29. He/she can choose a different way.	.74
			Freedom Awareness, Ontology of Capability, Equivalence	o30. All of his/her opportunities are equally valuable to him/her.	.77
			Freedom Awareness, Ontology of Capability, Independence	o31. This choice does not prevent him/her from pursuing his/her other options.	.61

9		Self-interest			
1.02	2.84	Teleological Reasoning, Motivator	o32. Maximising his/her self-interest is important when he/she is making this decision.	.85	
		Teleological Reasoning, Decision Type, Selfish Action	o33. In his/her decisions he/she tries to maximise his/her self-interest.	.87	

Note: * significant items but with moderately low correlation that are kept in the 3rd Evaluation Instrument due to theoretical necessity.

Study 3: Test of Fitness (CFA)

To retest the discriminant validity of eight 'self' factor models and nine 'other' factor models, we have conducted Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) using Lisrel 8 software. As summarised in Table 38 both 'self' and 'other' models are found fitted to the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. The goodness-of-fit indices for eight 'self' factor and nine 'other' factor models are Normed Fit Index (NFI) (.91 and .88, equivalently), Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) (.91 and .89, equivalently), Comparative Fit Index (CFI) (.92 and .90, equivalently), Incremental Fit Index (IFI) (.92 and .91, equivalently), and Relative Fit Index (RFI) (.90 and .89, equivalently), which show that both 'self' and 'other' models are fitted as their fitness indices are near the threshold of .9 (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002).

Table 38: Fit Indices of eight 'self' factor and nine 'other' factor models (Study 3)

	χ^2	<i>df</i>	ρ	NFI	NNFI	CFI	IFI	RFI	RMSEA
8 'self'-Factor Model									
Agentic Factors	115713.28	566	.0	.91	.91	.92	.92	.90	.07
9 'other'-Factor Model									
Agentic Factors	35325.64	524	.0	.88	.89	.90	.91	.89	.07

Note: Using LISREL 8 software; Cut-off criteria is .9 for excellent fit based on Normed Fit Index (NFI), Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Incremental Fit Index (IFI), and Relative Fit Index (RFI) measurements (Hu and Bentler, 1999); Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) measures close to .05 shows good fit (Levinson, 1947)

Study 3: The Evaluation Instrument (3rd Version)

The results of EFA and CFA have determined and confirmed eight 'self' factor and nine 'other' factor models as *the agency-oriented factors associated with freedom*. Table 39 is the revised Evaluation Instrument (i.e. the 3rd version that is the final version) that has been amended in three following aspects according to the findings of study 3: (a) s23, o7 and o16 are excluded from the previous version (i.e. 2nd version) as their correlation with the extracted components is moderately low and theoretically it is not crucial to keep them in the final Evaluation Instrument (i.e. there are other items with higher correlation measuring the same theoretical construct); (b) the order and label of factors are revised based on the findings of Study 3, (c) the agency-oriented factors are coincided in to eight 'self' and nine 'other' factors. Further, in Table 39 we map the agency-oriented factors onto Weber's (1993) rationality types and three types of reasoning (i.e. teleological, causal and correlational), as explained in Chapter 4 on Theory Development. For example, the first 'self' factor that is labelled "Motivation" is mapped onto Weber's substantive rationality as all of its items are *value* laden. The second column of Table 39 shows the type of reasoning mapped to each factor. For example, the 'self' Motivation factor is mapped onto 'teleological' reasoning that means the agent assigns a future-oriented reason to her decision. In addition, Figure 28 shows the agentic factors on the time line that its focus is on mapping factors onto temporal types of reasoning. At this stage we use Weber's (1993) theory and temporal types of reasoning (i.e. teleological, causal and correlational) to explain the results of factor analysis, we are using abduction to finalise the Evaluation Instrument.

Table 39: The Evaluation Instrument (3rd Version)

View Factor	Reasoning	Rationality Type	Items (theoretical themes and dimensions)
'Self' Motivation	Teleological	Substantive	<p>1: I can be an influential person through choosing this major. (Impact of Third Party Evaluation, How)</p> <p>2: This major drives me to reach my goals. (Impact of First Party Evaluation, What)</p> <p>3: This major allows me to help others. (Teleological Reasoning, Motivator, Ethical Preferences)</p> <p>4: I like this major. (Teleological Reasoning, Motivator, Subjective Preferences)</p> <p>5: I will be educated and this is useful for my future. (Teleological Reasoning, Decision Type, Self-Centred Choice)</p> <p>6: This decision is good for me and others. (Teleological Reasoning, Decision Type, sympathetic Action)</p> <p>7: Through this major I can create an impact on society that is more important than my personal interests. (Teleological Reasoning, Decision Type, Committed Action)</p>
'Self' Causal State	Causal/ Correlational	Theoretical	<p>8: I think because before this decision something happened that I could not achieve the result that I wanted in Concour. (Ontology of Attribution, Event-Temporal, Past)</p> <p>9: I think because something is happening now that I am choosing this major. (Ontology of Attribution, Event-Temporal, Present)</p> <p>10: I think because of my family status and situation I am choosing this major. (Impact of First Party Evaluation, How)</p> <p>11: My specific situation makes me choose this major. (Correlational Reasoning, Stimulus)</p> <p>12: I have some rules for myself that prevent me from choosing other majors that others choose. (Impact of Third Party Evaluation, How)</p>
'Self' Third Party Evaluation	Causal/ Correlational	Formal	<p>13: My parents recommended this major to me. (Third Party Evaluation-Who)</p> <p>14: Others have positive idea about me choosing this major. (Third Party Evaluation-What-Valence)</p> <p>15: Other encouraged me. (Third Party Evaluation-What-Motivator)</p> <p>16: I think this is a popular major for students. (Social Identifier-Correlational)</p>

Reasoning-Person)

'Self' Capabilities	Causal/ Correlational	Practical	<p>17: I believe that I have other alternatives. (Ontology of Capabilities-Number)</p> <p>18: I believe that my other alternatives are as good as this major. (Ontology of Capabilities-Equivalence)</p> <p>19: I think that I can choose to do another major at the same time. (Ontology of Capabilities-Independence)</p>
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'Self' Expectation	Teleological	Practical	<p>20: After being accepted in this major in university, my state will change. (Causal Reasoning-Transition)</p> <p>21: I think due to the state that I expect to reach through this major. (Attribution to Future State)</p> <p>22: Because I expect to find a good job in future. (Attribution to Future Event)</p>
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'Self' Resource Limitation	Causal	Formal	<p>23: I believe that I freely choose this job. (Goal Orientation-Psychological Freedom-Volition)</p> <p>24: My family situation limited my options. (Impact of Commodities-Intangible Resources)</p> <p>25: In my family I was under negative discrimination and resources were not evenly distributed among us. (Impact of Commodities-Intangible Resources)</p> <p>26: I think because before making this decision, my other choices were limited. (Causal State-Past State)</p>
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
'Self' Effort and Ability	Causal	Practical	<p>27: I believe that I have worked hard to be able to choose this major. (Goal Orientation-Psychological Freedom-Connotation)</p> <p>28: My opportunities are limited because of my result in Concour. (Impact of Commodities-Tangible Resources)</p> <p>29: Because my state and abilities are in line with major's requirements. (Causal Reasoning-Enabling State)</p> <p>30: I can get the required score in Concour, I will apply for this major, and after being accepted in this major my state will change. (Causal Reasoning-State Change)</p>
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'Self' Desire Intensity	Teleological	Substantive	31: I was always thinking about studying this major. (Goal Orientation-Correlational Reasoning-Time)
'Other' Motivation	Teleological	Substantive	<p>1: He/she genuinely wants this opportunity. (Goal Orientation-Freedom Awareness-Psychological Freedom-Volition)</p> <p>2: He/she has the drive. (Goal Orientation-Freedom Awareness-Psychological Freedom-Connotation)</p> <p>3: Because this choice is in line with her ethical beliefs. (Goal Orientation-Impact of Third Party Evaluation-Social Obligation)</p> <p>4: He/she is making the right choice. (Goal Orientation-Impact of First Party Evaluation-Valence)</p> <p>5: His/her personal evaluations largely influence his/her future decision. (Goal Orientation-Impact of First Party Evaluation-Valence)</p> <p>6: Moral and ethical concerns motivate his/her decision. (Goal Orientation-Teleological Reasoning-Motivator-Ethical Preference)</p>
'Other' Third Party Evaluation	Causal	Formal	<p>7: Certain people's evaluation influences this decision. (Third party evaluation-who)</p> <p>8: Because he/she trusts others' evaluation of this decision. (Third party evaluation-who)</p> <p>9: Because others have positive judgments. (Third party evaluation-what-valence)</p> <p>10: Because others encouraged him/her. (Third party evaluation-what-motivator)</p> <p>11: Typically, people similar to him/her choose the same way. (Social identifier-First party evaluation-How)</p>
'Other' Resource Limitation	Causal	Formal	<p>12: Environment limited his/her choice. (Impact of Commodities-Tangible Sources)</p> <p>13: He/she has social limitations. (Impact of Commodities-Intangible Sources)</p> <p>13: Conventions and customs limit his/her choice. (Impact of Commodities-Intangible Sources)</p> <p>14: His/her family limits his/her opportunities. (Impact of Commodities-Intangible)</p>

Sources)			
'Other' Causal State	Causal/ Correlational	Theoretical	<p>15: Because of his/her previous state, before this decision. (Causal State-Past state)</p> <p>16: Because of his/her current state when he/she is making this decision. (Causal State-Present state)</p> <p>17: Because of what happened before this decision. (Causal State-Past event)</p> <p>18: Because of what happened just when he/she is making this decision. (Causal State-Present Event)</p>
'Other' Expectation	Teleological	Practical	<p>19: After making this decision, his/her state will change. (Causal State-Transition)</p> <p>20: His/her state, when he/she is making this decision, enables him/her to transform into new state. (Causal State-Enabling State)</p> <p>21: Because of the state that he/she aims to reach after his/her decision. (Attribution to Future state)</p> <p>22: Because of what he/she expects to happen after his/her decision. (Attribution to Future event)</p>
'Other' Popularity	Correlational	Formal	<p>23: There are many others applying for this job. (Correlational Reasoning-Person)</p> <p>24: This option always has applicants. (Correlational Reasoning-Time)</p>
'Other' Social Group	Correlational	Formal	<p>25: He/she has many common points with those who choose the same majors. (Social Identifier-First Party Evaluation-How)</p> <p>26: He/she and those who choose the same major are more successful. (Social Identifier-First Party Evaluation-How)</p>
'Other' Capabilities	Correlational	Practical	<p>27: He/she can choose a different way. (Ontology of Capabilities-Number)</p> <p>28: All of his/her options are equally valuable to him/her. (Ontology of Capabilities-Equivalence)</p> <p>29: This choice does not prevent him from pursuing his/her other options. (Ontology of Capabilities-Independence)</p>

'Other' Self- Interest	Teleological	Practical	30: Maximising his/her self-interest is important when he/she is making his/her decision. 31: In his/her decision, he/she tries to maximise his/her decision.
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Figure 28: Agency Oriented Factor in Time Line



Summary: Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3

Table 40 presents an overview of Agentic Factors that are developed in the first three studies of this research in an attempt to answer the first research question (RQ1). We start from 11 themes developed in Study 1, then in two surveys (Study 2 and Study 3) we concise these factors into to eight 'self' and nine 'other' agentic factors. Overall, Table 39 determines the *cognitive* and *conative* modes of agency, in an attempt to achieve the first research objective (i.e. *determining agency-oriented factors that associated with freedom*). The main result of these three studies is that the nine 'other' factor model explains higher variance in the 3rd version of the Evaluation Instrument, comparing with the earlier versions. Further, the number of items has reduced from 46 to 36 at each standpoint of 'self' and 'other'.

However, this research aims to *determine the agency-freedom relationship*, thus, at this stage three following methodological steps remain: (A) finding empirical support for the *affective* mode of agency-oriented factors; (B) collecting empirical support for *rationality type* and *reconciling approach*; (c) investigating empirical evidence that shows how cognitive, conative and affective modes of agency are related with respect to freedom as developed in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (see Chapter 4, Theory Development). It is worth mentioning here, however, that the final step helps to *establish how freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors* (i.e. the second research objective). In this regard, in the following section, that is Study 4, we will conduct extensive in-depth interviews, using the Evaluation Instrument (Table 39) in order to accomplish the remaining steps in order to finally determine the agency-freedom relationship. Study 4 develops empirical support for *emotion*, its connection with *reason* and their impact on the freedom-agency relationship. In Chapter 6 a case study methodology is developed to apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency based on the findings of the first and second objectives. Further in Chapter 6 we use the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency and following its methodology, we will determine the agency-freedom relationship in one case study.

Table 21: Agentic tors, Chapter Overview

	Study 1	Study 2		Study 3	
Method	Interview (N = 6)	Survey (N = 1063)		Survey (N = 4086)	
Results	Themes	'Self' Agentic Factors	'Other' Agentic Factors	'Self' Agentic Factors	'Other' Agentic Factors
Agentic Factors	Cognitive Mode Logical Reasoning Teleological Reasoning Causal Reasoning Correlational Reasoning First Party Evaluation Third Party Evaluation Ontology of Attribution	Cognitive Mode Goal Orientation Causal State and Triger Casual Reasoning Social Identifier Nature and Timing of Attribution Third Party Evaluation	Cognitive Mode Goal Orientation Causal State and Triger Causal Reasoning Social Identifier Nature and Timing of Attributions Third Party Evaluation Correlational Reasoning Self-Centred Motivation	Cognitive Mode Motivation Social Status Third Party Evaluation Expectations Effort and Ability Desire Intensity	Cognitive Mode Motivation Social Status Third Party Evaluation Expectations Popularity Social Group Social Interest
	Conative Mode Freedom Awareness Impact of Commodities Affective Mode* Impact of Affective State Awareness of Affective State	Conative Mode Impact of Commodities Phenomenological Institutionalism Ethical Limitations	Conative Mode Ontology of Capabilities Impact of Commodities Number of Capabilities	Conative Mode Capabilities Intangible Resources	Conative Mode Capabilities Intangible Resources
Var.%		57.5%	58.6%	57.5%	64.1%

Note: (*) The 'Affective Mode' of Agency is empirically developed in qualitative rounds of data collection in Study 4.

Study 4: Qualitative Amendment

This is a qualitative study to test and develop: (a) the affective mode of agency-oriented factors, (b) map *rationality types* and *reconciling approaches* onto the Evaluation Instrument, and (c) link 'reason' and 'emotion' aspects of agency-outcome. In this regard, first, Study 4 empirically tests and develops the affective mode of agency that has been identified based on Weiner's (2010) list of emotion and has logically been linked to an agent's rationality types (see Chapter 4, Theory Development). Further, Study 4 will find that the empirical supports for the three modes of agency and two senses of freedom are related that is establishing freedom expansion/contraction based on agency-oriented factors (i.e. the second objective).

In Chapter 4 we have shown how the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency explains the agency-outcome of an individual who says "I have decided to become a teacher, not only because I like teaching but also as I believe in empowering human beings through education", in this case she is using value-laden rationality type (i.e. substantive type). Further, in Chapter 4 we have conjectured based on theory (see Kalberg, 1980; Cockerham, 2015; Weber, 1993) that this way of reasoning will expand her agency and positive freedom to live the life she has reason to value, even though her negative freedom may be contracted. Meanwhile, if one explains her decision saying "I have chosen to become a teacher because this is a popular job and my family expected me to become a teacher, but this is not what I really like", then she has used 'formal' rationality, which the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency says that this rationality type will contract her agency and positive freedom to live the life she has reason to value, even though her negative freedom may be expanded.

However, the question is how the above conjectures exist in reality, i.e. *how an agent's freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors* (i.e. the second objective). In other words, we need to test and developed our conjectures about the agency-freedom relationship that have theoretically been developed in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. In this regard, we need empirical support for the impact of an agent's rationality type, emotion, worldview, reconciling approach and agency-oriented factors on freedom. This empirical endeavour is particularly important in determining the agency-freedom relationship about incontinent decisions, which Davidson (2014) has defined as "intentional actions contrary to judgment". For example, what is the relationship between agency and the freedom of a political activist who decides to attend in a rally for her values (e.g. peace, freedom of speech, equality of human rights), although she sees the possibility of being arrested (Arlegi and Teschl, 2015); or a gambler who thinks of gambling as detrimental for the life she values but she cannot stop gambling (Davidson, 2001). These examples show the complexity of the agency-freedom

relationship, particularly due to the notions that Sen (1990, 1977) emphasises as ‘weakness of will’ (e.g. to explain the gambler’s behaviour) and ‘committed actions’ (e.g. to explain the political activist’s decision). Hence, we need further empirical evidence to test and develop the agency-freedom relationship that has been conjectured in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.

Further, we need empirical evidence for worldview and reconciling approaches in the Tri-Modal Theory Agency as explained in Chapter 4 on Theory Development. It is particularly important that this should be empirically investigated, due to what we call *human tendency to bring contradictory reasons for her decision* (i.e. “rationalisation”). Hence, Study 4 tries to find empirical evidence for the way an agent deals with opposing views in her mind. We have identified that our Evaluation Instrument can detect “rationalisation” by comparing one’s scores in two standpoints of the ‘self’ and ‘other’. It is conjectured that if an agent’s answers to ‘self’ and ‘other’ standpoints are contradictory, then it is possible that she is exercising “rationalisation” (see Chapter 4, Theory Development). Here, we test and develop these ideas empirically.

In this regard, Study 4 is designed in two parts. Part one includes extensive in-depth interviews on emotion, rationality type, and reconciling approach with the 10 students about their university major selection. As a result, affective modes of agency-oriented factors will be empirically tested and developed in relation to the cognitive and conative modes that have already been tested in three previous empirical studies (i.e. the first objective is being accomplished). The second part of Study 4 includes four extensive in-depth interviews in which we use agency-oriented factors to establish freedom expansion/contraction (i.e. the second objective is being accomplished). As a result, a case study methodology is developed to apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. The next chapter uses this methodology and agency-oriented factors to *determine the agency-freedom relationship* (i.e. the research aim) in one case study (see Chapter 6, Case Study).

Study 4: Sample

Study 4 has two parts, i.e. it includes two samples. In Part 1 we interview 10 students who have already been participated in Study 3. In the survey questionnaire of Study 3, we have asked respondents to indicate if they are interested in participating in an interview about university major selection, with a focus on the same topic. 1290 students out of a cohort of 4086 respondents have left us their ID and telephone number, showing interest in participating in an

interview, out of whom we have chosen 10 participants and 10 telephone interviews have been conducted. We have chosen these 10 individuals, because their scores in the Evaluation Instrument have shown that their answers to the equal factors of 'self' and 'other' are opposing. This indicated that these individuals were facing opposing 'other' worldviews, thus, using this sample we could have two important findings regarding: (A) 'rationalisation', because it is possible that 'rationalisation' has been exercised; and (B) 'reconciling approaches', because it is possible that this individual is aware of 'other' worldviews. Achieving these two findings is possible because the 'self' and 'other' worldviews of these participants are different (see Chapter 4, Theory Development).

In Part 2 of Study 4, our sample includes four individuals who are not from the host organisation in Iran, and they have made different decisions about other issues rather than university major selection and career choice. These four decisions are separated for three reasons. First, these decisions are identified as either incontinent (i.e. the decision is determined contrary to 'self' judgement) (see Davidson's (2001) 'weakness of will'), or counterintuitive (i.e. the decision is determined contrary to 'other' judgment) (see Sen's (2004) 'rational fool'). This enables us to apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency and the Evaluation Instrument on the decisions in which determining the agency-freedom relationship is complex, as the agent's decision is not easily understandable to lay observers. Second, we use the final version of the Evaluation Instrument and the developed version of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to determine the agency-freedom relationship in these four different cases, which helps us to develop a case study methodology to apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to any decision. Third, these decisions are diverse and different from our earlier focus on *career choice* and *university major selection*, thus, this sample enables us to test and develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency as a generic theory. This sample is explained in detail in Part 2 of Study 4.

Study 4: Measurement

To detect *emotion*, we have designed the interview questions according to Weiner's (2010) list of emotion (see Emotion in Chapter 4, Theory Development), and to detect *rationality type* we conduct interviews according to Weber's (1993) rationality types (see Reason in Chapter 4, Theory Development). Further, to detect *worldviews* and *reconciling approach* we design interview questions based on Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism. As explained in Chapter 4, we

have built upon Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism and three ways of 'dialogical', 'monological' or 'dialectic' approaches are identified that an agent may use to deal with opposing worldviews. Here, we take one step further, and we design our measurements for interview questions based on the definitions of dialogue, monologue and dialectic (Freedman and Ball, 2004; Marková, 2003; Matusov, 2007; Robinson, 2011), according to which three following criteria to identify an agent's reconciling approach are identified: (a) the type and quality of opposing worldviews (i.e. *ontology of worldviews*); (b) an individual's belief in single truth or the existence of multiple realities (i.e. *ontology of truth*); and (c) the individual's approach to keeping both opposing worldviews, merging them, or dismissing one of them (i.e. *reconciling mechanism*). Following, we explain three reconciling approaches based on *ontology of worldviews*, *ontology of truth*, and *reconciling mechanism*.

Dialogical Approach

Analysing Dostoyevsky's novels, Bakhtin developed his idea of understanding human behaviour under authority with respect to freedom through dialogism. The characteristics of dialogue in Dostoyevsky's novels are: (a) there is a double-voice discourse between characters (Bakhtin and Emerson, 1993); (b) the author has created 'independent' characters with unique worldviews (A worldview includes the agent's rationality type, values, type of reasoning, and direct and indirect emotions regarding her decision) that are not integrated into a single perspective and/or the worldview of the author (Robinson, 2011). It is said that you can better understand your life trajectory in relationship to an opposing worldview (Grant, 2015). For example, imagine your political stand compared with your family's political position. In this case, you can explain the trajectory of your own political stand comparing with that of your family. This is helpful because your perception of your family's political stand can be perceived as more stable during the time, rather than yours. In this regard, Holquist (2002) further argues that "self can find a sufficient degree of structure in accordance with other and this allows an individual to present a meaningful engagement with the world". It is worth mentioning here, however, that if we only have two worldviews in disagreement, it does not imply that they are in dialogue (Robinson, 2011). According to the review of the literature on Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism we have identified that a dialogue has several following characteristics.

- Ontology of Worldview in the Dialogical Approach: In dialogue opposing worldviews must have completely dichotomous elements; the agent recognizes the multiplicity and uniqueness, validity, and narrative weight of different worldviews; the worldviews are related and interact with each other (Freedman and Ball, 2004). Accordingly, we identify the following as the characteristics of worldviews in dialogue:
 - 'Self' and 'other' worldviews have utterly different elements
 - Opposing worldviews have equal value and both worldviews are acknowledged
- Reconciling Mechanism in the Dialogical Approach: In dialogue, all of the opposing worldviews must be heard and recognised. Different voices must interact in an attempt to be acknowledged and informed; the interaction between opposing worldviews must consistently continue and during this consistent process of interaction the initial worldviews may change (Robinson, 2011a). In dialogism, "individuals participate in a deliberate communication that requires the agent to evaluate opposing stands after listening, deliberating and seeking arguments, while at the same time this person is trying to find collective values and norms to somehow accommodate these opposing rationalities" (Englund, 2006). This means that the agent alters her understanding to allow a new input (Piaget, 1981). One who uses the dialogical approach resists closure or unambiguous expression and the interaction of opposing worldviews continues constantly (Marková, 2003). Following are the characteristics of using the dialogical approach to reconcile opposing worldviews of 'self' and 'other':
 - Opposing worldviews interact, inform and alter each other
 - The interaction between opposing worldviews never stops
- Ontology of Truth in the Dialogical Approach: There is no single truth in dialogism, but there are different realities that appear to different individuals (Bakhtin, 1935); for a dialogue to occur all participants in the dialogue process must value all voices equally valid to the reasoning process (Robinson, 2011). If two worldviews are in disagreement, it does not mean that one worldview is wrong (Bakhtin, 1935). Following are the characteristics of 'truth' when one uses the dialogical approach to reconcile opposing worldviews:
 - There is no single 'truth' in Bakhtin's understanding and different realities appear to different worldviews.
 - There are different realities appeared differently to 'self' and 'other'.

Monological Approach

Monologism is contrary to dialogism. In monologism one transcendental worldview constructs 'truth'. The opposing worldviews, ideologies, values, and desires are unheard and unrecognised by the agent (Robinson, 2011) and the agent has single consciousness (Matusov, 2007). Here, we identify the following characteristics to show if an agent uses a monological approach to reconcile opposing voices:

- A) Ontology of Worldviews:
 - 'Other' is expressed through apperception (i.e. making sense of the other worldview).
 - The opposing worldview is presented with lesser validity and importance by the agent.
- B) Ontology of Truth:
 - The agent believes in one transcendental 'truth'.
 - Opposing values and desires are denied and perceived as worldviews by agent.
- C) Reconciling Mechanism:
 - The opposing worldviews are not heard by the agent.
 - The opposing worldview is implicitly denied or explicitly refuted.

Dialectical Approach

The dialectical approach is different to both the dialogical and monological approaches. Here we identify it based on the Serradó and Vanegas (2015) definition of dialectic mechanism. We have defined the goal of a dialectic process based on Sennett's (2012) idea that "in dialectic point and counterpoint (thesis and antithesis) are evolved into a compromise or other state of agreement via conflict and tension (synthesis)". In the dialectical approach, when there are opposing worldviews, the opposing parties evolve/integrate them into a transcendent worldview. The following characteristics show if an agent uses the dialectic approach to reconcile opposing voices.

- Ontology of Worldviews:
 - 'Self' and 'other' voices are opposing

- Both voices are valid, recognised and heard
- Ontology of Truth:
 - An individual believes in a transcendental ‘truth’ (It is worth mentioning here, however, that our approach is different from historical dialectic (see Hegel, 2015) and we use the notion of ‘dialectic’ just to define a way of reconciling worldviews that two opposing worldviews exist and can be integrated into a third one.)
 - A solution can be deduced from integrating opposing worldviews.
- Reconciling Mechanism:
 - Two opposing worldviews can evolve together in a way that a third worldview is consistent with previous worldviews.
 - The interaction results in a unified solution.

To see if an individual is using either of the above three reconciling approaches we ask the questions presented in Table 40 . These questions are designed based on the mentioned three constructs (i.e. *opposing worldviews*, *ontology of truth*, and *reconciling mechanism*). Finally, in the last row of Table 40 we show the impact of using dialogical, monological and dialectic on freedom that is an *agent’s ability to live the life she has reason to value*. Hence, using ‘dialogical’ and ‘dialectic’ approaches may contract negative freedom, but one’s agency is more expanded than in the case when she is using ‘monological’ approaches and dismissing the ‘self’ worldview, while it is possible the agent is enjoying expanded negative freedom. Following, we explain the three reconciling approaches and their impact on the agency-freedom relationship in an imaginary example.

For example, imagine Person A, who is an employee in a fashion company, finds out that her worldview is opposing her boss’s worldview regarding the designs of their new hat collection. Facing the boss’s opposing worldview, if Person A uses ‘monologue’ and dismisses her own worldview, then her agency is contracted, but, her negative freedom (e.g. number and quality of options to be promoted, to get a higher salary, to have more holidays, to be sent on business trips, etc.) may be expanded as she is not conflicting with her boss’s worldview. However, in this situation as her agency is contracted then it (Baaren et al., 2015) is shown that her creativity is being undermined and she may feel unsatisfied. If she uses *monologue* and

dismisses her boss's worldview, then even though the conative mode of her agency is expanded and she is fully in control, the affective and cognitive modes of her agency are contracted, as well as her negative freedom (e.g. she may be punished or fired) as her boss expects her to perform according to the orders. On the other hand, if in this situation Person A uses *dialectic*, then she has managed to arrive at a single solution that is consistent with her own and her boss's initial worldviews. In this case, the conative mode of her agency is a bit contracted, because she is not fully in control of the situation but her affective and cognitive modes of agency are expanded, because she is not conflicting with her boss's worldview. In this case, her negative freedom is expanded (e.g. her options are expanded as she may be rewarded and/or promoted) as she is considering her boss's worldview. However, using dialectic her positive freedom will not be expanded as much as in the case when she uses *dialogue*, when she manages to consider both her own worldview and her boss's worldview, even though her worldview is being informed and may alter in discourse with the boss's worldview. Using dialogue, all three modes of agency and two sides of freedom are expanded because both parties' (Person A and her boss) worldviews are noticed, acknowledged and involved in an evolving discourse that never ends (Robinson, 2011). As a result of using dialogue, neither her agency nor her freedom is contracted, thus, she can create, innovate and enjoy doing her job. Normatively speaking, it can be conjectured that the best reconciling approach to have expanded agency and freedom is dialogue, then dialectic and finally monologue. However, it is shown that using dialogue and even dialectic to encounter the opposing worldview is not cognitively easy, because the agent must be able to self-distance from her 'self' rationality type and deal with the negative emotions that are generated after facing the 'other' opposing worldview. As mentioned earlier, self-distancing is a cognitively difficult task (White et al., 2015). In this line, Table 40 presents the measurements that we use in Study 4 to detect the reconciling approaches of interview participants.

Table 40: Measurement Scale of Monologue, Dialogue, Dialectic

Questions of Each Theme	Expected answers if the agent uses any of the three approaches:		
	Monological Approach	Dialogical Approach	Dialectic Approach
	Ontology of Worldviews:		
	1. Do you have the same worldview as your parents?		
	2. Which worldview is more important and valuable to you?		
	'Other' worldview is not recognised and acknowledged. Denying the difference.	'Other' worldview is recognised and acknowledge. The differences between 'self' and 'other' worldviews are understood. Differences are recognised in a neutral way.	'Other' worldview is recognised and acknowledged. The differences between 'self' and 'other' worldviews are understood. The differences are recognised in relation to a single 'true' world worldview.
	Ontology of Truth:		
	3. Whose worldview do you think is right?		
	Belief in single transcended 'truth' Either 'self' or 'other' worldview is assumed as 'truth'. Either 'self' or 'other' worldview is assumed as a wrong perspective.	Belief in the existence of different realities that appear to 'self' and 'other'. Both 'self' and 'other' world worldviews are assumed to be a different worldview to reality.	Belief in single transcended 'truth'. If 'self' and 'other' worldviews are different, then one 'true' worldview is assumed to be their integration. If 'self' and 'other' worldviews are similar then it is the 'truth'.
	Reconciling Mechanism:		
	4. How do you make up your mind, now that your parents have a different worldview with you?		

If 'self' is strong then dismissing the opposing worldview.
If 'other' is strong then dismissing the 'self' opposing worldview.

Keeping both worldviews.
Continually interacting with the opposing worldview and being informed and altered.

Integrating 'self' and 'other' world worldviews.
At the end, keeping one single world worldview that is the integrated version of the initial worldviews.

Impact on Freedom Expansion/Contraction

If 'self' worldview is dismissed, then positive freedom is contracted.
If 'other' worldview is dismissed then negative freedom is contracted.

Positive freedom is expanded.
Negative Freedom is expanded.

Positive freedom is contracted.
Negative freedom is expanded.

Impact of Agency Expansion/contraction

If 'self' worldview is dismissed, then agency is contracted.
If 'other' worldview is dismissed then the conative mode of agency is expanded, but affective and cognitive modes are contracted.

Agency is expanded.

Affective and cognitive modes of agency are expanded.

Study 4, Part 1: Result (Worldview and Reconciling Approach)

Table 41 presents the findings. As evidence, in interview with 10 students who have had opposing 'self' and 'other' worldviews, we have found evidence for three types of reconciling approached in three cases that the agent is using a reconciling approached as we conjectured in Table 40. The findings indicate that F.Z. is using dialectic, N.J. is using dialogue, and M.M. and P.T. are using monologue.

