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THEORETICAL ORIENTATIONS AND VALUES OF FEMINIST PSYCHOLOGISTS.

MARY. RICKETTS

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THEORETICAL ORIENTATIONS AND
VALUES OF FEMINIST PSYCHOLOGISTS

by

© Mary Ricketts

M.A. University of Windsor, 1976
M.L.S. University of Western Ontario, 1981

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through the Department of Psychology
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy at the
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1986

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my friend, Dr. Gary J. McDonald (1949-1984), because his life and work inspired my research, and because he believed in me. May he rest in peace.

Gary J McDonald 1949-1984

The many friends and colleagues of Gary J McDonald were shocked and saddened to learn of Gary's death December 22 from AIDS. He was a leader in research on the social psychology of gay men and a dynamic advocate of gay liberation.

Gary twice won the Mark Freedman Memorial Award, presented by the American Association of Lesbian and Gay Psychologists, for outstanding research on gay psychology. He received his PhD in psychology from the University of Windsor last June. Dr Henry Minton, Gary's doctoral research supervisor, said: "His loss to psychology and to gay liberation is a major one. My consolation is that his life touched mine."

Gary's organizational achievements include the co-organization of the first University of Regina gay association in the early 1970s. Later, he helped found and chaired the Canadian Psychological Association's section on Gay Lesbian Issues.

As an educator Gary conducted courses at a number of universities on sex roles and attitudes toward homosexuality.

Gary also studied drama at the Banff School of Fine Arts, wrote a children's play performed in Winnipeg, sang in musical productions in Saskatchewan, and sang and acted in Dawson City. He was a born mimic and story-teller with an ability to transform a small incident in a friend's life into a grand tale. His stories showed people that they were

important and often taught them something about themselves.

In 1983 he addressed the first Winnipeg AIDS forum, at which he spoke passionately on the need for gay men to retain their sense of self-worth in the face of an anti-gay backlash precipitated by AIDS. Despite his own difficult circumstances, he kept his fine sense of humour and showed much interest in and concern for other people.

Gary will probably be remembered as a trailblazer in the study of the social psychology of gay men, but, more importantly, he worked tremendously hard to use his skills, knowledge and public profile as tools for social change. His battle was the battle of hundreds of thousands of Canadian gay men and lesbians who are trying to deal more positively with their problems. Gary made that battle into a lifetime commitment. We are deeply in his debt. □

Compiled by Robert Strayer and Stan Rands in Regina; Lyle Dick, Dick Smith, Gerry, Eugene and Dan in Winnipeg; Henry Minton and Frank Butler in Windsor; and Phyllis Elliot and Anne Sprague in Toronto.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of the present study was to investigate the theoretical orientations and values of contemporary North American feminist psychologists. Surveys were distributed to all participants at the 1985 annual national conferences of the Association for Women in Psychology, and the Canadian Psychological Association's Section on Women and Psychology. On dichotomous measures of theoretical orientation in psychology (those that are based on the concept of opposing objectivist vs. subjectivist or scientist vs. humanist epistemologies), scores of respondents in the present study tended on the average to be in a markedly subjectivistic direction. As well as tending to favour subjectivistic rather than objectivistic epistemology, respondents in the present study also tended to be exogenist rather than endogenist in their views about the sources of individual differences, that is, they tended to place more emphasis on the external, social determinants of human behaviour than internal, biological determinants. Feminist psychologists also endorsed values about the role of science in society that were consistent with rejection of traditional positivist assumptions about the value-neutrality of science. Endorsement of a value-laden conceptualization of science was found to be associated with a preference for subjectivist epistemology. Significant within-group differences were found between heterosexual and non-heterosexual feminists, the latter group tending to favour a more subjectivistic and more exogenist theoretical orientation than the former, and between feminist academics and practitioners, the latter group tending to favour a more subjectivistic but less exogenist theoretical orientation than

the former. Results were discussed in the context of the changing theoretical values culture within psychology and directions for further research were described.

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I want to thank my parents, Margaret and William Ricketts, my brother, Michael Ricketts, and my best friend and severest critic, Arthur McIntyre, for their love and encouragement over the years. My committee members, Henry Minton (co-chair), Stewart Page, and Mary Lou Dietz, each contributed in their unique fashion to this project, and I am grateful for their guidance and insights. I was honored by the participation of prominent feminist psychologists Rhoda Unger and Jeri Wine as external co-chair and external examiner, respectively, on my committee. My friends Sally Kennedy, Olga Malott and Liz Duffin each provided competent practical assistance as well as emotional support through the tedious stages of data analysis and manuscript preparation. Doris Swan and David Reynolds always made risk-taking seem fun and worthwhile throughout my graduate school adventure, and I am grateful for their friendship and example. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the assistance provided by Doris Howard of the Association for Women in Psychology and Meryl Cook of the Canadian Psychological Association's Section on Women and Psychology in distributing my questionnaires, and the cooperation of the feminist psychologists who returned them.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the traditional view of psychology as a value-free science and of psychologists as objective, dispassionate observers of human behaviour has been challenged. Critiques of the role played by the positivist philosophy of science in shaping the development of North American psychology (Buss, 1979; Sampson, 1978) have demonstrated that a belief in the value neutrality of science is merely an assumption about epistemology which arises from the positivist world view; in other words, a value. With the erosion of the hegemony of positivist values has come an awareness that seemingly irresolvable differences in outlook among various groups within psychology reflect the existence of incompatible epistemologies (Koch, 1981). Consequently, interest has been shown in the development of psychometric measures of psychologists' epistemologies, in order to profile the value systems of distinct interest groups within the profession (Coan, 1979; Kimble, 1984; Krasner & Houts, 1984; Unger, 1984a). The present investigation is a case study of contemporary feminist psychologists, modelled after Krasner and Houts' (1984) study of the value systems of the founders of the behaviour modification movement.

Feminist psychology in North America emerged as a formally organized, distinct community of scholars in the early 1970s, with the formation of Division 35 (The Psychology of Women) of the American Psychological Association (APA) and the autonomous Association for

Women in Psychology (AWP). Parallel organizational efforts were taking place in Canadian psychology around the same time (Pyke & Stark-Adamec, 1981) and have resulted in what is known today as the Section on Women and Psychology (SWAP) of the Canadian Psychological Association (CPA). These developments took place within the larger social context of the women's movement, and feminist psychology has always been fairly explicit in acknowledging its emancipatory values and goals. "Feminist psychologists hold the conviction that women are an oppressed group, and the oppression ought to be ended" (Wallston, 1986). Feminist psychology was also inspired by a keen sense of betrayal at the biased way women's behaviour and experience have traditionally been treated as subject matter by men in the field. "The response is one of outrage that these procedures could have been used in a field we thought was what it said it was: scientific, an honest research for truth using a particular kind of method" (Parlee, 1985, p. 195).

The first section of this chapter will provide some historical perspective on the gradual shift away from rigid adherence to positivist values that has occurred within psychology. The epistemological implications of methodological issues raised during the crisis of confidence era in social psychology will be discussed, and parallels will be drawn between these issues and key themes in the feminist critique of "scientific" psychology.

The second section of this chapter will review the progress of recent efforts to measure and describe the epistemological values of psychologists, specifically the work of Coan (1979), Kimble (1984), Krasner and Houts (1984), and Unger (1984a). Based on the findings of these studies, some exploratory hypotheses will be generated about the

epistemological values profile of feminist psychologists that is expected to emerge from the present research.

Feminism and the Crisis of Confidence

Historical Roots of the Crisis of Confidence

According to Kuhn (1970), science is an essentially cultural creation to be understood in psychological and motivational terms. Science is scientists, who are psychological entities, not just logical ones. In Kuhnian terms, a "paradigm" represents the necessary consensus of a group of scholars about the nature and purpose of research in their field. A paradigm has two components, a "disciplinary matrix" and "shared exemplars." The disciplinary matrix is a set of fundamental assumptions or metatheory that is simply accepted as given, which categorically determines the direction of theory construction and hypothesis testing. Shared exemplars are approved models of good research which provide methods and precedents for investigating problems.

The field of psychology has been dominated by a paradigm that can basically be characterized as imitative of the outlook and methods of nineteenth century natural scientists. The central assumptions which form psychology's disciplinary matrix were heavily influenced by positivism: "... a philosophical tendency oriented around natural science and striving for a unified view of the world of phenomena, both physical and human, through the application of the methods ... whereby the natural sciences have attained their unrivalled position in the modern world" (Leichtman, 1979, p. 50).

Early in the twentieth century the controlled laboratory experiment became established as the dominant shared exemplar in North American

psychology. Gergen (1979) has argued that when psychologists became committed to experimentalism, an underlying conception of human psychological functioning was simultaneously absorbed that has significantly limited it "... in the range of its concerns, in the types of behaviour singled out for study, in the selection of explanatory constructs, and in its vision of human potential" (p. 194). In adopting a positivist approach to understanding human behaviour, psychologists also accepted a model of man that was essentially "mechanistic" in its implicit assumptions about human nature.

Danziger (1984) has commented that at a pragmatic level, the choice of a guiding metaphor has a profound effect on the way a phenomenon is subsequently conceptualized. The mechanistic model of man assumes that a person is basically like a machine, which implies certain beliefs:

1. belief in external causality;
2. belief in universal, transhistorical laws;
3. belief in reductionism; and
4. belief in quantification and prediction.

This set of assumptions has been described as the "... reactive, passive, robot, or empty organism model of man" (Reese & Overton, 1970, p. 131). Gadlin and Ingle (1975) have suggested that by adopting such a model, psychologists somewhat inadvertently specified their relationship to their human subject matter as a "person-thing" relationship in which subjects were manipulable objects, thus enabling them to overlook the implications of the experiment as a social situation for half a century.

By the mid-1960s and throughout the 1970s, a literature of self-criticism emerged within social psychology. The conclusions of reviews of many major theoretical areas within the field expressed disappointment

that decades of experimental work had failed to yield convincing advances in knowledge (Gergen, 1982). Psychologists were quick to embrace Kuhn's (1970) notion of "crisis" as a metaphor to explain what they were experiencing. Elms (1975) coined the phrase "crisis of confidence" in a somewhat satirical article which suggested that depicting psychology as embroiled in a "crisis of science" was an embarrassing exercise in self-dramatization.

In many respects the crisis of confidence can best be understood as a revolt against the inadequacies of a positivist psychology where some people, self-appointed as objective, study the behaviour of other people as if they were machines. Rosnow (1981) has organized the crisis of confidence literature around three main issues: artifacts, ethics, and relevance of the psychology experiment. These issues raised basic questions about the positivist view of psychological research as objective, value-neutral, and universally generalizable.

Artifacts. An artifact is any systematic error or bias attributable to uncontrolled variables resulting from the social interaction between the experimenter and the research subject. The artifact literature basically addressed the historical tendency of psychologists to ignore as irrelevant most aspects of the social context of the laboratory research situation, what Sherif (1979) has called its interpersonal and sociocultural "wallop" (p. 108). The social nature of human experimentation was treated as "... more a procedural difficulty ... than an indicator of a broad methodological problem or a general conceptual crisis" (Gadlin & Ingle, 1975, p. 1005). Farr (1978) has commented that because psychologists thought of themselves as guided by a natural science model of experimentation, they

tended to misconstrue social relations in the research setting as non-social, and then were surprised when unforeseen side effects or artifacts of a social nature emerged.

Ethics. The ethical literature raised questions about deception of research subjects, and focused attention on the larger sociopolitical context surrounding the research enterprise, especially the "real world" power imbalance between researchers as a social group and their subject populations. By the mid-1960s, the routine use of procedures involving deception had become institutionalized as "... standard operating procedure in the social psychologist's laboratory ... as much de rigueur as significance at the .05 level" (Kelman, 1968, p. 11). As was true of the artifact crisis, the ethical implications of deception were debated initially at the level of "procedural difficulty" rather than perceived as a fundamental challenge to the adequacy of the positivist paradigm. Kelman (1968) described over-reliance on methods involving deception by psychologists as "self-defeating," because subjects become both increasingly sophisticated and distrustful as a result, and will eventually assume they are being lied to, whether they are in fact or not.

Kelman (1972) contended that relatively powerless and dependent populations within society tend to be the focus of social research, because their existence is what is defined as "problematic" by a research community whose members tend to come from the middle and upper classes, and because these groups are also readily available as a subject pool for research in various institutional contexts. Kelman also raised questions about the "value-neutrality" of scientific findings as they are interpreted and used as the basis for rationalizing social policy.

Because less powerful groups in society are overrepresented in the subject population and vastly underrepresented in the researcher population, who are also beholden to the agencies that sponsor social research, the knowledge produced under these conditions is more likely to serve the interests of the elites in society than the disadvantaged.

In the late 1960s, increased pressure from U.S. government funding sources led social psychologists to redirect their research efforts in more applied directions. When urgent social problems such as drug abuse, violence, crime, overpopulation, the aged, women's issues, and racial conflict became the focus of psychological research, Sieber (1982) commented that the traditional ethical training of psychologists was simply not adequate to these new roles: "Scientists ventured into subcultures about which they knew far less than they realized concerning values, norms, and relationships with the larger culture" (p. 5).

Relevance. The relevance literature addressed the temporal and cultural relativity of research findings, as well as the extent to which psychologists' values and research interests at any given point in time merely mirror trends in the larger sociopolitical context to which they are bound. These ideas represented a challenge to the positivist assumptions that there are general laws of social behaviour that are transhistorical, and that knowledge about social interaction can be accumulated in the same sense that knowledge in the natural sciences is said to be cumulative. Rosnow (1981) described the central issue in this literature as the degree to which "... the method of experimentation was oblivious of how social phenomena were conditioned by developmental, teleological or historical circumstances" (p. 73).

Gergen (1973) approached the question of relevance by claiming that "... the study of social psychology is primarily an historical undertaking. We are essentially engaged in a systematic account of contemporary affairs" (p. 316). Gergen's argument challenged the basic positivist notion that there exist "universal" principles of human behaviour that transcend the temporal context from which they are derived. To Gergen, social psychology is all-too-relevant to modern culture: its subject matter is "learned dispositions of limited duration" and the field is merely a mirror of "... the continuously shifting patterns of that which is considered the good or desirable in society...." (p. 316). In stating that "... science and society constitute a feedback loop" (p. 310), Gergen focused attention on the sociohistorical context of research, stressing the often unacknowledged prescriptive or value biases that permeate psychological theories: "... as participants in society we can scarcely disassociate ourselves from these values in pursuing professional ends.... Value commitments may be unavoidable, but we can avoid masquerading them as objective reflections of truth" (p. 312).

Misogyny in Positivist Psychology

During the same period that the challenge to positivist assumptions about the objectivity, value-neutrality, and universality of psychological knowledge raised by the crisis of confidence was inspiring concern with metatheoretical issues in psychology generally, feminist psychology was becoming established (see Henley, 1985 and Parlee, 1985 for historical overviews). "Metatheoretical questions found a central place in the emergent discipline ... in part to legitimize and demarcate the new

endeavor" (Wittig, 1985, p. 800). Feminist psychologists have extensively documented how psychology as a male-dominated discipline has often merely reflected prevailing cultural views of the inferiority of women (Eichler, 1980; Laws, 1979; Lewin, 1984; Sherif, 1979; Weisstein, 1971).

Lott (1985) has commented that "... feminists can provide particularly insightful criticism of their own fields because ... we both belong and do not belong to the primarily male establishment and are thus both insiders and outsiders" (p. 156). Women scholars "... may have less commitment to prevailing ideology both because they are in a good position to recognize its flaws and because they have not received many rewards for having been committed to it" (Unger, 1983, p. 25).

Three key features of positivist psychology appear to operate in combination to produce "knowledge" about women that is inimical to them. The negative consequences for women of context-stripping, person-blaming, and an androcentric model of "man" transform concerns about artifacts, ethics, and relevance of the experiment from abstract armchair issues to problems that have "real world" implications.

Context-stripping. Mishler (1979) coined the phrase "context-stripping" to describe the cumulative effect, and intent, of standard methods of experimental design in psychology. "Concepts, environments, social interactions are all simplified by methods which lift them out of their contexts, stripping them of the very complexity which characterizes them in the real world" (Parlee, 1979, p. 131).

Benston (1982) has described the ideological bias underlying psychology's commitment to context-stripping research methods. "Scientific practice is to be devoted strictly to abstract, quantifiable

knowledge of the world where one strips down the phenomena of interest to 'basic' measurable quantities which can be observed undistorted by subjective factors" (p. 55). The implication is that attempting to integrate any non-quantitative content is incompatible with the ideal of objectivity and that a reductionist "impoverished reality" is "... somehow better or truer than any alternative" (p. 55). Benston then identified an intrinsic compatibility between the acceptance of this kind of science as a "good" and the positivist value assumptions that form psychology's metatheory, especially its dichotomized view of humanity, or male/female dualism.

Men are not expected to mix emotions or aesthetics or concern for the objects of study with rational thought; the male/female split of traits, in fact, makes pure rationality the ideal for men, while leaving subjective factors as the feminine domain. In such a split, one can be either rational or subjective, but not both (pp. 55-56).

Sherif (1979) implicated the context-stripping features of experimental design as conducive to the perpetuation of sexist bias in research, contradicting the notion that context-stripping is any guarantee of objectivity. She described a "short course in how to perpetuate social myth":

Restrict the framework for study to a narrow span of time. Attend only to what you decide is important, ignoring as much else as possible. Label these important aspects in the language of 'variables', both to sound objective and to mask your ignorance. Arrange the research situation as you choose. If you are biased, the situation will be. Record your selectively chosen data and discuss them as though dealing with eternal verities. If anyone tries to refer to historical, cultural or organizational circumstances outside of your own narrow framework ... derogate such talk as referring to 'soft' facts and 'soft' disciplines which you see as being of little relevance to your carefully controlled variables and findings (pp. 107-108).

Sherif (1979) also contended that because the experiment has historically been equated in social psychology with the "hard science" way of seeking knowledge, the measure of the worth of alternative

research methods has been their relative "hardness," or the extent to which they approximate the "rigour" of the experiment. She described the commonplace use of the adjectives "hard" and "soft" to modify terms like "data" as "... men trying to put down other men and their work" (p. 103) by the subtle connotation that "soft" somehow implies "effeminate." That contextual research techniques tend also to be often described pejoratively as "quasi-experimental" or "non-experimental" may in part explain psychologists' relatively greater discomfort with their acceptance than is apparent in the other social sciences.

In addressing the issue of the feminist perspective in psychology's active exclusion from the mainstream, Parlee (1979) commented that context-stripping research methods serve to obscure important connections between individual experience and social roles and institutions, which are crucial to understanding women's behaviour. In failing to take into account the socially structured power relations between the sexes which form the reality context in which interactions between individuals are embedded, context-stripping methods represent "... a commitment to making the political personal--the very opposite of what women realize when they become feminists" (p. 133).

Person-blaming. Psychology's focus on the individual helps to perpetuate a tendency to "blame the victim," that is, to explain behaviour in terms of intrapersonal variables rather than in terms of the relevant social context. "If one were to design a theory to keep women in inferior position and at lowered worth, none is more suitable than one locating the causes of women's behaviour and problems inside the woman" (Sherif, 1979, p. 119). Ryan (1971) has noted that policies suggested by research from this perspective "... are invariably conceived

to revamp and revise the victim, never to change the surrounding circumstances" (p. 24).

Two contemporary topics in the psychology of women exemplify acceptance of the "person-blaming" fallacy, to the extent that each assumes that the explanation for women's lower status in society lies in our individual psychological deficiencies. The unquestioned assumption is also made in each case whenever the behaviour of females differs from male norms, that difference is a sign of women's inferiority (Wine, 1982).

Horner's (1972) research on "fear of success" has been described by Tresemer (1977) as an effort to patch up a male theory of achievement to accommodate women, without questioning the masculinized definition of achievement or recognizing that it is a person-blaming construct. Wine (1982) has commented:

Though the extensive research literature on this motive has failed to replicate Horner's early results ... [fear of success] has become part of the folklore in psychology. It obviously serves the male-centered purposes of explaining away women's underrepresentation in advanced educational and occupational pursuits as our own fault (p. 75):

Bem (1974) developed the first measure of psychological "androgyny" which treated masculinity and femininity as two separate dimensions, in an attempt to correct for the negative bias against femininity inherent in traditional measures. Gender role flexibility was proposed as an alternative to rigid gender role typing as an ideal standard for human psychological adjustment. The androgyny construct generated an extensive literature, but it eventually became apparent that to become androgynous was somehow both more desirable and adaptive for women than for men (Jones et al., 1978). The subtle implication was that women could and should strive to improve their status in society by becoming more masculinized, that their femininity was what was basically "wrong"

with women and holding them back.

Both constructs (fear of success and androgyny) were inspired by feminist concerns about improving the status of women in society. Yet the combined impact of these influential concepts has been a very clear message that what women need to do to achieve equality with men (and enjoy better mental health) is to "act more like men," a recommendation that is fundamentally sexist (as well as rather hostile and insulting to women). "Popularized accounts of the findings pointed the finger at individual differences--back at women themselves--and away from larger social phenomena" (Henley, 1985, p. 106). Unger (1983) has pointed out that person-centered explanations for behaviour "... share a deep paradigmatic relationship to biological explanations. Society is seen as relatively unproblematic whereas individual behaviour is seen as problematic" (p. 22).

Caplan and Nelson (1973) discussed several reward contingencies in the professional milieu within which psychologists operate that predispose them to favouring a person-blaming approach, which often lends itself readily to person-fixing rather than system-fixing interpretations and change strategies. Because it is an occupational expectancy that psychological research should demonstrate the applicability of clinical skills and services (person-fixing), the chief focus of interest for psychologists tends to be on intrapersonal variables rather than possible causal factors outside their own area of expertise. Second, in terms of career advancements, "... it is the good will and approval of our colleagues in the scientific community, not that of the target population members affected by our work, that get us ahead" (p. 205). Third, in terms of socialization to the profession,

"... participants take it as given that members of the highest group have the right to define the way things really are ... by refusing to accept the hierarchy of credibility, we express disrespect for the entire established order" (p. 206).

