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Forget September 11

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September 11 has been etched on our memories. This article explores the uses and problems of memory in relation to responses to September 11, focusing largely on material from the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany as illustration, and argues that we might be better off forgetting September 11. The exhortation to remember is used to justify responding militarily abroad and, significantly, curtailing civil liberties at home. Criticism of these policies is difficult due to the moral cause established by the dead. However, the problematic of memory destabilises the possibility of straightforward knowledge and this is important for analysing the construction of a particular 'we' through distinguishing between 'us' and 'them' and the construction of September 11 as something exceptional. These constructions work together not only to make possible responses which are mere technical fixes, but also to undermine what may be said to constitute the identity of the West, other than as an entity under attack. This precludes the contemplation of alternative responses to the events which would take into account our responsibility towards others and the political power of renouncing a memory. It is in addressing the problematic of memory and, as a result, in considering such alternatives that we may find the affirmation of our identity that we currently seem to be unable to find. What is at stake are fundamental questions of politics, about who we are, about how to address our inevitable vulnerability and our responsibility towards others.

The footage of the two planes crashing, on September 11 2001, into the towers of the World Trade Center has been broadcast over and over again.¹ We cannot forget it. And just in case we should, there are websites which allow us to replay the footage as shown on different television stations across the globe.² September 11 has been etched on our memories not just because it can be seen as a momentous event: The superpower attacked on its very own territory,³ caught off guard, humiliated. A symbol of global capitalism devastated. Nearly 3,000 dead, innocent victims of a terrorist attack. Perhaps (although only perhaps) this was in some way new, as both US President George W. Bush and Noam Chomsky argue in what must be a rare instance of agreement.⁴ That isn't, however, why we remember. We remember not (only) the interpretation of the event. We remember the picture. The planes hitting the towers, the burst of fire – and then the collapse. This was a tragic event for those whose loved ones died. But at the same time, it was a spectacle. The “greatest work of art ever”, as composer Karlheinz Stockhausen controversially, and apparently spontaneously, put it.⁵

We might not agree with this particular assessment, but some certainly argue that whoever masterminded this (and let's just say for the moment that it was Osama Bin Laden) wanted you to see it. New York is not only a symbol of the American way of life, it is also a media metropolis with an exceptionally developed communication infrastructure and a large number of journalists. Due to the time lapse between the two aircraft hitting the two different towers of the World Trade Center TV crews were sure to be on site for the second, even had the first impact been missed.⁶ However, the interval between the first and the second collision was small and may rather have been the result of the difficulty of ensuring the simultaneity that was crucial for success; for any longer interval between the two attacks would have increased the likelihood that the aircraft would have been shot down before impact. Yet professor of media studies Joan Deppa claims: “It was meant to be right before our eyes.”⁷ The event, in this interpretation, was designed to publicly humiliate the superpower, to impress, to show off and, accordingly, those who staged it would certainly not want you to forget.

This view has to be voiced with some caution. We know very little about the plans and aims of the terrorists. Imputing their motives and intentions from how we may have experienced the events of that day is a dangerous move, and one which I will indeed criticise later in this article. Nevertheless, wherever you may have been that day, you probably did see the impact of the two aircraft on the towers of the World Trade Center. And if you didn't see it then, you certainly have seen it by now. You, very likely, cannot forget and we may suspect, although we certainly don't know, that those behind the events don't want you to.

Perhaps we can say with more confidence that President Bush does not want you to forget. He is convinced that you do, and will, remember: "Each of us will remember what happened that day, and to whom it happened. We'll remember the moment the news came – where we were and what we were doing. Some will remember the image of a fire, or a story of rescue. Some will carry memories of a face and a voice gone forever."⁸ Despite this confidence that you are unable to forget, he will not stop reminding you. He needs you to remember. Remember, will you, that everything our governments are doing in the so-called war against terrorism (or, alternatively, of course, against evil) is a response to the events of September 11. Killing civilians in Afghanistan, arguably violating the human rights of those detained by US forces,⁹ curbing our civil liberties,¹⁰ it's all justified because of the events of September 11. Remember. You saw it. Thousands dead. We owe it to their memory, they say, to fight back, to make sure this doesn't happen again. As Bush put it: "When we fight terror, we fight tyranny; and so we remember."¹¹ And: "We will remember the dead and what we owe them"¹², "we will always honor their memory."¹³

So there is one thing Osama Bin Laden and President Bush may agree on: We must remember September 11; for both can be seen to have an interest in our memory of the events. Bin Laden might wish us to remember what his network is able to do, in other words, to grasp his power, so that we are susceptible to fear. Bush, on the other hand, can use our memory to justify his war against terrorism, and to ensure that we accept this reaction. This 'agreement' between Bin Laden and Bush is as good a reason as any to be suspicious. My

concern here is, however, with Bush or rather with the Western reaction and the political deployment of memory involved in it, not least because much of what we may wish to say about the terrorists is necessarily based on our interpretation, rather than theirs. This article therefore explores the uses and problems of memory in relation to responses to the events of September 11, focusing largely on material from the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany as illustration. The ever-present exhortation to remember is used, I claim, as justification for both a military response abroad and for curtailing civil liberties at home. However, I argue that, as long as the questions raised by this memory are not posed, we might in fact be better off forgetting September 11.

The Uses of Memory

Bush's promise to remember is at the same time a justification for his course of action: "I will not forget this wound to our country or those who inflicted it. I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people."¹⁴ Thus, the reaction not only of the US administration, but also of other 'Western' governments, has arguably relied on our memory of the events of September 11. In the dominant story, this is the time when the West must provide its own security.¹⁵ This is the time to fight terrorism. The measures proposed and implemented to this end include the preparation of some form of judicial response, but I am here most interested in war on the one hand and increasing surveillance at home and abroad on the other.

