

University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindor

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Theses, Dissertations, and Major Papers

1981

Political efficacy in Canada.

Stephen. Brooks
University of Windsor

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd>

Recommended Citation

Brooks, Stephen., "Political efficacy in Canada." (1981). *Electronic Theses and Dissertations*. 3114.
<https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/3114>

This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters' theses of University of Windsor students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder (original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email (scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208.



National Library of Canada
Collections Development Branch

Canadian Theses on
Microfiche Service

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada
Direction du développement des collections

Service des thèses canadiennes
sur microfiche

NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us a poor photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30. Please read the authorization forms which accompany this thesis.

THIS DISSERTATION
HAS BEEN MICROFILMED
EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de mauvaise qualité.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30. Veuillez prendre connaissance des formules d'autorisation qui accompagnent cette thèse.

LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE
NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE

POLITICAL EFFICACY IN CANADA

by

© Stephen Brooks

A Thesis

submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through the Department of Political Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts at
The University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

1981

© Stephen Brooks 1981

748971

Abstract

Treating political efficacy as the dependent variable the thesis enquires into the relationship between this disposition and a number of categoric and attitudinal variables.

The analysis proceeds through the following seven stages:

- 1) The creation of a composite efficacy index and a straightforward bivariate analysis employing an additive efficacy measure as the dependent variable;
- 2) The imposition of a control for region with the national sample population divided into five regional populations: viz. Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairies, and B.C.;
- 3) The imposition of a control for education;
- 4) An examination of the bi-dimensionality of political efficacy involving an analysis of the perception of the responsiveness of government and subjective political competence components of political efficacy;
- 5) A discussion of the logical plausibility of a relationship existing between political efficacy and one's experience with authority in the workplace, including a review of some of the literature pertaining to this matter;
- 6) An empirical test of the relationship between political efficacy and the workplace structure of authority; and
- 7) A regression analysis and model positing the determinants of efficacy in the Canadian context.

The paper finds that the independent measures which

correlate most highly with political efficacy are education (gamma= .39) and the trust in man/optimism in the future index (r= .25)). Other noteworthy findings include a tendency for those who came of age politically during the Depression years to be somewhat less efficacious than any other generation of respondents, the tendency for males to be more efficacious than females is considerably greater in Quebec than elsewhere, and the negative correlation between membership in a union and political efficacy is smaller in B.C. than in the rest of the country.

Moreover, the present analysis reports only a slight correlation between the structure of authority in the workplace measures and political efficacy, therefore failing to corroborate the findings of Almond and Verba in The Civic Culture. With a four-item additive index as the independent measure the Pearson's r is a mere .16 .

Finally, empirical support is lent to the distinction between a subjective citizen competence and a perception of the responsiveness of government components of political efficacy. The two dimensions are closely inter-related but are not co-extensive.

Contents

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Pages</u>
1. Political Efficacy: Preliminary Considerations	1 - 18
2. A Composite Efficacy Index	19 - 51
i) Categorical Independent Variables	20 - 31
ii) Three Independent Measures with Social Class Implications	31 - 37
iii) Attitudinal Independent Measures	37 - 45
iv) Political Efficacy and Political Participation	45 - 48
v) Summary	48 - 49
3. Regional Variation	52 - 84
i) Atlantic Canada	53 - 57
ii) Quebec	57 - 63
iii) Ontario	63 - 66
iv) The Prairies	66 - 73
v) British Columbia	73 - 78
vi) Region and Political Efficacy	78 - 82
4. Controlling for Education	85 - 95
5. On the Bi-Dimensionality of Political Efficacy	96 - 108
6. Political Efficacy and the Workplace Structure of Authority: Preliminary Remarks and an Empirical Test	109 - 131
7. The Determinants of Efficacy in Canada	132 - 146
i) The Independent Variables: Why they were Selected and How They Have Been Operationalized	132 - 135
ii) With the Four-Item Efficacy Index as the Dependent Variable	135 - 136
iii) With the Subjective Citizen Competence Index as the Dependent Measure	136 - 137
iv) With the Perception of Government Responsiveness Index as the Dependent Measure	138 - 139
v) Concluding Remarks	139 - 144
Appendix A	147 - 148
Bibliography	149 - 151

List of Tables

Table 1.1	Efficacy over time in the United States	14
Table 2.1	Efficacy by region	20
Table 2.2	Efficacy by sex of respondent	22
Table 2.3	Efficacy by age of respondent	23
Table 2.4	Efficacy by country of birth	26
Table 2.5	Efficacy by ethnicity	27
Table 2.6	Efficacy by religion	29
Table 2.7	Efficacy by size of the community of residence	30
Table 2.8	Efficacy by occupation	32
Table 2.9	Efficacy by income	34
Table 2.10	Efficacy by education	34
Table 2.11	Efficacy by belief about whether it matters that one votes	38
Table 2.12	Efficacy by one's satisfaction with life	41
Table 2.13	Efficacy by federal party identification	42
Table 2.14	Efficacy by a trust in man/optimism in the future index	44
Table 2.15	Volunteer work in a campaign by efficacy	46
Table 2.16	Community activism by efficacy	46
Table 2.17	Contacting a political representative by efficacy	46
Table 3.1	Efficacy by ethnicity in Atlantic Canada: I	53
Table 3.2	Efficacy by ethnicity in Atlantic Canada: II	54
Table 3.3	Efficacy by religion in Atlantic Canada	54
Table 3.4	Efficacy by federal party identification in Atlantic Canada	56
Table 3.5	Efficacy by provincial party identification in Atlantic Canada	56
Table 3.6	Efficacy by sex of respondent in Quebec	57
Table 3.7	Efficacy by ethnicity in Quebec	58
Table 3.8	Efficacy by religion in Quebec	60
Table 3.9	Efficacy by federal party identification in Quebec	61
Table 3.10	Efficacy by provincial party identification in Quebec	62
Table 3.11	Efficacy by religion in Ontario	63
Table 3.12	Efficacy by federal party identification in Ontario	64

Table 3.13	Efficacy by provincial party identification in Ontario	65
Table 3.14	Efficacy by ethnicity on the Prairies	66
Table 3.15	Efficacy by labour union membership on the Prairies	68
Table 3.16	Efficacy by federal party identification on the Prairies	70
Table 3.17	Efficacy by provincial party identification on the Prairies	72
Table 3.18	Efficacy by ethnicity in British Columbia	73
Table 3.19	Efficacy by union membership in British Columbia	74
Table 3.20	Efficacy by religion in British Columbia	75
Table 3.21	Efficacy by federal party identification in British Columbia	76
Table 3.22	Efficacy by provincial party identification in British Columbia	77
Table 3.23	Percent of respondents disagreeing with five "low efficacy" statements about politics and government	81
Table 4.1	Efficacy by sex of respondent with education controlled for	86
Table 4.2	Efficacy by union membership with education controlled for	88-89
Table 4.3	Efficacy by federal party identification with education controlled for	90-91
Table 4.4	Efficacy by size of community of residence with education controlled for	92
Table 5.1	Perception of the responsiveness of government by region	98
Table 5.2	Subjective political competence by region	99
Table 5.3	Perception of government responsiveness by sex of respondent	100
Table 5.4	Subjective citizen competence by sex of respondent	100
Table 5.5	Perception of government responsiveness by occupation	102
Table 5.6	Subjective citizen competence by occupation	102
Table 5.7	Perception of government responsiveness by family income	104
Table 5.8	Subjective citizen competence by family income	104

Table 5.9	Perception of government responsiveness by education	104
Table 5.10	Subjective citizen competence by education	105
Table 5.11	Perception of the responsiveness of government by federal party identification	105
Table 5.12	Subjective citizen competence by federal party identification	105
Table 6.1	Efficacy by perceived ability to determine the pace at which one works: respondents with grade school graduation or less	116
Table 6.2	Efficacy by perceived ability to determine the pace at which one works: respondents with sec. school graduation or less	116
Table 6.3	Efficacy by perceived ability to determine the pace at which one works: respondents with at least some post-secondary education	117
Table 6.4	Efficacy by perception of recognition on the job: respondents with grade school graduation or less	119
Table 6.5	Efficacy by perception of recognition on the job: respondents with sec. school graduation or less	119
Table 6.6	Efficacy by perception of recognition on the job: respondents with at least some post-secondary schooling	119-
Table 6.7	Efficacy by perception of ability to wield influence in the workplace: respondents with grade school graduation or less	122
Table 6.8	Efficacy by perception of ability to wield influence in the workplace: respondents with secondary school graduation or less	122
Table 6.9	Efficacy by perception of ability to wield influence in the workplace: respondents with at least some post-secondary schooling	123
Table 6.10	Efficacy by perception of freedom in the workplace: respondents with grade school graduation or less	124
Table 6.11	Efficacy by perception of freedom in the workplace: respondents with secondary school graduation or less	124
Table 6.12	Efficacy by perception of freedom in the workplace: respondents with at least some post-secondary schooling	125
Table 6.13	Political efficacy by a workplace efficacy index: respondents with grade school graduation or less	126

Table 6.14 Political efficacy by a workplace efficacy index: respondents with secondary school graduation or less

126

Table 6.15 Political efficacy by a workplace efficacy index: respondents with at least some post-secondary schooling

127

Chapter 1

Political Efficacy: Preliminary Considerations

Understood as a value, political efficacy is the cornerstone of democratic theory. Easton and Dennis write:

As a norm (efficacy) refers to the timeless theme of democratic theory that members of a democratic regime ought to regard those who occupy positions of political authority as responsive agents and that the members themselves ought to be disposed to participate in the honors and offices of the system. The norm of political efficacy therefore embodies the expectation in democracies that members will feel able to act effectively in politics.¹

However, political efficacy may be understood as a state of mind, consisting as it does of an individual's expectations regarding his ability to influence the political system. These expectations take two forms, the first involving a belief about the responsiveness of government (does government care about what one thinks?; do representatives soon lose touch with electors?), and the second taking oneself as the primary point of reference (politics and government are too complicated for a person like me to understand; people like me don't have any say about what the government does). These dimensions are referred to by the Center for Political Studies of the University of Michigan as external and internal efficacy, respectively. These self-directed and authorities/institution directed expectations combine to form political efficacy, defined simply as "the degree to which the citizen feels that his public efforts are fruitful and will be responded to by elected officials."² This is the conceptualization of

political efficacy which informs the subsequent discussion.

It seems reasonable to suppose that the concept of political efficacy consists of two components which, although they may often vary directly with one another, are not identical. And while it seems plausible that the person who has confidence in his ability to influence his environment, the political sphere included, is likely to consider that government is both accessible and responsive, previous work suggests that these dimensions of the concept of political efficacy do possess some independence from one another.

In a paper by E. Litt entitled, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility", the author reports that a large proportion of his sample population register a sense of subjective political competence at the same time as they consider the political system to be corrupt and political authorities as generally untrustworthy. Litt observes:

...feelings of political cynicism may have different origins and effects than the belief that an individual may not make his voice heard in the determination of public affairs.³

So while Litt found the usual relationship between political efficacy and one's sense that people generally are trustworthy, no such direct association was found between political efficacy and one's belief in the trustworthiness of political authorities. In the end Litt suggests that political cynicism may become institutionalized, viz. that it "may be acquired as a community

norm, a part of the political acculturation process in the city's daily routine."⁴ In other words, the sense that political authorities are unresponsive (what Litt refers to as political cynicism) may be rooted in one's environment rather than in one's personality traits. And when de Tocqueville observes that "as the rulers of democratic nations are almost always suspected of dishonorable conduct, they in some measure lend the authority of government to the base practises of which they are accused",⁵ he is saying that men may have doubts regarding the integrity of the persons who constitute their government while still having faith that the political system works well and is responsive to the citizenry.

Political efficacy has frequently been discussed in connection with one or more other dispositional states. Horton and Thompson write: "(Political) efficacy may result in political alienation which involves not only apathy or indifference as a response to awareness of powerlessness, but also diffuse displeasure at being powerless and mistrust of those who do wield power."⁶ Also commenting upon the relationship between political efficacy and alienation, McDill and Ridley suggest that, "This political alienation would appear to be a reflection of a general feeling of social alienation or anomia, a Weltanschauung of being mastered by threatening forces beyond one's personal control."⁷ And as Melvin Seeman observes, the sociological concept of alienation bears a clear resemblance to the psychological construct of

internal versus external control of reinforcements, i.e. "the individual's sense of personal control over the reinforcement situation, as contrasted with his view that the occurrence of reinforcements is dependent upon external conditions, such as chance, luck, or the manipulation of others."⁸

Political trust, cynicism and efficacy generally are included under the rubric of political alienation.⁹ In The Civic Culture one finds an implicit division of the latter concept into input alienation (efficacy) and output alienation (political trust). Political trust and cynicism involve an evaluation of the behavior of those who occupy positions of political authority. Trust is placed in political authority as a consequence of perceived congruence between the behavior of those in positions of authority and the expectations which people have with respect to their conduct. In a democratic political system which is grounded upon the liberal premise that all just rule derives from the will of the governed, the expectation is that the incumbents of political office will act on behalf of the public interest and not out of self-interest. Pursuing this argument we would expect to find that as the gap between the public's output expectations and its perception of actual government outputs widens, political trust will fall and cynicism will increase. Support is lent to this hypothesis by Miller in his article, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970":

This study demonstrates that the widespread discontent prevalent in the U.S. today arises, in part, out of dissatisfaction with the policy

alternatives that have been offered as solutions to contemporary problems.¹⁰

And in a more precise encapsulation of his findings Miller states:

...the data analysis suggests that the individual evaluates the policies of the parties with respect to his own preference, and if he is dissatisfied with those policies it is more likely that he will feel alienated from the political system. There is, however, nothing inherent in his own policy preference that would result in his being less trusting of the government.¹¹

Jack Citrin, responding to Miller's arguments, warns that other interpretations of increased levels of cynicism are possible. Decreasing trust may, he suggests, reflect increasing sophistication on the part of the public and, consequently, greater congruence between what is perceived and objective reality. Second, Citrin argues that:

...the burgeoning ranks of the politically cynical may include many who are verbalizing a casual and ritualistic negativism rather than an enduring sense of estrangement that influences their beliefs and actions.¹²

Citrin contends that "declining trust is just a reflection of dissatisfaction with the incumbent"¹³ and does not undermine public trust in the regime.

Aberbach has noted that political distrust may have qualitative consequences for political behavior whereas inefficaciousness appears to have only quantitative consequences. Says Aberbach:

The evidence is that political distrust alone spurs negative voting in national elections, especially under certain favourable conditions which heighten

the relevance of distrust to the voting choice. Feelings of powerlessness influence turnout, but not the voters' choices.¹⁴

Logically, this is understandable given that political distrust would seem to carry with it a resentment deriving from unfulfilled expectations and a sense that the public trust has been betrayed. This disaffection is given an opportunity to be directed toward public objects during an election or referendum. Horton and Thomson observe that "referendums may serve as institutional outlets for protest...on the part of the powerless and ordinarily apathetic members of the community."¹⁵ On the other hand, a feeling of political inefficaciousness, involving "the expectancy or probability held by the individual that his own behavior cannot determine the occurrence of the outcomes, or reinforcements, he seeks"¹⁶, seems likely to result in lower political participation inasmuch as one of the root motivations of participation, viz. influencing political outcomes, is undermined.

There appears to be a separation between the personal and institutional factors which may act upon one's sense of political efficacy. Looking at the correlation between political participation and sense of political efficacy, M.W. Watts found that personal political efficacy correlates more highly with participation than one's perceptions regarding the responsiveness of governmental institutions. The author observes:

This suggests that the individual's beliefs about his own subjective potency in the proximal contacts with the "system" may be of more importance in engendering hostility of support than diffuse notions of institutional responsiveness to an amorphous referent

such as "the people". The subjective component may come closer to reaching the individual's motivating interests than the system component, particularly since the latter has a greater likelihood of eliciting simplistic or "socially acceptable" responses.¹⁷

Watts is saying substantially the same thing as Litt, viz. that perceptions of the responsiveness of government may be part of the cultural baggage one accumulates and so may possess an independence from personal feelings of political competence. And as Watts says, one must explain the "personal meaning of political activity for the actor and remove some of the cultural bias of an efficacy measure which incorporates both personal and systemic components."¹⁸

Prima facie, the significance of political efficacy for an understanding of political behavior seems great. Efficacy might reasonably be characterized as an intervening variable deriving from the experience of social class and providing a dispositional impetus for subsequent participation.

Socialization experience.....	Political Efficacy.....	Political
(class being the crucial	(or indeed another	Behavior
differentiating factor)	intervening factor	
	like interest in	
	politics)	

This causal model follows that advanced by Thompson and Horton when they suggest the following:

In fact, it may be that political alienation is a mediating factor between SES and political participation which provides an alternative to "subcultural orientation" or self-interest explanations of political behavior of the lower SES categories.¹⁹

The relationship between social class and such a dispositional variable as political efficacy, though unclouded,

warrants further consideration.

...(Rousseau) turns our minds...to considering how the social order affects the structure of human personality.²⁰

That political dispositions and, more generally, personality traits often are passed on from one generation to the next is a proposition which incites little argument. Moreover, no one will dispute that the effect which factors associated with a particular developmental background may have upon a person is frequently cumulative. Carole Pateman describes the phenomenon thusly:

It is middle-class children who are most likely to score high on the efficacy scale and we know that middle-class families are most likely to provide their children with a "participatory" family authority structure, working-class families tending to be more "authoritarian" or to exhibit no consistent pattern of authority. Since middle-class children are also more likely to go on to higher education, we begin to see the appearance of a cumulative pattern of participation opportunities.²¹

A pattern is apparent. The sons and daughters of middle class parents are more likely than those of working class and lower class parents to continue their formal education and, eventually, occupy an occupational role which allows considerable freedom for individual task definition. In addition, the former children are more likely than the latter to be exposed to information relevant to the ongoing operation of the political system. Hence, they are more likely to develop both a sense that politics is something which is not unrelated to their life concerns and that they figure within the scheme of things

political. And so the experience of being born into and raised in a particular social class environment has clear implications for the development of personality dispositions and, more particularly, orientations toward the political system. It may typically happen that the middle class child is reared by parents who allow him or her to participate in the making of family decisions, is likely to be in continuous contact with a stream of politically relevant information, is daily exposed to models whose values may become incorporated into his or her personality and belief structures, is likely to acquire post-secondary education and finally achieve a work position that allows for the exercise of individual discretion and the participation of the position holder in job-related decisions. On the other hand, the child who is reared in a working class household quite literally inhabits a different world from that of his middle class counterpart. His parents may be authoritarian with regard to their child-rearing practices, the child may only sporadically come into contact with information about things political and so never acquire a sense that politics is important to his life concerns, he is daily exposed to models whose values he may incorporate into his own personality and belief systems, he is less likely than the middle class child to acquire post-secondary education and, finally, is likely to occupy a work role that does not allow for his participation in job-related decision making.²² Almond and Verbe demonstrate

that,

...civic competence grows out of experiences which foster individual independence and co-operation, for example, participation in family decisions, the right to complain in home and school, and other similar experiences which raise the individuals' confidence that he has some control over his own life and his environment.²³

With respect to the significance of political efficacy and, more particularly, the way in which it is distributed within a society, the contemporary wisdom seems to be that a population can be too efficacious: a curious inversion of democratic theory! Carole Pateman describes the modern day restatement of democratic theory (given succinct expression by, inter alia, Almond and Verba), which holds widespread apathy to be a sine qua non of a healthy democratic system:

...a modern theory of democracy must be descriptive in form and focus on the on-going political system. From this standpoint we can see that high levels of participation and interest are required from a minority of citizens only and, moreover, the apathy and disinterest of the majority play a valuable role in maintaining the stability of the system as a whole.²⁴

It has been suggested that, given the relationship between a sense of efficacy and political participation and, moreover, the significantly greater likelihood that people of higher social standing will feel that the political system is open to them and will tend to participate at comparatively high levels, the political system may be disproportionately

responsive to the demands of the higher social stratum. Expressed differently, the needs and hopes of the lower social stratum may not be given sufficient weight in relation to the size of this class.²⁵

The subsequent analysis draws exclusively upon the Quality of Life survey conducted in 1977 by the Survey Research Centre Institute for Behavioral Research of York University. The survey was carried out with a national sample population of 3288 respondents. Included in the survey are five standard questions used to measure political efficacy. They appear below accompanied by the proportion of respondents who agree (inefficacious) and the proportion who disagree (efficacious).

- Q.21a) Generally, those elected to Parliament soon lose touch with the people.
 Agree.....75%
 Disagree.....25%
- Q.21b) I don't think that the government cares much what people like me think.
 Agree.....60%
 Disagree.....40%
- Q.21c) Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.
 Agree.....67%
 Disagree.....33%
- Q.21d) People like me don't have any say about what the government does.
 Agree.....54%
 Disagree.....46%

0.21e) So many other people vote in federal elections that it doesn't matter very much whether I vote or not.

Agree.....13%

Disagree.....87%

We have not used the final measure (0.21e) in the subsequent analysis due to our belief that it is less an indicator of political efficacy than a measure of one's sense of civic obligation or, indeed, belief in a norm which is fundamental to any democratic political system. For whereas a clear majority of respondents are inefficacious as measured by the other four items, only 13% of the sample population considers that their vote makes no difference. We suspect that response to this latter measure is heavily influenced by the pervasive belief in a citizen's obligation to vote, the ballot box being understood as the cornerstone of representative democracy. However, we have retained this response item for use as an independent measure to be cross-tabulated with the political efficacy measures we create subsequently.

During much of the subsequent analysis an unweighted additive efficacy index is used. The fact that 0.21e represents a much less difficult test than the other four response items, assuming that they all measure political efficacy, taken together with the equal weight assigned to each item composing the index caused us to omit 0.21e.

Our approach to the explanation of political efficacy in Canada resembles that used in analyses of voting behavior or political participation. Taking political efficacy as the

phenomenon to be explained we will look into the relationship between this disposition and those categoric variables which are most often used as independent variables in the study of participation or political choice. Moreover, we impose controls for education and region for the simple reason that (these) variables often are found to be confounding factors, the relationship between efficacy and another variable not being constant across education cohorts or regions.

Secondly, the present study follows Almond and Verba in pursuing the relationship between political efficacy and the structure of authority in the workplace. However, we are unable to perform a strict replication of this feature of the earlier study due to the fact that identical measures have not been used in the two works. Hence, our analysis will occur within the bounds prescribed by our measures.

Finally, our motivation for pursuing the question of the bi-dimensionality of political efficacy lies largely in the prima facie plausibility that a meaningful distinction can be drawn between efficacy measures which have the self as the primary point of reference (what we have designated as subjective citizen competence measures) and those measures which have as their primary referent political authorities or institutions (perception of the responsiveness of government items). The following adaptation of data reported by R. Inglehart in his book entitled The Silent Revolution adds fuel to our speculation in this regard.

Table 1.1

	<u>1952</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1974</u>
Public officials care what people like me think.	63%	70%	71%	61%	59%	56%	50%	49%	46%
Politics and gov't are not too complicated for a person like me to understand.	29%	36%	40%	31%	27%	29%	26%	26%	27%

Note: The above figures indicate the percentage giving the "efficacious" response. The above table is an adaptation of Table 11-1 (Changing Levels of Political Efficacy, 1952-1974), from Inglehart, The Silent Revolution (Princeton, 1977), 304.