Table 41: Empirical Evidence for Worldview and Reconciling Approach (Study4-Part1)

Participant	Reconciling Approach	Evidences
F.Z. Case of Dialectic	Participant	F.Z. is a 19-year-old student, living in Tabriz. She was studying natural science at high school. This is the second year that F.Z. is taking the University Entrance Exam (Concour). Her goal is to study medicine in Tabriz university. However, her exam result does not allow her to choose her desirable option (i.e. medicine in Tabriz university).
	Opposing 'Self' and 'other' Factors	(Self-Factor-1: Completely Agree) VS. (Other-Factor-1: Indifferent): (I think that I make this decision because I genuinely want it and this is based on my values.) VS. (Others are not sure that how genuinely I want this choice and whether I choose this based on my values.) (Self-Factor-4: Agree) VS. (Other-Factor-8: Indifferent) (I think that I have other alternatives with equal values.) V.S (Others are not sure whether I have other alternatives as valuable as this option.)
	Rationalisation	Once F.Z. says that she is very eager to study medicine, but another time she contradicts herself and says that she is indifferent about it. In this regard, F.Z. says: "well my mother, father, friends and consultant know that I really like medical major, but they exactly do not know how much I am putting effort in it or how much I am motivated to study in this major. "If it didn't happen, well it didn't happen. That is fine." She claims that the reason that others cannot understand her is that this is the second time that she is taking this exam. It is not clear, why the number of attempts is related to what she claims as others' misjudgement of her motives. Further, she does not feel comfortable revealing her result. In this regard, F.Z. says: "My result that became something (she does not say her result and instead uses 'something'), my mother told me that I did not try hard enough. This is because this year was the second year that I took the university entrance exam."
	Ontology of Worldview:	This is the first sign that F.Z. is using dialectic, because she is acknowledging her mother's worldview and assigns value to it but she believes in a single "true" worldview, as she says: "I think it is better to use each other's ideas. There should not be only what I want or only what my mother tells me. I think if we talk with each other and reach a common point, it is better."
	Ontology of Truth:	This is the second sign that F.Z. is using dialectic, because she believes in an agreement stage that satisfies both her and her mother, as she says:

		<p>“Me and my mother spoke with each other and finally we arrived to an agreement. At the end we suggested something that both me and my mother side were agreed on it and accepted it.”</p>
	Reconciling Mechanism:	<p>This is the third sign that F.Z. has used dialectic, because she has managed to integrate her worldview and her mother’s worldview in a way that is satisfying for both parties, as she says: My mother told me: “do not choose universities in far cities”, but I liked to choose other cities, because it has increased my options and the possibility of being accepted. Here, I said that “I do not choose very faraway cities; for example, I do not choose Ahvaz, Shiraz, etc. that are very far from our own city, but I choose Ardebil, Zanjan, and the cities near Tabriz”; then, my mother accepted that I choose other cities too.”</p>
	Agency and Freedom	<p>Using dialectic, F.Z.’s agency and positive freedom have been expanded, as expected in Table 21. As evidence she says: “When we talked like this, I was more confident about what I chose, because both my mother’s idea and my idea influenced it.”</p>
N.J. Case of Dialogue	Participant	<p>N.J. is an 18-year-old student. She was studying natural science in high school, aiming to study dentistry at university, but her result in the university entrance exam was lower than the required grade for the major of dentistry. She is the only child and few years ago her family migrated from Tehran to Booshehr that is a smaller and deprived city comparing with Tehran that is the capital city. She pointed to this migration several times during the interview and she is so proud of her slang that is like what is known as “Tehrani” slang. While studying at high school, she was working part time as a radio presenter in Booshehr radio station, as she claims “this was because I did not speak like a typical Booshehri”.</p>
	Opposing ‘Self and ‘other’	<p>(Self-Factor-5: Indifferent) VS. (Other-Factor-5: Completely Agree): (I am not sure if this choice influences my future state.) VS. (I think that others think that this choice will greatly influence my future.) (Self-Factor-6: not agree) VS. (Other-Factor-3: agree) (I think that my options are not limited.) VS. (I think that others think that my options are limited.)</p>
	Rationalization	<p>N.J. claims that her parents give her the authority to select her university major because she is an only child and they are living in rural city. It is not clear why these reasons justify her parents’ behaviour towards her, as she says: “They agree with me, because I am the only child, they let me to make my own decision. I mean this is because (we live in) rural cities. If I want to go to another city, I do not have the problem of</p>

	moving there with my family. I will not stay in a dormitory. If I choose to go to a different city, I will go there with my parents.”
Ontology of Worldview:	This is the first sign that N.J. is using dialogue, because she acknowledges her parents’ opposing worldview. Relative to the other worldview, she evaluates her ‘self’ worldview and being informed from that standpoint, then she considers the negative points in her ‘self’ worldview, as she says: “I try to react logically. This means that firstly I ask them what their reasons are. For example, to select a university major, my father told me not to choose private universities. This means: “Do not choose the majors that you like, such as dentistry and laboratory, because they are in private universities; instead go and study for another year and try to be accepted in public university in the next year, because it will reduce the cost.” Well, what I wanted was to apply for private universities this year. This is because, I saw my ability inside me and I saw that if I study for another year, I might be accepted in the same major as this year, but in public university. But I know that I cannot reach to dentistry in public university, even if I study for another year, based on the ability that I have and my energy. When I see that I have to study the same major next year, I prefer to be one year ahead. And the cost that I have to spend to study for another year too, but in a public university. I was thinking that it takes another year and passing another Concour, which I need to spend money for classes to take another exam. I talked with my parents and I told my thoughts. They became convinced and accepted that I also apply for private universities as well.”
Ontology of Truth:	This is the second insight that N.J. is using dialogue, because she assumes that there is an element of reality in different worldviews: “My choice has negative sides as well. For example, if I study nursing I have to take another exam after two years. My grades must be all A to be able to take this exam and I must have a TOFEL degree as well. My English is good, but the fact that my result must be all very good, is a risk.”
Reconciling Mechanism:	This is the third sign, implying that N.J. is using dialogue as for her the opposing worldviews are informed from each other and they continually change in this dialectic, as she says: “in some cases disagreement may happen. For example, I did not like nursing and I only wanted to choose ‘medicine’ or ‘dentistry’ majors, despite the fact that my result in exam would not match to these majors. I wanted to reject the other majors and I wanted to study for another year to take the next year university entrance exam. Well, I talked with my mother and father, and they told how they see those majors in the society. Then they asked me to do a research about other majors. Well, my mother was insisting that I choose nursing as well. Then, I went and did a research about nursing and I found that, yes, this is a good major and it has good prospects and

		then I grew interest in nursing.” “I did my research in internet, surfing different websites, talking with nursing students at university. I asked them about its future in the job market and I found out that nursing and midwifery students can progress by taking advanced exams. I did not know this before; and I also found out that being accepted in this exam is very difficult (at this point she is giggling). Yes, I found this out; I also found out that about its income and its post degrees.”
Agency and Freedom:		As conjectured in Table 21, using dialogue N.J.’s freedom and agency are expanded, because through dialogue, she has found 150 majors that she likes and she is confident she would be accepted in most of them, as she says: <u>Agency and freedom before and after Decision:</u> “At first, when I came from Concour, me and my friends knew that our result in the exam would not let us to choose the major that we wanted. That is why, after less than a week after the exam I started studying for the next year’s exam. After a while I saw that the pressure that is on me would not let me go forward. And I did not have the energy that I had during the previous year for studying. So, I took one week as a gap to see if I can reorganise myself to study again. After a week I looked at myself and I saw that, no, I could not continue in this way. This means that with that spirit if I continued, after a few months everything would be ruined. That is why I talked with my mother and my mom told me that there are other majors as well. The bridge of success is not only this profession (dentistry), and of course through other majors I can also attain what I want. Then I talked with my aunt and relatives, those who have studied top majors and knew about it. I came to this conclusion to choose different majors, and with help of God, if the result turns into what I wanted, then I will go to university. Now, my options are those that I really like. This means that I like all of them, and there is no option that I do not like in my application list. That means that even my last option is a thing that I like. My last and least option is nursing that I researched about it and I found that it is good. I have completed 150 options in my university application list. Although my result is five figure (this is very weak result) my first option is dentistry at Shahid Beheshi University. I start from this top choice and go down, until my last option that is nursing in Booshehr University.”
M.M.: Case of M.M. Monolo	Participant	M.M. is a student living in a rural city of Zanjan, that is a deprived area in Iran. She studied maths in high school and she achieved a very good result in the University Entrance Exam (Concour). She finished 83 rd out of about 800,000 participants. She has decided to study electronic engineering in Tehran University. Her main challenge is that job market for engineering positions

gue (Dismiss s Other Voice)	is abundant with many university graduates. According to the host organisation's official website, in 2015, there is a widespread tendency towards medical majors that are perceived as having better employment prospects in Iran. M.M.'s main decision challenge is that with her good result, she could have studied medicine that was popular, but she was limited to her field of study at high school that only allowed her to choose maths-related majors.
Opposing 'self and 'other'	(Self-Factor-5: indifferent) VS. (Other-Factor-5: completely agree): (I am not sure if her choice influences her future state.) VS. (I think that my parents think that this choice will completely change my future.) (Self-Factor-6: interference) VS. (Other-Factor-3: completely agree): (I am indifferent about the limiting impact of environment on my choice.) VS. (I think that others think that my options are highly limited by society.)
Rationalisation	She claims that the easy way is not exciting while she reports doubt and regret about her decision as she says: "With my choice, I have to build everything myself, and it is not like everything is provided, but I think if everything is there, it is not exciting at all." <u>Sign of doubt:</u> "I managed to convince my family that I can find a good job. I myself want to do that, but even if this will not happen, I am happy with my decision."
Ontology of Worldview:	This is the first sign that M.M. is using monologue and dismissing the 'other' opposing worldview, because she thinks they do not know her well and if they come to know her, they will arrive at the same worldview as her like her family, as she says: "My family gradually reached the same worldview as mine. For example, now they know that if I was studying biology, it was possible that I did not study hard, because I did not like that subject, and this might have influenced my result in Concour (university entrance exam). However, some people who do not know me, they ask me "why did you go to study maths, with this (good) result in Concour? Why did you not go to study medical majors?" But my family do not say the same thing."
Ontology of Truth:	This is the second sign that M.M. is using monologue, because she says that although there are different worldviews, but one must stand on her own worldview to the end, as she says: "There are many opposing views but you should think your own way. For example, I remember a girl who had chosen a mathematical major like me. I asked her: "Why did you go to study maths and why didn't you decide to study medical majors?" She answered: "Well, doctors are sitting in their offices and they are playing with flies as they are bored, because there are not enough patients." Well, this view exists but not everyone thinks in this way."

		<p>"I don't know what 'right' means here. But I think that one chooses only once and in the rest of her life she is following her decision. If one follows her choice and stay with it, no doubt she will achieve a result. The 'rightness' is what our performance will create."</p>
	Reconciling Mechanism:	<p>This is the third sign that M.M. is using monologue, because she is keeping her worldview intact and tries to convince others, as she says:</p> <p>"I managed to convince them that I can find a good job. It is supposed that I find a good job, but even if this will not happen, I am happy with my decision."</p>
	Agency-Freedom	<p>Using monologue and dismissing the opposing other worldview, M.M. has expanded positive freedom, as well as expanded affective and cognitive modes of agency, however, her conative mode of agency and her negative freedom are contracted and she experiences doubt and the fear class of emotion, as she says:</p> <p>"I had things with this problem. It turned into a challenge. But I remember when I went out of our school door after choosing the mathematical major, and I was going towards home, in my mind with each step that I was taking, I was imagining something in my mind that I don't know how to explain it with words. I was somehow thinking that I am going towards what I want and all of the doubts and regrets will remain behind me, somewhere that I do not ever look at them again."</p> <p>"Well, this challenge might never be solved, because sometimes one might say something that past will come in front of my eyes and all of those doubts that are settled down somewhere, they will come to the surface of my thoughts. But, anyway, when one makes a decision she must stand for it, as it may not be solved completely, I try not to think about it. This is because I think it has finished and I think that what has happened is the best thing that could have happened, and if someone wants to change my idea, I try not to think about it."</p>
P.T.: Case of Dialectic	Participant	<p>P.T. is an 18-year-old student of natural science. She lives in Sarab a rural city in Iran. She achieved a weak result in the university entrance exam that prevents her from applying for the popular majors in her field, such as medicine and dentistry in university. This is a special case, because she said that it was her father who had filled in the questionnaire on the website. This means that her father has access to her username and password and he used it to fill in the questionnaire. During the telephone interview, her father was also listening to the conversation. We report this case, because it represents a real other (i.e. father) worldview about the agent's decision. The interesting point is that the father has filled in the questionnaire in a way that 'self' and 'other' worldviews are not similar.</p>

Opposing 'Self' and 'other':	<p>(Self-Factor-5: Agree) V.S. (Other-Factor-5: Disagree) (Her father thinks that his daughter thinks that her choice will influence her future state.) VS. (Her father thinks that his daughter's thinks that her father thinks that her choice will not influence her future.)</p> <p>(Self-Factor-4: Agree) V.S. (Other-Factor-8: Disagree) (Her father thinks that his daughter thinks that she has other valuable alternatives.) V.S. (Her father thinks that her daughter thinks that he thinks that she does not have other alternatives.)</p>
Rationalization	<p>P.T. says that her weak result in Concour is due to her gender, she reports shame-related emotions about her decision because her exam result was not satisfactory.</p> <p>"I think about choosing nursing at university, and I think that it is good for my future. I feel that there is a good job market for nursing compared with other majors. If someone wants to study medicine, she has to try hard for seven years. But for nursing, you can achieve the job that you want in four years. I think, for a girl it is better that she does not invest seven years."</p> <p>Researcher: Why? Do you think for boys it is different? P.T.: (She giggled and said nothing)</p>
Ontology of Worldview:	<p>This is the first sign that P.T. used dialectic as she assigns high priority to some kind of true worldview with logical characteristics, as she says:</p> <p>"I put my view in high priority and think about their view too. If their view is logical, I will count on their idea, if it was not logical then I will ignore their view."</p>
Ontology of Truth:	<p>This is the first sign that P.T. uses monologue as for her there is a 'true' worldview that is logic but this logic is exactly the same as the 'self' worldview, as she says:</p> <p>"Logical means that I put myself in that position, the position that they want me to have in future and I see that I really cannot tolerate it, or if it does not match my feeling and situation, then I will dismiss their view."</p>
Reconciling Mechanism:	<p>This is the second sign that P.T. uses monologue, because she even dismisses her own worldview and becomes convinced or accept the other world view and convince the other party, as she says:</p> <p>"I try to convince them and make them satisfied, but if they will not be convinced, then I will give up."</p>
Agency-Freedom	<p>P.T. uses monologue and her negative freedom is contracted, three modes of her agency are contracted, if she "gives up" her 'self' and if she dismisses the 'other' worldview then the affective mode of agency is contracted as well as her positive freedom, as she reports shame and regret</p>

and she says:		
Expanded negative freedom: "I think it is good for my future. I feel that its job market is good."		
L.J.: Not aware of 'other' worldvi ew	Participant	L.J. is an 18-year-old student living in Kalbor, a small village in Iran. She is studying natural science in high school and aims to study medicine in university. Her result in the University Entrance Exam does not allow her to choose the most desirable option.
	Opposing 'Self' and 'other'	(Self-Factor-1: Completely Agree) VS. (Other-Factor-1: Indifferent): (I think that I make this decision because I genuinely want it and this is based on my values.) VS. (I think that others are not sure that how genuine I want this choice and whether I choose this based on my values.)
	Rationalisation	L.J. points to money and being good for society and the fact that everyone in her family studied medicine as the reasons that her family has the same worldview as what she likes. At the end, she declined to reveal the differences between her 'self' and the 'other' opposing worldview as she says: "I am not in my parent's position to know what they think, but they must think the same. Because in our family everyone is studying in medical majors, I think this influences their view. But, in general; No, I do not think that there is a big difference between us" "I think that they like medical majors, not because of its money, because our family interest is this and everyone has studied medical majors and they like me to study this to be able to be useful for society, so they must have the same idea as me.

Study 4, Part 1: Result (Emotion)

Table 42 presents the findings of Part 1 of Study 4 regarding the reconciling approach, emotion, and agency and freedom level of the participants. These findings support three notions in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to determine the agency-freedom relationship. First, it is found that agency and freedom levels must be determined before and after the focal decision. Second, the agency level must be evaluated for the three modes of cognitive, conative and affective. Third, the freedom level must be determined for the positive and negative senses of freedom. Fourth, as conjectured earlier, reconciling approaches reveal certain emotions and influence agency-freedom, as presented in Table 24. These findings indicate that each construct of agency (i.e. three modes) and freedom (i.e. two sides) must be evaluated independently to determine the agency-freedom relationship; otherwise the expansion/contraction of freedom cannot be established in relation to agency. In other words, breaking down the complex concepts of agency and freedom into their components will help to clarify their relationship (see Chapter 7, Discussion for more detail). The findings reveal four notions about agency-freedom: (A) using dialogue the three modes of agency and two side of freedom are expanded; (B) using monologue and dismissing the 'self' worldview the three modes of agency and positive freedom are contracted; (C) using monologue and dismissing the 'other' worldview the conative mode of agency and negative freedom are contracted; (D) using dialectic the conative agency and positive freedom are contracted. These findings are qualitatively driven from a sample of 10; thus they may have low external validity (see Chapter 9, Conclusion to read more about the limitations and call for future studies) but they provide significant ground to test the agency-freedom relationship. In the following section we study the 'rationality type' aspect of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.

Table 42: Empirical Evidence for Emotion mapped onto the Reconciling Approach

Case	Reconciling Approach	Agency Before -> After	Freedom Before -> After	Emotion
F.Z.	Dialectic	Cognitive: expanded Affective: expanded Conative: contracted	Positive: expanded Negative: expanded	Hope Joy Confidence Gratitude
N.J.	Dialogue	Cognitive: expanded Affective: expanded Conative: expanded	Positive: contracted Negative: expanded	Joy Hope Confidence
M.M.	Monologue (Dismiss other)	Cognitive: expanded Affective: expanded Conative: contracted	Positive: expanded Negative: contracted	Doubt Regret Fear (class) Pride Envy
P.T.	Monologue (Dismiss the weaker worldview)	Cognitive: contracted Affective: contracted Conative: contracted	Positive: contracted Negative: contracted	Doubt Shame fear

Study 4, Part 1: Result (Rationality Type)

This section presents the empirical support for the rationality types that are mapped onto the Evaluation Instrument (see Table 39: The Evaluation Instrument (3rd Version), Study 3). In this regard, we focus on one case and we calculate her scores in the Evaluation Instrument and then test the mapping of the factors onto rationality types. For this purpose, we choose M.M.'s case of university major selection. M.M. is a student in Zanjan that is a small and underdeveloped city in Iran. We choose her case because she has the maximum level of negative freedom regarding her university major selection, but she is dealing with an opposing other worldview that makes her experience doubt and regret (see Table 42). In this regard, an outside observer can think that M.M. chooses her university major with positive emotions and with high certainty, because she has achieved a very good result in the exam and she can select any major she likes in her field. M.M. has high negative freedom, because she has achieved a very good result in university entrance exam (i.e. ranked 83rd among half a million exam participants in the field of physics and maths), and due to her good result she is able to choose any math-related major she desires in any public and/or private universities in Tehran, Zanjan (her hometown) and all other cities around the country. However, she experiences *doubt* and *regret*, particularly when she reflects on her situation from the other's standpoint. The question is how M.M. is dealing with this situation, that within the scope of this study we ask *how her freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors* (i.e. the second research question). In this line, the interview findings show that M.M. says:

“My result in the university entrance exam was 83rd. If I studied biology in high school, then with this result I could have chosen a medical major at university. They say that medicine is better than engineering, because it has a better future.”

As evidence, when M.M. evaluated her university major selection from the 'other' standpoint, she was thinking about a medical major. According to the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency the reason that M.M. is experiencing regret and doubt is that the option of medical major is located in her *unrealisable* capability set as a *side effect* of her previous decision to choose a mathematical major at high school. In other words, her agency is contracted by her previous decision, when she uses Causal Reasoning. This is because M.M. experiences doubt and regret when she uses Causal Reasoning and assigns her decision to an event in the past. As presented in Table 43, using Causal Reasoning is mapped onto Formal Rationality, which is true in this incident as she is explaining her decision based on external norms and standards that imply medicine is a better major than engineering. These findings are in line with M.M.'s

scores in the Evaluation Instrument (Table 43). As evidence, M.M.'s average score for 'other' is higher than that for 'self' for the factor of Casual State (.47 and .61, equivalently), indicating that the Causal State is stronger rationality when M.M. reflects on her decision from the 'other' standpoint.

Table 43: M.M.'s Score in the Evaluation Instrument

Agentic Factor	Rationality Type	Standpoint	Score
Motivation			
	Substantive	Self	.77
	Substantive	Other	.73
Capabilities			
	Theoretical	Self	1.0
	Theoretical	Other	.86
Causal Sate			
	Theoretical	Self	.47
	Theoretical	Other	.60
Intangible Resources			
	Theoretical	Self	.60
	Theoretical	Other	.85
Third Party Evaluation			
	Formal	Self	.40
	Formal	Other	.40
Expectation			
	Practical	Self	.60
	Practical	Other	.85
Effort and Ability			
	Theoretical	Self	.70
Desire Intensity			
	Substantive	Self	.80
Popularity			

	Formal	Other	.30
Social Group	Formal	Other	.40
Self-interest	Practical	Other	.70

Note: The scores are calculated by summing up the score of the items for each factor and dividing their sum by the total score for each factor. These scores are to be used for presentational purposes alone, and they are not used for comparative purposes.

However, Causal Reasoning and Formal Rationality are not the only way of reasoning that M.M. is using to evaluate her decision. As evidence, M.M.'s score for Motivation factors from the 'self' and 'other' standpoints (.77 and .73, equivalently) are both high, implying that the decision to study engineering at Tehran university is also *value laden* and *goal oriented*, which means she also has Substantive Rationality and Teleological Reasoning. These findings are supported in interview as she says:

"My decision may not be right for others, but as I *believe* in what I am doing I can do it easily and better. Since the first year in high school, I realized that I was better in learning logic than memorising the long names in biology. As we are living in a deprived area, we had no labs for biology and learning maths was easier as it just needs your imagination. I could have chosen the field of biology and maybe I would have grown interest in it, but I knew that my mind did not have the ability for learning biology as it has in maths. I preferred to put everything in its own place. My family gradually reached the same view. For example, today they know that if I had chosen biology, possibly I did not study as much as I studied maths, because I did not like that subject; and this might have negative impact in my result in Concour (University Entrance exam). However, some people who do not know me, they ask me "why did you go to study maths with this (good) result in Concour? Why did you not go to study medical majors? But my family do not say the same thing."

Overall, these findings are the empirical evidence that supports the validity of the Evaluation Instrument, the rationality types behind its agentic factors, reconciling approach and emotions, in terms of establishing freedom expansion/contraction based on agency-oriented factors that is being developed further in the second part of Study 4.


Figure 29: M.M.'s Scores in the Evaluation Instrument supported by Qualitative Data

	'Self' Agency Oriented Factors	'Other' Agency Oriented Factors
<p>Realizable Capability Studying Electronic Engineering at Tehran University.</p> <p>Unrealizable Capability: being able to choose medicine</p> <p>↑</p> <p>Enabling Factor: Choosing Math at High School</p>	<p>Motivation Score: .771 M.M believes that she chooses this major mainly because of her own desire.</p>	<p>Motivation: Other: .733 M.M thinks that others think that she choose this because she likes it.</p>
	<p>Social State: Score: .466 M.M thinks that her previous decisions and state limited her current choice.</p>	<p>Social State: Other: .6 M.M thinks that other do not think that her choice is limited by situation. This is opposite to her other explanations.</p>
	<p>Intangible Resources Score: .6 She thinks that her options are some hoe limited by lack of resources.</p>	<p>Intangible Resources Other: .85 She thinks that others think that lack of resources limited her decision.</p>
	<p>Capabilities: Score: 1 She believes that she has other options that are independently valuable for her.</p>	<p>Capabilities: Other: .86 She thinks that others see a few options that are more valuable than her choice.</p>
	<p>Third Party Evaluation: Score: .4 M.M believes that others are not positive about her choice and have not encouraged her to choose it.</p>	<p>Third Party Evaluation: Score: .4 M.M thinks that others think that her choice is not valuable enough for her situation.</p>
	<p>Expectation: Score: .6 Although M.M thinks that this decision will change her future, she does not think that she will find a good job.</p>	<p>Expectation: Score: .85 She rationalizes here, because in contrast with her other explanations she says that others see a good future for her choice!</p>
	<p>Effort-Ability: Score: .7 She believes that she tried hard and her high ability enables her choose this major.</p>	<p>Popularity: Score: .3 She thinks that others see her choice as unpopular.</p>
	<p>Desire intensity: Score: .8 She has always wanted this major.</p>	<p>Social Group Score: .4 She thinks that others believe that individuals like her do not choose this major.</p> <p>Self interest Score: .7 She thinks that others believe that she is making this decision selfishly.</p>

Study 4, Part 1: Result interpretation

Figure 30 adds the findings regarding the *agency-oriented factors, emotion, reconciling approaches* and rationality type to the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. These findings imply that the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency can explain the freedom expansion/contraction of an agent when making an important decision. However, the question is how to use the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in a way that all cognitive, conative, and affective modes of agency are considered when we determine the agency-freedom relationship. For this purpose, we conduct Part 2 of Study 4 presented in the next section. At the end, a case study methodology is being developed that can be used to apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to determine the agency-freedom relationship. The next chapter uses this methodology in a full case study.

Figure 30: Empirical Findings in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency



Study 4, Part 2: Qualitative Amendment

This study aims to determine the agency-freedom relationship through (1st objective) *determining the agency-oriented factors associated with one's freedom to do/be what she values*, and (2nd objective) *establishing freedom expansion/contraction based on agency-oriented factors*. So far we have developed the Tri-Modal Modal Theory of Agency and an Evaluation Instrument that enables us to determine the agency-freedom relationship, but we need further empirical support for our second research objective. Further, we need guidelines for using the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in different contexts. Hence, here in Part 2 of Study 4 we will conduct four interviews. Participants fill in an Evaluation Instrument and then we have conducted face-to-face interviews. These individuals are chosen for three reasons: (A) they are different from the participants in previous samples and this enables us to test the generic aspect of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency; (B) their focal decision is different from the focus of other empirical studies in this research; (C) these decisions have either incontinent or counterintuitive characteristic that means the decision is made either contrary to self/other judgement, which makes an interesting case to analyse the agency-freedom relationship. Here, contrary to judgment is identified when a decision is made contrary either to the 'other' or 'self' worldview and the agent is aware of it and points to this dichotomy.

Table 44 presents the findings in terms of the participants' scores in the Evaluation Instrument, reconciling approach, affective mode, as well as their agency and freedom levels before and after the decision. In order to combine these findings according to the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, we have faced several key challenges. For example, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is a temporal theory, thus, one challenge in applying it to a decision is how far back/forward in one's life trajectory we should proceed. Further, this theory analyses one's capability set, thus, the question is how many capabilities must be analysed. This is regarded as a main operationalising challenge to apply any capability-oriented theory (Alkire, 2015, 2008), because in most cases agents face many potential opportunities in decision making (Kahneman, 2012; Simon, 1978). Another challenge is how to consider the three modes of cognitive, conative and affective of agency in one analysis, as the amount of data and information for identifying all of them can exceed the scope of many research analyses. Finally, the challenge is how to use all of these data to determine the agency-freedom relationship using the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, in a reliable and valid manner. In Chapter 6 we use our experience of conducting these four interviews (Table 44) in order to develop a case study methodology for the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that addresses the above challenges. Chapter 6 reports the case study methodology and uses it in one case study that is about M.G.'s decision.

Table 44: Agency-Oriented Factors and the Agency-Freedom Relationship (Study 4, Part 2)

ID	Profession & Decision	Age F/M	Agency-Oriented Factors				Agency-Freedom Relationship				
A.D.	Musician & Migration	31 F	Incontinent Characteristic of Decision: She decided to migrate, even though she knew that the side effect of her decision would force her to leave her family and belongings in the home country. 'other' opposing worldview: Not migrating								
			Rationality	Factor	'self'	'other'	Reconciling Approach	Affective mode	Agency	Freedom	
			Substantive	Motivation	.91	.70	Dialectic	'other' directed: Sadness, Hopelessness	Affective Mode Contracted ; Cognitive and	Negative Freedom: Expanded Positive Freedom: Contracted	
			Theoretical	Capabilities	.80	.60					
			Theoretical	Causal State	.46	.60					
			Theoretical	Intangible Resources	.20	.60					
			Formal	Third Party Evaluation	.80	.48					
			Practical	Expectation	.80	.75					
			Theoretical	Effort and Ability	.80						
			Substantive	Desire Intensity	.80						
			Formal	Popularity		.80					
Formal	Social Group		.80								

	Practical	Self-interest	.70
A.D.	Interview Evidence		<p>Rationality Type: (Substantive)</p> <p>“I want to introduce a new image of classical music into my country, where classical music is a very alien thing; it is forbidden. What I want does not end and it continues or it is better to say that I will continue it; because, my goal is not a dead end street. I do it and continue it.”</p> <p>Reconciling Approach: (Dialectic)</p> <p>“When I was deciding to migrate, it was like I was inside a bubble, in darkness. I didn’t know about the outside world, about living in a different country. I asked those who had already been outside the bubble, those who had migrated. They all helped me to make this decision.”</p> <p>Emotion:</p> <p>“migration is like a person getting out of a pool of cold water into which you have jumped and it is very <i>difficult</i> for you, and you are tortured in that cold water. I jumped into that cold water and with more <i>ease</i> I got out of the water and I will not be tortured again.”</p> <p>Agency:</p> <p>Agency (Before and After): “Migration increased my motivation. I had motivation before, but migration caused me to be more motivated.”</p> <p>Freedom:</p> <p>Before (Negative Side): “My options were limited. I couldn’t apply for England because it was expensive; I couldn’t apply for France, because the French Embassy was shot down during that time, after some have attacked the British embassy in Iran. The only option that I had, and I liked was Austria.”</p> <p>Before & After (Positive Side): “my difference with the past, I mean before migration is that things were very difficult for me in my own country to tolerate, now they are very easy; I have more toleration for a difficult situation.”</p>
M.G.	Entrepreneur & Keep up a start-up business	32 M	<p>Counterintuitive Characteristic of Decision:</p> <p>Although his start-up (i.e. an online book shop) was failing, he decided to fight back and keep it up. He claims that he is dealing with a lack of job security and financial stability, but he prefers his situation to a bureaucratic job because it is his passion. M.G’s decision is analysed in Chapter 6, Case Study.</p> <p>‘other’ opposing worldview:</p>

after failure	leaving the start-up and entrepreneurship and working as an employee							
	Rationality	Factor	self	other	Reconciling Approach	Affective mode	Agency	Freedom
	Substantive	Motivation	.94	.70	monologue and dismisses opposing worldview	'other' directed: fear, sadness, contempt	Conative Mode Contracted ; Affective and Cognitive Modes Expanded	Negative Freedom: Contracted Positive Freedom: Expanded
	Theoretical	Capabilities	.86	.93				
	Theoretical	Causal State	.56	.45				
	Theoretical	Intangible Resources	.55	.20				
	Formal	Third Party Evaluation	.15	.20				
	Practical	Expectation	.93	.90				
	Theoretical	Effort and Ability	.80					
	Substantive	Desire Intensity	.80					
	Formal	Popularity		.40				
	Formal	Social Group		.60				
	Practical	Self-interest		.80				

M.G Interview Evidence

Rationality Type: (Substantive)
 "My job is different to that of a normal employee. When you are an employee in the oil ministry, it is not important if you are doing your job or not. It doesn't matter at all. Do you know why? Because, you say tomorrow I'll do my job, simply you don't care."
 Reconciling Approach: (Monologue)

“At that time I was saying it is impossible, everyone else was telling me that it was not possible. But, from the other side there is a craziness that I was telling myself “I have to do this work”.

