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RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE FORMATION OF A VIABLE LATINO-ASIAN PACIFIC POLITICAL COALITION

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Editor's Note: The following article is a case study of the 1994 California Assembly District primary election. The author would like to thank Dr. Michael B. Preston for his constructive comments. He would also like to thank those at the 1996 Western Political Science Association Conference in San Francisco for their helpful suggestions.

INTRODUCTION

In "Paths To Political Incorporation For Latinos and Asian Pacifics in California," Steven P. Erie, Harold Brackman, and James Warren Ingram III (Erie et al.) examined the potentials and barriers for political incorporation of Latinos, African Americans, and Asian Pacifics in California. According to their findings, they argue that a bi-racial political coalition between Latinos and Asian Pacifics is likely based on the following factors: language and immigration issues. They stated:

Regarding a possible Latino alliance with Asian Pacifics, there appears to be a strong basis for collaboration on behalf of an immigrant rights agenda and in opposition to resurgent Anglo nativism. The two groups converge to the center on attitudes about economic development and crime, facilitating coalition building. However, the prospects for a durable alliance remain problematic...The most serious barrier to constructing a Latino/Asian Pacific coalition may be political rather than socio-economic. Because of diffuse and commingled Latino and Asian Pacific residential patterns in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, political rivalries are structurally built into ongoing reapportionment dynamics (Erie, Brackman, and Warren III, 1993, p. 4).

In short, what Erie et al. argue is that the prospects for a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition are high when they are centered on policy issues like immigration and language (e.g. English-only referendums). However, when a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition is centered on political issues such as constructing political boundaries and elected representation, the chances are less likely. In contrast to this theory, Leland T. Saito stated in "Asian Americans and Latinos in San Gabriel Valley, California: Interethnic Political Cooperation and Redistricting: 1990-92," that a Latino-Asian redistricting and reapportionment coalition in San Gabriel Valley was able to form. The reason according to Saito was due primarily to the fact that the number of

Asian Pacific registered voters was not significant enough to be a threat to a Latino candidate. Thus, Latino coalition leaders were able to agree with the Asian Pacific leaders' redistricting plan without endangering the reelection chances of an incumbent Latino candidate. However, an analysis of the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election will illustrate factors limiting bi-racial coalition building. This election represented a political challenge to the assumption underlying the 1990 redistricting agreement between the Latinos and Asian Pacifics, which was that a political district could be redrawn to reelect a Latino representative. The assumption in 1994 that Diane Martinez could be reelected was threatened by the arrival of a strong Asian Pacific candidate, Judy Chu, who possessed both a strong name recognition and a previous track record in Monterey Park.

The places represented in the 1994 49th Assembly district were the following: Alhambra, Belvedere, East Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Monterey Park, Rio Hondo, Rosemead, San Gabriel, South San Gabriel, and Temple City. The constituencies in these cities have been both predominantly Democratic and Latino. However, with the increased demographic growth and subsequent political incorporation of Asian Pacifics over the last three decades, particularly in the cities of Monterey Park and Alhambra where they currently represent a majority of the population, the potential for increased political conflict between Latinos and Asian Pacifics is great. For example, in Alhambra, Monterey Park, Rosemead, and San Gabriel Valley, the percentages of Asian Pacifics of the total population were 38.1%, 57.5%, 34.3%, and 32.4%, respectively (Ong and Azores, 1991, p. 14).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Previous studies conducted to determine the effects of a candidate's race on a minority group's voting preferences (e.g. racially polarized voting) have focused traditionally on African American voters. There exists a modicum of studies conducted on the voting behavior of other minority groups such as Asian Pacific and Latino voters. The central issue in these studies centers around the methodological approaches of measuring racially polarized voting. Illustrating direct correlation between racial bloc voting and racial candidates is problematic. The ecological fallacy represents one such problem. One cannot assume that ethnic groups vote homogeneously along ethnic lines without taking into consideration other important socio-economic status variables (e.g. education levels; political ideology). Compounding this problem is the unavailability of census data at the election precinct level which will allow one to incorporate such data. The U.S. Census bureau does not provide such information which correlates directly to election precinct return information of key state and local elections. Thus, the absence of such information and an exit poll make it very difficult to illustrate direct correlation. As will be illustrated, there exist two methods of addressing the ecological fallacy issue. One methodological model employed by some scholars include symbolic racism and realistic group conflict which utilize survey methods to explain one racial group voters' attitude toward another racial groups' candidate. A second method, which is non-survey oriented, has been to analyze ethnic and racial representation at the census tract level to correlate with election precinct returns, and then argue with some degree of likelihood that racial bloc voting occurred. This method has been critiqued by statisticians who attempt to predict racial bloc voting behavior with a high degree of

certainty and a low degree of error through ecological regression models. It is important to note that such models also cannot illustrate direct correlation but can incorporate other socio-economic variables mentioned previously into their analysis provided the existence of an exit poll.

METHOD ONE: SYMBOLIC RACISM AND REALISTIC GROUP CONFLICT

There exists two competing theories: symbolic racism and realistic group conflict, in which both attempt to explain the effects of a candidate's race on both African American and Caucasian voter attitudes. Symbolic racism attempts to explain the political roles of Caucasian voter's attitudes to African American candidates. According to a proponent, it is a joint function of anti-African American affect and traditional Protestant ethnic values (Sears, p. 56). Therefore, it is important to note that many of the studies on symbolic racism focus on Caucasian voter's perceptions of African American candidates. Realistic group conflict studies, in contrast, focus on both African American and Caucasian voters. This theory argues that the central political motive is the protection of group privilege which can be measured by determining the group members' perception of tangible out-group threat (Bovasso, p. 5).

In attempting to measure the influences of a candidate's race on African American and Caucasian voters' political motives from either a symbolic racism or realistic group conflict perspective, many studies have relied on various survey techniques such as self-administered questionnaires [David Sears and R. Kinder (1970, 1971); T. F. Pettigrew (1971); J.B. McConahay and J.C. Hough Jr. (1976), Moskowitz and Stroh (1994)], national survey data [Lawrence Bobo (1985)], and telephone surveys [Bovasso (1993)].

In the Sears and Kinder studies in 1970 and 1971, the authors introduced the concept of symbolic racism by examining the findings of a survey during the Los Angeles mayoral elections of 1969 which pitted an African American candidate, Tom Bradley, against a Caucasian candidate, Sam Yorty. The survey was created by Thomas Pettigrew who also examined Caucasian voters' responses to African American mayoral candidates. The questions that the survey used to measure symbolic racism were divided into three categories: 1) Antagonisms towards African Americans' demands; 2) Resentment about special favors for African Americans; and 3) Denial of continuing discrimination (Sears, p. 57). The findings of the questions in each category illustrated anti-African American affect in terms of antagonism, resentment, and anger towards African Americans' wishes and lack of sympathy for them (Ibid).

In the Moskowitz and Stroh study, the authors support the symbolic racism perspective. They employed a self-administered questionnaire distributed to a non-probability sample of 424 Caucasian subjects by students in several undergraduate political science courses at Georgia Southern University during Fall 1990 to Winter 1991. The authors manipulated the race of a hypothetical candidate to determine how the candidate's race influences voter preference through stereotype biases along with other "affect-laden" impacts of racial prejudice. The questionnaire was designed in two-sections. The first section was used to determine respondent's feelings about a public policy issue. The second section contained three items designed to elicit and

measure racist feelings about African Americans and asked them to respond to a seven point scale (One-strongly agree; Seven-strongly disagree):

- (1) Over the past few years the government and news media have shown more respect to blacks than they deserve.
- (2) Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more than they deserve.
- (3) Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.