The military campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan was in some sense the most visible response to the events of September 11. According to Bush, these "carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime."¹⁶ Thus, war in Afghanistan is to disable the terrorist network which had, with its attack on the World Trade Center, declared war on the US. I will return later to the problem that the events are designated by the US both as acts of war *and* as acts of terror. At this point, what I am concerned with is that the identification of the events of September 11 as "an act of war"¹⁷ provides the basis for the

United States' own military response. The broader logic behind this was described by one commentator, Michele Zanini, as follows: "if they have a war paradigm, then probably the US should have one too. If they're fighting a war with us, we should be fighting a war with them."¹⁸ Thus, the US reasons, having itself decided that the other is waging war, that it is acting in self-defence, with the aim of providing its own security, against a *de facto* declaration of war. The need to react militarily is at the same time, as we have just seen, supported by the memory of the dead. As Bush had also earlier put it: "None of us will ever forget this day. Yet, we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in the world."¹⁹

However, the question was from the beginning whether a military campaign would actually be able to achieve the proposed aim of security. We are all too aware of the attendant problems of defining 'security', if perhaps less of the issue of whether we should, or do, want security.²⁰ Clearly, however, September 11 has been experienced as a threat by many in the West, more precisely as a threat to their security. Jenny Edkins points out that one of the reasons why the events were experienced as significant by those not directly involved "was the way in which the feeling of vulnerability that they brought extended by easy analogy outwards in circles to many other previously 'safe' places."²¹ And Heribert Prantl claims that "people's basic trust in the security within the state [...] is severely shaken."²² Thus, the label that was attached by much of the media to the site of one of the attacks is as inappropriate as it is telling.²³ The term 'ground zero' normally refers to the "point on the surface of land vertically below or above the center of a burst of a nuclear weapon".²⁴ Notwithstanding the devastation on the site of the World Trade Center, the implicit comparison with a nuclear attack is deeply problematic. On the other hand, the parallel created, even if perhaps unwittingly, with Hiroshima may indicate the extent to which trust in security was shattered.

This apparentness of our vulnerability, of the impossibility of security was what struck me most on September 11. And yet this undeniable experience of vulnerability has not led

us, as it might have done, to find the best way of living with it – to heed, in other words, the Realist exhortation to work with, rather than against, the forces existing in politics²⁵ - but to a strong desire to overturn its inevitability and thus to search even more aggressively for an elusive security. Such increased desire for security was in evidence not only in the United States. In Germany, for example, according to a poll taken just after September 11, 95 per cent of the population are in favour of stricter security controls in airports and on train stations, 80 per cent support re-introducing border controls and 67 per cent video surveillance of streets and squares.²⁶ The latter is particularly stunning in view of the abuse of power through state surveillance both in the Third Reich and in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Suddenly, talk of a security apparatus which would observe ordinary citizens has become possible again.²⁷ *Rasterfahndung*, that is, profiling or a computer-aided search for those with similar characteristics as suspected terrorists, which was extremely controversial in the 1970s fight against the Red Army Faction, has been rediscovered.²⁸

Minister of the Interior Otto Schily believes that “the desire for security has increased”. While in the 1980s there were demonstrations against *Rasterfahndung* and even the census, in his view some today regard CCTV surveillance in train stations as something positive.²⁹ According to Schily, data protection is important, “but it must not hinder the fight against criminality.”³⁰ Therefore he also proposed - to list but a few of the measures - to enter finger prints into the passport of each citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany; to legally bind banks to give information to the intelligence services; to permit different branches of police and intelligence services to systematically compare data; to empower the Federal Criminal Office to investigate even where there is no concrete evidence to support the suspicion that a crime has been committed; and to force telecommunication companies to save data on their customers’ connections for six months.³¹

The far reaching ‘anti-terror’ legislation following on from these proposals was pushed through in unprecedented haste. The second set of laws was first discussed in the *Bundestag* on 15 November 2001 and finally approved on 20 December 2001. Prantl claims

that few members of parliament actually knew what they were deciding about.³² However, a range of the powers which were to be given to various state agencies through this new *Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus* (Law for the Purpose of Fighting International Terrorism) had to be removed before the law could be passed due to opposition both from within the governing coalition and the opposition. The decision over the inclusion of fingerprints and other biometric data in identity documents was postponed.³³ Thus the move to curtail civil liberties in Germany has been criticised,³⁴ even if the reactions have been nowhere near as strong as the serious political clashes over the laws to fight the internal terrorism of the 1970s.³⁵

In the final parliamentary debate over the anti-terrorism laws, Volker Beck of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen pointed out that “we must not permit that, because of the terror attacks, we ourselves become the instrument for abolishing Rechtsstaatlichkeit and freedom in our societies.”³⁶ In a similar vein, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer asserted that the “right and the duty to fight terrorism” must be balanced by “the right and the duty to preserve human rights.”³⁷ Prantl, however, diagnoses a fundamental move from *Rechtsstaat* to *Präventionsstaat*, that is, from a state based on the rule of law to one based on the idea of prevention. This is crucial as it means a completely new quality of intrusion into the individual’s privacy by the state in the name of preventing crime and terrorism.³⁸ The citizen can no longer keep the state at a distance through legal behaviour. According to Prantl, such intrusive policing might lead to more security, but it certainly leads to less and less freedom.³⁹ What is more, the terrorists are thereby achieving their aims in a subtle way, by “poisoning the spirit of the laws.”⁴⁰ In other words, our fear leads us to dismantle the very way of life we claim to be defending. The freedoms of life in Western liberal democracies are at issue not so much, or at least not only, in the fight carried to Afghanistan and possibly Iraq, but in the way in which we cope with the presence of the diffuse threat of terrorism in our own societies. The danger that we would undermine our very own values in the quest for ever more security was also observed by President Johannes Rau who said: “Everyday life cannot be protected, and a totally protected everyday life would not be a free life any more.”⁴¹