Emotion:

This is like ‘faith’; ‘belief’. Today no one expects me to work 16 to 20 hours a day and they tell me why you are wasting your time. But this “work” is joy, it is life itself and my identity.”

Agency and Freedom:

After: “I resisted that failure because I had commitment to my customers and employees. Commitment is a limitation that naturally exists in any decision that you make.”

M.T.	IT Professional & Migration	30 M	Incontinent Characteristic of Decision:							
			Rationality	Factor	self	othe r	Reconcilin g Approach	Affective mode	Agency	Freedom
			Even though he had good opportunities to migrate, he decided to stay in his country and grow within his own country and within the company where he started his career.							
			‘other’ opposing worldview: Migrating from a developing country to live and work in a developed country							
			Substantive	Motivation	.71	.70	Monologue and dismiss other	‘other’ directed: fear, joy	All Modes Expanded	Negative Freedom: Contracte d
			Theoretical	Capabilitie s	.60	.60				
			Theoretical	Causal Sate	.50	.60		‘self’ directed: hope, happiness		Positive Freedom: Expanded
			Theoretical	Intangible Resources	.46	.60				
			Formal	Third Party Evaluation	.45	.48				
			Practical	Expectatio n	.93	.75				
			Theoretical	Effort and Ability	.80					

	Substantive	Desire Intensity	.80
	Formal	Popularity	.80
	Formal	Social Group	.80
	Practical	Self-interest	.70

M.T. Interview Evidence

Rationality Type: (Practical)

“However, I was thinking that by staying in Iran my social status is better. This allowed me to ignore the lower job opportunity here in Iran. I compromised something but I am satisfied now. It is all about cost-benefit analysis.”

Reconciling Approach: (Monologue Dismiss other)

“As I remember, others were against my decision. My feeling was that others did not understand my logic. However, they know that I made this decision with motivation based on logic and reason.”

“Out of experience, I arrived to this point that what I think and say is true in 80 to 90 per cent of cases.”

Emotion:

“Well, in some areas I might make a decision with doubt. I cannot say that I was always zero-one.

Sometime, I didn’t know and I had uncertainty.”

“However, fear existed there. But, together with hope. This means that that hope, that good feeling that this decision is right was completely overcome to stress.”

Agency:

After: “after I made this decision, as time passed and I became more convinced and satisfied about it.

Since then the others’ words are completely ignored by me.”

Freedom:

“At that time I did not have high confidence in my decision, but now I am more confident about it.”

K.G. Entrepreneur & Devoting his wealth

62
M

Counter-Intuitive Characteristic of Decision:

Although devoting his business and wealth may contradict with self-centred goals, he decided to devote the entire profit and main part of his business to educational equality.

‘other’ opposing worldview:

Not devoting his business and wealth for other-centred cause.

Rationality	Factor	self	other	Reconciling Approach	Affective mode	Agency	Freedom
Substantive	Motivation	.94	.80	Dialogue	'other' directed: joy, self-esteem, hope	All Modes Expanded	Negative Freedom: Expanded Positive Freedom: Expanded
Theoretical	Capabilities	.73	.60				
Theoretical	Causal State	.20	.65				
Theoretical	Intangible Resources	.46	.60		'self' directed: hope		
Formal	Third Party Evaluation	.65	.56				
Practical	Expectation	.60	.75				
Theoretical	Effort and Ability	.80					
Substantive	Desire Intensity	1					
Formal	Popularity		.50				
Formal	Social Group		.70				
Practical	Self-interest		.80				

K.G. Interview Evidence Rationality Type: (Substantive)
 "A part of it has roots in my own life that I studied with a difficult situation, I worked and studied hard and I always thought if I could help those who were in this situation, they could progress and became successful"

Reconciling Approach: (Dialogue)

“I consult with many, but I did not go to speak with those who are selfish. If someone is selfish is thinking about himself. Well, I did not consult with those who disagreed.”

Emotion:

“I have done it, because if you can help others then you become happier and more satisfied and feel that you are influential.”

Agency:

Agency (Before and After): “Some might have thought that this decision was forced on me, but what was clear was that from 1998 I took a step on the way of donating to schools, books, and libraries.”

Freedom:

Before and After: I wanted that this (business) will continue in the next generation. However, it (the decision) has also other benefits. I saw that if I make this decision, many of the colleagues will find a better feeling in society. I myself am more comfortable. I do not feel that I am very different to others. This means that this decision had other aspects that were mostly positive.

Note: (F) stands for Female and (M) stands for Male; (Incontinent Characteristics of Decisions) are found based on participants claims, implying that they determined an action contrary to judgment; (ID) to ensure anonymity we use an ID to identify the participants; Changes in Agency and Freedom levels are identified in transition from the before state to the after state of the decision; For each factor, ‘self’ and ‘other’ scores are calculated by summing up the participant’s score on its items and dividing this by the total score for that factor; Emotions deduced based on in Chapter 4, Theory Development.

Study 4, Part 2: Result Interpretation (Link to Case Study Chapter)

Table 44 presented the result of interviews, using the Evaluation Instrument, but it also highlighted several challenges regarding the scope of analysis when applying the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to determine the agency-freedom relationship. Hence, we use these findings to develop a case study methodology and use it in one case study in the following chapter.

Chapter Summary

This chapter has provided empirical support for the causal mechanisms behind the agency-freedom relationship, through developing a valid and reliable Evaluation Instrument that measures agency-oriented factors (using a quantitative approach), and testing the quantitative results and mapping them onto the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (using a qualitative approach and logical deduction). Further, to show a complete image of the agency-freedom relationship, in the following chapter we use the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency and develop its case study methodology, then we use it to explain one complete case study.

Chapter 6: Case Study

Introduction

This thesis aims to *determine the agency-freedom relationship*. In this regard, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has been developed that: (a) explains cognitive, conative and affective modes of agency with respect to freedom, (b) measures agency with respect to both positive and negative sides of freedom, and (c) determines how agency and freedom are related. The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is developed to offer a reliable theory to explore an agent's constraints, values, reasons and emotions behind her decisions to see when she says "I chose to do/be something" then how much of her agency (i.e. cognitive, affective, and conative) is involved in this statement. To test it, this chapter will apply the theory to one case study. In this chapter we use the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to show how an individual's freedom to pursue the life she values can be contracted/expanded by her decision.

In this chapter, first the case study methodology is presented and then these steps are passed to develop M.G.'s case study. M.G. is an Iranian entrepreneur, who has decided not to give up his online book shop at a time of failure of his collaboration with an Indian company. It is found that M.G.'s decision has been in line with his values at that time, and as a result his negative freedom has been contracted, even though his positive freedom and the affective and cognitive modes of his agency have been expanded. In general, this case study shows that: (A) the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is reliable; (B) the agency-freedom relationship must be determined for two sides of freedom (positive and negative) and three modes of agency (affective, negative, and conative); (C) the affective mode of agency is influenced by several different emotions generated from different stand points; (D) the agency-freedom relationship is influenced by accidental side effects of decisions; (E) the 'cognitive' mode of agency is shaped by one's values and goals that may change over a period of time. In addition, this case study reveals that determining the agency-freedom relationship requires us to pass through all aspects of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.

Case Study Methodology


The findings of the final empirical study in the previous chapter have shown several following challenges regarding the scope of analysis when applying the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to determine the agency-freedom relationship: (A) start-stop point; (B) Side-Effect; (C) Number of Capabilities; (D) Direction of Analysis; (E) Number of Life Cycles; (F) Scope and Impact of Direct and Indirect Emotion. These challenges are involved in agency-freedom analysis, due to the generic and temporal nature of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. In this regard, following we develop a case study methodology that provides a guideline to apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, based on the findings of empirical studies in the previous chapter (Chapter 5), particularly Part 2 of Study 4. The case study methodology is developed based on the core caveat of the agency-freedom relationship in this study that implies *whatever one's values are she is free to pursue them unless she makes a decision that prohibits her from living her according to her values*. This means that we establish the agency-freedom relationship according to this assumption that if one makes a decision and it prevents her from living according to her *values*, then her freedom is *contracted* (see Chapter 4, Theory Development).

Scope of Analysis: Phases and Steps

In order to narrow the scope of analysis by the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, we identify three phases of (a) Capability Realisation, (b) Evaluation, and (c) Feedback Loop that includes 11 steps as presented in Figure 31. The first phase is Capability Realisation that explains how an agent realises, evaluates, chooses and pursues an option from her capability set (see Chapter 4, Theory Development). To show all aspects of the Capability Realisation of the model, researchers must accomplish the following four steps of: (Step 1) decision cycles; (Step 2) Side Effects; (Step 3) Decision Trajectory; and (Step 4) Capability Sets. The second phase of the model is Evaluation that shows how an agent evaluates her state of being/doing 'before' and/or 'after' making a significant and conscious decision. This phase has two steps of: (Step 1) the evaluation of the state of being/doing before the decision, and (Step 2) the evaluation of the state of being/doing after the decision. The third phase of the model is the Feedback Loop that is about the impact of agent's evaluation of her state of being/doing on her subsequent decision. This phase has five steps: (Step 1) type and direction of reasoning based on the agent's result in the Evaluation Instrument; (Step 2) direct and indirect emotions; (Step 3) rationality type;

(Step 4) reconciling approach; and (Step 5) the link between emotion, reason and decision. To apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, all of these three phases and their steps must be accomplished to determine the agency-freedom relationship.

Figure 31: The Three Phases and Eleven Steps of the Case Study Methodology




Start-Stop Point

Analysing the decisions in Part 2 of Study 4 in Chapter 5 shows that one challenge in using the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in determining the agency-freedom relationship is *where to start and stop the analysis in the model*. This is a problem, because of the temporal nature of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (see Chapter 4, Theory Development). In this regard, our solution to address this practical challenge is identifying three decision landmarks as presented in Figure 32. The first landmark is the ‘Decision’ itself, which is focal decision of analysis (i.e. agency outcome) (e.g. migration, choosing university major, career change, and etc.). This decision that is central to the temporal analysis is identified as Des1 in Figure 32. The second landmark is the ‘Start Point’ of analysis, which is the agent’s state of being/doing “before” making the focal decision, which is indicated by “start point” in Figure 32. The start point can be beneficial/adverse, functioning/commanding state at T1 (before making Des1). The start point is identified as S1 in Figure 32. The third landmark is the “stop point” of analysis, which is the agent’s state of being/doing after making the decision, which is evaluated as beneficial/adverse, functioning/commanding state at T2 (after making the decision), identified as S2 in Figure 32. The following are the examples of start-stop points for A.D., M.G., M.T. and K.G.:

- A.D. case of migrating to Austria:
 - S1: A.D.’s state of being/doing before migrating to Austria when she is in Iran,
 - Des1: Decision to migrate
 - S2: A.D.’s state of being/doing after migration when she is in Austria.
- M.G case of founding his online bookshop:
 - S1: M.G.’s state of being/doing before delivering a failed project in India when its failure threatened the survival of his business (online bookshop),
 - Des1: Decision to deliver the failed project and keep his online bookshop,
 - S2: M.G.’s state of being/doing after delivering the failed project.
- M.T. case of staying in Iran instead of migrating abroad to live in a developed country and to work in a leading high-tech company:
 - S1: M.T.’s state of being/doing before deciding to stay in his country,
 - Des1: Decision of staying in his country
 - S2: M.T.’s state of being/doing after staying in his country.
- K.G. case of devoting his business wealth for educational equality in Iran:
 - S1: K.G.’s state of being/doing before devoting his business wealth,
 - Des1: Decision of devoting his business wealth
 - S2: K.G.’s state of being/doing after devoting his business wealth.

Figure 32: The Start-Stop Point



Scope of the Capability Analysis


Due to the unlimited number of an agent's capabilities at any decision time (Britz et al., 2013), to identify the capability set we set a rule. First, we only trace two *capability complement sets* that are directly related to the focal decision of Des1. For example, the following are the capability complement sets for A.D., M.T., M.G. and K.G.:

- A.D. and M.T. cases of migration: capability sets of migrating and not-migrating.
- M.G. case of online bookshop: capability sets of keeping up and not keeping up his business after failure.
- K.G. case of devoting wealth: capability sets of devoting and not devoting wealth.

Decision Trajectory: The One Cycle Rule and the 12 Nodes

The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is dynamic and traces an agent's decision trajectory in time. As a result, one important challenge in determining the agency-freedom relationship is to identify the evaluation of before and after the decision and how many cycles we travel back/forward from the start point. To establish the number of cycles we set two following principles. The first principle is that to use the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we analyse one decision cycle in each case study. Figure 33 presents the "One Cycle" rule. The second principle is that we have designed a time sequence presentation of decision trajectory in 12 nodes that must be passed to conduct a case study (see Chapter 4, Theory Development).

Figure 33: The One Cycle Rule




Case Study Methodology (Sum up)

This study aims to determine the agency-freedom relationship. The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency determines this link by analysing how an agent's state of being/doing is being transformed by making an important 'decision', which is regarded as an agency outcome and the linking point between agency and freedom. Using the core model of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, the agency-freedom question can be expressed in this way that how an agent travels from her current state of being (St1) to her subsequent state of being (St2) by making an important decision (Des1). The state transition happens when this person makes this focal decision (Des1) that its analysis is the focus of this study. If Des1 conflicts with the agent's values, then either her positive or her negative freedom is contracted; otherwise, if Des1 is in line with her values, then her positive freedom is expanded, even though in some cases her negative freedom may be contracted. However, if one makes a decision according to her values, then her agency is expanded, which is more aspirational than the cases that one has high negative freedom but contracted level of agency. In the following sections, we use this lens and based on the above-mentioned methodological steps we will conduct M.G.'s case study using the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.

The M.G. Case Study: Introduction

M.G. is the founder of a pioneering online bookshop in Iran (the case is kept anonymous due to ethical considerations, see Chapter 3, Methodology). While he was a student in Tehran University, he started this online book shop. His co-founder and investor was a director of a well-known book shop chain in Tehran. The case of the online bookshop is about a decision M.G. made in India in 2013. At that time his online bookshop was collaborating with an Indian company but their collaborative project had failed. This put the whole business on the verge of bankruptcy. M.G. had to decide whether to resist the failure or give up the business. As presented in Figure 34, M.G. decided to resist the failure and deliver the project with his own team, instead of giving up the whole business (Des1). This decision transformed M.G.'s state of being/doing from (S1) to (S2) as highlighted in Figure 34.


Figure 34: Decision Trajectory (Zoom out)



Section 1: State of Being/Doing Before Decision

As mentioned in the case study methodology, to apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we start from explaining why M.G. has made the focal decision of (Des1), from evaluating his state of being/doing before making that decision (S1) (see Figure 35).

Figure 35: Section Position in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency



In this regard, we asked M.G. about his situation before making the decision and M.G. said:

“Two years ago we were working with an Indian company. At that time, it took nine months from the Indian company to deliver a project that they had to finalise it in two months and at the end the project did not deliver. I went to south of India to the Indian company myself. They told me that they could not deliver the project. I went out of the company and I sat in the street crying.”


To analyse this data, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency evaluates M.G.’s state of being/doing based on the two criteria of “value” and “volition” as presented in Figure 36 (see Chapter 3, Theory Development). In terms of “value”, M.G.’s narrative showed that his state of being was not desirable for him, because when he found out about the failure of the Indian company, he was embarrassed as he said that he sat on the street crying. Accordingly, from social view his state was not desirable too, as M.G. said:

“At that moment I remembered the conflict between me and what others were thinking. I was telling to myself what they always told me “are you crazy? You were in the university and studying! Why did you start this business?”

As evidence, M.G. thinks that the social view has questioned his choice and starting an online bookshop has not been approved and enforced by society. Regarding the “volition”

aspect of his decision, M.G.'s narrative showed that he did not end up at that situation from his own choice, and the Indian company forced him to end up with the failed project. Hence, M.G.'s state was "commanding", forced by the Indian company (Figure 36). Altogether, we evaluate M.G.'s state of being/doing before Des1, as "Adverse Commanding". In the following section we use M.G.'s result in the Evaluation Instrument to indicate why he made this decision.

Figure 36: Value-Volition Presentation of State of Being and Doing (At T1)



Section 2: State of Being/Doing After Decision

Based on the same criteria that we have used to evaluate M.G.'s state of being/doing before Des1, we will evaluate his state of being/doing after this decision. The findings indicate that M.G.'s S2 is Beneficial Functioning. S2 is functioning, because M.G. has had control over the situation, as he claimed that he willingly asked the Indian company to give him the control over their IT team to deliver the failed project, as he said:

“I asked them (the Indian company) to give me their whole team as the cost of not delivering my project, and I led the whole team myself for five days.”

This finding implies that he volitionally has arrived at S2, thus we evaluate his state of being/doing after the decision as ‘functioning’. In this line, we have found that M.G. was experiencing joy and pride, which are the evidences for assessing his new state after the decision (i.e. S2) as ‘Beneficial’. In this line, M.G. says that the result of his decision has ‘stunned’ him and others, because they have successfully delivered the failed project, as he said:

“It is stunning to say that the project that could not be delivered in nine months was delivered in five days. I brought eight engineers from Tehran and they were collaborating with us on the screens and this solved the problem and we delivered the project.”


Section 3: Findings of the Evaluation Instrument

This is the first step of phase 3 of the Feed backward-forward Loop (see Figure 37). Here, we identify the agency-oriented factors *associated with* M.G.'s freedom based on his scores in the Evaluation Instrument (Table 45). These scores imply several findings about M.G.'s decision. First, the 'self' and 'other' agency-oriented factors of 'Motivation' and 'Expectation' receive the highest scores (.94, .93, .70, and .90 respectively). As shown in Table 45, all these factors are a future-oriented type of reasoning, implying that M.G. is more of a teleological thinker, attributing his decision to the future rather than the past. Having teleological reasoning was supported in the interview as he said:

“One thing is very important for any entrepreneur that is ‘reputation’. If I gave up in India, there was no one there, but I would have lost my ‘reputation’ before my angle investor. I behaved in a way that my partner could ‘later’ say that “ok, he might be broken, but we can count on him.”

This finding implies that M.G. is using teleological reasoning, referring to a reason for his decision in the future. The reason is that he anticipates that if he fails to deliver the project then in the future he will lose his reputation. This finding also shows how M.G.'s evaluation at S1 will feed forward to his future state, as he anticipates a threat to his reputation. This also implies that M.G.'s goal is to become a successful entrepreneur who has a trustworthy reputation in the market, which is a sign showing that he has either practical or substantive rationality. In this line, M.G.'s highest scores are 'self' Motivation (.94) and this factor is mapped onto substantive rationality (see Chapter 3, Theory Development). M.G.'s high score in this factor shows that he has substantive rationality, but all of his other highest scores are 'Self' Expectation (.93), 'other' Expectation (.90), and 'other' Capabilities imply that he has practical rationality. The question is what exactly M.G.'s rationality type is. This is an important question, because it shows the type of his *values*, which is required to establish if his decision has contracted his freedom.

Figure 37: Section Position in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency



Further, Table 45 shows that M.G.'s score for 'self' and 'other' factors of 'third party evaluation' have the lowest values (.15 and .20 respectively). These findings indicate that: (A) M.G. was not using formal rationality, because third party evaluation is not significant in his decision making, (B) M.G.'s 'self' worldview is stronger than the 'other' worldview, and (C) he believes that he has higher motivation than what he perceived the 'other' thinks about his decision.

It is found that M.G.'s 'self' scores in the Evaluation Instrument are different to his 'other' scores. For example, his 'self' scores for Capabilities (.86) and Resource Limitation (.55) are smaller than 'other' scores for Capabilities (.93), and Resource Limitation (.20). These findings imply that: (A) M.G. was thinking about the opposing worldview when he was making the decision, and (B) M.G. saw more limitation on his resources to pursue what he wants, but he perceived that others were not aware of these constraints, and (C) he has had either 'substantive' or 'practical' rationality, as he has had future-oriented reasoning.

Here, the question is whether his rationality type is substantive or practical. In this regard, we trace M.G.'s decision cycle in time to see how loyal he remains to his *values*, and whether his goals are short-term or long-term oriented. These two sets of information will help us to identify his rationality type. If his values and goals are solid over time, then he has substantive rationality. Otherwise, if he changes his values and his objectives are short term, then he has 'practical' rationality. A mechanism that helps to identify the solidity of his values is how M.G. encounters with the opposing worldview and whether he dismisses his own worldview (including his values and goals) facing the opposing worldview in the future (see Chapter 3, Theory Development). In the following sections we investigate M.G.'s reconciling approach.

Table 45: M.G.'s Score in the Evaluation Instrument


Score	Factors	Reasoning	Rationality	Direction
.94	'Self' Motivation	Teleological	Substantive	Forward
.56	'Self' Causal State	Causal/Correlational	Theoretical	Backward
.15	'Self' Third Party Evaluation	Causal/Correlational	Formal	Backward
.86	'Self' Capabilities	Correlational	Practical	Backward
.93	'Self' Expectations	Teleological	Practical	Forward
.55	'Self' Resource Limitation	Casual	Theoretical	Backward
.80	'Self' Effort and Ability	Casual	Practical	Backward
.80	'Self' Desire Intensity	Teleological	Substantive	Forward
.70	'Other' Motivation	Teleological	Substantive	Forward
.20	'Other' Third Party Evaluation	Casual	Formal	Backward
.20	'Other' Resource Limitation	Casual	Theoretical	Backward
.45	'Other' Casual State	Casual/Correlational	Theoretical	Backward
.90	'Other' Expectation	Teleological	Practical	Forward
.40	'Other' Popularity	Correlational	Formal	Backward
.60	'Other' Social Group	Correlational	Formal	Backward
.93	'Other' Capability	Correlational	Practical	Backward
.80	'Other' Self Interest	Teleological	Practical	Forward

Section 4: Rationality Type

Here we identify M.G.'s Rationality Type that is the third step of analysing the Feed backward-forward loop in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (Figure 38). M.G.'s scores in the Evaluation Instrument qualify him for both practical and substantive rationalities. To reveal which one is his rationality type, here we analyse the data derived from in-depth interviews. Here, we try to indicate the value that led him to resist the failure of his online bookshop. It is found that M.G. had faith in his online bookshop that gave him "joy" and "hope", as he said:

"When others do not see even 1% success in your project, an entrepreneur never allows himself to think about failure. This is like 'faith'; 'belief'. Today no one expects me to work 16 to 20 hours a day and they tell me why you are wasting your time. But this work is "joy", it is life itself and my identity."

Figure 38: Section Position in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency



It is also found that M.G. compares his values and way of thinking with an employee in a bureaucratic organisation (ministry of oil), as he said:

"When you are an employee in oil ministry, it is not important if you are doing your job or not. It doesn't matter at all. Do you know why? Because simply you don't care."

This finding is in line with Weber's (2009) distinction between formal and substantive rationality. Weber says that the way a bureaucrat thinks and lives bounds his freedom within the standards set by formal institutions. Weber contrasts a bureaucrat with a person who has substantive rationality, who follows his own values and determines his own goals, who enjoys higher freedom (Kalberg, 1980). Similarly, in this case study M.G. contrasts his own situation with an employee in the ministry of oil. These findings show that M.G. does not have formal rationality and has teleological reasoning, which approves the findings of the Evaluation

Instrument about M.G.'s rationality type (see Table 45). It is found that the types of emotions M.G. was experiencing were related to substantive rationality (see Table 46) as he said:

“I made this decision because I had commitment to my customers and employees. Commitment is a limitation that naturally exists in any decision that you make. In entrepreneurship ‘commitment’ is important as it is the main precondition for success.”

In interview M.G. pointed to passion, joy, and pride, which are in Class S and Class L emotions as he said:

“What I understood from entrepreneurship was that creating jobs and creation in general is like artists’ work, which is full of emotion, and due to this “passion” what happens inside you is very influential on your decisions. I cannot explain the feeling as it is very “enjoyable”. It is “super”. It is like a normal person standing in front of a mirror and thinks that he is Al Pacino. You feel that you have a different life from a normal life. You see, I use some words frequently in my talks. I say that I am “proud” that even if I die today, I am satisfied. Do you know why? Because the world without me is different to the world with me.”

These findings show that when his values and emotions control his decisions they are in effect imposing demands on him, which serve to contract his negative freedom. However, M.G. is not bothered by this limitation because he has determined the values and goals himself, which if we add these findings to his high score in ‘self’ motivation (.94) we can conclude that he has substantive rationality and his positive freedom has been expanded by his decision.

Table 46: Rational Indicators of Causal Dimensions

Rationality Type	Controllability	Stability	Locus	Emotion Class	Main Emotion	Affordance
Substantive Rationality	Controllable	Stable	Internal	Class S & L	Hope	Hardly Change
Practical Rationality	Controllable	Stable*	Internal	Class S & L	Hope	Change

Note: * shows the comparative stability of practical and substantive rationalities as values (substantive rationality) are more stable than goals (practical rationality).


According to Table 46, if M.G. has either substantive or practical rationalities he has control over what values to believe and what goals to pursue, and this controllability allows him to experience emotions with positive hedonic characteristics. Table 46 shows that having either substantive or practical rationalities will enable M.G. to attribute his decision to controllable, stable and internal reasons. As explained in the previous chapter on emotion, when one's attribution has these three loci, then it is possible that this individual experiences the Class S and Class L emotions (e.g. pride and particularly hope). However, the main difference between having substantive or practical rationality is that having the former, the values of the person hardly change, while one who has practical rationality has shorter-term goals. Interview data show that M.G. has been loyal to his values for a long time since his childhood as he said:

“Now there are many people who are thinking about the internet-based books in Iran. If my online bookshop fails today, what do you think I will do tomorrow when I wake up? I go and start another business from its basics. Because I do these things since I was a kid. I have to do this because nothing else will satisfy me; I like this. I like creating value from nothing.”

These findings trace back M.G.'s values to the past, which imply that he has 'substantive rationality' because his values have remained unchanged since his childhood. So far the findings indicate that M.G.'s rationality type has been substantive when he has decided to keep up the business (i.e. Dec 1), but to see if his rationality type will remain stable, in the following sections we will trace his decision cycle forward to see if his values remain unchanged in the future. Figure 39 maps M.G.'s scores in the questionnaire onto rationality types, showing that the direction of his thinking is future oriented, as his scores in both substantive and practical

rationalities are high. However, so far we have found more evidence supporting the notion that M.G. has substantive rationality. To make sure about this conclusion, we need to delve deeper into M.G.'s values, to see whether his decisions are about being an entrepreneur and creating new businesses, or whether they are about deeper causes such as socio-cultural preoccupations. In the following chapters we explore M.G.'s decision cycles over time and trace his decision to have a clear image of his values, and rationality type.

Figure 39: Linear Decision Trajectory Guided by 'Self' and 'Other' Models



Backward Reasoning (Casual Thinking):

'Self' Factors:

- Casual State -> Theoretical Rationality (.56)
- Third Party Evaluation -> Formal Rationality (.15)
- Resource Limitation -> Formal Rationality (.55)
- Effort and Ability -> Practical Rationality (.80)

'Other' Factors:

- Third Party Evaluation -> Formal Rationality (.20)
- Resource Limitation -> Formal Rationality (.20)
- Casual State -> Theoretical Rationality (.45)

Present

Forward Reasoning (Teleological Thinking):

'Self' Factors:

- Motivation -> Substantive Rationality (.94)
- Capabilities -> Practical Rationality (.86)
- Expectation -> Practical Rationality (.93)
- Desire Intensity -> Substantive Rationality (.80)


'Other' Factors:

- Motivation -> Substantive Rationality (.70)
- Expectations -> Practical Rationality (.90)
- Self-interest -> Practical Rationality (.80)

Section 5: Reconciling Approach

This is the fourth step of phase 3 of the case study methodology (Figure 40), and we identify three notions of: (A) the existence of an opposing worldview; (B) how M.G. deals with this conflict; and (C) indicating the impact of the reconciling approach on M.G.'s freedom, based on Bakhtin's (1935) definition of freedom according to dialogism. So far we have found evidence supporting the conjecture that M.G. has substantive rationality when making his decision to keep his business. Here, we try to indicate his reconciling approach to determine if his freedom to live according to his values has been expanded/contracted based on agency factors.

Figure 40: Section Position in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency



Here, the findings show that M.G. had been facing the opposing worldview when he was making the decision, because his scores in the Evaluation Instrument in the 'self' and 'other' factors of Motivation (.94, and .70, respectively), Third Party Evaluation (.15 and .20, respectively), Capabilities (.86 and .93 respectively), and Resource Limitation (.55 and .20, respectively) were different (see Chapter 5 for a detailed explanation). M.G.'s different scores in the 'self' and 'other' factors of Resource Limitation and Capabilities implied that he saw more limitations on his choice from his 'self' standpoint, contrasting with the boundaries he perceived the 'other' attributed to his situation. Further, M.G. directly pointed to the existence of "dual worldviews" in his decision, as he said:

"At that time everyone was telling me that it was not possible. But, from the other side there is a craziness that I was telling myself "you have to do this work". That is why when you speak with any entrepreneur you see this dual situation."

So far the findings have established that the opposing worldview existed when M.G. was making the decision, the subsequent question would be how M.G. dealt with this opposing

worldview when he decided to resist the failure of his online bookshop (Des1). In this regard, the interview data showed that M.G. was using monologue dismissing the opposing worldview (or “satisficing dialogue”), for several following reasons. First, his view on the *ontology of truth* matched with monologue characteristics as he believes there is one ‘truth’ and it belongs to the person who is more convincing (see Chapter 5). In this regard, he downgraded the opposing worldview by attributing ‘third world citizen’ to their standpoint, claiming that they could not understand him, as he said:

“There is something that people in the third world countries cannot understand it very well, but I have it naturally, maybe because I studied philosophy in a period of my life. I am happy that when the foreign investors were evaluating the price of my start-up, the first thing that they have written about me was that “he is a convincing manager.”

These findings imply that M.G. believes that his worldview is more near to the single ‘truth’ (that he perceives exists) than that of others for several reasons: (A) He points to his degree in philosophy to claim that this degree has enabled him to understand what others could not see; (b) he attributed “third world country citizens” to the opposing position that downgrades their worldview on the basis that they are an underdeveloped nation; (c) he pointed to “foreign” investors’ positive evaluation about him that shows he attributes higher ‘truth’ to the understanding of the foreigners, claiming that his ‘self’ view is congruent with this worldview. Another evidence that showed M.G. was using monologue was his *reconciling mechanism* which is more similar to the characteristics of monologue (see Chapter 5), as he dismissed the opposing worldviews and only considered the worldview of his partner that was in line with his own worldview, as he said:

“Do you know how this conflict always reconciles in my mind? With the feeling that is captured in a sentence from my partner saying that “If this was an easy job, no doubt that someone would have done it before you.”

Here, M.G. was referring to his partner’s worldview that was congruent with his own worldview in order to support his vision. In this way, he welcomed the other’s worldview as long as it was in line with his own standpoint, showing that he was using monologue, dismissing the opposing worldview and keeping the worldviews in agreement. According to Table 47, as a result of using monologue and subjugating the opposing worldview, M.G. was in control of the situation. As he had full control over the situation, *controllability* was the main dimension of the

cause of his decision, so he was experiencing class C emotions (see Chapter 3, Theory Development). We found empirical support for three emotions of Class C in interview data. One emotion was “shame” towards his co-founder, generated because he assumed himself responsible for the contract with the Indian company that had failed to deliver the project, as he said:

“I could not go back to Tehran, because I was ashamed of Mr. F, because we had the contracts with the Indian company under his name”.

Another emotion was “regret” for willingly dismissing the other options that unlike him, his cousins had taken those ways and they had achieved a more secure job and salary, as he said:

“I was asking myself “What is at the end of it? I lost my life. I was comparing myself with my cousins who went to Azad University. They were employed and earned regular salary and they could buy good cars, but I might not be able to buy those cars. I was the one who studied in public university [better university] and I had the opportunity to be employed in ministry of oil. My mother still thinks that I had to do that”.

