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1807: ECONOMIC SHOCKS, CONFLICT AND THE SLAVE TRADE

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ABSTRACT. A large fraction of modern global conflicts have occurred in Africa, resulting in a disproportionate number of fatalities compared to other regions. Many of Africa's conflicts have deep historical roots. In this paper, we contribute to understanding the determinants of historical African conflict by studying an important historical source of conflict: suppression of the slave trade after 1807. We use geo-coded data on African conflicts to uncover a discontinuous increase in conflict after 1807 in areas affected by the slave trade, indicating that suppression increased the incidence of conflict between Africans. In West Africa, the slave trade declined. This empowered interests that rivaled existing authorities, and political leaders resorted to violence in order to maintain their influence. In West-Central and South-East Africa, slave exports increased after 1807 and were produced through violence.

1. INTRODUCTION

African conflicts are particularly deadly. Roughly thirty percent of conflicts over the past five decades have occurred in Africa, and these typically result in twice as many fatalities as conflicts in other regions (Hoeffler, 2015). Many of Africa's conflicts have deep historical roots. Legacies of centuries-old conflict, patterns of local state history, and borders established more than a century ago all predict present violence (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014; Depetris-Chauvin, 2016; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2011). It is important, then, to understand the history of conflict in Africa. In this paper, we document that adaptation to British suppression of the slave trade after 1807 included an increase in the incidence of intra-African conflict.

The Slave Trade Act of 1807 was enforced through naval patrols on the West African coast and reinforced by the United States' prohibition of slave imports in 1808. The effect on slave exports

FIGURE 1. The importance of 1807

was immediate, and is shown in Figure 1.[1] The effect was also heterogeneous. Suppression was only effective at reducing participation by British nationals and north of the equator (Eltis, 1987). South of the equator, Brazilian and Portuguese shippers dominated a trade that largely transported slaves to Brazil. As a result, the slave trade was re-organized. Exports from West Africa fell. By contrast, exports from West-Central and Southeast Africa expanded after a brief decline.

We use data from Brecke (1999) on conflicts in Africa over the period 1700 to 1900. Assigning coordinates to each of these conflicts, we then use proximity to slave-trade ports to divide Africa into a region that was affected by the transatlantic slave trade and a region that was not. We show that there was a discontinuous increase in the prevalence of conflict between Africans in the affected region after 1807 relative to the unaffected region.

We show that our main result cannot be explained by more detailed measurement of conflict in Africa after 1807, differential measurement of conflicts near and further from the coast over time, greater colonial encroachment, or by the jihads of the early nineteenth century. Our result is robust to several different specifications, including alternative divisions of Africa into affected

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[1]These figures are estimated using the Eltis et al. (1999) ship-level records. In particular, we use the variables *majbyimp* (Imputed principal region of slave purchase) *slaximp* (Imputed total slaves embarked), and *yearaf* (Year departed Africa (imputed)).

and unaffected regions, and to changes in the time window that we consider. Further, we show that 1807 did not increase conflicts with non-Africans, and that we can only find a structural break in conflicts amongst Africans around 1807.

What prompted the increase in intra-African violence? We show that the sharp increase in conflict occurred in both West Africa, where the slave trade declined, and West-Central/Southeast Africa, which dominated the final decades of the slave trade. In both regions, the restructuring of the slave trade disrupted the status quo, creating new violence as actors adjusted to the change. Where demand for slaves increased, they were produced through violence, for example as war captives. Where demand declined, states that had derived revenues from the slave trade found their relative power weakened. Authorities used the spoils of conflict to maintain their position. Of particular importance were the ability to violently acquire slaves that could be used in further conflict and access to firearms and horses through continued sale of slaves, despite suppression of the trade.

Why was this increase sustained? While we do not have detailed data with which to test between the possible explanations for why levels of conflict did not return quickly to baseline, the secondary literature on both historical and modern conflict in Africa offers several possibilities. Two mechanisms that Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) have used to explain the persistence of conflict in Africa are relevant here: inter-group distrust and poverty. Studies of Angola and Mozambique have similarly emphasized interethnic rivalries that were worsened by the post-1807 slave trade when discussing the historical roots of conflict in both countries (Chabal, 2001; Funada-Classen, 2013). The literature on conflict in nineteenth century Africa has similarly discussed many reasons why these conflicts persisted. These include the weakening of states that had depended on the slave trade,[2] the incentive to leave an enemy intact for future slave raiding and plunder, the need to engage in conflict in order to obtain the guns and horses needed for self-preservation, and the sustained external demand for slaves south of the equator. In our empirical results, we show that conflicts both became more frequent and lasted longer after 1807.

1.1. **Related literature.** Our principal contribution is to the literature on the economics of conflict. First, we show that the effects of economic shocks on conflict can be persistent. The literature on economic shocks and conflict focuses largely on immediate responses to transitory income fluctuations and the factors that mitigate them (Brückner and Ciccone, 2010; Miguel et al., 2004). Though empirical work has tested whether slowly-changing variables such as ethnic differences give rise to conflict (Djankov and Reynal-Querol, 2010; Esteban et al., 2012) and whether violent responses to transient shocks have longer-lasting institutional consequences (Dell, 2012), we are not aware of any study showing persistent violence caused by transient economic shocks. We show

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[2]Depetris-Chauvin (2016) and Heldring (2016) both provide empirical economic studies of the role of states in reducing conflict in Africa.

that the increased incidence of intra-African conflict in response to the 1807 shock was sustained for several years after the initial change.

Second, we add new evidence on the mechanisms by which both positive and negative economic shocks may precipitate conflict. Existing studies explain the apparently contradictory effects of both positive and negative shocks in terms of opportunity costs and returns to conflict (Besley and Persson, 2011; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Dube and Vargas, 2013). The set of mechanisms that has been considered by the empirical literature is small, but expanding. Fenske and Kala (2015), for example, focus on the returns to predatory, state-led violence in the context of the slave trade. Here, we focus on the returns to violence and the challenges faced by undemocratic political authorities in adapting to a new economic order.

Third, we add to the existing evidence that study of the past provides lessons about the relationship between economic shocks and conflict. Although most empirical work on conflict has focused on the period after 1945, history provides a larger universe of data with which to test how the response of conflict to economic variables varies by the type of shock, or by institutions, technology, and culture. Other studies of historical conflict have found, for example, that the spread of drought-resistant crops can reduce this responsiveness (Jia, 2014), or that culture can similarly mitigate the response to shocks (Kung and Ma, 2014). We find conflict to be responsive to trade shocks, and that this response is attenuated by the availability of alternative income sources – in our case the ability to produce oil crops that were central to African trade with Europe after 1807.

Our paper is a contribution to the literature on trade and conflict. Because war imposes costs by disrupting trade (Glick and Taylor, 2010), countries that trade more should be less likely to go to war. Empirical studies have found support for this claim (Polachek, 1980; Vicard, 2012). Jha (2013, 2014) finds that long histories of inter-ethnic trade limit conflict in the present. Indeed, countries enter trade agreements in part to reduce the probability of conflict (Martin et al., 2012). Other recent work has shown that the relationship between trade and conflict may be more complex. Martin et al. (2008a,b) suggest that multilateral trade reduces the costs of war with any one trade partner, Nunn and Qian (2014) argue that U.S. food aid increases civil conflict in recipient countries, and Rohner et al. (2013) emphasize the possibility that low levels of trust in inter-ethnic trade can perpetuate vicious cycles of recurrent conflict. Our contribution is to focus on trade of a good whose production is intrinsically violent, and on the unintended consequences of restricting that trade.

We also make a more minor contribution to the literature on the impact of the slave trade on Africa. Although the slave trade had many persistent effects, we are not aware of any other empirical paper that focuses on the link between present-day conflict and either the slave trade or its abolition. Further, existing studies focus on the long-run impacts on income, trust, ethnic stratification, and polygamy (Dalton and Leung, 2014; Nunn, 2008; Nunn and Puga, 2012; Nunn and

Wantchekon, 2011; Whatley and Gillezeau, 2011b). The only empirical study of which we are aware that looks at contemporaneous outcomes is Whatley and Gillezeau (2011a).

