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THE DETERMINANTS
OF PAKISTAN'S CHINA POLICY

1960-1965

by

Syed Urooj Akhtar Zaidi

A Thesis

Submitted to the Department of Political Science
in partial fulfillment of the
requirement for the degree of
Master of Arts

at the

University of Windsor
Windsor, Ontario

1979

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ABSTRACT

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Most previous analyses of Pakistan's China policy of the early 1960's have seized on the "Indian factor" as the explanation of that policy. This study repudiates such myopic single factor explanations. While it does not deny that the Indian factor was an important influence on Pakistan's policy of establishing closer relations with China, it seeks to identify, examine, and evaluate all the potentially relevant variables by employing a systematic framework for research, namely a modified version of the Brecher foreign policy research model.

The utility of such an approach is demonstrated by the fact that this work has identified eleven relevant variables in the "operational environment" of Pakistan's foreign policy, some of which have been overlooked in previous studies of Pakistan's China policy. Five of these are external variables: the global system, the subordinate state system, the dominant bilateral system, other bilateral systems, and Chinese attitudes and policies toward Pakistan. The remaining six are internal variables:

ideological and historical legacies, economic/developmental needs, the political structure, competing elites, the bureaucracy, and the personal background and world outlook of Ayub, the key decision-maker. While one can plausibly speculate that some of the eleven were more important determinants than others of Pakistan's China policy of the 1960-1965 period, the data presented here clearly shows that this policy was shaped by all of these variables jointly and not just by the "Indian factor" alone.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my indebtedness to the members of my thesis committee, without whose help this study could not have been completed. In particular, I am deeply grateful to Professor Bruce Burton, the chairman of the committee, for his assistance, guidance, supervision, and understanding at every stage in the preparation of this thesis; and Professor Terence Keenleyside for his valuable suggestions that have greatly improved the overall structure, organization, and the contents of this study. I would also like to express my thanks to Professor Christopher King, the third reader, for the keen interest he showed in the subject and for his scholarly advice from which this study has benefited a great deal.

Finally, the assistance I have received from my wife, Shabana Urooj Zaidi, has been so extensive and varied that it is futile even to attempt to describe it.

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Spring 1979

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

In an interview with Charles P. Arnot, telecast on 7 January, 1963, Mohammad Ayub Khan, when asked to explain why his country was drawing away from the West and moving closer to "Red China", answered:

I do not think it would be correct to say that there is any change basically in our foreign policy. The fact that we want to settle our border dispute with China, is a thing that has been a part of foreign policy, and is a part of friendly relations with our neighbours. And China is one of our neighbours and that is the basis on which we have been trying to work towards a settlement with China as well . . .

During a debate on the fundamentals of Pakistan's foreign policy, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, when asked the same question, replied: "We do it because it is in Pakistan's interest to normalize her relations with China." He added that this process of "normalization of Pakistan's relations" with China was not based solely upon the existence of a negative factor, such as a common dispute that both China and Pakistan had with India. He held that Pakistan's China policy was based on positive elements such as China's

¹The interview was telecast by all stations of the ABC network on 7 January, 1963. For the full text of the interview, see the Morning News, Karachi, 8 January, 1963.

position in Asia, her potential strength, and above all the fact that lasting peace in Asia could not be secured without her cooperation.²

Similarly, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, S.K. Dehlavi, commenting on the Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of March 1963, said: "There is no sinister motive behind this agreement for it is in keeping with Pakistan's Foreign Policy of good neighbourliness and friendship." He reminded his audience that border agreements had also been negotiated with Iran, Burma, and even with India in the past. The Sino-Pakistan Border Agreement, he said, had no relation to the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, because Pakistan initiated border negotiations with China in 1959.³

Thus, Pakistan's President Ayub, Foreign Minister Bhutto, and Foreign Secretary Dehlavi, all emphasized the positive elements in Pakistan's policies toward

²Pakistan National Assembly Debates, Volume 3, Pakistan Printing Press, Rawalpindi, 1964, pp. 1256-57. See also Bhutto's interview with New China News Agency, (NCNA) Correspondent in the Times, London, 10 July, 1964.

³S.K. Dehlavi's speech of 10 January 1963, delivered to Pakistan Society, London. For the full text of the speech, see Morning News, Karachi, 12 January 1962.

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China in the early sixties. In short, they refuted the contention that Pakistan's China policy was based on the "Indian factor" alone. It was, in their view, guided basically by a general policy framework, based on the theory of "normalization of relations" with great powers. According to this theory, Pakistan was not in a position to take sides in conflicts involving great powers at the expense of her own security.⁴

The "entente cordiale" that developed between China and Pakistan during 1960-1965 was one of the more fascinating events on the chessboard of international politics.⁵ When Ayub came to power through a military coup in October 1958, Pakistan was "on terms merely of nodding acquaintance" with China. By 1965, Pakistan, through her new China policy, had already reached the peak of understanding with China. The understanding seems peculiar because it was a relationship between an emerging world power and a weak middle power, and because it was a relationship between a Communist

⁴Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, pp. 114-121.

⁵The term "early sixties", wherever used, refers to the time period 1960-1965. Also, the terms "Pakistan," and "China" mean predivided Pakistan and the People's Republic of China respectively.

regime committed to world revolution and an essentially semifeudal bureaucratic military dictatorship committed to the defence of the "free world." Pakistan's initiation of the policy of establishing closer relations with China seems more peculiar because Pakistan was ruled by Ayub, a man trained in the grand Western traditions at Sandhurst, who instead of strengthening Pakistan's ties with the "free world," was moving Pakistan closer to the Communist bloc.

The Problem

The purpose of this study is to examine, discuss, and assess the determinants of Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties; that is to say Pakistan's policy of establishing closer relations with China in that period. This study will try to answer the question of whether Pakistan's China policy was based on the "Indian factor" alone, as most of the studies on the subject suggest, or whether it followed from a number of changes in the international and domestic environment of Pakistan in that period. Before proceeding to examine this policy and its determinants, it is desirable to examine the existing literature on Pakistan's China policy.

The existing literature on Pakistan's China policy.

Academic writing on Pakistan's foreign policy in general and Pakistan's China policy in particular is not voluminous.⁶ The majority of works published on these topics in India and Pakistan are noteworthy for the abuse of one state by the other.⁷ The more objective analyses of Pakistan government and politics have come from Western scholars; most of these, however,

⁶For a listing of works on various aspects of Pakistani politics, including periodic literature, see Lawrence Ziring's bibliographical essay: Political Science and Pakistan, one of the "State of the Art" papers presented to the National Seminar on Pakistan and Bangladesh at the Southern Asian Institute, Columbia University, May 1972, and likely to be published, along with others, under its auspices. See also, Studies on Chinese External Affairs: An Instructional Bibliography of Commonwealth and American Literature, compiled by Roger Dial and published by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada, June 1973. See also the bibliography attached to this study.

⁷See, for example, the following:
 B.L. Sharma, The Pakistan - China Axis, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1968; Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security, Longman's Lahore, 1960; B.N. Goswami, Pakistan and China: A Study of their Relations, Allied Publishers, Delhi, 1971; M.A. Chaudhri, Pakistan and the Great Powers, Karachi, 1970; G.W. Chaudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, The Free Press, New York, 1975; Anwar Hussain Syed, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale, University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1974.

have only a chapter on Pakistan's foreign relations.⁸
 The only full-scale study on Pakistan's foreign policy is that of S.M. Burke, a former member of Pakistan's foreign service.⁹

Pakistan's China policy has also been the subject of a number of articles appearing in international relations journals, mostly contributed by the aforementioned authors. These articles, therefore, have been a repetition of what was already covered in their books.¹⁰ The reasons for the scarcity of printed material and lack of understanding of Pakistan's point of view are many, and a discussion in detail of these reasons is beyond the scope of this short introduction. However, some discussion of the three most important causes would not be out of place.

⁸ See for example, Joseph Black and Kenneth Thompson, Eds., Foreign Policy in a World of Change, Harper, New York, 1963; Keith Callard, Pakistan; A Political Study, Oxford University Press, London, 1967; and Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era, Syracuse University Press, New York, 1971; and From Crisis to Crisis, Harper, New York, 1963.

⁹ S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, Oxford University Press, London, 1973.

¹⁰ Most articles have been contributed by Anwar H. Syed, M.A. Chaudhri, M.A. Khan, G.W. Chaudhury, Z.A. Bhutto, Khalid Bin Sayeed, Aslam Siddiqi, and S.M. Burke who have all written books on Pakistan's government and politics and her foreign policy.

First, the quality and nature of Pakistan's leadership in the past checked the curiosity of scholars interested in working on Pakistan's politics and government. The early leaders of Pakistan had neither the excellence of Gandhi, Nehru, and Azad, nor their foresightedness and maturity. While the Indian leaders were busy laying the foundation of democracy in India, Pakistani leaders were demonstrating that democracy was a form of government that did not suit the genius of the people.¹¹ While the Indian leaders were loved and revered by their masses, Pakistani leaders inspired awe and hate through their regal conduct and inaccessibility.¹² The life of the Indian leaders was recorded by either their own writings or by that of others who had sufficient reason to be attracted by their humility and charisma. Their writings, speeches, and interviews run into volumes

¹¹ Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 188-226; Ayub imposed the system of Basic Democracy which, he thought suited the condition and the genius of the people. The parliamentary form of government, in his opinion, was dragging Pakistan to destruction. He once remarked: "How can you have parliamentary democracy when you have not even reached the level of universal primary education?"

¹² This remark and some others in this section are based on personal observations of Pakistani leaders during my stay in Pakistan from 1948-1972.

and are shelved in all the good libraries of the world. This excellence of leadership and abundance of data on Indian government and politics brought international recognition not only to the Indian leaders, but also to the cause they stood for. Moreover, the Indian interest in foreign affairs is not newly acquired like that of Pakistan. It dates back to 1885, the year of the formation of the Indian National Congress.¹³ India inherited the foreign contacts of British India. Furthermore, the Indian National Congress had definite policies on all major world issues. Naturally, these contacts and familiarity with foreign affairs gave India a solid footing in conducting her foreign policy; it also helped her elicit the sympathy of scholars and diplomats, thereby creating an international lobby for the Indian point of view.

By contrast, Pakistan's leadership came from a separatist element of the Indian National Congress. Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, was a prominent leader of the Congress until 1920, fourteen years after the Muslim League was founded in 1906. The party which this

¹³T.A. Keenleyside, The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, England, 1966. p. 13.

ground or expertise. They were inspired by the bright prospects of getting fatter salaries and positions of power rather than by nationalist fervour or devotion to causes.¹⁶ They were no match for the leaders of the Indian National Congress. In short, Pakistan's leadership did not measure up to the task of running a new country. The country was suffering from economic disruption, maladministration, frustration and a complete loss of faith by the people in political leadership.¹⁷ The general belief was that none of these men had any honesty of purpose, integrity, or patriotism to root out the evils of the country.¹⁸ The central government was at loggerheads with the provincial governments, and a great deal of intrigue and infighting was going on within the central government itself. After Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated, Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammad, a civil servant, elevated himself to the position of Governor-General. He was overthrown by General Mirza, who later had to relinquish power to his associate,

¹⁶Of course there were a few exceptions, but the attitude of the majority of bureaucrats does justify this ruthless generalization.

¹⁷cf. footnote 15.

¹⁸Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, Columbia University Press, New York, 1972, pp. 25-30.

separatist element founded was the Muslim League; in 1940, this political party demanded a separate homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent. Pakistan owes her birth to this party. Unlike the Congress, the Muslim League had no foreign policy spokesman; its main thrust was to create a separate country for the Muslims of British India, especially after 1938.

At the time of the partition of India, even the Muslim countries of the world had more faith in India than they had in Pakistan. As a matter of fact, Pakistan was suspect in their eyes.¹⁴ The bulk of the Muslim League leadership were former members of the Indian Superior Services.¹⁵ These men had no political back-

¹⁴ S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, pp. 113-114.

¹⁵ S.M. Burke, The Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies, University of Minneapolis Press, Minneapolis, 1975, p. 31; with the exception of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, almost all other heads of the Pakistan government originally came from these services. Ghulam Mohammad, Choudhry Mohammad Ali, Feroz Khan Noon, Iskander Ali Mirza, Mohammad Ayub Khan, and Yahya Khan were all servicemen. Most of Pakistan's Foreign Ministers such as Zafrullah Khan, Arshad Hussain, Manzur Qadir, Shareefuddin Peerzada, and Aziz Ahmed also came from the superior services. Until the early 1970's, the provincial governors and the chief ministers and the judges of the High and the Supreme Court were, too, recruited from these services. In brief, Pakistan was virtually ruled by the senior bureaucrats of the army and the Civil Service of Pakistan.

General Ayub Khan. Ayub, after ten years of absolute authoritarian rule, had to resign in disgrace. General Yahya Khan, who succeeded Ayub, was put under house arrest by Bhutto, Pakistan's first elected head of the state, who, in his turn, was overthrown by General Zia-Ul-Haq and now faces charges of nepotism and first degree murder.¹⁹ One after another these men did their best to prolong their rule, and in doing so violated the constitution of Pakistan and the rights of her citizens.²⁰ Because of their unpopular political lives, they were singularly uncommunicative about their personal and public lives. Ayub was the first head of the state to write an autobiography and to contribute articles to international political journals. He was also the only head of the state, apart from Jinnah, who attracted the attention of Western scholars.²¹ Now this kind of leadership

¹⁹ Ibid., see also footnote 17.

²⁰ For details of what they did, see Tariq Ali's Pakistan: Military Power or People's Rule, Jonathan Cape, London, 1970; or any other political history. For example, Rounaq Jahan's Pakistan: Failure in National Integration.

²¹ Hector Bolitho was one of the several scholars who wrote on the life and works of Jinnah; see Jinnah: The Maker of Pakistan, London 1958. Ayub became a subject of Herbert Feldman and Lawrence Ziring; their books are cited quite often in this study.

and political atmosphere could only generate bitter criticism — and it did —; but due to restraints on the freedom of the press, the critiques could not be published. Pakistani scholars adopted a hands-off attitude. Those who did not, languished in jails.²² In fact, the quality and nature of Pakistan's leadership projected a very poor image of the country to the outside world; and as a result, Pakistan was ignored by local and foreign academics. The leadership problem also affected Pakistan's image internationally, and Pakistan was not received favourably by the world press or in international institutions like the United Nations.

Besides the problem of corrupt leadership, governments in Pakistan have almost always discouraged academic inquiry, by imposing restraints on freedom of speech and expression. For example, Ayub created a National Press Trust which watched closely the coverage of political events by the Pakistani press. The foreign press and

²²This and some other similar remarks are based on my experiences and observations in Pakistan. They can be documented by the frequent invocation of The Defense of Pakistan Rules for the purpose of seizing a paper or press and the sentencing of people to fines and jail terms, because they had incurred the wrath of Ayub by writing against him or his regime (see also footnote 12).

academics were controlled by another weapon, The Defense of Pakistan Rules. Any magazine, newspaper, book, article or oral criticism antagonistic to the ruling elite was declared dangerous or prejudicial to the interests of Pakistan, and its sale was immediately banned.²³ If any person was found guilty of voicing criticism against the ruling regime, he was arrested and prosecuted under The Defence of Pakistan Rules. At times foreign journalists and executives were asked to leave the country within twenty-four hours, because they had incurred the wrath of the Ayub regime.²⁴ Pakistan, though she has never been particularly democratic, was never so removed from the principles of democracy as she was during the Ayub Khan era.²⁵

Finally, the lack of research facilities in Pakistan was disappointing to those who might have been interested in working on Pakistan's government and politics. In 1947,

²³Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, p. 28.

²⁴Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era, pp. 33-67; see also Tariq Ali's, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power, Ali calls Pakistan a police state, and Ayub an absolute dictator, pp. 30-32.

²⁵See Tariq Ali's, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power, pp. 30-32.

Pakistan had only one university, the University of Punjab. By 1958, the number had increased and each province had a university of its own, but these universities, being new, were under-staffed and over-crowded.²⁶

Being underdeveloped, Pakistan could not afford the luxury of manning the universities with proper staff or equipping them with appropriate modern facilities.²⁷

On top of that, the information and data needed for research on Pakistan were not accessible and in some cases not even available. The teachers, being paid very low salaries, led a hand-to-mouth existence. These conditions did not inspire research, and even if they had, restraints on freedom of speech and expression and the unavailability of data would not have allowed academics to engage in it.²⁸

These, then, were the factors responsible for the paucity of objective academic research on Pakistan's political behavior. The result is apparent in the existence of only

²⁶Based on personal observations and experiences in Pakistan during 1948-1972, I attended the Universities of Sind and Karachi from 1960-1965. Later on, I taught at several colleges in Pakistan, during my attachment with the West Pakistan Education Department for seven years; 1965-1972. Besides, the facts can be verified by the findings of the Education Commission Report during the Ayub Khan era.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

one full-scale work on Pakistan's foreign policy.²⁹

Nevertheless, Pakistan's China policy, since it generated stresses and strains in Pakistan's relations with the superpowers, became the subject of voluminous writing. Most of the writing, however, focuses on a single factor explanation — fear of India — and thus fails to use a systematic framework to determine the factors which brought about this policy. In addition, the existing literature does not appropriately explain situations under which a specific factor may have had either a positive or negative effect on Pakistan's China policy. The fear of India is considered by the majority of writers as the sole determinant of Pakistan's policy of establishing closer relations with China in the early sixties.³⁰ According to these writers, Pakistan's China policy came into being out of such a fear, not out of love for China. Pakistan was getting close to China, they say, only to spite India, following blindly the

²⁹S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy.

³⁰The relationship has been called a "marriage of convenience": for example, see: Unna Warren, "A Friend of Our Enemy", The Atlantic, March 1964, pp. 79-81; B.L. Sharma, The Pakistan-China Axis; Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1967, pp. 285-287.

dictum that the enemy of an enemy is a friend.³¹ One critic has gone a little too far in arguing that Pakistan's foreign policy begins and ends at the Indo-Pakistan border.³² Reading through this literature and the popular press, one is led to conclude that the main concern of Pakistan is containment of India and that this concern underlies her China policy in the early sixties. It seems that had there been no India, Pakistan would have had no foreign policy at all! The only other explanation offered for Pakistan's China policy, beyond the Indian factor, was that put forward by Tariq Ali. He described Pakistan's China policy as "an opportunistic anti-American stance to disorientate elements on the left."³³

In short, very few scholars have treated Pakistan's China policy or Sino-Pakistan relations objectively. Lim's unpublished thesis on "Chinese Policies Toward Pakistan" is an excellent study, but, it focuses on China and her policies toward Pakistan.³⁴

³¹Unna Warren, "A Friend of Our Enemy", p. 80. See also Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 285.

³²Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 285.

³³Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power, p. 35.

³⁴Heng-Cheah Lim, The Foreign Policy of The Chinese People's Republic: 1958-1969, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario.

Burke's Pakistan's Foreign Policy, though it covers Pakistan's foreign policy from 1947-1972, has very little, if any, analytical assessment of the factors involved in the making of Pakistan's foreign policy. Even his second work, The Mainsprings of Pakistani and Indian Foreign Policies, hardly discusses "mainsprings" at all.³⁵ Syed's China and Pakistan is the most recent addition to the literature on Sino-Pakistan relations.³⁶ It is an improvement on Burke's historical approach, in that it has analyzed objectively some factors which influenced Pakistan's China policy. He has not, however, discussed all possible factors; for example, he does not discuss economic or academic interest groups in his book. In addition, he does not evaluate the relative significance of the determinants he has included in his discourse. Furthermore, his focus is on the Sino-Pakistan relationship and not on the determinants of Pakistan's China policy. Sharma's The Pakistan-China Axis is heavily propagandist. To him Pakistan's China policy was a product of the common enmity which China and Pakistan had with India.³⁷ Goswami's Pakistan and China

³⁵S.M. Burke, The Mainsprings of Pakistani and Indian Foreign Policies, University of Minneapolis Press, Minneapolis, 1975.

³⁶Anwar Hussain Syed, China and Pakistan.

³⁷B.L. Sharma, The Pakistan-China Axis.

suggests that there was a sort of continuity in Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties, but his approach toward the determinants of the policy is more historical than systematic. Goswami's study, like others, seems to indicate that India was the key to a full understanding of Pakistan's China policy. Thus he observes:

From the day of her birth, Pakistan considered India a real menace and a threat to her security and territorial integrity. To counteract that threat and to cut India to size, remained the central theme of her long term foreign policy objectives; her China policy had been largely conditioned by that theme . . . 38

In short, the existing literature on the subject dwells mainly on single factor explanations and, therefore, does not help much in furthering our understanding of the reasons for the adoption of this policy. Moreover, the subject demands and merits more attention than has been given to it. Clearly, then, a more rigorous and systematic examination of the variables involved in the determination of this policy is desirable in an effort to establish the relative importance of the different factors. In order to augment our understanding and to

³⁸B.N. Goswami, Pakistan and China.

achieve a more objective and analytical examination of the determinants of this policy, the theoretical framework of Michael Brecher's model of foreign policy decision-making has been adapted in a modified form in this study.³⁹ However, before the application of the model, a discussion of the contents of Pakistan's China policy and an explanation of the manner in which Brecher's model has been adapted for the purposes of this thesis are necessary.

The Basic Elements of Pakistan's China Policy in the early 1960's.

Pakistan's policy of establishing closer relations with China took on substance above and beyond the rhetoric of goodwill when Pakistan altered her position on the seating of China at the U.N. in 1961, and China and Pakistan arrived at border, air-travel, and cultural agreements during 1963-1965. The policy change was significant because it was a departure from tradition, and Washington officials, used to a Pakistani posture of acquiescence, were shocked at Pakistan's assertion

³⁹Michael Brecher, et al., "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior", Journal of Conflict Resolution, March 1969, pp. 75-101.

of independence from the United States and her unwillingness to redefine her basic foreign goals to suit the changing requirements of American global strategy.

Pakistan's policies and rather overfriendly attitude toward China in the period clearly demonstrated that Pakistan wanted to normalize her relations with China. This aspiration was a part of a general policy of "normalization of relations", based on a rational and pragmatic approach. The elements which formed Pakistan's China policy are described below:

- (i) Pakistan and Chinese membership in the U.N.O.: 1960-1965.

After the inauguration of the People's Republic of China, Pakistan was rather sympathetic toward the new regime. Pakistan, in November, 1949, opposed the Nationalist Chinese resolution in the U.N. for withholding all aid to Communist China, and voted for the adoption of a "hands-off China" resolution, as she voted for the Chinese people's right to choose their own form of government.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Werner Levi, "Soviet Union, China and Pakistan", Pacific Affairs, Fall 1962, p. 219.

Pakistan was one of the few countries which recognized the People's Republic of China within one year of the birth of the new republic. It was the first Muslim and the second Commonwealth country to do so. Having recognized the People's Republic of China as the lawful government of China, Pakistan considered it logical to support that government's claim to fill the Chinese seat in the United Nations.

In a plenary meeting of the General Assembly, on 25 September 1950, Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan argued that China was not applying for admission to the United Nations as she was already a member state and a permanent member of the Security Council. In 1950, at the U.N. General Assembly, Pakistan voted in favour of an Indian draft resolution that sought to invite Communist China to take her seat in the United Nations.⁴¹

At the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Pakistan expressed her inability to send troops to fight with the U.N. forces in Korea. She also abstained from

⁴¹ Sarwar K. Hassan, ed., Documents on Foreign Relations of Pakistan, p. 38.

voting on the American-sponsored resolution in the U.N. General Assembly which called for branding China as an aggressor. However, during 1951-1960, Pakistan did not show any enthusiasm for, nor take any initiative in seating China in the U.N.. On the contrary, Pakistan voted for the postponement of the issue of China's membership. During this period, Pakistan's foreign policy remained closely knit with the global policy of the United States. As late as early 1960, Ayub, commenting on the Laotian situation, declared that as a member of SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan would not hesitate to shoulder responsibility if called upon to do so. Pakistan also reacted unfavourably to the Chinese action in Tibet, and voted for placing the Tibet question before the U.N.⁴² However, in early 1961, President Ayub publicly stated that it was only fair to allow the People's Republic of China to occupy her legitimate position in the United Nations.⁴³

⁴²Dawn, 24 July and 24 November 1959. Ayub's proposal of joint defence against "the push from the North" was also made on 27 October 1959; See the Morning News, Karachi, 28 October 1959.

⁴³Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 162.

On March 18, 1961, Ayub disclosed that Pakistan would vote for China's admission to the U.N. at the next General Assembly session, and Pakistan did vote for the seating of the People's Republic of China in the U.N. in December 1961. This shift in Pakistan's stand toward Chinese representation continued from then onward, as she reverted permanently to her original policy of supporting the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.⁴⁴ Pakistan's support for the Chinese cause in the world body did not go unnoticed, and Pakistan reaped quite a few rewards from this aspect of her China policy.⁴⁵

(ii) The Sino-Pakistan Border Agreement:
2 March 1963

Three years before the Sino-Indian border dispute

⁴⁴In November 1961, at the U.N. General Assembly, Pakistan made a plea for a simple majority vote on the question of the seating of the People's Republic of China instead of continuing to insist on a two-thirds majority requirement. Pakistan warned that continuing efforts to keep China out of the U.N. were politically unwise.

⁴⁵China gave full moral and diplomatic support to Pakistan during the September 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. The Chinese support created tremendous pressure on India as well as the Great Powers to seek an early end to the war.

erupted into armed conflict, there began the process that culminated in the Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement. In September 1959, the government of Pakistan received a Chinese map showing parts of Hunza, a region of Pakistan, as Chinese territory. In October 1959, President Ayub announced that he would approach the Chinese for a formal demarcation of the Sino-Pakistan boundary.⁴⁶ Notes were exchanged, but negotiations did not start until 1962. The reason for this period of inaction was China's unwillingness to aggravate the Sino-Indian border dispute by consenting to discuss a boundary with Pakistan in a disputed area, the ownership of which was, according to China, yet to be determined between India and Pakistan. Also, the memories of Pakistan's anti-Chinese policies of the fifties were still fresh in the minds of the Chinese. Hence, China was still suspicious of the intentions of Pakistan, especially because of the unfriendly attitude of the Ayub regime toward Peking. However, as the Sino-Indian dispute deteriorated after the failure of the

⁴⁶Ayub's press conference of 23 October 1959. For details see, Dawn, Karachi, 24 October 1959.

Sino-Indian talks, the urgency for, as well as the advantages of, a peaceful settlement of China's border differences with her other neighbouring countries became even greater. In 1960, China settled her boundary questions with Burma and Nepal. As mentioned earlier, on 14 March 1961, Ayub indicated that Pakistan would vote for the seating of China in the U.N.⁴⁷ This announcement was taken by Peking as a gesture of friendship and also as an indication of a desire on the part of Pakistan to be independent of the United States. Pakistan voted in favour of the seating of China in the U.N. in 1961; and in January 1962, Peking announced its decision to negotiate an agreement on the border between Sinkiang and the contiguous areas of Hunza and Gilgit, parts of the disputed territory of Kashmir, the defence of which was under the direct control of Pakistan. The communique made it clear that the completed agreement would be of a provisional nature, pending the

⁴⁷Ayub indicated Pakistan's willingness to vote for China, in London, on 18 March 1961; see the Times, London, 19 March 1961.

settlement of the Indo-Pakistan Kashmir dispute, reflecting the Chinese desire to avoid committing herself on the dispute. The announcement, nevertheless, provoked bitter criticism, especially in India and the United States. It was said that Pakistan had no right to negotiate with China over the Kashmir border, since Kashmir did not belong to her, and that China, by agreeing to negotiate, had accepted the de facto control of Pakistan over the disputed area. Notwithstanding these criticisms and protests, the Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement was formally signed on 2 March 1963. The agreement removed a potential source of friction between the two countries that might have ultimately endangered the security of both countries. After the Boundary Agreement was signed, Sino-Pakistan relations rapidly expanded. Even before the Sino-Indian War, there were reports of secret Sino-Pakistan talks on some sort of a possible military pact. The following year these suspicions acquired strength from a speech of Pakistan's ebullient Foreign Minister, Ali Bhutto, in which he went so far as to remark:

. . . A conflict does not involve Pakistan alone. An attack by India on Pakistan involves the territorial integrity and security of the largest state in Asia and, therefore, this new element and this new factor brings to the situation a very important factor. . . . therefore, a subjugated Pakistan or a defeated Pakistan is not only something which is inimical to the people of Pakistan . . . it also poses a serious threat to other countries in Asia and particularly to the largest state in Asia.⁴⁸

Although Ayub and Bhutto later denied the existence of a military pact or a tacit alliance between Pakistan and China, Bhutto's remarks did indicate some understanding between the two countries vis-a-vis India.⁴⁹

(iii) Sino-Pakistan Trade Agreement: 5 January 1963

On 5 January 1963, a Chinese trade delegation headed by the Vice Minister for International Trade, Liu Hai-Yun, signed the first formal Sino-Pakistan

⁴⁸Speech delivered to the National Assembly of Pakistan on 17 July 1963; for the full text of the speech see, Dawn, 18 July 1963

⁴⁹See Ayub's statement in the Sunday Times, London, 20 October 1963; also Ayub's article, "The Pakistan-American Alliance," Foreign Affairs, January 1964, pp. 195-209.

trade agreement in Karachi, providing for reciprocal most favoured nation treatment in respect of commerce and trade, including shipping. Under this agreement, China was to supply Pakistan with metals, steel products, coal, cement, machinery, raw materials, and chemicals; while Pakistan was to supply China with cotton, jute, textiles, and sports goods. Following the agreement, the volume of Sino-Pakistan trade substantially expanded. According to Pakistan's Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. Wahiduzzaman Khan, China was the biggest buyer of Pakistan's cotton during the 1963-1965 period.⁵⁰

(iv) Sino-Pakistan Civil Aviation Agreement:
29 August 1963

On 29 August 1963, Pakistan and China concluded an agreement on civil aviation, linking Dacca in East Pakistan with Canton and Shanghai in China. The agreement provided reciprocal landing rights to Chinese and Pakistani aircraft. When the

⁵⁰Government of Pakistan, Twenty Years of Pakistan, Pakistan Printing Press, Islamabad, 1967, p. 42.

negotiations for the agreement were in progress, the United States exerted considerable pressure to dissuade Pakistan from concluding the agreement. Richard Phillip, a press officer of the U.S. State Department, was reported to have said that the U.S. would view an agreement between China and Pakistan as "an unfortunate breach of free world solidarity."⁵¹ When the agreement was finally signed, Washington abruptly announced the suspension of a \$4,300,000 loan to Pakistan for the construction of a new airport at Dacca.⁵²

(v) Radio-Photo Service Linking Peking and Karachi:
16 September 1963

An agreement to establish a radio-photo service, linking Peking with Karachi, came into force on 16 September 1963. Later, on 13 February 1965, a direct radio-telephone service started operating between

⁵¹Indian Express, New Delhi, 9 July 1963. According to the paper, a high ranking American official was sent to Karachi to convey the concern of the U.S. Government.

