

Has migration been beneficial for migrants and their children? Comparing social mobility of Turks in Western Europe, Turks in Turkey and Western European natives

Carolina V. Zuccotti (c.zuccotti@brighton.ac.uk)
Harry B. G. Ganzeboom (H.B.G.Ganzeboom@vu.nl)
Ayse Guveli (aguveli@essex.ac.uk)

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Abstract

The paper compares the social mobility and status attainment of first and second-generation Turkish migrants with those of natives in nine European destination countries and with Turks in Turkey. The widely used assimilationist approach is complemented by a focus on the benefits (and limitations) of migration, not only in terms of average achievements with respect to those left behind, but also in terms of the possibilities for social mobility. Based on a combined dataset from the European Social Survey (2002-2010) and the European Values Study (2008), the study shows that the children of low class Turkish migrants are more likely to acquire a higher education than their counterparts in Turkey, making them more educationally mobile. Moreover, they are able to use this education in the Western European labour market, an improvement over the first generation Turks. When comparing labour market outcomes of second generation Turks with respect to Turks in Turkey, the results show that the same education leads to a higher occupational status in Turkey, making the occupational ‘gains’ that second generation Turks obtain in Western Europe transform into ‘lags’ with respect to those left behind. Overall, however, the higher social mobility of second generation Turks represents a positive outcome of the migration project in terms of possibilities of leaving an unprivileged context.

INTRODUCTION

In the 1960s and the early 1970s, facilitated by labour import contracts, a number of Western European industries hired Turkish workers. Although migration of Turks was intended to be temporary and contracts were phased out after 1974, many labour migrants stayed, their numbers subsequently bolstered by family reunification and chain migration. Turkish origin residents are now the largest extra-communitarian migrant group in Western Europe.

Much of the research on first and second generation migrants in Europe concerns the integration of the Turkish origin population in destination societies. Such studies centre on educational and labour market achievements of migrants, in comparison to natives and/or other migrant groups (Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado 2007; Crul and Vermeulen 2003 and related articles from the same journal issue; [Euwals, et al. 2007](#); [Heath and Cheung 2007](#); [Heath, Rothon and Kilpi 2008](#); [Kogan 2011](#); [Kristen and Granato 2007](#); [Phalet and Heath 2010](#); [Van De Werfhorst and Van Tubergen 2007](#)). However, this may not be the perspective that migrants themselves find most relevant. People do not move to compete with other groups in the destination society but to improve their life chances – and their children’s – relative to what they would have been in the origin society. In other words, to understand international migration and its effects on those building a life abroad, we must consider social origins. In this paper we do so in two different but equally important ways. First, we compare individuals to their parents by studying intergenerational mobility (or the reverse: intergenerational reproduction) in both education and occupation. Second, we compare Turks who migrated to Western Europe and this group’s second generation to those who stayed in the origin country, Turkey. This latter perspective leads to a counterfactual view of the outcomes of migration: what would the occupational status of first generation Turks, along with the educational and occupational status of their descendants, be had they not migrated to Western Europe?

The overwhelming majority of studies compare migrants and their offspring to natives or to other migrant groups in the destination countries; they trace different forms of assimilation (Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Zhou 1993) and note how ‘ethnic penalties’ (Heath and Cheung 2007) evolve over time and over generations. By way of contrast, our original country-of-origin perspective reveals the benefits (or pitfalls) of migrating in terms of achievements and possibilities for upward social mobility compared to those left behind. We study status attainment and social mobility (or social reproduction) processes among Turks in Turkey, first and second generation Turks in Western Europe, and Western European natives, asking the following research questions: To what extent are social reproduction patterns different for Turks in Western Europe, Turks in Turkey and natives in destination countries? What do these differences suggest in terms of how groups are doing in comparative terms, especially how Turks in Europe are doing with respect to Turks in Turkey?

The analysis draws on a dataset combining the European Social Survey (2002-2010) and European Values Study (2008); data cover Turks in their most common Western European destinations and in Turkey.

TURKS IN WESTERN EUROPE

Social and economic development in Western Europe and Turkey made these two areas into receiving and sending migration regions, respectively, in the early 1960s. While Western Europe’s economic growth after World War II created a need for a low-skilled labour force, its educational expansion decreased the number of low-skilled job seekers. Lacking spontaneous migration from former colonies and with increasing job vacancies in manufacturing, mining, construction and the service industry, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Sweden (countries with the largest Turkish population) looked for new sources of manpower.

A 'guest worker' system was introduced, consisting of formal labour import agreements between these countries and Turkey ([Akgündüz 2008](#)).

At the same time, Turkey was transforming. Between the founding years of the Turkish Republic and the 1960s, Turkey witnessed a dramatic population growth, provoking mass movements from rural to urban areas (Kocaman 2008). Urbanization had increased by 17% in 1935, 42% in 1975 and 70% in 2011 (Karadayi 1974; UNDP 2013). Yet Turkey failed to implement large-scale industrialization; unemployment became an issue, together with other social and economic problems, such as big-city ghettos, segregation and poverty (Kiray 1982). The 'excess labour' – including workers in agriculture and artisans – had to choose between becoming part of the impoverished urban poor or finding another way to maintain their income and wellbeing. Temporary migration to Western Europe appeared a good solution; it even became an option for the urban middle class and low-ranking government officials (Akgündüz 2008).