1.2. **Outline.** In section 2, we outline our empirical strategy and describe our sources of data. In section 3, we present our main results and demonstrate their robustness to alternative specifications and interpretations. In section 4, we interpret our results. We situate our findings in the historical literature on the African "crisis of adaptation," and discuss the examples of South-Western Nigeria and Eastern South Africa. In section 5, we conclude.

2. BACKGROUND, EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA

2.1. **Background.** What led to the Slave Trade Act? Radical writers such as Williams (1944) have argued that the Slave Trade Act was part of a capitalist assault on barriers to trade. More mainstream work focuses instead on ideological opposition to slavery by both influential abolitionists and the British public. Slavery and the slave trade became increasingly incompatible with new ideologies that had grown prevalent in Britain, including ideas of liberty, benevolence, and happiness (Anstey, 1975, p. 96). Eltis (1987) describes a number of impulses that pushed Britain towards antislavery, including liberalism, progressivism, and values of laissez-faire, freedom, and individualism (p.22, 104). Underpinning his analysis is an argument that, in 1807, the slave trade was still economically profitable for Britain.

Enlightenment figures like Voltaire and Condorcet condemned the trade (Anstey, 1975, p. 122). Similarly, new currents in Evangelical and Quaker thought turned against slavery (p. 97). Particularly important was the development of concepts of benevolence and Providence (p. 126). The evangelical perspective stressed the importance of redemption and atonement, used the old testament deliverance of the chosen people as a typology for the salvation experience, stressed the law of love, and emphasised slavery and freedom as analogues of redemption and liberty within Christianity (p. 186). Oldfield (2012, p. 20) emphasises analogous trends in popular politics, in particular the growth of compassion, civility, and sociability. Drescher (1994), similarly, focuses on the role of the British public.

By the 1770s, educated opinion had turned in Britain and slavery had come to be seen as "morally and philosophically condemned" (Anstey, 1975, p. 239). It was ideological changes such as these that motivated campaigners such as Clarkson, Sharp and Wilberforce. Their efforts overcame opposition from the West Indies, the crown, and general concerns about national interest for a variety of proximate reasons, including the ability to cast it as patriotic vis-à-vis France, support by new Irish members of Parliament, the death of Pitt, and tireless lobbying (Anstey, 1975, p. 343,357,398) . These efforts were supported by hundreds of thousands of Britons who put their names on petitions demanding an end to the trade (Oldfield, 2012, p. 114).

Abolition of the slave trade came as a series of laws; in 1806 Britain banned British involvement in the foreign slave trade, including provision of credit; 1807 ended British participation in the

slave trade and initiated British efforts to press other European countries to do the same; laws in 1833 and 1838 prohibited slavery in the British Empire, and in 1843 British subjects were forbidden to hold slaves anywhere (Eltis, 1987, p. 83). Britain began capturing and condemning Portuguese and Bahian ships as early as 1810 (Eltis, 1987, p. 108,142). Treaties signed with Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands in 1817 and 1818 gave Britain the right to detain ships trading north of the equator (p. 86). Further, withdrawal of British credit and goods had an additional, if minor, effect on the trade of other countries (p. 142). After 1810, increased risk in the slave trade had become visible in the substitution of specie for goods in outbound cargoes (p. 152).

In West-Central Africa, abolition was inhibited by several factors, including lack of European sovereignty, a lack of alternative overseas commodity trade, and the ease of avoiding blockading cruisers (Eltis, 1987, p. 175-6) Britain was also reticent to interfere with the Portuguese South Atlantic trade because Portugal was a British ally (p. 27). The Portuguese trade also survived because it was dominated by Brazilians with few connections to Europe, because it rarely moved North of the equator, staying self-contained, and because Brazilian ports were relatively close to Africa but distant from Europe (p. 48). By the 1820s, the slave trade had been restructured, focusing on the Americas and dominated by Spanish and Portuguese slave merchants (p. 146).

2.2. **Empirical strategy.** Our principal outcome of interest is the number of intra-African conflicts occurring in either the region close to slave ports or the region far from slave ports in a given year. In our baseline analysis, the "near port" region includes areas within 1,000 km of a port listed in the Eltis et al. (1999) *Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database*, while the comparison region includes the rest of Africa that is within 2,000 km of a port.[3] This cutoff is chosen to capture the area from which slaves were brought to the coast, and hence the regions likely to be affected by the slave trade. The estimates in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) show that the overwhelming majority of slave exports came from ethnic groups whose centroids were within 1,000 km of the coast; see Figure A.1 in the appendix. We will show below that alternative definitions such as moving this cutoff closer to the coast, or alternative related definitions of treatment such as continuous distance to the coast, do not materially change the results.

We use OLS to estimate:

$$AfricanConflictIncidence_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Post_t \times NearPort_i + \beta_2 NearPort_i$$
$$+ \beta_3 Post_t + \beta_4 Year_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

(1)

Here, $AfricanConflictIncidence_{it}$ is the number of intra-African conflicts in region i in year t. $Post_t$ is an indicator for $t > 1807$. $NearPort_i$ is an indicator for areas that were affected by the ban, since they engaged in the slave trade. We estimate (1) on samples that include years within a

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[3]We do not consider the North African slave trade due to a lack of data on the sources of slave supply and volume of exports for that region before and after 1807.

window length W of 1807. We will let W vary from 15 to 40 years. For a given window length, we will have $2 \times (2 \times W + 1)$ observations.

In our baseline, we will use a Newey-West correction to address serial correlation in our standard errors. Standard errors produced by bootstrapping (Appendix Table A2) or by using Prais-Winsten estimation (Appendix Table A7) are very similar to our baseline results.

We estimate two augmented specifications that allow for separate time trends in the two regions, and for these trends to also change around 1807:

$$
\begin{aligned}
AfricanConflictIncidence_{it} = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Post_t \times NearPort_i + \beta_2 NearPort_i \\
& + \beta_3 Post_t + \beta_4 Year_t + \beta_5 Year_t \times NearPort_i \\
& + \epsilon_{it},
\end{aligned}
$$

(2)

and:

$$
\begin{aligned}
AfricanConflictIncidence_{it} = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Post_t \times NearPort_i + \beta_2 NearPort_i \\
& + \beta_3 Post_t + \beta_4 Year_t + \beta_5 Year_t \times NearPort_i \\
& + \beta_6 Post \times (Year_t - 1807) \\
& + \beta_7 Post \times (Year_t - 1807) \times NearPort_i \\
& + \epsilon_{it},
\end{aligned}
$$

(3)

In each of (1), (2) and (3), β_1 is our primary coefficient of interest. It captures the degree to which conflict was more common after 1807 than before, above what is predicted by any prior trend. If the effect of abolition on the incidence of conflict in Africa were to occur more gradually, it would appear as a change in the trend – as a positive estimate of β_7. Similarly, it is possible that both β_1 and β_7 increase. In practice, we typically find a more immediate effect.

2.3. **Data.** Our source of data on the incidence of conflict in Africa is Brecke (1999).[4] His purpose is to document all conflicts over the period 1400 to 1900 in which at least 32 persons are killed in battle. He assembles these from a large bibliography of secondary sources. His sources include already-existing lists of conflicts such as Clodfelter (2008), as well as sources specifically focused on African history such as Ajayi and Crowder (1985), Freeman-Grenville (1973) or McEvedy (1980).

In particular, Brecke (1999) lists the belligerents, dates, locations, and durations of 677 conflicts that took place between 1400 and 1900 in Africa. For example, one entry in his data reads "Tukulors-Segu (Timbuktoo, Mali), 1863." We use this information to assign each conflict a set of coordinates (in this example, 16.78, -3.01) and an indicator for whether both parties are African

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[4]Data and documentation can be downloaded from `www.cgeh.nl/data`.

FIGURE 2. Conflicts and proximity to ports, 1400-1900

(in this case, yes). The Brecke (1999) data do, then, record conflicts in the African interior; 22% of intra-African conflicts he records between 1700 and 1900 occurred in our comparison region that is further than 1,000 km, but within 2,000 km of the coast.[5] Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) show that conflicts from these data between 1400 and 1700 predict conflict and mistrust today. Iyigun (2008) uses these data to track the responsiveness of Protestant-Catholic conflict to Ottoman military activities. We join these data on conflict to several other sources of geographic data, which we discuss as they are introduced.[6] Several other studies have also used these data, including Parker (2008), Zhang et al. (2011), Fearon and Laitin (2014), Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011), Pinker (2011), and Lagerlöf (2014).