⁵²Asian Recorder, 1963, p. 5444; see also Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, Oxford University Press, London, 1969, pp. 99-112.

China and Pakistan following an agreement signed by the appropriate ministries.

(vi) China's Interest-Free Loan to Pakistan:
February 1965

On 31 July 1964, Pakistan's Minister of Commerce, Mr. Wahiduzzaman, announced that China had offered a \$60 million long-term interest-free loan to Pakistan. Under this agreement China was prepared to accept repayment over a 30 to 40 year period in the form of jute, cotton, and manufactured goods. Pakistan accepted the offer and signed the agreement on 19 February 1965. The amount of the loan may not have been as large as the amount of the previous U.S. loans to Pakistan, but, as Ayub said, "it involved a sacrifice on the part of China, and reflected the Chinese endeavour to promote further understanding and good will with Pakistan."⁵³

(vii) The Sino-Pakistan Cultural Agreement:
26 March 1965

On 26 March 1965, the Chinese Foreign Minister,

⁵³Dawn, 1 August 1964.

Chen Yi, and Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Bhutto, signed a cultural cooperation agreement, which President Ayub and Premier Chou had earlier indicated they felt would be a desirable development. Under this agreement China and Pakistan agreed to "cooperate and exchange experiences in the educational, art, journalistic, and other fields." The long term effect of this agreement upon Sino-Pakistan relations became evident in the late sixties and the early seventies, but since this paper deals with Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties only, it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the impact of this agreement.

(viii). Chou En-lai in Pakistan: 1964 and 1965

The development of Sino-Pakistan relations reached a climax in February 1964, when Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of The People's Republic of China, and Marshal Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, pledged China's support for self-determination in Kashmir during an official visit to Pakistan. In a joint communique issued on 23 February 1964, Chou

En-lai and Ayub Khan expressed the hope that the "Kashmir dispute would be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people as pledged by the Governments of India and Pakistan."⁵⁴ The communique was seen as a confirmation of the Pakistani stand over Kashmir and it was hailed in Pakistan as a great achievement of her foreign policy.⁵⁵ To get China committed to a stand on Kashmir was undoubtedly a high water mark in Pakistan's diplomacy because, despite their growing relationship, China had remained non-committal on the Kashmir issue until that time, and as a result there was lingering doubt in Pakistan as to the likely Chinese reaction in case of an Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir. The communique further stated that "it would be of no avail to deny the existence of these disputes and to adopt a big-nation chauvinistic attitude of imposing one's will on others."⁵⁶ The communique was hailed in Pakistan as heart warming and epoch making. Pakistan in return supported China's call

⁵⁴ Sarwar K. Hasan, ed., Document on Foreign Relations of Pakistan, Karachi, 1966, p. 425.

⁵⁵ The Times, London, described the communique as a "striking success" for Ayub: The Times, London, 25 February 1964.

⁵⁶ Dawn, Karachi, 24 February 1964.

for the total "prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons" and urged that the rightful place of the Chinese People's Republic in the United Nations be restored. Pakistan also reaffirmed her support for the convening of the Second Afro-Asian Conference for which China had been campaigning assiduously for several years. The Chinese support for self-determination in Kashmir added impetus to the development of Sino-Pakistan relations. It was during 1964, after Chou En-lai's visit, that the construction of a highway linking Pakistani-held Kashmir and Sinkiang across the Pamir mountains proceeded from both sides. Chou En-lai and Ayub agreed to issue visas freely to the citizens of each other's country. The main purpose of the June visit was to achieve further understanding and co-operation with regard to the forthcoming Afro-Asian Conference in Algeria.⁵⁷

(ix) Ayub Khan and Ali Bhutto in China: March 1965

Between 2 March and 9 March 1965, President Ayub and his party, including Foreign Minister

⁵⁷This conference was later postponed and then cancelled as a result of the military coup in Algeria on 19 June 1965.

Bhutto, paid a visit to China. The significance of this visit was twofold. First, it had symbolic value in reflecting the developing relationship between the two countries. Second, it was useful in that Pakistan and China reached further agreement in their views regarding certain major problems in international relations. In the communique issued at the end of Ayub's visit, Ayub and Chou expressed "firm support for the national independence movements and the struggle against imperialism in Africa and Asia."

The Framework for Analysis:

The above, then, are the basic elements of the Pakistan China policy in the early sixties. To understand why Pakistan pursued this policy, a systematic examination of all possible variables involved in the making of this policy is desirable. In an attempt to achieve a more objective and analytical examination of this policy than exists in the literature to date, aspects of Michael Brecher's model of foreign policy decision-making⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Michael Brecher, "A Framework for Research."

have been adopted for the purpose of this study. The framework has not, however, been followed rigidly in its application.⁵⁹ The following is the manner in which Brecher's model and its variables are applied in this study.

According to Brecher, all foreign policy systems comprise a set of components which can be classified into three general categories: inputs, process, and outputs.⁶⁰ The inputs are variables which influence a foreign policy decision, the process is the manner in which the decision is formulated, and the output is the decision itself. Since this study is primarily concerned with the determinants of Pakistan's China policy, and not with its process of formulation and implementation, it will focus on the inputs or, in Brecher's words, the "environment" which led to the policy. Brecher distinguishes between the operational environment, i.e., the environment as it exists, and the psychological environment, i.e., the environment as it is perceived to exist by the ruling elite. According to Brecher, it is the

⁵⁹ Although Brecher's categories have had to be substantially modified and fresh categories added to serve the needs of this study, nevertheless his model has been employed since it was found to be the most suitable of the few frameworks at present available for the systematic analytical examination of foreign policies.

⁶⁰ Michael Brecher, "A Framework for Research." p.80.

psychological environment, and not the operational environment, which is important in determining policy because decision makers act on the basis of their perceptions of the environment, not on the basis of the environment as it really is.⁶¹ However, if the Brecher methodology were to be strictly followed, the discussion could become overly repetitive, because it would become necessary to reexamine under the psychological environment the variables already treated under the operational environment. In order to avoid such repetition, the sharp distinction between the two environments has not generally been preserved in this study, although two sections of chapter three deal specifically with elements of the psychological environment.

The "operational environment" or the setting in which foreign policy decisions are taken according to Brecher, refers to the set of potentially relevant factors and conditions (internal and external variables), which may effect a state's external behavior. Among the external variables, Brecher includes, the global system, the subordinate system, subordinate other systems, bilateral systems, and dominant bilateral systems. Among the internal variables, he includes the impact of a country's military

⁶¹Ibid., p. 80.

capability, economic capability, political structure, interest groups, and competing elites on its foreign policy.⁶² Since some of these variables are not relevant to this study, the following is the manner in which Brecher's variables have been modified and applied in this analysis:

(I) External Variables:

1. Global System: Brecher defines the "global system" as constituting the total web of relationships among all factors — states, blocs, organizations — within the international system.⁶³ Under this variable, this study analyzes the impact of the international system on the behavior of Pakistan, and specifically its impact on Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties, that is from 1960-1965).
2. Regional Systems: In Brecher's model these include the "subordinate system" and "subordinate other systems." Brecher defines the "subordinate system" as a group of contiguous states — at least three — within a geographic region, and a "subordinate other system" as a group of non-contiguous states within a geographic region or sharing membership in an alliance.⁶⁴

⁶²Ibid, p. 81.

⁶³Ibid, p. 81.

⁶⁴Ibid, p. 83.

Pakistan belongs to both types of systems, but since the impact of the "subordinate other systems" on Pakistan's China policy was minimal, this study examines the impact of only the subordinate system, i.e., the South Asian region, on Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties.

3. Dominant Bilateral Relations: Brecher refers in this variable to the total pattern of interactions between the state under analysis and a superpower or pre-eminent actor in the global system.⁶⁵ Pakistan's relations with both superpowers are very important in an analysis of her China policy and, therefore, this study examines both these relationships under this variable. Pakistan's relations with the United States and its influence on the formulation of Pakistan's China policy are analyzed under the category "dominant bilateral system one" or DB₁, and Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union, as they influenced Pakistan's China policy, are examined under the category of "dominant bilateral system two" or DB₂. Brecher himself employed the dominant bilateral systems variable in this same fashion when he applied his model to the foreign policy of Israel.⁶⁶

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 83.

⁶⁶Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1972; and Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy, Yale University Press, New Haven Press, New Haven, 1975.

4. Bilateral Systems(other): According to Brecher's model, this variable refers to the total pattern of interactions between the state under analysis and any other states, except for relations involving superpowers, or pre-eminent powers within the global system.⁶⁷ Since it would be too cumbersome to examine all of Pakistan's bilateral relationships, this variable has been adapted, for the purpose of this thesis, to examine and analyze the relations of Pakistan with the bordering countries of India and Afghanistan, in so far as they influenced Pakistan's China policy.

5. Chinese Policies and Attitudes Toward Pakistan: There is no adequate place in Brecher's model for considering the impact of the policies and responses of the country which is directly affected by the decision concerned on that decision, that is in this case, the impact of Chinese policies, responses and attitudes on the determination of Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties. This study, therefore, examines separately Chinese policies and attitudes toward Pakistan in the early sixties and the influence such policies had on the formulation of Pakistan's policy of establishing closer relations with China in that period.

⁶⁷Michael Brecher, "A Framework for Research," p. 83.

(II). Internal Variables:

On the whole Brecher's categorization of variables in the internal environment is much too broad to be meaningful and in some cases the variables are not relevant to Pakistan's China policy in the 'sixties. For example, Brecher includes military and economic capability under the internal variables and uses them as a means of measurement of a state's power and hence a state's capability to further its interests in particular situations. Defined in this way, these variables are not readily applicable to a study examining the various determinants of a specific policy (as opposed to the means available to implement a specific policy) and, thus, these variables have been modified for the purpose of this study. Since Pakistan was highly dependent on U.S. military power and protection, the military posture of Pakistan may have had a specific effect on Pakistan's China policy, regardless of Pakistan's military power to back up her policy decisions. Pakistan's military position vis-a-vis India and the U.S. decision to supply arms to India, with total disregard to the balance of power in South Asia, are discussed respectively under the "bilateral systems" and "dominant bilateral systems" variables. Pakistan's economic needs and the restraints these needs place on her foreign policy decision making are examined under a domestic economic variable somewhat different from Brecher's. The remaining three internal

variables in Brecher's model, namely "political structure," "interest groups," and "competing elites," also require modification for the purpose of this thesis.

Brecher uses the variable of "political structure" in his model to include the political institutions and the constitutional matrix in which authoritative decisions are made.⁶⁸ Since not all the characteristics of the political system influenced Pakistan's China policy, only the relevant traits, such as the form of government, and the political climate of the early sixties in Pakistan, are analyzed under this variable. Similarly, Brecher's classification of "interest groups" is too broad and includes groups which are not normally considered by political scientists as being interest groups (e.g., military establishments and bureaucratic organizations). Finally, Brecher employs the variable of "competing elites" which he defines as those elites that vie for authority to make political decisions in the system.⁶⁹ Brecher includes the impact of opposition parties as well as the competing political factions within the ruling party or parties under this category. Pakistan under Ayub from 1958-1969 was ruled by one party, the Pakistan Muslim League. The opposition parties were banned during the

⁶⁸Michael Brecher, "A Framework for Research," p. 84.

⁶⁹Ibid., p.85.

first three years of his rule and afterwards they were not allowed to participate actively in the politics of Pakistan. For most of the time they were allowed to exist to make Pakistan look like a democracy, which she was not. Nevertheless, their advocacy, however limited in effectiveness, is examined together with the impact of the competing elite within the ruling party.

Clearly, then, the internal environment variables in Brecher's model are not entirely appropriate for the purposes of this study. Accordingly, the variables in the internal environment for examination in this study are adapted from Brecher in the following manner:

1. **Ideological and Historical Legacies:** Brecher treats societal factors under "the psychological environment."⁷⁰ This study, however, examines the ideology and historical legacies of Pakistan as separate influences on the decision making process and it also assesses their influence on Pakistan's foreign policy in general and Pakistan's policy of closer relations with the People's Republic of China in particular.
2. **Economic Developmental Needs:** In a brilliant article on the uses of foreign policy in less developed countries, Franklin Weinstein has observed

⁷⁰ Michael Brecher, "A Framework for Research," p. 86.

that economic development needs are among the three most important considerations in the formulation of foreign policies in less developed countries.⁷¹ This variable examines Pakistan's economic needs in the early sixties and the impact of these needs on Pakistan's China policy in that period.

3. Political Structure: Instead of assessing the impact of all aspects of the political system on Pakistan's China policy, this study focuses on the influence of the type of political regime and the political climate of Pakistan in the early sixties. In other words, the study examines the authoritarian nature and the stability of the Ayub regime, and the influence of these factors on Pakistan's policy of establishing closer relations with China during 1960-1965.

4. Competing Elites: This variable focuses on the influence of the competing elites within the ruling party. It also includes an examination of the policies advocated by the opposition parties, inside and outside the National Assembly of Pakistan, and their impact on steering Pakistan closer to the People's Republic of China.

⁷¹ Franklin B. Weinstein, "The uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries," World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 3, April 1972, p. 361.

5.. Bureaucracy: The influence of the senior bureaucrats of the Pakistan foreign service, the Pakistan civil service, and Pakistan's armed forces on Pakistan's China policy is examined under this variable. The discussion does not include an analysis of the process of formulation of the policy or of the structure of these services. It analyzes the influence of only those senior bureaucrats who by virtue of their rank and excellence were very close to the foreign policy decision-makers and thereby exerted considerable influence on Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties.

6. The Key Decision-Maker: Ayub's Personal Background and World Outlook:

The discussion here is focused on the personal background and world outlook of Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan from October 1958-March 1960, who was the chief decision-maker during the period of the formulation of Pakistan's China policy, i.e., the early sixties. It is, however, preceded by an analysis of the inconsequential role of Ayub's foreign ministers.

(III) The Method of Analysis:

In his model Brecher argues that it is possible to gain knowledge of elite perceptions and to rank, in order of importance, the variables of a particular decision

by means of "content analysis" of the speeches, interviews, press conferences and writings of the decision-maker.⁷² A simple frequency count of the pertinent articulated elite perceptions or images should, according to Brecher, permit the analyst or researcher to rank in order of importance the internal and the external variables that have influenced a specific foreign policy decision.⁷³ This technique assumes that the decision-makers usually act according to their articulated views, which is not necessarily the case. Besides, the technique fails to deal adequately with unarticulated views of the policy-making elite. In fact, public expression of elite perceptions in many cases reveals only "declared policy," not necessarily "real policy." Moreover, in some cases the articulated views represent merely a justification of a decision already taken for other unarticulated reasons. This study, therefore, does not adopt "content analysis" nor any other quantitative approach for the purpose of evaluating the determinants of Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties. Accordingly, the assessment of the variables has been made on a more general basis of qualitative analysis.⁷⁴

⁷²Michael Brecher, "A Framework for Research," p. 89.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴The independent variables in this research are the external and the internal environments as they influenced Pakistan's China policy, while the dependent variable is Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties.

CHAPTER TWO: EXTERNAL VARIABLES

The external setting of Pakistan's foreign policy underwent a number of changes during 1960-1965; that was so at all three levels of the environment; global, subordinate, and bilateral. This chapter deals with variables of the external environment that were pertinent to the formulation of Pakistan's China policy in that period.

Global System

This section first examines the nature of the global system in the early sixties and then analyzes its influence on Pakistan's policy of establishing closer relations with China.

In the late fifties and early sixties, changes of great importance took place in the international political scene. The Sino-Soviet rift, the U.S.-Soviet detente, the establishment of the new Afro-Asian states, and the emergence of China as a great power all made the international milieu considerably, though not entirely, different from what it was in the late forties and early fifties. The following is a brief examination of the impact of these changes on the formulation of Pakistan's China policy in the period under study.

The Sino-Soviet ideological confrontation heralded a big change in the hitherto monolithic structure of the Communist bloc. The split made both China and the Soviet Union aware of the dangers arising to each of them from a border shared with the other. The Soviet Union, consequently, was obliged to soften her attitude toward the Western bloc, to compensate for the loss of a powerful friend and to solidify her position vis-a-vis China. The split also prompted the Soviet satellite states to assert and pursue independent policies based on their national interests, thus further weakening bloc solidarity.¹ Thus, one overall effect of the rift between the two major Communist powers was to diminish the threat of aggression from the Communist bloc.

Another significant development was detente, the result in part of the emergence of a Soviet intercontinental missile delivery capability and the rapid accumulation of nuclear megatonnage by the two superpowers, which brought about a "balance of terror."² The parity in nuclear weapons eased the rigid confrontation, because the risks of nuclear escalation and the fear of one side gaining temporary advantage over the other led the two superpowers to favour reducing

¹ Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1956-1961, Athenium, New York, 1964, pp. 100-101.

² P. Gallois, The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age, Houghton, Mifflin, Boston, 1961, p. 31.

tensions.³ Moreover, the introduction of new devices fundamentally changed the relevance of military force to the attainment of political objectives. Thus, in the late fifties, the "balance of terror" and the escalation of nuclear capability led to the U.S. - U.S.S.R. detente and the adoption of a less doctrinaire approach to international relations by the leaders of the two blocs.

Detente was evident in the late fifties in the renewed dialogue between the superpowers. There were visits by Mikoyan and Kozlov to the U.S., and Nixon to the Soviet Union in 1958, the historic Eisenhower-Krushchev Camp-David talks in 1959, the abortive Paris Summit in 1961, and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963. The thawing of the Cold War was also visible in the improvement of cultural relations, personal travel in each other's orbit, in the increase in trade, and renewed negotiations on arms control. Detente led to a more or less cooperative approach on the part of the superpowers to the economic development of certain countries in which they had common interests. The U.S.-U.S.S.R. confrontation, which had long dominated the United Nations was overshadowed by issues relating to the economic and political development of the Third World. In fact, the thaw in the Cold War imparted a

³Michael Brecher, Foreign Policy System of Israel, Yale University, New Haven, 1972, pp.24-30.

measure of stability to the United Nations and made the global system as a whole more viable than before.⁴

In addition, a radical transformation in the character of international politics was brought about by the emergence into the international arena of a large number of new Asian and African states, beginning with the independence of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Burma. Most of these nations had shared common experiences of colonialism and fighting for independence. These states were more keen on achieving economic and social progress and preserving their independence than getting involved in the bipolar or triangular ideological confrontation. Their emergence changed not only the character of the U.N., but also the configuration of world politics. The U.N. had a membership of fifty-one at its inception, in 1945, but by 1960 the number had increased to over one hundred.⁵ The inflation of the U.N. membership was mainly due to the emergence of the new states, which by 1960 held a clear balance of voting strength in the Assembly. The big powers, instead of commanding them, were courting them for their support. Consequently, both blocs became flexible and tailored their goals and tactics to meet the wishes of the new-born Afro-Asian States. The direct U.S. - U.S.S.R.

⁴Michael Brecher, Foreign Policy System of Israel, p. 26.

⁵Ibid., p. 27

confrontation, which had long dominated the Assembly, now became secondary in the face of the different concerns of the new majority. Development and decolonization replaced security as the preoccupation of the U.N. The change brought about by these nations in the character of the U.N. and the global system made non-alignment, heretofore suspect in the eyes of the superpowers, a legitimate basis of foreign policy. This change in the attitude of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. toward non-alignment became an important factor in their attitude toward the Third World.

Finally, the rise of China in Asia and the economic recovery of Europe in general, and France and West Germany in particular were significant indicators that the tight bipolarity of the early fifties was giving way to polycentrism.⁶ The enormous resource and manpower potential of China were destined to give her the status of a big power almost from the beginning. China's successful explosion of nuclear devices and her capacity to confront the superpowers further elevated and confirmed the status of China in the eyes of the Third World countries. The U.S and the U.S.S.R. began to acquire awareness of a shared interest in the Himalayas and the "containment" of China became one of their main objectives. The arming of India against China in the

⁶Michael Brecher, Foreign Policy of Israel, p. 28.

Sino-Indian War of October 1962 was a demonstration of their approach toward China.

The above changes in the global system and the resulting changes in the policies of the big powers were significant for Pakistan's policy of establishing closer relations with China in the early sixties. First, the Sino-Soviet split brought the differences within the Communist bloc to the forefront and shattered its monolithic structure.⁷ These differences reduced to a substantial degree Ayub's apprehension of a Russian-Chinese "push" from the North against Pakistan. In other words, the Sino-Soviet split decreased Pakistan's dependence on her Western allies against such a threat. In addition, the Sino-Soviet confrontation also obliged the Soviet Union to soften her attitude toward the West, thereby reducing the tensions of the previous Cold War period. The Sino-Soviet split, therefore, gave Pakistan an opportunity to minimize her dependence on the West, especially the U.S., and to normalize her relations with the Communist bloc in order to increase her bargaining position vis-a-vis India. As a result of the split, Pakistan, according to Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir, was capable of exercising considerable maneuverability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.⁸

⁷ Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Split, p. 100.

⁸ Dawn, 28 June 1962.

Second, the detente between the superpowers made the U.S.-Pakistan alliance of the early fifties less relevant because the original purpose of the alliance — the curbing of Communist expansion in South Asia — had become less important in the era of the "spirit of Camp David." Besides, Pakistan could no longer rely on the United States in the light of the new U.S. South Asian Policy, aimed at arming India against the perceived new threat of Chinese aggression.⁹


Furthermore, the introduction of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM's), one of the developments that led to detente, considerably reduced the necessity for the superpowers of retaining military bases at formerly strategic locations overseas.¹⁰ As a result, the strategic significance of Pakistan was now ranked lower in U.S. considerations. Pakistan's leadership, which had already alienated China and the Soviet Union by her loyal adherence to the Western bloc, now could no longer count on massive U.S. help, so vital for Pakistan's physical and economic survival. Thus, Ayub was obliged to seek new friends who could and would

⁹The new U.S. South Asian policy and its impact on Pakistan's China policy is discussed under the "Dominant Bilateral Relations" variable.

¹⁰P. Gallois, The Balance of Terror, p. 33.

help Pakistan in her economic and defence needs.

The emergence of new Afro-Asian states as a third force in international politics changed the attitude of the superpowers toward non-alignment, thus further facilitating a change in Pakistan's foreign policy. Non-alignment, which used to be viewed as "amoral" or "immoral," assumed a mantle of respectability in the eyes of Washington and Moscow.¹¹ In the context of this changed attitude, it was now possible for the smaller and weaker countries to practice non-alignment without antagonizing the superpowers and to improve their bargaining position vis-a-vis the major powers. Clearly, this was an appropriate time for Pakistan to normalize her relations with the Communist bloc. In fact, Pakistan's China policy was a part of Ayub's attempt to normalize Pakistan's relations with all the major powers, and he could not have done it if non-alignment were still considered immoral by the superpowers.



Finally, there was the emergence of China as a significant new force in the global system. Pakistan's policy of establishing closer relations with China in the early sixties stemmed in part from the need of

¹¹ Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 133.

Pakistan to recognize the realities of Chinese power, as well as from the potential security threat from China that Pakistan perceived because of her contiguity with China.

In fact, China and Pakistan share a common border of about four hundred miles, between Sinkiang and territories north of Kashmir, including Hunza, Nagar, and Baltistan (parts of West Pakistan). Thus, like India, China was a neighbour of Pakistan in the east as well as the west. This contiguity, in the light of China's emergence as a new major power in the global system, could not be ignored in the formulation of Pakistan's foreign policy. What China meant and means to Pakistan has been succinctly stated by Bhutto:

China's dominant place in Asia is assured. Pakistan is an Asian state whose destinies are forever linked with those of Asia and it is vital for Pakistan to maintain friendly relations with China for strengthening Asian unity.¹²

Commenting on the global scene in general and the need as a result of alterations in it to have closer relations with China, Bhutto observed:

¹²Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, p. 131.

The new situation is such that it would be a dereliction of national duty if we did not, in the light of it, fully examine its political and military consequences Our national commitments are so heavy, the consequent responsibility so great, and the threat to our security and integrity is so serious that this government would be failing our people if it did not reappraise its political and military.¹³

Thus, the motivations behind Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties originated at least in part in Pakistan's objective reassessment of the changes in the global system. The Sino-Soviet split, the growing detente between the superpowers, together with the related new developments in military technology, the rise of the new Afro-Asian states, and the rise of China as a great power all pointed to the desirability of developing closer relations with China.

Subordinate State System

According to Brecher, Pakistan belongs to the "Southern Asian Subordinate System," which includes both South and Southeast Asia.¹⁴ There has, however, gradually emerged a tendency to separate South Asia from Southeast Asia and to regard it as a region in

¹³ Z.A. Bhutto's speech in Pakistan National Assembly on 22 June 1964; reproduced in full, Dawn, 23 June 1964.

¹⁴ Michael Brecher, Foreign Policy of Israel, p. 37

itself. There is no general agreement with regard to defining the area. Some regard it as limited to India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and Nepal, while others extend it to Afghanistan in the West and Burma in the east.¹⁵ In fact, Afghanistan has many features which warrant her inclusions in the South Asian subordinate system. This study, therefore, treats South Asia as an independent sub-system comprising India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Nepal, and Burma.

The South Asian System, defined in this way, acquires geographical unity. Most of the units in the region share common experiences of colonialism and the struggle for independence. The experience of British imperialism led to the development of almost identical political, legal, and administrative units in most of the countries of the region. All the member states were, as they still are, underdeveloped and the region was characterized by an arrested economy, a low standard of living, a stagnant agriculture, a shortage of capital and skills, little heavy industry, and a disturbing rate of population growth.

The common experiences of colonialism and political and economic underdevelopment have not, however, led to any sentiment of unity in the region. The political

¹⁵S.P. Varma and K.P. Misra, eds., Foreign Policies in South Asia, Orient Longman's, New Delhi, 1969.

consolidation that the region had under the umbrella of the British Empire withered away with its withdrawal. The differences between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, between India and Sri Lanka and between India and Burma over the rights of Indian settlers in Sri Lanka and Burma, and between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the Pakhtunistan issue have made South Asia a vortex of trouble.¹⁶ In addition, differences between various religious, racial, and linguistic groups have intensified and led to a host of difficulties in intra-regional relationships.

The bilateral relations among the member states are intense. They are in constant contact at every level and use every form of interaction, diplomatic, social, economic, cultural, political, and personal. The process is quite intense; developments in the domestic politics of one state have spillover effects on the internal, and, frequently, on the foreign affairs of other states. Thus, a change of government in India can exert considerable influence on Pakistan's domestic and foreign policies. Though formal relations do exist among all the member states, they are often marked by hostility. Four full-scale wars between India and Pakistan, not to mention the severing of diplomatic relations between India and

¹⁶ S.P. Varma and K.P. Misra, Foreign Policies in South Asia.

Pakistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and India and Nepal, reflect a condition of permanent conflict in the region. The regular confrontations at the U.N. and at a myriad of other international conferences further indicate the degree of friction and animosity in the interaction of these states.

