




CONFUCIAN DISCOURSE

AND CHU HSI'S ASCENDANCY



Confucian  
Discourse  
and  
Chu Hsi's  
Ascendancy

HOYT CLEVELAND TILLMAN



University of Hawaii Press Honolulu



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97 96 95 94 93 92 5 4 3 2 1

**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**

Tillman, Hoyt Cleveland.

Confucian discourse and Chu Hsi's ascendancy / Hoyt Cleveland

Tillman.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.

ISBN 0-8248-1416-9

1. Philosophy, Confucian—History. 2. Confucianism—History.  
3. Chu, Hsi, 1130-1200. 4. China—Intellectual life—960-1644.

I. Title.

B127.C65T55 1992

92-9630

CIP

University of Hawaii Press Books are printed on acid-free paper and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Council on Library Resources

FOR MY FATHER

WILLIAM FRED TILLMAN

AND IN REMEMBRANCE OF MY MOTHER

REBA ELIZABETH WILBANKS TILLMAN

(1916-1990)

AND MY MOTHER BY MARRIAGE

MARGARITA WEN-HWEI SOO MIH

(1908-1987)



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## FOREWORD

Over the past three decades, tremendous progress has been made in the West in the study of Confucianism. Today very few of us would subscribe to the crude but once dominant notion that Confucianism was no more than a political ideology that functioned to legitimate imperial authority. Viewing Confucianism in this way is almost as absurd as suggesting that the central significance of medieval Christianity consisted in its justification of the divine right of the king. Nor would we feel as confident as we once did to define Confucianism in late imperial China exclusively in terms of the examination system simply because Chu Hsi's commentaries on the Four Books had been established as the standard text for state examinations since 1315. Instead, in the West today we are more inclined to see Confucianism as a way of life involving faith and spiritual values. Needless to say, this new understanding would not have been possible without the recent rapid growth of Chinese intellectual history as a field of study.

Most, however, if not all of the recent studies on post-T'ang Confucianism are of a monographic nature focusing either on a particular thinker or on a specific aspect of thought. The result is that we see many individual trees but not the forest. The present study by Professor Hoyt Tillman is therefore a most welcome and timely contribution which serves to supplement as well as complement the one-sidedness of current approaches.

Tillman interprets the history of Confucianism during the Southern Sung primarily as a development from diversity to orthodoxy. This interpretation is amply supported by the written records of the period. In order to show

the diversity of Confucianism throughout the twelfth century, Tillman has chosen, quite ingeniously, I would say, to treat Chu Hsi not as a single philosopher in isolation but "in the context of his relationships and interchanges with his major contemporaries." Thus while nowhere is a chapter to be found dealing exclusively with his thought and scholarship, Chu Hsi is nevertheless everywhere in the book. In this way not only is the intellectual world of twelfth-century China more objectively represented, but Chu Hsi's contemporaries and intellectual rivals are also accorded a greater historical justice. Indeed, in terms of what Tillman calls "the three key levels of Confucian discourse," the Way (*Tao*) as generally conceived by Confucians in the twelfth century was by no means confined to speculative philosophy; it concerned cultural values and state policies as well. Only by freeing ourselves from the narrow "orthodox" conception of *Tao-hsüeh* ("Learning of the Way") as established in the official *Sung History* can we see that Lü Tsuch'ien, Ch'en Liang, Lu Chiu-yüan, and Yeh Shih were also, along with Chu Hsi, promoting Confucianism as a way of life each in his own way.

With regard to the notion of Confucian orthodoxy, a distinction of vital importance must be made between state orthodoxy and intellectual orthodoxy. Chu Hsi's branch of *Tao hsüeh* was officially recognized as orthodoxy in 1241, but this orthodoxy had never been universally accepted by Confucians of different persuasions throughout the late imperial age. As a matter of fact, the orthodoxy of Chu Hsi's Learning of the Way was no sooner politically established than it became intellectually questioned. In the middle of the Ch'un-yü reign, (1241-1252), only a few years after the imperial proclamation recognizing the Ch'eng-Chu school as orthodoxy, a private scholar named T'ang Chung had already initiated a movement to reconcile the doctrinal differences between Chu Hsi and Lu Chiu-yüan, a movement that continued well into the fourteenth century and culminated in Kung T'ing-sung's compilation, in 1322, of *The Convergences of Views of Chu and Lu on the Four Books* (*Ssu-shu Chu-Lu hui-t'ung*). Little wonder that Wu Ch'eng (1249-1333), the most prominent early Yüan Confucian of the Chu Hsi tradition, also found it necessary to involve Lu's idea of "honoring the moral nature" as a corrective to Chu's intellectual approach to the Confucian way. In my biased view, in the intellectual history of late imperial China we are more justified to speak of the Ch'eng-Chu school as the mainstream of Confucian learning than as orthodoxy in a strict and clearly defined sense. The reason is not far to seek. Confucianism was not an organized religion with a centralized authority serving as the arbiter of faith whose decrees were binding on all Confucians.

Professor Tillman's concept of "Confucian fellowship" serves the purpose of his book very well. He defines this fellowship as "a network of social relations and a sense of community with a shared tradition that was distinct from other Confucians of the era." It seems to me that "fellowship" is vividly

descriptive of the various Confucian groups formed around a few masters in the twelfth century such as Chu Hsi in Fukien, Lu Chiu-yüan in Kiangsi, Chang Shih in Hunan, and Lü Tsu-ch'ien in Chekiang. Despite their doctrinal and pedagogical differences, however, all these groups may be regarded as *Tao-hsüeh* communities for the simple reason that they were apparently formed for a common purpose: to study and promote the Confucian way. At least, this is how Chu Hsi sometimes understood the term *Tao-hsüeh*, and he could not possibly have foreseen that forty years after his death his own version of Confucian learning was to be identified with *Tao-hsüeh* exclusively. It would be anachronistic on our part today if we continue to follow the biased interpretation of the official *Sung History*, thereby equating *Tao-hsüeh* only with the Ch'eng-Chu school.

"Confucian fellowship" is a wholly new concept capturing the essence of the *Tao-hsüeh* community, which must be understood as a new social and cultural phenomenon in Sung China. The earliest *Tao-hsüeh* communities emerged in the eleventh century, notably the Kuan-chung group under the leadership of Chang Tsai and the Loyang group centered around the two Ch'eng brothers. But no such Confucian groups can be found in T'ang times. Han Yü's, for example, was a circle of poets and writers rather than Confucian believers even though he was generally acknowledged by Sung Neo-Confucians as the most important precursor of the *Tao-hsüeh* movement. From a historical point of view, the emergence of the *Tao-hsüeh* community in Sung China may be most fruitfully seen as a result of secularization. There is much evidence suggesting that the *Tao-hsüeh* community was, in important ways, modeled on the Ch'an monastic community. The Neo-Confucian academy, from structure to spirit, bears a remarkable family resemblance to the Ch'an monastery. But the difference is substantial and important. Gradually, quietly, but irreversibly, Chinese society was taking a this-worldly turn with Ch'an masters being replaced by Confucian teachers as spiritual leaders.

In this new book Professor Tillman has given us a comprehensive and reliable account of Southern Sung Confucianism, and the way he has conceptualized the vast subject is pregnant with suggestiveness. In time, I believe, it will stimulate and generate new thinking on Confucian studies in a variety of directions.

Ying-shih Yü

Princeton, New Jersey  
December 1991





## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It has been a delight to read the texts of Sung-era persons and to “talk with the ancients.” I wish to express my appreciation to those institutions and persons of the present without which I would not have had such opportunities to explore the past. Discussions and correspondence with numerous teachers, friends, and students attest to the continuing benefits of a fellowship in the pursuit of learning. I can only point to but never fully convey the depth of my heartfelt appreciation.

Benjamin I. Schwartz and Yü Ying-shih have continued to be my major mentors in the history of thought. Our discussions have been all the more delightful because of the participation and hospitality of Bunny and Monica. Professor Yü’s foreword to this book is especially appreciated. Another principal source of inspiration, James T. C. Liu, read the very first draft of the manuscript and provided valuable questions and challenges. After reading the manuscript and translations carefully, Wing-tsit Chan raised numerous points to consider. Robert Hymes, Henry Rosemont, Jr., Conrad Schirokauer, and Philip Williams also made many useful comments and suggestions. Peter Bol, Ch’eng I-fan, Ron-Guey Chu, Teng Kuang-ming, and Denis Twitchett made thoughtful suggestions on parts of the manuscript as well. Without Professor Twitchett’s invitation to write the chapter on Southern Sung Confucianism for the *Cambridge History of China*, I would not have started writing the present book. My local colleagues Roger Adelson, Chou Ju-hsi, James Rush, Phil VanderMeer, Retha Warnicke, Rodney Ito, Beth Luey, and Richard Everett read selected pages or discussed specific issues. The objections or questions raised by the above

individuals led me to reexamine my data and in many cases prompted me to strengthen my argument. I take full responsibility for the limitations of this study.

The research and writing of this book would have taken many more years if it had not been for a 1988–1989 fellowship provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities and supplemented by the Dean of Liberal Arts and Sciences at Arizona State University. During my sabbatical the following year (1989–1990), I held a fellowship in Chinese studies from the American Council of Learned Societies (with funds from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation). Although I had planned to use the ACLS year to draft a book on Chu-ko Liang, most of the year was devoted to revising the draft of the present book. The Department of East Asian Studies at Princeton graciously arranged for me to be a Visiting Fellow there during the ACLS fellowship. I have fond memories of colleagues at Princeton and the ambience of the institution. Colleagues at Harvard, my alma mater, also continued to be hospitable during the preparation of this book. My home institution, Arizona State University, has been generous in its encouragement to my research and writing. Special appreciation is expressed to Bettie Ann Doebler and Brian Foster for a spring 1988 Humanities Research Award sponsored by the Graduate College. The Office of the Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences (especially Sam Kirkpatrick and Gary Krahenbuhl) contributed funding for some of my research travel.

Librarians at the Asian collections at Princeton University, Harvard University, Columbia University, Cambridge University, Oxford University, the University of Leiden, the Bibliothèque nationale, Peking University, the Beijing Library, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, the University of Chicago, the University of California (Berkeley and Los Angeles), and the University of Arizona have been most cordial and helpful. During research trips, personal hospitality was extended by colleagues and friends too numerous to list but still remembered individually and fondly. Special appreciation is due Wu Ai-hwa and other librarians at Arizona State University for years of gracious cooperation.

My graduate students have been a major source of intellectual stimulation. Pang Huang, Ji Xiao-bin, Yu Zongxian, and Jenny Lee enhanced my understanding of numerous passages from Sung texts. Ji Xiao-bin and Niu Pu carefully read more than one version of the entire book manuscript. Alejandro Echevarria helped with proofreading and compiling the index. These graduate students were able to come to Arizona State University only through the support of the Department of History (especially the Chair, Robert Trennert, and the Graduate Studies Director, Retha Warnicke), the Graduate College (Brian Foster and Noel Stowe), and the Office of the Vice-President of Research (Henry Reeves).

My editor, Sharon F. Yamamoto, and Sally Serafim and the editorial staff of the University of Hawaii Press are commended for their professional production of this book. I appreciate their helpful spirit and the exceptional work and careful attention to detail of the copy editor, Susan Stone. Suggestions made by the Press' two referees also contributed significantly to the book.

My family has kept me from getting lost in the twelfth century by constantly pulling me back to daily realities. If I have managed to convey a sense of Sung men as real people with living traditions, my success is in no small part due to lessons about being a person learned with my family in daily life. Thank you my beloved Cristina and our children, Langston and Margaret, for years of companionship. Langston also assisted in some tasks related to this project. My parents, both by birth and marriage, have also been a reservoir of spiritual encouragement, even when worlds apart.



## INTRODUCTION

Existing studies of the new Confucianism of the Sung (960-1279) generally reflect the conventional Chinese and Japanese practice of concentrating on a single line of development to and from Chu Hsi (1130-1200), the greatest systematic and synthetic theoretician of Confucianism. A handful of eleventh-century philosophers are studied as his predecessors, one or two of his contemporaries are considered as foils, and a couple of his thirteenth-century disciples are credited with securing governmental patronage for his school of thought. The fourteenth-century Mongol rulers of China laid the foundation for this singular attention to Chu Hsi when they decreed that his commentaries on four classical writings would serve as the core of the civil service examinations. In the official *Sung History* (*Sung shih*), compiled under the Mongols, a special category of biographies further concentrated the focus on the narrow line of development that culminated in Chu Hsi's thought and writings. Chu Hsi remained the center of Confucian orthodoxy into the twentieth century. As his influence spread from China to Japan and Korea, his thought served for centuries as the cornerstone of East Asian political culture and traditional education. Not surprisingly, modern studies of Southern Sung (1127-1279) Confucianism have generally been written either as explorations in philosophy or as exercises in ideology. Despite the profound contributions of such studies, we still lack an integrated historical overview of Confucianism during the period. The present study seeks to meet the need for an intellectual history of the transformation of Confucianism during the Southern Sung.

Instead of portraying Chu Hsi as an isolated and unique philosopher, his intellectual development will be presented here in the context of his relationships and interchanges with his major contemporaries. This historical approach will supplement rather than reiterate the numerous studies available that concentrate upon his philosophy. The intent is not to denigrate Chu Hsi as a philosopher but to place him in the historical context of colleagues whose contributions have conventionally been slighted. Observing the exchange of ideas with his colleagues will yield a significantly different picture of Chu Hsi and his thought. To pose a part of our inquiry in terms that Chu himself used, how did he ultimately emerge as the authority on what he sometimes called "this *Tao* [Way] of ours," "our literary culture," "pure Confucians," "*Tao-hsüeh*," and "our faction"? Such language suggests something more than merely an amalgam of individual intellectuals sharing a vaguely defined set of philosophical concepts.

*Tao-hsüeh* (True Way Learning) Confucianism was the fellowship to which Chu Hsi belonged. The original diversity of this *Tao-hsüeh* Confucianism became so obscured, as orthodoxy grew ever more entrenched, that some of its outstanding features have remained opaque up to the present day among modern scholars. My 1982 book initiated an effort to view *Tao-hsüeh* from the perspective of its twelfth-century context and usage. In recent years progress has been made toward a convergence in terms used to discuss Sung Confucianism. Some American scholars have begun using the term "Tao-hsüeh" (or *Daoxue*) with increasing frequency but often with the same diverse and unspecified range of coverage as their individual usages of the term "Neo-Confucianism." Thus the ongoing scholarly debate about Confucianism is set to move on to the next step: exploring the historic evolution of *Tao-hsüeh* as a fellowship.<sup>1</sup> Instead of viewing *Tao-hsüeh* anachronistically from much later perspectives, it is important to reconstruct its process of development and the views of those in the Southern Sung who identified themselves with the fellowship. For example, rather than adopting the viewpoint of the *Sung History*, compiled under the Mongols in the 1340s, it is preferable to take the broad view of the movement found in an earlier (1239) history of *Tao-hsüeh*, the *Record of the Destiny of the Tao* (*Tao ming lu*). This broad view of the movement is also evident in twelfth-century sources, so I will use the *Tao-hsüeh* rubric to highlight the progressive evolution of the fellowship throughout the period from the late eleventh century through the Southern Sung. I would not deny that there were some fundamental philosophic differences between the various thinkers associated with the fellowship, but political, personal, cultural, and other ties provided substantial bonds even beyond the ideas that they did share.

As will become increasingly evident in the chapters that follow, the concentration on *Tao* learning led to the specific label *Tao-hsüeh*. Reserving "Sung learning" (*Sung hsüeh*) for use in its broad sense to denote the Confu-

cian renaissance during the Sung, I use *Tao-hsüeh* in its twelfth-century sense to refer to one particular wing of these “Sung Confucians.” Thus *Tao-hsüeh* originally stood between Sung learning (called Neo-Confucianism by some scholars) and Ch’eng I—Chu Hsi philosophy (called Neo-Confucianism and/or Neo-Confucian orthodoxy by other scholars). As a greater sense of community evolved among those who recognized an extraordinary commitment to *Tao* learning, both insiders and outsiders increasingly used *Tao-hsüeh* to identify a particular tradition and fellowship distinct both from other Sung Confucians and from conventional Confucians. Compared to those in the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship, other Sung Confucians continued more of the traditions of literary, institutional, and classical studies of earlier dynastic periods. Some statements about the fellowship’s opponents in Sung sources suggest that many of them might best be characterized simply as “conventional Confucians,” for it is unclear whether they took part in the renaissance of “Sung learning.” That a few Confucians from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries either used *Tao-hsüeh* in a sardonic way or had reservations about the term should not obscure its overwhelmingly positive usage within the *Tao-hsüeh* community itself.<sup>2</sup>

Although never as fully organized as a term like “association” or “society” would imply, those who identified with an extraordinary quest to revive and transmit the *Tao* became a fellowship. By “fellowship” I mean that they had a network of social relations and a sense of community with a shared tradition that distinguished them from other Confucians. They forged personal, political, and intellectual ties in a common effort to reform political culture, revive ethical values, and rectify Confucian learning. Academies served as institutional centers for the group. Rituals performed at the academies enhanced bonding. Prostrating before a master, one ritually declared oneself a student and became part of a lineage for propagating certain texts. Morn-ing services that included burning incense before an altar for ancient sages and recent masters enhanced awareness among academy students of continuity and cohesiveness within the tradition. Providing mutual aid, members of the fellowship promoted one another’s careers, especially through recommendations to government office and for promotions. Many participants adopted distinctive mannerisms and styles of dress and deportment. They developed special vocabulary and concentrated on particular kinds of issues, making it possible for senior members to recognize their civil service examination papers and to pass them. By the 1170s the fellowship’s leaders could talk in terms of “our faction.” In discussing this stage in the history of the fellowship, the narrative will necessarily concentrate on its leaders.

The fellowship differed from earlier Confucian groups in the degree of attention given to the ethical-spiritual development of its participants. Their extraordinary commitment to becoming good literati through personal cultivation gave them greater cohesion than earlier Confucians, who had been



more attentive to intellectual, literary, or political goals. Fellowship participants exchanged admonitions and gave special significance to writing eulogies and holding memorial services. Thus eulogies will be used in this study to trace group affiliation. A refusal to write eulogies for a deceased friend suggested that he was not regarded as a member of the fellowship. Anthologies and other writings also served to delineate those who belonged within the tradition. Sociologists may be correct in saying that Confucians' extraordinary focus on the family as the primary social unit militated against a well-defined sense of larger communities or societies that were not based upon kinship. Group cohesiveness outside the family depended primarily on brotherly ties between individual members of a group.<sup>3</sup> Yet exploring the evolution of *Tao-hsüeh* from a revival of *Tao* learning to a fellowship exclusive of other Confucians provides an opportunity to observe some of the potential for and limits of group formation among Confucians.

There are limits to how rigorously the fellowship can be defined, because it was somewhat elastic, with some change of membership over time. Some disciples promoted their deceased masters to the relative exclusion of other masters. A few major figures in earlier generations were read out of the tradition by later generations. Most of the extant sources originated from within the community; some were edited by later members. Hence a certain bias is inherent in the sources in favor of this group at the expense of those viewed as outsiders or as having learning adulterated with alien ideas. Chu Hsi, in particular, edited writings of and made pronouncements about his contemporaries and earlier members of the fellowship so that it is difficult to retrieve their ideas and their significance in the context of their own times. When he eventually emerged as the central theoretician of *Tao-hsüeh*, his ideas left a lasting imprint upon the tradition. As Chu's legacy eclipsed his contemporaries from the view of later generations, subsequent scholarship has followed his reformulations.

It is difficult to estimate the size of the fellowship, whose members came from the literati (*shih*) stratum of society. The numbers of literati rapidly increased as a result of unprecedented economic growth during the Sung. As the natural resources of the South were fully integrated into the national economy for the first time, there was a marked increase in the foodstuffs and goods required to support urbanization, nonagrarian enterprise, and cultural activities. The increasing person-to-land ratio eventually overwhelmed technological progress and economic growth, but most of the Sung period witnessed rapid development of technology and markets.<sup>4</sup> State policies also played a role in the increase in literati by enhancing the prestige bestowed upon scholars, providing patronage for printing, and establishing schools to prepare literati for the civil service examinations. The percentage of the population to win status through the examinations probably reached its peak by the end of the twelfth century, surpassing one-tenth of one per-

cent of the total population. The number of literati increased so markedly that the government had to change its quota for prefectural examination candidates. The quota of passes to fails shrank from 10 in 100, during the eleventh century, to 1 in 100, or less, by the beginning of the thirteenth century.<sup>5</sup> Given that some literati never attempted the prefectural examinations, the pool of literati can be estimated to be no less than 10 percent of a population of between 63 and 71 million. As a result of vastly expanded literacy and increased competition for positions in the officialdom, the literati became more heterogeneous.

Increasing numbers of literati also increased readership and the potential for forging a fellowship with shared ideas. As we shall see, over 375 academies were established during the Sung. A few of the major teachers of the second half of the twelfth century appear to have had approximately one thousand students each. Even though it is precarious to guess the size of the fellowship at any time, fragmentary quantified data on literati in society and advanced students in academies suggest that potential participants were numerous. Numbers within the fellowship clearly increased over time.

Activities by the fellowship were influenced by retrenchment policies that during the Southern Sung lightened the state's hand over local markets, religious groups, and educational endeavors. As the government's control over economic and cultural activities weakened, some individuals and groups had more opportunities to run their own institutions. Government withdrawal from close supervision of monasteries and cloisters facilitated the spread of lay Buddhist and Taoist associations.<sup>6</sup> Some Confucians also responded to this relaxation of local control by developing educational organizations, welfare institutions, and other community groups on a level between the family and the local government. Government retrenchment in social and economic policies was, however, accompanied by extraordinary centralization of political power in and around the throne. Power arising from the emperor's court would be used during the Southern Sung first to suppress but eventually to promote the fellowship. Thus governmental actions had contradictory influences on the potential community of literati.

*Tao-hsüeh* Confucians gradually established enough common ground, rhetorical idiom, and doctrinal solidarity that the loose fraternity became increasingly defined. In developing this fellowship, *Tao-hsüeh* men (and all were men) were also forming a tradition. This study will show leaders of the fellowship in the process of creating their tradition and making it normative. It will explore the evolution of *Tao-hsüeh* through issues that arose, noting the participants crucial in defining it at various stages.

According to the 1239 history *Record of the Destiny of the Tao*, the brothers Ch'eng Hao (1032-1086) and Ch'eng I (1033-1107) had begun illuminating *Tao-hsüeh* in the 1060s, but the movement itself dated from the mid-1080s.<sup>7</sup> A reform party led by Wang An-shih (1021-1086) had domi-

nated the country for about eighteen years. With the ascension of a new emperor, the conservatives headed by Ssu-ma Kuang (1019–1086) came to power as the Yüan-yu (1086–1093 reign period) group. When Ssu-ma Kuang returned to the emperor's court in 1085, he sponsored Ch'eng I as imperial tutor. As lecturer to the emperor in 1086–1087, Ch'eng I gained greater recognition and a wider audience than he had achieved as a private teacher in Loyang. The most prominent of the Ch'engs' associates in the movement were Chang Tsai (1020–1077), Shao Yung (1012–1077), Fan Tsu-yü (1041–1098), Lü Kung-chu (1018–1089), Lü Hsi-che (1036–1114), Hu An-kuo (1074–1138), and Chou Tun-i (1017–1073). Ssu-ma Kuang was more than simply the political leader of the conservative Yüan-yu group to which all of them belonged; his ideas were also considered important. Although politically allied with the conservatives, the brothers Su Shih (1036–1101) and Su Ch'e (1039–1112) had such a different view of the *Tao* that they were never included in the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition. With the exception of the Su brothers, the Yüan-yu group was central in the 1239 account of the fellowship. The group's political opponents banned its followers from office during three prohibitions over the course of the twelfth century. Sharing a disfavored political legacy apparently enhanced a sense of community among followers of *Tao* learning.

Although he was not a major political figure in the Yüan-yu movement, Ch'eng I helped to advance the early demarcation of *Tao-hsüeh*. He insisted that only those scholars who knew the *Tao* truly deserved to be called Confucians (*ju*); moreover, traditional literary and classical studies were no longer adequate to identify a person as being a Confucian.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, Ch'eng I noted, eulogies in memory of Ch'eng Hao were united in "praising his *Tao-hsüeh*." Ch'eng Hao, according to the Ch'eng brothers' friends and students, was "the only person since the time of Mencius who had transmitted the *Tao* of the sages."<sup>9</sup> Perceiving that the learning of Confucius had not been transmitted after Mencius, Ch'eng Hao had taken the restoration of the sages' teachings as his personal responsibility. Writing for a disciple in 1087, Ch'eng I drew attention again to the responsibility he shared with his brother: "When my brother and I promoted *Tao-hsüeh*, the [people of the] age were alarmed and lacked faith; you and [your cousin] Liu Chih-fu [Liu Hsüan, 1045–1087] were among those who have done the most to make those who learn see its effectiveness and believe."<sup>10</sup> Some of Ch'eng I's disciples quickly picked up this focus on the revival of the transmission of the *Tao* and the new term *Tao-hsüeh*. In the early twelfth century, Yang Shih (1053–1135) complained that for the centuries between Mencius and the Ch'engs, *Tao-hsüeh* had not been manifest. Yang also praised the *Tao-hsüeh* of some of his own contemporaries with whom he associated.<sup>11</sup> Hence *Tao* learning was by the end of the Northern Sung beginning to be identified with a particular fellowship of Confucians.

During the first period (1127–1162) of the Southern Sung, Confucians who identified themselves with *Tao-hsüeh* had drastically variant temperaments and strongly divergent ideas. During an era of government hostility, such thinkers as Hu Hung (1105–1161) and Chang Chiu-ch'eng (1092–1159) nurtured the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition, allowing it to grow in diverse directions. There was little communication among leading intellectuals, during this period of foreign invasion and political repression, and less unified authority and more diversity than at the turn of the century when Ch'eng I had been the preeminent figure within the fellowship. To the extent that there was a leading representative in this period, it was almost certainly Chang Chiu-ch'eng. Although the next generation sought to purge him from the tradition, his imprint has been preserved in the earliest extant—but until recently overlooked—anthology of the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition. As the political climate markedly improved during the subsequent period (1163–1181), a new generation enjoyed more latitude in developing the group's teachings and propagating them among the educated elite. The principal leaders during this period, Chang Shih (1133–1180) in the mid-1160s and Lü Tsu-ch'ien (1137–1181) from the late 1160s to 1181, did far more than modern scholars have realized to set the cadence of the movement and to affect Chu Hsi's ideas. As an example of his stature in his own day, Lü was called "the leader of this culture of ours" by Lu Chiu-yüan (1139–1193).<sup>12</sup> After Lü's early death, the political and intellectual environment during the next period (1182–1202) swung from accommodation to confrontation. Now asserting himself as the premier authority on the group's doctrines, Chu Hsi evoked controversy among Confucians, particularly Ch'en Liang (1143–1194) and Lu Chiu-yüan (Lu Hsiang-shan), who identified with ideas that Chu sought to rectify or expunge from the tradition. No longer buttressed by Lü's social and academic prestige, Chu's claims and agenda at once provoked hostility from conventional Confucians and the establishment, and Chu lived his last years under an imperial ban on the teaching of *Tao-hsüeh*. Having been the most senior intellectual in the group at the time of the ban and having died during its enforcement, Chu Hsi emerged as the symbol of the fellowship during the thirteenth century. Although the major thinkers during this later period had somewhat different priorities from Chu's, they stood under his banner in the struggle to reverse the government's ban on the fellowship and to upgrade its status to an orthodoxy.

An operating assumption in this book is that a larger than usual number of individuals and issues need to be explored in order to add depth and texture to what is known about the Confucianism of the Sung era. Although much more could be said about the individuals mentioned above and many others only briefly mentioned in the book, the diversity of thinkers and views presented is adequate to retrieve the basic spectrum of *Tao-hsüeh* in discernible periods of its development. To measure degree of diversity, simi-

lar issues of theory and practice will be used for each period. An attempt will also be made to focus on the most important issues from the perspectives of the thinkers themselves. Although it would be appealing to find *one* central theme or issue underlying all the debates and discussions, it is better to avoid reductionistic simplifications of complex intellectual and historical realities. The debates were driven by such diverse concerns as resisting foreign encroachment, reviving the Confucian tradition, pursuing truth, cultivating good individuals, and achieving a better sociopolitical order. Yet there is an underlying theme in the issues discussed here. The issues discussed in the present study were selected because they relate to a thesis about the character and evolution of the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship. Throughout the Southern Sung, cooperation and confrontation among a range of leaders progressively shaped the ideas of those leaders and defined *Tao-hsüeh* itself. The history of *Tao-hsüeh* men and their ideas during the Southern Sung will reveal the evolution of a gradually larger, more self-conscious and coherent group. Indeed, *Tao-hsüeh* only gradually—and with difficulty—evolved from a loose association of individual intellectuals with divergent ideas into a school of thought recognized as state orthodoxy.

There is a need for a more comprehensive analysis of the evolutionary struggle toward orthodoxy, a privileged status achieved in 1241 and continuing into the early twentieth century. The Southern Sung court publicly identified itself with *Tao-hsüeh* Confucianism, enshrined its principal personages in the Confucian temple, and encouraged the study of their texts and commentaries. But Sung rulers did not go as far as later emperors in institutionalizing the relationship. Later dynasties made its commentaries the official standard for the civil service examinations and commissioned compendiums of its major pronouncements and ideas. Hence in studies of the character and impact of orthodoxy, most modern scholars concentrate on developments under these later dynasties.<sup>13</sup> Official recognition as the right and correct Confucian tradition did not mean that these *Tao-hsüeh* teachings actually determined state policy. Having an official orthodoxy did not prevent the government either from employing officials associated with other Confucian schools or from drawing upon other religious traditions and folk beliefs to sustain public order. The government was most interested in public order and hierarchy; thus, considerable latitude was allowed in the realm of religious and intellectual ideas.

Still, the struggle culminating in the 1241 official recognition of the new Confucian tradition did alter political culture and public discourse. One modern scholar even suggests a relationship between state absolutism and orthodox legitimacy, on the one hand, and a new exclusiveness within Confucianism since the Southern Sung, on the other.<sup>14</sup> Even though most modern studies of orthodoxy pass over the thirteenth century, much of the framework of philosophical and state orthodoxy in late imperial China was

established in the Southern Sung. The few modern studies that do deal with the state's policy reversal of 1241 have quite exclusively concentrated on issues of *either* philosophy *or* political expediency.<sup>15</sup> Here again, I will follow the lead of the *Record of the Destiny of the Tao*, for in 1239 it highlighted the interaction of philosophy and politics in the fluctuating fortunes of the *Tao-hsüeh* group.

To reconstruct the evolution of *Tao-hsüeh* from diversity to orthodoxy, it is necessary to balance the following factors: (1) the debates over theory and praxis within the group and (2) the group's conflicts with the government over policy and ethics. Reconstructing the conflict over *Tao-hsüeh* should enhance understanding of the tension in China between the wielders of state power and other members of the educated elite at the periphery of power. This continuing struggle has since the late 1980s again captivated outside observers. So crucial is the Sung precedent that the Chinese University of Hong Kong organized a July 1990 conference on the ideals and actions of Sung Confucians in order to clarify historical reflection on the predicament of intellectuals in China today.

#### SOME PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS

Throughout this study, dialogues within the fellowship will be discussed in terms of three key levels of Confucian discourse. These are (1) what in the West is called speculative philosophy, (2) cultural values, and (3) comment on policy. My three levels are comparable but not identical to various triad paradigms in Chinese sources.<sup>16</sup> Speculative philosophy refers to Chinese reasoning about the most abstract or primary of principles. This abstract realm was often called "hsing-erh-shang" (the nonempirical, or that which is above or transcends determinate form). Although theorizing even about values and policy involves speculation, "speculative" will be reserved to indicate this most abstract level of reflection on the nature and order of all things. Some refer to this speculative level of Chinese philosophy as metaphysics and cosmology. Clifford Geertz distinguishes world view and ethos as two universal elements. In its conception of order in nature or a "picture of the way things in sheer actuality are,"<sup>17</sup> the cognitive element in world view is comparable to my first level. Ethos, as an evaluative determination and declaration of values, is similar to my second level. This second level, cultural values, includes both halves of what, according to Peter Bol, is the fundamental distinction within Sung thought: literary and other creative cultural attainments (even as a source of values), on the one hand; ethics/morality, on the other.<sup>18</sup> But what Bol sees as fundamental is, to me, just one of the major issues on the level of values. Many of the most significant disagreements among Confucians of the Sung centered on this level.

Despite the infatuation of modern scholars with Sung “metaphysics,” I hope to show that Confucians earnestly debated on all three levels. Because of its integrative function, self-cultivation is here assigned to the intermediate level.

For example, Chu Hsi and other Confucians used the term “Tao” (Way) on more than one level. Although applicable to Confucian teachings and commentary on social and political institutions, the term was more important on the two other levels of discourse. In the realm of history and culture, *Tao* denoted values of the ethical order in society. For example, Chu said, “I explain the word *Tao* as a general term for humaneness, integrity, decorum, and music; these four are the essence and function of the *Tao*.”<sup>19</sup> On this level, Chu usually spoke in terms of *Tao* and concrete embodiments (*ch’i*). On the more speculative level of abstract principles, he generally talked in terms of order, pattern, or principle (*li*) and psychophysical or vital energy (*ch’i*). *Tao* on this level was synonymous with principle. More precisely, *Tao* referred to the whole perceived synthetically, whereas principle indicated a more analytical perspective: “The word *Tao* is all-embracing; the *li* are so many veins inside the *Tao*.”<sup>20</sup> As in the case of our three general levels of discourse, the usages Chu refers to were in an organic relationship and affected one another. It is still important to ascertain the level of usage in a particular passage.

Confucianism should not suggest a modern “ism” with doctrinal uniformity, documented membership, or party program. “Confucian” is our word for what Chinese traditionally referred to as *ju*. Strictly speaking, *ju* were simply scholars engaged in the classical learning of the ancients, and the term was more vague and elastic than the word “Confucian” might suggest. Use of the word “Confucianism” does not imply approval of later efforts to force Confucius (551–479 B.C.) himself into some particular retrospective mold or interpretation.

There are reasons for following convention and rendering *ju* as Confucian, and several are worth considering briefly. First, Confucius was almost universally recognized by *ju* as their model “first sage-teacher.” He was the first to take the role of a private teacher and to take responsibility as an individual intellectual to voice public opinions on the government, culture, and ethics of his day. Second, the *ju* credited Confucius (probably erroneously) with having edited the Five Classics from early antiquity: the *Book of Poetry*, the *Book of Documents* (or *History*), the *Book of Changes* (*I ching*), the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, and the *Rites*. Hence *ju* studying their tradition saw themselves as uniquely indebted to Confucius for the classics of the tradition. Third, the sayings of Confucius set the language with which later *ju* dealt with most ethical, educational, political, and social issues. Typically, Confucius made brief statements about ideas and terms from various perspectives and expected his followers to discover for themselves the larger

conceptions underlying his statements. Rigorous definitions and systematic philosophical discourses were not provided. Confucius thus set up many of the fundamental *problematiques* with which later *ju* wrestled. In short, although the second sage, Mencius (371–289 B.C.), and various others made crucial intellectual contributions to the tradition, Confucius had a special status in the eyes of those within the *ju* tradition.

*T'ien*, although conventionally translated as “Heaven,” is markedly different from the most common meaning of that term in Western religions. The Chinese term covers a spectrum of meanings from the world of nature and the azure heavens to the consciousness or lord in the heavens.<sup>21</sup> Modern scholars generally emphasize the meaning of Heaven as the realm of nature. Although there was a trend in this rationalist direction, traces of the ancient notions of a consciousness or lord in the heavens persisted in Confucian thought. For instance, we will discuss how Chu Hsi and others used the notion of the “mind of Heaven” (*t'ien-hsin*) in a philosophically significant way.

Heaven's principle (*t'ien-li*) was core language used by *Tao-hsüeh* men to articulate their philosophy. Principle was an inherent pattern and order evident in coherence and rightness in things. From the time the Ch'eng brothers made this concept central to Confucian philosophy, principle denoted both the natural inclination in things and the origin or foundation of all things.

*Hsin* refers to both mind and heart; hence, there is a growing trend in the field to render it always as “mind-and-heart”. Although generally appropriate, there are times when the mental qualities of the mind are more central to a passage or discussion. At other times, the feelings of the heart are much more germane. Here the term will be rendered sometimes as “mind,” sometimes as “heart,” and sometimes as “mind-and-heart” in an effort to reflect the more prominent factor in a particular context. This convention should not be read as a denial of other aspects of the *hsin*. As the origin of thoughts, intentions, feelings, and desires, *hsin* is a much broader concept than the Western concept of the mind. More important, although traditional Chinese did not naively confuse the mind and the body, they did not engage the sharp mind/body dichotomy or dualism that has been so central in Western philosophy.<sup>22</sup> Confucians also thought of the *hsin* as the agent through which one could perceive the more complete reality or holism of which one was an integral part. Confucius and Mencius apparently assumed that people by nature were originally integrated and easily reintegrated with the complete whole, but *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians generally saw this integration as an optimum goal that required disciplined effort from one's mind.

*Jen* refers both to the particular virtue of benevolence specifically and to perfect virtue encompassing all other cardinal Confucian virtues generally. Although in antiquity *jen* had denoted many qualities, Confucius trans-



formed the word to point to the perfect ethical virtue of the truly superior person; thus, it had a history similar to that of "virtue" in the West. Confucius and his early disciples never provided a fixed definition of *jen*, Chu Hsi reasoned, because any definition would detract from its encompassing character and because it should ultimately be grasped in personal experience rather than in discursive reasoning.<sup>23</sup> As will be discussed in Chapter 3, Confucians after the classical period simply equated *jen* with compassion and deeds done out of concern for others, but *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians began interpreting it on a cosmic level as the life-force that linked all things in one. Thus *jen* is difficult to translate. Traditionally, those who emphasize *jen* as a particular virtue employ the term "benevolence," whereas those who weigh its universal, even cosmic, essence use the term "humanity." When referring to the mind or life-force in Heaven and Earth as humanity, the term "humanity" can become awkward, because it also refers simply to human beings in general. "Humaneness" seems less awkward as an anthropomorphic characterization of the mind of Heaven and Earth in giving birth to things. Although not a perfect equivalent, "humaneness" has the advantages of providing greater facility in usage, encompassing both benevolence and the perfect virtue within humans, and suggesting universal qualities.

*Tao* (Way) was used by both Taoists and Confucians, but with a fundamental difference. Taoists used the *Tao* to point toward the transcendent holism that was beyond all definitive names. As such, the *Tao* belonged to the natural realm and stood in contrast to what humans did or made. Therefore, Taoists rejected as unnatural and dysfunctional the systems and virtues elaborated by Confucians. To Confucians, however, the *Tao* in the natural order of Heaven and Earth coursed through the realm of human affairs. Furthermore, the *Tao* could be known through its expression in the cardinal Confucian virtues of humaneness, rightness, propriety, and wisdom. The *Tao* was also to be found in the Five Relationships: those between ruler and subject, husband and wife, parent and child, elder and younger (siblings), and friends. As both transcendent and immanent, the *Tao* served as the ultimate but intrinsic norm, a universal law that sustained the natural realm, cultural values, and human institutions. The *Tao* was thus the foundation of Confucian ethics.

"Ethics" as used here is comparable to the Chinese terms *i* and *te-hsing*. The former connotes what is right, proper, and just; others label it righteousness. "Rightness" seems more apt for *i*, for the Western term "righteousness" might call to the reader's mind quite different connotations derived from religious traditions in the West. The latter term *te-hsing* is ethical practice or behavior. Conduct that was ethical had to be based on Confucian virtues and ritual (*li*). Ritual was more than just etiquette or ceremony. Both secular and sacred, ritual was the normative means for

expressing oneself in a way that was in harmony with what had been established by authoritative others. Through ritual, one's activity in a set form or role could serve as a medium for cultivating oneself and harmonizing relations with others; thus, ethics generally encompass such concerns for rightness and proper behavior. The ethical person was called a *chün-tzu*. Often paraphrased as "gentleman," *chün-tzu* is translated here as "superior person." Especially in present-day parlance, "gentleman" seems too feeble a rendering. Moreover, although encompassing status and decorum, the Chinese term emphasized ethical qualities. The *chün-tzu* was seen as a profound and esteemed person of integrity in contrast to the superficial, mean, and petty person.

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR THE STUDENT

Three of the fundamental questions Confucius addressed were how one is to become a good person; how one is to learn; and how one is to serve in government. Unlike such ancient Greek philosophers as Socrates and Plato, Confucius was not vexed by uncertainty about what the good was or the difficulty of defining it. Confucius was more concerned not only that people see the relationship or priority among various apparent goods but also that they put into action, or implement, the good. For example, if one's father stole a sheep, how did one resolve the conflict between filial piety and duty to the state? Choice, in itself, was not dramatized as it has been in the West, for Confucius displayed no ambiguity in proclaiming (in *Analects*, 13/18) that filial piety here took precedence over state laws. Yet his comments in such cases illustrate the problem of relating two norms or duties and taking action that reflects proper priorities.

Starting from this problem of understanding the relationship or priority between various goods, modern scholars have set forth numerous "polarities" in Confucian thought.<sup>24</sup> Confucians had obligations not only to engage in self-cultivation to transform themselves into good persons but also to participate in governance to bring proper order to society and polity. Besides striking a balance between personal and public realms of endeavor, one had also to devote oneself to both knowledge and action. Knowledge involved not only erudition but also a grasp of what was ethically essential. Concern for the public realm was often oriented toward achieving results for others, but one also had to remain focused on attaining virtue and taking action in accord with what was good and proper. One had first to take care of family members but also to be altruistic toward others. In one's disciplined effort to achieve these goals, one had a duty to realize truths through self-discovery; yet, one also had to respect external authority, espe-

cially as expressed in ritual norms of behavior and also in laws and regulations. Polarities provide primarily descriptive rather than explanatory illuminations of issues in Confucian thought.

What was the “Mean” or balance between such polarities? How was it to be defined? On what authority would the Mean be determined or set forth? Neither the wise sayings of Confucius and Mencius nor the larger body of classics themselves could provide definitive answers. Various statements could be cited to support differing answers. The classics provided no ready answers that could not be challenged by a scholar with different priorities. Scholars in later centuries also sought to apply the classics to their own times. Hence disputes over ideas and exegesis were endemic to the tradition. Given the lack of systematic definitions in the classics, many later disputes centered on the meaning of key conceptual terms, including some of those explained in the previous section.

During the first century of the Han era (206 B.C.–A.D. 220), Confucians became involved in a new search for cultural and political unity. Han Confucians leaned toward the pole of external authority and norms at the expense of self-discovery and individual action. Ritual became institutionalized in the Han, and it permeated social interactions in a routinized manner; moreover, careful adherence to ritual detail was expected. Existing notions of resonance between the human realm and the activity of Heaven and Earth included predetermined patterns into which people’s actions were supposed to find their place. Only the one on the throne was in a pivotal position at the intersection of these three realms. Han Confucians incorporated such notions into Confucianism but argued that the five elemental agents, the driving forces within the system, were actually governed by the cardinal Confucian virtues. Han Wu-ti (r. 141–87 B.C.) realized that this version of Confucian doctrine could be sanctioned and used as a political philosophy to support the Han imperial order. Thus he bestowed professorships on Confucian teachers at the new imperial university, where students studied before becoming civil bureaucrats.

The dynamism of Han Confucianism faded as the Han government became corrupt and lost its ability to protect independent peasant cultivators from powerful propertied families in the countryside. Civil bureaucrats had little opportunity to ameliorate social and economic problems. Thus Han Confucians turned to writing commentaries on the classics. They focused, however, on details of the text instead of the larger issues of ethics and governance Confucius and Mencius had addressed. Confucianism had earlier been quite successful in setting forth what scholars should do to advance the public interest. When nothing seemed to work any more, Confucians were at a loss.

With the collapse of the centralized empire in the wake of civil war and foreign invasions, the state Confucianism of the Han became irrelevant.

Although some intellectuals for a time revolted against Confucian ritual norms, scholars soon returned to the study of classical ritual texts for ways to enhance bonding within families and clans, for such solidarity was crucial to surviving the centuries of disunity and disorder before the advent of the next imperial age of unity. Ritual and family ethics were the central Confucian focus during these centuries.

The revival of a centralized bureaucratic empire in later periods renewed interest in elements of Han Confucianism. The court again patronized the study of the classics and drew upon Confucian rituals to enhance state ceremonies and hierarchy. In periods of a strong central government, it was prestigious and rewarding to serve in the government bureaucracy or to participate in educational and scholastic projects supported by the state. Writers of classical commentaries in the T'ang era (618–906) continued to lose themselves in the kinds of textual details that had characterized Han scholarship. As had happened during the decline of the Han, in the wake of a mid-eighth century rebellion the central court became much less important as a focus for Confucian participation and scholarship. Confucian scholars then turned to more independent writing and topics. Many of these private scholars sought to revive the prose style of the classics and the study of substantial political and ethical issues therein.

Overall however, even the T'ang Confucians who sought to revive classical models remained "conventional" Confucians. They focused on the Five Classics and studied the language and details of the text. They also highly valued calligraphy, history, painting, poetry, and prose. This broad sense of learning was viewed as integral to personal cultivation and knowing the *Tao*. Although they were concerned about issues of personal ethics, their primary focus was political activism. They saw government service as the optimum arena in which to exercise their commitment to the public good. In terms of the questions addressed by Confucius, they continued to give high priority to how to learn and how to serve. Confucianism was still primarily a social-political ethic. These conventional T'ang Confucians were quite practical in terms of the kinds of questions they addressed and how they approached them. Although individuals could be quite rigid, these conventional Confucians were generally rather cosmopolitan in outlook and also open to dialogue with friends from other religious and philosophical systems.

The major religious and philosophical system of the time was Buddhism. Although it had reportedly been introduced in the first century, Buddhism at first appeared quite esoteric and foreign to the Chinese. When confidence in Confucian political activism faltered in the late Han, educated people first turned to Taoism for an alternative. The loss of the cultural and political heartland of North China in the early third century was blamed in part on Taoism for encouraging an escapist attitude among scholars and officials,

who should have been taking responsibility for social and political problems. Buddhism could thus capture the attention of the educated elite.

Buddhism appeared to provide more sophisticated answers to persisting problems. For example, Taoists had utilized the concept of “natural allotment or shares” (*fen*) to explain individual destiny and why people had so little success in ameliorating conditions of the time. Buddhist ideas of karma explained more fully how current conditions were the fruit of earlier actions. Karma also provided hope for change, because present action or deeds would figure into future conditions or destiny. Taoist notions about the equality of things and situations had encouraged relativism and resignation to whatever state one found oneself in. Buddhism provided philosophical and psychological constructs for understanding the fundamental emptiness or lack of permanence in all things. Buddhism also provided a path of deliverance from the suffering and impermanence of this world. In the wake of the collapse of their cultural world, conquest by foreign “barbarians,” and the ensuing centuries of disorder, Chinese became disciples of the sophisticated culture of Buddhist missionaries who arrived from India and Central Asia.

The change in *mentalité* during the reunification of the Chinese world in the late fifth through the mid-sixth centuries was reflected in fundamental transformations within Buddhism. Chinese monks became more confident that they could read the Buddhist sutras, perceive their implicit or hidden meaning, classify the seemingly conflicting truths therein, and present a systematic view. In this process of sinicizing Buddhism, several new schools or sects emerged. Most important for later centuries were Pure Land, a message of salvation through faith in the compassion of the Buddha; and Ch’an (Zen), a discipline leading to enlightenment. Scholars found Ch’an particularly appealing as an intellectual regimen toward a transcendent understanding or perspective.

Even Ch’an Buddhism was objectionable to many Confucians. In terms of praxis, Confucians condemned the Buddhist ideal of the monk or nun who severed family ties by leaving behind the household to join a monastery, nunnery, or temple. Such practice violated the social and family norms of Confucianism and called into question the cardinal Confucian relationships within the family and between the household head and the state. Because the door of the monastery was open to everyone, Buddhism implied a kind of social leveling or transcendence of convention and hierarchy. Moreover, Buddhist charity works could be viewed as subverting the authority of Confucian bureaucrats. In terms of theory, the Buddhist alternative presented a challenge to the notion that Confucian norms were universal and inherent in the natural order. Buddhists equated human nature with the mind; furthermore, they presented both as being empty of innate moral truths or virtues. Many Confucians perceived this view as undermin-

ing their fundamental conviction that at birth people possessed the beginnings of Confucian virtues. Although Sinitic Buddhism qualified the original view of the emptiness of all things, Confucians continued to regard Buddhist metaphysics as negating the reality of the sociopolitical world and the value of their own activism therein. Confucians also never forgot that Buddhism was a foreign religion, and foreign invasions after the mid-T'ang made such cultural incursions more unpalatable. ✓

The challenge and example of Buddhism, however, contributed to the nature of the renaissance of Confucianism that began in the late T'ang and flourished in the eleventh-century Northern Sung. Ch'an methods of mental discipline and exploring the inner self contributed to Confucian efforts at spiritual self-cultivation and transcendental understanding of the true self. Instead of looking within to see the mind and become a Buddha, Confucians sought to fathom the mind in a quest for sagehood. In the view of the Sung Confucian, since one could practice spiritual cultivation in the course of one's daily routine, one should remain within the family and society instead of retreating to a monastery. Confucian scholars admonished themselves to assume responsibility for doing something to ameliorate the troubles of the world. The Buddhist hermeneutic tradition of classifying scriptures and perceiving hidden meanings provided principles that Confucians could use to go beyond the minute details of the Han and T'ang commentary tradition to seek larger meanings, explicit or implicit, in the Confucian classics. The messages of Confucius and Mencius were now applied more directly to one's own personal life and to the problems of the present. Although those who laid the foundations of *Tao-hsüeh* participated in this Confucian renaissance, they were to develop these renaissance themes in ways that set them apart from other Sung Confucians.

Factional bickering among scholar-officials during the last half-century of the Northern Sung weakened renaissance optimism and resulted in political persecutions. The struggles between the reform party, led by Wang An-shih, and the conservative Yüan-yü party, headed by Ssu-ma Kuang, eventually led to a "restored-reform" administration (1094-1126). During this restored-reform period, the names of 309 Yüan-yü partisans were inscribed on stone in 1104. Heading the blacklist, Ssu-ma was the principal target for political persecution and even literary repression.<sup>25</sup> Under these pressures, the followers of the conservative Su brothers also began devoting more of their energies to literary endeavors than before. The restored-reform regime dominated the last three decades before the Northern Sung debacle. Wang's political thought continued to be influential, and the extraordinary status in the Confucian temple extended to him by the Sung court in 1104 was not withdrawn until 1241. Yet his legacy did suffer among intellectuals from the excesses and failures of the restored-reform period.

During the political turmoil of the last half-century of the Northern Sung,

the Ch'eng brothers and their disciples fared better than other Confucian groups. The Ch'engs suffered less suppression because they were scarcely involved in active politics. Furthermore, their emphasis on education, philosophy, personal cultivation, and the propagation of the *Tao* facilitated the spread of their teachings among the literati even in a hostile political climate. Their heightened attention to the issue and means of becoming a good Confucian person provided significance and goals for increasing numbers of literati who no longer found meaning in the traditional path of public service as an official. The stage was thus set for the legacy of the Ch'engs and their group to emerge during the Southern Sung much more in the mainstream than they had been in the Northern Sung.

# PART 1 THE FIRST PERIOD, 1127-1162

The loss of North China to invading Jurchens from northeastern Asia in 1127 caused cultural dislocation that was a major catalyst for changes in Sung Confucianism. Officials at the temporary capital of Lin-an (Hangchow) concentrated on reestablishing the dynasty and stabilizing areas in the South that the Jurchen Chin regime (1115-1234) was unable to annex. The court managed to establish what became known as the Southern Sung, but it had to endure the humiliation of requesting peace talks with Jurchen invaders, who had taken almost all of the imperial clan as captives, including the last two emperors of the Northern Sung. Initially requiring that Chinese in the North adopt Jurchen dress and hair styles, the conquerors also expressed open disdain for the Han Chinese way of life. The collapse of the Northern Sung and the loss of the cultural heartland of China shocked both intellectuals and officials. Confucians were particularly ashamed of the many scholar-officials who failed to remain loyal to the dynasty and even collaborated with "barbarian" interlopers. All these developments raised questions about the efficacy of Confucian education and heightened concerns about the state of literati customs and values.<sup>1</sup>

Many Confucians believed that cultural and ethical regeneration could empower them to bring order to their country and expel the foreign conquerors. As one twelfth-century Confucian observed about previous invasions of North China: "When the Central Plain was without the *Tao* of the Central Plain, the barbarians entered; when it restored the *Tao* of the Cen-



tral Plain, the barbarians returned to their territory.”<sup>2</sup> Debates evolved among Confucian scholars about whose interpretation of the *Tao* was correct and what reconstruction of the tradition should serve as the standard for building a Confucian society.

During the first ten years of the Southern Sung, members of the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship, although only a small minority among Confucian scholar-officials, had opportunities to advise the young emperor Kao-tsung (r. 1127-1162).<sup>3</sup> Struggling initially to survive politically and militarily, Kao-tsung sought advice from various quarters without achieving a consensus on policy and direction. Kao-tsung was hostile toward the restored-reform party that had dominated the last three decades before the Northern Sung debacle. On discovering that sudden changes in established reform programs were difficult to implement, however, he discouraged new reforms and thus allowed the legacy of old reform measures to persist. Still nostalgic about the Yüan-yü conservatives, Kao-tsung bestowed posthumous honors on Ssu-ma Kuang, Su Shih, Ch’eng I, and others. During the ten years from 1127 to 1137, some of his councilors, particularly Lü Hao-wen (1064-1131) and Chao Ting (1085-1147), favored those associated with the fellowship. Such *Tao-hsüeh* men scored first place on the national *chin-shih* (presented scholar or doctoral-level) examinations of 1132 and 1135, and it was rumored that the chief examiner during the next triennial examination for the civil service would be Chu Chen (1072-1138). Having been recommended by Chao Ting, Chu Chen was already a tutor of the heir apparent, a crucial position from which to win future imperial favor. Chu was a follower of Ch’eng I and specialized in the *Book of Changes*.<sup>4</sup>

Apparently flushed with the rising fortunes of those associated with *Tao* learning, Chu Chen in 1136 formally presented to the emperor their claim to the unique transmission of the *Tao*. Drawing on the parallel to family primogeniture, Chu presented the transmission of the *Tao* in linear succession from teacher to chosen disciple(s). In spite of parallels to Ch’an transmissions of authority, the Confucian idea of transmission was not the same as the Buddhist one. A Ch’an master traditionally passed his begging bowl as symbol of authority and enlightenment to one chosen disciple; moreover, there had been an unbroken succession of masters in every generation. Given the hiatus of over a millennium in the Confucian transmission, both the process of transmission and what was transmitted differed from Buddhist conceptions. In Confucianism, it was possible for more than one disciple in a generation to receive the transmission. One could also attain the *Tao* on one’s own instead of receiving certification from the master. A Confucian could not follow the Ch’an ideal of a “wordless transmission,” however, because the text of the classics was more important in Confucian transmission.<sup>5</sup> Even though the Ch’engs revived the transmission after a hiatus of centuries, they were really not engaging in a special form of word-

less transmission, for the classics were (as we will see in the third section of Chapter 5) an indispensable link to the minds of the ancient sages. According to Chu Chen, after the *Tao* had been established in the transmission from Confucius to Mencius via Tseng-tzu (505-c. 436 B.C.) and Tzu-ssu (492-431 B.C.), the transmission had been interrupted for over a thousand years until the Ch'eng brothers of the Northern Sung. Thereafter, their school became the true champions of the *Tao*, and their disciples conveyed the transmission of the *Tao* to the South.<sup>6</sup> Although common within the fellowship, this declaration had not previously been made at the Sung court.

Such a bold claim to exclusive legitimacy in transmitting the *Tao* did not go unchallenged. Ch'en Kung-fu (1076-1141) and Lü Chih (1092-1137) asked the emperor to prohibit private theories such as Ch'eng I's from influencing the government and its civil service examinations. They argued that the group championing the Ch'engs had been corrupted by the partisan legacy of the late Northern Sung. Private views such as Ch'eng I's and Wang An-shih's demanded conformity to a set of ideas to which all must agree. Prohibiting such doctrinaire approaches was, Ch'en reasoned, the only way to restore the more open and public discussion that had existed in the Sung before Wang's reforms. Wild, strange, immoral, and vile was how Ch'en characterized the notion that the *Tao* of the ancient sages had been lost since the death of Mencius until Ch'eng I revived the transmission. Ch'en also vented his ire against the haughty deportment of Ch'eng's disciples, who dressed in "big hats and broad sleeves, and with lofty gaze walked in measured steps."<sup>7</sup> Many *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians indeed sought to recapture even styles of dress and deportment from antiquity, as described by James Liu: "Among other features, they chose to wear a tall hat with a pointed top, a beretlike gear for casual wear, a roomy gown with broad sleeves, and a fine white-gauze shirt underneath. Their mannerism was strict: they sat squarely with their back erect, walked in measured steps looking straight ahead, bowed slowly and deeply to express sincere propriety, spoke in a dignified way with few gestures and carefully made at that."<sup>8</sup> Such ostentation reflected the rigorous seriousness of lifestyle and observance of rites among some Confucians seeking to revive the *Tao* of antiquity, but its presumption galled conventional officials.

Hu An-kuo and Yin Ch'un (1071-1142) rose to defend the learning of the Ch'engs from these attacks. In his memorial of 1137, Hu An-kuo attempted to dismiss the attacks as a reflection of the divisive assaults by Wang An-shih's partisans on the Ch'engs and Ssu-ma Kuang. He identified respected scholars, such as Hsieh Liang-tso (1050-c. 1120) and Yang Shih, as Ch'eng's disciples; moreover, he called attention to Ch'eng's association with senior statesmen of the Yüan-yü conservative party, such as Ssu-ma Kuang, Lü Kung-chu and Lü Ta-fang (1027-1097). Invoking such names, Hu sought to alleviate the concerns raised by Ch'en Kung-fu's specter of the deportment

of those associated with the Ch'engs. But he did not retreat from the claim that the Ch'engs had revived the transmission of the *Tao*:

The *Tao* of Confucius and Mencius has not been transmitted for a long time. Only after Ch'eng I and his brother began elucidating it could the sage's *Tao* be studied and achieved. . . . Recently, certain officials have insisted that scholars pursue the Mean and take Confucius and Mencius as their teachers but have forbidden them to follow the teachings of Ch'eng I. This is as mistaken as wanting to enter a house but not through the door.<sup>9</sup>

As "the door," the teachings of Ch'eng I provided the one way to the *Tao*. The Ch'engs had made the wisdom of the ancient sages more intelligible to Confucians in the Sung. Daring even to request honors for Shao Yung, Chang Tsai, and the Ch'engs, Hu proclaimed that the four had become famous "for their *Tao-hsüeh* and ethics." Nonetheless, the emperor did not bestow the requested honors.

By saying that those advancing private theories and special approaches to learning should be restrained, Kao-tsung tilted the balance against those associated with the fellowship. At Lü Chih's suggestion, he ordered notices posted in government schools admonishing students to study classical teachings instead of those of petty persons of recent vintage. Hu An-kuo, having been criticized at court, withdrew his name from consideration for office. Such withdrawals by senior *Tao-hsüeh* scholar-officials along with the outright dismissal of Chao Ting and Chang Chün (1096-1164) solidified the ascendancy of Ch'in Kuei (1090-1155) from 1138 until his death. A peace treaty favored by Ch'in brought stability to Kao-tsung's reign. In spite of an imperial proclamation that government service and the examinations should not discriminate on grounds of intellectual difference, Ch'in Kuei's peace party was allowed to discourage dissent and to discriminate against the party's hawkish *Tao-hsüeh* opponents. Those who agreed with Ch'in dominated the ranks of the examinations and government service during his tenure. Sometimes at court he and his partisans used the pejorative label "special-approach learning" (*chuan-men chih hsüeh*) to refer to those who followed the Ch'engs.<sup>10</sup> This clever characterization suggested a narrow approach to Confucian learning. Students of such special learning were in 1144 barred from the examinations. Ch'in Kuei's absolutist exercise of power and suppression of dissent had a stifling impact on intellectual culture. However, Kao-tsung did not allow Ch'in and his partisans to go as far in their direct action against the fellowship as had the literary proscriptions of the last decades of the Northern Sung.

Even in this unreceptive and repressive climate, Confucian scholars preserved and even in small ways developed the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition. Senior scholars such as Yang Shih, Yin Ch'un, and Hu An-kuo contributed to the

continuity of the teachings they had personally received from Ch'eng I. Their teaching in the South before and after the Jurchen invasion prepared the ground for the fellowship to become well rooted during the first period. But they were advanced in years and lived through only from eight to fifteen years of the Southern Sung. Our discussion will begin with the generation that was active during the reign of Kao-tsung, a time when the roots of *Tao-hsüeh* supported several trunks leaning in diverse directions.

# Chapter 1 *The First Generation: Chang Chiu-ch'eng and Hu Hung*

Under the loose guidance of a number of men who traced their intellectual lineages back to Ch'eng I and his associates, the fledgling *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship strove to become established in key geographical areas. Without a single authority center, it became more diverse than it had been around the turn of the century, when Ch'eng I had been the preeminent figure. After the early 1160s, Chu Hsi condemned two generations of earlier disciples of the Ch'eng brothers for their divergence from Ch'eng I's teachings, and most Confucians in later generations followed him. Although it is difficult to get beyond Chu's accounts and attain an independent assessment of these earlier *Tao-hsüeh* thinkers, these thinkers are crucial to our understanding of the evolution of twelfth-century *Tao-hsüeh*. This chapter will use two leading intellectuals to portray some of the diversity within the fellowship during the early years of the Southern Sung. Despite their differences, Chang Chiu-ch'eng and Hu Hung shared concerns as they commented on history and the classics and continued the tradition. Their comments on major concepts inherited from Northern Sung masters serve to portray much of the group's intellectual agenda during the twelfth century.

## CHANG CHIU-CH'ENG

Chang Chiu-ch'eng studied the teachings of the Ch'engs in the Northern Sung capital of K'ai-feng and regarded Yang Shih as his principal

mentor. After returning home to the Hangchow area, he ranked first among all candidates in the *chin-shih* examination of 1132, a coveted distinction that launched his career at the Ministry of Rites. Although over one-quarter of his extant collected works comment on historical events, he thrice declined the emperor's request to lecture on the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. When ordered to expound upon the moralistic historiography of the *Annals*, Chang declined, saying that he could only speak on the *Analects* of Confucius and the *Mencius*. Yet Kao-tsung once remarked that he had learned more about ancient history from Chang than from the more famous *Tao-hsüeh* historian Hu An-kuo.<sup>1</sup> Along with his place in the examinations, Chang was best known in his own day for his commentaries on the *Analects* and the *Mencius* as well as those on the *Doctrine of the Mean* and the *Great Learning*. Only most of those on the *Mencius* and the *Mean* are extant. In a memorial to the emperor, he proclaimed: "Your servant perceives that the Chin people [i.e., Jurchens] are in a situation where they certainly must be destroyed, and the Middle Kingdom possesses the principle of certain victory!"<sup>2</sup> Such outspoken statements and Chang's criticism of appeasement policies provoked Ch'in Kuei to accuse him of factional politics and send him into exile for about fourteen years. Chang excused "literati with the *Tao*" from seeking governmental office in light of Ch'in Kuei's treatment of his opponents, which apparently included the extermination of worthy statesmen.<sup>3</sup> After Ch'in's death in 1155, Chang reentered government service as prefect of Wen-chou.

The legacy of the Ch'engs was evident in Chang's writings, particularly those on Heaven's principle (*t'ien-li*), the investigation of things (*ko-wu*), and personal cultivation through being watchful over oneself while alone. Chang inherited both Ch'eng Hao's emphasis on principle as the natural inclination in things and Ch'eng I's emphasis on principle as the origin or foundation of all things. Like Ch'eng Hao, he focused on principle as inhering in but having priority over human feelings. For instance, he proclaimed: "The utmost point of principle also does not depart from human feelings; however, people discard human feelings in seeking to attain principle, and this is why they digress so far."<sup>4</sup> Such divergence was clarified from a different perspective when he observed: "Sages regard Heaven's principle as human feelings; ordinary people frequently follow human feelings but rebel against Heaven's principle."<sup>5</sup>

As a method of learning Chang gave priority to the thorough investigation of things to know their principles. He offered the following advice: "One who peruses the Six Classics ought to put priority on learning to investigate things. By investigating things, one can be thorough in one's approach to the principles of all under Heaven; by being thorough, true knowledge is pursued to the utmost, the will is made sincere, the self well cultivated, the family well regulated, the country well governed, and the world made

peaceful.”<sup>6</sup> Because everything from a single thought to the myriad things ultimately conformed to principle, people should be open to the myriad but return to the oneness of principle. In this way, they could be at one with all things. Investigating things to know their common principle was fundamentally a quest for oneness with all things through spiritual cultivation. Self-cultivation centered on overcoming one’s human desires, never relaxing one’s discipline, and preserving Heaven’s principle within one’s own mind and nature.

Chang’s conception of the mind-and-heart (*hsin*) and the virtue of humaneness (*jen*) drew heavily from Ch’eng Hao. In discussing Ch’eng Hao’s observation that medical texts referred to paralysis of the limbs as “not *jen*,” Chang identified humaneness with the mind’s state of having perception or consciousness. He elaborated: “Humaneness is consciousness, and consciousness is the mind; it is because of mind that consciousness is produced and because of consciousness that there is humaneness.”<sup>7</sup> The word I translate as “consciousness” (*chüeh*) conveys both perception as such and awareness of others’ sufferings; hence it is an empathy or feeling of oneness with others. Ultimately the locus classicus of Chang’s identification of humaneness with the mind’s sensitivity to others’ suffering was the *Mencius* (6A/11). Commenting on this passage, Chang said: “Humaneness is the single principle of scholarship most dear in the sage’s school. Only Mencius grasped humaneness and thus said, ‘Humaneness is the human mind (*jen-hsin*).’”<sup>8</sup> The essence of humaneness was like Heaven in being impartial and resembled the *Tao* in being beyond delineation by names. Chang was here asserting that because humaneness existed in the human mind, the only way to actualize it was to seek within the mind.

To Chang, the mind was the way to humaneness and the foundation of things, because “the mind is principle, and principle is the mind.” On some occasions, his statements on the nature of things appear to expound a conception of reality that we might regard as philosophical idealism: “The manifold things of the world all arise from within the mind.”<sup>9</sup> Chang’s view had implications for the authoritative status of the classics. Because the classics had been burned by the Ch’in dynasty (221–207 B.C.), he asserted, much of what arose from the human mind could no longer be found in those writings; hence there was a need for other principles of the human mind to find expression in the writings of later philosophers.<sup>10</sup>

Once the mind comprehended the principles inherent within it, one realized that “the Six Classics were all things within one’s own mind,”<sup>11</sup> for the classics only recorded the principles discovered by the ancient sages through their minds. Clearly, Chang was not actually explicating a philosophical idealism but rather underlining the primary role of the mind in self-cultivation. The mind was clearly placed in the context of ethical cultivation: “The mind of a superior person is invariably enduring and generous, and the

mind of the petty person is generally paltry and niggardly. What the mind maintains—order or disorder, peace or anxiety, gain or loss, success or failure—is produced by the mind itself; and this must be regarded as a warning.”<sup>12</sup>

Chang’s consideration of what “things” were in the mind relates to the cultivation of cultural values—the level toward which his discourse was generally directed. The thrust of his usage was toward the practice of cultivating one’s virtue and the study of history and the classics instead of such speculative abstractions as the Supreme Ultimate (*t’ai-chi*) and the Ultimate of Non-being (*wu-chi*) on which Chou Tun-i had mused. Chang warned: “The *Tao* is not Emptiness (*hsü*) or Non-being (*wu*) but rather nothing more than what functions in daily life. To regard Emptiness or Non-being as the *Tao* is enough to destroy the country.”<sup>13</sup> As a positive prescription for avoiding such heterodoxy, he prescribed: “Only studies and inquiries that attain flavor in insipid places can enter the *Tao*.”<sup>14</sup> Although we moderns might regard being even and bland as pedestrian, such insipidity was a positive quality to Sung Confucians.<sup>15</sup>

Referring to the transcendent aspect of the mind, he equated it not only with the new philosophical category of Heaven’s principle but also with an older but less used one—“the mind of Heaven” (*t’ien hsin*). For example, he at least twice identified the mind of the sage-king Wen (11th century B.C.) of Chou as the mind of Heaven. In more general terms, he announced: “Fidelity (or loyalty) and sincerity penetrate the mind of Heaven above and the mind of the sage-kings below.”<sup>16</sup> His ascription of a more traditional transcendence to Confucian virtues and his emphasis on self-cultivation reflected his emphasis on cultural values, a level of discourse intermediate between discussions of policy and speculative philosophy.

Although he defended Confucian cultural values, Chang was not hostile toward Buddhism. He became close friends with Ta-hui Tsung-kao (1089–1163), a leading monk of the Lin-chi sect of Ch’an Buddhism. After Ch’in Kuei exiled the two men to the same area, they spent considerable time together during a ten-year period. Ta-hui explained the *Doctrine of the Mean* and the investigation of things in Buddhist terms as part of his effort to promote the unity of the Three Teachings—Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. Cultivating relations with Confucian literati, the monk elicited Chang’s support in reconciling differences. Indeed, much of what was known about Chang in later centuries was transmitted through Buddhist sources. Chang acknowledged correct points in Buddhism and explained its philosophy of Emptiness as self-cultivation aimed at eradicating human desires. There is no question that Ta-hui influenced Chang’s Confucian discussions and commentaries. Most significantly, the priority Chang gave to achieving oneness through the investigation of things had parallels in the introspection and enlightenment experience advocated by Ta-hui. More-



over, Ch'an influence encouraged Chang to follow Ch'eng Hao in relating humaneness to the mental process of consciousness and regarding the mind as the foundation of principle.<sup>17</sup> Such points of synthesis enabled him to make a contribution to the development of themes of importance to *Tao-hsüeh*.

My presentation of his role in inheriting and developing concepts from the Ch'eng brothers is intended as a counterbalance to the conventional view of Chang as essentially a Buddhist. The conventional view regarding Buddhist influence on Chang became established soon after his death. According to Ch'en Liang's complaint in the early 1160s, "every home possessed Chang's writings and everyone practiced his doctrines." Many literati had allegedly been so deluded by him that it was said that he did greater damage to Confucianism than the Taoist Yang Chu (c. 350 B.C.) and the utilitarian Mo-tzu (c. 490-c. 403 B.C.) had done in antiquity.<sup>18</sup> In Chang's own view, such heterodox views were difficult to eliminate, because they shared some Confucian ethical values: "Most people do not recognize heterodoxy, so it is difficult to eradicate. It's just like Yang and Mo, whose ideas were based on the study of humaneness and rightness; are humaneness and rightness heterodox? Only Mencius was able to refute and thus to eradicate them."<sup>19</sup>

Although he was more inclined to find common ground with Buddhism than interested in exterminating it, Chang did not refrain from claiming that Buddhism was inferior to Confucianism. Chang criticized Buddhism for undermining Confucian cardinal virtues and the three bonds of fundamental relationships. Such shortcomings in ethical practice arose from a Buddhist penchant:

The superior person's being watchful over himself while alone refers to ritual decorum being nurtured within, tranquil and unmoved, in the state before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused. This is what the *Book of Changes* [in its commentary on the second hexagram] related as "seriousness to square the inner life" and what Mencius [7A/1] called "exerting one's mind to the utmost to know one's nature." When one attains this, one cannot stop. The Buddhists, I suspect, are near to this, but as they approach this point, they stop and do not enter.<sup>20</sup>

From a Confucian perspective, Buddhists appeared merely to sit content and silent upon reaching such a state of mind. Chang insisted that attaining the ethical realm meant that one could not cease one's discipline and actions toward bettering oneself and society. Thus he blamed Buddhists' obsession with Emptiness for their social withdrawal and continued to view himself as differing from Buddhists in traditional Confucian terms. Because most followers of the Ch'engs in his generation were attracted to Ch'an, Chang's

affinities with Buddhism actually enhanced his popularity among his contemporaries.

Chang's popularity and the representative character of his synthesis during the first generation of the Southern Sung are evident in the earliest extant anthology of *Tao-hsüeh* Confucianism. The *Writings by Various Confucians for Propagating the Tao* (*Chu-ju ming-tao chi*) was compiled around the early 1160s, probably by some unspecified student or students of Chang Chiu-ch'eng.<sup>21</sup> Chang's prominence in the anthology is evident in its culmination with his "Daily Renewal" (*Jih hsin*), two chapters of recorded conversations with his students. Hence to the compilers Chang represented the completion of the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition to that time. The version of the tradition that appears in this first anthology will be contrasted in Chapter 5 with the more familiar version in Chu Hsi's anthology.

#### HU HUNG

Hu Hung was the leader of another major line of *Tao-hsüeh*. In letters to students and colleagues, he warned: "*Tao-hsüeh* is waning, and customs and doctrines are decadent; we disciples ought to give our lives to shouldering this burden."<sup>22</sup> His words and intentions were, according to his student Chang Shih, in true accord with the "vital points of *Tao-hsüeh*."<sup>23</sup> Taken together, relevant passages suggest that Hu's *Tao-hsüeh* was identified with a particular intellectual, cultural, and ethical tradition of which he and his associates were disciples.

Although his family was from the flourishing economic area of Fukien, Hu Hung chose to teach for over twenty years in Hunan, an economic and intellectual frontier. Earlier, as a youth, he had briefly studied with Yang Shih, but for the most part he continued the Hu family tradition centered on his father, Hu An-kuo. Both mentors had played a major role in transmitting the teachings of the Ch'engs. Because of Hu Hung's father's career in the bureaucracy, Hu was given an honorary rank and had opportunities to hold government office. He never served, largely because he opposed the peace policies of the court. Ardently patriotic, he wrote several memorials to Kao-tsung to urge ethical reform as well as military action against the Chin. If the emperor would act out of true love for the people and restore antique institutions with more local autonomy, the country would be strengthened to take revenge against the Jurchen invaders and restore the fortunes of the Sung dynasty in the heartland of North China.<sup>24</sup> Even though Ch'in Kuei inquired about him, Hu replied that he had no interest in the benefits of office; moreover, in his remarks about the Mountain Slope Academy (*Yüeh-lu shu-yüan*) in Ch'ang-sha, Hunan, he conveyed his preference for that place.<sup>25</sup> Ch'in Kuei obliged by appointing him head of the

academy. Commitment to a life as a teacher and scholar in the countryside rather than to officialdom led him to decline office even after Ch'in died.

Faith in the priority of knowledge over action apparently sublimated Hu Hung's intense patriotism into a life of teaching what he regarded as Confucian historiography and orthodoxy. Besides five chapters of collected short writings, he wrote a one-chapter commentary on the *Book of Changes*, which followed the interpretation of Ch'eng I. He also compiled the *Great Records of Emperors and Kings* (*Huang wang ta-chi*), eighty chapters on the history of early antiquity to 249 B.C., in which he continued the moralizing historiography of his father's commentary on the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. Applying principles from the classics to historical studies was also the theme in Hu Yin's (1095-1156) historiography. By the standards of the Hu family, Ssu-ma Kuang's work was unsatisfactory because it did not adequately apply classical principles and ethics to history. During the early stage of *Tao-hsüeh*, such history projects were rare outside the Hu family. Nonetheless, Chang Chiu-ch'eng was also a historian, and the Lü family (as we shall see in Chapter 4) wrote histories. The Hu family was somewhat of an anomaly at the time in its uncompromising hostility to Buddhism. Rejecting any possibility of common ground with those Buddhists who engaged in dialogue with Confucians, the Hu family bitterly denounced Buddhism for its deviant versions of Confucian concepts such as the mind.<sup>26</sup> Such anxiety to combat the seductive influence of Ch'an Buddhism and to revive ancient institutions through classical and historical studies drove Hu Hung to discuss policy as well as speculative philosophy—levels of discourse below and above the intermediate level on which Chang Chiu-ch'eng had focused.

Hu's speculative philosophy centered on human nature or inner nature (*hsing*) as the essence of Heaven and Earth. The opening line of the *Doctrine of the Mean* had declared: "What Heaven imparts to people is human nature." Citing this classic, Hu reasoned: "The inner nature is the great foundation of all under Heaven."<sup>27</sup> On another occasion, he continued this praise of the nature within people: "How great the nature! The ten thousand principles are complete in it. Heaven and Earth are established from it. When ordinary scholars speak of human nature, they all alike discuss it with reference to a particular principle. None of them has seen the total substance of what Heaven imparts."<sup>28</sup>

Hu spoke of the inner nature as all-encompassing and of principles as more specific to individual things. Hence principles were of a lower and more partial order than the inner nature. The nature was so all-encompassing that *ch'i* (psychophysical or vital energy) was also grounded in it. He said: "If it were not for the inner nature, there would be no things. If it were not for the vital energy, there would be no forms. As for the nature, it is the root of the vital energy."<sup>29</sup>

The essence of the inner nature was so all-inclusive that even sages could not delineate it with a name. Thus it had the characteristic conventionally ascribed to the *Tao*. Just as the nature was the ground for principle and vital energy, the *Tao* was inseparable from actual things: "The *Tao*'s having things is like wind having motion or water having fluidity, so who can separate them? Therefore, to seek the *Tao* apart from things is simply absurd."<sup>30</sup> Hu also explained that what Taoists and some Confucians regarded as the "Non-being" (*wu*) character of *Tao* was actually nothing more than the state before it became visible. Things that had form were visible, but referring to *Tao* as *wu* really only meant that people could not see it. Thus the principle of things never was Non-being, and it was perverse to regard Non-being as the root of the life in things, as Lao-tzu had done. Likewise, Hu insisted that reality had priority over names, for names must conform to reality.<sup>31</sup> In these various ways, Hu demonstrated his proclivity to start from actual entities rather than some abstract realm. Although he at times used metaphysical terms, he did not speak from some transcendent vantage point. Similarly, the use of such terms as "form" and "essence" here should not be read as suggesting philosophical parallels to Neo-Platonism in the West.

The inseparability of the *Tao* from actual things had a parallel in Hu's conception of human nature and the mind as two aspects of one reality. The progression of his thinking from the oneness of Being to the relationship between human nature and mind was crystallized:

Heaven and Earth are the parents of the sages; sages are the children of Heaven and Earth. When there are parents, there are children, and when there are children, there are also parents; this is why the myriad things have appeared and the *Tao* has a name. It is not that sages can [delineatingly] name the *Tao*. Nonetheless, when there is this *Tao*, there is also this name. Designating its essence, the sages called it "the inner nature," and designating its function, the sages called it "mind." The inner nature cannot but be active, and when active it is mind. The sages transmitted the mind and taught the world through humaneness.<sup>32</sup>

Thus the essence of the *Tao* was the inner nature, and its function was the mind. The stage before expression could only be referred to as the nature, and the stage after being aroused or expressed could only be referred to as mind. In other words, the mind was the manifestation of the inner nature.

The mind had significant tasks. In addition to the process of objective cognition of the principles of things, the mind also had a role as governor. Placing the mind in a commanding role over human nature, Hu declared: "The vital energy is ruled by the nature, and the nature is ruled by the mind. When the mind is pure, the nature is settled, and the vital force is correct."<sup>33</sup> Elsewhere he observed that although a fault in the mind was difficult to cor-

rect, if one corrected the mind's faults, there would be no other faults. Commenting here on mind as master over things, he shifted priority back to human nature: "When the nature is settled, the mind rules; when the mind rules, things follow."<sup>34</sup> This formulation would more closely reflect his idea of inner nature as essence and mind as function. When a student questioned why the classics emphasized the transmission of mind rather than the inner nature, Hu again centered on mind: "The mind is that which comprehends Heaven and Earth and commands the myriad things in order to bring human nature to completion or fulfillment."<sup>35</sup> Ascribing to the mind the role of completing the nature would seem to contradict the basic idea that the nature was the essence of all things and the substance of the mind. There has been a tendency to dismiss this contradiction as simply reflecting Hu's philosophically subjective view of the mind. Rather than explain away the tension in these too facile terms, perhaps we should use the contradiction as a reference point from which to explore Hu's perspective on mind and human nature further.

The mind itself had a transcendent quality, for it was not subject to life or death. It shared the permanent and extensive qualities of the inner nature: "The mind is everywhere. Based on the transformation of the *Tao* of Heaven, it deals with social interactions, assists Heaven and Earth, and provides for the myriad things."<sup>36</sup> Furthermore: "There is nothing in the world greater than the mind; the trouble lies in not being able to extend it. There is nothing more persevering than the inner nature; the trouble lies in not being able to follow it."<sup>37</sup> Although individuals easily lost sight of this mind because of their selfish desires, the mind could be regained by heeding the advice of Mencius (6A/11): "The *Tao* of learning is none other than finding the mind that has gone astray." If that lost mind were apprehended, one could persevere, nourish it, and extend it until it became expansive; moreover, once "expansive without stopping, it becomes identical with Heaven."<sup>38</sup> When Confucius at seventy reached the point of being able to follow his mind-and-heart without violating ethical principles, he had actually fathomed or exerted this mind to the utmost; hence, he became one with Heaven.<sup>39</sup>

Only a humane person could fathom the mind; moreover, people had first to recognize the substance of humaneness. Although Hu generally championed learning through reading and investigating things, he suggested that ultimately the recognition of humaneness was an intuitive experience in which a person identified with the procreative process of Heaven, for the mind of Heaven and Earth was to give life to all things. Furthermore, humaneness was the virtue by which people could link themselves to the mind of Heaven and the creative processes of Heaven and Earth.<sup>40</sup>

Being sincere [like] the mandate of Heaven, being centered like the nature of Heaven, being humane like the mind of Heaven, and putting in order one's nature to establish destiny; only a humane person is able to do this. One who entrusts everything to destiny loses the mind of Heaven; one who loses the mind of Heaven discards the ability to restore and use things. For the one who puts his nature in order, the mind of Heaven is preserved. One who has preserved the mind of Heaven restores what others have abandoned. Only after comprehending this does one know that the great ruler cannot be inhumane.<sup>41</sup>

Because humaneness was a quality of the mind that was shared with Heaven, one could become one with Heaven by reaching the utmost depths of the mind. One could interpret Hu's statements as meaning that humaneness and Heaven, which the mind possessed, were simply the essence of the mind, that is to say, the inner nature. But Hu proceeded to characterize the inner nature not by such Confucian ethical qualities but in quite different terms.

The inner nature was so all-encompassing and so far beyond the ability of even sages to delineate that it transcended all fixed distinctions—including good and evil. When asked about his statement that the inner nature was the basis of Heaven and Earth, Hu replied: "The nature is the mystery of Heaven, Earth, and the spiritual forces; good is inadequate to describe it, so shall we even mention evil?"<sup>42</sup> When challenged by a student, Hu explained that Mencius' famous pronouncements (as in 6A/1-6) about the goodness of the inner nature were an exclamation of admiration rather than an assertion of goodness in contrast to evil. Setting aside Mencius' identification of the nature with the beginnings of the four cardinal Confucian virtues, he emphasized the physical side of the sage's comments (7B/24) to suggest: "The inclination of people's eyes toward the five colors, their ears toward the five sounds, and their mouths toward the five flavors is what their nature is like and is not something external. Therefore, the sage followed their nature to lead them to the utmost good, and so the people were easy to transform."<sup>43</sup> Hu also identified the inner nature with people's innate likes and dislikes. As evident in the second half of the quoted passage, however, Hu had by no means abandoned the Mencian assumption that following the natural feelings rooted in human nature was the path to attaining the highest good.

Hu's sensitivity to physical feelings, which he considered to be inherent in human nature, enabled him to speak more freely than other *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians about "the propriety involved in intimate physical contact and the *Tao* inherent in sexual intercourse."<sup>44</sup> Indeed, believing that both human desires and ethical principles arose from the inner nature, he did not follow

Ch'eng I in making an absolute distinction between human desires and Heaven's principles. Thus, "Heaven's principle and human desires are the same in essence but differ in function. They are the same in operation but differ in situation."<sup>45</sup> Principle and desires were of the same essence, because they were grounded in human nature without distinction of good and evil. Function was related to mind, so functions differed. Elaborating further, he reasoned: "Likes and dislikes are the nature. The petty person likes and dislikes in terms of the ego; the superior person likes and dislikes in terms of the *Tao*. Scrutinizing this, one can comprehend Heaven's principles and human desires."<sup>46</sup> Thus liking and disliking was characteristic of everyone's nature. Yet the object of one's liking distinguished a superior person from others.

Identifying the inner nature with feelings raises a question about distinguishing proper and improper emotions and actions. The inseparability of principle and desires referred only to the state before the feelings were expressed, that is, to the inner nature. Once the feelings were aroused, Hu measured them against the Mean to distinguish the good from the evil. As a Confucian, he emphasized upholding the standard: "What is in accord with the Mean is right, and what is not in accord with the Mean is wrong. Holding to the right while taking action is correct, but holding to the wrong while taking action is perverse. One who is correct does good, and one who is perverse does evil!"<sup>47</sup> More succinctly, the *Tao* of the inner nature was *chung*, that is to say, the Mean, equilibrium, centrality, or commonality. As centrality or equilibrium, the inner nature was neither good nor evil. Still, one could act in accord with it and be good. There appears to be a significant contradiction here: On the one hand, the nature as the Mean was neutral, inclined neither to good nor to evil. Yet on the other hand, Hu upheld the Mean or *Tao* as the standard of right and wrong in one's actions. Hu was building from the passage in the first section of the *Doctrine of the Mean*: "Before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused, it is called equilibrium. When these feelings are aroused and each and all attain due measure and degree, it is called harmony."<sup>48</sup> As the state before the feelings were expressed, centrality was, to Hu, the inner nature. Hence he was no doubt linking the sentences about human nature and equilibrium to explicate the philosophy of the *Doctrine of the Mean*.

Spiritual cultivation, one of Hu's utmost priorities, reflected his view of human nature and the mind. The Hu family believed that it was a waste of mental energy to sit quietly in silent meditation trying to cultivate the state before the feelings were aroused. They identified that state with the nature itself. Thus how could one cultivate an all-encompassing nature, which was beyond good and evil! Self-cultivation should start with the active phase through perceiving the original mind-and-heart in the midst of everyday

activities. The mind as the active state was the center of cultivation; therefore, much depended on the mental attitude with which one proceeded.

Only after clarifying principles and abiding in reverent composure (*ching*) can the *Tao* of sincerity be attained. The *Tao* of Heaven is most sincere and therefore never ceases. The *Tao* of people is to hold reverence as fundamental in order to seek to accord with Heaven. Confucius progressed from “setting his mind on learning” to “following his heart’s desires but not transgressing what is right” (*Analects*, 2/4). That is the perfection of the *Tao* of reverence. Reverent composure is that whereby the superior man completes his life.<sup>49</sup>

*Ching* meant seriousness in concentrating on what was fundamental to becoming a good person. But it also conveyed a sense of reverence and a calmness of mind and bearing. Thus one simple English rendering seems inadequate to capture its range of usage by different Confucians. Self-cultivation was not just an end in itself. The transformed self had a mission: “This is why it is only after humaneness and wisdom have been unified that the education of the superior person is complete.” It is the completed self that can bring things to completion.<sup>50</sup>

Hu also regarded self-cultivation as crucial to quieting the diverse and discordant voices of the age. Drawing on the image of a vast river with many branches, Hu portrayed contending perspectives as arising from partial views of the *Tao*:

The *Tao* fills the body and suffuses Heaven and Earth, but those who restrict themselves to one small island do not perceive its greatness. The *Tao* exists even in eating and sexual intercourse, but those who immerse themselves in only one branch do not know its essence. The various philosophers of the hundred schools appraise it from their own perspectives and embellish it with arguments. Notions arising from hearsay, convention, or confusion they designate as the *Tao* of principle and nature. They arrive at such opinions simply from ignorance. What a pity! This is why heretical theories and outrageous ways are so prevalent that only a few haven’t been deluded by them. But what can be done? The answer resides in personal self-cultivation.<sup>51</sup>

Spiritual cultivation was the solution not only because one needed to be ethical to be in touch with the *Tao* but also because scholars needed to become better people to work together in good faith. In a passage that brings to mind the bitter conflicts among Confucians over reform and war policies in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Hu lamented how difficult it was to criticize another’s real flaws and how it was even more difficult to accept such criticism oneself. If people could do both, they would have realized the



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meaning of friendship. Without friendship, people usually become petty, entrapping each other with trumped-up charges.<sup>52</sup>

Such passages convey a hunger for more friendship and fellowship within the Confucian community. It was his dedication to the task of bringing about such fellowship that led Hu to devote his life in remote Ch'ang-sha to teaching those who thus became known as the Hunan school.

In addition to its practice of spiritual cultivation, Hu's school was known for the primacy given to the inner nature, the all-encompassing essence of Heaven and Earth. Yet Hu Hung also said that human nature transcended traditional Confucian distinctions between good and evil. Moreover, he identified human nature with the likes and dislikes of the feelings in response to the five senses. At times, the primacy accorded to the nature appears to have been surpassed by that given to the mind. The mind had the task of ruling the nature and bringing it to completion or fulfillment. Hu never adequately addressed the question of how the mind as the function or manifestation of the nature could have a such a commanding role over that which was its essence. Even though he made the mind the focus of self-cultivation and the agent for completing the inner nature, he also portrayed the mind as responsive and passive: "The human mind's response to the myriad things is like water's reflection of myriad images."<sup>53</sup> Thus Hu's brief and undated statements in *Understanding of Words (Chih-yen)* were open to diverse interpretation and did not make the rigorous philosophical distinctions among concepts that the subsequent generation regarded as necessary for a coherent *Tao-hsüeh* philosophy.

Hu Hung's and Chang Chiu-ch'eng's discussions of *Tao-hsüeh* concepts helped stir the next generation of thinkers to wrestle with these ideas further. For example, as we will see in Chapter 3, Chu Hsi and his colleagues had an extended discussion of Hu Hung's *Understanding of Words*. Despite the inhospitable climate during Ch'in Kuei's dominance, Chang and Hu preserved and even nurtured the tradition to grow in different directions in reference to such points as Buddhism, human nature, mind, humaneness, study and self-cultivation. Changes in the political environment would give the next generation of *Tao-hsüeh* leaders greater latitude and leisure to develop and propagate more systematic arguments. The next generation would also have greater freedom in solidifying a fellowship and defining a tradition for those committed to *Tao* learning.

## PART 2 THE SECOND PERIOD, 1163-1181

In the wake of a Jurchen invasion in 1161, a shift in political culture accompanied the charged atmosphere during the period of warfare and temporary Sung military initiatives that followed. Kao-tsung abdicated in the summer of 1162, and the new emperor, Hsiao-tsung (r. 1162-1189), followed convention in calling for frank advice from scholars and officials throughout the realm. Answering the emperor's appeal, members of the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship advocated reform of Sung policies and war against the Jurchen. The excitement and promise of the day waned, however, when Hsiao-tsung opted for a new peace treaty that ended the war in 1164. Even though the new treaty set terms less unequal than those during the first period, *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians were bitterly disappointed over the lost chance to regain the North. Nevertheless, *Tao-hsüeh* intellectuals and the leadership of the government were now more mutually receptive than the generation before them had been. This second period witnessed no significant assaults on the legacy and followers of the Ch'eng brothers; moreover, members of the fellowship served more readily in government than they had during the previous reign.