The Brecke data can be compared to commonly-used alternatives such as Clodfelter (2008) or Jaques (2007): see Dincecco and Prado (2012) and Gennaioli and Voth (2015) for examples of papers using these alternative data. Clodfelter's index for the 1700s does not list any conflicts that took place in sub-Saharan Africa. The index for the 1800s lists 19 conflicts that took place in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as five "North African" conflicts involving Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and one

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[5]Other examples of intra-African interior conflicts include "Ethiopia-Funj (northwest Ethiopia), 1735," "Darfur-Wadai (Chad), 1739," and "Luba-Kazembe (Zaire), 1830."

[6]Although Brecke reports fatalities data for some conflicts, we do not use this. It is missing for most conflicts in the data and is reported for less than one third of African conflicts.

in the Sudan. These are, however, overwhelmingly conflicts involving non-Africans. For example, the only three sub-Saharan conflicts in his index starting before 1838 are "Portugal's Colonial Wars in Africa," the "Kaffir Wars" (i.e. the Xhosa wars) and the "First Ashanti War." Similarly, over the period 1500 to 1800 in which individual events have been coded by Dincecco and Prado (2012), Clodfelter reports only four events in sub-Saharan Africa: one at Elmina in Ghana, one at Porto Praya in Cape Verde, one at Dakar in Senegal, and one at Saldanha Bay in South Africa. Each of these was part of the War of the American Revolution (1775-1783).

Jaques mentions more conflict events in Africa over the period 1400 to 1800: three in Angola, two in Benin, one in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, two in Ethiopia, one in Ghana, six in Kenya, two in Mali, one in Niger, two in Senegal, one in Somalia, six in South Africa, three in Sudan or South Sudan, two in Tanzania, and one in Zimbabwe. However, almost all of these events are conflicts involving Europeans (e.g. "Portuguese Colonial Wars in West Africa", "Anglo-Dutch War"). The exceptions are the "Second Ethiopian-Ifat War" (1415), the "Wars of the Songhai Empire" (1468, 1493), the "Funj-Nubian War" (1504-1504), the "Adal-Ethiopian War" (1529, 1543) the "Moroccan-Songhai War" (1591) the "Rise of Dahomey" (1724-27), and the "Funj-Ethiopian War" (1730-1755). Similarly, Jacques (2007) only mentions eight intra-African conflicts in the period 1700-1900.[7] Brecke is, then, more comprehensive than the alternative existing datasets that cover Africa around 1807.

We show the conflicts in the data in Figure 2. The area colored red in the map is the region that lies within 1,000 km of the slave-trading ports listed in the *The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database*. The blue area is the region that is further than 1,000 km, but within 2,000 km of the coast. We present summary statistics in Table 1. Two facts are evident from this table. First, the incidence of conflict is greater in the region that is close to slave ports than in the comparison region both before and after 1807. Second, the incidence of conflict after 1807 rises in the region that is close to slave ports, but no comparable increase is evident in the comparison region.

3. RESULTS

3.1. **Main result.** We present our estimates of (1), (2) and (3) in Table 2. Across specifications, the estimated increase in intra-African conflict in the region near slave ports after 1807 ranges from 1.5 to 2. This is a large effect, compared with a pre-1807 annual mean of roughly one conflict per year. Figure 3 depicts these results pictorially, showing both the raw data and our estimates of (3). The increase in conflict after 1807 occurs rapidly, and appears largely as a level effect, rather than as a break in the trend. This break is sustained over time. Our estimates of the post-1807 trend in the affected region after 1807 ($\beta_4 + \beta_5 + \beta_6 + \beta_7$) are positive, except when we use a 40-year window, in which case the post-1807 trend is -0.034. Even if the initial increase were eroded at a rate of 0.034 conflicts per year, it would have taken nearly three decades to erase.

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[7]Funj-Ethiopian War; Mamluk Wars; Rise of Sokoto; Rise of Dahomey; Rise of Shaka Zulu; Sudanese-Ethiopian War; Zulu Civil War; Zulu Wars of Succession.

FIGURE 3. The break around 1807

Lines in this figure report predicted values from estimates of (3). In particular, these correspond to the results presented in column 4 of Table 2. Points correspond to raw data.

3.2. **Robustness.** The discontinuous increase in intra-African conflict after 1807 is robust to several alternative definitions of the two regions, to additional checks for robustness, and to alternative interpretations of the data. We present our main robustness tests in Table 3.

3.2.1. *Definition of proximity to slave ports.* We begin by changing the rules used to divide Africa into two groups. In panel A of Table 3, we define all areas within 1000 km of the coast as part of the affected region. Similarly, in panel B, we take as treated all areas within 500 km of a port. Results are similar if we define only areas within 250 km of a port as "affected" (Appendix Table A3). In panel C, we again take this region as that within 500 km of a port, but we discard the area between 500 and 1000 km from a port from the analysis. In panel D, we define the "near ports" zone as the portions of Africa contained within modern-day countries that housed ports listed in the *Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database*. Similarly, if we divide Africa into four bands, each 500km wide and defined by their distance from the nearest port, we find that the increase in conflict is largely confined to areas within 500km of the coast (Appendix Table A3). In the appendix (Table A4) we remove the comparison zone altogether, and continue to find a discontinuous break around 1807 within the affected zone.

FIGURE 4. Trend breaks in alternate years

This figure reports coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for β_1 from estimates of (2) for alternative selections of the cutoff year that defines $Post_t$.

In panel E of Table 3, we expand our baseline slave trade region so that it includes the belt of matrilineal societies south of the equatorial rainforest. Miller (1996) notes that the slaving frontier of the Angolan societies pushed inwards in the nineteenth century, largely into this zone. Similarly, slaves exported from Mozambique came increasingly from this region. In order to capture this area, we include the ethnic groups in this band between Angola and Mozambique that Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) report as having nonzero slave exports. Results remain similar to our baseline analysis.

3.2.2. *Other robustness.* We conduct a variety of other tests in order to verify the statistical robustness of our results. In panel F of Table 3 we replace our dependent variable with a count of the number of conflict starts in region i in year t. Similarly, in panel G, we replace the dependent variable with a count of the number of conflicts that continue into year t, having started in an earlier year. Both specifications give positive results, suggesting that the impact of 1807 on conflict on both the extensive and intensive margins.

We conduct a placebo analysis that we report in Figure 4. We re-estimate (2) using alternative years as the break-point. As shown in the figure, we only find a statistically significant break if we test for one in a narrow band around 1807.

In the appendix, we report additional statistical checks. We show that normalizing the conflicts by population (Table A5) or by area (Table A6) has little effect on the results.[8] Further, we report Prais–Winsten estimates of our main results in Table A7. We include a lagged dependent variable in Table A8. In Table A9, we exclude observations within 3 years of 1807. In each of these cases, the results are substantively similar to our baseline results. Similarly, controlling for annual average temperature across slave trade ports reported by Mann et al. (1998) does not change the main result (Table A10). Using a tobit estimator rather than ordinary least squares does not change the sign or significance of our results (Table A11).

In addition, we employ alternative strategies to identify the break after 1807. We report results from a Clemente et al. (1998) additive outlier unit root test for the conflicts in our "NearPort" region, for the period extending 40 years on either side of 1807. The test indeed finds that there is a structural break, and selects 1807 as the optimal year. This is reported in Figure A.2, in the appendix. We employ the approach of Abadie et al. (2010) to construct a synthetic control group over the same interval. We divide Africa outside of our near-port region into $5° \times 5°$ squares (see Figure A.3 in the Appendix). We generate weights for the synthetic control group using either their geographic characteristics or the incidence of intra-African conflict before 1807. In neither case does the synthetic control group experience an increase in conflict after 1807 that resembles the increase in the near-port area (see figure A.4 in the Appendix).[9]

Finally, we also test whether redefining the treatment area in an alternative way changes our results. We divide our area of analysis into 5 degree by 5 degree grid squares, and redefine treatment to be (continuous) distance from the coast (normalized by standard deviation of coastal distance). Results are presented in Table A1 and are consistent with our main result. The coefficient on the interaction between distance to the coast and the post-1807 dummy variable is negative and statistically significant, indicating that areas further from the coast experience relatively lower increases in conflict after 1807 compared to areas closer to the coast, and that this pattern was particular to conflicts involving only African parties. In Table A1, we also present results from the same specification but instead dividing the area of analysis into 1 degree by 1 degree grid squares, and those too are consistent with our main results.