The above data is, of course, American. Notwithstanding this the volatility over time in the case of the former measure, as contrasted to the comparative stability of the latter is suggestive of independence between these items which generally are grouped together under the rubric of political efficacy. Hence, we have chosen to engage in a more rigorous testing of this bi-dimensionality hypothesis in order to determine whether the division we have posited is empirically supportable and, furthermore, whether our independent variables differ in their influence upon the respective components of efficacy.

With respect to the format of the paper, the analysis proceeds as follows.

- i) The creation of a composite efficacy index - This section involves a straightforward bivariate analysis employing an additive efficacy measure as the dependent variable.
- ii) The imposition of a control for region - The national sample population is divided into five regional populations: viz. Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairies, and B.C.

- iii) The imposition of a control for education - Formal education is the control variable.
- iv) On the bi-dimensionality of political efficacy - This section involves an analysis of the perception of the responsiveness of government and subjective political competence components of political efficacy.
- v) Theoretical and logical considerations - This involves a discussion of the logical plausibility of a relationship between political efficacy and one's experience with authority in the workplace. This section includes a review of some of the writings upon this relationship.
- vi) An empirical test of the relationship between political efficacy and the workplace structure of authority - This entails an examination of the independent effect which one's experience with authority in an important non-political setting, the workplace, has upon political efficacy.
- vii) A regression analysis and model positing the determinants of political efficacy in the Canadian context - Here we probe the extent to which the variation in political efficacy is accounted for by our several categorical and attitudinal independent variables.
- viii) Concluding remarks - At this point we summarize our findings and address ourselves to the questions posed at the outset of the paper regarding the determinants and dimensionality of political in Canada.

As a final note regarding the presentation of the following analysis, each chapter will close with a brief summary in which we attempt to draw together the central threads of the discussion. Hopefully this will enable the reader to retain his bearings amidst a sea of data.

Footnotes

Chapter 1

1. Easton and Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy", American Political Science Review, 1967, 26. The political efficacy literature is voluminous. Treatments of the concept include, inter alia, J. Aberbach, "Alienation and Political Behavior", APSR, vol.63, 1969; Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1963); D. Anderson, "Family Decision-Making and Negative Political Orientation", (An unpublished paper delivered at the 1979 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association); P. Caddell, "Crisis of Confidence: Trapped in a Downward Spiral", Public Opinion, Nov., 1979; J. Citrin, "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government", APSR, vol.68, 1974; D. Dean, "Alienation and Political Apathy", Social Forces, March, 1960; E. Douvan and A. Walker, "The Sense of Effectiveness in Public Affairs", Psychological Monographs, vol.70, no.22, 1956; D. Easton and J. Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy", APSR, March, 1967; E. Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility", The Journal of Politics, vol.25, 1963; E. McDill and J. Ridley, "Status, Anomia, Political Alienation, and Political Participation", American Journal of Sociology, vol.68, 1962; A. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970", APSR, vol.68, 1974; A. Miller, "Rejoinder to 'Comment' by Jack Citrin: Political Discontent or Ritualism?", APSR, vol.68, 1974; W. Miller, "Crisis of Confidence: Misreading the Public Pulse", Public Opinion, Nov., 1979; S. Renshon, "The Psychological Origins of Political Efficacy: The Need for Personal Control", (A paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the APSA, 1972); M. Rosenberg, "Self-Esteem and Concern with Public Affairs", Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer, 1962, and "Some Determinants of Political Apathy", Public Opinion Quarterly, Winter, 1954-55; M. Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation", ASR, vol.24, 1959; F. Templeton, "Alienation and Political Participation", Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer, 1966; W. Thompson and J. Horton, "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action", APSR, March, 1967; and M.W. Watts, "Efficacy, Trust, and Commitment to the Political Process", Social Science Quarterly, December, 1973. Of special interest to the student of political efficacy in Canada are, H. Clarke, et al. Political Choice in Canada (McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Toronto, 1979), especially pp.31-33; L. Leduc, "Measuring the Sense of Political Efficacy in Canada", Comparative Political Studies, vol.8, 1976; M. Schwartz, Politics and Territory (McGill-Queen's Press, Montréal, 1974), especially pp.223-239; R. Simson and D. Elkins, "Regional Political Cultures in Canada", CJPS, vol.7, 1974; and R. Van Loon, "Political Participation in Canada: The

- 1965 Election", CJPS, September, 1970.
2. Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility", The Journal of Politics, 1963, 312.
 3. Ibid., 315.
 4. Ibid., 319.
 5. A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (London, 1946), Vol. I, 234.
 6. Thompson and Horton, "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action", Social Forces, Vol. 38, 1960, 190.
 7. McDill and J. Ridley, "Status, Anomia, Political Alienation, and Political Participation", American Journal of Sociology, vol. 68, 1962, 206.
 8. Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation", ASR, vol. 24, 1959, 786.
 9. See for example, A. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970", APSR, 1974, vol. 68; and A. Finifter, "Dimensions of Political Alienation", APSR, June, 1970.
 10. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970" APSR, vol. 68, 1974, 970.
 11. Ibid., 970.
 12. Citrin, "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government", APSR, vol. 68, 1974, 975.
 13. Ibid., 1000.
 14. Aberbach, "Alienation and Political Behavior", APSR, vol. 63, 1969, 99.
 15. Horton and Thompson, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism: A Study of Defeated Local Referendums", AJS, vol. 67, 1962, 485.
 16. Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation", ASR, vol. 24, 1959, 784.
 17. Watts, "Efficacy, Trust and Commitment to the Political Process", Social Science Quarterly, 1973, 630.
 18. Ibid., 631.
 19. Thompson and Horton, "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action", Social Forces, Vol. 38, 1960, 191.

20. Flamenatz, Man and Society (London, 1963), Vol.I, 440.
21. Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge, 1970), 49.
22. On the differences between social classes in respect of socialization to values see U. Bronfenbrenner, "Socialization and Social Class Through Time and Space", and H. Hyman, "The Value Systems of Different Classes", both in R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset (eds.), Class, Status, and Power (The Free Press, New York, 1966).
23. Pinner, "Parental Overprotection and Political Distrust", Sociology of Education, 1963, 59.
24. Pateman, Op.cit., 7.
25. Van Loon, "Political Participation in Canada: The 1965 Election", CJPS, 1970, 394.

Chapter 2

A Composite Efficacy Index

In the following section we use a composite efficacy index as our dependent measure. What we have done is build a simple additive index so that a respondent who fails to give an efficacious response to any of the four efficacy items is given a score of 0, a respondent who gives an efficacious response to one question is given a score of 1, a respondent who gives efficacious responses to two of the four items is accorded a score of 2, and so forth. We have not attempted to differentially weight the various items, giving greater weight to those items which represent a more severe test of a respondent's efficacy. However, we do assign weights to the respective items as a later stage when we create two rather more sophisticated indices of efficacy, one for perception of the responsiveness of government and the other for subjective political competence. Methodological details will be forthcoming when we are ready to employ these indices.

Before proceeding to the bivariate analysis the distribution of responses across categories of the composite efficacy measure warrants notice.

<u># of Efficacious Responses</u>	<u>Proportion of Respondents</u>	<u>Cumulative Frequency</u>
0	31.5	31.5
1	26.3	57.8
2	19.1	76.9
3	15.2	92.1
4	7.9	100.0

What is striking about the above distribution is the relative

paucity of respondents who fall into the higher efficacy categories. Fully 57.8% of the respondents give one or no efficacious responses. And less than a quarter of the respondents give three or more efficacious responses. One may fairly say that in absolute terms the level of efficacy in Canada, as has been documented in previous studies, is low.¹

i) Categoric Independent Variables

The first cross-tabulation involves political efficacy by region. Andone finds that while there is some inter-regional variation in the distribution of responses it is not terribly great.

Table 2.1

# of Eff. Responses	Atl.	Que.	Ont.	Prairies	B.C.	Canada	
0	38.2	35.1	27.8	31.5	28.9	31.5	
1	26.8	23.4	26.7	29.6	27.3	26.3	
2	13.7	17.4	20.3	21.0	21.2	19.1	
3	14.4	14.7	17.3	13.4	12.8	15.2	
4	6.9	9.4	7.9	4.6	9.7	7.9	
Mean score	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.4	F=3.7*
	N=281	N=785	N=1075	N=492	N=320	N=2952	

$\chi^2=41.86$ df=16 P<.001 V=.06

*significant at .01 level

Looking at the least efficacious respondents, those who give no efficacious responses, one finds that the proportion of extremely unefficacious people is greatest in Atlantic Canada (38.2) and Quebec (35.1), and least in Ontario (27.8) and British Columbia (28.9). But one must be cautious because the above table can be read otherwise. For instance, if one takes only those respondents who fall into the 3 and 4 efficacious

responses categories the following pattern obtains..

<u>Atl.</u>	<u>Que.</u>	<u>Ont.</u>	<u>Prairies</u>	<u>B.C.</u>
21.3	24.1	25.2	18.0	22.5

Clearly, the inter-regional variation, the Prairies excluded, is very small. A similar conclusion is drawn from a reading of the mean scores which range from a low of 1.3 to a high of 1.5 .

Now (although caution is advised in the reading of table 2.1, our initial interpretation, i.e. that the greatest proportion of very inefficacious respondents is to be found in eastern Canada, most particularly in Atlantic Canada (where 65% of the population gives one or fewer efficacious responses as compared to the national proportion of 57.8%), seems plausible given the objective reality of Atlantic Canadian political impotence. Having but a small percentage of the seats in the national legislature, perceiving that the political dialogue in Canada focuses most often upon personalities, events and issues germane to the Toronto/Quebec City axis, although more recently the West has come to figure more largely in the ongoing political process, Atlantic Canadians are more prone than other Canadians to feel that the political system is inaccessible and remote from any influence which they can bring to bear. In a word, the condition of Atlantic Canada vis-à-vis the Canadian political system is peripheral², and this sense of being at the fringe of things is reflected in the attitudes of the populace.

Of course British Columbia is also far from the fulcrum upon which the Canadian political system teeters, and yet the level of efficacy amongst the B.C. sample population is comparatively high. We would suggest that, notwithstanding that this region of Canada is resentful of the near monopoly which Ontario and Quebec seem at times to possess with respect to national politics, this monopoly being reflected in media coverage of things political in Canada and in the obsequiousness which national party leaders feel obliged to pay to central Canada at election time, the comparatively high level of education in B.C., the relative abundance of the province, and a political culture which includes a considerable sense of unity and power amongst the working class through their trade unions, all combine to compensate for whatever sense of being outside of the political mainstream is engendered by geographic location.

Turning now to efficacy by the sex of a respondent we observe the following pattern.

Table 2.2

# of Eff. Responses	Male	Female	
0	29.4	33.6	
1	26.0	26.7	
2	18.5	19.8	
3	16.8	13.5	
4	9.3	6.4	
Mean score	1.5	1.3	F=14.6*
	N=1498	N=1454	
$\chi^2=17.82$	df=4	P<.01	V=.08

*significant at .001 level

Males are marginally more likely than females to be efficacious. Moreover, while the difference between the sexes is quite small we suspect that it has grown smaller over time and will continue to dissipate as more and more women arrive at a political self-conception which is independent of their husband's. Perhaps the most interesting reading of the above table is obtained when the two highest efficacy categories are collapsed.

<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
26.1	19.9

One remarks that even in 1977, after a decade and a half of struggling to win acceptance for the idea that women can occupy roles other than those traditionally designated as woman's preserve, roughly 30% more males than females fall into the 3 and 4 efficacious responses categories of our composite measure.

The third cross-tabulation is efficacy by age. The age variable is divided into six cohorts: 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, and 70 and above. The findings are rather interesting.

Table 2.3

Age Politically	68-77	59-68	49-58	39-48	29-38	28 and before
# of Eff. Responses	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70 +
0	27.9	25.7	33.2	33.1	44.2	41.0
1	25.0	26.4	27.5	27.7	27.1	25.5
2	23.1	20.6	18.2	15.8	13.2	13.7
3	18.1	19.1	11.5	12.9	9.4	11.2
4	5.9	8.3	9.5	10.5	6.1	8.7
Mean score	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.1	1.2 F=8.2*
$x^2=88.68$	df=20	P<.001	Gamma=	-.11		

*significant at .001 level

Above each age cohort we have indicated the years during which each generation of respondents came of age politically. In as much as the accordance of full political rights at the age of 18 years is a relatively recent situation (i.e. 1970), we have considered 21 years of age to be the coming of age politically for all cohorts other than our youngest. The reason for identifying this time factor for each class of respondents is to allow us to relate the pattern of efficacy within a particular age cohort to the generational experiences it underwent.

Looking first at those who are least efficacious one finds that the range in the proportion of respondents who fail to give a single efficacious response extends from 25.7% in the case of the 30-39 cohort (the 60's generation) to 44.2% in the case of the 60-69 age cohort (the 30's generation). This may be read as a function of two factors. The first is generational experience. Those who came of age politically in the decade of the 1930's entered into a socio-political system which was in the throes of the Great Depression. And so it is not to be wondered at if a greater tendency towards subjective political impotence and perception of system unresponsiveness characterizes the attitudes of this generation. On the other hand, those who came of age politically during the 1960's did so at a time when a questioning of virtually all traditional authority and a push towards democratisation in the spheres of school, polity and, generally, society were underway. So we would expect that the attitudes of members of

this generation will tend to be imbued with the comparatively activist/democratic sense which characterised the decade.

The second factor at work in causing variation in political efficacy across categories of the age variable is education. The mean education level rises as we descend from the highest to the lowest age cohort. And education is a significant determinant of political efficacy for reasons which will be explicated when we cross-tabulate it with our composite efficacy measure. When we look at the lowest efficacy categories we find a clear pattern with the younger more-educated cohorts displaying higher levels of political efficacy than the older cohorts. The following adaptation of table 2.3 has combined the 0 and 1 efficacious response categories.

18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
52.9	52.1	60.7	60.8	71.3	66.5

However, one must be cautious in reading the efficacy by age cross-tabulation because a collapsing of the two most efficacious rows results in the following more ambiguous situation.

18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
24.0	27.4	21.0	23.4	15.5	19.9

At the highest levels of political efficacy there is little variation between any of the young adult to middle age cohorts whereas at the lowest efficacy levels the former tended to be more efficacious than the latter. But of course it is the case that in all age cohorts the greatest number of respondents cluster at the lowest efficacy levels. This being so we have laid greatest stress upon the lowest rows of the cross-tabulation

in interpreting the impact of age upon political efficacy.

Political efficacy by country of birth is the next cross-tabulation. The independent variable has been dichotomised so that we have those respondents who were born in Canada and those who were born elsewhere. And the sole remarkable feature of table 2.4 is the lack of significant variation in levels of political efficacy between the Canadian-born and the foreign-born.

Table 2.4

# of Eff. Responses	Canadian-born	Foreign-born	
0	32.2 - 57.7	28.6 - 58.4	
1	25.5	29.8	
2	19.5	17.3	
3	14.7 - 24.7	17.1 - 24.3	
4	8.0	7.2	
Mean score	1.4	1.4	F=.4*
	N=2382	N=570	

$$\chi^2=8.34 \quad df=4 \quad P>.05$$

*not significant at .05 level

Apparently, not being a native of Canada does not cause one to feel less a part of the political system than those who are native to the country. A priori, one might have expected otherwise. For on the face of it the argument that a person who has immigrated to the country and has had to make a greater or lesser adjustment to a new society and its component norms and institutions, political/governmental included, is more likely than a native Canadian to consider that the political system is unfamiliar and somehow foreign to him seems plausible. And it is not the case that a sense of unfamiliarity with the

political process is compensated for by a tendency for non-native Canadians to be more highly educated. The balance between Canadian-born and foreign-born respondents is virtually constant across educational cohorts at about 80% to 20%.

An interesting cross-tabulation from the standpoint of variation to be explained is political efficacy by ethnicity.

Table 2.5

# of Eff. Responses	Northern European	British Isles	French	Southern European	Eastern European	Other (Non-Eur)
0	30.0	27.2	35.7	33.6	28.9	42.8
1	26.5-56.5	26.5-53.7	24.4-61.1	26.8-60.4	29.9-58.8	28.2-71.
2	23.6	19.8	16.7	19.7	20.1	16.6
3	16.6	17.7	14.2	11.4	12.3	8.7
4	3.4-20.0	8.8-26.5	9.1-23.3	8.5-19.9	8.7-21.0	3.7-12.
Mean score	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.0 F=7
	N=313	N=1256	N=797	N=107	N=231	N=249
$\chi^2=64.25$	df=20	P<.001	V=.07			

*significant at .001 level.

While those respondents who trace their ancestry to the British Isles tend to be more efficacious than any other ethnic group, the margin of superiority is not very great. Indeed, while there is some variation between our classes of European respondents the most striking difference is between any one of these groups and the residual category of respondents. For example, if one compares British respondents to the respondents in the non-European category it can be observed that whereas 53.7% of the former give one or fewer efficacious responses, 71% of the latter fall into this very low efficacy range. Focusing upon the highest efficacy categories we find that 26.5% of those of British ancestry give either 3 or 4 efficacious

responses as compared to only 12.4% of non-European respondents.

Interestingly, respondents who are the descendants of European cultures not particularly renowned for possessing a heritage of democratic political institutions are not significantly less efficacious than those with either British or Northern European ancestry. We might have expected that either southern or eastern Europeans or, indeed, the French, given the history of their position in Canadian socio-political life vis-a-vis the dominant British plurality, would be less likely to consider themselves influential actors in the political process or feel that political authorities are responsive to their demands. However, the data does not corroborate the expectation. What is shown is that the psychological integration of non-Europeans into the Canadian political system has been far less successful than that of any group of Europeans. A possible explanation is that non-Europeans have had the greatest adjustment to make Canadian socio-political norms and institutions which have their roots in a European tradition.

The next cross-tabulation is political efficacy by religion. Again, we find that the variation across categories of the independent variable is not very large.

Table 2.6

# of Eff. Responses	Protestant		Catholic		Other Religion		No Religion		
0	31.5	58.2	34.6	59.4	27.6	55.6	18.5	49.5	
1	26.7		24.8		28.0		31.0		
2	19.6		17.1		21.7		24.8		
3	15.3		14.6		15.2		18.7		
4	6.9	22.2	8.9	25.5	7.5	22.7	7.0	25.7	
Mean score	1.4		1.4		1.5		1.6		F=2.8*
	N=1096		N=1295		N=357		N=204		
$\chi^2=32.56$	df=12	$P<.01$	$V=.06$						

*significant at .05 level

The most noteworthy feature of the above cross-tabulation is the similarity in the level of political efficacy across the religion categories. Looking at the two lowest levels of political efficacy one sees that 58.2% of Protestant respondents give 1 or fewer efficacious responses, as compared to 59.4% of the Catholic respondents and 55.6% of respondents belonging to another religious denomination. Our most efficacious group is that consisting of those who profess to have no religion. But the difference between respondents with no religion and those who admit to a denominational designation is quite small.

A final point to be made before moving on is that the lack of variation in political efficacy between religious denominations reflects the fact that no religious group is particularly alienated from the political system. Religious cleavages do not have the repercussions for political attitudes that they would have if the power relationship between denominations was grossly asymmetric and public policy was informed to some

considerable extent by religious considerations. And while religion in the Canadian context is of some significance with respect to political partisanship,³ its importance as a determinant of such a dispositional trait as political efficacy is strictly limited.

The next variable to be cross-tabulated with the composite efficacy measure is size of the community of residence.

Table 2.7

# of Eff. Responses	Large city 100,000+	Small city 10 - 100,000	Town 1 - 1,000	Village & Rural Under 1,000
0	29.3 - 56.8	27.7 - 52.2	35.1 - 55.5	37.6 - 64.0
1	27.5	24.5	20.4	26.4
2	19.5	23.4	18.9	15.8
3	16.2 - 23.7	14.0 - 24.4	21.7 - 25.6	11.3 - 20.1
4	7.5	10.4	3.9	8.8
Mean score	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.3
	N=1675	N=370	N=229	N=679

$\chi^2=48.44$ df=12 $P<.001$ Gamma= -.07

*significant at .01 level

One observes that the level of efficacy is fairly consistent across the large city, small city and town categories of the independent variable. However, respondents who reside in a village or rural setting tend to be somewhat less efficacious than those who reside elsewhere. There exist several reasons for the comparative inefficaciousness of rural populations, a few of which we will cite. On the one hand, level of formal education tends to be lower in rural areas than in more densely populated areas. And education, for reasons to be explained

subsequently, is a significant correlate of political efficacy. Second, the rural resident is subject to a less continuous and less intense flood of information, political included, through the various media. Now becoming confused, disoriented and paralyzed with respect to political action is a possible consequence of increased exposure to political information. Yet the converse is also possible. Greater exposure to and, to some unavoidable minimum extent at least, absorption of political information increases the likelihood that one will find the political process comprehensible and that one will feel within the mainstream of the system. And this question of considering oneself a part of the mainstream of the political system brings us to our third point, namely, that rural-dwellers will tend more often to be outside of the socio-political mainstream in a sense that is more than psychological. The objective reality of being peripheral may even engender a psychological hostility toward the centre and those symbols associated with it. It is therefore not implausible that rural-dwellers in an increasingly urban society may come to feel that they are ignored by the political authorities.

ii) Three Independent Measures with Social Class Implications

Table 2.8 involves a cross-tabulation of political efficacy by occupation. The occupation variable has been trichotomised into upper white-collar, lower white-collar, and blue-collar workers. The respective categories include the following Statistics Canada⁴ designations:

- a) Upper white collar.....Manager, administrator, etc.
 Natural science, math, engineering, etc.
 Social sciences, etc.
 Religion
 Teaching, etc.
 Medicine, health
 Art, literature, recreation, etc.
- b) Lower white collar.....Clerical
 Sales
- c) Blue collar.....Service
 Fishing, hunting, trapping
 Forestry, logging
 Mining, quarrying
 Processing occupations
 Machining
 Product repair, assembly
 Construction trades
 Transport equipment operator
 Materials handling
 Other craft, equipment operator
 Occupation not elsewhere classified

Job classification has precedence over industry/service sector. Hence, an executive who is employed by a mining or construction enterprise falls within the upper white collar designation. Farmers were excluded from the analysis due to an inability to reliably distinguish those who own and work their own farm from those who are simply farm labourers.

Table 2.8

# of Eff. Responses	Upper White Collar	Lower White Collar	Blue Collar	
0	11.9	30.2	35.5	
1	25.2 - 37.1	24.1 - 54.3	28.3 - 63.8	
2	20.9	22.6	17.5	
3	29.3	16.5	11.3	
4	12.7 - 42.0	6.7 - 23.2	7.3 - 18.6	
Mean score	2.1	1.5	1.3	F=53.6*
	N=403	N=416	N=784	
$\chi^2=120.79$	df=8	P<.001	V=.19	
*significant at .001 level				

One observes that the likelihood of a respondent being politically efficacious rises as we move from the ranks of

blue collar workers through lower white collar workers to upper white collar workers. Moreover, the variation in response pattern is considerably greater between the two white collar categories than between the lower white collar respondents and the blue collar group. Looking only at the two highest efficacy levels, either 3 or 4 efficacious responses, we find fully 42% of upper white collar workers in this category as compared to 23.2% of the lower white collar workers and 18.6% of blue collar workers.