The South Asian configuration of power has undergone some changes since the emergence of Pakistan. In 1947, the general power level was very low in both absolute and relative terms. No state was able to produce weapons or missiles. The armed forces were small in number and severely limited as to skills and weapons. None of the states had the necessary industrial base to expand its military capability; dependence on arms-producing members of the global system was virtually complete. By the late fifties and early sixties, the level of power had altered. Economic development had been accompanied by the growth of arms-producing industries. India, the biggest member state in 1947 — in population, size of army, and weapons — was regarded as a potential member of the nuclear club. Yet, all members remained dependent upon external sources for decisive weapons (planes, tanks, heavy artillery, missiles, and naval equipment). This dependence on great powers permitted continuous penetration by

superpowers and other great powers made South Asia a subordinate system in the literal sense.

The South Asian system has been characterized by permanent conflict between the two major actors of the system, India and Pakistan, over the Kashmir issue and the control and management of the Indus Basin waters. Besides the Indo-Pakistan conflict, Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan have been marred by bitter controversy over the Pakhtunistan problem.¹⁷ The antecedents of these conflicts go back to the formation of Pakistan. Since Pakistan shares most of her borders with Afghanistan and India in the east, west, and the south, she feels herself strongly threatened by these conflicts. The threats that Pakistan perceives from Afghanistan and India are examined in detail under the relevant bilateral variables. However, a general survey of the geopolitics of the region, which created a security problem of unusual complexity for Pakistan, is essential at this point.

The creation of Pakistan in August 1947, out of intense Hindu-Muslim communal conflict, with a psychology of fear and hatred toward India, and with a primarily

¹⁷ The Pakhtunistan problem arises from Afghanistan's demand for the creation of a separate state for the Pakhtuns living on the Pakistani side of the Pak-Afghan border. It is examined in detail under the variable of "Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan."

religious inspiration, was perhaps the most important event in the South Asian system in the forties. The partition of British India removed the very foundations of the political-military-economic edifice that the British had built in the subcontinent. A compact defence area provided with the best natural barriers of the world became divided within itself with consequent disintegration, locking up the armed forces of the area in hostile confrontation.

The two countries of the subcontinent, which had been economically complementary, became mutually exclusive and competitive in the world market, with consequent loss to both. The process of partition itself left unresolved problems, the most important of which were the disposition of the princely state of Kashmir and the control and management of the Indus Basin Waters, issues which to this day have been dissipating the economic, political, military, and even moral resources of the two states.¹⁸ According to Pakistani perceptions, India's method of applying force for settling political disputes, as in the cases of Hyderabad and Junagadh, and

¹⁸ Though the seeds of the Bangladesh problem were sown at the creation of Pakistan, this issue was not a major one until the late sixties; it is, therefore, not examined in this study.

her insistence on solving the Kashmir problem on her own terms created deep fears in Pakistan.¹⁹ The increasing power and the continued unfriendly stance of India has been one of the important considerations which restrict, rather seriously, the choice of objectives and methods in Pakistan's foreign policy.

Besides the Indian policies, the attitude of Afghanistan, a Muslim country in the northwest, added a new problem of frontier defence for Pakistan. Immediately after the creation of Pakistan, Afghanistan started a violent campaign for the creation of Pakhtunistan. She demanded that the Pakhtuns²⁰ living in the north and northwest of Pakistan be given the right of self-determination on the question of forming a separate state to be called Pakhtunistan. This state, according to the Afghanistan proposals, would be formed by detaching the following areas from West Pakistan:

¹⁹The cases of Hyderabad and Junagadh were the reverse of that of Kashmir (Kashmir is examined in the section of Pakistan's relations with India). When the Muslim rulers of Hyderabad and Junagadh, which were predominantly Hindu states, did not accede to India, India occupied them forcibly. See Robert D. Campbell, Pakistan: Emerging Democracy, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey, 1963, p. 123.

²⁰Pakhtuns live on both sides of the Afghanistan and Pakistan border. They get their name from the Pakhtu or Pushtu language that they speak; hence the variation in spelling, Pakhtuns or Pushtoons, Pakhtunistan or Pushtoonistan.

The North West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.), the states of Dir, Swat, Chitral, and Amb; Baluchistan and the princely states, Kalat, Kharan, Makran, and Las Bela within Baluchistan.²¹ These parts of Pakistan's territory are bounded by the Durand Line, the international frontier between Afghanistan and British India drawn in 1893. The division created great tension between the two countries and after Pakistan attained independence, worsened Pak-Afghan relations, for Pakistan inherited the disputed territories from British India.

The third major concern of Pakistan was her responsibility for guarding the Khyber Pass, the traditional route by which the subcontinent had often been invaded. Historically, this region has inspired Russian interests and has figured prominently in Russian strategy. The rapid growth of industries in Soviet Central Asia substantially increased the importance of this region. Pakistan feared that the Soviet Union in her search for a warm water port nearby might seek access to the Arabian Sea through Karachi.²² Likewise, the early attitude of the Soviet Union toward Pakistan and her

²¹ These states were geographically parts of the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan provinces, but administratively, they were separate princely states within Pakistan.

²² Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. I. p. 84.

strong support of the Indian and the Afghan stand on Kashmir and Pakhtunistan, coupled with the reports of her military build-up along the Pakistan border, created more apprehensions in Pakistan about Soviet expansionist designs. Although the thawing of the Cold War and the growing detente between the superpowers had substantially reduced the general Communist threat, Pakistan still perceived the Russian threat, especially in the early sixties when Pakistan-Soviet relations were far from satisfactory.

In addition, Pakistan became more keenly aware of the hovering presence of China in the northeast in the early sixties. By that time, the rapid growth of China had given her the status of a great power. The Sino-Soviet conflict and the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 had proved beyond any doubt that she was a force to be reckoned with in the region. Pakistan's common border with China dictated the urgency of settling the Sino-Pakistan border peacefully and of having good neighbourly relations with China in order to avoid a conflict of the Sino-Indian magnitude. The necessity of having good relations acquired more strength when the Pakistan Foreign Office came in possession of a Chinese map showing some parts of North Pakistan as parts of China.²³

²³ Mohamammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 131.

These regional, geopolitical factors explain Pakistan's dire need for security and her preparedness to meet any possible attack from outside. It is in the light of these factors in the subordinate system that Pakistan's original policy of neutrality, her later policy of alignment with the West, and her ultimate policy of establishing closer relations with China in the early 1960's have to be studied.

In the early years, 1947-1953, Pakistan considered that the best guarantee for her security as well as economic development lay in following a policy of neutrality in the East-West Cold War rivalries and in adopting an attitude of goodwill toward all and malice toward none. Pakistan, however, could not maintain her policy of neutrality for long. The continued massing of Indian forces on the eastern border of West Pakistan, the Afghan pressure on her north western border, the antagonistic attitude of the Soviet Union in supporting the anti-Pakistan policies of India and Afghanistan, and the Sino-Indian friendship left her completely isolated in the South Asia system.

Thus, geopolitical compulsions led her to conclude that neutrality between the two blocs would not guarantee her security in the region. She, therefore, rejected the idea of continuing her neutrality as unrealistic and impractical and entered into a neutral defence

agreement with the United States in May, 1954. Within another year, Pakistan had become a member of the SEATO and CENTO regional defence pacts. India, Afghanistan, China, and the Soviet Union denounced Pakistan's alignment with the West in unmitigated terms. They started a strong campaign against Pakistan among the Middle Eastern and other committed countries and were successful in partially isolating her from the countries of the Third World.

Despite Pakistan's professions that her membership in the defence pacts and the acceptance of military and economic aid were purely for self-defence and could not be taken to mean that she had become a camp-follower of the Western bloc, the fact remains that between 1954 and 1960 Pakistan followed a single-track policy of unqualified alignment with the United States. Her voting record in the United Nations on all important issues bears this out.²⁴

Pakistan's primary motive in entering into an alliance with the United States was to improve her overall position in the South Asian region and achieve a "balance of power" in the subcontinent to ensure her existence. As long as the U.S. was prepared to maintain the balance of power in the subsystem and as long as her position and presence in South Asia was forceful

²⁴S.M. Burke, Pakistan, Foreign Policy, p. 231.

enough to provide protection, Pakistan did not feel any need for changing the basics of her foreign policy.

By the early 1960's the changes in the global system, discussed earlier, however, modified the United States policy in South Asia. The thrust of the new United States policy was to contain the influence of China in Asia by building India as a bulwark against China. To achieve this objective, the United States in collaboration with the Soviet Union, rushed massive military and economic aid to India. The arming of India by both the superpowers tilted the balance of power in South Asia in favour of India. The imbalance thus created in the subsystem was perceived by Ayub as a serious threat against Pakistan's very existence. He minced no words in conveying this perception to President Kennedy in his letter of 5 November 1962. "Our belief is," he wrote; "that the arms now being obtained by India from you for use against China will undoubtedly be used against us at the very first opportunity."²⁵

Thus, the geopolitical realities of the region in the early sixties obliged the Ayub regime to evolve

²⁵The full text of the letter is reproduced by Ayub in his memoirs, Friends Not Masters, p. 143.

a pattern of relationships that would offset the imbalance of power created in the region by the penetration of global powers and thus ensure the continued existence of Pakistan in South Asia. The new approach to China launched during 1960-1965, was an important part of this process of building a new pattern of relationships.

Dominant Bilateral Systems

a. Relations with the United States

The American policy of containing Soviet and Chinese influence was fairly well established by the early 1950's. The United States, in the process of building anti-Communist coalitions in Asia and the Middle East, entered upon a "special relationship" with Pakistan during the 1954-1960 period. Over the years, the United States provided her with considerable economic and military assistance. In 1959, misunderstandings arose in the relationship and have since grown and multiplied, especially since the Sino-Indian border war of 1962.

This section examines the special relationship between the two countries and then assesses the influence of its dissolution on Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties.

Until the end of 1953, Pakistan followed a policy of what she called active neutralism. The policy of non-alignment, however, could not be maintained for long. The outbreak of the Korean War, followed by the active intervention of China in it, were major events that changed the course of international politics in Asia. The United States became alive to the Communist expansion in Southern Asia, which until that time had been considered to be outside the American defence perimeter. Until then, the United States in her global strategy had considered Pakistan only as a unit of the subcontinent. In the context of the contemplated defence arrangement against the Communist threat, however, the Eisenhower Administration realized that she occupied a very important strategic position. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of States in the Eisenhower government, in a major foreign policy statement, stressed her strategic position:

Communist China borders on northern territories held by Pakistan, and from Pakistan's northern borders one can see the Soviet Union. Pakistan flanks Iran and the Middle East and guards the Khyber Pass, the historic invasion route from the north into the subcontinent.²⁶

²⁶ See Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' speech of 29 May 1953, after his return from a fact-finding tour of South Asia. The speech is cited in full in Documents on International Affairs; 1953, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1956, pp.258-259.

A glance at the map shows that bases or airstrip facilities on the northwest frontier of Pakistan would have placed the Americans in a favourable position on the periphery of the Soviet Union. Along with the government, the American press too, was stressing Pakistan's strategic importance in any defence scheme against the Soviet Union.²⁷

Possible repercussions in India and Afghanistan were the chief negative factors that gave Eisenhower second thoughts about giving military aid to Pakistan. On 2 November 1953, the New York Times published reports of arms negotiations between Pakistan and the United States, but it was not until 25 February 1954, that Eisenhower announced the arms aid to Pakistan.²⁸ The beginning of this relationship coincided with a period of great turmoil in Pakistan's internal as well as external position. The assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's first Prime Minister, had shattered the political stability of the country; the economic depression of 1953-1954 and the personal rivalries of the politicians had led to a further deterioration of the situation. India and Afghanistan, taking advantage

²⁷ See Selig S. Harrison, "India, Pakistan and the United States; Case History of a Mistake," New Republic, 10 August 1959; also see New York Herald Tribune, 17 April 1953.

²⁸ New York Times, 26 February 1955.

of the situation, stepped up their hostile activities on the border. In short, Pakistan was plunged in utter confusion when Eisenhower made the announcement. Looking objectively at things, she realized that under the prevailing conditions it would serve her best national interests to link up with the defensive arrangements that the Eisenhower Administration was contemplating.

Thus, Pakistan became an ally of the United States in May 1954 by signing the mutual defence agreement with her.²⁹ In September 1955, Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact, later renamed CENTO,³⁰ another mutual defence organization, with Britain, Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Though the United States did not join this pact officially, she remained closely associated with it from its inception. In March 1959, Pakistan signed another bilateral agreement of cooperation with the United States.³¹ This treaty was more significant than the Mutual Defence Agreement of May 1954, because it contained more guarantees, direct and indirect, with regard to the defence of Pakistan. Through this:

²⁹ See the text of "Bilateral Agreement between the United States and Pakistan," in Documents on American Foreign Relations, New York, 1960, pp. 20-23.

³⁰ After Iraq left the Baghdad Pact, it was renamed CENTO.

³¹ Documents on American Foreign Relations, pp. 20-25.

agreement, the United States made a definite commitment that in the case of aggression against Pakistan, the United States, in accordance with her constitution, would "take such appropriate action, including the use of the armed forces as may be mutually agreed upon . . . in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request."³²

Both Pakistan and the United States reaped advantages and disappointments from their alliance. Between 1954 and 1962 Pakistan received more than one billion dollars worth of weapons, military training and technical expertise, and over three billion dollars in United States economic assistance.³³

In turn, the United States had Pakistan's firm and consistent support in the Cold War. Pakistan opposed China's admission to the United Nations, withstood Moscow's intimidation, and ignored the Soviet offer of trade and economic assistance. In brief, Pakistan supported the United States and her policies even to the detriment of certain of her own foreign

³²Ibid., p. 21

³³These figures have been taken from Samad Hafezi's unpublished thesis: "Transformation of the United States-Pakistan Alliance: 1954-1969," University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1971. Mr. Hafezi says that non-aligned India received more aid from the United States than Pakistan during 1954-1962.

policy interests.³⁴ The United States established a strong political presence in Pakistan. She maintained a communications base in Peshawar from where she conducted aerial and electronic monitoring; and espionage activities against the Soviet Union and China.³⁵

On the other hand, the one-sided or single-track policy of unqualified alignment made Pakistan isolated from and suspect among the non-aligned nations of Asia and Africa. It also provoked the hostility of the Communist bloc.³⁶ In other words, during 1954-1960, Pakistan's identification with the West was so complete that if the United States had deserted her she would have had no other friends to rely on. Pakistan, it seemed, was at the mercy of the United States. Realizing the helplessness of Pakistan, even the United States started taking her for granted.³⁷ Clearly, the pattern of Pakistan's relations with the United States and other countries required fundamental rethinking.

³⁴ Pakistan endorsed Dulles' 1956 proposal for a Suez Canal User's Association, thus offending the U.A.R., a fellow Muslim country.

³⁵ American advisors guided the ordering of priorities in Pakistan's development plan. Policies were made and implemented on the advice of these men. The United States Aid Organization in Karachi, according to Syed, resembled a parallel government. See Anwar H. Syed, China and Pakistan, p. 35.

³⁶ Werner Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and China," Pacific Affairs, Fall 1962, p. 216.

³⁷ See Anwar H. Syed, China and Pakistan, p. 35.

Besides economic development, another important motive of Pakistan in entering into an alliance with the United States was to improve her overall position vis-a-vis India and Afghanistan. She assumed that if she supported the United States against the Communist bloc the United States would reciprocate by backing her in her dispute with India. For sometime the United States' policy conformed to Pakistan's expectations, but with the emergence of the People's Republic of China as an Asian power and, more particularly after the development of the Sino-Indian border conflict, the United States' approach to South Asia underwent a complete and fundamental change.

The change was visible in the anxiety of the United States to contain China and to build up certain countries in Asia as bulwarks against her. For this purpose, the United States selected Japan and India. Building up India meant providing her with vast quantities of military hardware which created a sense of apprehension among her smaller neighbours, especially Pakistan. Since India and Pakistan regarded each other as arch-enemies, Pakistan was the first to be affected by the change in the United States South Asian policy. Pakistan felt the blow more since India was getting this patronage from the United States, Pakistan's closest ally. Obviously, Pakistan felt that she was

being let down by her ally who had always differentiated sharply between aligned and non-aligned states. In the late fifties, however, due to changes in the global and the subordinate systems, the United States adopted a new attitude toward non-alignment and thus redefined her relations with non-aligned countries. With the advent of the Kennedy Administration in 1961, this new positive approach to non-aligned states became the professed basis of American foreign policy in Asia and Africa.³⁸ Kennedy and some of his top advisors³⁹ not only approved of non-alignment, but even criticized military aid to Pakistan, because it was, in their opinion, adversely affecting the development of Indo-American relations. According to Mr. Chester Bowles, it was "bad arithmetic to alienate 360 million Indians in order to aid 80 million Pakistanis who are split

³⁸ President Kennedy was largely responsible for the new cast of U.S. South Asian policy. As a senator, Kennedy had expressed his reservations about forming military pacts with weaker, unstable and militarily-run countries at the expense of warm relations with India. For the text of his speeches on this subject in the Senate on 25 March 1958 and 1 November 1959, see, John F. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1960.

³⁹ Chester Bowles, J.K. Galbraith, Adlai Stevenson, Averell Harriman, and W.W. Rostow were all urging better understanding between Washington and New Delhi.

into two sections, and divided by 1000 miles of Indian territory. Instead of adding to the stability of the subcontinent, this will create new tensions and suspicions and thus further contribute to its insecurity."⁴⁰ Moreover, the development of new military weapons like the I.C.B.M.'s and nuclear submarines fitted with Polaris missiles had considerably reduced the value of military bases on the periphery of the Soviet Union. The defence alliances, according to some Harvard theorists, should, therefore, be replaced by regional economic cooperation as security against Communist expansion. Under the influence of this theory, the United States downgraded military pacts and started reshaping her policy in Asia on the assumption that "where India goes politically and economically, will determine the fate of the rest of the world."⁴¹ It was, therefore, considered vital by the United States to build up a strong India to counterbalance the increasing influence of Communist China, irrespective of its impact on other countries of the

⁴⁰ Chester Bowles, "U.S. Policy for Asia," reprinted by Dawn, 25 March 1962.

⁴¹ Government of the United States, "United States Foreign Policy," U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, 1961.

region. Accordingly, India was given a huge amount of economic aid which created great doubts in the smaller countries of the region about their security.

The U.S. proposal of economic aid, without any strings attached, suited India very well. Pakistan's reaction to the new U.S. South Asia policy, on the other hand, was very sharp. She argued that such help would enable India to divert her own resources toward building up her military might and would seriously disturb the balance of power in the subcontinent, which Pakistan was trying to maintain by her policy of alignment with the West. According to Pakistani perceptions, the strengthening of India by the U.S. posed a great danger to Pakistan's security, especially in the context of the Indo-Pakistan disputes. To add to this feeling, Democrats in the United States openly criticized the military aid to Pakistan and demanded that it should be substantially reduced. It was said that "backing the two horses (India and Pakistan) at the same time was a waste of tax-payers' money." Senator Fulbright, commenting on U.S. aid to Pakistan, observed that "American military aid to Pakistan was excessive and that this policy forced India to divert funds from economic development to

military purposes."⁴² Senator Albert Gore argued:

I find it difficult to defend giving a vast amount of military assistance to Pakistan and then providing economic aid to India with which she buys Canberra bombers. We are paying bills on both sides.⁴³

The new trends in United States foreign policy alarmed Ayub. He was so perturbed over the change he perceived in the U.S. policy that at his request his proposed visit to the United States was brought forward by about six months to July, 1961.⁴⁴ Although Ayub's visit to Washington toned down the rising tension, the growing lack of harmony in the interests of the two countries could not be checked. The United States would not sacrifice her global objective of "containing" China in Asia for the sake of maintaining friendly relations with Pakistan. The new U.S. South Asian policy was an attempt at an objective response to major developments in the vast jig-saw puzzle of international power politics. The Pakistan foreign

⁴²Cited by Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security, Longman's, Lahore, 1961, p. 56.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴In early 1961, President Kennedy had invited both Ayub and Nehru to visit the United States in December 1961.

policy elite saw the bases of change and realized that it had to exploit other political factors present in the international field to ensure Pakistan's security. In short, Pakistan was forced to deviate from her former position of absolute alignment with the U.S. and to make necessary adjustments in her foreign policy to accommodate the changing nature of the United States' policies toward her.

Pakistan's alignment with the U.S. had cost her a political fortune.⁴⁵ Ayub gives the following description of Pakistan's foreign relations in the late fifties:

By the time I became responsible for the affairs of the country in 1958, as President, the political identification of the country with the West was complete . . . We had few contacts or dealings with the Communist world. The Soviet Union regarded us with suspicion and distrust as some kind of a camp-follower of the United States.

⁴⁵S.M. Burke has discussed in detail the cost of Pakistan's alliance with the U.S. See, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, pp.201-239.

With the People's Republic of China we were on terms merely of nodding acquaintance. In the Middle East our position had been compromised by some of our leaders who handled the situation at the time of the Suez Crisis, in a clumsy fashion.

President Nasser and certain other Arab leaders under his influence thought that we were involved in some deep conspiracy to divide the Arab world. With the Afro-Asian community we had no association and Africa was a dark continent as far as we were concerned. This then was the picture in October 1958 46

Nevertheless, Pakistan was quite prepared to pay the U.S. price for the alliance as long as she was assured of her security. The United States, however, could offer only partial security; she was willing to provide protection against communism, not against any other threats. The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 made this fact clear; it violently shook the South Asian kaleidoscope and heralded the emergence of a new pattern. As soon as the hostilities started, India sent urgent requests for military aid to the British and the American governments, which, to the pleasant surprise of Nehru, responded most promptly. The first consignment of British and American aid arrived in India on 29 October 1962, and 1 November 1962 respectively.

⁴⁶ Mohammad Ayub, Friends Not Masters, p. 116.

Even with the cessation of fighting, the U.S., Great Britain, and other Western countries continued to strengthen India's armed forces so as to prevent a repetition of the disasters of October 1962.⁴⁷

The exact quantity of the U.S. military aid to India, begun in the early sixties, is uncertain. However, Pakistan termed it "massive".⁴⁸ During 1962-1964, President Ayub repeatedly bewailed the imbalance of military power in the subcontinent as a result of U.S. assistance to India.⁴⁹ Foreign minister Bhutto echoed the same theme; he thought that the aid "threatened the territorial integrity of Pakistan."⁵⁰ Even the initiators of the new U.S. South Asian policy agreed in principle with Ayub and Bhutto. At a press conference on 12 September 1963, President Kennedy said:

⁴⁷Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p.116.

⁴⁸See the speech of Pakistan's Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra in the National Assembly of Pakistan on 22 November 1963, cited in Dawn, 23 November 1963. See also editorials in Dawn and Pakistan Times, 23 and 24 November 1963.

⁴⁹See Ayub's statement in the Sunday Times, London, 20 October 1963; also Ayub's article, "The Pakistan-American Alliance", Foreign Affairs, January 1964, pp. 195-209.

⁵⁰Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, pp. 62, 68.

Every thing we give India adversely affects the balance of power with Pakistan, which is a much smaller country. We are dealing with a very, very complicated problem, because the hostility between them is so deep.⁵¹

Robert S. McNamara also acknowledged that the U.S. military aid to India for her conflicts with China "deeply troubled" Pakistan, but he justified it in the context of the U.S. global policy of containment of China.⁵²

It was not only the U.S. aid itself, but the manner in which it was given that troubled Pakistan. Throughout the early sixties, Pakistan emphasized the need for bringing about a just and honourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute, without which there could be no peace in the subcontinent. Ayub believed that the U.S. Administration was in a decisive position to exert pressure on India for resolving the dispute and that the military aid to India should be made conditional on the settlement of Indo-Pakistan disputes. In the beginning the U.S. seemed to agree with Ayub. According to Bhutto, the United States first made the grant of military aid to India conditional on the

⁵¹ Dawn, 14 September 1963

⁵² Quoted in Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, p.69.

settlement of the Kashmir dispute, but subsequently withdrew the condition because of Nehru's objection. Ambassador Galbraith informed the Indian government that aid to fight China was not contingent upon the settlement of the Kashmir dispute.⁵³ Ayub vehemently criticized the policy of arming India, referring with great anguish to the pledge given earlier by Kennedy that Pakistan would be consulted before arms were given to India.⁵⁴

The lack of consultation and complete disregard for Pakistan's cause led to bad feelings in Pakistan. Benjamin Oehlert, former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, in a revealing article, "How to Lose Allies," blames the United States for violating her pledge to Pakistan which "deeply concerned Pakistanis and caused them to reassess their position of alignment with the United States against their neighbours, Russia and China."⁵⁵ As mentioned earlier, Pakistan did not have any objections to U.S. aid helping India as long as the U.S. was prepared to use her good offices to bring diplomatic pressure to bear on India to solve the Kashmir dispute and normalize her relations with Pakistan. In fact,

⁵³Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, p.63.

⁵⁴Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 133-135.

⁵⁵Cited by G.W. Chaudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the major powers: Politics of a Divided Sub-continent, The Free Press, New York, 1975, p.111.

as early as 1959, Ayub had put forward a joint defence proposal for the defence of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent if India were prepared to solve the Kashmir dispute peacefully. In sum, the change in U.S. thinking and the subsequent new U.S. South Asian policy played a very prominent role in Pakistan's reassessment of her old foreign policy of complete identification with the U.S. Having lost the only powerful friend she had to India — that is how it was perceived by Pakistan's leaders — Pakistan decided to compensate for the loss by evolving a new pattern in her foreign relations based on normalization of relations with all major countries of the world. Thus, the change in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship was a major determinant of Pakistan's decision to establish closer relations with China in the early sixties.

b. Pakistan's Relations with the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Union's attitude toward the Pakistan movement and its leaders in the pre-1947 period was hostile. She regarded the Muslim League as the handmaid of the British imperialist forces whose main purpose was to divide and weaken the Indian National Movement and obstruct or delay Indian independence. In 1940, when the Muslim League adopted the famous "Pakistan Resolution" demanding a separate state for the Muslims of India, the Soviet Union at once condemned the resolution as "politically bankrupt and reactionary." Soviet

academics, A. Dyakov and V. Bushevich, charged the League with disrupting the front of the struggle of the Indian people for independence and urged all Muslims to support the Indian National Congress.⁵⁷ Though the Soviet attitude softened after her entry into the Second World War in June 1941, the Soviet Union maintained that the "partition of India would not solve the Hindu-Muslim problem and would weaken India", thus approving, in a way, the Congress position.⁵⁸

In August 1947, when Pakistan came into being, the Soviet Union ignored her and did not even send a message of congratulations.⁵⁹ The creation of Pakistan, in the Soviet estimation, was an imperialistic plot to weaken the new Dominion of India by playing India and Pakistan against each other and to extend British rule in some form.⁶⁰

⁵⁷See Gene D. Overstreet and Marshal Windmiller, Communism in India, Berkly, 1959, p. 188.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 188.

⁵⁹Werner Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China", Pacific Affairs, Fall 1962, p. 213.

⁶⁰Hafeezur Rehman Khan, "Pakistan's Relations with the U.S.S.R", Pakistan Horizon, Karachi, 1961, p. 33.

Although Pakistan and the Soviet Union agreed to exchange diplomatic envoys, the coolness in their relations might be judged from the fact that the appointment of their ambassadors was delayed until the autumn of 1949. Pakistan announced the appointment of her first ambassador to the Soviet Union on 30 October 1949. Three weeks later, the appointment of the first Soviet Ambassador was announced by Moscow; the ambassador, however, could not take up his appointment, and the second nominee arrived in Karachi only in March 1950.⁶¹

On 2 June 1949, in the wake of the announcement of Nehru's forthcoming visit to the United States, Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's first Prime Minister, received an invitation to visit Moscow, but no date was fixed for Mr. Khan's visit. However, when he received another invitation from the United States, he chose to visit Washington, and his Moscow visit never materialized. Mr. S. K. Hassan, writing about the Moscow invitation, remarked that "ideologically an alliance with the Soviet Union could have had no attraction for Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan or for any other Pakistani statesman".⁶²

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Sarwar K. Hassan, Pakistan and the United Nations, p. 54.

Besides the ideological consideration, Pakistan had noticed the subservient position forced upon the Soviet allies, and she did not want to lose her hard-won independence. Furthermore, there was the question of whether Russia could provide the economic and military assistance that Pakistan needed so urgently in the late forties and early fifties.⁶³ To this must be added Pakistan's dependence on the West for the solution of the Kashmir problem through the United Nations, where the United States exercised far greater influence than the Soviet Union.⁶⁴

So far as the Kashmir problem was concerned, Pakistan had not much of a chance of finding support from Russia. The Soviet attitude toward the Pakistan movement and Pakistan herself led Pakistan's leadership to surmise that, in the context of Kashmir, India could expect, and would get, more assistance from the U.S.S.R. and her satellites than Pakistan could, whether in terms of mediation or even the veto. To begin with, the Soviet Union abstained in the Security Council on resolutions dealing with Kashmir. Then, in January 1952, Jacob Malik,

⁶³ According to Pakistani perceptions, until the late fifties Russia was busy consolidating her own economy and was not in as good a position as the U.S. to provide aid. For this and other details, see Sarwar K. Hassan, "Foreign Policy of Liaquat Ali Khan", Pakistan Horizon, Karachi, December 1951, p. 86.