The third emotion was feeling “fear” about future as he said:

“I felt a dreadful fear. You compare yourself with the others. At the end there is fear, but when you digest this fear, this is like a person that behind him all the bridges were broken and you have no way but going forward.”

Table 47: Emotion Generated from Reconciling Approaches

Reconciling Approach	Mechanism	Causal Dimension	Emotion
Monologue	Dismiss 'Other' voice	Controllability	Class C & Fear

Note: Class C emotions are: Anger, Shame, Fear, Pity, Regret, Gratitude (see Chapter 4, Theory Development)

These findings imply that M.G. considers the other worldview (in this case his partner's), as long as they align with him. In this regard, M.G. said:

"If you come to our office, you see that there is always argument; I even argue with our typist and ask her "why should you type the letters in this way?" Sometime we set a tour in the office to show the typist what will eventually happen if she types like this, for the developer to design the web. So, being convinced is important for me".

Further, he claimed that he was considering different worldviews in order to arrive at a solution that is acceptable for all different parties, which is an insight to the reconciling approach that implies that sometimes M.G. uses the dialectic approach, as he said:

"For me arriving to the same point of view is important. You see, in decision making if there were no common point of view, then there is not enough commitment between people to do a job. If there is no common perspective, you decide to make it like a 'circle', your team perceive it as a 'rectangle' and finally a 'hexagon' will be created."

Here the question is what we learn from his reconciling approach and its impact on his freedom. The findings imply that M.G.'s reconciling approach is changing depending on the context of the problem. As he has pointed to some examples that he has welcomed others' perspectives, respecting the solution that satisfies all parties involved. Here, it is evident that he has used monologue in the specific decision to keep his business after the failure in India, but the question is whether this reconciling approach changes in his other decisions. The answer to this question helps us to know more about reconciling approaches (see Chapter 3, Methodology).

In this regard, despite M.G.'s claim of being welcoming towards the opposing worldviews, further evidence showed that M.G. was using monologue or "satisficing dialogue", depending on the power of the opposing worldview and the level of conflict between the opposition and his values. For example, in spite of M.G.'s claim that his office was where all worldviews were expressed and heard, he set limits on how much the other was permitted to believe in their

worldview. Accordingly, M.G. said the other worldview is acceptable as long as it does not contradict with his values, as he said:

“This is not like always you can convince each other. Here, I have a very good strategy. I say that up to the point that your partner’s decision will not threaten your vital interest, you agree with him, because we should prevent stupid arguments. We should also allow ourselves to be convinced.”

More evidence showing that M.G. was using “satisficing dialogue” was that his reconciling approach varied according to the position of authority. For example, he pointed to an example that his employees are convinced by him, as he said:

“When they disagree, I provide them with a pilot and allow them to produce the experimental results. People even tell me, to the CEO of the company, they say “shot up, lets data talk.” For example, I ask them to change something. They say “shot up, lets data talk.” Finally, they bring the data and then they say “ok, you said the truth.”

In this example M.G. was trying to say that his employees were allowed to question his worldview, but finally they would come to a conclusion that the boss was right. Meanwhile, he pointed to another example where he dismissed his own voice in front of the board members, as he said:

“There were many times that I was not convinced but I accepted to do what they want and at the end I found that it was a right way. I am doing it although I don’t have a good feeling about it. I think that if I have had enough evidence I could have convinced them.”

This implied that M.G. dismissed his view before the board members, although he was not happy with this arrangement. This also showed that he was stepping into the area of monologue that was, believe your view or my view, perhaps based on empirical evidence. What this tells us about M.G. is that he could be flexible enough to change the reconciliation process depending on the nature of the problem and the other’s level of authority. In other words, he used dialectic as long as the other could hold their idea up to the point that it did not threaten his own values, i.e. he was using a form of ‘pseudo dialectics’ and/or ‘satisficing dialogism’.

To summarise, using the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to explain M.G.’s decision has shown that he used a kind of “satisfying dialogic” that suffices up to a point in the absence of greater priorities entering the discussion. Table 48 summarises M.G.’s reconciling approach and his rationality type regarding his decision to keep the business. When M.G. used substantive

rationality, the strong standpoint in his decision was the 'self' particularly because he used monologue and subjugated the opposing worldview. As a result, M.G. was experiencing an emotion from the class of 'fear' that results in uncertainty and doubt that were involved in his decision cycle due to the existence of the opposing worldview that had been dismissed. Overall, this case has two observations for the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency: (A) using monologue generates class C emotions that particularly include fear, shame, and regret; and (B) the type of reconciling approach depends on the nature of the problem, the power of authority and the agent's belief in her values.

Regarding the impact of the 'reconciling approach' on 'agency', as we have found that he was using monologue, his affective and cognitive modes of agency are contracted after the decision, even though he is fully in control by subjugating the opposing worldview, hence his conative mode of agency is expanded. Further, regarding his positive and negative freedom we need to show whether the decision has been in conflict or conducive to his values by taking into account the impact of both reason (i.e. rationality types and reconciling approach) and emotion, which is the focus of the following sections.

Table 48: 'Self' v. 'Other' Strength based on Rationality and Reconciling Approaches

Rationality	Reconciling Approach	Result of Reconciliation	Emotion	Standpoint
Substantive	Monologue	Dismiss 'Other'	Fear	Self

Note: Standpoint refers to the strong standpoint in M.G.'s reconciling mechanism.

Section 6: Emotion

This section is about the 'emotion' step of phase 3 as presented in Figure 41. As explained in previous chapters, this study will capture the emotions behind decisions based on Weiner's (2010) Attribution Theory of Motivation. Here, we use the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to show the emotional reasons behind M.G.'s decision and its impact on his freedom. Table 49 shows the direct emotions that M.G. is experiencing when evaluating his state of being/doing at S1. The findings provide support for all Weiner's emotions, either empirically in the interview or logically derived from M.G.'s rationality type and reconciling approach. In this line, M.G. said that he was having 'hope' and 'joy' by pointing to it as 'crazy feeling', as he said:

"What I was feeling is like what Steve Jobs said in his lecture at Stanford University. He says "when they expelled me from the university, this was my feeling: 'stay foolish, stay high!'" This is the feeling that you always have. It is a bit crazy. You say it is impossible, everyone else is telling you that it is not possible, but from the other side there is a craziness that you say "I have to do this work". That is why when you speak with any entrepreneur, there is like this dual situation."

Figure 41: Section position in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency




Table 49 shows the direct emotions M.G. was experiencing, their consequences on M.G.'s expectancy and persistency (see Chapter 3, Theory Development). For example, the final column shows that feeling 'hope' leads M.G. to look forward to the future of his decisions to keep his business after the failure. These findings are in line with M.G.'s high score in both 'self' and 'other' factors of Expectation (.93 and .90 equivalently) in the questionnaire.

Table 49: 'Self' Emotion Classes Based on Weiner's Theory of Motivation

Direct Emotion	Consequence	Towards who	Influence Direction
Class C			
Shame	Latency	Co-founder	Backward
Regret	Persistency	Mother	Forward
Anger	Intensity	Indian company	Forward
Class L			
Pride	Persistency	self	Backward/Forward
Self-Esteem	Persistency	self	Backward/Forward
Humiliation	Latency	self	Backward/Forward
Class S			
Hope	High expectancy-Persistency	self	Forward
Hopelessness	Low expectancy-Latency	self	Backward

Note: 'Self' emotions are direct affects.

Table 50 presents the indirect emotions that M.G. perceived that others feel when evaluating his state of being/doing at S1, as a result of a rational process. The logical deductions in the table are empirically supported in the interview. For example, he perceived that his partner felt 'pride' towards him, as he said:

“At that time I had a feeling that later interpreted with my partner’s sentence that “if founding online book shop was an easy task, someone would have done it before you.”

In the fifth row of Table 50, we have shown that M.G. was experiencing 'pride' generated by his partner and its 'consequence' was 'persistency' in his decision to rescue his start-up business from failure, and M.G. was looking 'forward' when evaluating his decision from his partner's standpoint. Meanwhile, the final row of Table 50 evaluates M.G.'s decision from his mother's worldview, who according to M.G. was opposed to him starting his business and preferred that her son would have gone to work for the ministry of oil. As shown in the final row, when M.G. remembered his mother's evaluation, he was reporting 'hopelessness' and its consequence was latency in the decision to rescue the business from failure and looking backward, thinking about missing his opportunity of employment at the ministry of oil. Both Table 49 and Table 50 show that in M.G.'s decision process several different emotions were involved directly and indirectly, which were generated from different standpoints. However, M.G.'s decision to keep his business was in line with positive Class S emotion (hope), and positive Class L emotions (pride). Further, to see the impact of these emotions on M.G.'s freedom-agency we will map the emotions onto reasons in the following sections.

Table 50: 'Other' Emotion Classes Based on Weiner's Theory of Motivation

Indirect Emotion	Consequence	Other	Influence Direction
Class C			
Regret	Persistency	Co-founder	Forward
Anger	Intensity	Co-founder	Forward
Class L			
Pride	Persistency	Partner	Forward
Humiliation	Latency	Public (Cousins)	Backward
Class S			
Hope	High expectancy-Persistency	Partner	Forward
Hopelessness	Low expectancy-Latency	Mother	Backward

Note: 'Other' emotions are indirect Emotion.

Section 7: Mapping Emotions onto Reason

Table 51 presents an overall picture of both 'direct' (i.e. personally generated about self-evaluation) and 'indirect' (i.e. rationally generated from perception about other's evaluation) emotions that M.G. felt at S1 and maps them onto the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. Table 51 shows that there are four standpoints evaluating M.G.'s decision and generating different emotions, which are M.G.'s self, his partner, mother, co-founder, and his cousins that generated indirect emotions. The first eight rows of Table 51 show the direct emotions that M.G. was experiencing after evaluating his initial decision to start the business and his later decision to contract with the Indian company.

For example, he was experiencing 'pride' in his decision to start an online bookshop (Des-1), while we evaluated his subsequent state of being/doing as 'Beneficial Functioning'. This means that 'pride' had a 'good' hedonic aspect, leading him to 'start' 'to go on like that' (i.e. continuing business). However, at the same time based on M.G.'s evaluation of his decision to contract with the Indian company (Des0), we assessed his state of being/doing after this decision (Dec0) as 'Adverse Commanding', consequently he was feeling 'shame' and 'embarrassment', which have a 'bad' hedonic dimension and led him to 'start' to 'go away' from the state of being in contract with the Indian company. What we learn from Table 51 is the existence of different and sometimes opposite emotions influencing the agent. The question of how these emotions are generated and integrated in the agent's mind are a part of 'real' domain in Critical Realism (see Chapter 3: Methodology) that are not observable here (see Chapter 3, emotion and reason black boxes in the model). Here, we identify the emotions mapped onto his evaluation and the subsequent decision as they are within the 'empirical' part of 'real' domain of ontology of being in this research (see Chapter 3, Methodology). In the following section we trace the overall impact of these emotions and the reasons investigated in previous sections on M.G.'s freedom.

Table 51: Mapping M.G.'s Emotions onto the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency


Worldview	State	Emotion	Function	Hedonic	Signal for Behavioural Change
Self					
		Beneficial Functioning (Starting an online bookshop)			
		Pride	Start	Good	“to go on like that”
		Alpha Pride	Start	Good	“to go on the same due ability”
		Beta Pride	Start	Good	“to go on the same due effort”
		Adverse Commanding (Contracting with the Indian company)			
		Shame	Start	Bad	“to go away”
		Embarrassment	Start	Bad	“to go away”
Partner					
		Beneficial Functioning (Starting online bookshop)			
		Admiration	Start	Good	“Go towards and support”
		Gratitude	Start	Good	“Do it again”
Co-founder					
		Adverse Commanding (Contracting with the Indian company)			
		Anger	Stop	Bad	“Better not to do that”
Mother, cousins and acquaintances					
		Adverse Commanding (Starting the online bookshop)			
		Contempt	Stop	Bad	“to change behaviour”
		Humiliation	Stop	Bad	“to change behaviour”

Section 8: Reason, Emotion, Decision and Freedom

The final element of the phase of Feed backward-forward Loop in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is showing the impact of emotion and reason on an agent's freedom (Figure 42). Table 52 presents the impact of emotion and reasons on M.G.'s decision values, after each of his three decisions of: (Des-1) starting the online bookshop, (Des0) contracting with the Indian company, and (Des1) resisting the failure and delivering the failed project in India. Through identifying the conflictive/conducive impact of decision on M.G.'s values we conclude the impact on his decision on his freedom. The findings indicate that the decision to start the online bookshop has been conducive to M.G.'s values but it has imposed limitations on his options (i.e. contracted his negative freedom but expanded his positive freedom), as he said:

“When I was sitting in my office thinking about starting an online bookshop, I had freedom at its ultimate level. But after making the decision, you do not have that freedom anymore. Today that I am sitting here, I cannot close the business. Do you know why? Because 35 people are living from it.”

Figure 42: Section Position in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency



However, M.G.'s perception of freedom is different to our technical definition (i.e. defined based on Berlin's positive-negative sides), as he claims that if he has no commitment he is completely free. Here, his perception may be true about his negative freedom, but it is not explaining his positive freedom. In this line, M.G.'s claimed that he had the ultimate level of freedom at the start of the business. This claim is also under scrutiny, even from the positive side of freedom. This is because it was not possible as he had financial limitations, and his scores in the questionnaire showed that from the 'self' standpoint his Resources and Capabilities were limited (.55 and .86 respectively). These findings show how important it is to determine three modes of agency (cognitive, conative, and affective) and two sides of freedom (positive and negative) in agency-freedom relationship, as individuals have different perceptions and definitions of freedom and there are several complex notions involved in this relationship (e.g. capability, achievement, motivation, values, etc.) that can be easily misunderstood by lay observers.

Table 52: Emotion-Decision-Value-Freedom Relation with Strong 'self'

Decision	Self (E)	Self (Em)	Other (E)	Other (Em)	Relation to Value
Des-1	BF			Self: Pride	Conducive
Des-1		partner	BF	Pride-Admiration-Gratitude	Conducive
Des-1		mother	AC	Contempt-Scorn-Disgust-Sympathy	Conflicted
Dec1	BF			Self: Pride	Conducive
Des1		partner	BF	Pride-Admiration-Gratitude	Conducive
Des1		mother	AC	Contempt-Scorn-Disgust-Sympathy	Conflicted
Des0	AC			Self: Shame Embarrassment	Conflicted
Des0		partner	AF	Pride-Admiration-Gratitude	Conflicted
Des0		Co-founder	AF	Anger-Indignation-Schaderfreude	Conflicted
Des0		Mother	AC	Contempt-Scorn-Disgust-Sympathy	Conflicted

Note: E refers to Evaluation; EM refers to Emotion. BF is Beneficial Functioning; AF is Adverse Functioning; BC is Beneficial Commanding; AC is Adverse Commanding; Relation to Value shows the impact of decision on M.G.'s life from the evaluator's standpoint.

Table 52 shows that the decision to contract with the Indian company is evaluated as Adverse Commanding by M.G., his co-founder and his mother. These evaluations have generated shame, anger, and contempt, and the result of this decision could have prevented M.G. from pursuing his values and his long-term goal of becoming a successful entrepreneur. Hence, from other's standpoint this decision (Des0 in Table 52) has conflicted with M.G.'s values. It is found that living according to his values is conflicted by Des0 and this is supported in the interview, as he said:

“When I found the project failed in India, one thing was very important for me as it must be for any entrepreneur and that is reputation. If I gave up the business in India, there was no one there, but I would have lost my reputation before my angle investor, Mr. F.”

Here M.G. points to the commitment that comes from one's values rather than from the decision itself as one can choose to be irresponsible and abandon a position without concern for the consequences. He shows that his values require him to be committed, which plays a heavy part in his decision making – his choices are based on an appreciation and acceptance of responsibilities and commitment. This is a very important observation that shows his negative freedom is contracted by his decision, but his positive freedom is expanded. These findings also support the notion that he has substantive rationality, because his decision prevents him from pursuing other capabilities if they were contrary to his values. Further, the final rows of Table 52 show that the decision of not to give up the business after the failure in India (Des1) did not conflict with his values. This is supported in the interview as M.G. said:

“I could not give up easily. At the beginning it was just me and at any moment I cannot say that I don't want it any more. Do you know why? Because I have more than 200,000 users who give me money and they have my e-books. I cannot turn it off. They wake up in the morning and they want to have access to their books. It is a part of my responsibilities.”

Here, M.G. is also rationalising by equating commitment with free choice, albeit driven by his personal values. It is evidence that he is bounded to his values and desires to succeed. These findings imply that M.G.'s perception lacks the distinction between positive and negative freedom, because Des1 has expanded his positive freedom (he is determining to live according to his values), but it has contracted his negative freedom (self-imposed constraints have limited his options).


So far we have found two insights into the impact of M.G.'s decisions on his freedom. First, it is found that the overall effect of Des-1, Des0 and Des1 was not contracting M.G.'s freedom because except De0 (i.e. the decision to deal with the Indian company that contracted

M.G.'s positive freedom and three modes of his agency for a while), the other two decisions of Des -1 and Des1 were in line with his values of becoming a successful entrepreneur. In the following sections we trace M.G.'s life trajectory and the side effect of his decision to suggest a more accurate conclusion about the combined effect of M.G.'s decisions on different aspects of his freedom and agency.

Section 9: The Decision Cycle

This section analyses the temporal aspect of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency by tracing M.G.'s decision cycle (Figure 43). We try to use these findings to indicate freedom-agency relationship.

Figure 43: Section Position in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency




M.G.'s decision cycle to found the business is presented in Figure 44. So far, we have found that M.G. has 'substantive' (i.e. believe in nature of the book business and having a long-term goal of creating new services and products in cultural and/or IT market) when has decided to keep up his business. However, we have found several evidences for 'practical' rationality (i.e. this business is another start-up like other businesses that M.G has started before, and having a short-term goal of becoming financially successful) in M.G.'s way of reasoning.

To see if M.G.'s rationality type remains unchanged, Figure 44 shows M.G.'s life transition before and after (Des1). To clarify the solidity of M.G.'s values and the length of his goals we travel back and forth in his life trajectory. If we travel forth, Figure 44 shows that M.G.'s subsequent decision (Des2) is to sell half of the shares in his business and after that he decides to travel around Europe. At this stage, based on these two follow-up decisions of M.G. we can conclude that at the time of interviewing, M.G. had practical rationality with the short-term goal of financial satisfaction. Traveling forth in Figure 44 shows that his values (i.e. creating and expanding a new business in the IT sector) have not remained long in his life. However, if we travel back in his life trajectory the evidence shows that his rationality type has been substantive by the time of making Dec1, which is the focal point of this case study. This is because the earlier findings have established that his values that lead him to keep up his business (i.e. Dec1) have been with him since his childhood, indicating that his rationality type is substantive at this decision. Overall, in M.G.'s case study, his rationality type at the time of deciding to keep

the business was substantive rationality, but as time passed, his values changed and he has a shown tendency toward practical rationality. Thus, his rationality type has changed from substantive to practical in his life-trajectory. These findings show that one's values and rationality types can change over time.

Figure 44: The Decision Cycle




Note: This diagram is filled in based on the available data collected through interviews and questionnaires. Thus except for the main decision cycle that is about Dec1, the evaluation of the other states is not evidenced in the present study.

Section 10: Side Effects

Here, we investigate M.G.'s decisions over time, which leads us to focus on some of the side effects of his decisions when realising certain capabilities (Figure 45), and help to determine agency-freedom relationship.

Figure 45: Section position in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency




M.G.'s decision to start the business has had several side effects, presented in Figure 46. The main side effect of starting this business was that he lost his opportunity to be employed in the ministry of oil and according to him, leading a 'normal' life of receiving secure monthly income from a low-risk career. As evidence, M.G. said:

“For example, those who leave their life such as “Digikala.com”, or ‘cafébazar.com”, they could have had a wealthy life and they have had 1000 ways that normally will end in a relative success or financial satisfaction. For example, I could have become employed in Iran’s ministry of oil, as my mother always has suggested and as she still thinks that I have to do that. That job would have provided me with a life at middle class level in a normal way. That is why you see a dual difference between the way an entrepreneur sees his work and the way others see his/her work.”

Here, when M.G. is facing the opposite worldview of his mother, he is rationalising by identifying himself with other successful Iranian entrepreneurs. This can be explained based on Tajfel's (1978) social identity theory showing that M.G. is identifying himself as being as unique as other successful Iranian start-up owners, in order to deal with the uncertainty and doubt that are involved in the high-risk life of being an entrepreneur. This finding regarding the rationalisation supports the agency-oriented factor of 'logical reasoning' that has been identified in the thematic analysis of Study 3 of Chapter 5. Overall, Figure 46 shows an overview of M.G.'s


decisions and their side effects. Further, Figure 47 zooms in on one of his decisions with a focus on its side effect.

Figure 46: M.G.'s Side-Effects (Zoom out)




Note: In the areas where the data about decisions and side effects are not sufficient this Figure is left blank.

Figure 47: Side Effects (Zoom in)



To summarise, Figure 48 shows how both of the decisions and their side effects influence M.G.'s capabilities. As evidence, M.G.'s decisions are influenced by consequences, but the overall picture shows that M.G. has also had determinism in a chaotic environment to decide the destiny of his business, showing that his agency has been expanded through making the decision to start the business and keeping it up during the failures. These findings support the idea that M.G. has had substantive rationality when making Dec1. In the following sections we present a clear view of M.G.'s capabilities and how certain capabilities are desired, realised and chosen.

Figure 48: Side Effects and Decision on Capabilities (Zoom in)



Section 11: The Decision Trajectory in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency

This section is about M.G.'s decision trajectory (Figure 49). Here, we show how M.G.'s capabilities are influenced by emotion and reasons. Table 53 maps our findings regarding M.G.'s three modes of agency onto the phenotype and genotype of the 14 nodes of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (see Chapter 3, Theory Development).

Figure 49: Section Position in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency




Table 53: Genotype-Phenotype of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (M.G. Case Study)

Element	Genotype of Cell	Phenotype of Actor
Node A	<p>M.G.'s decision is influenced by:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. His substantive rationality with goal of becoming a successful entrepreneur, who has a good reputation and is financially satisfied. 2. A strong 'self' worldview that is not dismissed facing an opposite 'other' worldview. 3. 'Self' direct emotions of pride in his ability and previous successes; embarrassment for the failure in India; shame before the co-founder for contracting with the Indian company; regret before his mother and cousins; anger towards the Indian company. 4. Indirect perceived emotions of pride by his partner; anger and regret by his co-founder, humiliation and consent by his mother. 	<p>M.G. classifies his desires and undesired capabilities when making Des1:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desired: Not giving up the business after failure in India. • Un-Desired: Giving up the business.
Node B1	<p>M.G.'s desired capabilities when making Des1 are influenced by the following constraints:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Logical: threat to his reputation before his co-founder. 2. Physical: geographical constraints and distance from Tehran. 3. Axiological: commitment to customers, and responsibility to employees and business. 4. Emotion: direct experienced pride and joy; indirectly was shameful before co-founder that pushed him forward. 5. Reason: based on practical rationality he was pursuing the goal of becoming successful and keeping his reputation in the market. 	<p>M.G.'s realisable capabilities are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Realisable Desired: staying in India and delivering the failed project • Un-realisable Desired: going back to Tehran and continuing the business.
Node B2	<p>M.G.'s undesired capabilities are influenced by:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Logical: threat to his reputation before his co-founder 2) Axiological: commitment to customers and responsibility to employees and business. 	<p>M.G. is coerced to categorises non-desired capabilities in two sets:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Realisable Un-Desired: Giving up the business and going back to Tehran with failed project.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Un-realizable Un-Desired: Giving up the business but keeping his reputation before the co-founder.
Node C	Accidental properties of starting the business was staying in India and delivering the project.	M.G.'s capabilities were influenced by the side effect of his previous decision to choose a risky life of an entrepreneur.
Node D1	<p>Choosing a desired and realizable capability of staying in India and delivering the failed project:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Valuable from both personal worldview and his co-founder's perspective 2. He is not forced to make this choice. 3. M.G is conscious 4. Side-effects are generated that make him reluctant to explore future international contracts. 	M.G. made this choice free from the force of source of authority, and it has both personal and social value. This leads him to the "Beneficial Functioning" state.
Node E1	At S1, M.G. is evaluating his state of being/doing, using substantive rationality based on his goal to become a successful entrepreneur.	M.G feels hope using teleological reasoning and practical rationalities.
Node E2	At S1, M.G. is evaluating his state of being/doing, encountering the opposite worldview of 'others', dismissing the discouraging worldview of others.	Making the decision, M.G. evaluates his encounter with the discouraging and negative opposite worldview. He used monologue to integrate his own (i.e. 'self') and others' worldviews. This situation shows that M.G.'s self-worldview is strong.
Node E3 (a & b)	At S1, evaluating state of being/doing, from the dual worldviews of 'self' (E3a) and the perceived emotions of his co-founder, partner, mother, and cousins (E3b), attribution emotions are generated that influence subsequent decision (i.e. Des1).	Making the decision, M.G. evaluates his state of being/doing from the dual worldviews of 'self' and 'other' (i.e. partner, co-founder, mother, and cousins). This generates self-directed and perceived-

		indirect emotions that are combined (in the emotion black box). The emotions resulting from the black box are 'hope' and 'joy'.
Node F	At S1, M.G. had substantive rationalities. However, M.G.'s future decisions in the Decision Cycle show that his rationality type has changed into practical at the time of conducting this research.	M.G.'s type of rationality is: 1. Substantive, based on the value of creating digital on-line book shop and goal of career success.
Node G	At S1, facing an opposite worldview M.G.'s 'self' worldview is stronger in decision making.	The way M.G. dealt with the opposite worldview shows: 1) M.G. used monologue. 2) He is rationalising, trying to pretend that he is welcoming other worldviews, but he dismisses weaker worldviews. 3) M.G.'s rationality type is changing according to the nature of the problem, source of authority, and level of threat to his own values.
Node H	The self-directed emotions, the other's perceived emotions, rationality-oriented emotions, worldview-oriented emotions are combined and create joy and hope that influence the decision.	M.G. feels joy and hope after evaluating his decision.
Node I	Type of rationality and reconciling approach influence M.G.'s decision.	M.G. made his decision based on his substantive rationality that is based on his goal to become a successful and financially satisfied entrepreneur. In this way he uses satisfying dialogic, which means he dismisses the worldviews that contradict his values, or the worldviews

that are not empirically supported.

Node J

Decision maker's *rationale* and *affect* integrate and influence the decision. Here, substantive rationality overcomes the negative emotions to give up the business i.e. to make a decision that is in conflict with his values.

M.G. evaluated his state of being/doing at S1, from 'self' and 'other' worldviews. This results in some emotions. Meanwhile, he used his values and dealt with opposite worldviews based on substantive rationality.

In summary of Table 53, passing three phases of the theory has shown that M.G.'s decision trajectory from S1 to S2 by making Des1 has influenced his agency-freedom relationship. Making this decision, M.G. has substantive rationality and he has coped with the emotions and reasons that have pushing him away from deciding to keep his business. He has kept his worldview and has dismissed the opposing worldview. As Node J in Table 53 shows, M.G.'s decision of keeping his business after failure has been conducive to his values, thus, his positive freedom, as well as the cognitive and affective modes of his agency, are expanded after the decision. However, this decision contracted his negative freedom and the conative mode of agency, because some of his capabilities (e.g. working in a firm, earning regular salary and having job security) have been removed from his capability set after this decision. In addition, M.G.'s case study shows that one's capability realisation has a temporal mechanism that gradually changes according to the person's values, goals and emotions. In the following section we present M.G.'s capability sets, around his decision of delivering the failed project in India.

Section 12: Capability Sets

This is the final step of explaining M.G.'s decision in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. M.G.'s rationality type had influenced his capability sets as presented in Table 53. Here, our focus is on analysing Des1 that is the decision of resisting/giving up the business after the failure in India, thus in Table 54 we show M.G.'s capability sets, before and after this decision. In Table 54, each set includes all possible options having its membership criteria.

Table 54: Membership Criteria of Capability Sets (Before and After Des0 and Des1)


Set of Capabilities	Members: All Possible Capabilities
Capability Set Around Dec 0	
Set C	{Will expand the business} & {Will not expand the business }
Set D	{Will expand the business and will contract with Indian Company}
Set U	{Will collaborate with Indian company and fail}
Set UR	{Will collaborate with Indian company and will not fail}
Set AC	{Will end up with a failed project in India}
Set SE	{Consequences of failed project in India}
Capability Set Around Dec 1	
Set C	{Will give up the business after failure} & {Will resist and keep the business }
Set D	{Will deal with the Failed Project}
Set U	{Will go back to Tehran with the failed project}
Set DR	{Will stay in India and will deliver the failed project}
Set BF	{Deliver the project in India}
Set SE	{Consequences of successful delivery of project}

Section 13: Freedom-Agency

A gestalt view of M.G.'s decision was presented in Figure 50, showing that M.G.'s positive freedom, as well as the affective and cognitive modes of his agency, were not contracted by his decision because he was using substantive rationality and his decision was in line with his values, although his negative freedom has been contracted. The decision not to give up the business after the failure in India has generated emotions of embarrassment, shame, and hopelessness but could not overcome his pursuit of the goal of "becoming a successful entrepreneur" that generated 'pride' and 'joy' in him. He wanted to become a successful entrepreneur. He used teleological reasoning, thinking about his reputation. However, his resistance is influenced by: (a) the side effect of his previous decisions that brought success, self-esteem and pride, the emotions that indirectly lead him particularly from his partner's side; (b) using monologue and dismissing the opposing view that could discourage him from resisting the failure; (c) his teleological reasoning and substantive rationality that enabled him to focus on the future and his goal.

To conclude, M.G.'s agency level depends on his rationality type and reconciling approach that are shaped by his values in substantive rationality and dismissing the opposing worldview in monologue. In the decision to deliver the failed project in India, he has decided in line with his values and substantive rationality. This specific decision is value-laden, even though his capability set is limited (i.e. negative freedom is contracted) due to the self-imposed constraints that are coming with substantive rationality. Overall, this case study has shown that the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is able to determine the agency-freedom relationship by showing whether a decision is conflictive/conducive with the agent to live according to values.

Figure 50: Case Study Findings



Section 14: Conclusion

The M.G. case study illustrates the following points about the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, and according to these findings in the following chapter we will compare the Tri-modal Theory of Agency with some of its rival theories in order to establish the strengths and weaknesses of our theory within the agency-oriented area.

a) Conative Mode of Agency:

- I. The time trajectory of M.G.'s decisions shows that despite the unpredicted impact of side effects, M.G. could determine to live according to his values.

b) Affective Mode of Agency:

- I. Some parts of emotions that are generated in the agent's decision process are within the 'real' domain that is not observable, which are located in the black boxes in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.
- II. Multiple emotional strands are detectable by the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.

c) Cognitive Model of Agency:

- I. M.G. feels joy and passion when he uses substantive rationality and makes decisions based on his values and belief.
- II. Every element of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency must be passed to distinguish rationality type.
- III. M.G. feels the class of "fear", when he thinks about the opposite worldview of others.
- IV. M.G. uses different types of reconciling approaches in different situations and his reconciling mechanism is changing according to the nature of the problem and the strength of other parties.

d) Freedom-Agency Relationship:

- I. Although M.G. is not aware that he has substantive rationality and he cannot articulate the impact of his decision on his freedom, but he has an intuition that his decision has not contracted his freedom. This shows the importance of indicating three modes of agency and two sides of freedom to determine their relationship.
- II. The Evaluation Instrument is a reliable research instrument.
- I. The type of rationality and reconciliation M.G. has used, the emotions he has experienced, the capabilities and the chain of decision he has made are changing in his life trajectory. Hence, the agency-freedom relationship must be studied over time.

