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New Concepts for Argument Evaluation

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Logics of Reasonable Discussion

In logics of reasonable discussion, arguments are approached as given through a discussion between the opposite parties who try to resolve a conflict of opinion. In formal dialectics (Barth and Krabbe, 1982; Krabbe, 1985a, 1985b, 1986), the rules for reasonable debate are grounded in deductive dialectical validity, originally defined by Lorenzen (1961, 1978) and in accordance with Beth's ways of constructing proofs in logic (Beth, 1962). In that theory, *fallacies* are dialogue moves that do not conform to the dialogue rules. On the other hand, positively evaluated dialogue moves are those that conform to the dialogue rules and lead to a proper closing move (preferably in favor of the party who makes it). These two options of evaluating dialogue moves correspond to the principles of evaluating arguments as either deductively non-valid (fallacious) or deductively valid, in terms of winning strategies (Barth and Krabbe, 1982; 54).

Deductive validity is not the main criterion of reasonableness in the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984, 1992). That theory is pragmatic since it defines argumentation as a complex speech act, in accordance with Austin's (1962) and Searle's (1969) pragma-linguistics. It is dialectical in its providing the rules and norms for the use of the complex speech act of argumentation by the two opposite parties involved in reasonable argumentative discussion. The pragma-dialecticians analyze the traditional fallacies as discussion moves contrary to pragma-dialectical rules and norms. The standard fallacies are classified relative to the stage at which a party makes the incorrect move, the type of the reasoning involved and the role the party has in the discussion (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992). For instance, one type of *ad verecundiam* fallacy, the *ad verecundiam*₂ is based on a move that the Protagonist makes contrary to Rule 2, at the opening stage of a critical discussion. According to Rule 2, the obligation to defend an advanced standpoint, the burden of proof, is on the party whose standpoint has been questioned in the dispute, namely, the Protagonist. The Protagonist commits the *ad verecundiam*₂ when presenting a standpoint as unquestionably acceptable (unable to be reasonably challenged or further defended, when challenged) because of the personal guarantee of an authority (1992; 116-120; 216).

Woods and Walton's pluralistic dialectical framework (1982, 1989) is related to the works of Lorenzen, Hintikka (1979, 1981) Barth and Krabbe (1982), and specially influenced by Hamblin (1970, 1971) and Rescher (1976, 1977). The Woods-Walton framework for analyses of arguments and fallacies encompasses non-classical (many-valued) formal logic, deductive, inductive and plausible reasoning. In their approach, the idea of relative strictness is important: we cannot expect all arguments

to be equally strong and hence evaluated only as sound or unsound. Many of them are relatively good or bad, more or less plausible, depending on their context and purpose.

In his recent works (Walton, 1984, 1987, 1992, 1996, 1997), Walton has introduced principles of argument evaluation that differentiate between three levels of argument strength. In contrast to the *fallacious* (non-reasonable) dialogue moves, in the reasonable dialogue moves, *plausibly weak* or *plausibly strong* arguments are used. But that distinction does not seem precise enough. For fallacies are defined only by referring to the bad *ways of using arguments* (when, for example, the *ad verecundiam* is defined as suppressing the critical questions by a blocking move in a characteristic dialogue). However, the reasonable arguments are defined by referring *both to the good arguments and to the good ways of using them* (to the arguments *both* given in the characteristic logical form *and* presented without blocking the opposite party's right to ask one of the critical questions; see, for instance, Walton, 1997; 252). Consequently, Walton's evaluative concepts switch over two different dimensions of argumentation: the quality of reasoning and the way of using the reasoning in argumentation. Even if transgressing the simple dichotomy *valid/non-valid*, the threefold evaluative concepts are therefore still not adequate to deal with contextual characteristics of argumentation rightly indicated in Walton's works.

Apart from his work on fallacies and other contributions to argumentation theory (for instance, Woods, 1977, 1978, 1993), John Woods has recently claimed that fallacies are an intrinsic aspect of human reasoning. Argumentation analyses should point out the way in which the fallacies play a role in human survival (1992, 1995, with Gabbay, 2003) and consider the possibility of applying such analyses to "intractable disagreements about matters of life and death" (2000a, 2000b).


