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IDEOLOGY IN THE C.C.F. - N.D.P.

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR

BY  
BRYN DAVIES, B.A., B.Ed.  
THE UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR, 1973

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## ABSTRACT

Few concepts have inspired such a mass of commentary in contemporary political analysis than has ideology, yet in spite of its apparent importance, interpretive problems continue to prevail. Disputes over the structures and function of ideology - over its determinants, its desirability and even its very existence have occupied centre stage in academic debate; and the confusion of empirical with definitional issues and of both with normative concerns has tended to complicate the matter.

While intellectual disillusionment might well be generated by these widely recognized difficulties, it remains evident that the link between ideology and politics has continued to attract the attention of students of politics. This is largely because the notion of ideology lies very close to the core of our collective and intimate concerns: how men act politically, and how they ought to act. To better understand this phenomenon as it specifically relates to the experience of the Canadian "left", is the animus behind this undertaking.

The study is divided into three basic chapters, parenthesized by a brief introduction and conclusion. The introductory remarks serve two basic purposes: firstly, to acknowledge the normative hazards of engaging in an analysis of ideology per se; and secondly, to establish a structural perspective to which later references may be made in establishing and evaluating ideological activity.

Chapter I sets out to examine, in a somewhat concise way, various interpretive developments in our understanding of the concept of ideology. After establishing a difference between ideology in knowledge and ideology in politics, the chapter then attempts to reconcile this interpretive dichotomy by integrating both aspects into the notion of political culture. The role of ideational and situational determinants of any specific ideology is considered central to this linkage, and both are cited in later analysis. The chapter concludes with a functional analysis of ideological doctrine, whose application to developments in the Canadian "left" - either stated or implied - are apparent.

Chapter II attempts to highlight important stages in the evolution of organized socialism in Canada, beginning with the protest of early farmer and labour groups and ending with the formation of the NDP. Ideational and situational antecedents to socialist thought in the CCF are initially focused upon, followed by an examination of the movement's development into a political party of a more pragmatic political mould. The imposition of bureaucracy and structure and the party's eventual alliance with organized labour, both under the guiding hand of David Lewis, are considered strategic to this development. The chapter concludes by noting the significance of the CCF's latter-day moderation in establishing an ideological foundation for the NDP.

Chapter III examines the development of the NDP in the 1960's and the emergence of the Waffle as a socialist strain, re-incarnate, in opposition to the party's reformist. Implicit in this analysis are references to the growth of the New Left in Canada and to the subsequent ideological fragmentation of the party; the significance of the schism, in turn, is assessed on both a national and a provincial plane. The chapter concludes with an analysis of these alliances within the party which coalesced to effectively eliminate the public identity of the "left" from the NDP.

The study's conclusion seeks to integrate certain theoretical and empirical themes in light of the contrast between Chapter I and Chapters II and III. In turn, it makes a summary appraisal of the present ideological posture of the NDP, hypothesizing that socialism has evolved in a dialectical fashion over the years, but that the contribution of the New Left to this process will be effective only insofar as it is willing and able to work within the system.



## PREFACE

The impetus behind this undertaking received its principal inspiration from both a personal and an academic interest in the state of the "left" at the turn of the last decade. As an individual, I was not only exposed to, but immersed in various aspects of the New Left as it developed in the Windsor area. As a student of political science, I became interested in both the doctrinal and theoretical manifestations of Canadian socialism, both in their contemporary and historical aspects. The study before you is a product of this activity and these deliberations.

It must be established from the outset that the theoretical and historical aspects of this study have relied more heavily on secondary sources, although one trip was made to the Public Archives in Ottawa to study the CCF Papers. For that privilege, I must express my thanks to Clifford Scotton, the national secretary of the New Democratic Party.

In as much as there is very little written on the NDP, and almost nothing on the Waffle, the analysis of the latter half of the text is derived largely from personal experience. Specific documentation was based on my exposure to both New Democratic and Waffle activity. An examination of the bibliography will reveal the extent and depth of this participation. I was, and still am, an active supporter of the NDP and I have been on the membership list

mailing list of the Waffle since 1970. The subjective hazards of being a participant-observer in this analysis will no doubt be exposed as the text progresses.

At this point, may I express my appreciation to the Detroit Edison Company for their generous rendering of a Canadian-American Relations Fellowship in 1969 and 1970, to Drs. White and Lewis for their most gracious co-operation in the latter stages of the thesis' development, to my thesis advisor, Professor Price, for his patience and encouragement and critical, yet fraternal guidance over the years, and lastly to my wife Sheryl, for her faith that it would some day be complete.

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
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## INTRODUCTION

As indicated in the Abstract, the study of ideology can be both confusing and frustrating. Indeed a plethora of exhaustive definitions and classifications have been proffered, yet at this point, there appears little value in compiling still another; and to complicate matters, the hazards of over-rigidity, especially in view of more recent attempts,<sup>1</sup> should compel us to avoid the pedantic.

In narrowing our scope, suffice it to say that ideology may be elementally broken down into a perspective on knowledge and a perspective on politics.<sup>2</sup> The first is concerned with the question of to what extent man's knowledge is ideologically conditioned or distorted; in many ways, ideology in this sense has been contrasted with truth, knowledge, and science. The second area of inquiry

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<sup>1</sup>See Edward Shils, "The Concept and Function of Ideology", Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, pp. 66-75. Herein Shils strives systematically to differentiate between "ideologies", "outlooks", "creeds", "systems and movements of thought" and "political programmes". While his effort is admirable, the intent of this study is to avoid the difficulties that accompany such precision, and to emphasize, in a more general way, the influences on, and the content of, certain ideological thought. In this sense, Apter's definition of ideology as "a system of beliefs, potent in specific situations of conduct" and his view of political ideology as "an application of particular moral prescriptions to collectivities", seem more appropriate for our purposes. D. Apter, Ideology and Discontent, (New York, 1964), p. 17.

<sup>2</sup>See Giovanni Sartori, "Politics, Ideology and Belief Systems", American Political Science Review, Vol. 63 (1969), P. 398.

questions whether ideology is an essential feature of politics, and if so, what does it explain; this latter perspective is not concerned with truth-value, but rather with the practical and functional implications of ideology.

The above categories, while not purporting to be absolute, are nevertheless intended to provide the necessary theoretical focus for an analysis of ideology, both conceptually and in terms of specific doctrines. In addition, these categories comply with an underlying assumption of this study, namely that ideology is intricately enmeshed in the political culture and subcultures of any given society, and that as such, it may reflect, in a doctrinal sense, a variety of political prejudices. It therefore follows that while our study involves an "ideological" interpretation of the "left" in Canada, any direct implication that ideology is itself confined solely to oppositional movements of dissent or to extremist political philosophies, is neither supported, nor intended.

The notion that ideology is solely related to radical politics has been supported by many of the "and of ideology" theorists who, from the point of view of this writer, have failed to differentiate ideology per se from principled political conflict. Where many of these theorists have acknowledged the decline in such conflict and / or radical political activity, they have also heralded this tendency as the death knell of ideology. Surely, however, the erosion of political conflict cannot be equated with the elimination of ideology, for inasmuch

as alternative systems of belief are dissolved, the overbearing presence of a singular mode of thought is all the more encouraged.

That this demise of ideology in Western society has been both empirically observed and normatively applauded by the end of ideology theorists, lends credence to what Clifford Geertz has ironically coined "the ideologization of ideology".<sup>3</sup> Geertz's observation is important for two reasons: 1) that the tenor of debate within academic circles has been intensified and 2) that social scientists, like politicians, are equally susceptible to the bias endemic to main currents of social thought.

The logic of this latter observation has compelled many to question the posture of impartiality in the pursuit of "objective" social analysis, and in the case of the study of ideology, to more readily accept the validity of Mannheim's Paradox. As Geertz points out, Mannheim's attempt to construct a "non-evaluative conception of ideology" ended in an "ethical and epistemological relativism which he himself found uncomfortable".<sup>4</sup> As a result, nowhere is resistance to claims of objectivity and neutrality greater than in the study of ideology, and far be it from this writer to claim to have transcended the above scepticism. To acknowledge the inevitability of subjectivity in the ensuing analysis is not only to respond in advance to future allegations

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<sup>3</sup>Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System" in David Apter, op.cit., p. 47.

<sup>4</sup>Geertz, op.cit., p. 48

of bias, but also to admit, in a more intimate way, to the personal affinity of this writer to many of the ideas to be discussed herein.

Before proceeding with an overview of the concept of ideology, it would be analytically instructive to borrow a structural definition of ideology from an article written by Robert Haber.<sup>5</sup>

Therein he states that ideology exhibits four basic structural characteristics which include: 1) a set of fundamental moral values; 2) a perception of the ideal society in which those values may be realized; 3) a systematic analysis of present society, be it affirmative or negative; and 4) a programmatic strategy for the attainment of that ideal, again bearing in mind that such a strategy may be in defense of or in opposition to the prevailing conventional wisdom.

While these conceptual divisions may not always be "neat", they shall be employed from time to time throughout this study in acknowledging certain ideological forms.

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<sup>5</sup>For an elaboration of this position see Robert Haber, "The End of Ideology as Ideology" in Chaim Waxman, The End of Ideology Debate, (New York, 1969), pp. 182-206.

## CHAPTER I

### IDEOLOGY

In its earliest form, "ideology" simply referred to the "science of ideas" wherein various concepts were systematically reduced to their most elementary dimensions and later synthesized into more comprehensible forms.<sup>1</sup> The practitioners of this science, from whose name "ideology was derived", were known as ideologues. Through their National Institute in late eighteenth-Century France, they set out not only to fill what they felt to be scientific and methodological vacuum left by their philosophical predecessors, but also to persuade the public that their analysis-synthesis technique was man's only possible salvation from human prejudice and misunderstanding.

Their attempts to overhaul conventional thinking, however, fell into disrepute during the Napoleonic era, for it was during this time that new philosophies and schools of thought were blamed for the cumulative upheavals and excesses of the Revolution. As a result, the initial endeavours of the ideologues to attribute to "ideology" a theoretical status, were essentially undermined by

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<sup>1</sup>Richard H. Cox, Ideology, Politics and Political Theory, (Buffalo, 1969), pp. 10-11.



Napoleon's later damnation of what he called "obscure metaphysics and pernicious doctrines".<sup>2</sup> These accusations sufficed to brand the concept of ideology with additional political connotations. "Ideology" could now be interpreted as meaning not only the "science of ideas" but also as some form of visionary, abstract theorizing, apparently intent upon overturning traditional political practice by subverting the established opinions and actions of men.

This early politicization of the term ideology marked the genesis of a fundamental interpretive dichotomy regarding the concept's application. The "theoretical" and "political" or "doctrinal" usages so derived, however, have tended to lose their analytical distinctiveness, especially when examined from a concrete, real-life perspective. That is to say, oftentimes theoretical meanings of the term ideology derive their essence from political application, while the political interpretations, on the other hand, either refer to, or are dependent upon, theoretical reasoning. This intermingling of the doctrinal and the conceptual has been central to the complexity and perplexity endemic to any serious analysis of ideology.

While it is not the intended scope of this study to penetrate in any further depth the philosophical implications of this doctrinal/theoretical mix<sup>3</sup>, it is of interest to note in passing,

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<sup>2</sup>Cox, op.cit., p. 14.

<sup>3</sup>See Dante Germino, "The Revival of Political Theory" and P.H. Partridge, "Politics, Philosophy, Ideology", in Cox, op.cit.

that the current debate over the nature of political theory is rooted in these earlier developments in eighteenth and nineteenth century France. For where the ideologues attempted to replace traditional political thought with propositions capable of sensory verification (inspite of Napoleon's "metaphysical" accusations), the same principle was later elevated by Comte to the cardinal tenet of positivist methodology.<sup>4</sup> Since that time, traditional thought has been branded "ideological" by modern-day disciples of this Comtian tradition, inspite of the efforts of noted scholars like Strauss and Voeglin.<sup>4a</sup>

Without dismissing the possibility of independent theoretical contemplation, it is evident that historical and situational factors tend to parallel, if not influence, developments in the cultivation of ideas. That is to say, for example, that Comte's abiding faith in the scientific approach, in technocracy, and in an ultimate state of perfection, could be general symptoms of nineteenth century optimism; or to refer to a more classical example, Plato's design for an ordered society based on the rule of philosopher-kings could be linked to his distaste for the excesses of Athenian democracy and the intemperance of Athenian imperialism. While this apparent relationship between ideas and circumstance is worthy of note simply for historical reasons, it is of an even

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<sup>4</sup>Germino, ibid., p. 106.

<sup>4a</sup>Both Strauss and Voeglin are in the political-philosophical tradition of scorning rigidity and determinism in their pursuit of an understanding to the question "What is the ideal political state?"

more crucial import to an analysis of ideology. The fact that several commentaries on the determination of ideology have linked ideational factors with situational ones, merits further investigation.

Determinants of Ideology: Situational Factors

To be more specific, Marx and Engels believed, for example, that man's ideas were rooted in his relationship to the productive forces within society:

As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, coincides with what they produce and how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production... The production of ideas is directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life.<sup>5</sup>

The totality of man's consciousness - what he thinks about himself, about morality, religion, politics and law - is a social product derived in the last analysis from his relationship to the means of production. This is how, according to Marx and Engels, ideology is formed.

In the context of actual societies, it was posited that the prevailing ideology at any given time is rooted in the dialectical nature of the class struggle. Marx claimed, for example, that "the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch, the ruling ideas - i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society is, at the same time, its ruling intellectual force".<sup>6</sup> The dom-

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<sup>5</sup>Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, (New York, 1963), p. 15.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 39

inant class gives expression to these ideas with the intent of protecting its interests and maintaining its position of superiority.

In this regard, Engels further noted that "ideology is a mental process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, indeed, but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all".<sup>7</sup> Herein, Engels has equated the concept of ideology with "false consciousness" and with a conception of reality that is inextricably linked to the interest-bound values of the ruling class. On this point, Karl Mannheim embraced a similar notion:

Ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensively interest bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts that would undermine their sense of domination. There is implicit in the word ideology the insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real condition of society, both to itself and to others, and thereby stabilizes it.<sup>8</sup>

The foregoing discussion points to a fundamental difference between the theories of Marx and Mannheim. For Marx, the above statement vindicates what Engels labelled as "false consciousness". It is false insofar as it fails to acknowledge the reality of

<sup>7</sup>Engels letter to Mehring, quoted in Harold Walsby, The Domain of Ideologies: A Study of the Origin, Development and Structure of Ideologies, Glasgow, 1947, p. 11.

<sup>8</sup>Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, New York, 1936, p. 40.

dialectical materialism and the historical necessities contained therein.<sup>9</sup> Axiomatic to this is the assumption that once the subservient class had recognized the necessity of their historical role, they would no longer be bound by the confines of a false consciousness symptomatic of that particular stage of historical development. Mannheim, on the other hand, ascribed no special comprehension of reality to the subservient class, for according to him, their interests were reflected in their aspirations and ideas about the future - in their utopian ideology. "Certain oppressed groups", as he saw it, "are intellectually so strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition of society that they unwittingly see only those elements in the situation which tend to negate it".<sup>10</sup> As with the dominant class, they too are interest-bound and can make no special claim to the truth. The logic of this position impels Mannheim to assume that the beliefs of any group are grounded in the totality of its experience. As such, the relative position of any one group to

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<sup>9</sup>On this point, Marx and Engels claimed a privileged perspective of having themselves achieved "a mature consciousness" - one which illumined historical circumstance and enabled them to understand "the totality of the world and man's place in it". Lichtheim notes that Marx took it for granted that though "consciousness is conditioned by existence, it can also rise above existence and become a means of transcending the alienation which sets the historical process in motion. The truth about man is one and the same for all stages of history, even though every stage produces its own illusions". See George Lichtheim, The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays, (New York, 1967), p. 21. While a related problem concerns the role of intellectual reflection, independent to one's own class position, that question will be considered below.

<sup>10</sup>Mannheim, op.cit., p.40.

another or to its environment assures a variety of perspectives, none of which can be assumed to have an absolute or conclusive vision of reality.

The animus behind Mannheim's speculative venture was derived from a desire to interpret a reality devoid of ideological implications. For him, man's logical means by which to escape the confines of this Engelian "false consciousness" was to embrace the sociology of knowledge. Its task was to "understand the narrowness of each individual point of view and the interplay between these distinctive attitudes in the total social process".<sup>11</sup> The task of attaining this conscious awareness of reality, insofar as it related to the individual's knowledge of himself and his contextual situation, was assigned to a socially-unattached intelligentsia.

While it has been argued that Mannheim floundered in his theory of relativism<sup>12</sup>, it is evident, nonetheless, that his

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 72.

<sup>12</sup>Mannheim noted both that "all historical knowledge is relational and can only be formulated with reference to the position of the observer" (Ibid., p. 71), and that since "situational determination is an inherent factor in knowledge... we must reject the notion that there is a 'sphere of truth in itself'" (Ibid., p. 305). From the above, it would seem that Mannheim's abiding faith in the objectivity of sociological analysis could be interpreted as, at best, tenuous. As Geertz pointed out, under Mannheim's scheme, "socio-political thought would be tainted with the vulgar struggle for advantage which it had professed to rise above". He added in turn, that what was of even more immediate importance was the question of whether or not "this absorption into its own referent has destroyed its

exploration of the social determination of thought was a major advance in the quest for a theoretical understanding of the concept of knowledge. Werner Stark's later refinement and dissection of this sociological approach to thought proves all the more conclusively the utility of Mannheim's pioneer effort.

In the Sociology of Knowledge Stark frees us from the bonds of Mannheim's rationalizations by making a distinction between "the social determination of thought" and "ideological thought". He notes:

Ideas and beliefs... can be related to reality in a double way: either to the facts of reality, or to the strivings to which reality, or rather the reaction to this reality, gives rise.<sup>13</sup>

scientific utility altogether". See Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System" in Apter, Ideology and Discontent, (New York, 1964), p. 47. In addition, Cox, Sartori and Merton have called into question Mannheim's faith in a socially-unattached intelligentsia. The following quote from Sartori capsulizes the essence of these critiques: "If truth is no longer discovered by observation, reasoning, and argument, but by uncovering hidden causes which, unknown to the thinker, have determined his conclusions; if whether a statement is true or false is no longer decided by logical arguments and empirical tests, but by examining the social position of the man who made it - reason has finally been driven out - and so we arrive at a mental and intellectual nihilism". See Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory, (New York, 1965), p. 457. Note as well, Cox, op.cit., pp. 77-90 and Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, (New York, 1965), p. 548.

<sup>13</sup> Werner Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge, (London, 1958), p. 90.

For Stark, the former may be described as knowledge. It is, "in principle, truthful...theoretical...rational and cognitive"; the latter, ideology, is truthful "only by accident", and, to continue the parallel, it is "paratheoretical, emotionally-tinged, vitiated by bias, and evaluative".<sup>14</sup>

These two levels of thought are basically the products of two distinct socialization processes - the first involving the basic acculturation of the individual into his role as a social being, and the second, performing a more normative task of infusing the individual with certain cultural standards, be they in defense of, or contrary to the dominant pattern of belief. This dualism is important in that it permits a delineation between the situational determination of thought and the imposition of contextual social values. While Stark would readily admit that all thought is socially derived and not value-free, he would also submit that there is a qualitative difference between human subjectivity on the one hand and the more onerous reality of socially-conditioned value systems and patterns of behaviour on the other.

#### Ideational Factors

To be sure, the scope of the foregoing discussion of ideology has embraced a wide range of intellectual concerns - epistemological questions concerning the formation of ideas, the

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 90.



philosophical question of history and how it relates to consciousness ("true" and "false"), the empirical question of the relationship between specific ideas and specific social groupings, and "political" questions concerning the imposition of contextual social values. In spite of its rather complicated import, our analysis has attempted to integrate these aspects by placing a solitary emphasis on situational inducements.

From the above, however, it is not our intent to acquiesce in a situational reductionism. On the contrary, it is the position of this study that man's ideas are determined by an interaction of situational and ideational variables. Even in the case of Marxist thought - Marx's dogged reductionism notwithstanding - the ideational aspect cannot be avoided. The fusion of Marx's analysis both with his own political intent<sup>15</sup> and with the doctrine of later disciples<sup>16</sup> are cases in point.

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<sup>15</sup> Reinhard Bendix has characterized Marx's life as a contradiction between an adherence to situational reductionism and an affirmation of the constructive role of ideas: "If illusion and ideology will finally vanish... in the society of the future, then social knowledge has no constructive rôle here and now. But Marx does not accept this implication, which would cut the ground from under his own claim to be a scientist and a political leader. By treating all knowledge as a distorting reflex of the real world, Marx casts doubt upon the ends and uses of knowledge and of all human activities (yet) to make sure that the knowledge (he) gained will play a constructive role in human affairs". See R. Bendix, "The Age of Ideology: Persistent and Changing" in Apter, op.cit., pp. 309-10.

<sup>16</sup> It is evident that the political ambitions of many of Marx's disciples have blurred the distinction between "the blind necessity of historical automatism" and the "conscious purpose" of

While the above deviations are instructive in establishing an ideational approach to the determination of thought and behaviour, the efforts of Comte and Weber have provided an additional and more important contribution. Comte, writing at the same time as Marx, provided an ideational reductionist argument that could be interpreted as the polar opposite to the Marxian situational reductionist theme. Therein he posited that human history fell into three distinct and necessary "ideational" stages - the theological (from primitive times to the end of the middle ages), the metaphysical (middle ages to the end of the 18th Century) and the positive (19th Century and after).<sup>17</sup> Each of these stages, in turn, chronologically determined the polytheistic/monotheistic, the metaphysical and the scientific categories into which modes of human thought must inevitably fall.

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overt political action. In this regard both Lukacs and Lenin asserted that with the decomposition of bourgeois society, a revolutionary party must incarnate the consciousness of the epoch. (Cited in Lichtheim, *op.cit.*, p.39) For students of Marxist ideology, the significance of this development is twofold: firstly, ideology as "false consciousness" is replaced by the positivist notion that ideology is related to the on-going activity of a class or group effective enough to make some sort of difference (Lichtheim, p. 46), and secondly, the often times non-proletarian background of intellectual leaders renders tenuous the direct relationship between one's class and one's ideology. For a discussion of this problem see Carl Federn, "The Materialist Conception of History" in Cox, *op.cit.*, pp 53-64.

<sup>17</sup> See Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol. 1, (New York, 1968), pp. 73-145.

Weber, in a less dogmatic vein, acknowledged that both situational and ideational factors played an important part in affecting human thought and behaviour:

Material and ideal interests govern man's conduct. Yet very frequently the world images which have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamics of interest.<sup>18</sup>

According to R. P. Cuzzort, much of Weber's thought flowed from his reaction to the writings of Marx<sup>19</sup> - or, as Eric Nordlinger put it, their theories entered into a "dialogue" wherein the central focus was "the role of ideas in influencing behavioural and situational change".<sup>20</sup> Where Marx believed that all ideas are basically reflections of the economic substructure, Weber concluded that Marx's thesis was just one possibility among many, rather than a universally applicable generalization. Though Weber was not trying to stand Marx on his head, he was attempting to round out Marx's overly-narrow but powerful concentration upon economic forces by arguing that ideas may have an independent influence all of their own. Divergencies in these two approaches appear in their sharpest form in Marx and Weber's explanation of the rise of capitalism and the relationship of religion to that phenomenon.

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<sup>18</sup>H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, From Max Weber, (New York, 1958), p.63.

<sup>19</sup>R. P. Cuzzort, Humanity and Modern Sociological Thought, (New York, 1969), p.51.

<sup>20</sup>See Eric Nordlinger, Politics and Society, (Englewood Cliffs, 1970), p.15.

Where Marx saw the development of capitalism as a product of contradictory economic forces, Weber hypothesized that the ascetic Protestant ethic<sup>21</sup> was just as important as economic criteria in making conditions ripe for the rise of capitalism in the west; where Marx saw the church as an apologist for capitalist exploitation, Weber saw the church as the matrix of ideas from which capitalism had evolved. To capsulize Weber's argument, he claimed that the ideas of Luther and Calvin had combined to elevate the acquisitive motive to a moral principle. Luther's teachings suggested that man could enhance his own state of grace by meeting the demands of his own temporal calling; Calvin, in turn, suggested that man's fate had been predestined by the will of God and that as such, man should attempt to seek external signs of inner grace by striving for social achievement in accordance with God's holy commandments.<sup>22</sup> The result was the elevation of the work ethic to the status of an ascetic exercise; and the best work was that which was conscientiously planned, thorough, and methodically executed. That the best work was characterised by this quality, promoted within the capitalist ethic the rational use of wealth and the rational deployment of labour. It was in these terms that Weber attributed to the

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<sup>21</sup>See The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Talcott Parsons, trans.), (New York, 1930).

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., pp.105-120.

capitalist spirit an underlying moral stimulus based on Protestant doctrine. Contained therein was a specific ideational impetus which, according to his findings, was absent in the religions of other societies which, in spite of favourable material conditions, had not developed comparable capitalist structures.

Weber's contribution to our understanding, in turn, of the historical context of ideology, is of parallel significance. In terms of the above "dialogue", both Marx and Weber agreed that ideology could be interpreted as meaning the consciousness of an epoch. Yet as Lichtheim noted,

unlike Marx, for whom history as a whole exemplified a hidden rationality, Weber relativized sociology by severing it from philosophy: every culture has its own norms and values which enter into the perception of what is called reality.<sup>23</sup>

Unlike Marx, Weber denied that this situation could be transcended and that value judgements could be grounded in a universally accepted doctrine of human nature. What remained, according to Weber, was the subjective freedom of each individual to act from freely chosen standpoints according to his own convictions.<sup>24</sup> Though there needn't be a close connection between "the interests of the individual and the content of an idea during its inception", he submitted that ideas would eventually become routinized, in turn, to be selected and re-interpreted in accordance with the

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<sup>23</sup>Lichtheim, op.cit., pp.31-32.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p.33.

interests of certain social strata.<sup>25</sup> As such, while "both ideas and their publics are seen as independent, by a selective process, elements in both find their affinities".<sup>26</sup> Such is the nature of our situational-ideational mix.

The historic-cultural context of the above discussion compels us to make one additional, but brief observation as regards to the ideational dimension of human thought - namely, that ideas do not arise out of a historical vacuum, but rather exhibit a relational quality over time. Mannheim's observation that the single individual does not think, but rather participates in thinking further what men have thought before, focuses on this consideration:

The individual finds himself in an inherited situation with patterns of thought which are appropriate to his situation and attempts to elaborate further the inherited modes of response or to substitute others for them in order to deal more adequately with the new challenges which arise out of the shifts and changes in his situation.<sup>27</sup>

The above circumstance is applicable to situations wherein

- 1) the individual unconsciously derives meaning from his cultural or political-cultural milieu;<sup>28</sup>
- 2) the individual consciously derives certain notions from his acquaintance with an ideological heritage - ie. how would Bernstein or Woodsworth have acted in

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<sup>25</sup> Gerth and Mills, op.cit., pp.62-63

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p.63.