Chapter 7: Theory Evaluation

Introduction

This thesis aims to *determine the agency-freedom relationship* and so far a Tri-Modal Theory of agency has been developed and tested that: (a) explains cognitive, conative and affective modes of agency with respect to freedom; (b) measures agency with respect to both the positive and negative sides of freedom; and (c) determines how agency and freedom are related. This chapter compares the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency with other theories on 'agency' that somehow focus on freedom. The first section reviews the existing theories on the main aspects of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that are emotion, rationality, capability, reconciling approach, and side-effect. We focus on these elements because they are found significant in this study (see Chapter 6, Case Study). The following section identifies our rival theories, particularly the ones that focus on the relationship between agency and freedom, which are Grid-Group Cultural Theory by Douglas (2004), Self-determination theory by Deci and Ryan (2012), Milgram's (2009) Agency Theory, Endogenous-Exogenous Theory of Attribution by Kruglanski (1975) and Bandura's (2012, 1977) Theory of Human Agency.

Comparing Grid-Group Cultural Theory (Bruce, 2013; Douglas, 2004) with the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency shows that we have provided a comprehensive view of the factors influencing decisions that prevent overemphasis on single factors like culture in explaining human agency. In comparison with Milgram's (2009) Agency Theory, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency pays particular attention to the existence and distinction of different types of rationalities (see Weber, 1993) and reconciling approaches (see Bakhtin, 1935), which strengthen our conclusions because we are not overgeneralising one rationality type and one way of dealing with authorities to every individual. Unlike Self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan, 2012, 2008, 1985), the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency offers a comprehensive conceptualisation of 'freedom', which can convince policy makers and managers to be more careful and reluctant about making decisions for others. In comparison with the Endogenous-Exogenous theory of attribution (Kruglanski, 1975; Lange et al., 2011), the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency was able to fill a gap in the attribution literature that lacked a reliable theory for understanding decision behaviour with focus on freedom.

Last but not least, contrary to Bandura's (1977) Theory of Human Agency, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is conceptualising 'agency' with focus on the impact of an agent's 'decision' on her 'freedom'. In comparison with Bandura's theory that contains loose conclusions about agency and freedom, here, we avoid the simplified view of agency and freedom by considering following notions in our analysis: (A) the impact of 'reason' and 'emotion' on decision; (B) the

role of time in the agency-freedom link; (C) the side-effects of decisions on an agent's life trajectory; and (D) the multilevel impact of personal and universal constraints on positive and negative freedom. The loose conclusions like "if one empowers his competencies, self-regulatory skills and belief in his efficacy, then his freedom will be expanded" (Bandura, 2012). Our theory shows how Bandura's claim can be undermined by personal-universal constraints, the side-effects of an agent's previous decisions, her rationality type, and the way she deals with the opposing worldviews. Here, we have shown how emotion, reason and constraints can contract/expand freedom, even though she has empowered her internal assets (see Chapters 5 and 6).

Comparing the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency with its rivals reveals that the novelty and significance of the present study is determining a *multilevel* and *value-laden* relationship between agency and freedom, with thorough focus on both sides of freedom (i.e. positive and negative) and three modes of agency (i.e. cognitive, affective and conative). This is because we have consciously focused on *decision* as a link between agency and freedom, which is a well-known concept in various disciplines and prevents us from making loose judgments. This chapter shows our advantage in being deeply sceptical towards the existing loose judgements about decrease/increase in freedom and agency levels, as some (Bandura, 2012) equate freedom with a 'throwback to medieval theology'; others (Deci and Ryan, 2012) regard it as identical to well-being; and others (Kruglanski, 1975) use similar concepts like volunteer actions to stay away from providing a comprehensive definition for freedom.

The Main Elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency

M.G.'s case study has shown how the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency explains the impact of 'emotion' and 'reason' on his agency outcome (i.e. decision) and determines his agency-freedom relationship (Figure 50). These findings imply the important role of five elements in the agency-freedom relationships that are: (A) Emotion; (B) Rationality Type; (C) Worldview; (d) Capability Set; and (e) Side-effect. Following, we explain how the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has investigated each of these five elements regarding the agency-freedom relationship:

(A) Emotion: In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, the impact of 'Emotion' on the agency-freedom relationship is studied based on Weiner's (2010) list of attribution emotion, founded upon the appraisal psychology idea that a person experiences certain emotions when someone

is evaluating her behaviour. **Error! Reference source not found.** shows both direct and indirect emotions that M.G. has experienced. These findings have five implications. First, Weiner's (2010) emotions are empirically tested from the two standpoints of 'self' and 'other' in the case study. Second, the emotion that is generated depends on the standpoint from which the agent is evaluating herself. Third, rationality type and reconciling approach are two cognitive mechanisms that generate indirect emotions. Fourth, there are countervailing emotions that influence the decision-making process.

(B) Rationality Type: The impact of 'Rationality type' on the agency-freedom relationship is studied based on Weber's (1993) four types of rationalities based on this idea that an agent's freedom in the modern era depends on her way of reasoning, values and goals. In this regard we have developed an Evaluation Instrument that identifies an individual's rationality type based on an 8-Factor model of 'self' and a 9-factor model of 'other'. This instrument has been tested in two surveys (see Chapter 5, Data Analysis). The results of CFA have confirmed that both models are fitted. Meanwhile, EFA has found both models to be valid with 60% explanatory power. In addition, M.G.'s case study has tested and approved the reliability of both 'self' and 'other' models. Case study findings reveal that the temporal aspect of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is able to distinguish between 'practical' and 'substantive' rationalities that are both future-oriented reasoning.

(C) Worldview: The impact of 'Worldview' on the agency-freedom relationship is studied based on Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism based on this idea that if an agent dismisses her worldview in front of the worldview of authority then her freedom is contracted. The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency incorporates 'self' and 'other' agentic models to identify if there is any opposing worldview in the decision-making process. The M.G. case study shows that he was facing an opposing worldview as his 'self' and 'other' scores for some factors like 'Capabilities' were different (.86 and .55 respectively). These findings indicate that: (A) the Evaluation Instrument at the heart of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is a valid research instrument to identify the existence of opposing worldviews; (B) an agent's reconciling approach has a dynamic nature and it depends on the nature of the problem, (C) our approach of investigating how an agent encounters opposing worldviews is a cognitive way of exploring indirect emotions.


(B) Capability Set: The impact of the 'Capability Set' on the agency-freedom relationship is studied based on Sen's (1999) Capability Approach (CA) based on the 'plurality'

of human objectives. According to CA 'agency' is defined as one's ability to choose, act, create change, be responsible for her actions, while her achievements are judged based on her values and objectives (Sen, 2007). Here, we define agency as affective, cognitive and conative abilities to make a decision that is conducive to live the life agent personally has reason to *value*. The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency determines the relationship between three modes of agency and Berlin's (1969) *negative* freedom (i.e. the 'space' within which one is free to do/be what she wants) and positive freedom (i.e. what/who determines the action). The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency identifies the boundaries of the 'space' of negative freedom based on the number, quality, easiness/difficulty of choosing and pursuing a capability *before* and *after* realising that capability. In addition, our theory shows how 'reason' and 'emotion' determine a decision (i.e. the positive sense of freedom) (see **Error! Reference source not found.**). In this line, the case study findings have revealed how the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency: (a) identifies the factor influencing the capability set; (b) traces an agent's capabilities that are transforming into a state of being/doing; (c) classifies capabilities based on the 'desirability' and 'realisable' criteria; (d) an agent follows a capability and ends up at the 'functioning' and/or 'commanding' state of being/doing; and (e) both 'personal' and 'social' standpoints can be considered to evaluate the state of being/doing. Further, the 'Side Effect' is another aspect of the Capability Realisation phase of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. In this regard, case study findings indicate how accidental consequences of previous decisions will influence the capability set and its transition to a state of being/doing (see Chapter 6, Case Study).

To evaluate the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, we need to compare it with the existing theories that address the above-mentioned concepts of emotion, rationality type, worldview, capabilities and side-effect with respect to agency and freedom. Here, we draw a conceptual link between these five central elements of our theory and freedom (Figure 51), in order to identify its rival theories. Initially, we choose the competitor theories based on their focus on the agency-freedom relationship. The literature review chapter (see Chapter 2) has shown that there is a dearth of research on determining the agency-freedom relationship, but each concept has been independently studied in several theories. For example, there is a solid body of literature on decision (Becker, 2010, 1993; Bruce, 1999), emotion (Lerner et al., 2015), rationality (Kalberg, 1980), capability approach (Alkire, 2007, 2005; Jørgensen, 2015; Reizenzein, 2014), agency (Ajzen, 2015; Roberts, 2015) and freedom (Berlin, 1958; Sen, 1999).

However, the connection between these concepts has rarely been explored (MacCallum, 1967; Pattanaik and Xu, 1990). In the following sections we sum up the conceptual linkage and accordingly we identify the existing literature on each branch.

Figure 51: The Main Elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency



Conceptual Linkages in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency

Table 55 summarises the conceptual linkage of each part of the agency-freedom relationship in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (as presented in Figure 51), as well as its link to the three phases of the theory. The final column of Table 55 shows the unique function of that part in explaining the agency-freedom relationship. For example, the second row of Table 55 shows that we try to understand how ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’ influence one’s capability to pursue her valuable state of being/doing in “Capability Realisation” based on Sen’s (1999) Capability Approach and we use our theory and questionnaire to investigate this research enquiry. Table 55 provides a classification of the main themes of our theory that helps us to identify its main rivals that focus on agency and/or freedom in terms of the factors influencing decision, and the impact of decision on freedom.

Table 55: Elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency

Research Enquiry	Conceptual Link	Position in Theory	Element	Background Theory	Research Instrument
How does evaluation influence decision?	Evaluation > Emotion > Decision > Freedom.	Phase 3: Feed Backward-Forward Loop	Emotion	(Weiner, 2010) Theory of Motivation	Model, Evaluation Instrument
How do reason and emotion influence the decision object?	Reason & Emotion > Decision (Capability) > Freedom.	Phase 1: Capability Realization	Capability	Sen's (1999) Capability Approach	Model, Evaluation Instrument
How do values shape rationality that influences decision and freedom?	Value > Rationality > Reason & Emotion > Decision > Freedom.	Phase 3: Feed Backward-Forward Loop	Rationality	Weber's (1993) Rationality Types	Model, Evaluation Instrument
How does the opposing worldview influence decision and freedom?	Worldview > Reconciling Approach > Decision > Freedom.	Phase 3: Feed Backward-Forward Loop	Reconciling Approach	Bakhtin's (1935) Dialogism	Model, Evaluation Instrument, Case Study Guideline
How do unintended side-effects influence decision and freedom?	Decision > Side Effect > Decision > Freedom.	Phase 1: Capability Realization	Side Effect	Sen's (1999) Capability Approach	Model, Case Study Guideline

Note: Case study guideline refers to the methodology that is developed in Chapter 6 to apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. Model refers to the core decision model of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that is developed in Chapter 4.

Rival Theories of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency

Based on Table 55, we have identified five rival theories that focus on similar conceptual linkages in Table 56. For example, the second row of Table 56 shows that Rational Choice Theory (RCT) is developed by Becker (1976) based on the economic model of Supply and Demand to explain non-market behaviours like discrimination and marriage. This theory is in this table because it focuses on the Rational-Decision linkage that we have in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. The final column of the second row shows that subsequent research on RCT have focused on the role of emotion in decision making (Lerner et al., 2015), and investigating decisions made in an organisational context (Scott et al., 2015). However, RCT is not qualified as one of the main competitors of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, because RCT aims at understanding the rational-decision relationship and 'freedom' is not its focal point. The first column of Table 56 shows the conceptual linkage of each theory with our theory. For example, the conceptual link of the Practical Theory of Choice that is developed by Sen (1977) is understanding the impact of goals and ethics on decision that is presented in the table as: (Goal and Ethics > Decision). Here, the Practical Theory of Choice is not qualified as one of the main competitors of our theory, because its focal purpose is the understanding of ethical motivation rather than freedom.

The theories summarised in Table 56 are emphasising some parts of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. As presented in Table 56 only five theories are focusing on decision with emphasis on 'freedom', and that is why in the following sections we will compare them with the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. These theories are: (A) the self-determination theory by Deci and Ryan (2012, 2008); (B) the theory of endogenous-exogenous attribution by Kruglanski (1975); (C) Milgram's (2009) agency theory; (D) the Grid-Group Cultural theory by Douglas (2007); and (E) Bandura's (2012) Psychological Cognitive Theory of Human Agency. Figure 52 shows how these rival theories together cover all of the main elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.

Table 56: Potential Rival Theories of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency


Research Enquiry	Conceptual Link to Tri-Modal Theory of Agency	Author	Theory/Model	Recent Research Trends
How to explain motivation? Behaviours are motivated by satisfying the basic needs of competency, Relatedness and Autonomy.	Motivation>Decision >Freedom*	(Deci and Ryan, 2008, 1985, 1985)	Self-determination Theory	Patient Determination Act by Aryee et al. (2015) Evolution of theory by Buchanan (2016) Self-determination in organisations: Jørgensen (2015)
How to explain non-market decisions using an economic supply and demand model? Non-market behaviours can be explained by market rules.	Rational>Decision	(Becker, 2010, 1993, 1976)	Rational Choice Theory	Emotion and Decision by Lerner et al. (2015) Decision in Organizations by Scott et al. (2015)
How to explain rational and irrational decisions? People have several biases and they make decision on the bases of potential values of loss and gain.	Rational & Emotion>Decision	(Kahneman, 2003, 2003, 2002)	Prospect Theory	Decision and risk by Avineri and Ben-Elia (2015) Focus on guilt and happiness by Quick et al. (2015)
How to explain altruistic decisions? People may internalise others' goals and be involve in commitment actions that are against their self-interest.	Goal & Ethics>Decision	(Sen, 1990)	Practical Theory of Choice	Focus on Democracy by Neverauskas and Tijūnaitienė (2015) Democratic network governance by Sørensen and

Torfing (2016)				
How to explain decisions made in social settings? People have dual mind (automatic and planned) and make decisions on the bases of 'reciprocity' and 'hypocrisy'.	Affect & Environment > Decision	(Bargh, 1997, 1989)	Dual Process Model	In the field of education by Scaglione et al. (2015) Focus on obesity by Price et al. (2016) Risk Modelling by Sage and Haines (2015)
How to make Rational Choice Theory more realistic? Decisions are governed by 'loyalty' and 'authority'; one has bounded rationality so chooses the 'satisficing' option not the optimum option.	Rationality > Decision	(Simon, 1965)	Formal Theory of Employment Relationship	Focus on influence, case of US president by Haeder and Yackee (2015) Career pattern focus in civil servants in Germany by Veit and Scholz (2015)
How to explain human agency in social settings? Agency has four properties of intentionality, forethought, self-reactiveness, self-reflectiveness and one is both a producer and product of social settings.	Agency > Freedom	(Bandura, 2012, 1989, 1977)	Psychological Cognitive Theory of Human Agency	Focus on sustainability in consumption by Roy et al. (2015) Field of education (Murphy, 2015) Focus on Career self-management by Lent and Brown (2013)
How is brain activity in decision	Brain > Decision	(Damasio,	Theory of	Memory load and uncertain

making? Cognitive decision making is not possible without emotion.		2012, 1999; Damasio et al., 2015)	Automatic Behaviour	decision making by Cui et al. (2015) Emotion and decision by Lerner et al. (2015)
How to measure capabilities? Developing a reliable and valid index to measure a capability set.	Constrains>Capability>Decision	(Alkire, 2008, 2007, 2005)	Empowerment Measure Index	Role of Outcome in capability set by Kinchin et al. (2015) Role of organisation on capability set by Sun et al. (2015)
How do groups control behaviour? Grid and Group dimensions explain four cultural biases that explain how groups control behaviour.	Culture>Rationality>Decision>Freedom*	(Douglas, 2007)	Grid Group Cultural Theory	Focus on supply chain by Loffi et al. (2015) Focus on Attitude by Robinson and Swedlow (2015)
How does a rational person make a decision? Decisions can be understood in mathematical algorithm, where decision makers are players and choose an optimum strategy to maximise their interest.	Reason>Decision	Harsanyi et al. (1988)	General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games	Focus on Pragmatism by Benz et al. (2016) Fuzzy logic analysis by Esposito et al. (2015)
How to understand attribution? To understand a behaviour one must see if it is 'volunteer'.	Freedom>Behaviour*	(Kruglanski, 1975)	Theory of Endogenous-Exogenous Attribution	Focus on early childhood education by Sugimoto (2015) Focus on Tuberculosis by Jabbari and Kheiri (2016)

What is attribution? Each attribution has three aspects of time, stimulus, and persons.	Behaviour>Evaluation	(Kelley et al., 2013)	Kelly Cube	Focus on attitude and decision by Eiser and van der Pligt (2015)
How to explain behaviour under authority? People are either in an 'autonomous' state and control their choice, or in an 'agented' state and follow the order and put off responsibility to the authority.	Worldview>Decision>Freedom*	(Milgram, 2009, 1965, 1963)	Milgram's Agency Theory	Ethical decision making by Roberts (2015) Business ethics by Kaptein (2015)
How does emotion influence behaviour? Moral emotion has functional quality based on the actors' perceived controllability to situation.	Evaluation>Emotion>Decision	(Reisenzein, 2014)	Appraisal Theory of Moral Emotion	Emotion and decision by Kassam (2015)
How to improve Rational Choice Theory? Add identity dimension to the theory.	Identity>Decision	Akerlof and Kranton (2010)	Identity Economic	Focus on Stratification by Davis (2015) Identity in social networks by Patacchini and Zenou (2016)

Figure 52: Rival Theories of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in Conceptual Linkage



Comparative Analysis of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency

This section compares the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency with its rivals. To compare, first we explain how the other theories explain the agency-freedom linkage and then we compare them with the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. The comparison is based on 11 criteria: (A) research focus; (B) research problem; (C) research approach; (D) phenotypes; (E) aim; (F) main themes; (G) applications; (H) research instruments; (I) freedom measurement; (J) discipline and (K) research methods. In order to sum up each comparison we will apply both the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency and its competitor on an imaginary example.

Versus the Self-Determination Theory

Table 57 compares the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency with the Self-Determination Theory (SDT) (Deci and Ryan, 2012). SDT focuses on the freedom aspect of agency-outcome by defining 'motivation' as an individual's attempt to satisfy her need for 'autonomy'. To compare SDT and our theory, we use them to explain a patient's life or death choice before undergoing a difficult surgery. We use this hypothetical example because one area that SDT is used with particular focus on freedom is in the Patient Determination Act, which is a programme that supports patients to make their own life or death decision before they undergo vital surgery (Jørgensen, 2015). This programme requires medical institutions to (a) identify if a patient needs to be in charge of her life-death destiny, and (b) professionals need to put the responsibility for surgery on to the patient and let her to make the life or death decision (Jørgensen, 2015). The problem is that medical institutions hardly commit to Patient Determination Act (Angelos and Johnston, 1999a; Bahurmoz et al., 2015). As Table 57 shows, the justification that SDT provides for doctors and nurses is that patients have a basic psychological need for autonomy, so they need to leave them to make their own decision to satisfy this need. There are several studies showing that implementing this programme using the SDT approach is a challenging task, as it is difficult to convince professionals to let patients make the their own decision (Angelos and Johnston, 1999b). As Table 57 shows SDT is not founded on the 'plurality' of objectives and human 'agency' to live according to what they value. As a result, SDT lacks the required philosophical foundation to apply the Patient Determination Act and similar programmes that require professionals to allow patients to choose their destiny.

On the other hand, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is founded upon a comprehensive definition of freedom by Berlin (1969), who identifies two senses of positive-negative for freedom (Gray, 2015). Accordingly, in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency all individuals must have 'agency' to choose, act, live and being judged according to their own values (Sen, 1999). In this

case the challenge of implementing the Patient Determination Act can be addressed, because of the philosophical background of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. Another advantage of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency over SDT is its Evaluation Instrument that enables medical institutions, doctors and nurses to identify how a patient is reasoning, what her values and goals are. The existing SDT questionnaires focus on 'motivation' rather than 'freedom' as they have six measurements for motivation and only one measurement for autonomy (Aryee et al., 2015). Overall, Table 57 shows that 'freedom'-oriented nature of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is its advantage over SDT in order to be used in the cases where 'freedom' of choice matters.

Table 57: Self-Determination Theory v. Tri-Modal Theory of Agency

Self-Determination Theory	Tri-Modal Theory of Agency
Focus: Motivation	Focus: Freedom
Authors: (Deci and Ryan, 2012, 2008, 1985)	Authors: Present study
Research Problem: Lack of psychological well-being.	Research Problem: Unclear agency-freedom relationship.
Research Question: How to measure motivation to help people grow their psychological wellbeing?	Research Question: How to determine the agency-freedom relationship?
Research Approach: Explain motivation based on the basic psychological needs of autonomy, competency and relatedness.	Research Approach: Measure impact of constraints, 'reason' and 'emotion' on decision, in order to avoid conflicts with one's values (i.e. contracts freedom).
Discipline: Psychology	Discipline: Economy, philosophy, psychology
Research Method: Experiment	Research Method: Survey, Interview, Case study

<p>Model:</p> <p>Dependent variable: Behaviour (adoption and maintenance)</p> <p>Independent variables: Autonomous vs. Controlled behaviour motivation/regulation Behaviour related need satisfaction of (autonomy, competence, relatedness) Need-Supportive Behaviour Settings and Interactions Behaviour Causality Orientations Behaviour Goals/Participation motive</p>	<p>Model:</p> <p>Dependent Variable: Freedom (Negative and Positive) Agency (Cognitive, Affective, Conative)</p> <p>Independent Variables: Decision: (Object (Capability), Subject, Process) Emotion Direct: 'Self' Evaluation Indirect: 'Other' Evaluation, Rationality Type, facing opposing worldview Reason Rationality Type (Reasoning, Values, Goals) Worldview (Reconciling Approach) Constraints: Universal (Logical-Physical) Personal (Resources-Axiological)</p>
<p>Research Aim:</p> <p>Measure the impact of basic needs on motivation.</p>	<p>Research Aim:</p> <p>Explain how 'reason' and 'emotion' influence decision and trace their impact on freedom.</p>
<p>Research instrument:</p> <p>Five measurements of motivation One measurement of sense of choice</p>	<p>Research instrument:</p> <p>Eight scales from the 'self' standpoint Nine scales from the 'other' standpoint All measurements focus on freedom</p>
<p>Main themes:</p> <p>Distinguishes internal from external motives Human goal is achieving psychological wellbeing SDT is an organismic dialectical approach that people are active organisms and evolve to grow and</p>	<p>Main themes:</p> <p>Distinguishes factors in both emotional-reason, and self- other categories Human goal is being able to live the life she values. People have agency to make choices but their decisions</p>

development occurs automatically	are influenced by 'emotion' and 'reason', while they try to live conducive to their values.
Advantage points: Six sub-theories Applied in extensive areas Used experiment to set causality	Advantage point: Focus on two sides of freedom and three modes of agency Evaluation Instrument is developed in two surveys, 21 in-depth interviews, and one case study
Freedom Is defined as individual's basic psychological need to satisfy autonomous needs.	Freedom Agent's ability to live according to her values that is influenced by her agency outcome (i.e. decision) that is made based on the agent's rationality type, worldview, direct and indirect emotions, side effect of her other decisions and capability set.
Freedom-Oriented Application The 'Patient Determination Act' designed to give the responsibility of life or death to patients. The practical challenge of SDT is convincing medical institutions to allow patients be the agent of their own lives (Jørgensen, 2015).	Freedom-Oriented Application It can be used in the 'Patient Determination Act' by providing a freedom-based platform that can convince medical institutions to respect a patient's agency.

Note: The elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency are presented relative to SDT.

Versus Grid-Group Cultural Theory

Table 58 compares the Grid-Group Cultural Theory (Douglas, 2007) known as Cultural Theory (CT) and the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, for two reasons. First, CT considers 'freedom' as it shows how an individual's behaviour is 'controlled' in a group. Second, to classify human behaviour Grid-Group theory uses Weber's (1993) rationality types that serve as the theoretical background of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency for identifying an agent's reasons and values. Table 58 compares CT and our theory. As an example for Table 58, we use both theories to explain why a Muslim woman is wearing the Hijab in France.

Table 58 shows that to explain her decision behaviour CT focuses on the 'cultural' differences of that woman with French society. According to CT, as this woman is not following the regulations of French society and she is behaving according to her personal values she is 'isolated' in French society (Bruce, 2013). This may seem fine so far, but the problem of CT is when policy makers want to conduct policies based on this explanation. CT believes that the conflict between the opposing cultural biases is not reconcilable. In other words, it is not possible for French society and the Muslim woman to deal with their conflict and arrive at a solution in a way that both worldviews are heard and the outcome satisfies both parties' interests, because they have opposing cultural biases (Douglas, 2007). As a result of this view we see that French authorities have banned the Hijab in public spaces, ignoring Muslim protests against the Hijab ban (Noaparast, 2014). As evidence, using CT policy makers may involve their cultural bias in their judgments.

On the other hand, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency focuses on both positive and negative freedom and this prevents it from making naive judgments about freedom by narrowing its explanation to a single factor like culture. This is possible because our Evaluation Instrument measures the impact of eight agentic factors from the Muslim woman's standpoint as well as nine agentic factors from what she perceives that others think about her decision to wear the Hijab. This provides us with her capability set, rationality type, way of reasoning, values, goals and emotions regarding her decision (Row 10, Table 58). For example, if her scores in this questionnaire show that she has a 'causal' type of reasoning and her she is wearing the Hijab because her family coerced her, then in an interview we try find out if she dismisses her own worldview to follow the order, retains both worldviews or integrates them into a third worldview. At the end these findings help us to understand what type of rationality she is using, whether she is using 'monologue' and her freedom is contracted by wearing the Hijab or whether she is having a dialogue between the opposing worldviews and she is simply living according to her values. Her scores in the Evaluation Instrument show if she has 'teleological' reasoning and

'substantive rationality' and wearing the Hijab is in line with her faith and long-term goals or not. Further, we will not rely on quantitative data and try to conduct an interview to see if she is wearing the Hijab for her religious 'values' and she experiences 'joy' when practicing this ritual or whether it is a matter of coercion. After these analyses we can conclude if the decision to wear the Hijab has contracted her freedom to live the life she values or not. As evidence, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency offers an Evaluation Instrument and interview guidelines that help us to understand why an individual is behaving differently from the dominant grid of the society. These findings help to build upon cultural studies (Bruce, 2013; Robinson and Swedlow, 2015).

Further, as presented in row 11 of Table 58, our theory offers three ways of reconciling opposing worldviews (i.e. monologue, dialogue, and dialectic), which prevents us from accepting this simple assumption that people from different rationality types are not able to deal with the conflict between their worldviews. In other words, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is against CT's (Douglas, 2007) claim that different worldviews are not able to tolerate each other. This comparison shows that the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency prevents us from making overgeneralisations about human behaviour that could have harmful consequences for the wellbeing of minorities (Noaparast, 2014); the detrimental policies (e.g. the Hijab Ban in France) that are justified under the umbrella of cultural classifications in which the diversity of individuals' values, goals, emotions and way of reasoning is neglected.

Table 58: Grid Group Cultural Theory v. Tri-Modal Theory of Agency

Grid Group Cultural Theory	Tri-Modal Theory of Agency
Focus: Culture	Focus: Freedom
Authors: (Bruce, 2013; Douglas, 2007; Loffi et al., 2015)	Authors: Present study
Research Problem: Colonial mind-sets of 'primitive irrationality' and lack of a topology of cultural biases that explains human behaviours in different societies.	Research Problem: Agency-freedom link is unclear and policy makers neglect individuals' agency-freedom and they conduct some policies that undermine the wellbeing of affected people.
Research Question: How to explain behaviour in a group?	Research Question: How to determine agency in relation to freedom?
Research Approach: To understand the controlling role of groups on human behaviour, Cultural Theory classifies all cultures in two dimensions of group (boundary around community) and grid (regulation).	Research Approach: Measure the factors influencing agency in three forms of affective (emotion), cognitive (reason) and conative (capabilities) in order to indicate agency level according to its outcome (i.e. decision) and test whether the decision is against her 'values' and thus contracts her freedom.
Discipline: Anthropology and Sociology	Discipline Economy, Philosophy, Psychology
Research Method:	Research Method:

Field study

Survey, Interview, Case study

Model:

Two dimensions:

Grid

Group

Four cultural biases:

High grid and high group (Positional),

Low grid and low group (isolated)

Low grid and high group (egalitarian)

High grid and low group (individual)

Three types of Weber's Rationality:

Bureaucrat (as a positional figure)

Holy man (as an egalitarian figure)

Merchant (as an individualist figure)

Model:

Two dimensions:

Agency

Freedom

Three modes:

Cognitive

Affective

Conative

Two sets of factors:

Emotion

Reason

Four levels of agency-freedom:

Beneficial Functioning

Beneficial Commanding

Adverse Functioning

Adverse Commanding

Four Types of Weber's Rationality based on Kalberg's (1980)

categories:

Substantive

Practical

Theoretical

Formal

Four types of facing opposing worldviews:

Monologue (Dismiss 'self')

Monologue (Dismiss 'other')

Dialectic

Dialogue

Two sets of emotion:

Direct (Self-generated)

Indirect (Other-generated)
Three Dimensions of Decision:
Object (Capability)
Subject
Process

Research Aim:

Explain how much of an individual life is controlled by its group.

Research Aim:

Determine the agency-freedom relationship.

Research instrument:

Theoretical Framework
Model

Research instrument:

Theory
Model
Evaluation Instrument
Case study guideline

Main Themes:

Being built on universalism of cultural biases in a deterministic view of human life.
Tries to show distribution of a value set in society.
Explains human behaviour based on two dimensions of 'grid' and 'group' in four cultural categories.
Explains human behaviour in the abstract sense according to their interactions and interpersonal relations.
Believes in 'irreconcilable conflict' between worldviews that are coming from opposing cultural biases.

Main themes:

Is built upon liberal and pluralistic view of human life.
Tries to determine the agency-freedom relationship with reference to 'value'.
Explains decisions from the 'self' and 'other' standpoints.
Traces the impact of decision on 'positive' and 'negative' freedom and three modes of agency.
Explains agency-oriented factors based on 'reason' that are derived from four "rationality types" and "reconciling approaches" and two types of "emotions" that derived from the agent's evaluation of her current state of being/doing.
Prevents simple generalisations about how an agent deals with opposing worldviews and distinguishes between the dialogue, monologue and dialectic approach to facing opposing worldviews.

Freedom

Freedom is considered only from its negative sense as focuses on the "Grid" as what limits the freedom space of a social being in a group.

Freedom

Freedom is considered from: (a) the negative sense through the 'capability set' as a 'conative' mode of agency, and (b) the positive senses through 'emotion' and 'reason' influencing decisions that are equivalently the 'affective' and 'cognitive' modes of agency.

Note: The elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency are presented relative to Cultural Theory.

Versus Milgram's Agency Theory

Table 59 compares Milgram's (1965) Agency Theory and the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency for two reasons. First, Milgram (1965) focuses on the agency-freedom relationship by looking at freedom as 'obedience' before authorities. Second, to explain obedience Milgram explores how individuals encounter with the opposing worldview, particularly when it belongs to authority. In the worldview aspect of our theory we have the same focus, where we explore how one reconciles her 'self' worldview and 'other' opposing worldview based on Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism.