The affiliations of those awarded *chin-shih* degrees during the first and second periods are suggestive of trends in relations between the government and the fellowship. Measurement, however, is difficult. I will take as a sample those who would in the late 1190s be listed either as members of the "false learning" faction of *Tao-hsüeh* or as their attackers. Although the list of *Tao-hsüeh* partisans was compiled by their attackers, there was (as will be discussed in Part 3) considerable intellectual and political coherence

among those on the list even beyond their recommendations and memorials on each other's behalf. The list of attackers appears to be less coherent, but all those on this list either wrote memorials or did something else to attack *Tao-hsüeh* men. Since this group was self-selecting, it is particularly difficult to relate the characteristics of those listed to a larger body of scholar-officials who held similar views. Current data provide little evidence for comparing those on either list with the larger membership of the two groups; however, given the nature of the lists, certainly a higher proportion of *Tao-hsüeh* men than attackers are listed. Scholars have traditionally presented the attackers as acting from private resentments, personal grudges, or even a general anti-intellectualism. But I would like to leave open for later discussion the possibility that they might have had some reasoned grounds for their hostility. As far as our imperfect data reveal, the lists show no significant differential of age, status, level of government service, or geographical origin. Rather, both lists covered a considerable spectrum. The *Tao-hsüeh* men on the blacklist numbered 59, and their attackers merely 35. Information on the year of the *chin-shih* degree yields an even smaller sample: a total of 36 *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians and 21 attackers.<sup>1</sup>

Despite such limitations in the data, percentages still suggest trends. During the first period, 14 percent of the *Tao-hsüeh* group received their degrees. The two of prominence among these five men were Chu Hsi and Chou Pi-ta (1126-1204); however, they were quite young (18 and 26) at the time and not yet closely identified with *Tao-hsüeh*. During the second period, 86 percent of the *Tao-hsüeh* sample achieved *chin-shih* status. Among their attackers, almost 43 percent received their degrees in the first period and almost 57 percent during the second period. The results are even more striking for the last decade beginning in 1172, the year Lü Tsu-ch'ien and Yu Mao (1127-1194) served as the chief examiners. More *Tao-hsüeh* men (seven) won their degrees that year than in any other year, and only one of their later opponents earned his degree that year. Thus, out of all those later blacklisted as *Tao-hsüeh* men, more than 19 percent received their degrees in 1172. Subjectivity or an ideological bias in Lü's grading was evident in more than the sheer numbers. The government had stringent rules against favoritism and safeguards to prevent the examiners from knowing whose examination essays they were grading. Despite such safeguards, Lü recognized the style of Lu Chiu-yüan's essay, even though he had previously read only a few pieces of Lu's writings. It must have been even easier for him to recognize the paper of Ch'en Fu-liang (1137-1203), a friend from his own prefecture. As we will see, Lü had such exceptional prestige and status that he even dared to announce his discovery of Lu Chiu-yüan's paper. Our statistics on the 1172 examination do not even include this famous case, as Lu Chiu-yüan died too early to make the blacklist. Overall, in the decade from 1172 to 1181, 44 percent of the *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians obtained their degrees

compared to only 1 percent of their opponents. Compared with the first period, increasing numbers and percentages of *Tao-hsüeh* men were receiving their degrees during the second period—at the expense of more conventional Confucians who were critical of *Tao-hsüeh*.

Given the emerging trend in favor of the fellowship, it is not surprising that in 1180 Chao Yen-chung (1169 *chin-shih*) complained about bias evident in the prevalence of theories of human nature and principle and the influence of the Ch'engs in the examinations.<sup>2</sup> Chao had received his degree in the last examination in which the results for the two groups were almost balanced. Beyond concern over the impact of bias on any particular examination, someone like Chao realized that ties among successful candidates for a particular year and between them and their chief examiners had long provided major bonding for cooperation during subsequent political careers. Thus the examinations had a direct impact upon political factionalism.

The 1161 invasion stirred fervent commitments to the absolute correctness of Confucian values and to education as the means for ensuring the survival of those values among the young. Compared to Sung failures against the Chin under Kao-tsung, the relative success under Hsiao-tsung also apparently enhanced a sense of security and confidence. The crisis and the ensuing peace together enhanced, somewhat paradoxically, both fervor for defending the tradition and a climate of relative peace and confidence for the work of defining it. With political issues relatively relaxed, scholars could now focus more on intellectual questions.

The timing of the transition from Kao-tsung to Hsiao-tsung in 1162 also reflected a change of generations. Chang Chiu-ch'eng, Hu Hung, and Hu Yin had already died, and Li T'ung (Li Yen-p'ing, 1093-1163) soon followed. By 1163, a generation born in the first decade of the Southern Sung had come to maturity and begun to dominate the dialogue on Confucian values. Most notable were Chu Hsi, Lu Chiu-ling (1132-1180), Chang Shih, and Lü Tsu-ch'ien. Of these senior scholars, all but Chu died in 1180 or 1181. Although more junior scholars were already active before 1181, Chu and Chang and Lü dominated the period. These senior scholars were known as the three worthies of the Southeast, and they headed the major branches of the fellowship during the second period. They shared much of the same agenda—symbolized by their simultaneous presence in the capital in 1163 during the height of excitement over Sung hopes and plans for a restoration of control over the North. In subsequent personal visits and letters, their friendships deepened and their exchange of ideas promoted shared intellectual growth and definition of the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship and tradition.

Chu Hsi's development provides an introduction to the character of this period as distinct from the earlier one. As the bibliography suggests, Chu's

life and thought have been more extensively studied than has any other Sung personage, so I will only highlight certain aspects here.

The turmoil and uncertainties during Kao-tsung's reign dominated Chu Hsi's childhood. His father, Chu Sung (1097-1143), protested the search for peace with the invading Jurchen and was demoted to a local post in Fukien, where he lost even his position as county sheriff shortly before Chu Hsi was born there in 1130. Chu Hsi's father, a student of Yang Shih, laid the foundation for his interest in the teachings of the Ch'eng brothers and the historical writings of Ssu-ma Kuang. Nearing death, his father entrusted his education to three neighboring Confucians with some grounding in the legacy of the Ch'engs. Although one of the three, Hu Hsien (1082-1162), was a first cousin to Hu Hung, they did not partake of the Hu family hostility to Buddhism and Taoism but rather reflected the more accommodative spirit toward Buddhism that Chang Chiu-ch'eng represented. The writings of another of the three, Liu Tzu-hui (1101-1147), has been preserved only in the anthology of *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians compiled by Chang's students. Reflecting this environment and seeking solace, Chu Hsi developed a fascination for Ta-hui's Ch'an Buddhism. During his teens, death claimed not only his father but also his two brothers and two of the three neighboring scholars in charge of his education. In addition to encouraging a fascination with Buddhism and Taoism, these deaths contributed to his apparent sense of mission as a survivor and prevented him from having a single dominant mentor. Without the influence of one teacher over a long period of time, Chu was apparently more conditioned than most Confucians to set out on a relatively independent quest for certainty.

Chu Hsi's fortunes began to change after he passed the *chin-shih* examination in 1148. Although ranked only in the fifth or bottom group of successful candidates, Chu was only about half the average age of those candidates. Besides being freed at an early age from the need to concentrate his studies on the examination curriculum, he could anticipate an early start on a bureaucratic career, albeit from the lower rungs thereof. Appointed as registrar in T'ung-an county in Fukien, he occupied that post for over four years beginning in 1153 and reformed the management of local taxation and police work, upgraded educational standards, and drafted codes for proper ritual and decorum. That post gave him experience with the practical problems of official society and was followed by sinecure appointments as overseer of a mountain temple, which provided several years of leisure to reflect and study.

By the end of the 1150s, Chu's thinking evidenced signs of change. Beginning in 1153, he paid several visits to Li T'ung, a disciple of Yang Shih who had been highly praised by Chu's father as a dedicated follower of the Ch'engs. At first, while inquiring about the teachings of the Ch'engs, Chu also spoke enthusiastically about Taoism and Buddhism. Li rebuked him for

his fascination with such heterodoxies and urged him to concentrate on the Confucianism of the Ch'engs. Given the prominence of Buddhism in Fukien during the Sung, it is not surprising to find Fukienese known either for their interest in the synthesis of Confucianism and Buddhism (as in the case of the three neighbors who taught Chu during his teens) or for their outspoken zeal for orthodoxy (as in the case of Li T'ung, Hu Hung, and Chu Chen). In 1159, Chu Hsi compiled his first book, *Recorded Conversations of Hsieh Liang-tso* (*Shang-ts'ai yü-lu*), in which he purged some extraneous passages in which Hsieh, a disciple of the Ch'engs, was quoted as being critical of the Ch'engs for helping Buddhists. Although Hsieh Liang-tso was probably the most inclined toward Buddhism of all the major first-generation disciples of the Ch'engs, Chu's book marked a major step toward Chu's concentration on the school of the Ch'eng brothers. Gradually, Chu was embracing Li's more exclusive commitment to the Confucianism of the Ch'eng school.

By the mid-1160s, Chu had adopted Li's hostile attitude toward Buddhism and Taoism to such an extent that he wrote a major rebuttal of the prevailing syncretic trend seeking commonalities between Confucianism and these two religions. Chu completed by 1166 this "Critique of Adulterated Learning" (*Tsa-hsüeh pien*) to refute Su Shih's comments on the *Changes*, Su Ch'e's on the *Lao-tzu*, Chang Chiu-ch'eng's on the *Mean*, and Lü Pen-chung's (1084-1145) on the *Great Learning*. Chu's concerns were succinctly set forth in the colophon written by his friend Ho Shu-ching (1128-1175). The Su brothers, Chang, and Lü had adulterated the classics with the ideas of Lao-tzu, Chuang-tzu, and the Buddha. More recent scholars tended to follow the views of these renowned literati because of their reputations. Therefore heterodoxy was becoming increasingly entrenched. Chu Hsi, "fearing that this *Tao* of ours would not be made clear," had written this critique that "exposed their mistakes and absurdities."<sup>3</sup>

For example, paraphrasing and/or briefly quoting Chang's comments on passages from the *Mean*, Chu sought to point out that his views differed from those of the classics and the Ch'engs. Chu characterized Chang as being lost in introspection and disregarding rational inquiry and textual exegesis. Furthermore, Chang's explanation of humaneness as consciousness and his subjectivistic understanding of the original mind reflected the Ch'an quest for intuitive enlightenment. Chu certainly overstated the case when he dismissed Chang as no more than a Ch'an Buddhist in Confucian disguise. Yet he was no doubt correct that Chang had been influenced more than he was aware by Ch'an. Chu's "Critique of Adulterated Learning" also marked a clear break with his own syncretic leanings of his youth and launched his personal campaign against what he regarded as deviant orientations within Confucianism.

Chu's first commentary on the *Analects*, completed in 1163, and subsequent major works during this second period document the direction of his



maturation. By 1163, although he encompassed a wide range of contemporary and earlier commentaries, he had accepted the Ch'engs as the interpretative standard for the *Analects*. Completing in 1168 a compilation of the *Surviving Works of the Two Ch'engs* (*Erh-Ch'eng i-shu*), he presented the Ch'engs as having revived the lost teachings of the ancient sages. In 1172, his *Essential Meanings of the Analects and the Mencius* (*Lun Meng ching-i*) advanced deeper into the Ch'eng brothers' interpretations of these classics using the writings of their students. In 1177, he finished a set of four works: *Questions and Collected Commentaries on the Analects and the Mencius* (*Lun Meng chi-chu huo-wen*). Here he rejected most of the views of disciples of the Ch'engs. Another publication of 1177 that reinforced this display of independent maturity was the *Original Meaning of the Chou Dynasty Book of Changes* (*Chou I pen-i*). Instead of following Ch'eng I in interpreting the *Book of Changes* as a philosophical text about principle, Chu emphasized that divination was the original intent of the book. By deciding who and what to include in his various works, Chu Hsi demonstrated evolving maturation from a student of the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition to an authority. Chu Hsi's work during this second period evolved in communication with others who were also sorting through texts left by three diverse generations and striving for a more systematic presentation of the tradition.

To understand Chu Hsi's ideas in context, it is thus necessary to explore the thought of some of these other Confucians and their exchanges with Chu Hsi. For the period between 1163 and 1181, allowing Chang Shih and Lü Tsu-ch'ien to take their historical places in the foreground alongside Chu Hsi will balance the conventional accounts that have focused more narrowly on Chu. Free of the political suppression that had prevailed under Ch'in Kuei, major teachers were, during the second period, more at liberty and leisure to develop their ideas and to attract larger numbers of students. Although Lü also sought to defend the group against extraneous influences and outside pressures, his leadership—compared with that of the previous and subsequent periods—encouraged a freer exchange of diverse views and a *relative* pluralism within the fellowship.

Tensions existed despite this relative pluralism. As the political conflict over the Yüan-yü legacy became more distant in the changed political environment of the 1160s, "ideological" factors of ideas and intellectual lineages became increasingly prominent as criteria for inclusion in the fellowship. Chang Shih, Chu Hsi, and even Lü Tsu-ch'ien sought to disentangle *Tao-hsüeh* from its ties to Buddhism, which had been more pervasive during the first period. By sifting out traces of adulterated learning, they fostered greater consciousness of a single unique Confucian fellowship. Relative freedom from political interference provided an environment not only for expanding the fellowship, but also for turning attention to defining who and what belonged within the tradition.

## Chapter 2 Chang Shih

Chang Shih, whom Chu Hsi praised as having the "virtue of *Tao-hsüeh*" and as being a "pure Confucian,"<sup>1</sup> was probably the most influential individual in the fellowship during most of the 1160s. The exceptionally bright and gifted son of a famous official, Chang emerged as the leading figure among Hunan scholars after the death of his teacher, Hu Hung. Building on the Hu family tradition of scholarship, Chang brought the Hunan branch of *Tao-hsüeh* to completion philosophically, but the Hunan legacy languished soon after his death in 1180. By the 1170s, he had already been surpassed as leading teacher by Lü Tsu-ch'ien and as theoretician by Chu Hsi. Although included with Chu Hsi in the *Tao-hsüeh* biographies of the official *Sung History* and recognized in modern scholarship in East Asia, Chang Shih has been largely overlooked by most American and European scholars.<sup>2</sup>

Chang Shih first met Chu Hsi in 1163, when Chang was summoned to the capital to prepare the way for the return of his father, Chang Chün. Although Chang Chün's hawkish plans had failed during Kao-tsung's reign, he was now needed for the renewed war against the Chin. Chang Shih had from childhood accompanied his father to various posts away from their home in Szechwan. Like his father, he "selflessly took attacking the enemy barbarians and recovering the ancestral homeland as his own responsibility."<sup>3</sup> He played a major role in assisting his father during the military emergency, but the old warrior's untimely death in 1164 necessitated Chang Shih's temporary retirement to observe mourning.

Chang Shih became known for his forthright advice to Hsiao-tsung. When the emperor lamented how difficult it was to find officials who were devoted enough to die for what was right, Chang responded: "Seek this kind of official among those subjects who dare offend Your Majesty in giving their opinions. If they dare not give such advice in ordinary situations, how can Your Majesty expect them at a critical moment to give their lives for what is right?"<sup>4</sup> Asked about Heaven, Chang replied that Heaven should not be confused with the sky. Heaven referred to the Lord on High (*shang-ti*), which was an even more ancient appellation for the highest deity. Because this Lord on High was near the emperor, Hsiao-tsung should watch his thoughts in order to avoid angering the Lord on High.<sup>5</sup> Noting that the enmity with the Chin was such that one could not live under the same sky with the invaders, Chang urged the emperor to forswear talk of peace and to dedicate the dynasty to self-strengthening in preparation for liberating the North. When the emperor asked him about taking advantage of the enemy's weakness from several years of bad crops and weather, Chang countered with the Sung's own limitations. The key, he insisted, was not the momentary material conditions of the two sides, but rather a long-range plan to improve the quality of governance and readiness. Without winning the hearts of the people, it was impossible to regain the Central Plain. The way to win the hearts of the people was to "not exhaust their strength and not strain their resources."<sup>6</sup>

Such traditional Confucian ideas about the importance of the people's well-being were put into practice in Chang's administrative work. During the era of crisis in the wake of the loss of North China to the Chin, his actions in accord with Confucian ideals were, according to Chu Hsi, uncommon. Chu asserted: "Very few officials of high or low rank have been able to step forward to fulfill their duties without regarding their own safety; and even among those, no one can be compared to you in terms of filial piety in sustaining the family, devoted loyalty to the country, clarity and impartiality in administering justice, and thoroughness in deliberation."<sup>7</sup> Besides acting as expositor-in-waiting to the emperor and serving in the Ministry of Personnel and the Secretariat, Chang worked at prefectural posts for more than ten years, during which time he was in charge of four different prefectures in various regions of the realm. On assuming each post, he reportedly inquired frequently about the suffering of the people; moreover, he initiated reforms and relief measures to lighten the burdens of the people. Even though such statements are conventional biographical language, Chang was apparently a good administrator.<sup>8</sup> Education and local schools ranked near the top of his agenda. To revive education and enlighten the people, he wrote at least fifty-four instructional records for various kinds of schools and studies; moreover, he set down principles and rules to be followed. These instructions fervently proclaimed a special mis-

sion for education: "In this world, human ethics cannot be neglected for a single day; if neglected, the country would follow in decline."<sup>9</sup>

This moral agenda for education was necessary in what Chang regarded as a hostile cultural climate. Those who chased after the heterodox doctrines of Buddhism and Taoism were bad enough, but they were merely symptomatic of the era's general failure to comply with Confucian teachings. Some scholars disdained Confucianism as impractical. A passion for advantage was so pervasive that even senior scholars who expounded on Confucian texts often did so primarily to advance their own individual ends. Others who focused on the theoretical side of Confucianism were often even worse: "The flaw of scholars of recent generations is boundless speculation without any actual results from learning. Their point of view is like the heterodox theory of 'transcending the teachings of the narrow path.' Moreover, they come out below the level of the heterodox because they deceive not only themselves, but also others."<sup>10</sup> Chang lamented that so few understood and practiced true Confucian teachings and expressed the need to differentiate "our Confucians" from the host of popular heterodox and impure teachings.<sup>11</sup> Such spiritual degeneration was a frequent topic in his letters to Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu-ch'ien. However much such perceptions might have been exaggerated, they energized a zeal to defend the tradition and educate the community.

Chang Shih's own education was directed toward the Ch'engs from an early age. From childhood he had been taught by his father. The elder Chang had received instruction from followers of both the Ch'eng brothers and their rivals, the Su brothers from Szechwan. He also had friends from the restored-reform party, and he was not supportive of all claims made by his *Tao-hsüeh* friends about their tradition. Despite his linkage to the home area of Szechwan and the complexity of his own background, the father chose to direct the son to the Hu family tradition of the Ch'engs rather than toward the Sus.<sup>12</sup> After being dismissed from government service, Chang Chün apparently identified more with his *Tao-hsüeh* friends and had fewer reservations about their perspectives. At first, the young Chang Shih had access to Hu Hung only through personal correspondence and published writings. In his late twenties, he wept out of joy and admiration at their first meeting in 1161. Perceiving the youth's sincerity and capacity, Hu Hung taught him about humaneness. Chang Shih withdrew to reflect and wrote a letter about humaneness. After reading this letter, Hu exclaimed: "The school of the sages has such a person; how fortunate, how fortunate for this *Tao* of ours!"<sup>13</sup>

Chang thereafter wrote a long essay on humaneness, the "Record of Admiring Yen-tzu" (*Hsi Yen lu*). In the *Analects* (6/2 and 6/5), Confucius had praised his favorite pupil, Yen Hui (521-490 B.C.), for his love of learning and his ability for three months at a time to keep his mind free of any

thought contrary to humaneness. Chang compiled statements by Confucians through the centuries who had commented on Yen-tzu's humaneness and projected him as a model for spiritual cultivation. Hu Hung cautioned Chang that a major essay on such a crucial topic should be flawless. Moreover, in considering various views from different perspectives over the centuries, one had to seek clarity and correctness from often unclear and incorrect historical sources. Lauding Chang's diligence in verifying the sources, Hu added: "Deciding which words from the comments of the former worthies to ignore or to adopt is a very difficult matter."<sup>14</sup> Hu was in effect encouraging him to exercise critical judgment in order to determine what should be in the tradition. Soon after their second meeting, Hu Hung died. Yet Chang had obtained copies of Hu's writings, which he studied carefully.

The essay on humaneness continued to be central in Chang's personal development. He used it as a standard to evaluate his own progress, as described by Chu Hsi: "Chang wrote 'Record of Admiring Yen-tzu,' and reading it to examine himself morning and night, he sternly disciplined himself. What he learned was profound and far-reaching, but he never dared to consider himself adequate. He further made friends from all around to seek after what his own learning had not yet achieved. For more than ten years, he ceaselessly investigated, evaluated, practiced and experienced [what he learned about humaneness]."<sup>15</sup> Thus participating in the fellowship, Chang continued to mature until, fourteen years after drafting the original essay, he penned the colophon for its publication in 1173.<sup>16</sup>

Chang had by 1173 also completed commentaries on the *Analects* and the *Mencius*. Chang paraphrased these classics in a lucid ancient prose style and sought to clarify the classics with less recourse than typical among his contemporaries to Sung philosophical terms. Continuing Hu Hung's commentary on Ch'eng I's interpretation of the *Book of Changes*, Chang stressed the practical role of the book as a guide to governance and political ethics. His practical experience was also reflected in his *Annals of Governance* (*Ching-shih chi-nien*). The Hu family tradition of historiography in the service of ethics was reflected in his biography of Chu-ko Liang (181-234), the prime minister of the kingdom of Shu at the end of the Han. Chang regarded this "Confucian general" as a model for doing what was right instead of what was merely useful for personal advantage.<sup>17</sup>

There is a problem regarding Chang's writings as they have come down to us. His essay on humaneness and his commentaries underwent several revisions in consultation with friends, especially Chu Hsi. Thus the final completion of these works in 1173 represented a watershed in satisfaction with his level of maturation in dealing with the tradition. When Chu finalized the editing and wrote the preface to Chang's collected short writings in 1184, he omitted some of Chang's early writings—including the "Record of Admiring Yen-tzu." As will be illustrated in our next chapter, the absence of

this essay as well as other writings on humaneness and some letters to Chu inhibits our study of Chang's thought and the interaction between the two friends. Especially given Chu's own testimony to the importance of the "Record of Admiring Yen-tzu," it is as surprising as it is unfortunate that Chu excised these texts from Chang's collected works. Chu's editing and Chang's own inclination for revising his work before 1173 have resulted in a corpus with less evidence of evolutionary development than Chang reportedly experienced and greater apparent agreement with Chu than was certainly the case, especially before 1173.<sup>18</sup> This is a major obstacle to reconstructing the diversity of *Tao-hsüeh* Confucianism from the perspective of Chang's leadership of its Hunan branch in the 1160s and 1170s.

Chang Shih's continuing study of humaneness immersed him ever deeper in Confucian sources. Confucius had spoken of humaneness in terms of ritual propriety and not having any thought contrary to propriety. Mencius made humaneness one of the four basic virtues in human nature; moreover, the Ch'eng brothers regarded it as the sum of the four virtues and as being one with all things. Chang, in his "Treatise on Humaneness" (*Jen shuo*), eloquently expounded upon this tradition's view of the essence and function of humaneness. Because of its clarity in presenting what Chang regarded as the axis of Confucianism, this essay from 1172 or 1173 is here translated almost in its entirety.

The nature of people possesses the four virtues of humaneness, rightness, propriety, and wisdom. Its principle of love is humaneness. The principle of what is appropriate is rightness. The principle of yielding is propriety. The principle of knowledge is wisdom. Even when these four virtues do not yet have form to be seen, their principles are certainly rooted there [in the nature], so the body really possesses these. In its centrality or state of equilibrium, the inner nature only has these four virtues, and all the myriad goods are managed from here. What is called the principle of love is the mind of Heaven and Earth to give birth to things and that from which they are born. Therefore, humaneness is the chief of the four virtues and can also encompass them. The inner nature's state of equilibrium has these four virtues; thus, when the nature is manifested through the feelings, it acts as the beginnings of commiseration, shame and dislike, the sense of right and wrong, as well as deference and yielding. And what is called commiseration can also unify and penetrate the rest. This is why the nature and feelings are related as essence and function, and the *Tao* of the mind-and-heart resides as master in the nature and feelings. People simply becloud or block it with their own self-centeredness and so losing contact with the principle of their nature become inhumane—even to the point of being jealous and cruel. Are these [in accordance with natural] *human* senti-

ments? Their sinking is to a low level. For this reason, in becoming humane, nothing is more important than overcoming the ego (*chi*). When the self-centeredness of the ego has been overcome, there will be an expansive impartiality [or civic-mindedness, *kung*], and the principle of love that was originally stored in the nature will have nothing blocking it. When the principle of love is not blocked by anything, it will be connected to the meridians [channels of life-force] of Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things, and its function will also reach everywhere completely. Therefore, designating love to name humaneness is to be blind to its essence. (Master Ch'eng meant this when he said, "Love is feelings and humaneness is nature.") But the principle of love is humaneness. To point to impartiality as humaneness is to lose its true character. (Master Ch'eng meant this when he said, "Humaneness is hard to delineate with a name, only impartiality is near it, but it's impermissible to designate impartiality as humaneness.") Yet impartiality is the reason people can be humane. When tranquil, the substance of humaneness, rightness, propriety, and wisdom is present. And when in motion, the beginnings of commiseration, shame and dislike, respect and reverence, and right and wrong are realized. . . . For this reason, Mencius summarized humaneness by saying, "Humaneness is the human mind." It is like persevering the four virtues of Heaven and Earth, as set forth in the *Book of Changes*, and referring to them collectively as the origin [of the character] of Heaven and Earth. All this being so, is it at all possible for those who study to regard seeking humaneness as unimportant and overcoming the ego as not the Way?<sup>19</sup>

Although Chang did not here make a distinction between the two Ch'eng brothers, the passages from Master Ch'eng that were quoted for support came from Ch'eng I. The word *kung* is difficult to render here: it covers a range from civic-mindedness to public interest to impartiality. In the context of Chang's writings, "impartiality" is useful for conveying his sense of overcoming the ego and selfish desires, but "civic-mindedness" adds the positive thrust of his commitment to public issues. When we discuss the thinking of some other Sung Confucians, we will find the element of public interest to be much more dominant in their usage of *kung*.

In this essay, Chang followed Ch'eng I's idea of humaneness as the principle of love, countering Han Yü's (768-824) notion that humaneness was love. As the principle of love (i.e., compassion), humaneness was a virtue of the inner nature instead of a mere feeling. Chang thus built upon the distinction quoted from the Ch'engs that love was a feeling, but humaneness was human nature. Likewise, associating humaneness with the life-force in Heaven and all things drew upon the Ch'eng brothers' concept of humane-

ness as the seed of life and the basis of oneness with all things. Grounding his essay in Mencius' identification of humaneness with the human mind, Chang also shared Ch'eng Hao's conviction that knowing humaneness should be one's first priority. In spite of their shared grounding in these sources, Chang and Chu had some disagreements about this essay, "Treatise on Humaneness," which will be addressed in Chapter 3.

Chang's study of humaneness was so intense that it affected his perception of human nature in ways that were to lead him away from Hu Hung's major thesis that human nature was beyond good and evil. If the virtue of humaneness were so integral to one's inner nature, how could the nature be anything except good? In part, Chang was merely more grounded than Hu in Mencius' doctrine that human nature was originally and essentially good. In his commentaries, Chang proclaimed, "The good is the nature."<sup>20</sup> But he also developed Mencius' view.

Chang Shih began, like Mencius, by declaring that the inner nature was good because it possesses the beginnings of the four virtues: "Mencius called the nature good because it is where humaneness, rightness, propriety, and wisdom are maintained. And if in their expression there are no self-centered human desires to disorder them, there is then nothing but the mind-and-heart of commiseration, shame and dislike, deference and compliance, and right and wrong."<sup>21</sup> Mencius had identified the four beginnings with the originally good nature, but the four virtues (which arose from the development of the four beginnings) with the manifestation of the nature. Thus Mencius considered the four beginnings to be more basic than the four virtues. Chang reversed this priority. He regarded the four virtues as nature and the four beginnings as mind:

Humaneness, rightness, propriety, and wisdom are all located in the inner nature, and their manifestations that can be observed are the sense of commiseration, shame and dislike, deference and compliance, and right and wrong. . . . Therefore, investigating the state before manifestation, one finds that the essence of humaneness was already established, and rightness, propriety, and wisdom already existed in [the nature]. Following manifestation, one finds that the sense of commiseration materializes, and shame and dislike, deference and compliance, as well as the sense of right and wrong become manifest through it.<sup>22</sup>

Chang used this distinction between not-yet-expressed and already-expressed to differentiate between the four virtues and the four beginnings. Building upon Hu Hung's notion of the nature as essence in tranquility and the mind as nature's function in motion, Chang associated human nature with the tranquil or not-yet-expressed state and the mind with the active or



already-expressed state. Thus his departure from Mencius over the priority of the four beginnings and the four virtues arose from his acceptance of Hu's more detailed elaboration of the distinction between nature and mind.

Chang, no doubt, felt that his slight difference from Mencius served philosophically to anchor the Mencian faith more securely. A solid response was needed to the Buddhist challenge to the absoluteness of Confucian virtues and relationships. Significant urbanization and economic expansion with their attendant dislocations or disruptions of family and social relationships perhaps also spurred him to make these virtues—on which social relationships rested—even more basic than Mencius had. These relationships were of crucial importance: "Heaven and Earth have their positions, and people are born between them. Thus that which makes the human *Tao* is our having intimacy between parents and children, order between elder and younger siblings, distinctions between husbands and wives, loyalty between ruler and subjects, and trust between friends. These five are what Heaven has decreed and not something that people are able to contrive."<sup>23</sup> Basic Confucian relationships in family and society were, he also insisted, essential to the life of the people and the existence of the state. Because the concept of human nature was traditionally a major bulwark of these relationships, it is not surprising that he fervently sought to strengthen that concept.

Chang also identified the four virtues in the nature as what Heaven imparts to people in order to offer further substantiation for the goodness of the original nature. The *Doctrine of the Mean* had taught that "what Heaven imparts is human nature." Chang reasoned that the origin of the nature was the mandate of Heaven. Hence this "Heaven-mandated nature" (*t'ien-ming chih hsing*), which people received at birth, was purely good without any evil.<sup>24</sup> Elaborating on the nature as that which was mandated by Heaven, Chang highlighted the absolute goodness of the nature. Chang further prescribed following the original thusness (*pen-jan*) of human nature to know its goodness. Likening goodness to obedience, he remarked that the good "is what becomes manifest by following the original thusness of the inner nature, and what we call not good is disordering and not following the nature."<sup>25</sup> He seized upon Mencius' (6A/2) analogy between the character of water and human nature. Water could be dammed to go uphill or even struck to splash over one's head. When such artificial interference was exhausted, the nature of water would remain to flow downward. Applied to human nature, he reasoned: "Without any interference, letting it be thus, the rectitude of human nature and feelings is the so-called good. If there is intent to interfere, that is being not good."<sup>26</sup> Thus Chang reinforced his notion that one should not interfere with the character of the inner nature. Conventional suspicions among many Confucians about action based on deliberate intent to achieve immediate ends would appear to have been rein-

forced by Chang's further linkage of noninterference with rightness and principle, but interference with personal advantage and human desires.

To address the question of the origin of evil, Chang borrowed the Ch'eng brothers' concept of physical endowment (*ch'i ping*). Commenting on Kao-tzu's (c. 420–c. 350 B.C.) statement in the *Mencius* (6A/3), Ch'eng Hao had said:

Regarding "what is inborn is called the nature," the nature is the vital energy, and the vital energy is the nature, and both are what is called inborn. In the physical endowment of people at birth, principle possesses both good and evil. But people are not born with these two opposing elements in the nature to start with. Owing to the vital energy with which they are endowed, some become good from childhood, and others become evil. Human nature is of course good, but it cannot be said that evil is not the nature.<sup>27</sup>

Building on Ch'eng's concept, Chang explained why people are not good:

Because there is this body, form obtains something to which to be attached, vital energy obtains something with which to be mixed, the desires obtain something through which to be enticed, and so the feelings begin to be disordered. When the feelings become disordered, the rectitude of the nature is lost, and this is what is regarded as not good. But is it really the fault of the nature?<sup>28</sup>

Since evil arose from the physical endowment, Ch'eng Hao's use of the word "evil" to refer to the nature should, Chang was arguing, be understood as referring only to the physical endowment.

Using the *Record of Ritual*, Chang further addressed the problem of evil and the goodness of human nature. That classic spoke of people being tranquil at birth but also of the desires of the inner nature and human desires. Again drawing upon Hu Hung's notion that human nature was tranquil but had to move, Chang identified the desires of the nature with the movement of the nature in response to things. As things stimulated people endlessly and their likes and dislikes knew no bounds, people easily fell into evil thoughts and deeds. Their state should not be blamed on the inner nature itself but on the ego's self-centeredness or desires. To illustrate this distinction, Chang added: "Using the analogy of water, deep and clear is its essence. Water cannot but move, so fluidity is also its nature. When it flows rapidly, gushing through soil and sand, it becomes muddy. How could this muddy state be its true nature?"<sup>29</sup>

Because evil was only in the physical endowment, it could be overcome by drawing upon the capacity within the original goodness of nature itself. Chang's idea of transforming the physical endowment by returning to its beginnings was adopted from Chang Tsai's doctrine of transforming the

natural endowment. Chang Shih utilized this idea to explain Confucius' distinction between three levels of people: those born knowing, those who readily learned through study, and those for whom knowledge was only painfully acquired. Such a division, Chang Shih insisted, only spoke of their differences at the beginning of their progress: "Although those who acquired knowledge with difficulty were below the level of the other two, it was the original goodness of human nature that enabled them to achieve fulfillment just like the others."<sup>30</sup> The superior knowledge of those born knowing could also be arrived at through study. Even stupid ones had the same foundation as the sages, so everyone could exert effort and make progress. All people could become sages like Yao and Shun. The opportunity to advance through study might seem to modern readers to point to a social message. Economic expansion, urbanization, and education in the Sung probably did produce more social mobility than at any other time in China's traditionally layered society. The actual thrust of Chang's message, however, was more fundamentally ethical: "Although there are differences in the physical qualities with which people have been endowed, there is nothing set or unchanging about their goodness or badness, for they are all human."<sup>31</sup> Although recognizing that people could change, Chang's concept of the goodness of human nature provided him with a basis for absolute distinctions between good and evil.

The absoluteness in Chang's view of the goodness of human nature carried over to the distinction between rightness and advantage. Mencius and other early Confucians had begun discriminating between what was right or just (*i*) and what had advantage or utility (*li*). The Ch'eng brothers further strengthened the difference by setting rightness against advantage as absolute opposites. Within this framework, Chang identified distinguishing rightness and advantage as the first step in Confucian learning. Furthermore, he linked the absoluteness of the distinction to Heaven's principle and human desires. Here again, Chang chose to follow Ch'eng I instead of Hu Hung. Chang wrote: "The good is the impartiality of Heaven's principle, and those who diligently do good preserve this and never discard it. As for advantage, it is nothing more than one's individual self-centeredness: when applying one's mind, one only does so to augment one's own advantage."<sup>32</sup> Chang continued by urging careful study of the key difference between the superior person, who is mindful of what is right, and the petty person obsessed with what is advantageous.

The absoluteness of the distinction between rightness and advantage was even further enhanced by his criterion regarding whether or not the will was deliberately directed. In a passage that seemed to echo his advice against interfering with the inner nature, he warned against taking deliberate action toward a desired goal:

The learning of the sages is being thus without deliberation. Being thus without deliberation is the reason why destiny did not stop, natures were not biased, and teachings were inexhaustible. On the contrary, acting from deliberation is all the egocenteredness of human desires and not what Heaven's principle preserves. This is the difference between rightness and advantage. Regarding the perspective of those who have not yet profoundly scrutinized themselves in light of this distinction, very little throughout the whole day is done for anything except seeking advantage. And advantages are not limited to prestige, position, and profit. In every instance their wills are directing their activities, and even though the degree is not the same, they are one in serving themselves for themselves.<sup>33</sup>

"Being without deliberation" referred to the state before human nature was affected by calculation and expressed in action; this state was rightness and Heaven's principle. Conversely, "advantage seeking" characterized the state after human nature was affected by deliberation and human desires. Chang's broader scope meant that he did not limit advantages to the traditional emphases on prestige, position, or monetary profit. With its expanded scope, the prohibition against seeking benefit apparently applied to all areas of life and perhaps to all social classes rather than just to the elite.

Warning against deliberation was also a way of saying one should follow the *Tao*. Arguing that following the *Tao* could lead to either wealth or poverty, Chang still insisted that one should accept either destiny rather than act contrary to the *Tao*:

Only superior persons can maintain control of themselves and not be driven by likes and dislikes. Therefore, if by perverting the *Tao* they could obtain wealth and prestige, they would hold onto rightness and not do so. This is simply because being correct resides within them. If by misfortune they encounter poverty and dishonor, they are at peace with their destiny and do not flee from it. This is why they can be content in whatever state they are.<sup>34</sup>

To follow the *Tao*, one had to have self-discipline.

This process of following the *Tao* and controlling one's desires required self-cultivation. Some might argue that following one's own conscience was sufficient. Self-centered desire could be identified by one's conscience as that of which one was ashamed, and propriety could be recognized as that which did not burden one's heart. Chang rejected such arguments as too subjective. He countered: "If one's moral discipline were not complete and one were to take one's own opinion as the principal rule, would it not be a natural mistake to regard self-centeredness as not being self-centered and impropriety as propriety?"<sup>35</sup>

To guard against such subjectivity, one needed to investigate things to extend one's knowledge of actual principles. But the investigation of things itself could be misinterpreted, as Ch'an Master Ta-hui and his Confucian friends had done. Chang sought to counter such subjective or intuitive interpretations:

Principles do not depart from things; arriving at the ultimate of their principles is the way to extend one's knowledge. The current saying "whether or not a thing has been investigated totally depends on me" is like wanting to knock away things and let the self stand alone. If this isn't an heterodox view, what is? Moreover, can things really be knocked away? To act according to that saying would be like turning to the back of a mirror to look at our image.<sup>36</sup>

An attempt to make the investigation of things totally dependent on the observer would actually detach the observer from the objective things to be studied. It would also create a dysfunctional relationship, just like gazing into the wrong side of a mirror to see oneself.

Chang's effort to hold a middle course was evident in his comments on the relationship between the investigation of things, which was externally oriented, and reverent composure or seriousness, which arose internally. Commenting on the *Great Learning*, he remarked: "Everything from making the will sincere to rectifying the mind to bringing peace to the world is a matter of investigating things to extend knowledge."<sup>37</sup> But he also reversed the priority: "There is a *Tao* for investigating things; isn't it simply reverence?"<sup>38</sup> In explaining Ch'eng I's admonition to "abide in seriousness," Chang said: "It is because of extending our knowledge that we can make this mind clear, and reverent composure enables us to hold onto this mind and never lose it. Therefore, Master Ch'eng said that to concentrate on 'the one' is composure and also that having no particular leaning [i.e., being free of favoritism] is called the one."<sup>39</sup> In other words, we must comprehend oneness before we know where to exercise our effort. Even though he seemed to give investigation of things a certain priority, the attitude of reverent composure with which the mind approached the investigation of things had a privileged position.

Perhaps Chang was more inclined toward the priority of reverent composure; at least, what he wrote about it seems more vibrant. He commented: "Concentrating on the one is called composure; abiding in reverent composure, one can then have purposefulness without confusion, priority without disorder, constancy without being rushed, so that what one does will be simple."<sup>40</sup> By simple, Chang meant that one's activities would not be complicated by extraneous things because one's mind would not be enticed or distracted by desires. This theme of simplicity also harks back to his notions

of not interfering with the nature and not having premeditation. In his essay about “concentrating on one thing,” Chang elaborated on the one:

What is reverent composure? The secret resides in concentrating on one thing. What is the one thing here? It is being free of favoritism. In living, never go beyond one’s thought, and when managing affairs, never be distracted by the extraneous. While cultivating, be immersed in the Mean—never forgetting and never anxious. Even when hurried and rushed, one must preserve and accumulate this. After practicing this a long time, it will be refined and will reach to the ultimate. If one perseveres unremittingly, one can reach the standard of the sages and worthies.<sup>41</sup>

In other words, Chang continued the Hunan tradition of self-cultivation that focused on cultivating the mind and rectifying its orientations.

In discussing humaneness, human nature, and self-cultivation, Chang often spoke of principle, but did he engage in philosophical speculation about principle? In his commentary on the *Mencius*, he posited the priority of principle before actual things: “Activities and things all have a reason for being—which is Heaven’s principle.”<sup>42</sup> On occasion, he even used the concept of the Supreme Ultimate to explain the production of things: “The Supreme Ultimate moves and the two vital energies [i.e., yin and yang] take form, the two vital energies have form and the myriad things are produced, so all people and things are based on this.”<sup>43</sup>

Elsewhere, he joined the Sung philosophical terms with the more traditional concept of Heaven or the mandate of Heaven to refer to the ground of Being. In a passage that linked his various terms and pointed to his reason for addressing such issues, he wrote:

The whole essence of the mandate of Heaven has flourished without interruption from antiquity to the present and has penetrated the myriad things. Even though the masses were ignorant of it, this principle was never interrupted. Even though the sages fully realized it, nothing was ever added to it. Before responding [to things] was not prior, and after responding was not later [i.e., it transcended time restrictions]; and once it was established, then all were established, and once realized, everything was realized [i.e., it was the foundation of all]. The principles of the world are public and do not have anything on which to attach our egocenteredness; this is why the *Tao* of humaneness is great and the principle of destiny is small. From the Buddhist point of view, all things are made by our minds and produced from our minds. Such is their ignorance of the original essence of the Supreme Ultimate and their quest for self-benefit and self-interest; in such conditions, the

mandate of Heaven cannot penetrate and flourish. Therefore, what they call the mind is nothing but the human mind, without any recognition of the ethical mind of *Tao* (*tao hsin*).<sup>44</sup>

Clearly, Chang was seeking to refute the Buddhists for what he regarded as their undermining the foundation and reality of Confucian ethics. From his perspective, the Buddhists were caught in their own self-interests to the point that they could grasp only the human mind but not the *Tao* or ethical principles within the mind.

Chang's philosophy here, as in his discussion of self-cultivation, emphasized the mind. He identified the essence of both the mind and the inner nature as being one with Heaven: "The naturalness of principle is called the mandate of Heaven. In people it becomes human nature, and in being master of the inner nature, it is mind. Heaven, human nature, and mind have the same essence, although what is taken as function differs."<sup>45</sup> The mind had an apparently unlimited role as master of both inner nature and external things: "The mind is that which links the myriad activities and controls the myriad principles in order to be lord of the myriad things."<sup>46</sup> In Chu Hsi's system (as we shall see in the next chapter), the mind governed the nature and feelings, but in accord with principle itself. Although Chu could be eloquent about the power of the mind as master and its role in realizing principle, he was reluctant to ascribe to the mind control over principle itself. In this sense, his projection of the mind's mastery was less extensive or absolute than Chang Shih's, for the Hunan scholars were less equivocal about the mind's dominance of principle. The difference in degree here was rooted in the legacy of Hu Hung, which Chang Shih brought to completion.

Although Chang Shih engaged in speculative philosophy about abstract principles, he, much like his teacher Hu Hung, spoke far more often about ethical cultivation and cultural values. On the one hand, his comments suggest a substantial equivalence of mind, inner nature, Heaven, and principle; thus, his philosophy did not make the fine distinctions to which Chu Hsi would attach such importance. On the other hand, his focus on the cultivation of the mind was a major contribution to Confucian cultivation. These two factors—one of which might be regarded as a weakness and the other, a strength—were related. Chang was critical of empty talk about the mind and human nature, for his Hunan approach to spiritual cultivation emphasized examining oneself and making effort in daily life and practice. He complained that his contemporaries had lost sight of the practical theme of Chou Tun-i and the Ch'eng brothers, "thorough study of principles and abiding in reverent seriousness."<sup>47</sup> Even Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-1695), the primary editor of the *Records of Sung and Yüan Confucians*

(*Sung Yüan hsüeh-an*), praised Chang as having at an early age achieved a comprehension of cultivating the mind that Chu Hsi attained only much later in life.<sup>48</sup>

Another of Chang's contributions was the rediscovery of Heaven's principles in daily activities. Although this was a central theme for the Ch'engs, it had been partially eclipsed during the half century after Ch'eng I's death in 1107. In praising Chang for using Heaven's principle and human desire to distinguish absolutely between rightness and advantage, Chu Hsi said that Chang had "opened up what the prior sages had never expressed so clearly."<sup>49</sup>

A third contribution was his completion of Hu Hung's Hunan "school" of thought. In addition to perpetuating some of Hu's ideas about history, praxis, and the relation between the mind and the nature, Chang anchored the Hunan school more securely in the teachings of Mencius and the Ch'eng brothers than Hu had. At the same time, he continued his teacher's primary linkage to Ch'eng Hao's teaching on the mind, nature, and humaneness. As their younger contemporary Lu Chiu-yüan observed, Chang was more like Ch'eng Hao and Chu Hsi more like Ch'eng I.<sup>50</sup> At various times in his career, Chang returned to Ch'ang-sha, where he lectured at the Mountain Slope Academy. Because of his reputation as a scholar and an official, many students came to hear him, and he had quite a large following. No one managed to continue his teachings for very long, however.

Why did this Hunan branch of *Tao-hsüeh* wither? Traditionally, the explanation has been that the Hunan group was simply overwhelmed by Chu Hsi because of his achievements as a thinker and teacher. There appear to have been other factors, too. Hunan was far less developed than Chekiang or Fukien. Hence Hu Hung and Chang Shih operated from a cultural and economic base much weaker than Lü Tsu-ch'ien's. Chekiang or Chu Hsi's Fukien. Such objective conditions restricted the ability of the Hunan teachers to compete with teachers in other areas. For example, with a more centrally located academy drawing literati from the capital area, Lü was certainly at an advantage. Even the Mountain Slope Academy quickly declined until Chu Hsi revitalized it in 1193, while serving as an official in Hunan. That this well-established academy lapsed so quickly after Chang's death in 1180 suggests that it might have begun to wane even before the end of the 1170s. Given how soon the academy became a center of Chu's learning, Chang's teachings appear to have been difficult even for his disciples to maintain.

Part of the failure was due to the compound nature of Chang Shih's thought. His scholarship had a broader scope than that in the first generation of the Southern Sung. In addition to his priority of praxis over theory, his attention to both the cultivation of the mind and the investigation of



things to know principle meant that he embodied what would become independent strains of Confucianism during the last two decades of the century. After Chang's death, his students gravitated to other masters who developed one or another of these orientations far more rigorously and systematically. Perhaps related to their keen sense of the Buddhist challenge, Hunan scholars seem to have been less zealous than Chu Hsi about divisions within Confucianism. Hu Ta-shih (late twelfth century), who was Hu Hung's son and one of Chang's major students, actually studied with leading teachers of the three major divisions of *Tao-hsüeh* Confucianism during the subsequent period. Since the next generation developed these positions further, few in later centuries found any reason to extend special attention to Chang. Another reason for Chang's decline was the evolution of Chu Hsi's thinking, for Chu developed as a theoretician to the point that he easily eclipsed Chang by the mid-1170s.

## Chapter 3 *Chu Hsi and Chang Shih*

During the second period of the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship in the Southern Sung, much of Chu Hsi's development occurred in friendly intellectual exchange with Chang Shih. Chu regarded Chang as exceeding his own quickness and intuitiveness of mind, as evident in the speed and ease with which Chang comprehended ideas and expressed them in writing. Chu Hsi also claimed that whereas he had to work hard to learn, Chang obtained the *Tao* earlier and more easily. Although he was senior to Chang by about three years, Chu acknowledged: "[Chang Shih's] knowledge is so outstanding as to be unreachable, and having been in his company for a long time, I've repeatedly gotten a lot from him."<sup>1</sup> After the triumph of Chu's school, Chu's originality and profundity have generally been emphasized at the expense of Chang's contributions. Benefits of their interaction were actually mutual. Chu and Chang discussed a wide range of philosophical issues, on which they generally agreed. In addition to exploring terms and concepts, they also exchanged views on differences regarding specific passages in their commentaries on the *Analects* and the *Mencius*.<sup>2</sup> Instead of cataloging their differences here, we will focus on three issues of importance for the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship itself.

### ON SELF-CULTIVATION, EQUILIBRIUM, AND HARMONY

The first major issue involved two different traditions of self-cultivation and the understanding of the mind. Self-cultivation involved devel-

oping an internalized discipline. Although Chu Hsi's progression from one tradition through the other toward his own synthesis represented probably the most crucial watershed in his development as a Confucian theorist, it is important to realize that Chu's overall evolution was a gradual and cumulative one without sudden, radical breaks. His exchange with Chang Shih over the meaning of centrality or inner equilibrium (*chung*) and harmony (*ho*) in relation to the inner nature and the cultivation of the mind has been exhaustively investigated by modern scholars.<sup>3</sup> Hence I will provide only an overview and highlight its relevance.

The primary locus classicus of the issue was the opening section of the *Doctrine of the Mean* that identified centrality or equilibrium as the state before the feelings were aroused and harmony as the state after the feelings were aroused—if the feelings were appropriately expressed. According to the *Mean*, attaining equilibrium and harmony was the key to achieving oneness with Heaven and the myriad things; hence, it was a person's utmost ethical imperative. Chou Tun-i and Shao Yung had emphasized concentrating on tranquility in one's ethical discipline and had spoken of the mind as the Supreme Ultimate or source of all things. Chou had further equated tranquility and oneness with a state without desires. Chang Tsai had made a distinction between knowledge gained through the senses and the mind's innate knowledge arising from the inner nature. Ch'eng Hao had advocated dispelling selfish feelings as the way to settle the nature. Ch'eng I sought to enhance the rigor of cultivation with reverent composure and by concentrating the mind on one essential thing. Compared with earlier Confucians, the Northern Sung *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians had more sharply defined concepts of the mind and inner nature. Therefore, they placed greater emphasis on the task of cultivation to reach the centrality of the nature and/or mind. Their goal was to know the *Tao* and to attain oneness with the proper order of Heaven and the myriad things. They had not developed a systematic position, however. For example, Ch'eng I had advocated preserving and nourishing the feelings before they were aroused as well as examining these feelings after they had been expressed.

During the first half of the twelfth century, two distinct approaches developed within the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship to the methodological task of cultivating the mind to know its ultimate oneness with all things. One approach was developed in Fukien and the other in Hunan. In Fukien, one line of Ch'eng I's disciples, led by Yang Shih and Lo Ts'ung-yen (1072-1135), introduced quiet sitting in meditation as the way to experience the essence of the mind and settle the nature. In silent meditation, one was to clarify the mind by expelling all selfish desires. Lo taught this method to Li T'ung, who in turn passed it down to Chu Hsi. Li had Chu concentrate on attaining this state of clarity of mind in tranquil stillness but also focus on his tasks in daily life. Chu regarded Li's instructions about self-cultivation in tranquility

and activity as two distinct teachings. Although Li considered this state of mind to be the foundation for praxis in daily activities, Chu felt uncomfortable with the contradictory tension between these two intuitive teachings that could be rationally deduced. The crux of the problem was how the active mind could perceive its own tranquil state before action. After wrestling with Li's teachings for about eight years, Chu declared in 1166 that they were essentially correct as long as one understood that the state of intuitive oneness could not be realized quickly. Perhaps in an attempt to persuade Chang Shih, he traveled in 1177 to Hunan, where he visited for two months with Chang—whose alternative views had encouraged his doubts about Li's teachings.

The Hunan school represented the other major line of development from the Ch'eng brothers' teachings about the mind. Expanding on Ch'eng I's identification of the mind with the already-expressed state and Hu Hung's view of mind as the function of the inner nature, Chang wanted to focus exclusively on the mind's actual experience in daily affairs. Only by experiencing tranquility in activity or motion could one find the centrality of the mind. Instead of quiet sitting in meditation, one should use the mind's potential—arising from its essential oneness with the inner nature—for observing the subtle first stirrings of the virtues. Thus one could grasp Heaven's principles through their functioning in daily activities. One should apprehend these principles before attempting to preserve and nourish them in personal cultivation. Compared with Li T'ung's approach, Chang had one that was more dynamically oriented toward action.

Chu Hsi abandoned Li T'ung's view and almost fully embraced the Hunan approach during the two-month visit in 1167 and in four letters written in the subsequent year. Following the Hunan school, he identified human nature as essence and mind as nature's function. The incipient state before the feelings were aroused was now associated with the nature, and the expressed state of the feelings with the mind.

Soon questions flourished in Chu Hsi's mind about the Hunan approach. Trying to explain to one of his students why he had abandoned Li's method, Chu was apparently uncomfortable about rejecting his own teacher. He further confessed a feeling of declining ethical vigor after he had stopped following Li's prescribed concentration on the state of tranquility and had begun focusing exclusively on apprehending incipient principles in activity. Intellectually, Chang's position seemed now to have only partially resolved the issue by finding tranquility in the midst of activity. Since tranquility and activity were always in a dialectical relationship in the Supreme Ultimate, why could one not also discover motion in tranquility? Could one not preserve and nourish the essence of the mind before apprehending it in activity? Such questions drove him beyond both his immediate teacher and his friend to the Ch'eng brothers' writings.

As Chu declared in an 1169 letter to his friends in Hunan, studying Ch'eng I's writings provided the answer to his perplexity about inner equilibrium and harmony in tranquility and activity. He told his Hunan friends that his earlier views, which had been based on their teachings, lacked a great foundation. He thereupon selected passages from Ch'eng I's writings to resolve apparent inconsistencies from other passages to which they had all been attentive. The passages to which Chu drew attention now were in the *Surviving Works of the Two Ch'engs*, which he had just completed editing the year before. Chu now claimed that his friends had been wrong to follow Ch'eng I's apparent identification of the mind only with the state after the feelings were aroused. Master Ch'eng had corrected himself when he proclaimed the oneness of mind with both essence, the state of quietness and inactivity, and function, the state of active penetration of all things.

If one resided in reverent seriousness, as Ch'eng had advocated, one's mind would be properly poised in both tranquility and activity to apprehend and nourish principles. It was best to follow Master Ch'eng's twofold path of reverent seriousness and study: "Self-cultivation requires seriousness; the pursuit of learning depends on the extension of knowledge."<sup>4</sup> With this concept, Chu now had a complete view of equilibrium and harmony; moreover, he did not need to await activity before engaging in the cultivation process of examining and then nourishing. Even in the tranquil state before the feelings were aroused, the mind was consciously present. Although tranquil, this was a state of the mind, rather than the nature. Hence this state of mind within one's conscious experience was also a proper object of cultivation. Only after reaching this understanding was Chu able to attend to both traditions of cultivation. When around 1172 Chu wrote a preface to an earlier essay on equilibrium, he further surveyed his evolution from Li's view of cultivation through Chang's to his own. Thus he fully realized that his position had now matured, and he never again made substantial changes on this issue. Much later in his life, however, Chu tended to speak only in terms of preserving the mind, as his dual approach to cultivation of the mind gradually shifted farther away from the component that the Hunan scholars had emphasized.<sup>5</sup>

Chu's evolution on this issue was of major significance for several reasons, and we will elaborate on three. First, he had synthesized his predecessors into a new approach. By adopting Ch'eng I's emphasis on reverent seriousness, he moved beyond both Chou Tun-i's theme of tranquility, in which one emptied one's mind of passions, and Ch'eng Hao's slightly less passive view of calming or settling the inner nature. Besides seeking to restore a state of calm within the inner nature, Ch'eng Hao had sanctioned responding to things as they were encountered. Thus Ch'eng had already embraced a more active stance than Chou's. Having incorporated the Hunan approach to apprehending principles in daily activity and the Fukien prefer-

ence for meditating in tranquility, Chu enhanced the role of book-learning. Earlier *Tao-hsüeh* thinkers in Fukien had a more reflective and intuitive understanding of the mind and less enthusiasm for reading books. From Chu's new standpoint, the mind was *comparatively* more oriented outward toward the study of books and the empirical observation of things, although he used empirical observations as an ethical philosopher rather than as a scientist.<sup>6</sup> Hence Chu became far more dedicated to a life of scholarship and far more prolific as a writer than earlier *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians from Fukien.

Second, in abandoning and later altering his own teacher's position, Chu Hsi apparently passed through a crucial phase of inner tension toward a maturation that provided a sense of liberation or transcendence. It must have been at once liberating and comforting to discover that he could approach the teachings of Ch'eng I directly through critical and painful evaluation of the ideas of his own teacher as well as those of one of his closest friends. In this experience, he was convinced that he had corrected conventional understanding of Ch'eng I's doctrines through critical textual study of Ch'eng's surviving works. Because of his experience of maturation on this issue, he would certainly have become more self-confident about his own authority. Henceforth, his critical evaluation and restructuring of the Confucian tradition markedly progressed.

Third, Chang Shih was significant as a catalyst in Chu's evolution on this issue. Chang's Hunan school method of cultivation encouraged Chu to doubt his own Fukien approach. Chang's emphasis on experiencing tranquility in activity also served as a transitional stage from which Chu sought motion in tranquility. Thus Chang further contributed to Chu's quest for a solution to the tension between the two *Tao-hsüeh* traditions on cultivation and inner equilibrium. One might even suggest that the Hunan conception of nature as essence and mind as its function had prompted Chu to seek a resolution specifically in terms of essence and function.

Based on our earlier discussion of Chang's attention to Ch'eng I's doctrines of the investigation of things and reverent seriousness, we could entertain the possibility that Chang might well have interjected these themes into his discussions with Chu on the mind and inner equilibrium. We have very little record of what was discussed during their meetings in 1163, 1164, and 1167; moreover, some of Chang's early letters and writings were not included by Chu in Chang's collected works. Even extant material is often hard to date precisely. Because of such factors, it is extraordinarily difficult to speculate on the specifics of the direction of influence between these two friends. We do know from Chu's 1172 reflections that Chang readily agreed with his last formulation. Chang's only continuing point of disagreement reportedly was his idea that one first needed to apprehend principles before preserving or nourishing them.<sup>7</sup> The apparent ease of this agreement sug-

gests that Chu had struck a responsive cord with Chang's own emphasis on reverent composure and the investigation of things. Even if Chang had been the first to interject some of these ideas or to prompt Chu to consider them, such considerations still do not detract from the importance of Chu's articulation of a synthesis or his role as a theoretician. We might, however, be observing the beginnings of a pattern of Chu and later scholars of ignoring or downplaying his debts to his contemporaries.

In another set of exchanges from 1170 to 1172, it was Lü Tsu-ch'ien who had to admonish Chu about this dual approach to cultivating the mind. Chu had made what Lü regarded as an unfair criticism of a passage from Hu's *Understanding of Words*. According to Lü's analysis, Chu's objection was made from the perspective of the effort of holding fast and nourishing amidst tranquility, whereas Hu's comments were made in reference to the discipline of examining and scrutinizing amidst the flow of activities. Lü Tsu-ch'ien also noted that both modes of cultivation were important, and one could not be engaged without the other. Chu's criticism of Hu for having no place to seek the true mind was excessive, for Hu had specifically cited Mencius' example of an expression of the true mind in the case of the King of Ch'i: Mencius (1A/7 and 2A/6) had advised King Hsüan (r. 342-324 B.C.) to extend to others the feelings that the monarch himself had experienced when unwilling to see an ox suffer. So articulate was Lü in expressing the view of a balanced approach to cultivation that he must have been either immediately and totally converted to it or already oriented in that direction himself. As we will see in later discussions of Lü's personality and thought, it is quite likely that he was already oriented toward a balanced approach. In any event, Chu appeared less even-handed than Lü. Chu responded: "Certainly neither of the two modes of cultivation should be emphasized at the expense of the other, but the teachings of the sages emphasize holding fast and preserving far more than apprehending and examining, which is the opposite of the meaning in this section from Hu's text."<sup>8</sup> To Chu Hsi, apprehending and examining principles was directed toward the outer realm; hence, it had to come only after preserving and nourishing.

#### DISCOURSE WITH HU'S TEXT

The second major exchange centered on the text of Hu Hung's *Understanding of Words*. In the process of coming to his new understanding of equilibrium and harmony as states of the mind, Chu Hsi became dissatisfied with Hu's work. Beginning about 1170, he engaged Chang Shih and Lü Tsu-ch'ien in critically evaluating the text. The three had, according to Chu, reached basic agreement by 1172 on which passages were problematic.<sup>9</sup> Chu compiled the account of this exchange, "Misgivings about Master Hu's

*Understanding of Words*" (*Hu-tzu chih-yen i-i*). Chang Shih expressed basic agreement with this record.<sup>10</sup>

Chu's account of the discourse with Hu's text reveals Confucians of the day in the process of rectifying a text. Quoting a passage from Hu's text, Chu expressed his preference for Chang Tsai's language for describing the function of the mind. Chang Shih expressed uneasiness about both wordings and offered a substitute. Chu Hsi praised Chang Shih's substitute wording as apt. Then he quickly added: "However, whatever revisions we discuss should only be our own private deliberations about how we think it ought to read, but we won't alter the original manuscript."<sup>11</sup> At the beginning of the exchange, Chu Hsi thus disavowed any actual intent to alter Hu's text itself.

In another case, it was Chang Shih who objected to Chu's expunging part of one sentence and inserting substitute words that changed the meaning of Hu's text. Chang Shih cautioned Chu that the previous generation's ideas should be respected and preserved. Yet in the case of two other passages, Chang himself suggested that one "ought to be omitted" and that the other was "not necessary to preserve."<sup>12</sup> Only Lü Tsu-ch'ien, in the three statements attributed to him, spoke consistently in defense of Hu and in opposition to altering the text. Indeed Lü had a very high regard for Hu's *Understanding of Words*.<sup>13</sup> During the last exchange, Chu spoke quite candidly about altering Hu's original text: "Although this passage truly does not need to be preserved. . . . Now, I would like to preserve this passage but slightly change the wording."<sup>14</sup> It would appear that Chu had convinced himself of the need to modify Hu's text.

Chu's criticisms prevailed: the passages to which Chu objected are not found within the six chapters of Hu's *Understanding of Words* in extant editions.<sup>15</sup> Although it is difficult to ascertain whether it was Chu or Chang who actually expunged Hu's text, the impetus clearly came from Chu. As an indication of the relative importance of this project to the three friends, Chu provided the only account of the exchange, and statements attributed to Chang and Lü therein are not found in their own collected works. More important, however, "Misgivings" is a retrievable record that reveals members of the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship wrestling with a recent text and restructuring their tradition.

Chu Hsi took aim at eight problematic passages in Hu's text, and these have been summarily grouped under three themes.<sup>16</sup> Chu objected, first of all, to Hu's having placed human nature beyond good and evil. Second, having identified the mind as the already expressed state of the inner nature and humaneness as the mind, Hu necessarily discussed both mind and humaneness from the perspective of function rather than essence. Third, only after examining the mind in its state of incipient action, Hu claimed, could one hold fast and preserve it. Whereas self-cultivation and humane-



ness are discussed respectively in the preceding and succeeding sections of this chapter, let us now focus on the inner nature and the mind.

Hu Hung had proclaimed that human nature was the great foundation of all under Heaven, but the mind ordered the myriad things and brought the nature to completion or fulfillment. Chu Hsi objected to Hu's saying that the mind fulfilled the nature. Citing Ch'eng I's elucidation of Mencius' (7A/1) phrase, "exerting or fathoming mind to the utmost" (*chin hsin*) to know the nature, Chu argued that Ch'eng had been referring to the first principles (i.e., the nature) within the mind. Consequently, Ch'eng I had not limited the discussion to mere functions or products of the mind, as Hu had done. Hu had envisioned human nature and the mind as two parts of the same reality and related them to one another as essence and its function. To break this polarity, Chu proposed substituting a phrase taken from Chang Tsai, "the mind directs and unites (*t'ung*) the nature and the feelings."<sup>17</sup>

Another passage explored a similar theme. Chu cited the following comment from Hu: "To clarify its [the *Tao*'s] essence, the sages refer to it as the inner nature, and to clarify its function, they refer to it as the mind. The nature cannot but be active, and when active it is mind." Tracing such alleged confusion to the Ch'engs' disciple Hsieh Liang-tso, Chu again drew upon Chang Tsai's view of the feelings to substitute the following: "The nature cannot but be active, and when active it is the feelings. The mind directs the nature and the feelings." Responding to Chu's substitute wording, Chang Shih attempted to go back to Ch'eng I instead of Chang Tsai. He quoted Ch'eng I: "When the nature has form, it's called the mind; and when the nature moves, it's called the feelings." But in this case, Chu rejected Ch'eng's wording on the grounds that the words "having form" were unclear.<sup>18</sup> Hence Chu could not be persuaded simply by calling on the authority of Ch'eng I.

Even though they differed on whether the mind fulfilled the nature or simply directed it, both Hu and Chu gave prominence to the mind. Both viewed the mind as somewhat transcendent, and made distinctions between the mind of Heaven and Earth, which penetrated everywhere, and the mind within individual persons, which depended upon the body's vital energy for life. Hu Hung, playing on one occasion with a student's question, had suggested that the mind itself was not subject to life and death. Seizing upon the apparent bewilderment of the student, Chu denounced Hu for seeming to have embraced Buddhist notions of reincarnation. Hu should simply have spoken in terms of the principle being one but having many manifestations. In other words, it was the principle within the mind, rather than the mind *per se*, that was transcendent.<sup>19</sup> That principle within the mind was, to Chu, the same as the inner nature.

Hu Hung had written that Heaven's principles and human desires shared the same essence but differed in function; moreover, they engaged in the

same action but differed in feelings. Although Hu's expressed intent was to have people distinguish between principles and desires in the process of ethical cultivation, Chu Hsi condemned Hu's assumptions about what was innate within human nature. Chu argued that even though the beginnings of Heaven's principle were unknown, they were present at the birth of a person; hence, principle was innate. Desires arose only when people were bound by bodily form, indulged in habits, and were confused by feelings; hence, desires were not innate. If one thought that the two had the same innate essence, how could one ever distinguish between them? Instead of realizing that the original essence was completely pure and without human desires, Hu had aimed—Chu alleged—to find principle and desires within each other.<sup>20</sup>

A passage in the same vein was Hu's statement that one could understand the difference between Heaven's principle and human desires by scrutinizing how people liked or disliked things and other people. Likes and dislikes were human nature. The petty person simply liked or disliked in reference to the ego, but the superior person did so in terms of the *Tao*. Chu charged that Hu had thus "implied the *Tao* was outside of human nature" so that there was no priority between Heaven's principle and human desire. As such, Chu suggested that Hu would be wrongly negating the proclamation in the *Book of Poetry*:

Heaven in giving birth to the multitudes of the people,  
To every faculty and relationship annexed its law.  
The people possess this normal nature,  
Thus they love its normal, beautiful virtue.<sup>21</sup>

Mencius (5A/6) had set a precedent for citing this ode to support the claim that human nature possessed virtue innately. Chu sought to extend its scope to segregate desires and Heaven's law, for he associated Heaven's law with principle and human nature.

Although Chu conceded that liking and disliking were inherent in the nature, he insisted that they could not be directly referred to as the nature. Attempting to substantiate this distinction, Chu referred to likes and dislikes as "things" in order to summon further classical sanction. The *Book of Poetry* had recorded, "There are things, there must be their laws." This distinction must have been what Mencius (7A/38) was referring to when he said, "Our body and complexion are the manifestations of Heaven's nature within us." Chu concluded: "Now, if in discussing human nature we want to bring up things but omit the laws inherent therein, I'm afraid flaws will be unavoidable."<sup>22</sup> Making liking and disliking into "things" seems needlessly cumbersome, for Chu could have been more consistent with his overall philosophy if he had described them as feelings. Feelings were the function of human nature, as distinct from the nature itself. But Chu Hsi was driven

here to strike as authoritative a blow as possible against Hu's assumption. Chu wanted a nature equivalent to ethical principles rather than accepting Hu's view of inner nature as transcending good and evil.

If human nature were neither good nor evil as Hu believed, from where would good (behavior) arise? That Hu also adhered to the Confucian goal of good behavior was evident to Chu, who lauded Hu's statement "Doing the *Tao* is the most great and utmost good." Chu quickly added that this goal appeared impossible without a foundation of goodness in human nature itself.<sup>23</sup>

In a later section, Chu dealt with part of Hu's answer to the question regarding good behavior. Speaking of how even sages had feelings, desires, anxieties, and resentments, Hu had said differences in the ethical quality of persons were observable in the appropriateness of their responses and actions: "What is in accord with the Mean is right, and what is not in accord with the Mean is wrong. Holding to the right while taking action is correct, but holding to the wrong while taking action is perverse. One who is correct does good, and one who is perverse does evil. But conventional Confucians discussed human nature itself in terms of good and evil; aren't they far from the mark!" Chu judged this logic to be quite inadequate: "Yet we might question whether the norm of the Mean arises from something done by the sages themselves or something possessed by the inner nature. There is certainly no reason for saying that it arises from what the sages did. If we acknowledge that the nature certainly possesses this Mean, the original goodness of human nature is clear."<sup>24</sup> The connection between the sages and the Mean made sense, Chu forcefully argued, only if the appropriateness of the Mean was the goodness of the inner nature. As evident in our exposition of Chang's view of human nature, Chang had already abandoned Hu's tenet that the nature was beyond good and evil; hence, he readily agreed that Hu was wrong on this point.

Still, Chang held to Ch'eng Hao's view that although the nature was good, one could not deny that evil was also the nature. Building on Ch'eng Hao's analogy with water, Chang compared the goodness of the nature to its original purity and the evil to the turbidity resulting from its fluidity. Good actions were in accord with the inner nature, and evil arose from improper movement upset by things and desires. The goal in learning was to transform the turbidity to regain the purity of the origins. In this instance, Chu merely added that Ch'eng Hao's statement about evil referred only to the physical nature.<sup>25</sup>

This passage by Ch'eng Hao was so problematic to Chu Hsi that more should be said about it. Chu discussed this passage more than any other one from the Ch'engs. It is possible to set aside the apparent difficulties arising from Ch'eng Hao's statement by reference to the context—in which Ch'eng Hao compared the goodness of the nature to water's original purity.<sup>26</sup>

Nonetheless, in over thirty passages in the *Classified Conversations of Chu Hsi* (*Chu-tzu yü-lei*), Chu complained about how difficult this particular theory was; moreover, he said that Ch'eng Hao's view of the nature was not complete. He seized upon Ch'eng I's statement "nature is principle" as an insight that no one since Confucius had realized. Thus Chu was implicitly criticizing Ch'eng Hao. At the same time, Chu proceeded to use this lone statement by Ch'eng I to rationalize all of the views of both Ch'eng brothers on human nature, but Ch'eng Hao's view was actually different.<sup>27</sup> From Ch'eng Hao's idea that the nature has good and evil, Hu Hung advanced to say that the nature had neither good nor evil.

Another gap in understanding between Chu Hsi and Hu Hung involved the question of the substance or essence of things. The Ch'eng brothers had spoken of essence in relation to the state after the existence of things but not of an essence that preceded the coming of things into existence. For instance, they were fond of Chang Tsai's "Western Inscription" but not of his *Correcting Youthful Ignorance* (*Cheng-meng*). The former concentrated on the essence of actual entities, but the latter was more abstract. Late in his life, Ch'eng I had become more receptive to Chang Tsai; moreover, Chu seized upon his saying "nature is principle" to link Chang, Chou, and the Ch'eng brothers into a more unified philosophy. Hu Hung's comments were grounded more directly in the proclivity of the Ch'eng brothers for speaking of essence only after the existence of things. But Chu Hsi insisted on interpreting essence in an abstract sense of first principles before the existence of actual things.<sup>28</sup>

Hu and Chu spoke of essence from very different levels of discourse. It had been from the perspective after things came into existence that Hu had spoken of Heaven's principle and human desires as sharing the same essence and the mind as the function of the nature. Chu chose to analyze the implications of Hu's statements in light of his own speculative philosophy. Hu's point that the nature was perfection beyond the characterization of good was acceptable to Chu only if spoken in reference to a hypothetical state before activity. Once activity began, there was a contrast between good and evil; moreover, action in accord with the Mean was good. Chu postulated that Hu's position would require two goodnesses or even two natures: the original state of the nature in itself and the nature expressed in activity through the function of the feelings. Although Chu was the one who actually spoke of both an ethical, original nature and a physical nature, he did not really think in terms of two separate natures; furthermore, he regarded positing two actual natures as an untenable position.<sup>29</sup> In fact, he believed that he had rendered Hu's position untenable, even though Hu had not spoken in terms of two natures as Chu himself sometimes did.

The only solution, in Chu's mind, to this problem was to hold that the goodness attainable through one's actions was one and the same as the

goodness of the original inner nature. Along these lines, Chu wrote to Hu Hung's cousin in 1171:

We can say that what Heaven imparts is not confined to things, but if we consider it as not confined to goodness, we will not understand what makes Heaven Heaven. We can say that we cannot speak of human nature as evil; however, if we consider goodness as inadequate to characterize the nature, we will not understand where goodness comes from. Between such theories and other points, which are good, in *Understanding of Words*, there are numerous mutual contradictions.<sup>30</sup>

The essence of goodness was a primary principle, for knowing that ultimate essence was to know what made Heaven Heaven and the source of goodness.

It was from the level of speculative philosophy and in the defense of fundamental principles that Chu objected so vigorously to Hu's view of human nature. Writing in an 1171 letter to Hu's son, Chu acknowledged that Hu Hung had intended to exalt the mysterious nature. Hu's praise of the nature as being beyond the distinction between good and evil had, Chu argued, unintentionally demeaned the nature. If the nature were not absolutely good but rather of the same essence as human desires, it was rendered less than pure. Hu's interpretation would mean that the nature was "an empty object"; moreover, Chu warned his students that Hu's view of the nature was similar to the heterodoxy of the Su brothers and Buddhism.<sup>31</sup>

#### ON HUMANENESS

How to characterize humaneness was the third major issue between Chu Hsi and Chang Shih. This discussion began as early as their first meeting in 1163 and continued for over a decade. Although it was one topic discussed during Chu's two-month visit in 1167, it did not emerge as the central question until the issue of equilibrium and harmony had been settled. Chu Hsi drafted a treatise on humaneness and exchanged letters in 1172 and 1173 with Chang and Lü Tsu-ch'ien about humaneness. During 1173, Chu and Chang reached general agreement on most points and, after consultation with Lü Tsu-ch'ien, made final revisions to their treatises.

Chu Hsi's final treatise on humaneness had as its foundation the mind of Heaven and Earth. The *Book of Changes* had stated: "The great virtue of Heaven and Earth is to produce [things]."<sup>32</sup> Having been influenced by this idea of identifying Heaven and Earth with the production of things, the Ch'eng brothers equated this great virtue with the mind of Heaven and

Earth: "The mind of Heaven and Earth is to produce things."<sup>33</sup> After quoting this statement, Chu reasoned:

When people and things are produced, they receive the mind of Heaven and Earth as their mind. Therefore, with reference to the virtue or character of the mind, although it embraces and penetrates all and leaves nothing to be desired, nevertheless, one word will cover all of it, namely, humaneness. . . . The moral qualities of the mind of Heaven and Earth are four: origination, growth, benefit, and firmness. And the principle of origination unites and controls them all. In their operation they constitute the course of the four seasons, and the vital energy of spring permeates all. Therefore, in the mind of people there are also four moral qualities—namely, humaneness, rightness, propriety, and wisdom—and humaneness embraces them all. In their emanation and function, they constitute the feeling of love, respect, being right, and discrimination between right and wrong—and the feeling of commiseration pervades them all. . . . What mind is this? In Heaven and Earth, it is the mind to produce things infinitely. In people, it is the mind to love people gently and to benefit things. It includes the four virtues of humaneness, rightness, propriety, and wisdom, and it penetrates the four beginnings of the sense of commiseration, the sense of shame, the sense of deference and compliance, and the sense of right and wrong.<sup>34</sup>

Contrary to conventional translations, "virtue of the mind" is probably more apt than "character of the mind" to convey Chu's philosophical context. Although this virtue resides in and in a sense belongs to the mind, as virtue and principle it is actually the character of the nature rather than a characteristic of the mind *per se*.

Chu next elucidated humaneness in reference to essence and function. Essence and function were characteristic of Heaven and Earth as well as the mind of people. Because of this relation of essence and function, all of the qualities of Heaven and Earth were implied when origination was mentioned; moreover, all of the virtues in the mind of people were implied with the mention of humaneness. Chu proclaimed:

Humaneness constituting the *Tao* refers to the fact that the mind of Heaven and Earth to produce things is present in everything. Before feelings are aroused, this essence is already existent in its completeness. After feelings are aroused, its function is infinite. If we can truly practice love and preserve it, then we have in it the spring of all virtues and the root of all good deeds. This is why in the teachings of the Confucian school, the student is always urged to exert anxious and unceasing effort in the pursuit of humaneness. In the teachings of Confucius, it is

said [in *Analects*, 12/1], “Master yourself and return to propriety.” This means that if we can overcome and eliminate self-centeredness and return to the principle of Heaven, then the essence of this mind [i.e., humaneness] will be present everywhere and its function will always be operative.

Chu then cited passages from the classics as examples of what one should actually do in order to put the universal essence of humaneness into operation in one’s own life.

In the following part of his treatise, Chu Hsi sought to correct what he regarded as mistakes made by earlier *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians. He also sought to resolve an apparent contradiction with Ch’eng I, who had said that love should not be regarded as humaneness. Chu pointed out that he was claiming that humaneness was the “principle of love” rather than love itself; hence, there was no conflict with Ch’eng I’s true but hidden meaning.

Coupling “the principle of love” and “the virtue of the mind” soon became for Confucians the standard way to characterize humaneness. Together covering both essence and function, the phrases clarified the character of humaneness more than anyone had been able to do earlier. Chang Tsai had explicitly addressed the essence of humaneness and implicitly its function in his famous “Western Inscription.” In addition to clarifying Chang’s essay, Ch’eng I had established the doctrine that humaneness was the nature, but love was a feeling. Chu built upon Ch’eng’s doctrine but heightened the component of love and synthesized important components of the Confucian tradition into a balanced essay.

Chinese and Japanese scholars have extensively studied Chu Hsi’s essay and his letters to Chang Shih; moreover, they have generally emphasized Chu’s creative synthesis and Chang’s eventual acceptance of it. For instance, Satō Hitoshi speaks of “the unqualified defeat of Chang’s Hunan scholarship as well as his total submission to Chu’s views,” and Liu Shu-hsien laments the lack of any sign of Hu Hung’s legacy in Chang’s extant writings.<sup>35</sup> In addition to surveying these findings, I will make an effort to balance them with more attention to Chang’s side and how he might have enriched Chu’s synthesis. Chang had been diligently studying the concept of humaneness ever since his 1161 draft of the “Record of Admiring Yen-tzu.” Furthermore, he had repeatedly revised it over the years until his final colophon in 1173. The timing of the final form of that essay coincided with the revised version of Chang’s own “Treatise on Humaneness” (which was translated in Chapter 2). That revised treatise is so similar to Chu’s in tone and content that some scholars, beginning with Chu’s own disciple Ch’en Ch’un (1159-1223), have wrongly concluded that it was written by Master Chu himself.<sup>36</sup>

Because of the similarities between the two treatises, it has been impor-

tant to some scholars to argue that Chu's essay was prior and thus the locus of originality. But the evidence is problematic. The primary articles of evidence offered by others are two of Chu's letters to Lü Tsu-ch'ien. In the first, Chu reported to Lü early in 1173 that Chang Shih had written that he had no more doubts about the "Treatise on Humaneness."<sup>37</sup> One might conclude from this that Chu's own treatise "had assumed its final form."<sup>38</sup> But by the late autumn or early winter—after he reported receiving Chang's "Treatise on Humaneness"—Chu told Lü that he had "recently revised [his own] 'Treatise on Humaneness' *again*" (emphasis mine). Hence Chu's treatise continued to be revised during 1173.<sup>39</sup> In the second letter to Lü, Chu reported at the end of 1173 that Chang had recently sent a letter and also a certain "Record of Comments on Humaneness" (*Yen jen lu*), which Chu said was superior to previous draft(s). Moreover, the "Treatise on Humaneness" had also been revised as a result of the exchange of views.<sup>40</sup> Even if this unspecified treatise was Chang's, it was merely the last version of his treatise. In short, linking the series of letters together shows that both Chang's and Chu's treatises had continued to evolve—even after Chang had reportedly said that he had no more doubts.

Since the writings of both men on humaneness had been undergoing revisions and because Chang Shih's key writings on humaneness are no longer extant, it is difficult to prove that Chu Hsi's treatise was prior. As editor of Chang's literary corpus, Chu did not include "Record of Comments on Humaneness," "The Record of Admiring Yen-tzu," and some of Chang's letters to Chu about humaneness. Because Chang had been writing on humaneness since 1161, his writings must have been a focus of discussions between the two on humaneness—especially during Chu's 1167 visit, years before Chu drafted his own treatise—as well as a catalyst for Chu's treatise. Although we cannot compare the language in Chang's earlier writings on humaneness to that in Chu's treatise, from what does remain in their writings, as we will see, Chang appears to have made contributions to Chu's evolving synthesis on humaneness.

In his letters to Chang about humaneness, Chu Hsi criticized earlier Confucians' views for being partial and incomplete. Prior to the Ch'eng brothers, Confucians had reduced humaneness to the feeling of love; hence they failed to see its importance. Ch'eng I clearly differentiated between humaneness as the nature and love as a feeling, so the importance of humaneness was reasserted. His disciples, however, became so preoccupied with the exposition of humaneness as the nature that they overlooked love. Their forgetting about love resulted in a condition inferior even to earlier Confucians who recognized humaneness only as the feeling of love. Losing their grasp of essentials, the disciples of the Ch'engs failed to accomplish anything in their personal cultivation and soared into empty speculation about the principle of humaneness. In their ignorance, they were like those whom



Confucius (in *Analects*, 17/8) criticized for being fond of humaneness but not of learning. Such a stinging indictment against major figures within the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition is a graphic pronouncement of Chu's emerging confidence by the early 1170s that he had the authority to define the tradition.

Chu Hsi proceeded to declare early in 1171 what had to be done. To counter the misconceptions prevalent because of the disciples of the Ch'eng brothers, a clearer perception of humaneness was requisite:

In my opinion, when one really focuses one's mind on the pursuit of humaneness, the most effective way is of course to put it into practice. But unless one establishes a definite idea on the meaning and content of humaneness through learning, one encounters the danger of being mired in aimless confusion. The defect of the lack of learning is ignorance. If one can exert the effort of abiding in reverence and extending knowledge, and make them complement each other, then this defect will be eliminated. When one wants to gain a clear understanding of the meaning and content of humaneness, one will do well if one uses the concept of love as aid. When one realizes that humaneness is the source of love and that love can never exhaust humaneness, then one has gained a definite comprehension of humaneness. Thus it is absolutely not necessary to search for humaneness in obscure places.<sup>41</sup>

In short, one had first to have a sharper understanding of the meaning and content of humaneness before self-cultivation and Confucian discussion could return to the proper path.

Among the most significant points of contention that developed in the correspondence between Chang and Chu on humaneness, one centered on the mind of Heaven and Earth. In his treatise, Chu Hsi incorporated a statement by one of the Ch'engs: "The mind of Heaven and Earth is to produce things." The statement originally was an explanation of one of Ch'eng I's comments on the *Book of Changes*. Chang objected to Ch'eng's statement and recommended a similar one from Ch'eng I's commentary, "the mind of Heaven and Earth that produces things." From Chang Shih's perspective, there was a fundamental difference between the two statements.<sup>42</sup> He shared Hu Hung's conception of the mind as wondrously transcendent, as comprehending all under Heaven, and as commanding all things. "The mind of Heaven and Earth that produces things" was language that reflected their conception of an active and inexhaustible mind. As Chang read the phrases, the mind of Heaven and Earth that produces things was not restricted to the production of things, but the phrase Chu had adopted denoted such a restriction upon the mind.

Chu replied that both of the statements from the Ch'engs had the same meaning. Although he readily quoted Chang's preferred phrase in another essay he was currently writing, Chu asserted that both statements should be

understood as identifying the mind of Heaven and Earth with the function of producing things. In an 1172 letter to another friend, he attacked with exceptional force the Hunan position:

Scholars of late do not use love to define humaneness. They therefore feel dissatisfied when they see that our late Master Gentleman [Ch'eng I] interpreted the mind of Heaven and Earth through the workings of the single yang life-force producing the myriad things. They establish theories different from those of the ancients and portray the mind of Heaven and Earth as something transcendental and lofty. They do not understand that what Heaven and Earth focus on as their mind is none other than the production of things, and that if one interprets this mind any other way, one will invariably be drowned in emptiness and submerged in quietude and will fail to attain the proper connection between essence and function, root and branches.<sup>43</sup>

Chu was here warning that the Hunan notion of a transcendent mind would lead to the emptiness and quietude of Taoism and Buddhism. Compared with his own record to this point in the early 1170s, however, the Hu family and Chang Shih had been far more engaged in government service and cultivating the mind in daily activities. Thus Chu's criticism was overdrawn. But Chu was attempting to focus attention on the mind in people rather than the one in the cosmic realm.

In spite of their disagreement over the mind of Heaven and Earth, there was an *apparent* agreement over the following sentence, which connected that mind to the mind in people. Chu proposed: "When Heaven and Earth endow human beings and things with the mind of productiveness, this becomes the mind of human beings and things as well." Each thinker understood the sentence differently, however. To Chu, the emphasis was on the warm and gentle feelings of commiseration with which people were endowed so they could love and benefit others. Chang Shih followed other leads from the Ch'engs to emphasize being related, as if members of one body, to all things through all-encompassing humaneness. Although Chu acknowledged that the universality of humaneness made possible the extension of love to all things, he was also mindful that Ch'eng I had warned against the dangers of an indiscriminating universality. Identifying other things as the self could result in self-negation as absurd as sacrificing oneself to feed a hungry tiger. Compassion was more practical. Furthermore, compassion and love for other things were the effects rather than the essence of humaneness.<sup>44</sup> In ethics, some who emphasize love and oneness with others fail to realize that love alone is not enough; love does not itself inform us of what we should do for others. Despite Chu's caricature of Chang's position, Chang was not in any real danger of falling into such empty relativism and sentimentality. Confucians linked love with specific behavioral virtues, such

as justness or rightness and filial piety, which gave guidelines for action and bonding among persons.

A similar apparent agreement centered on the use in both men's essays of the phrase "the principle of love" to describe the essence of humaneness. Even though the phrase might well have been coined by Chu, Chang readily used it in his treatise and in his 1173 *Commentary on the Analects*. Chang used the phrase in the context of his emphasis on the oneness of all things and extending love universally toward all things. Thus Chang interpreted the principle of love as impartiality and being at one with all others. Nonetheless Chu denied that the phrase was predicated upon assuming oneness with all things. To Chu, all things had this same principle, so there was no need to await being one body with all things to achieve the principle of humaneness. Although impartiality was close to humaneness, Chu reiterated Ch'eng I's point that impartiality itself was "inadequate to denote the essence of humaneness." From the perspective of Hunan scholars, Chu was limiting the mind and the essence of humaneness. But from Chu's vantage, Hunan scholars restricted humaneness by emphasizing its character as impartiality and having no desires. Even though in his treatise he did not use the term "impartiality" and scarcely addressed expelling desires, Chu was of course still interested in achieving impartiality and controlling desires. In his correspondence, however, he strove to differentiate such characteristics from humaneness itself and to link humaneness more absolutely with principle. Instead of highlighting only love's universal extension, Chu's "principle of love" encompassed all cardinal Confucian virtues as values in and of themselves. These virtues were *a priori* principles, which did not depend on anything else for their existence or justification.<sup>45</sup> To Chu, humaneness was an *a priori* principle because it was the inner nature rather than either a feeling or the mind.

Chu Hsi also objected to the Hunan scholars' association of humaneness with the consciousness of the mind. Chang and other Hunan scholars had been led by Hsieh Liang-tso and also by Ch'eng Hao to identify humaneness with the mind's incipient and active functioning. This conception of the mind was the basis upon which their view of spiritual cultivation was grounded. Chang's reassertion of this theme in one of his letters discussing humaneness would suggest that the debate over equilibrium and harmony had not convinced him to abandon as much of his Hunan tradition as conventionally assumed. What Chang referred to as consciousness (*chüeh*) was conscience arising from being conscious of others' suffering. Mencius (2A/6) had drawn attention to the mind-and-heart that could not bear to see others suffer and would spontaneously respond, as though saving a child about to fall into a well. Hence consciousness denoted spontaneous ethical feelings arising from the mind and inner nature. Our use of the word "consciousness" to discuss this point of contention with Chu is apt because it also

denotes a cognitive state of mind; indeed, the weight of this denotation in English privileges Chu's interpretation of this issue. Chu chose to focus on this denotation to interpret what Chang and other Hunan scholars were saying. Referring to the broad meaning of humaneness as encompassing the other Confucian virtues, Chu suggested that it was because humaneness encompassed wisdom that Hunan scholars mistook wisdom for humaneness. A person having humaneness was of course conscious, but humaneness itself could not be reduced to consciousness. In an effort to maintain a focus on humaneness as the nature or principle instead of the mind, Chu designated humaneness as "the virtue of the mind."<sup>46</sup>

According to Chu Hsi, regarding consciousness as humaneness would presuppose using a mind to pursue the mind. As in the debate over cultivating equilibrium and harmony, he meant that examining the incipient feelings in the mind would require both the observing mind and the mind observed. He had difficulty understanding that Hu Hung, Chang Shih, and other followers of Ch'eng Hao were talking about intuitive reflection of the mind rather than using one mind to seek another mind. Similarly, he criticized the Hunan interpretation of Confucius' comment (in *Analects*, 4/7) "By observing faults, humaneness may be made known." Ch'eng I had glossed the passage: through observing the faults of others, one would know if they were humane. Hunan scholars interpreted the passage as an admonition about one's own spiritual cultivation. Although Chu lauded such concern for self-cultivation, he argued that the Hunan interpretation required the mind instantaneously to make a mistake, observe the mistake, and be cognizant that humaneness was observing the mistake. Such an approach, Chu charged, resulted in unnecessary levels of mental stress.<sup>47</sup> The incisiveness of this attack is nevertheless confounded, it seems to me, by Chu's earlier charge that the Hunan scholars' assumption of oneness with all things led to laxness in self-cultivation.