A plausible explanation for this pattern is two-fold. On the one hand occupation, along with qualifying one for professional occupational roles, will tend to contribute to the development of a sense of self-esteem and, relatedly, subjective competence.⁵ The more educated man, as compared to his less educated counterpart, is likely to have a greater sense of self-worth and believe in his own potency vis-à-vis the sub-system of society of which he is a member. Second, professional job roles, as against sales, service and a large number of blue collar job roles, tend more often to allow for the participation of the individual in workplace decision-making. In consequence participatory expectations are either instilled or reinforced; expectations which may be generalised to one's relationship with the political system. We pursue this latter thesis more thoroughly when we look at the relationship between the structure of authority in the workplace variables and political efficacy.

The following two independent measures are family income and years of formal education. We will present the cross-tabulations together. This is argued for by the inter-relatedness of these measures. Income has been trichotomised. Education is also trichotomous with the lowest category consisting of those with grade school graduation or less, the middle category being constituted of those with secondary school graduation or less, and the highest category being formed of those with at least some post-secondary education.

Table 2.9

Political Efficacy by Income

# of Eff. Responses	Lowest 1/3 of Respondents	Middle 1/3 of Respondents	Highest 1/3 of Respondents	
0	41.6	32.8	20.7	
1	26.0 - 67.6	24.8 - 57.6	27.1 - 47.8	
2	17.0	21.9	19.6	
3	9.8	12.4	22.2	
4	5.6 - 15.4	8.1 - 20.5	10.5 - 32.7	
Mean score	1.1	1.4	1.7	F=57.1*
	N=901	N=852	N=920	
$\chi^2=135.38$	df=8	P<.001	Gamma=.25	

*significant at .001 level

Table 2.10

Political Efficacy by Education

# of Eff. Responses	Grade School or less	Secondary Sch. or less	At least some Post-Secondary Sch.	
0	48.8	33.7	13.1	
1	27.2 - 76.0	27.7 - 61.4	22.8 - 35.9	
2	12.4	19.3	23.6	
3	6.7	12.8	27.2	
4	4.9 - 11.6	6.5 - 19.3	13.2 - 40.4	
Mean score	.9	1.3	2.0	F=101.2*
	N=569	N=1648	N=732	
$\chi^2=308.80$	df=12	P<.001	Gamma=.39	

*significant at .001 level

The relationship between political efficacy and each of the above two measures is substantial. Collapsing the two highest efficacy levels in table 2.9 one finds that 100% more of those respondents in the highest income category than of those in the lowest income category give either 3 or 4 efficacious responses (32.7% versus 15.4%). And when education is the independent measure the relationship is even greater. The proportion of respondents giving 3 or 4 efficacious responses is 11.6% in the case of those with grade school or less, 19.3% in the case of those with secondary school or less, and fully 40.4% in the case of those with at least some post-secondary education. We notice also that when education is used to measure a dimension of social class the "great leap forward" in efficaciousness occurs with the transition from the secondary school cohort to the post-secondary school cohort. We would argue that the explanation is two-fold. On the one hand the people who are most likely to attend a post-secondary institution have been socialised within a psychological/material ambience which is different from that of respondents who end their formal education at the primary or secondary school level.⁶ The former are more likely than the latter to have learned efficacious dispositions and expectations with respect to such a non-political authority system as the family. However, it is not simply a matter of one growing accustomed to being listened to and being able to influence decisions made within a system of inter-related persons, but it is also the case

that one may well adopt the dispositions of significant others with whom one interacts (eg. one's father). Second, it seems likely that education has a determining influence of its own, independent of relationship to social class background and familial socialisation. Education, potentially at least and for many in fact, means greater information, analytic/information processing ability and, generally, familiarity with a greater or lesser segment of the world, of which the polity is a part. Self-confidence in dealing with a larger system of which one is a member and, more generally, self-esteem tend to be engendered by higher education.

While it is true that income and education are inter-related, education being in large measure responsible for one's eventual income and, indeed, the income of one's family being partially responsible for the education one receives, the nature of the relationship of each of these social class variables to political efficacy is not identical. We have said already that the positive contribution which education tends to make to political efficacy derives largely from the self-esteem and confidence which are consequences of the experience of higher learning. But in the case of income the direct relationship which exists, while largely having the same roots as that between both occupation and education with political efficacy (given the inter-relatedness of education, occupation and income), results also from those with better material circumstances being more likely than those with lesser material circumstances

to be satisfied with the output side of the political system. So in this case the phenomenon at work is psychic well-being (i.e. a sense of being part of a larger system rather than the system being an inaccessible enigma), as was said of the consequences for political efficacy of higher education. To speculate for a moment, it may be that psychic well-being derives from being comparatively well off in a material sense, the sense of being capable of impacting upon a larger system resulting from the reductions in anxiety that comes of material success.

iii) Attitudinal Independent Measures

The next analysis involves the following independent variable:

So many other people vote in federal elections that it doesn't matter very much whether I vote or not.

The item involves a positive assertion about the meaningfulness of universal suffrage. In other words, it appears that what is being measured is support for that institution which is the cornerstone of any western political system; the democratic election. Support is lent to this interpretation of the measure under consideration by the fact that just under nine of ten respondents disagree with the proposition that so many people vote in federal elections that it doesn't matter very much whether or not I vote. Such consensus is characteristically found in the case of a system norm. However, it is the case that approximately 13% of our sample population considers that the voting act is meaningless. For this reason we have chosen

to examine the relationship between this measure and political efficacy, our suspicion being that those who do not support this norm will tend to be less efficacious than those who believe that it matters whether or not one votes.

The response pattern is as follows.

Table 2.11

# of Eff. Responses	Positive orientation toward the Norm of Individual Participation in Fed. Elections	Negative orientation toward the Norm of Individual Participation in Fed. Elections
0	27.5	56.5
1	26.2 - 53.7	27.5 - 84.0
2	20.8	7.9
3	16.7	5.9
4	8.7 - 25.4	2.2 - 8.1
Mean score	1.5	.6
	N=2546	N=387

F=148.2*

$\chi^2=163.74$ df=4 P<.001 $r=.24$

*significant at .001 level

Computing a simple Pearson correlation coefficient for this relationship one obtains a value of $r=.22$. Not unexpectedly, we find a very clear relationship between being of the belief that it matters whether one votes notwithstanding that so many others do likewise (a positive sense of civic obligation) and political efficacy. And although the proportion of respondents falling into the negative sense of civic obligation category is relatively small (13% of the entire sample/population), amongst this class of people the level of efficacy is extremely low. Fully 84% of these respondents give one or fewer efficacious responses (as compared to 53.7% of those respondents who have a positive sense of civic obligation) and only 8.1% give either 3 or 4 efficacious responses.

Rather than discussing what a positive sense of civic obligation means for an individual (for the present measure seems almost to elicit a ritualistic positive response) it is more useful to examine the meaning of a negative response to this measure. A person who considers that the central institution of representative democracy, the ballot box, is without meaning for him is most probably of one of two opinions. Either this person has engaged in an ultra-rational calculation of the actual weight of any one person's vote in the total electoral scheme or, much more likely, he harbours a manifest disaffection with respect to the political system. This disaffection may take the form of attitudes toward the party system (i.e. the belief that there is no real difference between the political parties) or a more general dissatisfaction with the output side of the political process. In any case, the likelihood of a person who is more or less disaffected with respect to such a fundamental democratic institution as voting, the act having symbolic significance relating to the ultimate accountability of political authorities to the people, feeling either that representative institutions are responsive or that a person like himself is capable of being an effective political is quite low. Such a person would seem to fall below a minimal threshold of political self-esteem which must be attained if one is to feel a part of the political system. Mercifully from the standpoint of system stability in Canada the proportion of respondents who feel negatively about such a psychological

foundation stone of democracy as the utility of the ballot box is small.⁷ For, as is clear from table 2.11, the likelihood of this negativism being accompanied by cynicism regarding the accessibility and responsiveness of political authorities, as well as a low level of subjective political competence, is very high.

Satisfaction with life in Canada is the next independent measure. The item reads thusly:

All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with life in Canada today?

Each respondent was asked to place himself on an eleven-rung scale ranging from 1 (completely dissatisfied), through 6 (neutral), to 11 (completely satisfied). We have trichotomised the measure so that subjects who give a response of 1 through 4 are grouped into the low satisfaction category, respondents who score 5 through 7 form the middle-range satisfaction category, and respondents who place themselves at 8 through 11 constitute the upper satisfaction cohort. Although approximately two-thirds of the sample population falls into the highest satisfaction category, proportionally there are enough respondents in the lower satisfaction cohorts to make an analysis of the relationship between life satisfaction and political efficacy worthwhile.

Because the grouping together of respondents acts to wash out some of the variance a simple correlation coefficient has been computed. The Pearson's r is a rather weak .12 .

Table 2.12

# of Eff. Responses	Low satisfaction.....		High satisfaction	
	Rungs 1-4	Rungs 5-7	Rungs 8-11	
0	36.8	34.3	30.0	
1	37.3 - 74.1	30.5 - 64.8	24.1 - 54.1	
2	13.1	19.0	19.6	
3	9.9 - 12.9	11.5 - 16.2	16.9 - 26.3	
4	3.0	4.7	9.4	
Mean score	1.0	1.2	1.5	F=21.7*
	N=148	N=762	N=2035	
$\chi^2=57.53$	df=8	P<.001	Gamma=.17	

*significant at .001 level

Because relatively few people fall into the lowest satisfaction range we will compare those who have a comme ci, comme ça attitude with respect to their satisfaction with life in Canada (rungs 5 through 7) to those who place themselves close to the top of the satisfaction ladder (rungs 8 through 11). Variation between the two groups is pronounced: whereas 64.8% of the mediocre satisfaction respondents give 1 or fewer efficacious responses, 54.1% of the high satisfaction people fall into this lowest efficacy category. And collapsing the two highest efficacy categories shows that 16.2% of the mediocre satisfaction people versus 26.3% of the upper satisfaction people give 3 or 4 efficacious responses. The results are hardly surprising given one's strong suspicion that satisfaction with life is largely a function of such things as material circumstances (income) and self-esteem (deriving in large measure from the social class environment in which one was and continues to be nurtured), this latter tending to rise with years of formal education.

These closely inter-related factors combine to create a sense of psychological well-being. The consequence for political efficacy is that one who feels "in control" with respect to his life in general is more likely than a person who is dissatisfied with the course of events in his life to i) feel that he possesses the competence to be an effective actor in the political system, and ii) consider that political authorities will listen to people like himself and take their demands into account.

The next analysis involves the relationship between federal party identification and political efficacy. We have divided the independent variable into the following categories: Liberal, Conservative, N.D.P., Independent, and Other partisanship.

Table 2.13

# of Eff. Responses	Liberal	P.C.	N.D.P.	Other Partisan	Independent
0	28.0	27.9	37.8	39.5	31.5
1	25.5	28.3	27.2	21.8	25.5
2	18.4	20.3	20.2	19.1	21.0
3	17.6	17.2	10.2	13.0	15.4
4	10.5	6.4	4.6	6.6	6.7
Mean score	1.6	1.5	1.2	1.3	1.4
	N=1049	N=586	N=297	N=94	N=486
$\chi^2=39.86$	df=16	$P<.001$	$V=.06$		

*significant at .001 level

The most efficacious respondents tend to be Liberal and PC identifiers and people who respond that they have no partisanship. And of these three groups Liberal partisans are the most efficacious with 28.1% of these respondents giving 3 or more efficacious responses. That Liberal identifiers

should be most efficacious comes as no surprise given the fact that this party has formed the national government for the 14 years preceding the 1977 survey, and for 37 of the 42 years prior to this date. Liberal partisans have good reason to consider that political authorities are responsive.

What is rather surprising is the showing of NDP partisans. They tend clearly to be lowest in political efficacy. Perhaps this is owing to the fact that, more than in the case of the Liberal or PC parties, NDP support tends to be drawn from the ranks of blue collar workers. And, as demonstrated previously, members of this broad occupational classification tend to be less politically efficacious than either upper or lower white collar workers. Notwithstanding this factor, it is surprising that NDP identifiers tend to be less efficacious than those in our residual "Other Partisan" category. We suspected that the fact of identifying with an established national party which, if distant from power at least is not about to disappear from the scene (and indeed is or has been in power in certain provinces), would militate in favour of efficaciousness on the part of these respondents relative to those who profess to be the adherents of marginal political parties. However, we find no comfort in the data.

The trust in man/optimism in the future index is the final attitudinal independent variable. The items which have gone together to form this index are the following:⁸

- a) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
- b) Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?
- c) Do you feel that most people would try to take advantage of you if they had the chance or would they try to be fair?
- d) Do you think its better to plan your life a good way ahead, or would you say life is too much a matter of luck to plan ahead very far?
- e) When you do make plans ahead, do you usually get to carry out things the way you expected, or do things usually come up to make you change your plans?
- f) Have you usually felt pretty sure your life would work out the way you want it to, or have there been times when you haven't been sure about it?
- g) Some people feel they can run their lives pretty much the way they want to, others feel the problems of life are sometimes too big for them. Which are you most like?

Each item is dichotomised with a trusting or optimistic response counting for 1 and a mistrusting or unoptimistic response counting as 2. A respondent who has a combined score of 9 or less has been placed in our trusting/optimistic category and a respondent with a total score of greater than 9 falls into our mistrusting/unoptimistic category (recognising that the category labels are to be construed in a comparative sense).

Table 2.14

# of Eff. Responses	Trusting/Optimistic	Mistrusting/Unoptimistic
0	18.0	37.7
1	23.6 - 41.6	27.6 - 65.3
2	22.9	17.3
3	23.4 - 35.4	11.4 - 17.3
4	12.0	5.9
Mean score	1.9	1.2
	N=939	N=2013

$\chi^2=184.65$ df=4 P<.001 r= -.25

*significant at .001 level

The difference is striking. 35.4% of the "trusting/optimistic" fall into the two highest efficacy categories as against only 17.3% of those classified as "mistrusting/unoptimistic". The trust in man/optimism about the future measure relates both to a sense of being in control rather than at the mercy of random happenstance and, second, that the larger system of which one is a part is benevolent or at any rate not something which stands apart from and is hostile to one. Such dispositions, viz. self-esteem, a sense of being able to manipulate the environment, and confidence in the orderliness of one's world, would appear to be the antecedents of political efficacy.

iv) Political Efficacy and Political Participation

The following three cross-tabulations involve political efficacy and political behavior. The behaviors which we have chosen to analyze are ones which, vis-a-vis such phenomena as voting and discussing politics are fairly "costly". That is they would seem to require social/psychological resources beyond those needed for more widely engaged in political activities. Based upon the findings of previous studies⁹ of the relationship between efficacy and political participation one expects to find a direct correlation between political efficacy and these costly modes of political/community participation. For it seems fair to assume that persons who possess the wherewithal (competence) to engage in political behavior, and who believe that political authorities are responsive, will be a good deal more likely to perform one of our selected behaviors than those who feel otherwise.

Question: We would like to know how involved you have been in politics and in your community. Could you tell me how often you have done each of the following things in the past five years? Would you say often, once or twice, or never?

Table 2.15

Been a volunteer worker during a political campaign.....

	# of Efficacious Responses					Mean score	
	0	1	2	3	4		
Often	2.5	2.5	3.7	3.3	8.6	1.9	
Once or twice	7.5	14.0	14.1	17.4	13.9	1.7	
Never	90.0	83.5	82.1	79.3	77.4	1.3	F=19.4*
	N=924	N=772	N=559	N=447	N=225		

$\chi^2=59.32$ df=8 P<.001 Gamma= -.22

*significant at .001 level

Table 2.16

Worked with others in your community to try to solve some community problem.....

	# of Efficacious Responses					Mean score	
	0	1	2	3	4		
Often	5.9	9.7	11.9	12.2	18.9	1.8	
Once or twice	13.7	23.3	24.5	26.7	26.1	1.7	
Never	80.4	67.1	63.6	61.1	55.0	1.3	F=45.9*
	N=925	N=773	N=559	N=448	N=225		

$\chi^2=105.88$ df=8 P<.001 Gamma= -.26

*significant at .001 level

Table 2.17

Spoken or written to an elected representative of yours.....

	# of Efficacious Responses					Mean score	
	0	1	2	3	4		
Often	4.2	8.8	10.1	12.3	13.2	1.9	
Once or twice	17.3	23.0	24.6	33.8	31.8	1.7	
Never	78.5	68.2	65.2	53.9	55.0	1.2	F=52.8*
	N=923	N=773	N=559	N=448	N=225		

$\chi^2=111.21$ df=8 P<.001 Gamma= -.27

*significant at .001 level

Consistent with expectations the proportion of

respondents who are extremely inefficacious (giving no efficacious responses) and who often perform one of our selected behaviors is very small (table 2.15, 2.5%; table 2.16, 5.9%; table 2.17, 4.2%). Moreover, there is a monotonic pattern with each of the cross-tabulations in that there is in each case a smooth gradation with political participation increasing as efficacious increases.

Now it is true that efficacy is least effective as a predictor of political participation when volunteer work during a political campaign is the participation measure. This is accounted for by the fact that many campaign workers are motivated not by interest in politics, partisan belief, or a sense that their efforts can make a difference, but by the stipend which accompanies some election work. And of course it is often the case that some partisan work (canvassing, stuffing or addressing envelopes, etc.) is the quid pro quo for appointment to such patronage positions as enumerator, district returning officer or poll clerk. It is possible that these individuals, often lower or middle class housewives, constitute the greater part of those respondents who are quite inefficacious (giving 1 or fewer efficacious responses) and yet have done campaign volunteer work on a frequent or episodic basis. In the case of the other two participation measures efficacy differentiates more effectively between respondents with respect to the likelihood of participation.

Looking at the relationship of political efficacy and political involvement in community problems one finds a range

from 80.4% of those who fall into the lowest efficacy category and never participate to 55% of those in the highest efficacy category who never participate. When speaking or writing to an elected representative is the measure of participation we observe that the range is from 78.5% (lowest efficacy and never participating) to 55% (highest efficacy and never participating).

That there is a clear relationship between political efficacy and political participation comes as no surprise. Our findings corroborate Almond and Verba's assertion that, "The more subjectively competent an individual considers himself, the more likely he is to be politically active."¹⁰ They found that the subjectively competent citizen is more likely to expose himself to political communications, convey political communications and engage in partisan activity than is the less self-confident citizen.¹¹

v) Summary

In this chapter we have examined the relationship between political efficacy and a number of categoric and attitudinal measures. Generally, demographic variables are the poorest predictors of political efficacy while certain categoric measures with social class implications and attitudinal measures are more highly inter-related with the unweighted additive efficacy index. Among the categoric measures age is particularly interesting in that there appears to be some evidence that generational experience bears upon political efficacy.

While each of the measures with social class implications is significantly correlated with political efficacy, education proves to be the best predictor with a gamma value of .39 . The only other measure which is equally strong as a predictor of political efficacy is the trust in man/optimism in the future index with an r value of .25 . Finally, in accounting for the comparative strength of social class measures and the above-mentioned attitudinal index as predictors of political efficacy we discussed the significance of self-esteem and its relationship to the socialization process.

5

Footnotes

Chapter 2

1. Comparing Canada with the United States one finds that the level of efficacy of Canadians tends to be lower. The following table is adapted from Schwartz's Politics and Territory. The Canadian survey was conducted in 1965 and the American in 1964.

Percent Agreeing with Statements Measuring Political Efficacy in Canada and the United States

	<u>Canada</u>	<u>United States</u>
Voting is the only way that people like me can have a say about how the gov't runs things.	75%	73%
Sometimes politics and gov't seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.	69%	66%
People like me don't have any say about what the gov't does.	49%	29%
I don't think the gov't cares much what people like me think.	46%	36%

Adapted from M. Schwartz, Politics and Territory (McGill-Queen's Press, Montreal, 1974), Table 9-4, 224.

2. With respect to the peripheral status of Atlantic Canada within the Canadian economic and political system see Hugh Innis, Regional Disparities (McGraw-Hill/Ryerson, Toronto, 1972).
3. See for example, Meisel, "Religious Affiliation and Electoral Behavior: A Case Study", CJEPS, Nov., 1956; Meisel, "Some Aspects of National Party Support in Canada", CJEPS, Feb., 1963, and Clarke, et al., Political Choice in Canada (Toronto, 1979), 100-103.
4. For a detailed breakdown of the Statistics Canada occupational codes see, The Census of Canada (1971), vol.3, Part 3 (Labour Force: Occupations) table 1, 1-22.
5. Useful works on status attainment include, Sewell, Haller and Porter, "The Educational and Early Occupational Attainment Process", ASR, 34, (February, 1969), 82-92; Sewell, Haller and Ohlendorf, "The Educational and Early Occupational Attainment Process: Replications and Revisions", ASR, 35, (December, 1970), 1014-1027; Sewell and Hauser, "Causes and Consequences of Higher Education: Models of the Status Attainment Process", American Journal of Agricultural Economics 54(December, 1972), 651-661; Haller and Portes, "Status

Attainment Processes", Sociology of Education 46(Winter, 1973), 51-91; and Kerkhoff, "The Status Attainment Process: Socialization or Allocation?", Social Forces 55(Dec., 1976), 368-381. With respect to the inter-relatedness of education and occupation see Sewell, Education, Occupation, and Earnings (Academic Press, New York, 1975), and Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1965), chapter vi.

6. For a discussion of inter-generational status inheritance see Kornberg, et al., Citizen Politicians: Canada (Carolina Academic Press, Durham, N.C., 1979); especially 31-53.
7. However, in an analysis of political support in Canada, Kornberg et al. find:
 (There is) a substantial reservoir of support for the idea of a Canadian political community. There is appreciably less support for the national political regime, for national party leaders and their parliamentary candidates, and for the several provinces and provincial regimes. There is also less support for the idea of a Canadian political community in Quebec, partisanship among French Canadians, who comprise approximately 80 per cent of the population of this province.
 From Kornberg, Clarke and Stewart, "Federalism and Fragmentation: Political Support in Canada", Journal of Politics (August, 1979), 903. †
8. Performing a factor analysis with these seven response items the following result is obtained.

	<u>Factor 1</u>	<u>Factor 2</u>
Q192	0.808	0.068
Q193	0.820	0.062
Q194	0.775	0.060
Q195	0.036	0.556
Q196	0.209	0.569
Q197	-0.107	0.676
Q198	0.093	0.689

Clearly, the first three measures group together on factor 1 while the final four items load highly on the second factor. The justification for grouping all seven response items together to form a single index is two-fold: A) an index, unlike a scale, does not assume unidimensionality; and B) the two dimensions are correlated.

9. See for example, W. Mishler, Political Participation in Canada (Macmillan, Toronto, 1979), 74-77; and R. Van Loon, "Political Participation in Canada: The 1965 Election", CJPS, no.3 (September, 1970), 393-394.
10. Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, 1963), 236.
11. Ibid., 236-239.

Chapter 3

Regional Variation

In this section of the paper a control for region is utilised in order to ascertain whatever variance between regions may exist with respect to the relationships between the composite efficacy measure and the range of independent variables. The sample has been divided into five regions rather than along provincial lines after the fashion of Simeon and Elkins¹ (due to the problem of shrinking cell sizes). Hence, the analysis proceeds using the following five regional classifications: Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairies, and British Columbia.