Once the respondents completed the questionnaire, they were then asked to look at a campaign brochure of a fictitious candidate whose picture was included as either an African American or Caucasian candidate. The authors found "that the more racist an individual, the more likely the individual projects the opposite of his or her position onto blacks"(Moskowitz and Stroh, p. 325). In other words, the more racist a voter was, the lower his or her evaluation of the African American candidate would be.

Lawrence Bobo, a proponent of realistic group conflict theory, also utilized a survey technique in 1988 to determine that racial group conflict is realistic when it involves a group oriented concern for the redistribution of power, wealth, and status of conflicting groups. In particular, Bobo looked at Caucasian voter opposition to busing and attitudes toward African American political activism. In regard to the latter, Bobo found that Caucasian voters perceived African American candidates and public policy as a threat to the redistribution of power and wealth in what he termed as the "paradox of racial attitudes." The paradox lies in Bobo's 1988 national survey findings which illustrated that Caucasians, in general, were beginning to become more accepting of African American social and political equality over a long period while at the same time were becoming less tolerant of public policies intended to achieve these forms of equality.

Another survey technique utilized to measure the influences of a candidate's race on African American voters' preferences is the telephone survey of a random population sample. In the Bovasso study, an attempt was made to determine whether "the perception of racial out-group threat and dissatisfaction with public resources predicted candidate support in registered Democrats" (Bovasso, p. 6). Bovasso was interested in measuring both African American and Caucasian voters' perceptions to determine their different motives of racial politics in the context of the symbolic racism and realistic group conflict debate.

Bovasso took a random sample of 1,935 New York City voters in the 1988 Democratic New York City Mayoral race in which incumbent Edward Koch and David Dinkins were the candidates, and then used a random digit dialing technique to implement a questionnaire. The format of the questionnaire was designed to determine whether African American and Caucasian voters' would reelect Koch as opposed to the other Republican and Democratic challengers :

Some people say that Mayor Koch is doing a good job and deserves to be reelected while others say that he should step aside to make way for new leaders. What do you think: do you support Mayor Koch or would you like to see someone else for mayor?

Bovasso used responses to the aforementioned question to determine indirectly how Caucasian voters would vote for the African American candidate, David Dinkins. The findings from the telephone survey supported both symbolic racism and realistic group conflict perspectives.

METHOD TWO: ADDRESSING THE ECOLOGICAL FALLACY THROUGH NON-SURVEY METHODS

A second method employed by some scholars is to overlay census tract data over election precincts to determine the likelihood of racially polarized voting. One problem with this method is that all election precincts within a political district do not always fit within a census tract, nor do all census tracts fit exactly within a political district. However, such methods are not uncommon and have traditionally been the standard. In Elmer R. Rusco's study, "Voting Patterns of Racial Minorities in Nevada"; Grant Din's study, "An Analysis of Asian Pacific American Registration and Voting Patterns in San Francisco"; and Henry Der's study, "Bilingual Ballot Foes Disagree on Statistics," all of these authors employed this methodology to illustrate racially polarized voting among African American, Latino, and Asian Pacific American voters.

The above methodology has not been accepted without criticism. One such criticism is that the above methodology assumes that ethnic and racial groups vote homogeneously along ethnic and racial lines. Freedman et. al. in their study, *Ecological Regression and Voting Rights*, have argued that by violating this principle, this can lead to unreliable results. Others such as Engstrom and McDonald in their study, "Quantitative Evidence in Vote Dilution Litigation," argue that the correlation co-efficient does not adequately demonstrate the relationship between individual correlations and ecological correlations. Thus, the non-survey models of measuring racially-polarized voting is at its infancy, and other innovative models have been developed by others. In Wendy Tam's study, "Asians—A Monolithic Voting Bloc?," she attempts to address the above difficulties by developing a specific aggregated multinomial model which treats socio-economic values of Asian Pacifics as nonlinearly related as opposed to the traditional linear analysis. Nevertheless, despite these models, none can claim direct correlation of racially polarized voting among the respective minority groups they are analyzing. The issue therefore becomes tautological.

SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

The 1994 49th Assembly district represented an ideal case study of the theory expounded by Erie et al. in accessing the potential for a Latino-Asian Pacific American political coalition in a political district which contained cities with large and commingled Latino and Asian Pacific communities. The candidates that will be focused on in this study are Diane Martinez and Judy Chu who finished first and second, respectively, in the primary with Martinez eventually winning the general election. As will be illustrated and argued later in the Findings section, Erie et al. were correct in their analysis in two key areas. First, commingled patterns of settlement in the cities in the 1994 49th Assembly district represented politically charged areas among Latinos and Asian Pacific candidates, and thus a potential barrier existed for a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition. Second, a formidable obstacle in

the formation of a viable Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition was the lack of a solid registered voter base. As Browning, Marshall, and Tabb found in their study on the successes and failures of minority mobilization in ten cities, a politically effective political coalition cannot occur without a strong voter base:

With only one or even with no minority representatives, a dominant coalition strongly committed to minority interests might still be able to turn a city government around. Conversely, even substantial minority representation might have little or no effect where minority groups fall short of 50 percent of the voting-age population, as they usually do (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, 1991, p. 9).

This was more the case for the Asian Pacific constituency in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election in which their registered voting base was not as large as it was for Latinos.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following research questions will be addressed in this study in relation to the Erie et al. thesis regarding the formation of a viable Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election.

Question One: To what extent were both Latinos and Asian Pacifics able to racially mobilize their votes and campaign contributions in favor of their respective candidates?

Question Two: To what extent was there racially polarized voting among the Latino and Asian Pacific identified primary voters in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election?

A) If there was racially polarized voting, what were some of the political factors that attributed to it?

Question Three: What are the implications of racially polarized voting on the formation of a viable Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition in a future Los Angeles district?

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF STUDY

1. Election Precincts and Definition of Racially Polarized voting: Addressing The Ecological Fallacy

In order to determine whether racially polarized voting occurred in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election, every tenth election precinct was randomly selected in all ten cities. This was done to ensure randomness and to maintain internal validity within the entire political district. There were three cities with less than ten election precincts: Rio Hondo, South San Gabriel, and Temple City. Subsequently, they were not counted based on the random selection criteria of every tenth election precinct. As a result of this selection criteria, the cities and the total number of their election precincts examined were the following: Alhambra (5), Monterey Park (4), Los Angeles (2), Rosemead (2), San Gabriel (2), Belvedere (1), and East Los

Angeles (1). It is important to note that there is no certain method to determine whether racially polarized voting actually did or did not occur among the Latino and Asian Pacific voters, because there was no exit poll conducted by either campaigns or local newspapers. Thus, one of the questions examined in this study is whether theoretically racially polarized voting occurred among both racial groups based upon the available precinct data.