After labour import contracts ended in 1974, Turks continued to migrate to Western Europe, mainly through family reunion and chain migration. In 1973, the number in Western Europe totalled 1.35 million, of whom 900,000 were workers and 450,000 dependants. In spite of return flows, the Turkish population in Western Europe rose to about 2 million in 1980, 3 million in 2006, and now stands at 4 million (Abadan-Unat 2011; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey 2012; UNDP 2013). As this is based on figures that only include Turkish citizens, there are likely many more persons of Turkish descent. Of the countries cited above, the majority reside in Germany, with substantial numbers in France and the Netherlands and sizeable groups in other Western European countries.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

Practically from the beginning of migration studies, a concern for scholars has been how migrants and their descendants are doing with respect to native or majoritarian populations in destination countries. This concern led to the development of assimilation and segmented assimilation theories (Alba and Nee 1997; Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997), which seek to explain why migrants integrate – or not – into the host society and why they acquire – or not – the same opportunities as the native population over time. The concept of ‘ethnic penalties’ emerged as part of this debate in the European context. It refers to the difference remaining in outcomes between migrants and native populations after background characteristics are taken into account ([Heath and Cheung 2007; Phalet and Heath 2010](#)).

We take a somewhat different approach; for a comprehensive view of the outcomes of migration, we need to compare migrants and their children with those left behind (Guveli, et al. 2015). With the exception of studies related to the ‘selection of migrants’ (Borjas 1987; Dronkers and De Heus 2009; Feliciano 2005) or to earnings (see Massey et al. 1993 for a review), the literature has barely scratched the surface of this issue.

People usually move in search of a better life, specifically when opportunities in destination societies seem better than those at home (or gains are higher than costs) (Sjaastad 1962). It is to be expected, therefore, that migration is usually beneficial for social mobility and career advancement. In fact, one of the main objectives of labour migrants is to improve their own and, more importantly, their children’s life prospects in comparison to those left behind.¹

¹ ‘Left behind’ refers to Turks in Turkey, including those living in rural areas and those in cities (which include those who used to live in rural areas but migrated to urban centres: according to UN statistics, urbanization increased from 42% in 1975 to 73% in 2014). It includes ethnic minorities, such as Kurds, as well. We ran tests (available upon request) showing that comparing Turks in Europe and Turks in Turkey leads to similar results, independently of location and ethnic belonging. Note, however, that – by including social origins in our analysis, a key assumption is that Turks in Europe compare themselves with Turks in Turkey with similar socio-economic backgrounds.

This, in many cases, presupposes a wish for intergenerational improvement, whereby children are better off than their parents.

In what follows, we study educational and occupational attainment, as well as processes of social mobility, for four groups: first generation Turks, that is, Turks born and mostly educated in Turkey who migrated to Western Europe; second generation Turks, that is, Turks born or mostly educated in Western Europe; Turks in Turkey; natives in Western Europe.

Migrants and OED model

To study status attainment and social mobility, we use the OED (Origin-Education-Destination) model, initially developed by Blau and Duncan (1967). This model also serves as a guide for our hypotheses. The OED model (see Figure 1a) follows two forms of reproduction: education and occupation. On the one hand, social origins affect education: parents influence their children by helping them with their homework, sending them to better schools or paying for extra-curricular help (OE). On the other hand, social origins affect occupation (destination) both directly and indirectly. In the latter indirect effect, high status families more successfully position their children in higher education than low status families (OE), and education has a value in the labour market, influencing occupational outcomes (ED). In the former, social origins directly affect occupation (OD) in a number of ways: parents influence their children by giving them job advice, helping them look for a job, providing economic resources (including the transmission of a family business), transferring ability and cognitive skills, offering social and relational aptitudes and supplying a wide range of networks and connections.

We assume each of the three main components of the OED model may play out differently for each group we consider. This is expressed in arrows A1-A3 in Figures 1b and 1c; these include the group variable (G): Turks in Turkey, first and second generation Turks and Western European natives. We expect to find different social reproduction patterns among the

groups. Arrow A1 in Figure 1b expresses differences in educational reproduction (OE); arrow A2 in Figure 1c expresses differences in the direct effect of parental background on occupation (OD); arrow A3 expresses differences in returns to education (ED).




Figure 1b and 1c also show ‘average group effects’ for education (GE) and occupation (GD), that is, differences created because of specific characteristics of the groups (or processes deriving from those characteristics). In the literature comparing migrants with native populations, these average group effects are usually referred to ‘ethnic penalties’ (i.e., to the detriment of the migrants). These ‘unexplained differences’ between groups are often attributed to discrimination (Heath and Cheung 2006; Wrench and Modood 2000), but other possible factors include cultural values, lack of networks, poor language skills, etc. In our analysis,

‘average groups effects’ might also refer to differences between migrants and Turks in Turkey: for example, those who leave may be more motivated and risk-taking than those who stay, giving them a gross advantage in destination countries over those left behind. An important characteristic of our model is that by assuming differences in social reproduction across groups, we may find these ‘unexplained differences’ actually occur only (or to a greater/lesser extent) for some educational levels or certain social backgrounds, indicating the existence of varied explanatory mechanisms. This is better understood with an example. Looking at the UK, some studies (Platt 2007; Zuccotti 2015a) find Caribbeans with lower class backgrounds are less penalized in the labour market than those with higher class backgrounds. This might suggest, for example, that discrimination based on skin colour – an ‘average effect’ – does not serve as an explanatory mechanism; in addition, Caribbeans with higher class parental backgrounds may lack specific ‘high class resources’ (ways of behaving and talking, social networks, etc.) necessary to achieve certain qualified occupations.

By following the OED model, we look at differences between groups by studying processes of social reproduction: we explore how OE, ED and OD relationships vary for each group and how this affects average differences between Turks in Europe and Turks in Turkey/European natives.

Mechanisms and hypotheses

In what follows, we use the OED model to derive our hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 refers to first generation Turks and discusses only occupational outcomes; hypotheses 2a and 2b refer to second generation Turks and discuss both educational and occupational outcomes. A summary of all hypotheses appears in Table 1.

Table 1: Hypotheses		
Generation	Outcome studied	Hypothesis
<i>First</i>	Occupation	1. Weaker effect of parental background (OD) and lower returns to education (ED) compared to Turks in Turkey and WE natives
<i>Second</i>	Education	2.a. Weaker effect of parental background (OE) compared to Turks in Turkey and WE natives
	Occupation	2.b. Weaker effect of parental background (OD) compared to Turks in Turkey and WE natives

Hypothesis 1 (first generation)

Our first expectation is that social reproduction with respect to the occupational status of first generation Turks will differ from that of Turks in Turkey and Western European (WE) natives in two respects. First, we expect parents of the former to be less influential (OD) than the parents of the latter two; second, we expect migrants to have lower returns to education (ED), that is, higher educational levels give them less occupational status.