Not every regionally-controlled cross-tabulation will be reported. Rather we will discuss only those which represent some noteworthy variation from the uncontrolled instance where the entire national sample population was used. Moreover, in some cases, due to the small number of respondents who fall into one or more categories of an independent variable within a region, we will collapse categories so that the table which we present is not identical in format to its counterpart in the bivariate analysis chapter.

A final caveat: In many of the subsequent cross-tabulation the probability that the results are due to chance is greater than five times in one hundred. We have chosen to report these findings in order to allow for very cautious speculation.

i) Atlantic CanadaTable 3.1: Efficacy by Ethnicity

# of Eff. Responses	British Isles Ancestry	Other Ancestry*
0	34.7	46.0
1	27.9 - 62.6	24.0 - 70.0
2	15.1	11.0
3	14.3	15.0
4	8.0 - 24.3	5.0 - 20.0
Mean score	1.3	1.2
	N=194	N=88

F=1.5**

 $\chi^2=15.12$ df=16 P>.05

**not significant at .05 level.

*summed percentages do not equal 100.0 due to rounding errors.

Due to the very small number of respondents falling into each of our European and non-European ancestry categories we have chosen to collapse these groups and so dichotomise the independent variable into British Isles ancestry and other ancestry. And we observe that those of other ancestry tend to be somewhat less efficacious than those who are descended from British progenitors. We might note that the composition of the "other" category is as follows: 18 northern Europeans, 33 of French ancestry, 3 of eastern or southern European background, and 34 non-Europeans.

If we combine the French respondents with the non-European respondents on the grounds that, in the former instance, members of this sociological group have occupied a position inferior to the dominant British majority in the social and political system of Atlantic Canada and, in the latter case, that nationally non-Europeans are found to be less efficacious than European

respondents, we find the following.

Table 3.2: Efficacy by Ethnicity

# of Eff. Responses	British Isles Ancestry	French and Non-European Ancestry
0	34.7 - 62.6	51.0 - 75.0
1	27.9	24.0
2	15.1	7.0
3	14.3 - 24.3	12.0 - 18.0
4	8.0	6.0
Mean score	1.3	.9
	N=194	N=67

$P > .05$

Clearly, the lesser tendency for non-British residents of the Atlantic provinces to be efficacious is caused primarily by the comparatively low efficaciousness of the French and non-Europeans in the region.

The next cross-tabulation involves political efficacy by religion. Again, the independent variable has been altered so that respondents who profess to have no religion are grouped together with those who are of a faith other than either Roman Catholicism or Protestantism.

Table 3.3: Efficacy by Religion

# of Eff. Responses	Protestants	Catholics	Other or No Religion
0	37.6 - 69.7	40.8 - 60.8	35.0 - 63.0
1	32.1	20.0	28.0
2	11.9	16.0	13.0
3	15.0 - 18.4	14.3 - 25.1	13.0 - 23.0
4	3.4	8.8	10.0
Mean score	1.1	1.3	1.4
	N=114	N=107	N=60

$\chi^2=10.47$ df=12 $P > .05$

*not significant at .05 level.

Whereas in the case of the national sample population

there was no significant variation in political efficacy between religious groups, excepting the finding that those with no professed religion tended to be somewhat more efficacious than other respondents, in Atlantic Canada there is an evident albeit very weak tendency for Catholic respondents to be more efficacious than Protestant respondents. This finding is not consistent with that observed in the case of efficacy by ethnicity. In that latter instance we observed that those of non-British ancestry (N=67) were rather less likely to be efficacious than those of British ancestry. And French respondents made up one half (N=33) of this non-British group. So we see that, even if we assume that a very high proportion of the non-British group is Catholic, a good number of those who report British Isles descent remain who must also be Catholic. The greater number of people falling into this classification are of Irish origin. Following this argument to its conclusion we expect that the comparatively greater efficaciousness of Catholics vis-à-vis Protestants is caused by the relatively higher efficaciousness of those of Irish origin (we believe this to be the case because efficacy among Atlantic Canadians of French descent is comparatively low). Unfortunately, the data set does not allow us to separate Irish respondents from others of British Isles origin. Notwithstanding this, all the evidence points in the direction of Irish Catholics being responsible for the slight tendency of Catholics to be more efficacious than Protestants.

Table 3.4: Efficacy by Federal Political Identification

# of Eff. Responses	Liberal's	PC's	Independents
0	45.5	34.5	33.1
1	22.8 - 68.3	29.0 - 63.5	30.7 - 63.8
2	9.3	11.6	15.7
3	14.3	18.4	13.0
4	8.1 - 22.4	6.5 - 24.9	7.6 - 20.6
Mean score	1.2	1.3	1.3
	N=97	N=77	N=44

$$x^2=13.35 \quad df=16 \quad P>.05$$

*not significant at .05 level.

Cross-tabulating political efficacy by federal political identification one finds little difference between identifiers of the two contending political parties (the number of NDP identifiers was too small to warrant inclusion). We would argue that this situation is reflective of competitiveness in Atlantic Canada of these two national political parties. Neither party occupies a dominant position after the fashion of the national Liberal party in Quebec or the national PC party in Alberta. Hence, one does not find a group of partisans whose frustration with being relegated to the impotent backwaters of electoral oblivion is reflected in a lesser level of political efficacy than those who identify with the "government" party.

Table 3.5: Efficacy by Provincial Political Identification

# of Eff. Responses	Liberal's	PC's	Independents
0	42.6	36.3	35.9
1	21.6 - 64.2	33.7 - 70.0	29.4 - 65.3
2	9.9	11.3	18.4
3	16.8	16.4	10.3
4	9.1 - 25.9	2.4 - 18.8	6.0 - 16.3
Mean score	1.3	1.1	1.2
	N=94	N=78	N=43

$$x^2=13.14 \quad df=16 \quad P>.05 \quad \text{*not significant at .05 level.}$$

When we substitute provincial for federal party identification the pattern is rather different from that found in table 3.4 . Those who identify provincially with the Liberal party tend to be more efficacious than those who identify provincially with the PC party. And while the difference is not great it is large enough to provide us with grounds for referring to the cross-tabulation of religion by political efficacy where we found that Catholics tend to be more efficacious than Protestants. Given that, proportionally, far more Catholics are Liberal than PC supporters, it seems that we have discovered a likely explanation of the tendency of provincial Liberal identifiers to be more efficacious than provincial PC identifiers. However, this difference in efficacy did not obtain federally and so the implausibility of this explanation is immediately pointed up. Rather the cause likely lies in differences between the federal and provincial party systems in the region, an explanation which will be pursued more thoroughly when we direct our attention to regions which better illustrate this situation.

ii) Quebec

Table 3.6: Efficacy by Sex

# of Eff. Responses	Male		Female	
0	31.0		39.6	
1	22.9	53.9	23.9	63.5
2	17.1		17.7	
3	17.5		11.8	
4	11.6	29.1	7.1	18.9
Mean score	1.6		1.2	F=11.8*
	N=410		N=375	

$x^2=12.75$ $df=4$ $P<.05$ $V=.13$

*significant at .001 level.

Recalling that in the case of the national sample population there is a marginal tendency for males to be more efficacious than females, we find that within Quebec this tendency is more pronounced. This would suggest that, notwithstanding the modernization which Quebec has undergone during the last two decades²(manifested in such phenomena as the increase in the mean level of educational attainment within the province, urbanization, and changing class and occupational structures), this overwhelmingly Catholic province yet maintains traditional values to a greater degree than any other region of Canada. The data is evidence of a more widespread tendency within Quebec than within other parts of Canada for women to feel more remote from the political system. Over 50% more men than women fall into the two highest efficacy categories, attesting to the fact that the traditional dichotomy between active males and passive females regarding things political yet obtains in la belle province.

Table 3.7: Efficacy by Ethnicity

# of Eff. Responses	British Isles Origin	French Origin	Other Origin	
0	30.1 - 42.5	35.2 - 59.5	38.0 - 62.0	
1	12.4	24.3	24.0	
2	13.2	17.1	21.0	
3	31.4 - 44.3	13.7 - 23.3	11.0 - 17.0	
4	12.9	9.6	6.0	
Mean score	1.8	1.4	1.3	F=1.8*
	N=61	N=619	N=106	

$\chi^2=27.12$ df=20 F>.05

*not significant at .05 level.

Cross-tabulating political efficacy by ethnicity (table 3.7) one finds that those of British descent are far and away

the most efficacious respondents. Moreover, those of French origin are not even significantly more likely to be efficacious than respondents who belong to neither of the founding groups. This situation of British-ancestry persons within Quebec being a good deal more likely to be politically efficacious than French-ancestry people within the province is quite different from the national pattern. In the latter instance those of British Isles stock were only marginally more likely to be efficacious than those of French descent.

In accounting for the greater efficaciousness of the British within Quebec we refer to the historical experience of that province. Historically it has been the case that English-Canadians, who have tended to be better educated than French-Canadians, have been dominant in the socio-economic system of the province. However, it is also indisputable that French-Canadians have held their own in respect of the proportion of positions they have held within the governmental system of Quebec. This being said we would argue that French Quebecers have developed a sense of frustration arising from a situation of having de facto restrictions placed upon their socio-economic mobility notwithstanding that in terms of numbers they have been fairly represented provincially and, over the last two decades, federally. In other words, if the reality of the relationship between the French and the English has changed over the latter two decades, a legacy of frustration and psychological impotence remains.

Table 3.8: Efficacy by Religion

# of Eff. Responses	Protestant	Catholic	Other and No Religion	
0	25.9	36.8	18.0	
1	14.3 - 40.2	23.9 - 50.7	24.0 - 42.0	
2	22.8	16.4	26.0	
3	23.4	13.8	22.0	
4	13.6 - 37.0	9.1 - 22.9	10.0 - 32.0	
Mean score	1.8	1.3	1.8	F=3.9*
	N=41	N=694	N=49	

$\chi^2=17.03$ df=12 P>05

*significant at .01 level

Little comment is needed in respect of the above table. It is a situation parallel to that of efficacy by ethnicity. Briefly, there appears to be a tendency for Catholic respondents to be less efficacious than Protestant respondents. While the number of non-Catholics in our Quebec sample population is small enough to make us wary of making unqualified statements, it seems that, in Quebec, Catholics are considerably less likely to be efficacious than non-Catholics. And, due to the inter-relatedness of ethnicity and religion within the province, the explanation is the same as that put forward to account for the greater tendency of those of British Isles descent to be more efficacious than those of French ancestry.

The next analysis involves the relationship between political efficacy and federal political identification.

Table 3.9: Efficacy by Federal Political Identification

# of Eff. Responses	Liberal	PC	SC	Independent
0	30.5	29.3	49.0	36.7
1	25.0	17.2	18.7	22.1
2	16.5	16.5	20.8	19.0
3	16.1	21.6	8.6	15.5
4	11.9	15.5	2.9	6.7
Mean score	1.5	1.8	1.0	1.3
	N=367	N=45	N=51	N=177

$\chi^2=20.2$ df=16 P>.05

*significant at .05 level.

Given the weakness of the Conservative party in Quebec and the previous suggestion of a relationship between the party system of a region and the distribution of efficacy within that region, we might have expected to find that PC partisans tend to be less efficacious than the supporters of the perennially successful Liberal party. What one in fact finds is that PC identifiers in Quebec are more efficacious than any other group of partisans. And while this is a clear departure from the model which posits that there will tend to be a direct relationship between political efficacy and the electoral success in the region of the party which one identifies with. However, Quebec is an aberrant case due to the fact that the overwhelming proportion of PC supporters in Quebec are Protestants of British descent and as such members of a social stratum which, historically, has been the most privileged within the province.

On the other hand we have the Social Credit party, a party whose support is almost entirely from Quebecers of

French descent (and, we might add, the most traditional strata of French-Canadian society).³ Here one finds that the level of efficacy is considerably lower than in the case with any other group of partisans or, for that matter, respondents who profess to have no federal political identification.

Finally we consider Liberal party supporters in Quebec. Supporters of this party are drawn from both French- and English-speaking Quebec. And the operation of factors related to the status of the French-Canadian vis-à-vis the English-Canadian in Quebec, taken in combination with the large proportion of French-Canadians within the ranks of Liberal party supporters, has resulted in Liberal partisans tending to be less efficacious than PC partisans, notwithstanding the success federally of the former party in Quebec.

Table 3.10: Efficacy by Provincial Political Identification

# of Eff. Responses	Liberal	PQ	Union Nationale and Other Parties	Independent
0	33.0 - 58.8	30.0	45.6 - 62.8	34.8 - 56.7
1	25.8	24.9	17.2	21.9
2	16.6	22.5	8.5	17.9
3	13.1 - 24.6	16.0	14.5 - 28.7	17.1 - 25.4
4	11.5	6.6	14.2	8.3
Mean score	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.4 F=.6*
	N=231	N=222	N=107	N=105

$\chi^2=27.31$ df=16 P<.05 V=.10

*not significant at .05 level

The most that can be said regarding the relationship between political efficacy and provincial political identification is that there is no clear pattern to be discerned. This is

curious because the "Union Nationale and Other Parties" category consists of individuals whose favoured political party is extremely remote from anything resembling political power. One might expect that this remoteness would cause party supporters to experience frustration and a consequent sense of being outside of the mainstream of the political system (i.e. political impotence).

Finally, there is no significant difference in efficaciousness between supporters of the two major provincial parties.

iii) Ontario

Recall that nationally there is no clear relationship between political efficacy and religion. In Ontario, however, the situation is rather different.

Table 3.11: Efficacy by Religion

# of Eff. Responses	Protestant	Catholic	Other Religion	No Religion	
0	30.8	27.9	23.4	14.3	
1	57.8	54.8	45.3	47.0	
2	19.0	17.7	27.3	28.6	
3	23.2	27.5	27.4	24.5	
4	6.4	9.6	9.1	8.1	
Mean score	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.7	F=2.5*
	N=514	N=351	N=143	N=67	

$$\chi^2=19.62 \quad df=12 \quad P>.05$$

*not significant at .05 level.

Proportionally, fewer members of non-Protestant non-Catholic denominations, as well as people professing to be a part of no religious faith, fall into the lower efficacy strata than do members of major denominations. And while nationally there is a slight tendency for respondents with no professed religion

to be more efficacious than any group of the faithful, the comparative efficaciousness of the "Other Religion" respondents is not to be found nationally. While the differences in efficaciousness between religious groups in Ontario are not great they seem worth noting.

Table 3.12: Efficacy by Federal Political Identification

# of Eff. Responses	Liberal	PC	NDP	Independent
0	25.3	25.7	34.8	27.0
1	26.0 -51.3	29.8 -55.5	30.0 -64.8	24.7 -51.7
2	19.3	19.9	19.4	26.4
3	19.7	19.1	9.6	14.2
4	9.8 -29.5	5.5 -24.6	6.3 -15.9	7.7 -21.9
Mean score	1.6	1.5	1.2	1.5
	N=382	N=241	N=142	N=164
$\chi^2=23.42$	df=16	P>.05		F=2.7*

*significant at .05 level.

Cross-tabulating political efficacy by federal political identification one finds that, in Ontario, there is no significant difference between Liberal and PC partisans. This is not unexpected given that the bases of support upon which the respective parties draw do not differ drastically in a socio-economic sense. Moreover, Ontario is the private preserve of neither of the major political parties, rather it tilts Liberal on occasion and PC at others.

In the case of NDP identifiers the comparative inefficaciousness of these respondents derives from the fact that the support profile of this party is rather different

from that of the other two parties. A comparatively greater proportion of NDP support is accounted for by working class people. In other words, the party draws its greatest support from blue collar strata⁴ and it is this to which one must attribute the tendency for NDP supporters to be lower in efficacy than supporters of the other two parties.

Table 3.13: Efficacy by Provincial Political Identification

# of Eff. Responses	Liberal	PC	NDP	Independent
0	19.2	26.7	30.4	23.8
1	26.9- 56.1	26.5- 53.2	31.0- 61.4	25.4- 49.2
2	19.6	20.3	18.5	29.1
3	15.3	20.5	13.2	13.9
4	9.0- 24.3	6.0- 26.5	6.9- 20.1	7.8- 21.7
Mean score	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.6 F=1.2*
	N=283	N=339	N=175	N=133
$\chi^2=21.77$	df=16	P>.05		
*not significant at .05 level.				

One observes from the above table that there is but a slight difference between provincial PC partisans and provincial Liberal identifiers in terms of efficaciousness. However, the difference is in a direction contrary to that which was found when efficacy was cross-tabulated with federal political identification. In the latter case there was found a slight tendency for Liberal partisans to be more efficacious than PC partisans, but when provincial political identification is the independent variable the PC identifiers tend to be slightly more efficacious. The margin is quite small and is noteworthy only inasmuch as it stands in contradistinction to the direction of the relationship when federal political party support is the

independent variable. The explanation for this difference may lie in the provincial party system of Ontario. Because the provincial Conservative party has formed the government in Ontario since the 1940's this provides supporters of that party with a psychological edge, albeit small, over those who identify provincially with an opposition party. This factor is sufficient to change the balance of efficaciousness from that which is found when federal partisanship is the independent variable (viz. Liberal identifiers being slightly more efficacious than PC identifiers).

The situation of NDP partisans is similar to that observed in the previous cross-tabulation. There is a tendency toward comparatively low efficaciousness caused by the support profile of that party.

iv) The Prairies

Table 3.14: Efficacy by Ethnicity

# of Eff. Responses	British Isles	Northern European	Eastern European	French, S. European and Non-European
0	33.6	21.9	35.2	35.0
1	27.5- 61.1	33.0- 54.9	27.3- 62.5	33.0- 68.0
2	17.5	26.2	25.2	19.0
3	15.4	14.7	9.8	9.0
4	6.0- 21.4	4.2- 18.9	2.5- 12.3	5.0- 14.0
Mean score	1.3	1.5	1.2	1.2 F=1.5*
	N=226	N=106	N=85	N=75

$\chi^2=26.57$ df=20 P>.05

*not significant at .05 level.

Cross-tabulating political efficacy by ethnicity for prairie respondents, and focusing upon the lowest efficacy categories where the greatest proportion of respondents is found,

one finds that the extent of variation is noteworthy. 54.9% of the northern European fall into the lowest two efficacy categories and, at the other extreme, fully 68% of the the French, southern European and non-European respondents fall into this lowest efficacy range. What is most noteworthy is the finding that prairie respondents of northern European descent, mainly Scandinavians and Germans, tend to be more efficacious than any other group of respondents. And while the difference between those of northern European ancestry and those of British Isles descent is not terribly significant (we must look at the proportion of respondents falling into the highest efficacy categories as well as the lowest), it is worth recalling that, in the national sample population there is a clear if not large tendency for British respondents to be more efficacious than northern European respondents.

We suspect that the explanation for the comparative efficaciousness of northern European respondents lies in the relationship between social class and ethnicity on the prairies. Many prairie residents of Scandinavian origin are descended from immigrants who came to Canada around the turn of the century during the period of free land grants in western Canada. A disproportionate number of people of northern European origin on the prairies remain engaged in agriculture (the proportion of the prairie labour force engaged in agriculture is approximately three times the national figure), prairie farming operations

tending to be larger in scale than is the case in other regions of the country. So, generally, the socio-economic status of northern Europeans tends to be comparatively high.⁵

The level of efficacy amongst eastern Europeans, southern Europeans, French and non-Europeans is, vis-a-vis those of northern European and British Isles origin, comparatively low. Again, the intervening factor is social class with members of these former ethnic groups being less likely to achieve a high level of formal education and consequently less likely to occupy a comparatively high occupation/income niche. A disproportionate number of these respondents are working class people within the prairie urban population.

Table 3.15: Efficacy by Labour Union Membership

# of Eff. Responses	Member of a Union	Not a Member of a Union
0	34.0	27.9
1	42.1 - 76.1	26.1 - 54.0
2	13.4	23.0
3	9.6	15.7
4	0.8 - 10.4	7.3 - 23.0
Mean score	1.0	1.5
	N=72	N=193

$\chi^2=12.76$ df=4 P<.05 V=.22

*significant at .01 level.

Whereas in the national sample population there is a small if clear relationship between political efficacy and union membership, with union members tending to be less efficacious (the cause being the correlation between social class as measured by occupation and likelihood of being part of a unionized work group), among prairie respondents this relationship is

considerably more pronounced. This is understandable if we keep in mind that whereas approximately 35% of the national labour force is unionized, the proportion in the case of the prairie workforce is roughly 25%. Moreover, the prairie economy being skewed toward agriculture and the development of primary resources, "What manufacturing there is tends to be concentrated in processing raw materials or in serving the rural and service population with the kinds of goods that are produced in small plants."⁶ Hence, those workers who are unionized will be less likely to be a part of industries characterized by the presence of large powerful unions. The question of the impact which employment with a marginal industrial enterprise can have upon political efficacy will be pursued further when we examine the union membership/political efficacy relationship, controlling for social class.

The next analysis involves the relationship between political efficacy and federal political identification. One observes a pattern which, in general, obtains across the country, viz. Liberal identifiers tend to be most efficacious, followed by Conservative partisans and finally NDP supporters. In most regions self-designated independents tend to be less efficacious than supporters of either the Liberal or Progressive Conservative parties but more efficacious than NDP partisans.

Table 3.16: Efficacy by Federal Political Identification

# of Eff. Responses	Liberal	PC	NDP	Independent
0	20.3	28.4	49.4	35.0
1	27.9	30.1	58.5	65.0
2	25.7	24.5	25.0	30.0
3	19.5	11.2	14.6	14.9
4	6.6	5.9	7.6	19.2
Mean score	1.6	1.4	.9	1.2
	N=118	N=164	N=47	N=65
$\chi^2=27.99$	df=16	P<.05	V=.13	F=3.9*

*significant at .01 level

What is pointed up is that the hypothesis which holds that identification with a political party which is electorally successful in national elections within a region will be a positive force in nourishing a sense of subjective political competence does not stand up to the test. Perhaps it is the case that identification with a federal party which does well regionally but is unsuccessful nationally gives rise to a sense of frustration which outweighs any satisfaction that may arise from the success of one's party locally. The prairies would appear to be a case in point as the difference in efficaciousness between Liberal and Conservative partisans is not inconsiderable and yet the national Conservative party is the dominant party in the region. And it is not the case that the variation in efficacy between identifiers of the respective parties is product of differences in the socio-economic profiles of the parties support bases.

Although the number of federal NDP partisans identified in this prairie sample population is rather small (N=47), the

pattern is consistent with that found in other regions of the country. NDP identifiers, for reasons of the greater tendency for supporters of this party to be drawn from blue collar strata, tend to be lower in efficaciousness than any other group of partisans or, for that matter, those who express no partisanship.

Before proceeding to the relationship between political efficacy and provincial political identification we must pause to acknowledge a problem. The grouping together of the Atlantic provinces, on the one hand, and the Prairie provinces on the other has obvious drawbacks. For example, the Saskatchewan party system is clearly different from the Alberta party system. And by combining such disparate regions into a single regional category we may be obscuring relationships between efficacy and partisanship within each province and finding instead an overall relationship which is a substantial distortion of that which obtains within one or more of the provinces within the regional grouping. Our only excuse for employing the somewhat gross categories of "Prairie region" and "Atlantic region" is that to take each of these provinces individually, given divisions of the respective independent variables, would result in a serious problem of insufficient sample sizes. Hence, rather than make heavily qualified generalizations with respect to the relationship between partisanship and efficacy within each Atlantic and Prairie province we have chosen to ensure that we have a sample size which allows for fairly safe generalization while at the same time pointing out that inter-provincial variation may be masked

by such combination. Happily, no such problems arise in the case of the B.C., Ontario and Quebec sample populations.