Unger (1983) has implicated these same forces as factors responsible for the intransigence of the mainstream in psychology to scholarship by and about women. "Not all members of a community of scholars have an equal opportunity to define what is legitimate knowledge ... women have less legitimacy than men even when they occupy supposedly equivalent positions" (pp. 23-24). Caplan and Nelson (1973) concluded that the regnant disciplinary outlook of psychology as a science basically colludes with the preference of officialdom for person-blame explanations for social problems in a mutually beneficial exchange. As well, the positivist propensity to regard "scientific data" as "truth" divorced from the realities of time, place or use, allows psychologists to downplay the repercussions of their research findings on the groups affected by them.

Androcentric model of "man." Wine (1982) has commented that the nature of the ideal human being that is evident in psychology's model of "man" is directly tied to its positivist methodologies. The guiding image is the "... abstracted, separated, self-interested, context-free individual" (p. 69). Androcentric individualism values separation, domination, rationality and egocentrism, and is an incomplete and impoverished view of human nature which is antithetical to the gynocentric principle of relationality:

Relationality refers to consciousness of the necessary interdependence of human beings, to a sense of connectedness to others, to awareness of one's embeddedness in human, social and historical contexts, to the maximization of well-being for all

persons, and to commitment to nonviolence (p. 68)

Unexamined positivist androcentric value assumptions underlying psychological theories play a subtle role in reinforcing the masculine life experience as a "human" standard in a way that is often detrimental or unfavourable to women.

Gergen (1979) has identified a deeply rooted bias in favour of logic over emotion, of abstraction in preference to concrete, historical or dialectical thought. Objectivity is valued over subjectivity, and hypothetico-deductive reasoning over intuitive or creative processes. "For the positivist, processes in the affective domain are either irrelevant or antithetical to understanding in the cognitive mode ... in a broad sense the affective processes are viewed as inferior and to be avoided in the quest for fundamental truth" (p. 196). Gergen described the manner in which theories of attitude change and social perception basically depend on a model of man as a rational being whose wires can get crossed by various emotional factors. "Affect is thus considered injurious to perceptual fidelity" (p. 204).

Reason and science are idealized as "precision tools" for the understanding and mastery of the material and social world. Being in control of oneself and controlling others are both highly valued characteristics of the positivist androcentric model of man. Furby (1979) has sensitively explored how research in the area of locus of control has been biased by the assumption that internality is inherently more desirable than externality. The main thrust of published studies has been described as a search for the means by which individuals can gain or increase this orientation, without considering the possibility that different people's environments may differ considerably in the

degree to which they are even potentially controllable. "This problem is considered individual and psychological, and no consideration is given to its possible societal roots" (p. 173).

Furby (1979) described the religious expression of positivism in the Protestant work ethic and its economic expression in the capitalist spirit as the antecedents of the North American cultural ideal of the independent, self-reliant individual who acts assertively in his own self-interest. She also analyzed the manner in which the fostering of an ideology which values internality functions as an effective means of social control in any society characterized by gross inequities in power between groups. If one's failure to get ahead in life is believed to be the result of a personal lack of ability or effort, the response alternatives range from self-pity to self-improvement. "Those who have more than the average wealth and power in American society have a vested interest in propagating an ideology that stresses internal locus of control" (p. 177). Furby suggested that North American psychologists were not sufficiently critical of the bias in favour of internality in locus of control theory because it did not contradict their personal experience by virtue of their relatively privileged socioeconomic status. The highly individualistic model of man and social life the theory portrays is also entirely congruent with typical masculine gender identity preoccupations with personal dominance over others.

Androcentric bias has also been analyzed by Israel (1979) in other research areas. He pointed to the hidden assumptions about human nature and society underlying level of aspiration, social comparison and conformity, and cognitive dissonance theories. According to Israel, these theories all basically revolve around salient middle class

masculine achievement concerns:

... as a consequence of a competitive, hierarchically structured social world, a nearly compulsive need to evaluate oneself in order to judge what would further one's self-interests in an achievement-oriented world ... and the conflict created by opposite desires: on the one hand, to go ahead, to be successful, to be superior, to surpass others; and on the other hand, to be accepted by the group as a subject who does not deviate too much from 'the common guy' and thus one who would not be rejected by and become isolated from the others (p. 242).

The implicit model of man is the typical male achiever: economic man striving in the marketplace in single-minded hot pursuit of personal goals. This model's assumptions were probably accepted so uncritically by psychologists because of the ubiquitous ideology of capitalism which permeates North American culture. But Israel also suggested a more compelling reason might have been that the model so closely mirrored the personal experience of young academics embroiled in a continuous struggle for advancement:

The problems these psychologists posed were similar to those that could be observed in the daily behaviour of other psychologists within their own academic environment.... Since some of the results were self-evident to the point of triviality, the researchers falsely concluded that they were studying problems related to 'human nature' (p. 254).

Wine (1985) has described traditional models of social interaction as being inspired by an androcentric "man against his environment" image. Social exchange, social power, social competence, and assertiveness theories all characterize interpersonal interaction as a win-lose game wherein self-centred pursuit of one's own goals is defined as adaptive, and prosocial behaviours (altruistic or nurturant responses) are, systematically evaluated as maladaptive.

This brief review of unexamined value assumptions underlying some traditional psychological theories permits a fairly complete sketch of the features of the positivist androcentric image of the ideal human

being. Gergen (1979) described him as rational rather than emotional. Furby (1979) contributed that he expects to dominate rather than be submissive in his social environment, and believes that those he dominates deserve it. He is independent and self-reliant. Israel (1979) related that he enjoys competition and is basically out for himself, though he realizes the survival value of getting along with the guys. He defines his self-worth in terms of his achievements and would be unlikely to place others' interests before his own. Such a profile obviously conforms closely to popular cultural stereotypes of masculinity. Males in our society are supposed to be independent, objective, stoical, self-confident, competitive, and ambitious.

Because stereotypical femininity has basically been defined in terms of the negative opposites of valued masculine traits, women have tended to be generally perceived as inferior copies of the ideal human being. "Women have served as a convenient 'other' to aid in defining the essence of humanity, the male" (Wine, 1982, p. 70). Laws (1978) also described this pattern as "... the assumption of male as normal and female as exception, of man as essence and woman as accident" (p. 4). The positivist androcentric model of man is considered by feminists to be a source of misogyny because research based on its assumptions usually appears to scientifically validate notions of women's inferiority to men, and perpetuates gender role stereotypes, that is, constructed views of men and women that contribute to the oppression of women by encouraging a

... political distribution of traits whereby one group (males) is assigned a set of traits that would facilitate their dominance and control of another group (females), which in turn is assigned another, different set of traits that would render them easily controlled (Greenglass, 1982, p. 11).

In conclusion, feminist psychology has been described as having

progressed rapidly through an "imitation" and a "protest" phase with respect to traditional positivist assumptions and methods (Wine, 1985). These developments have been discussed in the context of concurrent progress within mainstream social psychology, which for a long time identified itself as an empirical science, then experienced a crisis of confidence about the objectivity and value neutrality of the knowledge produced by such methods.

Several recent reviews of the progress of feminist psychology suggest that the field is now moving into a third phase, which focuses on the uniqueness of much of female experience, "... with the growing awareness that the categories, hierarchies, structure and research methods developed to describe male experience are simply not adequate to the task of describing 'ours'" (Wine, 1985; p. 187). Parlee (1985) has called research on topics that deal with aspects of female specificity "phenomena in search of a paradigm" (p. 197). Henley (1985) concluded that "... feminist psychology attempts to move from a compensatory and revisionist approach toward one that is transformative" (p. 119). These descriptions suggest that feminist psychologists are a group whose paradigm, or necessary consensus about the nature and purpose of research in their field, is presently "in transition" (Rosnow, 1981). Research on the epistemological and personal values of feminist psychologists may therefore clarify the role played by these domains of values in processes of paradigm change within a value-laden psychology.

Epistemological Typologies of Psychologists

Because the positivist conceptualization of scientific knowledge as objective and value-free has been predominant in North American psychology for so long, only a limited amount of research has been done on the

theoretical and/or personal values of psychologists. Such values have been assumed to be largely irrelevant to the research enterprise. For a review of some of the pioneering work in the field of psychology of science, see Krasner and Houts (1984) and Unger (in press). The new conceptualization of science as value-laden, which has been an outgrowth of critiques of positivism (including the kinds of issues raised by the crisis of confidence and by feminist psychologists mentioned in the previous section of this chapter), has generated a resurgence of interest in studying differences in the epistemological assumptions of various groups of psychologists.

Most descriptions of theoretical orientation patterns in psychology employ a grand dichotomy of some sort. Rogers (1961) described two basic trends--a scientific or "objective" trend characterized by reductionist theory and empirical methods, and a humanistic or "existential" trend, concerned with the experiencing person. Very early in the development of North American psychology, William James (1907) called these contrasting intellectual styles "tough-minded" and "tender-minded" respectively.

Allport (1955) linked these trends to competing philosophical traditions in the history of psychology. The empiricist or positivist tradition has dominated North American psychology and stresses the reactive organism model of man, the idea that the human being is essentially a passive recipient and reactor to environmental events. Behaviourism is an expression of this tradition. The rationalist tradition, more apparent in European psychology, stresses a view of the human organism that is more active and self-propelled. Gestalt and phenomenological psychology are expressions of this tradition. The

positivist tradition subscribes to an objectified view of the person, whereas the rationalist tradition concentrates on the person's subjective reality.

Gergen (1982) has described the positivist tradition as an "exogenic" epistemology which holds that knowledge copies (or should ideally copy) the actualities of the real world. The rationalist tradition has adopted an "endogenic" perspective about the origins of knowledge. Knowledge depends on processes inherent to the knower--how humans think and process information is of paramount importance, rather than the features of the world itself. Buss (1978) has described two prototypical statements that summarize these contrasting epistemological positions: either reality constructs the person, or the person constructs reality.

Gergen (1985) is an advocate of social constructionism in modern psychology, an epistemological perspective which seeks to move beyond the dualism to which the objective and subjective epistemological traditions are committed, and to place knowledge within the process of social interchange. Social constructionist metatheory holds that reality is socially, rather than objectively or subjectively, derived. Because human behaviour occurs in specific cultures and historical contexts, it should not be interpreted apart from consideration of the context in which it is embedded. Just as individuals are evolving systems, so also are cultures and patterns of social life. The construction of reality that psychologists validate through their research feeds back into the common conceptual agreements of the culture. Therefore, theory has the capacity to be a social change agent. When ideologies and social conditions are judged to be oppressive, the psychologist's role should be to point the way toward social change rather than validate the

existing state of affairs (Gergen & Morawski, 1980; Minton, 1986). Gergen (1985) has commented that social constructionism reasserts the relevance of moral criteria for scientific practice: "To the extent that psychological theory (and related practices) enter into the life of the culture, sustaining certain patterns of conduct and destroying others, ... the practitioner ... must confront the pragmatic implications of such conclusions within society more generally" (p. 273).

Recent efforts to describe and measure the epistemological values of psychologists include the work of Kimble (1984), Coan (1979), Krasner and Houts (1984), and Unger (1984). The following subsections will review this research. Each subsection contains a description of the psychometric measure developed by the author(s), and summarizes the important findings about the theoretical values of the groups of psychologists who were surveyed utilizing the measure. Conceptually, all of the scales have been derived from the traditional dichotomous (objectivist vs. subjectivist) conceptualization of theoretical orientation, though the item content of Unger's (1984) scale attempts to incorporate some attitudes consistent with a social constructionist perspective.

Kimble's (1984) Epistemic Differential (ED)

Kimble's (1984) Epistemic Differential (ED) reflects the basic concept of a scientist-humanist dichotomy in its organization. The final form of the scale contains eight items, each item consisting of two parts: a pair of opposed narrative statements followed by a summary of the conflicting ideas contained in the statements. Appendix A contains a copy of the ED items in their entirety. The content of the items is transparent to the point of crudeness, but does give a flavor for the

kinds of basic issues over which psychologists are presumed to differ depending upon their epistemological stance: 1) What are the most important values that govern scholarship? 2) How predictable is human behaviour? 3) Is knowledge that is gained through observation of behaviour superior to experiential, empathic modes of knowing? 4) Is the precision gained in the laboratory more important than the real life validity of the field? 5) Is every individual really unique? 6) Is any whole greater than the sum of its parts? 7) Does nature or nurture matter more? 8) Are people basically passive reactors to events or do they have control and choices in their lives?

Subjects are asked to indicate their personal degree of endorsement of each position on a scale of 0 (low) to 10 (high). For each bipolar item, the left-hand pole always represents the tough-minded or scientific position and the right-hand pole represents the tender-minded or humanistic position. Factor analysis by the principal factor, varimax rotation procedure, resulted in six of the items emerging as definers of an overall scientist-humanist factor:

<u>Scientist</u>		<u>Humanist</u>
Scholarly values	vs.	human values
Determinism	vs.	indeterminism
Objectivism	vs.	intuitionism
Laboratory	vs.	field setting
Nomothetic	vs.	idiographic laws
Elementism	vs.	holism

The remaining two items were: heredity vs. environment, and reactivity vs. creativity of man.

The ED was distributed to a random sample of 400 APA members, each

of whom belonged to only one of the following divisions: Division 3 (Experimental); Division 9 (Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, SPSSI); Division 29 (Psychotherapy); and Division 32 (Humanistic). Returns were 58%, 45%, 30%, and 31% from Divisions 3, 9, 29, and 32 respectively, resulting in an overall return rate of 164/400 or 41%. Subjects' responses were anonymous; apparently no demographic data were collected. A check of the 1985 APA Division membership statistics indicates the following sex ratios:

	<u>% Men</u>	<u>% Women</u>
Division 3 (Experimental)	84.8	15.2
9 (SPSSI)	65.6	34.4
29 (Psychotherapy)	70.5	29.5
32 (Humanistic)	72.8	27.2

Since men outnumber women by at least a 2/1 margin in all of these divisions, the likelihood is Kimble's (1984) data is reflective predominantly of the views of male psychologists.

Kimble (1984) reports highly statistically significant differences between his four interest groups on all eight items, with Division 3 members scoring more extremely in the scientific direction than the other groups. Overall means for the 6-item scientist-humanist factor were 2.82, 5.18, 5.90, and 6.13 for Divisions 3, 9, 29, and 32 respectively. Frequency distributions of these overall mean scores indicated that the percentage of subjects with scores in the scientific direction (mean rating below 5.0 on a scale from 0 to 10) for members of Divisions 3, 9, 29, and 32 were 95%, 47%, 23%, and 28% respectively. These results suggest that distinct, formally organized groups of scholars exist within psychology whose basic epistemological views are

highly incompatible with those of other groups. Kimble (1984) concludes that "birds of a feather flock together"--because psychologists choose to affiliate with professional organizations whose dominant values are seen as compatible with their own, social support then tends to intensify the values that made the organization attractive in the first place.

Coan's (1979) Theoretical Orientation Survey (TOS)

Coan's (1979) Theoretical Orientation Survey (TOS) is similar to Kimble's (1984) ED in that it also reflects the basic concept of a scientist-humanist dichotomy in its organization, though the contrasting epistemological positions are labelled as Objectivism vs. Subjectivism. The scale contains 32 items, each consisting of a declarative opinion statement. Subjects are asked to respond to items on a 5-point bipolar scale ranging from strong disagreement to strong agreement. Appendix B contains a copy of the TOS items in their entirety, arranged into eight factor subscales. Similar to the ED, five of these factors appear to define a second order factor Coan calls Objectivism vs. Subjectivism.

Objectivism

Impersonal causality

Behavioural content emphasis

Elementarism

Physicalism

Quantitative orientation

Subjectivism

personal will

experiential content

holism

reject physicalism

qualitative orientation

The remaining three factors were: factual orientation vs. theoretical orientation, biological determinism, and environmental determinism. An additional second order factor called Endogenism vs. Exogenism is formed by adding 50+ (Biological determinism - Environmental determinism) and is a measure of the subject's tendency to emphasize either the internal,

biological sources or the external sources of human behaviour and of individual differences in human behaviour. The endogenist attaches more importance to biological determinism than environmental determinism, while the exogenist does the opposite.

Coan (1979) reports normative TOS data from a sample of 510 male and 356 female APA members collected in 1972 (see Appendix C). Unfortunately, the statistical tables report only means and standard deviations for factor subscale scores for each group, but do not indicate which sex differences are statistically significant. However, Coan describes the sex differences which exist for most of the factors as "appreciable." Men score higher on all factors except biological determinism and endogenism vs. exogenism, for which Coan does indicate that women's higher score on biological determinism is significantly higher than men's, and women's higher score on endogenism "barely fails" to reach the .05 level of significance.

The most marked differences are found for objectivism and its components, particularly impersonal causality. All these differences favor more objectivistic scores for men ... women tend to be more oriented to the personal and subjective realm. [On factual vs. theoretical orientation] ... men tend more strongly than women toward factual orientation. Perhaps we should note that with samples of this size, a rather small difference can be statistically significant. Indeed, all the sex differences we observe here are small relative to the variation within each sex (pp. 87-88).

Coan (1979) reports that objectivism and all its components manifest small significant negative correlations with age, that is, for the total sample older subjects tend to be slightly more subjectivistic. Also, when the academics in the total sample were sorted out from practitioners, the academics had significantly higher scores for behavioural content emphasis, elementarism, and objectivism.

Krasner and Houts (1984) administered Coan's (1979) TOS to a group

of senior psychologists who were founders of the behaviour modification movement during the 1950s, and to a comparison group of their non-behaviourist contemporaries. Significant differences were found between these two groups on nearly all of the TOS factors (see Appendix D). The behaviour modification group endorsed factual, quantitative, empirical, and objectivist approaches to the study of human behaviour much more highly than did the comparison group, which was characterized by a more humanistic, subjectivist approach to psychology. The comparison group's scores quite closely resembled those of Coan's (1979) normative male sample (note that Krasner and Houts' total sample was composed of 113 males and 6 females). A principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation also replicated the eight first-order factors reported by Coan (1979).

Krasner and Houts' (1984) Epistemological Style Questionnaire (ESQ)

The Epistemological Style Questionnaire (ESQ) was rationally constructed by Krasner and Houts (1984), along the conceptual lines of Royce's lengthy Psycho-Epistemological Profile (PEP) (1970). Unlike the previously described ED and TOS measures, which are based on the notion of two contrasting epistemologies (labelled scientist vs. humanist and objectivist vs. subjectivist respectively), Royce (1975) described three basic approaches to acquiring knowledge:

The empiricist approach places a premium on observation and induction, whereas the rationalist approach favors formal logic and hypothetico-deductive method. In contrast, the metaphorical approach views knowledge acquisition as a process of creative insight and symbolic generalization (Krasner & Houts, 1984, p. 842).

The ESQ contains 24 items, each consisting of a declarative opinion statement, to which the subject responds on a 5-point bipolar scale

ranging from strong disagreement to strong agreement. Krasner and Houts' (1984) three a priori subscales, labelled empiricism, rationalism and metaphorism, proved statistically unreliable. Factor analysis revealed a four-factor internal structure. Appendix E contains the ESQ items in their entirety, arranged into these four factor subscales:

1. The Metaphorism scale contains eight items and is scored in the positive direction for an intuitive approach to science.
2. The Rationalism scale contains seven items and is scored in the positive direction for deductive as opposed to inductive method.
3. The Antiempiricism scale contains six items and is scored in the positive direction for opposition to traditional empiricism.
4. The Reductionism scale contains three items scored in a positive direction for disagreement with statements that express rejection of the positivist view of psychology as a "real" science.

Krasner and Houts (1984) administered the ESQ in their study of the theoretical values of behaviourists, and found significant differences between the behavioural and comparison groups on all four of its subscales (see Appendix F). The behavioural scientist group scored significantly lower on Metaphorism, Rationalism, and Antiempiricism, and higher on Reductionism, than the comparison group of more humanistically oriented psychologists.

Krasner and Houts (1984) also wanted to investigate relationships between psychologists' personal values and their discipline--specific assumptions about epistemology. They therefore developed a Values Survey (VS) with the assistance of a panel of experts in the area of philosophy of science and ethics. The VS is a 43-item scale whose subscales correspond to eight broad domains of values. Each item consists of a

declarative opinion statement to which the subject responds on a 5-point bipolar scale ranging from strong disagreement to strong agreement. (Appendix G contains the VS items in their entirety, arranged by subscale.) Four of the subscales specifically concern attitudes about ethical relations between the scientist and society: Science and Ethics, Scientists' Social Responsibility, Science and Theism, and Research Ethics. The remaining four subscales concern various sociocultural and personal values: Social Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Health Care Delivery and Environmentalism.

The VS was administered by Krasner and Houts (1984) to the subjects in their study of behaviourists, along with the TOS and ESQ. Though the behavioural and comparison groups differed significantly on all measures of theoretical orientation in psychology, there were no significant differences between the two groups on any of the VS subscales (see Appendix H). Means for both groups hovered at or close to the midpoint on the Science and Ethics, Scientists' Social Responsibility, Political Philosophy, and Environmentalism subscales. On Science and Theism, Social Philosophy, and Health Care Delivery, both groups' means fell considerably below the midpoint, that is, favoring atheism over theism, social altruism over social darwinism, and government control of health care over market control. On Research Ethics, both groups' means rose somewhat above midpoint, slightly favoring ethical constraint over freedom of inquiry. An additional finding was that within the behavioural group, those who were political and social conservatives scored significantly higher in favor of biological determinism than their more liberal peers.

However, for the most part, Krasner and Houts (1984) characterized

the psychologists in their study as individuals who seemed to compartmentalize their values about society and science in general from their epistemological values about psychology. Multiple regression analysis with VS scale scores as predictors of TOS and ESQ scale scores found only a few statistically significant relationships:

1. Subjects who favored freedom of inquiry over ethical constraints on research and subjects who favored social darwinism over social altruism also favored a behavioural rather than experiential content emphasis in psychology.
2. Subjects who endorsed the view that science is value-neutral also favored reductionism and quantitative methods.
3. Subjects who endorsed the view that science is value-laden favored an intuitive approach to psychology.