<sup>27</sup> Mannheim, op.cit., p.3

<sup>28</sup> As Gramsci noted, "Each one of us are the product of the

this situation? and 3) where the source of ideological ferment is internationally rooted and strategies applicable to one situation may, in fact, be appropriate, or at least enlightening to activity in similar situations. Historically speaking then, ideologies are vertically integrated by their evolutionary development in a particular locale, and horizontally integrated by a universality of appeal in a stated historical context.

Thus ideology, as an integral part of the thought process, is both socially and historically conditioned. In the "social" sense, it is "related to the fact of reality"<sup>29</sup> or "bound up in the life situation of the thinker"<sup>30</sup>; in the "historical" sense, the fact that reality is constantly in a state of flux, points to what Brzezinski has called "ideology's dialectical relationship with reality"<sup>31</sup>. In general terms, ideological thinking, as an evaluative and prescriptive exercise, will invariably be sensitive to changing historical trends and adjust its direction accordingly.

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historical process which has left us with an infinity of traces gathered together without the advantage of an inventory". Cited in Nigel Harris, Beliefs in Societh - The Problem of Ideology, (London, 1968), p.35.

<sup>29</sup>Stark, op.cit., p.48.

<sup>30</sup>Mannheim, op.cit., pp.78-79.

<sup>31</sup>Z. Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics, (New York), 1962, p.115.

### A Cultural Perspective

From the foregoing analysis, it is evident that the concept of ideology bears both a sociological and a political significance. As a form of congruent normative thought diffused within any given society, it has been equated both with knowledge and consciousness and with a rigidly defined set of political principles or doctrine. Whether one accepts the former or the latter interpretations - or both - it is apparent that ideology provides a more or less coherent organization for our experience as it relates to our conscious action or inaction in the pursuit of on-going purposes. It is therefore evident that in addition to the above "sociological" and "political" usages, the notion of ideology bears as well, a significant cultural import. Indeed, the works of Harris<sup>32</sup> and Geertz<sup>33</sup> have attributed to ideology a cultural significance in and of itself.

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<sup>32</sup> According to Nigel Harris, culture consists of an immense series of systems of concepts which stand in symbolic relation to our experience and help us to interpret that experience. Within this complex of systems exist both higher-order systems and lower-order systems - the former referring to a form of intuitive inbred logic itself (i.e. snow is "white" because that is how we have customarily come to understand and relate the substance with the colour), and the latter referring to ways in which we use that logic. It is the lower order systems about which men agree, which change, which vary between social groups, between different kinds of studies, between historical periods. These systems are necessary because they organize our experience very quickly so that we do not have to work out consciously from scratch an attitude to ultimate happenings. Harris has attributed to ideology this "lower-order" status. Nigel Harris, Beliefs in Society: The Problem of Ideology, (London, 1968), pp.30-33.

<sup>33</sup> In a comparable vein, Geertz has described ideologies as



There remains a problem, however, in clearly articulating a conceptual relationship between ideology per se and culture, and ideology and political culture, for inasmuch as cultural analysis often assumes a political and sociological perspective (as does ideology), an understanding of ideology vis a vis cultural phenomena will undoubtedly be conditioned by one's sociological and/or political understanding of the concepts involved. This point needs further clarification.

At the outset, let us define culture as "a series of systems of concepts which organize our experience so that, by identifying objects and attributing systematic meaning to them, we shall be able to overcome the problems we face in seeking to survive".<sup>34</sup> Political culture, in turn, is "a system of empirical beliefs, values and expressive symbols which defines the situation in which political action takes place".<sup>35</sup> Political culture is distinguished from general culture by its specific "political" context.

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"most distinctively maps of problematic social reality which serve as matrices for the creation of a collective conscience" and as "templates or blueprints for the organization of social and psychological processes", Geertz, op.cit., pp.62-64.

<sup>34</sup>Harris, op.cit., p.36.

<sup>35</sup>Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture" in Pye & Verba, Political Culture and Political Development, (Princeton, 1964), P.513

For those who subscribe to the more general, sociological interpretation of ideology - that it simply involves one's knowledge or consciousness in a given situation - it could be concluded that while ideology is an aspect of general culture, its wide-ranging scope would be more inclusive than that of political culture. In this respect, ideology could be viewed as embracing political culture rather than the reverse. On the other hand, for those who adhere to a "political" interpretation of ideology - that, as a doctrine, it prescribes appropriate forms of action based on particular moral precepts - it could be argued that its more limited scope makes ideology an aspect of both general culture and political culture.

It is indeed a temptation to subscribe to both interpretations of the concept of ideology and to analyze the development of specific modes of thought in Canada by going from the "cultural" (basic life processes) to the "ideological" (development of normative consciousness) to the "political-cultural" (normative predispositions to political things) and back to the "ideological" (specific evaluation of political events leading to principled political action). However to definitionally fluctuate between ideology as knowledge and ideology as doctrine in any such analysis would be to commit our efforts to unnecessary confusion. It therefore behooves us to take sides on the matter, since some form of cultural analysis remains fundamental to our developmental understanding of the

link between consciousness, general but normative predispositions, moral pronouncements, doctrinal articulation and the call for principled action. And since our analysis of the "left" in Canada is more concerned with "political" ideology than with ideology in its most general, societal application, it is necessary to embrace the former, more restricted interpretation.

In so doing, we are not negating the validity of situational and ideational stimuli in the development of varying forms of thought and consciousness - on the contrary, they remain essential to our comprehension of the bases upon which ideologies, as structurally defined in the introduction (moral visions, social criticism, political programmes), are established. Having accepted this more pejorative, positivist<sup>36</sup> interpretation of ideology, it is therefore assumed that those specific political ideologies or doctrines referred to below, will be conceptually understood as aspects, indeed sub-cultural aspects, within a more inclusive political-cultural framework. Conveniently, such is the perspective of Joseph Nettl and Philip Converse to whom we shall refer in developing this discussion. Let us now take a closer look at the relationship between political culture and ideology in the context of the above assumptions.

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<sup>36</sup> Lichtheim, op.cit., p.46.

## Political Culture and Ideology

The concept of political culture represents a hybrid of dimensions and inter-disciplinary approaches. As an analytical tool, it represents an attempt to bridge the gap between a micro-perspective based on psychological interpretation of an individual's political behaviour, and a macro-perspective, founded on the sociological orientations of group analysis. The inclusiveness of political culture is thus manifest in its wide appeal to history, psychology, sociology and anthropology, not to mention political studies.

To restate Sidney Verba's definition that political culture, consists of a system of empirical beliefs, values and expressive symbols which defines the situation in which political action takes place<sup>37</sup> is to acknowledge this multiplicity of approaches. Beliefs and values are elements of psychology and sociology. When placed in a political context, they have politico-cultural significance.

A belief is a simple proposition, conscious or unconscious, inferred from what a person says or does. It may describe as true or false, evaluate as good or bad and prescribe as desirable or undesirable.<sup>38</sup> Beliefs about something, being susceptible to

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<sup>37</sup> Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture" in Pye & Verba, Political Culture and Political Development, (Princeton, 1964), p.513

<sup>38</sup> Milton Rokeach, "Attitudes", Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 1, 1968, p.455.

mythological and ideological distortion,<sup>39</sup> may be subject to empirical verification; beliefs in something, are not. A normative belief, then, namely one that is analytical and prescriptive as opposed to cognitive, is subject to the values of those concerned. In this light, Rokeach contends that a value and a normative belief about action and goals are one and the same.<sup>40</sup> Hence, the thin line dividing the concept of belief from that of value is the specific and singular normative emphasis of the latter.

Attitudes, on the other hand, which are included in Almond and Powell's definition of political culture<sup>41</sup> are defined as an enduring organization of beliefs around an object or situation, predisposing an individual or group to respond in some preferential manner.<sup>42</sup> Being, in effect, a cluster of specific beliefs, they may either be normative (in the sense of value) or empirical (in the sense of beliefs about something).

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<sup>39</sup>Joseph Nettl, Political Mobilization, (London, 1962), pp.63-64. Although myths and ideology are prone to distort beliefs, this does not undermine their significance, or the significance of their impact. In the context of political culture, a distorted belief is just as important as one that is not.

<sup>40</sup>Rokeach, op.cit., p.450

<sup>41</sup>G. Almond and B. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, (Boston, 1966), p.23. In a definition very similar to others postulated by the "Princeton School" of political development, this book defines political culture as "consisting of attitudes, beliefs, values and skills which are current in an entire population, as well as those special propensities and patterns which may be found within separate parts of that population."

<sup>42</sup>Rokeach, op.cit., p.450

In some cases, values, beliefs and attitudes, as component parts of political culture, are inseparable and oftentimes, interchangeable. The above distinctions are by no means intended to be conclusive, nor do they defy criticism. The point in question is not one of precise and explicit differentiation however, but rather that the "attitudinal" character of these phenomena, as expressed through individual and collective orientations towards political objects, contributes to this essential social-psychological dimension of political culture. To be sure, such responses provide the necessary "subjective orientation to politics" that is discussed by Verba.<sup>43</sup>

In addition, the concepts of belief,<sup>6</sup> value and attitude serve a useful explanatory function to political culture. Since they, in fact, are essential components of the concept, an examination of their source, direction, content and mode of expression, is by association, an examination of the dimensions and scope of political culture.

The source of values, attitudes and beliefs may be found in human experience and hence may be affected by any conditions that affect experience. This experience may be of a political, parapolitical or non-political nature. It may be pertinent to both individual and group perceptions. While all individuals will inescapably partake of general cultural patterns (language,

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<sup>43</sup>Verba, op.cit., p.513.

religion, ethnicity, etc.), they will partake of the political aspect of that culture in varying degrees. Hence we have the difference between the politically attentive and the politically inattentive, the observer and the participant, the participant and the leader.

The content of these values, attitudes and beliefs may be cognitive (having a knowledge of), affective (emotionally responsive) and evaluative. Erik Erikson would include in this list social trust/distrust, confidence/suspicion, a sense of self reliance and a sense of initiative.<sup>44</sup> Lipset, through his application of the Parsonian pattern variables, would add ascription/achievement, universalism/particularism, individualism/collectivism and egalitarianism/elitism.<sup>45</sup> Any or all such such dichotomies may represent the pure or ideal type and as such, various intermediate positions along the axis linking the two polar extremities is more often the case.

The expression of these sentiments is directed towards what has already been coined political objects, the political system, or institutionalized political authority. It is this specific political orientation, or orientation to political things, that highlights political culture. These political "objects" may

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<sup>44</sup> See Peter Merkl, Modern Comparative Politics, (New York, 1970), pp. 157-63.

<sup>45</sup> S.M. Lipset, Revolution and Counterrevolution, (New York, 1968), pp. 31-64.

include any number of phenomena. Verba, for example, notes that the dimensions of political culture include the nation state, governmental output, and belief systems.<sup>46</sup> In this light, the feeling of belonging within the state both physically (territorially) and psychologically, the acceptability of and expectations about government legislation, and the appeal of "ideological/pragmatic" belief systems in the style of the political game, are all crucial to the formation and expression of political values, attitudes and beliefs. Lucien Pye<sup>47</sup> has added several other factors to this agenda. What he calls "the scope and function of politics" for example, includes a definition of public and private responsibilities, the permissible range of issues, the recognized function of government and government agencies, and the rules of the game. He also mentions the notions of power, authority and legitimacy which have parallel psychological roots in the early experience of the family. The general status of politics and politicians, and the acceptable level of rewards and penalties incurred from political participation are also felt to be crucial (in terms of an individual's attitude toward political recruitment). In turn, Pye feels

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<sup>46</sup> Verba, op.cit.

<sup>47</sup> Lucien Pye, "Political Culture", Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 1968, Vol.II, p.221



that political culture helps to establish acceptable levels of co-operation and/or competition. (This, in effect, is a function of Erikson's trust/distrust).

Having established a political-cultural framework, let us now examine the relationship between political culture and ideology. In Joseph Nettl's observation, ideology may be considered as a part of political culture.<sup>48</sup> That is to say, political culture may be subdivided into "cultural" and "ideological" components. The former is the "conditioning element of action"; the latter, "the product of action and object phenomena of socio-political life". To parallel this distinction with our earlier discussion of values, attitudes and beliefs, the exposure of the masses to socio-economic and political phenomena create certain general cognitive, and affective dispositions among their midst which give rise to a more normative, evaluative and prescriptive analysis. These responses may, in fact, take the form of ideological articulation, linking action with fundamental belief, giving a morality-oriented solidarity to collective purpose, and organizing individual roles through the stimulus to participate and the necessity to identify.<sup>49</sup>

This process serves to highlight the transition from a

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<sup>48</sup>Nettl, op.cit., p.62.

<sup>49</sup>See Apter, op.cit.

moulding of consciousness to a call for action. To return to our earlier distinction, the mass subculture is the embodiment of socio-political conditioning; the elite subculture articulates, in a more specific way, the responses that arise out of that socio-political situation. It is evident as well, that while situational inducements might cause an elite to emerge out of the mass, pre-existent ideological elites will be attempting, at the same time, to socialize the consciousness of the mass in a direction favourable to themselves. In both cases, however, the flirtation of the elite with the mass will be successful only insofar as the "perceived reality" of the mass is conducive to the absorption of such ideas.

Additional insight into this process is afforded by Philip Converse,<sup>50</sup> whose distinction between "belief system" and "ideology" have conceptual parallels to Nettl's "cultural" and "ideological" components. The essential difference between Converse and Nettl lies in the fact that Converse has attempted to categorize political attitudes by empirically testing and analyzing a cross-section of American public opinion. His study revealed that only 2% of the sample were consistent in their political opinions, "based on abstract and far-reaching conceptual grounds"<sup>51</sup> with another 9% approximating this criterion in only a

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<sup>50</sup> Philip Converse, "The Native of Belief Systems in Mass Politics", in Apter, op.cit., pp.206-262

<sup>51</sup> Converse, op.cit., p.218

"peripheral" way. These groups he labelled "ideologues" and "near-ideologues" respectively. Any ideational constraint exhibited by the remainder of his sample was attributed solely to sociological and psychological factors - ie. group interests, "nature of the times" etc. Political expression based on these motivations he labelled "belief systems".

On this note, it is important to acknowledge that in the case of highly mobilized political movements, the mass is prone to be more ideologically consistent, given that "interest", "principle", "social criticism" and "programme", as alluded to in our introductory comments, have all been unified into a single purpose. As such, the gulf between the ideologue and the mass, in terms of evaluative perceptions, is not as great as in the case of the generally-inert public.

Based on our knowledge of Nettl and Converse, it appears that what we have within political culture is an elite sub-culture and a mass subculture, with the former committed to action (Nettl) and principled political discourse (Converse), and the latter, more favourably disposed to being socialized into a particular political mould (Nettl) and expressing a political bias contingent upon the exigencies of the time (Converse).

While the central theoretical dimension of this study will emphasize the concept of ideology, it is evident that the ideational links exposed by this cultural analysis will render the notion of political culture fundamental to any further

discussion. Not only will it help to set in perspective the relationship between culture, belief systems and political ideology, but it will also permit us to conceptualize, in a more structured way, the fragmenting of subcultures from larger cultural spheres - i.e. as in the case of ideological factions within political parties, or as in the situation where political movements and parties embrace programmes significantly antagonistic to the prevailing conventional wisdom.

#### Some Functional Considerations

The above discussion, by and large, has perceived ideology from a theoretical point of view. To continue this scope in light of functional, rather than conceptual terms, it is evident that the existence of ideology "as doctrine" performs certain identifiable social, psychological and institutional roles for both individuals and collectivities alike. The political functions of ideology are derivative and integral to these. Inasmuch as the above categorical divisions are not exclusive - indeed, they are profoundly interlinked - it should be noted that ideology often functions to bridge the gap between these distinctions.

Starting at the most basic level of individual cognition, ideology performs the function of integrating observed environmental factors into a comprehensible framework. As evidenced by

child psychology, this process begins with random behaviour modelled on random observation, developing later into a pattern of ordered behaviour commensurate with one's own psychological development. On the societal level, facts and events take on meaning as part of an integrated system of beliefs. This composite picture may be true or false. It may, and often does, differ from one society to another or between sub-groups thereof; and may therefore be a source of conflict. The importance of ideology in this group context is that "the definition of the situation" can only take place when the group's perception of that situation is cognitively integrated.

Directly related to this is the function of socialization. This involves a dual role, with ideology serving to interpret the social situation and the social environment, in turn, serving to integrate the individual through the medium of the existent culture. Where ideational dispositions are collectively defined, the same is true of group behaviour.

If the inculcation of certain norms and values is the a priori of an entire culture, or in other words, where a dominant ideology appears to permeate all or most aspects of a given community, it can be said that ideological socialization functions to legitimize authority through encouraging overt support for existing institutional structures. In a society marked by cultural and politico-cultural stratification,

ideological fragments may arise in opposition to the prevailing situation, spurred on by what Mannheim would call utopian motivations. It is in this sense that left-wing groups, exhibiting "deviant" cultural norms, are considered to be "ideologically-oriented" by supporters of the dominant ideology. Such accusations, for the most part, are popularly interpreted as accusations of extremism, with a good number failing to acknowledge that ideology pervades all dimensions of the political structure - left, right and centre.

Closely linked to this encouragement of group solidarity is ideology's function of satisfying the requirements of the ego by directing one's motivation to both participate in, and identify with, the group concerned. This phenomenon ranges over the whole spectrum of activity, from being the member of a family to being a member of the state. In Erikson's words, ideology represents

the tendency at a given time to make facts amenable to ideas, and ideas to facts, in order to create a world image convincing enough to support the collective and the individual sense of identity.<sup>52</sup>

This personal need for identity interacts with the ideological factor and they mutually reinforce each other. It is in this search for identity and search for role which make youth particularly vulnerable to ideological attraction.

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<sup>52</sup>Erik Erikson, Young Man Luther, (London, 1958), p.20.

A closer scrutiny of the above functions will reveal the critical importance of ideology's notoriously symbolic nature. In Geertz's observation, and to return to our earlier "cultural" jargon, the cognitive symbol interprets and perceives, and the expressive symbol determines the affective mood.<sup>53</sup> It is in this communicative, interpretive, oftentimes metaphoric sense that Geertz proclaims ideology to be a cultural medium in itself, manipulating the psychophysical world into a schematic simplification of reality and directing patterns of behaviour toward certain purposeful goals. In addition, it is this aspect of ideology - its semantic nature from which is engendered a potent rhetorical force - that occurs "not just in the head, but also in the public world where people talk together, name things, make assertions and to a degree understand each other."<sup>54</sup> Depending on one's sensitivity to the ideological appeal and to the message of the metaphor, individual responses may run the gambit from forthright support to hostile revulsion.

The foregoing analysis has sought to study the concept of ideology from three principal perspectives. Firstly, through our examination of the works of Marx, Mannheim, Stark and Weber, it has been established that both situational and ideational determinants combine to mould certain normative predispositions

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<sup>53</sup>Geertz, op.cit., p.63.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p.64.

commensurate with specific circumstances and interests. While these dispositions can be of a general or specific nature, it has been decided to refer to ideology in its more restricted political or doctrinal context. As such, while ideology's more general application refers to the development of normative perceptions based on situational and ideational inducements, this broader aspect more closely approximates what we have referred to as the cultural or conditioning elements of ideology.

For purposes of conceptualizing in a more structured way, the second perspective of our analysis has placed ideology within a political-cultural framework, emphasizing the links both between these conditioning elements and programmatic, action-oriented aspects, and between the perceptual predispositions of the elite and mass subcultures. While it is assumed that those structural components of ideology as elaborated in the introduction, are best articulated by the ideological elite, the extent to which these aspects are diffused within the "mass" component will be determined by the keenness of the group concerned, the urgency of the situation and the sophistication of the group's mobilization process. We should also note that this political-cultural approach implies that the "political objects" referred to as central to political culture per se, are as well, the focal points for political ideology.

Thirdly, this chapter has put forth a functional dimension, emphasizing the integrative appeal of ideological activity.



While this approach has briefly touched upon individual psychological considerations inherent to notions of identity, solidarity and motivation, the overriding theme of this perspective has emphasized the importance of groups to ideological conflict.

The task now at hand is to proceed with an application of these various perspectives to the evolution of socialist thought in Canada. To capsulize the essence of our intent, John Wilson recently observed that contemporary analysis of the democratic left have exposed an inescapable tension "between the need to promote the ends of socialism and the need to achieve political power in order to achieve those ends".<sup>55</sup> The structural implications of this dichotomy point to the organizational discrepancy between a movement strategy and a party strategy, with the philosophical implications indicating a disagreement over long-run and short-run priorities. Adherents to a movement strategy have contended that to submit to short-run compromise is to acquiesce in the demise of socialist principle; defendants of a party strategy, on the other hand, regard those uncompromising disciples of socialist principle to be at best, politically naive to the opportunities afforded by parliamentary gamesmanship.

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<sup>55</sup> John Wilson, "Towards a Society of Friends": Some Reflections on the Meaning of Democratic Socialism", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. III, No. 4 (Dec. 1970), p.628.

That Canadian socialism has not escaped these constantly recurring themes of a "movement strategy" vs a "party strategy" and "principle vs politics", is revealed both by the experience of the CCF as it developed from a political movement into a full-fledge political party and by the recent ideological debate within the NDP between the Waffle movement and the party's leadership. In an attempt to better understand these developments, it is hoped that our situational-ideational, political-cultural (mass-elite) and functional perspectives will afford a framework within which to trace the emergence of, and tensions between, various forms of socialist thought within Canada. To be sure, the all-pervasive influence of ideas, the changing role of circumstance (both socio-economic and political), and the relationship between elite and mass groupings as they pertain to "movement" and "party" structures, are all crucial and interdependent variables, each one being central to our analytical effort. As such, the theoretical premises established in this chapter will now be specifically applied to the experience of the CCF and NDP in chapters II and III respectively.

## CHAPTER II

### The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation

It is the intent of this chapter to apply concretely the theoretical perspectives established in chapter I to the development of, and changes in the socialist experience of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. Our analysis will be divided into two major parts, the first dealing with the situational and ideational antecedents to the establishment of the CCF, and the second, emphasizing the gradual shift to a more pragmatic programme as the movement acquired a structure characteristic of conventional political parties. Fundamental inducements to this moderating trend will be examined; briefly, they include changes in the socio-economic and political situation, structural modifications in the CCF as it became more institutionalized, and the gradual monopolization of power within the party by an elite, inner-circle, at the centre of which was the party secretary, David Lewis. The chapter will conclude by considering developments within the CCF in the mid and late 1950's which hinted at a structural and ideological basis for the formation of a new party in 1961.

Antecedents to the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation

The marxian-Weberian dialogue<sup>1</sup>, as cited in chapter I, has provided us with a graphic illustration of two of the major conceptually distinct, yet functionally interrelated determinants of any given ideology. Marx, we will recall, stressed the material determination of ideas; Weber, though not totally discounting the concrete, tended to emphasize the abstract. To relate these theoretical predispositions to more substantive politico-economic phenomena, Marx prophesied that socialism would grow out of the inherent contradictions of capitalist society; Weber, in turn, observed that the ethics implicit in Protestant religion were, to a considerable extent, determining factors in the development of early capitalism. By one standard, the material basis for one's thought processes was posited; by the other, ideas, somewhat independent of the socio-economic milieu, were cited as crucial variables.

As such, it can be said that the development of evaluative and prescriptive discourse is generically fostered by socio-economic (situational) and/or socio-cultural (ideational) stimuli. While a debate over the relative merits of these two hypotheses might well be pursued, it is evident that the Canadian situation has afforded both perspectives an aura of credibility - that is to say, both the situational and the ideational have been significant determinants of socialist thought on the Canadian scene.

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<sup>1</sup>See Eric Nordlinger, Politics and Society, (Englewood Cliffs, 1970), pp. 17-20.

The basis of our assumption rests with a study by Kenneth McNaught, who notes that the CCF movement sprang from urban labour, from the farms of the prairie wheat belt, from the Christian social gospel and from radical urban intellectuals.<sup>2</sup> The first two - labour and farm groups - point to a materialist determination of class consciousness and ideological rationalization; the last two - religion and an already existent political philosophy - highlight the inherent role of ideas in the cultural determination of the thought process. It was the fusion of these socio-economic and ideational variables - the long-run conditioning of the workers and the farmers, and the influence of religious and political ideas - that combined to give direction to a federated movement of farmers, workers, and socialists in reaction to the catastrophic malaise of the early 1930's. Let us now consider in greater depth, the development and significance of these antecedents to the formation of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation.

It has generally been taken for granted that the working class is and will be the historical agent of socialist reform. Whether the revolution is engineered, in Marx's words, "by the forcible overthrow of existing social institutions"<sup>3</sup> or, as Engels later conceded, "by peaceful and constitutional means"<sup>4</sup> the coming apocalypse was to be based on the inevitable pauperization,

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<sup>2</sup>Kenneth McNaught, "CCF: Town and Country", Queen's Quarterly, Vol. 61, p.213.

<sup>3</sup>Louis Feuer, Marx and Engels, (New York, 1959), p.43.

<sup>4</sup>Lucien Laurat, Marxism and Democracy, (London, 1940), p.36-37.

proletarianization and polarization of capitalist society.<sup>5</sup> It is evident, however, that the explicitly dogmatic tone of this marxian assertion failed to foresee, and hence, duly accredit the moderating effects that organized unionism and partyism would have in absorbing, co-opting and pacifying the protest of the workers. The dual legitimacy of movements of reform in 19th-century England, and of the parliamentary gradualist tradition, is a case in point - a point which, according to many<sup>6</sup>, has influenced the course of labour activity elsewhere, and especially in Canada. In this light, to interpret the Canadian experience independent of the philosophical and tactical suggestions of the British precedent, especially in view of the organic relationship between the colony and the parent state, would be to neglect one of the most salient influences on the content and direction of Canadian labour ideology. In addition, to acknowledge the kinship between the British and Canadian working class is to substantiate the notion developed in chapter I, that ideational factors may bear both an historical and a contemporary relevance to the ideology in question. Let us examine this point further.

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<sup>5</sup> See Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol. 1, (New York, 1968), pp. 145-237.

<sup>6</sup> See Peter Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, (New York, 1952), pp. 130-141. Herein, Gay reflects on the experience of the workers' movement in late 19th and early 20th century Germany. See also, Martin Robin, Radical Politics and Canadian Labour, (Kingston, 1968), passim, and Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics, (Toronto, 1968), Chapter 1.