⁶⁴ Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, Macmillan, London, 1951, p.287.

the Soviet representative in the Security Council, blamed the United States and Britain for interfering in the internal affairs of Kashmir and prolonging the Indo-Pakistan dispute. He also accused Britain and the United States of putting forward one plan after another in order to "secure the introduction of Anglo-American troops into the territory of Kashmir and convert Kashmir into an Anglo-American colony and a military and strategic base".⁶⁵ The Soviet policy regarding Kashmir was unpalatable to Pakistani leaders, who became rather suspicious of Soviet motivations and saw any hope for a favourable resolution of the problem only in closer collaboration with the West.

During the late forties and the early fifties, the Soviet attitude remained cool and indifferent toward Pakistan. Nothing positive was done by the Soviet Union to prevent Pakistan from joining the Western alliance system. There was no counter offer of aid or assurance of security to Pakistan from her side. It appears that the Soviets either underestimated the role that Pakistan could play or purposely let Pakistan go in the opposite direction to justify her anti-Pakistan policies. Thus the pattern of the Pakistan-Soviet relationship remained unsatisfactory during the 1947-1953 period. In November 1953, when the news about the United States-Pakistan

⁶⁵ Dawn, 19, January 1952.

pact became public knowledge, the Soviet Union saw all her suspicions of Anglo-American stirring for military bases, referred to by Malik in 1952, come true. The Soviet Union lost no time in seeking clarification of the alleged U.S.-Pakistan negotiations for the establishment of United States air bases in Pakistan. A Soviet protest note delivered at Karachi on 30 November 1953, warned Pakistan against participating in the plans to set up "an aggressive military bloc" in West Asia.⁶⁶ Pakistan indicated her resentment of the protest note in strong terms. Mohammad Ali Bogra, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, in his reply delivered on 19 December 1953, said that his country would "tolerate no interference in her domestic or foreign policy from any quarter".⁶⁷ He also affirmed that Pakistan did not contemplate "taking any steps in hostility or unfriendliness toward any government or state with which, like the U.S.S.R., it has friendly relations".⁶⁸ Pakistan's explanation did not satisfy the Soviet Union and her attitude of indifference changed to an attitude of hostility. Pakistan's signing of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in April 1954, and her later

⁶⁶Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1953, p. 13320.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 13320:

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 13321.

joining of the SEATO, and CENTO pacts was denounced unequivocally by the Soviet Union. These pacts, in the view of the Soviet Premier, were aimed at "preservation and consolidation of colonialism, suppression of the national liberation movements, and interference in the affairs of the Chinese People's Republic and other Asian countries".⁶⁹ Thus, Pakistan's membership in the Western defence pacts brought a qualitative change in the Soviet attitude toward Pakistan and the issues concerning her.

Premier Marshal Bulganin's and First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev's December 1955 tour of South Asia was only a confirmation of the antagonistic attitude of the Soviet Union toward Pakistan. The very exclusion of Pakistan from the Soviet leaders' itinerary for the tour betrayed the lack of concern for Pakistan and her point of view. Besides, the public speeches and statements and official communiques attested to the negative perceptions of Pakistan on the part of the Soviet leaders.

On 19 December 1955, during their state visit to India, Bulganin and Khrushchev visited the disputed State of Kashmir and referred to it as "the northern part of India" and its inhabitants as part of "the Indian people". The following day, Khrushchev went

⁶⁹Statesman, New Delhi, 13 May 1955.

a step farther and denounced the partition of India for "imperialistic" reasons and declared that the question of "one of the states of the Republic of India has already been decided by the people of Kashmir".⁷⁰ Bulganin in his subsequent report to the Supreme Soviet reiterated that "the Kashmir question has already been settled by the people of Kashmir themselves. They consider themselves an integral part of the Republic of India".⁷¹ The Soviet Union's vetoes in the United Nations Security Council on resolutions for the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question also indicated not only her pro-India stand on Kashmir, but also her anti-Pakistan attitude.

During their visit to Afghanistan, 14-18 December 1955, Bulganin and Khrushchev expressed their sympathy with Afghanistan in her Pakhtunistan dispute with Pakistan. Marshal Bulganin, in a speech in Kabul on 16 December 1955, said that "the Pushtoon people should be consulted on this matter."⁷² (Pakhtunistan)".

⁷⁰For the full text of Bulganin's and Khrushchev's speeches see, International Affairs, Moscow, January 1956, pp. 206-207. The speeches were delivered in Srinagar on 9 and 10 December 1955.

⁷¹Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1956, p. 14654.

⁷²International Affairs, Moscow, January 1956, pp. 240-241.

At the end of the month, in a report to the Supreme Soviet, Marshal Bulganin observed:

Pushtoonistan (Pakhtunistan) is a region inhabited by independent Afghan tribes. In 1883, the region was included in the British Empire, and in 1947, contrary to the interests of the tribes inhabiting it, Pushtoonistan was incorporated in Pakistan. We think that the demands of Afghanistan to give the population of Pushtoonistan an opportunity of freely expressing their will are justified and well grounded.⁷³

The Soviet stand on Pakhtunistan was reiterated time and again. In 1957, the Soviet Union in a joint communique with Afghanistan supported Afghanistan's irredentist claims on Pakistan's territory.

The Soviet antipathy for the foreign policy position of Pakistan not only worsened Soviet-Pakistan relations, but also Pakistan's relations with other nations, and aggravated regional tensions. As India and some of the Arab states, particularly Nasser's Egypt, were equally opposed to the SEATO and CENTO, the Soviet protests to Pakistan worsened Pakistan's relations with these countries. Nehru, Nasser, and the Kremlin

⁷³ Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1956, p. 14654.

leaders denounced Pakistan's participation in military pacts in almost identical terms. Thus, Indo-Pakistan tensions were exacerbated, as the Soviet Union seized a wonderful opportunity to serve her own interests to the detriment of peace and harmony in the subcontinent.

Other moments of tension between Pakistan and the U.S.S.R. followed when, in 1956, the Soviet Union accused Pakistan of supporting the "colonizing proposals" of the Western powers for the future of the Suez Canal; when Pakistan strongly criticized the Russian invasion of Hungary in 1956; when, in February 1957, Russia cast her first veto in the Security Council proceedings on Kashmir to bar a resolution to which India did not agree; when Pakistan signed the bilateral Defence Agreement with the United States in March 1959; when Ayub proposed to India in 1959 a plan for joint defence of the subcontinent against the "Northern Push"; and when the American U-2 plane, piloted by Gary Powers, having taken off from Peshawar, was shot down in Russia in May, 1960.⁷⁴

The U-2 incident was a turning point in the Soviet-Pakistan relationship. The stern Soviet protest notes

⁷⁴At that time, Khrushchev was reported to have encircled Peshawar with his "red pencil" as one of the targets for annihilation by rockets. See G. W. Chaudhury, Pakistan and the Major Powers, p. 31.

of 14 May and 22 June 1960, accusing Pakistan of "complicity" in the flight of the United States reconnaissance aircraft over Soviet territory and threatening to destroy the very bases from where such flights originated, shook Ayub and his Government.⁷⁵ The U-2 incident had a great impact on his subsequent moves to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Ayub had already begun a thorough reassessment of Pakistan's foreign policy. The U-2 incident sped it up because it indicated Pakistan's dangerous exposure as a result of total commitment to the West, and Ayub now questioned whether that commitment was worth the risk. The U.S.S.R. had helped to initiate the questioning, and the Soviet leaders capitalized upon Pakistan's dissatisfaction and frustration, which was intensified by the United States' new South Asian policy during the early sixties. Mihail Kapista, the Soviet Ambassador in Rawalpindi, told the Pakistanis:

⁷⁵Writing about the incident, Ayub says: "In the U-2 incident we were clearly at fault, but the whole thing had been as much of a shock to us as it was to the Soviet Union". Friends Not Masters, p. 171.

We support India and Afghanistan against you because they are our friends, even when they are in the wrong, but your friends do not support you, even when they know you are in the right.⁷⁶

It was a shrewd comment, part of a clever strategy, and it scored heavily. The need for a change in Pakistan's foreign policy became urgent in the early sixties when the changes in the global and the subordinate systems demonstrated quite clearly that a policy of active neutralism was far better than one of total commitment. Pakistan saw India reaping benefits from both sides without being committed to either of them. Pakistan's policy of establishing closer relations with China was perceived by the Ayub regime as enabling Pakistan not only to play "East" off against "West", but also China against the U.S.S.R. Besides, the improvement of Sino-Pakistan relations was seen as a way of reducing the Soviet threat; according to Ayub, the Soviet Union and China adhered to a common theory, and the people of one country had great admiration and respect for the people of the other country.⁷⁷ Ayub was further

⁷⁶Dawn, 9 July 1960, also cited by Daily Telegraph, London, 11 July 1960

⁷⁷Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 170 and p. 174.

convinced that the differences between the two were not of an organic character and in case of an attack by a third country both countries would offer united resistance. In brief, Ayub perceived that the Soviet Union and China were still working for the same cause, and Pakistan, by moving closer to China and by reducing her dependence on the West, would please the Soviet Union and thus reduce the antagonism between the Soviet Union and Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan's perception of the push from the North indicated that she apprehended a combined threat from China and the Soviet Union from the Sino-Pakistan border. By moving close to China, Pakistan removed not only the possibility of such a threat, but also paved the way for a normal Soviet-Pakistan relationship.

Thus, in the context of the preceding discussion, it is quite obvious that Pakistan did perceive a serious threat from Russia, and the proportions of this threat were magnified in the early sixties when Pakistan realized that she did not have the United States support with which to defend herself against that threat. Consequently, Pakistan had to move closer to the Communist bloc to off-set her weak military capability for defending herself against such a threat. Pakistan's decision to establish closer relations with China was a

step in that direction. In short, Pakistan's relationship with the Soviet Union was an important determinant of Pakistan's new China policy.

Other Bilateral Relations

a. Pakistan's Relations with India:

In the contemporary period, the two halves of partitioned states have invariably been in a state of political, military, economic, and even cultural confrontation with each other. Palestine, Korea, Germany, and Vietnam all fit into this general pattern. The Indo-Pakistan mutual hostility and almost total confrontation is thus only one important example of a common phenomenon.

The Indo-Pakistan boundary represents the political division of a single geographical, ecological, economic, and defence unit, with all the resultant irrationalities. From a purely geopolitical view, the problems of security would be immeasurably simplified for both India and Pakistan if the armed forces of the two states were not locked up in mutual confrontation, within the subcontinent, but regarded as complementary to each other for the defence of the common geographical unit. Any attempt at ending the hostility between the two countries, however, has been thwarted by their antagonistic attitude

toward each other. Why do India and Pakistan react in the way they do? To answer this question it is necessary to examine briefly the history of their relations from the time of the independence of the two countries.

By mutual agreement of the major political parties, British India was divided into the two independent states of India and Pakistan in August 1947. The Indian National Congress leaders, however, accepted the partition with serious mental reservations and with fond expectations of its unworkability. Sardar Patel, the Indian Deputy Prime Minister, was "convinced that the new State of Pakistan was not viable and could not last."⁷⁸ He thought that "the acceptance of Pakistan (by the Congress) would teach the Muslim League a bitter lesson. Pakistan would collapse in a short time and the provinces which had seceded from India would have to face untold difficulties and hardship."⁷⁹ Taking this position in the Congress Council he remarked: "At best, they would ultimately have to come back on Hindu dictated terms; at worst, India could enforce its dominion over its weaker neighbour."⁸⁰ Similarly, Nehru, talking to a

⁷⁸ Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, Longman's, Calcutta, 1959, p. 207.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

senior British diplomat, remarked:

Our deliberate plan would be to allow Jinnah to have his Pakistan and gradually make things so impossible economically and otherwise for Pakistan that they would have to come back on their bended knees and ask to be allowed back into India.⁸¹

Speaking to Josef Korbelt, a member of the United Nations Commissions for India and Pakistan, Nehru repeated similar views:

We want to cooperate and work toward co-operation, and one day integration will inevitably come. If it will be in four, or five, or ten years—I do not know.⁸²

Even Mahatma Gandhi, at one of his prayer meetings soon after the partition plan was announced, observed:

We, Muslims and Hindus, are interdependent on one another. The Muslim League will ask to come back to Hindustan. They will ask Jawaharlal (Nehru) to come back and he will take them back.⁸³

⁸¹The conversation took place in 1945 and is cited by Khalid Bin Sayeed in Pakistan the Formative Phase, Karachi, 1960, p. 282.

⁸²Josef Korbelt, Danger in Kashmir, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1954, pp. 127-128.

⁸³Reported in The New York Herald Tribune, New York, 5, June 1947.

Thus, the Congress leaders were convinced that partition was a temporary phase and that Pakistan would not exist for long. There were also a number of actions calculated to prevent the establishment of Pakistan on a firm basis. For a time, India would not release Pakistan's share of the former government of India's cash balance.⁸⁴ Nor did India give Pakistan her share of the military stores, railroad carriages, official records, and other assets of the former subcontinent. On several occasions she shut off canal waters flowing from India to Pakistan, threatening to convert Pakistani fields into wastelands. Finally, she broke her pledge to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir to determine its future, and Pakistan had to fight two wars (1947-1948 and 1965) against India over Kashmir.

Probably no facet of Pakistan's foreign policy has undermined her international image, endangered her security, and thwarted her national development as much as her hostile relations with India. Whether Pakistan's policies toward India have been right or wrong will not be discussed here, but it must be noted for the present purpose that the "Indian factor" has played and will probably continue to play quite a

⁸⁴ These funds were released to Pakistan on the insistence of Mahatma Gandhi.

significant role in shaping Pakistan's foreign policy unless Indo-Pakistan disputes are resolved.

A normalization of relations between India and Pakistan cannot be achieved unless the Kashmir question is settled. The Kashmir problem is easily the greatest hurdle that stands in the way of long term peaceful relations between the two countries. The problem arose from the fact that at the time of partition India laid claim to all Hindu majority areas on the ground that partition of the subcontinent was to be effected on communal lines. However, at the same time India denied Muslim Kashmir to Pakistan. In 1947, The state of Jammu and Kashmir, popularly called Kashmir, had an overall Muslim population of 78%. The Hindu ruler of Kashmir, however, ignored the Muslim majority and acceded to India on 27 October 1947. India accepted the accession on the ground that since the paramountcy exercised by Britain over the Indian Princes lapsed when the British withdrew from India, the Indian princes had a sovereign right to accede to whichever dominion they desired. Pakistan's contention was that the wishes of the people should be a deciding factor in settling the question of accession. Pakistan further argued that India herself had disregarded the sovereign right of the princes when she had occupied Junagadh in September 1947 inspite of the fact that the Muslim Nawab

had acceded to Pakistan. Likewise, India ignored the wishes of the Nizam of Hyderabad, who had wanted to remain independent, and sent her troops into that state in September 1948.

In addition, Pakistan further argued that India was honour bound to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, as she had pledged to do so in the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council has met so far approximately a hundred and fifty times to solve the Kashmir problem, but has not met with any success.

For Pakistan, Kashmir is not merely a struggle for territory; it is more aptly a struggle for her ideology. The Pakistani leaders contend that Pakistan came into being on the basis of religious majority areas, and Kashmir, being a Muslim majority area and being contiguous to West Pakistan, should form part of Pakistan. In addition to the religious or ideological arguments, Pakistan put forth her demand for Kashmir on geographical, economic, and strategic grounds. Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's first Foreign Minister, argued as early as 1948 before the Security Council:

(Kashmir) is vital for Pakistan. If Kashmir should accede to India, Pakistan might as well, from both the economic and the strategic point of view, become a feudatory of India or cease to exist as an⁸⁵ independent sovereign state.

Again in 1951, he argued that Indian control over Kashmir would give India a complete stranglehold over the economy of West Pakistan.⁸⁶

By the late fifties, when Ayub came to power, much of the passion of the partition period had receded. The long list of Indo-Pakistan differences had been narrowed down to two — the canal waters dispute and the Kashmir problem. At a press conference on 22 October 1958, Ayub said that he would try to settle the Kashmir and the canal waters disputes with India amicably.⁸⁷ Pakistan had entered into the Western alliance in the fond hope of persuading the Western powers to use their good offices to help solve Indo-Pakistan differences. The alliance did help in solving

⁸⁵ Security Council, Official Record, No.6, p.8.

⁸⁶ Pakistan News, 16 September 1951.

⁸⁷ Dawn, Karachi, 23 October 1958.

the canal waters dispute,⁸⁸ but the efforts of Great Britain and the United States regarding a settlement on Kashmir were frustrated by the Soviet vetoes. During the Sino-Indian border dispute in the early sixties, when Pakistan thought that the U.S. could put considerable pressure on India to help to resolve the Kashmir question, the United States was convinced that containment of China was far more important than the resolution of the Kashmir problem.

President Ayub emphasized the importance of Kashmir during his talks with Nehru at Muree on 21 September 1960:

I showed him (Nehru) a map of Kashmir and West Pakistan and how all our major rail and road communications and canal head-works were completely outflanked. The security of Pakistan required a fair solution of the problem.⁸⁹

⁸⁸The Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan was signed in Karachi on 19th September 1960. Aloys Nicol has examined this problem in his classic study: The Indus Rivers, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967.

⁸⁹Mohammad. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 124.

Moreover, Kashmir is important because West Pakistan, being dependent on the waters of only three rivers, needs to conserve every single ounce of water in these rivers, and that can be done only in the hilly areas of Kashmir. Likewise, the increasing power requirements of Pakistan can only be met by hydro-electric generators in Kashmir.

In April 1964, during a speech in Washington, Foreign Minister Bhutto observed:

It (the Kashmir dispute) is the bane of all troubles and problems not only between India and Pakistan but in that whole region. The Kashmir dispute vitiates the air to such an extent that it has its ramifications not only within the subcontinent, but beyond the subcontinent.⁹⁰

He went on to remark: "Once it is settled, we are willing to live in peace with our great neighbour India."⁹¹

Thus, Kashmir is of paramount importance for the foreign policy decision-makers of Pakistan. Pakistani

⁹⁰Speech at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 27 April 1964. For the text of the speech see: A South Asian View, a collection of Bhutto's speeches, published by Information Division, Embassy of Pakistan, Washington, D.C., undated.

⁹¹Ibid.

policies toward all other countries are greatly influenced by those countries' stands on the Kashmir question in much the same way as Chinese policies are influenced by the stand of other countries on the question of the status of Taiwan. The fact that India is four times larger and stronger than Pakistan and that she is capable of forcibly occupying Kashmir, a part of which is under the administrative control of Pakistan, as she did in the cases of Junagadh and Hyderabad, constitutes a serious threat to the territorial integrity of Pakistan. Ever since Pakistan came into being, the Pakistan leadership has tried time and again, through the U.N., the Commonwealth, and the United States to solve the dispute peacefully. However, India, not in a mood to give up what she can easily retain, has been successful in neutralizing the Pakistani efforts through the patronage of the Soviet Union.

By the time Ayub came to power, Pakistan had tried different approaches to resolve her problems with India, such as dynamic neutralism and total alignment with the West, and had seen that none of them worked. In early 1959, therefore, Ayub tried a new approach. At that time he made his first move to normalize Pakistan's relations with India by offering Nehru a proposal for

joint defence of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. ⁹²

Ayub went personally to New Delhi to explain the details of the proposal and to discuss the dangers inherent in the political situation of that time. From Ayub's point of view it was a friendly gesture, yet to Nehru the offer was an embarrassment because the settlement of the Kashmir question was a prerequisite for the proposed joint defence. Kashmir was too big a price to pay for the friendship of a politically and militarily weak Pakistan. India's rejection of the "Joint Defence Proposal" and the new U.S. South Asian policy of strengthening India in the subcontinent confirmed Pakistan's fears that India's growing strength would be a factor dissuading her from solving the Kashmir problem.

As has already been noted in the section discussing Pakistan's relations with the U.S., in the wake of deteriorating Sino-India relations, when the West rushed military supplies to India, Pakistan voiced her concern at the resultant military imbalance in the subcontinent, and approached the West to use its full influence with India for a settlement of the Kashmir question. However to her discomfiture, Pakistan saw no such efforts on the

⁹²For Ayub's new approach to the foreign policy of Pakistan, see, Friends Not Masters, pp. 114-121.

part of Washington to resolve the conflict. On the contrary, she found that U.S. military aid was being used by India to consolidate and strengthen her position.⁹³ The U.S. military and economic assistance enabled India to decide to increase her army by raising some more divisions. Herein lay the biggest threat to Pakistani aspirations for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute — the increasing disparity between the military capability of the two countries. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto voiced Pakistan's apprehensions when he pointed out that India wanted "to build up an army for two fronts — to build an army to face the Republic of China, and to face the State of Pakistan."⁹⁴ Ayub repeated the same argument in his memoirs. He said that Indians wanted to raise "two armies, one for their wars with China and the other to intimidate Pakistan and other small neighbours of India."⁹⁵

Thus the growing strength of India, which seemed to reduce the possibility of effective resolution of their bilateral differences, played a significant part in

⁹³B.N. Goswami, Pakistan and China, p. 74.

⁹⁴Dawn, 5 December 1962.

⁹⁵Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 129.

Pakistan's move of forging a closer relationship with China in the early sixties.

b. Pakistan Relations with Afghanistan

Among Pakistan's neighbours, Afghanistan is strategically the most important.⁹⁶ She is a land-locked country whose contacts with the outside world are through the passes which cross into Pakistan. The Hindu Kush, which divides Afghanistan into two parts, also separates Central from Southern Asia. The great conquerors who crossed the Hindu Kush also found their way into the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. In fact, the Hindu Kush is the first line of defence of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.

The continuous hostility between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been a very painful experience for Pakistan. With the threat of India perpetually looming from the east and northeast of West Pakistan, Afghan pressure on the

⁹⁶ As the following examination of Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan will show, Afghanistan's policies and attitude toward Pakistan constitute one of the most important variables determining Pakistan's foreign policy. Since this variable has not received the attention it deserves and merits, this study examines in detail some important aspects of Pakistan-Afghan relations relevant to Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties.

western flank has greatly added to the security problems of Pakistan. Ian Stephens comes close to summing up Pakistani perceptions when he points out:

. . . it was evident that if, on Pakistan's birth, co-ordinated movements opposed to her could be produced in Kashmir and Afghanistan, both of them predominantly Muslim territories and near one another, the new State might be still-born, crushed by a sort of pincer movement,⁹⁷

Pakistan's problem with Afghanistan has resulted from Afghan ambitions in respect to certain areas in the northwest and west of West Pakistan. The problem has two facets: first, Afghanistan-Pakistan differences over the Durand Line, their common border; and second the Pakhtunistan problem.

Afghanistan contends that the Durand Line, which demarcated Afghanistan and British India under an agreement reached in 1883, was forced upon her, and that she accepted it under duress. Afghanistan also maintains that the Durand Agreement lapsed when the British withdrew from India in 1947. Pakistan argues that, in accord-

⁹⁷ Ian Stephens, Horned Moon, Earnest Benn, London, 1966, p. 108.

ance with international law, treaties of an imperial power concerning boundary lines of its colonial territories remain valid after its withdrawal, and all rights and duties arising from such treaties of the imperial power devolve on the successor state. Accordingly, Pakistan believes that the Durand Line is valid, and, as the successor to British power in that area, she has inherited all treaty rights and obligations.

The second facet, the Pakhtunistan problem, has had a variegated history. It originates in the Afghan demand for a separate state of Pakhtunistan for the Pakhtuns who live on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. The area demanded has never been precisely defined on a map, but it is said to include all the territory inhabited by Pakhtuns between the Indus river and the Durand line. According to an Afghan diplomat, the most important areas which would form Pakhtunistan are Chitral, Hazara, Kohistan, Swat, Dir, Buner, Peshawar, Tirah, Bajour, Kolat, Bannu, Dera Gazi Khan, Dera Ismail Khan, Khyber, Waziristan, Pezu, Gomal, Bolan, Malakand, Kalat, Makran, Kharan, the Chagai area, and Las Bela.⁹⁸ These areas constitute almost the whole province of Baluchistan and

⁹⁸ Rahman Pazhwak, Pakhtunistan: the Khyber Pass as the Focus of the New State of Pakhtunistan, Afghanistan Embassy, London, n.d., pp. 73-74, and p. 132.

a good part of North-West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.) on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line. The claim, on the one hand, includes all areas of Pakistan inhabited by the Pakhtuns; on the other, it excludes all Pakhtun areas of Afghanistan. This gives rise to Pakistani suspicions that the Afghan advocacy of an independent Pakhtun state may have been accentuated by hopes of its eventual integration with Afghanistan.

Afghanistan made the first formal move for Pakhtunistan in November, 1944, when the British withdrawal from India had become inevitable. Afghanistan approached London for assurance that, in the event of India becoming independent, the Pakhtuns living on the Indian side of the Durand Line would be given the choice of becoming independent or reuniting with Afghanistan, their "motherland." The British Government took the position that the territories claimed by Afghanistan were an integral part of India, having been recognized as such by the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1921, and that Afghanistan had no locus standi to interfere in the arrangements concerning the partition of India. Besides the British refusal to submit to Afghan pressure, Afghanistan herself realized that there was no desire among the Pakhtuns to join Afghanistan. Even Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the leader of Pakhtunistan movement, who represented

extreme opposition to Pakistan, did not entertain union with Afghanistan as one of the acceptable alternatives.⁹⁹ Having realized that there was no chance of getting the disputed area back, Afghanistan concluded that the issues should be resolved on the basis of Pakistan and Pakhtunistan — a free Pakhtun state.

Accordingly, Afghanistan gave her full support to the Pakhtunistan movement, officially initiated in 1945 by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib. Obviously, the intention was to prevent the accession of N.W.F.P. and parts of Baluchistan to Pakistan. In 1946, the Afghan Government again proposed the formation of Pakhtunistan to the interim British Indian government. Nehru, then the Foreign Minister in the interim government, rejected the Afghan proposal in unequivocal terms. However, after the announcement of the partition of India plan on 3 June 1947, when Afghanistan once again mounted a vigorous campaign for Pakhtunistan, the interim Indian government changed its position in favour of Afghanistan. Clearly, the change was a result of the realization, on the part of the Indian Congress

⁹⁹ See Ghaffar Khan's letter to Gandhi; cited in full in Pyare Lal's, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, Navajiran Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1956, p. 273.

leadership, that if the Pakhtuns were given only two choices, of either opting for India or opting for Pakistan, they would definitely opt for Pakistan. The Indian National Congress, therefore, made a strong demand that the Pakhtuns should also be given a third option of forming a separate state in the referendum that was to be held under the 3 June Partition plan.¹⁰⁰ Lord Mountbatten, then viceroy of India, rejected the demand on the grounds that the area in question was a part of British India, not a separate princely state, and asked Nehru to persuade the Congress to withdraw it. Although India gave up the demand, she never withdrew her support for the Afghan cause of an independent state of Pakhtunistan.

Failing to have the option of independence included in the referendum, the Khan brothers called upon their followers to boycott the polls. Nevertheless, the referendum was held in the North-West Frontier Province

¹⁰⁰ Under the partition plan referenda were to be held in all provinces of India, except the princely states, to ascertain whether those provinces wanted to remain in India or wanted to become a part of Pakistan. In N.W.F.P. and the parts of Baluchistan where the Pakhtuns are in a majority, the referendum was held in July, 1947. Both the provinces voted overwhelmingly in favour of joining Pakistan.

from July 6-17, 1947.¹⁰¹ Out of a total electorate of 527, 798 over 50 . percent took part in the polls. Pakistan received 289,244 votes as against India's 2,874. Thus, Pakistan secured an absolute majority of the total number of votes cast. In fact, more than fifty percent of the total electorate voted in favour of joining Pakistan. ¹⁰²

However, a plebiscite such as the one held in most of the Frontier Province could not possibly be arranged in the tribal areas of either N.W.F.P. or Baluchistan. These tribal areas, which are located in the hilly tracts of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, were always administered by the Central Government of India in the prepartition days. They encompass a small area, but because of ethnic differences and their inaccessibility, the local governments were asked not to administer them directly. The areas did not have legislative bodies and, hence, no electoral rolls. The representative institution in these areas was the Jirga, an assembly of the represent-

¹⁰¹ For this and other details see: Leonard Mosley, The Last Days of the British Raj, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1961, pp. 131-139.

¹⁰² V. P. Memon, The Transfer of Power in India, Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 389.

atives of various tribes living in these areas. It was through these Jirgas that the tribesmen governed themselves and expressed their preferences. It was also through these Jirgas that the Central government ruled these areas.