Thus the desire for security, unsurprisingly, turns out to be counterproductive, and this has not gone unnoticed. However, saying so has become more difficult due to the requirement of remembering and showing proper respect for the dead. The dead, and their innocence, must always be considered. The requirement of 'appropriate' memory, piety even, thus underscores the already typically compelling aim of security. As Simon Schama claims in *The Guardian*, "the shroud of mass reverence which enveloped everyone and everything after 9/11 [...] has succeeded in making secular debate about liberty into an act of indecency, disrespectful of the dead and disloyal to the flag."⁴² Schama points to the religiosity of US politics as well as to the patriotism unleashed after September 11. Interestingly, the victims, and especially the New York fire fighters, were also referred to as 'heroes'. Edkins points out that those "who died in the attacks are reinscribed as heroes who sacrificed their lives."⁴³ This is reflected, for example, in the remarks of New York Archbishop Edward Egan who, at a service on the Sunday following September 11, referred to "what we have come to call Ground Zero, but which I call Ground Hero."⁴⁴ The victims' supposed heroism gives grounds for the measures proposed, and, crucially, for the making of further heroes. As Bush said in a speech to US armed forces: "Now your calling has come. Each one of you is commissioned by history to face freedom's enemies."⁴⁵

Of course, if we follow Rau's and Prantl's argument, our own states, proposing ever more surveillance of their citizens in a bid to stop terrorist attacks before they happen, increasingly become a threat to the very freedom they claim to defend. Moreover, the measures proposed for the provision of security not only have counterproductive elements; it is also not clear that they are either in tune with the law,⁴⁶ or indeed that they would have been appropriate tools for preventing such terrorist attacks. Some measures proposed, and in some cases implemented, as a 'reaction' to September 11, would not actually have helped stop the event. The inclusion of biometrical data into identity documents is a case in point, as all of the hijackers had valid identity documents of their own. We have to ask ourselves how the swift implementation of such measures, despite questions over their legality, effectiveness and desirability, became possible in the Western democracies. It seems

surprising that in the FRG, with its traditionally strong support of data protection, such changes were possible so quickly and that the USA PATRIOT Act could curtail liberties in a country which so much prides itself on its citizens' freedoms. These policies were accepted, in my view, largely due to the moral cause established by the 3,000 dead. The moral righteousness enacted after September 11 has been difficult to oppose. After all, thousands are dead and 'the West' must be permitted to ensure its own security. They are not to have died in vain. We must act for the sake of their memory.

The Problem of Memory

But: What is it actually that we are remembering, reacting to? What was it that happened? Although the relatively simple answer is, of course, that 'the events of September 11' were either an act of terrorism or a liberating strike against the hegemonic power, we do not really seem to know. And this is not surprising as memory plays tricks on the idea of straightforward knowledge. We do not remember something that has already happened the way we experienced it then.⁴⁷ As Martin Walser puts it, as "long as something is, it is not, what it will have been. When something is over, one is not anymore the one to whom it happened. [...] Although the past, when it was the present, did not exist, it now imposes itself, as if it had existed in the way in which it imposes itself now."⁴⁸ Looking back, we already bring to the events a context which was not there when they first occurred. We cannot reproduce our first reaction to the planes hitting the towers of the World Trade Center. What is more, we ourselves have already changed. Two aspects therefore concern me here in particular. Firstly, the construction of a particular 'we' through distinguishing between a particular 'us' and 'them' and, secondly, based on this 'we', the construction of September 11 into something exceptional.

President Bush of course famously asserted that: "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."⁴⁹ More specifically, this meant that the US "will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them."⁵⁰ It is hardly necessary to point out that this reflects a particularly crude form of othering, but it might be worth

mentioning that when it all happened we had no knowledge of who was attacking whom (and indeed, at first, of whether this was an attack at all). The idea of an outside 'them' attacking an inside 'us' is an *ex post facto* story which already changes how we look at the event. The 'we' who thinks back to the attacks is not the one to whom it happened. The 'we' who remembers has already changed. This present 'we' is not identical with the past 'we' that then experienced the events of September 11.

However, even if we settle on a description of the events which entails the idea that 'we' were attacked, and even if such clear distinction between inside and outside, us and them, was possible, the question remains who exactly 'we' are: 'We' are just retaliating, defending ourselves and so on, or so we are told, but who are 'we'? Of course, we have been told that there are only two options, but this hardly answers the question. The West (standing by the US), I suppose, is the usual response, as the attack is felt to have been one on Western values and civilisation. But what exactly do we mean by that? And what makes us think that those who acted on September 11 are 'not West'?

There are thus at least two issues here. Our identification with so-called Western values and our exclusion of the terrorists from the idea of the West. Almost all of the hijackers lived for months, some for years, in the US before September 11. Three of the suspected pilots had lived, and studied, in Germany before that.⁵¹ Zacarias Moussaoui and others suspected of having aided the September 11 hijackers are citizens of Western countries such as France and Germany. All were in some way trained and socialised in the West. Given these links with the West, what does it mean to say that 'we' are defending ourselves against them? Apart from the unwarranted exclusion of people who came from our midst (many had, for example, studied at university), this implies an equally unwarranted inclusion of citizens of such 'Western' countries into support of policies they may not agree with. I, for one, rather object to being embraced by Mr Rumsfeld, claimed without ever having been asked, for this so-called war against evil. In as far as I may identify with the West, I certainly do not recognise it in the acts of the US administration or, for that matter, in the rush to curtail civil

liberties in Germany. At the same time as claiming to defend Western values, their very existence is being undermined. Thus our very own identity as Western, as subscribing to certain values, is in danger not only from the terrorists, but from our own policies. And these policies seem to be based less on consideration of appropriateness to the issues in question than on that memory of the tragedy of September 11 that haunts us.