Chang Shih's recorded replies to questions from his students reveal how far he went in accepting Chu's criticisms. Such passages are particularly important because Chang's letter replying to Chu about humaneness as consciousness is not extant. When a student asked about Chu's critique of Hsieh Liang-tso, Chang agreed that humaneness could not be reduced merely to consciousness but asserted that Chu's criticism was excessive. Chang added that what the mind knows is simply humaneness. Another student cited Chu's criticism of having one mind pursue another mind as the probable impetus for Chang's apparent change in recent comments about the passage in *Analects*, 4/7. The student asked Chang to clarify earlier statements about knowing humaneness from reflecting on failures to attain the Mean. How could examining extreme behavior, such as the man who cut a piece of flesh from his leg to make a medical potion for his parent, teach anything about the humaneness in filial piety?<sup>48</sup>

In reply, Chang Shih credited his pondering Ch'eng I's teachings with enabling him to correct his previous flaws, which had inclined him toward Buddhism. He then revealed that he had accepted Chu Hsi's distinction between generosity and humaneness, but he still believed that examining faults was useful. Although acknowledging the importance of study, he still upheld the Hunan view of the superiority of an intuitive perception of humaneness:

One must carefully study; then one can see the meaning of the words that sages established at that time. It's improper to say that excessive generosity is humaneness, but one can know that the generous person's mind was not far from humaneness. If compared with excessive pettiness or even with being merciless, isn't the difference great? Please use this to perceive intuitively (*t'i-jen*); then you will recognize the meaning of the reason why humaneness is humaneness and won't end up with insignificant details and lack of clarity.<sup>49</sup>

Commenting on this passage, Huang Tsung-hsi, in the *Records of Sung and Yuan Confucians*, approvingly likened Chang's observing faults to know humaneness to one's daily self-discipline. In recognizing a break in discipline, one resumed the discipline. Huang suggested that Chu Hsi had not given Chang Shih enough credit for knowing where to start; for "if one observed faults to know humaneness and softened one's temperament, that was the very way to begin." After all, Ch'eng Hao's similar admonition about "perceiving humaneness" did not merely mean knowing.<sup>50</sup>

Huang's judgment is comparable to some twentieth-century critiques of the exchange between Chang Shih and Chu Hsi over the character of humaneness. Most critical of Chu is Mou Tsung-san, who finds Chu culpable for perverting what Chang meant by the mind and the essence of humaneness. Mou identifies Chang as being within the mainstream of Confucianism that can be traced back through Hu Hung and Ch'eng Hao to Mencius. The mainstream view of the mind emphasized innate and spontaneous ethical feelings; moreover, the essence of humaneness had no limits. Mou identifies Chu Hsi with Ch'eng I and ultimately even Hsün-tzu (298-238 B.C.), especially in their reduction of the mind to its cognitive function at the expense of its innately ethical and active qualities. Instead of appreciating the unity of the mind, feelings, and nature, Chu Hsi allegedly rendered these asunder in his overly intellectualized analysis. According to Mou, Chu's reduced perception resulted in a passive conception of consciousness: one was dependent on external things to know even the principles inherent within the mind. Mou faults Chang for an inadequate defense of the mainline tradition. At times when Chu cited Master Ch'eng as an authority, Chang was too confused to realize that Ch'eng I's positions were being used to misrepresent Ch'eng Hao's.<sup>51</sup>

Ch'ien Mu (1895-1990) probably provided the best implicit answer to Mou. Attempting to counter Buddhist claims that the mind and principle were empty, Chu needed the mind to mesh with principle; therefore, he identified humaneness with the life-force and mind inherent in the cosmos. To establish a ground for the linkage, Chu said, for instance: "The mind of the myriad things is like the mind of Heaven and Earth. The mind of all under Heaven is like the mind of the sages. With Heaven and Earth's giving life to the myriad things, there is a mind of Heaven and Earth in each thing. With the sages in the world, every person has a mind of the sages."<sup>52</sup> Assuming this kind of connection, he could proclaim: "For a person of humaneness, the mind is principle."<sup>53</sup> In a passage that tied self-cultivation to achieving the life-force of humaneness in Heaven and Earth, Chu remarked: "When a scholar disciplines himself in overcoming the ego and returning to propriety to the point of eliminating egocentric desires completely, then his mind is purely this mind of Heaven and Earth giving life to things."<sup>54</sup> Within such passages, according to Ch'ien, principle, humaneness, and mind were all presented as one.<sup>55</sup> Such passages demonstrate that Chu had a broader view of the mind and one closer to Mencius than Mou had claimed. Yet Chu was at the same time insistent that people know the difference between mind and humaneness as well as the ethical gaps generally operative between one's own mind and that of Heaven and Earth. It was Chu's attentiveness to such gaps and distinctions that made him object so strongly to views like those of the Hunan scholars.

During the exchange of views between Chu Hsi and Chang Shih, some agreement was actually reached that resulted in specific revisions in their treatises on humaneness. Chu, in one of his letters, criticized Chang for not having the nature and the feelings related as essence and function as well as for not having the mind presented as commanding the nature and the feelings. Chang's extant treatise includes such language, so he must have been persuaded. Chang also apparently accepted Chu's point that the principle of love had priority over oneness with all things. In his draft, Chang had commented that nothing within Heaven and Earth is not one's own humaneness. Chu objected that such comments would imply that humaneness was a thing and obliterate the distinction between things as things and humaneness as arising from the mind. Chang never actually intended to make humaneness or the mind into things but only pointed to the all-inclusiveness of humaneness. Even though Chu clearly misrepresented Chang's point, Chang omitted the comment in the final version.<sup>56</sup>

By comparing the final version of Chu's treatise with statements in the letters of both men, we can observe that some minor alterations in Chu's treatise were also made because of Chang's objections.<sup>57</sup> In the "Diagram of the Discourse on Humaneness" (*Jen-shuo t'u*), which was charted after the treatise was revised, Chu incorporated the concept of impartiality twice. The

practice of humaneness in daily activities also came more to the fore. These changes reflected Chang's preoccupations. According to Satō Hitoshi, Chang's contributions to Chu's evolution on the concept of humaneness were even more pervasive than these specific details: "Chu's discussions with Chang Nan-hsien [Shih] on the nature of *jen* provide the finishing touch to his thinking on the subject. Furthermore, they also enable Chu to brush off an earlier influence exerted on him by the Hunan School through Chang."<sup>58</sup>

Differences remained in their treatises on humaneness. Chu focused more on theory, and Chang on practice. Chang had more emphasis on overcoming ego as well as on expelling ignorance and desires. Chu balanced overcoming ego and discussing learning. How far Chang would go to accommodate Chu also had limits. In his treatise, Chang did not renounce Hsieh Liang-tso's concept of humaneness as consciousness, but his statement (that a person of humaneness had consciousness without confusion) was expressed in such a way as not to confront Chu. Although he agreed that one could not reduce humaneness to impartiality, Chang did not drop the term altogether. Moreover, his final version of the treatise proclaimed: "Impartiality is the reason people can be humane."<sup>59</sup>

Most significant, Chang's treatise did not mention Chu's characterization of humaneness as "the virtue of the mind." Modern scholars have speculated about why Chang apparently neither adopted nor made an issue out of this characterization. Chang might have seen this issue as subsumed under other differences.<sup>60</sup> Or perhaps there was no disagreement over this wording because of a common heritage from the Ch'engs, who had used the metaphor of seeds of grain for humaneness as the principle of life in all things.<sup>61</sup>

Actually, the phrase "virtue of the mind" was originally Chang Shih's. Although some might object that the evidence for this claim comes a dozen years after Chu Hsi had used the phrase in his treatise, Chu himself is the witness. Chang had been dead for five years when Chu made his statement, so he was not compelled to make his admission and give Chang this credit. Having recently edited Chang's collected writings, Chu apparently had refreshed his memory of the sequence and content of his correspondence with Chang. His admission came in an 1185 letter to Lü Tsu-ch'ien's brother, in which he recounted how Chang had responded to his draft on humaneness. Chang "had wanted to change the words—the virtue of the nature and the foundation of love—into the virtue of the mind and the foundation of the good as well as to say Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things all share my essence."<sup>62</sup> Clearly, Chu was admitting that the phrase "virtue of the mind" had initially been put forward by Chang as his own alternative to Chu's "virtue of the nature." In the context provided by Chu's statement, the phrase fits well with the Hunan concept of the mind. The linkage is even clearer if the phrase is translated as the "character of the mind," instead of

the "virtue of the mind." One wonders if Chang was drawing it from the "Record of Admiring Yen-tzu" or the "Record of Comments on Humane-ness," neither of which Chu preserved.

Chu thus reminisced in the 1185 letter that he had objected to Chang's suggestion of "the virtue of the mind" on the grounds that it was too vague and could be used by different people to point to different things. Yet this was the phrase that Chu settled on for his own treatise. Chu apparently felt satisfied that, by counterbalancing it with the principle of love, he had offset the danger of the phrase being understood from the perspective of the Hunan conception of the mind. Chu's 1185 statement was a rare acknowledgment of an intellectual debt to a contemporary, so later scholars have easily overlooked it and what it suggests about the evolution of his thought.

Although it is unfair to say that Chang Shih simply capitulated to Chu Hsi, Chu did triumph quite convincingly. Accepting Chu's characterization of Hunan ideas as having been inherited from Hsieh Liang-tso, Chang was unable to establish his roots in Ch'eng Hao's philosophy. Instead, he followed Chu in looking to Ch'eng I for textual authority. Chang has been criticized from the perspective of modern textual scholarship for not differentiating between the strains of thought of the Ch'eng brothers. His failure to make those distinctions clearly as well as Chu's skill in using one Ch'eng brother to supplement—and even to alter—the ideas of the other one demonstrate the broad and fluid nature of *Tao-hsüeh* Confucianism in the twelfth century.

Generally, Chu addressed issues of theory, but Chang focused more on practice. Chang preferred to discuss cultural values and actual policies, but he was compelled to address the more abstract level of fundamental principles. At times, Chu chose to ignore what Chang or Hu Hung had intended in order to press an argument forward to its implications for theory. For example, Chu interpreted some statements as dealing with the essence of fundamental principles even though Hu and Chang had spoken from the perspective of the essence and function of actual entities. Such differences in preferred level of discourse meant that on some occasions the agreement Chu won was more apparent than real. The exchanges with Chang demonstrate how much more given to speculative philosophy Chu was than other contemporary *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians.

The exchanges with Chang played a role in Chu's process of defining an integrated synthesis of Confucianism and taking the clarity and significance of ideas, particularly humaneness and self-cultivation, to a new zenith. Confucian scholars of later generations have been aware that Chang contributed to Chu's development. Often that awareness has been overshadowed by needs within two camps of scholars. Some have needed to authenticate Chu's and by extension their own orthodoxy. Others have needed to



blame the eclipse of their own tradition on Chang's poor defense of the legacy from Ch'eng Hao and Hu Hung. In order to reconstruct the dynamics of twelfth-century Confucian thought, I have sought here to highlight Chang's contributions more than others have done. Such reconstructions have been complicated by the incompleteness of Chang's works.

Chu's omission of important materials when editing Chang's collected works along with his alteration of Hu Hung's text cannot but disturb our sense of historical honesty. When he decided not to preserve such materials, Chu was taking steps to excise some of the diversity of the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition and leave a far more homogeneous and certain legacy. His real concern was neither to uphold some objective standard of textual integrity nor to deny the contributions of his friend. To Chu, the ultimate issue was the transmission of the *Tao*, and he considered his actions most appropriate for ensuring—his view of—that transmission. Unfortunately, Chu's editing of Chang's works makes it difficult for us to reconstruct the struggle of either man to apprehend that *Tao* or the world of their thought. As we shall see in Period Three, the intellectual climate had begun to change significantly by the time Chu did his editing of Chang's literary corpus in 1184. But first we need to consider the leading *Tao-hsüeh* figure of the 1170s, Lü Tsu-ch'ien.

## Chapter 4 Lü Tsu-ch'ien

Although excluded from the *Tao-hsüeh* biographies in the official *Sung History* and generally overlooked by modern scholars, Lü Tsu-ch'ien (1137–1181) was the most preeminent figure in the fellowship from the late 1160s until he died prematurely in 1181. Compared to other twelfth-century leaders, Lü was much more effective as a political figure and his scholarship more widely recognized in his own day. Criticisms of Lü after his death, however, have raised a fundamental question: was he pluralistic and undogmatic or simply indiscriminating and vacillating?

Lü Tsu-ch'ien was a gifted member of what his contemporaries regarded to be the leading scholar-official family of the Sung.<sup>1</sup> Although the family had produced occasional great officials at least from the time one was enfeoffed as Lord of Tung-lai in Shantung during the Han dynasty, it was during the Northern Sung that the family reached the pinnacle of its governmental influence. Three of Lü's ancestors, Lü Meng-cheng (946–1011), Lü I-chien (978–1043), and Lü Kung-chu, had served as chief councilors for four Northern Sung emperors. Other family members had earned the trust of their sovereigns and their colleagues in the bureaucracy. Lü Tsu-ch'ien's great grandfather's elder brother, Lü Hao-wen, had played a crucial role in the investiture of Kao-tsung to reestablish the Sung dynasty after the Jurchen conquest. No family had a more distinguished record of service to the dynasty during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The Lü family also had exceptional intellectual attainments. Seventeen of its members from seven generations during the Sung were included in the *Records of Sung and Yüan*

*Confucians*. Three were given separate chapters, and another one headed a chapter together with Fan Chen (1008-1089). The three most significant intellectuals of the family were Lü Hsi-che, Lü Pen-chung, and Lü Tsu-ch'ien.

Lü Tsu-ch'ien synthesized his family tradition and various *Tao-hsüeh* strands to develop one of the major branches within twelfth-century *Tao-hsüeh*. As Ch'üan Tsu-wang (1705-1775) noted in the *Records of Sung and Yüan Confucians*:

During the 1165-1190 period, scholarly circles divided into three: the Chu school, the Lü school and the Lu school. The three schools were all active around the same time, but they were not very compatible. The learning of Chu Hsi stressed the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge. The learning of Lu Chiu-yüan sought to clarify and apprehend the original mind. The learning of Lü Tsu-ch'ien combined both of their strengths and embellished them with the tradition of the Central Plains literary and historical corpus. Although their points of entry and paths differed, they were basically alike in returning to the sages.<sup>2</sup>

Although this passage is a retrospective presentation from the eighteenth century, it correctly recognized that Lü was one of the major Confucian leaders during the second half of the twelfth century. This tripod characterization, unfortunately, omitted Chang Shih just as tripod depictions by modern scholars such as Mou Tsung-san have omitted Lü. Ch'üan's version is perhaps less problematic than the one put forth by modern scholars, for Lü's influence was much stronger than Chang's during most of this period. In any event, Ch'üan accurately observed that the special character of the Lü school was its breadth and inclusiveness. A key component of the Lü school's scope was the unsurpassed private library of literary and historical works that the Lü family somehow managed to transport south in the wake of the Jurchen conquest of the Northern Sung.

Drawing upon his family's tradition of scholarship and its library, Lü Tsu-ch'ien established a school in Chin-hua, the prefectural seat of Wu-chou in central Chekiang. After teaching on nearby Mt. Ming-chou, he moved his teaching center to the eastern section of the city of Chin-hua in 1170. Here at the Beautiful Pools Academy (Li-tse shu-yüan), he taught with his younger brother, Lü Tsu-chien (d. 1196). During the Southern Sung, Lü's academy rivaled Chu's White Deer Grotto Academy (Pai-lu-tung shu-yüan) near Nan-k'ang and Chang's Mountain Slope Academy near Ch'ang-sha. Various scholars at the Chin-hua academy continued Lü's tradition into later dynasties. Lü's scholarly orientations toward historical and institutional studies served as part of the foundation for the contributions of the Chin-hua school of thought in later centuries.<sup>3</sup> In recent centuries, scholars

have usually placed Chin-hua thinkers during the Southern Sung within the larger Che-tung (Chekiang) group because of shared concerns with institutional, historical, and statecraft studies. In addition to Chin-hua in Wu-chou, Che-tung areas of prominence included Wen-chou on the southeast coast and Ming-chou (modern Ningpo) in northern Chekiang. This grouping is appropriate because Lü's ideas influenced thinkers in all three areas during the Southern Sung and they had a sense of affinity.

While Lü taught in Chin-hua, unprecedented numbers of students flocked to his door for instruction. Although he shared their intent to study for the examination in order to serve the country, Lü definitely had a more fundamental commitment to the *Tao* and to the cultural tradition. Moreover, he sought to influence his students to embrace various cultural, ethical and philosophical concerns. His ethical philosophy of human nature and the mind was in the same Mencian vein that his colleagues in the fellowship considered mainstream, but he devoted less time than they to the fine details of those philosophical issues. What most set him apart from friends like Chu Hsi and Chang Shih was the degree of his commitment to nationwide political issues and historical and institutional studies, his areas of common ground with other Che-tung Confucians. That common ground included a more dynamic view of history than we commonly associate with Sung Confucians, especially those in the *Tao-hsüeh* community.

Over the centuries, scholars have focused on four special characteristics of the Lü family tradition.<sup>4</sup> First, the Lü family did not name one particular teacher or honor one exclusive teaching. Lü Hsi-che consciously began this tradition in the mid-eleventh century. Studying eclectically from one of Ouyang Hsiu's (1007-1072) students as well as from Hu Yüan and Sun Fu (992-1057), he had grounding in the teachings of those who revived classical Confucian learning in the Sung, but he also learned from the next generation, including Wang An-shih. The beginnings of *Tao-hsüeh* also caught his attention, and he associated with both Ch'eng brothers and Shao Yung. It was only after Lü Hsi-che treated Ch'eng as his teacher that large numbers came to study with the master, according to Chu Hsi's biographical account of Ch'eng I.<sup>5</sup> Thus Chu was well aware of the importance of the Lü family's social and political prestige to beginnings of the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship. Lü Hsi-che's grandson, Lü Pen-chung, followed his family's tradition by studying with various teachers, including Liu An-shih, Yang Shih, Ch'en Kuan (1057-1122), Yin Ch'un, and Wang P'in (1082-1153). Although all of these men were associated with the Ch'engs, they represented the broader scope of the *Tao-hsüeh* Confucianism in the early twelfth century. Liu An-shih, for example, had been a disciple of Ssu-ma Kuang, and his recorded conversations have been preserved only in the *Tao-hsüeh* anthology compiled by Chang Chiu-ch'eng's students. Chang himself had links to the Lü family, for he expressed affection for his teacher and friend, Lü Pen-chung.<sup>6</sup>

Appreciation of diversity was also transmitted to Lü Tsu-ch'ien through Lü Pen-chung's student Lin Chih-ch'i (1112-1176). Lin was the young Lü's major teacher and a principal influence on his views of history, especially the *Book of Documents*. The young Lü also had ties to the broad *Tao-hsüeh* movement through other teachers: Hu Hsien, with whom he studied briefly in 1160, and especially Wang Ying-ch'en (1119-1176). Wang had been a student of both Yang Shih and Chang Chiu-ch'eng. Hu Hsien combined the teachings of the Ch'engs, especially on the *Book of Changes*, with those of the Hu family on historical and classical studies.<sup>7</sup> A first cousin of Hu Hung, Hu Hsien had also been one of the three scholars to whom Chu Hsi's father entrusted Chu's education. Thus Chu and Lü personally shared a teacher in the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition. Another sector of the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship with which Lü Tsu-ch'ien was closely associated comprised those of Ch'eng I's disciples from Yung-chia in the neighboring prefecture of Wen-chou. That branch of *Tao-hsüeh* traced its roots back though Cheng Poshung (1128-1181) to Chou Hsing-chi (1091 *chin-shih*), who had led eight other Yung-chia natives north to study with Ch'eng I.<sup>8</sup>

Chu acknowledged Lü's broad scope but criticized his failure to concentrate on essentials. He probably had in mind Ch'eng Hao's statement that learning should be both broad and focused on basic principles. On one occasion in 1186, Chu agreed with a remark made by one of his students: "Lü Tsu-ch'ien exercised disciplined effort only on broad and adulterated learning but did not carefully investigate important essential principles."<sup>9</sup> Chu extended this criticism to the whole family: "Lord Lü Hsi-che's family tradition truly has many points to awe and enlighten others, and the cultivation of recent generations was profound and rich like this. But his method of learning has some flaws, such as saying, 'Don't specialize in any one school or be partial to any one theory'; so they are broad but adulterated."<sup>10</sup>

Second among Lü family characteristics, the family's not following just one teacher or tradition went so far as to encompass an openness to Buddhism. Sung Confucians were generally influenced by Buddhism, but the Lü family was relatively more conscious and frank about the Buddhist impact on their thinking. Late in life Lü Hsi-che had studied Buddhism and had fellowship with monks. Believing that some teachings of the Buddha and of Confucius were similar, he advocated harmonizing the two teachings. Lü Pen-chung inherited this fascination with Buddhism, especially Ch'an. Unlike these forefathers, Lü Tsu-ch'ien was not an advocate of Buddhism and even criticized Buddhism. Some have still argued that he was influenced by Ch'an views of enlightenment when he wrote: "If one understood these principles, a grudge that had lasted for a century could be reconciled in one day, the ignorance of a whole life could be penetrated with one word, and the most monstrous crimes could be cleared up in a second."<sup>11</sup> He made this statement while commenting on a hexagram in the *Book of Changes*. The

topical discussion in that context diminishes the likelihood that he was thinking in Buddhist terms. Chu suspected that his friend had "not avoided secretly entertaining the ideas of the Buddha," but "his cultivation of his good nature is so profound that he has been able to refrain from giving expression to it." This, according to Chu, was "not a small flaw."<sup>12</sup>

Given Chu's inability to point to anything specific or manifest in Lü's thinking or writings, we probably should not give much weight to the influence of the Buddhist component of his family tradition. Indeed Chu also criticized Lü and Chang Shih for not being able to recognize Buddhist influences on others because his two friends had never studied Buddhist scriptures as he had done.<sup>13</sup> Despite having been influenced by Buddhism and Taoism, many members of the fellowship were so hostile toward these religions that they bitterly characterized them as heterodoxy.

The Lü family was outstanding for its continuation of the liberal and eclectic intellectual orientation that had been prevalent among great families during the T'ang. Influenced by the relativistic bent of both Taoism and Buddhism, the Lü family encouraged tolerance, promoted harmony, and discouraged conflict. The Lüs were not the only Sung political family inclined toward inclusiveness and tolerance, but most of the others were not associated with the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship.<sup>14</sup> Although Buddhism had nowhere near as much influence on Lü Tsu-ch'ien as on his forefathers, he did maintain a relatively tolerant disposition toward intellectual diversity. This inclination was also grounded in a frankness and awareness regarding the difficulty of knowing. "The good has never been easy to know, and principle has never been easy to investigate," he declared in a letter.<sup>15</sup> In another letter he observed, "Ethical principles are limitless, but talent and knowledge have limitations."<sup>16</sup> Such awareness of uncertainty along with his sincere modesty led to an exceptional openness to others' views. As he remarked, "Everyone has his own partialities or biases; let each search out the sources of his own partialities and apply moral effort to rectify them."<sup>17</sup> Lü's intellectual disposition enhanced his role as a mediating figure among Confucians. As we shall see, even Lü was affected by the intolerance of his times. His search for harmony and common ground was confined to Confucians, particularly members of the fellowship.

Third, however receptive to Buddhist teachings and diverse views the Lüs may have been, their family tradition centered on themes from the "Four Books" that the fellowship regarded as mainstream. Although adding the *Classic of Filial Piety* to the four, Lü Pen-chung gave greater priority to the four than to the conventionally recognized classics:

Study and inquiry ought to be based on the *Classic of Filial Piety*, the *Analects*, the *Doctrine of the Mean*, the *Great Learning*, and the *Mencius*, savoring their flavor and investigating their details. Afterwards,

continuing to seek comprehension through the *Book of Poetry*, the *Book of Documents*, the *Book of Changes*, and the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, one must certainly obtain something. When one establishes one's own standpoint, the strong points of the hundred schools of thought can be put to use.<sup>18</sup>

Hence the Four Books along with teachings about filial piety had precedence over the other classics. Only when one's foundation in classical Confucianism was secure could one utilize the teachings of the other schools. The Lü family focused on the same themes in these four books that other *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians did. These themes included controlling the mind to nourish the inner nature, examining principles thoroughly to fathom the nature, rectifying the mind, and making the will sincere. For example, Lü Kung-chu from childhood, even in the days before the rise of the fellowship, had already taken "controlling the mind and nourishing the nature as the foundation."<sup>19</sup> This attention to the Mencian approach to self-cultivation remained as central to the Lües as it was to other participants of the fellowship.

Fourth, attention to cultivation was evident in a family motto taken from the *Book of Changes*: "Learn more from the words and deeds of one's predecessors in order to preserve one's virtue."<sup>20</sup> Lü Kung-chu had taken this advice early and established it as a family teaching. Although they learned from many teachers, the family members most cherished this Lü tradition. The motto also reflected the catholic approach of not limiting oneself to one teacher or doctrine. In their understanding of the motto, the Lü family included numerous worthies from ancient to recent times. Acting on the motto, they amassed a more extensive private library collection than any other family of the era. Their dominance of literary sources was widely recognized: "The transmission of the Central Plains literary and historical corpus all came to the Lü family, and the other great Confucians could not match them."<sup>21</sup> The resources of this collection of texts not only enriched the family's literary interests but also facilitated its historical studies.

In the broad scope of Lü learning, the Ch'eng brothers had a special place. Lü Hsi-che had studied with Ch'eng I, and his sons and grandsons studied with the Ch'eng brothers' closest disciples, including Yang Shih. Lü Tsu-ch'ien regarded Yang Shih's commentary on the *Doctrine of the Mean* as the standard for understanding that classic; moreover, he held that statements by Yang Shih and the Ch'engs should be central in one's education. Lü Pen-chung had also incorporated teachings from Chang Tsai into the family tradition. Although the official *Sung History* in the 1340s excluded Lü Tsu-ch'ien from the select group whose biographies are in the *Tao-hsüeh* section, it presented his philosophy as a synthesis of the two strains of *Tao-*

*hsüeh* from Chang Tsai and the Ch'engs.<sup>22</sup> These two strains were not, of course, the only components of Lü's synthesis.

Owing in part to the advantages of his family background and education, Lü excelled in the examinations and government service far more than any other major *Tao-hsüeh* thinker of the Southern Sung. After winning the *chin-shih* degree in 1163, he also passed the Erudite Literatus (*po-hsüeh hung-tz'u*) examination, a rare distinction achieved by only thirty-four scholars during the three centuries of the Sung era. The scope and proficiency of scholarship in diverse literary, historical, and institutional sources needed for that examination on vast erudition and grand composition demonstrated Lü's exceptional love for learning and desire to serve his emperor. Having won such recognition, he was quickly appointed to office and served most often as an official historian. Mourning in the wake of his mother's death in 1166 and his father's in 1172 interrupted his career. Visits by such friends as Chang Shih helped to sustain his ties to scholar-officials, so that he was quickly reappointed upon completion of each mourning period.

Lü became a professor in 1169 at the academy in Yen-chou, just to the south of the prefecture in which the capital was located, and was assigned to the imperial university in 1170. As a national professor, he implemented some of the study regulations and behavior codes that he had developed while teaching in his own private school nearby in Chin-hua. While in Yen-chou, he and Chang Shih, who was prefect there, were neighbors and daily companions. In 1170, Lü wrote two of his more famous memorials urging Hsiao-tsung to recruit worthy persons, distance himself from court favorites, and restore the dynasty's control over North China. Soon thereafter, the emperor elevated him to examiner for the Board of Rites, which meant that he was in charge of the *chin-shih* examinations of 1172. As discussed earlier, the results of that examination reveal a major shift in favor of the fellowship.

On the recommendation of the noted historian Li T'ao (1115-1184), Lü was appointed to the National Historiography Academy and commissioned to compile the veritable record of the reign of Hui-tsung (1100-1126). Given the Lü family's service in similar historical projects, it is not surprising that Hsiao-tsung selected Lü for this task. Lü I-chien had compiled a national history of the first three reigns of the dynasty, and Lü Kung-chu had been in charge of the veritable records of the reigns of both Ying-tsung (r. 1063-1067) and Shen-tsung (r. 1067-1085). In this area too, the Lü family's expertise and experience surpassed that of their contemporaries. Politically, Lü Tsu-ch'ien's assignment was exceptionally difficult because of the sensitive issue of the dynasty's failure to defend North China against the Jurchen. Presenting the completed history to the emperor in 1177, Lü advocated



learning from the dynasty's past mistakes and urged reforms. Hsiao-tsung responded by promoting him and commissioning him to compile outstanding memorials, prefaces, and letters from the Northern Sung. In this repository of models of Sung political wisdom and literary style, Su Shih, Wang An-shih, and Ou-yang Hsiu dominated, but numerous figures from the Northern Sung were represented. Typical of Lü's catholic approach, he selected writings on their merits without regard for their author's political or philosophical affiliations. Receiving the work at court, Hsiao-tsung enhanced the title of the work, calling it *Mirror of Sung Prose* ([Sung] *Huang-ch'ao wen-chien*), and awarded Lü three hundred taels of silver and a higher post.

By the time he was in his early forties, Lü Tsu-ch'ien was thus a central government official whom the emperor trusted and respected. Major court officials, such as Chou Pi-ta, were also among his close friends. Lü was so well received in part because his family had been in the Sung establishment for so many generations. In the pattern of the marriage alliances among national elite families of the Northern Sung, he had married daughters of Han Yüan-chi (1118-1187) and Jui Yeh (1114-1172), officials from prominent families outside of his local area. Unlike Chu Hsi, Lü paid close attention to and did not disdain active participation in court politics at the capital. The full promise of his career was not to be realized, however, for the impact of an illness at the end of 1178 necessitated his resigning from all active posts early the following year, two years before he died.

Illnesses had caused him problems throughout his life. In addition to interrupting his political career to observe three years of mourning when his mother died in 1166 and again when his father died in 1172, he mourned in succession three wives, each of whom died shortly after childbirth. Only one daughter and one son survived. Altogether he enjoyed conjugal relations for a total of only eight years between the time of his marriage to his first wife in 1157 and the death of his third wife in 1179; the rest of the time he was a widower. As a child and as an adult, he suffered prolonged illnesses, the circumstances and symptoms of which suggest tuberculosis in his youth and a stroke in his early forties. For example, Lü's letters contain complaints about his whole right side being weak and difficult to move. At times he needed help in eating and at other times he could only write very brief letters. Although he underwent frequent acupuncture treatments, physicians advised against moxibustion, for they feared the impact of fire on what they believed was a limited quantity of blood.<sup>23</sup> Judging from actuarial data on his forefathers and significant Sung literati, he should have lived at least one and probably two decades longer than he did. His illnesses and frequent bouts of mourning apparently gave him intimations of mortality.

Reflection during his lengthy illness as a youth had indeed transformed his personality. When Lü was a child, illness contributed to a bad tempera-

ment. He would even break the dishes if he did not like the food being served in them. The debilitating effects of Lü's illnesses did not prohibit him from extensive reading and writing, however. Indeed, his concentration was so powerful that Chu Hsi commented that even when Lü was ill, books did not leave his hands for long periods of time.<sup>24</sup> Reading the *Analects* while lying on his sickbed, he was impressed with the ancient sage's teachings about gentleness, particularly the admonition (in 15/14) "Require much of yourself and little of others." After taking the admonition to heart, his headstrong and self-centered temperament was so changed that he became widely respected for his modest and accommodating personality.<sup>25</sup> Seriousness of purpose and sense of duty to respond to the crises of the country and culture were enhanced by commitments arising from family experiences and early teachings.

After his retirement, during the three remaining years at home in Chin-hua, Lü devoted himself to teaching and scholarship. As they had done earlier, students flocked to him for instruction. They came in large numbers because of his social and political status and because he held the prestigious Erudite Literatus degree. Moreover, he had served as a professor of the imperial university and as chief examiner of the 1172 *chin-shih* examinations. His imperially commissioned collections were highly esteemed, and his academy in Chin-hua was conveniently located, at most a four-day boat ride upstream from the capital.

Students must surely have found Lü's pedagogy attractive. In his teaching, he emphasized seeking fresh perspectives instead of being bound by conventional wisdom. He remarked: "Nowadays, from beginners to elders, those who study mostly follow what is conventional and familiar, and none get beyond set patterns. Only after getting beyond set patterns can one have results."<sup>26</sup> He also admonished Chu Hsi about the necessity for students to apply what they learned and for the teacher to have a sense of orderly procedure and direction:

Extending knowledge and energetically practicing are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. If students have solid intentions, then teaching, pondering, searching, and concentrating certainly are the essentials for advancing in virtue. There are some among the younger generation who expend much effort on seeking the meaning of words but little on daily practice and experience. Although they may achieve some vague understanding, they actually have nothing to apply to themselves. . . . I am not saying to have them practice with vigor and slow down their extension of knowledge, but the one directing them should have an orderly procedure.<sup>27</sup>

Seeking to maintain a balance between knowledge and practice, Lü was mindful of the need for students to think for themselves.

How many students came? Around the year 1180 at the Beautiful Pools Academy, Lü claimed almost 300 students at one time.<sup>28</sup> Given Wing-tsit Chan's focus on Chu Hsi's prominence, it is significant that he accepts without qualification the figure of nearly 300 students at that time. Beyond that 300, there would be students from other years at that academy as well as those from 1167-1168 and 1173 at Mt. Ming-chao along with those whom he taught at the government's academy in Yen-chou. The total easily exceeded a thousand. Even the base figure of 300 at one particular time would by itself decidedly make Lü the most sought-after teacher of the 1170s, just as Chang Shih surely had been during the mid-1160s.

How do figures on Lü's students compare with those for Chu Hsi, the one seen in retrospect as the most famous teacher of the Southern Sung? Professor Chan cites the names of 467 students of Chu Hsi.<sup>29</sup> Only 5 of these had come to Chu between 1167 and 1179. An additional 35 (plus possibly as many as 9 others from the area) sought his instruction while he served in Nan-k'ang and rebuilt the White Deer Grotto Academy there.<sup>30</sup> Even if all of the 9 uncertain cases are credited to this period, it appears that Chu had a total of 49 students over a fifteen-year period, whereas Lü had as many as 300 at one time. Chu's 49 students through 1181 represent slightly more than 10 percent of the 467 total. Thus, even if the numbers are not complete, it is quite clear that the vast majority of Chu's students came to him between 1182 and 1200, the two decades after Lü's early death in 1181.

Lü apparently accepted students too soon after his father's death, for several friends criticized him. No one, however, questioned the sincerity of his personal mourning and filial piety. Lu Chiu-yüan observed that "even when Lü was wearing mourning clothes, his doorstep continued to be thronged with [students'] shoes." Chang Shih was more critical in a letter to Chu: "Most of the world says Lü is wrong to accept students." Furthermore, when directly admonished by Liu Ch'ing-chih (1139-1195), Lü decided to send all the students away for the year.<sup>31</sup> Although Lü dismissed the students, Chang still complained to Chu that Lü was "really not easy to understand." Referring specifically to Lü's having allowed students to flock to his residence, Chang suggested that although Lü had wound up sending the students away for a time, their mutual friend was still caught up in illusions: "But recently he mentioned to me that he wanted to draw and lead the students to the good *Tao*. I say that those who came did so merely because of the civil service examinations, so they were already harboring the mentality of personal gain. I'm afraid it would be difficult to direct them toward what is proper. Generally, he seems to be insufficient in his decisiveness in his handling things."<sup>32</sup> No doubt some of the students did show up just to prepare more thoroughly for the examinations. Others were surely attracted by his erudition and values.

Lü composed several of his major works as lectures or teaching materials

addressing issues involving analysis of history and institutions. He lectured on the *Book of Documents*, and his students later edited the lecture notes into *The Master from Tung-lai's Explication of the Book of Documents* (*Tung-lai Shu shuo*). An even better example would be his lectures at the imperial university under the title *Extensive Deliberations on the Tso Commentary by the Master from Tung-lai* (*Tung-lai hsien-sheng Tso-shih po-i*).<sup>33</sup> Although designed as guides to writing essays for the examinations, such works did, as he claimed to Chang, seek to teach ethical principles and lessons from the past.

There is further evidence that Lü's commitment arose from concerns common to his colleagues within the fellowship. He professed primary commitment to the *Tao*: "To strengthen the will for taking responsibility for the *Tao* and to complete the results of investigating principles: these are my aspirations."<sup>34</sup> Such commitment to the *Tao* was crucial, especially when Confucians of the day were not following the proper path in their teaching. Writing to Chu Hsi, Lü complained:

As for the difficulty of discussing learning, the flaw of the brilliant ones is losing themselves in mystery and emptiness, and the superficiality of the ordinary ones is being carried away with mere commentary on words and sentences. As for the mistakes of these two kinds, the more brilliant ones easily slip into heresy, and the ordinary ones lose sight of our greater tradition but still, for the purpose of earnestly teaching, diligently practice what is right. What they value differs, but all are one-sided.<sup>35</sup>

Here again, Lü emphasized the dangers of being one-sided in one's approach to the Confucian tradition.

The Confucian *Tao* was under siege, according to Lü, in a hostile environment—even among those who came to study. He lamented:

Are there any among our followers in whom we can have hope? It is proper to scrutinize carefully those without a solid foundation. In the past there were some who used miscellaneous phrases from our elders to enhance their own remarks, but in action they failed to imitate the elders. Those who envied and hated us frequently pointed to these [false imitators] as a pretext to ridicule and defame our *Tao*, such as happened during the early Shao-hsing (1131–1163) period. Although education should be for all without discrimination, this *Tao* of ours is still weak today, and those who want to expel and defame us are everywhere. Thus I'm afraid we must be diligent and strict.<sup>36</sup>

Lü was distraught that some who claimed to be students within the fellowship had provided enemies with a pretext for belittling the group's Way. Although these students cannot be specified using evidence now at hand,

Ch'en Kung-fu had once been friendly toward *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians, but at court during the mid-1130s he had turned to deride their special mannerisms. Lü here displays an anxiety similar to those in some fundamentalist sects. Such a candid expression of anxiety is particularly noteworthy because Lü was generally the most liberal and open leader of the *Tao-hsüeh* movement and the one with the greatest political security. For example, he felt free enough of fear of being censured for partiality to announce his recognition of Lu Chiu-yüan's examination essay.

More often, Lü displayed optimism that the hostile environment of the day could be redeemed. In a letter, he challenged a student to take a viewpoint maximizing one's own responsibility: "When discussing the way of governing, one should not say that the ruler's ideas are difficult to alter but rather consider that the minister's *Tao* is not yet thorough or complete. One should not say that heterodox theories are difficult to overcome but rather consider that the proper *Tao* has not yet been made clear. When disciplined effort attains this level, there must be a response to one's effort."<sup>37</sup> The literati should take responsible action instead of complaining: "The literati like to say that social customs are not good; but who makes customs! Customs are just ourselves; if we do not take action, how are customs going to become good?"<sup>38</sup> Elsewhere, Lü similarly complained that literati since the Ch'in and Han had ignored the fundamentals of social customs in their discussions of governmental affairs.<sup>39</sup>

Proper instruction was the key to curing the ills of the era:

I have reflected on why current affairs are difficult and why social customs are rash and corrupt. Tracing back to the origins of these ills, all are the result of instruction not being clear. When there are many instructors, if they have prominence and attainments, it will be easy for them to extend their influence from the top down. If they are by misfortune all in straitened circumstances, as long as the good ones are numerous, there will still be a principle for transforming the situation—just like blazing heat from vital energy must be stimulating and fumes from moxibustion soar upward [while being used on bodily ailments].<sup>40</sup>

In his own career and teaching, Lü was both working from the top down and building a mass of dedicated Confucian scholars in order to rectify society and polity to be in line with the *Tao*. Compared with Chang and Chu, Lü was more inclined to a positive view of instructing people for the examinations as a means of working within the system and transforming society from its political center. That faith in working within the system arose from the experience of generations of his family.

As a guide to working within the system, Lü's lectures at his academy in Chin-hua provided detailed analyses of governmental institutions. After a

century and a half of using these lectures for instruction in Wu-chou academies, his followers finally published them under the title *Detailed Explanations on All Administrative Systems Throughout the Generations* (*Li-tai chih-tu hsiang-shuo*). Appending his comments to accounts of historical institutions, the work covered a range of topics including schools, taxes and corvées, transports, salt monopoly regulations, alcohol prohibitions, money, famine relief, agricultural organization, soldier-cultivated lands, army organization, horse-breeding regulations, examinations for officials, the heir apparent, and state sacrifices. Presenting the historical strengths and flaws of such institutions, Lü also evaluated their suitability for the present. He based his judgments on actual conditions rather than empty theorizing. For example, since the power to buy and sell land belonged to the people, scholars of the day could only dream of implementing a national system with equal land allotments.<sup>41</sup>

In other writings, Lü addressed the general issue of laws. Compared with many other Confucians whose comments on governance promoted virtuous example at the expense of laws, Lü had a positive appreciation for the role of laws.<sup>42</sup> According to Lü, when others said that laws could not be used, they only had in mind the regulations of the ancient experts in realpolitik (conventionally called *fa-chia* and translated as "Legalists"), Shen Pu-hai (d. 337 B.C.) and Han Fei (d. 233 B.C.). The essence of laws was different: "Human laws are where human feelings and the principles of things reside."<sup>43</sup> These were the principles on which laws should be founded rather than making laws based on the ruler's whims. It was necessary to see "the vital force of humaneness and justness" in laws in concrete rather than just theoretical terms. Sometimes humaneness required severe laws and harsh punishments to discourage offenders. Laws with punishments too light to inspire much fear might invite more violations and thus end up punishing more people. Although such points sound as though Lü was simply on the side of the state, he also embraced both public and private interests: "If public interest does not overwhelm [household] affairs, and private interest is not harmful to what is just, there is a prevailing spirit of loyalty and generosity."<sup>44</sup>

In a skeptical vein, one might say that his advocating strong laws and a balance between public and private interests merely reflected his perspective as a member of an elite family. For such a family, loyalty to the throne and generosity toward the interest of private households were both ideal and practical. If we dismiss Lü's unusual attention to issues concerning laws and institutions as an expression of class interests, what would we say about other members of the elite who had less appreciation for the role of laws and private interests? Lü agreed with such people that virtue was the foundation of governance, but giving laws and private interest such positive attention was a special characteristic of his thought—one that he shared with other

Che-tung thinkers, particularly Ch'en Fu-liang and Ch'en Liang. As we will see more clearly in Ch'en Liang's case, they sought to balance private or family interests and the public or national interest.

Sharing another assumption with the Chekiang Confucians, Lü Tsu-ch'ien complained that civil or literary culture (*wen*) was far too dominant over both what was practical and what was martial (*wu*). In reading these criticisms of literary culture, we should remember that Lü compiled one of the most important collections of Sung literary compositions. Furthermore, he was among the foremost specialists of his day on literary styles. Che-tung men were often critical of the policy set by the dynasty's founder to demean military officials in relation to civil officials and to centralize military power under the direction of civil officials in the capital. Like these friends, Lü claimed that it was crucial to have unity and balance between military and civil wings. He drew upon history to support his point: "From antiquity, civil and martial ways were one *Tao*. During the time of Yao, Shun, and the Three Dynasties, high officials while at court administered affairs and while outside the capital handled punitive expeditions."<sup>45</sup> This principle was still clear to Confucius and even in the Western Han. During the Eastern Han when family background became a greater factor in the classification of officials, civil and martial groups began to be clearly differentiated. For instance, Liu Pa (fl. c. 220) disdained Chang Fei (d. 222) because of his martial background.<sup>46</sup>

After the Han, as civil and literary culture continued to flourish, history provided examples of what the literati of the Sung should take as warnings. Using the analogy of Duke I (r. 668-660 B.C.) of Wei who lost his state because of his fondness for playing with his cranes, Lü argued that the elites in recent history were no different from the duke's cranes:

During the Yung-chia (307-313) period of the Western Chin, those who engaged in pure talk filled the court. No matter whether they drank or composed poems, they all proudly looked askance at everything in the world. Their carefree and elegant minds—aloof from the turmoil of the times—made them appear like sacred mountain peaks magnificently erect or like pearls and jade radiantly reflecting each other. But during the rebellion of the five barbarian tribes, they were butchered like meat on a cutting board. They were also the cranes of Duke I of Wei.<sup>47</sup>

Literati at that time were so absorbed in their literary pursuits that tribes of less cultured people easily conquered all of North China, just as the Jurchen had recently done. Lü cited another example of the court of Liang Wu-ti (r. 502-549). When a military commander rebelled and assaulted the capital, he continued: "The literati were so indolent that they could not even ride horses. Hence they could not dare take up arms against the enemy but rather waited helplessly to be killed."<sup>48</sup>

With his northern background, Lü had probably learned to ride, despite his illnesses, and apparently relished this job at the literati of culture from the South, who lacked experience in the saddle. One might recall that during the Sung the sport of polo ceased to be played from horseback across an open field. It was safer for sons of literati families to play within the confines of courtyards and alleys.<sup>49</sup> At the end of his essay, Lü acknowledged that if one focused on their literary conversations and dignified demeanor, such literati deserved praise and admiration. Yet in times of national crises, "there were very few who acted any different from Duke I's cranes."

The use of history for practical lessons was another major point of similarity between Lü and his Che-tung friends. After reading history to understand the context of the time, one should put oneself into the situation to learn from the experience of others:

You should picture yourself in the situation, observe which things are advantageous and which dangerous, and note the misfortunes and ills of the times. Shut the book and think for yourself. Imagine that you are facing these various facts and then decide what you think ought to be done. If you look at history in this way, then your learning will increase and your intelligence will improve. Then you will get real profit from your reading.<sup>50</sup>

Lü's emphasis on reflection was reinforced in other ways. For example, "when reading history, one should read half of the book, set it aside, and then calculate the achievements and failures that will be in the second half. The things of great importance in history are six: choosing the good, admonishing, setting standards, [understanding] the body politic, discussing affairs through evaluations of historical figures, and handling affairs."<sup>51</sup> Although ethical lessons were included in the general goals, much attention was given to practical application for governance. Thus the didactic function of history was not limited to moral didacticism.

In reading history, one also had to realize that history was more than a chronicle of miscellaneous facts, for history was a record of continuous change and growth. Instead of "nothing more than a vast collection of facts crammed into your memory," one should "observe how things change."<sup>52</sup> Change was a given: "When affairs reach their zenith, there must be people to change them, and if there is no one to change them, they will be changed by inner forces."<sup>53</sup>

One historical example of these changes was provided by the case of Duke Huan (r. 684-642 B.C.) of Ch'i. He became the first hegemon, a generalissimo in charge of protecting the Chou king and the states and culture of the Central Plain against the rising power of Ch'u to the south. Duke Huan was the greatest of the hegemons and, at the conference at K'uei-ch'iu, accomplished all his objectives. So satisfied was the duke with his success



and the zenith of his power that he became proud and indolent. Thus satisfaction sowed the seeds for the decline of his hegemony. From Duke Huan's case, Lü offered a lesson: "But people did not know: the country will decline if it does not continue to flourish; and the governance of the world will fall back if it does not advance. If strength stops at strength, strength certainly cannot be preserved; and if the hegemon stops at being hegemon, the hegemony definitely cannot be preserved. It's like riding a steed on a steep slope: how can there be a place midway to stop?"<sup>54</sup> The dynamics observable in Duke Huan's case constituted a pattern that Lü illustrated in other historical situations. The process of rise and decline was also present in the polarity between China and the pastoral nationalities of the steppe and within the political units of China itself.

Seeking such continuous patterns had to be balanced with an appreciation for the special character of each era. Governance was different in each distinct era according to the prevailing structure of power. Reading the *Tso Commentary* (*Tso chuan*), one should distinguish between three discrete periods: the period before the rise of the Five Hegemons, the period of the successive rise and fall of the Five Hegemons, and the period after the demise of the hegemony. Using the structure of power to divide history into periods did not necessarily mean that the actions of the elite were the ultimate force behind history. In the tradition of Confucius and Mencius, Lü also declared that the rise and fall of states lay in the hands of the people rather than the great clans, feudal lords, or officialdom.

Lü defined historical periods in terms of power structures to address the issue of the usefulness of institutions from earlier times. Some like Chang Tsai and Hu Hung had argued for the feasibility of restoring the well-field system of centralized land management whereby households in antiquity had supposedly enjoyed equal landholdings. Such a restoration of antiquity was seen by Lü to be impossible because of the gap between the times and the different situation that existed in the Sung. Instead of trying to adhere to the institutions of the ancestors, one would be better advised to change institutions to achieve the actual purpose of the ancients—peace in the country.<sup>55</sup> Again, history had to be understood in its own context before being applied to contemporary governance.

Because histories varied in quality, some could be read summarily, but others had to be studied closely. Selected great histories deserved the kind of reading that other *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians reserved for the classics: "The *Tso Commentary*, the *Historical Records* (*Shih-chi*), and the *History of the Former Han* (*Han shu*) should be read carefully and thoroughly, scrutinized over and over again, truly not permitting even one word to be passed over quickly and casually."<sup>56</sup> Most later histories, beginning with the *History of the Later Han* (*Hou Han shu*), were inferior in their historiography. Taking a step toward the later movement in Che-tung historiography to regard the

classics as history, Lü approached the classics with an historian's eye. For example, he wrote: "To read the *Book of Poetry* is [to read] history. History is factual, and writings like the *Book of Poetry* richly embody the cresting and ebbing flow of sentiments; in chanting and reciting them, the affairs of that era can be contemplated and known."<sup>57</sup> He further declared that in reading history, one should start with the classic *Book of Documents* before going on to the *Tso Commentary*, and only then to the *Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government (Tzu-chih t'ung-chien)*. Following this order, one would have a clearer perception of history and its sources.<sup>58</sup> In two of these three examples, the centrality of the *Tso Commentary* to Lü's historiography is evident.

Lü considered the *Tso Commentary* to be so important as a history that he treated it as an independent work instead of a mere commentary on the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. Emphasis on the *Tso* did not diminish his interest in the *Annals*, the classic on which the largest number of works (at least 240) were written during the Sung. Following Sun Fu and others, Lü in his work on the *Annals* championed two themes: a minister's loyalty to the ruler and defense of the country against foreign incursions.<sup>59</sup> Still Lü was more unique in his approach to the *Tso*. In addition to his *Extensive Deliberations*, he wrote two other books on the *Tso*: *Explanations of the Tso Commentary (Ch'un-ch'iu Tso-shih-chuan shuo)*; and the *Historian Lü Tsu-ch'ien's Encyclopedia for the Tso Commentary (Tung-lai Lü T'ai-shih Ch'un-ch'iu Tso-chuan lei-pien)*. Ever attentive to details, he brought to the fore significant observations. For instance, by enumerating the names of generals, he proved the reduction in size of the Chou armies over time. Thus the *Tso* continued the record of ancient institutions and issues first recorded in the classics.

To continue that record to the Sung, Lü began his own major history, *Chronicle of Major Events (Ta shih chi)*. In the extensive notes and explanations appended, Lü commented on issues and discussed historiography. His *Chronicle* relied heavily on the *Historical Records* of Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145-90 B.C.), and his historiography was heavily influenced by the annals and biographies of that great historian. Besides using the *Records* and earlier sources to correct details of Ssu-ma Kuang's *Comprehensive Mirror*, Lü wrote two major critical works on the *Comprehensive Mirror*, neither of which has been preserved.<sup>60</sup> Although he had intended to provide a historiographical alternative to Ssu-ma Kuang's monumental work, illness halted his writing on the *Chronicle* at 90 B.C., and he never produced the alternative history of the next millennium. Still, he did compile the *Detailed Sections from the Seventeen Histories (Shih-ch'i shih hsiang chieh)*, which would have served as the foundation for a continuation of his more synthetic *Chronicle*. Some of his historiography is evident in his recorded opinions and the organization within this compilation. Compared with Chu Hsi, he was not as

obsessed with the issue of the legitimate succession of dynasties (*cheng-t'ung*). He gave the regal status of having basic annals to anyone who controlled the country. When he came to the Three Kingdoms, he recognized the greater power of the Wei by writing annals for the Ts'ao strongmen, beginning with Ts'ao Ts'ao (155-220). Furthermore, he downgraded the Shü Han ruler, Liu Pei (161-223), who received a mere biographical chapter, one that had to be shared with such officials as Chu-ko Liang.<sup>61</sup> On this practical issue of historiography, Lü was closer to Ssu-ma Kuang than to Chu Hsi. Although his Che-tung friends shared his preference for Ssu-ma Ch'ien's historiography, with its emphasis on comprehending changes through historical periods, they did not complete Lü's grand history of China.

What distinguished Lü from other Che-tung thinkers of his day was his greater attention to such philosophical issues as human nature and destiny. Some other Che-tung Confucians had little to say about human nature, destiny, and the mind; however, these topics were important in Lü's thinking.

Regarding the concept of the mind, Lü focused on the original mind discussed by Mencius. Like Mencius, Lü advocated the need first to regain the original mind as the foundation for all learning and ethical practice. To Mencius' conception, Lü added the *Tao-hsüeh* notion of principle: "Generally speaking, people have never been without innate knowing and innate ability; if one knows how to nourish them, these principles would naturally endure."<sup>62</sup> If one preserved such principles, one did not need to seek externally: "The foundation is not external, so just seek within oneself." Hence: "All the learning of Confucianism comes from self-reflection (*tzu-fan*)."<sup>63</sup> Self-reflection was so crucial because the external world mirrored what was within: "The internal and the external reflect each other without the slightest inaccuracy: when there is discord externally, there must be obstacles within [one's own mind]. There is no method except self-reflection [for addressing this situation]."<sup>64</sup> Despite this confidence in self-reflection, Lü warned against relying on enlightenment. If one waited for a sudden great awakening of the mind, one would, like the Buddhists, easily wander into emptiness. Instead of depending on sudden insights that were fragile, one would make more progress with steady cultivating and examining of the mind.<sup>65</sup> Although Lü appears intuitive and introspective here, his overall system gave greater weight to the investigation of actual things, as seen for example in his institutional and historical studies. Hence it would be difficult to paint him with Ta-hui's Ch'an brush, as Chu did in the case of Lü Pen-chung.

Lü Tsu-ch'ien also followed Mencius' view of the goodness of human nature. Lü proclaimed: "People are born in tranquility. This is the nature of Heaven, the basis of centrality, rectitude, humaneness, and rightness, and also the one source of the myriad things. And when [people abide] in the Mean, there is nothing that is not proper."<sup>66</sup> Evil came from outside the

nature. To explain evil, he borrowed Chang Tsai's and the Ch'eng brothers' teachings about a physical nature or endowment: "The nature is good, but the physical endowment has partiality; therefore, talent and character also flow into partiality."<sup>67</sup> With these assumptions, Lü perceived the task in spiritual cultivation to be preserving the good mind and nature from improper desires, which opened the door to external interference. He reasoned: "When this mind is constantly held fast and preserved, the mind will be broad and the body robust, and one will be carefree and contented, joyful and peaceful. Thus good fortune is rooted within oneself. If one indulges in a single carnal pleasure without restraint and destroys propriety, disaster will come from the outside."<sup>68</sup> Expressed in terms of expelling desires and preserving the mind, Lü's view of cultivation was quite close to Chang's and Chu's. But Lü did not go into as much technical detail concerning stages of the mind as Chu and Chang did. Still, as we saw in the "Misgivings Concerning Master Hu's Understanding of Words," it was Lü who made the strongest statement of the need for balance and a dual approach to cultivation of the mind, the approach for which Chu Hsi is famous.

Like other *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians, Lü perceived of humaneness as the foundation of the other cardinal virtues and all ethical behavior. Commenting on the *Mencius*, he expounded upon the nature of humaneness: "Apparently the virtue of humaneness is the criterion for being human. The word 'humaneness' is already completely exhaustive. Then saying the word 'propriety' one can know the high or low level of the person. As for the principles in the world, what else is there besides humaneness and propriety!"<sup>69</sup> Propriety was of crucial importance in Lü's thought, for propriety was both principle and that with which one nourished the mind.<sup>70</sup> Although Lü valued propriety and proclaimed the correlation between humaneness and propriety, there was no question about which was more fundamental: "Humaneness is the universally proper principle. If this principle is present within me, it will be apparent in my habits and manifest through my actions. Otherwise, even though propriety and music have never been abolished in the world, if I do not possess this principle, then propriety and music will be totally alien to me."<sup>71</sup> Likewise, Lü followed his family tradition in emphasizing the importance of filial piety and loyalty, but such virtues and requisite ethical behavior were also subsumed in humaneness. Such virtues arose from humaneness: "The reason filial piety and duty to fraternal elders are humaneness is that humaneness encompasses the mind of loving parents and being respectful to elder brothers; if one preserves and extends this frame of mind, humaneness can be known."<sup>72</sup>

These passages suggest that Lü associated humaneness both with the mind, as Chang Shih did, and with principle, as Chu Hsi did. Other passages more clearly reveal his common ground with both men and also his greater affinity with Chu. Like Chang, Lü identified humaneness with the

Mencian original mind: "Humaneness is people's original mind, as one essentially indivisible."<sup>73</sup> Lü also shared the idea that humaneness was characterized by impartiality or civic-mindedness and constancy or consistency: "The mind of a person of humaneness is impartially public-minded and constant."<sup>74</sup> In a letter to Chu, he could use the same imagery as Chu to express the relation between humaneness and love: "Love is the expression of humaneness; humaneness is the principle of love. Essence and function have never been separated from each other but have also never infringed upon each other."<sup>75</sup> Nonetheless, he also cautioned Chu against making humaneness overly clear or simple, for simplicity might mislead people into thinking that they did not have to exert great efforts to fathom this profound concept.

Lü advocated abiding in seriousness and preserving sincerity as essential in seeking humaneness. Although we glossed *ching* as "reverent composure" for Hunan *Tao-hsüeh* thinkers, "seriousness" usually seems more apt for Lü. His usage centered on qualities of concentrating and being sincere: "The one word 'seriousness' is the gate through which those who study enter the *Tao*. Seriousness refers to concentrating on one thing and not being distracted by the many. If things are here, but the mind is there, how can one understand and attain seriousness?"<sup>76</sup> Someone asked if there was any difference between the two terms "sincerity" and "seriousness." Replying that the two terms were the same, Lü noted: "What we call 'sincerely preserving' is being reverently serious."<sup>77</sup> Hence for cultivating the mind, Lü also, like Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi, emphasized the importance of seriousness. Overall, he pursued a balance of textual scholarship, governance, and spiritual cultivation.

The very breadth of Lü's scholarship and learning has made his statements sometimes appear to be mutually contradictory, for he had points of agreement with various Confucians whose positions became polarized. It would be unfair for such a reason to continue the modern convention of dismissing him as a mere historian with little capacity for theoretical questions. By disposition and family legacy, he struggled to find common ground in order to unify the Confucian community. If modern scholars were to study his voluminous writings and the development of his thought as closely as they have Chu Hsi's, we would perhaps perceive more clarity and consistency of viewpoint than we do at present. One reason modern scholars have not given Lü the attention he deserves perhaps is the extraordinary erudition and literary range in his writings, which make them much more difficult to read than those of his contemporaries.

Although younger than either Chu Hsi or Chang Shih, Lü appears to have emerged as the central figure in the *Tao-hsüeh* of the late 1160s and to have retained the leading role until his death in 1181. Besides Lü's extraordi-

nary personality and scholarship, his governmental positions and social status enabled him to attract unprecedented numbers of students and make exceptional contributions to the growth of the fellowship. Despite governmental safeguards (having papers recopied and replacing names with numbers) to prevent examiners from identifying individuals' essays, he had the literary acumen to recognize individual styles and thus pass the largest number of significant *Tao-hsüeh* thinkers in any Sung *chin-shih* examination. In spite of governmental and social penalties against favoritism in the examinations, he boldly announced his discovery of Lu Chiu-yüan's essay and was never censured. Although he went on to even higher posts and national recognition, the 1172 examinations most graphically testify to his special status and standing. Even though Chu Hsi asserted a dominant influence over Chang Shih by 1173, he never gained such dominance in relation to Lü. Only in the third period, in the wake of Lü's death, was Chu able to assert his authority over and to surpass Lü's influence within the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship. If Lü had been the one who survived two decades longer, his thinking might have made the remainder of the Sung and Chinese cultural history quite different. The political climate almost certainly would have been different as well, for Lü had won much more respect from officials at court than had other *Tao-hsüeh* intellectuals. Even if the two together had continued to live until 1200, Chu's theory and practice would, no doubt, have been affected, for the two had considerable mutual influence during the period 1163 to 1181.

## Chapter 5 *Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu-ch'ien*

A balanced survey of Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu-ch'ien's exchanges on a series of practical, educational, and philosophical issues will suggest the depth of their mutual influence. The account of Chu's dealings with Lü will demonstrate Lü's leading role during the period from 1163 to 1181 and the relative inclusiveness of Lü's *Tao-hsüeh*. Even Chu's mild criticisms of Lü during this period will establish a baseline for contrast with the following period, after Lü's death, when Chu became bitingly critical of his deceased friend. Those later condemnations along with the chapters on Chu's relations with those to whom Lü introduced him will illustrate the major shift in Chu's interactions with Confucians in the decades before and after Lü's death in 1181.

Lü Tsu-ch'ien was probably the closest friend Chu Hsi ever had. In 1156, during Chu's tenure as an official in T'ung-an, Chu went on government business to Fu-chou, where Lü's father was serving. After Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu-ch'ien became acquainted there, the two began to exchange letters. The frequency of their correspondence increased during the late 1160s and especially during the 1170s. They continued to correspond until 1181, when Lü's last letter arrived shortly before news of Lü's death. The length of their friendship thus exceeded by about eight years Chu's friendship with Chang Shih. In part because of the location of Lü's home in Chin-hua near the capital and on the way from Fukien to the capital, Chu spent more time with Lü than with Chang. Furthermore, 104 of Chu's letters to Lü are extant—more than to any other person. Of Lü's letters to Chu, 67 have been preserved,

more than double the number to anyone else.<sup>1</sup> Beyond the number of letters, their intimacy is evident in the scope of family matters as well as political and intellectual issues discussed in their correspondence.

Among family matters, none are as revealing as those involving Chu Hsi's eldest son, Shu (1153-1191). In letters to Lü, Chu lamented the youth's "extreme laziness and inability to grasp ethical principles while reading books."<sup>2</sup> Although the youth had also developed bad habits, Chu Hsi expressed concern about disciplining him too sternly because of their father-son relationship. In this predicament, he followed the advice given centuries earlier by Mencius (4A/18) and asked his friend to take over the son's education and ethical training. In 1173, when the youth was about 21, his father sent him with strict instructions not to drink all the time at Lü's place. Lü arranged for the youth to reside in the home of one of his closest students, P'an Ching-hsien (1137-1193). The young man was not to leave that home by himself and had to accompany P'an in making daily calls on Lü for instruction. After three or four years, Lü facilitated arrangements between Chu and the P'an families for the young man to marry P'an's eldest daughter (b. 1161). Shortly thereafter, Lü gave the hand of his only daughter, Huanien (b. 1159), to P'an's close relative P'an Ching-liang (late twelfth century). Hence Lü had arranged for Chu and himself to have marriage alliances with the same family of officials from Wu-chou. Chu Shu returned to the Chu home in 1180, but he failed the local examinations for the third time. Later Chu Hsi used the *yin* privilege of officials to secure for his son a prestige title, court gentleman for ceremonial service. But the hapless son died in 1191 at his wife's home in Wu-chou without having made any significant advancement in a bureaucratic career. Besides considering Lü's social prestige and political status, Chu chose to entrust his son to Lü because of his confidence in Lü's intellectual training and personal cultivation. He no doubt had considerable hope that Lü might nurture a change in his son's temperament and habits. He thus became indebted to Lü for taking care of his son's education and marriage.

Lü also served as a bridge between Chu and other Confucians. The most famous case involved Lu Chiu-yüan, whom Lü took under his wing after passing Lu's *chin-shih* examination paper in 1172. Seeking to reconcile differences between Lu and Chu, Lü invited them to meet at his home during the spring of 1175. Chu could not come as planned, so Lü made a trip to bring his two friends together. In the third month in 1175, he embarked from Chin-hua for Chu's home some 250 kilometers away in Ch'ung-an county, Fukien. Soon thereafter, Lü and Chu proceeded to Chu's Cold Springs Study (Han-ch'üan ching-she). Working at both Chu's home and study for over a month, they completed the draft of *Reflections on Things at Hand* (*Chinssu lu*). Afterwards, they went on an excursion up Wu-i mountain and then down toward the Goose Lake Monastery in Kiangsi. Meeting Lu and his



brother at a resort there, Lü sought to establish personal ties between Chu and the two Lu brothers. Lü mediated discussions regarding their approaches to book-learning and self-cultivation. In historical hindsight, that Goose Lake meeting has been portrayed as the watershed dividing Chu's and Lu's schools.<sup>3</sup> The force of Lü's personality and his commitment to accommodation within the fellowship significantly muted tensions for a time. As we shall see in Chapter 9, Lü actually managed in the six years after the meeting to lead the Lu brothers to his and Chu's common position.

### SOCIOPOLITICAL ISSUES

Among national issues, none was more pressing than policy toward the Jurchen conquerors, whose Chin dynasty ruled North China. Like Chu Hsi's father and other *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians, the Lü family had been outspoken critics of Ch'in Kuei and his peace policy. The Lü family had even been personally involved in some of the most crucial events of the dynasty's transition. Most significantly, Lü Hao-wen had briefly served as minister of war and followed the Sung emperor when he went to surrender at the Jurchen's camp. The Jurchen sent Lü back to K'ai-feng to assist the Jurchen's puppet ruler, but he persuaded the puppet to relinquish claim to the throne in deference to the only son of the Sung house who was not held captive. When Kao-tsung thus restored the Sung dynasty in the South, he appointed Lü Hao-wen as councilor. Lü's brief service in the puppet regime made him subject to criticism, so he soon accepted a lesser post. Lü Hao-wen's son, Pen-chung, later lost his office when he came into conflict with Ch'in Kuei. Although Lü Pen-chung opposed Ch'in Kuei's peace policy and advocated recovery of the North, he was also a pragmatist. Considering the might of the Jurchen military, he advised Kao-tsung against impetuous action but emphasized first consolidating Sung power and defenses in the South.<sup>4</sup>

Lü Tsu-ch'ien inherited this inclination in favor of consolidating power in the South through reforms and mounting military campaigns only after careful preparation. Hence he too proposed a moderate, pragmatic course midway between the peace party and the war hawks of his day.<sup>5</sup> His perspective was comparable to Chang Shih's mature position.

Chu Hsi was an ardent war hawk in his youth. During his memorials in the 1160s, he advocated offensive military action and categorically condemned all talk of peace. By middle age, his ardor cooled as he became more mindful of the greater military might of the Jurchen Chin. His hawkish posture gave way to a pragmatic position like Lü's. Although in his last years he remained committed to the goal of restoration, he criticized the hawks even more bitterly than the doves. Moreover, he began to realize that one to three decades of preparation would be needed before an attempt to

liberate the North could be mounted. Chu capsulized the more defensive and self-strengthening posture of his mature years: "The discussions at court now are either peace or war. But the ancients had a way of simultaneously being firm and maintaining a defense, a way that was neither waging war nor making peace. If we strengthen ourselves and set our own house in order, how can the enemy encroach upon us?"<sup>6</sup> Although in his sixties he had probably become even more defensive and cautious than Lü had been, Lü's views in this case apparently had influenced Chu.

Among the most pressing domestic issues was the need to relieve the hardship of the peasantry. The magistrate of Ch'ung-an county in Fukien asked Chu Hsi and Liu Ju-yü (1142 *chin-shih*) to assist in famine relief in 1167. Chu requested and received relief supplies from the prefect in the adjacent county of Chien-yang, where his friend Wei Shan-chih (1116-1173) had established a model granary in the early 1150s. The prefect there suggested in 1168 that Chu and Liu retain repayments of the previous year's loans in the local area for use in future emergencies. Also drawing upon Wei's example, Chu and Liu submitted a proposal for a community granary (*she-ts'ang*), which the prefectural office approved and for which it provided initial funding. When the granary was completed in 1171 in Ch'ung-an, Liu's relatives managed it. But as the historically more prominent person, Chu has been given principal credit for the concept.<sup>7</sup>

The state granaries of that day sought to benefit the peasantry either by providing direct subsidies during famines or by stabilizing extremes in price fluctuations. Controlled by the bureaucracy, state granaries responded slowly. Such granaries sometimes extended their relief only to areas of the countryside near cities and towns. Usually village officers or Buddhist monks handled distribution from state charitable granaries. To provide an alternative to participation by heterodox Buddhists, Chu sought to mobilize Confucian literati. Participating in the community granary would provide bonding among members of the fellowship and training in humaneness. Chu was working within a context of a growing civic consciousness during the Sung. For instance, villages in Wu-chou had already on their own organized charitable (*i*) service systems and foundations, which in some cases provided a base for establishing granaries.<sup>8</sup>

Lü Tsu-ch'ien helped defend Chu's community granary from criticism. Critics charged that Chu was following Wang An-shih's discredited "Green Sprouts" (*ch'ing-miao fa*) loan program. Even Chang Shih had such suspicions. As was done in Wang's program, Chu capitalized with state funds and collected repayment of the loans with interest.<sup>9</sup> In an essay in 1185, Chu sought to deflect criticism of his program by contrasting it with Wang's: Chu lent grain instead of cash, based administration on the local canton instead of the county, put more of the management in the hands of local literati, and sought to raise peasants' economic security instead of state

funds. Recounting how Lü had inspected the granary in Ch'ung-an and praised it as following the ideas of the ancients, Chu sought to draw attention to much earlier sources of inspiration and away from parallels to Wang's failed experiment. Lü had also expressed a commitment to establish a similar granary in Chin-hua. Chu's essay recorded its establishment by P'an Ching-hsien, who thus fulfilled this dream of his teacher.<sup>10</sup> Lü had earlier arranged for Chu's son to lodge with P'an and to marry Pan's daughter. Such Wu-chou families with whom Chu had connections through Lü responded favorably to his efforts in 1182 to manage famine relief there.

Although the emperor formally praised and promoted Chu's proposal to implement the granaries throughout the empire, opponents of the measure blocked state subsidies; thus, very few were ever established. With the exception of the model in Chu's village, the one in Chin-hua probably lasted longer than any of the others. By the middle of the thirteenth century, however, it had fallen into the hands of government clerks who lent grain only after bad harvests and demanded repayment in cash. Chu's model of Confucian gentlemen supervising a source of perennial credit assistance to peasants had thus been transformed into another tool of the local bureaucracy for famine relief.<sup>11</sup> However briefly the community granaries functioned as Chu intended, they demonstrated Chu's political ideals in action. Wei Shan-chih's earlier granary, Liu Ju-yü's role in "Chu's granary," and Lü's help in spreading this experiment to Chin-hua show that Chu did not act alone. He operated in a context of cooperation among Confucian literati to use granaries to meet a need. Chu's concern for building the local community was also demonstrated in his public proclamations as a local official and his sponsorship of community compacts that he adopted from Lü Ta-chün (1030-1081).<sup>12</sup> Community compacts were local associations that encouraged the village populace to practice socially desirable behavior.

#### ACADEMIES AND EDUCATIONAL ISSUES

Despite concern for other sectors of the local community, the literati were the principal focus of community building, and to Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu-ch'ien, no institution was more important for this purpose than academies (*ching-she* and *shu-yüan*). Soon after his mother died in 1166, Lü had set up a study on Mt. Ming-chao near her tomb and began teaching there. When Chu's mother died in the ninth month of 1169, Chu similarly built the Cold Springs Study in 1170 near her grave. Returning home to his unsurpassed family library, Lü established the Beautiful Pools Academy in the city of Chin-hua. Given Lü's prestige and the convenience of housing students in the city, as many as 300 students at a time studied in the academy.

Several years later, Chu worked to establish an academy when he assumed his duties as prefect of Nan-k'ang, Kiangsi, in 1179. In his letters to Lü, Chu discussed the project and persuaded his friend to write the historical record of the academy. On taking office, he declared his intent to visit the main government school in Nan-k'ang once every four or five days. Although the state maintained such schools to prepare literati for the civil service examinations, Chu was distraught that the three government schools in the prefecture were merely preparing students for the examinations. He began lecturing on ethical principles from the classics and making strong suggestions about what should be taught.<sup>13</sup> The educational officer, Yang Ta-fa (1175 *chin-shih*), presumably resented Chu's interference and complained to Lü. Hearing of the tension, Lü wrote to Chu to caution him about encroaching upon the prerogatives of the school preceptor.

Chu defended his activity at the government school. Answering Lü's letter, he sought to justify what he had done:

Regarding my visits to schools, I must say that I was only giving preliminary discussions on the *Great Learning* and had just completed lecturing on it. I have now asked the teaching official to repeat my lectures on the *Analects*, and all I am doing is merely giving further elaboration of those parts that students have trouble understanding. I never attempted to stand at the lecturing podium or to infringe on the duties of the instructing official—and certainly did not do what you were worried about in your letter.<sup>14</sup>

Despite his protestations, Chu added that he simply hoped to be of assistance like Wen Weng, a prefect in Szechwan during the Han dynasty. Wen Weng's educational work had traditionally been credited with acculturating the people in Szechwan to Confucian learning. For instance, Tu Fu (712–770) had written: "And like the educator Prefect Wen Weng of Han, he too exerted a great cultural influence."<sup>15</sup> With this model, Chu conveyed the urgency of his agenda. The imagery was all the more potent because this area of Nan-k'ang had many Buddhist and Taoist monasteries.

Symbolically reviving the tradition of Confucian education, Chu focused on rebuilding the White Deer Grotto Academy (Pai-lu-tung shu-yüan) on Mt. Lu.<sup>16</sup> This academy, located in a hollow about five miles north of Nan-k'ang city, had flourished during the tenth and early eleventh centuries and had even received a copy of the Confucian classics from Sung T'ai-tsung (r. 976–997). During the eleventh century, the state urged all prefectures and some counties to establish government schools to prepare literati for the examinations. Although not all prefectures were able to do so, the building of schools peaked in the middle decades of the eleventh century, and there was another surge of construction in the first quarter of the twelfth century. With the shifting of attention to government schools during the Northern

Sung, many private academies fell into disuse. It was necessary in 1179 to call on a woodcutter to locate the ruins of the White Deer Grotto Academy. In petitioning the court for financial aid to rebuild the academy, Chu emphasized the need to maintain this trace of antiquity as a symbol of Confucian education and literati values on a mountain where only heterodox religious institutions remained.

Upon court approval, the academy was constructed within six months and opened in the third month of 1180, just twelve months after Chu arrived in Nan-k'ang. He had managed within one year both to obtain authorization for the academy and to rebuild it. Besides private literati and state resources for the construction, the local government provided rice fields for perpetual financial support. The local literati and the imperial family had also promised to contribute books for its library. This restoration appeared similar to the earlier renovation in the 1160s of the Mountain Slope Academy, which was accomplished with considerable fanfare. During Hsiaotsung's reign (1162-1189) large numbers of academies were revived and/or founded. Overall, at least 375 private academies were established during the Sung.<sup>17</sup>

Given the pace of normal bureaucratic operation, one would think that Chu should have been happy, but some of his statements suggest otherwise. He complained at times about unnamed persons and officials who were impeding his plans. Much of the speculation about these unnamed officials has centered on Yang Ta-fa, who had grounds for resenting Chu's encroachments upon his educational prerogatives at the government school. Yet Yang was one of the two persons to whom Chu delegated the rebuilding, and Chu exchanged poems and letters with him. Lü's early intervention must have reduced tensions between the two men. In at least five of his letters to Lü, Chu mentioned Yang, and a couple of times Chu gave Yang credit for establishing one memorial shrine to Chou Tun-i and another to six local worthies.<sup>18</sup> Establishing such shrines was a significant part of Chu's program for encouraging Confucian virtues among the local people and bonding within the local Confucian community. If Yang had been active in opposing Chu's efforts, one would expect to find negative rather than positive references to him in Chu's writings at that time. Although about fifteen years later, Yang did side with those who attacked the fellowship, we should not read the intensity of conflict in that environment back to this earlier period.

Some of Chu's own comments do present an image of "a rather beleaguered Chu Hsi reacting indignantly to sharp attacks on the manner of the Academy's revival and on its educational activities."<sup>19</sup> That picture says much about Chu Hsi. Perhaps because he had served in only one post and that one more than two decades earlier, he became too easily annoyed by quite natural delays and questions about the academy. Especially when the regular government school was only five miles away and much more conve-

niently located, should he not have expected to justify the use of government resources and solicited donations from local literati to build an academy? It is not surprising that in his reports to the court he emphasized the historical and symbolic importance of the site and minimized its educational activities. In his poetry and statements to friends, he could be more forthright about his educational mission. Among *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians, it was common to be concerned about the impact of examination-style learning on literati culture. Nonetheless, even at this academy approximately one-third of study time was reportedly designated for preparing for the examinations. Beyond Chu's own statements, there are no corroborating documents to confirm any actual opposition to the academy. Hence, Chu Hsi's complaints perhaps reflect inexperience and misunderstanding of political reality. His deficiency in this regard is all the more apparent when viewed against the service records of his friends Lü Tsu-ch'ien and Chang Shih.

Chu's emphasis on institutionalization and acquiring government resources made the White Deer Grotto Academy much more secure than other academies in 1180. Private efforts and resources were hardly enough to establish an academy. Chu's White Deer Grotto Academy was to become a model for cooperation between the fellowship and the government in the thirteenth century after the relationship between them changed.

Chu's guidelines for behavior at the academy set a precedent of at least equal importance for future academies. In contrast to government schools with their detailed regulations, Chu Hsi sought to encourage an atmosphere where students would take more personal responsibility for their behavior. In a written exhortation, which he had posted over the lintel of the door, he called on the students to study the ancient principles:

You, sirs, should discuss them with one another, follow them, and take personal responsibility for their observance. Then, in whatever a man should be cautious and careful about in thought, word, or deed, he will certainly be more demanding of himself than he would be through mere compliance with regulations. If you do otherwise or even reject what I have said, then the "regulations" others talk about will have to take over and in no way can they be dispensed with. You, sirs, please think this over.<sup>20</sup>

Chu hoped the students would practice the self-cultivation of ethical principles. If they did not do so, he warned, they would be dealt with in accordance with conventional regulations. Later, in 1187, one of Chu's students wrote detailed regulations to supplement Chu's articles; however, Chu still regarded such regulations as matters for more elementary or preparatory education.<sup>21</sup> It should be noted that the academy students would be advanced learners who had already passed through the disciplined training of the government schools and/or private tutors.

Chu Hsi's stated principles were a summary of standard Confucian ethics

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and have been called the “Articles of Learning” of the academy. The principles were succinct quotes, all except one from the classics. First, as the foundation, the five human relations were reiterated from *Mencius*, 3A/4: the affection between parent and child, the rightness between ruler and minister, attention to separate functions between husband and wife, proper order between elder and younger, and faithfulness between friends. Grounded in the virtues of the five human relationships, one could proceed to study. Second, the order of study was quoted from section 20 of the *Doctrine of the Mean*: “Study it extensively, investigate it accurately, think it over carefully, sift it clearly, and practice it earnestly.” Third, the essentials for self-cultivation were taken from *Analects*, 15/5, and hexagrams 41 and 42 of the *Book of Changes*: “Let one’s words be sincere and truthful, and one’s deeds be earnest and reverential” and “Restrain one’s wrath and diminish one’s desires; move toward the good and correct one’s mistakes.” Fourth, the essentials for handling affairs focused on an admonition by Tung Chung-shu (176–104 B.C.): rectify yourself by ethical principles and do not seek benefit; exemplify the *Tao* and do not calculate results. Fifth, for dealing with others, Chu cited *Analects*, 15/23, and *Mencius*, 4A/4: “Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you”; and “If you do not succeed in your conduct, turn inward and seek its cause there.”<sup>22</sup> Thus the third through fifth categories sought to explain what was meant by study. Study was primarily and ultimately personal cultivation of ethical principles.

These articles of learning were designed to provide an alternative not only to the detailed regulations of the government schools, but also to the discipline observed in Buddhist monasteries. Although there was much that he did not like about Buddhism, Chu resembled many other Confucian intellectuals in his admiration for the disciplined life of Ch’an monks. The articles also had some similarity with the mutual encouragement for self-improvement discussed in Lü Ta-chün’s Community Compact.

An even closer source of inspiration was Lü Tsu-ch’ien’s academy rules. Lü drew up his guidelines in 1167 and had revised them twice by 1170. Thus they predated Chu’s by more than a dozen years. The fundamental similarity was the emphasis on self-cultivation of fundamental Confucian virtues through living in accordance with Confucian relationships. Lü set down in 1168 the following stipulations as the basic requirement for students: “All those who participate in this association must regard filial piety, brotherly affection, loyalty, and faithfulness as the foundation.” Beyond listing these essential Confucian virtues for human relations, Lü elaborated in the section on the qualifications necessary for study: “Anyone is prohibited from entering school who does not obey his parents, is not friendly toward his brothers, is not at peace with his clan, is not sincere and faithful to friends, does not act in accordance with his words, or conceals his faults.”<sup>23</sup> After enrolling in the academy, any pupil who committed one of the above trans-

gressions was first to be advised by his fellow students. If such personal admonition did not work, students were to discuss the faults of the individual in a public forum. Thereafter, if the offender still did not amend his ways, his name would be expunged from the register. As in Chu's guidelines over a dozen years later, Lü thus sought to direct students toward self-cultivation. Both urged students to work together to encourage mutual progress.

In their school guidelines, it appears that Chu and Lü simply equated ethical conduct with learning. Thus one might conclude that they reduced learning to the realm of ethics alone. Such reduction seems most apparent in Chu's guidelines. Despite their ostensible concentration on spiritual cultivation as the agenda of learning, one should not simply use this central concern and ultimate objective to characterize their conception of learning as nothing more than practicing ethical behavior. Such a reductionist characterization would belittle their larger curricula as well as their practical goals. From our discussions of their thought and writings as a whole, it should be clear that their view of learning and the Confucian tradition encompassed other aspects and subjects.

Unlike Chu's later articles, however, Lü set forth quite specifically what students were to do. Some rules stipulated that in their mutual admonitions, students had to address each other with proper decorum according to age. They should neither flatter nor be disrespectful to one another. Developing a community among the students also informed rules for class preparation and discussions. For instance, students had to take notes both in class and on questions that arose while reading. Their notebooks served as the basis for group discussions. Students even had to sign one another's notebooks to certify which questions had been addressed in group sessions.

Developing a sense of the group was so crucial that students were prohibited from "being intimate with people not in the same *Tao*." Although what Lü meant here by outsiders is less than completely clear, he sought to limit alien influences on students in the fellowship. Such exclusiveness—appearing even in Lü's thinking despite his relative openness—highlights the pervasiveness of the tendency among fellowship members to demarcate their group from other groups. They also took care to avoid either conflict or connections with local elites outside of the school. For example, students were forbidden to give presents to or to make requests of persons with official status. Students were warned to speak of the positive instead of the negative aspects of local administration and personnel. At the other end of the social spectrum, students should not become familiar with those doing vulgar things: drinking, gambling, fighting, or reading unedifying books. The family was the one unit beyond the academy with which close association was required. Lü was very strict in dictating that students maintain residency with their parents, follow proper mourning rites, and avoid arguments with clan members over financial matters. Other subjects included



being solemn and serious in class and diligent in studying. Students could be away from school no more than one hundred days a year and should pay courtesy calls on their former teacher at least once a year. If they met the teacher on the street, students had to show deferential respect when greeting him.<sup>24</sup> In these various stipulations, the underlying consideration continued to be the bonding that would develop within the academy.

Comparatively, Chu's articles for learning set forth basic principles, and Lü's detailed rules for behavior. In this sense, Chu focused on theory, but Lü on practice. It would be an overstatement to say that Chu's articles were devoid of practice, particularly the observation of filial piety. Nonetheless, there was a marked difference between the two friends in their relative attention to theory and practice. Chu's articles had the advantage of being succinct and well-known quotations from the classics, whereas Lü enumerated a series of specific details. Although Lü organized his rules carefully, beginning with a general principle and ending with specific regulations, Chu formulated an even more meticulous systemization, starting with the fundamental virtues for cultivation and concluding with three elaborations of what was most essential in studying. They both aimed at having a community of students learn Confucian truths through studying the classics and cultivating the virtues basic to human relationships. Hence, the forging of a Confucian fellowship was a major goal they shared. Chu's succinct articles became famous and were adopted by other academies. Their similarities with Lü's earlier principles suggest that Lü had a role in Chu's contribution.

In the record of the White Deer Grotto Academy, which Lü wrote at Chu's invitation, the purpose of reestablishing the academy was proclaimed. Chu made extensive comments on Lü's draft and had Lü's final, shortened version inscribed on stone at the academy. The purpose elaborated for the record arose from three challenges: competition from the Buddhists and Taoists, improvement of the educational system, and the promotion of Confucianism. As Lü recounted, both friends blamed many of the ills in the educational system on Wang An-shih's reforms. Instead of emphasizing the composition of examination essays, they preferred Ch'eng Hao's alternative of training students through a school system that emphasized teaching Confucian classics and ethics. According to Lü's projections, the academy would highlight the teachings of the Ch'eng brothers and Chang Tsai in interpreting the ancient sages.<sup>25</sup>

#### RECONSTRUCTING THE TAO-HSÜEH TRADITION

Compiling the *Records of the Evolution of the I-Lo School of the Two Ch'engs (I-Lo yüan-yüan lu)* in 1173, Chu Hsi further focused on the Ch'eng brothers and their immediate associates and disciples as a distinct

Confucian tradition. Drawing attention away from the general revival of Confucianism during the eleventh century, Chu Hsi privileged those who had emphasized the *Tao*. He was following Ch'eng I's proclamation that only those who concentrated on the *Tao*—rather than literary or classical studies—truly deserved to be considered Confucians. Thus Chu omitted other eleventh-century Confucians who had a broader conception of the revival of Confucian learning. By using a biographical genre to trace the origins of what he presented as one school of thought, Chu was pointing out the contributions of selected progenitors who had transmitted the *Tao* and made the right connections to the tradition ascribed to the Confucian sages in antiquity. The opening chapters focused on five major creative thinkers: Chou Tun-i, Ch'eng Hao, Ch'eng I, Shao Yung, and Chang Tsai. Given the title of the work and the widespread tendency to portray the Ch'engs as the central fountainhead of the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition, Chu's emphasis on Chou was significant.

In a recent essay, Teng Kuang-ming suggests that Chou Tun-i actually had no students and was not regarded in the Northern Sung as an important thinker. Thus it was Southern Sung *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians—particularly Chu Hsi—that projected Chou as having had a major role in the tradition. Even within the fellowship, there was opposition to Chu's extending special status to Chou. Wang Ying-ch'ên wrote twice to Chu to complain about projecting the Ch'engs as having been Chou's students and to assert that one could only say that in their youth the Ch'engs had been influenced by Chou. In the *Records of the Evolution of the I-Lo School*, Chu had asserted a stronger students and teacher relationship between the Ch'engs and Chou. Replying to Wang's objection, Chu wrote that his language about the Ch'engs having "received instruction" from Chou had simply been taken from Lü Ta-lin's (1044–1093) quotation in the Ch'engs' recorded conversations. Although Chu conceded Wang's point about the nature of the Ch'engs' relationship to Chou, he did not actually revise the account in the *Records of the I-Lo School* but simply referred to Lü Ta-lin's characterization. Thus Professor Teng concludes that Chu sidestepped a reasoned challenge and relied upon flawed evidence to alter the story of the origins of *Tao-hsüeh*.<sup>26</sup>

Although Chu Hsi was the one most responsible for placing Chou Tun-i on a pedestal, others in the fellowship had already laid the foundation. Chu Chen had in 1134 portrayed the Ch'engs as intellectually indebted to Chou. Hunan scholars had always emphasized Chou as well as the Ch'engs. Both Hu Hung and Chang Shih had claimed that the Ch'engs continued some of Chou's ideas. Besides drawing upon Chou's philosophy, Chang wrote at least six pieces in praise of Chou.<sup>27</sup> Despite Lu Chiu-yüan's rejection of Chou's "Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate" (to be discussed in Chapter 9), he credited Chou with teaching the Ch'engs. Even though Wang Ying-ch'ên

objected to any suggestion that the Ch'engs were Chou's students, such sensitivity about the status of the Ch'engs was not restricted to their relationship to Chou. For example, Yang Shih did not acknowledge that the Ch'engs had studied under Chang Tsai, but rather belittled Chang by presenting him as seeking instruction from his nephews, the Ch'eng brothers. Despite Lü Tsu-ch'ien's focus on blending Chang's ideas with the Ch'engs, his synthesis did not necessitate adopting a defensive posture toward Chou. Judging from Chu's responses to Lü Tsu-ch'ien's questions about the *Records of the I-Lo School*, Lü did not take issue with Chu's presentation of Chou as an early principal within the tradition.<sup>28</sup> Nor was Lü's family hostile to Chou's legacy, even though both Lü Hsi-che and Lü Pen-chung had rendered a judgment: although the Ch'engs had studied with Chou, they later surpassed him.<sup>29</sup> Statements that gave priority to the Ch'engs did not necessarily disparage Chou. In short, one should be careful not to overstate opposition within the fellowship to Chou Tun-i.

Chu Hsi similarly emphasized the greater contributions of the Ch'engs. Although he cited Ch'eng I's account of Ch'eng Hao as evidence that the Ch'engs had studied with Chou, Chu used the account to focus even more attention on the Ch'engs. According to that account, Ch'eng Hao did not understand the essentials even after gaining first-hand instruction from Chou, but instead continued to drift intellectually for almost a decade. Hence Ch'eng I judged Chou's teachings to have been inadequate even to direct an exceptionally gifted person like Ch'eng Hao. Only after returning to the Six Classics did Ch'eng Hao make a breakthrough to discover the truths of the ancient sages. Thereafter, he reached a level of truth that no one, not even Chou, had attained for almost fourteen centuries. Then Ch'eng Hao took the restoration of the Confucian tradition as his own responsibility.<sup>30</sup> Thus Ch'eng I claimed more for his brother than for Chou, and Chu implicitly sanctioned this claim. Chu Hsi later even more explicitly championed the Ch'eng brothers as the ones who revived the transmission of the *Tao*. Writing the preface to his commentary on *The Doctrine of the Mean*, Chu pointed out how indispensable this written text was to the transmission of the *Tao*:

Fortunately, however, this text was not lost, and when the masters Ch'eng, two brothers, appeared, they had something to study in order to pick up the threads of what had not been transmitted for a thousand years and something to rely on in exposing the speciousness of the seeming truths of Taoism and Buddhism. Though the contribution of Tzu-ssu was great, had it not been for the Ch'engs we would not have grasped his meaning from his words alone.<sup>31</sup>

This statement and Ch'eng I's account would appear to contradict Chu's declaration in the *Records of the Evolution of the I-Lo School* that Chou

was the one who repossessed the *Tao* and passed it down to the Ch'engs. The apparent contradiction here raises the possibility that modern schemata might be overstating Chu Hsi's emphasis on Chou's role and ideas.<sup>32</sup>

The celebration of a shrine to Chou in 1193 provides a clue to Chu Hsi's ranking of Chou and the Ch'engs. Even when drawing attention to Chou's unique role, Chu still credited the Ch'engs with the greater contribution: "Master Chou's learning truly received the untransmitted threads of Confucius and Mencius. When he passed it on to the two masters Ch'eng of Honan, the *Tao* was greatly illuminated."<sup>33</sup> Although Chou was credited with receiving the transmission, the credit for developing that transmission went to the Ch'eng brothers.

Based on the amount of attention accorded them in terms of space in the *Records of the I-Lo School*, Chu's ranking of the five Confucians would be as follows: Ch'eng Hao, Ch'eng I, Chang, Shao, and lastly Chou. Chu was also generous in his attention to famous Confucians associated with the Ch'engs, especially Lü Hsi-che and Hu An-kuo—ancestors of Lü Tsu-ch'ien and Hu Hung. In these two cases, more space was given to associates of the Ch'eng brothers than to Chou.

By compiling laudatory comments various individuals made about those included in the *Records*, Chu effectively enhanced the sense of a single distinct tradition that concentrated on the Confucian *Tao*. Five and one-quarter chapters were devoted to the major disciples of the Ch'engs, and twenty minor disciples were discussed in one brief chapter. Chu skillfully structured the tradition around the Ch'engs and used the I-Lo label to identify it principally as the school of the Ch'engs. Incorporating four prestigious associated Confucians and thirty-four disciples, Chu demonstrated the beginnings of a fellowship of Confucians that continued from the late eleventh century for over half a century through several generations. Although Chu was more inclusive in 1173 than he was inclined to be later, he was less so than some of his contemporaries, such as the compilers of the *Writings by Various Confucians for Propagating the Tao*.

Chu's reconstruction of the community was implicitly a response and an alternative to the version of *Tao-hsüeh* that had been set forth in *Writings by Various Confucians for Propagating the Tao*. That anthology, compiled around the early 1160s by Chang Chiu-ch'eng's students, set forth a different list: Chou, Ssu-ma Kuang, Chang, and then the Ch'engs. Thus the *Writings for Propagating the Tao* placed Ssu-ma Kuang second only to Chou in the revival of the transmission of the *Tao*. In terms of order, the difference from Chu's genealogy was interjecting Ssu-ma and Chang between Chou and the Ch'engs. Chou's place was not at issue, further evidence of the widely held view during the early Southern Sung that Chou had played a special role and that Chu's inclusion of Chou should not be mistaken for an innovation that broadened the tradition. Although Shao Yung was omitted from the succes-

sion in this earlier anthology, it implied a broader context for the beginning of the fellowship of the *Tao*, because the anthology was less concentrated on the Ch'engs and less involved with speculative philosophizing. It also included some Confucians—most notably Chang Chiu-ch'eng—whom Chu excluded for being too adulterated by Buddhism. As evidence of this somewhat broader view of the beginnings of the tradition, certain texts are extant because they were preserved in this anthology alone: works by Liu An-shih (1048–1125), Chiang Kung-wang (fl. 1101), Liu Tzu-hui (1101–1147), as well as the most complete copy of P'an Chih's (early twelfth century) writings.<sup>34</sup> P'an and Liu Tzu-hui were particularly receptive to Buddhism. Chiang was critical of slighting the role of the feelings in defining human nature, and P'an opposed separating the *Tao* and principles from things. Such affinity for the *Tao* as functioning in actual entities rather than as speculative philosophizing has also been noted in Chang Chiu-ch'eng's aversion to abstract philosophy. This relative disinterest in abstract philosophical discussions was further apparent in the anthology. Chou Tun-i's "Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate" (*T'ai-chi t'u shuo*) was not appended to *Penetrating the Book of Changes* (*T'ung-shu*). Overall, the anthology presented the Confucian fellowship through the generations back to the Ch'eng brothers and their associates in the conservative Yüan-yu party, particularly Ssu-ma Kuang and Liu An-shih. Having included works and thinkers that were omitted from later anthologies, the net of *Tao-hsüeh* was cast much broader than it would be after Chu Hsi's version prevailed.