## The Labour Movement

The earliest bond between the British and Canadian working class was forged, for the most part, between 1815 and 1850 - during which time over one million skilled and unskilled immigrant workers entered Canada. This massive influx of working people had already been inducted into their own variant of the British political culture. To cite E. P. Thompson's observations, "they exhibited a familiarity with village rights, with notions of equality before the law, and with craft union traditions".<sup>7</sup> In turn, they and their ancestors had been immersed in a heritage of evolutionary reformism, commencing as early as the Revolution of 1688 and including both the repeal of the Corn Laws and the Passage of the Reform Bills. In addition, working class immigrants toward the end of the century had borne witness to a sporadic, yet radical tradition of Christian socialism, syndicalism and chartism. Given the above, it is little wonder that the newly-emergent working class in Canada exhibited if not a propensity for, at least a sensitivity to political involvement and union activity. Normative beliefs about the political system and subjective dispositions toward appropriate action were thereby transplanted to the Canadian political milieu.

The possibility of an immediate and united front under the banner of British working class radicalism, however, was inhibited

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<sup>7</sup>Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class cited in James Laxer, "The Socialist Tradition in Canada", Canadian Dimension, Vol.6, no.6, p.28.

by the regional and cosmopolitan nature of socio-economic development. To be more specific, the scope of "ethnic" immigration in the 19th century had dotted the nation with a wide assortment of ideological backgrounds and predispositions; to this was added a variety of industrial enterprises, each based on differing environmental and ecological factors in the regions concerned. To be sure, the result was a malintegrated patchwork of conflicting political moulds.

In the mining, fishing and lumber communities of British Columbia, for example, rapid industrialization had produced a socio-economic situation wherein the strains and cleavages favoured the introduction of American and British marxian socialism. In contrast, the relative stability of urban Ontario encouraged the artisan class to adopt the principles of British labourism. This relative moderation, in turn, gave a boost to "partyism" - that process whereby the political platform most representative of labour's self-interest was to be the programme collectively supported. As such, the brokerage tactics of the Grit and Tory "friends of labour" served to integrate the politics of the working man into the structure of the established party system. This approach was further reinforced by the Gompersian<sup>8</sup> philosophies of the American Federation of Labour and the Trades

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<sup>8</sup> Samuel Gompers was a founder of the American Federation of Labour in 1886 and was continuously elected its president from then until his death in 1924. The Gompersian philosophy of "being partisan for a policy rather than a party" and of "rewarding thy



and Labour Congress, both of which were craft-union oriented.

Given the limitations of this regional isolation, the labour movement in Canada was, from the outset, infected with an organizational, ideological and tactical disunity. In the west, the marxist-oriented Socialist Party of Canada had become disenchant-ed with the political moderation of the eastern craft unions. In response, they committed an act of "dual unionism" by throwing their whole-hearted support behind the alternative industrial, and more radical, American Labour Union and the Western Federation of Miners. In turn, organized labour in the east reciprocated with a "dual-partyist" attack, withholding support from the Socialist Party of Canada, and establishing in 1906 an alternative, more moderate, independent-labourist, Canadian Labour Party.

While both these strategies witnessed limited and intermittent success in their respective regional spheres, the prolonging of this east-west schism did much to undermine the credibility, and hence, the national efficacy of labour political activity. Even the nation-wide, anti-labour legislation of the

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friends while punishing thine enemies" permeated the AFofL and its Canadian TLC affiliates throughout this period. His promotion of self-help through voluntary association in trade unions and his mistrust of third party movements were reflected within the TLC by certain ideational strains in predominately Ontario-based craft unions. Gompers influence was not effective enough, however, to discourage the legitimate development of socialist thought within the TLC, nor could he convince the TLC that independent political action at the close of the First World War was an unwarranted initiative on the part of the Canadian Labour movement. See Robin, op.cit., pp.68, 148, 287-289.

Borden government did not suffice to heal these sectional wounds. Rather than encouraging a united oppositional front, as some might have expected, the anti-strike policies of the wartime government served only to induce parallel shifts to the left in regional labour strategy. Western radicals, disillusioned with the inefficacy of the SPC's electoral appeal, came to favour direct action tactics; the eastern labour movement, in turn, which had gradually come to favour inter-union legislative action (to pressure the government), decided once again, to support direct political involvement. The advent of the One Big Union Movement in the west and the rebirth of the Canadian Labour Party in the east, were both institutional embodiments of this shift in labour's strategy.

The west's flirtation with syndicalist tactics has, of course, earned primacy in the annals of labour political history. For the most part, it has been associated with public outcry, political and class polarization and the state suppression of the One Big Union.<sup>9</sup> Yet despite the overtly negative implications of this confrontation, especially in view of the crushing defeat of the Winnipeg General Strike, it should be noted that this immediate post-war period was, at the same time, a constructive era in the evolution of the Canadian labour movement. For

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<sup>9</sup>See Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics, (Toronto, 1959), Chapter 8. See also Robin, op.cit., chapters 10-13, and Walter Young, CCF: The Anatomy of a Party, (Toronto, 1970) pp.14,240.

inasmuch as it instilled in the labour force a heightened sense of identity, it provided the trade union socialists with a more receptive audience comprised of dejected syndicalists in the west and more militant "partyists" in the east.

As a result, labour's return to politics in the early 1920's was marked by initial electoral excitement, highlighted by the formation of an Independent Labour-United Farmer coalition government in Ontario. Towards the end of the decade, however, the infiltration of the Canadian Labour Party (national version of the Ontario ILP) by the communist front, Workers' Party, induced massive defections by trade unionists and democratic socialists alike. With the left adopting the communist position and the right, that of the Liberals, the centre rallied round the banner of the Independent Labour Party whose parliamentary wing had not only gained prominence in the persons of J.S. Woodsworth and William Irvine, but had also been joined by the dissident United Farmers of Alberta faction of the then defunct Progressive Party. The Ginger Group which emerged out of that coalition later provided an important parliamentary base for the CCF. As a result, labour's "period of experimentation" was to culminate in the triumph of labourism and democratic socialism - both British ideologies. Radical European marxism, though still present, had been condemned to a minority status.

## The Farmers' Movement

Paralleling this rise in urban industrial labour was the emergence of the farmer as a politically-conscious social class. Where, in the case of the labour movement unionization was a natural outgrowth of the "compactness" of the workplace, farmers too, organized along lines commensurate with their occupational surroundings. Both Tyler and Lipset<sup>10</sup> in their studies of the rural scene cited the situational and experiential bases of agrarian radicalism - both of them noting the centrality of community isolation, climatic vulnerability and regional discrimination in the development of this political consciousness.

With productivity reliant upon nature, and with profitability susceptible to national and international market fluctuations, the basic insecurity of farm income demanded a combination of individual self-sufficiency and interpersonal co-operation. A growing pride in such virtues fostered the development of what many observers called an "agrarian fundamentalism" reflecting the Jeffersonian ideals of individual freedom, economic security and social equality.<sup>11</sup>

While these "intrinsic" factors provided a focus for the psychological development of the farmers' consciousness,

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<sup>10</sup> S.M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, (New York, 1968) and E. J. Tyler, The Farmer as Social Class, (ibid.) (Brandon, Manitoba).

<sup>11</sup> Tyler, op.cit., p.77

extrinsic factors, too, in the form of regional economic exploitation, encouraged a further crystallization of outlook. MacDonald's National policy was the major instrumentality of this situation with the tariff being "politically its most conspicuous element, symbolizing the wheat growers' exploitation, alleged and actual".<sup>12</sup> It was this policy which accentuated the west's quasi-colonial status<sup>13</sup> and which made the emergent farmers movement acutely aware of the powers of the state, the prejudice of eastern economic and political coalitions and the corruption of the party system.

While the period prior to 1900 marked the social-psychological conditioning of an agrarian consciousness, the following period, namely that between 1900 and 1917, witnessed the mobilization of opinion in the west and the organization of economic interest groups to confront the instability of the agricultural economy and to combat the threat of eastern encroachments.

The formation of these groups had a dual significance. First of all, they provided the necessary channels to socialize the farmers into politically active roles, thereby giving life to a farmers' movement. Secondly, they nurtured the necessary expertise from which an agrarian political elite was to emerge.

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<sup>12</sup>K.A. Mackirdy et.al., Changing Perspectives in Canadian History; (Don Mills, 1967), p.206.

<sup>13</sup>C.B. MacPherson, Democracy in Alberta, (Toronto, 1968); pp.6-11.

The greatest expression of agrarian opinion took root in the Canadian Council of Agriculture, an amalgamation of several farmers' organizations. Utilizing two distinct approaches, one educational and the other commercial, it sought to represent the interests of the farm population ~~both~~ on the hustings, before legislative and commercial groups and on the market itself. Its success and vigour were both evidenced by increased membership and by the wide range of political actions influenced by its affiliated groups.

The establishment of a Grain Growers' Grain Company, co-operative elevator companies and wheat pools provided for greater economic self-determination in western markets; the publishing of weekly and bi-weekly journals gave added expression to their collective sense of purpose; direct confrontations with the political system, as in the case of the 1910 Seige on Ottawa, enhanced their political sensitivity and translated their economic grievances into political demands. This increased frequency of contact with the east, in turn, magnified the west's feeling of exploitation and oppression, thereby maintaining a sense of disdain for the east and instilling a greater sense of enthusiasm in the need to organize effectively.

As in the case of organized labour, situational inducements to ideological action were complimented by the influence of ideas imported from foreign soil. The populist effects of the Grange, the American Progressive-Party and the Non-Partisan League,

for example, found particular expression in Alberta. Saskatchewan, on the other hand, having been settled in part by working class immigrants from England, Germany and Scandinavia, were given greater exposure to the left-wing trends that had developed in late 19th century Europe.

The application of this fragment theory<sup>14</sup> to ideational trends also had its impact on the development of leadership. The "group government", anti-party bias of Henry Wise Wood of the United Farmers of Alberta and the socialism of Green and Langley of the Saskatchewan Grain Growers Association are cases in point. Wood, who was president of the UFA from 1916-1930, brought with him from Missouri a wealth of political principles distilled from his experience with populist politics in American rural circles. Both Green and Langley were members of the British Labour Party, with Langley being one of the original members of the Fabian Society.

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<sup>14</sup>The notion of a "fragment theory" referred to above, is intended to support, in a general way, the hypothesis of Louis Hartz (later embraced by Gad Horowitz in Canadian Labour in Politics) that immigration fostered the transferral of ideological fragments from foreign political milieus to the developing Canadian scene. The transplanting of British and American ideas in this regard are the most notable such fragments. See Louis Hartz, The Founding of New Societies, (New York, 1964), passim, and Horowitz, op.cit., chapter I, passim.

## Social Gospel

While the above evidence of situationally-induced co-operativism goes without challenge, it should not be allowed to overshadow the importation of the collectivist ideal quite independent of, though supplementary to, the rural and urban experience. What we are referring to here, of course, is the significance of the social gospel in forging the link between proposed reforms and the religious heritage of the nation. Given the centrality of religion to European culture, we cannot underestimate the role of religious belief in providing identifications with the past, thereby conditioning, if not encouraging, British immigrants<sup>15</sup> to apply the ethics of the social gospel to their new environment and situation.

As a "call for men to find meaning in their lives, in seeking to realize the Kingdom of God in every fabric of society"<sup>16</sup>, the gospel expressed a philosophy not unlike the moderate socialism of labour and the collectivism of the prairie farmer. According

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<sup>15</sup>Inasmuch as E. P. Thompson has noted the "extraordinary hold" that Methodism had on the working people of England, the ideational links between Britain and Canada on a socio-religious plane, especially during the great wave of British immigration, is significant to our analysis. See Thompson, op.cit., p.391. The importance of the British connection is further enganced by the fact that the labour churches, Brotherhoods, and settlements, established to promote the message of the gospel, were set up in light of existing British models. See Richard Allen, "The Social Gospel and the Reform Tradition in Canada, 1890-1928", Canadian Historical Review, Vol.49, no.4, (Dec. 1968), p.384.

<sup>16</sup>Allen, op.cit., p.382



to McNaught, it laid heavy emphasis on the doctrine of love, and it proclaimed the principle of co-operation as opposed to that of competition. It asserted the brotherhood of man and decried excessive individualism and the adoration of profit in economic life. It placed greater emphasis upon the temporal welfare of individuals and society than upon the salvation of particular mortal souls.<sup>17</sup> It is little wonder that as the demands for reform ascended to the forefront of progressive thought, many came to see trade unionism and socialism as practical manifestations of Christianity.<sup>18</sup> The careers of J. S. Woodworth, T.C. Douglas, and to the lesser extent, that of Stanley Knowles, are perhaps the most celebrated examples of this interpenetration of doctrine.<sup>19</sup>

That the British socialist tradition accompanied this religious fragment to North America has already been touched upon. A. E. Partridge of the Grain Growers' Guide, Green and Langley of the SGGA and M. J. Coldwell of the I.L.P. all exhibited these strains in their political activity. Yet, as Frank Underhill

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<sup>17</sup>Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics, (Toronto, 1959), pp.48-49.

<sup>18</sup>Allen, op.cit., p.385.

<sup>19</sup>The popularity of the social gospel in the west and the fact Woodworth, Douglas and Knowles were all ordained ministers, trained in this western mould, may have some bearing on the relative success of each of their respective political careers.

noted in 1929, socialist philosophy in Canada had exhibited "a marked lack of intellectual leadership" in this regard.<sup>20</sup> Until that time, political strategies had either been expressed in a pragmatic fashion or in terms of radical proselytization, the latter of which was particularly alienating to a good number of working people. What was needed was an explication of home-brewed Fabian socialism - a political philosophy that was neither alien, nor inapplicable to the urban and rural scene in Canada. It remained for the League for Social Reconstruction to provide this impetus in early 1932. Ironically enough, it was Underhill who spearheaded the move, and once again, it was exposure to the British precedent<sup>21</sup> which provided both the incentive and the direction.

Underhill's idea for the League was first expressed to F. R. Scott and Percy Corbett, both of McGill, during their participation in a conference sponsored by the Institute of Politics at Williams College (Mass.) in August, 1931. All three of them agreed that a major realignment of political forces in Canada was both desirable and inevitable and that whatever new party came along, "it had to

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<sup>20</sup> Frank Underhill, "Radical Political Movements in Canada", Canadian Forum, Vol. 9 (May, 1929).

<sup>21</sup> Berger has noted that while at Oxford, Underhill "grairtated toward the Fabian Socialism of G. C. H. Cole and A. D. Lindsay. Carl Berger, "F. H. Underhill and the Tenacity of Liberalism", Canadian Forum, Vol. 51, (Nov. 1971), p.10.

be given an ideological foundation which would make fusion with the Conservatives or Liberals impossible".<sup>22</sup> The fate of the Progressives was still fresh in their memory. It was Underhill's opinion that "some form of Canadian Fabian Society could provide the solid intellectual base for a new political programme."<sup>23</sup> It was therefore decided to convene a meeting of interested people to formulate a policy statement that would clearly define their political position. Like the Fabian Society, the League was to have two classes of members - those who subscribed to the statement of principle and were full members, and those who supported the general aims of the League and received its publications, but were not totally committed to the whole of its democratic socialist philosophy.

The founding meeting of the LSR took place in January, 1932, seven months before the CCF was launched in Calgary and a year and a half before the Manifesto was to be accepted at Regina. The most important result of the meeting was the amendment and acceptance of the LSR Manifesto, from which, according to Scott, Underhill derived his first draft for the Regina document. The parallel in philosophy, not to mention the repetition of words and phrases,

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<sup>22</sup>F. R. Scott, "FNU and the Manifestos", Canadian Forum, Vol. 51, (Nov. 1971), p.8.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p.9.

is self-evident:

The League for Social Reconstruction is an association of men and women working for the establishment in Canada of a social order in which the basic principle regulating production, distribution and service will be the common good rather than private profit.

-extract from the LSR Manifesto, Jan. 1931<sup>24</sup>

The CCF is a federation of organizations whose purpose is the establishment in Canada of a Co-operative Commonwealth in which the principle regulating production, distribution and exchange will be the supplying of human needs and not the making of profits.

-preamble to Regina Manifesto, July, 1933<sup>25</sup>

Hartz's observation that Canadian political culture was derived from a blend of "European national tradition and historical timing"<sup>26</sup> has been borne out by the preceding situational-ideational analysis. What is important to remember in this context is that "European", for the most part, meant "British"; it was British immigrants, British ideas and British institutions that allowed a legitimate British form of socialism to develop and flourish in Canada. It was the ideational influence of these political traditions, the ethical conditioning of Wesleyian doctrine, the environmental conditioning of agrarian and urban industrial life and the socio-economic political conditioning of the anti-elitist struggles which emanated from these circumstances;

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<sup>24</sup>See League for Social Reconstruction, Democracy Needs Socialism, (Toronto, 1935).

<sup>25</sup>Young, op.cit., p.304.

<sup>26</sup>See Louis Hartz, The Founding of New Societies, (New York, 1964), chapter 7.

together they coalesced to give a sense of direction to the individual groups and movements that eventually integrated into the CCF.

#### Formation of the CCF

The first formal coalition of any such groups took place in 1932 when the United Farmers of Canada (Saskatchewan Section) and the Independent Labour Party of Saskatchewan, headed by M. J. Coldwell, agreed on joint political action. On the prodding of the Saskatchewan Farmer-Labour Group, the United Farmers of Alberta issued invitations to a conference to be held a year later in Calgary for the purpose of setting up a political organization, national in scope. According to Young, the ideological complexion presented by the participants in the meeting was mixed.<sup>27</sup> Both the urban socialists from the prairie cities and the LSR intellectuals supported a form of British Fabian socialism; labour delegates from British Columbia were more marxist in their orientation; the rural delegates could perhaps best be classified as "populists in tradition".

While a harmony of principle was not evidenced by the conference, the fact remained that no reform could be achieved without some form of co-operative effort. The coalition drew a unity of purpose from the conviction that capitalism was the

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<sup>27</sup>Young, op.cit., p.40

primary cause of their discontent. The result of the meeting was the formal organization of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (Farmer-Labour-Socialist) with a provisional eight-point programme calling for "the socialization of the banking, credit and financial system", the "retention and extension of social legislation to provide for insurance against crop failure, illness, accident, old age, and unemployment", the provision of "equal economic and social opportunity without the distinction of sex, nationality or religion", and the "encouragement of all co-operative enterprises, which are the steps to the attainment of the Co-operative Commonwealth".<sup>28</sup> It was agreed that the platform would be given further consideration at the First Annual Convention of the Federation to be held the following year in Regina.

The critical importance of that meeting, of course, lies in the revision and expansion of the 1932 programme into the Regina Manifesto - a statement of principle and policy which was to be the core and the spirit of the movement in the decade ahead. Not only was the document an expression of the movement's weltanschauung,<sup>29</sup> or in political-cultural terms, its additudinal predispositions to the prevailing situation, but it was also a statement of the movement's ideology - in Nettl's terms, a

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<sup>28</sup>The full text of the Calgary proposals is contained in The Appendix of Young, op.cit., pp. 303-304

<sup>29</sup>Young, op.cit., p.39

commitment to action; in Converse's sense, a strategy based on abstract and conceptual formulation.<sup>30</sup> In terms of our analysis of ideology, the "moral values", the "vision", the "social critique" and the "programme" to which we referred in the introduction as necessary structural components of any given ideology, are manifestly implicit in the message the Manifesto articulates.

According to Young, "the socialism of the Manifesto was a mixture of Christian, Fabian and Marxian Socialism, shot through with progressive reformism".<sup>31</sup> Its language was Fabian and Christian reformist, with its chief architect, Frank Underhill, admitting to never having read a word of Marx.<sup>32</sup> Its goals were revolutionary, but its message was not. The authors of the document were careful to include that they did not believe in "change by violence"<sup>33</sup> but rather, "in achieving their ends solely by constitutional means". At the same time, the term "class" was employed to denote "exploitation" and "the domination of one class by another" and not in the marxian sense of the inevitability of class conflict. As such, the class perspective was used as a lever to demonstrate "the glaring inequalities of wealth and opportunity...classic waste and instability, poverty

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<sup>30</sup>Underhill's contention that what was needed was a "philosophical bridge between the inchoate sources of discontent and grievance and advanced political thought" (Benger, op.cit., p.12), would surely qualify him to be placed among Converse's select group of "ideologues" discussed in Chapter I.

<sup>31</sup>Young, op.cit., p.45

<sup>32</sup>F.H. Underhill, "The Angry Thirties", Carleton University Seminar, 1963. Cited in Young, op.cit., p.54.

<sup>33</sup>All future quotes from the Regina Manifesto are taken from the original text documented in the Appendix of Young, op.cit., pp.304-313

and insecurity" and to expose the "capitalist domination of political life" through the old line political parties.

The main thrust of the Manifesto was directed towards the implementation of a comprehensive system of public ownership and social planning. A National Planning Commission, comprised mainly of technocrats, would "ensure the most efficient development of Canada's natural resources and the most equitable distribution of the national income." Currency, credit and prices would be regulated in the public interest through the "socialization of all financial machinery", including Chartered Banks and insurance companies. Public utilities - transportation, communication and hydro-electric power - received top priority on the party's socialization agenda, closely followed by the natural resource industries and "distribution" industries (milk, bread, coal, gas). Import and export boards would seek to eliminate the plight of the farmer. Taxation would be more equitable; Public health services would be instituted and universally accessible; human rights would be protected. People would be insured against old age, accident, illness, unemployment and crop failure. Foreign policy would be more oriented toward co-operation, disarmament and world peace.

As a statement of belief, the Regina Manifesto clearly articulated the oppositional nature of the movement's values in relation to those popularly held by the majority of society. It provided a focus for unity to those divergent and dissident



elements which comprised the CCF; it re-emphasized the importance of principle as integral to the goals and strategy of a socialist movement. As J. S. Woodsworth later noted, "In our efforts to win elections, we must not yield to the temptations of expediency. Let us stick to our principles, win or lose."<sup>34</sup>

Or as Frank Scott explained:

A democratic socialist party is held together by a group of ideals, which are essentially moral concepts. All policies applied from time to time are attempts to realize these ideals in a given country at a given time.<sup>35</sup>

To be sure, the dogged determination with which the CCF clung to its principles and ideals, especially in its earlier development, was characteristic of the relationship between ideology and a movement strategy. As the movement became institutionalized, however, programmatic specifications of those ideals fell subject to compromise and re-interpretation. It now remains for us to explore, through an institutional approach, why portions of this ideology persisted and how portions of this ideology changed as the theoretical instrumentality of a permanent and separate political party of the left in Canada.

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<sup>34</sup>Report of Fifth National Convention, 1938, CCFP, PAC .

<sup>35</sup>F.R. Scott (notes for Quebec provincial convention, 1955), Scott Papers, quoted by Young, op.cit., p.58

## The CCF Movement

According to Philip Selznick, organizations are coalitions of groups whose collective efforts are to attain certain specific goals.<sup>36</sup> The means-ends criteria of this process is subject to internal (power brokerage, bureaucracy) and external (changing environmental situation) pressures. Hence, the pursuit of goals is a problematic undertaking.

The goal structure of social movements, as variants of the above, differ from formal organizations in two basic ways.<sup>37</sup> First, the goal orientation emphasizes the need for change, as opposed to the rendering of some bureaucratic service; and secondly, goals are sought on the basis of purposive (rather than materialist or prestigious) incentives, wherein human fulfillment is derived from the promotion of certain basic norms or values.<sup>38</sup>

Given the nature of a social movement's goal-orientations, it is evident that movements are spawned from a condition of unrest and derive their motivating power both from current dissatisfaction and from hopes of a new scheme of living.

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<sup>36</sup>Philip Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization", American Sociological Review, Vol.13 (Feb. 1948), pp.23-35.

<sup>37</sup>M. Zald and R. Ash, "Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change", Social Forces Vol.44, 1968, pp.327-41.

<sup>38</sup>P. Clark and J. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.6, pp.129-66.

Blumer notes that in addition to this pervasive feeling of unrest, movements are also based on the exploitative agitation of a given situation by an emergent leadership, the inculcation of an esprit de corps by interpersonal dynamics and the infusion of morale through ideological rationalization. The culmination of this developmental process is reached when the movement itself is given a definitive structural framework - in essence, when it is institutionalized.<sup>39</sup>

The works of Michels and Weber, in turn, indicate that bureaucratization is endemic to the institutionalizing process, with the original charismatic leadership being displaced, and the role of pragmatism superceding that of principle in policy formation. Analytically there are three types of changes involved in this process; empirically they are often fused.<sup>40</sup> The first change involves a re-orientation of specific programmatic demands to a position which, generally speaking, is held to be more tolerable by a society at large. This new emphasis on diffuseness and flexibility usually implies a conservatization of policy. Secondly, a drive for organizational maintenance is pursued with the above goal-transformation being

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<sup>39</sup> Herbert Blumer, "Social Movements" in Barry McLaughlin, Studies in Social Movements, New York, 1969.

<sup>40</sup> Zald and Ash. op.cit., p.327

the instrumentality of that pursuit. In this sense, a more accomodative policy is generally the means by which to guarantee the sustenance of the movement's viability. Thirdly, oligarchical structures develop, with a concentration of power embedded in the hands of a few individuals. While Weber would emphasize that the bureaucratization of an elaborate hierarchical system of rules and offices does much to enhance this process,<sup>41</sup> Michels would take a more normative stance and bemoan the resultant membership apathy and organizational converstism.<sup>42</sup>

Walter Young's study of the CCF is crucial to our understanding of the above process. His organizational and ideological distinction between a movement and a party and his documentation of the group's development from a movement-party to a party-movement, are indeed complementary to our perception of the CCF's institutionalization and its implicit processes of goal-transformation, organizational maintenance and oligarchization. In his analysis he readily documents the growth of centralized control and the concomitant shift in party ideology from a posture of rigidity to one of greater societal accommodation. Let us now take a look at this process, bearing in mind as well, that while the metamorphosis of the movement was due in large part to the

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<sup>41</sup> See R. P. Cuzzort, Humanity and Modern Sociological Thought, New York, 1968, pp.49-71.

<sup>42</sup> See James Burnham, The Machiavellians, Chicago, 1943, pp.149-191.

internal manifestations of organization and control, certain external variables - ie. electoral possibilities, the universal revisionism of post-war social-democratic parties, the relative success of capitalist economies and the red scare programme of 1945 - also came to bear on the CCF's organizational and ideological disposition.