Therefore the question is not merely how we ought to react, but more fundamentally who 'we' are in the first place. This is a much more problematic question than has been acknowledged. Our invocations of memory presuppose an identity, a remembering 'we', if you will. As we have already seen, this raises issues to do with our inability to remember as the 'we' we were. We can remember only as who we are now. Moreover, the entity which is thought to remember and act, providing, for example, its own security, is often identified as the West. However, 'the West' is a deeply ambiguous designation of identity, and one which is paradoxically used to shun facets of the identity of many in the West. To begin with, many living in the West are at the same time associated with and socialised by cultures we are now identifying as other. The construction of our identity against this 'outside' enemy also excludes elements of what anyone may consider part of their identity. For instance, some of us may feel that we have a lot in common with 'ordinary people' in the non-West, perhaps more than we do with particular decision-makers here. As Amber Amundson, the widow of one killed in the attack on the Pentagon, puts it: "I began to feel pain for the women all over the world who lost, or who were going to lose, their husbands because of September 11."⁵² Thus the memory invoked to support the military provision of security relies on a conception of identity which excludes other, equally viable ways of identifying ourselves. Amber Amundson points to the common identity which may be created by a suffering that is seen as in some way shared.

To put this point differently, there are other 'we's we could enact with at least equal legitimacy. Why this particular we? Why the West, or rather the US and those who stand with them, against the rest? This question is important because it is, if not in itself, the

identification of this particular 'we' that makes it possible to construct September 11 into something exceptional. It is the centrality of the American 'we' that allows the US President, and indeed Noam Chomsky,⁵³ to observe that "Americans have known wars – but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941."⁵⁴ Thus, whilst we can think of numerous deadly terrorist attacks on ordinary business people, it is the idea that this was an act of war against the United States on its own soil, and by extension an attack on the West - and thus the framing of the event - that makes September 11 special.

This exceptionality assigned to the events leads us to zoom in on the day of September 11 2001. This may, in my view, commit us to a fundamental error. Whilst I normally welcome when an event is being understood in its singularity, rather than subsumed under a rule and filed away as familiar ('Ah, another terrorist attack. '), in this case it seems to be possible to represent the events both as singular, unexpected, tragic *and* as just another instance of terrorism. This is a dangerous combination as it allows those who would protect us from such evil in future to have their cake and eat it, too. Exceptional measures such as war and even the invocation of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty⁵⁵ are required – but the perpetrators are just ordinary terrorists anyway. And: They are terrorists, but theirs was "an act of war".⁵⁶ Theirs was an act of war, and not a crime,⁵⁷ and yet what they did were "evil, despicable acts of terror"⁵⁸, and those caught in Afghanistan are detainees, or 'unlawful combatants', not prisoners of war. The ambiguous framing which blends the themes of terrorism and war allows for picking and choosing the most convenient position on different matters.

But more than that, by looking to September 11 to understand recent events we turn it into the root, the cause, the origin. It is as if nothing ever happened before. The US administration wants us to see the 'war against terrorism' as an effect of September 11. In other words, the events of September 11 are the 'cause' of their policies today. We may not, however, ask how we got there lest we be disrespectful to the dead. James Der Derian

points to the “*exceptional ahistoricity*”⁵⁹ of the ways in which September 11 is understood, to a political climate in which “explanation is identified as exoneration.”⁶⁰ According to John le Carré, every “allusion to the recent attacks being part of a historical context is regarded as a justification.”⁶¹ Thus, wondering whether current US policies do not stand in a tradition which may be seen as in fact contributing to those events in the first place, or merely pointing to a longer perspective of inequality, military intervention and imperialist imposition in sovereign countries,⁶² is in danger to be seen to be about exonerating those who killed random people on September 11. Yet taking histories into account is crucial because such investigations provide a wider context for analysing the events and caution against any simple cause and effect thinking which starts on September 11 2001, against the simplistic notion that ‘they’ attacked ‘us’ and therefore ‘we’ are retaliating.

Of course, the point of such questions is not, and cannot be, that the West is itself to blame for the events of September 11. This would not only be equally simplistic; it would again paper over the problematic idea of ‘the West’ as an entity. Thus this brings us back to the issue of identity construction. The West is much more ambiguous and problematic a category. And this ambiguity is the point. I have already mentioned the issue of the association with the West of those who committed the attacks of September 11, and that of our linkages with cultures identified as outside the West. Of course, according to Jacques Derrida, a culture is able to “take the form of the subject only in the non-identity to itself, or, if you prefer, only in the difference with itself [*avec soi*]. There is no culture or cultural identity without this difference *with itself*.”⁶³ Whilst *différance* may be seen as a general condition of the possibility of identity, this is relevant in particular in relation to the construct of the West. The openness and pluralism of our societies seem to me to be part of those values which may be said to identify, other than geographically, the West. Thus, there can be no ‘West’ without ambiguity and without *différance*. However, at this point we are enacting a paradox, as we are not only claiming an impossibly delineated identity, but undermining the very freedoms which we claim make us who we are. The US President, on the day of the first attacks on Afghanistan, said in a speech to the nation: “We did not ask for this mission, but

we will fulfill it. The name of today's military operation is Enduring Freedom. We defend not only our precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear."⁶⁴ And yet new anti-terror legislation undermines the very freedoms people in the West have previously relied on.

However, our response is problematic not only in its outcome, but in its identification of the events of September 11 as an uncaused cause. 'Cause and effect'-thinking is fundamentally unhelpful as it suggests not only the separability of events, but also the ability to circumscribe actors as clearly delimited entities. That the latter is problematic in relation to al-Qaeda and 'the West' at least would appear obvious. The former might require some exposition. Clearly, the events of September 11 have in some way set off the response, but at the same time the response has dictated what these events were: acts of terrorism from outside, which may be associated not only with a terrorist network, Al-Qaeda, but also with a state, Afghanistan. The events of September 11 can function as a cause for the US war effort only thanks to this interpretation, which is an integral part of the war effort itself. The two are not independent, and thus do not fulfil the requirements of cause and effect.