The partition plan of 3 June 1947, laid down that fresh "agreements with the tribes of the North-West Frontier of India would have to be negotiated by the appropriate successor authority." This was done on behalf of Pakistan in November 1947, by Sir George Cunningham, then Governor of N.W.F.P., in the only manner known to the tribes. He interviewed the Jirgas of all the tribes from end to end of the frontier. According to Sir George Cunningham, all the tribes, without any exception, "stated and confirmed in written statements that they were part of Pakistan, and wished to preserve the same relations with Pakistan as they had with the British. This agreement was ratified by the Pakistan Government."¹⁰³ The rulers of the frontier states of Dir, Swat, Las Bela, Kharan, Makran, Amb, Kalat, and Chitral also executed Instruments of Accession in favour of Pakistan.

¹⁰³ Sir George Cunningham, "Pakistan's North-West Frontier and the Tribes", Pakistan Affairs, Karachi, 23 June 1949, p. 21.

It is noteworthy that the impartiality of the N.W.F.P. referendum, the decision of the Jirgas to become a part of Pakistan, and the accession of the frontier states to Pakistan were not questioned either by India or by tribesmen or by the leaders of the Pakhtunistan movement. Thus, there could be no substance in the oft-repeated Afghan allegation that the vote was "rigged." India signified her confidence in the integrity of Sir Rob Lockhart, who conducted the referendum, by appointing him as the first Commander-in-Chief of the Army of independent India. Similarly, the leaders of the Pakhtuns, the tribes and the Jirgas, at a joint party, demonstrated their acceptance of the outcome of the N.W.F.P. referendum on 23 July 1947 by presenting Sir Rob Lockhart and Sir George Cunningham with the traditional tribal sword of honour.¹⁰⁴

Thus, unable to find any support for union with Afghanistan, the Afghanistan rulers did not press irredentist claims directly, but concentrated on the allegedly selfless issue of an independent Pakhtunistan, and carried on anti-Pakistan activities after Pakistan came into being, in the name of Pakhtunistan.

¹⁰⁴Dawn, 14 August 1947.

The first forceful demand for the creation of Pakhtunistan was made in November 1947, when the Indian Army was poised for a quick advance into Kashmir toward the Pakistan border. At that time, Sardar Najibullah Khan, special envoy of His Majesty King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan, during a visit to Pakistan, demanded, inter alia, that the areas of Pakistan inhabited by Pakhtuns be constituted into a free sovereign state.¹⁰⁵ Afghan pressure on Pakistan has been almost continuous since that time and frequently has resulted in a state of high tension between the two neighbours. A brief description of bilateral developments will illustrate the trend of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations during the 1947-1965 period, and also throw light on its impact on Pakistan's foreign policy, especially her policy of establishing closer relations with China in the early sixties.

In September 1947, when Pakistan's application for admission to the United Nations came up in the General Assembly, Afghanistan was the only country to cast an opposing vote. Explaining Afghanistan's opposition, Hosayn Aziz, Afghanistan's representative in the United Nations said:

¹⁰⁵I.H. Baqai, "Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan," Pakistan Horizon, Karachi, September 1948, pp. 25-44.

Afghanistan cannot recognize the North-West Frontier Province as part of Pakistan so long as the people of the North West Frontier (Pakhtuns living in the N.W.F.P. and parts of Baluchistan) have not been given an opportunity free from any kind of influence — and I repeat free from any kind of influence — to determine for themselves whether they wish to be independent or to become a part of Pakistan. 106

In July 1948, Afghanistan made a two pronged incursion into Pakistan's territory. The Faqir of Ipi, a strong advocate of the creation of Pakhtunistan and an influential religious leader, led an attack on the Datta Khel and Boya Posts in N.W.F.P.; and Prince Abdul Karim, a powerful Afghan feudal lord, led another incursion into Baluchistan. The Pakistan Air Force, after frustrating the Afghan aim of slicing off a piece of Pakistan's territory, intensified air reconnaissance of the area to stop such ambitious incursions.¹⁰⁷ This Pakistani defensive measure produced a wave of anti-Pakistan propaganda by the Afghan press and radio, further worsening the relations between the two countries.

¹⁰⁶ Hosayn Aziz's speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 30 September 1947. The speech is quoted verbatim in Dawn, Karachi, 2 October 1947.

¹⁰⁷ The Statesman, 7 July and 17 July, 1948.

In 1949, Afghanistan moved two armed divisions and some of her air force to the Pakistan-Afghan border, presumably in the hope that this would give moral support to the Pakhtun tribes living on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, on 30 June 1949, the Afghan National Assembly passed a resolution repudiating all treaties, conventions, and agreements signed between Afghanistan and Great Britain before 1947. The resolution specifically rejected the Durand Line as the international frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The resolution also promised the support of the Assembly for the Afghan Government in its efforts to achieve Pakhtunistan.¹⁰⁹ In an exclusive interview published in the Indian News Chronicle on 4 March 1950, Sardar Najibullah Khan, then Afghanistan's Ambassador to India, claimed that the Pakhtun tribesmen in Pakistan were electing regional assemblies preparatory to electing a central assembly to set up a central government for Pakhtunistan. Another Afghan diplomat asserted that in August 1949, a number of Afridi tribesmen from N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan met in Afghanistan and inaugurated the "National Assembly of Pakhtunistan."¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸The Statesman, 4 August 1949.

¹⁰⁹Dawn, 15 July 1949.

¹¹⁰Rahman Pazhwak, Pakhtunistan, p. 124.

Pakistan strongly protested against the anti-Pakistan attitude of Afghanistan. Liaquat Ali Khan, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, said that these "National Assemblies have not been formed by the people of the areas concerned but they have been set up on paper in Kabul." He added that Pakistan could not be expected to continue pleading for friendship forever and that "not one inch of our land will be surrendered to anybody, come what may."¹¹¹

In 1955, Afghanistan's hostile attitude toward Pakistan reached the point where diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed. Before the year was over, Afghanistan enlisted the open support of the Soviet Union on the Pakhtunistan issue. During their state visit to Afghanistan in December 1955, Bulganin and Khrushchev gave their considered opinion that the demands of Afghanistan were justified and well-grounded.¹¹² Besides, the Soviet Union started providing economic and military assistance to Afghanistan. By 1959, the total Soviet economic assistance was estimated to have reached 240 million dollars. According to Pakistani perceptions, the Soviet penetration was such that Afghanistan had become almost a Soviet

¹¹¹ Dawn, 10 January 1950.

¹¹² Dawn, 18 December 1955.

stronghold. One Pakistani scholar believes that the Soviets, in the late fifties, had virtual control of the Afghan Army; they trained and equipped it with bombers and jet fighters.¹¹³ Reflecting this close Afghan-Soviet relationship, on 4 March 1960, Khrushchev signed a communique in Kabul which proposed the implementation of the principle of self-determination on the basis of the United Nations Charter to settle the Pakhtunistan problem.¹¹⁴ The complete Soviet support encouraged Afghanistan in her anti-Pakistan posture and it is manifest in the fact that when the Soviet-Afghan relationship was at its zenith in the early sixties, Pakistan-Afghan relations were touching their nadir.

Besides Afghanistan's special relationship with the Soviet Union, India's support of the Afghan policy of dismembering Pakistan added fuel to the fire. A number of Pakhtunistan days were celebrated in Indian cities; Indian journalists, politicians, and orators made it a permanent part of their political platform to uphold

¹¹³Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security, Longman's Green and Co., Lahore, 1960, p. 31.

¹¹⁴It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union has vetoed all proposals for the application of the same principle to settle the Kashmir question.

the Afghan claims.¹¹⁵ The leader of the Pakhtunistan movement, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, was received and treated like a head of state in India. When Khan Ghaffar Khan was living in exile in Kabul as the guest of the Afghan Government, in recognition of his services to the Pakhtunistan movement, the Indian Government sent a special plane to fly the ailing Pakhtun patriarch to New Delhi in order to decorate him with the Nehru Peace Frize.¹¹⁶ In December 1958, the Pakhtuns held a two day convention in New Delhi, for which the Indian government provided all necessary facilities. Even the disturbances on the Pakistan-Afghan border and Indo-Pakistan border in the years after 1947 were timed in such a way as to give substance to Pakistani perceptions that while one country provides the diversion the other delivers the blow.

Thus, the threat to Pakistan from Afghanistan was increased by the support of India and the Soviet Union. At the beginning of the 1960's, the chances of a normalization of Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan seemed very bleak, were Pakistan to continue to pursue her policy of total alignment with the West. Referring to Pakistan's foreign policy in the late fifties, Mr.

¹¹⁵ Arnold Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest, Cornell University Press, 1965, p. 255.

¹¹⁶ A purse of 100,000 rupees goes with the prize.

Khrushchev remarked:

If Pakistan were to adopt the same independent attitude as, for example, India, conditions could be created for the establishment of friendly relations between Pakistan and neighbouring countries.¹¹⁷

However, Pakistan did not change her stand at that time because she thought that the relationship with the U.S. was sufficient to protect her sovereignty and guarantee her independence. Nevertheless, the new U.S. South Asian policy in the early sixties changed Pakistan's perceptions of the value of reliance on the United States. More specifically, the support which Afghanistan enjoyed from India and the Soviet Union in her demands for the creation of Pakhtunistan and the re-negotiation of the Durand Line pointed to the need for a change in Pakistan's policy in order to offset the support of powerful states for Afghanistan vis-a-vis Pakistan.¹¹⁸

In short, Afghanistan's threat to dismember Pakistan had reached dangerous proportions and Pakistan, particularly in the early sixties, did not find herself

¹¹⁷Cited in Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security, pp. 31-32.

¹¹⁸See Ayub's statement in Morning News, 24 March 1960.

strong enough to quell the Afghan pressure on her North-West border. Accordingly, Pakistan had to reconsider Khrushchev's suggestion of following an independent policy in order to minimize the Afghan threat and to save her from dismemberment. Pakistan's new China policy was a part of her new independent policy. A closer relationship with China was perceived by Pakistan as a means of checking the Afghan ambitions of dismembering her and also of allowing her to concentrate on her more vulnerable Eastern border with India.

Chinese Attitudes and Policies Toward Pakistan

Pakistan was the third non-Communist country to recognize the People's Republic of China.¹¹⁹ Thereafter, with the exception of occasional misunderstandings, there was rarely any serious bitterness or significant conflict between the two countries. It is rather surprising, given their proximity, ideological and political differences, and undefined common border, that the two countries were generally able to maintain normal and correct relations.

Pakistan supported the resolution in favour of Chinese admission to the United Nations in 1950;

¹¹⁹ Pakistan recognized China on 4 January 1950; the first two were Burma and India.

China was grateful for this. In her turn, China came to Pakistan's rescue by signing a barter deal for the supply of coal in exchange for Pakistan's raw jute and cotton in the early fifties, when India refused to supply the coal, so essential for Pakistan's transport and communications system. Pakistan was appreciative of this friendly gesture and when the United Nations General Assembly proceeded to brand China as the aggressor in the Korean War, she abstained. She also refused to send troops to Korea during the Korean War. China reciprocated by remaining absolutely neutral in the Indo-Pakistan Kashmir dispute, even at a time when Sino-Indian relations were cordial. Both countries respected each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and helped each other, as far as possible, in matters of national interest. Consequently, Sino-Pakistan trade developed considerably during the early fifties. Pakistan's exports to China in 1952 shot up to \$85.8 millions, almost double the average annual exports to China during 1947-1951; as a result, the balance of trade shifted heavily in favour of Pakistan.

The normal relationship between China and Pakistan continued unhampered until 1954 when Pakistan, under

¹²⁰ Mafeez Ur-Rahman Khan, "Pakistan's Relations with The People's Republic of China," Pakistan Horizon, 3rd Quarter 1961, pp. 19-20.

the stress of circumstances , abandoned her policy of non-alignment and joined the Western bloc. Peking's reaction , though bitter, was still milder in tone than that of the U.S.S.R. when Pakistan became a member of such anti-Communist alliances as SEATO and CENTO. Also, when at the 1955 Bandung Conference Pakistan's Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra explained the geopolitical compulsions in Pakistan's joining the pacts, Chou En-lai accepted the explanation and was convinced that Pakistan did not have any aggressive designs against China. As a result of the mutual understanding, Sino-Pakistan relations remained largely normal. Chou's visit to Pakistan, followed by Prime Minister Suhrawardy's visit to China, in December 1956, further improved the understanding between the two countries. This exchange of visits served to confirm the officially held view that, despite differences in their outlooks, the two countries had no conflicts. This was the main gist of the joint communique issued at the end of these visits.¹²¹

The thing which impressed and gratified Pakistan most of all was the fact that, even at the height of Sino-Indian cordiality in the mid-fifties, China never

¹²¹ Pakistan Horizon, December 1956, pp. 220-222.

supported India on the Kashmir dispute. When Chou visited India in 1956, he was repeatedly pressed by the Indian journalists for his views on Kashmir, and he always insisted that the Kashmir dispute did exist and that it should be solved peacefully by negotiations. He expressed the same views in the joint communique issued at the end of his state visit to Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in the same year. Again, when the Sino-Indian delegations met in New Delhi in 1960 to draw up an agenda for discussing the demarcation of the Sino-Indian border, the Chinese delegation objected to the inclusion of the border between Sinkiang and Kashmir on the grounds that the area was not under the de facto or de jure control of India, and hence it could not be discussed. The item had to be dropped before the Chinese would consent to participate in the talks.

However, during the late fifties, Pakistan followed a line in her foreign policy which had a rather anti-Communist bias. Under the exigencies of the tense international situation and pressure from the United States, Pakistan reversed her original stand on Chinese admission to the United Nations. Although annoyed, the Chinese leadership exercised great restraint in its reaction to Pakistan's anti-Chinese policies.

The generally "correct" nature of the Sino-Pakistan relationship after 1949, with the exception of a brief period, does suggest a certain continuity in this relationship regardless of the Sino-Indian relations. It also indicates that the change in the Pakistani policies toward China in the early sixties was not a total switch from Washington to Peking; it was, rather, a policy of establishing closer relations than those which already existed between the two countries, because a variety of circumstances, as discussed in the preceding sections, pointed to the desirability of improved relations with China.

One additional factor that led Pakistan toward establishing a closer relationship with China was Pakistan's perception of China as a threat to her security. Though it may seem paradoxical, Pakistan's leaders perceived a latent threat to Pakistan's security emanating from China in the late fifties and early sixties.¹²² This threat became more imminent when China approached the status of a big power. China's strength was demonstrated in her conflicts with the U.S.S.R. and India, and her handling of the Tibetan rebellion. The perception of a threat was also magnified by Pakistan's

¹²² Ayub's offer of joint defence of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent to India was a clear proof of Ayub's perception of a potential Chinese threat.

hostile relations with India and Afghanistan, which had made Pakistan virtually isolated in South Asia. Pakistan's geography and security thus demanded a policy of closer relations with China to offset her isolation and incapability of defending herself against external threats.

Having failed to secure Indian co-operation for the joint defence of the subcontinent, Pakistan decided to cut her losses by moving closer to China. Such a policy was possible, as indicated above, because of the legacy of generally good relations between the two countries.

The preceding examination shows that Pakistan's policy of establishing closer relations with the People's Republic of China was the outcome of a number of changes at all three levels of the external environment, global, subordinate, and bilateral. At the global level, the emerging multipolarity of the international system, the developing detente between the superpowers, the Sino-Soviet split, the emergence of the new Afro-Asian states and the resulting increasing viability of a policy of non-alignment, and the emergence of China as a great power played a prominent role in Pakistan's decision to minimize her dependence on the West. At the subordinate system level, the growing power of India

and the threat Pakistan perceived from India, the belligerence of Afghanistan together with her stand on Pakhtunistan, the hovering presence of China in South Asia, the imbalance of power created by the policy of the superpowers of aiding India, and Pakistan's virtual isolation in the subordinate state system of South Asia pointed to the desirability of finding new friends and minimizing hostilities in order to ensure Pakistan's security in the region. At the bilateral level, the United States' new South Asian policy, which according to Pakistani perceptions had a strong pro-Indian bias, obliged Pakistan to review her policy of total alignment with the U.S. Moreover, the Soviet Union's policies of supporting India and Afghanistan vis-a-vis Pakistan necessitated a closer link with China in order to save Pakistan from dismemberment. Finally, the threats Pakistan perceived as emanating from India, Afghanistan, and even from China especially in the light of the deterioration of U.S.-Pakistan relations, led Pakistan to move toward China. Such a move, in the estimation of Pakistan's leaders, was perceived as necessary to enable Pakistan to exist in such a hostile environment. Besides, it would reduce the danger of a "push from the North" that concerned Pakistan in the late fifties and the early sixties.

These, then, are the external variables that influenced Pakistan's policy of establishing closer relations with China in the early sixties. The impact of the internal variables is examined in the next chapter.

v

CHAPTER THREE: INTERNAL VARIABLES

Foreign policy and domestic policy are inseparably interlinked. Foreign policy is far from being a matter of free choice; it is conditioned by a number of domestic factors. At the same time, in a given international environment, foreign policy can be judiciously used for promoting security and national development. This linkage and interaction between foreign and domestic policy is, in fact, a major consideration in the formulation of foreign policy. Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties was no exception to this general principle. Besides the impact of external variables, discussed earlier, internal variables such as ideology and historical legacies, economic developmental needs, political structure, views advocated by the competing elites, bureaucracy, and the personality traits of the key decision-maker all contributed to her policy of establishing closer relations with China.

This chapter examines and assesses the influence of these internal variables on Pakistan's policies toward China during 1960-1965.

1. Ideological and Historical Legacies:

The story of the struggle for Pakistan is all too familiar to be repeated here.¹ Suffice it to say that on 14 August 1947 Pakistan was brought to life as a new nation by the flowering of a nationalism, inspired by and based on what is generally termed the ideology of Islam; and, when this happened, Pakistan had to find her place in the world; she had to decide what attitude she was to take toward her various neighbours — some, potential friends, others, potential enemies — and other nations of the world.

Two options lay open to Pakistan's foreign policy elite. On the one hand, it could base the country's foreign policy on the Islamic religion and ideology.² Taking up the cause of Islam it could dwell in the past, see no enmity in other Islamic states, and propose to them policies advantageous to the cause of Islam as a whole. Alternatively the decision-making elite

¹For a detailed discussion of the creation of Pakistan and her ideology the reader is referred to Arif Hussain's comprehensive work on the subject: Pakistan: Its Ideology and Foreign Policy, Frank Cass and Co., London, 1969.

²Ideology here simply means a cluster of somewhat interrelated ideas forming the assumptions and presumptions in the minds of Pakistan's policy makers, and the attitudes born of the historical experience of the nation.

could recognize that this line of action had been rendered anachronistic by the progress of the years, that Pan-Islamism was a romantic creed, which seldom had made sense in the world of realpolitik and that it could hardly be a guide for the twentieth century. By this second approach, which would be the logical one in a world in which Islam had lost its compelling force to promote unity, Pakistan could decide, coolly and calculatingly, what her material interests were and could set herself to pursue these.

Unfortunately, the course that Pakistan's leadership followed was a strange combination of the two options. Pakistan, created in an atmosphere dominated by ideo-religious differences, could not ignore the ideological aspects in the formulation of her foreign policy. This section examines the influence of Islamic ideology on Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties.

The three most prominent elements that have been features of the ideology of Pakistan since 1947 are: the "two-nation theory," "Pan-Islamism," and "Pak-Islamism." The first of these has been defined as the view that in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent Muslims and Hindus formed two nations and that only the Muslim League had the right to speak for the Muslims. On the

basis of this theory the league demanded a separate country for the Muslim minority of India. The All-India National Congress not only opposed the League, but also countered the demand by a positive enunciation of the theory of Indian nationhood, basing its arguments mainly on geography. India, according to Gandhi, was one nation and should remain one nation "in spite of the change of faith of a large body of her children." ³ It was this divergence in outlook of Hindu-Muslim nationalist movements that brought the ideological issue into Indo-Pakistan relations. With the emergence of Pakistan, this issue should have come to an end. However, this was not to be. The Congress did not and does not accept the two-nation theory, and the League never did come to accept the philosophy of Indian secularism and one nationhood. In short, not merely two nations but two ideologies confronted each other and the gulf between them became wider and wider. The two-nation theory, therefore, has direct relevance and significance today as far as Pakistan's relations with India are concerned. The ideological factor has magnified the Kashmir dispute between the two countries to proportions where any peaceful solution seems out of the question.

³ Government of India, Gandhi-Jinnah Correspondence: Select Documents on Asian Affairs, Indian Council of World Affairs, n.d., pp. 356-357.

Kashmir has become the focus and touchstone of the ideological confrontation between the two countries. Pakistan is convinced that India "could not give way on the Kashmir issue without admitting the validity of the 'two-nation theory' which she never accepted."⁴ On the other hand, India considers the present status of Kashmir as a vindication of her secular philosophy and is, as a result, on safer grounds when she maintains that the Congress did not agree to a religious division of India. "In the minds of Mr. Nehru and the Congress," opines Korbelt, "Kashmir is in miniature another Pakistan, and if the Muslim nation can be successfully governed by India, then their philosophy of secularism is vindicated."⁵ Nehru, reporting to the All-India Congress Committee in July 1951, said: "We cannot give up the basic ideal which we have held so long and on which the whole conception of our state is founded."⁶ According to Korbelt the real cause of all the bitterness and bloodshed that have characterized the Kashmir dispute is the uncompromising struggle of two ways of life that find themselves locked in deadly conflict, in which

⁴Dawn, 15 August 1951.

⁵Josef Korbelt, Danger in Kashmir, p. 42.

⁶Ibid., p. 43.

Kashmir has become both a symbol and a battleground.⁷ In brief, there is no doubt that the Kashmir question grew primarily out of the ideological conflict. If it were merely a struggle for territory, national resources, manpower, or strategic positions, it might well have been solved long ago.⁸ As long as the Kashmir question remains unsolved it will continue to play a significant role in shaping Pakistan's attitudes not only toward India but toward all other countries as well. The official positions adopted by other countries on the Kashmir issue have understandably been of vital concern to the Pakistan government and have in turn greatly influenced that government's attitudes and policies toward them. For example, the neutral Chinese stand on the Kashmir question, discussed in chapter two, was an important factor in Pakistan's decision to establish closer relations with China. It is in this respect that the "two-nation theory" influenced Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties. Furthermore, the Pakistani apprehension of Indian threats is in part due to the antagonism based on ideological differences between the two countries. These apprehensions have given rise to Pakistan's felt security need vis-a-vis India and her

⁷Ibid., p. 25.

⁸Ibid., p. 25.

belief in the necessity of maintaining the balance of power in South Asia; certainly one important objective of Pakistan's China policy was to offset the imbalance of power in the subcontinent.

The second element, Pan-Islamism, can be defined as the view that Pakistan is only a stage in the development of the unity of the Muslim countries. It envisages Islam as a permanent force in history that will always help those who believe in it. In sum, Pan-Islamism is a faith in Islam as an international creed that will one day be supreme in the political culture of Muslim nations, if not the whole world. Pakistan's tentative first steps were taken in a world in which the Pan-Islamic idea, though heavily compromised, was not completely dead. Pakistan's brief honeymoon with Pan-Islamism,⁹ and her early misadventures with an unsophisticated policy of forwarding Islam were over by 1952. Since Pan-Islamism was relevant only to the Muslim World, and not to Pakistan's China policy further discussion of this aspect of ideology seems superfluous for the purpose of this study.

⁹Pan-Islamism is a creed that is dear only to Ulemas (religious leaders). It never appealed to the Pakistani leadership in general. Only Khawja Nazimuddin, Pakistan's Governor General during 1948-1951, toyed with the idea, but he too did not follow it rigidly. See, for example, Arif Hussain, Pakistan! Its Ideology and Foreign Policy, p. 50.

The third aspect of Pakistan's ideology, Pak-Islamism, emphasizes the national development of Pakistan. According to this view, although Pakistan is a predominantly Muslim country, Islam should not be allowed to play a pronounced role in statecraft or in the foreign policy formulation of the country. Policies, foreign and domestic, should rest on a more secular basis. In order to become a model Muslim country, Pakistan has to be developed and made strong to defend herself against internal and external threats. She could not, and should not, restrict herself to following policies promoting the cause of Islam, nor confine herself to cultivating relations with Muslim countries. The strength of Pakistan, it was thought, would automatically promote and strengthen Islam and make it look more attractive. In a way, Pak-Islamism was another version of Pan-Islamism revised and updated in the light of the international political scene in which Pan-Islamism had lost its force. It was based on a nationalism which, in turn, was based on Islam. The necessity of utilizing Islam in the promotion of nationalism was quite evident; in Pakistan, a country of six different languages and cultures only religion could serve as a cohesive, binding force.

With the exception of Khawja Nazimuddin, who leaned toward Pan-Islamism, all Pakistani leaders in power were Pak-Islamists.¹⁰ Accordingly, these leaders stressed the security and development needs of Pakistan; they kept Islam in the background only as a force to be used to rally popular support for their policies, and not as a determinant of these policies.

Generally, writers divide Pakistan's foreign policy into three main periods: non-alignment, 1947-1953; alignment with the West, 1954-1960; and active neutralism, from 1960 onwards. During these periods the three ideological aspects have influenced Pakistan's foreign policy elite to varying extents. The three aspects, however, cannot be said to have operated wholly independently of each other. From 1947-1953, there was more stress on the "two-nation theory" and "Pan-Islamism," because the general public in Pakistan understood these aspects. "Pak-Islamism," being new, was an alien idea and could not be practised before the leaders could mobilize some public support. Moreover, decision-makers, being non-elected did not have strong public backing; they, therefore, did not want to alienate the Ulemas who commanded an enormous following and who favoured Pan-Islamism.

¹⁰ Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Mohammad Iqbal, Liaquat Ali Khan, Iskander Mirza, Ayub Khan, H.S. Suhrawardy, Mohammad Ali Bogra, Feroz Khan Noon all belonged to the Pak-Islamist group. See Arif Hussain, Pakistan's Ideology and Foreign Policy, p. 50.

However, the failure of Pan-Islamism, demonstrated by the attitudes of other Muslim countries,¹¹ and the realization that the Muslim countries were not in a position to help Pakistan economically or militarily,¹² helped Pakistan's new leadership to justify and mobilize support for their own thinking, based on Pak-Islamism. It is evident from the attitude and policies of Pakistan

¹¹ Especially the attitude of Afghanistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who feared that Pakistan, the biggest Muslim country, as she then was, by invoking Islamic unity, wanted to play the role of leader in the proposed Muslim bloc. King Farook of Egypt ridiculed Pakistan openly, while Nasser's attitude was obviously less than satisfactory. For details, see Arif Hussain, Pakistan's Ideology and Foreign Policy, pp. 131-151.

¹² By December 1956, according to Arif Hussain, public opinion had swung toward Pak-Islamism. H.S. Suhrawardy, Pakistan's Prime Minister in 1956, addressing a meeting of students in December 1956, said:

The Arab world is divided among themselves and even if they weren't divided, zero plus zero is after all equal to zero.

Cited by Arif Hussain, Pakistan's Ideology and Foreign Policy, p. 144.

As early as 1952, Dawn, wrote editorially:

Pakistan is not adding to its prestige in the international field by running after, certain countries (Muslim countries) which are economically and otherwise in a far less stable position than Pakistan itself and which can really be of little help to us.

Dawn, 4 May 1952.

since 1953 that the major consideration of Pakistan's foreign elite has been strengthening and developing Pakistan, and not Islam. Islam, which until 1953, had acted as a negative factor hampering the establishment of relations with the Communist bloc,¹³ was now pushed into the background, and national security and national development became the two chief objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy.¹⁴ While on a tour of the Middle East in 1960, President Ayub said that Islam was no longer a solid tie between peoples, and nationalism was the force that had triumphed in the world.¹⁵ Writing about the objectives of his foreign policy in his memoirs, Ayub lists only security and development. Geopolitical realities, and not ideological considerations, received the main attention of his government during the early sixties. Afghanistan's and Egypt's anti-Pakistan policies, Gamal Nasser's relations with the Communist bloc, Turkey's secularism, Iran's independent attitude in conducting her foreign policy, and the hostilities among the Muslim countries themselves mobilized public opinion in favour of the government's

¹³In 1950, when Liaquat Ali Khan received invitations from the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for a state visit, he declined the Russian invitation on ideological grounds. According to Sarwar K. Hassan, "ideologically an alliance with the Soviet Union could have had no attraction for Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan or for any other statesman." See Sarwar K. Hassan, Pakistan and the United Nations, New York, 1960, p. 54.

¹⁴Arif Hussain, Pakistan's Ideology and Foreign Policy, p. 143.

¹⁵Dawn, 13 November 1960.

enlightened new thinking, strengthening the Pakistan leadership's view that policies should be based on the national interests of Pakistan. If these interests demanded a policy of closer relations with China, Islam should not be allowed to stand in the way since the development and political strength of Pakistan was seen as adding to the strength of Islam.