The very fact that the CCF had a confederal structure - that it integrated regionally-oriented, pre-existent farmer, labour and socialist movements onto a national plan - is evidence of its immediate institutionalized nature. Blumer's three other developmental categories - namely social unrest, popular excitement and movement formalization - had all been experienced by the individual groups as their organizations materialized in respect to their given locales.<sup>43</sup>

The inspirational leadership of J. S. Woodsworth did much to integrate these disparate movements into a viable and unified political force. To be sure, he had amassed a wealth of democratic-socialist credentials to qualify for the helm in the farmer-labour-socialist battle against the entrenched urban, commercial and industrial establishment. He had been deeply involved in the organizational activities of the Non-Partisan

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<sup>43</sup>For overviews of the movement-nature of rural and urban political groups - ie. the United Farmers of Alberta, the Non-Partisan League, the Western Conference of Labour Political Parties, the United Farmers of Canada (Sask.) etc. - see Lipset, Agrarian Socialism; Ward, Politics in Saskatchewan; Irving, The Social Credit Movement in Alberta; McNaught, A Prophet in Politics; Young, The CCF: Anatomy of a Party, Robin, Radical Politics and Canadian Labour.

League in Alberta; his links with the labour movement via the ILP and the Labour Church were extensive; his natural affinity for a gradualist approach to socialist politics was constantly revealed by his opposition to the Socialist Party of Canada, which dogmatically refused to recognize the legitimacy of the farmer as a member of the working class; he had received national acclaim for his preaching of the social gospel and his defense of those principles in the House; and in 1932 he was annointed "Honorary President" of the Fabian League for Social Reconstruction.

Though Woodsworth's popular appeal was reportedly inadequate in Ontario and Quebec,<sup>44</sup> the above evidence leaves little doubt that his reception in western Canada was an entirely different matter. With his own political experience deeply embedded in the traditions of prairie radicalism, Woodsworth was considered the spiritual leader of a great moral crusade. In Redl's terms, he could be considered a "patriarchal sovereign", drawing together the westerners by patterning their values in accordance with his, and through setting an example, encouraging others to "cast off their anxieties, thus permitting a stand in favour of approved values."<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Frank Scott to David Lewis, in Young, op.cit., p.161.

<sup>45</sup> Fritz Redl, "Group Emotion and Leadership" in Gouldner, Studies in Leadership, (New York, 1967).

According to Young, the party was built on the foundation of Woodsworth's presence, yet, by his nature and the nature of his position, he was unable to give his whole-hearted support to the development of a centrally-directed party.<sup>46</sup> As F. R. Scott noted, "his aim was to create a crusading movement".<sup>47</sup>

### The Shift to the Right

In 1933 Woodsworth emphasized the need to maintain the indigenous, non-party nature of the decentralized movement by allowing for "each affiliated organization to preserve its own identity".<sup>48</sup> By 1934, the CCF consisted of fifty-nine branches of the Socialist Party of Canada, the Canadian Labour Party, the Economic Reconstruction Clubs of Alberta, the Farmer-Labour party of Saskatchewan, locals of the ILP, one hundred and fifty-four CCF Clubs and 1,600 members from Ontario.<sup>49</sup> Lewis and Scott acknowledged that numerous differences of philosophy in the party ranged from "pure reformism to doctrinaire socialism".<sup>50</sup> As such, they claimed that the CCF was constantly being looked upon "with suspicion and strangeness". It was evident that a movement structure was not appropriate as an organizational requisite to

<sup>46</sup>Young, op.cit., p.162.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p.255.

<sup>48</sup>Woodsworth to Gould, Oct. 1933, Woodsworth Papers, CCFP, PAC.

<sup>49</sup>Young, op.cit., p.145.

<sup>50</sup>Frank Scott and David Lewis, Make This Your Canada (Toronto, 1943), p.119.

victory by conventional electoral means. As M. J. Coldwell reported to the 1935 National Convention:

My years experience as secretary-treasurer leads me to believe that if we are to conduct our educational and political campaign effectively, our affiliated bodies will have to more closely cooperate with the National Office. I realize, of course, that is to some extent due to the fact that we are a Federation rather than an organized party, and consequently our provincial organizations are to a very large degree self-contained and autonomous.<sup>51</sup>

The 1938 Convention acknowledged Coldwell's warning and disposed of the prevailing confederal arrangement. In its place the national and provincial parties were linked to one another through a federal organization.

Coldwell was also in the vanguard of a move to bureaucratize the party. In spite of Woodsworth's protests, a central office had already been established in 1934; in 1936 E.J. Garland had been appointed National Organizer; and in 1937 David Lewis was appointed Corresponding Secretary for the National Office. Prior to the 1938 Convention, Coldwell informed Woodsworth that he would resign from his position as National Chairman inasmuch as he did "not agree at all with the present lack of policy with regard to National Office matters".<sup>52</sup> That same year Lewis

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<sup>51</sup>Leo Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, Toronto, 1964, p.50.

<sup>52</sup>Coldwell to Woodsworth, CCFP, PAC.



assumed full time responsibilities as the party's National Secretary: Coldwell did not resign.

As a result of this growing division of labour within the party hierarchy, it might be possible to ascribe to Woodsworth, on the one hand, and to Lewis and Coldwell on the other, the designations "enthusiast" and "bureaucrat" respectively. Such were the labels devised by Roche and Sachs in their analysis of European socialist parties:

There is a tendency for two major leadership types to emerge...The bureaucrat is concerned with the organizational facet of social movements, with its stability, growth and tactics...In contrast, the enthusiast concerns himself primarily with what he deems to be the fundamental principles of the organization, the ideals and the values which nourish the movement.<sup>53</sup>

That the category "enthusiast" applies to Woodsworth has already been pointed out. This is particularly evidenced by his concentration on the advocacy of principle and by his view of organization as simply a means to some greater end. Though by no means refuting their ideological conviction, Lewis and Coldwell exhibited the "bureaucratic" mentality. Their main goal was to reconcile the diverse elements within the party, to secure organizational harmony and to maximize popular appeal. This integration of principle with organization is best revealed by the following statement of M.J. Coldwell in 1938:

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<sup>53</sup>P. Roche and S. Sachs, "The Bureaucrat and the Enthusiast: An Exploration of the Leadership of Social Movements" in McLaughlin, op.cit., pp.208-9.

I am much more anxious to preserve and promote institutions and ideals which will, when the time comes, enable us to achieve progressively ultimate aims, than I am in simply propagating ultimate ideals.<sup>54</sup>

According to Young, the above and later developments provided within the CCF "an example of the operation of Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy."<sup>55</sup> Michels was a Machiavellian and "Machiavellians", in Runciman's estimation, are saying that "democracy is a fraud".<sup>56</sup> The term democracy however, especially in the context of party theory, bears the connotation of relativity. That is to say, if one considers that party democracy should be gauged by the degree of membership control over leadership and policy<sup>57</sup>, then there is little doubt that the CCF was a more democratically-structured party than either the Liberals or the Conservatives. In this sense, John May has presented a convincing argument that inasmuch as a Rousseauian vision of direct and pure democracy is utopian and impractical, Michels' analysis of democratic socialist parties is still, relatively speaking, "a favourable document of the compatibility of organization and democracy".<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, the expect-

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<sup>54</sup>Young, op.cit., p.66.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p.140.

<sup>56</sup>W. G. Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory (Cambridge, 1969), p.70.

<sup>57</sup>R.M. Dawson, The Government of Canada, (Toronto, 1957), pp.514-16.

<sup>58</sup>See John May, "Organization and Democracy in Political Parties" in Nordlinger, op.cit., p.85.

ations of many have surpassed the level of grass-roots control that the "democratic structures" are willing to permit, and as such, the evident manipulation of those legitimate channels by members of the party hierarchy in the name of Lewis, Knowles and Coldwell, to name only a few, have led to cries of tokenism and shame. Relativism, again, is the key word.

Quoting from Gaetana Mosca's, The Ruling Class, that "no matter the form of government, the universal fact is the rule of the many by the few", Young goes on to state that Mosca's statement is a truism unless anarchy is a form of government.<sup>59</sup> In the CCF's history of 28 years (from 1932-1961), the party had only two leaders - Woodsworth and Coldwell; over the same time period the party's five major offices were held by eleven people; there were only five national secretaries, with Lewis reigning for twelve of those years; a mere eleven people occupied a total of eighty posts throughout the life of the party. Young has observed that given the number of offices in the party and the number of people that occupied them over such a long period of time, a distinguishable ruling elite of twelve people had emerged.<sup>60</sup> While theoretically speaking the convention and the national council were the supreme legislative bodies within the CCF, the convention met only every

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<sup>59</sup>Young, op.cit., pp.138-139. In citing the inevitability of structure, Young further notes that the degree of elite control is determined, for the most part, by the size of the leadership's constituency, to which it must be sensitive. In the case of the CCF, the clearly-articulated democratic structure of the party allowed for both the expression of dissent against the leadership and the imposition of leadership control over such elements.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., p.147.

two years and the council meetings were generally unrepresentative, as many delegates could find neither the time nor the money to attend meetings in Ottawa. The dominant influence in the national executive, in turn, was vested in the national officers who could make up the quorum, "often constituting the national executive among themselves".<sup>61</sup> They met at national headquarters in Ottawa and maintained close contact with the caucus and national party staff.

At the hub of this ruling clique was David Lewis, who ran the party, ideologically and administratively, without interruption up to and after the founding of the New Democratic Party.<sup>62</sup> He was the party's chief advisor on matters of policy, strategy and administration. On the role of leadership he commented:

I know the reluctance...of all of us to interfere in any way the democratic process on which the CCF was built...it is in no sense an interference with that process for the leadership to express their opinion and wishes clearly and emphatically and to do its utmost to persuade the local organization of the correctness of that opinion.<sup>63</sup>

As a labour lawyer and the party's most powerful bureaucrat conveniently stationed in industrial Ontario, Lewis was instrumental in wedding the CCF with the labour movement. Though his initial endeavours in the early 1940's were unsuccessful for a

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<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p.147.

<sup>62</sup>See Lorne Brown, "David Lewis' CCF", Canadian Dimension Reprint.

<sup>63</sup>Young, op.cit., p.166.

Leaf 74 omitted in page numbering.

number of reasons<sup>64</sup>, his early initiative at the founding convention of the CCL, which later endorsed the party, and his involvement with the CLC in the mid 1950's, which later served as an organizational base for the NDP, were particularly strategic in complimenting this aspect of socialist politics in Canada. These early contacts served to stabilize Lewis' support within union circles as well; the present marriage of organized labour with the right-wing of the NDP is not the least conspicuous element of the present party's structure.

These objective requirements of party organization were simply a reaffirmation of Michels' equation of institutionalization with oligarchy. It is undeniable that the need for structure and rules begets a hierarchical division of labour which, in turn, through the rational application of expertise to needs, leads to a monopoly control over the decision-making process, the communications network of the organization and over most of its available funds.<sup>65</sup> It is quite evident that David Lewis, Carl Hamilton and Lorne Ingle all performed these functions most efficiently in their capacities as National Secretary.

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<sup>64</sup>Horowitz points out that the influence of the American AF of L, the Gompersian TLC, the anti-affiliation Communist locals and the decline of CCF electoral support all contributed to the failure of a labour-CCF accord. Op.cit., pp.74-80.

<sup>65</sup>See Burnham, op.cit., pp.156-60.

In addition Michels' psychological criteria for leadership control seem to have been manifest in the experience of the CCF. The longevity of party service is oftentimes a self-perpetuating phenomenon inasmuch as the collectivity tends to identify with leadership and expresses its political gratitude through continual re-acclamation. In addition, the Machiavellian virtu of the leadership tends to be affirmed by the personal qualities of certain candidates - i.e. oratorical talent, the celebrity of prestige, a strength of conviction, a force of ideas, a goodness of heart and a display of self-sufficiency.<sup>65a</sup> Any or all of these attributes of the ideal political animal can be found in the characters of the party's elite, and in particular, Lewis and Coldwell.

Michels' further perspicacity into the nature of social-democratic parties is revealed by his following insight concerning the role and development of leadership:

At the outset, leaders arise spontaneously; their functions are accessory and gratuitous. Soon however, they become professional leaders, and in this second stage of development they are stable and irremovable.<sup>66</sup>

That the above distinction is reflected by the polarization of leadership roles after the 1938 convention is apparent.

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<sup>65a</sup>Loc.cit.

<sup>66</sup>Roberto Michels, Political Parties (New York, 1962), p.401.

It was at that point that the movement-party began its slow and transitional process into a party-movement.

In his indictment of this transition, Lorne Brown commented:

Leftists must devise ways and means of preventing the entrenchment of self-perpetuating cliques at the centre of power...Bureaucracy, oligarchy and individuals with intense feelings of infallibility and indispensability are not uncommon...and many of today's jaded bureaucrats were once angry young socialists.<sup>67</sup>

It was this very oligarchization process that he blamed for the socialist movement's change of face into a "reform party"; so too, it was this transformation of party goals that he chided as an outgrowth of the preservationist inclinations of party functionaries.

That Mr. Brown's accusations are not simply the shallow assumptions of a vengeful and dejected leftist is borne out by Young's survey of policy development. At one point he notes how the convention apparatus was prejudiced against motions coming from the floor, how the oratorical skills of David Lewis, the mastery of policy by party officials and the massive support and influence of the trade union leadership and delegations all made a co-ordinated opposition to reformism most difficult. Under the leadership of Coldwell, "the movement's chiliasm was muffled... by the socialization of the institution of parliament."<sup>68</sup> Even when control of a government was vested in the party, as the experience of the Saskatchewan government

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<sup>67</sup>Brown, op.cit.

<sup>68</sup>Young, op.cit., p.252



has most certainly corroborated, the realization of socialist ends in a predominantly capitalist nation and hemisphere was structurally and philosophically impeded.

As such, what had been witnessed since the Regina Manifesto was a gradual and virtually unabated moderation of the party's programme. In turn, it was quite clear, as Young observed, that the new direction of policy "came not from the membership, but rather from the leaders in the east."<sup>69</sup>

The different emphases on policy as expressed in the Replies to the Speech(es) From the Throne are poignant examples of this shift. Woodsworth's traditional response elicited a call for the co-operative commonwealth:

...Be it therefore resolved: that in the opinion of this House the government should immediately take measures looking to the setting up of a co-operative commonwealth in which all the natural resources and the socially necessary machinery of production will be used in the interests of the people and not for the benefit of a few.<sup>70</sup>

Coldwell's post-war equivalent, in turn, was expressed in more conciliatory terms:

...that in the opinion of this House, Your Excellency's advisers in their reliance on private enterprise have failed to propose the comprehensive planning which the present emergency demands...we submit further that such planning is essential...<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p.124.

<sup>70</sup>Hansard, Feb.19, 1932.

<sup>71</sup>Hansard, 1946, p.59.

To be sure, this ideological re-orientation of the CCF had marked the demise of the Woodsworthian tenet that "spiritual idealism cannot be divorced from political realism".<sup>72</sup> Political realism, to the new leadership, necessarily entailed a concerted effort to destroy the party's image as a social and economic deviant - an image derived largely from a depression psychology and manufactured by the propagandists of Canada's other two parties. The concern with image was made all the more imperative by the fact that the CCF controlled one provincial government, was on the threshold of a victory in another (Ontario), and was enjoying a popular support of increased vigour on the national level.<sup>73</sup>

As T.B. Bottomore noted, "revisionism was being forced upon most social-democratic parties after the war".<sup>74</sup> M.J. Coldwell's citing of "new developments in the past decade" in his Report to

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<sup>72</sup>Young, op.cit., p. (letter from Woodsworth to Nantin, 1938)

<sup>73</sup>A Gallop Poll electrified the nation with the prediction that a federal election would reveal 28% support for the Liberals and Conservatives, and 29% for the CCF. Commonwealth, Oct. 14, 1943. A good deal of this support could be attributed to the relative success and acceptance of government regulation and control during the wartime economy, to the growth of organized labour within the expanded munitions industries, to the popular sympathy expressed for the Soviet Unions' defense against the Nazis, and generally to the fact that many recalled the hardships of the depression (as encouraged by Laissez-faire economics) and were willing to accept a greater degree of government involvement for the sake of a better post-war world. For an elaboration of these factors see Gerald Caplan, "The Failure of Canadian Socialism: The Ontario Experience, 1932-1945, Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 44, 1963, pp.93-122.

<sup>74</sup>T.B. Bottomore, Critics of Society (New York, 1966), p.112.

the 1950 National Convention is evidence of this change of heart. The relative strength of the economy and the popularity of social welfare measures adopted by successive Liberal regimes did much to dampen the ardour of fervent socialist rhetoric. On this note, both Pickersgill<sup>75</sup> and Hutchinson have noted Mackenzie King's attempt to "swerve far enough to the left to expropriate anything of use left in the CCF's doctrines".<sup>76</sup> In addition, a combined effort of the Conservative Party and capitalist interests attempted to malign the CCF by identifying the party, at one and the same time, with the German Nazis and the Russian Communists.<sup>77</sup> Having acknowledged this alteration of circumstance, the party hierarchy set out to revise the Regina principles upon which the party's programme had theoretically been based.

#### The Winnipeg Declaration

While significant overtures in that direction had been initiated as early as 1951<sup>78</sup>, efforts to revise the party's founding principles did not reach fruition until the middle of the decade. David Lewis was at the centre of this effort.

<sup>75</sup>Jack Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, Vol. I, p. 566, cited in Caplan, op.cit.

<sup>76</sup>Bruce Hutchinson, The Incredible Canadian (Toronto, 1952) p. 413

<sup>77</sup>Caplan, op.cit., passim.

<sup>78</sup>A committee of the National Council, among whom were

In a speech entitled "A Socialist Takes Stock", Lewis provided a cogent statement of the moderate position, denying that public ownership was a "panacea for all ills" and that "political and social freedom was not dependent only on the form of ownership in the economy".<sup>79</sup> He cited the Soviet example as proof of his claim. He continued by asserting that he had always been concerned with socializing only the key economic levers of society and that the CCF had no intention of socializing everything - in spite of popular misrepresentation and misinterpretation. As such, he concluded that "the time

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included T. C. Douglas, Hazen Argue, Andrew Brewin, Grace MacInnis, Frank Scott and David Lewis, wrote a draft restatement of principles which was circulated throughout the party and published in Comment. The rationale behind the proposed revision was argued in a reference to J. S. Woodsworth's presidential address to the founding convention of the CCF, wherein he hailed the principles of the Regina Manifesto but cautioned that the dialectical process of creating a programme would involve both flexibility and accommodation: "Thanks to the pioneers of the socialist and co-operative movements, we have at least the fundamental principles on which we may base our teaching with regard to the co-operative commonwealth. We do not believe in unchanging dogma - society is not static. Knowledge grows and each age must work out a newer and higher synthesis. Such growing knowledge is dependent upon experience and action. Each new development, each new member of the organization should mean a fuller content in the body of our socialist doctrine". Second "confidential" draft, 1951, CCF Papers, Public Archives, Ottawa.

<sup>79</sup>David Lewis, A Socialist Takes Stock, Woodsworth Foundation, 1956. All subsequent quotes will be taken from this tract without specific reference to the page number.

was long overdue when it should be frankly stated without qualification and without apology...that modern tools of control and planning can be effectively applied without actually replacing private with public enterprise".<sup>80</sup> The feedback to this speech indicated that a good proportion of the party membership was prepared to formalize the moderating trend that had characterized the CCF's behaviour for almost a decade. The next year Lewis and three others<sup>81</sup> were appointed to prepare a draft statement for the July convention in Winnipeg.

The document, authored largely by Lewis himself, ignited a heated debate at the January meeting of the National Council. The most contentious clause was that concerning private enterprise:

At the same time, the CCF also recognizes that in many fields there will be need for private enterprise which can make a useful contribution to the development of our economy.<sup>82</sup>

The old left rallied around the principles of the Regina Manifesto. Colin Cameron, for example, opposed the revisionism, asserting

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<sup>80</sup>In citing "the experience of the Scandinavian countries" as living proof of this economic strategy, Lewis lends credence to our notion of the contemporary interrelatedness of ideas. For a statement of this "functional socialist" approach see Gunner Karlsson, Functional Socialism: A Swedish Theory for Democratic Socialization, Uppsala, 1968.

<sup>81</sup>With Lewis were Lorne Ingle (CCF National Secretary), Omer Chartrand (Quebec Provincial Secretary) and Morden Lazarus (Co-operative Press Association correspondent).

<sup>82</sup>Zakuta, op.cit., p.171.

that the CCF "must speak hard truths boldly"; Herbert Herridge claimed that the real solution "lay in providing a small core of socialist students to keep us away from expediency"; William Irvine maintained that "old capitalists were still the same". The new bureaucratic-parliamentary elite defended the restatement<sup>83</sup> with equal vigour. Coldwell argued for the supremacy of "empiricism over dogmatism"; F. R. Scott defended electoral psychology as being more important than economic theory; and David Lewis advised, in turn, that "to restate principle was neither to destroy it nor to weaken our moral indignation".<sup>84</sup>

The above polemic, as once again manifested on the floor of the convention in Winnipeg, was described by Leo Zakuta as exposing the ground upon which the party's last internal ideological battle was fought - "it revealed the difficulties of arriving at a satisfactory ideology".<sup>85</sup> To be sure, the

<sup>83</sup>It is evident as well that leading members of this elite had favoured a revision of principles long before the issue reached the convention floor. In Left Turn Canada, for example, Coldwell wrote that "had the 1932 programme (Calgary) remained in its original, simple form, the CCF might have made more rapid progress". P. C. Douglas, in turn, noted that although "the CCF had adjusted to post-war affluence, the domination of a depression psychology within the party should have been done away with in 1945". Toronto Star, Aug. 6, 1960.

<sup>84</sup>All quotations were taken from Young, op.cit., p.128 whose source, in this case, was a series of notes taken by Scott at the meeting.

<sup>85</sup>Zakuta, op.cit., p.93.

new Declaration lacked the original vigour and symbolic flare of the original manifesto, and it was after a long, and at times bitter debate, that the statement was finally approved by the convention.<sup>86</sup>

In an attempt to recognize the continuity between the old position of Regina and the new programme of Winnipeg, the Declaration of Principles re-emphasized social planning, the creation of the highest possible standard of living, and the creation of a Co-operative Commonwealth oriented to human needs. In turn, it hailed the impact of the Regina Manifesto on Canada's social system as having "wrung improvements out of unwilling governments" and having made Canada a better place "because of its cry for justice".

It continued to condemn capitalism for basic inequality and insecurity in Canadian society, for the wastage of human and natural resources and for the continued growth of unemployment. It also acknowledged public ownership as the most effective means of "breaking the stranglehold of private monopolies on the life of the nation". Yet while it asserted that a "society motivated by private gain and special privilege was basically immoral", the Declaration maintained a conciliatory attitude to that which it condemned, stating that "in the co-operative commonwealth there will be an important role for public, private

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<sup>86</sup> See Globe and Mail, Aug 3-4, 1956. See also Zakuta, op.cit., pp. 93-96.

and co-operative enterprise working together in the people's interest".<sup>87</sup> Where in the case of the Regina Manifesto, it was concluded that "no CCF government would rest content until it had eradicated capitalism and put into operation a full programme of socialized planning", the Winnipeg Declaration concluded with the statement that "the CCF will not rest content until every person in this land and in all other lands is able to enjoy equality and freedom, a sense of human dignity and an opportunity to live a rich and meaningful life". Be this change of heart a "modernization" or "clarification" of the Regina Manifesto, as many moderates asserted, or a "dramatic shift to the right", as more radical elements within the party maintained, the fact that the National Council declared that "the new declaration of principles would supercede all previous statements of principle"<sup>88</sup>, is at least a solid indication of the qualitative and symbolic difference between the two.

#### A New Basis For A New Party

A major significance of this revision, at least to many leftists in the party, was that it foreshadowed an emergent coalition between the CCF and the newly-constituted Canadian

<sup>87</sup>The total text of the declaration, from which all of the above quotes were taken, can be read in Young, op.cit., pp.313-317.

<sup>88</sup>National Council Minutes, July 30-31, 1956. CCFP, PAC.



Labour Congress. Myrtle Armstrong noted, for example, that "the Regina Manifesto had been embarrassing document to those who had hoped to gain the support of organized labour",<sup>89</sup> and as such, a programmatic revision or accommodation was imperative if any alliance between the party and labour was to be made.

Gad Horowitz, citing a comment in the United Auto Worker, lent further support to this hypothesis:

Many in organized labour will welcome the Winnipeg Declaration...with the tag "Socialism-Will-Cure-Everything" off its back, the CCF should be much more acceptable to union voters.<sup>90</sup>

While it is not the intent of this study to penetrate in any depth the mechanics of the eventual harmonization of CCF-CLC strategy in the mid 1950's<sup>91</sup>, it is important to note that after the disastrous showing of the CCF in the 1958

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<sup>89</sup>Myrtle Armstrong, The Development of Trade Union Political Activity in the CCF, M. A. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1957, p.87.

<sup>90</sup>Cited in Horowitz, op.cit., p.

<sup>91</sup>In 1956, the combined TIC-CCL leadership introduced a resolution authorizing the Political Education Committee of the CLC to "initiate discussion with unaffiliated trade unions, principal farm organizations, the co-operative movement, the CCF and other political parties pledged to support the programme of the CLC, excluding communist and fascist parties, and to explore and develop co-ordination of action in the legislative and political field". (Ibid., p. ) The National Convention of the CCF reciprocated by endorsing the CLC resolution. The extent of the later "co-ordination" was pointed by Eugene Forsey who noted that the 1958 resolution of the CLC, calling for "a broadly based political movement embracing the CCF, the labour movement, farm organizations, professional people, and other liberally-minded people" was in fact written by David Lewis. See Douglas Fisher, "The Last CCF Roundup", Canadian Forum, Vol.40, Sept.-Nov., 1960. The CCF's National Council then responded to the CLC's "initiative"

election<sup>92</sup>, it was on the joint initiative of the respective leaderships of the CCF and the CLC that a new party was formed. It is in turn significant that the National Committee for a New Party which emerged out of their deliberations was top-heavy with executive personnel from the two camps which had endorsed the decision.<sup>93</sup> Inasmuch as it was this committee which had been entrusted with the responsibility of stimulating grass-roots political support, creating a draft programme, writing a constitution and organizing the convention, it is little wonder that the ideological posture of the New Democratic Party reflected the relative moderation with which this group had customarily been associated.

Through a combined revision of CCF doctrine and party-labour strategy it is evident that the CCF-CLC coalition was attempting to chart a new course more consistent with the changing socio-economic and political exigencies at hand. Economically, a proliferation of welfare-statist legislation had provided greater security for the lesser privileged; in turn, working people

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by welding the two executives into a Joint National Committee for the purpose of forming a new party. Both conventions endorsed their leaderships' initiative. (Ibid., p.192). See also, Stanley Knowles, The New Party, (Toronto, 1960), *passim*.