We expect a weaker effect of parental background on occupations (OD) for migrants because when migrating, first generation migrants leave their parents behind, and with them, resources affecting their occupations. As for the relationship between education and labour market outcomes (ED), the literature consistently shows the educational qualifications of international migrants are not always recognized; hence, they do not have the same effect on occupational outcomes as they do for individuals seeking jobs in their own country (Algan, et al. 2010; Chiswick and Miller 2007; Heath and Cheung 2007; Johnston, et al. 2010; Kalter, Granato and Kristen 2007; Kogan 2006; Van Tubergen, Maas and Flap 2004).

How first generation Turks do with respect to Turks in Turkey will depend on the differences in the role of education and parental background in Western Europe and Turkey. For example, although depending less on parental resources might be detrimental for migrants

whose parents have high social backgrounds, it might be better for those who have left their lower social class parental backgrounds behind, as is the case for most first generation migrant Turks. As regards the role of education, the match between educational credentials and labour market will probably be less for first generation Turks with a Turkish diploma looking for a job in the Western European labour market than for Turks searching for a job in Turkey. While in terms of income and employment, migrants may find better chances outside their home country, a weaker match between education and occupation might give an overall advantage to Turks in Turkey, especially among those with higher educational levels. Finally, we need to consider unmeasured factors, for example, discrimination in the Western European labour market, which might give an overall advantage to Turks in Turkey; or a very high motivation among migrants, which might give an overall advantage to Turks in Western Europe.

Hypotheses 2a and 2b (second generation)

There is much debate about the fortunes of the children of migrants. Although some studies say disadvantages might persist over generations (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997) or social mobility might be ‘blocked’ (Pichler 2011), others expect an improvement over time; more importantly, the children of migrants are likely to do better than their parents (Alba and Nee 1997; Alba and Nee 2003), especially when arriving parents have low social backgrounds (Zhou, et al. 2008), as in the Turkish case.

We hypothesize the children of Turks will not only do better than their parents but will be less dependent on them in terms of education and occupation than Turks in Turkey (and, presumably, natives in Western Europe). We expect to find lower social reproduction levels for Turks in Western Europe than for Turks in Turkey; we expect these to be mainly the product of higher educational mobility (weaker OE) (*hypothesis 2a*) and, to a lesser extent, of a weaker direct effect of parental occupation on individuals’ occupation (OD) (*hypothesis 2b*).

Furthermore, as a consequence of *hypothesis 2a*, we expect second generation Turks to be in a better position than those left behind in terms of education.

Migrants want better lives for their children and will invest in them ([Dustmann 2008](#)). In fact, there is evidence of educational mobility among second generation migrants (see Heath, Rethon and Kilpi 2008 for a review). A German study shows the influence of the father's education on the chances of children reaching the *Abitur* is smaller for second generation Turks than for natives (Kristen and Granato 2007). While this implies a higher parental education is less of an advantage for Turks than for natives, it also suggests a low starting point – common among the descendants of Turkish migrants – might not be as detrimental for Turks.

Motivation and high parental aspirations are often used to explain educational mobility among ethnic minorities (Heath, Rethon and Kilpi 2008); there is evidence that the parents of second generation Turks have particularly high aspirations for their children (Abadan-Unat 2011). If so, a lower dependence on the (usually low) parental background among Turks in Western Europe means better educational outcomes compared to those left behind. A recent study shows Turkish children in Europe perform better (higher PISA test scores) than children in Turkey, given equal parental backgrounds (Dustmann, Frattini and Lanzara 2012).

Regarding occupational outcomes, the OED model shows the parental effect on occupation is mediated by the role of education: for second generation Turks, and in line with previous findings on social mobility of ethnic minorities (see for example Platt 2007; Zuccotti 2015a), we expect education attainment to be the main channel for social mobility. However, we also suggest the parental pressure to do well in the destination country might be expressed in the direct encouragement to find a good job and progress in a career; this will be reflected in a weaker direct effect of (the relatively low) parental class on children's occupations (OD). Although entrepreneurship among Turks might be a way to keep the relationship between

parents and children strong, the number of entrepreneurial parents in our sample is small compared to the number in manual jobs.

In determining how well Turks in Western Europe do compared to those left behind in terms of occupation, if educational mobility is higher for the former, and this is, in turn, translated into better positions in the labour market, Turks in Europe will probably be advantaged (especially those with lower social backgrounds). However, if ‘ethnic penalties’ are present for the second generation – expressed, for example, in discrimination – this might moderate the (expected) advantage over those left behind. The low performance for second generation migrants is acknowledged by studies exploring access to higher status jobs (Crul and Doornik 2003; Heath and Cheung 2007; Heath, Rethon and Kilpi 2008; Kogan 2006; Silberman, Alba and Fournier 2007; Simon 2003). Yet most do not consider parental background in their models, generating a possible bias in their conclusions, as in the UK case (Zuccotti 2015a).

DATA AND MEASUREMENT

Our analysis uses the European Social Survey (ESS 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010) and one round of the European Values Study (EVS 2008). Taken together, these six surveys cover almost all European populations and Turkey, making it possible to compare Turkish migrants (and their descendants), Turkish non-migrants and Western European natives. While primarily social attitudes surveys, ESS and EVS stand out for their detailed inventory of migration status, with questions on country of birth of respondents and their parents, period of arrival, nationality and language spoken at home. Both have relatively good information on parents’ educations and occupations and respondents’ corresponding status. There are minor differences in how data are collected and processed, both between ESS and EVS and between ESS rounds.