Chu's *Records of the I-Lo School* was the primary source used in the 1340s by the editors of the official *Sung History* for biographies in both the section on *Tao-hsüeh* masters and the section on other miscellaneous Confucians. In retrospect, the editors of the imperially commissioned Complete Library (*ssu-k'u*) project in the eighteenth century concluded that dividing Confucians according to *Tao-hsüeh* had begun with Chu Hsi's compilation in 1173.<sup>35</sup> Although efforts to define the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship predated Chu's work, his compilation did mark a significant step in reconstructing or redefining that tradition.

A more famous project—and a cooperative one between Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu-ch'ien—for promoting *Tao-hsüeh* teachings was the philosophical anthology *Reflections on Things at Hand*. The two friends did most of the compiling in 1175 when Lü visited Chu. They continued to correspond about some selections until 1178, when the anthology took its final form. Unlike Chu's work in 1173, this anthology included only the Four Masters: Chou, the Ch'engs, and Chang Tsai. The order of the transmission was again Chou, followed by the Ch'engs, and Chang. Shao Yung was now excluded. Although Chu used Shao's comments on cosmology and the natural world elsewhere, Chu considered him outside of the mainstream because of his fatalism and his failure to focus on self-cultivation and ethics.<sup>36</sup> The

number of passages from each of the Four Masters highlights the concentration primarily on the Ch'engs and secondarily on Chang. Of the total 622 passages, the Ch'engs contributed 80 percent and Chang almost 18 percent. Chou's 12 passages amounted to less than 2 percent of the whole. Only one passage came from his more controversial "Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate."<sup>37</sup> Judging from these figures (as well as those noted in the *Records of the I-Lo School*), the special role accorded to Chou should be balanced by the consideration of the very small percentage of passages and limited number of concepts that Chu borrowed from him. Thus, conventional schema for Chu's philosophy might possibly be revised to provide more attention to Chang Tsai's ideas than to Chou's. Some of the emphasis on Chang Tsai in the *Reflections* should probably be ascribed to Lü Tsu-ch'ien, however.

Since the middle of the thirteenth century, some followers of Chu Hsi have given him exclusive credit for the anthology, but two modern scholars have drawn attention back to Lü's assistance and contributions.<sup>38</sup> Lü's opinions affected the content of the work. Because of Lü's insistence, Chu included one passage on law and omitted several passages on the harmful influence of the examinations. In the case of some specific passages, Lü's opinions prevailed over Chu's initial objections. Given Chu's greater affinity for speculative philosophy, it is rather surprising that it was Lü who persuaded him to begin the book with abstract philosophical concepts. Lü's other significant contributions included omitting Ch'eng Hao's treatise on humaneness and including quotations from Ch'eng I's *Commentary to the Book of Changes (I chuan)*. Chu had misgivings about Ch'eng I's approach to the *Book of Changes* and did not want to incorporate any passages from it. The anthology included 106 passages from that work, or about 17 percent of the total, and much more than from any other source except Chu's edition of the *Surviving Works of the Two Ch'engs*. Years later Chu explained that he had yielded to Lü when he realized that specific passages that Lü had suggested were useful explanations of the principles involved in daily self-cultivation.<sup>39</sup> But why was Chu uncomfortable with Ch'eng I's commentary?

#### PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES

Ch'eng I headed one of two major Sung schools of interpretation, reading the *Book of Changes* for ethical principles rather than using it for numerology and divination. Following Wang Pi's (226-249) arrangement that collated sections of the text with the hexagrams, Ch'eng I sought meaning from the text rather than the hexagrams. Ch'eng I rejected the school of interpretation, championed by Shao Yung and Chou Tun-i, that focused on

the symbols and numbers represented in the hexagrams. Instead of such numerological speculation, Ch'eng insisted that one should apply the text's ethical principles to one's own spiritual cultivation.<sup>40</sup>

Chu Hsi took a different approach from Ch'eng I's *Commentary to the Book of Changes*. Instead of following Wang Pi's collation of the text with the hexagrams, Chu used Lü Tsu-ch'ien's edition of the text, for which he wrote a colophon. Citing his debt to an earlier work by Ssu-ma Kuang's student Ch'ao Yüeh-chih (1059-1129), Lü had restored a more ancient arrangement of the classic wherein the text was not collated with the hexagrams. Using Lü's more ancient arrangement of the classic, Chu drew attention to the hexagram images (along with the hexagram and line statements) rather than to later layers of explanatory texts, on which Ch'eng depended. Chu followed the traditional assumption that Confucius had written the Ten Wings (commentaries and essays included in the *Book of Changes*) to explain the hexagrams. But Chu regarded Confucius as having set forth his own ideas instead of those of the legendary Fu Hsi, to whom the trigrams were attributed. Having separated what he believed to be the ancient and homogeneous part of the classic from later layers of philosophical interpretation, Chu sought to correct what he regarded as Ch'eng's overly philosophical reading of the text. Ch'eng had rarely discussed the structural features of individual hexagrams, but rather identified more universal principles inherent in the hexagrams and line statements. Chu, by contrast, used some of Shao's and Chou's insights about numbers and symbols. Beginning with explanations of the structure and position of the lines of the hexagrams, Chu emphasized the oracular pronouncements associated with specific configurations. From Chu's perspective, Ch'eng had limited the text to specific universal principles instead of having the oracle speak to each and every situation.<sup>41</sup>

Chu explained that the original purpose of the classic had been simply prognosticatory rather than didactic like the other classics. Instead of debunking divination, Chu Hsi was actually promoting it among literati of his day as a useful instrument in spiritual cultivation. He explained in a 1176 letter to Lü:

Whenever one reads a hexagram and line, according to the prognostication obtained, one empties [or pacifies] the mind to search out what the meaning of the verse refers to and considers it a decision as to good fortune or misfortune, yea or nay. Then one examines the image in its actual situation and finds out the principle of why it is so and extends them to one's affairs. This enables everyone from kings and dukes to the common people to use it [the principle obtained through divination] for self-cultivation and ordering the state.<sup>42</sup>

The specific behavioral prescription of a line was determined by the situation and context in which one performed the divination. Only a sage knew

how to act properly in all situations, for such a person could perceive the incipient forces in people and things, and respond accordingly. Except for those rare sagely persons, everyone occasionally needed divination as a guide: to disclose things in nature, to complete human affairs, to penetrate wills, to determine tasks, and to settle doubts. The one who could properly use the classic for divination to foretell the future was a person of sincerity who was without selfish intent and whose mind had realized the unity between people, Heaven, and Earth. Yet divination need not be used in cases where ethical principles were already clear. Proper use applied to settling doubts and establishing a direction of activity after one had already done as much as possible with one's own ability and intellect. Chu turned to divination in 1195 to settle a disagreement with his disciples about whether he should submit a memorial criticizing the government's campaign against the fellowship. When the oracle went against submitting the memorial, he heeded the advice and burned the memorial.<sup>43</sup>

Lü Tsu-ch'ien's perspective on divination differed from Chu Hsi's. In his *Extensive Deliberations on the Tso Commentary*, Lü lectured literati about divination. According to Lü, different qualities that appeared in the divination process were nothing more than manifestations of one's own mind. He claimed:

Before heating the tortoise shell, the three omens were already provided, and before casting the yarrow stalks, the trigrams of the *Changes* were already manifested. After the tortoise shell was heated and the yarrow stalks cast, the auspiciousness of the omen is the auspiciousness of one's own mind, and the transformations of the *Changes* are also the transformations of one's own mind. . . . The distorted ones manifest their distortions, the presumptuous ones manifest their presumptions, and the witches manifest their witchery; all comes from what the mind itself manifests.<sup>44</sup>

Although Chu certainly expected literati to consult the oracle themselves instead of patronizing professional practitioners of divination, Lü brought witchery into the discussion to graphically illustrate the depth of his feelings about divination. Thus he agreed with Ch'eng's rejection of divination, even though he did not start, as Ch'eng had, with Wang Pi's version of the *Changes*. The passage quoted above is also noteworthy for Lü's thesis that divination can tell us only what is already known by the mind in itself.

Elsewhere, Lü even more explicitly declared that the mind determined what was said in an oracle. In his lectures on the *Book of Documents*, he remarked: "Before divining one decides in one's own mind and afterwards one projects one's mandate onto the tortoise shell. One's own will is first settled; then one uses this will to consult the person, the spirits, and the divination. When the sages performed a divination, it was not a situation of them having no idea within themselves and being dependent upon divina-



tion to make a decision.”<sup>45</sup> Given references in the classics to divination, the historian Lü had to acknowledge that sages had “consulted the ghostly and bright realms of the dead and living”; however, he viewed their consulting oracles as merely adding a supplementary perspective. Unlike Chu, he entertained the idea of sages engaging in divination without attaching any particular importance to their consulting the oracle. Rather than encouraging the literati to use divination as a means for self-cultivation, Lü rendered divination superfluous, for one determined the outcome of divination beforehand in one’s own mind. Thus he assured his audience that such divination was not crucial to anyone’s decision-making processes.

Lü proceeded to clarify what he perceived to be the relation between the mind and the mystery within Nature and Heaven. Lü identified the minds of the sages in antiquity with the “mind of Heaven” (*t’ien-hsin* or *t’ien chih hsin*). As we have already noted, Chang Chiu-ch’eng and Hu Hung had used the mind of Heaven to characterize the mind of sage-kings of antiquity; moreover, they had spoken of human virtues as linked to the mind of Heaven. Lü’s usage of the concept resonated with theirs. In the classics, the term “mind of Heaven” had been used only in one chapter in the *Book of Documents*; moreover, that one instance was a Han dynasty interpolation. In his lectures on the *Book of Documents*, Lü used the term in at least ten passages characterizing the minds and wills of the founding rulers and prime ministers of the Shang and Chou dynasties in early antiquity.<sup>46</sup> The sagely founders of these two early dynasties were said to have been one with virtue; therefore, they received the mind of Heaven from above and obtained the hearts of the people from below. Having received the mind of Heaven, they had the mandate from Heaven to rule. The mind of Heaven was without self-centeredness and so were the minds of these sage-kings.

Writing about even earlier sages, Lü had pronounced the linkage as a general principle: “The mind of the sage is the mind of Heaven; what the sage advocated was what Heaven mandated.” When the legendary sage ruler Shun bestowed the throne on Yü, the calendar and numbers of Heaven [i.e., the information from the heavens necessary to declare a new dynasty] were already inherent in his person. The mind of the sage was equivalent to the mind of Heaven itself because “this mind and principle were derived entirely from Heaven.”<sup>47</sup>

According to Lü, in addition to the inner nature mandated to us (according to the *Doctrine of the Mean*) by Heaven, the mind was also bestowed by Heaven. It is not surprising, then, that Lü was asked how one would distinguish the mind from the inner nature. To the student’s question, Lü replied: “The mind is like the Supreme Ruler, and the inner nature is like Heaven. That which is originally so is called the nature, and that which is the ruling power is called the mind.”<sup>48</sup> Implicitly, the unity of the mind and Heaven was not limited only to sages. Lü generalized or universalized the connec-

tion between Heaven and the mind: "The mind is Heaven, and there has never been Heaven outside of the mind; the mind is spiritual force (*shen*), and there has never been spiritual force extraneous to the mind."<sup>49</sup> He further differentiated the mind of Heaven from any mind that regarded anything as extraneous.<sup>50</sup> In a similar vein, Lü universalized the association between the mind and the *Tao*: "A mind outside of the *Tao* is not the mind, and a *Tao* outside of the mind is not the *Tao*."<sup>51</sup> Since *Tao* was also correlated with principle, this association returns us to Lü's identification of Heaven with principle.

In identifying principle with Heaven, Lü linked Heaven's principle with the mandate of Heaven and destiny. He proclaimed: "Destiny is a proper principle and is endowed by Heaven. And a proper principle that cannot be changed is what is called destiny."<sup>52</sup> It was impossible to escape the range of Heaven. When the rulers of the Hsia dynasty in early antiquity ceased to be virtuous in their rule and did not follow Heaven, "Heaven punished them with disasters." Furthermore: "The responsiveness of Heaven's principle is as fast as turning over one's hand. . . . Punishing the Hsia was not T'ang's (c. 1760 B.C.) original intent, but pressed by Heaven, he had no choice."<sup>53</sup> Thus Lü joined the new philosophical concept of principle together with the classical message that Heaven would punish those who did not rule virtuously. It was principle or virtue that provided bonding between Heaven and humankind: "One principle flows and penetrates, so Heaven and the sages have no gap between them."<sup>54</sup> From this perspective, people were governed by Heaven through Heaven's principles, in contrast to Lü's statements that destiny was determined by one's own mind. The tension here was only partially resolved by the postulation that mind was ultimately one with Heaven and principle. The tension was particularly acute in considering a problem in ethics: why are people so often remiss in virtue and fail to realize this oneness?

Lü Tsu-ch'ien turned to Shun's "sixteen-word" dictum in the *Book of Documents* to address a crucial aspect of this ethical problem. In this passage that was to become central to *Tao-hsüeh* discussions of the mind, Shun reportedly had admonished his successor-to-be, Yü: "The human mind is insecure; the *Tao* mind is barely perceptible. Have utmost refinement and singleness of mind. Hold fast the Mean!" Commenting on this passage, Lü wrote:

The human mind is the self-centered mind. If a person is self-centered, he will be annoyed and ill at ease. The *Tao* mind is the good mind, that is to say, the original mind, which is subtle and difficult to discover. This is the definite essence of the mind; if concentrated and not wandering, it is without blemish, and if purely refined, it has no deficiencies. This is where to exert one's disciplined effort. Possessing its defi-

nite essence and knowing where to exert one's effort, then one can hold to its centrality in the Mean.<sup>55</sup>

As Lü explained, this passage upheld both the goodness of the original mind-and-heart of which Mencius had spoken and the need for discipline in one's daily efforts to be good. It was not enough that one had within oneself the *Tao* mind, for the ethical task of becoming a good person still required serious and rigorous practice.

For assurance about the efficacy of one's efforts to bridge the ethical gap, Lü turned to the hexagrams of the *Book of Changes*. Explicating the line structure of the Return (*fu*) hexagram, Lü linked the message about self-cultivation with the Mencian doctrine of original goodness within each person:

Speaking of the Return hexagram on the macro level, Heaven and Earth, yin and yang, decline and growth all possess the pattern of necessary return. Speaking of it on the micro level, when people's good beginnings in the mind-and-heart are discovered, even the utterly evil person can certainly return to these good beginnings. As soon as the good mind is recovered, there is a pattern for proceeding smoothly. Using the structure of the hexagram to look at this, the active line is the yang line lying beneath five yin ones; although the five yin lines are stored above, as soon as the yang begins to move, the five yin lines already naturally have the ambience of fleeing and disappearing. There may be thousands of transgressions and a myriad of evils crowded together within one person; however, when the good mind is recovered, even the thousands of transgressions and myriad evils can be observed to flee and disappear. . . . It is of utmost importance for scholars to see the return of the *Tao* of Heaven from the heavenly movements above, that is, from the natural ethical principle of the heavenly movements. And the discovery of a person's good mind is also a definite principle of the human mind. . . . In people, even though obstructed and obscured by selfish intent, the endowed standard cannot be eliminated, for heavenly movements have no gaps or interruptions.<sup>56</sup>

The constant movement of the heavens and an analysis of the line structure of a hexagram thus served to reinforce Lü's faith in the Mencian doctrine of original goodness and confidence in the grounds for ethical transformation within oneself. Although Lü's analysis was closer to Ch'eng I's philosophical interpretation of the *Changes*, Lü shared Chu's interest in analyzing the line structure of hexagrams and applying the lessons to one's efforts to transform oneself into a better person.

Parallels between Lü's and Chu's views of the *Book of Changes* are evident in Chu's comments on this same hexagram. Chu elaborated on the

statement that one could observe the movement of the mind of Heaven and Earth in the Return hexagram:

Below the accumulated yin, a single yang is reborn. [As Ch'eng I said,] "The mind of Heaven and Earth to give birth to things" is incipient in extinction. Reaching this point in the cyclical process, its return can be seen. In human beings, it is activity at the peak of stillness, goodness at the depth of evil, and the original mind beginning to reappear just at the point of vanishing.<sup>57</sup>

Chu then quoted Shao Yung's poem about how the mind of Heaven was so still as to seem absent at the winter solstice, when the yang impulse began to rise again to give birth to all things. Seeing him cite both Ch'eng I and Shao Yung to clarify one line of text, we are reminded that Chu not only criticized both of these earlier *Tao-hsüeh* traditions about the *Changes* but also drew from them. Like Lü, Chu derived confidence from the cyclic movement of the heavens and the seasons that the original mind of goodness would return and provide the basis for correcting one's faults. It is also noteworthy that Chu was comfortable citing Shao's poem about the mind of Heaven for assurance about the character of goodness.

As Lü had done, Chu also identified the mind of Heaven with the mind of persons of integrity. In Chu's words, "For with the superior person, when the mind is extended, it is the mind of Heaven; when it is small, it is as watchful and reverent as the mind of King Wen of Chou; both are good."<sup>58</sup> He also cited Hsün-tzu: "The superior person with a mind extended will be one with Heaven and in accord with the *Tao*."<sup>59</sup> When Chu talked in terms of Heaven having consciousness and serving as lord, Heaven was always in accordance with the *Tao* and principle. In general, Heaven was simply principle. Even though principle was the central concept in his system, principle by itself did not actively control the flux of actual entities. The need for a ruling power led Chu on a few occasions to speak of Heaven as master. At least once he made the mind of Heaven the lord of principle itself, for "the agent by which these principles are controlled is the mind of Heaven."<sup>60</sup> In such passages, Chu presented the sages exerting their minds to the utmost to know their natures and Heaven; on realizing oneness with all things, the mind of the sage was united with the mind of Heaven. When discussing Chu's grounds for confidence in people's capacity to become good, scholars usually point to this oneness of the inner nature with that of the universe.<sup>61</sup> Linking the mind of Heaven to the mind of the sage or the superior person apparently provided Chu additional grounds for confidence, however.

In terms of the mind, Chu Hsi's confidence about people's capacity for the good was expressed most often through two concepts. First, as shown by the Return hexagram, the mind of Heaven and Earth was also one with human minds, for people shared through humaneness the virtue of giving

life to things. Second, building on Shun's sixteen-word dictum, Chu developed the distinction between the *Tao* mind and the human mind as a major doctrine for setting forth an ethical imperative. Given the difference between the instability of the human mind and the absolute goodness of the *Tao* mind, it was imperative to transform the human mind into the *Tao* mind, which was always at one with Heaven's principle.<sup>62</sup> In commenting on the concept of the *Tao* mind, Hu Hung had been more explicit and succinct: "There is no duality between the *Tao* mind and [the mind of] Heaven."<sup>63</sup>

Similarity between the *Tao* mind and the mind of Heaven would suggest that both were metaphors for addressing the need for assurance that one could become ethical. In people, consciousness allowed for the possibility of the ego making self-regarding choices that led in the direction of selfishness and evil. Chu denied such self-regarding calculation to the consciousness in Heaven, which always accorded with the *Tao*. Similarly, the mind of the superior person when extended was one with Heaven and in line with the *Tao*; in other words, it became the mind of Heaven. The *Tao* mind in all people was the original mind that, if preserved and nourished, would serve to direct people on an ethical path. Thus, being at one with virtue was common to both the *Tao* mind and the mind of Heaven. The ego's self-regarding calculation was antipodal to both the *Tao* mind and the mind of Heaven. Such parallels implicitly linked the *Tao* mind with the mind of Heaven, although Chu himself apparently never explicitly proclaimed the identity of these conceptual terms. Perhaps the connection was not explicitly drawn because of the regal connotations inherent in sometimes using "the mind of Heaven" to refer to the minds of sage-kings and even reigning emperors in one's own day. Against that background, it was more difficult to universalize the mind of Heaven than the *Tao* mind as a conceptual model for the perfected state of mind in anyone. Nonetheless, these two metaphors for spontaneous conformity with ethical norms still provided additional support for the conviction that self-cultivation could overcome self-regarding calculation and achieve harmony with what was right. Because of the traditional Confucian belief that the natural order in the universe was inherently ethical, linkage of people's minds to Heaven and the *Tao* augmented Chu's grounds for confidence in the potential efficacy of one's effort to be good.

Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu Ch'ien shared the goal of building a fellowship among Confucians committed to the *Tao*. They had different personal styles, which had an effect on the fellowship and its relations with outsiders, as will become clear in discussions of the period after Lü's death in 1181.

Heralding from surely the most prestigious literati family of his era, Lü not only championed family rites and traditions, but also spoke favorably of the interests of private households. Unlike our prevailing image of Southern

Sung elite families marrying those from regional elites and thus focusing on local issues, some recently migrant families continued to make supraregional marriage alliances in the Southern Sung.<sup>64</sup> Lü approximated this pattern of Northern Sung marriage alliances. His first wife was a daughter of Han Yüan-chi, a member of the K'ai-feng elite who migrated to Fukien after the loss of the North. Seven years after she died, Lü married her younger sister. After becoming a widower the second time, he married the daughter of Jui Yeh, a famous university professor from Hu-chou. Although his daughter married into the local elite, the marriage appears to have been part of his arrangement for Chu's son to marry into that same family, an act that reflected Lü's special generosity and graciousness toward his friend. After fleeing from the Jurchen conquest, some northern elite families failed to maintain their status and traditions, but the Lüs, at least through Tsu-ch'ien's generation, were very successful.

Also like his Northern Sung predecessors, Lü focused much more on national politics than he did on local community issues. With his knowledge of historical institutions and contemporary political realities, Lü was a widely respected authority on and participant in political institutions at the central level. Unlike some of his Che-tung contemporaries, like Ch'en Liang, who focused on family and national affairs, Lü did not ignore the middle level of community institutions. For example, he defended Chu's community granary program and planned to build such a program in Chin-hua. Furthermore, through friends who occupied key government posts, he facilitated Chu's efforts to establish his first granary and first academy.

Whereas Lü was more attentive to national issues, Chu excelled in the middle level of community organizations. In response to the space created by declining state power on the local level and increasing power of local elite families, Chu advocated a series of institutions to enhance community consciousness and cooperation on a middle level between state and family. Along with codes for rituals and decorum for community associations, he paid particular attention to community compacts, shrines or altars to former worthies, academies, and community granaries.<sup>65</sup> Chu borrowed most of his community models from others, but he effectively welded them into a program to serve his agenda for forging a community of Confucians. Both Lü and Chu also strove to enhance consciousness and cohesion among *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians. Although priorities differed, both were concerned about all three levels of affairs. Moreover, they cooperated and encouraged each other's endeavors to strengthen the country and the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship.

Lü Tsu-ch'ien apparently had some influence on Chu's theory and praxis. In the case of academies, Lü established both studies and academies a few years before Chu did; moreover, Lü's exceptional success as a teacher surely attracted Chu's attention. Guidelines for Lü's students foreshadowed those Chu wrote a dozen years later. Lü offered advice to Chu on various matters

during the process of Chu's reestablishment of the White Deer Grotto Academy; moreover, Chu had Lü's record of that project inscribed on stone at the academy. While discussing Hu Hung's *Understanding of Words*, it was Lü who admonished Chu to take a balanced approach to spiritual cultivation, the dual approach for which Chu himself is famous. While working with Chang Shih on the issue of humaneness, Chu frequently exchanged letters with Lü about the subject. In classical studies, Lü's rearrangement of the *Book of Changes* served as the textual framework for Chu's philosophical exegesis of that classic. Lü's insights into the text and preface of the *Book of Poetry* became part of Chu's interpretation of the odes. The content and order of the *Reflections on Things at Hand* demonstrated Lü's input. That cooperative project is well documented in their exchange of letters and some of Chu's comments to students. Most later scholars passed over or minimized Lü's contributions even to that work. Chu probably shares some responsibility for this bias among his later followers. After Lü passed away, Chu generally avoided calling attention to his indebtedness to Lü. Moreover, as we shall see in later chapters, his acrimony against Wu-chou utilitarians affected his evaluation of Lü's legacy.

In their various discussions, Lü demonstrated an ability to converse on all three levels of discourse. Even though he urged Chu to begin *Reflections on Things at Hand* with a chapter on the essence of the *Tao*, he was overall much less given to speculative philosophy than Chu Hsi was. Indeed, Chu pursued that level of discourse less with Lü than he had with Chang. Although Lü was less of a theoretician than Chu, modern scholars should not continue to pass over the theoretical component in Lü's writings. In the case of the mind of Heaven, juxtaposing their individual usages of this term in the context of their approaches to the *Book of Changes* has provided another perspective on their quests for certainty in self-cultivation. Their conceptions of self-cultivation and the mind also informed their views of divination. Lü's system focused more on mind than principle, whereas Chu's was more centered on the concept of principle. One of Lü's major attempts at mediation was his effort to find a balance between those giving priority either to principle or to mind. Such efforts to achieve harmony and balance have given his thought a composite appearance. Largely because of this image, his writings have not attracted serious study by modern scholars.

It has also become conventional to remark that Lü had little to say about Chu's central issues, particularly the mind, human nature, and ethical principles. Lü is said to have specialized as much in historical studies as Chu did in classical studies. It is true that their concentrations differed. Nevertheless, such comparisons easily overlook the significance of Lü's views on ethics, philosophy, and the classics. Lü made some contributions to these areas of scholarship and education.

Lü's own priorities are easily misrepresented when he is characterized as having concentrated on practical problems and historical studies. Despite being famous for his activism, scholarship, and historical studies, he advised persevering in this agenda: "tranquility more than action, practicing for one's self betterment more than praxis for society, self-cultivation more than discussing scholarship, and reading the classics more than history."<sup>66</sup> This statement suggests that his basic priorities were similar to Chu Hsi's. One should also be mindful that Lü's writings on history were saturated with discussions of mind, nature, and principle. Much of the history that he studied comprised classical accounts of the words and deeds of the sages. Even his studies of later historical sources served to reinforce ethical lessons. To Lü, there was no sharp divide between the classics and history because the classics, particularly the *Book of Poetry*, the *Book of Documents*, and the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, were the sources for the history of the classical era.

In making comparative contrasts between Chu and Lü, most modern scholars have implicitly accepted Chu's judgment. Chu remarked, "Lü Tsuch'ien had broad learning and knowledge of many things but was never able to hold onto essentials." Moreover, Lü's "flaw was nothing but ingeniousness (*ch'iao*)."<sup>67</sup> Ingeniousness encompasses being clever, artful, and opportune. What might appear to a Westerner as an asset was a serious flaw to Chu Hsi.

What Chu meant by Lü's ingenious artfulness might be clarified by touching briefly on some additional areas where the two friends differed. First, in response to Chu's observation that the *Book of Documents* was difficult to read, Lü opined that there was nothing that could not be explained. After a few years, Lü acknowledged that Chu was right in some cases. The two friends still differed on this classic, for Chu complained that Lü's ingenious explications of the *Documents* had sometimes explained the inexplicable. Second, although Chu appreciated some of Lü's glosses on the *Book of Poetry* and distinctions between that classic and its preface, he felt Lü was too ingenious in deciphering some of the odes. Third, Chu acknowledged that the *Tso Commentary* contained some principles that were not covered in the classics. Still, he protested, why spend so much time on the scattered and minor principles in that work? Although conceding that Lü's detailed comments on the *Tso* were very encompassing, Chu faulted Lü for being too ingenious in his comments. Fourth, Chu was highly critical of the Su brothers for having contaminated Confucianism with Buddhism and Taoism. Lü felt that their deviations did not merit as strong an attack as Chu demanded. Chu wrote to Chang Shih complaining that it was Lü's being intent on preparing students for the examinations that made him appreciative of Su's artfulness. In a late letter to Chu, Chang reported that although Lü did not defend the Sus, he had been unwilling to attack them out of def-



erence to their having been senior and respected members of the Yüan-yü conservative opposition to Wang An-shih. According to Chang, Lü had only recently realized the error in his position.<sup>68</sup>

Despite Chu's and Chang's condemnations of Su Shih, Lü Tsu-ch'ien actually continued to respect Su's work. Among Southern Sung Confucians, Lü was an exception to the general decline of interest in Su Shih and the ancient prose (*ku-wen*) style. Continuing a tradition within his family, he even admired the Kiangsi poets.<sup>69</sup> Although Lü himself engaged in belles lettres only when there was a request or a functional purpose to be served, he wrote at considerable length about various literary styles and models. In his comments on literary models, he most often directed people toward Ouyang Hsiu and Su Shih. After reading his *Mirror of Sung Prose*, in which he sought unity of principle and literary culture (*wen*), a modern Chinese scholar has noted that Lü disapproved of the division of scholarship between those following Ch'eng I's concept of principle and those adhering to Su's concept of literary culture.<sup>70</sup> Lü's synthesis of Su's and Ch'eng's ideas further reflected his commitment to building solidarity among Confucians of his day and preserving the Confucian tradition as a whole.

Although he benefited from Lü's mediating role, Chu Hsi could be sharply critical of his friend's tendency to reconcile differences and seek accommodation. On one occasion, he remarked: "Lü discusses ideas extremely well; however, he tends to discuss every matter as a whole, emphasizing unity [instead of analyzing differences]. He is also deeply afraid that someone will point out the faults of heterodox and vulgar ideas and is especially vigorous in sheltering Mr. Su Shih. He regards determining who is right and wrong as being not as good as cultivating oneself and being more reserved."<sup>71</sup> In turn, Lü perceived Chu as being too adversarial and insufficiently magnanimous and gentle.<sup>72</sup>

Acknowledging a difference in their temperaments, Chu attributed to his friend a warm and gracious natural temperament that revealed itself in being forgiving and accommodating. Chu confessed in an 1170 letter that his own natural allotment "has the shortcoming of being ferocious, so everything I discuss is accompanied by forceful intensity." Furthermore, his shortcoming was even worse than Lü's tendency to make concessions, for when "my temper is released, it's explosive enough to burn myself and injure things."<sup>73</sup>

Despite differences with Lü, Chu Hsi's affection and esteem for his friend was real. Mourning Lü's death provided an occasion for Chu to express his deepest feelings about Lü. When news reached him about Lü's passing, Chu offered a libation in his own home and sent a memorial tablet and eulogy. Much of the eulogy consisted of praise of Lü's self-effacing modesty, reluctance to criticize others, exceptional intelligence, compositional style, service to the government, and the ethical example he set for others.

Of greatest significance, Chu addressed the meaning of Lü's death for the fellowship of the Confucian *Tao*. Praising Lü's teaching of the *Tao*, Chu lamented the implications for "the decline of this *Tao* of ours" and the impact of Lü's death on "this *tang* of ours." Even though Lü had also done so, it is surprising that Chu used the term *tang* ("faction") to refer to their association. The use of this word in the 1170s and 1180s suggests awareness of the fellowship's evolution toward a cohesive and distinctive association. Ever since Confucius' warning against factions (in *Analects*, 15/22), the term carried extremely negative political and ethical connotations. Northern Sung statesmen generally took a more favorable view; however, even Ou-yang Hsiu's famous memorial from the 1040s in defense of forming a faction of superior men had not erased the negative legacy of the term.<sup>74</sup> Some of the opponents of *Tao-hsüeh* had already been warning the government about the group functioning like a faction. The opening lines of the eulogy made the most eloquent statement:

Heaven has severed this culture of ours, but why so cruelly? Ching-fu [Chang Shih] was already taken from us last year; why now has Po-kung [Lü Tsu-ch'ien] met this unseemly fate? Who will lead and restore order to *Tao-hsüeh*? Who will restore the virtue of rulers? Who will enlighten the younger generation? Who will bring fortune to this people? Who will finish the explication of the classics? Who will continue the recording of historical events? Stupid as I am, who is going to caution me about my flaws and superintend my mistakes? Since all this is so, how can I refrain from weeping bitterly in calling out to Heaven? How can I keep from being dumbfounded over the loss of Po-kung?<sup>75</sup>

In this eulogy, Chu clearly testified that Chang and Lü were leaders within the association to which he belonged; moreover, they had contributed to Confucian culture by their teachings about the *Tao*. Chu boldly set forth here the group's agenda for polity, society, and culture. Appropriately in this genre placing himself below the level of his deceased friends, he nevertheless laid claim implicitly to the mantle for carrying out the agenda of their group—which he specifically labeled *Tao-hsüeh*.

By rhetorically asking who would now lead *Tao-hsüeh*, Chu Hsi was saying that he would strive to take over for the deceased. After Lü's and Chang's deaths, Chu announced that no one remained who could even call him on his shortcomings. In the context of this complaint that no one remained who was capable of correcting him, his polite self-denigration, "stupid as I am," could be read as implying a claim that he was surrounded now only by people of lesser intelligence.

What flaws might Chu Hsi have had in mind? Lü Tsu-ch'ien had cautioned that Chu was "too anxious and intolerant"; moreover, Chu acknowledged in 1175 that he suffered from these tendencies.<sup>76</sup> One of Chang's

admonitions, in which he addresses Chu by his courtesy name, Yüan-hui, was particularly striking:

I'm also concerned that whereas your learning and conduct have won the respect of others and whereas those you see are below your level, you usually just admonish and reprimand them. Thus observing where others are wrong, you feel that there are multitudinous places where you are correct. Yüan-hui, others also fear your strength at debating and your strictness in refuting them. Even when they doubt something, they do not dare raise questions. I'm deeply afraid that you will consequently receive many words of flattery and few of criticism. If as a result you happen to have biases that you fail to scrutinize and correct, I'm afraid that the negative impact on the future will be inescapable.<sup>77</sup>

Given Chu's explicit claim in Lü's eulogy that he was stepping forward as leader of *Tao-hsüeh* and his expressed concern that there remained no one to counter his own shortcomings, the next period of the fellowship's evolution would make Chang's concern appear prophetic. Chu's development of *Tao-hsüeh* as a philosophy and a fellowship would take place in a new environment—one without such peers and intimate friends as Chang and Lü. During that more confrontational era, Chu would become much more critical of Lü than he had ever been while his friend was alive.

# PART 3 THE THIRD PERIOD, 1182-1202

As *Tao-hsüeh* became highly politicized during the third period, there was to be much more confrontation among intellectuals as well as between them and the government. Chu Hsi's eulogy for Lü Tsu-ch'ien at the end of the second period can be seen as having set the stage for the third period, as Chu claimed the mantle to lead the fellowship. By using the politically charged term "faction" to refer to his group of intellectuals and by setting forth its cultural and political agenda, Chu was implicitly challenging other Confucians inside and outside the government. Many Confucians beyond the circle of immediate mourners would have read the eulogy by a noted scholar for a highly renowned scholar-official. Lü had also spoken of "our faction" and the group centered on "our *Tao*"; moreover, in his academy rules and his role as chief examiner in 1172, he had taken bold steps to enhance the practical interests of the group. That Chu's claims—but not Lü's actions—provoked a backlash suggests that other scholar-officials were generally less receptive to Chu than they had been to Lü. Lü's status, prestige, personality, and scholarship had been so extraordinary that others apparently deferred to him as they were unwilling to do for Chu when Chu asserted his assumption of Lü's leading role.

At the beginning of the third period, Chu assumed a post with greater power than he had ever previously wielded. On his way to his new post, Intendant for Ever-Normal Granaries, Tea, and Salt for Eastern Liang-che (Chekiang), he had an audience in January of 1182 with Hsiao-tsung and submitted seven memorials. When he arrived at his post, Chu showed

unusual vigor in taking charge during an ongoing crisis that had resulted from a drought. Although he took time to pay his respects at Lü Tsu-ch'ien's tomb and to destroy a shrine to Ch'in Kuei, Chu spent much time traveling the circuit to inspect conditions and purge corruption in local administration.

Impeaching and dismissing several officials, Chu took such action against the prefect of T'ai-chou, T'ang Chung-yu (1136-1188). In his reports to the court, Chu accused T'ang of a spectrum of offenses ranging from improper decorum to malfeasance. T'ang had reportedly used government funds and power to build up his own wealth and business enterprises. He even allegedly forged paper money and made shady deals in silver currency. Chu's indictments against him presented a detailed and reasoned case.<sup>1</sup> T'ang had obtained his *chin-shih* and Erudite Literatus degrees earlier than Lü Tsu-ch'ien; moreover, they were the only two from Chin-hua to earn the latter degree during the Sung. Like many other Che-tung scholars, T'ang was a noted authority on governmental institutions. Considerably closer to conventional Confucian scholar-officials, he did not accept the *Tao-hsüeh* view that the country was in a cultural crisis. He was also associated with the learning of the Su brothers, whose philosophy Chu disdained.<sup>2</sup> Given the emperor's appreciation for T'ang's background and the advice of the chief counselor, T'ang was merely deprived of the post in T'ai-chou and the one to which he was being promoted. The latter post was offered to Chu, but Chu could not accept it without provoking further suspicions about his motives for the indictment. After trying to resign thrice, Chu was given a sinecure appointment and allowed to retire in early 1183.

T'ang's case provided an occasion for the first major debate at court about *Tao-hsüeh* since the days of Ch'in Kuei. Minister of Personnel Cheng Ping (d. 1194) initiated the attack on the fellowship. His memorial charged: "What is called *Tao-hsüeh* by scholar-officials in recent generations cheats the world by stealing a name and should not be trusted or employed."<sup>3</sup> In another memorial, censor Ch'en Chia (fl. 1180s) complained that members of the fellowship were presumptuous and that, under the pretense of virtue, they actually sought only personal advancement in the bureaucracy. Echoing through his memorial, Ch'en used the term *wei* (false) to label *Tao-hsüeh* fellows as insincere, depraved hypocrites who claimed sole possession of common Confucian truths but whose deeds revealed their callous plotting for wealth and power.<sup>4</sup> Defending *Tao-hsüeh* at court, Yu Mao presented it as the tradition of the ancient sages; some students at the imperial university also expressed their support. Yu Mao had served with Lü Tsu-ch'ien as an examiner in 1172, the year so many *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians had passed. Fears within some government circles about the political intentions of fellowship participants were surely enhanced by such connections to chief examiners and outspoken students at the university. Yet the controversy

receded from the emperor's court for a time after he proclaimed that *Tao-hsüeh* was a good name but cautioned that it could be used by hypocrites for villainous ends.

Criticism of *Tao-hsüeh* at court in 1183 has traditionally been interpreted as having been initiated by Wang Huai (1127-1189) as a defensive measure to protect T'ang Chung-yu. Wang and T'ang came from the same village, and their families were related by marriage. It is conceivable that those who attacked the fellowship in 1183 did so to curry favor with Wang, the chief counselor of state. In retrospect, Wang has been castigated as a leader in the government's attempt to suppress *Tao-hsüeh*.

The conventional picture omits crucial evidence, however. First, Wang Huai had earlier actively supported Chu's projects. In 1168 as prefect of Chien-yang, Wang had given official approval to Chu's plan for a community granary. By suggesting that Chu retain loan repayments instead of returning the proceeds to the prefecture, Wang had also provided the capital to establish the granary. Chu's proposal for rebuilding the White Deer Grotto Academy was approved during the period of Wang's rising influence at court. Wang was from Lü's area of Wu-chou and was probably favorably inclined to help Chu because of mutual connections to Lü. Concern over drought conditions in his home area led Wang in 1181 to recommend Chu to handle relief measures there. Second, Wang did not actually attempt to suppress the fellowship intellectually. He simply urged the emperor to dismiss the case as nothing more than a manifestation of friction between intellectuals with conflicting opinions.

Third, criticisms voiced by Wang and others in 1183 defended the establishment against what they considered to be the excesses of Chu's zealous attacks on intellectual and political opponents. They apparently saw Chu's destruction of the shrine to Ch'in Kuei and his impeachment of T'ang in this light. Ch'en Chia's warning to the emperor that Chu's group was a faction in the making did have some resonance with the eulogy to Lü in which Chu called his group a faction and outlined its cultural and political agenda. Modern scholars have noted that, in punishing nonofficials in the late 1190s, opponents of the fellowship stretched the conventional meaning of "faction" to include both intellectuals and commoners. Chu had opened that door with his use of the traditional political term "faction" for an association of intellectuals. One thing is certain: the events of 1182 made Chu Hsi a much more famous and controversial figure. *Tao-hsüeh* as a designation for a fellowship of intellectuals had become a highly politicized term.

The *Tao-hsüeh* controversy of 1182-1183 had a direct impact on the lives of nonofficials, at least in the eyes of one victim in Wu-chou. Although Ch'en Liang had been a student at the imperial university since 1168, he had been unable to pass the metropolitan examinations to become an official and only infrequently went to the university in the capital. Because of their

mutual friendship with Lü Tsu-ch'ien, Chu had called on him early in 1182. During Chu's year in Chekiang, Ch'en had given advice about drought conditions and the competence of particular officials. Although Ch'en's family was related to T'ang Chung-yu's by marriage, T'ang suspected that Ch'en had influenced Chu to issue the indictment. In a letter from 1183, Ch'en actually expressed his dissatisfaction with Chu's handling of the case. Ch'en further complained about Chu's suspicion of his motives and T'ang's slanderous remarks.<sup>5</sup> Not long thereafter, Ch'en was arrested, spent a few months in jail, and was beaten up by a gang after his release. At least as explained by Ch'en in a letter to Chu, these misfortunes had arisen from suspicions that he "had attached himself to *Tao-hsüeh*" officials in an effort to promote himself.<sup>6</sup>

The year in Chekiang and the confrontations there had also aroused Chu Hsi's suspicions about Che-tung intellectuals. Even though he acknowledged that he had enjoyed cordial relations there, Chu lamented: "During those several months, all I heard was compromising on minor points so as to win major issues—a 'theory' of improper toleration and surreptitious cooperation."<sup>7</sup> Here one detects disappointment that intellectuals in Chekiang had not been as steadfast as he expected in supporting his initiatives to purge corrupt officials from local administration. Reading this criticism, one might also remember Chu's warning about Lü Tsu-ch'ien's inclination for accommodation. Now that death had removed the moderating influence of Lü's integrity, Lü's predilection for tolerance had devolved into what Chu saw as a shameful abandonment of ethical standards. In an 1188 memorial, Chu even complained to Emperor Hsiao-tsung about the failure of Chekiang scholars to "distinguish right from wrong."<sup>8</sup> Commenting that same year to his students about his recent experience in Chekiang, Chu painted a picture of two extremes: one group led by Lu Chiu-yüan's student Yang Chien (1141-1226) did not even read books, and others, following Ch'en Liang, were driven to pursue the unconventional.<sup>9</sup>

Convinced that Lü Tsu-ch'ien's former students were now following Ch'en Liang, Chu expressed horror at the rapid spread of Ch'en's ideas. Reflecting on Lü's proclivity for historical studies, Chu professed to see a logical line of evolution from Lü's teachings to Ch'en's utilitarian notions: "While Lü Tsu-ch'ien was in good health, he loved to talk about historical studies—talk that, after his death, became the muddled clamor of a younger generation of scholars. This gang of scoundrels with scurrilous tongues advocate despising kings and honoring hegemony, contemplating advantage and calculating results—which grates on the ears even more!"<sup>10</sup> Chu's frustration from conflicts with Ch'en had thus spilled over into hostility toward his deceased friend.

Tensions with Ch'en Liang and Lu Chiu-yüan became acute during the 1180s, when Chu Hsi confronted what he regarded as their deviations from

the *Tao*. In Chu's view, Ch'en's utilitarian bent manifested itself in the quest for political and social results, and Lu strove for personal enlightenment like Ch'an Buddhists. Chu warned: "Unless we expend maximum effort struggling against and combating them, the *Tao* will have no way to become manifest."<sup>11</sup> Chu's letters to these men were sharper in tone than those written to Lü Tsu-ch'ien and Chang Shih during the previous period. Although junior and generally respectful in addressing Chu, Ch'en and Lu were less accommodating than Lü and Chang had been. Ch'en challenged Chu's perception of the *Tao* as transcending historical change along with Chu's divorcing what was right from what had utility. Lu developed an emphasis on achieving an intuitive oneness of mind to counter Chu's primacy of book-learning and the investigation of things. Lu also directly questioned the objectivity of Chu's authority to define the tradition. All three developed larger audiences in their academies in the 1180s than they had earlier enjoyed. As differences between these three teachers became more manifest, the strain spread to their students and friends.

These tensions affected the evolution of *Tao-hsüeh* as a fellowship. Ch'en complained about how he was being ostracized by Chu's associates and even Lü Tsu-ch'ien's. Writing to Chu in late 1185, he decried the cliquishness of members of the fellowship:

Because their own eyes are only occasionally open, they believe they have a secret art of learning. In small cliques of twos and threes, they whisper into each other's ears as though they are passing along secret information. They demarcate and establish boundaries between themselves and others like ties at the sacrificial altar of a secret society. They completely exclude a generation of men as outside of their school.<sup>12</sup>

To characterize literati as a cult or secret society, Ch'en must have been acutely frustrated by an increasing trend to concentrate on bonding within the fellowship to the exclusion of other Confucians.

Lu Chiu-yüan also developed reservations about the trend to use *Tao-hsüeh* to define a Confucian fellowship. In a comment to his students, he crystallized the problem: "Essentially this *Tao* abides in everyday conduct; instead, recent scholars limit it to one activity, so the name inflates an empty reputation and exceeds reality. This causes people to be uneasy. Therefore, those who use the expression *Tao-hsüeh* are certain to be profoundly rejected and vigorously censured. As soon as this trend prevails, won't it be fearful?"<sup>13</sup> From our historical retrospective, Lu's concerns here appear almost prophetic of the gathering storm.

Despite such warnings, Chu Hsi continued to delimit *Tao-hsüeh* as a positive appellation and to project himself as the authoritative scholar within the tradition. During the second period, a number of his works had dealt with the problem of establishing definitive texts from Northern Sung *Tao-*



*hsüeh* masters. That period of his agenda appears largely complete by 1178, when his scholarship shifted to focus more directly on the Four Books and the *Book of Changes*. In his commentaries, he became more independent and critical of earlier participants in the fellowship in his attempt to understand the sages of the classical era. Thus, after Chu settled to his own satisfaction the composition of the beginnings of the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition, he turned his attention to establishing an interpretation of the classics as the textual authority for the fellowship. Suggesting this general pattern is not meant to imply that these two stages were mutually exclusive, however.

Although he had coined the term eight years earlier, Chu began in 1189 propagating the term *tao-t'ung* (succession to, or tradition of, the *Tao*).<sup>14</sup> He and others had been speaking of the transmission of the *Tao* for over a century, but the creation of a specific term for this transmission was to prove significant. Thrice using the new term in his preface to his commentary on the *Doctrine of the Mean*, he claimed that it was the concern of Confucius' grandson, Tzu-ssu, about a possible loss of the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition that led to writing down these teachings so later generations would have a text from which they might discover the *Tao*. In that preface and in the one to the *Great Learning* written the month before, Chu set forth the order of the succession in antiquity and centered attention unmistakably on the Ch'engs as the most crucial figures in the restoration of the tradition of the *Tao*. By writing commentaries on these two works and defining the succession down to his mentors, Chu was also implicitly claiming to have inherited the mantle to lead the fellowship.

Chu more explicitly proclaimed in 1194 that he had come into contact with the "conveyance of the *Tao*." Referring to the *tao-t'ung* and its major members in antiquity and the Sung, he said that Shao Yung, Chang Tsai, and Ssu-ma Kuang shared the same *Tao* as Chou and the Ch'engs. He arranged tablets for Shao, Chang, Ssu-ma and Li T'ung along with tablets for Chou, the Ch'engs and Chang to accompany those for Confucius, Yen Hui, Tseng-tzu, and Mencius at the shrine in a recently completed school in Ch'ang-chou. By including his own immediate teacher, Li T'ung, Chu was suggesting that he had personal contact with the conveyance of the *Tao*.<sup>15</sup>

With a specific conceptual term for the transmission of the *Tao*, Chu's articulation of the idea was complete and more easily communicated. More than anything else, it was Chu's commentaries to the *Great Learning* and the *Doctrine of the Mean* that put his individual and distinctive stamp on Confucianism.<sup>16</sup>

The scholarship that Chu Hsi produced during his years in retirement augmented his reputation, and he was prevailed upon to accept a summons that led in 1188 to his third audience with Hsiao-tsung. By this time Wang Huai had been dismissed, and officials like Chou Pi-ta, who had closer ties to Chu, held influential positions in the capital. As a result of the audience,

Chu was appointed to the Ministry of War, but he declined again, citing a foot ailment. Continued reluctance to serve made him vulnerable to censure: as Chu himself acknowledged to Hsiao-tsung, "people point to me as a *Tao-hsüeh* man and heap upon me the crime of making a special effort to be superior."<sup>17</sup>

Chu Hsi's complaint about characterizations of *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians was prompted by an assault that had been mounted by Lin Li (1142 *chin-shih*), a senior official at the Ministry of War. Lin had severely criticized Chu Hsi for refusing the emperor's call to public service, but the thrust of the attack was directed against *Tao-hsüeh*. Earlier the two scholars had disagreed over interpretations of the *Book of Changes* and Chou Tun-i's "Western Inscription." Lin resented Chu's emphasis on Ch'eng I and Chang Tsai as well as his efforts to establish *Tao-hsüeh* as a privileged tradition and group. Lin charged: "Hsi fundamentally has no learning of his own. Instead, in an effort to promote himself irresponsibly, he hangs onto Chang Tsai and Ch'eng I, whom he takes as vaunted authorities, and calls this *Tao-hsüeh*."<sup>18</sup> Lin's was the most biting attack on the fellowship to date; he also repeated earlier charges of cliquishness, pretentiousness, and strange behavior.

Among those who defended Chu Hsi, Yeh Shih (1150-1223) addressed the issue of *Tao-hsüeh*. Yeh explained: "As for [Lin Li's] statement against *Tao-hsüeh*, it is groundless to the extreme. Those associated with [*Tao-hsüeh*'s] benefits and ills are not limited to Chu Hsi alone; therefore, your humble servant must vigorously refute [Lin]."<sup>19</sup> According to Yeh, *Tao-hsüeh* was broader than Chu Hsi, for many officials who sought to effect improvements in administration were associated with it. Some officials in high positions with interests to protect had launched an offensive against the faults of *Tao-hsüeh*. Yeh was most concerned with the inherent danger that such slanderous attacks would stifle discussion and arouse factional suppression of intellectuals. Because he was a leading advocate of Che-tung ideas about institutions and practical governance, it was significant that Yeh defended Chu and continued to identify *Tao-hsüeh* as a fellowship of scholars and officials much larger than Chu Hsi's immediate circle. Implicitly, Yeh was thus also rejecting Chu's efforts to restrict the parameters of *Tao-hsüeh*. Without resolving the controversy, Hsiao-tsung merely pronounced Lin Li's criticisms to be excessive, rather than groundless as Yeh had suggested, and demoted Lin to a prefectural post.

After Hsiao-tsung abdicated, officials associated with the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship became more embroiled in court politics and the affairs of the imperial family. While Kuang-tsung reigned (1189-1194), several of them were dismissed because of criticisms expressed about matters involving the imperial family. When it became apparent that tensions within the imperial family had violated Confucian expectations about filial piety and decorum, they

wrote memorials urging Kuang-tsung to pay regular courtesy calls on the retired emperor.

As one response to such criticism, Kuang-tsung elevated the *chin-shih* examination essay of Ch'en Liang to first place. Expressing frustration that obsession with decorum was distracting officials from practical problems, Ch'en suggested that Kuang-tsung's attention to state affairs was a higher expression of filial piety than making regular calls on the retired emperor. Ch'en further characterized the contemporary predicament:

In the past twenty years—with the flourishing of the school specializing in the *Tao*, virtue, human nature, and destiny—literary and administrative affairs have almost been completely ignored. This school's views are biased, and those scholars with a determination to act have evidently become frustrated and bitter about it. During the past ten years, people have risen in groups to stop and repress it; however, they have not yet been able to straighten out its biases or to expunge its falsity.<sup>20</sup>

Although expressing his empathy with those who had attacked *Tao-hsüeh*, Ch'en went on to caution that any suppression would exclude talented men whom the government needed. Thus he called for a more open polity in which people with different intellectual orientations could serve. Unfortunately, tensions were soon further exacerbated by another crisis at court.

When Hsiao-tsung died in 1194, Kuang-tsung declined on the pretext of ill health to assume his obligations to lead mourning observances. Scandalized by this breach of filial piety and decorum, many members of the fellowship wrote memorials, and Chu Hsi resigned his recently assumed post in protest. Yeh Shih and Liu Cheng (1129-1206) managed to have the heir apparent formally designated as the crown prince. Chao Ju-yü (1140-1196), a member of a junior branch of the imperial family, and Han T'o-chou (1152-1207), a relative of two empresses, cooperated in getting a decree from the empress dowager ordering Kuang-tsung to abdicate the throne to the prince. After Ning-tsung's (r. 1194-1224) ascension, the alliance between these two architects of the succession soon collapsed into a bitter feud.

Liu Cheng and Chao Ju-yü temporarily had the upper hand and recommended government positions be given to Chu Hsi and other fellowship members. Even before Chu arrived at the capital, Liu was demoted to a provincial post. Liu's demotion demonstrated the power of court favorites and relatives, and Chu wrote memorials warning Ning-tsung about falling under their influence. Because Han T'o-chou was an uncle of the new empress and in conflict with Liu and Chao, Chu's memorials were assumed to be directed against Han personally. Through Chao's recommendations, however, Chu was appointed as academician and lecturer. For about forty-six days in the autumn of 1194, Chu served at court and lectured the emperor on a number of occasions, during which he issued some additional

warnings about unscrupulous favorites surrounding the throne. He also made pronouncements about proper mourning rites and burial plans for Hsiao-tsung. Ning-tsung became weary of Chu's moralistic advice and accepted Chu's request to retire. When Han finally finessed the exiling of Chao early in 1195, like-minded officials and intellectuals as well as some university students again submitted dissenting memorials.<sup>21</sup>

Han T'o-chou and his accomplices could point to patterns evident in recommendations and memorials to build the case that Chao and Liu headed a faction with members from the fellowship. Given their role in effecting a change of the throne and their demands about behavioral standards for the imperial family, *Tao-hsüeh* fellows were easily portrayed as a danger to the dynasty. Through a series of petitions to the throne, their enemies managed in 1195 to get an imperial proscription against *Tao-hsüeh*, and candidates for the examinations had to make a sworn statement disclaiming any connection to this group. Finally in 1197, a blacklist specified fifty-nine members of this faction. The names of four high ministers headed the list. Chu's name was at the top of sixteen academicians; below there was a longer list of other civil and military officials. Many were better known as scholars than as officials. Six students from the university and two intellectuals had no official status at all.

The men on the list had diverse intellectual orientations, but a pattern is evident. Among major groupings, there were several Che-tung thinkers from each of several branches centered around Lü Tsu-chien, Yeh Shih, and Ch'en Fu-liang. Indeed, Che-tung utilitarians represented the primary target in terms of the number of persons listed. The son and two disciples of Wang Ying-ch'en were listed and also one person whose intellectual pedigree went back to a disciple of Ssu-ma Kuang. Lu Chiu-yüan's disciples Yang Chien and Yüan Hsieh (1144-1224) were included too.<sup>22</sup> Renowned *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians of the era, such as Lu Chiu-yüan and Yu Mao, who were omitted from the list had one thing in common: they had died before the factional crisis of 1194-1195. The omission of Huang Kan (1159-1221) was an exception. After Huang later became more conspicuous as Chu's chosen successor in 1200, Han T'o-chou treated him as a major figure in the group. Given the political component of the struggle of the 1190s, it should not be surprising that Han listed fewer of Chu's students than those of the politically more active Chekiang branch of the fellowship. Besides his role in court politics, Yeh Shih had already in 1195 been prominent among those condemned for being of "the same sort" as Chu and for "adopting *Tao-hsüeh* as their own label."<sup>23</sup>

Tracing the intellectual lineages of the diverse individuals on this blacklist, one would come back ultimately to the Ch'eng brothers *and also* most of their associates—except the Su brothers—in the conservative Yüan-yu party. They represented the same spectrum of thought as had long been

operative within the rubric of *Tao-hsüeh* Confucianism. The intellectual diversity of the list provides further evidence for the continuity of a broad view of this fellowship throughout the twelfth century. Despite such diversity, affinities among *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians apparently had not escaped the notice of their enemies.

Political events also encouraged cohesion among those associated with the fellowship. Conflicts with more conventional Confucians at court gave them reason to set aside philosophical differences and close ranks. Frustrations over the continued power of court favorites had since the 1170s provided one impetus for working together, but such political considerations had not prevented the bitter controversies within the fellowship during the 1180s. The crisis of the 1190s, however, did necessitate greater cohesion and reconciliation between various circles of the fellowship. Concerned about filial piety in the imperial family and dismissals of critics during the first half of the 1190s, almost everyone on the blacklist had sent similar dissenting memorials. Mounting political pressures also encouraged them to seek common ground.

Even Chu Hsi showed signs after 1194 of encouraging bonding within the larger fellowship, despite his efforts since the 1160s to exclude those with adulterated ideas from the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition. At his Bamboo Grove Study (Chu-lin ching-she, built in 1194), he included Ssu-ma Kuang among the seven masters to whom he and his students paid homage every morning. Perhaps the naming of this study after bamboo—a symbol of strength and flexibility under pressure—reflected an intent to moderate his intense and intolerant temperament, flaws which he had earlier acknowledged to Chang Shih. The symbolism of the bamboo grove contrasted sharply with the name of his school from 1183 to 1194, Study on Wu-i Mountain (Wu-i ching-she), for *Wu* meant martial, and *i* denoted pacification by force. Adopting the name of the mountain for his own study thus appears to be more than a mere coincidence. It was during his Wu-i years that Chu attacked his intellectual rivals most bitterly. Compared with earlier and later periods, he appears to have viewed the fellowship and tradition more narrowly during those years. The Bamboo Grove Study of 1194 was surrounded by water like Lü's school in Chin-hua, rather than fixed upon a rigid mountain like Wu-i. In contrast to his publications during the 1170s and 1180s, Chu's scholarship after the early 1190s also branched out to encompass a wider vista of the Six Classics, rites, and even literary works. By early 1194, death had removed his two principal challengers. Significantly, Lu Chiu-yüan and Ch'en Liang were the two major late twelfth-century Confucians who had expressed most reservations about the use of the *Tao-hsüeh* label. With these two arch rivals out of the picture, Chu could afford to lessen the intensity of his criticisms against some other Confucians.

With the passing of several thinkers during the mid-1190s, Chu Hsi

became increasingly senior in Confucian scholarly circles. Lü Tsu-ch'ien's younger brother died in 1196 from hardships of exile. Several secondary thinkers, particularly Ts'ai Yüan-ting and Shu Lin (1136-1199) also preceded Chu in death. By the time Chu died in 1200, almost all notable Confucian thinkers were two or more decades younger than he. Of the three exceptions, Ch'en Fu-liang, seven years his junior, survived him by only three years. Yang Chien and Yüan Hsieh were eleven or more years his junior, and these two disciples of Lu Chiu-yüan lived until the mid-1220s. In a Confucian world that honored elders, Chu's longevity served to strengthen his influence on younger scholars during the third period of the development of the *Tao-hsüeh* Confucian fellowship. This special status as senior intellectual within the *Tao-hsüeh* community also encouraged a greater sense of unity around an authority center than had been present in the two earlier and more diverse periods.

Chu Hsi's senior status among Confucian thinkers in the 1190s probably contributed to the discrepancy between the attacks on him and the punishments decreed during the ban against *Tao-hsüeh*. In his late sixties, during the proscription, his enemies at court probably feared a backlash if they inflicted physical harm. After all, he had already withdrawn into retirement and ceased to memorialize the throne, so they simply sent him an imperial order to refrain from teaching. Exiling his friend Ts'ai Yüan-ting was an easier way to cause him pain without making him a martyr. Chu had made Ts'ai quite vulnerable to attack, for it was reportedly his faith in Ts'ai's geomancy that had led him to submit a memorial protesting the location that had been selected for Hsiao-tsung's tomb.<sup>24</sup> Whether or not he saw himself as a factor in Ts'ai's misfortune, Chu did travel to intercept Ts'ai and his escorts in order to bid him an affectionate farewell.

Yet it was important to discredit Chu Hsi and his associates both as persons and as Confucians. Chu's alleged crimes included disloyalty, disrespect for the emperor, lack of filial piety, and sexual relations with two Buddhist nuns.<sup>25</sup> Besides such ad hominem slander, opponents accused *Tao-hsüeh* partisans of using secret codes to recognize and pass one another in the civil service examinations. Their enemies at court revived earlier charges relating to their narrow approach to learning and pretense of virtue. Their attackers also resented their claims of linkage to the Yüan-yü party list of proscribed conservatives during the restored-reform period of the late Northern Sung. Against such an array of evils, merely repeating earlier caricatures of *Tao-hsüeh* fellows no longer seemed sufficient. Therefore, their opponents used the label "false learning" (*wei-hsüeh*) to draw attention to their alleged falsity and hypocrisy. As during the attacks of the 1130s, their enemies advocated returning to the original teachings of Confucius and discarding the distorted opinions of private scholars of recent years.<sup>26</sup> Little is known about the thought of these antagonists, who have generally been dismissed as hav-

ing simply been anti-intellectual. However, recent work on the Kao family of Ming-chou suggests the integrity of Kao Wen-hu's (1134-1212) historical studies.<sup>27</sup> Another recent study of Chou Mi also points out the need to take his and his forefathers' criticisms of *Tao-hsüeh* seriously.<sup>28</sup> Future research may reconstruct additional traces of the intellectual orientations of those who attacked the fellowship. In any event, complaints voiced by the attackers in their memorials centered not only on *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians' inherent claims to superiority and doctrinal orthodoxy but also on their exclusionary grouping, with its potential to influence polity and policy. Even in an environment of such hostility, the ban against the fellowship gradually lost its momentum and was finally lifted early in 1202.

## Chapter 6 *Ch'en Liang*

Ch'en Liang's life and thought highlight the shift that took place in the intellectual climate in Wu-chou during the third period of *Tao-hsüeh's* evolution. This shift is best reflected in Ch'en Liang, because he was an active participant in both the second and third periods, and he expressed his inner frustrations so graphically. He started participating in the group in the 1160s, began realizing his incompatibility with it in the late 1170s, and then became a critic of the fellowship in the 1180s. His recorded reactions not only provide a vista on the evolving fellowship, but also suggest why some literati responded to it either positively or negatively.

Ch'en Liang was born in 1143 into a family that was marginally in the literati class.<sup>1</sup> Although the family claimed to hail from the Ch'ens of Yung-k'ang, Wu-chou, who had been officials during earlier dynasties, the family had ceased to produce officials before the end of the T'ang dynasty and its status had declined. The financial situation of his family had, according to Ch'en Liang, improved during the eleventh century. But the family's fortunes plummeted along with the dynasty's during the Jurchen invasions. The invaders killed Ch'en Liang's great-grandfather in a battle in the 1120s. Great-grandfather Ch'en had made a marriage alliance with the locally prominent Huang family, which provided the next two generations with spouses and kept the aspirations of the family alive. After the loss of this strong head of household, the family soon lost 200 *mou* (totaling about 28 acres) of rice fields, which represented most of its material resources. The new family head (Ch'en I, 1103-1167), at the age of twenty-four, had great



difficulty managing family affairs while preparing to serve his country. He tried without success to pass first the civil and then the military examinations. Having sat for the examinations and still obsessed with national affairs, Ch'en I had little interest in returning his attention to agricultural work. He became increasingly frustrated, and he drank heavily. When his only son likewise failed to gain distinction in the examinations, the son apparently was relegated to managing what remained of the family's land. Financial problems figured prominently in the decision in 1160 to give the family's third grandson to another family for adoption. Despite the distance of Yung-k'ang from the contested northern border, the invasions had negatively affected the family's rising expectations. Revenge against the Jurchen was a more important theme within this family and in Ch'en Liang's writings than it was for most of his contemporaries.

Ch'en I was the dominant influence on his grandson until Ch'en Liang reached his mid-twenties. The man who as a youth had been compelled by his father's death to assume responsibility for the household sought to cultivate a strong personality in his grandson by encouraging emulation of personalities like Li Po (701-762). The T'ang poetic genius was popularly viewed as a drunken nonconformist, but Ch'en Liang as a teenager composed a song praising the poet's unrestrained mind and unbridled personality. Ch'en I turned to his eldest grandson for vicarious fulfillment of his dreams for official degrees and status. Because of his father's military experience and his own efforts to pass the military examinations, the grandfather talked at length with Ch'en Liang about military strategy. Based on such tutoring about history and strategy, Ch'en Liang as a teenager wrote his first major work, *An Inquiry into History* (*Cho-ku lun*).

This work by Ch'en Liang on geopolitical strategy analyzed historical situations in terms of military principles. Rejecting the practice in recent centuries of separating civil and martial expertise, Ch'en argued for a unity of command. Such separation had encouraged civil officials to become effete and military officials to concentrate merely on the details of military training. To achieve success, mental and martial talents had to be combined to produce grand strategies. Instead of depending on cosmic forces of the Mandate of Heaven, leaders should realize that human planning determined the outcome of battles and conflicts between states. Lü Tsu-ch'ien had similar ideas, but Ch'en apparently went further than Lü in embracing the realpolitik of warfare. Specifically, Ch'en endorsed deception, ambushes, and other surprise tactics that had been elaborated in Sun-tzu's *Art of War* (*Sun-tzu ping-fa*). Ch'en similarly emphasized knowing one's own and one's opponent's actual situations, so that one could employ all factors of terrain, situation, and psychology to gain the advantage.<sup>2</sup> Ch'en applied such principles of strategy to actual historical cases from the Han and Three Kingdoms periods, most notably involving Chu-ko Liang.

Soon after writing this study, Ch'en ranked higher than Lü Tsu-ch'ien in an "avoidance examination," and the two became close friends. This circuit-level examination allowed relatives of officials to bypass the regular prefectural examinations; moreover, compared with the regular examinations during the Southern Sung, a much higher percentage of those who sat for this special examination passed.<sup>3</sup> Although Lü belonged to a family that qualified for the privilege of taking the special examination, one must assume that Ch'en managed to enter the examination only through the status of someone in his mother's natal family. Lü went on to the capital the following year to excel in both the *chin-shih* and the Erudite Literatus examinations. Not as free to ignore immediate economic opportunities, Ch'en went to the capital as a private secretary; hence, his progress in the examinations was interrupted.

Ch'en's *Inquiry into History* had come to the attention of Chou K'uei (1098-1174), who expressed confidence that Ch'en would someday be a national leader and hired him as a personal secretary. Called to the capital in 1162, Chou served until the end of 1164 in a series of positions, including vice-president of the Bureau of Military Affairs. Through Chou's post and his praise of his young secretary at court, Ch'en imbibed the crisis atmosphere of the second Chin war. Chu Hsi, Lü Tsu-ch'ien, and Chang Shih were also in the capital, but Ch'en did not meet Chu and Chang at this time. On account of his relative youth, personality, and family preoccupation with military strategy, Ch'en also seems to have been affected more profoundly than the others by the experience of the second Chin war. Military problems continued to dominate his thinking much more than they did these three elder contemporaries. After Hsiao-tsung opted for peace and Chou retired, Ch'en returned home in 1165.

During the next four years, Ch'en Liang's fortunes varied widely. While in the capital, Ch'en had impressed Ho Ch'üeh (d. 1172), a member of a notable Chekiang family with mercantile wealth. In spite of initial reluctance from the Ho clan, he arranged for his niece to marry Ch'en. Hence the Ch'ens continued to show enough promise to secure favorable marriage alliances. Not long after the wedding, Ch'en's mother died. The following year, his father was arrested. The family's servant had beaten another man to death, and the victim's family held Ch'en's father responsible. Because of tensions and hardships during his father's two years in jail, Ch'en's brother left home, and his grandparents died. Only intervention by an official in the capital ended the father's incarceration in 1168. Later that year, Ch'en passed first in the prefectural examinations and thus qualified as a student with stipend in the imperial university.

On achieving this distinction, Ch'en changed his personal name from Jun-*ng* to Liang, as though aware that his life was entering a new phase. Taking his new personal name from Chu-ko Liang did signal a continuation of

his military and political concerns, but also suggested greater attention to the intellectual component of becoming a "Confucian general." During this new phase Ch'en was to concentrate more on his studies and to become more conversant with teachers and principles of *Tao-hsüeh*. Under Chou K'uei's influence, Ch'en Liang had already begun serious study of topics and texts important to the fellowship. Chou had admonished Ch'en to study the *Doctrine of the Mean* and the *Great Learning* in order to understand human nature and destiny. In preparing for the prefectural examination, Ch'en also studied with Cheng Po-hsiung, the local scholar who had taught about the Ch'engs and Chang Tsai even during the period of Ch'in Kuei's dominance. At the university, Ch'en's first principal mentor was Jui Yeh, a man with close ties to Lü Tsu-ch'ien and noted for his self-cultivation. Although Ch'en became more of a friend than a student of these two professors, they did have an impact on him. After Jui and Chou died in the early 1170s, Lü remained until 1181 the contemporary with the most influence on Ch'en.

Despite his devotion to study under the guidance of these scholars, Ch'en still did not succeed in climbing the examination ladder; moreover, the resulting frustrations had a bearing on his thinking. Shortly after changing his personal name to Liang and going to the imperial university, he failed the 1169 metropolitan examination. Then he addressed a memorial to the emperor. When Hsiao-tsung took no apparent notice of the "Discourses on Restoration" (*Chung-hsing lun*), Ch'en responded to the disappointment with renewed commitment to study and self-cultivation. One wonders why he did not sit for the 1172 examinations in which his friend Lü Tsu-ch'ien passed so many *Tao-hsüeh* men. After almost a decade of study at home, he returned for the 1177 examinations but failed again. In the wake of this failure to pass, he again submitted memorials addressing the issues of the day, especially the question of war to liberate North China and restore the reign of the Sung there. Besides expressing his commitment to such goals, he hoped to circumvent the standard examination route and win direct appointment to office. Alas, his hopes were not fulfilled. These attempts in the examination halls and the emperor's court provided a catalyst for altering some of the basic orientations in his thinking. In the case of the 1178 memorials, he coined a new personal name, T'ung, to evade regulations against students submitting memorials to the emperor. Using a new name to circumvent regulations was rather fraudulent. This name became the basis for the courtesy name, T'ung-fu, by which others referred to him, but he continued to refer to himself as Liang. Conveniently, his three names roughly mark three periods of his thought: 1143-1168 as Ju-neng; 1168-1178 as Liang; and 1178-1194 as T'ung-fu.

In the late 1170s, Ch'en Liang wrote a postface to his "Discourses on Restoration" in which he analyzed his changing feelings and decisions. Rereading the essays after the lapse of ten years, Ch'en felt such distance that it

"seemed as though a generation had passed." Tracing his thoughts back further in his youth, he recounted his fascination with military heroes and his resentment that conventional laudatory and derogatory accounts were exaggerated. Studying their exploits stirred his emotions and aroused ambitions to such intensity that he was unable to be at peace with himself. While beset by such thoughts, he was persuaded by an exhortation written by a major figure in the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition:

One day I read in Yang Shih's *Recorded Conversations* the passage: "Only after the capacity for tranquility is achieved can one take effective action. A person with talent and brilliance, but without the discipline to study, will never attain this tranquility." Thereupon, my thoughts were suddenly engrossed. I had submitted these essays, but without meeting any response. I decided to isolate myself in my study, where I passed the next decade.<sup>4</sup>

What did he study during these ten years?

Writings of principal *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians and the classics were major sources of Ch'en's study during this period. As he later remarked, he had studied the writings of Chang Shih, Lü Tsu-ch'ien, and Chu Hsi because they emerged during the 1160s and 1170s as the leading scholars.<sup>5</sup> During the early 1170s, Ch'en wrote postfaces for and published editions of several works by early *Tao-hsüeh* masters, especially Chang Tsai and Ch'eng I. These men represented the same two primary strains that Lü Tsu-ch'ien was synthesizing; moreover, both Ch'en and Lü gave special attention to their discussions of institutions. As Lü observed, Ch'en's purpose was to direct attention to the function of institutions rather than to more abstract philosophizing about essence: "If there is essence without function, that which is called essence will, without doubt, be confused and crude."<sup>6</sup> Ch'en consistently concentrated his discussion on cultural values and commentary on institutions, and rarely ventured into more abstract speculation about primary principles.

In a postface about the transmission of the *Tao*, Ch'en even placed Chang Tsai between Chou Tun-i and the Ch'engs. Although he honored Chou for opening the way to the retransmission, he also placed Chang in the position of passing down concepts to the Ch'engs. Elevating Chang before the Ch'engs was the major point of similarity with the *Writings by Various Confucians for Propagating the Tao* as well as the point of difference between Ch'en's presentation and Chu Hsi's. Yet Ch'en's comments during the early 1170s on early *Tao-hsüeh* texts were so similar to Chu's views that one of Ch'en's writings has been mistaken for Chu's and continues to be published in Chu's collected works. This was Ch'en's 1173 preface to a study on comments by Chang, Chou, and Ch'eng I on governmental affairs.<sup>7</sup> During the early 1170s, he also wrote essays on the *Book of Documents*, the *Book of*

*Poetry*, the *Rituals of Chou*, the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, the *Book of Rites*, the *Analects*, the *Mencius*, and the *Book of Changes*. Quoting passages from several of these classics on the importance of disciplined cultivation, Ch'en confided to a childhood friend that after his personal debacle in the capital, he was inclined away from examinations and government service, but toward spiritual self-cultivation.<sup>8</sup>

The distinctive character of the second phase of Ch'en's development is more evident in these essays on the classics than in his postfaces to *Tao-hsüeh* texts. Sounding more like the *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians than his own later mature thought, Ch'en here voiced confidence in absolute principles and motive-centered ethics as well as hostility to the utilitarian quest for results. "Utilitarian" refers to an orientation toward maximizing results and judging value on the basis of the results achieved. Writing on the *Mencius*, Ch'en portrayed antiquity as an ideal age of harmony among people in contrast to the degeneration into utilitarian calculation and mutual struggle after the Chou dynasty began to decline. After the decline of the golden age of the Three Dynasties, Ch'en claimed: "The people were moved to judge according to advantage or disadvantage; calculation arose within their hearts and minds, and this scheming was carried out in their actions. At first, they calculated merely what would meet their convenience, but they finally ended in rapaciousness and murder—poisons reaching everywhere and unceasing."<sup>9</sup> Seeking to restore harmony and order, Mencius made rigid distinctions between integrity and advantage in order to rectify hearts and minds that had become twisted by calculating advantages and results.

Continuing these themes in his essay on the *Rituals of Chou*, Ch'en proclaimed that the Duke of Chou had in this classic preserved the governmental principles used during the golden age of the Three Dynasties of early antiquity. These principles were the complete *Tao* for public affairs. Knowable even despite the flux of later history, these principles could never be exhausted or outdated by the passage of time. Abandoning these principles, almost all rulers of later dynasties had focused so narrowly on "utilitarian and short-sighted policies" that the existence of the human order continued as if only by the thinnest of threads.<sup>10</sup> Despite the lapse of over fourteen centuries since the demise of the Chou house and the loss of part of the original *Rituals*, Ch'en expressed confidence that these principles could be implemented again, because Heaven had not forsaken them. Elsewhere, referring to Wang An-shih's use of the *Rituals of Chou*, Ch'en claimed that Wang had championed these ancient ideals merely "to embellish hegemonic and utilitarian ideas."<sup>11</sup> Like many *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians, Ch'en here associated utilitarian ethics with hegemonic methods and Wang's discredited reforms.

This bent toward Mencian motivational ethics and against utilitarian ethics also pervaded Ch'en's historical writing during the mid-1170s. In his five

chapters of essays on the Han dynasty, Ch'en frequently drew attention to the importance of concentrating the mind-and-heart on virtue. The mind of the ruler was the foundation of all government, and the degree of purity of the ruler's motive and virtue determined the quality of the whole government. Because concentrating the mind through introspection was so fundamental, the sage kings of early antiquity had merely admonished their successors to be discriminating and undivided. Although such advice might appear naive, Ch'en insisted that the way to govern did not transcend the principles inherent within such moralistic admonitions. Rulers' hearts and minds so determined the essence of their governments that historical study of their reigns should focus more on their minds than upon their deeds. Otherwise, historians would not only misconstrue the inner reality of relatively successful emperors but also overlook the emptiness and flaws underneath laws and institutions. One of Ch'en's chief negative examples was the conventional villain Ch'in Shih-huang-ti (r. 247-210 B.C.). More than the ruthlessness of Ch'in laws, Ch'en emphasized the flaw of being distracted from virtue by considerations of advantage and utility. Linking utilitarian concerns for results with harsh government, Ch'en asked rhetorically: "How could there be any other reason for the collapse of Ch'in tyranny except that the hearts and minds of the Ch'in founder and his officials were obsessed with the utilitarian and considered ethical training unimportant?"<sup>12</sup> He also portrayed this Ch'in ruler as vainly attempting to use human effort rather than Heaven's principles. Ch'en even pronounced an inverse relationship in which "the more one utilizes human effort, the more devoid of Heaven's principle one becomes."<sup>13</sup>

Even in these expositions of ethics, Ch'en maintained his passion for revenge to assuage the humiliation the Sung had suffered at the hands of foreign invaders. In his Han essays, he condemned Han Ching-ti (r. 157-141 B.C.) for sending a princess to marry a Hsiung-nu chieftain. Raving emotionally that barbarians were less than human, Ch'en asked rhetorically: How did this Han princess feel about losing her chastity to a "cur"? How could China stand such bitter humiliation? Although he otherwise demeaned the activist government of Han Wu-ti, he praised Emperor Wu's offensive warfare against the Hsiung-nu.

The issue of war and restoration sustained Ch'en's practical approach to national affairs even through his *Tao-hsüeh* phase, when he was hostile toward utilitarianism. In his essays on the Han dynasty, he paid as much attention to pragmatic skills in dealing with people as he did to Confucian ethical values. Although he acknowledged that Han rulers had not reached the standards set by the sage-kings of the Three Dynasties, he implicitly wrote about them to provide models or lessons for his own day. Furthermore, his essays on the classics emphasized establishing institutions accord-

ing to the times. He also characterized the *Tao* of Confucius as loyalty and reciprocity in contrast to abstract subterfuges for avoiding practical problems.

Ch'en's intellectual orientation had begun to show definite signs of change by the time he returned to the university in 1177 to sit for the metropolitan examinations. Earlier, he had written more conventional essays praising Chang Liang (d. 168 B.C.), Chia I (203-169 B.C.), Chu-ko Liang, and Wei Cheng (580-643) as capable advisors to their rulers. Reacting to suspicions about the purity of their Confucianism, he now addressed the question of why they had engaged in deviant or adulterated learning. He emotionally defended their operating principles as essentially Confucian. Of exceptional intelligence and ability, they had perceived the need to borrow from more practical sources of political wisdom for solutions to pressing problems of government. If the Confucian *Tao* were not fragmented and the classics not partially lost, these heroic and loyal statesmen would not have found it necessary to go beyond the confines of Confucianism for some of their ideas and policies.<sup>14</sup> Keeping in mind that he had taken his personal name in extraordinary self-identification with Chu-ko Liang, Ch'en seems here to be suggesting that, like his heroes, he was being driven by the crises of the day to supplement Confucianism with more pragmatic wisdom. When he failed the examinations a second time, he voiced a bitter complaint that the chief examiner was a petty fellow with no ability to judge talent. The example of these statesmen from earlier dynasties must have encouraged Ch'en, for they owed their positions not to degrees earned in examination halls but to rulers willing to listen to talented men with practical advice.

Reflecting in his 1178 postface to "Discourses on Restoration," Ch'en observed that even a decade of spiritual cultivation and study had not transformed his temperament because his unfulfilled ambitions still permitted no tranquility. Without a government position by which to fulfill his ambitions, he professed to being useless.<sup>15</sup> Having failed the examinations a second time, Ch'en again became so frustrated that he boldly petitioned for access to the emperor. Submitting three memorials within one month, he not only set forth military strategy for liberating the North, but also poured out his feelings before Hsiao-tsung in an unabashed plea to participate in such national planning. Outlining part of his vision for defeating the Jurchen, he insisted on awaiting a personal interview with the emperor before detailing solutions to the dynasty's problems.

The memorials aroused the emperor's interest in employing Ch'en. After reading the first memorial, Hsiao-tsung had it posted at court and alluded to a precedent for appointing someone lacking proper degrees. Taking this cue, one of the emperor's favorite court advisors, Tseng Ti (1109-1180), sent an envoy to arrange a meeting with Ch'en. Ch'en apparently shared Chu's disdain for this court favorite. And at least as intolerant as Chu of

being politic or shrewdly tactful, Ch'en refused even to meet the envoy. Because of this rebuff and the harsh comments in his memorials, court officials persuaded the emperor against extending Ch'en a personal audience before having him interviewed. Again refusing to answer questions through intermediaries, Ch'en pleaded in a third memorial for direct talks with the emperor. Impressed, Hsiao-tsung ordered that Ch'en was to be given a post. Scoffing at the offered post, Ch'en retorted: "What I want to do is to establish the foundations of the state for several hundred years; how could I use this to barter for an ordinary office!"<sup>16</sup> Given Ch'en's lack of official status and a surplus of qualified degree holders, the emperor had certainly been very generous. Moreover, Ch'en's contempt for the post makes it appear that he was just venting his emotions and seeking to make a name for himself. Unless of course, he was indeed just this confident in his ability to be another Chu-ko Liang and to set forth viable plans for the liberation of the North.

That Ch'en was just this serious about emulating Chu-ko Liang's model of dedicated service is suggested by the depth of his disappointment and despair. Leaving the capital in disgust, he returned home and turned to wine for solace about his shattered ambitions. So drunk did he become at a brothel that he began treating one of the prostitutes with the decorum due an imperial consort. Egged on by another brothel patron, Ch'en acted out imagined life in the imperial palace, and in homage to one of his students, he chanted, "Long live the emperor!" The devious patron reported the incident to the vice-president of the Board of Punishments, Ho Tan (d. after 1209), the examiner who Ch'en had insulted in 1177. Settling a personal score, Ho had Ch'en arrested and beaten until he confessed a deliberate degradation of the royal family. The emperor, after delegating an envoy to investigate, graciously dismissed the indictment on the grounds that Ch'en had been drunk.<sup>17</sup> Such imperial intervention to dismiss charges of lese majesty demonstrates just how impressed the emperor must have been with the 1178 memorials. Ch'en's memorials to Hsiao-tsung have remained, along with some of his letters to Chu Hsi, the most famous of his writings. Probably representative of reactions among his contemporaries, Lü Tsu-ch'ien was appalled by Ch'en's contemptuous statements to and about officials in the capital in 1177 and 1178. Their friendship and personal association also drove Lü to write letters admonishing Ch'en about the danger of such unconventional behavior and statements.

Answering Lü Tsu-ch'ien's admonitions, Ch'en defended his brash attempt to win a policy-planning position in 1178. Ch'en proclaimed that he was simply striving to do what his superiors, those with degrees and status, should have been doing to solve national problems. Boldly drawing a parallel to Confucius and Mencius, Ch'en noted that their offers to serve had been rejected by officials of their day. Although they surely knew that they



could not succeed, they had to speak out, because they, too, had taken responsibility for the *Tao*.<sup>18</sup> After pondering his experience more deeply, Ch'en wrote another letter to Lü that graphically portrayed the rampant swings of his emotions in the wake of failing to gain either degree or office. Reflecting on his raging passions, he concluded: "I am now convinced, only if a person is already a sage can he succeed at the task of mastering himself or attain the ideal equilibrium between the emotions of glee and anger, sorrow and joy."<sup>19</sup> This rejection of self-cultivation in the quest for sagehood marked a significant departure from *Tao-hsüeh* Confucianism. It also echoed the denunciation in his 1178 memorials of those literati who babbled about human nature and destiny while seeking to rectify their minds and make their wills sincere. Such pedants were superficial and impractical, for they had nothing to contribute to the pressing need to liberate the North from the enemy.

Given the seriousness of the case of lese majesty, Ch'en was chastened enough to heed Lü's admonitions for a while. Satisfied with Ch'en's progress, Lü reported in a letter to Chu Hsi: "Ch'en Liang in the past year or two has been acutely conscious of his former errors; he has the determination to study and his mind is open to advice."<sup>20</sup> Although Lü might have been overly optimistic in this evaluation, Ch'en had been shaken enough by his experiences that he did not develop the new orientations seen in his 1178 memorials until after Lü died in 1181. As he did with Chu, Lü served as a moderating influence upon Ch'en. It is uncertain how long that constraint would have lasted even with Lü present in nearby Chin-hua. Nonetheless, the rapidity with which Ch'en sprang forth with more radical writings within a year of Lü's death is striking.

In 1182, Ch'en wrote a series of essays that suggested orientations different from those of his *Tao-hsüeh* phase. In contrast to his earlier embrace of Mencian ethics, Ch'en presented human nature as physical, rather than ethical. Based on this conception of inner nature, Ch'en's discussions of ethics placed less emphasis on motives than on practical things (e.g., water and clothing) to satisfy people's physical needs and desires. Developing an implication of statements in his 1178 memorials about different spatial configurations of vital energy (*ch'i*), Ch'en now spoke not only of the *Tao* of China as the Middle Kingdom, but also of the *Tao* of surrounding barbarians. China's *Tao* had also evolved so that principles set forth during the Three Dynasties could not be maintained over time. Hence, later sages had to define the *Tao* in terms of the exigencies of their own times and circumstances. This conclusion marked a sharp contrast with his earlier pronouncements about unchanging and enduring classical principles. Similarly, instead of championing the principles of the utopian era of the Three Dynasties, Ch'en now decried those who degraded the integrity of Han and T'ang rulers. Such disparagement of accomplishments during recent dynas-

ties (in contrast to the glories of the Three Dynasties) had to be corrected, Ch'en asserted, before the *Tao* could be clear.<sup>21</sup> Ch'en had come to champion successful rulers of recent dynasties as having had qualities worthy of emulation.

Ch'en wrote a postface and colophon in 1185 for his reorganized edition of *Discourses on the Mean* (*Chung shuo*, or the *Wen-chung-tzu*), a publication that he had earlier halted in deference to Lü Tsu-ch'ien's objections. The *Discourses* were ascribed to Wang T'ung (584-617). Wang's ideas had inspired Wei Cheng and others in making the reign of T'ang T'ai-tsung (627-649) one of China's most successful; moreover, Wang had become a symbol for utilitarian approaches to politics. Ch'en offered his evaluation of Wang. Confronting the need to restore order after centuries during which people neglected Confucian political wisdom, Wang had adjusted classical principles to address the needs and circumstances of his era. Given the differences between historical situations, Wang correctly realized that Confucius' compilation of the classics was addressed to a particular historical situation and that the sage's work should serve as an example, rather than as a blueprint, for later generations. As Mencius had done almost a millennium earlier, Wang set forth new ideas to address the political crises of his own day. Hence Wang had developed the legacy of Confucius and had begun to rectify the principles of Heaven and Earth. Going beyond traditional Confucian notions of the need for institutions to be timely, Ch'en was thus asserting that later scholars should not be bound by particularistic formulations in the classics. Intellectuals in every era had to define the *Tao* in terms of their own times and circumstances. Thus Ch'en had identified with Wang—as a symbol of utilitarian politics and new formulations of Confucian teachings—to an extent that made members of the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship, specifically Lü and Chu, uncomfortable.<sup>22</sup>

Ch'en even elaborated on his new orientations in his school essays at the imperial university during the 1180s. Instead of speaking of one enduring *Tao*, Ch'en related how distinct *Taos* had been employed at various times in Chinese history. The *Tao* of sovereigns (*huang-tao*) had been implemented by mythical sages Fu-hsi and Shen-nung in earliest antiquity. Later, when society needed a more structured polity, the *Tao* of emperors (*ti-tao*) had been introduced by mythical sage-kings—the Yellow Emperor, Yao, and Shun—of early antiquity. After this *Tao* had declined, the sage-kings of the Three Dynasties improvised the kingly *Tao* (*wang-tao*) to restore peace. After further degeneration of the polity, generalissimos had to resort to the *Tao* of the hegemon (*pa-tao*) to enforce order. Confucius had dismissed the *Tao* of sovereigns as too remote and the *Tao* of the hegemon as inferior; hence, he focused on the kingly *Tao*. After Confucius' grandson deduced that the *Tao* of emperors was also too distant to be relevant, Mencius and other classical Confucians championed the kingly *Tao* alone but belittled

the hegemonic *Tao*. Although the Legalists had sought to forge a policy for the wealth and power of the state out of a mixture of the *Tao* of emperors with the kingly *Tao*, the collapse of the Ch'in had discredited this political philosophy. Seizing the opportunity, Confucians presented the Ch'in as if it were the standard for using the hegemonic *Tao*. Although practical rulers and Confucians during the Han and T'ang had borrowed—albeit usually begrudgingly and quietly—from Ch'in theory and praxis to establish orderly governments based on realpolitik, moralistic Confucians during the Sung, Ch'en charged, had gone to unprecedented extremes in denigrating the hegemonic *Tao* and clamoring for a pure kingly *Tao*. As a result, the government's response to problems had become increasingly problematic. Moralistic rigidity was running the risk of provoking responsible officials, who were attempting to solve national problems, into resorting to realpolitik. Rather than allowing moralistic and pragmatic approaches in governance to become so polarized, Ch'en recommended combining the kingly and the hegemonic *Taos* to address actual problems in a realistic manner. This unified approach would “compensate for the deficiency of the Confucian quest for kingly governance and transcend the Legalist search for wealth and power.”<sup>23</sup>

Defending Han Hsüan-ti (r. 73-49 B.C.) for having combined the kingly and the hegemonic *Taos*, Ch'en argued that this Han ruler had taken practical steps to ensure good government because he had personal knowledge of how bureaucrats could harm the people. Han Hsüan-ti, not confined to conventional Confucian political wisdom, achieved results by examining and comparing names and realities as well as making rewards dependable and punishment certain. Ch'en did acknowledge that Confucian rites and music declined in an environment so attentive to efficiency and laws. Still, he maintained that it was useless for *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians to continue attempting to replace the positive effects of such pragmatic policies with mere theoretical discussions. Ch'en now asserted that it was unrealistic to look just at the ruler's mind-and-heart as the factor determining the quality of governance. Challenging those who would see the heart of the ruler as the key to proper interaction between Heaven, Earth, and Humankind, Ch'en claimed that the reigning emperor had reigned so sagely for two decades that this traditional notion could be tested. Despite the virtue and intentions of this enlightened ruler, the common people still did not follow proper order in the realm. Hence, governance in actual practice was much more complex and difficult than such conventional Confucian theories assumed.<sup>24</sup> Thus Ch'en had changed his earlier position that emphasized the ruler's mind-and-heart. Although he most often used Han Kao-tsu and T'ang T'ai-tsung as examples of effective rulers, he had also altered his evaluation of pragmatic rulers in general.

The examples given thus far are perhaps sufficient for a preliminary char-

acterization of Ch'en's thought after 1178. His insistence on pragmatic approaches to real political problems led him to embrace utilitarian activists such as Wang T'ung and Han Hsüan-ti. Interested in an efficient polity, Ch'en argued that job titles and functions should coincide and that both rewards and punishments should be certain.

Because such issues of realpolitik conventionally belonged to the Legalist tradition and the hegemonic *Tao*, it might seem appropriate to cast Ch'en as a Legalist. Ch'en did have a more positive view of laws and institutions than *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians generally had. For example, he proclaimed that laws and regulations could even perform the ethical function of turning self-regarding individuals toward being civic-minded: "As soon as the way of people is established, it is impossible not to have *fa* (laws, regulations, and institutions) in the world. The human mind is mostly self-centered, but laws can be used to make it public-spirited. This is why the prevailing trend in the world is inevitably moving toward laws and institutions. . . . Laws and regulations are the principle of the public interest."<sup>25</sup> Reliance on laws had the sanction of following the precedent of the founders of the Sung dynasty, and laws had also become part of the natural order. Thus, Ch'en was asserting, laws and regulations were indispensable.