<sup>92</sup>The CCF's representation decreased from 25 to 8 seats, including the loss of M. J. Caldwell and Stanley Knowles. Knowles was then elected vice-president of the CLC, thereby providing a direct link between the Congress and the CCF.

<sup>93</sup>The original NCNP was made up of ten members executive from each organization. For a complete list, see Appendix I.

had come to share in the wealth engendered by massive industrialization - the real weekly income of workers in nine leading industries in 1961 being up 40% from that in 1949.<sup>94</sup>

Socially, there had developed a notable shift in the population distribution. Where in 1931, urban and suburban centres had embraced only 33% of the population, in 1961 they included an overwhelming 71%.<sup>95</sup> While agriculture had declined from 33% to 11% of the GNP between 1933 and 1961,<sup>96</sup> large enterprises of substantial capital investment had, at the same time, begun to buy out the small, privately-owned family farms of western Canada.<sup>97</sup> In Quebec, urbanism had long begun to challenge the predominance of its agrarian, parish-oriented past.<sup>98</sup>

Politically, the CCF had failed to rally the support of voters in urban-industrial Canada. Although it chose to contest about 85%<sup>99</sup> of the available urban seats in 1953, 1957 and 1958, as compared with only about 50% of those available in

<sup>94</sup>Working and Living Conditions in Canada, 10th ed., Ottawa, April 1961, pp.29-32.

<sup>95</sup>Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canadian Census, 1961, Vol. 7, Part I, Bulletin 2, pp.7, 24-25.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid., Canada Year Book, 1963, p.715.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., Canadian Census, 1961, Vol.5, Part III, Bulletin 2, table 2, pp.1-2.

<sup>98</sup>See Everett Hughes, French Canada in Transition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.

<sup>99</sup>Electoral statistics on this page have been cited in

rural areas,<sup>100</sup> only one candidate in ten in urban areas could muster more than 33% of the popular vote<sup>101</sup>, and only about 1/3 of the CCF MP's came from urban ridings.<sup>102</sup>

In short, the experience of the CCF in urban ridings represented a mediocre failure of the party to respond to industrial and service-oriented sectors of urban Canada. Given the fact that urban areas were being given a <sup>larger</sup> percentage of the seats,<sup>103</sup> and the fact that the CCF's rural base had been smashed by the Diefenbaker landslide of 1958, it is evident that what was needed was a new base of support rooted in urban, industrial, middle-class Canada. As Lyons concluded, the formation of the NDP was an attempt to construct a structure of incentives around a new name,<sup>104</sup> a new symbol and a new national leader.

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William Lyons, The New Democratic Party in Canada, PhD Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1965, pp. 54-61. The following is a ratio of urban seats contended to urban seats available: 1953 - 93/109, 1957 - 87/109, 1958 - 94/109.

<sup>100</sup>The following is a ratio of rural seats contended to those available: 1953 - 77/154, 1957 - 74/154, 1958 - 75/154.

<sup>101</sup>Lyons, op.cit., p.58

<sup>102</sup>The following is a ratio of CCF urban seats won to the total number of CCF seats in the House: 1953 - 9/23, 1957 - 7/25, 1958 - 3/8.

<sup>103</sup>See Bernard Drefusne, "Gerrymandering on the Way Out", Globe and Mail Magazine, Oct. 12, 1963.

<sup>104</sup>Lyons, op.cit., p.419.

For all intents and purposes, the programme of the New Democratic Party was a copy of the CCF programme and the recommendations of the National Committee.<sup>105</sup> It differed with the former inasmuch as it reversed the party's 1960 decision to oppose NATO and it extended unprecedented concessions<sup>105a</sup> to a hopefully receptive French Canadian constituency; it differed with the latter with respect to foreign investment, with a new paragraph being added to the section entitled "Control by Canadians" calling for the "selective repatriation of Canada's natural resources and industries". Structurally, the membership base of the NDP was similar to that of the CCF with the exception of a massive affiliation of eastern-based industrial unions to the former. The hierarchy of federal and provincial conventions and constitutions remained, with the party's staff being increased substantially and the new

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<sup>105</sup>The NCNP's Draft Programme was an extension of the Winnipeg Declaration of Principles. It promised economic planning, public investment, regional development and control of the adverse side effects of automation. To labour, it offered a National Labour Code; to the farmer, it promised low-interest government loans, parity prices, marketing boards, and the promotion of co-operatives; to fisherman and small businessmen, it offered government assistance in various forms. In turn, the programme endorsed medicare, a national contributory pension plan, expanded unemployment insurance, increased family allowances and massive government assistance to housing and education. While its proposals were very much similar to those promoted by the CCF, no specific reference whatsoever was made to "democratic socialism".

<sup>105a</sup>The new constitution provided that the associate president should speak the alternative mother tongue of the party president.

constitution again designed to woo the support of Quebec. The leadership of the new party remained solidly in tact, with the elites of the CCF and CLC holding the reins of power.

While the early power base and organizational inspiration of the CCF had resided in the west, an alternate power base had begun to develop by the late 1930's, made up largely of middle-class professionals and intellectuals. This urban-based elite had inspired programmatic moderation and trade-union affiliation. It followed that the development of the CCF structurally and ideologically, was, to a large extent, conditioned by the emergence of this eastern-based, urban, middle-class, union-conscious elite, whose alliance with the moderate leadership of the west accelerated this effort. In the political-cultural context, while the situational and ideational conditioning of the masses had provided the "cultural" basis necessary for a grassroots movement of protest, the CCF's eventual institutionalization re-oriented the onus of ideological development to the designs of the professionals, with whom the membership was compelled to comply.

At the core of this elite-dominated ideological process were M. J. Goldwell, T. C. Douglas, David Lewis and Stanley Knowles. All four had held strategic positions of authority within the party hierarchy,<sup>106</sup> they each had enjoyed common

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<sup>106</sup>Goldwell had been national secretary, national chairman and parliamentary leader. Douglas was a perennial member of the council or executive as a member of the caucus or as premier of

personal backgrounds and moderate ideological commitments; they were urban-based<sup>107</sup> and had sympathetic connections with the trade unions,<sup>108</sup> in addition, all four had links with the British socialist tradition.<sup>109</sup> Although Coldwell retained influential positions within the new party.

Given the CCF's institutional development, the consolidation of power around a small inner-circle, changes in the socio-economic and political situations, and the emergence of powerful industrial unions which had come to dominate the CLC, the outcome of the founding convention was somewhat predictable. The prime objective of the convention was to fashion a union between rural elements and union labour, and to transform the CCF of Lipset's

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Saskatchewan. Lewis was on the national council and executive from 1936-1960, first as national secretary, then as national chairman. Knowles was on the council in 1934, the executive in 1942; he was vice-president in 1954, chairman of the national convention from 1948-1958, and chief whip and deputy leader of the national caucus.

<sup>107</sup> Coldwell was former leader of the urban ILP section of the Farmer-Labour Party. Douglas was an M.P. from Weyburn, Knowles was from Winnipeg North-Centre and Lewis was from Toronto (originally Montreal).

<sup>108</sup> Coldwell had been leader of the Independent Labour Party prior to the formation of the CCF. Knowles was elected executive vice-president of the Canadian Labour Congress in 1958. Douglas had been a member of a printers' union since his early youth and Lewis was a labour lawyer.

<sup>109</sup> Both Douglas and Coldwell were immigrants from the United Kingdom, Lewis had studied at Oxford and Knowles and Douglas were ministers of the church in the tradition of the social gospel.

Agrarian Socialism into a political party appealing to a diversity of interests and regions. Implicit in this transformation was the abandonment of doctrinaire socialism:

The keynote of the platform was pragmatism. Instead of bodily proclaiming its faith in socialism and pledging itself to fight for it, the party offers a collection of ad hoc Keynesian remedies which it believes will promote progress and stability.<sup>110</sup>

While the dogmatism of the left had been circumstantially obliterated, it remained for the dogmatism of a new left to challenge in a concerted way, the revised emphasis of the party's elite. Though the content of this challenge focused on an evaluation of party structures, self-determination for Quebec, workers' control, the liberation of women and the elimination of foreign investment from Canadian soil, the resurgence of opposition from within the party ranks derived its principal impetus from an appeal to nationalism - an ideological fragment which had come to pervade the positions of all three major political parties by the end of the decade. What made the nationalist persuasion particularly crucial to developments within the NDP, however, was the fact that nationalism, as far as a radical minority was concerned, could quite logically be equated with socialism, anti-imperialism and, in a broader sense, popular democracy. The development and interpenetration of these ideas will provide a nucleus for Chapter III.

<sup>110</sup>Lipset, op.cit., pp.347-364.



## CHAPTER III

### The New Democratic Party and the Waffle.

In a recent analysis of the British Labour Party, D.I. Davies noted that "the predicament of all social-democratic parties is that the will to rule seems to be fundamentally compromised by the necessity of dissent".<sup>1</sup> Generally speaking, to rule has been the predilection of those in leadership positions; to dissent has been more closely linked to grass-roots sentiment emanating from a mass base.

To be sure, the CCF/NDP, in the mould of its British counterpart, has exhibited these conflicting strains in ideology and strategy, and like its mentor, has succeeded in relegating the position of a dissident "left" to one of impotence. In regard to this latter observation, specific incidents of left-wing defiance within the party have been met with a variety of public chastisement<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>D.I. Davies, "British Socialism and Imperial Decline", Canadian Forum, Vol. 51, no. 610 (Nov. 1971), p. 37.

<sup>2</sup>Cedric Cox, the brother-in-law of Harold Winch (MP, Vancouver East), was publicly criticized by both the NDP Provincial leader and the Provincial president for having visited Cuba as a guest of Fidel Castro. Globe and Mail, Jan. 8, 1963.

censorship<sup>3</sup>, suspension<sup>4</sup>, expulsion<sup>5</sup> and exclusion<sup>6</sup>. At times, the leadership has acted in concert with the provisions and spirit of the constitution; at others, it has revealed an uncompromising intolerance to legitimate expressions of dissent from rank and file members.

What is significant in this regard is that in each and every effort to reprimand the "left", the party leadership has acted from a position of power to safeguard the performance and the credibility of its own ideological position. The failure of the left, in turn, has been a function of its inability to organize collectively and to challenge, in a concerted way, the ideological supremacy of the party's parliamentary-labour elite.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Cox and Herbert Herridge (MP, Kootenay West) were both censured for attending a May Day rally in Vancouver. Globe and Mail, Aug. 15, 1963.

<sup>4</sup>Manitoba CCF M.L.A.'s, Dr. D. Johnson, Barry Richards and W. Daneleyko were suspended by the 1949 Provincial Convention for condemning the Marshall Plan and NATO as "tools of US imperialism". Canadian Dimension, "CCF: Roots and Branches", Vol. 7, no. 8 (April, 1971), p. 17.

<sup>5</sup>In 1962, eleven British Columbia Young New Democrats were expelled for being Trotskyites (Globe and Mail, Dec. 10, 1962). In 1963, ten NDY'ers were expelled for being members of the Young Socialist Alliance.

<sup>6</sup>In a more insidious, though no less effective tactic, the "left" has notoriously been excluded from positions of influence both within the party and at convention time. David Lewis was known to have drafted a list of "undersirables" who would be refused memberships in New Party Clubs. Lyons has noted the exclusion of left-wingers from the resolutions committee at the party's founding convention. Harold Winch was the only acknowledged leftist on the National Committee for a New Party out of over twenty positions.

<sup>7</sup>Zakuta has noted an attempt by a group of left-wingers to

One notable exception to this dissent-repression syndrome was the emergence of the Waffle Group as a left coalition within the NDP. Unlike the Communists and the Trotskyites who had tried to make headway by infiltrating the party from without, the Waffle Group sprang from the efforts of individuals already boasting party memberships and professing devotion to both the NDP and its party-politics. As such, it was a group which at that time, the party brass could neither dismiss or purge.

In light of both the above comments (and previous analysis), a principal focus of this chapter will be to examine the role of situational and ideational factors in the development of Waffle thought, though it must be admitted from the outset that distinction between the two will not be as clear-cut as was the case in our discussion of antecedents to the CCF. In turn, where in the previous chapter we chronicled the CCF's revision of socialist doctrine and its rejection of a movement strategy, it will be the task of this chapter to survey the reincarnation of a principled socialist movement within the framework of the New Democratic Party. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the response by party and labour officials to the obstinacy of Waffle strategists - a response which eventually forced the Waffle to re-evaluate its institutional relationship to the party.

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organize a "left Ginger Group" to "guard against any watering down of our essential socialist principles". Their request to have an open letter printed in the CCF News (as a paid advertisement was turned down by the Ontario Provincial Council. Provincial Council Minutes, Oct. 21, 1950, quoted in Zakuta, op.cit., p.20.

## Antecedents to the Waffle Movement

In preface to this analysis, let us first attempt to identify the sub-groups within the Waffle. By so doing we shall then be able to focus on those specific "cultural" and "ideological" strains which came to be identified with the outlook and the programme of the movement itself. In this light it would be instructive to examine the results of a Canadian Dimension survey conducted just prior to the National Leadership Convention in April, 1971.<sup>8</sup> Although only one hundred out of seven hundred acknowledged Waffle supporters<sup>9</sup> responded to the survey in time for publication, to the best of our knowledge, Dimension's efforts represent the first attempt to empirically delineate those groups and interests and opinions which have coalesced into the Waffle phenomenon.

Perhaps the most interesting revelation to be derived therefrom is that the basis of Waffle support includes an alliance of several constituent strains within the NDP. In statistical terms, the survey established that 80% of those sympathizing with the Waffle had been members of the CCF/NDP prior to the drafting

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<sup>8</sup> A profile of the Waffle and the NDP as per the Dimension survey is contained in Appendix B at the end of the thesis. Included in this section as well, are a series of comparative NDP-Waffle responses to various issues of contemporary concern.

<sup>9</sup> The Waffle sample was taken from the Waffle mailing list which includes New Democrats that may have attended one or two Waffle activities and may not be "hard-core" Wafflers. Where known Wafflers appeared on executive or association lists, from which the NDP sample was taken, they were surveyed as Wafflers, not "NDP'ers".

of the Waffle Manifesto in 1969<sup>10</sup> - in turn, 38% of the total had been members of the party for over ten years. It is also significant that while the Waffle may have proportionately monopolized the support of youth within the party (21% of Wafflers were students as compared with 6% of non-Waffle NDP), Waffle support was fairly evenly distributed within three broad age-groups: Under 30 - 34%, 30 to 50 - 36%, over 50 - 30%. In addition while there was a distinct "academic" flavour to Waffle support (students, teachers, and professors representing 39% of the group) a substantial constituent bloc was represented by other occupational categories; professional - 19%, blue-collar workers - 14%, farmers - 10%, retired - 6%, white collar - 6%, housewives - 5%.

In addition to these empirical observations, Kelly Crichton noted that three distinct ideational dispositions had been fused into the Waffle perspective.<sup>11</sup> The first, and perhaps the largest, represented those who supported the Waffle because it purported to be an anti-imperialist movement dedicated to the struggle for independence and socialism. This group was committed to work within the NDP because the party had afforded a viable organizational base in concert with a dual strategy of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activity. Recent recruits and a large proportion of the youth-academic contingent would be included in

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<sup>10</sup>All subsequent statistics and quotes from the survey will be based on findings recorded in Appendix B and henceforth, shall not be footnoted.

<sup>11</sup>Kelly Crichton, the wife of Melville Watkins, has played an

this group. A second group of people who became involved in the Waffle were active NDP'ers who had welcomed the Waffle as a "left" Ginger Group, intent on breathing new life into the party. Indeed, the fact that 95% of the Waffle respondents to the Dimension survey agreed with the analysis of the Regina Manifesto that "capitalism is a cancer which (still) must be rooted out", <sup>is</sup> indicative of this latent re-affirmation of early CCF doctrine, still evident within the NDP. A third, and smaller group, <sup>was</sup> comprised of various organized and unorganized tendencies on the left who had no commitment to the NDP, nor to the political programme of the Waffle, but who saw their task as "exposing the Bankruptcy of social democracy" and building a vanguard group within the NDP and the Waffle to work with other "progressive elements". It was this last group which had been a particular thorn in the side of the NDP and the Waffle alike, <sup>12</sup> and against whom the attack of the party elite and even some ardent Wafflers, appeared more justified than not.

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active leadership role within the Waffle since its inception. Her observations were put forth in a paper presented at the July 29-30, 1972 Gravenhurst Conference, where a large number of Wafflers met to discuss their future course of action in light of the party's "Crillia decision" that the Waffle, as an identifiable group within the NDP, had to disband.

<sup>12</sup> Stephen Lewis, in his inflammatory anti-Waffle speech to the Provincial Council in Oshawa, gave the following analysis of a Waffle provincial conference held in Hamilton in February, 1972: "What happened was painfully predictable, because when you set up parallel structures within the party, you provide avenues for views which are not ideological, but pathological; which are not dissent, but simple destructiveness; which are, in fact, the

The combined observations of Ms. Crichton and the Dimension staff are significant in that they substantiate our earlier hypothesis that ideologies may be "vertically integrated" within a specific locale. That is to say, in terms of that dissent which existed within the NDP, the Waffle represented 1) an extension and re-interpretation of the old left's notion of socialist principle, and 2) an extension and radicalization of the "moderate left" notion of economic nationalism.

In regard to the socialist connection, there appeared to be an alliance of "causes" between the old, "socialist-principle", leftists of Regina Manifesto vintage, and the new, "democratic-socialist"<sup>13</sup> leftists of the cultural revolt of the 60's. Out of this alliance there emerged a unity of complimentary ideological themes and political strategies, embracing the notions of pacifism,<sup>14</sup>

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antithesis of democratic socialism. And so all the sectarian fringes, from Trotskyites to Maoists, to American New Lefters, suddenly found themselves a forum. And absurdly enough, honest-to-God Wafflers have to spend a weekend contending with that kind of stuff. I know the Waffle repudiates it and wants no part of it. But if the Waffle is concerned, imagine how the party must feel because it's our political reputation that's at stake". ONDP Press Release, March 18, 1972.

<sup>13</sup>The Waffle liked to make a distinction between "social-democracy" and "democratic socialism". The former is elitist-oriented and usually involves electoral compromise; the latter is mass-oriented and attempts to link socialist principle with socialist action and education. See Hal Draper, "From Above or From Below: the Two Souls of Socialism", Our Generation, Vol. 6, no. 3 (Dec. 1969), pp. 68-99. The New Left interpretation of "democratic socialism", in turn, is very much similar to Marcuse's notion of "libertarian socialism". See Herbert Marcuse, "Radical Perspectives: 1969" in ibid., pp. 9-15.

<sup>14</sup>Under the leadership of Woodsworth, the CCF was staunchly

anti-imperialism,<sup>15</sup> and anti-capitalism, a re-emphasis on class politics and a movement strategy, and a mistrust<sup>s</sup> of oligarchical elements within the party. Though the nationalist connection, in

pacifist in its foreign policy. With the advent of war, however, and especially after Woodsworth's death in 1942, the party leadership shifted its position to one of military supply, and later, to one of support for the government's decision to send conscripted troops to the European campaign in 1944. The emergence of the Cold War further enhanced the CCF's departure from traditional pacifist principle - so much so, that it endorsed the deployment of three Canadian destroyers to Korea in 1951. The motivation behind this further shift was elaborated in a confidential second draft of the party's 1951 political programme. Though the excerpt is lengthy, it is significant to note that the CCF linked aggression with Communism (in spite of leftist cries to the contrary that the US was an aggressor as well - i.e. letter from Cook to CCF Comment, Feb. 6, 1952, CCF Papers, Public Archives): "It has become more and more clear that international communism has become an instrument of aggressive Soviet imperialism which scorns the principles of the United Nations. In this context, pacifism, isolationism and neutralism are obsolete and impractical. The non-Soviet world must be strong if peace is to be preserved. Within the democratic alliance, the military and economic resources of the US make her leadership both inevitable and necessary. But the democratic alliance does not mean subservience. Canada's geographic position on the North American continent and her resulting relations with the US, and her historic links with Great Britain and the older dominions confer on Canada positions of influence and respect". CCFP, PAC.

<sup>15</sup>In addition to the above opposition to Soviet imperialism (fn. 14), the CCF, at its founding convention, cautioned against the still-present "threat" of a relatively friendly, British imperialism. As the Regina Manifesto stated: "Within the British Commonwealth, Canada must maintain her autonomy as a completely self-governing nation. We must resist all attempts to build up a new economic British Empire in place of the old political one, since such attempts readily lend themselves to the purposes of capitalist exploitation and may easily lead to further world wars." While the above analysis of "capitalism" and "Empire" and "war" bore little relevance to the continentalist theme of the Waffle nationalists - indeed, at that time, the United States had retreated into isolationism - it is interesting to speculate on the relationship between nationalism, socialism and anti-imperialism, as it might have been articulated, had the US infiltrated our economy as much as it has today.



turn might be traced as far back as 1932,<sup>16</sup> it is only fair to say that the "moderate left" had not come to acknowledge and popularize the threat of American investment until the mid 50's.<sup>17</sup>

Indeed, to many within the party, the extent of foreign investment, until that time, had not warranted their specific attention.<sup>18</sup>

Though the militant left within the party continued to demand extended public ownership in response to this situation, the moderate left, who controlled the party, were happy to simply acknowledge

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<sup>16</sup>The intellectual wing of the CCF movement, The League for Social Reconstruction, was wary from the outset of the threat posed by foreign direct investment. At the 1932 Calgary Convention, the League presented an analysis of Canadian capitalism which included the warning that the country was being plagued by "increasing concentrations of power, especially in the hands of US investors", Lyons, *op.cit.*, p.30. In their later publication, Social Planning for Canada (Toronto, 1935, pp.52-59), a statistical breakdown of the extent of foreign ownership was presented.

<sup>17</sup>At a 1952 National Council meeting, Grace MacInnis noted that "we should point out and protest against the way the present government is giving out resources away to great firms in the US", Feb. 25, 1952, CCFP, PAC; in his historic speech, "A Socialist Takes Stock", David Lewis made reference to an "increasing and alarming share of our natural resources being in the hands of American corporations which milk our economy without regard for Canada's future", *op.cit.*, a transcript, in this author's possession from the National Council (n.d. but probably 1957, since other motions mention the St. Lawrence Seaway and the up-coming federal election) included a motion entitled "US Investment in Canada" - It analyzed the consequences of this situation and recommended that the only solution was "planned investment and control"; in addition, the CCFP-PAC files included a lengthy research paper on the Gordon Commission concerning Canada's Economic Prospects, with special emphasis on foreign investment.

<sup>18</sup>The following chart should be helpful in comparing the nature and extent of foreign ownership in Canada between 1913, 1926, 1939, 1952, 1960 and 1965. Note the shift from British

the threat, and endorse a remedial theme of government planning,<sup>19</sup> regulation, and assistance. It remained for the Waffle to rally opposition forces within the party against this apparent mediocrity and conscious neglect of an "obvious" socialist alternative.

portfolio (redeemable loans and bonds) to American direct investment which involves plant and equipment, is non-redeemable, and includes an element of control:

Foreign Investment (millions of dollars)

	1913	1926	1939	1952	1960	1965
<u>UK</u> <u>Direct</u>	200	336	366	544	1,535	2,013
<u>Portfolio</u>	2,618	2,301	2,110	1,340	1,824	1,485
<u>US</u> <u>Direct</u>	520	1,403	1,881	4,532	10,549	13,940
<u>Portfolio</u>	315	1,793	2,227	3,466	6,169	9,365

From Karl Levitt, Silent Surrender, (Toronto, 1970), p.66

<sup>19</sup> Coincident with the party's historic revision of principles, the CCF added to its agenda a critique on foreign investment. It was the first of the three major parties to do so. At the 1956 National Convention two resolutions were passed, one entitled "Canadian Capital for Canadian Development", and a second entitled "American Investment". The former recommended the establishment of a Canadian Development Bank and a National Investment Board "to encourage, assist and direct Canadian capital expenditures, be they public or private"; the second represented a greater fusion of nationalist and socialist doctrine, asserting that "the extension of social ownership is the only effective answer to the threat of foreign domination of our economy". CCFP, PAC, Vol. 20, Report of 14th National Convention. Although the 1958 and 1960 conventions made little or no mention of foreign investment, the founding convention of the NDP suggested investment and taxation policies to augment and stabilize Canadian control over her own economic and political destiny. The 1965 convention recommended a Canada Development Fund to reverse the trend of foreign control by giving incentives to various sectors of the Canadian economy. (see National Convention Reports, NDP Headquarters, Ottawa) Though the 1967 Convention gave unprecedented attention to foreign ownership in its analysis and 12-point programme, the emphasis remained on government planning, assistance and regulation. NDP, 4th Federal Convention, July 3-6, 1967, pp.29-32.

What is significant about the above themes, is that a "re-interpretation" or "re-application" at the hands of the Waffle, was done within a framework of ideas derived from the Canadian New Left in its most developed form. That is to say, notions of pacifism, anti-imperialism, participatory democracy, decentralization and libertarian socialism had been nurtured outside of the context of the NDP during the early 60's; as the perspective of the New Left became more nationalist in scope, an ideational reciprocity between activists in the New Left and militants within the NDP became more evident.

As for the composite "New" and "Old" Left strains within the Waffle itself, it seems apparent that the former provided a central core of committed and zealous activists, whose ideas, analyses and energy had been central to Waffle success; the latter, in turn, acted as a supportive base within the party, serving to legitimize and reinforce the Waffle's intra-party efforts.

While the development of nationalist and socialist strains within the party has already been given our limited attention, it now behooves us to take a closer look at the development of a New Left ideology within Canada, both as it responded to ideational stimuli emanating from the movement in the United States and as it gradually came to apply its "borrowed" perspective to issues specifically relevant to the Canadian situation.

## The New Left

In October 1960, C. Wright Mills addressed an "Open Letter to the New Left". Its conclusion was both optimistic and prophetic:

Let the old men ask sourly, "Out of Apathy - into what," The Age of Complacency is ending. Let the old women complain wisely about "the end of ideology". We are beginning to move again.<sup>20</sup>

It is somewhat fitting that Wright Mills should have forecast the emergence of the New Left as a dynamic and potent political force in the 1960's - indeed, his biting critiques of American society had made him a harbinger of that which he heralded.<sup>21</sup> In an age of relative quiescence, when the "end-of-ideology" theorists were "rallying their empirical skills and normative commitment behind the notion that ideology was dead, Wright Mills had boldly set out to intellectually<sup>22</sup> - and in the long run, politically - disprove their interpretation of ideology's demise. That the New Left emerged as the antithesis of the 50's vindicated his efforts.