Our four main comparison groups are: Turks in Turkey; Turks in Western Europe, comprising first generation (born *and* mostly educated in Turkey) and second generation (born *or* mostly educated in Western Europe); natives in Western Europe. For ESS 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010 and EVS, we consider Turks as those individuals interviewed in Western Europe who were born in Turkey, or have at least one parent born in Turkey (more than 90% have two parents born in Turkey) or have Turkish citizenship. For ESS 2002, we define Turks as those who speak Turkish as a first or second language, are Turkish citizens or were born in Turkey. ESS 2002 only asks for the *continent* of birth for parents, an ambiguous measure, as 12% of Turks live in the European part of Turkey. Western European natives and Turks in Turkey are those who, along with their parents, were born in one of the Western European countries in our sample or in Turkey, respectively. We restrict our analysis to nine countries where Turkish migrants are found by ESS or EVS: Germany, the Netherlands, France, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. We exclude Bulgaria and Greece because persons of Turkish descent in these countries are generally not labour migrants; we exclude Luxembourg because it has few Turks. All countries are available in both surveys and all rounds, except Austria, which is not available in ESS 2008 and 2010, and Turkey, which is not available in ESS 2002, 2006 and 2010. Information on the total number of respondents per survey/round and country appears in Table S1, in the online version of this article.

Although ESS and EVS are part of large-scale projects with standardized procedures for collecting data, for which comparability is respected, a possible weakness is the representation of migrants, including Turks. For example, as questionnaires are only in the language of the country, less educated and more recent migrants may be underrepresented in the sample. Three comments on this: first, although we are studying first and second generations, the crucial comparisons are with the latter group, as their outcomes express longer-term processes of integration and are more interesting when compared to Western European natives and Turks in

Turkey. Second, even if only the better-off Turks (in terms of education and occupation) are present in the sample, we are making use of a crucial variable to control for this: parental background. Finally, our results go in the same direction as those of a previous cross-national study on ‘ethnic penalties’ (Heath and Cheung 2007). Specifically, when looking at access to managerial and professional occupations (I and II in the EGP class scheme)² for second generation Turks and Western European natives (only in ESS rounds) and controlling for age and education, we find a negative effect – or ‘ethnic penalty’ – for second generation Turks compared to natives.

Our criterion for defining first and second generation Turks is place of education. We use a ‘majority’ rule whereby individuals are assigned to the first generation if they were born *and* completed most of their education (>50%) in Turkey and to the second generation if they were born *or* mostly educated in Western Europe. For individuals born in Turkey, the differentiation between first and second generations uses the person’s age, age of arrival in the destination country, and estimated age when education was finished. We approximate the years of education necessary to finish a certain educational level, assuming individuals enter the educational system at age six.³ For example, a person who finished upper secondary education (around age 18) and emigrated at age 15 is considered to have done most of his/her studies in Turkey but if emigrating at age 10 is considered to have done the majority in Western Europe. This variable is easily constructed in ESS 2010 and EVS, as they collect the precise age of arrival. For other rounds, the variable was approximated.⁴

² We created the service class using syntax in: <http://www.harryganzeboom.nl/isco88/index.htm>.

³ Following UNESCO (2006) age limits are: not completed primary education (6-9 years old); primary education or first stage of basic education (6-12 years old); lower secondary or second stage of basic education (6-15 years old); (upper) secondary education (6-18 years old); post-secondary non-tertiary education (6-20 years old); first stage of tertiary education (6-22 years old); second stage of tertiary education (6-26 years old). When ISCED is missing, we use the declared years of education.

⁴ Instead of the exact variable, we use crude categories: arrived last year; between 1 and 5 years; between 6 and 10 years; between 11 and 20 years; and 21 years and more. For the first two categories, we assume education was mostly done in Turkey. For the latter three, we *approximate* the likelihood of having finished more than 50% of education in the country of destination by creating a continuous variable running from 0 to 1. Consider a 23-year old person with primary education who emigrated between 11 and 20 years ago. This person studied between the

Table 2 shows the distribution of the four comparison groups by survey/year and destination country. The proportion of first and second generation Turks is similar in all data sources. Note: although our respondents are disproportionately situated in Germany, Turks in Germany are underrepresented (when compared to Turkish figures);⁵ this is the logical consequence of the ESS sampling design.

	Turks in Turkey	Turk 1 st	Turk 2 nd	WE Natives
Survey/round				
ESS1	0.0	18.4	16.5	19.7
ESS2	29.4	18.8	19.9	19.0
ESS3	0.0	16.7	18.2	18.8
ESS4	35.3	17.5	15.2	15.4
ESS5	0.0	15.8	18.9	14.4
EVS	35.3	12.8	11.4	12.8
Country				
Austria	0.0	8.5	13.1	8.7
Belgium	0.0	9.4	10.4	10.2
Switzerland	0.0	18.4	10.1	8.8
Germany	0.0	26.9	36.0	16.5
Denmark	0.0	6.8	5.4	10.8
France	0.0	2.6	4.0	10.6
Netherlands	0.0	15.4	14.5	12.1
Norway	0.0	4.7	1.3	11.7
Sweden	0.0	7.3	5.1	10.7
Turkey	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	2198	234	297	55329

* The sample is restricted to individuals with valid ISEI, education and parents' ISEI.

ages of 6 and 13 and arrived in Western Europe between the ages of 3 and 12 (approximate values). In total, primary studies take around 7 years. If the person emigrated at 10, 11 or 12 years old, we assume he/she completed most education in Turkey (at least 4 years out of 7). If the person emigrated at 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9 years old, we consider most studies were completed in Western Europe. S/he receives a value of 7/10 (or 0.7): in 7 out of the 10 possible ages of arrival, s/he did most of his/her education in Western Europe. This continuous variable is later dichotomized: those with values up to 0.5 are assigned to the first generation, those higher than 0.5 to the second generation (around 30% of all Turks have intermediate values).