In showing why the standard definition of fallacies ("arguments that seem to be valid, when they actually are not") is not adequate for analyzing most of the traditional fallacies, logics of reasonable discussion define fallacies as moves contrary to the given system of discussion rules. For example, something is a fallacy because it *blocks the resolution of the initial conflict of opinion*, through such dialogue moves by which one party *suppresses the opposite party's right to make the correct dialogue moves in obtaining the relevant information*.

Continuing a dialogue and neglecting that a fallacy has been committed, may have manipulative advantages for the party that has committed the fallacy. That party has then allegedly succeeded in convincing the opposite party to accept or reject certain point of view. But such a way of winning an argumentative dialogue is not considered as a victory of reasonableness, nor as a resolution of the conflict of opinion; it is rather a consequence of manipulative communication through appealing to the opposite party's psychological features, lack of information and the like.

Krabbe and Walton use *profiles of dialogue*, as logical tools to analyze fallacies. Assuming the theoretical background of a given dialogue model, they use these diagrams to structure argumentative dialogues as tree-branches, representing the regular sequences of dialogue-moves for the Proponent and the Opponent of a given claim. For example, in Walton (1997), the *ad verecundiam* fallacy is approached through the dialectical method of evaluation: the type and the logical form of arguments from expert opinion are defined, the characteristic critical questions are delineated, the appropriate type of dialogue is specified and the evaluative concepts are given to characterize presumptive arguments from expert opinion as *reasonable* (*weak* or *strong*) or *fallacious*. Here is Walton's example of an actual dialogue containing the *ad verecundiam* fallacy:

Respondent: Why A?
 Proponent: Because E asserts that A, and E is an expert.
 Respondent: Is E's assertion based on evidence?
 Proponent: How could you evaluate such evidence? You are not expert in this field of scientific knowledge. (Walton, 1997; 253)

Walton suggests the following profile of dialogue as the tool of the normative model for the actual dialogue exchange.



The three moves that follow the Respondent's critical question represent all *admissible* moves the Proponent may make in such a dialogue-situation, if he wants to advance a reasonable argument from expert opinion. By using the profile of dialogue, we may see that the Proponent in the actual dialogue makes the *ad verecundiam* fallacy, as Walton defines it: instead of making one of the three admissible moves, the Proponent blocks the Respondent's critical question about the evidence the expert used. The Proponent tries to represent the Respondent's question as illegitimate, by appealing to the emotions of modesty the Respondent is expected to feel when the authority of the relevant scientific knowledge is mentioned in the argument. (For profiles of dialogue and fallacy criticism, see also Krabbe, 1992, 1996, 2002b.)

In Walton and Krabbe (1995), many fallacies are characterized as an improper *shift between different types of dialogues*. In so characterizing fallacies, Walton and Krabbe distinguish between different types of dialogues: persuasion dialogue (critical discussion), negotiation, inquiry, deliberation, information-seeking dialogue and eristics. Each of the dialogue types has its characteristic initial situation, different main goals, specific aims of the participants, and particular side benefits. For instance, the initial situation of the persuasion dialogue consists of the conflicting points of view of the parties whose goal is to resolve the conflict by argumentative means, whereas the aim of each participant is to persuade the other party to accept a certain point of view. The characteristic initial situation in a quarrel (a subtype of eristics) is antagonism between the persons involved whose main goal is to reach a provisional accommodation in a relationship, whereas the aims of the parties is striking the other party and/or winning in the eyes of the onlookers (Walton and Krabbe, 1995; 77-79).

The following conversation illustrates what Walton and Krabbe call a *fallacy of bargaining*, based on a dialectical shift from persuasion dialogue to negotiation:

A doctor [tries to convince her patient to] quit both smoking and drinking, giving medical reasons for the recommendation.

Patient: O.K. I'll quit smoking, as long as you allow a glass of wine once in a while (according to Walton and Krabbe, 1995, 104).