<sup>20</sup>C. Wright Mills, An Open Letter to the New Left, Oct. 1960. (personal transcript)

<sup>21</sup>See White Collar: The American Middle Classes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951); The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); The Causes of World War III (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1958); The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959); Listen Yankee: The Revolution in Cuba (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960); and Power, Politics and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills, edited by Louis Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963)

<sup>22</sup>In his Open Letter to the New Left, Mills castigated the

To be sure, the 50's had been a decade of eclipse for radical political activity: the emergence of the cold war had tended to simplify one's political alternatives between American liberal-democracy, and Soviet totalitarian communism. The McCarthyist response to the latter had created a repressive environment in which leftist dissent was muted and the radical press, all but silenced. University campuses had yet to witness the organized dissent of America's youth: for the most part, universities were engaged in a productive and scientific competition with the Soviet Union, thereby encouraging the feeling that education should service the needs of government, industry, and scientific research; the notion of an education which was, prevalently liberal and humanistic in nature, had been afforded little status. On the whole, the 1950's had presented a picture of America united behind the rhetoric of affluence and liberty, and backed by military and economic security. Only small groups had attempted to resist conformity by remaining outside of the homogeneous social fabric, expressing their dissent in individualistic terms.

As such, the revolt, in its most embryonic form, came to be focused on the "beat generation". It was opposed to the daily

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"end-of-ideology" school for complacency, supporting the status quo, making a fetish of empiricism, and denigrating the importance of ideals in human history to a position of irrelevance.

campus routine, to suburban affluence, sexual puritanism and bureaucratic carcerism.<sup>23</sup> By rejecting the aberrations of industrial society, it represented a small, but significant movement at the forefront of the mass rebellion which would reach fruition a decade later. As Norman Mailer noted:

The beatnik comes from the middle class. He chooses not to work as a sentence against the conformity of his parents. Therefore he can feel moral value in his good-bye to society. In his absent-minded way, he is the torch-bearer of those nearly-lost values of freedom, self-expression and equality which first turned him against the hypocrisies and barren culturelessness of the middle class.<sup>24</sup>

Mailer's reference to a "barren culturelessness" is a concrete reflection of the popular notion that the youth revolt, in its most fundamental manifestations, was a cultural phenomenon. It was cultural in the sense that it was rooted in an aversion to the values, attitudes and beliefs of middle-class, western, industrial society - or as George Benello later put it, youth had recoiled at the "psychic deprivation" of a society whose dominant ideology was organizational, manipulative and one-dimensional:<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>Massimo Teodori, The New Left: A Documentary History, (New York, 1969), p.10.

<sup>24</sup>Norman Mailer, "The White Negro" in Advertisements for Myself (New York, 1959), p.312.

<sup>25</sup>This one-dimensionality of western, technological society was the focal point of a book widely read on the "left" by Herbert Marcuse. See Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, Boston, 1964.

Psychic deprivation refers to a loss of affectivity. Affectivity is about what deprived children are deprived of; warmth, support, an accepting love, but also causal efficacy, the opportunity to initiate interaction...Psychic scarcity is a net lowering of this affectivity throughout society.<sup>26</sup>

The immediate consequence of this situation was personal and social alienation, with the former pointing to one's separation from meaningful or creative work, thereby bringing into question the whole purpose of existence, and the latter denoting one's total estrangement from the mainstream of society. In some cases, this alienation encouraged radicalization;<sup>27</sup> in others, it stifled one's potential for commitment.<sup>28</sup> In Rousopoulos' terms, this difference was manifested in the "psychedelic left" on the one hand, and the "New" (politically-active) Left on the other.<sup>29</sup> While "alienation" into one or the other category depended on one's propensity for activism, there remained an underlying unity in these attitudinal predispositions. Both were

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<sup>26</sup>George Benello, "Wasteland Culture", in Hans Dreitzel, ed., Recent Sociology London, 1969, p.265. Benello's article was also published in Our Generation, Vol. 5, no.2 (November, 1967). Benello is an associate editor of this Canadian New Left journal.

<sup>27</sup>See Kenneth Kenniston, The Young Radicals (New York, 1969)

<sup>28</sup>See Kenniston's other brilliant study of youth and alienation, The Uncommitted (New York, 1965)

<sup>29</sup>Dimitrios Rousopoulos, "What is the New Radicalism", Our Generation, Vol.6, no. 1-2 (May-July, 1968), p.17.

aspects of the counter-culture:

The counter culture is the embryonic base of New Left politics, the effort to discover new types of community, new family patterns, new sexual mores... and new personal identities on the far side of the bourgeois home, the protestant work ethic, and power politics. <sup>30</sup>

This general aversion to the system was politically catalyzed in the U.S. by a series of issues which mushroomed in the early 1960's. The civil rights movement was the first of these, and in this sense, one of the most important, for not only did it focus on the libertarian, egalitarian and basic moral implications of integration, but it served to initiate a new interest in politics by combining a sense of idealism and purpose with new forms of effective, and personally-rewarding participation in extra-parliamentary action. This focus on race later led to an attack on poverty - The SDS, for example directed its efforts to urban slums where Economic Research and Action Projects (ERAP) were set up to mobilize the poor; the focus on human rights, in turn, had repercussions on the university campus - The Berkley Free Speech Movement was spontaneously organized in opposition to the university administration's decision to outlaw all political activity on the campus not directly related to university affairs. It was only a matter of course that the war in Viet Nam

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<sup>30</sup>Theodore Roszak, The Making of the Counter-Culture, (New York, 1969), p.63.



and its related issues of the draft and university-based military research, should be placed on the movement's agenda.

Where in the case of the bohemian "revolt", the ideals of liberty and freedom had borne a personal relevance to individual acts of non-conformity, these principles were later elevated to the need for collective liberation on a much grander scale. In turn, analyses which had concentrated on the specific issues of civil rights and poverty and peace, gradually came to look upon various problematic themes of American society as being integral aspects of a total system. As a result, the perspective of the protest movement shifted from a reformist analysis of isolated problems to a more revolutionary critique of American society itself. The demands for specific changes in sectors of national life gave way to a struggle for the redistribution of power at all levels of society. Where exploitation, alienation and dehumanization had all been traced to the evils of authoritarianism, centralization, bureaucracy and technocracy, the ethic of participatory democracy had been established as a guiding principle both for the movement's demands and its actions.

#### The Canadian New Left

To some,<sup>31</sup> it may seem somewhat ironical that the oft-

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<sup>31</sup>Throughout his leadership campaign, David Lewis stressed the irony of the waffle eclecticism, as did many of his supporters.

expressed slogan, "Continentalism is Treason", has been adopted by Canadian New Left nationalists whose very philosophy, in part, can be traced to its continental ties with militants in the United States. On a closer examination, however, if one accepts the notion established in chapter I that ideological dispositions may exhibit universalist tendencies in light of coincident historical situations, it could be argued that the cultural revolution of youth in the 60's was universal in scope.<sup>32</sup> Assuming the validity of this proposition, it follows that the similarity in themes of American and Canadian New Left discourse was a natural outgrowth of this universal phenomenon.

From a political-cultural perspective, this universality included the "cultural" basis of New Left ideologies - i.e. cognitive, affective and evaluative responses generally indicated a disdain, in various degrees, for what James Harding coined the C-I-A (Capitalism, Imperialism, Authoritarianism).<sup>33</sup> The "ideological" aspect, in turn, was somewhat less universal, for while the "moral fervour" and the "ideal visions" may have transcended political boundaries, the "social critique" and the "programmatic" aspects of various ideological responses were destined to

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<sup>32</sup> See Cy Gonick, "The New International Left", Canadian Dimension Kit #2: The Youth Revolt and the New Left, pp. 23-25.

<sup>33</sup> James Harding, "The Unity of Opposites: The Waffle and the NDP", Our Generation, Vol. 7-8, no. 4-1 (September, 1971), p.107.

exhibit a strategic flavour endemic to the specific societies in question.

It was in this latter, "ideological" regard, that the early New Left in Canada exhibited an eclectic sterility. Not only had it incorporated into its strategy a host of perspectives derived from its counterpart in the US, but it had also digested, in turn, several themes and issues which were more appropriate to the American political milieu than to that in Canada. One need only scan the earlier issues<sup>34</sup> of Our Generation (Against War - Volumes I - III) and Canadian Dimension to sense this dependency on the movement to the south.

On this note, James Laxer cited three specific American trends which were eventually embraced by the New Left in Canada:<sup>35</sup> firstly, a desire for participatory democracy - a notion which had been founded on the desire to deepen and enrich the meaning of pluralism in American life; secondly, an inbred suspicion of bureaucracy, organization and institutions - basically a reflection of the anarchist and individualist tradition of the American New Left;

<sup>34</sup>The earliest volumes of these magazines tended to emphasize the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, an issue which had vitiated Canada's first sizeable New Left grouping, The Combined Universities' Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CUCND). CUCND'S efforts to dissuade the government from importing nuclear weapons, however, had experienced a serious set-back with the Pearson administration's decision to set up Bomarc missile bases in North Bay and La Macaza. The group dissolved shortly thereafter. According to Margaret Daly, CUCND's ban-the-bomb failure had forced the "left" to re-evaluate its "single-issue, reactive orientation" and to eventually pursue a "multi-issue, organizing approach". As a result, portions of CUCND's scattered remnants realigned themselves the following year into the Student Union for Peace Action (SOPA). See Margaret Daly, The Revolution Game, Toronto, 1970, p.33.

<sup>35</sup>James Laxer, "The Student Movement and Canadian Independence",

and thirdly, the idea of mobilizing around the plight of the economically and racially oppressed minorities, as engendered by the belief that such minorities were the true agents of revolutionary social change in America.

While these orientations received wide application in the Canadian political milieu, they ignored, and therefore failed to align themselves with the radical and socialist perspective of an already-established left-wing tradition in Canada. As a result, the Canadian New Left, at least in its earliest stages of development, had failed to link the issue of self-determination with that of national independence; in turn, its inherent distrust of organization had stifled its potential for acting on a national scale, including the possibility of working through existing national institutions to further their cause (ie. the NDP and parliament); and thirdly, through its emphasis on oppressed minorities, it had neglected Canada's working class traditions, both as a cornerstone of radical political activity, and as a potential base of popular support.

The Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA) was the major vehicle of American New Left ideas in Canada. Its leadership had been influenced by the personal magnetism of Tom Hayden, the national leader of the Students for a Democratic Society; and its organizers had established personal contacts with SDS

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Canadian Dimension, Vol.6, no.3-4 (September, 1969), p.32.

personnel in the US. SUPA projects - which included organizing the poor in Kingston, the blacks in Nova Scotia, the Doukhobors in British Columbia and the Metis<sup>36</sup> in Saskatchewan - had all been inspired by SDS activity with oppressed minorities in urban slums, (especially ERAP and Newark Community Projects). SDS demonstration and sit-in tactics were emulated by SUPA in its protest against the Bomarc missile base at La Macaza, and in its confrontation with the US consulate over the issues of Viet Nam, and racial discrimination.

SUPA died in 1967. Some of its members interested in community organizing joined the Company of Young Canadians; others became active in the Canadian Union of Students and the New Democratic Youth; still others joined the new, and more militant New Left Committee. According to Jim Laxer, a long-time SUPA activist, the group was forced to disband because of its continental political orientation. As an official statement from the New Left Committee noted:

The key to SUPA's failure was its inability to develop a coherent analysis of the structure of modern capitalism and of its specific characteristics in Canada. Instead, SUPA remained ideologically confused and uncritically eclectic. SUPA tended to simplistically copy models of radical movements in Britain and the United States without regard to their relevance to Canada.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>In a feeble attempt to apply an American theme to a Canadian issue, one SUPA member noted: "Inevitably the Canadian student got all hung up about the Canadian Indian. It was the closest thing we had to the American Negro". Daly, op.cit., p.32.

<sup>37</sup>New Left Committee, "The Revolutionary Process", in Gerald McGuigan, Student Protest (Toronto, 1968), pp.107-8.

That the major reason for SUPA's dissolution was its un-Canadian perspective is significant, especially in view of the fact that in the same year, nationalism was given a greater priority at the Canadian Union of Students conference held in Winnipeg. Peter Warrian, the president-elect of CUS and an ex-member of SUPA, presented a position paper entitled "Democratization and Decolonization". Its major emphasis was that radical faculty and students should attempt to re-orient the Canadian university to an anti-imperialist position, whereby independence and socialism could be promoted in the interests of Canada's future.<sup>38</sup>

Under Warrian, the CUS leadership became "explicitly anti-imperialist, effectively socialist and militantly activist".<sup>39</sup> By the end of Warrian's term in office, the out-going CUS Secretariat was recommending to the new executive, that it adopt "a radical, socialist analysis of Canadian society".<sup>40</sup> Though the new administration was averse to such a course, the 1969 national convention endorsed the principle that

the aim of our programme should be to stimulate discussion of educational and social issues among the greatest possible number of students.<sup>41</sup>

Politically, the convention took the stand that the "principle

<sup>38</sup> See text of speech in Our Generation, Vol.6, op.cit., p.28.

<sup>39</sup> Stephen Langdon, "CUS", Canadian Dimension, Vol.6, no.7 (February-March, 1970), pp.6-9. Langdon was SAC President at the University of Toronto when CUS forced to disband in 1969. It was the U of T referendum which eventually forced CUS into an impossible financial position. Langdon later became active in the New Democratic Party.

<sup>40</sup> Canadian Union of Students, Issue, Vol.3, no.1 (September, 1969)

<sup>41</sup> CUS, Issue, Ibid.

of control over one's material and social environment is a fundamental democratic right". This notion of participatory democracy was then extended to both student control over the learning process and to the right of self-determination for the people of Quebec. Later that year, an article in the CUS national newspaper expanded this perspective to include the issue of foreign professors on Canadian campuses, which in turn, was linked to the question of Canada's continental relationship to the United States:

Clearly we cannot have independent universities without independent economic and political institutions as well. What we are dealing with here is American imperialism and the struggle for Canadian independence.<sup>42</sup>

By linking the modern demands of self-determination and democratization to the issue of Canadian independence, the Canadian New Left had begun to embrace an issue which was both central to its philosophy and integral to its "search" for Canadian perspectives.

While the Canadian New Left was beginning to adopt, in a radicalized form, the parliamentary left's theme of economic nationalism, the youth contingent of the NDP, in turn, was beginning to append the demands of democratization and popular

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<sup>42</sup>This analysis was contained in an article entitled, "Americanization of the Canadian University" by George Russell in Ibid. The above quotation was attributed to John Conway of Simon Fraser University in British Columbia. Conway was one of the "keynote" speakers at the first National Conference of the Waffle Movement. (personal transcripts)

self-determination to its own agenda. The first realizations of this development took shape at the 1965 Convention of the New Democratic Youth, wherein a "Left Caucus" called for Canada's withdrawal from NATO, the immediate nationalization of basic and key sectors of the economy, ultimate workers' control of the factories, and the recognition of Quebec's right to self-determination - all of which were major planks in the Waffle programme four years hence. In addition, as Stanley Gray noted, several references were made during the NDY meeting to the Students for a Democratic Society and the Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee in the U.S., and to SUPA and the Friends of SNCC in Canada.<sup>43</sup>

The following year, Arthur Pape and James Laxer, who were both active in SUPA, wrote that the movement for radical democracy in Canada "would inevitably bring its supporters up against the full power of the American Empire" and that as such, "the movement would be a movement for Canadian independence as well".<sup>44</sup> In turn, they criticized traditional Canadian nationalism for "turning-off" Canadian youth by "painting a land of independent-minded, rural Britons, too wise to go along with

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<sup>43</sup> Stanley Gray, "the NDY Convention", Canadian Dimension, Vol. 2, no. 6 (September-October, 1965).

<sup>44</sup> James Laxer and Arthur Pape, "Youth and Canadian Politics", Our Generation, Vol. 3, no. 4 (Nov. 1966), p. 21.



Yankee folly".<sup>45</sup> In its stead, they claimed that what really interested young people in Canada was the creation "of a broadly based opposition movement that really wished to repatriate the Canadian economy."<sup>46</sup> To return to Gray's analysis once again, he felt that such a movement would have to "focus its demands around the idea of participatory democracy: the democratization and decentralization of power within the framework of a publicly-owned and responsible economy".<sup>47</sup> In addition, he claimed somewhat prophetically that the movement would have to be built outside of the NDP, "for to think that the party can be changed by a membership revolt is to woefully underestimate the power of the party and union bureaucracy".

By 1967, however, dissent within the party had already begun to ferment: The NDY had begun to work with some SUPA people around the issue of nationalism;<sup>48</sup> Ken Novokowski was elected national president of the NDY on a platform of pledging

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<sup>45</sup>James Laxer and Arthur Pape, "The New Left as It Sees Itself", Canadian Dimension, Vol.3, no.6 (September-October, 1966), p.14.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p.15.

<sup>47</sup>Stanley Gray, "New Left, Old Left", Canadian Dimension, Vol.3 no.1 (November-December, 1965), pp.11-12.

<sup>48</sup>Robert Chodos, et.al., "David: The Centre of the Party", Last Post, Vol.1, no.7 (April-May, 1971), p.29. Novokowski is presently an ardent Waffler and is expected to run in British Columbia in the next federal election.

to break the organizations right-wing leadership;<sup>49</sup> and Jim Renwick, a Toronto MLA, won the national presidency of the NDP in a grass-roots revolt against J.H. Brocklebank, the choice of David Lewis and others in the party hierarchy.<sup>50</sup>

As the decade drew to a close, the power base of an expanded New Left shifted from Toronto to Western Canada. With this shift came a greater frequency of contact between Canada's socialist traditions and the modern demands of decentralization and democratization. As a result, the NDP's emphasis on national self-determination had an increasing impact on the attitudes of the young who had come to publicize what they felt to be a frightening parallel between the imperialism of the American military in Asia and the imperialism of American capital in Canada. In turn, activists from the New Left became more influential in the NDP and the NDY, as did also their bias for a mass movement strategy and extra-parliamentary activity. Don Mitchell, to cite one example of this NDP-New Left interaction, was elected vice-president of CUS in 1968; in 1969 he became an organizer for the National Farmers' Union; and in 1970, he was the Waffle's candidate for the leadership of the Saskatchewan

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<sup>49</sup>Hans Brown, "Youth and the NDP", NDP News, Vol.4, no.4 (April 1967), p.4. At that time, Brown was Federal Secretary of the NDY. He was also an original signatory of the Waffle Manifesto. Since that time, he became an assistant to Tommy Douglas and he is presently Provincial Secretary of the B.C. NDP. Brown's (ex) wife, Jackie Larkin, was one of the more militant and articulate members of the Waffle Group, holding as well, strategic executive positions within the party.

<sup>50</sup>Chodos, op.cit., p.29.

New Democratic Party. Another outstanding example was the experience of James Laxer: In 1965, he was president of Canadian University Press and an active nationalist within the Student Union for Peace Action; in 1969 he was instrumental in drafting the Waffle Manifesto which he later eloquently defended as a youth delegate to the NDP National Convention; and in 1971, he led the Waffle challenge to the party establishment by finishing a strong second to David Lewis in the leadership race. Although these cases are exceptional, they are not unlike, in a lesser degree, the experience of many New Left types who found personal fulfillment in the left-wing of Canada's only social-democratic party.

From a party perspective, the congregating of such people would, no doubt, provide a concerted challenge to the reformist politics of the established leadership; from a societal standpoint, a new movement would help to make public the unabated erosion of Canadian control over her resource and industrial sectors. It remained for a group of young intellectuals - all of whom had roots in the Canadian new left tradition and had since joined the NDP - to produce a document of principles directed against the problem of elitism and reformism within the party, and against the dilemma of continentalism in all of its social and political manifestations. The Waffle Manifesto served as an ideological basis for the mobilization of such a movement.

### The Waffle Manifesto

The original impetus for the manifesto came from Jim Laxer, who, in April 1969, convened several meetings for the purpose of drafting several principled, and militantly socialist resolutions for presentation to the 1969 NDP National Convention. Though he attempted to solicit contributions and suggestions from a number of activists whom he felt were committed to qualitative change within the party<sup>51</sup>, a double irony emerged out of his initial efforts: 1) Stephen Lewis, who later spearheaded a vicious attack on the Waffle, had been extended an invitation but later declined to attend, and 2) Professor Melville Watkins, after whose name the press had often coined the manifesto, had not been an original invitee to the initial discussions. While many would deem Watkins' omission as the ultimate in absurdity (especially in view of Lewis' invitation), this "oversight" is quite understandable, given the fact that Laxer and Lewis had been raised in a socialist milieu and that Watkins, until of late, had not even been a nationalist, much less a socialist.<sup>52</sup> Indeed, writing for the University League for Social Reform in 1965, Watkins had concluded in one

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<sup>51</sup>Participants in the original meeting included three graduate students from Queens' University - James Laxer, Lorne Brown, and John Smart - their wives, Gilles Endicott, Gerry Caplan (a professor from the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, and a later anti-waffle "hatcheman" for Stephen Lewis), and Ed Broadbent (a political science professor from York University and an MP for Oshawa-Whitby). Interview with Laxer, April, 1971.

<sup>52</sup>See Watkins and Godfrey, Gordon to Watkins to You, (Toronto, 1970), chapter I.

article that "we should stop harassing foreign investors".<sup>53</sup>

Though in a later USSR publication, his attitude on nationalism had reversed, he had yet to equate the demands of nationalism with those of socialism:

Canada is committed to the capitalist path of development, and, in the final analysis, Canadians should prefer home-brewed capitalists over alien capitalists. If Canada is to be a capitalist country - and the prospects for change in this respect are hardly part of the agenda for 1970 - then a case can be made for a Canadian bourgeoisie whose competence and initiative are of a higher order.<sup>54</sup>

The above position, according to Christina Newman,<sup>55</sup> was largely a consequence of Watkins' close association with Abraham Rotstein, a colleague at the University of Toronto, who later recommended to Walter Gordon that Watkins be appointed to lead the Task Force on Foreign Ownership.

In an autobiographical sketch of his own ideological transformation, Watkins admitted that his experience with the Task Force had had a radicalizing effect on his view of American control:

Working on the Report on foreign ownership made me into an economic nationalist, and defending the report pushed me towards socialism.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>Mel Watkins, "Canadian Economic Policy: A Proposal", in Abraham Rotstein, The Prospect of Change, (Toronto, 1965).

<sup>54</sup>Mel Watkins, "A New National Policy" in Lloyd and McLeod, Agenda 1970, (Toronto, 1968), p.175.

<sup>55</sup>Christina Newman, "The True Compromise Good and Sane: How Mel Watkins Brought Socialism to the NDP", Saturday Night (September, 1970), p.26.

<sup>56</sup>Mel Watkins, "Learning to Move Left", This Magazine is About Schools, Vol.6, no. 1 (Spring, 1972), p.82.

And like other young militants of his time, Watkins' brand of socialism was rooted in a New Left mould:

When I thought about democratic socialism, the word "democratic" did not simply mean building socialism by democratic means in the sense of gaining power electorally. What it meant was the redistribution of power from elites, who have it now, to the people. It meant democracy at every level of decision-making...In other words, I had a very New Left vision of socialism. And from my brief encounter with the NDP, I knew that the party was closer to the Old Left position of considering hierarchical structures inevitable.<sup>57</sup>

In June, 1968, Watkins ended his abstinence on partisan political comment<sup>58</sup> by writing in Our Generation that "in order for communities to establish different priorities, people must be politicized - electoral politics needs be supplemented by confrontation politics".<sup>59</sup> Shortly thereafter, Watkins allied himself<sup>60</sup> with Laxer's NDP study group; he later co-authored the Waffle Manifesto and joined the NDP to help spearhead the debate within the party.

According to Laxer, the manifesto was written in response to the issues of American imperialism, Quebec's right to self-

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<sup>57</sup>Loc.cit.

<sup>58</sup> Watkins had agreed to defend the Task Force Report for a period of one year after its publication in January, 1968. In this capacity he was to refrain from partisan political activity.

<sup>59</sup> Mel Watkins, "The Multi-National Corporation in Canada", Our Generation, Vol. 6, no.4, pp.97-103.

<sup>60</sup> That same year, Watkins was chosen president of the University League for Social Reform, a group of Toronto academics who had come together in 1964 to promote social change. In his search for contributors to a potential work on Canadian socialism, he was introduced to Laxer's group which he later joined as the only non-NDP participant.

determination and the need to have workers' control of the factories.<sup>61</sup> Each of these issues, on different levels, is an expression of the libertarian emphasis of the New Left ideology; each pointed to the need for "participatory democracy" in the industrial, national and international contexts.

Despite the press's interpretation of the document as being radically anti-American and rabidly nationalistic, Mel Watkins asserted that the manifesto's nationalism was of an independentist (not racist) genre, and that democratization and socialism, as reciprocal demands within the document, should not be underscored:

The Waffle Manifesto is also a serious statement about socialism; despite the press' build up of an independence movement image. It is about where socialists think power lies and how they should counteract that power...If you take the issue of independence and socialism, one way to link them is to think of the issue of democratization itself. What we as socialists believe in is that ordinary men and women should have control over their own lives and have the right to act collectively to establish that kind of control. The issue of independence is the issue of democratization when properly conceived.<sup>62</sup>

Where a Liberal might oppose continentalism because of the demise of the American dream, and where the Tory might oppose continentalism given the excesses of mass violence and intolerance

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<sup>61</sup>Laxer interview, op.cit.

<sup>62</sup>Transcripts of National Waffle Convention, August 1-3, 1970, Toronto, (personal tapes)

In the United States, the Canadian socialist opposes continentalism because closer integration with the US will jeopardize any hopes that are left of creating a socialist society in Canada. In a reciprocal fashion, many nationalists believe that state intervention and public ownership are the only means of assuring Canadian independence. As Jim Laxer noted:

Continental integration has become so pervasive that those who value an independent Canada and those who reject the values of corporate capitalism are coming to share a common agenda. Canadian nationalists are starting to realize that only large scale government intervention in the economy can win back control of this country for Canadians. Socialists are increasingly aware that we cannot build a better society here if Canada does not possess sovereign power.<sup>63</sup>

The manifesto asserted that "socialism is both a process and a programme".<sup>64</sup> The Waffle's "programme" demanded a sharp thrust to the left in party policy; its "process", on the other hand, re-emphasized the necessity of grassroots, socialist education. Inasmuch as the mainstream of the party had persisted in advocating essentially moderate policies based on an electoral strategy, divisions within the party were bound to develop.

This programmatic/strategic dichotomy was perhaps most

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<sup>63</sup>Laxer, "Student Movement", op.cit., p.2.