At the same time, Ch'en revealed traditional Confucian reservations about laws. Such political notions and concrete policy positions, moreover, remained quite constant through all three periods of his thought.<sup>26</sup> Elaborating on objections raised by Confucius, Ch'en claimed that stringent laws would restrict the actions of benevolent rulers but fail to bind crafty people who could always find ways to thwart and circumvent regulations. Calling on the state to limit the reach of its laws, he defended the legitimate interest of private households. Such private interest merely had to be brought into harmony or balance with the public interest. Ch'en's physical view of human nature did not really require that laws change people to the degree envisioned by *Tao-hsüeh* programs for ethical transformation. Further complications in trying to affix the Legalist label to Ch'en arise in other areas of his thought, such as his emphasis on ritual decorum as the natural principle for establishing order.

A more meaningful label for Ch'en's mature thought would be "utilitarian Confucian." The term "utilitarian" (*kung-li* or *shih-kung* in Chinese) has been misunderstood by some of my colleagues in China to be an identification with the Legalist legacy in contrast to the Confucian one. Ch'en's affinities with the Legalists were quite limited. I use the utilitarian label to point particularly to Ch'en's emphasis on achieving practical results by the most effective means, his understanding of the *Tao* in terms of what was appropriate to meet the needs of the time and circumstance, and his belief in maximizing benefits for both individual households and the whole country. This utilitarian tradition in China is comparable but not identical to the one in

the West.<sup>27</sup> The point of calling Ch'en both utilitarian and Confucian is to acknowledge the affiliation that he believed he had with the practical wing of the Confucian tradition. It is evident in his use of the classics to support his points that his radicalism had roots in the practical political wisdom of classical Confucianism.

Despite Ch'en's sharp condemnation of impractical *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians who so insistently invoked moralistic demands that they lost sight of the national crisis, he was not hostile to Confucianism per se. Indeed, he blamed much of the confusion evident among moralistic Confucians on their failure to apply the principles of the classics—not just the Four Books—to the problems of the day. As Ch'en sought to combine the kingly *Tao* with the hegemonic, he wanted both Confucian ethical norms and pragmatic orientations toward problem solving. Ethical and pragmatic aspects were essentially and ultimately one in his conception of the *Tao*. Although Ch'en asserted that his orientation was grounded in the thought of Confucius, Chu Hsi disapproved of his synthesis and insisted that he become a "pure Confucian" (*ch'un ju*). Before we acknowledge Ch'en to be Confucian, is there really any need to invoke Chu's ideological standard of the "pure Confucian"? Because Ch'en's mature philosophy is best expressed in his exchange of letters with Chu Hsi, further discussion of his philosophy will be set aside until the next chapter.

Ch'en's personal life continued to be punctuated alternatively by fortune and misfortune. His youngest brother, Ch'en Ming (1160-1187), returned in 1176 from the family that had adopted him. This younger brother might have brought some resources with him. Given Ch'en Liang's positive statements about merchants and the economic success of his wife's family, Ch'en Liang might have engaged in some mercantile activity. In any event, the family had managed by the early 1180s to repurchase the 200 *mou* of land lost approximately fifty years earlier. In 1184, Ch'en Liang was again arrested; this time he was charged with poisoning another man at a local feast. Ch'en had given the man seated next to him an herb to enhance the flavor of the food, and the man had died on returning home. After three months of confinement, Ch'en finally convinced the authorities that he had been tricked by a traveling herbalist. Soon after his release, however, a mob waylaid and beat him so severely that his head and eyes were still swollen at least a week later. Afterwards, he renewed his attention to study and gaining the security of official status. He returned to the capital in 1187 for the examinations. Having won a promotion within the imperial university to the senior rank, he was qualified to sit for a special examination equivalent to the metropolitan examination. Unfortunately, he fell ill with a fever and could not finish writing his paper. In an attempt to contain the epidemic, the government instituted a ban on travel in and out of the capital. Circumventing the restriction, he managed to return home. His younger brother, while

nursing him back to health, contracted the fever and died. So smitten with guilt was Ch'en that he again forswore the quest for degrees and office.

The following year, 1188, however, news from the capital so aroused Ch'en's ire that he hurried there with another memorial addressed to Hsiao-tsung. The Chin had sent only one envoy on an occasion when the Sung had dispatched three. The Jurchen were treating the Sung as a petty state. Demanding prompt retaliation, Ch'en drew upon cosmological arguments, geopolitical strategies, and historical analogies he had used a decade earlier to insist on a war of liberation against the Jurchen. Vainly waiting more than twenty days for a reply, Ch'en again retreated to his home in frustration. Ch'en's bold venture to advise the emperor about national policy and his strong statements about scholars and officials probably alienated many of his contemporaries. In 1190 he was incarcerated on charges that he had hired two laborers, who occasionally worked for him, to beat another man to death. Even though the magistrate found no definitive proof to substantiate the charges, he had to lock Ch'en up, because several influential people demanded his death. Although his students and friends made appeals for his release, Ch'en languished in confinement for almost two years, until Kuang-tsung responded to one official's petition and ordered him released in the second month of 1192. As in the case of lese majesty, only imperial intervention had effected his release. Tensions and frustrations resulting from the two cases along with the lingering suspicions arising from the 1184 herbal case beset Ch'en for almost all of the third period of his life and no doubt contributed to the radicalization of his thinking and statements during this period.

Devoting himself to study after being released from jail, Ch'en finally passed the examinations in 1193. Although he continued to express his strong opinions even in his examination essays, he at last won a sympathetic reading when his close friend Ch'en Fu-liang served as chief examiner for the departmental examination. Addressing the issue of the priority of laws versus the personnel administering them, Ch'en Liang plotted a course between that of the moralists, who stressed personnel, and that of the institutionalists, who relied on laws and regulations. Distinguishing his alternative from these conventional extremes, he advocated less stringency in administrative regulations in order to maximize flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances. The argument was such vintage Ch'en Liang that his close friend would certainly have recognized his paper. It was during the subsequent palace examination that Ch'en made his famous pronouncement on Kuang-tsung's failure to make routine courtesy calls on the retired Hsiao-tsung. Suggesting that the reigning emperor's attention to the actual problems of government was a higher expression of filial reverence, Ch'en downgraded the burning controversy to nothing more than a matter of appearances for the sake of public opinion.<sup>28</sup> Kuang-tsung ranked Ch'en's

essay first among all successful candidates that year, and the retired Hsiao-tsung was reportedly also pleased with Ch'en's eloquent apology. In addition, Kuang-tsung appointed Ch'en to serve as signatory official in charge of the affairs of the Office of the Staff Supervisor of the Prefecture of Chien-k'ang (Nanking). Although the post fell far short of the kind of policy position for which Ch'en had always yearned, he was being assigned to the place to which he had repeatedly urged Hsiao-tsung to move the capital in preparation for war with the Chin. Mindful of the strategic importance he had attributed to Nanking and the troops stationed there, Ch'en readily accepted the assignment. On the road to Nanking, he became ill and died in the third month of 1194. Perhaps there was no more suitable ending to a life of frustration and striving to reach a post from which to serve his sovereign and liberate the North.

Although Ch'en had belittled the *Tao-hsüeh* case against Kuang-tsung's disregard of decorum and had sharply criticized the *Tao-hsüeh* movement, Chu Hsi wrote to congratulate him on ranking first on the 1193 *chin-shih* examination. When one of Ch'en's sons called on Chu to request a eulogy, Chu declined, but he did write a twelve-character plaque designating "the grave of the Sung period official Ch'en T'ung-fu, the master from Lung-ch'uan."<sup>29</sup> The formality in Chu's response to Ch'en's death contrasts with the outpouring of emotions in eulogies to Lü Tsu-ch'ien. Therein is symbolically suggested the difference in Chu's relations with these two friends from Wu-chou. Because of Chu's progress in delineating *Tao-hsüeh* doctrine and asserting his leadership, he was in 1194 much less tolerant of the diverse trends in Wu-chou than he had been before 1182. By declining to write the eulogy for Ch'en as he had for others, Chu Hsi was implicitly declaring that Ch'en did not belong to the fellowship. Even Ch'en's longtime and close friend Ch'en Fu-liang declined to write a eulogy. This refusal is perhaps even clearer evidence of Ch'en Liang's exclusion from the fellowship.

The intellectual climate in Wu-chou had changed after 1181. Earlier in his middle years, Ch'en had studied *Tao-hsüeh* teachings under Lü Tsu-ch'ien's influence. Lü's attention to national problems and openness to intellectual diversity within the fellowship made it easier for Ch'en to submit to his guidance. Despite his outburst against *Tao-hsüeh* in 1178, Ch'en restrained his radicalism until after Lü's death in 1181 and disassociated himself from the fellowship in proportion to his familiarity with its more exclusionary trends and awareness of mutual incompatibility. Thus Ch'en's criticisms of *Tao-hsüeh* are not only a measure of his maturation as a utilitarian thinker but also a sign of its evolution away from relative diversity.

## Chapter 7 *Chu Hsi and Ch'en Liang*

The contrast between Chu Hsi's interaction with Ch'en Liang and Chu's earlier relations with Lü Tsu-ch'ien graphically portrays the transition taking place within *Tao-hsüeh* from the second to the third period. Although personalities contributed to this contrast, in both Lü and Ch'en, Chu considered that he was dealing with the leading thinker in Wu-chou. Hence their interchanges reflected intellectual trends in a key prefecture of the realm.

Even though Lü Tsu-ch'ien had attempted to initiate an exchange between Ch'en Liang and Chu Hsi at least as early as 1174, the two never communicated directly until after Lü's death in 1181. Soon after Chu assumed his post in Chekiang early in 1182, he called on Ch'en at the cave beside a high waterfall near Yung-k'ang, where Ch'en and Lü sometimes met. Ch'en then accompanied Chu to mourn at Lü's grave. Chu was displeased with Ch'en's eulogy, in which Ch'en focused on how he and Lü had lamented their contemporaries' lack of understanding of heroes from recent centuries. Initially, Chu and Ch'en were careful to seek common ground. On Ch'en's return visit, he stayed with Chu for ten days, and while they drank together, they shared their complaints about the dynasty's failure to regain control over all of China. Chu's boisterous singing while drinking had elicited an ethical admonition from Chang Shih, but Ch'en later reminisced fondly about lifting their wine cups together. Ch'en valued outspoken sentiments and strong personalities. Ch'en also characterized Chu as a "dragon among men."<sup>1</sup>



Chu Hsi was the only one of his contemporaries—besides himself—that Ch'en Liang praised as a dragon among men. Ch'en's close friend Yeh Shih criticized him for regarding his own talents too highly and those of others too lowly—a critique comparable to Chang Shih's and Lü Tsu-ch'ien's concerns about Chu.<sup>2</sup> The meetings of Ch'en and Chu, with their similar personalities, produced thunder and stormy conditions, as Chinese folk wisdom suggests about the coming together of two dragons. Ironically, neither was so regal: Chu was born in the year of the dog, and Ch'en in the year of the pig.

Chu and Ch'en corresponded from 1182 until 1193. After their exchange of visits in 1182, Ch'en journeyed to Fukien to visit Chu late in 1183, but Chu was unable to meet as planned in 1188. Most of their relationship is recorded in their letters. Although both at times made pointed personal remarks, their friendship endured. The status differential between them remained throughout their letters. Ch'en was the one who sent birthday greetings, including cash and other presents. As the junior scholar without official status, Ch'en often spoke in a more diffident voice. He also frequently expressed concern that his lack of status and his failure to follow convention were hindrances to Chu's taking his views seriously. Although he appealed to Chu to read his letters as if they were written by a person of esteem, Ch'en also claimed that Chu was the only fellow literatus other than Lü whom he had sought to convince of his views. Chu, for his part, worried that Ch'en would discount his views as hackneyed and conventional. Such apprehensions reveal something of how each saw the relationship and suggest that both men believed that Chu Hsi's ideas were becoming rather mainstream. The exchange provides evidence that Chu was making progress in the 1180s in projecting his claims about the tradition and becoming the center of the fellowship. In spite of the resulting privileging of Chu's position, Ch'en's challenge was still substantial.

The tone of the relationship changed during the first couple of years. While Chu worked on famine relief in Chekiang in 1182, his relations with Ch'en were quite cordial. As an outsider confronted with a crisis of drought and famine, Chu sought information and advice from local literati, with whom he had some connections through Lü Tsu-ch'ien. Ch'en provided reports on local conditions and officials. So close did the two become that when Chu indicted T'ang Chung-yu for corruption, Ch'en was entangled by rumors. Ch'en had allegedly either turned Chu against T'ang or failed to influence Chu to drop the charges. When Chu resigned in the first month of 1183 because of the controversy, Ch'en expressed both his regret that Chu was withdrawing and his confidence that Chu would soon be recalled to government service. After Ch'en's journey to visit Chu late in 1183, their letters centered less on specific policy issues, about which they had shared concerns, and more on philosophical topics, about which they differed.

For example, Chu seized upon the incident of Ch'en's incarceration in the herbal homicide case to reprimand him for his attitudes and assumptions. Because he had failed to restrain his brilliance with humility, Ch'en had habitually dealt with others in ways that violated decorum. Moreover, his behavior evoked such ill will that others believed slanderous stories about him. Apologizing for not admonishing him earlier, Chu prescribed disciplined cultivation to restrain behavior and renounce erroneous views. Specifically, Ch'en should abandon the idea of linking integrity and utility. In short, Ch'en should "exclusively adopt the *Tao* of the pure Confucian as a personal discipline."<sup>3</sup>

Ch'en defended himself. Claiming that his talents were so exceptional that people had no ready standard with which to measure him, Ch'en lamented that people failed to appreciate him as a military tactician and government advisor. They merely focused on details of his decorum. Even in this area where he admitted weaknesses, he claimed that people did not perceive correctly. Specifically, regarding his relations with Lü Tsu-ch'ien where Chu charged him with transgressing convention, Ch'en noted that Lü had esteemed him ever since 1162, when he had passed higher than Lü on the avoidance examination. Even after their career and status patterns diverged so greatly, Lü continued to treat him as a peer and intimate friend. Thus they had always spoken forthrightly to one another without standing on ceremony. Other of Lü's friends and students, who did not understand such bonding, were scandalized by the equality evident in the relationship. They regarded Ch'en's eulogy to Lü as a ploy to promote himself. (Besides responding to Chu's criticism of that eulogy, Ch'en was implicitly dismissing both Chu's complaint about his lack of decorum in dealing with Lü and Chu's claim to be hesitant to admonish him.) He explicitly rejected the idea that his character and ideas were responsible for his legal difficulties, although he did concede that his nonconformist bent was dangerous to himself.<sup>4</sup>

Responding to Chu's call to become a "pure Confucian," Ch'en drew upon the words of Confucius himself to spurn this model. Confucius (in *Analects*, 14/13) had spoken in terms of the model of the "complete person" (*ch'eng jen*). Why did one need to add the title "Confucian" (*ju*) to this goal of becoming a complete person? It was merely some of the master's disciples who seized upon one remark about being "a gentlemanly Confucian" (*Analects*, 6/11) to develop this label as a separate school. Nowhere in the Five Classics was this made the standard. Was it not then sufficient to strive to become a complete person? Besides virtue and humaneness, a complete person also needed talent and bravery. Traditional Confucians merely focused on virtue and humaneness; thus, they represented merely one major orientation within the larger goal of being a complete person. Ch'en claimed to be working to become a person. How then could Chu urge him to become a

“pure Confucian” instead of a “complete person”?<sup>5</sup> Ch'en grounded his position in the teachings of Confucius and rejected any attempt to narrow the parameters of those teachings.

Chu was not deterred from demanding that Ch'en strive for a higher calling. As Ch'en himself acknowledged, Chu considered being a “complete person” a lesser ideal than being a Confucian sage. Chu also lauded Ch'en's extraordinary talent and intelligence, while continuing to caution him about the danger of being deceived by such boldness and brilliance. He explained that his own intent was “simply to urge a worthy like yourself to progress even a step further than your present level of perfection; in the future, do not aim to be a person less than those of the Three Dynasties period, and do not expend so much enthusiasm in defending the Han and the T'ang.”<sup>6</sup> Ch'en's fondness for novel ideas reminded Chu of the flaw he perceived in the most talented Han and T'ang scholars: they “were unwilling to humble their minds and dedicate themselves to the discipline of being a [pure] Confucian and following the learning of the sages.”<sup>7</sup>

Personality differences colored the expression of their positions, and Chu even sought to link Ch'en's ideas to his unsettled temperament. Yet the substance of the issues debated cannot be reduced to such personality factors and must be explored as points of substance.

#### ON GOVERNANCE

Gross inequality in land ownership was a major problem during the Sung, when the countryside became increasingly dominated by large estates. When serving as a local administrator, Chu Hsi spent much of his time on relief work and proposing land surveys to make tax burdens more equitable.<sup>8</sup> During his tenure in office in Chekiang, Chu requested Ch'en's comments on his essay on the land question. Chu's essay merely consisted of three long quotations from the official *History of the Former Han Dynasty* and the *Han Chronicle (Han chi)*, written about a thousand years earlier.<sup>9</sup> Although he did not interject his opinions, Chu implicitly approved of these utopian images of society under the well-field system as it was assumed to have existed about a millennium before these historical accounts were composed. The well-field model suggested an integrated system based on a clearly defined social hierarchy overseeing the economic production of peasant households with approximately equal land allotments. Chu elsewhere criticized other *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians, most notably Hu Hung, for espousing this impractical, utopian scheme from high antiquity. Here, however, he clearly presented it as embodying the thrust of his own solution to Sung problems. His later criticism of this utopian model perhaps benefited from Ch'en's sharp response.

Ch'en Liang insisted that the clock could not be turned back to antiquity, for they now lived in an era of complex institutions. Institutions from different periods could not be mixed together in such an arbitrary fashion, despite what Chu had implied in his essay. If situations were comparable between high antiquity and the present and if people could really mutually benefit, people could cooperate with him without his having to resort to some antique compact. In other words, a realistic acceptance of the interests of private households and the complex institutional structure of the day was more relevant than idealized models from antiquity. Scholars—who over the centuries had written about such models while sitting quietly amidst their books—surely had never effected the changes they envisioned. Instead of relying on classical principles and the suasion inherent in his serving as an ethical example, Chu should (according to Ch'en's admonition in a follow-up letter) take action if he wanted to change local customs. Unless norms for proper decorum were packaged in folk songs, as Confucius had done with the *Book of Poetry*, reform would be as hopeless as trying to get people to eat sawdust.<sup>10</sup> Ch'en was urging him to take into account a broader audience rather than continuing to concentrate on the literati and attempting to transform society through them.

Chu's granaries and other community associations seemingly did not appeal to Ch'en. In his fourth letter to Chu, Ch'en claimed that he did not participate in community granaries, charitable services, and contributions to relief funds. Though neither the justification nor the accuracy of this claim can be ascertained, Ch'en's confession is shocking for one who also professed a lifelong dedication to the public interest. In Ch'en's comments elsewhere, he had suggested that the existence of wealthy and powerful families was good for the public welfare. Moreover, he claimed that differences of wealth had existed even within the well-field system during high antiquity. Whereas the well-field system could not be restored, he further proposed, "Shouldn't the difference between rich and poor be left alone to follow its natural course?"<sup>11</sup> Thus he advised against the government imposing harsh controls on wealthy people in the countryside. While Chu wrestled with the drought conditions in Chekiang, Ch'en reported in his second letter that private granaries of the wealthy were already exhausted. This remark might have been a ploy to deflect Chu's suasion, even pressure, for the wealthy to contribute. From such statements, one might surmise that Ch'en was reflecting the perspective of the small to middle landowning class, to whom Chu's charity work would seem to be a sacrifice of wealth merely for the appearance of being humane.

A better way of understanding Ch'en's reluctance to support community welfare institutions arises from the family-oriented perspective of his contemporary Yüan Ts'ai (fl. 1140–1195). In his *Precepts for Social Life* (*Yüan-shih shih-fan*), Yüan warned against the dangers of entanglement in welfare

activities, community organizations, and social relations beyond the family.<sup>12</sup> Yüan expounded on ways to maintain family interests, especially keeping a family's common property intact. Although he did not articulate family interests in as much detail as Yüan, Ch'en sought to strengthen cohesion within his extended family and to enhance its wealth and power. Although apparently not well suited for the task, Ch'en men took charge of family finances. Compared with Yüan, however, Ch'en displayed much more respect for women's making difficult decisions and taking action.<sup>13</sup> Yüan did not articulate utilitarian ideas as clearly as Ch'en, but Yüan's view of family interests clearly points toward an affinity with Ch'en's mature thinking on utilitarian principles. Hence each man's writings might be used to help contextualize some of the other's statements.

Differences in local economic conditions might also in part explain why Ch'en felt less personal obligation to engage in relief work. As a hinterland area between macroeconomic zones, Ch'en's Wu prefecture barely sustained itself in foodstuffs, and its concentration of landed wealth paled before that of the richer southeastern coastal macroeconomic region of Chu's Fukien. Buddhist charity institutions were also much stronger in Fukien and presented a formidable challenge for Confucian literati to assert themselves in community welfare. Conditions resulting from the famine in central Chekiang had to be resolved, Ch'en told Chu, by action from the central government. Given the relatively limited economic resources of this hinterland and its requisite trade ties to major macroeconomic regions around the capital and along the coast, it was perhaps reasonable for Ch'en to regard help from the outside as the only feasible solution.

There is evidence that Ch'en was not hostile to granaries and central government initiatives to solve problems locally. In his school essays, Ch'en praised the various granary programs of dynasties since the Han. He even urged reforms to make the granaries more solvent and more widely dispersed. One of his major works was a compendium of Ou-yang Hsiu's writings on reform and government institutions (Ou-yang favored more central government initiative than twelfth-century *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians did), which he presented as a model. Ch'en called for government action and laws to awaken people to the public interest and to put self-interest in harmony and balance with the public interest.<sup>14</sup> Although he warned against excessive government interference and blamed administrative centralization for much of the military weakness of the Sung, he remained generally positive about the central government's role in solving many of the problems of the day. Thus Ch'en's views on local institutions fit into a paradigm suggested by Robert Hymes: those with primary commitments—either to the family or to the central government—would be less interested in the kind of middle-level or community institutions that Chu Hsi sponsored.<sup>15</sup>

While Chu wrote more on reform of local and community institutions

than on national ones, Ch'en typically had exactly the opposite priorities. Here Ch'en was closer than Chu to the orientation of major eleventh-century thinkers. Yet his policy positions on many major issues (such as military reorganization, reduction of taxes, and ills in the school and examination systems) were not very different from those of Chu Hsi, Ch'en Fu-liang, and Yeh Shih. Thus policy issues appear to have been less of a factor in divisions between major thinkers than had been the case a century earlier. Still there were differences. For example, Ch'en was so critical of the examination system that he boldly wrote anti-examination statements in his school and examination essays. Thus he directly challenged his examiners to make the system more flexible and less rigid. Although Chu also had reservations about how the examinations functioned, he expressed them in a private essay and in personal conversations years after he had successfully climbed all the rungs leading to the *chin-shih* degree.<sup>16</sup>

Although both Ch'en and Chu advocated the restoration of Sung rule in North China, the arguments made for similar policies reveal some of their divergent orientations.<sup>17</sup> With his penchant for military affairs, Ch'en had a more developed strategy for assaulting the North in a three-pronged attack. Moving the Sung headquarters to Nanking and having the main forces attack from there was a strategy grounded in his assumptions about the spatial configurations of vital energies (*ch'i*). Those energies had evolved over time in different areas and had defined the character of those areas and the people resident there. Such spatial configurations were illustrated by discussions of the roles played by different areas throughout history. The Jurchen conquest of the Central Plain violated the purity of the primal Chinese energy located in the Central Plain. Given the special energy of that primary center, it was of utmost urgency to expel the aliens as quickly as possible. Violations of rites or norms, such as having two emperors and having the Sung emperor pay tribute to the Chin emperor, enraged Ch'en to the point of ardent vengeance. Ch'en called for prompt and direct military action to redress the humiliation inflicted on the dynasty and on China's rites and history. So intense was his preoccupation with a war to liberate the North that it dictated his stance on some other issues, particularly land policy.

In his arguments for war against the Jurchen, Chu Hsi also wailed about violations of rites; however, he tended to speak of those rites as classic and cosmic principles. Although personal humiliations might be overlooked, violations of principle could never be allowed. Such principles were constant, unwavering values on which human society and polity as well as the cosmic order were grounded. Although Chu shared Ch'en's assumption about the necessity of establishing a base in or near the Central Plain, he did not detail strategy to the degree Ch'en did. Instead of prompt military action and quick victories, Chu talked in terms of one to three decades of preparation. Chu had a more defensive, self-strengthening posture. His attention to

transforming the character of the administration added a further long step to liberation of the North. Chu focused on the need for moral regeneration, because self-cultivation and virtue were prerequisites for any reconquest of the North. Because the ethical quality of government was so basic, the Southeast had to be governed well before the Sung court could seriously contemplate extending its rule over the North.

Overall, Chu's program was more idealistic and radical than Ch'en's. Based on his conception of human nature as physical, Ch'en simply called for behavior and institutions that were normatively appropriate; hence, his agenda for reforms was more modest than Chu's. Priority given to the abstract or transcending character of principles provided Chu with grounds for optimism about transforming people and society in a more fundamental and sweeping way than Ch'en envisioned. Ch'en worked within the limitations of objective conditions, as he perceived them, because he was hostile to abstractions. Even while reconstructing selected Han and T'ang rulers into heroic models, Ch'en did not soar to the same heights of radical idealism that Chu achieved through an optimum vision of people becoming sages and conforming to ethical principles from high antiquity.

#### ON EXPEDIENCY AND UTILITY

One major issue between Chu Hsi and Ch'en Liang involved the ethical legitimacy of decisions based on *ch'üan*, a term rendered variously as expediency, exigency, moral discretion, or situational weighing. Faced with situations where the standard (*ching*) principle offered no easy solution, Confucians realized the necessity of taking irregular action in accordance with exigencies of time and situation. As Confucius remarked (*Analects*, 9/30), many could study the *Tao*, but few could join him in exercising situational judgment. During the Han, scholars defined *ch'üan* as follows: "That which is at variance with the standard and complies with the *Tao* is the expedient." Rejecting the traditional distinction as being too open to variant behavior, Ch'eng I had set forth a novel theory that the expedient was the same as the standard: the expedient was the application of the standard to time and situation. Chu Hsi, in his 1178 commentary on the *Analects*, followed Ch'eng I's interpretation. Yet in his comments to his students during the 1180s and 1190s, he repeatedly voiced his preference for the Han view over Ch'eng I's.<sup>18</sup> Perhaps Ch'en's challenge was a catalyst in changing Chu's mind and compelling him toward a new interpretation of this complex problem in Confucian ethics. Ch'en had developed Ch'eng's point about the equivalence of the standard and the expedient toward a logical conclusion that alarmed Chu.

Responding to Ch'en's 1182 essays, Chu Hsi complained about his ideas

regarding expediency. According to Chu, the thrust of the essays could be likened to a man who, in order to save his sister-in-law from drowning, violated standard principles forbidding physical contact between the sexes outside of marriage. This imagery from the *Mencius* (4A/17) made a sharp distinction between the standard and the expedient but allowed resorting temporarily to the expedient when an exceptional situation demanded it. Although Mencius here followed Confucius in embracing some flexibility in applying ethical principles to changing situations, Mencius still emphasized, as Chu also did, upholding standard principles in important matters and using the expedient only with utmost caution. Both Mencius and Chu rejected the implication that this archetypal case demonstrated that ethics were relative to the situation. Chu charged that Ch'en's essays contained much that ran counter to the standard. Deciding not to share the essays with his own students, Chu cautioned that if young scholars read such essays, they would become confused about the standard principles of the Three Bonds and Five Relationships, and the damage would be irremediable.<sup>19</sup>

Commenting to his students about discussions during Ch'en Liang's 1183 visit, Chu Hsi returned to what troubled him. According to Chu, Ch'en weighted expediency more heavily than integrity (rightness) and rendered integrity itself flexible, for "integrity became the manner in which expediency was used." Ch'en Liang's identification of integrity with being in accord with time and circumstance was nearly congruent with Ch'eng I's likening of expediency to the application of the standard to time and place. This similarity appears so obvious that Chu could hardly have missed it, but to have drawn this parallel would have been awkward for Chu.

Reporting that he had striven for a way to awaken Ch'en to this ethical problem, Chu asked, "Integrity then to you has the meaning of according with the time or situation?" Instead of recoiling from this reduction of integrity to situational weighing, Ch'en had replied, "Definitely."<sup>20</sup> Chu had thus failed to convince Ch'en that such a view of integrity was comparable to that of the petty person about whom Confucius had warned (in *Analects*, 4/16). Confucius had cautioned that in contrast to a superior person's understanding of integrity, a petty person understood only advantage or utility. Likewise, Chu condemned Che-tung utilitarians for not distinguishing between standard principles and situational advantages.<sup>21</sup> In short, Chu Hsi contrasted standard principles to both expediency and utility.

Responding to Chu's rigid dichotomy, Ch'en set forth positive models for his ethic to correct the more conventional images upon which Chu was drawing. The conceptual symbols, which Ch'en sought to reconstruct into positive utilitarian models, included the hegemony (*pa*) and selected rulers of the Han and T'ang dynasties. Ch'en had to overcome the polarity between these later rulers and the sage-kings of the ancient Three Dynasties and also between the hegemonic and the kingly *Taos*. If these polar concepts



were synthesized into one, pragmatic and expedient politics could attain higher ethical sanction and transcend conventionally negative connotations. If Han and T'ang rulers with accomplishments were viewed as ethical, then positive models for an ethic of end results in governance could be established. Although his effort to legitimize an ethic of end results distinguished the third period of his life, Ch'en had earlier attempted to synthesize what many others considered to be polarized concepts. During his first phase, he had focused on the gulf between military and civil officials and training. Philosophical study during his second phase served to enhance the spectrum and effectiveness of his synthetic arguments to support such practical orientations. Ch'en had become so versed in *Tao-hsüeh* Confucianism during the 1170s that, by the following decade, he could hold his own in a debate with the most systematic philosopher in the fellowship.

Regarding the imagery of the hegemon, Chu's comments elsewhere illustrate how difficult Ch'en's task was. As a scholar, Chu acknowledged historical and institutional distinctions between kings and the hegemon; moreover, he conceded that the ancients had correctly focused on differences of position. As a philosopher of ethics, however, Chu proceeded to speak of the hegemon from a moralistic viewpoint that largely ignored institutional history. For instance, if the hegemon had acted from civic-mindedness without selfish motives, they could have implemented the kingly *Tao*. Their "utilitarian minds" schemed to seize the cloak of humaneness to cover their selfish motives; moreover, they fooled themselves into thinking that the borrowed virtue was really their own. Following the complaint in the *Mencius* (7A/30) that the hegemon had used force to appropriate humaneness, Chu presented them as a symbol of the exercise of crude military power to dupe and coerce the people. Compared with the hegemon's resorting to coercion and feigned humaneness to achieve utilitarian goals, the kingly *Tao* represented humaneness and virtue. Building on the motives-based ethics of Mencius, Chu Hsi had augmented the trend among *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians to link self-interest and coercion to the hegemon. Despite his awareness of the historical context of the actual hegemonic institution, he enhanced the ethical cleavage between the hegemon and any true virtue.<sup>22</sup>

Grounded in these ethical distinctions, Chu urged Ch'en to forsake his concept of "seeking both integrity and utility and using the methods of the king and the hegemon together."<sup>23</sup> This characterization implied an opportune or impure mixture that was not limited to Confucian values, for Hsün-tzu had condemned the hegemon for this shortcoming. Han Hsüan-ti had approved of the Han government's use of kingship and hegemony in a mixed fashion, but Chu rejected this positive evaluation of a mixed approach. Chu's characterization considered hegemon of antiquity and rulers of later dynasties together as practitioners of heretical theory and

praxis.<sup>24</sup> Efforts to sustain pragmatic political wisdom with appropriated virtue had, according to Chu, achieved only temporary success because such programs were hollow and without the lasting substance of virtue.

Replying that Chu had failed to understand him fully, Ch'en restated his position. Because of the arbitrary distinctions initiated by Mencius and Hsün-tzu, Han and T'ang scholars never understood the concepts of integrity, utility (advantages), kingship, and hegemony. Making matters worse, the Ch'eng brothers and their disciples posited a gulf between Heaven's principle and human passions to polarize these concepts even further and denigrate the Han and T'ang. Chu and other disciples of the Ch'engs had alleged that the rule of the Three Dynasties had been based upon principle in contrast to the Han and T'ang, which rested on nothing more than cleverness and force. Furthermore, Chu claimed that even the glorious reigns of these recent dynasties had maintained peace and order only by accidental coincidence with principle. Even the most successful rulers of these later dynasties functioned only by expediency: as if living in a house built of patchwork, they struggled supporting one part of the house while they allowed another part to collapse. Such characterizations were, Ch'en cried, unfair:

Heaven and Earth as well as spirits and ghosts are also unwilling to accept this characterization of the rule of these heroes as patchwork expediency. The *Tao* of the so-called *tsa-pa* (a mixture of the kingly with the hegemonic) was certainly based on kingship. Where various Confucian scholars have placed themselves has been called integrity and kingship; the accomplishments of Han and T'ang rulers have been labeled utility and hegemony. The former talked like that; the latter performed like this. Although what has been said by various Confucian scholars is very good, what was accomplished by heroic rulers was also not bad. A perspective like this you have characterized as "seeking both integrity and utility and using the methods of the king and the hegemon together." But my own view is that, from top to bottom, there was only one mind which accomplished all this.<sup>25</sup>

The one mind in the last sentence referred to the human mind.

In this restatement of his position, Ch'en made several points, one of which requires clarification. By saying that everything was done by one mind, he suggested that there was no abstract or transcendent realm for judgment at play here. Heaven, Earth, people, and even ghosts functioned or interacted on the same level. In the context of proclaiming that Heaven and Earth would not accept the characterization of heroic rulers as being driven by mere expediency and that the *Tao* of these rulers was certainly grounded in kingship, Ch'en was saying that integrity, utility, and the methods of the king and the hegemon were all one. Having synthesized these into

a holistic concept, Ch'en insisted on calling it kingship instead of a composite of diverse or deviant elements. Thus he unified utilitarian orientations and Confucian ethics. Because of the holistic synthesis for which Ch'en had striven, we should acknowledge his efforts to be utilitarian Confucian, rather than merely utilitarian in contrast to Confucian.

Whereas Ch'en saw kingship and hegemony as holistically one, Chu Hsi continued to perceive them as parallel ideas. Instead of addressing Ch'en's historical and philosophical points about the hegemony, Chu Hsi sought to employ such symbolism to concentrate Ch'en Liang's attention on the need for personal discipline and cultivation. While admonishing Ch'en for his unsettled temperament, Chu insisted that rather than seeking such ideas as principle and human passions in the traces of the kings and hegemonies of antiquity and recent times, he would do better to reflect on the integrity and self-interest, deviation and rectitude within his own mind-and-heart.<sup>26</sup> Chu later added that a sage would still insist on minute distinctions whenever the difference between standard principles and human passions was at issue; otherwise, a small oversight might lead to grave mistakes. If such clear distinctions were ignored, Chu expressed fear that people would become unable to discriminate between integrity and advantage.<sup>27</sup> Although he did not repeat his characterization of Ch'en's position, Chu continued to speak from the conviction that the ideas under discussion were parallel concepts or polarities rather than holistic constructs.

With an impasse on the philosophical level of concepts, the debate turned even more to specific historical personages as representative cases. For example, Kuan Chung (I-wu, d. 645 B.C.), the chief councilor of the first hegemon, served as a symbol of achieving results. In contrast to almost all who identified themselves with Confucius' legacy, Confucius himself (in *Analects*, 14/16-17) had ascribed the hegemon's establishment of guidelines for the feudal lords in 650 B.C. to Kuan's influence and not to military force. Confucius had also credited Kuan Chung with saving the Chinese from being overrun and barbarized by outsiders. Confucius had gone so far as to praise Kuan's humaneness, a virtue he was hesitant to attribute to anyone except his favorite disciple, Yen Hui, and allegedly (in *Analects*, 18/1) to three men in ancient Yin (Shang) times. The master's phrase "like his humaneness" had so disturbed later commentators that they twisted this praise of Kuan Chung to indicate nothing more than apparent humaneness. Ch'eng I added the notion that Confucius had meant that Kuan demonstrated only "humane effects." If Ch'eng were correct, Ch'en observed, Confucius would then have been calculating results as the measure of virtue—the same mistake that others condemned Ch'en Liang for. Ch'en argued that Confucius had testified that Kuan had the humaneness of restoring proper order to the world. The magnitude of Kuan Chung's accomplishment—the social results—vindicated his virtue.<sup>28</sup>

Conceding that Confucius had highly praised Kuan Chung, Chu Hsi still had reservations. Although he shared Ch'en's view that commentators wrongly dismissed Confucius' praise as denoting only apparent humane-ness, he followed Ch'eng I's (apparent) intention in attributing humane effects to Kuan Chung. In protecting the civilized states against barbarism and in convening the feudal lords to establish rules for political behavior, Kuan Chung had achieved results that benefited others; therefore, he demonstrated humane effects. Arguing that there were levels of humane-ness, Chu insisted that Confucius surely did not equate Kuan's humane-ness with Yen Hui's. Bringing peace to China did not necessarily prove that Kuan was humane, for he lacked the subjective component of proper ethical motivation. Kuan Chung's work did not transform the people and did not last long after his death; these facts proved to Chu that Kuan's accomplishments were meager and his motives were selfish. Chu did not accept Ch'en's claim that Ch'eng's interpretation regarding "humane effects" would mean that Confucius was calculating results as a measure of virtue. Thus Chu still held to the traditional Confucian assumption that only true virtue laid the foundation for lasting accomplishments. Virtue always had benefits or advantages, but if one first sought those benefits, one's mind-and-heart would stray from virtue. As Chu observed: "Kuan Chung certainly respected the Chou dynastic house and withstood the barbarians. Why is this not the kingly *Tao*? This answer is simply that utilitarian orientations contaminated his mind-and-heart."<sup>29</sup> How could such a symbol of the utilitarian quest for results serve as a positive model? Chu was imploring Ch'en to abandon Kuan as a personal ideal.<sup>30</sup>

Ch'en also sought to rehabilitate Han Kao-tsu and T'ang T'ai-tsung as positive models whose policies could inform Sung government. Ch'en labored under the shadow of traditional assumptions about the Three Dynasties and the Han and T'ang dynasties. Confucians used as a normative standard certain reigns and individuals during the golden age of the Three Dynasties to reinforce their belief that archetypal values had proven effective as political and social wisdom. Historiography of recent imperial dynasties was divided. Official historiography, including works by Ou-yang Hsiu and Ssu-ma Kuang, had given high marks to the political achievements of pragmatic rulers and even sometimes likened them to the sage-kings of the Three Dynasties. These historians assumed that the experiences of recent dynasties could contribute to discussions of policy and polity. More moralistic writers, most notably Sun Fu (998-1057), Fan Tsu-yü and Ch'eng I, had focused on the personal ethical failings of rulers like T'ang T'ai-tsung.<sup>31</sup> Ssu-ma Kuang argued that there was only a difference of degree between kingship and hegemony, reigns in antiquity and recent times; whereas Ch'eng Hao had sought to made such differences absolute.<sup>32</sup> Ch'en and Chu were largely following the two separate historiographical tradi-

tions represented by Ssu-ma and the Ch'engs. Nonetheless, by arguing that what selected Han and T'ang rulers had done was based on the kingly *Tao*, Ch'en was going even further than Ssu-ma in transforming their reigns into positive models.

For Ch'en to succeed in reconstructing selected reigns of the Han and T'ang dynasties into positive models for utilitarian orientations, he had to readjust the evaluation of these later dynasties in relation to the golden age of the Three Dynasties of high antiquity. At first glance, he appeared simply to be attempting to make later dynasties qualitatively equal to the Three Dynasties, for Chu urged him to forsake precisely this assumption. But Ch'en denied this charge and reiterated his position. Acknowledging a difference in level of completeness between the two eras, Ch'en conceded that during the golden age, both intelligence and disciplined accomplishment were fully attained, but despite the intelligence of later rulers, disciplined accomplishment fell short. Expressed another way, the divide was between a time when "there was not anyone who did not follow the inner nature" and more recent times when "people followed their natures but were sometimes perverse."<sup>33</sup> Up to this point, Ch'en appeared to have retreated from championing the Han and T'ang. But his concession had set the stage for an integral challenge to Chu's more absolutist gulf between later dynasties and the Three Dynasties. If Chu were correct, Ch'en taunted, the elder theorist would have to claim that advantage-seeking and desire for wealth and power were absent during the golden age. The *Book of Poetry* and the *Book of Documents* had presented selected reigns of the Three Dynasties as totally pure.

According to Ch'en, such an "ideal type" was nothing more than a by-product of Confucius' "cleansing" of the historical record as he edited the classics. Only this bowdlerizing expurgation of the historical record made high antiquity appear so superior to later reigns; in reality, people had always failed to live up to the ideal. Ch'en lauded Confucius' revision of history, for the master's purpose was noble. Confucius felt duty-bound to rewrite the record of the Three Dynasties in order to defend the value of government and rites from the skepticism aroused—according to Ch'en—by the Taoists Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu. Later Confucians unfortunately misunderstood the historic character of the master's work. If Confucians really shared Confucius' concerns, they should clarify the ideal aspirations of the founders of the Han and T'ang dynasties as models more relevant to address current problems. Associating his own agenda with that of Confucius, Ch'en likened *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians' condemnation of the Han and T'ang, on the one side, to Lao-tzu's and Chuang-tzu's slander against the value of the governmental legacy of the Three Dynasties, on the other. Ch'en was thus divorcing himself from the fellowship. Still, Ch'en also invited Chu and his group "to join in the task of washing the world of the last two thousand

years clean so that its brilliant treasure would be constantly manifest."<sup>34</sup> If Chu would concede that the glory of high antiquity was a myth, Ch'en would be more free to construct positive models for pragmatic politics from more recent historical sources.

Chu Hsi did not directly answer Ch'en's bold portrayal of Confucius as washing the record of antiquity clean while editing the classics. Given the importance of the Confucian classics to Chu, it is surprising that he failed to confront Ch'en's claim. Statements in Chu's formal writings, such as memorials and commentaries, suggest that he actually believed in the historicity of the golden age of the Three Dynasties as presented in the classics. Despite such formal proclamations, Chu's comments to students and friends sometimes demonstrated greater historical awareness. Remarks about the classics demonstrate his sensitivity to the problem of later interpolations and idealizations.<sup>35</sup> For example, he criticized Lü Tsu-ch'ien's effort to accept and explain everything in the *Book of Documents*. Although he occasionally wrote as if political institutions of antiquity were actually historical and applicable to his own day (as in his essay on the land question), in his informal comments, he generally denounced as impractical those within the fellowship who advocated the return to such antique institutions. Since Chu had doubts about the efficacy of antique institutions and even the historicity of some claims made in the classics, he would have found it very difficult to challenge Ch'en's presentation of Confucius as creating an ideal type in editing the classics.

Seizing upon Ch'en's analogy of using four metals to make a tool, Chu was able to sidestep Ch'en's portrayal of Confucius. In trying to explain his attention to utility, Ch'en had likened his efforts to making a tool by using all available resources—gold, silver, copper, and iron. Chu acknowledged that the analogy demonstrated Ch'en's bent toward utilitarian results but argued that such a composite tool would fail to maximize the utility of any of the metals involved. Capitalizing on what Ch'en quickly conceded was a poor analogy, Chu further claimed that the ancients, just as surely as metals, had definite qualities. Such qualities could not be changed, despite Ch'en's effort "to transform utilitarian iron into the gold of morality." If the Han and T'ang founders were gold, there would be no need to attempt to transform them. The sages of antiquity were pure gold, whereas the best rulers of the Han and T'ang were iron with small bits of gold in it. Because Ch'en failed to ascertain the fundamental division between Heaven's principles and human passions, his evaluation of historical personages was warped: "It seems proper to you to point to iron as if it were gold and, without knowing their faults, to regard bandits as sons."<sup>36</sup>

Rather than being thrown on the defensive regarding high antiquity, Chu mounted an attack on the ethics of Han and T'ang rulers. Even though Han Kao-tsu had abolished tyrannical Ch'in laws, he never renounced the prac-

tice of executing a rebel's relatives; therefore, his magnanimity was almost meaningless. Motives behind the actions of these rulers were crucial. For example, every act of T'ang T'ai-tsung arose from his selfish passions. Only because of his cleverness and ability to appropriate the appearance of virtue could he surpass his rivals for power and establish a prolonged dynasty. How could one use such measures of success to argue that he was an appropriate model? It was crass delight in results—regardless of the means employed—that dominated these dynasties and restricted them to expediency and mediocrity.<sup>37</sup>

From a statement Chu made to his students, more light may be shed on the case of T'ang T'ai-tsung's expediency. Chu distinguished the case of the Duke of Chou executing his two brothers from that of T'ang T'ai-tsung's killing his two brothers to ensure his succession to the throne. In the Chou case, the brothers were plotting with descendants of the conquered Shang house against the Chou; hence they were criminals against the state and the ancestral temple. "The Duke of Chou had no choice but to execute them, but T'ang T'ai-tsung's case was obviously for the sake of rivalry for the throne."<sup>38</sup> As in Chu's debate with Ch'en, most crucial were the motives ascribed to those who took action. Excusing one fratricide and condemning another rested on accepting conventional Confucian assumptions about the motives operative in the two cases. Yet in direct contrast to his letter to Ch'en in which he portrayed T'ai-tsung as acting from expediency, Chu told his students that the Duke of Chou's case could be called an application of the expedient, but T'ai-tsung's could not. Chu claimed that whereas the duke had no other choice, T'ai-tsung partook of a clever, pragmatic maneuver. Thus Chu's basic ethics remained constant despite his fluctuating presentation of expediency.

Several comments to his students present Chu as less hostile toward the expedient than he was in his letters to Ch'en. In various life situations, such as when one's filial piety clashed with a parent's Buddhist religious beliefs, Chu allowed use of the expedient. The expedient could be resorted to if there were no other choices, if the matter involved only relatively minor principles, and if the exceptions were not regarded as a precedent that could be invoked in the future. Even then, Chu was hesitant. Commenting on Confucius' remark that only a few could join in making situational judgments, Chu chose to interpret the passage as a prohibition against ordinary people using such judgment.<sup>39</sup> Only one whose motives were as pure as a Confucian sage could safely exercise the expedient. Others would "in a little while suit their convenience and transgress"; furthermore, people generally practiced expediency as "going along with common practices and growing accustomed to evil."<sup>40</sup> Together these passages demonstrate Chu's fear of literati freely deciding for themselves when and where to employ situational judgment. There is a parallel here to his uneasiness about allowing people to

define right and wrong for themselves, for they might mistakenly regard their own desires as Heaven's principles.

Chu also sought to distinguish the expedient praxis of Che-tung utilitarians from the virtue of *hun-hou*. As typified by Yen-tzu, one with this virtue was genuinely honest, sincere, simple, straightforward, and without deceit or bitterness; this virtue was also manifested in being kind-hearted, lenient, and magnanimous toward others. In the absence of a single English equivalent, perhaps "honesty" would serve as a rough gloss. Chu explained:

True honesty is natural and intrinsic honesty. Today, scholars in central Chekiang follow only a general accommodating mentality; the motivation is not honesty. Honesty means when something proper can be done, simply do it without calculating advantages and disadvantages. Nowadays, these scholars calculate advantages and disadvantages to an extreme, and this results in accommodation and nothing more. The corruption in all of this is: those with this penchant end up doing anything through which advantage is attainable.<sup>41</sup>

Instead of taking a firm stand on unwavering principles, Che-tung utilitarians taught people to make concessions in an effort to accommodate one another in civil society.

Thus Chu Hsi also associated the inclination for expediency with the efforts of Che-tung scholars both to achieve accommodation within the Confucian community, as Lü Tsu-ch'ien had done, and to maximize advantages through utilitarian schemes, as in the case of Ch'en Liang. It would appear that confronting Ch'en's utilitarian ideas since 1182 had made him more sensitive to the danger of identifying expediency with standard principles. Ch'en's effort to define integrity in terms of adjusting to time and situation, perhaps, made Chu realize the difficulty in Ch'eng I's similarly worded pronouncement that the expedient was the application of the standard in time and place. After encountering Ch'en's opinions, Chu expressed more reservations about Ch'eng I's statement than about the Han view that Ch'eng had rejected.

Chu Hsi's basis for resolving the conflict between Ch'eng I and Han scholars about expediency is also instructive. When Han scholars proclaimed "that which is at variance with the standard and complies with the *Tao* is the expedient," they were following Mencius in dealing with cases involving rites and decorum. Because Ch'eng I defined the *Tao* as the universally valid principle, he equated the standard with the *Tao*. How could an act at a given time be both in conflict and in accord with the *Tao*? The Han view then, to Ch'eng, was illogical, and the expedient and the standard had to be the same. To Chu Hsi, Ch'eng I was right when one thought in terms of the *Tao* as both penetrating and serving as the ground for all things. Han scholars were also right, because the standard could also be



understood on a different level from the expedient. Therefore, an expedient act could vary from what was standard, in the case of normal decorum, and still comply with the *Tao*. Both interpretations explained why expediency could be used by the ancient sages and even, in a very restricted manner, by oneself. To understand both explanations required a realization that one could address the issue on different levels.<sup>42</sup> Chu's apparent resolution of this issue leads naturally to his debate with Ch'en about the *Tao* and to the level on which that debate was addressed.

#### THE TAO AND HISTORY

Scholars over the centuries have interpreted Chu Hsi's statements about the *Tao* in his debate with Ch'en Liang as metaphysical pronouncements. In developing their interpretations, they have concentrated on the exchange of letters at the expense of the essays that precipitated the debate. Proclaiming in his letters the continuous operation of the *Tao* in history, Ch'en presented all major dynasties in history as basically in line with that *Tao*. He further charged that if *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians were right in condemning the Han and the T'ang, the *Tao* would have been absent from the world for almost two thousand years. Ch'en also said that everything was done by the human mind and that people were nothing more than psychophysical energy that, if properly tempered, enabled people to form a triad with Heaven and Earth. Because of this monistic perspective from the human realm, his letters have been interpreted as a challenge to Chu's sense of the *Tao* as a transcendent, metaphysical ground. Thus scholars have assumed that the debate was a metaphysical one. When viewed in the context of Chu's response to Ch'en's essays as well as his letters, however, the debate over *Tao* comes into focus on the level of cultural values. As we shall see, they differed on the impact of history on the enduring nature of the *Tao* as value.

In the first of his 1182 essays sent to Chu, Ch'en argued that different *Taos* had been employed at various periods in history. The *Tao* of regarding the world as a commonweal had inspired the ancient sage-king Yao to search out talented people from obscurity and to share power with them. Although he passed the throne down to them, his *Tao* "could not be maintained for long," and Yü began a dynasty in order to settle the issue of succession. When Yü's descendants failed to become sages, the dynasty ceased to be a commonweal. Even after the eclipse of this *Tao*, rulers could not just resort to guile and force to sustain their position, for, as in the case of the Ch'in, the people would reject them. Later great rulers, such as the founders of the Han and T'ang dynasties, received the mandate to rule from Heaven and did not lose their dedication to the welfare of the people. Thus they

gave new expression to the *Tao* of government. Moralistic Confucians still denigrated these rulers as having exercised nothing more than cleverness and force. Such condemnations had to cease before the *Tao* could become clear again.<sup>43</sup> In Ch'en's presentation in this essay, the *Tao* had become adjusted to the times, as when Yü changed the rules for succession. In history, moreover, the *Tao* had even become eclipsed from time to time.

In another of the essays, Ch'en discussed the *Tao* presented in the classic *Spring and Autumn Annals*. Building on the experiences of earlier rulers, the Duke of Chou "divided the world into five areas and used Chou regulations and barbarian regulations to distinguish their frontiers in order to prevent their participation in China." Although Ch'en used the term "an unwavering, constant *Tao*" to refer to this injunction against "barbarians" or aliens interfering in China, he also demonstrated how the *Tao* had continued to evolve and to be applied in variant ways in history. As Chou power waned, aliens encroached upon the Central Plain; in response, Confucius wrote the *Annals* to reestablish the *Tao*. Because of the power of the various alien peoples and their intermingling with the Chinese, Confucius could not completely follow the Chou dynasty's *Tao* in dealing with the changed circumstances. Some of the concessions made by later dynasties so compromised this *Tao* that there was real danger of erasing the differences between barbarians and Chinese. Nonetheless, the wisdom of Confucius and the Duke of Chou about segregating Chinese and aliens did have an impact—adequate to ensure that the *Tao* of China and the *Tao* of the barbarians had evolved separately and unequally.<sup>44</sup> Qualitative and definitive distinctions, arising from differing geographic locations and historical evolution over time, defined the *Tao*.

Both of these cases involved principles—a commonweal of public interest and a prohibition against foreigners interfering in China—that Ch'en proclaimed had continuing relevance or authority. Even in these critical issues, his sense of historical context and change gave rise to a relativism that conditioned the absolutism of principles. Regarding a proposal for land reform, Ch'en also stated, "The *Tao* of antiquity cannot be restored."<sup>45</sup> These dissertations (about how the *Tao* changed and was occasionally lost) appear to have presented a different challenge than his statements in letters to Chu about a continuously operative *Tao*.

In his letters to Chu, Ch'en asserted that the *Tao* had been operative in all periods of China's history. Answering Chu's charge that the heroic rulers of the Han and T'ang merely occasionally and accidentally hit upon a coincidence with the *Tao*, Ch'en compared the *Tao* with the sun shining in a clear sky. The illumination of the sun was always available if people would only open their eyes, so how could there be any talk of just unwittingly walking in its light? Because some Confucians customarily kept their own eyes closed, when they did occasionally open their eyes, they saw things to which

they assumed all others were blind. As if members of a clandestine society, such *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians banded together to maintain the fiction of their own unique insights into a secret art of learning. Falsely accusing everyone for two thousand years of being blind, they claimed that only the thinnest of threads still linked their era to the *Tao*. In actuality, the *Tao* was always available like the sun, and many people over the centuries had worked within its scope.<sup>46</sup>

If *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians were correct in denigrating the Han and the T'ang as devoid of the kingly *Tao*, the world—Ch'en continued his retort—must have experienced an “absence of the *Tao*” for two thousand years. If human society functioned only by sheer expediency, the natural realm of Heaven and Earth surely also existed only on a subsistence level, so how could the *Tao* itself continue? Ch'en's underlying assumptions here were twofold. First, as evident in historical events, the *Tao* operated within actual entities and affairs of society. Second, whereas people could enhance the *Tao*, but the *Tao* could not enhance people, people were the active component of the triadic relationship of natural resonance with Heaven and Earth.<sup>47</sup> As he proclaimed to Chu, the founders of great dynasties “were the ones upon whom Heaven and Earth depended in order to revolve constantly without stopping and the ones upon whom human institutions relied for their continuation; therefore, it is mistaken to say that the existence or absence of *Tao* is something that people cannot anticipate.”<sup>48</sup> If the *Tao* did not depend on the actions of people, Ch'en charged, one would have to concede to the Buddhists that people were caught for eons in a revolving wheel of suffering.

Even admitting that at times (as when the mandate to rule was usurped) much of the *Tao* was lost, Ch'en argued that even usurpers' meager contributions to order demonstrated that their rule was not devoid of some inherent principle. It is important to note here that Ch'en was not saying that any regime in power was legitimate. Claiming that some acts by usurpers were not devoid of any principle was far from an assertion that their regimes possessed principle completely. Ch'en was rejecting as artificial the far more extreme or absolute contrasts between rulers of recent centuries and the sages of high antiquity. Such contrasts appeared only because Confucius had cleansed the record of the Three Dynasties to project an ideal type to serve as a model for solving governmental problems of his own day. Sage-kings of antiquity had acted in accordance with their own times and established institutions according to their circumstances. The great rulers of the Han and T'ang had done what they could in the context of their times. These later rulers also had genuinely ethical minds, as demonstrated by their magnanimous spirits and actual deeds.<sup>49</sup> Their motives and deeds essentially accorded with the *Tao* as immanent in the evolution of history.

In short, Ch'en's essays and letters sent to Chu presented a *Tao* that was

changing, even transitory, but also continuously present. Ch'en's arguments suggest a *Tao* that was immanent in history and deeds that accorded with the times and situation. Relative to time and situation, Ch'en's *Tao* challenged Chu's concept of unchanging, archetypal values.

Chu Hsi's response suggests that he perceived the central issue to be Ch'en's relativistic challenge to the enduring nature of archetypal values from high antiquity. Chu pinpointed the thrust of Ch'en's argument: "Your major theme does no more than champion the Han and the T'ang in that you say they were not different from the Three Dynasties, and you demote the Three Dynasties to the level of the Han and the T'ang. The premise of your view is simply that antiquity and contemporary times are different, and the doings of the sages and worthy statesmen cannot be completely accepted as the standard."<sup>50</sup> First, Chu brought out an apparent contradiction in Ch'en's essays and letters: the Han and the T'ang were not different from high antiquity, but antiquity and contemporary times were different. As already discussed, however, Ch'en was claiming that there was no *qualitative* difference between *unidealized* high antiquity and later dynasties. Chu's later comments will demonstrate that he actually realized Ch'en was making this distinction. Second, Chu articulated the grounds for Ch'en's relativism: changes over time militated against the value of the sages' words and deeds serving as the contemporary standard.

Ch'en's apparently relativistic inclination, according to Chu, had dictated his more abstract philosophical pronouncements. Chu reasoned: "Thus you had to go on to assert that, because Heaven, Earth, and Humankind unite to form a triad, it is unthinkable that Heaven and Earth could revolve alone if human activity ceased. As you see it, since Heaven and Earth eternally exist, Han and T'ang rulers only had to do as they did for them to be able to complete the human contribution and for Heaven and Earth to have something to depend upon to continue to the present."<sup>51</sup>

First, the notion of resonance between human action and activity in the realm of Heaven and Earth was an ancient one. During the Han period, it had become institutionalized as the philosophical cornerstone of the state Confucianism of that era.<sup>52</sup> Even though neither Chu nor Ch'en fully subscribed to the resonance theories and applications put forward during the Han, both men apparently accepted the premise of interaction between the three parts of the triad. Rather than challenging assumed resonance between the sociopolitical world and the natural realm of Heaven and Earth, Chu here sought to refute Ch'en's use of this assumption. He argued that human fallibility undermined Ch'en's argument that the continuous functioning of nature proved that the actions of some Han and T'ang rulers were confluent with the *Tao*.<sup>53</sup>

Second, in the passage above, Chu also presented Ch'en as arguing that to fulfill their cosmic responsibility, rulers in recent dynasties only had to do

whatever they had actually done. In other words, Chu was charging Ch'en with fully endorsing any historic action or ruler as adequate and proper. Taking their cue from Chu's defensive caricature of Ch'en's position, some modern scholars have presented Ch'en as idealizing any sociopolitical order that existed historically by simply equating it with the *Tao* or principle.<sup>54</sup> As shown above, Ch'en did not hold such a simplistic view. Ch'en made distinctions in his evaluations of the relative virtue and achievements of later rulers. In a famous summation of Ch'en Liang's position, Ch'en Fu-liang acknowledged that his friend had standards of evaluation: "When social results are achieved, there is virtue. When success is attained, there is principle."<sup>55</sup> Even though this summation was more balanced than the charge put forward by Chu, Ch'en Liang passionately rejected it as distorting his perspective on the *Tao* of results and virtue. Later rulers, he insisted, must have had more than "unwitting or accidental coincidence" with the *Tao*.<sup>56</sup> In other words, they had to strive to attain worthy goals. As in his earlier rejection of Chu's characterization of his opportune or impure mixture of kingship and hegemonic elements, Ch'en envisioned a holistic but nuanced relation between virtue and results, albeit a relationship that had degrees of actualization at different times.

Arguments to make the *Tao* relative to particular times and situations, Chu alleged, had been used for centuries either to reconcile people to the imperfections of contemporary governments or to transform certain later rulers into sagely models for the present. Both efforts sought to degrade the standard of high antiquity and relativize standards. According to Chu, putting forth the slogan that the *Tao* could not disappear forever (i.e., the *Tao* was continuously present in history), Ch'en was merely masking an attempt to equate later periods qualitatively with the golden age of high antiquity. Ch'en and his predecessors had been driven—by an obsession for obtaining pragmatic results—into adopting a relative view of the *Tao*. To Chu, such utilitarian and historicist notions had yielded nothing more than imperfect goals and incomplete accomplishments.<sup>57</sup> Although Chu did not specify here which relativistic scholars he had in mind, he alluded to Ch'en's high evaluation of Wang T'ung. Elsewhere, he complained that Ch'en Liang shared Wang's shortcomings: engaging in relativistic talk of several stages of the *Tao* and history and revising Confucian evaluations about Han rulers in comparison to the normative models of high antiquity.<sup>58</sup>

In rejecting Ch'en's relativism, Chu proclaimed the oneness and enduring value of the *Tao* of antiquity. According to Chu, "Any person is just this kind of person, and the *Tao* is always this *Tao*; how can there be any difference between the Three Dynasties and the Han and T'ang?" Chu meant there could be no qualitative difference in the standard for judging high antiquity and later times. Only with one standard *Tao* to evaluate people of all periods and situations would it be possible "to actualize within oneself

the constant principles of Heaven and Earth and the integrity common to antiquity and recent times."<sup>59</sup> With a set standard, one could see that the ethics and motives of later rulers failed to measure up to those of high antiquity. Otherwise, literati would continue to use success and failure to assess right and wrong. Judging by results, they would continue to follow expediency instead of ethical criteria. They might possibly attain mediocrity, but never the complete *Tao*. The *Tao* itself had integrity that transcended human corruptibility. Succinctly put, the *Tao* was a "natural, eternal, and indestructible entity, which has continued from antiquity to the present."<sup>60</sup>

How did Chu's claim that the *Tao* was enduring differ from Ch'en's? As Chu noted, both talked in terms of continuity in people's consciousness of institutions throughout history. Ch'en's wording that such consciousness could "not be forever" lost implied a possibility of it "sometimes" being lost; therefore, Chu was again calling him on the implicit conflict between his essays and his letters. Was it not contradictory to posit that the *Tao* was both constantly available to people and dependent on their actions? Even within his letters, Ch'en expressed the idea that "the existence or demise of the *Tao* lies with people, and you cannot have *Tao* without people." To Ch'en, this statement meant that the existence of the *Tao* itself depended on people's actions, but Chu urged him to abandon this notion. Chu claimed that the statement—if properly understood—simply pointed to the fact that people's apprehension and implementation of the *Tao* was sometimes complete and sometimes incomplete. Although Ch'en had acknowledged a discrepancy in degree of completeness, Chu faulted him for not focusing on people's level of personal cultivation of ethical principles as the reason for a gap in degree of completeness.<sup>61</sup>

To replace Ch'en's crystallization of the problem, Chu proposed a viewpoint encompassing perspectives from both the integrity of the *Tao* in itself and its actualization in the human realm: "That which makes Heaven, Earth, and Humankind a triad surely has never had two different *Taos*. . . . When people's ethically reasoning minds cease to exist or function for a moment, the *Tao* in the human realm ceases. When the *Tao* among people ceases, although the function of Heaven and Earth does not stop, the *Tao*'s aspect related to us—right then and there—certainly ceases to be actualized."<sup>62</sup> The *Tao* never disappeared; people just failed to follow it. Chu Hsi thus distinguished between the constancy of the *Tao* as an ethical standard and the lack of continuity of its realization in human history.

Answering Ch'en's portrayal of the *Tao* as immanent and relative, Chu thus had concentrated on the issue of the sense in which *Tao*, as standard or value, endured. In the human realm, he argued, *Tao* had not been realized for almost fifteen centuries. If such statements were read in isolation from the broader context of the debate, it would appear that Chu was asserting that the *Tao* was metaphysically independent and separate from actual

entities and historical events. The context reveals that Chu was making a distinction between the constancy of the integrity of the *Tao* as value and the inconstancy of its actualization in history. When rulers and their advisors failed to devote themselves to Confucian principles, the Han and T'ang dynasties, even at their zeniths, attained nothing more than an unwitting, accidental conformity with these values.

While Chu dated people's loss of the *Tao* from the death of Mencius, Ch'en had sought to characterize Chu's position as positing an eclipse of the *Tao* for two thousand years. This discrepancy of almost five centuries reflected Chu's attention to the ethical principles recorded by Confucius and Mencius in contrast to Ch'en's focus on the early Chou political order, which had fallen with the barbarian sacking of the western capital in 770 B.C. Whereas Chu consistently gave priority to apprehending the ethical principles that sages had recorded in the classics, Ch'en appears to have assumed that the order arising from the throne was a more crucial factor in or measure of the continuity of the *Tao*. This difference, in large part, arose from the tension between a philosopher dedicated to classic truths transcending time and a historian committed to the study of change through time.

Chu Hsi denounced those who thought that the *Tao* resided "not in the classics but in history." As a warning, Chu told his students that Ch'en Liang had been "ruined by his study of history." Ch'en's scholarship was so disturbing because it "dismissed the classics while mastering history, ignored the ethical way of the true king while esteeming the expedient methods of the hegemon, and went to extremes discussing the rise and fall of recent and ancient dynasties without seeking out the origins of incessancy and demise within the mind-and-heart."<sup>63</sup> Clearly, Chu saw Ch'en's utilitarian ideas as grounded in historical studies. After confronting Ch'en's challenge, Chu complained that Lü Tsu-ch'ien's historical studies had served as the foundation for Ch'en's more radical notions about ethics and values. As a philosopher, Chu was committed to ethical truths, which were most clearly expressed in the classics. After comprehending the principles in the classics, one could study their application in history. Therefore history was a secondary and subordinate field of study.

The scope of Chu Hsi's scholarship still encompassed history. Chu's historiographic rules, which he set forth for reworking Ssu-ma Kuang's *Comprehensive Mirror*, have been widely condemned by modern scholars for moralizing and distorting the historical record. Yet Chu's criticism of Ssu-ma for moralizing has impressed at least one modern scholar.<sup>64</sup> Chu complained that Ssu-ma on occasion deleted unedifying episodes or data that did not agree with his own ideas. There is a parallel here with his rebuke of Ch'en Liang for not admitting the evils and errors of historical personages.

The points raised by Chu do demonstrate his knowledge of history and his approval of the need to study the past. Furthermore, Ssu-ma's and Ch'en's selective presentations of the past to provide positive models surely affect our evaluations of them as historians. This line of reasoning, however, runs the risk of losing sight of the primary function of Chu's statements.

When pointing out historical faults that Ch'en or Ssu-ma had set aside, was Chu pursuing history for its own sake or for the sake of his own philosophical agenda? Surely, it was often the latter. Even if his criticisms about some historical cases were more objective, Chu was devaluing the foundation that historians used to construct intellectual alternatives to his own system. In support of his own philosophy, Chu committed flaws comparable to those for which he criticized Ssu-ma and Ch'en. For example, his approach to the deeds of the ancient sages was not dictated by critical scholarship alone, and he even filled in lacunae in the text of the *Great Learning*. Moreover, his criticism led to alterations of the text of Hu Hung's *Understanding of Words*, and he excised important essays and letters while editing Chang Shih's collected works.

In summary, Ch'en Liang attacked Chu Hsi's *Tao-hsüeh* from two sides, using both his historical studies and his utilitarian ethic to crack the absoluteness of Chu's values. From one side, Ch'en's historical studies were grounded in historicist assumptions about differences between distinct periods of history that made standards relative to particular times and situations. Chu caricatured Ch'en's perspective: any political order was idealized by simply equating it with the *Tao* of the time. Even though that caricature has dominated the interpretations of some modern scholars, Ch'en's own perspective was more nuanced about the degree of difference between ancient rulers and those of recent dynasties and also the relation between results and virtue. Ch'en's writings also reveal that he was sharply critical of many status quo or de facto conditions. He continued to insist that government officials strive to achieve normative Confucian standards. Yet he denied that such standards could remain unaffected by the process of historical change or the context of actual situations. Furthermore, he sought ethical sanction for reconstructing the history of selected reigns of the Han and T'ang into models for addressing practical sociopolitical problems.

From the other side, Ch'en's utilitarian ethic fused results and advantages together with integrity and principle. Contrary to Chu's insistence that priority had to be given to questions of personal virtue and ethical principles, Ch'en suggested that accomplishments for society and country had their own inherent ethical justification. The prongs of this attack on the timeless and absolute nature of Chu's ethical principles hinged upon Ch'en's obsession with an irredentist war. Faced with a trend among contemporary Con-



fucians to place much higher priority on defending archetypal cultural values than on addressing pragmatic issues, Ch'en reacted bitterly to what he regarded as obstacles to achieving national ends.

Even though there had been enough diversity in Lü Tsu-ch'ien's *Tao-hsüeh* of the second period to accommodate both Chu and Ch'en, their clearer recognition of mutual differences beginning in 1182 spurred greater systematization of thought and more radical pronouncements. As long as Lü Tsu-ch'ien had remained such a preeminent figure in the fellowship, both Ch'en Liang and Chu Hsi individually responded favorably to his guidance. After death removed Lü's moderating influence in 1181, Ch'en and Chu struggled to fill the leadership void in the wake of Lü's demise. When the two began personally interacting in 1182, they became more aware of differences between their Confucian traditions, and each further developed major concepts through cognizance of the other's ideas. Chu observed that Ch'en brought forth radical implications that had been only latent and implicit within Lü's historical studies. Compared to Lü, Chu delineated *Tao-hsüeh* doctrines far more rigorously and in ways that enhanced Ch'en's alienation. Feeling excluded, Ch'en disassociated himself from the fellowship and openly satirized it for being like a cultic secret society. In the resulting loss of this major thinker among Wu-chou Confucians, the fellowship became a little less diverse. By a corresponding amount, Chu's dominance of the group increased.

## Chapter 8 *Lu Chiu-yüan*

With Lu Chiu-yüan, the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship was to become firmly rooted in a new geographic area. He belonged to a family well established among the local mercantile and militia elites of Chin-ch'i county in Fu-chou prefecture (present-day Lin-ch'uan county, Kiangsi). Fu-chou had been the home of the eleventh-century reformer Wang An-shih. The fellowship had apparently never flourished in the prefecture before Lu's day, and he never had the advantage of a renowned teacher. Perhaps in part because Fu-chou was a cultural frontier for *Tao-hsüeh*, Lu addressed the masses as much as he did the literati. Although Lu's own school drew a much more localized audience than Lü Tsu-ch'ien's or Chu Hsi's, some of his disciples soon established branches in more dynamic centers, especially Ming-chou (Ningpo) in northeastern Chekiang.

Although the Lus claimed descent from individuals enfeoffed by kings during the ancient Chou, apparently Lu Chiu-yüan's only ancestor since antiquity to have reached a noteworthy official position was one who served at the court of the penultimate T'ang emperor. During the decades of turmoil in North China between the T'ang and the Sung, another forefather led the family on its migration south to Fu-chou. Settling in the mountainous northeastern corner of Fu-chou, the family secured its base near the headwaters of the Hsin River flowing northward out of Fu-chou into P'eng-li Lake. Whereas most of Fu-chou was in the Ju River watershed, the relatively isolated and mountainous region afforded the Lus an opportunity to develop considerable military independence and dominance over some

other local elite families like the Tengs and the Fus, who each had a fort and several thousand militiamen. Lu O (fl. 1127-1136) received official recognition for his leading role in commanding the militia of local families in several successful defenses of the area against bandits and also Jurchen raids. Lu's father, Lu Ho (d. 1163), became noted as a local Confucian scholar. Among Lu Ho's six sons, three became renowned Confucian scholars, the two youngest winning *chin-shih* degrees. Apparently owing in part to the examination success of Lu and his brother Chiu-ling, some local families and prefectural leaders wanted to decrease the dominance of the Lus among militia families in favor of the Tengs. When tea bandits appeared to threaten Fu-chou in 1175, Lu Chiu-ling did retain the family's officially recognized leadership. Soon thereafter, the Lus' command of the militia was eclipsed by the Tengs.<sup>1</sup> The timing of their declining military influence coincided with their shifting attention to intellectual issues and debates with Chu Hsi.

Like Ch'en Liang, Lu and his brother were the first in their family for over two centuries to win any national posts or degrees; furthermore, both Ch'en and Lu hailed from families with military experience defending the Sung against the Jurchen. Although not as obsessed as Ch'en with the Jurchen enemy, Lu as a youth practiced the military arts and later as an official offered martial advice to Hsiao-tsung. Both families evidenced enough local status to make advantageous marriage alliances, and both Ch'en and Lu married daughters from wealthy families. Marriage ties to a locally prominent and wealthy family had apparently influenced Ch'en to speak favorably about the status and contributions of such mercantile and landed families. The growing influence of mercantile wealth was even more evident in the case of the Lus.

Taking advantage of its mountainous base and access to Hsin River transport, the Lu family developed an herbal medicine business to support itself by trade. As in Ch'en's case, Lu presented his family as struggling financially, but Lu was more explicit about its economic activities:

My family scarcely has any land, and the vegetable garden is no more than ten *mou*; however, [expenses for] household members could be counted in the thousands [of strings of cash], so we have to rely on the family herbal store for our livelihood. The eldest brother is the family manager, the second-eldest brother is in charge of the medicine store, and the third-eldest brother teaches in the family school, the emoluments from which were used to cover the family's economic shortages.<sup>2</sup>

With its own enterprise, school, militia, and shrine, the Lu family had not divided its household property in six generations and already numbered in the hundreds during Lu's own lifetime. As such, the Lu family was noteworthy and exemplary for achieving the social ideals of the extended family. Although the Ch'ens strove for this ideal, they were nowhere near as suc-

cessful in attaining it. In contrast to the Ch'ens, the Lus were renowned for their tradition of strict family discipline.

Also unlike Ch'en Liang, Lu and his family responded warmly to Chu Hsi's community granary program. In 1188, the Lu clan was the first in Fu-chou to set up a community granary. Although it served only two out of forty-nine security sectors in the county, the Lu granary under Lu Chiu-shao's (late 1120s to 1190s) administration functioned well during a drought only a year after its founding. Locating the granary near their home and serving only their immediate two sectors, the Lu family apparently controlled the granary and charged interest on its loans. Although little is known about its functioning, there is reason to believe that the Lu granary was more of a clan-controlled institution than Chu's community model. During the first half of the thirteenth century, other granaries in Fu-chou were managed by elite families to reinforce bonding among their militia members as well as to earn profits through interest on loans. Lower interest than conventional usury could still turn a profit for the controlling family; moreover, the lower rates probably satisfied expectations that the granaries should have a community or charity function. Because the Lu family organization and rules were generally regarded as a model, it is quite possible that thirteenth-century community granaries in Fu-chou reflected the influence of the Lu granary. From Lu clan rules, it is clear that members were admonished to engage in charity for the pragmatic reason of avoiding conflicts with others. Charity and even expenditures for conventional rituals and social decorum, however, should come only if there were resources in the budget left over after daily and periodic expenses were covered. Altruism beyond the clan was clearly secondary to the continuance of the family and its livelihood.<sup>3</sup>

The Lus were not anxious for Confucian literati to take over community and charity activities that were being handled by Buddhist monks and institutions. Despite the apparent difference in the Lus' activities and Ch'en Liang's reaction to Chu's community granary program, the Lu brothers actually shared Ch'en's relative lack of interest in competing with Buddhist charity institutions, his advocacy of the primacy of family interests, and his focus on the government as the forum for activism beyond the family. The Lu brothers did not have as much affinity as Ch'en Liang for the ethic elaborated upon by their contemporary Yüan Ts'ai in *Precepts for Social Life*. Compared with Ch'en and Yüan, Lu Chiu-yüan internalized more of the biases, prevalent within the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship, against advantage-seeking and utilitarian concerns. The Lus were apparently less "negative" than Ch'en in their view of charity. But like Yüan's family-centered orientation, the Lu household absorbed so much of an individual's loyalties that its members were not as committed as Chu Hsi to middle-level institutions between the family and the state. Lu appears to have had little interest in

community-based compacts, shrines, and academies. He never promoted the community granary program while serving in office elsewhere. In contrast to Chu's favoring of community organizations over the interests of individual households, the Lu family placed priority on nurturing the extended family unit and its local interests.

In his correspondence with officials in his home area, Lu Chiu-yüan was an unabashed advocate for what he perceived to be the economic interests of his locale. Among various things, he advocated the removal of special tax levies and warned against connections between local clerks and their patrons among elite families. Nevertheless, he also revealed his own family interest, as when he solicited public funds to support the community granary administered by the Lu family and recommended an in-law for promotion within the prefectural government. In the most striking case of advocacy, he advised a prefectural administrator against collecting arrears in tax payments. Collecting anything except the current month's taxes would play into the hands of crafty clerks and exploit the people, Lu claimed, for forcing payment of arrearage was equivalent to levying new taxes. Such local interests of the people so overshadowed the government's interest that "if it should happen that the director of the Ministry of Revenue urges one to adjust accumulated arrears, one absolutely does not respond. No matter how much scolding comes in their official communications, one absolutely disregards them."<sup>4</sup>

At the time in 1182 when he was suggesting that this local administrator ignore orders from the central government, Lu himself was serving in the capital as a director of education at the imperial university and subsequently (1184-1186) as revising official in the Bureau of Edicts and Statutes. Furthermore, he was thrice appointed to local offices: in 1174 and 1179 as assistant magistrate respectively in Ching-an county (Kiangsi) and Ch'ung-an county (Fukien), and in 1189 as prefect of Ching-men commandery (Hupeh). Although he reformed some aspects of tax collection in Ching-men, there is no proof that in these local positions he ignored orders from the central government about tax arrears.

Lu's localized focus was apparent in other ways. In contrast to the numerous letters to officials serving in Fu-chou, Lu rarely corresponded with major Confucian thinkers. He passed the metropolitan examination for the *chin-shih* degree when Lü Tsu-ch'ien evaluated his essay; moreover, he had the highest regard for Lü. Yet his collected works contain only one letter addressed to Lü. There is also only one extant letter in his works to Lü's younger brother and one to Ch'en Fu-liang. He apparently never wrote to Chang Shih, Ch'en Liang, or Yeh Shih. The largest number of his letters were addressed to Chu Hsi: five complete letters are preserved in his literary works, and there are traces of sixteen others in his and Chu's works.<sup>5</sup>

Localism was also manifest in the geographical origins of Lu's students. The overwhelming majority of his students hailed from within his prefecture, and 9 of the 29 from outside Fu-chou came from neighboring prefectures within Kiangsi. Of the remaining 20 students, 13 came from Chekiang.<sup>6</sup> Some of these men probably studied with him only while he held a government office in their areas. He did almost all of his teaching either at home, especially for a three-year period beginning when he was thirty-four, or at nearby Hsiang-shan (Elephant Mountain), for five years beginning at age forty-nine. On this mountain, he built a study for his students and spent about eight months of the year there—a much less accessible place than Lü, Chu, or Ch'en had selected.

Without a significant outside mentor, Lu was schooled by his family. Schooling in Confucian values within the Lu family was exceptional, for the family even received an imperial commendation from Hsiao-tsung for its filial and fraternal virtues. It is not surprising that Lu, raised within a cultured family with such Confucian discipline and the youngest of six educated sons, appears always to have been at ease with Confucian behavioral standards. Except for Ch'eng Hao, no other major *Tao-hsüeh* thinker during the Sung found it so easy to be virtuous or was so assured about the simplicity of the Confucian message. The family's economic diversity and independence along with its military security perhaps also fostered Lu's confidence in the efficacy of one's own efforts and the ability to establish oneself through personal cultivation. In addition, he had passed the *chin-shih* examinations at age thirty-four, which was about two years earlier than the average for successful candidates during the Southern Sung. His personal cultivation was so thorough that he displayed no anxiety about the examinations; moreover, he was apparently content to accept whatever post the government assigned him.

As a child, Lu displayed a precocious curiosity. Reportedly, he became so immersed in contemplating the scope of Heaven that he forgot to eat. As a youth reflecting on time and space, he had a flash of insight about the oneness of the scope of his duties and the universe. He thus proclaimed: "The universe is my mind, and my mind is the universe. . . . If in the southern or northern seas there were to appear sages, they too would have this same mind and this same principle. If a hundred or a thousand generations ago or a hundred or a thousand generations hence sages were to appear, they likewise would have this same mind and this same principle."<sup>7</sup> Like Chu Hsi, Lu as a child pondered the cosmos and cherished the desire to become a sage. Unlike Chu, however, Lu at the early age of eight showed his antipathy toward Ch'eng I, when he asked, "Why is it that Ch'eng I's words differ from those of Confucius and Mencius?"<sup>8</sup> Years later, he observed that Chu was rigid and profound like Ch'eng I, and Chang Shih was conciliatory and

penetrating like Ch'eng Hao.<sup>9</sup> Although more favorable to Ch'eng Hao, Lu did not identify himself with Ch'eng Hao but with the simple practicality of the ancient sages.

The family's economic activities further enriched Lu's education by forcing him to focus on practical concerns and deal with a wide range of people. As Lu himself reflected: "Our family lived and ate together as a unit, and from time to time young male members of the family were appointed in turn to take charge of the treasury for three years. I happened to have worked in this position, and my learning greatly advanced."<sup>10</sup> In dealing with people about financial affairs, Lu acquired practical knowledge and communication skills that he could not have grasped simply from reading books. These experiences dealing with a variety of people contributed to Lu's sensitivity and effectiveness in communicating to diverse audiences. Lu indeed became known for the power of his lectures to move people. When he arrived at a village or town, several hundred people frequently assembled to listen reverently, and they were often moved to tears by his sincerity and delivery. His distinctive talent for public lecturing was deliberately engaged, as he himself acknowledged: "When I talk with people, most of the time I stir their hearts; hence, it is easy for them to listen to what I say."<sup>11</sup>

One of the most famous lectures in traditional China was delivered by Lu and inscribed in stone at the White Deer Grotto Academy. Speaking on the text of Confucius' famous distinction (in *Analects*, 4/16) that a superior person knew what was right and a petty person knew what was profitable, Lu admonished each student at the academy to apply this truth to his own life in preparing for the examinations. Each person's future would be determined by the bent of his own will toward either rightness or advantage. To hold office, it was necessary to submit to the civil service examinations. Being a superior or a petty person was not determined by success in the examinations, however. Those who fixed their aspirations on examination and career success became indifferent to the message in the classics that they were required to read. Although they became learned and expert in administration, they did not focus on the welfare of the people, and what was right became irrelevant to their thinking. Lu ended with a rousing challenge:

I sincerely hope that you can deeply reflect about yourself, that you do not allow yourself to become a petty person, and that you are fearful of the climate of advantage seeking and desires, and even come to despise it. You should concentrate your will on what is right and daily exert yourself in that direction—studying broadly, inquiring carefully, thinking cautiously, discriminating clearly, and earnestly putting these truths into practice. If you would enter the examination halls in such a spirit, your essays would certainly express your learning and the aspirations within your breasts; moreover, you would not be defying the sages. If

you would accept appointment to office in this spirit, you would certainly in all things fulfill your duties, be devoted to your affairs, have your mind on the country and your heart on the people, and you would not be calculating for your personal advantage. A person like this would be truly regarded as a superior person.<sup>12</sup>

Another of his extant lectures to almost six hundred people while he was prefect of Ching-men in 1192 demonstrates his ability to encourage even the illiterate to do what was right and to recover the original mind that had gone astray.<sup>13</sup>

An account by one of his students illustrates how Lu taught the diverse range within his audiences. After all had assembled in orderly fashion and were quiet, Lu would emerge from his chamber and, arriving by sedan chair, assume his seat.

During the lectures, he cited statements from the classics as references of proof. His speech was clear and resonant and the listeners without exception were enthralled and moved. . . . As for those who wished to say some words but were unable to express themselves, he spoke on their behalf in ways they themselves would have liked to have spoken; he thereby enlightened them by developing their own thoughts. When there were those who only had partial words or unfinished phrases that deserved attention, he always encouraged them to proceed. Therefore, they all felt grateful and made earnest effort and endeavors.<sup>14</sup>

The content of Lu's message also reflected his diverse audiences. Rather than discussing a scholar's concerns for investigating things and researching ancient texts as Chu Hsi did, Lu had a simple and easy teaching method designed to "awaken the tardy" to the resources within their own hearts and minds. Extended intellectual reasoning like Chu's just interfered with such fundamentals for recovering the original mind-and-heart and striving to be good by doing good. Lu was confident that ordinary people would have the power within themselves to establish themselves if they understood certain fundamental cultural values and had the discipline to persevere in the pursuit of proper goals. Lu admonished his students: "Assemble your spirit. Be your own master."<sup>15</sup>

In Lu's terms, all people possessed what Mencius (6B/1) had called an "original mind" (*pen-hsin*). Mencius also said (2A/6) that everyone's mind-and-heart possessed the four beginnings of humaneness, rightness, propriety, and wisdom. Making the linkage more explicit, Lu proclaimed: "The four beginnings are people's original minds, and what Heaven has bestowed upon us is just this mind."<sup>16</sup> Even without all the additional development of scholarly inquiry and ethical discipline that some like Chu Hsi prescribed, these four beginnings were fundamentally sufficient in themselves:



Recently, those who discuss study have said, "In expanding and completing [one's nature], one must complete the four beginnings one by one." This is nonsense! What Mencius meant by people having the four beginnings was to shed light on the goodness of human nature and to warn against doing violence to oneself or throwing oneself away. If this mind exists, these principles automatically become clear. When one ought to be compassionate, one will be compassionate; when one ought to be ashamed of wickedness, one will be ashamed; when one ought to yield according to propriety, one will yield; and when confronted with right and wrong, one will be able to distinguish between them.<sup>17</sup>

By virtue of the four beginnings in their original minds, people could know and do what was proper in any situation, so additional preparations were unnecessary. To illustrate his point, on one occasion while seated with a student, Lu suddenly rose to his feet. Spontaneously, the student also arose in polite deference. Thereupon, Lu remarked, "Do you still think there is a need to make preparations for responses like these?"<sup>18</sup> Although such responses would be more objectively interpreted as a product of culture-specific socialization, Lu assumed that the naturalness with which Confucians performed such acts of daily decorum proved that the principle of decorum naturally resided within the mind.

Natural principles in the mind were the basis for intuitive, holistic understanding, for "when one thing is right, all is right, and when one thing is clear, all is clear."<sup>19</sup> The very ability of the mind to reason, Lu argued, demonstrated the essential reliability of the mind and its accord with ethical principles inherent in Heaven or Nature. His argument ran:

Rightness and principle within the human mind-and-heart are the very things that have truly been bestowed by Heaven and cannot be destroyed. If some people are fooled by things to the point of running contrary to principle and violating rightness, it is probably because they do not reflect on rightness and principle. But if the mind is truly able to reflect and reason, then distinguishing between right and wrong or adopting and rejecting alternatives would be immediately clear. Therefore, judgment would be clear, and there would certainly be no doubts.<sup>20</sup>

Lu's holistic understanding was grounded in this assumed linkage between the original mind and the virtue in Heaven: "The capacity of the mind is extremely great, for if I am thoroughly able to fathom and use my mind, I will become like Heaven; to study is simply to understand this."<sup>21</sup> Hence the ancient sages simply taught people to preserve, nurture, and regain this

original mind. If one maintained this original mind, studying and cultivating in order to be good would be "simple and easy" tasks.

Unfortunately, people generally lost their grasp of this original consciousness of the virtuous four beginnings within their minds. In a letter, Lu reprimanded a friend:

If one is truly capable of being the master of one's own endeavor, external things cannot lead one astray, and one cannot be confounded by false theories. The trouble with you, my friend, is just that because this principle is not clear, you have no master within you. In the past you have stumbled on superficial and empty theories. You have continually relied on strange theories to be the master. Therefore, that mind with which Heaven endowed us became nothing more than your guest. Confusion and delusion were unavoidable, since the positions of host and guest were reversed.<sup>22</sup>

Consciousness of the virtue within the mind could thus become clouded by desires and impediments. These flaws resulted sometimes from imperfect natural endowments but more often from people's practices or actions. Whereas ordinary people were deluded by desires for material things, "intelligent and worthy people were deluded by opinions; although the level and degree differed, everything was the same in that principles were being deluded and minds were being degenerate and unable to attain what was appropriate."<sup>23</sup> Whether overwhelmed by attachments to material things or by points of view, people's minds became impoverished.

Seeking a remedy, people often turned to improving various skills to enhance clarity of thought or to overcome desires. Focusing on skills, however, took them away from the simple and easy path: "If one concentrates on the *Tao*, desires will evaporate and skills will progress. If one concentrates on skill, desires will be set ablaze and the *Tao* will be lost; moreover, skills will not improve either."<sup>24</sup> If desires had already produced significant impediments in the mind, the simple and easy method of preserving the mind would not be effective until one had peeled or stripped the impediments away. The repeated peeling away of impediments would yield a clean and bright mind. Unlike the simple and easy method, peeling off impediments called for more than individual determination alone. Help from others was required: "If one doesn't have bright teachers or good friends to help peel away the impediments, how can one get rid of one's flippancy and falsity and return to the true? How can one achieve self-examination, self-awareness, and self-purification?"<sup>25</sup> Thus Lu also appreciated the role of a fellowship in helping one to advance one's own spiritual cultivation. For the literate, Lu specifically recommended reading books.

Even though Confucians generally engaged in reading and studying for

the ultimate goal of self-cultivation, such personal cultivation dominated Lu's approach to reading. As he admonished his students, "The reason scholars study is nothing other than to become a virtuous person and not for doing any particular thing."<sup>26</sup> Expanding knowledge to address particular problems was quite secondary. Because self-cultivation was primary, reading without first recovering clarity of mind "would be like pretending to lead troops against the enemy but actually only embezzling resources."<sup>27</sup> Given the primacy of spiritual cultivation, Lu's easy and simple method of self-examination was more fundamental than either reading books or peeling away impediments with help from teachers and friends. Since "the goodness of this mind is not originally something imposed from the outside," Lu reasoned: "This matter of cultivating the mind does not depend on others, and others have no power over it either. The admonitions of sages and statesmen as well as insightful comments by teachers and friends can only serve to spur one forward."<sup>28</sup>

Lu's sense of the innate power to recover the original mind and become a good person was grounded in a Mencian (7A/4) confidence that everything was complete within one's own self. For example, Lu drew an analogy between the abilities of the senses and what Mencians regarded as the natural tendencies to act in accord with Confucian virtues. Addressing his students, Lu said: "Ears naturally hear, eyes naturally see, in serving parents one is naturally capable of being filial, and in serving elder brothers one is naturally capable of being fraternal; originally there was nothing lacking and no need to seek from the other, for all rested on one's taking a stand."<sup>29</sup> Along with his emphasis on the power inherent in the original mind for transforming oneself into an ethical person, Lu sometimes spoke of himself as a transcendent person. He reflected: "When there is nothing for me to take care of, I seem to be a completely ignorant and incompetent person. But when something requires my attention, I actually seem to be an all-knowing and all-capable person."<sup>30</sup> On another occasion, his imagery soared: "Raising my head to reach the southern stars, turning myself over to lean on the Big Dipper, lifting my head to gaze about beyond the heavens, there is no one like me!"<sup>31</sup> Lu's vision was far more romantic than Ch'en's dreams of becoming a hero and masterminding military campaigns.

Lu's faith in the power of the original mind was also expressed in philosophical pronouncements. The most famous were "the universe is my mind, and my mind is the universe" and "mind is principle."<sup>32</sup> These slogans and ideas were similar to Chang Chiu-ch'eng's. Because principle was generally understood by *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians to include a speculative or "metaphysical" level, Lu's sloganeering has sometimes been interpreted as expressing an extreme philosophical subjectivism or a notion of universal mind producing objects of its thoughts.<sup>33</sup> Although Lu did not provide us with philosophical treatises or rigorous definitions, his statements generally do not

support the view that he held to an extreme philosophical subjectivism wherein the mind projects ideas as objects. Rather Lu's subjectivism appears more simply to focus on the mind, as principle, extending value to things.