The precinct data was obtained from the Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder in Norwalk, and consisted of the following: official election precinct returns per candidate; election precinct rosters; and official campaign contribution data. From the election precinct rosters, the surnames of precinct voters were divided into three categories: Latino, Asian Pacific, and "Other." The category "Other" represented all surnames identified as neither Latino nor Asian Pacific.

A combination of two thresholds was used to determine if racially polarized voting theoretically occurred. One threshold used was the court's analysis in *Thornburg v. Gingles* which found that racially polarized voting occurred if any racial group voter (e.g. Latino voter) voted fifty percent or over for a candidate of the same racial group (e.g. Latino candidate).¹ The second threshold used was the Pearson correlation analysis (r) which determined the strength of relationship between the total number of identified racial group election precinct voters and the total number of precinct votes received by a racial group candidate. Once the r is obtained, the correlation coefficient (r^2) can also be determined. This correlation analysis could only be performed on Alhambra and Monterey Park because they contained more than two randomly selected election precincts. It is not possible to run a Pearson analysis in cities with less than or equal to two election precincts.

In performing a Pearson r analysis, the strength of relationship between the amount of Latino and Asian Pacific identified precinct voters with the amount of precinct votes received by Martinez and Chu can be determined. However, because applicable census data at the election precinct level could not be obtained, a regression analysis cannot be performed. Therefore, socio-economic status variables such as educational attainment, income, and generation differences cannot be factored into the equation. Such factors are recognized as being significant because to assume that all ethnic groups vote homogeneously is false. As a result, the strength of relationship can be determined from the existing precinct data, but it is not possible to determine whether this relationship is statistically significant.

2. Demographic and Political Characteristics of the 1994 49th Assembly District

Table 1 shows the six cities that were completely within the boundaries of the 1994 49th Assembly district. In five of these six cities, Asian Pacifics and Latinos represented the two largest racial groups. These cities represent commingled residential patterns with Latinos and Asian Pacifics. Table 2 shows that the Democratic Party represented a majority of the registered voters in the five largest cities. East Los Angeles represented the city with the largest percentage (79 %) of registered Democratic Party voters. This was 23 percentage points higher than the second highest percentage (56%) in Monterey Park. A majority of East Los Angeles Democratic Party registered voters were Latino. The significance of these percentages illus-

Table 1 Latino and Asian Pacific Populations Within Selected Cities² Source:

<i>Cities</i>	<i>Hispanic Population</i>	<i>Asian Pacific Population</i>	<i>White (Not of Hispanic Origin)</i>
Alhambra	29,260	31,519	20,106
Monterey Park	18,465	34,977	7,185
Rosemead	25,463	17,772	8,282
San Gabriel	13,297	12,090	11,379
East Los Angeles	119,418	1,583	3,254
Temple City	5,771	6,088	18,962

Source: 1990 U.S. Bureau of Census

trated why the 49th Assembly district voters have historically been both Democrat and Latino. Both of these characteristics are important to keep in mind in understanding the barriers to the formation of a viable Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election.

I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE 1994 49TH ASSEMBLY DISTRICT PRIMARY ELECTION

Table 2 Political Characteristics of Selected Cities in the 1994 49th Assembly District

<i>City</i>	<i>Total Number of Registered Voters</i>	<i>Democratic Party Registered Voters</i>	<i>Percent of Total Registered Voters</i>
Alhambra	29,128	15,124	53%
East Los Angeles	8,076	6,366	79%
Monterey Park	23,308	13,086	56%
Rosemead	14,253	8,206	58%
San Gabriel	13,330	6,479	49%

Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information.

The 1994 49th Assembly district primary election represented an important election in analyzing the potential for a bi-racial political coalition between Latino and Asian Pacifics in cities where commingled residential patterns existed. As mentioned earlier, the two main candidates running in the June 4th Democratic primary were incumbent Diane Martinez and former Monterey Park mayor and current city councilwoman Judy Chu.

The sequence of events which led both Chu and Martinez to declare their candidacies in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election illustrated the degree of political urgency that existed for both campaigns. Each campaign represented minority groups which attempted to achieve greater representation in what has historically been defined as a "Latino" district. In October of 1994, Martinez, the incumbent representative of the 49th Assembly district, announced that she was considering running for the state Senate seat vacated by Art Torres who decided to pursue the state Insurance Commissioner position. At the time of Martinez's announcement,

Chu put her name in as a candidate for the Assembly seat which apparently angered Martinez because she had deferred the seat to Hilda L. Solis, another Latina (Holguin, 1994, B2). As a result of Chu's announcement, Martinez decided to seek reelection in the 49th Assembly district. According to Martinez, she believed that Chu should have deferred to her at that point: "To me, its unfortunate that someone has as much ambition that they can't wait their time" (Holguin, 1994, B2).

The Martinez and Chu campaigns attempted to downplay the inter-racial tensions among Latinos and Asian Pacifics in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election. According to Diane Martinez, in an interview with the *Los Angeles Times* regarding the significance of race and ethnicity prior to the primary: "It's not really something I concern myself with. The issues are not about color" (Holguin, 1994, B2). Chu's response to the same question in the article was also devoid of the race issue: "I'm presenting myself as a candidate for all people" (Holguin, 1994, B3). Instead of focusing on the issue of race as the major issue of the primary election, both candidates focused on who was more qualified to achieve the common goals of improving education and the economy while reducing crime.

Table 3 shows the official election results, both Martinez and Chu accounted for nearly 78 percent of the total votes. The significance of this being that it was a two person election.

Table 4 shows the margin of votes between Martinez and Chu in the Democratic primary was less in Alhambra, Monterey Park, Rosemead, and San Gabriel than in East Los Angeles. The reason for this can be seen in the fact that there existed large Latino and Asian Pacific communities within these cities whereas in East Los Angeles, it was a predominantly a Latino population. Therefore, it will be theoretically argued that racially polarized voting occurred among the identified Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters in these cities.

According to an interview with Judy Chu, she acknowledged that race did play a significant role in the Democratic primary: "People who don't know you personally except by a name or face, they're going to be voting based on race." Chu also believed the Latino voters in East Los Angeles most likely voted for Martinez because of her race: "She (Martinez) is a name that sounds familiar. The Latino voters in East Los Angeles, who did not know me or the issues of my campaign, likely voted for Martinez because she was a Latino" (phone interview by author, Los Angeles, 21 April 1996). In contrast, in a

Table 3 1994 49th Assembly District Primary Election Results: Top Three Candidates

<i>Candidate</i>	<i>Grand Total Votes Casted</i>	<i>Grand Total Votes Received</i>	<i>Percent of Grand Total</i>
	24,635		
Diane Martinez		11,545	46.86%
Judy Chu		7,646	31.04%
Roy Torres		3,179	12.09%

Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information.