If passed unnoticed, the fallacy the patient makes when shifting from persuasion to negotiation may involve the doctor in the discussion of a completely other type. The shift changes the context of conversation so that the patient's (possible) success in reaching the goals of the negotiation (and in avoiding to consider the medical facts) might be presented as an alleged success in reaching the goals of the persuasion dialogue. It might also be claimed that the shift blocks argumentative conflict resolution since the patient does not attempt to analyze logically the doctor's reasons for the advanced claim. In this way, the characterization of fallacies as inappropriate dialogue shifts can be connected with the definitions of fallacies as the dialogue moves that block the conflict resolution.

Walton and Krabbe (1995; 108) define two other types of dialogue shifts related to the explanation of fallacies. *Internal dialogue shifts* are shifts in attitudes, sets of participants, or subjects discussed inside one particular type of dialogue. *Shifts in dialogue flavors* may change quality of a given dialogue. For instance, a quarrel flavor may be introduced in a persuasion dialogue and incline the participants to abandon the rules of persuasive discussion.

In his recent works, Krabbe distinguishes *different levels of logical dialogues* making thus formal dialectics suitable for fallacy criticism. Systems of rules for the *metalogues* are connected to the *object dialogues* (the existing systems of formal dialectics), so as to regulate logically adequate ways of shifting between the latter and the fallacy discussions in the metalogues (Krabbe, 1992, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b).

Transactional Analysis

The theory of transactional analysis (henceforth denoted as TA) originated in the psychotherapeutic practice and theoretical works of the Canadian psychiatrist, Eric Berne (Berne, 1961, 1963, 1966a, 1966b, 1972) and his collaborators and followers (for instance, Steiner, 1974; Dusay, 1972; English, 1971, 1972; Goulding and Goulding, 1976, 1979; Crossman, 1966; Klein, 1980; Clarkson, 1992; James and Contributors, 1977; Stewart, 1996, 2000). Even if TA is mostly about the cure of psychopathological behavior, its theoretical framework is suitable for analyzing well-functioning behavior and communication. Some of its results, I would like to claim, might contribute to further development of the principles for discovering and confronting the logically unacceptable moves in argumentation.

TA approaches the individual in his social surroundings, in which during his growing up he receives different psychophysical stimuli, *strokes*, from the closest caretakers (usually parents). This early *stroke training* forms the individual's personality (dis)ordering, the habits in his time structuring and emotional reacting, as well as the ways of asking for, receiving and giving strokes in the usual transactions during his life.

Personality is in TA structured by the *ego states-model*. It is claimed that through our conscious or preconscious life, we operate from one of the three different ego states: the Parent, the Adult and the Child; and that we continuously switch between them. The ego states may be identified by the *behavioral, social, historical and phenomenological modes of the ego states-diagnosis* (Berne, 1961; 66-69).

An ego state may be described phenomenologically as a coherent system of feelings related to a given subject, and operationally as a set of coherent

behavior patterns; or pragmatically, as a system of feelings which motivates a related set of behavior patterns (Berne, 1961; xvii).

According to Berne (1961), the Child is a set of feelings, attitudes and behavior patterns that exist as relics in the adult person. It is preserved in the exact forms of behavior, emotional reactions, ways of speaking, mannerisms etc. that the person used to express as a child.

[T]his phenomenon has been repeatedly reported in connection with dreams, hypnosis, psychosis, pharmacological intoxicants, and direct electrical stimulation of the temporal cortex. But careful observation carried the hypothesis one step further, to the assumption that such relics can exhibit spontaneous activity in the normal waking state as well (Berne, 1961; 11).

The healthy Child is said to be the best part of a person, the source of enjoying life, being spontaneous, creative, sexual. It also motivates the activities of the Adult so as to receive most of the pleasure from the successful learning and adaptation.

When healthy, the Adult ego state is an autonomous set of feelings, behavior patterns and attitudes adequate for different aspects of the real, external environment. Its function is to regulate learning, adaptation, intelligence skills, and organization of a person, to provide her with responsibility, reliability, sincerity and courage.

The Parent is a set of feelings, behavior patterns and attitudes formed by a person's re-playing the corresponding features of his parents or other authorities. The function of this ego state is to form certain automatic, habitual behavior and a set of rational prohibitive attitudes through which we save time and psychophysical energy. It also provides people with the capacity to help and protect another individual. (For elaborate ego states-model, see Berne, 1961, 1966b; Steiner, 1974; Klein, 1980; Stewart, 2000.)