To compare Milgram's (1965) Agency Theory and the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we use them to explain why an American citizen may vote for the state's gun law that regulates the possession of firearms accessories, despite the extensive body of evidence on the substantial threat of gun-related violence to children and youth in that country (Xuan and Hemenway, 2015). This example shows Milgram's (1965) limitations in explaining why one may vote for a law that harms others. For Milgram's (1965) theory an American citizen who votes for the state's gun law is either 'autonomous' and following her own will, or 'agentic' and following the order. The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency shows that this is a simplistic view of human agency for two reasons. First, our theory can show that an American citizen, as a modern individual could possess four different types of rationalities (i.e. practical, substantive, formal, and substantive), among which the 'formal' rationality is the only type that matches with Milgram's (1965) explanation. In the other words, there are many people who vote for the gun law because they wanted to satisfy their socio-economic needs (i.e. having practical rationality), and/or they believed that this is the fundamental principle of the US codes of conduct (i.e. having substantive rationality), and not because they are following the authorities (i.e. having formal rationality).

The second problem with Milgram's explanation is simplifying how people encounter with the opposing worldview to one form of reconciling approach, saying that if one is following an order that results in harming someone else this person dismisses her own worldview in front of the opposing worldview (i.e. monologue reconciling approach). Based on Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency identifies three different types of reconciling approaches (i.e. monologue, dialogue, and dialectic) that one may accommodate depending on the nature of the problem (see Chapter 6, Case Study). For example, imagine an American woman who votes against the state's gun law in order to protect her children's lives in a society where any maniac can possess a gun and attack public spaces (Xuan and Hemenway, 2015). At the same time, she can be aware of the opposing worldview of her husband who believes that having a gun is necessary for Americans, in order to be able to defend themselves in the

face of future terrorist attacks. This woman can use either dialogue (i.e. she considers her husband's worldview, being informed by him while keeping her own worldview), dialectic (i.e. considers her husband's worldview and integrates her own worldview with his perspective and arrives at a third worldview that is consistent with both of the original worldviews), and/or monologue (i.e. excludes either her own worldview or her husband's worldview). One of the weak aspects of Milgram's (1965) Agency Theory is that Milgram assumes that all people in front of authority use the monologue approach.

Comparing Milgram's (1965) Agency Theory with our theory highlights the simplistic generalisation about human agency in historical cases. The typical example of this fragile agency theory about human behaviour is on why soldiers from Nazi Germany became involved in the Holocaust during World War II. Milgram's (1965) Agency Theory is developed based on this example, where the military situation makes a soldier obey the order from higher ranked officers. Milgram relies on this special sample and theorises that people will avoid responsibility for their actions by obeying orders just as Nazi soldiers placed the responsibility for harming Jews on the shoulders of higher ranked authorities, as Hitler was the legitimate power in Germany at that time. This is because in military forces, formal rationality is enforced and an alternative example (e.g. the American reaction to state gun law) encourages other forms of rationalities and reconciling approaches that are not captured by Milgram (2015). Our theory shows the limitations of Milgram's (1965) Agency Theory. In addition, we offer the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that indicates these simplifications and suggests a more realistic explanation about agency and its link to freedom.

Table 59: Milgram's Agency Theory v. Tri-Modal Theory of Agency

Milgram's Agency Theory	Tri-Modal Theory of Agency
<p>Focus: Obedience</p>	<p>Focus: Freedom</p>
<p>Authors: (Milgram, 2009, 1965, 1963)</p>	<p>Authors: Present study</p>
<p>Research Problem: How individuals behave when there is a conflict between obedience to authority and their personal will.</p>	<p>Research Problem: How agency and freedom are related.</p>
<p>Research Question: Do people obey an order even if it involves harming another person?</p>	<p>Research Question: When one says "I chose to be/do something", how much of her agency is involved in terms of her freedom?</p>
<p>Research Approach: Conduct an experiment in which participants receive orders from authority to harm another person and observe the result.</p>	<p>Research Approach: To understand the agency oriented factors associated with freedom: In-depth Interview on why one makes a decision. Design a questionnaire. Test it in two surveys and amend it in 11 interviews and one case study; asking participants to reveal the 'reasons' behind their decision from the 'self' and 'other' standpoints. Map the result to indicate the agent's rationality type, and reconciling approach before the opposing worldview. Based on the theory, explore the 'emotions' generated from evaluating their state of being/doing before and after making</p>

	that decision. Trace their decision trajectory to see if it conflicts with the agent's values, i.e. contracts her freedom.
Discipline: Psychology and Philosophy	Discipline Economy, Philosophy, Psychology
Research Method: Experiment	Research Method: Survey, Interview, Case study
Model: Two states of behaviour: Autonomous state (one directs her decisions and takes responsibility for its consequences) Agentic state (one follows the order and puts the responsibility for her actions onto the authority; legitimacy of authority matters)	Model: Decision is influenced by: Emotion (generated directly from evaluating her state of being/doing and/or indirectly due to her rationality type and facing an opposing worldview) Reason (based on rationality type and standpoint) Freedom is contracted if agency outcome (i.e. decision) prevents one from living according to her values. Agency and Freedom are linked through decision
Research Aim: Identify an individual's state of behaviour.	Research Aim: Identify the agency-freedom relationship.
Research instrument: Experiment (ethical problems and sampling biases).	Research instrument: Model, Survey (Questionnaire validated in two studies), Case Study (validated in one extensive case)
Freedom	Freedom

Obedience aspect of negative freedom.

Positive-Negative Freedom mapped onto Cognitive, Conative
and Affective Modes of Agency

Note: The elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency are presented relative to the Milgram Agency Theory.

Versus Endogenous-Exogenous Attribution Theory

Table 60 compares the Endogenous-Exogenous Attribution Theory (Kruglanski, 1975) and the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency for two reasons. First, Kruglanski (1975) focuses on the 'volunteer' aspect of behaviour in attribution studies that has roots in freedom, which is the focus of the present study. Second, the 'volunteer' feature of behaviour is the focal point of Kruglanski's (1975) theory in an attempt to make Attribution Theories more realistic. In this line, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency also has tried to improve the reliability of observer's judgments about decision behaviour. To compare Kruglanski's (1975) theory and our theory we use these two lenses to explain why a student chooses to study medicine at university.

As presented in Table 60, Kruglanski (1975) focuses on the 'attribution' of the student's university major choice, while the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency focuses on the factors influencing her agency, trying to establish whether her university major choice (agency outcome) has prevented her from living the life she has reason to value (i.e. contract her freedom). Kruglanski (1975) asks the student if she chooses this major voluntarily and if it is the case then this theory argues that this decision is an 'action' not an 'occurrence', thus attributions assigned to this behaviour are either endogenous (e.g. ability, effort, talent) and/or exogenous (e.g. luck, environment). On the other hand, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency uses its Evolution Instrument and asks the student to fill in this questionnaire. This provides us with the student's rationality type, reasoning, opposing worldview, and values from her 'self' and 'other' standpoints. Further, if we find an opposing worldview in her answers to the questionnaire, we ask her how she deals with this conflict. We ask her about the emotions she has experienced and map them onto her reasons. At the end we conclude whether her freedom is contracted by her agency-outcome based on the above-mentioned 'reason' and 'emotion'. This information enables us to test if this decision has been in line with her values, and in case of contradiction, we say that this decision has contracted her freedom. In addition, we can say that if her university major choice contracts/expands affective, conative, and cognitive modes of her agency. On the other hand, Kruglanski's (1975) explanation only classifies this student's decision as an 'action' and waits for naïve observers to attribute reasons to this behaviour. Contrasting our explanation with Kruglanski's (1975) approach shows that the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency provides a much more coherent interpretation of human decision regarding freedom and agency.

Table 60: Endogenous-Exogenous Attribution Theory v. Tri-Modal Theory of Agency

Endogenous-Exogenous Attribution Theory	Tri-Modal Theory of Agency
Focus: Attribution	Focus: Freedom
Authors: (Jabari and Khiry, 2016; Kruglanski, 1975)	Authors: Present study
Research Problem: Volunteer aspect of behaviour is ignored in attribution theories.	Research Problem: Freedom of the decision maker is ignored in attribution theories and policy maker observations.
Research Question: How to explain attribution with focus on volunteer aspect of behaviour?	Research Question: How to explain decisions with a focus on freedom?
Research Approach: Whether a behaviour is volunteer (i.e. action) or non-volunteer (i.e. occurrence) shows if endogenous or exogenous attributions are assigned to it.	Research Approach: If a decision is influenced by agency-oriented factors and it conflicts with the agent's "values", then it contracts her freedom.
Discipline: Psychology	Discipline Economy, Philosophy, Psychology
Research Method: Experiment	Research Method: Survey, Interview, Case study

<p>Model:</p> <p>Behaviour has two dimensions: Volunteer (action) Non-volunteer</p> <p>Attributions assigned to action are: Endogenous Exogenous</p>	<p>Model:</p> <p>Agency-oriented factors have three modes: Affective (emotion) Cognitive (reason) Conative (Capabilities)</p> <p>Freedom is contracted by agency-outcome if the decision is against the agent's "values".</p>
<p>Research Aim:</p> <p>Explains attribution based on behaviour.</p>	<p>Research Aim:</p> <p>Explain freedom based on agency.</p>
<p>Research instrument:</p> <p>Experiment</p>	<p>Research instrument:</p> <p>Theory, Model, Questionnaire</p>
<p>Freedom</p> <p>Definition is narrowed to 'volunteer' vs. 'non-volunteer' behaviours.</p>	<p>Freedom</p> <p>Definition covers negative freedom through capabilities (conative mode of agency), and positive freedom through rationality type and worldview (cognitive mode of agency), and emotion (affective mode of agency) in time within life trajectory.</p>

Note: The elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency are presented relative to the Exogenous-Endogenous Theory of Attribution.

Versus Bandura's Human Agency Theory

Table 61 compares the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency with the Human Agency Theory (Bandura, 2012), because this theory: (a) is on the agency-freedom relationship; (b) considers the temporal aspect of reasoning; (c) points to freedom by acknowledging the 'agency-social structure' duality; (d) looks at the impact of circumstances as 'protuity' on human agency; and (e) addresses 'freedom' with respect to goals, rights, options and means to pursue them.

To clarify the differences between our theory and Bandura's (2012) theory, we apply both of them to a hypothetical decision. In this regard, we use these two lenses and explain an Englishman's voting behaviour in the UK's EU referendum in 2016. In this regard, Bandura's (2012) theory says that having the right to vote only shows that this person has passive freedom, and we need to look at his active freedom, that is the extent to which his vote is influential in his life. His theory will distinguish between 'passive' and 'active' forms of freedom, which is an immature version of Berlin's (1958) 'positive' and 'negative' senses of freedom, which is accommodated in detail in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. Bandura (2012) explains passive freedom as participating in the election in the absence of constraints, which is similar to Berlin's (1958) negative sense of freedom. Bandura's (2012) active freedom is about the extent to which this vote will enable the voter "to exercise his self-influence in the service of his selected goals and outcomes", which is similar to Berlin's (1958) positive sense of freedom. In this regard, Bandura's (2012) definitions of 'active' and 'passive' types of freedom are incomplete versions of Berlin's (1958) 'positive' and 'negative' senses of freedom, and it is not clear what are the added values of his new concepts compared with the original definitions.

Further, Bandura's (2012) explanation has several limitations: (A) neither of the four aspects of his agency (i.e. forethought, intentionality, self-reflectiveness, and self-reactiveness) in his theory are focusing on how constraints limit one's agency; (B) Bandura's theory overlooks 'causal' and 'correlation' types of reasoning as its mere focus in the 'forethought' aspect of agency is on 'teleological' reasoning that people reason based on forward thinking anticipating the future; (d) accordingly, Bandura's (2012) theory has a narrow perspective on future-oriented types of rationalities (i.e. substantive and practical), and ignores 'formal' and 'theoretical' ways of living. For example, a member of parliament may vote for the UK to remain in the EU against his personal interests and goals, because her party has coerced her, i.e. she has a 'formal' type of rationality and uses the 'correlational' type of reasoning attributing her decision to an event that is happening when she is voting and not to her goals in the future.

In contrast with Bandura's (2012) theory, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency explains the voters' agency through analysing the outcome of their agency (i.e. decision) and measuring its

impact on their freedom (i.e. the extent to which agency-outcome conflicts/conduces with the agent's values). This is because Bandura's focus is on 'agency' in regard to human 'development', whereas the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency focuses on 'agency' in 'decision'-making process and its relation to 'freedom'. In the example of voting, Bandura's (2012) preoccupation is to show that the Englishman's vote is both the *product* and *producer* of his circumstance, whereas the concern of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is to identify the 'reasons' and 'emotions' that influence the voters' agency when they vote, and whether that vote is conducive to their values.

As Table 61 shows, Bandura's (2012) theory believes that 'free-will' is a metaphysical concept and to understand the Englishman's voting behaviour we need to understand his 'intentionality', 'forethought', 'self-reflection' and 'self-reactiveness'. However, the main disadvantage of Bandura's theory is lack of a valid and reliable research instrument to measure the above-mentioned characteristics of agency. On the other hand, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is equipped with an Evaluation Instrument that identifies the Englishman's rationality type and reasoning from both his 'self' and 'other' standpoints. For example, if an Englishman votes for the UK to remain in the EU, and his results in our Evaluation Instrument show that he has 'substantive rationality' and strongly believes in the purity of English national culture, aiming at sustaining what has remained as the English way of life, then his freedom is contracted by this decision, because if the UK stays in the EU the country's borders are open to new cultures and ways of life (Bradley et al., 1986). On the other hand, if this person's scores show that he has 'practical rationality', wants to have financial satisfaction, aims at exporting his products to the EU market, then his decision for the UK to remain in the EU will expand his freedom, as it is in line with him living according to his values.

Another disadvantage of Bandura's (2012) theory is its loose conclusions about the contraction/expansion of freedom. He says that human development is possible if one develops his competencies, self-regulatory skills and belief in his efficacies in order to increase his options and then his freedom. The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency questions this simple and loose judgment about human freedom, as we have shown that how a human being is able to make a decision that contracts her negative freedom, despite having mature competency, self-regularity skills and efficacy. Overall, the advantage of our theory over Bandura's (2012) theory is our focus on the agency-freedom relationship and considering both the 'emotion' and 'reason' roots

of decisions that enable our theory to avoid typical misjudgement about the agency-freedom relationship.

Table 61: Theory of Human Agency v. Tri-Modal Theory of Agency

Theory of Human Agency	Tri-Modal Theory of Agency
Focus: Agency-Development	Focus: Agency-Freedom
Authors: (Bandura, 2012, 1989, 1977)	Authors: Present study
Research Problem: Duality between human agency and social structure.	Research Problem: Vague agency-freedom relationship.
Research Question: How to explain human agency in a social structure?	Research Question: How to determine the agency-freedom relationship?
Research Approach: Agency is people acting in an environment through a reciprocal interplay of interpersonal, behavioural, and environmental determinants.	Research Approach: There are several factors influencing agency-outcome in terms of freedom. This result in decisions that are in conflict with the agent's values, then contracting her freedom.
Discipline: Psychology	Discipline Economy, Philosophy, Psychology
Research Method: Experiment	Research Method: Survey, Interview, Case study

<p>Model:</p> <p>Agency has four core properties: Intentionality (action plans and strategies to realise goals) Forethought (agency has temporal extension in the past and future) Self-reactiveness (though and actions are linked through regulating) Self-reflection (self-examining actions and adjustment) Agency has three modes: Individual Proxy Collective Foundation of Agency (i.e. motivation): Self-efficacy belief</p>	<p>Model:</p> <p>Freedom is expanded/contracted by agency outcome (i.e. decision). Decision has three parts: Object (Capabilities) Subject Process Agency oriented factors are in three modes: Cognitive (Reason) Rationality Type Reconciling Worldview Affective (Emotion) Direct Indirect Conative Capabilities Decisions Constraints are: Universal Personal</p>
<p>Research Aim:</p> <p>Explain agency in relation to social structure.</p>	<p>Research Aim:</p> <p>Explain agency in relation to freedom.</p>
<p>Research instrument:</p> <p>Experiment</p>	<p>Research instrument:</p> <p>Theory, Model, Evaluation Instrument</p>
<p>Main Themes</p> <p>Free will is a throwback to medieval theology, so we have to see human behaviour as self-</p>	<p>Main Themes</p> <p>Freedom has two sides - positive and negative - that encompass personal and social aspects of causal</p>

influence, as a part of casual structure.
Level of agency depends on agentic personal sources, type of activities, and situational circumstance.
“Your freedom will expand if you develop your competencies, self-regulating skills, and belief in your self-efficacy, because your choices will increase.”
“The metaphysical aspect of freedom must be addressed by cultivation of agentic capabilities.”

structure.
Level of agency depends on level of freedom that is identifiable based on the impact of agency oriented factors on decision to be in line with one’s values and goals.
Freedom will expand/contract if a decision is in conflict with/conducive to values.
The metaphysical aspect of freedom can be addressed through analysing agency-outcome (i.e. decision).

Freedom

Freedom has a proactive and passive sense. The passive sense is about the absence of constraints. The active sense is exercises of self-influence in the service of selected goals and desired outcomes. Freedom involves rights, options and means to pursue them.

Freedom

Based on the philosophical worldviews of Berlin (1958) and Sen's (1999) CA, freedom has a positive sense (i.e. who/what decides) and a negative sense (freedom space to be free within). Both aspects are influenced by decision. If decision is conducive to values, then freedom is expanded, otherwise it is contracted. The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency shows how agency-oriented factors influence decisions with a focus on freedom, which shows the associated between agency-oriented factors and freedom.

Note: The elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency are presented relative to Bandura’s Agency Theory.

Conclusion

To evaluate the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we have compared it with five rival theories. The common point of these competitors is that all have addressed the agency and freedom from different perspectives. Comparing the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency with Grid-Group Cultural theory (Douglas, 2007) shows that our study helps policy makers avoid the making of policies that contract the freedom of minorities. The advantage of our theory is that it shows how people can have dialogue with opposing worldviews, which prevents policy makers from excluding minorities from political discourses. Comparing our theory with Self-Determination Theory (SDT) (Deci and Ryan, 2012) shows that our strength is the coherent concept of freedom that has a philosophical foundation in 'agency' and 'plurality' of objectives, which can facilitate the implementation of the Patient Determination Act in hospitals.

Comparing the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency with Milgram's Agency Theory highlights that our advantage is providing a thinking platform that prevents narrow perspectives of human behaviour that attribute only one way of reasoning to different individuals. Further, comparing our theory with Endogenous-Exogenous Attribution theory (Kruglanski, 1975) shows that we are filling the existing gap in the attribution literature, which ignores an individual's capability set, emotions, values, and constraints in explaining their behaviour. Finally, comparing our theory with Bandura's (2012) Theory of human agency shows that the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency offers a new definition of human agency based on the agency-freedom relationship.

In general, our focus on agency-freedom is the novelty of the present study. In particular, there are following four areas in our theory that are not paralleled by any other theory, as they are the constituted elements that in itself are novel with respect to decision making and freedom. First, distinguishing all of Weber's (1993) rationality types and the three types of reasoning in the past, present, and future. In this regard, Bandura's (2012) theory has somehow pointed to 'substantive' and 'practical' rationality types in the 'forethought' and 'intentionality' aspects of his theory. However, he does not show how to distinguish between a value-driven behaviour (i.e. substantive) and a goal-driven conduct (i.e. practical) where both are future-oriented rationalities. In addition, Bandura (2012) ignores the type of reasonings that refer to past and present (i.e. causal and correlational), and the type of rationalities that are not goal oriented (i.e. formal and theoretical). Further, Milgram's (2009) agency theory also sees every individual with a 'formal' type of rationality as it tries to explain human behaviour under authority. Both Self-Determination Theory (SDT) (Deci and Ryan, 2008) and Cultural Theory (Douglas, 2007) perceive all individuals as having a 'theoretical' type of rationality, as they try to explain human behaviour with reference to abstract cultural rules and basic psychological needs.

The second unique element of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is its focus on the distinction and contradiction of 'emotion' and 'reason' in decision behaviour. Previously, Deci and Ryan's (2012) SDT has focused on the emotional aspect of motivation in regard to people's attempt to satisfy their basic psychological need of 'relatedness'. However, SDT's approach does not capture how both 'emotion' and 'reason' influence the decision object, subject and process. The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency identifies the impact of 'emotion' and 'reason' on the decision objective (i.e. capability set), which enables us to identify an agent's values and traces the decision trajectory to show if the agency-outcome contracted/expanded freedom with respect to values.

The third unique element of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is its Evaluation Instrument, which is comprised of an 8-Factor model of 'self' and a 9-factor model of 'other' for identifying one's rationality type, direction of reasoning and values. Previously, Deci and Ryan's (2008) SDT offers a research instrument for measuring self-determination. In comparison, their questionnaires have low internal and external validity for measuring freedom, as noted in some reviews of SDT (Keitner, 2000; Teixeira et al., 2012; Van den Broeck et al., 2016).

The final unique element of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is its evaluation part that takes both 'self' and 'other' perspectives into account from the standpoints of decision maker and her reflection from the position of others. Bandura (2012) has tried to capture the role of self-reflection in human agency in his theory, but it lacks a research instrument to capture an agent's reflection on her behaviour and to show how this person reconciles opposing worldviews at the time of decision making. The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is able to help people to reflect on their decisions from the position of others, to face the opposing worldview if one existed, to reconcile their own worldview and the opposing worldview, and to express the emotion they experience during this process. This is a unique approach to study self-reflection in decision making that has an emotional side, founded upon Weiner's (2010) theory of attribution and a philosophical root in Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism. Overall, the combination of these four elements in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency will offer a novel worldview on human 'agency' through explaining how decisions are influenced by affective, conative and cognitive modes of agency, and whether they expand/contract freedom, by capturing all types of rationalities, reasonings, emotion-reason contradictions, and 'self'-'other' worldviews in the decision-making process.

Chapter 8: Discussion

Introduction

This thesis aims to *determine the agency-freedom relationship*. In this regard, a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is being developed that: (A) explains cognitive, conative and affective modes of agency with respect to freedom, (B) measures agency with respect to both positive and negative sides of freedom, and (C) determines how agency and freedom are related. This chapter reflects on the initial research questions and evaluates the findings. The outcomes of this study are unified in a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that has been validated in the previous chapter, according to which our main contribution is explaining the link between ‘agency’ and ‘freedom’ and that is a novel area.

The present study has established that to determine the agency-freedom relationship, it is appropriate to issue four caveats here. First, to study ‘agency’ without making loose judgments about its relationship with freedom, we need to focus on agency-outcome (‘decision’), as research (Lehnert et al., 2015; Roberts, 2015) has shown that ‘decision’ is a well-established concept in different domains of social science. In this line, the agency-freedom relationship in terms of ‘cognitive’ and ‘affective’ modes of decision behaviour can be informed by neuroscience breakthroughs on ‘agency’. For example, the Caspar et al. (2016) study that has found that coercion changes the sense of agency in the human brain and some other (Ajzen, 2015; Chorlton et al., 2012) findings that imply there are many brain activities that are not within an individual’s control in the decision-making process. Meanwhile to study the ‘conative’ mode of agency in the agency-freedom relationship, research can benefit from other disciplines such as sociology (Kalberg, 1980; Weber, 1993), philosophy (Bakhtin, 1935; Berlin, 1958), and economic development (Sen, 1999, 1990). This is because each discipline has progressed in different aspects of agency-outcome (Anderson, 2001; Roberts, 2015). The second caveat is that to determine the agency-freedom relationship, the reference point should be ‘values’. In this line, we say that an agent’s freedom is contracted if her decision is in conflict with her ‘values’. This means that the existence of different ‘rationality types’ (see Chapter 7, Theory Evaluation, where rationality types are defined based on Weber’s theory.) and various ways of reconciling the opposing worldviews (see Chapter 7, Theory Evaluation, where Reconciling Mechanisms are identified based on Bakhtin’s dialogism) must be taken into account, in order to determine a valid link between agency and freedom. Third, the agency-freedom relationship should be determined as a *temporal* link. The *temporal* aspect means that one’s agency and freedom levels must be evaluated *before* and *after* her decision, in order to

avoid judgmental misattribution, which research (Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014) has indicate as a methodological challenge of studies that focus on understanding human decisions.

Fourth, the expansion/contraction of agency and freedom must be established independently but in relationship to each other. In this line we say that having freedom is necessary to have agency. This means that if freedom (either positive or negative) is contracted then at least one mode of agency (either conative, cognitive or affective) is going to be contracted. In other words, the agency-freedom relationship is *multidirectional*. This means that this link can be either *inverse* or *direct*. Sometime, the agency-freedom relationship can be direct when an agent evaluates her state of being/doing as desirable/non desirable (see Chapter 4, Theory Development, where desirability is defined as Value-Laden criterion for assessing capabilities that is established in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency), from both the 'self' and 'other' standpoints, then both her agency and freedom levels are expanded/contracted simultaneously. However, at other times the agency-freedom relationship can be inverse when an individual makes counterintuitive (see Chapter 4, Theory Development, where counterintuitive decisions are defined as the actions that are determined by an agent contrary to other's judgement) and incontinent decisions (see Chapter 4, Theory Development, where incontinent decisions are defined as the actions that are determined by agent contrary to 'self' judgment like gambling) that the agent's state of being/doing is evaluated differently from the 'self' and 'other' standpoints. In these cases, the two sides of freedom (positive and negative) and the three modes of agency (affective, cognitive and conative) may expand or contract differently, which shows that the agency-freedom relationship can be inverse (Note that the relationship is either inverse/direct, which means it cannot be both direct and inverse at the same time). Hence, the final caveat to determine the agency-freedom relationship is to consider this relationship as 'multidirectional' that is what we have accomplished in the Tri-modal Theory of Agency. This study has managed to measure three modes of agency (cognitive, conative and affective) in relation to two sides of freedom (positive and negative) before and after making a decision, considering all mentioned caveats of the agency-freedom relationship. As a result, we have come to this understanding that *process* is as important as *end point* in the agency-freedom relationship, which is having freedom is important but having agency to choose to have freedom is more aspirational.

This chapter evaluates our findings according to the research questions in three sections. The first section provides an overview of the research aim, objectives, and questions. The second section shows how we have integrated existing theories on freedom and agency "*to identify the agency-oriented factors associated with freedom*", which is our first research

objective. Here, we have two contributions to agency-freedom research: (a) Defining 'Agency' based on 'Freedom', and (b) providing empirical support for the agency-oriented factors that associated with freedom. The second section establishes "*freedom expansion/contraction based on agency-oriented factors*" that is the second research objective of this study. Here, we contribute to the agency-freedom literature (Bandura, 2012; Deci and Ryan, 2012; Milgram, 2015) by measuring agency and freedom levels in relation to each other, respecting all modes of agency and all sides of freedom. To conclude, we show how this study opens a new path to study agency in relation to freedom.

Research Review

In line with 'pluralist' thinkers (Berlin, 1969; Sen, 1999) we believe that everybody must be the agent of her life. This means that everyone must be able to freely set her own value set, to choose her desirable (i.e. value-laden) capabilities, to pursue the life she has reason to value, to be evaluated based on her decisions, and to be responsible for her agency-outcome in social context. However, the *problem* is the ambiguousness of agency with a focus on freedom in terms of: (A) the extent to which a decision is made internally in terms of 'cognitive' and 'affective' states of agent (Damasio et al., 2015; Rudolph et al., 2013; Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014), and (B) the extent to which an agent is in control of her own decision (i.e. the 'conative' mode of agency) to make a volitional decision conducive to her own values (Simhony, 2014). Thanks to the field of neuroscience, today we know that when a person says "I chose to do/be something", even her conscious and willing choice is influenced by some factors, without the agent's awareness (Ajzen, 2015, 2011). In the other words, it seems that the chosen option has already been set for one to pursue (Meyer, 2008).

The ambiguity of the agency-freedom relationship becomes more critical when it allows authorities to overlook people's agency in their policies (Lehnert et al., 2015; Craft, 2013; Roberts, 2015). For example, in France policy makers have banned the Hijab in public spaces, ignoring Muslim women's agency to choose what to wear. No doubt, this has contracted some of these women's freedom, as they have willingly chosen to wear Hijab due to their values (Foerster, 2013). Another example is when hospitals and healthcare institutions ignore the 'Advance Directive' programme to allow patients volitionally choose between life and death before undergoing life-threatening surgery (Seal, 2010; Gilfix, 2010). Undoubtedly, some of these patients' freedom has been contracted by these hospitals. Further, there are many parents who ignore their children's freedom to choose the major they desire. As a result the freedom of many young adults to be/do what they value has been contracted in their family at


the beginning of their career path (Joussemet et al., 2008). Following, even though research (Ashkanasy and Härtel, 2014) has shown that employees' voice behaviour (i.e. their discretionary communication of their ideas about work-related issues with the intention to improve organisational function) will improve organisational career growth, managers fail to welcome employee voice behaviour (Schulte Steinberg et al., 2015). In all of these examples people in authority (e.g. policy makers, doctors, parents, and managers) have contracted the freedom of those who are under their control (i.e. Muslim women, patients, children, and employees). The problem is that this coercion on an individual's capability to do/be what they value (i.e. freedom) is not widely acknowledged in society (Alkire, 2007), politics (Georgantzis et al., 2013), organisations (Meyer, 2008) and even in academia (Van den Broeck et al., 2016). This is partly because as Weber (1993) argues and Milgram (1965) shows in his experiments, modern individuals think that obeying authorities and living according to established bureaucratic norms are perceived as the eligible and 'normal' way of life, even if this path is in opposition to one's personal values. Accordingly, in the literature on decision making (Craft, 2013; Lehnert et al., 2015) and judgments about human decision behaviour (Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014), the link between agency and freedom is rarely questioned or clarified.

To shed light on the agency-freedom relationship there is a **gap** in the literature in terms of *explaining the extent to which decisions are produced internally and their impact on contraction/expansion of freedom*. This gap has already been noted by some scholars in the area of agency studies (Craft, 2013; Lehnert et al., 2015), but it has not been addressed in a comprehensive way and in relation to freedom (see Chapter 2, Literature Review). Researchers in the field of neuroscience have studied the link between agency and action (Ajzen, 2015), but this field has neglected the importance of 'values' in the agency-freedom relationship (Hart, 2014). On the other hand, the existing theories on the value-freedom relationship in the field of social science suffer from other limitations. Some are narrowed to the impact of a single factor like 'culture' on decision (Douglas, 2007); some only focus on the motivational aspect of the decision-freedom relationship like Deci and Ryans' (2012, 2008) Self-determination Theories; some like Bandura's (2012) Human Agency Theory are future oriented and ignore different types of reasoning that refer to the past and present; some like Milgram's (2015) Agency Theory are limited to a single way that the 'self' is shaped in society; and most of them lack a coherent definition of freedom like Kruglanski's (1975) Endogenous-Exogenous Theory of Attribution (see Chapter 7, Theory Evaluation).

To fill this gap, the **aim** of this study has been "*to determine the relation between agency and freedom*". In this regard, our **first objective** has been "*to identify the agency-oriented*

factors associated with freedom". In other words, initially we have tried to identify the *internal* factors that influence the agency-outcome of an individual to live according to her values. Further, our second objective has been "*to establish how freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors*". In other words, we have used the agency-oriented factors to determine whether a decision has contracted/expanded freedom. Figure 53 presents our aim and objectives and the conceptual links between 'agency', 'decision', 'freedom' and 'value' in this study, as developed earlier (see the early conceptual framework in Chapter 4, Theory Development). In the following sections we show how we have achieved the following aim and objectives in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.

Figure 53: Visual Presentation of the Research Aim and Objectives



Agency-Oriented Factors Associated with Freedom

We believe that an individual's agency to do/be what she has reason to value is influenced by several factors. In this way, agency has an outcome (i.e. a decision) that contracts/expands the agent's freedom. To explain the agency-freedom relationship, our first research question is "*What factors influence one's agency to be/do what she values?*" This is an important enquiry for two reasons. First, it (Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015) is shown that the leading theories about agency and freedom are not unified in a single theory. Second, it is not clear how one's decisions contract/expand her freedom. In this regard, Sen's (1999) Capability Approach (CA) is regarded by scholars (Andersson et al., 2012; Gasper, 2002) as the leading study that has emphasised the link between agency outcome as a decision and freedom. In CA "substantive freedom is defined as *_the capabilities _ to choose a life one has reason to value*" (Sen, 1999). However, the problem is that several studies (Hodges and Creese, 2013; Roberts, 2015) have shown that CA is not explicit about how this *choice* (i.e. agency outcome) contracts/expands freedom and more importantly this theory lacks a valid practical research instrument.