<sup>64</sup>Waffle Manifesto, Canadian Dimension, Vol.6, no.3-4, p.10.



apparent in the defection of Ed Broadbent from the Waffle before its manifesto was released to the press. Broadbent's position was based on five fundamental criticisms of the original manifesto: 1) he disagreed with the opening statement that, "our aim is to make the NDP a truly socialist party" (The implication was, according to Laxer, that Broadbent felt the NDP already was a socialist party); 2) he could not accept the rhetoric of the "American Empire"; 3) he was not in agreement with the self-determination notion of "two nations, one struggle"; 4) the section on industrial democracy; and 5) the group's position on "nationalizing the commanding heights of the economy" were both too extreme for his liking.<sup>65</sup> Although in response, he drafted his own statement of principles, it is no surprise that his suggestions were turned down. Given the nature of his critique and the obvious fundamental clash of opinions, Broadbent was compelled to dissociate himself from the group.

The root of Broadbent's disagreement with Laxer was essentially derived from what he later called an "important distinction between the long-run goals of socialism and the short-run political objectives of a socialist party". In an interview with the author, he criticized the Waffle's model of "socialism now" as being "unrealistic in terms of serious politics" in

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<sup>65</sup> Jim Laxer interview, op.cit.

appealing to Canadians to move in a socialist direction. He maintained that an emphasis on "movement politics" was a "simplistic view of the universe" and suggested that one of the most important means of inducing the public to accept long-run socialist objectives was to indulge in electoral politics, gain power, incrementally break down the capitalist structure and prove the viability of a socialist programme. In this way, he saw no incompatibility between short-run compromise and long-run socialist objectives.<sup>66</sup>

The Waffle, on the other hand, would take a dim view of Broadbent's rationalizations. In a later interview, Laxer criticized the electoral politics of social-democratic parties in Britain, Sweden and Germany for not bringing about any fundamental change in their respective societies. He maintained that the electorate must first be convinced of the righteousness of socialism per se before the electoral success is attained. If a socialist party is elected on this premise, it will not be condemned to piece-meal legislative compromise, as has been the case with most social-democratic parties to date.

While the reaction of the party establishment to the Manifesto was somewhat predictable, the receptivity of the party's rank and file was not. Indeed, even party pundits, Fisher and Crowe had predicted in the Toronto Telegram that they would be

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<sup>66</sup> Interview with Ed Broadbent, January 20, 1971.

surprized "if twenty of the one thousand delegates would even be interested in discussing" the document, much less supporting it.<sup>67</sup>

Much to the contrary, however, the Waffle position received a full hearing at the convention, winning the endorsement of 268 out of 767 of the delegates present. As such, the Waffle's unprecedented challenge to the party's programme and strategy - and hence, to the legitimacy of the direction in which the established leadership had been guiding the NDP - was successful in forcing the party to assume a more militant posture, both on the question of foreign ownership and on the question of socialism itself.

To be more specific, Waffle pressure in a workshop on foreign ownership, for example, had compelled the resolutions committee to compromise<sup>68</sup> on the policy directives laid down by David Lewis and the Federal Council. As a result, not only

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<sup>67</sup> Cited in editorial, Canadian Dimension, Vol.6, no.5 (October-November, 1969), p.4.

<sup>68</sup> The compromise resolution introduced by Mel Watkins at a policy discussion group for presentation to the plenary session was described by the Toronto Star as a "watered-down version of the manifesto". Though its language was still strong - i.e. "multi-national corporations are the dominant institutions of Canadian life", and "Canada has been virtually reduced to a resource base and a consumer market within the American empire" - the resolution was deemed "less anti-American in its sentiments than the original manifesto". Toronto Star, October 29, 1969. It is interesting to note that the official party programme replaced the rhetoric of the "American empire" with a toned-down reference to the "American economy". The rest of the motion appears in tact. NDP, Resolutions and Statements, 5th Biennial Convention, 1969.

did the final resolution accepted by the convention lay down several guidelines for the restriction and regulation of investment, but in yielding to the enthusiasm of the party's left wing, it also asserted that "only democratic socialism could create the basis, economic and political, for Canadian independence".<sup>69</sup> In a second debate, although the Waffle resolution "For an Independent Socialist Canada" was soundly defeated<sup>70</sup>, it had forced the hand of the party leadership. In response, the party executive was compelled to draft a counter-proposal, "For an Independent and United Canada" which, while hitting at the same themes, was less strident in its rhetoric and more flexible in its solutions. The document won the overwhelming endorsement of the convention delegates.

While the Waffle Manifesto had no doubt been decisive in pushing the party to the left, of even greater consequence was the fact that it had helped to flush out and identify dissident strains within the party. In turn, those who had rallied around

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<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p.37.

<sup>70</sup>A principal reason for the Waffle defeat was the fact the party's influential leadership core, centred around David Lewis, John Harney, Ed Broadbent and Dennis McDermott, led the way in both criticizing the Manifesto and supporting the party executive's recommendations. Lewis maintained, for example, that "instead of spouting old-fashioned, fundamentalist rhetoric", the party should adopt "modern socialist methods to find modern socialist solutions to modern capitalist problems". David Lewis in Paul Fox, Politics Canada, 3rd edition, Toronto, 1970, p.247. Others commented that the "strident approach of the Waffle would be injurious to the party's efforts to gain financial support". Globe and Mail, October 29, 1969.

the manifesto, decided on the last night of the convention to maintain an on-going left-caucus within the party. The Waffle group was a product of that decision.

### The Rise and Decline of the Waffle Movement

Prior to the 1969 Federal Convention, the Waffle had consisted of a group of disaffected young radicals whose names had been appended to a document of principles; following that convention, the Waffle developed as a full-fledged protest movement. Given the duality of its thrust - to radicalize the party and to mobilize society - the Waffle's professed disdain for hierarchy and elitism was remoulded into a reserved and qualified acceptance of leadership and structure.

As such, the Waffle leadership came to be equated with the names of Mel Watkins and Jim Laxer - intelligent, articulate, publicly-acknowledged spokesmen for the group. Both were prolific in their writing, persuasive in their arguments and penetrating in their criticism of Liberals and Tories, and NDP and trade union brass. As participants at party Councils and conventions, they were unsettling in their agitation; as key figures on local, provincial and national Waffle steering committees, their leadership was decisive. Under their influence, the Waffle both challenged the NDP leadership at the party's centres of power, and embarrassed the NDP leadership by pressing for extra-parliamentary action, independent of those centres of power.

Structurally, the Waffle came to be identified with an intricate web of regional and local steering committees which had been established to facilitate communication and planning, co-ordination and integration. Waffle "clubs" were formed on university campuses; NDP riding associations, especially - though not exclusively - in areas where the party was weak, became agents of Waffle agitation. A National newspaper was printed to replace the old Waffle Newsletter in order that every group in the country might be better informed of various Waffle activities.

Ideologically, the Waffle gradually came to be recognized for its principled adherence to a specific political programme and strategy. In terms of the four-point perspective of our introductory remarks, this "ideology" could be said to include: 1) a moral revulsion for an elitist society that had acquiesced in the demise of Canadian independence and that had failed to acknowledge the need for collectivities - ie, English Canada, the Quebecois, workers, local communities, etc. - to be self-determining; 2) its ideal vision of an independent, socialist Canada; 3) its critique of all three major political parties for their lack of militancy in pursuing the independence issue, and in particular, the trade union and NDP leadership for failing to provide a necessary socialist perspective; and 4) its own

eleven-point programme<sup>71</sup> on how this vision could best be implemented.

While it goes without saying that the importance of leadership, structure and ideology were all central to the success of the Waffle, we should not overlook the fact that the Waffle had developed as a mass movement with a popular base of support. As such, in addition to its intellectual elite and activist core, the Waffle also represented in a more diffuse way, those thousands of NDP'ers who had been won over, in varying degrees, to the principles and precepts of the Waffle Manifesto; and in a similar vein, while the Waffle had clearly come out in favour of a specific programme and strategy, it had also come to embrace a totality of dissident values, attitudes and beliefs prevalent within the framework of the NDP. In a very real sense, the development of the Waffle, both as an organization and as a state of mind, had come to resemble in a conceptual way, the political-cultural structure elaborated in chapter I - complete with an elite and a mass, and a programme and a mood.

To better understand the persistence of this sub-cultural strain within the NDP, it would be helpful to refer back to the

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<sup>71</sup>The Waffle Programme presented to the 1971 Federal Convention included proposals on the resource industries, Quebec, public ownership, women's liberation, amendments to the NDP constitution to guarantee women's rights, recommendations on the NDP Council and Executive, women in the work force, farming, extra-parliamentary activity, regional economic development, and workers' control.

perspective developed by Herbert Blumer in his study of social movements. His emphasis on general unrest, social agitation, esprit de corps and popular morale, as earlier applied to the experience of the CCF, are equally applicable to the development of the Waffle:

The initial "stages of unrest" have already been noted within society: a growing sense of powerlessness and alienation, a disenchantment with the extent and implications of foreign economic control, an increased propensity for students to organize in response to these exigencies; within the party: a radicalization of the youth wing of the party to the precepts of the New Left, a growing disgust with the absence of meaningful alternatives to the other two parties, an increased distrust of the NDP's bureaucratic-hierarchical chain of command. The collective impact of these predispositions combined to assert within the party the need for self-examination and re-evaluation. The final initiative, of course, was taken by a small, but highly intelligent and articulate group of people, whose writing of the manifesto and proslytization of its principles served to raise fundamental questions and stimulate meaningful debate.

Given the intellectual posture of the group, the subsequent stage of "popular excitement" was facilitated by the Waffle's accessibility to radical, campus-based student organizations who were quick to rally behind the manifesto. In turn, the confrontation at Winnipeg with the party establishment provided



an excellent forum in which to test the movement's oratorical and argumentative capacities. The contacts made at the Winnipeg Convention; the national exposure given to the group through the news media, the editorial support rendered to it by Canadian Dimension (which had a substantial following in New Left and NDP circles), and the eventual publication of the Waffle Newsletter all enhanced the recruitment process of Waffle sympathizers.

The specifics of building an esprit de corps, as outlined by Blumer, are threefold. They are: 1) the encouragement of an ingroup/outgroup perspective, 2) the maintenance of informal fellowship, and 3) the promotion of ceremonial behaviour. Each of the above have proven to be applicable to the experience of the Waffle.

The ingroup/outgroup emphasis essentially entails the conceptualization of good/bad, we/they, solidarity/hostility dichotomies. The applications of this phenomenon to the Waffle are both numerous and obvious, and need only be mentioned though not necessarily expanded: Canada/USA, NDP/Libs-Cons, socialism/capitalism, democratic-socialism/social democracy, New Left/Old Left, movement/party, etc.

Informal fellowship, in turn, as the instrumentality of human integration, leads to common sympathies and a sense of intimacy. Douglas Fisher, in a recent analysis of the Waffle, noted how the mobility of Wafflers from city to city was facilitated by a tacit willingness on the part of its "members"

to billet others from out of town. In this way, attendance at regional, provincial and national meetings was maximized and Waffle participation at various conferences and teach-ins encouraged.

Central to Blumer's last, "esprit de corps" category, ceremonial behaviour, is attendance at meetings and rallies. Accordingly, participation in mass situations affords the individual a sense "of personal importance and a feeling of personal expansion in trying to identify with the movement".<sup>72</sup> In this light, Waffle groups (especially in Toronto where membership was over 1,000) undertook to demonstrate against the Continental Energy Deal,<sup>73</sup> the War Measures Act;<sup>74</sup> the closure of the Dunlop Plant,<sup>75</sup> and strike-breaking activities at Texpack<sup>76</sup> and Giddon Industries; In turn, the Waffle sponsored a leadership debate between Stephen Lewis and Walter Pitman in October 1970, a counter-conference to William Davis' Conference on Economic and Cultural Nationalism in June 1971 (which the NDP later took over), and a conference on the Auto Pact in Windsor in January 1972; the Waffle was also active in NDP and trade union conventions, holding nightly strategy sessions at the end of each day,

<sup>72</sup>Blumer, op.cit., p.14.

<sup>73</sup>See Waffle News, Sept. 1970, p.1.

<sup>74</sup>See Waffle News, Vol.2, no. 2 (November, 1970).

<sup>75</sup>Mel Watkins, "Dunlop's Demise", Canadian Dimension, Vol.6, no. 8 (April-May, 1970), p.6.

<sup>76</sup>Mark Zwelling, "The Strike at Texpack's Vanishing Plant", Canadian Dimension Vol. 8, no.3, pp.9-12.

and in organizing their own provincial and national conventions to deal with issues of contemporary concern.

Reinforcing the movement's esprit de corps was the pervasive influence of the group's morale which in turn inspired a collective sense of conviction. To these elements were added a sanctity of mission, a rectitude of purpose and a confidence in achievement - all of which were detectible in the doctrine of the Waffle Manifesto and in the uncompromising militancy of Waffle supporters. Indeed, one need only attend a Waffle conference or rally to witness the sense of urgency of the participants, whose academic analyses have been diffused by many into a flood of stereotypes, emotion and imagery. In turn, the unending utilization of what Blumer labelled as "symbolic referents" - in the context of the Waffle, badges, slogans, and cursory references to books and authors deemed essential to a Waffler's reading list - functioned to enhance this feeling of a collective mood and purpose.<sup>77</sup>

While the Waffle had, without a doubt, challenged the other elements in the party to respond to its overtures, in the long-run it was impossible for conservative strains within the party to divorce the issue of the Waffle's ideology and programme

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<sup>77</sup>The most popularized publications included Mel Watkins' Gordon to Watkins to You, Jim Laxer's The Energy Poker Game, Karl Levitt's Silent Surrender, and an anthology published by the University League for Social Reform entitled Close the 49th Parallel. Buttons and badges reading "Continentalism is Treason", "Nixon Drinks Canada Dry" and "The Struggle for Socialism" were also in evidence.

from the issue of the right of the Waffle to exist. At the forefront of this latter response, was an alliance of party and labour officials who had been most offended, and in turn, most threatened by the Waffle's initiatives. Like Laxer and Watkins, they too had a substantial following within the party - one which, when called upon, could rally to the defense of its principles; yet unlike Laxer and Watkins, they were the elite of the party - as members of the party executive, they had influence over the administration of the party; as M.L.A.'s and M.P.'s, they wielded a formidable prestige within the party; as leaders of the labour movement, they had substantial control the purse-strings of the party. For the Waffle to question the wisdom of this group, was to risk bringing down on themselves the full force of the party machine; for the Waffle to challenge the security of this group, was to indulge in a flirtation with suicide.

While a pattern of "establishment" responses to the Waffle had taken root as early as 1969<sup>78</sup>, the need for total and concerted organization against the movement was not apparent until 1971.

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<sup>78</sup>At the Federal Council meeting prior to the Federal Convention in 1969, party moderates led by David Lewis, Charles Taylor and Desmond Morton, together with the support of several labour delegates moved to crush the Waffle's policy initiatives in their infancy. Anthony Westell, Toronto Star, Oct. 29, 1969. After having experienced a parallel success on the floor of the convention, it was somewhat ironical that they should have expressed a reserved appreciation to the Waffle for their contributions to the exchange.

Riding on a crest of local achievements, the Waffle had re-mobilized on a national plane around the candidacy of Jim Laxer for the party's leadership. In response, members of the party elite were compelled to individually discredit the Waffle programme and its leadership<sup>79</sup> and to collectively co-operate in an effort to rebuke the Waffle advance.

In the pre-convention anxiety, and NDP Now committee was established to promote a programme deemed saleable to a receptive electorate. Though the committee itself was top-heavy with party officials of a pragmatic political mould, it is also evident that the group co-operated with trade union leaders in an effort to influence the labour vote on the floor.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Stephen Lewis, in a speech to the Provincial Council, chastised the Waffle for being "particularly sectarian and sterile". Globe and Mail, Feb. 22, 1971. David Lewis, in turn, demanded at a Federal Council meeting that the Waffle be "convincingly defeated". Mel Watkins, Independent Canada Seminar, March 6, 1971, University of Windsor. Dennis McDermott, in one of the most critical remarks of the pre-convention campaign, asserted that the Waffle was "a national haven for every social misfit in the party". Globe and Mail, Oct. 29, 1970.

<sup>80</sup> Desmond Horton, one of the prime movers behind the NDP Now idea, candidly admitted that while certain programmes were developed within the committee, it was labour which supplied the muscle in the crucial tests. Canadian Forum, Vol. 51, (April-May, 1971), p.3 (see editorial). The United Steel Workers were particularly effective in this regard, distributing officially-endorsed slates for party offices. Ottawa Citizen, April 24, 1971. Lynne Williams, an organizer for the USW, served as a crucial liaison man between Morton's group and the CLE steering committee which had been established to co-ordinate labour opinion and to direct labour's floor strategy - i.e. to deny the Waffle the floor microphones. Toronto Star, April 21, 1971.

The results of this effort were devastating. The Waffle was defeated in each of its attempts to win the national presidency, the associate presidency<sup>81</sup> and the national treasurership; in turn, it succeeded in electing only one of seven vice-presidents, and only two, out of a possible twenty-two executive members-at-large. The Waffle's position on farm policy, women, natural resources and Quebec were all soundly defeated; foreign ownership didn't even get to the floor. In the leadership race, Wilfred List estimated that 475 out of 543 labour delegates eventually supported the Lewis candidacy, with 406 of Lewis' 661 original first-ballot votes, derived therefrom.

The Waffle response to this dismal state of affairs was that it would have to make parallel inroads into the labour movement if it were ever to win primacy for its ideas within the party. As Jim Laxer noted at the final Waffle caucus following the Federal Convention:

We have to establish contact with dissident unionists to work to weld them into a continuing left organization within the trade union movement, so that the left of the trade unions and the left of the party will be one left.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>81</sup>The convention had always rubber-stamped the wishes of the Quebec Delegation in the election of a French-speaking delegate to the party's associate presidency. In an unprecedented move, however, the party rebuked the pro-Waffle, Quebec wing, and elected Roland Morin, an avowed federalist. Marc Boulard, who had been endorsed by the majority of his Quebec colleagues, supported self-determination for the Province of Quebec.

<sup>82</sup>Laxer Speech, Waffle Caucus, Chateau Laurier Hotel, Ottawa, April 24, 1971. (personal tapes)

The first such initiative in that direction took place in November 1971, when militant rank and file trade unionists were mobilized into a Waffle Labour Caucus for the Ontario Federation of Labour Convention. Though its impact on the policy sessions was negligible, the caucus succeeded in harassing both the trade union and the NDP leadership. In its policy booklet, "A Socialist Programme for Canadian Trade Unionists", the Waffle Caucus openly deplored the conservatism of the labour establishment:

The right-wing establishment in the trade union movement leads us off the field of battle. They have failed to mobilize our movement in the fight against the corporations. They have attempted to replace rank and file militancy with bureaucracy. They have tried to substitute submissions to the government for industrial action. Our task is to revitalize the trade union movement by organizing for rank and file control. <sup>83</sup>

The trade union leadership was further enraged when Laxer and Watkins journeyed to Windsor to organize a protest among auto workers against the proposed revisions of the auto pact. <sup>84</sup> Not only was their strategy contrary to the expressed position of the International UAW - that the "auto pact was good for workers on both sides of the border" <sup>85</sup> - but it was also a challenge to the leadership of Dennis McDermott. As he later commented, "I have

<sup>83</sup>Waffle Labour Caucus, A Socialist Programme for Canadian Trade Unionists, p.1.

<sup>84</sup>For an excellent overview of the Auto Pact issue and its potential threat to the Canadian worker see James Laxer, "The Story Behind the Auto Pact", Last Post, Vol.2, no.3, pp.31-40.

<sup>85</sup>Globe and Mail, Jan. 17, 1972.

no objection to a 'ginger group' within this party, but godammit they were going for my jugular".<sup>86</sup>

The official UAW response to this situation was McDermott's vitriolic attack the following week against the Waffle, against James Laxer, and against the militant Malton UAW local which had defied the international's directives from Detroit to terminate their lengthy strike against the multi-national corporate branch of Douglas Aircraft of California.<sup>87</sup> In turn, he took steps to assure that the NDP refrain from endorsing the suggestion that a one-day work stoppage was the most appropriate means by which to protest against the potential changes in the auto agreement.<sup>87a</sup> As well, in an effort to secure his January 16 demand that the NDP dissociate itself from the Waffle<sup>88</sup>, McDermott and several other labour leaders met with Stephen and David Lewis to demand a final solution to the Waffle problem.<sup>89</sup> Indeed, it would be a

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> See Globe and Mail and Toronto Star, Dec. 11, 1971.

<sup>87a</sup> In a report to an Ontario Waffle Conference in Hamilton Bill O'Dell, the political action chairman of the 199 local in St. Catharines, presented proof that McDermott had intervened to alter the NDP position on a one-day work stoppage. Where, on January 14 Lewis had indicated support for the protest action, on January 28 he reversed his position and claimed that the party should not interfere in UAW affairs. O'Dell presented a xeroxed copy of a letter from McDermott to Lewis, dated January 25, rebalting the local leadership, and claiming that it was against the interests of the workers to lose a day's pay. Personal notes, Waffle Conference, Hamilton.

<sup>88</sup> Globe and Mail, Jan. 17, 1972.

<sup>89</sup> See Walter Stewart, "The NDP's Showdown with the Waffle Radicals", Toronto Star, June 3, 1972.



solid blow to the Waffle's trade union strategy, if it were to be denied its legitimacy within the party, and in turn, its access to the NDP's blue-collar base, deemed as essential to an effective socialist movement.

The most appropriate administrative means by which to deal with the Waffle was outlined in a resolution passed by the Hamilton-Mountain riding association. It had been engineered by disappointed steelworkers in the area<sup>90</sup>, who had felt that the existence of the Waffle had impeded the party from making its anticipated breakthrough in the October provincial election.<sup>91</sup>

<sup>90</sup> The original impetus for a confrontation came from two steelworkers, Don Eastman, a defeated NDP candidate from Halton and Bob MacKenzie, a USW organizer on loan to the NDP and a member of the Ontario NDP provincial executive. Both had felt that the existence of the Waffle had impeded the NDP from making its anticipated breakthrough in the 1971 provincial election: "The Waffle makes it impossible for the voter to know what he's voting for when he votes NDP; whether he's voting to reform society, or smash everything up and start over again". Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Contrary to the feelings of Eastman and MacKenzie, there is documented proof that five of the six pro-Waffle candidates in the 1971 Provincial election increased support for the NDP by a percentage higher than the party's average of 1.3%. The largest increase was in Dan Hean's campaign, where he increased the NDP's popular vote from 24.7% to 41.1% in a contest against Allen Grossman, a popular PC cabinet minister. Popular support for the NDP in Scarborough West, Stephen Lewis' riding, declined 9.2%. It is also important to note that the national party's greatest popular support according to pollsters was 24%, immediately following the April 1971 Convention where the Waffle made its presence felt. See letter addressed to delegates at Grillia Provincial Council Meeting, June 24, 1972 (personal files). To further refute the contention that the Waffle was undermining NDP support, see Karl Jaffary, "Not Lewis, not labour, not the Waffles or television sank the NDP on Oct. 21 - the party isn't turning on the city voters", New Democrat, Nov.-Dec., 1971.

The basic thrust of the resolution was to re-interpret the party constitution regarding an NDP member's affiliation with other political groups. If passed, it would categorize one's association with the Waffle as tantamount to membership in another political party, thereby extending to the party executive the constitutional authority to restrict and, if need be, expel party members on that basis.<sup>92</sup> That motion was due for presentation to the March meeting of the Ontario NDP Provincial Council.

Compounding the pressure on Lewis to secure the passage of that resolution was the fact that an Ontario Waffle Conference had been attended by several steelworkers who reported back that the group was planning to step up its activity in an effort to take over the power structures of the party and the labour movement. Such had been the suggestion put forth in a position paper entitled "Where do we go From Here,".<sup>93</sup> Though the report was not correct Lewis was informed that the Ontario Waffle had endorsed the strategy of that document.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>92</sup>The Hamilton-Mountain resolution read as follows: "Exclusion from membership for belonging to or supporting another political party include those that adhere to any clearly ongoing identifiable group who organize, solicit funds, employ staff, hold press conferences to expand their own point of view instead of operating within and supporting the party through conventions and council action".

<sup>93</sup>The paper was distributed and read as one of a series of presentations prepared for a general discussion under the heading of "A Strategic Overview of the Waffle in the Coming Period". It was signed by noted militants Jackie Larkin, Steve Penner and Andy Wernick. Personal Files, Hamilton Waffle Conference, Feb. 11-13, 1972.

<sup>94</sup>Walter Stewart, op.cit.

It was at this point that Lewis decided to act. Dedicating the whole of his Provincial Council speech to a blistering attack on the Waffle, he assailed the Waffle for its disrespectful attitude to the leadership of the party, for its public identity as a structurally distinguishable entity within the NDP, for the dogmatism and rigidity of its ideology and for its "sneering, contemptuous attitude towards official trade unionism and labour leadership". On this last point he stressed that no other issue had aroused in him "more feeling and more incipient anger" than had the Waffle's "gratuitous and ritualistic" abuse of labour and its leadership.

Though Lewis accepted the interpretation of the Hamilton Mountain resolution, that the Waffle represented a party within a party, and as such must be expelled, he found it difficult to cope with the idea of a purge. As an alternative course of action, he therefore suggested that the matter be handed over to a three-man, executive commission for further study and recommendation. Lewis' request was accepted by the council, among whose numbers was an unusually large contingent of labour delegates - approximately 95 instead of the usual 20.<sup>95</sup>

The special committee was comprised of Gordon Vichert, the Ontario NDP president, John Brewin, Ontario NDP Treasurer, and Gerald

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<sup>95</sup>Michael Cross, "The Waffle of the Unions", Canadian Forum, Vol. 52 (April, 1972), p. 3. It is also interesting to note that Michael Lewis, Stephen's brother, had been appointed ONDP Labour Organizer in the interim. The turn-out of labour delegates to the meeting was largely his responsibility.

Caplan, a member of the Ontario NDP executive and a "special assistant" to Stephen Lewis. All three were acknowledged opponents of the Waffle. After reviewing 103 briefs, the commission concluded that the breach within the party could not be healed; in their view, the Waffle had represented a concerted challenge "to the party's strategies, structure, leadership, policies and principles".<sup>96</sup> The Waffle would have to dissolve or be expelled.

In spite of several attempts by party moderates to seek a compromise<sup>97</sup>, the scenario at Grillia was merely a consummation of Hamilton-Mountain's recommendations of November, McDermott's vendetta of January, Lewis' offensive of March and the Vichert Commission's report of May. Although the Council was to pass a "compromise" resolution - this one from Riverdale - essentially it was designed to do the same thing: "to give us the tools to do the job", as Bob MacKenzie put it; or in the words of Stephen Lewis, "to release the encumbrance from around his neck".

Although the Riverdale resolution acknowledged the right of non-public caucuses to exist, it clearly stated that "the present structure and behaviour of the Waffle cannot continue". An

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<sup>96</sup> Vichert Commission, Report to the ONDP Executive, p.13.