Frequently, Lu used the term "principle" in expressions (e.g., *tao-li*) denoting our second level of discourse—ethical principles and cultural values—rather than a more abstract level of principle. Sometimes his use of "principle" by itself appears to connote the metaphysical level of principle, for principle "fills the universe" and "even Heaven and Earth and spiritual beings cannot deviate from it."<sup>34</sup> More often, Lu spoke of principle and *Tao* in ways that reveal that he simply had an existential sense that there were norms or patterns in things. For example, he wrote: "This *Tao* fills the universe, and Heaven and Earth follow it in their movements; therefore, the days, months, and seasons circulate without error."<sup>35</sup> Here, the norm or pattern inherent in nature is the basis for regularities in the physical universe. He explicated the philosophical linkage more clearly in a letter: "The *Tao* fills the universe with nothing hidden or excluded from it. With reference to Heaven, it is called yin and yang cosmic forces; with reference to Earth, it is called softness and hardness; and with reference to people, it is called humaneness and rightness. Therefore, humaneness and rightness are people's original minds."<sup>36</sup> *Tao* was the pattern or norm operative as qualities inherent in actual entities in the three realms of Heaven, Earth, and Humankind. Where Chu Hsi relegated the two primal forces of yin and yang to the realm of forms, in contrast to that which transcends determinate form, Lu rejected this bifurcation or distinction between levels of the *Tao*. Thus, to Lu, there was nothing outside of the *Tao* and no *Tao* extraneous to things or the mind.<sup>37</sup>

These differences also reflected their understandings of the mind. Building on Shun's famous sixteen-word message, Chu developed a polarity between the ethical *Tao* mind and the human mind, but Lu rejected Chu's sharp contrast as untenable. For instance, Lu told his students:

It is wrong to say that the human mind is identical with human artificiality, whereas the *Tao* mind is identical with Heaven's principle. By the human mind is meant people's minds in general. To be subtle means for the mind to be refined and that, if it is coarse to any extent, it will not be refined. It is wrong to say that one is human desires and the other is Heaven's principle. There are good and evil in man, and there are also good and evil in Heaven. [A note in the original adds the elucidation "such as eclipses and evil stars."] How can it be correct to ascribe all good to Heaven and all evil to man?<sup>38</sup>

Lu liked to reiterate the words of Mencius (6A/11) "humaneness is the human mind." Lu's view also had considerable resonance with the views of humaneness prevalent among such earlier followers of the Ch'engs as Hsieh

Liang-tso, Chang Chiu-ch'eng, Hu Hung, and Chang Shih.<sup>39</sup> In other words, mind was one with Confucian virtues and principles. Lu rarely talked about human nature and, when asked, equated it with the mind. To Chu, it was the inner nature that was one with these virtues and principle, whereas the mind enclosed the inner nature. As such, Chu largely regarded the mind as "formed to know" with a priori modes for understanding principles rather than as a repository of ethical principles per se.<sup>40</sup>

Criticisms of Buddhism could also be utilized to elaborate upon these fundamental differences over levels of reality and discourse. Were Buddhist philosophical assumptions about the nature of reality of primary importance? Or did the division between the two teachings come down simply to a fundamental cleavage in ethical practice? As we have seen, Chang Chiu-ch'eng focused on the latter as the Buddhist shortcoming. Disinclined to follow elaborate philosophical points, Lu Chiu-yüan consequently distinguished between the two traditions not on abstract philosophical grounds but rather in regard to human relations and values. Writing to a friend who was impressed with the benevolent purpose, common among both Buddhists and Confucians, to help people, Lu charged that the Buddhist goal of rescuing people from the wheel of transmigration and sufferings was really selfish, because it was founded on the desire to escape from the world. By contrast, even when in communion with the Mean beyond the restraints of space and form, Confucians always emphasized putting the world in order for the common good. Hence Confucianism upheld public-spiritedness and rightness. Observing that Sinitic Buddhism respected Confucianized family values, Lu claimed definitive proof that Confucianism was superior:

As Buddhists are human beings, how can they cast aside our Confucian humaneness and rightness? Even though they leave their families to lead monastic lives, they still want to repay the Four Kindnesses [of parents, teachers, the ruler, and benefactors]. Thus, in their daily lives, they of course sometimes preserve these principles, which are, after all, rooted in the human mind and cannot be obliterated. However, their doctrines did not arise in order to preserve these principles. Therefore, whether these principles are preserved or not is of insufficient importance to those who are advanced in the Buddhist way of life. . . . The Buddhists pity people because they have not escaped the wheel of transmigration but continue in the sea of life and death. Do our Confucian sages and worthies merely float and sink in this sea of life and death of theirs? Our sages and worthies are free from that which the Buddhists pity. The teachings of our sages did not arise for the sake of escaping from this world of life and death, and so do not emphasize it. Therefore, our Confucian sages and worthies are free from that which the Buddhists pity, but Buddhist sages and worthies are not free from those things about which we Confucians show concern.<sup>41</sup>

Although Lu acknowledged that he had read very few sutras, he claimed that anyone should be able to see the absolute incompatibility between the two teachings because of the difference between public-spirited rightness and selfish-oriented advantage. Despite its derisive tone, Lu's criticism of Buddhism focused, as Chang Chiu-ch'eng's had done, on issues of ethical cultivation and social values.

Although Chu also attacked the Buddhists for devaluing Confucian social and family values, he did not consider these ethical issues to be the fundamental divide between Buddhism and Confucianism. Probably reflecting on a letter in which Lu set forth this distinction as the primary one, Chu pointed to what he perceived to be the weakness of Lu's analysis:

Lu says that Buddhists and Confucians share the same view and that the only difference lies in the distinction between rightness and benefits as well as between the public interest and self-interest. I think this is wrong. If what Lu says were correct, we Confucians and the Buddhists would then maintain one and the same doctrine. If this were the case, can there be any difference at all even in terms of the distinction between what is right and what benefits? The truth is that the fundamental viewpoints are different: we Confucians say all the myriad principles are real, whereas they say all principles are empty.<sup>42</sup>

Thus Chu focused, in his criticism of Buddhism, on the level of speculative philosophy—the very level Lu avoided.

Chu Hsi's frequent condemnation of Buddhists for teaching "emptiness" ignored the evolution and complexity of Buddhist metaphysics. By Emptiness (*śūnyatā*), Indian Mahayana teachers did not mean a simple emptiness void of reality, for they had begun to identify true Emptiness with wondrous Being. Sinitic Mahayana monks had progressed to emphasize wondrous Being and to transform true Emptiness into wondrous Being. Similarly, Sinitic Ch'an masters had borrowed the Mencian terms "original mind" and "original nature" for Ch'an discussions of an absolutely good mind/nature that transcended good and evil in a relative sense. Because principle was regarded as ethical in *Tao-hsüeh* philosophy, Chu did not appreciate the Ch'an perspective and condemned it as amoral or nonmoral. Furthermore, in his characterizations of Buddhists' views of the mind and nature, Chu failed to perceive their use of essence and function imagery even though such imagery was comparable to his own. Owing to his devoted study of Ch'an for a decade as a young man, he had more knowledge of Buddhism than most members of the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship, and his characterizations of Buddhist doctrines of Emptiness and the mind have dominated much of later Confucian discussions of Buddhism. Although his criticisms of Buddhism remained rather superficial and his metaphysical distinctions between the two traditions were largely ill-informed, Chu perceptively pointed to Buddhist failures in ethical practice—the area, ironically, that he faulted Lu

for regarding as primary. Although Buddhists sought to actualize the original mind/nature in daily life, their totalistic view of enlightenment was impractical for almost all people and still harbored the escapist and selfish tendency for which Lu had condemned them. Allowing a degree of situational weighing to apply the Mean and sponsoring a gradual program of study to transform one's desires and physical nature, Chu had a comparatively more effective method for actualizing the original mind.<sup>43</sup> Even though we can observe some Buddhist influence on Chu himself, he was confident about his own orthodoxy although quite concerned about Buddhist inclinations he perceived in other Confucians.

Chu Hsi criticized Lu for having a Buddhist bent, the same proclivity for which he had earlier condemned Chang Chiu-ch'eng. Indeed, he saw Lu as continuing Chang's ideas. Chu focused on Lu's and Chang's identification of the mind with principle, their concentration on the mind instead of classical texts, and their common emphasis on a simple and easy path of cultivation leading to enlightenment. Like similar ideas among Buddhists, these notions evidenced what Chu regarded as laxity in self-cultivation, misperception of the complexity of human nature, and disregard for acquiring knowledge through the investigation of things. Although his condemnation of Buddhism focused on its philosophical perspective of Emptiness, Chu's concern about covert Ch'an influences among Confucians centered rather upon issues of study and cultivation. In comments to his own students, Chu was especially critical of Lu and condemned his Ch'an Buddhist leanings.<sup>44</sup>

When Lu reproached Chu for using Buddhistic terms, Chu retorted that conscious usage of common terms was of little significance if the philosophical standpoint differed. Replying with an implicit reference to Lu's deliberate avoidance of studying Buddhist sutras, Chu suggested that the problem of Buddhist influence resided in people, such as Lu, who imported Buddhist ideas into Confucian terminology.<sup>45</sup>

Lu regarded himself as teaching the philosophy of Mencius. In conversations with his students, he reminisced that his understanding of Confucianism was based on self-attained enlightenment while reading the *Mencius*.<sup>46</sup> He was happy to be put down as saying nothing more than Mencius had (in 6A/15): "Recently, someone commented about me that aside from saying, 'First build up the nobler part of your nature,' I had said nothing clever. When I heard this, I said, 'Very true indeed.'" <sup>47</sup> Furthermore, he boasted that after the death of Mencius, clarity of Confucian teachings began only with himself.<sup>48</sup> In other words, he was bypassing Chou Tun-i and the Ch'engs to claim direct transmission of the *Tao* from Mencius. This was a major challenge to Chu Hsi's version of the transmission of the *Tao*.

Over the centuries, some Confucians have agreed with Lu that his learning continued that of Mencius in a special way. Wang Shou-jen (Yang-ming, 1472-1529) drew attention to the common ground between Lu and Mencius:

“Though not the equal of the two Ch’engs for purity of character and equality of disposition, Lu nevertheless was able, through his simplicity and directness of mind, to connect up with the transmission from Mencius. Basically, his insistence that learning must be sought in the mind was simply one [with Mencius]. It is for this reason that I have adjudged the learning of Lu to be the learning of Mencius.”<sup>49</sup> Although this judgment was rendered in 1520 in connection with the first reprinting of Lu’s collected works since 1212, Lu has been a more vital figure in Chinese thought than this lapse of time would suggest. Those modern scholars who consider the Mencian view of the mind to be the core of mainstream Confucianism have defended Lu as being much more in line with Mencius than Chu Hsi was.<sup>50</sup> Insofar as one concentrates on the Mencian view of the original mind, it is not unreasonable to regard Lu’s standpoint as more purely Mencian. Nonetheless, Chu drew more from Mencius in some other areas, such as concepts of human nature and the role of spiritual cultivation.

Lu’s claim to the mantle of Mencius was pointedly dismissed in a famous but controversial remark by Chu upon Lu’s death. As an extraordinarily activist administrator of Ching-men in 1191 and 1192, Lu had apparently so exhausted himself that his chronic bleeding illness, probably tuberculosis, became acute. As an herbal medicine specialist well aware that his end was near, he bathed, put on new clothes, and sat calmly in meditation for two days before expiring peacefully. On hearing of Lu’s passing, Chu remarked that Kao-tzu had died.<sup>51</sup> Linking Lu to the one who debated Mencius on human nature, humaneness, rightness, and the mind, Chu was implicitly attacking Lu’s Buddhist leanings, for Chu had earlier criticized Lu’s and Buddhist teachings for being similar to Kao-tzu’s. He had focused particularly on Lu’s and Kao-tzu’s similarities regarding the character of rightness and efforts to maintain an unperturbed mind. Even if Chu intended to render a philosophical epitaph, his remark had implications beyond a purely philosophical statement. Given Mencius’ image as the arch defender of the *Tao* against assaults from heretical teachings, Chu’s implicit parallel between himself and Mencius suggested the role he sought in relation to the *Tao* and the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship. Though inappropriately voiced at a memorial service, Chu’s complaint could also have included regret that he would no longer be challenged by this friend whose personal integrity he respected.



## Chapter 9 *Chu Hsi and Lu Chiu-yüan*

Even more clearly than Chu's relationship with Ch'en Liang, Chu Hsi's relationship with Lu Chiu-yüan shows the impact of Lü Tsu-ch'ien's leadership through 1181 and the changed environment within *Tao-hsüeh* after Lü's death. As for Ch'en Liang, Lü Tsu-ch'ien served as the bridge between Chu and Lu. Other studies have generally viewed Lü Tsu-ch'ien as little more than a conduit between these two protagonists, but his leadership and ideas were crucial to the triadic relationship.

With Lü Tsu-ch'ien's recognition of Lu Chiu-yüan's talent in the 1172 *chin-shih* examination, Lu gained instant renown because of Lü's prestige. Lü wrote to friends about Lu's scholarship and character, and various members of Lü's circle began talking about him. When Lu Chiu-ling visited in 1173, Lü reported to Chu that this visitor possessed the virtues of filiality and fraternity and that both Lu brothers had established resolve. Although they had earlier been biased in their studies, they had made rapid progress and now inquired about the *Tao* from all quarters. Replying that he had known of Lu Chiu-ling for a long time, Chu expressed reservations about Lu's ideas, for he had heard from a mutual friend that the Lus were comparable to Chang Chiu-ch'eng. In a following letter, Chu voiced concern that Lu Chiu-yüan might be using Confucian language to express Ch'an ideas; this was the vice for which Chu had condemned Chang. After Lu Chiu-yüan visited the Lüs in 1174, Chu replied to a letter from Lü's brother that it appeared that Lu Chiu-yüan disregarded classical texts in favor of a leap to grasp the fundamental mind of the sages. Chu further communicated to the

Lü's that he welcomed an opportunity to meet with Lu to settle some of the doubts that he and others had about Lu's learning. Thus began what has endured as the most famous and thoroughly studied of all interactions between twelfth-century Confucians.<sup>1</sup>

Lü arranged for Chu and these two Lu brothers to meet together in the sixth month of 1175 at the Goose Lake Monastery in southeastern Kiangsi. Near a major overland trade route from Fukien to Hangchow, the site was reasonably convenient for Chu and Lü. The Lus could travel most of the distance by boat before being carried by sedan chairs up the mountain. Since it was a resort area, the scholars spent between five and twelve days relaxing there. On occasion during several of these days, Lü mediated discussions between Chu and the Lus. Confident and assertive, the Lu brothers did not concede anything to Chu and, in their poems, even toyed with his positions. For the eleven or more literati in attendance at the meeting, the exchange was both stimulating and troubling because of the diversity of views and the failure to achieve a consensus. Even though Lü's original purpose was simply to get his friends acquainted with one another, the substantial differences brought forth in dialogue at the meeting quickly became the focus of attention. One of Lu's students has presented Lü as a neutral arbitrator. Lu himself recounted that Lü listened with an open mind but also claimed that Lü became mired in Chu's stance. Statements in some of Lü's letters reveal that both before and after the meeting, he sided with Chu regarding the major issue, the importance of textual scholarship in pedagogy and personal cultivation. As we have seen, although Lü also emphasized recovering the original mind, textual scholarship had an even higher priority in Lü's agenda than in Chu's.

Responding to Chang Shih's inquiry about whether the Lus had been willing to listen at Goose Lake, Chu crystallized what troubled scholars about the Lus. Chu reported: "Their flaw resides precisely in disregarding scholarship and devoting themselves solely to practice. In their practice, they just want people to engage in self-examination and awaken to the original mind; this is the crux of their flaw."<sup>2</sup>

Although in retrospect the Goose Lake Debate has been seen as the watershed dividing Lu's and Chu's schools, developments over the next several years suggest otherwise. Relations remained cordial, and Chu began direct correspondence with the Lu brothers. Individually in their correspondence about the debate, both Chu and Lü criticized the Lus for being too self-confident and dispensing with scholarship in favor of a direct encounter with their original minds. In spite of this laxity regarding study, which was a significant component of cultivation, Chu began to praise the character of the Lu brothers. During the late 1170s, Chu and Lü were mild in their criticism of the Lu brothers—perhaps in large part because the Lus were coming to appreciate the role of study and classical texts.

In the five years after the Goose Lake Debate, Lu Chiu-ling moved progressively toward an appreciation of Lü's and Chu's scholarship. When his stepmother died in 1177, he wrote to Chu with detailed questions about mourning rites. When Chu criticized some of the Lu family's observances, Lu Chiu-ling accepted Chu's admonitions, but Lu Chiu-yüan did not. In the second month of 1179, Lu Chiu-ling also journeyed to a Buddhist monastery on Ch'ien Mountain in Hsin-chou to call on Chu. Chu had gone this far to await final word on his appointment as prefect of Nan-k'ang. One of Chu's students was impressed that "every time Lu discussed something, he was certain to cite the *Analects*."<sup>3</sup> Reporting to Chang Shih on this three-day visit, Lu said that he still had (unspecified) reservations about Chu's viewpoint. Nevertheless, the pains Lu took to base his comments on the *Analects* illustrate just how far he had come since Goose Lake, when he had criticized Chu for focusing on the residual texts of the sages. Although he had earlier been critical of writing commentaries, he now repeatedly praised Chu's commentary on the *Doctrine of the Mean*. During the tenth month of 1179, Lu Chiu-ling traveled to Wu-chou to visit Lü. Writing to Chu about the visit, Lü issued a progress report: "Lu Chiu-ling recently came through and stayed for more than twenty days. Acknowledging that his opinions at Goose Lake were completely wrong, he profoundly desires to record truths, read books, and discuss scholarship; such a tranquil mind and subdued demeanor are very rare among our mutual acquaintances."<sup>4</sup> When Lu Chiu-ling died unexpectedly from an illness in 1180, Chu and Lü exchanged letters expressing the loss to their circle. Chu's eulogy further praised Lu for progressive maturation and proclaimed, "Our *Taos* joined in agreement and our wills became the same."<sup>5</sup>

Lu Chiu-yüan also progressed after the Goose Lake meeting toward Chu and Lü's standpoint on the importance of reading texts. Writing to Lü in 1179, Chu observed from Lu's letters to various individuals: "Lu actually tells others they must read books and discuss scholarship; hence, he realizes the error of his former theories. Yet he's unwilling to confess completely about being wrong in the past but correct today."<sup>6</sup> Writing again the following year, Chu reiterated that letters from various friends in Kiangsi confirmed that Lu had changed his fundamental viewpoint and was teaching the reading of texts.

Chu's sense of Lu's progress was also reinforced through conversations with many of Lu's students who, seeking instruction, made the short trek northward to Nan-k'ang. Two of Lu's major students, Ts'ao Chien (Li-chih, 1147-1183) and Wan Jen-chieh (fl. 1180), most impressed Chu, for they had forthrightly acknowledged Lu's errors. Although other students returned to Lu, these two students became Chu's disciples. Some of the others annoyed Chu with their obstinacy, however. Pao Yang (fl. 1180s) so disturbed Chu that he complained to Lu about this student's impression that

reading was an obstacle to embodying Confucian virtues. Lu responded by writing to reprimand Pao for his strange views. Afterwards, Pao returned to study with Chu in 1183. For several years after the Goose Lake meeting, tensions with the Lu school appeared to be abating as Lu and his students moved toward Chu's own view on the importance of reading texts.

Students, such as Pao Yang, who were slow to recognize the importance of reading texts demonstrated to Chu the consequence of Lu's failure to make a clean break with his earlier views; therefore, Chu redoubled his efforts. A planned meeting in 1180 had to be canceled when drought complicated Chu's administration of Nan-k'ang, and Lu had to attend to Lu Chiu-ling's funeral arrangements. Lu beseeched both Lü and Chu to write eulogies. Both eulogies pointed out, albeit politely, that Lu Chiu-ling had progressed from his earlier disregard for reading texts. In the second month of 1181, Lu came to pay a courtesy call on Chu to receive the eulogy. Given their shared sense of loss, the decorum of the circumstances encouraged seeking common ground rather than arguing. It was during this visit that at Chu's invitation, Lu delivered his famous lecture on the alternatives of seeking either rightness or advantage. Everyone was so moved that Chu had Lu's lecture inscribed on stone at the White Deer Grotto Academy. Overall, the visit went so well that Chu reported to Lü that Lu's position had changed quite a lot.

After the Nan-k'ang meeting, Chu exchanged evaluations of Lu with Lü Tsu-ch'ien. Writing to inquire if Lu had abandoned the opinions expressed at Goose Lake, Lü suggested: "Lu Chiu-yüan's flaw resides in looking at people rather than at principle."<sup>7</sup> He apparently meant that Lu focused on potentialities within people themselves rather than on universal and normative patterns that had to be studied. Chu Hsi replied that Lu's defect was even more fundamental. The Ch'an imprint on Lu's thinking revealed itself in his ideas about learning being simple and easy, and in his disproportional emphasis on the internal (mind) over external affairs. Overly self-confident, Lu regarded others as wrong when they pointed to such Buddhist tendencies.<sup>8</sup> Chu planned for a meeting among the three at Lü's academy in Chin-hua to resolve differences; however, Lü passed away unexpectedly in the eighth month of 1181.

In his eulogy, Lu expressed appreciation for Lü Tsu-ch'ien's patient instruction, which had enabled him to reform some of his wild ideas. He also acknowledged that his brother, Chiu-ling, had gravitated toward Lü's standpoint during the last couple of years. Although Lu had not abandoned all of his earlier thinking, he had changed markedly since the Goose Lake meeting six years earlier. Even in the polite language of this funeral eulogy, Lu's statement about his progress over the last few years came close to a public confession of his former errors. No doubt, Chu was more pleased with Lu's eulogy than he had been with Ch'en's. Just as in the case of Ch'en,

Chu's relationship with Lu—after Lü's restraining influence had been laid to rest—gradually became more tense during the mid-1180s.

In 1183, Chu Hsi's epitaph to Ts'ao Chien aroused some tension. Ts'ao, one of Lu's most promising students, had begun studying with Chu at Nan-k'ang during the winter of 1179. When Ts'ao died at the early age of thirty-seven in the spring of 1183, his friends asked Chu to compose an epitaph. Writing such eulogies provided an opportunity for Chu to project his views of the fellowship. As Chu had done almost three years earlier on the death of Lu Chiu-ling, he included a discussion of Ts'ao's intellectual progression toward Chu's standpoint. According to Chu, Ts'ao had exceptional ability to read both ancient and more contemporary styles of literature. After reading Chu's edition of the surviving works of the Ch'eng brothers, he began to realize that therein resided the learning of the sages. Having heard that the Lu brothers regarded only what was apprehended by the mind to be learning and that their teachings transcended the reach of texts and words, he went to study with them. Yet he was not satisfied with what he acquired there. Wanting to travel to Hunan to study with Chang Shih, he wrote to Chang, who reported to Chu, "This is truly a person with whom one can share learning." Before he could call on Chang, Chang passed away. After coming to study with Chu and reviewing Chang's literary corpus, Ts'ao confessed the inadequacy of his previous learning (from Lu) and declared that he would thenceforth hold fast to an unwavering standpoint. Excelling in the philosophical investigation of things, he shared with friends his new understanding: "Learning must set priority on knowing the *Tao*; however, one could neither become enlightened upon hearing the *Tao* just once nor enter the way with one leap." From his experience, he had learned not to follow even what his teachers said—if in his mind he was not at peace with what he heard. This account of Ts'ao's progressive understanding delineated points of Chu's own continuing differences with Lu's philosophy.

Chu's stark account of Ts'ao's transcending Lu's views disturbed some of Lu's students, especially Pao Yang, who had come again in 1183 to study with Chu. Reporting Pao's discomfort with the eulogy, Chu forwarded it to Lu for comment. Sharing what he had written with Lu, Chu must have seen himself as continuing the genre of comments in his and Lü's 1180 eulogies to Lu Chiu-ling. But those tributes had been far more polite and indirect in speaking of Lu Chiu-ling's evolution. Chu's 1183 epitaph more explicitly detailed shortcomings that Ts'ao had realized in Lu's pedagogy.

What's more, Chu expanded the implicit claim to the transmission of the *Tao* that he had made in his eulogy to Lü Tsu-ch'ien in 1181. Citing Hu Hung, the teacher of the first person from whom Ts'ao had wanted to study, Chu presented ideal learning as "being broad but not adulterated and restrained but not restricted." Ts'ao had achieved that ideal. More importantly, "If Heaven had allowed him a normal lifespan to devote his energy,

the transmission of this *Tao* of ours could have been passed on!"<sup>10</sup> Thus Ts'ao had not only returned to Confucian truth but had also approached readiness to transmit the *Tao*. Quite clearly, Chu was tacitly claiming that he was in line to oversee the transmission of the *Tao*. In Chu's account of Ts'ao's progress to discipleship, there was also an implied suggestion that Chu was now the one teacher to transmit the *Tao*. Even though he did not reduce the beginnings of the fellowship to one lineal line of descent, Chu appears to have been moving toward that model for his own position in the 1180s.

Lu answered in the third month of 1184. Chu's record "contained points that did not quite attain the truth"; furthermore, Lu's own earlier letter to Ts'ao presented what he himself "would regard as a true and accurate record."<sup>11</sup> In that letter to Ts'ao, Lu had responded to Ts'ao's announcement that he was switching to Chu's side. Although Lu apparently had not objected initially to Ts'ao studying with Chu, Lu was upset over losing his influence over one of his most promising students. Lu reacted bitterly: "What you regard as having order is actually a loss of order, and what you regard as proven is actually without proof. . . . Though you set out to pursue correct learning, you ended up pursuing distorted learning. Using this misconception to propagate this *Tao* of ours will, I'm afraid, prove unfortunate for our *Tao*."<sup>12</sup>

Taking seriously his own standing in relation to the propagation of the Confucian *Tao*, Lu here fortuitously prefigured a rebuttal of Chu's claim, in the epitaph, to the orthodox transmission of the *Tao*. Directing Chu to his earlier letter to Ts'ao enabled Lu to avoid a more direct confrontation with Chu but still to register his dissent.

Chu Hsi was also still attempting in the early to mid-1180s to avoid conflict with Lu Chiu-yüan. Especially in correspondence with Hsiang An-shih (P'ing-fu, 1153-1208), Chu encouraged efforts to harmonize his own emphasis on study and inquiry and Lu's on honoring the moral nature. The controversy at Goose Lake over the role of reading had now been refocused in these terms, but the issue still remained one of modes of instruction. During this period, in his letters to Lu's students, Chu did not urge them to switch sides but rather to combine the best elements of both approaches. Likewise, in his correspondence with Lü Tsu-ch'ien's former students and colleagues in Chekiang, he advised them to overcome their hostility to Lu's camp and incorporate Lu's good points. Animosity arising between the two camps after Lü's death benefited Chu's projection of his own way as a middle path between them. With his sense that one side was oriented to Ch'an and the other to utilitarianism and expediency, Chu used them as foils to warn against a bias toward either the inner or the outer realm.

In 1185, Chu lamented: "In recent years *Tao-hsüeh* has been assaulted from the outside by pedestrian scholar-officials and ruined from within by

members of our faction.”<sup>13</sup> Chu was complaining about scholar-officials whose more prevailingly conventional understanding of Confucianism had led them to ridicule *Tao-hsüeh* men’s interpretations and antiquarian mannerisms. But he was clearly more disturbed by ideas arising within the fellowship, for he immediately lambasted Che-tung thinkers for their utilitarianism and Lu for espousing Ch’an Buddhism. In spite of his harsh words, it is significant that Chu still included the Che-tung and Lu schools within his *Tao* Confucian fellowship. Yet this condemnation of Lu was the strongest Chu had voiced since before the Nan-k’ang meeting in 1181. Chu also wrote directly to Lu during 1185 to complain of unspecified Buddhist ideas in Lu’s 1184 memorials, but their correspondence remained cordial. Most of Chu’s criticisms during 1185 and 1186 were aimed not at Lu directly, but at Lu’s students for their wild (Ch’an) ideas about enlightenment. As tension between students from the two schools mounted, Chu continued in 1186 to advise one of his own students that there “was no need to argue strenuously” with the Lu camp.<sup>14</sup>

By 1187, however, Chu opted for much sharper criticisms of the Lu school. “Formerly, just because our faction was weak, I did not want to arouse internal contradictions,” he explained. Speaking out straightforwardly against those influenced by Ch’an Buddhism could no longer be avoided because “recently I realized the depth of their flaws.”<sup>15</sup> Writing again to the student whom he had restrained from attacking Lu on two occasions during the previous year, Chu declared: “Because upon coming here last winter his disciples completely revealed themselves as wildly arrogant and extremely truculent, I will henceforth clearly drum them out and will never again be obsequious as I was earlier.”<sup>16</sup> Chu was enraged by the continuing Ch’an Buddhist influence within the Lu camp, which allegedly led Lu’s students to disdain the sages and discard rules of decorum. Early in the fifth month of 1187, he complained directly to Lu about such Ch’an influences as gross distinctions between inner and outer realms and denigrating the texts of the sages. He warned that this leaning toward Ch’an presented a grave danger to the *Tao*, and its ills were already evident. Rather than reprimanding these students, as in the case of Pao Yang over seven years earlier, Lu this time reported that he could not agree with Chu’s critique.

After Lu refused to admit his errors and correct his students, Chu directly attacked Lu early in 1188. Unless Lu first purged his own ills, the medicine dispensed through teaching would “only enhance their afflictions.”<sup>17</sup>

Two of Lu’s activities might also have swayed Chu to adopt a hard line. During 1187, Lu built Elephant Mountain Study and began teaching large numbers of students for the first time since the mid-1170s, coincidentally the time the two scholars first clashed. Perhaps, Lu’s return to full-time teaching oriented him toward setting forth differences from Chu and also augmented

Chu's concerns about the negative impact of Lu's influence. For about a decade, many of Lu's students had been coming to Chu for instruction, but now they and others would likely go to Elephant Mountain instead. Even if competition for students was not a consideration, Chu's complaints show that his misgivings about Lu's students were a major factor in his feelings about Lu.

Another factor was the controversy over Lu's essay for a memorial hall to Wang An-shih, the leader of the major reform of eleventh-century governmental institutions. Wang had also hailed from Fu-chou. The prefect of Fu-chou asked Lu to write an essay to commemorate the renovation of Wang's memorial hall. Submitting his essay during the first month of 1188, Lu gave Wang high marks and placed much of the blame for the failures of the reforms on Wang's opponents, including the forefathers of *Tao-hsüeh*. Lu's positive evaluation of Wang contrasted sharply with the view of most *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians, who condemned his character and blamed his reforms for the fall of the Northern Sung. Some modern scholars view Chu's evaluations of Wang against the backdrop of such *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians as Yang Shih; therefore, Chu appears quite balanced and fair by contrast.<sup>18</sup> Such studies have not included Lu in that spectrum. Including Lu would highlight Chu's dissatisfaction with positive evaluations of Wang. As soon as he read Lu's essay, Chu condemned it in letters to friends. For instance, complaining about recent views of Wang, he pointed to Lu's essay in particular: "Such use of argumentative writings arises from his scholarship being decadent and his perceptions being dim; moreover, his own private opinions make the essay even worse."<sup>19</sup> When Chu's students joined in with the attack on the essay, Lu belittled them for lacking scholarship and making wild remarks. Even Chu expressed dissatisfaction with the way his students had confronted Lu: "The debate over Wang An-shih involved inadequate consultation at the time, and various people joining the discussion were not helpful in the matter."<sup>20</sup>

While tensions flared, Chu became engaged in his second major debate with two of the Lu brothers. During 1186 and 1187, he exchanged letters with Lu Chiu-shao over Chou Tun-i's phrase "the Ultimate of Non-being and also the Supreme Ultimate." Over a decade earlier, Chu had written expositions of Chou's "Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate" and "Western Inscription," but he had been reluctant to show others his manuscripts. As he explained in his colophon when he finally published them early in 1188, "Most recent Confucians are of the opinion that these two works are errant."<sup>21</sup> He referred principally to two groups. First, the Lu brothers sought to use the Taoist origins of Chou's "Diagram" to deflect Chu's sharp criticism of their alleged Ch'an proclivity. Second, critics outside of the fellowship sought to counter Chu's presumption to represent orthodox Confucianism. Lin Li, for example, condemned Chu in the sixth



month of 1188 for contempt in declining a court position and for trumpeting *Tao-hsüeh* as orthodox learning. Lin Li had earlier argued with Chu over interpretations of the *Book of Changes* and Chou's "Western Inscription." In their rebuttals of Chu's assumed intellectual orthodoxy, it served both groups to point to heterodox influences on Chou's writings. After the controversy that had been aroused at court by Lin Li's criticisms, Chu returned home to find Lu Chiu-yüan's first letter on the question of the Ultimate.

Lu Chiu-yüan in 1188 took up the challenge to Chu's exposition of Chou's "Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate." The elder Lu had decided that Chu was so obsessed with just winning arguments that it was futile to continue their correspondence. When Lu stepped in to take his elder brother's place, Chu welcomed him and expressed the hope that Lu Chiu-yüan would not break off the exchange. By the following year, in his second letter, Chu had changed his mind about the fruitfulness of pursuing the subject with Lu. In an exasperated tone, Chu wrote:

The intent of your letters was to instruct me thoroughly, but near the end your words, such as "if you still have doubts" and "please instruct me," were certainly platitudes that I don't dare accept as deserved. Yet my trifling opinions perhaps should still be laid before you. What is your esteemed judgment about this? If you still don't agree with me, we can take things as they come, for it's all right for each to respect what he has learned and to practice what he knows. There is no hope that we could anticipate definitely having the same ideas. When I speak of this, my remorse is deeply felt, so be sure to consider [my pain and points].<sup>22</sup>

In addition to attempting to make Lu feel guilty, Chu was declaring that he saw no point in reiterating his views if Lu would continue to reject them. In his reply, Lu urged Chu to concede: "When a perceptive person makes a mistake, even a subtle hint from others will cause him to see his own error after a while; so I'm sure that you, old friend, must have already clearly realized these mistakes you made."<sup>23</sup>

The exchange of ideas thus ended in a stalemate in 1189. When Chu's son died in 1191, Lu wrote expressing condolences, and Chu acknowledged Lu's letter. Both letters were expressions of decorum but failed to heal the rift between the two men.

Lu had almost always been less critical of Chu than Chu had been of him; however, after the debate on the Ultimate, Lu turned bitter. Sending to a friend copies of his essay on Wang An-shih and three of his letters to Chu, Lu referred to his own essay and letters as "writings that clarify the *Tao*." Explaining why he was not sending along copies of Chu's letters, he dismissed them as not worth reading and as "confused and without understanding." Lu also pointed out that the term "heresy" (*i-tuan*) came from the *Analects*; nevertheless, in Confucius' day there were no Buddhists in China,

and Taoism was not yet influential. How then could heresy refer principally to these teachings rather than to errors among those, like Chu, who regarded themselves as followers of Confucius? The correct principle of Heaven and Earth permitted no duality or variance, but private opinions created confusion about this principle. "Principle must truly be thoroughly fathomed," as Chu claimed; unfortunately, "at the present time there is no one who can thoroughly fathom principle."<sup>24</sup> After the debate, Lu also made similar statements to his students, pointing to Chu as a heretic, and some of these students picked up this theme that Chu's learning was adulterated.<sup>25</sup>

Although Chu had generally respected Lu as a person and as a friend, Chu's criticisms became more pronounced after Lu's death; moreover, Chu drew the lines between the two schools more sharply. Most of the criticisms in Chu's *Classified Conversations* were recorded after Lu's death and charged him with having been influenced by Ch'an Buddhism in his views of texts, study, and personal cultivation. Still, several of his major students became Chu's disciples. Even Pao Yang, bringing along his brothers and students, came to Chu's academy to perform the rites of discipleship. A number of Lu's other students also submitted to Chu's teachings in the 1190s. Given the depth of traditional Confucian loyalties to teachers, such shifts to Chu must have afforded him considerable assurance. The remnant followers of the Lu school continued to be disturbing, for Chu condemned them for lack of decorum and for talking nonsense.<sup>26</sup> These charges of speaking nonsense and being dominated by Ch'an implied that Chu had doubts about their membership in the fellowship.

Notwithstanding his enhanced criticism of the Lu school, Chu had become even more disparaging of the Che-tung utilitarians. In contrast to the period through the early 1180s, Chu's statements from the late 1180s through the 1190s tended to be more critical of those associated with Lü Tsu-ch'ien's school than of the Lu brothers. Chu condemned his old friend for being wrong more than Lu. Lü had focused on the secondary and external, Lu on the primary and internal. Scholarship in Lü's school had a tail but no head, and Lu's learning had a head but no tail; Ch'an Buddhism lacked both head and tail.<sup>27</sup> Although he continued to see himself as the Mean between the extreme positions of these two rival groups, Chu's language suggests that by the 1190s he had greater hope of establishing common ground with Lu's former students than with Lü's.

#### PEDAGOGY AND READING THE CLASSICS

Although various issues were discussed at the Goose Lake meeting, pedagogy was the one that loomed largest in the accounts of the partici-

pants. At this get-acquainted meeting, the Lu brothers summarized their views in poems. Setting the agenda, Lu Chiu-ling's poem complained that by concentrating on the residual texts of the sages one easily lost sight of learning the mind of the sages. Pointing at Chu's writing of commentaries and explication of words in the classics, the elder Lu was rebuking him. After a group discussion of the first poem, Lu Chiu-yüan presented his poem, which culminated:

Easy and simple effort brings lasting greatness.  
Fragmented work stays drifting and aimless.  
To know how to mount from the lower to the higher,  
Find out truth and falsehood this very day.<sup>28</sup>

According to Lu's recollections, Chu's face blanched upon hearing this poem, so the group adjourned the session in order to relax. This poem was an even more biting critique of Chu's scholarship for being fragmented and aimless. Using imagery of drops over time forming an ocean, Lu sought to present a natural and spontaneous process of learning to become a sage, a process that was simple and easy. All that was needed was a firm resolve and practice over time to realize one's original mind.

After his poem, Lu Chiu-yüan further belittled Chu Hsi's textual scholarship by raising the following question: "Before the time of the sages Yao and Shun, what book was there to read?"<sup>29</sup> Such early sages had surely become sages by cultivating their original minds, because they had no texts to study. Implicitly, Lu was making a radical conclusion by drawing together two assumptions about sagehood and textual scholarship. After texts became available for study, there were fewer sages; moreover, the quest for sagehood had lapsed during the golden era of classical commentaries.

One of the witnesses of the debate recalled the issue of pedagogy:

At the Goose Lake meeting when the discussion came to teaching others, Chu's intent was to have people first read widely before leading them back to the essential. The two Lu brothers proposed to have people first discover their original minds before reading extensively. Chu regarded Lu's teaching method as overly simplified, and the Lu brothers regarded Chu's method as fragmented, so they could not agree.<sup>30</sup>

This difference in approach has become a standard for discussing the discrepancy between Chu and the Lu brothers. Lü also valued "reading extensively"; thus, he and Chu differed from the Lu brothers not so much on the value of reading as on its priority.

Responding to efforts to reconcile pedagogic approaches, Chu enhanced the tendency to put the debate in terms of the poles of "honoring the moral nature" and "following the path of inquiry and study" as set forth originally in section 27 of the *Doctrine of the Mean*. Declaring in 1183 that it would be

good to combine the best of both approaches, Chu borrowed this paradigm: "Now, what Lu Chiu-yüan talks about are matters pertaining exclusively to 'honoring the moral nature,' whereas in my daily discussions I have placed a greater emphasis on 'inquiry and study.'"<sup>31</sup> Later scholars often separated Chu and Lu according to this paradigm, but some modern scholars have pointed out that this conventional distinction is more apparent than real. Chu remained committed to the higher goal of honoring the moral nature, for knowledge served ethical values and spiritual cultivation.<sup>32</sup> The issue originally addressed in these terms involved methods of instruction rather than more sweeping philosophic differences.

Poems delivered by the Lu brothers at Goose Lake have contributed to another problematic conception of Lu Chiu-yüan's pedagogy in contrast to Chu's. Based on these poems along with some of Lu's other statements and Chu's characterizations of Lu's position, scholars have sometimes simply pictured Lu as largely indifferent to reading the classics and their commentaries. During the five years after the Goose Lake meeting, however, the Lu brothers changed their minds about the importance of reading. Aspects of the chronology and impact of that change have already been presented in the above section on Lu's relations with Chu. Despite Lu's moving toward Chu's—and Lü Tsu-ch'ien's—standpoint on reading, differences remained. On hearing of Chu's effort to combine inquiry and study with honoring the moral nature, Lu quipped: "Chu wanted to get rid of the defects and combine the merits of both sides. But I do not think this is possible. If one does not know anything about honoring the moral nature, how can there be inquiry and study in the first place?"<sup>33</sup>

Lu claimed that reading and studying were as essential to people as water was to fish; with study one could even transform one's natural endowment.<sup>34</sup> In his conversations with students, he frequently spoke of the necessity of reading texts. For example, Lu denied in 1183 that he told people not to read and proclaimed reading to be of utmost and primary importance.<sup>35</sup> He claimed, "Broad learning in texts is not harmful to self-realization!" Lu continued in a letter to a friend: "The *Doctrine of the Mean* (section 20) certainly talks of energetically taking action but only after study, inquiry, reflection, and evaluation. Now, the notion of self-attaining and energetically taking action, which you adopt, differs from the instructions set forth in the *Mean* and the *Mencius*."<sup>36</sup> Rather than being an obstacle to self-realization, broad learning was the prerequisite for action; hence, for Lu as for Chu, knowledge should proceed action. "When did I ever claim not to read?" Lu protested. "It's only that my reading differs from others."<sup>37</sup>

What was distinctive about Lu's way of reading books? Several general themes are evident. Lu appears to have been quite open to people following their own individual preferences in selecting books to read: "What one reads can be chosen as one pleases and the level of the reading can also be decided

by oneself, for no reading will be without benefit.”<sup>38</sup> In another letter, he mentioned his criteria for selecting readings for youths: “Whenever I teach the younger generation about reading, I choose books that are written clearly and in which affairs are easy to comprehend, then let them peruse them leisurely. I have them put what they have learned through reading into everyday practical use but not engage in empty talk and vacuous theories.”<sup>39</sup> This theme of reading leisurely was reiterated to Lu’s students, who were advised against being rushed or trying to get through too much material, for “in reading books, what is to be valued is reading carefully, thoroughly, and enthusiastically.”<sup>40</sup> Elsewhere, he elaborated for his students:

What is called reading should understand principles of affairs, evaluate situations, and discuss circumstances; for example, in reading history, one must see the reasons for victory and defeat as well as the points for being right and wrong. One leisurely lets oneself be immersed, and after a long time, one will naturally attain a certain prowess. If one reads only three to five chapters like this, it is better than reading thirty thousand chapters in haste.<sup>41</sup>

Such reading aimed at grasping the principles or “implicit meaning” of the text. Although one had to know the literal meaning, one would have “only the learning of children” if one focused on a literal understanding.<sup>42</sup>

So thoroughly had Lu Chiu-yüan read the classics that he came to consider that he had fathomed their fundamental and implicit meaning. Feeling that he had even embodied them in his own life, he remarked: “If in our study we know the fundamentals, then all the Six Classics are footnotes to us.”<sup>43</sup> The latter half of this pronouncement has sometimes been interpreted as an arrogant transcendence of the imperative to read the classics. In light of how thoroughly the classics permeated Lu’s own statements, it seems that he was simply trying to draw attention dramatically to the fundamentals of understanding through inner experience and away from bookish approaches to the classics. From the works he quoted in his own writings, it is clear that his own favorite readings were the classics, especially the *Analects*, the *Mencius*, and the *Book of Changes*. Although he also quoted from various histories and made references to diverse rulers and officials from the past, he most often used references to disciples of Confucius and Mencius to make his points. Often in the process of making these points, he displayed a profound understanding of central themes in the classics.

Although reading the classics was fundamental to Lu, his view of commentaries was more complex. In contrast to Chu and many other Sung Confucians, Lu never wrote a commentary on any of the classics. Indeed, he once contemptuously described latter-day commentators as “busybodies embellishing the classics to project themselves on the world and seize a reputation.”<sup>44</sup> In his own reading of the classics, Lu professed to look only at

ancient annotations, because the words of the ancients were sufficiently clear in themselves. As for the layers of commentary that had been added in later centuries, Lu cautioned students against exhausting and overburdening themselves.<sup>45</sup> Before inferring that such statements entailed a blanket rejection of commentaries, one should note that Lu also advised: "In reading the classics, latter-day students must read the commentaries and the expositions of earlier scholars; otherwise, sticking to their own viewpoint and theories, they will surely enter the realm of regarding themselves as correct and conveniently disregard the ancients."<sup>46</sup> He sought the implicit meaning of the sages through a thorough, careful, and enthusiastic reading of the classics themselves.

What about Chu Hsi's conception of reading? Chu had far greater confidence in the power of book-learning to access the sages' minds through the principles detailed in accounts of their words and deeds. Although "only a matter of second order," book-learning could nourish ethical values and cultivation; moreover, "essentials come entirely from erudition."<sup>47</sup> As Professor Yü Ying-shih documents, Chu gave knowledge significant autonomy, for it was the foundation on which ethics and morality were established. Indeed, Chu's pedagogy and classical scholarship are known well enough to move quickly to an overall comparison with Lu's.<sup>48</sup>

Lu's comments on reading reveal that his way of reading books did differ from Chu Hsi's, for Lu's approach was more casual and less structured. Whereas Lu either allowed people to read whatever they pleased or started them with unspecified simple readings, Chu had a structured program wherein one read the Four Books—beginning with the *Great Learning* and the *Mencius*, then the *Analects*, and later the *Doctrine of the Mean*—before attempting the other classics. To assist others in reading these Four Books, Chu wrote a series of commentaries, perhaps his singularly most important intellectual and pedagogical endeavor. Only after a firm grasp of the principles in the classics had been attained would Chu recommend proceeding to more diverse and secondary readings, such as the histories. In getting established in learning, Chu wanted scholars to acquire their understanding of essentials of the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition from his compilation *Reflections on Things at Hand*. Otherwise, students could become confused when immersed in the writings of the founding masters of the tradition or misguided easily by the writings of their disciples. Similarly, in contrast to Lü's rules for academies and Chu's principles for study, Lu simply dispensed with customary school rules altogether. Yet strict about details of etiquette, he, for example, would never allow students to cross their legs while eating.<sup>49</sup> Although Chu also emphasized that reading a few texts thoroughly was more important than a cursory reading of many texts, Lu's statements in this regard clearly indicate that he was satisfied with far less extensive and diverse reading than was Chu. These differences over reading strategies

arose in part from the audience being addressed. Some of Lu's statements, such as his suggesting that any book one read would be beneficial, suggest an audience much broader than just literati. Although as a local official, Chu did address mass audiences, characteristically he concentrated on the literati far more than Lu did.

Although such differences are real, it is unfair to dismiss Lu simply as being intuitively spontaneous or as placing little value on reading the classics. These differences are also relative to and within a spectrum of twelfth-century Confucians. Chu presented himself in 1191 as the Mean on this spectrum between those like Lu, who stressed essentialism, and former associates of Lü Tsu-ch'ien, who valued erudition:

In learning we must first establish a base. Its beginning is rather simple, starting with what is essential to moral practice. The middle part is very broad. In the end, however, it returns to what is essential. Scholars nowadays are fond of the essentialist approach and do not pursue broad knowledge. . . . The problem is, without an extensive knowledge, how can we test the authenticity or falsity of what we hold to be essential? . . . There are other scholars who are only after erudition, but never return to what is essential. They study one institution today and another institution tomorrow, exerting themselves only in the investigation of the functional aspects of the *Tao*. They are even worse than the essentialists.<sup>50</sup>

Regarding erudition, Chu had actually been closer to Lü during the 1170s. As we have seen in other statements after Lü's death in 1181, however, Chu eventually condemned Wu-chou trends as more deviant than Lu's. For an illustration of Chu's and Lu's differences in reading texts, we turn to their debate over the Ultimate.

#### DEBATE OVER THE ULTIMATE

In 1187, Lu Chiu-shao challenged Chu's use of Chou Tun-i's "Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate." Lu pointed out that the term *wu-chi* (Ultimate of Non-being), which was found in the "Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate," did not occur in Chou's *Penetrating the Book of Changes*. (I will follow convention in translating *wu-chi* as Ultimate of Non-being; however, it might be more expressive of their respective interpretations to render the term as "ultimate non-being" for the Lus and as "formless ultimate" for Chu.<sup>51</sup> In either case, the Western philosophical *problematique* of universal form is not at issue here, and thinking in those terms would simply distract from the Chinese discussion.) According to Lu Chiu-shao, the "Explanation of the Diagram" was either another

person's work, which Chou merely transmitted, or the product of his own early and immature thinking. Because he did not speak of the Ultimate of Non-being in his mature writings, Chou must have realized that the concept was invalid. In *Penetrating the Changes*, Chou had advised, "Stop only in the Mean." Since this Mean was the same as the One from which the many were produced, the Mean was the Supreme Ultimate. Hence Chou had focused on the Mean within the production of actual entities instead of some abstracted "Ultimate of Non-being."<sup>52</sup> We should recall that the *Writings of Various Confucians for Propagating the Tao*, the earliest *Tao-hsüeh* anthology, had similarly sanctioned Chou's *Penetrating the Book of Changes* but omitted the "Explanation of the Diagram."

Chu Hsi defended Chou's positing the concept of the Ultimate of Non-being above the Supreme Ultimate. In his first reply to Lu Chiu-shao, Chu argued: "If the Ultimate of Non-being were not mentioned, the Supreme Ultimate would appear to be the same as a finite thing and insufficient to serve as the foundation of the myriad things. If the Supreme Ultimate were not mentioned, the Ultimate of Non-being would be engulfed in emptiness and incapable of being the foundation of the myriad things."<sup>53</sup> So subtle and thorough was Chou's understanding of this mystery of the origins of all things, Chu claimed, that Chou's exposition was "timeless and irrefutable." In his second reply, Chu reiterated the point that Chou had introduced this concept, the Ultimate of Non-being, to guard against people mistaking the Supreme Ultimate for simply another empirical entity. In these letters, Chu also inquired about Lu Chiu-yüan's opinion and claimed that if there were any problems with Chou's exposition, the fault resided in the reader rather than in Chou's text. As Chu had done in his debate with Ch'en Liang, he was suggesting that his opponent's views arose from personal failings. He was also looking past his immediate challenger to Lu Chiu-yüan.

To counter Chu's criticism that Lu Chiu-shao had dealt lightly with Chou's writings, Lu Chiu-yüan charged that Chu himself was guilty of having little regard for the wisdom of the sages as recorded in the classics. Specifically, the sages had employed the term "Supreme Ultimate" to refer to the foundation of the myriad things. In the "Appended Remarks" of the *Book of Changes*, Confucius himself had spoken of the Supreme Ultimate as the foundation for change. Confucius' presupposition here was Being. The ancient sage did not mention a notion of Non-being, so he did not feel a need to guard against any supposed danger of people regarding the Supreme Ultimate as simply another finite entity. Confucius had simply discovered the principle of the Supreme Ultimate, which possessed the intrinsic attribute of being the foundation of all things. Since Confucius himself had settled the matter, there was no need for later scholars to belittle his solution by adding on the notion of an Ultimate of Non-being. Lu also cited from Confucius' "Appended Remarks": "That which exists before and without



determinate form is the *Tao*"; and "The successive movement of yin and yang constitutes the *Tao*."<sup>54</sup>

Based on these passages in the classics, Lu reasoned:

The successive movement of yin and yang already exists before physical forms; how much more the Supreme Ultimate! Anyone who understands textual meaning will comprehend this. In all the centuries from the "Appended Remarks" until the present, I have never heard of anyone mistakenly regarding the Supreme Ultimate as just another finite entity. Supposing there was someone so stupid as to be unable to get the point from these passages. How could he possibly be helped simply by our old master Chou adding the two words "Ultimate of Non-being" to the Supreme Ultimate?<sup>55</sup>

If Chu were so concerned about students mistaking the Supreme Ultimate for a physical entity, Lu advised him to remain within the bounds of the classics: simply adopt the words "invisible and inaudible," which the *Book of Poetry* (Ode 235) had used to describe the transcendent character of Heaven.

Beyond being superfluous, the notion of the "Ultimate of Non-being" led one, Lu asserted, to stray from the Confucian classics into Taoism. First, as Chu Chen's scholarship had already established by the 1130s, Chou had received the "Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate" from a follower of Ch'en T'uan (906-989), a Taoist monk. Second, the term "Ultimate of Non-being" had been coined by Lao-tzu himself. It never appeared in the Confucian classics, and Lao-tzu had used it in the twenty-eighth chapter of *The Way and Its Power* (*Tao-te ching*). Third, according to Lao-tzu's first chapter, that without name was the origin of Heaven and Earth, and that with name was the mother of all things. This primary thesis of Lao-tzu had, Lu asserted, the same meaning as Chou's "the Ultimate of Non-being and then the Supreme Ultimate." Finally, in giving so much attention to the Ultimate of Non-being, Chu Hsi was not dealing adequately with the scholarship of the early *Tao-hsüeh* masters. Even if Chou had written the "Explanation of the Diagram," he never used the term in his later work. The Ch'eng brothers had studied with him, but their voluminous writings and recorded sayings contained no mention of the Ultimate of Non-being. Furthermore, the Ch'eng brothers and various other contemporaries knew Chou far better than P'an Hsing-ssu (fl. late eleventh century), on whose account Chu Hsi allegedly depended. Scholars within the fellowship had paid scant attention to P'an's biography until Chu Hsi revived it, so Lu asked him to justify taking P'an's account of Chou more seriously than that of the Ch'eng brothers.<sup>56</sup>

Because the genealogy of a concept or text was crucial to Confucians in evaluating its validity, Lu had raised serious questions about the orthodoxy

of a concept and text that was crucial to Chu's version of the tradition. Chu Hsi rejected the alleged transmission from Ch'en T'uan on the grounds that P'an Hsing-ssu's eulogy for Chou did not mention this connection. Having dismissed Ch'en T'uan as the source for Chou's "Diagram," Chu Hsi was free to claim that Chou's insight was his own and not inherited from others. In his recent essay, Teng Kuang-ming refutes Chu Chen's account of Chou's connections to Ch'en T'uan, but he also shows that Chu Hsi was wrong to deny Taoist influences upon Chou's "Diagram."<sup>57</sup>

Chu Hsi made no direct response to Lu's inquiry about earlier scholarship on Chou Tun-i but did address the problem of Chou's introducing a new term into the tradition. Suggesting that there was nothing wrong with introducing a new term, Chu pointed out that ancient sages before Confucius had not used the concept of the Supreme Ultimate. Confucius had indeed only spoken of the Supreme Ultimate, and Chou had interjected the Ultimate of Non-being. Chu sought to downplay the discrepancy on the grounds that both early and later sages shared the same principle. He asserted: "If there were penetrating insight to perceive the true essence of the Supreme Ultimate, one would understand that those sages who did not speak of the Ultimate of Non-being were not lacking, and those who did speak of it did not have more knowledge."<sup>58</sup> In other words, Chu was arguing that it did not really matter that sages of antiquity had never used the term.

Nonetheless, Chou's profound insight into the true essence of the Supreme Ultimate enabled him, Chu claimed, to "grasp a secret that had not been transmitted to a thousand earlier sages."<sup>59</sup> Hence Chou coined the term "Ultimate of Non-being" to express the insight that the Supreme Ultimate did not belong to the realms of Being and Non-being. Believing that Chou's term as well as his own exposition of it had enriched understanding of the foundation of all things, Chu set aside Lu's objection that Confucius had settled the matter and no new terms were needed.

Chu also sought to defend Chou against the charge of being Taoistic. Lao-tzu's Ultimate of Non-being meant "limitless" or "infinite." Chuang-tzu had similarly spoken of wandering leisurely in the wilderness of the Ultimate of Non-being. Chou's Ultimate of Non-being was not empty or without the principle of giving life to all things; hence, his use of the term differed from these ancient Taoists. Lu's confusion of such issues resulted, Chu alleged, from "simply following the words of the text to give forth explanations" as conventional Confucian scholars had done.<sup>60</sup>

Lu's more literal reading of the classics also led him, Chu was suggesting, into other misguided impressions. As already discussed, Lu himself advised students to seek the implicit meaning and not just the literal meaning of what they read. Compared with Chu, Lu was still relatively more literal in his reading of texts. In the case of the quotations from Confucius'

“Appended Remarks,” Chu asserted that Lu was wrong to deduce that yin and yang were above determinate form. It was only the principle inherent within the alternation of these cosmic forces that transcended form. If Lu insisted on placing these cosmic forces on the same plane with the *Tao* or the Supreme Ultimate, he would mislead people into thinking that the Supreme Ultimate was merely a finite, material entity. It was to avoid such confusion that Chou coined the term “Ultimate of Non-being” to suggest the nonmateriality of the Supreme Ultimate.

Chu also challenged Lu’s interpretation of the Ultimate as the Mean. In the case of the term “Supreme Ultimate” in the classics, Chu said that the Ultimate simply meant the utmost beyond which words could not describe. Lu had cited usages in various physical and institutional settings where Ultimate also suggested the Mean or middle. For instance, the ridgepole along the top of a roof was equidistant from all sides. Chu countered that people had later noted the centrality that was characteristic of such things, but originally it was the quality of the utmost inherent within such entities that led people to employ the word ultimate to designate them. Lu was assuming that the ancients began reasoning from observations of empirical forms to reach more abstract principles. But Chu apparently believed that the ancients began with more abstract reasoning that was then applied to explain physical things. Such instances suggest that Lu’s thinking centered on cultural values rather than Chu’s more abstract level of speculative philosophy.

Lu responded that Chu misrepresented him as positing the Supreme Ultimate on a level above the *Tao*. Chu regarded yin and yang as belonging to the realm within determinate forms, in contrast to the *Tao* and the Supreme Ultimate that transcended form to have a more abstract or universal status. From Chu’s perspective, Lu conflated and confused levels for discussing reality by presenting yin and yang as on the same level as the *Tao*. But Lu asserted that he had quoted passages from Confucius’ remarks on the *Book of Changes* simply to make the point that the *Tao* was nonmaterial and identified with the succession of yin and yang. In this classic, change itself (as the alternation of yin and yang cosmic forces) was the *Tao*. Several passages from the *Changes* reinforced this point, for instance: “In antiquity, the reason the sages composed the *Changes* was to follow the principles of human nature and destiny. Therefore, they determined the *Tao* of Heaven, which they called yin and yang; determined the *Tao* of Earth, which they called softness and hardness; and determined the human *Tao*, which they called humaneness and rightness.”<sup>61</sup> Lu’s more literal reading of the ancient text reflected the unified cultural view inherent therein before *Tao-hsüeh*. Confucians employed philosophical interpretations of the classics to address more abstract issues. Thus Chu’s adding the level of the Ultimate of Non-

being above the Supreme Ultimate suggested, to Lu, that Chu was the one who never really understood the Supreme Ultimate. As in the discussion on the Mean, Lu did not differentiate levels as sharply as Chu did.

Lu also defended his equating the Mean with the Ultimate and principle. The Mean and the Ultimate did differ when used as "empty terms" with descriptive or verbal functions. When used as "substantial terms," however, the Mean and the Ultimate referred to the same actual reality. Quoting from the first chapter of the *Doctrine of the Mean*, "the Mean is the great foundation of Heaven and Earth," Lu further exclaimed: "This is the utmost of principle; beyond this, is there any other Supreme Ultimate?"<sup>62</sup> Other classics, particularly the *Great Learning*, also spoke of knowing the utmost. The utmost merely meant principle: the Supreme Ultimate in the *Book of Changes*, or the imperial ultimate in the "Great Norm" chapter of the *Book of Documents*. Hence this principle—whether called the Mean or the Ultimate—referred to the same reality. Master Chou had continued teaching the Mean as the reality of Being in his *Penetrating the Changes*. The ancient Taoists had begun interjecting the concept of Non-being before Being, and it was that notion of Non-being that was reflected in the "Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate." Those within the school of the Confucian sages, however, had been unwilling to use the Taoist term "Ultimate of Non-being."

Chu Hsi replied that there was a fundamental difference between the Taoists' and Chou's concepts of Non-being. As Chu saw it, Lao-tzu had regarded Being and Non-being as two separate things; Chou regarded them as different aspects of one reality. Chu further borrowed another Taoist phrase, "taking action without deliberate action," to illustrate that Chou was not positing two separate entities but rather addressing two aspects of one reality. Furthermore, since Chou did no more than present perspectives for understanding principle as the utmost ultimate, it was ridiculous to present his "Explanation of the Diagram" as being in opposition to Confucianism. Chu thus countered that it was Lu himself, much like Lao-tzu, who was formalistically and forcefully separating Being and Non-being.

With such analysis of distinctions in meanings among passages using the same terms, Chu sought to refute Lu's proofs from the classics. Using the distinction between empty and substantial terms, Chu demonstrated that the phrase "knowing the utmost" (*chih chih*) meant different things in the two classics that Lu had quoted. In neither case did the utmost denote the utmost ultimate—as in the Supreme Ultimate. Indeed, the usage of "ultimate" in various contexts to denote the utmost standard had to be distinguished from later use of the term "Mean" because of the centrality of the utmost standard. Those usages in turn had to be demarcated from Chou's simple admonition to restrain one's physical expressions to be in accord

with the Mean. Although acknowledging that principle was inherent in both the Ultimate and the Mean, Chu was objecting that Lu used these terms more interchangeably than the ancients had.

At the very end of his letter, Chu reported that he had recently read a biography of Chou in a draft National History. According to a quotation in this source, the text in the "Explanation of the Diagram" read "from the Ultimate of Non-being and also became the Supreme Ultimate."<sup>63</sup> If Chou's work had originally contained these two extra words, "from" and "became" (*tzu . . . wei*), Chu said he would have to concede that Lu was correct. This wording would reinforce Lu's reading: "from the Ultimate of Non-being and then became the Supreme Ultimate." In other words, the two ultimates would, thus, appear to be two separate entities, and Chou would have been bifurcating reality into Non-being and Being—just as Lu had alleged. But Chu added that he personally suspected that the compilers of this National History had interjected the two additional words. In the end, the outcome of the exchange about the Ultimate of Non-being was even more inconclusive than it had started out to be. Although he had made erudite points about texts and philosophy, Chu could not refute the core of Lu's case about the Taoistic origins of the Diagram and Ultimate of Non-being.

#### TAO, OPINIONS, AND THE QUESTION OF CHU'S AUTHORITY

In spite of the inconclusiveness of the debate over the Ultimate, it was interlaced with a more critical but generally overlooked discussion about distinguishing objective truth from mere private opinions. Lu essentially questioned Chu's authority to define the tradition and the transmission of the *Tao*. This debate about the grounds for determining objectivity became more prominent in the second pair of letters. This last set of letters has conventionally attracted little scholarly attention. But differing views of objectivity began to surface even in the early stage of the exchange about the Ultimate.

Both sides early in the debate articulated concerns about their opponent being opinionated and obsessed with winning arguments. Chu chided Lu Chiu-shao for seeking merely to establish his own opinions instead of having an open mind toward his opponent's views. Frustrated by such preachments along with Chu's apparent rigidity and zest for winning, Lu Chiu-shao had declined to continue the discussion. Deciding to take his brother's place, Lu Chiu-yüan explained to a friend that even someone as exceptionally bright as Chu could not escape the common faults of having confused thinking, rigid theories, disregard for other views, and an addiction to winning. Good qualities inherent in all people, however, provided grounds for

confidence about making progress in personal cultivation and learning through discussion. When addressing Chu directly, Lu emphasized Chu's reputation for being receptive to exchanging views with friends. Nonetheless, just like having "only one male amongst a flock of females," Chu had attained such eminence that no one dared voice dissenting opinions. Lu admonished Chu to join him in "discussing principles according to the facts."<sup>64</sup>

Principle was not so easy to know, Chu replied. If one indeed had true insight into principle, one could easily distinguish what was right and wrong in another person's statements. Things were unfortunately more complex:

Regarding what we mean by principle, if it simply arises from the private viewpoint of an individual, a consensus of people's opinions would, I'm afraid, still be an insufficient basis for accepting or rejecting it. What's more, when principle is not yet clearly perceived, it is probably impossible to have a thorough understanding of the meaning of another's statements. So, how can one like you quickly dismiss the ancient texts as untrustworthy and simply entrust judgment to one's own mind?<sup>65</sup>

Chu professed his faith in the ultimate certainty of principle, but principle was not easy to know. A standard was needed for weighing individual views. A consensus of opinion reached through discussion, as Lu had advocated, was an inadequate gauge. Although he did not elaborate on the standard, Chu pointed to it indirectly in his charge against Lu for relying on judgments made within his own mind rather than those found in the texts of the tradition. Although Lu would not accept this characterization of his position, Chu had clearly drawn the lines—as he perceived them—between his more objective understanding of principle and Lu's more subjective reliance on the mind.

Lu Chiu-yüan responded with his own characterization of their shared predicament:

Lacking a constant teacher, we all seek in one direction and then another while wandering amid diverse opinions and confusion. *Even though we might consider that our own perception of principle is already clear, how are we to know that it's not merely our own private opinions or confused theories?* If we only follow familiar pronouncements and the many chime in with the one who sings out, how are we going to know our mistakes? This is extremely frightening! How fortunate that we have mutual doubts and cannot agree. Among comrades, it is appropriate for each to set forth his opinions completely in order to improve himself through discussions with others, so that everyone might return to the one, correct conclusion.<sup>66</sup>

The sentence that I have emphasized in this passage boldly framed a fundamental question about the objectivity of knowing. The way out of the raging sea of diverse private opinions was, according to Lu, to be found only through rigorous discussions with others committed to finding the answer. Another crucial function of the fellowship is evident here.

Lu also offered an explanation of why they were beset with such uncertainty. In antiquity, the situation had been different. What made the ancient sage Shun great was his willingness to humble himself in listening to others and his resolve to correct old views and adopt new ones discovered through discussions with others. Possessing simplicity and substance, the ancients first mastered the facts before attempting to elaborate theories. The classics reinforced this inclination by teaching people “to use facts to shed light on other facts.” Under such guidance, words corresponded with the reality of the affairs discussed. Nevertheless, “with the decline of the *Tao* during the Chou era, literary culture daily became more flourishing, factual truth became inundated by opinions, and classical teachings became hidden by argumentation and theories.”<sup>67</sup> Although we might accuse Lu of presenting value judgments in the guise of factual statements, he was confident that the substance of seeking the truth from facts had historically been replaced by excessive erudition and literary culture.

Lu then placed Chu within this devolution into opinionated erudition and literary refinement by comparing him to one of Confucius’ disciples. Although Tzu-kung had been taught personally by the master, he could not avoid being mired in excessive learning. Tzu-kung’s broad learning did not overcome his attachment to private opinions. Reminding Chu that Tzu-kung had been passed over when Confucius transmitted the *Tao*, Lu almost smirked: “How does your talent, my esteemed old friend, compare with that of Tzu-kung? The flaw of present-day scholars like you is much more profound than Tzu-kung’s.”<sup>68</sup> In light of Tzu-kung’s case, how could Chu be so confident about his own erudition in ancient texts? In addition to specific points about the Ultimate, Lu was thus seeking to undermine Chu’s standing as an authority on the classics, for it was from the platform of his exegesis of the classics that Chu pronounced standards and principles.

Rather than following the straightforward and simple teachings of the sages in the classics, Chu had spoken of the mysteries of Non-being and had praised Chou Tun-i for being privy to the secret of the Ultimate of Non-being, a secret for millennia unknown even by the sages. Although Chu argued that Chou’s discovery was in line with the *Tao* of the ancient sages, Lu easily exploited this “prophetic” and “solitary” side of Chou’s perception of the *Tao*:

My dear old friend, you spoke, on the one hand, of Non-being and, on the other hand, of Being; therefore, I don’t know how many mysterious

secrets were leaked. For example, you said . . . . Would it be that you have studied Ch'an Buddhism and learned such things? What I mean by leaking secrets refers to two inclinations: ordinarily delighting oneself in the mystery of one's theories and, frequently while teaching others, concealing this mystery and dwelling on the meaning of texts instead. In reality, neither of these two inclinations grasps reality but both only some trivial matters. Those with flawed endowments delight in these mysteries to give expression to their licentiousness; so who knows how many scholars with a good natural endowment have been entangled! These not only infect themselves but also others, and they are not a simple mistake of one word or action. I hope you won't linger long in such habits but will reform yourself.<sup>69</sup>

It is noteworthy here that Lu linked Chu's text-centered pedagogy to a fondness for esoteric theories. Lu also attacked the subjectivity in Chou's solitary perception of the essence of the Ultimate, an insight that Chu had lauded as a singular contribution to Confucian understanding of reality. Until revealed to Chou by Heaven and incorporated into a text of the tradition, the true essence of the Ultimate had been a mystery—according to Chu. This pronouncement was not one forced on Chu in the heat of debate.

Chu had similarly claimed in an 1172 letter to Chang Shih that "the secret" of the Ch'engs was simply Chou's "Diagram of the Ultimate."<sup>70</sup> Even though he did not offer it in the debate, Chu had a ready answer to Lu's point that the Ch'engs had never mentioned the Ultimate of Non-being in their own writings or to their own students. Apparently, it was simply a secret of such importance that it was not disclosed even to the inner circle of the fellowship. One should also recall that Chu himself had been reluctant to publish his exposition of Chou's work. The expressed reason was concern over his contemporaries' skepticism about Chou's work. Had he also been hesitant to draw attention to this secret discovered by Chou? In short, Chu implied in these comments that there was a component of essential truth that had neither been embodied in the classics nor made accessible to everyone.

Concluding his letter, Lu answered Chu's charge that he readily dismissed the classics. Lu claimed *only* to have no faith in this mystery of the Ultimate of Non-being. A notion not found in the Confucian classics, the Ultimate of Non-being should indeed not be used to judge Lu's willingness to accept or respect the classics.

Chu agreed that Lu's characterizations fit some of their contemporaries but denied their applicability to himself. There were scholars who delighted in the mystery of their own theories, as Lu had noted. Chu quickly added, "I find upon self-examination that I am not like those you described."<sup>71</sup> Quoting Lu's bold question concerning how one could know that one's percep-



tion of principle was really more than one's own private opinion, he lauded Lu's statement for being especially apropos. Instead of dealing with this question, however, Chu retorted that Lu himself should practice what he had preached about discovering one's own errors and reaching the one, correct conclusion. In both cases, Chu was simply dismissing complaints against himself without bothering to refute them. It is particularly disappointing that Chu did not see fit to respond straightforwardly to Lu's "apropos" question about how to distinguish principles from mere opinions.

Chu had more to say about Lu's portrayal of his advice about resolving disputes. Quoting Chu's admonitions to calm down before rejecting another's views, Lu had construed such advice as impractical because each side would want the other to settle down and accept its standpoint. Chu clarified his intent: "I wanted each side to put away the assumption that it was right and the other was wrong, and then and only then discuss principles according to the facts, so that the truth of right and wrong will be attained in the end."<sup>72</sup> Perhaps reflecting on Lu's reputation for perceptively handling cases as a magistrate, Chu reminded him that a judge before deciding a case should listen to the facts with an open mind and without prejudice. Similarly, if a scholar allowed personal emotions and rigid views to interfere, he would make mistakes even if trying to be fair.

As if these admonitions would not communicate clearly enough, Chu added a direct assault on the Lu brothers for their approach to the case at hand. Chu even ventured to distinguish the intentions each of the brothers had for their shared assumption about the Ultimate of Non-being. When Lu Chiu-shao set up his theory, he was so self-confident that he did not first conduct careful research. Furthermore, when someone pointed out the problems with his argument, he was unwilling to make retractions. Given his temperament, he had no intent to trick anyone; consequently, his problem arose simply from inadequate study. Lu Chiu-yüan's original intent, Chu further claimed, was flawed by the desire to prove his own theories and win arguments. He wanted to surpass Tzu-kung and had even less regard for Chou and the Ch'engs. It was with such intentions that Lu went over their words with a fine-toothed comb to find mistakes. Owing to such faults, the Lu brothers substituted groundless pronouncements for what the ancients really meant. The resulting exchange of letters had become superfluous. Thus, "if we carefully check the details, nothing in these letters has connected to the key points, and only desiring to win, we have just attacked each other."<sup>73</sup> If both parties had been open-minded, fair, and responsible, a conclusion could have been reached through a discussion of the actual facts. Chu, however, concluded that the attitude of his opponents frustrated any resolution.

In closing, Chu also returned to Confucius to reassert his own conception of the grounds for knowing and the transmission of the *Tao*. Although Lu

was certainly right that the sagehood of Confucius was not simply the product of diverse learning, Confucius had a love of inquiry and possessed broad learning. Moreover, it was the unity interlocking all his learning that distinguished Confucius as a sage. Based on this defense of learning as essential to sagehood, Chu addressed Lu's challenge about the transmission of the *Tao*:

The reasons Yen-tzu and Tseng-tzu alone received the transmission of the sage's learning were simply their broad literary culture (*wen*), strict propriety, and complete realization. They were not selected as a result of some empty fabrications. Although Tzu-kung did not receive the transmission of the *Tao* (*tao-t'ung*), what he knew also appears to have been no less than our contemporaries—even though he never had Ch'an learning as a camouflage. The time of Chou and the Ch'engs was much later than Mencius, but their *Taos* coincided.<sup>74</sup>

By comparing his contemporaries unfavorably with Tzu-kung because of their Ch'an ideas, Chu was also turning the tables on Lu for similarly criticizing him. Furthermore, Chu rested his case regarding his authority and perception of principle implicitly on broad literary learning, strict propriety, and complete realization of the unity of the *Tao*. Thus Chu here talked of the transmission of Confucianism in terms of a tripod of *wen*, *Tao*, and ethical conduct.

If standard dating of this letter to the first month of 1189 is correct, this letter was written two months before Chu's preface to his commentary on the *Mean*. Thus two months before his famous articulation of the term *tao-t'ung* in that preface, Chu was already using it to rebut Lu and to defend his own view that Chou and the Ch'engs had repossessed the transmission of the *Tao*. Such timing would make a case for Lu's challenge having played a role in stirring Chu to use the new term for the transmission of the *Tao*. Chu had coined the term in 1181.<sup>75</sup> Yet his letter to Lu was apparently the first occasion on which he used it as a major and forceful concept. This example would further demonstrate the importance of reading Chu's philosophy in the historical context of his confrontations with his contemporaries.

In conclusion, throughout their debate, Lu clearly challenged Chu's authority to interpret the classics and delineate the transmission of the *Tao*. From Lu's perspective, Chu simply confused individual opinions with an objective standard for determining the intent of the sages. In addition to attacking the "prophetic" component of Chu's approach to the *Tao*, Lu quoted the classics at considerable length to establish his views and challenge the accuracy and objectivity of Chu's interpretations. Contrary to conventional impressions, Lu drew attention to the need for some standard for distinguishing subjective opinions from more objective knowledge. Although Chu demonstrated his erudition in textual exegesis and proclaimed

the importance of finding principles in the text, he did not deal very effectively with Lu's probing questions about how to determine if one's perception of principle and the classics were any more than one's own subjective opinions. As one of his letters to Lü Tsu-ch'ien reveals, Chu had been disturbed for years about Lu's charge that his views were "merely opinions."<sup>76</sup> In his struggle with Lu over this issue, Chu's responses suggest that under the pressure of the debate, he had difficulty establishing the objectivity of his view of the *Tao* and his reading of the classics.

Lu consistently denied that Chu had apprehended the *Tao*. During the debate, for instance, Lu drew attention to Tzu-kung's reliance on learning as the reason for his having been excluded by Confucius from the transmission of the *Tao*. Chu similarly intellectualized the tradition. Pointing to Chu's extraordinary intellect as a fatal flaw, Lu told his students: "Although Chu's scholarship is as lofty as Mt. T'ai, it's a pity that he cannot reach the *Tao* through his learning. Therefore, he is essentially wasting his energy without making any inner progress."<sup>77</sup>

Although Lu's arguments that Chu exercised an inadequate degree of objectivity have generally been overlooked, some modern scholars have reconstructed Chu's hermeneutics regarding textual interpretation and the problem of objectivity.<sup>78</sup> Based largely on unconfrontational writings (principally comments to students and commentaries), they have provided a more systematic and reasoned presentation of views that Chu only assumed, asserted, and/or briefly defended in his contested exchanges with Lu. Chu had guidelines for respecting the integrity or autonomy of a text and obtaining objective knowledge through textual interpretation. Concern to have an objective standard for knowing principle led Chu to develop his rules for book-learning. Lu is mentioned in these studies usually to illustrate that Chu was similarly aware that the classics were ultimately a means to the reader's spiritual ends and had to be understood as an inner experience. Nonetheless, Chu went further than any earlier Confucian in intellectualizing the tradition and making knowledge the foundation of ethics and morals. From the perspective of Chu's system, Lu does appear *relatively* uninterested in book-learning and objective knowledge. But it is all too easy to regard Lu as being more subjective than he actually was.

Scholars have over the centuries discussed differences between Chu and Lu largely in terms of the question of whether the mind or the inner nature was equivalent to principle. The two men did not actually engage each other in a debate over this question. Since I have taken a more historical focus on topics that the participants decided were most crucial to address in their exchanges, I have not explored this issue. Nonetheless, this issue, involving some of their most fundamental assumptions, was not irrelevant. Regarding the mind as principle, Lu had greater confidence in reaching the truth through discussion and was wary of being led away from essential principles

by excessive book-learning. Lu's identification of yin and yang as the *Tao* also reflected his refusal to divide mind and principle into separate realms. Lu apparently did not share Chu's philosophical need either for a realm of abstract principles or for human nature to serve as intermediary between mind and principle.

In terms of principle, Chu has traditionally been credited with philosophically transcending Chou Tun-i by equating the Supreme Ultimate with principle. Lu actually identified the Supreme Ultimate with principle too. Lu differed in also equating these two concepts with the Mean, a step Chu was unwilling to take. Furthermore, Lu did not make the identification of principle with the Supreme Ultimate in order to establish, as Chu had, the priority of principle over psychophysical energy, for Lu was not driven by a metaphysical agenda.

Although the debate on the Ultimate ended inconclusively, modern scholars have generally given the victory to Chu in terms of philosophizing. Yet they have also conceded that Lu was correct about the Taoist origins of Chou's "Diagram" and Ultimate of Non-being. It is one measure of change in modern Confucian scholarship that even those who are attracted to Chu's philosophy no longer feel compelled to deny the origins of these components of his system.

Overall, Chu demonstrated his more analytical and scholarly reading of the classics. Lu's reading was more literal, straightforward, and holistic. Chu even complained about Lu "simply following the words of the classical text to give forth explanations" and "quoting extended passages in their entirety without becoming weary."<sup>79</sup> Lu's facility in quoting the classics to make his points should qualify widely held assumptions about his paltry level of seriousness or ability in reading the classics. Such impressions about Lu have been influenced by Chu's more dominant criticism of Lu for disregarding the classics and book-learning.

This more persistent aspect of Chu's caricature of Lu became entrenched among his followers, who also drew upon Chu's condemnation of the Lu camp for engaging in Ch'an thinking and disordering the *Tao*. As we have seen, after Lü Tsu-ch'ien's restraining influence was laid to rest, Chu and Lu asserted themselves more forcefully, and tensions between the two also spread among their students. In the process, the two masters and their followers became less tolerant and delineated the fellowship of the *Tao* more sharply. Even if Chu did not engage in *ad hominem* attacks on Lu, his condemnations of Lu for being contaminated by Ch'an and for laxity in both learning and cultivation were strident enough that Chu himself must bear some of the responsibility for frictions between them and their camps. Chu's followers did become more partisan than their master, but they had grounds in some of his statements for seeing themselves as continuing his struggle against those whose views would disorder the *Tao*. Some recent scholarship

has sought to correct the sharp dichotomy that has frequently been drawn in modern scholarship between Chu and Lu and also between their followers.

The present study has substantiated areas of agreement between the two friends but has nonetheless highlighted major points of disagreement. Such tensions contributed to the direction of *Tao-hsüeh's* evolution and thus should not be disregarded in historical reconstructions of the tradition. In the aftermath of the debates, during the thirteenth century, those under Chu's banner would succeed in gaining recognition of Chu's version of the tradition and succession of the *Tao*.

# P A R T 4 THE FOURTH PERIOD, 1202-1279

Although the ban against *Tao-hsüeh* ended in 1202, Li Hsin-ch'uan's retrospective essay on the movement, which was written that very year, carried the title "The Rise and Fall of *Tao-hsüeh*."<sup>1</sup> The first historian of the *Tao-hsüeh* movement was not at all optimistic about the state of the fellowship in 1202. Appearing almost moribund, it had reached its nadir at the end of two decades of politically charged controversy. In the 1239 preface to his history of the movement, Li would trace the resurgence of the fellowship as it gained government favor. By 1241, the emperor would publish an edict extending official recognition to the group. How did this happen?

Court politics dictated some changes of policy. Even Han T'o-chou realized by 1202 that the proscription had gone too far in alienating many intellectuals. In an attempt to marshal support in preparation for his war against the Jurchen, Han restored titles to individuals, such as Chu Hsi, who either had been forced into retirement or had died during the ban. He also offered government positions to some major *Tao-hsüeh* leaders who had been listed as members of the banned faction. Several from that list accepted posts. The most prominent of these were the utilitarians, Ch'en Fu-liang and Yeh Shih. Han also acquired the services of Huang Kan, Chu's son-in-law and the leader of Chu's disciples. Nevertheless, Han failed to galvanize such *Tao-hsüeh* leaders to his war effort. Even though participants in the fellowship had been known in the twelfth century for their hawkishness, these *Tao-hsüeh* scholar-officials in the early thirteenth century had reservations that

reflected Lü Tsu-ch'ien's and Chu Hsi's emphasis on self-strengthening and a defensive posture. Following defeat on the battlefield, the Sung court had to acquiesce to the Jurchen demand for Han's head, which was delivered in 1207. Fellowship leaders did not lament the demise of their chief opponent, even though he was removed in such a shameful manner. The new chief counselor, Shih Mi-yüan (1164-1233), continued the effort to appease the fellowship, when he had the court bestow an honorific title upon Chu Hsi in 1209.<sup>2</sup>

Li Tao-ch'uan (1170-1217) submitted a memorial in 1211 that set forth a *Tao-hsüeh* agenda. To improve the morale of scholars, the emperor should take three specific actions. First, the proscription against the fellowship should be publicly declared to have been a mistake. Second, Chu Hsi's commentaries to the Four Books should be used for the curriculum in the imperial university. Third, those honored in sacrifices at the Temple of Confucius should include Chou Tun-i, the Ch'eng brothers, Shao Yung, and Chang Tsai. Li presented these measures with the promise that the spirits of the literati would be revived, and therefore, talents would increase and governance would improve steadily.<sup>3</sup> Continuing hostility toward the fellowship in some quarters of the government made such an ambitious agenda premature. To mollify Li and other petitioners, however, the court in 1212 adopted Chu Hsi's commentaries on the *Analects* and the *Mencius* but not his more controversial ones on the *Doctrine of the Mean* and the *Great Learning*. During the remainder of the first quarter of the century, the court bestowed honorific titles upon Chang Shih, Chu Hsi, Lü Tsu-ch'ien, Lu Chiu-yüan, Chou Tun-i, the Ch'eng brothers, Chang Tsai, and even Chang Chiu-ch'eng.

When Ning-tsung died in 1224 without an heir, there was a succession crisis. Chief Counselor Shih Mi-yüan set aside an elder adopted heir, Prince Chi (d. 1225), in favor of a younger one, who was to become known as Li-tsung (r. 1224-1264). An uprising occurred in Hu-chou in reaction to what was seen as an illegal usurpation of Prince Chi's right to the throne. Although the prince had no prior knowledge of the uprising and did not approve of it, court agents implicated him and forced his suicide. In an attempt to revive the court's prestige, Shih appointed a number of *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians to high offices. When they petitioned for posthumous honors for Prince Chi, however, he purged them from office. Despite this setback, Li-tsung posthumously enfeoffed Chu Hsi in 1227 and 1229. These honors for Chu could be read as a response to the increasing threat from the Mongols, who destroyed the Hsi-Hsia Kingdom in northwestern China in 1227.

James Liu further surmises that as the Mongol threat increased in the 1230s, political expediency compelled the court to embrace *Tao-hsüeh* as an ideology.<sup>4</sup> When the Mongols exterminated the Chin in 1234, they reached

the Southern Sung frontier. But bloody military conquest was not the only danger posed by the Mongols. Under advice of former officials from the Chin, the Mongols constructed a new Confucian temple in the administrative center of North China and adopted the civil service examination system. Thus the Mongols were staking a claim to Confucian legitimacy to rule. To counter Mongol military and cultural encroachments, the Sung court sought to bolster its own claim to orthodoxy. Cheng Ch'ing-chih (1176-1251), who became chief councilor when Shih died in 1233, recalled to active service two leading senior statesmen from the fellowship, Wei Liaoweng (1178-1237) and Chen Te-hsiu (1178-1235). Another senior official, Ch'iao Hsing-chien (1156-1241), cautiously finessed in 1234 a proposal to bestow special honors upon Chu Hsi and five Northern Sung philosophers. In 1138, the Mongols patronized the founding of the Supreme Ultimate (T'ai-chi) Academy, where ritual services were held for Chou Tun-i, the Ch'engs, Chang Tsai, Yang Shih, and Chu Hsi. Recent research shows that *Tao-hsüeh* had been developing in the North since the early 1190s; however, scholar-officials in the Southern Sung regarded Mongol patronage of a captured scholar, Chao Fu (c. 1206-c. 1299), in the mid-1230s as the beginning of *Tao-hsüeh* teachings under alien rule in the North.<sup>5</sup> Such activity by the Mongols enhanced the ideological challenge to the Southern Sung regime.

In the first month of 1241, Li-tsung published an imperial edict that fully accepted *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians' claim to orthodoxy. In special rites, images of Chu Hsi, Chou Tun-i, Chang Tsai, and the Ch'engs were installed in the Confucian temple. Distinctive recognition was extended to Chu Hsi, who, as theorist and commentator on the Four Books, had enhanced the clarity of the *Tao* in the world. The tablet honoring their political nemesis, Wang An-shih, was finally expelled from the Confucian temple.<sup>6</sup> A few days later, the imperial university was ordered to pay homage to sages and worthies in the transmission of the *Tao*. In 1261, Lü Tsu-ch'ien and Chang Shih were added to those honored in the temple. By 1267, Lü occupied the position next to Chu Hsi and three of the Northern Sung masters, and Ch'eng Hao was assigned a position across the hall and just above Shao Yung, Ssu-ma Kuang, and Chang Shih.<sup>7</sup> Such actions buttressed propaganda claiming that orthodox Chinese culture had come South after the fall of the Northern Sung.

By recognizing the *Tao-hsüeh* claim to have repossessed the *Tao* of ancient sages and to have transmitted it in the South after the fall of the Northern Sung, the Southern Sung court could identify itself with this orthodox transmission as a means of bolstering its cultural propaganda. Cultural orthodoxy in the South served to counter the Mongols' rebuilding of the Confucian temple in the northern capital and conducting civil service examinations there. Such actions by the Mongols reflected an attempt to present themselves as the new patrons of Confucian culture and by exten-



sion the legitimate rulers of China. The Southern Sung, however, sought to deny any cultural legitimacy to the Mongol regime.

Real power relations at the Southern Sung court remained unchanged, however. Although a few *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians obtained prominent posts, they were given no authority to change actual policies. Thus their victory was largely a cosmetic one. Nevertheless, the public status of the fellowship and its relationship to the state had been fundamentally altered.

Li Hsin-ch'uan's 1139 preface to his history of the fellowship prefigured this political explanation of its rise. Within his broad and practical view of the *Tao-hsüeh* rubric, he credited leading councilors associated with the movement with serving as the pivot at every crucial juncture. In the late eleventh century, the rise or fall of *Tao-hsüeh* Confucianism was related to Ssu-ma Kuang's presence or absence at the emperor's court. During the 1130s, it was Chao Ting who made the difference. Chao Ju-yü was the crucial official during the 1190s. When these officials had power, *Tao-hsüeh* flourished, but when they were removed, the fellowship encountered "extreme difficulties."<sup>8</sup> In the view of many modern scholars who focus on the philosophy of the Chu Hsi school, however, the credit for the reversal of policy belongs to Chu Hsi's students and disciples.

# Chapter 10 *Chu Hsi's Disciples and Other Tao-hsüeh Confucians*

In attempting to evaluate the role of Chu Hsi's disciples in the reversal of the ban against *Tao-hsüeh*, we need to survey their numbers, activities, and ideas as well as the intellectual currents of their era. Lu Yu (1125-1210) mentioned in a funeral eulogy that Chu had about 1,000 students, and modern countings list the names of 467 who sought Chu's instruction.<sup>1</sup> At the end of the twelfth century, no intellectual—either inside or outside of the fellowship—could match Chu in number of serious students. Thousands of people came to hear Lu Chiu-yüan teach. The vast majority were not literati and so had little utility for transmitting a school of thought. The *Records of Sung and Yüan Confucians* list the names of 65 disciples at Lu's lecture hall in Fu-chou.<sup>2</sup> Although those in Chekiang would need to be added, Lu's total would still fall short of Chu's.

The geographic spread of Chu's students was also important. Of the 378 whose origins are known, 43 percent were from Fukien, 21 percent from Chekiang, almost 21 percent from Kiangsi, and about 15 percent from other areas. Other countings yield comparable figures: of those listed as Chu's students in the *Records of Sung and Yüan Confucians*, 51 percent were from Fukien; and of those who recorded sayings for Chu's *Classified Conversations*, 32 percent were Fukienese.<sup>3</sup> Their number gave Chu's students an unassailable base in Fukien. They also had considerable support in the home territory of Chu's primary intellectual rivals in Chekiang and Kiangsi. Together, Chekiang, Fukien, and Kiangsi were the intellectual and economic heartland of the Southern Sung. The area also had the most acade-

mies, institutions crucial for propagating Chu's teachings and adding members to the fellowship.<sup>4</sup> Chu had also attracted students from the outlying areas of the realm, giving his disciples a broad base, but one that was centered in the economic and cultural core regions. Approximately 28 percent of Chu's students served as officials at some time. Although few ever attained political prominence, 131 scholar-officials represented a significant cell within the bureaucracy.

Chu Hsi had made preparations for the transmission of his authority within his group. Chu had prepared Lu Chiu-yüan's former student Ts'ao Chien to the point that he was almost ready to receive the transmission of the *Tao*. After Ts'ao's death, much of Chu's hope for his group rested with Huang Kan.<sup>5</sup> Among the earliest to come to Chu, Huang had displayed the utmost reverence for Chu and dedication to the master's teachings. When Chang Shih died, Chu wrote to Huang and lamented that their *Tao* had become more vulnerable; hence, he wrote, demands on worthies like Huang would be heavy. Chu had his daughter wed Huang, and Huang aided him in collecting materials for some of his publications. By the time Chu finished building his Bamboo Grove Study in 1194, he had clearly selected Huang as his successor, for he expressed the hope that Huang would one day take his place lecturing there. Near the end of his life, Chu wrote to Huang, "This *Tao* of ours is entrusted to you, so I die with no regrets."<sup>6</sup> In the *Sung History* version, Chu reportedly also passed on his robes, an act that would mimic a transmission practice between Ch'an Buddhist masters. The account in Chu's collected writings makes no mention of the robes. Given Chu's hostility to Buddhism, such an obvious parallel to Buddhist practice is unlikely. Still, Chu was confident that he was in the position to entrust "this *Tao* of ours" to a chosen disciple. In other words, Chu was implicitly claiming status in the transmission of the *Tao* and the authority to select a successor to that transmission. On Chu's death, Huang mourned for a period of three years, as if mourning his own father.