Cause and effect are, of course, never as easily separated as they would need to be and Friedrich Nietzsche argues that this separation is fundamentally artificial and wrong. When people claim that lightning flashes, for example, they "posit the same event once as cause and then again as its effect."⁶⁵ Sometimes, cause and effect are mistaken for each other.⁶⁶ Moreover, although the cause is supposedly antecedent, it is in fact imagined after the effect has occurred.⁶⁷ Thus, cause and effect thinking raises more questions than it answers. What is more, in this case it is applied only partially. September 11, despite being a cause itself, would seem to be entirely uncaused in the dominant story. Notwithstanding my doubts as to the applicability of the notion of causality, it would certainly seem to be illogical to regard the events of September 11 as cause but uncaused. The attack was unmotivated, tragic, evil. This is unpersuasive if we are to regard politics as cause and effect relations, as the US administration apparently does when it says that the United States was

attacked, and so it now responds. This supposed automatism of attack and response, however, leaves out a crucial step, namely that of the interpretation, and now memory, of what has happened. Politicians' references back to the events, to what they presume we collectively remember, seem to assume that what we remember, the object of our memory, if you will, is something easily identified. And yet when we consider this more closely my earlier question about what is it we are responding to, and what, hence, is an appropriate response, still remains unanswered.

The Power of Memory

We are under the influence of a strong visual memory and the horror of a tragedy. That memory is being politically deployed to support particular courses of action. We neither have a clear idea of what happened and why, nor who 'we' are, and 'they'. Nevertheless the reality we are presented with is difficult to resist. The dominant story of September 11 and the reaction to it is not just the traditional one of the invocation of 'security' to support particular political aims. It is not even just one of the oft noted trick of othering, 'you are either with us, or with them'. These are part of the story, but the problem is more fundamental. The reality in this story is clear: a dangerous outside is intruding and must be kept out. That this story was never possible – inside and outside are not separate in this way - and never accurate – the terrorists were much more from the 'inside' than our governments would like to admit – is less interesting than the fact that, despite its obvious flaws, this story is immensely difficult to resist. The reality invoked is overpowering. Empirical detail does not disturb it.

So what is, or indeed what was, isn't actually the point. The point is what is done, to be doing something. The actionism of the high tech war effort nicely covers up the fact that we are at a complete loss as to how to respond to 'the events of September 11'. It is difficult to settle on an appropriate description of what happened on September 11 2001, in other words of that which we remember, and Edkins has suggested that we should hold on to "the events" as a designation.⁶⁸ Yet whether what happened were "evil, despicable acts of

terror”⁶⁹ or a somehow legitimate strike for freedom, we simply do not know how to engage, beyond a technical fix, with what has happened. The responses of war and surveillance are responses only in a limited sense of the word. ‘Response’ is derived from Latin ‘respondere’ which means not only what the modern ‘respond’ implies but also to agree, to promise in return. This seems impossible without a better idea of what we are responding to. Note also that the perpetrators of the attacks on September 11 have not in fact made a clear statement as to the aims of their actions. Speaking for them, assuming that US foreign policy, or indeed an objection to Western values, is at the root of their grievances, is therefore problematic.⁷⁰ Thus, even if we could agree on a description such as ‘terrorist attack’, the purpose for which it was undertaken is not transparent. To put the issue differently, we seem to be answering without having heard the call of the other. This call was neither phrased in a language that we understand – that of demands, for instance – nor are we, due to the memory of the event, in any sense prepared to hear it. Thus we cannot promise anything ‘in return’, as we have no grasp, beyond the most superficial level, of the call. Hence we are unable to respond.

Failing to find a response in the wider sense of the word we however fail in our responsibility. There has been little debate, as far as I can see, about our responsibility towards others, even in Germany where foreign policy and especially military action typically are contextualised with respect to responsibility.⁷¹ The question of responsibility is by definition a difficult one. The ability to respond is more than a mere application of ethical rules. Derrida maintains that “far from ensuring responsibility, the generality of ethics incites irresponsibility.”⁷² Assuming responsibility for an other unavoidably entails a betrayal of other others. As Derrida points out, “I cannot respond to the call, the request, the obligation, or even the love of another without sacrificing the other other, the other others.”⁷³ This makes it impossible to justify the responsible act. According to Derrida, “I can respond only to the one [...], that is, to the other, by sacrificing the other to that one. I am responsible to any one (that is to say to any other) only by failing in my responsibility to all the others, to the ethical or

political generality. And I can never justify this sacrifice, I must always hold my peace about it.”⁷⁴

This problematic aspect of responsibility – the impossibility of fitting it into the context of the generality of ethics or indeed justifying it within that context – makes it impossible for us to satisfy ourselves or others that we have acted responsibly. However, in the case at hand we have not even begun to address our responsibility to *any* other. Interestingly, in the German debate reference to ‘responsibility’ has concerned the provision of appropriate security mechanisms to fight terrorism within the context of the *Rechtsstaat*,⁷⁵ that is chiefly internal political arrangements, rather than our relationship to others. We have a duty, or so we are told, to remember and honour the dead, and we have already seen how this sentiment is deployed politically – but what about the living? What, if any, is our responsibility to those who are not part of the supposed ‘we’, those who do not stand with that supposed us? What about those whose loved ones are killed in the name of our security and in fact in the name of honouring our dead? We need think only of the attack on an Afghan wedding in July 2002, in which 250 civilians were supposedly killed or injured,⁷⁶ to realise just how removed from any of the issues at stake those suffering casualties may be in this war against terrorism.