In short, in the early sixties, the third ideological aspect, i.e., Pak-Islamism influenced Pakistan's decision to establish closer relations with China in two ways. First, it induced Pakistanis to think in terms of Pakistan, her security and development, thereby making it easier to cultivate closer relations with a Communist country, whose ideology and political system were, according to conservative Muslim belief, inherently antagonistic to Islam. Second, it helped Pakistan to achieve a degree of public support and independence from the confines of rigid Islamic ideology; Pakistan was now free to assert herself as an Asian state and embark on an independent foreign policy based on geopolitico-economic pressures emanating from the international political scene.

Two aspects of Pakistan's ideology have, therefore, influenced her China policy. First, the "two-nation

theory" made Pakistan perceive India as a permanent enemy. This perception necessitated offsetting the Indian threat by moving closer to China. Second, Pak-Islamism, allowed Pakistan to formulate policies based on her national interests, and thereby removed the obstacle imposed by the conservative Pan-Islamic approach to establishing friendly relations with the Communist bloc.

2. Economic Developmental Needs:

To a Pakistani, Pakistan is a God-inspired country; to a tourist, Pakistan is a picturesque country; but to an economist, Pakistan is a very poor country, or what the modern jargon terms "underdeveloped."¹⁶ The land does not produce enough to feed the population. Mineral resources are scarce. Industry is in its infancy. The transportation network is rudimentary. The literacy rate is much below the twenty percent mark. This in short is the kindest description of the chaotic economic conditions which Pakistan faced in the early sixties and continues to face today, and on which all economists, Pakistani and foreign, agree. The empirical

¹⁶In 1961-1962, gross national product was estimated at Rs. 33.5 billion or about Rs. 317.00 (U.S. \$67.00) per capita. See Albert Waterson, Planning in Pakistan, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1963, p. 6.

data supporting these observations are clear and abundant. This section gives a condensed summary of Pakistan's economy in the early sixties, and then analyzes the impact of economic needs on her policy of closer relations with China in that period.

(i) Agriculture:

Pakistan's economy is primarily agrarian. According to an economic survey conducted in 1961-1962, some 65 percent of the labour force was engaged in this sector, contributing 56 percent of the national income.¹⁷ There was no shortage of land as such; the total territory covered some 365,529 square miles. Arable land, however, was in short supply. Out of a total land area of 234 million acres, less than 27 percent was under cultivation.¹⁸ Because of the uneven supply of water, all the cultivable land could not be brought under the plough. Most alarming, however,

¹⁷ Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey of Pakistan 1961-1962, Government of Pakistan Printing Press, Rawalpindi, 1962, pp. 7-8.

¹⁸ Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, Government of Pakistan Press, Rawalpindi, 1962, pp. 70-72, and p. 131.

was the rapid advance of soil erosion and salination.¹⁹ The Photographic Survey Corporation, carrying out a soil survey of West Pakistan, reported that out of a total of 15.6 million acres in the region only 1.8 million acres of land were comparatively free from erosion and salination, and 4.3 million acres had been "rendered unproductive."²⁰

The problem of availability of arable land was compounded by the use of primitive agricultural methods, resulting in low yields in Pakistan's major crops. During 1957-1960, she had to import food worth Rupees 15 crores.²¹ This amount was equal to exactly the size of the country's trade deficit during that period.²² Food resources were not only inadequate, but there was evidence that in per capita terms they might be declining, because population was increasing at a rate almost twice that of the

¹⁹Government of Pakistan, Report of the Food and Agriculture Commission, Government of Pakistan Press, Karachi, 1960, p. 4. The report warned that a very large proportion of irrigated area might pass out of cultivation if a solution was not found immediately—see p. 3.

²⁰Ibid., p. 43.

²¹One crore = 10,000,000 (ten millions); the Pakistani rupee in the sixties was equal to 0.25 U.S. dollars.

²²Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, pp. 137-147.

domestic output of food.²³

(ii) Mineral Resources:

Pakistan's heritage in known mineral resources at the time of partition was very **ill-balanced**. She had practically no coal, with scattered deposits in West Pakistan producing only about 500,000 tons a year of poor quality coal. Although, by the early sixties, coal output increased by about 100 percent, it was insufficient for domestic needs, and Pakistan had to supplement it by importing large quantities of coal.²⁴

The story of iron deposits is very similar. Although there are some reserves of high grade iron ore in West Pakistan, they are practically inaccessible, while the deposits closer at hand yield only a small quantity of lower grade ore. Total domestic output was recorded at 4,000 tons in 1961.²⁵ Pakistan has other mineral resources as well. The following table indicates the state of their exploitation during 1959-1961:

²³Economic Survey of Pakistan 1961-1962, p. 16.

²⁴State Bank of Pakistan, Bulletin, Karachi, March 1964, p. 82. According to the bulletin, Pakistan imported coal worth Rs. 5.2 crores annually during the period 1960-1964.

²⁵These figures are taken from Economic Survey of Pakistan, p. 41.

Table 1

Production of Selected Minerals in Pakistan: 1959-1961 (in tons)			
Mineral	1959	1960	1961
Asbestos	46	-	-
Barytes	508	635	437
Bauxite	2,139	574	1,411
Chromite	16,000	18,000	25,000
Copper	-	154	-
Lead	331	17	62
Magnesite	376	663	160
Manganese	29	180	334
Silica Sand	22,000	26,000	15,000

The Geological Survey of Pakistan launched a massive search for oil through British and American help, but the results were disappointing.²⁶ A side effect of great importance, however, was the exciting find of good quality natural gas at Sui, Baluchistan, which reduced Pakistan's fuel shortage substantially. Thus, the shortage of mineral resources has made Pakistan almost exclusively dependent on imports of minerals, especially

²⁶ Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, pp. 131 and 152. According to the yearbook, Pakistan has to import petroleum and petroleum products every year and has to spend a large portion of her foreign exchange on such items. For example, in 1961 only, Pakistan had to spend Rs. 310 crores on importing petroleum and related products.

iron, scrap iron, and steel, from outside.

According to one source, the average cost per year of imported iron and steel in the early sixties was Rs. 36.5 crores.²⁷

(iii) Industry:

Pakistan, more than other developing countries, started with almost a clean slate in the matter of industries. What was achieved by way of industrialization in British India was concentrated in a few convenient areas like Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, and Delhi, which after partition, went to India. The major industries of the subcontinent in 1947 were cotton textiles, jute, sugar, iron and steel, cement, paper, and glass. The total number of factories at the time of partition was 921, employing 1,137,150 people. Out of these, only 34 factories, with a total employment capacity of 26,400 people, went to Pakistan.²⁸ Furthermore, the industries allocated to Pakistan were comparatively small and met only very simple needs. The total inventory was made up of a couple of biscuit

²⁷Ibid., pp. 152 and 154.

²⁸Government of Pakistan, Twenty Years of Pakistan: 1947-1967, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Islamabad, undated, p. 183.

factories, a few rice and flour mills, small sugar mills, a fruit squash and canning factory, a brewery, a distillery, a hydrogenerated oil mill, the salt mines at Khewar, a tea industry in Sylhet, a small oil field and refinery at Attock, five cement works, six engineering shops, a few steel re-rolling mills, a match factory, some small glass works, and a negligible tool manufacturing facility. This was, more or less, the industrial base of a country that had to feed a hundred million mouths!

Pakistan, however, rapidly expanded her industrial sector through massive imports of capital goods and industrial raw materials.²⁹ Accordingly, after

²⁹The following structure of imports illustrates Pakistan's expenditure on imports during 1959-1965.

Imports: 1959-1965 (in million rupees)

Year	Capital Goods	Industrial Raw Material	Consumer Goods	Total
1959	337.9	382.0	960.8	1,681.0
1960	634.4	680.3	1,797.3	3,112.0
1961	631.0	1,217.6	1,207.7	3,056.3
1962	1,113.2	1,248.0	1,153.5	3,514.7
1963	1,140.1	1,416.1	1,675.6	4,231.8
1964	1,454.7	1,565.0	1,730.0	4,749.7
1965	1,884.6	1,575.8	1,506.6	4,967.0

Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 1965-1966.

partition, industrial assets rose sharply from Rs. 58 crores in 1947 to Rs. 502 crores in 1959.³⁰

Notwithstanding the rapid growth, industry was not a substantial sector in Pakistan in the early sixties. It contributed only 13 percent to the national income.³¹ According to a survey conducted by the Government of Pakistan, the value of the fixed assets of the manufacturing industries at the end of 1960 had reached the very modest sum of Rs. 196.4 crores. Building up an industrial sector from almost nothing was, no doubt, very encouraging, but whether Pakistan, in face of unfavourable economic and social conditions, could sustain the momentum required to make her industrial sector relatively independent, was a crucial question in the sixties.

(iv) Human Resources:

Pakistan's deficiency in terms of human skills reflected a similar pattern. Most dramatic was the scarcity of the most fundamental skill of

³⁰Gustav Papanek, "The Development of Entrepreneurship", The American Economic Review, LIII, No. 2, May 1962.

³¹Economic Survey of Pakistan: 1961-1962, pp.7-8.

reading and writing. In 1961, out of a total population of 93,720,614 only 15.9 percent "could read or write with understanding a short statement of everyday life in any language."³² A more rigorous test of functional literacy, requiring a minimum of five years formal schooling reduced the figure to 9.4 percent. In the early sixties, universal education was not even considered feasible by the government.³³

The dimensions of the paucity of more specialized skills may be inferred from an estimate in the Second Five Year Plan that the annual output of all technical training centres in 1960 reached only 1,250 people. It was hoped that by 1965 this number would become a little more respectable by exceeding 11,190.³⁴ In view of the fact that in 1951 the non-agricultural labour force was almost five and a half million, this clearly was a tiny fragment.³⁵

³²Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Census Commission, Population Census of Pakistan 1961, Census Bulletin No. 4, Government of Pakistan Press, Karachi, 1962, p. vii.

³³Government of Pakistan, Report of the Commission on National Education, Government of Pakistan Printing Press, Karachi, 1960, p. 183.

³⁴Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Second Five Year Plan (1960-1965), Government of Pakistan Press, Karachi, 1960, pp. 347-348.

³⁵Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1962, p. 11.

In the field of advanced educational achievement, Pakistan's deficiency in the early sixties was beyond any doubt. In the early sixties, the number of college graduates was 82,069; only 4 percent of citizens twenty-five years of age or older;³⁶ the number of doctors was 9,200, or one for every 10,000 citizens;³⁷ there were approximately 2,000 nurses one for every 46,500 citizens.³⁸ Finally, in 1959 there were 170,847 teachers in elementary, middle, and secondary schools, which included a very small percentage of college graduates.³⁹

Thus, Pakistan's deficiency in human resources added yet another frustrating dimension to her moribund economy. To describe this last facet of the Pakistan economy as being in a rudimentary condition is no exaggeration. The key to the prosperity of a country lies in the development of human resources, and Pakistan's human resources in the early sixties were so poor that instead of being a source of national wealth, they were a constant drag on her economy.

³⁶Population Census of Pakistan 1961, p. xx.

³⁷Second Five Year Plan, p. 357.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid.

Such, then, was the state of the Pakistani economy in the early sixties. The dimension of its deficiency represented one of the important features of the operational environment that limited foreign policy decision making in that period. It was the general poverty of Pakistan that made it imperative for the country to accept economic development as the most important national objective. This stress on development gave a powerful economic orientation to Pakistan's foreign policy. Development has always been an important concern of the foreign policy elite, and it is certain to remain so. Writing about the foreign policy motivations of his government, Ayub observed: "The principal objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy are security and development."⁴⁰ Foreign Minister Bhutto echoed Ayub when he remarked that the only considerations on which Pakistan's foreign policy was based were the security and development of Pakistan.⁴¹ Ayub and Bhutto stressed the need for domestic development, because they were convinced that "survival without development is not possible."⁴² They were also aware, as were most Pakistanis, that their country lacked the capacity to finance her own economic development, and that development could not advance without foreign aid.⁴³ Accordingly, one of the

⁴⁰ Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 114.

⁴¹ Dawn, 22 August 1964.

⁴² Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 114.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 118.

basic considerations of the foreign policy elite was to secure funds for domestic development from abroad. This encompassed not only negotiations for aid, but also debt rescheduling, solicitations of foreign investment, and promotion of foreign trade.

From the very outset, "development" became the key word in the vocabulary of the government, and economists prepared numerous plans for long term economic development. Attempts at comprehensive planning started in 1948, when the government set up a Development Board. The Board prepared a six-year development plan which went into effect from the middle of 1951. This plan provided for a total investment of Rs. 2.6 billion in the public sector, of which Rs. 1.4 billion was to be financed from internal resources, and Rs. 1.2 billion from foreign aid and assistance. Pakistan could not achieve the projected developmental targets because, while the prices of Pakistani exports declined sharply, the cost of capital goods that Pakistan required shot up. Moreover, Pakistan was not committed to the Western bloc until 1954 and, therefore, did not get enough foreign assistance or investment to meet the costs of the plan. During 1947-1955, Pakistan received only 371 billion dollars in foreign economic assistance.⁴⁴

⁴⁴Since the value of the Pakistani rupee vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar was not uniform, the amount of foreign aid is shown in U.S. dollars only to avoid confusion.

The First Five-Year Plan, 1955-1960, envisaged a total investment of Rs. 10.8 billion, of which Rs. 6.6 billion was to be financed by domestic resources and Rs. 4.2 billion by foreign resources. As indicated in table 2 foreign economic assistance rose sharply during the First Five-Year Plan.

Table 2

Foreign Economic Assistance 1947-1965

Period	Grant % of Total	Loans % of Total	Total in U.S. dollars (millions)
1947-1955	67%	33%	371
1955-1960	58%	42%	990
1960-1965	14%	86%	2,377
			<u>3,738⁴⁵</u>

Consequently, the First Five-Year Plan, though not a big success, did bring some positive results. It provided the much needed infrastructure at that stage of Pakistan's economic development. National income rose by 11 percent and per capita income rose by a very modest three over the plan period. The relatively poor performance was by no means entirely of Pakistan's making. Adverse weather conditions and a deterioration

⁴⁵This figure excluded P.L. 480, food aid from the U.S., and contributions to the Indus Basin Development Fund. These figures are taken from Pakistan Economic Survey 1968-1969, Government Printing Press, Islamabad, 1969, p. 21.

in Pakistan's terms of trade also took a heavy toll.⁴⁶

In June 1960, the Second Five-Year Plan was launched under more favourable circumstances. The new government which assumed power in 1958 not only brought political stability to the country, but also laid the basis for a vigorous growth policy by giving more emphasis and support to economic development of the country. In financial terms the plan was roughly twice the size of the First Five-Year Plan. Total investment was estimated at Rs. 25 billion, of which Rs. 12.05 billion was to come from domestic resources. Education and agricultural sectors, previously ignored, received top priority. In industry, emphasis was shifted from consumer goods to capital goods. The GNP increased by 284 per cent over this plan period, and exports grew by seven percent. Dependence on foreign aid was six percent less than had been expected. The annual growth rate was 5.5 percent, and per capita income rose from Rs. 318 in 1959-1960 to Rs. 365 in 1964-1965, an increase of 12.9 percent.

A major factor in this success, modest though it

⁴⁶ Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 183-184.

was, was the amount of foreign aid, investments and loans received, 86 percent of which came during the first two years of the plan, i.e., 1960-1961.⁴⁷ On the negative side dependence on foreign aid increased and loans rose to a worrisome level in terms of the future problem of repayment. More serious still, the gap between the country's foreign exchange earnings and payments for imports grew, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of Pakistan's gross national product.

Table 3
Foreign Exchange Earnings and Cost of Imports: 1958-1965⁴⁸
(In millions of rupees)

Year	Total Foreign Exchange Earnings	Total Cost of Imports	Gap.
1958-1959	1,818	1,578	+240
1959-1960	1,917	2,461	-491
1960-1961	2,286	3,188	-902
1961-1962	2,384	3,109	-725
1962-1963	2,748	3,819	-1,071
1963-1964	2,785	4,430	-1,645
1964-1965	3,050	5,374	-2,324

In the face of these balance of payments pressures and uncertainties, there seems no escape from the conclusion that Pakistan's rapid industrialization during 1955-

⁴⁷Karl Von Vorvys, Political Development in Pakistan, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1965, p. 181.

⁴⁸Figures based on Pakistan Economic Survey 1968-1969, p. 22.

1965 failed to make a deep impact on Pakistan's overall unfavorable economic situation.

As mentioned earlier, Pakistan received considerable foreign aid during the 1947-1965 period, especially from the United States. However, in comparison to other aid recipients the relative level of per capita aid received by Pakistan was not unusually high. She ranked well below a number of other Afro-Asian countries.⁴⁹ While the foreign assistance and aid played a key role in her economic development, it also increased the level of outstanding indebtedness.⁵⁰ This problem was compounded by the fact that U.S. aid was tied, raising the average **procurement** price for Pakistan of goods and services imported under the aid programme by at least 12 **percent**.⁵¹ As well, Pakistan had to follow the political dictates of the U.S. in return for such aid. In the early sixties, even this "tied aid" was extended in a very hesitant manner. On 9 July 1961, in a televised interview in London, Ayub described the U.S. attitude in the following words:

⁴⁹ Joseph J. Stern, Growth and Development in Pakistan 1955-1969, Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 30. According to Stern, Pakistan received only \$5.10 per capita in U.S. foreign aid; p. 31.

⁵⁰ See Table 2 for how the grant element in the total foreign assistance declined continuously, raising the level of indebtedness.

⁵¹ Joseph J. Stern, Development in Pakistan, p. 31.

Now in respect of India the United States made a special effort with the other contributing countries to persuade them to match the United States' efforts. The United States went out of her way to bequeath a billion dollars as their contribution at a time when the Indian plan was not even worked out.

In our case, all sorts of objections were raised. Some were genuine while some were, to my mind, spurious — the sort of things which are designed to put off a caller. . . .

All I say is that the U.S.A. did not make any real effort in this regard. But let us hope that this performance will be improved next time.⁵²

The "performance," however, did not improve; on the contrary, according to Bhutto, it deteriorated.⁵³

Since heavy dependence on foreign aid and assistance was inevitable for Pakistan, it was essential for her to have diverse and numerous sources of foreign aid, so that the quantum of capital and technical know-how received could be maximized. It was, therefore, vital for her to inject the ailing economy with policies that would maximize the inflow of the required quantity and quality of foreign assistance in order to heal her

⁵³Z.A. Bhutto, Myth of Independence, p. 66.

economy and preserve her political independence. Such policies would not have been possible in the "tight bipolar" world of the early fifties; the changing pattern of the "global system" in the early sixties, however, made it somewhat easier to adopt and pursue friendly policies with both blocs without antagonizing either.

In sum, Pakistan's decision to establish closer relations with China was motivated in part by her economic developmental needs. She turned to China because, in spite of being the most allied ally, she was not receiving as much aid from the West as she had expected, or as many other recipients were getting. Furthermore, whatever aid she was receiving was becoming more and more "tied," increasing her indebtedness and compelling her to submit to the political dictates of the United States. Pakistan anticipated that the terms of Chinese aid and trade⁵⁴ and loans would be less exacting and her manner of providing such assistance less imperialistic. Finally, Pakistan expected that economic benefits might be derived by

⁵⁴China's enormous market was a big factor; unlike the U.S., China was considered to be more accommodating with regard to importing from Pakistan.

playing East against West and Russia against China, as India was doing in the case of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Pakistan's national interests would be best served, according to the perceptions of the Pakistani leadership, by reducing her dependence on one large donor (the U.S.) and normalizing her relations with all big powers. In short, economic developmental needs provided motivations for establishing closer relations with China, and thus played a significant role in Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties.

3. Political Structure:

Political structure, according to Brecher, "denotes in part the political institutions and the constitutional matrix in which authoritative decisions are made."⁵⁵ From October 1958 to June 1962, Pakistan was under military rule; the dominant political institution, if it could be called one, was the military junta and its "constitution" was martial law. From June 1962 to March 1969, Pakistan experienced democracy-Ayub style. The country had all the trappings of a democracy, e.g., a constitution, provincial and central legislatures, elections, and political parties. Yet,

⁵⁵Brecher, "A Framework for Research", p. 84.

in fact, it was a civil-military dictatorship headed by Ayub. He enjoyed virtually the same powers as President of a democratic Pakistan as he had exercised as Chief Martial Law Administrator. His power in both the periods rested mainly on senior military and civil bureaucracy. The second period, however, was marked by the inclusion in government of a few influential feudal lords and Pirs (religious leaders of enormous followings) through whom he controlled the masses. The opposition was also granted the freedom of voicing its disapproval, but it was made so weak and negligible that it could hardly check the powerful Ayub regime. Ayub's rule, at best, was an oligarchy composed of senior military and civil bureaucrats, very wealthy landowners and influential Pirs. Throughout his rule, he played one against the other and thus was successful in retaining absolute power. Nevertheless, even his harshest critics would agree that the character of his martial law regime and his system of "Basic Democracy" did impart a measure of stability to the chronically diseased politics of Pakistan. This section examines the character of his regime and then assesses its influence on the policy making process in general, and Pakistan's China policy in particular.

Before Ayub came to power in October 1958, politics in Pakistan were characterized by economic, administrative, and political instability. The record is emphatic in this regard.⁵⁶ The instability and political confusion gave rise to a general feeling of economic insecurity and by the middle of 1958 Pakistan was in the grip of a political and economic crisis. In the words of Damodar Singhal:

The rich began to hoard food and smuggle gold. The foreign exchange holdings descended to a dangerously low point. Food riots broke out in East Pakistan and labour strikes were common.

Intrigue and strife gained greater momentum when plans for a general election in 1958 were laid out. No politician really wanted to face an election, as he was not sure whether he would be successful. Peasants, students, and others were coerced or **bought** into taking sides in the electioneering campaigns.

Public morale and respect for political

⁵⁶Politics in Pakistan during 1947-1958 are ably dissected in the following works:

- a. Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, London, 1957.
- b. Mushtaq Ahmed, Government and Politics in Pakistan, Karachi, 1959.
- c. Khalid Bin Saeed, "Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan", Middle East Journal, Autumn, 1959, pp. 389-406, and his other works cited in this study.
- d. Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, Oxford University Press, London, 1967.

institutions was extremely low. Unscrupulous political defections from one party to another on the floor of the Assembly, maneuvering and bickering for office, lack of leadership and regional tensions brought about the collapse of this short-lived experiment in Pakistani parliamentary government.⁵⁷

Ayub's coup was a turning point in the political history of Pakistan. It marked the end of the seven year experiment in parliamentary democracy. Democracy and democratic institutions, in the words of a leading newspaper, were "wiped off the country's political map like one wipes spilt milk from a table".⁵⁸ The constitutional changes brought about by the imposition of martial law were as follows: the abrogation of the 1956 Constitution, the dismissal of the central and provincial cabinets, the dissolution of the national and provincial assemblies, and the banning of all political parties and political activities. The final change came only three weeks later after the imposition of martial law, when Iskander Ali Mirza, then President of Pakistan, who had initiated the retreat from democracy to military rule, was ousted and exiled by Ayub Khan. Thus on 27 October 1958, Ayub became the Chief Executive of the country, combining in his person the highest political and military authority of the land.

⁵⁷ Damodar P. Singhal, Pakistan, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1972, p.89.

⁵⁸ Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, p. 118.

In order to justify his seizure of power by unconstitutional means, Ayub established clearly and convincingly that the previous governments' experiments in parliamentary democracy had brought Pakistan to the verge of collapse, and that if the country were to be made stable, a new system, suitable to the genius of the people, had to be devised. This, according to him, was the principal thesis of the October military coup in Pakistan.⁵⁹

From the very outset, Ayub emphasized the need of a political system that would deliver his country from the devastating political chaos it was in. It is significant that long before the coup, Ayub had definite ideas about the political structure of Pakistan.⁶⁰ ~~Not~~ that he was in power, he started to translate these ideas into reality. With the solid backing of the Armed Forces, Ayub started to cleanse the Augean stables of Pakistan in order to pave the way for the introduction and acceptance of social and political changes. Martial law remained in force from October 1958 to June 1962, for almost 44 months. Ayub issued one regulation after another prescribing severe punishments for antisocial activities such as smuggling,

⁵⁹Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 37-42 and p. 186.

⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 186-191. The blueprint was prepared by Ayub in 1954.

hoarding, black-marketeering, etc. Special military courts were established and were authorized to pass severe sentences. Several members of the previous governments were arrested and held without bail; others were put under house arrest.⁶¹ According to one source, 6,978 politicians including former ministers, deputy ministers, parliamentary secretaries, and members of the provincial and central assemblies were disqualified from participating in any kind of political activity under the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order, 1959 (EBDO).⁶² The way Ayub proceeded against politicians, business magnates, and civil servants confirmed the popular suspicion of corrupt practices by the men who ruled Pakistan during 1947-1953, and also gave the Ayub regime some credibility among the masses.

In an effort to cleanse the administration, Ayub appointed a Screening Committee to investigate the integrity and efficiency of thousands of officers in all the services. Under Martial Law Regulation Number 61 and the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance of 1959, the government expanded the examination to include the members of the judicial and the prestigious Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). As a result, about 2,500 officials

⁶¹ Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, pp. 80-82; also see Dawn, 11 August 1959.

⁶² Karl Von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, p. 190.

were either compulsorily retired or dismissed; senior officials, however, remained generally unaffected.⁶³

For long term measures of reform, Ayub set up commissions of experts, gave them terms of reference, and asked them to draw up recommendations in a given time after a thorough study of all the practical aspects of particular questions and a sounding of public opinion. Almost every major aspect of public life and administration came under careful examination. The reports were studied by the government and assigned to relevant agencies for implementation. Some thirty such commissions were set up by 1962, and wide ranging reforms were introduced in land holding and land tenure, administration, education, taxation, the legal system, marriage and family laws, labour affairs, fiscal policy and other spheres.

In brief, Ayub projected himself as a colossus of justice bestriding the corrupt world of Pakistan who needed absolute authority in the interest of the common man. All this would not have been possible if he had not had unlimited authority or, as Ayub put it,

⁶³ Damodar Singhal, Pakistan, p. 194.

the "Cover of Martial Law." He was convinced that authoritarian controls were essential to move Pakistan toward stability. An underdeveloped country such as Pakistan, he thought, was not ready for the kind of politics prevalent in the developed nations. He was not prepared to listen to any views contradicting his theory, for he was, as the crowd of sycophants around him made him believe, the saviour of the country; anybody disagreeing with him was a disruptionist and an enemy of Pakistan. It was his consolidation of absolute power that enabled him to ram down the throats of a dissenting intelligentsia his new political system of "Basic Democracies," which made him the constitutional dictator of the country. Through this system Ayub hoped to generate a new group of leaders capable of mobilizing mass support, but also amenable to government persuasion. Through Basic Democracies, explained the President, "every village and every inhabitant in every village in our country would become an equal partner with the administration in conducting the affairs of the state."⁶⁴ If this system "does not

succeed," he warned, "then God help us."⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Mohammad Ayub Khan, Statements and Speeches, p. 35.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

The chief motive behind Basic Democracies, however, was to build a stable support structure at low levels by distributing favours among the rural elite and by controlling them through the bureaucracy. It was a five-tier arrangement of councils.⁶⁶ The country was divided into 80,000 rural and urban wards, 40,000 in each province. In these wards every 11,000 persons elected a representative, called a Basic Democrat, for a five year term. These Basic Democrats were brought together in groups of nine or ten to form Union Councils. Each Union Council then elected a chairman from amongst its members who became an ex-officio member of the municipal committee (a government body).

The next level was the Tehsil Councils in West Pakistan and Thana Councils in East Pakistan.⁶⁷ These consisted of the chairmen of the Union Councils within

⁶⁶The following is the structure of the "Basic Democracies" System:

5. Divisional Councils (16)
 4. District Councils (79)
 3. Tehsil/Thana Councils (754)
 2. Union Council (8,863)
 1. Ward Committees (80,000)
- Electorate
Elegible Voters (48,151,509)

⁶⁷A Tehsil or Thana is a revenue sub-division of a district.

a sub-division and official members, nominated by the deputy commissioner. Each council was headed by a bureaucrat, in charge of the subdivision.⁶⁸

The fourth tier was the District Councils, one for each district. They consisted of the chairmen of all Union Councils within each district and official members who were representatives of the departments at the district level. The total membership of the District Councils varied between 55 and 90, and they were headed by the deputy commissioners of the districts.

The fifth tier was the Divisional Councils, headed by the divisional commissioner. They consisted of elected and official members from within the divisions. The elected members came from the District Councils, elected by the members of the District Councils.