<sup>97</sup> The most notable attempts at a compromise involved Desmond Morton, an ardent rival of the Waffle, who initially tried to engineer an "affiliated status" for the Waffle, somewhat similar to relationship of trade unions to the party. He later supported the Riverdale motion. In addition, Walter Pitman and John Harney had lobbied for either a "rules approach" to govern Waffle behaviour, or the previously-suggested "affiliation" alternative. Both recommendations were contained in their resolution, which although it was on the agenda, never came to the floor.

impressive list of conservatives and moderates within the party had come to the resolutions defense - MLA's Michael Cassidy, Kim Renwick and Ian Deans; MP's Andrew Brewin and Ed Broadbent; eight members of the provincial executive, including Vichert, Caplan and Brewin; labour delegates Lynn Williams, Bob Mackenzie and Frank Quinlan; and of course, provincial leader Stephen Lewis.

The final vote was overwhelmingly in favour of that position endorsed by the party's elite.

The response of the Waffle to <sup>the</sup> NDP's verdict was to reassess its institutional relationship with the rest of the party both in light of the movement's goals and in light of the possibilities for success. The Waffle was not unanimous in its assessment. A majority of the group decided that since the Orillia decision had effectively denied them an existence within the party, it should concentrate its total efforts on the extra-parliamentary activity to which it had originally, in part, been committed. A minority of the group felt that it would be folly for the movement to withdraw from its social-democratic base without a fight. Many in this latter category rationalized that it would be suicide for the party to exercise its threat of a purge - more skeptical opponents of this group felt that to force party's suicide was indeed the design of this militant minority.

The final, and official, decision was cast by a delegate conference of the Waffle in London, on August 16, 1972. The "establishment" position, spearheaded by Watkins and Laxer, won

the support of most of those present. It was therein decided that the Waffle should re-express itself as the Movement for An Independent Socialist Canada, with its members being extended the right of retaining their membership in the NDP. Supporters of the Trotskyist League for Socialist Action, would be excluded from membership in the new group. Those who could not digest this strategy - many of them newly-recruited from the LSA - voluntarily withdrew from the conference and the movement, determined to pursue their "fight back" tactic. Given their diminished base of support, they reluctantly admitted that the fight would have to be waged within the guidelines laid down by the Orillia meeting.

In many ways, the demise of the Waffle movement, as a militant and organized strain within the NDP, reflected the challenge that most radical movements face when they threaten their adversaries with success. To paraphrase Mel Watkins somewhat prophetic eulogy of radical movements in general:

The issue was not radicals but their radicalism. We tolerate the former, but suppress the latter. Any organization that houses radicalism, institutionalizes radicalism. The latter has political consequences - ie. the status quo gets threatened.<sup>98</sup>

In certain respects, such had already been the experience of the CCF - its moral response to the malaise of the 30's, its gradual institutionalization, its eventual threat to incumbent political

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<sup>98</sup> Mel Watkins, "The C.Y.C.", Canadian Dimension, Vol.6, no.7 (Feb.-Mar.1970), p.5.

authority. Through a vicious red-baiting campaign, however, capitalist interests had managed to malign the CCF's doctrine to the extent that a newly-emergent social trust in the party had been subverted. Having been put on the defensive, and conscious of its goal to seek political power, the CCF was compelled to temper its institutionalized radicalism by modifying its doctrine.

In a like manner, the Waffle posed a legitimate threat to the status quo within the NDP, yet given its commitment to principled socialist action, any compromise at all with the party would have to involve structure, not dogma. Ideologically, the Waffle had attempted to link independence with socialism; institutionally, it had pursued parliamentary and extra-parliamentary action. With the reincarnation of the Waffle into the Movement for an Independent Socialist Canada, the group had been forced to compromise only on its organic relationship to the NDP; its principled adherence to independence and socialism and extra-parliamentary activity had remained in tact.

## CONCLUSION

A cursory review of the foregoing analysis will reveal that there exists within our study of the CCF-NDP a basic structural division between our discussion of "ideology in theory" and "ideology as doctrine". In this respect, Chapter I attempted to provide a general and critical overview of ideology, taking into account its theoretical determinants, its conceptual locus within a political-cultural framework, and its functional relevance to groups and individuals. Chapters II and III, in turn, attempted to trace the development of a particular ideological theme in Canada, as perceived from both historical and contemporary perspectives and more specifically, in light of the relationship between party structures, strategy, policy and elite control.

While an attempt has been made throughout to integrate the theory of Chapter I with the more substantive and narrative aspects of Chapters II and III, it should be admitted that as the study progressed the theoretical significance of certain developments within the CCF-NDP became less explicit. In this respect, events concerning the demise of the Waffle were presented in an extensively documentary fashion, and in places, with critical overtones. In retrospect, however, while the format of this study admittedly enveloped a gradual de-emphasis on certain theoretical aspects, it revealed in a more general and more fundamental way, the



specifically normative and ideological pressures that come to bear on the perceptions of a participant-observer. To be sure, while this will not be lauded, it remains no less relevant to our earlier theoretical discussion of ideology as it relates to knowledge and to the normative dilemma identified in the Introduction as Mannheim's Paradox. In this respect, both the analysis and the presentation of the analysis are instructive in our understanding of the concept.

Having confessed these initial problems, it is now incumbent upon this study to make some general observations about the evolution of socialism in Canada; and having acknowledged the dichotomy between fact and theory, the integrative challenge of these summary remarks is no doubt apparent.

In brief, what this study has attempted to examine was the linear progression of a "left" ideology in Canada, from its spontaneous, extra-parliamentary emergence in the depression, to its institutionalized stabilization in post-war, industrial Canada. Central to this analysis were the concepts of "culture" and "movement".

The notion of culture - or, more specifically, political-culture - has provided us with a double focus: from a macro-perspective, it helped us to identify the sub-cultural relationship between the normative and oppositional nature of the CCF-NDP within a much wider and more moderate Canadian cultural milieu; from a micro-perspective, it helped us to focus on yet a smaller and more militant strain within the CCF-NDP which emerged as a

product of the 1960's both in response to the general issue of Canada's survival and more specifically, in opposition to the NDP's failure to impart a more traditional socialist analysis to the "crisis".

The concept of movement, in turn, was important not only because it defined the structure and strategy of the CCF in the early 1930's and the Waffle in the late 1960's, but it also helped us to highlight the problem of oligarchy. In this respect, the issue of elite dominance was given special emphasis, particularly in our discussion of the CCF's shift to a more pragmatic political outlook, in our chronicling of the formation of the NDP and in our analysis of the Waffle's ouster from the party. It must be admitted, in turn, that it was the position of the established Waffle elite which prevailed in the formation of a Movement for an Independent Socialist Canada in August 1972.

In retrospect, it is evident that what these elites chose to do was to convince their followers of a "correct" connection between certain moral precepts, ideal visions, situational analyses and programmes for action. This could be said just as much for Woodsworth in the trauma of the depression, as it could for Lewis in the prosperity and complacency of post-war Canada, as it could for Watkins or Laxer in an era of international youth revolt. In each case, they strove to rally their respective constituencies against the evils of capitalism in its unbridled, monopolistic and later foreign-controlled manifestations respectively. The

The fact that their strategies were predicated on the assumption that socialism, in its various interpretations, was the only antidote to the nation's ills, brought the CCF, the NDP and later the Waffle into conflict with the more pervasive and conventional disposition among most Canadians that competition and free enterprise were fundamentally good and essentially desirable.

For the CCF, this invariably meant that to succeed in the electoral game, it would have to sacrifice its principle and dilute its dogma. The transition was accomplished under the guiding hand of the party leadership who rationalized the changes in emphasis by citing changes in both the socio-economic and political spheres. The course that the CCF chose to follow has been well-documented-- its bureaucratization and institutionalization in pursuit of electoral success (late 1930's, early 1940's), its reconciliation of public with private ownership during and after the war years when government planning was legitimized and prosperity seemed immanent, its alliance with the trade union movement and its official rejection of the Regina Manifesto in 1956, both in an effort to rationalize electoral appeal, and finally, the broadening of its base by inviting liberally-minded members of the middle class to join with the labour movement and other left tendencies in Canada into a new political party. The mass base of the CCF acquiesced in all of these developments with little resistance, convinced that such changes were both politically expedient and ideologically correct.

It was in response to this apparent inertia of the organized

left in Canada that the Waffle erupted in 1969. With its roots in the politics of the New Left, it sought to inject into the NDP a quality of intellectualism and ideological concern which had been lacking in the party since its inception. By popularizing the principles of "self-determination" and "liberation" it opened the party's eyes to new perspectives on women, industrial democracy, party democracy, Quebec's relationship to the rest of Canada and Canada's relationship to the "American Empire". As the conscience of the NDP, it rooted out, identified and united certain elements within the party into a potent political force which was willing to admit, without fear or shame, that theirs was a socialist party.

As a radical, sub-cultural strain within Canadian politics, the Waffle sought to reshape the base of the NDP and to infiltrate the membership of the trade union movement. Its principle intent was to mobilize a socialist, working-class movement around a normative perspective that was not only radically opposed to conventional political sensibilities, but significantly inimical to the basic political attitudes proffered by Canada's "institutionalized left". In this respect, it is clear that while the Waffle may have been regarded as a sectarian expression of the parliamentary fringe by Liberals or Conservatives, it was perceived with much greater consternation by the trade union leadership and party elite. For not only did the Waffle pose a potential challenge to the leaderships of both the NDP and the labour movement, it threatened in a

more immediate way, to undermine the public respectability of the party which that same leadership had so carefully nurtured over the previous three decades. It was with this in mind that the union and party elite rallied their support for the expulsion of the Waffle from their midst.

It remains clear, in turn, that the ideological position assumed by various elements within the NDP at that time were a reflection of what Mannheim, would have regarded as "interest bound" perceptions. In this regard, the Waffle perceived the confrontation as a struggle for its right to articulate principled socialist doctrine to an attentive audience of party activists. For the party leadership, it meant the possible elimination of the Waffle's publicly-identifiable militancy which, from their own perspective, had jeopardized electoral success. For organized labour, the routing of the Waffle from the party would help to discredit the Waffle's flirtation with the rank and file of the trade union movement. For the centre-left members of several constituency associations the intransigence of the combattants represented a threat to the very survival of the party itself.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>On June 4, 1972 a meeting of fifteen Toronto area riding associations urged the party executive to "draw back from the brink". See Globe and Mail, June 5, 1972 and Toronto Citizen Vol.3, no. 10 (May 18-June 1, 1972). In another incident, the executives of the St. David and St. Andrew-St. Patrick riding associations resigned in protest to the proposed expulsion of the Waffle. Globe and Mail, May 25, 1972.

Their subsequent insistence on a compromise - either an affiliate-status for the Waffle within the NDP, or a "rules" approach to regulate their public activity - represented an effort to heal the party's wounds. For them, schism undermined party solidarity; a purge would rupture the principle of openness by which the party had been defined.

The eventual rejection of a structural accommodation with the Waffle by the NDP had the effect of castrating dissent and deflating the idealism which the Waffle had promoted. It was indeed a blow for many young people to whom the Waffle represented a last chance to see whether or not it was possible to work within the system; and in supporting the expulsion, Stephen Lewis appeared to have avoided an obvious opportunity to reconcile the age-old tensions between unions and the intellectual left, issues and principles, realities and ideals.

Ideologically, the purge must be seen in the context of the suspension of the militant New Brunswick section of the party<sup>2</sup> and in its repudiation of the Quebec wing's position regarding the right of Quebec to be self-determining. Clearly the leadership has sought

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<sup>2</sup>The Federal Council expelled the New Brunswick party in November 1971, following a provincial convention which elected a radical new leadership to several positions within the party. The federal council demanded that their N.B. wing produce satisfactory evidence that the convention had "been properly conducted". Globe and Mail, Nov. 13, 1971.

to cast the party in its own image, consolidating the NDP's strategy around a commitment to expediency and reformism.

In this connection, the victory of the NDP in three provincial elections and its successful control of the balance of power in Ottawa, have advanced such tendencies. Indeed, the NDP's support for the Liberal's foreign ownership bill<sup>3</sup> and the sale of Polymer Corporation<sup>4</sup> to intended private interests are cases in point. The position of the 1973 National Convention to encourage public "control" instead of "ownership" of the resource sector of the economy - a classic functional socialist position - represents a reversal in party militancy.<sup>5</sup> What is more, the NDP's

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<sup>3</sup>Despite a rhetorical denunciation of the Liberal sell-out, Lewis continues to support the foreign ownership legislation with the demand, in committee, that crucial amendments be passed. While Lewis has claimed responsibility for "the expanded scope of the bill" (new businesses set up by existing foreign controlled firms in fields unrelated to their normal business will now be screened), it is interesting to note that the frame of reference for "foreign controlled" firms has been adjusted in the interests of the multi-national corporation - where the original legislation defined foreign-controlled firms as having 5% of the voting shares and 20% of the non-voting shares, the revised legislation has shifted those requirements to 25% and 40% respectively. Toronto Star, April 3, 1973.

<sup>4</sup>For details, see Toronto Star, March 27, 1973.

<sup>5</sup>Toronto Star, July 23, 1973. The Left Caucus, a dependent ✓ of the Waffle and a replication of the caucus formed in Aug. 1972 to further the cause of socialism within the Ontario NDP, was instrumental in promoting the traditional Waffle demand of outright nationalization of the resource sector of the economy. Their appeal was overwhelmingly rejected by a convention, cautioned by the expectation that the party's parliamentary wing would soon be pressuring the Liberal government with concrete and viable "alternatives".

present posture on resource policy is not as "socialistic" as recent recommendations by two former Liberal cabinet ministers, Eric Kierans and Walter Gordon.<sup>6</sup>

In turn, the NDP is increasingly being directed by a core of professional organizers who welcome these changes. They feel that the party has suffered in the past from too much soul-searching, too much amateurish nitpicking and too many alienated intellectuals who made the party a pathetic case study in introspective paralysis. For them, the expulsion of the Waffle represented a cleansing of the party from sectarian diversion.

Yet placed in perspective, these developments are not unique to the Canadian scene. Indeed, the evolution of ideology within the CCF-NDP is an indicator of what we classified in our earlier remarks as the horizontal integration of ideological thought; more specifically, the revision of socialist doctrine within the NDP was accomplished with reference to, and in the tradition of, most post-war, western European, social-democratic parties. And in a no less similar vein, the revolt of the Waffle was simply a Canadian

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<sup>6</sup>Walter Gordon advocated, in a speech at McMaster University in February, that a Crown Corporation be given sole responsibility for all exploration and development in the far north. Eric Kierans, in his Report on National Resources Policy in Manitoba, urged the Manitoba government to adopt a policy of "repatriation by the Crown of all existing resources leased to the private sector and that a period, not exceeding ten years, be granted as sufficient to accomplish the transfer". For an overview of these policies see Canadian Dimension, Vol.9, no. 1 (May 1973), p.4.



specification of a much more universal upheaval of young people on an international scale. In turn, what we regarded as the vertical integration of ideology within a specific locale, was reflected in both the evolution of the leadership's position over the years and in the Waffle's appeal to certain latent strains of old left militancy still festering within the NDP.

These universal and historical perspectives are particularly significant in revealing the inherently dialectical nature of ideology itself. Simply put: existing situations and ideas constitute a breeding ground in which new ideas are nursed and brought to fruition, and the implementation of which create new situations out of which subsequent ideas and situations will emerge. This interaction of idea with situation as the theoretical determinant of ideology was given particular emphasis in Chapter I; its evolutionary significance, in turn, was borne out in later Chapters through our historical discussion of ideological development within the CCP-NDP.

In this respect, what our study has attempted to do, was to focus on two major dialectical themes which came to bear on the development of socialism in Canada: the first being the moral revulsion of various interests in Canadian society in response to the visible effects of the depression; the second, being the rebellion of youth in response to their fear of over-centralized, imperial control - military, economic, political and cultural.

In both situations, capitalism was the enemy. In the 1930's, the critique of the "old left" spoke to the internal contradictions of capitalism in its crudest form. In the 1960's, the New Left found itself up against a radically revised and impeccably efficient capitalist system, multi-national in scope and imparting a sense of "alienation" and "powerlessness" - in addition to status - which young people sought to overcome.

From this dialectical perspective, it might well be put that the "thesis-antithesis-synthesis" cycle has been completed in the case of the revolt of the 1930's, but has been left unconsummated in the case of the 1960's. To be more specific, the revision of the capitalist system (antithesis) in response to the malaise of the depression (thesis), resulted in what we now know as the welfare state (synthesis). It was this later period of corporate and state control (thesis) against which the libertarianism of the New Left (antithesis) rebelled in an effort to "humanize" the system. Yet if this hypothesis is correct, it might well be asked why the dialectical process has not come full-circle; was Charles Reich's euphoric prediction of the "greening of America" simply a utopian delusion, signifying the tail-end, rather than the beginning of "the revolution of the new generation?"<sup>7</sup>

The implications of these questions to this study are as

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<sup>7</sup>See Charles Reich, The Greening of America (New York, 1970) and Philip Nobile, ed. The Con III Controversy (New York, 1971)

perplexing as they are intriguing: for 1) to abstain from responding to these queries might well imply that our "dialectical" perspective is valid only insofar as it is corroborated by retrospective analysis; or 2) if, in fact, our "dialectical" analysis is correct, a failure to envision a new "synthesis" may only reflect our lack of predictive insight about a process that has yet to be completed. If the former is true, it may be futile to contemplate the inevitability of a new synthesis; if the latter is true, it must be admitted that the scope of this study embraces neither the precision nor the vision to establish what the nature of that synthesis may be.

Yet if perchance, we are to achieve a new synthesis in the 1970's - and if the remnants of the New Left are to play a significant role in this development - it must be acknowledged that change is not simply a product of emotions and consciousness and ideological purity. Societal renewal is more complex. Institutions have to be reshaped; political majorities have to be built.

In this respect, the apparent decline of the New Left as a potent political force was a function of its failure to both acknowledge and to break out of its ideological isolation; and in spite of its sensitivity to concrete economic issues, it continued to articulate a more cerebral concern for the powerlessness and sense of alienation which it felt to be endemic to the post industrial system. This, combined with their rhetoric, earned them the unsavory reputation of being intellectually elitist<sup>8</sup>, too far

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<sup>8</sup>The intellectual orientation of the Waffle has already

removed from the every-day reality of the common man. And even as certain segments of the New Left were incorporated into the mainstream politics of Canada and the U.S.,<sup>9</sup> their dogmatic adherence to principle and their avert hostility to the brokerage function condemned their expression to a factional status.<sup>10</sup>

In the Canadian context, the militant left must accept that the process is one of consensus politics - one in which, according to Abraham Rotstein, "the fringe is important because it shifts the middle". In this respect, it follows that remnants of the New Left must regard the NDP, (in spite of its shortcomings), as Canada's

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been cited. See Appendix II. In the United States a Washington Post survey noted that 39% of the pro-McGovern delegates to the 1972 Democratic National Convention had done some post-graduate work. See Penn Kemble and Josh Muravchik, "The New Politics and the Democrats", Commentary, Vol. 54, no.6 (Dec.1972), p.83.

<sup>9</sup>For some analyses of the role of the youth in the presidential campaign of Senator George McGovern, see Irving How, "Picking Up the Pieces", Dissent (Winter, 1973), pp.7-12, S.M. Lipset and Earl Roak, "The Election and the National Mood", Commentary, Vol.51, no.1 (Jan. 1973) pp.43-50, William Miller, "The Meaning of '72", New Republic, Aug. 12, 1972.

<sup>10</sup>The approximate 30% support extended to the Waffle within the NDP has been stressed throughout - both in the issues of policy and leadership. In a parallel vein, it is evident that the McGovern supporters constituted about 30% of the Democratic Party. Lipset, op.cit., p.45. In both cases, the apparent disproportionate emphasis rendered to the left within the press was primarily a function of their ability to carry debate and assert a mastery over party rules and structure.

authentic and legitimate expression of political radicalism. It must not repeat the Waffle's mistake of an impatience with history and a sectarian insistence on sacred dogma. Inside the NDP, the Waffle was a viable, anti-capitalist force that had reached a new level of effectiveness in Canadian politics. Outside, the Waffle is just one more of a dozen or so sects, each claiming to be the sole upholder of socialist truth.

Members of the NCNP

CLC	CCF
1. Claude Jodoin, CLC Pres.	1. David Lewis, CCF National Pres.
2. Stanley Knowles, CLC Exec. V-P	2. Hazen Argue, CCF (Acting) Leader
3. Donald MacDonald, CLC Sec.-Treas.	3. Therese Casgrain, CCF V-P
4. William Dodge CLC Exec. V-P	4. Andrew Brewin, CCF National Treas.
5. George Burt, CLC Gen. V-P and Leader in UAW	5. Carl Hamilton, CCF National Sec.
6. William Mahoney, CLC Gen. V-P and Leader in USW	6. Harold Winch, MP and CCF National Exec.
7. Frank Hall, CLC V-P and Leader in Railway Clerks	7. Premier T. C. Douglas, CCF National Council
8. Joe Morris, CLC V-P and Leader in IWA	8. Frank Scott, CCF National Council
9. William Smith, CLC V-P and Leader in CBRT	9. Gerald Picard, CCF National Council and Leader of CCF in Quebec
10. Roger Provost, CLC V-P and Pres. of Quebec Federation of Labor	10. Donald C. MacDonald CCF Ontario Leader

- Added:
1. Walter Pitman, "New Party" MP
  2. Walter Kontak, Professor of Political Science,  
St. Francis Xavier University
  3. Walter Young, Professor of Political Science,  
University of Manitoba on leave to University  
of Toronto representing New Party Clubs
  4. Sam Bowman, Past Sec. of Ontario Farmers' Union
  5. Rev. W. Edgar Mullen; Alberta New Party Clubs
  6. Leo McIssac: P.E.I. farm spokesman and potato co-op  
leader
  7. Louis Lloyd, Saskatchewan Federated Co-op
  8. Len Lavenlure, V-P of Ontario Federation of Agriculture

Lyons, op.cit., p.453.

Appendix B

CANADIAN DIMENSION SURVEY

(all figures in percentages)

I PROFILE OF THE WAFPLE

Age -

Under 20	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	Over 60
5	29	18	18	16	14

Occupation -

Student	Teacher	Professor	Professional	Blue Collar	White Collar
21	8	10	19	14	6
Farmer	Housewife	Retired	Businessman		
10	5	6	1		

Income -

Under \$3,000.	3-5	5-8	8-10	10-15	Over 15
9	22	17	22	13	17

No. of Years in NDP -

1 or less	2-3	4-9	10 and over
10	17	35	38

MALE - 75

FEMALE - 25

II PROFILE OF THE NDPAge -

Under 20	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	Over 60
2	16	26	25	19	12

Occupation -

Student	Teacher	Professor	Professional	Blue Collar	White Collar
6	18	9	5	19	4
Farmer	Housewife	Retired	Businessman		
18	5	8	8		

Income -

Under \$3,000.	3-5	5-8	8-10	10-15	Over 15
5	14	30	16	23	12

No. of Years in NDP -

1 or less	2-3	4-9	10 and over
6	13	29	52

MALE - 88

FEMALE - 12



III QUESTIONS

The following questions were posed to NDP and WAFFLE Supporters in order to establish a comparative perspective on ideological positions:

A SOCIALISM

1. Do you think that the analysis of capitalism in the Regina Manifesto as "a cancer that must be rooted out" still holds, or have events since the 1930's convinced you that capitalism can be humanized?

	Can be humanized	Must be rooted out
NDP	50	50
WAFFLE	5	95

2. Do you think that public ownership is relevant for socialism or has it been made unnecessary by other instruments of government?

	Yes, relevant	No	Only as a last resort (where controls fail)
NDP	66	7	27
WAFFLE	93	0	7

B NATIONALISM

1. Do you think "nationalism" is a phoney issue or has it some relevance for socialism?

	Has relevance	Phoney	Only if clearly related to an anti-imperialist strategy
NDP	77	18	5
SAFFLE	37	13	50

2. If, in your opinion, public ownership is necessary,  
 (a) What industries should a socialist government  
 take over?

Listed in order of No. of times mentioned	NDP	WAFFLE
1. All key industries	23	43
2. Resources and Utilities	20	13
3. Resource industries, insurance, utilities and finance, banks.	13	10
4. All monopolies	9	5
5. Utilities only	9	2
6. Resource industries	6	5
7. Insurance	6	5
8. Drug	6	5
9. CPR	6	1
10. Bankrupt Companies	4	2
11. Resource and Finance	4	1
12. Utilities and Finance	--	6
13. All land	--	1
14. Food chains	--	5
		3

- (b) Should companies nationalized be compensated?

	Yes	No	Only where necessary*	Only to a degree**
NDP	61	9	8	23
WAFFLE	15	28	9	48

\*To the minimum degree it is politically possible to get  
 away with.

\*\*After having deducted excess profits, cost of pollution,  
 government hand-outs, etc.

3. In your opinion, has the Americanization of Canada  
 proceeded too far to be halted?

	Yes	No
NDP	10	90
WAFFLE	10	90

C. QUEBEC

1. (a) Do you believe in special status for Quebec?

	Yes	No	Up to Quebec
NDP	34	57	9
WAFFLE	50	30	20

(b) Does Quebec have the right to separate?

	Yes	No	Up to Quebec
NDP	66	34	--
WAFFLE	99	1	--

(c) Would you be in favour of Quebec separating?

	Yes	No	Up to Quebec
NDP	9	79	14
WAFFLE	12	61	27

2. Do you think the NDP should opt out of politics in Quebec, Quebec,

	Yes	No
NDP	11	89
WAFFLE	46	54

D EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY ACTIVITY

1. In your opinion should NDP constituency associations engage primarily in gearing for elections or should they be seriously engaged in such things as setting up day-care centres, organizing consumers, supporting strikes, holding seminars?

	Such activities legitimate	Secondary	Elections only important
NDP	52	17	31
WAFFLE	99	--	1

#### E. OPINION OF THE WAFFLE

1. What is your understanding of the Waffle group?

	Good for Party	Bad for Party	Some good, some bad	Good, but too arrogant and dogmatic
WAFFLE	88	--	--	10*
NDP	65	25	5	6

\*At least 2% of Wafflers said the group was too centralized and "elitist".

#### F. PROSPECTS OF THE NDP

1. Do you think the NDP will form the government of Canada by 1980?

	Yes	No	Possibly	Won't Speculate
NDP	24	54	16	4
WAFFLE	25	60	15	--

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1948 - 1965

Born in Windsor, Ontario where Mr. Davies attended both elementary and senior secondary school.

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Attended the University of Windsor, graduating in 1969 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science.

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