The ideal of a healthy person is in TA seen as the achieved ability to live and behave as a spontaneous, autonomous and intimate person, able to express each of the ego states through its characteristic and uninhibited feelings and behavior. The Adult is executive and able to adequately include the Child and the Parent in the socially proper transactions. TA initiates changes in psychopathological behavior and provides training in adequate transactions, relative to a particular person and its social surroundings. Some works are about analyzing or TA-counselling of well-functioning people (Berne, 1963; Jongeward and Contributors, 1973; Stewart, 1996, 2000). Four aspects of TA may be distinguished: *structural analysis*, *analysis of transactions*, *analysis of games*, *analysis of scripts*.

The structural analysis approaches human behavior through the ego states' functioning. Psychopathological behavior is explained (by referring to standard classifications) as *contamination* or *exclusion* of a given ego state (characteristic for structural pathology), or the lability of cathexis and the permeability of the boundaries between the ego states (characteristic for functional pathology). (See Berne, 1961, 1966b; Steiner, 1974; James, 1977; Klein, 1980; Stewart, 1996, 2000.)

The analysis of transactions is observation of the ways in which a personality structure functions in communication with the others: Which ego state is most often executive, and in which way? What kind of transactions the person is usually engaged in? Are there some symptomatic shifts between the ego states? Which underlying conflicts are expressed through the transactions? Which manipulative behavior

patterns does the person exemplify? In which manipulative transactions of the other people is the person most easily involved? Consider the following situation:

One day, Camellia, following a previous train of thought, announced that she had told her husband she was not going to have intercourse with him any more and that he could go and find himself some other woman. Rosita asked curiously: "Why did you do that?" Whereupon Camellia burst into tears and replied: "I try so hard and then you criticize me" (Berne, 1961; 88).

After Camellia's reaction, Rosita stays silent, but another women from the group, Holly, jumps in and reassures Camellia that she should not be upset since everyone in the group is on her side and everything will certainly be fine. Berne analyzed these transactions by using the following diagrams.

Diagram 1




Diagram 2




Diagram 3





Diagram 4



The three women's personalities are structured by the ego states, where P stays for the Parent, A for the Adult and C for the Child. On diagram 1, the transactional stimulus comes from Camellia's Adult, who is executive when Camellia describes her decision to the audience. Rosita's Adult is executive in the transactional response, since her question expresses her mature curiosity about the described event. On diagram 2, Rosita's answer is taken as a new transactional stimulus, to which Camellia does not answer by her Adult who would have provided the requested information, as expected by the stimulus. She makes a *shift in her ego state* instead, making her Child executive when reading Rosita's question as an accusation. Camellia's defensive accusation is addressed to Rosita's Parent, and contains an attempt to initiate the corresponding shift in Rosita's ego state.

By refusing to answer to Camellia's Child accusation, Rosita, however, does not accept the invitation to make her Parent executive in the communication. She decides to stay in her Adult, being aware that she has not criticized Camellia. What is

on diagram 2 described as Camellia's response, is on diagram 3 a new transactional stimulus in which Camellia's Child addresses Rosita's Parent. Rosita's silent stimulus to Camellia's Adult is represented by the Adult response on diagram 3. Holly provides the complementary Parent defense of Camellia's Child, which is represented on diagram 4.

On diagrams 1 and 4, we see *complementary transactions*; diagrams 2 and 3 illustrate *crossed transactions* (Berne, 1961, 1966b). A *complementary transaction* may be characterized as one in which: (1) the executive ego state in a transactional response is the ego state addressed by the corresponding transactional stimulus, and (2) the response appeals to the ego state from which the stimulus has been executed. *The transaction is crossed* when: (1) the executive ego state in a transactional response is different from the ego state addressed by the corresponding transactional stimulus, or (2) when the response does not appeal to the ego state executive in the stimulus. Neither complementary nor crossed transactions are good or bad in themselves. They obtain certain meaning and value through aims and achievements of a particular conversation. Manipulative ways of using complementary transactions are analyzed in TA explanation of the games and scripts.