**Table 4 Total Votes Per Top Three Candidates
In the 1994 49th Assembly District**

<i>Candidate</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>Total Votes Casted</i>	<i>Total Votes Received</i>	<i>Percent of Total</i>
	ALHAMBRA	4,561		
Martinez			2,162	47.40%
Chu			1,501	32.90%
Torres			544	11.93%
	EAST L.A.	1,544		
Martinez			840	54.40%
Chu			114	7.39%
Torres			439	28.43%
	MONTEREY PARK	3,980		
Martinez			1,622	40.75%
Chu			1,569	39.42%
Torres			483	12.14%
	ROSEMEAD	2,103		
Martinez			982	46.70%
Chu			666	31.67%
Torres			267	12.70%
	SANGABRIEL	2,042		
Martinez			933	45.70%
Chu			709	34.72%
Torres			230	11.26%
	TEMPLE CITY	32		
Martinez			16	50%
Chu			6	18.75%
Torres			5	15.63%
	UNINCORPORATED	4,455		
Martinez			2,530	56.79%
Chu			613	13.76%
Torres			891	20%

Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information.

recent interview with Susan Baker, Diane Martinez’s campaign manager, she believed that race did not play any significant factor in either Martinez’s campaign strategy or the votes she received:

In my opinion, anything that was ethnic had nothing to do with it...We have been raised in this country that if you are a citizen, you are American. This is the way we ran the campaign. We didn’t target any one special interest group or one particular race (phone interview by author, Los Angeles, 25 April 1996).

The significance of race in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election will be examined in the following section to determine whether or not racially polarized voting occurred in these heavily Latino and Asian Pacific populated cities. But before determining whether this occurred, the issue of whether

Martinez's or Chu's campaign attempted to reach out to other voters aside from those of their own racial group must be addressed.

Both the Martinez and Chu campaigns attempted to appeal beyond their respective racial group voters in the district. The Chu campaign attempted to target a broad cross-racial base of voters in the 49th Assembly district. According to Chu:

I definitely tried to target a broad range. I tried to canvass as many voters as I could. In addition, we were walking neighborhoods and doing mailers. I went to a number of Latino forums such as the City Terrace Forum and the Mother's of East Los Angeles to outreach to the Latino voters (Chu, interview).

The same strategy was employed by the Martinez campaign. As Susan Baker stated: "We looked at the precincts to find out where the largest number of voters were and we targeted them" (Baker, interview).

For the Martinez campaign, there existed several beneficial factors which she could heavily rely upon that Chu could not. The first was that she was the incumbent representative of the 49th Assembly district. This meant that she not only understood which cities and racial groups would give her the necessary votes but also there existed cities with large concentrations of Latino voters. An example of a heavily populated Latino neighborhood is unincorporated East Los Angeles, in which Latinos represented over ninety percent of the total poll voters in three of the election precincts analyzed. It would be safe to assume that a majority of those Latino voters would likely vote for a Latino candidate whether it be Martinez or Torres. The significance of this is that it gave Martinez a large potential voting sector which she could target. Secondly, like Chu, Martinez had a previous track record of public service in the area. Chu was the former Monterey Park mayor and current city councilwoman, whereas Martinez was the incumbent representative of the 49th Assembly district. However, unlike Chu, Martinez represented a larger constituency which would potentially allow her to appeal to a larger cross-section of voters.

Despite the large number of Asian Pacifics in Alhambra, Monterey Park, Rosemead, and San Gabriel, Chu was unable to translate them into votes as greatly as Martinez did with the Latinos in these cities.

As seen in Table 5, Martinez captured a greater number of first place finishes in the election precincts of Alhambra, Monterey Park, San Gabriel, and Rosemead than Chu, despite the fact that the Asian Pacific population is the largest in each of these cities. For example, in Monterey Park, Martinez captured 23 first place precinct finishes (56% of the total) compared to Chu's 16 first place precinct finishes (39%), despite the fact that Asian Pacifics constituted 57.5 percent of the total population. The same trend existed in Alhambra where Asian Pacifics represented the largest group at 38.1 percent of the total population. Martinez captured 43 first place election precinct finishes (84% of the total) compared to Chu's 7 first place election precinct finishes (14% of the total). With these general primary results in mind, there existed three voting trends that were found to have occurred among the Latino and Asian Pacific voters.

Table 5 Election Precinct Finishes For Three Candidates In 49th Assembly District Cities.

<i>Candidate</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>1st Place Precinct Finish</i>	<i>2nd Place Precinct Finish</i>	<i>3rd Place Precinct Finish</i>
	ALHAMBRA			
Diane Martinez	Total N=52	43 (2 ties)	7 (2 ties)	0
Judy Chu		7 (2ties)	42(1 tie)	0
Roy Torres		0	(1 tie)	51
	MONTEREYPARK			
Diane Martinez	Total N=41	23 (2 ties)	16	0
Judy Chu		16 (2 ties)	22	1
Roy Torres		0	1	40
	ROSEMEAD			
Diane Martinez	Total N=22	19	3	0
Judy Chu		3	19	0
Roy Torres		0	0	22
	SANGABRIEL			
Diane Martinez	Total N=23	18	5	0
Judy Chu		5	18	0
Roy Torres		0	0	23
	EAST L.A.			
Diane Martinez	Total N=12	12	0	0
Judy Chu			1	11
Roy Torres		0	11	1
	TEMPLE CITY			
Diane Martinez	Total N=1	1	0	0
Judy Chu		0	1	0
Roy Torres		0	0	1
	UNINCORPORATED			
Diane Martinez	Total N=28	27	1	0
Judy Chu			12 (1 tie)	15
Roy Torres		0	12 (1 tie)	15

Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information.

II. FINDINGS AND TRENDS

Trend One: Low Asian Pacific Election Precinct Voter Turnout and High Campaign Contributions

The first trend found in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election was a combination of a low Asian Pacific election precinct voter turnout coupled with a high amount of campaign contributions. In several Alhambra election precincts, 0150005A and 0150006A, there were eight and four identified Asian Pacific precinct voters out of 58 and 51 total identified voters for 15.7 and 7.8 percent of the total, respectively. These findings tend to support previous studies of Latino and Asian Pacific racial mobilization trends in other local and state-wide California elections. According to Byran Jackson's study of the ethnic voter turnout in the 1982 and 1986 California Gubernatorial elections, the Asian Pacific voter turnout rate in 1986 was 27 percentage points compared to 14 percentage points in 1982 (Jackson, 1991, p. 212). As Jackson stated, Asian Pacific voters represented the lowest turnout among Anglo, Latino, and African American voters. Thus, what were the factors which contributed to the low Asian Pacific voter turnout in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election? There appear to be several factors responsible for their low voter turnout.

The first factor was that many of the Asian Pacific registered voters were registered immediately before the primary election. There was an intense door to door voter registration drive by the Chu campaign to get out the Asian Pacific vote. According to one Chu volunteer,

We worked all day and morning to walk to every house in the identified Asian Pacific precincts. I would go to the houses in the afternoon, and if they weren't there, they were probably at work. I knew I had to come back either late in the evening or early in the morning to register them at their homes (Sy, Levin G., phone interview by author, Los Angeles, 7 April 1996).

Yet despite the Chu campaign's attempt to register as many Asian Pacifics before the June 4th primary, many of these registered voters who did not vote by absentee ballots, also did not vote at the precinct polls. As Michael Eng, a Chu campaign strategist, stated:

Many of the Asian Pacific Americans registered by us will not vote in the Democratic primary because of the fact they usually do not vote in the election prior to the one they are registered before. This is problematic among the Asian Pacific community. That's why they must be registered throughout the entire year and not just before an election (phone interview by author, Los Angeles, 21 April 1996).