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[8]Areas of the NearPort and Comparison regions are computed in ArcMap. Total populations are computed by multiplying these areas by the population densities estimated by averaging over raster cells for population density in 1800 reported by Klein Goldewijk et al. (2011).

[9]In a similar exercise (Table A12), we divide both the near-port and comparison regions into $5° \times 5°$ squares. We run separate regressions a) discarding any regions that experienced no conflict in the century leading up to 1807, and b) including only these regions. We find that conflict after 1807 increased in both samples, and that the increase is larger in areas that had no conflict prior to 1807. Also note that normalizing conflicts by population in each region would have no effect, since it would simply involve dividing the outcome variable by a constant for both regions.

3.3. **Alternative interpretations.** We recognize that, in addition to the Slave Trade Act, suppression included other components such as the American abolition of slave imports from 1808 and prohibitions on British engagement with foreign slave trades after 1806. Here, we are address other possible explanations of the increase in conflict that did not result from suppression.

3.3.1. *Measurement of conflicts.* It is possible that a greater number of documentary sources were produced after 1807 in which intra-African conflicts were recorded. More missionaries and explorers, for example, may have visited Africa. Warneck (1901, p. 188-236), Sundkler and Steed (2000), and Gammell (1854), however, reveal the slow progress of missionaries in West Africa, outside of Sierra Leone, which we discard in Appendix Table A13.[10] Further, we show in the appendix that conflicts do not move further from the coast after 1807, as would be expected if Europeans were recording more wars as they gained better knowledge about the interior (Table A15). Discarding all conflicts within 250 km of the routes of major explorers between 1807 and 1847 mapped by Century Company (1911) does not substantially change the results (Table A16), nor does controlling for the stock of accumulated explorer visits in each region (Table A17).

3.3.2. *Colonialism and European intervention.* Increasing colonial encroachment by Europeans after 1807 may have instigated conflict. We show in Appendix Table A13 that the results are similar if these countries identified by Olsson (2009) as colonized between 1807 and 1840 are discarded from the analysis. In panel H of Table 3 we show further that conflict between Europeans and Africans does not increase discontinuously after 1807. In a similar placebo exercise, we re-define our "near port" and "comparison" groups by their distance to Red Sea, rather than Atlantic slave ports. We show in Table A14 in the Appendix that intra-African conflicts do not increase around the Red Sea after 1807. To show that white expansion in South Africa is not driving the results, we show in panel I of Table 3 that we continue to find an increase in conflict after 1807 when South Africa is excluded from the analysis. Similarly, discarding intra-African conflicts within 500km of a conflict involving non-Africans within the past year gives results similar to the baseline (Table A18), as does simply controlling for the number of non-African conflicts (Table A19).

3.3.3. *Jihad.* The early nineteenth century was a period of jihad throughout West Africa (Curtin, 1971). While some of these movements may have been influenced by changes in the structure of the slave trade, we wish to show that these do not fully account for our main result. To show this, we discard the "Islamic" zone mapped by Bartholomew and Brooke (1918) from our analysis in panel J of Table 3. The results remain similar to our baseline.

3.3.4. *The Napoleonic Wars.* It is unlikely that our results wrongly attribute the effects of the Napoleonic Wars to suppression of the slave trade. In Figures 3 and 4, the break in intra-African conflict is concentrated around 1807, rather than around 1793 or 1815. Results remain similar to

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[10]In addition we show in Figure A.5 that the Google Ngrams Viewer reports no increase in the number of books published after 1807 that mention Africa.

the baseline if we drop from our sample regions in which France was the dominant shipper from the nearest port (Table A20).

4. Mechanisms

4.1. **Overview.** We use Table 4 and Figure 5 to show that both West Africa and Southeast/West-Central Africa experienced increases in violence. The break is larger in Southeast and West-Central Africa, and the difference is statistically significant. Militarization increased across the continent after 1807 (Reid, 2012). Lovejoy (1989) in particular claims that the collapse of the Lunda states, the jihads in West Africa, the activities of the Cokwe, insecurity in Igboland, and enslavement during the Yoruba wars are all examples of violence shaped by the slave trade and its suppression.

The fundamental difference between the two regions is the nature of the demand shift after 1807. Although West African slave exports declined after 1807, West-Central Africa and Southeast Africa expanded their involvement in the transatlantic slave trade. Lovejoy and Richardson (1995a) document that, in West Africa, the real prices of slaves fell due to the suppression of demand. In the rest of Africa, real slave prices rose after 1807, as demand was diverted southwards.

In both regions, suppression upset the status quo. As political actors adjusted to the change, violence was the result. Political authorities in both regions were compelled to adapt to changing circumstances. In both regions, the response included a greater resort to conflict. Where demand for slaves increased, slaves were produced through violence. Where demand fell, existing authorities saw their power threatened and used violence to maintain it.

4.2. **West Africa.** Responses by existing authorities to the disruption of the slave trade increased violence in West Africa. The internal use of slaves in both production and combat increased, and violent enslavement remained worthwhile. Despite the declining external demand for slaves, revenues from their sale remained important in securing imported materials such as horses and guns that states relied on to preserve their power.

4.2.1. *Power of states.* States in Africa differed from those in Europe. Austin (2009) argues that major states did have power structures that were both autonomous from and dominant over kinship systems, but that rather than exercising a "monopoly" of violence, states held only a "comparative advantage" in it. In particular, the literature acknowledges that in an environment of land abundance, in which farmers could easily outmigrate, political organizations in Africa did not exercise exclusive control of territory, but instead secured control of people through loyalty, coercion, and the completion of infrastructure, in particular roads that allowed for access and troop movement (Herbst, 2014).

Many African states relied on the slave trade as a source of power. In Senegambia, for example, Klein (1972, p. 422-3) argues that the slave trade had strengthened political authorities by providing horses and firearms, elevating the warrior and noble classes above the peasantry, and enabling

FIGURE 5. West Africa v. West-Central and Southeastern Africa

- Comparison: West-Central and Southeast Africa
- Comparison: West Africa
- NearPort: West-Central and Southeast Africa
- NearPort: West Africa

The lines in this figure represent predicted values from results presented in column 4 of Table 4. Points correspond to raw data.

rulers to redistribute wealth in order to solve internal tensions and conflicts. Declining Atlantic demand for slaves thus threatened the power of these states. Lovejoy and Richardson (1995b, p. 42) suggest that "[a]ll the states in the immediate interior of the Gold Coast and the Bights of Benin and Biafra appear to have experienced political unrest in the period." In Asante, rulers had used the slave trade to bolster their power by redistributing profits to their loyal supporters (Aidoo, 1977). Throughout West Africa, abolition also restricted the availability of imported currencies such as cowries and copper (Hogendorn and Gemery, 1981).

States were forced to react to these changes. Historical literature on Africa after 1807, for example Lovejoy (2011) or Law (2002), refers to this period as a "crisis of adaptation." The shock of 1807 reduced Asante imports by £200,000 to £400,000 per year. The state needed to reduce consumption to maintain the trade balance, and accomplished this through a combination of force and fear, collecting more taxes and attempting to tighten its monopoly on trade (Whatley, 2011). The collapse of Oyo and subsequent civil war were due in part to the state's loss of revenue from the slave trade (Reid, 2012). Smith (1971, p. 187-8) cites over-dependence of the state on the slave trade and its decline after 1807 as a reason for the collapse of Oyo. Law (1977, p. 255), similarly, argues that a decline in slave exports from the 1790s onwards cut into the revenues of the central

state, which led to greater taxation of the outlying regions that soon rebeled against Oyo rule. Osadolor (2001) provides a similar narrative for the Benin Kingdom. The extraordinary power struggles that plagued the state in the nineteenth century were driven by an economic crisis, which "was the impact of commercial transition, of which the ruling aristocracy attempted to balance economic interests and domestic political constraints through the reorganization of power and the search for a military strategy capable of protecting vital interests" (p. 172).