In the *psychological games*, there are one or more *theses* to be defended and players take particular *roles* and make specific *moves* through *complementary ulterior transactions*. By playing the games, the players (usually without awareness) *aim* at obtaining *advantages* (the compulsory satisfaction of the transformed biological, social and psychological needs) (Berne, 1966a, 50-58).

Uterior transactions are those transactions that operate at two different levels: *at the social level*, a transactional stimulus from an ego state of a person is addressed to an ego state of another person, whereas *at the psychological level*, another kind of stimulus is sent and different ego states are involved. The *complementary ulterior transactions* are needed for the successful playing of the games since they do not block the game-communication.

The earliest discovered game of that type, *Why Don't You, Yes But (YDYB)*, is obvious in the next dialogue (following Berne, 1966a):

- White: "My girl friend insists on making her own clothes, but she never succeeds in making anything charming to wear. What shall I do?"
 Black: "Why doesn't she take a course in clothes making?"
 White: "Yes, but she doesn't have time."
 Blue: "Why don't you buy her some books on clothes making?"
 White: "Yes, but she doesn't know how to use them."
 Red: "Why don't you buy her some nice clothes?"
 White: "Yes, but that would cost too much."
 Brown: "Why don't you accept what she does the way she does it?"
 White: "Yes, but the clothes she makes don't look good, you know."


According to Berne,

Since the solutions are, with rare exceptions, rejected, it is apparent that this game must serve some ulterior purpose. YDYB is not played for its ostensible purpose (an Adult quest for information or solutions), but to reassure and gratify the Child. A bare transcript may sound Adult, but in the living tissue it can be observed that White presents [himself] as a Child inadequate to meet the situation; whereupon the others become transformed into sage Parents

anxious to dispense their wisdom for [his] benefit. [...] The game can proceed because at the social level both stimulus and response are Adult to Adult, and at the psychological level they are also complementary, with Parent to Child stimulus ("Why don't you...") eliciting Child to Parent response ("Yes, but..."). The psychological level is usually unconscious on both sides, but the shifts in ego state (Adult to "inadequate" Child on White's part, Adult to "wise" Parent by the others) can often be detected by an alert observer from changes in posture, muscular tone, voice and vocabulary (Berne, 1966a, 117).

Diagram 5 represents Berne's analysis of the game transactions.

Diagram 5



The other elements of the game are omitted here, being beyond the focus of this article. For a complete analysis of YDYG and other games, see Berne, 1966a.

The main goal of the game analysis is raising the awareness of the games a person plays, and of the reasons for playing them, as well as learning to recognize the ways of initiating the games and being involved in the games of the other people. The techniques are developed for recognizing and confronting the game-transactions, and are supported by the parallel training in reaching autonomy, intimacy and spontaneity (for instance, in Berne, 1966a; James, 1977; Clarkson, 1992; Stewart, 1996, 2000).

Another aspect of TA is the analysis of *scripts*. The scripts are life dramas that people in their childhood accept, without awareness, as characterizing their lives, due to the influence of good and bad, directly and indirectly given word, gesture or physical touching messages of the closest caretakers and the other authorities in their child world. The goal of the script analysis is to block out the compulsive behavior patterns resulting from the script decisions, to initiate the change in the corresponding fantasies and to encourage person's free choice of his life's quality (Berne 1961, 1966b; Steiner, 1974; Goulding and Goulding, 1976, 1979; English, 1971, 1972; Klein, 1980; Stewart, 1996, 2000).

For the purpose of this article, the most important results of TA are the successful analyses of the manipulative transactional strategies grounded in the ego states-shifts. The TA decomposing of the ulterior transactions warns us that the achievement of cooperation in argumentative discussion requires still other logical techniques than only those assumed in the logics of reasonable discussion. Even if these other transaction-logical aspects of the argumentative resolution of conflicts of opinion (i.e. the underlying personal conflicts and ulterior transactions involved) are neither explicitly given nor contained in the implicit meanings of the claims or reasons advanced, they are both observable and relevant in persuasive dialogues.

Transactional Analysis and Fallacies

Hamblin (1970) advanced excellent arguments to show why the ideal of validity cannot be the criterion for defining fallacies. His work much influenced the new definitions of the fallacies given in models for reasonable discussion (see the first part of this article). In all of these models, the standard definition of the fallacies, as "arguments that seem to be *valid*, when they actually are not," is rightly abandoned.