Unger's (1984) Attitudes about Reality Scale (AARS)

Unger's (1984) Attitudes about Reality Scale (AARS) was rationally constructed to reflect Buss' (1979) description of objectivist vs. subjectivist epistemologies as a continuum ranging from belief that reality constructs the person to belief that the person constructs reality. The scale contains 40 items, each of which consists of a declarative opinion statement to which the subject responds on a 7-point scale ranging from strong agreement to strong disagreement. Appendix I contains the AARS in its entirety. Four a priori subscales were developed: 1) power as a personal versus a societal construct; 2) preference for biological versus social explanations for individual and group differences; 3) acceptance of the societal status quo versus belief in the legitimacy and efficacy of individual efforts to change society; and 4) belief that science is value-free and objective versus

relativistic and subjective. High total mean scores on the AARS reflect a tendency to concur with statements that indicate reality is stable, irreversible, and deterministic. Low total mean scores reflect a tendency to concur with statements that indicate reality is changeable and largely a matter of cultural and historical definition.

Unger (1984) reports that a sample of feminist leaders within the American Psychological Association and the Association for Women in Psychology scored significantly lower on the AARS than a comparison group of psychology professors and a sample of students enrolled in psychology of women courses at a state college. The biggest differences between activist feminist psychologists and the comparison faculty and students were on statements involving beliefs about biological causality and scientific values.

In related research, Unger (in press) has explored connections between epistemology and personal experience in college students. She hypothesized that epistemology may be meaningfully associated with social group membership, because the life experiences of minorities may sensitize those individuals to aspects of reality of which individuals who lack such experiences are simply unaware. "One would expect that those who have experienced a relatively unproblematic relationship with society would be more likely to view the individual as a consequence of the various aspects of ~~an~~ unchanging reality" (p. 6).

The AARS was administered to a sample of 150 undergraduate students (24 males and 126 females), along with a biographical questionnaire. Epistemological beliefs were found to be significantly related to religious affiliation, age, and political preference (see Appendix J). Catholics, who composed the religious majority in the locale where the

research was conducted, had the highest total mean AARS score. Students in their late teens and 20s had significantly higher total mean AARS scores than mature students (the over 30s). Students who identified their political preferences as Republican, Conservative, or Uninterested had significantly higher total mean AARS scores than students who were Democrats, Independents and Liberals.

In addition, students in the study who identified themselves as feminists on the biographical questionnaire had much lower total mean scores than other female students in the sample. Their scores approached those of the sample of feminist leaders in psychology discussed earlier (Unger, 1984). "Women who identify with women as a socially deprived group - feminists - appear to have a particularly strong predisposition to endorse the world view that the person constructs reality" (Unger, in press, p. 22).

Exploratory Hypotheses

Because the total amount of research that has been conducted to date on the theoretical values of distinct groups within psychology is obviously very limited, the general purpose of the present study is simply to add to the knowledge base by surveying a wider range of feminist psychologists than Unger's (1984) small sample of leaders in the field. A number of hypotheses about the theoretical values of feminist psychologists may be formulated in an exploratory fashion, based on trends in the research findings that were summarized in the second section of this chapter, and on the review of theoretical literature contained in the first section of this chapter.

Hypothesis 1

Because feminist psychology as an emergent perspective has been

conceptually identified with a revolt against positivist values, scores of feminist psychologists on measures of theoretical orientation based on an objectivist vs. subjectivist dichotomy will tend on the average to be in a subjectivistic direction. This pattern will emerge as a coherent feminist world view, that is, it will be unaffected by differences in age or level of education within the sample.

Hypothesis 2

Unger (in press) has suggested that individuals who operate from a minority group perspective in society may tend to favour subjectivist over objectivist epistemology in psychology. To the extent that feminism can be characterized as a minority group perspective that alters one's social perceptions and values, this line of reasoning would provide further support for Hypothesis 1. However, it also raises the question, what about "minorities" within feminism? Because lesbians are a more stigmatized minority group in society, and psychology as a profession, than women in general, their life experiences may sensitize them to aspects of reality of which women whose sexual orientation is more mainstream may be unaware. Lesbian-identified feminist psychologists will therefore tend to be even more subjectivistic (i.e., less committed to traditional ideology) than heterosexual feminist psychologists.

Hypothesis 3

A sample of feminist Ph.D. psychologists will tend to be more subjectivistic than Coan's (1979) normative random sample of female APA members. This hypothesis is based, like Hypothesis 1, on the premise that feminist psychology has been identified with a critical stance toward positivist values about science, and on Kimble's (1984)

observation that in "unselected populations" of psychologists the distribution of scores on measures of theoretical orientation tends to be continuous.

Hypothesis 4

When Coan (1979) sorted the academics from the practitioners in his normative sample of APA members, the academics had significantly higher mean scores for behavioural content emphasis, elementarism, and objectivism. Within a feminist Ph.D. psychologist sample, the academics will similarly tend to be more objectivistic (i.e., committed to traditional empiricism) than the practitioners.

Hypothesis 5

Gergen (1985) has recently described feminist psychologists as front runners in the social constructionist movement in modern psychology. A commitment to emancipatory values appears to be an important point of correspondence between the two perspectives, a point where both deviate from the traditional ideology about science as value free. "It is this socially activist component of the psychology of women which produces conflicts for those who have been socialized to believe that advocacy and scholarship are incompatible activities" (Unger, 1982, p. 5).

It is hypothesized that on measures that assess attitudes about ethical relations between the scientist and society, feminist psychologists' responses may be congruent with how a hypothetical social constructionist might reply. In addition, feminist psychologists are expected to see science as more value laden, the scientist as more socially involved, moral values as more relevant for science, and ethical constraints on human research as more important an issue, than Krasner and Houts' (1984)

sample of senior psychologists.

Hypothesis 6

It is hypothesized that the pattern of "compartmentalizing" personal values about society and science from epistemological values, described by Krasner and Houts (1984), will not be as evident in a sample of feminist psychologists. That is, more predictive relationships will be found between personal values and theoretical orientation preference than the few reported by Krasner and Houts (1984).

CHAPTER II

METHOD

Sampling Procedure

Because the general purpose of the present study was to survey the theoretical values of a sample of feminist psychologists that could be considered representative of the field at this point in its history, the practical question then became, who are feminist psychologists and how does one find them? Proceeding from Kuhn's (1970) dictum that science is scientists, that is, that a "field" becomes defined when a group of scholars who share some common point of view organize themselves formally, it was decided that the operational definition of a feminist psychologist for the purposes of this study would be a de facto one--a person who is a psychologist who chooses to attend an annual national conference of a professional organization within psychology that is feminist-identified, is a feminist psychologist.

To obtain a representative sample of contemporary feminist psychologists, distribution of the questionnaire at professional conferences was adopted as the sampling procedure for this study, for additional conceptual as well as financial reasons. It was felt that sampling feminist psychology journal article authors (to replicate the sampling via authorship strategy used by Krasner and Houts, 1984), would tend to overload the sample with academics and underrepresent practitioners. Random sampling via feminist professional organization membership lists might not necessarily tap individuals who were actively

involved and au courant with new developments in the field. As well, either of these strategies would have involved a more costly two-way mailing, which was not feasible for the researcher.

Arrangements were made with two feminist professional organizations, the Association for Women in Psychology (AWP), and the Canadian Psychological Association's (CPA) Section on Women and Psychology (SWAP), to include the questionnaire in the registration kit presented to all participants at the AWP's 10th National Conference on Feminist Psychology in New York City in March, 1985, and at CPA SWAP's annual pre-conference in Halifax in June, 1985. Approximately 500 questionnaires were distributed at the AWP conference, and 100 questionnaires at the SWAP pre-conference via this procedure. Because attendance at the AWP conference was lower than had been estimated, an additional 200 questionnaires were distributed by the researcher to AWP conference attendees who were willing to take extra copies home to give to feminist colleagues, bringing the total number of questionnaires circulated to 800.

Measures

The present study utilized the same three measures of theoretical and personal values employed by Krasner and Houts (1984) in their case study of the founders of the behaviour modification movement. Kimble's (1984) Epistemic Differential (ED) was rejected in favour of Coan's (1979) Theoretical Orientation Survey (TOS) because though the two measures are conceptually similar, the TOS was considered to be more sophisticated from a psychometric standpoint, and better normative data exists for the TOS. Unger's (1984) Attitudes about Reality (AARS) scale was not utilized because its psychometric properties are not as yet well

established. Factor analysis failed to lend concurrent validity to its four a priori subscales (Unger, in press).

Theoretical Orientations Survey (TOS)

This 32-item scale developed by Coan (1979) assessed respondents' epistemological assumptions about psychology. The TOS has been shown to have adequate reliability and validity (see Appendix C) and factors into eight subscales, which were described in the previous chapter (see Appendix B). Krasner and Houts' (1984) factor analysis replicated the eight first-order factors reported by Coan (1979).

Epistemological Style Questionnaire (ESQ)

This 24-item scale was rationally constructed by Krasner and Houts (1984) to assess three basic epistemological assumptions about science: empiricism, rationalism, and metaphorism, based on the conceptual outlines of Royce's Psycho-epistemological Profile (PEP) (1970). Krasner and Houts' (1984) factor analysis of the ESQ revealed that it actually contains four factors, labelled Metaphorism, Rationalism, Reductionism, and Antiempiricism. Krasner and Houts (1984) report reliabilities (Cronbach's α) for these factor subscales of .65, .62, .64, and .50 respectively.

The Metaphorism scale contains eight items and is scored in the positive direction for an intuitive approach to science. The Metaphorism scale was found to be negatively correlated ($r = -.54$, $p < .001$) with the TOS Objectivism score, which indicates that subjects who score high on ESQ Metaphorism would be likely to score in the subjectivistic direction on the five component subscales of TOS Objectivism.

The Rationalism scale contains seven items and is scored in the

positive direction for deductive as opposed to inductive method. The Rationalism scale was found to be negatively correlated ($r = -.61$, $p < .001$) with the Factual vs. theoretical orientation subscale on the TOS. Therefore, subjects who score high on ESQ Rationalism would be likely to score in the direction of favoring a rational theoretical approach over factual inductive methods.

The Antiempiricism scale contains six items and is scored in the positive direction for opposition to traditional empiricism. The Antiempiricism scale also was found to be negatively correlated ($r = -.34$, $p < .001$) with the TOS Factual vs. theoretical orientation subscale. Therefore, subjects who score high on ESQ Antiempiricism would also be likely to score in the direction of favoring a rational theoretical approach over factual inductive methods.

The Reductionism scale contains three items scored in a positive direction for disagreement with statements that express rejection of the positivist view of psychology as a "real" science. The Reductionism scale was found to be positively correlated ($r = .46$, $p < .001$) with the TOS Objectivism score, which indicates that subjects who score high on ESQ Reductionism would be likely to score in the objectivistic direction on the five component subscales of TOS Objectivism.

Values Survey (VS)

This 43-item scale was developed for Krasner and Houts (1984) by a panel of eight experts in the area of science and ethics, to assess the personal and sociocultural values of psychologists in eight broad domains: science/ethics, scientists' social responsibility, science/theism, social philosophy, political philosophy, health care delivery, environmentalism, and research/ethics. Krasner and Houts (1984) describe

the reliabilities of the VS subscales as "adequate" but do not specify further.

The Science and Ethics subscale contains four items and is scored positively for endorsement of a view of the scientist as objective and dispassionate. The dimension is labelled "Value-neutral vs. value-laden."

The Scientists' Social Responsibility subscale contains five items and is scored positively for endorsement of a view of the scientist as accountable for the uses of his research, which should promote rather than endanger human welfare. The dimension is labelled "Social involvement vs. social isolation."

The Science and Theism scale contains five items and is scored positively for endorsement of a view that religious and moral values are relevant for science, and not incompatible with a scientific outlook. The dimension is labelled "Theism vs. atheism."

The Social Philosophy scale contains seven items and is scored in a positive direction for endorsement of a competitive, "survival of the fittest" outlook on social relations. The dimension is labelled "Social darwinism vs. social altruism."

The Political Philosophy scale contains six items and is scored in a positive direction for endorsement of a capitalist, free enterprise economic philosophy. The dimension is labelled "Conservatism vs. liberalism."

The Health Care Delivery scale consists of four items and is scored in a positive direction for endorsement of views opposing socialized medicine. The dimension is labelled "Market control vs. government control."

The Environmentalism scale consists of five items and is scored in

a positive direction for endorsement of views opposing preservation of the natural ecology. The dimension is labelled "Industrialism vs. environmentalism."

The Research Ethics scale contains seven items and is scored positively for endorsement of protection of the rights of human subjects as a high priority concern for the researcher. The dimension is labelled "Ethical constraints vs. freedom of inquiry."

Attitude to Survey Item

Coan (1979) utilized an item to assess respondents' attitude toward the research: "It is worthwhile to study the theoretical orientations of psychologists." Coan included the item in the hope that it would provide some clues regarding differences between respondents and non-respondents to the questionnaire (assuming that non-respondents might resemble respondents who disagreed with the item). "... Subjects who are most likely to find my questionnaire interesting at first glance are people with strong interests in theoretical issues. Those who lack such interest are likely to find the questionnaire more tedious and more difficult to complete" (p. 57). The item is included as item #100 at the end of the theoretical orientation portion of the questionnaire in the present study (see Appendix K).

Explanatory Letter

The questionnaire in booklet form also contained an explanatory letter at the beginning, and a tear sheet at the end which respondents could return by separate cover to request information about the outcome of the study. In the explanatory letter (see Appendix L), no attempt was made to disguise the purpose of the study or the fact that feminist

psychologists were the focus of interest, because it was felt that an open approach would more effectively assess values held by a group of professional psychologists.

Personal Profile

The Personal Profile portion of the questionnaire was assembled by the researcher (see Appendix M). It contains 72 items about respondents' personal background, lifestyle, education and employment experiences, and affiliation patterns. Items were constructed and ordered following the guidelines in Dillman (1978) to maximize clarity, flow and ease of completion of the questionnaire. Items were carefully structured and phrased so that the respondents had control over the amount of confidentiality they might wish to preserve regarding information that might identify individuals. Only those aspects of the Personal Profile data that pertain to the exploratory hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter will be reported on in the context of the present study.

The 100-item Theoretical Orientation Survey (composed of the TOS, ESQ, and VS items) and the 72-item Personal Profile were pre-tested by six of the researcher's colleagues. On the average, these respondents required 45 minutes to complete the booklet.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

The results are presented in two sections. Section One consists of a brief description of the respondents in relation to selected demographic characteristics. Section Two addresses each of the six exploratory hypotheses listed at the end of Chapter I.

Section One

Description of the Sample

A total of 214 of the 800 questionnaires distributed were returned, but some were damaged in the mail and/or incomplete, and therefore unuseable. The final sample consisted of 190 respondents, 184 of whom (97%) were female and 182 of whom (96%) were white. The average age of respondents was 38.55 years. Though 45% of the respondents indicated a conventional religious affiliation (Protestant, Jewish or Catholic), 167 or 88% of the total sample described themselves as "not regular churchgoers." Forty percent of the sample described their primary professional activity as teaching or research; the remainder indicated activities related to the provision of psychological services. Fifty-six percent of the sample described their sexual orientation as heterosexual or straight; the preponderance of the remainder described themselves as lesbians. Seventy-one percent of the respondents (n = 134) are currently employed in the United States and 19% (n = 37) in Canada (19 respondents or 10% of the total sample did not specify their geographic location). In terms of educational level and major field,

92 or 48% of respondents held Ph.D.s in psychology, 67 or 35% had B.A.s or M.A.s in psychology (52 or 78% of this group are current doctoral students in psychology), and 31 or 17% were non-psychologists, most of whom had master's degrees in social work or other mental health services-related fields.

Tables 1-3 summarize the demographic variables of sex, age, country where employed, highest ranked professional activity, and preferred term for own sexual orientation for each of three subgroups formed by educational level and major field: Group 1 = Ph.D. psychologists (n = 92); Group 2 = below-Ph.D. psychologists (n = 67); Group 3 = below-Ph.D. non-psychologists (n = 31). The three subgroups appear to be quite similar in terms of demographics, except that Group 2, which is composed mostly of graduate students, has a lower mean age (34.8 years) compared to Group 1 (40.4 years) and Group 3 (41.1 years).

Section Two

Hypothesis 1

The prediction that respondents in the present study would tend to score consistently in a subjectivistic direction on measures of theoretical orientation was supported. Tables 4 and 5 contain mean TOS and ESQ scale scores for the feminist subgroups defined in the previous section: Group 1 = Ph.D. psychologists; Group 2 = below-Ph.D. psychologists (mainly doctoral students in psychology); Group 3 = below-Ph.D. non-psychologists (mainly feminist professionals with master's degrees in related fields). Multivariate analysis of between-subgroup differences for the eight TOS subscales yielded no significant multivariate effect, Hotelling-Lawley Trace $F(16, 358) = .80, p < .69$. Results for the four ESQ subscales were also non-significant, Hotelling-

Table 1

Summary Table of Demographic Variables for Ph.D. Psychologist Group(N = 92)

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Sex		
Male	3	3.3
Female	89	96.7
Age*		
20s	5	5.4
30s	44	47.8
40s	29	31.5
over 50	14	15.3
Country of employment		
United States	68	73.9
Canada	22	23.9
Didn't say	2	2.2
Highest ranked professional activity		
Teaching	35	38.0
Research	18	19.6
Administration	6	6.5
Direct service to client	27	29.3
Assessment	4	4.3
Employee supervision	0	0.0
Consulting	1	1.1
Other	1	1.1
Didn't say	0	0.0
Preferred term for own sexual orientation		
Heterosexual	41	44.6
Straight	17	18.5
Bisexual	4	4.3
Homosexual	6	6.5
Gay	6	6.5
Lesbian	11	12.0
Other	7	7.6

* \bar{X} = 40.4 years

Table 2

Summary Table of Demographic Variables for Below-Ph.D. PsychologistGroup (N = 67)

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Sex		
Male	2	3.0
Female	65	97.0
Age*		
20s	26	38.8
30s	24	35.8
40s	13	19.4
Over 50	4	6.0
Country of employment		
United States	40	59.7
Canada	12	17.9
Didn't say	15	22.4
Highest ranked professional activity		
Teaching	6	9.0
Research	15	22.4
Administration	4	6.0
Direct service to client	24	35.8
Assessment	3	4.5
Employee supervision	0	0.0
Consulting	1	1.5
Other	2	3.0
Didn't say	12	17.9
Preferred term for own sexual orientation		
Heterosexual	36	53.7
Straight	3	4.5
Bisexual	7	10.4
Homosexual	0	0.0
Gay	1	1.5
Lesbian	19	28.4
Other	1	1.5

* \bar{X} = 34.8 years

Table 3

Summary Table of Demographic Variables for Below-Ph.D. Non-PsychologistGroup (N = 31)

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Sex		
Male	1	3.2
Female	30	96.8
Age*		
20s	4	12.9
30s	11	35.5
40s	11	35.5
Over 50	5	16.1
Country of employment		
United States	26	83.9
Canada	3	9.7
Didn't say	2	6.4
Highest ranked professional activity		
Teaching	1	3.2
Research	1	3.2
Administration	6	19.4
Direct service to client	16	51.6
Assessment	0	0.0
Employee supervision	1	3.2
Consulting	1	3.2
Other	2	6.5
Didn't say	3	9.7
Preferred term for own sexual orientation		
Heterosexual	10	32.3
Straight	4	12.9
Bisexual	4	12.9
Homosexual	0	0.0
Gay	1	3.2
Lesbian	10	32.3
Other	2	6.5

* \bar{X} = 41.1 years

Table 4

Results of Analysis of Variance of TOS Scale Scores Across Three Feminist Groups

Scales ^a	Group 1		Group 2		Group 3		F
	\bar{X}	s.d.	\bar{X}	s.d.	\bar{X}	s.d.	
Factual orientation	7.68	2.50	7.78	2.17	8.09	2.27	.36
Impersonal causality	9.33	3.22	8.48	2.69	8.45	2.27	.07
Behavioural content	8.13	2.77	7.78	2.17	8.03	2.29	.40
Elementarism	8.40	2.56	8.51	2.79	8.29	2.18	.08
Biological determinism	9.92	3.19	9.28	2.82	9.84	3.61	.85
Environmental determinism	10.95	3.23	11.46	3.71	11.74	3.78	.78
Physicalism	8.10	2.46	7.99	2.32	8.61	2.33	.75
Quantitative orientation	9.03	2.95	8.62	2.82	9.03	2.81	.43
<u>Combined scores</u>							
Objectivism ^b	43.00	10.62	41.37	9.59	42.42	8.82	.52
Endogenism ^c	48.97	5.41	47.82	5.40	48.10	5.21	.97

^aRange for each scale is 4-20

Higher score indicates endorsement of the labelled dimension pole

^bRange is 20-100

^c50+ (Biological-Environmental Determinism)

Note. F values were not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 5

Results of Analysis of Variance of ESQ Scale Scores Across Three Feminist Groups

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Range</u>	<u>Group 1</u>		<u>Group 2</u>		<u>Group 3</u>		<u>F</u>
		\bar{X}	s.d.	\bar{X}	s.d.	\bar{X}	s.d.	
		n = 92		n = 67		n = 31		
Rationalism	7-35	25.97	3.06	25.24	3.54	24.39	3.49	2.86
Metaphorism	8-40	24.22	3.35	24.45	3.37	23.90	3.03	.29
Antiempiricism	6-30	22.66	3.00	22.16	3.31	21.35	3.15	2.08
Reductionism	3-15	8.35	2.38	8.36	2.10	7.97	1.89	.39

Note. F values were not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Lawley Trace $F(8,366) = 1.21$, $p < .29$. There were no statistically significant differences between subgroups on any of the TOS or ESQ scales, though a trend for Group 1 to score highest on ESQ Rationalism barely fails to reach the .05 level of significance. (See Tables 4 and 5). These results indicate that differences in level of education and major field of academic training within the total sample have little relevance to the respondents' theoretical orientations.