Another interesting trend among the Asian Pacific voters was the high degree of absentee ballots use which was similar to previous elections. In the special 1991 46th Assembly district primary election, there also existed a high degree of absentee ballot use among Korean American voters (Lai, 1994, p. 36). In that election, the Korean American voters were targeted by the Korean American candidate, T.S. Chung, through absentee ballots which in turned allowed him to capture the largest number of absentee ballots among all candidates. One of the reasons for their preference for absentee ballots, according to Chung's campaign consultant was that "many Koreans work from early in the morning to late at night, so they don't have the time to go to the polling place" (Lai, 1994). This belief also applied to other Asian Pacific ethnic groups as illustrated in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election. Judy Chu received the most absentee votes among all three Democratic candidates with 2,248 compared with Martinez's second most absentee votes of 1,757.

A second factor contributing to the low Asian Pacific voter turnout was the large percentage of foreign born Asian Pacifics during the last twenty-five years and the political resocialization that must occur for them to become familiar with mainstream political culture and institutions within their newly adopted homeland. Between the decades of 1970-80, the percentage of foreign born Asian Pacifics increased due to the increase in international migration. In 1980, 63.1 percent of all Los Angeles county Asian Pacifics were foreign born; the percentages among the various ethnic groups were: Vietnamese (92.9 %), Koreans (85.9 %), Filipinos (72.8%), and Chinese (70.3%) (Nakanishi, 1985, p. 33). Their need for political resocialization is what Lucian Pye believed to have stemmed from nativistic cultural views of recent Asian immigrants in his study *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural*

Dimensions of Authority :

In all Asian societies, including Japan, there has been an ambivalence about the relationship between wealth and power. The general view was usually one in which wealth should not properly lead to power...when power was seen as properly associated with status, the thrust of political behavior was always in the direction of stability and order for the total system as well as dignity for the individuals at every station in society (Pye, 1984, p. 49).

Another explanation for low voter turnout is the tendency for recent Asian Pacific immigrants to focus on homeland politics as opposed to American politics (Nakanishi, 1985, p. 47). However, as Nakanishi and others have argued, the term "political participation" can be manifested in alternative forms in American politics aside from voting such as campaign contributions.

During the primary election, Judy Chu was able to raise the largest amount of individual campaign contributions. According to official campaign disclosure forms, the total amount of campaign contributions raised by the Judy Chu and Diane Martinez campaigns were \$226, 108.00 and \$196, 559.73, respectively. Thus, Chu was able to exceed Martinez in individual campaign contributions by nearly fourteen percent. Moreover, the official campaign disclosure forms indicated that a majority of Chu's individual contributors were Asian Pacific professionals, state workers, and small business owners. The combination of low Asian Pacific precinct voter turnout and large amounts of campaign contributions is a familiar trend in past local and state-wide elections (Tachibana, 1986, p. 536). In contrast to Chu, many of Martinez's individual contributors were primarily non-Latino individuals, organizations, and companies.³ This lack of campaign fundraising strength among the Latino community also represented a familiar trend in past local and state-wide elections (Saito, 1993, p. 60). One reason which explained this is that Martinez was the incumbent representative and thus she was able to tap into mainstream special interest groups ranging from education to crime fighting. The significance of the Chu campaign's ability to raise more contributions than the Martinez campaign is that it represented a barrier to the formation of a Latino-Asian political coalition. The low voter turnout factor had begun to change in areas like San Gabriel Valley with both the growing Asian Pacific population and number of registered voters. This represented a perceived threat in historically defined Latino districts like the 1994 49th Assembly district which contained cities with large Latino and Asian Pacific populations. This may explain the sense of political urgency that underlied both the Martinez and Chu campaigns. Moreover, it may also explain why Martinez suddenly decided to seek reelection upon Chu's public announcement. Chu's political recognizability combined with the campaign fund-raising strength of Asian Pacifics and a growing voter base was seen by some Latino leaders as a threat to their political status in the 49th Assembly district.

Trend Two: Racially Polarized Voting Among Latino and Asian Pacific Precinct Voters In All Randomly Selected Election Precincts

The second and most significant trend found from the election precinct data for the formation of a viable Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition was that racially polarized voting theoretically occurred among Latino and Asian Pacific

voters. In all of the 17 election precincts that were randomly selected and analyzed, it was theoretically found that the threshold of the Gingles case (whereby voters of a particular racial group vote 50 percent or greater for a candidate of the same race) was met and exceeded. Moreover, a Pearson regression analysis (r) was performed on the precinct data of the two most populated cities, Alhambra and Monterey Park. The analysis illustrated a very strong relationship between the total number of identified Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters, on one hand, and the total number of votes received by the Latino and Asian Pacific candidates, on the other hand. With both of these findings from the precinct data, it will be theoretically argued that racially polarized voting occurred during the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election.

The city of Alhambra represented the city with the largest number of election precincts (51) within the 1994 49th Assembly district. Using the random selection criteria of every tenth election precinct, five election precincts (0150014A, 0150028A, 0150044A, 0150063A, and 0150081A) were analyzed. Each of these election precincts contained a large percentage of Latino and Asian Pacific registered voters.

As illustrated by the open primary results in Table 7, the total number of identified Latino precinct voters in all five randomly selected election precincts was 178. The total number of votes that the Latino candidates Martinez and Torres received was 212. The total number of identified Asian Pacific precinct voters was 100, and the total number of votes received by Asian Pacific candidate Judy Chu was 113. The total number of identified "Other" precinct voters was 318. Therefore, if racially polarized voting theoretically occurred in Alhambra, fifty percent or greater of the total votes that Martinez and Torres received must have come from the 178 identified Latino precinct voters in order to meet the Gingles threshold. The same argument can also be made for Judy Chu in which fifty percent or greater of her votes must have come from the total 100 identified Asian Pacific precinct voters. Graph 1 in the Appendix illustrates this argument, in that almost three-quarter

Table 7 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific Election Precinct Voters in Alhambra

<i>Alhambra Election Precincts</i>	<i>Total Number of Identified Latino Precinct Voters</i>	<i>Total Martinez Precinct Votes</i>	<i>Total Torres Precinct Votes</i>	<i>Total Number of Identified Asian Pacific Precinct Voters</i>	<i>Total Chu Precinct Votes</i>	<i>Total Number of "Other" Identified Precinct Voters</i>
0150014A	25	31	5	15	17	44
0150028A	18	24	3	3	3	109
0150044A	45	37	12	18	21	41
0150063A	45	32	10	27	24	28
0150081A	45	45	13	37	48	96
Total (T)	T=178	T=169	T=43	T=100	T=113	T=318

Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information.

$$r(\text{Total number of identified Latino precinct voters, Total number of Latino candidate votes}) = .87$$

$$r^2 = .75$$

$$r(\text{Total number of identified A/P precinct voters, Total number of Chu votes}) = .96$$

$$r^2 = .92$$

ters of the total Latino identified precinct voters were equivalent to the total number of votes Martinez received. This trend was also evident with the bar graphs of the total votes received by Judy Chu and the total identified Asian Pacific precinct voters. Therefore, the Gingles threshold of 50 percent was easily met and surpassed by both Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters. However, it is important to note that this does not mean that either Martinez, Torres, or Chu only received votes from their respective racially identified voters, but they must also have come from the other two identified groups of precinct voters. What it does indicate is that a majority of the Latino and Asian Pacific votes were racially polarized among their respective racial candidates.