States' relative loss of power was destabilizing. In Asante, abolition of the export trade made slaveholding affordable for commoners, weakening the relative power of the elite (Whatley, 2011). In Senegambia, Curtin (1981) suggests that the gradual decline of the slave trade and the progressive shift towards the production of cash crops put European goods, most notably guns, in the hands of the peasantry. As authorities became more oppressive due to their declining revenues, this enabled peasants to respond by supporting Muslim clerics that challenged royal authority. Klein (1972, p. 424) takes a similar view, arguing that "the peanut trade put money, and thus guns, in the hands of peasants."

4.2.2. *Internal use of slaves.* Enslavement increased throughout Africa after 1807 (Lovejoy, 1989, p. 390). By the end of the nineteenth century, slaves accounted for between 18% and 35% of the population in several parts of West Africa (Lovejoy, 1989, p. 391-2). Many of these slaves were captured violently. Further, the slave raiding and pillaging that were widespread in the nineteenth century did not require destroying the enemy, and so left open the possibility for later conflict (Klein, 1972, p. 426).

Some historians have argued that the value of slaves in production created an incentive for continued raiding. In Sokoto, for example, slave farms were often acquired through warfare and raiding, and were concentrated in the hands of political leaders (Lovejoy, 1978). However, it is also possible that commodity reduction reduced conflict by lowering the revenue pressures on local states. We test for this in Table 4, using data from the FAO-GAEZ to divide the near-port region into areas suitable for the cultivation of oil crops and those that are not. Palm oil was Africa's most important agricultural export in the period after 1807 (Lynn, 2002). We find that the effect of 1807 on conflict was attenuated in these areas.[11]

More importantly, then, slaves were valuable as soldiers. The infantry of savannah states such as Borno and Bagirmi consisted largely of slaves, while the Oyo cavalry was made up of Nupe, Hausa and Borno slaves (Smith, 1989, p. 43). In Sokoto, the use of slave cavalry provided the Caliph with a regular military contingent, and slaves regularly passed their plunder on to their owners (Smaldone, 1977, p. 135). In Masina, a successful campaign using slaves as soldiers could

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[11]In similar exercises (Tables A22 and A23), we find that the increase in conflict after 1807 was similarly attenuated in regions suitable for cotton production or where pre-colonial states reported by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) were present. Because of the concern that oil-crop suitability differs between West-Africa and the rest of the continent, we also disaggregate these results by West-Africa and West-Central/Southeast Africa (Table A21). This pattern still holds, but the conflict-dampening effects of palm oil are weaker in West Africa.

pay for itself (Johnson, 1976, p. 485). Yorubaland became militarized, and the internal use of slaves was a critical part of this process. Because war provided both slaves and other resources, "economic considerations were as important as the political ones in determining the issues of war and peace" (Awe, 1973). Slaves and other resources were sought in war, kidnapping, and raids (Falola, 1994).

4.2.3. *Access to firearms and horses.* Despite suppression of the slave trade, slaves remained an important means of acquiring firearms and horses. States along the Gold and Slave Coasts were dependent on imported firearms throughout the eighteenth century (Osadolor, 2001; Richards, 1980). Firearms and horses were expensive, and usually imported, either from the coast or over the Sahara (Law, 1976; Smith, 1989). Horses were imported due to their vulnerability to sleeping sicknesses spread by tsetse flies (Smith, 1989, p. 89-90).

Firearms were essential during the nineteenth century, prompting states to continue their efforts at enslavement despite depressed prices (Smith, 1989, p.31). Tellingly, gunpowder shipments to Africa did not fall after 1807 (Whatley, 2011). A nineteenth-century state that could neither acquire firearms or horses risked military defeat, as in the case of Masina (Johnson, 1976, p. 495). Similarly, the use of regular cavalry by jihadists as early as 1817 "entailed a fundamental change in the nature of the insurgents' military organization" (Smaldone, 1977, p. 32). For Sokoto, like earlier Sudanic states, the supply of horses was a key priority. These were acquired through: appropriation as taxation, tribute, and war booty from the vanquished; selective and systematic local breeding, and; interstate and inter-emirate commerce (Smaldone, 1977, p. 48).

4.3. **West-Central and Southeast Africa.** In West-Central and Southeast Africa, the increased demand for slaves was met in part through greater violent enslavement. Increased demand came from greater Portuguese and Brazilian purchases, and expansion of slave trading in the interior for African use. Miller (1996) provides a similar account. Warlords gained political importance, controlling (for example) the trade in ivory. In Gordon's view,

> The British abolition of the slave trade in 1807 intensified the slave trade in the south-central interior, resulting in new forms of violence that eroded the control of Luba and Lunda rulers over trade and agricultural production, widened social cleavages, and empowered gun-wielding warlords. (p. 937)

Although his focus is on the Indian Ocean slave trade later in the nineteenth century, Reid (2007) highlights an analogous role of slave demand in East African conflicts. Traders such as Tippu Tip wrought "violent and rapid economic upheaval" in the northern Lake Tanganyika area, in their attempts secure dominance of the slave and ivory trades (p. 113). States such as Buganda saw the revenues from sale of captives as a benefit of violence, while some non-state groups and communities devoted themselves entirely to raiding others for sale (p.119). In South Africa, Cobbing (1988) argues that slave demand at Delagoa Bay and Griqua slave raids were the main pressures driving

conflict in the region. The Zulu actively raided their neighbors for slaves to meet this demand. Gordon (2009) adds that British curtailment of slave imports into the Cape after 1806 prompted white farmers to turn to the interior for their supplies of slaves. Although this view is controversial, Cobbing's opponents have come to recognize the importance of slave exports in sustaining the Ngoni wars (Eldredge, 1992; Hamilton, 1992; Omer-Cooper, 1993).

5. CONCLUSION

We have shown that British suppression of the slave trade precipitated an increase in the prevalence of intra-African conflict. The effect we find is large; after 1807, the incidence of conflict roughly doubled in regions affected by the slave trade. This pattern is robust to multiple alternative specifications, and cannot be explained by other contemporaneous events, such as colonial intrusion, jihad, or missionary expansion. Of course, there are limitations to our analysis. Because we lack data on belligerents' aims and conflict outcomes, direct evidence on the mechanisms for this increase in violence must come from the secondary literature. 1807 was a unique event. This prevents us from making a more general inference about the relationship of the slave trade and warfare in Africa over the longer run. Despite these concerns, our results have general implications. Both positive and negative shocks, then, play a role in generating conflict. The mechanisms we highlight are an increase in the returns to violence and the challenge of responding to economic change. In both directions, the "crisis of adaptation" spurred conflict. Our study thus contributes to the understanding of historical conflict in Africa. To the extent that historical conflict is associated with present conflict and therefore with worse modern development outcomes, our study contributes to a deeper understanding of the causes of both modern conflict and development.

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Table 1. Summary statistics: Number of African-only conflicts, 1757-1857

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Mean	s.d.	Min	Max	N
Summary statistics					
Comparison/Pre	0.041	0.20	0	1	49
Comparison/Post	0.061	0.32	0	2	49
NearPort/Pre	1.04	0.76	0	4	49
NearPort/Post	3	1.29	1	6	49
T-tests: Equality of means					
NearPort v. Comparison: Pre	8.88				
NearPort v. Comparison: Post	15.48				
Pre v. Post: Comparison	0.38				
Pre v. Post: NearPort	9.15				

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Number of intra-African conflicts					