Our responsibility towards those others, who are not involved, can certainly not be discounted due to the atrocity of the attack we believe to have suffered. We may also ask, however, whether we have chosen the best path in relationship to the perpetrators. With Derrida, we may raise the question of forgiveness. Of course, the random murder of 3,000 people is unforgivable, but this is precisely why the question arises; for “forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable.”⁷⁷ In contrast, if “one is only prepared to forgive what appears forgivable [...], then the very idea of forgiveness disappears.”⁷⁸ Forgiveness is by necessity mad.⁷⁹ However, the question of forgiveness is politically powerful, especially in relation to the situation at hand. “There are situations where [...] it is necessary, if not to let memory fade (that should never be necessary, where possible), but at least to act as if, on the public

scene, it was renounced to draw all the consequences from it.”⁸⁰ As a demand, forgiveness would be unreasonable. However, our convictions and way of life seem to be under threat as much from the ‘events’ as from our very own reaction, which is based on our memory of what many experienced as deeply unsettling. Moreover, as we will see below, those most closely related to the victims of September 11 seem most able to think about the possibility of and indeed need for an entirely different reaction. Therefore, the question of forgiveness, and thus with Derrida the ability to renounce a memory, seems to me to be important. This idea, in its very madness, may contain an affirmation of our identity which we currently seem to be unable to find. Might not a refusal to react with military reprisals and tightening of security at home reflect both a celebration of our values and an affirmation of our identity as more than an entity under attack?

These important questions are not asked. Instead, the dead are used to justify a supposedly technical fix to the perceived security problem. Military action and increased surveillance are thought to deliver security by disabling the terrorist network suspected of having set in train the events of September 11. The memory of the dead is deployed to justify the aspects of such policies which might be unpopular, such as endangering the lives of soldiers or restricting our freedom. This memory is, however, significant only insofar as it renders objections to official policy even more difficult than they might otherwise be. The memory is to reconfirm the state as the provider of security; it is not a collective expression of concern and sympathy for those who have suffered as a result of these events.

No one has asked the victims of the events of September 11, or indeed their surviving relatives, what should be done in their memory. This is pointed out by Ryan Amundson, the brother of Craig Scott Amundson, who died in the attack on the Pentagon: “It is assumed that those most personally affected by the September 11 attacks take comfort in whatever actions our political leaders deem necessary. This assumption is not true.”⁸¹ In contrast, he considers his “brother’s death being used as a justification for continued violence [...] an indignity.”⁸² And Amber Amundson has disputed the way in which her husband’s memory is

being used: "If you choose to respond to this incomprehensible brutality by perpetuating violence against other human beings, you may not do so in the name of justice for my husband. Your words and imminent acts of revenge only amplify our family's suffering, deny us the dignity of remembering our loved one in a way that would have made him proud, and mock his vision of America as a peacemaker in the world community."⁸³ Later, she read out a letter in front of the White House in which she said: "So, Mr. President, when you say that vengeance is needed so that the victims of 9/11 do not die in vain, could you please exclude Craig Scott Amundson [sic] from your list of victims used to justify further attacks."⁸⁴ Amundson clearly disagrees with what the US administration is doing 'in his memory'. She wants to resist the political instrumentalisation of that memory for the 'war against evil'.⁸⁵

Of course, very much in contrast to the ease with which our memory is treated as shared and unproblematic in the dominant discourse that seeks to use it to underpin certain policy decisions, what has been arresting about the reaction to the events has been the variety of ways and places people chose to express memories of those who died on the day. Countless personal tributes were left, for example, at the site of the World Trade Center, and many of these have now been moved on to a museum. Numerous 'memorials' of individual people were also posted on the internet, and personal memories reported in the media. Despite this outpouring of diverse and visible personal grief, the possibility of multiple memories seems to me to have been obscured, overshadowed by the tragedy of the crumbling twin towers. A certain way of using memory has become politically powerful. The memory of the dead has been instrumentalised to support particular courses of action. The problem then is that the supposed respect for the dead stands in the way of debate, in the way of an evaluation of what should or needs to be done. As Schama points out: "Apparently, the dead are owed another war. But they are not. What they are owed is a good, stand-up, bruising row over the fate of America; just who determines it and for what end?"⁸⁶ This view is also supported by another relative of Craig Scott Amundson, Kelly Campbell, who says that on September 11 2002 they "wanted there to be alternatives in a

way that looked at where we go as Americans, where we go as humans.”⁸⁷ It is this consideration of alternatives that has been lost.

Conclusion

Bush recommended the following in his address to the joint session of congress and the American people on 20 September 2001: “I ask you to live your lives, and hug your children.”⁸⁸ Only weeks later the US went to war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. What might at first have appeared to be an alternative approach to dealing with the experience of an inevitable insecurity, turned out in fact to be a deeply patronising comment, the ultimate closure of debate. Concentrate on your families. Do not concern yourselves with the difficult business of politics. The state will provide security. - This is a deeply troubling attitude, not only to the question of how we should react to the events of September 11, but to the role of citizens in politics.

This attitude is justified by the supposed enormity and exceptionality of the events of September 11, and this view of the events is based on our memory of the crumbling twin towers, of watching some of those trapped inside jumping to their death, of realising the complete incineration of enormous office buildings and those who were inside them. The unimaginable horror of what happened that day at the World Trade Center has overshadowed not only the other attacks of that day; it has also made it difficult for us to think appropriately about how we should deal with this situation. Nothing is any more as it was before, we are told. Before anyone has really had time to think about what it all means, about what, if anything, we should do, September 11 had already been turned into a symbol, into a watershed.⁸⁹ As such it is in the way of critical debate, not only about these specific events, but about fundamental questions of politics, about who we are, about how to address our inevitable vulnerability and our responsibility towards others.

Whilst I would normally exhort people to remember events, to hear different stories about them, the memory of September 11 seems, so far, to simply serve the political aim of

closure and the justification of confrontation. Maybe we remember September 11, but we forget that we have changed, that we no longer are who we were that day. We forget what is important to us, not as those who have been attacked, but as people and political entities having an existence other than in reaction to these events. We forget, in other words, who we were, and indeed who we are. If the memory of September 11 is so overpowering that we agree to have our own lives overturned, our freedoms vis-à-vis the state undermined, our values mocked by our own states' policies, then I think we should forget September 11. It seems a better idea than forgetting ourselves in the name of the memory of the dead.

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² See www.televisionarchive.org and www.nytimes.com.

³ President Bush remarks that "Americans have known wars – but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941." Address by the President to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20/09/01, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.