A Pearson regression analysis performed on the total number of identified Latino precinct voters and the total number of votes received by the Latino candidates indicated a very strong relationship with a correlation coefficient (r^2) of .75. The relationship between the total number of identified Asian Pacific precinct voters and the total number of votes Chu received was also very strong in which a correlation coefficient (r^2) of .92. Therefore, as a result of both findings, it can be argued with some degree of certainty that racially polarized voting occurred among the Latino and Asian Pacific identified voters in Alhambra.

Monterey Park was the city with the second largest number of election precincts in the 1994 49th Assembly district with a total of 41. Four randomly selected election precincts were analyzed. According to Table 8, the total number of identified Latino precinct voters was 280. The total number of votes that both Latino candidates received was 223. The total number of Asian Pacific identified precinct voters was 88, and the total number of votes Chu received was 140. The total number of identified "Other" voters was 142. If racially polarized voting were to occur in Monterey Park, as in Alhambra, a majority of the total identified Latino precinct voters must have voted for the two Latino candidates. The same must also be true for the total identified Asian Pacific precinct voters, a majority of whom must have voted for Chu.

As seen in Graph 2 in the Appendix, over three-quarters of the total votes for Martinez and Torres were equivalent to the total number of identified Latino precinct voters. The total number of identified Asian Pacific precinct voters was equivalent to over three-fifths of the total votes for Chu. Again, as seen in Alhambra, the Gingles threshold was exceeded by the identified Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters.

A Pearson regression analysis performed on the Monterey Park precinct data indicated a strong relationship between the total number of identified Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters with the total number of votes received by the Latino and Asian Pacific candidates. A correlation coefficient (r^2) of .57 was determined for the relationship between identified Latino precinct voters and the total number of votes received by both Latino candidates. An even higher correlation coefficient (r^2) of .68 was calculated for the relationship between identified Asian Pacific precinct voters and votes for Chu. Therefore, like Alhambra, racially polarized voting more than likely occurred among the Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters for their respective candidates during the 1994 49th Assembly primary election.

Table 8 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific Election Precinct Voters in Monterey Park

<i>Monterey Park Election Precincts</i>	<i>Total Number of Identified Latino Precinct Voters</i>	<i>Total Martinez Precinct Votes</i>	<i>Total Torres Precinct Votes</i>	<i>Total Number of Identified Asian Pacific Precinct Voters</i>	<i>Total Chu Precinct Votes</i>	<i>Total Number of "Other" Identified Precinct Voters</i>
4500016A	39	25	7	19	25	40
4500030A	86	81	11	17	46	68
4500046A	50	21	15	7	13	26
4500090A	105	48	15	45	56	8
Total (T)	T=280	T=175	T=48	T=88	T=140	T=142

Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information.

$$r(\text{Total number of identified Latino precinct voters, Total number of Latino candidate votes})=.76$$

$$r^2=.57$$

$$r(\text{Total number of identified A/P precinct voters, Total number of Chu votes})=.83$$

$$r^2=.68$$

The significance of finding racially polarized voting in Alhambra and Monterey Park is that both cities constituted the two largest Latino and Asian Pacific populations in the 1994 49th Assembly district. In Alhambra, Latinos and Asian Pacifics represented 36 and 39 percent of the total population respectively. In Monterey Park, Latinos and Asian Pacifics represented 30 and 58 percent of the total population, respectively. The demographic makeup and voting trends of Latinos and Asian Pacifics in Alhambra and Monterey Park support the Erie et al. thesis that among highly commingled areas, barriers to political coalitions arise.

As illustrated by Table 9, in all of the randomly selected election precincts in the partially incorporated cities of East Los Angeles, Los Angeles, and Belvedere, there was a high degree of racially polarized voting among the identified Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters. In East Los Angeles, the total number of identified Latino precinct voters was 92 compared with the 81 total votes for Martinez and Torres. This would result in a ratio, as illustrated by Graph 3 in the Appendix, of over three-quarters. In the randomly selected election precincts in Los Angeles, the total number of identified Latino precinct voters was 216 compared with the 167 total votes for Martinez and Torres. The ratio between these two, as illustrated by Graph 4 (p. 36), was over three-quarters. In the one randomly selected election precinct of Belvedere, the total number of identified Latino election precinct voters was 106 compared with the 98 total votes for Martinez and Torres for a ratio of over three-quarters according to Graph 5.

For the identified Asian Pacific precinct voters in these election precincts, there also existed a high degree of racially polarized voting. In the one election precinct in East Los Angeles, the number of identified Asian Pacific precinct voters (9) was exactly equivalent to the number of total votes for Chu as illustrated in Graph 3 (p. 36). In the Los Angeles election precinct, the total number of identified Asian Pacific voters was 10 compared to the total 27 votes received by Chu. Based on these findings, a strong probability existed that Chu's total votes came from a majority of the 10 identified Asian Pacific precinct voters and some from the precinct voters identified as "Other." The significance of these findings in the above election precincts

Table 9 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific Election Precinct Voters in East Los Angeles, Los Angeles, and Belvedere

East Los Angeles Election Precincts	Total Number of Identified Latino Precinct Voters	Total Martinez Precinct Votes	Total Torres Precinct Votes	Total Number of Identified Asian Pacific Precinct Voters	Total Chu Precinct Votes	Total Number of "Other" Identified Precinct Voters
4500016A	92	57	24	9	9	5
Total (T)	T=92	T=57	T=24	T=9	T=9	T=5
Los Angeles Election Precincts	Total Number of Identified Latino Precinct Voters	Total Martinez Precinct Votes	Total Torres Precinct Votes	Total Number of Identified Asian Pacific Precinct Voters	Total Chu Precinct Votes	Total Number of "Other" Identified Precinct Voters
9000901A	122	86	12	10	20	16
9002811A	94	57	12	0	7	12
Total (T)	T=216	T=143	T=24	T=10	T=27	T=28
Belvedere Election Precincts	Total Number of Identified Latino Precinct Voters	Total Martinez Precinct Votes	Total Torres Precinct Votes	Total Number of Identified Asian Pacific Precinct Voters	Total Chu Precinct Votes	Total Number of "Other" Identified Precinct Voters
0850054A	106	82	16	3	23	8
Total (T)	T=106	T=82	T=16	T=3	T=23	T=8

Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information.

was that the Gingles threshold was easily exceeded. Since only one or two randomly selected election precincts in each of these partially incorporated cities was chosen, a regression analysis could not be performed.

In some cities, particularly East Los Angeles, the theoretical argument that racially polarized voting occurs was magnified by the disproportionate number of Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters. In this heavily Latino populated city, there were 92 identified Latino precinct voters compared to 9 identified Asian Pacific precinct voters. The ratio of identified Latino precinct voters to the total votes for Martinez and Torres was almost one to one. The ratio of identified Asian Pacific precinct voters to the total votes for Chu was exactly one to one. Thus, in a city where Latinos represented 96 percent of the total population compared to less than 2 percent for Asian Pacifics, based on the above findings, there appeared to be no cross-racial voting by Latinos for Chu.

According to Table 10, a high degree of racially polarized voting occurred in the randomly selected election precincts in Rosemead and San Gabriel. In Rosemead, the total number of identified Latino voters was 92 compared with the 104 total votes for Martinez and Torres. In San Gabriel, the total number of identified Latino voters was 87 was almost the same as the 88 total votes for Martinez and Chu.