Table 2. Main Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	*Number of intra-African conflicts*					
	*Specification 1*					
NearPort X Post	1.958***	2.310***	2.206***	2.140***	2.260***	2.124***
	(0.320)	(0.336)	(0.308)	(0.267)	(0.254)	(0.279)
NearPort	1.375***	1.190***	1.154***	1.194***	1.083***	0.976***
	(0.171)	(0.160)	(0.140)	(0.128)	(0.133)	(0.139)
Year	0.022	0.028*	0.019*	0.008	0.009	0.000
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Post	-0.400	-0.626*	-0.434	-0.208	-0.300	-0.008
	(0.320)	(0.359)	(0.279)	(0.219)	(0.235)	(0.285)
	*Specification 2*					
NearPort X Post	1.508*	1.352*	1.800***	2.004***	1.833***	2.150***
	(0.821)	(0.713)	(0.610)	(0.540)	(0.517)	(0.568)
NearPort	1.157***	0.724**	0.955***	1.127***	0.873***	0.988***
	(0.250)	(0.324)	(0.281)	(0.223)	(0.256)	(0.311)
Year	0.007	0.005	0.011	0.006	0.003	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Post	-0.175	-0.148	-0.231	-0.140	-0.087	-0.021
	(0.165)	(0.137)	(0.148)	(0.105)	(0.091)	(0.094)
NearPort X Year	0.029	0.047	0.016	0.004	0.012	-0.001
	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
	*Specification 3*					
NearPort X Post	1.496*	1.369*	1.840***	2.025***	1.863***	2.216***
	(0.850)	(0.734)	(0.623)	(0.546)	(0.513)	(0.523)
NearPort	1.199***	0.645**	0.718***	0.976***	0.626**	0.355
	(0.256)	(0.271)	(0.272)	(0.256)	(0.283)	(0.237)
Year	0.013	0.009	0.006	0.005	0.004	0.000
	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Post	-0.162	-0.139	-0.240	-0.142	-0.086	-0.021
	(0.152)	(0.126)	(0.155)	(0.106)	(0.088)	(0.092)
NearPort X Year	0.024	0.055*	0.035	0.015	0.026*	0.031***
	(0.044)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.010)
(Year-1807) X Post	-0.013	-0.009	0.009	0.002	-0.001	0.001
	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.004)
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	0.012	-0.017	-0.040	-0.021	-0.029	-0.066***
	(0.066)	(0.062)	(0.041)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Observations	62	82	102	122	142	162
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3. Robustness checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	A. NearPort measured by distance from coast					
NearPort X Post	1.833***	2.214***	2.129***	2.075***	2.204***	2.027***
	(0.308)	(0.332)	(0.306)	(0.265)	(0.254)	(0.276)
	B. 500 km cutoff					
NearPort X Post	1.958***	2.324***	1.991***	1.634***	1.488***	1.402***
	(0.472)	(0.444)	(0.396)	(0.357)	(0.321)	(0.309)
	C. 500 km cutoff without 500-1000km zone					
NearPort X Post	1.958***	2.317***	2.098***	1.887***	1.874***	1.763***
	(0.352)	(0.344)	(0.316)	(0.292)	(0.264)	(0.254)
	D. NearPort measured by country having slave port					
NearPort X Post	0.425	0.860**	0.922***	0.503	0.541*	0.596*
	(0.348)	(0.339)	(0.333)	(0.323)	(0.306)	(0.307)
	E. Including the matrilineal belt as "NearPort"					
NearPort X Post	1.958***	2.310***	2.286***	2.206***	2.317***	2.174***
	(0.320)	(0.336)	(0.306)	(0.266)	(0.254)	(0.280)
	F. Conflict starts					
NearPort X Post	0.825**	0.869***	0.775***	0.613**	0.554**	0.534**
	(0.375)	(0.305)	(0.279)	(0.261)	(0.239)	(0.217)
	G. Conflict continuations					
NearPort X Post	1.133***	1.440***	1.431***	1.527***	1.706***	1.591***
	(0.221)	(0.233)	(0.223)	(0.201)	(0.184)	(0.201)
	H. Number of non-African conflicts as dependent variable					
NearPort X Post	0.183	0.043	0.026	0.287	0.244	0.462
	(0.367)	(0.322)	(0.305)	(0.344)	(0.311)	(0.293)
	I. Excluding South Africa					
NearPort X Post	0.683**	1.055***	1.043***	1.138***	1.372***	1.348***
	(0.291)	(0.309)	(0.272)	(0.241)	(0.235)	(0.236)
	J. Excluding Islamic Regions					
NearPort X Post	1.833***	2.271***	2.222***	2.156***	2.303***	2.139***
	(0.334)	(0.364)	(0.335)	(0.304)	(0.278)	(0.284)
Observations	62	82	102	122	142	162
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors. Other Comparisons, not reported, are NearPort, Year, and Post.

Table 4. Mechanisms

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
NearPort X Post X West Africa	0.550*	0.705**	0.643***	0.638***	0.744***	0.774***
	(0.331)	(0.285)	(0.246)	(0.207)	(0.195)	(0.186)
NearPort X Post X SEA/SWA	1.408***	1.605***	1.563***	1.502***	1.516***	1.351***
	(0.245)	(0.306)	(0.271)	(0.239)	(0.214)	(0.224)
P-Value	0.040	0.033	0.013	0.007	0.008	0.048
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
NearPort X Post X Oil suitable	0.271	0.302*	0.363**	0.335**	0.344***	0.302***
	(0.212)	(0.176)	(0.156)	(0.135)	(0.123)	(0.111)
NearPort X Post X Oil unsuitable	1.688***	2.007***	1.843***	1.804***	1.915***	1.823***
	(0.310)	(0.299)	(0.289)	(0.247)	(0.229)	(0.253)
P-Value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Observations	124	164	204	244	284	324
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors. Other Comparisons, not reported, are NearPort X Group 1, NearPort X Group 2, Group 1, Group 2, Year, and Post.

APPENDIX A. NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FIGURE A.1. Slave exports and distance from coast

Notes: This figure plots the cumulative percentage of all exports in the Indian Ocean and Atlantic slave trades, reported in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), against the distance of each ethnic group centroid from the coast.

FIGURE A.2. Clemente-Montañés-Reyes Unit Root Test

This graph reports the t-statistic resulting from a test for a breakpoint in the year indicated on the x-axis.

FIGURE A.3. Regions for synthetic control analysis

FIGURE A.4. Results of synthetic control analysis

This figure reports the results of a synthetic control analysis using the method of Abadie et al. (2010). The weights for the "geographic predictors" synthetic control group are constructed using population density in 1700, malaria suitability, ruggedness, humidity, rainfall, temperature, constraints on agriculture, and elevation. a The weights for the "conflict predictors" synthetic control group are constructed using the number of intra-African conflicts every five years from 1775 to 1805.

FIGURE A.5. Interest in Africa over time

The n-gram score is the fraction of books in English reported by the Google Ngrams Viewer to contain the word
"Africa".

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Using 1 degree by 1 degree grid squares as unit of analysis						
Number of intra-African conflicts						
Treatment X Post	-0.0168*	-0.0185**	-0.0152*	-0.0139*	-0.0138*	-0.0128*
	(0.00902)	(0.00872)	(0.00790)	(0.00726)	(0.00706)	(0.00675)
Number of non intra-African conflicts						
Treatment X Post	-0.00364	-0.00345	-0.00368	-0.00416	-0.00464	-0.00685
	(0.00511)	(0.00457)	(0.00398)	(0.00402)	(0.00401)	(0.00423)
Observations	4,216	5,576	6,936	8,296	9,656	11,016
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40
Using 5 degree by 5 degree grid squares as unit of analysis						
Number of intra-African conflicts						
Treatment X Post	-0.0322*	-0.0363**	-0.0308*	-0.0286*	-0.0287*	-0.0264*
	(0.0183)	(0.0176)	(0.0162)	(0.0153)	(0.0150)	(0.0143)
Number of non intra-African conflicts						
Treatment X Post	-0.00846	-0.00821	-0.00889	-0.0103	-0.0112	-0.0157*
	(0.0111)	(0.00930)	(0.00825)	(0.00762)	(0.00799)	(0.00848)
Observations	2,015	2,665	3,315	3,965	4,615	5,265
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with standard errors clustered at the grid point level in parentheses.

<div align="center">Table A2. Bootstrapped Standard Errors</div>

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
NearPort X Post	1.958***	2.310***	2.206***	2.140***	2.260***	2.124***
	(0.307)	(0.288)	(0.291)	(0.243)	(0.229)	(0.245)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	N	N	N	N	N	N
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.508**	1.352**	1.800***	2.004***	1.833***	2.150***
	(0.655)	(0.613)	(0.540)	(0.463)	(0.456)	(0.484)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.496**	1.369**	1.840***	2.025***	1.863***	2.216***
	(0.727)	(0.640)	(0.578)	(0.490)	(0.448)	(0.461)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	62	82	102	122	142	162
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with standard errors estimated through 999 bootstrap replications.