Table 3.17: Efficacy by Provincial Political Identification

# of Eff. Responses	Liberal	PC	NBP	Independents
0	23.8	27.6	39.1	25.4
1	27.6	29.9	27.9	25.7
2	22.7	26.4	14.4	16.3
3	22.6	9.9	14.9	29.0
4	3.4	6.2	3.7	3.7
Mean score	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.6
	N=75	N=204	N=74	N=44

$\chi^2=24.77$ df=16 P>.05

*not significant at .05 level.

Once again Liberal party identifiers, this time provincially, tend to be more efficacious than any other group of partisans. This is the case notwithstanding the electoral bankruptcy of provincial Liberal parties on the prairies.

Regarding prairie respondents who express no provincial partisanship one finds a comparatively high level of efficacy. However, in that this is inconsistent with other findings with respect to the efficaciousness of independents vis-a-vis the partisans of either the Liberal or PC party, our first inclination is to treat the finding with caution due to the small sample size (N=44).

Finally, the gap in efficaciousness between NDP partisans and identifiers of either of the other major political parties is not as large in the case of provincial identification as in that of federal identification. And while one cannot discount the possibility that the sample size is inadequate it

may be that the provincial viability of the NDP in both Saskatchewan and Manitoba compensates somewhat for the fact that NDP partisans tend more often than supporters of the other two parties to be drawn from lower socio-economic strata. However, one cannot overlook the possibility that the greater efficaciousness of provincial NDP partisans, as compared to federal NDP partisans, is accounted for by differences in the support profiles of the national and provincial NDP parties on the prairies (We are alerted to this possibility by the fact that 14% of prairie respondents who express a federal partisanship are NDP identifiers versus 20% of those who express a provincial partisanship.).

v) British Columbia

Table 3.18: Efficacy by Ethnicity

# of Eff. Responses	British Isles	Northern European	Other European and Non-European
0	22.1	25.9	46.0
1	31.4	22.3	20.0
2	22.7	35.2	11.0
3	14.0	8.0	14.0
4	9.8	8.6	9.0
Mean score	1.6	1.5	1.3
	N=188	N=48	N=85

$\chi^2=56.93$ $df=20$ $P<.05$ $V=.21$

*significant at .01 level.

The relationship between political efficacy and ethnicity is reported for reasons of its rather curious nature. Not surprisingly, respondents of British Isles ancestry tend to be highest in efficacy. What is rather more surprising is the skewed distribution in the case of respondents who are of

neither British Isles nor northern European descent. We observe that just under half of these respondents give no efficacious responses, yet a quarter of the respondents fall into the highest two efficacy categories, a proportion virtually identical to that in the case of the British Isles respondents. Unfortunately, the categories that have gone together to form the "Other" ethnicity classification (French, 11; southern European, 11; eastern European, 29; non-European, 34) are in each case insufficient to allow us to know which group or groups is or are responsible for the concentration at the low end of our composite efficacy measure and, moreover, whether the finding that a quarter of respondents of other than British or northern European descent fall into the highest two efficacy categories is true across the ethnic classifications which have been combined into this residual category.

Table 3.19: Efficacy by Union Membership

# of Eff. Responses	Belongs to a Union	Does not belong to a Union
0	30.4	16.6
1	17.8 - 48.2	34.0 - 50.6
2	24.9	17.1
3	23.5	16.9
4	3.4 - 26.9	15.5 - 32.4
Mean score	1.5	1.8
	N=72	N=82

$\chi^2=14.68$ $df=4$ $P<.05$ $V=.31$

*not significant at .05 level.

Recalling that nationally there is a clear correlation between political efficacy and membership in a union, those who do not belong tending to be more efficacious than those

who do, in British Columbia the relationship is unclear. 48.2% of the B.C. union members fall into the lowest two efficacy categories versus 50.6% of non-union B.C. respondents. Nationally, the proportions are 60.2% and 50.9%, respectively. However, at the upper end of the efficacy continuum the B.C. pattern is consistent with the national situation, union members being less likely to fall into these categories.

British Columbia is the province in which the proportion of the workforce which is unionized is the highest in Canada: roughly 45% versus 35% for the national labour force.⁷ Moreover, the British Columbia working class population has a political party, the NDP, which is viable in the region in both national and provincial elections and which faithfully represents the interests of B.C. unions, the key clientele of the party. In other words it may be that B.C. typifies a case in which the regional political culture and the party system deriving therefrom has acted to mitigate the normally clear inverse relationship between membership in a labour union and political efficacy.⁸

Table 3.20: Efficacy by Religion

# of Eff. Responses	Protestant	Catholic	Other Religion	No Religion
0	24.3	42.6	44.0	19.4
1	25.3- 49.6	21.7- 64.3	32.9- 76.9	32.6- 52.0
2	24.3	22.6	13.0	18.5
3	13.5	6.4	8.0	19.2
4	12.6- 26.1	6.8- 13.2	2.1- 10.1	10.3- 29.5
Mean score	1.6	1.1	0.9	1.7
	N=160	N=49	N=46	N=66
$\chi^2=23.50$	df=12	$F<.05$	$V=.16$	$F=5.8^*$
*significant at .01 level.				

Although the number of respondents falling into the Catholic, Other Religion and No Religion categories is in each case smaller than we would wish it is nonetheless evident that Protestant respondents and those who profess to adhere to no religious organization tend to be more efficacious than Catholic respondents and those who belong to other denominations. Clearly then, in B.C. groups other than the dominant British/Protestant majority feel less a part of the mainstream of the political system.

Table 3.21: Efficacy by Federal Political Identification

# of Efficacy Responses	Liberal	PC	NDP
0	20.6	25.7	42.5
1	25.6 - 46.2	24.4 - 50.1	24.1 - 66.6
2	22.2	24.3	21.9
3	15.9 - 31.6	21.8 - 25.7	7.6 - 11.4
4	15.7	3.9	3.8
Mean score	1.8	1.5	1.1
	N=85	N=58	N=68
$\chi^2=25.84$	df=16	F=.05	V=.15

*significant at .01 level.

British Columbia is a province in which, over the last few federal elections, each of three major political parties has been competitive. This being the case one might find it somewhat surprising that the level of efficacy of those who identify with the federal NDP is so low. For while recognising that the socio-economic profile of NDP support is in large measure responsible for the comparatively low level of efficacy which is observed, one might have suspected that the fact that regionally one's political party is viable would compensate to some degree for the low sense of subjective competence

engendered by the experience of social class. In as much as the data provides us with no support for this hypothesis we must abandon it and conclude that the regional party system, itself a function of the regional and national political cultures, is not a significant determinant of political efficacy.

Table 3.22: Efficacy by Provincial Political Identification

# of Eff. Responses	NDP	Social Credit	Liberal and PC Parties
0	38.7	11.8	32.0
1	23.6 - 62.3	28.5 - 40.3	18.0 - 50.0
2	19.7	25.2	30.0
3	10.0 - 18.0	24.9 - 35.5	12.0 - 21.0
4	8.0	9.6	9.0
Mean score	1.2	1.9	1.5
	N=104	N=81	N=66
$\chi^2=34.34$	df=16	P<.05	V=.18

*significant at .01 level.

Looking at the relationship between political efficacy and provincial political identification one finds that Social Credit partisans tend clearly to be our most efficacious respondents. And as in previous instances where we have cross-tabulated political efficacy with partisanship the crucial factor is the social class profile of any group of partisans. Partisanship ought to be viewed as an intervening variable coming between social class and subjective political competence. This being the case it comes as no surprise that those who identify with the provincial NDP in British Columbia are considerably less likely to be efficacious than Social Credit party identifiers and somewhat less likely to be efficacious than those who

identify with either the provincial Liberal or Conservative parties.

It is however true that members of labour unions in B.C. tend to be only marginally less likely than non-union members to be efficacious. In order to accommodate this with the fact that NDP partisans in B.C. are considerably less likely to be efficacious than partisans of either the Liberal or Conservative parties, federally, and the Social Credit party provincially one might argue that the discrepancy arises from the fact that a large proportion of the unionized labour force in B.C. is either white-collar or employed in skilled trades which pay well and allow for comparative latitude in worker task definition.

vi) Region and Political Efficacy

The two central works on the relationship between political efficacy and region in Canada are Simeon and Elkin's article entitled, "Regional Political Cultures in Canada",⁹ and Schwartz's book, Politics and Territory¹⁰. Rather than replicating the approaches taken by Simeon and Elkins and Schwartz, respectively, we have chosen to continue with our four-item additive efficacy index in order to determine whether we can add anything new to the findings of regional variation reported by the previous works.

With a four-item efficacy scale as the dependent

variable¹¹ Simeon and Elkin find that the level of efficacy is lowest amongst Atlantic Canadians, French-speaking Quebecers and francophones living outside of Quebec (roughly 3 of 5 respondents ranking low on the efficacy scale), higher among prairie respondents and English-speaking Quebecers (approximately 4 of 10 respondents ranking low on the scale), and highest among British Columbians and Ontario respondents (1 of 4 and 1 of 3 respondents ranking low on the efficacy scale in the respective provinces). Controlling for subjective class identification the impact of region persists. For example, amongst working class identifiers the proportion ranking low on the efficacy scale is 26% in B.C., marginally more than 40% in Ontario and Manitoba, 50% to 60% amongst Alberta, Saskatchewan and English-speaking Quebec respondents, and over 60% in Atlantic Canada and among French-speaking Quebecers. Moreover, Simeon and Elkins report that:

...class differences varied considerably from province to province. In B.C., only four percentage points separate the proportion of working- and middle-class individuals low on efficacy. By contrast, in Alberta the gap is 26 points, in Ontario, 12, in Nova Scotia, 24, among the Quebec French, 12, and so on.¹²

A control for education mitigates but does not eliminate the influence of region:

In every educational category, and most especially in the middle ones, provincial differences persist. At the lower and upper ends of the scale there seems to be somewhat of a convergence, but regional differences are still noticeable even there.¹³

Like Simeon and Elkins, Schwartz found that

education does not wipe out the effect which region has upon political efficacy. As further evidence of the significance of region Schwartz offers her findings of "regional differences in the ways in which educational groups were polarized, and in the items producing the greatest amount of polarization."¹⁴ Schwartz finds that polarization between education cohorts is greatest in Quebec, followed by, in descending order, British Columbia, Atlantic Canada, Ontario and the Prairies. And in respect of the response items on which there is greatest polarization in the several regions, in British Columbia "Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things" and "People like me don't have any say about what the government does" produced the greatest polarization, with the latter response item causing the greatest division in Ontario and Atlantic Canada. In Quebec, the measure reading, "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on", produced the greatest polarization between education groups.¹⁵

Finally, the authors of Political Choice in Canada report a breakdown for each efficacy measure by province. Their table is here adapted in order to show clearly how the inter-regional variation in efficacy differs from measure

to measure.

Table 3.23: Percent of Respondents Disagreeing with Five "Low Efficacy" Statements about Politics and Government

	Least eff. province	Most eff. province	The low proportion as a percentage of the high proportion
So many other people vote in elections that it doesn't matter very much whether I vote or not.	77 (Que.)	93 (B.C.)	.83
I don't think that the gov't cares much what people like me think.	41 (Nfld.)	65 (Sask.)	.63
People like me don't have any say about what the gov't does.	29 (Nfld.)	60 (B.C.)	.48
Generally, those elected to Parl. soon lose touch with the people.	20 (Nfld.)	44 (N.S.)	.45
Sometimes politics and gov't seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.	12 (Nfld.)	43 (B.C.)	.28

Adapted from Clarke, et al., Political Choice in Canada, 32.

Whereas the variation between regions is not great in the case of perception of whether or not it makes a difference whether one votes, the inter-regional differences are considerable in the case of each of the other measures, being greatest in the case of the "Politics is too complicated." measure.

The present analysis serves to corroborate these previous findings of regional variation in political efficacy. Of the regionally-controlled relationships which have been examined in this chapter three are especially interesting. The first is the relationship between sex and political efficacy

in the province of Quebec. We found that the difference between the sexes is considerably larger than is the case with the national sample population or any other region of the country. Second, while union membership is negatively correlated with political efficacy in the case of the national sample population, the strength of this relationship is greater amongst prairie respondents. Third, the difference in efficaciousness between union members and respondents who do not belong to a union is considerably smaller in B.C. than in the country as a whole.

Finally, we looked at the relationship between both federal and provincial political identification and political efficacy within each region. And we found that, generally, the electoral viability of the party with which one identifies adds little if anything to our ability to predict efficacy. Rather, the social class bases of support upon which a party draws is the important factor.

Footnotes

Chapter 3

1. Simeon and Elkins, "Regional Political Cultures in Canada", CJPS, 1974.
2. Useful treatments of modernization in Québec include, G. Gagnon et L. Martin (eds.), Québec 1960-1980: La crise du développement (Editions Hurtubise, Montréal, 1973); and G. Lebel, Horizon 1980: Une étude sur l'évolution de l'économie du Québec de 1946 à 1968 et sur ses perspectives d'avenir (Ministère de l'industrie et du commerce, Québec, 1970). The former has primarily a sociological focus while the latter involves an economic perspective. See also G. Rocher, Le Québec en mutation (Editions Hurtubise, Montréal, 1973).
3. For a discussion of Social Credit party support in the province of Quebec see M. Pinard, "One-Party Dominance and Third Parties", CJEPS 33(August, 1967); and M. Stein, "Le Crédit social dans la province du Québec: sommaire et développements", CJPS 6(December, 1973).
4. In an article by N.H. Chi entitled "Class Voting in Canadian Politics", the author demonstrates that while "Canadian voters do not vote along class lines, the Canadian party system has a definite class-differentiated structure." Using data from the 1965 National election study Chi finds the following breakdown of intra-party support for each of the national political parties.

Party	Professional 7%	Owner/ Manager	Sales 5	Clerical & other wh-collar 10	Skilled worker 29	Unskilled worker 14	Farmer 20
PC	7%	14	5	10	29	14	20
Lib	7	12	3	10	34	17	16
NDP	4	8	1	10	52	15	10
SC	2	10	4	10	32	23	19

PK.001 Table adapted from table 1, p.229 in Kruhlak, et al., The Canadian Political Process.

Combining the skilled and unskilled worker categories one finds that, in 1965, 43% of PC support, 51% of Liberal support and 67% of NDP support was accounted for by blue collar workers.

5. In his book entitled Agrarian Socialism (Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1950), S.M. Lipset observes that Scandinavians, who constitute approximately 10 per cent of the prairie population, historically have been the social equals of those of British descent. He documents the over-representation of those of Scandinavian descent within the leadership of

the CCF, the only other ethnic group to be over-represented being the British. See Agrarian Socialism, 184-185.

6. Phillips, Regional Disparities (Toronto, 1978), 102.
7. Statistics Canada does not report a regional breakdown for the proportion of the labour force which is unionized. However, one can compare the figure for Canada as a whole with that reported by the BC Department of Labour. Though the data is not as recent as one would wish it substantiates the point we have made.

Organised labour as a percentage of total paid workers.

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Canada	26.8	27.8
BC	42.0	41.8

8. For a treatment of the relationship between political culture and the party system in British Columbia see M. Robin, "British Columbia: The Politics of Class Conflict", in M. Robin(ed.), Canadian Provincial Politics: The Party Systems of the Ten Provinces (Prentice-Hall, Toronto, 1972).
9. Simeon and Elkins, "Regional Political Cultures in Canada", CJPS, 1974.
10. Schwartz, Politics and Territory (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 1974), especially pages 225-232.
11. The items that go together to form their scale are:
 - a) What do you think you could do if the federal government were considering a law which you felt to be unfair or wrong?(Dichotomized between those who said "nothing" or "don't know" and the rest.
 - b) People like me don't have any say about what the government does. Agree/disagree.
 - c) Sometimes government and politics seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on. Agree/disagree.
 - d) How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think? A good deal, some, or not very much? Dichotomised between "not very much" and the two other responses.
12. Simeon and Elkins, "Regional Political Cultures in Canada", CJPS, 1974, 417.
13. Ibid., 417.
14. Schwartz, Politics and Territory, 231.
15. Ibid., 231.

Chapter 4



Controlling for Education

Although we nowise claim the equivalence of education with social class we would argue that the former has clear implications for the latter. Social classes are distinguished from one another by characteristic modes of thought. Obviously we are not arguing that pronounced discontinuities in cognition and disposition must be present if we are to speak of classes. Rather, the existence of classes within a modern liberal society primarily has lifestyle and attitudinal implications which are matters of degree.¹ For example, the greater prevalence of authoritarian/intolerant dispositions among those of low educational attainment vis-à-vis their more educated brethren is an instance of the relationship between attitudes and class experience.² This does not imply a disregard of the inter-connection between the components of the social class experience. It is indisputable that the likelihood that one will have the wherewithal and the inclination to undergo higher education will be largely dependent upon one's family income, the role models to which one is exposed and, generally, the material/psychological ambience within which one grows up. However, given our concern with subjective political competence, a concept inter-twined with self-esteem and a more general sense of being able to influence one's environment, we feel that education, because of its clear cognitive and dispositional implications and because it is a prime causal agent in the determination of occupation and income (other measures with social class implications) is for our purposes a useful control measure.³

The subsequent analysis will focus upon four controlled relationships: Political efficacy by sex, union membership, federal political identification and size of the community in which one resides, respectively. These are the only instances where we find noteworthy variations from the uncontrolled relationships.

Table 4.1: Efficacy by Sex

Grade School Graduation or Less

# of Eff. Responses	Male	Female	
0	49.1 - 75.5	48.3 - 76.5	
1	26.4	28.2	
2	12.1	12.7	
3	5.9 - 12.4	7.8 - 10.8	
4	6.5	3.0	
Mean score	.9	.9	F=14.5*
	N=306	N=264	

$$x^2=4.52 \quad df=4 \quad P>.05$$

Secondary School Graduation or Less

# of Eff. Responses	Male	Female	
0	31.8 - 59.8	35.5 - 62.9	
1	28.0	27.4	
2	18.8	19.8	
3	13.9 - 21.5	11.8 - 17.3	
4	7.6	5.5	
Mean score	1.4	1.2	F=14.5*
	N=772	N=876	

$$x^2=6.02 \quad df=4 \quad P>.05$$

At Least Some Post-Secondary Education

# of Eff. Responses	Male	Female	
0	11.0 - 33.2	15.9 - 39.6	
1	22.2	23.7	
2	22.1	25.6	
3	30.3 - 44.7	23.1 - 34.8	
4	14.4	11.7	
Mean score	2.2	1.9	F=14.5*
	N=417	N=315	

$$x^2=8.9 \quad df=4 \quad P>.05$$

*significant at .01 level.

Recall that in the case of the uncontrolled relationship males tended to be somewhat more efficacious than females. However, when one controls for education the difference in political efficacy between males and females is inconsiderable in the case of those with secondary school graduation or less, but is quite evident amongst those with at least some post-secondary education.

In as much as differences between males and females in political participation become progressively smaller as the education ladder is ascended, and given the positive correlation between subjective political competence and participation, one might have anticipated that a similar narrowing of the gap in efficacy separating males from females would occur as one moves from the lowest to the highest education cohort. However, it must be kept in mind that comparatively "low cost" election-oriented acts generally constitute the political participation measure in surveys which document the reduction of a difference in participation between males and females as education increases. And it is clearly the case that if "high cost" participatory measures are employed (what Milbrath designates as gladiatorial behavior) the difference between males and females in political participation does not evaporate amongst those at the highest education level, i.e. at the level of having at least some post-secondary education. This being the case a plausible argument can be made that the explanation for the difference between male and female efficaciousness at the highest education

level, and the absence of such a difference at lower education levels, is that highly-educated females experience greater frustration deriving from a fuller awareness of their de facto inferiority vis-à-vis men with respect to their relationship to the political system. An awareness of distance between one's resources (knowledge, communication skills, insight, etc.) and the opportunities available to females, this pessimism regarding woman's place in the political system deriving in large measure from the indisputable fact that at the upper reaches of the system (among elected officials at any level) males are clearly over-represented.

Table 4.2: Efficacy by Union Membership

Grade School Graduation or Less

# of Eff. Responses	Union Member	Not a Union Member
0	48.2	46.9
1	25.0- 73.2	24.3- 71.2
2	13.9	14.2
3	6.3	8.3
4	6.5- 12.8	6.3- 14.6
Mean score	1.0	1.0
	N=94	N=134

$$x^2 = .33 \quad df=4 \quad P > .05$$

Secondary School Graduation or Less

# of Eff. Responses	Union Member	Not a Union Member
0	33.3	29.3
1	32.2- 65.5	26.3- 55.6
2	14.9	22.6
3	13.1	14.5
4	6.5- 19.6	7.3- 21.8
Mean score	1.3	1.4
	N=348	N=567

$$x^2 = 10.56 \quad df=4 \quad P < .05 \quad V = .11$$

At Least Some Post-Secondary Schooling

<u># of Eff. Responses</u>	<u>Union Member</u>		<u>Not a Union Member</u>	
0	17.3		11.0	
1	23.8	41.1	23.1	34.1
2	25.7		21.9	
3	24.3		29.2	
4	8.9	8.9	14.9	44.1
Mean score	1.8		2.1	F=11.8*
	N=157		N=315	

$$\chi^2 = 7.69 \quad df = 4 \quad P > .05$$

*significant at .01 level.

The application of a control for education eliminates the relationship between efficacy and union membership only amongst those with the lowest educational attainment, moderating the relationship in the case of the middle education cohort. One is left to conclude that the difference in efficacy between union members and people who do not belong to a union, education held constant, is a product of differences in occupation which are masked by our gross classifications. In other words, the fact that there remains a clear relationship between efficacy and membership in a union within the highest education cohort is symptomatic of the fact that there are differences between those occupations which tend to be unionized and those which tend not to be. The difficulty with any manageable rendering of education or occupation as a control variable is that intra-division variation is obscured. For it is probable that individuals with bachelor, professional or graduate degrees are disproportionately represented in that group

within the highest education cohort which is not unionized. Most professionals will fall into this group while the unionized section of the highest education level population will be disproportionately constituted of community college graduates and persons who failed to complete their university education. In brief, the range of class variation within an education cohort becomes larger as we move from the lowest to the highest level of education, with evident implications for the relationship between subjective political competence and union membership.

In this next controlled cross-tabulation, political efficacy by federal political identification by education, only the "some secondary school to secondary school graduation", and "at least some post-secondary school" categories are included. This is due to the fact that the number of NDP partisans is, in the case of the "grade school graduation or less" cohort, too small to allow for confident generalization.