The total number of identified Asian Pacific precinct voters in the Rosemead election precincts was 42 compared with the 49 total votes Chu received. In the San Gabriel election precincts, there existed a total number of 22 identified Asian Pacific voters compared with the 38 total votes Chu received. As seen in Graph 6 and Graph 7, the *Gingles* test is clearly met in Rosemead and San Gabriel, and strongly illustrates the case that racially polarized vot-

ing occurred among Latino and Asian Pacific voters. Therefore, in the next section, the effects of such voting will be examined on the development and maintenance of a viable Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition.

III. THE EFFECTS OF RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING ON LATINO-ASIAN PACIFIC POLITICAL COALITION BUILDING

As illustrated earlier, the prospects for a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election appeared very slim

Table 10 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific Election Precinct Voters in Rosemead and San Gabriel

<i>Rosemead Election Precincts</i>	<i>Total Number of Identified Latino Precinct Voters</i>	<i>Total Martinez Precinct Votes</i>	<i>Total Torres Precinct Votes</i>	<i>Total Number of Identified Asian Pacific Precinct Voters</i>	<i>Total Chu Precinct Votes</i>	<i>Total Number of "Other" Identified Precinct Voters</i>
5750017A	60	44	11	19	33	57
5750071A	32	41	8	23	16	49
Total (T)	T=92	T=85	T=19	T=42	T=49	T=106
<i>San Gabriel Election Precincts</i>	<i>Total Number of Identified Latino Precinct Voters</i>	<i>Total Martinez Precinct Votes</i>	<i>Total Torres Precinct Votes</i>	<i>Total Number of Identified Asian Pacific Precinct Voters</i>	<i>Total Chu Precinct Votes</i>	<i>Total Number of "Other" Identified Precinct Voters</i>
6100015A	50	48	2	19	18	101
6100033A	37	34	4	3	20	118
Total (T)	T=87	T=82	T=6	T=22	T=38	T=219

Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information.

due to the high degree of racially polarized voting. Both Martinez and Chu were able to capture a large percentage of the Latino and Asian Pacific votes, respectively, but were unable to cross over to the opposite racial minority voters. As a result of racially polarized voting, a Latino-Asian Pacific coalition could not develop due to two important factors: 1) the concept of minority representation versus non-minority representation; and 2) the political incorporation of Asian Pacifics.

Minority versus Non-Minority Representation

The first factor impeding a bi-racial coalition was the necessity to distinguish between minority versus non-minority representation. For many racial minority groups, as Browning, Marshall, and Tabb stated (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, 1990, p. 5), the key struggle of local politics has centered around actual representation through their incorporation into a bi-racial coalition. In the case of African American and Latino communities in California which had no representatives of the same race in 1960, minority representation has grown to only twenty-seven African American and three Latino mayors in cities with populations over 50,000. As a result of the need for minority representation, there has been increased racial representation in state and local positions among the Latino community, although still not proportional to their population. The same phenomenon also existed among the Asian Pacific communities in which Judy Chu attempted to become the first

Chinese American in the Assembly since March Fong Eu left in 1974. Thus, there has not been a Chinese American representative in the Assembly for over twenty years, although Asian Pacifics represented the fastest growing racial group in California (Ong and Azores, p. 2). As seen earlier with Leland T. Saito's study of the Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition that developed in 1990 centering on the redistricting and reapportionment of San Gabriel Valley, the underlying reason why Latino coalition leaders ultimately agreed to a joint redistricting plan was that it assured to them minority representation through the reelection of a Latino candidate.

With this idea of minority representation in mind, it is understandable why racially polarized voting occurred among the Latino and Asian Pacific communities in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election. The 49th Assembly district community has traditionally been viewed as a historically "Latino" represented community. Many of its past representatives have been Latino, as illustrated by Diane Martinez's victories in 1991 and 1995. The most important challenge faced by Latinos and by Asian Pacifics in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election was the urgency of obtaining a minority representation for themselves. This idea would support the Erie et al. theory that highly commingled areas would experience competition for limited political resources such as elected representatives.

The Political Incorporation of Asian Pacifics: Its Effects Upon Established Racial Minority Groups and The Development of Interest Group Strategy

A second factor which may have ultimately contributed to racially polarized voting is the increased political incorporation of Asian Pacifics. As mentioned earlier, there has not been a Chinese American representative in the State Assembly for over twenty years, despite the fact Asian Pacifics represent the fastest growing racial group in California. Given the trend of increasing numbers of Asian Pacifics in an atmosphere where all minority racial groups strive for greater representation, it can be argued that Latinos perceived Asian Pacifics as a potential threat to their traditionally Latino represented district. The 1994 49th Assembly district primary election represented one Latino represented district that contained an established Latino voter base (East Los Angeles, Monterey Park, and Alhambra). However, in the last twenty years, the cities of Monterey Park, Alhambra, Rosemead, and San Gabriel have witnessed a large Asian Pacific population growth. As a result of their increased population growth in these cities, younger generation Asian Pacific individuals are slowly being politically incorporated into mainstream political institutions. There have been studies illustrating that older generation Asian Pacifics are more concerned with "homeland politics" than American politics (Pye, 1984, p. 49). Nonetheless, as a result of their acculturation into the mainstream political processes and institutions during the last twenty years, Asian Pacific candidates running for local positions (e.g. city unified school board districts, city council) and state representative positions (e.g. secretary of state, state treasurer) are becoming more prevalent in California politics. In 1993, for example, Mike Woo became the first Asian Pacific Los Angeles mayoral candidate to run in the nation's second largest city.

With the increased political incorporation of Asian Pacifics particularly in cities within the 1994 49th Assembly district, Asian Pacifics own a degree of political clout. However, it must also be noted that sheer numerical repre-

sentation is not enough to ensure political clout:

The ability to mount a large-scale protest depends on the absolute number of people who can be mobilized to demonstrate. In contrast, the ability to mount a powerful electoral challenge depends not on numbers but on the percentage which those numbers constitute of the electorate (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, 1990, p. 13).

With this point in mind, Los Angeles Asian Pacific community leaders realized the political potential that the San Gabriel Valley Asian Pacific constituency possessed. Los Angeles Latino community members recognized this potential and agreed to cooperate with Asian Pacifics leaders during the 1990 redistricting and reapportionment process. Such a political coalition between both racial groups would have been unheard of in either the 1970 or 1980 redistricting and reapportionment processes. Asian Pacifics did not constitute a significant population in San Gabriel during these periods. As one Asian Pacific coalition member succinctly put it: "I can say that Asians are committed to working with Latinos because the political reality is that Asians need Latinos more than Latinos need Asians because our population is smaller and we have a low number of registered votes" (Saito, 1993, p. 61). The significance of this illustrates how the increased demographic growth and political incorporation of Asian Pacifics affected established racial minority groups' political interests. Due to the rapid population growth of Asian Pacifics in San Gabriel Valley over the last two decades and their subsequent political acculturation, Latinos realized the necessity of having to form a political alliance with Asians during the 1990 redistricting and reapportionment process.

Historically established minorities have turned to special interest strategy as an effective form of political empowerment. According to Bruce Cain:

Typically party allegiance fosters an ideology that gives logical coherence to or at least some reasoned connection between various issue positions held by its followers. By comparison, groups adopting special interest orientation eschew permanent alliances for temporary partnerships of convenience and tend to prefer strategies that allow them to 'go it alone' (Cain, 1991, p. 15).