Table A3. Alternative NearPort Definitions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	A. NearPort measured as 250 km from coast					
NearPort X Post	1.692***	2.124***	1.591***	1.234***	1.144***	1.150***
	(0.483)	(0.464)	(0.441)	(0.391)	(0.346)	(0.328)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	N	N	N	N	N	N
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
Observations	62	82	102	122	142	162
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40
	B. NearPort measured using distance bands					
0 to 500 Km X Post	1.727***	1.980***	1.902***	1.801***	1.738***	1.760***
	(0.432)	(0.412)	(0.363)	(0.330)	(0.300)	(0.284)
500 to 1000 Km X Post	-0.169	-0.296	-0.130	0.132	0.221	0.356
	(0.341)	(0.321)	(0.290)	(0.262)	(0.242)	(0.235)
1000 to 1500 Km X Post	-0.169	-0.289	-0.198	-0.088	-0.136	0.020
	(0.228)	(0.202)	(0.166)	(0.143)	(0.131)	(0.134)
1500 to 2000 Km X Post	-0.231	-0.337	-0.236	-0.120	-0.164	-0.028
	(0.240)	(0.210)	(0.172)	(0.149)	(0.136)	(0.139)
Distance Band Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	124	164	204	244	284	324
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Table A4. Removing the Comparison group					
			Number of intra-African conflicts			
Post	1.333	1.205*	1.569**	1.865***	1.746***	2.129***
	(0.804)	(0.699)	(0.592)	(0.530)	(0.509)	(0.560)
Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
Post	1.334	1.231*	1.601**	1.884***	1.776***	2.194***
	(0.837)	(0.723)	(0.603)	(0.536)	(0.506)	(0.515)
Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	31	41	51	61	71	81
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.

Table A5. Normalize by population

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of intra-African conflicts per million persons					
NearPort X Post	0.037***	0.043***	0.039***	0.038***	0.040***	0.038***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	N	N	N	N	N	N
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	0.033*	0.029**	0.040***	0.041***	0.036***	0.040***
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	0.032*	0.029**	0.041***	0.041***	0.036***	0.041***
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	62	82	102	122	142	162
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Table A6. Normalize by area					
	Number of intra-African conflicts per million square km					
NearPort X Post	0.146***	0.171***	0.162***	0.157***	0.166***	0.157***
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.021)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	N	N	N	N	N	N
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	0.115*	0.103*	0.137***	0.151***	0.137***	0.159***
	(0.061)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.042)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	0.114*	0.104*	0.141***	0.152***	0.139***	0.164***
	(0.063)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.039)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	62	82	102	122	142	162
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.

Table A7. Prais-Winsten Estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
NearPort X Post	1.950***	2.094***	2.169***	2.108***	2.201***	2.003***
	(0.293)	(0.365)	(0.314)	(0.274)	(0.260)	(0.332)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	N	N	N	N	N	N
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.574**	1.181*	1.693***	1.898***	1.826***	1.820***
	(0.604)	(0.688)	(0.626)	(0.547)	(0.516)	(0.640)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.566**	1.183*	1.726***	1.917***	1.850***	1.997***
	(0.616)	(0.696)	(0.621)	(0.546)	(0.507)	(0.550)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	60	80	100	120	140	160
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using Prais-Winsten estimation and allowing errors to follow an AR(1) structure.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Table A8. Including lag intra-African conflicts					
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
NearPort X Post	1.814***	1.508***	1.874***	1.789***	1.910***	1.359***
	(0.522)	(0.516)	(0.445)	(0.387)	(0.376)	(0.425)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	N	N	N	N	N	N
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.418	1.048	1.519**	1.654***	1.634***	1.379**
	(0.882)	(0.676)	(0.639)	(0.604)	(0.534)	(0.529)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.415	1.048	1.551**	1.674***	1.668***	1.605***
	(0.898)	(0.678)	(0.648)	(0.609)	(0.524)	(0.509)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	60	80	100	120	140	160
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
NearPort X Post	2.083***	2.471***	2.318***	2.222***	2.344***	2.189***
	(0.307)	(0.352)	(0.320)	(0.271)	(0.259)	(0.286)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	N	N	N	N	N	N
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	2.117	1.529	2.228***	2.430***	2.097***	2.518***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.705)	(0.565)	(0.570)	(0.639)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	2.117*	1.529	2.228***	2.430	2.097***	2.518***
	(1.158)	(0.000)	(0.705)	(0.000)	(0.556)	(0.559)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	48	68	88	108	128	148
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Table A9. Removing observations within 3 years of 1807

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.

	Table A10. Control for temperature					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
NearPort X Post	1.958***	2.310***	2.206***	2.140***	2.260***	2.124***
	(0.320)	(0.335)	(0.306)	(0.264)	(0.253)	(0.279)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	N	N	N	N	N	N
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.508*	1.352*	1.800***	2.004***	1.833***	2.150***
	(0.816)	(0.710)	(0.603)	(0.530)	(0.513)	(0.565)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.496*	1.369*	1.840***	2.025***	1.863***	2.216***
	(0.838)	(0.724)	(0.614)	(0.536)	(0.509)	(0.524)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	62	82	102	122	142	162
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.

Table A.11 Tobit

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
NearPort X Post	5.908***	6.999***	2.113***	2.034***	2.209***	2.536***
	(0.120)	(0.127)	(0.791)	(0.727)	(0.759)	(0.751)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	N	N	N	N	N	N
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	7.911***	9.371***	7.183***	4.432***	3.476**	2.469*
	(0.132)	(0.141)	(2.195)	(1.431)	(1.542)	(1.364)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	5.745***	6.165***	8.512**	4.242***	3.478***	2.558**
	(0.146)	(0.165)	(3.408)	(1.009)	(1.031)	(1.098)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	62	82	102	122	142	162
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using a tobit, with robust standard errors.

Table A12. 5⁰ x 5⁰ cells by pre-1807 conflict

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
	Cells with pre-1807 conflict					
NearPort X Post	0.621**	0.857***	0.765***	0.739***	0.859***	0.899***
	(0.299)	(0.269)	(0.242)	(0.205)	(0.197)	(0.190)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	N	N	N	N	N	N
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
	Cells with no pre-1807 conflict					
NearPort X Post	1.337***	1.452***	1.442***	1.401***	1.401***	1.226***
	(0.199)	(0.224)	(0.212)	(0.189)	(0.167)	(0.181)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	N	N	N	N	N	N
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
Observations	62	82	102	122	142	162
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.

Table A13. Removing countries colonized between 1807 and 1840

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
NearPort X Post	2.146***	2.452***	2.242***	2.003***	2.029***	1.923***
	(0.336)	(0.341)	(0.315)	(0.294)	(0.275)	(0.277)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	N	N	N	N	N	N
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.808**	1.667**	2.228***	2.561***	2.343***	2.444***
	(0.885)	(0.746)	(0.661)	(0.612)	(0.574)	(0.587)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.783*	1.668**	2.272***	2.607***	2.397***	2.520***
	(0.910)	(0.770)	(0.667)	(0.608)	(0.552)	(0.528)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	62	82	102	122	142	162
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.

Table A14. Conflicts near Red Sea Ports as a Placebo

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
NearPort X Post	0.133	-0.000	-0.002	-0.168	-0.060	-0.051
	(0.140)	(0.142)	(0.148)	(0.157)	(0.152)	(0.139)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	N	N	N	N	N	N
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	-0.142	0.086	0.068	0.303	-0.010	-0.033
	(0.211)	(0.126)	(0.196)	(0.228)	(0.230)	(0.196)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	-0.181	0.095	0.087	0.342**	0.015	-0.026
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.138)	(0.160)	(0.197)	(0.179)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	62	82	102	122	142	162
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table A15. Wars do not move further from the coast

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Average distance of wars from the coast, by year					
Panel A. NearPort Group						
Post	25.899	-126.657	-144.845	-191.214**	-149.128*	-134.696*
	(82.822)	(99.514)	(93.548)	(90.718)	(85.910)	(79.093)
Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
Post	23.156	-111.727	-133.816	-184.339**	-146.240*	-132.281*
	(79.746)	(92.216)	(89.377)	(87.658)	(83.385)	(74.721)
Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Panel B. NearPort and Comparison Groups						
Post	25.899	-126.657	-157.248	-216.851**	-161.537*	-134.948*
	(82.822)	(99.514)	(94.915)	(92.764)	(87.004)	(78.832)
Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
Post	23.156	-111.727	-147.925	-213.264**	-159.899*	-132.961*
	(79.746)	(92.216)	(92.512)	(91.791)	(85.694)	(75.785)
Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	31	41	51	61	70	79
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.