The political system of Basic Democracy was introduced in May 1959, and the first elections were held in December 1959. The first function of the new electoral college, composed of 80,000 Basic Democrats, was to legitimize the martial law regime. On 14 February 1960,

⁶⁸ Usually called sub-divisional officer (SDO) or assistant commissioner.

the Basic Democrats were polled for a vote of confidence. Ballots were so printed as to permit only a "yes" vote. In addition, each vote was numbered and registered against a specific voter so that the government could identify and punish those who spoiled their ballots.⁶⁹ The result was a forgone conclusion; the B.D.'s, as they were usually called, not only made their confidence in the regime known,⁷⁰ but also elected Ayub as President for a five-year term. Three days after the "election," to the accompaniment of a thirty-one gun salute, General Mohammad Ayub Khan was sworn in as President of Pakistan.

After having received this "mandate" from the people, the President proceeded to the most important task, the framing of the constitution of Pakistan. With the kind of authority he had, he could have written the constitution himself, but his "liberal outlook" inclined him to appoint a Constitutional Commission. The Commission submitted its report on 6 May 1961. It suggested a qualified presidential and federal form of government, a vice-president, bicameral legislatures, and direct elections through adult franchise. These recommendations were totally unaccept-

⁶⁹Karl Von Vory, Political Development in Pakistan, p. 202.

⁷⁰Out of a total of 78,720 votes cast, 75,282 were cast in favour of Ayub. See Morning News, Dacca, 16 February 1960.

able to Ayub, and ultimately it was almost his own version that was promulgated on 1 March 1962. The new constitution was not put to popular vote as had been previously promised and went into effect on 8 June 1962. From June 1962 to March 1969 Pakistan was ruled under the Ayub constitution, which allowed Ayub to retain all the authority and crucial controls that he had enjoyed under martial law rule. He was made the supreme commander of the armed forces, and was given the power to appoint governors, ministers, judges of the Supreme and High Courts, the attorney-general, and the chief election commissioner. He enjoyed extensive authority in legislative, financial, administrative, and other policy matters. He did not have to share power with a prime minister or vice-president who could have refused to be pushed around. All he had was a cabinet of ministers, who served to perpetuate his personal rule, and a National Assembly elected by the 80,000 B.D.'s⁷¹ who were controlled and monitored by the bureaucracy.

In short, Ayub's authority was so coercive that

⁷¹The system of Basic Democracies was also retained, despite the Constitution Commission's recommendation that it be replaced by adult franchise. For a detailed discussion of the new Constitution, see Khalid Bin Saeed's The Political System of Pakistan, pp. 105-126.

differences between the presidential system and the martial law rule, which had preceded it, were hardly significant.⁷²

Nevertheless, Ayub could not have ruled Pakistan single handedly. There were powerful groups — groups that formed the bases of his power; these groups were the top echelon of the civil and military bureaucracy and the competing elite within the ruling party. At times, Ayub also had to take into consideration the views advocated by the opposition parties to keep them well under control. The attitudes of these groups thus played a significant role in Pakistan's policy-making process.⁷³ Ayub, however, played one group against the other and thus never allowed any of them to sway him completely. In this manner, he kept the political restraints at a minimum and enjoyed maximum freedom to implement his policies. Even when he seemed to agree with his political advisors, it was to enhance his power **through** them rather than to demonstrate his weakness.

⁷²Choudhry Muhammad Ali, a former Prime Minister of Pakistan, went so far as to describe the presidential system as a government of the President, by the President, and for the President. See his statement in Dawn, 2 April 1963.

⁷³The views advocated by these groups are examined in the next two sections.

The powers that the political structure of Pakistan conferred on Ayub minimized the restraints on his regime in carrying out his policies.⁷⁴ A striking example was the change in Muslim Family Laws, restricting polygamy in Pakistan, imposed upon the majority of religious leaders, who were almost hysterical in their opposition but could not stop Ayub from what they called distorting Islamic laws.⁷⁵

The near absence of restraints also played a key role in stabilizing Pakistan to an extent where she could think of achieving a degree of independence in her foreign policy. Ayub had become so stable and secure that by 1961 the world knew that he was not a passing shadow. His power to make and unmake policies, and his

⁷⁴An illustration of "dealing with the opposition" is provided by Ayub himself in his memoirs. According to him, some senior administrators and technical experts took extreme positions after he had made up his mind to sign the Indus Basin Water Treaty in the early sixties. He made the following speech to deal with the dissenting experts:

The responsibility does not lie on anyone of you, so let me tell you very plainly that the policy is going to be mine. I shall consult you whenever I am in doubt regarding technical details, but if anyone of you interferes with the policy, I shall deal with him myself. . . . so don't make any mistake about it.
(emphasis added)

Everyone understood him and Ayub signed the treaty. See, Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 109-110.

⁷⁵The Ulemas would have crusaded against the change in a more democratic Pakistan.

political acumen had impressed Western leaders.⁷⁶ Economically and politically, the military regime had put Pakistan on an even keel. Ayub had brought the country back to stability and in the process had made himself more powerful. By the middle of 1960, he was, at least technically, a representative of the people, after the 80,000 Basic Democrats had shown their confidence in him. With armed forces to back him, with a constitution that gave him unlimited power, with a bureaucracy wanting to perpetuate his rule, Ayub was in a strong position to formulate and alter Pakistan's policies in any way he desired.

Thus the political structure of Pakistan did play a significant role in the making of Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties in three ways: first, by bringing the country back to normalcy and providing economic, political, and administrative stability, so that the Ayub regime could think in terms of achieving a degree of independence in foreign policy; second, by concentrating so much power in the President so that if

⁷⁶Upon the conclusion of his Asian tour in June 1964, U.S. Vice President Lyndon Johnson, in his report to President John F. Kennedy, observed:

President Ayub, in Pakistan, is singularly impressive. He is seasoned as a leader, where others are not, confident and straight forward and, I would judge, dependable. . . .

Quoted in Dawn, 17 June 1964.

he wished to alter Pakistan's foreign or domestic policies, he was largely free to do so; and finally, by removing constitutional restraints upon the policy-making elite, thus making it free to choose what was in the interests of the state without having to fear being voted out of office.

4. Competing Elites:

Brecher employs the variable of "competing elites" to assess the influence of those elites that vie for authority to make political decisions in the system. He includes the impact of opposition parties as well as the competing political factions within the ruling party under this category.⁷⁷ He suggests that even in an authoritarian system pressures on policy-making may be channelled through competing political factions within the ruling party or through various interest groups.⁷⁸ However, Ayub's administration in Pakistan during the martial law period, October 1958-June 1962, was so highly authoritarian that there was not even a ruling party, let alone opposition parties. After June 1962, however, with the introduction of a presidential system in Pakistan, Ayub permitted the establishment of both opposition and ruling parties. Although the impact

⁷⁷Brecher, " A Framework for Research," p.85.

⁷⁸Ibid.

of the opposition elites was less than that of the ruling elite, it was nevertheless of some significance. This section, therefore, examines and assesses the nature and the influence of the governing and the opposition elites in Pakistan, especially their impact on Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties, i.e., 1960-1965.

A. Governing Elites

The question "who rules whom" has been a constant political problem since man developed the earliest forms of societal organizations. The answer to the question, however, becomes comparatively easy if one is dealing with an autocracy such as Pakistan was in the Ayub Khan era. The period under discussion (1960-1965) represented two phases of competing elites. The first period, 1960 to June 1962, was the martial law era during which no political participation was allowed. Political parties were outlawed, the national and the provincial assemblies were dissolved, and most of the old politicians were disqualified from participating in any form of political activity.⁷⁹ The only public representatives were the directly elected basic democrats, who constituted the electoral college that elected the President and the members of the national and the provincial assemblies.

⁷⁹The Elective Bodies Disqualification Ordinance (EBDO) was promulgated shortly after martial law. It barred prominent politicians from participating in politics for a period of eight years, i.e., from 1958 to 1966.

These 80,000 basic democrats were expected to do what political parties do in other political systems. They, however, had hardly any influence on Pakistan's policy-making process, because they were supervised and controlled by a powerful and efficient bureaucracy, and since they had very little ability to influence the policy-makers in any way.⁸⁰ In fact, from October 1958 through June 1962, Ayub ruled the country through the support of the bureaucracy. It was the mainstay of his rule, and the senior military and civil service officers were the only governing elite during this period. Their views and their impact on Pakistan's China policy are examined under the bureaucracy variable.

The second period, July 1962-December 1965 was, however, to some extent different from the first period. During this period, Ayub made some concessions to the opposition and also to the factions of the ruling party (of which he was the president), in an attempt to consolidate his position and power and to regain the public confidence that had started receding because of the highly authoritarian nature of the first period. However, even in this period of "limited democracy", he

⁸⁰For the details of education and other qualifications of the basic democrats see, Karl von Varys, Political Development in Pakistan, pp. 202-204.

leaned heavily on the bureaucracy and created a stern paternalistic democracy in which opposition was barely tolerated.⁸¹ Nevertheless, as the pressure on the Ayub regime increased, it had to give in on some issues. Political parties were legalized in July 1962 with certain limitations, and a party system seemed to develop in the country. All the opposition parties joined together to form one powerful opposition party in order to fight the autocratic rule of Ayub. The party was named the Combined Opposition Party (COP); it consisted of the Council Muslim League (CML)⁸², the Awami League (AL), the National Awami Party (NAP), the Jamaat-i-Islami, and the Nizam-e-Islam Party. The Pakistan Muslim League (hereinafter referred to as PML) became the ruling party. The majority of basic democrats, provincial and federal ministers, governors of the provinces, other important public office holders, and

⁸¹ During this period, Ayub repeatedly used the threat of a "bloody revolution," less benign than the 1958 coup, to counter serious opposition. Ayub also threatened to use the "language of weapons" if he lost the 1964-1965 presidential elections. See The Pakistan Observer, Dacca, 21 March 1966.

⁸² The Muslim League Party had splintered into two factions, the government faction being known as the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and the opposition faction being known as the Council Muslim League (CML). Ayub joined PML, assumed its presidency, and gave it his government's full support.

elite businessmen, industrialists, and landlords were pressured to join the rank and file of the PML. The top echelon of the PML, which comprised the senior ministers in the central cabinet and the provincial governors, even suggested that all civil servants should become members of the ruling party.

Ayub relied heavily on some of the top echelon not only because they held key positions in his administration, but also because they had some public support in their respective areas. Ayub, though endowed with political genius, lacked political support, and he foresaw the necessity of creating political support through the top echelon of the PML for the 1964-1965 presidential elections. He, therefore enlisted the support of the PML senior leadership by accommodating them in prestigious positions. Malik Amir Mohammad Khan, often referred to as the Nawab of Kalabagh, one of the wealthiest landowners in Pakistan was appointed Governor of West Pakistan in April 1960; Mohammad Ali Bogra, an influential Bengalee leader, was appointed Foreign Minister; Khawja Shahabuddin, a wealthy landowner and a revered Bengalee politician was given an ambassadorial assignment (later he was appointed as Minister of Information and Broadcasting); Abdul Monem

Khan, another Bengalee was asked to join the administration first as a minister later as Governor of East Pakistan; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, an influential Sindhi landowner, though a political unknown, was appointed as a central minister; Adamjee Valika, a very influential industrialist, was appointed treasurer of the PML. These people provided yeoman service in mobilizing public support for Ayub.⁸³ Ayub's landslide victory in the 1964-1965 presidential elections owed a great deal to their loyalty to Ayub. Following the elections, these people, realizing their political importance, vied for more power and authority in the government. Proximity to Ayub and key positions in the government had given them the required leverage to influence Ayub. These men comprised the elite within the ruling party and became its mouthpiece. This group put continuous and steady pressure on Ayub to bring about a radical change in Pakistan's foreign policy. Foremost in this group were Manzur Qadir, Mohammad Khan, Abdul Monem Khan, Altaf Hussain,⁸⁴ Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and Z.A. Suleri.⁸⁵ These people were highly ambitious and skilled politicians. Their goal was much higher than that of merely

⁸³ There were many other wealthy landowners and Jagirdars (feudal lords) controlled through the senior leadership or the bureaucracy.

⁸⁴ Editor of Dawn, Karachi.

⁸⁵ Editor of the Pakistan Times, Lahore.

continuing as central ministers in Ayub's Administration. Having a penchant for power, they wanted to use their prestigious positions to acquire public support on a national level. For that purpose, they continued to be loyal to Ayub without identifying themselves too closely with his policies. They did it very tactfully, for they knew well that Ayub would not tolerate any opposition. They impressed on Ayub that the policies which they were advocating were in the best interests of the regime, since they reflected public opinion. These policies, if followed, would not only enhance the image of Pakistan, but would also help to perpetuate his personal rule. Since each of these men was representing the top echelon of the PML, no one can be solely credited with the advocacy of a radical change in Pakistan's foreign policy; however, some carried more weight than others in advocating a closer relationship with China.

Thus the ruling party, through its senior and influential leaders, brought influence to bear on Ayub to effect a change in Pakistan's foreign policy. One example of this pressure was the meeting of the Basic Democrats in January 1962 at Larkana, Bhutto's ancestral home and estate, and their demand at that time for a

reorientation in Pakistan's foreign policy.⁸⁶ The demand for a change in foreign policy, of course, reflected the influence of this elite group in the party, which had been consistently suggesting to Ayub that the benefits of the new situation arising out of the changing international scene should be fully taken into account and process of establishing closer relations with China should be initiated immediately. In making these suggestions, this group was motivated by sheer pragmatism that led it to realize that the improvement in Pakistan's relations with China was bound to enhance Pakistan's leverage vis-a-vis the superpowers as well as India and Afghanistan. Accordingly these men worked behind the scenes to convince Ayub of the **necessity** of establishing a closer link with China within the new context of international politics.⁸⁷ The training and the interests of this elite group were in the field of international relations. Ayub was somewhat impressed by this highly educated, bright, intelligent, affluent, and influential coterie of men and assigned them to the top posts in his administration. These men, in

⁸⁶The meeting was held on 19 January 1962 at Al-Murtaza, Bhutto's bungalow. Ayub was the chief guest at the meeting. The meeting demonstrated the PML leadership's support among the Basic Democrats on the question of a change in foreign policy. See Dawn, 20 January 1962.

⁸⁷Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Myth of Independence, p. vii.

turn, demonstrated their political acumen by working ardously at their assigned tasks and promoted their political image in the eyes of Ayub and also among the educated middle-class and students. ~~Since these men had accumulated~~ some degree of public support, Ayub had to accept their influence, especially when the policies they advocated reflected the views of the PML leadership and could evoke popular support.

Besides this elite group, M.A.H. Isphahani, a close associate of Jinnah and a very influential businessman, who had served as Pakistan's Ambassador to the U.S.A. and High Commissioner in the United Kingdom before Ayub came to power, was a public figure of considerable standing. He was one of the leading industrialists and enjoyed the support and respect of the Pakistan Chamber of Commerce, and people of Karachi, Pakistan's biggest city. After visiting China in 1960, Isphahani became strongly convinced that there was tremendous scope for the expansion of Pakistan's trade with China. In a book he wrote after the visit, he strongly recommended the adoption of a pragmatic approach toward China.⁸⁸ In another statement, issued in February 1961, he argued very forcefully that instead of relying on one bloc for economic and military aid, the Pakistan leadership would

⁸⁸M.A.H. Isphahani, 27 Days in China, Karachi, 1960.

be wise to approach the question of aid in a straightforward and business-like manner and solicit aid from all countries, Communist or non-Communist, without any strings.⁸⁹ Again in an article written in 1964, Isphahani urged that Pakistan should endeavour to improve her relations with China, because China was not only a great Asian neighbour, but also a potential world power.⁹⁰

Another associate of Jinnah and a prominent PML leader, Khawja Shahabuddin lent his weight to what sometimes has been described as Pakistan's China lobby in the ruling party. He argued that Pakistan had everything to gain by establishing closer relations with China.⁹¹

In the National Assembly of Pakistan, the members of the ruling party agreed with the views advocated by their party leadership. They wanted a policy of establishing cordial relations with China without withdrawing from the military alliance with the United States. They advocated that the cardinal aim of Pakistan's foreign policy "must be a settlement with China on all points."⁹²

⁸⁹ Dawn, 1 February 1960.

⁹⁰ M.A.H. Isphahani, "The Foreign Policy of Pakistan, 1947-1964", Pakistan Horizon, Third Quarter, 1964, pp. 246-248.

⁹¹ Dawn, 30 December 1962.

⁹² Dawn, 6 November 1962.

B. Opposition Elite

The members of the Combined Opposition Party (COP) in the National Assembly, representing all the opposition parties; agreed with the members of the ruling party on the question of establishing closer relations with China. They, however, argued that Pakistan should completely withdraw from the Western military pacts of SEATO and CENTO, unless the government could prove that these pacts were vital for Pakistan's security. Sardar Bahadur Khan, the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, was of the opinion that Pakistan had antagonized half the population of the world by being a member of SEATO and CENTO.⁹³ The opposition cited China's amicable border pacts with Burma and Nepal to support its demand for an independent foreign policy.⁹⁴ Yousuf Khattak, an opposition member of the National Assembly from N.W.F.P., strongly advocated Pakistan's withdrawal from military alliances. He also pointed out that the emergence of China as a big power in Asia had created much hope for Pakistan and her security.⁹⁵ Major Akhtaruddin Ahmed, an opposition member of the National Assembly from East Pakistan, feared that East Pakistan might become a base for American-Indian mili-

⁹³ Pakistan National Assembly Debates, p. 83.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 90.

⁹⁵ Dawn, 28 March 1963.

tary operations in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in India,⁹⁶ and for this reason favoured closer relations with China.

Maulana Abdul Hameed Khan Bhashani, leader of the National Awami Party (NAP), was the most outspoken supporter of a pro-Chinese foreign policy, including total withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO. Bhashani, sometimes described as Pakistan's Red Dean of Canterbury, drew the bulk of his support from East Pakistan. He had strong leftist leanings and a deep contempt for what he described as "U.S. imperialist activities." In contrast, the Chinese Peoples Republic, he believed, "stands for equality among nations, sympathizes with the oppressed, and helps them to become strong. China has no territorial ambitions at the expense of other countries."⁹⁷ Bhashani called upon the Ayub regime to establish closer relations with China. He also advocated "an independent and non-aligned foreign policy" and avoidance of such military pacts as SEATO and CENTO, Pak-U.S. bilateral pacts and such other pacts that may hamper the economic development of Pakistan."⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Dawn, 27 November 1962.

⁹⁷ Dawn, 27 November 1962. ✓

⁹⁸ For the full text of his statement see Dawn, 6 March 1964; and the Dacca Times, Dacca, 6 March 1964.

Thus, the opposition and the governing elite in the Assembly, leaders of the Combined opposition Parties, and the majority of the ruling party's leadership agreed on the need to establish closer relations with China. The cumulative pressure of this joint advocacy produced a visible impact on Pakistan's foreign policy elite, and this was first evident in 1961 when the question of Chinese representation came up before the U.N. in a routine fashion. The reversal in Pakistan's stand toward China in the early sixties strongly suggests that the Ayub regime did take the views of the competing elites in consideration in reviewing Pakistan's foreign policy and establishing closer relations with China. Besides, Ayub found in Pakistan's new China policy an attractive and useful means of evoking popular support.⁹⁹ The views advocated by influential members of the ruling party, the demands of the opposition, and the pressure of the members of the National Assembly, and the receding public support for his Administration all substantially influenced Ayub and his regime to establish closer relations with China.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Ayub's friendly gestures toward China had neutralized Bhashani's opposition to the pro-American policy of the Ayub administration in late fifties; as a result, Ayub became more popular in East Pakistan, a province which had never given much support to him previously.

¹⁰⁰ According to the Pakistan Times, a high level conference was held at Karachi on 26 May 1961, in which the entire scope of Pakistan's foreign policy was reviewed in depth, in light of the popular advocacy of closer relations with China. See the Pakistan Times, Lahore, 27 May 1961.

In short, the views put forward by elites constituted an important positive influence on Pakistan's decision of moving closer to China. To what extent the civil and military bureaucracy and Ayub himself were in favour of or against this policy is examined under the "bureaucracy" and the "key decision maker" variables respectively.

5. Bureaucracy

During the early sixties, a Pakistani journalist, then on a visit to India, is reported to have remarked that there were only two political parties in Pakistan — the army and the bureaucracy. The remark, although an exaggeration and far from truth, throws some light on the important and critical role played by the army and the civil service in the support structure as well as the demand generating process of Pakistan's political system.

The military takeover in Pakistan was a classic case of a "reform coup" as defined by Huntington.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ Samuel P. Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," in Changing Patterns of Military Politics, ed. S.P. Huntington, Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1962, pp. 32-40. According to Huntington, in a reform coup a combination of military and civilian groups seizes power intending to make reforms in the political, economic, or social structure without instigating a convulsive revolutionary process.

It was brought about by men who had institutional bases of power in the Pakistan political system before the 1958 coup. Long before Ayub came to power, the military had been working as a silent partner in the civil-military bureaucratic coalition that held the key decision-making power in the country.

In post-independence India, political control over the civil-military bureaucracy was made possible by strong political organization and leadership. In Pakistan, however, in the absence of such organization the civil-military bureaucracy assumed de facto military power by dismissing the politicians as superfluous and as impediments to modernization.¹⁰² The military disillusionment with political leadership dated from 1948, when Liaquat Ali Khan, then Pakistan's Prime Minister, signed the ceasefire agreement on Kashmir. This, according to a military historian of Pakistan, was a blunder in the eyes of the army brass that cost Pakistan victory.¹⁰³ From that time, top military men nursed a grudge against politicians.

¹⁰²On the attitude of bureaucracy toward the politicians, see Henry F. Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1964, pp. 91-96.

¹⁰³Fazal Mugeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1963, pp. 117-118.

After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, the military bureaucracy developed a close working alliance with the civil bureaucracy, and Pakistan was virtually ruled by the civil bureaucracy supported by the top military brass. This unusual coalition was based not merely on certain institutional interests, but also on the fact that their views on the country's problems and solutions were very similar.¹⁰⁴ Like the civil bureaucracy, the military gave priority to state and government building schemes and believed in having a strong centre. Both looked with suspicion on the political elite whom they considered to be a disruptive force.¹⁰⁵ As mentioned earlier, even during the period when a veneer of parliamentary democracy was maintained in Pakistan, the bulk of power, apart from that wielded by Ayub, was in the hands of a coterie of senior civil servants, civil servants turned politicians, and the senior army officers.

In fact, during 1947-1958, the top echelon of bureaucracy plus a few bureaucrats-turned-politicians like

¹⁰⁴ Wayne Ayres Wilcox, "The Pakistan Coup d'Etat of 1958", Pacific Affairs, XXXVIII, 1965, pp. 27-30; and J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension, Praeger, New York, 1969, pp. 179-186.

¹⁰⁵ Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 55-58.

Ghulam Mohammad, Choudhry Muhammad Ali, General Iskender Mirza, Major-General A.M. Raza, and Ayub himself had effective control over the political process of Pakistan. The various "civilian coups" — the removal of Prime Minister Nazimuddin in April 1953, the removal of the Fazlul Haq ministry in 1954, and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in October 1954 — all testify to this conclusion. The Army High Command, although not directly involved, in these acts, gave consistent support to the ruling clique and acted as the first determiner of power.¹⁰⁶ Power passed overtly to the army in October 1958, when General Muhammad Ayub Khan took the administration of the country through a military coup. In reality, however, not much had changed, and the coup, therefore, constituted no fundamental departure from the civil-military bureaucratic ascendancy that had existed until that date. The coup was more a formalization of the existing power structure in Pakistan. The deployment of the army and the appointment of provincial martial law administrators was more in the nature of a symbolic show of force rather than a long-term involvement of the army in the day-to-day administration of the country. It is interesting to note that Ayub appointed Aziz Ahmed, a

¹⁰⁶Fazal Mugeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, pp. 120-125.

senior civil servant, as Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator of the country and elevated him to a position next to himself in authority. The hold of the civil bureaucracy on the levers of political power did not diminish despite the fact that now the army, instead of remaining a back seat driver, was at the steering wheel. The hold of the bureaucratic-army combine in the early sixties is evident from Ayub's appointment of senior bureaucrats, civil and military, to important portfolios in his first cabinet, October 1958-February 1960. These appointments also show that Ayub depended heavily on the bureaucracy. According to an influential Pakistan newspaper, the effective political party of President Ayub was the bureaucracy which ran the regime in his name.¹⁰⁷ Ramizuddin Ahmed, a member of the National Assembly of Pakistan from East Pakistan, alluded to the same fact when he asserted in the National Assembly:

I see, even now, the present regime for the last four years is not the President's rule or administration. It is bureaucracy's rule.¹⁰⁸

The validity of Mr. Ahmed's assertion is attested to

¹⁰⁷ Pakistan Observer, Lahore, 15 February 1969.

¹⁰⁸ Dawn, 18 June 1963.

by most of the research done on Pakistan's bureaucracy.¹⁰⁹

In the bureaucracy the prestigious Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), according to Khalid Bin Sayeed, a leading authority on Pakistan's politics and government, was the most important policy-making group. Its members exercised an important influence on Pakistan's foreign policy, especially Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties. The senior-most officers of this service were manning the most important policy-making positions not only in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also in all other ministries.¹¹⁰ These CSR officers took turns in occupying the top positions of Secretary to the Ministry — the job next in rank to that of the minister — in each of the central and provincial ministries. The position of secretary to the ministry of foreign affairs, which was supposed to be filled by the seniormost officer of the Pakistan Foreign Service (PFS), went almost always to a senior bureaucrat in the civil service of Pakistan. Mohammad Ikramullah, Aziz

¹⁰⁹ See Ralph Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, Duke University Press, Durham, 1966.

¹¹⁰ Because of their seniority and their placements in key-positions in the administration, these bureaucrats controlled the service careers of their junior colleagues.

Ahmed, Sultan Mohammad Khan, S.K. Delhavi, and Agha Shahi, who all served as secretary for foreign affairs during the late fifties and early sixties were members of the Civil Service of Pakistan.

50 These CSP officers felt very strongly that the United States had made up her mind to support India even at the expense of Pakistan's security. They also objected to what they called American interference in the domestic affairs of Pakistan.¹¹¹ Their influence on Pakistan's China policy can be judged from the fact that the American diplomats blamed them and not the foreign minister or the President, for taking Pakistan closer to the Communist bloc. In 1963, some American Embassy officials labelled Qudratullah Shahab and S.K. Delhavi, both CSP officers and both working as secretaries to central ministries,¹¹² as Communists who had influenced Pakistan's decision to establish closer relations with China.

Even Dawn, the pro-government paper, commenting on Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties, singled

¹¹¹ S.M. Burke, "The Management of Pakistan's Foreign Policy", in Pakistan: The Long View, eds., Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti, and Howard Wriggins, Duke University Press, Durham, 1977, pp. 340-368.

¹¹² S.K. Delhavi was then Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Qudratullah Shahab was Secretary to the Ministry of Education.

out S.K. Dehavi and commended him for his efforts and "hardest work" in bringing about a change in Pakistan's attitude toward China.¹¹³ The Pakistan Writers' Guild passed an anti-American resolution in July 1963, at the behest of Qudratullah Shahab, condemning the Western policy of arming India against China.¹¹⁴ The resolution described the U.S. policy of arming India as being against the very existence of Pakistan.¹¹⁵ Besides the top echelon of the civil service, a number of young officers between the ages of thirty and forty, according to Professor Sayeed, were reported to have socialist sympathies, and were, therefore, also supportive of closer relations with China.¹¹⁶ Since these officers, senior and junior, held important positions in Ayub's administration, their advocacy of closer relations with China created a strong China lobby in the very governing elite of Pakistan with which they worked so closely.

Thus, a number of bureaucrats were of considerable influence in the determination, make-up, and

¹¹³ Dawn, 4 May 1962 (Editorial: The Glow in the North).

¹¹⁴ Shahab was the Secretary-General of the Writers Guild; he initiated the resolution at the Guild's annual meeting in Karachi on 29 July 1963. See Dawn, 30 July 1963.

¹¹⁵ Dawn, 30 July 1963.

¹¹⁶ Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Pakistan and China," p.250.

implementation of Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties by virtue of their being a major component of the ruling elite and by their holding crucial positions in the central and provincial cabinets and secretaries.¹¹⁷ They were in a position

¹¹⁷ Some of the important positions held by senior bureaucrats during 1960-1965 are shown in the following table:

Name	Service Cadre	Position Held
Mohammad Ayub Khan	Army	President
A.R. Khan	"	Defence Minister
W.A. Burki	"	Health Minister
Azam Khan	"	Rehabilitation Minister
K.M. Shaikh	"	Works Minister
M.M. Peerzada	"	Secretary to the President
Aziz Ahmed	Civil Service	Chief Secretary to the Government of Pakistan and Deputy Martial Law Administrator
M.M. Ahmed	"	Deputy Chairman Planning Commission
Fida Hassan	"	Advisor to President
Shujait Ali Hasnie	"	Governor State Bank of Pakistan
Ghulam Ishaque	"	Finance Secretary
S.K. Delhavi	"	Foreign Secretary
Q.U. Shahab	"	Education Secretary
Zakir Hussain	"	Governor East Pakistan
Altaf Gauhar	"	Secretary Information and Broadcasting
Akhtar Hussain	"	Governor West Pakistan

Besides these, almost all Secretaries to the central and provincial ministries, and all heads of the districts and divisions in the country came from the Civil Service of Pakistan.

to wield influence and power over the media, over the masses, thus creating support in public for their advocacy of closer relations with China.