Afterwards, Huang Kan resumed his government career, even though the administration was dominated by Han T'o-chou. He still maintained his independent views, which he shared with any civil or military officials willing to listen. Owing to his criticisms of central government policies, he was not employed at the capital but in various local posts. Because of his exemplary record in dealing with precautions against famines and Jurchen invaders, he won renown as an official serving in various counties and prefectures in Chekiang and central China. Wherever he served, he encouraged Chu's views of education. Besides setting up a temple in Han-yang to commemorate Chou Tun-i, the Ch'eng brothers, and Chu Hsi, he lectured at the White Deer Grotto Academy near Nan-k'ang. When he retired to Fukien, scholars from as far away as central and western China came to study with him. His travels and service as an official, thus, helped to solidify and

expand Chu's following. In a eulogy, he lauded his fellow student Chou Mo (1141-1202) for the custom of convening quarterly meetings of "our faction" in Chou's home area in Kiangsi.<sup>7</sup>

Huang steadfastly upheld Chu's doctrines. He is especially noted for closely following Chu's views regarding the distinction between the human mind and the *Tao* mind; the mutual interaction between the essence and function of the *Tao*; the balance between cultivating the mind and investigating things; and education, family rituals, and the transmission of the *Tao*. With the assistance of Li Hsin-ch'uan, he edited the first collection of Chu's recorded conversations. He also wrote one of the first major biographies of Chu Hsi, which has served as a primary source for later ones.

Concluding his biography of Chu, Huang portrayed Chu Hsi as the culmination of the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition. He wrote:

The transmission of the correct orthodox tradition of the *Tao* required the proper men. From the Chou dynasty on, there have been only several people capable of inheriting the correct tradition and transmitting the *Tao*, and only one or two could enable the *Tao* to achieve prominence. After Confucius, its subtlety was perpetuated by Tseng-tzu and Tzu-ssu, but it was not prominent until Mencius. After Mencius, the interrupted tradition was continued by the Four Masters—Chou, the Ch'engs, and Chang. But only with our Master Chu did it become prominent.<sup>8</sup>

Equating Chu with Mencius, Huang accorded Chu Hsi a greater role in the *tao-t'ung* than these Four Masters of the Northern Sung. In his "General Account of the Transmission of the Succession to the *Tao* Among the Sages and Worthies," Huang elaborated on the concept from Chu's preface to the commentary on the *Mean*. Beginning his account with the generation of all things from the Supreme Ultimate, Huang suggested that the *Tao* had originated from Heaven itself. Starting with Shun's sixteen-word admonition about the difference between the human mind and the *Tao* mind, Huang proceeded through the essential contributions of the sages of antiquity and the Sung.<sup>9</sup>

Thus, for Huang, the transmission of the *Tao* culminated in the teachings and commentaries of Chu Hsi. Indeed, Chu had made the *Tao* "prominent," a contribution surpassing that of Chou Tun-i and the Ch'engs. Passing directly from Chou and the Ch'engs to Chu, Huang also set aside Chang Tsai. Although the gaps in the transmission between Mencius and the Ch'engs and between them and Chu remained, Huang did not focus attention on these elisions or gaps.

More concerned to establish the continuity of the tradition as a school of thought, Huang focused on preserving what had already been developed. He proclaimed: "The sages and worthies passed it on from one to another,

setting forth the teachings over the ages like the signs of Heaven [which the sages observed], incandescent and unchanging. Though each was slightly different in the details, the more each contributed to the discussion, the greater the clarity. This is what the scholar should follow and preserve; to deviate from it is to err."<sup>10</sup> This scholastic approach concentrated on systematizing received teachings in an effort to build orthodoxy in what Huang perceived to be a hostile environment. Huang attempted to be comprehensive in preserving Chu's teachings. Nonetheless, while organizing those teachings and deciding what was most fundamental, he made a subtle shift. Instead of dwelling on Chu's level of speculative philosophy, Huang highlighted cultivation of the inner self. One might also say that he made the move to expand Chu's claim to the field of cultivating the mind in response to the continuing challenge from Lu Chiu-yüan's students.

So major was Huang's role in solidifying the followers of Chu that the master's other disciples deferred to him. Huang's Fukien origins and his status and connections as an official were superb qualifications for holding Chu's group together for the two crucial decades after Chu's death. But other disciples made contributions too.

Another special disciple, Ch'en Ch'un, first met Chu Hsi in 1190 while Chu was serving as prefect in Chang-chou in southern Fukien. He had been studying Chu's writings since 1180 when someone gave him a copy of *Reflections on Things at Hand*; thus he was delighted at the opportunity to see Chu. In the letter introducing himself to Chu, he praised Chu as the only person of his generation who was qualified to transmit the *Tao* and succeed the Ch'eng brothers: "With the Master's arrival, the *Tao* of Confucius, Mencius, Chou, and the Ch'engs becomes more brilliant. The Master alone can be called our leader in this present era."<sup>11</sup> Accepting Ch'en as a student, Chu encouraged him to focus more on essential principles rather than just book-learning. Chu advised: "Whenever you look at principles, you must investigate into the Source (*ken-yüan*). For example, why must a father abide in affection, a son in filial piety, a ruler or minister in benevolence or respect?"<sup>12</sup> Often talking late into the night, the two discussed Heaven's principle as the Source. According to Ch'en, the master said that he had never discussed this with others. In other words, Ch'en felt that Chu was transmitting a special truth solely to him. Chu apparently shared this feeling of having found someone to propagate the *Tao* in this area of Southern Fukien. While there he reported to Ch'en's father-in-law, "I'm happy to have obtained this man for this *Tao* of ours."<sup>13</sup>

Following Chu's instructions, Ch'en concentrated his study on the Source, or Heaven's principle, in various things and human relationships. During the 1190s, Ch'en sent essays to Chu, who wrote approving comments and made occasional suggestions. After Chu left Chang-chou in 1191, the two did not meet again until Ch'en journeyed to visit Chu late in 1199.

Although Chu was already not well, he devoted much of his time to Ch'en. Deciding that Ch'en had obtained an adequate grasp of the first principles through seeking the Source, Chu admonished him to balance that higher learning with more attention to the lower level of praxis in daily affairs. At the farewell dinner, Chu further urged: "After your return home, you must seek within yourself."<sup>14</sup> Because of this admonition, Ch'en oriented himself more to self-cultivation and praxis. Chu also encouraged him to travel instead of staying in his remote village, thus inviting him to take a more active leadership role. Although both visits with Chu lasted little more than seven months altogether, Ch'en recorded more than six hundred conversations, a greater number than any other disciple. The detail and quality of his redactions were also exceptional.

Ch'en's most important work in transmitting Chu's doctrines was *Terms Explained (Pei-hsi tzu-i)*. Ch'en herein made systematic explanations of twenty-five categories of terms central to Chu Hsi's philosophy. Over 230 sections were employed to elucidate these concepts. The first half dealt with one's daily praxis or cultivation, and discussed such concepts as destiny, human nature, mind, and sincerity. The second half focused on more philosophical concepts, such as principle, the Supreme Ultimate, and Buddhism. Hence the order generally followed Chu's admonition in 1199 to focus more on daily praxis before reaching for abstract philosophical principles. The influence of Chu's 1190 advice to seek for the Source also continued in the pervasiveness of references to Heaven's principle and the mandate of Heaven. Ch'en's longest section was on cosmic negative and positive spiritual forces (*kuei-shen*), which Chu rarely discussed. Moreover, Ch'en omitted Chu's important discussions of vital, psychophysical energy. In describing the Ultimate, Ch'en frequently used the Taoist term "undifferentiated" (*hun-lun*), even though Chu had rarely used this term. He never actually contradicted his master, and his explanations have long been regarded as faithful to Chu. His exposition on the mind was particularly successful in systematizing and clarifying Chu's many-faceted statements.<sup>15</sup> As a trustworthy systematization of major concepts, Ch'en's explanations provided a guidebook for students reading Chu's various writings and statements.

When Ch'en went to the capital in 1216 for the examinations, many of Chu Hsi's followers came to visit him. Although he failed the examinations for the second time, various people sought his instruction in Chu's teachings. The most important instance occurred in 1217 at Yen-ling (Yen-chou), in Chekiang, on his way home from the capital. The prefect and local literati requested that he lecture at the government school. Ch'en's four lectures emphasized the practicality of *Tao-hsüeh* and the importance of Chu Hsi's teachings.

The second lecture, "The Source of Teachers and Friends," most explicitly set forth the tradition and succession of the *Tao*. Beyond reiterating this

*tao-t'ung*, Ch'en Ch'un followed Chu in claiming that Chou Tun-i had received the *Tao* directly from Heaven. He also focused on the transmission from Chou and the Ch'engs directly to Chu Hsi. Ch'en lauded Chu's role: "He got at the subtle words and ideas the Ch'engs had left to posterity and refined and clarified them. Looking back, he penetrated the minds of the sages, and looking to the present, he drew together the many schools and assembled them as one." Ch'en thus passed over Chang Tsai and elevated Chu Hsi. So crucial was Chu's analysis and synthesis that one could not learn to be a sage without entering through the gate of his teachings. Criticizing anyone who failed to regard Chu as the way or door, Ch'en concluded: "Since one has not found the correct door to enter, it will be unreasonable to say that one can really obtain the correct way of the Sage's 'transmission of the mind.'" <sup>16</sup> What was actually transmitted—according to Chu Hsi—was the *Tao* rather than the mind as in Ch'an Buddhism. As evident here and in a passage (in the version from Ch'en's collected works) interjected between the two quotations above, Ch'en denounced both Ch'en Liang's utilitarians and Lu Chiu-yüan's followers in Chekiang, so that they could "no longer disturb our *Tao*."<sup>17</sup> He reinforced his assault with two supplemental essays against Buddhism and examination learning. As already discussed, examination learning could serve as a caricature of Lü Tsuch'ien's pragmatic teachings; indeed, Ch'en elsewhere characterized Lü as too focused on literary studies.<sup>18</sup> Ch'an Buddhists' monistic view of mind and the inner nature was the same error that Chu had ascribed to Lu Chiu-yüan.

The pervasiveness of Lu Chiu-yüan's legacy in Yen-chou appalled Ch'en Ch'un. There had already been followers of Lu in Yen-chou for almost half a century. Chan Fu-min (fl. 1179) had gone to study with Lu in 1179 and 1185 to learn meditation and how to recover the original mind. Later, Chan introduced the even more radical views of enlightenment espoused by some of Lu's students. By 1217 when Ch'en Ch'un spent two months in Yen-chou, Lu's followers, who dominated the prefecture, had allegedly gone so far in their neglect of scholarship that Ch'en concluded they were completely Buddhist. Perhaps more shocking to Ch'en was the claim that Lu had inherited the *Tao* directly from Mencius. Although more pronounced in bypassing the Northern Sung masters, this claim built on Lu's own identification with Mencius as well as his challenge to Chu's assumption of authority. Apparently, Ch'en found the Yen-chou literati too committed to Lu to listen, but he did win one convert. Cheng Wen (b. 1192) was swayed by Ch'en's long letter and personal entreaties. Ch'en's open hostility to Lu was probably a result of his Yen-chou experience.<sup>19</sup>

Even though Lu is not mentioned in *Terms Explained*, it would be an overstatement to say that Ch'en was oblivious to the continuing challenge of Lu's followers. Ch'en addressed such issues as the mind and the Ultimate,

setting forth arguments that Chu had employed against Lu. His comments about expediency could be read in a similar way as a response to Ch'en Liang. The important philosophical concept of vital energy did not arise, probably because it was not central in competition with the Chu school's primary rivals. As long as Ch'en remained fairly isolated in southern Fukien, he could maintain a positive presentation of Chu's teaching without feeling pressed to attack. When confronted in Chekiang, however, he had reacted so bitinglly that most later scholars have regarded him as sharply partisan all of his life.

Among the next generation of leaders of Chu's school, the most outstanding was Chen Te-hsiu. Chen's early education placed him on a different path, however. As a precocious child, he was taught by his father until the latter died when Chen was only about fourteen. A neighboring scholar-official, Yang K'uei (fl. 1190s), allowed the fatherless youth to study with his own children and later to wed his daughter. Since nothing is known about Yang beyond a report that he held the *chin-shih* degree, he must have been a more conventional Confucian and unaffiliated with the fellowship. Under his direction, Chen won the *chin-shih* degree at age twenty-two in 1199, a year in which candidates had to swear that they had no connection to the banned *Tao-hsüeh* partisans. After further study, Chen obtained the rarely awarded Erudite Literatus degree in 1205. By doing so, he demonstrated his mastery of broad learning and literary versatility.

Although already an established scholar-official, Chen altered his course after 1205 under the inspiration of Chan T'i-jen (1143-1206), a follower of Chu Hsi. Even though Chan died the following year, he apparently had aroused sufficient interest that Chen continued reading Chu's writings. By 1219, his study of Chu's scholarship had become so renowned that Huang Kan wrote to a colleague regarding Chen and Ch'en Mi (1171-1230): "As for these two gentlemen, their achievements in the future are bound to be brilliant. They are like great spirits protecting our doctrines and institutions (*fa*). Since our former master Chu passed away, they are the ones upon whom we depend to carry on the tradition. What a joy!"<sup>20</sup> Although usually translated as "laws," *fa* here certainly referred to the doctrines and institutions of the Chu school. Writing directly to Chen, Huang also expressed his admiration for Chen's political stance and representation of the Chu school.

As Huang recognized, Chen Te-hsiu's political prestige was an asset to the group. During the first phase of his career (1202-1214), Chen began as an assistant prefect in Fukien. However, after winning his Erudite Literatus degree in 1205, he was promptly asked to serve at the imperial university and then at various secretarial posts at the capital. In 1213, the emperor sent him as state envoy to the Chin, but the Mongol siege of the Chin capital prevented him from completing his trip. Having observed the predicament of the Chin, he reported to the throne on his return that the Mongols would



defeat the Chin. Although the Mongols soon seized the Chin capital in 1214, it took them until 1234 to finish the conquest; hence, Chen's 1213 statement earned him even more fame for his foresight. His forthright memorials during this period were widely circulated, which infuriated the powerful chief councilor Shih Mi-yüan. Withdrawing to avoid continued service directly under Shih, Chen spent most of the second phase (1215–1224) in prefectural posts. Whether he was handling famine relief in Chiang-tung, suppressing pirates in Ch'üan-chou, or establishing a benevolent granary in T'an-chou, Chen's proven effectiveness earned him further acclaim. Although summoned to serve at the capital again in 1225, he was soon impeached and dismissed during the purge of those who had argued for a posthumous title for Prince Chi. He spent the next seven years in a forced retirement during which he concentrated upon scholarship. Finally, in 1233, Chen was recalled to serve as prefect of Ch'üan-chou, and in 1234 he was transferred to Fu-chou, where he again performed admirably. During the last phase of his career (1234–1235), he was personally summoned by the emperor to serve in the capital, and was there given important posts. His health soon waned, and he died in 1135 in his fifty-eighth year. Altogether, he had served at the capital for fifteen years and in the prefectures for about twelve. Because of the autocratic power of Shih Mi-yüan, Chen accomplished little at court. Like most of Chu's followers, he preferred to serve in regional posts where he had more latitude to act and make contributions to the welfare of the people.<sup>21</sup>

Some of Chen's contemporaries eulogized him for saving their culture. Drawing from these earlier biographic eulogies, the official *Sung History* used the phrase "this culture"—with which Confucius (*Analects*, 9/5) had described his own mission—to magnify Chen's role: "Chen singlehandedly and valiantly took upon himself the responsibility for preserving this culture. Thus with the proscription lifted, it was largely through his efforts that the correct learning could be made clearly known throughout the land and to later generations."<sup>22</sup> Extrapolating from such evidence, one modern scholar concludes: "Together Wei [Liao-weng] and Chen [Te-hsiu] were responsible for the Sung courts' reversal of the ban on Chu Hsi."<sup>23</sup> Before addressing this claim, more needs to be said about Chen and the larger intellectual context.

Setting aside for now the political expediencies discussed in Part Four, let's examine Chen Te-hsiu's influence on the reversal of state policy toward the fellowship. Although Chen was only one of those who had for decades advocated a reversal of policy, he and Wei Liao-weng had more visibility than most other proponents. Probably Chen's greatest contribution, like Wei's, was through his other activities that enhanced the popularity of Chu's learning among literati. His exemplary service in attending to formal education, customs, and livelihood as an official in various prefectures helped to

spread the values of *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians. On the local level, he also established shrines to such worthies as Chu Hsi, strengthened the tradition of academies, and expanded Chu's granary reforms to include loans to landless families.

Chen's writings on governance were another contribution. The *Classic on Governance* (*Cheng ching*) focused on improving local administration through discussions of how officials should conduct themselves and handle affairs such as tax collection or litigation. In the first section, fifty quotations from the classics set forth basic principles. Next, twenty-two excerpts from historical texts, mostly on the Han dynasty, furnished illustrations of exemplary local officials. A third part provided supplementary material on dealing with six specific difficulties faced by local administrators and included recommendations based on his own experiences. A final section contained several of Chen's proclamations and directives about rectifying problems on the local level. The most innovative one involved charitable granaries: Chen extended benefits to landless tenants and removed the supervisory responsibilities that Chu had retained for local officials. Chen effectively synthesized earlier *Tao-hsüeh* approaches to governance with a balance of moralistic and practical concerns. He expanded on Chu's program for developing the middle-level institutions that functioned in the local community.<sup>24</sup> Yet Chen's application of history to statecraft and his recognition of the necessity of law and punishments could be seen as reflecting positions similar to those of Che-tung utilitarians.

Chen's famous *Extended Meaning of the Great Learning* (*Ta-hsüeh yen-i*) also reflected a synthesis of thinking about governance. In the preface, he drew a parallel with Chu's writings on and lectures to the throne about the classic *Great Learning*.<sup>25</sup> Aside from including an interpretation of the *Great Learning* itself, Chen detailed what emperors should study and how they should engage in spiritual cultivation. In self-cultivation, Chen emphasized reverence and restraining desires. Although he did not discuss larger philosophical issues or concrete policies for governing the state or bringing peace to the world, Chen expressed confidence that if the ruler would concentrate on self-cultivation and regulating the royal family, institutional problems would be easy to resolve. Throughout, his focus was the standard Mencian one on the ruler's mind-and-heart, discussed in reference to Ch'en Liang's essays during his own *Tao-hsüeh* phase. As Ch'en Liang and Lü Tsuch'ien had also done, Chen Te-hsiu drew upon Han and T'ang rulers as positive models for later emperors. Chen did not call attention to these alternative thinkers, however.

Chen Te-hsiu also presented to Li-tsung in 1234 his *Classic of the Mind-and-Heart* (*Hsin ching*). Again largely following Chu Hsi, Chen began with Shun's famous sixteen-word admonition about the *Tao* mind and the need to refine the human mind by holding fast to the Mean. Proceeding to quote

many other sources, he developed the *Tao-hsüeh* theme of constant mindfulness and attentiveness to one's ethical duty. Relying heavily on Mencius, Chen also quoted Chou Tun-i, the Ch'engs, and Chu Hsi as authoritative classics in their own right. Ironically, he juxtaposed the Mencian doctrine of the goodness of human nature *and* the ease with which the human mind frequently gave rein to evil desires. Although he never abandoned Mencian idealism about human perfectibility, he went further than other *Tao-hsüeh* thinkers had in emphasizing the importance of disciplining the self to conquer desires.<sup>26</sup> Chen's "rigorism" or "extreme scrupulosity" indeed yielded "a more austere, straitlaced ideal of human conduct than can be found in the Ch'eng brothers or Chu Hsi."<sup>27</sup>

More graphic cases may be found in Chen's *Classic on Governance*, for he lauded and rewarded citizens in Ch'üan-chou for self-mutilations on behalf of filial piety. A daughter of one *chin-shih* degree holder cut flesh from her abdomen to provide medicine for her father. Chen erected a memorial arch and composed an essay to commemorate her self-sacrifice. He also hosted a banquet for a man who had survived after having cut flesh from his thigh to make a medicine for his parents.<sup>28</sup> The latter case brings to mind a question earlier posed by one of Chang Shih's students: what could an extreme act, such as cutting flesh from one's thigh for a parent, possibly teach about the humaneness in filial piety? Chen's rigorism was no doubt unusual but also probably laid part of the foundation in Fukien for similar excesses during the Ch'ing period in the name of Confucian virtues.

As in the case of Huang Kan and Ch'en Ch'un, Chen Te-hsiu shifted the center of Chu's philosophy away from the level of speculative philosophy and toward the level of cultural values and spiritual cultivation. Chen particularly emphasized the doctrines of reverence, the inner nature endowed by Heaven, and the investigation of things. Still, in most areas he faithfully followed Chu Hsi.

Regarding the orthodox transmission of the *Tao*, Chen revived an aspect of Chu's vision that Huang Kan had passed over. Whereas Huang had engaged a scholastic approach to the *tao-t'ung* to define the curriculum for Chu's school, Chen turned attention back to the "prophetic" tone in Chu's description of Chou Tun-i's rediscovery of the *Tao*. After a hiatus of centuries during which the *Tao* had been obscured, no one could teach the *Tao* to Chou; therefore, Chou had to be inspired directly by Heaven to be able "to grasp the long-lost secret."<sup>29</sup> This creative interaction between Heaven and inspired individuals applied to all Four Masters—Chou, the Ch'engs and Chu. For Chen, as for Ch'en Ch'un, Chu had replaced Chang Tsai as one of the Four Masters. Dedicating a commemorative hall established in 1227 to honor the Four Masters, Chen further asked rhetorically: "Likewise with the learning of the Four Masters, how could they have offered such novel

views and put forward new interpretations, such as their predecessors had not been able to arrive at, were it not simply due to Heaven?"<sup>30</sup>

This "prophetic" view of Heaven's inspiration suggested the potential for more openness about the *Tao* tradition than did Huang's scholastic goals of defining a school of thought. For instance, although he did not accord the same status to Lü Tsu-ch'ien as he did to Chu, Chen wrote a dedication for a commemorative hall built for Lü and praised his teaching of the *Tao* in Wu-chou.<sup>31</sup>

Chen also differed from some of Chu's students in showing no hostility toward the learning of Lu Chiu-yüan. Chen's concentration on the theme of the mind could be partially inspired by Lu's writings. Although Chen did not explicitly set forth a synthesis of Chu's and Lu's ideas about the cultivation of the mind, some of his students did so. The T'ang brothers and their nephew T'ang Han (1244 *chin-shih*) were from An-jen in the southern part of modern Anhwei, not far from Lu's base in Kiangsi. Without discouraging their efforts, Chen discussed with them the similarities and differences between Chu and Lu. T'ang Chin (mid-thirteenth century), the second of the three brothers, helped to restore the White Deer Grotto Academy near Nan-k'ang that Chu had rebuilt and at which he had ordered that Lu's lecture be inscribed on stone in 1180. Moreover, T'ang was a friend of Ch'eng Shao-k'ai (1212-1280), the founder of the Unity of the *Tao* (Tao-i) academy in Kiangsi. At this academy Wu Ch'eng (1249-1333) would later find the inspiration to attempt his famous reconciliation of Chu's and Lu's educational methodologies.<sup>32</sup> In Kiangsi, followers of these two masters apparently were less antagonistic than in Chekiang. Few of Lu's students in Kiangsi were intellectuals, and none of them developed his thought to a significant degree.<sup>33</sup>

A more creative center of Lu Chiu-yüan's learning was Ming-chou in northeastern Chekiang. Although Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu-ch'ien had considerable influence on the four masters of Ming-chou, they ultimately followed Lu Chiu-yüan more closely. Among the four, Yang Chien was the most eminent.<sup>34</sup> Even though most of his literary works have been lost, a greater number of his writings have been preserved than those of Lu's other disciples. Hence we are less dependent on hostile portrayals of his thought than we are in the case of other Lu students.

Yang Chien was among the earliest of Lu's disciples. In 1172 when Lu passed through Fu-yang county (just south of Hangchow) and delivered a lecture, Yang was serving as assistant magistrate there. Responding to Yang's questions about what was meant by the original mind, Lu referred to a lawsuit that Yang had just adjudicated. The clarity of knowing which disputant was right arose from Yang's original mind instead of from the law codes. Immediately, Yang became aware of the clarity of mind that he had

experienced in deciding the case. When he asked if that was all, Lu shouted, "What else could there be?"<sup>35</sup> Without any further question, Yang withdrew to meditate all night. Enlightened, he prostrated himself the next morning before Lu to formalize becoming a disciple. According to his own account, he was especially grateful for Lu's second response. Without it, the recovery of the original mind would have appeared complicated.

Yang's enlightenment, tranquility of mind, and practical statesmanship became renowned during his service at various government posts over a forty-five-year period. In the early 1180s, for instance, Chu Hsi recommended him as a person who knew both how to cultivate himself and how to govern. As a local official, he devoted himself to the welfare and culture of the people. When Chao Ju-yü was dismissed as chief councilor in 1195 at the beginning of the campaign against *Tao-hsüeh*, Yang was among those who submitted dissenting memorials to the emperor. For his protest, he was forced into retirement and his name placed on the proscribed list. Although some others joined the government at Han T'o-chou's invitation after the ban was lifted in 1202, Yang did not return until after Han's demise. The new chief councilor, Shih Mi-yüan, had several close relatives who were either Yang's patrons or his students. At the capital, Yang held high posts first at the Bureau of History and later at the Ministry of Public Works; between these posts, he served as prefect of Wen-chou in southeastern Chekiang. After he failed to persuade the emperor to accept refugees who were fleeing from a severe famine in Chin-ruled northern China in 1214, Yang resigned from government service.

During his last dozen years, Yang Chien taught at a Ming-chou academy, the name of which referred to himself; Master of Mercy Lake Academy (Tz'u-hu shu-yüan). Before his death there at the age of eighty-six, he instructed large numbers of students. The *Records of Sung and Yüan Confucians* lists more than sixty direct students and names numerous disciples for the next several generations. More so than Lu Chiu-yüan, Yang lectured at an academy in an accessible location and focused on teaching his philosophy to younger generations of literati. His attention to public administration, education, writing commentaries, and historiography distinguish him from a mere subjectivistic philosopher with no knowledge of traditional scholarship and governance.

Yang Chien taught his students to realize the truth innate within their original minds. Yang equated the original mind with the human mind, the *Tao* mind, the true self, humaneness, and the *Tao*. Along with denying Chu's distinction between the human mind and the *Tao* mind, Yang identified the true self with the unity of all things. In his commentary on the *Book of Changes*, he proclaimed that the hexagrams and the process of change described therein simply pointed to transformations within the self. Ch'eng I had interpreted this classic as teaching about principle, and Shao Yung and

Chou Tun-i had emphasized numerology. To Yang, the classic simply taught about the mind. Yang focused directly on the mind without Lu Chiu-yüan's efforts to incorporate the philosophy of principle and the discourse on the abstract Ultimate. Thus Yang's philosophy centered more completely on the concept of mind. Rather than following Lu's division between the self and external things, Yang had a more holistic view of self as being in union with all things. Although people possessed this *Tao* mind innately, it easily became obstructed by preconceptions, obduracy, and egoism. Other Confucians sought clarity through erudition and self-cultivation, but Yang regarded both methods as obstacles, because they led people away from the simple and direct realization of the *Tao* mind as the human mind. His suggestion that people dispense with preconceptions and intuitively realize the true mind sounded like Ch'an Buddhism to many of his contemporaries and later scholars; however, some have defended him against that charge.<sup>36</sup>

Yang Chien's Buddhist inclinations apparently alienated Yeh Shih. Although there had been sharp tensions between associates of Lü Tsu-ch'ien and those of Lu Chiu-yüan in Chekiang at least since the early 1180s, both branches of the fellowship had maintained relations. Significantly, Yeh Shih had been the most effective champion of *Tao-hsüeh* when Chu was criticized at court in 1188. Both Yeh and Yang had been major targets of the ban against the fellowship at the end of the twelfth century. Yang's development of Lu Chiu-yüan's philosophy of mind into a more holistic and radical position apparently helped convince Yeh about the dangers of the subjective bent within the fellowship. Yeh had to confront Yang's philosophy more directly when Yang served as prefect in Yeh's Wen-chou around 1211. After his forced retirement in 1208, Yeh had retreated to Wen-chou. Shortly before his retirement, he had edited Ch'en Liang's literary works. Going through Ch'en's writings and challenges to Chu Hsi probably also enhanced his frustration with Chu's version of the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition. In any event, a scholar-official who had once been a major champion of *Tao-hsüeh* became in his later years bitingly critical of the metaphysical and abstract approaches to *Tao* that were associated with many *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians. To counter their notion that various sages had contributed new insights into the *Tao*, Yeh bitterly retorted that Confucius had merely transmitted the Six Classics. Therefore, all true Confucians should likewise do no more than preserve the tradition established in the classics. *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians lauded a series of ancient and recent masters who had contributed to the tradition, but Yeh condemned all of them for their innovations.<sup>37</sup>

A major effect of Yeh Shih's alienation was to reduce the parameters of those within the *Tao-hsüeh* rubric in the thirteenth century. The more thoroughly utilitarian wing (once headed by Ch'en Liang and then by Yeh Shih) excised itself.

Ironically, Yang Chien's philosophy also gave some of Chu's students

grounds for excluding him from *Tao-hsüeh*. It was even easier for them to portray Yang as a Ch'an Buddhist than it had been for Chu to so characterize Lu Chiu-yüan. Having so radically equated the human mind, the *Tao* mind, the true self, and all things, what could his students add? Students in Yang Chien's academy in Ming-chou preserved Yang's alternative into the Yüan. But even in Ming-chou the long-range trend favored synthesis with Chu's methodology. Despite Yang's notoriety, intellectual life in Ming-chou during the thirteenth century continued to be diverse and syncretistic, as most evident in writings of Huang Chen (1213-1280) and Wang Ying-lin (1223-1296), for they drew from all major currents of twelfth-century *Tao-hsüeh* thought.<sup>38</sup>

By the mid-1230s, the center of intellectual activity—in terms of leading figures—shifted back to Chekiang.<sup>39</sup> Although Chekiang had never lost its edge in terms of sheer numbers of scholars, after Lü Tsu-ch'ien's death in 1181, the intellectual center had moved to Chu's Fukien, where it had continued under such leaders as Huang Kan and Chen Te-hsiu. The Che-tung prefectures of Ming-chou, Wen-chou, and Wu-chou had continued to be important during the half century of Fukien's prominence, however.<sup>40</sup>

For continuing Chu's philosophy into the Yüan, no group was more crucial after the mid-1230s than four teachers in Wu-chou. The succession of these four Chin-hua masters continued Chu's teachings from the early thirteenth century well into the fourteenth: Ho Chi (1188-1268), Wang Po (1197-1274), Chin Lü-hsiang (1232-1303), and Hsü Ch'ien (1270-1337). Having been instructed as a youth by Huang Kan, Ho Chi had ties to the most direct lineage of Chu's school; he, in turn, passed these teachings down to the other Chin-hua masters. These four Chin-hua masters accorded Huang Kan the position of the primary inheritor of Chu's transmission of the *Tao*. They presented other students of Chu, such as Ch'en Ch'un, as branch lineages. By drawing attention to their own direct ties to Huang Kan, they projected their own Chin-hua group as the continuation of the most orthodox succession, and later scholars have generally accepted their claim. Following Huang Kan instead of Ch'en Ch'un, the Chin-hua masters focused attention on Chu's commentaries on the Four Books instead of his *Reflections on Things at Hand*. They taught people to master the Four Books by using Chu's commentaries before reading the writings of the Northern Sung masters, especially the more abstruse works of Chou Tun-i. Hence Chu increasingly dominated their perception of the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition.

The four Chin-hua masters did not follow Chu blindly. For example, Wang Po doubted Chu's claim that the commentary on the "investigation of things" had been lost from the *Great Learning*. Moreover, he offered revisions to some of Chu's views of the Ultimate of Non-being, the *Book of Poetry*, and the *Book of Documents*. Deeply distressed over the progressive

deterioration of the Southern Sung, Wang also paid special attention to practical affairs and went beyond Chu in embracing a positive view of penal laws and state power.<sup>41</sup>

Although Wang Po was responding to actual developments in the polity and society of his time, it is not at all irrelevant that his family partook of Wu-chou's diverse intellectual legacy. His grandfather had had exchanges with Chang Shih, Lü Tsu-ch'ien, Yang Chien, and Chu Hsi. Wang's father had sought instruction from both Lü Tsu-ch'ien and Chu Hsi. Although Wang had apparently grafted Chu's learning onto his Wu-chou roots, it is particularly revealing that he drew such attention to the succession of the *Tao* tradition and Chu's exceptional position of authority therein. Wang's successors—Chin Lü-hsiang and Hsü Ch'ien—were also influenced by Lü Tsu-ch'ien's legacy that continued at Lü's academy in Chin-hua.<sup>42</sup> There apparently was no significant tension in Chin-hua between the four masters and members of Lü's academy.

The cooperation in Chin-hua between those with primary ties to either Lü Tsu-ch'ien or Chu Hsi may partly explain the actions taken by Ch'iao Hsing-chien from the early 1230s through 1241. As mentioned in Part Four, Ch'iao was the senior councilor who worked behind the scenes in 1234 to win Chu Hsi recognition in the Confucian temple. Followers of Chu Hsi have credited Chen Te-hsiu and Wei Liao-weng with reversing the dynasty's policy against *Tao-hsüeh*. Yet Chen and Wei returned to government service only briefly after Shih Mi-yüan died in 1233. Chen arrived at court in the autumn of 1234 and died a few months later. Wei's efforts to affect central administrative policy and military preparedness were quickly frustrated, and he was soon sent down to prefectural administration, where he died in 1137. Neither one was at court very long or had any proven impact on court policy. Ch'iao Hsing-chien, a veteran at court politics, continued to serve through the whole period of the elevation of *Tao-hsüeh*. He was still serving at court when the crucial reversal of policy was announced in the first month of 1241. As a senior and adept councilor, Ch'iao surely had more influence than Chen and Wei in effecting this change at court; moreover, they had died more than four years earlier. Capable of much more effective measures than the written appeals from intellectuals with scant voice at court, Ch'iao was positioned to finesse the court's receptivity to the political advantages of recognizing *Tao-hsüeh* as orthodoxy. Since political expediency was the impetus behind the court's actions, someone with Ch'iao's practical experience and tact surely clarified the emperor's perception of this course of action.

It might surprise us to learn that Ch'iao Hsing-chien was a student of Lü Tsu-ch'ien. Yet Ch'iao was maintaining the pattern of generosity toward Chu that Lü had established. Like his teacher, he was also acting on behalf of the larger interests of both the fellowship and the Sung court. Ch'iao's



actions and Wang Po's synthesis suggest that Chu had become a primary symbol to members of the fellowship by the 1230s. Yet as evident in positions of honor in the Confucian temple in 1267, Lü Tsu-ch'ien and Ssu-ma Kuang were still included in Southern Sung conceptions of the *Tao-hsüeh* tradition. Thus the larger view of the fellowship, which had persisted through the twelfth century, had not yet been eclipsed.

## CONCLUSION

Beyond documenting the major conclusions about individual thinkers and their specific ideas and relationships drawn at the end of each chapter, my aim has been to introduce the historical development of *Tao-hsüeh* Confucianism during the Southern Sung. Philosophical and ideological approaches have so dominated existing studies that it has become imperative to supplement them with a view of *Tao-hsüeh* as intellectual history. What might this new perspective reveal about the evolution of the fellowship and its impact on the Southern Sung? Some of the important points will be organized around four major questions concerning the success of the fellowship, Chu Hsi's prominence in the tradition, other alternatives within the fellowship, and implications for studying Confucian philosophy.

First, what accounts for the fellowship's unprecedented success in emerging as state and intellectual orthodoxy by 1241? The foreign takeover of North China convinced many intellectuals that there was a larger cultural crisis. Retrieval of the Confucian *Tao* and moral rearmament through spiritual cultivation were considered necessary to set things right in polity, culture, and society. After the fall of the Northern Sung, the central government had less ability to direct local affairs and oversee religious and cultural groups. Thus the fellowship experienced less official restrictions on its growth than it had in the late Northern Sung. Unprecedented numbers of literati also provided potential members for the fellowship. As the size of the

literati class continued to grow with the flourishing economy and greater access to printed books and education, acquiring government office had also become increasingly difficult. Larger numbers of literati competed for smaller quotas in the civil service examinations. As greater numbers failed, it became increasingly difficult to maintain a family's elite status through government careers. Besides the decreasing chances for passing the examinations, the decline in central government power also made striving for office less attractive than it had been in the eleventh century. According to Peter Bol's surmise, when Sung literati saw their diminished prospects for attaining government office, *Tao-hsüeh* became attractive in large part because its enhanced emphasis on being moral provided a basis for justifying their elite status in society.<sup>1</sup> That explanation is certainly probable for countless ordinary literati who despaired of pursuing careers in government.

For those who did seek to pass the examinations and enter public service, however, the fellowship provided networking. Such networking during the Northern Sung had often come from marriage alliances among elite families from diverse areas, but Southern Sung elites tended to marry prominent families within their local area. Social networks among literati were of practical significance in a bureaucratic system where personal recommendations and guarantees were crucial to every step in the recruitment and promotion process. As the civil service examinations became increasingly competitive, political and social connections, which were evident in Lü Tsu-ch'ien's life, clearly attracted literati to join the fellowship. Literati by the hundreds flocked to Lü's Tsu-ch'ien's academy, especially after he served as chief examiner for the 1172 examinations and passed a large number of *Tao-hsüeh* men. Chu Hsi also encouraged the practice of recommending like-minded friends even though outsiders might allege favoritism or factionalism. By the 1190s, Chu Hsi's students in Kiangsi had instituted regional assemblies of "our faction" on a quarterly basis for discussion and mutual support.

Even government repression of the fellowship eventually worked to its advantage. When government officials did not attack the fellowship, debates flourished more readily within the fellowship about its tradition and texts. Efforts by intolerant chief councilors to suppress the fellowship and exclude its members from the examinations and official posts inadvertently promoted unity within the fellowship itself. Participants in the fellowship opposed what they regarded as tyrannical officials and court favorites dominating access to public service. With roots in the conservative Yüan-yü party of the late eleventh century, Southern Sung *Tao-hsüeh* leaders had only minor differences about political policies. Ch'in Kuei's discrimination against the group and Han T'o-chou's blacklisting of most of its leaders enhanced the need for consensus within the fellowship.

Ironically, the official ban on *Tao-hsüeh* at the end of the twelfth century had gone so far that the government had to make a dramatic policy reversal to appease the significant numbers of intellectuals and scholar-officials who identified with the fellowship. Nothing less than a full embrace of the doctrinal claims of *Tao-hsüeh*, adopting Chu's commentaries on the Four Books as curriculum in state schools, and enshrining selected representative leaders of the tradition would have satisfied the group's agenda—at least in the form of Li Tao-ch'uan's petition to the throne in 1211. During the first three decades of the thirteenth century, the court restored honors to Chu Hsi, Lü Tsu-ch'ien, Chang Shih, Lu Chiu-yüan, Chang Chiu-ch'eng, and others. Such piecemeal and partial steps by the court did not lessen the demands of *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians.

The emperor in 1241 recognized *Tao-hsüeh* as state orthodoxy. Rituals were performed for images of Chu Hsi and the Four Northern Sung Masters enshrined in the Confucian temple. The 1241 edict credited Chu and his commentaries on the Four Books with making the *Tao* "brilliantly manifest" in recent times. Government students were subsequently ordered to pay homage to those in the transmission of the *Tao* and to study Chu's commentaries. The court also ordered the tablet of Wang An-shih expelled from the esteemed position it had occupied in the Confucian temple since 1104.

If the central government had been stronger and more secure, it could have withstood the demands of the fellowship or even successfully suppressed it. Besides being weaker than during the Northern Sung, the Southern Sung court was threatened militarily and culturally by the Mongol regime, which consolidated its conquest of North China in 1234. Advised by Confucians who served their regime, the Mongols rebuilt the Confucian temple in Peking and took other steps to assert their cultural legitimacy to rule China. Political expediency and military weakness necessitated the Southern Sung's decision to recognize *Tao-hsüeh* in order to win over its most vocal critics and to propagate the belief that cultural legitimacy had become established in the South. Fellowship leaders, who were given only token appointments in the central government, could not actually determine state policy. But the fellowship still gained significant advantages. The new public status enhanced its popularity and influence throughout society. The government now regularly patronized academies headed by participants in the fellowship. Academies and charitable activities had long contributed to the fellowship's cohesion and development; however, even meager governmental resources could strengthen such projects.

Focus here on the sociopolitical context should not be interpreted as a denial of the crucial importance of philosophy in the success of the fellowship. Earlier Confucian groups had never achieved such a degree of cohesion and maintained it over such an extended period. Progress toward consensus on basic concepts was certainly a major factor in the coherence of the

fellowship. One driving concern underlying other issues was defining and establishing the fellowship's tradition.

Second, among the questions we might ask, why did Chu Hsi emerge as the center of the fellowship by the end of the twelfth century? As the most systematic theoretician in the fellowship, Chu Hsi developed the most comprehensive philosophy. He particularly surpassed others on the level of speculative philosophy. Doctrinally, he had written more commentaries and guides for interpreting the classical canon as well as intellectual genealogies for defining the composition of the fellowship. Institutionally, he had seen most clearly the potential for group building through such community institutions as academies, shrines, and compacts on a middle level between family and government. These are the conventional reasons given for Chu Hsi's ascendancy, but our study has also brought additional factors to the fore.

Chu Hsi strategically presented himself as the Mean, in contrast to the extreme points of view that were held by his rivals. In the process, he often discredited other figures within the fellowship for their "adulterated learning," contaminated with Buddhism, Taoism, or notions of realpolitik. The diversity of earlier *Tao-hsüeh* particularly troubled him, for various individual followers of the Ch'eng brothers had been developing the tradition in variant ways within different geographic areas. Without a single center of authority, there was no clear standard for the larger fellowship. To the extent that one individual could have led *Tao-hsüeh* during the first period of the Southern Sung, it was Chang Chiu-ch'eng, but Chang's openness to dialogue with Ch'an Buddhist monks disturbed Chu Hsi. From around 1160 on, Chu began rejecting the disciples of the Ch'eng brothers as having deviated from their teachers' doctrines. Thus he sought to recapture what he considered to be the true legacy and texts of the Ch'engs. Chu's anthologies of the mid-1170s continued this effort, but with positive presentations of who and what belonged to the tradition. Writing eulogies also provided a forum for him to define the tradition and fellowship.

It was in his eulogies to Chang Shih and Lü Tsu-ch'ien that Chu Hsi began to stake his claim to be the premier authority. Especially in the 1181 eulogy to Lü, Chu proclaimed the cultural and political agenda of their *Tao-hsüeh* group. Following Lü's lead in labeling the association a *tang*, Chu borrowed this politically charged image of a faction to refer to the fellowship of Confucians headed by Lü and Chang. Chu further asserted that he would henceforth have to take the leadership role. He even had the temerity to declare that there was no longer anyone qualified to call him into account for his flaws, as Lü and Chang had formerly done.

Over the next two decades, Chu gradually expanded on this assumption to guide the fellowship with an ever firmer hand. Among the traces of his ascension is his 1183 epitaph for Ts'ao Chien, in which he presented himself as the teacher qualified to judge that Ts'ao had advanced almost to the point

of readiness to receive the transmission of the *Tao*. Another major step came in 1189 with the preface to his commentary on *The Doctrine of the Mean*, where he presented to a larger audience his recently coined term *tao-tung*. This term facilitated his formalization of the idea of a succession of sages in the *Tao* tradition from earliest antiquity through the Ch'eng brothers to the present. Having a specific term also helped to institutionalize the idea. Setting forth his use of the Ch'eng brothers' comments to explicate the most abstruse of the Four Books, Chu implicitly declared his direct inheritance of the succession to the transmission of the *Tao*. In 1194, Chu drew up a list of thinkers in the past who transmitted the genuine *Tao*. Here, he announced that he had come into contact with "the conveyance of the *Tao*." In short, Chu progressively after 1181 presented himself as the only living person who represented the correct succession and tradition of the *Tao*. Despite reservations about his claims, even his major rivals during the 1180s and 1190s conceded that he was outstanding within the *Tao-hsüeh* community of the day.

In terms of years to devote to scholarship unencumbered by preparation for the civil service examinations, Chu had an exceptional advantage over possible rivals. He enjoyed 52 years between his *chin-shih* degree and his death. By contrast, his major rivals were at a marked disadvantage: Lu Chiu-yüan lived 22 years after winning his degree; Lü Tsu-ch'ien had 18 years, and Ch'en Liang survived less than a year. Although Lü's scholarly productivity per year certainly surpassed Chu's, Chu Hsi's relative health and leisure to devote 52 years to scholarship yielded an unprecedented body of scholarship, teachings, and students. Just as Ch'eng I's influence was enhanced because he lived for many years after the deaths of the major thinkers of his era, Chu Hsi survived younger men: Chang and Lü by almost nineteen years, and Ch'en and Lu by about six. But Chu's standing cannot be attributed to longevity alone.

Chu Hsi's stature rose to greater heights during the tribulations and frustrations experienced by *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians from the 1190s proscription to its official reversal in 1241. Except for four court officials, Chu Hsi was the most prominent person on the blacklist. He was the group's most senior intellectual in a culture that revered seniority. When he died during the ban, he apparently came to be regarded as a martyr. As the principal martyr, Chu's name spread even more widely after his death in 1200. Against the backdrop of the powerful chief councilors who wielded seemingly hegemonic power during the thirteenth century, he emerged as a symbol of *Tao-hsüeh* to many Confucians chafing under the abuse of power by court officials. In petitions for honors for *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians, Chu gradually emerged as the symbolic representative of the group. Although honors were requested and bestowed upon Lü Tsu-ch'ien, Lu Chiu-yüan, Chang Shih, and others, petitioners and the court alike focused more and more exclu-

sively on Chu Hsi by the late 1220s. Even Lü's student Ch'iao Hsing-chien worked behind the scenes to accord special honors in the Confucian temple for Chu instead of Lü Tsu-ch'ien.

Chu's appointed heir, Huang Kan, claimed that Chu Hsi's achievement surpassed any of the Northern Sung masters. They had simply reclaimed and continued the *Tao* tradition, but Chu had played the same role as Mencius did in making the *Tao* prominent. Ch'en Ch'un went even further in jettisoning Chang Tsai in order to portray Chu as having received the transmission directly from the Ch'eng brothers. According to this view, Chu had penetrated the work of the sages so thoroughly that he had singlehandedly unified the truths from various schools. Henceforth, Chu would be the sole guide for entering the ancient sages' true way of learning. Following Ch'en's lead in setting Chang Tsai aside, Chen Te-hsiu explicitly elevated Chu to the status of one of the Four Masters. Chen Te-hsiu also reintroduced the "prophetic" element in Chu's view of the transmission of the *Tao*. Heaven had revealed the secret of the *Tao* to the Four Masters; consequently, they had insights that earlier Confucian teachers and sages never attained. The four Chin-hua masters followed Huang Kan in focusing on Chu's commentaries on the Four Books. Thus they discounted Ch'en Ch'un's concentration on *Reflections on Things at Hand*, a compilation of passages from Chou, the Ch'engs, and Chang Tsai. For Chu's disciples, Chu and his commentaries on the Four Books made even the Northern Sung masters recede to a secondary status. The Chin-hua masters also drew a direct line from the Ch'engs through Chu and then to Huang and themselves; others were now considered to be merely lesser branches of the *Tao-hsüeh* family. In short, so important was Chu to his own disciples that they projected him beyond his contemporaries and even the Four Masters of the Northern Sung.

Third, perusing the above discussion of Chu Hsi's prominence, a reader might raise questions about alternatives and the broader scope of the fellowship. I have tried to show that the path to orthodoxy was far from simply a straight line from the Ch'engs to Chu Hsi. Other lines within the diverse tradition offered alternatives that at times appeared very viable. Thus the tradition evolved through tension within the fellowship itself as well as through the struggle between the fellowship and the government. During the Southern Sung, there generally was a much larger view of the fellowship than the one established in the official *Sung History* compiled more than sixty years after the demise of the Southern Sung.

Lü Tsu-ch'ien was an example of those who maintained a broad view of *Tao-hsüeh*. I know of no evidence that Lü Tsu-ch'ien accepted Chu Hsi as the unquestioned authority to define the tradition and fellowship of the *Tao*. Quite to the contrary, although not reducible to one individual leader, the fellowship generally centered around Chang Shih during most of the 1160s and Lü Tsu-ch'ien in the 1170s. In addition to the exceptional scope

and quality of his historical, classical, institutional, and literary scholarship, Lü enjoyed social and political status that transcended that of other leaders of the fellowship. Throughout the last dozen years of Lü's life, no other leader within the fellowship had nearly as extensive a network of connections with scholar-officials or attracted as many students. Against the backdrop of hostility against *Tao-hsüeh*, he sought to protect what he occasionally referred to as "this *Tao* of ours" and "our faction." As one of the two chief examiners for the national *chin-shih* examinations in 1172, he passed examination essays of the largest number and most significant group of *Tao-hsüeh* men ever to attain their degrees in any one year during the Sung. So truly extraordinary was his status that despite state regulations against favoritism in the examinations, he could boldly announce his recognition of Lu Chiu-yüan's essay. Modern scholars have generally given little attention to Lü's contributions. Nonetheless, Lü certainly must occupy a crucial place in any reconstruction of Sung *Tao-hsüeh*.

Except for Chu Hsi's own students, his contemporaries did not accept Chu's assumption of authority. As Yeh Shih pointed out, the *Tao-hsüeh* rubric extended to many leading scholar-officials who promoted reform, so it was not at all limited to Chu Hsi. Major thinkers continued to debate with him over the philosophical content of Confucianism and the composition of the tradition. Ch'en Liang challenged his presentation of the golden age of antiquity as a model for recent times. Lu Chiu-yüan called into question Chu's understanding of the classics along with the purity of his brand of Confucianism. It was Lu who pressed Chu most straightforwardly to acknowledge that his system was grounded on mere individual opinions that required further scrutiny and discussion within the fellowship. These friends also issued warnings about *Tao-hsüeh* behavior and attitudes. Lu cautioned about the danger of a backlash if members of the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship continued to maintain the exclusive claim to be the only true Confucians. Ch'en Liang complained that members of the fellowship sought to be so exclusive that they resembled participants of a cultic secret society gathered around an altar. Since the state historically sought to suppress cultic secret societies, Ch'en's complaint could have been a warning.

Opponents outside of *Tao-hsüeh* had since the 1130s been condemning the fellowship for professing to be more authentically Confucian than others. They presented arguments to the emperor's court that *Tao-hsüeh* did not represent standard Confucian teachings but only a few recent upstarts' narrow approach to selected classical truths. Fellowship partisans were simply poorly qualified and less successful scholar-officials who sought to advance their professional careers by claiming a doctrinal superiority. Although the attacks on *Tao-hsüeh* had subsided by the mid-1150s, Chu Hsi's aggressive claims and actions in the 1180s sparked renewed assaults. Such acts as his destruction of Ch'in Kuei's shrine and impeachment of



T'ang Chung-yu had much less practical impact than what Lü Tsu-ch'ien had done to further the interests and goals of the fellowship. Still, Chu evoked much sharper reaction, largely because he was not as endowed as Lü was in terms of personal magnetism, social status, and political savvy. When those associated with the fellowship became key players in the affairs of the imperial family in the early 1190s, their enemies had even more reason to sound an alarm. By 1195, these enemies had seemingly won the power struggle and obtained an imperial ban against what was decreed to be a type of false and pretentious learning.

These opponents presented evidence that *Tao-hsüeh* was a closed society with a particular membership and a certain political agenda. Besides recommending one another for government posts, *Tao-hsüeh* partisans had been very successful in identifying like-minded men among the candidates for degrees in the civil service examinations. Although the government had rigorous safeguards to prevent examiners from knowing who had written any particular examination essay, those within the group shared ideas and language that enabled them sometimes to identify and pass kindred spirits. My analysis of Lü Tsu-ch'ien's grading of the 1172 examinations substantiates these charges of favoritism. Further evidence that *Tao-hsüeh* constituted a faction was provided by the role of some of their leaders in seeing that Ning-tsung was declared heir apparent and then emperor to replace Kuang-tsung. Patterns of memorials protesting the dismissal of their leaders at court revealed the depth of their linkage, for dissent placed one at risk. From such activities, it was clear to his opponents that Chu Hsi had not used the term "faction" too loosely in his 1181 eulogy to Lü Tsu-ch'ien. Events seemed to prove that Chu's agenda, which this eulogy set out, was far from empty rhetoric.

The composition of the "proscribed list" in 1197 also demonstrated consistency and agreement about the range of membership of the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship. In terms of number of individuals condemned, Che-tung scholars eclipsed Chu Hsi and his disciples as the largest single target. The diversity of those listed included such scholars as Chu Hsi, Yeh Shih, and followers of Lü Tsu-ch'ien and Lu Chiu-yüan. Indeed, the intellectual origins of the blacklisted Confucians are traceable back not only to the Ch'eng brothers, Chou Tun-i, and Chang Tsai, but also to such associates within the Yüan-yu conservative party as Ssu-ma Kuang, Hu An-kuo, and the Lü family. Hence the broad conception of the *Tao-hsüeh* rubric endured throughout the twelfth century among its critics no less than its defenders.

There are signs that the broader view of the fellowship did not disappear during the remainder of the Southern Sung. Li Hsin-ch'uan, the first historian of the *Tao-hsüeh* movement, maintained a broad view of the fellowship. Besides recognizing Chang Chiu-ch'eng's importance in the 1130s, Li recorded court honors for Lü Tsu-ch'ien and Chang Shih, and also included

Ssu-ma Kuang in his own 1223 petition for special sacrifices at the Confucian temple for Chu and the Four Masters of the Northern Sung. Even the 1241 edict enshrining Chu Hsi and the Four Masters in the Confucian temple was not the dynasty's last word. In the 1260s, Ssu-ma Kuang and Lü Tsu-ch'ien were added. More significantly, Lü was placed beside Chu Hsi, whereas Ch'eng Hao was moved to a lesser position with Shao Yung and Chang Shih. Hence the 1241 edict did not bring about the total triumph of the narrow view of *Tao-hsüeh* focused on Ch'eng and Chu. It was later dynasties that elevated Chu to the central hall of the temple as one of the ten wisemen.

Even Chu Hsi's disciples who made exclusionist claims about Chu's uniqueness also made implicit accommodations with the larger fellowship in the thirteenth century. On the first front, there were the historians, institutionalists, and/or utilitarians from Che-tung. Some of Chen Te-hsiu's major positions corresponded to the historical and institutional legacy of Che-tung Confucians. But he did not call attention to these parallels. He presented himself as following Chu's teachings. Consequently, modern scholars have interpreted those ideas that he shared with earlier Che-tung Confucians as his own new developments in bringing the institutional legacy of Chu Hsi to completion. Similarly, the four Chin-hua masters also drew upon Che-tung traditions about the role of law, the significance of historical institutions, and the importance of military and political means of defending the dynasty. They did not draw attention to their Che-tung roots, however. Instead, they projected themselves as being in the most orthodox line of Chu Hsi's teachings. Such developments could be seen as a synthesis of Chu's philosophy with Che-tung institutional and historical wisdom. In effect, they represented a tilting of the balance of Chu's system in favor of institutional and social concerns, and away from his preferred level of speculative philosophy.

On a second front and apparently in response to Lu Chiu-yüan's lingering influence, Chu's disciples also shifted the balance of Chu's philosophy toward the level of cultural values underlying ethics and self-cultivation. Although striving to be faithful to Chu's trust in him, Huang Kan tended to emphasize self-cultivation at the expense of Chu's scholarly inquiry and speculative philosophy. Even though Ch'en Ch'un lashed out against Lu's influence only when it confronted him head-on in Yen-chou in 1217, his emphasis on the mind and spiritual cultivation in his *Terms Explained* could be interpreted as a positive response to Lu's challenge. That challenge necessitated organizing and extending Chu's teachings on the mind and self-cultivation. Some of Lu's students in Chekiang, particularly Yang Chien, continued and further developed Lu's philosophy as an alternative to Chu's. More typically, however, Lu's students of the thirteenth century moved toward a synthesis with Chu's methodology. Chen Te-hsiu was probably inspired to

amplify Chu's learning on the mind in friendly dialogues with those attracted to Lu Chiu-yüan's ideas. Chen's exchanges with the T'ang family of southern Anhwei, for instance, encouraged amicable exploration of common ground.

It appears quite clear that Chu's followers shifted priorities away from his preferred level of speculative philosophy. Other *Tao-hsüeh* masters during the twelfth century had engaged that level of discourse much less often and less thoroughly than Chu had. Chu and his contemporaries sometimes answered on a different level of discourse than the one on which they had been addressed. Yet they were not as oblivious to each other's points as some modern scholars have surmised. Chu sometimes ignored major points by his friends in an attempt to direct the discussion and the terms to a different, usually more theoretical, level of discourse. Besides the level of abstract principles, Chu's thought had also encompassed discourse on cultural values and practical affairs, but his priorities among these three levels had been different from his contemporaries and successors. Therefore, when his students gravitated back toward the center of twelfth-century *Tao-hsüeh*, they actually did so through synthesis in a way that increased the Chu school's share in the discourse on cultural values and practical affairs. Through their ability to stake claims in Chu's name to a fuller possession of the discourse on cultural values and practical affairs and to a more complete philosophy of mind and praxis of governance, they significantly contributed toward the eventual triumph of Chu's school.

As this emerging synthesis centered on Chu took hold, Confucianism became unprecedentedly exclusive, as James Liu has surmised. In fact, a proclivity for exclusiveness had begun rather early. One early sign was Ch'eng I's proclamation that only those who concentrated on the *Tao* truly deserved to be called Confucians. Gradually over time, members of the fellowship generated a mode of discourse involving terms of inclusion and exclusion: "our Confucians," "this *Tao* of ours," "this culture of ours," and by the 1170s even "our faction." Their commitment to making state and society accord with the *Tao* often simply resulted in heightened anxiety. Confronted by hostility from the government and other Confucians, and living in a world where Buddhism and Taoism pervaded society and influenced the thought of many, *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians tended to become increasingly insecure and moralistic in their view of the antagonisms between their group and the conventional world. In their writings, we have detected some emotions and inclinations similar to those found in moral regeneration movements in other cultures. Their writings often smacked of mild paranoia, betraying a heightened anxiety about the dangers to their group from those outside of it.

In terms of interactions with the government, *Tao-hsüeh* exclusiveness seems related to state absolutism and the issue of orthodox legitimacy dur-

ing the Southern Sung. Chu's concept of the orthodox succession in the *Tao* tradition (*tao-t'ung*) had parallels with the traditional Confucian idea of a legitimate succession of dynasties (*cheng-t'ung*). Moreover, especially during the accommodation that culminated in the 1241 proclamation recognizing *Tao-hsüeh* as the state orthodoxy, both intellectual and political leaders were surely cognizant of the shared goal of reinforcing claims to ideological legitimacy. In view of the larger history of Confucianism, it should not be surprising that literati strove ultimately for unification along one correct path rather than for autonomy as an independent body or "loyal opposition." One might further suggest that a common ground between state absolutism and intellectual orthodoxy was the fellowship's heightened concentration on the ruler's mind-and-heart as the principal key to politics, polity, and social values. In short, although Chu himself cannot escape some of the responsibility for the narrowing of the Confucian Way, we should place his role in the longer progressive evolution of persons and events from Ch'eng I to the official *Sung History* in the 1340s.

Fourth, one might ask, how does the gestalt emerging from this intellectual history of *Tao-hsüeh* affect modern interpretations of Sung Confucianism? Several brief examples will serve as illustrations. Given the tendency among Chu Hsi's students to shift the center of Chu's school away from speculative philosophy, shouldn't we refrain from the current convention of depicting *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians as philosophers obsessed with metaphysics? That impression has arisen from a concentration on Chu's most abstract philosophical statements. Even in Chu Hsi's case, although he gave greater priority to ethical philosophy than to social and political issues, ethics is not, after all, metaphysics. Moreover, some modern scholars have cited Chen Te-hsiu and Wu Ch'eng as proof that the Chu school centered on teachings about the learning of the mind-and-heart. These modern scholars tend to slight the influence of Lu's ideas and followers on these two philosophers. Is it not somewhat one-sided to present Chen and Wu simply as true and faithful students of Chu Hsi? If they presented themselves in this way, that might suggest more about the power of Chu as a symbol than about their completely pure reliance on Chu's ideas. Although Chen was excluded from the *Tao-hsüeh* rubric in the official *Sung History*, recent scholarship has established how central and crucial he was to the tradition. By bringing into focus the writings and contributions of such leaders as Chang Chiu-ch'eng and Lü Tsu-ch'ien, the present study has sought to advance the reconstruction of the historical diversity and evolution of *Tao-hsüeh*.

This historical perspective on the evolution of the *Tao-hsüeh* fellowship also enriches our understanding of the philosophy of its major thinkers. Although the conclusions reached in the chapters on individuals are too diverse and numerous to summarize effectively here, the case of Chu Hsi is instructive.

Setting the evolution of Chu Hsi's thinking in the context of exchanges with his contemporaries has produced a new perspective on his thought. For example, Chu borrowed most of his community models from others with whom he shared a goal of forging a Confucian society. Chu himself acknowledged in a letter, which has usually been overlooked, that half of his famous characterization of humaneness came directly from Chang Shih. Chu's highly acclaimed plans for academies and principles for study at academies were prefigured in and probably inspired by Lü Tsu-ch'ien's earlier work. Lü's classical studies of the *Book of Changes* and the *Book of Poetry* contributed to the textual framework for Chu's views of these classics. Lü was also a major player and not merely a mediator in such issues as differences between Chu's and Lu Chiu-yüan's educational methodologies. Indeed, Chu sometimes presented himself as the Mean between contending points of view on some issues. Although his projection of others' views often made them appear more extreme than they actually were, Chu appears often to have striven for what he regarded as the Mean. Hence the dynamics of his thinking are obscured unless contemporary alternatives are clearly known.

Audience also influenced Chu Hsi's message. Statements in confrontational situations sometimes differed from those that he made in other circumstances. His comments about the hegemonies of antiquity varied between occasions when he spoke as historical scholar or as ethical philosopher engaged in argument. Debates with Ch'en Liang apparently influenced Chu's views on the well-field system and the relation between situational weighing, or expediency, and the *Tao*. Although generally passed over by modern scholars, Lu Chiu-yüan's questioning of Chu's objectivity and authority demonstrably functioned as a crucial aspect of Lu's challenge. It highlighted both the importance of Chu's assumption about his certainty in knowing the *Tao* and his unwillingness to defend this assumption against Lu's direct challenge. Even though privately he expressed doubts and continuously struggled to reach better understandings, he projected assurance and spoke with authority when addressing others. Compared with his philosophical and methodological pronouncements, Chu's debate with Lu—and also his expurgation of Chang Shih's and Hu Hung's writings—reveal another side of Chu Hsi, one less dedicated to the integrity of texts than the one projected by modern scholars. Such details add depth and texture to our picture of Chu Hsi. The present study has sought to understand his actions arising from a concern, shared within a Confucian fellowship, for the transmission of "our *Tao*."

Confrontational writings and disputes have thus illustrated the importance of context and group dynamics in the development of ideas and orientations. This pattern should not be surprising given Confucian emphasis on human interactions and relatedness rather than individual autonomy.

What remains to be done? I would like to mention several major needs in an attempt to challenge others. The present study by necessity focuses on the leading thinkers of the fellowship. Although these intellectuals deserve fuller studies, a greater task is investigating the larger fellowship including not only those who were primarily political figures but also rank-and-file participants. Even less is known about Confucians outside of the fellowship during the Southern Sung. Southern Sung Confucians who were primarily poets, painters, historians, encyclopedists, and officials have rarely been incorporated into our studies of thought. The works of many of the opponents of *Tao-hsüeh* have not been preserved, but available works have only begun to be explored. To complete the story set forth in this present study, a second volume is needed to deal more thoroughly with the thirteenth century (in the North as well as the South) and on into the 1340s with the compilation of the official *Sung History*. I hope others will join in such historical adventures. Ming and Ch'ing scholars have in recent years been working on the issue of orthodoxy from the sixteenth to the early twentieth centuries. We ought now to work toward filling gaps in the narrative. Given the impact of *Tao-hsüeh* in late imperial China and its continuing influence on education, socioeconomic values, and political culture in East Asia today, can we afford to ignore the intellectual history of its evolution?



## NOTES

### Abbreviations Used in the Notes

CLC	Ch'en Liang, <i>Ch'en Liang chi</i>
CTWC	Chu Hsi, <i>Hui-an hsien-sheng Chu Wen-kung wen-chi</i> ( <i>Chu-tzu wen-chi</i> )
CTYL	Chu Hsi, <i>Chu-tzu yü-lei</i>
HNYL	Li Hsin-ch'uan, <i>Chien-yen i-lai hsi-nien yao-lu</i>
LCYC	Lu Chiu-yüan, <i>Lu Chiu-yüan chi</i>
LTLWC	Lü Tsu-ch'ien, <i>Lü Tung-lai wen-chi</i>
NHC	Chang Shih, <i>Nan-hsien chi</i>
SB	Herbert Franke, ed., <i>Sung Biographies</i>
SCWCL	Yeh Shao-weng, <i>Ssu-ch'ao wen-chien lu</i>
SMLHS	Ch'iu Han-sheng et al., eds., <i>Sung Ming li-hsüeh shih</i>
SS	T'o-t'o et al., eds., <i>Sung shih</i>
SSCSPM	Ch'en Pang-chan and Feng Ch'i, eds., <i>Sung shih chi-shih</i> <i>pen-mo</i>
SYHA	Huang Tsung-hsi, Ch'üan Tsu-wang, et al., eds., <i>Sung Yüan</i> <i>hsüeh-an</i>
TML	Li Hsin-ch'uan, <i>Tao ming lu</i>

### Introduction

1. For a summary of the debate and its philosophical implications, see my "A New Direction in Confucian Scholarship: Approaches to Examining the Differences Between Neo-Confucianism and *Tao-hsüeh*." Notable instances of this ongoing debate include Conrad Schirokauer's review of my 1982 book in *Philosophy East and West*, October 1983, 410-412; the introduction to Wm. Theodore de Bary and JaHyun Kim Haboush's, eds., *The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea*, 4-10; the panel on Neo-Confucianism and *Tao-hsüeh* at the 1989 annual meeting of the Asso-



ciation for Asian Studies; and the introduction to Robert Hymes and Conrad Schirokauer's *Ordering the World*. In his 1983 article "Lüeh-lun Tao-hsüeh te t'ê-tian, ming-ch'eng ho hsing-shih," 37-56, Feng [Fung] Yu-lan called for scholars in China to use the term "Tao-hsüeh" in its historical sense as it was used during the eleventh and twelfth centuries rather than to follow the Ch'ing practice of confusing *Tao-hsüeh* with the later (mid-thirteenth-century) and more narrow term *li-hsüeh* (School of Principle, i.e., Chu Hsi's school, also called Neo-Confucianism by some modern scholars). In "Lüeh t'an Sung-hsüeh," 1-15, Teng Kuang-ming announced in 1987 a fundamental revision of his conception of Sung Confucianism: Sung learning should be seen as distinct from the School of Principle. Thus there is considerable agreement between my view and those of these senior Chinese scholars.

2. Sun Ying-shih, in *Chu-hu chi*, 6.4b-5a, reported hearing that the name "Tao-hsüeh" was coined by sarcastic intellectuals in Chekiang, but he (1154-1206) was writing rather late in its evolution. Chou Mi, *Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hsü-chi*, B.4b-5b, also wrote a famous indictment of *Tao-hsüeh* in the late thirteenth century. See the study by Ishida Hajime "Shū Mitsuo to Dōgaku," 25-47.

3. See particularly Ambrose Y. C. King, "The Individual and Group in Confucianism: A Relational Perspective," 57-68.

4. Mark Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past*, 69-215; Robert M. Hartwell, "Demographic, Political, and Social Transformations in China, 750-1550," 365-442; Kang Chao, *Man and Land in Chinese History*, passim.

5. See especially John Chaffee, *The Thorny Gates of Learning in Sung China*, 104; Thomas H. C. Lee, *Government Education and Examinations in Sung China*, 221.

6. Chikusa Masaaki, *Chūgoku Bukkyō shakaishi kenkyū*, 262-285.

7. TML, 1.1a-2a.

8. Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I, *Erh-Ch'eng chi* 1:95 (*I-shu* 6); Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu hsin hsüeh-an* 1:17.

9. Ch'eng and Ch'eng, *Erh-Ch'eng chi* 2:639, and Ch'eng I's account, 2:638.

10. *Wen-chi*, 11, commemorative text for Li Tuan-p'o, in Ch'eng and Ch'eng, *Erh-Ch'eng chi* 2:643; translations adapted from Peter Bol, "This Culture of Ours." Ch'eng's commemorative text for Liu immediately precedes that for Li in *Erh-ch'eng chi* 2:643.

11. Yang Shih, *Yang Kuei-shan hsien-sheng wen-chi*, 2.3b, 2.5a, 2.27a-28b, 3.12a, 3.25b, 3.29b, 3.31b, and 4.14a. As the locus of the *Tao*, Ch'eng I in his eulogy focused on the classics instead of on personal discovery in contact with Heaven and Earth or with the mind of the ancient sages.

12. LCYC, 26.305, eulogy to Lü.

13. See especially Kwang-ching Liu, ed., *Orthodoxy in Late Imperial China*; C. K. Yang, *Religion in Chinese Society*; John D. Langlois, Jr., and Sun K'o-kuan, "Three Teachings Syncretism and the Thought of Ming T'ai-tsu," 97-139; and T'ang Yü-yüan, "Ch'eng-Chu li-hsüeh ho shih ch'eng wei t'ung-chih chieh-chi te t'ung-chih ssu-hsiang," 125-134.

14. James T. C. Liu's hypothesis may be seen as inherent in his *Reform in Sung China*, his "The Sung Emperors and the *Ming-t'ang* or Hall of Enlightenment," 45-57, and even more so in *China Turning Inward*. He has made the point more explicitly in our personal discussions.

15. The more philosophical approach is best represented by Wm. Theodore de Bary's *Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of the Mind-and-Heart*; political history is central in James Liu's *China Turning* and "How Did a Neo-Confucian School Become the State Orthodoxy?"

16. Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 153-154, 196-198. Donald J. Munro, *Images of Human Nature*, 5, translates *hsing erh shang* as "nonempirical." For an example of a comparable triad, consider the famous one attributed to Hu Yüan (993-1057): substance or essence (*t'i*), literary and cultural expression (*wen*),

and function (*yung*) in governance. See SYHA, 1.25, translated in Wm. Theodore de Bary, et al., eds., *Sources of Chinese Tradition* 1:384. Other triads included such terms as belles lettres, ethics, and politics; Heaven, Humankind, and Earth; or conduct, words, and deeds.

17. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, 127.

18. See especially Peter Bol's "Culture and the Way in Eleventh-Century China," and his "*This Culture of Ours*."

19. CTWC, 72.25a.

20. CTYL, 6.159, Chung-hua ed., 6.99, translated in Graham, *Two Chinese Philosophers*, p. 12; see also Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 1:244, and Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, ch. 5.

21. The diversity is particularly evident in discussions in Tillman, "Consciousness of T'ien in Chu Hsi's Thought," 31-50; Wing-tsit Chan, *Chu Hsi: New Studies*, 184-196; and Robert Eno, *The Confucian Creation of Heaven*, passim.

22. On this dualism, see particularly Irene Bloom, "On the Matter of the Mind," 293-327; Jean Lévi, "The Body: The Taoists' Coat of Arms"; and Mark Elvin, "Tales of *shen* and *xin*: Body-Person and Heart-Mind in China during the Last 150 Years."

23. CTYL, 20.759, Chung-hua ed., 20.470; Satō Hitoshi, "Chu Hsi's 'Treatise on Jen,'" 214. See also Lin Yü-sheng, "The Evolution of the Pre-Confucian Meaning of *Jen* and the Confucian Concept of Moral Autonomy," 172-204; Wing-tsit Chan, "The Evolution of the Confucian Concept *Jen*," 295-319; and his "Chinese and Western Interpretations of *Jen* (Humanity)," 107-129.

24. Benjamin I. Schwartz, "Some Polarities in Confucian Thought," 50-62; Yü Ying-shih, "Observations on Confucian Intellectualism," 105-146; Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 26-29 and passim; and Munro, *Images*, passim.

25. For the list and the decree elevating Wang, see Pi Yüan, comp., *Hsü tzu-chih t'ung-chien*, 89.2271-2273.

## Part 1: The First Period, 1127-1162

1. James Liu, *China Turning*, ch. 4.

2. Hu Hung, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 6.1a, translation adapted from Conrad Schirokauer, "Chu Hsi's Political Thought," 127.

3. See Jing-shen Tao, "The Personality of Sung Kao-tsung," 531-543.

4. Liu, *China Turning*, chs. 4-6; SYHA 37.1251-1262; SMLHS 1:221-286.

5. Thomas A. Wilson, "Genealogy of the Way," ch. 2; Wm. Theodore de Bary, *The Message of the Mind in Neo-Confucianism*, 29; Wing-tsit Chan, "Chu Hsi's Completion of Neo-Confucianism," 80-81.

6. TML, 3.3a-5a; HNYL, 101.1660-1661; Liu, *China Turning*, 74-75.

7. TML, 3.5a-7a, especially 6a; SSCSPM, 80.867. See also the summary overview in Ishida Hajime, "Shū Mitsū," 33-34, 36.

8. James Liu, "State Orthodoxy," 497.

9. TML, 3.12b-13a, cf. the translation in Conrad Schirokauer, "Neo-Confucians under Attack," 165; HNYL 108:1755-1756. For Yin Ch'un's protest, see TML, 3.16a-18, 4.1a-3a, 4.4a-5a.

10. TML, 4.3a-11a; HNYL, 151.2431-2432, 153.2469, 165.2704, 168.2750, 173.2847; SYHA, 96.3194-3195; Liu, *China Turning*, 78-79.

## Chapter 1: The First Generation: Chang Chiu-ch'eng and Hu Hung

1. HNYL, 121.1960; Liu, *China Turning*, 71. Computation based on Chang Chiu-ch'eng, *Heng-p'u wen-chi*; see also SS, 374.11577-11579; SYHA, 40.1314-1315. On

the classics and history, see especially Teng K'o-ming's recent book *Chang Chiu-ch'eng ssu-hsiang chih yen-chiu*, 47-55, 60-63, 143-146.

2. *SS*, 374.11577; *SYHA*, 40.1313; Chang Chiu-ch'eng, *Heng-p'u wen-chi*, 12:2a-9b.

3. *SYHA*, 40.1315; *HNYL*, 108.1754.

4. *SYHA*, 40.1309. On his relation to the school of the Ch'engs, see Teng K'o-ming, *Chang Chiu-ch'eng*, 119-131.

5. Chang, *Heng-p'u hsin-chuan*, A.20b; *SYHA*, 40.1307; *SMLHS*, 1:306.

6. Chang Chiu-ch'eng, *Meng-tzu chuan*, 28.5a; *SMLHS*, 1:307; Teng K'o-ming, *Chang Chiu-ch'eng*, 92-97. The Six Classics were the five mentioned earlier (*Documents, Changes, Poetry, Spring and Autumn Annals*, and *Rites*) and the *Rituals of Chou (Chou-li)*. The last of these took the place of the *Book of Music*, which was no longer extant.

7. Chang, *Meng-p'u hsin-chuan*, A.31a; *SYHA*, 40.1308. See also Chang, *Meng-tzu chuan*, 14.9a; *SMLHS* 1:312.

8. Chang, *Heng-p'u hsin-chuan*, A.31a; *SMLHS* 1:312; see also Chang, *Heng-p'u wen-chi* 5.4a-9a.

9. Chang, *Meng-tzu chuan*, 27.20b; *SMLHS* 1:313; Teng K'o-ming, *Chang Chiu-ch'eng*, 97-108. As we shall see in Chapter 8, Lu Chiu-yüan made similar statements about the mind.

10. *SYHA*, 40.1305.

11. Chang, *Heng-p'u wen-chi*, 18.7a; *SMLHS* 1:314.

12. *SYHA*, 40.1310.

13. *SYHA*, 40.1312.

14. *SYHA*, 40.1303.

15. Jonathan Chaves, *Mei Yao-ch'ên and the Development of Early Sung Poetry*, 105, 114-125, 133.

16. Chang, *Heng-p'u wen-chi*, 9.6a, 8.11a-12a.

17. *SYHA*, 40.1307, 1317; *SMLHS* 1:308-317; Teng K'o-ming, *Chang Chiu-ch'eng*, 16-28. On Ta-hui, see Chün-fang Yü, "Ta-hui Tsung-kao," 211-235, and Miriam Levering, "Ch'an Enlightenment for Laymen." Robert Gimello is working on Ta-hui's "lettered Ch'an."

18. *CLC*, 19.260, rev. ed., 27.319. See Chu Hsi's views in Part Two and also in Teng K'o-ming, *Chang Chiu-ch'eng*, passim.

19. *SYHA*, 40.1304-1305.

20. Chang, *Heng-p'u wen-chi*, 5.1a-2a, also 5.8a; Chang, *Heng-p'u hsin-chuan*, A.16b-17a, A.40a-40b. See also Teng K'o-ming, *Chang Chiu-ch'eng*, 28-32.

21. Ch'ên Lai, "Lüeh-lun Chu-ju ming-tao chi," 30-38, dates this anthology no earlier than 1159 and probably before 1168 but no later than 1179. For Chang's popularity in his own day and his influence during the Southern Sung, see Teng K'o-ming, *Chang Chiu-ch'eng*, especially 149-158.

22. Hu Hung, *Wu-feng chi*, 2.86a, letter to T'an Tzu-li; Hu Hung, *Hu Hung chi*, p. 147. See other examples in *Wu-feng chi*, 2.67a-67b, 2.84b; *Hu Hung chi*, pp. 133, 146.

23. *NHC*, 14.7a.

24. Hu, *Wu-feng chi*, 2.4b-6a, 17a-17b, 25a-28b; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, pp. 84-85, 94, 99-102. On institutions, see *Wu-feng chi*, 2.64b-65a, 2.75ab, 3.70b-71a, 4.53a-55a; Hu Hung, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 5.13a, 6.3a-5a; *Hu Hung chi*, pp. 43, 45-47, 131, 139-140, 211, 265-266; *SMLHS*, 1:287-288; *SS*, 345.12922-12926; *SB*, 438-440.

25. Hu, *Wu-feng chi*, 2.32a-33a; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, pp. 104-105.

26. Hu, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 1.2a, 1.3b, 1.4a, 1.5a, 1.10-11a, 2.1a, 2.4a-4b, 3.6a, 4.10b, 5.10a; Hu, *Wu-feng chi*, 2.51b-55a; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, pp. 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 13, 22, 34, 41, 120-123. See also Conrad Schirokauer, "Chu Hsi and Hu Hung," 480-482.

27. CTWC, 73.44a; SYHA, 42.1370, see also 1373. For the *Doctrine of the Mean*, see Wing-tsit Chan, *Source Book*, 98.
28. Hu, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 4.2b; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, p. 28. Translated in Schirokauer, "Chu and Hu," 487.
29. Hu, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 3.6a; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, p. 22. Translated in Schirokauer, "Chu and Hu," 487; also *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 4.1a-3b; *Hu Hung chi*, pp. 27-28.
30. Hu, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 1.4b; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, p. 4. Translated in Schirokauer, "Chu and Hu," 488; Mou Tsung-san, *Hsin-t'i yü hsing-t'i* 2:434-436.
31. SMLHS 1:300-302.
32. CTWC, 73.47a; SYHA, 42.1376, also 1378. On his view of mind and human nature, see Mou Tsung-san, *Hsin-t'i* 2:436-454.
33. Hu, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 2.7b; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, p. 16. Translation adapted from Schirokauer, "Chu and Hu," 490; see also SYHA, 42.1368.
34. Hu, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 4.5a; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, p. 30. Translation adapted from Schirokauer, "Chu and Hu," 490. See also SYHA, 42.1369.
35. CTWC, 73.40b; SYHA, 42.1370.
36. CTWC, 73.43a; SYHA, 42.1372.
37. Hu, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 3.10a-10b; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, p. 25; SYHA, 42.1368.
38. CTWC, 73.45b; SYHA, 42.1375, translated in Schirokauer, "Chu and Hu," 484; also SYHA, 42.1372.
39. Hu, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 2.1a; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, p. 10; *Analects*, 2/4.
40. Hu, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 1.4a and 7b; Hu, *Wu-feng chi*, 3.55b-56a; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, pp. 4, 6, and 196-197; SYHA, 42.1368, 1375. Also see the discussion in Mou Tsung-san, *Hsin-t'i* 2:484-501.
41. Hu, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 5.9b; also Hu, *Wu-feng chi*, 2.2a, 2.4b, 4.17a-17b, 4.23a-23b; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, pp. 41, 83, 85, 234, 239.
42. CTWC, 73.44a; SYHA, 42.1373. Cf. Schirokauer's translation in "Chu and Hu," 487.
43. Hu, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 1.11a-11b; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, p. 9.
44. Hu, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 1.8b; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, p. 7; SYHA, 42.1367-1368; see *Analects*, 3/20.
45. CTWC, 73.41b; SYHA, 42.1371. Translation adapted from Schirokauer, "Chu and Hu," 488. "Situation" could more literally be read as "feelings."
46. CTWC, 73.42b; SYHA, 42.1372. Cf. Schirokauer's translation, "Chu and Hu," 488.
47. CTWC, 73.44b-45a; SYHA, 42.1374.
48. Chan, *Source Book*, 98.
49. Hu, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 4.3a-3b; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, p. 28. Translation in part adapted from Schirokauer, "Chu and Hu," 486.
50. Hu, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 1.1a; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, p. 1; SYHA, 42.1368; the last sentence appears only in the latter source.
51. Hu, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 1.3a-3b; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, p. 3; SYHA, 42.1367.
52. Hu, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 3.7a-7b; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, p. 23; SYHA, 42.1369.
53. Hu, *Hu-tzu chih-yen*, 4.10b; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, p. 34; SMLHS 1:302.

## Part 2: The Second Period, 1163-1181

1. Using the listing of men, degree dates, and backgrounds in Schirokauer, "Neo-Confucians under Attack," 167-168, 184-192, I am adding Chao Yen-yü (1160 *chin-shih*) from Ch'ang Pi-te, Wang Te-i, et al., *Sung jen chuan-chi tzu-liao so-yin* 4:3536.

2. Pi Yüan, comp., *Hsü tzu-chih t'ung-chien*, 147.3936, and 146.3896, for an 1178 complaint; Schirokauer, "Neo-Confucians under Attack," 168. Chao Yen-chung was

in the same generation of direct descent from a younger brother of the dynasty's founder as another famous attacker, Chao Yen-yü.

3. CTWC, 72.16a-46a, especially 46a; Ichichi Tsuyuhiko, "Shushi no 'Zatsugaku ken' to sono shūhen," 3-49. I have benefited from reading Ari Borrell's Columbia University seminar paper focusing on Chu's critique of Lü Pen-chung.

## Chapter 2: Chang Shih

1. CTWC, 81.2b, colophon to one of Chang's poems.

2. Special notice should be given to Takahata Tsunenobu's biography of and various articles on Chang that are appended to his *Chō Nanken shū jinmei sakuin*. Wing-tsit Chan, especially in *Chu Hsi: New Studies*, 396-418, has recently drawn attention to Chang's importance.

3. Chu's eulogy in CTWC, 89.1a-10a, especially 2a; SS, 429.12770-12775; Takahata Tsunenobu, "Chō Nanken nenpu," 65-89.

4. SS, 429.12774.

5. SYHA, 50.1633.

6. SS, 429.12771-12774, especially 12771.

7. CTWC, 89.4b; SMLHS 1:320.

8. Takahata Tsunenobu, "Chō Nanken no Jōkō fu ni okeru no jisei," 90-109.

9. NHC, 9.3a; SMLHS 1:319.

10. SYHA, 50.1630. See also passages quoted on pages 1625 and 1627.

11. SYHA, especially 50.1613, 1618, and 1626-1631 passim.

12. On Chang Chün, see SYHA, 44.1409-1418, and Liu, *China Turning*, 93. For Chang Shih's view of Su Shih, see NHC, 35.2a-3a; SYHA, 51.1675.

13. Hu Hung, *Wu-feng chi*, 2.65b; Hu Hung, *Hu Hung chi*, p. 132; CTWC, 89.1b; the words "for this *Tao* of ours" are found only in Chu's account, but they are consistent with the context. See also NHC, 26.3a-5a; Hu's colophon in *Wu-feng chi*, 3.51b-53a, and *Hu Hung chi*, pp. 192-193.

14. Hu, *Wu-feng chi*, 2.67b, see also 2.68b; Hu, *Hu Hung chi*, p. 133, see also p. 134.

15. CTWC, 89.1b-2a; SMLHS 1:321.

16. NHC, 33.8b-9b, and letter to Lü's brother in 25.7a-7b; SMLHS 1:321.

17. See Chu Hsi's preface in NHC; Chang on Chu-ko, in NHC, 10.5a-7a, 36.10a-10b; and Chang's *Han cheng-hsiang Chu-ko chung wu-hou chuan*.

18. Takahata Tsunenobu, "Chō Nanken no shisō hensen," 1-25, and his "Chō Nanken shū no hanpon," 26-65.

19. NHC, 8.1a-2a, cf. the partial translation in Wing-tsit Chan, *New Studies*, 174. The reference to the *ch'ien* hexagram section in the *Book of Changes* actually uses the terms *ch'ien* and *k'un*, which are near equivalents to *t'ien* and *ti* (Heaven and Earth). Wing-tsit Chan (Chan Wing-tsit), *Chu-tzu hsin t'an-so*, 375-376, identifies Chang's quotes from the Ch'engs and the classics. See also NHC, 25.13a-13b.

20. Chang Shih, *Meng-tzu shuo*, 6.12b; also his *Kuei-ssu Lun-yü chieh*, 9.1b; SMLHS 1:330.

21. Chang, *Meng-tzu shuo*, 3.1a; SMLHS 1:331.

22. Chang, *Meng-tzu shuo*, 2.27b-28a; SMLHS 1:331.

23. NHC, 14.2a-2b; SMLHS 1:326 and 331.

24. Chang, *Meng-tzu shuo*, 3.1b and 6.3a; SMLHS 1:332.

25. Chang, *Meng-tzu shuo*, 6.12b; SMLHS 1:332.

26. Chang, *Meng-tzu shuo*, 6.4a; SMLHS 1:332. See Munro, *Images of Human Nature*, 57-74, on the water image.

27. Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I, *Erh-Ch'eng chi* 1:10, cf. the translation in Chan, *Source Book*, 528.

28. Chang, *Meng-tzu shuo*, 6.3b; *SMLHS* 1:333.
29. SYHA, 50.1623.
30. Chang Shih, *Kuei-ssu Lun-yü chieh*, 8.21b; *SMLHS* 1:333-334.
31. Chang, *Lun-yü chieh*, 8.14a; also other passages in *SMLHS* 1:334.
32. Chang, *Meng-tzu shuo*, 7.25a; *SMLHS* 1:325; see also *NHC*, 14.5b-6b.
33. *NHC*, 14.5b-6a; *SMLHS* 1:325-326.
34. Chang, *Lun-yü chieh*, 2.13b; *SMLHS* 1:327.
35. SYHA, 50.1618.
36. SYHA, 50.1618.
37. SYHA, 50.1624; *SMLHS* 1:335.
38. SYHA, 50.1613; *SMLHS* 1:335.
39. *NHC*, 12.2b; *SMLHS* 1:323. See Ch'eng and Ch'eng, *Erb-Ch'eng chi* 1:143.
40. Chang, *Lun-yü chieh*, 3.11b; *SMLHS* 1:336.
41. *NHC*, 36.9a-9b; *SMLHS* 1:336.
42. Chang, *Meng-tzu shuo*, 6.30a; *SMLHS* 1:323.
43. *NHC*, 11.7a; *SMLHS* 1:323.
44. SYHA, 50.1619-1620.
45. Chang, *Meng-tzu shuo*, 7.1a; *SMLHS* 1:323.
46. *NHC*, 12.2b; *SMLHS* 1:323.
47. Chang, *Lun-yü chieh*, preface, 1b; *SMLHS* 1:337-338.
48. SYHA, 50.1635.
49. *CTWC*, 89.9b; *SMLHS* 1:337. See *SMLHS* 1:337-338 on Chang's three contributions.
50. *LCYC*, 34.413. See also the editors' comments in SYHA, 50.1609, 1635-1636.

### Chapter 3: Chu Hsi and Chang Shih

1. Quoted by Huang Tsung-hsi in SYHA, 50.1635. See also the passages quoted in SS, 427.12710 and 429.12775; *CTYL*, 103.4140, Chung-hua ed., 103.2605; Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 525-529, or *New Studies*, 396-404.
2. *CTWC*, 31.10a, 17a-20b, 21a-37a. See also the discussion in Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu hsin hsüeh-an*, 4:510-530; Takahata Tsunenobu, "Chō Nanken no Rongokai ni ataeta Shushi no eikyō," 110-123; Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 530-537, or *New Studies*, 404-409.
3. Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 1:105-112, 2:123-182; Ch'ien Mu, *Sung Ming li-hsüeh kai-shu*, 103-109; Mou Tsung-san, *Hsin-t'i* 3:71-228; Wang Mao-hung, *Chu-tzu nien-p'u*, 1A.23-27, 1B.35-42. Matthew Levey's dissertation elucidates differences between Wang, Ch'ien, and Mou on this issue. See also Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 537-543, or *New Studies*, 409-416; Ch'en Lai, *Chu Hsi che-hsüeh yen-chiu*, 91-188; Chang Li-wen, *Chu Hsi ssu-hsiang yen-chiu*, 434-440; Ts'ai Jen-hou, *Sung Ming li-hsüeh*, 1:76-106; Tomoeda Ryūtarō, *Shushi no shisō keisei*, 38-102; Liu Shu-hsien, *Chu-tzu che-hsüeh ssu-hsiang te fa-chan yü wan-ch'eng*, 71-138; Shen Mei-tzu, *Chu-tzu shih chung te ssu-hsiang yen-chiu*, passim; Chung-ying Cheng, "Chu Hsi's Methodology and Theory of Understanding," 179-186; Thomas A. Metzger, *Escape from Predicament*, 85-99; and John Berthrong, "Glosses on Reality," 78-86.
4. Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I, *Erb-Ch'eng chi* 1:188; *CTWC*, 64.28b-29b. Translated in Chan, *Source Book*, 600-602.
5. Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 3:219-223.
6. Yung Sik Kim, "The World-View of Chu Hsi," passim, and "Problems in the Study of the History of Chinese Science," 83-104.
7. *CTWC*, 75.22b-23b; Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 543.
8. *CTWC*, 73.46b; SYHA 42.1375-1376.

9. Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 3:198-228, especially 200.
10. NHC, 21.9b.
11. CTWC, 73.40b; SYHA, 42.1370.
12. CTWC, 73.44b, 45a, 47a; SYHA, 42.1374, 1375, 1377.
13. Lü regarded Hu's work as superior to Chang Tsai's *Correcting Youthful Ignorance* (*Cheng-meng*); see SYHA 42.1366.
14. CTWC, 73.47a; SYHA, 42.1377.
15. Wu Jen-hu in the introduction to his punctuated edition of the *Hu Hung chi*, p. 3, made this observation. Wing-tsit Chan, in *Hsin t'an-so*, p. 544, n. 165 (or *New Studies*, p. 423, n. 165), made the same observation as well as the observation that the statements attributed to Chang and Lü are not in their collected works. Despite his observation that statements to which Chu objected are not in existing editions, Professor Chan informed me that he believes "no one changed Hu's text." Rather, "In the discussion of the text, Chu, Chang, and Lü proposed changing certain words." These comments from his June 1990 letter would appear to conflict with his published observation. Surely Chu was quoting Hu's statements from Hu's original text. Since these statements are not in existing editions of Hu's text, it seems safe to conclude that his text was changed to omit these passages to which Chu had objected in his "Misgivings."
16. Listed in CTYL, Cheng-chung ed., 101.4104, Chung-hua ed., 101.2582; and categorized by the editor in SYHA, 42.1377.
17. CTWC, 73.40b-41a; SYHA, 42.1370; Chang Tsai, *Chang Tsai chi*, 374; see also T'ang Chün-i, "Chang Tsai's Theory of Mind and Its Metaphysical Basis," 113-136; and Ira Kasoff, *The Thought of Chang Tsai*, 28-33, 86-90.
18. CTWC, 73.47a-47b; SYHA, 42.1377.
19. CTWC, 73.43a-43b; SYHA, 42.1374; Schirokauer, "Chu and Hu," 490, 493.
20. CTWC, 73.41b-42a; SYHA, 42.1371.
21. CTWC, 73.42a. *Book of Poetry* translation adapted from James Legge, *The Chinese Classics* 4:541. For Chu's reading of this poem see his *Shih chi chuan*, 214.
22. CTWC, 73.42b-43a; SYHA 42.1372, and editors' criticism of Chu's taking likes and dislikes to be things; also cf. the translations in Legge, *Classics* 4:541, and D. C. Lau, *Mencius*, 191.
23. CTWC, 73.43a; SYHA, 42.1372.
24. CTWC, 73.44b-45a; SYHA, 42.1374-1375.
25. CTWC, 73.43ab; SYHA, 42.1373. Ch'eng Hao's statement appears in *Erh-Ch'eng chi* 1:10, translated in Chan, *Source Book*, 528.
26. This is done by Wing-tsit Chan in *Source Book*, 529. Chan translated the phrase *li yu shan e* ("principle possesses good and evil") to read "according to principle, there is both good and evil." For my translation, see Chapter 2. Ch'ien Mu apparently reads the phrase more literally and regards it as quite troublesome for Chu (see below).
27. I am here following the case made by Ch'ien Mu in *Chu-tzu* 3:209-215. See also Chiu Hansheng, "Zhu Xi's [Chu Hsi's] Doctrine of Principle," 116-137; and A. C. Graham, "What Was New in the Ch'eng-Chu Theory of Human Nature?" 138-157.
28. Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 3:215-216.
29. CTYL, 101.4109-4110, Chung-hua ed., 101.2585-2586; translated in Chan, *Source Book*, 616-617; another view is presented in Schirokauer, "Chu and Hu," 494. Chu made the comment in reference to the reiteration of Hu Hung's position by one of his sons.
30. CTWC, 42.4b, third letter to Hu Shih (1136-1173), cf. the translation in Schirokauer, "Chu and Hu," 494.
31. CTWC, 46:27b-28a; Schirokauer, "Chu and Hu," 494; e.g., CTYL 101.4117 and 4119, Chung-hua ed., 101.2590 and 2591.

32. Hsi-tz'u (Appended Remarks, second section) in *Chou I cheng-i*, 8.3a, in *Shih-san ching chu-shu* 1:86; translated in Chan, *Source Book*, 268.

33. *Wai-shu*, 3, in Ch'eng and Ch'eng, *Erb-Ch'eng chi* 2:366.

34. CTWC, 67.20a-21b; translation adapted from Chan, *Source Book*, 593-596. Chan also identifies references to earlier sources. See especially *Book of Changes*, commentary on hexagram no. 1, *ch'ien* (Heaven).

35. Satō Hitoshi, "Chu Hsi's 'Treatise on Jen,'" 218; Liu Shu-hsien, *Chu-tzu chehsüeh*, 172; also Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 1:55-60, 73-81, 345-366, 2:39-81; Mou Tsung-san, *Hsin-t'i* 3:229-234, 234-258, 258-300; Tomoeda Ryūtarō, *Shushi no shisō keisei*, 102-122; Liu Shu-hsien, "Chu-tzu te jen-shuo, t'ai-chi kuan-nien yü tao-t'ung wen-t'i te tsai sheng-ch'a," 173-188; Olaf Graf, *Tao und Jen*, passim; Wing-tsit Chan, "Lun Chu-tzu chih jen-shuo," 37-68, and *Hsin t'an-so*, 371-381, 521-548.

36. Liu Shu-hsien, "Chu-tzu tsai sheng-ch'a," 177-181, uses Ch'en's view to argue that Chu used some of Chang's draft to write the final treatise when editing Chang's works. Wing-tsit Chan's rebuttal is in *Hsin t'an-so*, 376-381, or *New Studies*, 176-177.

37. CTWC, 33.12a, 16th letter to Lü.

38. Wing-tsit Chan, in *New Studies*, 155-157, draws this conclusion. In this letter, Chu mentions wanting to compile the *I-Lo yüan-yüan lu* and needing some materials from Che-tung about the Yung-chia school. Chan seems to assume that the final draft of the treatise must have been completed before Chu began compiling the *I-Lo yüan-yüan lu*. Chu was, however, certainly capable of working on both at the same time. (The *I-Lo yüan-yüan lu* will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5.)

39. CTWC, 33.15a, 23d and 24th letters to Lü.

40. CTWC 33.18b, 27th letter to Lü. The *Yen jen lu* is an alternate title of *Chu Ssu yen jen* [Comments on Humaneness from the Chu and Ssu Rivers (the Confucian heartland of Shantung)]; preface in *NHC*, 14.4a-5b. Chu had referred to it earlier; see his 16th letter from 1171 in CTWC, 31.4b-5b. See also Wing-tsit Chan, "Lun jen-shuo," 56, 58-59, and *Hsin t'an-so*, 547.

41. CTWC, 31.4b-5b, 16th letter to Chang, translation adapted from Satō Hitoshi, "Treatise," 216-217.

42. *NHC*, 21.4a-5b. Satō Hitoshi, "Treatise," 218-219; Mou Tsung-san, *Hsin-t'i* 3:259-261.

43. CTWC, 42.18a, 10th letter to Wu I (Hui-shu) from Hunan, translation adapted from Satō Hitoshi, "Treatise," 219; Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 1:55-60. Ch'eng I's statement is from his comments on the Return hexagram of the *Book of Changes*; see *Erb-Ch'eng chi*, 3:819.

44. CTWC, 32.16b-17a, 33b-34b; also *NHC*, 21.5ab. See the discussion in Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 2:57-66; Mou Tsung-san, *Hsin-t'i* 3:259-261; and Satō Hitoshi, "Treatise," 220-221.

45. CTWC, 32.18a-18b, 19a-19b, 21a-21b, 23b-24b, 33b-34b; *NHC*, 21.5b, 22.5b-6a. See the discussion in Wing-tsit Chan, "Lun jen-shuo," 40-50; Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 1:73-81, 2:66-68; Mou Tsung-san, *Hsin-t'i* 3:267-272, 285-296; Satō Hitoshi, "Treatise," 221-222.

46. CTWC, 31.6a, 32.17a-18a, and 20a-20b. See also the discussion in Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 2:70-72; Mou Tsung-san, *Hsin-t'i* 3:273-284; Satō Hitoshi, "Treatise," 222.

47. CTWC, 31.5b-6a; *NHC*, 21.2b. See also the discussion in Mou Tsung-san, *Hsin-t'i* 3:298; Satō Hitoshi, "Treatise," 222-223.

48. *NHC*, 31.5b-6a; *SYHA*, 50.1620-1621.

49. *NHC*, 31.6b.

50. *SYHA*, 50.1621.

51. Mou Tsung-san, *Hsin-t'i*, especially 3:234-300. Liu Shu-hsien's and Ts'ai Jen-hou's evaluations follow Mou's.



52. *CTYL*, 27.1107; Chung-hua ed., 27.689–690.
53. *CTYL*, 37.1570; Chung-hua ed., 37.985.
54. *CTYL*, 20.754; Chung-hua ed., 20.467.
55. Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 1:357–358, 362–363, 2:56. Although he implicitly answers some points in Mou's critique, Wing-tsit Chan ("Lun jen-shuo," 44, 49–51) sets it aside on the grounds that it arose from another school of Confucianism.
56. Wing-tsit Chan, "Lun jen-shuo," 55–58, agrees with Mou Tsung-san that Chu misread Chang on this point.
57. Chu omitted wording about "none who do not love," the relationship between the heart/mind unwilling to allow suffering, and the four cardinal virtues; see Wing-tsit Chan, "Lun jen-shuo," 54–55. For Chu's "Diagram," see *CTYL*, 105.4185, Chung-hua ed., 105.2633; Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 371–374, or *New Studies*, 280–282.
58. Satō Hitoshi, "Treatise," 217.
59. *NHC*, 8.1a–2a. For points of difference, see *CTWC*, 32.21a–33b, 33.15a, 18a–18b, 20a–20b; these differences are very clearly delineated in Wing-tsit Chan, "Lun jen-shuo," 56–58.
60. Wing-tsit Chan, "Lun jen-shuo," 57.
61. Satō Hitoshi, "Treatise," 224.
62. *CTWC*, 47.27a, 25th letter, dated 1185, to Lü Tsu-chien; Liu Shu-hsien, *Chu-tzu che-hsüeh*, 145, 189–190, and "Chu-tzu tsai sheng-ch'a," 180.

#### Chapter 4: Lü Tsu-ch'ien

1. *Nien-p'u* biography in Lü Tsu-ch'ien, *Tung-lai Lü T'ai-shih wen-chi*, vol. 9; *SS*, 434.12872–12874; *SYHA*, 51.1652–1688; *SMLHS* 1:340–367; Liu Chao-jen, *Lü Tung-lai chih wen-hsüeh yü shih-hsüeh*, 1–26; Yao Jung-sung, "Lü Tsu-ch'ien," 1–71; Wing-tsit Chan, *New Studies*, 424–434.
2. *SYHA*, 51.1653, translation adapted from Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 62. Another retrospective appreciation of the Lü family's Central Plain literary and historical corpus is found in Lü's biography in *SS*, 434.12872.
3. *SYHA*, 73.2434; *SMLHS* 1:341; Liu Chao-jen, *Lü Tung-lai*, especially 215–262; and John D. Langlois, Jr., "Chin-hua Confucianism under the Mongols (1279–1368)."
4. Those characteristics were identified during the Sung, elaborated in *SYHA*, and conveniently organized in *SMLHS* 1:341–344. Similar ones are described in Pu Chin-chih, "Lun Lü Tsu-ch'ien te 'Wu-hsüeh' t'e-cheng," 89–98; and Liu Chao-jen, *Lü Tung-lai*, 113–121.
5. Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I, *Erh-Ch'eng chi* 1:338.
6. Chang Chiu-ch'eng, *Heng-p'u wen-chi*, 20.1a–1b, 19.9b–10a, and *Heng-p'u jih hsin*, 17b.
7. On Lü's teachers, see Liu Chao-jen, *Lü Tung-lai*, 84–93.
8. *SYHA*, 32.1127–1158.
9. Wu Shou-ch'ang (late twelfth century) was the student who made the original remark recorded in *CTYL*, 122.4719, Chung-hua ed., 122.2949.
10. *CTWC*, 43.21b, 11th letter to Lin Tse-chih; *SYHA*, 23.908.
11. *LTLWC*, 14.342–343, "I shuo" Opposition hexagram; *SMLHS* 1:343.
12. *CTWC*, 47.22a, 19th letter to Lü Tsu-chien, 1177–1181.
13. *CTYL*, 124.4762, Chung-hua ed., 124.2972; Ch'en Lai, *Chu Hsi*, 333.
14. Liu Tzu-chien, *Liang Sung shih yen-chiu hui-pien*, 41–47; and Ch'ien Mu, *Sung Ming li-hsüeh kai-shu*, 198–199. A recent M.A. thesis links these characteristics of Lü Tsu-ch'ien also to the inward orientation of his ethical tension and to the environment of growing up in an extended family. See Ji Xiao-bin, "Inward-Oriented Ethical Tension in Lü Tsu-ch'ien's Thought," especially 24–33.

15. Lü, *Tung-lai Lü T'ai-shih wen-chih, pieh-chi*, 9.8b, letter to Liu Ch'ing-chih; SYHA, 51.1667; also LTLWC, 4.90.

16. Lü, *Tung-lai Lü T'ai-shih wen-chi, pieh-chi*, 10.1a, letter to Ch'en Fu-liang; SYHA, 51.1668.

17. LTLWC, 20.464, "Tsa shuo"; Wu Ch'un-shan, *Ch'en T'ung-fu te ssu-hsiang*, 151. There are two similar passages in SYHA, 51.1665.

18. SYHA, 36.1234; SMLHS 1:343.

19. SYHA, 19.788; SMLHS 1:343.

20. *Ta-ch'u* chapter of the *Book of Changes*, in *Chou I cheng-i*, 3.40, in *Shih-san ching chu-shu* 1:40.

21. Ch'üan Tsu-wang's evaluation in SYHA, 36.1234.

22. SS, 434.12874; SYHA, 51.933-937.

23. LTLWC, 4.81, 4.84, 4.92. Besides Lü's own symptoms, the deaths of his three wives also raise the possibility of tuberculosis, which has historically been especially deadly for young women.

24. CTWC, 82.2a; Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 555.

25. SS, 434.12874; SYHA, 51.1652.

26. SYHA, 51.1654.

27. SYHA, 51.1666.

28. *Tung-lai Lü T'ai-shih wen-chi, pieh-chi*, 9.8a, letter to Liu Ch'ing-chih (Tzu-ch'eng); Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 554.

29. Wing-tsit Chan, *Chu-tzu men-jen*, especially 1-27, and *Hsin t'an-so*, 454-455.

30. These are counted and named in John Chaffee, "Chu Hsi in Nan-k'ang," 425, nn. 57-62, based on data in Wing-tsit Chan, *Chu-tzu men-jen*.

31. SYHA, 51.1674.

32. SYHA, 51.1675.

33. On these and other works, see Liu Chao-jen, *Lü Tung-lai*, 33-75.

34. SYHA, 51.1666.

35. SYHA, 51.1667.

36. SYHA, 51.1664.

37. LTLWC, 5.127; SYHA, 51.1672.

38. LTLWC, 20.465, "Tsa shuo."

39. SYHA, 51.1657.

40. SYHA, 51.1673.

41. *Li-tai chih-tu hsiang-shuo*, 9.1a-7a. Because this work is not mentioned in the *Sung shih* or in Lü's *nien-p'u*, some doubt he wrote it. See Yves Hervouet, *A Sung Bibliography*, 174.

42. It should be noted that Chu Hsi, while serving as a local official, was rigorous in enforcing penal law; see Conrad Schirokauer, "Chu Hsi as an Administrator," 228-232. Otherwise, Chu appears to have been less positive about the role of law than Lü was.

43. LTLWC, 20.457, "Tsa shuo"; P'an Fu-en and Hsü Yü-ch'ing, *Lü Tsu-ch'ien ssu-hsiang ch'u-t'an*, 39-47.

44. LTLWC, 19.443, "Shih shuo"; P'an Fu-en and Hsü Yü-ch'ing, *Lü Tsu-ch'ien*, 42.

45. SYHA, 51.1661; P'an and Hsü, *Lü Tsu-ch'ien*, 52-60.

46. SYHA, 51.1661. Chu-ko Liang rebuked Liu Pa; see Ch'en Shou, ed., *San-kuo chih*, 39.982, n. 3.

47. Lü Tsu-ch'ien, *Tung-lai po-i*, 2.138-139; SMLHS, 1.359-360.

48. Lü Tsu-ch'ien, *Tung-lai po-i*, 2.139; SMLHS, 1.360.

49. James T. C. Liu, "Polo and Cultural Change," 203-244.

50. LTLWC, 19.431, "Shih shuo"; translated in Wm. Theodore de Bary, *Sources* 1:442.

51. LTLWC, 20.462, "Tsa shuo"; SMLHS 1:361.

52. *LTLWC*, 19.431, "Shih shuo"; translated in de Bary et al., *Sources* 1:442.
53. *LTLWC*, chapters 12-14, "I shuo"; P'an and Hsü, *Lü Tsu-ch'ien*, 157.
54. Lü, *Tung-lai po-i*, 3.167-168; *SMLHS* 1:361; also Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 64-65.
55. P'an and Hsü, *Lü Tsu-ch'ien*, 156-160; *SMLHS* 1:361-362; *SYHA*, 51.1664; see also Lü, *Li-tai chih-tu hsiang-shuo*, 9.1a-7a.
56. Lü Tsu-ch'ien, "Tso-shih chuan tu shuo kang ling," quoted in *SMLHS* 1:360.
57. Lü, *Tung-lai Lü T'ai-shih wen-chi (wai-chi)*, 5.26a; Liu Chao-jen, *Lü Tung-lai*, 175.
58. *LTLWC*, 20.462, "Tsa shuo"; *SMLHS* 1:361.
59. Liu Chao-jen, *Lü Tung-lai*, 178-190.
60. *Ibid.*, 52-53, 197.
61. Lü Tsu-ch'ien, *San-kuo chih hsiang-chieh*, chapters 1 and 12, in his *Shih-ch'i shih hsiang-chieh*.
62. *LTLWC*, 13.309, "I shuo," I hexagram; *SMLHS* 1:350.
63. *LTLWC*, 18.415-416, "Meng-tzu shuo"; *SMLHS* 1:350.
64. *LTLWC*, 5.121, letter to P'an Shu-tu; similar passage in *SMLHS* 1:350.
65. *LTLWC*, 4.96, reply to P'an Shu-ch'ang, and 20.450, "Tsa shuo"; *SMLHS* 1:351.
66. *LTLWC*, 3.52; P'an and Hsü, *Lü Tsu-ch'ien*, 93.
67. *LTLWC*, 20.455, "Tsa shuo"; *SMLHS* 1:351; also P'an and Hsü, *Lü Tsu-ch'ien*, 92-98.
68. Lü, *Tso-shih-chuan shuo*, 6.12b-13a; cf. *SMLHS* 1:352.
69. *LTLWC*, 18.420, "Meng-tzu shuo"; *SMLHS* 1:354.
70. *SYHA*, 51.1657-1658; P'an and Hsü, *Lü Tsu-ch'ien*, 64-69, especially 65.
71. *LTLWC*, 17.391, "Lun-yü shuo"; *SMLHS* 1:355.
72. *LTLWC*, 17.391, "Lun-yü shuo"; *SMLHS* 1:355; also P'an and Hsü, *Lü Tsu-ch'ien*, 107-111, 116-120.
73. *LTLWC*, 17.391, "Lun-yü shuo," quoted in *SMLHS* 1:355; similar passage in *LTLWC*, 18.420, "Meng-tzu shuo."
74. *LTLWC*, 17.392, "Lun-yü shuo"; *SMLHS* 1:355.
75. *LTLWC*, 3.60, letter to Chu Hsi; P'an and Hsü, *Lü Tsu-ch'ien*, 119.
76. *LTLWC*, 20.461, "Tsa shuo"; *SMLHS* 1:355.
77. *LTLWC*, 20.465, "Tsa shuo"; *SMLHS* 1:355.

## Chapter 5: Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu-ch'ien

1. Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 555. It could be argued that Ts'ai Yüan-ting (1135-1198) was a closer friend of Chu, but probably not during Lü's lifetime.

2. *CTWC*, 33.12a, 18th letter to Lü. See also *CTWC*, 94.27a, eulogy to son; *CTWC*, *hsü-chi*, 8.6a-8b, letter and instructions to son; *Tung-lai Lü T'ai-shih wen-chi*, 7.16b-17a, 20th letter to Chu; and Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 54-57, 555, or *New Studies*, 37-38, 426.

3. Wm. Theodore de Bary was among those who popularized this overly sharp division between the school of principle and the school of mind. In his effort to provide a corrective, he has recently perhaps gone too far in minimizing differences between their views of principle and the mind. See, for example, his *Sources of Chinese Tradition* and his *Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of the Mind-and-Heart*.

4. *SS*, 362.11329-11332, 376.11635-11637; *SYHA*, 36.1233-1234.

5. *SS*, 434.12872; P'an Fu-en and Hsü Yü-ch'ing, *Lü Tsu-ch'ien*, 52-60.

6. *CTYL*, 133.5135, Chung-hua ed., 133.3200. Translated in Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 179-180; see also discussion 169-180.

7. *CTWC*, 77.23b-24b; Richard von Glahn, "Community and Welfare: Zhu Xi's

Community Granary in Theory and Practice"; Liang Keng-yao, *Nan-Sung nung-ts'un te ching-chi*, 279-293, and his "Nan-Sung te she-ts'ang," 1-33; and Schirokauer, "Chu Hsi as Administrator," 221-224.

8. Liang Keng-yao, *Nung-ts'un*, 267-274; Brian McKnight, *Village and Bureaucracy in Southern Sung China*, 158-163; also Wang Te-i, *Sung-tai tsai-huang te chiu-chi cheng-ts'e*, passim.

9. NHC, 12.8b; Ts'ai Shang-hsiang, *Wang Ching-kung nien-pu k'ao-lüeh*, appendix 1, pp. 392-394; Liang Keng-yao, "She-ts'ang," 5-10.

10. CTWC, 79.15b-17a.

11. See Richard von Glahn's account of the Chin-hua granary. Wing-tsit Chan (June 1990 letter) says there is still a granary in Chu's village, and Ron-Guey Chu has a picture of it. This granary model fared better in Korea and also attracted the attention of Confucians in Japan.

12. CTWC, 74.23a-37b; Monika Übelhör, "The Community Compact (*Hsiang-yüeh*) of the Sung and Its Educational Significance," 371-388; Wm. Theodore de Bary, *The Liberal Tradition in China*, 32-37; and Ron-Guey Chu, "Chu Hsi and Public Instruction," 252-273.

13. Thomas H. C. Lee, "Chu Hsi, Academies and the Tradition of Private *Chiang-hsüeh*," 302-303; John Chaffee, "Chu Hsi in Nan-k'ang," 420-421; *SYHA pu-i*, 49.154a-154b; *SYHA*, 97.3226.

14. CTWC, 34.11b, 69th letter; translation adapted from Thomas Lee, "Chu Hsi," 303.

15. Tu Fu, "Tseng tso-p'u-yeh Cheng-kuo-kung Yen-kung Wu," (Poem eulogizing Yen Wu, d. 765) in Ch'iu Chao-ao, *Tu shih hsiang-chu*, 16.1383-1390; translated in William Hung, *Tu Fu*, 232-233. On Wen, see *Han shu*, 89.5181-5183.

16. On the history of the academy and Chu's role, see Li Ts'ai-tung, *Pai-lu-tung shu-yüan shih-lüeh*. After restoration in 1988, the academy began publishing a new annual journal, *Pai-lu-tung shu-yüan t'ung-hsün* in 1989. See also John Chaffee, "Chu Hsi and the Revival of the White Deer Grotto Academy, 1179-81," 40-62; Wing-tsit Chan, "Chu Hsi and the Academies," 394-396; Schirokauer, "Chu Hsi as Administrator," 212-216. On schools, see Liu Tzu-chien, *Liang Sung shih yen-chiu hui-pien*, 211-227; Chaffee, *Thorny Gates of Learning*; and Thomas Lee, *Government Education*.

17. Linda Walton-Vargo, "Education, Social Change, and Neo-Confucianism in Sung-Yüan China," 243-247, presents a summary of various counts by modern Chinese and Japanese scholars. Chaffee, "Chu Hsi and the Revival," 46-47, gives a figure of over 250 for the Southern Sung alone.

18. CTWC, letters in 26.3a-4b, 50.1a-1b, poems in 7.4b-6a, see also *pieh-chi*, 7.10a; letters to Lü in 34.9a-9b, 34.13b, 34.14b, 34.24b, 34.32a. Chou had served as prefect in Nan-k'ang and had retired there in 1071.

19. Chaffee, "Chu Hsi in Nan-k'ang," 416; Chaffee does read conflict back to this period.

20. CTWC, 74.17b; translation adapted from Thomas Lee, "Chu Hsi," 315.

21. CTWC, 82.13a, colophon to regulations written by Ch'eng Tuan-meng; Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 492.

22. CTWC, 74:16b-17a; translation adapted from Wing-tsit Chan, "Chu Hsi and the Academies," 397.

23. LTLWC, 10.247.

24. LTLWC, 10.247-249; Yao Jung-sung, "Lü Tsu-ch'ien," 41-44.

25. LTLWC, 6.138-139; CTWC, 34.21a-23a; Wing-tsit Chan, "Chu Hsi and the Academies," 402-403. Restored-reform leaders also emphasized schools, but what was to be taught differed.

26. Teng Kuang-ming, "Kuan-yü Chou Tun-i te shih-ch'eng ho chuan-shou," 53-60.

27. NHC, 10.4b-5a, 10.8a-13b, 34.4a-4b; Hu Hung, *Wu-feng chi*, 3.14b-16a;

Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 2:151. Chou Tun-i, *Chou Lien-hsi hsien-sheng wen-chi*, 9-13, contains laudatory pieces, many from the Sung, including another by Chang in 9.6b.

28. CTWC, 35.7a-11a, 102d reply to Lü. Ch'en Lai, *Chu-tzu shu-hsin*, 179, suggests an 1180 date, but it is unclear to me why Lü would have waited until 1179-1180 to discuss Chu's 1173 work.

29. SYHA, 12.520; Wilson, "Genealogy," 180-181.

30. Chu Hsi, *I-Lo yüan-yüan lu*, 2.11a; or Chu Hsi and Lü Tzu-ch'ien, *Chin-ssu lu*, 14.9b-10a. Translated in Wing-tsit Chan, *Reflections on Things at Hand*, 299-300. Several of the insights discovered referred specifically to the *Mencius*, 4B/19, and to passages in the *Book of Changes*, which Chan identifies.

31. CTWC, 76.22b; translated in de Bary, *Message*, 29; cf. the translation in Wilson, "Genealogy," 189-190.

32. For the conventionally accepted philosophical schema, see Wing-tsit Chan's "Chu-tzu tao-t'ung-kuan chih che-hsüeh-hsing," 22-32, and his "Chu Hsi's Completion of Neo-Confucianism," 73-81. As an alternative, Thomas Wilson has recently offered a hermeneutical approach. To highlight Chou Tun-i's role in Chu's construction of the succession of the *Tao*, Professor Wilson ("Genealogy of the Way," introduction and ch. 5) advances the hermeneutical theory of filiative genealogy, a record of a school with *only one* lineal descent or legitimate line of succession. Despite his stimulating formulation of the issue, Wilson might be adhering too strictly to hermeneutics of filiative genealogy in presenting Chu's projection of Chou's role. The discussion in this section will present Chu as having a more complex view. On Chu's view of Chou's role, see CTWC, 78.12a-13b, 78.15a-16a, 79.9a-11a, 80.11b-12b; CTYL, 93.3741-3744, Chung-hua ed., 93.2356-2358.

33. CTWC, 80.11b; translation adapted from Wilson, "Genealogy," 190.

34. Liu An-shih's *Yüan-ch'eng yü-lu*; Chiang's *Hsing-shuo*; Liu Tzu-hui's *Sheng chuan lun*, and P'an's *Wang ch'üan chi*. This anthology became the major source for the revival of *Tao-hsüeh* Confucianism under the Chin around 1190; see T'ien Hao (Hoyt Tillman), "Chin-tai ju-chiao," 107-140.

35. Chi Yün, Yung Jung, et al., *Ssu-k'ü ch'üan-shu tsung-mu*, 57.519.

36. Don J. Wyatt, "Chu Hsi's Critique of Shao Yung," 649-666; Wing-tsit Chan, "Chu-tzu chih *Chin-ssu lu*," 126; but see Anne D. Birdwhistell, *Transition to Neo-Confucianism*, 211-215.

37. Wing-tsit Chan, in "Chu-tzu chih *Chin-ssu lu*," 132-136, and *Reflections on Things at Hand*, 330-336, identifies and adds up the passages; I use his figures to compute percentages.

38. Wing-tsit Chan, *Reflections on Things at Hand*, 324-325; and Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 3:156-157.

39. CTYL, 119.4592, Chung-hua ed., 119.2874-2875; Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 393.

40. Kidder Smith, Jr., "Ch'eng I," 136-168; Birdwhistell, *Transition*, 30-49.

41. CTWC, 38.5b, 66.11b-27b, 82.20b, 85.6a-8b; CTYL, 66.2579, 67.2624-2632, 67.2651, Chung-hua ed., 66.1622, 67.1649-1654, 67.1666. See also Chang Li-wen, "Chu Hsi's System of Thought of I," 292-311; Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 1:501-522, 4:1-52; Joseph A. Adler, "Chu Hsi and Divination," and his "Divination and Philosophy," passim. On Lü's precursors on the I, see Liu Chao-jen, *Lü Tung-lai*, 34.

42. CTWC, 33.32b, 47th letter; Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 4:28-29; translation adapted from Adler, "Chu Hsi and Divination," 189.

43. Huang Kan, *Mien-chai chi*, 36.36a-36b; Wang Mao-hung, *Chu-tzu nien-p'u*, 4B.216. See also Adler, "Chu Hsi and Divination," 199-205; Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 91-93, 246-254; and Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 2:480-501. For another instance in which Chu turned to divination, see CTYL, 107.4244-4245, Chung-hua ed., 107.2669-2670.

44. Lü Tsu-ch'ien, *Tung-lai po-i*, 2.109-110; cf. *SMLHS* 1:348.
45. Lü Tsu-ch'ien, *Tseng-hsiu Tung-lai Shu shuo*, 3.21a; *SMLHS* 1:348-349.
46. Lü, *Tseng-hsiu Tung-lai Shu shuo*, 7.1b, 9.5b, 10.2b, 14.13b, 15.3b, 19.18a-18b, 20.4a, 22.8b, 23.4a, 28.12a. In 10.2b, Lü quotes from the "Hsien yu i te" chapter of the *Book of Documents*; see James Legge, *The Chinese Classics* 3:215. I consulted the *Shih-san-ching so-yin* and Harvard-Yenching Institute indexes.
47. Lü, *Tseng-hsiu Tung-lai Shu shuo*, 3.17a-17b; *SMLHS* 1:347.
48. *LTLWC*, 20.451, "Tsa shuo"; *SMLHS* 1:347.
49. Lü, *Tung-lai po-i*, 1.74; *SMLHS* 1:347.
50. Lü, *Tung-lai Lü T'ai-shih wen-chi (pieh-chi)*, 16.14a, also 16.11a-11b.
51. Lü, *Tung-lai po-i*, 2.164; *SMLHS* 1:347.
52. Lü, *Tseng-hsiu Tung-lai Shu shuo*, 8.13b; *SMLHS* 1:345.
53. Lü, *Tseng-hsiu Tung-lai Shu shuo*, 8.2b-3a; *SMLHS* 1:346; also Lü, *Tung-lai po-i*, 3.196.
54. Lü, *Tseng-hsiu Tung-lai Shu shuo*, 12.10a; *SMLHS* 1:346.
55. Lü, *Tseng-hsiu Tung-lai Shu shuo*, 3.17b-18a; *SMLHS* 1:352. The translation of Shun's dictum is adapted from de Bary, *Orthodoxy*, 116; cf. Legge, *The Chinese Classics* 3:61.
56. *LTLWC*, 13.301-303, "I shuo"; *SMLHS* 1:354. Macro and micro are perhaps too modern and technical for this context, but I haven't found a better gloss for "speaking of it from the big" and "speaking of it from the small."
57. Chu Hsi, *Chou I pen-i*, 1.49a; translation adapted from Adler, in appendix to Smith et al., *Sung Dynasty Uses of the I Ching*, 253.
58. *CTYL*, 95.3887, Chung-hua ed., 95.2447-2448.
59. *Hsün-tzu*, 2.4a-4b. Cf. translation by John Knoblock, *Xunzi*, 1:176, passage number 3.6.
60. Chu Hsi, *Chu-tzu ch'üan-shu*, 45.6a. For more passages, see my "Consciousness of T'ien in Chu Hsi's Thought," 31-50; and *CTWC*, 11.8b, 13.6a-7a, 57.36b, 95B.22a-22b, and *hsü-chi*, 10.14b. Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 239, has a different perspective, but Yamanoi Yü conveys the vital importance of the concept of Heaven in Chu's thought in "The Great Ultimate and Heaven in Chu Hsi's Philosophy," 79-92.
61. For example, Wing-tsit Chan, "Evolution of Jen," 295-319, and "The Neo-Confucian Solution to the Problem of Evil," 773-791.
62. Tillman, "T'ien in Chu Hsi," 43-48; Munro, *Images*, 158-160, 162, 182.
63. Hu Hung, *Wu-feng chi*, 2.67a.
64. Robert P. Hymes, *Statesmen and Gentlemen*, 82-104 and 115-123, emphasizes the change in marriage patterns but does allow (p. 211) that recently migrant families were probably exceptions.
65. Robert P. Hymes, "Lu Chiu-yüan, Academies, and the Problem of the Local Community," 432-456; de Bary, *Liberal Tradition*, 32-34; Brian McKnight, "Chu Hsi and His World," 408-436; Munro, *Images*, ch. 2, on family imagery.
66. *SYHA*, 51.1670.
67. *CTYL*, 122.4719; Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 561.
68. Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 559-561; Peter K. Bol, "Chu Hsi's Redefinition of Literati Learning," 171-183.
69. His maternal grandfather, Tseng Chi (1084-1166), and his grand uncle Lü Pen-chung were noted poets. Tseng was influenced by the Kiangsi poets, but his friend Lü Pen-chung omitted him from his famous list of members of the Kiangsi school. Liu Chao-jen, *Lü Tung-lai*, 147-153; *SB* 732-733; Hervouet, *Sung Bibliography*, 408-409.
70. Liu Chao-jen, *Lü Tung-lai*, 129-159, especially 132-133, 141, 144-145.
71. *SYHA*, 51.1676.
72. *LTLWC*, 3.78, translated in Xiao-bin Ji, "Ethical Tension," 91-92; see Lü's let-

ters to Chu quoted in Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 557, and Wu Ch'un-shan, *Ch'en T'ung-fu te ssu-hsiang*, 189.

73. CTWC, 33.6b, 7th letter to Lü; Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 557.

74. James Liu, *Ou-yang Hsiu*, 48–62 passim.

75. CTWC, 87.12b, 13b, parts quoted in SYHA, 51.1676–1677; cf. the translation in Wing-tsit Chan, *New Studies*, 431; see also CTWC (*pieh-chi*), 3.12a.

76. Lü's warning about Chu was expressed in a letter to Chang, who quoted it in his own letter to Chu; NHC, 22.9b. Chu's acknowledgment is in his 27th letter to Chang in CTWC, 31.15b. See also Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 521–523.

77. NHC, 20.10a; cf. the quote in SYHA 49.1574.

### Part 3: The Third Period, 1182–1202

1. Yang Lien-sheng, "The Form of the Paper Note *Hui-tzu*," 365–373; Conrad Max Schirokauer, "The Political Thought and Behavior of Chu Hsi," 115–117.

2. Ishida Hajime, "Tō Chū-yū oboegaki—Nansō shisōshi no hitokusari," 23–37; Chu Jui-hsi, "Sung-tai li-hsüeh-chia T'ang Chung-yu," 43–53; Chou Hsüeh-wu, *T'ang Yüeh-chai yen-chiu*, 1–128; T'ang Chung-yu, *Ti wang ching-shih t'u-p'u*, passim; T'ang Chung-yu, *Chin-hua T'ang-shih i-shu*, passim; SYHA, 60.1951–1961; *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu ts'ung-mu*, 135.1147.

3. SSCSPM, 80.869; translation adapted from John W. Haeger, "Neo-Confucian Syncretism," 506.

4. TML, 5.4b–6a; SSCSPM, 80.869; Schirokauer, "Neo-Confucians under Attack," 169–170; Haeger, "Syncretism," 506.

5. CLC, 20.277–278, revised ed., 28.336–337; Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 120. On the story that Ch'en influenced the indictment because his desire for a singing girl had been foiled by T'ang, see Wu Ch'un-shan, *Ch'en T'ung-fu*, 38–40.

6. CLC, 20.280, rev. ed., 28.339. On Wang Huai's reported hostility to Ch'en because of his relations with Chu, see SCWCL, 2.47.

7. CTWC, 38.30a; translation from Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 181.

8. CTWC, 11.28b.

9. CTYL, 122.4734–4735, Chung-hua ed., 122.2958; translated in Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 182.

10. CTWC, 35.24b, letter to Liu Ch'ing-chih; translated in Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 183.

11. Quoted by Wang Mao-hung, in *Chu-tzu nien-p'u*, 134; translated in Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 58.

12. CLC, 20.293, rev. ed., 28.352; translated in Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 183.

13. LCYC, 35.437; Schirokauer, "Neo-Confucians under Attack," 171.

14. See the use of the term in 1181 in CTWC, 84.29b. Chu's prefaces to his commentaries to these two books are in CTWC 76.19b–23a. See also Chang Yung-chün, "Sung Ju chih tao-t'ung-kuan chi ch'i wen-hua i-shih," 22; de Bary, *Message*, 28–32; Wing-tsit Chan, "Chu-tzu tao-t'ung-kuan," 22–32, and his *Hsin t'an-so*, 429–435; and Wilson, "Genealogy," introduction and ch. 4.

15. CTWC, 86.12a–12b; Wing-tsit Chan, *Chu Hsi: Life and Thought*, 67–68.

16. Mou Tsung-san, *Hsin-t'i* 1:19–20, 44–45; Daniel Gardner, *Chu Hsi and the Ta-hsueh*; Wei-ming Tu, *Centrality and Commonality*.

17. CTWC, 11.28b; translation adapted from Schirokauer, "Neo-Confucians under Attack," 172.

18. TML, 6.2a–2b; SSCSPM, 80.870; cf. the translation in Haeger, "Neo-Confucian Syncretism," 506. See also SYHA *pu-i*, 25.92.

19. Yeh Shih, *Yeh Shih chi*, 2.16–20; TML, 6.3a–8b; SSCSPM, 80.870–871; partly

echoed by censor Liu Kuang-tsu (1142-1222) in *SSCSPM*, 80.871-872, and *TML*, 6.8b-12b.

20. *CLC*, 11.114, rev. ed., 11.117; translated in Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 114.

21. For details, see Schirokauer, "Political Thought and Behavior," 129-142, "Neo-Confucians under Attack," 177-179, "Chu Hsi's Political Career," 181-183; *SYHA*, 97.3200-3212.

22. Schirokauer, "Neo-Confucians under Attack," 184-192; *SYHA*, 97.3197-3200.

23. *SCWCL*, 4.150, 151.

24. *SCWCL*, 2.46.

25. *SCWCL*, 4.143-146, translated in Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 549-553.

26. *TML*, 7A.1a-23a, 7B.1a-27a; *SSCSPM*, 80.872-877; Schirokauer, "Neo-Confucians under Attack," 180-183, 194-196; Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 764-771.

27. Ishida Hajime, "Nan Sō Meishū no Kōshi ichizoku ni tsuite," 225-256; and Erling von Mende, "Wo ist der Geist zu Hause?" 55-82. Schirokauer, "Neo-Confucians under Attack," 191, briefly mentions the literary interests of Kao and two other attackers.

28. Ishida Hajime, "Shū Mitsu," 25-47.

## Chapter 6: Ch'en Liang

1. Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, ch. 2, and "Ch'en Liang on Statecraft," 403-431.

2. *CLC*, 5.49-8.90, rev. ed., 5.50-8.93; Hou Wai-lu, *Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang*, 4B:696-703. Sun-tzu, *The Art of War*, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, passim.

3. Chaffee, *Thorny Gates of Learning*, especially 100-103.

4. *CLC*, 2.30, rev. ed., 2.30; translation adapted from Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 80.

5. *CLC*, 21.322, rev. ed., 29.383.

6. *LTLWC*, 5.109; *CLC*, 16.196, rev. ed., 23.247.

7. *CLC*, 14.164, rev. ed., 23.254; *CTWC*, 76.32b-33a. Wang Ying-lin also noted this mistake; see *K'un-hsieh chi-wen*, quoted in *CLC*, 2.443.

8. *CLC*, 19.259-261, rev. ed., 27.318-320, letter to Ying Mung-ming (d. c. 1195).

9. *CLC*, 10.105, rev. ed., 10.109; translation adapted from Hellmut Wilhelm, "Heresies of Ch'en Liang," 108-109.

10. *CLC*, 10.101-102, rev. ed., 10.104-105.

11. *CLC*, 16.195, rev. ed., 23.246.

12. *CLC*, rev. ed. only, 17.195.

13. *CLC*, rev. ed. only, 19.205-206.

14. *CLC*, 11.132-133, rev. ed., 11.126-128.

15. *CLC*, 2.30, rev. ed., 2.30-31.

16. *SS*, 436.12930-12940; *SSCSPM*, 79.847-866; *CLC*, 1.1-15, rev. ed., 1.1-15.

17. *SS*, 436.12940-12941; *SCWCL* 1.24-25; Wu Ch'un-shan, *Ch'en T'ung-fu*, 36-37; Yoshiwara Fumiaki, "Chin Ryō no hito to seikatsu," 51-54.

18. *CLC*, 19.263, rev. ed., 27.322.

19. *CLC*, 19.262, rev. ed., 27.321.

20. Lu Tsu-ch'ien, *Tung-lai Lü T'ai-shih wen-chi, pieh-chi*, 8.10a; *SYHA*, 56.1842.

21. *CLC*, especially 3.31-33, 4.40-41, 4.43-44, and 4.47-48, rev. ed., 3.32-34, 4.41-42, 4.44, and 4.48-49.

22. *CLC*, 14.168-170, 16.192-194, rev. ed., 23.249-250, 23.251-252; *CTWC*,



- 36.27b. On Wang as symbol, see Harold Wechsler, Jr., "The Confucian Teacher Wang Tung," 225-272.  
 23. *CLC*, rev. ed. only, 15.172-173.  
 24. *CLC*, rev. ed. only, 15.167-168.  
 25. *CLC*, rev. ed. only, 11.124-125.  
 26. Tillman, "Ch'en Liang and Statecraft," 426-428.  
 27. See my "Yan Fu's Utilitarianism in Chinese Perspective," 63-84.  
 28. Ch'en's two essays are in *CLC*, rev. ed., 11.124-126 and 11.115-121; for reactions and his post, see *SS*, 436.12943.  
 29. *CTYL*, 107.4256, Chung-hua ed., 107.2676.

## Chapter 7: Chu Hsi and Ch'en Liang

1. On relations between Chu and Ch'en, see Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 115-131.  
 2. Yeh, *Yeh Shih chi*, 20.207-208.  
 3. *CTWC*, 36.19a-19b.  
 4. *CLC*, 20.278-282, rev. ed., 28.337-341.  
 5. *CLC*, 20.281-282, 287, rev. ed., 28.340-341, 346.  
 6. *CTWC*, 36.20a-21b; *CLC*, 20.287, rev. ed., 28.346. On Chu's view of the complete person, see Ch'iu Han-sheng, *Ssu-shu chi-chu chien-lun*, 111-113; *SMLHS* 1:440-447.  
 7. *CTWC*, 36.24a.  
 8. Schirokauer, "Chu Hsi as Administrator," 217-228.  
 9. *CTWC*, 68.27a-29b; Hsün Yüeh, ed., *Han chi*, 8.3-4, and Pan Ku, ed., *Han shu*, 23.1079, 1081-1082, 24A.1119-1123. Mencius (3A/3 and 5B/2) began the myth, which was used by centuries of reforms; see Joseph R. Levenson, "Ill Wind in the Well-field," 268-287. Modern scholars emphasize passages where Chu criticized the utopians: see Hsiao Kung-ch'üan, *Chung-kuo cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih*, 4:502-504; and Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 1:198.  
 10. *CLC*, 20.273-274, 277, rev. ed., 28.332-333, 338.  
 11. *CLC*, rev. ed. only, 13.153; also second and fourth letters in *CLC*, 20.275-276, 280, rev. ed., 28.334-335, 339.  
 12. Patricia Ebrey, *Family and Property in Sung China: Yüan Ts'ai's Precepts for Social Life*, passim.  
 13. For Ch'en's accounts of two local heroines, see *CLC*, 13.160-161, rev. ed., 23.243-244. See also his eulogies to various women in his *CLC*, 25.375-387, rev. ed. 33.437-450.  
 14. Tillman, "Ch'en Liang on Statecraft," 403-431, and Ch'en Liang, ed., *Ou-yang wen-ts'ui*.  
 15. Robert Hymes, "Local Community," 432-456.  
 16. See discussion in my "Ch'en Liang on Statecraft," 406-426.  
 17. Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 169-180, and "Proto-Nationalism," 403-428.  
 18. For *ch'üan*, see Wei Chung-t'ung, "Chu Hsi on the Standard and the Expedient," 255-271; Conrad Schirokauer, "Chu Hsi's Sense of History"; and John D. Langlois, Jr., "Law, Statecraft, and the *Spring and Autumn Annals* in Yüan Political Thought," 89-152.  
 19. *CTWC*, 36.18b.  
 20. *CTYL*, 137.5252, Chung-hua ed., 137.3269-3270. Citing Chu's comment that expediency "must by necessity comply with the righteousness," Wei Cheng-t'ung ("Chu Hsi on the Standard," 260) presents Chu himself as making integrity flexible; however, given the context of Chu's debate with Ch'en, Chu surely did not intend to make integrity flexible.

21. CTWC, 53.33a.
22. See the passages from Chu's works in Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 144-145, and the discussion of earlier views on pp. 26-28, 46-53.
23. CTWC, 36.19a.
24. *Hsün-tzu*, 7.8a-8b, 18.10a; Pan Ku, ed., *Han-shu*, 9.277.
25. CLC, 20.281, rev. ed., 28.340; translated in Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 139.
26. CTWC, 36.20a-20b.
27. CTWC, 36.26b-27a.
28. CLC, 11.133, and 20.287, 289-290, rev. ed., 11.128, and 28.346, 349-350.
29. CTYL, Cheng-chung ed., 33.1328, 93.3739, also, 16.519, 20.754-755, 25.1010-1017, 29.1173-1174, 33.1358-1359, 37.1566, 44.1791-1796, 48.1892-1895, 51.1931-1932, 53.2027-2028, 55.2088, 60.2299-2301; CTWC, 36.26a, 27a; Chu Hsi, *Meng-tzu chi-chu*, 3.1a-1b, and *Lun-yü chi-chu*, 2.7b-8b, 7.14a-15a.
30. CTWC, 36.21a, 26a.
31. Sun Fu, *T'ang shih lun-tuan*, 1.3b-21b; Fan Tsu-yü, *T'ang chien*, 2.12a-13a, and *chüan* 3-6; Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I, *Erh-Ch'eng chi*, e.g., 1:236; Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 5:9-11.
32. Ssu-ma Kuang, *Wen-kuo Wen-cheng Ssu-ma kung wen-chi*, 74.13a-13b, p. 539; Ch'eng and Ch'eng, *Erh-Ch'eng chi* 2:450-452; Teng Kuang-ming, "Chu-Ch'en lun-pien chung Ch'en Liang wang pa i li kuan te ch'üeh-chieh," 2-3.
33. CLC, 20.289, 20.292, rev. ed., 28.348-349, 28.351; also CTWC, 36.22b-23a.
34. CLC, 20.285, 292-293, rev. ed., 28.344-345, 352-353. Although by tradition Lao-tzu was older than Confucius, Chuang-tzu came later than Confucius. Ch'en's presentation of Confucius as reacting to the influence of both Taoist personalities or traditions was probably a product of the rhetoric of debate.
35. Chu Hsi, *Chu Hsi pien wei-shu yü*. For idealizations, see his *Ta-hsüeh chang-chü*, preface, 1-3; Ch'iu Han-sheng, *Ssu-shu*, 102-104.
36. CTWC, 36.27a-27b, also 26a, and CLC 20.287, 290, rev. ed., 28.346-347, 349-350.
37. CTWC, 36.20b-21a, 25b.
38. CTYL, 37.1581, Chung-hua ed., 37.991, translated in Wei Cheng-t'ung, "Chu Hsi on the Standard," 264.
39. Passages from CTYL, 37 and 89, discussed in Wei Cheng-t'ung, "Chu Hsi on the Standard," 262-267.
40. CTYL, 37.1586, Chung-hua ed., 37.994, and letter to Chang Shih; both quoted in Schirokauer, "Sense of History."
41. CTYL, 122.4737, Chung-hua ed., 122.2958, translated in Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 149. As also in CTYL, 118.4538, Chung-hua ed., 118.2843, Chu contrasted his contemporaries to the *hun-hou* quality of Yen-tzu.
42. See Wei Cheng-t'ung, "Chu Hsi on the Standard," 258-259.
43. CLC, 3.31-33, rev. ed., 3.31-34.
44. CLC, 4.47-48, rev. ed., 4.48-49, translated in Tillman, "Proto-Nationalism," 410-411.
45. Lin Hsün's proposal to Kao-tsung in 1130, in CLC, 16.200, rev. ed., 23.256.
46. CLC, 20.292-293, rev. ed., 28.351-352; also 21.330, rev. ed., 29.390-391, letter to Ch'en Fu-liang.
47. CLC, 4.43, 4.48 (essays sent to Chu), 20.292 (letter to Chu), also 9.97, rev. ed., 4.44, 4.49, 28.351-352, 9.100-101, exam essay in rev. ed. only, 11.124.
48. CLC, 20.286-287, rev. ed., 28.346.
49. CLC, 20.281-282, 20.285-286, 20.290-291, 20.292-293, 20.295, rev. ed., 28.340-341, 28.344-346, 28.349-350, 28.351-353, 28.354.
50. CTWC, 36.22b, translated in Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 161.
51. CTWC, 36.23a, translated in Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 161-162.

52. Robert Eno, *The Confucian Creation of Heaven*, passim; John B. Henderson, *The Development and Decline of Chinese Cosmology*, passim.
53. CTWC, 36.24b-25a.
54. The classic representative would be Carsun Chang (see *Development of Neo-Confucian Thought*, 309-331), but this stereotype lingers among China scholars.
55. Ch'en Fu-liang, *Chih-chai hsien-sheng wen-chi*, 36.2b-3a, translated in Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism*, 133.
56. CLC, 21.330, rev. ed., 29.390-391, letter to Ch'en Fu-liang; see also Teng Kuang-ming, "Chu-Ch'en lun-pien," 4.
57. CTWC, 36.23b-27b.
58. CTYL, 123.4750 and 137.5247-5253, Chung-hua ed., 123.2966 and 137.3267-3270.
59. CTWC, 36.25a-25b.
60. CTWC, 36.20b-21a.
61. CTWC, 36.23a-25a.
62. CTWC, 36.24b.
63. Quotations are from, respectively, CTWC, 47.24a; CTYL, 123.4748, Chung-hua ed., 123.2965; and CTWC, 53.33b.
64. See Schirokauer, "Chu Hsi's Sense of History."

## Chapter 8: Lu Chiu-yüan

1. SS, 434.12879-12882; SB, 675-679; LCYC, chapter 36. On the Lu family as a local elite, see Hou Wai-lu, *Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang* 4B:651-656; Hymes, *Statesmen*, 140-144.
2. LCYC, 28.332; SMLHS 1:556.
3. Hymes, *Statesmen*, 152-157, 163-164, and reiterated in his "Local Community."
4. LCYC, 7.98, first letter to Ch'en Ts'ui, translation adapted from Hymes, *Statesmen*, 124. On Lu's social and political thought, see Hou Wai-lu, *Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang* 4B:659-669; Li Chih-chien, *Lu Chiu-yüan che-hsüeh ssu-hsiang yen-chiu*, 225-262; Hsü Fu-kuan, "Hsiang-shan hsüeh-shu," 59-71.
5. Wing-tsit Chan, "Chu Lu t'ung-hsün hsiang-shu," 251-269.
6. Based on student data mapped by Hymes, *Statesmen*, 107.
7. LCYC, 33.388 and 36.482-483; translation adapted from Derk Bodde in Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy* 2:573.
8. LCYC, 36.481-482.
9. LCYC, 34.413.
10. LCYC, 34.428; translation adapted from Yim-tze Kwong's of Ying-shih Yü, "The Religious Ethic and Mercantile Spirit in Modern China," English version of *Chung-kuo chin-shih tsung-chiao lun-li yü shang-jen ching-shen*.
11. LCYC, 36.503; translation adapted from Ying-shih Yü, "Religious Ethic."
12. LCYC, 23.275-276; cf. the translation in Carsun Chang, *The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought* 1:299-301.
13. LCYC, 23.283-286.
14. LCYC, 36.501-502, translation adapted from Oaksook Chun Kim, "Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan," 258-259.
15. LCYC, 35.455; translation adapted from Chan, *Source Book*, 586.
16. LCYC, 11.149, second letter to Officer Li; SMLHS 1:560.
17. LCYC, 34.396; SMLHS 1:564.
18. LCYC, 35.470; SMLHS 1:565.
19. LCYC, 35.469; SMLHS 1:564.
20. LCYC, 32.376; SMLHS 1:565.

21. LCYC, 35.444; SMLHS 1:563.
22. LCYC, 1.4, letter to Tseng Chai-chih; translation adapted from Oaksook Kim, "Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan," 248.
23. LCYC, 1.11, letter to Teng Wen-fan; SMLHS 1:566.
24. LCYC, 22.272; SMLHS 1:563.
25. LCYC, 35.464; SMLHS 1:567.
26. LCYC, 35.470; SMLHS 1:563.
27. LCYC, 35.463; SMLHS 1:563.
28. LCYC, 5.66, letter to Shu Yüan-pin; see also 35.452; SMLHS 1:569.
29. LCYC, 34.408; SMLHS 1:570.
30. LCYC, 35.455; SMLHS 1:570.
31. LCYC, 35.459; SMLHS 1:570.
32. LCYC, e.g., 22.273, 11.149; Chan, *Source Book*, 579.
33. A classic example would be Hou Wai-lu, *Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang* 4B:670-684, but see also Ch'en Te-jen, *Hsiang-shan hsin-hsüeh chih pi-chiao yen-chiu*.
34. LCYC, 11.147, eighth letter to Wu Tzu-szu; translated in Chan, *Source Book*, 579.
35. LCYC, 10.132, letter to Huang K'ang-nien; SMLHS 1:560.
36. LCYC, 1.9, letter to Superintendent Chao; cf. the translation in Chan, *Source Book*, 575.
37. LCYC, 1.9, 19.561, and 34.395; see also Wang Te-yu, *Tao chih lun*, 146-167.
38. LCYC, 35.462-463; translation adapted from Chan, *Source Book*, 586; also 34.395-396.
39. LCYC, for example, 19.233 and 31.373. T'ang Chün-i, *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh yüan-lun: yüan hsing p'ien*, 531-643; Teng K'o-ming, *Chang Chiu-ch'eng*, 63-69.
40. Ying-shih Yü, "Morality and Knowledge," 243-248; T'ang Chün-i, *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh yüan-lun*, 399-499; Ch'en Lai, *Chu Hsi*, 337-355; Yamanoi Yü, "Shushi bunshü ni mieru Shushi no 'shin,'" 27-44; and Huang Chin-shing, "The Lu-Wang School in the Ch'ing Dynasty: Li Mu-t'ang," 27-38.
41. LCYC, 2.16-21, especially 17, letters to Wang Shun-po, translation adapted from Chan, *Source Book*, 576.
42. CTYL, 124.4766, Chung-hua ed., 124.2976, translation adapted from Charles Wei-hsun Fu, "Chu Hsi and Buddhism," 381. For Lu's 1179 letter, see CTYL, 124.4765-4766, Chung-hua ed., 124.2975-2976; Ch'en Lai, *Chu Hsi*, 296.
43. Charles Fu, "Chu and Buddhism," 375-403, and "Morality and Beyond," 375-396; Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 3:489-579; Wing-tsit Ch'an, *Reflections on Things at Hand*, ch. 13; Galen Eugène Sargent, *Tchou Hi contre le Bouddhisme*; Chan, *Source Book*, 646-653; de Bary, *Orthodoxy*, 126-131.
44. CTYL, fascicle 124; on Lu's similarity to Chang, 124.4781-4782, Chung-hua ed., 124.2984-2985. See also Ch'en Lai, *Chu Hsi*, 331-335; Teng K'o-ming, *Chang Chiu-ch'eng*, 152-160; Siu-chi Huang, *Lu Hsiang-shan*, 67-74; SMLHS 1:309-316, 571-574; Mou Tsung-san, *Ts'ung Lu Hsiang-shan tao Liu Chi-shan*, 187-212.
45. LCYC, 2.30; CTWC, 36.14a-14b; SYHA, 58.1907, 1911.
46. LCYC, 35.471; Ying-shih Yü, "Morality and Knowledge," 248.
47. LCYC, 34.400, translation adapted from Chan, *Source Book*, 582.
48. LCYC, 10.134, letter to Lu Yen-pin; SMLHS 1:571.
49. Wang Shou-jen, *Wang Wen-ch'eng-kung ch'üan-shu*, 7.29b-30a, translation adapted from de Bary, *Message*, 82; LCYC, p. 538.
50. Mou Tsung-san, *Ts'ung Lu*, 4-5, 13-25, 81-92; Liu Shu-hsien, "The Problem of Orthodoxy in Chu Hsi's Philosophy," 452-454.
51. CTYL, 124.4772, also 4757-4758, 4767, 4768-4769, Chung-hua ed., 124.2979, also 2971, 2976, and 2977. Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 591-596, and *New Studies*, 451-455, interprets the remark from "a purely philosophical point of view."

## Chapter 9: Chu Hsi and Lu Chiu-yüan

1. Passages from letters and other documents have been quoted and dated by others, e.g., *nien-p'u*, in *LCYC* 36; Wang Mao-hung, *Chu-tzu nien-p'u*, 2A.58-61, 75-78, 2B.96-101, 3A.124-133, 3B.166-167; Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 3:293-488; Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 572-596, and reiterated in his *New Studies*, 435-461; and Ch'en Lai, *Chu Hsi*, 281-328. Most of my account of the relationship is drawn from these studies.

2. *CTWC*, 31.15b-16a, 18th letter to Chang.
3. *CTYL*, 124.4753, Chung-hua ed., 124.2968.
4. *LTLWC*, 4.77, 52d letter to Chu.
5. *CTWC*, 87.10b-11b.
6. *CTWC*, 34.17a-17b, 77th letter to Lü.
7. *LTLWC*, 4.80, 59th letter to Chu.
8. *CTWC*, 34.34b.
9. *CTWC*, 90.7a-9a, especially 8a.
10. *CTWC*, 90.9a.
11. *LCYC*, 7.94-95.
12. *LCYC*, 3.42.
13. *CTWC*, 35.22a, 11th letter to Liu Ch'ing-chih.
14. *CTWC*, 50.28a-29a, 11th and 12th letters to Ch'eng Cheng-ssu.
15. *CTWC*, 54.28b, reply to Chao Chi-tao. Wang Mao-hung had dated Chu's sharp attacks in such letters as beginning in 1185, but Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 3:335-343, and Ch'en Lai, *Chu Hsi*, 316-322, provide evidence for this 1187 dating.
16. *CTWC*, 50.29b-30a, 16th letter to Ch'eng Cheng-ssu.
17. *CTWC*, 36.7a.
18. Ishida Hajime, "Shu Ki no kinei zengokan," 65-82; Schirokauer, "Chu Hsi's Sense of History"; and Bol, "Redefinition," 163-171. Ishida focuses on what Chu said about Wang and his contemporaries. Building on Ishida's work, Schirokauer and Bol add Yang Shih as a contrast to Chu's views.
19. *CTWC*, 53.1b, second letter to Liu Kung-tu; *SMLHS* 1:578; also *CTYL*, 124.4770, Chung-hua ed., 124.2978; *CTWC*, 70.6b-13a; and *LCYC*, 19.231-234.
20. *CTWC*, 50.31b, 18th letter to Ch'eng Cheng-ssu; and Lu's comment in second letter to Hu Chi-sui, *LCYC*, 1.7; *SMLHS* 1:579.
21. *CTWC*, 82.14a.
22. *CTWC*, 36.16a-16b; *SYHA*, 58.1912-1913.
23. *LCYC*, 2.31; *SYHA*, 58.1913.
24. *LCYC*, 15.194-195.
25. *LCYC*, 34.402; Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 3:408.
26. *CTYL*, 124.4756 and 4769, Chung-hua ed., 124.2970 and 2978.
27. *CTYL*, 121.4699-4700, 122.4719 and 4731, Chung-hua ed., 121.2938, 122.2949 and 2956; Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 3:462-463, 470-471.
28. *LCYC*, 34.427-428, translated in Julia Ching, "The Goose Lake Monastery Debate," 165; also *LCYC*, 36.490-491; Wing-tsit Chan, "Chu Lu O-hu chih hui pu-shu," 233-249; Mou Tsung-san, *T'sung Lu*, 81-92.
29. *LCYC*, 36.491, translation from Ching, "Goose Lake," 169.
30. *LCYC*, 36.491, comment by Chu Heng-tao.
31. *CTWC*, 54.5b, second letter to Hsiang An-shih (P'ing-fu), translation from Ying-shih Yü, "Morality and Knowledge," 228.
32. T'ang Chün-i, *Yüan-lun: yüan hsing p'ien*, 531-643; and Ying-shih Yü, "Morality and Knowledge," 228-230. For other views, see Mou Tsung-san, *T'sung Lu*, 93-102; Hsü Fu-kuan, *Hsiang Shan hsüeh shu*, 32-45; *SMLHS* 1:575.
33. *LCYC*, 36.494, translation from Ying-shih Yü, "Morality and Knowledge," 228.
34. *LCYC*, 12.170, first letter to Huang Hsün-chung, and 35.462; *SMLHS* 1:568.

35. LCYC, 35.470; Ch'en Lai, *Chu Hsi*, 329; see also Mou Tsung-san, *Ts'ung Lu*, 42-67; Hymes, "Local Community," 435-438.
36. LCYC, 4.54; second letter to Liu Ch'un-sou; Ch'en Lai, *Chu Hsi*, 330.
37. LCYC, 35.446; *SMLHS* 1:567.
38. LCYC, 3.38-39, letter to Ts'ao T'ing-chih; *SMLHS* 1:567.
39. LCYC, 11.143, second letter to Chu Chi-tao; *SMLHS* 1:568.
40. LCYC, 14.186, first letter to Hsü Pi-hsien, also 34.408; *SMLHS* 1:568.
41. LCYC, 35.442; *SMLHS* 1:442.
42. LCYC, 35.432; *SMLHS* 1:568.
43. LCYC, 34.395, translation adapted from Chan, *Source Book*, 580.
44. LCYC, 14.190, third letter to Sun Chün; *SMLHS* 1:559.
45. LCYC, 35.441, translated in Chan, *Source Book*, 584.
46. LCYC, 35.431; Ch'en Lai, *Chu Hsi*, 329.
47. CTYL, 10.255 and 33.1336, Chung-hua ed., 10.161 and 33.834, translated in Ying-shih Yü, "Morality and Knowledge," 233 and 236. See generally CTYL, chapters 10-11, partly translated in Daniel Gardner, *Learning to be a Sage*, 128-162, and his introduction.
48. Ying-shih Yü, "Morality and Knowledge," passim. Besides the sources in note 47, see especially Ch'ien Mu, *Chu-tzu* 3:613-687; and Daniel Gardner, "Transmitting the Way," 141-172.
49. LCYC, 33.389 and 35.457.
50. CTYL, 11.298-299, Chung-hua ed., 11.188, translation adapted from Ying-shih Yü, "Morality and Knowledge," 236.
51. Wilson, "Genealogy," 173-174; Chou's "Explanation," translation from Chan, *Source Book*, 463-464.
52. LCYC, 2.22-23; SYHA, 58.1897; also Carsun Chang, *Development* 1:146-151; Siu-chi Huang, *Lu Hsiang-shan*, 76-86; Mou Tsung-san, *Hsin-i'i* 1:357-415; Yamanoi Yü, "Shushi no tetsugaku ni okeru 'taiki,'" 37-68, and his "Great Ultimate and Heaven," 79-87.
53. CTWC, 36.3b; cf. translation in Carsun Chang, *Development* 1:146-147; also second reply, CTWC, 36.4b-5a.
54. LCYC, 2.23; "Appended Remarks," part 1, chapters 5 and 12 of Legge, trans., *The Yi King (Book of Changes)*; cf. Chan, *Source Book*, 577. On Lu's and Chu's views of the Tao, see Wang Te-yu, *Tao chih lun*, 146-167.
55. LCYC, 2.23; SYHA, 58.1898.
56. LCYC, 2.24; SYHA, 58.1898-1899; On Chu Chen's view, see SYHA, 37.1252-1253; and for P'an's, see Chou Tun-i, *Chou Lien-hsi hsien-sheng wen-chi*, 10.19a-20b. Chu actually wrote his own account of Chou to replace P'an's; *ibid.*, 10.20b-22b; Wilson, "Genealogy," 177, 181.
57. Teng Kuang-ming, "Kuan-yü Chou Tun-i," 53-60.
58. CTWC, 36.7b-10b, especially 8a; SYHA, 58.1900-1903.
59. CTWC, 36.9a; SYHA, 58.1902.
60. CTWC, 36.10a-10b; SYHA, 58.1902; view ascribed to another but likened to Lu's.
61. *Book of Changes*, "Discussion of the Trigrams" (Shuo kua), *Chou-i cheng-i*, 9.4b-5a, in *Shih-san ching chu-shu* 1:93-94; LCYC, 2.29; cf. translation in Wilhelm, *The I Ching*, 264.
62. LCYC, 2.28-30, especially 28. Oaksook Kim, "Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan," 200-201.
63. CTWC, 36.10b-16b, especially 16b; SYHA, 58.1908-1913. Reflecting their different readings of the word *erh*, the translation for Chu is "and also," for Lu "and then."
64. LCYC, 2.25; also letter to T'ao Ts'an-chung, 15.192-193; SYHA, 58.1899-1900, 1914.
65. CTWC, 36.8a; SYHA, 58.1900.

66. *LCYC*, 2.26; *SYHA*, 58.1903-1904.  
 67. *LCYC*, 2.27; *SYHA*, 58.1904.  
 68. *LCYC*, 2.27; *SYHA*, 58.1904.  
 69. *LCYC*, 2.30; *SYHA*, 58.1907. On the "prophetic," see de Bary, *Orthodoxy*, 9-13. Gardner, "Transmitting," 166, n. 116, does not recognize any basis in Confucian texts for using this concept. Nonetheless, Lu registered this kind of complaint against Chu.  
 70. *CTWC*, 31.9a.  
 71. *CTWC*, 36.14b, also 11a; *SYHA*, 58.1911, also 1908.  
 72. *CTWC*, 36.14b-15a; also *LCYC*, 2.25; *SYHA*, 58.1911-1912, also 1899.  
 73. *CTWC*, 36.11b, 15b; *SYHA*, 58.1908, 1912.  
 74. *CTWC*, 36.15b-16a; *SYHA*, 58.1912.  
 75. *CTWC*, 84.29b.  
 76. *CTWC*, 34.34a, 94th letter to Lü; Ch'en Lai, *Chu Hsi*, 302.  
 77. *LCYC*, 34.414, also 34.419-420, cf. the translation in Chin-shing Huang, "The Lu-Wang School," 27.  
 78. Ying-shih Yü, "Morality and Knowledge"; Gardner, "Transmitting," passim.  
 79. *CTWC*, 36.10a, 13b; *SYHA*, 58.1902, 1910.

#### Part 4: The Fourth Period, 1202-1279

1. Li Hsin-ch'uan, *Chien-yen i-lai ch'ao-yeh tsa-chi*, 6.1a-3a, "Tao-hsüeh hsing-fei"; Chaffee, "Chu Hsi in Nan-k'ang," 431.
2. For the role of Shih and his relatives in the politics of the era, see Richard L. Davis, *Court and Family in Sung China*.
3. *TML*, 8.6b-9a; *SSCPM*, 80.877-878; Haeger, "Syncreticism," 510-511.
4. James Liu, "Orthodoxy," 501-504, reiterated in his *China Turning*, 146-149.
5. Pi Yüan, comp., *Hsü tzu-chih t'ung-chien*, 169.4614-4615. For the spread of *Tao-hsüeh* in the North since around the 1190s, see T'ien Hao (Tillman), "Chin-tai ju-chiao."
6. Pi Yüan, comp., *Hsü tzu-chih t'ung-chien*, 170.4630.
7. *SS*, 105.2554-2555.
8. *TML*, preface, 2a.

#### Chapter 10: Chu Hsi's Disciples and Other *Tao-hsüeh* Confucians

1. Wing-tsit Chan, *Chu-tzu men-jen*, 1-27, and *Hsin t'an-so*, 454-455; also Tanaka Kenji, "Shumon deshi shiji nenkō," 147-218, 261-357.
2. *SYHA*, chapter 77; see also *SMLHS* 1:580.
3. Mao Huaixin, "The Establishment of the School of Chu Hsi and Its Propagation in Fukien," 508; other percentages based on Wing-tsit Chan's numbers in *Chu-tzu men-jen*, 1-27, and *Hsin t'an-so*, 454-455.
4. See Linda Walton-Vargo, "Education," passim.
5. *SB*, 450-454; *SS*, 430.12777-12782; *SYHA*, 63.2017-2050; Morohashi Tetsuji, *Shushigaku taikai* 10:1-3, 55-89, 423-435.
6. *CTWC*, 29.22b; *SS*, 430.12778. See also the discussion in Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 436-439.
7. Huang Kan, *Mien-chai chi*, 38.20b-21a, Wing-tsit Chan, *Hsin t'an-so*, 462.
8. Huang Kan, *Mien-chai chi*, 36.48a-48b, translation adapted from Chan, "Chu's Completion," 75. The words "its subtlety . . . Mencius" do not occur in this edition or in the TSCC edition; however, they do occur in the version of Huang Kan's work passed down under the title *Chu-tzu hsing-chuang*, 65b. On Huang and his views, see also Wang Te-i, "Huang Kan te hsüeh-shu yü cheng-shih," passim.

9. "Sheng-hsien tao-t'ung ch'uan-shou tsung-hsü shuo," in Huang K'an, *Mien-chai chi*, 3.17a-19b; SYHA, 63.2022-2023.

10. Huang K'an, *Mien-chai chi*, 3.19b; translation adapted from de Bary, *Orthodoxy*, 11; see also his discussion on pp. 10-12, and in *Message*, 37-38. De Bary characterizes Huang's as a "scholastic" approach as distinct from a "prophetic" one.

11. Ch'en Ch'un, *Pei-hsi tzu-i*, 74, "Lun Chu-tzu" (On Master Chu) translation adapted from Wing-tsit Chan, *Neo-Confucian Terms Explained*, 8, 198. See also Chan's introduction; SYHA, 68.3317-3332; SB, 95-97; SMLHS 1:490-516; SS, 430.12788-12790; Berthrong, "Glosses on Reality," passim.

12. CTYL, 117.4488, Chung-hua ed., 117.2815, translation adapted from Chan, *Neo-Confucian Terms*, 9.

13. CTWC, 57.2b, first letter to Li Yao-ch'ing (i.e., Li T'ang-tzu, fl. 1190s); SMLHS 1:491; also SS, 430.12788.

14. CTYL, 117.4520, Chung-hua ed., 117.2832; translation adapted from Chan, *Neo-Confucian Terms*, 11.

15. Wing-tsit Chan, *Neo-Confucian Terms*, 12-22; Berthrong, "Glosses," 17, 22-24; Yung Sik Kim, "Kuei-shen in Terms of *Ch'i*," 149-162.

16. Ch'en Ch'un, *Pei-hsi tzu-i*, 76-77, translated in Chan, *Neo-Confucian Terms*, 181-182, cf. the translation in de Bary, *Message*, 38. In a note, Wing-tsit Chan points out that in Chu's view what was transmitted was the *Tao*, not the mind. Chan's criticism of the idea of the transmission of the mind is, no doubt, directed against Lu Chiu-yüan's view. Nevertheless, his point would appear to be applicable to de Bary's thesis in *Message* and *Orthodoxy*, too, for de Bary's thesis centers on the transmission of the mind.

17. *Pei-hsi ta-ch'üan chi*, version quoted and translated in Chan, *Neo-Confucian Terms*, 181.

18. SYHA, 51.1678.

19. For details and sources, see Chan, *Neo-Confucian Terms*, 24-31.

20. Huang Kan, *Mien-chai chi*, 5.23a-23b, letter to Li Fan (1190 *chin-shih*), translation adapted from Ron-Guey Chu, "Chen Te-hsiu and the 'Classic of Governance,'" 120, and discussion, passim. See also de Bary, *Orthodoxy*, 73-126; SB, 88-90; SS, 437.12957-12965; SYHA, 81.2693-2708; and SMLHS 1:607-615.

21. Ron-Guey Chu, "Chen Te-hsiu," 35-102.

22. SS, 437.12964, translation adapted from de Bary, *Orthodoxy*, 88.

23. De Bary, *Message*, 45; see also 87-89.

24. Ron-Guey Chu, "Chen Te-hsiu," 163-208; his valuable study does not discuss the likely influence of Che-tung utilitarians on Chen.

25. Chen Te-hsiu, *Chen Hsi-shan hsien-sheng chi*, 3.16a, translated in de Bary, *Orthodoxy*, 109, and discussed on pp. 106-123.

26. Chen Te-hsiu, *Hsin ching*, 1a-23b; de Bary, *Orthodoxy*, 73-83.

27. This apt judgment is made by de Bary in *Orthodoxy*, 81-82.

28. Ron-Guey Chu, "Chen Te-hsiu," 205-206.

29. Chen Te-hsiu, *Chen Hsi-shan hsien-sheng chi*, 2.1b, translated in de Bary, *Orthodoxy*, 99. De Bary on p. 9 uses the term "prophetic" to refer to such special access to truth beyond what was received in classical texts.

30. Chen, *Chen Hsi-shan hsien-sheng chi*, 2.20b, translated in de Bary, *Orthodoxy*, 10.

31. Chen, *Chen Hsi-shan hsien-sheng chi*, 2.10b-11b.

32. SYHA, 84.2839-2844, 92.3033-3062; Ron-Guey Chu, "Chen Te-hsiu," 20-25; David Gedalecia, "Evolution and Synthesis in Neo-Confucianism," 91-102, and "Wu Ch'eng's Approach to Internal Self-cultivation and External Knowledge-seeking," 279-326. The other two brothers were T'ang Ch'ien and T'ang Chung.

33. SYHA, 77.2565-2614; SMLHS 1:580-587.

34. The other three masters of Ming-chou were Shu Lin, Shen Huan (1139-1191), and Yüan Hsieh; SYHA, 75 and 76. On Yang, see SS, 407.12289-12292; SB, 1218-



1222; SYHA, 74; and Linda Walton, "The Institutional Context of Neo-Confucianism," 468-472.

35. SYHA, 74.2466, translated in Fung Yu-lan, *History* 1:582.

36. SYHA, 74.2459-2480; SMLHS 1:587-598; Shimada Kenji, "Yō Jiko," 123-141; Walton, "Institutional Context," 471, 482-483, Fung Yu-lan, *History* 1:579-585; Carson Chang, *Development* 1:336-341.

37. Yeh Shih, *Yeh Shih chi*, 2.11, 10.162, 12.220, 15.273; Winston Wan Lo, *The Life and Thought of Yeh Shih*, 149-176. Ironically, Yeh's critique of creativity also undermined Ch'en Liang's philosophy.

38. SYHA, 85.1615-1622, 86.2883-2900; SS, 303.10045, 438.12987-12991; SMLHS 1:362-367; SB, 445-447, 1167-1176; 622-644; C. Bradford Langley, "Wang Ying-lin," *passim*. On Lü's influence, see Liu Chao-jen, *Lü Tung-lai*, 224-228.

39. SYHA, 86.2884 and 2886.

40. Liu Chao-jen, *Lü Tung-lai*, 215-216.

41. SYHA, 82.2725-2733; SMLHS 1:645-676.

42. Liu Chao-jen, *Lü Tung-lai*, 229-230, 231-232.

## Conclusion

1. Peter K. Bol, "Reflections on the Promise of Neo-Confucianism."

## GLOSSARY

This list includes characters for Chinese names, places, and terms in the text, except when they occur as titles and authors listed in the Bibliography.

Anhwei 安徽  
An-jen 安仁

Chan Fu-min 詹阜民  
Chan T'i-jen 詹體仁  
Ch'an 禪  
Chang-chou 漳州  
Chang Chün 張浚  
Chang Fei 張飛  
Chang Liang 張良  
Ch'ang-chou 常州  
Ch'ang-sha 長沙  
Chao 趙  
Chao Chi-tao 趙幾道  
Chao Fu 趙復  
Chao Ju-yü 趙汝愚  
Chao Ting 趙鼎  
Chao Yen-chung 趙彥中  
Chao Yen-yü 趙彥逾  
Ch'ao Yüeh-chih 晁說之  
Chekiang 浙江

Che-tung 浙東  
Ch'en Chia 陳賈  
Ch'en I 陳益  
Ch'en Kuan 陳瓘  
Ch'en Kung-fu 陳公輔  
Ch'en Mi 陳宓  
Ch'en Ming 陳明  
Ch'en T'uan 陳搏  
Cheng Ch'ing-chih 鄭清之  
*Cheng-meng* 正蒙  
Cheng Ping 鄭丙  
Cheng Po-hsiung 鄭伯熊  
*cheng-t'ung* 正統  
Cheng Wen 鄭聞  
Ch'eng Cheng-ssu 程正思  
*ch'eng jen* 成人  
Ch'eng Shao-k'ai 程紹開  
Ch'eng Tuan-meng 程端蒙  
*chi* 己  
Chi, Prince (Chao Hung) 濟王(趙竑)  
*ch'i* (embodiment) 器

*ch'i* (energy) 氣  
*ch'i ping* 氣票  
 Chia I 賈誼  
 Chiang Kung-wang 江公望  
 Chiang-tung 江東  
*ch'iao* 巧  
 Ch'iao Hsing-chien 喬行簡  
 Chien-k'ang 建康  
 Chien-yang 建陽  
*ch'ien* (Heaven) 乾  
 Ch'ien mountain 鉛山  
*chih chih* 知至  
 Chin 金  
 Chin-ch'i or Chin-hsi 金溪  
*chin hsin* 盡心  
 Chin-hua 金華  
 Chin Lü-hsiang 金履祥  
*chin-shih* 進士  
 Ch'in Kuei 秦檜  
 Ch'in Shih-huang-ti 秦始皇帝  
*ching* (reverence, seriousness) 敬  
*ching* (standard, classics) 經  
 Ching-an 靖安  
 Ching-fu (張)敬夫  
 Ching-men 荆門  
*ching-she* 精舍  
*Ching-shih chi-nien* 經世紀年  
 Ch'ing (dynasty) 清  
*ch'ing* (feelings) 情  
*ch'ing-miao fa* 青苗法  
*Cho-ku lun* 酌古論  
 Chou (dynasty) 周  
 Chou Hsing-chi 周行己  
*Chou I cheng-i* 周易正義  
 Chou K'uei 周葵  
 Chou Mo 周謨  
 Chou Pi-ta 周必大  
 Chu Chen 朱震  
 Chu Chi-tao 朱濟道  
 Chu Hung-tao 朱亨道  
 Chu-ko Liang 諸葛亮  
 Chu-lin ching-she 竹林精舍  
 Chu Shu 朱塾  
 Chu Sung 朱松  
*chuan-men chih hsüeh* 專門之學

*ch'üan* 權  
 Ch'üan-chou 泉州  
*chüeh* 覺  
*chün-tzu* 君子  
*Ch'un-ch'iu Tso-shih-chuan shuo*  
 春秋左氏傳說  
*ch'un ju* 醇儒  
*chung* 中  
*Chung-hsing lun* 中興論  
*Chung shuo* 中說  
 Ch'ung-an 崇安  
  
*erh* 而  
*Erh-Ch'eng i-shu* 二程遺書  
  
*fa* 法  
*fa-chia* 法家  
 Fan Chen 范鎮  
 Fan Tsu-yü 范祖禹  
*fen* 分  
*fu* (return) 復  
 Fu (surname) 傅  
 Fu-chou 撫州  
 Fu-hsi 伏羲  
 Fukien 福建  
 Fu-yang 富陽  
  
 Han (dynasty) 漢  
 Han Ching-ti 漢景帝  
 Han-ch'üan ching-she 寒泉精舍  
 Han Fei 韓非  
 Han Hsüan-ti 漢宣帝  
 Han Kao-tsu 漢高祖  
 Han T'o-chou 韓侂胄  
 Han Wu-ti 漢武帝  
 Han-yang 漢陽  
 Han Yü 韓愈  
 Han Yüan-chi 韓元吉  
 Hangchow 杭州  
*ho* 和  
 Ho Chi 何基  
 Ho Ch'üeh (K'o) 何恪  
 Ho Shu-ching 何叔京  
 Ho Tan 何澹  
 Hsi-Hsia 西夏

- Hsi-tz'u* 繫辭  
*Hsi Yen lu* 希顏錄  
*Hsiang An-shih* (P'ing-fu) 項安世(平父)  
*Hsiang-shan* 象山  
*Hsiao-tsung* 孝宗  
*Hsieh Liang-tso* 謝良佐  
 "Hsien yu i te" 咸有一德  
*hsin* 心  
*Hsin* (river) 信  
*Hsin-chou* 信州  
*hsing* 性  
*hsing-erh-shang* 形而上  
*Hsing-shuo* 性說  
*Hsiung Chieh* 熊節  
*Hsiung-nu* 匈奴  
*hsü* 虛  
*Hsü Ch'ien* 許謙  
*Hsü Pi-hsien* 胥必先  
*Hu An-kuo* 胡安國  
*Hu Chi-sui* 胡季隨  
*Hu-chou* 湖州  
*Hu Hsien* 胡憲  
*Hu Shih* 胡實  
*Hu Ta-shih* 胡大時  
*Hu-tzu Chih-yen i-i* 胡子知言疑義  
*Hu Yin* 胡寅  
*Hu Yüan* 胡瑗  
*Huan, Duke of Ch'i* 齊桓公  
*Huang Chen* 黃震  
*Huang Hsün-chung* 黃循中  
*Huang K'ang-nien* 黃康年  
*huang-tao* 皇道  
*Huang-wang ta-chi* 皇王大紀  
*Hui-tsung* 徽宗  
*hun-hou* 渾厚  
*hun-lun* 渾淪
- i* 義  
*I, Duke of Wei* 魏懿公  
*I ching* 易經  
*I chuan* 易傳  
*i-tuan* 異端
- jen* 仁  
*jen-hsin* 人心
- Jen shuo* 仁說  
*Jen shuo t'u* 仁說圖  
*ju* 儒  
*ju-chia* 儒家  
*Ju-neng* (陳)汝能  
*Ju river* 汝河  
*Jui Yeh* (Yü) 芮燁(煜)  
*Jurchen* 女真
- K'ai-feng* 開封  
*Kao-tsung* 高宗  
*Kao-tzu* 告子  
*Kao Wen-hu* 高文虎  
*ken-yüan* 根源  
*Kiangsi* 江西  
*ko-wu* 格物  
*ku-wen* 古文  
*Kuan Chung* (I-wu) 管仲(夷吾)  
*Kuang-tsung* 光宗  
*kuai-shen* 鬼神  
*K'uei-ch'iu* 葵丘  
*k'un* 坤  
*K'un-hsüeh chi-wen* 困學紀聞  
*kung* (impartiality) 公  
*kung* (results) 功  
*kung-li* 功利
- Lao-tzu* 老子  
*li* (principle, order) 理  
*li* (ritual, decorum) 禮  
*li* (utility, benefits) 利  
*Li Fan* 李燾  
*li-hsüeh* 理學  
*Li Po* 李白  
*Li T'ang-tzu* (Yao-ch'ing) 李唐咨(堯卿)  
*Li Tao-ch'uan* 李道傳  
*Li T'ao* 李燾  
*Li-tse shu-yüan* 麗澤書院  
*Li-tsung* 理宗  
*Li Tuan-p'o* 李端伯  
*Li T'ung* (Yen-p'ing) 李侗(延平)  
*li yu shan e* 理有善惡  
*Liang-Che* 兩浙  
*Liang Wu-ti* 梁武帝  
*Lin-an* 臨安

Lin-chi 臨濟

Lin Chih-ch'i 林之奇

Lin-ch'uan 臨川

Lin Li 林栗

Lin Tse-chih 林擇之

Liu An-shih 劉安世

Liu Cheng 留正

Liu Ch'ing-chih 劉清之

Liu Ch'un-sou 劉淳叟

Liu Hsüan (Chih-fu) 劉絢(質夫)

Liu Ju-yü 劉如愚

Liu Kuang-tsu 劉光祖

Liu Kung-tu 劉公度

Liu Pa 劉巴

Liu Pei 劉備

Liu Tzu-hui 劉子翬

Lo Ts'ung-yen 羅從彥

Lu Chiu-ling 陸九齡

Lu Chiu-shao 陸九韶

Lu Ho 陸賀

Lu mountain 廬山

Lu O 陸諤

Lu Yen-pin 路彥彬

Lu Yu 陸游

Lü Chih 呂祉

Lü Hao-wen 呂好問

Lü Hsi-che 呂希哲

Lü Hua-nien 呂華年

Lü Kung-chu 呂公著

Lü Meng-cheng 呂蒙正

Lü Pen-chung 呂本中

Lü Ta-chün 呂大鈞

Lü Ta-fang 呂大防

Lü Ta-lin 呂大臨

Lü Tsu-chien 呂祖儉

"Lun Chu-tzu" 論朱子

Lun Meng chi-chu huo-wen 論孟集註或問

Lun Meng ching-i 論孟精義

Lung-ch'uan 龍川

Ming (dynasty) 明

Ming-chao mountain 明招山

Ming-chou 明州

Mo-tzu 墨子

mou 畝

Nan-k'ang 南康

Ningpo 寧波

Ning-tsung 寧宗

Ou-yang Hsiu 歐陽修

pa 霸

pa-tao 霸道

Pai-lu-tung shu-yüan 白鹿洞書院

P'an Chih 潘植

P'an Ching-hsien 潘景憲

P'an Ching-liang 潘景良

P'an Hsing-ssu 潘興嗣

P'an Shu-ch'ang 潘叔昌

P'an Shu-tu 潘叔度

Pao Yang (Hsien-tao) 包揚(顯道)

pen-hsin 本心

pen-jan 本然

P'eng-li lake 彭蠡湖

po-hsüeh hung-tz'u 博學宏詞

Satō Hitoshi 佐藤仁

shang-ti 上帝

Shang-ts'ai yü-lu 上蔡語錄

Shao-hsing 紹興

Shao Yung 邵雍

she-ts'ang 社倉

shen 神

Shen Huan 沈煥

Shen-nung 神農

Shen Pu-hai 申不害

Shen-tsung 神宗

Sheng chuan lun 聖傳論

shih 士

shih-kung 事功

Shih Mi-yüan 史彌遠

Shu Lin 舒璘

shu-yüan 書院

Shu Yüan-pin 舒元賓

Shun 舜

ssu-k'u 四庫

Su Ch'e 蘇轍

Su Shih 蘇軾

Sun Chün 孫濬

Sun Fu 孫復

Sun-tzu (Wu) 孫子(武)  
*Sun-tzu ping-fa* 孫子兵法  
*Sung-hsüeh* 宋學  
 Szechwan 四川

*Ta-hsüeh yen-i* 大學演義  
 Ta-hui Tsung-kao 大慧宗杲  
*t'ai-chi* 太極  
*T'ai-chi t'u shuo* 太極圖說  
 T'ai-chou 泰州  
 T'ai-tsung 太宗  
 T'an-chou 潭州  
 T'an Tzu-li 談子立  
*tang* 黨  
 T'ang (dynasty) 唐  
 T'ang Chin 湯巾  
 T'ang Ch'ien 湯千  
 T'ang Chung 湯中  
 T'ang Han 湯漢  
 T'ang T'ai-tsung 唐太宗  
 Tao 道  
*tao-hsin* 道心  
*Tao-hsüeh* 道學  
 "Tao-hsüeh hsing-fei" 道學興廢  
 Tao-i 道一  
*tao-li* 道理  
*Tao-te ching* 道德經  
*tao-t'ung* 道統  
 T'ao Ts'an-chung 陶贊仲  
 Teng 鄧  
 Teng Wen-fan 鄧文範  
*ti* 地  
*ti-tao* 帝道  
*t'i* (essence, substance) 體  
*t'i-jen* 體認  
*t'ien* 天  
*t'ien chih hsin* 天之心  
*t'ien-hsin* 天心  
*t'ien-li* 天理  
*t'ien-ming chih hsing* 天命之性  
*Tsa-hsüeh pien* 雜學辨  
*tsa-pa* 雜霸  
 Ts'ai Yüan-ting 蔡元定  
 Ts'ao Chien (Li-chih) 曹建(立之)  
 Ts'ao T'ing-chih 曹挺之

Ts'ao Ts'ao 曹操  
 Ts'ao Wei 曹魏  
 Tseng Chai-chih 曾宅之  
 Tseng Chi 曾幾  
 Tseng Ti 曾覲  
 "Tseng tso-p'u-yeh Cheng-kuo-kung  
 Yen-kung Wu" 贈左僕射  
 鄭國公嚴公武  
 Tseng-tzu 曾子  
*Tso chuan* 左傳  
 Tu Fu 杜甫  
*t'ung* 統  
 T'ung (-fu) (陳)同(父或甫)  
*T'ung-lai Lü T'ai-shih Ch'un-ch'iu Tso-  
 chuan lei-pien*  
 東萊呂太史春秋左傳類編  
*T'ung-shu* 通書  
*tsu-fan* 自反  
 Tzu-kung 子貢  
 Tzu-ssu 子思  
*tsu...wei* 自...爲  
 Tz'u-hu shu-yüan 慈湖書院

Wan Jen-chieh (Cheng-ch'un)  
 萬人傑(正淳)

Wang An-shih 王安石  
*Wang ch'üan chi* 忘筮集  
 Wang Huai 王淮  
 Wang Pi 王弼  
 Wang P'in 王蘋  
 Wang Po 王柏  
 Wang Shou-jen (Yang-ming)  
 王守仁(陽明)  
 Wang Shun-po 王順伯  
*wang-tao* 王道  
 Wang T'ung 王通  
 Wang Ying-ch'en 汪應辰  
 Wang Ying-lin 王應麟  
*wei* 偽  
 Wei Cheng 魏徵  
*wei-hsüeh* 偽學  
 Wei Liao-weng 魏了翁  
 Wei Shan-chih 魏撻之  
*wen* 文  
 Wen-chou 溫州

*Wen-chung-tzu* 文中子

*Wen Weng* 文翁

*wu* (martial) 武

*wu* (non) 無

*Wu Ch'eng* 吳澄

*wu-chi* 無極

*Wu-chou* 婺州

*Wu I* (Hui-shu) 吳翌(晦叔)

*Wu-i* (mountain) 武夷

*Wu-i ching-she* 武夷精舍

*Wu Shou-ch'ang* 吳壽昌

*Wu Tzu-szu* 吳子嗣

*yang* (active cosmic force) 陽

*Yang Chien* 楊簡

*Yang Chu* 楊朱

*Yang K'uei* 楊圭

*Yang Ta-fa* 楊大發

*Yao* 堯

*Yen-chou* 嚴州

*Yen Hui* 顏回

*Yen jen lu* 言仁錄

*Yen-ling* 嚴陵

*Yen Wu* 嚴武

*Yin* (dynasty) 殷

*yin* (passive cosmic force) 陰

*yin* (protection or privilege of officials)  
陰

*Yin Ch'un* 尹淳

*Ying Meng-ming* 應孟明

*Ying-tsung* 英宗

*Yu Mao* 尤袤

*Yü* 禹

*Yüan* (dynasty) 元

*Yüan-ch'eng yü-lu* 元城語錄

*Yüan Hsieh* 袁燮

*Yüan-hui* (朱)元晦

*Yüan-shih shih-fan* 袁氏世範

*Yüan Ts'ai* 袁采

*Yüan-yu* 元祐

*Yüeh-lu shu-yüan* 嶽麓書院

*yung* 用

*Yung-chia* 永嘉

*Yung-k'ang* 永康

## PRE-1900 CHINESE SOURCES

The following abbreviations are used for standard editions:

CHSC	Chung-hua shu-chü (Peking)
HCHTS	Hsü Chin-hua ts'ung-shu
KHCPTS	Kuo-hsüeh chi-pen ts'ung-shu
SKCS	Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu
SPPY	Ssu-pu pei-yao
SPTK	Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an
TSCC	Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng

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#### Production Notes

This book was designed by Richard Hendel. Composition and paging were done on the Quadex Composing System and typesetting on the Compugraphic 8400 by the design and production staff of University of Hawaii Press.

The text typeface is Sabon and the display typeface is Compugraphic Optima.

Offset presswork and binding were done by The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group. Text paper is Writers RR Offset, basis 50.