Table 6 contains mean VS scale scores for the three feminist subgroups. Multivariate analysis of the eight VS subscales yielded no significant multivariate effect, Hotelling-Lawley Trace $F(18,356) = 1.42$, $p < .12$. There were no statistically significant differences between subgroups on any of the VS scales, with the exception that Group 1 scored slightly lower on the Science and Theism scale, $F(2,187) = 3.09$, $p < .05$. These results indicate that the three subgroups are very similar in terms of their broad personal and sociocultural values. There was no significant difference between subgroups on Coan's (1979) Attitude to Survey Item, "It is worthwhile to study the theoretical orientations of psychologists", $F(2,187) = .87$, $p < .42$.

Previous research has found a slight negative correlation between objectivism and age, that is, older subjects tend to be somewhat more subjectivistic (Coan, 1979; Unger, in press). Table 7 contains correlations between age and mean TOS, ESQ, and VS scale scores for the three feminist subgroups. For the most part, age was unrelated to these variables for this sample. For Group 2 (mainly psychology doctoral students), there was a moderate negative correlation between age and Quantitative Orientation ($r = -.28$, $p < .05$), and the Social Philosophy ($r = -.29$, $p < .05$), and Political Philosophy ($r = -.24$, $p < .05$) scales.

Table 6

Results of Analysis of Variance of VS Scale Scores Across Three Feminist Groups

Scale	Range	Group 1		Group 2		Group 3		F
		\bar{X}	s.d.	\bar{X}	s.d.	\bar{X}	s.d.	
Science and ethics	4-20	9.84	2.27	9.91	2.89	10.55	2.99	.88
Scientists' social responsibility	5-25	17.87	2.08	18.04	1.81	18.48	2.03	1.12
Science and theism	5-25	14.79	3.58	15.99	3.22	16.16	3.69	3.09*
Social philosophy	7-35	18.04	1.93	18.57	2.20	17.84	2.10	1.81
Political philosophy	6-30	16.64	3.92	16.66	3.86	17.48	3.89	.60
Health care	4-20	7.47	2.34	7.40	2.81	7.45	2.10	.01
Environmentalism	5-25	12.34	2.44	11.66	2.44	11.48	2.17	2.28
Research ethics	7-35	28.74	3.13	29.06	2.95	29.23	2.51	.41
Attitude to survey ^a	1-5	4.37	.62	4.33	.68	4.19	.60	.87

^aFrom Coan (1979)* $p < .05$

Table 7

Correlations between Age and TOS, ESQ and VS Scale Scores for ThreeFeminist Groups

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Group 1</u>	<u>Group 2</u>	<u>Group 3</u>
	(N = 92)	(N = 67)	(N = 31)
	<u>r</u>	<u>r</u>	<u>r</u>
Factual orientation	.05	-.07	-.01
Impersonal causality	-.03	.14	.10
Behavioural content	.08	-.04	-.01
Elementarism	-.13	-.06	.11
Biological determinism	-.05	.02	.35*
Environmental determinism	.13	.07	-.10
Physicalism	-.02	-.03	.13
Quantitative orientation	-.09	-.28*	-.05
Objectivism	-.05	-.08	.06
Endogenism	-.11	-.04	.32
Rationalism	-.15	-.05	.05
Metaphorism	-.09	-.13	-.07
Antiempiricism	-.00	-.05	.01
Reductionism	-.09	-.21	-.13
Science and ethics	.14	-.00	-.26
Scientists' social responsibility	.02	-.15	-.09
Science and theism	-.09	-.09	-.01
Social philosophy	-.14	-.29*	.10
Political philosophy	.00	-.24*	-.08
Health care	.10	-.03	.18
Environmentalism	.09	-.06	.33
Research ethics	.00	.20	.18

*p < .05

That is, the older respondents in this group tended to be less quantitatively oriented, and more liberal in their social and political philosophy. For Group 3 (non-psychologists), there was a moderate positive correlation between age and Biological Determinism ($r = .35$, $p < .05$).

Hypothesis 2

To test whether differences in sexual orientation have any impact on theoretical orientation, the total sample was divided into two groups on the basis of how the respondents described their own sexual orientation. Individuals who described themselves as heterosexual or straight formed the Heterosexual subgroup ($n = 106$), and individuals who described themselves as bisexual, homosexual, gay, lesbian, or other, formed the Non-Heterosexual subgroup ($n = 84$).

Table 8 contains mean TOS scale scores for the Heterosexual and Non-Heterosexual subgroups. Multivariate analysis of differences between the Heterosexual and Non-Heterosexual feminist subgroups on the eight TOS scales yielded a significant multivariate effect, Hotelling-Lawley Trace $F(9,180) = 3.33$, $p < .001$. Non-Heterosexuals were significantly less likely to endorse factual approaches to the study of human behaviour on the TOS than the Heterosexuals, $F(1,188) = 11.01$, $p < .001$. Scores for the Non-Heterosexual subgroup were also significantly lower on the TOS Behavioural Content Emphasis, $F(1,188) = 12.32$, $p < .001$, Elementarism, $F(1,188) = 4.57$, $p < .05$, and Quantitative Orientation, $F(1,188) = 7.10$, $p < .01$ scales, as well as the composite Objectivism score, $F(1,188) = 7.86$, $p < .01$. These results support the hypothesis that respondents who described their own sexual orientation as other than heterosexual

Table 8

Results of Analysis of Variance of TOS Scale Scores for Heterosexual and
Non-Heterosexual Feminist Groups

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Heterosexuals</u>		<u>Non-heterosexuals</u>		F
	N = 106		N = 84		
	\bar{X}	s.d.	\bar{X}	s.d.	
Factual orientation ^a	8.27	2.50	7.17	1.98	11.01***
Impersonal causality	9.00	3.00	8.74	2.81	.38
Behavioural content	8.54	2.68	7.30	2.03	12.32***
Elementarism	8.77	2.69	7.98	2.36	4.57*
Biological determinism	10.01	3.09	9.27	3.15	2.60
Environmental determinism	10.79	3.33	11.85	3.63	4.34*
Physicalism	8.42	2.54	7.81	2.15	3.04
Quantitative orientation	9.38	2.94	8.27	2.70	7.10**
<u>Combined scores</u>					
Objectivism ^b	44.10	10.55	40.10	8.74	7.86**
Endogenism ^c	49.22	4.95	47.43	5.74	5.31*

^a Range for each scale is 4-20

Higher score indicates endorsement of the labelled dimension pole

^b Range is 20-100

^c 50 + (Biological-Environmental Determinism)

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

would be less likely to endorse traditional empiricist epistemology in psychology. Non-Heterosexuals were also significantly more likely to emphasize external, social sources of individual differences in human behaviour over internal, biological sources, as indicated by their significantly higher score on the Environmental Determinism scale, $F(1,188) = 4.34, p < .05$, and lower composite Endogenism score, $F(1,188) = 5.31, p < .05$.

Table 9 contains mean ESQ scale scores for the Heterosexual and Non-Heterosexual subgroups. Multivariate results were statistically significant, Hotelling-Lawley Trace $F(4,185) = 3.41, p < .01$. Non-Heterosexuals scored significantly higher on the ESQ Rationalism, $F(1,188) = 6.39, p < .05$, and Antiempiricism scales, $F(1,188) = 6.20, p < .05$, and lower on the Reductionism scale, $F(1,188) = 7.00, p < .01$, than the Heterosexuals. These results are consistent with the Non-Heterosexual group's pattern of responses to the TOS subscales, because the ESQ Rationalism and Antiempiricism scales were found by Krasner and Houts (1984) to be negatively correlated with the TOS Factual vs. theoretical orientation scale, and ESQ Reductionism was found to be positively correlated with the TOS composite Objectivism score, as previously reported in Chapter II.

Table 10 contains means of the VS scale scores for the Heterosexual and Non-Heterosexual subgroups. Multivariate results were statistically significant, Hotelling-Lawley Trace $F(8,181) = 3.29, p < .001$. Non-Heterosexuals scored significantly lower than the Heterosexuals on the Science and Ethics subscale, $F(1,188) = 10.65, p < .001$, which measures the degree of credence given to the value-neutrality of science. Non-Heterosexuals tended also to be significantly more liberal in their

Table 9

Results of Analysis of Variance of ESQ Scale Scores for Heterosexual and Non-Heterosexual Feminist Groups

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Range</u>	<u>Heterosexuals</u>		<u>Non-heterosexuals</u>		<u>F</u>
		\bar{X}	s.d.	\bar{X}	s.d.	
Rationalism	7-35	24.92	3.43	26.13	3.11	6.39*
Metaphorism	8-40	24.30	3.37	24.18	3.22	.07
Antiempticism	6-30	21.77	3.28	22.90	2.88	6.20*
Reductionism	3-15	8.66	2.16	7.82	2.19	7.00**

*p < .05
 **p < .01

Table 10

Results of Analysis of Variance of VS Scale Scores for Heterosexual and Non-Heterosexual Feminist

Groups

Scale	Range	Heterosexuals		Non-heterosexuals		F
		\bar{X}	s.d.	\bar{X}	s.d.	
Science and ethics	4-20	10.52	2.56	9.30	2.56	10.65***
Scientists' social responsibility	5-25	17.96	1.89	18.12	2.10	.29
Science and theism	5-25	15.65	3.50	15.17	3.53	.89
Social philosophy	7-35	18.66	2.01	17.61	1.98	12.97***
Political philosophy	6-30	17.42	3.42	15.99	4.29	6.52**
Health care	4-20	7.66	2.25	7.17	2.70	1.89
Environmentalism	5-25	12.54	2.36	11.23	2.30	14.84***
Research ethics	7-35	28.64	3.09	29.30	2.78	2.31
Attitude to survey	1-5	4.30	0.59	4.36	0.71	.35

**p < .01

***p < .001

political and social values than Heterosexuals, as indicated by their lower scores on the Social Philosophy, $F(1,188) = 12.97, p < .001$, Political Philosophy, $F(1,188) = 6.52, p < .01$, and Environmentalism scales, $F(1,188) = 14.84, p < .001$.

Hypothesis 3

Table 11 contains a comparison of mean TOS scale scores for the feminist Ph.D. psychologist subgroup in the present study, with normative data provided by Coan (1979) from a random sample of 356 female APA members. It was predicted that the feminist Ph.D. psychologists would tend to score in a more subjectivistic direction than the available norms for female psychologists, and the data consistently support this prediction. Feminist psychologists are more theoretically oriented, and score lower on all five component subscales of Objectivism (Impersonal Causality, Behavioural Content Emphasis, Elementarism, Physicalism, and Quantitative Orientation) than the normative sample. In addition, the feminist psychologists tend to more strongly emphasize external, social explanations for individual differences in human behaviour over biological ones, as indicated by their lower composite Endogenism score.

Hypothesis 4

Coan (1979) observed that the academics in his normative sample of APA members tended to be somewhat more objectivistic than the practitioners. To test whether this relationship between occupational choice and theoretical orientation would hold true for feminist psychologists as well, the Ph.D. psychologist subgroup was divided on the basis of which professional activity the respondent ranked highest in

Table 11

Means and Standard Deviations of TOS Scale Scores for 356 Female APA Members and 92 Feminist Psychologists

Scale	Female APA Members ^a		Feminist Psychologists	
	N = 356		N = 92	
	\bar{X}	s.d.	\bar{X}	s.d.
Factual orientation ^b	8.88	2.64	7.68	2.50
Impersonal causality	10.83	3.52	9.33	3.22
Behavioural content	10.02	3.04	8.13	2.77
Elementarism	9.62	2.71	8.40	2.56
Biological determinism	11.38	3.41	9.92	3.19
Environmental determinism	11.65	3.56	10.95	3.23
Physicalism	9.56	2.68	8.11	2.46
Quantitative orientation	10.22	3.04	9.03	2.95
<u>Combined score</u>				
Objectivism ^c	50.27	10.00	43.00	10.62
Endogenism ^d	49.73	5.88	48.98	5.41

^aFrom Coan (1979)

^bRange for each scale is 4-20

Higher score indicates endorsement of the labelled dimension pole

^cRange is 20-100

^d50 + (Biological-Environmental Determinism)

terms of time spent. Respondents who ranked teaching or research highest formed the Academics subgroup ($n = 53$), and respondents who ranked administration, direct service to client, assessment, consulting, or other as the activity in which most of their professional time was spent, formed the Practitioners subgroup ($n = 39$).

Tables 12 and 13 contain mean TOS and ESQ scale scores for the Academic and Practitioner subgroups. Multivariate analysis of differences between the Academic and Practitioner subgroups of the feminist Ph.D. psychologist sample on the eight TOS scales yielded a significant multivariate effect, Hotelling-Lawley Trace, $F(9,82) = 2.57$, $p < .01$. Results for the four ESQ subscales, Hotelling Lawley Trace, $F(4,87) = 4.37$, $p < .01$. Practitioners scored significantly lower than Academics on the TOS Behavioural Content Emphasis, $F(1,90) = 11.42$, $p < .001$, and Physicalism scales, $F(1,90) = 4.88$, $p < .05$. Practitioners' lower mean score on the Quantitative Orientation scale, $F(1,90) = 3.63$, $p < .06$ barely failed to reach statistical significance. The composite Objectivism score for the Practitioner subgroup was significantly lower than the Academic subgroup, $F(1,90) = 7.60$, $p < .01$. The Practitioners also scored significantly lower on ESQ Reductionism, $F(1,90) = 7.87$, $p < .01$. These results substantially replicate Coan's (1979) findings, and indicate that academic feminist psychologists tend to be somewhat more likely to endorse traditional empiricist epistemology in psychology than practitioners.

Practitioners also scored significantly higher than Academics on Biological Determinism, $F(1,90) = 4.97$, $p < .05$, and on the composite Endogenism score, $F(1,90) = 5.14$, $p < .05$. These results probably reflect a tendency on the part of therapists to emphasize individual

Table 12

Results of Analysis of Variance of TOS Scale Scores for Academic and Practitioner Feminist Psychologist Groups

Scale	<u>Academics</u>		<u>Practitioners</u>		<u>F</u>
	\bar{X}	s.d.	\bar{X}	s.d.	
	N = 53		N = 39		
Factual orientation ^a	7.66	2.50	7.72	2.52	.01
Impersonal causality	9.79	3.43	8.69	2.84	2.66
Behavioural content	8.92	3.04	7.05	1.92	11.42***
Elementarism	8.70	2.48	8.00	2.65	1.68
Biological determinism	9.30	3.14	10.77	3.09	4.97*
Environmental determinism	11.40	3.22	10.33	3.18	2.47
Physicalism	8.58	2.66	7.46	2.02	4.88*
Quantitative orientation	9.53	2.97	8.36	2.83	3.63
<u>Combined score</u>					
Objectivism ^b	45.53	10.74	39.56	9.56	7.60**
Endogenism ^c	47.91	5.47	50.43	5.04	5.14*

^aRange for each scale is 4-20.

Higher score indicates endorsement of the labelled dimension pole.

^bRange is 20-100.

^c50 + (Biological-Environmental Determinism)

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 13

Results of Analysis of Variance of ESQ Scale Scores for Academic and Practitioner Feminist Psychologist Groups

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Range</u>	<u>Academics</u>		<u>Practitioners</u>		<u>F</u>
		\bar{X}	s.d.	\bar{X}	s.d.	
		N = 53		N = 39		
Rationalism	7-35	26.45	2.84	25.31	3.26	3.22
Metaphorism	8-40	23.94	3.27	24.59	3.47	.83
Antiempiricism	6-30	23.08	2.87	22.10	3.12	2.40
Reductionism	3-15	8.92	2.37	7.56	2.20	7.87**

**p < .01

psychodynamics more than feminist academics, who are markedly exogenist in their views about the sources of individual differences.

Table 14 contains mean VS scale scores for the Academic and Practitioner subgroups. Multivariate results were statistically significant, Hotelling-Lawley Trace $F(8,83) = 2.08, p < .05$. Statistically significant higher scores were found for the Practitioner subgroup on two of the four subscales that concern scientific ethics: Science and Theism, $F(1,90) = 4.17, p < .05$, and Research Ethics, $F(1,90) = 7.21, p < .01$. Both scales assess attitudes about the relevance of moral values to science. Practitioners were also more likely than Academics to oppose socialized health care, as indicated by their significantly higher score on the Health Care Delivery scale, $F(1,90) = 7.21, p < .01$.

Hypothesis 5

Table 15 presents a comparison of mean scores on the four VS subscales that concern scientific ethics, between Krasner and Houts' (1984) sample of senior behaviourists and their contemporaries, and the feminist Ph.D. psychologists in the present study. The two samples were not at all comparable in terms of sex or age. Krasner and Houts' subjects were primarily males whose average age was approximately 60 years, and the feminist psychologists in the present study were primarily females whose average age was approximately 40 years. However, the VS was developed by Krasner and Houts (1984), and their subjects provide the

Table 14

Results of Analysis of Variance of VS Scale Scores for Academic and Practitioner Feminist Psychologist

Groups

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Range</u>	<u>Academics</u>		<u>Practitioners</u>		<u>F</u>
		<u>\bar{X}</u>	<u>s.d.</u>	<u>\bar{X}</u>	<u>s.d.</u>	
Science and ethics	4-20	9.43	2.34	9.69	2.20	.27
Scientists' social responsibility	5-25	17.74	2.06	18.05	2.13	.51
Science and theism	5-25	14.15	4.08	15.67	2.55	4.17*
Social philosophy	7-35	17.83	1.85	18.33	2.02	1.54
Political philosophy	6-30	16.28	4.13	17.12	3.60	1.05
Health care	4-20	6.92	2.15	8.21	2.41	7.21**
Environmentalism	5-25	12.47	2.36	12.15	2.56	.38
Research ethics	7-35	27.96	3.01	29.79	3.01	8.32**
Attitude to survey	1-5	4.39	0.66	4.33	0.58	.23

*p < .05

**p < .01

Table 15

Means of Four VS Scale Scores about Attitudes toward Science for Four Samples of Psychologists

Scales	Krasner and Houts' psychologists ^a			Feminist psychologists		
	Behavioral	Comparison	Academics	Practitioners	Academics	Practitioners
	N = 82	N = 37	N = 53	N = 39		
	\bar{X}	\bar{X}	\bar{X}	\bar{X}	\bar{X}	\bar{X}
	s.d.	s.d.	s.d.	s.d.	s.d.	s.d.
	Range					
Science and ethics	12.98	11.81	9.43	9.69	2.34	2.20
Social responsibility	14.70	13.97	17.74	18.05	2.06	2.13
Science and theism	11.28	11.81	14.15	15.67	4.08	2.55
Research ethics	23.84	23.05	27.96	29.79	3.01	3.01

^a From Krasner and Houts (1984)

only comparison data available at the present time for this measure.

Means for Krasner and Houts' subjects hovered close to the midpoint on the Science and Ethics and Scientists' Social Responsibility scales. On the Science and Theism scale, the means fell considerably below the midpoint, favoring atheism over theism. On the Research Ethics scale, the means rose slightly above the midpoint.

The feminist psychologists' scores project a quite different profile of general values about science. The means for the Science/Ethics scale fell well below the midpoint, favouring a view of science as value-laden. The means for the Scientists' Social Responsibility scale rose well above the midpoint, favouring social activism over social isolation as the proper role of the scientist. The means for Science and Theism hovered at the midpoint of the scale, indicating that the feminist psychologists were less likely to endorse the view that moral values are irrelevant for science than Krasner and Houts' subjects. Finally, the feminist psychologists' means for the Research Ethics scale indicated a stronger endorsement for the view that scientists are constrained by responsibility for the well-being of their human subjects.

This profile of feminist psychologists' values about science seems congruent with how a hypothetical social constructionist might score on these four scales, based on the description of social constructionism outlined in Chapter 1 (Gergen, 1985; Gergen & Morawski, 1980; Minton, 1986). If the values of Krasner and Houts' (1984) subjects can be considered to any degree to be "typical" of their generation of psychologists, then the values held by the respondents to the present study represent a pronounced shift away from traditional assumptions about the role of science in society.

Hypothesis 6

In Krasner and Houts' (1984) study of the values of behavioural scientists, multiple regression analysis was performed using VS scale scores as predictors of TOS and ESQ scale scores. Results indicated only four statistically significant but weak relationships between personal values and theoretical values, which were reported in Chapter I. This finding was interpreted as evidence that psychologists who are similar in their broad sociopolitical values can hold different, even incompatible, discipline-specific assumptions--at least partly because they have been socialized as "scientists" to separate their beliefs about psychology from other beliefs they hold.

It was hypothesized that feminist psychologists might demonstrate less of a trend to compartmentalize their value systems than Krasner and Houts' subjects. Tables 16 and 17 contain results of a multiple regression analysis using VS scale scores as predictors of TOS and ESQ scale scores for the feminist Ph.D. psychologist group. For this group, 23 statistically significant relationships were indicated between VS scales and TOS and ESQ scales, in contrast to the four reported by Krasner and Houts (1984).