Table 4.3: Efficacy by Federal Political Identification

<u>Some Secondary School or Secondary School Graduation</u>								
<u># of Eff. Responses</u>	<u>Liberal</u>		<u>PC</u>		<u>NDP</u>		<u>Independent</u>	
0	28.4	56.5	29.9	60.8	44.2	72.5	34.4	60.0
1	28.1		30.9		28.3		25.6	
2	18.8		23.0		18.4		19.4	
3	15.7		12.6		4.9		14.5	
4	9.0	24.7	3.6	16.2	4.2	9.1	6.0	20.5
Mean score	1.5		1.3		1.0		1.3	F=6.7* σ
	N=550		N=355		N=184		N=256	
$\chi^2=47.85$	df=16	P<.001		V=.09				

At Least Some Post-Secondary Schooling

# of Eff. Responses	Liberal	PC	NDP	Independent
0	13.6	11.6	10.4	15.9
1	21.1- 34.7	19.4- 31.0	26.2- 36.6	23.1- 39.0
2	22.3	19.7	28.2	28.1
3	27.3	32.2	28.2	25.6
4	15.8- 43.1	17.1- 49.3	7.0- 35.2	7.3- 32.9
Mean score	2.1	2.2	2.0	1.9
	N=299	N=130	N=68	N=140

$$x^2=19.14 \quad df=16 \quad P>.05$$

*significant at .01 level.

Perhaps the most interesting finding to emerge from the above controlled analysis is that even with education held constant NDP partisans tend to be less efficacious than those who identify with either the Liberal or Conservative parties. This would seem to indicate that, notwithstanding a similarity in education to identifiers of other political parties, NDP respondents tend to differ in some way which bears upon values and, consequently, upon dispositions toward political authority. However, we do observe that the gap between NDP identifiers and supporters of the other two political parties narrows as education increases. And so among those with at least some post-secondary education NDP identifiers, while still tending to be somewhat less efficacious than other partisans, are much closer to the efficacy level of Liberal and Conservative party supporters than is the case in either the uncontrolled situation or where the level of education is lower.

The final analysis involves the relationship between efficacy and the size of one's community of residence, with

education controlled for.

Table 4.4: Efficacy by Size of Community of Residence

Some Secondary School or Secondary School Graduation

# of Eff. Responses	Large City 100,000 +	Small City 10,000-100,000	Town 1,000-10,000	Village and Rural 1,000 -
0	33.7	30.0	41.3	33.9
1	27.9- 61.6	21.9- 51.9	23.9- 65.2	31.9- 65.8
2	20.3	24.4	17.9	13.7
3	12.7- 18.0	12.5- 21.6	11.7- 16.9	13.5- 20.6
4	5.3	11.1	5.2	7.1
Mean score	1.3	1.5	1.2	1.3 F=4.6*
	N=946	N=234	N=111	N=357
$\chi^2=28.66$	df=12	P<.05	V=.08	

At Least Some Post-Secondary Schooling

# of Eff. Responses	Large City 100,000 +	Small City 10,000-100,000	Town 1,000-10,000	Village and Rural 1,000 -
0	14.4	14.8	3.5	11.9
1	24.0- 38.4	24.3- 39.1	12.3- 15.8	22.6- 34.5
2	21.9	21.7	29.0	30.4
3	26.4- 39.7	24.8- 39.2	52.3- 55.3	16.1- 35.1
4	13.3	14.4	3.0	19.0
Mean score	2.0	2.0	2.4	2.1 F=4.6*
	N=487	N=82	N=66	N=97
$\chi^2=40.44$	df=12	P<.001	V=.14	

*significant at .01 level.

Note: We have not included the cross-tabulation for those with only grade school graduation or less due to the small number of respondents falling into the small city and town categories.

Recall that in the absence of a control for education there is no relationship between political efficacy and size of community of residence, save for a tendency for the inhabitants of villages and rural areas to be slightly less efficacious than other respondents. Controlling for education one unearths a rather intriguing finding.

Among respondents with at least some post-secondary

education there is a clear tendency for those who reside in towns to be more efficacious than any other group of respondents. It may be that this is due to the fact that this group is largely constituted of local worthies, i.e. citizens who, because of their role in the community (eg. doctor, lawyer, businessman, teacher, etc.) and the fact that the size of the community is such that anonymity is avoided are part of an influential stratum within the town. Towns are of a size favourable to conditions supportive of the self-esteem of an educated person who holds a responsible position in the community. For the anonymity of the more populous community is avoided while at the same time the community is large enough to provide one with a sense of being within the mainstream of society. In contrast to town residence, it is conceivable that rural residence may contribute to a sense of being peripheral, this being accompanied by resentment toward what are perceived as the power centres of the socio-political system. However, this is but speculation.⁴

Summary

Using education as the control measure one finds that most of the relationships reported in the bivariate analysis chapter remain fairly constant across education cohorts. There are four exceptions to this general rule, certain of which must be approached with caution due to a failure to meet the test of significance ($P < .05$).

Briefly, and keeping in mind the above caveat, we found the following:

- i) The positive relationship between being male and political efficaciousness appears to exist only amongst the most highly educated stratum of the population.
- ii) The negative relationship between membership in a union and political efficacy increases in strength as education is increased.
- iii) Those who federally identify with the NDP tend to be less efficacious than those who identify with either of the two major political parties. However, this tendency becomes weaker amongst the most highly educated.
- iv) Amongst the most highly educated stratum of the population town-dwellers tend, by a considerable margin, to be more efficacious than any other group of respondents.

Footnotes

Chapter 4:

1. T. Bottomore's, Classes in Modern Society (Pantheon, New York, 1966), provides a general discussion of social class in Western democracies. See also P. Blumberg (ed.), The Impact of Social Class (Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1972), for several essays dealing with the attitudinal dimension of social class, and chapter iv entitled "Cultural Perspectives of Social Class", in T. Lasswell, Class and Stratum (Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, 1965).
2. See S.M. Lipset, Political Man (Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1960), 97-130, for a discussion of working-class authoritarianism. See also H. McCloskey, "Conservatism and Personality", APSR 52(March, 1958), 27-45.
3. For an excellent treatment of the relationship between education, occupation, income and attitudes see J.A. Brittain, The Inheritance of Economic Status (Washington, 1977).
4. In his discussion of the relationship between political participation and size of community in Canada, Mishler observes that there exist two competing theories in respect of the psychological and behavioral consequences of the latter factor. He summarizes the respective schools of thought thusly:

One theory, the urbanization thesis, describes cities as the cultural, commercial, and political centres of society, providing their residents greater opportunities and stronger motivation for action than are characteristic of rural areas. Urban environments, it is argued, facilitate mass communication, provide a wider range of educational opportunities, increase ethnic and religious integration, and enhance both the scope and sophistication of individual attitudes. Rural environments, according to this view, are largely peripheral to the political system. They are devoid of cultural stimulation and political opportunity and characterized by parochial political values.

...An opposing view celebrates the virtues of rural life (eg. "the greater sense of community shared by residents of rural areas") and indicts the cities for destroying the human spirit and promoting alienation.

See Mishler, Political Participation in Canada, (Macmillan, Toronto, 1979), 104-105.

Chapter 5

On the Bi-Dimensionality of Political Efficacy

Intuitively, one suspects that two distinct if inter-related dimensions are tapped by the four standard efficacy measures which we have combined to form an additive index.

On the one hand, the following two items appear to probe a respondent's perception of the responsiveness of government:

- Q21a. Generally, those elected to Parliament soon lose touch with the people.
- Q21b. I don't think that the government cares much what people like me think.

On the other hand these next two measures seem to relate more closely to a respondent's subjective political competence, i.e. confidence regarding his ability to influence the political system:

- Q21c. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.
- Q21d. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.

Of course intuition and seeming plausibility do not provide a sufficient justification for the creation of two separate efficacy indices, one measuring perception of the responsiveness of government and the other subjective political competence. Consequently we have carried out a principal components factor analysis in order to determine whether there is empirical support for our hypothesis regarding the bi-dimensionality of political efficacy.

So as not to sacrifice precision we have retained the original response categories, strongly agree, agree, disagree, and disagree, for each of the four political efficacy measures.

The varimax rotated factor matrix which we obtain is as follows:

	<u>Factor 1</u>	<u>Factor 2</u>
Q21a	.828	-.006
Q21b	.767	.261
Q21c	.005	.907
Q21d	.458	.593

We observe that the factor loadings are such that Q21a and Q21b, the items which we previously described as perception of the responsiveness of government measures, both load highly on the first factor, and Q21c and Q21d, which we designated as subjective political competence measures, both load highly on the second factor. Additionally, we find that the factor loadings of Q21d, in the case of the first factor, and Q21b, in the case of the second factor, are sufficiently great that we are alerted to the existence of some degree of overlap between the two dimensions of efficacy. Hence, we have chosen to incorporate the reality of the inter-relatedness of the four efficacy items into both our index of perception of the responsiveness of government and that of subjective political competence by taking into consideration the factor score coefficients. These are as follows:

	<u>Factor 1</u>	<u>Factor 2</u>
Q21a	.636	-.246
Q21b	.512	.016
Q21c	-.260	.829
Q21d	.179	.409

Utilising the coefficient values in the case of factor 1 we arrive at our composite measure of the perception of the responsiveness of government. Similarly, the values obtained in the case

of the second factor are used in the creation of our index of subjective political competence.

After obtaining a frequency distribution for each of the above measure certain contiguous categories were combined in order to obtain the following distributions. An explanation of how the cutting points were arrived at is found in Appendix 'A'.

Perception of the Responsiveness of Government

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Absolute Frequency</u>	<u>Relative Frequency*</u>	<u>Cumulative Freq</u>
0	1327	40.3	40.3
1	591	18.0	58.3
2	545	16.6	74.9
3	827	25.1	100.0

Subjective Citizen Competence

0	1117	33.9	33.9
1	690	21.0	54.9
2	568	17.3	72.2
3	915	27.8	100.0

*Identical to the adjusted frequency.

The subsequent analysis includes only those cases in which the impact of the independent variable upon the two efficacy measures is dissimilar in some noteworthy respect.

Table 5.1: Perception of the Responsiveness of Gov't by Region

<u>Perception of Government Responsiveness</u>	<u>Atlantic</u>	<u>Quebec</u>	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>Prairies</u>	<u>BC</u>
0	43.0	44.3	35.8	42.4	40.4
1	18.0	18.5	17.3	16.4	21.0
2	16.0	13.0	19.9	17.6	13.1
3	23.1	24.2	27.0	23.5	25.5
	N=315	N=879	N=1198	N=540	N=357
$\chi^2=34.64$	df=12	$P<.001$	$V=.06$		

Table 5.2: Subjective Political Competence by Region

Subjective Citizen Competence	Atlantic	Quebec	Ontario	Prairies	BC
0	40.0	36.4	30.6	35.6	31.4
1	20.2	17.3	22.3	23.2	23.0
2	18.6	14.0	18.8	20.1	14.6
3	21.3	32.4	28.3	21.0	31.0
	N=315	N=879	N=1198	N=540	N=357
$\chi^2=52.39$	df=12	$P<.001$	$V=.07$		

One observes that region is related differently to the two efficacy measures. In the case of perception of the responsiveness of government there is very little variation in efficacy between regions, aside from the slight tendency for Ontario residents to be more efficacious. However, when subjective citizen competence is the dependent variable the pattern of inter-regional variation is rather different. In this latter instance one observes that Atlantic Canadians are the least efficacious of our respondents, with residents of British Columbia and Ontario being the most efficacious.

Although the inter-regional variation is in neither the case of perceived responsiveness nor subjective competence very large, the data is suggestive in two important respects. First, notwithstanding the inter-relatedness of the four efficacy measures which we have used in the creation of our two indices (a fact taken into account in the building of the two measures) there are differences between subjective competence and perception of government responsiveness with respect to both cause and implication. The fact that the pattern of inter-regional variation differs depending upon which efficacy measure

is employed alerts us to the existence of these differences. Second and corollary to this first tentative conclusion is our belief that the determining influence of both broad norms of the political culture as well as short-term forces is greater upon perception of government responsiveness than upon subjective political competence, while this latter is influenced to a greater degree by more individual-specific socializing experience (more generally, the particular social class ambience in which one has been nurtured). This latter hypothesis will be developed more fully throughout the remainder of the analysis.

The next independent variable is sex. And here we observe a most interesting difference between our two dependent measures in the pattern of efficacy found to obtain.

Table 5.3: Perception of Government Responsiveness by Sex

Perception of Government Responsiveness	Male	Female
0	41.8	38.9
1	20.0	16.0
2	15.2	17.9
3	23.1	27.2
	N=1639	N=1650
$\chi^2=18.44$	df=3	P<.001
		V=.07

Table 5.4: Subjective Citizen Competence by Sex

Subjective Citizen Competence	Male	Female
0	32.4	35.4
1	18.0	23.9
2	19.5	15.0
3	30.0	25.6
	N=1639	N=1650
$\chi^2=31.6$	df=3	P<.001
		V=.10

What is intriguing about the comparison between the above two tables is less a difference in the strength of the relationships found, the strength of the correlation being in neither case very great, than the difference in the direction of the relationships. When perception of government responsiveness is the dependent variable one observes that females are somewhat more likely to have a high opinion of the responsiveness of government than are males. However, when subjective citizen competence is the dependent factor the direction of the relationship is reversed, with males being slightly more likely than females to consider that they can make an impact upon the political system.

Perhaps what we are observing is a somewhat greater proclivity for males to be cynical about those who occupy governmental office, while simultaneously being more likely than females to believe that they possess an understanding of and, potentially, the capacity to play an effective part in the political process. One is tempted to ascribe the greater tendency for males to be subjectively competent to the higher educational attainment of males. However, we earlier reported that among males and females with at least some post-secondary education the greater efficaciousness of males persists. Hence, we are inclined to think that differences in male versus female role socialization, even in this age of progressively greater equality between the sexes, account for the variation in efficaciousness.

The next analysis involves occupation as the independent

variable.

Table 5.5: Perception of Government Responsiveness by Occupation

Perception of Government Responsiveness	Upper White Collar	Lower White Collar	Blue Collar
0	28.0	39.5	44.4
1	31.3	18.9	16.3
2	13.5	19.4	16.6
3	27.2	22.3	22.6
	N=440	N=466	N=867

$\chi^2=60.74$ $df=6$ $P<.05$ $\text{Gamma} = -.11$

Table 5.6: Subjective Citizen Competence by Occupation

Subjective Citizen Competence	Upper White Collar	Lower White Collar	Blue Collar
0	15.1	32.7	37.1
1	19.6	19.2	20.8
2	23.4	19.9	17.5
3	41.9	28.3	24.6
	N=440	N=466	N=867

$\chi^2=82.99$ $df=6$ $P<.05$ $\text{Gamma} = -.25$

In both cases the level of efficacy of lower white collar workers is much closer to that of blue collar workers than upper white collar respondents. Moreover, the relationship between occupation and both subjective political competence and perception of government responsiveness is apparent, upper white collar workers being clearly more likely to be efficacious than other respondents and lower white collar workers being marginally more efficacious than blue collar workers. More important to the present analysis is the finding that the relationship between efficacy and occupation is considerably more pronounced in the case of subjective political competence than in that of perception of the responsiveness of government.

The gamma values are $-.25$ and $.11$, respectively.

That occupation more effectively differentiates between respondents with respect to their subjective political competence is clear. It may be that this is accounted for by the considerable influence which the experience of social class has upon one's sense of being able to impact upon the environment. Arguably, the intervening factor is self-esteem.¹ Experience within the family, school and other social circumstances contributes more or less to the development of a sense that one is important in a larger scheme of things, and that what one thinks and does can make a difference upon the course of events. We are arguing that the efficacy measures which have as their primary point of reference the individual, rather than some aspect of the environment (eg. government), are more likely to be determined by individual-specific socializing experiences rather than experiences and norms of the political culture which are of wider currency. Conversely, measures which have as their fundamental point of reference such a feature of the political system as the authorities (whether presented in the guise of "government", "public officials", MP's, etc.) are more likely to elicit a response which is informed by broad cultural norms which the individual respondent shares with most others.

When either income or education is substituted for occupation as the independent variable one again finds that the correlation with subjective citizen competence is considerably

higher than is the case where perception of government responsiveness is the dependent measure. The comments appertaining to the case of occupation by the two efficacy measures likewise obtain in these following instances.

Table 5.7: Perception of Government Responsiveness by Family Income

Perception of Government Responsiveness	Lowest Third of Respondents	Middle Third of Respondents	Highest Third of Respondents
0	47.6	41.2	33.1
1	14.2	15.6	25.6
2	14.6	18.8	16.0
3	23.6	24.5	25.3
	N=1020	N=939	N=989

$$x^2=73.18 \quad df=6 \quad P<.001 \quad \text{Gamma}=.10$$

Table 5.8: Subjective Citizen Competence by Family Income

Subjective Citizen Competence	Lowest Third of Respondents	Middle Third of Respondents	Highest Third of Respondents
0	44.2	34.9	23.8
1	19.4	20.0	23.7
2	11.8	19.8	20.6
3	24.6	25.2	31.9
	N=1020	N=939	N=989

$$x^2=106.29 \quad df=6 \quad P<.001 \quad \text{Gamma}=.19$$

Table 5.9: Perception of Government Responsiveness by Education

Perception of Government Responsiveness	Grade School Grad. or Less	Secondary Sch. Grad. or Less	At Least Some Post-Sec. Schooling
0	48.3	41.8	30.5
1	9.3	17.5	26.3
2	15.3	17.8	15.0
3	27.1	23.0	28.3
	N=681	N=1807	N=797

$$x^2=107.03 \quad df=9 \quad P<.001 \quad \text{Gamma}=.10$$

Table 5.10: Subjective Citizen Competence by Education

Subjective Citizen Competence	Grade School Grad. or Less	Secondary Sch. Grad. or Less	At Least Some Post-Sec. Schooling
0	51.0	36.2	14.6
1	15.7	23.7	19.4
2	9.7	17.4	23.3
3	23.6	22.8	42.8
	N=681	N=1807	N=797

$$x^2=295.51 \quad df=9 \quad P<.001 \quad \text{Gamma}=.33$$

The final independent variable which impacts differently upon perception of government responsiveness than upon subjective political competence is federal political affiliation. This last comparison is reported only because of the intriguing difference between the level of perceived government responsiveness, on the one hand, and that of subjective political competence, on the other, among self-designated independents and non-partisans.

Table 5.11: Perception of the Responsiveness of Government by Federal Party Identification

Perception of Government Responsiveness	Independent	Liberal	PC	NDP	Other
0	45.1	34.8	37.4	48.5	51.3
1	16.4	19.9	21.1	13.3	18.2
2	13.6	18.6	19.2	17.9	11.6
3	24.9	26.7	22.3	20.4	18.9
	N=550	N=1161	N=622	N=321	N=97

$$x^2=46.28 \quad df=12 \quad P<.001 \quad V=.07$$

Table 5.12: Subjective Citizen Competence by Federal Party Identification

Subjective Citizen Competence	Independent	Liberal	PC	NDP	Other
0	32.8	30.5	33.1	43.2	41.9
1	17.4	23.0	25.3	16.7	20.2
2	17.9	18.5	16.7	19.8	13.9
3	31.9	28.0	24.9	20.3	24.0
	N=550	N=1161	N=622	N=321	N=97

$$x^2=41.51 \quad df=12 \quad P<.001 \quad V=.07$$

With respect to perception of government responsiveness there is a clear tendency for independents to be less efficacious than Liberal partisans, and a somewhat less pronounced tendency for them to be less confident of the responsiveness of government than are PC identifiers. However, the case of subjective citizen competence is rather different. Here one finds that independent respondents are no less efficacious than Liberal party supporters and, indeed, tend to be more efficacious than partisans of the PC party. This suggests that independents tend more often than partisans to possess a low opinion of the responsiveness of the political system and the authorities who constitute the human embodiment of that system, while simultaneously feeling that they are competent to effect (perhaps singly, perhaps in combination with others) political change. In other words, it is among independents that we are most likely to encounter individuals within whom are combined system-directed cynicism and self-directed confidence.

Summary

What the foregoing analysis makes plain is that political efficacy in Canada is indeed bi-dimensional, consisting of a perception of government responsiveness dimension and a subjective citizen competence dimension. And while these dimensions are inter-related, a fact taken into account in the construction of our two efficacy measures, they are not co-extensive. This is primarily a function of a difference in reference. Whereas the perception of government responsiveness

measures allude primarily to a feature of the world outside of the respondent, i.e. the political authorities, the subjective political competence items have as their primary focus the individual himself, and so are influenced to a greater degree by the respondent's self-esteem.²

9

FootnotesChapter 5

1. Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, 1963), 360-361.
2. Of course, in the absence of an independent measure of self-esteem the commentary is, strictly speaking, speculative.

Chapter 6

Political Efficacy and the Workplace Structure of Authority:
Preliminary Remarks and an Empirical Test

(It) stands to reason that if any aspect of social life can directly affect government it is the experience with authority that men have in other spheres of life, especially those that mould their personalities and those to which they normally devote most of their lives.¹

Why study the relationship between the structure of authority in the work environment, the psychological dispositions of a person and, ultimately, notions regarding oneself as an actor in the political system? The answer lies in the marriage of two distinct corpi of research literature, the first dealing with industrial democracy and the second with political efficacy. Speaking generally, the workplace participation literature is concerned with the interconnections between the structure of authority in the workplace and i) productivity, ii) satisfaction with the job, iii) the tenor of one's relations with co-workers and superiors, and iv) the worker's self-conception. The second corpus, that of political efficacy research, is concerned with the inter-relationship between the sense of being able to influence the political system and such categorical factors as social class, education and region, and attitudinal factors such as political trust and support.²

Few explicit attempts have been made to bridge the gap between these two literatures.³ And yet, intuitively, the hypothesis that a linkage exists between the structure of authority one experiences in the workplace and notions

as to one's relationship to political authorities, mediated by the psychological dispositions which are reinforced or created by the former experience, seems plausible. Now it may be that the lack of attention paid to this association derives from a suspicion that such a relationship may be spurious: that both factors are traceable to some third phenomenon such as formal education or other class-related phenomena. And it is doubtless the case that such factors as formal education, the social class in which one was reared, occupation, the structure of authority in the workplace, sense of personal effectiveness, and political efficacy are interconnected in an intimate way. However, it seems reasonable to suppose that the structure of authority in the workplace is intimately associated with the personality of the person who is subject to it. Whether the workplace experience can merely act to reinforce already existing dispositions and whether the relationship between self and authority which obtains in this environment can be generalized to one's manner of orientation to the political realm are questions which will be addressed subsequently.

But before essaying answers to these questions some observations regarding the significance of the study of the structure of authority in the workplace and political efficacy, respectively, are in order. On the autocracy which often characterises the work milieu, André Gorz

observes:

On the margin of civil society, with its formal liberties, there...persists behind the gates of factories, a despotic, authoritarian society with a military discipline and hierarchy which demands of the workers both unconditional obedience and active participation in their own oppression.⁴

Gorz is making the point that, for many men and women, a key segment of life with ramifications for one's entire existence, is spent in a servitude which would be considered wholly inappropriate to other realms of social interaction.

Returning to the linkage which has been posited between the structure of authority which is experienced in the workplace and the sense of being able to act effectively in the political system, as mediated by the personality dispositions which are reinforced or instilled by the former experience, the comments of Blumberg are germane. He observes:

Even today, with the shortest work day and work week in modern history, the worker's daily job still extends nearly from one end of his waking hours to the other, especially if transportation is included plus an essential allowance for recuperation from the mental and physical fatigue of work. And as work dominates the day, so it dominates the week. Work stands like an enormous, dominating giant astride our waking hours, making its constant, unrelenting demands upon our minds and bodies. One cannot merely "forget" work if it is unpleasant: it is simply too much with us.⁵

And later Blumberg speaks of,

...the interaction between life and work, and the impossibility of isolating malaise in one sphere from other spheres of life. As Ferdynard Zweig has said, 'A man is not one person at home and a different person at his work, he is one and the same man. He projects his personal worries, frustrations, and fears

on to his workplace, and vice versa from workplace to home'.⁶

Earlier, the point was made that the association between the structure of authority in the workplace and a sense of being able to influence the political system is not direct. It is mediated by a psychological factor, viz. self-esteem. For it has been shown that participation in workplace decision making contributes to i) the nurturing of commitment to the system, ii) satisfaction with the system and one's role within it, and most importantly, iii) the creation of a sense of competence and, relatedly, self-esteem. This latter factor, a belief in one's competence, is necessary if the self is to handle the risks involved in comparatively active (inter-personal) modes of political participation. Quoting Blumberg once more:

...participation, power, and responsibility on the job tend to satisfy basic ego needs. Having the power of participation implies to workers that they are equal partners, collaborators in an enterprise, rather than passive, coerced, and unwilling subordinates. Participation strengthens the belief, or creates it, that they, the workers are worthy of being consulted, that they are intelligent and competent.⁷

Now the proposition being examined is that men can learn, as a result of the workplace experience, patterns of submissiveness to authority. Conversely, their work experience may instill in them a sense of self-esteem and competence to participate which may be generalised to the realm of the political. And while it is conceded that the

encounter with a workplace authority structure may do no more than reinforce already existing dispositions, one's job experience is of such crucial importance that it can be responsible for the creation of psychological dispositions.⁸ By way of illustration, A.S. Tannenbaum found that lengthy exposure (one year) to an environment which afforded the individual opportunities to participate tended to reduce some of the attitudes of dependency among workers. Conversely, those exposed to a hierarchical structure of authority for a similar period of time tended to suffer a reduction in some attitudes of independence.⁹ Moreover, the classic studies carried out by Kurt Lewin¹⁰ demonstrated that the structure of authority can effect changes in the dispositions of the individual.

Blumberg is cogent:

In other words, although it is true that participation does have different effects upon different individuals - depending upon their values, attitudes, expectations, personality needs, and the like - it is also true that a structure of participation creates appropriate values, attitudes, and expectations, and thus in the long run becomes more effective because of the eventual compatibility of personality with structure. In other words, the organisation that permits participation ultimately produces individuals who are responsible to participation.¹¹

It would follow from the above that autocratic structures of authority will tend to produce individuals who are apathetic and incompetent with respect to participation. They will have acquired neither the confidence and skills necessary for participation, nor the expectation that they

ought to be able to participate.

The notion of a web of mutual influence existing between one's workplace experience and adjustment to the norms of participatory democracy can be summarised thusly: i) participation in workplace decision making may lead to the creation of expectations that one has the opportunity to participate in other public spheres, the polity included; ii) a sense of competence (self-esteem) may be engendered by workplace participation, resulting in the individual possessing the requisite confidence to engage in political participation; and iii) the individual will benefit through the "gaining of familiarity with democratic procedures and the learning of political (democratic) skills."¹²

While the foregoing suggests that the direction of causality is as below,

Participation in workplace decision making \longrightarrow Expectations of political participation

one must recognise the likelihood that the causal flow is not unidirectional. As Almond and Verba observe:

Demands to participate in job decisions are often justified by the political norms of democratic participation. And the individual whose political experience includes chances to participate in decisions will be less likely to accept unquestioningly the authority relationships at his place of work.¹³

However, for purposes of the subsequent analysis we choose, as do Almond and Verba, to consider the workplace structure of authority as the independent variable. However, the investigation of the relationship between political efficacy and perceptions of the workplace structure of authority is

informed by the strong possibility that the causal relationship is reciprocal.

The following analysis employs four independent variables which relate to the structure of authority in the workplace. They are:

Can you determine the pace at which you do most of your work? Yes or no?

And the following three measures:

Question: I am going to read you some statements about jobs. Please tell me how true each one is of your job using one of these answers.

Very true...Somewhat true...Not very true...Not at all true

- i) There is the recognition you deserve for your work.
- ii) You can influence important decisions that are made by your supervisor.
- iii) There is a great deal of freedom to decide how to do your work.

In the subsequent analysis we have collapsed the "Not very true" and "Not at all true" categories of the latter three measures into a single category designated "Not true".

This is done due to the small number of respondents falling into the latter category of the respective independent measures.

Education has been controlled for in order to eliminate whatever confounding effects this factor may have. And in the subsequent analysis the focus will most often be upon the middle and upper education cohorts for the simple reason that, given divisions of both the dependent efficacy measure and each of the independent variables, the problem of small N's is encountered. Nonetheless, all of the controlled cross-tabulations

are documented in order that the reader may decide for himself what interpretation the data will safely bear.

The first independent variable is a respondent's perception of whether he is able to determine the pace at which he works.

Table 6.1

Level of education = Grade school graduation or less

# of Eff. Responses	Can determine pace of work	Cannot determine pace of work
0	47.2 - 73.1	52.1 - 69.8
1	25.9	17.7
2	15.1	9.2
3	5.5 - 11.8	14.5 - 20.9
4	6.3	6.4
Mean score	1.0	1.1
	N=183	N=49

F=.6*

$\chi^2=6.4$ df=4 P>.05
*not significant at .05 level.

Table 6.2

Level of education = Secondary school graduation or less

# of Eff. Responses	Can determine pace of work	Cannot determine pace of work
0	31.6 - 59.5	29.0 - 60.5
1	27.6	31.5
2	18.6	23.7
3	14.8 - 22.2	10.2 - 15.7
4	7.4	5.5
Mean score	1.4	1.3
	N=706	N=203

F=.6*

$\chi^2=6.4$ df=4 P>.05
*not significant at .05 level.

Table 6.3

Level of education = At least some post-secondary schooling

# of Eff. Responses	Can determine pace of work	Cannot determine pace of work
0	11.5	18.4
1	23.9 - 35.4	20.9 - 39.3
2	23.4	22.6
3	27.8	27.1
4	13.4 - 41.2	11.0 - 38.1
Mean score	2.1	1.9
	N=356	N=112
$\chi^2=3.7$	df=4	P>.05
		F=.6*
		*not significant at .05 level.

Ignoring table 6.1 on account of the small number of respondents who consider that they are unable to determine the pace at which they work, one observes a relationship between efficacy and the extent of autonomy allowed in workplace decision making which, while very slight, is in the expected direction. There is a marginal tendency for those who feel that they can determine the pace at which they work to be more efficacious than those who feel that they are unable to do so.

On the face of it, the marginality of the correlation between this structure of authority in the workplace variable and political efficacy seems to argue against the thesis that the experience of being able to participate in decisions made in a non-political setting such as one's place of work (one's work experience being especially important due to the relationship of a man's job to his self-esteem and, second, the fact of the sheer proportion of waking hours which are devoted to one's work) will contribute to the development of self/authority

dispositions which may be generalised to the political system. However, it may only be that this particular independent measure has questionable validity. One possible problem which is immediately apparent is the fact that each respondent was presented only two response categories: yes I can determine the pace at which I work or no I cannot. In consequence fully 77.4% of the respondents say that they can determine their pace of work versus only 22.6% who submit that they cannot. In brief, because the measure is of the all or nothing, black or white variety, it may be that the extent of variation is masked and that one would observe a greater relationship between autonomy on the job and political efficacy if the autonomy measure was of a more or less format (i.e. at least trichotomous).

The difficulties created by dichotomous response categories are absent from the following three structure of authority in the workplace variables. The first measure reads: There is the recognition you deserve for your work. Note that in tables 6.4 through 6.12 the "Not very true" and "Not at all true" categories have been collapsed into a single "Not true" cohort for the reason given previously, i.e. the small number of respondents falling into the "Not at all true" category of each independent measure.

Table 6.4

Level of Education = Grade school graduation or less

# of Eff. Responses	Very true	Somewhat true	Not true
0	49.4 - 67.4	52.4 - 75.9	33.5 - 69.0
1	18.0	23.5	35.5
2	20.5	9.6	12.7
3	7.8 - 12.0	9.3 - 14.4	4.5 - 18.3
4	4.2	5.1	13.8
Mean score	.9	.9	1.3
	N=75	N=99	N=46
$\chi^2=15.28$	df=8	P=.05	Gamma=.09
*significant at .01 level.			

Table 6.5

Level of education = Secondary school graduation or less

# of Eff. Responses	Very true	Somewhat true	Not true
0	35.3 - 59.2	24.1 - 55.2	34.6 - 67.0
1	23.9	31.1	32.4
2	18.0	20.4	20.9
3	12.8 - 22.8	17.8 - 24.5	8.8 - 12.1
4	10.0	6.7	3.3
Mean score	1.4	1.5	1.1
	N=291	N=411	N=199
$\chi^2=29.31$	df=8	P<.05	Gamma= -.05
*significant at .01 level.			

Table 6.6

Level of education = At least some post-secondary schooling

# of Eff. Responses	Very true	Somewhat true	Not true
0	12.1 - 24.6	9.2 - 21.6	24.4 - 50.0
1	22.5	22.4	25.6
2	19.5	25.9	23.8
3	36.2 - 45.9	26.8 - 42.5	14.8 - 26.3
4	9.7	15.7	11.5
Mean score	2.1	2.2	1.6
	N=152	N=229	N=87
$\chi^2=25.25$	df=8	P<.05	Gamma= -.12
*significant at .01 level.			

As with the previous controlled analysis the focus will be upon the middle and upper education cohorts. But first

a word about the independent variable. Arguably, a sense of being accorded recognition for work done bears directly upon a man's self-conception and belief in his own value. For recognition entails the extension from one to another of an evaluation of worth. And such recognition serves to instill or reinforce confidence in one's competence to fulfill a particular role (in this case an occupational role). Now it may seem a bit of a jump from possessing a sense of self-worth with respect to the structures and significant others encountered in the work world to a feeling of self-worth with respect to things political. However, our argument is this: While it may be the case that the experience of personal autonomy or democratic participation in the workplace may only reinforce already existing (if inchoate) dispositions toward political efficacy, the experience of an undemocratic workplace and, generally, conditions which undermine self-esteem may militate against the development of political efficaciousness.

This being said it is most useful to compare those respondents who say either that it is very true or somewhat true that their job affords recognition to those who respond that this is not at all true of their job. The former demonstrate a marked tendency to be more efficacious than the latter. Given that the response patterns of those who say that the statement is very true and those who say it is somewhat true are quite similar we will compare only the less emphatic group to respondents who claim that there is no truth to the statement

that their job affords the recognition they deserve. What one observes is that amongst those with secondary school graduation or less the proportion of "somewhat true" respondents who fall into the two highest efficacy categories is 24.5% and amongst the "not true" respondents the proportion is 12.1%. When the lowest two efficacy categories are collapsed the percentages are 55.2% and 67.0%, respectively. The same pattern obtains in the case of respondents with at least some post-secondary education.

Clearly, respondents who experience workplace conditions which fail entirely to reinforce their sense of self-worth are less likely to feel politically efficacious than those whose occupational conditions are at least somewhat supportive of self-esteem. And as a final point the impact of workplace conditions supporting or undermining self-esteem through the extent to which recognition is accorded is greatest among the most highly educated respondents (see table 6.6). This is not surprising in that we would expect that those who have undergone the experience of higher education, an experience which tends to promote self-esteem, and who come to occupy work conditions where recognition is withheld will be most likely to be disillusioned due to the dissonance between the expectation and the experience. And at a time when an increasingly large number of highly educated people (most often young adults) find themselves "underemployed", performing

jobs in which recognition of their abilities and qualifications is not forthcoming, the incidence of this disappointment with, potentially, spill-over effects for political dispositions will most probably increase.¹⁴

The third independent measure reads: You can influence important decisions that are made by your supervisor.

Table 6.7

Level of education = Grade school graduation or less

# of Eff. Responses	Very true	Somewhat true	Not true
0	46.3 - 69.4	59.6 - 65.3	41.2 - 75.3
1	23.1	15.7	34.1
2	10.3	13.2	13.4
3	9.1 - 20.3	7.4 - 11.4	4.5 - 11.4
4	11.2	4.0	6.9
Mean score	1.2	.8	1.0
	N=45	N=70	N=65

$\chi^2=10.36$ df=8 $P>.05$
*significant at .01 level.

Table 6.8

Level of education = Secondary school or less

# of Eff. Responses	Very true	Somewhat true	Not true
0	33.1 - 54.9	28.2 - 57.3	31.2 - 66.2
1	21.8	29.1	35.0
2	22.0	20.6	19.4
3	12.4 - 23.1	16.2 - 22.1	8.4 - 14.5
4	10.7	5.9	6.1
Mean score	1.5	1.4	1.2
	N=223	N=296	N=249

$\chi^2=20.01$ df=8 $P<.05$ Gamma= -.07
*significant at .01 level.

Table 6.9

Level of education = At least some post-secondary schooling

# of Eff. Responses	Very true	Somewhat true	Not true
0	9.3	11.5	19.3
1	22.4 - 31.7	18.6 - 30.1	26.8 - 46.1
2	18.2	27.6	23.8
3	43.9	23.1	18.8
4	4.2 - 50.1	19.2 - 42.3	11.4 - 30.2
Mean score	2.2	2.2	1.8
$\chi^2=37.11$	$N=135$	$N=148$	$N=132$
$df=8$	$P<.05$	$\text{Gamma} = -.15$	$F=6.2^*$

*significant at .01 level.

Looking at the two tables where there are sufficient cases to permit fairly confident generalisation, tables 6.8 and 6.9, one observes a clear direct relationship between political efficacy and perceived ability to influence workplace decision making. Moreover, the magnitude of the relationship is substantial. For example, collapsing the two highest efficacy categories one finds that amongst the most highly educated respondents 50.1% of the "very true" respondents, 42.3% of the "somewhat true" respondents, and only 30.2% of those who answer "not true" fall into this category. This pattern is consistent with our argument that confidence in one's ability to participate in job-related decisions can reinforce a pre-existing belief in one's political competence and the accessibility of the political authority system and, conversely, that the experience of being impotent in a non-participatory workplace may contribute to the development of a generalised sense of personal impotence.

Confidence in the soundness of the above interpretation is bolstered by the results of cross-tabulations using the final authority in the workplace variable. This measure reads: There is a great deal of freedom to decide how to do your work. We would suggest that this measure involves both the reinforcement or inhibition of a sense of self-worth (in that being able to define one's task contributes to subjective competence) as well as relating directly to one's status vis-à-vis the system authorities (i.e. do they or do they not allow for freedom?).

Table 6.10

Level of education = Grade school graduation or less

# of Eff. Responses	Very true	Somewhat true	Not true	
0	52.5	44.6	49.6	
1	18.9 - 71.1	31.0 - 75.6	25.8 - 75.4	
2	10.7	13.8	15.7	
3	10.1	8.1	0.0	
4	8.1 - 18.2	2.4 - 10.5	8.9 - 8.9	
Mean score	1.0	.9	.9	F=8.3*
	N=113	N=71	N=42	
$\chi^2=10.72$	df=8	P>.05		
*significant at .01 level.				

Table 6.11

Level of education = Secondary school graduation or less

# of Eff. Responses	Very true	Somewhat true	Not true	
0	30.4	29.0	33.0	
1	22.9 - 53.3	33.2 - 62.2	37.2 - 70.2	
2	20.7	19.3	18.6	
3	17.9	10.9	9.0	
4	8.1 - 26.0	7.5 - 18.4	2.3 - 11.3	
Mean score	1.5	1.3	1.1	F=8.3*
	N=444	N=303	N=159	
$\chi^2=27.84$	df=8	P<.05	Gamma= -.13	
*significant at .01 level.				

Table 6.12

Level of education = At least some post-secondary schooling

# of Eff. Responses	Very true	Somewhat true	Not true	
0	13.0	9.4	22.3	
1	23.5	24.0	17.6	
2	19.0	30.6	24.8	
3	33.7	20.8	17.8	
4	10.8	15.2	17.5	
Mean score	2.1	2.1	1.9	F=8.3*
	N=263	N=153	N=52	
$\chi^2=21.59$	df=8	P<.05	Gamma= -.03	

*significant at .01 level.

The relationship between efficacy and perception of the degree of freedom one has in deciding how to do one's work decreases as we move from the cohort which includes those with secondary school graduation or less to those with at least some post-secondary education. Among the middle education respondents and, to a considerably lesser degree, among those in the other two education cohorts there is a pattern similar to that observed when one's ability to influence important decisions of workplace supervisors was the independent variable, viz. the greater is a respondent's perception of freedom to define for himself his work tasks the greater is the likelihood that he will feel politically efficacious. However, the strength of the relationship is weak.

The final stage of this analysis of the relationship between political efficacy and perceptions of the workplace structure of authority involves a simple four-item unweighted additive index at the independent variable. It has been constructed

by dichotomising each of the four independent variables and assigning a value of 1 for a response which indicates an ability to influence workplace decision making and a value of 0 for a contrary response. The 0 and 1 categories of the independent variable have been combined due to the small N's which obtain when the categories are treated singly.

Table 6.13

Level of education = Grade school graduation or less

# of Eff. Responses	# of Responses Indicating an Ability to Influence Workplace Decision Making			
	0 or 1	2	3	4
0	44.4	40.1	49.0	54.9
1	27.8	35.0	24.2	18.7
2	11.1	8.8	11.9	15.5
3	5.6	3.2	11.5	5.6
4	11.1	12.9	3.4	5.3
	N=18	N=36	N=51	N=70

$$x^2=19.54 \quad df=16 \quad P>.05$$

Table 6.14

Level of education = Secondary school graduation or less

# of Eff. Responses	# of Responses Indicating an Ability to Influence Workplace Decision Making			
	0 or 1	2	3	4
0	27.3	41.1	27.1	29.9
1	42.0	31.5	28.6	24.7
2	20.5	14.3	26.4	18.9
3	6.8	6.2	13.4	16.0
4	3.4	7.0	4.5	10.6
	N=88	N=109	N=222	N=339

$$x^2=42.96 \quad df=16 \quad P<.001 \quad r=.13$$

Table 6.15

Level of education = At least some post-secondary schooling

# of Eff. Responses	# of Responses Indicating an Ability to Influence Workplace Decision Making			
	0 or 1	2	3	4
0				
1	32.2	26.0	8.2	9.3
2	25.0	18.8	29.8	19.4
3	17.9	24.2	24.5	23.0
4	14.3	19.1	25.5	35.3
	10.7	11.9	12.0	13.0
	N=28	N=70	N=116	N=198

$\chi^2=46.34$ $df=16$ $P<.001$ $r=.16$

Briefly, while one observes a relationship between political efficacy and the additive index it is readily apparent that it is quite weak in every instance.

Finally, we have performed a regression analysis using education and our workplace participation index as independent variables, as well as a measure of the interaction of social class with workplace participation.¹⁵

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>r Squared</u>	<u>r² Change</u>
Education	.097	.097
Workplace participation	.105	.007
Interaction of Education and workplace participation	.109	.004

In brief one finds that the interaction effect is not significant. As for the main effects, with education entered first and workplace participation second the unique variance accounted for by the latter variable (.105 - .097) equals .008 ($P<.001$), while the unique variance accounted for by education (.105 - .014) equals .091 ($P<.001$). The sum of the unique variance accounted for by each of these measures

equals .099 . The joint variance of workplace participation and education (.105 - .099) equals .006 . Hence, expressed in percentage terms one finds the following:

Unique variance accounted for by workplace participation.....	.8%
Unique variance accounted for by education.....	9.1%
Joint variance of workplace participation and education.....	.6%
	<hr/>
Total of explained variance	10.5%

Summary

In summary of the preceding analysis of political efficacy correlated with each of the four independent variables and the additive index (with education controlled for) the following may be said. While there does appear to be a relationship between political efficacy and the structure of authority in the workplace, with a respondent who experiences workplace circumstances which are democratic and participatory being more likely to be politically efficacious than one whose work situation does not allow for participation and the development and/or reinforcement of self-esteem which is a consequence of such an encounter with a participatory system of inter-related roles, the relationship is very weak. This leads one to speculate that pre-adulthood socialising forces have a greater bearing upon such psychological dispositions as self-esteem, subjective competence, and perception of the responsiveness of authority, than do later learning experiences. We recognize that this runs counter to the

arguments of both Almond and Verba and Eckstein with respect to the relative significance of pre-adult and adult socializing experiences in the determination of political dispositions.

Based upon observation of the pattern of relationships in the five nations included in their study, Almond and Verba conclude:

There appears to be a rank order in the strength of the connection between non-political types of participation and political competence: the connection becomes stronger as one moves from family to school to job participation.¹⁶

And in explaining this they draw upon Eckstein:

Eckstein has suggested (that) the closer¹⁷ a social structure is to the political system, the more likely there is to be a strain toward congruence between the two authority patterns.¹⁸

Now it may be that the difference between the findings of the present study and those reported in previous works derive from differences between the measures employed in the respective studies. We leave open the possibility that the measures of the workplace structure of authority used in the present study leave something to be desired. And so caution is counselled in the interpretation of the present findings. At the same time we would argue that, based upon the findings of this analysis, Carole Pateman's thesis in Participatory Democracy, viz. that the workplace setting is a key determinant of a worker's dispositions toward authority, so that he who is part of a democratically-run work enterprise "learns" expectations and practices which are generalised to the political system, is not unquestionable.

Footnotes

Chapter 6

1. Eckstein, A Theory of Stable Democracy (Princeton, 1961), 225.
2. Much of the writing on political efficacy involves not a direct inquiry into the concept and its attitudinal/behavioral characteristics, but rather an exploration of political participation. Hence, efficacy is most often treated as an independent variable.
3. Both Almond and Verba's, The Civic Culture, and Carole Pateman's Participation and Democratic Theory explore the linkage between political efficacy and workplace participation.
4. Gorz, Strategy for Labor: a Radical Proposal (Boston, 1967), 30.
5. Blumberg, Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation (London, 1968), 47-48.
6. Ibid., 51.
7. Ibid., 130.
8. See for example Blauner, Freedom and Alienation (Chicago, 1964).
9. Tannenbaum, "Personality Change as a Result of an Experimental Change of Environmental Conditions", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1957, 404-406.
10. See "Frontiers in Group Dynamics", in Human Relations (June, 1947), 5-47; "Studies in Group Decision", in Group Dynamics; and "Group Decision and Social Change", in Readings in Social Psychology (1947).
11. Blumberg, Op.Cit., 109.
12. Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge, 1970), 74.
13. Almond and Verba, Op.Cit., 366.
14. We are speaking here of a general psychological malaise characterised by a sense of worthlessness and impotence.
15. The interaction effect variable was constructed by multiplying a respondent's score on the workplace participation index (which ranges from 0 through 4) by

the education value (ranging from 1 through 8):

16. Almond and Verba, Op. Cit., 371.

17. By "closer" Eckstein means more proximate in terms of time and/or similarity "in the degree of formality of authority patterns" to the political system.