In this regard, the present study has developed a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that contributes to Capability Studies (e.g. Alkire, 2007; Andersson et al., 2012) by offering an agency-oriented approach towards determining freedom expansion/contraction. This is a significant contribution, because one of Sen's (1999) distinctive reasons to justify the importance of research on 'freedom' is the importance of having 'agency' that means people are able to: (A) act and bring about change, (B) be responsible for their actions, (C) be judged on their own achievements regarding their own values and objectives. Recent studies have shown that capability literature needs a theory that captures the agency aspect of freedom particularly to study individuals' perception of entitlement (O'Leary-Kelly et al., 2016), child survival and agency of women (Requejo et al., 2015), as well as agency and fertility reduction (Sandström et al., 2015).

Addressing this gap and to investigate our first research question "*What factors influence one's agency to be/do what she values?*" we have conceptualised 'freedom' based on agency-outcome (decision) in a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. First, we have used Sen's (1999) 'substantive freedom' as our cornerstone, which has the foundation of Berlin's (1958) two senses of freedom and Rawls's (2009) view on primary goods. Here, in line with Berlin (1958) who says "to coerce a man is to deprive him from freedom", we have proposed the agency-oriented concept of freedom as "*a decision will contract freedom if it is in conflict with the*

agent's values." This articulation enables us to focus our definition of freedom around the notion of agency-outcome (decision) and consequently agency, which offers a new trend in the field of ethical decision making (e.g. Craft, 2013; Lehnert et al., 2015). Further, this start-point has enabled us to achieve our first objective based on Berlin's (1958) two senses of 'positive' and 'negative' freedom that is regarded as an inclusive view towards liberty (Gray, 2015), as explained in the following two sections.

Negative Freedom and Agency

Negative freedom is described as "the 'space' within which a person can do what she wants without the interference of others" (Berlin, 1958). Here, the focal debate among the scholars has always been on the criteria according to which this non-interfered 'space' is regarded as appropriate (Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015; Simhony, 2014). Unlike welfarists like Bentham (1996), who believe that 'utility' must define this 'space' and Rawls (2009), who says 'primary goods' must identify this 'space', our view in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is that "*the capabilities to choose a life an individual has reason to value*" must set the boundaries of this 'space'. For example, 'fasting' and 'starving' are different states of being, because the 'space' (i.e. the capabilities) the former person has is larger than the latter person. Having the capability 'to eat' expands the first person's freedom in a negative sense, compared with the second person who lacks the capability to eat. In other words, negative freedom "depends simply on the power to choose between at any rate two alternatives" (Berlin, 1969). In this regard, the core of our enquiry to "*understand the negative sense of agency-oriented factors associated with freedom*" is established on: (a) recognising the *quantity* and *quality* of an agent's options, and (b) identifying the *values* and *perspectives* of evaluating these alternatives in the decision-making process. In this regard, a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has been built upon the following notions of Sen's (1999) CA, which empowers our findings with the advantages of CA, which Clark (2005) has categorised as 'theoretical depth' and 'multidisciplinary relevance':

First, Sen (1999) says that to evaluate freedom researchers must be explicit about the judgments about 'functioning' (i.e. the things a person does/is), and 'capabilities' (the things a person is free to do/be or potential functioning). However, several reviews (Andersson et al., 2012; Hodges and Creese, 2013) of CA literature have shown that there is inconsistency between how different researchers identify 'capabilities' and 'functioning' (Alkire, 2008; Nussbaum, 2004), and how they determine the capability set (Alkire and Foster, 2011). More importantly many researchers in this domain are not explicit about their evaluation criteria for

'capabilities' and 'functioning' (Andersson et al., 2012). In this regard, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has addressed these shortcomings through: (A) identifying a 'desirability' assessment criterion of capabilities that tests how 'valuable' and 'volitional' a capability is perceived by the agent; (B) evaluating the 'desirability' of each capability from both the 'personal' and 'social' standpoints; (C) tracing how a capability turns into functioning at the two assessment phases of 'desirability' and 'realisable' checking; (D) identifying how 'realisable' a capability is based on logical, physical, axiological constraints and resource limitations; (E) distinguishing between the state of being/doing that an agent is willing to choose (i.e. functioning) and the state that an agent is coerced to attain (i.e. commanding); (F) differentiating between 'beneficial' and 'adverse' states of being/doing from both the personal and social standpoints (see Chapter 6, Case Study).

The significance of the present study is that the mentioned methodological steps are applied and empirically tested in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. This benefits the studies in the field of CA (e.g. Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015; Comim, 2001) that try to investigate how an agent transforms her capabilities into functioning. In addition, our attention to various aspects of capability evaluation has a result in developing the assessment criterion of 'desirability', whose important characteristic is that it is 'value-laden', because this focus will expand decision analysis beyond the rationalist view. In this line, using 'desirability' can address the limitations of rationalists' decision analysis. It (Wismadi et al., 2013) has been shown that the rationalist view of understanding decisions is utility oriented and its mere focus on 'preferences' has neglected to acknowledge an agent's values and emotions. Sen (1990) has criticised the rationalist view for failing to distinguish between 'motive', 'choice' and 'welfare' in the analysis of 'preferences' in decision making. Hence, our multidimensional and explicit attention to capability evaluation can help to address the limitations of rational choice theories.

Second, Sen (1999) emphasises that to evaluate substantive freedom (i.e. *the capabilities*) all of the 'realised' and 'non-realised' options must be considered and evaluated. For example, comparing two states of being of *fasting* and *starving*, if an observer ignores the 'unrealised' option of *eating*, it will be difficult to compare these two people's negative freedom. However, the capability scholars' (Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015; Comim, 2001) main challenge has been the absence of a valid research instrument to capture, trace and evaluate capabilities. This is because capabilities are countless and dynamic in relation to time and context (see Chapter 2, Literature Review). Our study has addressed this limitation in three following ways.

First, we have particularly focused on impact of the agents' important decisions on their freedom (e.g. career choice, migration, marriage, investment, etc.). This has narrowed our research domain to recognising the capabilities that are related to that specific decision in the agent's life trajectory. As evidence, in Chapter 6 (Case Study Methodology Section) we have explained how the 'complementary capabilities' that are related to a decision are analysed in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. For example, in the M.G. case study we have identified two sets of 'delivering the failed project' and 'not delivering the failed project', which has helped the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to trace M.G.'s life trajectory according to the decision of sustaining his business. Our second approach to address the evaluation challenge of the capability set is founded upon the economic view that "the value of a set of options is in the best use one can make out of them" (Sen, 1999a). In this line, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has a temporal dimension and we have focused our evaluation on the agent's state of being/doing *before* and *after* the decision (see Chapter 6, Case Study), instead of evaluating all of the alternative states of being/doing one could have been/done (i.e. capability set) at any time in her life.

Third, we have distinguished among different types of obstacles on an agent's capability realisation. In the Logical Core of the Tri-modal Theory of Agency, we have established that one's capability set is limited by personal and universal constraints (i.e. physical, logical, resource based and axiological) (see Chapter 3, Theory Development). Hence, there is only one subset of an agent's capability set that its members are logically *reasonable*, physically *possible*, *allowable* from an axiological sense, and *achievable* in terms of availability of resources, which in sum there is one capability set that its members are *realisable*. Distinguishing between various types of constraints on an agent's capability set contributes to capability studies (e.g. Hodges and Creese, 2013) that try to identify the capability set using set theory. This direct approach towards evaluating capabilities will contribute to the literature that is trying to identify an agent's capabilities (Abel and Frohlich, 2012; Ahlberg, 2013; Alkire, 2008; Alkire and Foster, 2011), agency (Hart, 2014), and wellbeing (Basu, 2013). Overall, to identify the negative sense of agency-oriented factors associated with freedom, we have focused on an agents' capabilities. This is a novel view towards the 'conative' mode of agency in terms of freedom within the fields of psychology (Bandura, 2012) and social science (Abel and Frohlich, 2012; Sandström et al., 2015). In the next section we show how the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has captured the positive sense of freedom.

Positive Freedom and Agency

Investigating the first research question of '*What factors influence one's agency to do/be what she values?*', we have also captured the 'positive' sense of freedom that implies "what/who is the source of control to determine what a person is able to do/be" (Berlin, 1969). Research (Simhony, 2014) shows that a critical aspect of understanding the 'positive' sense of freedom is the human divided self, which psychologists (Haidt, 2006) distinguish as the 'cognitive' and 'affective' parts of human being, motivating human actions. In this regard, Berlin (1958) believes that we have a 'higher' self that controls our reason-oriented actions and a 'lower' self that makes us behave irrationally (Simhony, 2014). Unlike Berlin (1958) and in line with recent findings in the field of neuroscience (Damasio et al., 2015; Damasio and LeDoux, 2012; Damasio, 1999), emotion literature (Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014) and moral philosophy of emotion (Nussbaum, 2007, 2004, 2003), we believe that 'self' has an 'affective' and a 'rational' side and both are necessary for an intelligent decision. Hence, positive freedom is captured in both the *affective* and *cognitive* modes of the Tri-modal Theory of Agency that both modes can lead an agent to live according to her values (i.e. expand freedom).

In this line, through taking the following steps we have tried to capture what is known (Ajzen, 2015) as the 'cognitive' and 'affective' modes of agency, with respect to Berlin's (1958) positive freedom. First, we have distinguished between 'emotion'- and 'reason'-oriented factors that influence decisions. In addition, we have used Weiner's (2010) method of investigating emotions to empirically test the impact of emotion on decision. In line with the Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew (2014) findings, our findings have indicated that an agent is dealing with different countervailing emotions simultaneously at the decision time (see Chapter 6, Case Study, Feed Backward-Forward Loop). These findings are significant because Weiner's (2010) attribution emotions are tested in the field of agency-freedom (Jin et al., 2014; Lehnert et al., 2015), that is for the first time, to the best knowledge of the author.

Our second novelty in identifying agency-oriented factors associated with freedom is that unlike Berlin (1958) and in line with cognitive psychologists like Bandura (2012), British Idealists like Simhony (2014), and normative behavioural theories like (Ajzen, 2015; Cialdini and Trost, 1998; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005), the present study is sceptical about the idea that "positive freedom is merely a matter of inner conditions of the true self" (Berlin, 1969). This study has empirically shown that agency will take shape in the environment. Accordingly, we have developed an agent's interaction with social institutions based on two theories of Weber's (1993) Rationality Types and Bakhtin's (1935) Dialogism on reasoning and freedom.

Weber (1993) says that a modern individual's freedom is declining in modern bureaucratic societies that dictate a common set of values and goals to everyone. In this line, to show how societies shape the type and direction of reasoning we have mapped our agency-oriented factors onto Weber's (1993) types of rationalities. In addition, we have mapped these factors onto three types of reasoning in the past, present, and future (i.e. causal, correlational, and teleological equivalently) (see Chapter 4, Theory Development). This builds on studies (Kelley et al., 2013) that focus on the causal aspect of understanding human behaviour, and researchers (Olesen, 2011) that try to simulate human behaviour. In this line, our findings have indicated the agency-oriented factors in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency as following: (A) factors of 'Causal State', and 'Resource Limitation', representing Weber's (1993) *theoretical rationality* that an agent reasons based on external abstract principles that is mapped onto *casual and/or correlational reasoning*; (b) factors of 'Expectation', 'Capabilities', 'Effort and Ability' and 'Self-interest', representing Weber's (1993) *practical rationality* that an agent reasons based on her goals that is mapped onto *teleological reasoning*; (c) factors of 'Motivation' and 'Desire intensity', representing Weber's (1993) *substantive rationality* that an agent reasons based on her values and beliefs that is mapped onto *teleological reasoning*; and (d) factors of 'Third-party evaluation', 'Popularity' and 'Social Group', representing Weber's (1993) *formal rationality* that an agent reasons based on external norms that are mapped onto *casual and/or correlational reasoning* (see Chapter 5, Data Collection, Findings and Analysis).

Our findings have established that Weber's (1993) rationality types and directions of reasoning are relevant for the purpose of identifying an agent's values and goals. According to recent reviews on decisions and agency outcome (Lehnert et al., 2015; Roberts, 2015), and to the best knowledge of the authors, this is a unique accomplishment in the field of agency and freedom. This finding implies that the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency can identify an agent's rationality type in terms of her values and objectives and this contributes to the understanding of freedom expansion/contraction relative to agency-outcome. Further, comparing the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency with its rivals has shown that the present study is unique as it takes all types of Weber's (1993) rationality types into account (see Chapter 7, Theory Evaluation). For example, both Douglas (2007) and Milgram (2015) perceive all individuals as having a *formal* rationality type and this is a significant shortcoming in their theories. Overall, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency builds on studies that try to apply Weber's (1993) rationality types in the area of human agency (Bandura, 2012), reasoning (Kalberg, 1980) and institutional phenomenology (Meyer and Land, 2013; Meyer, 2008).

The other theory that we have used to show how external factors influence agency from the 'positive' freedom perspective is Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism that implies one's freedom is limited when this person is subjugating her worldview in front of authorities. In this line, to show the impact of opposing worldviews on the agency-freedom relationship, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has measured the impact of each agency-oriented factor from 'self' and 'other' standpoints (see Chapter 5, Data Collection, Analysis, and Findings). The state of the art on dialogism and freedom (e.g. Robinson, 2011) has not shown similar studies like the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that has the following advantages over the existing literature in this area. First, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency helps an agent to reflect on her decision from the other's perspective. This is a significant approach because self-reflection is regarded by scholars (Ajzen, 2011; Hoy, 2013) as a complex and sometimes impossible task to occur naturally. Second, our theory enables researchers to identify 'rationalisation' (i.e. when an agent offers a comfortable instead of sound reason for her decision) by comparing 'self' and 'other' worldviews. We have found that if the 'self' and 'other' worldviews are different, then it is possible that the agent is substituting a convenient explanation for the actual reason (e.g. emotion), which results in unsound reasoning (see the 'rationalisation' sections in Chapters 3, 5 and 6). This is a novel contribution to the field of attribution theory, because it will improve the validity of self-report data collection methods, which are identified as misattribution (Allen, 2012; Tipper and Bach, 2008) and judgmental biases (Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Tipper and Bach, 2008). Further, through detecting rationalisation we identify the role of 'logical reasoning' as an agency-oriented factor on the agent's freedom (see Chapter 5, Study 1, Thematic Analysis).

Third, we have shown that if agent is facing an opposing worldview then she may use either of the three reconciling approaches of 'dialogue', 'dialectic' and 'monologue' (see Reconciling Mechanisms in Chapters 5 and 6). We have built these reconciliation approaches upon Bakhtin's (1935) theory of dialogism. As a result, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has adapted Bakhtin's (1935) dialogical view as an agency-oriented perspective toward freedom, which to the best knowledge of the author is among the first attempts in this area. Further, our theory offers a unique method to identify the axiological constraint of *subjugating personal worldview in front of authority* in the literature on ethical decision making (e.g. Craft, 2013; Roberts, 2015). This helps to enhance the studies on interpersonal interactions in decision making (e.g. Bakhtin and Emerson, 1993; Robinson, 2011) and different behavioural theories (e.g. Ajzen, 2015; Cialdini and Trost, 1998; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005).

Overall, our attempt to identify the positive sense of agency-oriented factors associated with freedom has covered three aspects of the 'self' in decision making for the first time: (a) the

duality of the rationality-affect based on Weiner's (2010) attributional emotions; (b) the social impact of institutions on shaping a person's values and goals based on Weber's (1993) rationality types; (c) the invisible impact of authorities in coercing an agent to subjugate her personal worldview based on Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism. Further, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has shifted freedom-oriented research on the 'self' (e.g. Martins, 2015; Simhony, 2014) towards the focus on 'agency' that is backed up by scientific findings like the breakthroughs of Damasio et al. (2015). In this line, the present study helps to: (a) distinguish between the 'affective' and 'cognitive' factors influencing an agent with respect to freedom, (b) identify the effect of 'reason' and 'emotion' on decision objectives (i.e. capabilities), (c) evaluating agency outcome (i.e. decision) with respect to 'values' (see Feed backward-forward Loop in Chapters 3, 5 and 6).

So far, we have shown how the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has integrated the 'cognitive' mode of agency in the fields of psychology (Ajzen, 2015) and neuroscience (Damasio et al., 2015) with the notion of the 'self' in social science (Weber, 1993), philosophy (Bakhtin, 1935), and economy (Sen, 2007) under the umbrella of Berlin's (1969) positive freedom. The next section presents the empirical contributions of this present study and how the 'affective' mode of agency is captured in relation to freedom.

Methodological Advantages

We believe that determining the agency-freedom relationship through agency outcome (decision) enables us to empirically develop a set of factors to measure agency-level with respect to freedom-level. In this regard, our attempt to address the first question that "*What factors influence one's agency to do/be what she values*" has led us towards the empirical assessment of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. In this regard, our main rival that offers an empirical theory to explain the behaviour-authority relationship is Deci and Ryans' (2012, 2008) Self-Determination Theory (SDT) (see Chapter 7, Theory Evaluation). A recent review (Van den Broeck et al., 2016) has shown that Deci and Ryan have managed to offer a six-scale theory to empirically measure 'authority' as a dimension of 'motivation'. As evidence, authority-motivation only focuses on the psychological aspect of the agency-freedom relationship (Hui et al., 2013). Addressing this shortcoming, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has managed to develop 8-factor model of 'self' and 9-factor model of 'other' that measures agency-oriented factors with respect to freedom (see Evaluation Instrument, Chapter 5, Data Collection, Findings and Analysis).

The above models have the following advantages. First, the result of CFA has established that both the 'self' and 'other' models are fitted to the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.

Second, the results of EFA have shown that both models can distinguish more than 65% of differences among individuals' in terms of their decision motives, limitations, reasoning, rationality, goals and values. Third, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is applicable in other contexts because it has been developed in two surveys on 'career choice' of 1063 employees, and on university major choice of 4086 students. Fourth, the empirical factors are validated in 20 interviews and one case study. Fifth, our theory helps participants to reflect on their opposing worldview, which research (Hoy, 2013) has shown that the self-reflection approach helps to improve the reliability of self-report data collection. Further, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first published study that empirically apply Weber's (1993) types of rationalities in the context of Iran.

In addition to these methodological advantages that identify 'reasons' behind the agency-outcome, we have developed a mechanism to empirically measure the impact of direct and indirect 'emotions' on the agency-freedom relationship. Our approach is developed based on Weiner's (2010) emotion list in his attribution theory of motivation (see Chapter 3, Theory Development). Using Weiner's method, we have collected empirical evidence that is in line with Weiner's (2010) list of emotions. To the best knowledge of the author, and relying on recent studies on Weiner's study (e.g. Reizenzein, 2014; Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014), the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is the first study that has adapted Weiner's (2010) emotions in the field of agency-freedom. In this line, recent empirical studies on emotion have mainly been on decision, which they (Clark, 2005, 2002; Craft, 2013) either neglect to acknowledge freedom, or they (Jin et al., 2014; Damasio et al., 2015; Damasio and LeDoux, 2012) are narrowed to the field of psychology and neuroscience.

So far we have shown how the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency captures an agent's three modes of 'cognitive', 'affective', and 'conative' with respect to freedom. The next section shows how these agency-oriented factors are used to explain an agent's freedom expansion/contraction.

The Agency-Freedom Relationship in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency

We have determined the agency-freedom relationship through identifying whether an agent's decisions are in line with her values. In this line, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is built based on this idea that 'a decision contracts an agent's freedom if it is in conflict with her values'. Accordingly, our *second* research question is "What is the implication of agency-oriented factors for the expansion/contraction of the agent's freedom?" To answer this question, we have used agency-oriented factors to explain how a decision can contract freedom relying on Berlin's

(1969) concept of 'coercion'. Berlin (1969) says that "*any kind of inability is not coercion; coercion is when other people consciously/unconsciously intervene with your actions and put obstacles on the way of achieving your goals.*" In other words, this sense of freedom is the space within which your actions are not intervened by external and non-agentic factors. For example, if you cannot understand a difficult text then you are not coerced. You are coerced when others interfere with your education that enables you to realise the capability of reading (Martins, 2015). On the same basis, we have been careful in our agency-based conceptualisation of freedom that "*any kind of decision that limits your capability set is not contracting your freedom. Your freedom is contracted when you make a decision that is in conflict with your values.*" In addition we say that a decision may contract an agent's negative freedom and her conative mode of agency, but it is in line with her values and expands her positive freedom, as well as her affective and cognitive modes of agency (see Chapter 6, Case Study conclusion). Meanwhile, a decision can expand both sides of freedom and all modes of agency (see Chapter 5, K.G.'s Decision). A decision can contract an agent's negative freedom and the conative mode of agency, but expands her positive freedom as well as her affective and cognitive modes of agency (see Chapter 5, M.T.'s Decision). As evidence, our findings have established that the agency-freedom relationship is multidirectional, thus, all aspects of freedom and agency must be determined independently and thoroughly in relation to each other. This is a contribution to agency studies like (Bandura, 1977; Milgram, 2015), as well as Berlin's (1969) and Sen's (1999) definition of freedom.

The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has established that not all of the decisions that are contracting negative freedom and conative mode of agency are contracting positive freedom and affective-cognitive modes of agency. In other words, the agency-freedom relationship is monotonic and multidirectional. Monotonic means that at any time the relationship moves in one direction. Multidirectional means that this relationship could be either *direct* or *inverse*. Our findings have indicated that the direct link between freedom and agency can be either positive or negative. The positive-direct way relationship is when an agent chooses her own desirable option that is commensurate with her own values and others evaluate her decision as desirable too (i.e. Beneficial-Functioning). In a positive-direct relationship both agency and freedom levels are expanded. The negative-direct way relationship is when an agent chooses an option that is not desirable from both the self and other standpoints, which means the choice is not commensurate with her own and social values (i.e. Adverse-Commanding). In the negative-direct relationship both agency and freedom levels are contracted.

However, the findings have indicated that agency and freedom are not always directly related and in counterintuitive and incontinent decisions this relationship is inverse (see Chapter 5, Study 4, Part 2). The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has established two types of inverse relationships. The first type of inverse relationship between agency and freedom is when an agent chooses her desirable option commensurate with her own values, but it is contrary to others' values (i.e. counterintuitive decision). Here, agency-outcome will have contracted negative freedom and the conative mode of agency, but positive freedom and affective-cognitive modes of agency may be expanded (i.e. Adverse-Functioning) (see Chapter 6, Case Study). The second type of inverse relationship of agency and freedom is when agent attains a capability that is not commensurate with her own values but others (i.e. external norms) evaluate it as desirable. Here, her positive freedom, as well as cognitive and affective modes of her agency are contracted, but her negative freedom and conative mode of agency may be expanded (i.e. Beneficial-Commanding state of being/doing) (see Chapter 5, Study 4, Part 1 and Part 2).

In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency the relationship between agency and freedom is determined in one's journey from her *before state* to the *after state* of the focal decision, for three modes of agency (cognitive, conative and affective) and two sides of freedom (positive and negative), in order to clarify the above-mentioned complexities involved in this link, particularly when agency and freedom are inversely related. The advantage of the present study is that we have developed a case study methodology and we have applied the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to one case study that shows how these complexities in the agency-freedom relationship can be addressed (see Chapter 6, Case Study). Our findings have shown that the main contribution of determining the agency-freedom relationship as monotonic, multidirectional and temporal in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is to Sen's (1977) idea of "committed actions" and Davidson's (2014) studies on "incontinent actions", because the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is able to show 'why' and 'how' some decisions are made contrary to personal and social judgments. This is because our findings have established 'values' as the cornerstone of the agency-freedom relationship. In this regard, we say having freedom is important, but having agency to choose to have freedom is more *aspirational* (i.e. value laden). As evidence, in Chapter 6, M.G.'s case study is a manifestation of this idea, as M.G.'s substantive rationality and his hope have resulted in the decision to save his business. This decision has contracted M.G.'s negative freedom to live a financially secure life, but that precise decision has expanded his positive freedom, as well as his affective and cognitive modes of agency to live an aspirational life. A life that creates change in the way people have access to book through

online tools in his country. These findings can be used in future studies to test whether the affective and conative modes of agency are more related to the positive side of 'freedom', and the conative mode of agency is more related to the negative side of freedom. Figure 54 summarises our findings regarding the agency-freedom relationship in the following four domains of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency:


- *Beneficial Functioning (BF)*: If one's state of being/doing is evaluated as BF, then three modes of agency (cognitive, conative and affective) and two sides of freedom (positive and negative) have a positive-direct relationship. Hence, both her agency and freedom levels are expanded after decision. In this case the chosen option is both internally and externally *desirable* that is *value* laden according to both 'self' and 'other' evaluation. As an example see K.G.'s agency-freedom after the decision to give away his business wealth in Chapter 5, Study 4, Part 2.
- *Adverse Commanding (AC)*: If one's state of being/doing is evaluated as AC, then three modes of her agency (cognitive, conative and affective) and two sides of freedom (positive and negative) have a negative-direct relationship. Hence, agency and freedom levels are both contracted after her decision. This means that her chosen capability is in conflict with both her own values and external norms. For example, the state of being/doing of Jean Valjean, the protagonist of Victor Hugo's 1862 novel *Les Misérables*, who was arrested for committing a crime (stealing a bread) after breaking the law was Adverse Commanding.
- *Adverse Functioning (AF)*: If one's state of being/doing is evaluated as AF, then her agency and freedom have a reverse relationship of type one (Figure 54). Hence, at least one mode of her agency (possibly the cognitive mode) and her positive freedom is contracted while her negative freedom is expanded after decision. Here the agency level after the decision needs to be determined by collecting evidence according to (A) agentic factors using the Evaluation Instrument, (B) considering reflection problem that how self and other's viewpoint can influence each other (see Minsky's (1975) theory of mind), and (C) considering the neighbourhood effect on the agent's evaluation of her state of being and doing as suggested in several studies (Goux and Maurin, 2007; Freeland, and Keister, 2016). In this case the agent's chosen option is internally desirable (i.e. conducive to her values) but externally non-*desirable* (i.e. in conflict with some norms). As an example, see Chapter 5, M.M.'s decision.
- *Beneficial Commanding (BC)*: If one's state of being/doing is evaluated as BC, then her agency and freedom have a reverse relationship of type two (Figure 54). Hence, at least

one mode of her agency (possibly the affective mode or cognitive mode) is contracted after the decision, but her negative freedom is expanded. This means that her chosen capability is in conflict with her own values, but is conducive to external norms. To clarify what mode of agency is expanded and how positive/negative freedom changes we need to consider the reflection problem by collecting data about the agentic factors, as well as the neighbourhood effect on agent's evaluation. For example, a social smoker who has to refrain from smoking in public spaces in the UK is at the Beneficial Commanding state of being/doing, because internally she wants to smoke but she refrains from doing so due to the smoking ban regulation, which is beneficial to her own health and that of others.

It is important to clarify how AF and BC rank in terms of agency and freedom with each other. In this regard, we believe that the process of living according to an agent's values is more important than the end point that may be achieved by making decisions that are in conflict with personal values but expands one's available options (Clark, 2005; Gasper, 2002; Nussbaum, 2004). In this line, we call for further studies to use the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency and our Evaluation Instrument to investigate the relative ranking of BA and AF in terms of agency before and after the decision, as presented in Figure 54. In this line, to understand agency-freedom link one of the issues that need to be considered about the relationship between agency and freedom is that in this thesis we investigate the *correlation* of these two concept and we have not tried to establish *causality*. Here, we say that agency and freedom are correlated in monotonic and multidirectional way, and we have established that to understand this relationship the changes in three modes of agency (affective, cognitive and conative) and two sides of freedom (positive and negative) need to be studied in isolation. However, if a research will try to explain causal relationship between agency and freedom then the issue of endogeneity needs to be considered. The endogeneity issue is that agency and freedom can have two-way relationship, which means that expansion of agency increases freedom level, while at the same time one can argue that the expansion of freedom can increase agency. If future research tries to explain the causal relationship between agency and freedom, an instrumental variable must be found that is correlated with one side of this causal relationship, while it is not correlated with the other side. For example, it can be argued that agent's educational level is correlated with her cognitive and affective modes of agency, but it is not correlated with her negative sides of freedom. Hence, educational level can be used as an instrumental variable to explain the casual relationship between cognitive and affective modes

of agency and negative freedom. It must be emphasised that the present thesis is not concerned with explaining the causal relationship between agency and freedom, but if future studies are looking for causal link then they need to find relevant instrumental variables, like educational level.

Figure 54: The Freedom-Agency Relationship in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency



Agency-Freedom Relationship		
Multidirectional	Temporal	
	State Evaluation	Agency and Freedom After Decision
Inverse (Type1)	Adverse Functioning (Low Freedom)(High Agency)	One side of Freedom contracted One mode of Agency contracted
Inverse (Type 2)	Beneficial Commanding (High Freedom)(Low Agency)	One side of Freedom contracted One mode of Agency contracted
Negative Direct	Adverse Commanding (Low Freedom)(Low Agency)	Freedom Contracted Agency Contracted
Positive Direct	Beneficial Functioning (High Freedom)(High Agency)	Freedom Expanded Agency Expanded

In this line, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is novel as most of the freedom-oriented studies are narrowed to the decision object (i.e. capabilities) by building upon Sen's (1999) CA and hardly offer a new perspective to study freedom (Bellanca et al., 2011; Cameron and Eyeson, 2012). Some studies have indirectly explained the impact of environment on the freedom of individuals but they are narrowed to single factors like culture (Douglas, 2007), authority (Milgram, 1965), identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010) and market (Becker, 2010). Some decision researchers focus on the psychological aspects of a decision and indirectly point to freedom through other concepts, such as agency (Bandura, 2012) and motivation (Deci and Ryan, 2012). In addition, most of the freedom-oriented studies have a normative perspective (Bandura, 2012; Sen, 2007) and their problem is that they are mainly theoretical and developed in the field of philosophy (Bakhtin, 1935; Berlin, 1958), and/or ignore the philosophical foundations and rely purely on empirical findings in the field of psychology (Bandura, 2012).

Conclusion

To conclude, this study builds upon agency-freedom studies by linking these two concepts. Our novelty is to establish a monotonic, multidirectional and temporal relation between agency and freedom through developing a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. This theory is coherent and unique because it measures both the 'positive' and 'negative' senses of freedom in relation to three modes of agency that are cognitive, conative and affective.

In terms of negative freedom, this study has three contributions to the area of agency-freedom. First, we follow Sen's (1999) view on negative freedom. The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency identifies the impact of both 'reason' and 'emotion' on agent's capabilities. Second, capabilities are assessed based on a value-laden criterion (i.e. 'desirability') as well as the 'realisable' characteristic that is about personal and universal constraints on the agency-freedom relationship. Overall, this study contributes to the understanding of negative freedom by identifying the boundaries of the space within which one is free to decide based on her: (a) values and (b) capability set.