The Science and Ethics scale, which measures beliefs about the value-neutrality vs. value-ladenness of science, proved to be an especially consistent predictor of theoretical values. Respondents who endorsed a view of science as value-neutral were likely to favour factual rather than theoretical approaches in psychology, $B = .32$, $p < .01$, and score higher on TOS Objectivism and all five of its component subscales (Impersonal Causality, $B = .29$, $p < .05$; Behavioural Content Emphasis, $B = .43$, $p < .001$; Elementarism, $B = .27$, $p < .05$; Physicalism, $B = .33$,

Table 16

Results of Multiple Regression Analysis Using VS Scale Scores as Predictors of TOS Scale Scores for

Feminist Ph.D. Psychologist Group

Predictor	Factual orientation		Impersonal causality		Behavioural content		Elementarism	
	B	P	B	P	B	P	B	P
Science and ethics	.32	.01	.29	.04	.43	.001	.27	.03
Scientists' social responsibility	.18	.19	-.19	.24	-.10	.44	-.30	.03
Science and theism	-.12	.11	-.30	.001	-.12	.11	-.02	.81
Social philosophy	.04	.78	-.05	.79	.03	.84	.03	.87
Political philosophy	-.03	.74	.01	.89	-.01	.92	-.02	.82
Health care delivery	.12	.31	-.15	.27	-.03	.75	-.21	.07
Environmentalism	.14	.24	.32	.02	.27	.02	.16	.18
Research ethics	.03	.79	-.06	.56	-.10	.27	-.08	.40
Attitude to survey	-.76	.06	-.52	.27	-.58	.15	-.35	.39

Predictor	Biological determinism		Environmental determinism		Physicalism		Quantitative orientation	
	B	P	B	P	B	P	B	P
Science and ethics	.04	.81	.00	.99	.33	.01	.51	.001
Scientists' social responsibility	.15	.42	-.08	.68	-.17	.20	-.20	.18
Science and theism	.01	.93	-.14	.18	-.13	.07	.03	.70
Social philosophy	.02	.94	.36	.10	.03	.87	.15	.40
Political philosophy	.13	.28	-.20	.10	-.06	.51	-.05	.62
Health care delivery	.35	.03	-.09	.56	-.04	.74	-.17	.19
Environmentalism	-.01	.94	-.25	.12	-.03	.82	.18	.16
Research ethics	.01	.97	-.06	.67	-.11	.24	-.06	.55
Attitude to survey	-.80	.14	-.31	.58	-.36	.37	-.44	.33

Note. Statistically significant parameter estimates are underlined.

Table continues ...

Table 16 continued

<u>Criterion</u>	<u>Objectivism</u>		<u>Endogenism</u>	
	<u>B</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>P</u>
<u>Predictor</u>				
Science and ethics	1.82	.0001	.04	.88
Scientists' social responsibility	-.97	.04	.22	.47
Science and theism	-.54	.04	.14	.39
Social philosophy	.19	.74	-.34	.35
Political philosophy	-.12	.70	.33	.11
Health care delivery	-.61	.14	.44	.10
Environmentalism	.90	.03	.24	.36
Research ethics	-.42	.20	.06	.78
Attitude to survey	-2.42	.12	-.49	.59

Note. Statistically significant parameter estimates are underlined.

Table 17

Results of Multiple Regression Analysis using VS Scale Scores as Predictors of ESQ Scale Scores for

Feminist Ph.D. Psychologist Group

Criterion	Rationalism		Metamorphosis		Anti-Empiricism		Reductionism	
	<u>B</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>P</u>
Predictor								
Science and ethics	<u>-.43</u>	<u>.007</u>	<u>-.45</u>	<u>.005</u>	<u>-.20</u>	<u>.20</u>	<u>.36</u>	<u>.001</u>
Scientists' social responsibility	<u>-.01</u>	<u>.94</u>	<u>-.27</u>	<u>.14</u>	<u>.32</u>	<u>.06</u>	<u>-.27</u>	<u>.02</u>
Science and theism	<u>-.05</u>	<u>.60</u>	<u>.23</u>	<u>.02</u>	<u>-.05</u>	<u>.57</u>	<u>-.10</u>	<u>.10</u>
Social philosophy	<u>-.16</u>	<u>.45</u>	<u>-.17</u>	<u>.41</u>	<u>.19</u>	<u>.35</u>	<u>-.14</u>	<u>.29</u>
Political philosophy	<u>.01</u>	<u>.92</u>	<u>-.04</u>	<u>.75</u>	<u>-.04</u>	<u>.73</u>	<u>.02</u>	<u>.75</u>
Health care delivery	<u>-.05</u>	<u>.74</u>	<u>.37</u>	<u>.02</u>	<u>.04</u>	<u>.81</u>	<u>-.02</u>	<u>.86</u>
Environmentalism	<u>.09</u>	<u>.53</u>	<u>.08</u>	<u>.59</u>	<u>-.16</u>	<u>.29</u>	<u>.21</u>	<u>.03</u>
Research ethics	<u>-.04</u>	<u>.72</u>	<u>.26</u>	<u>.04</u>	<u>.03</u>	<u>.82</u>	<u>-.11</u>	<u>.18</u>
Attitude to survey	<u>1.01</u>	<u>.05</u>	<u>-.13</u>	<u>.80</u>	<u>.26</u>	<u>.61</u>	<u>.36</u>	<u>.28</u>

Note. Statistically significant parameter estimates are underlined.

$p < .01$; Quantitative Orientation, $B = .51$, $p < .001$) than respondents who viewed science as value-laden. They were also likely to score higher on ESQ Reductionism ($B = .36$, $p < .001$), and score lower on ESQ Rationalism ($B = -.43$, $p < .01$), and Metaphorism ($B = -.45$, $p < .01$) than respondents who viewed science as value-laden. These results support the notion that belief in the value-neutrality of science is a value position that is closely associated with commitment to positivist epistemology in psychology.

The Scientists' Social Responsibility scale was a statistically significant predictor of scores on TOS Elementarism ($B = -.30$, $p < .05$), and Objectivism ($B = -.97$, $p < .05$), and ESQ Reductionism ($B = -.27$, $p < .05$). These results suggest some connection between endorsement of social involvement rather than social isolation as the proper role of the scientist in society, and a tendency to reject traditional empiricist epistemology in psychology. The Science and Theism scale was a statistically significant predictor of scores on TOS Impersonal Causality ($B = -.30$, $p < .001$) and Objectivism ($B = -.54$, $p < .05$), and ESQ Metamorphism ($B = .23$, $p < .05$). These results suggest some connection between endorsement of the view that religious and moral values are relevant for science, and a tendency to favour a holistic rather than mechanistic model of man, and subjectivist epistemology in psychology.

The Health Care Delivery scale was a significant predictor of TOS Biological Determinism ($B = .35$, $p < .05$) and ESQ Metamorphism ($B = .37$, $p < .05$). These results are intelligible in view of the previously reported finding that practitioners in the feminist Ph.D. psychologist sample tended to endorse free enterprise medicine, and favour biological determinism and subjectivist epistemology to a greater degree than

feminist academics.

The Environmentalism scale was a significant predictor of TOS Impersonal Causality ($B = .32, p < .05$), Behavioural Content Emphasis ($B = .27, p < .05$) and Objectivism ($B = .90, p < .05$), and ESQ Reductionism ($B = .21, p < .05$). The Research Ethics scale was a significant predictor of ESQ Metamorphism ($B = .26, p < .05$). These results suggest some connection between the endorsement of protective attitudes toward the natural environment and the welfare of human research subjects, and a tendency to favour subjectivist epistemology in psychology.

Respondents who agreed with Coan's (1979) Attitude to Survey Item, "It is worthwhile to study the theoretical orientations of psychologists," were likely to score low on TOS Factual Orientation ($B = -.76, p < .06$) and high on ESQ Rationalism ($B = 1.01, p < .05$), indicating a tendency to favour theoretical over factual approaches in psychology. This result is consistent with Coan's (1979) comment that the psychologists who would be the most likely to find the research questionnaire interesting would be those with strong interests in theoretical issues.

The overall pattern of results from the multiple regression analysis indicated that the VS subscales which were found to be useful predictors of some aspects of theoretical orientation were those that assessed general attitudes about the role of science in society. For the feminist Ph.D. psychologist sample, the Social Philosophy and Political Philosophy subscales did not significantly predict any aspect of theoretical orientation.

The TOS, ESQ, and VS scale data were subsequently factor analyzed using the principal components, varimax rotation method. Summary Tables 18, 19, and 20 are contained in Appendix N. Results of the factor

analysis of the TOS data confirmed Krasner and Houts' (1984) replication of Coan's (1979) eight first-order factors. On the ESQ, eight factors were retained by the Mineigen criterion rather than the four reported by Krasner and Houts (1984), and there is little correspondence between the pattern of item loadings onto these factors and the item arrangement of the ESQ subscales. Houts (personal communication, 1986) has expressed only guarded confidence in the psychometric properties of the ESQ and VS scales. On the VS, 14 factors were retained by the Mineigen criterion. There is a high degree of correspondence between the pattern of items that load onto the first three factors, and the items that compose the VS Social Philosophy and Political Philosophy subscales. This result lends concurrent validity to those measures; however, no meaningful conceptual scheme has yet emerged for the pattern of factors composed of items that correspond to those VS subscales which appear to be related to theoretical orientation.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

The purpose of the present study was to investigate the theoretical orientations and values of contemporary North American feminist psychologists. Surveys were distributed to all participants at the 1985 annual national conferences of the Association for Women in Psychology, and the Canadian Psychological Association's Section on Women and Psychology. On dichotomous measures of theoretical orientation in psychology (those that are based on the concept of opposing objectivist vs. subjectivist or scientist vs. humanist epistemologies), scores of respondents in the present study tended on the average to be in a markedly subjectivistic direction. As well as tending to favour subjectivistic rather than objectivistic epistemology, respondents in the present study also tended to be exogenist rather than endogenist in their views about the sources of individual differences, that is, they tended to place more emphasis on the external, social determinants of human behaviour than internal, biological determinants.

Within-group comparisons based on the level of education (Ph.D. vs. below-Ph.D.) and major field of academic training (psychology vs. non-psychology) of respondents indicated that the Ph.D. psychologists' theoretical orientation scores were not significantly different from those of conference participants who had below-Ph.D. level training in psychology (mainly current doctoral students) or below-Ph.D. level training in academic fields other than psychology (mainly in related

human services fields). The three feminist comparison groups also shared similar values about the role of science in society, views characterized by a tendency to reject traditional positivist assumptions about scientific objectivity. The lack of within-group differences based on level of education and major field of training was somewhat surprising in that the Ph.D. psychologist group would presumably have been more intensively socialized to hold attitudes consistent with a scientist-practitioner professional model than the other feminist groups. Their significantly lower score in the atheistic direction on the Science and Theism scale was the only indication of such differential socialization, however.

Some significant differences emerged when the total sample was divided into Heterosexual and Non-Heterosexual groups, based on respondents' self-descriptions of sexual orientation. With respect to theoretical orientation, the Non-Heterosexuals tended on the average to be more subjectivistic than the Heterosexuals, as well as more exogenist. They also tended to be more skeptical about the value-neutrality of science, and more liberal in their social and political philosophy than the Heterosexuals. It should be noted that these between-group differences were small, relative to the variation within each group; however, the findings are consistent with the hypothesis that because lesbian feminists represent "a minority within a minority," they would tend to be even less committed to traditional ideology in psychology than heterosexual feminists.

The feminist Ph.D. psychologists in the present study tended to be less objectivistic than a comparison group of randomly selected female APA members surveyed by Coan (1979), and they also tended to be more

exogenist than Coan's subjects. Within the feminist Ph.D. psychologist group, some significant differences emerged between Academics (those whose primary professional activity was either teaching or research) and Practitioners (those whose primary professional activity was service-related). Practitioners tended on the average to be more subjectivistic than Academics, but less exogenist. They also tended to be slightly more theistic, more concerned about the rights of human subjects, and more moderate in their opposition to free enterprise health care than Academics. Again, these differences (though statistically significant) were small relative to the variation within each group; however, the findings are consistent with differences in emphasis that might be expected, based on the nature of these occupational roles. Academics tend to be more involved with the conduct and dissemination of research, and might be expected to show somewhat greater commitment to traditional empirical values than practitioners. Because practitioners were primarily involved in the provision of clinical services, it is understandable that they would tend to focus on intrapersonal variables relevant to their own area of expertise more so than academics.

The general values about science that were found to be predictors of a preference for subjectivist epistemology on the part of feminist Ph.D. psychologists were the following: 1) science should be value-laden rather than value-neutral; 2) the scientist's role should be one of social involvement, as opposed to social isolation; 3) moral values are not incompatible with a scientific outlook; and 4) the rights of human research subjects should take precedence over scientific freedom of inquiry. These views seem to be consistent with the newly emerging perspective on epistemology in psychology known as social constructionism

(Gergen, 1985). It was also noted that the feminist Ph.D. psychologists in the present study endorsed all of these value positions more strongly than the subjects in Krasner and Houts' (1984) study, a group of older male psychologists who also favoured more objectivistic epistemology.

Respondents in the present study tended on the average to agree with Coan's (1979) Attitude to Survey Item, "It is worthwhile to study the theoretical orientations of psychologists," which was found to be predictive of a preference for rational or theoretical rather than empirical or factual approaches in psychology. Therefore, the results of the present study may be biased by the underrepresentation of more empirically-oriented feminist psychologists, who may simply not have returned the questionnaire. On the other hand, it cannot be assumed that non-respondents tended to be more empirically-oriented, because both Kimble (1984) and Krasner and Houts (1984) reported better return rates from empirically-oriented psychologists, who were more willing to cooperate with empirical data collection efforts. The moderate return rate in the present study (27%) is most likely attributable to the time-consuming and intrusive nature of the questionnaire, and the fact that it was distributed by an unknown graduate student, rather than by someone prominent in the field.

In terms of demographic characteristics, it can be argued that the sample is reasonably representative of the current composition of AWP's and SWAP's membership. But to what extent are the findings generalizable to other women in psychology? The purpose of the present study was to raise, rather than answer, that question, by focussing on a movement within psychology whose advocates are nearly all women. Gender has been treated as a non-issue in most of the research on theoretical

orientations of psychologists. Kimble (1984) did not even ask his subjects to indicate whether they were male or female. This was unfortunate because the females in his study would have provided an ideal comparison group for the present study, composed of women psychologists who were not formally affiliated with feminist psychology. Krasner and Houts' (1984) sample of senior behaviourists was composed nearly entirely of males. Coan (1979) made an effort to ensure that women were represented proportionally to men in his research, but the sex differences in theoretical orientation he found were downplayed as much as possible, and he indicated no real curiosity about them, probably because the differences were in the stereotypically "expected" direction, that is, women were found to be "less objective" than men.

The generalizability of the findings of the present study may be limited because the definition of a feminist psychologist was restricted quite narrowly by the sampling strategy to individuals who were presumably not unwilling to be identified professionally with the label of "feminist" or a specialization in "psychology of women." There are obviously many more women, as well as men, within psychology who may consider themselves feminists in their personal lives, who may support equal opportunities for women in the profession, and whose epistemological values have probably been influenced by feminist consciousness during the past decade, but who would be very reluctant to label themselves or their work as "feminist" for fear of adverse professional consequences. Unger (1982) has outlined several factors which act to reduce the professional legitimacy of the field: (1) the study of women is regarded as a low prestige content area where most research is conducted by younger scholars who are primarily women; (2) professional activity

in organizations and publishing in journals on the psychology of women are regarded as trivial pursuits because the area is not regarded as a "real" specialty; and (3) women who are involved in teaching and doing research in the psychology of women seem to be particularly vulnerable to unfavourable promotion and tenure decisions. Given all these disadvantages to wearing the feminist label, the question regarding generalizability of the results of the present study becomes a difficult one to test. How might the impact of feminism on epistemology among psychologists who aren't "open" about being feminist be assessed? There are no really sophisticated psychometric measures of feminism; existing scales that measure attitudes toward women and feminism are quite crude and transparent, and most professional psychologists would probably not endorse obviously sexist statements today.

The most adequate measure of theoretical orientation used in the present study, from a psychometric standpoint, was Coan's (1979) Theoretical Orientation Survey (TOS). It was based on the traditional objectivist vs. subjectivist dichotomy of epistemologies, and did not directly assess the newly emerging perspective known as social constructionism. There was no way of differentiating the responses of subjects who scored in a subjectivistic direction because of a true preference for humanistic, existential, or phenomenological approaches per se from subjects who tended to endorse the subjectivistic point of view in a forced-choice situation where the only other alternative was to agree with the objectivist positivist view. Subjects who believed that "the personal is highly personal" might endorse many items the same way as subjects who believed that "the personal is political," but for different reasons. However, the social constructionist subject would

probably be likely to score in a more exogenist direction than would the "pure" subjectivist.

The four factor subscales of the Epistemological Style Questionnaire (ESQ) each correlated with either the TOS Factual vs. theoretical orientation subscale or the TOS composite Objectivism score. There was no indication that the ESQ was assessing a "third" epistemological stance that might be consistent with social constructionism.

The only subscales of the Values Survey (VS) whose validity was supported by factor analytic results were the Social and Political Philosophy scales. However, these subscales failed to predict any aspect of theoretical orientation for the present sample. The factor structure of the other six VS subscales, which were found to be related to some aspects of theoretical orientation, was unclear. Further factor analytic work on the items that compose those subscales is warranted, because they appear to assess attitudes and values about science that might be useful in constructing a measure of social constructionist epistemology.

The overall profile of the theoretical orientations and values of feminist psychologists that emerged from the present study was clearly that of a group who on the average favoured subjectivistic over objectivistic epistemology, a preference for exogenist rather than endogenist explanations for behaviour, a value-laden conceptualization of science, and belief in social activism as the appropriate role of the scientist.

Within the feminist psychology community, academics and practitioners, and heterosexuals and lesbians, are commonly perceived as interest groups that often seem to have divergent values, concerns, and

priorities. Results of the present study indicated that some of these perceived differences may have as their source differences in basic epistemological values. These findings raise many interesting questions about the relationships between occupational choice, social group membership, and epistemological values of psychologists. The trend has been to consider personal epistemology as a relatively fixed, consistent feature of an individual (Unger, 1985). Yet processes of paradigm change within a field occur basically because people's views change. It is, for example, unlikely that respondents in the present study held the same theoretical views 10 or 15 years ago that they do today, and their views 10 years from now may be different yet again. The question then becomes, what are the "enabling" experiences that precipitate change? Consciousness-raising is influenced in a general way by social movements, but minority group identification is probably crucial, involving the experience of social oppression and of critically evaluating societal norms and values, leading to the perception of alternative views of reality as equally valid. Such experiences have been described as part of the process of becoming a feminist, as well as part of gay and lesbian identity development (Faderman, 1984; Minton & McDonald, 1983/1984).

Several promising avenues of research can be developed from questions raised by the present study. First, more research is needed on the theoretical orientations of other groups within psychology who seem committed to emancipatory values and social change, for example, SPSSI, Division 44, the Society for Changing Men, etc., in order to clarify whether the same cluster of theoretical values (subjectivism plus exogenism, plus value-ladenness of science) that typified feminist

psychologists is characteristic of other groups who may hold social constructionist views.

Second, it would be a good idea to study the theoretical orientations and values of women in different areas of specialization within psychology, to compare their views with those of feminist psychologists. Feminist psychologists may in fact not be nearly as radical in their views as they are commonly perceived to be. Third, all further research on the theoretical orientations of psychologists should be designed so as to ensure that females are fairly represented in the sample, and data can be analyzed for sex differences. Groups within psychology whose membership is composed of roughly equivalent proportions of males and females might be compared with groups where males greatly outnumber females and vice versa.

Fourth, it would be worthwhile to pursue the effort to develop a psychometric measure that would assess social constructionism. Defining its component factors would be useful simply in terms of being able to better convey to the profession at large a clearer, more concrete idea of what the perspective is about. At present, social constructionism is not at all well understood.

Finally, there is a need for more in-depth research on the connections between personal experience and epistemology, especially the impact of "minority," that is, feminist and/or gay consciousness, on theoretical orientations and values in psychology. It is not coincidental that unexamined underlying assumptions and implicit ideology became concerns for psychology at the same time that women, gays and minorities began to participate in the profession in sufficient numbers to have an impact on the direction of its advancement.

APPENDIX A

KIMBLE'S (1984) EPISTEMIC DIFFERENTIAL (ED)

1

MOST IMPORTANT VALUES

The most important values that govern research and scholarship are scholarly values. Although humanistic values play a role, that role is a subordinate one. The immediate goal of scholarship is the advancement of knowledge. The strongest criticisms one can make of a study are methodological criticisms. A study that is unsound in these terms cannot be justified by any apparent degree of relevance to the human condition and is therefore, pointless.

The most important values that govern research and scholarship are humanistic values. Although scholarly values play a role, that role is a subordinate one. The immediate goal of scholarship is the improvement of the human condition. The strongest criticism one can make of a study is in terms of relevance to the human good. A study that lacks such relevance cannot be justified by any appeal to scholarly values and is pointless.

Scholarly values	Human values
Increasing knowledge	Improving the human condition
Methodological strength	Relevance to social good

2

DETERMINISM

The concept of determinism applies to behavior. All human activity is caused by physical, physiological, or experiential variables. In principle it is possible to discover exact laws relating even individual behavior to these variables. Behavior is understandable, predictable, and controllable.

The concept of determinism does not apply to behavior, certainly not to individual human behavior. There can be no causal laws of human activity except perhaps at the level of statistical averages. Even in principle, behavior must be regarded as mysterious, unpredictable, and beyond control.

Determinism	Indeterminism
Causal laws	Statistical averages
Understandable, Predictable, Controllable	Mysterious, Unpredictable, Uncontrollable

BASIC SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE

The final source of knowledge about human behavior and experience is to be found in the evidence that is available in observation. The proper objects of such observation are the behavior of other people and the circumstances under which behavior occurs. Empathic understanding cannot be trusted. This means that psychology should base its conclusions on experiments, questionnaires, and investigation. Self report, case histories and commonsense can contribute little.

The final source of knowledge about human behavior and experience is to be found in the intuitions we all have because we are human. The most effective way to arrive at an understanding of the behavior of other people is through empathic knowledge of how we would behave in the same circumstances. This means that psychology should look to self report, case histories and commonsense in searching for conclusions. Experiments, questionnaires and investigation can contribute little.

Observation	Intuition
Behavior of others	Personal experience and empathy
Experiment, questionnaire, investigation	Self report, case history, commonsense

SETTING FOR DISCOVERY

The most important setting for investigations of human behavior is the laboratory; the most important method is experimentation. Whatever experiments sacrifice as a result of artificiality is more than made up for by what they gain in degree of control. Precision in making observation is more important than real-life validity.

The most important setting for investigations of human behavior is the real world in which people and animals live. Whatever such field studies sacrifice in degree of control is more than made up for by what they gain by working in a natural rather than artificial situation. Real-life validity is more important than precision in making observations.