6. The Key Decision-Maker: Ayub's Personal Background and World Outlook

Few high policy decision-makers have the time or inclination to formulate a coherent view of the "operational environment" in which they have to make foreign policy decisions. Yet all possess a set of "images" and are governed by them in their response to foreign policy problems. In other words, they are pre-disposed to view their "operational environment" through a distinctive prism. This prism is shaped by their political culture, historical legacy, and personality traits. Together they form the attitudinal prism through which policy-makers filter the information they acquire. In more direct and simple language it is the perception of reality and not reality itself that plays a decisive part in foreign policy decision-making.¹¹⁸

Foreign policy decisions are made by a small group of men who are authorized by the political system to act on strategic-level issues. Since these

¹¹⁸ These introductory remarks are based on Brecher's elaboration of his research model in The Foreign Policy System of Israel, pp. 211 ff.

decisions, regardless of their character, have a qualitative impact on state behaviour, they are the monopoly of the very few — the "high policy elite."¹¹⁹ This high policy elite makes foreign policy decisions in all political systems, be they presidential or parliamentary. It is usually composed of the chief executive, the foreign minister, the defence minister and other senior members of the cabinet, the top echelon of the ruling party, and the senior bureaucrats in the foreign ministry.

During 1960-1965, Pakistan's foreign policy elite did not quite conform to this normal composition of a high policy elite. This was so first, because until June 1962 Pakistan was ruled by martial law and there were no political parties — ruling or opposition; and second, because, most of the ministers appointed by Ayub were either senior bureaucrats or political unknowns who were not public men. They did not have any rapport with the masses and, therefore, were unable to influence Ayub. Furthermore, Ayub had the solid backing of the civil-military bureaucracy and as Chief Martial Law Administrator all authority was vested in his person. Accordingly, the high policy elite up to July 1962 comprised the senior bureaucrats, the foreign

¹¹⁹Ibid.

minister, and the President only. After July 1962, when the ban on political activity was lifted, the opposition and the ruling party were reformed and "competing elites" started contributing to the policy-making process. One thing, however, was common to both post and pre-July 1962 periods — the dominant role of the President. Accordingly Pakistan's policies, domestic and foreign, reflected his personality and bore the stamp of his domination. Nevertheless, Ayub was influenced, if not pressured, by the views espoused by the bureaucracy during the martial law period, and the competing elites and the bureaucrats during the post-martial law period. The impact of these factors has been examined in the preceding sections. As for the role of the foreign ministers in the formulation of foreign policy — especially Pakistan's China policy during 1960-1965 — it was surprisingly inconsequential.

The period 1958-1965, during which Pakistan's policy of establishing close relations with China was established, saw three foreign ministers: Manzur Qadir, from October 1958-June 1962; Mohammad Ali Bogra, from June 1962 to January 1963; and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, from January 1963 to June 1966. These three men advised

Ayub on matters of foreign policy, and often "he acted in accordance with their advice, but only in rare circumstances and for brief periods did they ever sway him."¹²⁰ At their best, they were "excellent exponents of the brilliant foreign policy of President Ayub Khan."¹²¹ Two of these foreign ministers, Qadir and Bhutto, were political unknowns and had never served in any political office before 1958;¹²² neither had they sufficient rapport with or support from the masses to carry any weight in the council of ministers. The reason for this kind of generous patronage in appointing politically unknown persons to crucial positions in the central cabinet was obvious; Ayub did not want any person with a political background or backing to outshine him in his political maneuverings. He wanted yes-men, not advisors, who could dance to the tune of their master's voice; he wanted minstrels not ministers who could sing his praises and promote his policies so that he could perpetuate his rule.

He had made it quite clear that the policy was going to be his; the ministers were there to assist

¹²⁰ Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era, p. 2.

¹²¹ Dawn, 20 June 1966.

¹²² Bhutto was a lecturer in a local law college and Qadir was practicing law in Lahore, before they joined the cabinet as ministers.

him in justifying or implementing that policy.¹²³ The three foreign ministers — Qadir, Bogra, and Bhutto — were no exception. Qadir was Ayub's foreign minister during the period, when Pakistan's new China policy took shape. He did the spade work, i.e., officially asked China to demarcate the Sino-Pakistan border and impressed on her Pakistan's sincerity in initiating Sino-Pakistan talks leading to a boundary agreement. That he did it successfully is apparent from the fact that China agreed in principle to the demarcation of her border with Pakistan.¹²⁴ Also, he was mainly responsible for publicizing Ayub's thesis of foreign relations based on the theory of "normalization of relations" with all major powers. Qadir knew Ayub too well to try to influence him or to disagree with him. He worked arduously and diligently for the perpetuation of Ayub's rule in order to retain his prestigious position in the cabinet. In fact, he was assigned to projects which had no relevance to his portfolio (such as helping Ayub in devising the political system of Basic Democracies and framing the constitution),¹²⁵ while he was bypassed in matters pertain-

¹²³ See Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 109-110.

¹²⁴ Manzur Qadir's statement; for the text of the statement see the Pakistan Times, Lahore, 16 January 1961.

¹²⁵ Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era, pp. 23-25.

ing to foreign affairs by the President.¹²⁶ Qadir did not seem to mind playing Ayub's stooge, for he knew that was the only way to continue to be in Ayub's good graces. Qadir was assigned the portfolio of Law on 8 June 1962, because he was needed to implement Ayub's constitution to which he had devoted most of his energy and time during his term as foreign minister.

Qadir was replaced by Mohammad Ali Bogra; he was an ideal choice because he acted like a transmission belt. Twice ambassador to the United States, congenial and accustomed to carrying out orders, Ayub expected him to follow his policy to the letter. Ayub was pleased to find that Bogra **more** than met his expectations, but his failing health did not allow him to outshine his predecessor in loyalty to his master. Nevertheless, up until his death on the 23 January 1963, Bogra forwarded Ayub's policy of establishing closer relations with Chou En-lai, which he had established during the 1955 Bandung Conference.¹²⁷ In fact, he was given the job because of his good relationship with the Chinese Foreign Minister, for Ayub had already made up his

¹²⁶ Kuldip Nayar, Distant Neighbours: A Tale of the Subcontinent, Vikas Publishing House, Delhi, 1972, pp. 94-95.

¹²⁷ S.M. Burke, Pakistan Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, pp. 28-29.

mind to establish a better relationship with China.

Bogra's death brought Bhutto to the corridors of international politics. Bhutto identified himself very closely with Ayub's policies; however, by the time he became foreign minister, Pakistan was well along in her policy of establishing closer relations with China. All that remained was to sign the boundary agreement and to justify and popularize the decisions already taken. Bhutto did that job enthusiastically and there seemed to be no divergence between his thinking and that of Ayub. The only occasion on which he differed with Ayub's policies was at the time of the signing of the Tashkent Declaration, the cease-fire agreement between India and Pakistan signed at Tashkent in 1966.¹²⁸ This was the time when Ayub's popularity was touching its nadir. Even then, Ayub did not succumb to Bhutto's pressure; notwithstanding Bhutto's disagreement, he signed the treaty and later sacked Bhutto. Bhutto, it is stated, made a number of efforts to get Ayub Khan to reverse his decision, but failed.¹²⁹

¹²⁸ Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era, pp. 31-33.

¹²⁹ Shabbir Hussain, Lengthening Shadows, Rawalpindi, 1970, p. 107.

Despite Bhutto's claim to the contrary, the fact is that Bhutto, like Qadir and Bogra, could hardly exert any influence on Ayub in foreign policy decisions.¹³⁰ Indeed, rather than playing a role in the formulation of foreign policy, he was obliged to publicly defend and praise policies such as the signing of the Tashkent Declaration, with which he disagreed.¹³¹

In short, up until June 1966, he served Ayub as his "soldier" and "lieutenant."¹³² The relationship between the two was more like that of a domineering father and an obedient son than that of a President and his advisor. Bhutto idolized Ayub and had no comparisons in comparing him to Lincoln, Lenin, Ataturk, and Salahuddin.¹³³

¹³⁰ G.W. Chaudhury, Pakistan and the Major Powers, p. 43; according to Choudhry, Ayub dominated foreign policy-making so much that on occasions he asked Bhutto to keep quiet during official talks with the Soviet Prime Minister in April 1965.

¹³¹ For example, see his statements of 15 January and 19 February 1966, and his speech in the National Assembly of Pakistan on 16 March 1966, in which he observed that the Tashkent Declaration did not "detract one iota" from Pakistan's resolve to seek a just solution of the Kashmir dispute, and that it "closes no possibilities, blocks no efforts, to the achievement of our legitimate aims." See Dawn, 16 January, 20 February, 17 March 1966.

¹³² Dawn, 28 November 1968.

¹³³ Dawn, 15 February 1964.

Thus, it is inconceivable that ministers like Qadir, Bogra, and Bhutto could have exerted influence or pressure on Ayub to follow policies contrary to his thinking. They were, rather, instrumental in reinforcing Ayub's own predilection to alter Pakistan's foreign policy and to establish closer relations with China. The remainder of this section, therefore, focuses exclusively on the personality and philosophy of Ayub Khan and assesses the impact of these factors on Pakistan's China policy during the early sixties.

Ayub cannot be regarded as either a great politician or as an outstanding statesman. There are some who even question his military expertise. However, whatever might be said to denigrate him, the paramount fact is that the impact of his complex personality was sufficiently strong, and his position unquestionably well enough entrenched to enable him to resist any encroachment on his authority or personal thinking.¹³⁴ His autobiography, as well as his speeches and other public statements, reveals that his thinking was neither penetrating nor profound, and that his political thought

¹³⁴Herbert Feldman. From Crisis to Crisis, p. 6.

was not based on extensive reading and reflection.¹³⁵ It was rather the product of a combination of solid common-sense and opportunism. From 1907, when he was born, to 1958, when he seized power, Ayub's personality and political thought were shaped by various elements; prominent among these were his conservative upbringing, his Western education, his military training, his fear of China and the Soviet Union, and his irreconcilable antagonism toward India. These five elements composed the "attitudinal prism" of Ayub Khan and played a meaningful role in his foreign policy decisions.

The first, although not the most important, influence on Ayub was his orthodox upbringing. He was born on 14 May 1907, in a small village in what is now Pakistan of orthodox Muslim Pathan parents of modest means. In his memoirs, Ayub recalls with some pride how his father, Mir Dad Khan, a Risaldar Major in the British Indian Army, longed to live under the flag of Islam and how he wanted Ayub to become a Hafiz-e-Quran.¹³⁶ Despite his employment in the

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ One who knows the Quran by heart.

British Indian Army, Mir Dad had a deep-seated hatred for the colonial powers and a strong sense of Muslim nationalism.¹³⁷

Although Ayub was not as staunch in his Islamic beliefs as his father, he had a strong pro-Muslim bias. As President of the Army Selection Board in India, he was accused of favouring the Muslim applicants for commission in the Army.¹³⁸ In addition Ayub's belief that Islam was a panacea for all social ills, and that Muslims would never be converted to Communism reflected the influence on him of the orthodox environment in which he spent most of his impressionable years. His strong conviction of the excellence and universality of Islam led him to believe that ideologically Communism, Christianity and Hinduism did not pose serious threats to Islam.¹³⁹ According to Ayub, the Sino-Soviet and Indian threats were purely physical and political ones to the existence of Pakistan. A normalization of relations with China, India and the Soviet Union, he perceived would promote the cause of Islam by making Pakistan physically strong, thus enabling her to present a

¹³⁷ Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 2.

¹³⁸ Ibid., pp. 14-15.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 166.

model Islamic state to the outside world. Thus, the ideological constraints, felt by Pakistan's pre-1958 governments to developing closer relations with China and the Soviet Union gave way to Ayub's Pak-Islamist thinking.¹⁴⁰ It was on the basis of this thinking that Ayub sought a closer relationship with China.

Ayub's Western education played the most pronounced part in the make-up of his personality. His early exposure to Western education began in India at the University of Aligarh, at that time largely staffed by the British or British trained Indians. His stay at Aligarh was followed by military education and training in England at the Royal Academy, Sandhurst, which equipped Ayub with a first-hand knowledge of Western military thought and British ways of life. The influence was so profound that for the rest of his life he walked, talked, and even thought like a British Army officer.

The influence of Western education was reinforced by Ayub's thirty-two year army career (1926-1958),

¹⁴⁰ See **section one** of this chapter for a discussion of Pak-Islamism.

during which he worked very closely with British officers. Later as Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army (1952-1958), Ayub had close associations with the British and American military bureaucracy because of Pakistan's membership in the Commonwealth, CENTO and SEATO. In fact, Ayub played a vital role in bringing Pakistan close to the United States.

In short, his Western military education and subsequent Western exposure left a deep impact on Ayub. It equipped him with pragmatic thinking based on solid common sense. His stress on Pakistan's geopolitical exigencies, military needs, and economic development reflected his pragmatism and realism in the British tradition. In foreign policy his reference to the celebrated dictum that nations have no **eternal** enemies or friends, only eternal interests, demonstrated his pragmatic thinking. It was on the basis of this approach to policy making that he tried to normalize Pakistan's relations with India.

An important indicator of his Western orientation was his fear of China and the Soviet Union. Though he did not perceive an ideological threat from them, he,

like all British Army officers, sincerely believed that there was a military danger to the Indian sub-continent from China and the Soviet Union. As Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Armed Forces, his role in forging a close alliance with the West betrayed his pro-Western attitude as well as his fear of China and the Soviet Union. Besides, his offer to India for a joint defence against the threat from the north leaves no doubt about his perceptions of the Sino-Soviet threat to Pakistan. Finally, his foreign policy based on the theory of normalization of relations with all major powers also indicated his perceptions of the Sino-Soviet threat.

Aybu's antagonism toward, and fear of India was a permanent element of his thinking. It was in part a consequence of his orthodox upbringing which had inculcated in him a hatred for Hindus. The feeling was intensified during partition when Ayub, then a colonel, served on the Boundary Force created by Lord Mountbatten for the safe transfer of Hindu and Muslim populations between India and Pakistan. In his autobiography, Ayub describes the atrocities committed by Hindus and Sikhs on the Muslim population in language ringing with anti-Hindu bias.¹⁴¹ Also, having served as Commander-in-Chief

¹⁴¹ Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 15-18.

of the Pakistan Army, Ayub was more aware than the political leaders of the military weakness of Pakistan vis-a-vis a militarily strong India.

Finally, his military training made Ayub used to a strict sense of army discipline; while it taught him to give full loyalty and obedience to his superiors, it also taught him to expect and demand the same from his subordinates.¹⁴² Democracy, he used to say, did not suit the genius of the Pakistani people; in fact it did not suit his temperament for it checks and questions authority, and he was not used to that.¹⁴³

¹⁴²When Liaquat Ali Khan, then Pakistan's Prime Minister, asked Ayub how the senior officers would feel if a junior officer were to be made Commander-in-Chief superseding them, he replied:

Sir, may I say with great respect that this question should never have been asked. Our drill is simple and clear. As army officers we serve to the best of our ability and leave the judgment to our superiors. Whatever decision they take, whether we like it or not, we must accept it. And if somebody is not prepared to accept that decision, he should get the hell out of the army.

Cited by Ayub in Friends Not Masters, p. 34.

¹⁴³Ayub admitted that he could not forgive H.S. Suhrawardy, a former Prime Minister of Pakistan, for interrogating him and his colleagues during the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case in March 1951. Ibid., p. 37.

These, then, were the prominent elements of Ayub's personality and thinking. When he became President of Pakistan nothing had changed in him. His thinking was based on the same elements and his policies reflected the influence of these personality traits. From the very outset Ayub's objective, for reasons of pragmatism, was to establish normal relations with the four major powers involved in Asia — the U.S., and the U.S.S.R., the People's Republic of China, and India -- without antagonizing any of them. Without establishing non-hostile bilateral relations with all these countries, Ayub thought, Pakistan's practical objectives of security and development could not be achieved. The security of Pakistan required normal relations with China, India, and Russia; and the developmental relations with the United States, which could and did provide economic assistance.¹⁴⁴ This was the vital pragmatic element in Ayub's thinking. "It was on this basis," he tells us, "that I set out to normalize our relations with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union."¹⁴⁵ His first proclamation, issued on 7 October 1958, justifying the imposition of martial law in Pakistan, shows not only his concern for foreign

¹⁴⁴Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp.114-115

¹⁴⁵Ibid.

policy, but also the direction it was to take under his government:

We desire to have friendly relations with all nations, but political adventurers try their best to create bad blood and misunderstandings between us and countries like the U.S.S.R., the U.A.R., and the People's Republic of China. Against India, of course, they cry for war, knowing full well that they will be nowhere near the firing line. In no country in the world, do political parties treat foreign policy in the manner ¹⁴⁶ it has been done in Pakistan.

Ayub's signing of the U.S.-Pakistan Bilateral Security Pact in March 1959, his efforts to resolve Indo-Pakistan differences and conclude a joint defence agreement, his overtures to Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and other Muslim countries, and his policy toward China all point to his practical concern, stemming from his Western military education and exposure, to secure as many friends as possible.

The need for friends arose from Ayub's knowledge of Pakistan's military weakness. Besides, his perceptions of the Chinese and Indian threats acquired more strength from the rise in stature and power of India

¹⁴⁶ Dawn, 8 October 1958.

and China.¹⁴⁷ Pakistan, his military training told him, was vulnerable to attack from three different quarters. On the eastern border there was the implacable hostility of India; on the northwestern border Afghanistan was teaming up with Russia and India; and finally, on ill-defined Sino-Pakistan borders in the north there was the menacing presence of China.

Obviously, the only practical solution was to strengthen Pakistan politically and militarily so that she could survive in such a hostile environment. The Western orientation of Ayub prompted him initially to adopt a pro-Western approach rather than to move closer to China or into the Communist orbit. However, owing to Kennedy's pro-India policy and Nehru's aversion to Ayub's offer of joint defence for the subcontinent, Ayub was compelled to follow a different course. In his memoirs, Ayub has explained how his mind worked when the force of events led him to reappraise Pakistan's foreign policy. According to his perceptions, the major countries interested in Pakistan were India, the Soviet Union, China and the U.S.. The prospects for estab-

118. ¹⁴⁷ Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 117-

lishing "normal relations" with India did not appear encouraging. If Pakistan could establish correct bilateral relations with the remaining three powers without antagonizing any of them it would offset the imbalance of power created by the pro-Indian policy of the United States and also make Pakistan more secure in the South Asian subordinate system. By moving closer to China and normalizing her relationship with the Soviet Union, Pakistan would eliminate two potential threats and thus acquire a stable position to face the third, i.e., the Indian threat, more effectively. Ayub also hoped that such a policy might pressure India into resolving Indo-Pakistan problems, especially Kashmir. In that case, Ayub perhaps hoped to go down in the history of Indo-Pakistan relations as one of the greatest statesmen that Pakistan had ever produced.¹⁴⁸

In brief, the policy of forging a closer relationship with China was very much in line with Ayub's political thinking which was reinforced by the pressures emanating from the external and internal environment.

¹⁴⁸ Ayub was very conscious of his publicity and public image and thought of himself as the saviour of Pakistan and one of the great statesmen of the world.

This is obvious from all the political statements he issued after he came to power and the pains he took in justifying this policy in his memoirs.¹⁴⁹ First, he emphasized Pakistan's vulnerable geographical location and her need for friends, in accordance with his Western military training. Second, he doubted the wisdom of Pakistan's previous policy of complete identification with the West, which had antagonized China and Russia. Third, on the basis of his military expertise and realism; he thought that the U.S. was incapable of responding quickly to an attack on Pakistan.¹⁵⁰ Fourth, Ayub often questioned the policy of shutting Pakistan off completely from the possibility of any major assistance from the Communist bloc, an attitude once again reflecting his Western pragmatic thinking. Finally, Ayub, given his Pak-Islamist approach, could not see any reason why Pakistan could not do business with the Soviet Union or China in spite of ideological differences.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ See Ayub's Friends Not Masters, pp. 161-178. Ayub's concern for foreign policy is also evident in his having devoted almost one-third of his book to foreign policy without even mentioning his foreign ministers.

¹⁵⁰ Mohammad Ayub Khan, "Pakistan Perspective", New York Times, 27 June 1960.

¹⁵¹ In his view, if Muslims did not become converted to Christianity after such a long history of domination and friendship, why would they trade their ideology for Communism. See his memoirs, Friends Not Masters, p. 166.

Even the Chinese leadership recognized the fact that Ayub was the architect of Pakistan's China policy in the early sixties. As Tariq Ali recalls, the leaders in Peking asked Maulana Bhashani, Chairman of the pro-China National Awami Party, to support Ayub in the 1965 elections and to give him a chance to deepen Pakistan's friendship with China.¹⁵² Bhashani agreed "because he did not want to upset Ayub's foreign policy which was veering steadily towards China."¹⁵³

In short, Ayub's belief in the superiority of Islam vis-a-vis Communism, his pragmatic thinking based on Western military education, his awareness of Pakistan's military deficiencies and geopolitical relations based on his military training, his fear of China and Russia prompted by his Western orientation, his antagonism toward India, based on his orthodox Islamic upbringing, all played a significant role in his decision to establish closer relations with China.

¹⁵² Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power, p. 140.

¹⁵³ Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 223.

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSIONS.

This study was inspired by the dearth of objective analyses of Pakistan's China policy in the early 1960's. The existing literature on the subject provides only a partial explanation of the reasons for the policy and is characterized by a heavy anti-Indian or anti-Pakistan bias. It focuses mainly on the Indo-Pakistan conflict or the common enmity which Pakistan and China had for India. Every move that Pakistan and China made toward each other is attributed to this conflict and explained — often explained away — in terms of the "Indian factor." These single factor explanations make one presume that had there had been no conflict between the two countries, Pakistan would have had no foreign policy at all!

The reason for the myopia that characterizes these works on Pakistan's China policy lies principally in the research methods employed. None of the scholars has employed a systematic framework for his research that would have obliged him to examine and evaluate all potentially relevant variables despite the initial biases of the researcher. A systematic approach, in this way, guarantees against errors of omission and commission and thus promises impartial and honest research. Had the existing studies employed such an approach, as this study does, it is unlikely that they would have ignored some of the important

variables that have emerged through this inquiry. For example, the dictates of a changing global system, the compulsions arising out of a new U.S. South Asian policy, the security threats that Pakistan perceived from Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, and the economic needs of a poor and underdeveloped Pakistan, all factors heretofore almost entirely neglected, emerge in this study as important additional reasons for Pakistan's decision to establish a closer link with China.


In fact, this study identifies and examines eleven variables, five external and six internal, in the "operational environment" of Pakistan's foreign policy. The data presented indicate that Pakistan's China policy was an outcome of, and a compromise among, all these variables, even if one can speculate that some were more important determinants of the policy than others.

Stated simply, therefore, this work repudiates all single factor explanations of Pakistan's China policy offered in the past by establishing the relevance and importance of other variables and by proving that the Indian factor, however important it may have been, was merely one of the factors, and not the only one, that prompted this policy. The repudiation of the past single factor explanations demonstrates the utility of using a systematic

approach for research and also the need for and appropriateness of such studies in the specific case of Pakistan's foreign policy.

The findings of this study suggest that the external environment of Pakistan had a greater input in affecting her decision to establish closer relations with China than did the internal environment. The examination of the "operational environment" shows that the variables in the internal environment did not undergo as much change as those in the external environment. In fact, the internal environment remained relatively constant. By contrast, substantial changes took place in the external environment, especially in variables relating to the global, the dominant bilateral, and the other bilateral systems.

Pakistan's China policy was most importantly a reaction to her objective assessment of the general tendencies in the global system resulting from the U.S.- Soviet rapproachment, the emergence of China as a big power in Asia, the Sino-Soviet confrontation, and the new advances in military technology. These changes had altered the geopolitical situation of the South Asian region, in general, and Pakistan, in particular, to a great extent. The new global system had rendered Pakistan's policy of complete alignment with the West obsolete. She was convinced that in the new polycentric world her salvation depended



on keeping clear of the rivalries of big powers and normalizing her relations with all of them, irrespective of their ideological and political differences, and remaining neutral in the Cold War. Thus, the global system dictated a reorientation of Pakistan's foreign policy, especially her attitudes and policies toward China.

Like the global system, Pakistan's dominant bilateral system, especially her relations with the U.S., underwent a complete change. Up to the late fifties, Pakistan, largely because of her economic and military dependence, had followed a policy of total alignment with the U.S. However, the change in the U.S. South Asian policy and the imperious manner in which the U.S. tried to impose her new policies on Pakistan brought a fundamental transformation in Pakistan's attitude toward her. According to Pakistani perceptions, the new U.S. South Asian policy was completely unfavourable to Pakistan since it tilted the balance of power in favour of India. The U.S. insistence on following that policy convinced Pakistan that her national interest was of no consequence to the U.S. and would be sacrificed if it served U.S. global objectives to do so. The imbalance of power thus created by the new U.S. South Asian policy was perceived by Pakistan as a serious threat to her security. Pakistan also resented the satellite status to which she was reduced as a result of her alignment with the West, which, to use Ayub's phrase, made her the "laughing stock" of the world. In brief, the

imbalance of power created by the new U.S. South Asian policy and Pakistan's resentment of the U.S. attitude toward her generated a desire in her to shed the yoke of American overlordship and regain national dignity by seeking other avenues of help. On the bilateral level, Pakistan's relations with India and Afghanistan added yet another important dimension to her security problems. Because of the Kashmir problem and the Pakhtunistan issue, the hostility between Pakistan and India, and Pakistan and Afghanistan became so deep that peaceful relations between them were almost out of the question. Pakistan had to deploy a good proportion of her armed forces on her common border with the two countries to defend herself against the security threat she perceived from India and Afghanistan.

Up to the late fifties, Pakistan had U.S. protection; however, by the early sixties, according to Pakistani perceptions, it was no longer available. The U.S. had embarked on a policy which seemed entirely biased in favour of India; Pakistan was left all by herself — weak, helpless, and vulnerable — to defend herself against these military threats. On the other hand, India had become more powerful now that she had the support of both the superpowers, and was, therefore, better equipped to help Afghanistan against Pakistan. As a result, the

Afghan and the Indian threats became more and more imminent. It was against these threats that Pakistan sought security. Being deserted by the United States and being deprived of the Soviet Union's help because of her friendship with the U.S., Pakistan decided to establish closer relations with China in order to survive in the region. Thus, as past studies have indicated, Pakistan's bilateral relations with India did, indeed, have considerable, although by no means an exclusive, impact on the formulation of her China policy. However, to that bilateral relationship must also be added the influence of Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan.

To summarize, the global system, the dominant bilateral system, and other bilateral systems variables all experienced major changes that pointed to the necessity of having a closer relationship with China. Compared to these changes, the changes in Pakistan's domestic environment were insignificant, and hence it can be plausibly argued that internal variables played a less potent part than external variables in bringing about the shift in Pakistan's policy toward China. One key internal variable which underwent little change in the early 1960's was the political structure. The highly authoritarian nature of Ayub's regime throughout the 1960-1965 period made it possible for the key decision-maker to a large extent to ignore domestic pressures on foreign policy if these were not in accordance with his own thinking. In the case of Pakistan's

China policy, Ayub's military training and his world views had set his predilections in favour of establishing closer relations with China. The significance of the other features of the internal environment lies in the fact that they reinforced Ayub's own thinking and thus enabled him to execute his policies without much resistance.

Three internal variables, namely, the economic developmental needs of Pakistan, the bureaucracy, and the competing elites reinforced Ayub's thinking. All of these variables pointed to the desirability of establishing a better relationship with China. The economic needs of Pakistan called for a diversification in Pakistan's relations with other big powers, because it was better for Pakistan to have access to a number of foreign markets and sources of economic and military help than to be dependent on one big power, and, thus, be obliged to follow its political dictates. Similarly, the competing elites and the bureaucracy emphasized Pakistan's insecurity vis-a-vis India and Afghanistan. In their views, Pakistan's national interest would be better served if Pakistan were to establish better rapport with all big powers. It would, in the opinion of the senior bureaucrats and elites, give Pakistan better leverage not only against India and Afghanistan, but also against the big powers themselves by enabling her to play one power off against the other. Nor did the historical

S and ideological legacies place any serious obstacle in the path of a new China policy. Indeed, by the early 1960's the ascendant ideological approach was the Pak-Islamic one and its influential adherents were successfully arguing that if Pakistan's national interests were best served by establishing closer relations with a Communist country, then Pakistan should not shrink from pursuing such a course.

Thus, Pakistan's China policy of the early 1960's was firmly rooted in both her external and internal environments. Its inherent soundness is attested to by the fact that the three administrations that have succeeded Ayub's have maintained the policy in all its essentials. A good relationship with China is considered to be just as essential in 1979 as it was in 1962.

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