The two main reasons for the adoption of special interest strategy, according to Cain, are the following: the diversity of interests and opinions within the minority communities themselves and the absence of strong political parties, with which minorities can identify (Cain, 1991). This may have been the situation with the Latino-Asian Pacific reapportionment coalition in which diverse interests within and among the two racial groups may have forced the two to "go it alone" in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election. An example of this strategy was the decision of the Martinez and Chu campaigns to run against each other in the Democratic primary as opposed to attempting to establish a political alliance like the 1990 Latino-Asian Pacific redistricting and reapportionment coalition. The competing interests that marked both the Martinez and Chu campaigns overrode any attempts to bridge common political interests among them. As will be discussed in the next section, the future of multi-racial coalitions in Los Angeles will depend on a new leadership that must be able to bridge these competing interests.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the framework of the Erie et al. theory, it appears that the most serious barrier to a coalition between Latinos and Asian Pacifics in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election may be political, because of their diffuse and commingled residential patterns. This theory is supported by two factors: first, the high degree of racially polarized voting between the two groups during the primary election; and second, the urgency that underlied both the Martinez and Chu campaigns for greater minority representation.

The first factor which illustrated the potential barriers to a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition is the trend of racially polarized voting that occurred in the following cities in the 1994 49th Assembly district: Alhambra, Monterey Park, East Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Rosemead, San Gabriel, and Belvedere. However, the degree of racially polarized voting differed among these cities. In the cities with heavily populated Latino and Asian Pacific concentrations (Alhambra, Monterey Park, East Los Angeles), racially polarized voting was high. A Pearson regression analysis of the total number of Latino and Asian Pacific identified precinct voters and the total number of votes, which the Latino and Asian Pacific candidates in Alhambra and Monterey Park received, showed a significant relationship. In the one election precinct analyzed in East Los Angeles, the city with the largest Latino population, a strong degree of racially polarized voting occurred when comparing the total number of identified Latino precinct voters with the total number of votes received by both Martinez and Torres. In smaller incorporated areas with less Latino and Asian Pacific populations such as Belvedere and parts of Los Angeles, the degree of racially polarized voting was not as high among the identified Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters.

It is important to note the limitations of these findings for racial bloc voting among the Latino and Asian Pacific identified voters. Since neither campaigns nor local newspapers conducted an exit poll of the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election, the occurrence of racially polarized voting could not be directly measured. Instead, a theoretical argument of racially polarized voting was made based on precinct and census data. Thus, it is recommended that a survey be developed which would target identified and randomly selected Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters, who voted in the primary election. Such surveys could provide information to explain the reason(s) why they voted for a certain candidate.

Nonetheless, the findings of the election precinct data strongly support the argument that racially polarized voting occurred among the identified Latino and Asian Pacific voters. This in turn was one of the barriers that existed against the formation of a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition. If Latinos and Asian Pacific voters did in fact vote along racial lines, what was the possibility of them voting for a consensus candidate backed by a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition? For example, if a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition was formed that agreed to support Judy Chu as their candidate for the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election, would the Latino voters in Alhambra, Monterey Park, and East Los Angeles necessarily have voted for her? Further, the findings illustrated that racial representation in state and local elected and appointed positions is a key political issue for Latino and Asian Pacific communities. This belief is supported by the degree of political urgency that stemmed from the Chu and Martinez campaigns. Judy Chu stat-

ed that both Latinos and Asian Pacifics were underrepresented in local government and thus strived for greater political incorporation. Chu believed that the respective groups' attempts at greater political representation negatively impacted the potentials for a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition in the 49th Assembly district: "In some ways there are going to be problems in this (San Gabriel Valley) area because these groups make up significant percentages of the population and want greater political representation" (Chu, interview). However, Chu believed that Latinos were already making some inroads for greater political representation at the local and state government levels compared with Asian Pacifics: "There already exists a group of Latino Assembly representatives that are flexing their muscle. Latinos are just beginning to obtain political incorporation. Asians are still at the infancy stage in (American) politics, but I see them making significant strides in terms of voter registration and outreach" (Chu, interview).

Attempts to achieve greater political incorporation into local and state representative positions is problematic particularly when a more recent group begins to challenge politically a pre-established groups' representation of a political district. Historically, the major cities within the 1994 49th Assembly district boundaries (e.g. Monterey Park, East Los Angeles, and Alhambra), have been both Latino and Democratic in its constituency and representation. With the recent influx of Asian Pacifics primarily after the Immigration Act of 1965, these cities have witnessed the largest Asian Pacific population growth in the nation during the last twenty years (Ong and Azores, 1991, p. 12). Subsequently, Asian Pacifics have begun to run as candidates as opposed to simply being large campaign contributors to non-Asian Pacific candidates. These trends are consistent with the Erie et al theory that competition for limited political resources in highly commingled residential areas like the 1994 49th Assembly district acts as the most serious obstacle to the formation of a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition.


Prospects For Future Latino-Asian Pacific Political Coalitions: The Need For A New Coalition Leadership To Bridge Competing Interests

Despite these findings of racially polarized voting and competition for minority representation, political coalitions between Latinos and Asian Pacifics might be possible in future local and state elections, particularly with the reconfiguration of multi-racial politics. The traditional bi-racial coalition in Los Angeles between White liberals and African Americans must eventually be reconfigured to accommodate the growing interests of Latinos and Asian Pacifics. As a result of these new racial groups, there will be those groups who will likely align with others who have similar ideologies, interests, and leadership (Sonenshein, 1993, p. 267). According to Erie et al, the prospects for a political coalition between Latinos and Asian Pacifics will likely rest with policies dealing with nativity and immigration issues. Along these lines, Sonenshein believed that the future challenge of managing multi-racial coalitions in the post-incorporation period of Los Angeles is the development of a leadership which can bridge competing interests and create new coalitions (1993). Thus, in the case of the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election, the competing interests of the Latino and Asian Pacific communities must be guided by the same type of political philosophy fostered by the Latino and Asian Pacific coalition leaders of the 1990 redistricting and reapportionment coalition in San Gabriel (Saito, 1993, p. 60). Those Asian Pacific coalition leaders, who were newcomers to the electoral politics


scene, realized the need to develop an alliance with more experienced and larger represented Latinos. Latino coalition leaders understood the growing population and campaign fundraising ability of the Asian Pacific community. It was this form of leadership in both communities that was able to make the Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition work, despite the Erie et al belief that political issues like redistricting and reapportionment would be a barrier to the formation of such a coalition. As a result of this new coalition leadership, future types of bi-racial coalitions in Los Angeles, whether it be between Asian Pacifics and Latinos, could be possible.

APPENDIX


Graph 1 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific Election Precinct Voters in Alhambra




Graph 2 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific Election Precinct Voters in Monterey Park




Graph 3 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific Election Precinct Voters in East Los Angeles




Graph 4 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific Election Precinct Voters in Los Angeles




Graph 5 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific Election Precinct Voters in Belvedere



Graph 6 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific Election Precinct Voters in Rosemead



Graph 7 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific Election Precinct Voters in San Gabriel



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