18. Almond and Verba, Op. Cit., 372.

Chapter 7

The Determinants of Efficacy in Canada

At this point in the study regression analysis is useful in order to ascertain what proportion of the variance in each of the measures of political efficacy is accounted for by the several independent variables which have been selected. The first analysis has the four-item unweighted additive index as the dependent variable, and the subsequent analyses use subjective citizen competence and perception of the responsiveness of government indices, in that order. Briefly, one finds that certain categoric measures such as region, religion and ethnicity tend to be extremely weak predictors of political efficacy, however the latter is operationalized, while the trust in man/optimism in the future attitudinal measure and categoric variables with social class implications tend to be the best predictors.

i) The Independent Variables: Why they were Selected and How They Have Been Operationalised

In the selection of independent variables two criteria were applied. The first is prior knowledge of the Canadian political culture and the second is the assumption that the experience of socialization within a particular class ambience (and the impact which this has upon one's self-esteem) is of crucial importance for an understanding of both political behavior and attitudes, political efficacy included.

With respect to the first criterion one knows that factors such as region and ethnicity loom large in Canadian politics. Inter-regional variation in political participation,¹

both in extent and modes, as well as variation in the pattern of partisanship and party systems across province alerts us to the apparent importance of region for an understanding of Canadian politics. Of course the prominence of ethnicity, meaning in the Canadian context the cleavage between French and English Canadians, is clear from the most casual observation of the Canadian socio-political scene, both contemporary and historic. Moreover, there exists in Canada a considerable correlation between ethnicity, religion and region, accounted for by the singular position of the province of Quebec, an overwhelmingly French Catholic society set in the midst of a predominantly English-speaking Canada in which Catholics are in the minority. For these reasons we chose to include within each of our regression analyses measures of region and ethnicity, respectively.²

Second, the hypothesis that socialization, both explicitly political and more general, to the norms of a particular class bears upon the political behavior and expectations of a person is obviously not original to the present paper. The relationship may be direct with an individual adopting, more or less imperfectly, the politically relevant values of one or more role model with whom he comes into contact, or it may be through the intermediary offices of self-esteem. In either case one can justifiably say that there is a clear tendency for expectations to be in considerable measure a consequence of the significant others, material circumstances and information which

have combined together to constitute the experience of socialization.

The independent variables used in the following analyses can be grouped into the following categories.

- a) Categorical measures with social class implications.....Occupation
Years of formal education
Family income
- b) Other categorical measure.....Ethnicity
Religion
Region
Sex
- c) Attitudinal measures.....Trust in man/Optimism regarding the future
Federal political identification

Federal political identification which, in its original form, is a nominal measure has been dichotomised into a partisan and a non-partisan category, with Liberal party identification as the suppressed category. It has been operationalized thusly based upon the assumption, prima facie plausible, that those who do not identify with an established political party will tend to lack a psychological linkage with the political system which will be possessed by those who are party identifiers.

With respect to the four categorical variables which do not necessarily have social class implications, viz. ethnicity, religion, sex and region, all of which are nominal, required changes have been made. Of course the operationalisation of sex of respondent poses no problems, being naturally dichotomous. However, in the case of ethnicity respondents have been divided into those of French descent and those of non-French descent, with British Isles ancestry being our suppressed category.

Operationalizing religion the Protestant denominational category has been suppressed and the sample population divided into Catholics and non-Catholics. Moreover, we wished to ascertain the independent effect which an absence of religious belief has upon the political disposition being examined. Hence a second dummy variable has been created, with respondents divided into believers and non-believers. Also, based upon the seemingly plausible assumption that those who are of a faith other than Protestantism or Catholicism are likely to be less well integrated into Canadian society, one further religion measure has been constructed with respondents divided into two categories, non-Catholic/non-Protestant believers and other believers. Lastly, four dichotomous region variables are used with Ontario as the suppressed category.

ii) With the Four-Item Efficacy Index as the Dependent Variable

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>r Squared</u>	<u>r² Change</u>
Trust in man/Optimism in the future	.094	.094
Education	.142	.048
Family income	.153	.011
Occupation	.159	.006
Region(Que/non-Que)	.162	.003
Region(Prairies/non-Prairies)	.168	.006
Sex of respondent	.169	.001
Region(BC/non-BC)	.170	.001
Partisanship	.171	.001
Region(Atlantic/Non-Atlantic)	.171	.001
Religion(non-believer/believer)	.172	.001
Religion(Catholic/non-Catholic)	.173	.001
Religion(non-Cath,non-Prot.believer/ Other)	.173	.000
Ethnicity	.173	.000

Disappointingly, one finds that all of the independent measures, taken together, account for only 17% of the variation

in the additive efficacy measure. Moreover, fully 16% of the variation in political efficacy is accounted for by the trust in man/optimism about the future index and the three measures of social class. Indeed one finds that the only variables which make a significant independent contribution to the prediction of this measure of political efficacy are the trust in man/optimism regarding the future attitudinal measure and education, together accounting for marginally more than 14% of the variation in the dependent measure.

The socio-demographic variables are found to add little to our ability to account for variation in political efficacy. Region, ethnicity, religion and sex, regardless of how the former three are operationalized, together make but a miniscule contribution to the understanding of efficacy when attitudinal and social class measures are included in the equation.

iii) With the Subjective Citizen Competence Index as the Dependent Measure

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>r Squared</u>	<u>r² Change</u>
Education	.083	.083
Trust in man/Optimism in the future	.117	.034
Family income	.133	.016
Sex of Respondent	.144	.012
Ethnicity	.149	.004
Occupation	.152	.004
Region(Prairies/non-Prairies)	.154	.002
Region(BC/non-BC)	.157	.004
Region(Atlantic/non-Atlantic)	.158	.001
Region(Que/non-Que)	.160	.002
Religion(Non-believer/Believer)	.161	.001
Religion(Non-Cath, Non-Prot. believer/ Other)	.166	.005
Religion(Catholic/non-Catholic)	.168	.002
Partisanship	.169	.001

With subjective citizen competence as the dependent measure one again finds that trust in man/optimism about the future, education and family income are the three variables which make the greatest independent contribution to an explanation of the variation in political efficacy. However, there is a change in the relative predictive strength of these variables. When the four-item unweighted index was the dependent measure trust in man/optimism regarding the future was the best predictor, followed by education. With subjective citizen competence dependent the order of these two independent variables is reversed. Moreover, whereas the independent contribution of sex of respondent was extremely slight in the previous regression analysis, in this instance it ranks as the fourth best predictor of the variation in political efficacy. Together, education, trust in man/optimism in the future, family income and sex of respondent account for 14.5% of the 17% of the variation in subjective citizen competence which we are able to account for.

Again, the socio-demographic variables have extremely weak independent effects upon the efficacy measure. Additionally, partisanship (operationalized as partisans vs. non-partisans with Liberal identifiers suppressed) has only the slightest independent effect when other factors are controlled.

iv) With the Perception of Government Responsiveness Index as the Dependent Measure

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>r Squared</u>	<u>r² Change</u>
Trust in man/Optimism in the future	.044	.044
Occupation	.050	.006
Region(Que/non-Que)	.056	.006
Sex of Respondent	.059	.003
Partisanship	.059	.001
Religion(Non-Cath,Non-Prot.believer/ Other)	.060	.001
Religion(Non-believers/believers)	.061	.001
Education	.062	.001
Religion(Catholic/non-Catholic)	.063	.001
Ethnicity	.063	.000
Region(Prairies/non-Prairies)	.064	.001
Region(BC/non-BC)	.064	.000
Family income	.064	.000

Whereas there was considerable similarity between the previous two regression analyses, both in terms of the total proportion of variance accounted for and the factors which have the greatest independent effect upon political efficacy, a markedly different situation emerges with perception of government responsiveness as the dependent measure. In this latter case a meager 6.4% of the variation in the efficacy measure is accounted for by the independent variables. Indeed, the trust in man/optimism about the future attitudinal measure proves to be the only factor which has a significant independent effect upon perception of government responsiveness, accounting for 4.4% of the variation. Education, a comparatively good predictor of the other two dependent measures, contributes as little to the explanation of perception of government responsiveness as most of the socio-demographic variables.

In summary of the three analyses, in no case does

the total amount of variance accounted for by the selected independent variables exceed 17%. Indeed, with the weighted perception of the responsiveness of government measure as the dependent measure one is able to account for only 6.4% of the variance in political efficacy.

Also, the socio-demographic measures, viz. region, religion, ethnicity, and sex, tend to be the poorest predictors of political efficacy, while the trust in man/optimism in the future attitudinal index and categorical measures with social class implications (especially education) tend to have the greatest independent effects. Finally, there are differences between the efficacy measures with respect to the relative predictive strength of the independent variables. For example, with the additive efficacy index as the dependent measure the trust in man/optimism in the future variable is the best predictor followed by education, whereas with the weighted subjective political competence measure dependent the order of these independent variables is reversed.

v) Concluding Remarks

Though individuals' perceptions of their own political ability may not mirror the objective situation, it cannot be unrelated to that situation. If an individual believes he has influence, he is more likely to attempt to use it. A subjectively competent citizen, therefore, is more likely to be an active citizen. And if government officials do not necessarily respond to active influence attempts, they are more likely to respond to them than to a passive citizenry that makes no demands. If the ordinary citizen, on the other hand, perceives that government policy is far outside his sphere of influence, he is unlikely to attempt to influence

that policy, and government officials are unlikely to worry about the potential pressure that can be brought to bear on them. Thus the extent to which citizens in a nation perceive themselves as competent to influence the government affects their political behavior. (Emphasis mine)³

We have quoted at length from Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture because their justification for the study of political efficacy is particularly cogent. Those who have an interest in the health of democratic political systems must not attend only to the institutions and patterns of behavior characteristic of such systems, but also to the dispositions held by citizens. For as J.R. Lucas observes, democracy is both a noun, referring to a set of governmental institutions and processes, and an adjective, implying as it does broad-based participation (either directly or through representative institutions which are responsible to the general public) in political decision-making.⁴

At this point in the paper we will review briefly the determinants of political efficacy in Canada, making reference to certain findings which we consider worthy of mention.

Political efficacy in Canada is most strongly influenced by social class and attitudinal factors which, to a considerable degree, are the dispositional fruit of the experience of socialization to the norms of a particular social class. The independent measures which correlate most highly with political efficacy are education ($\gamma = .39$) and the trust in man/optimism in the future index ($r = .25$).⁵

In as much as response to the latter measure is found to be directly to categorical measures with social class implications (eg. a person with high educational attainment is more likely to express trust in other men and optimism about the future than is a person with a lower educational attainment)⁶ one can confidently argue that efficacy is in large part a product of the experience of social class. While the experience of socialization to the norms of a particular social class is of considerable significance in the determination of political efficacy, there is some suggestion that the dispositions of a generation can be influenced in the same direction by one or more phenomena common to that generation. For example, there is a tendency, albeit slight, for those who came of age politically during the Depression years to be somewhat less efficacious than any other generation of respondents. This finding is not simply due to the fact that the mean level of formal education rises as age of respondent decreases.

Cultural factors may also operate to influence the relationship between political efficacy and certain independent variables. A case in point is the relationship between efficacy and sex in the province of Quebec, as contrasted to the relationship in any other region of the country. The tendency for males to be more efficacious than females is considerably greater in Quebec than elsewhere ($P < .05$). And in British Columbia, a province with, vis-a-vis other regions of Canada, a tradition of class polarization and in which there exists a competitive

party with close ties to unionized labour,⁷ one finds that the negative correlation between membership in a union and political efficacy is smaller than in the rest of the country.

When education is controlled for one finds that most relationships remain constant across cohorts. However, we are cautious in drawing conclusion because often the application of a control for education results in our findings not being statistically significant at or beyond the conventional .05 level. Keeping mind of this caveat the following was found: a) that the tendency for NDP identifiers to be less efficacious than supporters of the other two major parties becomes weaker among the most highly educated stratum of the population; b) that the negative relationship between membership in a union and political efficacy increases strength as education increases; c) the positive relationship between being male and political efficacy appears to exist only among the most highly educated; and d) among the highly-educated stratum of the population town-dwellers tend to be more efficacious than any other group of respondents.

After examining relationships between political efficacy and several independent variables, all of which, with the exception of the trust in man/optimism in the future attitudinal index, are frequently used in conventional studies of voting behavior and political participation, we considered the significance which the structure of authority in the workplace has for an understanding of efficacy. Stimulated

by the findings of, inter alia, Almond and Verba⁸ and Pateman⁹ we speculated that perceived ability to influence decisions in such a personally important non-political setting as the workplace might contribute to the creation of both expectations that one ought to be able to participate in the process of political decision-making and confidence in one's competence to play a participatory role, as well as contributing to a familiarity with participatory norms and procedures. However, these expectations were not confirmed. There was only a slight correlation between the structure of authority in the workplace measures and political efficacy. With a four-item additive index as the independent variable the Pearson's r was a mere .16 .

It may be that the failure to corroborate Almond _____ and Verba's findings in respect of the relationship between efficacy and participation in the workplace stems from shortcomings with the workplace participation measures. Alternatively, it may be that the absence in the Canadian context of a significant relationship tells us something about this society's socio-political value system. Perhaps it is the case that Canadians are more apt to compartmentalize social spheres, thereby failing to transfer the expectations and dispositions appropriate for one system of interactions (eg. the workplace) to another (eg. the political system). If one considers that the direction of causality is more likely to be thus, -

Expectations regarding the political system _____ Expectations regarding relationships in the workplace

than it may be that the weakness of the relationship in the

Canadian context, as compared for example to that found to obtain in the United States, is evidence of the lower salience of participatory democracy norms in this society.¹⁰

In addition to inquiring into the determinants of political efficacy the dimensionality of the concept was considered. Morris Rosenberg was among the first to suggest that efficacy is bi-dimensional,¹¹ and the present work suggests that there is empirical support for the distinction between a subjective citizen competence and a perception of the responsiveness of government component of political efficacy. The two dimensions are closely inter-related but are not co-extensive.

As we remarked in opening this paper, efficacy is one of the crucial components of a democratic value system. This being the case one is disappointed to find that in absolute terms the level of political efficacy in Canada is not high. Moreover, the fact that the present study was able to account for only 17% of the variance in political efficacy alerts us to the possibility that better and, perhaps, different measures are required in order to more fully explain the concept. Hopefully the present study has provided some indication of potentially fruitful lines of inquiry for further research. Indeed, the comparative strength of the trust in man/optimism in the future measure suggests that attitudinal factors might be one such area for future inquiry.

Footnotes

Chapter 7

1. On the matter of inter-regional variation in political participation see Burke, Clarke and Leduc, "Federal and Provincial Political Participation in Canada: Some Methodological and Substantive Considerations", Canadian Review of Sociology (Fall, 1978), 61-75.
2. On the inter-relatedness of region, religion and ethnicity see Kalbach and McVey, The Demographic Bases of Canadian Society (McGraw-Hill, Toronto, 1971), especially pages 156-162 and 178-180, and tables 6:5 and 7:4.
3. Almond and Verba, Op.Cit., 182-183.
4. Lucas, Democracy and Participation (Harmondsworth, England, 1976), 9-10.
5. These correlations are obtained with the unweighted four-item additive efficacy index as the independent variable.
6. The relationship between the trust in man/optimism in the future measure and education is as follows:

	<u>Grade Sch. grad. or less</u>	<u>Sec. Sch. grad. or less</u>	<u>At least some post-sec. schooling</u>
Trusting/ Optimistic	19.3	30.3	43.7
Mistrusting/ Unoptimistic	80.8	69.7	56.3
	N=681	N=1807	N=797

$\chi^2=103.85$ $df=2$ $P<.001$ $\text{Gamma}=.33$
7. Martin Robin has written extensively on the history, political culture and party system of BC. See, inter alia, Radical Politics and Canadian Labour, 1880-1930 (1968); "The Social Basis of Party Politics in British Columbia", Queen's Quarterly (1965); The Rush for Spoils: The Company Province 1871-1933 (1972); Pillars of Profit: The Company Province 1934-1972 (1973).
8. Almond and Verba, Op.Cit.
9. Pateman, Op.Cit.
10. One who argues the thesis that the norms of participatory democracy have lower salience in Canada than in, for example, American society is Robert Presthus. He writes: "...ambivalence about personal efficacy and marginal degree of political interest is in part a residue of both Empire Loyalist and early

French-Canadian preferences for hierarchy and restricted participation in political affairs." Presthus goes on to argue that this alleged deferential quality in the Canadian socio-political culture is one of the pre-conditions to the successful operation of a system of elite accomodation in Canada. See Elite Accomodation in Canadian Politics (Macmillan; Toronto, 1973), especially chapter 2 entitled, "The Canadian Political Culture", pp.20-63.

11. Rosenberg, "Some Determinents of Political Apathy", Public Opinion Quarterly, (1954).

Appendix A

The frequency distributions of the respective efficacy measures are as follows.

Perception of the Responsiveness of Government

<u>Code</u>	<u>Absolute frequency</u>	<u>Relative frequency</u>	<u>Adjusted frequency</u>	<u>Cumulative frequency</u>
-0.26	208	6.3%	6.9%	6.9%
-0.08	184	5.6	6.1	12.9
0.0	935	28.4	30.9	43.8
<hr/>				
0.18	295	9.0	9.8	53.6
0.25	64	2.0	2.1	55.7
0.38	33	1.0	1.1	56.8
0.43	199	6.0	6.6	63.3
<hr/>				
0.51	174	5.3	5.7	69.1
0.56	38	1.2	1.3	70.4
0.64	104	3.2	3.4	73.8
0.69	228	6.9	7.5	81.3
<hr/>				
0.82	42	1.3	1.4	82.7
0.89	34	1.0	1.1	83.9
1.07	232	7.1	7.7	91.5
1.15	77	2.4	2.6	94.1
1.33	179	5.4	5.9	100.0
Missing cases	262	8.0	---	100.0
Total	3290	100.0	100.0	

Subjective Citizen Competence

Code	Absolute frequency	Relative frequency	Adjusted frequency	Cumulative frequency
-0.25	104	3.2%	3.4%	3.4%
-0.23	77	2.4	2.6	6.0
0.0	935	28.4	30.9	36.9
0.02	174	5.3	5.7	42.6
0.16	42	1.3	1.4	44.0
0.18	179	5.4	5.9	49.9
0.41	295	9.0	9.8	59.7
0.43	228	6.9	7.5	67.2
0.58	33	1.0	1.1	68.3
0.60	34	1.0	1.1	69.4
0.83	208	6.3	6.9	76.3
0.85	64	2.0	2.1	78.4
0.99	38	1.2	1.3	79.7
1.01	232	7.1	7.7	87.4
1.24	184	5.6	6.1	93.4
1.26	199	6.0	6.6	100.0
Missing cases	262	8.0	—	100.0
Total	3290	100.0	100.0	

We wished to collapse categories of each of the respective measures in order to obtain four categories of roughly equal size. However, due to the distribution of responses the first division comes at a point causing the lowest efficacy category to encompass 36.9% and 43.8% of the sample respondents in the case of subjective citizen competence and perception of the responsiveness of government, respectively. The remaining values were collapsed in an effort to achieve a rough equivalence in N's across the other three categories of each of the efficacy measures.

Bibliography

- Aberbach, J., "Alienation and Political Behavior", APSR, vol.63, 1969.
- Agger, Goldstein and Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning", The Journal of Politics, vol.23, 1961.
- Almond, G. and Verba, S. The Civic Culture (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1963).
- Anderson, D., "Family Decision-Making and Negative Political Orientations", (An unpublished paper delivered at the 1979 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association).
- Bell, R., "The Determinants of Psychological Involvement in Politics: A Causal Analysis", Midwest Journal of Political Science, May, 1969.
- Blauner, R. Freedom and Alienation (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1964).
- Blumberg, P. Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation (Constable, London, 1968).
- Caddell, P., "Crisis of Confidence: Trapped in a Downward Spiral", Public Opinion, November, 1979.
- Citrin, J. "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government", APSR, vol.68, 1974.
- Clarke, et al. Political Choice in Canada (McGraw-Hill/Ryerson, Toronto, 1979).
- Dean, D., "Alienation and Political Apathy", Social Forces, March, 1960.
- DiRenzo, G.(ed.) Personality and Politics (Doubleday, New York, 1974).
- Douvan, E. and Walker, A., "The Sense of Effectiveness in Public Affairs", Psychological Monographs, vol.70, no.22, 1956.
- Easton, D. and Dennis, J., "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy", APSR, March, 1967.
- Finifter, A.W., "Dimensions of Political Alienation", APSR, June, 1970.

- Frenkel-Brunswick, E., "The Interaction of Psychological and Sociological Factors in Political Behavior", APSR, March, 1952.
- Kariel, H.S., "Democracy Unlimited: Kurt Lewin's Field Theory", American Journal of Sociology, vol.62, no.3.
- Kornhauser, W. The Politics of Mass Society, (Glencoe, Illinois, 1959).
- Leduc, L., "Measuring the Sense of Political Efficacy in Canada", Comparative Political Studies, vol.8, 1976.
- Levin, M. The Alienated Voter (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962).
- Lipsitz, D., "Work Life and Political Attitudes", APSR, vol.58, no.4.
- Litt, E., "Political Cynicism and Political Futility", The Journal of Politics, vol.25, 1963.
- McDill and Ridley, "Status, Anomia, Political Alienation, and Political Participation", American Journal of Sociology, vol.68, 1962.
- Miller, A., "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970", APSR, vol.68, 1974.
- Miller, A., "Rejoinder to 'Comment' by Jack Citrin: Political Discontent or Ritualism?", APSR, vol.68, 1974.
- Miller, W. "Crisis of Confidence: Misreading the Public Pulse", Public Opinion, November, 1979.
- Mishler, B. Political Participation in Canada (MacMillan, Toronto, 1979).
- Mussen, P. and Wyszynski, A., "Personality and Political Participation", Human Relations, vol.5, no.1.
- Pateman, C. Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970).
- Pinner, F., "Parental Overprotection and Political Distrust", The Annals, September, 1965.

- Renshon, S., "The Psychological Origins of Political Efficacy: The Need for Personal Control", (A paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1972).
- Robinson, W.S., "The Motivational Structure of Political Participation", ASR, April, 1952.
- Rosenberg, M., "Self-Esteem and Concern with Public Affairs", Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer, 1962.
- Rosenberg, M., "Some Determinants of Political Apathy", Public Opinion Quarterly, Winter, 1954-55.
- Schwartz, M. Politics and Territory (McGill-Queen's Press, Montreal, 1974).
- Seeman, M., "On the Meaning of Alienation", ASR, vol.24, 1959.
- Simeon, R. and Elkins, D., "Regional Political Cultures in Canada", CJPS, September, 1974.
- Templeton, F., "Alienation and Political Participation", Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer, 1966.
- Thompson, W. and Horton, J., "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action", APSR, March, 1967.
- Van Loon, R.J., "Political Participation in Canada: The 1965 Election", CJPS, September, 1970.
- Watts, M.W., "Efficacy, Trust, and Commitment to the Political Process", Social Science Quarterly, December, 1973.

Vitae

Stephen Brooks was born on 11 May, 1956 in Windsor, Ontario. He attended elementary and secondary schools in that city and entered the University of Windsor in the autumn of 1974.

In the spring of 1978 Mr. Brooks was awarded his Bachelor of Arts degree with honours in political science. Upon graduation he received the Board of Governors Gold Medal for highest standing in the political science programme.

Mr. Brooks commenced graduate work at the University of Windsor in the autumn of 1978. He was the recipient of an Ontario Graduate Scholarship and the Walter White Memorial Scholarship.

Mr. Brooks graduated with his Master of Arts degree in political science in the spring of 1981.