⁴ Address by the President to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20/09/01, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>; Noam Chomsky, 9-11, New York: Seven Stories Press, 2001, pp 11f.

⁵ Quoted in "Was einem Künstler, der sich maßlos überschätzt, zum Terrorangriff auf New York einfällt", *die tageszeitung*, 19/09/01. Note that Stockhausen takes back his comment as soon as he becomes aware of what he has said.

⁶ Konstantin von Hammerstein/Frank Hornig, "Die Echtzeit-Katastrophe", *Der Spiegel*, 15/09/01, pp 126-128, here p 126.

⁷ Quoted in Konstantin von Hammerstein/Frank Hornig, "Die Echtzeit-Katastrophe", *Der Spiegel*, 15/09/01, pp 126-128, here p 126.

⁸ Address by the President to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20/09/01, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.

⁹ See, for example, Michael Byers, "US doesn't have the right to decide who is or isn't a PoW", *The Guardian*, 14/01/02. Also Heribert Prantl, *Verdächtig. Der starke Staat und die Politik der inneren Unsicherheit*, Hamburg and Vienna: Europa Verlag, 2002, p 21. On the issue of the prisoners' rights see also Reinhard Müller, "Auch 'Freischärler' haben Rechte", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)*, 22/01/02, p 7.

¹⁰ See, for example, Prantl, *Verdächtig*; Wolfgang Koydl, "Von Bin Laden zu Orwell", *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 04/09/02; Andrian Kreye, "Die Kaninchen vor der terroristischen Schlange", *FAZ*, 9-10/02/02, p 19.

¹¹ Remarks by the President at The World Will Always Remember September 11th Ceremony, 11/12/01, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/200111211-1.html>.

¹² Remarks by the President at The World Will Always Remember September 11th Ceremony, 11/12/01, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/200111211-1.html>.

¹³ Remarks by the President at the Department of Defense Service of Remembrance, 11/10/01, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/print/20011011.html>.

¹⁴ Address by the President to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20/09/01, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.

¹⁵ See, for example, Remarks by the President on the USS Enterprise on Pearl Harbor Day, 07/12/01, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011207.html>.

¹⁶ Presidential Address to the Nation, 07/10/01, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html>.

¹⁷ Address by the President to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20/09/01, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.

¹⁸ Michele Zanini, interviewed by Laura Miller, "A new breed of terrorism", 11/09/01, <http://www.salon.com/books/int/2001/09/11/zanini/print.html>.

¹⁹ Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, 11/09/01, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html>.

²⁰ See, for example, Mark Neocleous, "Against security", *Radical Philosophy*, 100, 2000, pp 7-15.

²¹ Jenny Edkins, "Forget Trauma?", *International Relations*, 16(2), 2002, p 244.

²² Prantl, *Verdächtig*, p. 18.

²³ Note also Edkins' objection to the phrase. "Forget Trauma?", p 252.

²⁴ "Glossary", <http://www.atomicarchive.com/Glossary/Glossary4.shtml>.

²⁵ See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973, pp 3-5.

²⁶ Georg Bönisch et al., "Angriff auf den Staat im Staate", *Der Spiegel*, 24/09/01, pp 28-32, here p 31.

²⁷ Jürgen Hogrefe et al., "Die neue Allianz", *Der Spiegel*, 08/10/01, pp 22-24, here p 24.

²⁸ Georg Mascolo et al., "Scharfes Tempo", *Der Spiegel*, 08/10/01, pp 26-29, here p 26. See also Prantl, *Verdächtig*, pp 52-54.

²⁹ Andreas Ulrich, "Die Grenzen der Freiheit", *Der Spiegel*, 15/10/01, pp 60-63, here p 61.

³⁰ "Das ist Gespensterseherei", interview with Federal Minister of the Interior Otto Schily, *Der Spiegel*, 24/09/01, pp 32-34, here p 34.

³¹ Georg Mascolo et al., "Scharfes Tempo", *Der Spiegel*, 08/10/01, pp 26-29, here p 27. For the full draft and justification of the Law for the Purpose of Fighting International Terrorism see Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache*, 14/7386, 08/11/01.

³² Prantl, *Verdächtig*, p 57.

³³ See the final debate about the law in parliament: Deutscher Bundestag, *Plenarprotokoll*, 14/209, 14/12/01, pp 20747-63. See also Johannes Leithäuser, "Ob der 'elektronische Fingerabdruck' in den Paß kommt, ist ungewiß", *FAZ*, 05/01/02, p 4.

³⁴ Witness the final debate about the law in parliament: Deutscher Bundestag, *Plenarprotokoll*, 14/209, 14/12/01, pp 20747-63. See also the summary of criticism of the new laws by experts in Prantl, *Verdächtig*, pp 64-66.

³⁵ Andreas Wehr, "Terrorismusbekämpfung in Europa", *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 7, 2002, p. 863.

³⁶ Deutscher Bundestag, *Plenarprotokoll*, 14/209, 14/12/01, p 20752. *Rechtsstaatlichkeit* means the rule of law.

³⁷ Quoted in Georg Bönisch et al., "Druck aus dem Kessel", *Der Spiegel*, 01/10/02, pp 22-26, here p 26.

³⁸ Prantl, *Verdächtig*, pp 9-11. See also Erhard Denninger, "Freiheit durch Sicherheit? Anmerkungen zum Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 10-11, 2002, pp 22-24.

³⁹ Prantl, *Verdächtig*, p 11.

⁴⁰ Prantl, *Verdächtig*, p 19.

⁴¹ Quoted in Petra Bornhöfte et al., "Wir sind eine Welt", *Der Spiegel*, 38, 15/09/01, pp 30-35, here p 31.

⁴² Simon Schama, "The dead and the guilty", *The Guardian*, 11/09/02, pp 1-2, here p 1.

⁴³ Edkins, "Forget Trauma?", p 250.

⁴⁴ "New York hopes for a 'normal' Monday", CNN.com, 16/09/01, <http://fyi.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/rec.newyork.monday/>.