Laboratory	Real world
Experimentation	Field study
High control in artificial situations	Low control in natural situations
Precision observation	Real-life validity

NATURE/NURTURE ISSUE

The most important influences on human behavior are physiological. Heredity is more important than situations when it comes to understanding behavior. Psychology should be more a biological science than a social one because biological variations contribute more to psychological processes than variations in environment.

The most important influences on human behavior are in the environment. Situations are more important than heredity when it comes to understanding behavior. Psychology should be more a social science than a biological one because environmental variations contribute more to psychological processes than variations in biology.

Heredity	Environment
Physiology	Situation
Biological science	Social science

LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

Progress in the understanding of human behavior requires the analysis of behavior, experience and stimulus situations into their elements. Only then can we proceed to the task of determining the rules of synthesis by which these elements combine to produce complex behavior and experience. The construction of the nervous system is designed to deal with elements. Elements must, therefore, be basic; the whole of behavior and experience must be made up of these parts. The idea that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts is nonsense.

Progress in the understanding of human behavior requires the recognition of the unanalyzability of behavior, experience, and the environment. We live in an organized perceptual world, not a fragmented physical one. The whole has priority; attempts to extract mental or behavioral elements from it is bad science. Parts have meaning only in the context of wholes. If the nervous system processes only elements, this casts doubt on physiological interpretation because it fails to recognize that wholes are in fact greater than the sums of their parts. To deny that is nonsense.

Elementism	Holism
Wholes constructed from parts	Wholes give meaning to parts

UNIQUENESS

There is no such thing as an absolutely unique individual. People are about the same the whole world over. People differ but they differ in degree, not kind. They occupy different positions on many identical dimensions.

Every individual is totally unique. It takes all kinds to make a world and no two are the same. The differences among people are so fundamental that no individual can be meaningfully compared with any other.

Quantitative variation Individual uniqueness

CONCEPT OF ORGANISMS

The behavior of organisms is reaction to stimulation. Behavior is an automatic expression of the laws of behavior. Situational and physiological variables have effects on behavior over which the organism has little or no voluntary control.

The behavior of organisms is active creativity. Behavior is much more than an automatic expression of the laws of behavior. The effects on behavior of situational and physiological variables are something over which the organism has considerable voluntary control.

Reactivity Creativity

Automaticity Voluntary control

APPENDIX B

COAN'S (1979) THEORETICAL ORIENTATION SURVEY (TOS)

NOTE. High score (5) indicates endorsement of capitalized scale pole for bipolar scales.

STRONGLY AGREE = SA

STRONGLY DISAGREE = SD

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION SURVEY

(Items 1-32 in Appendix K)

Factor 1 FACTUAL ORIENTATION vs. theoretical orientation

An inclination to espouse a radical empiricism and disparage speculation, abstract interpretation, and theory building vs. an inclination to favor theory-building and speculation that goes beyond the limits of extant observation.

Item 1. A science is likely to progress most rapidly if researchers devote themselves primarily to the systematic gathering of factual information and engage in little elaborate speculation or theory building. SA = 5

Item 9. It is just as important for psychological researchers to formulate theoretical interpretations as it is to accumulate specific facts about behaviour. SD = 5

Item 17. A theory should consist mainly of inductive generalizations based on observations, with little in the way of constructions of hypothetical formulations contributed by the theorist. SA = 5

Item 25. The most valuable theories are ones involving speculation that goes well beyond established facts and points the way to future discoveries. SD = 5

Factor 2 IMPERSONAL CAUSALITY vs. personal will

The advocacy of a determinism that excludes or de-emphasizes individual choice or participation vs. an emphasis on the importance of individual choice, purpose and uniqueness and a tendency to regard these as

necessary ingredients of any adequate explanation of human actions.

Item 2. Human behaviour is characterized in all aspects by lawful regularity and thus, in principle, it is completely predictable. SA = 5

Item 10. In principle, human behaviour cannot be completely predicted, because people can choose to act in ways that we have no basis for expecting. SD = 5

Item 18. Human actions are just as strictly determined by whatever causes are operating as all other physical events are. SA = 5

Item 26. In principle, an individual's choice or decision can never be fully predicted from antecedent conditions or events. SD = 5

Factor 3 BEHAVIOURAL CONTENT vs. experiential content emphasis

A tendency to focus on publicly observable behaviour as subject matter and to consider this the appropriate subject matter for psychology vs. a tendency to regard the conscious experience of the individual as an essential subject matter for psychological theory and research.

Item 4. Psychologists should be as concerned with explaining private conscious experience as they are with explaining overt behaviour. SD = 5

Item 12. The individual subject's personal account of his/her private conscious experience is one of the most valuable sources of psychological data. SD = 5

Item 20. Psychologists can gain many valuable insights through meditation and other procedures designed to expand or illuminate private experience. SD = 5

Item 28. The primary goal of psychologists should be the explanation of observable behaviour, rather than the explanation of conscious events.

SA = 5

Factor 4 ELEMENTARISM vs. holism

A preference for dealing both in theory and research with relatively elementary or specific variables and relationships vs. a preference for dealing in both theory and research with complex global patterns and relationships.

Item 5. For many research purposes, it is best to permit many relevant variables to interact in a natural fashion and then analyze the results, rather than try to effect strict control. SD = 5

Item 13. Highly controlled experiments often give a misleading picture of the complex interactions that actually occur under natural circumstances. SD = 5

Item 21. In the long run researchers can achieve most if they devote each individual study to a very specific, circumscribed problem. SA = 5

Item 29. We would gain more valuable information if researchers spent more time studying total action patterns in relation to the total influencing environment and less time relating single responses to a few specific stimuli. SD = 5

Factor 5 BIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM

Item 6. Individual differences in personality are governed in a high degree by heredity. SA = 5

Item 14. The direction of human behaviour is governed to a considerable extent by inborn predisposition. SA = 5

Item 22. Much of the variation in human temperament is governed by inborn constitution. SA = 5

Item 30. An individual's patterns of relative strengths and weaknesses in verbal, mathematical, and perceptual abilities is governed to a great extent by genetic factors. SA = 5

Factor 6 ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINISM

Item 3. All behaviour, except for simple reflexes, is learned. SA = 5

Item 11. Except for a few elementary drives like hunger and thirst, all human motives are learned. SA = 5

Item 19. Nearly all individual differences in human behaviour can be accounted for in terms of past reinforcements. SA = 5

Item 27. Nearly all the behavioural tendencies that have been called instinctive in people are actually products of learning. SA = 5

Factor 7 PHYSICALISM vs. rejection of physicalism

The view that psychologists should employ concepts definable in physical terms and seek laws and principles expressible in physical terms vs. an acceptance of terms and theoretical formulations that are not totally reducible to physical terms.

Item 7. All concepts used in psychological theory should be explicitly definable in terms of observed physical events. SA = 5

Item 15. It is best to define perception just in terms of stimulus-response relationships, rather than in terms of internal events that cannot be publicly observed. SA = 5

Item 23. Any meaningful statement about mental events can be translated into a statement about behaviour with no serious loss of meaning. SA = 5

Item 31. As far as possible, the stimulus and response variables used in psychological theory should be defined in strictly physical terms. SA = 5

Factor 8 QUANTITATIVE ORIENTATION vs. qualitative orientation

A tendency to favor quantitative measurement, quantitative description, and the use of mathematical formulations in theory vs. a de-emphasis of quantitative procedures and formulations and an acceptance of subject matter and methods that do not readily permit quantitative treatment.

Item 8. The use of mathematical models and equations in theory often serves to create a false impression of scientific respectability instead of furthering our understanding. SD = 5

Item 16. As this science progresses, psychological theories will tend increasingly to be composed of abstract mathematical or logical equations. SA = 5

Item 24. A strong insistence on precise measurement and quantification is likely to cause psychologists to neglect important areas of research.

SD = 5

Item 32. A good indicator of the maturity of a science is the extent to which its explanatory principles are stated in precise quantitative form.

SA = 5

Second order Factor I OBJECTIVISM vs. subjectivism

Sum of scores on Factors 2, 3, 4, 7, 8

<u>Objectivism</u>	vs.	<u>Subjectivism</u>
Impersonal causality		Personal will
Behavioural content emphasis		Experiential content
Elementarism		Holism
Physicalism		Reject physicalism
Quantitative orientation		Qualitative orientation

Second order Factor II ENDOGENISM vs. exogenism

Sum 50 + (BIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM - ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINISM)

A tendency to emphasize either the internal, biological sources or the external sources of human behaviour and of individual differences in human behaviour. The endogenist attaches more importance to biological determinism than environmental determinism, while the exogenist does the opposite.

APPENDIX C

NORMATIVE DATA ON TOS SCALES FOR 510
MALE AND 356 FEMALE APA MEMBERS AND
ALPHA RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS AND
RETEST RELIABILITIES FOR TOS SCALES

Means and Standard Deviations on TOS Scales for 510 Male and 356 Female

APA Members^a

<u>Factor</u>	<u>Males</u>		<u>Females</u>	
	<u>Mean</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>SD</u>
1 Factual orientation	9.34	3.22	8.88	2.64
2 Impersonal causality	12.26	4.22	10.83	3.52
3 Behavioural content	10.50	3.56	10.02	3.04
4 Elementarism	10.16	2.96	9.62	2.71
5 Biological determinism	10.93	3.37	11.38	3.41
6 Environmental determinism	11.95	3.89	11.65	3.56
7 Physicalism	10.49	3.38	9.56	2.68
8 Quantitative orientation	10.85	3.28	10.22	3.04
I Objectivism	54.25	11.94	50.27	10.00
II Endogenism	48.98	6.24	49.73	5.88

^aFrom Coan (1979)

Alpha Reliability Coefficients and Retest Reliabilities for TOS Scales^a

<u>Factor</u>	<u>Alpha</u>	<u>Retest</u>
1 Factual orientation	.717	.608
2 Impersonal causality	.804	.809
3 Behavioural content	.736	.811
4 Elementarism	.618	.684
5 Biological determinism	.774	.718
6 Environmental determinism	.793	.761
7 Physicalism	.684	.736
8 Quantitative orientation	.714	.760
I Objectivism	.845	.881
II Endogenism	.820	.773

^aFrom Coan (1979)

APPENDIX D

KRASNER AND HOUTS' (1984) TOS DATA

Means and Standard Deviations of Theoretical Orientation Survey Scale.

Scores by Behavioural and Comparison Groups

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Group</u>			
	<u>Behavioural</u>		<u>Comparison</u>	
	(n = 87)		(n = 37)	
	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>
<u>Primary scales</u>				
Factual (vs. theoretical orientation)	10.61	3.99	7.27	2.13**
Impersonal causality (vs. personal will)	15.07	3.97	12.24	4.15**
Behavioural (vs. experiential) content emphasis	12.72	3.88	9.49	3.44**
Elementarism (vs. holism)	11.54	3.46	9.05	2.16**
Biological determinism	11.67	4.18	12.27	3.32
Environmental determinism	11.31	3.91	9.65	3.11*
Physicalism	13.03	3.66	9.65	3.09**
Quantitative (vs. qualitative) orientation	12.30	2.84	10.22	3.07**
<u>Secondary scales</u>				
Objectivism (vs. subjectivism)	64.67	11.93	50.65	11.42**
Endogenism (vs. exogenism)	50.36	6.98	52.62	5.38

Note. Higher score indicates endorsement of capitalized scale pole for bipolar scales. Range for 8 primary scales is 4-20 and for 2 secondary scales, 20-100 and 12-60, respectively.

*p < .05

**p < .001

APPENDIX E

KRASNER AND HOUTS' (1984) EPISTEMOLOGICAL STYLE QUESTIONNAIRE (ESQ)

NOTE. High score (5) indicates endorsement of the named factor.

STRONGLY AGREE = SA

STRONGLY DISAGREE = SD

EPISTEMOLOGICAL STYLE QUESTIONNAIRE

(Items 33-56 in Appendix K)

Factor 1 Rationalism

Item 33. Observation of raw data is both prior to and independent of theory. SD = 5

Item 35. All scientific theories contain hypothetical constructs whether explicitly stated or not. SA = 5

Item 37. Intuition is central to good science and scientific method. SA = 5

Item 39. Science can never prove any theory conclusively true. SA = 5

Item 41. Scientific theories necessarily make metaphysical assumptions. SA = 5

Item 52. Hypothetico-deductive method is superior to inductive method as an approach to sound scientific knowledge. SA = 5

Item 54. To warrant the description of "scientific" a theory need not define hypothetical constructs in terms of observable operations. SA = 5

Factor 2 Metaphorism

Item 34. However interesting and rewarding they might be, courses in the liberal arts and humanities really contribute little to the solution of scientific problems. SD = 5

Item 36. Terms must have an observable referent to be meaningful. SD = 5

Item 40. Psychology is in its infancy as a science and will eventually achieve the elegance and exactitude of physical science. SD = 5

Item 43. The universe is fundamentally chaotic. SA = 5

Item 44. Having a feel for one's subject that goes beyond existing data contributed little to scientific progress. SD = 5

Item 48. Determinism is a correct assumption; all events have a cause.

SD = 5

Item 53. The primary criterion for assessing the validity of a scientific theory is not formal logic but prediction of observable events. SD = 5

Item 56. Knowledge is advanced primarily by collection of data and not by logical deduction from correct axioms. SD = 5

Factor 3 Anti-empiricism

Item 38. Scientific theories can be true only in a probabilistic sense.

SA = 5

Item 42. Science can only conclusively prove a theory false. SA = 5

Item 46. The philosophy of science has little, if anything, of significance to contribute to the actual practice of science. SD = 5

Item 50. Scientific observation provides us with hard data that are independent of our subjective desires, wishes, and biases. SD = 5

Item 51. Scientists are so engrossed in procedural detail that they lose track of the basic meaning of their subject. SA = 5

Item 55. Scientists change their scientific opinions more in response to hard scientific evidence than in response to their colleagues' opinions.

SD = 5

Factor 4 Reductionism

Item 45. Psychology cannot in principle be reduced to physical science (e.g., biochemistry). SD = 5

Item 47. Psychologists should not adopt the methodology of the physical sciences to investigate human behaviour. SD = 5

Item 49. Knowledge of people achieved through literature is more profound than any knowledge of people that can be achieved by scientific method.

SD = 5

APPENDIX F

KRASNER AND HOUTS' (1984) ESQ DATA

Means and Standard Deviations of Epistemological Style Questionnaire

Scale Scores of Behavioural and Comparison Groups

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Range</u>	<u>Group</u>			
		<u>Behavioural</u>		<u>Comparison</u>	
		N = 87		N = 37	
		<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>
Metaphorism	8-40	18.38	4.63	20.43	4.13*
Rationalism	7-35	22.15	4.72	24.76	3.83**
Reductionism	3-15	9.95	2.64	8.35	2.78**
Antiempiricism	6-30	19.06	3.84	20.81	3.16*

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

APPENDIX G

THE VALUES SURVEY

NOTE. High score (5) indicates endorsement of capitalized dimension pole.

STRONGLY AGREE = SA

STRONGLY DISAGREE = SD

VALUES SURVEY

(Items 57-99 in Appendix K)

Scale 1 Science and Ethics

Dimension: VALUE-NEUTRAL vs. value-laden

Item 57. Science is about facts, not values. SA = 5

Item 68. Scientists should not allow personal or social values to distort their pursuit of scientific knowledge. SA = 5

Item 80. The acquisition of new knowledge is an ultimate criterion for carrying out research. SA = 5

Item 85. Scientists, as scientists, should not endorse ethical standards. SA = 5

Scale 2 Scientists' Social Responsibility

Dimension: SOCIAL INVOLVEMENT vs. social isolation

Item 58. A researcher should know what is done with the results of his/her research. SA = 5

Item 70. A researcher should be held personally responsible for uses of his/her research. SA = 5

Item 91. Scientific research should have a clear social utility as defined by a majority of people. SA = 5

Item 94. Scientists should not retain from the public any information about the adverse uses that can be made of their research outcomes. SA = 5

Item 98. Scientists should not pursue their scientific work if it clearly endangers the general welfare of humanity. SA = 5

Scale 3 Science and Theism

Dimension: THEISM vs. atheism

Item 59. Theological matters are irrelevant for science. SD = 5

Item 71. It is important to preserve religious-moral tradition even if scientific progress is impeded. SA = 5

Item 92. Belief in deities is inconsistent with a scientific world view. SD = 5

Item 93. Agnosticism is the most reasonable position with respect to the question of an original creator or God. SD = 5

Item 99. The lawfulness of nature reflects the existence of an original creator. SA = 5

Scale 4 Social Philosophy

Dimension: SOCIAL DARWINISM vs. social altruism

Item 60. All things considered, competition is the best relationship between people in a society. SA = 5

Item 67. Material and class equality are idle dreams. SA = 5

Item 69. "Survival of the fittest" should be a guiding principle of a just social order. SA = 5

Item 72. We are all morally obligated to reduce pain and suffering in the world. SD = 5

Item 81. The affluent of the world have a moral obligation to respond to the needs of the less well-off. SD = 5

Item 90. Those most qualified to control property and resources are those who have survived the competitive struggle. SA = 5

Item 95. In science as in life, the best results follow when one is engaged in a competitive struggle for knowledge and resources. SA = 5

Scale 5 Political Philosophy

Dimension: CONSERVATISM vs. liberalism

Item 61. Private property and private ownership of production are necessary to have optimal personal freedom. SA = 5

~~Item 66.~~ Goods and services are best provided by centralized government agencies as opposed to local agencies and private corporations. SD = 5

Item 76. Goods and services are best provided by private corporations as opposed to government agencies. SA = 5

Item 88. Capitalism should be eliminated. SD = 5

Item 89. Individual liberty should take precedence over social goals and collective restraints on liberty. SA = 5

Item 96. Socialism is a desirable goal. SD = 5

Scale 6 Health Care Delivery

Dimension: MARKET CONTROL vs. government control

Item 62. Quality will suffer if the government intrudes into the health care delivery system. SA = 5

Item 65. Health care is neither a right nor a privilege, but a service that the professional may dispense according to his/her own set of values. SA = 5

Item 73. The government should regulate the structure and cost of health care. SD = 5

Item 82. All citizens should be guaranteed access to adequate and necessary health care. SD = 5

Scale 7 Environmentalism

Dimension: INDUSTRIALISM vs. environmentalism

Item 63. Science and technology should be utilized to solve environmental problems. SA = 5

Item 77. The solution to the environment crises requires new values, new social systems, and new political structures. SD = 5

Item 79. Every species in the environment has a right to continued survival. SD = 5

Item 83. People who care about the environment must live lives that show their concern. SD = 5

Item 87. There should be laws protecting all aspects of the environment. SD = 5

Scale 8 Research Ethics

Dimension: ETHICAL CONSTRAINT vs. freedom of inquiry

Item 64. The voluntary consent of the human subject is the sine qua non of human experimentation. SA = 5

Item 74. The subject of an experiment is entitled to full and frank disclosure of all the facts, probabilities, and opinions which a reasonable person might consider before giving his/her consent. SA = 5

Item 75. The proposal for undertaking human research which fails to consider all reasonable possibilities of harm is morally irresponsible. SA = 5

Item 78. Compensation to volunteers in human experimentation should never be so much as to constitute an undue inducement. SA = 5

Item 84. Freedom to do scientific research is not absolute but must be constrained by ethical and social considerations of the society where the research is done. SA = 5

Item 86. It is incumbent on the researcher to prove that a proposed experiment is ethical in all of its aspects. SA = 5

Item 97. No experimentation that does not directly benefit the patient should be performed on patients who are ill. SA = 5

Item to gauge attitude of respondent to the questionnaire

Item 100. It is worthwhile to study the theoretical orientations of psychologists. SA = 5

APPENDIX H

KRASNER AND HOUTS' (1984) VS DATA

Means and Standard Deviations of Values Survey Scales Scores by Behavioural and Comparison Groups

	<u>Range</u>	<u>Dimensions</u>	<u>Group</u>			
			<u>Behavioural</u>		<u>Comparison</u>	
			<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>
			N = 82		N = 37	
Science/ethics	4-20	Value-neutral (vs. value-laden)	12.98	3.14	11.81	3.27
Scientists' social responsibility	5-25	Social involvement (vs. social isolation)	14.70	3.15	13.97	2.97
Science/theism	5-25	Theism (vs. atheism)	11.28	3.91	11.81	4.02
Social philosophy	7-35	Social darwinism (vs. social altruism)	15.54	3.95	14.19	3.95
Political philosophy	6-30	Conservatism (vs. liberalism)	18.93	5.02	17.38	3.98
Health care delivery	4-20	Market control (vs. government control)	8.92	2.88	7.87	2.34
Environmentalism	5-25	Industrialism (vs. environmentalism)	15.40	3.10	15.22	3.44
Research/ethics	7-35	Ethical constraints (vs. freedom of inquiry)	23.84	4.42	23.05	4.87

Note. Higher score indicates endorsement of capitalized scale dimension.

APPENDIX I

UNGER'S (1984) ATTITUDES ABOUT REALITY SCALE

NOTE. Each item is answered on a 7-point scale in which A = Agree almost completely, B = Agree very much, C = Agree somewhat, D = Neither agree nor disagree, E = Disagree somewhat, F = Disagree very much, and G = Disagree almost completely. Items are scored with A = 7 through G = 1, except for items marked with an asterisk, in which scoring is in the reverse direction (A = 1 ... G = 7).

ATTITUDES ABOUT REALITY SCALE

- * 1. Who has power is a central issue in understanding how society works.
2. It is maladaptive to refuse to conform to the demands of society.
3. Science has underestimated the extent to which genes affect human behaviour.
- * 4. Some nonconformity is necessary for social change to occur.
- * 5. The way scientists choose to investigate problems is influenced by the values of their society.
6. If one works hard at solving a problem, one can usually find the answer.
7. If everyone learns what is important to them, the world would take care of itself.
8. Most sex differences have an evolutionary purpose.
9. People who achieve success usually deserve it.
10. The saying "You shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free" is still valid today.
11. The more technology we develop the better our science will be.
12. Accidental solutions to problems are very rare.
13. At the present time, people are recognized for their achievements, regardless of their race, sex, or social class.