Table A16. Removing conflicts within 250km of an explorer route

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
NearPort X Post	1.892***	2.110***	1.966***	1.906***	2.002***	1.899***
	(0.302)	(0.352)	(0.312)	(0.265)	(0.245)	(0.261)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	N	N	N	N	N	N
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.317*	1.381*	1.809***	1.942***	1.762***	1.985***
	(0.749)	(0.696)	(0.581)	(0.518)	(0.501)	(0.549)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.287*	1.422**	1.870***	1.975***	1.802***	2.054***
	(0.768)	(0.709)	(0.584)	(0.518)	(0.481)	(0.490)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	62	82	102	122	142	162
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
				Table A17. Control for stock of explorer visits		

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
NearPort X Post	1.950***	2.201***	2.103***	2.066***	2.161***	1.934***
	(0.326)	(0.342)	(0.315)	(0.278)	(0.270)	(0.304)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	N	N	N	N	N	N
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.519*	1.430**	1.854***	2.029***	1.847***	2.170***
	(0.816)	(0.706)	(0.607)	(0.539)	(0.517)	(0.558)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.515*	1.506**	1.939***	2.069***	1.880***	2.236***
	(0.847)	(0.735)	(0.622)	(0.544)	(0.516)	(0.518)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	62	82	102	122	142	162
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	*Number of intra-African conflicts*					

Table A18. Discard conflicts within 500km of a non-African conflict

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
NearPort X Post	1.887***	2.207***	2.125***	2.039***	2.144***	2.024***
	(0.305)	(0.311)	(0.287)	(0.251)	(0.236)	(0.260)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	N	N	N	N	N	N
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.275	1.214*	1.649***	1.916***	1.763***	2.048***
	(0.791)	(0.685)	(0.589)	(0.523)	(0.494)	(0.542)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.282	1.239*	1.686***	1.937***	1.794***	2.111***
	(0.814)	(0.695)	(0.598)	(0.525)	(0.484)	(0.494)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	62	82	102	122	142	162
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.

Table A19. Control for conflicts within 500km of a non-African conflict

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
NearPort X Post	1.931***	2.299***	2.201***	2.134***	2.249***	2.167***
	(0.310)	(0.319)	(0.295)	(0.271)	(0.255)	(0.273)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	N	N	N	N	N	N
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.444*	1.209*	1.735***	2.006***	1.832***	2.125***
	(0.777)	(0.655)	(0.575)	(0.539)	(0.515)	(0.563)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.448*	1.219*	1.764***	2.029***	1.859***	2.210***
	(0.777)	(0.616)	(0.576)	(0.542)	(0.503)	(0.525)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	62	82	102	122	142	162
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.

Table A20. Discard conflicts closest to French-dominated ports

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
NearPort X Post	1.821***	2.157***	2.198***	2.296***	2.422***	2.316***
	(0.332)	(0.324)	(0.303)	(0.264)	(0.246)	(0.272)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	N	N	N	N	N	N
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.308	1.171	1.382**	1.454***	1.470***	1.857***
	(0.877)	(0.741)	(0.633)	(0.551)	(0.519)	(0.577)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	N	N	N	N	N	N
NearPort X Post	1.264	1.169	1.441**	1.502***	1.510***	1.930***
	(0.903)	(0.767)	(0.643)	(0.554)	(0.517)	(0.531)
NearPort, Post, Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
(Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	62	82	102	122	142	162
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Table A21. Mitigating effects of palm oil suitability by region					
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
West Africa X NearPort X Oil Suit. X Post	1.296***	1.041***	0.710**	0.617**	0.450*	0.256
	(0.393)	(0.381)	(0.337)	(0.293)	(0.268)	(0.269)
West Africa X NearPort X Oil Suit.	-1.157***	-1.055***	-0.965***	-1.021***	-0.946***	-0.797***
	(0.184)	(0.168)	(0.149)	(0.132)	(0.133)	(0.137)
West Africa X NearPort X Post	-1.124***	-0.982***	-0.837***	-0.771***	-0.628***	-0.438*
	(0.322)	(0.332)	(0.289)	(0.254)	(0.235)	(0.240)
NearPort X Oil Suit. X Post	-1.341***	-1.336***	-1.079***	-1.041***	-0.999***	-0.885***
	(0.222)	(0.253)	(0.238)	(0.208)	(0.187)	(0.189)
West Africa X NearPort	1.225***	1.088***	1.027***	1.081***	0.991***	0.880***
	(0.164)	(0.156)	(0.134)	(0.121)	(0.127)	(0.130)
West Africa X Oil Suit.	-0.006	0.014	0.015	0.004	0.010	-0.010
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
West Africa X Post	-0.035	-0.057	-0.070*	-0.044	-0.049*	-0.017
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.028)
NearPort X Oil Suit.	-0.025	-0.007	-0.011	-0.015	-0.009	-0.023*
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)
NearPort X Post	1.412***	1.472***	1.343***	1.303***	1.274***	1.145***
	(0.206)	(0.232)	(0.208)	(0.183)	(0.162)	(0.168)
Oil Suit. X Post	-0.035	-0.057	-0.070*	-0.044	-0.049*	-0.017
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.028)
Year	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	248	328	408	488	568	648
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table A22. Cotton Suitability

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
Post X NearPort X Cotton Suitable	0.875***	0.855***	0.763***	0.669***	0.630***	0.576***
	(0.281)	(0.258)	(0.222)	(0.202)	(0.182)	(0.165)
Post X NearPort X Cotton Unsuitable	1.083***	1.455***	1.443***	1.471***	1.629***	1.548***
	(0.294)	(0.275)	(0.245)	(0.216)	(0.207)	(0.226)
Post X Cotton Suitable	0.062	0.048	0.118	0.099	-0.108*	0.050
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.150)	(0.136)	(0.064)	(0.145)
Post X Cotton Unsuitable	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.193	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.160)	(0.138)	(0.000)	(0.143)
NearPort X Cotton Suitable	0.125	0.095	0.077	0.065	0.056	0.049
	(0.094)	(0.078)	(0.058)	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.046)
NearPort X Cotton Unsuitable	1.250***	1.095***	1.077***	1.129***	1.028***	0.927***
	(0.176)	(0.160)	(0.139)	(0.127)	(0.133)	(0.139)
Cotton Suitable	-0.062	-0.048	-0.038	-0.032	-0.028	0.000
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.076)	(0.031)	(0.065)	(0.075)
Post	-0.231	-0.337*	-0.276	-0.153	0.000	-0.029
	(0.204)	(0.195)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.136)	(0.000)
Year	0.011	0.014	0.009	0.004	0.005	0.000
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Observations	124	164	204	244	284	324
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.

	Table A23. Centralization					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of intra-African conflicts					
Post X NearPort X No State	1.350***	1.505***	1.402***	1.270***	1.342***	1.298***
	(0.267)	(0.244)	(0.221)	(0.197)	(0.192)	(0.191)
Post X NearPort X State	0.346*	0.307*	0.365**	0.470***	0.517***	0.452***
	(0.188)	(0.158)	(0.153)	(0.135)	(0.122)	(0.118)
Post X No State	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.103**	0.000
	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.116)	(0.095)	(0.042)	(0.104)
Post X State	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.103	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.116)	(0.095)	(0.000)	(0.104)
NearPort X No State	1.250***	1.095***	1.038***	1.097***	0.972***	0.902***
	(0.153)	(0.149)	(0.126)	(0.116)	(0.123)	(0.121)
NearPort X State	0.188*	0.143*	0.115*	0.097	0.111**	0.098*
	(0.104)	(0.082)	(0.067)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.051)
No State	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.058)	(0.009)	(0.048)	(0.050)
Post	-0.141	-0.145	-0.126	-0.051	0.000	0.004
	(0.148)	(0.136)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.099)	(0.000)
Year	0.009	0.007	0.007	0.003	0.004	0.001
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	124	164	204	244	284	324
Window	15	20	25	30	35	40

Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.