⁴⁵ Remarks by the President on the USS Enterprise on Pearl Harbor Day, 07/12/01, <http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011207.html>.

⁴⁶ In Germany, for example, experts have voiced concern over the constitutionality of the anti-terror laws. See Prantl, *Verdächtig*, pp 64-66. For an informative evaluation of the permissibility of responses in terms of international law see Andreas von Arnau and Ulf Marzik, "Das Völkerrecht und der internationale Terror: Welche Gegenreaktion erlauben allgemeines Völkerrecht, NATO-Vertrag und UNO-Charta?", in: Felicitas von Aretin und Bernd Wannemacher (eds.), *Weltlage. Der 11. September, die Politik und die Kulturen*, Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2002, pp 175-193. On the effects on international law of the United States' actions see Michael Byers, "Terror and the Future of International Law", in: Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds.), *Worlds in Collision. Terror and the Future of*

Global Order, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp 118-127 and Michael Byers, "Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law After September 11", *International & Comparative Law Quarterly*, 51, 2002, pp 401-414.

⁴⁷ For a good discussion of this problem as part of a novel see Martin Walser, *Ein springender Brunnen*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000, part I, chapter 1.

⁴⁸ Walser, *Ein springender Brunnen*, 9.

⁴⁹ Address by the President to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20/09/01, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.

⁵⁰ Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, 11/09/01,

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html>.

⁵¹ Steve Smith, "Unanswered Questions", in: Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds.), *Worlds in Collision. Terror and the Future of Global Order*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p 51.

⁵² Amber Amundson, "Our Grief Is Not a Cry For War", 07-08/12/01,

<http://www.afsc.org/nero/pep/amundson.htm>.

⁵³ Chomsky, 9-11, pp 11f.

⁵⁴ Address by the President to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20/09/01, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.

⁵⁵ See Statement by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, 02/10/01,

<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm>.

⁵⁶ Address by the President to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20/09/01, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.

⁵⁷ This distinction is noted by John MacArthur, "Das ist Propaganda", *Der Spiegel*, 08/10/01, p

74.

⁵⁸ Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, 11/09/01,

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html>.

⁵⁹ James Der Derian, "In terrorem: Before and After 9/11", in: Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds.), *Worlds in Collision. Terror and the Future of Global Order*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p 102.

⁶⁰ Der Derian, "In terrorem", p 102.

⁶¹ John le Carré, "Dieser Krieg ist längst verloren", *FAZ*, 17/10/01, p 49.

⁶² See also Chomsky, 9-11, pp 82-84.

⁶³ Jacques Derrida, *The Other Heading. Reflections on Today's Europe*, Translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992, pp 9f (italics in original).

⁶⁴ Presidential Address to the Nation, 07/10/01,

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html>.

⁶⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig: Insel Verlag 1991, p 38.

⁶⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Götzendämmerung oder wie man mit dem Hammer philosophiert*, Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1985, pp 39f.

⁶⁷ Jonathan Culler, *On Deconstruction. Theory and Criticism after Structuralism*, London: Routledge, 1983, pp 86f.

⁶⁸ Jenny Edkins, "The Absence of Meaning: Trauma and the Events of 11 September",

http://watsoninstitute.org/infopeace/911/edkins_trauma.html.

⁶⁹ Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, 11/09/01,

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html>.

⁷⁰ See David Campbell, "Time is Broken: The Return of the Past In the Response to September 11", *Theory & Event*, 5(4), 2002, section 4; see also Chomsky, 9-11, p 77.

⁷¹ Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations. The Politics of Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002, esp. Chapter 3.

⁷² Jacques Derrida, *The Gift of Death*, Translated by David Wills, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995, p 61.

⁷³ Derrida, *The Gift of Death*, p 68.

⁷⁴ Derrida, *The Gift of Death*, p 70.

⁷⁵ Deutscher Bundestag, *Plenarprotokoll*, 14/209, 14/12/01, pp 20747-63.

⁷⁶ "Civilian catastrophe as US bombs Afghan wedding", *Guardian Unlimited*, 01/07/02. See also "Wedding blunder 'happened in Taliban target area'", *Guardian Unlimited*, 04/07/02.

⁷⁷ Jacques Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, London and New York: Routledge, 2001, p 32.

⁷⁸ Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism*, p 32.

⁷⁹ Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism*, p 49.

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- ⁸⁰ Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism*, p 56.
- ⁸¹ Ryan Amundson, "Our Grief Is Not a Cry For War", 07-08/12/01, <http://www.afsc.org/nero/pesp/amundson.htm>. See also Duncan Campbell, "Relatives protest at war plans", *The Guardian*, 12/09/02, p 6.
- ⁸² Ryan Amundson, "Our Grief Is Not a Cry For War", 07-08/12/01, <http://www.afsc.org/nero/pesp/amundson.htm>.
- ⁸³ Amber Amundson, "A Widow's Plea for Non-Violence", *Chicago Tribune*, 25/09/01.
- ⁸⁴ Amber Amundson, "Our Grief Is Not a Cry For War", 07-08/12/01, <http://www.afsc.org/nero/pesp/amundson.htm>. The spelling of the name varies.
- ⁸⁵ For a group founded by family members of victims of September 11 who promote "open dialogue on alternatives to war" see <http://www.peacefultomorrows.org/mission.html>.
- ⁸⁶ Simon Schama, "The dead and the guilty", *The Guardian*, 11/09/02, pp 1-2, here p 2.
- ⁸⁷ Duncan Campbell, "Relatives protest at war plans", *The Guardian*, 12/09/02, p 6.
- ⁸⁸ Address by the President to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20/09/01, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.
- ⁸⁹ The President of the EU Commission Romano Prodi spoke of "a watershed in the political relations of the world. Nothing will be as it has been hitherto." Quoted in Carolin Emcke et al., "Wir werden zurückschlagen", *Der Spiegel*, 15/09/01, pp 16-25, here p 21.