14. People cannot be trained to be creative, they are either born that way or not.
15. People who demand social change are usually those who have been ineffectual in present society.
- *16. The facts of science change over time.
17. The United States has the most egalitarian society in the world.
18. Once a scientific fact is discovered, it remains part of that science from then on.
- *19. We communicate much more information to each other than we are aware of doing.
20. Personality characteristics account for most differences in human behaviour.
21. Important ideas are most likely to originate from prestigious institutions.
22. Effort can often make up for an absence of talent in an area.
23. It is more important to be liked than to be powerful.
24. Biological sex, sex role, and sexual preference are highly related to each other in normal people.
25. The mother-infant relationship is a key to understanding adult behaviour.
26. People who are part of minority groups should not have to worry about other people in these groups who are less successful than they are.
- *27. Unconscious motivations are very important for understanding human behaviour.
- *28. Deviance is not a particular kind of behaviour, but a perception by others that that behaviour is socially unacceptable.

29. Society must protect itself from those who do not accept its rules.
- *30. Famous people's research is frequently cited in order to lend prestige to the findings of less renowned researchers.
31. Most people would cooperate with each other if only they understood that everyone would benefit by such actions.
32. Scientific merit is determined by the excellence of the work done.
- *33. It is important to decrease the distance between the "real world" and the scientific laboratory.
34. A great deal can be learned about human behaviour by studying animals.
- *35. Those who are non-conformists during one period of history are often found to be innovators by future eras.
- *36. The acceptability of evidence is related to the importance of the person who discovers it.
37. It is better not to know too much about things that cannot be changed.
38. Physiological differences limit the degree to which males and females can learn to be similar to each other.
- *39. People who have the least to lose in a relationship will be more likely to get their way in that relationship.
40. Most social problems are solved by a few very qualified individuals.

APPENDIX J

UNGER'S (in press) ATTITUDES ABOUT REALITY DATA

Religious Identity and Scores on the Attitudes about Reality Scale

<u>Group</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>SD</u>
Catholic	101	150.57	16.40
Protestant	30	145.80	22.28
Other	9	144.56	6.89
Jewish	13	135.31	19.44
Unaffiliated	14	136.50	15.07

Age and Scores on the Attitudes about Reality Scale

<u>Group</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>SD</u>
Below 20	58	152.57	13.02
20-29	63	151.35	16.28
30-39	28	138.43	18.43
40-49	14	136.07	14.20
50 and above	7	116.86	22.33

Political Identity and Scores on the Attitudes about Reality Scale

<u>Group</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>SD</u>
Conservative/Republican	28	154.71	18.08
Uninterested	43	152.86	13.80
Democratic	44	143.09	16.29
Independent/Liberal	44	138.73	20.23

APPENDIX K

RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION SURVEY

INSTRUCTIONS: The statements below represent a wide range of issues pertaining to theory and methods in psychology, issues in the philosophy of science, and personal and social values. Please indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement with each one by CIRCLING THE APPROPRIATE ANSWER. There are no right or wrong answers. Your answer should reflect your own personal attitudes and inclinations. You may feel that some of the items are vague, obscure, or improperly stated, but try to decide in each case whether you agree or disagree with the item. Use the cannot say category no more than necessary.

SD = strongly disagree D = disagree ? = cannot say A = agree SA = strongly agree

- | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|---|---|---|------|
| 1. A science is likely to progress most rapidly if researchers devote themselves primarily to the systematic gathering of factual information and engage in little elaborate speculation or theory building. | SD | D | ? | A | SA |
| 2. Human behavior is characterized in all aspects by lawful regularity and thus, in principle, it is completely predictable. | SD | D | ? | A | SA |
| 3. All behavior, except for simple reflexes, is learned. | SD | D | ? | A | SA |
| 4. Psychologists should be as concerned with explaining private conscious experience as they are with explaining overt behavior. | SD | D | ? | A | SA * |
| 5. For many research purposes, it is best to permit many relevant variables to interact in a natural fashion and then analyze the results, rather than try to effect strict control. | SD | D | ? | A | SA * |
| 6. Individual differences in personality are governed in a high degree by heredity. | SD | D | ? | A | SA |
| 7. All concepts used in psychological theory should be explicitly definable in terms of observed physical events. | SD | D | ? | A | SA |
| 8. The use of mathematical models and equations in theory often serves to create a false impression of scientific respectability instead of furthering our understanding. | SD | D | ? | A | SA * |
| 9. It is just as important for psychological researchers to formulate theoretical interpretations as it is to accumulate specific facts about behavior. | SD | D | ? | A | SA * |
| 10. In principle, human behavior cannot be completely predicted, because people can choose to act in ways that we have no basis for expecting. | SD | D | ? | A | SA * |
| 11. Except for a few elementary drives like hunger and thirst, all human motives are learned. | SD | D | ? | A | SA |
| 12. The individual subject's personal account of his/her private conscious experience is one of the most valuable sources of psychological data. | SD | D | ? | A | SA * |

13. Highly controlled experiments often give a misleading picture of the complex interactions that actually occur under natural circumstances. SD D ? A SA *
14. The direction of human behavior is governed to a considerable extent by inborn predisposition. SD D ? A SA
15. It is best to define perception just in terms of stimulus-response relationships, rather than in terms of internal events that cannot be publicly observed. SD D ? A SA
16. As this science progresses, psychological theories will tend increasingly to be composed of abstract mathematical or logical equations. SD D ? A SA
17. A theory should consist mainly of inductive generalizations based on observations, with little in the way of constructions of hypothetical formulations contributed by the theorist. SD D ? A SA
18. Human actions are just as strictly determined by whatever causes are operating as all other physical events are. SD D ? A SA
19. Nearly all individual differences in human behavior can be accounted for in terms of past reinforcements. SD D ? A SA
20. Psychologists can gain many valuable insights through meditation and other procedures designed to expand or illuminate private experience. SD D ? A SA *
21. In the long run researchers can achieve most if they devote each individual study to a very specific, circumscribed problem. SD D ? A SA
22. Much of the variation in human temperament is governed by inborn constitution. SD D ? A SA
23. Any meaningful statement about mental events can be translated into a statement about behavior with no serious loss of meaning. SD D ? A SA
24. A strong insistence on precise measurement and quantification is likely to cause psychologists to neglect important areas of research. SD D ? A SA *
25. The most valuable theories are ones involving speculation that goes well beyond established facts and points the way to future discoveries. SD D ? A SA *
26. In principle, an individual's choice or decision can never be fully predicted from antecedent conditions or events. SD D ? A SA *
27. Nearly all the behavioral tendencies that have been called instinctive in people are actually products of learning. SD D ? A SA
28. The primary goal of psychologists should be the explanation of observable behavior, rather than the explanation of conscious events. SD D ? A SA

29. We would gain more valuable information if researchers spent more time studying total action patterns in relation to the total influencing environment and less time relating single responses to a few specific stimuli. SD D ? A SA *
30. An individual's patterns of relative strengths and weaknesses in verbal, mathematical, and perceptual abilities is governed to a great extent by genetic factors. SD D ? A SA
31. As far as possible, the stimulus and response variables used in psychological theory should be defined in strictly physical terms. SD D ? A SA
32. A good indicator of the maturity of a science is the extent to which its explanatory principles are stated in a precise quantitative form. SD D ? A SA
33. Observation of raw data is both prior to and independent of theory. SD D ? A SA *
34. However interesting and rewarding they might be, courses in the liberal arts and humanities really contribute little to the solution of scientific problems. SD D ? A SA *
35. All scientific theories contain hypothetical constructs whether explicitly stated or not. SD D ? A SA
36. Terms must have an observable referent to be meaningful. SD D ? A SA *
37. Intuition is central to good science and scientific method. SD D ? A SA
38. Scientific theories can be true only in a probabilistic sense. SD D ? A SA
39. Science can never prove any theory conclusively true. SD D ? A SA
40. Psychology is in its infancy as a science and will eventually achieve the elegance and exactitude of physical science. SD D ? A SA *
41. Scientific theories necessarily make metaphysical assumptions. SD D ? A SA
42. Science can only conclusively prove a theory false. SD D ? A SA
43. The universe is fundamentally chaotic. SD D ? A SA
44. Having a feel for one's subject that goes beyond existing data contributes little to scientific progress. SD D ? A SA
45. Psychology cannot in principle be reduced to physical science (e.g., biochemistry). SD D ? A SA
46. The philosophy of science has little, if anything, of significance to contribute to the actual practice of science. SD D ? A SA *
47. Psychologists should not adopt the methodology of the physical sciences to investigate human behavior. SD D ? A SA *

48. Determinism is a correct assumption; all events have a cause. SD D ? A SA *
49. Knowledge of people achieved through literature is more profound than any knowledge of people that can be achieved by scientific method. SD D ? A SA *
50. Scientific observation provides us with hard data that are independent of our subjective desires, wishes, and biases. SD D ? A SA *
51. Scientists are so engrossed in procedural detail that they lose track of the basic meaning of their subject. SD D ? A SA
52. Hypothetico-deductive method is superior to inductive method as an approach to sound scientific knowledge. SD D ? A SA
53. The primary criterion for assessing the validity of a scientific theory is not formal logic but prediction of observable events. SD D ? A SA *
54. To warrant the description "scientific" a theory need not define hypothetical constructs in terms of observable operations. SD D ? A SA
55. Scientists change their scientific opinions more in response to hard scientific evidence than in response to their colleague's opinions. SD D ? A SA *
56. Knowledge is advanced primarily by collection of data and not by logical deduction from correct axioms. SD D ? A SA *
57. Science is about facts, not values. SD D ? A SA
58. A researcher should know what is done with the results of his/her research. SD D ? A SA
59. Theological matters are irrelevant for science. SD D ? A SA *
60. All things considered, competition is the best relationship between people in a society. SD D ? A SA *
61. Private property and private ownership of production are necessary to have optimal personal freedom. SD D ? A SA
62. Quality will suffer if the government intrudes into the health care delivery system. SD D ? A SA
63. Science and technology should be utilized to solve environmental problems. SD D ? A SA
64. The voluntary consent of the human subject is the sine qua non of human experimentation. SD D ? A SA
65. Health care is neither a right nor a privilege, but a service that the professional may dispense according to his/her own set of values. SD D ? A SA

66. Goods and services are best provided by centralized government agencies as opposed to local agencies and private corporations. SD D ? A SA *
67. Material and class equality are idle dreams. SD D ? A SA
68. Scientists should not allow personal or social values to distort their pursuit of scientific knowledge. SD D ? A SA
69. "Survival of the fittest" should be a guiding principle of a just social order. SD D ? A SA
70. A researcher should be held personally responsible for uses of his/her research. SD D ? A SA *
71. It is important to preserve religious-moral tradition even if scientific progress is impeded. SD D ? A SA
72. We are all morally obligated to reduce pain and suffering in the world. SD D ? A SA *
73. The government should regulate the structure and cost of health care. SD D ? A SA *
74. The subject of an experiment is entitled to full and frank disclosure of all the facts, probabilities, and opinions which a reasonable person might consider before giving his/her consent. SD D ? A SA
75. The proposal for undertaking human research which fails to consider all reasonable possibilities of harm is morally irresponsible. SD D ? A SA
76. Goods and services are best provided by private corporations as opposed to government agencies. SD D ? A SA
77. The solution to the environment crises requires new values, new social systems, and new political structures. SD D ? A SA *
78. Compensation to volunteers in human experimentation should never be so much as to constitute an undue inducement. SD D ? A SA
79. Every species in the environment has a right to continued survival. SD D ? A SA *
80. The acquisition of new knowledge is an ultimate criterion for carrying out research. SD D ? A SA
81. The affluent of the world have a moral obligation to respond to the needs of the less well-off. SD D ? A SA
82. All citizens should be guaranteed access to adequate and necessary health care. SD D ? A SA *
83. People who care about the environment must live lives that show their concern. SD D ? A SA *

84. Freedom to do scientific research is not absolute but must be constrained by ethical and social considerations of the society where the research is done. SD D ? A SA
85. Scientists, as scientists, should not endorse ethical standards. SD D ? A SA
86. It is incumbent on the researcher to prove that a proposed experiment is ethical in all of its aspects. SD D ? A SA
87. There should be laws protecting all aspects of the environment. SD D ? A SA *
88. Capitalism should be eliminated. SD D ? A SA *
89. Individual liberty should take precedence over social goals and collective restraints on liberty. SD D ? A SA
90. Those most qualified to control property and resources are those who have survived the competitive struggle. SD D ? A SA
91. Scientific research should have a clear social utility as defined by a majority of people. SD D ? A SA
92. Belief in deities is inconsistent with a scientific world view. SD D ? A SA *
93. Agnosticism is the most reasonable position with respect to the question of an original creator or God. SD D ? A SA *
94. Scientists should not retain from the public any information about the adverse uses that can be made of their research outcomes. SD D ? A SA
95. In science as in life, the best results follow when one is engaged in a competitive struggle for knowledge and resources. SD D ? A SA
96. Socialism is a desirable goal. SD D ? A SA *
97. No experimentation that does not directly benefit the patient should be performed on patients who are ill. SD D ? A SA
98. Scientists should not pursue their scientific work if it clearly endangers the general welfare of humanity. SD D ? A SA
99. The lawfulness of nature reflects the existence of an original creator. SD D ? A SA
100. It is worthwhile to study the theoretical orientations of psychologists. SD D ? A SA

APPENDIX L

EXPLANATORY LETTER



As we have listened for centuries to the voices of men and the theories of development that their experience informs, so we have come more recently to notice not only the silence of women but the difficulty in hearing what they say when they speak.

Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice, 1982.

AS A PARTICIPANT in the 10th National Conference on Feminist Psychology, I'm sure that you share my conviction that feminist voices matter in defining the culture within our profession.

YOU CAN MAKE a valuable contribution to our collective understanding of who feminist psychologists are by responding to this survey.

I ENCOURAGE YOU to take the time to provide me with information about your views and experiences for my Ph.D. dissertation research, so that we can learn more about the status of feminists in psychology in 1985.

PLEASE LET YOUR VOICE BE HEARD!

RETURN POSTAGE has been provided for your convenience.

I WOULD BE HAPPY to provide you with information about the results of this survey when the data analysis is completed, if you mail back the enclosed request form to me separately.

THANK YOU!

MARY RICKETTS, M.A., M.L.S.
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR
WINDSOR, ONTARIO
CANADA N9B 3P4

APPENDIX M

PERSONAL PROFILE

PERSONAL PROFILE

This section contains items about aspects of YOUR background, lifestyle and experiences that may have some bearing on how your views on theoretical and values issues in psychology have been formed. I have tried to pay attention to the way that forced-choice items often do not permit some people to describe the reality of their situations without distortion. Therefore, space has been provided at intervals where you may wish to clarify, explain or expand something about your responses.

- 1. Your sex? (Circle number of your answer.)
 - 1 MALE
 - 2 FEMALE
- 2. Your present age? _____ YEARS
- 3. What is your religious affiliation? (Circle number.)
 - 1 PROTESTANT
 - 2 JEWISH
 - 3 CATHOLIC
 - 4 NONE
 - 5 OTHER (please specify) _____
- 4. Would you describe yourself as a regular churchgoer?
 - 1 NO
 - 2 YES
- 5. What is your racial origin? (Circle number.)
 - 1 WHITE
 - 2 BLACK
 - 3 HISPANIC
 - 4 ORIENTAL
 - 5 EAST INDIAN
 - 6 NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN
 - 7 MIXED (please specify) _____
 - 8 OTHER (please specify) _____

6. IF you have answered MIXED or OTHER to item #5, please describe your parents' racial origins. (Circle numbers.)

MOTHER		FATHER		
1		1		WHITE
2		2		BLACK
3		3		HISPANIC
4		4		ORIENTAL
5		5		EAST INDIAN
6		6		NORTH AMERICAN
7	_____	7	_____	MIXED (please specify)
8	_____	8	_____	OTHER (please specify)

7. Are you or have you ever been married to, or involved in a committed relationship with, a person whose racial origin is different from your own? (Circle number.)
- 1 NO
2 YES
8. IF you have answered YES to item #7, do you have children from the relationship? (Circle number.)
- 1 NO
2 YES
9. Are you or have you ever been married to, or involved in a committed relationship with, a person whose religion is different from your own?
- 1 NO
2 YES
10. IF you have answered YES to item #9, do you have children from the relationship? (Circle number.)
- 1 NO
2 YES
11. Please indicate the number of children of each sex you have in each age category. (If none, write "0".)
- | FEMALE | MALE | |
|--------|-------|----------------------|
| _____ | _____ | UNDER 5 YEARS OF AGE |
| _____ | _____ | 5 - 13 |
| _____ | _____ | 14 - 18 |
| _____ | _____ | 19 - 24 |
| _____ | _____ | 25 AND OVER |
12. How many people live in your household? _____ PEOPLE
13. Do you live in an organized collective or communal living arrangement or religious community? (Circle number.)
- 1 NO
2 YES
14. IF you have answered YES to item #13, please describe your group in a few words.
-
15. IF you have answered NO to item #13, please describe the other people who live in your household. (Circle all numbers that apply.)
- | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1 I LIVE BY MYSELF | 7 MY SISTER(S) # _____ |
| 2 MY MOTHER | 8 MY HUSBAND |
| 3 MY FATHER | 9 MY WIFE |
| 4 MY GRANDMOTHER | 10 MY MALE LOVER |
| 5 MY GRANDFATHER | 11 MY FEMALE LOVER |
| 6 MY BROTHER(S) # _____ | 12 MY CHILD(REN) # _____ |

- 13 MY GRANDCHILD (REN) # _____
- 14 MY STEPCHILD (REN) # _____
- 15 MY MOTHER-IN-LAW _____
- 16 MY FATHER-IN-LAW _____
- 17 OTHER RELATIVES (please specify) _____
- 18 MALE FRIEND(S) _____
- 19 FEMALE FRIEND(S) _____
- 20 LIVE-IN DOMESTIC ASSISTANTS _____
- 21 OTHER NON-RELATIVES _____

16. What is your present marital status? (Circle one number.)

- 1 SINGLE
- 2 LEGALLY MARRIED
- 3 INVOLVED IN A COMMITTED RELATIONSHIP OTHER THAN MARRIAGE
- 4 SEPARATED
- 5 DIVORCED
- 6 WIDOWED

17. Please describe the sequence of changes that have occurred in your marital status over the course of your life. Use the terms SINGLE, MARRIED, INVOLVED, SEPARATED, DIVORCED and WIDOWED, and indicate the approximate number of years.)

YEARS	YEARS
1 SINGLE _____	6 _____
2 _____	7 _____
3 _____	8 _____
4 _____	9 _____
5 _____	10 _____

18. Regarding your personal life, do you consider yourself to be living an "alternate" lifestyle? (Circle number.)

- 1 NO
- 2 YES

19. IF you answered YES to item #18, how open are you about your lifestyle with most people you know? (Circle number.)

- 1 COMPLETELY OPEN
- 2 MOSTLY OPEN
- 3 SOMETIMES OPEN
- 4 MOSTLY NOT OPEN
- 5 DEFINITELY NOT OPEN

20. IF you wish to mention anything else about what your family life is like, please do so.

21. Which academic degrees have you completed? (Circle numbers.)

YEAR OF GRADUATION

- | | |
|------------------------|-------|
| 1 HIGH SCHOOL | _____ |
| 2 COMMUNITY COLLEGE | _____ |
| 3 UNDERGRADUATE DEGREE | _____ |
| 4 MASTER'S DEGREE | _____ |
| 5 DOCTORATE | _____ |
| 6 OTHER | _____ |

22. In what major field is your highest academic degree?

MAJOR FIELD

23. Are you currently a student? (Circle number.)

- 1 NO
2 YES

24. IF you are currently a student, what degree are you working toward and when do you expect to graduate? _____ DEGREE

MAJOR FIELD _____ YEAR

25. IF you have or are working toward a DOCTORATE in PSYCHOLOGY, what type is it? (Circle number.)

- 1 Ph.D.
2 Ed.D.
3 Psy.D.
4 OTHER (specify) _____

26. IF you have or are working toward a DOCTORATE in PSYCHOLOGY, where is the conferring university located?

STATE OR PROVINCE _____ COUNTRY

27. IF you wish to mention the name of the conferring university, please do so.

28. IF you have or are working toward a DOCTORATE in PSYCHOLOGY, please specify your degree subfield or area of specialization. (Circle numbers.)

- | | | |
|------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|
| 1 CHILD CLINICAL | 9 ENGINEERING | 17 PSYCHOMETRICS |
| 2 CLINICAL | 10 EXPERIMENTAL | 18 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY |
| 3 COGNITIVE | 11 GENERAL | 19 QUANTITATIVE |
| 4 COMMUNITY | 12 INDUSTRIAL/ORG. | 20 SCHOOL |
| 5 COMPARATIVE | 13 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY | 21 SOCIAL |
| 6 COUNSELLING | 14 PERSONALITY | 22 APPLIED SOCIAL |
| 7 DEVELOPMENTAL | 15 PHYSIOLOGICAL | 23 SYSTEMS/HISTORY/METHODS |
| 8 EDUCATIONAL | 16 PSYCHOLINGUISTICS | 24 OTHER _____ |

29. If you are a PSYCHOLOGIST, are you a member of the AWP (Association for Women in Psychology)? (Circle number.)
- 1 NO
 - 2 YES
30. IF you are a PSYCHOLOGIST, are you a member or student affiliate of APA (American Psychological Association)? (Circle number.)
- 1 NO
 - 2 YES
31. IF you have answered YES to item #30, to which division(s) of APA do you belong? Please list by division number(s) or name.
- _____
32. IF you are a PSYCHOLOGIST, are you licensed/certified?
- 1 NO
 - 2 YES
33. IF you wish to mention anything else about your educational background or graduate training, please do so.
- _____
- _____
34. What is your current employment status? (Circle number.)
- EMPLOYED FULL TIME (35 OR MORE HOURS A WEEK) IN:
- 1 ONE FULL TIME POSITION
 - 2 ONE FULL TIME POSITION PLUS SECONDARY POSITION
 - 3 TWO OR MORE PART TIME POSITIONS
- EMPLOYED PART TIME (LESS THAN 35 HOURS A WEEK) IN:
- 4 ONE POSITION
 - 5 TWO OR MORE POSITIONS
 - 6 PRESENTLY UNEMPLOYED AND SEEKING WORK
 - 7 PRESENTLY UNEMPLOYED OR RETIRED AND NOT SEEKING WORK
35. In what type of setting(s) do you work? (Circle numbers that apply.) IF you are presently unemployed, please describe your last job.
- | | |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1 UNIVERSITY | 9 HOSPITAL |
| 2 FOUR YEAR COLLEGE | 10 CLINIC |
| 3 COMMUNITY COLLEGE | 11 OTHER HUMAN SERVICE SETTING |
| 4 OTHER ADULT EDUCATION SETTING | _____ |
| _____ | 12 BUSINESS |
| 5 HIGH SCHOOL | 13 GOVERNMENT |
| 6 GRADE SCHOOL | 14 OTHER _____ |
| 7 INDEPENDENT PRIVATE PRACTICE | _____ |
| 8 GROUP PRIVATE PRACTICE | _____ |

36. IF you wish to mention your position title(s), please do so.

37. How would you describe your professional life in terms of the relative amount of time you devote to duties related to the following activities? (Number only the categories that apply to you, ranking them in order from 1 = MOST to ... 10 = LEAST time spent.)