In terms of positive freedom, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has three contributions to research on what/who is the 'self' that controls agency-outcome with respect to freedom. First, we have empirically shown that both the 'rational' and 'affective' sides of 'self' are in charge of planned and intellectual agency-outcome that are conducive to an agent's values and expand freedom. Second, we have empirically tested the impact of Weiner's (2010) attribution emotions on agency-outcome in relation to freedom. Finally, we have identified how the 'self' is shaped in 'society' from two perspectives. Our first approach is based on Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism that

sheds light on the reconciliation approaches that people use to subjugate their 'self/'other' worldview when they face authorities. Second, based on different types of Weber's (1993) rationalities we have established self-society interaction by showing how the 'self' reacts to the values and goals of societies. Overall, both the 'cognitive' and 'affective' modes of agency are captured in positive sense of freedom. The novelty of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is gathering 'positive' and 'negative' senses of freedom in three modes of agency (i.e. cognitive, affective and conative) within a unified theory.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

Introduction

This thesis aims to *determine the agency-freedom relationship*. As a result, a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency was developed that: (a) explains cognitive, conative and affective modes of agency with respect to freedom, (b) measures agency with respect to both the positive and negative sides of freedom, and (c) determines how agency and freedom are related. This chapter presents the link between the research gap and the novelty of our enquiry. In this regard, it starts by presenting the theoretical contributions of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to Berlin's (1958) view on freedom in philosophy, Sen's (1999) Capability Approach in human development, Weiner's (2010) emotions in the Attribution Theory of Motivation, Weber's (1993) rationality types and Bakhtin's (1935) dialogical theory. Following, this chapter presents three practical contributions of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that are: (a) it is a *valid* theory because it has been tested and approved in one complete case study (see the M.G. Case Study); (b) it is accompanied by a *reliable* Evaluation Instrument because it has been tested and amended in two surveys (N1 = 1063 and N2 = 4086) (see Chapter 5); and (c) this theory offers eight Self and nine Other scales to measure agency levels based on an agent's freedom. Further, this chapter presents the methodological contributions of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency as it is among the pioneering *multidisciplinary* theories on the agency-freedom relationship that determines the agency-freedom relationship by linking Berlin's (1958) definition of freedom with Sen's (1999) focus on an agent's capabilities and Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism as the *conative* mode of agency; linking them to Weber's (1993) rationality types as the *cognitive* mode of agency, and finally mapping these two modes of agency onto Weiner's (2010) attribution emotions as the *affective* mode of agency. In this line, this study has managed to develop an Evaluation Instrument that has improved *self-report data collection* tools by measuring each agentic factor associated with freedom from the 'self' and 'other' stand points.

However, in the limitations section we show that the Tri-modal Theory of Agency requires further development in the following areas: (A) analysing the number and quality of *capabilities* (e.g. using Fuzzy Analysis techniques as suggested by Martinko and Martinez, 2012) in *time* (see Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015); (B) measuring the impact of emotion on the agency-freedom relationship (e.g. using longitudinal data, experimental intervention, and research methods that test emotions within person and day-to-day variation as suggested by Ashkanasy, 2015); (C) identifying the impact of side-effects and impact of chance and/or luck on agency-outcome with respect to freedom; (D) detecting an agent's exercise of rationalisation from the standpoint of real third-party observers; (E) measuring the reason-emotion association

and its impact on agency outcome; and (F) conducting cross-cultural studies to broaden the generalisability of the outcome.

This chapter will end by recommending several areas for future studies and relevant research questions that are: (A) analysing decision *side effects* on the agency-freedom link; (B) ranking agency and freedom levels in the inverse agency-freedom relationships of Adverse Functioning and Beneficial Commanding (see Chapter 8, Discussion); (C) collecting more empirical evidence for impact of *emotion*, *reason* and their combination on the agency-freedom link; (D) applying the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to freedom-oriented questions about decisions in different contexts; (E) using the Evaluation Instrument to detect rationalisation in agency-freedom oriented research topics; (F) grouping people based on their rationality type with respect to their agency and freedom level; and (G) using the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to test the agency-freedom relationship of individuals for improving their mental health in different social settings (e.g. organisations). Overall, this chapter shows how this research has started a new path to study the agency-freedom relationship.

Novelty and Gap

The findings indicate that this research has been the first multidisciplinary (i.e. philosophy, psychology, sociology, economy) study that has successfully addressed the gap in freedom-agency research by defining agency and freedom in relation to each other and developing a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to measure the agency-freedom relationship. The *gap* is that the relationship between *agency* and *freedom* is contested and unclear (see Chapter 2, Literature Review). In other words, it has been unclear *how* internally a decision is produced and *how* one's freedom is expanded/contracted as a result of that decision, when one says "I chose to do/be something", particularly when this decision is made contrary to external judgment (i.e. counterintuitive) and/or internal judgment (i.e. incontinent actions) (see Chapter 3, Methodology). The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has clarified the answers of the above-mentioned two research questions by achieving two objectives: (A) identifying the agency-oriented factors associated with freedom, and (B) establishing freedom expansion/contraction based on those agency-oriented factors. Addressing these two objectives, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency contributes to the area of agency-freedom in the following theoretical, practical and methodological strands.

Theoretical Contribution

Our attempt to show *what factors influence one's agency to do/be what she values* (i.e. the first research question) has several theoretical contributions to freedom and agency studies. First, it builds on Berlin's (1958) definition of freedom by questioning his view about the role of the divided self on decision making. Berlin believes that intellectual and rational decisions are reason oriented and emotion distracts one's intellectual choices (Martins, 2015). In this line, we have used Weiner's (2010) Attribution Theory of Motivation and we have shown the important role of emotion on life-changing and intellectual decisions. The novelty of our approach is that we have used Weiner's (2010) list of emotions and his method of investigating emotions with focus on agency and freedom. The reason that we have combined Weiner's (2010) emotional approach in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is to analyse the emotions that influence an agent's subsequent decision. The findings of the M.G. case study have shown that when M.G. was reflecting on others' (i.e. his partner, mother, angel investor, and his cousins) evaluations of his situation, he was experiencing different emotions (i.e. pride, sadness, fear, and envy) simultaneously. It is not yet clear how emotion and reason are integrated in the mind (Damasio et al., 2015), but our findings have shown that 'hope' and 'substantive rationality' has been the main drivers of M.G.'s agency outcome (see Chapter 6, Case Study). The emotions that are detected in the present study are similar to Weiner's (2010) list of emotions, but our novelty is that we have used them to understand how these emotions influence agency outcome with a focus on freedom.

Second, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has advanced Sen's (2007, 1999, 1977, 1973, 1997) Capability Approach in the area of the agency-freedom relationship by: (A) tracing how a capability turns into state of being/doing, which builds upon Alkire's (2008, 2007, 2005, 2002) approach of identifying a capability set; (B) evaluating capabilities and state of being/doing from personal and social views based on their volition and desirability in a unified model; (C) measuring the role of *emotion* on capability realisation that is a reply to Nussbaum's (2007, 2003) call in the field of philosophy and human development; (D) acknowledging the impact of decision *consequences* on capability realisation; (E) developing eight self and nine other measurement scales to evaluate states of being/doing with a focus on freedom and agency that is consistent with the Deci and Ryan (2012, 2008, 1985) attempt to identify motivation; and (F) for the first time establishing how personal and environmental factors influence capability realisation based on both Weber's (1993) sociological theory and Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism.

Third, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency contributes to existing agency theories (e.g. Bandura, 2012, 1989, 1977; Milgram, 2009, 1965, 1963), normative theories of behaviour

(Cialdini et al., 1990), exchange theories of behaviour (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005), and attitude theories of behaviour (Ajzen, 2011) by identifying a fresh perspective on how *environment* and *agents* interact. This is the first study that has combined Weber's (1993) view on how modern individuals' internalise bureaucratic social norms and Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism on how an agent subjugates her worldview in front of others. In this line, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency contributes to freedom-agency studies by: (A) mapping the factors that influence one's evaluation of her state of being/doing onto Weber's (1993) different types of rationalities in order to show how societies impact individuals' agencies, and what *values* shape an individual's reasons for her decisions; (B) following Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism, developing our agentic Evaluation Instrument as a self-report method that helps individuals to self-reflection on their decisions, and enables researchers to detect if an agent is subjugating her worldview in front of the opposing worldview.

Overall, the two theoretical contributions above advance our understanding of the person-environment interaction in the agency-freedom *link* with respect to Berlin's (1958) *positive* and *negative* freedom. This is because our attempt to answer the first research question is based on *who/what* is the source of control (i.e. positive freedom), while it also helps to identify *the space* within which an agent is free to do/be what she values (i.e. negative freedom). Further, our attempt to *show freedom expansion/contraction based on agency-oriented factors* (i.e. the second research question) has resulted in several theoretical contributions to freedom studies. First, it builds on Berlin's (1958) definition of *coercion* (see Chapter 8, Discussion) by (a) defining agency and freedom in relationship, (b) focusing on one's *values* in order to show if a decision is conducive to those values (i.e. expands freedom), or is in conflict with those values (i.e. contracts freedom). No doubt, psychological, social, and philosophical theories of agency will benefit from the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, because for the first time *freedom* and *agency* are linked in an analytical theory of agency outcome (i.e. decision), which is a well-known concept in all of these disconnected disciplines. Finally, our advancements to the agency-freedom link have been tested in one comprehensive case study (see Chapter 6, Case Study).

Practical Contribution

The findings indicate that the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has five practical contributions to the field of the agency-freedom link. Researchers can apply this theory to any conscious and significant decision (e.g. employee selection, appraisal, retention, promotion, investment, career choice, migration) to answer the four following important questions about the agency-freedom

link: (A) what are the agency-freedom levels of the agent according to her evaluation of her state of being/doing before and after that decision; (B) what is the agent's decision trajectory in time; (C) what are the possible unintended consequences of agency-outcome; and (D) whether the participant is exercising 'rationalisation'. In particular, detecting 'rationalisation' is a practical contribution to attribution studies (Ababneh et al., 2013; Carless and Waterworth, 2012; Sugimoto, 2015), because the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency can identify if an individual is providing unsound reasons for her decisions, which shows lay individuals may have unsound logical reasoning when they try to explain their decisions (see Chapter 5, Study 1).

In addition, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is accompanied by an Evaluation Instrument to identify agency-oriented factors. This instrument is valid (approved in one complete case study) and reliable (tested and amended in two surveys). This instrument is a significant practical contribution to the field of Self-Determination (Aryee et al., 2015; Deci and Ryan, 2012). Finally, this study contributes to the studies that focus on the role of emotion in an individual's social behaviour in organisations (Ashkanasy and Daus, 2016, 2013), particularly the studies on employees' voluntary participation (Ashkanasy, 2013), their affective commitment and the relationship between these issues and career growth (Ashkanasy, 2015, 2014).

Methodological Contribution

Developing the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we have two methodological contributions to the field of agency-freedom. First, this is the first study that applies a multi-disciplinary theory to agency-freedom studies from several disconnected areas in the humanities, selects the most relevant theory on agency-freedom from each discipline, and finally combines them in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. In this line, the theories that are selected and combined are by Bakhtin (1935) and Berlin (1969) on philosophy of freedom; by Sen (2007, 1990) on economy of decision making; by Weber (1993) on sociology of individual decision-makers in bureaucratic societies; and by Weiner (2010) on psychology of emotions that are generated in the decision-making process. Second, this research builds upon the studies (Tao, 2016, 2013) that use the mixed-method approach towards social enquiry based on critical realist research philosophy to determine an agency-freedom relationship. In this regard, both the individuals' interpretations as well as the existing trends of agency-outcome regarding freedom are investigated, using both qualitative and quantitative methods. In particular, we have several unique methodological advantages. First, our quantitative method is conducted on two large samples ($n=1063$, and $n=4086$) in two different studies on *career choice* and *university major selection*. Second, the survey questionnaires are designed in a way that each participant is required to self-reflect on

her decision from the two worldviews of 'self' and 'other'. Third, based on the result of the factor analysis the agency-oriented factors are tested and amended in two studies. Finally, our case study is particularly novel because it has been accompanied by a coherent methodology for applying the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.

Limitations of the Study

It must be acknowledged that the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has some limitations. First, the impact of decision *side-effects* is not explained in detail on the agent's life trajectory. Hence, the role of chance and/or luck on the agency-freedom relationship is not determined in this version of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. This restriction is because the combinatorics of a decision's side-effects are huge and so it is impractical to deal with through conventional methods within the time boundaries of a PhD thesis. In this line, we have narrowed our analysis to only *one decision cycle* in an agent's life (as shown in case study methodology, we have traced decisions one cycle before and after the focal decision). Second, *capability analysis* needs further enquiry in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. At the moment, we have only analysed two *complementary capabilities* related to one focal decision. This is because focusing on a greater number of capabilities has required us to use Fuzzy Analysis on how the capability set will evolve in time. Using this approach would also exceed the time available for a PhD project. Third, investigating the impact of emotion on the agency-freedom link needs further empirical support and application of additional techniques from neuroscience and psychology. In this regard, the Tri-Modal of Theory of Agency has only opened the path to study the impact of emotion on the agency-freedom linkage. Here, we have found some empirical support only for the emotions in Weiner's (2010) list. In this vein, our theory does not explain how countervailing emotions like pride, shame, sadness, joy and etc. combine in a way that an agent decides to choose an alternative that contradicts some of these drives.

Fourth, an agent's choice lays in etymology of a *cognition-affect* counterbalance in detail with the Tri-Modal theory of Agency. We have acknowledged this limitation in the Emotion and Rationale Black Boxes, but further studies in the field of neuroscience may help to satisfy this inadequacy. However, recent studies on rational-affect association (Damasio et al., 2015; Holmstrom et al., 2014) are not providing comprehensive answers to these questions and it seems that emotional scientists are taking the first steps in this line of enquiry.

Fifth, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency needs further consideration to detect the role of the theme of 'logical reasoning' (see thematic analysis, Chapter 5, Study 1), through the exercising of 'rationalisation' (i.e. when one replaces the sound - in the logical sense - reason

for a convenient one). Instead, the present study has collected data only from the agent's point of view. Hence, we need to expand the evaluation part of our theory by collecting data from third-party observers as well. Further, our proposition regarding the type of reconciling approach that an agent uses to integrated her 'self' with the 'other' worldview is a novel idea and with extra findings it can be presented as an original sub-theory. Finally, a limitation of the present study is its contextual limitation in that it is narrowed to Iran. Due to accessibility issues, the Tri-Modal Theory of agency has been developed and applied in two surveys, several interviews and one case study in Iran. However, these limitations do not prevent the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency from establishing a novel view of the agency-freedom relationship. On the other hand, these restraints call for the following areas for future research on the freedom-agency link.

Recommendations for Future Research

To improve the Tri-Modal of Theory of Agency, we call for future research on the following areas. First, consistent with researchers that have focused on impact of chance on freedom, like Alfred (2015), Garcia Gracia et al. (2015), and Hedgecoe (2015), we call for further research on the impact of decision *consequences/side-effects* on the agency-freedom relationship. In this line, researchers can investigate the following questions "How to capture the impact of more than one decision cycle on agent's freedom"; "How chance and/or luck influence one's agency level", and "How an agent's emotional-rational states change in time and what impact it has on the agent's freedom".

Second, in line with emotion-decision scientists in the field of neuroscience (Damasio et al., 2015), psychology (Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014), robotics (Roberts, 2015) and philosophy (Nussbaum, 2007), we recommend researchers to conduct further empirical studies on the impact of emotion on the agency-freedom relationship. In this regard, researchers can investigate "What are the more reliable data collection tools to explore affectively and cognitively driven *emotions* generated in the past"; "How comprehensive is Weiner's (2010) list of emotions to explain the agency-freedom relationship"; and "How opposing emotions combine to drive an agent towards one certain path". Here, we are repeating what studies with a focus on emotion have acknowledged in the humanities (Holmstrom et al., 2014) and robotic (Roberts, 2015).

Third, in line with research on understanding decisions (e.g. Xie et al., 2015), particularly the studies on counterintuitive decisions (e.g. Tuthill, 2015), we call for further studies on comparing agency levels of the state of being/doing that are an inverse relationship between agency and freedom (i.e. Adverse Functioning (AF), and Beneficial Commanding (BC)). In this line, researchers can address the questions such as "How to rank agency and freedom levels of

AF or BC in relation to each other". These are new areas that are established by the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency and researchers with interest in the areas of person-environment interaction (e.g. Amiot et al., 2012; Bandura, 2015; Ajzen, 2015; Cialdini and Trost, 1998; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005) can benefit from these lines of enquiry.

Fourth, as an study that has developed an Evaluation Instrument to detect the exercising of 'rationalisation' by comparing 'self' and 'other' evaluations in a self-report questionnaire we call for further investigations on the following research questions: "How to recognise if an agent is deceitful about her freedom level in a self-report questionnaire"; "Is there any correlation between one's tendency to exercise rationalisation and her agency level with a focus on freedom"; "Is there any link between rationalisation, rationality types, reconciling approach and values". These research enquiries offer important insights for researchers in the areas of agency and freedom by using our Evaluation Instrument.

Fifth, future studies can use the agentic factor to cluster individuals according to their agency level. This line can include such research questions as: "Are people with certain Weberian (1993) rationality types (i.e. substantive, practical, formal, and theoretical) classifiable in distinguishable agency levels?"; "Do people with substantive rationality enjoy higher level of agency than individuals that have the formal type of rationality?" These enquiries particularly build upon the studies that focus on Weber's (1993) rationality types (e.g. Adler, 2012; Cockerham, 2015; Kalberg, 1980).

Further, future studies can apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in different contexts in order to understand the impact of culture and society on the agency-freedom relationship. Accordingly, researchers can investigate "Are agentic factors valid in different cultures?"; "The extent to which the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is able to explain agency-freedom link in different societies"; and "what is the role of culture in an individual's tendency to make counterintuitive decisions". Finally, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency can be used in the area of psychological wellbeing (e.g. Moscone et al., 2016) to understand the role of agency and freedom on mental health of an individual in a social setting (e.g. work setting). This line can include such research questions as "What is the impact of having expanded agency in all three modes of cognitive, conative and affective on the mental health of workers?", or "Is there any meaningful relationship between having certain rationality types and psychological wellbeing at work setting?"

To conclude, this study has started a new path to clarify the agency-freedom relationship and it ends this research with a call for more research on this area. At the end, we have come to

this understanding of the agency-freedom relationship that *although freedom matters, having agency to give up freedom in pursuit of one's values ought to be the primary aspiration.*

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Coding (Study 1)

Key themes	Sub-themes
<p>1 Logical Reasoning</p>	<p>Actual Sentence Use: This choice is not my priority, but it is still my priority; I cannot leave my belongings and my family, ... I can forget my family and leave the country; I did not want to choose my other options, so I chose this job with full freedom; its wage was very low, no one knows this as a job ... I like this job;</p> <p>Actual Word Use: Choices; And So Or if Forced me; My Priority; Freely; Cost & Benefit Analysis; Better Decision; Right Word; Because; Situation; Completely Free; Low Wage; Satisfied; Need; I was only 19 years old; Age; Free time to study; Earn money;</p>
<p>2 Freedom Awareness</p>	<p>Actual Sentence Use: My other better alternatives; My first priority was to become a professor; I made this decision freely; The situation pushed me to make this decision, but I made a free choice; I cannot fight with all of the things around me; I could have made other choices, but I decide freely; My main alternative was studying for a PhD; My main alternative was becoming a professor in a university abroad; My main alternative was working in my university major; Being a personal tutor is an option, which may not be the first</p>

option but keeps us in contact with society;
I had freedom of choice among a limited number of similar options;
I did not face a closed door among the options I had but there were
not many alternatives;
If I had more options to choose then the gender difference might
become important;
Being a man or woman does not limit your options in this job as a
personal tutor;
In the public sector the priority is with men, but to become a
personal tutor there is no difference;

Actual Word Use:
My First Option;
Other Better Alternatives;
Stanford University;
Good Universities;
Universities Abroad;
University Professor;
Low Ranked Universities;
Better Options;
Leave Other Choices;
Higher Level;
Continue;
First Priority;
Countries' Situation;
Difficult;
Cannot Become;
Situation;
Things around me;
Cannot;
Let me;
I am pushed;
Freely;
Limitation;
Studying for PhD;
Main alternative;
Situation;
Opportunity;
Organisation provides an opportunity;
Forced opportunity;
Available options;
Freedom to choose among limited options;
Not many options;
Contact with society;
Facing a closed door;
Not many alternatives;
Gender difference;
Priority with men;

3 Teleological Reasoning

Actual Sentence Use:
This job had a proper future;
To start show your brother ship then you will be promoted;
When I was student, I imagining myself in the position of my own personal tutor;
I became a personal tutor because I felt job security in this organisation;
I became a personal tutor because this institution has a learning environment;
This job gave me good job experience;
I could not reach my financial goals as a personal tutor;
I did not want to stay in this role but I expect to be promoted after six years;
Since I was a student I like to be a personal tutor;
I liked to give consultancy to students since I was a student myself;
When becoming a personal tutor, I was not thinking about its future;
It was a job that I liked;
I became a personal tutor in order to be in touch with students and give them consultancy;
I could teach them (the students) at home if I was lucky;
Because the other options were not interesting for me at all;
Because I like this job,
I do this with a minimum wage;
I like personal tutorship over other part-time jobs because I like the educational atmosphere;
I think I like the role of Personal Tutor rather than teacher;
If I took Kanoon exams as a student, I could choose a better major and then find a better job;
If I were in my Personal Tutor shoes;
I was thinking about in the past;

Actual Word Use:
Role of personal tutor;
Teaching ability;
Improve myself;
Lead me;
Future;
Dream;
Wish;
Establishing;
Meritocracy in Kanoon;
Environment for my improvement;
Development in my career;
Job security;
General goal;
Preparing myself for something;
Required experience;
Too young;
When I was student;

Value;
Consultancy;
Think about future;
Like;
Financial Source;
Educational Field;
Teaching;
Students;
Class;
Teach at Home;
Consultancy;
Minimum wage;
Role;
I think;
Teacher;
Impact of previous decisions;
Kanoon Exams;
Better major;
Student;

4 First Party
Evaluation

Actual Sentence Use:
A job that ensures you receive a regular salary;
I do not pay attention to what others say;
I try to prove to others that I made a right choice by improving in
my job;
I had the required background as my family is working in Kanoon;
I do not accept many people, only my family;
I believe only in my family;
My concerns are my family's concerns;
I have consulted an expert and he prevented me from starting my
business as a woman;
The female age of entrepreneurship is higher;
My mother had a great role;
My mother forced me to choose an option that leads me towards
stability;
My family directed my university major;
My parents' influence is positive and I accept it;
I can moderate my family's influence but it is a good force;
My family's force leads me towards a good end;
We live in a small city and everyone is curious about your actions
and decisions;
In our small city we have to do things that are required by people in
power;
In other jobs people have better social status;
My interests and freedom to choose are more important than my
social status;

Actual Word Use:
Father;
Mother;
Close Friends;

Public Sector;
Salary;
Insure;
Security;
Prove them;
Different View;
What Others Say;
Required Back Ground;
Family;
Accept people;
Concern;
Problem;
Wisdom;
Influence;
Female;
Age;
Entrepreneurship;
Sharif University;
Leads toward stability;
Family;
Direct;
University major;
Belief;
Since childhood;
Good end;
Positive force;
Push me;
Towards good end;
Social status;
Interest;

5 Third Party
Evaluation

Actual Sentence Use:
Others could not understand me;
Discouraging signals coming from other sources around me;
My father and mother knew me;
My parents always look at me in a good way;
After becoming a personal tutor, others' perceptions of me had
changed;
It seemed that they were saying I made a mistake;
No one knows my interest;
I know myself;
Seeing me from outside they cannot have a correct judgment;
When I entered this role I found out that it was a bit different than I
had imagined it;
After a while I found out that my previous perception was wrong;
All my colleagues are trying to get money from people's children;
This job has difficulties of its own;
The manager above us is not an interesting and kind man at all;
They ask us lots of tasks while the money we got in return is not
enough at all;

I prefer teaching in a good high school rather than a university;
I am forced not to show my different religious beliefs because they
attribute different things to my behaviour;
Compared with other jobs I learn managerial rules as a personal
tutor;
I laugh at those who criticise my decision, because I know better;
They say I made a mistake;
My father was not agreeing;
My family could not stop me from pursuing my interest;
I compare my job with my students' parents' jobs and I see other
jobs are better judged in Iran;
I wish I had chosen a major that suites better the country's social
and economic situation;
When I go for job interviews in the public sector they look at me as
if I was an unemployed person;
When I say what is my major and university, they look at me like I
have done nothing important;
My father and partner have no objection to working as a personal
tutor;
I was lazy and becoming a personal tutor helped me because I had
to work on weekends;
In future decisions I pay more attention to the environment and
how to treat others at work;
I consult with others but I always take the final decision;
My family knew me;
After the environment my personality is important in my decisions;
I do not choose the jobs that my friends always choose;
They knew me;
I am a picky person;
I have special interests;
I prefer to be a good teacher in a high school, rather than being a
professor in a bad university;
In Iran if they have different religious beliefs, it is for themselves
and they do not show it;
In Iran people are forced to adapt the religious beliefs authorised in
the country;
Going to university gives you something that puts you higher than
other students;
I had no other option as I was studying and worked as a personal
tutor;
I do not say luck, but I say God will;
I behaved as it is said in Islam which is true;
No one treats personal tutoring like a proper job;
The public sector does not employ my major easily;
To start a business, you need lots of investment;
Iran's educational system look at my major traditionally;

Actual Word Use:
Discouraging Signal;
Other Sources Around;
Father & Mother;

Parents;
Look at Me;
Perception Toward me;
They were Saying;
Prevent;
General View;
Judgment;
Negatively Evaluated;
Students' Educational Development;
Colleagues;
Getting Money from Peoples' Children;
My Mind;
Priority;
Job;
Difficulties;
Manager;
Kind;
Lots of Tasks;
Corruption;
Lower Degree;
Formalized;
Academic Job;
Iran;
Prefer;
Different Religious Beliefs;
They may Attribute;
My behaviour;
My brother;
Example;
Successful;
Managerial rule;
Criticise my choice;
Others;
Laugh at them;
Agree;
My students' parents' jobs;
Accepted;
Suites;
Social and economic situation;
Valued here;
Unemployed person;
Bad feeling;
Treat;
Husband;
Objection;
I was lazy;
Environment;
Treat others;
Final decision;
Consult with others;
Good Teacher;

Part-time job;
Friend;
Family;
Effort;
Luck;
Ability;

7 Causal Reasoning

Actual Sentence Use:
I have some belongings that I cannot leave;
Because my university lessons were more intense and I could not do a part-time job;
They have passed a law that only those with a PhD degree can become a professor in university;
My belonging to my family did not allow me to leave and go to another country to study;
As I could not find a job related to my major I became a Personal Tutor;
Comparing bad feelings I received from interviews in other organisations, working in Kanoon gave me good feeling;
My previous job was not satisfying and by accident I saw an ad for Personal Tutorship;
I was lazy to start a difficult job;
I had to try harder for other alternatives;

Actual Word Use:
Belonging;
Cannot Leave;
External Force;
Busy Schedule;
Part Time Job;
During That Time;
It was a Good Time;
After Two Years;
When;
More Free Time;
Start Working;
AT the End Of;
Gradually Graduating;
Pass a Law;
PhD;
Master;
Lower Ranked University;
Compare;
My major;
Interesting;
Advertisement;
By accident;
Previous job;
Lazy;
Try harder;

8 Impact of
Commodity

Actual Sentence Use:
The influential factors in my decision definitely are within me.
I chose it because of interest and ability that I felt from within.
I was the best student in our school.
I was hard working with good results at school.
There are so many other better candidates with PhDs from other
countries.
To start working in Kanoon you must first become a Personal Tutor
and show your abilities.
I think this is a free choice.
They interviewed me for this job, so it could be effort.
That means that my interests are also important that I became a
Personal Tutor in Kanoon.
Because of my personality I may not continue the task that I have
started in a perfect way.
I have to work in Kanoon to build up my personality.
One or two days of hopelessness is enough, not more.
To be hired I did not put in any effort.
After the interview I was easily accepted as a Personal Tutor.
The organisation has had a very positive view towards me,
because I had the things that they were looking for.
I did not put in so much effort, but during my job in Kanoon, I was
always working hard.
I was trying hard to stay in Kanoon, when I faced difficulty and was
desperate.
Ability and wisdom are more important than effort. Without thinking
this person cannot enter Kanoon.

Actual Word Use:
Within Me;
Interest;
Ability;
Best Student;
Hard Working;
Talented;
IQ;
Better Candidates;
Hopelessness;
Easily;
Try Hard;
Things They Look for;
Working Hard;
Trying Hard;
Wisdom;
Effort;
Thinking;

9 Correlational

Actual Sentence Used:

Reasoning

At that time, I was 19 years old.
Simultaneously I could choose to work as an engineer.
At that time, I had no experience.
Other people like me decided the same.
I became a Personal Tutor, because I was looking for this job.
I did not have the required job experience to choose another job.
I could not find a job related to my major.
It was because of my major that I end up being a Personal Tutor.
I had no other job opportunity.
Actual Word used:
Simultaneously
At that time
Then
At that age
During that period

10 Impact of
Affective State

Actual Sentence Use:
Because, I am funded by my family and like Iran;
I had a sense of gratitude towards Kanoon;
If it was not for Kanoon, I could not succeed in Concour;
Kanoon helped me and I felt gratitude towards it;
I had to return Kanoon's favour;
I like to;
Helping students satisfies some feeling in me that I like to do this
job;
It was important work in Kanoon, not other places;
I like working in Kanoon;
I want to talk about myself;
I am seeing myself indebted to Kanoon;
Main feeling;
I was hopeful when deciding to become a Personal Tutor;
I made a right choice because I wanted to build up my character;
After some defeats I became helpless;
Working with students in Kanoon is energising;

Actual Word Use:
My Family;
Funded
Iran;
Country;
Belongings;
Feel;
Obligated;
Sense;
Reciprocity;
Feeling;
Gratitude;
Helped me;
Favour;
Help;

Like;
Connected;
Main Feeling;
Hope;
Important;
Build up character;
Hopeless;
Defeat;
Continue;
Personality;
Energizing;

11 Awareness of
Affective State

Actual Sentence Use:
This job helps me to build my character;
I forced myself to stay in this job;
My personality is like when something contradicts with my study, I
get rid of it;
I decided to stay in this job to build up (my character);
I wanted to sit and do a secure job and be relaxed;
I found stability and serenity in Kanoon;
I chose what I liked which was not a right decision;
Others reacted unpleasantly when they found out that I am a
Personal Tutor;
I had to prove them wrong;

Actual Word Use:
Build;
Character;
Help;
Force herself;
Characteristics;
Personality;
Contradict;
Feel;
Stay;
Build up;
Relaxed;
Secure job;
Serenity;
Stability;
Like;
Right;
Choose;
Unpleasant reaction;
Prove them wrong;
Successful;

Appendix 2: Participant Advertisement (Study1)

Dear Sir/Madam,

Thanks for participating in this research, which is a part of my (Parastoo Ghalamchi) doctoral thesis in Brunel Business School. Brunel University and I assure you about the confidentiality of the information you provide for this research, i.e. no natural and legal third party can have access to your information without your permission. The next six questions are about your decision to become a Personal Tutor in this organisation. In particular, these questions try to reveal how *volitional* and *valuable* you think your decision to become a Personal Tutor is. Please read them carefully and answer the questions. If any of these questions seems vague, please mention it in the available box. Finally, please send us your contact information, if you are interested in participating in an interview about the same topic. In this interview we will ask you more questions in detail about the factors influencing you to choose to become a Personal Tutor. We will also send you the interview questions in advance.

Question1

Did you choose to be a Personal Tutor in Kanoon as your number one preference?

Yes

No

I don't know

Question2

If you had an alternative, why did you not choose it? Please explain.

Question3

Did you feel any pressure from any party, when you were deciding to work as a Personal Tutor in Kanoon?

Yes

No

I don't know

Question4

Do you think being a Personal Tutor in Kanoon is beneficial to your career life?

Yes

No

I don't know

Question5

Do you think being a Personal Tutor in Kanoon is beneficial to your personal life?

Yes

No

I don't know

Question6

Do you think being a Personal Tutor in Kanoon will help you achieve your life ambitions?

Yes

No

I don't know

If you are interested in participating in this research and attending an interview related to your

decision to become a Personal Tutor, please fill in the attached questions and include the following contact information and send them to this email: Parastoo.ghalamchi@brunel.ac.uk

Name:

Email Address:

Telephone: