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INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE IN THE FORMULATION
OF
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE POLICY:
THE CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW OF 1994

by

Jonathan M.W. Rankine

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
through the Department of Political Science
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Arts at the
University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

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ABSTRACT

Political, economic, and cultural events in the early 1990s offered a unique opportunity to refocus Canada's Official Development Assistance program. A special joint parliamentary committee reviewing Canadian foreign policy held public hearings across Canada in 1994, to which interest groups made submissions. This study attempts to discover to what degree interest groups influenced development assistance policy in the review.

Comparing the substance of these groups' representations against the subsequent Committee's recommendations and Government's policy statements provides an opportunity to make suggestions concerning the relative influence of domestic interests on the formulation of Canadian foreign policy. In addition, by dividing the groups into three categories - promotional, self-interested economic, and self-interested non-economic - it should be possible to comment on the relative influence of different types of groups on foreign policy outcomes. Based on this analysis, it should also be possible to suggest whether a pluralist, statist, or dominant class theoretical perspective best explains the foreign policy process in Canada.

The findings indicate a high level of congruence between the opinions expressed by all three categories of groups and the subsequent recommendations of the Committee and response of the Government. However, there are four counter consensus issues on which interest groups held views which differed from the Committee and later, the response of the Government. On these issues, promotional groups tended to agree with the Committee, while self-interested economic groups were congruent with the Government. It is therefore difficult to assess the impact of any one of the three categories of groups. This said, the expectations of self-interested economic groups appear to have been those most closely met in the policy response of the Government.

The data suggest that, although there is evidence of both the structural dominant class and neopluralist theories, the structural dominant class theory is the more compelling explanation. Further, this study establishes the inconsistency between rhetoric and practice in Canada's ODA program, in that one thing is said and another done. This inconsistency is the result of pursuing international political goals and commercial interests at the cost of the humanitarian purpose of reducing global poverty and developing the world's human potential.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank Professors Terrence Keenleyside and Joan Boase, both to whom I am indebted for their extensive assistance and guidance in developing and finishing this thesis. In addition, thank you to Professors Walter Soderlund and Ian Pemberton who, as second and third readers, ensured that my ideas and arguments were as eloquent as the rough materials allowed for.

I would also like to extend my gratitude to the Department of Political Science for their support provided to me during my studies.

Great appreciation is extended to Fiona Bladon, Diane LeFevre and Janice Hilchie of the Committees and Parliamentary Associations Directorate for providing for me such accommodating research facilities and assistance.

Finally, a special thank you to my family for their tolerance of my pedantic wanderings and, especially, to Kristi Restivo for her endless support.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DEA	Department of External Affairs
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
EDC	Export Development Corporation
GNP	Gross National Product
GPT	General Preferential Tariff
GSP	General System of Preferences
ICHRDD	International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development
IDA	International Development Assistance
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INC	Industrial Cooperation Program
LDCs	Less-Developed Countries
LLDCs	Least-Developed Countries
NGIs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PGs	Promotional Groups
SCEAIT	Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade

SCHR	Standing Committee on Human Rights
SIEGs	Self-interested Economic Groups
SINEGs	Self-interested Non-economic Groups
WB	World Bank, The

INTRODUCTION

Political, economic, and cultural events in the early 1990s offered a unique opportunity to refocus Canada's Official Development Assistance (ODA) program. A special joint parliamentary committee reviewing Canadian foreign policy held public hearings across Canada in 1994 to which interest groups made submissions. The focus of this study is to discover to what degree interest groups influenced development assistance policy in this foreign policy review. The study affords the opportunity to examine the development of what Susan Philips refers to in another context as a "consultative partnership," or a government-coordinated, institutionalized stakeholder consultation (1991, 207).

The committee reviewing Canadian foreign policy held public hearings across Canada in 1994, receiving oral and written testimony from 530 individuals and groups. Of this aggregate, interest groups numbered 191. In November of 1994, the Committee issued a three volume report indicating its recommendations concerning the future direction of Canadian foreign policy in general, including official development assistance policy. In February of 1995, the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien responded with two documents. It released its official response to the

recommendations, and a smaller booklet outlining the proposed direction of the Government's foreign policy. These two publications, combined, indicated the development assistance policy intentions of the Chrétien government.

The three government documents provide an opportunity to examine the influence of interest groups on the policy-making process, since various groups appeared as witnesses during the Committee's hearings. This afforded an opportunity for the Committee to take the views of the groups into account in its report and for the Government to consider the concerns of the groups in its subsequent determination of policy.

This paper takes as its departure point the seminal study undertaken by Eileen E. Crookes in 1990, Interest Groups and the Shaping of Canadian Foreign Aid Policy In the Mulroney Era. In her study, Crookes examines and evaluates the effect of the participation of interest groups in the development assistance policy review conducted in 1987. Crookes analyzes submissions to the 1987 Winegard Committee hearings, the recommendations included in the Committee's report, For Whose Benefit?, the response of Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative government, To Benefit a Better World, and its policy statement, Sharing Our Future, all released in 1987.

Crookes employs a three-category typology to classify interest groups: self-interested economic groups, self-interested non-economic groups, and promotional groups. On this basis, she tests the relative strengths of the pluralist, dominant class, and statist theoretical perspectives concerning the influence of interest groups in the making of Canadian foreign policy. By coding and analyzing the oral and written submissions made by interest groups to the Committee, Crookes seeks to establish the degree of congruence between the inputs of different types of groups and the Winegard Committee's recommendations and the Government's ensuing statements of policy.

In this study a similar methodology is employed in order to: a) examine the relationship between the positions of interest groups that made submissions and the subsequent Committee recommendations and Government response; and b) suggest whether a pluralist, statist, or dominant class theoretical perspective best describes the foreign policy process in Canada.

METHODOLOGY

This section outlines the methods used in this study to measure the relationship between the concerns expressed in the interest groups' submissions and the subsequent recommendations of the Committee and the Government response. It includes a discussion of: a) the research design, b) the primary sources used to establish the development assistance concerns of interest groups, and c) the codesheet utilized to analyze the groups' submissions.

Research Design

The research design tests the following question: "To what degree do interest groups influence government official development assistance (ODA) policy?" It incorporates a document analysis of running records and episodic records concerning ODA and interest groups. It also incorporates a content analysis of written submissions made to a government committee, using nominal level measures.

Primary Source Materials

The primary sources of material that served as a data base for this study are the three volumes of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, the Government Response to the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, and the written submissions made by interest groups to this Committee. These sources are analyzed to determine whether there are similarities between the submissions, the Committee's recommendations, and the Government's response to those recommendations.

The report of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy was selected as a primary source of data as it is the first thorough review of Canadian development assistance policy since the 1987 Winegard Committee's publication, For Whose Benefit?. In addition, this review provides a suitable opportunity to examine the ability of interest groups to influence the policy-making process. An indication of the Government's view on the issues raised by the reviewing Committee is contained in the Government Response to the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy of 1995.

The written submissions made by interest groups to the Committee are also analyzed. Thus, it is possible to demonstrate whether or not the groups presented perspectives on aid issues that were consistent or at odds with the subsequent Committee recommendations as well as with Government responses.

Prior to the commencement of public hearings, in 1994 the Government issued a Guidance Paper For the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy. This paper indicates a particular interest in development assistance. It emphasizes that:

Canada's international assistance priorities [must] ensure that a clear policy framework is in place... [as well as] more balanced, comprehensive policies toward international assistance which take account of the need to direct a significant portion of Canadian official development assistance to direct human investment, basic human needs and environmental sustainability. (Canada, 1994c, 33)

Since this guidance paper provided direction to the interest groups as well as to the parliamentarians in their discussion of Canada's ODA program, it suggests that in the 1994 review agenda-setting was not the exclusive preserve of interest groups. Crookes points to

a similar situation in her study of the Winegard Committee hearings (1990, 84).

Appendix C of the report of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy presents a list of the individuals and groups that made oral and/or written submissions to the reviewing committee. For the purposes of this study, after eliminating groups that had inconsequential or missing submissions, there remained 73 group submissions to analyze: 53 promotional groups, 14 self-interested economic groups, and 6 self-interested non-economic groups (These categorizations will be explained in Chapter One).

The Codesheet

Content analysis, using the codesheet shown in Appendix A, was undertaken to measure the level of congruency of the interest groups' submissions first with the recommendations of the Committee, and second with the intended government policy as delineated in Ottawa's response. The development assistance issues listed on the codesheet were determined by reviewing the issue areas examined in the Government's response to the Committee's report, as well as any dominant issues which persisted over time.

In all, twenty issues were determined to be appropriate for assessment. As well, the codesheet offered the opportunity to deal with any unforeseen issues raised by interest groups.

In addition to suggesting the influence of interest groups on the policy-making process, this paper will try to determine whether or not certain types of interest groups had more influence on the process than others.

Chapter One outlines and explains the interest group typology utilized and examines as well the pluralist, statist and dominant class theoretical perspectives regarding the influence of societal groups in the foreign policy process.

Chapter Two examines the progression of 20 development assistance issues through the three preceding parliamentary reviews - 1971, 1980, and 1987 - in light of respective committee recommendations and government responses to these review. This is undertaken in order to provide a context for understanding these issues.

The findings, based on the coding of the groups' submissions, are contained in Chapter Three. In this chapter, the same 20 development assistance issues discussed in Chapter Two are examined to establish the degree of congruence between the positions taken by interest groups in their testimony and the

subsequent Committee recommendations and Government policy responses of the 1994 review.

Chapter Four consists of conclusions concerning the impact of different types of interest groups on the foreign policy-making process and makes suggestions regarding the dominant theoretical perspective in relation to the formation of public policy objectives. With an overall high level of congruence (except for the “counter consensus” issues) between the opinions expressed by all three categories of groups and the subsequent Committee’s recommendations and Government’s response, the impact of any one of the three categories of groups is difficult to assess. This said, the expectations of self-interested economic groups appear to have been those most closely met.

The data suggest that, although there is evidence supporting both the structural dominant class and neopluralist theories, the structural dominant class theory is the more compelling explanation. Further, this study establishes the gap between the rhetoric and practice in Canada’s ODA program, in which one thing is said and another done. This is the result of pursuing international political goals and commercial interests at the cost of the humanitarian purpose of reducing global poverty and developing the world’s human potential.

CHAPTER ONE

The Interest Group Typology

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it will set out the interest group typology that was used to categorize the groups that submitted briefs to the committee. Second, it will discuss the pluralist, statist, and dominant class theoretical perspectives that are used to suggest the most plausible explanation of ODA policy determination.

As the intention of this study is to replicate Crookes' analysis of interest group influence, a similar three-category typology to classify interest groups is employed. This typology derives from a combination of Frederick Englemann and M.A. Schwartz's categories of interest groups as either economic or non-economic, and Richard Van Loon and M. Whittington's categories of interest groups as either self-interested or promotional (Crookes, 1990, 92). Thus, the three-category typology used to classify interest groups consists of: a) self-interested economic groups (SIEG) - those seeking to achieve outcomes which serve the interests of a membership with an economic orientation, such as business and labour organizations; b) self-interested non-economic groups

(SINEG) - those seeking to achieve outcomes which serve the interests of a membership with a non-economic orientation, such as ethnic and women's' groups; and c) promotional groups (PG) - those whose stated purpose is to seek the good of the domestic or international community-at-large, such as church or human rights groups (Crookes, 1990, 92-93).

Clearly, there are some grey areas in the assignment of interest groups to one of the three types. For instance, some self-interested non-economic groups may appear, *prima facie*, to be promotional. Therefore, the general guidelines under which assignments were made were: a) who was the actor and b) what was the goal? This can be illustrated with two examples.

First, a group with a general human rights focus [the goal], such as Amnesty International [the actor], would be coded as a promotional group, regardless of whether or not some of their human rights concerns focused on one geographical area, say on human rights infractions in Serbia. In contrast, an ethnically self-defined group, such as the Serbian National Shield Society of Canada [the actor], that expressed human rights concerns surrounding Serbia [the goal], would be coded as a self-interested non-economic group.

In short, an apparent altruism is the defining difference between promotional groups and the self-interested economic and

non-economic groups, (with monetary concerns separating the latter two). Due to this aspect of altruism, promotional groups most closely resemble Cranford Pratt's "counter consensus groups" - those "that oppose on [solely] ethical grounds important elements of Canadian foreign policy" (1983-84, 118). Conversely, self-interested groups are "special interest groups which take positions" based on economic, ethnic or other factors (Pratt, 1983-84, 118).

By establishing both a coding system for the various aid issues and an interest group typology, it is possible to identify the relative influence of the different types of groups on the Committee and the Government. This can be achieved by calculating the frequency with which the three different interest group types raised issues and contrasting these findings with the treatment of those issues in the subsequent Committee report and Government response. However, before doing this, the theoretical contexts in which the roles of interest groups are defined must first be analyzed.

Interest Groups and Theoretical Perspectives: Pluralism, Statism and Dominant Class Theory

A general theory of the determinants of Canadian policies towards the less-developed countries is a beginning point for a study of any particular policy. According to Cranford Pratt, the utility of such a general theory rests "in the illumination it provides to the broad thrust of these policies, to the linkages between them and the interests of the powerful socio-economic forces that are dominant in our society, and to how these linkages operate to influence policy. It also suggests lines of enquiry for the study of particular policies" (Pratt, 1996, 257). As it is the purpose of this study to discuss the issues of linkages and interests in Canadian development assistance policy, we must first turn to the various theories concerning the role of interest groups in the policy process.¹

¹ See, for example, Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, 1985, 68-70; Paul Pross, 1992, 3-5, 14-15, 119-121, 140-163; Kim Nossal, 1989b, 107; David Dewitt and John Kirton, 1983, 167; Robert Jackson and Michael Atkinson, 1974, 35-37; W.M. Dobell, 1985, 35-37; David Taras, 1985, 7-9; Michael Atkinson and William Coleman, 1989, 47-54; Michael Tucker, 1980, 43; John Kirton and Blair Dimock, 1983-84, 92-96; and George Hoberg, 1993, 319.

Interest groups are defined by Robert Prethus as “collectivities organized around an explicit value on behalf of which essentially political demands are made vis-à-vis government, other groups, and the general public” (1973, 99). There are numerous ways that interest groups attempt to exert influence on governments, an important one of which is the submission of briefs to parliamentary committees.²

The Pluralist Perspective on the Role of Interest Groups

In his 1983 work, “Canadian Policy Toward the Third World: The Search for a Paradigm,” Cranford Pratt discusses three theoretical perspectives that explain the role of domestic influences in shaping Canadian foreign policy (1983, 2, 6). These are pluralism, statism, and dominant class theory. On a particular policy issue, such as ODA, it is possible to infer which of these

² In addition to the submission of briefs, other methods for groups to exert influence include: letters, social contacts, telephone calls, meetings with bureaucrats, ministers, caucus and Members of Parliament at both the federal and provincial levels, as well as administering programs, acting as regulatory bodies, and engendering public support.

theoretical perspectives is most explanatory by determining the relative influence of different types of groups.

According to Pratt, the pluralist³ theory of democratic society is built upon several premises (1983, 6). The first premise maintains that an important role for the citizen rests in creating numerous structures, or groups, in which citizens express their needs in a political manner. The second premise holds (as consensus is the goal) that mediation among these groups is necessary for democracy to work. Third, it is incumbent upon interest groups to become adept at “playing the game” in order to participate effectively - all of which, in turn, further the system’s legitimacy. In short, individuals with common interests form associations that strive to achieve political success dependent upon the development of lobbying skills.

Kim Nossal suggests that pluralism posits an equal role for the numerous interests which form civil society in which the state is seen as a passive tool for the implementation of these

³ See, for example, Elizabeth Riddel-Dixon, 1985, 72-73; Réal Lavergne, 1989, 33-90; Robert Jackson and Michael Atkinson, 1974, 6, 35; David Taras, 1985, 7; George Hoberg, 1993, 319-321; Paul Pross, 1992, 23, 73-78; and W.M. Dobell, 1985, 35-37.

interests⁴ (1983-84, 3). A variation of this perspective, neopluralism, holds that certain elites are “more equal” than others in their ability to translate their preferences into state action (Nossal, 1983-84, 4). Further, Pratt argues “pluralist theories have difficulty doing justice to the hard fact that the interest groups which are effective in our society are in fact not broadly representative. Instead...the corporate sector...is vastly the most influential” (1983, 7). Although most pluralists do not deny this fact, they argue, rather, that the benefit to society as a whole is not undermined (Presthus, 1973, 349). However, Pratt argues that this “benefit to society” ignores the class bias of the system and leads to “elite accommodation...reflect[ing] a maldistribution of political resources that is perhaps universal” in the viewpoint of pluralists (1983, 8).

Under both pluralism and neopluralism, interest groups are granted a considerable opportunity for input into the foreign policy process. But this societal focus of much of pluralist theory fails to realize the importance of the role played by government, in that government is viewed as merely mediatory, rather than as proactive

⁴ It is important to note that it is inherent in this viewpoint that the public interest is the sum of the interests of the groups.

or creative (Pratt, 1983. 8). In fact, pluralist theory gives an “inflated perception of the importance of interest groups” as “the government...is far more manipulative of public opinion” than this theory suggests (Pratt. 1983-84. 107).

Discussion in the literature which addresses the influence of societal actors suggests that there exists little empirical evidence for the prevalence of pluralism: clearly it is more normative than descriptive. Thus, Nossal argues that a liberal pluralist model is effective only in understanding “the interests of individuals and their political activity,” and not in analyzing the effects of this activity on policy-making (1989b. 90). The fact that interest groups are active in *attempting* to have an impact on policy should not be mistaken for influence (Nossal. 1989b, 116).

The Statist Perspective on the Role of Interest Groups

Nossal advances another theoretical model that can be classified as the statist model. In his article “Analyzing the Domestic Sources of Canadian Foreign Policy,” Nossal outlines his arguments for statism as the most suitable theory for understanding the influence of domestic interests on Canadian foreign policy.

Under this theory,⁵ the state is an autonomous entity pursuing its own interests, for it has the power, preference and resources to do so. Logically, the civil service plays an important role under this theory. Policy is necessarily a result of the departmental process in which interest groups, as members of civil society, are accorded very little importance in terms of a role in the policy-making process (Nossal, 1983-84, 7-8). As a consequence, the state uses interest groups to achieve its own interests, rather than the opposite - interest groups using the state to achieve their own goals - which is the process described by pluralists (Nossal, 1983-84, 8-9).

Therefore, Nossal argues (1983-84, 7, 17) that statism is the most applicable theory in examining the domestic determinants of foreign policy, since it: a) provides for an explanation for circumstances in which foreign policy reflects only the state's interests, and no other; and b) takes into consideration the fact that most historical analyses have concluded that policy is a product of accommodations reached among the contending views and interests

⁵ See, for example, Kim Richard Nossal, 1983-84, 1-22; 1989b, 90; David Dewitt and John Kirton, 1983, 114; John Kirton and Blair Dimock, 1983-84, 68-69; Mark Neufield, 1995, 7-29; David Gillies, 1987, 29; and Michael Tucker, 1980, 43.

of governmental officials.⁶

Pratt argues that proponents of statism maintain that the government is relatively independent in the foreign policy process. Under statism, linkages between government departments and sectors of the economy demonstrate a dominant role for governmental actors. These actors seek allies in their dual pursuit of influence and the Government's interests. The statist perspective, therefore, does not provide for much real effect on policy stemming from interest group action (Pratt, 1983, 8). Further, as a result of this focus on government, the statist perspective emphasizes procedural processes within the governmental structure rather than emphasizing how interest groups might influence these processes (Pratt, 1983, 8).

In contrast to pluralism's group inputs and government mediation, it is understandable why statism finds favour in analyses of foreign policy, as its language deals with the *national interest*. However, as Pratt points out, this term is "hopelessly unusable for it leaves one without either an objective meaning...or any clear test

⁶ It is important to note that many of these analyses had a specific focus on governmental actors and were undertaken prior to the literature's more recent focus on interest groups in its organizational theories.

of which actual policies are, and which are not, compatible with it” (1983, 9).

Although Nossal admits that there exists no convincing *objective* definition of the national interest, he argues that government officials “inexorably” bring to office some *subjective* conceptions of it, or have them inculcated through their many years within the state apparatus (1984, 4). In addition, he suggests that administrative imperatives, common to all organizations, provide a source from which interests are derived (1984, 4). Finally, the career aspirations of individual officials provide a third set of interests (Nossal, 1984, 5). Thus, under statism, it is the interests of the state, rather than societal interests (as suggested by pluralism), or the ruling class (as suggested by dominant class theory, to be discussed below) that prevail (Nossal, 1984, 5-6).

A variation of statism - modified statism - accords a greater role for economic interests since they, and the state, are both supported by the maintenance of the capitalist system. Nossal himself forecasted this when he wrote in 1984: “a state committed...to the elimination of the right of private ownership would be an appropriate test of statist theory, but the situation *is unlikely to arise*” (1984, 7). [Italics mine]

In The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy (1989), Nossal proposes that by determining the issues to be dealt with, and more importantly, in “defining the bounds of acceptable policy actions,” interest groups *may* influence state behaviour (Nossal, 1989b, 117). However, since the agenda may be large and the boundaries broad, the state “may be compelled to act, but not in a specific manner” (Nossal, 1989b, 116). Clearly, in this five year period Nossal moved from a statist to a modified statist position.

As Pratt emphasizes (1983, 10), statism has much in common with the third theory we shall examine, dominant class theory, for both view the state as having a significant autonomy to pursue its self-determined goals.

The Dominant Class Perspective on the Role of Interest Groups

Dominant class theory⁷ maintains that the capitalist class within civil society has a large degree of influence over the policies

⁷ See, for example, Pratt’s non-marxist variation 1983-84, 276; 1990a, 156-57, 161; 1996, 35-258; Linda Freeman’s neomarxist variation 1980; 1982, 479-504; 1985, 107-139; Robert Carty and Virginia Smith, 1981, 46; and Michael Atkinson and William Coleman, 1989, 50-54.

of the state. The state's dependence on capital growth defines the consequent competing goals of aid policy that occur between those with counter consensus or economic concerns. Further, under this perspective, two central assumptions are made: the first is the close relationship between those who rule and those who own and control the means of production; the second is the partial autonomy of the state to manage its affairs (Pratt, 1983, 11).

Within this paradigm, there is a role for interest groups to interact with government. This role, according to Pratt, has two functions. One is to provide a means for governmental actors to keep abreast of the needs of economic interest groups. The second is to allow the state to maintain ruling class hegemony by making moderate concessions. These concessions are made to what Pratt terms the "associated and subordinate classes," as opposed to those who neither form an integral part of the ruling class nor challenge the state's dominant ideology (1983, 12).

Within dominant class theory there are two approaches: instrumental and structural. The former maintains the state is reactive to the dominant class, or, in more familiar terms, the state is a tool of the bourgeoisie (Nossal, 1983-84, 5). However, Pratt pointedly writes that this theory "should suggest only a pervasive bias, not an omnipresent determinant. Policy can be determined by

irrational convictions that last for significant periods and are in defiance of the rational interests of the bourgeoisie” (1983, 12). The structural approach maintains that the state has a degree of autonomy from the dominant class; thus, it survives by mediating among conflicting demands that, in the long term, serve the interests of the dominant class. This explains why certain undertakings may have the appearance of being contrary to dominant class interests.

Whether in the vein of instrumentalism or structuralism, the tying of aid (the practice of requiring that ODA provided to a developing country be used by that country to procure goods and services from the donor country, even when cheaper goods may be available) is seen to demonstrate the capitalist classes' dominance in the development of aid policy (Carty and Smith, 1981, 102; Freeman, 1982, 108). This is a result of what Pratt argues is the corporate bias informing Canada's ODA policy (1983-84, 276). As further evidence of this bias, he argues that due to commitments being overruled in favour of Canada's economic interests, a general erosion of the need for greater inclusiveness in policy-making has occurred since it was emphasized in Strategy for International Development 1975-80 (Pratt, 1983-84, 273).

In addition, Pratt provides the examples of the historically

cites the financial dependence of the major parties upon corporate and/or wealthy backers, and the upper-middle to upper class socioeconomic background of the majority of governmental actors as evidence to support his contention that "government policy-making...will be particularly responsive to the needs of the corporate sector" (1983, 13-16).

Nossal criticizes the ability of the dominant class theory to surpass the explanatory powers of statism. First, he does not presume that state officials are *not* "socialized and politicized" before serving office (Nossal, 1984, 7), allowing for class biases among government officials and/or bureaucrats. This is, therefore, homogeneous to what Pratt argues is accounted for only by the dominant class theory. Nor does Nossal fail to recognize a "general predilection" for capitalism or linkages among the elected and the electors (Nossal, 1984, 7). Thus, since statist theory can also account for these issues, the dominant class theory is by no means superior in his view. In short, Nossal argues, statism does not assume that the state operates *in extremis*.

Thus, the difference between Pratt and Nossal's views is that the former maintains that the purpose of the capitalist state's actions are to ensure its unity and the reproduction of its conditions of production: The structural requirements of the system are the

only determinants for Canada's ODA program (Pratt, 1983, 10, 21). In contrast, Nossal argues that Canada's ODA policies are "motivated by a 'minimax' calculus of contending interests in international standing and prestige, bureaucratic maintenance and limiting real expenditures." where the first two interests are maximized, while the last interest is minimized" (1989a, 257). He terms this disposition of government the minimax mixed-motive model, in which the state, and not the capitalist system, provides the impetus for Canada's ODA program.

Based on the assessment of the differences among the pluralist, statist, and dominant class perspectives concerning the domestic influences of interest groups on foreign policy, it is clear that an *ex post facto* examination of the ODA policy process can suggest a number of conclusions concerning interest group influence. However, the previous discussion indicates that the neopluralist, structural dominant class, or modified statist theories are those most useful when examining interest group influence, as all three suggest a role for interest groups - economic interest groups most notably. In addition, both the structural dominant class and modified statist theories suggest an active role for the state in pursuing policy.

Congruence

The issue of congruence, as it is at the core of this study analyzing the influence of the three types of groups, must be explained. The existence of any congruence, *prima facie*, will suggest that there is evidence of the relevance of pluralism: it can also be suggest that government policy satisfied the demands of all interest groups. However, with the combination of congruency measurements and interest group typologies, the prevalent influence of one type of group over the others can be more clearly indicated.

To develop the analysis further, Table 1:1 indicates what degree of influence (if any) interest groups may have according to the three theoretical perspectives and their variations:

TABLE 1:1

**INFLUENCE OF THE THREE TYPES OF GROUPS ACCORDING TO
THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES**

<u>THEORY:</u>	<u>TYPES OF GROUPS:</u>		
	<u>PG</u>	<u>SIEG</u>	<u>SINEG</u>
1. Pluralism	√	√	√
2. Neopluralism	√	√√	√
3. Statism	x	x	x
4. Modified Statism	√-I	√	√-I
5. Instrumental Dominant Class	x	√√	x
6. Structural Dominant Class	√-II	√√	√-II

Notes:

PG	Promotional Groups
SIEG	Self-interested Economic Groups
SINEG	Self-interested Non-economic Groups
√	Influence
√√	Greater influence
x	No influence
√-I	Incidental influence
√-II	Influence due only to hegemony-maintaining concessions

Any testing that demonstrates congruency between the recommendations of the Committee and the Government's intended policy (termed *the state* for simplicity in this section) and the demands of all three types of groups will therefore be indicative of

pluralism. Any testing that demonstrates congruency between the state and the demands of all three types of groups, but with a higher level of congruency between the state and self-interested economic groups, will therefore be indicative of neopluralism.

If there is no congruency between the state and the demands of all three types of groups, then there will be evidence for the relevance of statist theory. However, if there is evidence of congruency between the state and self-interested economic groups, and any other congruency between the state and promotional and self-interested non-economic groups appears to be incidental (that is, only due to the groups' submissions having matched the predetermined interests of the state), then modified statism will be indicated.

Congruency between the state and the demands of only self-interested economic groups will be indicative of instrumental dominant class theory. However, evidence of congruency between the state and self-interested economic groups, and any other congruency between the state and promotional and self-interested non-economic groups which appears to be due to hegemony-maintaining concessions (that is, the majority of, or most important, decisions still serve the goals of the dominant class) will be indicative of structural dominant class theory.

By testifying before the Committee, interest groups demonstrated their belief in the importance of the process, making possible the study of the potential influence of these groups on policy. Before examining the issues, a review of the evolution of Canadian aid policy is beneficial to assist in determining which theoretical perspective the policy-making process continues to support and how the issues have come to be defined over time.

CHAPTER TWO

The Evolution of Canadian Official Development Assistance Policy

In order to understand how the Federal Government develops and attains its policy goals, it is necessary to consider both historic and current government policies concerning Canadian development assistance. A review of the evolution of Canadian aid policy is also beneficial to assist in verifying which theoretical perspective of interest group activity the policy-making process tends to support. Further, such a review also outlines how issues have come to be defined. As a result, in this chapter government documents, specifically the reports of prior committees, Governments' responses to these reports, and their policy statements will be analyzed to ascertain if there are discernible trends in the progression of Canadian development assistance policy.

This chapter describes the 20 development assistance issues to be coded and analyzed in Chapter Three that were also largely, or in part, contained within the three parliamentary reviews of 1971, 1980, and 1987. These issues were also addressed in the resulting Government statements of official development assistance policy:

Strategy for International Development Cooperation 1975-1980, To Benefit A Better World, and Sharing Our Future. It must be noted that not all 20 issues were addressed by each of the documents analyzed, as some issues tend to be prominent in one period and not in the next. However, within this brief history of the evolution in Canadian policy, under each of the 20 themes the background of each issue as it developed before the 1994 review can be assessed.

As Crookes outlines, Canada's development assistance program originated as a parallel program to the United States' post-World War II Marshall Plan and from its participation with other Commonwealth powers in the Colombo Plan (1990, 41-49). Its reach soon extended from Europe to Africa (especially Francophone Africa), Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America. The type (and therefore, purpose) of aid provided shifted from 1) infrastructure rebuilding, 2) altruistic actions (those which characterized what has been termed Canada's internationalist period of foreign policy), and 3) the goal of containing communism, to 1) the promotion of Canadian goods and services and 2) the further enhancement of Canada in the world system.

An examination of the 20 issues will allow a better understanding of this development. The issue-by-issue examination is structured according to the chronology of the parliamentary

reviews of 1971, 1980, and 1987, *vis-à-vis* these reviews' respective committee recommendations and government statements.

TABLE 2:1

THE ISSUES:

- 1). DEGREE OF FOCUS ON BASIC NEEDS
 - 2). FOOD AID
 - 3). EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE
 - 4). AID AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP
 - 5). AID UNTYING
 - 6). AID-HUMAN RIGHTS LINKAGE/DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT
 - 7). HUMAN RIGHTS & BILATERAL CUTS
 - 8). SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT (ICHRDD)
 - 9). WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT
 - 10). STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
 - 11). ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY
 - 12). NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS
 - 13). AREA FOCUS
 - 14). DEGREE OF FOCUS ON LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
 - 15). NON-AID ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS
 - 16). DEBT ALLEVIATION
 - 17). PARALLEL FINANCING
 - 18). BUSINESS PROMOTION VIA THE EXPORT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (EDC) AND/OR THE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION PROGRAM (INC)
 - 19). LEVEL OF NGO ACTIVITY
 - 20). ODA LEGISLATION
-

1) Basic Needs

The term *basic needs* refers to “needs such as health, education, nutrition, shelter, water and sanitation” (Canada, 1994e, 49-50). Basic needs has remained a central consideration in the ODA literature, assuming a considerable significance in most documents’ analyses of ODA’s goals and requirements.

For example, in the 1971 report of the Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee on External Affairs (the Lachance Report), the issue of basic needs, as a part of human resource development, was prominently addressed with an emphasis on education (Canada, 1971, 29). The Government’s response, Strategy for International Development Cooperation 1975-1980, indicated that, as a crucial issue on which to focus, priority be given to meeting basic needs (Canada, 1975, 23, 25).

In 1980, the report of the Parliamentary Task Force on North-South Relations specified the necessity of access to basic human needs for effective sustainable development (Canada, 1980, 13). The Government responded in 1981 by concurring that basic needs was, and would remain, one of the central thrusts of ODA policy (Canada, 1981, 4, 6).

The 1987 report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (the Winegard Committee) again

emphasized the importance of basic needs, focusing on primary health care, education, and women in development (Canada, 1987b, 14-19). In addition, “basic needs human development [was to] be strongly integrated into all bilateral country programming” (Canada, 1987b, 64). To these recommendations the Government concurred in both its response (Canada, 1987a, 44-45, 72-73), and in a statement which indicated that basic needs would remain a “thematic objective” of Canada’s ODA program (Canada, 1987c, 91).

2) Food Aid

Food aid delineates foodstuffs, notably wheat, or funding (in the case of untied food aid) provided to needy countries in times of a shortfall, or in severe cases, famine. The Lachance Report challenged the dependence created by the volume of food shipped to aid recipients, claiming that it undermined domestic food production. As a result, it recommended a reduction in food aid (Canada, 1971, 29). The Government responded that food aid was a short term palliative, yet stated it would set food aid’s portion of the ODA budget at 25 per cent. However, this was to be done while channelling more through multilateral channels, allowing up to 20 per cent of the total food aid to be procured untied by less-developed countries (LDCs) (Canada, 1975, 11, 35).

The 1980 Task Force recommended that there should be more untied procurement from aid recipients' neighbours allowed and argued for an improvement of measures towards attaining self-reliance in the food aid program (Canada, 1980, 49). In the Government's response, it stated that food aid was to be used only as a transitional measure, concurring with the Task Force's recommendations (Canada, 1981, 7).

The Winegard Committee similarly recommended that untying be allowed where a neighbouring LDC has an exportable surplus of food, but that food aid not exceed 10 per cent of ODA (Canada, 1987b, 39, 58). The Government, in its response and statement, accepted the former, while rejecting the latter, calling food aid an "effective and flexible instrument" worthy of an annual ODA budgetary increase of 5 per cent (Canada, 1987a, 70; Canada, 1987c, 92-93).

3) Emergency Assistance

Emergency assistance consists of humanitarian relief, usually in response to natural disasters, wars, or famines. The Lachance Committee recommended this assistance should remain available as required, but separate from food aid (Canada, 1971, 29). As emergency assistance demanded both contingency planning and

provisions beyond the level of preparedness of the Government of that time. the response of the Government included adding more funds and strengthening current capabilities by improving coordination with both the international community and domestic resources (Canada, 1975, 37). In its 1981 response, the Government concurred with the Task Force's recommendation that a larger portion of ODA funds be allotted for meeting emergencies by doubling funds available in 1981-82 (Canada, 1981, 6).

The first recommendation of the Winegard Committee was that while emergency assistance should continue to be provided on compassionate grounds, it should be monitored to prevent abuse (Canada, 1987b, 26-27). The second was that a 2 per cent (of total ODA) figure for emergency assistance be a base minimum (Canada, 1987b, 56). Both recommendations were accepted in the Government's response (Canada, 1987a, 49, 69) and statement (Canada, 1987c, 91-92).

4) Aid as a Percentage of GNP

By setting an aid target of 0.7 per cent of GNP by the year 1975-76, the Lachance Report recommended attaining the official United Nations's target (Canada, 1971, 29). The Government's response in 1975 chastised those donor nations that were lapsing,

reaffirming its own commitment to the goal by highlighting its progress to a rate of 0.52 per cent of GNP which was attained in 1974-75 (Canada, 1975, 12, 24).

The 1980 Task Force again recommended the Government commit to achieving the 0.7 per cent target, this time by 1990, with 0.57 per cent by 1985 as an interim target (Canada, 1980, 49). The Government's response was non-committal, stating "a review [is] now underway on what should be the path for ODA to 0.5 and 0.7 per cent of the GNP in order to ensure a smooth growth and better programming of aid funds" (Canada, 1981, 3).

By 1987, it was clear to the members of the Winegard Committee that the 0.7 per cent target was unrealistic, as it had continually been postponed due to the Government's commitment to reduce its debts. Thus, it first recommended, as part of legislation establishing CIDA and an ODA charter, that the Government commit to a "secure floor" minimum annual level of 0.5 per cent. In addition, it recommended that, beginning in the fiscal year 1988-89, progress towards achieving 0.6 per cent by 1995-96 be initiated. There was no mention of a date at which this was expected, or when the 0.7 per cent target would be achieved (Canada, 1987b, 123-24). The Government agreed to the Committee's recommendations in its response, but not with the need for legislation (Canada, 1987a,

103). As well, in its statement, the Government committed to the goal of 0.7 per cent by the year 2000 (Canada, 1987c, 91).

5) Aid Untying

This term refers to either ceasing, or at least, reducing the common practice of requiring that ODA provided to a developing country be used by that country to procure goods and services from the donor country. Untying of aid, specifically at the multilateral level, was emphasized in the Lachance Report (Canada, 1971, 29). The Government addressed the issue in its response by stating that the majority of member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) “declared their readiness to join in an agreement on the untying of bilateral development loans in favour of procurement in developing countries” (Canada, 1975, 12). But Canada, which as part of the DAC did not declare its readiness to do the same, did agree to “study the implications of untying a greater proportion of bilateral allocations,” and press for greater liquidity of resource transfers via multilateral organizations combined with contributing to these transfers in the form of untied grants or loans (Canada, 1975, 31, 32).

The 1980 Task Force recommended that procurement for aid projects be consistent with development assistance objectives. “Although a significant proportion should be procured in Canada, CIDA should be freed from any fixed percentage rule” (Canada, 1980, 40). In its response, the Government agreed that a more flexible approach seemed to have some merit and would be studied further, but it found that existing regulations had not constrained selection and implementation of development projects (Canada, 1981, 5).

In the Winegard Report, recommendations were made to move quickly to implement the guidelines on goods procurement practices for ODA adopted at a DAC meeting in 1986 - to relax the 80 per cent rule towards 50 per cent (thus somewhere between 20 per cent and 50 per cent of ODA would be untied). It also recommended that CIDA have the freedom to waive tying requirements for the least-developed countries (LLDCs) in Sub-Saharan Africa (Canada, 1987b, 39). The Government accepted the first recommendation; however, it specified an allowance for an untied aid level of 50 per cent only for LDCs, with other countries qualifying for only 33 1/3 per cent. The second recommendation, that aid tying be waived for LLDCs, was accepted, although in rather ambiguous language (Canada, 1987a, 57-58). Notably, in the Government’s statement, Sharing Our Future, only the second recommendation and agreement received mention

(Canada, 1987c, 52). As it explained, the Government considered the real issue to be the appropriate level of tying and not whether there should be tying of aid at all, since it would be counter-productive to subsidize Canada's competitors (Canada, 1987c, 51).

6) Aid-Human Rights / Democratic Development

Human rights, as inalienable basic freedoms, are linked to democratic institutions and practices that, in turn, reinforce human rights. An example is democracy's rule of law, under which arbitrary arrest (freedom from such an occurrence being a human right) by a state's agents is forbidden. The linkage between human rights and ODA was first drawn by the Winegard Report in 1987. It stated that "human rights must be seen as an integral part of development, not as a factor separate from or incidental to the basic needs of the poor" (Canada, 1987b, 26). Thus, the report highlighted the need to link aid with the observance of specific human rights standards by recipients of Canadian ODA (Canada, 1987b, 23). The Government agreed only partially, claiming that cultural particularisms (without stating them) barred it from determining minimum standards. Thus, the Government was not willing to affirm that there are inalienable human rights and its ODA allotments be linked to their observations (Canada, 1987a, 50).

In addition, the Committee made several recommendations towards the establishment of an operational framework for the monitoring of human rights (Canada, 1987b, 27-31). The committee recommended that:

- a) a Human Rights Unit be established within CIDA (accepted by the Government) (Canada, 1987a, 51);
- b) CIDA use a classification grid by which to classify recipient countries' adherence to human rights standards to be included in its annual report to Parliament (both the grid and public knowledge of *in camera* subject matter that might occur from its inclusion in CIDA's annual report to Parliament were rejected) (Canada, 1987a, 52-53);
- c) an annual ODA-Human Rights Review to Parliament be made by CIDA/DEA and referred to SCEAIT and SCHR (rejected as this would not "serve the foreign policy interests of Canada") (Canada, 1987a, 53-54);
- d) countries deemed to be grossly violating human rights be declared ineligible for bilateral ODA (accepted in principle) (Canada, 1987a, 54);
- e) all CIDA country program reviews and project approval documents have a human rights analysis section (accepted by the Government with a less-stringent condition that the information be provided to Cabinet rather than being a standard format on all documents) (Canada, 1987a, 55);
- f) close consultations regarding human rights evaluations be undertaken with Canadian NGOs (accepted by the Government) (Canada, 1987a, 55); and

g) human rights concerns become part of the agenda of IFIs (accepted in principle by the Government). (Canada, 1987a, 56).

The Government reaffirmed these intentions in its follow up statement of policy (Canada, 1987c, 93).

7) Human Rights and Bilateral Cuts

The Winegard Committee was very clear in its language when it stated that countries deemed "human rights negative be automatically declared ineligible to receive direct government-to-government assistance" (Canada, 1987b, 30). The Government agreed, but with considerably weaker language, stating that "the Government takes into consideration" the issue (Canada, 1987a, 54-55). In its statement, the Government expressed further that "where there are ...violations of basic human rights, Cabinet will deny *or reduce* government-to-government aid." again diminishing the impact of the Committee's strong recommendations concerning human rights (Canada, 1987c, 93).

8) ICHRDD Support

SCEAIT proposed in late 1986 that an independent institute, mandated to be pro-active in building democratic human rights

institutions in recipient countries, be established. It was to be named the International Institute of Human Rights and Democratic Development (IIHRDD), later to be renamed the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD) (Canada, 1987b. 30-31). The Government agreed to the institute's distinct mandate in its 1987 response, announcing later in its statement "its intention to establish an institute for human rights and democratic development" (Canada, 1987c. 93).

9) Women in Development

In the 1980 Task Force's report, it was recommended that a "higher priority be given to education and development of skills of women" in the ODA program, to which the Government concurred (Canada, 1980, 39; Canada, 1981, 4).

In the 1987 review, the Winegard Committee made the recommendation that a larger part of ODA "be channelled to projects that are developed by, and directed at, women, particularly at the grass roots level" as one of the program's priorities (Canada, 1987b, 16). The Government agreed to attain this goal, pledging as well to extend the consultative process to women's groups (Canada, 1987a, 44). This was reaffirmed as a thematic objective of ODA by the Government in its statement (Canada, 1987c, 91).

10) Structural Adjustment

Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) are lending programs of IFIs, such as the World Bank (WB), the International Development Association (IDA), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that require recipient countries to, usually dramatically, restructure their fiscal practices, including debt and deficit-reducing measures. These measures are often very radical, rapid and pervasive, thus altering the countries' practices. As a result, societies face incredible changes with little or no preparation, since many of the cuts come from social programs. Understandably, there is a large amount of criticism of SAPs, for often years of work in certain areas have been nullified due to stringent restructuring requirements made by lenders.

In the early 1970s, the future effects of SAPs were not yet realized. The only early mention had the government indicate that it would continue to support IFIs (and their SAPs) by participating actively in the formulation of their policies and programs (Canada, 1975, 22).

But by the time of the 1980 Task Force's review, both the WB and the IMF were targeted for reforms such as: greater borrowing privileges, increased responsiveness, and creating special drawing rights. The government agreed to work with these organizations in

order to pursue these reforms (Canada, 1981, 3-4).

By 1987, SAPs were recognized as bringing neither real benefits to the poor nor even mitigating the effects of the adjustments on the poor (Canada, 1987b, 47). Thus, the Winegard Report made several recommendations concerning the issue. The first was that CIDA ensure that SAPs reinforce or at least be consistent with the basic objectives of Canada's ODA program (Canada, 1987b, 47). Canadian representatives on the governing boards of IFIs were directed to "promote approaches to structural adjustment lending in developing countries that fully address the effect of economic policy conditionality on the poorest people" and Canada's bilateral program was directed to ensure that SAP programs were adequately funded for the long-term, an obvious response to some of the devastating "slash and burn" policies of the period (Canada, 1987b, 49). The Government concurred in both its response and statement (Canada, 1987a, 47-49; Canada, 1987c, 93) to all of the above.

11) Environmental Sustainability

Environmental sustainability, the practice of ensuring that development projects promote responsible use of resources, was recommended by the Lachance Report to ensure an emphasis on

environmental protections within the development process (Canada, 1971, 29). The Government's response of 1975 did not address these concerns.

In 1980, the Task Force recommended that Canada should encourage projects which "use renewable and locally available sources of energy," give priority to reforestation in its agricultural aid, and work with other industrialized countries to implement energy conservation measures (Canada, 1980, 58-59). In its response, the Government agreed to all three recommendations.

In the Winegard Report, the environment received considerable attention. In moving that a Development Assistance Charter be adopted as part of a legislated mandate for Canada's ODA program, the Committee recommended that "Canadian development assistance should work always to strengthen the human and institutional capacity of developing countries to solve their own problems in harmony with the natural environment" (Canada, 1987b, 12). It also recommended that CIDA ensure that environmental impact assessments be carried out for large capital projects, especially for those in the forestry and energy sectors (Canada, 1987b, 64). In its response, the Government recognized ecological management and energy availability, diversification, and use as challenges to development (Canada, 1987a, 20).

The response established that, as a thematic objective of ODA:

Environmentally sound development which is ecologically sustainable, responsive to human needs and appropriate to the circumstances of the particular developing country or region, including environmental assessment of all capital projects and encouraging the adoption of environmental strategies [be pursued].
(Canada, 1987a, 23)

In the Government's statement, Sharing Our Future, a non-legislated charter was proposed which stated that an aim of ODA is to "strengthen the ability of people and institutions in developing countries to solve their own problems in harmony with the natural environment," very much in accordance with the Committee's language (Canada, 1987c, 23).

12) Number of Recipients

The Lachance Committee highlighted the probable effectiveness of a specific, narrowed focus for Canada's ODA program (Canada, 1971, 29). In its statement of 1975, the Government pledged to concentrate its bilateral development programs on a limited number of countries (Canada, 1975, 27).

That bilateral aid should be concentrated in fewer countries was also supported by the Government in its response to the Task

Force's report of 1980. However, this was to occur while remaining sensitive to humanitarian and other foreign policy considerations (Canada, 1981, 5).

The Winegard Committee recommended that the total number of core program countries not exceed 30, with these countries receiving at least 80 per cent of total direct bilateral aid (Canada, 1987b, 66-67). The Government welcomed these recommendations, pledging to propose a new eligibility system (Canada, 1987a, 75). It did this in its statement, which proposed a more focused bilateral aid program, but with only 75 per cent of ODA concentrated on 30 countries or regional groupings (Canada, 1987c, 92).

13) Area Focus

The area or regional focus of Canada's ODA program was to "continue to reflect the traditional distribution of Canada's bilateral assistance among the major areas of the world." according to the statement of the Government of 1975 (Canada, 1975, 27). In addition, regional cooperative enterprises would be encouraged and promoted (Canada, 1975, 28). This was congruent with the recommendations of the Lachance Report (Canada, 1971, 29).

The 1980 review did not contain specific references to an area focus for Canada's ODA program. However, the Winegard Report did,

emphasizing that the attention paid to Africa was not misplaced, and recommending that “distribution of bilateral ODA among CIDA’s regional branches [i.e. areas] maintain roughly its current balance. (Canada, 1987b, 61). The Government concurred in its response (Canada, 1987a, 71). Further, in its statement, the Government presented a specific allocation formula: 45 per cent to Africa, 39 to Asia, and 16 to the Americas (Canada, 1987c, 92).

14) Degree of Focus on Least-Developed Countries

As demonstrated in the Lachance Report, the specific concerns of poor countries was worrisome (Canada, 1971, 29). The Government outlined in its 1975 statement that, as a principle of its ODA program, the direction of its assistance would be to those countries which are at the lower end of the development scale (Canada, 1975, 23). Thus “particular attention will continue to be given to the hardcore least-developed countries identified by the United Nations” (Canada, 1975, 26).

The 1980 Task Force recommended that a high proportion of aid funds be concentrated in the poorest and most seriously affected countries, and the government concurred (Canada, 1981, 5). In its response, the Government affirmed that over 70 per cent of bilateral program assistance would be directed towards the LLDCs; moreover,

it stated that the majority of Canada's multilateral ODA programs would also be directed in the same way (Canada, 1981, 5).

Meeting the needs of the poorest countries and people as the "primary and overriding objective of the Canadian aid program" was the first recommendation that the Winegard Committee made, and it emphasized this in its recommended legislated charter as well (Canada, 1987b, 10, 12). The Government concurred with this recommendation, while still denying the appropriateness of a *legislated* charter (Canada, 1987a, 41). In addition, the Winegard Report recommended that "the strong concentration of CIDA's bilateral aid on low-income countries be maintained" (Canada, 1987b, 61). The Government supported this, reaffirming its objectives of allocating 0.15 per cent of the GNP to LLDCs and at least 75 per cent of its bilateral aid to low-income countries and small island states (Canada, 1987a, 71). This was again emphasized in its accompanying statement (Canada, 1987c, 92).

15) Non-Aid Economic Concessions

Non-aid economic concessions include elements such as trade, monetary reform, investment, shipping, as well as transfers of knowledge and technology. The Lachance Committee recognized that support for education was a key factor in reducing dependency on

donors, as an indigenous, educated population is unquestionably beneficial (Canada, 1971, 29). Tariff and non-tariff barriers as devices for protectionism were concerns for the Committee, as they undermine recipient economic development (Canada, 1971, 29). The Government's 1975 statement outlined its work towards non-aid "multiple instruments," such as IMF Oil Facility subsidies for LLDCs and its General System of Preferences (GSP), which allow importers to import goods duty free while helping domestic companies readjust to import competition (Canada, 1975, 11, 18). As non-aid instruments are generally targeted towards middle and upper range developing nations, as opposed to LLDCs, the Government also stated that it "will carefully weigh the alternatives and tradeoffs between aid and non-aid instruments in particular circumstances in order to find the most appropriate balance for the pursuit of development objectives" (Canada, 1975, 19).

The Winegard Committee report recommended that "as part of a long-term strategy of trade liberalization and adjustment, the Government...work out a realistic agenda for reducing protectionist barriers to developing country imports" (Canada, 1987b, 44). Once more, the Government highlighted its GSP, support for the inclusion of developing nations in trade talks, work with IFIs, and new reduction of domestic quotas (Canada, 1987, 61-62).

16) Debt Alleviation

Alleviation of debt owed to both IFIs and lender nations is a vital issue for developing nations. For much of their meagre GNP may be required to service an ever-increasing debt, as opposed to being put back into domestic schemes that allow the countries to develop as a result of development assistance programs. In 1975 the Government stated that "the current account deficits which threaten many of the developing countries demand an immediate and massive inflow of resources from the rest of the world, if economic collapse and starvation are to be avoided" (Canada, 1975, 11). The World Bank estimated that in 1975 developing nations lost \$14 billion of purchasing power in comparison to the start of the decade. Thus, the government emphasized that whatever funds were forthcoming to LLDCs had to come quickly. It also emphasized the need for IFIs, the OECD and Group of Ten to work in concert with developing nations to assist them with debt-relief (Canada, 1975, 11, 33). More flexible terms of assistance were also announced (Canada, 1975, 30).

The 1980 Task Force made several recommendations that, in combination, were measures to effect debt-relief for developing nations. The first was simply to press other industrialized and oil-exporting countries to increase aid levels, with which the

Government concurred (Canada, 1981, 3). The subsidization of interest charges on future loans made by OPEC countries to oil-importing developing nations with increased voting shares granted to these OPEC countries (to act as an incentive) was also recommended. This recommendation was agreed to by the Government (Canada, 1981, 4).

Yet, by 1987, a “crushing mountain of debt [was] piling up in the developing countries,” so much so that the Winegard Committee feared “that aid agencies risk[ed] being transformed into *de facto* debt relief agencies, with much of development in these countries put on indefinite hold” (Canada, 1987b, 51). Thus, along the lines of the Canadian five-year moratorium on ODA debt for Sub-Saharan African countries, the Committee urged “further remedial action, such as the extension of the moratorium to other official debt,” as well as impressing upon the donor community the need to adopt similar measures, or at the least, partial debt forgiveness, reduced interest rates, or loans for grant conversions (Canada, 1987b, 51-52).

In its response, the Government recognized the need to “relieve the ODA-related debt-servicing burden of selected developing countries which request debt forgiveness, and meet the criteria of need and commitment to economic adjustment” (Canada,

1987a, 26). It concurred with the Committee's recommendations, announcing extensions of debt moratoriums and forgiveness, conversions of loans to grants, and increased efforts to realize similar policies within the international donor community (Canada, 1987a, 67; Canada, 1987c. 93).

17) Parallel Financing

The Government stated that it would strive to obtain greater flexibility in its assistance whenever CIDA, the EDC and any other Canadian institutions undertake parallel financing (which occurs when the government and a partner co-fund a program) in developing countries, with CIDA's input intended to support an overall degree of concessional relations appropriate to the recipients (Canada, 1975, 30).

Since parallel financing is often considered under other partnership elements, such as business promotion via the EDC and/or the INC and level of NGO activity, there is additional discussion of financing considerations in these two categories.

18) Business Promotion Via the EDC and/or the INC

The Export Development Corporation (EDC) and its twin within CIDA, the Industrial Cooperation Program (INC), were designed for

developing countries reaching higher ranges of per capita income and which require capital goods and technological assistance and expertise; their mandate is to promote the export of Canadian goods and services. The Lachance Report stressed the need for all government departments and corporations, such as the EDC, to pursue increased cooperation with CIDA in order to emphasize the development implications of their policies (Canada, 1971, 29). In the Government's statement of 1975, it indicated a willingness to further CIDA-INC's cooperation with the EDC, with parallel lines of credit and joint ventures as examples (Canada, 1975, 34).

The 1980 Task Force recognized the importance of facilitating exports when it recommended an increase in Trade Commissioners abroad, government assistance to the EDC to promote the private sector's ability to develop trade relationships with developing countries, and cooperation with the Department of Finance for import penetration, all to which the Government agreed (Canada, 1981, 10). There was, however, no emphasis on the aid-trade relationship between CIDA-INC and the EDC.

The Winegard Committee adopted a critical stance towards the issue of business promotion where it conflicted with the goals of Canada's ODA program: "We still hear far more about how aid can support our exports than about how trade with us can support their

[developing nations] development” (Canada, 1987b, 43). While recognizing the highly trade-dependent nature of the Canadian economy, the committee’s concern was that “Canada not compete for aid business in ways that deflect us from the basic development priorities outlined in our ODA charter” (Canada, 1987b, 40). As a result, it stressed that the Government ensure that “no part of any Canadian concessional export financing package is counted as ODA unless it meets CIDA’s development criteria as defined in the ODA charter,” and “efforts be made to improve Canada’s export position in developing countries that do not compromise the integrity of the aid program” (Canada, 1987b, 42). Both of these recommendations were accepted by the Government, which also indicated its commitment to the code of conduct proposed by the DAC regarding the use of export credits on a concessional basis.

In addition, the Government pledged not to consider these credits as part of the ODA/GNP ratio (Canada, 1987a, 60). It further announced in its statement of 1987 that, as a part of its Partnership Program, (with one-half of Canadian aid allocated to national and international development partners), the percentage of funding towards CIDA-INC would be doubled between 1987-1992 from 2 to 4 per cent of ODA (Canada, 1987c, 94).

19) Level of NGO Activity

The Lachance Committee supported expanded relations between the Government and NGOs by recommending increased consultations and development through a matching grant program (Canada, 1971. 29). In its statement, the Government affirmed that "priority support will be given to projects and programs of Canadian or international non-governmental organizations directed at the major development issues" (Canada, 1975. 25). The Government recognized the need for a diversity of channels to transfer resources, expecting to allocate from 6 to 10 per cent of ODA to Canadian and international NGOs in the period 1975-80 (Canada, 1975. 35). Most notably, it said of NGOs:

The growing competence of Canadian NGOs and their demonstrated ability to mount substantial programs justify increased financial contributions from the Government, while at the same time preserving the maximum degree of flexibility for private initiatives in the formulation and execution of projects.
(Canada, 1975. 35)

The 1980 Task Force report recommended that NGOs and other partners receive an increased share of ODA, with more projects operated on CIDA's behalf by Canadian NGOs, to which the Government agreed in its response (Canada, 1981. 6).

In 1987, the abilities of NGOs were to a significant extent highlighted by the Winegard Committee, and it strongly emphasized increased cooperation between CIDA and NGOs, with four recommendations made to that effect: 1) maintain NGOs as active and substantial partners, 2) increase funding for NGOs, 3) allow NGOs freedom to operate without geographical restrictions, and 4) hold NGOs to be priority agents (Canada, 1987a, 97). The Government agreed to all of the recommendations, except for the third, to which it responded that it would not finance operations of NGOs in countries deemed ineligible for aid (Canada, 1987a, 85-88). These responses were reaffirmed in its statement as well (Canada, 1987c, 94).

20) ODA Legislation

ODA legislation was first presented in the report of the Winegard Committee in 1987. The report opens with the recommendation that a legislated Development Assistance Charter be adopted by the government in order to create a stronger mandate for Canada's ODA program. The Charter contains three principles that were argued would refocus Canada's ODA program towards a greater responsiveness to true development needs:

- 1). The primary purpose of Canadian official development assistance is to help the poorest countries and people in the world.
- 2). Canadian development assistance should work always to strengthen the human and institutional capacity of developing countries to solve their own problems in harmony with the natural environment.
- 3). Development priorities should always prevail in setting objectives for the ODA program. Where development objectives would not be compromised, complementarity should be sought between the objectives of the aid program and other important foreign policy objectives. (Canada, 1987b, 12)

The purpose of the Charter was to have “a clear and binding declaration of the fundamental purposes of aid, to guide its managers and to inform Canadians and the people of the Third World” (Canada, 1987b, 12).

The Government responded that a fourth principle should be added:

- 4). Development assistance should strengthen the links between Canadian citizens and institutions and those in the Third World. The Government will therefore endeavour to foster a partnership between the people of Canada and the peoples of the Third World. (Canada, 1987a, 41)

The Government also included an abbreviated version of this charter

in its statement of policy (Canada, 1987c, 23). However, the government opted to present the principles in a public statement of policy, avoiding a binding declaration that legislation would entail (Canada, 1987a. 41).

Summary

In her analysis of the three parliamentary reviews of 1971, 1980, and 1987, and of the three government statements of development assistance policy, Strategy for International Development Cooperation 1975-1980, To Benefit A Better World, and Sharing Our Future, Crookes concludes that "one must question the meaningfulness of Ottawa's most recent undertakings on these and other aid issues" (1990, 78). Crookes further argues that:

a comparison of the contents of the six documents reveals some disturbing similarities. Many of the issues, which were raised by the Lachance Committee in 1971 were still under consideration by the Winegard Committee in 1987. That similar issues and recommendations are evident in policy reviews in 1971, 1980 and 1987 is discouraging. How seriously has the government taken the recommendations of the the three parliamentary reviews? On the surface the similarities of the reviews suggest that they have not had much of an impact. (77-78)

Within the documents (save for the uncharacteristic, overtly critical Winegard Report), there is minimal discussion of the apparent inability of previous strategies to alleviate conditions of poverty among the poorest nations. There is much room in this area to reprove Canada's earlier emphasis on large-scale infrastructure projects, aid-trade/tied-aid relationships, and top-down policy development.

This is the reason for many of the critical stances taken by some interest groups towards the announcement of the 1994 review, as Pratt's statement denotes: "Major developments in the years 1989 to 1993 [December of which, then Minister of Foreign Affairs André Ouellet announced the initiation of the 1994 review] illustrate and help to explain the rapid decline of the importance of humane internationalist considerations in the shaping of Canada's aid policies" (1993-94, 102). These developments included: severe slashes to CIDA's budget, CIDA's full endorsement of SAPs, and the struggle for coherent policies within CIDA as evidenced by its increased attachment to foreign policy and trade objectives. For these reasons, Pratt expected the 1994 review to result in cuts to bilateral aid, matched with an increasing concentration in those countries deemed by the Government and Canadian businesses to be of foreign policy and commercial interest.

Chapter Three and Four will detail, issue by issue, whether or not the most recent foreign policy review continues the trend. Do the same issues, with the same recommendations and responses, reoccur? Does the foreign policy review of 1994 reaffirm the criticism that the Canadian government continues to make intentions of policy known that are not then followed in practice? Moving from the specific issues to the interest groups that raised them, do the data demonstrate congruency which would suggest that some or all of the three types of groups had influence? If so, which theoretical perspective is most applicable in determining the foreign policy-making process of the 1994 review?

CHAPTER THREE

Findings

This chapter presents the primary data collected from the examination of the written submissions made to the Committee reviewing Canadian foreign policy. Interest groups' positions on 20 development assistance issues are compared to the recommendations set out in the Committee's report as well as the Government's response (presented in Appendix B). On this basis, it is possible to determine the degree of congruence between the three, thus providing insight into which issues produced the greatest agreement. From this evidence, inferences may be drawn concerning the ability of interest groups to influence the policy-making process.

As outlined in the Introduction, 73 interest groups' written submissions to the reviewing Committee are coded according to 20 development issues drawn from the Committee's recommendations and the Government's response.

The Issues

1) Basic Needs

Basic needs remained a central consideration in the 1994 review in both the Committee's recommendations and Government's response (Canada, 1994e, 48; Canada, 1995c, 58, 60, 64). The Committee recommended, and the Government concurred, that increased support should be provided for basic needs. Specifically, on the position: "Basic needs funding be increased to 25 per cent of the ODA program budget, an increase from the previous 20 per cent." Table 3:1 shows the following distribution:

TABLE 3:1

ISSUE: 1) DEGREE OF FOCUS ON BASIC NEEDS

<u>Interest Group Categories:</u>		<u>With Committee:</u>			
		CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. :	NOT APP.
Promotional		40			13
Self-Int.	Econ.	7	1		6
Self-Int.	Non-Ec.	1			5
	<u>TOTALS:</u>	48	1		24
		<u>With Government Response:</u>			
		CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. :	NOT APP.
Promotional		40			13
Self-Int.	Econ.	7	1		6
Self-Int.	Non-Ec.	1			5
	<u>TOTALS:</u>	48	1		24

With 49 of 73 groups (67.1 per cent) making recommendations, there was clearly widespread attention devoted to this issue. In addition, data suggest there was widespread support for an increase in basic needs funding. There was also strong congruence among all three group types, the Committee, and the Government. Promotional groups clearly were the most vocal concerning basic needs, with forty commenting on the issue. Seven of the self-interested economic groups commented, as did one of the self-interested non-economic groups. One of the self-interested economic groups⁸ indicated only partial support for the basic needs increase.

2) Food Aid

Quite interestingly, food aid does not receive mention in either the Committee's recommendations or the Government's response in the 1994 review. Since this was an issue addressed in previous reviews, the number of times food aid was mentioned in the groups' submissions was surveyed. However, as we see in Table 3:2, it did not occasion very much comment by interest groups, as only four groups commented on it. Clearly, it is an issue of little current importance to interest groups, the Committee, or the Government.

⁸ Canadian Chamber of Commerce.

TABLE 3:2

ISSUE: 2) FOOD AID

Interest Group Categories:

Promotional	3
Self-Int. Econ.	1
Self-Int. Non-Ec.	
<u>TOTALS:</u>	4

3) Emergency Assistance

The key position on which congruence is measured is: "Although emergency assistance is an important part of ODA, it must be tied to long term development" - the position which the Committee recommended, and with which the Government concurred (Canada, 1994e, 56; Canada, 1995c, 69).

TABLE 3:3

ISSUE: 3) EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE

Interest Group Categories:

With Committee:

	CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. :	NOT APP.
Promotional	7			46
Self-Int. Econ.	3			11
Self-Int. Non-Ec.	2			4
<u>TOTALS:</u>	12			61

		<u>With Government Response:</u>			
		CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. :	NOT APP.
Promotional		7			46
Self-Int.	Econ.	3			11
Self-Int.	Non-Ec.	2			4
	<u>TOTALS:</u>	12			61

While a low number of all groups - twelve (16.4 per cent) - made recommendations concerning this issue, demonstrating its minor importance to them, there was, however, total congruence between these interest groups and recommendations of the Committee and positions announced by the Government.

4) Aid as a Percentage of GNP

In the 1994 review, the Committee recommended that funding of ODA be stabilized, with progress towards the 0.7 per cent target "when Canada's fiscal situation permits," with which the Government concurred (Canada, 1994e, 58; Canada, 1995c, 71). Thus, the position on which we assess congruence is: "ODA as a percentage of GNP goal be targeted at 0.7 per cent."

TABLE 3:4

ISSUE: 4) AID AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP

<u>Interest Group Categories:</u>		<u>With Committee:</u>	
		CONG. :	PART. CON. : NO CONG. : NOT APP.
Promotional		20	33
Self-Int. Econ.		4	10
Self-Int. Non-Ec.			6
	<u>TOTALS:</u>	24	49

		<u>With Government Response:</u>	
		CONG. :	PART. CON. : NO CONG. : NOT APP.
Promotional		20	33
Self-Int. Econ.		4	10
Self-Int. Non-Ec.			6
	<u>TOTALS:</u>	24	49

Surprisingly, since a larger budget would entail more money for Partnership Programs, only 24 (32.9 per cent) of all groups that would possibly benefit from increased monies made recommendations concerning this issue. However, there was total congruence between both promotional and self-interested economic groups and both the Committee and Government positions. None of the self-interested non-economic groups involved addressed the issue.

5) Aid Untying

The Committee pressed the government to work through the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD to lower the proportion of tied aid to 20 per cent by the year 2000 (Canada, 1994e, 52). The Government, however, was non-supportive (Canada, 1995c, 63). The Government again stressed that aid tying provisions “help build relations of mutual benefit between Canada and developing countries” (Canada, 1995c, 63), matching the stance adopted in its response to the review of 1987 (Canada, 1987a, 58). Thus, this continued to be a contentious issue between the Committee and the Government. Nonetheless, the position on which congruence is assessed is: “Further aid untying measures be pursued.”

TABLE 3:5

ISSUE: 5) AID UNTYING

Interest Group Categories:

With Committee:

	CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. :	NOT APP.
Promotional	7			46
Self-Int. Econ.	1	2		11
Self-Int. Non-Ec.				6
<u>TOTALS:</u>	8	2		63

		<u>With Government Response:</u>			
		CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. :	NOT APP.
Promotional				7	46
Self-Int.	Econ.	2		1	11
Self-Int.	Non-Ec.				
	<u>TOTALS:</u>	2		8	63

Only a small number of groups, ten (13.7 per cent), made recommendations on this issue. Eight groups in total - seven promotional, and one self-interested economic - made recommendations that concurred with the Committee's, but were opposite to the Government's response. On the other hand, two self-interested economic groups⁹ made recommendations opposite to those of the Committee, but congruous with those of the Government. Self-interested non-economic groups did not make recommendations on this issue.

6) Aid-Human Rights / Democratic Development

Congruence on the aid-human rights and democratic development linkage is tested by groups' positions on the following statement: "Human rights and democracy are basic priorities of

⁹ Association of Consulting Engineers of Canada; Conference Board of Canada.

Canada's ODA and should find central expressions in Canadian foreign policy," which was recommended by the Committee and supported by the Government (Canada, 1994e, 50; Canada, 1995c, 60, 65).

TABLE 3:6

ISSUE: 6) AID-RIGHTS LINKAGE/DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

		<u>Interest Group Categories:</u>		<u>With Committee:</u>	
		CONG.	PART. CON.	NO CONG.	NOT APP.
Promotional		41		12	
Self-Int.	Econ.	7		7	
Self-Int.	Non-Ec.	5		1	
	<u>TOTALS:</u>	53		20	
		<u>With Government Response:</u>			
		CONG.	PART. CON.	NO CONG.	NOT APP.
Promotional		41		12	
Self-Int.	Econ.	7		7	
Self-Int.	Non-Ec.	5		1	
	<u>TOTALS:</u>	53		20	

A high number, 53 (72.6 per cent), of all groups made recommendations concerning this issue, demonstrating the importance of human rights and democratic development within Canada's ODA program. There was also total congruence between the positions articulated by all groups, the Committee, and the

Government. Especially engaged on this issue were promotional and self-interested non-economic groups, as only half of the self-interested economic groups addressed the question.

7) Human Rights and Bilateral Cuts

In the 1994 review, the Committee recommended measures up to and including the termination of bilateral aid be adopted for human rights abusing states (Canada, 1994e, 54). The Government artfully dissented, allowing only that high-profile aid and trade measures *might* play a role in its response to violators, since its “ultimate aim is not to punish countries and innocent populations” (Canada, 1995c, 65). However, it did not indicate which measures, including termination, might be employed (Canada, 1995c, 65). This was therefore another issue of disagreement between the Committee and the Government. The position on which congruence is assessed is: “Aid termination will be undertaken, when and if necessary, in cases of human rights abuse.”

TABLE 3:7**ISSUE: 7) HUMAN RIGHTS & BILATERAL CUTS**Interest Group Categories:With Committee:

	CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. :	NOT APP.
Promotional	17			36
Self-Int. Econ.		2		12
Self-Int. Non-Ec.	2			4
<u>TOTALS:</u>	19	2		52

With Government Response:

	CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. :	NOT APP.
Promotional			17	36
Self-Int. Econ.	2			12
Self-Int. Non-Ec.		2		4
<u>TOTALS:</u>	2		19	52

A moderate number of groups, 21 (28.8 per cent), made recommendations concerning this issue. In viewing the data, an interesting and predictable pattern of congruence emerges. Promotional and self-interested non-economic groups are aligned with the Committee Report, while self-interested economic groups, perhaps aware that businesses related to them might suffer from termination of aid, sided with the Government. Somewhat surprisingly, only two of these groups¹⁰ addressed the issue,

¹⁰ Business Council on National Issues; Canadian Exporters Association.

possibly because of its social sensitivity. That promotional groups would support the Committee's position is not surprising for two reasons: (1) cuts to bilateral assistance, which is direct government-to-government aid, would seldom affect their funding on grassroots projects, and (2) the issue is one of the counter-consensus issues of this review.

8) ICHRDD Support

The Committee stated in its outline of six program priorities for Canada's ODA, that as a part of human rights and the issue of empowerment, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development "has a strong role to play" (Canada, 1994e, 50). The Government reaffirmed its commitment to the Centre in its response (Canada, 1995c, 65). The position on which congruence is measured is: "Support is needed for the ICHRDD's mission."

TABLE 3:8

ISSUE: 8) ICHRDD SUPPORT

<u>Interest Group Categories:</u>	<u>With Committee:</u>		
	CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. : NOT APP.
Promotional	4		49
Self-Int. Econ.			14
Self-Int. Non-Ec.			6
<u>TOTALS:</u>	4		69

		<u>With Government Response:</u>			
		CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. :	NOT APP.
Promotional		4			49
Self-Int.	Econ.				14
Self-Int.	Non-Ec.				6
	<u>TOTALS:</u>	4			69

That all of the promotional groups making representations should support the Centre is understandable, since the Centre's mission conforms to that of most of the promotional groups. However, what is unclear is why so few promotional groups (7.5 per cent), as well as other groups, had so little input to offer on this issue. Perhaps the groups considered support, especially governmental support, for the ICHRDD a non-issue, which, due to recent budget cuts to its annual funding, may have been shortsighted. The ICHRDD has developed an approach that has been hailed by domestic and international NGOs, as well as the United Nations, as an ideal model of research, education, activism and leadership. Whatever the reason, Canadian interest groups of all stripes had little to say about it, positive or negative.

9) Women in Development

The Committee's recommendation concerning women's participation in development was that it be viewed as vital and advantageous, and so be listed as one of ODA's program priorities, with which the Government concurred (Canada, 1994e, 50; Canada, 1995c, 60). Thus, the position on which congruence is assessed is: "Canada's ODA program must support the full participation of women as equal partners in the sustainable development of their societies."

TABLE 3:9

ISSUE: 9) WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT

<u>Interest Group Categories:</u>	<u>With Committee:</u>		
	CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. : NOT APP.
Promotional	25		28
Self-Int. Econ.	5		9
Self-Int. Non-Ec.	2		4
<u>TOTALS:</u>	32		41
	<u>With Government Response:</u>		
	CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. : NOT APP.
Promotional	25		28
Self-Int. Econ.	5		9
Self-Int. Non-Ec.	2		4
<u>TOTALS:</u>	32		41

While an intermediate number, 32 (43.8 per cent) groups, made recommendations on this issue, there was total congruence among group submissions and both the Committee and Government positions. Nearly half of promotional groups were in agreement with both the Committee and Government, as were 35.7 per cent of self-interested economic groups and 33.3 per cent of self-interested non-economic groups.

10) Structural Adjustment

Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) were an issue towards which the Committee was very critical. In previous years, Canada had used a substantial amount of its bilateral assistance to support SAPs, which, it was argued, had an effect of worsening, rather than relieving the conditions of the world's poor. Thus, it strongly recommended that in supporting structural adjustment programs, it was necessary to reform these so as to make poverty reduction a central purpose be pursued (Canada, 1994e, 53). The Government agreed that improvement via reform was necessary (Canada, 1995c, 64). The position on which the measure of congruence is based is: "Canada must pursue reform of structural adjustment programs in order to alleviate their negative effects on the poor."

TABLE 3:10**ISSUE: 10) STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT**

<u>Interest Group Categories:</u>		<u>With Committee:</u>		
		CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. : NOT APP.
Promotional		35		18
Self-Int. Econ.		4	1	9
Self-Int. Non-Ec.				6
	<u>TOTALS:</u>	39	1	33
		<u>With Government Response:</u>		
		CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. : NOT APP.
Promotional		35		18
Self-Int. Econ.		4	1	9
Self-Int. Non-Ec.				6
	<u>TOTALS:</u>	39	1	33

Just over half of the groups - 40 (54.8 per cent) - made recommendations concerning this issue. There was a high level of congruence between the groups' viewpoints and Committee and Government positions. Promotional groups were in agreement with the Committee and Government in all cases, as were 4 self-interested economic groups. Only one self-interested economic group¹¹ was judged as being partially in support of SAP reforms. No self-interested non-economic group addressed the issue.

¹¹ Société de développement international Desjardins.

11) Environmental Sustainability

In the 1994 review, the Committee recommended that environmental sustainability be a key program priority of ODA; the Government agreed in its response (Canada, 1994e, 50; Canada, 1995c, 58, 60). The position on which congruence is assessed is: "Helping developing countries protect their environment and contribute to addressing global and regional environmental issues is a priority of Canada's ODA program."

TABLE 3:11

ISSUE: 11) ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY

<u>Interest Group Categories:</u>		<u>With Committee:</u>		
		CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. : NOT APP.
Promotional		26		27
Self-Int. Econ.		5	1	8
Self-Int. Non-Ec.		1		5
	<u>TOTALS:</u>	32	1	40
		<u>With Government Response:</u>		
		CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. : NOT APP.
Promotional		26		27
Self-Int. Econ.		5	1	8
Self-Int. Non-Ec.		1		5
	<u>TOTALS:</u>	32	1	40

Thirty-three groups (45.2 per cent) in total made recommendations on this issue. Combined, there was generally high congruence among the groups, and among the groups and both the Committee and Government. Half of the promotional groups making presentations held positions which corresponded to those of both the Committee and Government, as did just over one-third of the self-interested economic groups. One self-interested economic group¹² was also partially congruent with both positions. In addition, one self-interested non-economic group¹³ held a position congruent with both the Committee and Government.

12) Number of Recipients

In its 1994 review, the Committee pointed out the ineffectiveness of attempting to fund ODA for 128 countries. Arguing that Canadian ODA was too dispersed, it recommended that a greater share go to fewer countries (Canada, 1994e. 54). The Government, while acknowledging the importance of the volume of Canadian interests worldwide, conceded that "the effectiveness of ODA can be enhanced by concentrating on a more limited number of

¹² Canadian Chamber of Commerce.

¹³ Eritrean Relief Association in Canada.

priorities" (Canada, 1995c, 67). Thus, the position on which the assessment of congruence is based is: "The number of recipients of Canadian ODA should be lowered, thus concentrating greater funds on fewer countries."

TABLE 3:12

ISSUE: 12) NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS

Interest Group Categories:

With Committee:

	CONG.	PART. CON.	NO CONG.	NOT APP.
Promotional	3			50
Self-Int. Econ.	1		2	11
Self-Int. Non-Ec.				6
<u>TOTALS:</u>	4		2	67

With Government Response:

	CONG.	PART. CON.	NO CONG.	NOT APP.
Promotional	3			50
Self-Int. Econ.	1		2	11
Self-Int. Non-Ec.				6
<u>TOTALS:</u>	4		2	67

For reasons which are not clear, there was minimal discussion on this issue in presentations made by any of the groups; only six (8.2 per cent) made recommendations on the issue. Congruence was present between promotional groups and both the Committee and Government. However, of the 3 self-interested economic groups

that made recommendations, only one was congruent with the Committee and Government positions; the two others were in opposition.¹⁴ This might be explained because of the potential for lost revenue stemming from a decrease in program funding that includes, under CIDA-INC, insurance for Canadian exporters to new markets. None of the self-interested non-economic groups involved addressed the issue.

13) Area Focus

The area focus of Canada's ODA program came under review by the Committee, which recommended that a high level of assistance be targeted towards Africa (Canada, 1994e, 54). The Government, in its response, also expressed its full agreement that the greatest proportion of aid go to Africa (Canada, 1995c, 67). The position of which congruence is assessed is: "The greatest proportion of Canadian aid should go to Africa."

¹⁴ Congruent: Association of Consulting Engineers in Canada.
Non-congruent: Société de développement international Desjardins & The Canadian Exporters Association.

TABLE 3:13

ISSUE: 13) AREA FOCUS

<u>Interest Group Categories:</u>	<u>With Committee:</u>		
	CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. : NOT APP.
Promotional	9	4	40
Self-Int. Econ.	1		13
Self-Int. Non-Ec.	1		5
<u>TOTALS:</u>	11	4	58

	<u>With Government Response:</u>		
	CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. : NOT APP.
Promotional	9	4	40
Self-Int. Econ.	1		13
Self-Int. Non-Ec.	1		5
<u>TOTALS:</u>	11	4	58

A total of 15 (20.5 per cent) groups made recommendations on this issue. Although this level of interest in itself was not notable, there was a variation among promotional groups, with 4 of 13 making submissions in opposition to the positions of both the Committee and Government, while the remaining nine held positions congruent with both the Committee and Government. Put plainly, the results show that infighting is possible among promotional groups, especially between those with ties to particular regions. In this case, three of the four non-congruent submissions derived from

groups with a specific mission in Latin America,¹⁵ and the other derived from one with a specific focus in South Asia.¹⁶

Only one each of self-interested economic and self-interested non-economic groups made recommendations on this issue, and these were congruous with both Committee and Government positions. This demonstrates a wide-range of assessments on the effectiveness of the previous Canadian focus on Africa, based upon both perceived and actual results.

14) Degree of Focus on Least-Developed Countries

The term least-developed countries (LLDCs) refer to countries that, by generally agreed upon indicators such as per capita GNP, are in the lowest grouping. The Committee strongly emphasized that most of the world's poorest people do not reside in countries classified as least-developed. This was due to the fact that the term "least-developed" was used interchangeably with "the poorest people" in the briefs presented to the Committee. Therefore, many groups indicated a belief that the poorest people do reside in LLDCs.

¹⁵ Canada-Caribbean-Central America Policy Alternatives; Central America Monitoring Group & Jesuit Centre for Social Faith and Justice.

¹⁶ South Asia Partnership.

Even though the Committee's recommendation was to provide assistance to the poorest people in the countries most requiring Canada's help, with which the Government concurred (Canada, 1994e, 48; Canada, 1995, 58), the coding position employed to harmonize this discrepancy and assess the degrees of congruence is: "An emphasis of Canada's ODA program should be on LLDCs and/or the poorest people."

TABLE 3:14

ISSUE: 14) DEGREE OF FOCUS ON LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

<u>Interest Group Categories:</u>	<u>With Committee:</u>			
	CONG.	PART. CON.	NO CONG.	NOT APP.
Promotional	12			41
Self-Int. Econ.	1	1		12
Self-Int. Non-Ec.				6
<u>TOTALS:</u>	13	1		59
	<u>With Government Response:</u>			
	CONG.	PART. CON.	NO CONG.	NOT APP.
Promotional	12			41
Self-Int. Econ.	1	1		12
Self-Int. Non-Ec.				6
<u>TOTALS:</u>	13	1		59

A relatively low number, 14 (19.2 per cent), of groups made

recommendations on this issue. The largest grouping came from the promotional group category, of which all (12 in total) made recommendations that were congruent with both Committee and Government positions. Two self-interested economic groups made recommendations, one congruent¹⁷ and one partially congruent¹⁸ with both Committee and Government positions. None of the self-interested non-economic groups participating addressed the issue, perhaps indicating that the majority of this category's members do not represent constituents from countries that are so defined.

15) Non-Aid Economic Concessions

As the Committee noted, expanded trade opportunities are more important than aid to many developing countries; thus, it recommended that Canadian markets be opened further to products from developing countries (Canada, 1994e, 58). The Government agreed to this in its response, highlighting its commitment to extending its preferential tariff rate, the General Preferential Tariff (GPT), to imports from developing countries (Canada, 1995c, 72). The congruency-assessing position is: "Canadian markets should be further opened, especially by way of the GPT."

¹⁷ Professionals in Agriculture/Agriculture Institute of Canada.

¹⁸ Canadian Chamber of Commerce.

TABLE 3:15

ISSUE: 15) NON-AID ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS

<u>Interest Group Categories:</u>	<u>With Committee:</u>		
	CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. : NOT APP.
Promotional	23		30
Self-Int. Econ.	3		11
Self-Int. Non-Ec.	1		5
<u>TOTALS:</u>	27		46

	<u>With Government Response:</u>		
	CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. : NOT APP.
Promotional	23		30
Self-Int. Econ.	3		11
Self-Int. Non-Ec.	1		5
<u>TOTALS:</u>	27		46

Just over a third, 26 groups (35.6 per cent), made recommendations on the issue. Among the 23 promotional groups making representations, there was total congruence with both the Committee and Government positions. Further, three self-interested economic groups made congruent recommendations. The one self-interested non-economic group that addressed the issue made a recommendation congruent with both Committee and Government positions.

16) Debt Alleviation

Due to the immense debt load under which many developing countries are straining, the Committee recommended further bilateral and multilateral debt relief measures (Canada, 1994e. 40). The response of the Government was affirmative, as might be expected due to Canada's long, progressive stance on this issue (Canada, 1995c. 40). The position used to assess congruence is: "Further bilateral and multilateral debt relief measures should be developed as part of Canada's ODA program."

TABLE 3:16

ISSUE: 16) DEBT ALLEVIATION

<u>Interest Group Categories:</u>		<u>With Committee:</u>		
		CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. : NOT APP.
Promotional		22		31
Self-Int. Econ.			1	13
Self-Int. Non-Ec.				6
	<u>TOTALS:</u>	22	1	50
		<u>With Government Response:</u>		
		CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. : NOT APP.
Promotional		22		31
Self-Int. Econ.			1	13
Self-Int. Non-Ec.				6
	<u>TOTALS:</u>	22	1	50

Twenty-three, or just under a third, of interest groups made recommendations on this issue. Twenty-two of the recommendations were made by promotional groups, all of whom were in congruence with the positions of both the Committee and Government. Only one self-interested economic group¹⁹ made a recommendation, one which was in opposition to both the Committee and Government positions. To understand this position, we must understand that this interest group represents one of the leading beneficiaries of Canada's traditional aid focus on heavily-tied, large-scale infrastructure projects - consulting engineers. However, funds diverted from project-delivery programs to debt relief programs would be contrary to their interests. None of the self-interested non-economic groups involved addressed the issue.

17) Parallel Financing

The Committee recommended that the share of allocations to partnership programs, which entail parallel financing, be maintained, and increased in cases where partners (notably NGOs) excel (Canada, 1994e, 56). The Government emphasized its poor

¹⁹ The Association of Consulting Engineers of Canada. Recall that this group also made a recommendation that aid provisions remain tie (69) and that the number of aid recipients not be reduced (82).

fiscal situation concerning its extent of the share, but allowed that priority to any increases would be given to partners who excelled (Canada, 1995c, 70). The congruence-assessing position is: "Successful partners (notably NGOs) should have priority in any increase in allocations to partners via parallel financing."

TABLE 3:17

ISSUE: 17) PARALLEL FINANCING

Interest Group Categories:

With Committee:

	CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. :	NOT APP.
Promotional	7			46
Self-Int. Econ.	2			12
Self-Int. Non-Ec.				6
<u>TOTALS:</u>	9			64

With Government Response:

	CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. :	NOT APP.
Promotional	7			46
Self-Int. Econ.	2			12
Self-Int. Non-Ec.				6
<u>TOTALS:</u>	9			64

A minimal number - nine groups, including seven promotional and two self-interested economic - made recommendations on this issue. Of these, there was total congruence with both the Committee and the Government positions. No self-interested non-

economic group involved in the process addressed the issue.

18) Business Promotion Via the EDC and/or the INC

The issue of the merits of business promotion, via the EDC and/or CIDA-INC, within the ODA program was another contentious issue. The committee's recommendation that "any functions of CIDA found to be essentially Canadian trade promotion activities be transferred to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade or to the Export Development Corporation where they belong" was met with a resounding no (Canada, 1995c, 62).

Instead, the Government reaffirmed the unique opportunity that CIDA-INC provides "for the Canadian private sector to contribute to poverty reduction and sustainable development" (Canada, 1995c, 62). In other words, aid and trade were to remain closely aligned, which strongly suggests whose interests the government was supporting in its response to the Committee's recommendations. Clearly, the policies enunciated in the Government's response will have had the self-interested economic groups' approval. The position on which congruence is assessed is: "Non-development focused business promotion should not be part of CIDA's function or mandate."

TABLE 3:18

ISSUE: 18) BUSINESS PROMOTION VIA THE EDC AND/OR INC

Interest Group Categories:

With Committee:

	CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. :	NOT APP.
Promotional	11			42
Self-Int. Econ.	1		6	7
Self-Int. Non-Ec.				6
<u>TOTALS:</u>	12		6	55

With Government Response:

	CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. :	NOT APP.
Promotional			11	42
Self-Int. Econ.	6		1	7
Self-Int. Non-Ec.				6
<u>TOTALS:</u>	6		12	55

About a quarter of groups (18) made recommendations on this issue. As one might expect of a contentious issue, there was not high congruence, either among groups or between groups and the Committee position and the opposing Government position. Moreover, clear differences emerge between promotional and self-interested economic groups. Eleven promotional groups made recommendations which were congruent with the Committee's

findings, but contradictory to those of the Government's response.²⁰ In contrast, seven self-interested economic groups made recommendations, with 6 opposed to the Committee's findings but congruent with the Government's position, and one supportive.²¹ None of the self-interested non-economic groups involved addressed the issue.

19) Level of NGO/Partner Activity

Because of their essential contribution to Canada's ODA program, expanding the level of NGO/partner activity via the partnership program or other measures was a general theme in the Committee's recommendations (Canada, 1994e, 54, 56, 59). The Government was in agreement, stating: "development assistance

²⁰ Canadian Council for International Cooperation; CUSO; Development and Peace (Toronto); Global Concerns Committee; Harmony Foundation of Canada (Victoria); Inter-Church Coalition on Africa; International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development; International Development Executives Association; Mennonite Central Committee Canada; NGOs of Guelph & Partnership Africa Canada.

²¹ Opposed to Committee: Association of Consulting Engineers of Canada; Business Council on National Issues; Canadian Chamber of Commerce; Canadian Exporters Association; Conference Board of Canada; Mihaly International Canada & Société de développement international Desjardins.

Congruent with Committee: Canadian Labour Congress.

must be a collective endeavour, and this requires a corresponding commitment to information sharing and ongoing consultation” (Canada, 1995c, 73). The position on which agreement is assessed is: “Government - NGO/partner activity should be increased.”

TABLE 3:19

ISSUE: 19) LEVEL OF NGO/PARTNER ACTIVITY

<u>Interest Group Categories:</u>		<u>With Committee:</u>			
		CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. :	NOT APP.
Promotional		40			13
Self-Int.	Econ.	6			8
Self-Int.	Non-Ec.	2			4
	<u>TOTALS:</u>	48			25
		<u>With Government Response:</u>			
		CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. :	NOT APP.
Promotional		40			13
Self-Int.	Econ.	6			8
Self-Int.	Non-Ec.	2			4
	<u>TOTALS:</u>	48			25

A high number, 48 groups (65.8 per cent), made recommendations on this issue. There was total congruence among all groups. The largest number of recommendations (40) was made by promotional groups, all congruent with the positions of both the Committee and Government. Six self-interested economic groups

made congruent recommendations, as did two self-interested non-economic groups.

20) ODA Legislation

The final issue, and also another one that was contentious, is that of a legislated ODA mandate. The Committee advised that legislative enactment would hold CIDA accountable and “protect Canadian ODA from random and wayward influences.” thus strongly recommending that Parliament adopt legislation that firmly establishes the basic principles to guide Canadian ODA (Canada, 1994e, 51). Conversely, the Government rejected the proposal as being inflexible and limiting, arguing that a Policy Statement was adequate to the task. The position on which congruence is assessed is: “Legislation concerning ODA’s basic principles should be adopted by Parliament.”

TABLE 3:20

ISSUE: 20) ODA LEGISLATION

<u>Interest Group Categories:</u>	<u>With Committee:</u>		
	CONG. :	PART. CON. :	NO CONG. : NOT APP.
Promotional	4		49
Self-Int. Econ.			14
Self-Int. Non-Ec.			6
<u>TOTALS:</u>	4		69

With Government Response:

CONG. : PART. CON. : NO CONG. : NOT APP.

Promotional	4	49
Self-Int. Econ.		14
Self-Int. Non-Ec.		6
<u>TOTALS:</u>	4	69

A very low number of groups, 4 in all (5.5 per cent), made recommendations on this issue, surprising since the costs and/or benefits to the groups could be extensive as a result of legislation. One would have expected greater interest in the issue. As it was, all four participating promotional groups²² advanced positions which were congruent with the Committee's recommendations and opposed to the Government's response. None of the self-interested economic groups nor self-interested non-economic groups made recommendations on the issue.

²² Canadian Council for International Cooperation; Canadian Crossroads International; Inter Pares & Ontario Council for International Cooperation.

Summary

This chapter has assessed the degree of congruence of submissions made by all 73 interest groups with both the Committee's recommendations and the Government's response on twenty ODA-related issues in those instances in which a ranking could be accorded. From the data presented, we draw the following conclusions.

While significant congruence between positions of interest groups, the Committee and the Government was expected, for most issues congruence was total or nearly so. In contrast, there were only seven issues, or just over one-third, on which there was any substantial disagreement among the three: In four cases (issues 5, 7, 18, and 20 - the counter consensus issues) disagreement occurred between the Committee and the Government. However, stemming from the discussion in Chapter Two, this was to be expected. In five cases (issues 5, 7, 12, 16, and 18), disagreement also occurred between promotional and self-interested economic groups; and in one case (issue 13), disagreement occurred among promotional groups. These disagreements among groups may be attributed to "special interest politics," i.e., "the institutionalization of the voluntary sector around two seemingly contradictory phenomena:

competition for scarce public dollars, and mutual self-interest in the public promotion of the voluntary sector” (Murphy, 1991, 167). In addition, as the issue-by-issue discussion indicated, on some issues for which one would have assumed there would be more interest (e.g., ODA legislation), many groups were silent.

Table 3:21 presents the degree of congruence of the positions of all 73 interest groups.²³ The first data column presents the total number (= **n**) and percentage (= **%**) of groups that made submissions. The second and third columns present the total number (= **n**) and percentage (= **%**) of groups that made congruent submissions to the Committee’s recommendations and the Government’s response, respectively.

²³ Note: The measure for Food Aid is not congruence, but frequency. Recall its discussion on page 65.

TABLE 3:21

**DEGREE OF CONGRUENCE AMONG INTEREST GROUP
COMMITTEE AND GOVERNMENT POSITIONS
(FOR ALL GROUPS SUBMITTING)**

<u>ITEM:</u>	<u>% OF GROUPS MAKING SUBMISSIONS</u>		<u>% OF PARTICIPATING GROUPS CONGRUENT WITH THE</u>			
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>COMMITTEE</u>		<u>GOVERNMENT</u>	
			<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>
1. BSC NEEDS	49	67.1	48	97.9	48	97.9
2. FOOD AID	4	5.5	N/A		N/A	
3. EMRCY AST	12	16.4	12	100	12	100
4. AID % GNP	24	32.9	24	100	24	100
5. AID UNTY	10	13.7	8	80.0	2	20.0
6. AID-RTS	53	72.6	53	100	53	100
7. HR & BI CTS	21	28.8	19	90.5	2	9.5
8. ICHRDD SPT	4	5.5	4	100	4	100
9. WMN IN DEV	32	43.8	32	100	32	100
10. SAPS	40	54.8	39	97.5	39	97.5
11. ENV SUST	33	45.2	32	96.9	32	96.9
12. # RECPNTS	6	8.2	4	66.6	2	33.3
13. AREA FOCS	15	20.5	11	73.3	11	73.3
14. FOCS LLDCS	14	19.2	13	92.9	13	92.9
15. N-AID EC CS	27	36.9	27	100	27	100
16. DEBT ALVN	23	31.5	22	95.7	22	95.7
17. PRL FINCG	9	12.3	9	100	9	100
18. BIZ PRMTN	18	24.7	12	66.6	6	33.3
19. LVL PTR ACT	48	65.8	48	100	48	100
20. ODA LGSTN	4	5.5	4	100	0	0.0

Tables 3:1-3:20 and 3:21 demonstrate several points. First, there was an overall low level of interest among groups. Second, there was a surprisingly high level of congruence of opinion on

development issues among interest groups, the Committee, and the Government. In this sea of consensus, there was higher congruence between the Committee and the interest groups (issues 5, 7, 12, 18, and 20 were the deciding issues) than between the latter and the Government, but the variations here are not great.

Third is the lack of disagreement among the three types of groups: Only four issues - 5) aid untying; 7) human rights and bilateral cuts; 18) trade promotion; and 20) ODA legislation - can be said to have been contentious. For these issues, promotional groups showed the strongest congruency with the Committee's recommendations, suggesting that they and the Committee were in general agreement with each other. As they are counter consensus issues - those that find support among groups "that oppose on [solely] ethical grounds important elements of Canadian foreign policy" (Pratt, 1983-84, 118) - this finding is not surprising.

Table 3:22 presents a comparison, on the four counter consensus issues, of the submissions by interest group type to further highlight these variations. The first data column presents the total number (= **n**) and percentage (= **%**) of groups that made recommendations. The second and third columns present the total number (= **n**) and percentage (= **%**) of groups that made congruent submissions to the Committee's recommendations and the

Government's response, respectively. (Appendix B contains the remaining data tables).

TABLE 3:22

**TYPE OF INTEREST GROUP CONGRUENT WITH
THE COMMITTEE AND GOVERNMENT ON
THE COUNTER CONSENSUS ISSUES**

<u>ITEM:</u>	<u>% OF GROUPS MAKING SUBMISSIONS</u>		<u>% OF PARTICIPATING GROUPS CONGRUENT WITH THE</u>				
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>COMMITTEE</u>		<u>GOVERNMENT</u>	
				<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>
5. AID UNTYG	10	13.7	PG	7	100	0	0
			SIEG	1	33.3	2	66.6
			SINEG	0	0	0	0
7. HR & BI CTS	21	28.8	PG	17	100	0	0
			SIEG	0	0	2	100
			SINEG	2	100	0	0
18. BIZ PRMTN	18	24.7	PG	11	100	0	0
			SIEG	1	14	6	86
			SINEG	0	0	0	0
20. ODA LGSTN	4	5.5	PG	4	100	0	0
			SIEG	0	0	0	0
			SINEG	0	0	0	0

These figures further demonstrate the high level of congruency between promotional groups and the Committee, as on all four counter consensus issues, promotional groups were in total agreement with the Committee. In addition, the high level of

congruency between self-interested economic groups and the Government is also demonstrated on the first three counter consensus issues (they did not make recommendations on the last issue).

Thus, the data suggest, first of all, a greater convergence of opinion among interest groups, the Committee and the Government than in the 1987 review. Second, there remains a vocal and informed minority opposition that raises counter consensus issues as indicators of a government more concerned with political and economic than humanistic concerns. Third, due to special interest politics, interest groups appear to have narrowed their focus. As a result, some issues that may be of common interest to all were overlooked. Finally, expanded "stakeholder consultations," including the travelling committee concept, have worked in the interest of the Government: it received more input from a greater number of groups than in previous reviews, further legitimizing its policies as well as meeting its *Red Book* pre-election promise to democratize policy-making.

In the concluding chapter, the above findings will be evaluated in order to determine which of the theoretical perspectives concerning the influence of interest groups on the foreign policy-making process is most persuasive.

CHAPTER FOUR

Conclusion

This chapter will assess whether the most recent foreign policy review demonstrates the pluralist, statist, or dominant class perspective concerning domestic influence on Canadian aid policy as a conclusion to the study.

As indicated in Chapter One, by classifying the groups making submissions into one of the three types, the resulting theoretical perspective on interest group influence which best describes the 1994 review can be indicated. Thus, under pluralism, any of the promotional and self-interested economic or non-economic groups could have had influence, while under neopluralism, certain elites (self-interested economic groups) will have been "more equal" than others in their influence. Conversely, under statism, none of the three types of groups will have had much, if any, influence, as the state directs policy-making. Under a variant, the modified statist position, self-interested economic groups will have had influence, and any seeming compliance with promotional or self-interested non-economic groups on the part of the government, albeit possible, will have been generally incidental.

With a strict interpretation of the instrumental dominant class theory, only self-interested economic groups will have had any effect, as the pervasive bias of the state is to be reactive only to the dominant class. Under the structural dominant class theory, however, promotional and self-interested non-economic groups may have had an effect, but their interests will have been served only by hegemony-maintaining concessions that will serve the dominant class (represented by SIEGs) in the long term.

As analysis in Chapter Three demonstrated, in an overall milieu of consensus between interest groups, the Committee and the Government, on those issues for which self-interested economic groups had specific interests, the Government appeared to respond to their positions. Promotional groups were, however, partially accommodated. But even considering this latter partial accommodation, the Government's stance as a whole appears to be concerned with economic implications,²⁴ first and foremost.

This study has demonstrated a great convergence (or at least a general lack of disagreement) of concerns and policies among interest groups, the Committee, and Government. It has also demonstrated a lack of interest among groups concerning issues of

²⁴ See the following discussion on these economic concerns in *Rhetoric Versus Practice*, page 111 onwards.

great importance, an importance indicated by previous reviews, the publications of interest groups, and the ODA literature in general. This finding is both puzzling and troubling.

In the conclusion of her study, Crookes finds that “based on the data examined...and the actions of the Mulroney government since the release of Sharing Our Future, ...statist theory is best able to explain the making of [aid] policy” (1990, 170). Her conclusion derives from both the results of the coding of interest group submissions that showed a lack of any real evidence of influence by the interest groups (159), and from a systematic study of the (lack of) correlation between the Government’s statements of its policy intentions and its actual practices over the period 1970-1987.

This begs the question of which theoretical perspective is best supported by the data of this study. Since the Government incorporated recommendations from the Committee which were congruent with promotional, self-interested economic and/or self-interested non-economic interest groups in its response, statism can be rejected, as this theory posits very little, or no, role for interest groups in the formulation of policy.

The modified statist perspective can also be rejected, as it argues that only self-interested economic groups are accommodated in policy. But promotional and self-interested non-economic

interest groups were accommodated in the Government's response - a great difference from an indication of "incidental capitulation" that would support modified statism.

Pluralism, the next theoretical perspective under consideration, provides a model for understanding that is too simplistic. First, pluralism inflates the role of interest groups in the policy-making process. Second, as a result of this inflation, the role of the state in policy-making is diminished by presenting the state as either a passive tool of, or broker among, relatively equal groups. This, in turn, diminishes the ability to demonstrate that decisions may be made to maximize Canada's influence in the international arena. Pluralism also minimizes the consistently pro-business bias of Government policy and practice that Pratt, throughout twelve years of analyses (1996, 240, 245), and this study, demonstrate. Finally, the data show that pluralism can be rejected, since the government clearly took positions on issues that were contrary to both the groups' submissions - e.g., the counter consensus issues - and the Committee's recommendations.

Instrumental dominant class posits that only self-interested economic groups will have had any effect, as the state is reactive only to the dominant class. But for the same reasons that the modified statist perspective was rejected, so too can the

instrumental dominant class theory, since promotional and self-interested non-economic interest groups were indeed accommodated. There remain to be examined the structural dominant class and neopluralist theories.

The structural dominant class theory posits that promotional and self-interested non-economic groups may have an effect on policy, but that the majority of decisions made will serve the goals of the dominant class. If we consider the four counter consensus issues - further aid untying, cutting aid to human rights violators, moving business promotion out of CIDA, and legislating ODA - that were most contentious, the Government's positions were taken in direct opposition to the findings of the Committee (charged with gathering all available information in order to present to the Government the best possible recommendations for improving Canada's ODA program) as well as the submissions from the majority of the groups. The Government took these actions because concessions made in these four areas to promotional and self-interested non-economic groups would have had a negative financial cost to the two parties who benefit under the status quo: itself and self-interested economic groups.

As a result, promotional and self-interested non-economic groups' interests were served by hegemony-maintaining concessions

made in other areas that would not threaten the long-term perpetuation of the dominant class system.²⁵ Due to this fact, as well as the inapplicability of the other theories discussed thus far, there is support for the structural dominant class perspective concerning the policy-making process of the 1994 review.

Neopluralism remains to be considered. Indeed, the generally high level of congruence among groups, the Committee, and Government suggest neopluralism as a rival to the structural dominant class theory as the most compelling theoretical explanation. Admittedly, considering the relative “success” of self-interested economic groups on issues vital to them in the Government’s response, they may be viewed as having been “more equal” than others.

Thus, analysis of the data suggests that either the structural dominant class or neopluralist theory is the most compelling explanation concerning the domestic influence of interest groups on Canadian aid policy. But which is the more compelling explanation of the two? Or are they somehow complementary?

²⁵ Pratt provides a convincing historical synopsis of the large degree towards which governmental actions over the previous two decades support the structural dominant class theory; See 1996, 241-243.

In what can be termed a surprisingly conciliatory recent article, Pratt (1996, 257) outlines the complementarity of a good general theory - in this case, the dominant class perspective - with another, i.e. statism, that allows for the possibility of a variety of causal forces that influence policy-making:

[The dominant class theory's] main claim upon the attention of other scholars must depend on its power as a general theory. However, no general theory of policy determinants is by itself an adequate guide to a full understanding of individual policy decisions. The inevitable pluralism of social causation intrudes. Most of us, I suspect, are not for long satisfied with explanations that either are unrelated to broader socioeconomic forces or remain at the level of general theory. Perhaps...dominant class and statist perspectives...are instead complementary, each useful at different levels of analysis.

How does this affect the decision concerning the most compelling theoretical explanation for the findings of this study? Crucial is whether or not one considers the pluralism of social causation within Pratt's discussion to include neopluralism. In the large body of literature concerning Canadian foreign policy, most attention is given by theorists to the statist and dominant class perspectives. In short, neopluralism is not *de rigueur*.

Nonetheless, and even if possibly unpopular, the data suggest that neopluralism applies here as well as the dominant class perspective. While the data do not speak for themselves in any decisive way on this issue, it is possible to move further by analyzing the actual practice of the ODA program which provides additional evidence pointing to the validity of the structural dominant class theory.

Rhetoric Versus Practice

The repetition of issues over the last two decades demonstrates that ODA practices have been out of sync with government statements of policy as indicated in government responses to various committee recommendations. In other words, the objective reality of ODA policy has been, at the minimum, noticeably different from the official line. As the following examples will demonstrate, it is a reality that reaffirms the structural dominant class perspective.

By contrasting Crookes' findings from the 1987 review to these of the 1994 review, one may determine if the trends she notes do indeed continue. Crookes finds five new issues exclusive to the Winegard Report of 1987 and the Government's response and

statement of 1987. These issues are: 1) an increasing emphasis on human resource development, 2) decentralization, 3) environmental emphasis in the ODA programs, 4) expanding the role of women in development programs, and 5) a focus on human rights. Crookes is hopeful that this new emphasis suggested an improvement in aid policy (1990, 79-80).

Unfortunately, the concerns that Crookes highlights in her 1990 study are easily raised once more within this analysis: The 1994 review once again addressed generally the same issues, and the same criticisms raised by the parliamentary review committees of previous reports reoccurred. This suggests that little progress has been made over the twenty year period.

For instance, five of the six ODA program themes outlined in the Government's response of 1987 (Canada, 1987a, 22-23) were repeated in its response of 1995 (Canada, 1995c, 60), (though this is not to say it could have been expected that these problems would have been resolved in a seven-year period). For example, basic needs, women in development, the environment, and structural adjustment/private-sector development were reprised (Canada, 1987a, 22-23; Canada, 1995c, 60). Human resource development remained as well (Canada, 1987a, 32), albeit now termed "development of the human potential," within the umbrella heading

“sustainable development” (Canada, 1995c, 58).

In the 1987 Sharing Our Future document, the issue of human rights²⁶ was to take a primary role in deciding the eligibility of countries to receive ODA (Canada, 1987c, 32). Although one finds in the government documents a firm commitment to pursuing policies that reinforce human rights, there has been considerable criticism from the reviewing committees (and interest groups at large) over how faithfully the Government has pursued such policy guidelines. In the most recent review, human rights, formerly a “specific policy issue” (Canada, 1987a, 27), reoccurred as one of five program priorities (Canada, 1995c, 60). However, to the disappointment of those who sought a policy with teeth, the Government rejected the termination of bilateral aid to human rights offenders as an option in the most recent review (Canada, 1995c, 65).

Further supporting the structural dominant class theory, the Government has responded in practice to the views voiced by self-interested economic groups regarding aid tying by simply leaving its previous policies unchanged. This is, however, unsurprising, as the Government stressed that aid tying provisions “help build relations

²⁶ For example, see: Canada, 1987a, 49-56; Canada, 1987b, 23-31; Canada, 1987c, 27-32; Canada, 1994e, 50; Canada, 1995a, 42; and Canada, 1995c, 60, 65.

of mutual benefit between Canada and developing countries” (Canada, 1995c, 63), rejecting the recommendation to lower the proportion of tied aid. The Government mirrored its stance adopted in the review of 1987, which did not satisfy the recommendations of that committee either (Canada, 1987a, 58).

In addition to aid-tying, the issue of trade promotion supports the structural dominant class perspective. The most recent reviewing committee reaffirmed that CIDA’s mandate is not to promote Canadian exports (Canada, 1994e, 51). In the 1987 review, the Committee similarly emphasized that Canada’s ODA program should be “driven less by political considerations and fixed percentage rules than by development objectives and what makes economic sense from the perspective of both Canada and its Third World partners” (Canada, 1987b, 38).

But the Government repeated the stance it took on trade in the 1987 review, in which it stipulated that Canadian businesses should obtain maximum benefit from the ODA program (Canada, 1987a, 100). Then and now, the Government decided to assist businesses to achieve maximum benefit by expanding its support to Canadian exporters, as once again the “first objective for Canadian foreign policy is the ‘promotion of prosperity and employment’ [with] the dominant emphasis on advancing Canada’s national interest through

trade promotion” (Plewes, Sreenivasan, & Drainin, 1996, 233).