⁵ Ministry of Labour and Social Security (Abadan-Unat 2011).

The time of arrival is a key piece of information. The vast majority of the first generation Turks in our data (around 70%) arrived in 1980 or later, probably migrating as part of family reunion or chain migration processes. Among second generation Turks born in Turkey rather than the destination country (36%), around 78% arrived before 1980, thus living more than 20 years in the destination country.⁶

Respondents and their parents' educational qualifications are measured with the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-97), which ranges from 0 (incomplete primary) to 6 (postgraduate level of tertiary education). We scale these into approximate years of education⁷ and replace the missing cases with the declared years of education completed (for respondents only). We prefer qualifications scaled by duration over stated duration, following Hout and DiPrete (2006). In EVS, only the father's education is collected, except for households headed by single mothers. For parents in ESS, we consider the maximum value of father and mother. In all surveys, the reference time for parental information (and occupation) is when the respondent is 14 years old.

Respondents' occupations (current or last) are measured with the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), available for all countries and years: these have been transformed into the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996), which varies between 16 and 90. For parental occupations, in EVS the respondent is asked about the father's occupation (for single mother households, the mother's occupation) and in ESS, both the father and mother's occupation. In all surveys, ISCO codes are available for most cases, but ESS also has crude self-classification scores, which are converted into their approximate ISCO equivalent. For ESS, we convert both detailed ISCO and crude measures

⁶ Values refer to individuals with valid ISEI, education and parents' ISEI.

⁷ Not completed primary education (3.25 years); primary education or first stage of basic education (6.5 years); lower secondary or second stage of basic education (9.5 years); (upper) secondary education (13 years); post-secondary non-tertiary education (14.25); first stage of tertiary education (16.5 years); second stage of tertiary education (20.5 years).

into ISEI scores (for father and mother); we then take the average between both ISEI versions (for father and mother); finally, we consider the maximum value between both parents.

Analysis is based on OLS regressions, with separate models for men and women. Educational attainment covers people between 25 and 65, while occupational attainment covers those from 18 to 65. We exclude those older than 65, given the very few older Turks in Western Europe.

ANALYSIS

Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables broken down by comparison group and gender. Parental education and occupational status are higher for first generation Turks than those who stayed behind; this also applies to their education. These values point to a positive selection of Turks in Western Europe. As for occupational status, despite differences in education and parental backgrounds favouring migrants, first generation Turks have either similar (men) or lower (women) occupational status than their counterparts in Turkey. Unlike Turks in Turkey, the first generation maintain the level of their parents' occupational statuses. Finally, we observe an important gap in ISEI when comparing them to natives in Western Europe, as most previous literature has shown.

Table 3 reveals second generation Turks have clearly moved up the educational hierarchy relative to those left behind and to their parents but have not quite reached the level of Western European natives. For occupational status, second generation Turks are collectively quite mobile relative to their parents and are approaching (but not quite reaching) the level of Western European natives. Despite their higher levels of education, the occupational status of second generation male Turks is only slightly higher than those left behind, while the women have even lower status than their compatriots at home. Note: in Turkey, the number of women with a valid ISEI score – implying they are either currently employed or have been in the past

– is much smaller (N=658). While in Turkey, more than 70% of women have never worked (or do not declare so in this survey), in Western Europe, this drops to around 18% for second generation Turkish women. In addition, lower educated women are most likely to be out of the labour market in Turkey (figure available upon request).

Table 3: Descriptive statistics by comparison group and gender (means)

	Men				Women			
	Turks in Turkey	Turks 1 st	Turks 2 nd	WE Natives	Turks in Turkey	Turks 1 st	Turks 2 nd	WE Natives
Parents' education	6.4	7.9	9.2	11.6	6.2	8.5	8.7	11.5
Education	9.5	10.7	12.3	13.6	7.9	10.2	11.9	13.4
Parents' ISEI	30.8	34.3	33.8	43.7	33.1	33.6	32.4	43.5
ISEI	36.3	35.8	38.1	46.0	42.0	31.8	39.9	44.6
Age	39.1	41.2	31.1	43.4	34.9	39.3	29.5	43.5
<i>Total 25-60*</i>	1549	152	123	24685	1963	100	88	25796
<i>Total 18-60**</i>	1540	154	170	27273	658	80	127	28050
<i>Total 18-60***</i>	1890	162	190	28605	2382	110	155	29606

* Total population 25-60 with valid education and parents' education & ISEI (total for the first two percentage rows)

** Total population 18-60 with valid education, ISEI and parents' ISEI (total for the last three percentage rows)

*** Total population 18-60 with valid education and parents' ISEI

Tables 4 and 5 show the results of the regression models for education and occupation for the four comparison groups, differentiated by gender. The age of the respondent is set at 35; the independent variables (parents' education and occupation, respondents' education) are standardized into z-scores so they have equal standard deviations, making the coefficients comparable across equations.⁸ All models control for survey/year dummies (not shown). Although we are interested in the average situation of Turks in Western Europe, we explore country effects by adding country dummies (see Tables S2 and S3). The models with country dummies are very similar to the ones presented below.⁹ For the purposes of this paper and ease

⁸ Although group distributions are different, the results are the same with non-standardized coefficients.

⁹ We find some country differences. Regarding educational outcomes, only the Austrian case is different from the rest: here second generation Turks do not seem to gain an educational advantage over those left behind. The results on occupational attainment show Turks in Germany (especially the first generation) are particularly disadvantaged

of interpretation, we discuss the tables without country dummies. Finally, Figures 2a-3b add graphical evidence to key findings in Tables 4 and 5: Figures 2a and 2b show educational mobility for the various groups (based on Models 3a and 3b from Table 4); Figures 3a and 3b show returns to education (based on Models 4a and 4b from Table 5).¹⁰

Table 4: Education (years) by comparison group (ref.=Turks in Turkey), parents' education (PEDUC), parents' ISEI (PISEI) and age1 (men and women 25-65). Models control for survey/round².