Still, in the new definitions of the fallacies, another characteristic of the standard definition, namely, that a logical fallacy is an "argument that *seems to be valid*, when it actually is not," is neglected. Certainly, the ideal of validity should be changed for more adequate criteria of defining the fallacies. But the *appearance* of a bad argument as a good argument is important for adequately approaching the *sophistical* reasoning so characteristic for fallacies (see the classical approach, Aristotle, 1928). We should therefore save the corresponding part of the standard definition and remember that the inappropriate dialogue moves or shifts (which satisfy the common fallacy criteria in the new definitions) are also *presented in a specific way*, namely so that the opposite party in a discussion cannot easily recognize them as improper discussion moves. We may consequently transform the standard definition and claim that a logical fallacy is committed when *an inappropriate dialogue move or shift* is made so as to make it *seem to constitute proper part of the discussion*, whereas it actually does not.

Some results for the logics of reasonable discussion are that (1) the procedures of discovering fallacies should suggest techniques for discovering and confronting the tricky aspects of argumentation that make the wrong moves or shifts *seem as the proper parts of the discussion*; (2) the definitions of fallacies should comprise and distinguish between the aspects of reasoning (the good or bad arguments) and the social aspects (the good or bad ways of using arguments) of argumentation.

I would first try to show how some results of TA might be combined with the new definitions of fallacies so as to improve the logical models of discussion in accordance with task (1). Consider again Walton's example of an *ad verecundiam* fallacy given on page 3. Provided that we accept Walton's (or a similar) definition of this fallacy, we may, following the reasoning advanced above, try to recognize the tricky aspects which may block not only the Respondent's right to make the proper dialectical move, but also his ability to realize that the right is blocked. And here TA comes into play: it may be observed that the improper dialogue moves or shifts in argumentative discussions are usually made through ulterior transactions containing the corresponding shifts in ego states. The manipulative strength of these ulterior transactions is what often *makes the inappropriate dialogue move or shift seem logically adequate when it actually is not*.

In Walton's example of an *ad verecundiam* fallacy, the ulterior transaction contained in the characteristic blocking dialogue move is represented by the following TA diagram:

Diagram 6




At the social level, the Proponent responds to the Respondent's Adult stimulus request for the information by asking an allegedly Adult question about the Respondent's ability to estimate the quality of the evidence requested. At the psychological level, the Proponent's ulterior response contains the ego state shift, which results by his Parental accusation of the Respondent's Child.

There are two options for the next Respondent's move. First, it may be a *complementary ulterior transaction*, when the Parental Proponent's response (taken now as a new stimulus) incites the Respondent's Child to obstruct her own Adult ability to logically consider the obtained response and recognize it as a move that is blocking the dialogue. In such a situation, at the social level, the Respondent's Adult says something like: "Yes, you are right. I'm not an expert in this field and should therefore not challenge but simply accept the opinion of the expert you cited." At the psychological level, the Respondent's Child reacts to the Proponent's Parent stimulus by *feeling modesty and reverence confronted with the authority of the cited expert*, and responds by a message like: "Shame on me, how stupid I am!"

However, the Respondent has a second option: she may initiate a *crossed non-ulterior transaction*. When doing so, she recognizes the Proponent's Parental appeal to the Respondent's Child and refuses the corresponding shift in her ego states: she decides to stay in her Adult who can confront the logically wrong move made by the Proponent. The Respondent's crossed non-ulterior transaction is obvious in her Adult response: "My non-expertise in this field does not mean that the expert opinion you state is unquestionably acceptable. Besides, you didn't answer the question." The following TA diagram represents these two options for the Respondent's move.

Diagram 7



Fallacies and the Evaluative Scale

Let us now consider task (2) formulated on page 9 and relate the suggested definition of fallacies to the techniques for differentiating and evaluating the reasoning and the social aspects of argumentation. In that way, we will approach the static and dynamic aspects of argument evaluation.