Further, although in its 1987 response the Government said it was committed to achieving the aid target of 0.7 per cent of GNP by the year 2000 (Canada, 1987a, 25), the Government’s 1989 budget announced slashes in aid expenditures over the following five-year period (Crookes, 1990, 78). On 27 February, 1995, when tabling his 1995-96 budget, Finance Minister Paul Martin said “the debt and the deficit are not inventions of ideology. They...will have a very significant impact on the level of government spending in the future” (1995d, 10095). As a result of this budget statement, \$550 million was cut from international assistance between 1994-95 and 1997-98 (Canada, 1994b, 33). Therefore, the ODA/GNP ratio will fall from 0.39 per cent of GNP for 1994-95 to 0.32 per cent of GNP for 1997-98 (Canada, 1994a, 32). The ODA budget, which stood at 2.74 billion dollars in 1994-95, was slashed by 29 per cent and will stand at 1.95 billion in 1998-99 - a thirty year low (CCIC, 1996, 2). The Government now is committed only to “making progress toward the target of 0.7 per cent *when Canada’s fiscal situation permits*” (Canada, 1995c, 71). [Italics added]

There are, of course, other contributing factors as to why ODA has been, and remains targeted for further budget cuts. First, in times of recession, nations have a habit of turning inward to focus more on their own economic needs. The recessionary economies of most developed countries in the late-1980s and early-1990s fostered exactly this scenario. This, combined with the *au courant* 'smaller government' or 'new public management' mantras, has, in essence, resulted in less government involvement, due to smaller (and in some cases, nonexistent) bureaucracies and budgets. Thus, domestic and internationally-based NGOs have been forced to make do with less and to find income from new sources.

However, with the increase in funding to the EDC and CIDA-INC combined with the Government's position on aid as a percentage of GNP, self-interested economic groups have found their needs met on two fronts: increased export assistance established in the ODA envelope in particular and fiscal restraint in government spending in general.

Moreover, the Government extended the definition of what qualifies as basic needs so that it could more easily meet its stated commitment towards increasing the basic needs proportion of ODA from 20 per cent to 25 per cent. Basic needs now includes both emergency aid and big ticket infrastructure items, such as roads and

buildings. In 1996, with this new definition, CIDA estimated that Canada had neared a basic needs proportion of ODA of 21 per cent, but the North-South Institute estimates that the figure is actually less than 14 per cent (CCIC, 1996, 2). What is the reason for this discrepancy? Basic needs have never included emergency assistance (as the basic needs are understood to have a long-term focus) or hydroelectric dams (as basic needs are better served by [and defined by the reviewing Committee as including] inoculation, schooling and nutrition). Therefore, this expansion of the ODA envelope accounts for the seven per cent difference.

As other examples of creative bookkeeping, the Government has recently included refugee resettlement and assimilation costs (for immigrants to Canada) in the ODA percentage of GNP figure and also extended the ODA envelope to now include not only "old-style ODA," but also debt-relief measures, assistance to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (a measure which at one point the Government stated would not be taken), environmental commitments (to enact international agreements), and semi-concessional funding through the EDC (to support exports of Canadian businesses). This was clearly undertaken, as the North-South Institute argues, to make the cuts to ODA seem less dramatic (1991, 1).

What is unacceptable about these changes in definitions and costing is that the Government has pursued them in order to *make practice appear to follow policy*, rather than work towards meeting its commitments. All of these actions are symptomatic of an approach towards Canadian official development assistance policy that is as much rhetoric as it is reality concerning the practice of policy (Allahar, 1991, 296). The issue of policy implementation is therefore key, as Terrence Keenleyside and Peter Fleming suggest in their study, "The Rhetoric of Canadian Aid":

Actual performance [of the Government] in such areas as increasing aid relative to the gross national product, reorienting assistance towards rural community development and focusing on non-aid solutions to the problem of development has been disappointing...The government has demonstrated an inability to transform much of its rhetoric into reality. (1983, 22)

In addition, as Pratt writes in his brief to the 1994 reviewing committee, "there are powerful structural reasons why the Canadian bureaucracy will almost inevitably give preference to immediate commercial objectives and international political goals" (1994, 5). He then remarks on the practice of the Canadian Government addressing economic interests first and foremost in Canada's ODA program: "Projecting fundamental Canadian values through a

poverty-focused aid program and acting on our long term interest in a more just international order are in contrast soft options easily set aside for more immediate, more self-serving interests” (1994, 5). If we consider the counter consensus issues of the most recent review, altruism clearly was set aside as the prime motivation for policy.

David Gillies concludes that “commercial interests have gained increasing salience among the multiple goals of Canadian development assistance” (1987, 29). As evidence, he cites the economic groups’ and Government’s tacit acceptance of export financing as a legitimate objective of the aid program and “the Government’s equivocal and disappointing position on tied aid and export credits” that “mark the limits of any proposed Development Charter” (1987, 29). With a parochial and self-interested approach to multilateral economic and political cooperation, Gillies effectively argues that the traditional image of Canada “as a committed internationalist has become much less credible...” (1987, 30). Gerald Schmitz, in his analysis of Canada’s ODA program, argues as well that “in a sense, ‘value for money’ is put before values” (1996, 289) and that “lowering expectations may be the easiest way to improve opinions of Canada’s aid record, with its undeniable weaknesses, compromises, and mixed motives.”

Pratt's, Gillies', and Schmitz's views are supported by research indicating that the yield on Canadian loans and investments to developing countries amounts to an annual \$4.8 billion (North-South Institute, 1996, 1). There is a great disparity between this yield and the (decreasing) \$2 billion ODA program. It is also discouraging to note that in at least 47 developing countries, more money is spent servicing foreign debt than on education (North-South Institute, 1996, 2). Further, the top recipient of Canadian aid in the year of the review (1994-95) was China, at \$132 million, much of which consisted of heavily-tied infrastructure funding²⁷ (North-South Institute, 1996, 2).

As a result, the cuts made to Canada's ODA program, in conjunction with the movement towards increased bilateral relations with strict aid-trade mechanisms, leave groups that hold an interest in reforming Canada's ODA program with ever-decreasing resources. They are also left with ever-increasing barriers, such as a decline in humanitarian values in both government programs and the population at large. For, as Pratt (1993-94, 121) argues:

²⁷ Presumably, China is not the country that first comes to mind when contrasts to the conditions of several African states are made, especially since, as has been noted, China "takes basic needs such as food, housing, and health care for granted" (Swift, 1991, 99).

If public advocacy of development assistance were now to be based on Canada's long term interests, public support could easily atrophy...There is moreover a close link between domestic social values and the ethical component of foreign policy. If Canada's liberal humanitarian values are not also reflected in Canada's foreign policy, then popular attachment to them domestically will likely itself decline.

What degree of difference is there between this foreign policy review, undertaken during Jean Chrétien's Liberal government, and that undertaken during Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative government? First, this study indicates a change in the government-interest group relationship from the previous review. As an example of a consultative partnership, the 1994 review was an improvement on the Government's part in bringing into the policy-making process more groups and individuals; in fact, roughly two-hundred more parties made representations than in the 1987 review. Further, interest groups and the government appeared to be generally more congruent in their policy objectives during this review in contrast to the last.

However more improved the process in the 1994 review was, though, the policy that resulted was not an improvement on, nor even of the same calibre as that originating in the 1987 review. The comprehensiveness and weight of the 1987 review struck a

resounding note among those involved in development, who were further spurred on by Canada's successes in hastening the demise of Apartheid in South Africa and bringing famine relief to Ethiopia (among other successes). The review of 1994, to the contrary, appears to have served more as a method of legitimizing policy promoting the economic interests of both the state and the dominant class than as a means to meet the needs of developing nations. And yet, if interest groups - especially promotional groups - were silent on some issues and weak on others. how complicit were they? This is an important and troubling question.

This study has sought to first determine the influence of interest groups on development assistance policy in the foreign policy review of 1994 and second. to suggest whether a pluralist, statist, or dominant class theoretical perspective best describes the foreign policy process in Canada.

With an overall high level of congruence (except for the counter consensus issues) among the opinions expressed by all three categories of interest groups, the Committee, and the Government, the impact of any one of the three categories of interest groups is difficult to assess. This said, the expectations of self-interested economic groups appear to have been those most closely met.

Therefore, although there is evidence supporting both the structural dominant class and neopluralist theories, the structural dominant class theory is the more compelling explanation. This conclusion is supported by the consistent gap between the rhetoric and practice in Canada's ODA program, in which one thing is said and another done - the result of pursuing international political goals and commercial interests at the cost of the humanitarian purpose of reducing global poverty and developing the world's human potential.

This study has also demonstrated a striking failure to reform Canada's ODA program in the face of the recommendations of numerous committees and criticisms from both Canada's program and recipient partners. Thus, a real commitment to reform ODA policy and improve its delivery on the Government's part has proven to be true in rhetoric only.

While the circumstances surrounding development assistance policies in the immediate post-World War Two period - a rejection of colonialism as well as increased geopolitical concerns and the expansion of profit motives under the new Bretton-Woods system - have changed somewhat, it is less certain whether the premises underlying those policies in the developed world also changed. There seems little doubt that Canada's ODA program requires a radical rethinking.

Although many hoped effective development programs would have resulted in the end of, or at the least, a dramatic reduction in the debt boomerang, famines, and civil wars that have plagued developing nations, conditions have only worsened. This leaves those who most require development assistance awaiting Canada's leadership towards achieving a more just and humanitarian international order.

APPENDIX A

Sample Codesheet

GROUP NAME/TYPE:				
DATE OF SUBMISSION:				
TITLE OF SUBMISSION:				
LENGTH OF SUBMISSION (#pg):				
HEADQUARTERS:				
WITH COMMITTEE <OR> GOVERNMENT				
ITEM:	CONGR	PAR CON	INCONGR	NOT APP
DEGREE OF FOCUS ON BASIC NEEDS				
FOOD AID				
EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE				
AID AS A % OF GNP				
AID UNTYING				
AID-RIGHTS LINKAGE/DEMOC DEV				
HUMAN RIGHTS & BILATERAL CUTS				
ICHRDD SUPPORT				
WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT				
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT				
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY				
# OF RECIPIENTS				
AREA FOCUS				
DEGREE OF FOCUS ON LDCS				
NON-AID ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS				
DEBT ALLEVATION				
PARALLEL FINANCING				
BUSINESS PROMOTION - EDC/ICB				
LEVEL OF NGO/PARTNER ACTIVITY				
ODA LEGISLATION				

APPENDIX B

Data Tables

CODING TOTALS FOR ALL INTEREST GROUPS				
WITH COMMITTEE:				
ITEM:	CONGR	PAR CON	INCONGR	NOT APP
DEGREE OF FOCUS ON BASIC NEEDS	48	1		
FOOD AID	4			
EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE	12			
AID AS A % OF GNP	24			
AID UNTYING	8		2	
AID-RIGHTS LINKAGE/DEMOC DEV	53			
HUMAN RIGHTS & BILATERAL CUTS	19		2	
ICHRDD SUPPORT	4			
WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT	32			
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT	39	1		
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY	32	1		
# OF RECIPIENTS	4		2	
AREA FOCUS	11		4	
DEGREE OF FOCUS ON LDCS	13	1		
NON-AID ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS	27			
DEBT ALLEVATION	22		1	
PARALLEL FINANCING	9			
BUSINESS PROMOTION - EDC/ICB	12		6	
LEVEL OF NGO/PARTNER ACTIVITY	48			
ODA LEGISLATION	4			

CODING TOTALS FOR ALL INTEREST GROUPS				
WITH GOVERNMENT:				
ITEM:	CONGR	PAR CON	INCONGR	NOT APP
DEGREE OF FOCUS ON BASIC NEEDS	48	1		
FOOD AID				
EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE	12			
AID AS A % OF GNP	24			
AID UNTYING	2		8	
AID-RIGHTS LINKAGE/DEMOC DEV	53			
HUMAN RIGHTS & BILATERAL CUTS	2		19	
ICHRDD SUPPORT	4			
WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT	32			
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT	39	1		
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY	32	1		
# OF RECIPIENTS	2		4	
AREA FOCUS	11		4	
DEGREE OF FOCUS ON LDCS	13	1		
NON-AID ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS	27			
DEBT ALLEVATION	22		1	
PARALLEL FINANCING	9			
BUSINESS PROMOTION - EDC/ICB	6		12	
LEVEL OF NGO/PARTNER ACTIVITY	48			
ODA LEGISLATION			4	

APPENDIX C

LIST OF SUBMISSIONS BY GROUP TYPE

Promotional

- Africa Policy Reference Group (of CCIC)
- Aga Khan Foundation Canada
- Amnesty International (Canada)
- Association québécoise des organismes de coopération internationale
- Canada-Caribbean-Central America Policy Alternatives (CAPA)
- Canadian Co-operative Association
- Canadian Coalition for the Rights of Children
- Canadian Committee for UNIFEM
- Canadian Council for International Cooperation
- Canadian Council of Christian Charities Relief and Development Group
- Canadian Council of Churches
- Canadian Crossroads International
- Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA)
- Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief (CPAR)
- Canadian Red Cross Society
- CARE Canada
- Central America Monitoring Group
- Centre canadien d'étude et de coopération internationale
- Citizens for Public Justice
- Co-development Canada
- Coady International Institute
- CUSO
- Défense des enfants international - Canada francophone
- Development and Peace
- East Timor Network
- Environment and Development Group (of Saskatchewan CIC)
- Forum of International NGOs Based in Canada
- Global Community Centre
- Global Concerns Committee

- Harmony Foundation of Canada
- Inter Pares
- Inter-Church Coalition on Africa
- InterChurch Fund for International Development
- International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD)
- International Development Executives Association
- International Development Research Centre (IDRC)
- International Institute for Sustainable Development
- Jesuit Centre for Social Faith and Justice
- Mennonite Central Committee Canada
- National Council of Women of Canada
- National Forum on Canada's International Relations
- Network on International Human Rights
- NGOs of Guelph
- North-South Institute
- Ontario Council for International Cooperation (OCIC)
- Oxfam Canada
- Partnership Africa Canada
- Primate's World Relief and Development Fund (PWRDF)
- Results Canada
- Save the Children
- South Asia Partnership
- Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility
- World University Service of Canada (WUSC)

Self-Interested Economic Groups

- Association of Consulting Engineers of Canada
- Business Council on National Issues
- Canadian Chamber of Commerce
- Canadian Consortium of Management Schools
- Canadian Exporters' Association
- Canadian Labour Congress
- Canadian Society for International Health
- CESO

- Conference Board of Canada
- Institute of Public Administration of Canada
- Mihaly International Canada Ltd.
- Professionals in Agriculture/Agricultural Institute of Canada
- Project Services International
- Société de développement international Desjardins (caisses populaires et d'économie)

Self-Interested Non-Economic Groups

- Association of African Women for Research and Development
- Eritrean Relief Association in Canada
- Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils
- Relief Association for Southern Sudan
- Serbian National Shield Society of Canada
- Taiwanese-Canadian Association

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VITA AUCTORIS

NAME: Jonathan Matthew Welch Rankine

PLACE OF BIRTH: Oshawa, Ontario, Canada.







YEAR OF BIRTH: 1970

EDUCATION: O'NEILL COLLEGIATE
Sept. 1984 - June 1989
Oshawa, Ontario, Canada.
Ontario Secondary School Diploma

UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO
Sept. 1990 - May 1994
London, Ontario, Canada.
Honours Bachelor of Arts Degree
in Political Science

UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR
Sept. 1995 - April 1997
Windsor, Ontario, Canada.
Master of Arts Degree
in International Relations

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