	Men			Women		
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 3b
Constant	9.74 (0.09)***	11.46 (0.09)***	12.55 (0.14)***	8.40 (0.08)***	10.18 (0.08)***	11.52 (0.13)***
Turks 1 st	1.40 (0.27)***	0.80 (0.24)***	0.28 (0.34)	2.47 (0.32)***	1.68 (0.29)***	0.41 (0.36)
Turks 2 nd	2.77 (0.30)***	2.00 (0.27)***	0.40 (0.32)	3.70 (0.34)***	3.11 (0.31)***	1.98 (0.37)***
WE Natives	4.45 (0.09)***	2.25 (0.08)***	1.14 (0.14)***	6.07 (0.08)***	3.91 (0.08)***	2.57 (0.13)***
PEDUC		1.30 (0.02)***	2.23 (0.09)***		1.24 (0.02)***	2.31 (0.09)***
Turk 1 st * PEDUC			-0.23 (0.27)			-0.98 (0.28)***
Turk 2 nd * PEDUC			-1.91 (0.28)***			-0.74 (0.31)**
WE Natives * PEDUC			-0.97 (0.10)***			-1.13 (0.09)***
PISEI		0.40 (0.02)***	0.40 (0.02)***		0.44 (0.02)***	0.40 (0.02)***
Age	-0.04 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00)**	-0.00 (0.00)**	-0.07 (0.00)***	-0.04 (0.00)***	-0.04 (0.00)***
<i>Adj. R</i> ²	0.11	0.28	0.28	0.21	0.36	0.37
<i>N</i>	26509	26509	26509	27947	27947	27947

¹ The values are B-coefficients (SE) from OLS regressions. PEDUC and PISEI are z-scores and AGE centered at 35. *** p-value<0.01 ** p-value<0.05 * p-value<0.10

² The constant refers to Turks in Turkey in EVS.

in terms of occupational status compared to Turks in Turkey; the opposite is observed in Austria and The Netherlands.

¹⁰ Predicted values in Figures 2a-3b refer to individuals who are 35 years old; variables not observed in the figures are set to the mean. To construct the figures, we use margins and marginsplot commands in STATA (version 12.1).

Table 5: Occupation (ISEI) by comparison group (ref.=Turks in Turkey), education (PEDUC), parents' ISEI (PISEI) and age¹ (men and women 18-65). Models control for survey/round².

	Men				Women			
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a	Model 4a	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 3b	Model 4b
Constant	35.63 (0.46)***	45.42 (0.40)***	40.52 (0.59)***	44.34 (0.55)***	41.76 (0.65)***	47.94 (0.56)***	45.45 (0.76)***	48.08 (0.70)***
Turk 1 st	-0.52 (1.38)	-3.57 (1.16)***	-2.35 (1.55)	-4.32 (1.49)***	-10.21 (1.89)***	-11.03 (1.63)***	-11.26 (2.15)***	-13.05 (2.02)***
Turk 2 nd	3.07 (1.32)**	-2.05 (1.11)*	0.40 (1.59)	-2.70 (1.45)*	-2.08 (1.55)	-3.40 (1.33)**	-3.32 (1.98)*	-5.17 (1.82)***
WE Natives	9.36 (0.44)***	-2.65 (0.39)***	4.10 (0.57)***	-1.60 (0.54)***	2.83 (0.64)***	-5.83 (0.56)***	-0.88 (0.75)	-5.95 (0.69)***
PISEI		3.21 (0.09)***	6.19 (0.50)***	2.34 (0.47)***		2.57 (0.09)***	5.10 (0.69)***	1.11 (0.65)*
Turk 1 st * PISEI			-0.76 (1.44)	2.04 (1.30)			-1.51 (1.96)	0.28 (1.87)
Turk 2 nd * PISEI			-4.12 (1.63)**	-1.11 (1.46)			-3.21 (2.00)	-0.20 (1.82)
WE Natives * PISEI			-0.68 (0.51)	0.89 (0.48)*			-0.39 (0.70)	1.50 (0.66)**
EDUC		8.34 (0.09)***		7.89 (0.33)***		7.76 (0.09)***		9.54 (0.46)***
Turk 1 st * EDUC				-3.29 (1.04)***				-3.88 (1.61)**
Turk 2 nd * EDUC				-1.51 (1.39)				-3.41 (1.44)**
WE Natives * EDUC				0.55 (0.34)				-1.83 (0.47)***
Age	0.13 (0.01)***	0.21 (0.01)***	0.22 (0.01)***	0.21 (0.01)***	-0.01 (0.01)	0.11 (0.01)***	0.06 (0.01)***	0.11 (0.01)***
Adj. R ²	0.03	0.32	0.13	0.32	0.00	0.26	0.08	0.26
N	29137	29137	29137	29137	28915	28915	28915	28915

¹ The values are B-coefficients (SE) from OLS regressions. EDUC and PISEI are z-scores and AGE centered at 35.

*** p-value<0.01 ** p-value<0.05 * p-value<0.10.

² The constant refers to Turks in Turkey in EVS.

Table 4 shows *first generation Turks* have significantly higher levels of education than Turks in Turkey (the reference group in all models) (Models 1a and 1b, Table 4); this difference remains statistically significant even after controlling for parental background (Models 2a and 2b). Although we do not focus on educational outcomes of first generations in our theoretical background and hypotheses, it is interesting to note they are a positively selected group (Models 2a and 2b) and are disadvantaged when compared to Western European natives. Model 3b adds an interaction between parental education and group; it reveals the education of first generation Turkish women depends less on their parents' education (expressed by the negative interaction effect), than does the education of those remaining in Turkey. This leads to a relative advantage for the migrants when considering those with lower parental education (Figure 2b). The results show Turkey is a much less mobile society in terms of education than Western European countries: the steeper line in Figures 2a and 2b reveals the education of individuals depends more on their parents' education.