TEACHING	_____
RESEARCH	_____
ADMINISTRATION	_____
DIRECT SERVICE TO CLIENT	_____
ASSESSMENT	_____
EMPLOYEE SUPERVISION	_____
CONSULTING	_____
OTHER (please specify)	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

38. In your employment setting(s), are the colleagues that you interact with on a regular basis (Circle number.)

- 1 NEARLY ALL MALES
- 2 MORE MALES THAN FEMALES
- 3 ROUGHLY EQUAL NUMBERS OF MALES AND FEMALES
- 4 MORE FEMALES THAN MALES
- 5 NEARLY ALL FEMALES

39. Are the other people who work in your professional area of specialization or research interest area (Circle number.)

- 1 NEARLY ALL MALES
- 2 MORE MALES THAN FEMALES
- 3 ROUGHLY EQUAL NUMBERS OF MALES AND FEMALES
- 4 MORE FEMALES THAN MALES
- 5 NEARLY ALL FEMALES

40. Are the people in your personal network of professional friends and acquaintances (Circle number.)

- 1 NEARLY ALL MALES
- 2 MORE MALES THAN FEMALES
- 3 ROUGHLY EQUAL NUMBERS OF MALES AND FEMALES
- 4 MORE FEMALES THAN MALES
- 5 NEARLY ALL FEMALES

41. Have you ever participated in activities related to improving the status of women in your employment setting? (Circle number.)

- 1 NO
- 2 YES

42. IF you have answered YES to item #41, how would you describe your degree of involvement in status of women activities? (Circle number.)

- 1 VERY INVOLVED
- 2 MORE INVOLVED THAN MOST COLLEAGUES
- 3 AS INVOLVED AS MOST COLLEAGUES
- 4 LESS INVOLVED THAN MOST COLLEAGUES
- 5 MINIMAL INVOLVEMENT

IF you are a FACULTY MEMBER at a UNIVERSITY or FOUR YEAR COLLEGE or COMMUNITY COLLEGE, please answer items #43 to #55. ALL OTHER RESPONDENTS MAY SKIP TO ITEM #56.

43. Are you a member of a department of PSYCHOLOGY?

- 1 NO
- 2 YES

44. IF you answered NO to item #41, please indicate your department's title.

45. What is the highest academic degree your department grants?

- 1 BACHELOR'S
- 2 MASTER'S
- 3 DOCTORAL
- 4 OTHER (please specify) _____

46. How many of the faculty in your department are (Indicate a number.)

FEMALE _____ MALE _____

47. IF your department has a graduate program, are the graduate students (Circle number.)

- 1 NEARLY ALL MALES
- 2 MORE MALES THAN FEMALES
- 3 ROUGHLY EQUAL NUMBERS OF MALES AND FEMALES
- 4 MORE FEMALES THAN MALES
- 5 NEARLY ALL FEMALES

48. IF you teach at a FOUR YEAR or COMMUNITY COLLEGE, is the student population (Circle number.)

- 1 ALL MALES
- 2 NEARLY ALL MALES
- 3 MORE MALES THAN FEMALES
- 4 ROUGHLY EQUAL NUMBERS OF MALES AND FEMALES
- 5 MORE FEMALES THAN MALES
- 6 NEARLY ALL FEMALES
- 7 ALL FEMALES

49. What type of appointment do you have? (Circle number.)

- 1 FULL TIME
- 2 PART TIME
- 3 ADJUNCT
- 4 SESSIONAL
- 5 OTHER (please specify)

50. What is your tenure status? (Circle number.)

- 1 TENURED
- 2 TENURE TRACK
- 3 NOT TENURE TRACK
- 4 OTHER (please specify)

51. What is your present rank? (Circle number, and indicate the number of years at present rank, and at any lower ranks through which you have progressed.)

YEARS AT RANK

- 1 FULL PROFESSOR _____
- 2 ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR _____
- 3 ASSISTANT PROFESSOR _____
- 4 LECTURER _____
- 5 OTHER _____

52. Have you ever been discriminated against in matters related to promotions and tenure?

- 1 NO
- 2 YES

53. Have you ever left a tenure-track position before an unfavorable decision regarding promotion or tenure could be made?

- 1 NO
- 2 YES

54. Have you ever been denied tenure or promotions?

- 1 NO
- 2 YES

55. IF you answered YES to #52, #53, or #54, do you feel the event(s) happened because you are (Circle all numbers that apply.)

- 1 A WOMAN
- 2 A RACIAL MINORITY PERSON
- 3 A FEMINIST
- 4 GAY/LESBIAN

5 A PERSON WHOSE TEACHING OR RESEARCH INTERESTS CONCERN WOMEN'S ISSUES

6 OTHER _____

IF you wish to describe the circumstances in more detail, please do so.

56. IF you wish to mention anything else about what the climate is like for women and/or feminists in your professional milieu, please do so.

57. Where is your current employment located?

STATE OR PROVINCE _____ COUNTRY _____

58. IF you wish to mention the name of the setting(s) where you are currently employed, please do so.

59. Have you been steadily employed for the most part since obtaining your highest academic degree?

1 NO

2 YES

60. If you answered NO to item #59, please briefly describe the reasons for interruptions that have occurred in your career.

61. What was your approximate salary from your principal employer in 1984 (before deductions)? (Circle number.)

1 LESS THAN \$5,000

2 \$5,000 TO \$9,999

3 \$10,000 TO \$14,999

4 \$15,000 TO \$19,999

5 \$20,000 TO \$24,999

6 \$25,000 TO \$29,999

7 \$30,000 TO \$39,999

- 8 \$40,000 TO \$49,999
- 9 OVER \$50,000

62. Please indicate the range of your total personal income from employment in 1984 (before deductions) IF that figure would fall in a different range from your answer to item #61. (Circle number.)

- 1 LESS THAN \$5,000
- 2 \$5,000 TO \$9,999
- 3 \$10,000 TO \$14,999
- 4 \$15,000 TO \$19,999
- 5 \$20,000 TO \$24,999
- 6 \$25,000 TO \$29,999
- 7 \$30,000 TO \$39,999
- 8 \$40,000 TO \$49,999
- 9 OVER \$50,000

63. How does your 1984 income compare to your annual income during the previous two years? (Circle number.)

- 1 A LOT HIGHER
- 2 SOMEWHAT HIGHER
- 3 ABOUT THE SAME
- 4 SOMEWHAT LOWER
- 5 A LOT LOWER

64. How does your 1984 income compare to what you expect to earn annually during the next two years? (Circle number.)

- 1 A LOT HIGHER
- 2 SOMEWHAT HIGHER
- 3 ABOUT THE SAME
- 4 SOMEWHAT LOWER
- 5 A LOT LOWER

65. IF you wish to mention anything else about your earning or employment pattern, please do so. _____

66. I think of myself as _____ (Circle number.)

- 1 TOTALLY HETEROSEXUAL
- 2 PREDOMINANTLY HETEROSEXUAL
- 3 MORE HETEROSEXUAL THAN HOMOSEXUAL
- 4 EQUALLY HETEROSEXUAL AND HOMOSEXUAL
- 5 MORE HOMOSEXUAL THAN HETEROSEXUAL

6 PREDOMINANTLY HOMOSEXUAL

7 TOTALLY HOMOSEXUAL

67. Which of the following terms do you prefer to describe your sexual orientation?
(Circle number.)

1 HETEROSEXUAL

2 STRAIGHT

3 BISEXUAL

4 HOMOSEXUAL

5 GAY

6 LESBIAN

7 OTHER (please specify) _____

68. Would you tend to prefer a man or a woman as a close friend? (Circle number.)

1 MAN

2 WOMAN

3 NO PREFERENCE

69. Would you tend to prefer a man or a woman as a life companion? (Circle number.)

1 MAN

2 WOMAN

3 NO PREFERENCE

70. Would you tend to prefer a man or a woman as a sexual partner? (Circle number.)

1 MAN

2 WOMAN

3 NO PREFERENCE

71. Which sentences describe your style as a feminist? (Circle as many as apply.)

1 I'M NOT A FEMINIST

2 I'M NOT A FEMINIST, BUT ...

3 OF COURSE I'M A FEMINIST. AREN'T YOU?

4 I'M MORE OF A FEMINIST IN MY PERSONAL LIFE THAN AT WORK

5 I'M MORE OF A FEMINIST AT WORK THAN IN MY PERSONAL LIFE

6 I WOULD LIKE TO BE MORE OF A FEMINIST THAN I AM IN MY PERSONAL LIFE

7 I WOULD LIKE TO BE MORE OF A FEMINIST THAN I AM IN MY WORK

8 BEING A FEMINIST IS AN OBVIOUS PART OF BOTH MY PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL IDENTITIES

9 OTHER (please specify) _____

72. If you wish to mention anything else at all about yourself that you feel is pertinent, or comment on how this survey might have been improved, please do so.

PLEASE SEND ME INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THE THEORETICAL
ORIENTATION SURVEY OF FEMINIST PSYCHOLOGISTS.

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

I would be interested in participating in further research on questions
raised by the outcome of this survey. (Circle number.)

1 NO

2 YES

SEND TO: MARY RICKETTS
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR
WINDSOR, ONTARIO
N9B 3P4

APPENDIX N

RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS OF TOS, ESQ, AND VS SCALES

Table 18

Varimax Rotated Factor Pattern of TOS Scale Items for Feminist Ph.D.Psychologist Group

Factor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Item									
1	-.08	.09	.01	.10	.05	.77	.10	.30	.21
2	.12	.02	.02	.69	.03	.01	.16	.10	.30*
3	-.16	.79	-.09	-.07	.12	-.00	.06	-.22	.09
4	.02	.09	-.06	-.02	.18	.14	.75	.16	.04
5	.63	.05	-.19	.06	.18	-.01	-.13	-.02	.22
6	-.10	-.18	.83	.06	.04	.06	.06	.03	.01
7	.03	.07	.13	.04	.69	.07	.26	.04	.24
8	.73	-.10	.06	.17	.12	.02	.07	.04	-.09
9	.16	-.04	.07	.02	-.05	.67	.13	-.09	-.01
10	.27	-.06	.09	.78	.00	.08	.14	-.05	.04
11	.06	.82	-.11	.01	-.07	-.03	.00	-.08	-.04
12	.34*	-.08	-.05	.23	.28	.16	.57	-.02	.03
13	.61	.00	-.01	.13	.00	.04	.22	.19	.35*
14	-.10	-.27	.78	.02	.05	-.07	-.03	.18	.08
15	.12	.01	-.03	.24	.76	.05	.09	.07	-.05
16	.08	-.13	.05	.06	.10	.08	.14	.80	.07
17	-.15	-.10	.04	.07	.35*	.72	.04	.00	.08
18	-.01	.29	.03	.49	.21	.08	-.14	.27	.08
19	.15	.59	-.15	.16	.28	.07	-.16	.17	.10
20	.42*	.00	-.02	.35*	.12	.05	.43	-.00	.02
21	.39	.19	.07	.16	.19	.37*	-.21	.28	.08
22	.02	-.12	.77	.07	.16	.09	-.12	-.04	-.07
23	.23	.20	-.00	.13	.16	.15	.16	.34*	.62
24	.63	.03	.03	.12	.07	.07	.29	.19	.20
25	.40*	-.09	-.02	.04	.09	.54	.25	.08	-.24
26	.11	.05	-.01	.77	.12	.07	-.02	.04	-.11
27	-.07	.76	-.19	.08	-.03	-.07	.12	.14	-.07
28	.24	.24	-.11	.18	.36*	.06	.32*	.38	.20
29	.42*	-.16	.07	.10	.18	.09	-.06	-.17	.53
30	.10	.04	.73	-.04	-.11	.04	-.02	-.08	.03
31	.20	.06	.02	-.04	.56	.17	.09	.13	.09
32	.34*	.05	.22	.12	.47*	.00	-.01	.54	-.16

Variance Explained by Each Factor

3.00	2.68	2.66	2.40	2.33	2.18	1.73	1.71	1.40
------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------

Eigenvalues

6.37	3.54	2.16	1.86	1.52	1.33	1.20	1.08	1.02
------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------

highest loading

*additional loading over .30

Table 19

Varimax Rotated Factor Pattern of ESQ Scale Items for Feminist Ph.D.Psychologist Group

Factor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Item								
33	.13	-.13	.29	.26	.06	.22	-.53	.35*
34	.70	-.13	.07	-.24	.16	-.03	-.11	-.05
35	.32*	-.11	.64	-.03	.16	-.01	-.01	.01
36	.25	.04	.20	.01	.71	.10	.07	-.08
37	.69	-.14	.00	.30*	.32*	-.06	.07	-.07
38	.01	.07	-.14	-.09	.02	-.07	-.01	.83
39	.05	-.16	-.09	.77	.09	-.01	.04	.09
40	.68	.00	.28	.07	-.25	.05	.16	.06
41	.00	-.14	.24	.71	.01	.05	-.05	-.27
42	.02	-.72	-.04	.10	-.05	-.01	-.03	-.11
43	-.09	-.17	-.13	.02	.17	.03	.71	.11
44	-.03	.27	-.61	-.07	-.00	.01	.08	.14
45	.19	-.08	.36*	.25	-.24	.12	.57	.02
46	-.03	-.04	.03	.50*	-.23	.55	.09	-.04
47	-.02	.09	.02	.01	-.01	-.84	-.02	-.01
48	.08	.18	.56	-.18	.41*	-.15	.27	-.03
49	.02	.01	.10	.07	.74	-.08	-.05	.10
50	.62	-.02	.34*	.07	.13	.07	-.15	.12
51	.21	-.15	.48	.21	.15	.19	-.18	-.01
52	.18	-.58	.16	.09	.00	.12	.07	.01
53	.45*	-.28	.01	-.06	.30*	.48	-.02	-.08
54	-.35*	.38	-.06	-.20	.28	.28	.01	-.03
55	-.06	.70	-.17	-.16	-.04	.11	-.03	.04
56	.02	.58	-.14	.09	.04	-.03	-.20	-.40*
Variance Explained by Each Factor								
	2.46	2.19	1.97	1.82	1.81	1.50	1.35	1.16
Eigenvalues								
	4.23	2.32	1.73	1.38	1.28	1.23	1.07	1.01

highest loading
*additional loading over .30

Table 20

Varimax Rotated Factor Pattern of VS Scale Items for Feminist Ph.D.Psychologist Group

Factor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Item							
57	.37*	.14	-.12	-.03	-.10	-.07	.16
58	-.10	-.01	-.28	.36*	-.04	.35*	-.08
59	.04	.16	-.05	.06	.35*	.12	.03
60	-.77	.08	-.27	.15	-.06	.06	.04
61	.58	.24	-.03	-.18	.18	.04	.14
62	.14	.64	.29	.06	-.05	.08	-.00
63	.04	-.14	-.03	-.09	-.04	.19	.02
Factor	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
57	.07	-.01	-.11	.33*	.43	.30*	.03
58	.02	.30*	.00	-.06	-.39	-.10	.25
59	-.28	.04	-.10	-.53	-.08	-.26	.07
60	-.02	.10	.01	-.03	-.14	-.02	.06
61	-.06	.16	.11	.16	-.10	-.10	.14
62	-.15	.06	-.04	.12	-.13	-.10	-.08
63	-.06	.09	-.02	-.06	-.16	.77	.17
Factor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
64	-.01	-.09	-.09	-.05	-.16	.60	-.19
65	-.02	.33*	.73	.06	.08	-.14	-.06
66	.13	.59	-.01	-.15	.24	.04	.14
67	.55	.37*	-.10	-.04	-.08	-.09	-.08
68	.23	.07	-.01	-.07	.10	.12	.18
69	.62	.07	.16	-.02	-.01	-.23	-.15
70	.04	.17	.00	-.67	.02	-.08	.04

highest loading

*additional loading over .30

Table continues

Table 20 continued

Factor	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Item							
64	-.07	.12	-.01	-.07	-.12	.16	-.13
65	.06	-.01	.01	.06	-.03	.05	.06
66	.05	-.06	.07	-.37*	.04	.02	.20
67	.25	.06	-.07	.15	-.24	.06	-.10
68	-.10	.10	-.13	.71	.10	-.16	.00
69	.24	.06	.03	.14	-.12	.01	.09
70	.18	-.21	-.01	.14	.02	.08	.11
Factor	1	2	3	4	5	5	7
71	-.08	.03	-.08	.31*	.27	-.20	.01
72	.15	.14	.65	-.14	.01	.06	.07
73	-.03	.71	.21	-.09	-.02	-.08	-.04
74	-.07	.02	.00	.03	.05	.82	-.05
75	-.09	.14	-.25	.23	.05	.50	-.26
76	.40	.38*	.13	-.27	.14	.08	.02
77	.08	.10	.15	-.08	.08	-.10	.03
Factor	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
71	.04	.29	.04	-.31*	.05	.26	-.40
72	.04	.21	-.21	-.08	.01	-.04	-.02
73	.04	-.02	-.18	-.02	.14	-.03	-.04
74	.01	-.17	-.05	.05	.02	.05	.06
75	.12	-.12	.15	.16	.23	.14	.06
76	-.16	.19	-.12	-.15	.08	-.18	-.12
77	.08	.71	.04	.09	.09	.07	.10
Factor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
78	.04	.10	-.15	-.07	.04	.34*	.20
79	.16	-.01	.11	-.13	-.05	.07	.09
80	.12	.00	.02	-.00	-.02	.02	.12
81	-.24	-.12	-.56	-.06	.06	.11	-.32*
82	.12	.16	.46*	-.03	.12	-.12	.00
83	-.08	-.06	.24	-.11	-.00	-.04	.16
84	-.04	.17	-.42*	.20	-.04	.17	-.46

Table continues

Table 20 continued

Factor	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
78	-.29	-.04	.13	.05	-.13	.04	-.45
79	.78	.10	-.13	.04	-.00	-.04	-.12
80	-.12	.07	-.04	-.04	.04	.17	.79
81	-.13	-.11	.01	-.03	.06	.17	-.15
82	.16	.14	-.55	-.04	.13	-.00	-.16
83	.16	.52	-.43*	-.10	.06	-.02	-.11
84	-.24	-.01	-.20	-.04	.07	.07	-.09

Factor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
85	.15	.02	.07	.06	-.09	-.06	.75
86	.01	-.02	-.01	.11	.03	.23	-.64
87	.02	.09	.22	-.20	-.03	-.12	-.31*
88	.44	.43*	-.09	-.31*	.17	-.09	.02
89	.21	.03	-.04	.05	-.06	.01	.03
90	.66	.14	-.07	.06	.01	.07	.16
91	-.07	-.07	-.05	.69	.10	-.10	-.02

Factor	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
85	-.07	.09	-.08	.09	.06	-.02	-.02
86	-.39*	.04	.12	-.03	-.05	-.13	-.08
87	.51	.20	-.02	-.13	.10	-.27	.11
88	.12	.38*	.18	.18	-.13	.03	.03
89	.03	.16	.05	.06	.74	-.20	.08
90	.06	.01	-.12	-.06	.23	-.06	.07
91	.04	-.31*	-.09	-.09	-.07	-.01	.06

Factor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
92	-.03	.09	.05	-.07	.70	-.03	-.26
93	.09	.09	.09	.06	.76	.02	-.03
94	-.10	-.14	-.00	-.02	-.02	.06	-.09
95	.71	-.07	.12	-.05	.15	-.01	.20
96	.32*	.50	.14	-.26	.23	.07	-.04
97	-.16	-.04	.00	.63	.20	.09	-.00
98	-.26	.16	-.13	.33*	.12	.25	-.02
99	.17	-.05	-.05	.18	.77	-.06	.09

Table continues

Table 20 continued

Factor	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
92	-.11	.05	.05	-.22	.18	-.01	-.11
93	.05	.12	-.04	.04	-.16	.09	.01
94	-.05	.08	.77	-.14	.10	.03	-.22
95	-.09	-.02	-.11	-.03	.22	.01	.06
96	.18	.26	-.03	.09	.13	.04	-.01
97	-.14	-.16	.16	.19	.16	.07	.06
98	-.15	-.01	.27	.04	.05	.47	-.05
99	-.03	-.06	-.04	.07	-.03	-.09	-.01

Factor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Variance Explained by Each Factor							
	3.65	2.50	2.34	2.28	2.26	2.01	1.88
Eigenvalues							
	6.57	3.20	2.63	2.17	1.70	1.59	1.44

Factor	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Variance Explained by Each Factor							
	1.72	1.69	1.54	1.53	1.45	1.42	1.41
Eigenvalues							
	1.37	1.32	1.22	1.20	1.14	1.10	1.03

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