In distinguishing between the reasoning and the social aspects, I will rely on some results from Jovičić (2002). In that work, *argumentative strategy* (AR-strategy) is defined as a way in which an argumentative group (AR-group) avails itself both of the reasoning aspects and the social aspects in an argumentative activity with the aim of persuading the audience group (the A-group) to accept the advanced thesis. The evaluative principles are defined *relative to the A-group*, it being assumed that in evaluating an AR-strategy, it is essential to know the audience at which the strategy is aimed. Attempts to specify universal evaluative criteria are, therefore, considered as misguided.

It is further claimed that the *reasoning aspects* of an AR-strategy comprise the theses advanced, the reasons given to support them, and the logical relations between the theses and the reasons. The *social aspects* of the AR-strategy comprise the ways in which the AR-group uses the relevant characteristics of the A-group so as to make the argumentation more attractive for the A-group. Some of these characteristics are the interests of the A-group concerning the AR-strategy, the activity or passivity of the A-group, its knowledge of the reasoning context, and its challenge potential (expressed through the relevance of the A-group's evaluation and the possibility of having an effect on the AR-group).

The evaluative concepts are defined for estimating the AR-strategies: the reasoning aspects may be *acceptable, unacceptable, or both acceptable and unacceptable*. (Note that an evaluation as both acceptable and unacceptable reasoning is not a real contradiction, since each of the contradictory evaluative terms refers to different reasoning aspects of a complex AR-strategy. It is also different from evaluating reasoning as neither acceptable nor unacceptable, since, in contrast to the latter, it does not imply that people are indifferent to the reasoning or do not have enough information to evaluate it, but simply see that there are equally many, equally important reliable as unreliable aspects of the reasoning.) The acceptability means that, in the reasoning of the AR-strategy, the AR-group uses reasons that really support the thesis. The criteria for reasons supporting the thesis should be defined precisely, with respect to the logical relation on which the reasoning relies. For instance, the evaluative criteria for reasoning in which the reasons supporting the theses are opinions of authorities are provided in Jovičić, 2002. Other kinds of reasoning require different criteria.

The social aspects of an AR-strategy may be used in an *effective, ineffective or both effective and ineffective* way. Effectiveness means that the AR-group appeals to the characteristics of the A-group in a way that makes the argumentative activity attractive to the A-group. An example of providing the evaluative criteria for effectiveness may be found in Jovičić, 2003.

Assuming all defined possibilities, the entire AR-strategy may be evaluated, relative to the A-group, by the following combinations of evaluative concepts:

- (1) Acceptable and effective;
- (2) Acceptable, and both effective and ineffective;
- (3) Acceptable but ineffective;

- (4) Both acceptable and unacceptable, and effective;
- (5) Both acceptable and unacceptable, and both effective and ineffective;
- (6) Both acceptable and unacceptable, but ineffective;
- (7) Unacceptable but effective;
- (8) Unacceptable and both effective and ineffective;
- (9) Unacceptable and ineffective,

where evaluations are ordered, so that the first one is the most, the last one the least valuable (whereas the distinction between 3 and 4 is not sharp).

Let us now come back to the suggested definition of fallacies. Being characterized as *inappropriate dialogue moves or shifts made so as to make them seem as proper parts of the discussion*, fallacies are *the unacceptable but effective AR-strategies* (described by point 7 on the scale). The inappropriate dialogue move or shift corresponds to an *unacceptable AR-strategy* (since the reasons provided by the reasoning in such a strategy, as well as by the inappropriate dialogue moves or shifts, either do not support the thesis or are not provided at all). The way of presenting the inappropriate move so as to make it seem as proper part of the discussion corresponds to the *effective appeal to the social aspects* of the AR-strategy.

The manipulative aspects of the unacceptable but effective AR-strategy (reflected in the effective ways of presenting bad reasoning as a good one) turn such a strategy into a fallacy. Fallacy criticism would in that way be distinguished from other kinds of argumentation criticism, which are still available according to the principles of the evaluative scale.

The Static and Dynamic Aspects in Argument Evaluation

By the static aspects in argument evaluation, I mean the fixed elements that have to be taken into account in evaluating many different types of argumentation. In contrast to that, dynamic aspects are adaptive to particular contexts and to different points of view relative to which argumentation is evaluated.