Following the first generation into the Western European labour market (Table 5), we find first generation Turkish women have lower occupational attainment than Turks in Turkey and Western European natives, while men are only disadvantaged with respect to the latter (Models 1a and 1b). After controlling for background characteristics (education plays the major role), the effect for first generation Turkish men becomes significantly negative, denoting a disadvantage with respect to Turks in Turkey; a similar effect is seen for women, but they experience a larger disadvantage in general. Note the change in the effect for Western European natives (from positive to negative) implying that, given equal background conditions (again the effect is driven by education), a higher occupation is obtained in Turkey. This makes the difference between first generation Turks and Turks in Turkey larger than the difference between the former and Western European natives (Models 2a and 2b).

For social reproduction processes (see interaction effects between parental occupation and group in Models 3a and 3b), we do not find statistically significant results, although the negative interaction effect points to a lower dependence of first generation Turks on parental occupation than Turks in Turkey. This is mainly driven by lower returns to education (see interaction effects between education and group in Models 4a and 4b) – as partially expected in *hypothesis 1* – for first generation Turks compared to Western European natives and Turks in Turkey, particularly for women (returns to education are the highest in Turkey). These results are better observed in Figures 3a and 3b. Here we see the higher the educational level, the higher the difference between first generation Turks and Turks in Turkey. For example, the prediction for men with 12 years of education is 39 ISEI points for first generation Turks and 42 ISEI points for Turks in Turkey; this 3-point difference rises to 6 points for individuals with 15 years of education. Figure 3b also shows gaps are larger among women: comparisons of individuals with 12 years of education show a gap of 12 points in ISEI; the gap for 15 years of education is 15. However, fewer women have (or have had) a job in Turkey, pointing to possible selection mechanisms for this group.

Thus, on average, migration to Europe has not given an occupational advantage to most first generation Turks over those left behind. Although we do not find a weaker direct effect of parental background on occupations (OD), we find (*hypothesis 1*) both men and women experience lower returns to education (ED) in the destination countries, making those with relatively higher education more disadvantaged compared to Turks in Turkey and Western European natives. The gap is even larger when comparing first generation women with their counterparts in Turkey, suggesting differences in Western European and Turkish labour markets in terms of the value of education (the disadvantage practically disappears for lower educated men).

Moving to the *second generation Turks*, Table 4 shows, on average (after controlling for age), second generation Turkish men and women are more educated than their counterparts in Turkey but less educated than Western European natives (Models 1a and 1b). When controlling for parental education and occupation (Models 2a and 2b), differences from Western European natives vanish for men, but remain statistically significant for women, although differences between the genders in educational achievement are neither large nor statistically significant (tests available upon request). Meanwhile, the positive difference with Turks in Turkey remains. Models 3a and 3b show second generation Turks are more educationally mobile than Turks in Turkey (and compared to Western European natives). Going to Figures 2a and 2b, we observe men and women who have parents with lower educational levels (the majority of Turks in Western Europe) are particularly advantaged. For example, while the predicted education for a male Turk in Turkey with parents averaging 6 years of education is 10 years of education, for a second generation Turk, it is 12. Women are similarly advantaged among those with higher educational levels. This result confirms *hypothesis 2a*: the majority of second generation Turks are doing better in terms of education than Turks in Turkey, with a weaker parental effect on education (OE) the main driver.

In Table 5, Models 1a and 1b (which only control for age) show, on average, the occupational status of the second generation has improved compared to the first generation, likely related to their educational improvements in the destination country. When we compare them to Turks in Turkey, we observe an advantage for men. Nevertheless, the status of the second generation remains lower than among Western European natives. After controlling education and parental background (Models 2a and 2b), similarly to what was observed for the first generation, second generation Turks are now disadvantaged with respect to Turks in Turkey. At the same time, differences with Western European natives vanish.¹¹ In other words,

¹¹ Previous studies (see Heath and Cheung 2007) find ethnic penalties for second generation Turks in access to the service class. We calculate this for the five ESS rounds/years (see footnote 2); when controlling for age and

although second generation Turks may have improved their situation in the destination country, under equal conditions, they may have had a better occupational status in Turkey.

For occupational mobility, Models 3a and 3b of Table 5 show the total contribution of parental occupation, before the mediation of the level of education. For second generation Turks, the parental background is much less important in determining occupational achievements than for Turks in Turkey or for Western European natives. This can be seen in the negative – and substantive – interaction coefficients for this group (although for women differences are not statistically significant). When education is added (Models 4a and 4b), the difference in the effect of parental occupation reduces substantially for both genders, showing the strong mediating role of education in intergeneration reproduction; however, it becomes statistically non-significant, not giving good evidence of *hypothesis 2b*. Looking at the returns to education, we see the effect of education is smaller for second generation Turks than for Turks in Turkey, although results are statistically significant only for women. When these results are plotted in Figure 3, both men and women, particularly the latter, are more disadvantaged with respect to Turks in Turkey (and to Western European natives) at higher educational levels. For example, while among women with 12 years of education the gap between second generation Turkish women and women in Turkey is 4 points in ISEI in favour of the latter, among those with 15 years of education the gap jumps to 7.

All in all, the second generation is doing better than the first generation in terms of occupation and is integrating into the European labour market. These Turks are much less dependent on their parents' background, especially in terms of education (OE), allowing them to reach higher educational levels and get better jobs. Migration, thus, gives an initial advantage

education, there is a significant negative effect for second generation Turks compared to native Western Europeans (pooled men and women). The same model for ISEI shows a negative but non-significant effect; thus, the study of 'ethnic penalties' based on ISEI draws a more favourable picture of second generation Turks in Western Europe than studies based on access to the service class. When the class of origin is introduced in both models, the negative effect disappears, showing the relatively lower parental background of second generation Turks helps explain differences with natives (see Zuccotti 2015b for a discussion on this).

to the descendants of those with lower social backgrounds, since the children can separate their outcomes from their origins. This general advantage in terms of occupation vanishes once we control for education. In fact, in Turkey, education has an overall greater value when accessing occupations, compared to Western Europe.¹² Consequently, even if second generation Turks are not disadvantaged with respect to Western European natives in equality of education, they have lower occupational statuses than Turks in Turkey, on average. For women, there are higher returns to education (ED) in Turkey, compared to both Western European natives and second generation Turks; this increases the gap among the higher educated. A similar pattern is observed for first generation women (remember, however, working women in Turkey are a much more selective group).

¹² This is an average Western European effect. Note: it is mainly driven by Germany, the country with the most Turks.

Figure 2a: Education by parents' education; men.




Figure 2b: Education by parents' education; women.






Figure 3a: ISEI by education; men.



Confidence intervals: p-value < .10; based on Model 4a from Table 5.

Figure 3b: ISEI by education; women.



Confidence intervals: p-value < .10; based on Model 4b from Table 5.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Many studies on migrants' integration in Western Europe look for evidence of 'ethnic penalties' by comparing migrants with native populations in various outcomes, including education and occupation. We select an alternative perspective, focusing on social origins and looking at those left behind. Improving with respect to parents and to those remaining in the origin country is, we believe, a priority for migrants who move for economic reasons. This perspective also allows a counterfactual question: what would have happened to migrants and their offspring had they decided to stay? Main findings are summarized in Table 6.

Table 6: Summary of findings		
Generation	Outcome studied	Main findings
<i>First</i>	Occupation	First generation Turks in Western Europe are disadvantaged in terms of occupation with respect to Turks in Turkey, and this is especially strong among the higher educated, as expected from <i>Hypothesis 1</i> : for Turks in Turkey (as for WE natives), education has a greater value in the labour market.
<i>Second</i>	Education	Second generation Turks in Western Europe reach higher educational levels as compared to those left behind; this is thanks to higher (upward) educational mobility, as expected from <i>Hypothesis 2a</i> .
	Occupation	Second generation Turks in Western Europe are disadvantaged in terms of occupation with respect to Turks in Turkey, in particular highly educated women; this is mainly because in Turkey education has a greater value in the labour market. We do not find strong evidence of lower OD effect, as expected from <i>Hypothesis 2b</i> .

Overall, for first generation Turks, migration has led to lower occupational status than they would have obtained in Turkey. Their poor performance in the destination countries is no surprise; economic gains, mainly in terms of money, are an important part of the motivation to move, but this often implies sacrifices in occupational status. Their lower returns to education as compared to those of Turks in Turkey and Western European natives (*hypothesis 1*) might

indicate a lack of recognition of their educational credentials, along with discrimination and difficulties in the labour market. Moreover, the difference between first generation Turks and Turks in Turkey is amplified by characteristics of the Turkish labour market itself. On the one hand, given equal education and parental background, in Turkey it is possible to attain higher occupations than in Western Europe, on average. On the other hand, but only for women, returns to education are higher in Turkey (although women are much less likely to have an occupation in Turkey).

Outcomes for the second generation suggest longer-term consequences of migration and help to disentangle the counterfactual perspective. Here, the comparisons with Turks in Turkey suggest the migration project has mixed results. The second generation is more successful than its Turkish counterparts in educational achievement, mainly driven by a lower dependence on parental education (*hypothesis 2a*), leading Turks from low class backgrounds (the majority in Western Europe) to achieve higher education status in Western Europe than in Turkey. This finding supports the classic suggestion that migrants are motivated to achieve a better life for themselves and their children. The second generation Turks in Europe might also have benefitted from richer cultural capital and gained from educational expansion in European countries since the 1960s, though a similar but slower progress has been taking place in Turkey since 1980 (OECD 2012). Nevertheless, educational expansion does not necessarily generate social mobility in a society; further research is required.

For occupation, on average, second generation Turks are doing better than the first generation and better than Turks in Turkey. However, the advantage over those left behind reverses once education is taken into account, mostly because the value of education in Western European and Turkish labour markets varies: specifically, given a certain education, an individual gets higher occupational status in Turkey than in Western Europe. For second generation women, the disadvantage with respect to those left behind is amplified by the

existence of higher returns to education in Turkey. Summing up, even though the majority of second generation Turks do not suffer ‘ethnic penalties’, they cannot reach the same occupational levels as their counterparts back home. Note: we do not find strong evidence of a lower parental direct effect on occupation for second generation (*hypothesis 2b*).

Has migration to Western Europe been beneficial for Turks? We are inclined to say yes. The possibility of the children of low class Turkish migrants acquiring a relatively higher education and converting this education in the labour market represents a positive outcome. Although in Turkey, given the equality of parental occupation and education, the occupational status is higher on average (particularly for highly educated women), the possibility of a child with a low class background reaching a higher occupational status through education, thus differentiating him/her from his/her parents, is less likely. Furthermore, among women, there is a gain in access to the labour market. That said, research shows educational outcomes of second generation Turks vary in different European destination countries (Crul and Schneider 2010), possibly having differential impacts on their labour market careers across European destination countries. Therefore, although educational mobility, the main driving force of the benefits of migration, is a pattern we find for Turks in most Western European countries, more country-specific analyses would illuminate the extent of the advantages and disadvantages of migration.

Our novel origin-country perspective compares migrants and their offspring with their counterparts who stayed in Turkey. The approach has much to offer to international migration studies. For example, researchers can trace the influence of migration on family processes, friendships and networks, cultural, religious and political behaviour, values and lifestyles, health and wellbeing. Notably, the perspective answers recent calls to avoid methodological nationalism in international migration studies and to search for mechanisms behind migration processes and their impact on the whereabouts of migrants and their descendants, rather than aiming to answer policy driven research questions of the destination country nations (Amelina

and Faist 2012; Guveli 2015; Guveli, et al. 2015). We expect our work will trigger further research on other aspects of integration, and we anticipate a more complete understanding of the penalties and benefits of migration.

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