Let us first consider these static and dynamic aspects concerning the present definition of fallacies combined with the suggested evaluative scale. Instead of taking criticism of fallacies as the only way of criticizing bad argumentation (as usual in logics of reasonable discussion, except in Krabbe, 1992, 1996, 2002b), the evaluative scale differentiates between the following three types of criticism:

- (1) *Fallacy confrontation* (confronting the effective ways of presenting wrong dialogue moves or shifts as if they are proper parts of discussion). That type of criticism is aimed at the AR-strategies described by point 7 at the evaluative scale and some aspects of strategies described by points 8, 4 and 5.
- (2) *Criticism of the unacceptable and ineffective AR-strategies* (criticizing untenable theses, unreliable or irrelevant reasons given to support the corresponding theses or/and providing active criticism. For the principles of active criticism, see Krabbe, 1999, 2002b). Criticism of the unacceptable but ineffective AR-strategies is aimed at the AR-strategies described by point 9 at the evaluative scale and at some aspects of the strategies described by points 5, 6 and 8.
- (3) *Criticism of the ineffective but acceptable AR-strategies* (criticizing persuasively ineffective ways of appealing to the characteristics of the A-

group). That type of criticism is aimed at the AR-strategies described by point 3 and at some aspects of the strategies described by points 2, 5 and 6 at the evaluative scale.

The suggested definition of fallacies presupposes a general concept of fallacies and may therefore be seen as static. It allows, however, for dynamic evaluation of fallacies, being suitable for taking into consideration the varying contexts of the fallacy-confrontation. It grants that there are different types of unacceptable reasoning contained in the fallacies, as well as different effective ways of appealing to the social characteristics so as to make the unacceptable reasoning seem to constitute a proper part of discussion. The adequate classifications of such effective appeals and of techniques for confronting them remain to be specified.

As a general conceptual framework, the evaluative scale assumes a *static conceptual net*, comprising for instance the concept of AR-strategies, the reasoning and the social aspects of argumentation, different types of criticism, classification of distinct logical relations between the claims and the reasons, the combinations of the acceptability and the effectiveness as the general evaluative concepts, or the static plausibility ordering between the nine evaluative combinations.

The static conceptual net displays, however, the following dynamic aspects:

- (1) *Ordered plurality of evaluative levels.* The nine evaluative levels at the scale are adequate for estimating the differences in logical strength of argumentation. Dynamic argumentative practice seldom contains only sound or unsound (valid or non-valid, either good or bad) arguments. Accordingly, the scale evaluates argumentation, as Ralph Johnson (2000) puts it, "in a continuum from strong to weak, with various points in between."
- (2) *Context-sensibility.* The concepts of acceptability and effectiveness are suitable for introducing particular evaluative sub-criteria varying with respect to the types of reasons advanced, the specific logical relations between the claims and the reasons, the role certain claims have in the reasoning, and relative to the social characteristics of the pertinent A-groups.
- (3) *A possibility to alternate evaluation relative to different points of view.* The evaluative procedure assumed by the scale acknowledges the fact that one and the same AR-strategy may be evaluated in one way when analyzed by the AR-group, in a rather different way when approached by the A-group.
- (4) *The dynamics of manipulative appeals to the social characteristics.* An effective appeal to the social characteristics may be manipulative or non-manipulative, relative to the reasoning linked with. When combined with an acceptable (or both acceptable and unacceptable) reasoning (as in the AR-strategies described by points 1 and 4 at the scale), the effective appeal is not manipulative. On the contrary, it is an advantage. Nevertheless, when combined with the unacceptable reasoning, the same effective manner of appealing to the social characteristics is manipulative and thus contains a fallacy.
- (5) *Appraisal of the indecisive argumentation.* The evaluative concept of both acceptable and unacceptable (and correspondingly, of both effective and ineffective) AR-strategies allows for evaluating the situations in which there are as many good as bad aspects of the reasoning and/or of the social aspects of the AR-strategies.

Being suitable for taking into account the adequate evaluative sub-components, which may precisely be determined from case to case, the suggested definition of the fallacies and the corresponding evaluative scale provide logical distinctions necessary for estimating dynamics of argumentation.

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